Title: State v. Couch

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: November 9, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
CLARK ZANE COUCH,
Respondent on Review.
(CC MI010414; CA A119570; SC S52288)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 2, 2006.
Denise G. Fjordbeck, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. 
With her on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Foster A. Glass, Bend, argued the cause for respondent on
review.  With him on the briefs was Mark L. Pollot.
Sarah Uhlemann, Rebecca G. Judd, and Jonathan Lovvorn,
Washington D.C., filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae The
Humane Society of the United States.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette,
Durham, Balmer and Kistler, Justices.**
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Jefferson County Circuit Court, Gary S. Thompson, Judge. 196 Or App 665, 103 P3d 671 (2004).
**Riggs, J., retired September 30, 2006, and did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case. 
Walters, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case. 
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
In this case, the issues before the court are (1)
whether nonindigenous, exotic deer, held in private ownership,
can be considered "wildlife" as that term is defined in Oregon's
fish and game statutes; and (2) if not, whether the Oregon Fish
and Wildlife Commission (commission) nevertheless possesses the
authority to regulate such animals.  
The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer to the
district attorney's information that charged defendant with more
than 50 violations of administrative rules related to possessing
or hunting certain kinds of nonindigenous deer in Oregon.  The
trial court reasoned that the deer at issue did not qualify as
"wildlife" under the applicable statutes and that, as a result,
the commission had exceeded its delegated authority in regulating
them through its administrative rules.  The Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that, although the animals at issue indeed did
not qualify as "wildlife," the trial court had erred in
sustaining the demurrer on the basis of facts not alleged in the
information.  State v. Couch, 196 Or App 665, 103 P3d 671 (2004). 
On review, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision, albeit for
different reasons, reverse the trial court's judgment, and remand
this case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
In July 2001, the state filed a district attorney's
information charging defendant with more than 50 misdemeanor
violations involving rules promulgated under Oregon's wildlife
laws. (1)  The caption for each count contained in the
information cited one or another of three state statutes as
providing the bases for each of the charges:  ORS 498.002 (1999),
amended by Or Laws 2003, ch 656, § 10, ORS 498.022, and ORS
496.992, set out respectively.  ORS 498.002(1) (1999) provided:
"Wildlife is the property of the state.  No person
shall angle for, hunt, trap or possess, or assist
another in angling for, hunting, trapping or possessing
any wildlife in violation of the wildlife laws or of
any rule promulgated pursuant thereto."
ORS 498.022 provides, in part:
"Except as the State Fish and Wildlife Commission
by rule may provide otherwise, no person shall
purchase, sell or exchange, or offer to purchase, sell
or exchange any wildlife, or any part thereof."
Finally, ORS 496.992(1) provides:
"Except as otherwise provided by ORS 153.022 and
other law, violation of any provision of the wildlife
laws, or any rule promulgated pursuant thereto, is a
Class A misdemeanor when the offense is committed with
a culpable mental state as defined in  ORS
161.085." (2)   
With regard to the specific charges set out in the
information, the state alleged that defendant had violated the
following Department of Fish and Wildlife rules relating to the
private holding, hunting, or propagation of cervids: (3)  (1)
selling certain cervid species without the required licenses or
permits, OAR 635-049-0020 (2000); (2) possessing two particular
cervid species without the required licenses, OAR 635-049-0020
(2000); and (3) unlawfully hunting, killing, or attempting to
hunt or kill, exotic mammals or game mammals held by a private
party, OAR 635-064-0010 (2000). (4)  The misconduct underlying
each count at issue in this case allegedly occurred in 2000 and
involved either fallow deer, Axis deer, or Sika deer. (5) 
Fallow deer are a species indigenous to Europe and the Middle
East, Axis deer are native to India, and Sika deer are native to
Japan.  All three species are cervids.
In his demurrer, defendant argued that, because the
deer that were the subject of the state's allegations were
captive and nonindigenous, they did not qualify as "wildlife" and
therefore were beyond the scope of the commission's authority to
regulate.  In response, the state argued that the legislature
intended the term "wildlife" to include both indigenous and
nonindigenous species, whether captive and privately owned, or
untamed and unrestrained.
The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer.  It
reasoned that
"wildlife [are] indigenous species that are running
free or swimming free on the lands or the waters of
this state.  In contrast, game mammals being raised on
a game farm within a confined setting and under the
ownership of a property landowner, which are not
indigenous and that are not running free on public and
private lands in this state, are not wildlife per se." 
Building on that foundation, the trial court ultimately concluded
that 
"[t]he regulations that have been passed by the Fish
and Wildlife Commission are ultra vires acts that go
beyond the delegation set forward by the Oregon State
Legislature.  These animals are not wildlife, but
privately owned, exotic species of cervids, held for a
substantial period of time."
The state appealed the order sustaining defendant's
demurrer, and the Court of Appeals reversed.  The Court of
Appeals rejected the state's argument that, under the relevant
statutes, "wildlife" included nonnative deer species held in
captivity.  The Court of Appeals examined the long history of the
term's application in legal matters, as well as this court's
previous decisions regarding "wildlife" regulation, and concluded
that the statutory term "wildlife" referred to "animals ferae
naturae[ (6)] that have not previously been subject to lawful
capture."  Couch, 196 Or App at 678.  Nevertheless, the Court of
Appeals determined that the trial court had erred in sustaining
defendant's demurrer because the allegations contained in the
information did not establish the "manner in which the deer were
brought into this state and whether they have been held by
defendant in lawful, private captivity."  Id. at 679. 
Although the state prevailed on appeal, it nonetheless
petitioned for review in this court, arguing that, while the
Court of Appeals had been correct in reversing the trial court's
order below, the Court of Appeals nevertheless had erred in
holding that, as used in the pertinent statutes, "wildlife"
"refers to "animals ferae naturae that have not previously been
subject to lawful capture."  Id. at 678.  The state also argued
that, even if the Court of Appeals' definition of "wildlife" were
consistent with the legislature's intent, the commission's
authority "to prevent serious depletion of any indigenous species
and to provide the optimum recreational and aesthetic benefits
for present and future generations of the citizens of this state"
was not limited to animals that fell within the scope of that
definition; rather, it included animals such as the deer
identified in the state's charging information.  We allowed the
state's petition for review to determine (1) the intent behind
the legislature's use of the term "wildlife" in the pertinent
statutes; and (2) the effect of that definition on the
commission's authority to regulate the animals and activities at
issue here. (7)  See generally State v. Snyder, 337 Or 410,
415-20, 97 P3d 1181 (2004) (notwithstanding fact that it
prevailed on merits before Court of Appeals, state permitted to
petition for Supreme Court review as to statutory interpretation
issue, because state qualified as aggrieved party and controversy
remained justiciable).
On review, the parties take different paths to arrive
at their respective definitions of "wildlife."  Defendant, for
example, argues that the Court of Appeals properly interpreted
that term as it is used in Oregon's wildlife laws.  The Court of
Appeals began its analysis with ancient Roman law and the
writings of Justinian, then moved through history, drawing from
the sixteenth-century judicial opinions of Lord Coke, the
eighteenth-century writings of William Blackstone, and this
court's early wildlife-related decisions.  Relying on those
resources, the Court of Appeals essentially defined "wildlife" as
all animals existing, uncaptured, in a state of nature, and
emphasized the congruency between the term and its definition by
highlighting the term's use in statutes such as ORS 498.002:
"Thus, when ORS 498.002 declares that '[w]ildlife
is the property of the state,' we may understand that
the reference to 'wildlife' fairly clearly is to
animals ferae naturae over which the state has
sovereignty, subject to the traditional qualification
that the wildlife be 'in a state of nature and at
large,' and not previously subject to lawful capture. 
That always has been the extent of the state's
authority to regulate 'wildlife,' and nothing in the
text or context of the statute suggests that the
legislature intended to depart from that longstanding
tradition."
Couch, 196 Or App at 677-78 (internal citation omitted).  That
is, the Court of Appeals relied on the ownership provision set
out in ORS 498.002 to conclude that all animals existing,
uncaptured, in a state of nature qualified as "wildlife."
The state, on the other hand, contends that we should
give the term "wildlife" its dictionary definition:  "living
things that are neither human nor domesticated; esp: the mammals,
birds, and fishes that are hunted by man for sport or food." 
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2616 (unabridged ed 2002). 
Under that definition, the state argues, "wildlife" clearly would
include the deer species named in the challenged information. 
The state then emphasizes its own perception of congruency
between the term and its proffered definition by asserting that
statutes such as ORS 498.052 would make little sense under a
contrary reading:    
"ORS 498.052 bars the release into the wild of
'domestically raised wildlife.'  If the Court of
Appeals is correct that only free animals are wildlife,
there can be no such thing as 'domestically raised
wildlife.'  The statute makes sense only if it includes
exotic and captive animals."
What both the state and the Court of Appeals have
failed to fully embrace, however, is the fact that the
legislature has expressly defined the term "wildlife" as it is
used within the wildlife statutes.  Consequently, we first must 
examine that definition.  See, e.g., State v. Cox, 336 Or 284,
289, 82 P3d 619 (2003) (inquiry into former jeopardy claim first
focused on legislature's definition of operative offense); SAIF
v. Lewis, 335 Or 92, 97, 58 P3d 814 (2002) (where legislature
statutorily had defined phrase at issue, court's analysis focused
on statutory definition).  The task before us is one of statutory
construction; consequently, we employ the methodology set out in
PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859
P2d 1143 (1993).  Our goal is to discern the intent of the
legislature by examining the statutory text in context.  Id. at
610.
The legislature's definition of "wildlife" is set out
in ORS 496.004(19).  It provides:
"As used in the wildlife laws, unless the context
requires otherwise:
"* * * * *
"(19) 'Wildlife' means fish, shellfish, wild
birds, amphibians and reptiles, feral swine as defined
by State Department of Agriculture rule and other wild
mammals."
The text of that statute represents the starting point of our
analysis.  PGE, 317 Or at 610.  It also represents the best
evidence of the legislature's intent.  Id.  
As a threshold matter, we note that, unlike the
definitions proposed by the Court of Appeals and the state, the
statutory definition of the term "wildlife" does not set out
general characteristics against which every animal can,
regardless of species, be compared and appropriately categorized. 
In other words, the statutes do not declare that "wildlife" means
any animal that retains its wild nature and remains at large, or
is generally hunted for food or sport.  Instead, the plain text
of ORS 496.004(19) first demonstrates that not all animals need
be "wild" to be defined as "wildlife" under the statute.  Of all
the animals listed in ORS 496.004(19), only two kinds must
expressly be "wild" in order to fit within the definition: "wild
birds" and "wild mammals" other than feral swine.  
The wildlife laws do not define "wild."  As a common
word, however, we give the term its "plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning."  Id. at 611.  In this case, the most sensible meaning
of "wild," given its use within the statute, is found in its
primary dictionary definition:  "[L]iving in a state of nature:
inhabiting natural haunts (as the forest or open field): not
tamed or domesticated[.]"  Webster's at 2614.  Consequently only
birds and mammals living untamed or in a state of nature are
considered "wildlife" under ORS 496.004(19).  At the same time,
however, that prerequisite is conspicuously absent with regard to
the remaining animals listed in the statute.  Unlike birds and
mammals, neither fish, shellfish, amphibians, nor reptiles need
be "wild" to qualify as "wildlife" under the definition.  The
result, from a textual perspective, is that, regardless of their
situations in or out of nature, fish, shellfish, amphibians, and
reptiles appear to be wildlife per se for the purposes of ORS
496.004(19). 
Additionally, the current definition of "wildlife" in
the Oregon statutes has developed in such a way that its history
further demonstrates that the definition has not -- in the
legislature's view -- been a static concept.  See Krieger v.
Just, 319 Or 328, 336, 876 P2d 754 (1994) (context of a statute
includes its prior versions).  Prior to 1971, the word was
undefined in Oregon's wildlife laws.  In its stead, the
legislature relied on its definitions for "game animals," ORS
496.006 (1969); "game bird," ORS 496.008 (1969); "game fish,"
496.010; and "fur-bearing animals," ORS 498.095(9) (1969) to help
give meaning to Oregon's fish and game laws.  In 1971, however,
the legislature created the following definition and added it to
those statutes:     
"'[W]ildlife' means game fish, wild mammals except
whales and porpoises, birds, amphibians and reptiles."
ORS 496.006(3) (1971).  In 1989, the legislature amended that
definition to provide, "'[w]ildlife' means fish, wild birds,
amphibians, reptiles and wild mammals," ORS 496.004(15) (1989)
before giving it its present form in 2001.  If nothing else,
those changes illustrate that, for at least the last 35 years,
the meaning of "wildlife" in what is now ORS 496.004(19) has
accommodated the exclusion or inclusion of different elements
according to the legislature's determination of the state's
policy needs.  
That fact, together with the other observations noted above, lead us to conclude that the term "wildlife" means
whatever the legislature says that it means.  As this court noted
in Enertrol Power Monitoring Corp. v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 78,
84, 836 P2d 123 (1992), regarding a similarly amorphous phrase: 
"Given the 'will-o'-the wisp character of the term
"state agency,"' that term 'means whatever the
legislature says it means; its breadth or narrowness
fluctuates according to the legislative definition.'"
The same holds true in this case.  Here, the legislature has
declared that, unless the context requires otherwise, "wildlife"
means "fish, shellfish, wild birds, amphibians and reptiles,
feral swine as defined by State Department of Agriculture rule
and other wild mammals."  We are obliged to apply the
legislature's definition.  As a result, some animals -- birds and
mammals -- indeed must be "wild" to be categorized as wildlife
under the definition in ORS 496.002(19), while other animals --
fish, shellfish, amphibians and reptiles -- need not meet that
requirement.  
That fact is further borne out by the text of ORS
496.705.  Subsection (1) of that statute provides:
"The State Fish and Wildlife Commission may
institute suit for the recovery of damages for the
unlawful taking or killing of any of the wildlife
referred to in subsection (2) of this section that are
the property of the state."
(Emphasis added.)  The statute goes on to list a specific
schedule of civil damages for unlawfully killing a variety of
different animals.  The point is this:  If our construction of
the term "wildlife" were not congruent with its statutory
definition, there would have been no need for the legislature to
specifically limit the reach of ORS 496.705 to "wildlife" that is
the property of the state.  But the legislature did exactly that
and, in the process, underscored the fact that not all animals
need be "wild" to qualify as "wildlife" under the statutory
definition.  Consequently, the Court of Appeals' contrary holding
in that regard is incorrect.  That said, however, the deer at
issue in this case are, indeed, mammals and, in keeping with ORS
496.004(19), must therefore exist untamed and undomesticated in a
state of nature if they are to fall within the ambit of any
statute directed solely at the regulation of "wildlife." 
It is important to note that whether the particular
deer at issue here are "wild" or not is a question that has yet
to be litigated at trial; consequently, we cannot speak
dispositively to the status of those animals in that regard. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the deer in this case are not "wild,"
however, we must answer the question whether Oregon's wildlife
laws nevertheless provide the commission with authority to
regulate such animals.  
The answer to that question is an unqualified "yes." 
Whether regulated as "wildlife" or not, deer clearly fall within
the regulatory authority that the commission has been given over
"game mammals."
"Game mammals," are defined in ORS 496.004(9) as:   
"antelope, black bear, cougar, deer, elk, moose,
mountain goat, mountain sheep and silver gray
squirrel."
Unlike the animals listed in the statutory definition of
"wildlife," the statutory definition of "game mammals" does not
require any of the listed species to be wild, a designation that
the legislature has demonstrated that it is clearly able to make
when it wants to.  Because deer are expressly included in the
"game mammal" definition, it follows that the commission's
authority to regulate nonwild deer species exists in statutes
that focus on game mammal regulation in Oregon.  Under ORS
497.071(1), for example, funds derived from the sale of hunting
and fishing permits are expressly earmarked "to provide adequate
revenue to the State Fish and Wildlife Commission whereby game
mammal herds and game fish populations may be increased for the
benefit of Oregon hunters and anglers."  (Emphasis added.)  More
to the point in this case, ORS 497.228 places strict controls on
any person engaged in the business of propagating game
mammals (8) for sale: 
"(1) No person shall engage in the business of
propagating game birds or game mammals for sale unless
a wildlife propagation license is first obtained from
the State Department of Fish and Wildlife.
"(2) The State Fish and Wildlife Commission may
refuse to issue a license to an applicant if the
commission finds that the conduct of the wildlife
propagation business would tend to be harmful to
existing wildlife populations.
"(3) The commission, by rule, may prescribe
requirements for the care, inspection, transportation
and the sale, taking or other disposition of the game
birds or game mammals and for such record keeping and
reporting procedures as will insure that the
propagation activities are conducted in such manner as
will not be harmful to existing wildlife populations."
Defendant, however, appears to assert that ORS 498.002
-- with its declaration that "[w]ildlife is the property of the
state" -- is more than simply an important source of commission
authority.  In defendant's view, it is apparently the only
source.  He argues that the commission's power therefore extends
to only animals that are the property of the state, not to
animals that are privately owned.  We disagree, for several
reasons.  
First, defendant cites no authority for the proposition
that ORS 498.002 is the only source of the commission's
regulatory authority, and we know of none.  Indeed, if nothing
else, our discussion of game mammals demonstrates that the
wildlife laws contain other sources of authority besides ORS
498.002 under which the legislature has authorized the commission
to act.  Second, defendant's argument is premised on the notion
that "wildlife" can refer to only animals living untamed in a
state of nature.  As we have established, however, that premise
cannot be squared with the plain text of the term's definition in
ORS 496.004(19).  Finally, it is incorrect to assume -- as
defendant implies in his argument -- that the state must own or
have some possessory interest in a thing before it can be
regulated. 
Defendant also argues that the provisions of ORS
497.228, set out above, regulating game mammal propagation confer
something other than a general regulatory authority on the
commission.  Specifically, defendant argues that ORS 497.228 is
simply a recodification of former ORS 497.770 (1971), repealed by
Or Laws 1973, ch 723, § 130, a statute that explicitly recognized
that the degree of authority it imparted to the commission was
limited.  When former ORS 497.770 (1971) was in force, it
required the commission -- on receipt of a nominal five dollar
fee -- to issue permits to virtually any interested individual
allowing them to engage in the business of raising and selling
any kind of game animal in Oregon.  At the time, the statute made
clear that its provisions were intended only
"to aid the game commission in the enforcement of the
state game laws and not to place the game raisers under
the jurisdiction of the game commission." 
Former ORS 497.770(5) (1971).  That statute, however, was not
"recodified" as petitioner asserts; it was repealed in 1973.  Or
Laws 1973, ch 723, § 130.  That same year, the legislature
enacted ORS 497.228, and with it a regulatory scheme that was
considerably more robust that its predecessor.  Not only was the
commission now authorized to deny propagation licenses when to do
otherwise would harm existing wildlife populations, it also was
empowered to create requirements for the care, inspection,
transportation, and ultimate disposition of game mammals.  Those
changes do not suggest that the legislature intended ORS
497.228 (9) to be an extension of business as usual under
former ORS 497.770 (1971); indeed the opposite is true, and
defendant is mistaken when he argues otherwise. 
We summarize our disposition of this case as follows.  
First, "wildlife" means what the legislature stated in ORS
496.004(19).  The Court of Appeals erred in fashioning a
definition for the term that deviated from the text of that
statute.  Second, the commission possesses the authority to
regulate deer in Oregon either as "wildlife," ORS 496.004(19), or
as a "game mammal," ORS 496.004(9).  Finally, we note that
defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the charging
instrument based on federal constitutional law. (10)  The
nature of the rulings below, however, made it unnecessary for
either the trial court or Court of Appeals to address those
issues, and we decline to consider them now without a more fully
developed record.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. The phrase "wildlife laws" has a specific meaning under
Oregon law.  It is the short title for the statutes set forth in
the Oregon Revised Statutes, chapters 496, 497, 498, and 501. 
See ORS 496.002 (so stating). 
2. We note that the captions for counts 48-50 in the
information refer to "ORS 496.99."  We assume that to be a
scrivener's error, because no such statute exists.  Such a
mistake, however, does not invalidate those counts, because the
charging part of the information adequately sets out the crime
charged.  See State v. Briggen, 112 Or 681, 683, 231 P 125 (1924)
(to determine crime charged, court looked to charging part of
indictment, not caption). 
3. OAR 635-045-0002(12) (2000) defined "cervid" as "any
member of the family cervidae (deer), including gametes or
hybrids."  
4. OAR 635-049-0020 (2000) provided, in part: "It is
prohibited to possess, purchase, sell, exchange or otherwise hold
any cervid or part thereof in the state of Oregon unless
specifically excepted" by rule.
OAR 635-064-0010 (2000) provided, in part: "It is
unlawful to hunt, kill, or attempt to hunt or kill, exotic
mammals * * * or game mammals * * * held or obtained by private
parties[.]"  However, OAR 635-064-0010 (2000) did allow such
animals to be (1) slaughtered for meat or fur production; (2)
euthanized as a result of health, safety, science, or valid
husbandry concerns; and (3) hunted following an expressed
authorization from the Wildlife Division Director. 
5. One additional count alleged that defendant unlawfully
had possessed elk in violation of OAR 635-049-0020.  Because the
trial court did not dismiss that count and the trial court's
decision regarding that count has not been assigned as error on
appeal, it is not relevant to our discussion. 
6. "Animals ferae naturae" means animals that retain their
wild nature.  Black's Law Dictionary 87 (6th ed 1990).   
7. Neither the state nor the defendant claims error
respecting the Court of Appeals decision regarding the legal
sufficiency of the information.  
8. The term "propagate" is undefined in Oregon's wildlife
laws.  We note that that word ordinarily means both to "increase
by natural reproduction" and to "foster the spread of" something. 
See Webster's at 1817 (so stating).  
9. Save for the fact that it no longer refers to "game
fish," ORS 497.228 remains in force today in essentially the same
form as it did when it was enacted in 1973.
10. Specifically, defendant argues that the regulations at
issue in this case both violate the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution, Article I, section 8, clause 3, and have
been preempted by existing federal laws and regulations.