Title: PINE v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PINE v. STATE2001 WY 13337 P.3d 368Case Number: 00-162Decided: 12/21/2001
 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

DEANNA LYNN 
PINE, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
Mary B. Guthrie, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

            
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

            
VOIGT, Justice. 

[¶1]      In March 2000, a 
jury convicted appellant, Deanna Lynn Pine, of engaging in an unlawful 
clandestine laboratory operation in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1059(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001), a felony, and possession of a Schedule II 
controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(C) 
(LexisNexis 2001), a misdemeanor.  
On appeal, appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to 
convict her of engaging in an unlawful clandestine laboratory operation and that 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague.  We affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant raises 
two issues on appeal:

 

ISSUE 
I

 

Whether 
the evidence was sufficient to sustain Pine's conviction under Wyo. Stat. Ann. . 
. . § 35-7-1059(a)(ii) (LEXIS 1999) for possession of laboratory equipment or 
supplies with intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation.

 

ISSUE 
II

 

Whether 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a)(ii) (LEXIS 1999) is 
unconstitutional.

 

The 
State of Wyoming, as appellee, phrases the issues in substantially the same 
manner.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Appellant and 
Michael Browning traveled together from Arizona to South Dakota in August 1999, 
where they stayed for approximately one week.  On August 9, 1999, the Niobrara County 
Sheriff's Office received a call from appellant claiming that she had been 
assaulted and then abandoned at Mule Creek Junction north of Lusk.  Deputy Darrel Frye responded to the call 
and ultimately stopped a tan Chevy Blazer with Arizona license plates, which 
matched the vehicle description provided by appellant, as it reached the town of 
Lusk.1  The driver of the Chevy Blazer was 
Michael Browning.

 

[¶4]      After a brief 
conversation regarding the purpose of the stop and providing Deputy Frye his 
identification, Mr. Browning removed several items from the Chevy Blazer 
(presumably his subjective determination regarding what property belonged to 
appellant), including:

 

            
(1)       
A green Rubber Maid container of female clothing and items, including a 
white towel (halfway down into the container) with "yellowish-brown" stains on 
it, later determined to be iodine.  
Appellant admitted to Deputy Frye that the container was hers, but 
apparently denied "owning" the towel.

 

            
(2)       
An orange water cooler.  
Appellant told Deputy Frye that the water cooler had been in the vehicle 
since she and Mr. Browning left Arizona, but claimed that it belonged to Mr. 
Browning.

 

            
(3)       
A briefcase.  Appellant 
admitted to Deputy Frye that the briefcase was hers.  In the briefcase, Deputy Frye discovered 
May and June 1999, receipts for several cases of fusees obtained from a Colorado 
company for a South Dakota company owned by an individual with whom appellant 
had previously resided.  One receipt 
indicated that a "D.P." picked up three of these cases on behalf of the South 
Dakota company.  The briefcase also 
contained a paper bearing the handwritten name, address, and phone number of the 
referenced Colorado company and other notations, including the phone number for 
Arizona Brake and Clutch.

 

            
Appellant told Agent Steve McFarland of the Division of Criminal 
Investigation that the fusees were used in the course of the South Dakota 
company's construction business.  
Interestingly, an August 8, 1999, South Dakota hardware store receipt for 
four three-packs of flares was also discovered in the vehicle.  The "striker plates" of fusees or flares 
contain phosphorus, an ingredient used in the synthesis of 
methamphetamine.

 

            
(4)       
Two compact disc cases and an address book.  Appellant stated that these items were 
hers.

 

            
(5)       
A closed cardboard box containing a "Furby."  Appellant admitted to Deputy Frye that 
the "Furby" was hers.  Underneath 
the "Furby" in the cardboard box, Deputy Frye discovered a twisted coffee filter 
containing a crystallized substance, later determined to be 
methamphetamine.

 

[¶5]      At some point, 
Mr. Browning also handed Deputy Frye a vinyl pouch containing binoculars, a 
glass tube with methamphetamine residue, a Ziploc baggy with methamphetamine 
residue, and a book of matches.  
After obtaining Mr. Browning's consent, Deputy Frye searched the Chevy 
Blazer and discovered a blue towel wrapped around a triple-beam Ohaus 
"dial-a-gram" scale.  A 
"yellow-tannish" residue appeared on the bottom of the scale.  The residue apparently was not submitted 
for chemical testing, but the color was consistent with that of iodine.  Scales of this nature can be used to 
weigh or measure substances, including iodine, throughout the synthesis of 
methamphetamine in order to obtain a precise chemical reaction.  Officers also seized a duffel bag 
containing male clothing and a glass pipe with methamphetamine residue from the 
Chevy Blazer, as well as a twisted coffee filter containing methamphetamine from 
underneath the driver's seat.

 

[¶6]      In the water 
cooler, officers discovered many items frequently used to manufacture 
methamphetamine, including:

 

            
(1)       
A bottle of muriatic acid.  
Muriatic acid can be used to assist in crystallizing 
methamphetamine.

 

            
(2)       
A bottle of "Heet."  "Heet," 
which contains methanol, can be used to extract phosphorous from the "striker 
plates" on fusees or flares.

 

            
(3)       
A package of coffee filters.  
Coffee filters can be used to filter substances at various stages in the 
synthesis of methamphetamine.

 

            
(4)       
Two cans of brake cleaner.  
Two of appellant's fingerprints were retrieved from the cans of brake 
cleaner.  Appellant told Agent 
McFarland that, while in a Rapid City, South Dakota auto parts store, Mr. 
Browning instructed her to get the brake cleaner, and she took it off the 
shelf.  Brake cleaner can be used to 
absorb methamphetamine oil from methamphetamine base in its liquid 
form.

 

            
(5)       
A bottle of Red Devil lye.  
Lye can be used to bring liquid methamphetamine to a "basic 
condition."

 

            
(6)       
A white bottle with vinyl tubing around the top.  Receipts for vinyl or rubber tubing were 
seized from the vehicle, at least one of which was found in appellant's 
briefcase.  Appellant disputed 
whether the size of the tubing indicated on the receipt matched the size of the 
tubing seized from the cooler.

 

            
(7)       
Two plastic Clairol hair color bottles cut to form funnels, which tested 
positive for methamphetamine.

 

            
(8)       
Tin foil.

 

            
(9)       
Glass jars, which tested positive for iodine.  Iodine can be used to aid in converting 
ephedrine or pseudoephedrine (an ingredient essential to manufacturing 
methamphetamine) to methamphetamine.

 

            
(10)     A tin 
box containing rubber stoppers, a bottle labeled pseudoephedrine that tested 
positive for phosphorus, and coffee filters which tested positive for iodine, 
"phenyl-propanone," and phosphorous, all of which have a role in the synthesis 
of methamphetamine.

 

            
(11)     Unused 
quantities of most of these substances remained, such that the contents of the 
cooler were still useful in manufacturing additional 
methamphetamine.

 

[¶7]      Appellant first 
told Agent McFarland that she did not know what was in the water cooler; 
however, when asked if her fingerprints would be found on any items contained in 
the cooler, without first having seen its contents, appellant "talked about what 
was inside the cooler," replying that her fingerprints might be found on the 
brake cleaner, her hair dye bottles that Mr. Browning made into funnels, and 
pill tablets (presumably pseudoephedrine).  
On August 10, 1999, the Niobrara County undersheriff noticed 
"brownish-yellowish" stains on appellant's fingertips, palms, fingers and 
cuticles.  The undersheriff 
testified that the color of these stains was consistent with that of the stains 
on the white towel and Ohaus scale, and based on his experience, all three 
stains were consistent with iodine stains.

 

[¶8]      Appellant was 
charged with knowingly possessing laboratory equipment or supplies with intent 
to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1059(a)(ii), a felony, and possession of a Schedule II controlled 
substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(C), a 
misdemeanor.  Neither Mr. Browning 
nor appellant testified at appellant's trial.  A jury convicted appellant of both 
offenses in March 2000, and the district court sentenced her to serve a 
two-and-one-half to six-year prison term for the felony conviction, concurrently 
with twelve months' incarceration for the misdemeanor 
conviction.

 

DISCUSSION

 

            
Sufficiency of the 
Evidence

 

[¶9]      Appellant argues 
that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to sustain her clandestine 
laboratory operation conviction.  
According to appellant, the State did not prove that she exercised 
dominion and control over, or "possessed," the water cooler, its contents, or 
the scales seized from the Chevy Blazer.  
Appellant maintains that, based on the evidence, she was nothing more 
than a passenger in the Chevy Blazer, which is insufficient to infer that she, 
as opposed to Mr. Browning, possessed the contraband.  Notably, appellant does not challenge 
the sufficiency of the evidence as to any other element of her clandestine 
laboratory operation conviction, including whether the seized items constituted 
"laboratory equipment or supplies" or whether the items, if possessed, were 
sufficient to infer a specific intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation.2

 

When 
reviewing an appeal based on sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence, 
and any applicable inferences based on the evidence, in a light most favorable 
to the State.  Nixon v. 
State, 994 P.2d 324, 329 (Wyo.1999); and see Pool v. State, 2001 WY 
8, 17 P.3d 1285 (Wyo.2001).  In 
conducting such a review, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the 
jury; rather, we determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational 
individuals would, or even could, have found the essential elements of the crime 
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Id.

 

McFarlane 
v. State, 2001 
WY 10, ¶ 4, 17 P.3d 31, 32 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶10]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a) 
provides, in pertinent part:

 

            
(a)       
It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or 
intentionally:

 

                        
* * *

 

            
(ii)        
Possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation[.][3]

 

To 
establish "possession," the State must prove that appellant "either 
individually or jointly with another exercised dominion and control'" over the 
contraband, had knowledge of its presence, and that it was contraband.  Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 
967 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Wise v. State, 654 P.2d 116, 119 (Wyo. 1982)).

 

"It is 
not necessary to offer direct evidence of the [appellant's] actual possession of 
the contraband.  [C]ircumstantial 
evidence linking together a series of facts' allowing a reasonable inference 
that the [appellant] had the requisite control and knowledge of the [contraband] 
is sufficient to show constructive possession.  Wise, 654 P.2d  at 119.  The court must consider the totality of 
the circumstances when determining whether sufficient evidence was presented to 
allow the jury to infer that the [appellant] had the requisite control and 
knowledge of the contraband.  
Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 967 
(Wyo.1996)."

 

Mora v. 
State, 984 P.2d 477, 481 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Seeley v. State, 959 P.2d 170, 176 
(Wyo. 1998)).

 

[¶11]   The aforementioned facts, when 
viewed in a light most favorable to the State, provide sufficient indicia of 
possession that a jury could reasonably infer that appellant "possessed" the 
contraband.  The totality of the 
circumstances and accompanying inferences, including the nature of appellant's 
association with Mr. Browning and the Chevy Blazer, her fingerprints, the stains 
observed on the scales, appellant's hands, and the towel retrieved from 
appellant's belongings, in addition to appellant's own statements and the 
evidence contained in her possessions, establish a direct nexus between 
appellant, the water cooler and its contents, and the other items that comprised 
the clandestine laboratory operation; appellant knowingly exercised dominion and 
control over the contrabandshe was, quite literally, caught 
"red-handed."

 

            
Constitutionality of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059

 

[¶12]   Appellant next argues that Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague.  In particular, appellant contends that 
the statute does not define the terms "supplies" or "separatory funnel" and 
therefore does not "advise a person of ordinary intelligence what is prohibited 
conduct."  According to appellant, 
the common dictionary definitions of these terms do not clarify their meaning to 
a degree that one could comprehend what conduct the statute 
prohibits.

 

[¶13]   Appellant's argument is essentially 
a "facial" challenge.  In 
challenging a statute for facial vagueness, the appellant must demonstrate that 
the statute reaches a "substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct;[4] or the statute specifies no 
standard of conduct at all."  
Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 657 (Wyo. 2000).  The ultimate test is "whether a person 
of ordinary intelligence could read the statute and comprehend what conduct is 
prohibited" because laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply 
them.  Id.  "A statute employs a standard, for 
purposes of vagueness, if "by [its] terms or as authoritatively construed [it 
applies] without question to certain activities, but whose application to other 
behavior is uncertain,"'" whereas a vague statute impermissibly delegates basic 
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and 
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application.  Id. (quoting 
Luplow v. State, 897 P.2d 463, 466 (Wyo. 1995) and Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 976 (Wyo. 
1988)).

 

[¶14]   According to two of our recent 
decisions, the statute, without question, applies to certain activities.  We first addressed the constitutionality 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a) in Statezny 
v. State, 
2001 WY 22, ¶¶ 13-14, 18 P.3d 641, 645 (Wyo. 2001), 
finding "no suggestion" that the statute was "unconstitutional on the face of 
things . . .."  Subsequently, in 
Browning 
v. State, 
2001 WY 93, ¶¶ 14-25, 32 P.3d 1061, 1067-69 (Wyo. 2001) (an appeal by appellant's co-defendant), 
we specifically held that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a)(ii) was not 
unconstitutionally vague on its face.  
In light of this precedent, we decline to analyze Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1059(a)(ii) further in the context of appellant's facial challenge.  See 
Griego, 
761 P.2d  at 976.  The statute clearly is not so deficient 
on its face that it sets forth "no standard of conduct at 
all."

 

[¶15]   Affirmed.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

  1The Niobrara 
County Sheriff picked appellant up at Mule Creek Junction and returned with her 
to the sheriff's office, where Deputy Frye interviewed 
her.

  2At trial, 
appellant stipulated that the water cooler and its contents constituted a 
clandestine laboratory operation and had been used to manufacture 
methamphetamine.  Appellant's 
primary defense was that she did not "possess" the 
contraband.

  3Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1058(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2001) defines "[e]quipment" or "laboratory 
equipment" as "all products, components or materials of any kind when used, 
intended for use or designed for use in the manufacture, preparation, 
production, compounding, conversion or processing of a controlled substance in 
violation of this article."  The 
same section provides that "[e]quipment" or "laboratory equipment" includes a 
"[g]lass reaction vessel," "[s]eparatory funnel," "[g]lass condensor," 
"[a]nalytical balance," or "[h]eating mantle."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1058(a)(ii) 
defines [c]landestine laboratory operation" as:

 

            
(A)        
Purchasing or procuring chemicals, supplies, equipment or a laboratory 
location for the illegal manufacture of controlled 
substances;

 

            
(B)        
Transporting or arranging for the transportation of chemicals, supplies 
or equipment for the illegal manufacture of controlled 
substances;

 

            
(C)        
Setting up equipment or supplies in preparation for the illegal 
manufacture of controlled substances; or

 

            
(D)        
Distributing or disposing of chemicals, equipment, supplies or products 
used in or produced by the illegal manufacture of controlled 
substances.

  4Appellant does 
not argue that the statute reaches any form of constitutionally protected 
conduct.