Title: Ray v. Mangum

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

163 Ariz. 329 (1989) 788 P.2d 62 In re the Marriage of Clora Jacqueline RAY, Petitioner/Appellant, v. John William MANGUM, Respondent/Appellee. No. CV-89-0273-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. December 29, 1989. *330 Riley, Hoggatt & Suagee, P.C. by Richard J. Riley, Sierra Vista, for petitioner/appellant. William H. Callaway, Tucson, for respondent/appellee. CAMERON, Justice. I. JURISDICTION Clora Jacqueline Ray ("Ray") (formerly Clora Jacqueline Mangum), seeks review of a court of appeals' memorandum decision that denied her request for child support arrearages in the amount of $21,950.00. We have jurisdiction under Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3) and A.R.S. § 12-120.24. II. ISSUES III. FACTS On 31 May 1977, petitioner Ray and respondent John William Mangum ("Mangum") were divorced in Cochise County, Arizona. The court ordered Mangum to pay $200.00 per month in child support for the two children. Payments were to be made to the clerk of the court. Ray subsequently remarried and moved to Texas. In December, 1978, Mangum initiated proceedings in Texas to enforce his visitation rights. A decree was entered on 13 November 1979, granting Mangum reasonable visitation rights and ordering him to pay $200.00 per month in child support as well as provide medical insurance for the children. Again, support payments *331 were to be made through the clerk of the court. On 27 February 1987, Ray filed a motion in Texas to modify the 1979 order for child support. After the Texas motion was filed, Ray and Mangum met in Willcox, Arizona, to discuss the matter. Their daughter, Katie Mangum, was also present at the Willcox meeting. As a result of this meeting, the parties entered into a written agreement that was filed in Parker County, Texas on 18 March 1987. Ray's motion to modify the 1979 order for child support was thereafter dismissed without prejudice. The agreement, which was prepared by Mangum, provided in pertinent part: There was no reference in the agreement to past due child support. Mangum complied with the terms of the agreement. On 2 February 1988, Ray filed a petition for order to show cause in Arizona demanding, among other things, $21,950.00 in child support arrearages. The trial court denied Ray's request for past due child support, holding as follows: (Order entered in the Superior Court of Cochise County on 5 August 1988). Ray appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals agreed with the trial court's finding of waiver and/or estoppel and stated: Ray v. Mangum, No. 2 CA-CV 88-0324, Memo. Decision at 3 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 25, 1989). *332 IV. DISCUSSION A. Waiver of Child Support Arrearages Support payments may not be retroactively modified by a court nor by the divorced parents. See Lamb v. Superior Court, 127 Ariz. 400, 402, 621 P.2d 906, 908 (1980); Hatch v. Hatch, 113 Ariz. 130, 134, 547 P.2d 1044, 1048 (1976); Cordova v. Lucero, 129 Ariz. 184, 185, 629 P.2d 1020, 1021 (App. 1981). In certain fact situations, however, a custodial parent can waive the collection of child support arrearages. Cordova, 129 Ariz. at 185, 629 P.2d at 1021. "Waiver" is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right, express or inferred. American Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Ranier Const. Co., 125 Ariz. 53, 55, 607 P.2d 372, 374 (1980). Thus, to effectuate a waiver of child support arrearages, the facts must demonstrate by "clear and compelling evidence" the voluntary and intentional abandonment of a known right. Cordova, 129 Ariz. at 187, 629 P.2d at 1023 (emphasis supplied). In Cordova, the custodial parent wrote a letter to the children's father advising him that she did not want his support, that she did not want him near the children, and that she was going to have the children adopted by her new husband. No support payments were made after receipt of the letter. In addition, the custodial parent waited three and one-half years without making any further claim to arrearages. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that these facts proved by clear and compelling evidence that the custodial parent had waived her rights to collect child support arrearages. In adopting a strict standard for waiver of child support arrearages, the court of appeals recognized the importance of protecting the welfare of minor children: Cordova, 129 Ariz. at 187, 629 P.2d at 1023. The facts of the case before us are insufficient to support a finding of waiver. Not only was there no evidence whatsoever of an intent by Ray to abandon her claim to child support arrearages, there was evidence indicating that Ray's intentions were just the opposite. Furthermore, the testimony showed that there was no meeting of the minds at the Willcox meeting on the issue of past due child support. Mangum testified that although they did not discuss arrearages at the meeting, he nonetheless believed the agreement to be dispositive of all issues: Jacqueline Ray, on the other hand, testified at trial as follows: Katie Mangum corroborated her mother's testimony as to what occurred at the Willcox meeting: The court of appeals agreed with the trial court's finding that Mangum's "reasonable belief" controlled whether or not child support arrearages were waived: Ray, at 3. We disagree with this finding. The fact that Mangum believed there was a waiver and destroyed his records in reliance on this assumption is not clear and compelling evidence of a waiver by Ray. Where conflicting testimony exists and the parties' unspoken assumptions and intentions conflict, one party's belief cannot provide clear and convincing evidence of the parties agreement. Much more is needed to meet the waiver clear and compelling evidence standard, such as a waiver in writing (Cordova, supra), or an admission by the custodial parent of an intent to waive child support arrearages. See e.g., In re Szamocki's Marriage, 47 Cal. App. 3d 812, 121 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1975) (former wife waived claim to back child support where all the facts indicated that she wanted no further contact with her ex-husband nor any further support payments from him); Kaminski v. Kaminski, 8 Cal. App. 3d 563, 87 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1970) (custodial parent waived any claim to collect support arrears when she stated "I don't want anything from you at all" and denied her ex-husband his court granted visitation rights). In the instant case, the agreement was silent on arrearages and there was no indication by Ray that she waived them. Nor did any other facts indicate a waiver. In fact, unlike the custodial parent in Cordova, Kaminski, or Szamocki, Ray wanted to continue receiving support payments in the future, and, additionally, to have them increased. Based on Ray's testimony at trial, she believed that her rights to child support arrearages were intact. While this fact alone is not controlling, an agreement to increase child support is certainly not inconsistent with this belief. Nor is such an agreement inconsistent with a claim for past due child support. We hold that, under the facts of this case, there was not clear and compelling evidence that Ray waived her claim to past due child support. B. The Agreement as an Estoppel The court of appeals found that by signing the March 1987 agreement the parties waived the collection of arrearages. However, the agreement itself made no mention of child support arrearages. Nevertheless, the court of appeals believed that Mangum destroyed his records of past child support in reliance on the 1987 agreement, and could therefore assert the defense of estoppel. The elements necessary to support an equitable estoppel are: Heltzel v. Mecham Pontiac, 152 Ariz. 58, 61, 730 P.2d 235, 238 (1986) (quoting from Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 394, 682 P.2d 388, 399 (1984)). We believe that entering into an agreement to increase child support from $200.00 a month to $450.00 a month is not conduct that would induce a person to reasonably believe that all past due child support would be forgiven. More importantly, we believe that it is not reasonable to rely on something that was, by Mangum's own admission, never discussed and never reduced *334 to writing. Mangum, therefore, had no reason to believe that Ray was waiving her right to claim child support arrearages and thus no reason to destroy his past records of child support. Although it may be difficult for Mangum on remand to prove how much child support he paid, the fact that he destroyed his past records does not in itself prove justifiable reliance. We note, in this regard, that the divorce decree ordered Mangum to make payments through the clerk of the court of Cochise County. Mangum admitted that he made no payments in this manner. The Parker County, Texas court entered a similar order in the proceeding brought by Mangum to enforce his visitation rights. Some checks were sent to the clerk of the Texas court and a record of those payments was maintained. Mangum should, of course, be credited with non-recorded support payments, provided he can prove they were made. If, however, Mangum cannot satisfactorily show that such payments were made, the records of the Cochise and Parker County court clerks should prevail. We hold that the facts are insufficient to support a finding of estoppel. Reversed and remanded to determine the amount of child support in arrears. GORDON, C.J., FELDMAN, V.C.J., and MOELLER and CORCORAN, JJ., concur.