Title: Herbert v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOHN HERBERT, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 373, 2022 
§ 
§  Court Below–Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. 2005000034 (N) 
§                   
§   
§                
 
Submitted: October 11, 2023 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
November 7, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs, the arguments of counsel, 
and the record on appeal, we conclude that:  
(1)  
Appellant’s conviction should be affirmed on the basis of and for the 
reasons assigned by the Superior Court in its March 17, 2022 memorandum opinion 
and August 8, 2022 memorandum opinion. 
(2) 
Appellant also challenged the sentence imposed by the Superior Court 
in its September 15, 2022 sentencing order.  Appellant argues that the Superior Court 
erred in concluding that 11 Del. C. § 4205A(d)(1) established a five-year minimum 
mandatory sentence for appellant’s conviction for Unlawful Sexual Contact First 
Degree.  After filing this appeal, appellant filed a motion in the Superior Court 
2 
 
raising the same argument.  The trial court deferred ruling on appellant’s motion 
because appellant intended to raise the issue on appeal.1   
(3) 
We conclude that the Superior Court correctly imposed a minimum 
mandatory sentence of five years of unsuspended Level 5 incarceration under 11 
Del. C. § 4205A(d)(1).  Section 4025A concerns additional penalties for serious sex 
offenders or pedophile offenders.  Subsection (d)(1) states that “[n]otwithstanding 
any provision of this chapter or any other laws to the contrary, the Superior Court, 
upon the State’s application, shall sentence a defendant convicted of any crime set 
forth in § 769 or § 783(4) of this title to not less than 5 years to be served at Level V 
if the victim of the crime is a child less than 7 years of age.”  It is undisputed that 
appellant was convicted under 11 Del. C. § 769 for unlawful sexual contact and that 
the victim was less than seven years old at the time of the offense.   
(4) 
Appellant, however, argues that because § 4205A(d)(1) does not 
contain similar language to other statutory provisions that impose minimum 
mandatory sentences, such as the habitual offender statute,2 the Superior Court had 
discretion to suspend some or all of the five-year sentence required by Section 
4205A(d)(1).  Appellant points out that other provisions in Title 11 that impose a 
 
1 See App. to Opening Br. at A404.  
2 The habitual offender statute states, for example, that “[n]otwithstanding any provision of this 
title to the contrary, any minimum sentence required to be imposed . . . shall not be subject to 
suspension by the court, and shall be served in its entirety at full custodial Level V institutional 
setting without the benefit of probation or parole[.]” 11 Del. C. § 4214(e) (emphasis added).  
3 
 
minimum mandatory sentence specifically state that the minimum sentence “shall 
not be subject to suspension.”3  The absence of that language in Section 4205A(d)(1) 
does not, as appellant argues, allow the Superior Court to suspend any portion of the 
five-year minimum sentence.  Here, 11 Del. C. § 4204(d) controls.  It states that 
“[n]otwithstanding anything in this Criminal Code to the contrary, probation or a 
suspended sentence shall not be substituted for imprisonment where the statute 
specifically indicates that a prison sentence is a mandatory sentence, a minimum 
sentence, a minimum mandatory sentence or a mandatory minimum sentence, or 
may not otherwise be suspended.”4  Section 4205A(d)(1) creates a minimum 
sentence for convictions under Section 769, and the trial court therefore did not have 
discretion to sentence appellant to anything less than five years of unsuspended 
Level 5 incarceration.  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED and appellant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence is 
DENIED.  
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
3 See 11 Del. C. §§ 1448(e)(4), 4214(e).  
4 11 Del. C. § 4204(d).