Title: Fercenia v. Guiduli

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Fercenia v. Guiduli (2002-451); 175 Vt. 541; 830 A.2d 55

2003 VT 50

[Filed 28-May-2003]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2003 VT 50

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-451

                              APRIL TERM, 2003

  Jean Fercenia	                       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Chittenden Superior Court
                                       }	
  Robert C. Guiduli, M.D. and	       }
  Guiduli Opthalmic Associates, Inc.   }	DOCKET NO. S0906-01 CnC

                                                Trial Judge: Mary Miles Teachout

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Defendants Dr. Robert Guiduli and Guiduli Opthamalic
  Associates, Inc., bring this interlocutory appeal from an order of the
  Chittenden Superior Court denying their motion for judgment on the
  pleadings.  Defendants contend that plaintiff Jean Fercenia's failure to
  comply with the requirements set forth in Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 3
  and the waiver of service requirements set forth in Rule 4(l) resulted in
  the expiration of plaintiff's cause of action under the applicable statute
  of limitations.  The trial court, in denying defendants' motion, found that
  plaintiff's failure to comply with the requirements of the Rules did not
  prejudice defendants, and as a result, did not bar commencement of the
  action.  We hold that plaintiff's failure to timely file defendants' waiver
  of service with the court in accordance with V.R.C.P. 4(l)(5) constituted a
  failure to commence the action before expiration of the statute of
  limitations.  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's denial of
  defendants' motion and dismiss plaintiff's case.

       ¶  2.  This appeal arises in the context of a medical malpractice
  action.  On July 27, 2001, plaintiff filed a five-count complaint in
  Chittenden County Superior Court, alleging negligence, "res ipsa loquitur,"
  breach of contract, and failure to obtain informed consent against
  defendant Guiduli, and liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior
  against defendant Guiduli Opthamalic Associates, Inc.  The basis for the
  complaint was a cataract surgery that defendant Guiduli performed on
  plaintiff's left eye on July 28, 1998.  According to the complaint, the
  surgery resulted in the improper placement of the lens in plaintiff's eye.  
        
       ¶  3.  On September 6, 2001, plaintiff's attorney David Lynch wrote
  to the attorney for defendants, David Spielman, requesting waiver of formal
  service of process pursuant to V.R.C.P. 4(l) and noting that plaintiff
  "must complete service of the complaint by September 27, 2001."  After
  obtaining Mr. Spielman's agreement to proceed pursuant to Rule 4(l), on
  September 20, 2001, plaintiff's attorney mailed Mr. Spielman two copies of
  a document entitled "Acceptance and Waiver of Service."  These documents,
  which defense counsel was to sign and return to Mr. Lynch, read in part
  that defendant "accepts service of the complaint [in the matter] . . . and
  waives any all other [sic] form of legal service of process."  Plaintiff's
  attorney, however, failed to include a copy of the complaint with these
  documents.  After telephone conversations on September 21 and September 24
  discussing Mr. Lynch's omission of the complaint, Mr. Spielman, by faxed
  letter dated September 25, requested that Mr. Lynch provide defense counsel
  with "a revised acceptance of service . . . and a copy of the complaint." 
  In a letter dated September 26, 2001, Mr. Lynch provided defense counsel
  with a revised acceptance and waiver of service form and requested that Mr.
  Spielman sign the form and return it by fax that day.  The letter indicated
  that Mr. Lynch would "have the complaint served tomorrow" if he did not
  receive a signed copy of the acceptance and waiver of service form later
  that day.  Mr. Spielman executed the document and returned it to Mr. Lynch
  via fax on the same day, September 26, 2001.   

       ¶  4.  A copy of the September 26 revised acceptance and waiver of
  service form was filed with the trial court on October 1, 2001.  On October
  11, 2001, defendant filed a motion to dismiss counts II and III of the
  complaint, which alleged respectively "res ipsa loquitur" and breach of
  contract.  The court ultimately granted this motion, finding that res ipsa
  loquitur is "a rule of evidence and not a separate cause of action," and
  that plaintiff's breach of contract claim was improper because the suit
  "[a]s a medical malpractice claim . . . is a tort action."  On November 28,
  2001, defendants filed their answer and asserted the statute of limitations
  as an affirmative defense.  The next day, defendants filed a motion for
  judgment on the pleadings pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(c), alleging that
  plaintiff's action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations
  because plaintiff failed to file defendants' signed waiver of service with
  the trial court within sixty days from the date of filing the complaint, as
  required by the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure.  The court denied
  defendants' motion, holding that:

    Defendants were not prejudiced by the filing of the Waiver on
    October 1st when it was mailed on September 27, 2001.  Defendants
    knew of the suit well in advance of the September 25th actual due
    date.  Defendants could tell by Atty Lynch's correspondence that
    Attorney Lynch intended to effect personal service on September
    27th if the Waiver was not returned in time for filing on that
    date; and Defendants agreed to accept service, but did so on
    September 26th.  Under the circumstances, Defendants cannot take
    technical advantage of Plaintiff's attorney's unwitting error.

       ¶  5.  On August 26, 2002, defendants filed a motion for permission
  to appeal, which the trial court denied.  We granted defendants' motion for
  interlocutory appeal on October 30, 2002.  On appeal, defendants assert
  that the trial court erred in denying their motion for judgment on the
  pleadings because plaintiff's failure to file defendants' waiver of service
  with the trial court within sixty days of filing her complaint, as required
  by V.R.C.P. 3 and 4(l), resulted in the expiration of the applicable
  statute of limitations and therefore barred plaintiff's medical malpractice
  action.  We agree.
   
       ¶  6.  When reviewing a denial of a motion for judgment on the
  pleadings, the issue before the Court is whether the movant is entitled to
  judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the pleadings.  Sorge v. State,
  171 Vt. 171, 174,