Title: Commonwealth v. Pickering

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12312 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JONATHAN PICKERING. 
 
 
 
Essex.     December 5, 2017. - May 22, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, 
JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Probation, Revocation of probation.  
Evidence, Communication between patient and 
psychotherapist, Privileged communication.  
Psychotherapist.  Privileged Communication. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 4, 2014. 
 
 
A proceeding for revocation of probation was heard by 
Timothy Q. Feeley, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Emily A. Cardy, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
Kenneth E. Steinfield, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  While serving a probationary term in connection 
with two convictions of open and gross lewdness, the defendant 
2 
 
 
endeavored to meet a person whom he believed was a thirteen year 
old boy so that he could perform sexual acts on him.  Following 
a probation violation hearing, a judge in the Superior Court 
concluded that the defendant had violated his probation by 
committing child enticement in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 26C.  
The defendant appealed, claiming that the exclusion of certain 
testimony violated his constitutional right to present a 
defense, and we granted his application for direct appellate 
review.  Specifically, he argues that the judge's sua sponte 
ruling to exclude the admission of certain evidence as violative 
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, G. L. c. 233, § 20B, 
deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense.  
Without deciding whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege 
applies to group therapy, we agree that the judge's evidentiary 
ruling that the psychotherapist-patient privilege applied here 
was erroneous because there was no evidence that the privilege 
would have been applicable in these circumstances.  However, the 
defendant was not precluded from presenting the evidence at 
issue in this appeal, and he presented other evidence of 
arguably more weight on the same issue.  Moreover, the excluded 
evidence was of minimal probative value, and the Commonwealth 
presented overwhelming evidence that the defendant violated his 
probation.  Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant's 
constitutional right to present a defense was not violated and 
3 
 
 
exclusion of certain statements did not create a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts as they were developed at 
the defendant's probation violation hearing.  In 2014, the 
defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of open and gross 
lewdness in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 16, and received a 
suspended term of incarceration and a five-year term of 
probation.  The defendant's probation included special 
conditions that prohibited him from having unsupervised contact 
with children under age sixteen, and required him to undergo sex 
offender treatment.  To fulfil this requirement, the defendant 
attended weekly group therapy sessions for sex offenders.  These 
sessions were facilitated by a therapy "group leader," who 
supervised a group of approximately eight sex offenders, some of 
whom had been convicted of sexually abusing children.1  In order 
to maintain a level of anonymity, the participants would only 
refer to each other by first name during the group therapy 
sessions. 
 
Another participant in the defendant's sex offender therapy 
group, whom we shall call David Sawyer, attended the same group 
therapy sessions as the defendant for approximately six months.  
                                                          
 
1 The record before the court is silent concerning the 
therapy group leader's qualifications or whether that person 
would have met the description of a psychotherapist under      
G. L. c. 233, § 20B. 
4 
 
 
Sawyer did not speak much during those sessions and described 
himself as a "listener," in contrast to the defendant, who spoke 
rather often.  Although the two men attended the same group 
therapy sessions, they did not have a close relationship, and 
they never communicated or met outside those sessions.  Indeed, 
Sawyer never used his last name in group therapy and never 
provided it to the other group members.  However, there was 
evidence that the group therapy participants recorded their 
first and last names on a sign-in sheet when they attended the 
group therapy, for purposes of keeping attendance and reporting 
to the probation department.2 
 
During the time that Sawyer and the defendant were 
attending the same group therapy sessions, Sawyer came across a 
personal advertisement that the defendant had posted on the 
Internet Web site Craigslist.  The subject of the defendant's 
advertisement was, "Naked Driving and more - m4m."  The 
advertisement included a message stating that the defendant was 
seeking to meet "young guys," under twenty-five years old, to 
engage in various sexual acts.  The advertisement did not 
include the defendant's name, but Sawyer recognized the 
defendant from the photographs included in the advertisement, 
one of which depicted the defendant in the nude. 
                                                          
 
2 It was unclear whether and to what extent the therapy 
group participants could see each other's full names on the 
sign-in sheet. 
5 
 
 
 
Sawyer testified that he was concerned that the defendant's 
advertisement indicated that the defendant was seeking to meet 
underage people in order to engage in sexual conduct.  To 
determine whether Sawyer's concern was well founded, Sawyer 
responded by electronic mail (e-mail) message to the defendant's 
advertisement, claiming to be a thirteen year old boy who was 
interested in meeting the defendant.3  The ensuing e-mail 
exchange involved the defendant sending multiple sexually 
explicit messages seeking to meet the boy and perform sexual 
acts on him.  Moreover, on multiple occasions the defendant 
sought to confirm his understanding that the person he was 
communicating with was a thirteen year old boy.  In one such e-
mail message, the defendant requested a photograph of the boy so 
that he could verify that he was communicating with a thirteen 
year old boy and "[n]ot a cop or someone else."  Sawyer 
responded by sending the defendant a photograph of a young boy 
that he found as a result of searching for "cute young boy" on 
the Internet.  After receiving that photograph, the defendant 
made the additional request that the boy send a nude photograph 
of himself.  Sawyer declined, stating, "Absolutely not. . . .  
For your own good."  The defendant responded, stating his 
                                                          
 
3 Although we describe the electronic mail exchange (e-mail) 
as the defendant communicating with a child for the sake of 
clarity, no children were involved in the correspondence. 
6 
 
 
approval, "Good answer. . . .  I await your next contact. . . .  
You seem concerned about me . . . and you." 
 
Throughout the course of this correspondence, Sawyer took 
precautions to conceal his identity and maintain the illusion 
that he was a thirteen year old boy.  Sawyer did this by using a 
privacy setting on the Craigslist Web site.  When this setting 
is applied, the recipient of an e-mail message can see only a 
generic alpha-numeric address and not the sender's personal e-
mail address.  Moreover, Sawyer steadfastly maintained that he 
was a thirteen year old boy throughout the exchange; the 
defendant never indicated that he was aware that he was 
communicating with anyone other than a thirteen year old boy. 
 
Sawyer eventually sent the sexually explicit e-mail 
exchange between him and the defendant to the therapy group 
leader.  He did so anonymously and under the guise of a 
"concerned friend."4  The therapy group leader forwarded the 
messages to the State police, and an investigation ensued.  
Because Sawyer did not reveal that he was the author of the 
messages, the investigation proceeded with the understanding 
that the defendant had been communicating with a child.  Shortly 
after the investigation began, the defendant's probation officer 
                                                          
 
4 Sawyer testified that he identified himself as a 
"concerned friend" to obscure his identity from the group leader 
and make it seem like a friend of the defendant's had discovered 
the e-mail exchange.  He further testified that he and the 
defendant were not friends. 
7 
 
 
issued a notice of probation violation to him, stating that the 
defendant had violated his probation by having unsupervised 
contact with a child under sixteen years old.  The defendant was 
detained without bail pending his probation violation hearing. 
 
The defendant does not contest that he was the author of 
the advertisement or that he used his personal e-mail address to 
post the advertisement on Craigslist.  Furthermore, the e-mail 
address that he used to post the personal advertisement at issue 
here is the same address that the defendant had used to post a 
similar personal advertisement in 2009, which led to his prior 
conviction of enticement of a child.5 
 
At some point during the investigation, the police 
discovered that Sawyer had been the person corresponding with 
the defendant, not a thirteen year old boy.  A State police 
trooper interviewed Sawyer, and Sawyer admitted to authoring the 
e-mail messages.  During this interview, the trooper also 
inquired into Sawyer's criminal background.  Sawyer acknowledged 
                                                          
 
5 In the prior case, the defendant had posted a personal 
advertisement on the Internet Web site Craigslist.  An 
undercover police officer replied to the defendant's 
advertisement and pretended to be a thirteen year old boy.  The 
defendant and the person whom he believed was a thirteen year 
old boy engaged in a sexually explicit e-mail exchange.  The 
defendant set up a meeting with the purported child at a 
restaurant, and he was subsequently arrested when he arrived.  
As discussed infra, this was properly admitted, not for 
propensity purposes but to rebut the defendant's defense that he 
was aware that he was speaking with an adult when he attempted 
to meet the purported thirteen year old boy in this case. 
8 
 
 
that he had been charged with statutory rape and pleaded guilty 
to the lesser charges of indecent assault and battery on a child 
and child enticement.  Sawyer explained that when he was 
eighteen years old, he began dating a person whom he believed to 
be sixteen years old.  Eventually, that individual revealed to 
Sawyer that he was actually only thirteen years old; Sawyer 
immediately ended the relationship.  Sawyer was adamant that the 
situation was a misunderstanding.  Moreover, Sawyer stated that 
he has no sexual interest in children. 
 
After police discovered that Sawyer was the author of the 
messages purporting to be from a child, the Commonwealth amended 
the defendant's notice of probation violation to reflect that he 
violated his probation by committing the crime of child 
enticement.  At the defendant's probation violation hearing, the 
defendant's theory of defense was that he knew that he had been 
communicating with Sawyer, not a thirteen year old boy, and the 
two men were engaging in a fantasy role play.  The defendant 
argued that he did not have the requisite intent to commit the 
crime of child enticement because he knew that he was not 
communicating with a child.  In support of this theory, the 
defendant presented testimony from a digital forensic analyst, 
who examined the messages at issue, which had been recovered 
from the defendant's cellular telephone.  The analyst opined 
that it was possible, despite the e-mail privacy setting, that 
9 
 
 
"David Sawyer" may have appeared as the sender of the messages.  
Based on the way they were saved, the analyst conceded that he 
could not determine whether the defendant actually saw Sawyer's 
name or the anonymized e-mail address when the defendant 
received the messages. 
 
Throughout the probation violation hearing, the 
Commonwealth and defense counsel sought to elicit testimony 
concerning the substance of discussions that had occurred in the 
course of the sex offender group therapy sessions.  On numerous 
occasions the judge expressed concern that statements made 
during group therapy sessions were protected by the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.  Defense counsel agreed with 
the judge that the privilege applied, but nevertheless sought to 
elicit testimony that Sawyer had told the therapy group about 
Sawyer's own convictions of indecent assault and battery on a 
child and child enticement.  The judge ruled that he would not 
allow the defendant to testify about what Sawyer had said in 
group therapy without a waiver from Sawyer, the presumed 
privilege holder.6 
                                                          
 
6 On the first day of the hearing, the judge initially 
stated that he would not allow Sawyer to testify about what was 
said during the group therapy sessions.  However, as discussed 
infra, on the second day of the hearing the judge stated that he 
would allow Sawyer to testify about Sawyer's own statements 
during group therapy. 
10 
 
 
On the second day of the probation violation hearing, 
defense counsel began by reaffirming her belief, and the judge's 
concern, that the conversations that occurred during group 
therapy were privileged.  Defense counsel again sought to admit 
testimony that Sawyer had told the therapy group about his own 
convictions for purposes of showing the defendant's state of 
mind.  Defense counsel argued that although the privilege 
applied, Sawyer had waived it by speaking with the police and 
independently discussing his convictions.  Defense counsel 
proffered that the testimony she intended to elicit from Sawyer 
would be consistent with what Sawyer told police about his 
convictions.7  The judge reaffirmed his prior ruling that the 
defendant could not testify about what Sawyer had said during 
group therapy.  However, the judge concluded that if Sawyer 
wanted to testify about his own statements during group therapy, 
that evidence would be admissible.  Despite this ruling, defense 
counsel did not question Sawyer about what Sawyer had said 
during group therapy. 
 
Based on the evidence presented, the judge concluded that 
the defendant had violated his probation by committing child 
enticement and sentenced the defendant to serve the balance of 
his remaining sentence. 
                                                          
 
7 Defense counsel presented a transcript of the pertinent 
portion of Sawyer's interview with police in support of the 
proffer. 
11 
 
 
 
Discussion.  Although this case appears to raise the issue 
whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege applies to group 
therapy, the record here does not provide an adequate basis for 
this court's determination whether, and to what extent, the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege applies in that context.8  
Assuming, without deciding, that the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege applies to group therapy, no evidence was presented to 
establish that the privilege would have been applicable here.  
The psychotherapist-patient privilege only applies where the 
therapy is administered by a "psychotherapist," as that term is 
defined by G. L. c. 233, § 20B.  Here, there was no evidence 
concerning the group leader's qualifications or whether that 
person met the statutory definition of a psychotherapist.  See 
                                                          
 
8 The course of the proceedings and the discussion of the 
potential application of the privilege during the hearing 
clearly illustrate why the record before us is inadequate to 
address the applicability of the privilege.  Most notably, 
defense counsel represented to the judge on several occasions 
that the privilege indeed applied in this case, despite the fact 
that the privilege had not been invoked, but defense counsel 
nevertheless sought to admit this testimony, arguing that Sawyer 
had waived any such privilege.  Simply stated, the legal 
argument advanced by the defendant at the hearing concerning the 
contours of the psychotherapist-patient privilege cuts against 
the defendant's personal interest and his argument now on 
appeal.  Even setting aside that substantial hurdle, as 
discussed infra, the record is inadequate for this court to 
consider whether, and to what extent, the psychotherapist-
patient privilege applies to group therapy.  We further note 
that here it was the defendant who assumed that the privilege 
applied while simultaneously arguing against it.  Given these 
peculiarities, we leave for another day whether the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege proscribed by G. L. c. 233, 
§ 20B, applies to group therapy. 
12 
 
 
id.  Moreover, similar to other statutory and common-law 
privileges that are not self-executing, the psychotherapist-
patient privilege must be invoked or asserted by the privilege 
holder.  See Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 438 Mass. 325, 331 (2002) 
("some action by the patient or client is necessary to 
'exercise' the privilege"); Mass. G. Evid. § 503 (2018).  The 
potential privilege holder in this case, Sawyer, did not invoke 
the privilege.  Instead, the judge was concerned that the 
privilege applied here and ruled that the defendant could not 
testify about what Sawyer had said during group therapy.  Even 
if we were to assume that the privilege applied to group 
therapy, the judge erred in concluding that the privilege 
required the exclusion of certain evidence because these 
prerequisites were not satisfied. 
 
In the defendant's view, the erroneous exclusion of 
evidence concerning what Sawyer had said to the therapy group 
about his own convictions violated the defendant's due process 
right to present a defense at his probation violation hearing.  
See Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 464 Mass. 315, 322 (2013) ("right to 
present a defense in probation revocation proceedings . . . is 
parallel to, but not coextensive with, the right to present a 
defense at trial").  However, we are mindful that a "defendant 
is not necessarily deprived of the right to present his theory 
of defense simply because the judge excludes a piece of evidence 
13 
 
 
supporting such theory."  Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 724, 
743 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 464 Mass. 16, 19 n.5 
(2012).  Accordingly, a claim that evidence was erroneously 
excluded does not constitute a per se violation of the 
defendant's constitutional right to present a defense.  See 
Commonwealth v. Vardinski, 438 Mass. 444, 449 n.11 (2003), 
quoting Commonwealth v. McAfee, 430 Mass. 483, 491 n.3 (1999) 
("Evidentiary rules of exclusion do not abridge an accused's 
right to present a defense so long as they are not 'arbitrary' 
or 'disproportionate to the purposes that they are designed to 
serve'").  Because the defendant did not object to the judge's 
conclusion that the psychotherapist-patient privilege applied 
here, and in fact argued that the privilege did apply, we review 
the defendant's claimed error to determine whether exclusion of 
certain evidence created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 556, 563-564 
(1967). 
 
The core of the defendant's argument is that testimony 
about what Sawyer said in group therapy about his own 
convictions would have been probative of the defendant's state 
of mind.  According to the defendant, evidence of his state of 
mind -- that the defendant was aware of Sawyer's sexual 
proclivities -- would have supported the theory that the 
defendant knew he was exchanging e-mail messages with Sawyer, 
14 
 
 
rather than a thirteen year old boy.  This argument fails for a 
number of reasons. 
 
First, the defendant was not foreclosed from eliciting the 
testimony.  The record shows that, although the judge ruled that 
the defendant could not testify about what he had heard Sawyer 
say in group therapy, the judge did not foreclose the defendant 
from questioning Sawyer on cross-examination about what Sawyer 
had said in group therapy sessions.  Indeed, on several 
occasions the judge stated that Sawyer would be permitted to 
testify about what he had told the group concerning his 
convictions.  However, defense counsel chose not to question 
Sawyer about what he had said in group therapy.9  This may have 
been a strategic decision by defense counsel, who stated that 
                                                          
 
9 Rather, the defendant took the position that since Sawyer 
disclosed to the State police trooper similar information to 
what he had said in group therapy, the privilege was waived.  
This is not our law.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 523 (c) (1).  The 
fact that Sawyer reiterated factual information that he 
previously had discussed during group therapy, and which existed 
independent of the group therapy, would not have undermined the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege had it applied here.  See 
Robinson v. Commonwealth, 399 Mass. 131, 135 (1987) (that some 
information patient communicated to psychiatrist was later 
repeated to others is irrelevant for purposes of waiver 
analysis).  We have held that the mere fact "[t]hat a client 
tells a friend what he also tells his attorney in no way 
undermines the attorney-client privilege as to what was 
communicated to the attorney."  Id.  See generally Commonwealth 
v. Goldman, 395 Mass. 495, 499-500, cert denied, 474 U.S. 906 
(1985) (witness who testifies as to specific content of 
privileged communication may waive privilege, but witness does 
not waive privilege by testifying as to events which may have 
been topic of privileged communication). 
15 
 
 
she expected that Sawyer would testify consistently with what he 
had told the trooper about his own convictions.  However, much 
of Sawyer's statement to the trooper did not inure to the 
defendant's benefit or support the defendant's theory of 
defense, where Sawyer said that his convictions arose from a 
misunderstanding and that he did not have any sexual interest in 
children. 
 
Second, even if this testimony had been admitted, it had 
minimal probative value.  "Evidence is relevant if (a) it has 
any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence and (b) the fact is of consequence in 
determining the action."  Mass. G. Evid. § 401 (2018).  See 
Commonwealth v. Gerhardt, 477 Mass. 775, 782 (2017).  Relevant 
evidence "need not establish directly the proposition sought; it 
must only provide a link in the chain of proof" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Sicari, 434 Mass. 732, 750 (2001), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1142 (2005). 
 
Defense counsel sought to elicit testimony that Sawyer had 
told the sex offender therapy group that he had been convicted 
of indecent assault and battery on a child and child enticement.  
The defendant claims that this testimony was relevant to show 
the defendant's state of mind because evidence that Sawyer had 
told the therapy group about his convictions was indicative of 
Sawyer's sexual proclivities.  According to the defendant, his 
16 
 
 
presumed knowledge of Sawyer's sexual proclivities would have 
been relevant to establish the defendant's knowledge that he was 
corresponding with Sawyer, not a thirteen year old boy, 
throughout the e-mail exchange. 
 
The nexus between the defendant's knowledge of Sawyer's 
convictions and the contention that he knew he was communicating 
with Sawyer throughout the e-mail exchanges is attenuated at 
best, and depends on multiple unsupported inferential leaps. 
Indeed, the defendant has failed to articulate clearly how 
evidence of Sawyer's convictions would have informed the 
defendant that he was communicating with Sawyer.  Critically, 
Sawyer's convictions did not involve the solicitation of an 
underage person on the Internet or role playing, particularly 
role playing where Sawyer assumed the role of a child .   
Moreover, as stated supra, defense counsel expected that 
Sawyer's statement in group therapy would be consistent with 
what he had told police:  that he had no sexual interest in 
children. 
 
Third, the defendant's claim of an infringement on his 
right to present a defense is further belied by the fact that he 
presented other compelling evidence that was more probative of 
his theory of defense.  The defendant submitted evidence that 
supported an inference that he knew Sawyer's full name, because 
the sign-in sheet at the group therapy meetings listed each 
17 
 
 
participant's full name and was open for each of the people to 
see.  This evidence, coupled with the defense expert's opinion 
that it was possible that the defendant saw the name "David 
Sawyer" as the sender of the e-mail messages, permitted the 
inference that the defendant knew it was Sawyer from the therapy 
group who had sent him the messages.  Although these potential 
inferences did not ultimately carry the day, they were more 
probative of the defendant's theory of defense than the 
testimony that is the subject of this appeal.  Accordingly, not 
only was the defendant not prevented from presenting a defense, 
he likely presented the best defense available to him, so 
exclusion of the evidence at issue did not create a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
We are further convinced that the erroneous application of 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege did not create a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice because the 
Commonwealth presented overwhelming evidence to establish that 
the defendant committed the crime of child enticement.  Sawyer 
testified that he and the defendant had never communicated 
outside group therapy sessions, and that he never used his full 
name in those sessions or provided it to any member of the 
group.  There also is nothing in the substance of the sexually 
explicit e-mail exchange indicating that the defendant was 
cognizant that he was speaking with anyone other than a thirteen 
18 
 
 
year old boy.  The defendant confirmed on multiple occasions 
that he was communicating with a thirteen year old boy, 
expressed a desire to perform sexual acts on the boy, and 
requested a nude photograph of the boy.  Furthermore, the 
defendant's expert conceded that he could not determine 
conclusively whether the defendant actually saw Sawyer's full 
name when he received the e-mail messages or whether that was 
merely a function of how the cellular telephone saved the 
messages. 
 
To show the defendant's intent and rebut his contention 
that he was engaged in a role play, the Commonwealth also 
submitted evidence that the defendant had been convicted of a 
prior act of enticing a child through a Craigslist personal 
advertisement.  See note 5, supra.  Similar to the circumstances 
here, the defendant had been communicating with an adult (an 
undercover police officer) who pretended to be an underage 
child.  This evidence was properly admitted for the purpose of 
establishing the defendant's state of mind and to rebut the 
defendant's claim that he was aware that he was not 
communicating with a child.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 404 (b) 
(2018). 
 
Conclusion.  We affirm the judge's conclusion that the 
defendant violated his probation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.