Title: Davis v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CHRISTOPHER J. DAVIS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 597, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0505010323 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 24, 2006 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: June 12, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 12th day of June 2006, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Christopher J. Davis, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s November 9, 2005 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find 
no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
In June 2005, Davis was charged with Arson in the Second 
Degree, Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (“DUI”), 
Offensive Touching, Terroristic Threatening, Criminal Mischief, Disorderly 
Conduct, Resisting Arrest and Carrying a Concealed Deadly Instrument.  
 
2
Davis pleaded guilty to the lesser-included charge of Reckless Burning and 
the charges of DUI (4th offense), Offensive Touching and Terroristic 
Threatening.  All of the remaining charges were dismissed.  Davis was 
sentenced to a total of 6 years and 7 months of Level V incarceration, to be 
suspended after 6 months and successful completion of the Key Program for 
1 year at Level IV Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Program and, 
upon successful completion of that program, for 3 years at Level III 
probation.   
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Davis claims that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea.  Specifically, he 
argues that his counsel failed to communicate with him, failed to conduct a 
pretrial investigation, misinformed him about the length of the Key Program 
and violated attorney/client privilege by communicating with his mother, all 
of which led to his coerced guilty plea.   
 
(4) 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in connection with a guilty plea, a defendant must show that, but for 
his counsel’s unprofessional errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but 
would have insisted on proceeding to trial.1  The defendant must make 
                                                 
1 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
 
3
concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them, or risk 
summary dismissal.2         
 
(5) 
 Davis has presented no evidence to support his claim that but 
for unprofessional errors on the part of his counsel he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on proceeding to trial.  The transcript 
of the plea colloquy reflects that Davis’ guilty plea was knowing and 
voluntary and that he was satisfied with his counsel’s performance.  When 
the Superior Court judge asked if this was “[his] personal decision to wrap it 
all up today,” Davis replied, “Yes.  Thank you for that opportunity.”  In the 
absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Davis is bound by 
those representations.3  Moreover, Davis’ guilty plea provided him with a 
clear benefit.  The sentencing judge observed that Davis was facing a 
sentence of over 9 years at Level V on all of the charges against him.  By 
pleading guilty, Davis received a Level V sentence that was suspended after 
only 6 months. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                                 
2 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
3 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631-32 (Del. 1997).