Title: Vermont Golf Association, Inc. v. Department of Taxes

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Vermont Golf Association, Inc. v.
Department of Taxes (2011-220)
 
2012 VT 68
 
[Filed 10-Aug-2012]
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is
subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision
before publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@state.vt.us or by
mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont
05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this
opinion goes to press.
 
 
2012 VT 68 
 
No. 2011-220
 
Vermont Golf Association, Inc.
Supreme Court
 
 
 
On Appeal from
     v.
Superior Court, Rutland Unit,
 
Civil Division
 
 
Department of Taxes
December Term, 2011
 
 
 
 
Mary
  Miles Teachout, J.
 
Paul S. Kulig, Stephen E. Crowley,
and John P. Crowley (On the Brief) of Kulig &
Sullivan,
  P.C., Rutland, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
 
William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Danforth Cardozo,
III and John P. McAllister,
  Assistant Attorneys General,
Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee.
 
 
PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J.,
Dooley, Skoglund, Burgess and Robinson, JJ.
 
 
¶ 1.            
SKOGLUND, J.   Vermont Golf Association challenges the
superior court's dismissal of its appeal from a decision by the Department of Taxes assessing sales and use tax on prior
activities.  The court based its dismissal on Vermont Golf's failure to
provide security to the Commissioner of Taxes to perfect its appeal to the
superior court pursuant to 32 V.S.A. § 9817.  We affirm.
¶ 2.            
Vermont Golf sponsors golf tournaments throughout the state. 
Golfers pay entry fees to Vermont Golf, which thereafter pays "greens fees" to
the golf courses on which the tournaments are held.  The Department
audited Vermont Golf for the period from March 2001 through February 2008 and
assessed sales and use tax on the entry fees.  Vermont Golf contested this
assessment, and the Department credited it with the tax it had paid on the
"greens fees."  Beginning in March 2008, Vermont Golf, under protest,
remitted to the Department the sales tax on the full amount of each entry fee
it collected.  Following a hearing, the Commissioner of Taxes concluded
that the entry fees were subject to sales and use tax.
¶ 3.            
After Vermont Golf appealed to the superior court, the Department
notified Vermont Golf that if it failed to pay security pursuant to
§ 9817, the Department could move to dismiss the appeal.  Vermont
Golf did not provide security, and the Department moved to dismiss.  The
superior court concluded that § 9817 mandates security to pursue an
appeal, and the court extended the time in which Vermont Golf could provide it. 
At that point, Vermont Golf offered to give a security interest in its assets,
but the Department rejected this offer and renewed its motion to dismiss. 
Vermont Golf filed a motion under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 74(c) for a
stay of the Commissioner's decision.  
¶ 4.            
The superior court denied the stay and granted
the Department's motion to dismiss the case.  The court ruled that
Vermont Golf had not complied with § 9817, which it concluded requires security
to be posted to perfect an appeal.  The court determined that Vermont Golf
was required to choose one of three options for providing security: paying the
deficiency, depositing the amount of the deficiency with the Commissioner, or
filing a bond with the Commissioner in the amount of the deficiency. 
Vermont Golf's offer of a security interest did not, in the court's view,
satisfy the statute.  Thus, the court held that even if the court ordered
a stay, Vermont Golf's failure to provide security was a jurisdictional defect
precluding the appeal from going forward.  Accordingly, it granted the
motion to dismiss.  This appeal followed.
¶ 5.            
Vermont Golf argues that: (1) failure to give security pending appeal is
not a condition of an appeal compelling dismissal; (2) in the alternative, if
security pending appeal is required, post-audit taxes remitted to the
Department are a sufficient basis to allow an appeal; and (3) if security
pending appeal is not required, the court abused its discretion in denying its
motion for a stay.  The State contends that: (1) in order to pursue an
appeal, § 9817(a) requires taxpayers to "give security, approved by the
Commissioner, conditioned to pay the tax levied"; (2) post-audit remittance of
taxes is insufficient to obtain judicial review because the statute requires
security in the amount of the deficiency; and (3) the court correctly denied
Vermont Golf's request for a stay because the requirement that it give security
before review was not an "agency decision" under V.R.C.P. 74(a).
¶ 6.            
Section 9817 of Title 32 provides as follows:
(a)
Any aggrieved taxpayer may, within 30 days after any decision, order, finding,
assessment or action of the commissioner made under this chapter, appeal to the
superior court. The appellant shall give security, approved by the
commissioner, conditioned to pay the tax levied, if it remains unpaid, with
interest and costs, as set forth in subsection (c) of this section.
 
(b) The appeal provided by this section shall be
the exclusive remedy available to any taxpayer for review of a decision of the
commissioner determining the liability of the taxpayer for the taxes imposed.
 
(c) Irrespective of any restrictions on the
assessment and collection of deficiencies, the commissioner may assess a deficiency
after the expiration of the period specified in subsection (a) of this section,
notwithstanding that a notice of appeal regarding the deficiency has been filed
by taxpayer, unless the taxpayer, prior to the time the notice of appeal is
filed, has paid the deficiency, has deposited with the commissioner the amount
of the deficiency, or has filed with the commissioner a bond (which may be a
jeopardy bond) in the amount of the portion of the deficiency (including
interest and other amounts) in respect of which review is sought and all costs
and charges which may accrue against the taxpayer in the prosecution of the
proceeding, including costs of all appeals, and with surety approved by the
superior court, conditioned upon the payment of the deficiency (including
interest and other amounts) as finally determined and all costs and charges. If
as a result of a waiver of the restrictions on the assessment and collection of
a deficiency any part of the amount determined by the commissioner is paid
after the filing of the appeal bond, the bond shall, at the request of the
taxpayer, be proportionately reduced.
 
(Emphasis added.)
 
¶ 7.            
"When interpreting a statute, our principal goal is to effectuate the
intent of the Legislature."  Tarrant v. Dep't of
Taxes, 169 Vt. 189, 197, 733 A.2d 733, 739 (1999).  If
legislative intent is clear from the plain language of the statute, "the
statute must be enforced according to its terms" without resorting to other
aids to statutory construction.  Id.  If the statute is
ambiguous, however, "legislative intent must be
determined through consideration of the entire statute, including its subject
matter, [and] its effects and consequences."  Tarrant, 169 Vt. at
197, 733 A.2d  at 739.  Although ambiguous taxation statutes are generally
construed in favor of the taxpayer, "absent compelling indication of error, the
interpretation of a statute by the administrative body responsible for its
execution will be sustained on appeal."  Morton Bldgs., Inc. v. Vt. Dep't of Taxes, 167 Vt. 371, 374,
705 A.2d 1384, 1386 (1997) (quotations omitted).
¶ 8.            
The first sentence of § 9817(a) provides that any aggrieved taxpayer
"may" appeal the Commissioner's decision to the superior court within thirty days
of the decision, and the second sentence of the subsection states that the
appellant "shall give security" as set forth in subsection (c) "if it [the
assessed tax] remains unpaid, with interests and costs."  Although the two
conditions of an appealfiling a notice of appeal within thirty days and
posting securityare set forth in two separate sentences in subsection (a)
rather than in one sentence, as in a previous iteration of the statute, the
subsection plainly makes the posting of security mandatory to perfect an appeal
to the superior court.
¶ 9.            
"Where a statute specifies acts to be done by parties to entitle them to
maintain an action or to perfect an appeal, it is generally mandatory."  3
J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57:23 (7th ed. 2011); see id.
§ 57:15 (stating that statutory provisions "specifying steps necessary to
perfect appeal are mandatory").  Here, § 9817(a) mandates the posting of
security for an appeal to the superior court.  Thus, failure to post
security is a fatal defect, regardless of whether we consider it to be
jurisdictional in nature.  Compare Holden v. Campbell, 101 Vt. 474,
476, 144 A. 455, 456 (1929) ("[W]hen the Legislature creates a remedy
contingent upon its being asserted within a specified period of time or in a
prescribed manner, such requirements must be substantially complied with in
order to give the court jurisdiction.") with Jos. L. Muscarelle
Dev. Co. v. Manalapan TP, 13 N.J. Tax Ct. 330, 335 (1993) (holding that,
whether viewed as jurisdictional or merely quasi-jurisdictional defect, statute
required that specified portion of taxes be paid "in order to maintain the
appeal").
¶ 10.         In
short, § 9817(a) allows any aggrieved taxpayer to appeal to the superior court,
but the taxpayer must provide security approved by the Commissioner to cover
any tax that remains unpaid.  The statute requires that the taxpayer
either pay the tax assessed or post approved security as a mandatory condition
to appeal the Commissioner's decision to the superior court.  "Many states
have pay-to-play' statutes, which generally require that a tax be paid before
it can be contested in court."  D. Young, Challenging State and Local
Taxes on Constitutional Grounds, 10 J. Multistate Tax'n
& Incen. 12, 21 (2000). 
Requiring the paying of a tax before obtaining judicial review does not violate
due process.  See Hoffer v. Ancel,
2004 VT 38, ¶ 14, 176 Vt. 630, 852 A.2d 592 (mem.) (noting that United States Supreme Court made clear
in McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 36-37 (1990) stating that "due process is fully secured by a system that
requires the taxpayer to pay the tax before having a right to contest it by way
of refund"); see Akins v. Miss. Dep't of Rev., 70 So. 3d 204, 209 (Miss. 2011) (citing McKesson and noting that
requiring payment of tax "before seeking judicial review has been held to
provide taxpayers with a fair opportunity to challenge the validity of the
tax").
¶ 11.         Vermont
Golf does not dispute the State's representation in this appeal that the
Department of Taxes has always construed § 9817, as well as similar provisions
relating to taxes on tobacco products and rooms and meals, as pay-to-play
statutes.  Further, Vermont Golf concedes that the language of § 9817(a)
prior to 1998when the statute was amended to reflect its current
languagerequired the posting of security to go forward with an appeal,
notwithstanding any inconsistency in the language of § 9817(c). 
Vermont Golf contends, however, that the Legislature intended the 1998
amendment to eliminate the requirement that security be posted to proceed with
an appeal to the superior court.  We disagree.
¶ 12.         The
prior version of § 9817(a), enacted in 1969, see 1969, No. 144, § 1, was one
long sentence providing that an aggrieved taxpayer could "appeal to the
superior court, by filing a petition of appeal with the superior court
as prescribed by law and on giving security . . . as set forth in
subsection (c)."  32 V.S.A. § 9817(a) (1991) (emphasis added).  We
agree with Vermont Golf that this earlier version of § 9817(a) required the
posting of security to proceed with an appeal to the superior court.  Cf. Baird
v. State Dep't of Rev., 545 So. 2d 804, 805-06 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1989) (construing similar language to mean that "the taxpayer must comply
with each condition precedent [including posting bond] in order to perfect an
appeal to the circuit court").
¶ 13.         The
pay-to-play nature of the statute is even more explicit if we examine the
language of the statute before 1969.  Prior to adoption of the "by filing"
language, the relevant statute provided in a separate sentence that the court
"shall take from the appellant a bond or recognizance to the state, with
surety, to prosecute the appeal to effect."  32 V.S.A. § 9275
(1968) (emphasis added).  There can be no misunderstanding: the
Legislature considered the posting of security mandatory for proceeding with an
appeal.  As shown below, there is no indication that the Legislature since
then has expressed an intent to change this policy.
¶ 14.         According
to Vermont Golf, the 1998 Amendment, in which the current language of § 9817(a)
was adopted, eliminated the security requirement for perfecting an appeal by
placing that requirement in a second sentence separate from the first sentence
containing the right to appeal.  That is plainly not the case, however, as
demonstrated by the purpose statement inserted with the 1998 amendment and by
the legislative history of that amendment.  The purpose section to Act
161, which amended § 9817 along with many other statutes dealing with appeals
from administrative agencies to courts, states as follows:
  It is the
intent of the general assembly that this act shall clarify existing law and
practice by providing uniform language regarding appeals.  The act
is not intended to make substantive changes to the law.  The act
leaves questions such as choice between jury trial or
court trial, de novo or on the record appeal, and scope of review to specific
statutory provisions or prior practice governing appeals from particular
agencies, including rules of court procedure.
 
1997, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1
(emphasis added).  This statement of purpose unambiguously evinces a
legislative intent merely to clarify existing law and practice while providing
uniformity to language regarding appeals from administrative agencies to
courtswithout making any substantive changes to the law.
¶ 15.         Arguing
that the new language inserted by the 1998 amendment concerns procedural rather
than substantive matters, Vermont Golf would have us believe that, despite this
statement of purpose, the Legislature intended the new language to change §
9817 from a pay-to-play statute into one that does not make the posting of
security mandatorya reading contrary to the Department of Taxes' longstanding
interpretation of the statute that it is empowered to execute.  Whether
the change resulting from the 1998 amendment is labeled substantive or
procedural in nature, construing it as eliminating the pay-to-play status of §
9817 would unquestionably impose a significant change to the meaning of the
statute as long construed by the Department of Taxesa change involving
important public policy interests.  See F.M. Burlington Co. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 134 Vt. 515, 518, 365 A.2d 531, 533
(1976) (stating that § 9817 is "a special statute" vitally affecting
public interests involving imposition and collection of taxes).
¶ 16.         Because
of § 9817's special status, we held in F.M. Burlington, that "the
taxpayer's right of appeal" is governed, with respect to the availability of
extensions of time to appeal, by § 9817, as opposed to the more general appeals
statute and Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, which allow requests for
extensions of time to appeal.  Id.  We were persuaded by the
fact that the later-enacted general appeals statute included "no legislative
intention providing an extension of the specific time limitations contained in
a proceeding arising out of the special legislation creating the sales and use
tax."  Id.  We reasoned that a later general appeals statute
"not expressly contradicting" the earlier specific one could "not be considered
as intended to affect the more particular or positive previous provisions,
unless it is absolutely necessary to give the latter act such a
construction."  Id. at 518-19, 365 A.2d  at 533
(quotation omitted).  Here, of course, with a far more substantive
change at stake, this rule of construction should have even greater force.
¶ 17.         This
case has similarities to Perry v. Med. Practice Bd., 169 Vt. 399, 737 A.2d 900 (1999).  There, we concluded that the Medical Practice Board had
the authority to deny a request to withdraw an application for a medical
license.  Id. at 405, 737 A.2d  at 905. 
The appellant argued that a subsequent 1997 amendment to the relevant statute
explicitly giving the board the power to deny a request to withdraw an
application demonstrated that such power had been previously lacking.  We
stated that to attain the "fundamental objective" of discerning and
implementing legislative intent, we would "look to the words of the statute
itself, the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment,
and the legislative policy it was designed to implement."  Id. at
406, 737 A.2d  at 905; see Dep't of Bldgs. &
Gen. Servs., 2003 VT 92, ¶ 14, 176 Vt. 41, 838 A.2d 78 ("We have frequently relied upon legislative history where the meaning
of the statute cannot be determined from the words alone."); MacDonough-Webster Lodge No. 26 v. Wells,
2003 VT 70, ¶ 6, 175 Vt. 382, 834 A.2d 25 ("In circumstances where the purpose
and significance of a statute are unclear, we look to the statute's legislative
history to shed light' on its meaning.").
¶ 18.         Examining
the 1997 amendment in Perry, we noted: (1) the amendment "was part of a
larger, omnibus bill revising and standardizing the procedures that govern the
regulation of thirty-four separate occupations and professions"; (2) the board
had a prior, longstanding policy of disallowing requests to withdraw
medical-license applications except under certain limited circumstances; and
(3) a memorandum contemporaneous to the amendment from the Director of the
Office of Professional Regulation described the relevant part of the amendment
as a provision to clarify existing law and practice.  169 Vt. at 406, 737 A.2d  at 905.  We concluded that "[t]hese circumstances strongly support[ed]
an inference that the amendment was intended to clarify the meaning and scope
of the Board's regulatory authority, not to change it."  Id. at
406-07, 737 A.2d  at 906.
¶ 19.         In
this case, no inference is required.  The Legislature explicitly declared
that the statute was intended only to clarify existing law and practice. 
As in Perry, the amendment was part of an omnibus bill with twenty-five
separate sections involving appeals from a wide range of administrative
agencies.  See 1997, Act 161 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1-25.  The driving
force behind the bill was the judiciary's Civil Rules Committee, whose chairman
explained to the Senate Judiciary Committee that attorneys had complained over
the years about the bewildering array of procedures and antiquated language
involving appeals from various administrative agencies.  The chairman
further stated that the bill was aimed at getting rid of arcane language and
procedures and making it clear to attorneys and clients where and when to take
an appeal.  Judicial Review of Administrative Actions: Hearing on H.30 Before Senate Judiciary Comm., 1997-1998 Bien. Sess. (Vt. January 16, 1998).  Indeed, the purpose
statement eventually enacted as part of Act 161 was proposed to the House
Judiciary Committee by the chairman of the rules committee to make it
absolutely clear that the amendment was intended only to clarify existing law
and not to affect any substantive rights.  Judicial Review of
Administrative Actions: Hearing on H.30 Before Senate
Judiciary Comm., 1997-1998 Bien. Sess. (Vt. May 2, 1997).
¶ 20.         Moreover,
the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, where Act 161 originated, told
the Senate Judiciary Committee that this was "strictly a housekeeping bill"
that affected "no substantive rights" but rather was aimed only at "clean[ing] up language that does not conform to the standard way
of describing how an appeal is taken."  Judicial Review of Administrative
Actions: Hearing on H.30 Before Senate Judiciary
Comm., 1997-1998 Bien. Sess. (Vt. May 2, 1997 and March 31,
1998).  The chairman advised that the Civil Rules Committee had
solicited input from all of the affected departments, including the Department
of Taxes.  The general counsel for the Department of Taxes told the Senate
Judiciary Committee that she was familiar with the changed language in the
three sections concerning taxes on tobacco products, meals and rooms, and sales
and use, and that she supported the changes, which were aimed at getting rid of
arcane and antiquated language.  Judicial Review of Administrative
Actions: Hearing on H.30 Before Senate Judiciary
Comm., 1997-1998 Bien. Sess. (Vt. May 2, 1997).
¶ 21.         Nowhere
in the legislative history of the bill over a span of two legislative sessions
is there any discussion of altering the Department of Taxes' longstanding
interpretation of § 9817 (or other comparable provisions dealing with taxes on
tobacco products and rooms and meals) as pay-to-play statutes requiring the
posting of security to proceed with an appeal to the superior court. 
Notably, in simplifying the language in the tax statutes, the 1998 amendment
removed not only the "by filing" phrase that Vermont Golf concedes made it a
pay-to-play statute, but also the phrase "to prosecute the appeal to effect" in
the tobacco products and meals and rooms statutes, which even more explicitly
demonstrated the pay-to-play aspect of those statutes.  1997, Act 161, §§
22-23.  It is inconceivable that the Legislature intended to make such a
significant policy change affecting substantial rights, as well as the public fisc, without any discussion of such a change.
¶ 22.         According
to Vermont Golf, by standardizing all appeals from administrative agencies to
courts, the Legislature meant for the civil and appellate rules, including
Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 74 and Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 3,
to be followed.  Under Rule 74(b), an appeal is taken by filing a notice
of appeal with the court in a manner as provided by Appellate Rules 3 and
4.  Vermont Golf points out that, under Rule 3, an appellant's failure to
take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal "does not
affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such actions as the
Supreme Court deems appropriate, which include dismissal of the appeal."
¶ 23.         The
short answer to this argument is that these are procedural rules,
and the specific statutory requirement of posting security in § 9817(a), which
affects substantial rights, trumps a procedural rule requirement. 
Subsection 9817(a) establishes a specific, required statutory antecedent for an
appeal from a tax assessment to go forward.  The failure to post security
may not deprive the court of its subject matter jurisdiction, see In re
Guardianship of L.B., 147 Vt. 82, 84, 510 A.2d 1319, 1321 (1986) (noting
that under V.R.A.P. 3 timely filing of notice of appeal is only procedural step
that is jurisdictional, and holding that dismissal for failure to timely file
statement of questions for appellate review does not require dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds), but it conditions a taxpayer's right to proceed with
the appeal on meeting the specific statutory requirement of posting security in
the manner set forth in § 9817(c).
¶ 24.         Vermont
Golf's main argument in support of its position that § 9817(a) does not require
the posting of security as a condition to appeal to the superior court is that
compelling security as a condition to appeal is inconsistent with § 9817(c),
which contains language suggesting a scenario in which an appeal could go
forward without the security having been paid.  The first problem with
this position is that the language of § 9817(c) that Vermont Golf relies upon
was the same in relevant part before the 1998 amendment, and yet, as noted,
Vermont Golf readily concedes that § 9817(a) was a pay-to-play statute requiring
the posting of security to perfect an appeal before the Legislature supposedly
eliminated that aspect of the law with Act 161.  As demonstrated above,
the 1998 amendment did not affect § 9817 in any substantive way. 
Therefore, any inconsistency between subsections (a) and (c) is overcome by the
plain language of subsection (a) and the certainty that the 1998 amendment was
not intended to change its meaning.
¶ 25.         Moreover,
the State provided a reasonable explanation for any inconsistency.  As the
State notes, subsections (a) and (c) have distinct purposes in the
statute.  Subsection (a) makes the posting of security mandatory to
proceed with the appeal, while subsection (c) specifies the three possible
forms of the security that may be posted, provides for reducing the security in
specified circumstances, and allows the Department to assess a deficiency after
the expiration of the appeal period if security has not been posted,
notwithstanding a notice of appeal.  The last point is redundant and
perhaps inconsistent with respect to the requirement that security be posted
for the taxpayer to go forward with an appeal.  But, as the State points
out, any redundancy or inconsistency appears to result from the fact that some
of the language of subsection (c) was adopted wholesale from a federal statute
that is part of a different system in which, unlike in Vermont, an assessment
is imposed after rather than before a notice of deficiency and legal
proceedings.
¶ 26.         For
the same reason, Vermont Golf's reliance on federal law is misplaced. 
Vermont Golf relies upon case law construing a federal statute from which some
of the language of subsection (c) is taken.  But § 9817(a), not § 9817(c),
is the subsection that establishes the statute's pay-to-play status.  See Rock
v. Dep't of Taxes, 170 Vt. 1, 8, 742 A.2d 1211, 1216-17 (1999) (cautioning
against construing analogous federal provisions so as to extend their force and
operation "beyond the clear import of the language and legislative
intent).  For all of the above reasons, we uphold the superior court's
dismissal of Vermont Golf's appeal from the Commissioner's decision based on
Vermont Golf's failure to post security in the matter required by § 9817.
¶ 27.         Vermont
Golf argues in the alternative that the appeal should be allowed to go forward
based on its post-audit taxes remitted under protest beginning in March 2008
after the Commissioner's ruling.  The State counters that the procedure
for providing security to stay an assessment is designed to protect the State's
financial interest in taxes which have been assessed, not possible future tax
liabilities or, as in this case, taxes paid by Vermont Golf after the audit.
¶ 28.         As
noted above, § 9817(c) provides that a taxpayer must pay the deficiency,
deposit the amount of the deficiency with the Commissioner, or file a bond "in
the amount of the portion of the deficiency (including interest and other
amounts) in respect of which review is sought and all costs and charges." 
The statute refers to "the deficiency" as the deficiency being appealed by the
taxpayer.  Here, the Commissioner's decision affirmed the Department's
assessment.  Thus, to stay the assessment, Vermont Golf had to pay the amount for which it was found liable in the
Commissioner's decision, deposit that amount with the Commissioner, or file a
bond in the amount of which Vermont Golf sought review.  Vermont Golf's
post-audit payment of taxes is irrelevant to this analysis.
¶ 29.         Finally,
we need not address Vermont Golf's argument that the superior court's denial of
its motion to stay should be overturned for abuse of discretion, given our
holding that § 9817 requires the posting of security to perfect an appeal
to the superior court.
Affirmed. 
 
 
FOR THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate Justice
 
 
¶ 30.         ROBINSON,
J., concurring.   I concur in the
majority's conclusion based on the evolution of the language of 32 V.S.A. §
9817 since its inception, as well as its application in practice through that
time, that the statute does, indeed, establish a so-called "pay-to-play" regime
in connection with appeals to the superior court of decisions of the
commissioner relating to the sales and use tax.  I write separately,
however, because I believe the majority's conclusion that the plain language of
the statute compels this result fails to consider the statute as a whole, and
thus gives short shrift to the internal contradictions in the text of the
statute.
¶ 31.         In
order to determine the intent of the legislature, we "must examine and consider
fairly, not just isolated sentences or phrases, but the whole and every part of
the statute . . . together with other statutes standing in pari
materia with it, as parts of a unified statutory
system."  State v. Jarvis, 146 Vt. 636, 637-38,
509 A.2d 1005, 1006 (1986) (quotation omitted).  "We have long
presumed that all language in a statute or regulation is inserted for a
purpose,' and that we must not allow a significant part of a statute to be
rendered surplusage or irrelevant.' "  In
re Miller, 2009 VT 36, ¶ 14, 185 Vt. 550, 975 A.2d 1226 (citation
omitted).  
¶ 32.         The
majority is right that 32 V.S.A. § 9817(a) requires an aggrieved taxpayer who
files an appeal to give security, although the subsection in its current form
does not expressly state that payment of the security is a prerequisite to
maintaining an appeal, or that the penalty for failure to post security is
dismissal.  Meanwhile, 32 V.S.A. § 9817(c) provides, in relevant part,
that the commissioner may assess a deficiency after the appeal period runs
"notwithstanding that a notice of appeal regarding the deficiency has been
filed by the taxpayer, unless the taxpayer, prior to the time the notice of
appeal is filed, has [provided security]."  That provision expressly
contemplates and addresses the scenario in which a taxpayer has filed an
appeal, but has not provided security.  If provision of security is
an essential prerequisite to maintaining an appeal, then this portion of 32
V.S.A. 9817(c) is surplusage.  On the other hand, in order to give effect
to this language in subsection (c), we would have to conclude that the statute
is not "pay-to-play," thereby rendering the second sentence of
subsection (a), which requires an appellant to give security, pointlessor at
least quite oddly-placed.  
¶ 33.         In
short, the statute as currently written is internally inconsistent.  As a
result of this ambiguity, we are called upon to conduct the more searching
exploration of legislative intent, including the history and evolution of the
statute, ably undertaken by the majority in this case.  MacDonough-Webster Lodge No. 26 v. Wells,
2003 VT 70, ¶ 6, 175 Vt. 382, 834 A.2d 25 ("In circumstances where the purpose
and significance of a statute are unclear we look to the statute's legislative
history to shed light on its meaning." (quotations
omitted)).  I write separately in the hope that express acknowledgment of
the ambiguity in 32 V.S.A. § 9817 may lead to clarifying revisions.
¶ 34.         I am
authorized to state that Chief Justice Reiber joins
this concurrence.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate
  Justice