Title: UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, A UTAH CORPORATION v. LOREN J. RICHARDS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, A UTAH CORPORATION v. LOREN J. RICHARDS1985 WY 82702 P.2d 1272Case Number: 84-188Decided: 07/09/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, A UTAH CORPORATION, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

LOREN J. RICHARDS, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

 
 
Henry F. Bailey, 
Jr., of Loomis, Lazear, Wilson & Pickett, Cheyenne, for appellant.

John E. 
Stanfield; John B. Scott; Michael Sue Kern of Smith, Stanfield & Scott, 
Laramie, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROSE, 
Justice.

Nature of the 
Case

[¶1.]     On March 30, 1982, the 
appellee, Loren J. Richards, suffered a crushing injury to the four fingers of 
his left hand while he was engaged in work for his employer, the Union Pacific 
Railroad Company. The four fingers were amputated, and subsequent operations 
became necessary in order to develop stubs so that the plaintiff might obtain 
some kind of limited finger utilization. These subsequent operations were 
partially successful, but the appellee was left with a badly deformed hand that 
is extremely limited in its usefulness and one which gives him continuous 
discomfort.

[¶2.]     During the course of 
the proceedings, the railroad admitted liability, and the parties proceeded to 
trial on the issue of damages, with the jury returning a general verdict for the 
plaintiff-appellee in the amount of $425,000.

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

Questions Presented Upon 
Appeal

[¶4.]     The appellant describes 
the questions for our consideration as follows:

"1. Whether, in the 
absence of proof of a probability of loss of future earnings, the Court erred in 
instructing the jury on that issue; and as a corollary question, whether the 
Court erred in allowing Plaintiff's economist, Dr. James Evenson, without a 
factual basis therefor, to testify regarding loss of future earnings or earning 
capacity.

"2. Whether, given the 
fact of no actual economic loss and no probability of economic loss in the 
future, the amount of the verdict awarded to Plaintiff was excessive in light of 
all the facts and circumstances of the case."

The issues with 
which we will concern ourselves here are:

1. Did the trial court 
commit error in instructing upon and permitting the jury to consider the issue 
of impairment of earning capacity?

2. Was the verdict 
excessive?

ISSUE NO. 
1

Impairment of Earning 
Capacity (Loss of Future Earnings)

[¶5.]     The trial court in this 
case permitted the jury to consider loss of future earnings as an element of 
damage. Subparagraph (d) of Instruction No. 9 is the only part of any 
instruction relevant to this issue against which objection was lodged, and it is 
here urged that subparagraph (d) permitted the jury to speculate as to whether 
or not plaintiff has suffered impairment of earning 
capacity.

[¶6.]     We cannot agree with 
this contention of the appellant and will affirm the trial court on this 
issue.

[¶7.]     Instruction No. 9 tells 
the jury members that, the defendant having admitted liability, they 
must

"* * * fix the amount of 
money which will reasonably and fairly compensate him for those elements of damage proved by 
the evidence to have been caused by the defendant * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

The instruction 
then says:

"The claimed elements of damage 
are:

* * * * * * 

"(d) Loss of earnings. 
The present cash value of earnings reasonably certain to be lost in the future, 
if any.

* * * * * 
*

"Whether any of these 
elements have been proved is for you to determine." (Emphasis 
added.)

The Expert 
Testimony

[¶8.]     In this case, the 
plaintiff called an economist, Dr. James A. Evenson, to aid in proof of damages. 
Before he testified, the jury was admonished that they could not consider the 
testimony of Dr. Evenson with regard to the actual loss of earnings, but only to 
the possible loss of future earnings. Based upon the economist's testimony and 
other evidence, the trial judge, in his memorandum in support of his order 
overruling the appellant's motion for a new trial, concluded that the jury was 
possessed of such evidence as would permit them, if they chose, to reach the 
following conclusions:

"(1) That the plaintiff's 
future employment with the Union Pacific Railroad Company was subject to 
termination upon any number of contingencies, including possible change of 
supervisors, change of employment policy by the board of directors, or his 
voluntarily seeking a new career and abandoning his present 
occupation;

"(2) That the plaintiff, 
after either an involuntary or voluntary termination of his employment with the 
Union Pacific Railroad Company would be impaired in his employability to certain 
specific percentages as compared with other male workmen of similar education, 
background and training who were not disabled by loss of four fingers on the 
left hand as plaintiff was and is; specific findings as to the present and past 
earnings of the defendant were available to the jury to be used as guides in the 
application, if they choose to make such findings, of the percentages set forth 
in the preceding finding numbered (2)."

[¶9.]     We have carefully 
reviewed the law of impaired earning capacity and the record in the case at bar, 
and find that these conclusions of the trial judge are sound and accurate. We 
further find that this evidence is sufficient, together with the economist's 
explanation of the method utilized to reach his conclusions, to withstand 
appellant's charge that the court erred in instructing on the loss of future 
earnings.

[¶10.]  The appellant argues that where the 
injury is shown to be permanent but there is no proof of actual loss of 
earnings, it is error to admit evidence of impaired earning capacity. We cannot 
agree. In this connection, the railroad argues that the trial court may not 
speculate about whether the appellant will lose his job with the Union Pacific 
Railroad Company thereby being forced to compete upon the open market for 
employment, and that the condition of the evidence is that so long as he works 
for the railroad he will not suffer impaired earning 
capacity.

[¶11.]  Appellant's argument on this issue is not 
viable, because impairment of earning capacity does not depend upon proof of 
loss of earnings. In light of the appellant's contentions on this issue, 
attention is called to Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 88, 99-100, where it is 
said:

"Since impairment of 
earning capacity does not depend on loss of earnings, it has been held that in 
order to recover for impairment of earning capacity in an action for personal 
injuries it is not necessary to show loss of earnings or the difference between 
earnings, if any, before and after injury. * * *

"* * * [P]roof that 
earnings increased or remained the same between the time of injury and the time 
of trial does not necessarily bar a recovery for impairment of earning capacity, 
since increased earnings may be quite compatible with impairment of earning 
capacity."

It was, thus, 
not necessary that plaintiff be able to prove that he had in fact lost earnings 
before testimony could properly be received to the effect that his earning 
capacity had been diminished. In fact, it is not necessary to the proof of 
diminished earning capacity that an injured plaintiff show that he or she has ever competed in the workplace. We have 
held in Fox v. Fox, 75 Wyo. 390, 296 P.2d 252, 261 (1956), when considering a woman's right to recover under the 
married woman's statutes, that a person's impairment of her capacity to labor 
may be considered as an element of damage in an action for personal 
injuries

"`* * * even though there 
is no proof that she ever had earned any money, or ever had done any work, and 
whether or not it appears that she had used her earnings in support of her 
family.'" Quoting from 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 401(2)(c), p. 
893.

This 
pronouncement represents the general rule of damage pertaining to recovery for 
impaired earning capacity, absent proof of actual loss of earnings, and it is 
just as applicable in the case at bar as it was in Fox v. Fox, supra. This is also the rule 
announced in 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages § 92, where the text says that one element of 
damage for impairment of the plaintiff's earning ability is the decrease in his 
earning capacity. The encyclopedia goes on to say:

"* * * This is a recovery 
for injury to the capacity to earn 
and not for the plaintiff's loss in earnings; thus, an unemployed plaintiff can 
be compensated for this element even though he can show no specific loss of 
earnings." (Emphasis added.)

Therefore, any 
contention which the appellant makes to the effect that the trial court erred in 
permitting the introduction of evidence upon the plaintiff's impaired earning 
capacity, absent proof of loss of earnings, does not find support in law. For 
further and more detailed authority see Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 88, supra; 22 
Am.Jur.2d, Damages § 89, pp. 130-132.

Sufficiency of the 
Evidence On the Issue of Impaired Earning Capacity

[¶12.]  In reaching his decision on a motion for 
new trial, the district judge quoted approvingly from Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d at 
97:

"* * * Although the 
evidence need not show conclusively or with absolute certainty that earning 
capacity has been impaired, mere conjecture or speculation does not warrant an 
award of damages therefor in personal injury actions. All damages, however, are 
subject to some uncertainties and contingencies, especially those that seek to 
compensate for future injuries. Accordingly, most courts hold that * * * 
impairment of earning capacity must be shown with reasonable certainty or 
reasonable probability, and there must be evidence which will permit the jury to 
arrive at a pecuniary value of the loss."

[¶13.]  Given this rule - with which we agree - 
it was sufficient for the economist to testify - as he did - that, in reaching a 
conclusion that appellee, who was possessed of a work and earnings history when 
he was injured, had suffered a 42.28 percent loss of earning capacity, he had 
considered the following factors:

(1) The time frame - 
i.e., when the injury occurs with reference to how long the subject has worked; 
when the injury takes place; the time of trial; and the plaintiff's life 
expectancy.

(2) The type of loss 
encountered.

(3) The plaintiff's 
actual earning capacity before injury.

(4) Earning capacity 
following injury - i.e., what would an individual with the plaintiff's injury, 
given his training and his physical, mental and educational capacity, be 
expected to earn on the competitive market in case of voluntary or involuntary 
discharge?

(5) Loss of fringe 
benefits.

[¶14.]  In calculating anticipated diminished 
earning capacity following injury, the economist testified that, if the 
plaintiff were to remain with the Union Pacific Railroad Company, and was 
capable of doing his assigned tasks, he would suffer no diminished earning 
capacity.1 He explained, however, that if the 
plaintiff were, for whatever reason, forced to compete for employment upon the 
open market, his earning capacity would be substantially diminished. In one 
example, the doctor testified to tables from the Public Health Service which 
showed that the employment rate for the nondisabled, married male, into which 
category the plaintiff fits, was, at the time he testified, 94.4 percent, while 
the employment figure for the same category of individuals with similar 
disabilities as those suffered by the appellee was 73.8 percent. He testified 
that there was 29.38 percent more unemployed disabled individuals in the 
plaintiff's work-age and educational category than those who were not disabled. 
Combining these figures, the expert expressed the opinion that the plaintiff had 
a 42.28 percent loss-of-earning capacity over his work-life 
expectancy.

[¶15.]  The economist then calculated the income 
that plaintiff would receive from the Union Pacific Railroad Company in the work 
year of his injury to be $29,552, and testified that, assuming he were competing 
upon the open labor market, this annual income figure could be expected to be 
reduced by 42.28 percent to $17,057, resulting in an anticipated yearly loss of 
$12,495. The economist then reduced the yearly loss to present value, multiplied 
by the plaintiff's work-life expectancy, to reach the anticipated lost earning 
capacity figure of $290,928. Dr. Evenson then explained that the record revealed 
that the employee's fringe benefits cost the railroad 28.55 percent of the 
worker's salary, so that in order to arrive at a loss-of-fringe-benefits figure, 
all that need be done was to calculate 28.55 percent of the present-earnings 
loss. When reduced to present value, the witness arrived at a fringe-benefit 
loss of $82,914 for the plaintiff's work-life expectancy.

[¶16.]  It was, then, the expert's opinion that, 
according to this method of calculation, the employee would suffer a wage and 
fringe-benefit loss of $373,842.

[¶17.]  The witness described yet another 
approach which he designated as the "loss in interest approach," which assumed 
high interest rates and a low growth rate, explaining that most economists 
utilize this approach to reach a diminished-capacity fringe benefit reduced to 
present-value figure. Dr. Evenson explained that the utilization of this 
approach would indicate a diminished-capacity loss figure of $404,750 over the 
work-life expectancy of the plaintiff, and the fringe-benefit loss would be the 
same as in the prior example, giving a total loss of 
$520,104.

[¶18.]  Based upon his testimony, inquiry and 
expertise, the witness was asked for his opinion as to the diminished earning 
capacity and fringe benefits, and expressed the judgment that the loss, reduced 
to present value over the work-life span of the appellee, would be between 
$450,000 and $500,000.

[¶19.]  In view of the majority rule of law which 
holds that, in order to establish impairment of earning capacity, it is not 
necessary to prove loss of earnings, we hold that no error was committed in 
permitting the jury to hear the testimony of Dr. Evenson under the trial court's 
admonition, and we find that the controversial Instruction No. 9, subparagraph 
(d) was properly submitted.

The Plaintiff's 
Testimony

[¶20.]  In settling this issue, we are also 
mindful of the rule which holds that

"* * * the appearance of 
the plaintiff on the stand and his testimony as to the nature of his injuries 
and their duration are sufficient to take the question of impaired earning 
capacity to the jury in personal injury actions." Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d at 101, 
citing 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages § 314.

[¶21.]  In the trial of this case, the plaintiff 
testified, and the jury was shown his deformed hand and saw pictures of the hand 
after injury and operation. Mr. Richardson testified in detail concerning his 
training, his qualifications for other types of employment, his skills, 
employment obligations, the nature of his work with the Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, and the problems that his deformed hand presented in the course of his 
discharging his employment obligations. The jury also heard testimony concerning 
the emotional trauma that he had suffered and was suffering, as well as the 
plaintiff's testimony pertaining to his past and present pain and suffering. 
Supporting this testimony of the plaintiff was the testimony of a psychiatrist 
and an attending medical doctor. From this evidence, the jury could believe, if 
they chose, that the plaintiff had suffered substantial diminished earning 
capacity, and the plaintiff's testimony alone was sufficient to take this damage 
element to the jury for its consideration.

[¶22.]  Given the testimony of the expert 
witness, the plaintiff and the doctors, we hold that there was sufficient 
evidence on the issue of diminished earning capacity for this element of damage 
to be submitted to the jury's consideration.

ISSUE NO. 
2

Was the Verdict 
Excessive?

[¶23.]  In view of our holding concerning Issue 
No. 1, we disregard the predicatory language found in appellant's identification 
of Issue No. 2, and address the simple question which 
asks:

"[Was] the amount of the 
verdict awarded to Plaintiff * * * excessive in light of all the facts and 
circumstances of the case"?

[¶24.]  In responding to the charge that a jury's 
verdict is excessive, we are bound by these following guidelines. Before a jury 
verdict will be set aside, it must appear to be so excessive as to denote 
passion, prejudice, bias or some erroneous basis. State Highway Commission v. Peters, 
Wyo., 416 P.2d 390 (1966); Fitzsimonds v. Cogswell, Wyo., 
405 P.2d 785 (1965); Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Like, 
Wyo., 381 P.2d 70 (1963).

[¶25.]  Speaking to the excessiveness issue 
concerning a compensatory award in Town 
of Jackson v. Shaw, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1246, 1251-1252 (1977), we 
said:

"* * * Where law thus 
provides no specific measure for quantifying damages, the amount to be awarded 
rests almost totally within the discretion of the jury, and courts, both trial 
and appellate, are reluctant to interfere with that decision unless by its 
excessiveness or inadequacy the award carries with it an implication of passion, 
prejudice or bias or the result of some erroneous basis. 22 Am.Jur.2d (Damages) 
§ 366, pp. 472-474; 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment § 68, pp. 780-783. This is the 
standard for use generally in Wyoming, Booth v. Hackney, Wyo. 1973, 516 P.2d 180; Holly Sugar Corporation v. Perez, 
Wyo. 1973, 508 P.2d 595, and is the standard which we must here use. We 
cannot set aside an award of damages merely because we might consider it 
excessive; there must be more basis than that. State Highway Commission v. Peters, 
Wyo. 1966, 416 P.2d 390.

"Of the various formulas 
used by different courts to determine the question of excessiveness, the 
frequently quoted and paraphrased standard employed by Chancellor 
Kent in a libel case answers the 
problem rather satisfactorily:

"`* * * The damages, 
therefore, must be so excessive as to strike mankind, at the first blush, as 
being beyond all measure unreasonable and outrageous, and such as manifestly 
show the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice, or 
corruption. In short, the damages must be flagrantly outrageous and extravagant, 
or the court cannot undertake to draw the line; for they have no standard by 
which to ascertain the excess. * * *' Coleman v. Southwick, 1812, 9 Johnson 
45, 6 Am.Dec. 253, 258."

[¶26.]  We do not find such evidence in this 
record as would indicate that the verdict is so excessive as to show that the 
minds of the jurors were poisoned by the passion, prejudice or bias of which the 
aforesaid opinions and authorities speak. Further, the appellant has not 
referred this court to such an "erroneous basis" as would lead us to the 
conclusion that such error influenced the jury. We are not aware of any such 
error in the case at bar as would lead to the conclusion that the jury verdict 
is anything but the well-reasoned work product of twelve intelligent and caring 
jurors.

[¶27.]  Where passion and prejudice have not 
influenced the jury's verdict, the amount to be assessed for damages suffered by 
a personal-injury plaintiff is within the sound discretion of the trier of fact, 
Fitzsimonds v. Cogswell, supra. In 
the case at bar, the trial court, in resolving the motion-for-new-trial issues, 
considered very carefully the facts and law pertaining to the charge of 
excessive damages and found that such passion and prejudice as will upset a jury 
verdict as a matter of law did not exist. We find no abuse of the trial court's 
discretion in reaching this conclusion, and we find no lawful grounds for 
upsetting the jury's verdict in answer to the charge that it was 
excessive.

[¶28.]  Affirmed.

1 However, the expert 
testified:

"In my experience I find 
a lot who will go back to work for their prior employer at salaries equal to or 
above what it was before, but when it gets tough they are one of the first 
people that are let go and they have more underemployment. * * * A lot of times 
they also have problems with promotion."