Title: Sheneman v. Division of Workers' Safety and Compensation Internal Hearing Unit

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Sheneman v. Division of Workers' Safety and Compensation Internal Hearing Unit1998 WY 47956 P.2d 344Case Number: 97-150Decided: 04/01/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

                   

Frank SHENEMAN, Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

DIVISION OF WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION INTERNAL 
HEARING UNIT, Department Of Employment, State Of

Wyoming, Appellee (Respondent).

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Fremont County, Nancy J. Guthrie, J.

 

Donald L. Painter, Casper, 
for Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney General, 
Cheyenne, for Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ., and DONNELL, District 
Judge.

 

DONNELL, 
District Judge.

 [¶1] The primary issue is whether the Internal 
Hearing Unit of the Division of Workers' Safety and Compensation (Division) was 
legally formed and whether it had jurisdiction to decide if Frank Sheneman's 
request for a hearing to contest the Division's final determination denying him 
worker's compensation benefits was timely. Frank Sheneman asserts the issue of 
timely filing was required to be heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings 
because the Workers' Compensation Rules and Regulations authorizing the Internal 
Hearing Unit were not in effect on the date of his injury. The two remaining 
issues ask whether the Internal Hearing Unit's finding was supported by 
substantial evidence and whether the procedure and order were in accordance with 
law. We affirm the district court's order which held the Division legally 
created the Internal Hearing Unit. We hold the Internal Hearing Unit had 
jurisdiction over the procedural determination and Frank Sheneman did not have a 
substantive right to a hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings. In 
addition, we affirm the final agency order of the Department of 
Employment.

 

                    
                         I. 
ISSUES

 

[¶2] Appellant, Frank 
Sheneman (Sheneman), presents these issues for review: 

 

          
1. Whether an Internal Hearing Unit legally exists.

 

2. Whether the Internal Hearing Unit has jurisdiction 
to take the administrative action complained of.

 

3. Whether the Internal Hearing Unit can legally take 
action on an injury occurring prior to creation of the Internal Hearing 
Unit.

 

          
4. Whether the Findings of Fact are supported by substantial 
evidence.

 

          
5. Whether the Final Agency Order complained of is contrary to 
law.

 

[¶3] The Division, as 
appellee, states the issues in this manner:

 

I. 
The Appellant has never served the Petition for Review or any of his briefs on 
the employer. Should this appeal be dismissed?

 

II. The Division made a rule authorizing a hearing 
within the Division to determine the timeliness of an Employee's 
objection:

 

A. 
Did the Division have authority to adopt the internal hearing 
procedure?

 

B. 
Was the application of the procedure to the Employee's pending case in 
accordance with law?

 

C. 
Was the Hearing Officer's decision supported by substantial evidence and in 
accordance with law?

 

                                             
II. FACTS

 

[¶4] On July 28, 1995,1 Sheneman sustained an injury which 
he claims is compensable under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act. On August 
23, 1995, the Division sent an Initial Review, Notice of Lack of Information to 
Sheneman, which provided, in pertinent part:

 

This is not a denial of benefits. The Workers' 
Compensation Division has received and reviewed your claim and needs the 
following information to make a determination:

 

          
* * *

 

d. 
The Division needs all medical records, notes/documentation for the past 5 
years.

 

          
              
e. The employer has objected to this injury * * *.

 

Please contact your treating health care provider 
about submitting medical records for your injury.

 

Please provide the Division with the requested 
information on or before September 19, 1995 and submit any other 
additional information you believe may be important to help determine whether or 
not benefits should be paid.

 

(Emphasis in 
original.)

 

[¶5] Sheneman received the 
Initial Review three or four days after it was mailed and took it to his 
attorney who advised him to get a letter from his treating physician explaining 
the doctor's opinion regarding the injury. Sheneman contacted his physician and 
requested a letter. The doctor dictated the letter which was dated August 30, 
1995. According to Sheneman, however, he did not receive it until October 18 due 
to a backlog of work at the doctor's office.

 

[¶6] When the Division did 
not receive the information it requested by September 19, it issued its Final 
Determination on September 20, 1995, which stated in pertinent 
part:

 

The Workers' Compensation Division has reviewed your 
claim and issued an initial review dated August 23, 1995, requesting the 
information listed below and has yet to receive any of the information and has 
determined that we cannot approve payment of benefits for the following 
reason(s):

 

Benefits for employment-related coronary conditions 
except those directly and solely caused by an injury, are not payable unless the 
employee establishes by competent medical authority that:

 

          
* * *

 

d. The Division needs all medical records, 
notes/documentation for the past 5 years.

 

          
  e. Your employer is still 
objecting to this injury.

 

Please contact your treating health care provider 
about submitting medical records for your injury.

 

Either the employee or the employer may object to 
this determination and request a hearing. Affected parties have a right to a 
hearing before a hearing examiner as provided by the Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Act and to legal representation. We must receive a written request, 
stating your reason(s) for objecting on or before October 16, 1995. If a timely 
written request for hearing is not filed with this division, the final 
determination by the Division pursuant to W.S. 27-14-601(k)2 shall not be subject to further 
administrative or judicial review.

 

(Emphasis in 
original.)

 

[¶7] According to Sheneman, 
the August 30, 1995 letter from his physician, received on October 18, 1995, 
stated in part:

 

In 
summary, it appears that the patient does have labile hypertension. Any type of 
stress will exacerbate the situation and cause more myocardial ischemia and the 
angina symptoms that he developed. Based on the patient's symptoms and activity 
at the time of his angina, it appears that the most recent hospitalization and 
evaluation were stress related and occurred while on the job. This certainly 
appears to be work related on this particular occasion. He is currently 
undergoing intensive medical treatment to improve his hypertension, therefore, 
improve the risk of having further anginal symptoms.

 

Sheneman took the letter to 
his attorney who forwarded the physician's letter along with a cover letter to 
the Division. The Division received both letters on October 19, 
1995.

 

[¶8] The Division issued a 
Notification of Late Response to Final Determination to Sheneman on October 24, 
1995, which said:

 

The Division has received your response to our Final 
Determination dated September 20, 1995. The response was due in our office no 
later than October 16, 1995 and was not received by the Division until October 
19, 1995. (Wyoming Statute 27-14-601(k)(iv)).

 

If 
timely written request for hearing is not filed, the final determination by the 
Division shall not be subject to further administrative or judicial review 
pursuant to W.S. 27-14-601(k)(vi).

 

          
The Division will not be referring this matter to 
hearing.

 

[¶9] Sheneman took the 
Notification of Late Response to Final Determination to a new attorney who wrote 
a letter dated November 1, 1995 to the Division. The letter explained that 
Sheneman's response was late because he was waiting to receive a medical report 
from his doctor who was out of town. The letter included a request that the 
matter be referred to the Office of Administrative 
Hearings.

 

[¶10] The Division granted 
Sheneman a hearing before its Internal Hearing Unit to consider the timeliness 
of his written objection.  Following 
the hearing by the officer of the Internal Hearing Unit, the Division issued its 
Hearing Officer's Report and Recommended Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order on July 15, 1996. The Hearing Officer's Report stated, in pertinent 
part:

 

          
RECOMMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT

 

1. Respondent issued a Final Determination dated 
September 20, 1995 * * *;

 

2. Respondent mailed the Final Determination to Frank 
Sheneman, petitioner, at this correct address * * *;

 

          
3. Petitioner received the Final Determination at the above address; 

 

4. The Final Determination required a response to be 
received by the Division on or before October 16, 1995;

 

5. The Final Determination advised the interested 
parties in pertinent part that: ". . . Either the employee or the employer may 
object to this determination and request a hearing. Affected parties have a 
right to a hearing before a hearing examiner as provided by the Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Act and to legal representation. We must received [sic] a written request, stating your 
reason(s) for objecting on or before October 16, 1995. If a timely written 
request for hearing is not filed with this division, the final determination by 
the Division pursuant to W.S. 27-14-601(k) shall not be subject to further 
administrative or judicial review. . . ."

 

6. The Division did not receive a written request 
from petitioner, objecting or requesting a hearing on or before October 16, 
1995;

 

          
RECOMMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

 

7. The Division's Final Determination dated September 
20, 1995, properly advised the petitioner of the deadlines for a timely response 
pursuant to W.S. §§ 27-14-601(k)(iv) (15 working days) and Ch. 1 § 4(c) of the 
Rules and Regulations (3 additional working days following notice sent by 
mail);

 

8. The Division's Final Determination dated September 
20, 1995, properly advised petitioner of his rights pursuant to W.S. § 
27-14-601(k)(iii);

 

9. The petitioner did not respond to the Division's 
Final Determination within the time allowed by law;

 

10. The Final Determination is not subject to further 
administrative or judicial review pursuant to W.S. § 
27-14-601(k)(vi).

 

(Emphasis in 
original.)

 

[¶11] Sheneman filed a 
Petition for Review of the Department of Employment's Final Agency Order to the 
Ninth Judicial District Court.  That 
court issued its order affirming the agency decision on April 22, 1997. Sheneman 
appeals from the district court's order.

 

    
                                  III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶12] This court's review of 
administrative action or inaction is confined to the record and is limited by 
W.R.A.P. 12.09(a) to those matters specified in Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c) (1997). 
The statute provides that the reviewing court shall:

 

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings and conclusions found to be:

 

          
* * *

 

          
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or

 

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case 
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 

[¶13]We do not afford 
deference to the reviewing court's findings.

 

[W]e do, however, "afford respect and deference to an 
administrative agency's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial 
evidence. Aanenson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Div. v. White, 837 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Wyo. 1992)). 'Substantial evidence' is a 
term of art, best described as 
'relevant evidence that a reasonable mind can accept as adequate to support an 
agency's conclusion.' Casper Oil Co. 
v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 224 (Wyo. 1995). Further, we consider only that 
evidence favoring the party prevailing below, leaving out of consideration 
conflicting evidence. Wyoming Steel and Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 876 
(Wyo. 1994) (quoting Matter of Injury to Carpenter, 736 P.2d 311, 312 (Wyo. 
1987)). * * * Unlike its findings of fact, however, an administrative agency's 
conclusions of law are afforded no special deference, and will be affirmed only 
if truly in accord with the law. Matter of Cordova, 882 P.2d 880, 882 (Wyo. 
1994). See also Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c)."

 

Haagensen v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 949 P.2d 865, 867 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting 
Coleman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 915 P.2d 595, 598 
(Wyo. 1996)) (emphasis added).

 

                                           
IV. ANALYSIS

 

A. INTERNAL HEARING UNIT

 

[¶14] Sheneman asserts three 
complaints regarding the Internal Hearing Unit. First, he argues the Internal 
Hearing Unit was created illegally because the Division was "not empowered to 
adopt rules and regulations to deal with the resolution of contested matters 
that are not required to be heard by the [Office of Administrative Hearings] 
including agency review of claimed late filings."3 The Division points to Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-112(a) and (e) (1997) of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act as well 
as Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-802(a) (Cum.Supp. 
1995) for the authority of the Division to promulgate the Workers' Compensation 
Rules and Regulations.

 

[¶15] In Painter v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 953, 955 (Wyo. 1997), this 
court addressed the precept of pari materia:

 

We 
have often stated the precept that the worker's compensation statutory scheme 
should be construed as a whole, its component parts in pari materia. Newton v. 
State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 922 P.2d 863, 865 (Wyo. 1996); Little 
America Refining Co. v. Witt, 854 P.2d 51, 55 (Wyo. 1993).

 

[¶16] Sheneman's claim that 
the Division lacked authority to promulgate rules and regulations under these 
circumstances is unfounded. First, Sheneman's argument focuses on the specific 
enumerations of Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-802(a). He omits any reference to the 
permissive language of the first sentence that empowers the Division to adopt 
rules and regulations:

 

The director may adopt rules and regulations for 
administration of this act. The 
director shall by rule and regulation establish for qualification of resident 
and non-resident employers, provide for advance payments of employer premiums 
under W.S. 27-14-202(e), provide fee schedules for all medical and hospital care 
rendered injured employees and for the establishment of the state's average 
monthly wage. Changes in any rule or regulation adopted under this subsection 
shall be considered only at quarterly intervals.

 

Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-802(a) (emphasis 
added).

 

[¶17] Other provisions in 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act mandate that the Division, as an 
agency, promulgate rules and regulations:

 

(a) In addition to other rulemaking requirements 
imposed by law, each agency shall:

 

(i) Adopt rules of practice setting forth the 
nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures available in 
connection with contested cases [.]

 

Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-102 (1997) (emphasis 
added).

 

[¶18] In addition, Wyo. 
Stat. § 16-3-112 provides:

 

(a) If not otherwise authorized by law there shall 
preside at the taking of evidence in all contested cases the statutory agency, 
one (1) or more members of the body which comprises the agency, or an 
employee of the agency or an employee of another agency designated by the agency 
to act as presiding officer. The functions of all those presiding in contested 
cases shall be conducted in an impartial manner. * * *

 

          
* * *

 

(e) When required by law an agency shall adopt 
rules and regulations providing a procedure for the use and the selection of an 
administrative hearing officer. An agency shall not delegate the authority to 
make final decisions to an independent administrative hearing officer unless 
required by law.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶19] These provisions not 
only empower the Division to enact rules and regulations, but specifically 
authorize "one (1) or more members of the body which comprises the agency, or an 
employee of the agency" to take evidence in a contested case. Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-112(a). The Division is required to refer contested cases to a medical 
hearing panel of the Medical Commission or to the Office of Administration 
Hearings. Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-616 (Cum.Supp. 1995). The Division chose to form 
the Internal Hearing Unit, comprised of members of its agency, to determine the 
timeliness of an apparent untimely filing for a hearing. Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-601(k)(vi) (Cum.Supp. 1995); Wyoming Workers' Compensation Rules, 
Regulations and Fee Schedules, ch. 1, § 6 (Jan. 1996).

 

[¶20] Based on our 
examination of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act and the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act as a whole, looking at the component parts as well 
as the purposes of the acts and underlying policy considerations, we hold that 
the Division had ample authority to form the Internal Hearing Unit. 
Additionally, we hold the Division was authorized to promulgate rules and 
regulations relating to the resolution of contested matters that are not 
required to be heard by the Medical Commission or the Office of Administrative 
Hearings, including agency review of claimed late filings.

 

[¶21] Sheneman argues issues 
two and three together because they are one and the same. He complains the 
Internal Hearing Unit did not have jurisdiction because it was not in existence 
at the time he sustained his injury on June 28, 1995.4 Sheneman cites Starr v. Sunlight 
Ranches, 890 P.2d 1096 (Wyo. 1995), stating this court held that a hearing 
before the Office of Administrative Hearings is a substantive right fixed at the 
time of injury and that the Medical Commission, created by statute to hear 
certain worker's compensation cases, could not hear cases where the injury date 
preceded the creation of the Medical Commission. The Division states Starr is 
not controlling because a hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings 
was expressly precluded in this case, absent a timely request for a hearing 
under Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-601(k)(iv).

 

[¶22] This issue is resolved 
by determining whether Sheneman's complaint is substantive or procedural. We 
discussed the effect of a substantive law and procedural law in Connors v. 
Connors, 769 P.2d 336, 349 (Wyo. 1989):

 

The question here is clearly one of procedural law, 
which has been defined as " 'those rules * * * applicable in the 
administration of the remedies available in cases of invasion of primary 
rights of individuals in Courts or other lawfully constituted tribunals and 
agencies[,]' " [State ex rel.] Frederick [v. District Court], 399 P.2d [583] at 
585 [(Wyo. 1965)] (quoting Kellman v. Stoltz, 1 F.R.D. 726, 728 (N.D.Iowa 
1941)), providing " 'the method of enforcing and protecting [the] duties, 
rights, and obligations as are created by substantive laws.' " Frederick, 
399 P.2d  at 585 (quoting In Re McCombs' Estate, 80 N.E.2d 573, 586 (Ohio 1948)). 
See also McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1290 n. 15 (Wyo. 1980). More 
specifically, " 'procedure' is the machinery for carrying on the suit, including 
pleading, process, evidence, and practice * * *[;] a statute relating to the 
proper method of obtaining jurisdiction in respective instances [is] a part of 
the law of procedure and not of substantive law." Frederick, 399 P.2d  at 
585.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶23] The Division's rules 
and regulations forming the Internal Hearing Unit provided the machinery for 
carrying on the claim since Sheneman's request for a hearing on the merits was 
untimely. It is interesting to note that Sheneman would have had no right of 
review at all absent the rules and regulations of which he now complains. While 
Sheneman argues his request for hearing should have been heard by the Office of 
Administrative Hearings, that remedy was and is expressly precluded by statute. 
Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-601(k)(vi) precludes review "[i]f timely written request for 
hearing is not filed, the final determination by the division pursuant to this 
subsection shall not be subject to further administrative or judicial review." 
The Division's rules and regulations relating to the proper method of obtaining 
jurisdiction in this instance are a part of the law of procedure and not of 
substantive law. Starr, 890 P.2d  at 1096 is not controlling because the statute 
creating the Medical Commission related to a substantive right, not merely a 
procedural right.

 

[¶24] Establishing the fact 
that the jurisdiction of the Internal Hearing Unit is procedural leads us to 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 763 
n. 7 (Wyo. 1990), where we said:

 

The State Fund cites W.S. 27-14-503(a) and 27-14-505. 
Those statutes were found in the prior law and are similar but not identical 
with the present provisions. The 1986 recodification, effective June 23, 
1986, is to be applied procedurally as long as a substantive right is not 
adversely affected. Owens v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959). See also Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric 
Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525, 78 S. Ct. 893, 2 L. Ed. 2d 953, reh'g denied 357 U.S. 933, 78 S. Ct. 1366, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1375 (1958) and 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 354 at 490 
(1974).  Processing was handled 
under the hearing examiner administrative structure that was first created by 
the 1986 enactment. Bemis v. Texaco, Inc., 400 P.2d 529, reh'g denied, 401 P.2d 708 (Wyo. 1965) is not inapposite since the issue there concerned substantive 
rights and not procedural provisions changed by a newly enacted 
statute.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶25] The Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Rules and Regulations that became effective January 1, 1996 are to 
be applied procedurally as long as a substantive right is not adversely 
affected. After Sheneman failed to file a timely request for a hearing on the 
substantive issue of whether his coronary condition qualified for worker's 
compensation benefits, his only remaining complaint was the procedural question 
of whether or not he failed to file a timely request. Sheneman's substantive 
right was not adversely affected. We hold processing of claims is a procedural 
right that was properly conducted under the Internal Hearing Unit even though 
the Internal Hearing Unit was created after Sheneman's 
injury.

 

B. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

 

[¶26] Sheneman asserts that 
the final determination was required to be answered by October 19 and he met 
that deadline. He calculates that the answer was to be received by the Division 
on October 16 and that three days are to be added if the notice is sent by 
mail.

 

[¶27] The time limit within 
which a hearing must be requested is calculated according to the following 
statute and rule:

 

Any interested party may request a hearing before a 
hearing examiner on the final determination of a division by filing a written 
request for hearing with the division within fifteen (15) days after the date 
the notice of final determination was mailed by the 
division.

 

Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-601(k)(iv). Wyoming Workers' Compensation Rules, Regulations and Fee 
Schedules, ch. 1, § 4(c) provides:

 

Computation of Time. In determining the time 
prescribed by the Act for filing any notice, complaint, claim or other paper 
with the division, only workdays shall be included in determining the time 
period; three (3) work days shall be added if the division serves by mail a 
notice which requires or authorizes action.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶28] The final 
determination was mailed Wednesday, September 20, 1995. September 21, the next 
working day, was the first day of the fifteen day period. Excluding weekends and 
adding three days for mailing, the correct deadline was Monday, October 16, the 
deadline stated in the Division's final determination. Sheneman erroneously 
accounted for mail by adding three work days plus three more work days for a 
total of six days, which is not provided for by law. 

 

[¶29] The following evidence 
supplied in the record supports Finding of Fact number 6 that the Division did 
not receive a written request on or before October 16, 1995 from Sheneman, 
objecting or requesting a hearing:

 

1. October 18, 1995: Letter from Sheneman's counsel 
stating that he had just "turned over to me the original of a letter signed by 
his physician * * *."

 

2. October 19, 1995: Date stamp of Division showing 
receipt of counsel's letter regarding the physician's August 30, 1995 
letter.

 

3. November 1, 1995: Letter from Sheneman's current 
counsel explaining, "Mr. Sheneman has further explained to me that he sent his 
response on October 18, 2 days late, because he was waiting to receive a medical 
report that had been requested by Workers' Compensation."

 

4. January 10, 1996: Letter from Sheneman's current 
counsel stating "By letter of November 1, I advised you of our position with 
respect to Mr. Sheneman's 2-days' late filing due to the problems he had getting 
the medical report that was requested by the Division."

 

5. May 3, 1996: In a hearing by conference call, 
Sheneman's counsel stated, "It [the objection to the Final Determination] was a 
matter of a couple of days late."

 

6. June 28, 1996: In a hearing by conference call, 
Sheneman was asked if he "ever attempt[ed] to explain to anyone at Workmen's 
Comp that [he was] going to be late in responding because [he was] late in 
getting the letter from the doctor." Sheneman responded, "No, I wasn't aware 
that I had to notify them that I was going to be late."

 

7. Petition for Review states: "Petitioner 
understood, or misunderstood, that, since he was still attempting to get the 
information requested by Respondent from his physician, he had until that 
information was made available to him to present the information to Respondent. 
Accordingly, Petitioner did not respond to the Final Determination in accordance 
with its terms on or before October 16 and, instead, did so when, on October 18, 
1995, Petitioner sent a copy of his attending physician's letter to Respondent, 
which was received by Respondent on October 19, 1995."

 

[¶30] We find the 
calculation for receipt of the request on or before October 16, 1995 was correct 
and the Division's letter complied with the requirements of Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-601(j).5 We hold the decision of the 
Department of Employment was based on substantial evidence, that is, "relevant 
evidence that a reasonable mind can accept as adequate to support an agency's 
conclusion."  Casper Oil Co. v. 
Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 224 (Wyo. 1995).

 

 C. 
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW

 

[¶31] Sheneman's final issue 
incorporates his previous arguments by reference and states that since 
Conclusion of Law number 9 is without observance of procedure required by law, 
the agency action is required to be set aside. Our previous holdings in this 
case cause us to hold that the agency decision is in accordance with 
law.

 

D. DISMISSAL OF PETITION FOR 
REVIEW

 

[¶32] The Division requests 
that this appeal be dismissed because Sheneman failed to serve his petition for 
review on the employer.  The 
Division cites Bridge v. State Dept. of Employment, Unemployment Ins. Com'n, 896 P.2d 759 (Wyo. 1995) for the proposition that failure to timely serve a copy of 
the petition for review on a party constitutes a procedural defect that must be 
remedied without unnecessary delay to comply with W.R.A.P. 12.03. Failure to do 
so requires this court to dismiss the appeal pursuant to W.R.A.P. 1.03. 

 

[¶33] W.R.A.P. 1.03 
addresses failure to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
states:

 

The timely filing of a notice of appeal, which 
complies with Rule 2.07(a), is jurisdictional. The failure to comply with any 
other rule of appellate procedure, or any order of court, does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate 
court deems appropriate, including but not limited to: citation of counsel or a 
party for contempt; refusal to consider the offending party's contentions; 
assessment of costs; dismissal; or affirmance.

 

(Emphasis added.) We reject 
the Division's invitation to dismiss this appeal. Bridge, 896 P.2d  at 760 
states: "The fact that Bridge failed to name, join or serve [his employer] was 
not a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal of the petition for review." 
Here too, the fact that Sheneman failed to name, join or serve his employer was 
not a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal of the petition for review. In 
addition, the issue of whether the Division had authority to establish the 
Internal Hearing Unit and whether the Internal Hearing Unit has jurisdiction in 
timeliness of filing determinations is important to previous and future Internal 
Hearing Unit determinations.

 

                                          
V. CONCLUSION

 

[¶34] The Division had ample 
authority to form the Internal Hearing Unit and promulgate rules and regulations 
relating to the resolution of contested matters that are not required to be 
heard by the Medical Commission or the Office of Administrative Hearings, 
including agency review of claimed late filings. The processing of claims is a 
procedural right that was properly conducted under the Internal Hearing Unit, 
even though the Internal Hearing Unit was created after Sheneman's injury. 
Substantial evidence was presented to support the finding that Sheneman failed 
to timely file his written request. As such, he is not entitled to further 
administrative or judicial review on the merits. The final agency order is not 
contrary to law and we affirm the district court's order affirming the agency 
decision.

 

          

FOOTNOTES

1The 
order in the Ninth Judicial District Court and Sheneman's petition for review 
state he was injured on July 28, 1995.  
Both counsel for Sheneman and the Division state in their appellate 
briefs, and Sheneman states in his testimony, he was injured on June 28, 1995. 
Regardless, the date is immaterial to our determination.

 

Counsel 
for Sheneman was generally careless about accuracy, stating many of these events 
took place in 1996 rather than 1995 and referring to Sheneman as appellee on one 
occasion. He also made bold statements but failed to cite to authority. He 
failed to attach the final agency order from this case to his appellate brief, 
but did attach a final agency order from a totally unrelated 
case.

  

           
2 Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-601(k)(vi) 
(Cum.Supp. 1995) provides:

 

If 
timely written request for hearing is not filed, the final determination by the 
division pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to further 
administrative or judicial review.

           

 

3 
Sheneman asserts the Office of Administrative Hearings is "the agency most 
capable of making such a determination * * * and certainly more impartially than 
Appellee's own employees making a determination of the correctness of the action 
of other employees of the same agency." While Sheneman conjectures the Division 
could not be impartial, he does not argue or present any actual evidence that 
the presiding officer in the Internal Hearing Unit was in fact 
biased.

  

4 
Sheneman asserts the Division's rules and regulations did not authorize the 
Internal Hearing Unit until January 1, 1996, while the Division states the 
effective date was August 1, 1995. Regardless, both agree the rules and 
regulations became effective after Sheneman's injury.

  

5 Wyo. 
Stat. § 27-14-601(j) states:

 

Notice 
to any employee or his dependents under this section of a final determination by 
the division denying the compensability of an initial injury, a claim for 
medical or hospital care for which the employee or his dependents may be liable 
for payment or denying any impairment, disability or death benefit, shall 
include reasons for denial and a statement 
of the employee's or his dependents' rights to a hearing before a hearing 
examiner as provided by this act and to legal 
representation.