Title: KARI JO ROEMMICH V. SHANE CHRISTOPHER ROEMMICH

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KARI JO ROEMMICH V. SHANE CHRISTOPHER ROEMMICH2010 WY 115238 P.3d 89Case Number: S-10-0008Decided: 08/10/2010
 
 
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
KARI 
JO ROEMMICH,Appellant(Defendant),v.SHANE CHRISTOPHER 
ROEMMICH,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Stacy 
E. Casper of Casper Law Office, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Nick 
Edward Beduhn of Goppert, Smith & Beduhn, Cody, 
Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  When shared physical custody of their 
child failed, Kari Jo Roemmich (Mother) filed a petition for custody 
modification seeking primary physical custody of the child with reasonable 
visitation for Shane Christopher Roemmich (Father).  After a hearing on the petition, the 
district court awarded Father primary physical custody with reasonable 
visitation by Mother and ordered Mother to pay child support.  Mother appeals the district court's 
order raising a number of claims, including error in awarding custody to 
Father.  We affirm the district 
court's custody determination, but remand for further proceedings on the issues 
of visitation and child support. 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  Mother asserts the district court 
committed error or abused its discretion in the following 
ways:

 
 
            
1.         
Granting custody to Father when he did not file a counter-petition for 
custody;

 
 
            
2.         
Failing to strike Father's witnesses and exhibits after he did not 
disclose them to Mother as agreed and in a timely fashion;

 
 
            
3.         
Granting custody to Father after a stalking protection order was entered 
against him;

 
 
            
4.         
Granting custody to Father on the basis of findings concerning Mother's 
employment that were contrary to the evidence;

 
 
            
5.         
Failing to order visitation in sufficient detail to promote understanding 
and compliance; and

 
 
            
6.         
Ordering child support with no evidence of the parties' 
incomes.

Father 
asserts the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting custody to 
him or figuring child support.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]   Father and Mother were married on 
July 1, 2000, in Cody, Wyoming.  In 
2003, they had a child.  They were 
divorced by decree entered in April of 2009.  In accordance with the parties' 
agreement, the decree provided that Mother and Father would have joint legal 
care, custody and control of the child, with each parent having physical custody 
of the child for one week and visitation the following week.  

 
 
[¶4]   On June 15, 2009, Mother filed a 
petition for modification of custody in which she alleged that substantial 
changes in circumstances had occurred warranting modification of the decree, 
including that Father had berated and harassed her in front of the child, Father 
had been stalking her to the point that she had filed for a protective order and 
the shared physical custody arrangement was not in the child's best 
interest.  Mother also filed a 
motion seeking temporary custody of the child pending a decision on her 
modification petition.  The 
following day, on June 16, 2009, the district court set the temporary custody 
motion for hearing on June 19, 2009.  

 
 
[¶5]  On June 18, 2009, Father filed a motion 
to continue the temporary custody hearing, asserting insufficient time to 
prepare his case.  The district 
court granted the motion and continued the hearing until July 10, 2009.  On the day the hearing was to be held, 
Father filed a response to Mother's motion for temporary custody in which he 
alleged that no material change in circumstances had occurred since entry of the 
original decree and it was not in the child's best interest to award temporary 
custody to Mother.  He also filed a 
response to Mother's custody modification petition in which he denied berating 
or harassing her in front of the child and denied stalking her but admitted the 
shared custody arrangement was not in the child's best interest.    

 
 
[¶6] 
 For reasons that do not appear in 
the record, no hearing was held on July 10, 2009. By order dated July 15, 2009, 
the district court rescheduled the temporary custody hearing for July 20, 
2009.  A hearing was held on July 
20, however, the matter heard was Mother's petition for custody modification, 
not the temporary custody motion.  After two days of testimony, the district 
court issued a decision letter in which it concluded it was in the child's best 
interest for Father to have primary physical custody.  The district court entered an order to 
that effect and also ordered that Mother was to have visitation with the child 
every other weekend beginning August 28, 2009, and was to pay Father child 
support in the amount of $279.00 per month.  Mother appealed from the district 
court's order.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]  We review a district court's order on a 
petition to modify custody, visitation, and child support for an abuse of 
discretion.  Inman v. Williams, 2009 WY 51, ¶ 9, 205 P.3d 185, 191 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
We 
will not interfere with the district court's decision regarding modification of 
custody absent a procedural error or a clear abuse of discretion.  In determining whether the district 
court has abused its discretion, we must decide whether it could reasonably 
conclude as it did.  Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  

 
 

Id., 
quoting Selvey v. Selvey, 2004 WY 
166, ¶ 15, 102 P.3d 210, 214 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

1.    
Requirements 
for Modifying Joint Custody  

[¶8]  Mother asserts the district court abused 
its discretion in awarding primary physical custody of the child to Father when 
he did not file a pleading seeking custody but instead merely filed a response 
to her petition.  She claims his 
response did not give her adequate notice that he was seeking custody.  Father responds that once Mother filed a 
petition for modification alleging a material change in circumstances, the 
district court was required to determine what custodial arrangement was in the 
best interest of the child.  Father 
contends the district court was required to make that determination regardless 
of the pleading he filed in response to the petition.  Father argues that because he agreed 
that the shared custody arrangement had failed, a material change in 
circumstances existed as a matter of law and the district court was left to 
decide which parent should have custody based upon the child's best 
interest.  

 
 
[¶9]  Mother filed her petition pursuant to 
Wyo. Ann. Stat. § 20-2-204 (LexisNexis 2009), which provides in pertinent part 
as follows:

 
 
§ 
20-2-204. Enforcement and modification.

 
 
            
(a)       
Either parent may petition to enforce or modify any court order regarding 
custody and visitation.

. 
. . .

            
            
(c) A court having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, 
custody and visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of 
a material change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question and 
that the modification would be in the best interests of the children pursuant to 
W.S. 20-2-201(a). 

 

[¶10]  We construed this provision in Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566, 570 (Wyo. 
1990), in the context of the parents' requests to modify visitation, child 
support and medical insurance provisions in the original divorce decree.  Father filed a petition to modify the 
divorce decree to clarify his visitation rights, asserting that Mother had 
failed to allow reasonable visitation in accordance with the decree.  Mother responded with a cross-petition 
to modify the child support and medical insurance provisions of the decree 
alleging that circumstances had changed in that she was no longer working.  The district court modified the 
visitation provision and Mother appealed to this Court claiming the district 
court erred in doing so because Father had not shown a change in circumstances 
supporting the modification.  We 
said: 

 
 
[T]he 
parties willingly presented and tried to the court the modification issues 
relating to visitation and medical insurance.  Since the parties induced the district 
court to act by their motions to modify these provisions of the original divorce 
decree and by their litigation posture at the hearing on the motions, neither of 
them can be heard on appeal to argue error based upon that action.  

We 
determine that the district court could reasonably conclude from the evidence 
that the parties wanted it to exercise its revisory powers with respect to the 
visitation provisions and the medical insurance 
provision[.]

 
 

Id. 
at 571.

 
 
[¶11] 
Subsequently, in Gurney v. Gurney, 
899 P.2d 52 (Wyo. 1995), we addressed modification of custody in the context of 
a divorce decree providing for shared physical custody.  Shortly after the decree was entered, 
Mother moved with the child to a nearby town.  Father filed a petition for modification 
of the custody order, claiming Mother was not abiding by the visitation 
agreement and a substantial change of circumstances had occurred warranting an 
award of primary physical custody to him.  
In response, Mother denied a change of circumstances had occurred and 
requested that Father's petition be denied.  She also counter-petitioned for an order 
awarding primary physical custody to her and requested a hearing on the ground 
that communication between the parties had deteriorated and shared physical 
custody was not working.  Following 
the hearing, the district court found a material change in circumstances had 
occurred and the best interest of the child supported modifying the decree to 
award primary physical custody to Father. 

 
 
[¶12]  Mother appealed and we addressed the 
requirements for reopening a shared custody order.  We concluded that when the parents are 
unable to make the shared physical custody arrangement work, "a change of 
circumstances justifying judicial reexamination of the original joint custody 
order is demonstrated."  Id. at 55.  We said:  

 
 
[C]onsidering 
 the parties' express invitations to reopen [the original custody order], 
common sense dictates the district court should reopen the joint custody order 
and award custody to one parent or the other.  Here, as in Gaines, each party invited the district 
court to do so.  No error can be 
claimed because that court accepted and, at the parties' behest, acted upon the 
invitations.  

            

 Id.  We have since reiterated the rule in 
Wyoming that when both parents inform the court that a joint physical custody 
arrangement is not working, a sufficient change in circumstances justifying the 
reopening of the custody order has been presented to the district court.  Harshberger v. Harshberger, 2005 WY 99, 
¶ 10, 117 P.3d 1244, 1249-1250 (Wyo. 2005), citing Gurney, 899 P.2d  at 
55.

 
 
[¶13]  Here, Mother petitioned the court for 
modification of the original custody order asserting that the child was 
"suffering from the current shared custody arrangement."  Father filed a response in which he 
agreed that the child was suffering from the arrangement.  Both parents having informed the 
district court that the shared custody arrangement was not working, the district 
court was presented with a sufficient change in circumstances justifying 
reconsideration of the original order.  
The parents presented a material change in circumstances by their 
agreement that shared physical custody was not working, and the district court 
was required pursuant to § 20-2-204(c) to determine what custody arrangement was 
in the child's best interest.      

 
 
[¶14]  Mother claims Father's response to her 
petition to modify custody did not provide adequate notice that the district 
court might award Father primary physical custody of the child.  She contends that because Father did not 
file a counterclaim for primary custody, the district court was limited to 
deciding whether to continue the original shared custody arrangement or 
modifying the decree by awarding primary physical custody to her.  She asserts the district court did not 
have discretion to award primary custody to Father because he did not request 
such an award by way of a counterclaim.  

 
 
[¶15]  As reflected in Gurney, the law has been established in 
Wyoming for fifteen years that when parents agree shared physical custody is not 
working, a district court is required to establish a custody arrangement that is 
in the child's best interest.  Upon 
filing her petition for custody modification, and receiving Father's response 
agreeing that shared custody was not in the child's best interest, Mother was on 
notice that the original custody arrangement would be re-opened and a 
determination would be made as to what arrangement was in the best interest of 
the child.  The district court was 
required to determine what arrangement was in the child's best interest, and was 
not limited to maintaining the status quo or awarding primary custody to 
Mother.       

 
 

2.    
Witness 
and Exhibit Designations

[¶16]  In her second issue, Mother contends the 
district court erred in not striking Father's designation of witnesses and 
exhibits when he filed them at noon on the first day of trial contrary to the 
discovery rules and the parties' agreement.  She claims she was prejudiced because 
the late filing denied her the opportunity to interview Father's witnesses prior 
to the trial and prepare to respond to his evidence.  

 
 
[¶17] 
The record reflects that Mother filed her witness and exhibit designations on 
July 16, 2009.  She contends Father 
did not file his designations until halfway through the first day of trial on 
July 20, 2009.  Mother asserts the 
parties had an agreement to exchange witness and exhibit designations by July 
16, the Wednesday prior to trial.  Because Father failed to comply with the 
agreement and the discovery rules, Mother contends the district court should 
have stricken Father's witnesses and exhibits pursuant to W.R.C.P. 37, which 
provides in pertinent part as follows:

 
 
Rule 
37. Failure to make disclosures or cooperate in discovery;   sanctions.

. 
. . .

 
 
            
(c) Failure to disclose; 

     (1) A party that 
without substantial justification fails to disclose information as required by 
Rule 26(a) . . . is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as 
evidence at trial . . . any witness or information not so disclosed.  In addition to or in lieu of this 
sanction, the court, on motion and after affording an opportunity to be heard, 
may impose other appropriate sanctions.     

 
 
[¶18]  Father contends there was no firm 
agreement concerning disclosure and he did not violate the discovery rules.  He points to the following provision in 
W.R.C.P. 26(a)(1.1) governing disclosure in divorce actions:  "[D]isclosures in divorce actions must 
be made within 30 days after the defendant is served unless a different time is 
set by stipulation in writing or by court order."  He contends the thirty day time limit 
did not apply because he did not have thirty days between service of the 
petition and trial and no other time for disclosure was set by written 
stipulation or court order.  Even if 
there had been a time set for disclosure, he asserts sanctions are appropriate 
under Rule 37 only when a party fails "without substantial justification" to 
disclose information as required.  
He asserts he demonstrated substantial justification by his attorney's 
representations to the district court that he was out of town or in court the 
week before trial.  He also contends 
that he attempted to fax his designations to Mother on the Friday before trial 
and an equipment failure beyond his control intervened.

 
 
[¶19]  W.R.C.P. 26 provides in relevant 
part:

 
 

(a)   Required 
disclosures; 

     . . . 
.

     (1.1) Initial 
disclosures in divorce actions.  In 
divorce actions the following initial disclosures are required  in post-decree 
proceedings to the extent that they pertain to a particular claim or 
defense:

     . . . 
.

(H) 
A party seeking custody or a change in custody shall set forth the facts 
believed to support the claim of superior entitlement to custody.  In addition, as to a change of custody 
the party shall set forth any facts comprising a substantial change in 
circumstances and disclose any supporting documentation.

 
 
These 
disclosures in divorce actions must be made within 30 days after the defendant 
is served unless a different time is set by stipulation in writing or by court 
order.  A party must make its 
disclosures based on the information then reasonably available to it and is not 
excused from making its disclosures because it has not fully completed its 
investigation of the case or because it challenges the sufficiency of another 
party' disclosures or because another party has not made its 
disclosures.

 
 
[¶20]  Pursuant to this provision, Father was 
required to disclose any facts supporting his belief that joint custody was not 
working and, if he intended to seek primary physical custody, the facts 
supporting such an award.  The rule 
required him to make the disclosure within thirty days of service of the custody 
modification petition unless a different time was set by written stipulation or 
court order.  The record contains no 
written stipulation or court order setting a time for disclosure.  Father was served with the petition on 
June 15, 2009, meaning he was required to make his disclosure on July 15, 
2009.  His contention that there 
were not thirty days between service and trial is, therefore, incorrect.  Father does not dispute that he failed 
to make his disclosure on July 15.  
Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 37(c), the district court had the discretion to 
refuse to allow him to present his evidence or impose other appropriate 
sanctions. 

 
 
[¶21]  After hearing the parties' arguments on 
Mother's motion to exclude Father's evidence, the district court determined that 
it was in the child's best interest to allow Father to present his 
evidence.  In its ruling, the 
district court acknowledged that allowing presentation of the evidence would be 
"somewhat prejudicial" to Mother and admonished Father's attorney to "do better" 
in the future.     

 
 
[¶22]  While we do not condone Father's failure 
to comply with the discovery rules, our review of the district court's ruling is 
limited.  A "district court must 
generally be afforded broad discretion, both in the mechanisms adopted to 
control discovery and in its selection of appropriate sanctions for violations 
of . . . discovery . . . ."   Ruwart v. Wagner, 880 P.2d 586, 592 
(Wyo. 1994).  A court does not abuse 
its discretion if it reasonably could have concluded as it did.  We do not find unreasonable the district 
court's conclusion that the best interest of the child favored allowing Father 
to present his evidence.       

 
 

3.    
Stalking 
Protection Order

[¶23]  Mother asserts the district court abused 
its discretion in awarding primary physical custody to Father when he was the 
subject of a stalking protection order.  
Spousal abuse is contrary to a child's best interest; therefore, she 
maintains, the district court's order must be reversed.  Father contends the issue of spousal 
abuse was only one factor the district court was required to consider and the 
district court properly considered all of the factors set forth in § 20-2-201 in 
arriving at its decision.  Father 
also asserts witness credibility determinations are properly left to the 
district court and after hearing the witness testimony the district court chose 
not to make a finding that spousal abuse occurred. 

 
 
[¶24]  The best interest of the child are 
paramount in child custody determinations.  
Parris v. Parris, 2009 WY 44, 
¶ 18, 204 P.3d 298, 304 (Wyo. 2009).  
Upon a showing in a custody modification proceeding that a material 
change of circumstances has occurred, it must be shown that modification of 
custody is in the best interest of the child.  Durfee v. Durfee, 2009 WY 7, ¶ 6, 199 P.3d 1087, 1089 (Wyo. 2009).  In 
determining the best interest of the child, the court is required pursuant to § 
20-2-201 to consider the following factors:    

 
 
            
(i) The quality of the relationship each child has with each 
parent;

            
(ii) The ability of each parent to provide adequate care for each child 
throughout each period of responsibility, including arranging for each child's 
care by others as needed;

            
(iii) The relative competency and fitness of each 
parent;

            
(iv) Each parent's willingness to accept all responsibilities of 
parenting, including a willingness to accept care for each child at specified 
times and to relinquish care to the other parent at specified 
times;

            
(v) How the parents and each child can best maintain and strengthen a 
relationship with each other;

            
(vi) How the parents and each child interact and communicate with each 
other and how such interaction and communication may be 
improved;

            
(vii) The ability and willingness of each parent to allow the other to 
provide care without intrusion, respect the other parent's rights and 
responsibilities, including the right to privacy;

            
(viii) Geographic distance between the parents' 
residences;

            
(ix) The current physical and mental ability of each parent to care for 
each child;

            
(x) Any other factors the court deems necessary and 
relevant.

 
 
In 
addition, § 20-2-201 provides:

 
 
            
(c) The court shall consider evidence of spousal abuse or child abuse as 
being contrary to the best interest of the children.  If the court finds that family violence 
has occurred, the court shall make arrangements for visitation that best 
protects the children and the abused spouse from further 
harm.

 
 
[¶25]  In support of her claim that spousal 
abuse occurred, Mother testified that on one occasion in early April shortly 
after the divorce, Father wanted to talk to her as she was giving the child a 
bath and getting him ready for bed.  
She testified that she told Father she did not want to talk with him 
then; he followed her around the house until she went into the bedroom and 
slammed the door; he pushed the door open; she got her cell phone and he grabbed 
it from her; she went into the child's room to get the house phone and Father 
tackled her on the bed, took the phone and removed the batteries.  Mother testified she then went into the 
bathroom to get the child and Father proceeded to tell the child, "Your mom is a 
lying, cheating whore.  She's a 
liar.  Her family is a bunch of 
liars.  And all this is her 
fault."  

 
 
[¶26]  Mother testified that a few weeks later, 
on May 1, 2009, Father called her on her cell phone and said, "We need to talk . 
. . to prove what a lying, cheating whore you are."   Mother testified he continued to 
call her names, she hung up, he repeatedly called her back, and she called the 
police to ask what she could do to stop him.  She testified that as she was speaking 
with a police officer, Father continued to call and text her, and did so "every 
minute for two hours."  Mother 
testified that Father waited for her outside her school that day and called her 
when she was not there as he expected her to be.  He continued to call and text even after 
being told by a law enforcement officer not to contact her.  Mother testified Father told her she 
could not have the child the following Sunday unless she came into his house 
when she came to pick him up and listened to something Father had to tell 
her.  She again called the police 
and a police officer offered to park nearby while she picked up the child.  Mother told Father an officer was going 
to come with her.  When she arrived 
to pick up the child, Father asked her where her "f---ing body guard" was?    

 
 
[¶27]  Mother testified that on May 6, 2009, 
she went to her storage shed and Father unexpectedly showed up with the 
child.  Father proceeded to take 
things out of her storage shed and put them in his vehicle.  He got into her car and rifled through 
items in it.  He took her car keys, 
she threatened to call the police and he threw the keys back into her car.  Mother testified that after this 
incident, Father continued to call and text Mother repeatedly.  He brought the child to the birthday 
party Mother was having for the child on May 30, 2009, and followed her around, 
getting in her face and bullying her.    

 
 
[¶28]  Father confirmed that a protection order 
was entered against him prohibiting him from having any contact with Mother for 
ninety days.  He also confirmed the 
protective order was placed against him for numerous text messages and phone 
calls he made to Mother in which he made threatening statements.  He admitted he sent a text to Mother on 
May 1, 2009, stating to the effect, "You are so full of sh--.  I cannot wait until the day comes when I 
get to share with your son who you really were."  He also admitted sending a text to 
Mother stating, "[E]veryone knows you are a crazy bitch."  Father also admitted taking items from 
Mother's car without her permission although he testified the items belonged to 
him and he and Mother jointly owned the car.  He further admitted to taking the phone 
away from Mother to prevent her from calling the police during the fight when 
Mother was giving the child a bath.  
He also admitted pushing Mother but testified he did so because she was 
hitting him.

 
 
[¶29]  Father testified that both parties 
engaged in taking "pot shots" at each other.  He testified that many times he 
contacted Mother about financial matters that needed to be resolved after the 
divorce.  He testified that he asked 
Mother to come into the house when she picked up the child in order to get her 
signature on some papers.  He denied 
Mother's account of the confrontation at the storage shed, stating that she 
jumped on his back and started scratching him when he was removing some of his 
tools from the shed and she then jumped in her car and took off, squealing the 
tires as she drove away.  He 
testified that he did not get into her car or take her phone or her keys. 

 
 
[¶30] 
It is clear from the decision letter that the district court considered the 
evidence both parties presented on the issue of spousal abuse.  The district court summarized the 
testimony of three law enforcement officers Mother called as witnesses about 
their involvement with her complaints and concerns about Father's behavior.  The district court also summarized 
Mother's and Father's testimony about the events in the house while the child 
was taking a bath and at the storage unit and specifically noted that Mother's 
testimony was inconsistent with Father's testimony.  Beyond summarizing the testimony, 
however, the district court made no finding on the issue of spousal abuse and 
does not appear to have weighed it as a factor in determining the child's best 
interest. 

 
 
[¶31]  It would have been helpful if the 
district court had made express findings about the spousal abuse 
allegations.  However, considering 
all of the evidence and the district court's statements in their entirety, we 
cannot say the district court abused its discretion in declining to base its 
custody determination on the evidence of spousal abuse.  While there is no question from the 
evidence that Father harassed Mother by cell phone and that the parties fought 
on two occasions in the presence of the child contrary to his best interest, we 
conclude the district court reasonably could have determined from the totality 
of the evidence that the admitted harassment and alleged abuse was not 
sufficient to override the other factors it was required to consider in 
determining custody.  It is clear 
from the district court's decision letter that it considered and weighed each of 
the factors set out in § 20-2-201.  
Additionally, as we have said many times, the district court is in the 
best position to assess witness credibility and weigh testimony and is therefore 
in a better position than this Court to judge the respective merits of the 
parties' claims.  Pond v. Pond, 2009 WY 134, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 650, 652 (Wyo. 2009).  From the 
evidence presented, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in declining to award primary custody to Mother on the basis of her spousal 
abuse claim.   

  

4.    
Findings 
Contrary to the Evidence

[¶32]  Mother contends that in awarding custody 
to Father the district court assumed she would continue to work nights which was 
contrary to her trial testimony that she would work days at her new job.  Father responds that the district court 
based its decision on all of the factors set forth in § 20-2-201, not just 
Mother's employment; therefore, whether or not it made an incorrect assumption 
about where and when Mother was working, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in awarding primary custody to Father.

 
 
[¶33]  Mother testified at the hearing that she 
had been accepted into nursing school, and would continue to work during the two 
years it would take her to complete the nursing program.  She testified, however, that she would 
not continue to work at her current job, but would be working as a certified 
nurse's assistant during the day while the child was in school.  In its decision letter, in considering § 
20-2-201(v)how the parents and the child can best maintain and strengthen a 
relationship with each other, the district court made the following 
findings:

 
 
            
[Father] proposed having [child] attend Sunset School where he teaches 
third grade.  [Child] would go to 
school and leave school with his father.  
He would be with his father after school.  [Mother] is pursuing a nursing degree 
with a combination of real classes and online study.  Real time is between 10:00 a.m. and noon 
during the weekdays, and the Court 
assumes her employment at Wyoming's Rib and Chop House would continue with some 
evening hours.  The Court finds 
[Father's] schedule to accommodate this factor and thus finds in his 
favor.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added).

 
 
[¶34]  The district court made the following 
finding with regard to § 20-2-201(x)other factors the court deems necessary and 
relevant:

 
 
            
[Father] had several witnesses who worked at Sunset School, including his 
principal and two other co-employees.  
It is apparent [Father] is a fine teacher and respected by others. 
[Father] testified he used skills learned as a teacher to help with 
parenting.  [Father] is stable in 
his profession, and [Mother] is seeking to become a nurse after having worked in 
a bank and working in a 
restaurant.  The court applauds 
her effort to become a nurse, however, believes [Father's] position will provide 
more stability and consistency for [child].  This factor favors [Father.] 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added). 

 
 
[¶35]  The district court's decision letter 
confirms Mother's contention that it incorrectly assumed she would continue 
working nights.  However, the 
district court's decision letter reflects that the assumption was not the only 
or even a primary factor in its determination to award primary custody to 
Father.  The district court's 
incorrect assumption is not sufficient to establish that it abused its 
discretion in awarding primary custody to Father.     

 
 

5.    
Visitation

[¶36]  Mother asserts the district court's 
visitation order is not sufficiently definite to promote understanding and 
compliance as required by § 20-2-202(a)(1) because it ordered "visitation as 
proposed by [Father] in his closing argument" when Father's closing argument 
contained no visitation proposal and made no provision for holiday and summer 
visitation.  Section 20-2-202 
provides in relevant part:

 
 
§ 
20-2-202.  
Visitation.

 
 
            
(a)  The court may order 
visitation it deems in the best interests of each child and the court 
shall:

            
        (i) 
 Order visitation in enough detail 
to promote understanding and compliance;

 
 
[¶37] 
Father maintains the original divorce decree addressed holiday visitation and it 
remains in effect because it was never modified.  Father points out that summer visitation 
was not addressed in the original decree or the modification order but neither 
party objected or proposed an alternative order.  Father suggests the matter be remanded 
to the district court for determination of summer 
visitation.

 
 
[¶38]  The parties are correct that the 
district court's order does not address holiday and summer visitation.  In their presentations to the district 
court, both parties sought primary physical custody of the child with reasonable 
visitation by the other parent.  
More specifically, Mother proposed visitation for Father on alternating 
major holidays, including Thanksgiving, Christmas, spring break, and six weeks 
visitation in the summer.  Father 
agreed that if he was awarded primary physical custody, Mother should have 
reasonable visitation on alternating major holidays and for six weeks in the 
summer.  Given the parties' 
agreement concerning holiday and summer visitation, it is appropriate to remand 
these proceedings to the district court for entry of a revised order providing 
for visitation by Mother on alternating major holidays and for six weeks in the 
summer.     

 
 

6.    
Child 
Support

 
 
[¶39]  In her final issue, Mother claims the 
district court erred in ordering child support without adequate evidence of the 
parties' income.  In support of her 
claim, she points to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-308(a) (LexisNexis 2009), which 
states, 

 
 
            
(a)  No order establishing or 
modifying a child support obligation shall be entered unless financial 
affidavits on a form approved by the Wyoming Supreme Court which fully discloses 
the financial status of the parties have been filed, or the court has held a 
hearing and testimony has been received.

 
 
Mother 
asserts she did not file a financial affidavit nor did she testify concerning 
her income.  Therefore, she claims, 
the district court abused its discretion when it ordered her to pay child 
support in the amount specified in the order.

 
 
[¶40]  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307(d) 
(LexisNexis 2009) authorizes the parties in a divorce proceeding to submit child 
support agreements to the district court for approval.  In their property settlement and child 
custody agreement Mother and Father stipulated to the 
following:

 
 
5.  Child Support.  [Mother's] net monthly income shall be 
imputed, since she is a student, at $1,025.00.  [Father's] net monthly income is 
$3,110.36.  [Mother's] support 
obligation during [Father's] custody is $107.00.  [Father's] support obligation during 
[Mother's] custody is $325.00, resulting in a support obligation of $218.00 per 
month.  The parties agree to deviate 
from this amount due to the time each spends with the child and the 
contributions each party makes to the minor child's expenses, including clothing 
and activities.  

 
 
The 
divorce decree incorporated the parties' agreement almost verbatim except that 
it clarified the parties had agreed to deviate from the presumptive amount, "to 
a zero support obligation" and added that Father would provide health insurance 
for the child.  

 
 
[¶41]  Later, in seeking an order modifying the 
decree to award primary physical custody of the child to her, Mother also sought 
an order establishing child support.  
In her opening statement at the hearing, counsel for Mother proposed that 
child support be calculated on the basis of the income figures incorporated into 
the divorce decree.  Had the 
district court calculated Mother's child support obligation on the basis of the 
figures the parties stipulated to earlierfigures the court had approved and 
incorporated into the decree just two months before it would not have been an 
abuse of discretion. 

  

[¶42]  However, for reasons that do not appear 
in the record, rather than calculating child support using the $1,025.00 net 
monthly income imputed to Mother in the divorce decree as Mother proposed, the 
district court imputed a net monthly income of $1,160.53 to Mother.  Combining that amount with Father's 
monthly net income of $3,110.36, the same figure used in the divorce decree, the 
district court arrived at a joint presumptive child support obligation of 
$880.00 per month.  Concluding that 
Mother was responsible for 27% of that amount, the district court calculated her 
child support obligation as $239.00 per month.  Again for reasons that do not appear in 
the record, the district court then ordered Mother to pay child support of 
$279.00 per month, $40.00 more than it calculated her obligation to be in the 
preceding paragraph of the order.  
There is no evidence in the record supporting the $1,160.53 income 
imputed to Mother nor is there any explanation for the order requiring her to 
pay $279.00 per month, as opposed to the earlier calculation of $239.00 per 
month.  On remand, the district 
court will need to recalculate Mother's child support obligation based upon the 
parties' respective incomes as incorporated in the divorce decree, or request 
the parties to submit financial affidavits as provided in § 
20-2-308.

 
 
[¶43]  The district court's modification order 
awarding primary physical custody to Father is affirmed.  The case is remanded to the district 
court for a revised order setting out holiday and summer visitation and 
calculating child support.