Title: Fallaro v. Yeager

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

364 Pa. Superior Ct. 408 (1987) 528 A.2d 222 Katherine FALLARO, Appellant, v. Marie YEAGER Bucks County Children and Youth Social Services Agency. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued March 25, 1987. Filed July 1, 1987. *409 William A. Meehan, Jr., Haverford, for appellant. Paul W. Rauer, Philadelphia, for appellee. Andrew F. Schneider, Schneider and Goldblum, Langhorne, for amicus curiae Bucks County Children and Youth Social Services Agency. Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and TAMILIA, JJ. TAMILIA, Judge: This appeal is from an Order directing the Bucks County Children and Youth Agency to take custody of Robert and Michael Rennie, for dispositional purposes, so that a foster home can be found for the children in Bristol, Pennsylvania. *410 A summary of the facts as found by the lower court indicates that Marie Yeager is the natural mother of the boys, aged seven and five. Katherine Fallaro is the aunt by marriage of Ms. Yaeger. The boys have lived in the Fallaro home for most of their lives. Initially, Ms. Yeager also lived at the home, but in February of 1984 she moved, along with her sons, to live with Mark Ercolani, who is now her husband. Sometime in June, 1984, the boys were again living with the Fallaro's, the circumstances of their return being in dispute. On June 29, 1984, Mrs. Fallaro filed a petition for confirmation of custody and on July 5, 1985, Ms. Yeager filed a petition for custody. The petitions were consolidated and temporary custody was granted to Mrs. Fallaro pending a full hearing. Following two hearings, Mrs. Fallaro was granted temporary custody and Ms. Yeager given visitation rights. An investigation of Yeager's home was also ordered. Mrs. Fallaro, on May 21, 1985, filed an emergency petition alleging Mr. Ercolani had sexually abused the children and requesting the visitation rights be vacated. The visitation rights were subsequently suspended pending a hearing, but Yeager was permitted to visit the children at the Fallaro home in the presence of Mrs. Fallaro. On June 6, 1985, Ms. Yeager filed a petition for contempt and an emergency petition for reconsideration of the temporary Order. A hearing was scheduled, but the parties failed to appear. The matter was subsequently assigned to the judge whose Order is presently at issue and, after numerous continuances, a hearing was held May 15, 1986. An Order was then entered granting Fallaro and Yeager shared legal custody and providing that the boys would continue living with Fallaro, the mother to have unlimited visitation. The court notes in its Opinion that this Order was entered with a view toward reuniting the boys with their mother. Ms. Yeager filed a petition for contempt on June 11, 1986 alleging Mrs. Fallaro interfered with her visitation rights. *411 Following a hearing on July 10, 1986, the court found Mrs. Fallaro to be in contempt of the May 15, 1986 Order. An Order was entered specifying Ms. Yeager's rights of visitation and requiring that a third adult be present if they were in the company of Mr. Ercolani. This Order was to be reviewed in sixty days. A review hearing was conducted on September 10, 1986 following which the court made findings of fact and issued an Order. In the findings of fact, the court stated: Findings of Fact, Forer, J., 9/10/86. The accompanying Order, which is the subject of the present appeal, provided: Order, Forer, J., 9/10/86. An appeal to the above Order was taken by Mrs. Fallaro and an Amicus Curiae brief filed by the Bucks County Children and Youth Social Services Agency.[1] The amicus curiae brief raises the issue of whether it was proper for the court to make a finding of dependency in a case brought before it on the issue of custody. We think the court's action in making such a determination was improper and the Order must be vacated. This conclusion is based on a reading of the statutes involved and a concern for the violation of rights which would occur if such a practice is permitted. The present matter was before the lower court on cross-petitions for custody. There was no petition for dependency filed, and yet the court, sua sponte, made such a determination. This Court, in In Interest of M.B., 356 Pa.Super. 257, 514 A.2d 599 (1986), disapproved of a lower court making a dependency determination when a petition was filed under the Child Protection Services Law, 11 P.S. § 2201 et seq. In that case, the Court found the allegation of abuse to be unfounded but determined that the child was a dependent under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-6365. As the Court stated in M.B.: In Interest of M.B., supra, 356 Pa.Superior Ct. at 259-260, 514 A.2d at 600-601. The Court went on to review the various sections of the statute, specifically discussing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6321: In Interest of M.B., supra, 356 Pa.Superior Ct. at 261-262, 514 A.2d at 602. We think the rationale set forth by the Court in In Interest of M.B. is equally applicable to the present case. There are clear distinctions between a custody hearing and a dependency adjudication which must be preserved. A brief review of these differences will illustrate further the necessity of our holding in this case. In a custody proceeding between the parents, the single question before the court is: what is in the child's best interest? Custody is awarded according to which parent can demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the child's best interest would be served by placement with him or her. In Re Custody of Hernandez, 249 Pa.Super. 274, 376 A.2d 648 (1977); Helsel v. Blair County Children and Youth Services, 359 Pa.Super. 487, 519 A.2d 456 (1986). The determination and burden of proof change somewhat if a third person is involved. Hernandez, supra, 249 Pa.Super. at 286, 376 A.2d at 654. See also Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. 363, 416 A.2d 512 (1980). A further distinction is the manner in which a custody action is to be pursued. This has been clearly established through statute and procedural rules. See 48 P.S. § 92; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5341 et seq.; Pa.R.C.P. 1915.1-1915.25. A dependency determination is completely governed by statute. Initially, the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301 et seq., establishes the following purposes: The scope of the act is established in section 6303 wherein it states: The specific method of proceeding under the statute is set forth in sections 6321 and 6334 which provide in pertinent part: The procedural aspects are further governed by sections 6336, 6341 and 6351 which provide for the conduct of hearings, the adjudication and disposition of a child found to be dependent. Section 6336 provides: A clear and convincing standard of proof is established in section 6341 which states in pertinent part: See also In Interest of Leslie H., 329 Pa.Super. 453, 478 A.2d 876 (1984). Finally, the alternatives available to the court following a determination of dependency are spelled out in section 6351. A reading of the statute makes clear the difference between the question to be determined in a dependency hearing and that in a custody hearing. The statute, in section 6302, defines a dependent child in the following manner: Thus the court must be convinced by clear and convincing evidence that the child fits into one of the categories established in section 6302 before it can adjudicate the child as dependent. It is only after this determination is made that the application of section 6351 comes into play and the best interest of the child is considered when the court makes a disposition. One last section to examine is section 6337 which provides a right to counsel. This supports purpose number (4) in section 6301, supra, which establishes the desire of the legislature to ensure a fair hearing and the protection of constitutional rights. This section has been interpreted to impose a requirement that counsel be appointed in dependency adjudications. In Interest of Theresa E., 287 Pa.Super. 162, 429 A.2d 1150 (1981); Commonwealth ex rel. Grimes v. Yack, 289 Pa.Super. 495, 433 A.2d 1363 (1981). From this review of the Juvenile Act it is apparent that clear and convincing evidence must be presented to show the child is dependent as defined by the act. "The hearing judge should not ask what are the childs `best interests' but whether the child is presently without proper care and if so, whether such care is immediately available." In Interest of Theresa E., supra, 287 Pa.Superior Ct. at 178, 429 A.2d at 1158, citing In the Interest of Pernishek, 268 Pa. super. 447, 458, 408 A.2d 872, 877 (1979). In contrast, a custody petition raises the singular issue of what is in the best interest of the child with the standard of proof varying depending upon the parties involved. Hernandez, supra; Ellerbe, supra. The different questions to be addressed and the distinctive procedural mechanisms designed to adjudicate these issues make it mandatory that a court not be permitted to intermingle custody and dependency determinations. This Court has looked with disfavor on parties who sought to bring proceedings under the Juvenile Act as an alternative way to seek custody. Yack, supra; Theresa E., supra. Likewise, we have stressed the importance of bringing a dependency petition as opposed to a custody action when the forfeiture of parental rights is at issue. Helsel, supra. See also In Interest of M.B., supra. The lower court here made a dependency determination without the procedural safeguards provided for by the Juvenile Act. A petition for dependency determination was never filed and the parties were proceeding solely on cross-petitions *422 for custody. In addition, the children were not provided with counsel as required by the statute. The rights of all the parties were thus substantially affected by the sua sponte determination of dependency. In addition, the current thrust of child dependency actions is directed toward permanency planning. Pursuant to Public Law 96-272, June 17, 1980, Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, the states are mandated to provide numerous services to families and children if they are to be eligible for federal matching funds for those services. Pennsylvania, through the Department of Welfare and the County Children and Youth Services offices, has fully implemented these services. Paramount to compliance is the requirement of due process and an appropriate judicial determination that removal of a child from his home was required. 55 Pa.Code § 3130.71(a). Prior to removal is the requirement that the agency make reasonable effort to prevent removal. 62 P.S. § 701 et seq.; 55 Pa.Code §§ 3130.11, 3130.13, 3130.35-3130.42. The federal and state law requires periodic court monitoring, which is the role of the Juvenile Court, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351, 55 Pa. Code § 3130.71, and it also involves case plans for services for the child, parents and foster parents (55 Pa.Code § 3130.67) to: (1) improve conditions in the home (§ 3130.67(6)(7)(8); and (2) facilitate child's return home or plan for permanent placement (§ 3130.61-67). Ultimately, the goal is to rehabilitate the family, reunite the child with his family or, after reasonable efforts over an appropriate period of time have failed, to terminate parental rights and free the child for adoption pursuant to the Adoption Act of 1980, Subchapter B Involuntary Termination, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a). Thus it is clearly apparent that with the enormous social and legal implications involved in a finding of dependency, this can only be accomplished through the proceedings in Juvenile Court pursuant to a dependency petition, which calls into play the full panoply of services, safeguards and goals provided by federal and state laws and resources. No *423 matter how well intended the judge may be in a proceeding pursuant to an action for custody, national and state policy will not be followed and the law cannot operate to effectuate that policy. In an addendum to the Opinion dated November 13, 1986, the lower court recognizes that dependency actions are governed by the Juvenile Act. The court concludes, however, that since the children have been supported by public assistance, they are wards of the state. Addendum to Opinion dated November 13, 1986, Forer, J., pp. 1-2). The lower court went on to further justify its actions by stating: Id. at 2-3. We must reject the court's rationale for several reasons. First, we think to equate the receipt of welfare payments with a finding of dependency is totally unwarranted. Although *424 a finding that a child is without subsistence would lend support to a determination of dependency, this is not to be construed in such a way so that receipt of public assistance equates with a lack of subsistence. In many instances, parents may be forced to rely upon public assistance as the sole means of support for themselves and their children. To rely on this fact, as the reason for finding a child dependent, could result in thousands of children being declared dependent upon proper petition for that reason alone. The court's concern with the welfare of the children is recognized, but we do not think this justifies an otherwise improper action. We agree with the brief of the amicus curiae that to allow such an action would set an undesirable precedent. Courts, when faced with a bitterly contested custody dispute, where the animus of the parties negatively affects the best interest of the children, could place the children in the child welfare system and avoid making the decision. In such instances, the children would be isolated from their families, the agencies burdened with an increased caseload and the ultimate resolution of the problem only postponed. We hold that the courts must adhere to the procedures developed for resolution of the various problems which arise concerning the welfare of children. There are distinct methods established to determine custody and dependency because different issues are before the court and various interests must be protected. The standards of proof and rights of the parties vary depending upon the type of proceeding. It is clearly improper for a court to bypass the procedures and safeguards established to protect these rights by invoking the "best interest of the child." Absent a dependency petition, the court is without jurisdiction to make a determination. In Interest of M.B., supra. The Order must thus be vacated and the case remanded. Unless a dependency petition is filed, the court must rule on the custody petitions filed by the parties. Jurisdiction relinquished. [1] A motion for stay was granted by this Court on November 10, 1986.