Title: Slaton v. Slaton

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Jeffrey Lyle SLATON v. Teresa Austin SLATON

97-337                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered October 16, 1997


1.   Appeal & error -- petition for review -- no deference to ruling of court
     of appeals. -- Upon granting a petition for review, the supreme
     court reviews the case as if the appeal was originally filed
     in the supreme court and gives no deference to the ruling
     rendered by the court of appeals.

2.   Appeal & error -- abstract deficiencies -- motion to strike irrelevant
     portions of abstract granted. -- Where the portions of appellant's
     abstract of the original divorce decree regarding the grounds
     for divorce and why custody was initially granted to appellant
     were irrelevant to the issues on appeal, the supreme court did
     not consider them.

3.   Appeal & error -- abstract deficiencies -- appellee's motion for costs to
     supplement deficiencies denied. -- The supreme court denied
     appellee's motion for costs incurred to supplement the
     deficiencies in appellant's abstract because the court found
     it impossible to separate the time and costs for the
     supplemental abstract portions essential only to the appeal
     itself.

4.   Jurisdiction -- custody and support -- continuing-jurisdiction argument had
     no merit. -- The chancery court has continuing jurisdiction to
     modify child-support and custody orders only when the moving
     party has demonstrated a change in circumstances requiring
     modification; where appellee failed to state in her motion for
     reconsideration that the circumstances had changed such that
     modification was required, the supreme court found no merit in
     appellee's continuing-jurisdiction argument.

5.   Motions -- liberal construction. -- Motions should be liberally
     construed, and courts should not be blinded by titles but
     should look to the substance of motions to ascertain what they
     seek.

6.   Motions -- appellee's motion for reconsideration was motion for new trial.
     -- Where appellee claimed in her motion for reconsideration
     that the divorce decree was contrary to the preponderance of
     the evidence, which is a specifically enumerated ground for a
     new trial under Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6), the supreme court
     held that appellee's pleading was a motion for a new trial.

7.   Appeal & error -- argument will not be considered for first time on
     appeal. -- An argument not raised before the trial court will
     not be considered for the first time on appeal.

8.   New trial -- order expressed in general terms affirmed if supported on any
     ground alleged. -- When an order granting a new trial is
     expressed in general terms without a specification of grounds,
     it must be affirmed if it can be supported on any ground
     alleged in the motion.

9.   New trial -- trial court's order did not grant appellee's request for. --
     The supreme court held that the trial court's order did not
     grant appellee's request for a new trial pursuant to Ark. R.
     Civ. P. 59(a)(6) where it was apparent from the court's order
     and its comments during the subsequent hearing that the trial
     court was attempting to stay the effect of the divorce decree
     so that it could hear additional evidence rather than review
     the evidence it heard at the initial divorce hearing as
     requested by appellee in her Rule 59(a)(6) motion. 

10.  New trial -- Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6) motion cannot bring into record that
     which does not otherwise appear. -- An Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6)
     motion cannot be used to bring into the record that which does
     not otherwise appear in the record.

11.  Jurisdiction -- new-trial motion deemed denied -- trial court did not have
     jurisdiction to enter modified order under Ark. R. Civ. P. 59. -- Because
     the trial court did not act upon appellee's motion for a new
     trial within thirty days as required by Ark. R. App. P. 4(c),
     the motion was deemed denied, and the trial court did not have
     jurisdiction under Ark. R. Civ. P. 59 to enter its order
     modifying the original divorce decree.

12.  Jurisdiction -- modification of order -- when court loses jurisdiction. --
     A trial court loses jurisdiction to set aside or modify an
     order pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(b) if it does not do so
     within ninety days of the entry of the original order.

13.  Jurisdiction -- modification of order -- trial court did not have
     jurisdiction to enter modified order under Ark. R. Civ. P. 60. --
     Although a trial court may modify or set aside its order
     beyond the ninety-day limitation contained in Ark. R. Civ. P.
     60(b) if the specifically enumerated conditions listed in Rule
     60(c) exist, there was nothing in the record to suggest that
     those conditions existed in this case, nor were they argued
     below or upon appeal; thus, the supreme court concluded that
     the trial court, which modified its divorce decree well beyond
     the ninety-day period contained in Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(b), did
     not have jurisdiction to enter its modification order pursuant
     to Ark. R. Civ. P. 60.

14.  Jurisdiction -- appellant did now waive issue of subject-matter
     jurisdiction. -- A party may not consent to subject-matter
     jurisdiction where no such jurisdiction lies, nor may
     jurisdiction be waived; the supreme court concluded that
     appellant did not waive the issue of the trial court's
     jurisdiction to enter the modified order.

15.  Appeal & error -- failure to obtain ruling precludes review. -- Because
     appellee failed to obtain a ruling from the trial court on the
     issue of res judicata, the supreme court would not consider it
     on appeal.

16.  Pleading -- nothing in record suggested appellee requested inclusion of
     estoppel in amended answer. -- Although a party may correct his or
     her failure to plead an affirmative defense by amending the
     complaint at any time pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 15(c),
     nothing in the record suggested that appellee ever requested
     that her answer be amended to include the affirmative defense
     of estoppel.

17.  Pleading -- nothing in record suggested estoppel became issue by express
     or implied consent. -- Although, under Ark. R. Civ. P. 15(c), an
     issue not set forth in the responsive pleading may be raised
     by express or implied consent of the parties and thereby
     treated in all respects as though it had been properly
     pleaded, nothing in the record suggested that the affirmative
     defense of estoppel became an issue during the hearing by
     either express or implied consent of the parties, and the
     supreme court accordingly found that appellant was not
     estopped from asserting that the trial court did not have
     jurisdiction to enter the order modifying custody and child
     support.

18.  Jurisdiction -- trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter order
     modifying custody and child support -- matter reversed and remanded. --
     The supreme court held that the trial court did not have
     jurisdiction to enter its order modifying custody and child
     support and reversed and remanded for the trial court to
     determine the amount that appellee owed in past-due child-
     support payments.


     Appeal from Washington Chancery Court; Lawrence Dawson, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     Davis & Watson, P.A., by: Charles E. Davis, for appellant.
     Annie Powell and Eddie N. Christian, for appellee.

     Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.
     This appeal questions whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to rule upon a posttrial motion.  We disagree with
the trial court's conclusion that it had jurisdiction to enter
the order, and accordingly we reverse and remand.
     On September 26, 1991, Jeffrey Slaton obtained a divorce
from Teresa Slaton in the Washington County Chancery Court. 
Jeffrey was awarded custody of the two children born of the
marriage.  Teresa was granted visitation rights and ordered to
pay $300 a month child support.  Several hours after the divorce
decree was entered, Teresa Slaton filed a pleading entitled a
"Motion for Reconsideration" in which she claimed that the
divorce decree was contrary to the preponderance of the evidence
adduced at trial.    
     In response, the trial court entered on September 30, 1991,
an order stating that the divorce decree should be "stayed and
held in abeyance until further hearing in this matter which is
scheduled for October 8, 1991, at 9:00 a.m."  The following day,
the court appointed a guardian ad litem to investigate and
represent the children's interests.  
     The court did not hold a hearing on the matter until
February 24, 1992.  During the hearing, the court explained that
it granted Teresa's motion because:
     I didn't feel that I had all the information that I
     should to make a meaningful decision.  And, quite
     frankly, my decision hasn't changed that much other
     than I have given full credence to the report of the ad
     litem, and this is going to be the order in regards the
     minor children. 
The court then orally announced its ruling. 
     On March 5, 1992, the court modified the initial divorce
decree by providing that Jeffrey and Teresa would share joint
custody of the children with neither parent being required to pay
child support.  Although joint custody was granted, Jeffrey
became the primary custodial parent with detailed visitation
rights granted to Teresa.  
     Over the next three years, Jeffrey and Teresa filed numerous
motions regarding child custody, support, and visitation.  On
December 26, 1995, the court granted Teresa sole custody of the
children and ordered Jeffrey to pay child support in an amount to
be determined at a later hearing.  Five days later, Jeffrey filed
a "Motion to Declare Order Void and to Set Arrearage."  In this
motion, Jeffrey claimed that the March 5, 1992, order was void
because the trial court lost jurisdiction by failing to rule upon
Teresa's motion for reconsideration within thirty days as
required by Ark. R. App. P.--Civ. 4(c).  Because the March 5,
1992 order was void, Jeffrey argued that the original September
26, 1991 divorce decree was still in effect, and that Teresa owed
him over $14,000 in past-due child-support payments under that
decree.
     In an order entered on February 12, 1996, the trial court
found that it had jurisdiction to issue the March 5, 1992 order
pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(b) which allows a trial court to
modify an order within ninety days of its having been filed with
the clerk.  In the alternative, the court found that Jeffrey had
waived his jurisdiction argument by appearing before the court
and participating in the hearing.  Finally, the court found that
Jeffrey was estopped to deny the validity of the March 5, 1992
order because both parties had relied upon it for several years. 
Accordingly, the court denied Jeffrey's motion.  From this order,
Jeffrey filed a timely notice of appeal in the Arkansas Court of
Appeals.
     In an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals found that
Teresa's September 26, 1991 motion for reconsideration was
actually a motion for a new trial under Ark. R. Civ. P. 59, and
that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the March 5, 1992
order because it had granted Teresa's motion for a new trial on
September 30, 1991, which was well within the thirty-day limit
mandated by Ark. R. App. P.--Civ. 4(c).  Slaton v. Slaton, No. CA
96-670, (Ark. Ct. App. March 5, 1997).  We granted Jeffrey's
petition for review.  Upon granting a petition for review, we
review the case as if the appeal was originally filed in this
court and give no deference to the ruling rendered by the Court
of Appeals.  Goston v. State, 327 Ark. 486, 939 S.W.2d 818
(1997); Mullinax v. State, 327 Ark. 41, 938 S.W.2d 801, cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 2411 (1997).  
                    I.  Abstract Deficiencies
     In her brief, Teresa made a motion to strike the portions of
Jeffrey's abstract of the September 26, 1991 divorce decree
regarding the grounds for divorce and why custody was initially
granted to Jeffrey.  We agree that these matters were irrelevant
to the issues on appeal, and thus they were not considered.  See
Ark. S. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(b); Purtle v. McAdams, 317 Ark. 499,