Title: RT COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION FOR THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RT COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION FOR THE STATE OF WYOMING2003 WY 14579 P.3d 36Case Number: 02-144Decided: 11/10/2003
October 
Term, A.D. 2003

 

 

RT 
COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; RANGE

TELEPHONE 
COOPERATIVE, INC.; UNION

TELEPHONE 
COMPANY; and DUBOIS

TELEPHONE 
EXCHANGE, INC.,

 

Appellants(Petitioners) 
,

 

v.

                                                                                    

THE 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

FOR 
THE STATE OF WYOMING; and

CONTACT 
COMMUNICATIONS,

 

Appellees(Respondents) 
.

 

 

W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certification

From 
the District Court of Washakie County

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

Bruce 
S. Asay of Associated Legal Group, LLC, Cheyenne, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Asay.

 

Representing 
Appellee Public Service Commission:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and 
Harry D. Ivey, Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Ivey.

Representing 
Appellee Contact Communications:

Alexander 
K. Davison and Wendy J. Curtis of Patton & Davison, Cheyenne, WY.   Argument by Ms. 
Curtis.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      RT 
Communications, Inc., Range Telephone Cooperative, Inc., Union Telephone 
Company, and Dubois Telephone Exchange, Inc. (collectively petitioners) seek 
reversal of an order entered by appellee Wyoming Public Service Commission 
(PSC).  After administrative 
hearing, PSC approved appellee Contact Communications' application 
(Contact) 
for a concurrent certificate of public convenience and necessity to provide 
local telecommunications exchange services.  Eventually this matter was certified to 
this court after petitioners filed a petition of review in the district court 
questioning such order.  Upon our 
review, we affirm.  

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Petitioners 
identify the following issues:

 

[1.]  Did 
the Wyoming Public Service Commission misinterpret the Wyoming statute for 
certificates of public convenience and necessity?

 

[2.]  Did 
the Wyoming Public Service Commission err as a matter of law in refusing to 
follow the provisions of its own regulation?

 

[3.]  Was 
the commission's finding that the applicant possessed sufficient technical, 
financial and managerial resources to provide safe, adequate and reliable local 
exchange service supported by substantial evidence?

 

[4.]  Were 
the petitioners deprived of due process and a fair hearing by action of the 
commission in considering an ex parte document?

 

[5.]  [Were 
t]he petitioners . . . deprived of due process and a fair hearing 
by the commission's refusal to allow appropriate participation in the 
rehearing[?]

 

[6.]  Was 
the decision of the commission contrary to law in that it impermissibly took 
official notice of non-cognizable facts?

 

PSC 
states the issues as:

 

I.  Did 
the Wyoming Public Service Commission follow and apply applicable law when it 
granted the Certificate of Public Convenience and 
Necessity?

 

II.  Is 
the Wyoming Public Service Commission's decision supported by substantial 
evidence?

 

III.  Did 
the Wyoming Public Service Commission base its decision on an ex parte 
document?

 

IV.  Were 
applicants provided due process in proceedings before the Wyoming Public Service 
Commission?

 

V.  Should the Wyoming Supreme Court consider issues raised 
for the first time on appeal? 
 

Contact postures the issues before this court in an affirmative 
phrasing:
 

1.  The 
decision of the PSC was in accordance with law.

 

2.  The 
decision of the PSC was supported by substantial evidence.

 

3.  The 
letter from Contact Communications was correctly not considered by the 
Commission.

 

 

FACTS 
AND BACKGROUND

 

[¶3]      On April 2, 1997, 
Contact, then known as WYOCOM, filed an application with PSC for issuance of a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity to provide local 
telecommunications exchange services as a reseller of services in service areas 
with fewer than 30,000 access lines.  
On May 15, 1997, petitioners, along with TCT West, Inc. and Tri County 
Telephone Association, Inc., moved to intervene with respect to the application, 
and PSC granted this motion. 

 

[¶4]      On March 24, 
2000, Contact amended its application.  
Thereafter, PSC approved the amended application orally in an open 
meeting, ruling that Contact had made a prima facie showing that it 
possessed sufficient technical, financial, and managerial resources to provide 
safe, adequate, and reliable local exchange services.  Shortly after this oral approval, 
petitioners filed a motion to set aside PSC's action and requested that a fair 
hearing be held.  

 

[¶5]      On June 27, 2000, 
PSC issued a Notice and Order confirming its oral approval of the 
application.  However, on October 6, 
2000, PSC issued a procedural order setting a hearing concerning the motion to 
set aside PSC's approval of Contact's application, and PSC conducted a two-day 
hearing on January 25-26, 2001, regarding such issues.  At the conclusion of this hearing, PSC 
orally advised the parties of its tentative decision. 

 

[¶6]      On April 9, 2001, 
the president of Contact sent a letter to PSC expressing Contact's frustration 
with the tentative ruling made by PSC, most particularly the restrictions PSC 
was considering placing on Contact upon granting the application.  This letter was carbon copied to 
petitioners' attorney of record.  On 
April 13, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Application and Revoke 
Certificate.  PSC issued its formal 
memorandum opinion, findings, and order approving Contact's application for a 
concurrent certificate of public convenience and necessity to provide local 
telecommunications exchange services on May 2, 2001.  This memorandum, findings, and order 
granted Contact's application but included the restrictions earlier verbally 
expressed to the parties.  

 

[¶7]      Contact then 
filed a petition for rehearing with PSC contesting certain restrictions PSC had 
placed on Contact and requesting clarification regarding the geographic 
area.  This was followed by 
petitioners filing their objection to Contact's petition for rehearing.  Eventually, PSC entered an order setting 
rehearing and specifying that the parties were required to file contemporaneous 
disclosure statements including the witnesses and documentary evidence they 
intended to offer at the rehearing.  
Petitioners objected to this disclosure proceeding, arguing that it was 
unfair that the disclosure be contemporaneous.  Rather, petitioners asserted that 
Contact should be required to file its disclosure first, allowing petitioners to 
review such disclosure and conduct additional discovery and then file their 
disclosure.  After consideration, 
PSC denied petitioners' objection.  
Subsequently, petitioners failed to file any disclosure as ordered by 
PSC, and PSC refused to allow petitioners to offer witness testimony at 
rehearing as a result.  

 

[¶8]      On July 23, 2001, 
PSC conducted a hearing on Contact's petition for rehearing.  On December 5, 2001, PSC issued its 
Order on Rehearing affirming its previous grant of Contact's application but 
removing the previously imposed restrictions.  Petitioners later filed their Petition 
for Review in the district court.  
On March 18, 2002, the district court certified this matter to this 
court.  

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶9]      In Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 2003 WY 22, ¶¶6-7, 63 P.3d 887, ¶¶6-7 
(Wyo. 2003), we reiterated our standard of review with respect to administrative 
matters:

 

            
Our review of administrative decisions is guided by the standards set 
forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c):

 

(c)  To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when pre­sented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and deter­mine the meaning or applicability of the 
terms of an agency action.  In 
making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial error.  The reviewing 
court shall:

 

(i)  Compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unrea­sonably delayed; 
and

 

(ii)  Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 

(A)  Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 

(B)  Contrary 
to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

 

(C)  In 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

 

(D)  Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or

 

(E)  Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.  

 

See 
Newman v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2002 WY 
91, ¶9, 49 P.3d 163, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002) and McTiernan v. Scott, 2001 WY 87, 
¶11, 31 P.3d 749, ¶11 (Wyo. 2001).

 

            
We further enunciated in Powder River Coal Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 2002 WY 5, ¶5, 38 P.3d 423, ¶5 (Wyo. 
2002):

 

            
When we review cases certified pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b), we apply 
the appellate standards which are applicable to the court of the first 
instance.  State by and through 
Wyoming Department of Revenue v. Buggy Bath Unlimited, Inc., 2001 WY 27, ¶5, 
18 P.3d 1182, ¶5 (Wyo. 2001); see also Union Telephone Company, Inc. 
v. Wyoming Public Service Commis­sion, 907 P.2d 340, 341-42 (Wyo. 
1995).  Judicial review of 
administrative decisions is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  Buggy Bath 
Unlimited, Inc., ¶5; W.R.A.P. 12.09(a); Everheart v. S & L 
Industrial, 957 P.2d 847, 851 (Wyo. 1998).

 

In 
addition, in Powder River Coal Co., at ¶6 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. State, 918 P.2d 980, 983 (Wyo. 1996) and State by and through Dep't of 
Rev. v. Buggy Bath Unlimited, Inc., 2001 WY 27, ¶6, 18 P.3d 1182, ¶6 (Wyo. 
2001)), we noted when this court reviews ques­tions of law posed in an 
administrative context, this court must conduct a de novo review.  We affirm an agency's conclusions of law 
when they are in accordance with the law.  
However, when the agency has failed to properly invoke and apply the 
correct rule of law, we correct the agency's error.  Id.  See also State ex rel. 
Workers' Safety & Compen­sation Div. v. Garl, 2001 WY 59, ¶¶8-9, 26 P.3d 1029, ¶¶8-9 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶10]   We went on in Sinclair Oil 
Corp., at ¶8:

 

            
When issues are presented to us concerning whether there exists 
substantial evidence in the record to support the administrative decision, we 
have described substantial evidence as:  
"relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the 
conclusions of the agency."   
McTiernan v. Scott, at ¶11.  

 

The 
substantial evidence standard also requires that there be more than a scintilla 
of evidence.  It is not required 
that the proof attain such a degree of certainty as to sup­port only one 
conclusion to the exclusion of all others.  
Once the measure of evidence has surpassed the scintilla threshold, the 
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the entire record does 
not mean that the conclusion drawn by the administrative agency is not supported 
by substantial evidence.  Even where 
this court, after reviewing the record, arrives at a different conclusion, the 
court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency's as long as the 
agency's conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.  

 

Joe 
Johnson Company v. Wyoming State Board of Control, 
857 P.2d 312, 314-15 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Department of Employment, Labor 
Standards Division v. Roberts Construction Company, 841 P.2d 854, 857 (Wyo. 
1992)).  "For evidence to be 
sufficient to allow a reasonable mind' to accept an agency's conclusion, there 
must appear in the record evidence which allows either a definitive conclusion 
or a reasonable extrapola­tion based on the surrounding circumstances." 
GID v. Wyoming State Board of Control, 926 P.2d 943, 951 (Wyo. 
1996).

 

Id.  Therefore, 
when this court is charged with reviewing an agency's decision for substantial 
evidence pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E), 

 

[t]hat 
duty requires a review of the entire record to determine if there is relevant 
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
decision.  Joe Johnson 
Company, 857 P.2d  at 314-15.  
Occasionally, the process of review will neces­sarily require the 
reviewing court to engage in an assessment of the facts adduced during the 
administrative hearing.  That 
assessment does not usually involve a reweighing or reconsid­eration of the 
basic facts found by the agency.  
However, as a by-product of that process, the reviewing court may arrive 
at an ultimate conclusion derived from those basic facts that is differ­ent 
from the agency's.  A court will 
reach a different conclusion based on the evidence only in those situations 
where the agency's conclusion is clearly contrary to the weight of the 
evi­dence.

 

McTiernan, 
at ¶16 (footnote omitted).  We have 
further stated in Newman, at ¶12 (quoting State 
ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. v. Jensen, 
2001 WY 51, ¶10, 24 P.3d 1133, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001)) 
that the substantial evidence test to be applied is as 
follows:

 

In 
reviewing findings of fact, we examine the entire record to determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support an agency's findings.  If the agency's decision is supported by 
sub­stantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that 
of the agency and must uphold the findings on appeal.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence.  

 

[¶11]   Finally, we recognized in 
Sinclair Oil Corp., at ¶9:

 

            
Speaking specifically of PSC, we have said that PSC is required to give 
para­mount consideration to the public interest in exercising its statutory 
powers to regulate and supervise public utilities.  The desires of the utility are 
secondary.  Tri County Telephone 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 11 P.3d 938, 941 (Wyo. 2000) (citing 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 662 P.2d 878, 883 (Wyo. 
1983)).  Additionally, in 
rec­ognition of the limited nature of our review, we have explained that the 
judicial function is exhausted when we can find from the evidence a rational 
view for the conclusions of the PSC.  
Tri County Telephone Ass'n, at 941 (citing Telstar 
Communications, Inc. v. Rule Radiophone Servs., Inc., 621 P.2d 241, 246 
(Wyo. 1980)).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

[¶12]   In its decision, PSC 
stated:

 

36.  The 
Wyoming Supreme Court has determined that public interest considerations are 
applicable to the regulation of telecommunications companies in the state of 
Wyoming.  (Tri-County Telephone 
Association, Inc., and TCT West, Inc., v. The Wyoming Public Service 
Commission, 11 P.3d 938 (Wyo. 2000). To this end, the Commission has 
determined that the public interest, at a minimum, requires that Contact 
demonstrate that it possesses sufficient technical, financial and managerial 
resources to provide safe, adequate and reliable local exchange services. This 
requirement is expressly applicable to telecommunications companies seeking a 
Concurrent Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to provide local 
exchange services in the service territories of local exchange companies with 
more than 30,000 access lines in the state of Wyoming pursuant to the provisions 
of W.S. § 37-15-201(b).

 

. . .

 

40.  During 
the course of these proceedings, the [petitioners] alleged the applicability of 
W.S. § 37-2-205(a) relating to Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity. 
While the provisions of W.S. § 37-2-205(a) are applicable to telecommunications 
companies pursuant to the provisions of W.S. § 37-15-408, the Commission rejects 
the [petitioners'] assertions that they are controlling in this case. The 
Commission finds that the provisions of W.S. § 37-2-205 relate specifically to 
Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity to construct plant. The 
construction of plant is not at issue in this case.  The Commission has never enforced the 
requirements of this statute upon telecommunications companies seeking 
Concurrent Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity to provide local 
exchange telecommunications services in the state of Wyoming.  The Commission finds that it would be 
inappropriate to do so in this case. 

 

41.  The 
[petitioners] have also alleged the applicability of Section 204 of the 
Commission's Procedural Rules and Special Regulations relating to applications 
for Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity.  While alleging the applicability of this 
rule, Mr. Clark acknowledged that it is "outdated and discuss[es] the 
construction of facilities." The Commission finds that this rule was originally 
promulgated in response to W.S. § 37-2-205. For the reasons stated in 
paragraph 40, above, the Commission rejects the applicability of Section 204 of 
its Procedural Rules and Special Regulations, to this case. 

 

(Citations 
omitted.)  

 

[¶13]   Petitioners assert that Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 37-2-205(a) and 37-15-201(c) (Lexis Nexis 2003) control the issuance of 
a certificate of public convenience and necessity in this instance and that PSC 
erred as a matter of law by not fully applying these statutes in making its 
determination and in applying Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-15-201(b).  In particular, petitioners argue that 
both §§ 37-2-205(a) and 37-15-201(c) require a public utility to demonstrate 
that there is a need for its services before a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity may be granted and that no such showing was made in this case. 

 

[¶14]   Beginning with § 37-15-201(b) and 
(c), we note that it provides:

 

(b)  The 
commission shall grant a concurrent certificate or certificates of public 
convenience and necessity to provide local exchange service in the service 
territory of a local exchange company with more than thirty thousand (30,000) 
access lines in the state if it finds, after notice and opportunity for hearing, 
that the applicant possesses sufficient technical, financial and managerial 
resources to provide safe, adequate and reliable local exchange services within 
the identified geographic area.

 

(c)  Prior 
to January 1, 2005, in the service territory of a local exchange 
telecommunications company with thirty thousand (30,000) or fewer access lines 
in the state, the commission shall, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, 
issue a concurrent certificate or certificates of public convenience and 
necessity to provide local exchange service, only if the application clearly 
shows the applicant is willing and able to provide safe, adequate and reliable 
local exchange service to all persons within the entire existing local exchange 
area for which the certification is sought and the incumbent local exchange 
service provider:

 

(i)  Consents 
to a concurrent certificate; or

 

(ii)  Is 
unable or unwilling to provide the local exchange service for which the 
concurrent certificate is sought; or

 

(iii)  Fails 
to protest the application for the certificate after notice and opportunity for 
a hearing; or

 

(iv)  Has 
applied for and received a concurrent certificate to provide competitive local 
exchange telecommunications services in any area of this state; 
or

 

(v)  On 
or after the effective date of this chapter, begins to provide one-way 
transmission of radio or video signals through terrestrial, nonsatellite local 
distribution facilities in an area with existing service.

 

Thus, 
its becomes apparent that the Wyoming legislature intended to draw a distinct 
line between the areas with more than thirty thousand access lines and those 
with thirty thousand access lines or less.  
Moreover, it would initially appear that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-15-201(c) 
must be applied in this case because Contact applied in areas with thirty 
thousand access lines or less.

 

[¶15]   However, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the United States in its holding in RT Communications, Inc. v. 
Fed. Communications Comm'n, 201 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2000), 
specifically affirmed the preemption by the Federal Communication Commission 
(FCC) of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-15-201(c) and (d) pursuant to the provisions of § 
253(b) of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (FTA).  In its opinion, the court held that the 
FCC's preemption was based on a reasonable interpretation of the statute and was 
not otherwise unconstitutional.  
That court further agreed with the interpretation rendered by the FCC 
that the requirements contained within Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-15-201(c) and (d) 
were not competitively neutral within the meaning of § 253(b) of the FTA.  The court reached this conclusion 
because these statutes awarded certain local exchange carriers the ultimate 
competitive advantagepreservation of monopoly statusand simultaneously saddled 
potential new entrants with the ultimate competitive disadvantagean 
insurmountable barrier to entry.  
The court also recognized § 253(b) of the FTA forbids any statute which 
prohibits or has the effect of prohibiting entry.  RT Communications, at 
1268.  Therefore, given such 
preemption, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-15-201(c) simply may not be applied in this 
case.

 

[¶16]   We are then faced with determining 
whether PSC properly applied § 37-15-201(b) and appropriately concluded that § 
37-2-205(a) was not applicable under the particular circumstances of this 
case.  Upon review of the historical 
regulatory background regarding telecommunications companies in Wyoming, we see 
that in 1995 the Wyoming legislature adopted the Wyoming Telecommunications Act 
(WTA) which made extensive changes to the existing laws in the area, including 
the laws governing the issuance of certificates.  In doing so, the legislature expressed 
its intent:

 

            
It is the intent of this act to ensure essential telecommunications 
services are universally available to the citizens of this state while 
encouraging the development of new infrastructure, facilities, products and 
services.  The provision of 
telecommunications services has been developed and regulated under a 
monopolistic environment. This act recognizes the increasingly competitive 
nature of the telecommunications industry and the benefits of competition. It is 
the intent of this act to provide a transition from rate of return regulation of 
a monopolistic telecommunications industry to competitive markets and to 
maintain affordable essential telecommunications services through the transition 
period, and the provisions of this act shall be construed to achieve those 
goals.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 37-15-102 (LexisNexis 2003).  In addition upon enactment of the WTA, 
the legislature expressly eliminated telecommunications companies from the 
definition of "public utility" as previously defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
37-1-101 and utilized when applying § 37-2-205.  At that same time, the legislature 
enumerated which existing statutes were to continue to be applicable to 
telecommunications companies.  Wyo. 
Stat. § 37-15-408.  That statute 
provides in part (emphasis added):

 

W.S. 
37-1-104 through 37-1-106, 37-2-102, 37-2-104, . . . 
37-2-205(a), . . . inclusive, unless in conflict with other 
provisions of this chapter, are applicable to telecommunications companies and 
telecommunication companies shall be considered public utilities for the 
purposes of those provisions. 

 

Hence, 
the legislature presumably meant for § 37-2-205(a) to apply with respect to 
telecommunications companies.  

 

[¶17]   Likewise, because of express 
reference, the legislature unquestionably intended that  § 37-15-201 also be applicable to 
the granting of certificates to telecommunications companies.  Section 37-15-201(a) states (emphasis 
added):

 

Except 
for those telecommunications companies that as of January 1, 1995, 
have a valid certificate of public convenience and necessity previously issued 
by the commission to provide local exchange services in the state, all 
telecommunications companies seeking to offer and provide local exchange 
service shall obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the 
commission prior to providing that service in this state. 

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 37-2-205(a) provides (emphasis added):

 

(a)  No 
public utility shall begin construction of a line, plant or 
system, or of any extension of a line, plant or system without 
having first obtained from the commission a certificate that the present or 
future public convenience and necessity require or will require such 
construction.  This act 
shall not be construed to require any public utility operating outside of a city 
or town to secure a certificate for an extension into an area within which it 
has lawfully commenced operation, or for an extension into territory contiguous 
to its line, plant or system for which no certificate is in force and is not 
served by a public utility of like character or for any extension within or to 
territory already served by it, necessary in the ordinary course of its 
business.  If any public utility, in 
constructing or extending its line, plant or system interferes or is about to 
interfere with the operation of the line, plant or system of any other public 
utility already authorized or constructed, the commission on complaint of the 
public utility claiming to be injuriously affected, may after hearing make such 
order and prescribe the terms and conditions for the location of the lines, 
plants or systems affected, as to it are just and reasonable.  The power companies may, without the 
certificate, increase capacity of existing plants.

 

[¶18]   In Wyodak Resources Dev. Corp. 
v. Dep't of Rev., 2002 WY 181, ¶¶18-19, 60 P.3d 129, ¶¶18-19 (Wyo. 2002), we 
recognized: 

 

            
In the conduct of statutory interpretation, we begin by inquiring into 
the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed by the legislature 
according to the manner in which those words are arranged.  If more than one reasonable 
interpretation exists, we resort to general principles of statutory 
construction. When the legislature has spoken in unambiguous terms, however, we 
are bound to the results so expressed.  
State by and through Wyoming Department of Revenue v. Buggy Bath 
Unlimited, Inc., 2001 WY 27, ¶7, 18 P.3d 1182, ¶7 (Wyo. 
2001).

 

            
We have also observed:

 

            
It is the court's obligation to make sense out of a statute and give full 
force and effect to the legislative product; in construing statutes, intention 
of the law-making body must be ascertained from the language of the statute as 
nearly as possible.  A statute must 
not be given a meaning which would nullify its operation if it is susceptible of 
another interpretation.

 

Hasser 
v. Flint Engineering, 
647 P.2d 66, 69-70 (Wyo. 1982).  
Likewise, we will not construe a statute in a way that renders a portion 
of it meaningless.   Fosler 
v. Collins, 13 P.3d 686, 692 (Wyo. 2000); US WEST Communications, Inc. v. 
Wyoming Public Service Commission, 989 P.2d 616, 619-20 (Wyo. 1999).  

 

[¶19]   Review of the plain language 
utilized within § 37-2-205(a) evidences that the legislature intended that it 
apply to situations wherein a utility contemplated construction or the extension 
of a line, plant, or system.  In 
this instance, Contact contemplated no such construction or extension. Contact 
merely requested that it be allowed to provide additional concurrent services 
with the current local exchange carriers on those lines which already existed in 
the area.  Conversely, reviewing the 
wording used within § 37-15-201 and applying the ordinary meaning of such 
wording indicates that the legislature intended that statute to apply to the 
situation at hand.  Contact's 
application determined which statute governed.  Contact only requested to be allowed to 
provide telecommunications services by resale through use of the incumbents' 
facilities, and it did not apply for any construction or extension related 
certificates.

 

[¶20]   Moreover, this conclusion is 
supported by our long-established rules of law that specific statutes control 
over general statutes involving the same subject and that the legislature 
intended no part of its enactments to be inoperative, superfluous, futile, or 
absurd. Board of County Comm'rs v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2002 WY 151, ¶¶30 
and 33, 55 P.3d 714, ¶¶30 and 33 (Wyo. 2002); Bryant v. State ex rel. Dep't 
of Transp., 2002 WY 140, ¶14, 55 P.3d 4, ¶14 (Wyo. 2002); Corkill v. 
Knowles, 955 P.2d 438, 444 (Wyo. 1998).  We further conclude that the decision of 
PSC to apply § 37-15-201(b) is the most reasonable under the circumstances, 
particularly taking into account the directives enumerated in RT 
Communications, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 201 F.3d 1264.  Through utilization of the criteria 
enumerated within § 37-15-201(b), PSC treated Contact's application like it 
would treat an application in an area with more than thirty thousand access 
lines.  This ensured consistent 
treatment and thereby explicitly complied with § 253(b) of the FTA by ensuring 
that Contact was not faced with an insurmountable barrier to entry.  Finally, in making this determination, 
PSC gave the required paramount consideration to the public interest when 
exercising its regulatory statutory powers over public utilities, see 
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, at ¶9, and complied with the 
intent of the Wyoming legislature expressly enumerated in § 37-15-102.  

 

[¶21]   In addition, petitioners complain 
that PSC improperly failed to follow its own administrative rules and 
regulations by not applying section 204 of its rules of practice and 
procedure.  Section 204, which 
governs applications made under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-2-205, reads as 
follows:

 

Section 
204. Applications for Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity. 
Any 
person who will become a public utility after the construction and 
operation of utility facilities shall prior to commencing 
construction file an application for a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity including the following information[.] 

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  By the same rationale 
utilized above with respect to § 37-2-205(a), section 204 does not govern 
Contact's application.  Again, the 
application of Contact did not involve the construction of a line, plant, or 
system.  We therefore conclude PSC 
applied the appropriate rules with respect to its decision.  Indeed, the record reflects PSC took a 
very deliberate, conscientious, and systematic approach in making its 
determination to ensure that the specific criteria existed. 

 

Substantial 
Evidence

 

[¶22]   Contemporaneous with its complaints 
that PSC applied an incorrect legal standard in granting the application filed 
by Contact, petitioners argue PSC's determination was not supported by 
substantial evidence.  In making its 
argument that insufficient evidence was presented to PSC to support its ultimate 
decision, petitioners complain that the financial and technical documentation 
filed and testimony elicited by Contact regarding these areas were inconsistent, 
deficient, or not credible.  

 

[¶23]   Upon review of the record, we 
conclude that Contact possessed sufficient managerial, financial, and technical 
resources to support the concurrent certificate granted by PSC. Contact 
presented evidence concerning its managerial resources by providing the names, 
background, and experience in the telecommunications industry of its president, 
vice-president, and other directors.  
Contact's president also testified concerning the pooling of employment 
talent and business facilities between itself and Wyoming.com.  Contact's pre-filed testimony also 
disclosed that Contact's network was managed on a 
twenty-four-hour/seven-days-a-week basis through two levels of engineers and 
other networking means.

 

[¶24]   Contact's financial capabilities 
were shown through submission of numerous financial documentation indicating 
sufficient equity and profitability.  
Contact was also able to show that it possessed an adequate line of 
credit.  Furthermore, Contact 
demonstrated its knowledge of technical offerings and services required to 
provide telecommunications services and the capabilities of its employees to 
provide and monitor such services.   

 

[¶25]   We, therefore, determine PSC's 
findings and rulings were based on substantial evidence.  Upon careful review and consideration of 
the entire record before us, we hold the record provides a rational basis for 
PSC's ultimate findings of fact and conclusions of law.   As such, we hold these findings of 
fact and conclusions of law were not clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight 
of the evidence.  We recognize, as 
we have on numerous other occasions, that we will not substitute our judgment 
for that of an agency when substantial evidence supports the decision rendered 
by the agency involved.  Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, at ¶38; Elk Horn Ranch, Inc. v. Board of 
County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 167, ¶13, 57 P.3d 1218, ¶13 (Wyo. 2002); Newman 
v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶12, 49 P.3d 163, ¶12 (Wyo. 2002).  

 

Ex 
Parte Allegations

 

[¶26]   Petitioners also assert that PSC 
improperly relied upon an ex parte communication in making its decision and, as 
a result, petitioners were not afforded the right to a fair hearing which 
constitutes manifest injustice. Particularly, petitioners allege that the ex 
parte communication created a bias against Contact and that this bias can be 
seen in PSC's response to Contact's request for rehearing. 

 

[¶27]   As indicated previously, at the 
conclusion of the initial hearing held in this matter, PSC orally advised the 
parties of its tentative decision, which included certain restrictions PSC was 
considering placing on Contact when granting the application.  Thereafter, Contact, through its 
president, sent a letter to PSC expressing Contact's frustration with the 
tentative ruling made by PSC, most particularly the restrictions 
identified.  This letter was carbon 
copied to petitioners' attorney.  
Later, PSC issued its formal memorandum opinion, findings, and order 
approving Contact's application for a concurrent certificate of public 
convenience and necessity to provide local telecommunications exchange services 
that granted Contact's application but included the restrictions on Contact 
earlier verbally expressed to the parties. 

 

[¶28]   Contact then filed a petition for 
rehearing with PSC contesting the restrictions PSC had placed on Contact and 
requesting clarification regarding the geographic area.  PSC granted this petition for 
rehearing.  PSC conducted a hearing 
on Contact's petition for rehearing and issued its Order on Rehearing affirming 
its previous grant of Contact's application but removing its previously imposed 
restrictions.   

 

[¶29]   In Monn v. State, 811 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Wyo. 1991) (emphasis added), we recognized:

 

            
A judicial proceeding is said to be "ex parte when it is taken or granted 
at the instance and for the benefit of one party only, and without notice 
to, or contestation by, any person adversely interested." Black's Law 
Dictionary, p. 517 (5th ed. 1979).  
An ex parte investigation is "[a]n investigation conducted about a person 
who is not personally contacted or questioned."  Id. at p. 
517.

 

Similarly, 
Black's Law Dictionary, p. 597 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added) 
defines "ex parte" as:

 

ex parte, 
adv. 
On or from 
one party only, usu. without notice to or argument from the adverse 
party.   

 

ex 
parte, 
adj.  Done or made at the 
instance and for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or 
argument by, any person adversely interested.

 

[¶30]   We further identified in Seid v. 
Seid, 2001 WY 137, ¶¶14-15, 36 P.3d 1167, ¶¶14-15 (Wyo. 
2001):

 

            
In Coletti v. State, 769 P.2d 361, 362 (Wyo. 1989), we held that 
merely because an ex parte contact might be censurable, it does not 
automatically require reversal and remand.  
Also see Lund v. Lund, 849 P.2d 731, 734-37 (Wyo. 
1993).  In Coletti, it was 
established that the district court had received an ex parte communication from 
a deputy sheriff containing information that was designed to supplement an 
incomplete presentence report.  
However, in that case we gave recognition to the rule that where a matter 
is tried to the court sitting without a jury, as well as in a circumstance where 
the court is pronouncing sentence, a presumption exists that the court will not 
be misled or confused by what is irrelevant and is able to eliminate that which 
is immaterial from that which properly may be considered. Coletti, 769 P.2d  at 363.  In addition, in 
Coletti we took into account the fact that the district court 
categorically disavowed that any use had been made of the ex parte 
communication.  Id. Here, the 
district court disavowed ever having seen the letter upon which this claim 
focuses.

 

            
In a case where a guardian ad litem had ex parte contact with a district 
court, and we determined that it constituted an ethical impropriety, we held 
that reversal of a judgment required more than simply the occurrence of the ex 
parte communication.  Moore v. 
Moore, 809 P.2d 261, 264 (Wyo. 1991).  
In that case, we espoused the rule that in order to lead to the reversal 
of a judgment in such an instance, a manifest injustice must appear.  Further, in order to evaluate the 
presence of a manifest injustice, we look to the totality of the 
circumstances.

 

[¶31]   In this instance, Contact's letter 
was carbon copied to counsel for petitioners.  Thus, it technically does not constitute 
an ex parte document.  In addition, 
petitioners clearly responded to this letter through the filing of their Motion 
to Dismiss Application and Revoke Certificate.  In any event, even assuming that the 
letter constitutes an improper ex parte communication, upon our review of the 
totality of circumstances, we conclude that no manifest injustice 
occurred.

 

[¶32]   Initially, we recognize that PSC 
specifically identified that it determined this letter did not constitute a 
formal motion and, consequently, no formal action was taken with regard to 
it.  Moreover, PSC in its 
substantive findings contained within its Order on Rehearing, 
stated:

 

38.  At 
the rehearing, Contact presented the testimonies of Mr. Steve Mossbrook and Mr. 
Christopher Savage.

 

39.  Mr. 
Mossbrook testified on behalf of Contact and Wyoming.com, Contact's parent 
company.  Mr. Mossbrook's testimony 
on behalf of Wyoming.com addressed the issue of the [47 U.S.C.] 214(e) 
restrictions upon Contact's certificate and the impact they would have on the 
service offerings of Wyoming.com.  
Specifically, Mr. Mossbrook testified regarding the cost of the services 
that Contact could provide Wyoming.com.

 

40.  Mr. 
Mossbrook next testified on behalf of Contact.  Mr. Mossbrook's testimony addressed the 
issues of the restrictions imposed upon the concurrent certificate of public 
convenience and necessity through the imposition of the 47 U.S.C[.] 214(e) 
eligible telecommunications carrier requirements.  Mr. Mossbrook testified regarding cherry 
picking, stating that Contact does not "elicit anything that would specify an 
advantage that would be greater for certain customers than others in hopes of 
taking them away from the ILECs [incumbent local exchange carriers] in some 
way".

 

41.  Mr. 
Mossbrook also testified regarding the ETC [eligible telecommunications carrier] 
issue and the burden it placed on Contact's CLEC [competitive local exchange 
carrier] entry.  Specifically, Mr. 
Mossbrook testified that achieving ETC status meant the provisioning of voice 
service, which would require a large investment to purchase the equipment 
necessary to provide voice services.  
He testified that this would result in Contact competing heavily against 
the ILECs as a means of recouping the money spent on the new equipment in an 
effort to meet the ETC standards.  
Mr. Mossbrook stated that Contact did not have any immediate plans of 
offering voice services and without such a requirement, the services offered by 
Contact in the independent territories would be limited to data 
services.

 

42.  Mr. 
Savage's testimony addressed issues concerning the [F]ederal Telecommunications 
Act of 1996.   Mr. Savage 
testified regarding the requirements of 47 U.S.C[.] Sections 214, 253, and 251, 
and how they interrelate.  
Specifically, Mr. Savage testified that if Contact were to have to meet 
the 214(e) requirements, it might have some difficulty meeting that requirement 
if an ILEC exercised its right to a temporary exemption under Sections 251 
(f)(1) and 251 (f)(2).

 

43.  Mr. 
Savage also testified that the protections which the Commission sought to give 
the [petitioners] are available through the interconnections process and are not 
appropriately addressed during the certificate proceedings.  Mr. Savage stated that the conditions on 
the certificate should be removed subject to the rights that any small telephone 
company may have under Section 251(f) to object to particular aspects of the 
interconnection and competition regime.  
He further stated that if the Commission is committed to a regime in 
which there will be competing providers of universal service in rural 
territories, then the condition that is on the certificate needs to be modified 
so that it more closely corresponds to the balance of rights and obligations of 
both competitors and small rural telephone companies that Congress put into the 
statute.

 

(Citations 
omitted.)  PSC then formally recited 
the applicable law and found that the concerns which initially led to its 
imposition of restrictions when granting the certificate would be adequately 
addressed through the interconnection process and the protections afforded by 47 
U.S.C. 251(f)(1).  Consequently, PSC 
removed the previously ordered restrictions.  

 

[¶33]   Again, upon our review of the 
record, we confirm the findings of fact set forth by PSC within its Order on 
Rehearing.  Moreover, we conclude 
that the reasoning utilized by PSC in removing the restrictions is based on 
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as rational for this 
conclusion.  Therefore, while we 
certainly do not condone Contact's action in sending the letter to PSC, we hold 
that petitioners' argument is ultimately unpersuasive.

 

 

[¶34]   Petitioners also complain that PSC 
improperly required petitioners to file contemporaneous disclosure on rehearing 
and then improperly refused to allow petitioners to present witness testimony at 
the rehearing when they failed to comply with PSC's directive.                           

 

            
It is well established in Wyoming that with regard to an agency's 
decision on the admis­sion or exclusion of evidence and testimony, such is 
left within the sound discretion of the agency.   Judicial discretion is a composite 
of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it 
means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the 
circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. In re: 
Worker's Compensation Claim of Shryack, 3 P.3d 850, 855 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting 
Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998)).  An abuse of discretion has also been 
said to have occurred only when the decision shocks the conscience of the court 
and appears to be so unfair and inequitable that a reasonable person could not 
abide it.  Hall v. Hall, 2002 
WY 30, ¶12, 40 P.3d 1228, ¶12 (Wyo. 2002); Everheart v. S & L 
Industrial, 957 P.2d 847, 853 (Wyo. 1998); Goddard v. Colonel Bozeman's 
Restaurant, 914 P.2d 1233, 1238 (Wyo. 1996).

 

Sinclair 
Oil Corp., 
2003 WY 22, ¶41.

 

[¶35]   As indicated previously, PSC 
entered an order setting rehearing and required that the parties file 
contemporaneous disclosure statements including the witnesses and documentary 
evidence they intended to offer at the rehearing by a date certain.  Petitioners objected to this disclosure 
process, arguing that it was unfair that the disclosure be contemporaneous and 
argued that Contact should be required to file its disclosure first allowing 
petitioners to review such disclosure and conduct additional discovery and then 
file their disclosure.  PSC denied 
petitioners' objection.  Petitioners 
then failed to file any disclosure as ordered by PSC, and PSC refused to allow 
petitioners to offer witness testimony at rehearing as a result.  

 

[¶36]   In making its determination 
regarding these issues, PSC detailed in its Order on 
Rehearing:

 

32.  The 
[petitioners'] objection was considered, at the Commission's open meeting held 
on July 17, 2001.  For the reasons 
stated below, the Commission denied the relief requested in the objection.  

 

a.  The 
Commission determined that throughout the course of these proceedings, the 
[petitioners] have consistently sought to delay final resolution of this 
matter.  The Commission viewed the 
filing of the objection as merely another delay tactic.

 

b.  Section 
104(c) of the Commission's Procedural Rules and Special Regulations provides 
that "prefiled testimony and exhibits shall be filed by applicants, intervenors 
and staff in the manner and time designated by the Commission by separate 
order."  The establishment of 
contemporaneous prefiling deadlines is common practice, particularly in the 
context of rehearings.

 

c.  The 
Commission determined that the [petitioners] were not disadvantaged by the 
contemporaneous prefiling deadline due to the fact that the issues to be 
addressed, on rehearing, had been limited to issues that were originally raised 
by the [petitioners] in the initial hearing.

 

33.  The 
Commission viewed the [petitioners'] failure to prefile testimony, or request an 
extension of time in which to do so, as an appropriate method by which to avoid 
the contemporaneous filing deadline.  
Consequently, the Commission believed that the appropriate sanction, for 
this action, was to preclude the [petitioners] from offering witness testimony 
at the rehearing.  The Commission 
issued its Order Denying Relief Requested in Objection to Procedural Order on 
July 20, 2001. 

 

[¶37]   Petitioners' main thrust in this 
area is that because new issues were being addressed upon rehearing, they should 
have been afforded prior disclosure by Contact and an opportunity to conduct 
discovery before having to make their own disclosure.  Thus, they assert that they were denied 
due process given PSC's decisions.  
However, our review of the record indicates that PSC did limit the issues 
to be addressed on rehearing to the restrictions imposed by 47 U.S.C. 214(e) 
eligible telecommunications carrier requirements, and such issues were addressed 
by petitioners at the initial hearing.  
Therefore, we fail to see how petitioners were prejudiced by PSC's 
ruling.  In addition, although we 
cannot comment concerning the alleged delay by petitioners, as the entire record 
on appeal has not been designated before us, the record does reflect that 
Contact's amended application was filed on March 24, 2000, and that substantial 
time had elapsed since that time.  
Finally, petitioners were given more than adequate notice of the 
disclosure deadline but chose not to comply or file any other appropriate motion 
further addressing such issues.  
Accordingly, we conclude that PSC's rulings may not be characterized as 
an abuse of discretion because such decisions do not shock the conscience of 
this court and do not appear to be so unfair and inequitable that petitioners 
could not have reasonably followed PSC's directives.

 

[¶38]   Additionally, petitioners allege 
that it was improper for PSC to take judicial notice of certain non-cognizable 
facts and that each of these actions by PSC violated petitioners' due process 
rights.  Petitioners argue that they 
were not given appropriate notice that PSC was going to take judicial notice of 
certain facts in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-3-107(r) and 16-3-108(d) of 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.  
Hence, petitioners assert that PSC erred by indicating in paragraph 38 of 
its May 2, 2001 order that its ultimate finding that Contact had sufficient 
technical, financial and managerial resources to warrant issuance of a 
concurrent certificate was supported by findings made in an unrelated case.1  

 

[¶39]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-3-107(r) does 
require that findings of fact shall be based exclusively on the evidence and 
matters officially noticed.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-108(d) details the manner in which parties must be notified if 
an administrative body takes judicial notice of cognizable facts.  However, under long-standing precedent, 
this court has also clearly established it will not consider those issues on 
appeal not previously raised.  
State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 2001 WY 90, ¶35, 32 P.3d 325, 
¶35 (Wyo. 2001); Cooper v. Town of Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 1208 (Wyo. 
2000); R.O. Corp. v. John H. Bell Iron Mountain Ranch Co., 781 P.2d 910, 913 (Wyo. 1989).  Petitioners failed 
to make such an argument to PSC, although they certainly had an opportunity to 
do so.

 

[¶40]   Moreover, even if PSC's actions are 
deemed to be improper, we find them to constitute harmless error.  Our review of the record discloses that 
sufficient evidence existed for PSC to conclude that Contact had sufficient 
technical, financial, and managerial resources to warrant issuance of a 
concurrent certificate above and beyond those facts judicially noticed by 
PSC.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶41]   Upon our 
careful review and analysis, we affirm the action of PSC in approving the application of 
Contact seeking a concurrent certificate of public convenience and 
necessity to provide local telecommunications exchange services. 
 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1In this order, PSC noted that 
Contact had previously shown that it possessed a level of technical, financial, 
and managerial resources that was sufficient to warrant the granting of a 
concurrent certificate of public convenience and necessity in an area with more 
than thirty thousand access lines in Wyoming in another matter and that 
Contact's technical, financial, and managerial resources met or exceeded those 
of other companies who were previously granted such a certificate.