Title: People v. Wagener

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 88843-Agenda 6-November 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								MICHAEL WAGENER, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 1, 2001.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Michael Wagener, was charged with first degree
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 1994)) and concealment of a
homicidal death (720 ILCS 5/9-3.1 (West 1994)). After a bench
trial in the circuit court of Cook County, he was found guilty but
mentally ill of both offenses. The court imposed consecutive
prison sentences of 50 years for his murder conviction and 5 years
for his conviction of concealment of a homicidal death. The
appellate court affirmed. No. 1-98-1561 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted defendant leave to appeal
(177 Ill. 2d R. 315), and affirm his convictions and sentence.
BACKGROUND
	Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
of his guilt, nor does he contend that the circuit court's conclusion
that he was guilty but mentally ill, rather than legally insane, was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we will
set out only the facts relevant to the issues raised in this appeal.
For context, we note that the State proved the following facts in its
case in chief. On December 2, 1994, defendant fatally bludgeoned
and strangled his wife, Mary, in their home in Chicago. He
wrapped her body in plastic and hid it under the back porch of the
house. He then drove to Menominee, Wisconsin, with his
daughter, Ashley, where he checked into a hotel using an assumed
name and address. He was arrested at the hotel on December 5.
While in police custody, he gave a statement in which he admitted
killing his wife and secreting her body at their house.
	Defendant's trial strategy was an insanity defense. See 720
ILCS 5/6-2 (West 1994). He called his two sisters as witnesses.
Both stated that defendant blamed the September 1989 loss of his
job at a major Chicago law firm on a conspiracy to "ruin his life."
Defendant believed that people were putting chemicals in his work
area so that he would itch and sneeze all day; "messing with"
papers in his office and talking about him behind his back; "doing
things" to his telephone; and following him. In subsequent
conversations, defendant stated that the firm had "enlisted the
CIA, the FBI, the post office, just about everybody to continue to
ruin his life." He believed that there were listening devices in his
house and spent thousands of dollars to have the house
"debugged" multiple times. His sisters tried to get defendant
psychological help, but he refused.
	Defendant was also extremely overprotective of his children
and fearful for their safety. When his son, Richard, died of sudden
infant death syndrome in February 1994, defendant believed his
wife had killed the child and he became very depressed. Although
defendant and his wife began to go to marriage counseling in the
summer of 1994, defendant remained depressed and continued to
believe that his wife had killed their son.
	One of defendant's sisters, Cathy Michiels, had several
telephone conversations with defendant on December 3, 1994, the
day after the murder. In the course of the conversations, defendant
told her that his daughter was with him and was all right, but when
Michiels asked him if he had hurt his wife, he told her "it was bad,
that it was very bad, it was extreme." Defendant told Michiels that
his wife had confessed to killing their son. Defendant told
Michiels that he needed a lawyer. Michiels referred him to
Thomas Gooch, an Illinois attorney.
	Michiels was subsequently contacted by a different attorney,
who told her that defendant wanted Michiels to come to
Menominee and get Ashley before defendant turned himself in.
Michiels contacted Gooch to ask if he knew anything about the
arrangement. Michiels testified that Gooch told her that "he was
aware of it, that he thought that [defendant] was-that it wasn't
really an attorney that called him. He thought it was [defendant]
pretending, you know, to be an attorney and he wasn't driving up
to Menominee so he had contacted the Chicago Police Department
and called them." Michiels did drive to Menominee to take
custody of Ashley.
	During cross-examination, the State asked Michiels, over
objection, about another conversation she had with attorney
Gooch. Michiels denied recalling that Gooch had told her that
defendant had "asked him what the punishment was for
committing a capital crime and crossing state lines." However, she
admitted that it was possible that she had so told a police officer.
	The defense also called three expert witnesses on the topic of
defendant's sanity. Drs. Larry Heinrich, Marvin Schwarz, and
Matthew Markos all testified that at the time of the crime
defendant was insane-he could not appreciate the criminality of
his offense, nor could he conform his conduct to the requirements
of the law. Each believed that defendant had a delusional
psychotic disorder, and that he had killed his wife because he
believed his wife meant to kill Ashley, just as he believed she had
killed their other child.
	Each expert testified that he had reviewed the police reports
generated in connection with the case. One of these reports
contained the statement with which the State had cross-examined
Michiels-that attorney Gooch had told her that defendant had
asked him about the penalty for committing a capital crime and
then crossing state lines. The State cross-examined all of the
defense experts with this statement, over defendant's continuing
objection to the line of questioning.
	In rebuttal the State presented an expert, Dr. Carl Wahlstrom.
Dr. Wahlstrom agreed with the defense experts that defendant was
suffering from a "persecutory" type of delusional disorder.
However, he testified that defendant was sane at the time of the
crime. One of the reasons for his conclusion was defendant's
ability to "very carefully conceal the crime." Specifically, Dr.
Wahlstrom relied in part on the fact that when defendant arrived
in Menominee, "he contacted an attorney regarding the issue of
having-regarding everything that is involved and the commission
of two [sic] capital crimes."
	The court found defendant guilty but mentally ill of first
degree murder and concealment of a homicidal death. At a
subsequent hearing, defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms
of 50 years' imprisonment for his murder conviction and 5 years'
imprisonment for his concealment conviction. The appellate court
affirmed. No. 1-98-1561 (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23). We granted defendant leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315.


ANALYSIS


	Defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed for
violations of his attorney-client privilege. In supplemental
briefing, defendant contends that his sentence should be vacated
because section 5-8-4(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730
ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 1994)), under which his sentences were
made consecutive, is unconstitutional.

I. Attorney-Client Privilege


	Defendant first contends that he is entitled to a new trial. He
argues that his conversation with attorney Gooch was protected by
the attorney-client privilege, and that the disclosure in the police
report that he had asked attorney Gooch about the penalty for
committing a capital crime and crossing state lines breached his
privilege. He maintains that the State's use of this evidence at trial
constituted reversible error. Although the State does not admit that
the statements to attorney Gooch were privileged, it contends that
assuming that they were initially privileged, defendant waived the
privilege. We agree.
	We assume, arguendo, that defendant's conversation with
attorney Gooch was privileged at the time it occurred. We also
assume that the privilege remained intact despite the disclosure by
Gooch to defendant's sister, her subsequent disclosure to the
police, and the recording of that statement in the written report.
Indeed, the State does not maintain that any privilege which might
have attached to defendant's statement was waived by any of these
acts. Instead, the State asserts that defendant waived any privilege
by giving the police report containing the statement to his
testifying expert witnesses.
	We begin with the general rule that experts may be
cross-examined for the purpose of discrediting their testimony, as
well as to ascertain which factors were taken into account and
which were disregarded in arriving at these conclusions. People v.
Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 329 (1998). Opposing counsel is
allowed to cross-examine an expert with respect to material which
he has reviewed but upon which he did not rely. People v. Page,
156 Ill. 2d 258, 275 (1993), quoting People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 179 (1992). Indeed, counsel may venture beyond the facts
supported by the record in inquiring as to what changes of
conditions would affect his opinion. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 329;
Page, 156 Ill. 2d  at 275; Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 179. Thus the
general rule would allow the State to cross-examine the experts
with the content of a report included among the materials which
they considered in forming their opinions.
	Defendant does not dispute the above law, but contends that
general rules regarding cross-examination of experts are beside the
point in this case. He contends that it is irrelevant that the police
report containing his statement was supplied to the psychiatric
experts testifying for the defense because the statement was still
privileged. Defendant argues that "in insanity cases the attorney-client privilege applies to information received by the defense
mental health experts in the same manner as it does to the
defendant's attorney." He relies on this court's opinion in People
v. Knuckles, 165 Ill. 2d 125 (1995). There, this court extended
attorney-client privilege to communications between a defendant
and a psychiatric expert, in order to "accord the common law
attorney-client privilege the scope necessary to meet the
complexities of modern legal practice." Knuckles, 165 Ill. 2d  at
135.
	However, Knuckles distinguished between testifying and
nontestifying experts. Communications between a defendant
raising an insanity defense and a psychiatric expert are protected
by the attorney-client privilege only so long as "the psychiatrist
will not testify and the psychiatrist's notes and opinions will not
be used in the formulation of the other defense experts' trial
testimony." Knuckles, 165 Ill. 2d  at 140. Contrarily, the privilege
is waived "with respect to the testimony and reports of those
experts who are identified by the defense as witnesses who will be
called to testify on behalf of the defendant at trial, or whose notes
and reports are used by other defense experts who testify."
Knuckles, 165 Ill. 2d  at 139.
	Thus Knuckles is of no help to defendant. Drs. Heinrich,
Schwarz and Markos all testified at trial. Thus, the attorney-client
privilege between them and defendant was waived.(1) Knuckles, 165 Ill. 2d  at 139. Because the communication had been revealed to
these persons with whom the privilege was waived, defendant
waived the privilege entirely. See Profit Management
Development, Inc. v. Jacobson, Brandvik & Anderson, Ltd., 309
Ill. App. 3d 289, 299 (1999) ("[a]ny disclosure by the client is
inherently inconsistent with the policy behind the privilege of
facilitating a confidential attorney-client relationship and,
therefore, must result in a waiver of the privilege"); People v.
Childs, 305 Ill. App. 3d 128, 136 (1999) (same); Fidelity &
Casualty Co. v. Mobay Chemical Corp., 252 Ill. App. 3d 992,
1000-01 (1992) (same).
	Defendant relies on Regan v. Garfield Ridge Trust & Savings
Bank, 220 Ill. App. 3d 1078 (1991), for the proposition that a party
does not waive the protection of the attorney-client privilege by
calling a witness who does not testify as to privileged matters. In
Regan, the plaintiff called his prior attorney as a witness to testify
regarding the attorney's dealings with defendants and their
lawyers. When defendants attempted to cross-examine the attorney
regarding conversations with his client, the attorney refused to
answer, asserting attorney-client privilege. The appellate court
agreed with the trial court that the privilege had not been waived.
Regan, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 1090-91.
	Regan is distinguishable because, in the instant case, the
waiver did not depend on the substance of the witnesses'
testimony. The mere fact that they testified waived attorney-client
privilege between them and defendant. Knuckles, 165 Ill. 2d  at
139. While we agree with Regan that the attorney-client privilege
is not waived by simply calling an attorney as a witness to matters
not involving the privilege, the attorney-client privilege between
a defendant and a psychiatric expert depends upon the expert's not
testifying at all. Once this fact changes, the privilege is waived.
Knuckles, 165 Ill. 2d  at 139-40. Accordingly, the privilege was
waived in its entirety with respect to all information defendant had
shared with the experts, just as it would be by the voluntary
revelation of a privileged communication to any person with
whom the privilege was not shared. See Profit Management
Development, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 299; Childs, 305 Ill. App. 3d at
136; Fidelity & Casualty Co., 252 Ill. App. 3d at 1000-01.
	In his opening brief to this court, defendant argues that the
privilege could not have been waived by attorney Gooch's
disclosure to defendant's sister. He bases this contention on
statements in various cases that a client will not be held to have
waived the privilege through an unauthorized disclosure by his
counsel. See, e.g., Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th
Cir. 1949); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951
(N.D. Ill. 1982); Chavez v. Watts, 161 Ill. App. 3d 664 (1987);
People v. Mudge, 143 Ill. App. 3d 193 (1986); 8 J. Wigmore,
Evidence §2325 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). However, as
previously noted, the State does not argue that Gooch's disclosure
constituted a waiver of the privilege.
	Moreover, as the State notes in response, this rule does not
vitiate the waiver which occurred in this case when defendant's
trial counsel disclosed the information to the testifying expert
witnesses. The very section of Wigmore upon which defendant
relies states that
			"[s]ince the attorney has implied authority from the
client *** to make admissions and otherwise to act in all
that concerns the management of the cause, all disclosures
(oral or written) voluntarily made to the opposing party or
to third persons in the course of negotiations for
settlement, or in the course of taking adverse steps in
litigation *** are receivable as being made under an
implied waiver of privilege, giving authority to disclose
the confidences when necessary in the opinion of the
attorney. This is so unless it appears that the attorney has
acted in bad faith toward the client." (Emphasis in
original.) 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2325 (McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961).
This clearly supports the State's position that trial counsel's
disclosure of the information waived whatever privilege may have
existed. See also American Bar Association Section of Litigation,
The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine, at
165 (3d ed. 1997) ("[a]lthough the client is the holder of the
privilege, it is ordinarily the lawyer's obligation to claim the
privilege on the client's behalf, even in the client's absence.
Indeed, in most instances, it is through actions taken (or not taken)
by counsel that courts find a waiver has occurred"). This court has
previously allowed trial counsel to waive a client's privilege. See
People v. Newbury, 53 Ill. 2d 228, 234-35 (1972) (attorney waived
client's physician-patient privilege by questioning physician on
direct examination). See also People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 118
(1998) (in the course of litigation, "[a] defendant is bound by the
acts or omissions of his counsel"); cf. People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 240 (2000) ("[t]he only trial-related decisions over which
a defendant ultimately must have control are: whether to plead
guilty; whether to waive a jury trial; whether to testify in his own
behalf; whether to appeal; and whether to submit a lesser-included
offense instruction").
	All of the authorities upon which defendant relies refer to
unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure. In this case defendant has
not even argued that the disclosure by trial counsel to the expert
witnesses was either unauthorized or inadvertent, and it was
defendant's burden to so establish. Golden Valley Microwave
Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 204, 207 (N.D.
Ind. 1990); cf. United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548, 551 (10th Cir.
1979).
	Any attorney-client privilege which might have protected the
conversations between defendant and attorney Gooch was waived
by the disclosure of the statement to defendant's testifying expert
witnesses. Accordingly, we need not reach the State's alternative
arguments that the statements were not privileged and that any
error in their admission was harmless.


II. Constitutionality of Defendant's Sentence


	Defendant contends in the alternative that his sentences must
run concurrently, rather than consecutively. While this case was
pending on appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). This court allowed the parties to submit
supplemental briefs on the constitutionality of defendant's
consecutive sentence pursuant to section 5-8-4(b) of the Unified
Code of Corrections (the Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West
1994)) in the wake of Apprendi.
	Before addressing its merits, the State contends that defendant
has waived his argument by failing to raise it at trial, even though
Apprendi was not decided until more than two years after
defendant's trial. The State contends that the recent vintage of
Apprendi is irrelevant because "the cases which were the
precursors to Apprendi *** addressed the same general issue of
enhanced penalties based upon facts presented at sentencing." The
State further contends that defendant should not be allowed to rely
upon the rule that a party may challenge the constitutionality of a
statute at any time because "the statute under which defendant was
sentenced has not been declared unconstitutional on its face.
Therefore, the void ab initio [sic] doctrine *** is inapplicable. At
worst, section 5-8-4(b) may be unconstitutional only as applied
to a particular case, but the void ab initio [sic] doctrine has never
been applied to such situations." (Emphasis in original.)
	Defendant's argument is not waived. First, a party may
challenge the constitutionality of a statute at any time. See, e.g.,
People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1 (2000). We reject the State's
argument, made without benefit of authority, that defendant falls
outside of this rule because the statute "has not been declared
unconstitutional on its face." The State appears to contend that a
party may only challenge a statute which has already been
declared facially unconstitutional. We decline to so hold.
	Additional support for the conclusion that defendant has not
waived the argument may be found in People v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 331 (1997). There, a defendant challenged on appeal a sentence
imposed pursuant to a guilty plea. The State contended that
defendant should be barred from challenging his sentence on
appeal because he had not moved to withdraw his guilty plea in
the trial court. We found the argument was not waived, because
the defendant was arguing that the court had imposed a sentence
for which it lacked statutory authority, rather than merely that his
sentence was excessive. We held that the rule requiring a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea before arguing that a sentence
was excessive would not "bar defendant's claim that his sentence
was void because it does not conform with the statute." Williams,
179 Ill. 2d  at 333. See also People v. Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d 409, 413
(1998) (defendant's argument that his sentence "violated statutory
requirements" could be considered regardless of whether
defendant had moved to withdraw his guilty plea).
	Accordingly, we will address the merits of defendant's due
process claim.
	Section 5-8-4(b) of the Code allows the trial court to impose
consecutive sentences in certain cases. At the time of defendant's
offenses, it provided:
			"The court shall not impose a consecutive sentence
except as provided for in subsection (a) unless, having
regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and character of the defendant, it is of the
opinion that such a term is required to protect the public
from further criminal conduct by the defendant, the basis
for which the court shall set forth in the record." 730
ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 1994).
The parties agree that the trial court imposed consecutive
sentences on defendant pursuant to section 5-8-4(b), based on a
finding that consecutive sentences were required to protect the
public from defendant. Defendant contends that his sentence is
void because he was entitled, as a matter of due process, to have
a jury, rather than the court, make this finding. He relies, as
previously noted, on the Supreme Court's opinion in Apprendi.
	In Apprendi, the Court considered three New Jersey statutes.
One statute classified the possession of a firearm for an unlawful
purpose as a "second degree" offense. Another statute provided
that a second degree offense was punishable by imprisonment for
"between five years and 10 years." A third statute, which the New
Jersey Supreme Court labeled a "hate crime" statute, authorized an
extended term of between 10 and 20 years' imprisonment for a
second degree offense if the trial judge found by a preponderance
of the evidence that "[t]he defendant in committing the crime
acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of
individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion,
sexual orientation or ethnicity." The defendant was sentenced to
12 years' imprisonment for possession of a firearm because the
trial court found that defendant had violated the hate crime statute.
	The Court found that the "hate crime" statute violated due
process. Specifically, the Court extended to state statutes its prior
holding that in federal statutes " 'any fact (other than prior
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must
be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 476, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 446, 120 S. Ct.  at 2355, quoting Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 326 n.6, 119 S. Ct. 1215, 1224 n.6 (1999). See also Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455, 120 S. Ct.  at 2362-63 ("[o]ther than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt").
	The State contends that Apprendi does not apply to this case
because no additional factual findings beyond the facts of
defendant's convictions were required for defendant's sentences
to be made consecutive. The State relies on section 9-3.1 of the
Criminal Code, which defines the offense of concealment of
homicidal death, the second of the two offenses of which
defendant was convicted. Subsection (b) of that statute provides:
			"Nothing in this Section prevents the defendant from
also being charged with and tried for the first degree
murder, second degree murder or involuntary
manslaughter of the person whose death is concealed. If
a person convicted under this Section is also convicted of
first degree murder, second degree murder or involuntary
manslaughter, the penalty under this Section shall be
imposed separately and in addition to the penalty for first
degree murder, second degree murder or involuntary
manslaughter." 720 ILCS 5/9-3.1(b) (West 1994).
The State contends that the last sentence of this section requires
the trial court to impose consecutive sentences when a defendant
is convicted of both concealment of a homicidal death and first
degree murder, second degree murder, or involuntary
manslaughter. To construe the statute otherwise, the State
contends, would render the phrase "in addition to" mere
surplusage. Thus, the State argues, there is no Apprendi issue in
this case because the trial court did not have to make any factual
findings in order for the sentences to be consecutive.
	We disagree. The State's position has been unanimously
rejected by our appellate court, which has held that the "separately
and in addition to" language is simply intended to clarify that a
conviction for concealment of a homicidal death does not merge
into a murder conviction. See, e.g., People v. Dover, 312 Ill. App.
3d 790 (2000); People v. Gil, 125 Ill. App. 3d 892 (1984); People
v. Schlemm, 82 Ill. App. 3d 639 (1980). We agree with this
construction. As these cases have noted, section 5-8-4 of the Code
of Corrections governs whether sentences are to be served
consecutively. Moreover, section 5-8-4 shows that the legislature
uses the word "consecutive," rather than the more ambiguous
phrase "in addition to," when it intends that the sentences be
served consecutively. Although this construction can be
understood as rendering the "in addition to" language redundant,
we note that the legislature has twice amended section 9-3.1 since
the decisions in Gil and Schlemm (see Pub. Act 84-1308, art. III,
§23, eff. August 25, 1986; Pub. Act 84-1450, §2, eff. July 1,
1987), but has left intact the "separately and in addition to"
language. "[T]his court presumes that the legislature knew of the
prior interpretation placed on its language by judicial decision,"
and "[w]here terms used in a statute have acquired a settled
meaning through judicial construction and are retained in
subsequent amendments, they are to be understood as previously
interpreted by the courts unless the legislature clearly indicates a
contrary intention." Carver v. Bond/Fayette/ Effingham Regional
Board of School Trustees, 146 Ill. 2d 347, 353 (1992). We find
that section 9-3.1 does not mandate consecutive sentences.
	However, we affirm defendant's sentence in this case. Our
appellate court is sharply divided on the question of whether
Apprendi concerns are raised by consecutive sentencing, where the
sentences for the individual crimes remain within the statutory
range. Compare People v. Lucas, No. 1-99-2623, slip op. at 6-7
(March 21, 2001); People v. Hayes, 319 Ill. App. 3d 810, 820
(2001); People v. Maiden, 318 Ill. App. 3d 545, 550 (2001);
People v. Primm, 319 Ill. App. 3d 411, 428 (2000); People v.
Sutherland, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1117, 1131 (2000) (all finding section
5-8-4(a) of the Code constitutional and affirming defendants'
consecutive sentences thereunder), with People v. Mason, 318 Ill.
App. 3d 314, 320 (2000); People v. Harden, 318 Ill. App. 3d 425,
428 (2000); People v. Waldrup, 317 Ill. App. 3d 288, 300 (2000);
People v. Carney, 317 Ill. App. 3d 806, 813 (2000); People v.
Clifton, Nos. 1-98-2126, 1-98-2384 cons., slip op. at 55
(September 29, 2000) (all finding section 5-8-4(a)
unconstitutional and vacating consecutive nature of defendants'
sentences thereunder). Those decisions which have struck down
section 5-8-4(a) of the Code have focused on the fact that
consecutive sentencing increases the actual amount of time a
defendant will spend in jail, and reasoned that Apprendi
commands that any fact which in reality increases the amount of
time spent in jail should be submitted to a jury and proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. The majority of the decisions upholding the
statute have reasoned that Apprendi concerns are not raised unless
"the [maximum] penalty for a crime" (emphasis added) (Apprendi,
530 U.S.  at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63) is
increased, and since consecutive sentences remain discrete
sentences, none of the penalties for any individual crime has been
increased.
	Initially, we note that Apprendi explicitly disclaimed any
holding regarding consecutive sentencing. There the State noted
that defendant had pled guilty to two counts of unlawful
possession of a firearm, as well as a single count of unlawful
possession of an antipersonnel bomb. The State argued that
defendant could have been given consecutive sentences on the two
convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm, and thus received
the same 12-year term of imprisonment as he in fact received on
the single unlawful possession count under the hate crime statute.
The Court refused to address this argument, stating:
		"The constitutional question, however, is whether the 12-year sentence imposed on count 18 [the unlawful
possession of a firearm count which was found to be a
hate crime] was permissible, given that it was above the
10-year maximum for the offense charged in that count.
The finding is legally significant because it
increased-indeed, it doubled-the maximum range within
which the judge could exercise his discretion, converting
what otherwise was a maximum 10-year sentence on that
count into a minimum sentence. The sentences on [the
other two convictions] have no more relevance to our
disposition than the dismissal of [several other charges
against the defendant]." Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 474, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 445, 120 S. Ct.  at 2354.
Thus, it is clear that the decisions holding that consecutive
sentencing triggers Apprendi concerns are extending that case
beyond its facts, as indeed the seminal case in that line
acknowledged. See Clifton, Nos. 1-98-2126, 1-98-2384 cons.,
slip op. at 51-52 (rehearing pending).
	The decisions of our appellate court finding that consecutive
sentencing does not raise Apprendi concerns are supported by the
only reported United States circuit court decision on this topic. See
United States v. Cruz, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (2d Cir. February 13,
2001) ("[t]he district court's use of section 5G1.2(d) [of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines to sentence defendant consecutively]
did not result in a sentence on any one count above the maximum
available on that count *** and so did not violate Apprendi").
Accord United States v. Moreno, No. S3 94 Cr. 0165 (S.D.N.Y
December 14, 2000) (holding that Apprendi did not prohibit
consecutive sentencing even though court, not jury, made finding
prerequisite to consecutive sentencing regarding quantity of drugs
involved). See also United States v. Henderson, 105 F. Supp. 2d 523, 536-37 (S.D.W.V. 2000). Several other federal circuits have
implicitly reached the same conclusion by finding no plain error
in sentencing even though individual sentences exceeded the
maximum allowable sentence based on the facts found by the
jury-in violation of Apprendi-because on remand the sentences
could be made consecutive to reach the same total sentence. See
United States v. Parolin, 239 F.3d 922, 930 (7th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Sturgis, 238 F.3d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2000).
	We find that Apprendi concerns are not implicated by
consecutive sentencing. It is a settled rule in this state that
sentences which run consecutively to each other are not
transmuted thereby into a single sentence. People v. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d 367, 371-72 (1995); People v. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d 439, 446-47 (1995); Thomas v. Greer, 143 Ill. 2d 271, 278-79 (1991).(2)
Because consecutive sentences remain discrete, a determination
that sentences are to be served consecutively cannot run afoul of
Apprendi, which only addresses sentences for individual crimes.
Accordingly, section 5-8-4(b) of the Code passes constitutional
muster.
	We recognize that Apprendi contains isolated statements
which on their face might appear to support the conclusion that the
jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt each and every fact
which might have any real-world impact on the length of time the
defendant might spend in prison. For instance, the Court stated:
		"If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by
statute when an offense is committed under certain
circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the
loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are
heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant
should not-at the moment the State is put to proof of
those circumstances-be deprived of protections that have,
until that point, unquestionably attached." Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 484, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 451, 120 S. Ct.  at 2359.
See also Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 494, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 457, 120 S. Ct.  at 2365 ("the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of
effect-does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?").
	However, these statements cannot be taken out of context.
The issue in Apprendi was "whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination
authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an
offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the basis of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis added.) Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 469, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 442, 120 S. Ct.  at 2351. See also
Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455, 120 S. Ct.  at
2362-63 ("[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt" (emphasis added)). The Court specifically stated
that consecutive sentencing was "not relevant" to the "narrow
issue" under consideration. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 474, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 445, 120 S. Ct.  at 2354.
	We are bound to follow the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. People v.
Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 398 (1990); People v. Loftus, 400 Ill. 432,
436 (1948). See also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 4 L. Ed. 97 (1816). But we are not bound to extend
the decisions of the Court to arenas which it did not purport to
address, which indeed it specifically disavowed addressing, in
order to find unconstitutional a law of this state. This is especially
true where, as here, to do so would require us to overrule settled
law in this state. See Jones, 168 Ill. 2d at 371-72; Kilpatrick, 167
Ill. 2d at 446-47; Thomas, 143 Ill. 2d  at 278-79 (sentences retain
their discrete character even if they are to be served
consecutively). Each of defendant's individual sentences was
within the statutory range established by the legislature. This is all
that Apprendi requires.


CONCLUSION


	For the reasons above stated, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court, which affirmed defendant's convictions and
sentence.
	Affirmed.
 



 



1.      1Neither party raises any argument regarding whether the privilege
was waived when defendant's trial counsel initially listed the experts as
testifying witnesses, or remained intact until the experts actually took
the stand. Accordingly, we express no opinion on this question.

2.      2Defendant contends that this court has "recognized that an order
requiring a defendant to serve a sentence consecutively instead of
concurrently 'was in a very real sense an increase in the length of his
sentence,' " citing Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d  at 444. First, such a statement
would have been dictum, because such an order was not before us in
Kilpatrick. More importantly, this court did not make the statement to
which defendant refers. We were merely quoting from an appellate
court case, People v. Muellner, 70 Ill. App. 3d 671, 683 (1979), which
had dealt with a different aspect of the statute under consideration. We
did not adopt this statement.