Title: People v. Rivera

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 89884-Agenda 13-March 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant v. 								ERNESTO RIVERA, Appellee.
Opinion filed December 6, 2001.
 
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	We granted leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) in this case
in order to decide whether the circuit court may, during the
summary stage of a post-conviction proceeding, partially dismiss
some claims raised in a post-conviction petition while advancing
other claims raised in the same petition to the second stage of the
proceeding. In this case, the circuit court believed that it could
proceed in such fashion. The appellate court disagreed, holding
that a "defendant's postconviction petition must survive as a
whole or be dismissed as a whole." 315 Ill. App. 3d 454, 458. We
now affirm the appellate court's judgment in part and remand the
case to that court for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND
	After a trial in the circuit court of La Salle County, a jury
found defendant, Ernesto Rivera, guilty of controlled substance
trafficking. 720 ILCS 570/401.1 (West 1992). Defendant received
a prison sentence of 40 years. He was also fined $1,774,290,
which represented the street value of the cocaine involved in the
trafficking. The appellate court affirmed the convictions on direct
appeal. People v. Rivera, 268 Ill. App. 3d 1124 (1995).
	Defendant then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction
relief pursuant to the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the
Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1998)). The petition alleged
six violations of defendant's constitutional rights. Specifically,
defendant alleged that (i) the interpreter provided to him during
the trial did not adequately translate the proceedings for him, (ii)
the sentencing statute under which he had been sentenced was
unconstitutional, (iii) his prison sentence and street value fine were
excessive, (iv) the circuit court erred in denying his motion to
suppress, (v) his consent to search was coerced, and (vi) both his
trial and appellate attorneys provided him ineffective assistance of
counsel. The circuit court dismissed claims (ii) through (v) as
frivolous or patently without merit. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1 (West
1998). However, the court found that defendant had stated the gist
of a meritorious claim in both claims (i) and (vi). The court
appointed an attorney to represent defendant and advanced claims
(i) and (vi) to the second stage of post-conviction review.
	Subsequently, defendant moved pro se to amend his petition,
stating that he wanted to add two claims. Defendant argued that he
had been prejudiced by gender bias on the jury and that he had
been denied his right to testify in his own behalf. Defendant's
appointed counsel then filed an amended post-conviction petition
on defendant's behalf. This petition alleged incompetence on the
part of defendant's interpreter, ineffective assistance of counsel on
the part of defendant's attorneys and extensive sentencing.
	The State moved to dismiss the amended petitions. The circuit
court dismissed all of the claims except for defendant's contention
that the interpreter was incompetent. The court ordered that an
evidentiary hearing be held as to that issue.
	At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court
found that defendant had not proved that his interpreter was
incompetent, only that he failed to understand some of the
proceedings. The judge further found that defendant had the
opportunity to stop the proceedings and ask for clarification if
defendant so desired. For these reasons, the circuit court denied
defendant post-conviction relief.
	Defendant appealed. He argued, as an initial matter, that the
circuit court erred in entering the partial dismissals of his post-conviction petition. The appellate court agreed, holding that the
Act does not provide for partial dismissals and that, as a result,
defendant's entire petition should have survived to the second
stage. Because the matter did not proceed in that fashion, the court
stated that the cause had to be remanded "for further proceedings
regarding the claims made by the defendant in his pro se petition.
The trial court is directed to appoint counsel to represent the
defendant and to proceed as though none of the proceedings that
followed the partial dismissal had taken place." 315 Ill. App. 3d at
458. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS
	The positions of the parties in this case are relatively
straightforward. The State maintains that the circuit court may,
under the Act, summarily dismiss portions of a post-conviction
petition as frivolous or patently without merit because the Act
does not expressly prohibit such an action. Defendant responds
that such dismissals are not permitted because the Act neither
expressly permits nor provides for them. In light of this, the
question presented in this case is one of statutory interpretation
and, as such, our standard of review is de novo. King v. Industrial
Comm'n, 189 Ill. 2d 167 (2000).
	The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a
mechanism by which those under criminal sentence in this state
can assert that their convictions were the result of a substantial
denial of their rights under the United States Constitution or the
Illinois Constitution or both. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West
1998). Proceedings under the Act are commenced by the filing of
a petition in the circuit court in which the original proceeding took
place. Prior to November 23, 1983, the Act provided that a post-conviction proceeding was commenced by filing a petition with
the clerk of the court in which the conviction in question took
place. The clerk was required to docket the petition and bring it to
the attention of the court (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 122-1),
which would then appoint counsel to represent the petitioner if the
petitioner so requested. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 122-4. At
that point, the State was then required to answer the petition or
move to dismiss it. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 122-5.
	The General Assembly amended the Act in 1983 by adding
section 122-2.1, which is the section at issue in this case. As a
result of the 1983 amendment, petitioners were no longer entitled
to the assistance of counsel in drafting their post-conviction
petitions. When a petitioner, whether under sentence of death or
not, filed a post-conviction petition, the trial court was directed by
section 122-2.1 to determine whether the petition was "frivolous"
or was "patently without merit." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par.
122-2.1(a). If the trial court found the petition to be frivolous or
patently without merit, the statute directed the trial court to
dismiss it. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 122-2.1(a). If the
petition was not dismissed, the statute directed the trial court to
order that the petition be docketed for further proceedings pursuant
to sections 122-4 through 122-6 of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985,
ch. 38, par. 122-2.1(b). Once so docketed, section 122-4 provided
the means for a trial court to appoint counsel if the court was
"satisfied that the petitioner has no means to procure counsel." Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 122-4. If a petition survived dismissal
pursuant to section 122-2.1, the statute directed that the State
answer or move to dismiss the petition. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38,
par. 122-5.
	Thus, the biggest change wrought to the Act by virtue of the
1983 amendment was that counsel was appointed to an indigent
petitioner only after the court initially reviewed the petition and
only if the court did not dismiss the petition on the ground of
frivolity. Also, the State was permitted to answer or move to
dismiss the petition only after the court made an order pursuant to
section 122-2.1.
	Further change occurred in 1989, when the General Assembly
amended the newly created section 122-2.1. As a result of the
1989 change, the statute now provides that if a post-conviction
petitioner is under sentence of death, the trial court shall appoint
counsel to assist the petitioner in preparing the petition if the
petitioner lacks funds to procure counsel. 725 ILCS
5/122-2.1(a)(1) (West 1998); see also People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 242-43 (1995) (discussing the Act's differing procedures
for prisoners under sentence of death and those sentenced to
imprisonment). The amendment also created section
122-2.1(a)(2), which currently provides that if a petitioner is
sentenced to imprisonment and the trial court determines that the
petition is "frivolous" or is "patently without merit," the trial court
shall dismiss the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1998).
If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to section 122-2.1(a)(2),
then the trial court is to "order the petition to be docketed for
further consideration in accordance with Sections 122-4 through
122-6." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 1998). Accordingly, the
trial court may appoint counsel to an indigent non-capital
petitioner if the petition survives the summary dismissal stage. See
725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 1998). Therefore, after January 1, 1990,
a trial court could no longer dismiss a capital litigant's petition on
the basis of frivolity. However, noncapital litigants still had to
survive the trial court's frivolity determination in order to further
proceed under the Act and to receive the appointment of counsel
if the petitioner lacked funds to procure counsel. It is against this
statutory background that the issue presented here must be
resolved.
	In our view, this case presents a simple issue: What should be
done with a noncapital post-conviction petition that contains
multiple allegations-some of which are "frivolous" or "patently
without merit" and some of which cannot be said to be either?
Does the circuit court, in such situations, have the authority under
the Act to dismiss, summarily, the frivolous or patently without
merit allegations and send whatever allegations remain to the
second stage, at which point counsel is appointed, if necessary,
and the State is required to appear? We believe the language of the
Act compels us to answer the latter question in the negative.
	Section 122-2.1 expressly provides that "if the petitioner is
sentenced to imprisonment and the court determines the petition
is frivolous or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the
petition in a written order ***." "If the petition is not dismissed
pursuant to this section, the court shall order the petition to be
docketed for further consideration in accordance with Sections
122-4 through 122-6." (Emphases added.) 725 ILCS
5/122-2.1(a)(2), (b) (West 1998). Clearly, the Act does not speak
in terms of dismissing individual claims that are either frivolous
or patently without merit; the statute speaks solely in terms of the
petition itself being frivolous or patently without merit, and the
Act mandates that if the petition is not dismissed under section
122-2.1, then the trial court shall order the petition docketed.
"Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court
must give it effect as written, without 'reading into it exceptions,
limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express.' "
Garza v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 378 (1996), quoting Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer
Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83 (1994).
Under the plain language of the Act, in cases such as this, the
circuit court must docket the entire petition, appoint counsel, if the
petitioner is so entitled, and continue the matter for further
proceedings in accordance with sections 122-4 through 122-6.
The State is then given the opportunity to answer or otherwise
plead.
	We further note that section 122-2.1 states that a dismissal of
a petition under that section "is a final judgment." 725 ILCS
5/122-2.1 (West 1998). This language would pose a problem if we
were to interpret section 122-2.1 as permitting partial summary
dismissals. As our appellate court has recognized, "[a]llowing
partial dismissal raises serious questions about the judicial review
process, since first stage dismissals are final and appealable
judgments." People v. Noel, 291 Ill. App. 3d 541, 544 (1997). If
a summary dismissal of only portions of a petition were to be
viewed as proper under the Act, would the claims that have been
partially dismissed be immediately appealable or would the
question of the propriety of that order have to wait until the
conclusion of the entire proceeding? Under either scenario, the
result would be piecemeal appellate litigation. Moreover, if, after
a partial summary dismissal is entered, counsel is appointed and
counsel proceeds to redraft the previously dismissed claims, what
real practical value does the partial summary dismissal serve? In
our view, section 122-2.1 provides for a simplified procedure in
order to ensure that the criminal justice system's limited resources
are expended where most needed. To permit partial summary
dismissals under the Act would only add unnecessary confusion to
the first stage of the post-conviction process and would hamper
judicial administration. We therefore reject the State's contention.
	Support for our conclusion that partial summary dismissals
are ill-advised in this context can be found in the legislative
history of section 122-2.1. Our review of the history reveals that
our construction of the statutory framework of section 122-2.1 not
only conforms to the language of the statute, but is faithful to the
intentions of the General Assembly when it enacted the provision.
This legislative history demonstrates that the General Assembly
did not intend for anything other than a total and final dismissal to
be had under section 122-2.1 For example, Senator Sangmeister,
one of the sponsors of the legislation, told members of the Senate
that the purpose of the amendment was to have a judge look at a
petition to determine "whether or not the petition has any merit.
Once the judge looks at it and says, 'I don't think this has any
merit' and tosses it out, that's the end of it. If ... if he feels it has
merit, then he looks to see whether the ... the defendant is indigent
and then if he is, he does either appoint the public defender or
other counsel ***." (Emphases added.) 83d Ill. Gen. Assem.,
Senate Proceedings, May 19, 1983, at 172 (statements of Senator
Sangmeister). Similar sentiments were expressed in the House
debate. Representative Johnson, another sponsor of the legislation,
stated that, under the amendment, "[t]he court has to examine the
petition and to determine whether the petition was filed frivolously
and obviously without merit. If it is filed frivolously and obviously
without merit, then those further steps that are necessary to be
taken in terms of appointment of counsel and so forth, aren't
necessary. If, in fact, *** a petition that is not frivolous and has
merit, then those normal procedures take place." (Emphasis
added.) 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 21, 1983,
at 87 (statements of Representative Johnson). Representative
Johnson also spoke of how the amendment contemplated a
procedure "where a quick look at the record in the case will show
that the petition is absolutely untrue. There is no need to go to the
expense of appointing a court appointed lawyer, of bringing the
individual back from the penitentiary. It only addresses that type
of petition." (Emphases added.) 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, June 21, 1983, at 89 (statements of Representative
Johnson). As these comments reveal, the sponsors spoke of ending
with finality those petitions which in their totality are frivolous
and patently without merit. Partial summary dismissals, as allowed
in this case by the circuit court, do not further these legislative
goals. Moreover, we note that when the General Assembly
amended section 122-2.1 in 1989, it did not add any language
which would indicate an intent to depart from the principles
invoked on the floors of both legislative chambers in 1983. In our
view, the summary dismissal stage of the post-conviction
proceeding does nothing more than allow the circuit court to act
strictly in an administrative capacity by screening out those
petitions which are without legal substance or are obviously
without merit.
	Our decision today is not without precedent. Although we
acknowledge that opinions of the appellate court are not binding
on this court, we do take note that our analysis of this issue is
consistent with that reached by our appellate court. See People v.
Patton, 315 Ill. App. 3d 968, 975 (2000); People v. Noel, 291 Ill.
App. 3d 541, 544 (1997). Indeed, no published opinion by any
Illinois court of review has reached a contrary interpretation of
section 122-2.1 on this question. We affirm these appellate court
decisions by holding today that summary partial dismissals made
during the first stage of a post-conviction proceeding are not
permitted under the Act.
	Having decided that the Act does not allow for partial
summary dismissals, we must next determine the effect of this rule
on this case. As noted previously, the appellate court here
concluded that the circuit court erred in entering the improper
partial summary dismissal. The court believed that the error had
the effect of tainting the post-conviction proceedings from the
point in time that the improper order was entered. As a result, the
appellate court believed that the cause had to remanded "for
further proceedings regarding the claims made by the defendant in
his pro se petition. The trial court is directed to appoint counsel to
represent the defendant and to proceed as though none of the
proceedings that followed the partial dismissal had taken place."
315 Ill. App. 3d at 458. Simply put, the appellate court believed
that the error in permitting a partial dismissal was so fundamental
that the entire process needed to be started anew. As a result, the
appellate court did not reach any of the remaining issues of
defendant's post-conviction appeal. While there may be some
cases in which remandments for new proceedings are warranted,
we do not believe that the record supports sending this case back
for the appointment of counsel and further pleadings.
	After the circuit court here entered the partial summary
dismissal order, which dismissed four counts of defendant's
original petition, defendant filed an amended petition in which he
raised additional claims. During that same time, the circuit court
appointed counsel to defendant. Appointed counsel then met with
defendant and discussed, through an interpreter, the various post-conviction claims available to defendant. After these discussions,
counsel filed an amended post-conviction petition, which refers to
the previous pleadings and re-alleges some of the claims therein.
In open court, counsel indicated that he had mailed the new
amendment to defendant for his approval. At a status hearing held
in defendant's presence and with the aid of an interpreter, counsel
indicated that defendant had reviewed the pleading and that
defendant believed it should be filed in that manner. The claims
were then litigated-some were dismissed by the circuit court upon
motion by the State, and the sole claim not dismissed was the
subject of a full evidentiary hearing, after which it was denied.
Thus, it is difficult to perceive how further proceedings in this
matter will be of any benefit to anyone-defendant was given the
opportunity to consult with appointed counsel, to discuss the
claims that had been improperly dismissed, and to re-allege them
if he so desired. For these reasons, we do not believe that the
proceedings ordered by the appellate court are warranted. The
record affirmatively shows that defendant was not prejudiced by
the entry of the partial summary dismissal under these facts. We,
therefore, vacate that part of the appellate court's judgment that
remanded the matter to the circuit court. In light of this
determination, we remand the matter to the appellate court for
further proceedings on defendant's post-conviction appeal.

CONCLUSION
	The appellate court correctly held that partial summary
dismissals are not permitted under the Act, and we affirm that
portion of the court's judgment. The appellate court, however,
erred in remanding the matter to the circuit court for further
proceedings on defendant's pro se claims, and we vacate that
portion of the court's judgment. The matter is remanded to the
appellate court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.



Appellate court affirmed in part;
vacated in part; cause remanded.
	I agree with the result reached today by the majority. It is
unnecessary to relitigate the claims summarily dismissed by the
circuit court in the first stage of the post-conviction proceedings.
However, it is unnecessary to relitigate the claims summarily
dismissed in the first stage because, unlike the majority, I believe
a circuit court has authority to summarily dismiss portions of the
petition in the first stage of the post-conviction proceeding.
	As repeatedly recognized by this court, we must give effect to
the language of the statute as written. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997); Garza v. Navistar International
Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 378 (1996). A plain
language approach is a simple approach, which obviates the need
to discuss legislative history. People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250,
261 (1994) (for purposes of construing a statute, courts should first
consider the statutory language, and where statutory language is
clear, it will be given effect without resort to other aids for
construction). This court has also recognized that, "[a]
fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that we must
give effect to the entire statutory scheme rather than looking at
words and phrases in isolation ***. [Citation.] In other words,
statutes should be construed as a whole, with each provision
evaluated in connection with every other section." Primeco
Personal Communications, L.P. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
196 Ill. 2d 70, 87-88 (2001), citing Michigan Avenue National
Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000); see also
People v. Burpo, 164 Ill. 2d 261, 267 (1995), citing People v.
Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d 263, 270 (1987) (courts must give
construction that is consistent with the purpose and policies of the
statute); Santiago v. Kusper, 133 Ill. 2d 318, 327 (1990) (courts
must construe an act so the legislative scheme is harmonious and
consistent in all its parts).
	In the instant matter, the Act neither expressly permits nor
prohibits partial first-stage summary dismissals of a post-conviction petition. It is apparent, however, from a review of the
Act as a whole that partial summary dismissals in stage one of the
post-conviction proceedings are consistent with the legislative
scheme.
	Several provisions of the Act grant a trial judge great latitude
and discretion in post-conviction proceedings. See People v.
Wright, 149 Ill. 2d 36, 54 (1992). For instance, section 122-5
extends post-conviction trial judges discretion to make any orders
regarding pleadings or amendments that he or she finds proper,
and allows the trial judge to determine whether to permit the
withdrawal of the petition upon the petitioner's request. Wright,
149 Ill. 2d  at 54. Additionally, section 122-6 grants the trial court
discretion to receive evidence in support of the petition, such as
affidavits, oral testimony, or depositions. Wright, 149 Ill. 2d  at 54.
Discretion is a necessary component of the Act, essential to
address the volume of post-conviction litigation. Moreover,
discretion permits the court to meet the needs of each particular
petitioner, and achieve the overall goal of the Act-to provide relief
from constitutional deprivations. Thus, I believe that partial
summary dismissals in stage one of the proceeding are in accord
with the overall legislative scheme of the Act which provides
discretion to the trial court.
	Additionally, the authority to order partial summary
dismissals is a matter of the inherent authority a court possesses to
control its own docket, and the proceedings before it, through
orders and actions that are neither authorized nor prohibited by the
Act. People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d 175, 179-83
(1988); see also Sander v. Dow Chemical Co., 166 Ill. 2d 48, 65
(1995) (recognizing a trial court's inherent authority to dismiss a
cause of action with prejudice for violations of court orders). In
Fitzgerald, the defendant filed a post-conviction petition and
issued subpoenas for the taking of discovery depositions of
persons involved in the original trial proceedings. After the trial
court denied its motions to block the taking of the depositions, the
State sought a writ of mandamus, or, alternatively, a supervisory
order, from this court to compel the trial court to vacate the orders
granting discovery. We explained that post-conviction proceedings
are sui generis in nature and, therefore, neither civil nor criminal
discovery rules apply. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d  at 181. Looking to
the language of the Act, we noted that the Act is silent on whether
a trial judge may order the taking of discovery depositions.
Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d  at 179. However, because review under the
Act is limited to a narrow range of constitutional issues that were
not presented in the original proceeding, we held that the trial
court clearly has inherent authority under the Act to order
discovery so that a trial judge to better manage the proceedings
and avoid relitigating issues from the original proceeding.
Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d  at 183.
	Just as the Act is silent on a circuit court's authority to order
discovery in post-conviction proceedings, the Act is also silent on
the issue of partial summary dismissals of a post-conviction
petition. Yet, partial summary dismissals permit a court to better
manage its docket and the proceedings and avoid litigating issues
which lack merit. Thus, pursuant to Fitzgerald, a trial court clearly
possesses inherent authority to dismiss claims within a petition
that are frivolous are patently without merit, rather than advance
those claims for further consideration.
	I do not find that this outcome restricts a petitioner's ability
to redraft allegations that have been previously dismissed as
frivolous in the first stage, and present those allegations to the
court as amendments in the second stage of the proceedings. As
discussed by the majority, counsel is appointed by the court to
represent petitioners in the second stage of the proceedings if the
court finds that the petition contains allegations that state the gist
of a constitutional claim. Section 122-4 of the Act, and Supreme
Court Rule 651(c), ensure that counsel reviews the allegations
with the petitioner, examines the record, and makes necessary
amendments, so the petition is presented in an adequate legal
form. 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2000); 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c);
People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 238 (1993). Neither the
provisions of the Act, nor holdings by this court, limit the right to
amend a petition once the court finds that the petition contains
nonfrivolous claims. Rather, this court has stated that counsel may
make any necessary amendments to the original petition, without
limitation. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996); People
v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 358-59 (1990). This interpretation is
also consistent with the language of Rule 651(c), which states that
counsel may make "any" amendments to the petition. 134 Ill. 2d
R. 651(c). Accordingly, an attorney may redraft allegations
previously dismissed in stage one of the proceedings if he or she
believes it is possible to articulate a more meaningful and
meritorious claim.
	This interpretation does not hamper judicial administration or
add confusion to the post-conviction process. In fact, it does the
opposite. It preserves the limited resources of both the bar and the
bench, and focuses the proceedings upon claims which have
potential merit. Accordingly, I believe that partial summary
dismissals are permitted in the first stage of a post-conviction
proceeding.