Title: Hart v. Keenan Properties, Inc.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
FRANK C. HART et al., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
KEENAN PROPERTIES, INC., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S253295 
 
First Appellate District, Division Five 
A152692 
 
Alameda County Superior Court 
RG16838191 
 
 
May 21, 2020 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred.   
 
1 
HART v. KEENAN PROPERTIES, INC., 
S253295 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
We granted review to determine whether a company’s 
name and logo appearing on an invoice can constitute hearsay.  
Under the facts presented, a witness’s observation of the name 
and logo was circumstantial evidence of identity, not proof of the 
truth of matters asserted in the document.  Because the 
observation was not offered for a hearsay purpose, defendant’s 
hearsay objection was properly rejected. 
I.  FACTS 
After Frank Hart developed mesothelioma, he and his 
wife, Cynthia, sued Keenan Properties, Inc. (Keenan) and other 
entities involved in the distribution and use of pipes containing 
asbestos.  Only Keenan’s liability is at issue, and turns on 
whether sufficient evidence shows it was the source of the pipes. 
From September 1976 to March 1977, Hart installed pipes 
for Christeve Corporation (Christeve) in McKinleyville.  His job 
involved 
cutting 
and 
beveling 
asbestos-cement 
pipe 
manufactured by the Johns-Manville Corporation (Johns-
Manville).  Although the process released dust, Hart worked 
without respiratory protection.   
Keenan Pipe and Supply, a wholesale distributor, sold 
asbestos-cement pipe between 1965 and 1983.  In 1977, it 
changed its name to Keenan Supply.  The logo for both Keenan 
Pipe and Supply and Keenan Supply was the letter “K” drawn 
HART v. KEENAN PROPERTIES, INC., 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
to resemble a straight pipe and an angled pipe, enclosed in a 
circle.1  Successor Keenan retained no sales records or invoices 
from the relevant period.  Its representative testified the 
company logo was originally rendered in green and white, then 
changed in the 1970s to red and white.  The witness also 
acknowledged what appeared to be a copy of a Keenan invoice, 
which bore Keenan’s name and logo.  He agreed that Keenan 
would have sent a sales invoice to its customers.  
Christeve’s bookkeeper, Olga Mitrovich, testified that 
when Christeve closed in 2001, she retained no documents 
related to the McKinleyville project.  She remembered the logo 
of Keenan Pipe and Supply as “the K with a circle around it.”  
Asked why, she replied:  “Because I know that we dealt with 
them, and [the logo] was unique, and I like it.”   
Foreman John Glamuzina was Hart’s supervisor from 
January to March 1977.2  He was familiar with asbestos-cement 
                                        
1  
In 1983, Keenan Supply sold its name and most of its 
assets to Hajoca Corporation, which continues to use Keenan’s 
logo:   
 
(Keenan Supply | Eureka, CA   [as 
of May 21, 2020].  All internet citations in this opinion are 
archived by year, docket number and case name at 
.)   
 
2  
Glamuzina was unavailable at the time of trial.  The jury 
was shown video clips from his deposition testimony.  (Evid. 
Code, § 1291); all further statutory references are to the 
Evidence Code.) 
 
HART v. KEENAN PROPERTIES, INC., 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
pipe, and recalled that it was used on the McKinleyville project.  
Glamuzina explained:  “[T]here would be different invoices to 
sign when the truckers would come up with a load.”  When he 
received materials delivered to the worksite, he “would just 
check the load for my eight-inch pipe, shorts or whatever came 
on the pipe, that’s all I would check on that.”  He would also 
check the invoices to make sure the supplies listed matched 
what was being delivered.  If the information was correct, he 
signed the invoice and retained a copy, which he turned in to the 
site office.  He did remember seeing the name “Keenan” on 
invoices but could not “recall exactly” how Keenan’s name was 
printed or how many times he saw the name on invoices.  He 
testified he did not see names of any other suppliers and 
explained that “[w]hen you’re working out in the field, you’re in 
a hurry . . . .”  When asked why “Keenan sticks out in your 
mind,” he replied:  “Just the way the — their K and stuff is all 
— I don’t know.”    
Keenan moved to exclude any reference by Glamuzina to 
Keenan invoices.  It argued, inter alia, that any reference to 
“Keenan” on the invoices constituted inadmissible hearsay.3  
The court rejected Keenan’s hearsay argument, giving two 
reasons.  First it held the evidence was not hearsay but merely 
circumstantial evidence of identity.  Second, even if hearsay, the 
evidence fell under an exception as the statement of a party 
opponent.  It admitted Glamuzina’s testimony as to the name 
and logo he saw printed on the invoices given to him when pipes 
                                        
3  
Keenan also argued that the invoices did not exist, and if 
they did exist, they were not authenticated.   
 
HART v. KEENAN PROPERTIES, INC., 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
were delivered.  Keenan did not request a limiting instruction 
on the permissible consideration of Glamuzina’s testimony. 
The jury returned a plaintiff’s verdict, with a special 
finding that Hart was exposed to asbestos from pipe supplied by 
Keenan.  Following apportionment of fault and settlements by 
other defendants, a judgment of $1,626,517.82 was entered 
against Keenan.   
The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding Glamuzina’s 
descriptions of the invoices were hearsay.  (Hart v. Keenan 
Properties, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 203, 213.)  We apply a 
different analysis to that question and reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the 
truth of its content.4  (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 
674.)  Section 225 defines the term “statement” as either “oral 
or written verbal expression” or “nonverbal conduct of a person 
intended by him as a substitute for oral or written verbal 
expression.”  Verbal expression means “relating to, or expressed 
in words.”  (Garner, Dict. of Modern American Usage (1998) p. 
676; see also Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) p. 1870.)  Non-
verbal expression refers to “conduct intended as a substitute for 
the actual use of words.”  (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 
1138, 1143, fn. omitted.)  A document is generally a form of 
written verbal expression.  If it is prepared before trial and 
offered to prove the truth of the words it contains, it is hearsay. 
                                        
4  
“ ‘Hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a statement that was 
made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and 
that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.”  (§ 1200.) 
HART v. KEENAN PROPERTIES, INC., 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
As noted, the trial court relied on alternate theories to 
admit Glamuzina’s testimony about the content of the invoices.  
First, it concluded that Glamuzina did not convey hearsay, 
because the name and logo were not offered to prove the truth 
of any statement contained in the invoice.  Instead, his 
observations were circumstantial evidence of Keenan’s identity 
as the source of the pipes.  Based on the facts here, the court was 
correct.  As a result, we do not further consider the alternative 
basis for its ruling. 
A. Relevance When Not Offered for Truth of 
Content 
“When evidence that certain words were spoken or written 
is admitted to prove that the words were uttered [or written] 
and not to prove their truth, the evidence is not hearsay.  (People 
v. Smith[ (2002)] 179 Cal.App.4th 986, 1003 . . . .)  (Text cited 
with approval in People v. Armstrong [ (2019)] 6 Cal.5th 735, 786 
. . . .)  ‘The first and most basic requirement for applying the not-
for-the-truth limitation . . . is that the out-of-court statement 
must be offered for some purpose independent of the truth of the 
matters it asserts.  That means that the statement must be 
capable of serving its nonhearsay purpose regardless of whether 
the jury believes the matters asserted to be true.  [Citations.]’  
(People v. Hopson [(2017)] 3 Cal.5th 424, 432 . . . .)”  (Simons, 
Cal. Evid. Manual (2020) Hearsay Evidence, § 2:5, p. 84.)  For 
example, suppose A hit B after B said, “You’re stupid.”  B’s out-
of-court statement asserts that A is stupid.  If those words are 
offered to prove that A is, indeed, stupid, they constitute hearsay 
and would be inadmissible unless they fell under a hearsay 
exception.  However, those same words might be admissible for 
a non-hearsay purpose:  to prove that A had a motive to assault 
B.  The distinction turns not on the words themselves, but what 
HART v. KEENAN PROPERTIES, INC., 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
they are offered to prove.  The concept can prove analytically 
elusive when the words themselves also make an assertion. (See 
1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (5th ed. 2018) Hearsay, § 37, p. 832 
[“The distinction between these two uses of the evidence is not 
always readily apparent”].)  If the words are admitted for a non-
hearsay purpose the jury is not allowed to consider the truth of 
any substantive assertion, and is often instructed to that effect. 
Otherwise competent evidence must also be relevant.  So, 
the non-truth purpose for which a statement is offered must be 
relevant.  Evidence is relevant if it has a “tendency in reason to 
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action.”  (§ 210.)  Documents and other 
items found at a location may be relevant to show a person has 
a connection with that place.  People v. Goodall (1982) 131 
Cal.App.3d 129 held that various items, including documents, 
were admissible to show Goodall was linked to a home where 
drugs were manufactured.  Evidence recovered at the site 
included a summons, various receipts, and Goodall’s driver’s 
license, as well as photographs of her at the residence.  The court 
held that the documents were relevant regardless of the truth of 
their content.  “Without considering the documents for the truth 
of the matter stated therein, it is relevant that documents 
bearing appellant’s name or other items reasonably identifiable 
as appellant’s were found at the residence. . . .  The jury could 
infer that these items would not have been so located unless 
[Goodall]” had sufficient connection with the site to exercise 
control or was aware of the illicit activity there.  (Id. at p. 143.)  
The Harts rely principally on the similar case of People v. 
Williams (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1535 (Williams).  Williams 
sought to establish standing to challenge an apartment search 
by offering proof he lived there.  He called the searching officer 
HART v. KEENAN PROPERTIES, INC., 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
who had recovered a fishing license and a paycheck made out to 
him.  Both documents, bearing the defendant’s name and the 
apartment address, were recovered from a dresser in the 
bedroom where contraband was found. “The trial court opined 
that the documents were being offered for the truth of the 
matter being asserted therein — i.e., that the defendant lived at 
the apartment, as indicated by the address on the license and on 
the checks.”5  (Id. at p. 1541, fn. omitted.)   
The Court of Appeal rejected that analysis.  It explained 
that even if the documents had not contained the address of the 
searched apartment, “the fishing license and two checks at issue 
here are more likely to be found in the residence of the person 
named on those documents than in the residence of any other 
person.”  (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 1542.)  In other 
words, the license and checks were not admitted to prove what 
the defendant’s name was, that he was permitted to fish in 
California waters, or that the issuers of the checks paid him 
money in a certain amount.  Instead, the fact that documents 
bearing his name were found at the apartment was relevant on 
a different point.  They tended to support an inference that the 
person named lived there.  The items were “circumstantial 
evidence that a person with the same name as the defendant 
resided in the apartment from which they were seized.”  (Ibid.) 
In Goodall and Williams the documents were relevant 
regardless of their truth.  It was the presence of the documents, 
not the truth of their content, that linked those defendants to 
the residences.  Even if the documents bore false aliases, they 
could still be evidence of the disputed link, if it could be 
                                        
5  
A second check made out to Williams was also found, but 
apparently did not bear his address. 
HART v. KEENAN PROPERTIES, INC., 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
established that Goodall and Williams used those false names.  
The documents were offered to prove the link, not the truth of 
the words on them.  The same inference of a link could be drawn 
from the presence of items containing no hearsay at all, like a 
distinctive ring belonging to Goodall or a photo of Williams with 
his mother. 
Here the disputed fact was whether Keenan supplied 
pipes for the McKinleyville project.  To prove that fact, plaintiffs 
had to establish a link between Keenan and the pipes 
Glamuzina recalled being delivered.  The appearance of the 
name and logo was relevant for that purpose, even if the 
company name and logo were not expressive of Keenan’s 
identity as the source.  If Keenan did not use its name and had 
no logo, the appearance of a document that could be shown to be 
theirs would be relevant evidence if offered to prove the link.  
Suppose that Glamuzina testified that the pipes were 
accompanied by a document bearing the legend:  “Best Pipes On 
The Planet,” and the company representative testified that 
Keenan printed that slogan on their invoices.  That evidence, 
taken together would have a tendency in reason to prove the 
disputed link.  The words would not be admissible to prove that 
Keenan’s pipes were the best on Earth, as the slogan asserted.  
They would, however, be admissible as circumstantial evidence 
that the pipes that were delivered along with the identified 
invoice came from Keenan.  The inference would be valid 
regardless of whether the assertion in the slogan is true.  It is 
the combination of some characteristic that makes the document 
identifiable and the independent evidence connecting Keenan to 
the identifiable document that establishes the link.  The fact 
that the point of identification is words is not sufficient to make 
HART v. KEENAN PROPERTIES, INC., 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
the words hearsay, unless the words are offered to prove the 
truth of their content. 
Here the link between Keenan and the pipes does not 
depend on the word “Keenan” being a true statement that 
Keenan supplied the pipes.  Instead, the link relies on several 
circumstances demonstrated by the evidence.  The foreman 
testified that when the pipes were delivered, he was given an 
invoice bearing Keenan’s name and logo and that the invoice 
matched the load delivered.  Bookkeeper Mitrovich testified she 
would not pay for a delivery without receiving paperwork from 
the foreman.  Keenan’s representative identified its logo and 
testified that it was printed on Keenan invoices.  He also 
confirmed the practice of providing an invoice to customers.  
Taken together, the evidence was relevant to prove the disputed 
link between Keenan and the pipes, regardless of the content 
the words on the invoice might otherwise have asserted. 
B. Other Arguments by Keenan 
Keenan objects that the actual documents Glamuzina 
described were not available, and that their contents were not 
authenticated as required by section 1401.  Those arguments 
are unavailing.  The absence of a document does not always 
preclude admission of its contents.  Although, generally, “oral 
testimony is not admissible to prove the content of a writing” 
(§ 1523, subd. (a)), such secondary evidence may be admitted “if 
the proponent does not have possession or control of a copy of 
the writing and the original is lost or has been destroyed without 
fraudulent intent on the part of the proponent of the evidence.”  
(Id., subd. (b).)  Here, the Harts never possessed the documents 
and were not responsible for their destruction. 
HART v. KEENAN PROPERTIES, INC., 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
“Authentication is to be determined by the trial court as a 
preliminary fact (§ 403, subd. (a)(3)) and is statutorily defined 
as ‘the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding 
that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims 
it is’ . . .  (§ 1400).”  (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 
266.)  “Essentially, what is necessary is a prima facie case.  ‘As 
long as the evidence would support a finding of authenticity, the 
writing is admissible.  The fact conflicting inferences can be 
drawn regarding authenticity goes to the document’s weight as 
evidence, not its admissibility.’ ”  (Id. at p. 267.)  “The 
determination regarding the sufficiency of the foundational 
evidence is a matter left to the court’s discretion.  [Citation.]  
Such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal unless an 
abuse of discretion is shown.”  (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
1, 47.) 
“The means of authenticating a writing are not limited to 
those specified in the Evidence Code.  [Citations.]  For example, 
a writing can be authenticated by circumstantial evidence and 
by its contents.”  (People v. Skiles (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1178, 1187 
(Skiles).)  Section 1410 clarifies:  “Nothing in this article shall 
be construed to limit the means by which a writing may be 
authenticated or proved.”  In People v. Gibson (2001) 90 
Cal.App.4th 371 (Gibson), manuscripts describing a prostitution 
enterprise were found in the appellant’s hotel room and her 
home.  The Court of Appeal acknowledged that “[t]here was no 
evidence presented that appellant actually wrote or typed either 
manuscript, nor were any fingerprints obtained from either 
document.”  (Id. at p. 382.)  However, circumstantial evidence 
properly authenticated the manuscripts.  “There are clear 
references to the author being ‘Sasha,’ one of appellant’s aliases.  
The evidence clearly showed that appellant was operating as a 
HART v. KEENAN PROPERTIES, INC., 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
madam, that the manuscripts discussed the prostitution 
business, and that the locations where these items were seized 
were each a residence of appellant.  Moreover, no evidence 
showed that these items belonged to anyone else.”  (Id. at p. 
383.)  We note here that authentication is a threshold 
admissibility question for the court, which may look to the 
document’s content.  Whether the trier of fact can consider the 
content of an admitted document for its truth in resolving a 
disputed fact is a separate question. 
Here, evidence showed Keenan was in the business of 
selling asbestos-cement pipe and did business with Christeve.  
One of Glamuzina’s duties was to check invoices.  His 
description of the logo was consistent with the exemplar of a 
Keenan invoice that its representative acknowledged.  The 
foundation for authenticity was sufficient. 
Keenan 
seems 
to 
assert 
the 
invoices 
could 
be 
authenticated only by someone associated with Keenan.  It 
urges that Glamuzina was not a party-opponent and “cannot 
stand in as a surrogate for Keenan.”  The argument fails.  
Glamuzina’s testimony did not purport to make representations 
on Keenan’s behalf.  Rather, he conveyed his own observations 
of documents he reviewed when the pipes were delivered.  
(People v. Veamatahau (2020) 9 Cal.5th 16, 27.)  Although 
testimony by Keenan’s agent would have been another way to 
authenticate the invoices, it was not the only way.   
Keenan also questions the trial court’s reliance on 
Glamuzina’s testimony, for several reasons.  First, it states the 
evidence was provided by “an 81-year-old witness burdened by 
all the fallibility of human memory,” and notes that the 
testimony related to events occurring 40 years earlier.  A 
HART v. KEENAN PROPERTIES, INC., 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
witness’s memory and credibility may affect how a court 
exercises its discretion, but it was for the trial court to evaluate 
Glamuzina’s demeanor and testimony in deciding whether a 
preliminary fact had been adequately demonstrated. 
Second, Keenan complains Glamuzina did not explain 
what he meant by “their K and stuff.”  However, there was 
evidence that Keenan used a distinctive K logo which continues 
in use today and which bookkeeper Mitrovich described as 
“unique.”  It was not unreasonable to infer Glamuzina was 
referring 
to 
the 
K 
logo 
acknowledged 
by 
Keenan’s 
representative.   
Third, Keenan asserts there were dissimilarities between 
Glamuzina’s testimony and the invoice exemplar.  In particular, 
when asked what information was on the invoices, Glamuzina 
responded, “[W]hat [the trucker] had on his load, and I’d just 
double-check it, see — usually it tells you where it came from.  
That’s all.”  Asked what he meant by “where it came from,” he 
responded, “What plant or — stuff like that . . . .”  Keenan notes 
that the sample of a Keenan invoice does not identify a “plant.”  
The exemplar does, however, include a street address in Los 
Angeles and lists various cities where Keenan apparently had 
offices.  It is not clear what Glamuzina meant by “plant.”  But 
whatever ambiguity or dissimilarity is reflected in his 
recollection again goes to weight, not admissibility.  The trial 
court’s conclusion that the foundational evidence of authenticity 
was sufficient was neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
Fourth, Keenan claims Glamuzina’s testimony was 
inconsistent with the Harts’ trial theory that the presence of a 
Keenan branch near the McKinleyville worksite supported the 
conclusion that the pipe was theirs.  Asked how Christeve 
HART v. KEENAN PROPERTIES, INC., 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
ordered materials for the McKinleyville job, Glamuzina said 
Christeve’s owner “would order his pipe down in Southern 
California and whatever they did to get it to up north.”  He was 
then asked, “So to the best of your understanding, he ordered 
from someone in Southern California, and Keenan was 
delivering it to the jobsite in Northern California?”  Glamuzina 
confirmed that understanding.  Subsequently asked whether 
the owner “would get supplies from Southern California,” 
Glamuzina responded, “He would order pipe . . . down there, and 
it would always come from up north or wherever we were 
working, it would always come from a different place.”  It is not 
clear that Glamuzina’s testimony was inconsistent with the 
Harts’ reliance on the proximity of a Keenan branch to the 
worksite.  But regardless of how any inconsistency might be 
weighed by the jury, it does not follow that the trial court abused 
its discretion in finding a preliminary showing of authenticity.  
In addition to challenging the adequacy of Glamuzina’s 
testimony, Keenan contends contrary evidence precludes a 
finding of adequate authentication.  It cites other invoices 
showing that Johns-Manville sold asbestos-cement pipe to 
Christeve and shipped it to the McKinleyville site.  The court 
admitted two invoices from Johns-Manville to Christeve and a 
letter from Christeve to Johns-Manville, based on Olga 
Mitrovich’s recognition of handwriting on those items, but it 
excluded other Johns-Manville invoices.  According to 
Glamuzina, more than 60,000 feet of asbestos-cement pipe was 
installed at the McKinleyville site.  While relevant, evidence 
that a different company supplied asbestos-cement pipe to the 
worksite does not preclude an inference that Keenan did as well. 
Keenan also relies on various cases to argue the 
authentication evidence was inadequate.  It relies principally on 
HART v. KEENAN PROPERTIES, INC., 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
Osborne v. Todd Farm Service (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 43.  
Osborne was injured while moving hay bales.  She sought to 
establish that Berrington, a hay supplier, had sold a particular 
bale to Todd Farm Service.  The trial court rejected the 
plaintiff’s offer to testify that she saw a delivery person from 
Todd Farm Service with a receipt identifying Berrington as the 
supplier of the bale.  The Court of Appeal upheld the ruling.  It 
noted the plaintiff did not possess the receipt, no other witness 
claimed to have seen it, and Todd Farm Service, “the alleged 
source of the document, testified that no such receipt ever 
existed.  [Todd] did not segregate hay in his barn by supplier 
and he did not document the supplier of hay included in any 
delivery.  Based on this evidence, it was well within the trial 
court’s discretion to find that [the plaintiff] failed to prove the 
preliminary facts necessary to admit her testimony about the 
delivery receipt into evidence.”  (Id. at p. 53.)   
This case is different from Osborne, where all evidence 
except the plaintiff’s recollection showed no such receipt ever 
existed.  In contrast, Keenan admitted it sent invoices and 
acknowledged an exemplar with a Keenan logo on it.  Reviewing 
invoices was one of Glamuzina’s responsibilities, which lends 
weight to his recollection of how the invoices looked.  In addition, 
the invoices were seen at a worksite accompanying a delivery of 
asbestos-cement pipe, a product Keenan sold.  Osborne 
concluded only that the trial court in that case did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding the evidence.  That holding does not 
preclude a different court, faced with some but not all of the 
circumstances present in Osborne, from exercising its discretion 
differently. 
Finally, Keenan argues that other cases suggest a 
document cannot be authenticated if there is no copy before the 
HART v. KEENAN PROPERTIES, INC., 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
court and only one witness testifies to seeing the document.  It 
points to Skiles, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 1182; People ex rel. 
Harris v. Sarpas (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1570-1571; 
Gibson, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at page 379; and Young v. 
Sorenson (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 911, 915-916.  Those cases do not 
sweep as broadly as Keenan contends.  As noted, section 1523, 
subdivision (b) provides that the contents of a writing may be 
proven by oral testimony when the proponent does not have a 
copy and “the original is lost or has been destroyed without 
fraudulent intent on the part of the proponent of the evidence.”  
The statute does not impose any additional evidentiary 
requirement.  The strength of authenticity evidence in other 
cases does not establish the trial court abused its discretion 
here.  
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded to the 
Court of Appeal for consideration of other contentions left 
unresolved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Hart v. Keenan Properties, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XXX 29 Cal.App.5th 203 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S253295 
Date Filed:  May 21, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Alameda 
Judge:  Brad Seligman 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
CMBG3 Law, W. Joseph Gunter and Gilliam F. Stewart for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Maune Raichle Hartley French & Mudd, David L. Amell, Marissa Y. Uchimura; Kazan, McClain, Satterly 
& Greenwood, Denyse F. Clancy and Ted W. Pelletier for Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
The Arkin Law Firm and Sharon J. Arkin for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
W. Joseph Gunter 
CMBG3 Law LLP 
100 Spectrum Center Drive, Suite 820 
Irvine, CA 92618 
(949) 467-9500 
 
Denyse F. Clancy 
Kazan, McClain, Satterley & Greenwood 
55 Harrison Street, Suite 400 
Oakland, CA 94607 
(510) 302-1000