Title: City of Evanston v. Robinson

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

City of Evanston v. Robinson1985 WY 90702 P.2d 1283Case Number: 84-86, 84-87Decided: 07/11/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
CITY OF EVANSTON, 
WYOMING, A WYOMING MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), CITIES SERVICE 
COMPANY, A CORPORATION; AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY, A CORPORATION; MESA PETROLEUM 
COMPANY, A CORPORATION; AND BURTON/HAWKS, INC., A CORPORATION; REX L. RANDOLPH; 
STEVE C. CHAMPLIN; R. DOWNS POINDEXTER; GRADY VAUGHN; ALBERT SKLAR; R.K. 
O'CONNELL; RAINBOW RESOURCES, INC.; TERRA RESOURCES, INC.; EMC ENERGIES, INC.; 
FRANK L. SCHULTE; HORIZON OIL & GAS CO.; WILLIAM R. DIXON; HUSKY OIL CO.; 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF CASPER, N.A.; BILL HAWKS; GUY BURTON, JR.; BILL D. 
FARLEIGH; AND WILLIAMS EXPLORATION COMPANY, (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

GEORGE L. ROBINSON AND 
SARAH J. ROBINSON, HUSBAND AND WIFE; KILBURN PORTER AND NELLIE EVALINE PORTER, 
HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

 BURTON/HAWKS, INC., A CORPORATION; REX L. 
RANDOLPH; STEVE C. CHAMPLIN; R. DOWNS POINDEXTER; GRADY VAUGHN; ALBERT SKLAR; 
R.K. O'CONNELL; RAINBOW RESOURCES, INC.; TERRA RESOURCES, INC.; EMC ENERGIES, 
INC.; FRANK L. SCHULTE; HORIZON OIL & GAS CO.; WILLIAM R. DIXON; HUSKY OIL 
CO.; FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF CASPER, N.A.; BILL HAWKS; GUY BURTON, JR.; BILL D. 
FARLEIGH; AND WILLIAMS EXPLORATION COMPANY, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), CITY OF 
EVANSTON, WYOMING, A WYOMING MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; CITIES SERVICE COMPANY, A 
CORPORATION; AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY, A CORPORATION; MESA PETROLEUM COMPANY, A 
CORPORATION, (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

GEORGE L. ROBINSON AND 
SARAH J. ROBINSON, HUSBAND AND WIFE; KILBURN PORTER AND NELLIE EVALINE PORTER, 
HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, UintaCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

 
 
Dennis W. 
Lancaster of Phillips, Lancaster & Thomas, P.C., Evanston, for appellant in 
Case 

No. 
84-86.

Houston G. 
Williams and Richard L. Williams of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., 
Casper, for appellants in Case No. 84-87.

Charles D. 
Phillips, Evanston, Frank J. Allen, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, 
C.J.*, and ROSE, ROONEY**, BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral arguments.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     These appeals present a 
single issue for review:

"Does the City of 
Evanston have 
such right, title or interest in the streets and alleys of the City as will 
allow the City to grant a valid oil and gas lease covering the oil and gas 
underlying the streets and alleys?"

The case arose 
as a class action by property owners in Evanston, Wyoming, seeking a declaration of the rights 
to oil, gas and other minerals underlying the streets and alleys abutting their 
lots. The district court determined that the City had acquired no rights or 
interest in the minerals as a result of the dedication of the streets and alleys 
to the public use. Accordingly, the court entered summary judgment denying the 
claims to the underlying minerals asserted by the City, its mineral lessee, and 
the lessee's assignees. We will affirm.

FACTS

[¶2.]     Members of the class 
involved in this litigation own property in the original Town of Evanston or in 
subsequently developed subdivisions. The plat of the original town was recorded 
August 19, 1870, and specified areas were dedicated to the public 
use:

"I, Grenville M. Dodge, 
being Agent and Trustee for the Union Pacific Railroad Co. as owner of the 
lands, lots and premises described and shown on the foregoing plat do designate 
and name the Town of Evanston, and dedicate the Streets, Alleys, and Public 
grounds therefor shown on Said Plat to the public use."

No statute 
governed the effect of filing a plat or dedicating streets and alleys at the 
time that the original town was established.

[¶3.]     The plats for all of 
the other subdivisions involved in this case were filed between 1885 and 1950 
and are subject to the Platting and Dedication Act, §§ 34-12-101 through 
34-12-104, 34-12-106 through 34-12-115, W.S. 1977. These plats included or had 
attached language of dedication similar to the following 
example:

"I, Martin V Morse, being 
the owner of the land and premises described and shown on the plat hereto 
annexed, do name the same as M.V. Morse's Fourth Addition to the Town of 
Evanston, in the State of Wyoming. And I do hereby 
dedicate the streets and alleys as shown on said plat to the public 
use."

[¶4.]     Property owners within 
these subdivisions sought a judicial declaration of the rights to the minerals 
underlying the streets and alleys and brought this class action against the City 
of Evanston; Burton/Hawks, Inc., the City's oil and gas lessee; various 
assignees of Burton/Hawks; and Cities Service Company, Amoco Production Company 
and Mesa Petroleum Company, operators charged with the distribution of proceeds 
from the sale of the oil and gas. The district court entered summary judgment, 
declaring

"* * * [t]hat Defendant 
City of Evanston does not (except as it claims through conveyances other than 
the dedications of streets and alleys affected by the acknowledgement and/or 
filing of plats) own oil and gas and other minerals underlying streets and 
alleys abutting lots owned by members of the Class."

The district 
court did not determine the extent, if any, of the property owners' rights in 
the minerals, but directed the entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), 
W.R.C.P., so that the City, Burton/Hawks, and the assignees of Burton/Hawks 
could perfect immediate appeals to this court.1

DEDICATION OF PROPERTY TO 
THE PUBLIC USE

Common Law Dedication of 
Streets and Alleys

[¶5.]     When the plat of the 
original Town of Evanston was filed in August, 
1870, the Territory of Wyoming had no laws in effect concerning 
the platting of subdivisions or the dedication of property. The territorial 
legislature had repealed all laws enacted by the Territory of Dakota which might have affected the 
question of ownership under a dedication. Chapter 84, Laws of the WyomingTerritory, 1869. Consequently, the common 
law governs the dedication of streets and alleys in the original plat. Gay Johnson's Wyoming Automotive Service Co., Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, Wyo., 367 P.2d 787 
(1961).

[¶6.]     We have held that 
dedication of streets and alleys at common law creates an 
easement:

"* * * Under common law, 
at dedication the public or municipality acquires an easement in the streets and 
alleys, but the fee remains in the original proprietor or abutting owner." Gay Johnson's Wyoming Automotive Service 
Co., Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, supra, 367 P.2d  at 788.

The City's 
interest under a common-law dedication is sufficient to accommodate the use of 
the property by the public for street and related purposes, but the City 
acquires no interest in the minerals underlying the streets. Leadville v. Coronado Mining Co., 37 
Colo. 234, 86 P. 1034 (1906); Lambach v. Mason, 368 Ill. 41, 53 N.E.2d 601 
(1944).

[¶7.]     Appellants contend that 
the dedicatory language associated with the original town plat is broad enough 
to overcome this common-law rule. The phrase "dedicate[d] * * to the public 
use," according to appellants, indicates that the dedicator intended to convey 
the street areas for more public uses than streets alone. For example, the City 
has the right to lay sewer and utility lines beneath the surfaces of streets, 
appellants point out. See Ruby Drilling 
Co., Inc. v. Billingsly, Wyo., 660 P.2d 377 (1983). Other permissible, 
subsurface uses would include the mining of oil and gas to obtain revenues for 
the public coffers, appellants submit. If the dedicator intended to reserve an 
interest in the minerals beneath the streets, it should have restricted the 
general dedicatory language, appellants conclude.

[¶8.]     We cannot agree that 
the addition of the phrase "to the public use" enlarges the effect of a 
common-law dedication. By definition, a dedication of property is an expression 
of the owner's intent to devote that property to the public 
use:

"* * * [A] dedication is 
generally defined as the devotion of property to a public use by an unequivocal 
act of the owner, manifesting an intention that it shall be accepted and used 
presently or in the future. The intention of the owner to dedicate and 
acceptance thereof by the public are the essential elements of a complete 
dedication. Thus it is vital to a dedication of property to public use that it 
is to be forever and irrevocable after acceptance, and that it be for a public 
use." 11 McQuillin, Mun Corp § 33.02, p. 636 (3rd ed.).

"* * * Dedication is the 
intentional appropriation of land by the owner to some proper public use. The 
intention of the owner to set aside lands or property for the use of the public 
is the foundation and life of every dedication. [Citation.]" City of Phoenix v. Landrum & Mills Realty Co., 71 
Ariz. 382, 227 P.2d 1011, 1013 (1951).

See also Hand v. Rhodes, 125 Colo. 508, 245 P.2d 292, 
295 (1952); 4 Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, § 1101, p. 574 (3rd ed. 
1975).

[¶9.]     The dedicatory language 
attached to the plat of the original Town of Evanston simply expresses the owner's intent to 
devote the delineated streets and alleys to the public use, in compliance with 
the elements of a lawful dedication. Under the law of the Territory of Wyoming applicable at the time, such 
dedication transferred only an easement. Gay Johnson's Wyoming Automotive Service 
Co., Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, supra. Therefore, the streets and alleys in 
the original town plat were appropriated for public passage and not for the 
multiple uses envisioned by appellants.

[¶10.]  The fact that the public's interest as an 
easement holder encompasses the right to install utility lines under the streets 
does not compel the conclusion that the City has the right to remove minerals 
underlying the streets. Courts have historically recognized that a city's 
interest in dedicated streets and alleys includes the right to use so much of 
the ground underneath as might be required for laying gas and water pipes, 
building sewers, and for other related municipal purposes. Ruby Drilling Co., Inc. v. Billingsly, 
supra; City of Leadville v. Bohn 
Mining Company, 37 Colo. 248, 86 P. 1038 (1906). Elliott's treatise, The Law 
of Roads and Streets, contains the following comprehensive definition of a 
street:

"The right of the public 
in a street is by no means confined to the surface of the way, and this all who 
set apart land for a street are conclusively presumed to know. `"Street" means 
more than the surface; it means the whole surface and as much of the depth as 
is, or can be, used, not unfairly, for the ordinary purpose of a street. It 
comprises a depth which authorizes the urban authority to do that which is done 
in every street, namely, to raise the street, and lay down sewers - for, at the 
present day there can be no street in a town without sewers, or at least the 
right to construct them - and, also, for the purpose of laying down gas and 
water pipes. "Street," therefore, includes the surface and so much of the depth 
as may not unfairly be used as streets are used.' But it has been held that 
dedication for a street does not deprive the owner of the right to mine 
underneath without interfering with it." 1 Elliott, The Law of Roads and Streets 
§ 20, pp. 21-22 (4th ed. 1926).

The extraction 
of minerals, unlike the installation of equipment for urban services, is 
inconsistent with the public's interest in the dedicated property as the holder 
of easements for passage and transportation.

[¶11.]  We hold that, in accepting the plat of 
the original town, the City of Evanston acquired no interest in the minerals 
underlying its streets and alleys, either by operation of law or as a result of 
the dedicatory language associated with the plat. The public's interest extends 
to the use of the surface for transportation and to that portion of the land 
beneath the surface which is necessary for the construction of streets and the 
provision of urban services.

Statutory Dedication of 
Streets and Alleys

[¶12.]  The Platting and Dedication Act, supra, 
governs the filings of all of the subdivision plats at issue in this case except 
the original town plat. Section 34-12-104, W.S. 1977, of the Act has remained 
substantially the same since its adoption and provides:

"The acknowledgment and 
recording of such plat, is equivalent to a deed in fee simple of such portion of 
the premises platted as is on such plat set apart for streets, or other public 
use, or is thereon dedicated to charitable, religious or educational 
purposes."

Appellants 
contend that under this statute the City received a fee simple determinable in 
dedicated streets and alleys, which interest includes the right to the 
underlying minerals for so long as the City uses the property for public ways.2 In support of their position, 
appellants cite Belgum v. City of 
Kimball, 163 Neb. 774, 81 N.W.2d 205, 62 A.L.R.2d 1295 (1957); Mattheisen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. City of 
La Salle, 117 Ill. 411, 2 N.E. 406 (1885); City of Des Moines v. Hall, 24 Iowa 234 
(1868).

[¶13.]  While we have not previously considered 
the question of a city's right to extract the minerals underlying its streets 
and alleys, we have analyzed the interests acquired by municipalities under § 
34-12-104 in other contexts. In Tissino 
v. Mavrakis, 67 Wyo. 560, 228 P.2d 106 (1951), we upheld the 
district court's order enjoining a private property owner from obstructing a 
public street and found no error in the court's declaratory judgment 

"* * * [t]hat the fee 
simple title to all of that portion of Harvey Avenue, * * * together with all 
alleys within such Subdivision * * * as shown by said Plat, belongs to the 
public and such fee simple title is hereby confirmed in the public, for public 
use as such street and alleys." 228 P.2d  at 109.

More recently, 
we examined the terms of the statute as they bear on a city's right to vacate 
and sell land dedicated as a street. We said that the statutory language 
effected a conveyance to the municipality of a title in trust for the benefit of 
the public:

"* * * [I]n answer to the 
precise question submitted, we have no alternative but to hold that the interest 
the defendant city acquired in the above-described premises as a result of the 
dedication under the then existing statutory provisions was, at best, a title in 
trust for the public, granting to the city the right to hold, use, occupy, and 
enjoy the premises for public use as a street. Once that right was terminated by 
vacation pursuant to authority delegated to the city by the legislature the city 
no longer had any title or interest in the premises. It has nothing to sell or 
to convey." Payne v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 
398 P.2d 557, 562 (1965).

In reaching this 
conclusion we relied on the discussion by the Iowa Supreme Court in City of Des Moines v. Hall, supra, an 
opinion existing at the time that we adopted our platting statutes from those in 
effect in Iowa:

"In considering the 
matter, it is fitting that we go first to the source of the statutes relating to 
the platting of a townsite. As mentioned in Thomas v. Jultak, 68 Wyo. 198, 231 P.2d 974, 979, our statutes, adopted in 1876, were taken almost verbatim from Iowa, 
and the provision with which we are particularly concerned, § 34-115 
[predecessor of § 34-12-104, W.S. 1977] is substantially the same as § 637, Code 
of Iowa, 1851. In 1868, some eight years prior to adoption here, the Iowa 
Supreme Court in The City of Des Moines 
v. Hall, 24 Iowa 234, 239, was called upon to construe the 
meaning of the section. In the initial opinion it was said in substance that the 
force of the statute was to divest the proprietor of the title to the premises 
set aside for the street and to vest the same in the public. In essence that is 
the view this court took of that language in Tissino v. Mavrakis, 67 Wyo. 560, 228 P.2d 106, 
115. In neither opinion was anything said concerning the vesting of title in a 
municipality. However, the Iowa court's opinion as to the streets went on to 
point out, at 24 Iowa 238, that the statute nevertheless gave to the 
municipality `the fullest power and control over the same, which can arise from 
title, in order that all improvement of them as highways might be made without 
let or hindrance from any quarter.' Then on rehearing the court went further. It 
was then said that statutory dedication under the provisions of § 637 did vest a 
`fee simple' title to the streets in the municipality. But, even then, the 
Iowa court did 
not go as far as we are asked to go. As pointed out in the dissent, at 24 
Iowa 248, the 
majority conceded the possibility of reverter in case the streets should be 
vacated and conceded `that the city could not sell the streets or any part of 
them.' With these limitations it is apparent that Iowa, at the time our statute 
was adopted, did not hold that the language employed vested a fee simple 
absolute to the streets in the municipality. Instead, the interest received was 
what is sometimes rather loosely described as a qualified, base, or determinable 
fee. [Citations.]" 398 P.2d  at 559-560.

[¶14.]  We summarized the holdings in our prior 
cases in Ruby Drilling Co., Inc. v. 
Billingsly, supra, 660 P.2d  at 279-280, and concluded that § 34-12-104 was 
intended not to vest the public authority with fee title to the land underlying 
a street or alley, but rather to grant an interest or title in trust in 
designated ways for the public benefit. We held in that case that abutting 
property owners lacked sufficient interest in a dedicated roadway to maintain an 
action in trespass for the installation of a water line within the street 
area.

[¶15.]  Notwithstanding the foregoing cases 
characterizing the public's interest as a title "for public use as such street 
and alleys" or "the right to hold, use, occupy, and enjoy the premises for 
public use as a street," appellants contend that the public authority also 
acquires a fee simple in the mineral estate when streets and alleys are 
dedicated. The strong language of § 34-12-104 requires such a conclusion, 
appellants urge.

[¶16.]  Section 34-12-104 provides that the 
proper filing of a subdivision plat "is equivalent to a deed in fee simple" of 
areas set apart for public use. The term "fee simple" distinguishes estates in 
real property which, typically, are of potentially infinite duration. This 
general term includes the estate in fee simple absolute and all types of estates 
in fee simple defeasible. Restatement of the Law 2d Property § 14 and Comment a. 
A fee simple may be created in the mineral estate alone or in the surface estate 
alone. Williams v. Watt, Wyo., 668 P.2d 620 
(1983).

[¶17.]  We considered the ramifications of a 
statutory reference to the fee simple estate in State ex rel. Cross v. Board of Land 
Commissioners, 50 Wyo. 181, 58 P.2d 423 (1936). The statute at issue there 
directed State officials, under specified circumstances, to issue a land patent 
conveying title "in fee simple" to the patentee. The purchaser contended that 
the terms of the statute required a conveyance of the mineral estate, 
notwithstanding the fact that the State had reserved the minerals in the 
contract for sale:

"Stress is laid by 
relator upon the language of section 91-513,[3] quoted above, that when a patent 
for state lands is issued it shall `convey a good and sufficient title to the 
patentee therein named in fee simple,' and it is said that the use of the words 
`in fee simple' establishes that the title to said land when sold must 
necessarily include all the minerals below the surface thereof." 58 P.2d  at 
429-430.

After reviewing 
pertinent authorities, this court concluded that the statute in question 
permitted the board of commissioners to transfer to the purchaser a "fee-simple 
estate" in "the land, excepting, however, minerals and mining rights." 58 P.2d  
at 430.

[¶18.]  It is clear that the concept of a fee 
simple estate in the surface in no way violates the commonly understood meaning 
of the phrase "in fee simple" found in § 34-12-104. The statute goes on to 
precisely define and limit the fee simple estate transferred by the recording of 
a plat to "such portion of the premises platted as is on such plat set apart for 
streets, or other public use." (Emphasis added.) Giving these words their plain 
and ordinary meaning,4 that portion of the subdivision set 
apart for streets and alleys reasonably includes only the surface and so much of 
the subsurface as is necessary for street construction and municipal services. 
We would impermissibly strain the express statutory provisions were we to hold 
that those areas set apart for streets and alleys include a band of ground 
extending to the center of the earth and encompassing all of the minerals 
beneath the roadways. The transfer of mineral rights to the public domain is 
inconsistent with the dedication of narrowly specified areas of private property 
for public passage.

[¶19.]  The case for excluding the minerals from 
the transferred estate is even stronger under § 34-12-104 than under § 91-513, 
supra n. 3, at issue in State ex rel. 
Cross v. Board of Land Commissioners, supra. There, the statute required the 
board of land commissioners to convey a fee simple title to the "land" 
purchased. In holding that the board could convey the land exclusive of the 
mineral estate, we emphasized the importance of reason and context in 
interpreting statutory language:

"It is argued that the 
use of the word `land' in the statutes of this state, providing for the sale by 
the board of land commissioners of state-owned property of that character, 
refers only to land in the sense of its having an indefinite extent upward and 
downward from the surface, and therefore it always includes whatever may be 
erected upon it and whatever may be directly under it. The word may have that 
meaning of course, under some circumstances, but it does not always have it. 
Reason and context play an important part in determining its true significance." 
58 P.2d  at 429.

[¶20.]  We hold, therefore, that the City of 
Evanston acquired no interest in the oil, gas or other minerals underlying its 
streets and alleys as a result of the recording and acknowledgment of 
subdivision plats pursuant to § 34-12-104. We note that courts in other 
jurisdictions have interpreted legislation corresponding to § 34-12-104 in a 
similar fashion. Mochel v. Cleveland, 
51 Idaho 468, 5 P.2d 549 (1930) (under a statute identical to ours the city 
acquired title to lands for public use only); Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County, 36 Utah 
127, 104 P. 111, 116 (1909) (the "fee to the surface" passes pursuant to a 
statute which vests the fee of dedicated parcels of land for the uses intended 
in the recorded plat5); City of Leadville v. Bohn Mining 
Company, supra, 86 P.  at 1040 (under a statute which vests in the 
municipality the fee of the streets, alleys and other designated places, the 
city acquired "a complete, perpetual, and continuous title to the space 
designated as streets, so long as it used them for the purpose intended"). We 
decline to follow those cases cited to us by appellants as we find them 
inconsistent with the language and subject matter of § 
34-12-104.

[¶21.]  Appellants' argument that the broad 
dedicatory language enlarges the effect of the statutory dedications fails for 
the reasons discussed with respect to common-law 
dedications.

[¶22.]  The declaratory judgment entered by the 
district court is affirmed.

ROONEY, J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion.

1 In its brief, appellant 
City of Evanston 
raises questions concerning the property owners' titles to the minerals and 
their obligations to pay property taxes on the minerals. These matters do not 
pertain to the single issue decided by declaratory judgment and will not be 
addressed by this court.

Unless otherwise 
indicated, for purposes of this opinion "appellants" refers to appellants in 
both Case No. 84-86 and Case No. 84-87.

2 Appellants describe the 
interest acquired by the City as a "fee simple determinable," since the City 
loses all rights to the property upon vacation, Payne v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 398 P.2d 557 (1965), and "the proprietors of the lots so vacated may enclose the streets, 
alleys and public grounds adjoining lots in equal proportions." Section 
34-12-109, W.S. 1977.

3 Section 91-513, W.R.S. 
1931, provided in part:

"Whenever the purchaser 
of any state land, or his assigns, has complied with all the conditions of this 
article, and has paid all the purchase money therefor, together with the lawful 
interest thereon, he shall receive a patent for the land purchased. * * * Such 
patent signed and executed as aforesaid, shall convey a good and sufficient 
title to the patentee therein named in fee simple."

4 Words used in a statute 
must be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise indicated. Stagner v. WyomingState 
Tax Commission, Wyo., 682 P.2d 326 (1984); 
Wyoming State Department of Education v. 
Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681 
(1982).

5 Accord: Sears v. Ogden 
City, Utah, 572 P.2d 1359 
(1977); Mallory v. Taggart, 24 
Utah 2d 267, 470 P.2d 254 (1970); White v. Salt Lake 
City, 121 Utah 134, 239 P.2d 210 
(1952).

ROONEY, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶23.]  I do not disagree with that said in the 
majority opinion, but note that some of the law quoted and cited therein 
pertains to ownership of the streets and alleys and of the mineral rights 
pertaining thereto after vacation of the streets and alleys. We are here 
concerned with ownership of the mineral rights when there has been no vacation 
of the streets and alleys.

[¶24.]  I also note that the judgment of the 
district court, herein affirmed, recognizes that the ownership of the mineral 
rights is in none of the parties hereto but is in the dedicators or their 
successors and assigns. Such estate cannot be changed without proper conveyance 
or under pertinent statutory provisions. Although not directly addressing this 
portion of the judgment, the law cited in the majority opinion supports the 
district court's position with reference to it.