Title: ASCH v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ASCH v. STATE2003 WY 1862 P.3d 945Case Number: 00-128Decided: 02/06/2003
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

DAVID 
ASCH,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
John M. Burman, Diane E. Courselle, Director, Defender Aid Program; 
Kimberly A. Corey and Gay George, Student Interns.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. 
Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Jillian M. Bullock and Zachary 
T. Lee, Student Interns.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

*  Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      A jury convicted 
David Asch (Asch) of possession of a felony amount of methamphetamine, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031 (LexisNexis 2001).  In this appeal, Asch contends that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel, that the district court improperly 
instructed the jury after a witness refused to answer a question, and that he 
was denied his right to due process of law when he was forced to appear before 
the jury in shackles.

 

[¶2]      We 
reverse.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Six issues have 
been identified by the parties:

 

1.         
Was Asch's right to effective assistance of counsel violated as a result 
of a conflict of interest in his representation at the preliminary 
hearing?

 

2.         
Was Asch's right to effective assistance of counsel violated as a result 
of counsel's failure to obtain a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript and 
to undertake a reasonable investigation of the case?

 

3.         Was 
Asch's right to effective assistance of counsel violated as a result of 
counsel's failure to ensure that Asch would be in street clothes during the 
trial?

 

4.         Was 
Asch's right to effective assistance of counsel violated as a result of 
counsel's calling a witness who refused to answer a question and was held in 
contempt of court?

 

5.         Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in instructing the jury that it could 
consider the witness's refusal to answer a question as bearing on her 
credibility?

 

6.         Was 
Asch denied his right to due process of law as a result of his legs being 
shackled during the jury trial?

 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY

 

[¶4]      At about 10:30 p.m., 
on September 2, 1999, in Casper, Asch was the front-seat passenger in a car 
being driven by Sheryl Sutton (Sutton).  Casper Police Officer Andrew Swisher 
(Swisher) stopped the car for expired registration.  In the process, 
Swisher observed Asch "making . . . concealing movements" to the center and left 
of his seat.  
The denouement of the traffic stop was Sutton's arrest for possession of 
a marijuana pipe found under the passenger seat, and Asch's arrest for 
possession of seven grams of methamphetamine found between the front seats and 
for interference with a peace officer for having lied about his identity.

 

[¶5]      At his initial 
appearance in county court (now referred to as circuit court) the following day, 
Asch requested appointment of counsel.  An order was entered on September 9, 1999, 
appointing the State Public Defender to represent him.  A preliminary 
hearing was set for September 13, 1999.  The Notice and Order of Preliminary Hearing 
shows copies having been sent to "prosecutor" and "defense counsel," but neither 
is identified by name.

 

[¶6]      The preliminary 
hearing took place at the time and date scheduled.  However, Nadine 
McLeod (McLeod), the contract public defender assigned to represent Asch, did 
not appear.  
Instead, Asch was represented by Wilhelm Bierman (Bierman), the 
supervising attorney in the Casper office of the State Public Defender.  Asch was bound over 
for trial in the district court.

 

[¶7]      McLeod appeared with 
Asch at arraignment in the district court on November 9, 1999.  Asch pled not 
guilty to the felony possession charge, but he pled guilty to the misdemeanor 
charge of interference with a peace officer.  Sentencing on the misdemeanor charge was 
postponed pending completion of a presentence investigation report.  The felony count 
was placed in the "trial stack;" it eventually was tried to a jury on February 
22, 2000.

 

[¶8]      The State called only 
two witnesses at trialthe arresting officer and an expert from the Wyoming 
State Crime Laboratory.  Sutton was the only defense witness.  Succinctly stated, 
Officer Swisher described the traffic stop and arrests, the expert identified 
the substance as methamphetamine, and Sutton testified that the methamphetamine 
belonged to her and not to Asch.  On cross-examination, Sutton refused to 
identify the source of the methamphetamine, even in the face of the district 
court judge's direct order to do so.  Proceedings were then had outside the 
presence of the jury, Sutton was found to be in direct contempt of court, and 
was sentenced to sixty days in jail.  The jury was then brought back into the 
courtroom and the district court judge orally instructed them as follows:

 

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, as you saw and heard, Ms. 
Sutton refused to answer the pending question that had been asked by the 
District Attorney's Office in this matter.  I'm going to advise you that you can consider 
her refusal to answer that question in connection with your consideration of all 
other evidence and matters that may bear on her credibility and the credibility 
of her testimony before the Court.

 

[¶9]      After the jury 
convicted Asch of the felony possession charge, the district court ordered the 
preparation of an addendum to the previously ordered pre-sentence investigation 
report.  On 
March 28, 2000, Asch was sentenced to incarceration in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary for a term of sixty to seventy-two months.  Asch filed his 
Notice of Appeal with the district court on April 24, 2000.

 

[¶10]   Development of the issues in this 
appeal has followed a tortuous path, at best.  The appeal was docketed on May 18, 2000.  Subsequently, five 
orders were entered extending the time for filing of briefs.  The proceedings 
were also stayed while this Court considered Asch's motion for a limited remand 
for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Well 
after oral argument, we granted Asch's earlier-filed motion for remand, not only 
to develop the evidence as to ineffective assistance of counsel, but also as to 
the shackling issue, which had not been raised in the initial appellate 
briefs.  On 
remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and issued a decision 
letter finding, first, that Asch had failed to establish ineffective assistance 
of counsel, and second, that Asch had failed to prove that he was prejudiced by 
having been shackled during the trial.  The case was then returned to this Court, 
where we allowed supplemental briefing.  The briefs were filed in June and July of 
2002.  Further 
oral argument was not allowed, but the case was "reconferenced" on August 13, 
2002.

 

DISCUSSION

 

Was Asch's right to effective assistance of counsel 
violated as a result of a conflict of interest in his representation at the 
preliminary hearing?

 

[¶11]   Claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel are reviewed under the following standard:

 

"Wyoming has a well-established and oft-repeated standard 
for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel:

 

When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the paramount determination is whether, in light of all the 
circumstances, trial counsel's acts or omissions were outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance.  Herdt v. State, 
891 P.2d 793, 796 (Wyo.1995); Starr v. State, 
888 P.2d 1262, 1266-67 (Wyo.1995); Arner v. State, 
872 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo.1994); Frias v. State, 
722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo.1986).  The reviewing court should indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant 
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.  Herdt, at 796; Starr, at 
1266; Arner, at 104; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

 

            
Under the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and Frias, an 
appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the 
record that counsel's performance was deficient and that prejudice 
resulted.  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Starr, at 1266; King v. State, 
810 P.2d 119, 125 (Wyo.1991) (Cardine, J., dissenting); Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628, 629 (Wyo.1986); Frias, 722 P.2d  at 145.  In other words, to warrant reversal on a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that 
his counsel failed to "render such assistance as would have been offered by a 
reasonably competent attorney" and that "counsel's deficiency prejudiced the 
defense of [the] case."  Lower v. State, 
786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo.1990).  "The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as 
having produced a just result."  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.'

 

Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶ 6, 18 P.3d 1164, 1168-69 (Wyo.2001) (quoting Grainey v. State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 
(Wyo.2000))."

 

Becker v. State, 2002 WY 126, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d 94, 98-99 (Wyo. 
2002) (quoting Reyna v. 
State, 2001 WY 105, ¶ 19, 33 P.3d 1129, 1134-35 (Wyo. 2001)).  An appellant bears the burden of proving that 
counsel was ineffective.  Barkell v. State, 
2002 WY 153, ¶ 10, 55 P.3d 1239, 1242 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶12]   The State does not contest Asch's 
assertion that the preliminary hearing is a critical stage in the criminal 
proceedings at which a defendant has a constitutional right to the assistance of 
counsel.  See Davila v. State, 831 P.2d 204, 214 (Wyo. 
1992) (Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting); Auclair v. State, 660 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 909 (1983); and Hurst v. State, 563 P.2d 232, 235 (Wyo. 1977).  In turn, Asch does not base his argument on 
the "failure" of his assigned counsel to appear at the preliminary hearing.1  Instead, Asch premises his argument that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel at the preliminary hearing on the 
theory that Bierman's representation of him created a conflict of interest 
because Thomas Smith (Smith), who represented Asch's "co-defendant" Sutton, was 
also an assistant public defender within Bierman's office.

 

[¶13]   It is, perhaps, obvious that an 
attorney with a direct, personal conflict of interest might not provide 
effective representation to a defendant.  An attorney who is related to a crime victim, 
for instance, should not be called upon to represent the alleged perpetrator of 
that crime.  
That type or level of conflict, where the attorney's personal interests 
conflict with those of his client, is readily recognized.  Almost as apparent 
is the conflict of interest created when one attorney, though free of personal 
conflict, attempts to represent two people charged with the same crime.  In that situation, 
the interests that conflict are the interests of the two defendants.

 

"Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect 
because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from doing.  For example, . . . 
[joint representation] may well . . . preclude[] defense counsel . . . from 
exploring possible plea negotiations and the possibility of an agreement to 
testify for the prosecution, provided a lesser charge or a favorable sentencing 
recommendation would be acceptable.  Generally speaking, a conflict may also 
prevent an attorney from challenging the admission of evidence prejudicial to 
one client but perhaps favorable to another, or from arguing . . . the relative 
involvement and culpability of his clients in order to minimize the culpability 
of one by emphasizing that of another.  Examples can be readily multiplied.

 

. . .

 

[I]n a case of joint representation of conflicting 
interests the evilit bears repeatingis in what the advocate finds himself 
compelled to refrain 
from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations 
and in the sentencing process."

 

Shongutsie v. State, 827 P.2d 361, 365 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Holloway v. 
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 1181-82, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426 
(1978)) (emphasis in original).

 

[¶14]   Because the potential for a conflict of 
interest "inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation,'" this 
Court has rejected a case-by-case inquiry, and has adopted "the rule that 
prejudice will be presumed in all instances of multiple representation of 
criminal defendants and, in the absence of an appropriate waiver, multiple 
representation will constitute reversible error."  Shongutsie, 827 P.2d  at 367 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980)).  This rule applies whether the co-defendants 
are tried jointly or separately.  Kenney v. State, 
837 P.2d 664, 673 (Wyo. 1992).

 

[¶15]   W.R.Cr.P. 44(c) governs the process for 
obtaining a waiver of the potential conflict of interest in a case of joint 
representation:

 

Whenever two or more defendants have been charged with 
offenses arising from the same or related transactions and are represented by 
the same retained or assigned counsel or by retained or assigned counsel who are 
associated in the practice of law, the court shall promptly inquire with respect 
to such joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel, including separate 
representation.  
Unless it appears that there is good cause to believe no conflict of 
interest is likely to arise, the court shall order separate representation.

 

While such a waiver may allow a defendant to be represented 
by the attorney of his choice, despite the potential conflict of interest, it 
does not rid the attorney of his obligation to abide by the rules of 
professional conduct.  
Kenney, 837 P.2d at 673-74; Shongutsie, 827 P.2d  at 
367.2

 

[¶16]   W.R.Cr.P. 44(c) was adopted in response 
to Shongutsie.  Kenney, 837 P.2d  at 664 n.1, 675 
n.11.  It contains two provisions specifically 
applicable to the instant case.  First, conflict of interest must be addressed 
not only where co-defendants are charged with the same offense, but where they 
are charged with "offenses arising from the same or related 
transactions . . .."  Consequently, the fact that Asch was charged 
with a methamphetamine offense, while Sutton was charged with a marijuana 
offense, does not negate the necessity for a conflict of interest inquiry.  And second, 
conflict of interest must be addressed not only where co-defendants are 
represented by the same attorney, but also where they are represented by 
"retained or assigned counsel who are associated in the practice of law . . 
.."  The 
question is the effect, if any, of the fact that Bierman, who represented Asch 
at the preliminary hearing, and Smith, who represented Sutton, both worked in 
the Casper office of the State Public Defender.

 

[¶17]   Asch contends that the appearance of 
both Bierman and Smith in these related cases requires reversal of his 
conviction because (1) based on Shongutsie, a 
presumption of prejudice exists; (2) the State Public Defender's Office is a 
"firm" within the meaning of the rules of professional conduct;3 and (3) the State Public Defender's Office is 
not exempt from the requirement that attorneys must provide effective assistance 
of counsel, free from any conflict of interest.4

 

[¶18]   The State counters Asch's argument 
first by noting that the facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from the 
facts in both Shongutsie and Kenney.  In Shongutsie, 
one lawyer represented two defendants in a joint trial.  In Kenney, one lawyer represented two defendants in 
separate trials.  
Here, separate attorneys in the Casper office of the State Public 
Defender briefly represented two co-defendants in separate proceedings.5  The question of first impression for this 
Court is whether we should adopt a per se rule 
presuming a conflict of interest and disqualifying by imputation attorneys 
within the State Public Defender's Office from separately representing 
defendants charged with offenses arising from the same incident.

 

[¶19]   The State contends that Wyoming should 
follow the lead of other states that have found public defenders' offices 
different from private law firms, and have concluded that a case-by-case inquiry 
into conflicts of interest is appropriate.  See, for example, 
People v. Daniels, 52 Cal. 3d 815, 277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906, 915, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 846 (1991) (automatic disqualification would hamper 
ability of public defender to represent indigents in criminal cases); State v. Pitt, 77 Hawai'i 374, 884 P.2d 1150, 1156 
(1994) (case-by-case inquiry because public 
defender's office, as a government office, is different from a law firm); People v. Miller, 79 Ill. 2d 454, 38 Ill.Dec. 775, 404 N.E.2d 199, 202 (1980) (no per se rule is 
necessary; a case-by-case analysis is sufficient to determine whether any facts 
peculiar to the case preclude multiple representation within a public defender's 
office); and State v. Bell, 90 N.J. 163, 447 A.2d 525, 528 (1982) (same potential for prejudice does not exist 
in public defender's office).

 

[¶20]   In his Reply Brief, Asch points out 
numerous cases that have reached the opposite conclusion.  See, for example, Ward v. State, 753 So. 2d 705, 708 
(Fla.App. 2000) (public defender's office is equivalent of a 
law firm for conflict purposes); Perkins v. State, 
226 Ga. App. 613, 487 S.E.2d 365, 368 (1997) (for purposes of claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, lawyers in the same public defender's office are 
considered members of a law firm); State v. Watson, 
620 N.W.2d 233, 241 (Iowa 2000) (representation of two clients by different 
attorneys from a public defender's office constitutes dual representation for 
purposes of conflict of interest analysis); and Jackson 
v. State, 329 S.C. 345, 495 S.E.2d 768, 773 (1998) (multiple representation out of a public 
defender's office may be a conflict of interest).

 

[¶21]   We are quite cognizant of the fact 
that, in Reynoldson, and again in Shongutsie, we emphasized the need to maintain caution 
in multiple representation cases, despite the limited resources of the State 
Public Defender's Office, "where any conflict in representation could be 
envisioned.'"  
Shongutsie, 827 P.2d at 367 (quoting Reynoldson v. 
State, 737 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Wyo. 1987)).  We continue to adhere to that principle.  Nevertheless, 
because representation of separate defendants by separate attorneys is 
fundamentally different than representation of separate defendants by a single 
attorney, we agree with the courts of those jurisdictions that have found a 
case-by-case inquiry, rather than per se 
disqualification, appropriate for cases alleging a conflict of interest based on 
representation of co-defendants by separate attorneys from the State Public 
Defender's Office.  
We do not consider this to conflict with the holdings of Shongutsie and Kenney.

 

[¶22]   There are several reasons we reject 
automatic disqualification of assistant public defenders under these 
circumstances.  
The first reason is aptly stated in Comment d(iv) to Section 203(2) of The Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers:

 

[P]ublic defenders who are subject to a common supervisory 
structure within an organization ordinarily should be treated as independent for 
purposes of [imputing conflicts of interest].  The lawyers provide legal services, not to 
the public defender office, but to individual defendants.  Ordinarily, the 
office would have no reason to give one defendant more vigorous representation 
than other defendants whose interests are in conflict.  Thus, while 
individual defendants should be represented by separate members of the 
defender's office, the representation of each defendant should not be imputed to 
other lawyers in an office where effective measures prevent communications of 
confidential client information between lawyers employed on behalf of individual 
defendants.

 

[¶23]   Similarly, there is no financial 
incentive for attorneys in a public defender's office to favor one client over 
another.  People v. Christian, 41 Cal. App. 4th 986, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 874 (1996).  The public defender does not receive more 
money if one client prevails and another does not.  See, David H. Taylor, Conflicts 
of Interest and the Indigent Client: Barring the Door to the Last Lawyer in 
Town, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 577, 606 (1995).  An assistant public defender, as a salaried 
government employee, simply does not have the financial interest in a case that 
is inherent in private practice.  Turbin v. Superior 
Court In and For County of Navajo, 165 Ariz. 195, 797 P.2d 734, 737 
(1990); Bell, 447 A.2d  at 
528.

 

[¶24]   Another reason to adopt a case-by-case 
inquiry for conflicts of interest within the State Public Defender's Office is 
that to do otherwise would needlessly jeopardize the right of individual 
defendants to skilled and competent representation.  As noted by the 
Illinois Supreme Court, "[i]n many instances the application of such a per se rule would require the appointment of counsel 
with virtually no experience in the trial of criminal matters, thus raising, 
with justification, the question of competency of counsel."  People v. Robinson, 79 Ill. 2d 147, 37 Ill.Dec. 267, 402 N.E.2d 157, 162 (1979).  See also Bell, 
447 A.2d  at 528.

 

[¶25]   We do not wish to overstate this 
argument, inasmuch as all Wyoming attorneys are expected to have some level of 
knowledge of criminal law.  But it goes without saying that an 
experienced public defender who specializes in criminal defense is a valuable 
asset within the criminal justice system, especially to the indigent 
defendant.  
Furthermore, given Wyoming's many small communities, with a limited 
number of lawyers, it could be difficult in many cases even to find local 
counsel for a defendant.

 

[¶26]   The third reason to avoid an automatic 
disqualification rule for imputed conflicts of interest among assistant public 
defenders is fiscal.  
Paying outside counsel every time there are multiple defendants in a case 
would, no doubt, be quite an expense for the taxpayers of the state.  Where there has 
been no showing of an actual conflict of interest, and thus no showing of 
prejudice to the defendants, the minimal benefit of a per se rule would not justify the additional 
expense.  While 
we cannot and should not "put a price on" the legal representation we provide to 
indigent defendants, the judicial branch of government still has an obligation 
to be fiscally responsible.

 

[¶27]   Finally, a per 
se disqualification rule is not necessary because W.R.Cr.P. 44(c) already 
provides an effective mechanism for dealing with potential conflicts of interest 
in cases of multiple representation.6  Whether or not 
assistant public defenders that work out of the same office are, or are not, 
comparable to members of a private law firm, they are certainly "associated in 
the practice of law" and there is no reason W.R.Cr.P. 44(c) should not apply to 
them.

 

[¶28]   In a perfect world, W.R.Cr.P. 44(c) 
would always be applied just as it is written.  The assistant public defenders assigned to 
represent co-defendants would notify the judge of such assignment.  The judge would 
then immediately hold a hearing, where inquiry would be made into any possible 
conflicts of interest, and where the defendants' rights and options would be 
explained to them.  
Absent a waiver by the defendants or a finding by the judge that there 
was good cause to believe no conflict of interest was likely to arise, separate 
counsel would be appointed.  And, of course, a perfect record would be 
made of all the proceedings.

 

[¶29]   Unfortunately, the instant case took 
place in the real world, and perfect procedures were not followed.  To the credit of 
the State Public Defender's Office, a contract attorney, McLeod, was assigned to 
represent Asch, presumably because Smith had been appointed to represent 
Sutton.7  But the preliminary hearing was set and held 
before McLeod was even aware of the appointment.  That resulted in Bierman's appearance in her 
stead.

 

[¶30]   At this point, it should be remembered 
that the only conflict of interest issue raised is Bierman's appearance at the 
preliminary hearing.  
The question is whether, given Smith's appointment to represent Sutton, 
Bierman's brief representation of Asch that day in circuit court created such a 
conflict that Asch's later conviction by a jury in district court should be 
reversed.  The 
limited nature of this question makes it less difficult to apply an "after the 
fact" analysis than would be true in many cases.

 

[¶31]   Bierman testified at the motion hearing 
that, as the supervising attorney in the Casper office, he assigned particular 
attorneys to particular felony cases.  Misdemeanors, however, were assigned on a 
rotating basis by the office secretaries.  Asch was charged with a felony, but Sutton 
was only charged with a misdemeanor.  Consequently, Bierman would have assigned 
Asch's case to McLeod, but he would not have assigned Sutton's case to 
Smith.  Bierman 
further testified that, at the time of Asch's preliminary hearing, he was not 
even aware that Sutton was being represented by his office.  If multiple 
representation can be seen as an attempt to serve two masters, then there was no 
conflict of interest here because Bierman was not even aware that there were two 
masters to serve.8

 

[¶32]   One other aspect of Bierman's testimony 
leads to the conclusion that no conflict of interest arose in this case.  Bierman testified 
that, since it was his practice to advise attorneys for whom he had covered a 
hearing what had transpired at that hearing, he probably did so with 
McLeod.  On the 
other hand, Bierman could not recall ever having discussed the case with 
Smith.  There 
is nothing in the record to contradict these assertions, so the only evidence is 
that no information obtained by Bierman during the preliminary hearing was used 
to Sutton's advantage or Asch's disadvantage.

 

[¶33]   Looking, both figuratively and 
literally, at the bottom line of W.R.Cr.P. 44(c), we can only conclude that 
there is good cause to believe that no conflict of interest occurred in this 
case.  
Considering the broader standard of effective assistance of counsel, we 
also conclude that counsel's performance in this case was not outside the wide 
range of professionally competent assistance, and we can find nothing in the 
record that substantiates any prejudice having befallen Asch by Bierman's 
appearance at the preliminary hearing.9

 

[¶34]   It should be obvious that conflict of 
interest issues should not come before this Court in the manner that this case 
came here.  
Both the attorneys and the judge have a duty to recognize potential 
conflicts and to deal with them in open court, with the participation of the 
defendants, before representation has been compromised.  In the instant 
case, however, the single incident underlying the claim of a conflict of 
interest occurred before there was any reasonable opportunity for the potential 
conflict to be recognized.  Further, there simply is nothing in the 
record from which we can find that an actual conflict of interest existed.  We conclude that 
Asch did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at his preliminary 
hearing.

 

Was Asch's right to effective assistance of counsel 
violated as a result of counsel's failure to obtain a copy of the preliminary 
hearing transcript and to undertake a reasonable investigation of the 
case?

 

[¶35]   Bierman testified at the motion hearing 
that, after he filled in for McLeod at Asch's preliminary hearing, he "probably" 
informed her as to what had occurred at that hearing.  McLeod agreed that 
Bierman "would have told her what happened."  Asch's complaint on appeal is that McLeod was 
ineffective in her representation of him because, having missed the preliminary 
hearing, she made no attempt to obtain a transcript of the proceedings, and made 
no determination as to whether the preliminary hearing testimony would be useful 
in investigating the case or for impeaching witnesses at trial.

 

[¶36]   The State called two witnesses at 
trial: the arresting officer, Swisher, and a crime laboratory expert.  Clearly, the 
State's case was based almost entirely on Swisher's testimony.  Swisher had also 
been the only witness at the preliminary hearing.  Asch contends that McLeod should have used 
portions of Swisher's preliminary hearing testimony as prior inconsistent 
statements to impeach his trial testimony.  As specific examples, Asch points out that 
(1) at the preliminary hearing, Swisher testified that the methamphetamine was 
not field tested, while at trial he testified that it was field tested; (2) at 
the preliminary hearing, Swisher testified that the methamphetamine was found on 
the passenger side of the "hump" between the seats, while at trial he testified 
that it was found tightly wedged between the two front seats; and (3) at the 
preliminary hearing, Swisher testified that the methamphetamine was found in an 
area equally accessible to the driver and the passenger, while at trial he 
testified that it was found in the area where he saw Asch "pushing something 
down."

 

[¶37]   Asch further argues that, had McLeod 
obtained a transcript of the preliminary hearing, she would have been able at 
trial to challenge Swisher's testimony by reminding him of his statements at the 
preliminary hearing that (1) his observations of Asch's movements were made at 
night, through his own windshield, through the rear window of Sutton's car, past 
the rear seat and into the front seat area; (2) he "really didn't have an actual 
view of [Asch] hiding something;" and (3) the area where the methamphetamine was 
found between the seats was accessible to Sutton and she could have had her 
hands there before the traffic stop.  Finally, Asch contends that, had McLeod 
investigated what Swisher said at the preliminary hearing, she would have 
discovered that Sutton's car, being front-wheel drive, did not have a "hump" 
between the front bucket seats, as Swisher testified at both the preliminary 
hearing and the trial.

 

[¶38]   McLeod never admitted that she had not 
reviewed the preliminary hearing testimony.  The most she would say was that she did not 
recall having done so.  She did, however, staunchly defend her 
decision not to use Swisher's testimony from that hearing to impeach him at 
trial:

 

Q         [Defense 
Counsel]  Now, 
is it  what generally do you use information from a preliminary hearing 
for?  You, 
yourself, in a trial, what would you use it for?

 

A         
You've got to look at each individual case; is there something specific 
that would help you at a preliminary hearing later on.  In this kind of 
case, there was nothing at the preliminary hearing there was going to be 
specifically helpful in the trial.

 

. . .

 

Q         
Now, at trial, and I have this if you would like to look at this also, 
Officer Swisher testified that he did not field test the drugs at the 
scene.  You 
mentioned earlier that nothing in this case from the preliminary hearing seemed 
to be important at trial?

 

A         All 
right.  That 
very statement you said there, that is not a conflicting statement enough that 
was worth going through the rigmarole, shall we say, of trying to bring in a 
preliminary tape transcript.

 

            
The preliminary hearing transcript is not done by a certified court 
reporter.  
Basically inadmissible under the Supreme Court rulings right now.  To bring that in, 
we would have to have verified the whole preliminary hearing tape before to make 
it accurate.

 

            
What we have is a very poor record that I think is transcribed by a 
secretary with headphones.  In this particular case, what he said at the 
hearing where you're going for the not field testing or not field testing at the 
site, they come to the same thing.

 

            
The main point of this case and theory of Mr. Asch's defense was going to 
be that Sheryl Sutton owned the drugs, even  and the drugs were found in a 
common area; she owned them, she was the driver, thereby it was hers.

 

Q         
Okay.  
Now, along those lines  Let me get this straight.  So you're saying 
you didn't feel that you wanted to put the preliminary hearing into evidence 
because it was poorly recorded or poorly transcribed?

 

A         
No.  In 
the theory of this case and what our defense was going to be, it was excess 
baggage that only ruins your credibility with the jury.

 

Q         And 
you said that his defense was that Sheryl Sutton owned the drugs?

 

A         
Owned the drugs.

 

Q         
Okay.  
Well, at the preliminary hearing also, Officer Swisher testified that 
while in his car, he didn't actually see Mr. Asch hide anything?

 

A         
Correct.

 

Q         And 
at the trial you failed to question him about that.  Now, if he said he 
didn't see him hide anything, is it possible somebody else maybe hid 
something?

 

A         
That is a very elementary point and I wouldn't waste the jury's time and 
patience with cross-examining that point.

 

. . .

 

Q         
Okay.  
Now, at the preliminary hearing, Officer Swisher also testified that the 
drugs were equally accessible to the driver?

 

A         
Correct.

 

Q         And 
as you just said, Mr. Asch's defense was that the drugs were Sheryl 
Sutton's?

 

A         
Correct.

 

Q         And 
you have the officer saying that the driver could have accessed the drugs, yet 
you didn't impeach him with that at trial either?

 

A         
There was no point to it.  It wasn't that great a point, yes.

 

. . .

 

Q         
Well, did you ever investigate the car?

 

A         I'm 
sure I did.

 

Q         Did 
you become aware of what the interior of the car looked like?

 

A         I 
was aware of what the interior of the car was like from one of my first 
conversation[s] with Mr. Asch, plus I've also been going to trial, I'm sure I 
met with Swisher and also there was a very most key person described the car 
would have been Sheryl Sutton, the owner, she was taking the stand.

 

Q         And 
were you aware of not only the inside but the outside of the car as well from 
that?

 

A         I'm 
sure I was.

 

Q         And 
did you have a chance to review the preliminary hearing, besides what Mr. 
Bierman told you?

 

A         I 
don't recall.

 

Q         So 
you wouldn't recall if he told you what Officer Swisher said about the physical 
nature of the car?

 

A         
No.

 

Q         So 
you would have no basis on which to impeach him on cross-examination if his view 
of the car was, in fact, inaccurate?

 

A         The 
way you would impeach would be to call the owner of the car who was familiar 
with the car to testify to the jury what the inside of the car is like.  The jury would then 
be able to see as the officer testified wrong and the owner, who knows the car, 
testified that maybe he doesn't recall other things quite as well either.

 

            
It's much more effective to have the actual proof there from the actual 
owner than to go through a litany of just going through words from a poor 
transcript, vague words.

 

Q         
Now, but you didn't feel that had there been inaccuracies it would not be 
important to put the owner up there, to put the owner up there to give the 
description of the car and impeach Officer Swisher's recollection of the 
car?

 

A         
Sheryl Sutton did testify.

 

. . .

 

Q         
Now, it also came out in the preliminary hearing of what kind of car it 
was, certain aspects, so you could have impeached Officer Swisher on any 
inaccuracies; is that true?

 

A         I'm 
sure it is.

 

Q         But 
you chose not to?

 

A         
No.  
Some things are much more effective, and that is not a very effective way 
of establishing points in trial.

 

. . .

 

Q         And 
now, all these other things that we previously mentioned that happened at the 
preliminary hearing, you didn't feel those would impeach his credibility so you 
chose not to cross-examine him on that, all these  there's tangible physical 
inaccuracies of his 

 

A         Not 
sufficient to make a point.

 

Q         But 
the fact is 

 

A         
Once you get into doing trial work you will realize that you ruin your 
trial by going after every little possible point you can.  You go with the 
theory of the case, figure out your main point and go with it.  To go after every 
little nitpick you can makes you look like a fool to the jury and it makes your 
case a lot worse.

 

. . .

 

Q         
[Prosecutor]  
Now, the field testing.  Was there actually a chemist that testified 
to a chemical test to the trial?

 

A         
Yes.  
When there's not a question raised whether the drugs are drugs, then 
there's no point to question whether a field test was done at the scene or at 
the police department.

 

Q         I 
think you stated this in substance in your testimony, but in your experience, is 
it best to focus upon one clear and concrete theory rather than attacking 
everything that moves?

 

A         
Yes.  
About the only way to win in a good case is to have one theory and go for 
it; a shotgun case, you shoot yourself in the foot.

 

. . .

 

Q         
Given that was going to be the theory of the defense, did you think that 
bringing up minor points with Mr. Swisher would be effective?

 

A         
No.  I 
did not want to create jury sympathy for the police officer.

 

. . .

 

Q         
Yes.  In 
your opinion, do you believe that the tactical decision, even though it might 
not have been successful, was sound when you made it, that is, to rely on Sheryl 
Sutton's testimony in this particular case?

 

A         The 
only thing that was relevant in this case is who owned those drugs.  Mr. Asch with his 
criminal record could not take the stand.  We did discuss that in full and it was his 
choice not to take the stand.  With his record, with all his drug felonies 
it would not have worked.

 

            
So the only person then would have to be somebody else to say they 
had.  We did 
have the law that says the driver should be presumed to be in possession of the 
drugs.  The 
officer was saying it was him.  The only form of testimony would have to be 
that somebody else owned the drugs.

 

Q         And 
did you feel it was a sound tactical decision to concentrate on Sheryl's 
testimony rather than cross-examine the officer about minor matters in doing 
so?

 

A         
That was the only possibility.

 

[¶39]   As stated earlier herein, our standard 
for review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel requires an appellant 
to prove both that counsel's performance was deficient and that prejudice to the 
appellant resulted.  
The adequacy or deficiency of counsel's performance is measured under an 
objective test, the question being whether counsel provided such assistance as 
would have been provided by a reasonably competent attorney.  Becker, 2002 WY 126, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d  at 98 (quoting Reyna, 2001 WY 105, ¶ 19, 33 P.3d at 
1134-35).

 

[¶40]   We have long recognized that failure of 
counsel to conduct a reasonable investigation may constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Epperson v. State, 
637 P.2d 671, 672-73 (Wyo. 1981).  Our first detailed analysis of counsel's duty 
to investigate came in Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 
145 (Wyo. 1986):

 

The United States Supreme Court has outlined trial 
counsel's duty to investigate as follows:

 

"* * *  [S]trategic choices made after less than 
complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable 
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.  In other words, counsel has a duty to make 
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
investigations unnecessary.  * * *  The reasonableness 
of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the 
defendant's own statements or actions.  Counsel's actions are usually based, quite 
properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information 
supplied by the defendant.  * * *  [W]hat investigation decisions are reasonable 
depends critically on such information.  * * *'  (Emphasis added.)  Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066."

 

The reasonableness of investigation decisions depends on 
other evidence as well.  "[I]n those cases involving claims of 
inadequate investigation * * * consideration [must be given to] the strength of 
the evidence known to counsel that suggested further inquiry was needed."  2 LaFave & 
Isr[ae]l, Crim.Proc. § 11.10(d) at 25 (1986 Pocket Part).

 

(Emphasis in original.)  We reversed Frias' second-degree murder 
conviction because Frias' attorney ignored considerable evidence that the victim 
had committed suicide and made no independent investigation into that 
defense.  Frias, 722 P.2d  at 147.

 

[¶41]   Since Frias, we have had numerous occasions to revisit this 
issue.  Our 
developing jurisprudence has reflected our application of an objective test 
based on the totality of the circumstances, judged from the perspective of 
counsel at the time.  
In particular, we have distinguished between reasonable decisions made as 
part of trial strategy, and unreasonable decisions resulting from a failure to 
investigate.  
Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 58, 43 P.3d 80, 102 (Wyo. 2002).  In that regard, an appellant cannot prove 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate a possible defense 
unless there are facts in the record indicating the availability of that 
defense.  Reyna, 2001 WY 105, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d  at 1137.  The same principle holds true where an 
appellant fails to identify the favorable evidence or witnesses that additional 
investigation would have revealed.  Shipman v. State, 
2001 WY 11, ¶¶ 10-14, 17 P.3d 34, 37 (Wyo. 2001); Grainey v. State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶42]   A failure to investigate or to prepare 
adequately for trial does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel where 
the failure is the appellant's fault.  Mapp v. State, 
953 P.2d 140, 144 (Wyo. 1998) (pro se defendant 
asked standby counsel to take over case three days before trial).  Further, 
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be premised on the failure to 
investigate a particular defense where that defense is presented and argued to 
the jury.  Dean v. State, 931 P.2d 942, 946 (Wyo. 
1997).  On the other hand, a failure to investigate 
that results in counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress evidence, where 
the motion likely would have been successful, does constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  In Interest of LDO, 
858 P.2d 553, 557-59 (Wyo. 1993).

 

[¶43]   Failure to interview an eyewitness is 
so egregious that it has been considered ineffective assistance of counsel 
without the need to show prejudice, such being presumed.  King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 123 (Wyo. 
1991); Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 
343 (Wyo. 1987).  "Strategic justification cannot be extended 
to the failure to investigate."  King, 810 P.2d  at 
123.  Where a proper investigation has been made, 
however, the decision to call or not to call a particular witness is "virtually 
unchallengeable" as a strategic choice left to counsel's discretion.  Laing v. State, 746 P.2d 1247, 1249 (Wyo. 
1987).

 

[¶44]   Application of this law to the facts of 
this case leads us to the inescapable conclusion that McLeod's representation of 
Asch was deficient.  
There were three people who could testify as to who possessed the 
methamphetamine:  
Asch, Sutton, and Swisher.  Asch was tactically unavailable because of 
his criminal record.  
Sutton was willing to, and did, testify that the methamphetamine belonged 
to her.  The 
State's case depended entirely on Swisher's testimony about what he saw during 
the traffic stop.  
Consequently, cross-examination of Swisher was necessary not only to 
point out inconsistencies and weaknesses in his testimony, but also to bolster 
Sutton's testimony.  
Yet, McLeod made no effort to use Swisher's preliminary hearing testimony 
in cross-examination; in reality, she made no effort to cross-examine him at all 
as to what he saw.10  No reasonable attorney would have allowed 
this case to go to the jury without having investigated Swisher's testimony and 
without having raised questions about his observations.

 

[¶45]   The next question is whether Asch was 
prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance.  To prove prejudice, an appellant must show 
"a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the 
trial would have been different.'"  Dickeson v. State, 
843 P.2d 606, 611-12 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Frias, 
722 P.2d at 147).  We find in that regard that counsel's failure 
in this case is closely akin to the failure to interview an eyewitness, in which 
case prejudice is presumed.  Asch's only hope of winning this case was to 
convince the jury that, given the location of the methamphetamine in an area 
equally accessible to Sutton, the State could not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Asch was in possession.  The only proof that Asch, rather than Sutton, 
possessed the methamphetamine was what Swisher claimed to have seen through the 
rear window of Sutton's car.  McLeod's failure to investigate and test 
Swisher's testimony, therefore, went to the very heart of the State's case.  That is a 
deficiency that is "so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a 
trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 
(1984).  We conclude that Asch did not receive 
effective assistance of counsel.

 

Was Asch's right to effective assistance of counsel 
violated as a result of counsel's failure to ensure that Asch would be in street 
clothes during the trial?

 

[¶46]   This case went to trial on February 22, 
2000.  Four 
days earlier, McLeod obtained by stipulation an Order Allowing Defendant to Wear 
Street Clothes.  
Asch's complaint on appeal is that this order was obtained too late for 
him to be able to obtain street clothes and that, as a result, he appeared 
before the jury in jail clothing.  He raises the issue as a matter of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.

 

[¶47]   Having decided to reverse Asch's 
conviction on other grounds, we will only briefly address the underlying issue 
of a defendant appearing before a jury in jail clothing.  The State appears 
to concede that the matter is controlled by Estelle v. 
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-13, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1693-97, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126 
(1976), which holds that (1) forcing a defendant to wear prison 
attire during a jury trial may prejudice the defendant; but that (2) if the 
defendant is not compelled to wear prison garb, and he does not object, there is 
no constitutional violation.  We have previously stated, though in dictum, that we "do not disagree with the principles of 
Estelle . . .."  Campbell v. State, 
589 P.2d 358, 362 (Wyo. 1979).  We now reiterate that position and hold that, 
if a defendant objects, he cannot be compelled to wear jail or prison clothing 
in a jury trial, absent a showing by the State of a compelling need for such 
clothing.  It 
seems to go without saying that there is a risk that jurors may draw an adverse 
inference when a defendant appears before them in prison attire.

 

Was Asch's right to effective assistance of counsel 
violated as a result of counsel's calling a witness who refused to answer a 
question and was held in contempt of court?

 

[¶48]   Sutton was the only witness called at 
trial in Asch's defense.  She testified that both the marijuana pipe 
and the methamphetamine seized by Swisher were hers, and that she had been the 
one who stuffed the methamphetamine down between the seats.  On 
cross-examination, she refused to identify the person who had sold her the 
methamphetamine.  
Sutton was found in contempt of court and ordered to jail.  The jury was then 
given the instruction quoted earlier herein to the effect that it could consider 
Sutton's refusal in evaluating her credibility.

 

[¶49]   Asch argues primarily that McLeod was 
ineffective because she called Sutton to the stand, knowing Sutton would refuse 
to identify her source.  Secondarily, Asch contends that McLeod should 
have done a better job of dealing with the problem by questioning Sutton about 
her reasons for non-disclosure.  Asch premises his contention that McLeod knew 
both that the prosecutor would ask Sutton about her source and that Sutton would 
refuse to answer, on a meeting held in the prosecutor's office a few days before 
trial.  No one 
disputes that the prosecutor, Sutton, and Smith (her attorney) were present, or 
that Sutton said during the meeting that she would not reveal her source.  Asch argues that 
McLeod was also present.  At the motion hearing on remand, Smith 
testified, however, that he did not believe McLeod was present.  McLeod flatly 
denied being there.

 

[¶50]   We are inclined not to pursue this 
contention beyond this point.  Not only has Asch failed to provide 
convincing evidence that McLeod even knew Sutton would refuse to answer that 
particular question, but Asch has also not established that he was prejudiced by 
Sutton's refusal.  
We do not know how the jury perceived the matter, and we do not know what 
Sutton's answer would have been had she answered the question.  And of even more 
consequence is the fact that Sutton basically was Asch's whole case.  In the balance, 
Sutton's admission that the drugs were hers, and that she had hidden the 
methamphetamine as Swisher approached the car, was certainly more helpful to 
Asch's cause than her refusal to identify her source was harmful.  Deciding whether or 
not to call Sutton as a witness is precisely the kind of discretionary decision 
that will not be second-guessed by this Court.  Further, we cannot say that McLeod's direct 
or redirect examination of Sutton, whether or not McLeod knew of the intended 
refusal, was deficient.

 

Did the district court abuse its discretion in instructing 
the jury that it could consider the witness's refusal to answer a question as 
bearing on her credibility?

 

[¶51]   The jury was present in the courtroom 
when Sutton refused to answer the prosecutor's question as to who had sold her 
the methamphetamine.  
The jury was not present, however, during the contempt proceedings.  When the jury was 
brought back into the courtroom, the district court judge instructed that "you 
can consider her refusal to answer that question in connection with your 
consideration of all other evidence and matters that may bear on her credibility 
and the credibility of her testimony before the Court."

 

[¶52]   McLeod objected to the giving of this 
instruction, but did not contemporaneously state a reason for her 
objection.  
However, the argument over whether Sutton should be required to identify 
her source focused on the issue of whether such information was relevant.  The State convinced 
the district court that the information was relevant both to the question of who 
possessed the methamphetamine at the time of the traffic stop and the question 
of Sutton's credibility.

 

[¶53]   On appeal, Asch does not find fault 
with the wording of the instruction nor does he suggest that it is always 
improper to give such an instruction.  Asch simply argues that the district court 
was wrong when it found the drug source information to be relevant.  Further, Asch 
submits no authority in direct support of his contention.  Instead, in his 
appellate brief, Asch attempts to equate this situation with the prosecutor's 
calling of a witness whom the prosecutor knows will not testify:

 

Although Mr. Asch called Ms. Sutton as a witness, it was 
not until she was confronted with an irrelevant question from the prosecutor that 
Ms. Sutton refused to answer.  This situation, then, is akin to cases in 
which the prosecutor calls a witness for the purpose of drawing an adverse 
inference from [that] witness's refusal to testify.  This leaves the 
jury to infer that both the witness and the accused are guilty.  Jones v. State, 777 P.2d 54, 58 (Wyo.1989); Prime v. State, 767 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1989); and Haselhuhn v. State, 727 P.2d 280, 295 (Wyo.1986).

 

(Emphasis in original.)

 

[¶54]   We have previously rejected this 
argument.  See Porth v. State, 868 P.2d 236, 240 (Wyo. 
1994).  Sutton was called by Asch, not by the State, 
so the spectre of the State calling a witness for an improper purpose simply is 
not present.  
And the State has the right to cross-examine defense witnesses about 
matters raised during direct examination and to test their credibility.  Haworth v. State, 840 P.2d 912, 918 (Wyo. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 930 (1993).  The scope of such cross-examination is a 
matter within the discretion of the trial court, which will not be disturbed on 
appeal absent a showing of abuse of that discretion.  Porth, 868 P.2d  at 240.  In the instant case, it was not an abuse of 
discretion for the district court to find the drug source information relevant 
both to Sutton's credibility and to the specific issue of who possessed the drug 
at the time of the traffic stop.

 

Was Asch denied his right to due process of law as a result 
of his legs being shackled during the jury trial?

 

[¶55]   Asch was confined in the Natrona County 
Detention Center at the time of his jury trial.  It has long been the policy of the Natrona 
County Sheriff that any inmate being transported to court from the detention 
center be restrained through the use of some combination of hand restraints, arm 
restraints, leg restraints, and belly chains.  In his decision letter after the remand 
hearing, the district court judge confirmed testimony from the hearing that "for 
at least thirty (30) years" the following policy has been in effect in Natrona 
County as to restraint of defendants within the courtroom itself:

 

            
With respect to the first of the topics mentioned above, the general 
policies of the Natrona County Sheriff's Office and this district court were 
delineated in testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing.  That testimony set 
forth the established procedures which provide for a criminal defendant's hands 
to be free from restraints during all trial proceedings, for his legs to be 
restrained during the trial proceedings, for the criminal defendant to enter the 
courtroom and be seated behind counsel table before members of the jury enter 
the courtroom (thereby precluding prospective jurors or jury members from seeing 
the leg restraints), and for the leg restraints to be removed in the event that 
a criminal defendant needs to cross the courtroom to take the witness 
stand.  The 
policy and procedures are designed to assure that a criminal defendant is not 
observed to be shackled before the jury.  The purposes behind the established 
procedures are to assure safety in the bar of the court, to maintain the custody 
of the criminal defendant, and to remove possibilities of his or her escape from 
custody.

 

The administrator of the detention center testified that 
defendants would be unshackled in the courtroom only if they had obtained a 
court order to that effect or if the judge orally authorized removal of the leg 
shackles.

 

[¶56]   There is no dispute that, consistent 
with the above policy, Asch's hands were free while he was in the courtroom, but 
his legs were shackled.  There is also no dispute that, despite the 
precautions described by the detention center administrator and the district 
court judge, one juror observed Asch in shackles throughout the one-day 
trial.  No 
evidence was presented suggesting that any other juror saw the leg shackles or 
that the shackling played any role in the juror's deliberations.

 

[¶57]   The shackling of a criminal defendant 
in the presence of a jury is universally condemned, although reversal of a 
conviction in such circumstance is not automatic.  See Sheldon R. 
Shapiro, Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of 
Gagging, Shackling, or Otherwise Physically Restraining Accused During Course of 
State Criminal Trial, 90 A.L.R.3d 17 (1979).  In State v. Finch, 
137 Wash. 2d 792, 975 P.2d 967, 997-99, cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 922 (1999), the Supreme Court of Washington analyzed cases from 
across the United States and presented the following rationale for the general 
rule, from which we quote approvingly at length:

 

            
It is well settled that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to 
appear at trial free from all bonds or shackles except in extraordinary 
circumstances.  
. . .

 

            
This is to ensure that the defendant receives a fair and impartial trial 
as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 3 and article I, section 22 (amendment 10) 
of the Washington State Constitution.  . . .

 

            
This court has emphasized:

 

            
Section 22, art.1, of our constitution, declares that, "In criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person."[11]  The right here declared is to appear with the 
use of not on[ly] his mental but his physical faculties unfettered, and unless 
some impelling 
necessity demands the restraint of a 
prisoner to secure the safety of others and his own custody, the binding of the 
prisoner in irons is a plain violation of the constitutional guaranty.

 

. . .

 

            
Courts have recognized that restraining a defendant during trial 
infringes upon this right to a fair trial for several reasons.  The one most 
frequently cited is that it violates a defendant's presumption of 
innocence.  . . 
.

 

            
The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the 
Constitution, "is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal 
justice." Estelle [v. Williams], 425 U.S. [501], 
503, 96 S. Ct. 1691 [48 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1976)].

 

            
. . .

 

            
Courts have recognized that the accused is thus entitled to the physical 
indicia of innocence which includes the right of the defendant to be brought 
before the court with the appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and 
innocent man.  
. . .  
Courts of other jurisdictions, including our own, have long recognized 
the substantial danger of destruction in the minds of the jury of the 
presumption of innocence where the accused is required to wear prison garb, is 
handcuffed or is otherwise shackled.  . . .

 

            
Shackling or handcuffing a defendant has also been discouraged because it 
tends to prejudice the jury against the accused.  . . .  Measures which single out a defendant as a 
particularly dangerous or guilty person threaten his or her constitutional right 
to a fair trial.  
. . .  
The Supreme Court has stated that use of shackles and prison clothes are 
"inherently prejudicial" 
because they are "unmistakable indications of the need to separate a defendant 
from the community at large."  Holbrook [v. 
Flynn], 475 U.S. [560], 568-69, 106 S. Ct. 1340, [89 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1986)] 
(emphasis added).

 

            
When the court allows a defendant to be brought before the jury in 
restraints the "jury must necessarily conceive a prejudice against the accused, 
as being in the opinion of the judge a dangerous man, and one not to be trusted, 
even under the surveillance of officers."  [State v.] Williams, 
18 Wash. [47], 51, 50 P. 580 [(1897)] . . ..

 

            
. . .

 

            
Shackling or handcuffing a defendant has also been discouraged because it 
restricts the defendant's ability to assist his counsel during trial, it 
interferes with the right to testify in one's own behalf, and it offends the 
dignity of the judicial process.  . . .

 

            
. . .

 

            
When determining whether restraints should be used during a courtroom 
proceeding this court has stated:

 

            
"A trial judge must exercise discretion in determining the extent to 
which courtroom security measures are necessary to maintain order and prevent 
injury.  That 
discretion must be founded upon a factual basis set forth in the record.  A broad general 
policy of imposing physical restraints upon prison inmates charged with new 
offenses because they may be potentially dangerous' is a failure to exercise 
discretion."

 

[State v.] Hartzog, 96 Wash.2d [383] 400, 635 P.2d 694 [(1981)].

 

 

(Emphasis in original.)

 

[¶58]   While the shackling of criminal 
defendants at any time in the courtroom has been condemned on several grounds, 
shackling in the presence of the jury has clearly been seen as the most 
problematic.  
People v. Hill, 17 Cal. 4th 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656, 952 P.2d 673, 695 (1998).  The concern that jurors will be influenced by 
observing the defendant in physical restraints is obviated, of course, if the 
jurors do not actually see the defendant in restraints.  Consequently, it 
has been held that the mere fact that the defendant was somehow physically 
restrained during a jury trial does not demand reversal.  United States v. Ware, 897 F.2d 1538, 1541-42 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 930 (1990), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Jones, 
235 F.3d 1231, 1236-37 (10th Cir. 2000); State v. Apelt, 176 Ariz 349, 
861 P.2d 634, 645-46 (1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 834 (1994); State v. Woolcock, 201 Conn. 
605, 518 A.2d 1377, 1382 (1986); State v. Montana, 489 So. 2d 348, 349 (La.App. 1986); State v. Weidul, 649 A.2d 318, 319 (Me. 1994); State v. Scott, 323 N.W.2d 790, 792 (Minn. 1982).  Likewise, some courts have held that an 
inadvertent view by a juror of a defendant's shackles in the courtroom does not 
necessarily create prejudice or necessitate reversal.  Harrell v. Israel, 672 F.2d 632, 635-37 (7th Cir. 
1982); Gillie v. State, 305 Ark. 296, 808 S.W.2d 320, 324-25 (1991).

 

[¶59]   For several reasons, however, we are 
not convinced that a defendant's right to a fair trial is adequately protected 
by a rule that requires him to prove actual prejudice from in-court 
shackling.  Our 
major concern, as it is the major concern of most courts, is, of course, the 
effect of shackling upon the jury.  The problem with requiring a defendant to 
prove prejudice is that the jurors, themselves, may not even be aware that they 
have been prejudiced.

 

            
The Court of Appeals was correct to find that Justice Giannini's 
assessment of jurors' states of mind cannot be dispositive here.  If "a procedure 
employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will result 
that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process," Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-543 (1965), little 
stock need be placed in jurors' claims to the contrary.  See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351-352 (1966); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961).  Even though a 
practice may be inherently prejudicial, jurors will not necessarily be fully 
conscious of the effect it will have on their attitude toward the accused.  This will be 
especially true when jurors are questioned at the very beginning of proceedings; 
at that point, they can only speculate on how they will feel after being exposed 
to a practice daily over the course of a long trial.  Whenever a 
courtroom arrangement is challenged as inherently prejudicial, therefore, the 
question must be not whether jurors actually articulated a consciousness of some 
prejudicial effect, but rather whether "an unacceptable risk is presented of 
impermissible factors coming into play," [Estelle 
v.] Williams, 425 U.S., at 505.

 

Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570, 106 S. Ct. 1340, 89 L. Ed. 2d 525 
(1986).  
Because of this unacceptable risk, the issue of the necessity for 
shackling or other restraints must be addressed by the trial court before such 
prejudice may arise.

 

[¶60]   Shackling's effect on the jury is not 
the only concern.

 

Not only is it possible that the sight of shackles and gags 
might have a significant effect on the jury's feelings about the defendant, but 
the use of this technique is itself something of an affront to the very dignity 
and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is trying to uphold.

 

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353 
(1970).  
Further, shackling offends the presumption of innocence and it may 
interfere with the defendant's ability to participate in his own defense.  Zygadlo v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 941 (1984).

 

[¶61]   Previously in this opinion, we 
discussed Estelle in the context of a defendant 
being forced to wear prison clothing at trial.  We noted there that, if the defendant 
objects, and there is no showing by the State of a compelling reason, he cannot 
be forced to wear prison clothing during his jury trial.  But failure to 
object in that situation negates the presence of compulsion.  Estelle, 425 U.S.  at 
512-13.  Many 
courts find the shackling of a defendant to be similar, and find that failure to 
object acts as a waiver of the right not to be shackled or otherwise 
restrained.  See State v. Mills, 196 Ariz. 269, 995 P.2d 705, 708 
(1999); People v. McCue, 175 Ill.App.3d 762, 125 
Ill.Dec. 243, 530 N.E.2d 271, 273 (1988); and People v. 
Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d 229, 32 Ill.Dec. 893, 396 N.E.2d 6, 12 (1979).  On the other hand, 
if a pretrial objection to shackling is lodged, it is an abuse of discretion for 
the trial court not to hold a hearing.  Rhoden v. Rowland, 
10 F.3d 1457, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993).

 

[¶62]   Once again, we are not convinced that 
it should be a criminal defendant's responsibility to ensure that he is provided 
a trial free from inherently prejudicial practices.  That duty should 
belong to the State and to the court.  Consequently, we hold that in future cases, 
defendants shall not be shackled or otherwise physically restrained in the 
courtroom during a jury trial, nor shall other exceptional security measures be 
utilized, unless the State has first moved that such measures be utilized, the 
court has heard such motion, and after allowing the defendant an opportunity to 
contest the motion, the court has stated on the record the compelling reasons 
justifying the measures.  See United States v. 
Theriault, 531 F.2d 281, 285 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 898 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1977).  
At such hearing, the State has the burden of establishing the necessity 
for particular restraints and that such restraints are the least drastic 
effective measures available.  State v. Thompson, 
832 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1991).  The trial court must consider alternatives, 
and may not rely blindly on the judgment of correctional officers.  Finch, 975 P.2d  at 1003.  In exercising its discretion, the court 
should consider at least the following factors:

 

"[T]he seriousness of the present charge against the 
defendant; defendant's temperament and character; his age and physical 
attributes, his past record; past escapes or attempted escapes, and evidence of 
a present plan to escape; threats to harm others or cause a disturbance; 
self-destructive tendencies; the risk of mob violence or of attempted revenge by 
others; the possibility of rescue by other offenders still at large; the size 
and the mood of the audience; the nature and physical security of the courtroom; 
and the adequacy and availability of alternative remedies."

 

Finch, 975 P.2d  at 1002 (quoting State v. 
Hartzog, 96 Wash. 2d 383, 400, 635 P.2d 694 (1981)).

 

[¶63]   The rule just announced does not apply 
to the situation where one or more jurors inadvertently sees a defendant in 
physical restraints outside the courtroom.  This Court has twice before considered that 
issue.  In Smith v. State, 773 P.2d 139 (Wyo. 1989), three jurors 
inadvertently observed the defendant, in handcuffs, being transferred from the 
jail to the courtroom.  The defendant moved for a mistrial, which 
motion was denied.  
We affirmed because "[t]here was nothing in the record which identifies 
the three jurors, nor is there any evidence presented to show that appellant was 
prejudiced thereby."  
Id. at 141.  After characterizing the incident as "brief 
and incidental," we concluded that such an incident is not necessarily 
prejudicial, and to justify a new trial, actual prejudice must be shown.  Id.  Similarly, in Eustice v. State, 11 P.3d 897 (Wyo. 2000), the jury 
briefly observed the defendant in handcuffs and shackles in the hallway as he 
was being returned to the courtroom following a break in the trial.  Citing Smith, we affirmed the defendant's conviction on the 
ground that a jury's brief or incidental viewing of the defendant in restraints 
is not necessarily prejudicial, and there had been no showing of actual 
prejudice.  Id. at 901.  We further concluded that defense counsel was 
not ineffective for having failed to move for a mistrial.  Such a motion would 
have been futile because there was no inherent prejudice.  Id. at 905.

 

[¶64]   We continue to adhere to the holdings 
of Smith and Eustice 
because such occurrences outside the courtroom, unlike physical restraints 
within the courtroom, do not carry the same risk of inherent prejudice, do not 
constitute the same affront to the dignity of the judicial process, and do not 
infringe upon the defendant's right to the presumption of innocence and his 
right to participate fully in his own defense.  In addition, the sheriff's duty to maintain 
custody over a prisoner during transportation to and from the courthouse creates 
a presumed necessity for physical restraints, and that necessity must be 
outweighed by specific evidence of actual prejudice.  Consequently, if 
such an incident occurs, the defendant must bring the matter to the trial 
court's attention through a motion for a mistrial, a request for a cautionary 
instruction, or some other curative action, or the issue is waived.  If an appropriate 
motion is made, the court shall hold a hearing, not to determine the necessity 
for the restraints, but to determine whether the defendant was prejudiced.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶65]   Asch was denied his right to effective 
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to conduct an adequate 
investigation of matters surrounding his primary defense and failed adequately 
to pursue that defense at trial.  Asch has not substantiated his other 
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in instructing the jury that it could consider witness Sutton's 
refusal to answer a question in evaluating her credibility.  The district court 
did, however, abuse its discretion in allowing Asch to be shackled in the 
courtroom throughout his trial without first requiring the State to justify such 
restraints on the record.

 

[¶66]   We reverse and remand to the district 
court for a new trial.

 

FOOTNOTES

  
1In fairness to McLeod, her non-appearance at the 
preliminary hearing probably should not be characterized as a "failure."  Although Asch's 
initial appearance in the circuit court was on Friday, September 3rd, the Order 
Appointing Counsel was not signed until Wednesday, September 8th, and filed 
Thursday, September 9th.  The Notice and Order of Preliminary Hearing 
was not signed and filed until Friday, September 10th.  Inasmuch as the 
preliminary hearing took place at 9:00 a.m., on Monday, September 13th, it is 
entirely plausible that, as McLeod testified at the remand hearing, she was not 
notified of the preliminary hearing before it took place.  Neither Bierman nor 
McLeod could recall specifically why Bierman appeared and McLeod did not.  McLeod speculated 
that Bierman may have been at the courthouse for other matters and simply filled 
in for her.

  
2Rule 1.7 of the Wyoming Rules of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys at Law prescribes the lawyer's duties, independent of 
anything the court might do, when clients' interests may be adverse to one 
another.

  
3Rule 1.10(a) of the Wyoming Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law provides that "[w]hile lawyers are 
associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any 
one (1) of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 1.7, 
1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2."  
And since the State Public Defender's Office is an organization that 
employs lawyers, it is a "firm" under the rules.  See, John Burman, 
Conflicts of Interest in Wyoming, XXXV Land & 
Water L. Rev. 79, 123 (2000).

  
4"This Court is disinterested in establishing a 
rule which minimizes caution in co-representation cases or, even with 
recognition of the limited resources of the public defender, which would not 
emphasize the importance of different counsel where any conflict in 
representation could be envisioned.'"  Shongutsie, 827 
P.2d at 367 (quoting Reynoldson v. 
State, 737 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Wyo. 1987)).

  
5Smith represented Sutton throughout her 
proceedings, but Bierman only represented Asch at his preliminary hearing.  McLeod, a contract 
attorney, did not physically operate out of the public defender's office.  Asch has not raised 
a conflict of interest issue as to McLeod.

  
6The case-by-case approach of W.R.Cr.P. 44(c) 
also "represents an ethical resolution" of conflict of interest issues arising 
under the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law.  Burman, supra, XXXV Land & Water L. Rev at 125.

  
7Both Bierman and Kenneth Koski, the State Public 
Defender, testified at the motion hearing as to the office's existing policies 
concerning conflicts of interest, which policies emphasized W.R.Cr.P. 44(c) and 
the rules of professional conduct.

  
8It would seem that, in this situation, the only 
client who could have been prejudiced would have been Sutton, because Bierman 
was not aware he should be protecting her interests.

  
9Raising the conflict of interest issue under the 
banner of ineffective assistance of counsel creates an interesting 
dichotomy.  
Under the standard test for ineffective assistance of counsel, not only 
is competency presumed, but prejudice must be proven.  When the issue is a 
conflict of interest, however, at least in the "pure" case of multiple 
representation by a single attorney, the conflict is presumed and no proof of 
prejudice is required.  The difference results, we believe, from the 
inherent danger of prejudice where there is a conflict of interest.

  
10The cross-examination of Swisher takes up 
approximately three pages of the trial transcript.

  
11Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 provides:  "In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to defend in person and by counsel 
. . .."