Title: In re B.L.V.B.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

IN_RE_BLVB.92-321; 160 Vt. 368; 628 A.2d 1271


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 92-321


 Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B.           Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
                                              Probate Court
                                              Washington District

                                              February Term, 1993


 George K. Belcher, J.

 Julie A. Frame, David W. Curtis and Leslie J. Dunn of Hoff, Agel, Curtis &
    Cassidy, P.C., Burlington, for plaintiffs-appellants

 Paula L. Ettelbrick, Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., New York,
    New York, and Susan M. Murray of Langrock Sperry & Wool, Middlebury, for
    amici curiae



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      JOHNSON, J.   The issue we decide today is whether Vermont law requires
 the termination of a natural mother's parental rights if her children are
 adopted by a person to whom she is not married.  We hold that when the
 family unit is comprised of the natural mother and her partner, and the
 adoption is in the best interests of the children, terminating the natural
 mother's rights is unreasonable and unnecessary.  We reverse.
      Appellants are two women, Jane and Deborah, who have lived together in
 a committed, monogamous relationship since 1986.  Together, they made the
 decision to have and raise children, and together, they consulted various
 sources to determine the best method for them to achieve their goal of
 starting a family.  On November 2, 1988, Jane gave birth to a son, B.L.V.B.,
 after being impregnated with the sperm of an anonymous donor.  On August 27,
 1992, after being impregnated with sperm from the same donor, she gave birth
 to a second son, E.L.V.B.  Deborah assisted the midwife at both births, and
 she has been equally responsible for raising and parenting the children
 since their births.
      Appellants sought legal recognition of their existing status as co-
 parents, and asked the probate court to allow Deborah to legally adopt the
 children, while leaving Jane's parental rights intact.  The adoption
 petitions were uncontested.  The Department of Social and Rehabilitative
 Services conducted a home study, determined the adoptions were in the best
 interests of the children, and recommended that they be allowed.  A clinical
 and school psychologist who had evaluated the family testified that it was
 essential for the children to be assured of a continuing relationship with
 Deborah, and recommended that the adoptions be allowed for the psychological
 and emotional protection of the children.
      Despite the lack of opposition, the probate court denied the adoptions,
 declining to reach whether the adoptions were in the best interests of the
 children because the proposed adoptive mother "does not satisfy the
 statutory prerequisite to adoption."  The court relied on 15 V.S.A. {{ 431
 and 448.  Section 431, covering who may adopt, provides:
           A person or husband and wife together, of age and sound
           mind, may adopt any other person as his or their heir
           with or without change of name of the person adopted.  A
           married man or a married woman shall not adopt a person
           or be adopted without the consent of the other spouse.
           The petition for adoption and the final adoption decree
           shall be executed by the other spouse as provided in
           this chapter.


         Section 448, which describes how the rights and obligations of both
 parents and children are altered by a final adoption decree, provides in
 pertinent part:
         The natural parents of a minor shall be deprived, by the
         adoption, of all legal right to control of such minor,
         and such minor shall be freed from all obligations of
         obedience and maintenance to them. . . .  Notwith-
         standing the foregoing provisions of this section, when
         the adoption is made by a spouse of a natural parent,
         obligations of obedience to, and rights of inheritance
         by and through the natural parent who has intermarried
         with the adopting parent shall not be affected.
 The court read the last sentence of { 448, the "step-parent exception," and
 { 431, as clearly requiring that "if a couple adopts together, they must be
 married.  If one partner is the birth parent, and the other partner desires
 to adopt, then they must be married:  otherwise, the birth parent will lose
 rights in the child under { 448."
      Appellants make numerous attacks on the probate court's interpretation
 of the statutes, but in the main, they contend that the statutory language
 does not prohibit the adoptions, that enforcing the termination of the birth
 mother's rights under { 448 would reach an absurd result in these
 circumstances, and that such a result is inconsistent with the best
 interests of the children and the public policy of this state.  We agree.
      In interpreting Vermont's adoption statutes, we are mindful that the
 state's primary concern is to promote the welfare of children, In re Camp,
 94 Vt. 455, 458, 111 A. 565, 567 (1920), and that application of the
 statutes should implement that purpose. (FN1) See In re S.B.L., 150 Vt. 294,
 301-02,