Title: Kenosha Professional Firefighters v. City of Kenosha

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2009 WI 52 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1198 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Kenosha Professional Firefighters, Local 414, 
IAFF, AFL-CIO and Alan M. Horgen, 
          Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
City of Kenosha and Steve Stanczak, in his 
capacity as Personnel Director of the City of 
Kenosha and Custodian of its Personnel Records, 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 17, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 3, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Wilbur W. Warren III   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER and GABLEMAN, JJ., join the concurrence.  
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
petitioners-appellants-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by Jeffrey P. Sweetland and Hawks Quindel Ehlke & Perry, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jeffrey P. Sweetland. 
 
For the respondents-respondents there was a brief by 
Matthew A. Knight, assistant city attorney and the City of 
Kenosha, Kenosha, and oral argument by Matthew A. Knight. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 52
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  2007AP1198   
(L.C. No. 
2006CV19) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Kenosha Professional Firefighters, Local 414, 
IAFF, AFL-CIO and Alan M. Horgen,   
 
 
Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners,   
 
 
v. 
 
City of Kenosha and Steve Stanczak, in his 
capacity as Personnel Director of the City of 
Kenosha and custodian of its personnel records,  
 
 
Respondents-Respondents.   
FILED 
 
JUN 17, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.    
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   We review an unpublished 
decision of the court of appeals dismissing for lack of 
jurisdiction an appeal from two decisions of the Circuit Court 
for Kenosha County, Wilbur W. Warren, III, Judge.1  Kenosha 
Professional Firefighters, Local 414, IAFF, AFL-CIO, and Alan M. 
Horgen (collectively "the firefighters") appealed to the court 
                                                 
1 Kenosha Prof'l Firefighters v. City of Kenosha, No. 
2007AP1198, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 28, 2008). 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
2 
 
of appeals from a January 19, 2007, decision of the circuit 
court denying the firefighters' application for attorney fees, 
statutory damages, and costs, as well as from an April 26, 2007, 
decision of the circuit court denying the firefighters' motion 
to reconsider the January 19, 2007, decision.  The firefighters 
brought their appeal to the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 808.03(1) (2005-06),2 governing appeals as of right from 
final judgments or orders of the circuit court.3 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.03(1) provides in full as follows: 
Appeals as of right. A final judgment or a final order 
of a circuit court may be appealed as a matter of 
right to the court of appeals unless otherwise 
expressly provided by law.  A final judgment or final 
order is a judgment, order or disposition that 
disposes of the entire matter in litigation as to one 
or more of the parties, whether rendered in an action 
or special proceeding, and that is one of the 
following: 
(a) Entered in accordance with s. 806.06(1)(b) or 
807.11(2). 
(b) Recorded in docket entries in ch. 799 cases. 
(c) Recorded in docket entries in traffic regulation 
cases 
prosecuted 
in 
circuit 
court 
if 
a 
person 
convicted of a violation may be ordered to pay a 
forfeiture. 
(d) Recorded in docket entries in municipal ordinance 
violation cases prosecuted in circuit court.  
A separate provision, Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2), governs 
permissive appeals from interlocutory judgments or orders of the 
circuit court.  Section 808.03(2) is not at issue in the present 
case. 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
3 
 
¶2 
The court of appeals determined (1) that the circuit 
court's January 19, 2007, decision represented its final order 
denying 
the 
firefighters' 
application 
for 
attorney 
fees, 
statutory damages, and costs; (2) that the firefighters failed 
to appeal timely from that final order; and (3) that the court 
of 
appeals 
therefore 
lacked 
jurisdiction 
to 
review 
the 
January 19, 2007, decision and the issues decided therein.4  The 
court of appeals also concluded that under Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 
55 Wis. 2d 21, 197 N.W.2d 752 (1972), the firefighters have no 
right of appeal from the circuit court's April 26, 2007, 
decision denying the firefighters' motion for reconsideration.5  
¶3 
The City of Kenosha agrees with the court of appeals 
and argues that the firefighters' appeal to the court of appeals 
was tardy.  The City urges that the circuit court's January 19, 
2007, decision was a final order and that the appeal from that 
decision was too late.  It also argues that pursuant to the Ver 
Hagen case, the circuit court's April 26, 2007, decision did not 
extend the time for appeal.  
                                                 
4 See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.10(1)(e) ("The notice of 
appeal must be filed within the time specified by law.  The 
filing of a timely notice of appeal is necessary to give the 
court jurisdiction over the appeal."). 
5 In Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 55 Wis. 2d 21, 26, 197 N.W.2d 752 
(1972), this court held that "although a party may move the 
trial court to reconsider its orders or judgments . . . [the 
party] must present issues other than those determined by the 
order or judgment for which review is requested in order to 
appeal 
from 
the 
order 
entered 
on 
the 
motion 
for 
reconsideration." 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
4 
 
¶4 
The firefighters agree with the City that the court of 
appeals should have dismissed the appeal.  The firefighters 
argue, however, that the dismissal should be without prejudice.  
Consistent with their position in the court of appeals, the 
firefighters contend that the two circuit court decisions from 
which they appealed to the court of appeals are not final 
judgments or final orders for purposes of appeal.  They reason 
that the circuit court's two decisions relating to attorney 
fees, statutory damages, and costs cannot be final because the 
circuit court has not yet entered a final, appealable judgment 
or final order disposing of the firefighters' underlying 
litigation against the City relating to the release of public 
records.  Under the firefighters' reasoning, their appeal should 
be dismissed without prejudice so that the firefighters may 
appeal again upon entry of final judgments or orders disposing 
of the underlying litigation and the firefighters' request for 
fees, damages, and costs.  According to the firefighters, 
although their appeal was properly dismissed, the court of 
appeals erred in dismissing their appeal with prejudice.   
¶5 
We therefore state the issue on review as follows: 
Should the firefighters' appeal be dismissed as tardy or as 
premature?  In other words, should the firefighters' appeal be 
dismissed with prejudice or without prejudice?   
¶6 
In response to the issue on review, we conclude for 
two related reasons that the January 19, 2007, and April 26, 
2007, circuit court decisions from which the firefighters 
appealed are not final judgments or final orders for purposes of 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
5 
 
appeal under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  First, the decisions do 
not dispose of the entire matter of attorney fees, statutory 
damages, and costs in litigation between the parties.  Second, 
because the circuit court has not entered a final, appealable 
judgment or order disposing of the firefighters' underlying 
litigation against the City relating to the release of public 
records, the circuit court's decisions relating to attorney 
fees, statutory damages and costs should not be accorded the 
status of final judgments or final orders for purposes of 
appeal.   
¶7 
Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeals 
erred in dismissing the firefighters' appeal with prejudice.  
The appeal should have been dismissed without prejudice.  The 
firefighters may appeal under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) when the 
circuit court enters final judgments or orders disposing of the 
firefighters' underlying litigation against the City and the 
firefighters' request for fees, damages and costs.  We remand 
the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
I 
¶8 
We briefly state the facts relevant to the issue on 
review.    
¶9 
The firefighters petitioned the circuit court for a 
peremptory writ of mandamus compelling the City of Kenosha and 
Steve Stanczak, in his capacity as Personnel Director of the 
City 
of 
Kenosha 
and 
custodian 
of 
its 
personnel 
records 
(collectively "the City"), to disclose certain public records 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
6 
 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1)(a).6  On April 27, 2006, a 
peremptory writ of mandamus was entered stating that "it is  
ordered, adjudged and decreed" that the firefighters' petition 
for mandamus be granted subject to limitations stated in the 
peremptory writ.   
¶10 The writ compelled the City to disclose most of the 
records sought by the firefighters.  It did not, however, grant 
or deny the firefighters' petition insofar as the firefighters 
sought disclosure of a set of "matrix scores" that, according to 
the City, had been destroyed by a third-party contractor in the 
ordinary course of business.  In the peremptory writ the circuit 
court requested the City and the custodian of the records to 
file affidavits based on personal knowledge that the matrix 
scores were destroyed before the firefighters requested them and 
that the custodian has no information as to how the destroyed 
material can be retrieved.  The peremptory writ also states that 
the City concedes that the matrix scores constitute public 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.37(1) provides in relevant part as 
follows: 
Mandamus. If an authority withholds a record or a part 
of a record or delays granting access to a record or 
part 
of 
a 
record 
after 
a 
written 
request 
for 
disclosure is made, the requester may pursue either, 
or both, of the alternatives under pars. (a) and (b). 
 
(a) The requester may bring an action for mandamus 
asking a court to order release of the record.  The 
court may permit the parties or their attorneys to 
have access to the requested record under restrictions 
or 
protective 
orders 
as 
the 
court 
deems 
appropriate. . . .  
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
7 
 
records and that the circuit court retains jurisdiction for the 
purpose of determining whether further discovery may be had with 
respect to the existence of the matrix scores.   
¶11 After 
the 
writ 
was 
entered, 
the 
City 
provided 
affidavits on October 26, 2006, and November 9, 2006, relating 
to the destruction of the matrix scores.  No further order or 
judgment was entered by the circuit court relating to the matrix 
scores or any other public records matter that was the substance 
of the peremptory writ.   
¶12 On August 4, 2006, the firefighters applied for an 
award of attorney fees, statutory damages, and costs pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a).7  The City opposed the application, 
arguing among other things that the firefighters' application 
was untimely under Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4).8  The City contended 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.37(2)(a) provides in relevant part 
that "the court shall award reasonable attorney fees, damages of 
not less than $100, and other actual costs to the requester if 
the requester prevails in whole or in substantial part in any 
action filed under [s. 19.37(1)] relating to access to a record 
or part of a record under s. 19.35 (1) (a)." 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.06(4) provides in full as follows: 
A judgment may be rendered and entered at the instance 
of any party either before or after perfection.  If 
the party in whose favor the judgment is rendered 
causes it to be entered, the party shall perfect the 
judgment within 30 days of entry or forfeit the right 
to recover costs.  If the party against whom the 
judgment is rendered causes it to be entered, the 
party in whose favor the judgment is rendered shall 
perfect it within 30 days of service of notice of 
entry of judgment or forfeit the right to recover 
costs.  If proceedings are stayed under s. 806.08, 
judgment may be perfected at any time within 30 days 
after the expiration of the stay.  If the parties 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
8 
 
that Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4) required the firefighters to file 
their application no more than 30 days after the entry of the 
April 27, 2006, writ of mandamus.   
¶13 On January 19, 2007, the circuit court issued a 
decision denying the firefighters' application for attorney 
fees, statutory damages, and costs, agreeing with the City that 
the application was untimely under Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4).  The 
circuit court's written decision relating to the costs and fees 
stated in relevant part: "Petitioner's application for costs and 
fees is denied."   
¶14 The firefighters moved for reconsideration of the 
circuit court's January 19, 2007, decision.  The circuit court 
denied the firefighters' motion for reconsideration in a written 
decision entered April 26, 2007.  The circuit court's April 26, 
2007, 
decision 
stated 
in 
relevant 
part 
that 
"[a]fter 
reconsideration, the Petitioner's application for costs and fees 
remains denied."   
¶15 The firefighters appealed from the circuit court's 
January 19, 2007, decision denying their application for 
attorney fees, statutory damages, and costs, as well as from the 
circuit 
court's 
April 
26, 
2007, 
decision 
denying 
the 
                                                                                                                                                             
agree to settle all issues but fail to file a notice 
of dismissal, the judge may direct the clerk to draft 
an order dismissing the action.  No execution shall 
issue until the judgment is perfected or until the 
expiration of the time for perfection, unless the 
party seeking execution shall file a written waiver of 
entitlement to costs. 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
9 
 
firefighters' motion to reconsider the January 19, 2007, 
decision.  The firefighters did not and could not appeal from 
the peremptory writ of mandamus entered on April 27, 2006, which 
was in their favor.9  A final judgment or final order pertaining 
to fees or costs may be appealed separately from any appeal of 
the merits of the underlying dispute.10  
¶16 In their docketing statement to the court of appeals, 
the firefighters represented that the appeal was taken from two 
final judgments or final orders.  The court of appeals ordered 
the parties to submit memoranda addressing the jurisdictional 
                                                 
9 A party cannot appeal from a judgment or order that is in 
its favor.  See Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Koenigs, 110 
Wis. 2d 522, 
526, 
329 
N.W.2d 157 
(1983) 
("Prior 
to 
the 
reorganization of the court system in 1977 and the consequent 
revision in the rules and statutes of appellate procedure, sec. 
817.10, Stats., provided any judgment or order was reviewable by 
a 'party aggrieved.'  This provision was omitted from the 1977 
revision, 
because 
it 
was 
considered 
merely 
to 
state 
a 
fundamental and well understood concept upon which standing to 
appeal was predicated: 'The elimination of the phrase in the 
revisions of the statutes and rules was not intended to change 
the concept that a person had to be aggrieved by a judgment or 
order before he could appeal.'  Martineau and Malmgren, 
Wisconsin Appellate Practice, sec. 601 (1978)."). 
10 See, e.g., Laube v. City of Owen, 209 Wis. 2d 12, 561 
N.W.2d 785 (Ct. App. 1997) (dismissing as untimely the City of 
Owen's appeal from an order disposing of the merits of the 
condemnation litigation, which was a final order, but permitting 
the City to proceed with its appeal from a subsequent order 
requiring 
the 
City 
to 
reimburse 
the 
Laubes' 
litigation 
expenses).  See also Leske v. Leske, 185 Wis. 2d 628, 633, 517 
N.W.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1994) ("[T]he pendency of a claim for 
attorney's fees under a specific fee-shifting statute does not 
render a judgment or order nonfinal, provided that the judgment 
or order disposes of all the substantive causes of action 
between the parties."). 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
10 
 
issue of whether either of the two circuit court decisions from 
which the firefighters appealed is "final" within the meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  It also ordered the parties to address 
whether the April 27, 2006, peremptory writ of mandamus is 
final.  
¶17 Notwithstanding their representation in the docketing 
statement, the firefighters argued in their memorandum to the 
court of appeals that "[n]o final judgment or order has been 
filed in this case[.]"  The firefighters contended that neither 
the circuit court's January 19, 2007, decision nor its April 26, 
2007, 
decision 
is 
final 
for 
purposes 
of 
appeal. 
 
The 
firefighters therefore urged the court of appeals to dismiss the 
appeal. 
¶18 The court of appeals concluded that the circuit 
court's January 19, 2007, decision denying the firefighters' 
application for attorney fees, statutory damages, and costs is a 
final order and that the firefighters' appeal from that decision 
filed more than 90 days after entry of the decision was 
untimely.  The court of appeals also concluded that the circuit 
court's April 26, 2007, decision denying the firefighters' 
motion for reconsideration did not decide any new issues and 
that under Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 55 Wis. 2d 21, 26, 197 
N.W.2d 752 (1972), the firefighters therefore have no right of 
appeal from the April 26, 2007, decision.  The court of appeals 
therefore concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over any part of 
the firefighters' appeal.  The court of appeals did not 
determine whether the April 27, 2006, peremptory writ of 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
11 
 
mandamus entered by the circuit court was a final judgment or 
final order. 
II 
 
¶19 We now address the issue on review, namely whether the 
firefighters' appeal should be dismissed with or without 
prejudice.   
¶20 In order to resolve this issue we must determine 
whether either of the two circuit court decisions from which the 
firefighters appealed is a final judgment or order for purposes 
of Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  The question whether a document is a 
final judgment or order presents an issue of law that this court 
reviews independently of the court of appeals and circuit court 
but benefiting from their analyses.11 
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.03(1) defines a "final" judgment 
or final order from which appeal may be taken as a matter of 
right.  It provides in relevant part that "[a] final judgment or 
final order is a judgment, order or disposition that disposes of 
the entire matter in litigation as to one or more of the 
parties . . . ."   
¶22 The statute's requirement that a final judgment or 
final order "dispose" of the entire matter in litigation has 
                                                 
11 See Sanders v. Estate of Sanders, 2008 WI 63, ¶21, 310 
Wis. 2d 175, 750 N.W.2d 806. 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
12 
 
frequently distressed the Wisconsin courts.12  In two recent 
cases, Tyler v. Riverbank, 2007 WI 33, 299 Wis. 2d 751, 728 
N.W.2d 686, and Wambolt v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 2007 
WI 35, 299 Wis. 2d 723, 728 N.W.2d 670, the court attempted to 
clarify the statutory text. 
¶23 Tyler and Wambolt teach that in order to "dispose" of 
the entire matter of litigation as to one or more parties and to 
constitute a final judgment or final order under Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.03(1), a circuit court's decision must contain "an 
explicit statement either dismissing the entire matter in 
litigation as to one or more parties or adjudging the entire 
matter in litigation as to one or more parties.  Focusing on the 
existence of an explicit statement will clarify when a document 
disposes of the entire matter in litigation and is final for 
purposes of appeal."13  Furthermore, a circuit court cannot 
                                                 
12 See Tyler v. Riverbank, 2007 WI 33, ¶¶16-17, 299 
Wis. 2d 751, 728 N.W.2d 686 ("[C]onfusion remains as parties and 
courts attempt to identify the § 808.03(1) document. . . .  A 
common area of confusion . . . is the meaning of the term 
'dispose.'"); Wambolt v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI 35, 
¶15, 299 Wis. 2d 723, 728 N.W.2d 670 (Although "[a]ppeals 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) are a fundamental aspect of 
litigation in this state . . . the question of what constitutes 
a final order or final judgment from which a party may appeal 
continues to arise."). 
13 Tyler, 299 Wis. 2d 751, ¶3. 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
13 
 
dispose of the entire matter in litigation merely by deciding 
all the substantive issues presented by the matter: "'Deciding' 
a case in the sense of merely analyzing legal issues and 
resolving questions of law does not dispose of an entire matter 
in litigation as to one or more parties."14  Explicit language 
dismissing or adjudging the matter in litigation is required in 
the circuit court's decision to render that decision a final 
judgment or final order for purposes of appeal.15 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also id., ¶17 ("A court disposes of the entire matter 
in litigation in one of two ways: (1) by explicitly dismissing 
the entire matter in litigation as to one or more parties or (2) 
by explicitly adjudging the entire matter in litigation as to 
one or more parties."); Wambolt, 299 Wis. 2d 723, ¶39 ("[I]n 
order to 'dispose' of the matter under § 808.03(1), a memorandum 
decision must contain an explicit statement either dismissing 
the entire matter in litigation or adjudging the entire matter 
in litigation as to one or more parties[.]"). 
14 Wambolt, 299 Wis. 2d 723, ¶34.  See also Tyler, 299 
Wis. 2d 751, ¶17 ("To define 'dispose' in the negative, a court 
merely addressing, or deciding, substantive issues is not enough 
to qualify as disposing of them."). 
15 Wambolt, 299 Wis. 2d 723, ¶34.   
Tyler and Wambolt also prospectively established a new 
requirement.  "In order to further limit the confusion regarding 
what documents are final orders or judgments for the purpose of 
appeal," we stated in Tyler and Wambolt that "we will, 
commencing September 1, 2007, require a statement on the face of 
a document that it is final for the purpose of appeal.  Absent 
such a statement, appellate courts should liberally construe 
ambiguities to preserve the right of appeal."  Wambolt, 299 
Wis. 2d 723, ¶50.  See also Tyler, 299 Wis. 2d 751, ¶25. 
The 
prospective requirement established in Tyler and 
Wambolt does not, however, apply in the present case.  All 
relevant documents in the instant case were entered prior to 
September 1, 2007.   
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
14 
 
¶24 In Tyler, for example, we determined that the circuit 
court's order denying Tyler's post-trial motions did not dispose 
of 
the 
entire 
matter 
in 
litigation 
because 
although 
it 
"include[d] a series of motion denials and findings to support 
them, it [did] not include any language related to the disposal 
of Tyler's claims."16  The Tyler court concluded that a judgment 
stating in relevant part that "the claims of Plaintiff are 
dismissed with prejudice" constituted the final judgment from 
which an appeal could be taken.  The judgment was the first and 
only document to dispose of the entire matter in litigation 
after the jury verdict.17   
¶25 In Wambolt, we concluded that the circuit court's 
memorandum decision granting a defendant's motion for summary 
judgment against the Wambolts was not a final judgment or final 
order when the decision did not contain an explicit statement 
dismissing or adjudging the entire matter in litigation as to 
one or more parties.18  A later order in Wambolt that does 
contain an explicit statement dismissing the matter against a 
party was the appropriate final, appealable order.19  This 
document 
denied the Wambolts' motion for reconsideration, 
stating that "for the reasons stated in the Court's Memorandum 
                                                 
16 Tyler, 299 Wis. 2d 751, ¶19.   
17 Id., ¶22.   
18 Wambolt, 299 Wis. 2d 723, ¶40.  See also id., ¶7.   
19 Wambolt, 299 Wis. 2d 723, ¶40. 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
15 
 
Decision . . . [the defendant who moved for summary judgment 
against the Wambolts] is dismissed from this action."20  
¶26 A more recent case, Sanders v. Estate of Sanders, 2008 
WI 63, 310 Wis. 2d 175, 750 N.W.2d 806, further illustrates our 
conclusion in Tyler and Wambolt that a judgment or order must 
contain an explicit statement either dismissing or adjudging the 
entire matter in litigation as to one or more parties to 
"dispose" of the matter of litigation for purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.03(1).  We concluded in Sanders that the circuit court's 
order disposed of the entire matter in litigation as to at least 
one party because the order stated that "all claims brought and 
made by and between Diane Sanders and [the Estate] are hereby 
dismissed on the merits and without costs" and further that "all 
claims have been resolved or adjudicated at the trial court 
level."21  We also concluded in Sanders that an order confirming 
the sale of real estate was not a final order for purposes of 
appeal because it did not determine the entire matter in 
litigation between the parties relating to real estate.22 
¶27 Consistent with Tyler, Wambolt, and Sanders, the court 
of appeals focused its inquiry on whether either of the two 
circuit court decisions from which the appeal was taken contains 
"an explicit statement either dismissing the entire matter in 
                                                 
20 Wambolt, 299 Wis. 2d 723, ¶10. 
21 Sanders v. Estate of Sanders, 2008 WI 63, ¶41, 310 
Wis. 2d 175, 750 N.W.2d 806.   
22 Id., ¶40. 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
16 
 
litigation as to one or more parties or adjudging the entire 
matter in litigation as to one or more parties."23  The court of 
appeals concluded that the circuit court's January 19, 2007, 
decision contains such a statement because it explicitly denied 
the firefighters' application for attorney fees, statutory 
damages, and costs.  The City, in its brief to this court, 
supports the court of appeals' conclusion that "[t]he final 
order . . . was entered January 19, 2007, more than ninety (90) 
days before the notice of appeal."24   
¶28 We do not agree with the court of appeals' analysis of 
the circuit court's decisions from which the firefighters 
appealed.  It is clear that neither the January 19, 2007, 
decision denying the firefighters' application for attorney 
fees, statutory damages, and costs nor the April 26, 2007, 
decision denying the firefighters' motion for reconsideration of 
the January 19, 2007, decision contains an explicit statement 
dismissing or adjudging the entire matter regarding attorney 
fees, statutory damages, or costs in litigation between the 
firefighters and the City.  In stating that the firefighters' 
application for attorney fees, statutory damages, and costs is 
denied, the circuit court merely decided a substantive issue 
before it, much as the circuit court in Tyler did when it denied 
Tyler's 
post-trial 
motions 
in 
an 
order 
that 
this 
court 
determined not to be final.  Neither the January 19, 2007, 
                                                 
23 Tyler, 299 Wis. 2d 751, ¶3. 
24 Brief of Respondents-Respondents at 6. 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
17 
 
decision nor the April 26, 2007, decision took the additional 
step necessary to dispose of the entire matter of attorney fees, 
statutory damages, or costs in litigation.  Neither decision 
states, for example, that the firefighters' claim for attorney 
fees, statutory damages, and costs is dismissed or that the City 
is dismissed from the action.  Nor did the decisions finally 
adjudge all the attorney fees, statutory damages, or costs in 
the course of litigation in the circuit court.  Future attorney 
fees might be incurred in the proceedings relating to the 
pending matrix scores, as we discuss below.   
¶29 The parties and the court of appeals do not identify 
any other circuit court document from which the firefighters 
could have appealed the circuit court's decision denying the 
firefighters' application for attorney fees, statutory damages, 
and costs.  Our review of the circuit court record confirms that 
the January 19, 2007, and April 26, 2007, decisions are the only 
two 
documents 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
entered 
after 
the 
firefighters 
filed 
their 
application 
for 
attorney 
fees, 
statutory damages, and costs.   
¶30 Accordingly we conclude that no document explicitly 
dismisses or adjudges the entire matter in litigation as to one 
or more parties.  No document finally disposes of the matter of 
attorney fees, statutory damages, or costs.     
¶31 When a document does not explicitly state that it is 
dismissing or adjudging the entire matter as to one or more of 
the parties, the appropriate course of action for an appellate 
court "is to liberally construe documents in favor of timely 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
18 
 
appeals."25  This general tenet of appellate practice further 
supports our conclusion that the circuit court's decisions 
relating to fees, damages, and costs were not final judgments or 
final orders for purposes of appeal.   
¶32 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
therefore 
was 
correct 
in 
dismissing the appeal but erred in dismissing it as tardy.  The 
firefighters' appeal of the denial of attorney fees, statutory 
damages, and costs is premature, and the appeal must be 
dismissed without prejudice.  
¶33 The 
firefighters 
use 
a 
somewhat 
different 
but 
substantially similar argument to support their position that 
the circuit court's January 19, 2007, and April 26, 2007, 
decisions relating to fees, damages, and costs are not final for 
purposes of appeal to the court of appeals.  They contend, as we 
explained previously, that the two circuit court decisions are 
not final for purposes of appeal because the circuit court has 
not yet entered a final, appealable judgment or order disposing 
of the firefighters' underlying litigation against the City 
relating to the release of public records.  The firefighters 
contend that the April 27, 2006, peremptory writ of mandamus 
does not constitute a final judgment or order disposing of the 
entire matter in the firefighters' underlying litigation against 
the City for release of public records.  Relying on language 
from a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
                                                 
25 Sanders, 310 Wis. 2d 175, ¶33 (quoting Wambolt, 299 
Wis. 2d 723, ¶46).   
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
19 
 
Seventh Circuit, the firefighters argue that "[t]he denial of a 
request for fees as a 'prevailing party' is not appealable when 
the merits are not appealable, for questions about who has 
prevailed cannot intelligently be resolved in advance of the 
merits."26     
¶34 The court of appeals did not address the argument that 
the firefighters set forth.  In light of our analysis under Wis. 
Stat. § 808.03(1) of the nature of the two circuit court 
decisions from which the firefighters appealed, we also need not 
decide the merits of the firefighters' argument that the circuit 
court's January 19, 2007, and April 26, 2007, decisions are not 
final judgments or final orders for purposes of appeal because 
the April 27, 2006, peremptory writ of mandamus does not 
constitute a final judgment or final order for purposes of 
appeal.  We nevertheless address the firefighters' argument 
because the cause is being remanded to the circuit court and the 
firefighters' argument may be presented to the circuit court. 
¶35 A peremptory writ of mandamus is a judgment or order.27  
Thus Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) applies to determine whether the 
peremptory writ of mandamus is a final judgment or order for 
purposes of appeal, and Tyler, Wambolt, and Sanders also apply.  
These cases teach, as we explained previously, that in order to 
"dispose" of the entire matter in litigation as to one or more 
                                                 
26 Sandwiches, Inc. v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 822 F.2d 707, 
711 (7th Cir. 1987).   
27 State ex rel. Tiner v. Milwaukee County, 81 Wis. 2d 277, 
278, 260 N.W.2d 393 (1977). 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
20 
 
parties and to constitute a final judgment or final order 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1), a circuit court document 
must include "an explicit statement either dismissing the entire 
matter in litigation as to one or more parties or adjudging the 
entire matter in litigation as to one or more parties."28   
¶36 In the present case, the April 27, 2006, peremptory 
writ of mandamus may be viewed as containing explicit language 
disposing of some, but not all, matters in litigation between 
the firefighters and the City relating to the release of public 
records.  The April 27, 2006, peremptory writ explicitly 
"ordered, adjudged and decreed" that the City must disclose 
certain records to the firefighters, but neither required 
release of the matrix scores nor denied the firefighters' right 
to their release.  Although the peremptory writ may be viewed as 
having decided and disposed of some matters in litigation, it 
did not dispose of the entire matter in litigation between the 
parties.  The disposition of the matrix scores remained 
unresolved.   
                                                 
28 Tyler, 299 Wis. 2d 751, ¶3. 
See also id., ¶17 ("A court disposes of the entire matter 
in litigation in one of two ways: (1) by explicitly dismissing 
the entire matter in litigation as to one or more parties or (2) 
by explicitly adjudging the entire matter in litigation as to 
one or more parties."); Wambolt, 299 Wis. 2d 723, ¶39 ("[I]n 
order to 'dispose' of the matter under § 808.03(1), a memorandum 
decision must contain an explicit statement either dismissing 
the entire matter in litigation or adjudging the entire matter 
in litigation as to one or more parties."). 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
21 
 
¶37 The peremptory writ is similar to the order confirming 
the sale of real estate in Sanders, which the Sanders court 
concluded was not final for purposes of appeal.  We concluded in 
Sanders that the circuit court's order confirming the sale of 
real estate was not a final order because it left matters 
relating to the real estate unresolved, including the question 
whether the Estate of Sanders had complied with its obligation 
to bring the land into compliance with environmental standards.29 
¶38 The peremptory writ in the present case, like the 
order confirming the sale in Sanders, left at least one matter 
in litigation unresolved.  The writ did not dispose of the 
firefighters' petition for mandamus insofar as it related to the 
matrix scores.  The writ therefore cannot be final for purposes 
of Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).30   
¶39 The reasoning in Sanders extends to the circuit 
court's decisions relating to attorney fees, statutory damages, 
                                                 
29 Sanders, 310 Wis. 2d 175, ¶40. 
30 The City argues that the circuit court intended for the 
peremptory writ to be a final judgment, relying upon statements 
that the circuit court made orally on the record.  This inquiry 
into the circuit court's intent, however, is foreclosed by 
Wambolt, which states that "a negative answer to the question of 
whether an order or judgment disposes of the substantive issues 
obviates the need to reach the question of [the circuit court's] 
intent, for an order that fails to dispose of the substantive 
issues in a litigation with respect to one or more parties 
cannot be a final order or final judgment under the plain 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1)."  Wambolt, 299 Wis. 2d 723, 
¶30 n.9.  Wambolt makes clear that under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1), 
the circuit court's intentions cannot render final a document 
that otherwise is not final. 
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
22 
 
and costs as well.  Because neither the peremptory writ of 
mandamus nor any other document disposed of the entire matter in 
litigation relating to the firefighters' requests for public 
records, the circuit court was not in a position to dispose of 
the entire matter relating to the attorney fees, statutory 
damages, and costs that the firefighters may be entitled to as 
the prevailing party under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a).  
¶40 The firefighters' attorney fees, for example, are not 
necessarily fixed when the circuit court has yet to dispose of 
the firefighters' demand for disclosure of the matrix scores.  
The circuit court's decisions relating to attorney fees, 
statutory damages, and costs therefore might not be the last 
word regarding these matters and should not be accorded the 
status of final judgments or final orders for purposes of 
appeal.  This holding comports with a purpose underlying the 
rule that an appeal may be taken as a matter of right only from 
final judgments or final orders, namely the purpose of ensuring 
that factual and legal questions come before an appellate court 
only one time, after the circuit court has resolved all issues.31  
                                                 
31 See Heaton v. Indep. Mortuary Corp., 97 Wis. 2d 379, 395-
96, 294 N.W.2d 15 (1980) ("The purpose of sec. 808.03, Stats., 
providing appeal as of right of final orders and judgments and 
limiting appellate review of intermediate determinations until 
final judgment unless the court of appeals permits an earlier 
appeal is twofold: (1) to protect the trial proceedings by 
avoiding unnecessary interruptions and delay caused by multiple 
appeals and (2) to reduce the burden on the court of appeals by 
limiting the number of appeals to one appeal per case and 
allowing piecemeal appeals only under the special circumstances 
set forth in sec. 808.03(2), Stats.").  
No. 
2007AP1198 
   
 
23 
 
¶41 In 
sum, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
January 19, 2007, and April 26, 2007, decisions from which the 
firefighters appealed are not final judgments or final orders 
for purposes of appeal under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  They do 
not dispose of the entire matter of attorney fees, statutory 
damages, 
and 
costs 
in 
litigation 
between 
the 
parties.  
Furthermore, because the circuit court has not entered a final, 
appealable judgment or order disposing of the firefighters' 
underlying litigation against the City relating to the release 
of public records, the circuit court's decisions relating to 
attorney fees, statutory damages, and costs should not be 
accorded the status of final judgments or final orders for 
purposes of appeal.   
¶42 Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeals 
erred in dismissing the firefighters' appeal with prejudice.  
The appeal should have been dismissed without prejudice.  The 
firefighters may appeal under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) when the 
circuit court enters final judgments or orders disposing of the 
firefighters' underlying litigation against the City and the 
firefighters' request for fees, damages, and costs.  We remand 
the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
¶43 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded.   
 
No.  2007AP1198.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶44 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   I agree 
with the majority opinion's conclusion that the peremptory writ 
issued April 27, 2006, did not dispose of the entirety of the 
Kenosha Professional Firefighters, Local 414, IAFF, AFL-CIO and 
Alan M. Horgen's (hereinafter collectively referred to as the 
firefighters) petition for mandamus to compel compliance with 
their open records request because it was not a final order with 
regard to the matrix scores they had requested.1  I write in 
concurrence because the lack of finality of the peremptory writ 
is the sole reason that this court should conclude that the 
January 19, 2007, decision denying statutory attorney fees is 
not a final order.  Stated otherwise, because the firefighters 
moved for an award of attorney fees prior to the circuit court's 
rendering a final decision on the merits, their motion for 
attorney 
fees 
was 
premature, 
not 
late. 
 
Accordingly, 
I 
respectfully concur in the majority opinion.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶45 This case arises from an open records request made by 
the firefighters.  Because the firefighters were forced to go to 
court to obtain compliance with their open records request and 
because the circuit court concluded that the City of Kenosha 
(the 
City) 
improperly 
denied 
part 
of 
that 
request, 
the 
firefighters claimed a statutory right to "reasonable attorney 
fees, damages of not less than $100, and other actual costs" 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a).   
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶38. 
No.  2007AP1198.pdr 
 
2 
 
¶46 Three decisions relating to the firefighters' open 
records request are at issue here:  The April 27, 2006, 
peremptory writ, the January 19, 2007, decision denying the 
firefighters' motion for attorney fees as untimely filed and the 
April 26, 2007, decision denying the firefighters' motion for 
reconsideration 
of 
the 
January 19, 
2007, 
decision. 
 
The 
firefighters contend that the April 27, 2006, peremptory writ is 
not 
a 
final 
order 
under 
the 
provisions 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 808.03(1), and therefore, they were premature in moving for an 
award 
of 
reasonable 
attorney 
fees 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.37(2)(a). 
 
The 
firefighters 
argue 
that 
because 
the 
April 27, 2006, peremptory writ was not a final order on the 
merits of their claim, the January 19, 2007, decision denying 
fees could not have been a final order on the issue of fees in 
this case.     
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶47 In recent years, we have attempted to explain what a 
judgment or order must contain if it is to be final for purposes 
of appeal under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  See Sanders v. Estate 
of Sanders, 2008 WI 63, 310 Wis. 2d 175, 750 N.W.2d 806; Tyler 
v. RiverBank, 2007 WI 33, 299 Wis. 2d 751, 728 N.W.2d 686; 
Wambolt v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI 35, 299 Wis. 2d 723, 
728 N.W.2d 670; Harder v. Pfitzinger, 2004 WI 102, 274 Wis. 2d 
324, 682 N.W.2d 398.  Notwithstanding all of our efforts, the 
petitions for review that turn on the issue of finality keep 
coming.   
No.  2007AP1198.pdr 
 
3 
 
¶48 Today we attempt to explain finality on the merits in 
the context of a peremptory writ of mandamus that was issued 
April 27, 2006.  I join the majority opinion's conclusion that 
the peremptory writ was not a final order on the merits of the 
underlying action.2  However, there is at least one other issue 
that may be affected by the lack of finality of the peremptory 
writ.  This issue, and perhaps others, lurks, unspoken, in the 
majority opinion's discussion of whether the January 19, 2007, 
decision that denied the firefighters' request for fees was a 
final order.   
¶49 The following is the issue that is apparent to me.  Is 
it even possible for a decision denying attorney fees to have 
been an appealable decision because an appealable decision on 
the merits has not been made?  To state the issue otherwise, 
even though there can be the entry of a final order on the 
merits of an action, i.e., an appealable order, when a request 
for attorney fees is pending, Baumeister v. Automated Products, 
Inc., 2004 WI 148, ¶31, 277 Wis. 2d 21, 690 N.W.2d 1, it does 
not necessarily follow that there can be a final order on 
attorney fees, i.e., an appealable order, when a final order on 
the merits has not yet been made.  
¶50 The majority opinion's analysis seems to assume that 
the circuit court's decision denying fees could have been a 
final, appealable decision, even though the circuit court's 
decision on the merits was not final and therefore, not 
appealable.  The majority opinion gives this impression by 
                                                 
2 Id. 
No.  2007AP1198.pdr 
 
4 
 
examining the January 19, 2007, decision on attorney fees to 
determine whether the decision complied with Sanders and 
Wambolt.3  However, if a final decision on the merits, i.e., an 
appealable decision on the merits, is required before it is 
possible to have a final decision on attorney fees, then there 
is no need to do a Sanders/Wambolt finality analysis on the 
attorney fee decision because that decision could never be a 
final decision.   
¶51 The connection between the lack of finality in the 
peremptory writ and whether the decision denying fees could 
nevertheless be a final decision for purposes of appeal was not 
briefed or argued.  Furthermore, it is an open question that has 
not been directly addressed by a Wisconsin appellate court. 
¶52 Hartman v. Winnebago County, 216 Wis. 2d 419, 574 
N.W.2d 222 (1998) and Purdy v. Cap Gemini America, Inc., 2001 WI 
App 270, 248 Wis. 2d 804, 637 N.W.2d 763, give some assistance 
in identifying the connection between the finality of the merits 
of the underlying action and how an award of attorney fees fits 
within the costs permitted when a final judgment is perfected.  
However, they do not resolve the question of whether an adverse 
                                                 
3 See id., ¶¶27-28. 
No.  2007AP1198.pdr 
 
5 
 
decision on attorney fees may be appealed when a decision on the 
merits of the claim has not been resolved in a final order.4  
¶53 In Hartman, we examined whether the statutory attorney 
fees provided under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to a successful plaintiff 
on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim came within Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4)'s 
requirement to tax those fees within 30 days of entry of 
judgment or forfeit the right to them.  Hartman, 216 Wis. 2d 
419, ¶2.  Our decision turned on interpreting the meaning of 
"costs" in § 806.06(4) to decide whether that term encompassed 
statutory attorney fees.  Id., ¶21.  By interpreting the meaning 
of "costs" in Wis. Stat. § 814.04(2), we concluded that "costs" 
had the same meaning in § 806.06(4).  Id., ¶26.  The § 1988 
attorney fees were "costs" within the meaning of § 814.04(2) 
because they were fees "allowed by law."  Id.  Therefore, they 
had to be taxed within 30 days of entry of judgment or they were 
forfeited.  Id., ¶36.  Query, how can an order on attorney fees 
be final and taxable if there is no final judgment on which to 
tax them? 
¶54 In Purdy, the court of appeals reviewed whether a 
request for attorney fees based on a provision in Purdy's 
employment contract was made too late.  Purdy, 248 Wis. 2d 804, 
                                                 
4 The 
question 
of 
whether 
the 
decision 
denying 
the 
firefighters' request for attorney fees was an appealable final 
order before a final order was entered on the merits of their 
underlying claim was never briefed or argued to us.  The 
firefighters never made the argument that the majority opinion 
relies upon for its determination that the January 19, 2007 
decision denying the firefighters' motion for statutory attorney 
fees was not a final order.  I do not decide this question in 
this concurrence. 
No.  2007AP1198.pdr 
 
6 
 
¶3.  When Cap Gemini moved to dismiss Purdy's claim as untimely, 
the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, relying on 
Hartman's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4).  Id., ¶¶14-
15.  In so doing, Purdy linked a contractual right to attorney 
fees to the statutory obligation to perfect costs in 30 days or 
lose them.  There was no discussion of what obligation one might 
have in regard to attorney fees if there were not a final 
judgment on the merits of the action when the award of attorney 
fees was made. 
¶55 However, other courts have explained that entry of a 
final order or judgment on the merits is required before an 
adverse decision on attorney fees can be appealed.  Prod. & 
Maint. Employees' Local 504 v. Roadmaster Corp., 954 F.2d 1397, 
1401 (7th Cir. 1992) (reasoning that if the underlying decision 
on the merits of plaintiff's ERISA claim was not final, neither 
is the decision regarding attorney fees under 29 U.S.C. 
1132(g)(1)); Richardson v. Penfold, 900 F.2d 116, 118 (7th Cir. 
1990) (concluding that the trial court erred in awarding 
attorney fees, which award was premature because a judgment on 
the 
merits 
of 
plaintiff's 
claim 
had 
not 
been 
entered); 
Sandwiches, Inc. v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 822 F.2d 707, 711 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (concluding that the "denial of a request for fees as 
a 'prevailing party' is not appealable when the merits are not 
appealable").  
¶56 The reasoning of Roadmaster, Richardson and Sandwiches 
is persuasive.  They raise my concern about the way in which the 
No.  2007AP1198.pdr 
 
7 
 
majority opinion analyzes the January 19, 2007, decision that 
denied the firefighters' request for attorney fees.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶57 The lack of finality of the peremptory writ is 
sufficient reason to conclude that the January 19, 2007, 
decision is not a final order denying statutory attorney fees.  
I would not venture further.   
¶58 Accordingly, I respectfully concur.   
¶59 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
 
 
 
No.  2007AP1198.pdr 
 
1