Title: People v. Rhoades

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF  
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ROBERT BOYD RHOADES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S082101 
 
Sacramento County Superior Court 
98F00230 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
November 25, 2019 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye, Justices Chin, Corrigan, 
Cuéllar, and Groban concurred. 
 
Justice Liu filed a dissenting opinion. 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
S082101 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant Robert Boyd Rhoades was convicted of the first 
degree murder of Michael Lyons, with special circumstances of 
murder in the commission of forcible sodomy, murder in the 
commission of a lewd act on a child, and murder by torture.  He 
was sentenced to death for the crime.  In this automatic appeal 
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b)), 
we now affirm the judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
On May 16, 1996, eight-year-old Michael Lyons went 
missing after attending school in Yuba City.  His body was found 
the next day on the banks of the Feather River.  He had been 
stabbed to death sometime between the late afternoon of May 
16 and the early morning of May 17.  Defendant was tied to the 
crime mainly by physical evidence indicating that Michael was 
attacked in defendant’s pickup truck, which was found stuck in 
the muddy river banks on May 17, and that the murder weapon 
was a fishing knife defendant kept in the back of his truck.   
Defendant was charged in Sutter County with first degree 
murder (count 1; Pen. Code, § 187) with special circumstances 
of murder in the commission of kidnapping, murder in the 
commission of sodomy, murder in the commission of a lewd act 
on a child, and intentional murder involving the infliction of 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
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torture (id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B), (a)(17)(D), (a)(17)(E), 
(a)(18)); kidnapping (count 2; id., § 207, subd. (a)); kidnapping 
for the purpose of committing a lewd act with a child (count 3; 
id., § 207, subd. (b)); torture (count 4; id., § 206); sodomy by force 
or with a person under 14 years of age and more than 10 years 
younger than the perpetrator (count 5; id., § 286, subd. (c)); a 
lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 (count 6; id., 
§ 288, subd. (a)); a lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age 
of 14 by force or duress (count 7; id., § 288, subd. (b)(1)); oral 
copulation by force or with a person under 14 years of age and 
more than 10 years younger than the perpetrator (count 8; id., 
former § 288a, subd. (c)1); and possession of methamphetamine 
(count 9; Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)).  The 
information also alleged prior convictions and prison terms for 
purposes of sentence enhancements and sentencing under the 
“Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, 667.5, 1170.12) and a 
misdemeanor charge of possessing a hypodermic needle or 
syringe (count 10; Bus. & Prof. Code, former § 4140, added by 
Stats. 1996, ch. 890, § 3 and repealed by Stats. 2011, ch. 738, 
§ 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2012). 
After the Sutter County court granted a motion for change 
of venue, the case was tried in Sacramento County.  The guilt 
trial began on April 14, 1998, and concluded with jury verdicts 
on June 17, 1998.  The jury convicted on all counts except those 
charging kidnapping (counts 2 and 3) and forcible oral 
copulation (count 8), as to which it could not reach a verdict, and 
found true the special circumstances, except that for murder in 
                                              
1  
Former section 288a of the Penal Code was recently 
renumbered as section 287.  (Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 49, 
pp. 3218–3221.) 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
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the commission of kidnapping, as to which it could not reach a 
verdict.  A mistrial was declared on the counts and allegation as 
to which the jury was deadlocked, and those counts were 
dismissed on the prosecutor’s motion. 
The first penalty trial ended in a mistrial on July 9, 1998, 
when the jury was unable to reach a verdict.  The penalty retrial 
began on December 1, 1998, with selection of a new penalty jury 
and concluded with a verdict of death on March 19, 1999.  On 
September 10, 1999, the Sacramento County Superior Court 
sentenced defendant to death for first degree murder with 
special circumstances, to life terms (stayed under Pen. Code, 
§ 654) for sodomy, lewd act with a child, and torture, and to a 
determinate term for his prior convictions and prison terms.  
Defendant’s automatic appeal was noticed the same day. 
Guilt Phase Evidence 
Michael Lyons lived in Yuba City with his mother, 
stepfather, and two younger sisters.  He attended third grade at 
a school in their neighborhood.  Various witnesses saw him leave 
school on the afternoon of May 16, 1996.  Michael’s teacher 
testified that Michael left the classroom when his last class 
ended at 2:50 p.m.  Another teacher, who was on gate duty that 
day, testified that Michael left the school at 3:05 p.m.  The 
teacher noted the time because Michael was the last student to 
leave, and she was anxious to get inside out of the rain.  
Sometime after 3:00 p.m., a neighbor of Michael’s saw him 
walking by himself, carrying a stick, along C Street in Yuba 
City. 
Two witnesses testified to a possible child abduction on the 
afternoon of May 16.  Raymie Clark was standing on an 
apartment balcony overlooking C and Boyd Streets.  From a 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
 
distance of about 400 yards, Clark saw a boy walking and 
playing with a stick.  A pickup truck with a camper shell stopped 
and the boy ran up to the truck, then backed up and started 
pointing, then went back toward the truck.  When the truck 
pulled away, the boy was no longer there, and as the truck drove 
away, the passenger door opened and then “slammed shut.”  
Charlie Wilbur, who was Clark’s cousin, came out to the balcony 
as the truck drove away and Clark drew his attention to it.  
Wilbur described the truck as a creamy white, while Clark saw 
it as a shiny gold color.  (Although it was raining at the time, the 
sun was also shining brightly.)  Clark’s and Wilbur’s time 
estimates for this occurrence varied between 2:45 p.m. and 3:30 
or 4:00 p.m.   
After school, Michael sometimes went to stay with his 
grandmother, who lived close to the school; otherwise, he was 
supposed to walk home.  On May 16, Michael’s grandmother was 
working late and never saw Michael, and he never arrived at 
home.  A police-organized search for Michael began on the night 
of May 16, around 8:00 p.m., was suspended later that night, 
and resumed on the morning of May 17. 
At around 11:00 a.m. on May 17, a search team found 
Michael’s body in the “river bottoms” along the banks of the 
Feather River.  The body was lying under some bushes in a wet, 
muddy area near the river.  He was found naked from the waist 
down and with a dark green sweater pulled up over his head.   
Between Michael’s body and the river, which was 10 to 15 
feet away, was a bloodstained blanket.  Defendant’s wife later 
told police the blanket appeared to be one defendant kept in his 
pickup truck.  Under the body, police found a silver bracelet.  
Both defendant’s wife and the owner of the bracelet later 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
 
identified the bracelet as having recently been in defendant’s 
truck.  About 12 to 15 feet from the body, in the dirt and sand 
by the river, were footprints, of which castings were made.  The 
impressions were later found to match defendant’s feet in 
overall size, shape and toe form. 
Dr. James Dibdin performed Michael’s autopsy.  Michael 
had suffered a pair of deep cuts with a knife to the left side of 
his neck, one superimposed on the other, which would in 
themselves have been fatal.  In addition, he had been cut across 
the right side of his neck and stabbed on the left side of his chest, 
puncturing his lung, and on the left abdomen through to his 
back (the latter two both deadly wounds).  He also suffered 
defensive wounds to his hands.  Dr. Dibdin found multiple 
lacerations to Michael’s anus, one an inch long, internal 
bleeding associated with these lacerations, and abrasions and 
bruising on the buttocks.  Dr. Dibdin opined that the cause of all 
these injuries was forcible sodomization with a penis.  Rectal 
swabs and smears showed the presence of semen.  Michael’s lips 
were also bruised on the inside, having been forced against his 
teeth.  The cause could have been a penis being pushed into his 
mouth, a hand placed hard over his mouth, or both.  Finally, 
Dr. Dibdin described a group of shallow stab wounds below 
Michael’s chin, caused by repeatedly jabbing with the tip of a 
knife, a set of straight line abrasions on Michael’s face and 
buttocks, suggesting a serrated knife being scraped across the 
skin, and four stab wounds to Michael’s buttocks and hip, one 
three and one-half inches deep. 
The cause of death was multiple stab and incised wounds 
with contributing factors of anal penetration and repetitive 
minor injuries.  From the degree of rigor mortis, Dr. Dibdin 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
 
estimated Michael died 12 to 24 hours before the autopsy, or 
between 4:00 p.m. on May 16 and 4:00 a.m. on May 17.   
On the morning of May 17, 1996, a party of volunteers 
searching the river bottoms for Michael had encountered 
defendant, who was wearing pants and no shirt and seemed 
nervous or shocked.  Defendant asked for help getting his truck 
out, saying he was in a hurry to leave town.  The volunteers 
continued their search. 
Later that morning, a Sutter County Sheriff’s Department 
patrol boat went to the site where Michael’s body had been 
found, and from there proceeded south downstream looking for 
evidence or for other people in the area.  Between a quarter-mile 
and a half-mile from where the body was found, the sheriff’s 
patrol came upon defendant’s truck, a white or beige pickup with 
a camper shell, stuck in the mud right at the river’s edge.  
Despite the loud noise of the boat’s exhaust system and its 
official markings, defendant, who was sitting motionless in the 
driver’s seat, did not react to its presence until the boat came 
closer.  Defendant made eye contact with the patrol sergeant, at 
which point he got out of the truck and stood on the bank.  
Defendant was wearing only a pair of wet blue jeans; despite the 
cold, breezy and intermittently wet weather he was shirtless, 
barefoot, and (it was later discovered) wore no underwear.  
According to the sheriff’s sergeant, defendant also appeared 
unenthusiastic about encountering the sheriff’s boat, even 
though his situation appeared somewhat perilous. 
Defendant was brought aboard the boat and handcuffed.  
As officers took defendant north to the Yuba City boat ramp, 
they passed the scene of the body’s discovery, where several 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
 
people in white coveralls were now working.  Defendant stared 
straight ahead and did not look at the scene.   
Defendant’s truck was at the river’s edge, partly in the 
water.  The cable of a small come-along winch was wrapped at 
one end around the rear axle and at the other around a tree.  On 
the open tailgate, there was a fishing knife, a thin bladed fillet 
knife with a serrated edge.  The knife had blood underneath 
some sandy river soil in corners where the blade met the handle; 
DNA testing showed the blood was Michael’s. 
Footprints matching Michael’s were found on the inside of 
the truck’s windshield.  Pubic hairs found on Michael’s clothing 
(which could not have belonged to the eight-year-old victim) 
were consistent in color, shape, and structure with samples 
taken from defendant.  On brushing defendant’s pubic area, a 
criminalist found silty river-bottom soil and a green polyester 
fiber.  The fiber matched a fiber from Michael’s sweater in color, 
shape, diameter, fiber type, and internal structure.  There was 
blood on Michael’s sweater and on defendant’s jeans and 
underwear.  There was also a large bloodstain on defendant’s 
shirt.  The blood on defendant’s underwear and shirt, which 
were found in his truck, was dilute.  Examination of defendant’s 
body after his arrest showed he had abrasions and scratches on 
his arm, hips, and inner thigh, and a possible bruise on his 
penis.  Methamphetamine and a syringe were found in 
defendant’s truck; defendant’s blood tested positive for 
methamphetamine.  
The prosecution presented witnesses to show defendant’s 
whereabouts on the afternoon of May 16, 1996.  Defendant’s 
father, who ran a barbershop where defendant worked, testified 
defendant left the shop at around 11:00 a.m., saying he was 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
 
taking his truck to Sears for a repair.  Defendant called at about 
1:00 p.m. to say the repair was not finished yet but he would 
come in when it was.2  The father did not hear from defendant 
again until defendant called from jail the next day.  Employees 
and a fellow card player at Rooney’s Card Room in Marysville 
testified that defendant played cards there from 1:00 p.m. until 
sometime after 3:00 p.m.; he tried to quit at 2:15 p.m., but 
because the house had staked him some money when he started 
playing, he had to play for at least two hours or share his 
winnings with the house.  Defendant left Rooney’s sometime 
between 3:00 p.m. and 3:30 p.m.; the other card player, who saw 
the clock when defendant left, remembered the time as 3:15 p.m. 
or 3:17 p.m.  A police investigator timed the drive from Rooney’s 
to the intersection of C and Boyd Streets in Yuba City (where 
Clark saw the possible child abduction) at under four minutes.   
The prosecution introduced no statements by defendant to 
the police, but a Sutter County deputy sheriff testified to a 
statement defendant made during a recess in the preliminary 
hearing.  After the time of death had been discussed in the 
proceedings, the deputy sheriff overheard defendant tell his 
attorney, “I can give them a better time of death than what they 
have.”   
The prosecution also presented two witnesses to describe 
defendant’s behavior on a Yuba City public bus on May 14, 1996, 
two days before Michael’s killing.  Alicia Tapia testified she saw 
an unkempt, dirty man, whom she later identified as defendant, 
get on the bus wearing a long knife in a sheath.  The man then 
                                              
2  
The parties stipulated that the Sears Automotive shop in 
Yuba City had no record of providing services to defendant on 
May 16, 1996.   
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
 
had a conversation with another man about child abuse and 
molestation.  Tapia complained to the bus driver and the driver 
told defendant to change the subject and stop upsetting the 
passengers.  Kevin Buchanan testified to a conversation he had 
on the bus that day with a man with a knife, whom he identified 
at trial as defendant.  After they saw a woman on the street 
striking a child, the conversation turned to child abuse and child 
molestation.  When Buchanan said he disliked molesters and 
would beat them up, defendant admitted he had been in prison 
for molesting a child and sometimes thought he would do it 
again.  If he did, defendant said, he would kill the child.  To 
Buchanan’s further questions about how he would do it, 
defendant said he would take the child to the river bottoms and 
kill the child with his knife, which he displayed to Buchanan.  A 
woman Buchanan described as a “Mexican lady” told them to 
change the subject because they were scaring her children.   
Finally, the prosecution presented evidence of defendant’s 
two prior sex offenses through the testimony of the victims.  
Sharon T. testified that in 1985, she became acquainted with 
defendant at the restaurant where she worked.  After gaining 
entry to her apartment on a pretext, defendant put a large 
hunting knife to her throat, demanded money, handcuffed her, 
and forced her to orally copulate him.  He then said he was 
taking her down to the river where he had to meet some people.  
As defendant drove her toward the river, he started laughing 
and said, “This is just like Bonnie and Clyde, but Bonnie’s not 
going to make it.”  When they neared the levee, Sharon opened 
the passenger door and, after a struggle, jumped from the 
moving car.  Defendant backed up toward her, but she rolled 
under the open door, then ran to a nearby public building.  
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
 
Based on this incident, defendant was convicted of kidnapping, 
forcible oral copulation, and robbery.   
The other victim, Crystal T., testified that in 1993, when 
she was four years old, defendant—who was married to 
Crystal’s grandmother—touched her vagina and put his penis in 
her mouth.  Defendant was convicted of a lewd act with a child.   
Defendant testified in his own defense.  He denied any 
contact with Michael Lyons.  On May 16, 1996, he went to work 
at his father’s barbershop but left before noon so that his father, 
who needed the money, could have more work.  Instead of having 
his truck repaired as he had intended, he bought $60 worth of 
methamphetamine from a friend and, after injecting a small 
amount, went to Rooney’s Card Room.  He arrived at 1:00 p.m., 
played poker for two and a half hours and left around 3:30 p.m.  
He then drove to various places in Yuba City and Marysville 
looking for another friend who had told him she needed a ride, 
but did not find her.  Defendant drove home to the town of Sutter 
and stayed there about an hour, then came back to Yuba City 
and down to the river bottoms, where he could use drugs without 
fear of encountering his family, the police, or his parole officer. 
After defendant drove around the river bottoms, fished, 
and did some dope, defendant’s truck got stuck sometime around 
8:00 or 8:30 p.m.  He tried unsuccessfully to free his truck for a 
couple of hours, but realized he needed his come-along winch, 
which was back at his house.  During the night, he walked out 
of the river bottoms to his father’s barbershop, stopped there to 
inject more methamphetamine, then walked and hitchhiked to 
his house in Sutter.  After retrieving the come-along, he walked 
and hitchhiked back to Yuba City and returned to his truck in 
the river bottoms.  He probably walked 10 miles during the 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
 
night.  Defendant testified that when the deputy sheriff 
overheard him talking about the time of Michael’s death, he 
meant only that Michael must have been killed during this 
period when he was away from his truck. 
Arriving back at his truck between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. on 
May 17, defendant testified, he found it ransacked, with papers 
and tools strewn about.  Though he thought he had locked the 
cab when he left, the camper shell did not lock and he found the 
sliding windows between the cab and the camper open.  After 
freeing his truck with the come-along, defendant decided to head 
to the Shanghai Bend area of the river bottoms because he knew 
some people who stayed there.  On the way there, his truck 
again became stuck in the mud.  For the next eight hours, 
defendant tried but failed to free it.  He did not seek help from 
his father because his father would have been angry at him for 
using drugs; he had various reasons not to contact other 
relatives or acquaintances.  Though his truck was quite stuck, 
he believed he would eventually get it out by himself. 
Defendant was not pleased to see the sheriff’s patrol boat 
because he had drugs in his truck.  On the boat, defendant saw 
the people who looked like astronauts working on the shore but 
was not concerned by it.  He did not know why he was being 
arrested. 
Defendant denied being on a bus on May 14 or behaving 
on the bus at any time as Tapia had described.  That day, he was 
occupied with returning a boat to his father and getting his 
wife’s car repaired. 
Defendant testified that the scratches on his body and the 
blood on his shirt were from dragging logs while trying to free 
his truck from the mud.  He did not know how much he was 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
 
bleeding or how his shirt got a large bloodstain running from 
one shoulder to the opposite armpit area. 
In addition to presenting defendant’s testimony, the 
defense presented evidence to discredit the testimony about the 
May 14 bus incident and to suggest that another person living 
in the river bottoms was involved in Michael’s death.  
Defendant’s father corroborated defendant’s account of his 
activities on May 14, and the bus driver testified that had a 
passenger displayed a knife in a threatening manner she would 
have immediately reported the event to the police.  The driver 
knew both Tapia and Buchanan and did not recall the events 
they described.  Donald Dugger, who lived in a trailer in the 
river bottoms, testified that a couple of days after Michael’s 
disappearance, Bobbie Lemmons—another bottoms resident, 
who had found Michael’s shoes and pants while scavenging in 
the area—asked Dugger to provide him with an alibi for the 
night of May 16.  Police found a pocket knife with “L” and “R” 
(defendant’s wife’s initials) engraved on its two sides in 
Lemmons’s storage locker; he did not recall where he had gotten 
it.  Defendant identified the knife as his wife’s and a fishing pole 
found in the locker as one that had been in his truck.  A man 
walking on the river bank around 4:15 p.m. on May 16 testified 
that he saw Michael (whom he did not know but later recognized 
from a photograph in the newspaper) playing there with another 
boy his age, and a woman who was fishing on the Marysville side 
of the river on May 16 (who also later recognized Michael from 
a photograph in the newspaper) testified she saw him with two 
men, one of whom she thought was defendant, on the Yuba City 
bank in the late afternoon. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
 
Penalty Retrial Evidence 
On retrial of penalty after the first jury hung, the parties 
presented extensive evidence replicating that given at the guilt 
phase.  In addition, Michael’s aunt testified to the impact of 
Michael’s death on her and on Michael’s mother and sister.  The 
prosecution also presented evidence that defendant had suffered 
convictions for check forgery in the 1980’s, in addition to his 
convictions for the crimes against Sharon T. and Crystal T. 
The defense presented three witnesses to support 
defendant’s claim he had gone to a house looking for his friend 
on the afternoon of May 16, 1996.  But of these witnesses, the 
only one who remembered seeing a man resembling defendant 
at the house was using drugs heavily at the time and had told 
the prosecution investigator she could not identify the man and 
did not really know what day he was there.  The defense also 
presented evidence that Michael’s stepfather had been convicted 
in 1995 of spousal abuse of Michael’s mother and of evading a 
police officer, as well as the testimony of a forensic pathologist 
who disagreed with Dr. Dibdin’s opinions in other cases but who 
had not reviewed any materials relating to Michael’s death. 
Defendant’s father, mother, aunt, and sister testified 
about defendant’s childhood and family life.  Until defendant 
was about 10, his father gambled, drank, and cheated on 
defendant’s mother, which caused a lot of turmoil in the family.  
After that, defendant’s father returned to his religion, Seventh 
Day Adventism, and defendant was sent to a church school and 
was restricted in his activities.  In his teens defendant fought 
with his father over the strict rules of their religion, over going 
to church, and over a boarding school he was sent to.  
Defendant’s sister thought their father was overly strict and 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
 
critical with defendant.  Defendant’s family knew he had a drug 
problem, which began at the end of his high school years, but 
they loved him. 
James Park, a consultant on adult prison operations and 
prisoner classification, reviewed the records of defendant’s prior 
imprisonments, from 1986 to 1990 and 1993 to 1994.  Although 
defendant had four disciplinary actions, there were also work 
reports indicating he was productive, did not cause trouble, and 
could help train other inmates and assist the employee-
supervisor.  Park opined that defendant would make a positive 
adjustment to state prison confinement. 
DISCUSSION 
Guilt Phase Issues 
I.  In Camera Review of Medical and Psychological  
              Records 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conducted part 
of the investigation into Michael’s death.  Certain FBI interview 
reports produced before trial indicated that Michael had 
previously been molested by a relative.  On several occasions 
both before and during trial, defendant subpoenaed and sought 
to compel production of various medical and psychological 
records concerning the prior molestation.  On the basis of the 
FBI interview reports, defense counsel asserted the molestation 
may have continued to the time of Michael’s death; counsel 
further argued that defendant had a due process right to the 
disclosure of the records because they might lead to 
development of exculpatory evidence.  Seeking the records again 
before the second penalty trial, counsel also argued they were 
potentially relevant to impeach Dr. Dibdin, the autopsy 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
 
physician, and Tina Lyons, Michael’s aunt, a penalty phase 
victim impact witness. 
Before trial, the Sutter County Superior Court reviewed 
the records in camera, weighed their value to defendant’s 
exercise of his constitutional rights against the various 
evidentiary privileges and privacy interests asserted, including 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege, and denied defendant’s 
request to compel discovery of the records.  Noting the 
documents were remote in time from Michael’s murder, the 
court found nothing that would assist defendant in his 
presentation of a defense or confrontation of witnesses.  The 
court denied the motion subject to renewal during trial if the 
material became relevant, however.  During trial, the 
Sacramento County Superior Court also reviewed the materials 
and, on two occasions, again denied defense motions to compel 
their discovery on the ground that nothing in the records would 
assist the defense. 
Defendant contends the trial court’s refusal to order 
production of the medical and psychological records deprived 
him of his rights to due process, to confront witnesses, and to 
present a defense.  Without access to the materials, defendant 
acknowledges he cannot argue their specific relevance, but he 
asserts they may have been relevant to show the existence of  
“other molestations and suspects” and to impeach “the rosy 
picture painted of Michael and his family in the victim impact 
portion of the penalty phase.”  He requests that this court review 
the materials, which are under seal, to determine if any of them 
should have been produced.  The Attorney General does not 
oppose the request, and we agree that review of the sealed 
materials is appropriate to determine what relevance, if any, 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
 
they bear to the posited defenses or impeachment.  (See People 
v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 592–595; People v. Hammon 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1122–1128; People v. Webb (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 494, 517–518.)3 
After our own review of the sealed records, we agree with 
the two superior courts that considered the issue:  the records 
contain nothing of significance to the defense.  As the lower 
courts observed, most of the materials relate to events remote in 
time from Michael’s murder, and nothing in them casts 
suspicion for that crime on any person.  Nor do the materials 
contradict Dr. Dibdin’s testimony that he found no indications 
on Michael’s anus or rectum of scarring from a previous 
molestation, or Tina Lyons’s testimony that Michael’s murder 
had taken away a part of Michael’s mother, Sandra, and 
rendered her “lifeless,” no longer carefree and happy as she had 
been before.  We therefore find no error in denial of defendant’s 
motions to compel discovery.  (People v. Webb, supra, 6 Cal.4th 
at p. 518.) 
II.  Admission of Hearsay Statements Made by  
                  Defendant’s Wife  
Defendant’s wife, Lynnette Rhoades, invoked her marital 
privilege not to be called as a witness against her spouse.  (Evid. 
Code, § 971.)  Over defendant’s hearsay objection, the court 
admitted the testimony of Yuba City Police Sergeant Michael 
Johnson that on May 20, 1996 (three days after defendant’s 
arrest), Lynnette identified from photographs the blanket found 
near Michael’s body and the bracelet found under the body.  
                                              
3  
In the trial court, the parties disputed whether privileges 
had been validly asserted as to some of the records.  Defendant 
does not renew those arguments on appeal. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
 
According to Johnson, during an interview he conducted with 
her, Lynnette said the blanket appeared to be one defendant 
kept in the back of his pickup truck and that she had seen the 
bracelet in the truck a few days before Michael’s murder.   
On appeal, defendant contends admission of the hearsay 
statements violated his federal confrontation and due process 
rights.  He argues that neither of the hearsay exceptions cited 
by the trial court as a basis for admission (namely, spontaneous 
statement (Evid. Code, § 1240) and statement against social 
interest (id., § 1230)) applies.  He also argues that admission of 
the statements violated his right of confrontation under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  (See Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 
53–55, 68 (Crawford) [testimonial hearsay inadmissible under 
6th Amend. unless declarant is unavailable and there has been 
a prior opportunity for cross-examination].) 
The Attorney General defends the application of both 
hearsay exceptions but concedes that the statements—which 
were made in response to questioning by law enforcement 
officers seeking information to be used at a criminal trial—were 
testimonial and therefore barred under Crawford.  The Attorney 
General maintains, however, that defendant forfeited his 
confrontation clause claim by failing to object on that ground at 
trial and that, in any event, admission of Lynnette’s statements 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
We reject the Attorney General’s forfeiture argument.  
Because defendant’s trial preceded the decision in Crawford, his 
claim of a confrontation clause violation was preserved despite 
the absence of an objection on that ground.  (People v. 
Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1215 [concluding that “in a case 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
 
tried before Crawford, a defendant does not forfeit a Crawford 
challenge by failing to raise a confrontation clause objection at 
trial”]; People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1288, fn. 8 
[“[B]ecause 
defendant’s 
counsel 
could 
not 
have 
anticipated Crawford’s 
sweeping 
changes 
to 
federal 
confrontation clause case law, he did not forfeit this claim by 
failing to object to the admission of [the] statements on federal 
constitutional grounds.”].) 
We further agree with both parties that Lynnette 
Rhoades’s statements were testimonial and were inadmissible 
under Crawford.  At an in limine hearing on their admissibility, 
Sergeant Johnson testified that he and an FBI agent 
interviewed Lynnette at her family home in Stockton on May 20, 
1996.  She told them she had just spoken to defendant’s attorney 
and would not talk to them unless they could show her that 
defendant had committed a crime.  They told her the victim’s 
footprints had been found inside defendant’s truck.  She became 
extremely upset, crying, hyperventilating, and even vomiting.  
After about five minutes, she calmed down somewhat, though 
she was still crying, and agreed to talk with them.  She then 
answered their questions in detail, including identifying the 
bracelet and blanket, and signed a written statement.  
Statements made to law enforcement officers in an interview 
primarily designed to obtain evidence of a past crime are 
considered testimonial.  (Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 
813, 829–831; Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 53, fn. 4; People 
v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 984.)  As defendant had no 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, 
Lynnette’s 
statements were inadmissible under the rule of Crawford. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
 
We are, however, convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that this federal constitutional violation did not affect the jury’s 
verdict.  (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)  
Because this harmlessness standard is more demanding than 
that applicable to errors under California evidence law (People 
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836), we need not decide 
whether the trial court erred in finding either of the posited 
hearsay exceptions applicable.  Other evidence more strongly 
tied the murder to defendant’s truck, especially Michael’s 
footprints on the inside of the windshield and his blood on 
defendant’s knife, which police found on the truck tailgate.  
Moreover, the bracelet’s owner identified it as one she had 
recently placed with other belongings in the truck.  And 
defendant was linked to the murder by other physical evidence, 
including the blood on his clothing, the fiber found in his pubic 
area, and the pubic hairs on Michael’s clothing and the 
footprints in the mud near Michael’s body, both of which were 
consistent with defendant’s. 
Defendant 
argues 
the 
hearsay 
statements 
were 
particularly damaging in that they tended to show Lynnette had 
“turned on” defendant and believed him guilty, but in 
comparison to the physical evidence tying the murder to 
defendant such an implication bore little if any significance.  
Admission of Lynnette’s statements, though error under the 
confrontation clause, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
III.  Admission of Defendant’s Remark Overheard  
                  by Deputy 
As noted, Sheriff’s Deputy Carlton Dinwiddie testified 
that during a recess in the preliminary hearing, he overheard 
defendant say to his attorney, “I can give them a better time of 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
 
death than what they have.”  Defendant renews his contention 
that the statement was within the attorney-client privilege and 
therefore should have been excluded under Evidence Code 
sections 952 and 954.  He also argues the admission of the 
statement deprived him of his rights to counsel and to a fair 
trial.  We find no error. 
Deputy Dinwiddie testified at an in limine hearing to the 
circumstances in which he overheard the remark:  Dinwiddie 
and another deputy were assigned to transport and guard 
defendant at the preliminary hearing.  During a recess after 
testimony about the time of Michael’s death, defendant, his 
attorney, and the defense investigator went into the jury room 
to confer.  Each sheriff’s deputy sat by one of the two open doors 
of the room; Dinwiddie was about 10 or 15 feet from defendant.  
At first, Dinwiddie could not hear what defendant or the others 
were saying, but at some point defendant stood up, raised his 
voice and said, “I can give them a better time of death than what 
they have.”  Defendant’s attorney told him to be quiet, noting 
that the walls, or in this case the doors, have ears.  The three 
men continued their conversation, but Dinwiddie could not hear 
what more they said. 
Defendant’s 
statement 
was 
not 
a 
confidential 
communication protected by the attorney-client privilege.  
(Evid. Code, § 954.)  Only communications made “in confidence 
by a means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the 
information to no third persons other than those who are 
present to further the interest of the client in the consultation 
or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary . . .” (id., 
§ 952) qualify as confidential.  “Thus, where the client 
communicates with his attorney in the presence of other persons 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
 
who have no interest in the matter . . . he is held to have waived 
the privilege.”  (D. I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 
60 Cal.2d 723, 735.)  In circumstances similar to those here, 
California courts have applied these principles to hold that 
clients’ oral communications to their lawyers during court 
proceedings or recesses were unprivileged because they were 
made so loudly as to be overheard by others who were openly 
and permissibly present.  (People v. Urbano (2005) 128 
Cal.App.4th 396, 402–403; People v. Poulin (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 
54, 64; People v. Castiel (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 653, 659.)   
While defendant may be correct that he had no choice of 
locations for consulting with his attorney, he did have a choice 
about how loudly to speak.  He chose to do so in a manner that 
the deputy, who was openly and permissibly present, could 
overhear.  The facts show there was no need for the defendant 
to make the reported remark so loudly:  For most of the 
remainder of the conversation, the parties had spoken so quietly 
that Dinwiddie was unable to hear their words, and after 
defendant made the overheard remark his attorney told him to 
speak more quietly.  (See People v. Urbano, supra, 128 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 402–403 [trial court “found that Urbano had 
no need to speak in a voice ‘loud enough for individuals in the 
audience to hear,’ as his attorney was sitting right next to him 
in the jury box, but nevertheless made his communication in a 
way that ‘clearly disclose[d] it to third persons’ ”].)  And while 
defendant alludes to the deputies’ “unnecessary proximity” and 
argues they were “essentially spying” on him, he refers to no 
evidence to support those characterizations.  The deputies were 
10 to 15 feet away by the open doors of the jury room; the record 
does not suggest they deliberately positioned themselves so as 
to overhear defendant or his attorney. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
 
The trial court properly overruled defendant’s attorney-
client privilege objection.  Although on appeal defendant claims 
admission of the statement violated his federal constitutional 
rights, he makes no argument for such violation other than that 
the communication was privileged.  Defendant’s constitutional 
claim therefore fails along with the Evidence Code claim. 
IV.  Admission of Evidence of Defendant’s Prior  
                  Offenses 
Through in limine motions, defendant contested the 
admissibility of defendant’s prior crimes against Sharon T., the 
acquaintance whom defendant sexually assaulted in her home, 
robbed, and drove toward the river bottoms, and Crystal T., the 
four-year-old relative whom defendant molested.  The trial court 
ruled evidence of both crimes admissible under Evidence Code 
sections 1101, subdivision (b), and 1108, and declined to exclude 
the evidence under Evidence Code section 352, though the court 
excluded evidence of a third prior incident as more prejudicial 
than probative.  On appeal, defendant contends the court abused 
its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in admitting the 
Sharon T. and Crystal T. evidence.  He also argues that the 
admission of the evidence violated his federal constitutional 
rights to due process and a fair jury trial.  We find no statutory 
or constitutional error. 
The facts of the Sharon T. and Crystal T. incidents, as 
outlined in the People’s motion papers arguing for their 
admissibility, were as follows:  In 1985, defendant telephoned 
Sharon and said he wanted to discuss a piece of real estate with 
her.  He came to her Marysville apartment and she let him in.  
After they talked for a while in her living room, he moved to sit 
beside her, pulled out a six- or seven-inch knife and put it to her 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
 
neck, pulling back her head by her hair.  Defendant told Sharon 
he was wanted for armed robbery and needed to stay with her 
for 24 hours, then demanded money, taking $50 in cash and her 
ATM card.   
Defendant handcuffed Sharon, ordered her into the 
bedroom, took off her clothes, and forced her to orally copulate 
him until he ejaculated.  Then, after loosening one of the 
handcuffs, he told her to get dressed, saying they were going for 
a ride to Riverfront Park.  He wiped down surfaces in the 
apartment, remarking that “people who make mistakes get 
caught.”  Taking her car keys, he told Sharon he had a gun and 
would kill her if she tried to run.  During the ride down to the 
river, he compared the two of them to Bonnie and Clyde, but 
noted that Bonnie “isn’t going to make it.”  Sharon, believing 
defendant would kill her if they got to the river, jumped from 
the moving car.  After evading defendant’s attempt to recapture 
her, she ran to a nearby building for help.   
In 
1993, 
defendant 
molested 
Crystal 
T., 
the 
granddaughter of his wife, Lynnette.  Crystal and her mother 
(Lynnette’s daughter) lived in the same trailer park as 
defendant and Lynnette.  After Crystal’s mother left her with a 
babysitter in the trailer park, defendant telephoned the sitter 
and told her to send Crystal to his trailer.  When the mother 
came home, Crystal was still in defendant’s trailer.  That 
evening, Crystal said that “Grandpa made me put his pee in my 
mouth and it was yucky.”  The same evening, she repeated the 
report to a police detective, adding that defendant “rubbed his 
pee on my pee and butt.” 
The trial court properly admitted defendant’s sexual 
offenses against Sharon and Crystal under Evidence Code 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
 
section 1108, subdivision (a).  That provision states:  “In a 
criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual 
offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another 
sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 
1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 
352.”  (Id., § 1108, subd. (a).)  The first of the two referenced 
provisions, Evidence Code section 1101, sets out a general rule 
against using propensity evidence to prove a person’s conduct on 
a particular occasion.  (Id., § 1101, subd. (a).)  The second, 
Evidence Code section 352, sets out the general rule that “[t]he 
court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, 
or of misleading the jury.”  As we have explained, Evidence Code 
section 1108 by its terms establishes an exception to the general 
rule against admitting propensity evidence, “ ‘provid[ing] the 
trier of fact in a sex offense case the opportunity to learn of the 
defendant’s possible disposition to commit sex crimes.’ ”  (People 
v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 49 (Jones), quoting People v. 
Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 915 (Falsetta).)  But the statute 
also calls for exclusion under Evidence Code section 352 if the 
trial court, in its discretion, concludes evidence of prior sex 
crimes is unduly prejudicial.  (People v. Cordova (2015) 62 
Cal.4th 104, 132 [trial court has discretion to exclude prior sex 
offense evidence if  “its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs 
its probative value in showing the defendant’s disposition to 
commit the charged sex offense or other relevant matters”].)   
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
in admitting the Sharon T. and Crystal T. incidents because 
they were unduly prejudicial.  We find no abuse of discretion.  
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
25 
 
The prior sex offenses were similar enough to those charged in 
this case that the jury could reasonably draw an inference of 
propensity to commit crimes of this nature.  (See Falsetta, supra, 
21 Cal.4th at pp. 912, 915, 917 [evidence of any prior sexual 
offense is considered relevant under Evid. Code, § 1108, but its 
probative value is increased by relative similarity of the crimes, 
among other factors].)  Defendant’s molestation of Crystal, like 
Michael Lyons a small child, involved the same acts charged in 
this case:  oral copulation and sodomy or attempted sodomy.4  
And defendant forced Sharon to orally copulate him by holding 
a long knife to her neck, threatening force similar to that by 
which Michael was later killed and, inferentially, threatened.  
Both offenses were proven by evidence independent from that 
implicating defendant in the assault on Michael, and neither 
was very remote in time.  The prior offenses’ value in proving a 
propensity for crimes of the kind charged was thus substantial.  
(See, e.g., People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 
825–826 (Daveggio); People v. Williams (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1166, 
1196–1197 (Williams); Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 50–51; 
People v. Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 62–63 (Loy).) 
On the prejudice side of the scale, although defendant’s 
prior sexual crimes were certainly capable in themselves of 
causing emotional reactions in jurors, neither was especially 
inflammatory in comparison with the charged offenses.  Because 
defendant had already been convicted in both incidents, there 
                                              
4  
Although the jury ultimately was unable to reach a verdict 
on the charge of oral copulation of Michael, the court could not 
anticipate that outcome when ruling on admissibility of the 
prior crimes.  The People presented evidence suggesting oral 
copulation, though the jury ultimately did not unanimously find 
that evidence convincing beyond a reasonable doubt.   
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
26 
 
was no danger of extensive “minitrials” on the prior incidents 
and the jury here would not have been tempted to use this 
proceeding to punish him for his past acts.  Nor was this a case 
in which defendant’s guilt for prior incidents was used to shore 
up a weak case on the current charges; the evidence that 
defendant sexually assaulted and killed Michael was strong, if 
circumstantial.  (See Daveggio, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 825–826; 
Williams, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1197; Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th 
at p. 51; Loy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 61–62; Falsetta, supra, 21 
Cal.4th at p. 917.)  On balance, we cannot say the trial court 
abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in 
admitting evidence of  defendant’s prior sexual offenses against 
Sharon and Crystal under Evidence Code section 1108. 
Defendant points out that his kidnapping of Sharon was 
not itself a sexual offense as defined in Evidence Code section 
1108, subdivision (d)(1), even though the kidnapping occurred 
immediately following the sexual assault.  But evidence of the 
kidnapping was, in any event, properly admitted under 
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).  That provision 
clarifies that the usual prohibition on propensity evidence does 
not preclude the admission of evidence relevant “to prove some 
fact . . . other than [the person’s] disposition to commit such an 
act,” such as the person’s “motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, [or] identity.”  (Ibid.)  Here, the 
evidence was relevant to prove defendant’s premeditated intent 
to kill Michael when he abducted him and to show the existence 
of a common design or plan involving kidnapping sexual assault 
targets and taking them to the Feather River bottoms area to 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
27 
 
assault and kill them with a knife.5  (See People v. Ewoldt (1994) 
7 Cal.4th 380, 402–403 (Ewoldt) [outlining the degrees of 
similarity required for relevance on intent and common design 
or plan under Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b)].) 
Again, the facts showed that defendant gained control 
over Sharon by telling her that he wanted to talk to her about a 
real estate project.  He then sexually assaulted her and 
kidnapped her by threatening her with a long knife to her 
throat; en route to the river, he indicated he intended to kill her 
there.  This evidence tends to prove that defendant harbored the 
same lethal intent when he abducted Michael, whom he later 
killed by cutting his throat with a long knife.  (See Daveggio, 
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 827; People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 
1063, 1098; People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 779, fn. 15.)  
In addition, the similarities between Sharon’s kidnapping and 
threatened murder and Michael’s kidnapping and murder in 
choice of weapon (long knife) and location (driving victim to river 
bottoms area) are sufficient to make the prior incident relevant 
to show a common design or plan, which was in turn relevant to 
show Michael was in fact kidnapped.  (See Ewoldt, supra, 7 
Cal.4th at p. 403 [“To establish the existence of a common design 
or plan, the common features must indicate the existence of a 
plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the 
plan thus revealed need not be distinctive or unusual.”]; see also 
ibid. [prior molestation of victim’s older sister relevant on 
common plan where molestations occurred at similar time and 
place and the defendant offered a similar excuse for his actions 
                                              
5  
As with oral copulation (see ante, fn. 4), the fact that the 
jury later failed to reach a verdict on the kidnapping charge 
does not affect the correctness of the court’s ruling on 
admissibility of evidence to prove that charge. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
28 
 
in both cases]; People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 304 
[evidence tended to show the defendant “had a common plan of 
attacking elderly women late at night while they were alone in 
their homes in his neighborhood, with the purpose of sexually 
assaulting them”]; People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 603 
(Davis) [in each case, “defendant abducted a stranger, a female; 
used a weapon; assured the victim that he would not harm her; 
took her to a remote location; and carried bindings with him, 
indicating that the behavior was planned”].)  The kidnapping 
evidence was thus admissible under Evidence Code section 
1101, subdivision (b), and, for the reasons already given, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude the 
evidence under Evidence Code section 352.6 
Defendant next contends the admission of his prior crimes 
under Evidence Code section 1108 violated his rights of due 
process and a fair trial under the United States Constitution.  
We have previously upheld section 1108’s exception from the bar 
on propensity evidence against similar challenges.  (Loy, supra, 
52 Cal.4th at pp. 60–61; Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 912–
922.)  Defendant makes no compelling argument for 
reconsidering our prior holdings.  He relies for support on 
McKinney v. Rees (9th Cir. 1993) 993 F.2d 1378, 1384–1386, 
which found that the use of propensity evidence in that case 
                                              
6  
The jury was instructed, with a modified version of 
CALJIC No. 2.50, that any evidence of a prior kidnapping could 
not be considered as proving bad character or criminal 
disposition, but only on intent, motive, or common plan or 
scheme.  Defendant contends this cautionary instruction was 
ineffective, but he provides no grounds to believe the jury could 
not or did not follow the instruction.  (See People v. Mooc (2001) 
26 Cal.4th 1216, 1234 [jury is assumed to follow court’s 
instructions].)  
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
29 
 
deprived the criminal defendant of a fair trial.  But the Ninth 
Circuit later explained in U.S. v. LeMay (9th Cir. 2001) 260 F.3d 
1018, 1026, that a constitutional violation of the kind found in 
McKinney occurs only when the “prejudicial effect [of the 
propensity evidence] far outweighs its probative value.”  
Rejecting a facial challenge to the then-recently promulgated 
rule 414 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C.), which 
allows evidence of prior child molestations when a defendant is 
accused of that crime, the LeMay court relied on rule 403, which 
calls for the exclusion of unduly prejudicial evidence.  (LeMay, 
at pp. 1026–1027.)  In Falsetta, we similarly relied on Evidence 
Code section 352 to reject a facial challenge to Evidence Code 
section 1108, and similarly distinguished McKinney as involving 
the admission of inflammatory character evidence with little or 
no probative value, even as to the defendant’s propensity to 
commit sexual offenses.  (Falsetta, at pp. 916–918, 921–922.)  
Here, we have already held that admission of defendant’s prior 
crimes was not unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 
352.  The admission of the evidence thus did not violate 
defendant’s constitutional rights. 
V.  Exclusion of Evidence of Witness’s Prior  
                   Conviction 
Defendant’s next claim of error concerns the trial court’s 
exclusion of evidence that defense witness Bobbie Lemmons had 
suffered a prior conviction.  Lemmons, a river bottoms resident 
who testified to finding the victim’s shoes and pants, had been 
convicted in 1992 of annoying or molesting a child, a 
misdemeanor.  (Pen. Code, § 647.6.)  The only information in the 
record about the nature of the conviction comes from the 
prosecution’s motion in limine to exclude the conviction, which 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
30 
 
notes that the conviction stems from an incident in which 
Lemmons admitted “to putting his hand down his daughter’s 
pants, and when she protested he stopped.” 
In an Evidence Code section 402 hearing on admissibility 
held before Lemmons testified, defense counsel asked Lemmons 
whether he had suffered a conviction for misdemeanor child 
molestation.  The prosecutor objected that the prior conviction 
was inadmissible either as impeachment or under section 1101 
or 1108 of the Evidence Code.  Defense counsel argued he could 
impeach Lemmons, his own witness, because Lemmons’s 
expected testimony would be adverse to defendant and because 
the defense theory of the case implicated Lemmons in Michael’s 
death.  The court denied admission of the conviction as 
impeachment, finding that counsel had not yet demonstrated 
Lemmons’s testimony would be adverse to defendant.7 
Court and counsel revisited the issue after Lemmons’s 
testimony.  Defense counsel now argued the conviction was 
admissible not as impeachment but on a theory “likened to 1108 
or 1101 conduct, which is relevant to show the possibility of 
another person committing the crime . . . .”  The trial court 
adhered to its exclusion ruling, explaining that Evidence Code 
section 1108 applied only to a criminal defendant and that the 
lack of demonstrated similarity between Lemmons’s past crime 
and the assault and murder of Michael precluded admission 
                                              
7  
On appeal, defendant makes no argument for an 
impeachment theory of admissibility, though he describes the 
conviction as “impeachment evidence” in his section heading for 
this issue.  And while he argues the conviction’s exclusion 
violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses 
against him, he does not grapple with the fact that Lemmons 
was called as a witness by the defense, not the prosecution. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
31 
 
under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), to prove 
some fact in issue other than criminal disposition. 
The trial court’s ruling of inadmissibility was correct 
under the Evidence Code.  By its terms, Evidence Code section 
1108 applies only to a criminal defendant’s prior sexual offenses.  
(Id., § 1108, subd. (a) [“In a criminal action in which the 
defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the 
defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or offenses is 
not made inadmissible by Section 1101 . . . .”].)  As Lemmons 
was not on trial, his conviction could not be admitted to show a 
propensity to commit sexual offenses.  Evidence Code section 
1101, subdivision (b), does not contain the same textual 
limitation—it permits the admission of “evidence that a person 
committed a crime” for certain purposes, including to show the 
person’s intent or the identity of a person responsible for a crime 
(italics added)—but Lemmons’s prior conviction was not 
admissible for these statutorily enumerated purposes.  Even if 
Lemmons’s past act with his daughter might be thought 
sufficiently similar to the attack on Michael that it would have 
been relevant to intent (see Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402), 
it was not admissible on that theory because Lemmons was not 
charged with the crimes against Michael Lyons and his intent 
was not at issue in the trial.  The material issue to which defense 
counsel argued the conviction was relevant was not Lemmons’s 
intent but the identity of the perpetrator:  counsel argued the 
conviction would tend to show that Lemmons, rather than 
defendant, sexually assaulted and killed Michael.  But “[f]or 
identity to be established, the uncharged misconduct and the 
charged offense must share common features that are 
sufficiently distinctive so as to support the inference that the 
same person committed both acts.”  (Id. at p. 403.)  Here there 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
32 
 
was virtually no resemblance between the crimes, much less the 
high degree of shared features needed for prior crimes to be 
admissible on identity.   
Defendant contends exclusion of the conviction showed 
judicial bias amounting to a  due process violation.  He argues it 
was unconstitutional to admit his own convictions while 
excluding that of a third party on whom he wished to cast 
suspicion for the crimes:  “If propensity evidence was admissible 
against appellant, it violated due process to exclude the same 
with respect to Mr. Lemmons.” 
Defendant failed to establish the foundation for his claim 
of constitutionally unequal treatment.  At trial, defendant did 
not argue for admission of Lemmons’s conviction on the 
constitutional ground he now asserts.8  The record therefore 
contains neither the full factual basis for a balancing of 
prejudice and probativeness under Evidence Code section 352, 
nor any indication that the trial court conducted such a 
weighing.  Nor is it clear from the limited facts available that 
the consumption of time and danger of confusing the issues 
involved in litigating the details of Lemmons’s prior offense 
would have been sufficiently counterbalanced by its probative 
value in showing his propensity to commit offenses like that 
                                              
8  
We assume for the purpose of discussion that defendant’s 
constitutional claim is not forfeited.  A constitutional objection 
not made at trial may be considered on appeal to the extent it 
merely posits an additional legal consequence from the asserted 
error.  (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435–439.)  
Whether defendant’s constitutional claim falls within this rule 
or instead rests on “a reason not included in the actual trial 
objection” (id. at p. 438) is a somewhat difficult question, one we 
leave unresolved in favor of a decision on the merits. 
 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
33 
 
committed against Michael.  But as discussed earlier (ante, 
pt. IV.), Evidence Code section 1108 allows a defendant’s prior 
sexual offenses to be introduced as propensity evidence only if 
the evidence is not unduly prejudicial in comparison to its 
probative value.  Defendant has thus failed to establish that 
Lemmons’s conviction would be admissible under Evidence Code 
section 1108 even if that statute were extended to 
nondefendants.  His claim of unconstitutional unfairness in 
exclusion of the conviction therefore fails.  (See People v. Prince 
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1242–1243 [exclusion of third-party 
culpability evidence lacking significant probative value in 
comparison to its danger of distraction and consumption of time 
is not a constitutional violation]; People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 
826, 834 [even where relevant to establish reasonable doubt, 
third-party culpability evidence is subject to exclusion under 
Evid. Code, § 352].) 
VI.  Guilt Phase Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed egregious 
misconduct in examining witnesses and in closing argument, 
depriving defendant of a fair trial in violation of his due process 
rights.   
Prosecutorial 
misbehavior 
“violates 
the 
federal 
Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct ‘so 
egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to 
make the conviction a denial of due process.’  [Citations.]  But 
conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial 
fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state 
law only if it involves ‘ “the use of deceptive or reprehensible 
methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.” ’ ”  
(People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820; accord, People v. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
34 
 
Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819.)  We conclude there was no 
prejudicial misconduct under either federal or state law. 
First, defendant asserts the prosecutor improperly 
insinuated to the jury that defendant acted immorally and 
created a threat to the Yuba City community by habitually and 
illegally driving his truck over the river levees, potentially 
causing them damage.  The relevant exchange occurred during 
defendant’s testimony.  After defendant agreed with the 
prosecutor’s supposition that going over the levees is illegal 
“because it tears up the levees and might cause the levees to 
break,” the prosecutor continued:  “Is there some reason you 
persist in doing this when it’s dangerous to the whole 
community?”  A defense objection (“speculation”) was sustained 
as to the form of the question, and the prosecutor rephrased:  “Is 
there some reason you[,] when you know this is dangerous[,] 
that you continue to do it?”  Defendant answered that it is “not 
necessarily dangerous” and that “everybody does it.”  When the 
prosecutor continued with a question about a levee break and 
flood that occurred in 1996, defense counsel objected on grounds 
of relevance, and the prosecutor withdrew the question, but 
went on to say:  “[W]ell, I guess what I’m getting at is you just 
don’t care about other people.”  The court sustained a defense 
objection to the form of the question and the prosecutor moved 
on to another topic.   
In this series of questions, the prosecutor explored a 
legitimate area for cross-examination:  the nature of defendant’s 
activities in the river bottoms.  On direct, defendant had 
testified to his affinity for the river bottoms and for driving his 
four-wheel drive truck in the area, describing activities that 
were either innocent or, at least, had no direct victims:  driving 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
35 
 
around on the challenging terrain, fishing, “goofing off” with 
friends or by himself, and doing drugs.  The prosecutor’s 
questions about the antisocial nature  of four-wheel driving over 
the levees constituted impeachment on this point, though its 
value as impeachment was very slight.  The inference created 
by the question was also weak and attenuated, but not entirely 
illogical, and the evidence produced was by no means 
inflammatory.  The cross-examination thus was not, as 
defendant asserts, irrelevant questioning intended to inflame 
the jury’s passions, and it created no fundamental unfairness.  
To the extent the prosecutor’s questioning about the levees could 
be deemed a deceptive or reprehensible method of cross-
examination (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 819), 
prejudice was not reasonably likely.  (People v. Watson, supra, 
46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) 
Second, defendant maintains the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by eliciting an answer from Sheriff’s Sergeant 
Harris, who was on the patrol boat when defendant was 
arrested, to the effect that given defendant’s situation—stuck as 
he was in the mud with a rising river—Harris thought 
defendant should have been happy to see the patrol boat.  In an 
earlier hearing out of the jury’s presence, the court had ruled 
that Harris could describe defendant’s reaction to the boat’s 
arrival and could relate his own observations about the rising 
water, but could not say defendant’s reaction went against his 
expectations.  After establishing that defendant seemed to 
Harris unenthusiastic about the boat’s arrival, the prosecutor 
asked, “Did it appear to you that he was in any kind of 
predicament at that point?”  Harris answered:  “Yes.  Under the 
circumstances, his lack of enthusiasm caught my attention due 
to the fact he was in quite some peril there and his pickup being 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
36 
 
in the location it was and the river rising and weather and the 
fact that he was stuck would have actually—I thought he—to 
the contrary, that he would be very glad to see us.”   
There was no prosecutorial misconduct.  Although 
Harris’s answer may have gone beyond the limit set by the court, 
the prosecutor’s question did not call for Harris to give such an 
answer and there is no indication the prosecutor instructed or 
expected Harris to give it.  (Cf. People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 
471, 482 [prosecutor who expects witness may give an 
inadmissible answer must warn witness].)   
Third, defendant contends the prosecutor exceeded the 
scope of proper rebuttal in his final argument to the jury by 
expressing skepticism that defendant could have walked around 
10 miles in wet conditions, wearing old, “cruddy” shoes, without 
getting blisters on his feet.  We disagree.  Though defense 
counsel spent most of his closing argument pointing to 
purported weaknesses in the prosecution case and suggesting 
that someone else (for example, Bobbie Lemmons) might have 
been the killer, he also maintained that defendant’s testimony 
was consistent and believable.  And since defendant had no alibi 
for the period of Michael’s killing, the defense claim of innocence 
depended critically on the believability of defendant’s account of 
his actions during that time.  It was fair rebuttal for the 
prosecutor to point out implausible aspects of that account.9 
                                              
9  
Defendant also suggests the prosecutor’s argument 
introduced facts not in evidence.  But attorneys may urge 
inferences from the evidence, as the prosecutor did in suggesting 
that walking 10 miles in those conditions would have resulted 
in injury to defendant’s feet. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
37 
 
Finally, defendant complains of the prosecutor’s argument 
that the large, dilute bloodstain on defendant’s shirt must have 
come from Michael because defendant’s scratches would not 
have produced such a significant amount of blood.  Defendant 
maintains this argument contradicted the testimony of the 
prosecution DNA expert.  (See People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th 
at p. 823 [“Although prosecutors have wide latitude to draw 
inferences 
from 
the 
evidence 
presented 
at 
trial, 
mischaracterizing the evidence is misconduct.”].)  The record 
does not support defendant’s claim.  The expert testified that 
DNA obtained from the shirt matched defendant rather than the 
victim, but also made clear that the DNA did not necessarily 
come from the bloodstain, which was very faint and appeared 
diluted; it could instead have come from skin cells deposited by 
the person wearing the shirt.  The prosecutor thus urged fair 
inferences from the evidence in arguing that although the DNA 
was defendant’s because he was wearing the shirt, the blood 
(which defendant had tried to wash out of the shirt) came from 
the victim’s many terrible wounds. 
VII.  Instruction on Circumstantial Evidence 
Defendant contends a reference to “innocence” in a 
standard instruction on evaluating circumstantial evidence 
(CALJIC No. 2.01) improperly suggested to the jury that it was 
his burden to prove his innocence rather than the People’s 
burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.10  We have 
                                              
10  
In his opening brief, defendant also complained of the use 
of the term “innocent” in CALJIC No. 1.00.  In his reply brief, 
however, defendant acknowledges that, as the Attorney General 
points out, the version of that instruction given here did not use 
the term. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
38 
 
previously rejected substantially identical challenges to this 
instruction, 
and 
defendant 
supplies 
no 
argument 
for 
reconsideration.  “CALJIC No. 2.01 (concerning the sufficiency 
of circumstantial evidence) did not compel the jury to find 
defendant guilty and the special circumstance true using a 
standard lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  ([People 
v.] Jones [(2013)] 57 Cal.4th [899,] 972.)  Nor did it create an 
impermissible mandatory presumption by requiring the jury to 
draw an incriminatory inference whenever such an inference 
appeared ‘reasonable’ unless the defense rebutted it by 
producing a reasonable exculpatory interpretation.”  (People v. 
Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 831; accord, People v. 
Delgado (2017) 2 Cal.5th 544, 572–573.) 
Penalty Phase Issues 
VIII.  Mistrial Motion after Outburst by Victim’s  
                     Stepfather 
During defendant’s testimony at the penalty phase of trial, 
Billy Friend, the victim’s stepfather, suddenly shouted out, 
“You’re going to die you slimy son of a bitch.”  The court 
immediately recessed, giving the jury its ordinary admonition 
not to form an opinion or discuss the case.  Defendant moved for 
a mistrial, describing Friend’s outburst as, in effect, testimony 
that the defense had no opportunity to impeach with Friend’s 
prior convictions and evidence of “rancor” in the family before 
Michael’s death.  The court found Friend in contempt, ordered 
him to refrain from any more untoward conduct, and denied the 
mistrial.  When the jurors and alternates reentered, the court 
addressed them as follows: 
“All right.  The Court will note for the record that all of the 
jurors have now entered the courtroom.  And first of all, the 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
39 
 
Court wants to tell you all that you heard, I’m sure, an outburst 
that occurred in this court just before we took the recess. 
“If you’ll recall both before, during, et cetera, any time I’ve 
had contact with you, I’ve indicated time and time again that 
your judgment in the case is to be based on only evidence that 
comes from that witness stand and such documentary or 
physical evidence that the Court admits into evidence.  
Obviously I did not say that includes any outburst from 
somebody in the larger area of the courtroom. 
“I run a public courtroom as long as I have, and so long as 
I can do it within my power this is going to be a public courtroom 
and anybody can come in.  And they’re supposed to act like 
ladies and gentlemen.  When they don’t, we have the kind of 
thing that occurred here today. 
“The assurance I want from all 16 people in front of me is 
that you’re not going to let that matter influence your decision 
in any way.  And in that regard I’m instructing you you’re not to 
allow it to influence you in any way.   
“Now any one of the 16 of you who feel you could not follow 
that direction fully, I want you to please raise your right hand. 
“Court sees no hands. 
“Now also, this outburst can affect people in different 
ways.  And any of you feel that either the outburst or anything 
up to right now has so badly affected you that you can’t continue 
to be jurors and treat all parties to this litigation fairly?  If you 
feel anything’s happened in that regard, again please raise your 
hand. 
“I see no hands.  When I ask these questions I sometimes 
have a feeling that maybe jurors think well, I’m not supposed to 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
40 
 
raise my hand, I’m going to cause a big stink if I do.  That—big 
stinks are what courtrooms are all about.  That’s what brings 
matters into Court.  And I’m not afraid to face any of them.  So 
if you’d have answered—if you’d have raised your hand to either 
of those questions, please do so, because I seek honest opinions 
when I ask you questions. 
“All right. I see no hands, and I thank you very much.  And 
at this juncture I believe we should continue with the 
examination of Mr. Rhoades.”   
Defendant does not maintain that the People were 
responsible for Friend’s outburst.  In this circumstance—a 
spectator outburst not attributable to either party—a mistrial is 
called for only if the misconduct is so inherently prejudicial as 
to threaten defendant’s right to a fair trial despite admonitions 
from the court.  Prejudice is not presumed.  (People v. Chatman 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 368–370; People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 50, 87–88.)  The situation here did not call  for a mistrial.  
The hostile outburst by a family member of the victim exposed 
the jury to no information except the very fact of Friend’s 
hostility, which would not have been surprising in itself, and 
Friend’s inability to maintain the decorum of the courtroom.  
The court’s careful admonition and inquiry elicited no 
suggestion any jurors would be unable to set aside the event in 
their deliberations.  Under these circumstances, the court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial.   
IX.  Racially Discriminatory Use of Peremptory  
                   Challenges 
Defendant contends the prosecution intentionally used its 
peremptory challenges to remove all African-Americans from 
the penalty retrial jury in violation of Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
41 
 
476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258.  The 
trial court concluded defendant failed to make out a prima facie 
case of discrimination and thus did not require the prosecutors 
to explain their reasons for the challenged strikes.  Defendant 
contends this was error.  And because the trial was conducted in 
1999, he contends it is now too late to ask the prosecutors to 
explain why they struck the challenged prospective jurors.  
Defendant contends he is therefore entitled to reversal of the 
penalty judgment.  We conclude the contention lacks merit. 
“Both the state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use 
of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors based on 
group bias, such as race or ethnicity.  (See Batson v. Kentucky[, 
supra,] 476 U.S. [at p.] 97 [(Batson)]; People v. Wheeler[, 
supra,] 22 Cal.3d [at pp.] 276–277 (Wheeler).)  When the defense 
raises such a challenge, these procedures apply:  ‘First, the 
defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that 
the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of 
discriminatory purpose.”  [Citation.]  Second, once the defendant 
has made out a prima facie case, the “burden shifts to the State 
to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering 
permissible 
race-neutral 
justifications 
for 
the 
strikes.  
[Citations.]  Third, “[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, 
the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the 
strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.”  [Citation.]’  
(Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168, fn. omitted; see 
also People v. Lewis [(2008)] 43 Cal.4th [415,] 469.)”  (Davis, 
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 582.) 
The trial court here denied defendant’s Batson-Wheeler 
motion at the first stage, finding he had not established a prima 
facie case.  “Though proof of a prima facie case may be made 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
42 
 
from any information in the record available to the trial court, 
we have mentioned ‘certain types of evidence that will be 
relevant for this purpose.  Thus the party may show that his 
opponent has struck most or all of the members of the identified 
group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of 
his peremptories against the group.  He may also demonstrate 
that the jurors in question share only this one characteristic—
their membership in the group—and that in all other respects 
they are as heterogeneous as the community as a whole.  Next, 
the showing may be supplemented when appropriate by such 
circumstances as the failure of his opponent to engage these 
same jurors in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask 
them any questions at all.  Lastly, . . . the defendant need not be 
a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a 
violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and 
especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the 
group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, 
these facts may also be called to the court’s attention.’  (Wheeler, 
supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280–281, fn. omitted; see also Batson, 
supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 96–97 [in assessing a prima facie case, the 
trial court should consider ‘all relevant circumstances,’ 
including ‘a “pattern” of strikes against black jurors’ and ‘the 
prosecutor’s questions and statements during voir dire 
examination’] [citations].)”  (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 
597 (Bell); accord, People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 384 
(Scott).) 
 
A.  Background 
Each prospective juror for the penalty retrial completed a 
162-question, 44-page questionnaire.  On January 11, 1999, 
after hardship excusals, voir dire by the parties, and challenges 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
43 
 
for cause, the parties exercised peremptory challenges on 
prospective jurors seated in the jury box, alternating their 
challenges until both sides accepted the jury, which was then 
sworn in.  Attorney Michael B. Bigelow represented defendant 
in this process, while Prosecutors Frederick A. Schroeder and 
Susan E. Nolan, both from the Sutter County District Attorney’s 
Office, represented the People.11 
Defendant made his first Batson-Wheeler motion after the 
prosecutor struck three African-American women:  Shirley R., 
Adrienne A., and Alice S.  Noting that the prosecution had also 
used peremptory challenges against two White prospective 
jurors and that “there are a number of other jurors in the venire 
in the courtroom,” the court denied the motion without prejudice 
to its renewal.  The prosecution then excused two more White 
prospective jurors and a fourth African-American woman, Alicia 
R.  The strike prompted a renewed defense motion. 
Addressing the second Batson-Wheeler motion, the trial 
court noted that the prosecution had exercised four of its eight 
peremptory challenges against African-Americans.  The court 
asked defense counsel what other circumstances supported his 
motion.  Counsel responded that based on the juror 
questionnaires and voir dire, there were “no other discernable 
differences” between the struck jurors and those still in the box.  
Prosecutor Nolan replied, “Oh, I think there are significant 
differences,” but when the court asked her to elaborate, she 
declined on the ground that the defense had not yet made a 
                                              
11  
Schroeder, the lead prosecutor, exercised the prosecution’s 
peremptory challenges, but Nolan, who had also conducted some 
of the voir dire, participated in arguing the Batson-Wheeler 
motions. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
44 
 
prima facie case and the burden therefore had not shifted to the 
prosecution.  Asked for specific similarities, defense counsel 
noted the following:  “Relatives in prison”; “Formerly victims of 
assault”; “Strong religious views”; and “Volunteers somehow 
related to WEAVE” (an organization assisting survivors of 
domestic and sexual violence).  The prosecutor responded that 
the defense needed to point to specific questions that the struck 
prospective jurors had answered the same way as those jurors 
the prosecutors had kept, but had not done so.  With regard to 
the standard for finding a prima facie case, defense counsel 
maintained that he needed only to show that circumstances 
“raise an inference” of discrimination, while the prosecutor, 
citing People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1154 (Howard) 
(italics omitted), repeatedly argued a showing of a “ ‘strong 
likelihood’ ” was needed.12  
The court denied defendant’s second Batson-Wheeler 
motion under “the authority of this Howard case,” but cautioned 
the prosecutors “that any further matters of this kind will weigh 
heavily on this Court.”  The court continued:  “I’m very close, I’m 
going with Howard for the time being, but if I see very much 
more of this, I’m going to indicate to you, you may well have a 
                                              
12  
In Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pages 1153 to 1157, we 
upheld the trial court’s ruling that no prima facie case had been 
established where the prosecutor had used two of his 11 
challenges to strike the only two African-American prospective 
jurors tentatively seated in the jury box.  We concluded the 
record of voir dire supported the trial court’s finding that the 
defendant had not established a “ ‘strong likelihood’ ” of 
discrimination.  (Id. at p. 1156.)  As discussed below, we no 
longer apply a “strong likelihood” standard in evaluating 
whether the opponent of the strikes has established a prima 
facie case of discrimination. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
45 
 
serious problem on your hands.”  After defendant’s second 
Batson-Wheeler motion was denied, the prosecution used three 
more peremptory challenges before both sides accepted the 
panel, with no further motions by the defense and no further 
comment on the record as to the jury’s racial or ethnic 
composition. 
Although the trial court did not explicitly say so, it appears 
from the lack of any contrary statement that at the time of 
defendant’s second motion no other African-Americans were 
seated in the jury box; the Attorney General agrees on this point.  
Beyond that, the record does not make clear how many other 
African-Americans 
remained 
in 
the 
jury 
pool 
(the 
questionnaires do not record race or ethnicity), though the trial 
court’s warning to the prosecutors against engaging in “any 
further matters of this kind” or “very much more of this,” and its 
earlier remark that “there are a number of other jurors in the 
venire in the courtroom,” suggest that the court believed some 
of the remaining prospective jurors were African-American or 
belonged to another racial or ethnic minority. 
We briefly sketch the relevant questionnaire and voir dire 
answers given by the disputed prospective jurors: 
In her juror questionnaire, Shirley R., a 60-year-old 
administrative assistant, declined to answer several questions 
about the death penalty, but indicated she had strong opinions 
about it; she thought the Biblical verse “an eye for an eye” has 
been “grossly misinterpreted and misused”; and she considered 
life in prison without the possibility of parole to be “more of a 
punishment than the death penalty.”  She responded “yes” to a 
question asking whether, given the choice between life in prison 
without parole or death for a person convicted of first degree 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
46 
 
murder with special circumstances, she would always vote for 
life. 
Under questioning by defense counsel, Shirley R. said that 
while she had strong opinions about the death penalty, “I would 
truthfully be able to consider both penalties after hearing the 
evidence.”  Asked by Prosecutor Schroeder whether she agreed 
that the death penalty was the appropriate punishment in some 
cases, she answered, “No, I can’t truthfully say that,” and 
explained, “I try to lead a Christian life, and my Bible says thou 
shalt not kill.  It doesn’t say give me any exceptions . . . .”  On 
further questioning by the prosecutor, however, she backed off 
from an absolute position and agreed that the death penalty 
might be appropriate sometimes and she could impose it in what 
the prosecutor described as “just really a horrible case.”  Neither 
side challenged Shirley R. for cause. 
Adrienne 
A., 
a 
26-year-old 
customer 
service 
representative, stated she did not believe the death penalty 
served any purpose; that in “some or most” cases it is 
unnecessary; that she had not supported its reinstatement 
because “I can’t support actions to kill a human as a sentence 
even if that individual has killed someone”; and that if she were 
making the laws, there would not be a death penalty.  She 
nonetheless thought the death penalty was appropriate for 
premeditated murders and would not always vote for life 
without parole (or death) for a person convicted of first degree 
murder with special circumstances. 
In answer to defense counsel’s questions, Adrienne A. 
explained that while she had not seen the purpose of the death 
penalty in cases she had heard about, if she actually heard all 
the evidence and found it “the just verdict,” she would vote for 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
47 
 
it.  Questioned by the prosecutor, she affirmed her ability to 
impose death in an appropriate case, and both sides passed her 
for cause. 
Alice S., a 36-year-old budget analyst, was the mother of a 
six-month-old infant.  She raised doubts as to whether caring for 
her baby would interfere with her ability to serve, noting that 
her husband travels “so I get very stressed at times.”  She also 
thought serving in this case would touch on “a very sensitive 
area” for her because her brother had been convicted of a sexual 
offense; Alice S. believed her brother was innocent but due to his 
alcoholism “had no accountability the day of the alleged crime.”  
On questioning by Prosecutor Nolan, Alice S. clarified that she 
believed her brother had not committed the crime with which he 
was charged.  His alcohol use had resulted in his being “pretty 
much homeless,” and as a result he “basically had no 
accountability.”  If a person actually committed the crime, 
though, “they should be held responsible if there was alcohol or 
drugs and they’re convicted.”  Asked whether she could vote for 
a death sentence if she believed, after hearing all the evidence 
and the instructions on the law, that it was the appropriate 
sentence, she first said, “I can’t really answer that.”  But when 
the prosecutor clarified that she was not being asked whether 
she would vote for death in this case but only whether she could 
in a case where she thought it was the appropriate verdict, she 
answered, “Yes.”  There was no challenge for cause. 
Alicia R., the final African-American prospective juror 
struck by the prosecution, was 36 years old and worked in 
customer service.  In answers to the juror questionnaire, Alicia 
R. indicated that she had no strong opinions about the death 
penalty.  But asked about the Old Testament verse, “an eye for 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
48 
 
an eye,” she wrote she did not adhere to that view because 
“Christ died on the cross for everyone’s sin.”  When asked 
whether her views on the death penalty had changed over time 
and why, she wrote:  “Clara Fay Tucker has changed my position 
because she proved that some people can change.”13  Asked for 
her views on the statement “[a] defendant who is convicted of 
sexual assault and murder of a child should receive the death 
penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances of his 
background or mental state,” Alicia R. indicated that it 
“[d]epends” on the facts of the case.  But asked for her views on 
the statement “[a] defendant who is convicted of sexual assault 
and murder of a child should receive life in prison without 
possibility of parole regardless of the facts and circumstances of 
                                              
13  
Karla Faye Tucker, who through media coverage of her 
impending execution “came to be known . . . as a soft-spoken, 
gentle-looking, born-again Christian pleading for mercy,” was 
executed in Texas on February 4, 1998.  (Verhovek, Execution in 
Texas:  The Overview; Divisive Case of a Killer of Two Ends as 
Texas Executes Tucker, N.Y. Times (Feb. 4, 1998) p. A-1 
 [as of Nov. 25, 2019].)  Tucker 
had reportedly used drugs since childhood (id., p. A-20) and was 
“[s]trung out . . . on a variety of drugs” at the time of the killings.  
(Verhovek, As Woman’s Execution Nears, Texas Squirms, N.Y. 
Times 
(Jan. 
1, 
1998) 
p. A-12 
 [as of Nov. 25, 2019].)  (All 
Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, docket 
number, 
and 
case 
name 
at 
.) 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
49 
 
his background or mental state,” Alicia R. responded that she 
“[a]gree[d] somewhat.” 
In voir dire Prosecutor Schroeder asked whether, if 
Alicia R. “made that kind of mental decision that . . . the death 
penalty objectively appears to you to be the correct decision,” she 
“would” vote for it.  She replied, “I suppose.”  Neither side 
challenged Alicia R. for cause. 
 
B.  Analysis 
The trial court in this case applied the “strong likelihood” 
standard from Howard to determine that defendant had not 
established a prima facie case of discrimination.  At the time the 
trial occurred in 1999, there was some confusion in the case law 
as to how, if at all, this standard differed from the “reasonable 
inference” standard articulated in other California cases.  A few 
years after defendant’s trial, this court granted review to resolve 
the issue in People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1306, 
1313–1318.  In that case we ruled that both terms “refer to the 
same test, and this test is consistent with Batson.”  We went on 
to elaborate:  “Under both Wheeler and Batson, to state a prima 
facie case, the objector must show that it is more likely than not 
the other party’s peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were 
based on impermissible group bias.”  (Id. at p. 1306.) 
The United States Supreme Court, in turn, granted review 
to consider the issue and disapproved People v. Johnson’s 
“ ‘more likely than not’ ” standard.  (Johnson v. California, 
supra, 545 U.S. at p. 168.)  The high court explained that under 
Batson, the trial judge should “have the benefit of all relevant 
circumstances, including the prosecutor’s explanation, before 
deciding whether it was more likely than not that the challenge 
was improperly motivated.”  (Johnson v. California, at p. 170.)  
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
50 
 
To serve its function in the three-step process, the requirement 
for a prima facie case must not be “so onerous that a defendant 
would have to persuade the judge—on the basis of all the facts, 
some of which are impossible for the defendant to know with 
certainty—that the challenge was more likely than not the 
product of purposeful discrimination.  Instead, a defendant 
satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing 
evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference 
that discrimination has occurred.”  (Johnson v. California, at 
p. 170, italics added.)   
Because the trial in this case predated this court’s decision 
in People v. Johnson, it is unclear whether the trial court 
understood the “strong likelihood” standard to mean “more 
likely than not.”  Nonetheless, the trial court presumably 
understood the standard to be somewhat more demanding than 
the “reasonable inference” standard, for which defendant had 
argued.  In the category of cases involving jury selection before 
the high court clarified the prima facie case standard in Johnson 
v. California, this court has adopted a mode of analysis under 
which, rather than accord the usual deference to the trial court’s 
no-prima-facie case determination, we “review the record 
independently to determine whether the record supports an 
inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on a prohibited 
discriminatory basis.”  (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 
779; accord, People v. Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5th 989, 999 (Reed); 
Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 582–583; Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th 
at p. 597.)     
Here we consider whether the record supports an 
inference the prosecution excused one or more of the African-
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
51 
 
American prospective jurors because of their race.14  We consider 
“all relevant circumstances” in making that determination.  
(Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 96–97.)  We have identified 
certain types of evidence as “especially relevant,” including:  
“whether a party has struck most or all of the members of the 
venire from an identified group, whether a party has used a 
disproportionate number of strikes against members of that 
group, whether the party has engaged those prospective jurors 
in only desultory voir dire, whether the defendant is a member 
of that group, and whether the victim is a member of the group 
to which a majority of remaining jurors belong.  [Citation.]  We 
may also consider nondiscriminatory reasons for the peremptory 
strike that ‘necessarily dispel any inference of bias,’ so long as 
those reasons are apparent from and clearly established in the 
record.”  (Reed, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 999–1000.) 
We consider the showing defendant made at his second or 
renewed motion, as that presents the fuller record of facts and 
argument.  Looking to the pattern of the prosecution’s 
                                              
14 
Defendant’s briefing repeatedly notes that all the African-
Americans called into the jury box and excused by the 
prosecution were women, but does not argue their sex should 
alter the Batson-Wheeler inquiry.   
 
In supplemental briefing and at oral argument, defendant 
suggested the prospective jurors’ sex is relevant because 
African-American women are subject to discrimination on the 
basis of stereotypes relating to both race and sex; defendant 
asserted that the prosecutors here must have engaged in such 
dual stereotyping.  But discrimination in this context cannot be 
assumed; it must be demonstrated.  Because defendants’ efforts 
to demonstrate discrimination have, in substance, focused on 
the jurors’ race rather than their sex, we likewise focus on the 
jurors’ race in determining whether defendant established a 
prima facie case. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
52 
 
challenges, the record shows that at the time of defendant’s 
renewed Batson-Wheeler motion the prosecutors had used four 
of their eight peremptory challenges to eliminate every African-
American seated in the jury box.  Because the juror 
questionnaires did not record racial or ethnic heritage, we 
cannot know how many African-Americans were in the entire 
venire or in the pool of prospective jurors remaining after 
hardship and cause excusals.  We will assume with defendant, 
however, that the prosecutors’ use of half their strikes against 
the four African-American prospective jurors was substantially 
disproportionate to the representation of African-Americans in 
the jury pool.  Given the demographic makeup of the community 
from which the jurors were drawn, unless African-Americans 
were greatly overrepresented in the venire or received hardship 
and cause excusals at much lower rates than others, it is likely 
that they comprised substantially less than 50 percent of the 
pool.15  (See Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 384; Bell, supra, 40 
Cal.4th at p. 597.)   
Exercising our independent review on appeal, we are 
nonetheless persuaded that the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges 
                                              
15  
According to census data, African-Americans made up just 
under 10 percent of Sacramento County’s population in 2000.  
U.S. Census Bureau, Population of Sacramento County, 
California:  Census 2010 and 2000 Interactive Map, 
Demographics, 
Statistics, 
Graphs, 
Quick 
Facts 
 [as of Nov. 
25, 2019].  We take notice of the census data here in recognition 
of the possibility that the lack of on-the-record comment simply 
reflects that the pool’s composition was apparent to court and 
counsel at the time.  But we note that it was defendant’s burden 
to make the record necessary to support his motion.   
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
53 
 
does not give rise to an inference of discrimination.  As an initial 
matter, we note that this case “did not involve a situation in 
which ‘[r]acial identity between the defendant and the excused 
person,’ or between the victim and the majority of remaining 
jurors, raises heightened concerns about whether the 
prosecutor’s challenge was racially motivated.”  (People v. 
O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 980.)  Neither defendant nor the 
victim were African-American—both were White—and the 
record reveals no other case-specific reason why a prosecutor 
would be motivated to exclude a particular class of jurors.  We 
caution that stereotypes and biases can influence jury selection 
in any case.  But in the absence of such reasons, or of any 
indication these particular prosecutors habitually employed 
group bias in their selection of juries, we are less inclined to find 
a prima facie case based solely on the prosecutors’ 
disproportionate use of peremptories against one group.  (Scott, 
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 384; Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 597, 
599.) 
Furthermore, the record does not reveal any apparent 
disparities in the nature or extent of the prosecutors’ 
questioning of the African-American prospective jurors versus 
prospective jurors of other racial and ethnic backgrounds.  And, 
finally, the record discloses readily apparent, race-neutral 
grounds for a prosecutor to use peremptory challenges against 
each of the four prospective jurors at issue.  (See, e.g., Reed, 
supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 999–1000.) 
By referring to “readily apparent” grounds for the strikes, 
we do not mean merely that we can imagine race-neutral 
reasons the prosecutors might have given if required to do so at 
the second step of the Batson inquiry.  As defendant and 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
54 
 
Justice Liu’s dissenting opinion quite rightly point out, the very 
purpose of Batson’s first step is to elicit the prosecution’s actual 
reasons for exercising its strikes when other circumstances give 
rise to an inference of discrimination:  “The Batson framework 
is designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and 
inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury 
selection process.  [Citation.]  The inherent uncertainty present 
in inquiries of discriminatory purpose counsels against 
engaging in needless and imperfect speculation when a direct 
answer can be obtained by asking a simple question.”  (Johnson 
v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 172.)  It follows that 
speculation about reasons the prosecutors might have had for 
striking the jurors would go beyond our proper role in assessing 
the prima facie case. 
But our cases have also recognized that where the record 
reveals “obvious race-neutral grounds for the prosecutor’s 
challenges to the prospective jurors in question,” those reasons 
can definitively undermine any inference of discrimination that 
an appellate court might otherwise draw from viewing the 
statistical pattern of strikes in isolation.  (Davis, supra, 46 
Cal.4th at p. 584, italics added; accord, People v. Taylor (2010) 
48 Cal.4th 574, 616.)  Put differently, when the record of a 
prospective juror’s voir dire or questionnaire on its face reveals 
a race-neutral characteristic that any reasonable prosecutor 
trying the case would logically avoid in a juror, the inference 
that the prosecutor was motivated by racial discrimination loses 
force.  Therefore, as we have said, an appellate court may take 
into account “nondiscriminatory reasons for a peremptory 
challenge that are apparent from and ‘clearly established’ in the 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
55 
 
record [citations] and that necessarily dispel any inference of 
bias.”  (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 384.)16 
Here, the record reveals readily apparent reasons for the 
strikes that dispel the inference of bias.  In particular, Shirley 
R. and Adrienne A. each expressed strong views against the 
death penalty on their questionnaires and in voir dire.  On her 
questionnaire, Shirley R. wrote that she considered life in prison 
                                              
16  
Our dissenting colleague appears to agree that an 
appellate court may consider such readily apparent reasons for 
a strike, though he may differ as to precisely how obvious an 
hypothesized reason must be to dispel any inference of biased 
selection.  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 19; see also People v. 
Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 872–873 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).) 
 
We stress that in considering these grounds on appeal we 
do not suggest that a trial court evaluating a Batson-Wheeler 
prima facie case should search the record for reasons for the 
peremptory challenges instead of asking the attorney who 
exercised them for his or her reasons as part of a second-step 
inquiry.  In the trial court, “a direct answer can be obtained by 
asking a simple question.”  (Johnson v. California, supra, 545 
U.S. at p. 172.)  But in this court, which may conduct its review 
of a no-prima-facie-case ruling many years or even decades after 
it was made, asking the attorneys would be anything but 
simple—indeed, both defendant and the dissent argue that it 
would be impossible here.  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 24 
[only possible remedy for trial court’s failure to ask question is 
to reverse penalty judgment]; see People v. Johnson (2006) 38 
Cal.4th 1096, 1100–1104.)  On the other hand, as an appellate 
court, we have the benefit of being able to examine the record in 
more detail, and at a great deal more leisure, than a trial court 
in the midst of jury selection.  What is the soundest and most 
practical approach for trial courts is not necessarily the 
soundest and most practical approach for appellate courts, and 
vice versa. 
 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
56 
 
without the possibility of parole to be “more of a punishment 
than the death penalty” and checked an answer indicating that 
given a choice of penalties, she would always vote for life; on 
questioning by the prosecutor, she averred that the Bible makes 
no exceptions to its commandment against killing and she could 
not “truthfully say that” she considered death the appropriate 
punishment in some cases.  Adrienne A. wrote that the death 
penalty was often or usually unnecessary, that she did not 
believe it served any purpose, that she could not “support 
actions to kill a human as a sentence even if that individual has 
killed someone,” and that if she were making the laws there 
would be no death penalty.  Both women also gave some more 
nuanced answers in voir dire, declaring themselves able to 
impose a death sentence if warranted, such that they were not 
subject to a challenge for cause.  But given their strongly stated 
views opposing the death penalty, the fact they were not subject 
to for-cause challenges did not render them desirable jurors for 
the prosecution in a penalty retrial.  
Comparisons to the seated jurors the prosecution accepted 
do not negate the force of these readily apparent reasons for 
peremptory challenge.17  It is true that both Juror No. 4 and 
                                              
17  
Although we have sometimes declined to consider such 
comparisons in a first-stage Batson-Wheeler analysis—
particularly when neither the trial court nor this court, in 
evaluating the prima facie case, has posited possible 
prosecutorial reasons for the challenged strikes (Bell, supra, 40 
Cal.4th at pp. 600–601; see also People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 313, 350 [comparative analysis not mandated in first-
stage cases])—more recent decisions have considered such 
comparisons.  (See, e.g., Reed, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 1002–
1003; People v. Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 836–838.)  These 
 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
57 
 
Juror No. 9 expressed reservations about the death penalty that 
overlapped in certain respects with Shirley R.’s and Adrienne 
A.’s.18  But neither of these seated jurors expressed the sort of 
unqualified opposition to the death penalty that both Shirley R. 
and Adrienne A. did at times.  Two non-African-American 
prospective jurors who did express such unqualified anti-death-
penalty views on their questionnaires were struck by the 
                                              
cases recognize that comparative juror analysis has a role to 
play as an aid in determining whether the reasons we are able 
to identify on the record are ones that help to dispel any 
inference that the prosecution exercised its strikes in a biased 
manner.  Whether or not this evolution in jurisprudence 
demands we explicitly “repudiate[]” our earlier decisions (dis. 
opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 20), we clarify here that juror 
comparisons can play a role at the first stage of the Batson-
Wheeler analysis. 
This case illustrates the utility of juror comparisons in 
conducting our independent appellate review of the first stage 
determination.  By comparing the excused jurors to those the 
prosecutor retained on the identified characteristics, we test the 
hypothesis that these characteristics were distinct enough to 
account for the challenge and dispel any inference of bias.   
18  
Juror No. 4 thought the purpose of the death penalty was 
to act as a deterrent to crime, but doubted “if it really works,” 
checked “No” on a question asking specifically whether 
enforcing the death penalty deters crimes such as murder, and 
did not support it politically because “it takes too much money.”  
Juror No. 9 was doubtful as to the penalty’s deterrent value and 
thought life in prison without the possibility of parole “could be 
worse than death for some people.”  Both these jurors were in 
the group initially seated in the box at the outset of peremptory 
challenges, meaning they were also seated when defendant’s 
Batson-Wheeler motions were denied.  Neither of these jurors 
was African-American. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
58 
 
prosecution before defendant made his second Batson-Wheeler 
motion. 
As to Prospective Juror Alice S., there were, as the 
Attorney General posits, two main “causes for concern” for a 
prosecutor:  her uncertainty whether she would be able to serve 
as a juror while caring for her six-month-old infant (often on her 
own while her husband was away), and her belief that her 
brother had been wrongly convicted of a sexual offense.  Both 
are readily apparent bases for objection from a prosecutorial 
view that tend strongly to dispel any inference of bias.  While 
the jury being chosen would decide only penalty, the issue of 
lingering doubt remained one the jury would face; the jury was 
ultimately instructed it could consider lingering doubt and the 
defense argued for the lesser penalty partly on that basis.  The 
penalty trial accordingly lasted about two months, during which 
the prosecutors asked the jurors to absorb and follow the 
evidence of guilt, most of it physical and circumstantial, in 
sufficient detail that they would not have lingering doubts as to 
defendant’s responsibility.  Having spontaneously expressed 
doubts about whether her need to care for her six-month-old 
infant would allow her to complete her jury service if selected, 
Alice S. was clearly not a good choice for this task.   
With regard to her brother, Alice S. expressed the belief 
he was innocent of the crime and had been convicted only 
because, due to his alcoholism and resulting lack of housing, he 
could not account for his activities at the time of the crime.  
Given the evidence of defendant’s substance abuse during the 
relevant timeframe and the nature of his lingering doubt 
defense, this response would have raised concerns for any 
reasonable prosecutor trying the penalty phase of this case. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
59 
 
Defendant points to no juror accepted by the prosecution who 
expressed similar doubts about his or her ability to serve or 
similar attitudes about the prosecution of a family member.19 
Finally, Prospective Juror Alicia R. indicated on her 
questionnaire that her views on the death penalty were 
influenced by the highly publicized case of Karla Faye Tucker, a 
late Texas death row inmate who was well-known for having 
committed a capital crime while battling an addiction to drugs, 
and who had become a Christian while in prison; in Alicia R.’s 
view, Tucker “proved that some people can change.”  Answering 
a question seeking general information about prospective jurors’ 
views on the death penalty, Alicia R. indicated that “an eye for 
an eye” is wrong because “Christ died on the cross for everyone’s 
sin.”  She tended to agree with the statement “[a] defendant who 
is convicted of sexual assault and murder of a child should 
receive life in prison without possibility of parole regardless of 
the facts and circumstances of his background or mental state,” 
while remaining noncommittal regarding her view of imposing 
the death penalty in such a case.  Asked whether she would have 
a death penalty if she were making the laws, Alicia R. 
responded, “can’t say.”  Alicia R.’s responses revealed a view of 
                                              
19  
As the dissent observes, Alice S. clarified that she did not 
regard substance abuse as an excuse for crime.  (Dis. opn. of 
Liu, J., post, at p. 13.)  The readily apparent concern about 
Alice S., however, was not her attitude toward substance abuse 
generally, but that she believed her brother’s alcoholism led to 
his wrongful conviction by rendering him incapable of supplying 
an alibi.  From any reasonable prosecutor’s perspective, this 
belief created a clear risk that Alice S. might be especially 
receptive to the alibi defense put forward by defendant, who 
claimed to be taking drugs during the period when the victim 
was abducted and killed. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
60 
 
the proper role of the death penalty, and a strong belief in the 
possibility of redemption for persons who commit even the most 
serious crimes, that would naturally have raised serious 
concerns for any prosecutors selecting the penalty retrial jury in 
this case. 
Defendant points to no other juror whom the prosecution 
accepted who appeared to hold similar attitudes toward the 
death penalty, particularly for a crime like defendant’s.  Seated 
Juror No. 4 did write that the death penalty might be 
inappropriate for some people convicted of sexually assaulting 
and murdering a child because “some persons may benefit from 
rehabilitation.”  But in contrast to Alicia R., Juror No. 4 also 
indicated that she disagreed with the statement “[a] defendant 
who is convicted of sexual assault and murder of a child should 
receive life in prison without possibility of parole regardless of 
the facts and circumstances of his background or mental state.”  
Furthermore, Juror No. 4—unlike Alicia R.—had specifically 
identified the “[k]illing of a child” as a crime for which she 
believed the death penalty might be the appropriate sentence. 
Only one other seated juror, Juror No. 7, expressed even 
qualified agreement with the statement that a defendant 
convicted of sexual assault and murder of a child should be 
sentenced to life without parole regardless of the circumstances.   
But unlike Alicia R., Juror No. 7 also said that such a defendant 
should be sentenced to death regardless of the circumstances.  
Juror No. 7’s attitudes toward the appropriate penalty for this 
type of crime were further revealed by her responses to other 
questions:  Unlike Alicia R. (but like Juror No. 4), Juror No. 7 
specifically identified “[k]illing of a child” as a crime for which 
the death penalty may be appropriate.  Finally, unlike Alicia R., 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
61 
 
who “[couldn’t] say” whether she would have the death penalty 
if she were making the laws, Juror No. 7 affirmatively indicated 
that she would have a death penalty “to keep repeat offenders 
from society.”  For the prosecution, conducting the penalty 
retrial of a repeat offender convicted of sexually assaulting and 
murdering a child, the difference between the two prospective 
jurors’ responses would have been highly significant. 
The dissent stresses that the prosecution here did not 
challenge Shirley R., Adrienne A. or Alicia R. for cause, 
questioning how we can then find their anti-death-penalty views 
to be obvious grounds for their excusal by peremptory challenge.  
(Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 15.)  The two questions, though, 
are entirely distinct.  “Unlike a for-cause challenge . . . , the 
issue here is not whether a juror held views that would impair 
his or her ability to follow the law.  Unimpaired jurors may still 
be the subject of valid peremptory strikes.”  (People v. 
Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, 773.)  A prospective juror’s 
attitude toward the death penalty is a common basis for both 
cause and peremptory challenges, and an advocate who finds a 
juror undesirable on that basis but is unable to have him or her 
excused for cause is expected to use a peremptory challenge to 
remove the juror.  (See People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 
767–770.)  It is entirely plausible that the prosecutors believed 
they were unlikely to succeed with for-cause challenges here, 
but felt nonetheless that the three women’s views on the death 
penalty made them undesirable jurors in a penalty trial.   
Notwithstanding the various circumstances tending to 
dispel any inference of discrimination in this case, defendant 
contends the high court’s decision in Johnson v. California 
compels a prima facie case finding here.  Defendant relies 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
62 
 
largely on a brief paragraph in which the high court noted that 
the inferences of discrimination that had led the trial court in 
that case to tell the parties “ ‘ “we are very close” ’ ”—and that 
had also led this court to describe the prosecution’s pattern of 
strikes as “ ‘suspicious’ ”—were “sufficient to establish a prima 
facie case under Batson.”  (Johnson v. California, supra, 545 
U.S. at p. 173.)  Defendant argues the same result should obtain 
here, since this case involves a similar pattern of strikes against 
African-American prospective jurors and a similar statement by 
the trial judge about being “close.” 
To the extent defendant argues that Johnson v. California 
requires us to find a prima facie case based on the pattern of 
strikes alone, we are unpersuaded.  It was not the pattern of 
strikes alone that gave rise to the inference of discrimination in 
Johnson v. California; context mattered as well.  Johnson v. 
California, unlike this case, “involved the ‘highly relevant’ 
circumstance that a black defendant was ‘charged with killing 
“his White girlfriend’s child.” ’ ”  (Johnson v. California, supra, 
545 U.S. at p. 167, quoting People v. Johnson, supra, 30 Cal.4th 
at p. 1326.)  Although defendant suggests otherwise, nothing in 
the high court’s opinion indicates any disagreement with the 
proposition that the racially charged nature of a case may 
properly inform an appellate court’s consideration of whether a 
pattern of strikes establishes a prima facie case of 
discrimination.20  Nor does the high court’s opinion suggest that 
                                              
20  
Indeed, no party in Johnson v. California asked the court 
to make any such ruling.  On the contrary, the defendant in that 
case strongly urged the court to consider the racially charged 
nature of the case.  (Johnson v. California (U.S. Supreme Ct., 
Feb. 2, 2005, No. 04-6964) Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, 
p. 48.) 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
63 
 
other factors—such as discrepancies in the extent or quality of 
questioning, or readily apparent race-neutral reasons for 
exercising the strikes—are irrelevant to the inquiry. 
Defendant and our dissenting colleague argue that the 
high court in Johnson v. California did at least imply that such 
reasons are irrelevant by failing to address any of them.  (Dis. 
opn. of Liu, J., at pp. 11, 15–16.)  Although the trial court in that 
case had hypothesized certain race-neutral reasons for the 
peremptory challenges—“that the black venire members had 
offered equivocal or confused answers in their written 
questionnaires” (Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at 
p. 165)—the high court did not mention those reasons in 
addressing whether a prima facie case was established.  But the 
omission is not significant, because the reasons themselves were 
not significant.  Of the three disputed prospective jurors in 
Johnson v. California, one gave what the trial court described 
as a “ ‘rambling’ ” response that suggested difficulty in 
understanding, the second answered a question according to her 
“ ‘emotions and feelings,’ ” and no reason was posited for the 
third.  (People v. Johnson, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 1307–1308.)  
It is neither surprising nor meaningful that the trial court’s 
assessment that a prospective juror was “rambling” or acting on 
her “feelings” played no role in the high court’s brief prima facie 
case discussion.  Unlike jurors’ uncertainty or equivocation 
about their ability to apply the death penalty, this type of 
unsatisfactory response was not the sort of readily apparent 
reasons for a prosecutorial juror strike that would have 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
64 
 
dispelled any inference of discrimination arising from the 
pattern of excusals.21 
Nor, contrary to the argument made by defendant and the 
dissent, does the trial court’s comment here (“I’m very close, I’m 
going to go with Howard for the time being, but if I see very 
much more of this, I’m going to indicate to you, you may well 
have a serious problem on your hands.”) amount to a finding 
that the circumstances gave rise to an inference of bias.  
Although defense counsel had argued that only an inference of 
bias was needed for a prima facie case, the trial court never 
addressed that standard.  And although Wheeler had used both 
phrases—“strong 
likelihood” 
and 
“reasonable 
inference” 
(Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280–281)—our decision there 
did not identify them as different levels of proof.  Nor did 
Howard, the decision by which the trial court was mainly 
guided.  (See Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1153–1157 
[quoting 
Wheeler’s 
strong-likelihood 
language 
without 
mentioning reasonable inference as an alternative].)  The trial 
court’s statement appears to have been intended as a warning 
to the prosecutors to be careful with their future peremptories, 
because additional strikes might lead to a finding of a prima 
facie case of discrimination.  It is not clear the trial court meant 
                                              
21  
For this reason, we disagree with the dissent’s suggestion 
that the answers given by the prospective jurors in this case 
were equivocal or confused in the same way as those in 
Johnson v. California.  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 15–16.) 
 
The dissent (p. 11) also notes that our opinion in People 
v. Johnson, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pages 1325 to 1326, suggested 
some reasons that could have supported a peremptory 
challenge to the third disputed prospective juror.  These, too, 
fall short of the kind of readily apparent reasons that would 
lead any reasonable prosecutor to challenge a juror. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
65 
 
it as a commentary on how suspicious (or not) the prior strikes 
had been, given the totality of the circumstances, nor is it 
apparent that the court implied the existence of a prima facie 
case under a “reasonable inference” standard.  In any event, our 
review of the court’s ruling in this case is independent; it is not 
necessary for us to determine precisely why the trial court 
denied the motion or what changes in the law or facts would 
have led it to grant the motion.  
In sum, considering all the relevant circumstances, we 
conclude the record does not “support[] an inference that the 
prosecutor excused a juror on a discriminatory basis.”  (Reed, 
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 999.)  Although the prosecutors used half 
their peremptory challenges to excuse all the African-American 
prospective jurors seated in the box, this was not a case that 
raised heightened concerns about racial bias in jury selection.  
There were no apparent differences in the extent or manner of 
the prosecutors’ questioning of prospective jurors of different 
racial backgrounds.  And, most importantly, the record discloses 
readily apparent grounds for excusing each prospective juror, 
dispelling any inference of bias that might arise from the 
pattern of strikes alone.22  Our independent review of the record 
leads to the conclusion that defendant failed to establish a prima 
facie case of unconstitutional discrimination. 
                                              
22  
No different conclusion would follow from examination of 
the record at the time of defendant’s first Batson-Wheeler 
motion.  The pattern of strikes was similar (three out of five 
challenges used against African-Americans) and grounds for 
prosecutorial challenge were readily apparent as to all three 
struck prospective jurors (Shirley R., Adrienne A., and Alice S.). 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
66 
 
X.  Denial of Defense Challenge for Cause 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his 
challenge for cause to a juror who, he asserts, bore an 
impermissible bias in favor of the death penalty.  Defendant 
contends the error deprived him of his right to an unbiased jury 
drawn from a cross-section of the community in violation of the 
federal Constitution.  We hold defendant did not preserve the 
issue for appeal and that it lacks merit in any event. 
On her questionnaire, Juror No. 10 wrote that a juror 
should “listen carefully” and not “make up your mind before all 
evidence is in,” and that she was willing to determine as best 
she could which sentence was appropriate, and to return that 
sentence.  Asked generally for her opinions about the death 
penalty, she wrote:  “I am in favor of it when it involves 
children.”  If she were making the laws, she would have a death 
penalty.  She agreed with the statement that a defendant 
convicted of sexual assault and murder of a child should receive 
the death penalty “regardless of the facts and circumstances of 
his background or mental state.” 
On questioning by defense counsel, the juror reiterated 
her view that the death penalty was appropriate in cases 
involving children, but also indicated a willingness to consider 
evidence in mitigation even in such a case.  When counsel asked 
whether she would “not consider” life without the possibility of 
parole in such a  case, this colloquy ensued: 
“A:  It would be difficult for me to say, no, that they—life 
in prison.  I couldn’t go along with that always. 
“Q:  Why not? 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
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“A:  Because of it being a child involved.  That’s where I 
have my problem with this— 
“Q:  Okay 
“A: —case 
“Q:  So then, honestly, as you sit there, because a child was 
involved, life without possibility of parole is not something that 
you could honestly, that you could honestly, honestly— 
“A:  Uh-hum. 
“Q:  —deep down, that you could honestly consider? 
“A:  Well, it would be difficult for me to do that. 
“Q:  You—so you couldn’t consider it honestly? 
“A:  Well, honestly, I guess until I heard all the evidence 
myself, it would be difficult. 
“Q:  Do you think—go ahead? 
“A:  No.  I’m just, I would just—because it was a child 
involved, I’d have to do a lot of thinking on that.  But it depends 
on what the evidence is in their background.” 
On further questioning by defense counsel, Juror No. 10 
appeared to say that because a child was involved, the defense 
would have to prove to her that life without parole was the 
appropriate sentence, even if the court instructed the jury that 
the defense did not have to prove anything.  The court, however, 
had counsel’s question reread and asked the juror whether, 
having it in mind, she would follow the court’s instructions.  She 
replied, “Yes, I would.”   
On renewed questioning by defense counsel, Juror No. 10 
explained that while she was “leaning towards the death 
penalty” she “would have to listen to everything first before I 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
68 
 
could definitively say for sure.”  After questioning by the 
prosecutor, in which the juror affirmed she would listen to the 
evidence and sentence defendant to life if she felt that was the 
appropriate penalty, the court pressed her on whether she would 
“really listen” to the factors in mitigation as well as those in 
aggravation, and on whether she could consider them in a fair 
fashion, without a predisposition to selecting the death penalty.  
She replied, “I honestly feel that I could [do] that,” and, when 
the court asked if there was any question in her mind, she 
answered, “No.” 
The trial court denied defendant’s challenge for cause.  
The court concluded that while the juror tentatively favored the 
death penalty based on the case synopsis she had read in the 
questionnaire, her answers on voir dire showed she would 
consider all the evidence in reaching her ultimate verdict.  
Defendant did not exercise a peremptory challenge against 
Juror No. 10 and did not exhaust his peremptories, using only 
16 of the 20 allotted.   
The Attorney General maintains that defendant has failed 
to preserve the issue of his for-cause challenge because he did 
not exhaust his peremptory challenges or express dissatisfaction 
with the jury that was seated.  We agree.  “ ‘To preserve a claim 
of error in the denial of a challenge for cause, the defense must 
exhaust its peremptory challenges and object to the jury as 
finally constituted.’  (People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 
146.)  Defendant did neither.”  (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 469, 487 (Hillhouse).)  Defendant here had four 
peremptory challenges remaining when he accepted the jury, 
one of which he could have used to excuse Juror No. 10.  At the 
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time he accepted the jury, defense counsel said simply, “Pass the 
panel, Your Honor,” giving no indication of dissatisfaction. 
For the proposition that the issue of his challenge to Juror 
No. 10 must be deemed preserved, defendant relies on a single 
phrase in a United States Supreme Court decision on a different 
issue, United States v. Martinez-Salazar (2000) 528 U.S. 304.  
There the high court held that a defendant who does use a 
peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror who should 
have been excused for cause has not been deprived of any right 
under federal court rules or the Constitution.  (Id. at p. 307.)  
Rejecting the lower court’s conclusion the defendant had been 
“compelled” to use a peremptory challenge against the 
prospective juror, the court stated that the defendant “had the 
option of letting [the prospective juror]  sit on the petit jury and, 
upon conviction, pursuing a Sixth Amendment challenge on 
appeal.”  (Id. at p. 315.) 
As we have previously explained, this passage does not 
establish that a California defendant can preserve a for-cause 
challenge issue without exhausting his or her peremptories and 
objecting to the panel.  In Martinez-Salazar, “the high court 
interpreted federal law, specifically rule 24 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure (18 U.S.C.), as not requiring a defendant 
to excuse a prospective juror in order to preserve the issue of the 
trial court’s denial of a challenge for cause.  (United States v. 
Martinez-Salazar, supra, 528 U.S. at pp. 314–315.)  However, 
the court recognized that state law may be different.  (Id. at 
pp. 313–314 [citing Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81].)  In 
Ross v. Oklahoma, at page 89, the court noted that under 
Oklahoma law, ‘a defendant who disagrees with the trial court’s 
ruling on a for-cause challenge must, in order to preserve the 
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70 
 
claim that the ruling deprived him of a fair trial, exercise a 
peremptory challenge to remove the juror.  Even then, the error 
is grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all 
peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon 
him.’  The court found ‘nothing arbitrary or irrational about such 
a requirement, which subordinates the absolute freedom to use 
a peremptory challenge as one wishes to the goal of empanelling 
an impartial jury.’  (Id. at p. 90.)  . . .  [T]he California rule is 
similar to Oklahoma’s.”  (Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 487; 
accord, People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 426.)  Martinez-
Salazar casts no doubt on the continued validity of our rule 
requiring defendant to have taken additional steps to preserve 
the claim that his for-cause challenge was improperly denied. 
We also reject defendant’s claim on the merits.  A 
challenge for cause under Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 
412, 424, requires the trial court to determine whether the 
prospective juror’s views on the death penalty “would ‘ “prevent 
or substantially impair” ’ the performance of the juror’s duties 
as defined by the court’s instructions and the juror’s oath.”  
(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975.)  “ ‘On 
appeal, we will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is fairly 
supported by the record, accepting . . . the trial court’s 
determination as to the prospective juror’s true state of mind 
when the prospective juror has made statements that are 
conflicting or ambiguous.’  (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 
668, 727.”  (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1114; 
accord, People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 987; People v. 
Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 424–425.) 
Juror No. 10’s statements were at times ambiguous and 
conflicting.  On the one hand, she generally thought the death 
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penalty appropriate for sexual assault and murder of a child, 
and knowing from the synopsis on her questionnaire that 
defendant had been convicted of the “murder, torture, sodomy 
and sexual assault” of an eight-year-old boy, she leaned toward 
the death penalty in this case.  On the other hand, she believed 
jurors should keep an open mind and listen to all the evidence 
and, under close questioning by attorneys for both parties and 
by the court, she affirmed that she would consider the mitigation 
evidence presented and could return a life sentence if she 
believed it appropriate.  Although at one point she appeared to 
say that because the victim was a child she would put a burden 
of proof on the defense even if instructed otherwise, when 
questioned carefully by the court she clarified that she would 
follow the court’s instructions on how to decide the penalty.  The 
trial court was fully engaged in assessing the juror’s state of 
mind on these points and was able to observe her tone of voice 
and demeanor.  In these circumstances, we have no grounds to 
overturn the court’s determination that Juror No. 10 was not 
disqualified by bias.  Finding no error in this determination, we 
also reject defendant’s claims to denial of his constitutional 
rights in this regard. 
XI.  Permissibility of Penalty Phase Retrial 
Defendant contends the retrial of penalty before a new 
jury after the original jury was unable to reach a verdict on this 
issue, as provided for in Penal Code section 190.4, subdivision 
(b), conflicts with evolving standards of decency in the United 
States and therefore violates the bans on cruel and/or unusual 
punishments under the 
United States and 
California 
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72 
 
Constitutions.  (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, 
§ 17.)23  
As in People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at page 633, 
defendant here cites statutory law from other United States 
jurisdictions to show that California is in the minority of death 
penalty jurisdictions allowing a penalty retrial and argues a 
retrial unfairly imposes double-jeopardy-type burdens on 
capital defendants.  We rejected both arguments in Taylor:  
“Although we have never addressed the precise Eighth 
Amendment challenge defendant raises, we have determined 
that ‘California’s asserted status as being in the minority of 
jurisdictions worldwide that impose capital punishment’ does 
not establish that our death penalty scheme per se violates the 
Eighth Amendment.  [Citations.]  Likewise here, that California 
is among the ‘handful’ of states that allows a penalty retrial 
following jury deadlock on penalty does not, in and of itself, 
establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment or ‘evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.’  (Trop v. Dulles (1958) 356 U.S. 86, 101.)  [¶]  Arguing 
points more typically raised in a claim of double jeopardy, 
defendant further contends that compelling a capital defendant 
to endure the ‘ “embarrassment, expense and ordeal” ’ (United 
States v. Scott (1978) 437 U.S. 82, 95) of a second trial on the 
question of whether he should live or die is inconsistent with 
Eighth Amendment principles.  But, as defendant concedes, in 
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania (2003) 537 U.S. 101, 108–110, the 
high court held that the double jeopardy clause did not bar a 
penalty retrial after appellate reversal of the capital defendant’s 
                                              
23  
Defendant cites other constitutional guarantees as well 
but makes no distinct argument for their violation. 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
73 
 
conviction, 
notwithstanding 
that 
in 
accordance 
with 
Pennsylvania law, the defendant had been sentenced to life 
without parole following juror deadlock at the penalty phase.  
Given that the double jeopardy clause permits retrial following 
juror deadlock under such circumstances, we fail to see how 
subjecting defendant to retrial of the penalty phase in this case 
could offend the constitutional proscription against cruel and 
unusual punishment.”  (Taylor, at p. 634; accord, People v. 
Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 356; People v. Peoples (2016) 62 
Cal.4th 718, 751; People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 
254, 311.) 
In his reply brief, defendant acknowledges Taylor but 
urges us to reconsider that decision, arguing that by allowing 
“repeated attempts to convince a jury to return a death verdict,” 
our retrial procedure impermissibly “enhances the possibility 
that even though the defendant’s crime warrants a life sentence, 
he may be sentenced to death.”  As a matter of double jeopardy 
law, this argument fails because the government is entitled, in 
capital sentencing as in a trial of guilt, to one complete attempt 
to obtain the verdict sought, an opportunity not provided where 
a jury deadlock has resulted in a mistrial.  (Sattazahn v. 
Pennsylvania, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 109; id. at pp. 120–121, 124 
(dis. opn. of Ginsburg, J.).)  Nor does defendant’s cruel and 
unusual punishment claim persuade us to reconsider our 
decision in Taylor.  As we explained in one of Taylor’s recent 
progeny, it is true that the prosecution benefits from retrial, but 
the same “may be said about any case that is retried after the 
jury deadlocks . . . .  [T]he high court has recognized that ‘ “a 
defendant’s valued right to have his trial completed by a 
particular tribunal must in some instances be subordinated to 
the public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just 
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74 
 
judgments.” ’ ”  (People v. Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 356.)  
That a rule barring retrial of penalty on jury deadlock would 
benefit the defense does not demonstrate that the opposite rule, 
allowing retrial in order to provide the People a full opportunity 
to prove their case for the death penalty, deprives defendants of 
any right to which they are constitutionally entitled. 
XII.  Denial of Funding for Mitochondrial DNA  
                    Testing 
Defendant contends he was deprived of due process and 
the constitutional right to present a defense when, before the 
penalty retrial, the court denied investigative funds to conduct 
mitochondrial DNA testing on the pubic hairs recovered from 
the victim’s clothing.  He also argues the trial court erred in later 
precluding comment on the lack of such testing.  We find no 
deprivation of constitutional rights in the denial of funding and 
no error in the court’s later ruling. 
In September 1998, after the first penalty trial ended in a 
hung jury, defense counsel (recently appointed to replace 
counsel at the first trial) requested that the judge presiding over 
investigative funding requests (Hon. Timothy J. Evans) under 
Penal Code section 987.9 authorize $3,500 to $4,500 for a 
laboratory in Virginia to conduct mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) 
testing of the pubic hairs.24  No DNA testing had yet been done 
on these hairs, which the prosecution evidence showed were 
                                              
24  
At places in his briefing, defendant also appears to 
complain that mtDNA testing was denied for the blood stain on 
his shirt and for scrapings from under the victim’s fingernails.  
His funding request as to those items, however, was for DNA-
DQ ALPHA and PCR-DNA testing, respectively, rather than 
mtDNA testing.  As the appellate briefing focuses exclusively on 
mtDNA, we discuss only the request for testing the pubic hairs.  
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75 
 
physically similar to defendant’s pubic hairs.  Defendant 
asserted that the proposed mtDNA testing, which would take 12 
to 14 weeks to complete and destroy half of the evidentiary 
material, was “critical” for the defense to oppose the prosecution 
identification of the hairs as defendant’s.   
At an October 1998 hearing before the trial judge 
(Hon. Loyd H. Mulkey, Jr.), defense counsel noted that Judge 
Evans had denied his funding requests for additional DNA 
testing, including for mtDNA testing on the pubic hairs.  On 
February 1, 1999, after the new penalty jury was selected and 
sworn but before opening statements were made, counsel asked 
Judge Mulkey to take notice his funding requests for DNA 
analysis had been denied and renewed the request, together 
with a request for a continuance to conduct the testing; in the 
alternative, counsel sought permission to present evidence and 
argue to the jury that the funding requests had been denied.  
The prosecutor objected to any evidence that the People had not 
ordered mtDNA testing, asserting he had never even heard of 
that technique “before last Monday” and could find no authority 
for its use in California criminal proceedings. 
On February 8, 1999, Judge Mulkey rejected the renewed 
funding request on the ground that, as the trial judge, he had no 
authority to entertain confidential requests under Penal Code 
section 987.9.  The court then heard testimony from a defense 
DNA expert, Lisa Calandro.  Neither she nor her laboratory 
performed mtDNA testing, but she testified generally as to how 
it worked, that it had been done elsewhere since before 1994, 
and that in her reading on the subject she had encountered no 
scientific controversy over its validity.  Defendant also sought to 
call the director of the Virginia laboratory that would have 
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76 
 
performed the mtDNA analysis to testify telephonically, but the 
court sustained the prosecutor’s objection to that procedure 
under Evidence Code section 711.  The court denied defendant’s 
motion to allow evidence and argument on the fact there had 
been no mtDNA testing, but did so without prejudice to its 
renewal during trial. 
During the penalty retrial, the court made a final ruling 
that it would not allow either party to present evidence or 
comment in argument on the other’s failure to conduct mtDNA 
testing.  “I don’t know what a DNA test would produce because 
I don’t have one.  [¶]  So I’m going to proscribe both sides from 
commenting in argument on [that or another unrelated matter].  
That’s going to have to be the ruling.  If I’m wrong, I’m wrong.  
[¶]  But I just, when I open it up, I just have to keep opening it 
up by stages.”  If the People were to comment on the fact that 
the defense did not conduct such testing when, before trial, they 
had custody of the samples, the defense would respond that they 
later sought funding for testing but were denied it.  “Then why 
were they denied?  What does Judge Evans tell me is the reason?  
[¶]  The reason is not in the minute order.  So perhaps I have to 
bring him down here and testify.”  The ruling applied to both 
evidence and argument. 
Considering first the denial of funding for mtDNA testing 
of the pubic hairs, we conclude the trial court did not err.  The 
September 1998 funding request failed to establish that mtDNA 
testing would likely produce admissible evidence.  While 
California courts have since endorsed the admissibility of 
mtDNA evidence (e.g., People v. Stevey (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 
1400, 1414–1415), no published decision had done so at the time 
of trial.  Although the record indicates that the trial court gave 
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defendant multiple opportunities to show that mtDNA testing 
was generally accepted in the scientific community, defendant 
did not make such a showing.25  The request, moreover, failed to 
explain why the defense did not seek funding for mtDNA testing 
on the pubic hairs, which would take the laboratory some 
months to perform, before trial rather than between the mistrial 
and the penalty retrial when it bore the potential for delaying 
the retrial.  For this reason as well, we cannot find an abuse of 
discretion in Judge Mulkey’s declining to overrule Judge 
Evans’s earlier ruling. 
Nor has defendant established that the trial court’s ruling 
on funding resulted in deprivation of his constitutional right to 
present a defense.  Defendant cites several federal decisions for 
the proposition that denial of expert assistance may deprive a 
criminal defendant of due process and the right to present a 
defense.  But in those cases, which arose on habeas corpus, the 
courts could consider information outside the appellate record 
and, if necessary, remand for an evidentiary hearing on factual 
questions about the nature and impact of potential extra-record 
evidence.  (See Wallace v. Stewart (9th Cir. 1999) 184 F.3d 1112, 
1116, 1118 [remanding for an evidentiary hearing on claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to fully inform 
psychiatrists of the defendant’s background]; Dunn v. Roberts 
(10th Cir. 1992) 963 F.2d 308, 313 [denial of expert on battered 
woman syndrome deprived the defendant of opportunity to 
                                              
25  
Before this court defendant has cited cases from other 
jurisdictions that, starting in 1999, consistently allowed mtDNA 
evidence, but he did not cite any such cases before the trial court.  
The only evidence presented to the trial court was Calandro’s 
testimony, which the court reasonably determined was 
insufficient to establish general acceptance. 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
78 
 
present a defense where expert “would have aided Petitioner in 
her defense by supporting her assertion that she did not have 
the required specific intent”]; Cowley v. Stricklin (11th Cir. 
1991) 929 F.2d 640, 643 [defendant “showed that psychiatric 
expertise would aid his defense significantly”]; cf. Terry v. Rees 
(6th Cir. 1993) 985 F.2d 283, 285 [denial of independent 
pathologist was harmless error where independent expert 
appointed in habeas corpus proceedings “agreed with the state 
pathologist that . . . the victim was subjected to repetitive child 
abuse with head injuries being the cause of death”].)  Based on 
the record available on appeal, we cannot say the trial court 
deprived defendant of “a fair opportunity to present his defense” 
(Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 76) or “the basic tools of 
an adequate defense” (Britt v. North Carolina (1971) 404 U.S. 
226, 227) when it refused an untimely request for funding to 
conduct mtDNA testing, testing the defense failed to show would 
likely produce even admissible evidence.26 
Nor did the court err in precluding evidence or argument 
on the failure of either party to conduct mtDNA testing.  Each 
party posited a reason for its failure to do so:  the prosecution 
that it had been unaware of the mtDNA technique and was 
unsure of its admissibility; the defense that the Penal Code 
section 987.9 judge had denied its funding request for such 
testing.  The trial court saw no way of allowing evidence on the 
subject without also allowing exploration of these side issues.  
                                              
26  
Defendant asserts he would be entitled to testing under 
the standards set in Penal Code section 1405, which sets 
prerequisites and procedures for postconviction forensic DNA 
testing.  We express no view on that question, which will arise 
if and when defendant makes a motion for postconviction 
testing. 
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Since there was no evidence as to what mtDNA testing would 
have found, the court concluded the fairest and most practicable 
approach was to omit any discussion of the topic.  (See Evid. 
Code, § 352 [evidence may be excluded if its tendency to undue 
consumption of time and confusion of the issues outweighs it 
probative value].)  In the absence of evidence as to why the 
parties did not perform mtDNA testing, jury arguments 
suggesting one or another inference from that omission would 
likely have been misleading and confusing.  While jury 
arguments pointing to the absence of particular evidence 
generally qualify as “fair comment on the state of the evidence” 
(People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 756), the trial court 
retains the discretion to “ensure that argument does not stray 
unduly from the mark, or otherwise impede the fair and orderly 
conduct of the trial.”  (Herring v. New York (1975) 422 U.S. 853, 
862.)  We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling. 
XIII.  Prosecutorial Misconduct in Argument on  
                     Penalty  
Defendant contends the prosecutor made several improper 
remarks in argument to the jury that, taken together, deprived 
defendant of his due process right to a fair trial.   
In People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1033, we 
held the prosecutor acted improperly in arguing that the capital 
defendant’s family background, introduced as mitigation under 
Penal Code section 190.3, factor (k), gave him no reason to kill 
and therefore “ ‘is an aggravating factor.’ ”  (See also Edelbacher, 
at p. 1041 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).)  In his first assignment of 
misconduct, defendant maintains the prosecutors here27 
                                              
27  
Prosecutor Nolan gave the first penalty argument, 
Prosecutor Schroeder the rebuttal. 
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committed Edelbacher error in arguing defendant had a “normal 
childhood” and had shown “no reason for him to turn into a 
rotten egg.”  We disagree.  The prosecutors’ argument was that 
the family background the defense had presented should be 
given no weight as mitigation:  it was a “zero” on the scales.  
Prosecutors may properly point out the absence of mitigating 
evidence.  (People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 659, fn. 9.)  The 
defendant’s argument, moreover, was forfeited by his failure to 
lodge an objection and seek a jury admonition.  (Id. at p. 659.) 
Second, defendant contends that in his rebuttal argument, 
Prosecutor Schroeder falsely told the jurors they could not 
consider lingering doubt because they had not heard the entirety 
of the prosecution’s guilt-phase case.  On two occasions the 
prosecutor did indeed make such an argument, but in both cases 
the court sustained defendant’s objection and admonished the 
jury to disregard the argument.28  At other points the prosecutor 
referred to witnesses who had testified at the guilt phase as 
                                              
28  
On the first occasion, the prosecutor, complaining about 
“huge gaps” in the defense presentation of the facts, said:  “Now 
for you to have a lingering doubt, you have to hear the entire 
case I put on last year.”  After the court sustained a defense 
objection and told the jury to “disregard that statement,” the 
prosecutor immediately argued that defense counsel, in his 
opening statement, admitted “that he has to put on the entire 
case I put on—.”  Another objection was sustained but the court 
declined to admonish the jury again, saying, “I just did, counsel.”  
Later in his argument, the prosecutor urged the jury to note the 
potential witnesses who had been mentioned but had not 
testified and asked rhetorically, “If you [didn’t] hear my whole 
case, how can you have a lingering doubt?”  Again an objection 
was sustained and the jury was admonished to “disregard the 
last sentence of the argument.” 
 
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buttressing the case for guilt, prompting a defense objection and 
an admonishment by the court to “disregard that portion—that 
matter insofar as it references the guilt phase of the trial.” 
Despite the court’s admonitions, defendant insists that the 
prosecutor’s repeated suggestions that the penalty retrial jury 
was not in a position to consider lingering doubt because they 
had not heard the entire case for guilt, coupled with what he 
characterizes as a “terse” instruction on lingering doubt,29 
“failed to permit the jury to give full effect to the lingering doubt 
mitigation in this case.” 
We agree the prosecutor’s repeated argument that the 
penalty retrial jury could not consider lingering doubt without 
having heard the entire prosecution case for guilt was a 
deceptive or reprehensible means of persuasion and hence 
constituted misconduct under California law.  (People v. 
Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 920; People v. Hill, supra, 17 
Cal.4th at p. 819.)  Even for a penalty retrial jury, lingering 
doubt is a proper consideration in mitigation.  (People v. 
Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 948–949; People v. Gay (2008) 
42 Cal.4th 1195, 1218–1223.)  Moreover, the jury instructions, 
including that on lingering doubt, were settled before argument 
to the jury.  The prosecutor knew the court would instruct the 
jury it could consider that factor in mitigation, and should not 
have attempted to persuade the jury to the contrary.  But in 
                                              
29  
The jury was instructed:  “Lingering doubt may be 
considered as a factor in mitigation if you have a lingering doubt 
as to the guilt of the defendant.”  The court refused the defense’s 
more elaborate proposed instruction, which stated that “[t]he 
adjudication of guilt is not infallible” and permitted the jury to 
consider “the possibility that at some time in the future” new 
evidence might come to light.   
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light of the court’s sustaining defense objections and promptly 
giving admonitions, a jury instruction that clearly (if concisely) 
allowed consideration of lingering doubt, and defense counsel’s 
argument focusing on weaknesses in the evidence of guilt and 
expressly on lingering doubt as grounds for a verdict of life, we 
find no reasonable possibility the jury was confused on the 
subject and hence no such possibility it would have reached a 
different penalty verdict absent the misconduct.  (See Gonzales, 
at p. 953.)  Our conclusion necessarily implies the prosecutor’s 
argument did not so infect the trial with unfairness as to deny 
defendant his federal due process rights.  (Id. at p. 953, fn. 33.) 
Third, defendant complains of a portion of the prosecutor’s 
rebuttal argument addressing the time at which someone in a 
pickup truck had apparently abducted a boy—on the 
prosecution’s theory, Michael Lyons—near the corner of Boyd 
and C Streets.  The prosecutor argued that while the defense 
relied on Ray Clark’s testimony that he saw the abduction at 
around 3:00 p.m. (too early for Michael to have reached that spot 
after leaving school or defendant after leaving the card room), 
the defense had failed to call Clark’s cousin Charles Wilbur, who 
also witnessed the event and placed it later, at 3:30 or 4:00 p.m.  
Because the kidnapping charge had been dismissed after the 
guilt jury failed to reach a verdict on that count, defendant 
argues, it was unfair to hold against him that he “did not again 
raise a reasonable doubt about his guilt” of kidnapping. 
The argument was proper.  It responded directly to fairly 
extensive defense argument on the same points:  the timing of 
the apparent abduction and the observations of Clark and 
Wilbur.  The fact that the guilt jury did not unanimously find 
kidnapping proved beyond a reasonable doubt did not preclude 
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the prosecution from arguing, as a circumstance of the capital 
crime (Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (a)), that defendant had in fact 
abducted the victim in town and taken him to the river bottoms.  
(See People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346, 378, fn. 6; People v. 
Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1157.)  And as defendant 
acknowledges, “it is neither unusual nor improper to comment 
on the failure to call logical witnesses.”  (People v. Gonzales 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1275; see People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 1082, 1174 [penalty phase].) 
Fourth, defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in 
deceptive argument regarding the defense’s ability to conduct 
DNA testing on the victim’s fingernail scrapings.  In context, the 
prosecutor’s argument was not prejudicial misconduct. 
Before instruction and argument, the jury was read a 
stipulation about the fingernail scrapings:  “ ‘It’s hereby 
stipulated to and agreed to by the parties that the fingernail 
scrapings taken from the body of Michael Lyons were 
appropriately 
transported 
to 
Forensic Analytical, 
DNA 
laboratory for the defense.  [¶]  The defense had the possession 
of the scrapings from January 19, 1998 until April 1998, after 
which time they were returned to the People.  [¶]  The defense 
did not test the fingernail scrapings.’ ” 
In his argument to the jury, defense counsel stated that, 
as stipulated, defendant’s “first lawyers” had the fingernail 
scrapings but had not tested them, that neither had the 
prosecution’s experts, and that “I frankly don’t know why no one 
examined it.”  He went on to suggest the jury should hesitate to 
return a death sentence because in the future, improved DNA 
analysis techniques might be applied to the scrapings or to the 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
84 
 
semen found on the victim’s anal swab and might exonerate 
defendant. 
In response, the prosecutor noted that defense counsel 
“makes a big deal about the fingernail scrapings, and he’s the 
one who brought this whole idea up.”  Defense counsel, the 
prosecutor continued, had not asked the prosecution expert why 
she did not test the scrapings.  Moreover, “Defense’s own expert 
had it for almost three months.  They didn’t examine it either.  
Why didn’t he present their expert to tell you why that wasn’t 
done?”  Defense counsel objected and, still before the jury, 
stated, “Your Honor, we went through this.  I asked for money 
to get it done and it wasn’t, and he is walking right into it.”  
Outside the jury’s presence, the court ruled it would allow the 
prosecutor to comment on the fact that—as stipulated—no 
defense expert had tested the scrapings, but not to ask 
rhetorically why defense counsel did or did not do anything.  The 
same would apply to argument by defense counsel.  In the jury’s 
presence, the court admonished the jury to disregard both 
attorneys’ remarks made before the recess and explained that 
the argument would be confined to the stipulation read them 
previously:  “It’s not to go beyond that.”  
Renewing his argument, the prosecutor stated that 
defense counsel is “the one who wants to prove lingering doubt” 
and that “[i]f there are unanswered questions with regard to the 
fingernail scrapings, that’s where you look for the answer.  He 
didn’t provide it to you.”  The court sustained a defense objection 
to this remark and told the jury to disregard it.  The prosecutor 
then stated, simply, “His expert had it for almost three months,” 
and moved on to another topic. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
85 
 
We do not agree with defendant that the prosecutor spoke 
deceptively in asking rhetorically, “Why didn’t he present their 
expert to tell you why that wasn’t done?”  That remark referred 
to the pretrial period in early 1998, described in the stipulation 
and in defense counsel’s own prior jury argument, when 
defendant’s “first lawyers” had the physical evidence and could 
have had their DNA expert examine the fingernail scrapings.  
Nothing we have found in the record indicates that at that time 
the defense failure to test was due to lack of funding; it was only 
later, in the period before the penalty retrial, that defendant’s 
new attorneys sought and were denied funding for PCR-DNA 
testing on the fingernail scrapings.  (See fn. 24, ante.)   
The prosecutor did, though, violate the trial court’s ruling 
by arguing, after the recess, that “[i]f there are unanswered 
questions with regard to the fingernail scrapings, that’s [the 
defense] where you look for the answer.  [Defense counsel] didn’t 
provide it to you.”  The court had, immediately before this, 
ordered the attorneys to confine their arguments to the 
stipulated facts, meaning they could note the absence of testing 
but not assert that one or the other party was responsible for it.  
The prosecutor’s improper argument, however, was not a very 
strong one, since the jury also knew that the prosecution had not 
tested the fingernail scrapings for DNA.  In light of the 
sustained objection and prompt admonition, there is no 
reasonable possibility of prejudice.  (People v. Gonzales, supra, 
51 Cal.4th at p. 953.) 
Fifth and finally, defendant claims the prosecutor 
endorsed improper experimentation by the jurors in urging 
them to look at a photograph of the victim’s skin with a 
magnifying glass to see a pattern of knife marks.  Use of a 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
86 
 
magnifying glass to more closely examine an exhibit that has 
been admitted into evidence does not constitute improper 
experimentation, as it introduces no extra evidence material to 
the jury’s deliberations.  (People v. Turner (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 
174, 182.)  The prosecutor’s argument was therefore also not 
improper. 
Although we have found two instances of improper 
prosecutorial argument (the argument that lingering doubt 
could not be considered and blaming the defense for the lack of 
DNA evidence regarding the fingernail scrapings), we have 
found neither bore a reasonable possibility of affecting the 
penalty verdict.  We reach the same conclusion as to their 
cumulative effect:  the two errors went to different topics of 
argument and the court gave the jury clear admonitions to 
disregard both remarks. 
XIV.  Denial of Motion to Continue Sentencing 
On September 10, 1999, the date set for sentencing, 
defendant moved for a continuance in order to prepare a motion 
for new guilt trial based on newly discovered evidence, namely 
a letter purporting to be from someone defense counsel referred 
to as “Raymond Walton” stating that defendant had been set up 
by a person named Timothy Clarke, who was confined in a Yolo 
County jail.  In response, the prosecutor noted that the letter 
was actually signed simply “Raymond,” purportedly of “Walton 
Ave.” in Yuba City.  The prosecution had called the telephone 
number given in the letter but found it disconnected.  The 
woman who lived at the last address associated with that 
number had lived there for a year; she said no Raymond lived at 
the address.  The letter was apparently sent to Al Rhoades, a 
relative of defendant, but Al had no idea who Raymond was.  
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
87 
 
Two men named Timothy Clark, spelled differently from the 
letter, had been confined in Yolo County jail, one in 1991 and 
one in 1997.  The letter contained no information as to how 
Clark or Clarke had supposedly set defendant up for the crime.  
The prosecutor also noted that the guilt verdicts had been 
returned 15 months earlier and the intended new-trial motion 
would be defendant’s third.  The trial court, further noting the 
length of time that elapsed since the penalty verdicts had been 
returned in March 1999, found no cause for a continuance and 
denied the motion.   
Continuances in criminal cases are to be granted only for 
good cause, and the trial court’s denial of a continuance is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion only.  (Pen. Code, § 1050, subd. 
(c); People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1037.)  Given the 
length of time elapsed since the guilt and penalty verdicts and 
the vague and speculative nature of the letter’s claim, there was 
no abuse of discretion here. 
XV.  Conviction on Multiple Offenses Arising from  
                  the Same Act  
On counts four through seven—torture, forcible sodomy on 
a child, lewd act on a child, and forcible lewd act on a child—the 
sentencing court imposed prison sentences but ordered them 
stayed under Penal Code section 654 pending execution of the 
sentence for murder.  Defendant contends the stay of sentence 
was insufficient to protect him, arguing it is “unfair and 
unconstitutional under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to 
permit a jury in a death penalty case to use the same identical 
facts to convict appellant of separate crimes, which they then 
are permitted to consider in deciding whether he should live or 
die.”  We rejected similar arguments in People v. Melton (1988) 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
88 
 
44 Cal.3d 713, 766–768 (holding consideration of overlapping 
special circumstances proper but providing that jury should be 
told, on defense request, not to double count each special 
circumstance), and People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 
1029 (explaining that “lewd conduct is a separate offense from 
either rape or sodomy and therefore the jury could consider all 
three special circumstances under section 190.3, factor (a)”).  
The jury here was instructed not to double count the special 
circumstance 
findings 
even 
though 
they 
were 
also 
circumstances of the capital crime:  “[Y]ou may not weigh the 
special circumstances more tha[n] once in your sentencing 
determination.”  Defendant cites nothing in the record to 
suggest, and we have seen no indication, that the jury 
nonetheless gave any improper weight to the circumstance that 
defendant had, during his fatal attack on Michael Lyons, 
committed multiple sexual offenses as well as torture.   
XVI. 
 
Refusal 
of 
Defense 
Instructions 
on  
                          Determination of Penalty  
Defendant complains of the court’s refusal to give several 
of his proposed special instructions.  We find no error. 
First, defendant offered an instruction stating that the 
mitigating circumstances listed “are given merely as examples” 
and the jury should not limit consideration to these specific 
factors but may consider “mercy, sympathy and/or sentiment in 
deciding what weight to give each mitigating factor.”  The trial 
court refused the instruction on the ground it was adequately 
covered by CALJIC No. 8.88, which as given here defined a 
mitigating circumstance as “any fact, condition or event which 
does not constitute a justification or excuse for the crime in 
question, 
but 
may 
be 
considered 
as 
an 
extenuating 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
89 
 
circumstance” in determining the penalty.  The jury was also 
instructed in CALJIC No. 8.85 that under Penal Code section 
190.3, factor (k), they could consider in mitigation “any 
sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or 
record . . . whether or not related to the offense for which he is 
on trial.”   
We have held that these standard instructions “leave 
adequate room for the consideration of mercy” without an 
instruction using that term (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 
771, 827) and that an express reference to “mercy” risks 
encouraging arbitrary decisionmaking (People v. Lewis (2001) 
26 Cal.4th 334, 393)—a risk aggravated here by defendant’s 
proposed instruction’s use of the term “sentiment.”  Defendant 
provides 
no 
compelling 
argument 
to 
reexamine 
these 
conclusions. 
Second, defendant’s proposed instruction stating that “the 
evidence which has been presented regarding the defendant’s 
background may only be considered by you as mitigating 
evidence” was also refused as cumulative of standard 
instructions.  Defendant contends it was error to refuse this 
instruction, and the prosecutor exploited the error by arguing 
defendant’s background as an aggravating circumstance.  (But 
see pt. XIII., ante [rejecting this characterization of the 
prosecutor’s argument].)  We have held that “[t]he court need 
not instruct that the jury can consider certain statutory factors 
only in mitigation” (People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 
311) and that “[i]t follows the trial court need not instruct that 
background evidence may be considered only in mitigation” 
(People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 897; see also Tuilaepa 
v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 979 [“A capital sentencer need 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
90 
 
not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital 
sentencing decision.”]).  We adhere to these holdings. 
Third, defendant asked that the jury be instructed:  “If you 
sentence the defendant to death, you must assume that the 
sentence will be carried out.”  The trial court declined to give 
that instruction “in the abstract, so to speak” but agreed that an 
instruction on the topic would be appropriate “if there is a 
reason to believe the jury has concerns or misunderstanding” 
regarding the effect of a death verdict.  This course accorded 
with our precedent (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 
1091; People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 378–379) and was 
not error.  The jury did not indicate on the record any confusion 
or doubt as to the meaning or effect of either of the possible 
penalty verdicts. 
Finally, the trial court refused defendant’s request that 
the jury be instructed:  “A jury may decide, even in the absence 
of mitigating evidence, that the aggravating evidence is not 
comparatively substantial enough to warrant death.”  But 
where, as here, the jury is instructed that “[t]o return a 
judgment of death each of you must be persuaded that the 
aggravating evidence is so substantial in comparison with the 
mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life 
without parole,” an instruction like the one defendant proposed 
is unnecessary to guide the jury.  (People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 
Cal.4th at p. 1191, italics omitted.) 
XVII.  Cumulative Prejudice from Errors 
The only errors we have found in the penalty phase are 
two instances of prosecutorial misconduct in argument to the 
jury.  As discussed above (see pt. XIII., ante), they were not 
prejudicial either individually or cumulatively.  
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
91 
 
XVIII.  Delay in Appellate Review 
Defendant contends that executing him after significant 
passage of time during the appellate process would constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  We have 
rejected this claim in numerous decisions beginning with People 
v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 606:  “As we have explained, 
the automatic appeal process following judgments of death is a 
constitutional safeguard, not a constitutional defect [citations], 
because it assures careful review of the defendant’s conviction 
and sentence [citation].  Moreover, an argument that one under 
judgment of death suffers cruel and unusual punishment by the 
inherent delays in resolving his appeal is untenable.  If the 
appeal results in reversal of the death judgment, he has suffered 
no conceivable prejudice, while if the judgment is affirmed, the 
delay has prolonged his life.”  (See also 
People v. 
Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1368–1369 [following 
Anderson and reciting intervening precedent in accord].)   
More recently, we considered at length and rejected the 
related claim that systematic delays in implementation of 
California’s death penalty render the penalty impermissibly 
arbitrary in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  (People v. 
Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1371–1375; accord, People v. 
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 645; see also Jones v. Davis (9th 
Cir. 2015) 806 F.3d 538, 546–553 [theory of arbitrariness by 
delay proposes new rule of constitutional law that cannot be 
applied to state procedures in federal habeas corpus case].) 
Defendant’s briefing provides no grounds for reexamining 
either of these conclusions. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
92 
 
XIX.  Incomplete Appellate Record 
Defendant contends his conviction must be reversed 
because the parties were unable to reconstruct via a settled 
statement four unreported bench conferences and several “off-
the-record ” discussions concerning record correction, and 
because certain confidential attorney fee requests could not be 
obtained either from the Sutter County Superior Court or from 
trial counsel.  He argues generally that without these 
transcripts he cannot make an argument about “any reversible 
error that may have occurred” and that the attorney fee 
requests, in particular, “could bolster a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.”  “ ‘[D]efendant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the appellate record is not adequate to 
permit meaningful appellate review.  [Citations.]  He has not 
done so.’ ”  (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1037.) 
XX.  Relief from Defaults and Incorporation of  
                    Claims 
In a set of generalized arguments that do not refer to any 
of his brief’s specific claims for relief, defendant maintains that 
all violations of state law rights also constitute federal 
constitutional violations, that trial counsel’s failure to request 
or object to instructions should be excused, that we should 
review all errors in capital cases on the merits rather than 
invoking procedural bars, and that when the court reviews 
defendant’s to-be-filed petition for writ of habeas corpus we 
consider any claim that should have been raised on appeal to be 
incorporated into his appellate briefing.   
We have addressed questions of forfeiture as necessary in 
discussion of defendant’s specific arguments for reversal and 
have addressed the merits of defendant’s constitutional claims 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
93 
 
whenever appropriate.  With regard to claims made on habeas 
corpus, defendant has not yet filed a petition challenging his 
convictions and death sentence, but in any event we would 
decline to incorporate habeas corpus claims into the appellate 
brief in the manner requested.  (See People v. Richardson, supra, 
43 Cal.4th at p. 1038.) 
XXI.  Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty  
Defendant raises a number of federal constitutional 
challenges to California’s death penalty law, each of which we 
have previously rejected.   
“[T]he 
California 
death 
penalty 
statute 
is 
not 
impermissibly broad, whether considered on its face or as 
interpreted by this court.”  (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 
731, 813.)  Penal Code section 190.3, factor (a), which permits a 
jury to consider the circumstances of the offense in sentencing, 
does not result in arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death 
penalty in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  (People v. 
Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 149; see Tuilaepa v. California, 
supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 975−976, 978.) 
“The death penalty statute does not lack safeguards to 
avoid arbitrary and capricious sentencing, deprive defendant of 
the right to a jury trial, or constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment on the ground that it does not require either 
unanimity as to the truth of aggravating circumstances or 
findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating 
circumstance (other than Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (b) or (c) 
evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the 
appropriate sentence.”  (People v. Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
94 
 
p. 1235.)  The Supreme Court’s recent Sixth Amendment 
decisions (e.g., Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. ___ [136 S.Ct. 
616], Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, and Apprendi v. New 
Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466) do not affect our conclusions in this 
regard.  (Rangel, at p. 1235.)   
“The jury may properly consider evidence of unadjudicated 
criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b) [citation], jury 
unanimity regarding such conduct is not required [citation], and 
factor (b) is not unconstitutionally vague.  (Tuilaepa v. 
California, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 976.)”  (People v. Lee (2011) 51 
Cal.4th 620, 653.)  Nor does our statute’s lack of a requirement 
for written jury findings on aggravating circumstances violate 
due process or the Eighth Amendment or deny a capital 
defendant the opportunity for meaningful appellate review.  
(People v. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 490; People v. 
Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 91.)  And, as discussed earlier (see 
pt. XVI, ante), an instruction that certain factors may only be 
considered in mitigation is not constitutionally required.  
(Tuilaepa, at p. 979; People v. Valencia, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
p. 311.) 
“Intercase proportionality review, comparing defendant’s 
case to other murder cases to assess relative culpability, is not 
required by the due process, equal protection, fair trial, or cruel 
and unusual punishment clauses of the federal Constitution.”  
(People v. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 490.)  Procedural 
differences between capital and noncapital trials do not 
constitute violations of equal protection, and California’s use of 
the death penalty does not violate international law either by 
punishing certain first degree murders with death or by 
employing the procedures defendant complains of above.  
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
95 
 
(People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 488; People v. Solomon 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 844.) 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the superior court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
 
We Concur: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
S082101 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
During jury selection for the penalty retrial in this capital 
case, defendant Robert Boyd Rhoades raised a challenge under 
Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler 
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 after prosecutors used four of eight 
peremptory strikes against four black women jurors, thereby 
“eliminat[ing] every African-American seated in the jury box.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 52.)  The proceeding occurred in 1998, 
seven years before Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 
and the trial court believed it was bound by this court’s 
precedent, People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1154 
(Howard), which required a defendant to show not merely an 
inference but a “ ‘strong likelihood’ ” of discrimination at 
Batson’s first step.  Applying that standard, the trial court 
denied the Batson motion but said, “I’m very close.” 
These facts bear an uncanny resemblance to those in 
Johnson v. California, where the trial court also denied a Batson 
motion under the “strong likelihood” standard but said, “[W]e 
are very close.”  (Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at 
p. 165, italics omitted; see id. at p. 164 [prosecutor used three of 
12 strikes to remove all three black jurors].)  In that case, the 
high court disapproved the “strong likelihood” standard, calling 
it “an inappropriate yardstick by which to measure the 
sufficiency of a prima facie case.”  (Id. at p. 168.)  “Instead,” the 
high court held, “a defendant satisfies the requirements of 
Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
2 
 
trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has 
occurred.”  (Id. at p. 170.)  Then, in concluding that the 
defendant had met this burden, the high court explained:  “In 
this case the inference of discrimination was sufficient to invoke 
a comment by the trial judge ‘that “we are very close,” ’ and on 
review, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that ‘it 
certainly looks suspicious that all three African-American 
prospective jurors were removed from the jury.’  [Citation.]  
Those inferences that discrimination may have occurred were 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case under Batson.”  (Id. at 
p. 173, italics added.) 
If the evidence of discrimination is “very close” to meeting 
the “strong likelihood” standard, then logically it is sufficient to 
meet the less onerous “inference” standard.  Yet today’s opinion, 
sidestepping Johnson v. California’s logic, finds no inference of 
discrimination at Batson’s first step.  How is this possible?  
“[M]ost importantly,” the court says, “the record discloses 
readily apparent grounds for excusing each prospective juror, 
dispelling any inference of bias that might arise from the 
pattern of strikes alone.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 65.) 
As I discuss below, this mode of analysis — hypothesizing 
reasons for the removal of minority jurors as a basis for 
obviating inquiry into the prosecutor’s actual reasons — has 
become a staple of our Batson jurisprudence, and it raises 
serious concerns.  “The Batson framework is designed to produce 
actual answers” — not hypothesized answers — “to suspicions 
and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury 
selection process.”  (Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at 
p. 172.)  If an inference of bias is to be dispelled, it is up to the 
prosecutor to dispel it by stating credible, race-neutral reasons 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
3 
 
for the strikes.  It is not the proper role of courts to posit reasons 
that the prosecutor might or might not have had.  This case 
illustrates the problem:  By combing the record for “readily 
apparent” reasons for the strikes (which, on close inspection, are 
not readily apparent at all), the court does exactly what Johnson 
v. California “counsels against”:  It “engag[es] in needless and 
imperfect speculation when a direct answer can be obtained by 
asking a simple question.”  (Ibid.) 
The court’s opinion coincides with a decision, also filed 
today, finding no inference of discrimination where the 
prosecutor disproportionately excused black jurors in the 
penalty trial of a black defendant accused of killing a white man 
and raping a white woman.  (People v. Johnson (Nov. 25, 2019, 
S029551) __ Cal.5th __, __ [p. 41].)  The prosecutor there was 
asked but declined to answer whether he targeted black 
prospective jurors for criminal background checks.  (Id. at p. __ 
[p. 35].)  Of course, each case must be evaluated on its own facts.  
But if we consider today’s decisions together and alongside 
others in our case law, some unsettling observations emerge. 
It has been more than 30 years since this court has found 
Batson error involving the peremptory strike of a black juror.  
(See People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216.)  In the 14 years since 
Johnson v. California, this court has reviewed the merits of a 
first-stage Batson denial in 42 cases, all death penalty appeals.  
(See appen., post, at p. 25.)  Not once did this court find a prima 
facie case of discrimination — even though all 42 cases were 
tried before Johnson v. California disapproved the “strong 
likelihood” 
standard 
and 
held 
that 
“an 
inference 
of 
discrimination” is enough.  In light of this remarkable 
uniformity of results, I am concerned that “this court has 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
4 
 
improperly elevated the standard for establishing a prima facie 
case beyond the showing that the high court has deemed 
sufficient to trigger a prosecutor’s obligation to state the actual 
reasons for the strike.”  (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 
864 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) (Harris).)  Today’s decisions are the 
latest steps on what has been a one-way road, and I submit it is 
past time for a course correction. 
I. 
The penalty retrial in this case began in 1998 in 
Sacramento County, a community that was 64 percent white 
and 10 percent black at the time.  (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 
Census of Population and Housing, Summary Population and 
Housing Characteristics:  California (2002) p. 112.)  Rhoades, a 
white man, was convicted of killing a white eight-year-old boy.  
Defense counsel made his first Batson motion after the 
prosecution used three of five peremptory strikes to remove 
three black women:  Shirley R., Adrienne A., and Alice S.  The 
trial court denied the motion, and the prosecution declined the 
court’s invitation to state reasons for the record.  The 
prosecution later excused a fourth black woman, Alicia R., 
leaving no black jurors on the panel.  At that point, the 
prosecution had used four of eight strikes against black women, 
and defense counsel made a second Batson motion.  Three 
additional jurors were subsequently seated on the main panel. 
 
After the second Batson motion, the prosecution gave the 
trial court a copy of Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, which held 
that the “strong likelihood” standard applied at Batson’s first 
step.  Defense counsel argued that he needed to show only “that 
the relevant circumstances raise an inference that the 
government use [sic] the challenges to exclude a class of jurors 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
5 
 
because of their race.”  Defense counsel observed that none of 
the struck jurors had been challenged for cause for their death 
penalty views and that there were “no discernable differences” 
between the struck jurors and those remaining in the jury box, 
citing “Relatives in prison,” “Formerly victims of assault,” 
“Strong religious views,” and “Volunteers somehow related to 
WEAVE” as similarities.  One prosecutor said, “Oh, I think there 
are significant differences,” but declined to elaborate when 
asked to do so because the trial court had not yet found a prima 
facie case.  
 
The prosecutor again insisted that “a strong likelihood” 
was required and that defense counsel’s showing did not “rise to 
the level to [sic] the standards set out in People v. Howard or 
People v. Wheeler.”  The trial court compared the prosecution’s 
strikes with the pattern of strikes in Howard and said, “The 
distinction that’s bothering me in the case that you cite . . . you 
have essentially two out of eleven [in Howard] . . . [a]nd in this 
case, you had four out of eight?  That’s quite a distinction, isn’t 
it?”  The prosecutor maintained that more was required under 
Howard, and defense counsel reiterated that there were “no 
discernable differences” between the struck jurors and other 
jurors.  The trial court again invited the prosecutor to describe 
how the jurors were different; the prosecution again declined. 
 
The trial court denied the Batson motion under “the 
authority of this Howard case” but warned that “any further 
matters of this kind will weigh heavily on this Court . . . .  I’ve 
indicated how the Court feels at this juncture.  I’m very close, 
I’m going to go with Howard for the time being, but if I see very 
much more of this, I’m going to indicate to you, you may well 
have a serious problem on your hands.” 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
6 
 
These circumstances readily support an inference of 
discrimination.  At the time of the second Batson motion, the 
prosecutors had accepted no black jurors; instead, they had 
removed all the black jurors they could have removed up to that 
point.  And there is no indication that the prosecutors later 
accepted a black juror.  Further, as today’s opinion concedes, 
“the prosecutors’ use of half their strikes against the four 
African-American 
prospective 
jurors 
was 
substantially 
disproportionate to the representation of African-Americans in 
the jury pool” given the demographic makeup of the community.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 52.)  The record makes clear that the 
pattern of strikes caught the attention of the trial court as well. 
It is true that this case does not involve “ ‘ “[r]acial identity 
between the defendant and the excused person.” ’ ”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 53.)  But assuming the jury’s racial composition 
approximated the demographics of the community, it is likely 
that this case involved “ ‘ “[r]acial identity . . . between the 
victim and the majority of remaining jurors.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  In 
capital cases involving white victims, it is entirely plausible that 
prosecutors may be motivated to seat white jurors.  And whether 
a prosecutor strikes a black juror in order to seat fewer black 
jurors or to seat more white jurors, it is discrimination all the 
same. 
What the record also makes clear is that the trial court 
believed it was bound by Howard’s “strong likelihood” standard 
and had that standard clearly in mind when it denied the Batson 
motion and said, “I’m very close.”  Before the trial court ruled, 
the parties had argued over the proper standard, and “the trial 
court presumably understood the [Howard] standard to be 
somewhat more demanding than the ‘reasonable inference’ 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
7 
 
standard, for which defendant had argued.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 50.)  The trial court ultimately decided “to go with Howard for 
the time being” instead of defense counsel’s position that it was 
enough to show “that the relevant circumstances raise an 
inference” of discrimination. 
Given this context, the most natural meaning of the 
comment “I’m very close” is that the trial court found the 
circumstances sufficient to raise “an inference” of discrimination 
but not quite a “strong likelihood” of discrimination.  Indeed, I 
am not sure what else it could mean.  Consider an analogy:  If a 
judge analyzing a set of facts under the clear and convincing 
evidence standard were to say, “I’m very close,” wouldn’t we 
conclude that the judge has determined that the facts meet the 
preponderance of the evidence standard? 
As noted, Johnson v. California involved a virtually 
identical comment by a trial court applying the “ ‘strong 
likelihood’ ” standard.  (Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. 
at p. 165, italics omitted.)  In analyzing the Batson issue under 
the correct standard, the high court said:  “In this case the 
inference of discrimination was sufficient to invoke a comment 
by the trial judge ‘that “we are very close,” ’ and on review, the 
California Supreme Court acknowledged that ‘it certainly looks 
suspicious that all three African-American prospective jurors 
were removed from the jury.’  Those inferences that 
discrimination may have occurred were sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case under Batson.”  (Id. at p. 173, italics added.) 
Today’s opinion attempts to distinguish Johnson v. 
California by noting that it involved the racially charged context 
of a black defendant accused of killing his white girlfriend’s 
child.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 62.)  But in comparing this case to 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
8 
 
Johnson v. California, the court neglects to mention that this 
case involves the strikes of four black jurors, not three, and the 
percentage of prosecution strikes used against black jurors was 
one-half (four out of eight), not one-fourth (three out of 12).  (See 
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. at p. 164.)  Because there are 
countless varieties of circumstances where a trial court could 
find that multiple strikes of black jurors come “very close” to a 
“strong likelihood” of discrimination, I do not see how the 
differences between this case and Johnson v. California 
diminish the salience of the trial court’s comment here. 
Today’s opinion goes on to resist the clear meaning of “I’m 
very close” by saying, “The trial court’s statement appears to 
have been intended as a warning to the prosecutors to be careful 
with their future peremptories, because additional strikes might 
lead to a finding of a prima facie case of discrimination.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 64.)  But the trial court’s warning that 
“additional strikes might lead to a finding of a prima facie case” 
under the erroneously high standard suggests that in its view 
the lower and correct standard had already been satisfied or 
surpassed.  Today’s opinion then says, “It is not clear the trial 
court meant it as a commentary on how suspicious (or not) the 
prior strikes had been, given the totality of the circumstances.”  
(Id. at pp. 64–65)  But what else could the trial court have meant?  
Next, today’s opinion says, “nor is it apparent that the court 
implied the existence of a prima facie case under a ‘reasonable 
inference’ standard.”  (Ibid.)  But the same thing could have 
been said of the trial court in Johnson v. California, and yet the 
natural meaning of its “very close” comment was readily 
discerned and credited by the high court.  (See Johnson v. 
California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 173.) 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
9 
 
Today’s opinion further says, “In any event, our review of 
the court’s ruling in this case is independent,” thereby 
attempting to distance our analysis from the trial court’s.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 65.)  But the reason we apply independent 
review is that “the court may have used a standard for the prima 
face case that was later found too demanding under Batson.”  
(People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 598.)  Our need to 
independently determine whether the correct legal standard has 
been satisfied does not negate the relevance of the trial court’s 
underlying assessment of how suspicious these four strikes 
were.  In light of all that this court and the high court have said 
about the firsthand perspective of trial courts in the Batson 
inquiry (see, e.g., People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 626–627; 
Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 477), I see no reason 
why we would or could ignore the trial court’s comment here.  
Having watched the jurors answer questions, and having 
observed the prosecutors conduct voir dire, use peremptory 
strikes, and argue the Batson issue, the trial court determined 
that the circumstances were “very close” to establishing a 
“strong likelihood” of discrimination.  Even if this determination 
is not binding on us, it is entitled to substantial weight in our 
analysis — just as the trial court’s identical observation in 
Johnson v. California was given substantial weight by the high 
court. 
II. 
The analysis should end there, as it did in Johnson v. 
California, with the straightforward conclusion that the trial 
court’s “inference[] that discrimination may have occurred [was] 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case under Batson.”  
(Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 173.)  Yet today’s 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
10 
 
opinion manages to salvage the trial court’s ruling.  How?  By 
resorting to a mode of reasoning that nowhere appears in the 
high court’s Batson doctrine:  Any inference of discrimination is 
dispelled, this court says, because “the record discloses readily 
apparent, race-neutral grounds for a prosecutor to use 
peremptory challenges against each of the four prospective 
jurors at issue.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 53.) 
We will examine those “readily apparent” grounds in a 
moment, but let us first pause to consider what the court has 
done here.  Step one of the Batson framework is a threshold 
inquiry to determine whether the prosecutor should be required 
to state reasons for contested strikes.  In many instances, the 
prosecutor will voluntarily state reasons before the first-step 
determination is made, in order to remove any doubt about the 
issue.  In this case, the prosecutors chose to stay mum; they 
repeatedly declined to explain why they believed the struck 
jurors differed from seated jurors.  Now, instead of taking their 
silence at face value, this court on appellate review claims it is 
able to discern the reasons that would have motivated any 
reasonable prosecutor to strike the four black jurors.  The court 
then relies on those hypothesized reasons to conclude that there 
was no need for the prosecutors to state their actual reasons. 
This maneuver is hard to square with the high court’s 
clear statement that “[t]he Batson framework is designed to 
produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that 
discrimination may have infected the jury selection process.”  
(Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 172; see ibid. [“ ‘[I]t 
does not matter that the prosecutor might have had good 
reasons . . . [;] [w]hat matters is the real reason they were 
stricken’ ”].)  No wonder the high court has never approved the 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
11 
 
consideration of hypothesized reasons in first-stage Batson 
analysis.  (Cf. Williams v. Louisiana (2016) 579 U.S. __, __ [136 
S.Ct. 2156, 2156] (conc. opn. of Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, 
Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ.) [state rule permitting the trial court 
instead of the prosecutor to supply a race-neutral reason 
at Batson’s 
second 
step 
“does 
not 
comply 
with 
this 
Court’s Batson jurisprudence”].) 
Again, the high court’s application of the law to the facts 
in Johnson v. California is instructive.  There, the trial judge’s 
“own examination of the record had convinced her that the 
prosecutor’s strikes could be justified by race-neutral reasons.  
Specifically, the judge opined that [two of] the black venire 
members had offered equivocal or confused answers in their 
written questionnaires.”  (Johnson v. California, supra, 545 
U.S. at p. 165.)  On review, this court hypothesized various 
reasons to explain the strike of the third black juror.  (See People 
v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1325–1326 [“[T]he record 
discloses race-neutral grounds for challenging C.T.: “(1) she was 
childless (this case involved the death and alleged abuse of a 
minor), (2) the police had made no arrest after the robbery of her 
home five or six years ago, and (3) she omitted to answer the two 
questions in the questionnaire dealing with her opinions of 
prosecuting and defending attorneys.”].)  But the high court 
assigned no weight to any of these hypothesized reasons in 
considering whether a prima facie case of discrimination had 
been established.  (Johnson v. California, at p. 173.)  
Today’s opinion gives a nod to Johnson v. California’s 
admonition “ ‘against engaging in needless and imperfect 
speculation’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 54) but denies that any 
imperfect speculation is happening here.  The court says 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
12 
 
hypothesized reasons must be limited to “ ‘obvious’ ” or “readily 
apparent” race-neutral characteristics “that any reasonable 
prosecutor trying the case would logically avoid in a juror.”  (Id. 
at pp. 53–54, italics omitted.)  As this case illustrates, however, 
what is “obvious” or “readily apparent” is an elastic concept, 
especially in the hands of appellate judges who “have the benefit 
of being able to examine the record in more detail, and at a great 
deal more leisure, than a [prosecutor] in the midst of jury 
selection.”  (Id. at p. 55, fn. 16.) 
Consider Alice S., one of the black jurors struck.  In her 
questionnaire and during voir dire, she discussed her brother’s 
conviction and incarceration in Virginia and her belief that he 
had been convicted only because his alcoholism and 
homelessness meant that he could not account for his activities 
at the time of the crime.  Today’s opinion says that “[f]rom any 
reasonable prosecutor’s perspective, this belief created a clear 
risk that Alice S. might be especially receptive to the alibi 
defense put forward by defendant, who claimed to be taking 
drugs during the period when the victim was abducted and 
killed.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 59, fn. 19.)  But this explanation 
is far from obvious in light of the stark dissimilarities between 
Rhoades’s case and the situation of Alice S.’s brother. 
Alice S. testified that the convergence of two factors — her 
brother’s alcoholism and his homelessness — prevented him 
from mounting an alibi defense:  “[H]e didn’t really have 
anywhere to live.  So he basically was out in the streets.  And 
because he had no accountability as far as, you know, being 
impaired, you know, I felt like he is an alcoholic but he wasn’t a 
molester or whatever.”  Rhoades, by contrast, lived in a home in 
Sutter County at the time of the crime; he was employed and 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
13 
 
owned a truck.  In describing his drug use, Rhoades described 
himself as a “weekender”:  “I work all week long and do my 
partying on the weekends.”  The prosecution’s evidence revealed 
the relatively privileged nature of Rhoades’s life and upbringing, 
including his education in private schools and a father who 
employed him despite his substance abuse.  It is hardly obvious 
that Alice S.’s sympathy for her brother’s inability to mount an 
alibi defense would have made her “especially receptive” to the 
alibi defense put forward by Rhoades, whose personal and social 
circumstances differed greatly from her brother’s.  Indeed, Alice 
S. said, “I think [defendants] should be held responsible if there 
was alcohol and drugs and they’re convicted,” and she 
unequivocally accepted the fact that Rhoades had been 
convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances.  
The prosecution did not press her on this point. 
Moreover, it is not obvious that the prosecution would 
have been much concerned about lingering doubt in light of the 
strong physical evidence linking Rhoades to the murder, 
including blood on Rhoades’s clothing, pubic hairs consistent 
with Rhoades’s found on the victim’s clothing, the victim’s 
footprints on the inside of the windshield of Rhoades’s truck, and 
a DNA test showing the victim’s blood on Rhoades’s knife — all 
of which the prosecutors intended to present, and did present, 
in detail during the two-month penalty retrial.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at pp. 6–7, 58; see id. at p. 19 [finding confrontation clause error 
harmless “beyond a reasonable doubt” given the strength of the 
evidence].)  Although the defense did rely on lingering doubt in 
mitigation, the prosecution was aware from the first penalty 
trial that the defense would not cite Rhoades’s drug use to 
bolster the case for lingering doubt (and indeed, the defense did 
not do so). 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
14 
 
Today’s opinion also posits that the prosecutors struck 
Alice S. because she was unsure she would be able to serve as a 
juror while caring for her six-month-old infant.  But Alice S. did 
not request a hardship excusal, even though the trial court 
granted hardship excusals for other jurors who had family 
obligations.  And during voir dire, the prosecution did not ask 
Alice S. a single question about whether her childcare duties 
would interfere with serving on the jury.  Even if it is possible 
that this concern motivated the prosecution to remove Alice S., 
is it so obvious that we need not inquire? 
As for Shirley R., Adrienne A., and Alicia R., today’s 
opinion hypothesizes that they were struck because of their anti-
death penalty views.  Here it is important to keep in mind that 
the prosecution, before exercising peremptory strikes, can use a 
for-cause challenge to remove a prospective juror whose death 
penalty views would “ ‘prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his 
instructions and his oath.’ ”  (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 
412, 424, fn. omitted.)  “Substantial impairment” does not 
require the juror to have expressed firm opposition to the death 
penalty.  “In many cases, a prospective juror’s responses to 
questions on voir dire will be halting, equivocal, or even 
conflicting.  Given the juror’s probable unfamiliarity with the 
complexity of the law, coupled with the stress and anxiety of 
being a prospective juror in a capital case, such equivocation 
should be expected.”  (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 
1094).  We regularly affirm trial court findings of substantial 
impairment “ ‘even in the absence of clear statements from the 
juror that he or she is impaired because “many veniremen 
simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point 
where their bias has been made ‘unmistakably clear.’ ” ’ ”  
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
15 
 
(People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 41; see, e.g., People v. 
Hawthorne (2009) 46 Cal.4th 67, 83 (Hawthorne) [upholding for-
cause excusal where juror gave “equivocal answers” and “was 
‘less 
than 
consistent 
in 
her 
answers’ ”]; 
People 
v. 
Merriman (2014) 
60 
Cal.4th 
1, 
52 
[same]; 
People 
v. 
Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 665–666 [same]; People v. 
Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 832 [same].) 
In this case, the prosecution did not challenge Shirley R., 
Adrienne A., or Alicia R. for cause.  This fact underscores that it 
is “judicial speculation” (Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. 
at p. 173) to hypothesize that the prosecution struck these jurors 
for their death penalty views.  Quoting selectively from the juror 
questionnaires and voir dire, the court says no seated juror 
expressed “the sort of unqualified opposition to the death 
penalty that both Shirley R. and Adrienne A. did at times.  Two 
non-African-American prospective jurors who did express such 
unqualified antideath penalty views on their questionnaires 
were struck by the prosecution before defendant made his 
second [] motion.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 57–58, italics added.)  
Not only were the views of these two nonblack jurors, Evelyn B. 
and Thomas S. (both white), markedly more skeptical of the 
death penalty, but the prosecution challenged both of them for 
cause, though unsuccessfully.  How can we conclude that Shirley 
R.’s and Adrienne A.’s death penalty views were “readily 
apparent” grounds for striking them when the prosecution did 
not even attempt to excuse them for cause?  Especially when a 
juror’s equivocal views may result in excusal for cause?  To be 
sure, their death penalty views could have been a legitimate 
concern to a reasonable prosecutor.  But that is a far cry from 
saying these black jurors had views that “any reasonable 
prosecutor . . . would logically avoid.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 54.) 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
16 
 
I acknowledge there can be instances where a juror’s death 
penalty views do not amount to substantial impairment but do 
present an obvious concern to the prosecution.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 61.)  But this is not one.  When the death penalty views of 
each struck juror are considered not selectively but in their 
totality (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 55–61), it is evident that each 
juror simply gave the type of “ ‘equivocal or confused answers’ ” 
we often see in capital jury selection — the type of answers that 
the high court found unilluminating and irrelevant in Johnson 
v. California.  (Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 165; 
but cf. maj. opn., ante, at pp. 63–64, fn. 21.) 
Indeed, at least six  seated jurors also expressed hesitation 
or inconsistency in their death penalty views.  Juror No. 4 said 
she “[didn’t] really have an opinion” about the death penalty and 
didn’t support reinstatement because “it takes too much money.”  
But if tasked with making the laws, she would institute a death 
penalty.  Further, she noted that the killing of a child is a 
circumstance that could warrant the death penalty, but when 
asked whether a defendant convicted of sexual assault and 
murder of a child should categorically receive the death penalty, 
she said “some persons may benefit from rehabilitation.”  Juror 
No. 6 thought the death penalty was warranted for intentional 
killing, but he also thought life without parole as punishment 
for murder is “excellent.”  Juror No. 7 “[a]gree[d] somewhat” 
with the statement that a defendant convicted of sexual assault 
and murder of a child should be sentenced to life without parole 
regardless of the circumstances, but also “[a]gree[d] somewhat” 
that such a defendant should be sentenced to death regardless 
of the circumstances.  Juror No. 9 was “neither for nor against” 
the death penalty but said if he were making the laws, it would 
be “difficult . . . but [he] probably” would institute a death 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
17 
 
penalty law.  Juror No. 11 wrote that he “cannot answer this 
question” when asked in what circumstances the death penalty 
is warranted, but he later said it may be warranted for all types 
of killings mentioned on the form.  And Juror No. 12 did not 
believe in “an eye for eye” — “the New Testament fulfills that 
. . . hate the sin, love the sinner” — but she thought all types of 
killings could warrant the death penalty.   
Today’s opinion is correct that the struck jurors made 
some statements that the seated jurors did not.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at pp. 55–61.)  But the court also acknowledges that “both Juror 
No. 4 and Juror No. 9 expressed reservations about the death 
penalty that overlapped in certain respects with Shirley R.’s and 
Adrienne A.’s.”  (Id. at pp. 56–57.)  And Alicia R. wrote that in 
“some cases the death penalty is acceptable” but “[couldn’t] say” 
if there would be a death penalty if she made the laws.  Like 
Juror No. 4, Alicia R. believed in the possibility of redemption.  
Like Juror No. 12, she believed in the teachings of the New 
Testament.  And like Juror No. 9, she had no strong feelings 
about the death penalty but felt it was warranted in certain 
circumstances. 
In sum, although the death penalty views of Shirley R., 
Adrienne A., or Alicia R. differed in some ways from those of the 
seated jurors, the fine parsing required to tease out those 
differences hardly suggests they were obvious reasons for the 
strikes.  This hypothesis seems especially speculative in light of 
the fact that the death penalty views of these black jurors did 
not prompt the prosecution to challenge them for cause. 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
18 
 
III. 
Although every Batson issue must be decided on its own 
facts, it is instructive to take a step back and place today’s 
decision in the broader context of our Batson jurisprudence. 
As noted, this court has decided the merits of a first-stage 
Batson issue in 42 cases (all capital cases) during the 14 years 
since Johnson v. California.  (See appen., post, at p. 25.)  Not 
once did we find that the circumstances established a prima 
facie case of discrimination.  What makes this track record even 
more remarkable is the fact that all 42 cases were tried before 
Johnson 
v. 
California 
clarified 
that 
an 
inference 
of 
discrimination is all that is required at Batson’s first step.  In 
other words, the trial courts in these 42 cases made their first-
stage Batson rulings at a time when our unduly stringent 
“strong likelihood” standard was the controlling law.  Can it 
really be that not a single one of those rulings was erroneous 
under the lower standard set forth in Johnson v. California?  It 
is not difficult, in my view, to cite several cases where the 
circumstances 
plainly 
gave 
rise 
to 
an 
inference 
of 
discrimination.  (See, e.g., People v. Johnson, supra, __ Cal.5th 
at p. __ [p. 1] (dis. opn. of Liu, J.); id. at p. __ [p. 2] (dis. opn. of 
Cuéllar, J.); People v. Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5th 989, 1019–1028 
(Reed) (dis. opn. of Liu, J.); id.at p. 1031 (dis. opn. of Kruger, J.); 
Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 870–879 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.); 
id. at pp. 880–882 [discussing People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 
856, 872–873, 904–908 (Clark); People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 
Cal.4th 472, 485–489 (Hartsch); People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 872, 900–903].) 
A key factor behind this uniformity of results is the court’s 
habit of relying on hypothesized grounds for contested strikes — 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
19 
 
a line of reasoning that appears in 30 of the 42 cases.  (Appen., 
post, at p. 25.)  The most commonly hypothesized reason is a 
struck juror’s death penalty views.  (Ibid.)  As discussed above, 
this is an area full of complexity and nuance, unlikely to be 
replete with sharp distinctions among death-qualified jurors.  
The next most commonly hypothesized reason is a struck juror’s 
(or family member’s) negative interaction with, or negative 
opinion of, the criminal justice system.  (Ibid.)  But “[i]n light of 
the undeniable evidence that some minority groups . . . have 
been overpoliced and subjected to harsher sentences than 
others, it hardly seems race neutral to categorically allow 
potential jurors to be stricken simply because they have had 
contact with or hold negative opinions about law enforcement or 
the judicial system.  Reflexively allowing these strikes 
compounds institutional discrimination . . . .”  (People v. Bryant 
(2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 525, 546 (conc. opn. of Humes, J.).) 
The court purports to limit hypothesized reasons to 
“ ‘obvious’ ” or “ ‘readily apparent’ ” characteristics “that any 
reasonable prosecutor . . . would logically avoid in a juror.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 53–54, italics omitted.)  I acknowledge there 
have been instances where the reason for a strike was truly 
obvious — for example, when the struck juror “was married to a 
convicted murderer” and “[n]one of the seated or alternate jurors 
had anything remotely similar in their backgrounds.”  (People v. 
Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 889, 983 (Jones) (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).)  
But, as today’s opinion demonstrates, the court is willing to 
hypothesize reasons well short of something so conspicuous. 
Moreover, the limits stated in today’s opinion come late in 
our jurisprudence.  Our first-stage Batson cases have regularly 
relied on hypothesized reasons so long as they “reasonably” or 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
20 
 
“legitimately” could have caused concern.  (E.g., Clark, supra, 52 
Cal.4th at p. 907 [“The prosecutor reasonably could believe that, 
given J.J.’s profession, she might consciously or unconsciously 
exert undue influence during the deliberative process, or that 
fellow jurors would ascribe to her a special legal expertise.”]; 
Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 489 [“O.B.’s bias against police 
officers, G.C.’s failure to complete the questionnaire and his 
hesitance over evidentiary questions and the confidentiality of 
deliberations, and K.W.’s initial unwillingness to resolve 
evidentiary conflicts were all matters that could legitimately 
give an advocate pause.”]; People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 
574, 644 (Taylor) [“Thus, both were engaged in professions the 
prosecutor reasonably could believe would tend to make them 
overly sympathetic to the defense.”]; People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 313, 347 (Bonilla) [“In each of these three cases, the 
juror’s responses would give reason enough for a prosecutor to 
consider a peremptory, without regard to the juror’s sex.”]; 
People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1102–1103 [“Even 
though L.B. gave assurances that she could evaluate the 
evidence objectively, based on these responses, the prosecutor 
reasonably might have been concerned with L.B.’s negative 
views of the police and the judicial system based on the incident 
with her cousin and her self-described strong personality, and 
challenged her on these bases.”].)  A juror characteristic that a 
prosecutor reasonably could find problematic is hardly the same 
as a characteristic that “any reasonable prosecutor . . . would 
logically avoid.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 54, italics added.)  If 
today’s opinion is intended to turn over a new leaf in our Batson 
doctrine, one would expect to see these prior cases disapproved.  
But the court repudiates none of them, even though they are 
plainly at odds with the high court’s admonition against “the 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
21 
 
imprecision of relying on judicial speculation.”  (Johnson v. 
California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 173.)   
Similarly, today’s opinion acknowledges “the utility” of 
comparative juror analysis in first-stage Batson analysis and 
notes that our “more recent decisions have considered such 
comparisons.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 56–57, fn. 17.)  But this 
also comes late in our jurisprudence.  For more than a decade, 
this court has repeatedly said that comparative juror analysis 
“is inappropriate” (People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 439) 
or “has little or no use” (Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 350) in 
first-stage Batson analysis.  Today’s opinion is grossly 
inaccurate when it says we have declined to conduct 
comparative juror analysis “particularly when neither the trial 
court nor this court, in evaluating the prima facie case, has 
posited possible prosecutorial reasons for the challenged 
strikes.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 56, fn. 17, italics added.)  We 
have regularly declined to conduct comparative juror analysis at 
Batson’s first step in cases where we have relied on hypothesized 
or even actually stated reasons for contested strikes.  (See 
Sánchez, at pp. 439–440; People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 
205, 225–226, fn. 6; Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 907–908 & 
fn. 13; Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 616–617; Hawthorne, 
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 80, fn. 3; People v. Howard (2008) 42 
Cal.4th 1000, 1019–1020; Bonilla, at pp. 343, 347–350.)  Again, 
if today’s opinion is intended to turn over a new leaf, one would 
expect to see these prior cases disapproved.  But the court 
repudiates none of them despite repeated calls to do so.  (See 
Reed, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1026 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.); Sánchez, 
at pp. 492–494 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.); Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th 
at pp. 862–863 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.); id. at pp. 874–876 
(conc. opn. of Liu, J.).)  The court’s refusal to overrule our prior 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
22 
 
cases, even though they stand alone against “a mountain of 
contrary authority” (Sánchez, at pp. 492–494 (conc. opn. of Liu, 
J.) [citing cases]), is quite puzzling and irregular.  (Cf. People v. 
Lopez (Nov. 25, 2019, S238627) __ Cal.5th __, __ [pp. 33–34] 
[overruling 
search-and-seizure 
precedent 
that 
had 
put 
California in “a minority of one” among all jurisdictions].) 
I would like to believe that the limits stated in today’s 
opinion will rein in this court’s reliance on hypothesized reasons 
in first-stage Batson analysis.  (Cf. Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at 
pp. 872–873 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).)  But in light of our prior case 
law (which the court does not disapprove) as well as today’s 
decision 
and 
another 
recent 
decision 
that 
relied 
on 
“underwhelming” hypothesized reasons to find no inference of 
discrimination arising from the removal of five out of six black 
jurors (Reed, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1025 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.)), I 
now believe a  different approach is needed. 
I see at least two options.  First, the high court could make 
clear that reliance on hypothesized reasons in first-stage Batson 
analysis is generally impermissible.  Such reliance “effectively 
short-circuits the three-step framework and defeats the 
essential inquiry into whether the possible reasons for a strike 
were the prosecutor’s actual reasons.”  (Harris, supra, 57 
Cal.4th at p. 873 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.); see Johnson v. 
California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 172 [“The inherent uncertainty 
present in inquiries of discriminatory purpose counsels against 
engaging in needless and imperfect speculation when a direct 
answer can be obtained by asking a simple question.”].)  If there 
are to be exceptions for “obvious” reasons, it must be emphasized 
that such exceptions should be rare and truly exceptional — for 
example, the struck juror “was married to a convicted murderer” 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
23 
 
(Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 983 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.)) — and 
not a regular practice of the sort that has appeared in more than 
two-thirds of our first-stage Batson decisions.  Further, the 
practice should be especially disfavored on appellate review in 
cases where the trial court did not identify any obvious reason 
for a contested strike. 
A second option is for this court, the Judicial Council, or 
the Legislature to follow the lead of several state high courts 
that have essentially eliminated Batson’s first step.  (See State 
v. Rayfield (S.C. 2006) 631 S.E.2d 244, 247; Melbourne v. State 
(Fla. 1996) 679 So.2d 759, 764; State v. Parker (Mo. 1992) 836 
S.W.2d 930, 939–940; State v. Holloway (Conn. 1989) 553 A.2d 
166, 171–172; Wn. Gen. Rules, rule 37(d).)  Under this approach, 
whenever a defendant raises a Batson challenge to the 
prosecutor’s strike of a prospective juror from a legally 
cognizable group, “[t]he trial court will then require the state to 
come forward with reasonably specific and clear race-neutral 
explanations for the strike.”  (State v. Parker, at p. 939, 
fn. omitted.) 
This approach would serve the important goals of 
promoting transparency, creating a record for appellate review, 
and ensuring public confidence in our justice system, while 
imposing “the comparatively low cost of requiring a party to 
state its actual reasons for striking a minority prospective 
juror.”  (Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 884 (conc. opn. of Liu, 
J.).)  As the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys 
observed in the development of that state’s rule, “[t]he first step 
of the Batson inquiry, a prima facie test, has historically cut off 
discussion 
as 
to 
meaningful 
objections 
to 
peremptory 
challenges.  That step ultimately served to mask intentional or 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
24 
 
unconscious bias.  Eliminating the prima facie showing will be 
a highly significant improvement in the process, insofar as it 
will force litigants to root their challenges in concrete reasons 
focused directly on a juror’s ability to serve.”  (Wn. Supreme Ct., 
Proposed New GR 37—Jury Selection Workgroup Final Report 
(2018) appen. 2, Statement on the Workgroup Final Report Wn. 
Assn. of Prosecuting Attorneys, p. 1  [as of Nov. 25, 2019].)  Our 
Legislature has passed laws expanding protections against 
discrimination in jury selection (see, e.g., Code of Civ. Proc., 
§ 231.5), and it can do so again. 
One way or another, it is time for a course correction in 
our Batson jurisprudence.  The stark uniformity of outcomes in 
our case law raises a serious concern that our analytical 
approach has evolved into a one-way ratchet.  I would hold that 
the totality of circumstances in this case gives rise to an 
inference of discrimination.  And because the passage of time 
makes impractical a remand to explore the prosecution’s actual 
reasons for the contested strikes, I would reverse the penalty 
judgment.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
LIU, J.
 
 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
1 
 
 
APPENDIX 
First-stage Batson Decisions by the California Supreme Court 
Since Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162 
 
An asterisk (*) denotes that this court hypothesized its 
own reason or accepted the trial court’s hypothesized reason for 
a contested strike.  This does not include cases where the 
prosecutor stated reasons for the record and this court’s analysis 
considered reasons identical to the prosecutor’s stated reasons. 
(See, e.g., People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 435–437; 
People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1017–1020.) 
A dagger (†) denotes that a prospective juror’s death 
penalty views were hypothesized as a reason for the strike. 
A double dagger (‡) denotes that a prospective juror’s (or a 
family member’s) negative experience or negative view of law 
enforcement was hypothesized as a reason for the strike. 
 
1.  
People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50*‡ 
2.  
People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168*‡ 
3.  
People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491*‡ 
4.  
People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287*‡ 
5.  
People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067*‡ 
6.  
People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582 
7.  
People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50*†‡ 
8.  
People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313*† 
9.  
People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872*† 
10. 
People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
 
 
2 
 
11. 
People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000 
12. 
People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263 
13. 
People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863 
14. 
People v. Hawthorne (2009) 46 Cal.4th 67 
15. 
People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539*†‡ 
16. 
People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472*†‡ 
17. 
People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574 
18. 
People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769*†‡ 
19. 
People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706*†‡ 
20. 
People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856*‡ 
21. 
People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal. 4th 1 
22. 
People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771*†‡ 
23. 
People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205*† 
24. 
People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535*† 
25. 
People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393*† 
26. 
People v. Lopez (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1028* 
27. 
People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658 
28. 
People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804*‡ 
29. 
People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899*‡ 
30. 
People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40*† 
31. 
People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809*† 
32. 
People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446 
33. 
People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609* 
34. 
People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 363*‡ 
35. 
People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411 
PEOPLE v. RHOADES 
 
 
3 
 
36. 
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 
37. 
People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21*†‡ 
38. 
People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184*† 
39. 
People v. Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5th 989*†‡ 
40. 
People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697*†‡ 
41. 
People v. Johnson (Nov. 25, 2019, S029551) __ Cal.5th __*‡ 
42. 
People v. Rhoades (Nov. 25, 2019, S082101) __ Cal.5th 
__*†‡  
  
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Rhoades 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S082101 
Date Filed: November 25, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Loyd H. Mulkey, Jr., Kenneth L. Hake and Maryanne G. Gilliard 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. Farrell and Ronald S. Matthias, Assistant Attorneys General, Eric 
Christoffersen, Stephanie A. Mitchell, Sean M. McCoy and Jennifer M. Poe, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Richard Jay Moller 
So’Hum Law Center 
P.O. Box 1669 
Redway, CA 95560-1669 
(707) 923-9199 
 
Jennifer M. Poe 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 
(916) 324-5474