Title: DARNELL TAYLOR v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DARNELL TAYLOR v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 18Case Number: No. S-10-0118Decided: 02/07/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

DARNELL 
TAYLOR,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price, II Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Andrew J. 
Kuhlmann, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      On October 30, 
2008, police searched an apartment leased by the appellant's girlfriend and 
found marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine.  The appellant's girlfriend told police 
that the drugs belonged to appellant, and he was charged with three counts of 
possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance.  At trial, after the State presented its 
case in chief, the appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal claiming that the 
evidence presented by the State was insufficient to show that he had 
constructive possession of the drugs.  
This motion was denied and the appellant was convicted on all three 
counts.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Did the 
district court err when it found that the State had presented sufficient 
evidence to establish the elements of constructive possession and denied the 
appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In July of 
2007, the appellant's girlfriend, Courtney Vandom, gave the appellant a key to 
her apartment.  Toward the end of 
2007, Ms. Vandom and her daughter moved into the appellant's apartment.  However, Ms. Vandom maintained the lease 
on her apartment.

 
 
[¶4]      During the first 
ten months of 2008, the appellant and Ms. Vandom continued to live together in 
the appellant's apartment, but Ms. Vandom visited her old apartment about once a 
week.  During these visits, Ms. 
Vandom would give packages to people the appellant would send to the 
apartment.  The appellant would 
accompany Ms. Vandom to her apartment on occasion, but he also often went to the 
apartment when she was not present.

 
 
[¶5]      On October 30, 
2008, officers with the Division of Criminal Investigation and the Campbell 
County Sheriff's Department executed a search warrant on Ms. Vandom's 
apartment.  The search of the 
apartment uncovered bags of illicit drugs hidden under the mattress in the 
master bedroom and in the pantry area of the kitchen.  The bags contained marijuana, 
methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin.  Ms. Vandom arrived at the apartment 
complex after the search had already commenced, and went to her sister's 
apartment, which was also in the complex.  
Officers eventually came to speak with Ms. Vandom in her sister's 
apartment.  The officers arrested 
Ms. Vandom and took her upstairs to her apartment and told her what they had 
found.  Ms. Vandom said she was 
aware of the marijuana in the apartment and that it belonged to her and that she 
was selling to "pay my bills."  
However, she said that she was not aware of the methamphetamine, cocaine, 
and heroin, and that the drugs belonged to the appellant.  Ms. Vandom later admitted that she was 
aware of the other substances and that she delivered them for the 
appellant.

 
 
[¶6]      On the night 
after the search, the appellant called a friend who picked him up and brought 
him to the friend's house.  The 
friend testified that the appellant was "agitated" and "nervous" because he said 
there were drugs in the apartment.  
The appellant specifically told the friend that there was 
methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana in the apartment.  Later that night, after giving the 
appellant a change of clothes, the friend dropped the appellant off near an 
alley in Gillette.

 
 
[¶7]      Two or three days 
later, the appellant again contacted this friend and asked him to go to Ms. 
Vandom's apartment to retrieve the appellant's jacket.  The appellant also told his friend that 
an ounce of methamphetamine was still in the apartment.  The appellant mailed his apartment key to 
the friend, and his friend searched the apartment for the methamphetamine.  During the search, the appellant 
contacted the friend and told him that the methamphetamine was located on the 
top shelf of the pantry.  The friend 
was unable to find the drugs, and he did not hear from the appellant again after 
that.

 
 
[¶8]      After a search 
that lasted several months, law enforcement located the appellant in Florida, 
took him into custody, and returned him to Wyoming.  The appellant was charged with four 
counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance within 500 
feet of a school.  After a 
preliminary hearing, the appellant was bound over on the first three counts 
involving the methamphetamine, cocaine and heroin.  The fourth count, alleging possession of 
marijuana with intent to deliver, was dismissed.  The appellant entered not guilty pleas 
on all three counts.

 
 
[¶9]      A jury trial 
commenced on November 18, 2009, and lasted two days.  At the completion of the State's 
case-in-chief, the appellant orally moved for a judgment of acquittal.  The district court denied the 
motion.  Following the denial, the 
appellant did not present any evidence and the case proceeded to the jury.  The jury returned a guilty verdict on 
all three counts.  The appellant was 
sentenced on March 8, 2010, and timely filed a notice of 
appeal.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]   We have described the standard 
applicable to a review of a denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal as 
follows:

 
 
Our 
responsibility in considering the propriety of a ruling on a motion for 
judgment of acquittal is the same as 
that of the trial court.  Cloman v. State, Wyo., 574 P.2d 410 (1978).  The question raised is the sufficiency 
of the evidence to sustain the charge, which is a matter to be determined within 
the sound discretion of the trial court.  Chavez v. State, Wyo., 601 P.2d 166 (1979); Montez 
v. State, Wyo., 527 P.2d 1330 (1974).  In making that determination the 
district court must assume the truth of the evidence of the State and give to 
the State the benefit of all legitimate inferences to be drawn from that 
evidence.  If a prima facie case is 
demonstrated when the evidence is so examined, the motion for judgment of 
acquittal properly is denied.  Russell v. State, Wyo., 583 P.2d 690 (1978).  It is proper to grant a motion for 
judgment of acquittal only if there is no substantial evidence to sustain the 
material allegations relating to the offense that is charged.  Heberling v. State, Wyo., 507 P.2d 1 (1973), cert. 
denied 414 U.S. 1022, 94 S. Ct. 444, 38 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1973); Fresquez 
v. State, Wyo., 492 P.2d 197 (1971).  Such a result is 
indicated if the evidence requires the jury to speculate or conjecture as to the 
defendant's guilt or if a reasonable juror must have a reasonable doubt as to 
the existence of any of the essential elements of the crime when the evidence is 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State.  Chavez v. State, supra; Russell v. 
State, 
supra.

 

 

Martinez 
v. State, 2009 
WY 6, ¶ 11, 199 P.3d 526, 
530 (Wyo. 2009) (qouting Aragon v. State, 627 P.2d 599, 602 
(Wyo.1981)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   The appellant was charged and 
convicted under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2009),1 which statute makes unlawful the 
possession of certain controlled substances with intent to deliver, and Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1036(b)(i)(A)(I) and (II),2 which statute provides for specific 
penalties when certain crimes are committed within 500 feet of a school 
zone.  The appellant does not 
dispute the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the "intent to deliver" 
element, or the "within five hundred feet" of a school zone element of the 
crimes for which he was convicted.  
Instead, he asserts that the motion for acquittal should have been 
granted because evidence supporting the "possession" element was lacking.  It is true that the there was no 
evidence that the appellant was in actual possession of the drugs.  For this reason, in prosecuting the 
appellant the State relied on the concept of constructive possession.  Discussing the elements of constructive 
possession, we have said:

 
 
Possession 
of a controlled substance is proved when the evidence establishes that the 
accused either individually or jointly with another exercised dominion and 
control over the substance, had knowledge of its presence, and knowledge that 
the substance was a controlled substance.  
Sotolongo-Garcia [v. State], [2002 WY 185,] ¶ 12, 60 P.3d [687,] 
689 [(Wyo. 2002)]; Wise v. State, 654 P.2d 116, 119 (Wyo. 1982).  Direct evidence of the defendant's 
actual possession of the substance is not required.  Rather, constructive possession is all 
that is necessary and such may be proved by circumstantial evidence linking 
together a series of facts allowing a reasonable inference that the defendant 
had the requisite knowledge and control of the substance.  Sotolongo-Garcia, ¶ 12, 60 P.3d  at 689; 
Wise, 654 P.2d  at 
119.

 
 

Cureton 
v. State, 
2007 WY 168, ¶ 16, 169 P.3d 549, 552 (Wyo. 2007).  When determining whether sufficient 
evidence was presented demonstrating constructive possession, the Court must 
consider the totality of the circumstances.  Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 967 (Wyo. 1996).

 
 
[¶12]   The appellant argues that the State 
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish constructive possession and 
therefore his motion for acquittal should have been granted.  We disagree.  Assuming the truth of the evidence 
presented by the State and giving every favorable inference thereto, we conclude 
that the district court's decision was 
proper.

 
 
[¶13]   Regarding the appellant's "dominion and control" over the 
drugs, Ms. Vandom testified that the drugs belonged to the appellant, and that 
the appellant placed them in the apartment.  She also testified that the appellant 
frequently asked her to give packages of the drugs to people the appellant sent 
to the apartment.  We have said that 
"[i]f a 
defendant is sufficiently associated with the persons having physical custody so 
that he is able, without difficulty to cause the drug to be produced for a 
customer, he can also be found by a jury to have dominion and control over the 
drug and, therefore, possession."  
Wise v. State, 654 P.2d 116, 119 (Wyo. 
1982).  Further, the evidence also 
showed that the appellant had a key to the apartment where the drugs were found 
and many of the appellant's personal items were discovered in the apartment, 
including clothes, shoes, hats, and his 
wallet.

 
 
[¶14]   We turn now to the next element of 
constructive possession  knowledge of the presence of the drugs.  The appellant's friend testified that on 
the night after the search, the appellant told him that there was 
methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana in the apartment.  He also testified that, a few days 
later, the appellant told him there was methamphetamine in the apartment "[i]n 
the pantry on the top shelf to the right."  
When the police searched the apartment, they found methamphetamine in 
that very spot.  This evidence 
sufficiently demonstrates that the appellant was aware of the type and location 
of the drugs in the apartment.

 
 
[¶15]   Next, we examine whether sufficient 
evidence was presented to show that the appellant knew the substances in 
question were illegal controlled substances.  The fact that the drugs were concealed 
in bags and placed in hiding places, such as between the mattress in the bedroom 
and on the top shelf of the pantry, indicates that the appellant knew he was 
bringing illegal controlled substances into the apartment and needed to conceal 
them.  Also, Ms. Vandom's testimony 
that the appellant directed her to give packages of the controlled substances to 
people the appellant sent to the apartment in exchange for money also indicates 
the appellant's knowledge of the illicit nature of the substances.  Finally, the fact that Ms. Vandom was 
told to exchange the packages for money only at the apartment, and not in a more 
public location or at the appellant's residence, also creates an inference that 
the appellant knew that the substances in question were illegal controlled 
substances.

 
 
[¶16]   Finally, the appellant argues that even if he had 
constructive possession, the evidence does not support a finding that the 
elements of such were met on October 30, 2008  the date the Felony Information 
alleges that the crime occurred and also the date listed as an element of the 
crimes in the jury instructions.  
Again, we disagree.  The 
above-described evidence clearly is sufficient to show that the appellant had 
constructive possession of the drugs on October 30, 2008.  Ms. Vandom testified that she had given 
the appellant a key to the apartment in 2007, and that since then the appellant 
always had unfettered access to the apartment.  The appellant's friend testified that 
the appellant sent him the key to the apartment after October 30, 2008, so that 
he could access the apartment.  
Furthermore, the friend's testimony regarding the appellant's behavior 
shortly after the search, and the appellant's specific knowledge regarding the 
variety and location of the drugs, provide sufficient evidence that on October 
30, 2008, the appellant knew of the location and illicit nature of the 
drugs.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   After reviewing the entire record, and accepting all the 
evidence as true and giving every favorable inference thereto, we find that 
the State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that each 
of the elements of constructive possession were present on October 30, 
2008.  Therefore, we conclude that 
the district court properly denied the appellant's motion for a judgment of 
acquittal.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) reads:

 
 
(a)     Except as authorized by 
this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with 
intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance. Any person who 
violates this subsection with respect to:

 
 
(i)      Methamphetamine 
or a controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II which is a narcotic 
drug, is guilty of a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more 
than twenty (20) years, or fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars 
($25,000.00), or both;

 
 

2Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. 35-7-1036(b)(i)(A)(I) and (II) read:

 
 
b)      Any person who is 
convicted of any of the following listed offenses with regard to a controlled 
substance listed in Schedules I through IV shall have the penalties specified in 
this subsection imposed as part of the sentence and in addition to any other 
penalties authorized by law, if that offense was committed within any school bus 
as defined in [W.S. 31-7-102(a)(xl)] or within the boundaries of or within five 
hundred (500) feet of the boundaries of real property used by a school district 
primarily for the education of any student in any grade from kindergarten 
through twelfth grade:

(i)      If an 
adult:

(A)     For manufacture, 
delivery or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver in violation of 
W.S. 35-7-1031(a) or subsection (a) of this section:

(I)      Imprisonment for 
a minimum of two (2) years; and

(II)      An additional 
fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).