Title: People v. Nieves

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 83670-Agenda 3-September 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								HECTOR NIEVES, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 16, 2000.
	JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County,
defendant, Hector Nieves, was convicted of first degree murder.
The same jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty based
upon convictions for two or more murders. After the jury found
that no mitigating circumstances existed sufficient to preclude the
imposition of the death penalty, the court entered judgment on the
jury's finding and sentenced defendant to death. Defendant's
sentence has been stayed pending direct review by this court. Ill.
Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d R. 609(a). In this appeal,
defendant raises 12 issues challenging his conviction and death
sentence. We affirm defendant's conviction, reverse defendant's
sentence of death, and remand the cause for the imposition of a
sentence other than death.
	Late in the evening of September 13, 1992, police found the
body of the victim, Louis Vargas, behind a building at 2808 West
North Avenue in Chicago. Vargas' face and head had been badly
beaten with what police believed to be a blunt object. His body
was found between the rear wall of the building and a large truck,
lying face down in a pool of blood on top of several cardboard
boxes. Police determined that Vargas had died fairly recently, as
his head was still bleeding when they arrived on the scene. Vargas'
shoes were missing, and one of his pants' pockets was bloody and
turned inside out. No identifiable fingerprints or other physical
evidence was found at the murder scene. Police searched the
vicinity of the crime scene, including nearby Dumpsters and
garbage cans, but did not find a murder weapon.
	The day after Vargas' body was found, the police interviewed
several people in the area. Although no witnesses to Vargas'
beating were located, Anthony Laboy told police that he had seen
Vargas in Humboldt Park the previous day. Laboy was sitting on
a bench drinking a beer around 6:30 p.m. when he saw Vargas and
another man, known only to Laboy as "Papo," about 25 feet away.
According to Laboy, the two were arguing over money to buy
liquor.
	Laboy further told police that, in the course of the argument,
Papo took out a long cylindrical object that looked liked a
screwdriver or an ice pick. Papo turned toward Vargas, who
grabbed the object and threw it to the ground. Vargas then grabbed
Papo's walking cane and threw it to the ground. Next, Vargas
"slammed" Papo to the ground. After this incident, Vargas and
Papo walked away with several other men. According to Laboy,
the argument had ended, and everything looked to be "straightened
out." Laboy did not see Vargas or Papo the rest of the night.
	Based on Laboy's information, police searched Humboldt
park for Papo, later identified as defendant, Hector Nieves, to
question him in connection with Vargas' murder. Police were
unable to locate defendant, however, and the murder went
unsolved for more than a year and a half.
	On May 20, 1994, New York City officials contacted the
Chicago State's Attorney's office regarding a man who
surrendered to New York police in connection with a murder in
Central Park and who also wished to make a statement regarding
a murder in Chicago. Cook County Assistant State's Attorney
John Muldoon, Chicago police detective Louis Rabbit, and a court
stenographer traveled that same day to New York City to meet
with the man, who identified himself as Hector Nieves. After
Muldoon and Rabbit advised defendant of his rights, defendant
spoke privately with them for about 20 minutes. At the conclusion
of this conversation, defendant agreed to give a court-reported
statement.
	After again being advised of his rights, including the right to
remain silent and the right to counsel, defendant stated that he was
with Vargas in Humboldt Park during the afternoon of September
13, 1992. The two began arguing when defendant refused to give
Vargas a dollar to buy wine. Vargas became very upset and threw
defendant's walking cane, which defendant needed due to a recent
leg surgery. Defendant stated that he got angry at Vargas for taking
his cane and decided to retaliate. He formed a plan to wait for
Vargas to go to sleep and then kill him.
	Defendant further stated that, later that night, he went to
Vargas' usual sleeping place behind a restaurant at the intersection
of North Avenue and California Street. Defendant knew that there
was always a truck parked in the rear alley and that Vargas always
slept underneath this truck. After finding a pipe in the alley,
defendant climbed into the back of the truck and waited for
Vargas. Vargas arrived around 9:30 or 10 p.m. Defendant waited
approximately 15 minutes to be sure that Vargas was sound asleep,
and then climbed out of the truck. He struck Vargas on the head
with the pipe between 10 and 15 times, killing him. Defendant
stated that he then left the scene, throwing the pipe into a back
yard about three houses away.
	The case proceeded to trial in June 1997. In addition to
Alexander Laboy and John Muldoon, several Chicago police
personnel who worked on the case testified for the prosecution.
Dr. Edmond Donoghue, chief medical examiner for Cook County,
testified as to the cause of Vargas' death. Dr. Robert Kirschner,
who had performed the autopsy on Vargas' body, had since retired
and was out of the country. Dr. Donoghue reviewed Dr.
Kirschner's file and testified as an expert in forensic pathology.
Dr. Donoghue concluded that Vargas died from severe injuries to
the skull and brain consistent with being beaten about the head
with a pipe. According to Dr. Donoghue, Vargas had been struck
at least eight times in a beating that "would have killed anyone."
	No witnesses testified on behalf of the defense, which rested
at the close of the prosecution's case in chief. The jury then found
defendant guilty of first degree murder.
	At the death penalty eligibility hearing, New York City police
detective Eugene Heghmann and New York Assistant District
Attorney Cynthia Sippnick both testified regarding defendant's
involvement in the June 1993 death of Santos Bermudez. Sippnick
further testified that defendant subsequently pleaded guilty in New
York to first degree manslaughter in connection with Bermudez's
killing, and a certified copy of that conviction was entered into
evidence.
	At the close of Sippnick's testimony, the trial court ruled,
outside the presence of the jury, that the New York first degree
manslaughter statute was substantially similar to the Illinois first
degree murder statute. The jury then returned a verdict
unanimously finding defendant eligible for the death penalty for
having been convicted of murdering two or more individuals. See
720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1996).
	At the aggravation-mitigation phase of the death penalty
hearing, the prosecution introduced evidence of defendant's
lengthy criminal history and numerous prison disciplinary
infractions. The jury also heard evidence linking defendant to two
additional murders, that of Lonnie Jackson in 1991 and of Rafeal
Cuevas in 1992, to which defendant had confessed in separate
court-reported statements made at the same time as his statement
regarding the Vargas murder.
	In mitigation, defendant presented testimonial evidence of his
good behavior while held at the Cook County jail. Defendant's
brother also offered testimony of defendant's abusive childhood.
In addition, two licensed clinical psychologists testified as to
defendant's low intelligence and severe personality disturbance.
	After hearing all the factors in aggravation and mitigation, the
jury unanimously found that there were no mitigating
circumstances sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death
penalty. The trial court then sentenced defendant to death.
ANALYSIS
Trial Errors
Voir Dire
	Defendant first contends that his right to due process and a
fair trial was abridged when he was not afforded the opportunity
to question potential jurors after their responses to the trial court's
voir dire questions resulted in their excusal for cause. During voir
dire, the trial court first individually questioned each potential
juror, without input from the State's Attorneys or defense counsel.
On the basis of their responses, the trial court either excused the
potential jurors for cause or passed them along for further
questioning by both parties.
	After the first stage of this process, three potential jurors,
George Mikicich, Eleanor Taylor and Jewel Heingeininger, were
excused for cause after their responses to the court's questions
revealed that their beliefs would prevent them from imposing the
death penalty. Two other potential jurors, Cecilia Isom and George
Lyons, passed the first stage of questioning by the trial court,
although they expressed concerns about the death penalty but
stated that they would consider it. Upon further questioning by the
prosecution, however, both Isom and Lyons were excused for
cause after both stated that they would not be able to impose the
death penalty.
	Initially, we note that defendant objected only to the excusal
of Mikicich, Isom and Lyons. Defendant did not object to the
excusal of Taylor or Heingeininger, nor did he seek to question
those potential jurors who were excused for cause after the court
had concluded its examination of them. In this appeal, however,
defendant does not argue that these potential jurors were
improperly excused. Rather, he argues for the first time that the
voir dire was unfair and prejudicial because the trial court allowed
the prosecution to examine potential jurors who expressed
scruples against the death penalty after their initial examination,
but summarily excused for cause without further questioning by
defense counsel those potential jurors who stated that they could
not impose the death penalty. According to defendant, the
prosecution was given greater latitude to question potential venire
members and received a benefit when Isom and Lyons were
excused without the prosecution having to use any of its
peremptory challenges. Thus, the number of venire members that
the prosecution was able to excuse was increased, some of whom
may have been sympathetic to defendant. Defendant claims that he
should have been given the same opportunity to question venire
members Mikicich, Taylor and Heingeininger to clarify their
stance regarding the death penalty.
	The State asserts that defendant has waived review of this
issue because defense counsel failed to object on this particular
ground before the trial court and failed to raise this issue in his
post-trial motion. We agree. To preserve an issue for review, a
defendant must both object at trial and specifically include the
objection in a post-trial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176,
186 (1988). Here, defendant has never before raised the issue of
being denied an opportunity to conduct additional voir dire of
potential jurors Mikicich, Taylor and Heingeininger. Thus, this
issue is waived.
	Defendant next claims that the trial court abused its discretion
when it refused to grant his motion for a mistrial after the
prosecution asked a potential juror who worked at the Cook
County jail whether he had worked with defendant. During voir
dire, potential jurors were called to the jury box in groups of 12 to
be questioned. One such potential juror, James Graham, stated that
he was a minister and had worked for 35 years as a volunteer at the
Cook County jail. After the trial court's initial voir dire, the
prosecution continued to question Graham about his work at the
jail, during which the following exchange took place:
			"Prosecution: In the course of your work with inmates
at Cook County Jail, have you ever had occasion to work
with any of the individuals on death row?
			Graham: Yes, I have.
			***
			Prosecution: Have you ever had occasion to work with
Mr. Nieves who is before your Honor, before the court
today?
			Defense: Objection.
			Graham: No."
	At this point, a conference was held outside the presence of
the jury where defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis
that the prosecutor's question implied that defendant was or had
been incarcerated at the Cook County jail. Defendant's motion
was denied.
	Defendant contends that the potential jurors who were present
during the prosecutor's questioning of Graham were left with the
clear implication that he was involved in other criminal conduct or
may already be on death row. Despite Graham's negative
response, defendant claims that the prosecutor's question was
deliberately posed to link defendant with the Cook County jail,
thus prejudicing him to such a degree that a new trial is warranted.
Defendant points out that the trial court had already asked all
potential jurors whether they knew defendant, to which Graham
responded in the negative. Thus, according to defendant, there was
no reason to further ask Graham if he had worked with defendant.
	The State responds that its questioning of Graham was proper
in its entirety and was intended only to uncover whether Graham
knew defendant. At worst, the State argues, the question may have
alerted other potential jurors to the fact that defendant was in
custody, but defendant's conclusion that the question would lead
other potential jurors to believe defendant had committed other
crimes is unsupported. Further, the State points out, defendant has
failed to establish how the jury that eventually heard this case was
influenced or prejudiced by the prosecution's questioning of
Graham during voir dire.
	The decision whether to grant a mistrial is left to the
discretion of the trial court. People v. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d 376 (1986).
There is no evidence to suggest that the prosecution's questioning
was designed to do anything more than determine whether Graham
was acquainted with defendant. Given that defendant was awaiting
trial for murder, it was not unreasonable for the prosecutor to ask
Graham if he had encountered defendant through his work with
inmates at the Cook County jail. This question does not
necessarily imply that defendant had committed other crimes or
was already on death row. It is more likely that potential jurors
hearing the prosecutor's question would make the quite logical
inference that the prosecutor was referring to defendant's time in
custody pending trial for the murder of Louis Vargas. The jury
pool was not so tainted as to warrant a mistrial based upon this
question. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied defendant's motion for mistrial.
	Furthermore, even assuming an error in the selection of jurors,
reversal is not required unless the defendant has in some way been
prejudiced. See People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 344 (1995). In
Lewis, this court held that the trial court's statement to potential
jurors that witnesses from Folsom Prison and the Alameda and
Oakland police departments would be testifying did not so
prejudice the defendant as to require reversal. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d  at
347. In so holding, we rejected the defendant's claim that the
entire venire would have wondered, if not assumed, that the
defendant was a convicted felon, stating that compelling
eyewitness evidence against the defendant made it unlikely that his
conviction was the result of the jury having heard the limited
witness information. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d  at 345.
	We believe that the questioning of James Graham was proper.
Moreover, we do not believe that defendant suffered any prejudice
as a result.
Inadmissible Expert Testimony
	Next, defendant argues that the testimony presented by Dr.
Edmond Donoghue, chief medical examiner for Cook County, was
not competent to establish Louis Vargas' cause of death because
it was based upon an autopsy performed by Dr. Robert Kirschner,
who had retired and was out of the country at the time of trial.
Defendant claims that, because Dr. Donoghue was not present
during the autopsy and relied solely upon the medical examiner's
report in forming his opinion as to the cause of Vargas' death, his
testimony consists of inadmissible hearsay.
	The State argues that defendant failed to preserve this issue
for review because he did not object to the admission of Dr.
Donoghue's testimony at trial. We agree. Defendant did not object
at trial and did not include this issue in his post-trial motion. To
the contrary, after Dr. Donoghue testified as to his background and
qualifications, defense counsel readily agreed that Dr. Donoghue
was qualified to render an opinion, stating, "No questions, Judge,
he's an expert." Defendant has therefore waived this issue.
	Defendant also argues, however, that defense counsel's failure
to object to Dr. Donoghue's testimony constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel. According to defendant, there was no
tactical reason for defense counsel's failure to object and, had
defense counsel done so, defendant would not have been convicted
because all evidence concerning the cause of Vargas' death would
have been excluded.
	To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show (1) that his attorney's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that the attorney's
deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant.
People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 320 (1998), citing Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). We decline to find ineffective assistance of
counsel here, as any objection to the prosecutor's remarks would
rightfully have been overruled. The testimonial evidence offered
by Dr. Donoghue was admissible pursuant to this court's decision
in Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186 (1981). In Wilson, we held that
an expert may give his opinion based upon facts that are not in
evidence if those facts are of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field. Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d  at 193 (adopting
Federal Rule of Evidence 703). In the instant case, Dr. Donoghue
reviewed and formed his opinion based upon the contents of Dr.
Kirschner's medical file on Louis Vargas, which included autopsy
photographs, a postmortem examination report, a toxicologic
analysis report, an evidence receipt, diagrams made by Dr.
Kirschner while he conducted the autopsy, an investigator's report,
and other administrative documents. We believe the reports found
in Dr. Kirschner's file, which Dr. Donoghue used in forming his
opinion, are the type of evidence reasonably relied upon by experts
in the field of forensic pathology to form their opinions as to the
cause and manner of death.
	This court also has held that experts not only may consider
such information in forming their opinions, but may also testify as
to nontestifying experts' findings and conclusions. People v.
Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 176 (1992). While the contents of reports
relied upon by experts would be inadmissible as hearsay if offered
for the truth of the matter asserted, an expert may disclose the
underlying facts and conclusions for the limited purpose of
explaining the basis for his opinion. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 176.
Here, Dr. Donoghue used Dr. Kirschner's reports and records as
the basis for forming his opinion as to the cause of Louis Vargas'
death. Such testimony was admissible. Thus, defense counsel's
failure to object did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness.
Other-Crimes Evidence
	Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by improperly allowing evidence of other crimes he allegedly had
committed. First, defendant claims that such evidence was
improperly introduced when Assistant State's Attorney John
Muldoon read the following portion of defendant's court-reported
statement:
			"Muldoon: Now again Hector you turned yourself into
the New York Police Department today, is that correct?
			Defendant: Yes.
			Muldoon: And you told them about this incident and
some other incidents, is that correct?
			Defendant: Yes.
			Muldoon: Both in Chicago and in New York and-"
	Defense counsel then objected. A sidebar was held in which
defense counsel asked that the reference to "other incidents" be
redacted from the copy of the statement that went back do the jury
during deliberations. The trial court granted the request.
	In general, evidence of other crimes is not admissible if it is
relevant merely to establish defendant's propensity to commit
crimes. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 146 (1998). Evidence that
suggests or implies that the defendant has engaged in prior
criminal activity should not be admitted unless relevant. People v.
Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 346 (1995). Defendant argues that the
reference to "other incidents" in his statement constituted evidence
of other crimes that had no probative value and was introduced
only to show defendant's propensity to commit crimes.
	The State responds that the minor reference to other incidents
was not introduced to show defendant's propensity to commit
crimes, but rather was relevant to explain the manner in which
defendant came to be in the custody of the Chicago police.
Furthermore, the State argues, even if the reference to "other
incidents" should have been redacted from defendant's statement
before being read to the jury, in light of the overwhelming
evidence of defendant's guilt, the reference was not so prejudicial
that it influenced the jury or denied him a fair trial.
	Contrary to the State's assertion, we do not believe that the
reference to defendant's "other incidents" in New York could have
been properly introduced to show how the investigation of Vargas'
murder unfolded. When other-crimes evidence is presented as part
of the steps in the investigation of a crime and the events leading
up to it, the evidence must also be relevant to specifically connect
defendant with the crimes for which he is being tried. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d  at 346. We fail to see how any evidence of defendant's
criminal activity in New York is relevant to prove he committed
the murder of Louis Vargas in Illinois. See People v. Richardson,
123 Ill. 2d 322, 342 (1988) (other-crimes evidence not admissible
in a criminal case unless it is relevant to prove that the defendant
committed the crime at issue). While defendant's presence in New
York is relevant to explain the delay between the time of Vargas'
murder and defendant's arrest, any evidence of other crimes
committed by defendant while in New York is irrelevant to
defendant's guilt in the present case.
	That said, this court repeatedly has held that the improper
introduction of other-crimes evidence is harmless error when a
defendant is neither prejudiced nor denied a fair trial based upon
its admission. See Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 147; People v. Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d 249, 285 (1998); Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d  at 347; People v. Hayes,
139 Ill. 2d 89, 145-46 (1990). Here, no other references were made
to defendant's New York criminal activity during the guilt phase
of defendant's trial, and the reference to "other incidents" was
redacted from defendant's statement before it was given to the
jury. Thus, we agree with the State that any prejudicial effect that
may have been produced by this one isolated and cryptic reference
to defendant's criminal activity in New York was overshadowed
by the substantial evidence of defendant's guilt-most notably, his
own uncontested statement. While we believe the reference to
"other incidents" was improper, we conclude that this error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, defendant was not
denied a fair trial, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
	Defendant next challenges the admission of Chicago police
officer Frank DeMarco's testimony that one of Vargas' pants'
pockets was turned inside out when his body was found.
Defendant claims that the trial court again abused its discretion by
allowing improper and highly prejudicial testimony of other
crimes because DeMarco's statement implied that defendant
robbed Vargas, a crime for which he was not charged.
	The State asserts that the testimonial evidence regarding
Vargas' inside-out pants' pocket was relevant to reveal the nature
of the crime, citing People v. King, 29 Ill. 2d 150, 153-54 (1963).
We agree. In King, the defendant was convicted of murder. On
appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by admitting into
evidence testimony concerning three knife wounds on the neck of
the victim, claiming that the evidence raised an inference that the
wounds were caused by the defendant, who had been charged only
with her shooting. This court held that no error was committed by
the trial court in admitting the testimony, stating:
		"All evidence concerning 'the physical facts and
circumstances showing a killing are admissible in
evidence as tending to throw light on the transaction and
to reveal the nature' of the crime. [Citation.] Also all facts
of the crime which show the aggravated nature of the
offense are relevant to the punishment to be set by the
jury." King, 29 Ill. 2d  at 154.
	The testimony surrounding the condition of Vargas' clothes
when his body was found is clearly evidence of the physical facts
and circumstances surrounding his murder. Defendant's
characterization of the testimony regarding Vargas' inside-out
pants' pocket as improper other-crimes evidence is inaccurate; it
is not evidence of another crime, but part of the very same crime
at issue before the court. The fact that defendant was not charged
with robbery is irrelevant, just as it was irrelevant that the
defendant in King was not charged with stabbing the victim. In
both cases, the evidence was properly admitted to shed light on the
crimes committed. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by overruling defendant's objection to this
evidence.
Improper Closing Argument
	Next, defendant claims that the following remarks made by
the prosecution during its rebuttal closing argument denied him a
fair trial:
			"Prosecutor: Ladies and gentlemen, there is no stranger,
there is no robber there that no one knows about, there
was only one person in the entire universe who had a
motive based on the evidence to kill [Louis Vargas].
			Defense counsel: Objection, that is not a reasonable
inference.
			Trial Court: Proceed. The jury has heard the evidence."
	Defendant argues that the prosecution did not present any
evidence from which it could be inferred that Vargas' character
was such that he had no enemies and that no one else in the entire
world would have wanted to kill him. According to defendant, the
prosecution's remarks were based upon the unreasonable inference
that, merely because the State only presented evidence concerning
defendant's motive, there could be no one else who had a motive
to kill Vargas.
	The State responds that its remarks constituted a reasonable
characterization of the evidence and logical inferences drawn
therefrom. Moreover, the State contends, its rebuttal argument was
in direct response to and invited by defendant's closing argument.
Finally, the State asserts that, even if its rebuttal argument was
improper, it did not result in any prejudice to defendant in light of
the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.
	In presenting a closing argument, the prosecutor is allowed a
great deal of latitude and is entitled to argue all reasonable
inferences from the evidence. People v. Johnson, 146 Ill. 2d 109,
143 (1991). The standard of review applied to arguments by
counsel is similar to the standard used in deciding whether a plain
error was made: comments constitute reversible error only when
they engender substantial prejudice against a defendant such that
it is impossible to say whether or not a verdict of guilt resulted
from those comments. People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 323
(1990). Here, the jury heard evidence that defendant and Vargas
had a physical confrontation just a few hours before Vargas' body
was found. The jury also heard defendant's own statement where
he described both his plan to kill Vargas in retaliation for his
taking defendant's cane in the earlier fight and his successful
execution of this plan. The prosecutor's statement that only one
inference could be drawn from these facts was argument of a
reasonable inference from the evidence adduced at trial. See
People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 508 (1993).
	Moreover, as the State correctly points out, the prosecutor's
remarks were made in direct response to defendant's closing
argument. During his closing argument, defense counsel argued:
			"The real murderer waited in another location. The real
murderer was a robber, was a robber who came in there,
struck Mr. Vargas, took his shoes, took whatever he had
in his pockets because his pockets were turned out. And
the only reason that they, the State[,] is going after Mr.
Nieves is because of a previous incident that Mr. Laboy
testified about. ***
			*** [T]here is no physical evidence connecting our
client to this murder. There are no fingerprints found in
the truck that he allegedly laid and waited for Mr. Vargas
to get home. There was no murder weapon recovered. ***
That's because the real murderer does not sit before you.
The real murderer is still out on the street-probably wiped
the item off and walked with it, that's why they couldn't
find the murder weapon."
The prosecutor's comments during rebuttal that only one person
had a motive to kill Vargas based upon the evidence were properly
made in response to defense counsel's closing argument. See
People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 441 (1993) (the prosecutor may
respond to comments by defense counsel that clearly invite a
response). Further, because the prosecutor's comments were
invited, they cannot be relied upon as error on appeal. People v.
Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 43 (1996).
	Finally, even if it could be said that the prosecutor's remarks
were improper, we would still find reversal unwarranted. The
evidence of defendant's guilt was substantial enough that the jury
would have returned a verdict of guilty even if the prosecutor had
not made this argument. The remarks are not so prejudicial that it
is impossible to say whether the verdict of guilt resulted from
these comments. See Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d  at 323.
Sentencing Errors
Eligibility Phase
	Defendant next contends that his sentence of death must be
vacated because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was eligible for the death penalty. Defendant takes
issue both with the jury's finding of eligibility based upon the
aggravating factor of two or more convictions for murder and with
the trial court's finding that subsection (1) of New York's first
degree manslaughter statute (N.Y. Penal Law §125.20 (McKinney
1998)) is substantially similar to the Illinois first degree murder
statute. Because we conclude that the evidence did not support the
jury's finding of eligibility, we confine our analysis to this issue.
	When this court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence at the
eligibility phase of a capital sentencing hearing, the standard
employed is whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the elements necessary to establish the defendant's
eligibility for the death penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. People
v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 474-75 (2000). The State did not
come even close to meeting this standard.
	The sole aggravating factor advanced by the State for
defendant's death penalty eligibility was that he had been
convicted of murdering two or more individuals. See 720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1996). Section 9-1(b)(3) authorizes the
imposition of the death penalty when "the defendant has been
convicted of murdering two or more individuals under subsection
(a) of this Section [first degree murder] or under any law of the
United States or of any state which is substantially similar to
subsection (a) of this Section." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1996).
Here, the State contended, and the trial judge agreed, that the New
York statute under which defendant was convicted was
substantially similar to the Illinois first degree murder statute. The
trial judge therefore ruled that defendant's New York conviction
could be used together with the conviction for first degree murder
in the present case to establish defendant's eligibility for the death
penalty under section 9-1(b)(3).
	Unfortunately, the State failed to present any competent
evidence as to the particular New York statute under which
defendant was convicted. To be sure, the State introduced a
certified copy of defendant's New York conviction, which
unequivocally states that, on November 18, 1994, defendant
pleaded guilty to and was convicted of "the crime of manslaughter
[in the first degree]." By itself, however, this evidence is
insufficient to establish defendant's eligibility under section
9-1(b)(3), as the certified copy of defendant's New York
conviction fails to delineate the particular subsection of the first
degree manslaughter statute under which defendant was convicted.
This omission is critical, as the New York first degree
manslaughter statute contains four subsections, only the first of
which reasonably could be construed as "substantially similar" to
the Illinois first degree murder statute:(1)
			"A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree
when:
			(1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to
another person, he causes the death of such person or of
a third person; or
			(2) With intent to cause the death of another person, he
causes the death of such person or of a third person under
circumstances which do not constitute murder because he
acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance
***. ***; or
			(3) He commits upon a female pregnant for more than
twenty-four weeks an abortional act which causes her
death, unless such abortional act is justifiable ***; or
			(4) Being eighteen years old or more and with intent to
cause physical injury to a person less than eleven years
old, the defendant recklessly engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of serious physical injury to such
person and thereby causes the death of such person." N.Y.
Penal Law §125.20 (McKinney 1998).
Even a cursory reading of the above statute reveals that, if
defendant's 1994 guilty plea was entered under subsection (2), (3),
or (4), defendant's resulting conviction could not form the basis
for death penalty eligibility under section 9-1(b)(3).
	Recognizing the conviction certificate's deficiency, the State
introduced additional evidence to prove that defendant in fact
pleaded guilty to and was convicted of violating subsection (1) of
the New York manslaughter statute. The sum total of that evidence
consists of the following exchange between Assistant State's
Attorney Maureen Ferrick and witness Cynthia Sippnick, a New
York assistant District Attorney who was present for defendant's
confession and "followed the prosecution" of defendant's case:
			"Ferrick: What portion of the statute did the defendant,
Nieves, plead guilty to?
			Sippnick: He pled guilty under the first subsection."
On this testimony, and nothing more, the jury concluded that
defendant was convicted of violating subsection (1) of the New
York first degree manslaughter statute and therefore was eligible
for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(3).(2)
	Stated simply, the State's "evidence" concerning the
particular subsection of the first degree manslaughter statute under
which defendant was convicted amounts to no evidence at all.
How does Sippnick possess this knowledge? Was she present in
open court when defendant entered his guilty plea? Was she a
participant in the plea negotiations? Did another assistant District
Attorney tell her? Did she review defendant's prosecution file?
Did defendant actually enter the plea, or did his counsel enter it on
his behalf? Did she, in fact, have any basis for this assertion?
Neither this court nor the sentencing jury has any way of knowing
the answers to these questions, as the State failed to introduce any
evidence concerning the basis of Sippnick's naked assertion.
Notably, in response to defendant's assertion that the State was
obligated to corroborate Sippnick's conclusory testimony with
either a transcript from defendant's guilty plea hearing or a
certified copy of the New York charging instrument, the State
responds:
		"A transcript would not necessarily have revealed which
subsection the defendant pled guilty to. It is entirely
possible that the transcript would have revealed no more,
and perhaps substantially less, than what is revealed in
[defendant's videotaped confession]. No importance
would attach, under New York law, to the subsection
under which defendant pled, and it is likely as not that the
transcript might not have made any reference to it
whatsoever. Likewise, a certified copy of the New York
charging instrument would have proved nothing with
respect to what offense defendant pled guilty to. In fact,
the certified copy of conviction *** reveals that defendant
was indicted for the highest offense-second degree
murder, and pled to the lesser offense of first degree
murder." (Emphasis in original.)
Far from helping the State's cause, this passage begs a very
important question: If neither a transcript from defendant's guilty
plea hearing nor the New York charging instrument reveals the
particular subsection under which defendant pled guilty, how
exactly did Sippnick come to possess this information? The fact
is that we, like the sentencing jury, have no idea, as the State
offered no evidence whatsoever on that very crucial point.
	The facts of this case bear a striking resemblance to those
presented in People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418 (1999). In West, as in
this case, the State sought to establish the defendant's death
penalty eligibility under section 9-1(b)(3). By way of proof, the
State introduced a certified copy of the defendant's 1978 murder
conviction, entered upon a plea of guilty. The conviction
certificate failed to identify, however, whether the defendant
pleaded guilty to intentional murder, knowing murder, or felony
murder. Moreover, the State failed to introduce any additional
evidence as to the defendant's mens rea at the time of the earlier
murder. In holding that the State failed to meet its burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was eligible
for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(3), this court stated:
		"We simply lack any evidence of record that establishes
under what theory of murder defendant was charged or
convicted. Indeed, our review of the record reveals that
not one scintilla of evidence was ever presented to the
jury during the State's case in chief during the eligibility
phase of the hearing with respect to the issue of
defendant's mens rea at the time of the [earlier] murder."
West, 187 Ill. 2d  at 442.
	Admittedly, unlike in West, the State in this case did introduce
one scintilla of evidence relating to the particular theory of first
degree manslaughter under which defendant was convicted.
However, even when construed in a light most favorable to the
State, that evidence amounts to nothing more than Sippnick's
naked assertion concerning the particulars of defendant's guilty
plea, which assertion may or may not be rooted in verifiable fact.
On so slender a reed, no rational jury could have concluded,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant pleaded guilty under
subsection (1) of the New York first degree manslaughter statute,
as opposed to one of the three remaining subsections of that
statute. We therefore reverse the imposition of defendant's death
sentence and remand this cause to the circuit court for the
imposition of a sentence other death. See West, 187 Ill. 2d  at 447-48.
	Because our ruling on this issue is dispositive, we need not
address defendant's remaining contentions of sentencing error.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, we affirm defendant's conviction but
vacate defendant's death sentence and remand to the circuit court
for a new sentencing hearing.
Conviction affirmed;
 death sentence reversed;
cause remanded for resentencing.
	JUSTICE HEIPLE, specially concurring:
	I agree with the majority's decision to affirm defendant's
conviction for first degree murder. I further agree that defendant's
death sentence must be vacated. However, I base this second
conclusion on other grounds.
	The sole aggravating factor advanced by the State for
defendant's death penalty eligibility was that he had been
convicted of murdering two or more individuals. 720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1996). Section 9-1(b)(3) of the Criminal Code
authorizes the imposition of the death penalty when "the defendant
has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals under
subsection (a) of this Section [first degree murder] or under any
law of the United States or of any state which is substantially
similar to subsection (a) of this Section." (Emphasis added.) 720
ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1996). Defendant contends that his
conviction for manslaughter in New York cannot be used to find
him eligible for the death penalty because section 9-1(b)(3) clearly
states that a defendant must have been convicted of "murdering"
two or more individuals.
	This court's primary objective when construing the meaning
of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
legislature. People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996). An
inquiry into the legislative intent behind a statute must necessarily
begin with the language of the statute. People v. Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d 233, 253 (1989). The statutory language must be given its plain
and ordinary meaning, and where that language is clear and
unambiguous, the court must apply the statute without further aids
of statutory construction. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d  at 457. Because the
construction of a statute is a question of law, this court's review is
de novo. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d  at 457. 
	In drafting section 9-1(b)(3), the General Assembly
specifically chose to use the word "murder." Murder is a term of
art describing a specific crime. Had the General Assembly
intended for homicides not resulting in murder convictions in
other states to trigger death penalty eligibility, the legislature
would have used a broader term such as "killing" or "homicide."
Instead, the General Assembly specifically required that a
defendant be convicted of "murdering" two of more individuals.
	The legislature's intent in section 9-1(b)(3) is clear and
unambiguous: in order for a defendant to be eligible for the death
penalty, he must have been convicted of murdering, and not
simply killing, two or more people. Defendant's conviction from
New York, upon which his death penalty eligibility was
predicated, however, was not for murder but for manslaughter.
Thus, defendant does not meet the death penalty eligibility
requirements under section 9-1(b)(3) and is entitled to the
vacation of his death sentence and a new sentencing hearing.
	JUSTICE BILANDIC joins in this special concurrence.
	JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
	I agree with the majority that the defendant's conviction for
first degree murder must be affirmed. I do not agree, however,
with the majority's separate holding that the defendant was not
properly found eligible for the death penalty. In my view, the
evidence was sufficient to sustain that finding.
	The State based the defendant's eligibility for the death
penalty on the multiple-murder aggravating circumstance found in
section 9-1(b)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1996)). That statute authorizes imposition of the
death penalty on a defendant who has been found guilty of first
degree murder under the following conditions:
			"[T]he defendant has been convicted of murdering two
or more individuals under subsection (a) of this Section or
under any law of the United States or of any state which
is substantially similar to subsection (a) of this Section
regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of
the same act or of several related or unrelated acts so long
as the deaths were the result of either an intent to kill
more than one person or of separate acts which the
defendant knew would cause death or create a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered
individual or another[.]"
	The defendant was convicted in New York in 1994 of
manslaughter in the first degree. At the sentencing hearing below,
the State contended, and the trial judge agreed, that the New York
statute under which the defendant was convicted was substantially
similar to the Illinois first degree murder statute. The trial judge
therefore ruled that the defendant's New York conviction could be
used together with the conviction for first degree murder in the
present case to establish the defendant's eligibility for the death
penalty under section 9-1(b)(3). At the conclusion of the first
stage of the hearing, after the introduction of evidence of the
defendant's New York conviction, the jury found that the
defendant was eligible for the death penalty under the multiple-murder aggravating circumstance.
	Regarding the jury's eligibility finding, the majority believes
that the evidence did not establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the
defendant's conviction in New York of an offense similar to the
Illinois offense of first degree murder. I disagree. The State
introduced a certified copy of the defendant's New York
conviction for manslaughter in the first degree. Although the
document did not reveal which particular subsection of the New
York statute formed the basis for the defendant's conviction, an
assistant District Attorney from New York, Cynthia Sippnick,
testified that the defendant was convicted under subsection (1).
	The New York statute defining the offense of manslaughter
in the first degree provides:
			"A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree
when:
			(1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to
another person, he causes the death of such person or of
a third person; or
			(2) With intent to cause the death of another person, he
causes the death of such person or of a third person under
circumstances which do not constitute murder because he
acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance
***. ***; or
			(3) He commits upon a female pregnant for more than
twenty-four weeks an abortional act which causes her
death, unless such abortional act is justifiable ***; or
			(4) Being eighteen years or more and with intent to
cause physical injury to a person less than eleven years
old, the defendant recklessly engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of serious physical injury to such
person and thereby causes the death of such person." N.Y.
Penal Law §125.20 (McKinney 1998).
	In the proceedings below, the trial judge ruled that the
defendant's conviction had to be based on subsection (1) of the
New York statute if the State was to use it to establish the
defendant's commission of an offense substantially similar to the
Illinois offense of first degree murder. I believe that the evidence
was sufficient to establish the defendant's conviction under
subsection (1). Assistant District Attorney Sippnick testified,
without objection, that that provision formed the basis for the
defendant's conviction. It is clear that the defendant's New York
homicide did not involve the circumstances described by
subsections (3) or (4) of the statute-the defendant was not
performing an abortional act, and the victim was not under the age
of 11. In addition, the defendant's conviction under subsection (1),
as testified to by Sippnick, is entirely consistent with the
circumstances of the offense. According to the statements the
defendant later gave authorities, the victim in the New York case
was another homeless man, called Cano, whom the defendant had
known for several weeks. The two resided in Central Park. On the
day of the homicide, the defendant and Cano got into an argument
when Cano refused to share his drugs with the defendant. Cano,
armed with a knife, threatened to kill the defendant unless the
defendant left. The defendant backed away, and Cano put down
the knife and injected himself with drugs. The defendant then
returned, picked up Cano's knife, and stabbed Cano in the neck.
	In discounting the State's evidence, the majority opinion
poses a number of questions regarding the foundation for Assistant
District Attorney Sippnick's testimony. Slip op. at 17. These are
all matters that the defendant could have raised at the sentencing
hearing, but did not. Although the burden rests on the State to
establish a defendant's eligibility for the death penalty, in this case
the defendant's failure to raise any objection to the State's mode
of establishing the conviction is significant and should result in the
waiver of the hearsay objection he now makes to the evidence.
Notably, the defendant does not dispute the accuracy of the
assistant District Attorney's testimony that he pleaded guilty to,
and was convicted under, subsection (1) of the statute. There is
nothing inherently improper about the State's proof of the
defendant's conviction under that provision of the New York
statute; unchallenged at the hearing, the evidence should be
considered sufficient on review.
1.      1Defendant, of course, argues that no portion of the New York first
degree manslaughter statute is "substantially similar" to the Illinois first
degree murder statute. We need not address this issue, however, as the
State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the particular
subsection to which defendant pleaded guilty.

2.      2Admittedly, after reviewing defendant's conviction certificate,
Sippnick testified that she possessed "personal knowledge that in fact
[defendant] was convicted of [first degree manslaughter]." This,
however, is a far cry from possessing personal knowledge of the
particular subsection to which defendant pleaded guilty.