Title: State v. Robinson

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA14-165 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed:  5 August 2014 
 
Keen Lassiter, as Guardian Ad 
Litem for JAKARI BAIZE, a minor, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Johnston County 
No. 11 CVS 3982 
NORTH CAROLINA BAPTIST HOSPITALS, 
INCORPORATED a/k/a NORTH CAROLINA 
BAPTIST HOSPITAL, WAKE FOREST 
UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES, TERRY 
DANIEL, M.D. AND DAYSPRING FAMILY 
MEDICINE ASSOCIATES, PLLC, 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by plaintiff from orders entered 9 September 2013 by 
Judge Thomas H. Lock in Johnston County Superior Court.  Heard 
in the Court of Appeals 21 May 2014. 
 
Pulley, Watson, King & Lischer, P.A., by Charles F. 
Carpenter and Tracy K. Lischer, and Edwards & Edwards, 
L.L.P., by Joseph T. Edwards and Sharron R. Edwards, for 
plaintiff-appellant. 
 
Wilson Helms & Cartledge, LLP, by G. Gray Wilson and Linda 
L. Helms, for defendant-appellees North Carolina Baptist 
Hospitals, 
Incorporated 
a/k/a 
North 
Carolina 
Baptist 
Hospital and Wake Forest University Health Sciences. 
 
Carruthers & Roth, P.A., by Richard L. Vanore, Norman F. 
Klick, Jr., and Robert N. Young, for defendant-appellees 
Terry 
Daniel, 
M.D. 
and 
Dayspring 
Family 
Medicine 
Associates, PLLC. 
 
 
McCULLOUGH, Judge. 
 
 
-2- 
 
 
Plaintiff Keen Lassiter as guardian ad litem for Jakari 
Baize appeals an order granting expert witness fees as costs to 
defendants Terry Daniel, M.D., and Dayspring Family Medicine 
Associates, PLLC, pursuant to section 7A-305 of the North 
Carolina General Statutes.  Based on the reasons stated herein, 
we reverse and remand the orders of the trial court. 
I. 
Background 
On 8 December 2010, Chinatha Clark as guardian ad litem for 
Jakari Baize filed a complaint against defendants North Carolina 
Baptist Hospitals, Incorporated a/k/a North Carolina Baptist 
Hospital, Wake Forest University Health Sciences (collectively 
“defendants Baptist and Wake Forest”), Terry Daniel, M.D., and 
Dayspring 
Family 
Medicine 
Associates, 
PLLC 
(collectively 
“defendants Daniel and Dayspring”) for medical malpractice. 
In February of 2011, defendants filed motions for the court 
to schedule a discovery conference. 
On 6 July 2012, plaintiff Keen Lassiter as guardian ad 
litem for Jakari Baize filed an “Amended Designation of Expert 
Witnesses.” 
Following a hearing held on 13 January 2013, the trial 
court entered a “Discovery Scheduling Order” (“DSO”).  The DSO 
was amended by order entered 4 February 2013.  Plaintiff was 
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ordered to designate, on or before 1 May 2012, all expert 
witnesses intended to be called at trial.  The trial court also 
stated that “[p]laintiff shall make [his] expert witnesses 
available for deposition upon request by any party on or before 
November 15, 2012.” 
Prior to the 15 November 2012 deadline, the following 
witnesses were deposed by defendants:  Kitty B. Carter-Wicker, 
M.D. on 27 July 2012; Thomas Hegyi, M.D. on 3 August 2012; 
Richard Inwood, M.D. on 22 August 2012; Marcus C. Hermansen, and 
M.D. on 25 September 2012. 
On 20 December 2012, plaintiff filed a “Motion to Amend 
Discovery Scheduling Order” seeking an extension of the deadline 
to depose his expert witnesses. 
On 27 December 2012, defendants filed a “Motion to Strike 
and Exclude Certain Expert Witnesses Designated by Plaintiff,” 
arguing that plaintiff had failed to comply with the provisions 
of the DSO.  Defendants argued that plaintiff failed to provide 
dates, prior to the 15 November 2012 deadline, for the 
depositions of the following expert witnesses: Richard C. 
Lussky, M.D.; J.C. Poindexter, Ph.D.; Lois Johnson, M.D.; Ann T. 
Neulicht, M.D.; and Steven Shapiro, M.D.  Defendants asserted 
that they would be prejudiced if the aforementioned expert 
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witnesses were not stricken and precluded from testifying at 
trial. 
Following a hearing held at the 14 January 2013 term of 
Johnston County Superior Court, the trial court entered an 
order, denying plaintiff’s motion to amend the DSO and granting, 
in part, defendants’ motion to strike and exclude certain expert 
witnesses.  Dr. Lussky, Dr. Poindexter, and Dr. Neulicht were 
excluded from testifying as experts; Dr. Shapiro was only 
allowed to testify as a treating physician and not as an expert; 
and Dr. Johnson was to be made available for deposition no later 
than 1 March 2013. 
On 22 July 2013, plaintiff filed a “Notice of Voluntary 
Dismissal 
Without 
Prejudice” 
of 
all 
claims 
against 
all 
defendants. 
On 2 August 2013, defendants Daniel and Dayspring filed a 
motion to tax costs against plaintiff pursuant to section 41(d)1 
of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and sections 7A-
305 and 6-20 of the North Carolina General Statutes.  Defendants 
Daniel and Dayspring alleged that they had “incurred reasonable 
                     
1N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41 (2013), entitled “Voluntary 
dismissal; effect thereof,” provides in subsection (d) the 
following:  “Costs. – A plaintiff who dismisses an action or 
claim under section (a) of this rule shall be taxed with the 
costs of the action unless the action was brought in forma 
pauperis.” 
-5- 
 
 
and 
necessary 
expenses 
for 
stenographic 
and 
videographic 
services, the cost of deposition transcripts, travel expenses of 
defense counsel for depositions and expert witness fees for the 
depositions of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses in the total amount 
of $39,749.60[.]” 
Also on 2 August 2013, defendants Baptist and Wake Forest 
filed a motion to tax costs against plaintiff pursuant to Rule 
41(d) 
of 
the 
North 
Carolina 
Rules 
of 
Civil 
Procedure.  
Defendants Baptists and Wake Forest alleged that they had 
incurred “reasonable and necessary costs in the amount of 
$29,609.80” in the preparation and defense of plaintiff’s 
action. 
Following a hearing held at the 26 August 2013 civil 
session of Johnston County Superior Court, the trial court 
entered orders taxing certain costs against plaintiff on 9 
September 2013.  The trial court denied expenses incurred by 
defendants for video conferencing, stenographic preparation of a 
deposition summary, and room rent which were found to be “not 
reasonable and necessary.”  However, the trial court held as 
follows: 
[defendants] incurred expenses recoverable 
under North Carolina General Statute § 7A-
305 
for 
stenographic 
and 
videographic 
services 
and 
expert 
witness 
fees 
for 
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depositions 
of 
expert 
witnesses 
taken 
pursuant to the provisions of the [DSO] 
entered in this action which the Court 
concludes did not need to be subpoenaed in 
light of the language of the [DSO] and that 
those expenses set forth below were, in the 
Court’s 
discretion, 
reasonable 
and 
necessary[.] 
The trial court ordered $23,799.61 to be taxed as costs against 
plaintiff to be paid to defendants Baptist and Wake Forest and 
$24,738.76 to be taxed as costs against plaintiff to be paid to 
defendants Daniel and Dayspring. 
On 30 September 2013, plaintiff entered notice of appeal 
from these two orders. 
II. 
Standard of Review 
“Whether a trial court has properly interpreted the 
statutory framework applicable to costs is a question of law 
reviewed de novo on appeal.  The reasonableness and necessity of 
costs is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”  Peters v. 
Pennington, 210 N.C. App. 1, 25, 707 S.E.2d 724, 741 (2011) 
(citations omitted). 
III. Discussion 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred 
by granting expert witness fees as costs to defendants pursuant 
to section 7A-305 of the North Carolina General Statutes. 
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-20, 
 
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[i]n actions where allowance of costs is not 
otherwise provided by the General Statutes, 
costs may be allowed in the discretion of 
the court.  Costs awarded by the court are 
subject to the limitations on assessable or 
recoverable costs set forth in G.S. 7A-
305(d), unless specifically provided for 
otherwise in the General Statutes. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-20 (2013) (emphasis added).  N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 7A-305(d)(11) grants the trial court explicit statutory 
authority, to award as discretionary costs, “[r]easonable and 
necessary fees of expert witnesses solely for actual time spent 
providing testimony at trial, deposition, or other proceedings.” 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-305(d)(11) (2013).  In addition, N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 7A-314 provides, inter alia, that 
(a) 
A witness under subpoena . . . shall be 
entitled to receive five dollars ($ 
5.00) per day, or fraction thereof, 
during his attendance[.] 
 
(b) 
A witness entitled to the fee set forth 
in subsection (a) of this section . . . 
shall 
be 
entitled 
to 
receive 
reimbursement for travel expenses . . . 
.  
 
. . . .  
 
(d) 
An expert witness . . . shall receive 
such compensation and allowances as the 
court, 
or 
the 
Judicial 
Standards 
Commission, 
in 
its 
discretion, 
may 
authorize. . . . 
 
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-314(a), (b), and (d) (2013).  “In sum, 
before a trial court may assess expert witness testimony fees as 
costs, the testimony must be (1) reasonable, (2) necessary, and 
(3) given while under subpoena.”  Peters, 210 N.C. App. at 26, 
707 S.E.2d at 741. 
Both plaintiffs and defendants agree that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
7A-305, read in conjunction with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-314, 
limits the trial court’s power to award expert fees as costs 
only when the expert is under subpoena.  However, plaintiff 
argues 
that 
because 
none 
of 
the 
expert 
witnesses 
were 
subpoenaed, the DSO did not modify or waive the requirement of a 
subpoena, 
and 
the 
parties 
did 
not 
waive 
the 
subpoena 
requirement, the trial court erred by granting expert witness 
fees.  On the other hand, defendants contend that the DSO 
eliminated the need to subpoena expert witnesses for deposition. 
Both plaintiff and defendants cite to our holding in 
Jarrell v. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, 206 
N.C. App. 559, 698 S.E.2d 190 (2010), in furtherance of their 
respective arguments.  In Jarrell, the plaintiffs challenged an 
order granting the defendants’ motion for costs, “specifically 
disputing that portion totaling $5,715.40 in costs associated 
with out-of-state expert witnesses.”  Id. at 560, 698 S.E.2d at 
-9- 
 
 
191.  Two expert witnesses were served with subpoenas to 
testify, but the plaintiffs argued that the out-of-state expert 
witnesses appearances at trial were not subject to subpoena 
because the subpoenas served upon them were ineffective to 
compel their attendance.  Id. at 564, 698 S.E.2d at 193.  The 
defendants 
argued 
that 
their 
discovery 
scheduling 
order 
“expressly 
waived 
the 
statutory 
requirement 
that 
expert 
witnesses 
must 
testify 
pursuant 
to 
subpoena 
before 
the 
prevailing party may recover expert fees.”  Id. at 561, 698 
S.E.2d at 191-92.  Our Court reviewed the language of the 
Jarrell discovery scheduling order and directed our attention to 
a paragraph that stated that “[a]ll parties agree that experts 
need not be issued a subpoena either for deposition or for trial 
and waive that requirement of the statute as it may affect the 
recovery of costs.”  Id. at 561, 698 S.E.2d at 192. 
In Jarrell, our Court reiterated the following: 
 
[w]here § 7A-314 specifically authorizes the 
court to tax expert witness fees as costs, 
only 
“witness[es] 
under 
subpoena, 
bound 
over, or recognized” are included.  Read in 
pari 
materia, 
with 
specific 
statutes 
prevailing 
over 
general 
ones, 
§ 
7A-314 
limits 
the 
trial 
court’s 
broader 
discretionary power under § 7A-305(d)(11) to 
award expert fees as costs only when the 
expert is under subpoena. 
 
Id. at 563, 698 S.E.2d at 193. 
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Although our Court agreed with the defendants that the “the 
express terms of the DSO would [have] render[ed] inapplicable 
the statutory provisions detailing recovery of expert witness 
costs,” it did not consider the substance of the defendants’ 
argument for failure to raise it at the trial level.  Id. at 
561-62, 698 S.E.2d at 192.  Our Court ultimately ruled that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the validity of the 
subpoenas served on the non-party expert witnesses.  Id. at 560, 
698 S.E.2d at 191.  In addition, our Court held that because the 
“[p]laintiffs are not entitled to argue that [the expert 
witnesses’] appearance was voluntary in fact, [the] [d]efendants 
have met not only the requirements of § 7A-305(d)(11) but have 
also overcome the hurdle imposed by § 7A-314 ‘that the cost of 
an expert witness cannot be taxed unless the witness has been 
subpoenaed.’”  Id. at 565, 698 S.E.2d at 194. 
Based on a thorough review, we hold that the facts of 
Jarrell are distinguishable from the case sub judice.  In 
Jarrell, the expert witnesses were subpoenaed while the expert 
witnesses at issue here were never issued a subpoena.  Another 
important distinguishing factor is that the discovery scheduling 
order language in Jarrell was explicit in terms of waiving the 
requirement of issuing an expert witness a subpoena in order to 
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recover costs.  Here, the DSO language merely provided that 
“[p]laintiff shall make [his] expert witnesses available for 
deposition upon request by any party on or before November 15, 
2012.”  There was no mention by the parties that the expert 
witnesses at issue did not need to be issued subpoenas for 
deposition or for trial and we do not interpret this DSO 
language as a waiver of the statutory requirements detailing 
recovery of expert witness costs.  Based on the foregoing, we 
hold that the trial court erred by awarding costs for expert 
witnesses when the witnesses were not under subpoena. See Stark 
v. Ford Motor Co., __ N.C. App. __, __, 739 S.E.2d 172, 176 
(2013) (citing Jarrell, Ford Motor Company conceded and our 
Court agreed that the trial court erred in awarding fees for 
expert witnesses incurred while the expert witnesses were not 
under subpoena). 
IV. 
Conclusion 
We reverse the trial court’s 9 September 2013 orders to the 
extent it awarded costs for expert witnesses when the witnesses 
were not under subpoena.  We also remand to the trial court for 
a determination of an award of costs consistent with this 
opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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Judges STEPHENS and STROUD concur.