Title: Chandler v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 94907-Agenda 14-May 2003.PAULETTE CHANDLER, Adm'r of the Estate of Douglas Chandler, 
Appellee, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, 							Appellant.
Opinion filed October 2, 2003.
	 
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	On January 16, 1997, a motor vehicle driven by Douglas
Chandler collided with a railroad train owned and operated by
defendant, Illinois Central Railroad Company (Illinois Central), at the
Center Street crossing in Tilden, Illinois. Chandler sustained fatal
injuries in the collision. Plaintiff, Paulette Chandler, administrator of
decedent's estate, filed an action under the Wrongful Death Act (740
ILCS 180/1 et seq. (West 1996)) in which she alleged that Illinois
Central's negligence was the proximate cause of the death. Illinois
Central filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 and
section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615,
2-619 (West 2000)) and a motion for summary judgment (735 ILCS
5/2-1005 (West 2000)). The circuit court of St. Clair County granted
the motion to dismiss. The appellate court reversed and remanded for
further proceedings. 333 Ill. App. 3d 463. We granted Illinois
Central's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315). Following briefing and oral arguments in
this case, the parties entered into a settlement agreement and
subsequently moved this court to dismiss the appeal as moot.
However, because the appeal presents "(i) a question of public
interest, (ii) an issue in need of authoritative determination for future
guidance, and (iii) a situation likely to recur" (see Callis v. Norfolk &
Western Ry. Co., 195 Ill. 2d 356, 364 (2001)), we address the issues
raised by this appeal and now affirm in part and reverse in part the
judgment of the appellate court. Owing to the parties' settlement,
however, there is no need for this court to remand the cause to the
circuit court for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND
	In 1962, Illinois Central operated a railroad line running
generally in a northwesterly-southeasterly direction between East St.
Louis, Illinois, and Carbondale, Illinois. Train operations over the
railroad line were by train order and timetable utilizing two main
tracks for directional running. The railroad line crossed various streets
and highways at grade in Randolph County and St. Clair County,
including the crossing at issue in the Village of Tilden. In a petition
filed with the Illinois Commerce Commission on March 10, 1962,
Illinois Central proposed to install a centralized traffic control system
on one of the main tracks and to retire the other main track. The
centralized traffic control system would improve operating efficiency
by allowing train movement in both directions on a single track. With
the retirement of one main track, various grade crossings on the
railroad line would change from double main line grade crossings to
single main line grade crossings. At crossings where there would be
no possibility of two or more trains occupying the crossing at the
same time, the existing gate installations would be removed, leaving
automatic flashing light signal installations. Illinois Central described
the proposed grade crossing changes in detail, attaching blueprint
drawings to its petition.
	Following a hearing, the Commission made the following
findings:
			"(6) that due to present operation over two main tracks,
the existing crossing protection in the above referred to
Villages consists of automatic flashing light signals with
short arm gates as is customary for such operation;
			(7) that the elimination of one main track and by
concentrating through train movements in both directions, on
one track, it is impossible for a 'two train situation' to exist
at any of the crossings at which gates are now installed; that
the railroad proposes to relocate the existing signals as may
be necessary to conform to the single track operating
arrangement and to remove the short arm gates at such
locations bringing said installations into conformity with
standard practice for such conditions; that the re-established
signal installation at the various crossings will conform to
the requirements of General Order 138 of this Commission,
and result in single main line grade crossings protected by
automatic flashing light signals and bells;
* * *
			(12) that the next southerly crossing is Center Street (IC-41.9-G), Tilden, Randolph County. The northbound main
track would be removed, the existing signals to remain as
now placed and the short arm gates removed; movements
over the house track would be made at slow speed under
flagman protection when required."
The Commission ordered that Illinois Central "proceed in making the
changes in the existing automatic flashing light signal and gate
protection at the crossings of *** Center Street in the Village of
Tilden, Randolph County, Illinois."
	Illinois Central changed the Center Street crossing in conformity
with the Commission's order. Thus, on the date of the collision, the
crossing was equipped with luminous flashing signals only. Traveling
in a southerly direction on Center Street, decedent's vehicle entered
the crossing and was struck by a train proceeding in a westerly
direction. Plaintiff filed this wrongful death action on behalf of
decedent's next of kin.
	Plaintiff filed the original complaint in Randolph County on
October 6, 1997. On January 11, 1999, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed
the complaint. Plaintiff filed a nearly identical complaint in St. Clair
County on January 11, 2000. Plaintiff amended the complaint on
November 28, 2000. The circuit court dismissed the first amended
complaint without prejudice on February 23, 2001. On March 2,
2001, plaintiff filed a pleading entitled "Third Amended Complaint,"
the pleading at issue in this appeal. Plaintiff has never filed a second
amended complaint.
	In paragraph five of the third amended complaint, plaintiff
alleged that Illinois Central:
			"a. Negligently and carelessly failed to adequately
maintain its flashing warning signals;
			b. Negligently and carelessly failed to adequately warn
motorists of the approach of the train;
			c. Negligently and carelessly placed the flashing signals
controlling southbound traffic on Center Street more than 15
feet from the rail, contrary to the Illinois Administrative
Code Title 92 §1535.335;
			d. Negligently and carelessly placed the flashing signals
controlling such southbound traffic on Center Street in a
manner that failed to adequately warn southbound motorists
of an approaching train;
			e. Negligently and carelessly failed to equip the crossing
with gates when the defendant knew or should have known
the railroad crossing was ultra hazardous;
			f. Negligently and carelessly failed to keep its right-of-way reasonably clear of brush, shrubbery, trees, weeds and
other unnecessary obstructions for a distance of at least 500
feet each way from its grade crossing in violation of 635
ILCS Section 5/18C-7401;
			g. Negligently and carelessly failed to keep a proper
lookout for vehicles at or near the crossing;
			h. Negligently and carelessly drove its train at a speed that
was not reasonable and proper;
			i. Negligently and carelessly failed to stop or slow its train
in a manner as to avoid the accident;
			j. Negligently and carelessly removed gates from the
crossing in question when the defendant knew or should
have known that such presented a hazard to motors on
Center Street;
			k. Negligently and carelessly failed to have crossing gates
protecting the intersection in question."
Plaintiff complained that, as a direct and proximate result of the
negligent act or omissions of Illinois Central, decedent was not given
adequate notice of the approach of the train, and decedent sustained
fatal injuries in the ensuing collision.
	The circuit court granted Illinois Central's motion to dismiss. In
so ruling, the court noted, "Plaintiff has conceded that Paragraph 5(h)
of her Third Amended Complaint should be dismissed based on
federal preemption, and based on that stipulation, the Court orders
that Paragraph 5(h) of the Third Amended Complaint is dismissed."
The court then found that title 92, section 1535.335, of the Illinois
Administrative Code (92 Ill. Adm. Code §1535.335 (1996)) does not
impose a duty to place signals within 15 feet of the near rail at a
crossing. Accordingly, the court dismissed paragraph 5(c). Next, the
court dismissed paragraph 5(i), finding that the allegations did not
relate back to plaintiff's original complaint. Citing section
18c-7401(3) of the Illinois Commercial Transportation Law
(Transportation Law) (625 ILCS 5/18c-7401(3) (West 1996)) and
Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107 (1995),
the court found a conclusive legal presumption that the warning
devices at the crossing were adequate. Consequently, the court
dismissed paragraphs 5(d), 5(e), 5(j) and 5(k). The court dismissed
the remaining paragraphs for failure to allege a duty owed to decedent
by Illinois Central.
	The appellate court reversed and remanded. The court found no
proper basis for dismissal of plaintiff's action, except with regard to
paragraph 5(h), which plaintiff conceded should be dismissed based
upon federal preemption.(1) 333 Ill. App. 3d at 474. We allowed Illinois
Central's petition for leave to appeal. We also allowed the Illinois
Trial Lawyers Association to file an amicus curiae brief in support of
plaintiff.

ANALYSIS
A. Adequacy of Warning Devices
	Plaintiff alleged that Illinois Central's negligent conduct was the
proximate cause of decedent's death. To state a cause of action for
negligence, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed a duty
to the plaintiff, that the defendant breached that duty, and that the
plaintiff incurred injuries proximately caused by the breach. First
Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 256 (1999);
Thompson v. County of Cook, 154 Ill. 2d 374, 382 (1993). The
existence of a duty is a question of law for the court to decide.
Thompson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 382; Wojdyla v. City of Park Ridge, 148 Ill. 2d 417, 421 (1992). Whether the defendant breached its duty to the
plaintiff and whether the breach was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries are factual matters for a jury to decide. Thompson,
154 Ill. 2d  at 382.
	Section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2-619 (West 2000)) provides for the involuntary dismissal of a
cause of action based on certain defects or defenses. One of the
enumerated grounds for a section 2-619 dismissal is that the claim is
barred by affirmative matter which avoids the legal effect of or
defeats the claim. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2000). Affirmative
matter "is something in the nature of a defense which negates the
cause of action completely or refutes crucial conclusions of law or
conclusions of material fact contained in or inferred from the
complaint." Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 486
(1994). Affirmative matter must be supported by affidavit, unless
apparent on the face of the pleading attacked. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9)
(West 2000).
	A section 2-619 dismissal is akin to the grant of a motion for
summary judgment. Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education, 178 Ill. 2d 370, 383 (1997). "For that reason, the reviewing court conducts de
novo review and considers whether 'the existence of a genuine issue
of material fact should have precluded the dismissal or, absent such
an issue of fact, whether dismissal is proper as a matter of law.' "
Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d  at 383, quoting Kedzie & 103rd Currency
Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116-17 (1993); see also
Wright v. City of Danville, 174 Ill. 2d 391, 398-99 (1996).
	In the case at bar, the circuit court dismissed paragraphs 5(d),
5(e), 5(j) and 5(k) of the third amended complaint because it found
that section 18c-7401(3) of the Transportation Law (625 ILCS
5/18c-7401(3) (West 1996)) creates a conclusive legal presumption
that the warning devices at the crossing were adequate. The circuit
court dismissed paragraph 5(c) because it found that the
Administrative Code did not impose a duty upon Illinois Central to
place its signals within 15 feet of the near rail at a crossing. Because
these paragraphs, at root, all question the adequacy of the warning
devices at the crossing, we review the portions of the circuit court's
order dismissing the paragraphs in tandem.
	In Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d 107, this court considered, and rejected,
the plaintiffs' argument that the Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway
Company (EJ&E) was negligent in failing to install crossing gates at
a crossing equipped with flashing light signals, a warning bell, and
railroad signs and markings. Initially, the court recognized that a
railroad has a duty to provide adequate warning devices at its
crossings. Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d  at 120. The court also recognized that
the Transportation Law authorizes the Commission to require the
installation of warning devices at railroad crossings. Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d  at 121. Since the record showed that the existent warning
devices were operating properly at the time of the accident, the court
noted that its review would be limited to whether EJ&E owed a duty
to provide additional warning devices at the crossing, such as the
gates at issue. Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d  at 120-21.
	In considering the adequacy of the existent warning devices and
the need for additional warning devices, the court reviewed section
18c-7401(3) of the Transportation Law, the section at issue in this
case:
		"The Commission shall have power, upon its own motion, or
upon complaint, and after having made proper investigation,
to require the installation of adequate and appropriate
luminous reflective warning signs, luminous flashing signals,
crossing gates illuminated at night or other protective
devices in order to promote and safeguard the health and
safety of the public. Luminous flashing signal or crossing
gate devices installed at grade crossings, which have been
approved by the Commission, shall be deemed adequate and
appropriate." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95½, par. 18c-7401(3),
now 625 ILCS 5/18c-7401(3) (West 1996).
The court interpreted the language as providing that:
		"once the Commission has investigated a crossing and has
approved the installation of a luminous flashing signal or
crossing gate device, then the installation of that device shall
be deemed adequate and appropriate. A conclusive legal
presumption is created which prevents plaintiffs from
arguing that the railroad should have installed other warning
devices." Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d  at 121.
Further, the court noted that the legal presumption of adequacy
applies to any Commission investigation and approval, not just those
that occurred after the effective date of the Transportation Law.
Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d  at 122.
	The record in the case established that the Commission had made
the requisite investigation and approval pursuant to the
Transportation Law. Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d  at 123. In 1965, the
Commission had entered an order that flashing light signals be
installed at the crossing, and, in 1981, Commission staff had
inspected the crossing and determined that crossing gates were not
necessary. Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d  at 123-24. Accordingly, the court
concluded:
			"Having established that the Commission found the
warning devices at the 22nd Street crossing to be adequate
and appropriate, this determination is legally conclusive
pursuant to the Transportation Law. As a result, the plaintiffs
are barred from contesting the adequacy and appropriateness
of the warning devices at the 22nd Street crossing. EJ&E
therefore had no duty to provide additional warnings on the
date of the accident. Thus, EJ&E is entitled to summary
judgment with respect to the adequacy of the warning
devices installed at the 22nd Street crossing." Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d  at 124.
	In the case at bar, as in Espinoza, plaintiff questions the
adequacy of the warning devices at the Center Street crossing. In
particular, plaintiff maintains that Illinois Central was negligent in the
placement of the flashing signals controlling southbound traffic on
Center Street. Plaintiff also maintains that Illinois Central was
negligent in removing the short arm gates from the crossing in 1962
and in failing to equip the crossing with gates as of the date of the
collision. The record reveals, however, that in 1962 the Commission
duly investigated the crossing and the adequacy of the warning
devices. The Commission examined the documentary evidence
submitted by Illinois Central, including the blueprints showing the
location of the track and flashing signals. The Commission also
considered the testimony adduced at the hearing on the matter. The
Commission concluded that, in view of the proposed change from a
double main line grade crossing to a single main line grade crossing,
the flashing signals should remain as placed and the short arm gates
removed. As in Espinoza, "[h]aving established that the Commission
found the warning devices at the *** crossing to be adequate and
appropriate, this determination is legally conclusive pursuant to the
Transportation Law." Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d  at 124. As a result,
plaintiff is barred from contesting the adequacy and appropriateness
of the warning devices. Illinois Central had no duty to provide
additional warning devices on the date of the accident.
	The appellate court found Espinoza to be factually
distinguishable in that Espinoza concerned the installation of warning
devices at a crossing while the case at bar involves the removal of
warning devices from a crossing. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 469. Reflecting
the reasoning of the appellate court, plaintiff maintains in this court
that the conclusive legal presumption applies only where the
Commission has approved the installation of warning devices at a
crossing, not where the Commission has approved the removal of
some warning devices, albeit the crossing is protected by other
devices. Thus, according to plaintiff, the conclusive legal
presumption applies where the Commission approves the installation
of automatic flashing light signals at a crossing, such that the crossing
is protected by the flashing lights and the customary railroad signs
and markings. The conclusive legal presumption does not apply
where the Commission approves the removal of short arm gates from
a crossing, such that the crossing is protected by existent automatic
flashing light signals and the customary railroad signs and markings.
Such a distinction is untenable because in each instance the
Commission ultimately approves the type of warning device in use at
the crossing.
	Plaintiff also follows the reasoning of the appellate court in
arguing that the conclusive legal presumption only applies where the
Commission, upon its own motion or upon complaint, approves the
installation of the warning devices (see 333 Ill. App. 3d at 470).
Plaintiff notes that Illinois Central initiated the proceedings at issue
as opposed to the Commission or a private citizen. We reject
plaintiff's argument. First, plaintiff assumes that the conclusive legal
presumption cannot apply if a railroad moves for a change to a
railroad crossing. Nothing in section 18c-7401(3) so intimates.
Moreover, there is no principled reason to distinguish between
instances where the Commission approves the warning devices
following investigation, whether the proceedings are initiated by the
Commission, the railroad, a municipality or a private individual.
Second, as noted in Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d  at 122, the conclusive legal
presumption applies to "any Commission investigation and
approval." It is not limited to instances where the Commission
requires the installation of warning devices at a crossing, as opposed
to instances where the Commission approves existent warning
devices. Again, there is no principled reason for a distinction. The
Commission undertakes the same investigation and is motivated by
the same safety concerns whether it enters an order in a proceeding
initiated by a railroad or by another entity, and whether it approves
existent warning devices or warning devices which are to be placed
at the crossing at a later date. In this regard we note that section
18c-7401(3) provides that "[n]o railroad may change or modify the
warning device system at a railroad-highway grade crossing,
including warning systems interconnected with highway traffic
control signals, without having first received the approval of the
Commission." 625 ILCS 5/18c-7401(3) (West 1996). Illinois Central
modified the warning device system at the Center Street crossing
upon approval of the Commission.
	We conclude that the circuit court was correct in finding a
conclusive legal presumption that the warning devices at the crossing
were adequate. Paragraphs 5(c), 5(d), 5(e), 5(j), and 5(k) of the third
amended complaint were properly dismissed.

B. Relation Back
	The circuit court found that paragraph 5(i) of the third amended
complaint did not relate back to plaintiff's original complaint.
Because the third amended complaint was filed beyond the expiration
of the statute of limitations, the circuit court dismissed paragraph 5(i)(2)
pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2-619 (West 2000)). Citing section 2-616(b) of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-616(b) (West 2000)), plaintiff argues that
paragraph 5(i) grew out of the same transaction or occurrence set out
in the original complaint and should not have been dismissed.
	Section 2-616 provides that:
			"At any time before final judgment amendments may be
allowed on just and reasonable terms, introducing any party
who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant,
dismissing any party, changing the cause of action or defense
or adding new causes of action or defenses." 735 ILCS
5/2-616(a) (West 2000).
The section further provides:
			"The cause of action, cross claim or defense set up in any
amended pleading shall not be barred by lapse of time under
any statute or contract prescribing or limiting the time within
which an action may be brought or right asserted, if the time
prescribed or limited had not expired when the original
pleading was filed, and if it shall appear from the original
and amended pleadings that the cause of action asserted, or
the defense or cross claim interposed in the amended
pleading grew out of the same transaction or occurrence set
up in the original pleading ***." 735 ILCS 5/2-616(b) (West
2000).
This court has recognized that a liberal construction of the
requirements of section 2-616(b) is necessary "in order to allow the
resolution of litigation on the merits and to avoid elevating questions
of form over substance." Boatmen's National Bank of Belleville v.
Direct Lines, Inc., 167 Ill. 2d 88, 102 (1995); Bryson v. News
America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 106-07 (1996).
	Illinois Central concedes that plaintiff filed the original
complaint within the statute of limitations. Thus, the first requirement
of section 2-616(b) is satisfied. The question becomes whether
paragraph 5(i) grew out of the same transaction or occurrence set up
in the original complaint. We believe that it did. Plaintiff alleged in
the original complaint that Illinois Central had a duty "to use
reasonable care in the operation and movement of its train, and in the
maintenance of its right-of-way and to use reasonable care in the
evaluation of hazards and protection of the general public at points
where its tracks and right-of-way crossed over public intersecting
roadways." Plaintiff also alleged that Illinois Central breached its duty
by failing to give adequate and timely warning of the approach of its
train to the Center Street crossing and failing to keep a proper lookout
for vehicles at or near the crossing. Plaintiff maintained that, as a
result of Illinois Central's negligence, decedent was killed when his
car was struck by a train at the Center Street crossing. Paragraph 5(i)
of the third amended complaint is likewise based on Illinois Central's
duty to use appropriate care to avoid collisions when operating its
trains. In paragraph 5(i), plaintiff alleged that Illinois Central failed
to stop or slow its train in a manner as to avoid the collision with
decedent's car. Paragraph 5(i) is necessarily based upon the same
transaction or occurrence set up in the original complaint. We
conclude that the second requirement of section 2-616(b) has been
met. The circuit court erred in its finding that paragraph 5(i) did not
relate back to the original complaint.


C. Allegation of Duty
	The circuit court found that paragraphs 5(a), 5(b), 5(f), and 5(g)
of the third amended complaint failed to allege a duty owed by
Illinois Central to plaintiff's decedent. Consequently, the circuit court
granted Illinois Central's motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615
of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)).
	A section 2-615 motion to dismiss attacks the legal sufficiency
of the complaint. Illinois Graphics, 159 Ill. 2d  at 484. Such a motion
does not raise affirmative factual defenses, but alleges only defects
appearing on the face of the complaint. Illinois Graphics, 159 Ill. 2d 
at 484; Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (1992).
"Because Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction, a pleading must be
both legally and factually sufficient. It must assert a legally
recognized cause of action and it must plead facts which bring the
particular case within that cause of action." 3 R. Michael, Illinois
Practice §23.4 (1989), citing Teter v. Clemens, 112 Ill. 2d 252 (1986);
see also People ex rel. Fahner v. Carriage Way West, Inc., 88 Ill. 2d 300, 308 (1981). Thus, the question presented by a section 2-615
motion is whether the allegations of the complaint, when viewed in
a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of
action upon which relief can be granted. Vernon v. Schuster, 179 Ill. 2d 338, 344 (1997); Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d  at 86-87.
	Although a complaint is deficient when it fails to allege the facts
necessary for recovery, the plaintiff is not required to set out
evidence; only the ultimate facts to be proved should be alleged, not
the evidentiary facts tending to prove such ultimate facts. Carriage
Way West, Inc., 88 Ill. 2d  at 308, quoting Board of Education of the
Kankakee School District No. 111 v. Kankakee Federation of
Teachers Local No. 886, 46 Ill. 2d 439, 446-47 (1970). Allegations
of law or conclusions are not required and are, indeed, improper.
Illinois Graphics, 159 Ill. 2d  at 489. The Code of Civil Procedure
specifically recognizes that no complaint is bad in substance which
reasonably informs the defendant of the nature of the claim that he or
she is called upon to meet. See 735 ILCS 5/2-612(b) (West 2000).
	In ruling on a section 2-615 motion, a trial court is to consider
only the allegations of the pleadings. Illinois Graphics, 159 Ill. 2d  at
485; Urbaitis v. Commonwealth Edison, 143 Ill. 2d 458, 475 (1991).
Further, the trial court should dismiss the cause of action only if it is
clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proven which will entitle
the plaintiff to recovery. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 86-87; Illinois
Graphics, 159 Ill. 2d  at 488. A court of review determines de novo
whether the trial court should have granted dismissal. Beahringer v.
Page, 204 Ill. 2d 363, 369 (2003).
	In an action for negligence, as in the case at bar, the plaintiff is
required to state facts from which a court will raise a duty to the
plaintiff, as well as facts showing the defendant's breach of that duty
and a resulting injury. Miller v. S.S. Kresge Co., 306 Ill. 104, 106
(1922); Illinois Steel Co. v. Ostrowski, 194 Ill. 376, 385 (1902); see
also Gallagher Corp. v. Russ, 309 Ill. App. 3d 192, 197 (1999);
Browning v. Heritage Insurance Co., 33 Ill. App. 3d 943 (1975). The
existence of a duty depends upon whether the plaintiff and the
defendant stood in such a relationship to each other that the law
imposed upon the defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct for
the benefit of the plaintiff. Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 179, 186 (2002). As noted above, whether a duty exists is a
question of law to be determined by the court. Happel, 199 Ill. 2d  at
186, quoting Ward v. K-mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140 (1990).
	Illinois Central maintains that the circuit court's order of
dismissal was proper because plaintiff failed to allege that Illinois
Central owed a duty to plaintiff's decedent. We disagree. We believe
the allegations of the third amended complaint are sufficient to raise
a duty to plaintiff's decedent. In the third amended complaint,
plaintiff alleged that Illinois Central owned and operated the train that
collided with decedent's vehicle at the Center Street crossing.
Plaintiff further alleged that Illinois Central operated and maintained
the Center Street crossing and the devices to warn of the approach of
the trains. In paragraph 5(a), 5(b), 5(f), and 5(g) of the third amended
complaint, plaintiff alleged that Illinois Central failed to adequately
maintain its flashing warning signals at the crossing; failed to
adequately warn motorists of the approach of the train; failed to keep
a proper lookout for vehicles at or near the crossing; and failed to
keep its right of way reasonably clear of brush, shrubbery and trees.
Plaintiff then alleged that decedent's death was proximately caused
by Illinois Central's negligence.
	It is established that a railroad has a duty to provide adequate
warning devices at its crossings. Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d  at 120;
Churchill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 73 Ill. 2d 127 (1978); see
Sheahan v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 212 Ill.
App. 3d 732, 735 (1991); Langston v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry.
Co., 330 Ill. App. 260, 279 (1946). It is equally well established that
a railroad has a duty to keep a proper lookout and warn of the
approach of a train. Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d  at 119; see Magna Bank of
McLean County v. Ogilvie, 235 Ill. App. 3d 318, 323 (1992);
Sheahan, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 735. Lastly, section 18c-7401(3) of the
Transportation Law requires that a railroad "remove from its right of
way at all grade crossings within the State[ ] such brush, shrubbery,
and trees as is reasonably practical for a distance of not less than 500
feet in either direction from each grade crossing." See 625 ILCS
5/18c-7401(3) (West 1996); see also Ill. Adm. Code §1535.205
(1996). This court has previously observed that "[i]t was negligence
in the [railroad] company to permit or suffer weeds, or anything else,
to grow upon its right of way to such a height as would materially
obstruct the view of the highway. The safety of persons and property
alike make it necessary the company should keep its right of way free
from obstructions, so that persons approaching the crossing may
readily ascertain whether there is danger, and the employees in charge
may be enabled to discover whether there is anything on the track."
Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Smith, 78 Ill. 112, 114 (1875);
see also Goodrich v. Sprague, 376 Ill. 80, 89 (1941).
	The third amended complaint reasonably informed Illinois
Central of the nature of the claim which it was called upon to meet.
The facts alleged raised a duty owed by Illinois Central to decedent.
It was not necessary that plaintiff allege in formulaic words that
Illinois Central had a duty to do or not do a particular thing. See 2
Nichols Illinois Civil Practice §30:109 (rev. 2002). We conclude that
the circuit court erred in granting dismissal.

CONCLUSION
	The circuit court properly dismissed paragraphs 5(c), 5(d), 5(e),
5(j) and 5(k) of the third amended complaint. Accordingly, we
reverse that portion of the appellate court opinion reversing the
dismissal of paragraphs 5(c), 5(d), 5(e), 5(j) and 5(k). The circuit
court erred, however, in dismissing paragraphs 5(a), 5(b), 5(f), 5(g)
and 5(i) of the third amended complaint. Accordingly, we affirm that
portion of the appellate court opinion reversing the dismissal of
paragraphs 5(a), 5(b), 5(f), 5(g) and 5(i).



Appellate court affirmed in part
and reversed in part;
circuit court affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
1. 1Plaintiff did not petition this
court for leave to appeal from the appellate court's adverse ruling on
paragraph 5(h).                 

2.             
           

 2Plaintiff included paragraph 5(i) in the first
 amended complaint. However, that pleading was also filed after the statute of
 limitations had expired.