Title: Miller Land & Mineral Co. v. State Highway Com'n of Wyoming

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Miller Land & Mineral Co. v. State Highway Com'n of Wyoming1988 WY 91757 P.2d 1001Case Number: 87-288Decided: 07/14/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
MILLER LAND & MINERAL 
COMPANY, A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION 
OF WYOMING, WYOMING HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF WYOMING, AND ROBERT L. MITCHELL 
AND JANE G. MITCHELL, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

William L. 
Miller of Hursh, Miller & Fasse, P.C., Riverton, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Lawrence A. Bobbitt, III, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees 
State Highway Com'n of Wyoming, Wyoming Highway Dept., and State of 
Wyo.

M.L. Barton of 
Hill, Young & Barton, Riverton, for 
appellees Robert L. Mitchell and Jane G. Mitchell.

Before BROWN, C.J., THOMAS, CARDINE and MACY, JJ., 
and ROONEY, Ret. J.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a summary judgment granting appellees Robert L. Mitchell and Jane G. Mitchell 
title to the gravel in, on, or under the surface of their lands on the basis of 
the finding that gravel is not a mineral.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant Miller Land 
& Mineral Company raises the following issues:

"A. Whether the District 
Court erred in holding that gravel was not included in the mineral reservation 
in the deed which is the subject of this action, which 
states:

`Reserving unto Grantor, 
all mineral[s] and mineral rights existing under said above lands and premises 
or appurtenant thereto, together with the right to enter upon said lands to 
explore for and produce the same.'

"B. Whether the District 
Court erred in holding that as a matter of law, in the context of this case, 
both from the objective evidence and the status of gravel pursuant to custom and 
usage in the State of Wyoming, absent specific intent being expressed in a deed, 
gravel is not deemed to be a reserved mineral and is claimed as a part of the 
surface estate."

[¶4.]     The property located 
west of Crowheart, 
Wyoming, which was owned by John L. 
Miller at the time of his death, was sold from his estate to Dale Urbigkit and 
Patricia Urbigkit. Mr. Miller owned the surface and mineral rights to this 
property. The deed conveying this property to the Urbigkits contained the 
following reservation:

"Reserving unto Grantor, 
all minerals and mineral rights existing under said above lands and premises or 
appurtenant thereto, together with the right to enter upon said lands to explore 
for and produce the same * * *."

All the minerals 
and mineral rights were conveyed to appellant by an administrator's deed 
pursuant to an order contained in the decree of distribution entered on April 
17, 1981, in the Matter of the Estate of John L. Miller, 
Deceased.

[¶5.]     While the highway 
department was constructing a section of highway west of Crowheart in 1985 and 
1986, the State entered into a materials agreement with the Urbigkits for the 
purchase of certain materials, including gravel. Title to the property was 
subsequently transferred from the Urbigkits to the Mitchells, so the State also 
entered into a materials agreement with the Mitchells. On May 13, 1985, the 
Urbigkits assigned all their rights in their materials agreement with the State 
to the Mitchells.

[¶6.]     The highway department 
removed approximately 105,016.6 tons of gravel from below the surface of this 
property for highway construction use, and the State has paid the Mitchells for 
this gravel. Through a complaint originating suit filed October 9, 1986, 
appellant notified the State that it was the owner of the mineral rights for 
such property, which included the gravel being purchased by the State, and that 
payment for this gravel should be made to appellant. The court eventually 
entered summary judgment in favor of appellees, and this appeal was 
taken.

[¶7.]     Appellant first 
contends that, if the language in the deed does not express a clear intent to 
reserve gravel under the lands conveyed, it was error to not consider an 
affidavit showing such intent which supported its motion for summary 
judgment.

[¶8.]     Our relevant general 
standards for interpreting a written instrument are that, if it is free from 
ambiguity, the intention of the parties is to be secured from the words of the 
instrument, Farr v. Link, Wyo., 746 P.2d 431 (1987); Nelson v. Nelson, Wyo., 740 P.2d 939 (1987), and that the interpretation of an instrument to determine 
whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law for the courts to decide. 
Western Utility Contractors, Inc. v. City of 
Casper, Wyo., 731 P.2d 24 (1986); 
State v. Moncrief, 
Wyo., 720 P.2d 470 (1986). The 
courts, however, may augment these general rules by considering pertinent 
extrinsic factors when interpreting a conveyance of a mineral interest. Cheyenne 
Mining and Uranium Company v. Federal Resources Corporation, Wyo., 694 P.2d 65 
(1985).

[¶9.]     The courts which have 
held that the general reservation of "all minerals" is inherently ambiguous have 
traveled over a long and tortuous path in a complex and hopeless search to 
discover the particular minerals the parties intended to reserve. The only 
reliable rule which surfaces from the confusing and inconsistent approaches 
taken by those courts attempting to ferret out the subjective intent of the 
parties is that the word "mineral" means what the court says it means. The 
result is title uncertainty and the need to litigate each general reservation of 
minerals to determine which minerals it encompasses. Spurlock v. Santa Fe 
Pacific Railroad Company, 143 Ariz. 469, 694 P.2d 299 (1984), cert. denied 472 U.S. 1032, 105 S. Ct. 3513, 87 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1985); Reeves, The Meaning of the Word "Minerals," 54 N.D.L.Rev. 419 
(1978).

[¶10.]  Although we may consider the extrinsic 
evidence presented by appellant to support its motion for summary judgment, we 
see no need to do so. We hold that the mineral reservation "[r]eserving unto 
Grantor, all minerals and mineral rights existing under said * * * lands" 
expresses a clear and unambiguous intent by the grantor to reserve all the 
minerals, whatever they may be.

[¶11.]  We recognize, however, that gravel cannot 
be reserved in a general mineral reservation unless it is a mineral. The 
threshold question of law of first impression before this Court therefore is 
whether or not gravel is a mineral, not whether the grantor intended to reserve 
gravel.

[¶12.]  Appellant has launched a three-pronged 
attack to support its contention that gravel is a mineral. It reasons that (1) 
the Ad Valorem Tax Division of the Department of Revenue and Taxation taxes 
gravel production in the same manner as it does mineral production; (2) the 
Wyoming legislature has included gravel as part of the definition of a mineral 
in the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act, § 35-11-103(e)(ii), W.S. 1977; and (3) 
we should follow the emerging law that gravel is a mineral posited in the United 
States Supreme Court case of Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 103 S. Ct. 2218, 76 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1983).

[¶13.]  Appellant has directed our attention to a 
copy of an unsigned memorandum dated December 29, 1980, from the Ad Valorem Tax 
Division stating that sand, gravel, and aggregate production is considered 
mineral production in Wyoming. Appellant concludes that, since the 
State of Wyoming taxes gravel production in the same 
manner as it taxes mineral production, gravel is a mineral. This conclusion has 
no merit whatsoever. Even if this administrative agency has taken the position 
that gravel is a mineral, we fail to see how its determination in any way can 
affect the decision of this Court.

[¶14.]  Appellant also refers this Court to a 
section in the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act which includes gravel in the 
definition of a mineral for reclamation purposes. Appellant argues that "the way 
in which our legislature views gravel certainly is a reflection of the ordinary 
citizens' mind and definition of gravel and minerals." We understand this to 
mean that, if the State of Wyoming considers gravel to be a mineral for 
reclamation purposes, parties to a conveyance or reservation of "all minerals" 
should consider gravel as an included mineral. We disagree and do not consider 
this to be a cogent argument which we are obliged to discuss. Edwards v. 
Edwards, Wyo., 732 P.2d 1068 (1987); Dawson v. City of 
Casper, Wyo., 731 P.2d 1186 (1987).

[¶15.]  Additionally, we recognize that, in the 
case of Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., the United States Supreme Court 
specifically limited its holding to the statutory interpretation of the 
Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916. That court declared that "gravel is a 
mineral reserved to the United States in lands patented under 
the SRHA." Id., 103 S. Ct.  at 2231. We also agree with the 
South Dakota Supreme Court when it stated in the case of Rysavy v. Novotny, 
S.D., 401 N.W.2d 540, 542 (1987), that:

"In Watt, the Supreme 
Court relied heavily upon congressional intent behind the SRHA, and other 
federal statutes dealing with mineral rights. It is therefore of little help in 
deciding the present case in which those statutes do not 
apply."

[¶16.]  We further do not subscribe to 
appellant's thesis that to hold contrary to the Watt case would create 
confusion. If there is any confusion, we suspect that the Watt case is the 
culprit as the vast majority of courts have held for various reasons that gravel 
is not a mineral estate in general private grants or reservations of minerals. 
Reeves, The Meaning of the Word "Minerals," supra at 428.

[¶17.]  In spite of all the attention the topic 
of whether gravel is or is not a mineral has received, many problems remain.1 The courts which have decided 
whether gravel is or is not a mineral have relied on various doctrines,2 which spawn confusion, inconsistent 
results, and litigation to resolve questions of fact. Additionally, although 
legal writers and law professors are quick to point out these problems, they 
have failed to suggest any alternatives which are faultless. According to 
Professor John S. Lowe, this dilemma is the "tar baby" of natural resource law. 
He asserts that the more the courts attack the problems the more stuck they 
become. Lowe, What Substances Are Minerals?, 30 Rocky Mtn. Min.L.Inst. 2-1 
(1984).

[¶18.]  In Chittim v. Belle Fourche Bentonite 
Products Co., 60 Wyo. 235, 149 P.2d 142 (1944), this Court quoted with approval 
two definitions of a "mineral" in arriving at the conclusion that bentonite is a 
mineral. These definitions are: "`any form of earth, rock, or metal of greater 
value while in place than the enclosing country or superficial soil,'" and 
"`[t]he real test seems to be the character of the deposit as occurring 
independently of the mere soil, valuable in itself for commercial purposes, that 
is, near enough to a market to have a value.'" Id. at 146. However, these definitions are 
more productive of protracted litigation than of justice in arriving at a 
decision as to whether gravel is a mineral.

[¶19.]  Gravel is a mixture of pebbles and broken 
fragments of rock mixed with finer materials such as sand and clay, 18A Words 
and Phrases, "Gravel" 444 (1956); Webster's New World Dictionary 610 (2d ed. 
1972), and can be found below, above, or in the soil making up the surface of 
land. While gravel in the technical sense belongs to the mineral kingdom, it 
usually is not considered a mineral within the ordinary meaning of the word. 
Lillington Stone Co. v. Maxwell, 203 N.C. 151, 165 S.E. 351 
(1932).

[¶20.]  In an effort to cut the Gordian Knot, we 
join the vast majority of courts and hold that gravel is not a mineral, and, 
insofar as gravel is concerned, we adopt what is commonly known as the "ordinary 
and natural meaning" test articulated in Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949):

"In our opinion 
substances such as sand, gravel and limestone are not minerals within the 
ordinary and natural meaning of the word unless they are rare and exceptional in 
character or possess a peculiar property giving them special value, as for 
example sand that is valuable for making glass and limestone of such quality 
that it may profitably be manufactured into cement. Such substances, when they 
are useful only for building and road-making purposes, are not regarded as 
minerals in the ordinary and generally accepted meaning of the 
word."

Also see Moser 
v. United States Steel Corporation, Tex., 676 S.W.2d 99 (1984); Elkhorn City Land Company v. Elkhorn 
City, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 762 (1970); 
and Little v. Carter, Ky., 408 S.W.2d 207 
(1966).

[¶21.]  Although this doctrine may not be free of 
criticism, we are of the opinion that arriving at a clear rule of law is of more 
importance than the make of the vehicle used in getting to the destination. The 
policy considerations in favor of this rule of law are significant in that the 
rule will minimize title uncertainty and continued litigation to resolve factual 
issues.

[¶22.]  Affirmed.

ROONEY, Ret. J., files a 
concurring opinion.

THOMAS and CARDINE, JJ., files specially 
concurring opinions.

FOOTNOTES

1 Source materials are in 
abundance and are too numerous to mention. For the interested reader, a good 
place to start is with the excellent articles of Lowe, What Substances Are 
Minerals?, 30 Rocky Mtn.Min.L.Inst. 2-1 (1984); Reeves, The Meaning of the Word 
"Minerals," supra; and Comments, The Meaning of "Minerals" in Grants and 
Reservations, 30 Rocky Mtn. L.Rev. 343 (1958).

2 Surface doctrine, 
special value, manner of enjoyment, knowledge of existence, popular meaning, 
commercial value, and scientific meaning.

ROONEY, Retired Justice, 
concurring.

[¶23.]  In general, I agree with much of that 
said in the majority opinion, but I cannot accept as proper the basis upon which 
the result is there reached.

[¶24.]  In an admirable effort to set a rule 
which would "minimize title uncertainty and continued litigation to resolve 
factual issues," the majority opinion concludes that the reservation of minerals 
in this deed "expresses a clear and unambiguous intent by the grantor to reserve 
all the minerals," and that gravel is not a mineral under the "ordinary and 
natural meaning" test.1

[¶25.]  However, the majority holding will not 
accomplish the stated purpose. The "ordinary and natural meaning" test, adopted 
by the majority opinion, is subject to too many variations and gives little 
guidance to practicing lawyers for advice to clients concerning the scope of a 
grant or reservation of minerals - other than gravel - in conveyances made in 
years past or in conveyances now under consideration. Nor does the test settle 
the issue as it pertains to gravel itself. The indefinite nature of the test is 
manifest in the test itself. The majority opinion quotes the test as set forth 
in Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 
(1949):

"In our opinion 
substances such as sand, gravel and limestone are not minerals within the 
ordinary and natural meaning of the word unless they are rare and exceptional in 
character or possess a peculiar property giving them special value * * 
*."

The task of 
determining the existence of rare character, exceptional character, or peculiar 
property giving special value, is as difficult as determining the grantor's 
intent in using the word "minerals." The fact that this particular substance - 
gravel - was purchased by the Highway Department for more than a meager sum 
would indicate it to be of special value.2

[¶26.]  Additionally, if the use of the word 
"minerals" in a grant, reservation, or exception in a conveyance "expresses a 
clear and unambiguous intent by the grantor to reserve all the minerals, 
whatever they may be," as the majority opinion holds, then, strictly speaking, 
the conveyance would be of nothing at all - especially in the "ordinary and 
natural" meaning of the word, since for most people, "minerals" means a 
substance other than "vegetable" or "animal." Thus, a conveyance reserving 
"minerals" would include only that which is other than inert substances, i.e., 
nothing at all. Obviously such could not be the intent of any of the parties. It 
exemplifies the ambiguous nature of the word "minerals" when used in a grant, an 
exception, or reservation in a conveyance.

[¶27.]  Although I agree with the majority 
opinion that there are defects in all of the several approaches or tests used by 
the courts to determine the meaning of the word "minerals" when used in such 
context, I believe the least defective, best, and more accurate approach for 
such purpose is through application of the usual rules of construction and 
established Wyoming precedent.

[¶28.]  In referring to some of the rules of 
construction, the majority opinion cited Cheyenne Mining and Uranium Company v. 
Federal Resources Corporation, Wyo., 694 P.2d 65 (1985). This court there 
said:

"We repeated the basic 
purpose and general rules of contract interpretation in Amoco Production Company 
v. Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463, 465 
(1980):

"`Our basic purpose in 
construing or interpreting a contract is to determine the intention and 
understanding of the parties. Fuchs v. Goe, 62 Wyo. 134, 163 P.2d 783 (1945); Shellhart v. Axford, Wyo., 485 P.2d 1031 (1971); Oregon Short Line Railroad Company 
v. Idaho Stockyards Company, 12 Utah 2d 205, 364 P.2d 826 (1961). If the 
contract is in writing and the language is clear and unambiguous, the intention 
is to be secured from the words of the contract. Pilcher v. Hamm, Wyo., 351 P.2d 1041 
(1960); Fuchs v. Goe, supra; Hollabaugh v. Kolbet, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1359 (1980); Wyoming Bank and Trust Company v. Waugh, Wyo., 
606 P.2d 725 (1980). And the contract as a whole should be considered, with each 
part being read in light of all other parts. Shepard v. Top Hat Land & 
Cattle Co., Wyo., 560 P.2d 730 (1977); Rossi v. Percifield, Wyo., 527 P.2d 819 
(1974); Shellhart v. Axford, supra; Quin Blair Enterprises, Inc. v. Julien 
Construction Company, Wyo., 597 P.2d 945 (1979). The interpretation and 
construction is done by the court as a matter of law. Hollabaugh v. Kolbet, 
supra; Bulis v. Wells, Wyo., 565 P.2d 487 (1977); Shepard v. Top Hat 
Land & Cattle Co., supra.'

"A more recent case to 
the same effect is Rouse v. Munroe, Wyo., 
658 P.2d 74 (1983).

"In interpreting a 
conveyance of a mineral interest, the court may augment these general rules by 
considering pertinent, extrinsic factors. In Dawson v. Meike, Wyo., 
508 P.2d 15, 18 (1973), we said:

"`* * * [W]e find no 
fault with * * * the authority of Houghton v. Thompson, 57 Wyo. 196, 115 P.2d 654, that to interpret a contract for the conveyance of an interest in oil and 
gas the court should consider not only the terms of the writing but also the 
surrounding circumstances, attendant facts showing the relations of the parties, 
the nature and situation of the subject matter, and the apparent purpose of 
making the contract.'

"See also Picard v. 
Richards, Wyo., 366 P.2d 119 (1961). The basic purpose 
of contract interpretation - to determine the intention of the parties - remains 
the same, however, regardless of the form of the agreement. Dawson v. Meike, supra." 
Id. at 
70-71.

The foregoing 
quotation from Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer Chemical Company of 
Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463 (1980), 
continued:

"If the contract is 
ambiguous, resort may be had to extrinsic evidence. J.W. Denio Milling Co. v. 
Malin, 25 Wyo. 143, 165 P. 1113 (1917); 
Kilbourne-Park Corporation v. Buckingham, Wyo., 404 P.2d 244 (1965). An ambiguous 
contract `is an agreement which is obscure in its meaning, because of 
indefiniteness of expression, or because a double meaning is present.' Bulis v. 
Wells, supra, 565 P.2d  at 490. Ambiguity justifying extraneous evidence is not 
generated by the subsequent disagreement of the parties concerning its meaning. 
Homestake-Sapin Partners v. United States, 10th Cir. 1967, 375 F.2d 507." Id. 
at 465.

[¶29.]  That the word "minerals" used in the 
context under consideration here is ambiguous is evidenced by the many source 
materials and cases cited in the majority opinion concerning its meaning. Used 
in this context, it is not plain and clear, is not definite in that expressed, 
and can be understood in more than one way. As noted supra, if given its 
ordinary and natural meaning in this context, the conveyance would transfer 
nothing. "Mineral" is defined in Webster's Third International Dictionary, p. 
1437 (1971), as

"any of various naturally 
occurring homogeneous or apparently homogeneous and usu[ally] but not 
necessarily solid substances (as ore, coal, asbestos, asphalt, borax, clay, 
fuller's earth, pigments, precious stones, rock phosphate, salt, soapstone, 
sulphur, building stone, cement rock, peat, sand, gravel, slate, salts extracted 
from any river, lake, and ocean waters, petroleum, water, natural gas, air, and 
gases extracted from the air) obtained for man's use usu[ally] from the ground * 
* * something that is neither animal nor vegetable * * *."

[¶30.]  The ambiguity, then, must be resolved 
under our rules of construction by ascertaining the intention of the parties - 
primarily that of the grantor in a deed. In doing so, I do not agree with the 
majority opinion that we can disregard the precedent set by this court in 
Chittim v. Belle Fourche Bentonite Products Co., 60 Wyo. 235, 149 P.2d 142 
(1944). The parties must be taken to have acted with knowledge of, and in 
accordance with, established law. Their intent at the time of the deed must have 
been with knowledge of the definition of "minerals" contained in the Chittim 
case. In that instance, the mineral in question was bentonite. This court 
said:

"Bentonite would appear 
to be a mineral within the definition adopted by the Court in McCombs v. 
Stephenson, 154 Ala. 109, 44 So. 867, and approved by the 
authors of Morrison's Mining Rights 16th Ed. (1936), p. 250, as follows: `any 
form of earth, rock, or metal of greater value while in place than the enclosing 
country or superficial soil'. And Mr. Lindley, Vol. I, Lindley on Mines, 3rd Ed. 
(1914), Sec. 93, p. 156, sums up an exhaustive examination of the English and 
American case law on the subject with the statement:

"`The real test seems to 
be the character of the deposit as occurring independently of the mere soil, 
valuable in itself for commercial purposes, that is, near enough to a market to 
have a value.'" Id. at 145-46.

[¶31.]  Gravel will satisfy this definition if it has the requisite value. And there 
may be instances wherein a reservation of minerals has been made in past years 
and wherein the requisite value was present and recognized to be so in the minds 
of the parties. Since the scope of the grant, reservation or exception is that 
intended by the parties - primarily by the grantor, the requisite value must be 
determined as of the time of the grant, reservation or 
exception.

[¶32.]  In this case, the mineral reservation or 
exception was contained in a deed dated December 18, 1978. The requisite value 
of gravel at that place did not exist at that time. It was not then valuable in 
itself for commercial purposes. It was not near enough to a market to have a 
value, and since the purchase by the Highway Department was for more than gravel 
(see note 2), one can question whether or not it has "`greater value while in 
place than the enclosing country or superficial soil'" or whether or not it was 
"`occurring independently of the mere soil;'" id. at 146, with reference to its 
value. It was only when the Highway Department began constructing the road west 
of Crowheart in 1985 and 1986 that this gravel obtained the requisite 
value.

[¶33.]  Accordingly, I conclude that the 
reservation or exception of "minerals" in the 1978 deed was not intended by the 
parties to include gravel.

FOOTNOTES

1 In its footnote 2, the 
majority opinion lists doctrines or tests used by courts in deciding whether or 
not gravel is included in a grant, or in a reservation or exception of 
"minerals" in an instrument.

2 Of note is the fact that 
the agreement between the Highway Department and Mitchells was for purchase of 
"all of the sand, stone, gravel or soil which said Department may remove" for 
use on a highway construction project. The record does not reflect if payment 
was made for only gravel, and it cannot be assumed that payment was not also for 
the other three substances.

THOMAS, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶34.]  I agree with the result which is reached 
by the majority opinion in this instance. Had we let the matter rest with simply 
a statement that gravel is not included when a reservation in a deed alludes to 
"mineral and mineral rights," I would be satisfied. We go on, however, to adopt 
what we describe as the "ordinary and natural meaning" test. I am somewhat 
apprehensive that this does create an avenue for future confusion, at least with 
respect to mineral substances other than gravel. In this regard, I have a good 
deal of affinity for Justice Rooney's views.

[¶35.]  It seems to me that it is compatible with 
our precedent to conclude that any mineral substance with inherent value at the 
time of the conveyance could be recognized as covered by a general reservation. 
Conversely, those mineral substances that possess only circumstantial value at 
the time of the conveyance would not be included. I then would define "inherent 
value" as a value that would result in profit from development whenever the 
owner chooses to proceed. "Circumstantial value" would be defined as a value 
that attaches only because of the occurrence of future events, which are not 
anticipated at the time of the conveyance. In such an instance, development 
would only be pursued because of a fortuitous event.

[¶36.]  I believe that a test such as that would 
provide a sufficiently objective standard so that any given situation could be 
resolved by expert testimony. If we are going beyond a holding in this case that 
gravel is not a mineral, then I would prefer to pursue something beyond the 
Texas articulation of the "ordinary and natural meaning" test. I am persuaded 
that such a test will lead to future debate. Probably, any test is susceptible 
to litigation. My position is that the "inherent value" versus "circumstantial 
value" test provides a standard that is objective rather than subjective. The 
adoption of such a standard would facilitate the resolution of future 
disputes.

CARDINE, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶37.]  I concur in the result only, preferring 
that we simply hold that gravel is not a mineral. If lands being conveyed are 
known to be valuable for gravel, such can be retained, if the parties so intend, 
by specific reservation of gravel in the instrument of conveyance. The same is 
true if there is no knowledge of the existence of gravel. In the absence of such 
reservation, gravel is not reserved. The benefit of such a holding is that it is 
simple, clear, without ambiguity, and easily applied. It would eliminate 
litigation over this seemingly troublesome question.