Title: Matter of Bessemer MT.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Bessemer MT.1993 WY 100856 P.2d 450Case Number: 92-226Decided: 07/15/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of a 
Petition to Designate

Bessemer MT. As Rare and 
Uncommon.

RISSLER & McMURRY, 

Petitioner,

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
COUNCIL, 

Respondent.

Appeal from the District 
Court, Natrona County.

Donald J. 
Rissler, Brown, Raymond & Rissler, P.C., Casper, for 
petitioner.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Mary B. Guthrie, Deputy Atty. Gen., for 
respondent.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS and GOLDEN, JJ., ROONEY, J., Retired, and LANGDON, District 
Judge, Retired.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The essential 
question posed in this case is whether the Environmental Quality Council (EQC) 
can, pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 35-11-112(a)(v) (Supp. 1992), classify lands 
within the state as "very rare or uncommon" without adopting by regulation the 
criteria or factors that will establish a standard for such a classification. We 
are satisfied that, in the absence of factors or criteria established by 
regulation, the phrase "very rare or uncommon" is too amorphous to permit 
judicial review of the action of the EQC, as required by statute. In the absence 
of the appropriate criteria or factors adopted by administrative rulemaking,1 classifications made on an ad 
hoc basis are inherently arbitrary and capricious. We reverse the decision 
of the EQC and remand this case for a determination in the light of appropriate 
standards for such classifications, adopted pursuant to a regular rulemaking 
proceeding conducted in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act.

[¶2]      The issues 
certified to this court by the trial court are stated in this way:

1. Whether the actions of 
the Environmental Quality Council in designating Bessemer Mt. as Rare and 
Uncommon are arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.

2. Whether the actions of 
the Environmental Quality Council violate Appellant's due process and equal 
protection rights.

3. Whether the actions of 
the Environmental Quality Council in designating Bessemer Mt. Rare and Uncommon 
are in excess of its statutory jurisdiction.

4. Whether the actions of 
the Environmental Quality Council violate State Law and Administrative 
Procedure.

5. Whether the actions of 
the Environmental Quality Council are supported by substantial evidence as 
demonstrated in the record.

[¶3]      The relevant 
facts in this case are minimal. The EQC, pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 
35-11-112(a)(v) (quoted here-in-below), designated nine sections of land in 
Natrona County, southwest of the city of Casper, known as Bessemer Mountain or 
Red Butte, as "rare and uncommon." This designation was the product of a hearing 
held by the EQC on April 23 and 24, 1992. Public notice of the hearing was 
published in the CASPER STAR TRIBUNE, and notice was mailed to all of the 
individual landowners in accordance with the statute.

[¶4]      At the hearing, 
several people spoke both for and against the designation. The EQC reviewed all 
the comments, both oral and written, and determined the area should be 
designated as "rare and uncommon." On August 7, 1992, the Principal Statement of 
Reasons behind the EQC's decision was filed with the Secretary of 
State.

[¶5]      Rissler & 
McMurry, a construction company holding a mineral lease on a school section in 
the designated area, filed a petition for review of the decision of the EQC. 
Rissler & McMurry and the EQC agreed the matter should be certified to this 
court, because of the constitutional and procedural questions involved and in 
the best interest of justice and economy. A joint motion to certify the case was 
filed on September 25, 1992, and that motion was granted on September 28, 
1992.

[¶6]      The primary issue 
encompassed by the certified questions is the propriety of a classification by 
the EQC of certain lands as "very rare or uncommon" pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 
35-11-112(a)(v) (Supp. 1992), which provides:

(a) The council shall act 
as the hearing examiner for the department and shall hear and determine all 
cases or issues arising under the laws, rules, regulations, standards or orders 
issued or administered by the department or its air quality, land quality, solid 
and hazardous waste management or water quality divisions. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of this act, including this section, the council shall have no 
authority to promulgate rules or to hear or determine any case or issue arising 
under the laws, rules, regulations, standards or orders issued or administered 
by the industrial siting or abandoned mine land divisions of the department. The 
council shall:

* * * * * *

(v) Designate at the 
earliest date and to the extent possible those areas of the state which are very 
rare or uncommon and have particular historical, archaeological, wildlife, 
surface geological, botanical or scenic value. When areas of privately owned 
lands are to be considered for such designation, the council shall give notice 
to the record owner and hold hearing thereon, within a county in which the area, 
or major portion thereof, to be so designated is located, in accordance with the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.

We note in 
passing that, in order to be designated as "very rare or uncommon," a tandem 
requirement is found in the statute. First, the land must be "very rare or 
uncommon" and, second, the land must have some "particular historical, 
archaeological, wildlife, surface geological, botanical or scenic 
value."

[¶7]      The disposition 
of this case is foreshadowed by the following colloquy from the hearing 
record:

EQC MEMBER: But the 
problem is that if it is - if what is scenic is a subjective determination in 
every case, if we just kind of roll them around the state, and we go into John 
Shiffer's home and make some decisions about whether he lives in a scenic place, 
or go into my place and make a decision about whether I live in a scenic place, 
the opponents of this will always complain that we're making those decisions on 
an arbitrary basis, that we are not applying standards. And I'm just wondering 
if you have any standards to suggest to us, as difficult as that is?

[ATTORNEY IN SUPPORT OF 
THE DESIGNATION]: Well, honestly, I don't. But I certainly understand the 
problem that you've raised, and I acknowledge that it will dog your heels in 
every one of these cases. You will have those who are affected by the rare and 
scenic designation complaining that the criteria are not sufficiently set, that 
the Rules of Procedure are not clear enough, they haven't been reduced to 
writing, and there is too much movement then that is permitted in each 
case.

I recognize that that is 
a very real argument.

Several 
interested persons did attend the hearing in Casper concerning the question of 
whether Bessemer Mountain was "very rare or uncommon," pursuant to the statute. 
During the public hearing, discussions were focused on the statute and the 
various meanings of the words in it.

[¶8]      The word "scenic" 
was clearly of some import. The attorney appearing for Rissler & McMurry 
expressed the view that "scenic" was in the eye of the beholder. When asked what 
the words "rare and uncommon" meant, one of the people at the hearing said, "You 
asked the right person, because I tried to write a law that defined scenic this 
year; * * *. I finally threw up my hands and decided that scenic probably is in 
the eye of the beholder, * * *." We perceive fundamental truth in that 
statement, and we simply add that the same comment very clearly applies to "very 
rare or uncommon." What might appear to be "very rare or uncommon" to one 
person, such as an area like Bessemer Mountain, might seem simply ordinary to 
another. Furthermore, the perception of the EQC might change from site to site 
throughout the state.

[¶9]      Our task is to 
apply to this determination the standard for review of an agency decision as 
stated in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114 
(1990), which states, in pertinent part:

(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D) Without observance of 
procedure required by law; or

(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

When the 
administrative agency's decision is certified to the Wyoming Supreme Court, 
pursuant to WYO.R.APP.P. 12.09, we review the decision under the same appellate 
standards applicable to the reviewing court of the first instance. Texaco, Inc. 
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 845 P.2d 398 (Wyo. 1993); Amax Coal Co. v. Wyoming 
State Bd. of Equalization, 819 P.2d 825 (Wyo. 1991) (both cases citing 
Application of Campbell County, 731 P.2d 1174 (Wyo. 1987)).

[¶10]   As one premise for its argument 
that the decision of the EQC was arbitrary, Rissler & McMurry points out the 
EQC has not adopted any rules to aid it in making the determination of the 
status of the land as "rare and uncommon." We agree with this observation by 
Rissler & McMurry and hold the EQC cannot classify lands within the state as 
"very rare or uncommon" without first establishing by regulation the criteria 
and factors which will set the standard for that classification. We are 
satisfied that, in the absence of such a regulatory standard, the phrase "very 
rare or uncommon" is too amorphous to permit judicial review of the action of 
the EQC. Consequently, any such classification inherently is arbitrary and 
capricious.

[¶11]   Before we impose the obligation to 
create standards by rulemaking, we must determine that the legislature afforded 
such authority to the EQC. We conclude the authority to develop the criteria and 
factors, which will serve as standards for the "very rare or uncommon" 
classification, is vested in the EQC in two ways. First, rulemaking in 
accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act is necessary when a 
proposed action of an agency is substantive or legislative, as opposed to 
interpretive. See Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel, 668 F. Supp. 1466 
(D.Wyo. 1987). "A substantive/legislative rule is one affecting individual 
rights and obligations." Hodel, 668 F. Supp.  at 1475 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. 
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302, 99 S. Ct. 1705, 1718, 60 L. Ed. 2d 208 (1979)). Hodel 
then defines the legislative rule adopted by the agency as:

The whole or a part of an 
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect 
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the 
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency. 5 U.S.C. § 
551(4).

Hodel, 668 F. Supp.  at 1475-76.

[¶12]   The second authorization for the 
EQC to adopt regulations in this instance is found in the particular statute 
relating to the subject matter. WYO. STAT. § 35-11-112(a)(i) (Supp. 1992) 
provides:

Promulgate rules and 
regulations necessary for the administration of this act, after recommendation 
from the director of the department, the administrators of the various divisions 
and their respective advisory boards; * * *.

This statute 
encompasses an express provision manifesting a specific delegation of the 
legislative power to the EQC to act in a legislative capacity and supplement the 
statute by filling in the details or making the law. The act does not leave the 
promulgation of the rules to the discretion of the EQC but, instead, the statute 
uses the word "shall," ordinarily regarded as mandatory, and directs the EQC to 
promulgate rules and regulations after receiving recommendations from the 
various persons and entities listed.

[¶13]   The general policy justifying the 
rulemaking function of an administrative agency is found in 1 AM.JUR.2D 
Administrative Law § 111, at 911 (1962) (footnotes omitted), adopted from the 
cases there cited:

Necessity fixes a point 
beyond which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel the legislature to 
prescribe detailed rules for the purpose of avoiding an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative power; it then becomes constitutionally sufficient if 
the legislature clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which 
is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority. The legislature 
is not denied the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which 
will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing 
standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate 
rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the 
policy as declared by the legislature is to apply. If this could not be done, 
there would be infinite confusion in the laws, and in an effort to detail and to 
particularize they would miss sufficiency both in provision and execution, and 
the many administrative agencies created by the state and national governments 
would be denuded of their utility, and government in some of its most important 
exercises become impossible.

[¶14]   The Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act, WYO. STAT. § 16-3-106 (1990), sets forth the procedural authority 
for rulemaking:

Any interested person may 
petition an agency requesting the promulgation, amendment or repeal of any rule 
and may accompany his petition with relevant data, views and arguments. Each 
agency may prescribe by rule the form of the petition and the procedure for its 
submission, consideration and disposition. Upon submission of a petition, the 
agency as soon as practicable either shall deny the petition in writing (stating 
its reasons for the denials) or initiate rulemaking proceedings in accordance 
with W.S. 16-3-103. The action of the agency in denying a petition is final and 
not subject to review.

[¶15]   In this instance, we discover an 
express provision in the statute by which the legislature authorized the EQC to 
promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration of the act. We 
are satisfied the intent of the legislature was to invoke the expertise of the 
EQC to establish by regulation the factors and criteria that will serve as a 
standard for making the classification of "very rare or uncommon." When the 
legislative mandate is broad, as in this case, the administrative agency must 
invoke expertise to create standards, which will furnish notice to the public of 
how the decision may be reached. The creation of such standards serves to 
eliminate any need to develop standards on a case by case basis, which is 
time-consuming; may lead to inconsistent results; and severely inhibits judicial 
review.

[¶16]   The policy approach, pursuant to 
which we decide this case, is aptly articulated in KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:26, at 128 (2d ed. 1979):

The law may be in the 
early stages of a massive movement toward judicially required rulemaking that 
will reduce discretion that is unguided by rules or precedents. Under the new 
law, agencies that use systems of precedents are still generally free to choose 
between adjudication and rulemaking, but agencies without systems of precedents 
may be judicially required to use their rulemaking power to provide guiding 
standards.

Persuasive 
authority justifying this requirement is found in the cases cited in the 
treatise following the quotation. We are satisfied this is an instance in which 
it is appropriate to require the EQC to choose between adjudication and 
rulemaking in order to provide for use in the future those factors and criteria 
that will serve as the standard for designating lands as "very rare or 
uncommon." This requirement will not only facilitate the adjudicative process, 
but will result in judicial review being more meaningful and 
significant.

[¶17]   The EQC cites several Wyoming cases 
in urging its claim that the designation of this area as "rare and uncommon" was 
not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Town of Torrington v. 
Envtl. Quality Council, 557 P.2d 1143 (Wyo. 1976), is cited for the proposition 
that requiring a rule for every possible matter that might come before an agency 
is unduly restrictive. The EQC fails to focus, however, on the caveat 
that:

We are careful to note at 
this point that there may be situations in which rules and regulations are 
"necessary" in connection with establishment of a new site but we must confine 
ourselves to the case at hand.

Town of 
Torrington, 557 P.2d  at 1146.

In Town of 
Torrington, the court found no necessity for a rule defining a new solid waste 
disposal site because the relevant statute, WYO. STAT. § 35-502.43 (1957) (now 
substantially amended as WYO. STAT. § 35-11-502 (Supp. 1992)), provided that 
each site must be treated on an individual basis. Thus, "the use of rules and 
regulations are of no value at least under the element of this action." Town of 
Torrington, 557 P.2d  at 1146. That case can be distinguished from this case, 
however, because there the relevant statute anticipated an ad hoc approach to 
solid waste disposal sites. In this instance, the statute particularly provides 
for the promulgation of rules and regulations necessary to administer the 
act.

[¶18]   The EQC also relies upon Thomson v. 
Wyoming In-Stream Flow Comm., 651 P.2d 778 (Wyo. 1982). In that case, the court 
held the Secretary of State did not have to promulgate rules dealing with the 
initiative process because the constitution, coupled with the applicable 
statutes, was self-executing. Thus, there was no requirement that the Secretary 
adopt rules to implement the constitutional and statutory provisions. The 
general rule there stated is that "[a] clear statutory direction is enforceable 
by an agency in accordance with its plain meaning without promulgation of the 
rule." Thomson, 651 P.2d  at 791. In this instance, there does not seem to be any 
plain meaning without promulgation of a rule that sets the statutory standards 
for arriving at a classification of lands as "very rare or uncommon." In such an 
instance, it is appropriate to require the implementation of standards pursuant 
to the rulemaking power, particularly when that authority is expressly and 
explicitly delegated in the statute.

[¶19]   We have said, in Jergeson v. Bd. of 
Trustees of Sch. Dist. No. 7, Sheridan County, 476 P.2d 481, 483-84 (Wyo. 1970) 
(footnote omitted):

As to the failure of the 
board to adopt rules and regulations required by the Act, this court has 
frequently called attention to the statutory requirement to adopt rules and 
regulations, and it is most unfortunate that various agencies have neglected so 
to do. Undoubtedly, a court would, upon request by an interested person, direct 
an agency to comply.

See Rolfes v. 
State ex rel. Burt, 464 P.2d 531 (Wyo. 1970); Scarlett v. Town Council, Town of 
Jackson, Teton County, 463 P.2d 26 (Wyo. 1969); Glenn v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 
Sheridan County, 440 P.2d 1 (Wyo. 1968).

[¶20]   We direct that the EQC adopt the 
factors and criteria which will serve as standards for the classification of 
lands as "very rare or uncommon." This direction is consistent with the cases 
set forth above as well as the statutory requirements. We reverse the decision 
of the EQC and remand this case for future determination to be made in the light 
of standards encompassing appropriate criteria and factors for the 
classification, adopted pursuant to a regular rulemaking proceeding in 
accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.

FOOTNOTES

1 Although the 
Administrative Procedure Act uses two words, "rule making," we choose to use one 
word in accordance with recent practice of the Supreme Court and Congress. 
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:2, at 4 (2d ed. 1979).