Title: Meriter Hospital, Inc. v. Dane County

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 145 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2837 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Meriter Hospital, Inc.,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Dane County,  
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 248 
Reported at:  268 Wis. 2d 658, 673 N.W.2d 328 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 7, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 22, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Gerald C. Nichol   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent-petitioner 
there were briefs by John Walsh, Guy DuBeau and Axley Brynelson, 
LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Guy DuBeau. 
 
For the defendant-respondent-cross-appellant there was a 
brief 
and 
oral 
argument 
by 
Kristi 
A. 
Gullen, 
assistant 
corporation counsel. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Laura J. Leitch, 
Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin Hospital Association, Inc. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Andrew T. Phillips, 
Evan N. Claditis and Prentice & Phillips LLP, Milwaukee, on 
behalf of Wisconsin Counties Association. 
2004 WI 145 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-2837  
(L.C. No. 
99-CV-2678)  
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Meriter Hospital, Inc.,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Dane County,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross- 
          Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 7, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
Meriter 
Hospital (Meriter), seeks review of a published decision of the 
court of appeals, Meriter Hospital, Inc. v. Dane County, 2003 WI 
App 248, 268 Wis. 2d 658, 673 N.W.2d 328, affirming the circuit 
court of Dane County, Judge Gerald C. Nichol presiding.  The 
issues we address are, first, whether Wis. Stat. § 302.381 (2001-
02) requires the respondent, Dane County, to pay all of the 
medical and hospital bills incurred on behalf of an indigent 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted.   
No. 
02-2837   
 
2 
 
prisoner, Michael Gibson (Gibson), who was a prisoner in the 
Dane County jail upon admittance to the hospital, but had the 
criminal charges pending against him dismissed on the third day 
of his extended hospitalization, after his parole hold had also 
been lifted.  Second, we determine whether the Dane County 
Sheriff 
complied 
with 
his 
statutory 
obligations 
under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 59.27(1) and 302.38(1).     
¶2 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
plain 
reading 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 302.382 does not require Dane County (County) to pay 
for all of the medical and hospital bills of Gibson, an indigent 
prisoner, once the parole hold had been cancelled and the 
circuit court had granted the motion of the State of Wisconsin 
(State) to dismiss the pending charges against him.  Gibson lost 
his prisoner status and was no longer "held" under the criminal 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 302.38 provides, in relevant part:  
Medical care of prisoners. (1) If a prisoner needs 
medical or hospital care . . . [the] superintendent or 
other keeper of the jail or house of correction shall 
provide appropriate care or treatment and may transfer 
the prisoner to a hospital . . . making provision for 
the security of the prisoner.  . . .  
(2) The prisoner is liable for the costs of 
medical and hospital care outside of the jail or house 
of correction.  If the prisoner is unable to pay the 
costs, the county shall pay the costs in the case of 
persons held under the state criminal laws or for 
contempt of court . . . . 
(3) The maximum amount that a governmental unit 
may pay for the costs of medical or hospital care 
under this section is limited for that care to the 
amount payable by medical assistance under subch. IV 
of ch. 49. . . .  
No. 
02-2837   
 
3 
 
laws of Wisconsin, when the circuit court dismissed the charges.  
We also conclude that Gibson's status did not change when the 
Department of Corrections issued an apprehension request for 
him.  This request to bring Gibson into custody only had the 
effect of making him a "potential prisoner," and did not render 
him "held under the state criminal laws or for contempt of 
court," as set forth in § 302.38(2).  In so holding, we decline 
to expand the County's liability under § 302.38(1) and require 
it to pay for all of Gibson's care.       
¶3 
Finally, we conclude that the Dane County Sheriff3 met 
his statutory obligations in dealing with Gibson.  The sheriff 
kept the prisoner secure, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 59.27(1), 
while 
Gibson 
was 
"held 
under 
the 
state 
criminal 
laws."  
Additionally, we hold that the sheriff met the "appropriate 
care" standard under Wis. Stat. § 302.38(1).  Thus, we affirm 
the court of appeals. 
I 
¶4 
The relevant facts of this case are not in dispute.  
Michael Gibson, an indigent inmate at the Dane County jail, 
became gravely ill on December 16, 1998, and was transported by 
the sheriff to Meriter Hospital.  Meriter's staff treated Gibson 
for a bacterial infection and septic shock, leading to multi-
organ dysfunction failure.  The parties agree that he likely 
                                                 
3 All references to "sheriff" herein include the sheriff, 
all deputies, and other personnel that are under the control of 
the Dane County Sheriff.  The sheriff at the time these matters 
occurred was Gary H. Hamblin. 
No. 
02-2837   
 
4 
 
would have died within 24 hours had he not received proper 
medical 
attention, 
and 
that 
all 
treatment 
rendered 
was 
necessary. 
¶5 
Gibson was treated at Meriter for 34 days.  Because he 
was in custody for a parole violation and as a result of pending 
criminal charges, it was necessary that a deputy provide 
security outside of Gibson's hospital room 24 hours per day.4  
The total cost for Gibson’s care and treatment at Meriter, not 
including the overtime pay for the security provided, amounted 
to $187,569.37.   
¶6 
During 
the 
first 
three 
days 
of 
Gibson’s 
hospitalization, the sheriff informed the Dane County prosecutor 
and Gibson’s parole officer that Gibson had been hospitalized.  
On December 17, 1998, the Wisconsin Division of Community 
Corrections issued a cancellation of the order to detain Gibson.  
The State then moved to dismiss the charges against Gibson on 
December 
18, 
1998. 
 
The 
Deputy 
District 
Attorney, 
Judy 
Schwaemle, indicated in her motion that the decision to drop the 
charges was based on Gibson’s grave illness, and that it was no 
longer in the public interest to maintain the prosecution 
against him on charges of resisting or obstructing an officer.  
The circuit court, Judge Patrick J. Fiedler presiding, granted 
                                                 
4 Under Wis. Stat. § 302.38(1), the sheriff is required to 
make "provision for the security of the prisoner."  In this 
case, it was argued that the sheriff could not reduce the level 
of staffing within the jail to provide guard coverage, so that 
many of the deputies were forced to work overtime, in order to 
provide security while Gibson was hospitalized.     
No. 
02-2837   
 
5 
 
the motion and dismissed Gibson's pending criminal charges and 
ordered his release from custody.  
¶7 
On December 17, 1998, the Department of Corrections 
issued an apprehension request that, among other things, 
directed Meriter to contact either the Dane County Sheriff or a 
probation agent, so that Gibson could be returned to custody 
after his release from the hospital.  On January 14, Meriter 
contacted the sheriff to inform him of Gibson’s proposed release 
date, pursuant to the apprehension request.  When Gibson finally 
left the hospital on January 18, 1999, the sheriff did not act 
on the apprehension request and take him into custody, until 
several weeks after his release from Meriter.5   
¶8 
With respect to the correct payment methodology, both 
parties agree that Wis. Stat. § 302.38 controls this review, 
that Gibson was an indigent prisoner when he was admitted to the 
hospital, and that Meriter may recoup from Dane County at least 
some of the costs of Gibson’s hospital care.  The total hospital 
bill for Gibson's 34-day stay amounted to $187,569.37.  In 
response to this bill, Dane County paid Meriter $4,463.26, based 
on the discharge rate established by the State’s fiscal agent 
for the medical assistance program.  This amount was for the 
three days of Gibson's treatment during which the County 
                                                 
5 On February 8, 1999, the police were called to Gibson's 
home for a noise complaint.  There was no ticket issued or 
charges filed, but because of his outstanding apprehension 
request in the system, the police took Gibson to the Dane County 
jail.  While at the jail, Gibson's apprehension request was 
cancelled, and he was released.   
No. 
02-2837   
 
6 
 
conceded that he was formally “held.”  By contrast, Meriter 
claims that under the terms of § 302.38(3), it is owed the 
amount payable for the entirety of Gibson’s stay under the 
Medical Assistance provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 49, subch. IV.   
¶9 
Meriter bases its reimbursement expectations on a 
calculation method known as the Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) 
rate, determined by the Wisconsin Department of Health and 
Family Services.  Under this methodology, providers are paid a 
set fee based on the diagnosis of the individual patient.  That 
set fee can be increased when actual costs exceed a certain 
threshold.  As noted, the actual costs for Gibson's treatment 
were $187,569.37, which brings this matter past the applicable 
threshold.  Based on the DRG amount, before allowing the 
increase caused by exceeding the threshold, the payments due for 
Gibson's treatment would be $74,847.92.     
¶10 Meriter filed a complaint against the County to compel 
increased compensation for Gibson's bill for his treatment.  
Both sides filed motions for summary judgment.  The circuit 
court granted partial summary judgment to Meriter on the issue 
of payment methodology, ruling that Meriter was entitled to 
receive payment at the DRG rate under Wis. Stat. ch. 49, subch. 
IV.  The rest of Meriter's motion for summary judgment was 
denied.  A trial was held on April 18, 2002, and the circuit 
court ruled that "the County [was] liable to Meriter for 
Gibson's hospital costs only up to the time the pending charges 
were dismissed and the parole hold dropped."  The court also 
held that the apprehension request did not alter Gibson's 
No. 
02-2837   
 
7 
 
status.  The circuit court determined that Gibson would be 
“held” for only the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 302.38 if the 
sheriff took him into custody.   
¶11 The Court of Appeals, District IV, in an opinion by 
Judge Charles P. Dykman, affirmed, holding that the County was 
not liable for Gibson's treatment costs which were incurred 
after the parole hold was dropped and the charges against him 
were dismissed, since he was no longer "held" under Wis. Stat.  
§ 302.38.  The court also determined that Gibson was not 
"otherwise detained" under Wis. Stat. § 301.01, and that an 
apprehension request did not affect his status once the charges 
pending against him were dropped.  Finally, the court of appeals 
decided that the County must pay Meriter according to the DRG 
rate, rather than the discharge rate, but prorated that amount 
to include only the three days in which Gibson received care.  
The County appealed the DRG payment issue, but we denied review.  
Accordingly, we decline to address it further.       
II 
¶12 We first address whether Wis. Stat. § 302.38 requires 
the County to pay for the medical and hospital bills of an 
indigent prisoner, if he or she is no longer "held under the 
state 
criminal 
laws." 
Wis. Stat. § 302.38(2). 
 
The 
interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, which we 
review de novo.  State v. Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 525, 544 
N.W.2d 406 
(1996). 
 
Although 
we 
consider 
this 
question 
independent of the decisions of the circuit court and the court 
of appeals, we nevertheless benefit from their analyses.  Meyer 
No. 
02-2837   
 
8 
 
v. Sch. Dist. of Colby, 226 Wis. 2d 704, 708, 595 N.W.2d 339 
(1999).          
¶13 When interpreting a statute, the primary objective "is 
to determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
Knowing this, the court's analysis should begin with the plain 
language of the statutory text.  Id., ¶45.  If the language of 
the statute is clear on its face, the court should apply the 
statute using the common and generally accepted meanings of the 
terms.  Fox v. Catholic Knights Ins. Soc., 2003 WI 87, ¶19, 263 
Wis. 2d 207, 665 N.W.2d 181.  With an unambiguous statute, the 
court need not consult extrinsic sources of interpretation.  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46; Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 
28, ¶7, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656. 
¶14 Meriter asserts that the court of appeals incorrectly 
interpreted Wis. Stat. § 302.38(2).  It states that the phrase 
in the statute, "held under the state criminal laws," is 
ambiguous, and could be reasonably interpreted to freeze the 
County's obligation to pay for a prisoner upon his admittance to 
the hospital.  In support, Meriter argues that § 302.38(2) "does 
nothing to identify temporal limitations, i.e., when it is that 
the prisoner must be 'held;' the subsection only identifies who 
must pay."  Meriter also contends that the court of appeals 
misinterpreted the legislature's use of the word "held."  It 
argues that "held" was inserted by the legislature in the past 
tense, because the legislature intended that there be a 
No. 
02-2837   
 
9 
 
contemporaneous holding of a prisoner as a prerequisite for 
liability, but that once established, liability continues even 
if the status changes.   
¶15 We agree with the court of appeals and conclude that 
Wis. Stat. § 302.38 is unambiguous.  We interpret the plain 
meaning of the statute's language, and conclude that Gibson was 
"held under the state criminal laws," as 
set 
forth in 
§ 302.38(2), for only the first three days he was at Meriter.  
The statute places payment obligations on the County for only 
the periods of time during which an indigent prisoner has 
criminal charges pending against him or her or is held for 
contempt of court.  We conclude that the legislature inserted 
the word "held" to modify the class of prisoners for whom the 
County is liable for medical and hospital bills.  Dane County 
has argued that "held" is both the past tense and past 
participle of "hold," and that a participle, in its most common 
use, acts as an adjective.  Consistent with that approach, the 
correct grammatical interpretation of this statute, therefore, 
would be that the legislature used the term "held" to describe 
those persons who are indigent prisoners.  Applying that 
grammatical methodology here, we conclude that § 302.38(2) 
requires a contemporaneous holding of the prisoner, in order to 
hold the County liable for the medical and hospital costs 
incurred.  A change of status has a direct bearing on whether 
such liability continues.      
¶16 We also decline to accept Meriter's argument that we 
should, in effect, expand the interpretation of "held" to 
No. 
02-2837   
 
10 
 
include an apprehension request.  Meriter argues that Gibson did 
not lose his prisoner status under Wis. Stat. § 302.38, after 
his charges were dismissed and the parole hold dropped, because 
he was still a prisoner, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 301.01(2).6  It 
claims that the issuance of the apprehension request "otherwise 
detained" Gibson in the hospital, because the sheriff was 
supposed to take him into custody upon his release from Meriter.  
We agree with the court of appeals that Gibson lost his status 
as a prisoner when the circuit court dismissed the pending 
criminal charges, after the parole hold was cancelled.   
¶17 An apprehension request is not the same as a detention 
of Gibson by the sheriff.  This request, at best, made Gibson a 
"potential prisoner," dependent on whether the sheriff acted on 
the request.  In this case, the sheriff did not bring Gibson 
back into custody.  The hospital had contacted the sheriff with 
information concerning Gibson's expected release in accord with 
the apprehension request, but the sheriff did not apprehend him 
upon his release from Meriter.       
¶18 When 
interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 301.01, 
we 
cannot 
expand the scope of the statute, as requested by Meriter, simply 
because it includes the phrase "otherwise detained."  "[W]here a 
general term . . . is preceded or followed by a series of 
specific terms, the general term is viewed as being limited to 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.01(2) provides, in part: "'Prisoner' 
means 
any 
person 
who 
is 
either 
arrested, 
incarcerated, 
imprisoned or otherwise detained in excess of 12 hours by any 
law enforcement agency of this state . . . ." 
No. 
02-2837   
 
11 
 
items of the same type or nature as those specifically 
enumerated."  State v. Campbell, 102 Wis. 2d 243, 246, 306 
N.W.2d 272 (Ct. App. 1981) (citations omitted).  In § 301.01, 
the term prisoner is defined as a person who is either 
"arrested, 
incarcerated, 
imprisoned 
or 
otherwise 
detained . . . ."  Therefore, the correct interpretation of that 
statute involves limiting the phrase "otherwise detained" so as 
to coincide with the preceding terms: arrested, incarcerated, 
and imprisoned.  A pending apprehension request, by itself, does 
not result in a person being "held."     
¶19 This interpretation is consistent with the holding in 
State v. Edwards, 2003 WI App 221, 267 Wis. 2d 491, 671 
N.W.2d 371.  In that case, Edwards made repeated trips to the 
hospital, while serving a jail sentence.  He filed a motion 
seeking confinement credit for the time he was receiving care, 
because 
his 
sentence 
was 
stayed 
during 
the 
periods 
of 
hospitalization.  He argued that he was  "in custody" during his 
hospital stints and, as a result, should be allowed credit.  The 
court of appeals held that while in the hospital, Edwards was 
not a prisoner for the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 302.38(1).  Id.  
¶20 The court of appeals correctly relied on Edwards and 
Wisconsin's 
escape 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a), 
to 
support its conclusion that Gibson was no longer "held" under 
the criminal laws of Wisconsin.  The escape statute establishes 
that a probationer is still a prisoner if he or she is "in 
actual custody or is subject to a confinement order under s. 
973.09(4)." Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a).  The court in Edwards 
No. 
02-2837   
 
12 
 
held that because the circuit court stayed his sentence, his 
confinement order did not apply during his time in the hospital.  
Therefore, Edwards was not in custody, and could not have been 
charged with escape, had he attempted to leave the hospital.  
Edwards, 267 Wis. 2d 491, ¶21.  Similarly, in this case, the 
court of appeals stated: "Gibson was not in custody after the 
trial court dismissed the charges against him.  The State could 
not have charged him with escape if he had left the hospital."  
Meriter Hosp., 268 Wis. 2d 658, ¶10.  We agree that because the 
apprehension request did not result in Gibson being in custody, 
and thus "held," the County was not liable for his medical and 
hospital bills from Meriter beyond his third day of care.     
III 
¶21 We next address whether the sheriff breached any 
duties in his handling of Gibson's medical treatment.7  Meriter 
presents two arguments.  First, it asserts that the sheriff 
violated 
his 
statutory 
responsibility 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 59.27(1),8 by seeking the release of a prisoner for 
                                                 
7 The court of appeals declined to evaluate and analyze 
these arguments.  It concluded that "Wisconsin Stat. § 302.38 
does not consider the State's or the sheriff's motives; we will 
not presume as much when applying this unambiguous statute."  
Meriter Hosp. v. Dane County, 2003 WI App 248, ¶12, 268 
Wis. 2d 658, 673 N.W.2d 328.   
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 59.27(1) provides, in relevant part: 
"The sheriff of a county shall do all of the following:  
(1) Take the charge and custody of the jail maintained by 
the county and the persons in the jail, and keep the persons in 
the jail personally or by a deputy or jailer." 
No. 
02-2837   
 
13 
 
medical reasons.  Second, Meriter argues that the sheriff did 
not 
provide 
Gibson 
with 
"appropriate 
care" 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 302.38(1), because it sidestepped the statute's 
corresponding obligation to pay for that care.     
¶22 We first consider whether the sheriff avoided his 
statutory 
obligation 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 59.27(1). 
 
Meriter 
contends that, as a result of this statute, the sheriff has a 
duty to keep prisoners in jail and no statutory authority to 
seek actively the release of a prisoner entrusted to him.   
¶23 We are not persuaded by Meriter's arguments concerning 
Wis. Stat. § 59.27(1).  Meriter presents nothing that suggests 
the sheriff failed in his duty to secure Gibson.  The fact that 
the sheriff no longer guarded Gibson after the parole hold was 
cancelled and the charges against him were dismissed, and then 
failed to take him into custody after he was released from the 
hospital, is not sufficient to establish a violation of 
§ 59.27(1).  Even if we assume that Meriter is correct in 
arguing that it was the sheriff that requested that the charges 
against Gibson be dismissed, we have found no statutory mandate 
that forbids the sheriff from seeking to have charges against a 
prisoner dropped.9  Accordingly, we hold that the sheriff did not 
violate his duty to secure prisoners in accord with § 59.27(1).   
                                                 
9 Meriter was in no position to argue that the State 
erroneously exercised its discretion in moving to dismiss the 
criminal charges pending against Gibson, nor that the circuit 
judge did so by granting the motion.   
No. 
02-2837   
 
14 
 
¶24 We 
next 
address 
whether 
the 
sheriff 
met 
his 
obligations 
to 
provide 
"appropriate 
care" 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 302.38(1).  Meriter contends that the requisite 
care was not provided to Gibson, because the County did not pay 
for all of the care that was deemed "appropriate."  It argues 
that subsections (1) and (2) should be read in pari materia, 
because any care provided under subsection (1) creates an 
obligation to pay for that care under subsection (2).10   
¶25 According to Wis. Stat. § 302.38(1), all sheriffs in 
Wisconsin are required to provide prisoners in their custody 
with "appropriate care or treatment."  We previously determined 
in Swateck v. County of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 58, 531 N.W.2d 45 
(1995), that the sheriff could meet his or her burden for 
"appropriate care" if his or her actions were "especially 
suitable, fitting or proper. . . . "  Id. at 61.  We held that 
the legislature made this requirement mandatory on sheriffs by 
inserting the words "shall provide" into the statute.  We also 
concluded that the use of the word "may" in the latter part of 
§ 302.38(1) 
implied 
discretion. 
 
"[T]he 
legislature 
here 
recognized that although prisoners 'shall' be provided with 
                                                 
10 We note that after the parole hold was lifted and the 
charges pending against Gibson were dismissed by the circuit 
court, that those charges were not refiled.  It is also 
important to note, again, that upon Gibson's discharge from 
Meriter, the sheriff did not act on the apprehension request and 
take Gibson into custody until several weeks later.  Had the 
sheriff acted on the apprehension request immediately after 
Gibson's discharge from Meriter, and had the dismissed charges 
been refiled, certainly Meriter's position would be much 
stronger.   
No. 
02-2837   
 
15 
 
appropriate medical care, sheriffs have the discretion or 
'liberty' as to how to provide that care."  Id. at 59.     
¶26 The sheriff properly used his discretion in accord 
with Wis. Stat. § 302.38(1), in transferring Gibson to Meriter 
Hospital.  All agree that Gibson likely would have died if he 
were not taken to the hospital.  The question that we consider, 
then, 
is 
whether 
the 
sheriff's 
actions 
can 
be 
deemed 
appropriate, even though the County refuses to pay for all of 
the care that the hospital appropriately administered.  Meriter 
argues that when the sheriff provides care by transferring an 
indigent prisoner to a hospital, the sheriff is taking the 
position that the transfer to the hospital satisfies his or her 
statutory obligation to provide "appropriate care."  Meriter 
argues that because the sheriff would have had to pay for the 
costs of providing care to the prisoner in jail, he assumes 
responsibility for the costs of providing the "appropriate care" 
at the hospital.  
¶27 We decline to 
adopt 
Meriter's interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 302.38(1).  The statute, on its face, limits the 
financial responsibility of the County, by requiring it to pay 
for medical care only when a certain class of prisoners cannot 
pay—— those persons "held under the state criminal laws or for 
contempt of court."  Wis. Stat. § 302.38(2).  The legislature 
also limited the County's costs by its reference to the medical 
assistance rates contained in Wis. Stat. subch. IV of ch. 49.   
¶28 The clear statutory language limiting the County's 
financial liability does not allow us to accept Meriter's 
No. 
02-2837   
 
16 
 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 302.38(1).  By asking the court 
to expand the County's liability and require it to pay for 
essentially all of the care that results from treating an 
indigent prisoner, even after that person is no longer being 
"held," Meriter's expanded reading of the statute could lead to 
absurd results.  If, for example, an indigent prisoner broke his 
leg while in a jail or house of correction, the sheriff or other 
custodian would provide "appropriate care" by transferring the 
prisoner to a hospital.  If that prisoner is later released from 
custody, but continues necessary treatment for his broken leg, 
the county or other municipality involved would continue to be 
liable, if Meriter's argument were to be accepted.  Any such 
indigent person arguably might be able to rely on the county or 
other municipality involved to pay for a lifetime of medical 
bills involving the broken leg even after release from custody.  
Such an interpretation would have far reaching ramifications, 
and would clearly exceed an appropriate interpretation of the 
statute.    
¶29 Meriter's arguments are less than persuasive on an 
equitable basis in light of the fact that it did not seek any 
alternative remedies, in order to be compensated more fully for 
Gibson's bills.  In Gibson's Progress Notes while at Meriter, 
dated January 14 and 15, 1998, it is clear that the hospital had 
notice that the County planned to pay for only the first three 
days of Gibson's care.  The note from January 14 stated:  
Patient and Family Services phone call to Sargeant 
(sic) Vander Molen @ Dane County Jail.  He reports 
No. 
02-2837   
 
17 
 
patient is NOT a hold for Jail.  Pt was released from 
custody on 12-18-98.  Spoke w/ Rene Bain, Financial 
Coordinator, who reports Co. Jail is NOT paying for 
pt's Hospital stay as of 12-18-98.  Pt has no health 
insurance, is self-pay.  Will talk to pt regarding 
Interim Assistance through the county.  
Meriter was aware of at least some of the funding options 
available to pay for a greater portion of the treatment provided 
to Gibson.  It could have attempted to gather the necessary 
information and resources to ensure that Gibson would qualify 
for whatever assistance was available to him.  At the very 
least, Meriter could have taken some responsibility itself to 
check out other sources of payment, rather than sending the 
County a bill for Gibson’s entire 34-day hospitalization. 
IV 
¶30 Meriter next argues that we should incorporate medical 
assistance law into our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 302.38.   
According 
to 
§ 302.38(3), 
"[t]he 
maximum 
amount 
that 
a 
governmental unit may pay for the costs of medical care or 
hospital care under this section is limited for that care to the 
amount payable by medical assistance under subch. IV of ch. 
49. . . . "  Meriter asserts that by means of this language, the 
legislature intended that municipalities, including counties, 
must pay the health care providers for indigent prisoner care 
the same amount that those health care providers would have 
received for treating medical assistance patients.   
¶31 In response to Meriter's argument, the County argues 
that reference to ch. 49 in the statute appears to serve merely 
as an upper limit for the County's financial responsibility.  We 
No. 
02-2837   
 
18 
 
are satisfied that if the legislature had intended that the 
amount counties pay for indigent prisoners be equal with what 
the health care provider receives under medical assistance laws, 
it could have clearly said so in the statute, and it did not do 
so. 
 
We 
have 
already 
held 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 302.38 
is 
unambiguous, and we conclude that there is no language in the 
statute requiring that regulations from the medical assistance 
program be applied in the manner Meriter desires.     
¶32 Relying on a medical assistance law approach, Meriter 
also contends the County should be liable for all of the days 
Gibson 
was 
hospitalized, 
because 
liability 
under 
medical 
assistance attaches on a person's arrival at the hospital, and 
is not contingent upon any future events.  Such an argument 
ignores the plain meaning of the statute, and again attempts to 
read into the reference to ch. 49 much more than is appropriate.    
V 
¶33 Finally, we address Meriter's policy argument that if 
we affirm the court of appeals, we will open the floodgates to 
prisoner dumping by county jails across the state.   
¶34 We note, again, that the process of dismissing 
criminal charges does not lie with the sheriff.  In this case, 
while the sheriff may have brought to the district attorney's 
attention 
the 
fact 
that 
Gibson 
was 
seriously 
ill 
and 
hospitalized in intensive care, the decision to move to dismiss 
the pending criminal charges was not made by the sheriff or the 
County, but by the district attorney.  It was the circuit court 
that granted that motion.   
No. 
02-2837   
 
19 
 
¶35 If the result in this case seems harsh, redress should 
come from the legislature, not from this court.  "If a statute 
fails to cover a particular situation, and the omission should 
be cured, the remedy lies with the legislature, not the courts."  
La Crosse Hosp. v. La Crosse, 133 Wis. 2d 335, 338, 395 
N.W.2d 612 (Ct. App. 1986) (citations omitted).     
VI 
¶36 In sum, we conclude that Dane County is not liable to 
Meriter for Gibson's medical and hospital bills for the period 
after his parole hold had been cancelled and the criminal 
charges against him had been dismissed.  We apply the plain 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 302.38(2), and determine that Gibson was 
not "held under the state's criminal laws or for contempt of 
court" beyond the third day of his hospital stay at Meriter.  We 
also conclude that Gibson's status did not change when the 
Department of Corrections issued an apprehension request for 
him.     
¶37 Additionally, we hold that the sheriff met all 
requisite statutory obligations.  Gibson was provided with 
security pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 59.27 while he was considered 
a prisoner, and was  provided with "appropriate care" when he 
was transferred from the jail to the hospital, as required under 
Wis. Stat. § 302.38(1).  The County does not have an obligation 
to pay for all of the care that was provided to Gibson.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
    
No. 
02-2837   
 
 
 
1