Title: Commonwealth v. Camuti

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13422 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WILLIAM J. CAMUTI. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 3, 2023. – February 21, 2024. 
 
Present (Sitting at Lowell):  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, 
Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.1 
 
 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Practice, Criminal, Postconviction 
relief, Assistance of counsel.  Evidence, Scientific test.  
Homicide. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 3 and November 15, 2013. 
 
A postconviction motion for forensic testing, filed on 
April 16, 2021, was heard by Christopher K. Barry-Smith, J., and 
a motion for reconsideration was considered by him. 
 
 
Dana J. Gravina for the defendant. 
Hallie White Speight, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  In 2013, the defendant, William J. Camuti, 
killed his long-time friend and business associate, Stephen 
 
1 Justice Lowy participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to his retirement. 
 
2 
 
Rakes, by poisoning him with potassium cyanide, and then 
disposed of the victim's body in a wooded area and lied to the 
police about the events surrounding the victim's death.  A 
Middlesex County jury subsequently convicted the defendant of, 
among other charges, murder in the first degree.   
Several years later, the defendant filed a motion for 
forensic testing under G. L. c. 278A, seeking an order 
authorizing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing of the shirt 
that the victim was wearing when his body was discovered.  After 
a nonevidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge denied the 
motion, finding that the defendant had failed to meet his burden 
under G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b), to establish that a reasonably 
effective defense attorney would have sought to test the 
victim's shirt for DNA.  We affirm.   
1.  Background.  "We summarize the facts presented at the 
hearing on the motion for forensic testing, which included 
relevant trial transcripts and exhibits."  Commonwealth v. 
Linton, 483 Mass. 227, 229 (2019).   
a.  The police investigation.  On July 17, 2013, a jogger 
discovered the victim's body in the woods near a State highway 
in Lincoln.  A forensic pathologist with the office of the chief 
medical examiner later determined that the cause of death was 
acute cyanide toxicity.   
3 
 
On the side of the road where the victim's body was found, 
Lincoln police officers discovered what appeared to be drag 
marks of perhaps heels "striking and pulling on the ground."  
The victim's shirt had been pulled up in the areas near the 
victim's shoulders, neck, and armpits, and there was mud on the 
back of his heel.  Although a photograph of the victim's body 
was presented to the jury to show the areas where the shirt was 
pulled up, the shirt itself was never admitted in evidence at 
trial.  
The police later learned that, at the time of his death, 
the victim was involved as a potential witness in a Federal 
trial against James "Whitey" Bulger.  Additionally, the victim 
had a civil judgment against Bulger, and was looking to sell the 
judgment and the rights to his story involving the matter.  The 
defendant was a long-time friend of the victim; the two were 
also business collaborators, having been involved in several 
real estate deals together.  Due to their business dealings, the 
defendant owed the victim $100,000.  The defendant had also been 
helping the victim market the movie rights to the victim's 
involvement with Bulger.   
After determining that the defendant was the last person 
the victim had called, investigators proceeded to interview him 
multiple times.  The defendant's account of his last day with 
the victim varied with each interview.  The police first spoke 
4 
 
with the defendant at his home on July 18, 2013.  During the 
interview, the defendant told the police that, on July 16, 2013, 
at approximately 1:30 P.M., he met the victim at a fast-food 
restaurant in Waltham to discuss a real estate venture in the 
Dorchester section of Boston.  Upon arrival, the defendant 
purchased two iced coffees and met with the victim inside the 
restaurant.  The defendant claimed that, at the conclusion of 
their meeting, which lasted about fifteen minutes, he left while 
the victim remained inside the restaurant.  The defendant also 
told the police that the victim was not feeling well on the day 
of the meeting.   
After the initial interview, the police went to the 
restaurant, where they discovered the victim's car, still parked 
in the front parking lot.  The police called the defendant and 
interviewed him a second time.  During this interview, the 
police informed the defendant that there were cameras at the 
restaurant and asked him if he had taken the victim anywhere 
after their meeting.  In response, the defendant's memory of the 
meeting had changed.  This time, the defendant told the police 
that, although he and the victim arrived at the restaurant at 
the same time, the defendant had already gone inside and 
purchased two iced coffees, which they consumed inside the 
defendant's vehicle during the course of their meeting.  The 
defendant's account of what happened after the meeting had also 
5 
 
changed.  He now asserted that, after their meeting at the 
restaurant, the defendant proceeded to drive the victim to an 
office supply store in Waltham; however, the victim ended the 
ride abruptly, indicating that he had another meeting.  The 
defendant claimed to have then dropped the victim off by the 
side of the fast-food restaurant.   
On July 19, 2013, the police executed a warrant to search 
the defendant's residence.  During the search, the police 
officers discovered business documents linking the victim to the 
defendant, as well as a receipt from the fast-food restaurant, 
dated July 16, 2013, at 1:07 P.M., for two iced coffees.  The 
police also discovered an e-mail printout titled "Gmail RE:  
Response for offer potassium cyanide," in which a seller 
provided a quote for potassium cyanide products.  Another e-mail 
printout seized by the police indicated that the prospective 
buyer was a "Jewelry lab working with precious metals and 
required a very small amount of potassium cyanide."  The contact 
information that was listed for the "[j]ewelry lab" was the 
defendant's cell phone number.  A search of the defendant's 
laptop computer also revealed two Internet address links 
referencing potassium cyanide.  One of those addresses led to a 
webpage where the following question was posted:  "Can I mix 
potassium or potassium cyanide in hot coffee or tea and drink 
it?  Will it work?"  A response posted on the webpage said, 
6 
 
"Only if you have a death wish.  Even a small amount of cyanide 
is fatal."2   
The police also searched the defendant's vehicle pursuant 
to a warrant.  Neither the victim's latent fingerprints nor 
blood was found.  The car, however, had a global positioning 
system (GPS) device that tracked its movements on July 16, 2013.  
The data from the GPS device showed that at 12:02 P.M., the 
defendant's car left his residence in Sudbury.  At 12:28 P.M., 
the vehicle stopped at a supermarket in Waltham.3  At 1 P.M., the 
vehicle arrived at the fast-food restaurant in Waltham.  At 1:12 
P.M., the vehicle was driven around the block before it returned 
to the restaurant at approximately 1:20 P.M., where it remained 
stationary for about thirty minutes.  At approximately 2:07 
P.M., the vehicle arrived at a movie theater in Woburn, where it 
remained stationary until 2:46 P.M.  After that, the defendant 
drove around, stopping at various locations, including an 8:50 
P.M. stop at the location where the victim's body was found.  
After that stop, the vehicle was driven to the defendant's 
Sudbury home.   
 
2 Another response also discussed ways to mask the bitter 
taste of cyanide with sugar, stated that a lethal dose varies 
depending on a person's body weight, and provided the range of 
what would be considered lethal doses. 
   
3 The police located a receipt from the supermarket dated 
July 16, 2013, at 12:31 P.M., for the purchase of latex gloves.   
7 
 
While the search warrant was being executed at his house, 
the defendant was interviewed for the third time at the Lincoln 
police department.  Initially, when asked what happened on July 
16, he recounted the events of that day just as he had during 
the second interview.  However, when questioned further by the 
police, the defendant claimed that, following the meeting with 
the victim at the fast-food restaurant, he drove the victim to a 
movie theater parking lot in Woburn.  The police told the 
defendant that they did not believe his account of the events 
and asked him whether he had ever purchased or researched 
potassium cyanide.  The defendant initially denied purchasing 
potassium cyanide, but later admitted that he had done so.  He 
also said he did not know whether he had researched potassium 
cyanide.   
A day later, on July 20, 2013, the defendant was 
hospitalized after attempting suicide.4  The police interviewed 
the defendant on July 21 and July 23, 2013, while he was 
recovering at the hospital.  The defendant had been administered 
various medications, including a morphine drip, fentanyl, 
gabapentin, hydromorphone, and oxycodone.  During the hospital 
interviews, the defendant confessed to killing the victim by 
 
4 While the defendant was hospitalized, the police executed 
a warrant to search his storage locker in Waltham.  The police 
located additional documents related to the victim.   
8 
 
placing potassium cyanide in his coffee.  The defendant also 
told the police that he drove around with the victim in his car 
while waiting for the potassium cyanide to take effect before 
stopping and dragging the victim's body from the car once it was 
dark outside and leaving it in the same location where the 
victim's body was found.   
b.  The trial.  i.  Theories of defense.  At trial, the 
defendant pressed three defenses:  (1) the defendant's 
confession at the hospital was not voluntary based on his 
medical condition at the time; (2) there was no proof that the 
victim was deliberately poisoned by potassium cyanide; and (3) 
there was no forensic or DNA evidence connecting the defendant 
to the murder.   
With respect to the voluntariness of the defendant's 
confession, on cross-examination, the police officers who had 
interviewed the defendant when he was in the hospital conceded 
that the defendant never said that he killed the victim during 
his interviews prior to being hospitalized.  The police officers 
also acknowledged that the defendant only admitted to killing 
the victim once he was hospitalized in the intensive care unit 
with serious injury.  The arresting officers also testified that 
once the defendant had been arrested, he requested an attorney 
and did not make any more statements.  Additionally, defense 
9 
 
counsel offered expert psychiatric testimony about the supposed 
involuntariness of the defendant's confession.   
Next, as for the cause of the victim's death, a forensic 
pathologist from the office of the chief medical examiner 
testified that she performed an autopsy on the victim and 
determined that the cause of death was acute cyanide toxicity.  
She further testified on cross-examination that no medical 
history confirmed whether the victim had been exposed to other 
possible sources that could cause cyanide poisoning, such as 
fires or metal working, and that persons receiving certain blood 
pressure medications can have elevated blood levels of 
potassium.  Defense counsel also elicited testimony that while 
the amount of cyanide present in the victim's blood was toxic, 
whether it was lethal varied by individual, and argued that the 
Commonwealth had not proved that the victim ingested a lethal 
dose.   
Finally, regarding the forensic connection between the 
defendant and the murder, a State police trooper, who conducted 
the trace evidence examination of the victim's body, testified 
at trial.  On cross-examination, the trooper admitted that he 
was unaware of what, if any, trace evidence was recovered from 
the body, because the information was sent out for forensic 
testing, and he was unaware of the results.  Defense counsel 
also elicited testimony from the police that there was no blood 
10 
 
or DNA from the victim in the defendant's storage facility, 
home, or car.   
For its part, the Commonwealth offered expert testimony 
regarding the collection and analysis of DNA evidence from a 
crime scene specialist who worked for the State police crime 
laboratory, but who did not personally perform any DNA testing 
in this case.  While the crime scene specialist testified that 
DNA might be collected from the armpit of a shirt depending on 
the circumstances, he also testified that the outside of a 
shirt, again depending on the circumstances, is not a "pristine" 
source for collecting a DNA sample.  The crime scene specialist 
explained that although it would be possible to obtain DNA from 
a shirt if someone "shed[ded] a considerable amount," DNA would 
not necessarily be present just because someone had touched the 
shirt.   
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked whether skin 
cells can be transferred from one person to another, and the 
crime scene specialist answered affirmatively.  Defense counsel 
also confirmed that the crime scene specialist never looked for 
potential DNA samples on the victim's body for analysis.   
ii.  Defense counsel's closing argument.  In his closing, 
defense counsel argued that the Commonwealth introduced largely 
circumstantial evidence that did not make up for the lack of 
direct evidence establishing that the defendant murdered the 
11 
 
victim and disposed of his body.  Defense counsel strenuously 
emphasized that there was "zero trace evidence" connecting the 
defendant to the crime scene or the victim's body, whether 
"biological, DNA, fingerprint, or of another nature."  Lastly, 
defense counsel pointed out that the "[forensic pathologist] 
could not on cross-examination . . . tell you if the amount of 
cyanide found in [the victim's] femoral blood samples or gastric 
sample was lethal or fatal in the case."   
c.  Procedural history.  On October 3, 2013, a Middlesex 
grand jury returned four indictments against the defendant, 
charging attempted murder, G. L. c. 265, § 16; unlawful 
disposition of a human body, G. L. c. 114, § 43M; and two counts 
of willfully misleading a police officer in a criminal 
investigation, G. L. c 268, § 13B.5  A fifth indictment, for 
murder, G. L. c. 265, § 1, was returned on November 15, 2013.  
The jury trial commenced on April 3, 2017, and after seventeen 
days of trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of murder in 
the first degree based on deliberate premeditation, unlawful 
disposition of a human body, and both counts of willfully 
misleading a police officer in a criminal investigation.  The 
 
5 On April 25, 2017, the Commonwealth filed a notice of 
nolle prosequi as to the charge of attempted murder.   
 
12 
 
defendant appealed from his convictions on May 1, 2017.  His 
direct appeal has yet to be docketed.   
On April 16, 2021, the defendant filed a motion under G. L. 
c. 278A, § 3 (§ 3), seeking DNA testing of the victim's shirt.  
On September 17, 2021, a Superior Court judge, who did not 
preside at the defendant's trial, ruled that the defendant had 
met the requirements of § 3 and could proceed to a hearing under 
G. L. c. 278A, § 7.  Following a nonevidentiary hearing, the 
judge issued an order denying the defendant's motion.  The 
defendant filed a notice of appeal and a motion for 
reconsideration of the denial of his motion for postconviction 
DNA testing.  On January 3, 2023, his motion for reconsideration 
was denied.  This appeal ensued.   
2.  Discussion.  a.  Statutory framework.  The Legislature 
enacted G. L. c. 278A "as a means to permit prompt access to 
scientific and forensic testing in order to remedy wrongful 
convictions" (citation omitted).  Linton, 483 Mass. at 234.  
General Laws c. 278A involves a two-step procedure for 
requesting postconviction forensic testing.  See Commonwealth v. 
Wade, 467 Mass. 496, 501 (2014) (Wade II), S.C., 475 Mass. 54 
(2016).  First, a court must determine whether a party's motion 
for postconviction forensic testing meets preliminary criteria 
13 
 
set forth in G. L. c. 278A, § 3.6  See id.  If the motion for 
forensic testing has satisfied these preliminary requirements, a 
judge "shall order a hearing on the motion."  G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 6 (a).   
Second, the moving party has the burden to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence each of six factors set forth in 
G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b).7  The third factor, § 7 (b) (3), which is 
 
6 The motion must include the following: 
 
"(1) the name and a description of the requested forensic 
or scientific analysis; (2) information demonstrating that 
the requested analysis is admissible as evidence in courts 
of the commonwealth; (3) a description of the evidence or 
biological material that the moving party seeks to have 
analyzed or tested, including its location and chain of 
custody if known; (4) information demonstrating that the 
analysis has the potential to result in evidence that is 
material to the moving party's identification as the 
perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case; and (5) 
information demonstrating that the evidence or biological 
material has not been subjected to the requested analysis 
because [of one of five reasons enumerated in G. L. 
c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5)]."   
 
G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b).   
 
7 The moving party has the burden to establish:   
 
"(1) that the evidence or biological material exists; (2) 
that the evidence or biological material has been subject 
to a chain of custody that is sufficient to establish that 
it has not deteriorated, been substituted, tampered with, 
replaced, handled or altered such that the results of the 
requested analysis would lack any probative value; (3) that 
the evidence or biological material has not been subjected 
to the requested analysis for any of the reasons in clauses 
(i) to (v), inclusive, of paragraph (5) of subsection (b) 
of [§] 3; (4) that the requested analysis has the potential 
to result in evidence that is material to the moving 
14 
 
the center of the dispute in this case, requires the moving 
party to show that the requested test has not been performed on 
the evidence or biological material at issue for one of the 
following five reasons: 
"(i) the requested analysis had not yet been developed at 
the time of the conviction; 
 
"(ii) the results of the requested analysis were not 
admissible in the courts of the commonwealth at the time of 
the conviction; 
 
"(iii) the moving party and the moving party's attorney 
were not aware of and did not have reasons to be aware of 
the existence of the evidence or biological material at the 
time of the underlying case and conviction; 
 
"(iv) the moving party's attorney in the underlying case 
was aware at the time of the conviction of the existence of 
the evidence or biological material, the results of the 
requested analysis were admissible as evidence in courts of 
the commonwealth, a reasonably effective attorney would 
have sought the analysis and either the moving party's 
attorney failed to seek the analysis or the judge denied 
the request; or 
 
"(v) the evidence or biological material was otherwise 
unavailable at the time of the conviction."   
 
G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5).  See G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (3). 
Here, the defendant relies on § 3 (b) (5) (iv); thus, the 
defendant as the moving party was required to demonstrate by a 
 
party's identification as the perpetrator of the crime in 
the underlying case; (5) that the purpose of the motion is 
not the obstruction of justice or delay; and (6) that the 
results of the particular type of analysis being requested 
have been found to be admissible in courts of the 
commonwealth."   
 
G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b).   
15 
 
preponderance of the evidence that a reasonably effective 
attorney would have sought DNA testing of the shirt but failed 
to do so.   
b.  Standard of review.  Where, as here, the motion judge 
was not the trial judge, and the record purely is documentary, 
we regard ourselves in as good a position as the motion judge to 
assess the trial record.  See Commonwealth v. Moffat, 478 Mass. 
292, 298 (2017), S.C., 486 Mass. 193 (2020).  Because the motion 
judge was not required to make credibility determinations or 
consider the relative weight of the evidence or the strength of 
the case presented against the moving party, we stand in the 
same position as the motion judge in determining whether the 
defendant demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
reasonably effective attorney would have sought DNA testing of 
the victim's shirt.  See Linton, 483 Mass. at 233-234.  
Accordingly, we review the denial of the defendant's motion 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7, de novo.  See id.   
c.  Application.  The defendant asserts on appeal that a 
reasonably effective attorney would have sought a DNA analysis 
of the victim's shirt, and that his attorney failed to do so.  
The Commonwealth contends that the lack of trace evidence 
connecting the defendant to the scene where the victim's body 
was found coupled with the Commonwealth's purported failure to 
conduct available forensic analysis played a pivotal role in the 
16 
 
defendant's strategy at trial.  As such, the Commonwealth 
asserts that a reasonably effective attorney would not have 
sought the DNA testing of the victim's shirt because DNA 
evidence from the shirt could have further inculpated the 
defendant and, thus, undermined this important defense.  Under 
the circumstances of this case, we agree with the Commonwealth.   
The inquiry under § 3 (b) (5) (iv) whether a reasonably 
effective attorney would have sought the requested testing is 
objective.  See Commonwealth v. Wade, 475 Mass. 54, 63 (2016).  
As we have previously explained, unlike in a motion for a new 
trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 
1501 (2001), the reasonably effective attorney prong of G. L. 
c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5) (iv), does not require the defendant to 
establish that trial counsel's strategic decision to forgo 
forensic testing was manifestly unreasonable.  See Linton, 483 
Mass. at 237.  Rather, the statute requires a showing only that 
a reasonably effective attorney would have sought the requested 
analysis, not that every reasonably effective attorney would 
have done so.  See Wade II, 467 Mass. at 511.  Therefore, the 
defendant here would be entitled to postconviction forensic 
testing of the victim's shirt if he, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, has shown that "a" hypothetical reasonably effective 
attorney would have chosen to undertake testing in these 
circumstances.  See Linton, supra at 238.   
17 
 
That is not to say that the permissive standard under    
§ 3 (b) (5) (iv) is without limits.  See Linton, 483 Mass. at 
237-238.  In Linton, the defendant sought postconviction 
forensic testing of a "questioned hair."  See id. at 237.  The 
precise source of the hair, and whether it came from the victim, 
or an extraneous source, was unknown.  See id.  Like the shirt 
in this case, the hair was never tested or introduced at trial.  
See id.  Nevertheless, the absence of testing was a prominent 
aspect of Linton's defense.  See id. at 238.  In his closing, 
Linton's trial counsel relied "on the uncertainties concerning 
the hair to argue that [the] police were deliberately not 
testing evidence in an effort to locate other suspects because 
they had focused improperly upon the defendant as the only 
suspect."  Id.  There was other inculpatory evidence in Linton, 
such as a test result showing that the defendant was a possible 
contributor to the DNA found under the victim's fingernails.  
See id.  In isolation, both the DNA found under the victim's 
fingernails and the hair could have been easily explained by the 
victim's marriage to Linton.  See id.  However, considering both 
the test result showing that Linton was a possible contributor 
to the DNA found under the victim's fingernails and the trial 
counsel's emphasis on the absence of information concerning the 
hair, we could not conclude that a reasonably effective attorney 
18 
 
would have tested the hair, and accordingly affirmed the order 
denying Linton's motion for postconviction testing.  See id.   
Here, the defendant argues that while the absence of trace 
evidence played a minimal role in his defense, the fact that the 
victim's shirt was not tested played no role at all in his trial 
defense strategy.  To be clear, the defendant does not dispute 
that his trial counsel emphasized the lack of trace evidence 
linking him to the crime scene.  Instead, he makes a nuanced 
distinction that, in referring to a lack of trace evidence, his 
trial counsel was not referencing the absence of DNA testing of 
the victim's shirt, but rather the absence of footprints and 
tire impressions where the victim's body was discovered, as well 
as the absence of the victim's DNA in the defendant's vehicle, 
home, and storage unit.  This distinction is not meaningful in 
any sense.   
The general lack of trace evidence, including forensic 
evidence on any object or in any location linking the defendant 
to the victim's death, was a prominent theory of his defense.  
First, throughout the trial, defense counsel repeatedly focused 
on the purported weaknesses in the police investigation, 
emphasizing that the police could have collected DNA or other 
trace evidence but failed to do so.  Second, as the defendant 
himself points out in his argument, defense counsel elicited 
testimony from the police that there was no blood or DNA from 
19 
 
the victim found in the defendant's car, storage unit, or home.  
Indeed, the defendant's trial counsel consistently focused on 
the theory that nothing directly linked the defendant to the 
victim's body or the crime scene.  Thus, had the victim's shirt 
been tested, and if the results came back showing that the 
defendant's DNA was present on the shirt, the defendant's theory 
that the Commonwealth's case was entirely circumstantial and 
unsupported by physical evidence would have been torpedoed.   
On the other hand, had the test been ordered and the 
results came back positive for a third party's DNA, the 
potentially exculpatory value of this evidence would have been 
marginal at best.  While searching the defendant's car, the 
police discovered a receipt, dated July 16, 2013, at 12:31 P.M., 
for the purchase of latex gloves.  An absence of the defendant's 
DNA on the victim's shirt could have easily been explained by 
the reasonable inference that the defendant was wearing latex 
gloves while disposing of the victim's body.  Moreover, 
considering that, as stated by the State police crime scene 
specialist at trial, clothing seldomly provides a "pristine" DNA 
sample and that there are inherent difficulties interpreting 
such results, coupled with the fact that no theory of a third-
party culprit was sufficiently developed at trial, any presence 
of a third party's DNA would have had minimal exculpatory value. 
20 
 
Under these circumstances, we cannot say that a reasonably 
effective attorney would have risked undermining the defendant's 
strongest defense in favor of throwing a "Hail Mary"8 by 
requesting a DNA test on the victim's shirt.  Accordingly, the 
defendant has not met his burden to show that a reasonably 
effective attorney would have sought such testing at the time of 
his trial.   
The order denying the motion for postconviction testing is 
affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.  
 
 
8 In football, a "Hail Mary" is a long pass made in 
desperation into the end zone with little time remaining and 
with only a small chance of success.  Although the chance of 
success is grim, it is not zero.  Doug Flutie did, after all, 
complete arguably the most famous Hail Mary to secure a victory 
for Boston College over the University of Miami in 1984.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lys, 481 Mass. 1, 11 n.8 (2018).