Title: State v. Walcott

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

72 Wn.2d 959 (1967) 435 P.2d 994 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. IRVING JAMES WALCOTT, Appellant.[*] No. 38975 The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. December 28, 1967. Robert L. Butler and Arnold J. Barer, for appellant. Charles O. Carroll, Thomas A. Stang, and Bruce W. Rudeen, for respondent. HUNTER, J. This is an appeal by the defendant (appellant), Irving James Walcott, from a conviction for the possession of marijuana. The assignment of error upon which the defendant primarily relies is to the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. On November 5, 1965, at approximately 5 o'clock in the afternoon, King County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Thomas A. Stang filed complaints for search warrants in the Seattle District Justice Court of magistrate Evangeline Starr. Seattle police detectives R.W. Waitt and A.L. Fawcett were present at this time. In addition to the allegations of the respective complaints, oral testimony with reference to the propriety of issuing the search warrants was received by the magistrate. *961 She determined that probable cause had been established for the issuance of search warrants for five locations in Seattle. In this case we are only called upon to determine the legality of search warrant No. 0297 issued by the magistrate for a search of the premises located at 5514 1/2 - 11th Ave. N.E., Seattle. The complaint for search warrant No. 0297 was signed by Detective Waitt. The pertinent portion of the complaint reads as follows: The informant was at the hearing before the magistrate. The police officers did not disclose her name and the state did not elect to have her testify under oath. The informant was not previously known to the officers and they had had no past experience with her. However, the officers testified under oath as to their testing of the reliability of her statements concerning the information furnished. The court questioned the informant as to the truth of statements she made to the officers. She affirmed the statements. The residence at 5514 1/2 - 11th Ave. N.E. was searched at approximately 9 p.m., November 5, and about 30 pounds of marijuana were seized. Defendant Walcott resided at this address and was present at the time of the search. He was arrested after the discovery of the marijuana. The defendant prior to his trial moved to suppress the evidence seized, challenging the finding of probable cause for issuance of the search warrant. In view of the fact that no written record was made of the hearing before the magistrate, affidavits of magistrate Starr, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Stang and detectives Waitt and Fawcett were obtained. These affidavits purport to relate what occurred at the hearing on probable cause *962 for issuance of the search warrants. They were considered on the motion to suppress evidence. A special hearing was then ordered by the trial judge in order to provide persons arrested in the aftermath of the searches an opportunity to examine the magistrate, the deputy prosecuting attorney and the detectives as to the contents of the affidavits and the proceedings before the magistrate. At this special hearing, the magistrate and the two detectives were examined and this testimony was transcribed. On February 3, 1966, based upon the affidavits and the transcript of the special hearing, the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence was denied. The defendant contends that the evidence adduced before the magistrate did not show probable cause for the issuance of search warrant No. 0297 as a matter of law under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. [1] In considering this contention it must be kept in mind that the question of whether probable cause justified the issuance of a search warrant should not be viewed in a hypertechnical manner. The United States Supreme Court emphasized this in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684, 85 Sup. Ct. 741 (1965), at 109: In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 84 Sup. Ct. 1509 (1964), the court explained: [2] In this case, the crucial factual issue is whether the information furnished by the unidentified informant was sufficiently reliable to support the magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant authorizing the search of the premises where defendant Walcott resided. The rule for testing the sufficiency of such information was stated in Aguilar, supra, at 114: The evidence in the instant case to be considered in light of these rules is as follows: Prior to the application for a search warrant, the unidentified informant voluntarily told officers Fawcett and Waitt of the Seattle Police Department that she had been present when a large quantity of marijuana was purchased in Mexico and brought to 5514 1/2 - 11th Ave. N.E. in the University District. She related that she had visited five addresses in the University District where she had seen marijuana and she gave the names of some of the persons living at these locations. Officers Fawcett and Waitt, in company with the informant, checked these addresses and found them to be identical with addresses which had been the subject of prior investigations concerning suspected trafficking in narcotics by persons who included those named by the informant. The officers repeated this information under oath to the magistrate, at the time of application for search warrants for these premises. At the hearing on the defendant's pretrial motion for suppression of the evidence, the information disclosed by officers Fawcett and Waitt to the magistrate was set forth in their affidavit as follows: The magistrate submitted an affidavit at the same hearing containing the following: Considering the above affidavits in their entirety, which the trial court believed, we are satisfied that the sufficiency and reliability of the information given by the unidentified informant was adequate under the requirements established by Aguilar, supra, to justify the issuance of the warrants. (1) The underlying circumstances upon which the informant based her report were fully disclosed to the magistrate, and these circumstances included personal observation of the narcotics at the locations named. (2) The underlying circumstance demonstrating that the informant's information was reliable was the police officers' comparison of the names and addresses given by the informant with prior reliable information in possession of the police concerning persons and locations suspected of being involved in narcotics violations, and the coincidences disclosed by this comparison. In every instance, the residents of the premises were suspicioned of trafficking in narcotics by reason of prior investigations of the officers. Some of the same individuals asserted to have been seen at these premises by the informant were these persons. This justified reliance on the reliability of the informant's information. It is contended, however, that the prior information that the defendant Walcott was suspected of trafficking in marijuana and dangerous drugs was furnished by untested informants. This is not supported by the record. The officers' affidavit does not refer to these informants as untested or unreliable, and the magistrate's affidavit conclusively shows *967 that she was told by the officers that these informants were reliable. That portion of the affidavit reads: If doubts are entertained as to the sufficiency of the information in this record to show probable cause justifying the issuance of the challenged search warrant, these must be resolved in favor of the validity of the warrant. United States v. Ventresca, supra; Aguilar v. Texas, supra. [3] The defendant contends, however, that the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution requires that the complaint or affidavits must show probable cause on their face before a search warrant may issue. The defendant concedes that the law of this state requires only an oath or affirmation to support a finding of probable cause. State v. Malbeck, 69 Wn.2d 695, 419 P.2d 805 (1966). He argues, however, that this state should follow the federal rule which requires that sworn statements in support of an application for a search warrant be reduced to writing. Although the federal practice, which results in making and preserving a contemporaneous record of the proceedings before the magistrate, may be preferable; however, it is not a constitutional requirement under the Fourth Amendment. We adhere to our ruling in Malbeck and the cases cited therein. The defendant further contends the evidence seized under the search warrant at 5514 1/2 - 11th Ave. N.E. was not in his possession, as it was not in the room he occupied; and that the remainder of the dwelling was not under his dominion or control. The evidence as to his control of the *968 premises was in dispute. But there was substantial evidence in the record, which the jury was entitled to believe, that the defendant was in charge of the entire premises in the absence of a Miss Leaf, who at the time of the seizure of the evidence, was in California. This contention is therefore without merit. [4] The defendant further contends the trial court erred in giving instruction No. 4, on the subject of constructive possession. This contention is also without merit, because the instruction correctly defined constructive possession as a person having dominion and control over the property alleged to be possessed. See State v. Spillman, 110 Wash. 662, 188 Pac. 915 (1920); State v. Parent, 123 Wash. 624, 212 Pac. 1061 (1923); State v. Johnson, 129 Wash. 62, 224 Pac. 602 (1924). [5] The defendant contends the court erred in failing to give his proposed instructions to the effect that the state must prove that the defendant knew of the existence of any marijuana found in his possession. The law of this state is to the contrary. Mere proof of possession is sufficient, absent a showing by the defendant that his possession was unwitting, authorized by law, acquired in a lawful manner, or otherwise excusable under the statute. State v. Henker, 50 Wn.2d 809, 314 P.2d 645 (1957); State v. Mantell, 71 Wn.2d 768, 430 P.2d 980 (1967). We are satisfied the defendant received a fair trial in this case. The judgment of conviction on the verdict is affirmed. FINLEY, C.J., HILL, WEAVER, ROSELLINI, HAMILTON, HALE, and NEILL, JJ., concur. DONWORTH, J. (dissenting) In my opinion the majority, in its effort to sustain the validity of the search warrant issued in this case, overlooks the vital issue (alluded to by appellant in his brief, and urged before this court in oral argument) which requires that appellant's conviction be reversed. I, therefore, respectfully dissent. The requirements for the issuance of search warrants is governed by the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides, in part, that: The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part: The Fourth Amendment is applicable to this state through the Fourteenth. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684 (1961); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 83 Sup. Ct. 1623 (1963). In addition, article 1, section 7, of the Constitution of Washington provides: It has been held that, although this latter provision differs very slightly in language from the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, the two provisions are identical in purpose and substance. State v. Miles, 29 Wn.2d 921, 190 P.2d 740 (1948); Seattle v. See, 67 Wn.2d 475, 408 P.2d 262 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 387 U.S. 541, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943, 87 Sup. Ct. 1737 (1967). In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 84 Sup. Ct. 1509 (1964), the requirements of an application for a search warrant based, as in the present case, upon hearsay information, which are necessary to meet the requirements of the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, were set forth as follows: In this case, the written complaint (set forth in substance in the majority opinion at page 961), when considered alone, clearly fails to state sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. The magistrate is not informed thereby of any of the "underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant ... was `credible' or ... [her] information `reliable.'"[2] It is only by the consideration of the written complaint, together with the affidavits signed by Detectives Waitt and Fawcett, Justice of the Peace Evangeline Starr, and Deputy Prosecutor Stang, which were prepared after a motion to suppress had been interposed by appellant, that the trial court and this court were and are able to find any semblance of probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrants in this case. In Aguilar v. Texas, supra, the Supreme Court stated, in a footnote at page 109 of the opinion, that: *971 Appellant incorrectly contends that such requirement is met only where consideration is limited to the face of the written complaint or affidavit for search warrant. This is the net effect of Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, 18 U.S.C.A., which is referred to in the majority opinion at page 955. Rule 41 provides, in part: It has been held that, under this rule, "affidavit" refers to a sworn statement in writing, and that, if sworn information was presented to the commissioner other than that contained in affidavits, such information could not be considered by him or by the reviewing court on motion for the return of property seized and to suppress such property for use as evidence. United States v. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310 (1st Cir.1966); United States v. Walters, 193 F. Supp. 788 (W.D. Ark. 1961). I agree, however, that this federal rule of criminal procedure is not applicable to criminal cases in this state, as is correctly pointed out in the majority opinion. In this state, the magistrate is not limited to the written complaint for search warrant in determining the existence of probable cause. In Ladd v. Miles, 171 Wash. 44, 49, 17 P.2d 875 (1932), we said: And, in State v. Malbeck, 69 Wn.2d 695, 419 P.2d 805 (1966), it was held that a signed affidavit for a search warrant was not required, so long as the information contained in the unsigned document constituting probable cause was stated under oath. However, even though the issuing magistrate is not limited to a consideration of the written complaint or affidavit *972 under the law in this state (as he would be under Rule 41), but may consider oral testimony and such other evidence as may be presented to him at the time the warrants are sought, the question is whether or not there must be some form of contemporaneous record made of such evidence. As appellant points out in his brief, in contending that Rule 41 should be applied: Unfortunately, there is a dearth of authority on the question of whether, in the absence of specific statutory requirement of a contemporaneous record or language in a state constitution which requires such a record, due process requires such a record. The reason for such a hiatus is obvious since in the federal courts, and in most states, when the question has arisen, such statutory or constitutional requirement does, in fact, exist. My research has disclosed no authority in this state specifically requiring or not requiring some contemporaneous record. The question seems one of first impression in this court. One state, Wisconsin, has considered the question absent specific statutory authority. In Glodowski v. State, 196 Wis. 265, 271, 220 N.W. 227 (1928), the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that: Without some such requirement, there is no reliable way that a reviewing court can determine whether the evidence before the magistrate at the time the warrants issued complied with the constitutional requirements as applied in Mapp v. Ohio, supra, Ker v. California, supra, and Aguilar v. Texas, supra. Such a requirement seems to me to be imperative. I would note in addition to the above that, even considering the attempts to recreate the justice court proceedings as valid, the subsequent affidavits introduced, together with the record from the justice court and testimony elicited at the superior court hearing, fail, in my opinion, to establish that a sufficient showing of probable cause was made before the issuing magistrate to justify her issuance of warrant No. 0297. In State v. McClung, 66 Wn.2d 654, 659, 404 P.2d 460 (1965), we quoted with approval from State v. Bantam, 163 Wash. 598, 600, 1 P.2d 861 (1931), as follows: See, also, In re Little v. Rhay, 68 Wn.2d 353, 357, 413 P.2d 15 (1966). *974 Turning to the affidavit of the officers, Fawcett and Waitt, which purportedly reflects the information which was presented to the magistrate at the time the search warrants were sought, we find the statement: I cannot agree with the majority that this information, if given to the magistrate at the time the warrants issued, fulfills the second requirement of Aguilar, supra. Certainly, the fact that a man's place of business is frequented by suspected drug users cannot constitute corroboration for information from an otherwise untested and unknown informant, sufficient to fulfill the constitutional requirements of Aguilar, supra, and to justify the issuance of a search warrant authorizing an invasion of that man's home. Such would constitute a flagrant application of the odious doctrine of "guilt by association." Secondly, no basis is given for the police suspicion that appellant and the Eigerwand Coffee House were a source of marijuana and dangerous drugs other than that, in March, 1965, the police received some unspecified information "from informants that both were involved." Such informants are not identified, nor do the officers even allege that they were "reliable." It is not sufficient that the officers do not refer to informants as "untested or unreliable" (see majority opinion, page 966), but rather it is necessary that the state establish the informant's reliability. Aguilar v. Texas, supra. Finally, the statement in the majority opinion that "the magistrate's affidavit conclusively shows that she was told by the officers that these [italics mine] informants were reliable," is simply incorrect. *975 During the hearing in superior court, referred to on page 961 of the majority opinion. Justice of the Peace Starr testified as follows: And later during the same hearing she testified as follows: At the time the detectives appeared before Justice of the Peace Starr, five separate complaints were presented, upon the basis of which five separate search warrants were sought by the officers, one for each of five separate addresses. We are concerned with only one of those addresses in this case, 5514 1/2 - 11th N.E., where appellant Walcott resided. The statement contained in the portion of the magistrate's affidavit quoted in the majority opinion at page 967 does not relate to 5514 1/2 - 11th N.E., nor to any specific address.[3] *976 I am unable to find in the record any support for the assertion in the majority opinion that the magistrate's affidavit "conclusively" shows that she was told by the officers that the informants of March, 1965 were reliable. In summary, the written complaint for search warrant No. 0297, considered alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the search warrant in question. The insufficient, written complaints, together with the warrants themselves and the return thereon, constituted the entire record of the evidence which was before the issuing magistrate. The state contends that the record could have reflected more, but the fact remains that it did not. Two months after the warrants were issued and the dwelling house of appellant was invaded and searched by the police and evidence was seized upon which the conviction of appellant is based, motions to suppress were interposed by appellant. The state then, for the first time, sought to "fill the gaps" in the insufficient, written record made before the magistrate, with affidavits based upon affiant's memory of what had occurred at the time the search warrants were issued. The consideration of these subsequent affidavits by the trial court, and the consequent denial of appellant's motion to suppress, in my opinion, constituted a denial of due process requiring a reversal of appellant's conviction. However, even if the anomaly proposed by the majority opinion is to now be adopted as the rule in this state, it is clear, from the recreated record of the proceedings before the issuing magistrate, that there was not a showing of probable cause sufficient to satisfy the constitutional standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar, supra, at the time the warrants issued. No credible basis was presented for the officers' reliance on the word of the anonymous informant. *977 The warrant having been improperly issued, the conviction of appellant, which rests on the evidence unlawfully seized pursuant thereto, must be reversed, and appellant's sentence vacated. I would so order. February 13, 1968. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 435 P.2d 994. [1] Justice of the Peace Starr testified at the superior court hearing, referred to on page 949 of the majority opinion, as follows: "Q. Well, what did the police tell you that made you believe that she [the informant] was a person entitled to be believed? A. Nothing. Q. What did Mr. Stang tell you that made you believe she was entitled to be believed? A. Nothing. I relief [sic] upon my observations." (Italics mine.) [2] The informant, under oath at the hearing on the motion to suppress, denied having given information to the officers relating to three of the five addresses, and further denied having any knowledge at all regarding those three addresses. [3] If the magistrate's statement can be rationally construed to relate to any specific address, it must necessarily (if it is to be read consistent with the version offered in the affidavits of the police officers) relate to 2303 N.E. 65th and 4243 11th N.E. Regarding these two addresses, the officers assert in their affidavit that information was received from "reliable" informants. See majority opinion, page 964. There is simply no basis for contending that it related specifically to 5514-1/2 11th N.E., let alone that it "conclusively" establishes that information as to that specific address came from "reliable" informants.