Title: Ex parte PT Solutions Holdings, LLC.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 11/23/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1150687
____________________
Ex parte PT Solutions Holdings, LLC
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Laurie B. White
v.
PT Solutions Holdings, LLC)
(Barbour Circuit Court, CV-15-900087)
MURDOCK, Justice.
PT Solutions Holdings, LLC ("PT Solutions"), petitions
this Court for a writ of mandamus seeking an order directing
1150687
the Barbour Circuit Court to vacate its March 15, 2016, order
denying PT Solutions' motion to dismiss the underlying
complaint filed by Laurie B. White based on an outbound forum-
selection clause and to grant the motion to dismiss.  We grant
the petition.
I.  Facts
PT Solutions states that it is a Georgia-based company
that operates physical-therapy clinics.   In 2006, PT
1
The submissions from the parties indicate that PT
1
Solutions is a business formed in Alabama that now maintains
its principal place of business in Georgia.  White submitted
a "Business Entity" filing from the Alabama Secretary of
State's Web site that lists PT Solutions as a "Domestic
Limited Liability Company" with a "registered office" at
"6715 Taylor Court, Montgomery Alabama 36117."  The header on
the first page of the contract at issue also lists the
foregoing Montgomery address for PT Solutions.  In the
complaint it filed in the Superior Court of Fulton County,
Georgia, PT Solutions stated that it is "a limited liability
company with its principal place of business at 1990 Vaughn
Road, Suite 330, Kennesaw, Georgia, 30144.  [PT Solutions]
does business throughout the country, including but not
limited to Alabama and Georgia."  Another exhibit attached to
PT Solutions' petition is a business-information sheet from
the Corporations Division of the State of Georgia that lists
PT Solutions as a "Foreign Limited Liability Company" with its
"principal office address" at the Georgia address 
mentioned in
its Georgia superior court complaint.  A "Certificate of
Authority" from the Georgia Secretary of State states that PT
Solutions "has been duly formed under the laws of Alabama and
has filed an application meeting the requirements of Georgia
law to transact business as a Foreign Limited Liability
Company in this state."  In PT Solutions' responses to White's
"First Set of Requests for Admissions and Requests for
2
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Solutions hired White as the clinic director of its Eufaula,
Alabama, location, which is located near the Alabama-Georgia
border.  In September 2014, PT Solutions revised the
employment agreements for its clinic directors.  PT Solutions
states that the purpose of the revision was to make those
contracts uniform and easier to administer. The new contract
consisted of a "Letter Agreement" ("the letter agreement")
that stated the terms of compensation and a "Noncompetition
and 
Nonsolicitation 
Agreement" 
("the 
noncompetition
agreement").
One of the changes implemented in the new contract was a
new bonus plan.  The letter agreement provided that clinic
directors were eligible for annual bonuses, the target amount
of which is prorated and paid on a monthly basis, and the
actual amount is finalized at the end of each year.  In its
opening paragraph, the letter agreement provided:  "If you
sign and return this Letter Agreement no later than 11/3/2014,
this Letter Agreement will be retroactively effective as of
Production, and Interrogatories," PT Solutions states that it
"admits that it was formed under Alabama law; however, PT
Solutions does business in both Alabama and Georgia, among
other places, and its principal place of business is in
Kennesaw, Georgia."
3
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September 1, 2014."  In a subsequent paragraph, the letter
agreement provided:  "As of September 1, 2014, you will be
eligible to participate in an annual performance 
bonus 
program
for 
each 
calendar 
year 
that 
you 
are 
employed 
by
[PT Solutions].  Eligibility for Bonus compensation requires
execution 
of 
the 
'Noncompetition 
and 
Nonsolicitation
Agreement' attached hereto and incorporated by reference
herein ...."  The final paragraph of the letter agreement
provided:  "If you wish to accept this offer (including the
attached Noncompetition and Nonsolicitation Agreement) on the
terms described above, please sign and date this Letter
Agreement and return it to [PT Solutions] no later than
11/03/14."  
In part, the noncompetition agreement prohibited a clinic
director from, 
"either directly or indirectly, participat[ing] in
any Restricted Business (as such terms are defined
below).  For purposes of this offer of employment
and 
except 
as 
allowed 
above, 
(a) 
the 
term
'Participate' means to have any direct or indirect
interest, whether as an officer, director, employee,
partner, sole proprietor, agent, representative,
independent contractor, consultant, franchisor,
franchisee, creditor, owner or otherwise ...;
(b) the term 'Restricted Business' means any
enterprise, business or venture within 25 miles of
any location where you provided services during your
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employment with [PT Solutions] and where you ...
provided services at the time of termination, which
is engaged in the Business or a business identical 
to or engaged in any portion of the Business of
[PT Solutions]."
The noncompetition agreement also contained a choice-of-law
and outbound forum-selection clause,  which provided:
2
"This Agreement has been entered into under and
shall be governed by and construed in accordance
with the laws of the State of Georgia, without
regard to its conflict of laws provisions.  You
agree that a Superior Court in Fulton County,
Georgia, 
shall 
be 
the 
sole 
and 
exclusive
jurisdiction and venue for all disputes between the
parties under this Agreement. Employee hereby
irrevocably consents to jurisdiction and venue of
such court for adjudication of all disputes between
the parties under this Agreement and waives any
objections or defenses to jurisdiction or venue in
any such proceeding."
(Emphasis added.)
PT Solutions provided White with the letter agreement and
the noncompetition agreement on October 27, 2014.  After that
date, White regularly communicated with PT Solutions to
discuss the terms of the new contract.  According to an
affidavit from Amy Scott, PT Solutions' director of Human
Resources, around November 15, 2014, White met with senior
"An 'outbound' forum selection clause is one providing
2
for trial outside of Alabama, while an 'inbound' clause
provides for trial inside Alabama."  Professional Ins. Corp.
v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347, 348 n.1 (Ala. 1997).
5
1150687
administration for PT Solutions in Callaway Gardens, Georgia,
to discuss the new contract, the bonus plan, and the fact that
she would need to sign both the letter agreement and the
noncompetition agreement in order to participate in the bonus
program.  On December 29, 2014, Scott e-mailed White to remind
her that she needed to execute the new contract by
December 31, 2014, in order to be eligible for the bonus
program.  White responded the same day with an e-mail in which
she stated that she was concerned that the bonus program was
based on 
"units not visits for our clinic which could mean a
20% pay cut at the end of the year.  Our previous
bonus structure worked for our clinic because it
took into account the actual profit at the end of
the year and not necessarily the unit goal.  While
we may not meet the unit goal due to our Medicare
population, we try to market cheaper, work with less
staff and keep our expenses lower to increase
overall profit.  I have not received an incentive
based on units since July[;] however, [I] have
received an incentive based on visits almost every
month prior to the new contract. I am eager to sign
a contract that works for all, please let me know
your thoughts." 
According to Scott, the next day White met with PT
Solutions' director of Clinical Operations Danny Mayhan for a
final discussion about her bonus structure.  On December 31,
2014, White signed 
the 
letter agreement and the noncompetition
6
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agreement.  White acknowledges that she signed both portions
of the new contract on that date.  
According to PT Solutions, it paid White a $6,500
year-end bonus for 2014, which she would not have received
absent her execution of the letter agreement and the
noncompetition agreement.  PT Solutions also says that White
received subsequent monthly bonus payments in 2015, for a
total of $10,666 in bonuses received under the new contract.
White denies that she was paid bonuses under the new contract.
On September 9, 2014, Eufaula Physical Therapy ("EPT"),
a physical-therapy company located less than half a mile from
PT Solutions' Eufaula clinic, was formed.  On June 26, 2015,
White voluntarily resigned her position as clinic director of
PT Solutions' Eufaula clinic and became clinic director for
EPT.  She also recruited the office manager and two physical
therapists who were working at PT Solutions' Eufaula clinic to
come work at EPT.  A PT Solutions' customer, Medical Center
Barbour, terminated its contract with PT Solutions, providing
as its reason that White at EPT had made a very good offer to
take over PT Solutions' work.  
7
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Because 
of 
White's 
actions 
on 
behalf 
of 
EPT,
PT Solutions' counsel, on December 9, 2015, sent White a
cease-and-desist letter in which he asserted that White had
violated the noncompetition agreement.  
In 
response 
to 
the 
cease-and-desist 
letter, 
on
December 21, 2015, White sued PT Solutions and fictitiously
named defendants in the Barbour Circuit Court ("the Alabama
action"); 
she 
sought 
a 
judgment 
declaring 
that 
the
noncompetition agreement was unenforceable.  The complaint
asserted that the outbound forum-selection clause was
unenforceable because:  (1) the Georgia forum is 155 miles
from White's residence, which, she said, was "unnecessarily
and avoidably disruptive and burdensome" to her; (2) White did
not have sufficient contacts with Fulton County, Georgia;
(3) "[t]he course of dealings, negotiations, and employment
all occurred within the Eufaula division of the Circuit Court
of Barbour County, Alabama"; (4) under Alabama law the
noncompetition agreement cannot be enforced against a
"professional," and White qualifies as a professional because
Alabama law recognizes physical therapists as professionals;
therefore, 
White 
argues, 
the 
noncompetition 
agreement 
violates
8
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the public policy of Alabama; and (5) by its terms the letter
agreement was effective only if it was signed by November 3,
2014, and White did not sign it until December 31, 2014;
therefore, 
Whites 
argues, 
the 
new 
contract 
was 
not
enforceable.
On January 28, 2016, PT Solutions sued White in the
Fulton County, Georgia, Superior Court alleging that she had
breached the noncompetition agreement, had violated the
Georgia Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and had tortiously
interfered with PT Solutions' business relationships ("the
Georgia action").  
On February 1, 2016, PT Solutions filed a motion in the
Barbour Circuit Court to dismiss the Alabama 
action, 
asserting
improper venue and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based
on the forum-selection clause.  On March 2, 2016, White filed
an answer and a motion to dismiss the Georgia action.  On
March 15, 2016, the circuit court denied PT Solutions' motion
to dismiss the Alabama action.  In the same order, the circuit
court set the case for trial on May 11, 2016.
On March 21, 2016, White filed her "First Set of Requests
for 
Admissions 
and 
Requests 
for 
Production, 
and
9
1150687
Interrogatories" in the Alabama action.  The following day,
White filed a motion to reduce by two weeks the period within
which PT Solutions must respond to that discovery.  On
March 23, 2016, PT Solutions opposed White's motion and filed
a motion to stay the Alabama action in light of the fact that
it was preparing to file a petition for a writ of mandamus
with this Court.  White filed a reply on the following day
opposing the motion to stay.  
On March 24, 2016, PT Solutions filed the instant
petition for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to
vacate its order denying the motion to dismiss the Alabama
action and to grant the motion.  
On March 29, 2016, White filed a "First Amendment to
Complaint" in the Alabama action in which she added a claim
seeking a declaration that "[e]nforcing the forum selection
clause in this case would undermine the fundamental public
policy of the State of Alabama."  
On April 15, 2016, this Court ordered answers and briefs
and stayed the proceedings in the Alabama action pending
resolution of the petition.
10
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II.  Standard of Review
"[A]n attempt to seek enforcement of the outbound
forum-selection clause is properly presented in a
motion to dismiss without prejudice, pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., for contractually
improper venue.  Additionally, we note that a party
may submit evidentiary matters to support a motion
to dismiss that attacks venue.  Williams v. Skysite
Communications Corp., 781 So. 2d 241 (Ala. Civ. App.
2000), quoting Crowe v. City of Athens, 733 So.2d
447, 449 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999)."
Ex parte D.M. White Constr. Co., 806 So. 2d 370, 372 (Ala.
2001).
"'[A] petition for a writ of mandamus is the
proper vehicle for obtaining review of an order
denying enforcement of an "outbound" forum-selection
clause when it is presented in a motion to dismiss.'
Ex parte D.M. White Constr. Co., 806 So. 2d 370, 372
(Ala. 2001); see Ex parte CTB, Inc., 782 So. 2d 188,
190 (Ala. 2000).  '[A] writ of mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy, which requires the petitioner
to demonstrate a clear, legal right to the relief
sought, or an abuse of discretion.'  Ex parte Palm
Harbor Homes, Inc., 798 So. 2d 656, 660 (Ala. 2001).
'[T]he review of a trial court's ruling on the
question of enforcing a forum-selection clause is
for an abuse of discretion.'  Ex parte D.M. White
Constr. Co., 806 So. 2d at 372."
Ex parte Leasecomm Corp., 886 So. 2d 58, 62 (Ala. 2003).
III.  Analysis
In M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10
(1972), the United States Supreme Court concluded that, for
purposes 
of 
federal 
law, 
outbound 
forum-selection 
clauses 
"are
11
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prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is
shown by the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under the
circumstances."  This Court in Professional Insurance Corp. 
v.
Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347, 351 (Ala. 1997), agreed with the
Supreme Court's reasoning, stating that "a forum selection
clause should be enforced so long as enforcing it is neither
unfair nor unreasonable under the circumstances." The Court
later expounded on this idea as follows:
"[I]t has been well established that [an outbound
forum-selection] clause will be 'upheld unless the
party challenging the clause clearly establishes
that it would be unfair or unreasonable under the
circumstances to hold the parties to their bargain.'
Ex parte CTB, Inc., 782 So. 2d [188,] 190–91 [(Ala.
2000)].  The showing is sufficient where it is
clearly established '"(1) that enforcement of the
forum selection clause[] would be unfair on the
basis that the contract[] [was] affected by fraud,
undue influence, or overweening bargaining power or
(2) that enforcement would be unreasonable on the
basis that the chosen ... forum would be seriously
inconvenient for the trial of the action."'  Id. at
191 (emphasis added)."
Ex parte Leasecomm Corp., 886 So. 2d at 62–63 (emphasis
omitted).  The Court has noted that "[t]he burden on the
challenging party is difficult to meet."  Ex parte D.M. White
Constr. Co., 806 So. 2d at 372.
12
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In its motion to dismiss below, PT Solutions introduced
a contract indisputably signed by White that contained an
unambiguous 
outbound 
forum-selection 
clause 
that 
dictates 
that
the only proper venue for a dispute between the parties is the
Superior Court in Fulton County, Georgia.  Therefore,
PT Solutions met its initial burden of establishing that
White's action should be dismissed as having been filed in an
improper venue. The burden then shifted to White to clearly
establish 
that 
enforcement 
of 
the 
forum-selection 
clause 
would
be unfair or unreasonable under the circumstances.
As we noted in the rendition of the facts, White
presented several arguments as to why she believes the forum-
selection clause is unenforceable.  White focuses on only one
of those arguments in her response to PT Solutions' petition.
Specifically, White contends that the forum-selection clause
is invalid because it is contained in a noncompetition
agreement that, she says, violates Alabama public policy.  The
components of White's argument are as follows.  First, she
argues that the noncompetition agreement is a restraint on the
practice of her profession of physical therapy.  Second, she
contends that prohibiting restraints on the practice of a
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profession is a fundamental public policy of the State of
Alabama, citing §§ 8-1-190, 8-1-196, and 8-1-197, Ala. Code
1975, for support.   Third, she notes that in M/S Bremen the
3
United States Supreme Court stated:  "A contractual
choice-of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if
enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the
forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or
by judicial decision."  407 U.S. at 15.  White thus concludes
that the forum-selection clause should not be 
enforced 
because
the noncompetition agreement violates a fundamental public
policy in this State.
Sections 8-1-196 and 8-1-197 were added by Act No. 2015-
3
465, effective January 1, 2016.  Section 8-1-190(a) (formerly
§ 8-1-1(a)), Ala. Code 1975, provides that "[e]very contract
by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful
profession, trade, or business of any kind otherwise than is
provided by this section is to that extent void."  Section
8-1-196, Ala. Code 1975, provides:  "Nothing in this article
shall be construed to eliminate any professional exemption
recognized by Alabama law."  Section 8-1-197, Ala. Code 1975,
provides: 
"It is hereby declared that this article
expresses fundamental public policies of the State
of Alabama. Therefore, this article shall govern and
shall be applied instead of any foreign laws that
might otherwise be applicable in those instances
when the application of those foreign laws would
violate a fundamental public policy expressed in
this article."
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The 
problem 
with 
this 
argument 
is 
that 
White
misunderstands the statement in M/S Bremen.  The Supreme Court
stated that a forum-selection clause "should be held
unenforceable if enforcement [of the clause] would contravene
a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought." 
Id.  In other words, the Court was saying that enforcement of
the forum-selection clause must contravene a state's public
policy, not that the clause should be held unenforceable if
enforcement of the contract that contains the clause would
contravene a state's public policy. As one federal district
court has explained:  "[W]hat matters is not whether the
contract as a whole violates public policy, but whether the
forum-selection clause itself violates public policy."
Fountain v. Oasis Legal Fin., LLC, 86 F. Supp. 3d 1037, 1044
(D. Minn. 2015).  See also Brandt v. Comtrust, Inc., No.
CV06-166-S-EJL, July 28, 2006 (D. Idaho 2006) (not selected
for publication in F. Supp.) (refusing to enforce a forum-
selection clause because of Idaho's strong public policy
against the enforcement of such clauses); Jones v. GNC
Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 2000)
(affirming a district court's refusal to enforce the parties'
15
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contractual forum-selection clause, concluding that it
contravened 
California's 
strong 
public 
policy 
against
enforcing such clauses in franchise agreements).  White's
argument goes to the enforcement of the contract as a whole,
i.e., that enforcement of the noncompetition agreement would
contravene a strong public policy of the State, not to
enforcement of the forum-selection clause itself.  "It has
long been established that forum-selection clauses are not
against Alabama public policy ...."  Ex parte Riverfront, LLC,
129 So. 3d 1008, 1015 (Ala. 2013).  Therefore, the possibility
that the noncompetition agreement violates Alabama public
policy does not prohibit enforcement of the forum-selection
clause.  
White also contended below that the contract was
unenforceable because she did not sign the contract until
December 31, 2014, and the final paragraph of the letter
agreement provided:  "If you wish to accept this offer
(including the attached Noncompetition and Nonsolicitation
Agreement) on the terms described above, please sign and date
this Letter Agreement and return it to [PT Solutions] no later
than 11/03/14."  In other words, White asserted that she did
16
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not accept the offer of the new contract in a timely manner
according to its terms, and therefore the new contract never
became effective.  According to White, because the new
contract never took effect, the forum-selection clause in the
noncompetition agreement cannot be enforced.  
Like White's public-policy argument, this argument about
whether the contract ever became effective challenges the
contract as a whole, not the validity of the forum-selection
clause.  But when venue is challenged based on a forum-
selection clause, as it was in this case, the court evaluates
only the validity of the forum-selection clause.  
"[N]umerous courts ... have addressed the validity
of a forum-selection clause before determining the
validity of a contract as a whole.  See Rucker v.
Oasis Legal Fin., LLC, 632 F.3d 1231, 1237–38 (11th
Cir. 2011) (treating the forum-selection clause as
a severable part of the contract and analyzing its
validity separately); see also Muzumdar v. Wellness
Int'l Network, Ltd., 438 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir.
2006) (reasoning that the court must decide whether
it is the proper court to decide the validity of the
contract before it decides the validity of the
contract)."
Fountain v. Oasis Legal Fin., LLC, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 1044.  
"Appellants also spend a good deal of time
trying to convince us that because the contracts
themselves are void and unenforceable as against
public policy -- i.e., they set out a pyramid scheme
-- the forum selection clauses are also void.  The
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logical conclusion of the argument would be that the
federal courts in Illinois would first have to
determine whether the contracts were void before
they could decide whether, based on the forum
selection clauses, they should be considering the
cases at all.  An absurdity would arise if the
courts in Illinois determined the contracts were not
void and that therefore, based on valid forum
selection clauses, the cases should be sent to
Texas--for what?  A determination as to whether the
contracts are void?"
Muzumdar v. Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd., 438 F.3d 759, 762
(7th Cir. 2006).  "Allegations that the entire contract was
procured as the result of fraud or overreaching are
'inapposite to our [forum-selection clause] enforceability
determination, which must ... precede any analysis of the
merits [of the contract's validity].'"  Afram Carriers, Inc.
v. Moeykens, 145 F.3d 298, 301 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Haynsworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 964 (5th Cir.
1997) (bracketed language added in Moeykens)).
In the context of discussing allegations of fraud in a
contract dispute, this Court explained the logic behind
considering the validity of the forum-selection clause before
analyzing the validity of the contract as a whole.  
"The United States Supreme Court in Scherk v.
Alberto–Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2449, 41
L.Ed.2d 270 (1974), relying on its holding in The
Bremen v. Zapata Off–Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct.
18
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1907, 
32 
L.Ed.2d 
513 
(1972), 
addressed 
the
enforcement of forum-selection clauses and upheld
the enforceability of a forum-selection clause when
the action involved claims of fraud.  In Scherk, the
Court, despite the allegations of fraud, upheld the
enforcement of a forum-selection clause, stating:
"'In 
The 
Bremen 
we 
noted 
that
forum-selection clauses "should be given
full effect" when a "freely negotiated
private 
international 
agreement 
[is]
unaffected by fraud...."  407 U.S., at 13.
This qualification does not mean that any
time a dispute arising out of a transaction
is based upon an allegation of fraud, as in
this case, the clause is unenforceable.
Rather, it means that an arbitration or
forum-selection clause in a contract is not
enforceable if the inclusion of that clause
in the contract was the product of fraud or
coercion.'
"417 U.S. at 519 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 2449. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in
Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d
1285, 1296 (11th Cir. 1998), applied the Scherk
holding, stating, 'By requiring the plaintiff
specifically to allege that the choice clause itself
was included in the contract due to fraud in order
to 
succeed 
in 
a 
claim 
that 
the 
choice 
is
unenforceable, courts may ensure that more general
claims of fraud will be litigated in the chosen
forum, 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
contractual
expectations of the parties.'
"Thus, the proper inquiry is whether the
forum-selection clause is the result of fraud in the
inducement in the negotiation or inclusion in the
agreement of the forum-selection clause itself.  If
the forum-selection clause is the result of fraud in
the inducement, then the fraud exception to the
enforceability of the clause applies.  However, if
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the claim of fraud in the inducement is directed
toward the entire contract, the fraud exception to
enforcement of the forum-selection clause does not
apply."
Ex parte Leasecomm Corp., 879 So. 2d 1156, 1158-59 (Ala. 2003)
(second emphasis, other than on "in the chosen forum," added).
White has never contended that the forum-selection clause
itself is invalid as the result of fraud, undue influence, or
overweening bargaining power.  Instead, she challenged the
validity of the contract as a whole based on when she executed
it.  White is certainly entitled to argue that the contract
never became effective, but the argument must be raised in the
forum dictated by the forum-selection clause because the
possible invalidity of the contract as a whole does not negate
enforcement of the forum-selection clause.
The only argument White raised below that challenged the
forum-selection clause itself was her assertion that, because
the Georgia forum is 155 miles from White's residence,
litigating in the forum was "unnecessarily and avoidably
disruptive and burdensome" to White.  At least in regard to
the facts of this case and the arguments presented, we find
White's position uncompelling.
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This Court has held that
"distance of travel does not establish that a forum
is unreasonable.  Ex parte Northern Capital Res.
Corp., 751 So. 2d 12 (Ala. 1999) (enforcing outbound
forum-selection clause requiring that litigation be
conducted in Missouri); O'Brien Eng'g Co. v.
Continental Machs., Inc., [738 So. 2d 844 (Ala.
1999)] (enforcing outbound forum-selection clause
requiring 
that 
litigation 
be 
conducted 
in
Minnesota); Moseley v. Electronic Realty Assocs.,
730 So. 2d 227 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998)(enforcing
outbound forum-selection clause requiring that
litigation be conducted in Kansas); and Professional
Ins. Corp., et al. v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347
(Ala. 
1997)(enforcing 
outbound 
forum-selection
clause requiring that litigation be conducted in
Florida)."
Ex parte D.M. White Constr. Co., 806 So. 2d at 373–74.  A
complaining party must cite more than mere distance to warrant
negating the forum-selection clause.  "'Inconvenience'
sufficient to void a forum-selection clause is present where
a 'trial in that forum would be so gravely difficult and
inconvenient that the challenging party would effectively be
deprived of his day in court.'"  Ex parte Leasecomm Corp., 886
So. 2d at 62–63 (quoting  Ex parte Rymer, 860 So. 2d 339, 342
(Ala. 2003)). 
In this case, White admitted that both PT Solutions'
Eufaula clinic and EPT's clinic are located near the Alabama-
Georgia border.  White acknowledged that she treated many
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patients from Georgia when she worked for PT Solutions.  There
is also evidence indicating that White traveled to Georgia
several times for business purposes during her 
employment 
with
PT Solutions.  Furthermore, White did not explain how the
designated forum would be so "gravely difficult and
inconvenient" as to deprive her of her day in court.  Instead,
White simply argued that "[f]orcing [White] to litigate in
Fulton County, Georgia would 'spread thin [her] resources and
would hamper [her] ability to obtain quick, convenient, and
effective relief.'  Oliver v. Merritt Dredging Co., 979 F.2d
827, 834 (11th Cir. 1992)."  In short, the inconvenience to
White does not rise to a level justifying negation of the
forum-selection clause.  
In sum, PT Solutions presented an unambiguous forum-
selection clause that was contained in a 
contract 
indisputably
signed by White, and White failed to present -- either in this
Court or in the circuit court -- an argument that establishes
that 
it 
would 
be 
unfair 
or 
unreasonable 
under 
the
circumstances 
to 
enforce 
the 
forum-selection 
clause. 
Accordingly, the circuit court exceeded its discretion in
denying PT Solutions' motion to dismiss the Alabama action.
22
1150687
IV.  Conclusion
White failed to clearly establish that enforcement of the
forum-selection 
clause 
would 
be 
either 
unfair 
or 
unreasonable.
PT Solutions has demonstrated a clear legal right to have the
action against it dismissed on the basis that venue in the
Barbour Circuit Court is, by virtue of the outbound
forum-selection clause, improper.  The circuit court exceeded
its discretion in denying PT Solutions' motion to dismiss.  We
direct the court to dismiss this cause, without prejudice,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Bolin, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
23