Title: METZ BEVERAGE COMPANY v. WYOMING BEVERAGES, INC.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

METZ BEVERAGE COMPANY v. WYOMING BEVERAGES, INC.2002 WY 2139 P.3d 1051Case Number: 00-287Decided: 02/07/2002

October Term, A.D. 2001

METZ 
BEVERAGE COMPANY,

a 
Wyoming corporation, 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

v.

WYOMING 
BEVERAGES, INC.,

a 
Wyoming corporation, 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County:

The 
Honorable Terrence L. O'Brien, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

John 
C. Smiley, Stephen C. Peters, and Todd E. Mair of Lindquist & Vennum 
P.L.L.P., Denver, CO.  Argument by 
Mr. Peters.

 Representing 
Appellee:

John 
W. Davis of Worland, WY; and David G. Palmer and Brian L. Duffy of Zevnik, 
Horton, Guibord, McGovern, Palmer & Fognani, L.L.P., Denver, CO.  Argument by Messrs. Davis and 
Palmer.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and VOIGT, JJ., and BROOKS, 
D.J.



BROOKS, 
District Judge. 

[¶1]      This 
case is brought by the appellant, Metz Beverage Company (Metz), against the 
appellee, Wyoming Beverages, Inc. (Wyoming Beverage), alleging the wrongful 
termination of a distributorship contract.  

[¶2]      Metz had 
distributed Pepsi products for approximately 30 years in northeast Wyoming for 
Wyoming Beverage.  In June 1997, 
Wyoming Beverage notified Metz that their long-term business arrangement would 
be terminated effective in October of 1997.  Thereafter, Wyoming Beverage filed a 
declaratory action seeking a resolution of the relation­ship.  Metz filed a counterclaim asserting, 
among other things, breach of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, promissory 
estoppel, and a claim seeking an accounting.

[¶3]      After extensive 
discovery and the filing of voluminous motions, the district court granted 
summary judgment against Metz on Metz's breach of contract, fraud, and unjust 
enrichment claims.  The matter is 
now before this court upon Metz's appeal of the district court's order and 
certification pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54(b).

ISSUE

[¶4]      The issue on 
appeal is straightforward: 

Did the 
District Court have a proper legal and factual basis to grant summary judgment 
against Metz as to Metz's claims of breach of contract, fraud and unjust 
enrichment.

FACTUAL 
BACKGROUND

[¶5]      In 1967, Metz 
began to distribute Pepsi products in northeast Wyoming for Wyoming 
Beverage.  That relationship, which 
continued for 30 years, started as an oral agreement between Forrest Clay of 
Wyoming Beverage and Buster Metz for Metz.  
The relationship and agreement appears to have been profitable and 
amicable for much of the 30 years.

[¶6]      In May of 1996, 
Buster Metz died.  On June 12, 1997, 
Mr. Clay wrote a letter to Dorothy Metz, Buster's widow, 
stating:

We 
believe that our oral agreement is terminable at will and that competitive 
circumstances and business necessities dictate termination of the distribution 
arrangement. . . . 

It is 
our intention to accomplish the transfer to direct distribution on October 1, 
1997[.]

It is 
undisputed that the original agreement made by Mr. Clay and Mr. Metz, in 
addition to being oral, was indefinite in terms of its duration.  In 1990, the parties began discussing a 
written agreement.  The initial 
attempts to reach a written agreement failed apparently as a result of the 
parties' inability to agree as to the proper length of the agreement.  Metz sought an agreement that was 
significantly longer in duration than that proposed by Wyoming Beverage.  

[¶7]      Between 1992 and 
1994, Metz and Wyoming Beverage again tried to negotiate a writ­ten 
contract.  Wyoming Beverage insisted 
on a limited three-year contract with no right of renewal.  Metz continued to seek a longer 
agreement with a provision that any agreement could only be terminated for 
cause.  During the negotiations, 
there was extensive communi­cation and correspondence among Mr. Clay and 
Dorothy and Diana Metz.  Diana Metz, 
Buster's daughter, had become deeply involved in the family business by that 
time.

[¶8]      Mr. Clay, in his 
correspondence with Metz, often expressed dissatisfaction with the performance 
of Metz's obligations under the contract and indicated that the failure to 
correct Metz's performance problems would result in termination of the oral 
agreement.  Ultimately, the parties 
did not reach a written agreement.  
Buster Metz died in 1996.  
Wyoming Beverage terminated the relationship with Metz in October of 
1997, and Wyoming Beverage itself took over direct distribution of the Pepsi 
products in northeast Wyoming.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶9]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate when no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Covington v. W.R. Grace-Conn., Inc., 
952 P.2d 1105, 1106 (Wyo. 1998).  
A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were 
proven, would establish or refute an essential element of a cause of action or a 
defense that the parties have asserted.  
Allmaras v. Mudge, 820 P.2d 533, 535 (Wyo. 1991).  The movant bears the initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment.  If the movant carries his burden, the 
party who is opposing the motion for summary judgment must present specific 
facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists.  Weber v. McCoy, 950 P.2d 548, 551 
(Wyo. 1997).  This court 
evalu­ates the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same 
standards and by using the same materials as the district court employed and 
used.  We examine the record in the 
light most favorable to the party who opposed the motion for summary judgment, 
and we give that party all the favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn 
from the record.  We  accord no deference to the district 
court's decisions on issues of law.  
Marchant v. Cook, 967 P.2d 551, 554 (Wyo. 
1998).

BREACH 
OF CONTRACT CLAIM

[¶10]   It is the position of Wyoming 
Beverage that any contract which existed with Metz was terminable at will by 
either party.  Wyoming Beverage 
asserts that any such contract was unenforceable or limited because of the 
statute of frauds and the fact that the agreement had no specific duration.  Metz, however, contends there was a 
valid enforceable contract that was only terminable for cause and that Wyoming 
Beverage breached its agreement with Metz by simply terminating the contract 
without cause.

A.  The 
Contract

[¶11]   Wyoming Beverage has, at times in 
the record, contested the existence of a contract with Metz.  Wyoming Beverage has instead referred to 
an arrangement or relationship with Metz.  
However, there is no doubt that an agreement of some nature existed 
between the par­ties from 1967 to 1997.  The agreement was acknowledged in 
various pieces of correspon­dence sent by Mr. Clay to Metz.  For example, in a letter to Diana Metz 
dated December 6, 1993, Mr. Clay stated:

If you 
fail to meet these obligations by the dates indicated, the oral 
agreement between Wyoming Beverages and Metz Bever­ages will be 
terminated, effective April 15, 1994.

(Emphasis 
added.)  Similarly, on April 25, 
1994, Mr. Clay wrote to Dorothy Metz:  
"As I mentioned to you then, we have no desire to cancel our oral 
agreement " (emphasis added).  
We, therefore, conclude what the parties have essentially conceded that 
there was a contract between Metz and Wyoming Beverage.

B.  The 
Statute of Frauds

[¶12]   Wyoming Beverage next contends that 
the agreement between the parties was void because it violated the statute of 
frauds.  The parties acknowledge 
that the agreement in question was one for the sale of goods and, therefore, the 
Wyoming statutes incorporating the Uniform Commercial Code at §§ 34.1-2-101 
et seq. apply.

[¶13]   The statute of frauds relating to 
the Uniform Commercial Code is found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-2-201 (LexisNexis 
2001), which provides as follows:

            
(a)  Except as otherwise 
provided in this section a con­tract for the sale of goods for the price of 
five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more is not enforceable by way of action or 
defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for 
sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker.  A writing is not insufficient because it 
omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not 
enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such 
writing.

            
. . .

            
(c)  A contract which does 
not satisfy the requirements of subsection (a) but which is valid in other 
respects is enforceable: 

                        
. . .

            
(ii)  If the party against 
whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in 
court that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable 
under this provision beyond the quan­tity of goods 
admitted[.]

[¶14]   During discovery Mr. Clay testified 
in a deposition as follows: 

Q:  You 
sold him [Metz] all the product he could order. It was that 
simple?

A:  I 
sold him what he ordered that I could sell him, yes.  

Pat 
Reed, one of Wyoming Beverage's managers, also testified as 
follows:

Q:  Metz Beverages was encouraged to order 
however much product it could sell, wasn't it?

A:   Yes.

Q: And 
Wyoming Beverages would supply to Metz Beverage, again, however much product 
Metz would require?

A:   Yes.

From the 
foregoing letters, there is documentary evidence wherein Wyoming Beverage 
admitted that there was an agreement.  
Furthermore, there is evidence in the form of letters, testimony, and a 
30-year ongoing business relationship that Wyoming Beverage would sell to Metz 
all of the Pepsi products that Metz needed to satisfy its customers.  Thus, there is evidence of the agreement 
and that the agreement was a requirements contract.

[¶15]   This court has previously held that 
the Uniform Commercial Code parol evidence rule is intended to liberalize the 
rigidity of the common law.  In 
addition, we noted the Uniform Commercial Code is intended to expand commercial 
practices through custom and usage as well as by agreement between the 
parties.  Century Ready-Mix Co. 
v. Lower & Co., 770 P.2d 692, 697 (Wyo. 1989).  Thus, rigid adherence to the statute of 
frauds is contrary to the phi­losophy of the Uniform Commercial Code, and it 
is this court's policy to sustain a contact whenever possible.  This court will not seek technical 
grounds for defeating a contract.  
Century Ready-Mix, at 697.  
The record reveals, through deposition testimony and other writings, that 
there was ample evidence to create an issue of fact as to any Uniform 
Com­mercial Code statute of frauds defenses raised by Wyoming 
Beverage.

[¶16]   Wyoming Beverage also relies on the 
general statute of frauds, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-23-105 (LexisNexis 2001), which 
states:

            
(a)  In the following cases every agreement shall be void 
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and 
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith:

(i)  Every 
agreement that by its terms is not to be per­formed within one (1) year from 
the making thereof[.]

This 
argument also fails for a number of reasons.  As previously noted, there are in fact 
vari­ous writings acknowledging the existence of the agreement.  The writings need not be made 
contemporaneously with the initial agreement, especially where, as here, the 
agreement was of long duration and the writings occurred during the performance 
of the contract.  Mead v. Leo 
Sheep Co., 32 Wyo. 313, 232 P. 511, 513 (1925); Laramie Printing Trustees 
v. Krueger, 437 P.2d 856   , 859 (Wyo. 1968).

[¶17]   Furthermore, this court has held 
that the general statute of frauds is inapplicable where there has been 
substantial part performance by one party.  
Fowler v Fowler, 933 P.2d 502, 504 (Wyo. 1997).   Clearly, 30 years of performance by 
both parties would appear to satisfy the substantial part performance exception 
to the statute of frauds.

[¶18]   Finally, assuming this was a 
contract with no duration that was either terminable for cause or terminable at 
will, conceptually it could have been performed within one year.  Therefore, it would not fall within the 
statute of frauds.  The purpose of 
the statute of frauds is to prevent the enforcement of alleged promises that 
never were made.  The statute is not 
to be utilized to repudiate promises that in fact were made.  B&W Glass, Inc. v. Weather Shield 
Mfg., Inc., 829 P.2d 809, 816 (Wyo. 1992).  The general Wyoming statute of frauds is 
inap­plicable to this case.

C.  Terms of the Contract

 
[¶19]   Wyoming Beverage contends 
ultimately that if there was an agreement sufficient to withstand the statute of 
frauds, such an agreement was indefinite in duration and could be terminated by 
either party at any time.  In 
support of its contention, Wyoming Beverage relies on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
34.1-2-309 (LexisNexis 2001), which provides:

(b)  Where 
the contract provides for successive perform­ance but is indefinite in 
duration it is valid for a reasonable time but unless otherwise 
agreed may be terminated at any time by either party. 

(Emphasis 
added.)  Metz, not surprisingly, 
asserts that it had been agreed by the parties that the contract would only be 
terminable for cause.  The question, 
then, is whether there was evidence that would permit the fact finder to 
conclude that the parties had otherwise agreed that Metz could only be 
terminated for cause.  In the 
absence of such agreement, the contract was terminable at will pursuant to § 
34.1-2-309.

[¶20]   This court believes that there is 
evidence that the agreement could only be terminated for cause.  It is again found in the correspondence 
among Mr. Clay and Dorothy and Diana Metz.  
On December 6, 1993, Mr. Clay wrote Diana Metz:

Our 
concerns about your sales level and failure to follow proper product rotation 
procedures, have been called to your attention on numerous occasions. 
. . .

. . .

If you 
fail to meet these obligations by the dates indi­cated, the oral agreement 
between Wyoming Beverages and Metz Beverages will be 
terminated. . . .

Similarly, 
on April 7, 1994, Mr. Clay wrote Diana Metz again and 
stated:

If our 
concerns have not been adequately addressed, and if you have not realized your 
marketing goals, we must seriously con­sider our other options, including 
the termination of our existing oral 
agreement. . . .

Again on 
April 25, 1994, Mr. Clay wrote to Dorothy Metz and stated:  "[I]f the problems we have discussed are 
not corrected, then we would have no alternative to terminating the oral 
agreement."  Certainly it appears 
that Mr. Clay was demanding that Metz improve perform­ance or risk having 
the agreement terminated.  A 
reasonable inference from such correspon­dence is that the existing 
agreement could only be terminated for cause.  

[¶21]   There is further evidence that a 
for-cause provision was part of the original agree­ment. The draft 
agreements submitted by Wyoming Beverage to Metz during negotiations for a 
written agreement in 1994 contained provisions for notice and an opportunity to 
cure prior to termination.  A 
reasonable inference to be drawn from such drafts, especially in light of Mr. 
Clay's correspondence to the Metz family, is that the drafts represent a 
formalization of the prior oral agreement.

[¶22]   Additionally, William Metz, the son 
of Buster Metz, filed an affidavit setting forth hearsay statements of Buster 
Metz to the effect that the original agreement between Wyoming Beverage and Metz 
could only be terminated for cause.  
The district court refused to consider such statements as being 
hearsay.  The district court's 
ruling necessarily involves the dead man's statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-102 
(LexisNexis 2001), which provides:

In an 
action or suit by or against a person who from any cause is incapable of 
testifying, or by or against a trustee, executor, administrator, heir or other 
representative of the person incapable of testifying, no judgment or decree 
founded on uncorroborated testimony shall be rendered in favor of a party whose 
interests are adverse to the person incapable of testifying or his trustee, 
executor, administrator, heir or other representative.  In any such action or suit, if the 
adverse party testifies, all entries, memorandum and declarations by the party 
incapable of testifying made while he was capable, rele­vant to the matter 
in issue, may be received in evidence. 

(Emphasis 
added.)  

[¶23]   Wyoming Beverage originally 
submitted testimony from Forrest Clay, which is part of the record, reflecting 
statements made by Buster Metz to Mr. Clay concerning the original 
agreement.  Mr. Clay stated by 
affidavit that Buster Metz had told him that there was no need for a written 
agreement in that:  "If it's not 
good for you, it's not good for me."  
Certainly a reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from Mr. Metz's 
statement to Mr. Clay is that the agreement could be terminated with or without 
cause at any time.

[¶24]   Once the Clay affidavit was 
submitted by Wyoming Beverage, Metz argues that it had the right to submit and 
have the court consider the statements Buster Metz made to his son.  Indeed, § 1-12-102 specifically provides 
that if the adverse party testifies as to statements made by a decedent, all 
declarations by the party incapable of testifying, made while he was capable, 
relevant to the matter at issue may be received in evidence.  Wyoming Beverage asserts, however, that 
the dead man's statute is inapplicable since Buster Metz is not a party and that 
Metz is still a viable corporation.  
Wyoming Beverage points out the dead man's statute specifically pertains 
to parties to an action.  For those 
reasons, Wyoming Beverage argues the hearsay statements of Buster Metz were 
properly excluded.

[¶25]   Wyoming Beverage ignores the 
reality of the situation.  Buster 
Metz was the principal shareholder and operating officer of Metz in 1967 and for 
many years thereafter.  It would be 
unfair to allow statements of Buster Metz to be placed in evidence to be used 
against him and his company and yet not consider statements made by Mr. Metz 
which were offered by Metz.  In the 
particular factual setting of a small family corporation, the dead man's statute 
should be read to allow relevant rebuttal testimony of the principal owner and 
officer of the corpo­ration after that person's death.

[¶26]   In Consolidated Constr., Inc. v. 
Smith, 634 P.2d 902, 904 (Wyo. 1981), we found that the word "person" as 
used in the dead man's statute includes an individual, partnership and 
corporation.  Further, this court 
concluded that the protections afforded by the dead man stat­ute were 
applicable to a partnership within the setting of that case.  Since the term "person" includes 
corporations as well as partnerships, the protections afforded by the Wyoming 
dead man's statute would also apply to a corporation.  Clearly, a corporation can only speak 
through the people operating the business.  
See, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-16-801 and 
17-16-841.

[¶27]   We agree with the court in Mark 
Patterson, Inc. v. Bowie, 661 N.Y.S.2d 709, 712 (1997), which 
held:

[T]he 
purpose behind the "Dean Man's Statute" would be frus­trated "if 
. . . the statute could be avoided by the device of framing a pleading 
in such a way that . . . the claim is asserted only against a 
corporation, the stock of which is owned by the decedent's  executors."

(Quoting 
Matter of Cohen, 137 N.Y.S.2d 300, 308 (1954)).  Therefore, where a plaintiff files an 
affidavit setting forth hearsay statements of a deceased principal shareholder 
and officer of a defendant corporation, the dead man's statute permits 
presentation of rebuttal hearsay statements of the deceased person.  In summary, it would simply be unfair to 
permit the use of statements made by the principal shareholder and operating 
officer of the corporation to be used against the entity and then invoke the 
dead man's statute to prohibit any contrary state­ments that were made by 
that corporate officer.

[¶28]   Wyoming Beverage next argues that 
the district court specifically stated that he did not consider the affidavit of 
Mr. Clay as it pertains to Mr. Clay's conversations with Buster Metz.  Thus, Wyoming Beverage asserts, there is 
no reason to consider Metz's rebuttal affi­davit.  Indeed the trial judge noted that he did 
not consider the affidavits of Mr. Clay in reaching his decision.  However, that is not how W.R.C.P. 56 
operates.  The moving party in a 
summary judgment proceeding files its papers and affidavits in support of 
summary judg­ment, and the responding party files its papers and affidavits 
in opposition.  The district court, 
like the supreme court, must review the entire record that is before it.  Wyoming Ins. Dep't v. Sierra Life 
Ins. Co., 599 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Wyo. 1979).  While the evidence which is relied upon 
to sustain or defeat a summary judgment must be such as would be admissible in 
evidence, Hunter v. Farmers Ins. Group, 554 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Wyo. 1976), 
the trial court cannot decide what portions of the admissible evidence it will 
or will not consider.  It is up to 
the parties to determine which evidence should be presented to the court.  Here, the trial court did not rule that 
the Clay statements were inadmissible.  
Thus, it was an abuse of dis­cretion to exclude the responsive 
affidavit of William Metz.

[¶29]   Finally, as to the breach of 
contract claim, there is no dispute that Metz and Wyoming Beverage had done 
business for 30 years.  During those 
years Wyoming Beverage imposed various requirements on Metz.  Those included the requirement that Metz 
not sell competing products.  
Certainly, the imposition of such a restraint on Metz's operation, taken 
together with the Clay letters or the statements from Buster Metz, might give 
rise to the inference that Metz could only be terminated for cause.  This court believes that there was 
sufficient evi­dence in the record to raise the inference that the parties 
had agreed that their oral contract was only terminable for cause.  In light of that evidence, a jury could 
conclude that Wyoming Beverage breached its agreement with Metz by simply 
terminating the relationship.  We 
must, therefore, hold that the district court was in error when it granted 
summary judgment as to the Metz breach of contract claim.1

FRAUD 
CLAIM

[¶30]   In Marchant v. Cook, 967 P.2d 551, 554 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Jurkovich v. Tomlinson, 905 P.2d 409, 
411 (Wyo. 1995)), we outlined the elements that needed to be proved in a fraud 
claim by stating:

Fraud is 
established when a plaintiff demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that 1) the defendant made a false repre­sentation intended to induce 
action by the plaintiff; 2) the plain­tiff reasonably believed the 
representation to be true; and 3) the plaintiff relied on the false 
representation and suffered damages.

When a 
party who is asserting a fraud claim is confronted with a motion for summary 
judg­ment, that party must present clear, unequivocal and convincing 
evidence to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists.  Laird v. Laird, 597 P.2d 463, 466 
(Wyo. 1979) and McKenney v. Pacific First Federal Savings Bank of Tacoma, 
Washington, 887 P.2d 927, 929 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶31]   Here Metz has not met that 
burden.  In support of its fraud 
claim, Metz points to the April 25, 1994 letter to Dorothy Metz from Forrest 
Clay, quoted above.  Metz contends 
that the following statement in that letter constitutes a factual basis for 
fraud, since, even then, Wyoming Beverage was planning to cancel the parties' 
agreement and take over the Pepsi distributorship:  "As I mentioned to you then, we have no 
desire to cancel our oral agreement with Buster and discontinue dealing with 
Metz Beverages."  However, this 
letter must be placed in the proper context.  It followed letters of December, 
February, June, and earlier in April.  
All of the letters, including the letter of April 25th, unequivocally 
demonstrate that the relationship between Metz and Wyoming Beverage was tenuous 
at best.  It seems clear that Metz 
was being told in a straightforward manner that if performance did not improve, 
the contract would be terminated.

[¶32]   In addition, it is evident from the 
record that Wyoming Beverage was of the opinion, as far as back as the early 
'90s, that the agreement of the parties was terminable at will.  Furthermore, Metz could take no solace 
from the Wyoming statutes, which provided that an oral contract of indefinite 
duration was potentially terminable at will.  The April 25, 1994 letter to Ms. Metz, 
when read in its proper context, said:  
"we have no desire to cancel our oral agreement 
. . . provided your company improves its performance."  (Emphasis added.)  This letter to Metz was written three 
years before the agreement was terminated.  
It expressed only a desire not to cancel an agreement.  Furthermore, it expressed a warning that 
the entire relationship was in jeopardy.  
The letter falls far short of clear and convincing evi­dence of 
fraud.  An expression of mere 
desire, coupled with a warning, cannot, in this circumstance, be deemed to be 
the kind of misrepresentation to give rise to fraud.  This is especially true where the 
ultimate action of Wyoming Beverage did not occur until three years after the 
letter.  

[¶33]   We have held in a promissory 
estoppel setting, where the burden of proof is simply a preponderance of the 
evidence that mere statements of hope are insufficient to justify 
reason­able reliance.  Davis 
v. Davis, 855 P.2d 342, 348 (Wyo. 1993).  Likewise, a claim of fraud mandating 
clear and convincing evidence can fare no better where the claimant is relying 
upon a qualified expression of desire to establish reasonable reliance.  For those reasons, we hold the district 
court's entry of summary judgment as to Metz's fraud claim was 
proper.

UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT

[¶34]   Metz's claim for unjust enrichment 
as it was filed and presented to the district court was to the effect that 
Wyoming Beverage had wrongfully taken over Metz's business in northeast 
Wyoming.  Metz seeks recovery for 
the value of the good will of the business that Metz developed with its 
customers.

            
In its amended counterclaim, Metz alleged that:

Metz 
Beverage built the Pepsi Cola soft drink distribution busi­ness in the five 
counties with its own substantial investments of labor and capital providing 
valuable services to Wyoming Beverages.

. . .

Should 
Wyoming Beverages prevail in its nefarious scheme to usurp the market and the 
business that Metz Beverage has built in the five counties over 30 years, it 
will be unjustly enriched.

Counsel 
for Metz summed up his argument by stating to the district 
court:

[S]urely 
30 years ought to be worth something, and surely we ought to be paid something 
for the Pepsi division. 

[A]ll of 
the good will associated with developing that market over these 30 years goes 
uncalled for without this remedy.

[¶35]   During this appeal Metz attempted, 
to some extent, to incorporate the argument that various tangible assets are 
included within the unjust enrichment claim.  However, it is con­ceded that the 
value of such assets is recoverable under Metz's accounting claim.  It appears to this court that tangible 
assets, if any, are being included in the unjust enrichment claim for the first 
time on appeal. As this court has stated innumerable times, we will not address 
mat­ters that are being raised for the first time on appeal.  Oatts v. Jorgenson, 821 P.2d 108, 
111 (Wyo. 1991).  Therefore, we will 
address the unjust enrichment claim as it was filed and presented to the 
district court, that being a claim for the loss of the good will of the 
business.

[¶36]   We set forth the elements of an 
unjust enrichment claim in Adkins v. Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 131 (Wyo. 
1995), by holding that

a party 
who is seeking damages on the basis of unjust enrich­ment must prove four 
elements: 

(1) Valuable 
services were rendered, or materials furnished,

(2) to 
the party to be charged,

(3) which 
services or materials were accepted, used and enjoyed by the party, and, 

(4) under 
such circumstances which reasonably notified the  party to be charged that the plaintiff, 
in rendering such services or furnishing such materials, expected to be paid by 
the party to be charged.  Without 
such payment, the party would be unjustly enriched.

(Quoting 
Johnson v. Anderson, 768 P.2d 18, 25 (Wyo. 1989)).  Clearly, unjust enrichment claims 
visualize a situation where a party receives something of value without payment, 
which was accepted and used so as to unjustly enrich the recipient of the goods 
or services.  In this case those 
elements cannot be proven.

[¶37]   At the outset, this court would 
note that if Metz prevails on its breach of contract claim, there is no reason 
Metz cannot recover for the loss of the value of its business.  Metz acknowledges that its unjust 
enrichment claim is separate from its claim for breach of con­tract.  The simple truth, however, is that 
without a contract Metz cannot recover for the loss of business.  Without a contract and the right to do 
business, Metz's sub-distributorship would have no value, and Metz would have no 
right to continue to serve northeast Wyoming.  Since Metz would have nothing of value 
it could transfer to another person or entity, Metz cannot prove the first 
element of an unjust enrichment claim.

[¶38]   Similarly, in the absence of an 
enforceable contract, Wyoming Beverage has not been unjustly enriched since it 
already owns the Pepsi distributorship and can do with it as it wants.  Therefore, the last element of an unjust 
enrichment claim could not be proven.  
Sim­ply stated, in order to recover the value of its business, Metz 
must prove that an enforceable contract to continue in business with Wyoming 
Beverage existed.  Without such a 
contract, Metz had no ongoing business with which to enrich anybody, least of 
all Wyoming Bever­age, which in fact owned the distributorship.  Not surprisingly, Metz has not cited any 
law to support an unjust enrichment theory seeking the loss of the good will of 
a business.  The district court 
properly granted summary judgment as to the unjust enrichment claim of 
Metz.

CONCLUSION

[¶39]   We hold that the district court did 
not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of Wyoming Beverage on the 
fraud and unjust enrichment claims.  
However, the district court's entry of summary judgment as to Metz's 
breach of contract claim must be reversed in that material factual issues 
exist.

[¶40]   Reversed in part, and affirmed in 
part.

FOOTNOTES

1The parties in their briefs both 
made much of a piece of correspondence referred to as the "Cannon letter."  During the failed negotiations for a 
written agreement, Metz's attorney, Tom Topel of Billings, Montana, suggested to 
the Metz family that they employ a Wyoming attorney to advise the Metzs of their 
rights under the existing oral agreement.  
The Metzs hired Sheridan attorney Kim Cannon for that purpose.  Mr. Cannon authored a letter on January 
11, 1991, which stated in part:  
      
"Absent a specific time provision, the contract may be terminated by 
either party."  That letter was sent 
to the Metzs' other attorney, Tom Topel.  
During William Metz's deposition in 1998, he waived the attorney-client 
privilege as to confidential communications involving Metz Beverage with Mr. 
Topel relating to Pepsi and the Pepsi business.  The  "Cannon letter" was produced to Wyoming 
Beverage after a motion to compel.  
The district court found there had been a waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege.

This court is of the opinion that 
the waiver by Mr. Metz was sufficient to allow disclosure of the "Cannon 
letter."  Mr. Metz waived 
confidential communications with Mr. Topel relating to Pepsi.  That waiver describes the very essence 
of the "Cannon letter" to Mr. Topel.  
A waiver is the intentional relinquishing of a known right.  Lingle State Bank of Lingle v. 
Podolak, 740 P.2d 392, 396 (Wyo. 1987).  That is exactly what Mr. Metz did.  

The relevancy of the letter is, 
however, another matter.  The 
"Cannon letter" expresses broad ranging legal opinions without the benefit of 
depositions and correspondence that were not yet in existence.  Mr. Cannon's partial paraphrasing of a 
statute, coupled with much qualification and other extraneous legal theorizing, 
is of dubious significance.  In any 
event, we do not believe the "Cannon letter" has any bearing on our conclusion 
that  the Metz breach of contract 
claim should be presented to the jury.