Title: Sayre v. Dickerson

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

179 So. 2d 57 (1965)
Katie SAYRE
v.
Grace Louise DICKERSON.
1 Div. 130.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 30, 1965.
*58 J. Terry Reynolds, Jr., and Wm. Lauten, Mobile, for appellant.
Kilborn, Darby & Kilborn, Mobile, for appellee.
COLEMAN, Justice.
For prior decision on this appeal denying motion to strike demand for oral argument, see Sayre v. Dickerson, 275 Ala. 371, 155 So. 2d 327.
The respondent appeals from a decree, in equity, whereby the court gave effect to an agreement allegedly made by the parties in settlement of a suit which arose out of conflicting claims of ownership of a parcel of land sometimes referred to as Point Legere or the Point, on Dog River.
The case may be more easily understood by reference to the following map.
*59 
*60 The area shown is part of the land embraced in the map of a subdivision recorded in Map Book 3 at page 530. The parties allege that, in 1937, the map of the subdivision was filed for record by "A. H. Legere," as owner. His title is not disputed. Both parties claim through him.
The recorded map of the subdivision shows lots numbered from 1 to 5, both inclusive, and from 8 to 11, both inclusive, but does not show any lot numbered 6 or 7. The Dr. S. H. Stephens Lot is not numbered. The words Parcel No. 1 and Parcel No. 2 do not appear on the recorded map. The line running from north to south between the two parcels does not appear on the recorded map. The map here shown is the result of a survey made pursuant to the alleged agreement of the parties in the instant case, and the north-south line and the words Parcel No. 1 and Parcel No. 2 were placed on the map according to the survey. On the recorded map of the subdivision, the entire area embraced in Parcel No. 1 and Parcel No. 2, is shown simply as an unnumbered lot bounded by the Dr. S. H. Stephens Lot, the 20' lane, lot 8, and Dog River.
In 1936, Legere conveyed to Seldon H. Stephens the Dr. S. H. Stephens Lot, by a deed which described the boundary by courses and distances.
Complainant alleges, and respondent neither admits nor denies, that, after the recording of the map of the subdivision in 1937, complainant acquired Lot 5; various other persons from time to time acquired the other numbered lots shown on the map; in 1947, complainant acquired the Dr. S. H. Stephens Lot; and Legere still owned the large unnumbered lot which is the area shown as Parcel No. 1 and Parcel No. 2 on the map set out in this opinion.
Complainant alleges that by deed dated July 3, 1947, she purchased from Legere, for $1,000.00, the land embraced in Parcel No. 1 and Parcel No. 2. A copy of the deed is made Exhibit B to the bill of complaint. The description in the deed is as follows:
Complainant alleges:
Respondent denies that complainant bargained to buy the lands embraced in Parcel No. 1 and Parcel No. 2; admits that Legere did sell to complainant "the lands referred to in the deed .... described as Lot seven ...."; denies that the lands conveyed were described as Lot Seven through error or inadvertence; and says that the land conveyed did not extend east so as to include, and Legere did not intend to convey, the land embraced in Parcel No. 1 and Parcel No. 2.
By deed dated November 23, 1949, Legere conveyed to respondent "`any other real property in which the grantor herein has any interest whatever and which property is located in Mobile County, Alabama.'"
Legere died in 1950 leaving a will by which he devised to respondent all his property, except some property not here pertinent.
In brief outline the controversy is this. Complainant claims to own all of Parcel No. 1 and Parcel No. 2 by virtue of the July 3, 1947, deed. She seeks to reform the description in the deed and to quiet her title. Respondent says the July 3, 1947, deed did not convey all of both parcels to complainant, and that respondent, as successor *61 to Legere, owns all of both parcels, or the greater part of them. It is apparent that the controversy results from the description in the deed referring to Lot No. 7, and the absence of any lot so numbered on the recorded map of the subdivision.
The case was set for hearing August 28, 1962. The transcript of the testimony taken on the hearing commences with the statement of counsel that "The parties have reached a settlement." Then, in open court, counsel dictate or recite the terms of the settlement.
The agreement, in short, is that a survey shall be made, to begin at the southeast corner of the Dr. S. H. Stephens Lot, thence run north along east line of said lot 130 feet, thence run east parallel with north line of Section 17 to the average tide line of Dog River. At the middle point of the line from Dr. S. H. Stephens Lot to Dog River, a line is to be run north and south to the river. All of the disputed land east of the north-south line will be the property of respondent and all west of the line will be property of complainant. The agreement, as written by the reporter and signed by the trial judge contains the following recitals:
Apparently, the surveyor agreed upon by the parties completed the survey and filed a map dated September 17, 1962. The map set out in this opinion is taken from the map dated September 17, 1962. By the agreement, Parcel No. 1 goes to respondent, subject to the agreement, and Parcel No. 2 goes to complainant.
On September 27, 1962, counsel, who had hitherto represented respondent, filed a written withdrawal from the cause alleging that respondent has been fully advised and that the withdrawal "is made at her request."
On October 5, 1962, through new counsel, respondent filed motion to set aside the submission, or suspend rendition of decree, or "to revoke the memorandum of settlement allegedly" made August 28, 1962.
As grounds of the motion, respondent says that she objects to and is not satisfied with the agreement; that it deprives her *62 of property without due process; that the agreement was made "over her protest and without her consent or approval"; and that, if the agreement is permitted to stand, she and her successors will be unable to enter her property except by air or water, and that such condition would render her property worthless.
On October 26, 1962, hearing was had on the motion and on December 7, 1962, the court rendered a decree giving effect to the agreement of August 28, 1962.
Respondent appeals from the decree of December 7, 1962, and assigns its rendition as error.
Appellee moves to dismiss the appeal on three grounds.
First, appellee says that there has been no appeal from the "decree of August 28, 1962, and said decree has become final, more than six months having elapsed since the date thereof."
The paper of August 28, 1962, is entitled:
As we read it, it sets out the terms of an agreement and is not a decree. The agreement is "ratified, adopted, affirmed" by the court, but, however final it may be as an agreement, it looks to the subsequent rendition of a decree and is not itself a decree. We do not think it is in such form that an appeal could be taken from it, and hold that the first ground of appellee's motion to dismiss is not well taken.
Second, appellee says that the appeal is an appeal from a consent decree and a consent decree will not support an appeal, citing Payne v. Graham, 20 Ala. App. 439, 102 So. 729, where the court said: "A consent decree or judgment will not support an appeal." The statement was made in answer to the argument that a certain Mississippi decree had been erroneously admitted into evidence. The Court of Appeals pointed out that "... this decree was never offered in evidence." Whether a decree, which was not offered in evidence, would or would not support an appeal was wholly unnecessary to the decision and is dictum.
Appellee cites also Heath v. Hall, 39 Ala.App. 623, 106 So. 2d 38, where the Court of Appeals held that the appeal should be dismissed because there was "no actual controversy" and it was "impossible for this court to grant any relief because of the proceedings below ...." This is the only Alabama case we have found, or have been cited to, where an appeal from a consent judgment was dismissed.
Heath v. Hall, supra, relies on Gunter v. Hinson, 161 Ala. 536, 50 So. 86, where this court affirmed the decree of the trial court. With reference to a consent judgment, this court said:
In McNeil and Skinner v. State, supra, this court did not dismiss the appeal but affirmed a judgment rendered "by the consent of the appellants," in an action at law.
In Adler v. Van Kirk Land & Const. Co., supra, this court did not dismiss the appeal, but reversed and rendered a decree dismissing a bill to set aside a consent decree.
In Gossett v. Pratt, 250 Ala. 300, 34 So. 2d 145, this court affirmed a consent judgment.
In Grigsby v. Liles, 274 Ala. 67, 147 So. 2d 846, we held that the action of the *63 trial court in vacating consent judgment and granting new trial must be regarded as correct unless such action constitutes an abuse of discretion or is plainly and palpably wrong.
In National Bread Co. v. Bird, 226 Ala. 40, 145 So. 462, this court refused to disturb an order granting a new trial.
In City of Bessemer v. Brantley, 258 Ala. 675, 65 So. 2d 160, on the cross-assignment, this court said:
The authorities cited support the principle that a party cannot be heard to complain of action of the court which was done with the party's consent.
On the basis of the cases noted, we conclude that the proper disposition of an appeal from a consent judgment, which is truly a judgment rendered by agreement of appellant and not due to be disturbed, is to affirm the judgment and not to dismiss the appeal. The second ground of appellee's motion to dismiss is not well taken.
The third ground of appellee's motion to dismiss is that the December decree, here appealed from, is nothing more than a decree denying appellant's motion to set aside "the consent decree of August 28, 1962," citing Grigsby v. Liles, 41 Ala.App. 627, 147 So. 2d 836, as authority that such decree is not appealable.
As already stated, we do not think that the Memorandum of Settlement Between Parties, dated August 28, 1962, is a decree. It must follow that the December decree is not a decree denying a motion to set aside a final decree. Appellee's third ground is not well taken. The motion to dismiss is denied.
Appellee has filed also a motion to strike the assignments of error for indefiniteness and as complaining of matters not assignable for error. Some of the assignments may be insufficient, but others are adequate. Assignments 1 and 6 recite:
These assignments may not be models of good pleading but, we think, they sufficiently point out the error complained of. They complain of the action of the court in rendering the December decree. The motion to strike is denied.
We come to consider appellant's argument on the merits. She says, first, that the decree ought not to stand because she did not agree to the settlement made in court by her attorney on August 28, 1962, and that, because she did not agree to the settlement, it ought not to be binding on her. She states in brief:
It seems clear that on August 28, 1962, appellant was personally present in open court when the settlement agreement was made and dictated to the reporter by counsel. Later, after appellant had employed new counsel and had filed her motion to revoke the agreement, a hearing on her motion to revoke was held in open court on October 26, 1962.
Appellant testified ore tenus at the October hearing. The record indicates that, at the October hearing, appellant's counsel read aloud to her the Memorandum of Settlement, whereupon she testified on direct examination as follows:
On cross-examination, appellant testified as follows:
The map of Garratt's survey is dated September 17, 1962.
From appellant's testimony, it is apparent that she did not, on October 26, agree to the settlement made in August; but, even on October 26, she admitted, on direct examination, that in August, she had "said `yes,'" although "under protest." On cross-examination in October, she testified that in August she had said: "Well if it has to be it has to be."
We are of opinion that appellant's own testimony shows that she was, on August 28, informed of the terms of the settlement and, at that time, agreed to it, although she agreed reluctantly. We think she did consent in August.
We hold that, because appellant consented to the settlement, her contention, that the decree should be reversed on the ground that she did not consent, is not well taken.
On the merits, appellant's second contention is that the consent decree ought not to be allowed to stand because the agreement on which the decree is based deprives appellant, and her successors in title, of any way of ingress or egress by land and she can reach her parcel only by water or air. She argues to the effect that such an agreement is contrary to the public policy and, therefore, ought not to be enforced by the courts.
In this connection, we note appellant's motion to strike appellee's supplemental brief which was filed after oral argument. Appellant says the brief should be stricken because appellee did not file it within ten days after service of appellant's brief and because the proposition of law argued in the supplemental brief was not argued in appellee's original brief.
During oral argument, this writer inquired of counsel whether a landowner could waive or surrender a way of necessity. Appellee's supplemental brief undertakes to answer that question. Proposition 19 in appellee's original brief asserts that a person may waive the benefit of a statute or even of a constitutional provision enacted for his benefit.
When a party has timely filed his original brief, this court has rarely, if ever, refused to receive a supplemental brief that may be helpful. We do not think we should strike a supplemental brief which is filed in response to a question from the court and by a party who has timely filed all previously required briefs. Appellant's motion to strike supplemental brief is denied.
Appellant has cited many cases which have to do with common law and statutory ways of necessity.
In Dutton v. Taylor, 2 Lutw.R. 1487, one of the grounds, on which the existence of a way of necessity is placed, is that it is for the public good that the land be not unoccupied. Lide v. Hadley, 36 Ala. 627.
At common law, the right to a way of necessity does not arise where there is no privity of title. Trump v. McDonnell, 120 Ala. 200, 24 So. 353. § 56, Title 19, appears to eliminate the requirement of privity of title in certain cases outside corporate limits of a municipality. The law of this state does provide that a landowner shall have certain rights to common law and statutory ways of necessity.
We are not here concerned, however, with the question whether appellant, as owner of the seaward end of the peninsula, has a right to a way of necessity across the inland part of the peninsula. This is not a proceeding to acquire or protect a right of way. This proceeding was brought to settle a dispute as to ownership of the entire peninsula. The parties agreed to settle the dispute by dividing the peninsula between them with the condition that the *68 owner of the seaward end should never have a right of way, either by common law or by statute, across the inland part of the peninsula. The question is whether such an agreement may be ratified by the court, or, is such an agreement that it contravenes public policy and is, for that reason, void and unenforceable. Stated another way, may the owner of the seaward end of a peninsula waive and surrender, for himself and successors, the right to a way by land over the remainder of the peninsula?
We have found little, if any, authority in point. See: Thompson on Real Property, 1961 Replacement, § 368, Vol. 2, page 459; Ways of Necessity, Simonton, 25 Columbia L.R. 571, 584, 33 W.Va.L.Q. 64; 19 Oregon L.R. 363. This court has, with approval, quoted the following statements:
Perhaps the strongest authority on the question is a Massachusetts case where the trial court denied petitioner's claim to certain rights of way. On appeal, the appellate court approved the ruling of the trial court and said:
The court said further that a right of way of necessity over the land of the grantor is implied by law "because that is presumed to be the intent of the parties," and
In Doten v. Bartlett, 107 Me. 351, 78 A. 456, 32 L.R.A.,N.S., 1075, the court held that the defendants were bound by the recitals of a deed and mortgage executed by defendants. The court said:
In Haskell v. Wright, 23 N.J.Eq. 389, 396, the court denied a landowner the unrestricted use of a way, saying, "The defendant having accepted the conveyance of this lot, with a restricted right of way, is barred from claiming a larger way as a necessity."
Where part of a salt meadow was sold for a canal, the court held that the grantor, with respect to the remainder of the meadow, had no right to a way of necessity over and across the canal. The court said:
In Powers v. Heffernan, 233 Ill. 597, 84 N.E. 661, 16 L.R.A.,N.S., 523, the court held that the purchaser had a right to use a stairway on an adjoining lot of the grantor, but the court said:
We think there are expressions in the cases next cited which support the principle that parties may, by express agreement, waive and relinquish the right to a way of necessity, to wit: Chappell v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 62 Conn. 195, 24 A. 997, 17 L.R.A. 420; Baldwin Lumber Co. v. Todd, 124 La. 543, 50 So. 526; Myers v. Dunn, 49 Conn. 71; Bascom v. Cannon, 158 Pa. 225, 27 A. 968; Ewert v. Burtis, (N.J.Ch.), 12 A. 893; Lebus v. Boston, 107 Ky. 98, 51 S.W. 609, *70 52 S.W. 956; Golden v. Rupard, 80 S.W. 162, 25 Ky.L.Rep. 2125.
We note the following provision of the settlement agreement in the instant case, to wit:
This provision leads us to conclude that the peninsula is surrounded by tidewater. All tidal streams are, prima facie, public and navigable. Walker v. Allen, 72 Ala. 456.
In Littlefield v. Hubbard, 124 Me. 299, 128 A. 285, 38 A.L.R. 1306, the court noted the rule that where land borders on the ocean, there exists no way of necessity even over a grantor's land, although such passage by water may not be as convenient as a passage by land. Citation to other cases relating to this rule may be found in the annotation.
We point out that we are not here deciding whether the owner of land bounded on three sides by water can obtain a way of necessity over the adjoining land as at common law or by our statute, § 56, Title 19. We do have to decide whether the agreement of such a landowner to release his right to a way over the adjoining land contravenes public policy. Littlefield v. Hubbard, supra, and similar cases indicate that such an agreement does not offend public policy and are cited for that reason.
One further consideration occurs to us. Suppose Parcel No. 1, on the map set out in this opinion, should be found to contain some valuable deposit which could be obtained and utilized only by removing the entire surface of Parcel No. 1 and causing it to be obliterated or covered by water. In such case, would not the owner of Parcel No. 1 have the right to destroy the entire surface so as to obtain the deposit? We think the owner would have that right, and if she does, then she would have the right to do something less than destroying the surface, that is, to relinquish the right of way by land to Parcel No. 1.
No case or statute of which we know forbids a party from surrendering the right to a way of necessity. The right to such a way at common law rests on the implication that the parties intended and agreed to provide for such a way. If such a right rests on the implied agreement of the parties, then, if they are free to contract as they see fit, they must have the right to provide expressly that no way of necessity shall exist.
We are of opinion that the agreement to divide the peninsula did not offend public policy by imposing on the owner of Parcel No. 1, the condition that the owner, for herself and successors in title, should release the right to a way across Parcel No. 2.
Error not being shown, the decree appealed from is affirmed.
Motions denied.
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON, GOODWYN, MERRILL and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.