Title: State v. Alexander

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Alexander (2000-135); 173 Vt. 376; 795 A.2d 1248

[Filed 08-Feb-2002]

[Motion to Change Mandate Denied 28-Mar-2002]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of 
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 2000-135

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Addison Circuit

Raymond H. Alexander	                         January Term, 2001

Dean B. Pineles, J.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, David Tartter, Assistant Attorney 
  General, Montpelier, and John Quinn, Addison County State's Attorney, 
  Middlebury, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney, 
  Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       JOHNSON, J.     Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction, based
  on a jury verdict,  of attempted kidnapping.  He contends: (1) the court
  erroneously denied a request to instruct on the  lesser-included offense of
  unlawful restraint in the second degree; (2) the evidence was insufficient 
  to establish the element of intent; and (3) the evidence was insufficient
  to establish the requisite  element of restraint.  We agree with
  defendant's first claim of error, and accordingly, we reverse. 

       The record evidence disclosed the following.  The complainant worked
  at a manufacturing  plant in Middlebury.  On the date in question, she had
  worked late to prepare for a business trip the

 

  next day. Shortly after 6:00 p.m., as she was walking down a hallway
  preparing to leave, she  encountered defendant, who worked in the building
  as a janitor.  The complainant asked him if he  would turn out the lights. 
  Defendant did not respond, but instead grabbed her wrist, said "you're 
  coming with me," and forcefully pulled her into a conference room.  As she
  struggled to free herself,  defendant pushed her against a wall and pulled
  out a knife.

       The complainant warned him that the president of the company would be
  returning  momentarily, and offered him money.  Defendant did not respond. 
  Instead he proceeded to pull her  out of the conference room and into an
  open manufacturing area,  near the ladies' bathroom.  He then  attempted to
  force the complainant into the bathroom.  Although she resisted and
  momentarily freed  herself, defendant grabbed her again, put her in a
  headlock, and started punching her in the head and  stomach.  The attack
  left the complainant dazed, though she continued to struggle and eventually 
  broke free and ran for an exit, with defendant in close pursuit.  The
  complainant ran out a shipping  door just ahead of defendant, although he
  managed to tackle her by the ankles causing her to fall  headlong down the
  steps. Once outside, the complainant ran to another office and summoned
  help.   Defendant did not pursue her outside the building.

       Defendant was initially charged with attempted sexual assault and
  attempted kidnapping with  intent to sexually assault or place the
  complainant in fear of sexual assault.  The information was  later amended
  to charge attempted aggravated sexual assault and attempted kidnapping with
  intent to  place the complainant in fear of being subjected to bodily
  injury.  At the close of the State's evidence,  defendant moved for
  judgment of acquittal.  The court denied the motion as to the kidnapping
  count  but granted judgment of acquittal as to the attempted sexual
  assault.  The defense called no  witnesses.  At the charge conference,
  defendant requested an instruction on the lesser-

 

  included offense of unlawful restraint in the second degree.  The court
  denied the request because the  court found that there was no dispute that
  defendant brandished a knife and physically assaulted the  victim. 
  Defendant renewed his objection to the court's failure to instruct on the
  lesser offense at the  end of the instructions.  The jury found defendant
  guilty as charged.  This appeal followed.  	
	
       Defendant contends the court erred in refusing to give a requested
  instruction on the  lesser-included offense of unlawful restraint in the
  second degree.  Defendant's argument is premised upon  the meaning and
  structure of the kidnapping statute, which provides, in pertinent part, as
  follows:

    (a)  A person commits the crime of kidnapping if the person 
        (1) knowingly restrains another person with the intent to: 
            (A) hold the restrained person for ransom or reward; or 
            (B) use the restrained person as a shield or hostage; or 
            (C) inflict bodily injury upon the restrained person or place 
    the restrained person or a third person in fear that any person will be  
    subjected to bodily injury; or 
            (D) sexually assault the restrained person or place the restrained
    person or a third person in fear that any person will be  sexually 
    assaulted; or 
            (E) facilitate the commission of another crime or flight 
    thereafter

  13 V.S.A. § 2405(a)(1). The amended information charged defendant with a
  violation of §  2405(a)(1)(C) (intent to inflict bodily injury or place
  person in fear of bodily injury).

       Under the statute, in pertinent part, restrain "means to restrict
  substantially the movement of  another person without the person's consent
  or other lawful authority," id. § 2404(3), and a restraint  is without
  consent if it is accomplished "by force, threat, or deception."  Id. §
  2404(4)(B).   Kidnapping is punishable by a maximum sentence of life
  imprisonment, although the sentence may  be reduced upon a showing that
  defendant voluntarily caused the release of the victim in a safe place 
  without having caused serious bodily injury.  Id. § 2405(b).

       In addition to kidnapping, the code also proscribes unlawful restraint
  in the first degree, 

 

  which entails "knowingly restrain[ing] another person under circumstances
  exposing that person to a  risk of serious bodily injury,"  id. §
  2407(a)(1), and is punishable by imprisonment for not more than  fifteen
  years, as well as unlawful restraint in the second degree, which consists,
  inter alia, of   "knowingly restrain[ing] another person," id. §
  2406(a)(3), and is punishable by imprisonment for  not more than five
  years.
 	
       The code thus sets forth three distinct offenses involving an unlawful
  restraint, with different  levels of punishment corresponding to the
  severity and circumstances of the offense.  Defendant  argues that although
  the evidence may have been sufficient to show that he committed the lesser-
  included offense of knowingly restraining the victim, in violation of §
  2406 (unlawful restraint in the  second degree), it was insufficient to
  show that he restrained the victim with the intent to inflict  bodily
  injury or place the victim in fear of injury, as required for kidnapping. 
  Id. § 2405(a)(1)(C).   Defendant's argument rests upon a construction of
  the statute requiring, in effect, proof of dual  intents, a knowing
  restraint for the separate and additional purpose of inflicting bodily
  injury.  The  State contests defendant's construction, asserting that the
  statute is satisfied if the restraint itself  evinces an intent to injure.  
  In order to address defendant's claim on the lesser included offense, we 
  must address the proper interpretation of the actual crime charged.  We
  conclude that defendant's  interpretation is the more sound.

       Enacted in 1989, Vermont's kidnapping, unlawful restraint
  first-degree, and unlawful  restraint second-degree statutes generally
  parallel the Model Penal Code provisions for kidnapping,  felonious
  kidnapping, and false imprisonment.  See Model Penal Code §§ 212.1, 212.2,
  212.3  (1980).  Under the Model Penal Code, kidnapping is defined - and
  distinguished from felonious  restraint and false imprisonment - by the
  requirement that the restraint must be accomplished for one 

 

  of four purposes: to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield
  or hostage; to facilitate the  commission of a crime or flight thereafter;
  to inflict bodily injury on or terrorize the victim; or to  interfere with
  the performance of any governmental or political function.  See id. §
  212.1.  The  Model Code commentary explains that the authors chose the
  "usual way of differentiating from  among offenses in this field [by]
  specify[ing] nefarious purposes with which the actor must  undertake
  removal or confinement of his victim."  Model Penal Code § 212.1 cmt. at
  227.  The Code  commentary further underscores the authors' understanding
  that injurious or threatening behavior  used to effectuate a taking may
  constitute felonious restraint, but will not amount to kidnapping  unless
  the restraint is intended to accomplish one or more of the specific
  offenses set forth in the  statute.  As the authors explain:

    Thus, for example, the actor who uses a gun to force another to
    drive  him somewhere engages in unlawful restraint under
    circumstances  exposing the victim to risk of serious bodily harm. 
    If he does so in  order to terrorize the victim or in order to
    commit or escape from a  felony, he may be convicted of kidnapping
    under Section 212.1.  But  if his purpose is merely to obtain
    transportation, he is liable only for  the lesser offense of
    felonious restraint.

  Id. § 212.2 cmt. at 240-41.

       This is also the general view of those states with kidnapping statutes
  similar to Vermont's.   Kansas, for example, defines kidnapping as the
  taking or confining of a person, accomplished by  force, threat, or
  deception, "with the intent" to inflict bodily injury or terrorize the
  victim, among  other specified offenses.  Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3420 (1995 &
  2000 Supp.).  The Kansas Supreme Court  has held that the statute requires
  a specific intent to commit one of the proscribed offenses  independent of
  the means used to accomplish the taking.  "Our statute requires that the
  taking or  confinement be accomplished not only by the proscribed means
  (i.e., 'by force, threat or deception') 

 

  but also with the specific intent to accomplish one of four types of
  objectives."  State v. Buggs,