Title: Beeks v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
NAEES BEEKS,  
   
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 192, 2015 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
of the State of Delaware, 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
Cr. ID. No. 1404019473 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Submitted:  November 18, 2015 
Decided:  
December 1, 2015 
 
Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and SEITZ, Justices. 
ORDER 
 
This 1st day of December, 2015, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
In May, 2014, the police arrested Naees Beeks after he threatened the 
parents of the mother of his child.  At trial, defense counsel cross-examined 
Wilmington Police Department Detective Michael Gifford regarding the events 
that led to Beeks’ arrest.  Detective Gifford testified on cross-examination that 
Terrance Cook, a witness to the incident, told him that Beeks had a gun.  Instead of 
objecting to the testimony as hearsay, Beeks’ attorney continued to question 
Detective Gifford about the statement. 
 
(2) 
In his closing statement, defense counsel argued to the jury that only 
the parents said Beeks had a gun.  On rebuttal, the State corrected defense 
2 
 
counsel’s misstatement and reminded the jury of Detective Gifford’s testimony 
about what Cook had told him.  Beeks objected to the reference to Detective 
Gifford’s testimony as hearsay and moved for a mistrial.  The Superior Court 
denied that request and instructed the jury to rely on their recollection of the 
testimony and to draw their own conclusions.  The jury found Beeks guilty of all 
charges.   
 
(3) 
Beeks has appealed, claiming that the Superior Court erred when it 
permitted the jury to hear hearsay statements objected to during closing argument.  
We find no merit to Beeks’ appeal and affirm the Superior Court’s denial of 
Beeks’ motion for a new trial. 
 
(4) 
Morgan McCallum and her daughter’s father, Naees Beeks, had been 
involved in a tumultuous relationship.  McCallum and her daughter lived with 
McCallum’s mother and stepfather.  Because of Beeks’ prior incidents of violence 
against McCallum, Beeks was not permitted at their residence. 
 
(5) 
On April 26, 2014, Beeks and his friend, Terrance Cook, went to 
McCallum’s house.  Beeks and McCallum were arguing in front of the home, and 
McCallum’s stepfather told Beeks to leave.  Beeks refused to leave until he saw his 
daughter.  The stepfather once again told Beeks to leave and cautioned that if he 
did not leave, trouble would follow.  Beeks then displayed a firearm and threatened 
the stepfather.  McCallum’s mother went outside when she heard the commotion 
and told Beeks he had to leave.  She saw Beeks point a firearm at the two of them. 
3 
 
 
(6) 
On May 1, 2014, the police arrested Beeks and charged him with 
Aggravated Menacing, 1 Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony,2 and Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon.3  At trial, Detective Gifford of 
the Wilmington Police Department testified about the April 26 incident.  On cross-
examination by defense counsel, Detective Gifford testified that Cook told him 
Beeks brandished a gun during the incident.  The record reflects that once 
Detective Gifford recited Cook’s statement, Beeks’ counsel did not object.  
Instead, counsel questioned Detective Gifford further: 
Q: That was Mr. Cook, okay, so Mr. Cook said he had a gun? 
A: Mr. Cook said who had a gun? 
Q: That Mr. Beeks had a gun? 
A: Mr. Cook said your client had a gun. 
. . . 
Q: . . . Since you brought it up, Mr. Cook said that Mr. Beeks had a 
handgun? 
A: That’s correct.4 
 
 
(7) 
Beeks’ counsel did not object or ask that the testimony be disregarded 
because he did not want to call any more attention to the statement.5  Cook did not 
testify.  On redirect, the State did not ask any questions regarding Cook’s statement 
to Detective Gifford, nor did the State mention the testimony in the first part of its 
closing argument.  In Beeks’ closing argument, however, defense counsel stated 
that only McCallum’s mother and stepfather said Beeks had a gun.  On rebuttal, 
                                          
 
1 11 Del. C. § 602. 
2 11 Del. C. § 1447A. 
3 11 Del. C. § 1442. 
4 App. to Opening Br. at 22 (Trial Test. of Det. Gifford). 
5 Id. at 31; Opening Br. at 6-7. 
4 
 
the State sought to correct the record and reminded the jury of Detective Gifford’s 
statement.  Beeks’ counsel immediately asked for a sidebar conference. 
 
(8) 
At the sidebar conference, Beeks objected to the State’s repetition of 
Detective Gifford’s hearsay testimony.  He also explained that he did not object 
earlier to Detective Gifford’s statement because he did not want to draw attention 
to the improper testimony.  The trial judge was unsure of the substance of 
Detective Gifford’s statement, but permitted the State to make the argument that 
there was another witness who said Beeks had a gun.  He also permitted Beeks to 
object.  After the conference concluded, the State continued its rebuttal and 
reminded the jury of Detective Gifford’s testimony.  Beeks objected to the 
testimony as hearsay.  The judge then instructed the jury to rely on their own 
recollection as to what Detective Gifford said in court and to “make of it what you 
will.”6  Beeks moved for a mistrial, which the court denied.  The jury found Beeks 
guilty of all charges.  The trial judge sentenced him to ten years at Level V, 
suspended after three years for decreasing levels of supervision.   
 
(9) 
Beeks argues that Cook’s statement through Detective Gifford should 
not have been admitted and a mistrial should have been granted.  Specifically, 
Beeks claims that Cook’s statement through Detective Gifford was a statement by 
a non-testifying co-defendant and therefore inadmissible under the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Bruton v. 
                                          
 
6 App. to Opening Br. at 31 (State’s Closing Statement). 
5 
 
United States.7  The State responds that the Confrontation Clause was not violated 
because Beeks was not on trial with his co-defendant Cook.  Further, the State 
contends that Beeks’ failure to object when Detective Gifford testified constituted 
a waiver of any objection.  The State argues that we should not review the claim on 
appeal because counsel’s failure to object was a strategic decision that resulted in a 
waiver of the right to appeal the issue.  Our standard of review for a trial court’s 
denial of a motion for mistrial is abuse of discretion.8 
 
(10) Under Bruton, a defendant is deprived of his rights under the 
Confrontation Clause when, in a joint trial, the State’s admission of a 
codefendant’s confession incriminates the defendant, unless the confession is 
sufficiently redacted to exclude the possibility that the jury will use it against the 
defendant.9  As a threshold matter, Bruton is inapplicable.  By definition, to raise a 
claim under Bruton, the statement must come from a co-defendant in a joint trial.10  
The State entered a nolle prosequi on Cook’s charges prior to Beeks’ trial.  Thus, 
they were not co-defendants and not involved in a joint trial.  Additionally, the 
                                          
 
7 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
8 See Taylor v. State, 827 A.2d 24, 27 (Del. 2003). 
9 Id.; see also Smith v. State, 647 A.2d 1083, 1089 (Del. 1994) (“In a joint trial, admission of a 
codefendant’s confession that also incriminates the defendant violates the Confrontation Clause, 
unless the confession is sufficiently redacted to exclude the possibility that a jury will use it 
against the defendant.”) (internal citation omitted). 
10See, e.g., Lampkins v. State, 465 A.2d 785, 794 (Del. 1983) (“The mere possibility that in a 
joint trial some evidence may be admitted against one defendant which is inadmissible against 
another is not, standing alone, a sufficient reason to require separate trials.”). 
6 
 
State did not introduce the evidence of Cook’s statement.  The testimony occurred 
during cross-examination.  Bruton is therefore inapplicable. 
 
(11) It is also settled law that a conscious decision to refrain from objecting 
at trial as a tactical matter constitutes a waiver that precludes plain error review on 
direct appeal.11  Beeks’ theory of the case was that only McCallum’s mother and 
stepfather, two biased witnesses, saw Beeks with a gun on the date of the incident, 
and thus a reasonable doubt existed as to whether Beeks in fact had a gun.12  Both 
at trial and in his brief, Beeks admits that he did not contemporaneously object to 
Detective Gifford’s testimony because he did not wish to call attention to it and 
discredit his theory of the case.  This deliberate action was the result of an 
informed tactical decision by defense counsel.  Thus, Beeks waived appellate 
review of any arguable claim of error. 
 
(12) Beeks also argues that the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibited 
the State from mentioning the Detective’s hearsay testimony during closing 
because hearsay statements are inadmissible regardless of the failure to object.13  
The State argues in response that hearsay testimony admitted without objection 
                                          
 
11 Jones v. State, 2015 WL 694151, at *3 (Del. Nov. 9, 2015) (“This Court has held that where a 
party elects not to object, then a waiver has occurred and plain error review is not available.”); 
Wright, 980 A.2d at 1020 (“However, if the record reflects that the decision not to object at trial 
was a ‘deliberate tactical maneuver by’ defense counsel and did not result from oversight, then 
that action constitutes a true waiver.”); see also Stevens v. State, 3 A.3d 1070 (Del. 2010); Czech 
v. State, 945 A.2d 1088 (Del. 2008); Crawley v. State, 929 A.2d 783 (Del. 2007) (Table); Baker 
v. State, 637 A.2d 825 (Del. 1993) (Table); Tucker v. State, 564 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1989).  
12 Opening Br. at 6-7. 
13 See D.R.P.C. 3.4(e). 
7 
 
becomes substantive evidence and part of the trial record, and can be used by the 
State in closing argument. 
 
(13) When inadmissible hearsay evidence is admitted without objection, 
the general rule is that the hearsay thereafter becomes part of the record and can be 
used to determine the facts of the case.14  As stated in McCormick on Evidence: 
[The] failure to make a sufficient objection to incompetent evidence 
waives any ground of complaint as to the admission of the evidence.  
But it has another equally important effect.  If the testimony is 
received without objection, the testimony becomes part of the 
evidence in the case and is usable as proof to the extent of its rational 
persuasive power.  The fact that it was inadmissible does not prevent 
its use as proof so far as it has probative value.  The inadmissible 
evidence, unobjected to, may be relied on in argument, and alone or in 
part it can support a verdict or finding. . . . This principle is almost 
universally accepted.15 
 
(14) In our adversarial system, counsel has an obligation to object to 
hearsay evidence, particularly if it is damaging or untrue.  When counsel fails to 
object to hearsay, the evidence becomes part of the record.  Any other rule would 
lead to the undesirable result of requiring the trial judge to police the record for 
unobjected to hearsay, which if missed could be raised as error after trial.  We 
therefore follow the “almost universally accepted” view and hold that once hearsay 
                                          
 
14  J.A. Bock, Annotation, Consideration, in Determining Facts, of Inadmissible Hearsay 
Evidence Introduced Without Objection, 79 A.L.R.2d 890 § 3 (Originally published in 1961); 
Tom Fulkerson, Hearsay Admitted Without Objection: A Reassessment of Its Probative Value, 33 
BAYLOR L. REV. 983, 983 (1981) (“In the vast majority of American jurisdictions hearsay 
evidence admitted without objection has probative force on review.  Texas and Georgia form a 
distinct minority, holding that in both civil and criminal cases hearsay is without probative value, 
even if admitted without objection.”).  
15 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 54 (7th ed. 2013). 
8 
 
evidence is admitted without objection, a prosecutor may properly refer to the 
evidence in closing argument.16 
 
(15) Finally, Beeks appears to make a claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  It is settled Delaware law that this Court will not consider allegations of 
ineffective assistance of counsel made for the first time on direct appeal. 17  
Accordingly, we will not address this claim. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Justice 
 
                                          
 
16 State v. Trewartha, 2006 WL 2780160, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2006) (“Although 
appellant now claims that Detective Day’s testimony was hearsay and should not have been 
utilized by the prosecutor during rebuttal, this argument rings hollow in light of his failure to 
object at trial. . . . [T]he prosecution is afforded considerable latitude in closing argument, and a 
prosecutor may comment upon the testimony and other evidence, and may suggest reasonable 
inferences to be drawn thereon.”); Gochicoa v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 440, 447-48 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(“[T]he prosecutor’s use of the hearsay evidence did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct; the 
hearsay statements, once admitted in evidence without objection, were a proper subject of the 
prosecutor’s closing argument.”); People v. Dandridge, 424 N.E.2d 1262, 1265-66 (Ill. App. 
1981) (trial court properly allowed prosecutor’s reference in his closing argument to two city 
employees’ testimony where defense counsel failed to make timely objection to hearsay during 
the employees’ testimony); State v. Clark, 387 So. 2d 1124, 1130-31 (La. 1980) (trial judge did 
not err in overruling defendant’s objection to prosecutor’s reference to hearsay testimony during 
closing argument where defendant did not object to introduction of hearsay statements when they 
were made); Commonwealth v. Bennett, 372 N.E.2d 271, 271-72 (Mass. App. 1978) (where 
hearsay evidence had been admitted without objection, it was reversible error for trial judge to 
refuse to allow defendant’s counsel to comment on it in closing argument).  
17 Desmond v. State, 654 A.3d 821, 829 (Del. 1994).