Title: Brandy B. v. Eden Central School District

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

- 1 -
=================================================================
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
No. 94  
Brandy B., &c.,
            Appellant,
        v.
Eden Central School District,
et al.,
            Respondents,
et al.,
            Defendant.
(And a Third-Party Action.)
John A. Collins, for appellant.
Julie Pasquariello Apter, for respondents Eden Central
School District et al.
Michael J. Willett, for respondent Eden County Child
and Family Services.
JONES, J.:
In this action against defendants Eden Central School
District and Child and Family Services of Erie County (CFS) for
damages resulting from an alleged sexual assault committed by an
11-year-old student upon a five-year-old student, the issues are
whether (1) the school district had sufficiently specific
- 2 -
No. 94
- 2 -
knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused the
injury so that the third-party act could have been reasonably
anticipated and (2) CFS had a duty to warn the child-offender's
foster parents and others of the need to closely supervise him. 
We hold that the school district proved as a matter of law that
they did not have sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of
the injury-causing conduct.  As to CFS, plaintiff did not set
forth a prima facie claim against it.
Robert F., born October 1991, has a troubling history. 
Based upon records from multiple sources, he was removed from his
parents' home at age three due to neglect and possible physical
abuse.  After living in foster care for several years, he resided
with his father, step-mother and several siblings until he was
hospitalized at age nine because he displayed severe aggression
in the home.  
In October 2000, Robert was admitted to Western New
York Children's Psychiatric Center, where he resided until his
placement at Crestwood Children's Center in January 2001. 
Crestwood's assessment of Robert, dated September 2001, noted his
risk behavior involved: "verbal aggression, aggression towards
himself and others, threats with weapons, fire setting,
hyperactivity, impulsivity, auditory hallucinations, history of
stealing, temper tantrums, poor peer relations, academic
problems, and history of suicidal injurious ideation's."  The
assessment further stated that he had not "presented any of his
- 3 -
No. 94
- 3 -
referral symptoms since admission."  Crestwood also recommended
that Robert receive "a lower level of care in the form of
community residence," noting that he "has been free from self-
harm as well as not harming or threatening others."  
In January 2002, Robert entered the Lee Randall Jones
Community Residence.  At the same time, he was enrolled at the
Stanley G. Falk School.  A Counseling Individualized Education
Plan (IEP) Summary Review conducted by the Falk School in
February 2002 indicated that Robert was "a pleasant boy who
appears to be adapting well to his structured school environment
. . . [who] displays appropriate social skills in his
interactions with others including, greetings, eye contact,
taking turns and sharing."  The review considered behavior
concerns for Robert, which included restless and distractive
behavior, and concluded that the Falk School was "appropriate in
the least restrictive environment to meet his varied needs."  In
August 2002, Samantha Heise, Robert's case coordinator at the
community residence, wrote that "Robert ha[d] not had one
incident of physical aggression towards others or himself since
admission."  She noted that he had positive peer interaction.  A
second counseling IEP summary review provided by the Falk School
and the community residence's "Admissions Committee Meeting Case
Presentation" summarized Robert's prior acts, including behaviors
detailed herein, as well as exposing himself and masturbating in
public.  It appears that Robert's stated history predates his
- 4 -
No. 94
- 4 -
hospitalization.  
Sometime in 2002, Robert began residing with foster
parents.  In September 2002, he was transferred to the Eden
Central School District to attend fifth grade.  Robert's December
2002 IEP prepared by the school's committee recommended that he
be placed in general education classes for science and social
studies.  In an undated, 2002-2003 Eden Central School District
progress report, it was noted that: "Robert has a friendly
personality.  He was very polite with his peers and teachers.  He
will continue to need support for social and emotional
development next year."  Regarding his social and emotional
development, his 2002-2003 IEP stated that he was immature for
his age, seeking physical hugs and attention from adults, but
that he did not need escorts or restraints.  He was also assigned
individual counseling and group counseling once a week throughout
the school year.  
In September 2002, Brenna B., who lived in the same
neighborhood as Robert, started kindergarten with the Eden
Central School District.  Brenna and Robert rode the same school
bus.  It was there that the alleged sexual assault occurred in
March 2003.  Brenna's mother, Brandy B., had received some notice
from Brenna of inappropriate interactions between the two
children, namely, that Robert called Brenna his girlfriend; she
spoke to the bus driver and requested that the two children not
sit together.  Thereafter, Brenna told her mother that Robert had
- 5 -
No. 94
- 5 -
exposed himself to her while sitting together on the school bus,
and forced her to touch him. 
Brandy commenced this action against the school
district for injuries resulting from the alleged sexual assault
based upon inadequate supervision of the children and against CFS
for failing to warn the foster parents of the need to closely
supervise Robert.  Supreme Court granted defendants summary
judgment dismissing the complaint.  The Appellate Division
affirmed (63 AD3d 1583).  Plaintiff appeals by leave of this
Court.  We now affirm.   
       
It is well-settled that schools have a duty to
adequately supervise their students, and "will be held liable for
foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of
adequate supervision" (Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 49
[1994], citing, Lawes v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 16 NY2d
302, 306 [1965]; Decker v Dundee Cent. School Dist., 4 NY2d 462,
464 [1958]).  However, unanticipated third-party acts causing
injury upon a fellow student will generally not give rise to a
school's liability in negligence absent actual or constructive
notice of prior similar conduct (see id.).  "[I]t must be
established that school authorities had sufficiently specific
knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury;
that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have been
anticipated" (id., citing Bertola v Board of Educ, 1 AD2d 873 [2d
Dept 1956]).  Summary judgment must be granted if the proponent
- 6 -
No. 94
- 6 -
makes "a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a
matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the
absence of any material issues of fact," and the opponent fails
to rebut that showing (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324
[1986]).  
Here, the alleged sexual assault against Brenna was an
unforeseeable act that, without sufficiently specific knowledge
or notice, could not have been reasonably anticipated by the
school district.  Robert's history demonstrates that he had
severe behavioral issues that had not manifested themselves
for more than two years.  Since his initial hospitalization in
2000, each program noted that he had not displayed any aggression
towards anyone, and, because of his behavioral improvements, he
was approved for less restrictive programs.  More significantly,
his prior history did not include any sexually aggressive
behavior.  Thus, without evidence of any prior conduct similar to
the unanticipated injury-causing act, this claim for negligent
supervision must fail.  
Additionally, Brandy's reliance upon her statement to
the bus driver -- that she did not want the two children sitting
together -- and Robert's behavioral history as notice is
unavailing.  Brandy's statement did not name Robert or attribute
any misbehavior to the unidentified boy that Brandy wanted to
separate from her daughter.  Moreover, his past conduct without
any subsequent incident of aggression was far too removed to
- 7 -
No. 94
- 7 -
require that the school district provide Robert an aide or that
CFS warn others of Robert's past.  Therefore, because defendants
demonstrated that they had no specific knowledge or notice of any
similar conduct which caused the injury and plaintiff presented
no triable issue of fact, the courts below properly granted them
summary judgment.  
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed, with costs.
- 1 -
Brandy B. v Eden Ctrl School Dist., et al.
No. 94 
CIPARICK, J. (dissenting in part):
Because I believe a reasonable jury could find that
sufficient notice was given to Eden Central School District and
Eden Central School District Board of Education (collectively,
the school defendants) and that the sexual assault here was a
"foreseeable injur[y] proximately related to the absence of
adequate supervision" (Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 49
[1994]), I respectfully dissent from the majority's holding as it
relates to the school defendants. 
A plaintiff attempting to hold a school district liable
for harm to one student caused by another must satisfy a two-part
test (see Mirand, 84 NY2d at 49-50).  First, to show that the
school negligently breached its duty to supervise, a plaintiff
must establish "that school authorities had sufficiently specific
knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused [the]
injury; that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have
been anticipated" (id. at 49).  Second, this breach must have
been the proximate cause of the injury, i.e. "under all the
circumstances the chain of events that followed the negligent act
or omission was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the
- 2 -
No. 94
- 2 -
situation created by the school's negligence" (id. at 50, citing
Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp., 51 NY2d 308, 315 [1980]).  Here,
a reasonable jury could find both prongs of the test satisfied.
The overarching question, as we emphasized in
Mirand, is whether circumstances would have put a "reasonable
person on notice to protect against the injury-causing act"
(Mirand, 84 NY2d at 49).  This notice may come either from prior,
similarly dangerous conduct or from other circumstances that
render the injury foreseeable (see e.g. id. at 49-51 [affirming
liability where school knew of threats to plaintiff and "the jury
needed little more than its own common experience to conclude"
that there should have been greater supervision]).  Thus, the
Appellate Divisions have found circumstances in which the absence
of supervision, without any more specific notice, is so egregious
as to give rise to liability (see Doe v Fulton School Dist., 35
AD3d 1194, 1195 [4th Dept 2006]).  In Fulton School Dist., for
example, the Fourth Department held that "a jury could find that
[the alleged sexual assault] was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the District's failure to provide adequate
supervision . . . even in the absence of notice of a prior sexual
assault" (id. at 1195).  Similarly, the Third Department has
found that circumstances may be sufficient "to put defendants on
notice of a potentially harmful situation" where a twelve-year-
old student repeatedly sexually assaulted a six-year-old student
because "the instances of inappropriate touching occurred on
- 3 -
No. 94
- 3 -
multiple occasions in two different locations over a period of
time" (Doe v Board of Educ. of Morris Cent. School, 9 AD3d 588,
591 [2004]).  Here, a reasonable jury could find that
circumstances were sufficient to put the school defendants on
notice that closer supervision was appropriate.   
While Robert's history of mental illness alone
might not "put a reasonable person on notice" that he would
sexually assault a fellow student (see Mirand, 84 NY2d at 49),
this history must be read in conjunction with the school's actual
knowledge that he was frequently interacting closely with a
kindergartner on the school bus.  As the school defendants
indisputably knew, Robert has a history of sometimes violent
behavior as well as inappropriate sexual behavior, including
exposing himself and masturbating in public.  Although he has
made remarkable progress, a jury could find that the mother's
communications with the bus driver put the school defendants on
notice that something unusual was going on between Robert, an
eleven-year-old with a history of serious mental illness, and
Brenna, a five-year-old who regularly sat with him.  According to
the mother's deposition testimony, she told the driver that
"Brenna, who was in kindergarten, seems to be interacting with
this twelve-year-old [sic]."  She allegedly followed up with two
letters to the driver, one requesting that her two children sit
together and a second requesting that the driver call her to
discuss the situation.  These communications between the mother
- 4 -
No. 94
- 4 -
and the driver, considered along with Robert's history, are
enough to allow a reasonable jury to find that the school
defendants had sufficient notice of a dangerous situation and
could have anticipated the sexual assault.
With respect to proximate cause, the second prong
of the Mirand test, a reasonable jury could find that the absence
of adequate supervision on the bus was a proximate cause of
Brenna's injury.  As we noted in Mirand, "[p]roximate cause is a
question of fact for the jury where varying inferences are
possible" (84 NY2d at 51). 
Although I would permit the negligent supervision
action to go forward against the school defendants, I agree with
the majority that the action against Child and Family Services of
Erie County (CFS) was properly dismissed.  The complaint alleges
that CFS failed to warn the school and foster family that Robert
needed close supervision at all times, but there is no evidence
that it withheld any information or could have anticipated that
Robert would sexually assault a fellow student. 
Therefore, I would modify by affirming the
Appellate Division's grant of summary judgment to CFS and
reversing its order granting summary judgment to the school
defendants, and I would reinstate the amended complaint as to the
school defendants.  
- 5 -
No. 94
- 5 -
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed, with costs.  Opinion by Judge Jones.  Judges
Graffeo, Read, Smith and Pigott concur.  Judge Ciparick dissents
in part and votes to modify in an opinion in which Chief Judge
Lippman concurs. 
Decided June 10, 2010