Title: Attorney Grievance v. Akpan

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 26
September Term, 2007
_________________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
EMMANUEL DAMASCUS AKPAN
_________________________________________
Bell, C. J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned)
Raker, Irma S. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned)
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, Specially
Assigned),
                  JJ.
_________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
_________________________________________
Filed: June 19, 2008
1
Maryland Rules 16-752(a) and 16-757(c) state as follows:
“Rule 16-752.  Order designating judge.
“(a) Order.  Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or
Remedial Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order
designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the
clerk responsible for maintaining the record.  The order of
designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar
Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the
extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery,
filing of motions and hearing.”
“Rule 16-757.  Judicial hearing.
* * *
“(c) Findings and conclusions.  The judge shall prepare and
file or dictate into the record a statement of the judge’s findings of
fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action,
and conclusions of law.”
On August 20, 2007, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, by Bar
Counsel, filed in this Court a “Petition For Disciplinary Or Remedial Action” against
the respondent, Emmanuel Damascus Akpan.  Mr. Akpan was admitted to the Bar of
this Court on June 16, 1994; he also has been admitted to practice law in several other
jurisdictions.  He maintains an office for the practice of law in Silver Spring, Maryland.
The Attorney Grievance Commission in the petition alleged that Mr. Akpan, in
connection with his representation of Mr. Julius K. Muli, violated several Maryland
Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.  Pursuant to Maryland Rules 16-752(a) and
16-757(c), this Court referred the matter to Judge Eric M. Johnson of the Circuit Court
for Montgom ery County. 1  Judge Johnson’s findings and conclusions, in relevant part,
are as follows (footnotes omitted):
“Bar Counsel alleges that Mr. Akpan violated MRPC 1.1 (Competence), 1.3
-2-
(Diligence), 1.4 (Communication), 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating
Representation), and 8.4(c),(d) (Misconduct). 
“On December 21, 2007, this matter was heard in the Circuit Court for
Montgom ery County, before Judge Eric M. Johnson.  At the conclusion of the hearing,
this Court dictated into the record a statement of its findings of fact and conclusions
of law with respect to alleged violations of MRPC 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence),
and 1.5(a) (Fees), finding no violation of those rules of professional conduct.
“The only issues that remain are the alleged violations of MRPC 1.4
(Communication), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), and 8.4(c),(d)
(Misconduct).
* * *
“Mr. Akpan, a member of the Maryland Bar since June 16, 1994, represented
Mr. Muli commencing on or about January 10, 2006.  Mr. Akpan’s retainer agreement
states that Mr. Akpan’s law firm will represent Mr. Muli ‘at the second interview for
obtaining [permanent] residence.’  The interview was to be conducted by the
Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS) of the United States Department of
Homeland Security, and its purpose was to discuss the adjustments of Mr. Muli’s
immigration status and his application for permanent residence.
“Although Mr. Akpan wrote to CIS for a postponement of the interview, no
postponement occurred and neither he nor Mr. Muli appeared.  Subsequently, Mr. Muli
was placed in removal proceedings.  A trial in Immigration Court was scheduled for
-3-
June 21, 2006.
“Mr. Muli notified Mr. Akpan that he had been placed in removal proceedings
and met with Mr. Akpan on March 22, 2006.  Mr. Akpan explained to Mr. Muli the
nature of removal proceedings.  Since Mr. Muli was not given a second interview,
Mr. Akpan discussed with Mr. Muli the need to file a new I-130 Application for Alien
Relative in order to obtain that second interview.  Even though the January 10, 2006,
retainer agreement may not have contemplated the filing of an I-130 petition (because
one had been filed prior to Mr. Akpan’s involvement in the case), Mr. Akpan filed the
petition, signed by Ms. Boone, Mr. Muli’s wife, on or about April 4, 2006.  Mr. Akpan
testified that the representation he provided after March 22, 2006, with respect to re-
filing the I-130 petition was covered by his initial retainer agreement of January 10,
2006.
“On June 21, 2006, neither Mr. Muli nor Mr. Akpan attended the removal
proceedings.  Although Mr. Akpan advised Mr. Muli in preparation for the removal
proceedings and talked about attending the removal proceedings together with
Mr. Muli, Mr. Akpan claims that he did not represent Mr. Muli in the removal
proceedings.  He notes that the retainer agreement, signed on January 10, 2006, states,
inter alia, ‘this fee does not include professional services in connection with
administrative or court review . . . .’  Mr. Akpan testified that Mr. Muli neither retained
him nor executed a retainer agreement for that service.
“Mr. Akpan had expressed to Mr. Muli the importance of Mr. Muli’s appearance
-4-
at the removal proceeding; however, Mr. Muli did not attend because he mis-calendared
the date and relied upon Mr. Akpan to notify him of the trial date based on the
assumption that Mr. Akpan would be representing him with respect to the removal
proceedings.
* * *
“Maryland Rule 16-757(b) provides that ‘[t]he petitioner has the burden of
proving the averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence.’
“I.
No attorney-client relationship existed with respect to the removal
proceedings before the Immigration Court.
“The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers addresses the
formation of an attorney-client relationship as follows:
‘A relationship of client and lawyer arises when:
‘(1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the lawyer provide legal services
for the person; and . . .
‘(b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services . . . .’
While an attorney-client relationship existed with regards to services relating to
securing a second interview as evidenced by the January 10, 2006, retainer agreement,
there is insufficient evidence to support the existence of an attorney-client relationship
arising out of Mr. Akpan’s alleged representation at the removal proceedings on
June 21, 2006.  While the record is replete with assumptions that Mr. Muli made with
respect to Mr. Akpan’s alleged representation at the removal proceedings, scant, if any,
testimony supports the assertion that Mr. Muli manifested to Mr. Akpan his intent that
-5-
Mr. Akpan provide legal services with respect to the removal proceedings.  Thus, the
Court does not find an attorney-client relationship existed with respect to the removal
proceedings by clear and convincing evidence.
“II.
Communication
“MRPC 1.4 states that ‘[a] lawyer shall: . . . (2) keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of the matter . . . .’  ‘A lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation.’
“Mr. Akpan did not promptly inform his client of the scope of his representation
when Mr. Akpan became aware of Mr. Muli’s removal proceedings.  After becoming
aware of Mr. Muli’s removal proceedings, Mr. Akpan took steps to secure Mr. Muli
with a second interview by re-filing the I-130 petition.  Mr. Akpan did not inform
Mr. Muli that he was not representing Mr. Muli with respect to the removal
proceedings, as he should have.  Even though Mr. Akpan had the basis to believe that
Mr. Muli had not engaged him for the purpose of pursuing his interest in the
Immigration Court, he nevertheless violated Rule 1.4(a) and (b) as he communicated
to Mr. Muli . . . information which led Mr. Muli to incorrectly assume that he would
be represented when such was not the case.
“III.
Misconduct. 
“MRPC 8.4 states that ‘[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . (c)
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation [and] (d)
-6-
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.’  There is no
evidence that Mr. Akpan engaged in conduct involving any dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation.  However, Mr. Akpan’s failure to comply with MRPC 1.4 in his
failure to communicate with his client is conduct that was prejudicial to the
administration of justice under subsection (d).  Mr. Akpan’s failure to clarify and
define the scope of his representation left Mr. Muli to assume that Mr. Akpan was
going to represent Mr. Muli at the removal proceedings and that Mr. Akpan was going
to inform Mr. Muli of the June 21, 2006, trial date.  Mr. Akpan’s conduct in failing to
properly communicate the scope of his representation resulted in Mr. Muli’s failure to
appear at the removal proceeding.  Although Mr. Muli admits that he did not appear for
the removal proceedings due to his oversight, he relied on Mr. Akpan to inform him of
the trial date because he incorrectly assumed that Mr. Akpan was representing him in
that matter.
“IV.
Declining or Terminating Representation
“MRPC 1.16(d) states that ‘[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer shall
take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as
giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel,
surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any
advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred.’  There is no
evidence that Mr. Akpan’s representation of Mr. Muli with respect to the January 10,
2006,  retainer agreement terminated.  Mr. Akpan testified that the re-filing of the I-130
-7-
2
The prior reprimand letter stated as follows:
“Dear Mr. Akpan:
“The Attorney Grievance Commission, at its meeting on May 19, 2004,
approved the proposed Reprimand agreed upon by you and Bar Counsel and directed
that Bar Counsel administer this letter of reprimand to you.
“Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-737, you are hereby reprimanded as
follows:
“The Respondent represented Grace Idun, a Ghanan citizen,
commencing in March 2003.  Ms. Idun sought the Respondent’s
assistance in connection with an Immigration case.  She desired to
change the venue of the case from Buffalo, New York, to Baltimore,
Maryland, and to remain in the United States.  The Respondent’s
Motion to change venue filed in the Immigration Court in Buffalo did
not comply with that jurisdiction’s local rules.  The Respondent and
his client failed to appear at the scheduled Master’s hearing and the
Respondent failed to file a motion to waive the presence of Ms. Idun.
Ms. Idun was ordered removed from the United States to Ghana, in
absentia.  The Respondent’s actions violated Rules 1.1 and 1.3 of the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.”
(continued...)
petition after Mr. Muli received the Notice to Appear was a continuation of the services
under that retainer agreement.  Further, it was Mr. Muli’s belief that Mr. Akpan’s
representation continued and extended to his removal proceedings.  Therefore, the
allegation that Mr. Akpan violated MRPC 1.16(d) is without merit.
“For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the Court finds that Mr. Akpan violated
MRPC 1.4 and 8.4(d), but did not violate MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.5(a), 1.16(d), or 8.4(c).” 
The Attorney Grievance Commission filed no exceptions to Judge Johnson’s
findings and conclusions. The Commission did point out, in its recommendation to this
Court regarding the appropriate sanction, that Mr. Akpan had previously been
reprimanded in May 2004 pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-737.2  Based on Judge
-8-
2
(...continued)
“The Maryland Rules provide that a reprimand  constitutes discipline which
is public and open to inspection.  The Commission will be providing a copy of this
letter to the Complainant.”
Johnson’s determination that Mr. Akpan violated Rules 1.4 and 8.4(d) of the Maryland
Law yers’ Rules of Professional Conduct, and considering the prior reprimand, the
Attorney Grievance Commission has recommended that Mr. Akpan be reprimanded by
this Court.
Mr. Akpan filed seven exceptions to Judge Johnson’s findings and conclusions,
arguing that particular findings, and the conclusions resulting therefrom, were
“unsupported by clear and convincing evidence” and were “clearly erroneous.”
Mr. Akpan has recommended that “this Court should dismiss the disciplinary action.”
The first of Mr. Akpan’s exceptions is that Judge Johnson’s
“findings of facts are unsupported by clear and convincing evidence
because the trial court reached its findings without independent expert
testimony in the practice of immigration law.”
Mr. Akpan complains:
“Bar Counsel failed to present an expert in immigration law and
the trial court refused to hear testimony from Mr. Akpan’s . . . own
expert in immigration law.”
As support for the argument that expert testimony was required, the respondent Akpan
relies on Attorney Grievance Commission v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505, 520-521, 823 A.2d
651, 660 (2003).  He also cites two opinions of this Court in attorney malpractice cases,
Franch v. Ankney, 341 Md. 350, 357 n.4, 670 A.2d 951, 954 n.4 (1996), and Central
-9-
Cab Co. v. Clarke, 259 Md. 542, 551-552, 270 A.2d 662, 667-668 (1970).  None of
these opinions supports the respondent’s argumen t.
The respondent attorney in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Awuah, supra,
374 Md. at 520-521, 823 A.2d at 660, made the same argument that the respondent
Akpan now makes, and this Court flatly rejected the contention:
“Awuah claims that the trial court did not understand
immigration law and that Bar Counsel did not provide an
expert to assist the trial judge.   The detailed findings of
fact, which are prima facie correct, not to be disturbed
unless clearly erroneous, Blum, 373 Md. at 293, 818 A.2d at
230 (citing Wallace, 368 Md. 277, 793 A.2d 535), entered
by the trial judge in the record, refute Awuah’s contention,
and were he to have wished to present any expert to the
court, he could have under Md. Rule 5-702.  A trial judge is
presumed to know the law.”
In both Franch v. Ankney, supra, 341 Md. at 357 n.4, 670 A.2d at 954 n.4, and Central
Cab Co. v. Clarke, supra, this Court took the position that the need for expert testimony
in an attorney malpractice case depended upon the facts or situation in the particular
case.  See Central Cab Co., 259 Md. at 551-552, 270 A.2d at 667-668 (“In our opinion,
however, the present case is not one of those situations in which expert testimony is
required.  * * *  [W]e have found expert testimony not to be required by the facts in this
case and . . . the lower court should have found as a matter of law that there was a
breach of duty by” the attorney).
Counsel’s assertion, on behalf of Mr. Akpan, that Judge Johnson erred because
he “refused to hear testimony from Mr. Akpan’s . . . own expert in immigration law,”
-10-
is not quite accurate.  After a witness had finished testifying, Judge Johnson asked
“Who’s next?”  Counsel for the respondent indicated that an “immigration attorney”
would testify as an expert witness.  The Deputy Bar Counsel then stated that he had
received notice of this witness “last week long after the discovery deadline had
passed,” and that he had “no opportunity to depose this witness.”  A colloquy ensued
between Judge Johnson and respondent’s counsel as to the nature of the witness’s
testimony and whether the testimony would be helpful.  Judge Johnson then commented
that he had no “basis of knowledge to challenge” the proposed testimony and that “the
immigration attorney would be extremely informative, but not particularly helpful.”
Next, the following interchange occurred:
“RESPO NDEN T’S COUNSEL:  Okay.  I will take the hint,
Your Honor.  We learn everyday.
“THE COURT:  Well, it’s not a hint.
“RESPO NDEN T’S COUNSEL:  I will leave her, and I will call
[a different witness].
‘THE COURT:  Okay.  You want to let her know she can go?
“RESPO NDEN T’S COUNSEL:  But, Your Honor, may I just let
her – yes.  I was just going to let her know.
“THE COURT:  You can save yourself by telling her that the
Court wouldn’t allow her to testify.  That way you’re off the hook
for having her sit around here all afternoon.
“(Discussion off the record.)
“RESPO NDEN T’S COUNSEL:  Thank you, Your Honor.”
-11-
It seems obvious that Judge Johnson did not rule that the expert witness could not
testify.  On the contrary, the respondent’s counsel decided not to call the expert
witness.  The Judge’s statement that counsel could tell the witness that “the Court
wouldn’t allow her to testify,” was merely an effort to help the respondent’s counsel.
Moreover, even if Judge Johnson’s remarks were construed as a ruling that the expert
witness would not be allowed to testify, the respondent’s counsel made no objection.
For the above reasons, Mr. Akpan’s first exception is overruled.
Mr. Akpan’s remaining six exceptions all relate to Judge Johnson’s findings and
conclusions concerning representation at the removal proceedings.  Those findings and
conclusions were that there was “insufficient evidence to support an attorney-client
relationship arising out of Mr. Akpan’s alleged representation at the removal
proceedings,” that Mr. Muli assumed that Mr. Akpan would represent Mr. Muli at those
proceedings, that “Mr. Akpan did not promptly inform his client of the scope of his
representation when Mr. Akpan became aware of [the] removal proceedings,” that
“Mr. Akpan did not inform Mr. Muli that he was not representing Mr. Muli with respect
to the removal proceedings, as he should have,” and that Mr. Akpan’s failure to
commu nicate properly concerning representation at the removal proceedings, “which
led Mr. Muli to incorrectly assume that he would be represented,” violated Rules
1.4(a), 1.4(b), and 8.4(d).
In his exceptions, Mr. Akpan asserts that the findings, that Mr. Akpan did not
properly communicate to Mr. Muli concerning representation at the removal
-12-
proceedings, are inconsistent with the finding that no attorney-client relationship
existed with respect to representation at the removal proceedings.  Mr. Akpan also
asserts that the above-summarized findings, relating to removal proceeding
representation, are “clearly erroneous” because Judge Johnson “relied on Mr. Muli’s
undetailed and incredible testimony.”  The respondent Akpan takes the position that the
evidence which he offered outweighed the testimony from Mr. Muli concerning
representation at the removal proceedings.  In light of Mr. Akpan’s evaluation of the
evidence, he concludes that there were no violations of Rules 1.4(a), 1.4(b), and 8.4(d).
We overrule all six of Mr. Akpan’s exceptions regarding representation at the
removal proceedings.  There is no inconsistency between a finding that “there is
insufficient evidence to support the existence of an attorney-client relationship” at the
removal proceedings, and the findings concerning Mr. Muli’s assumption of
representation and concerning Mr. Akpan’s failure to communicate properly about
representation at the removal proceedings.
Judge Johnson’s findings of fact, based upon Mr. Muli’s testim ony, are not
clearly erroneous.  Maryland Rule 16-759(b), governing the review of a hearing judge’s
findings in an attorney disciplinary case, specifically provides in relevant part that the
Court of Appeals “shall give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to
assess the credibility of witnesses.”  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Commission v.
Harris, 403 Md. 142, 158, 939 A.2d 732, 742 (2008) (“Consistent with the standard of
review for factual findings in attorney discipline cases, we have [reiterated] that the
-13-
judge ‘may elect to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon’”); Attorney
Grievance Commission v. Mba-Jonas, 402 Md. 334, 344, 936 A.2d 839, 844 (2007)
(“We accept [the hearing judge’s] finding and [resulting] legal conclusion as she had
the opportunity to weigh the credibility of the witnesses.  In our review of such
disciplinary hearings, we accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact . . . unless shown
to be clearly erroneous”); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Robertson, 400 Md. 618,
630, 929 A.2d 576, 583 (2007) (“‘Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving
any conflict in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder,’” quoting State v.
Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750, 720 A.2d 322, 331 (1998)).
Considering that Mr. Akpan did violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct, that the Attorney Grievance Commission has recommended a
reprimand as the appropriate sanction for Mr. Akpan’s conduct, and that the purpose
of these proceedings is not “to punish the erring attorney but to protect the public”
(Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mba-Jonas, supra, 402 Md. at 348, 936 A.2d at
847, and cases there cited), we agree that the proper sanction is a reprimand.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
SHALL 
PAY 
ALL 
COSTS 
AS
TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS
COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF
ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT
TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR
WHICH 
SUM 
JUDGMENT 
IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE
A T T O R N E Y  
G R I E V A N C E
C O M M I S S I O N  
A G A I N S T
EMMANUEL DAMASCUS AKPAN.