Title: In re Storment

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 92832-Agenda 11-March 2002.
								In re PAUL M. STORMENT, JR., Attorney, Respondent.
Opinion filed November 21, 2002.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Central to our disposition of this case is the question of
whether respondent violated Rule 1.5(g)(2) of the Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct (Code) (134 Ill. 2d R. 1.5(g)(2)) by sharing
a fee with another lawyer when respondent was unable to assume
the same legal responsibility for the conduct of the case as the
lawyer receiving the referral. The Administrator of the Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) filed a
complaint charging Paul M. Storment, Jr., respondent, with
various violations of the Code. The Hearing Board (Hearing Board
or Board) found that respondent had not violated Rule 1.5(g)(2)
(134 Ill. 2d R.1.5(g)(2)), but that he violated Rule 1.5(f) (134 Ill.
2d R.1.5(f)) by failing to obtain his client's written consent to a
division of fees with another lawyer. The Hearing Board
recommended censure. The Review Board affirmed the Hearing
Board's findings on misconduct and censure. This court granted
leave to file exceptions and accepted the matter for further
consideration. 134 Ill. 2d R.753(e)(5). We affirm the Boards'
findings on misconduct, but conclude that the circumstances
warrant a harsher penalty than censure.

I. BACKGROUND
	In 1992, this court suspended respondent's law license for two
years for advising a client to testify falsely during a child custody
hearing. In re Storment, MR 8487 (1992). Based on the same
incident, respondent was also disbarred by the Missouri Supreme
Court and by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri. Respondent's 1992 suspension ended in
September 1994. He was never reinstated, however, to practice
either in the State of Missouri or before the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
	In 1995, Kevin Pleas was charged in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri in connection with a
narcotics conspiracy. Pleas was referred by a former client to
respondent. Respondent arranged for a meeting with Pleas and
then contacted Scott Rosenblum, an attorney licensed in both
Illinois and Missouri, and offered to refer Pleas to him.
Respondent and Rosenblum met with Pleas at the Jefferson
County jail, and both attorneys agreed to represent Pleas. The
disciplinary charges at issue here arose from that arrangement.
	The Administrator's complaint charged that respondent never
disclosed, either to Pleas or Rosenblum, that he had been disbarred
from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, where the Pleas case was pending, and that he was not
authorized to practice law in Missouri. The complaint also alleged
that Pleas did not sign any writing disclosing a division of fees
between respondent and Rosenblum. The complaint further
alleged that, although respondent kept $18,500 of the total fee paid
by Pleas, he did not enter an appearance, prepare any pleadings,
motions or other documents, or perform any substantial services
on Pleas' behalf in the criminal case.
	Based on the foregoing, the ARDC claimed that respondent
violated Rules 8.4(a)(4) (134 Ill. 2d R. 8.4(a)(4) (conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation)) and
8.4(a)(5) (134 Ill. 2d R. 8.4(a)(5) (conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice)); and Supreme Court Rule 771 (134 Ill.
2d R. 771) (conduct that tends to defeat the administration of
justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute).
The specific basis for those general charges was that respondent:
(1) divided a fee for legal services with another lawyer without the
written consent of the client (see 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.5(f)); (2)
participated in a division of fees that was not in proportion to the
services performed and the responsibility assumed by each lawyer
(see 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.5(g)); and (3) obtained a fee for the referral of
a client to another lawyer while unable to assume the same legal
responsibility for the performance of the services in question (see
134 Ill. 2d R. 1.5(g)(2)). In his answer, respondent denied any
misconduct.
	At the hearing, the following testimony was elicited.
Respondent testified that he made no reference to money or to the
case in the initial telephone conversation with Pleas because the
call was monitored. According to respondent, he told Pleas that he
was not licensed in Missouri, but that he knew a good lawyer,
Rosenblum, who could help him. Respondent further testified that,
when he and Rosenblum went together to meet Pleas, he again told
Pleas that he was not licensed in Missouri while Rosenblum was
talking with another client. After Rosenblum joined them, they
discussed general defense strategy. Respondent stated that he told
Pleas he would "take care of the family" and the inquiries of the
family; that he would deal with the seizure by the government of
a summer home in Illinois; and that he would "lend his expertise"
to Rosenblum when the case went to trial and, potentially, to the
court of appeals. 	
	Respondent stated that Pleas first inquired about fees during
the initial meeting with Rosenblum. Respondent claimed that
Rosenblum requested $100,000 "up front" and that Rosenblum
told Pleas that both he and respondent would be working on the
case for that fee. Respondent testified that the amount of cash
actually delivered was $58,500. He did not give his girlfriend,
Robin Johnson, a receipt for the money. To protect his client,
respondent put the cash into his business account in a series of five
deposits. Pleas did not want anyone to know that he had received
the money. A deposit of more than $10,000 would have required
the completion of an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 8300.
Respondent did not complete and file that IRS cash transaction
report. Respondent testified that he telephoned Rosenblum and
told him the money was short. Rosenblum said that he would take
$40,000 and that respondent could keep the remainder. He
delivered the money to Rosenblum a few days later.
	Pleas testified that he met with respondent on two occasions,
once alone and once with Rosenblum. Pleas denied knowing that
respondent was not licensed in Missouri. Pleas further testified
that when he telephoned respondent at the suggestion of Johnson,
respondent offered to represent him for a fee of $100,000. Pleas
stated that he arranged for this sum to be delivered to respondent
in cash. According to Pleas, he discussed his case with both
attorneys and understood that Rosenblum would assist in his
defense. Pleas denied that respondent had advised him or anyone
else in his family regarding property in Illinois. According to
Pleas, he was unaware of any pleadings or briefs on his behalf by
respondent. Pleas pled guilty on February 20, 1996, and was
sentenced to 15 years in prison on July 27, 1996.
	Rosenblum testified that he recalled only one meeting at the
jail with Pleas. He stated that it was made clear to Pleas that he
would be the trial lawyer. According to Rosenblum, there was no
discussion about respondent's disbarment while he was present.
	Rosenblum testified that he asked for a $50,000 retainer at the
first meeting and told Pleas that he would also charge $25,000 for
each week of trial. There was no discussion of any fee division.
Rosenblum testified that respondent delivered $40,000 to him in
cash, but said that he was not told that respondent had received
$18,500. Rosenblum assumed that respondent would be
compensated for whatever work he did on the Pleas matter, but he
had no knowledge of the arrangements for respondent's
compensation. Pursuant to his usual practice, he filed an IRS Form
8300, reflecting a receipt of the $40,000.
	Rosenblum recalled that he talked to respondent periodically
during the representation and was informed of respondent's
contacts with Pleas' family, who "needed a lot of hand-holding."
Respondent gave Rosenblum some ideas about possible legal
issues, including suppression of evidence, and may have sent him
some case law. He also thought respondent may have been
involved in a forfeiture matter involving Pleas' property in Illinois.
	Pleas' girlfriend, Johnson, testified that she obtained $100,000
in cash from Pleas' sister and delivered it to respondent at his
office. Johnson denied talking with respondent about a forfeiture
matter involving Pleas' property. She related that she telephoned
respondent on several occasions to get a status report on Pleas'
case. Johnson met with respondent on one additional occasion to
pick up a power of attorney that respondent had prepared for Pleas
in connection with a water damage claim to a home owned by
Pleas in Illinois.
	Following the close of testimony, the Hearing Board
concluded that the Administrator did not prove a violation of Rule
8.4(a)(4). The Board found that the evidence did not demonstrate
any false statements by respondent concerning his disbarment in
Missouri. In arriving at this conclusion, the Board assessed the
relative credibility of respondent and Pleas and determined that it
was more probable that respondent, an attorney with considerable
experience in drug conspiracy cases, would have disclosed to Pleas
his reason for bringing in another attorney with similar experience.
The Board further noted that the Administrator did not establish
any motive for keeping his ineligibility a secret. The Hearing
Board also found that respondent's conduct in retaining $18,500
of the money paid by Pleas was not dishonest, as the evidence
established that Rosenblum did not claim that he was deceived by
respondent in any way, and that he assumed respondent would be
compensated for his services by Pleas.
	Regarding Rule 1.5(f), the Hearing Board found that
respondent violated that rule because he divided a fee for legal
services with another attorney without his client's written consent.
The Board noted, however, that Pleas was aware that respondent
would work on his behalf and that he knew respondent would be
paid for his services.
	The Hearing Board found that the Administrator failed to
prove that the division of legal fees was not in proportion to the
services performed in violation of Rule 1.5(g). While the amounts
received by each attorney seemed high for the services rendered,
the Administrator did not allege excessive fees. In the absence of
records establishing the time spent by each attorney, there was no
basis in the record to assess the proportionate contributions of
each.
	The Hearing Board next found that the evidence did not
establish a violation of Rule 1.5(g)(2). The Rule states:
			"(g) A division of fees shall be made in proportion to
the services performed and responsibility assumed by
each lawyer, except where the primary service performed
by one lawyer is the referral of the client to another lawyer
and
* * *
				(2) the referring lawyer agrees to assume the same
legal responsibility for the performance of the services
in question as would a partner of the receiving lawyer."
134 Ill. 2d R. 1.5(g)(2).
	The Board found that the exception clause did not apply
because it had already determined that respondent and Rosenblum
had engaged in a division of fees for the services performed by
each. Thus, the primary service performed by respondent was not
a "referral" within the meaning of the rule.
	Even if the referral exception applied, the Board reasoned, the
term "legal responsibility" in paragraph (2) has been construed to
mean financial responsibility in the event of malpractice by the
attorney handling the case. Citing Elane v. St. Bernard Hospital,
284 Ill. App. 3d 865, 872 (1996), the Board rejected the
Administrator's argument that legal responsibility required an
agreement by respondent that he could assume the representation
of Pleas in the criminal case.
	Finally, the Hearing Board concluded that respondent's
technical violation of Rule 1.5(f) did not operate to prejudice or
defeat the administration of justice in violation of either Rule
8.4(a)(5) or Rule 771. Since his omission was not part of a court
proceeding, it would probably not be recognized outside the legal
profession as obvious misconduct by a lawyer. Therefore,
respondent's technical violation did not affect the image of the
courts or the legal profession.
	 After considering in aggravation respondent's prior
discipline, the Hearing Board recommended a censure. The Board,
however, rejected the Administrator's request for a finding that
respondent received $100,000, rather than $58,000, and for a
finding that his retention of the additional monies was dishonest.
On that issue, the Board found that the testimony of Pleas and
Johnson was not credible.
	The Administrator filed exceptions to the report and
recommendations of the Hearing Board, challenging both censure
and the failure of the Hearing Board to find that respondent
engaged in all of the charged misconduct. The Administrator also
contended that respondent's activities constituted the unauthorized
practice of law. The Administrator further requested the Review
Board to consider the respondent's failure to file IRS Form 8300.
Ultimately, the Administrator sought the disbarment of
respondent.
	The Review Board conducted an independent examination of
the record and affirmed. In particular reference to Rule 1.5(g)(2),
the Review Board agreed that an attorney's ability to accept a
referral fee is not dependent on the actual ability to practice law or
assume active participation in the case. The Review Board further
agreed that the technical violation of Rule 1.5(f) of the Code due
to the lack of a written fee division agreement was proven, but did
not require a finding that such conduct prejudiced the
administration of justice or brought the courts or the legal
profession into disrepute.
	Since respondent was not charged with the unauthorized
practice of law, the Review Board observed that due process
principles might preclude consideration of this issue as an
aggravating factor. The Board resolved this issue against the
Administrator on other grounds, however, finding that the record
disclosed that respondent lawfully provided services to Pleas and
his family in Illinois. He was not shown to have provided legal
services in Missouri. The Review Board also declined to consider
in aggravation respondent's failure to file IRS Form 8300, finding
that this failure was not so intimately connected with the fee
division arrangements as to overcome the general principle that an
attorney cannot be disciplined, or disciplined more harshly, based
on misconduct not charged in the complaint. The Review Board
noted that even if this factor were considered in aggravation, it
would not affect its decision as to the proper quantum of discipline
for the misconduct.
	The Review Board affirmed the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the Hearing Board and recommended
censure. The case is now before us on the Administrator's
exceptions to the ruling.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
	In attorney disciplinary proceedings, misconduct must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence. In re Eckberg, 192 Ill. 2d 70, 84 (2000). Deference is accorded to findings of fact made
by the Hearing Board, because the Board is able to observe the
demeanor of witnesses, judge their credibility, and evaluate any
conflicting testimony. In re Spak, 188 Ill. 2d 53, 66 (1999).
Therefore, this court will not disturb the Board's factual findings
unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re
Timpone, 157 Ill. 2d 178, 196 (1993). Nonetheless, the
recommendations of the Hearing Board and the Review Board are
advisory and not binding on this court. In re Eckberg, 192 Ill. 2d 
at 85.
	In interpreting a supreme court rule, we apply the same
principles of construction that apply to a statute. Our goal is to
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the drafters of the rule.
In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395, 404 (1998). The
construction of a rule, like a statute, is also a question of law that
we review de novo. Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d  at 401.

B. Rule 1.5(g)(2)
	The Administrator argues that respondent violated Rule
1.5(g)(2) because respondent could not assume actual
responsibility for the case. The Administrator contends that
respondent's Missouri disbarments were an ethical impediment to
his receipt of attorney fees for the referral to a licensed Missouri
attorney. Conversely, respondent argues, and the Boards held, that
Rule 1.5(g)(2) does not anticipate that a referring lawyer actually
be able to assume representation of the client. According to the
Boards, the term "legal responsibility" as used in the rule refers
instead to potential financial responsibility for any malpractice
action against the recipient of the referral.
	The Boards were persuaded by the reasoning in Elane v. St.
Bernard Hospital, 284 Ill. App. 3d 865 (1996). In that case, a
lawyer referred a medical malpractice claim to another lawyer
under a written fee agreement. The agreement provided that the
referring lawyer would receive 45% of the fees if the matter were
settled or tried and that she would remain legally responsible for
the performance of services to the extent required by Rule 1.5. The
referring lawyer became a judge shortly after the referral. When
the medical malpractice case was settled, the receiving lawyer
refused to pay the referral fee. The receiving lawyer claimed that
Supreme Court Rule 65(F) prohibits a sitting judge from assuming
legal responsibility for a referred matter. 134 Ill. 2d R. 65(F).
	The referring lawyer filed a petition for adjudication of
entitlement to attorney fees and the trial court entered judgment for
the receiving lawyer. The appellate court reversed, holding that the
term "legal responsibility"in Rule 1.5(g)(2) does not involve the
practice of law within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 65(F).
284 Ill. App. 3d at 872.
	In reaching this conclusion, the Elane court relied, in part, on
a Chicago Bar Association Professional Responsibility Committee
opinion interpreting former Code of Professional Responsibility
rules substantially identical to Rules 1.5(f) and (g) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. The committee opined that " 'legal
responsibility,' " within the meaning of the rules, involved " 'the
acceptance of passive financial guaranty obligations.' " 284 Ill.
App. 3d at 871, quoting Chicago Bar Association PRC Op. 87-2,
at 4 (1988). The court also cited with approval a 1994 advisory
opinion from the Illinois Judicial Ethics Committee reaffirming
this analysis and stating the " 'legal responsibility' consists solely
of potential financial responsibility for any malpractice action
against the recipient of the referral." 284 Ill. App. 3d at 872. The
court observed that these opinions were based on the committee
commentary to Rule 2-107 of the former Code. 284 Ill. App. 3d
at 871-72. That commentary, in relevant part, is as follows:
			"The rule expands and attempts to clarify the ABA
provisions respecting division of fees among lawyers. In
particular, it expressly sanctions payment of a fee to the
referring lawyer where that lawyer takes no part in the
actual handling of the case-a practice which is apparently
prohibited by the ABA rule-so long as the referring
lawyer assumes responsibility for the work of the other as
though he were the other's partner, and the total fee of the
lawyers does not exceed reasonable compensation for the
legal services performed. Additional language seeks to
improve the ABA rule by increasing disclosure to the
client, clarifying the obligations to the client of each
lawyer involved, and discouraging lawyers from retaining
cases which could be better handled by another.
			To require actual participation in a case before a fee
may be earned discourages some lawyers from referring
cases they know could be better handled by another. This
is not in the interest of the client or the lawyer." 107 Ill.
2d Canon 2, R. 2-107, Committee Commentary, at 625.
	We agree with the Boards that this language indicates that the
rule is concerned with the financial responsibility of the referring
lawyer for potential malpractice actions against the receiving
lawyer.
	The Administrator contends that Elane is distinguishable from
the facts at hand. The Administrator cites an opinion of the New
York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics
interpreting a provision of the New York Lawyer's Code of
Professional Responsibility (Opinion 745 (July 1, 2001)). The
New York committee stated:
			"From the time the New York Lawyers' Code of
Professional Responsibility was adopted until it was
significantly amended in 1990, DR 2-107(A) prohibited
a lawyer from receiving a referral fee merely for
'forwarding' a matter to another lawyer. *** The
amended version of DR 2-107(A), however, now permits
a division of legal fees where the following ***
condition[ ] [ is] satisfied:
* * *
			(2) The division is in proportion to the services
performed by each lawyer, or by a writing given the
client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the
representation.
* * *
			In our view, where a lawyer is unable to assume sole
responsibility for a matter due to a conflict of interest, that
lawyer is also disqualified from assuming joint
responsibility and, therefore, the referring lawyer may not
accept a referral fee from the receiving lawyer.
[Citations.] Without now deciding what the precise
contours of joint responsibility are, we conclude that joint
responsibility is more than financial accountability and
malpractice liability." (Emphasis in original)
	While we have found ethics opinions, in general, to be
instructive (see In re Vrdolyak, 137 Ill. 2d 407, 422-23 (1990)), in
this case the language of the New York provision and the Illinois
provision are dissimilar. Rule 1.5(g) is framed in terms of the
agreement of the referring lawyer to accept the same legal
responsibility as would a partner of the receiving lawyer. The New
York rule does not describe the scope of the phrase "joint
responsibility." Accordingly, we are persuaded that the Elane
court's interpretation of Rule 1.5(g) in conformity with Chicago
and Illinois State Bar Association ethics opinions is correct. We
hold that the term "legal responsibility" as used in Rule 1.5(g)(2)
refers only to potential financial responsibility for any malpractice
action against the recipient of the referral.

C. Rule 1.5(g)
	The Administrator also contends that respondent violated
Rule 1.5(g) by participating in a division of legal fees that was not
in proportion to the services performed and the responsibility
assumed by each lawyer. The Hearing Board found that respondent
met with Pleas, consulted with members of Pleas' family, drafted
a power of attorney for Pleas' girlfriend, gave some advice on an
Illinois forfeiture matter, and discussed legal issues with
Rosenblum. Evidence in the record also demonstrated that
Rosenblum met with Pleas, prepared for pending motions in his
criminal case, represented Pleas in court appearances, and
negotiated the plea agreement.
	No evidence was presented by either party, however,
establishing the specific number of hours worked by each attorney.
The Hearing Board observed:
		"Without an allotment of time spent for various services,
we are unable to determine what an appropriate division
of fees would be for this matter and, concomitantly,
whether the division in this case was proper. While the
amounts received by each attorney seem to be high for the
services rendered, the Administrator has not charged that
the fees were excessive. The issue presented is whether
the fees were divided proportionately. We find, in light of
the lack of any records as to specific time spent by each
attorney, that a violation of Rule 1.5(g) was not proved."
The Review Board agreed, noting that the burden of proof was on
the Administrator.
	The Administrator argues here that the record demonstrated
only minimal services performed by respondent, and that any
failure of proof as to the time spent is attributable to him, since
that is a matter that should be particularly within his own
knowledge, and it is reasonable to expect him to come forward
with the necessary proof. In support of this argument, the
Administrator cites Belding v. Belding, 358 Ill. 216, 220-21
(1934), where this court held:
			"It is a rule well recognized, that where the evidence to
prove a fact is chiefly, if not entirely, in control of the
adverse party and such evidence is not produced, his
failure to produce the evidence tends to strengthen the
probative force of the evidence given to establish such
claimed fact. [Citation.] The burden of producing
evidence, chiefly, if not entirely, within the control of an
adverse party, rests upon such party if he would deny the
existence of claimed facts. [Citation.] Where a party alone
possesses information concerning a disputed issue of fact
and fails to bring forward that information, and it is
shown that it can be produced by him alone, a
presumption arises in favor of his adversary's claim of
fact. [Citation.]"
	In the cause at hand, the Administrator failed to show that the
means of proving the proportionality of the fees was in the
exclusive possession of respondent such that the burden-shifting
rule of Belding applies. It is essential that the Administrator prove
each allegation by clear and convincing evidence. In re Enstrom,
104 Ill. 2d 410, 416 (1984). The complaint alleges that respondent
participated in a division of legal fees that was not in proportion
to the services performed and the responsibility assumed by each
lawyer. Thus, it was the Administrator's burden to prove that the
fee division was disproportionate to the services performed and
the responsibility assumed by both respondent and Rosenblum.
	In this regard, testimony was elicited from respondent,
Rosenblum and Pleas' girlfriend, Johnson, about the work
performed by both attorneys. All three witnesses were able to
describe, in some measure, the nature of the work done by both
respondent and Rosenblum. Hence, neither respondent nor
Rosenblum had exclusive knowledge about the services performed
on behalf of Pleas, and whatever information they had, they shared
with the Hearing Board, pursuant to the examination conducted by
counsel for the Administrator. Moreover, there is no indication in
the record that time records exist, and if such records did exist,
both respondent and Rosenblum would have had to produce them
to prove lack of proportionality. If the Administrator desired such
records or more explicit testimony, the opportunity existed to
make appropriate inquiry of both respondent and Rosenblum.
Under these circumstances, the burden of going forward with
evidence of time spent and services performed did not shift, but
remained with the Administrator.
	The Administrator also argues that since respondent was not
authorized to practice law in Missouri and since respondent spent
some time researching and discussing the case with Rosenblum,
those activities amounted to the unauthorized practice of law, even
though these services were rendered in Illinois. However,
respondent was not charged with the unauthorized practice of law,
nor was the issue raised or argued before the Hearing Board. This
argument is, therefore, waived. See Eagan v. Chicago Transit
Authority, 158 Ill. 2d 527, 534-35 (1994).
	For these reasons, we find no error in the findings of the
Boards that a violation of Rule 1.5(g) was not proved.

D. Rule 8.4(a)
	The Administrator also challenges the findings of the Boards
that respondent did not engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4).
According to the Administrator, a violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4) was
proved because: (1) respondent did not disclose to Pleas or to
Rosenblum that he had been disbarred in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri and was not authorized
to practice law in that venue; and (2) respondent did not disclose
to Rosenblum that he had received at least $58,500 on behalf of
Pleas and that he had kept $18,500 for his own purposes.
	Regarding this issue, the Hearing Board specifically found
that Pleas' testimony was less credible than respondent's. The
Hearing Board likewise concluded that there was no evidence of
any intent by respondent to deceive either Pleas or Rosenblum.
Contrary to this conclusion, the Administrator contends that the
Hearing Board's findings indicated a "naive and impractical
understanding" of respondent's conduct. In particular, the
Administrator argues that the Board ignored an obvious
motivation for respondent to conceal his Missouri disbarment: a
potential client is apt to refuse to employ a disbarred lawyer to
represent him.
	Hypothesizing about what a party or a witness is "apt" to do,
however, is beyond the scope of review afforded by this court. We
must give great deference to the findings of the Hearing Board. In
re Timpone, 157 Ill. 2d 178, 196 (1993). While the conclusion
urged by the Administrator could have been reached by the
Hearing Board, we are not persuaded that the facts found by that
body appear to be arbitrary, unreasonable or not based on
evidence. Nor can we say that an opposite conclusion is apparent.
Accordingly, we find no error in the Boards' determinations that
respondent did not violate Rule 8.4(a)(4).

E. Rules 8.4(a)(5) and 771
	The Administrator also argues that respondent's violation of
the writing requirement in Rule 1.5(f) was prejudicial to the
administration of justice and tended to bring the courts or the
profession into disrepute, thus breaching Rule 8.4(a)(5) (134 Ill.
2d R. 8.4(a)(5)) and Rule 771 (134 Ill. 2d R. 771) prohibiting such
conduct. Violations of these rules are generally considered
subsidiary charges, dependent on proof of other, more specific
violations. In re Witt, 145 Ill. 2d 380, 398 (1991).
	Here, the Boards concluded that respondent's failure to obtain
his client's written consent to the fee division was merely a
technical violation of the rules and had no impact on Pleas'
representation or the outcome of the case. Thus, the administration
of justice could not have been undermined. Further, the Boards
held that respondent's actions did not bring the courts or the legal
profession into disrepute since those actions did not occur in a
court proceeding and would not be recognized by laymen as
obvious misconduct.
	We do not believe that respondent committed a "mere
technical violation" of the rule. In In re Walner, 119 Ill. 2d 511,
522 (1988), this court declined to label a rule violation a mere
technicality if the record did not suggest it was a simple oversight.
More specifically, in In re Spak, 188 Ill. 2d 53, 67 (1999), we held
that Rule 1.5(c)'s requirement of a writing in contingent fee
contracts is mandatory even if the Review Board finds that the
purposes of the rule were sufficiently served by the client's
knowledge of the fee terms and confirmation of the terms in
writing before paying the fee. As we observed:
		"[T]he Review Board's reading of the rule would permit
an attorney to wait to reduce a contingent fee to writing
until after the work is done and the attorney is in
possession of the proceeds of litigation. A client in such
a situation may be left with the unenviable choice of
agreeing with his attorney's recollection of the fee
agreement, or delaying receipt of his money pending
resolution of a fee dispute. The inequality of bargaining
power between the attorney and client in such a case is
readily apparent. We decline to adopt a rule so fraught
with potential for abuse." Spak, 188 Ill. 2d  at 67.
	A similar observation applies to Rule 1.5(f). The writing must
not only authorize a division of fees, but also set out the basis for
the division, including the respective responsibility to be assumed
and economic benefit to be received by the other lawyer. The
requirement of a writing ensures that the scope and terms of each
lawyer's representation are defined, thus preventing or minimizing
uncertainties and disputes. Pleas' general understanding that both
respondent and Rosenblum were to be compensated for their
services does not fulfill the rule's mandatory writing requirement.
For this reason, we cannot agree with the Boards' assessment of
respondents' violation of Rule 1.5(f) as a mere technicality.
	Nevertheless, we agree that the violation had no impact on
either Pleas' representation or the outcome of the case. The record
lacks clear and convincing evidence of any prejudice to the
administration of justice. In re Vrdolyak, 137 Ill. 2d 407, 425
(1990). We also agree with the Boards' conclusions that the
violation did not bring the courts or the profession into disrepute.
Therefore, it was not error to find that respondent did not violate
Rule 8.4(a)(5) (134 Ill. 2d R. 8.4(a)(5)) or Rule 771 (134 Ill. 2d R.
771).

F. Evidence in Aggravation
	The Hearing Board recommended censure for respondent's
violation of Rule 1.5(f) after considering in aggravation
respondent's prior discipline for advising a client to give false
testimony and subsequently eliciting that testimony at a court
hearing. The Board noted the difference between the nature of the
prior misconduct and the current violation and accordingly gave
the earlier discipline less weight than if it had resulted from
wrongdoing similar to misconduct found here. The Board also
observed that in Spak censure was imposed for failure to reduce a
contingent fee agreement to writing. Since the only charge proven
against this respondent was the failure to reduce a referral
agreement to writing, the Board deemed censure to be appropriate
here as well.
	The Administrator then asked the Review Board for
additional findings in aggravation, based on respondent's alleged
unauthorized practice of law and failure to file IRS Form 8300.
The Review Board found that the complaint did not give fair
notice of the additional misconduct and that the failure to file the
IRS form was not sufficiently connected to the original charges to
be considered in aggravation.
	Before this court, the Administrator cites In re Rosin, 118 Ill. 2d 365 (1987), to show that the failure to file the IRS form is
sufficiently connected with the charged misconduct to be
considered in aggravation. In that case, Rosin was suspended from
the practice for two years and until further order of the court for
engaging in conflicts of interest and making false statements to the
ARDC. The court noted that the Administrator cited in
aggravation Rosin's uncharged conduct of dividing fees with a
disbarred lawyer and loaning money to a company controlled by
a sitting judge. Rosin, 118 Ill. 2d  at 388. The court did not,
however, expressly state that it considered the uncharged conduct
in imposing the sanction. Even if the uncharged conduct had been
considered, however, the case fails to examine its relationship to
the charged misconduct.
	Although this court has held that procedural due process
rights, including the right to fair notice, would be violated if an
attorney were disciplined for uncharged misconduct (In re
Chandler, 161 Ill. 2d 459, 470 (1994)), we have considered
uncharged conduct in aggravation when it was similar to the
current charges and established by evidence in the record. For
example, in In re Elias, 114 Ill. 2d 321, 336-37 (1986), we
considered in aggravation uncharged incidents that were
"illustrative of respondent's pattern and practice of commingling
and conversion as charged in *** the Administrator's complaint."
The pattern and practice evidence consisted of the attorney's
records of transactions concerning clients whose funds were
commingled and converted other than the clients specifically
named in the complaint. While the complaint did not contain the
names of those clients, it did provide notice sufficient to prepare
a defense.
	Here, the respondent's failure to file the IRS form is not
illustrative of any pattern or practice of misconduct charged in the
complaint. It is entirely unrelated to respondent's obligation under
Rule 1.5(f) to obtain his client's written consent to the referral
arrangement. The Review Board did not err in refusing to consider
respondent's uncharged failure to file the IRS form in aggravation.
	The same principles apply to the Administrator's argument
alleging the unauthorized practice of law. The complaint contains
no notice of this allegation. Thus, the Boards correctly rejected the
Administrator's argument and refused to consider this alleged
misconduct in aggravation.

III. CONCLUSION
	 Although the Hearing Board's and the Review Board's
recommendations are entitled to deference, the final determination
on sanctions rests with this court. In re Cetwinski, 143 Ill. 2d 396,
404 (1991). While disbarment may not be appropriate for the
limited violation found in this case, we believe that censure is too
lenient a penalty in view of respondent's recidivism and his
unexplained total disregard of the plain requirements of Rule
1.5(f). We would expect that an attorney who has been suspended
from the practice for two years for counseling his client to commit
perjury would have a heightened awareness of the necessity to
conform strictly to all of the requirements of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Therefore, we order respondent suspended
from the practice of law for two years.



Respondent suspended.
 
	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.