Title: Aladdin Petroleum Corporation v. Gold Crown Properties

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

221 Kan. 579 (1977)
561 P.2d 818
ALADDIN PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Appellant,
v.
GOLD CROWN PROPERTIES, INC.; GOLD CROWN, INC.; PRESIDENTIAL WOODGATE, a General Partnership consisting of Gold Crown, Inc., a Kansas Corporation, Presidential Realty Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, and M. Shapiro and Son, Inc., a New York Corporation; STEVE SCHUETZ; and COMMERCE MORTGAGE COMPANY, a Missouri Corporation, Appellees.
No. 48,127

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 5, 1977.
Robert L. Howard, of Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Phillip S. Frick, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for the appellant.
Edward Hund, of Smith, Shay, Farmer & Wetta, of Wichita, argued the cause, William Farmer and Paul Smith, of the same firm, and Blair, Matlack, Rogg, Foote & Scott, were with him on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FROMME, J.:
The questions presented by this appeal concern the extent and nature of a private right-of-way easement reserved by the grantor or seller in a real estate purchase agreement. The real estate was purchased for the construction of a high-density apartment complex. The apartment complex was built. Disagreement *580 then arose and this action was filed by the grantor. The grantor, Aladdin Petroleum Corporation, was largely owned and controlled by George H. Bruce, its president.
The names and interests of the defendants in this action are confusing. Gold Crown Properties, Inc. is the purchaser-grantee named in the real estate purchase agreement. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Gold Crown, Inc. The real estate was conveyed by warranty deed to Gold Crown, Inc., and later transferred to Presidential Woodgate, a partnership.
Presidential Woodgate is a general partnership consisting of Gold Crown, Inc., Presidential Realty Corporation and M. Shapiro and Son, Inc. Presidential Woodgate is now the owner of the real estate and it constructed and owns the apartment complex. In order to avoid any confusion of parties in discussing the case we will refer to Gold Crown Properties, Inc., Gold Crown, Inc., and Presidential Woodgate, the present owner, as the grantees both individually and collectively.
The additional defendants in the case are Steve Schuetz, president of Gold Crown, Inc., and the vice-president of Gold Crown Properties, Inc., and Commerce Mortgage Company, a Missouri corporation which financed and now holds a construction mortgage on the real estate and apartment complex.
So much for the parties  we now turn to the facts giving rise to the claims of the grantor, Aladdin Petroleum Corporation. The grantor was the owner of a 20 acre tract of land in Wichita, Kansas, described as the East half of the Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 1, Township 27 South, Range 1 East of the Sixth P.M. It was bounded on the south by 21st Street. There were no access roads on the west, north and the east of this tract. The grantees wanted to acquire the south half of this tract to construct the apartment complex. The grantor requested an easement or easements for ingress and egress to the north 10 acres which he did not sell. When the contract for sale of the south 10 acres was being negotiated the parties agreed that two rows of trees that were growing along the west side of the land being sold should be preserved. It was agreed an easement between these two rows of trees from 21st Street north to the north 10 acres would be reserved by grantor for ingress and egress. The parties further agreed if the design of the apartment complex allowed (as it eventually did) a similar easement would be reserved by grantor along the east 60 feet of the acreage being sold. When the contract was drawn no *581 measurements had been made and none of the parties knew how much land was between the west property line and the inside row of trees. All parties agreed that 60 feet should cover the space from the west property line to and including the two rows of trees.
The contract when signed included the following paragraph:
The parties agree that reference in this paragraph to "property described in paragraph 1 above" actually refers to the north 10 acres which grantor continues to own.
It was understood that zoning would have to be changed to permit the building of the apartment complex. A plat was submitted to the Wichita-Sedgwick County Metropolitan Area Planning Department by an engineering firm employed by the grantees. The plat, as originally drawn, referred to the 60-foot easements described in paragraph 8 of the contract. The engineering firm was advised by the planning department that "The reference to the private ingress-egress agreement and easement shall be deleted from the plattor's text." Copies of the letter were sent to grantor and grantees. The reference to the private easements was deleted and the plat detailing the location of the apartment complex was resubmitted and approved by the planning department. George H. Bruce, for the owner, signed the application for zoning change.
There is a conflict in the evidence as to just what happened when the sale was finally closed and the deed was delivered to the grantees. A separate agreement reserving the easement was never drawn. The deed of conveyance erroneously included the entire 20 acres and made reference in a general way to easements of record. However, the contract had not been recorded.
After the deed had been delivered and construction had begun, *582 disagreements arose between grantor and grantees. The error in the deed of conveyance was discovered. The grantees began building carports on the easement between the two rows of trees. Approximately the west 20 feet of the easement was being covered by permanent carports to be used by the persons living in the apartment complex. Between the carports and the inside row of trees a strip 24 feet in width was provided for ingress and egress. It was designated on the plat as a fire lane easement. A fire lane easement of that width was required by the Wichita building code. By separate oral agreement the grantees were to use an additional acre of the land retained by the grantor for use as a storage yard during construction. Grantor claimed that grantees had failed to fence the one acre tract as agreed and were occupying additional portions of the land which they did not own and which they refused to vacate.
The present action was filed by grantor and all claims were tried to the court. Detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law were made by the trial court. The grantor now appeals only from that portion of the judgment which deals with the easements. Its claim is for specific performance of paragraph 8 in the contract and for an injunction against the building of carports upon the easements.
In the journal entry the court held:
The first description of easement includes the entire area between the two rows of trees referred to in paragraph 8 of the contract. *583 The second description includes a like area on the east side of the 10 acre tract sold to grantees.
The court made additional findings and conclusions. (In its findings and conclusions it refers to the north acreage owned by grantor as the Bruce tract and the acreage sold to grantees as the Woodgate tract.) These findings and conclusions pertinent to this appeal are:
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The grantor-appellant contends that where the trial court has found the parties agreed to an easement for ingress and egress of specific width and definite boundaries, the owner of the dominant estate (grantor) is entitled to the undisturbed use of the entire way and its use may not be limited by the court to what may be considered reasonable or necessary. Appellant argues that the owners of the servient estate (grantees) may not erect substantial and permanent structures upon an easement for ingress and egress which will deprive the owner of the dominant estate of passage over the entire width of the easement.
The grantees-appellees contend the trial court did not determine that the parties agreed on a definite access way which was to run the length and the width of the easement area. They insist the court concluded that the parties merely agreed to a particular area within which a roadway would be constructed and that because the parties agreed only upon the outer boundaries of the general easement area there was a need for the court to establish a reasonable way within the general easement area, which it did.
The law appears to be settled that where the width, length and location of an easement for ingress and egress have been expressly set forth in the instrument the easement is specific and definite. The expressed terms of the grant or reservation are controlling in such case and considerations of what may be necessary or reasonable to a present use of the dominant estate are not controlling. If, however, the width, length and location of an easement for ingress and egress are not fixed by the terms of the grant or reservation the dominant estate is ordinarily entitled to a way of such width, length and location as is sufficient to afford necessary or reasonable ingress and egress.
In 3 Tiffany, Real Property, § 805, pp. 331, 332 (3d ed. 1939), it is said:
*585 It is stated in 28 C.J.S., Easements, § 75, p. 753:
In our present case the agreement for easement was expressed in paragraph 8 of the real estate purchase contract. The right of ingress and egress was established along and across approximately the west 60 feet of said property, "which easement shall be between the two row of trees running north and south along the west side. Said easement shall be a perpetual easement and right-of-way". In construing this provision it is apparent the west 60 feet of said property was a description of the general area and location of the easement area. The easement itself was limited to the specific area between two rows of trees, which amounted to a practical location of the right-of-way. The court specifically determined the width, length and location of the easements by metes and bounds descriptions and granted the same to appellant. The width, length and location were readily ascertainable by visual perception using the two rows of trees as points of reference.
There was conflicting testimony introduced during the trial in an effort to establish laches and estoppel against the plaintiff. Plaintiff was charged with having acquiesced in the building of carports and in accepting the 24 foot fire lane easement shown in the plat filed with the planning department in order to close the sale. However, the trial court specifically found: "Under the facts of this case, the plaintiff is not barred by the doctrines of laches and/or estoppel." It was further urged that the provision in the contract for easements was merged in and controlled by the terms of the deed. The court determined that the defense of merger was not applicable because it was shown the parties intended otherwise. See Webb v. Graham, 212 Kan. 364, Syl. 2, 510 P.2d 1195.
A cross-appeal by defendants was filed on these issues of merger, estoppel and laches and then abandoned, so we have none of these issues before us.
Once the trial court determined and granted easements of a definite width, length and location, any additional determination of reasonableness of width was inconsistent with the nature of the easement determined. The determination of a definite easement controls. There still remains, however, the question of whether carports *586 for parking are a reasonable use by a servient estate under the facts of this case.
It is well settled that the owner of the servient tenement may use the land over which the way extends in any manner which does not reasonably interfere with its use. (Potter v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 201 Kan. 528, 441 P.2d 802; 25 Am.Jur.2d, Easements and Licenses, § 89, p. 494; 28 C.J.S., Easements, § 91, pp. 770-771.)
It is stated in 25 Am.Jur.2d, Easements and Licenses, § 89, pp. 494-495:
The trial court in support of its holding that carports should be permitted on the easement stated:
However, the cases cited do not, in our opinion, support the court's application of this principle to the instant case. In Cooper v. Sawyer, 405 P.2d 394 (Hawaii, 1965), the court did approve parking if it did not interfere with the reasonable use of the easement, but it further held any parking would be subject to immediate moving of the parked vehicle to prevent its obstructing ingress and egress. This implies no permanent structures would have been permitted.
In Loveman v. Lay, 271 Ala. 385, 124 So. 2d 93, the easement was only 10 feet in width and appellant's parking interfered with ingress and egress. The court held the servient owner could not unreasonably interfere with the use of the easement by parking vehicles on it. In Keeler v. Haky, 160 Cal. App. 2d 471, 325 P.2d 648, painted stalls, marked on the easement, had been assigned to tenants living on the dominant estate. The question was whether the easement was an exclusive one. The court decided permanent *587 parking would make the use exclusive. The court held such a use was not compatible with the terms of the grant and was not a reasonable and proper enjoyment of an easement to pass and repass. The parking actually interfered with the movement of vehicles on the easement. In Feld, et al. v. Y.M. Hebrew Asn'n., 208 Miss. 451, 44 So. 2d 538, again the owners of the easement were enjoined from parking on the easement, so as to block it. In Baker v. Koslowski, 117 Vt. 124, 85 A.2d 500, there existed a 40 foot driveway-easement. The defendant was prohibited from parking on the right-of-way so as to interfere with plaintiff's free use of it.
In none of the above cases were there permanent structures involved. However, the cases would indicate that parking is allowed as long as it does not unreasonably interfere with travel on the easement. The court also cites two A.L.R. annotations. The first, Anno., Private Way  Parking, 37 A.L.R.2d, § 1, p. 944, discusses the right to park vehicles on a private way. The introductory remarks state:
The annotation states that cases have generally held there exists no absolute right to park but each has a right to park thereon "at such times and in such a manner as not to interfere with its use by the other." (p. 945.) None of the cases dealt with permanent carports as is the case here; most merely concerned parking cars so as to block the access.
The second annotation, Anno., Easement  Private Way  Reasonable Use, 3 A.L.R.3d 1256, deals with the question of whether use of an easement exceeds the privilege granted, thus unreasonably burdening the servient estate. The cases cited involve mode of use (foot traffic or various vehicles) and extent of use (purpose for which used, amount and degree of use). None of the cases are applicable here.
A case in point is Wurlitzer Co. v. State Bank, 290 Ill. 72, 124 N.E. 844. There the dispute concerned the rights of the parties to a private passageway some 18 feet in width between their respective buildings. One of the objections of the plaintiff was that the defendant had placed upright supports or pillars in the right-of-way. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in sustaining the lower *588 court's determination that said pillars were violative of the rights of the plaintiff, stated at page 82:
28 C.J.S., Easements, § 96, pp. 778-779, discusses what constitutes an obstruction:
The following language then appears in § 97, p. 779:
In our present case the easements described in paragraph 8 of the contract and determined by the trial court were for ingress and egress over a definite width, length and location. Construction of carports or other permanent obstructions over a portion of an easement for passage of a definite width wrongfully impairs and interferes with the privilege of passage which the owner of the definite easement holds. The carports were wrongfully constructed on the easement. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to have the carports removed and the case must be remanded with instructions directing the trial court to issue a mandatory injunction for that purpose.
The other portions of the judgment of the trial court from which no appeal was taken shall remain unaffected, including the holding that said easements shall terminate if the north 10 acres now owned by plaintiff is utilized or zoned for industrial use. It is noted the trial court held that these easements were inferior to the rights of *589 Commerce Mortgage Company which had no notice of the easements, either actual or constructive. No appeal was taken from those portions of the judgment and they stand adjudicated.
The judgment of the trial court as to the extent of the rights of the grantor and grantees under the easements is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to proceed in accordance with the opinions expressed herein.