Title: Commonwealth v. Wall

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-09850 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  GREGORY A. WALL. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     May 9, 2014. - September 11, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Gants, Duffly, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Intoxication.  Malice.  Evidence, Intoxication, 
Telephone conversation, Relevancy and materiality, 
Inflammatory evidence, State of mind, Impeachment of 
credibility, Medical record.  Witness, Impeachment.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, State of mind, Assistance 
of counsel, Instructions to jury, Objections to jury 
instructions.  Constitutional Law, Public trial. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 30, 2002. 
 
 
The case was tried before Judith Fabricant, J.; a motion 
for a new trial, filed on November 16, 2009, was heard by her; 
and a second motion for a new trial, filed on January 11, 2013, 
was considered by her. 
 
 
 
Matthew A. Kamholtz for the defendant. 
 
Tracey A. Cusick, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
CORDY, J.  Just before midnight on May 3, 2002, police 
responded to 16 Sumner Street in Quincy after a neighbor 
telephoned to report that she had just witnessed the defendant, 
Gregory A. Wall, moving a trash barrel with a human leg 
protruding from it across their shared backyard.  On arrival, 
the officers observed a trail of red droplets leading to the 
defendant's back door.  Through a window in the door, one of the 
officers observed the legs of someone standing next to a plastic 
bag containing two human feet.  On entering the apartment, the 
officers discovered a horrific scene.  A woman's body had been 
dismembered.  The defendant was found moments later in his 
bedroom closet, his clothes and hands stained with the victim's 
blood.  He would give several explanations to police, generally 
claiming that, after the victim came to his apartment, he passed 
out due to his consumption of alcohol and prescription 
medication (Ativan) and woke up to find the victim dead.  He was 
taken to the Quincy Medical Center for observation, where 
doctors determined that his blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.21 
per cent. 
 
The defendant was charged with murder in the first degree, 
and the Commonwealth proceeded on theories of premeditation, 
3 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder.2  Defense 
counsel, relying on evidence of the defendant's intoxication and 
statements the defendant made to police, alleged that a third 
party -- most likely the victim's boy friend -- entered the 
house and killed the victim while the defendant was unconscious 
due to severe intoxication, and that the defendant merely 
panicked and attempted to clean up the scene after waking up to 
the sight of the aftermath of the murder.  After a six-day 
trial, the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree 
on the theories of premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty. 
 
On appeal, the defendant raises numerous claims of error.  
He contends that the trial judge abused her discretion in 
admitting in evidence recorded telephone calls made on the day 
of the murder between the defendant and his girl friend, Linda 
Reid, who was incarcerated at the time; that a medical record 
containing the preliminary "urine toxicology screen," which 
showed that he tested negative for any drugs, was erroneously 
admitted; that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to 
the admission of the toxicology report and failing to use a 
prior inconsistent statement to impeach Reid on her unfounded 
assertion that there was no Ativan in the house at the time of 
                                                          
 
 
2 The Commonwealth presented evidence that the defendant had 
had sex with the victim and alleged that the murder was 
committed in the course of an uncharged aggravated rape. 
4 
the murder; that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury 
that there is no "legal limit" of intoxication for any purposes 
other than determining whether one is guilty of operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; and that his 
right to a public trial was violated when his uncle was 
prevented from entering the court room during jury empanelment.  
For the reasons stated below, we find no reversible error, and 
discern no basis to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to reduce or reverse the verdict.  As a result, we affirm 
the defendant's conviction. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  
Commonwealth v. Sanna, 424 Mass. 92, 93 (1997). 
 
a.  The murder.  The victim arrived at the Quincy Adams 
Restaurant in Quincy at approximately 1 P.M. on May 3, 2002.  
Catriona Craig, a bartender at the restaurant, had known the 
victim as a customer for two years.  The victim's boy friend, 
Evan Baker, whom Craig also had known for over one year, was 
already in the restaurant playing the game Keno.  The victim sat 
on the other side of the bar from Baker, and the two argued a 
bit without speaking directly to one another, using Craig as an 
intermediary. 
 
At approximately 2 P.M., the defendant entered the 
restaurant and sat with the victim at the bar.  The two sat 
5 
together for the entirety of the defendant's stay and struck up 
a conversation.  Baker never spoke to either the defendant or 
the victim.  The defendant left the bar between 3:30 and 4 P.M., 
the victim left a few minutes later, and Baker left a minute 
after that.  Baker returned ten minutes later, alone, to play 
Keno for another ten minutes before leaving. 
 
The defendant lived at 16 Sumner Street with his girl 
friend, Linda Reid, who had been incarcerated the previous week.  
At 4:30 P.M., Joshua Delong, a resident of 18 Sumner Street, saw 
the defendant return to the building and enter his apartment 
with a woman he would later identify as the victim. 
 
Delong lived with his mother, Shirley Folsom (Shirley), and 
his two brothers.  At the time of the murder, Shirley's sister, 
Donna Hons, and brother-in-law were visiting and staying in the 
apartment across the hall from Shirley's.  That apartment was 
directly above the defendant's apartment. 
 
At approximately 6 P.M., Shirley and her family went out to 
dinner.  When they returned around 9 P.M., members of the family 
heard loud banging noises emanating from the defendant's 
apartment, which occurred continuously until 11 P.M.  Shortly 
thereafter, Hons heard noises coming from outside and looked out 
the window to see the defendant dragging a barrel through the 
back yard.  She watched as he covered the barrel with a blanket 
and tried unsuccessfully to lift it into a nearby shopping cart.  
6 
After watching for a while, she went to get Shirley, who then 
observed the defendant dragging a barrel with a human leg 
protruding from it, prompting her to call the police. 
 
Officers David Levine and John Michael McGovern of the 
Quincy police department responded to the scene at 11:56 P.M.  
They proceeded to the back yard, where they found a pile of 
garbage bags.  After speaking with one of the witnesses, they 
rummaged through the trash barrels in the backyard, finding 
clothing covered in reddish stains.  They also noticed a 
similarly stained shower curtain in a shopping cart near the 
barrels and a trail of droplets of a red substance leading to 
the rear door of the house. 
 
The two officers separated, with Levine staying in the rear 
of the house and McGovern heading to the front.  Levine 
proceeded up to the rear doorway.  Looking downward through a 
window in the rear door,3 he saw what appeared to be two human 
feet sticking out of a plastic shopping bag.  He also saw the 
legs of someone -- presumably the defendant -- standing by the 
feet.  He announced his presence and ordered the door open.  The 
defendant said "hold on," and ran from the room. 
                                                          
 
 
3 Officer Levine described the rear door as "a wooden door 
with a window in the middle with an interior curtain across."  
He was able to look down through the space between the curtain 
and the door to see a small portion of the room. 
7 
 
Levine forced his way into the apartment and went directly 
into the kitchen, where he saw the victim's body in a garbage 
barrel.  She was placed in the barrel head-first, with her legs 
in the air.  Her body had been dismembered, with part of her 
legs cut off.  A blood-stained hacksaw subsequently was found in 
the barrel with the victim. 
 
Meanwhile, Officer McGovern heard a commotion and returned 
to the back of the building in time to see Levine break into the 
apartment.  He radioed for assistance and returned to the front 
door, which he kicked in.  Several officers arrived moments 
later and undertook a search of the apartment.  The defendant 
was found hiding in a bedroom closet with the victim's blood on 
his hands and clothes.4  He was ordered to the floor and 
arrested.  Sergeant Charles E. Santoro immediately read the 
defendant the Miranda warnings, which the defendant indicated he 
understood.  He told Santoro that the person in the barrel was a 
woman, and that he had taken "all kinds of pills." 
 
The medical examiner who performed the victim's autopsy 
testified that the victim suffered through a series of brutal 
injuries before her death.  He determined that there were ten 
lacerations caused by blunt trauma to her head.  Though he could 
not testify as to what caused the trauma, a broken hammer with 
                                                          
 
 
4 Forensic testing confirmed that the blood on his hands and 
clothes was either the victim's blood or a mixture that included 
the victim's blood. 
8 
human hair stuck to it was found in a trash barrel taken from 
the backyard.5  The victim had abrasions on her nose, a black 
eye, and bruises on her arms, hands, and shoulders.  Three 
fingers on her left hand and one on her right hand had been 
pulled off while she was still alive, with one finger on her 
left hand hanging on by the skin.  She also suffered three stab 
wounds to her left abdomen, one of which perforated her small 
intestine.  The medical examiner determined her cause of death 
to be a combination of the blunt head trauma, abdominal stab 
wounds, and traumatic amputation to her fingers.  Postmortem, 
she suffered a ten-inch long, five- to six-inch deep cut to her 
right femur and the total amputation of both legs below the 
knee. 
 
b.  The defendant's statements.  At the booking station, 
the defendant made a telephone call to his mother that Officer 
David Santosuosso was able to overhear.6  He told her that he had 
met a woman earlier in the day, that she had come back to his 
apartment, and that a man may have come back with her.  He said 
that he was either "blacked out" or "whacked out," and told her 
that he was charged with murder.  He later called her again, at 
                                                          
 
 
5 The barrel also contained clothing, a knife, and a human 
finger. 
 
 
6 The defendant told officers that he wished to call his 
mother, although they had no way of confirming the identity of 
the person to whom he actually spoke. 
9 
which point Lieutenant John Sullivan overheard him say, "They 
think I killed her, I don't know how she got there, I just woke 
up and she was there."7 
 
After he was booked, the defendant spoke to several police 
officers and detectives and gave conflicting versions of the 
events leading to the murder.  He told Detective Chris McDermott 
that he met the victim and her boy friend (whose name he could 
not recall) at the Quincy Adams restaurant, invited both of them 
to his apartment, went home alone, and apparently fell asleep.  
He claimed that he woke up to the sound of them arguing in his 
kitchen, and his next memory was being ordered out of the closet 
by police.  When asked what happened to the woman found in his 
apartment, he said that he did not hurt her, but that he "just 
tried to get rid of it." 
 
He told Detective Robert Curtis that he went to the Quincy 
Adams restaurant, had about four beers, and spoke to the victim, 
whom he knew only as Cathy.  He went on to say that he invited 
the victim to his house, went home alone, and that she arrived 
some time later, alone.  He said that her boy friend arrived 
after that, and the three had a friendly interaction.  Later, he 
                                                          
 
 
7 The defendant also told Officer Brian Mahoney while being 
booked that he had taken some Ativan that night.  The 
information was relayed to Lieutenant Sullivan, who decided to 
call an ambulance to get the defendant medical attention.  He 
was taken to the Quincy Medical Center and observed for several 
hours, after which he was returned to the police station at 
approximately 5:30 A.M. 
10 
told Curtis that the victim and her boy friend arrived at his 
house unexpectedly.  But he also stated that he invited the 
victim to his house and told her she could bring her boy friend.  
In the end, he claimed that he did not remember what had 
happened that night, and that he was woken up by the arrival of 
the police.  When Curtis pointed out the inconsistencies in the 
versions of events he had given, the defendant said that he did 
not remember his first two explanations and smiled. 
 
The defendant also spoke to State police Trooper Brian 
Brooks.  The defendant first claimed that he invited the victim 
and her boy friend to his apartment, but then went to his 
apartment alone and fell asleep.  He later recanted and said 
that he had invited only the victim, who took it on herself to 
invite her boy friend.  He went on to state that he and the 
victim had consensual sex,8 that her boy friend came over an hour 
later, and that he fell asleep in his living room while the 
victim and her boy friend talked in the kitchen.  He claimed 
that the next thing he remembered was "waking up seeing the mess 
and the Quincy police at the door." 
 
c.  The defense.  The defendant pursued a third-party 
culprit defense.  His primary theory was that he had been 
                                                          
 
 
8 The defendant initially denied that he had had sex with 
the victim, before eventually admitting to Trooper Brian Brooks 
that he had, a fact that subsequently was confirmed by forensic 
testing. 
11 
unconscious during the murder due to severe intoxication from 
drug and alcohol use, and that another person, likely Baker, 
entered the house and killed the victim while he slept.9  
Although he did not explicitly argue it to the jury, his 
secondary theory was that if he had killed the victim, he was so 
intoxicated as to be unable to form the mental state required 
for murder, as evidenced by defense counsel's request for an 
intoxication instruction. 
 
On July 27, 2005, after a six-day trial and less than one 
day of deliberations, the defendant was convicted of murder in 
the first degree on the theories of premeditation and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  He was sentenced to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole. 
                                                          
 
 
9 In response to this argument, the Commonwealth presented 
evidence that, on May 4, 2002, police seized the pants, socks, 
sneakers, shirt, and cap that Baker was wearing on the night of 
the murder, and that each item tested negative for the presence 
of human blood.  It also called Baker as a witness.  Baker 
testified that he went to the Quincy Adams Restaurant at 
3:30 P.M. to pick the victim up for dinner; that the victim 
returned to the bar shortly after they left together; that he 
returned to the bar several times -- both alone and with his 
mother, Marion Baker (Marion) -- to look for the victim; and 
that he finally went home at around 8:30 P.M.  Both the 
bartender, Catriona Craig, and Marion corroborated Baker's 
account that he returned to the bar several times, with Craig 
testifying that he was at the bar at 8:30 P.M., that he had not 
changed his clothing, and that there was no blood on his 
clothing.  Finally, Marion testified that Baker was home when 
she went to bed around 7 P.M. and woke up at 10 P.M., and that 
she did not hear anyone leave the house in between those times. 
12 
 
The defendant's first motion for a new trial was filed on 
November 16, 2009, and denied on May 27, 2010.  On January 11, 
2013, the defendant filed a second motion for a new trial,10 
alleging for the first time that the court room was closed to 
his uncle during jury empanelment.  The trial judge deemed the 
issue waived in a written decision and order on May 30, 2013, 
and took no action on the defendant's argument.  This is the 
consolidated appeal of the defendant's direct appeal and his 
appeal of the trial judge's denial of both motions for a new 
trial. 
 
We address other salient facts as they arise below. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Recorded telephone conversations.  The 
defendant argues that the judge erred in admitting several 
recorded telephone conversations made on the day of the murder 
between himself and Reid. 
 
Before Reid's testimony, the prosecutor stated an intention 
to play five tape-recorded telephone conversations between Reid 
and the defendant.  These conversations were not being offered 
for the truth of what was said, but only to rebut the 
defendant's contention that he was severely intoxicated to the 
point of unconsciousness around the time of the murder, by 
                                                          
 
 
10 Although the defendant characterizes the motion as a 
supplemental motion for new trial, we consider it to be a second 
motion for new trial, where the defendant advanced three new 
arguments that were not raised in his initial 124-page motion 
for a new trial and memorandum in support thereof. 
13 
allowing the jurors "to hear him, what his voice sounds like."  
Defense counsel strenuously objected, arguing that, although 
"[t]here are no admissions," "[h]e sounds like a lonesome 
lover. . . . I don't think he shows himself in a particularly 
good light."  He went on to contend that Reid "chastises him 
throughout the conversations.  She is chastising him for not 
doing what she wants, for being drunk, for drinking, for doing 
one thing or another."  The judge overruled the defendant's 
objection and allowed the Commonwealth to introduce the 
recordings through Reid. 
 
After the second recording was played, the judge instructed 
the jury that the recordings were admitted only to allow the 
jurors "an opportunity to hear the defendant's voice at the time 
and to evaluate his mental and emotional condition . . . . and 
condition of sobriety at the time of the conversations."11  After 
a recess, defense counsel again objected to their introduction 
and filed a written motion for a mistrial.  He argued that 
"[t]his tape recording has been brought before the jury for one 
                                                          
 
 
11 The prosecutor conceded that the telephone conversations 
contained statements showing that the defendant took a check 
addressed to Reid, cashed it, and spent some of the money on 
alcohol, but explained that there was no way to edit that 
portion of the tape, and the judge instructed the jury not to 
consider the statement for the truth of the matter asserted. 
14 
thing and one thing only, to show what a low life my client is."  
The judge denied the motion.12 
 
Reid testified that the first telephone call was placed at 
approximately 10 A.M. on the day of the murder.  She described 
the defendant as sober and coherent at that time.  The second 
call was placed between noon and 3 P.M.  Reid testified that the 
defendant was drunk at that time.  In this conversation, and 
indeed in the remainder of the conversations, Reid repeatedly 
chastised the defendant for being intoxicated, for failing to 
assist her in her efforts to secure release from prison, and for 
spending her paycheck, which she had earmarked for legal 
services and rent, on alcohol.  The third call was placed after 
6 P.M., the fourth at about 6:45 P.M., and the final call at 
8:45 P.M.  On the last four calls, the defendant sounds 
intoxicated, yet coherent and responsive. 
 
The defendant argues that the recordings should not have 
been admitted, because they amounted to an "assault against 
[his] character, with repeated references to his being a drunk, 
a liar, and a thief."  Because the error is preserved, we review 
for prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 
                                                          
 
 
12 The judge did note that the first recording revealed that 
the defendant was on probation at the time, and offered to 
address the issue with the jury; defense counsel was disinclined 
to bring further attention to the matter, and no curative 
instruction was given. 
15 
353 (1994).  We conclude that the judge did not abuse her 
discretion in allowing the recordings to be played. 
 
Massachusetts law accords relevance a liberal definition.  
Commonwealth v. Sicari, 434 Mass. 732, 750 (2001), cert. denied, 
534 U.S. 1142 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. LaCorte, 373 Mass. 
700, 702 (1977) ("rational tendency to prove an issue in the 
case").  See Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 440 (1978), 
overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Mendes, 406 Mass. 
201 (1989), and cases cited ("renders the desired inference more 
probable than it would be without the evidence").  Relevant 
evidence is admissible as long as the probative value of the 
evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.  Commonwealth v. Keo, 467 Mass. 25, 32 (2014), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Smiley, 431 Mass. 477, 484 (2000).  
"Whether evidence is relevant in any particular instance, and 
whether the probative value of relevant evidence is outweighed 
by its prejudicial effect, are questions within the sound 
discretion of the judge."  Commonwealth v. Marrero, 427 Mass. 
65, 67-68 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Valentin, 420 Mass. 
263, 270 (1995). 
 
The relevance of the first recording -- a call that was 
placed to Reid at approximately 10 A.M. on the morning of the 
murder -- well before the defendant met the victim at the Quincy 
Adams Restaurant -- and in which the defendant was apparently 
16 
sober, may seem marginal.  It is not relevant to his 
consciousness, sobriety, or general state of mind during the 
events leading to the victim's murder.  However, its relevance 
is in establishing a base line for the jury regarding the 
defendant's speech and voice patterns when he is sober, a base 
line that may have been useful to them for comparison purposes 
with the defendant's later calls.  The defendant comes across 
during the conversation as sober, coherent, and devoted to Reid.  
The conversation is amicable, the two do not argue, and Reid 
does not accuse the defendant of lying or stealing.  While the 
call does reveal that the defendant was on probation at the 
time, the jury were not likely to have believed that the 
defendant was guilty of a horrific murder by virtue of being on 
probation for an unknown offense.  In addition, the judge 
offered to give a limiting instruction on the matter, which 
defense counsel declined.  We see no abuse of discretion in 
these circumstances. 
 
The remaining four calls are plainly relevant to show the 
defendant's "mental state at or about the time of the homicide, 
so as to respond to the defendant's contention that he was so 
impaired by alcohol or drugs as to be incapable of forming the 
intent necessary for the crime, as well as his contention that 
he was unconscious when someone else killed the victim." 
17 
 
The second call was placed between noon and 3 P.M., a time 
frame which encompasses his initial meeting with the victim at 
the Quincy Adams Restaurant.  His level of intoxication 
beginning at that time was highly relevant to the Commonwealth's 
theory -- that he was not so intoxicated as to be unable to 
commit the murder or form the required mental state for malice.  
The final three recordings were even more plainly relevant.  
According to Delong, the defendant returned to his apartment 
with the victim at 4:30 P.M., well before the third call was 
placed by Reid at 6 P.M.  Thus, the three calls captured a time 
period where the defendant and the victim were at his apartment, 
a time period where the murder may well have taken place.13  
Combined with Hons's testimony that she heard loud noises coming 
from the defendant's apartment between 8:15 P.M. and 11 P.M.; 
testimony from Hons and Shirley that the defendant was moving 
trash barrels at 11 P.M.; testimony from Kathleen McLaughlin, 
Reid's friend, affirming that she spoke to the defendant on the 
telephone between 8:30 and 8:45 P.M.;14 and testimony from Linda 
Reid's mother stating that she received a telephone call from 
the defendant's apartment at 10:25 P.M., the recordings were 
                                                          
 
 
13 The medical examiner was unable to determine either the 
time of injury or the time of death with any specificity. 
 
 
14 Kathleen McLaughlin testified that the defendant "wasn't 
totally drunk," and that he "wasn't in a bad mood.  He was calm.  
He just didn't sound like someone that had been drinking a lot." 
18 
relevant to show that the defendant's assertion that he was 
unconscious when the murder took place was a fabrication.  They 
also allowed the jury to assess his coherence at the time, in 
order to determine whether he was capable of forming the 
required mental state for malice. 
 
To be sure, the final four recordings do not paint the 
defendant in an especially positive light.  However, they do not 
suggest that the defendant had a propensity for violence of any 
kind, and certainly not the type of violence that would soon 
occur at his apartment.  To the contrary, the picture painted by 
the recordings was largely consistent with defense counsel's 
portrayal of the defendant.  Defense counsel's opening statement 
characterized the defendant as an alcoholic, and described him 
as "a drunk, a whimpering sort of fellow . . . a patsy."  He 
began his closing by asking the jury, "Did you listen to that 
tape with Greg Wall and Ms. Reid?  Did you hear Greg Wall?  Was 
that the sound of a killer or a wimp?"  His strategy at trial 
was to color the defendant as a drunk who was unwittingly caught 
in the middle of a domestic dispute between Baker and the 
victim.  The recordings are more in line with the defendant's 
theory of the case than with an overt suggestion that the 
defendant was a man capable of the violence inflicted on the 
victim. 
19 
 
In any event, any prejudice was cured by the judge's 
extensive instructions to consider the recordings only regarding 
the defendant's mental and emotional state at the time, and her 
instructions to ignore references to the defendant's alleged 
cashing of Reid's paycheck.  See Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 456 
Mass. 182, 195 (2010), citing Commonwealth v. Pope, 406 Mass. 
581, 588 (1990) (jury presumed to have followed judge's 
instructions).  We therefore conclude that, although the judge 
erred in allowing the first recording in evidence, the rest were 
properly admitted, and the probative value of the calls readily 
outweighed any prejudicial effect. 
 
b.  Impeachment of Reid.  The defendant also argues that 
his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Reid 
on her testimony that the defendant did not have Ativan in their 
apartment at the time of the murder.  We disagree. 
 
As noted above, both of the defendant's theories of the 
case rested on the premise that he was severely intoxicated at 
the time of the murder, specifically due to his professed use of 
alcohol and Ativan.  Pursuant to that defense, on cross-
examination, defense counsel elicited testimony from Reid 
suggesting that the defendant was a heavy drinker, and that he 
was severely intoxicated during the final four telephone 
conversations.  Regarding the conversation at 6 P.M., counsel 
asked Reid whether the two spoke about drugs.  She responded 
20 
that "[h]e was looking for Ativan in the house."  She added that 
he used Ativan whenever she "didn't throw them out on him," and 
testified that she often threw them out "[b]ecause he was crazy 
when he was taking them."  She then added, "[t]here was none in 
the house at that time." 
 
The defendant contends, correctly, that Reid could not 
possibly have known with any certainty whether there was any 
Ativan in the house, given that she had been incarcerated since 
April 28.15  He also notes that Reid's testimony directly 
contradicted a statement she made to Dr. Ira K. Packer, a 
psychologist from Bridgewater State Hospital who examined the 
defendant with respect to his criminal responsibility before 
trial.16  According to Dr. Packer's report, which was not in 
evidence, Reid told him that, on the night of the murder, she 
called the defendant at approximately 9 P.M.  Packer noted that 
"[Reid] indicated that he seemed 'buzzed' and reported that he 
                                                          
 
 
15 Although the details of Reid's incarceration are not in 
the record, Detective Robert Curtis testified that both Reid and 
the defendant were placed in protective custody for intoxication 
on April 28, 2002.  He added that, because Reid was on probation 
on an unrelated matter, she was transferred to the Massachusetts 
Correctional Institute at Framingham the next day.  The 
defendant was released. 
 
 
16 The examination of the defendant's criminal 
responsibility was ordered by the judge.  The defendant did not 
pursue a defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or 
defect, and thus Dr. Ira K. Packer did not testify. 
21 
had drunk between six and twelve beers plus having taken some 
pills." 
 
Defense counsel did not impeach Reid with either her 
statement to Dr. Packer or the commonsense notion that she could 
not be sure whether there were pills in the house because she 
had been incarcerated for five days.  Indeed, he did not 
question Reid's statement in any way.  He later affirmed that he 
did not have a strategic reason for his failure to cross-examine 
Reid on the issue. 
 
"Counsel is ineffective where his conduct falls 'below that 
which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer' and 
prejudices the defendant by depriving him 'of an otherwise 
available, substantial ground of defence.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Lavoie, 464 Mass. 83, 89, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2356 (2013), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  
Generally, even on the more favorable standard of review under 
§ 33E, "failure to impeach a witness does not amount to 
ineffective assistance of counsel."  Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 
Mass. 340, 357 (2001).  Commonwealth v. Bart B., 424 Mass. 911, 
916 (1997).  "[A]bsent counsel's failure to pursue some 
obviously powerful form of impeachment available at trial, it is 
speculative to conclude that a different approach to impeachment 
would likely have affected the jury's conclusion."  Fisher, 
supra. 
22 
 
The defendant has failed to meet his burden.  First, the 
jury were informed that Reid was incarcerated at the time of the 
murder, and listened to five telephone calls, each of which 
began with a recorded statement that the call was being placed 
from a correctional institution.  The jury were likely able to 
discern that Reid did not have personal knowledge of the 
presence of Ativan in the house on May 2 without counsel cross-
examining her on the matter. 
 
Second, Reid's testimony does not directly contradict her 
statement to Dr. Packer.  She merely told Dr. Packer that the 
defendant took some "pills," which were not necessarily Ativan.  
Further, the introduction of Dr. Packer's report to refute 
Reid's testimony was fraught with risks, as the record before us 
includes several statements from Reid which would reflect poorly 
on the defendant.17,18 
 
Finally, even if defense counsel's failure to cross-examine 
Reid on the issue fell below the standards expected of an 
                                                          
 
 
17 For example, Reid told Dr. Packer that the defendant 
threatened to kill his landlord by "knocking him in the head, 
cutting him up, and throwing him in the ocean" due to the 
defendant's jealousy over the landlord's interactions with Reid.  
The defendant also allegedly woke her one night and "had an evil 
look and said if [Reid] ever cheated on him he'd beat [her] 
within an inch of [her] life." 
 
 
18 Although the Commonwealth asserts that Dr. Packer 
concluded in his report that the defendant was criminally 
responsible, that portion of the report is not before us.  
However, if the Commonwealth is correct, we cannot say that 
defense counsel erred in opting not to introduce such evidence. 
23 
ordinary, fallible lawyer, the defendant still would not have 
been materially prejudiced.  The weight of the evidence against 
the defendant was overwhelming, where he was seen dragging a 
garbage barrel containing a leg through his back yard and was 
later found hiding in his closet, covered in blood from the 
dismembered body in his kitchen, offering only the defense that 
he had slept through a brutal murder committed by a third party 
and attempted to dispose of the evidence.  Further, the 
defendant offered no expert testimony on the nature or effects 
of Ativan in support of his theory that it contributed to his 
intoxication.  See Commonwealth v. Green, 408 Mass. 48, 50-51 
(1990) (expert testimony required to prove codeine is opium 
derivative).  Thus, there is no reason to believe that the 
jury's verdict was swayed by Reid's plainly unfounded 
speculation that there was no Ativan in the house at the time of 
the murder. 
 
c.  Toxicology report.  The defendant also argues that the 
admission of preliminary negative toxicology results in a 
medical record was improper.  He did not object to the admission 
of the record.  Consequently, we review his claim only to 
determine whether any error created a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 
132, 138 (2007).  While the report was admitted erroneously, we 
24 
find no such likelihood, and thus reject the defendant's 
argument. 
 
In a continuing effort to show the defendant's alleged 
intoxication at the time of the murder, defense counsel asked 
nearly every witness that came into contact with the defendant 
in the hours before and after the crime whether the defendant 
appeared to be intoxicated.  With one exception,19 every witness 
testified either that the witness did not notice whether the 
defendant appeared to be intoxicated or that he did not appear 
to be impaired. 
 
In order to bolster his argument, the defendant moved at 
sidebar to offer the first page of the medical record from his 
stay at the Quincy Medical Center.  The proffered portion of the 
record showed that the defendant's serum alcohol, as measured at 
2 A.M. on May 4, 2002, was 243, which the parties stipulated was 
equivalent to a BAC of 0.21 per cent as measured by a 
breathalyzer.  It also contained a note that there was 
"[a]lcohol on [the defendant's] breath." 
                                                          
 
 
19 Officer John McGovern testified that the defendant 
appeared sober when he was arrested.  However, he would later 
admit on cross-examination that the defendant was "barely 
coherent," "confused," and "not mak[ing] a lot of sense," and 
described his eyes as "bugged out."  No other witness testified 
that the defendant smelled of alcohol or looked or acted 
intoxicated on the night in question, despite defense counsel's 
repeated questions on the matter. 
25 
 
In response to the defendant's proffer, the prosecutor 
said, "I'm going to put in the whole [medical record], so why 
don't we just put the whole thing in?"  Defense counsel did not 
object and the entire medical record, consisting of eleven pages 
including laboratory results, was admitted in evidence. 
 
The defendant's medical record also contained the results 
of a toxicology screen.  Because the defendant self-reported 
that he had taken Ativan pills, a urine test for drugs was 
performed.  The toxicology screen report stated that defendant 
tested negative for benzodiazepines,20 amphetamine, cocaine, 
"tetrahydo," tricyclic antidepressants, barbiturates, and 
opiates.  The report contained a disclaimer, however, noting 
that "[u]rine results are presumptive based only on screening 
methods, and they have not been confirmed by a second 
independent chemical method.  These results should be used only 
by physicians to render diagnosis or treatment or to monitor 
progress of medical conditions."  The medical record also 
contained clinician's notes from an examination of the 
defendant, stating that, "his urine toxicology screen was 
negative for [Ativan]," and another note reading, "Drug screen:  
Negative (including for benzodiazepines)."21 
                                                          
 
 
20 Ativan is a brand name for lorazepam, a benzodiazepine. 
 
26 
 
The defendant now argues that the portions of the record 
pertaining to his negative drug test were not presumptively 
reliable and therefore inadmissible.  We agree that had there 
been an objection, the portion of the records in question would 
not have properly been admitted, but we conclude that there was 
no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arising 
from their admission. 
 
"Records kept by hospitals . . . may be admitted . . . as 
evidence in the courts of the Commonwealth so far as such 
records relate to the treatment and medical history of such 
cases."  G. L. c. 233, § 79.  "[T]he statute allows admission of 
the substantive content of hospital records because of the 
presumption of reliability which attaches to statements relating 
to treatment and medical history in these records."  Bouchie v. 
Murray, 376 Mass. 524, 527-528 (1978).  See Commonwealth v. 
Irene, 462 Mass. 600, 612, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 487 (2012), 
quoting Doyle v. Dong, 412 Mass. 682, 685 (1992) ("we have 
considered the contents of hospital records to be reliable, 
'because the entries relating to treatment and medical history 
are routinely made by those responsible for making accurate 
entries and are relied on in the course of treating patients'").  
Section 79 was enacted "primarily to relieve the physicians and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
21 The drug screen note was on the summary report prepared 
by the treating clinician, just below the results of the serum 
alcohol text. 
27 
nurses of public hospitals from the hardship and inconvenience 
of attending court as witnesses to facts which ordinarily would 
be found recorded in the hospital books."  Commonwealth v. 
Gogan, 389 Mass. 255, 263 (1983), quoting Leonard v. Boston 
Elevated Ry., 234 Mass. 480, 482 (1920). 
 
However, "[t]he statute is not to be interpreted as 
rendering admissible all the contents of hospital records; 
rather the medical records exception statute makes admissible 
only those portions of records relating to treatment and medical 
history which possess the characteristics justifying the 
presumption of reliability."  Bouchie, 376 Mass. at 528.  
Pursuant to the four-part test announced in Bouchie, supra at 
531, in determining whether material contained in a hospital 
record is admissible, we must consider whether:  (1) the 
document is the type of record contemplated by G. L. c. 233, 
§ 79; (2) the information is germane to the patient's treatment 
or medical history; (3) the information was recorded from the 
personal knowledge of the entrant or from a compilation of the 
personal knowledge of those who are under a medical obligation 
to transmit such information; and (4) the statements contained 
in the record are inadmissible as third-party hearsay statements 
not within any exception. 
 
The record here would initially seem to fall well within 
the parameters of the Bouchie test, as there is no doubt that 
28 
the medical personnel obtained and recorded the results of the 
toxicology screen for the purpose of treating the defendant's 
self-reported drug ingestion.  However, the defendant points us 
to two Appeals Court cases concluding that toxicology reports in 
markedly similar circumstances were inadmissible.  In 
Commonwealth v. Lampron, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 340, 344 (2005), a 
preliminary toxicology report was held to be inadmissible where 
it contained a disclaimer indicating that "[p]ositive results of 
screening tests are not confirmed."  The same was true in 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 164, 167-168 (2003), 
where the record indicated that "a second [test] must be used to 
obtain a confirmed analytical result."  In both cases, the 
disclaimers "call[ed] the reliability of the test into 
sufficient question as to create doubt as to whether the record 
alone can stand competent as proof of the medical facts recited 
therein."  Id. at 168. 
 
We conclude that the presumption of reliability that 
attaches to the content of hospital records is defeated where 
the record explicitly indicates that the results of a toxicology 
screen are "presumptive based only on screening methods and have 
not been confirmed by a second independent chemical method."  
The Commonwealth's argument that it could have introduced the 
results of the drug screen through the testimony of uncalled 
medical personnel is unavailing.  The fact that the report 
29 
hypothetically could have been introduced in another way does 
not alter the fact that the medical record as introduced was 
inadmissible hearsay.  We are further unmoved by the fact that 
Lampron and Johnson were cases where the presence of drugs were 
elements of the charged offenses. 
 
Despite the error, the defendant suffered no risk of a 
miscarriage of justice where the weight of the evidence against 
him was overwhelming, and the improper evidence was cumulative 
on the issue of the credibility of his story.22 
 
d.  Intoxication instruction.  The defendant argues that 
the judge erred in instructing the jury that the presumption of 
intoxication present where the charge is operating under the 
influence was inapplicable to this case.  Where the defendant 
objected at trial, we review for prejudicial error.  Flebotte, 
417 Mass. at 353.  Because the instruction was an accurate 
statement of the law, we affirm. 
 
Given that the crux of his defense was an argument that he 
was too intoxicated to have killed the victim, the defendant 
                                                          
 
 
22 The defendant also argues that defense counsel was 
ineffective for agreeing to the introduction of the preliminary 
toxicology report.  For the reasons stated above, counsel could 
not have been ineffective where the admission of the report did 
not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992) (where on 
review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, defendant fails "to show 
. . . that, as to an unpreserved claim of error, there is a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, he would not 
prevail by asserting as to the same issue the ineffectiveness of 
his counsel"). 
30 
elicited a great deal of testimony regarding his BAC, which was 
measured at the hospital as 0.21 per cent.  He asked nearly 
every police officer about their experiences with intoxicated 
drivers and the legal presumption that a person with a BAC of 
0.08 per cent or above is intoxicated for the purposes of the 
statute criminalizing operating a vehicle while intoxicated, 
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).  In closing, defense counsel 
stated: 
"that hospital record you will take a look at, I am sure, 
and you will see that his blood serum alcohol was 243, and 
there is a stipulation which we agree and thus you must 
accept it, that that means [0].21 on a breathalyzer -- and 
you heard a lot of conversations between myself and those 
officers about what 0.08 meant in terms of the need to 
arrest somebody who blows that in a breathalyzer for 
operating under a motor vehicle and legal drunk and the 
rest of it. You know that [0].21 is almost three times 
higher than the legal limit.  You know that he was very 
much under the influence of alcohol." 
 
 
As requested by defense counsel, the judge instructed the 
jury on the issue of intoxication: 
"[Y]ou may consider any credible evidence of the 
defendant's consumption of alcohol or other drugs in 
determining whether the defendant deliberately premeditated 
the killing of the deceased, that is whether the defendant 
thought before he acted and whether the defendant reached 
the decision to kill after reflection at least for a short 
period of time.  You may also consider those circumstances 
. . . in determining whether the defendant intended to kill 
and with respect to the issue of malice for purposes of the 
theory of first degree murder based on extreme atrocity or 
cruelty. . . . You may also consider those circumstances in 
determining whether the defendant acted in a cruel or 
atrocious manner in causing the death of the deceased.  I 
reiterate that whenever the Commonwealth must prove that 
the defendant intended to do something or had knowledge of 
31 
certain facts or circumstances, in order to prove the 
crime, you may consider any evidence of intoxication in 
determining whether the Commonwealth has met its burden of 
proving the defendant's intent or knowledge."  
 
 
Immediately after her instruction on intoxication, the 
judge, sua sponte, gave a limiting instruction: 
"Now, I want to clarify one point.  In this case, you heard 
various references to a legal limit with respect to 
operation of a motor vehicle.  And I want to just clarify 
something on that topic.  In Massachusetts, the law is that 
it is unlawful to operate a motor vehicle with a blood 
alcohol content of .08 or more.  That is what is referred 
to by the legal limit for purposes of operating a motor 
vehicle.  There is no such legal limit for any other 
purpose other than for purposes of operating a motor 
vehicle." 
 
The defendant objected to the instruction, arguing that it 
"diminished the defendant's proof of intoxication." 
 
A trial judge has the duty to state the applicable law 
clearly and correctly.  Commonwealth v. Corcione, 364 Mass. 611, 
618 (1974), and cases cited.  "In assessing the sufficiency of 
the jury instructions, we consider the charge in its entirety, 
to determine the 'probable impact, appraised realistically . . . 
upon the jury's factfinding function.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Batchelder, 407 Mass. 752, 759 (1990), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Richards, 384 Mass. 396, 399-400 (1981). 
 
The defendant does not argue -- and we discern no reason to 
conclude -- that the judge's instructions on the elements of 
murder or intoxication were inaccurate.  Instead, he merely 
argues that the judge's supplemental instruction that the "legal 
32 
limit" for intoxication repeatedly referenced pertained only to 
charges of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence 
was erroneous.  We disagree. 
 
First, the judge's instruction was legally and factually 
accurate.  The only "legal limit" recognized by the Commonwealth 
in the context of criminal conduct is the presumption of 
intoxication when driving an automobile with a BAC of 0.08 per 
cent or above.  The defendant argues that the "legal limit" also 
appears in G. L. c. 111B, § 8 -- the incapacitated person 
statute -- which provides that a person is presumed intoxicated 
if a breathalyzer examination shows his BAC to be 0.1 per cent 
or higher, and that the person shall then "be placed in 
protected custody at a police station or transferred to a 
facility."  Although he is correct, the incapacitated person 
statute is not a criminal statute, and specifically provides 
that a person placed in protected custody "shall not be 
considered to have been arrested or to have been charged with 
any crime."  G. L. c. 111B, § 8.  Thus, the judge's instruction 
was accurate. 
 
The instruction also was not misleading.  Contrary to the 
defendant's argument, the judge did not "dilute both the 
intoxication instruction . . . and the evidence of 
intoxication."  The judge did not suggest that the defendant was 
not intoxicated.  She simply, and correctly, informed the jury 
33 
that the defendant's BAC was not dispositive proof of 
intoxication for the purposes of determining whether he acted 
with malice aforethought, as it would be in a case charging a 
defendant with operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence.  She did not suggest in any way that the defendant 
was not impaired. 
 
Further, the judge's instruction did not preclude the jury 
from concluding that the defendant was severely intoxicated.  
The "effects of liquor upon the mind and actions of men are well 
known to everybody."  Commonwealth v. Taylor, 263 Mass. 356, 362 
(1928).  It was repeatedly put before the jury, by means of a 
stipulation by the parties, that the defendant's BAC was 0.21 
per cent.  Defense counsel ably elicited testimony from several 
police officers opining that, in their experience, the 
defendant's BAC was very high.  In addition, the jury could use 
their common sense to ascertain that, if the defendant's BAC was 
nearly three times higher than the legal limit to drive an 
automobile, he was likely to have been fairly severely 
intoxicated.23  In short, the judge's instruction was accurate 
and appropriate, and was therefore not given in error. 
                                                          
 
 
23 We also note the possibility that the judge gave the 
instruction in response to defense counsel's actions in 
repeatedly referencing 0.08 per cent as the "legal limit" for 
intoxication.  At sidebar during Officer Levine's testimony, the 
judge informed defense counsel that she did not approve of a 
question asking whether Levine was aware that a person with a 
34 
 
e.  Closed court room.  The defendant finally argues that 
his right to a public trial was violated when his uncle was 
allegedly prevented from entering the court room during jury 
empanelment.  We agree with the judge that the issue was waived. 
 
The uncle's exclusion, assuming it occurred, was not raised 
by the defendant at trial.  Nor was it raised in the defendant's 
first motion for new trial filed on November 16, 2009.  In his 
second motion for new trial filed on January 11, 2013 -- almost 
four years after he filed his first motion for new trial, and 
over seven years after his conviction, the defendant alleges 
that his right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution was violated when his uncle was 
barred from the court room during the jury empanelment process.  
In support of his argument, he proffered an affidavit from the 
uncle, in which he alleged that a court officer prevented him 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
0.08 per cent blood alcohol content is presumptively under the 
influence of liquor.  She stated, "there is no presumption of 
under the influence for any purpose other than driving.  This 
defendant wasn't driving a car, so I'm going to ask you to steer 
clear of that sort of thing."  She went on to say:  "It's a 
determination by the Legislature that a person shouldn't drive 
at a certain level.  It has nothing to do with any other 
purposes.  But, in any event, that's a legal matter, not a 
factual matter.  It's not a question to ask a witness about.  
So, I'm going to ask you to steer clear of that."  Given that 
defense counsel continued to broach the subject, the judge 
likely wished to ensure that the jury did not believe that the 
defendant was, as a matter of law, too intoxicated to form the 
intent for murder; an impression to which defense counsel 
contributed. 
35 
from entering the court room while the jury were being 
selected.24 
 
The judge took no action on the defendant's second motion 
for new trial.  She determined that the defendant waived his 
argument by failing to raise the issue in his original motion 
for new trial.  He now appeals from what amounted to the denial 
of his motion for new trial. 
 
The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to the 
jury selection process.  See Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 
Mass. 94, 106 (2010) (citation omitted).  It is well settled 
that the violation of a defendant's right to a public trial is 
structural error requiring reversal.  See United States v. 
Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 263 (2010) (citation omitted); Cohen (No. 
1), supra at 105 (citation omitted).  However, even structural 
error "is subject to the doctrine of waiver."  Id. at 106, 
quoting Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30, 33 n.3 (2000).  A 
defendant need not consent personally to the waiver of his right 
to a public trial; trial counsel may waive the right to a public 
trial as a tactical decision without the defendant's express 
consent.  Lavoie, 464 Mass. at 88-89.  Further, the right to a 
public trial may be procedurally waived whenever a litigant 
fails to make a timely objection to an error.  Commonwealth v. 
                                                          
 
 
24 The defendant also offered an affidavit from defense 
counsel averring that he was not aware of any closure and never 
discussed the issue with the defendant. 
36 
Morganti, 467 Mass. 96, 102 (2014).  A procedural waiver may 
occur where the failure to object is inadvertent.  See id. at 
102 (holding public trial claim waived where counsel failed to 
object to court room closure during jury empanelment despite 
having no tactical reason); Commonwealth v. Alebord, 467 Mass. 
106, 113, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2830 (2014) (same). 
 
Where defense counsel did not object to any alleged court 
room closure at trial, and the defendant failed to raise the 
claim in his first motion for new trial, we conclude the 
defendant's right to a public trial during jury empanelment has 
been waived.  See Morganti, 467 Mass. at 102; Alebord, 467 Mass. 
at 113.  See also Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 641 
(1997), quoting K.B. Smith, Criminal Practice and Procedure 
§§ 2070, 2084 (Supp. 1986) (doctrine of waiver applies equally 
to constitutional claims not properly raised on direct appeal or 
in prior motion for new trial).  "To conclude otherwise would 
tear the fabric of our well-established waiver jurisprudence 
that 'a defendant must raise a claim of error at the first 
available opportunity.'"  Morganti, supra at 102-103, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294 (2002). 
 
Despite the fact that the claim is waived, we still analyze 
the defendant's claim pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
determine whether a closure would subject him to a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Contrary to the 
37 
defendant's assertion that the evidence is "clear and at this 
stage uncontested" that the court room was closed during jury 
empanelment, the record contains no such findings from the trial 
judge, and indeed the record is insufficient to determine 
whether a closure actually took place.  However, we need not 
remand the case for further findings.  Even if we were to assume 
that the court room was closed in the manner alleged by the 
uncle, the closure would not have caused the defendant to suffer 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice because 
there is no "serious doubt whether the result of the trial might 
have been different" had the court room not been closed to the 
defendant's uncle.  Randolph, 438 Mass. at 297, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002), S.C., 444 Mass. 
72 (2005).  See Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 736-737 
(2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2693 (2012); Commonwealth v. 
Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 833 (2001). 
 
f.  General Laws c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
record in accordance with G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to determine 
whether there is any basis to set aside or reduce the verdict of 
murder in the first degree, regardless of whether such grounds 
were raised on appeal.  We find no such reason, and we decline 
to exercise our powers under the statute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.