Title: State v. Murphy

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 100,178 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ANTHONY R. MURPHY, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Appellate review of the trial court's determination of whether a reasonable person 
would feel free to refuse the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter 
consists of two parts:  (1) the factual underpinnings are reviewed under a substantial 
competent evidence standard and (2) the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those 
facts, i.e., whether a reasonable person would feel free to refuse the requests or to 
terminate the encounter, is reviewed under a de novo standard. 
 
2. 
The factors that tend to establish a voluntary encounter include:  knowledge of the 
right to refuse, a clear communication that the driver is free to terminate the encounter or 
refuse to answer questions, return of the driver's license and other documents, and a 
physical disengagement before further questioning. 
 
3. 
Factors that tend to establish a continued detention include:  the threatening 
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical 
touching of the person, the use of aggressive language or tone of voice indicating that 
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compliance with an officer's request is compulsory, the prolonged retention of a person's 
personal effects such as identification, a request to accompany the officer somewhere, 
interaction in a nonpublic place, absence of other members of the public, or the display of 
emergency lights. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 42 Kan. App. 2d 933, 219 P.3d 1223 (2009). 
Appeal from Geary District Court; STEVEN L. HORNBAKER, judge. Opinion filed February 1, 2013. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
Shawn E. Minihan, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellant. 
 
Tony Cruz, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Steve Six, attorney general, was with 
him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by  
 
Per Curiam:  Anthony R. Murphy was charged with and convicted of possession 
of cocaine with intent to sell and possession of cocaine without a tax stamp. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed his convictions in State v. Murphy, 42 Kan. App. 2d 933, 219 P.3d 
1223 (2009). In September 2010, we granted Murphy's petition for review on the issue of 
whether the traffic stop became a voluntary encounter before Murphy gave consent to 
search. 
 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
On June 22, 2006, Deputy Mark Maschmeier, of the Geary County Sheriff's 
Department, observed Anthony Murphy driving 79 miles per hour on I-70, where the 
posted speed limit is 70 miles per hour. The deputy turned on his emergency lights and 
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initiated a traffic stop at 6:49 a.m. He approached the car and obtained Murphy's driver's 
license and rental car papers. Deputy Maschmeier returned to his car to run Murphy's 
driver's license through dispatch while writing out a warning for speeding. Murphy had a 
valid Colorado license and his rental paperwork was in order. 
 
Maschmeier walked back to Murphy's vehicle and gestured for Murphy, who was 
now outside of his car, to join him at the back of the vehicle. He had Murphy sign the 
warning while they were both standing between their respective vehicles. Maschmeier 
then returned Murphy's driver's license and other paperwork, told Murphy he was free to 
go, and a brief handshake was exchanged. 
 
In the next several seconds, Murphy took two or three steps toward his car and 
Maschmeier turned and took one or two steps toward his own vehicle. The deputy then 
turned back and said, "By the way"—Murphy then turned around and looked at the 
deputy—"You don't happen to have any illegal contraband in the vehicle, uh, any drugs, 
alcohol, weapons?" Murphy denied having any such things in his car. Maschmeier then 
asked if Murphy would mind if he searched the vehicle. When Murphy consented to a 
search of the car, he asked if he could pat Murphy down. After conducting a pat-down 
search of Murphy, Maschmeier got the passenger out of the car and patted her down as 
well. During the search of the vehicle, Murphy voluntarily gave the deputy the keys to 
open locked suitcases in the trunk. Maschmeier eventually found 107.92 grams of crack 
cocaine in a fanny pouch in the spare tire compartment of the trunk. The emergency 
lights on the police vehicle remained on during the entire exchange and subsequent 
search. 
 
 
 
 
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VOLUNTARY ENCOUNTER 
 
The only issue in this case is whether the traffic stop became a voluntary 
encounter before Murphy consented to the search of his vehicle. In State v. Thompson, 
284 Kan. 763, 779-93, 166 P.3d 1015 (2007), we carefully reviewed the United States 
Supreme Court jurisprudence that frames the central principles guiding our analysis in 
this exact scenario. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
 
"Appellate review of the trial court's determination of whether a reasonable 
person would feel free to refuse the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the 
encounter consists of two parts:  (1) the factual underpinnings are reviewed under a 
substantial competent evidence standard and (2) the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from 
those facts, i.e., whether a reasonable person would feel free to refuse the requests or to 
terminate the encounter, is reviewed under a de novo standard. [Citation omitted.]" 
Thompson, 284 Kan. at 776. 
 
Analysis 
 
Ordinarily, the court must determine first whether the trial court's factual findings 
are supported by substantial competent evidence. But Murphy does not challenge the 
underlying factual findings. Instead, Murphy contends that the Court of Appeals erred in 
making its ultimate legal conclusion. 
 
After the conclusion of a seizure pursuant to a traffic stop, the encounter with law 
enforcement may continue if it becomes consensual. See Thompson, 284 Kan. at 796-97. 
The continued encounter will be deemed consensual if under the totality of the 
circumstances the officer's conduct conveys to a reasonable person that he or she was free 
to refuse the request or otherwise terminate the encounter. 284 Kan. at 775. 
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Under Thompson, the court conducts a de novo review of whether a reasonable 
person would have felt free to refuse the officer's request or terminate the encounter 
under the totality of the circumstances. 284 Kan. at 776. In Thompson, we set forth a 
nonexclusive list of factors that frequently occur in this type of encounter to aid in our 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Those factors that tend to establish a 
voluntary encounter include:  "knowledge of the right to refuse, a clear communication 
that the driver is free to terminate the encounter or refuse to answer questions, return of 
the driver's license and other documents, and a physical disengagement before further 
questioning." 284 Kan. at 811. Factors that tend to establish a continued detention 
include:  
 
"the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some 
physical touching of the person, the use of aggressive language or tone of voice 
indicating that compliance with an officer's request is compulsory, the prolonged 
retention of a person's personal effects such as identification, a request to accompany the 
officer somewhere, interaction in a nonpublic place, absence of other members of the 
public, or the display of emergency lights. [Citations omitted.]" Thompson 284 Kan. at 
811. 
 
No single factor is legally dispositive. Moreover, the court does not merely count 
the factors weighing on one side versus the number of factors weighing on the other. 284 
Kan. at 803-04. Instead, in the totality of the circumstances, one factor may be more 
indicative of a coercive atmosphere (or conversely of a consensual encounter) in one case 
than it is in another. 284 Kan. at 804. 
 
This case is factually very similar to Thompson. In Thompson, the officer pulled 
over the defendant for a faulty headlight. After returning the defendant's driver's license, 
issuing a verbal warning, and telling the defendant to have a nice day, the officer turned 
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to walk away. Within a second or two, the officer returned and asked, "By the way, can I 
ask you a few questions?" 284 Kan. at 769. The defendant agreed and ultimately 
consented to a search of his vehicle that yielded drug paraphernalia and a baggie with 
powder residue.  
 
Though very similar, this case presents slightly different facts. We review the 
totality of the circumstances presented here to determine whether a reasonable person 
would have felt free to refuse the officer's request or to terminate the encounter. Here, 
Murphy was outside his vehicle when Deputy Maschmeier returned his driver's license 
and car rental papers. The deputy told Murphy he was free to go, shook hands with 
Murphy, and physically disengaged by stepping toward his car while Murphy walked 
around his car toward the driver's seat. Both Murphy and Maschmeier were outside their 
vehicles when the deputy asked, "By the way, you don't happen to have any illegal 
contraband in your vehicle—any drugs, alcohol, weapons?" After obtaining Murphy's 
consent to search the vehicle, Maschmeier also asked to, and did, conduct a pat-down 
search of Murphy. 
 
Moreover, Deputy Maschmeier was the only law enforcement officer present. He 
did not display his weapon or use aggressive language or a tone of voice indicating that 
compliance with his request was compulsory. The encounter was in a public place, and he 
did not request Murphy to accompany him to another location. These factors support the 
conclusion that the encounter was voluntary, despite the fact that Maschmeier did not ask 
Murphy's permission to ask additional questions or turn off his emergency lights. 
Although the deputy conducted a pat-down search, this physical touching occurred after 
Murphy consented to a search of his vehicle. Having considered the totality of the 
circumstances, we conclude, as we did in Thompson, that a reasonable person would have 
felt free to refuse Deputy Maschmeier's request or to terminate the encounter. Therefore, 
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we hold that Murphy gave consent to search his vehicle during a voluntary encounter 
with the officer. 
 
Affirmed. 
 
MORITZ, J., not participating. 
 
BRENDA M. CAMERON, District Judge, assigned.1 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE: District Judge Cameron was appointed to hear case No. 
100,178 vice Justice Moritz pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court by Art. 
3, § 6(f) of the Kansas Constitution. 
 
* * * 
 
ROSEN, J., dissenting:  I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, which 
concludes that the encounter between Deputy Mark Maschmeier and Anthony R. Murphy 
was voluntary. The touchstone of a voluntary encounter is whether a reasonable person 
under the totality of the circumstances would have felt free to leave or terminate the 
encounter. Under the totality of the circumstances presented here, as I joined in the 
dissenting opinion in State v. Thompson, 284 Kan. 763, 813, 166 P.3d 1015 (2007) 
(Beier, J., dissenting), I do not believe that a reasonable person would have felt free to 
terminate the encounter and simply get in his or her car and drive away. 
 
Watching the video of this traffic stop, less than 3 seconds passed between the 
almost imperceptible handshake and the officer's question. Particularly troubling, given 
this timeframe, Deputy Maschmeier began the supposed voluntary encounter with the 
phrase "By the way." As Judge Greene of the Court of Appeals stated in his dissent: 
 
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"The precise question before us is how a reasonable person would interpret the remark 
'By the way.' Does it signal a need to continue the prior detention or does it indicate a 
desire to spark up a brand new conversation? 
 
 
"'By the way' is 'an incidental remark thrown in, and tending the same way as the 
discourse itself.' (Emphasis added.) Evan's/Brewer's Dictionary of Phrase and Fable 177 
(Centenary ed. rev. 1981). I respectfully contend that when the phrase is used shortly 
after a previous conversation, it indicates an afterthought and its common meaning is 'and 
another thing' or 'also.' To a reasonable person, the use of the phrase after being told one 
is 'free to go' would suggest a need to reengage the prior conversation for an afterthought. 
It is difficult for me to believe that a reasonable person under the totality of these 
circumstances would just walk back to his or her vehicle, blowing off the officer's 
remark, 'By the way.' Thus, I would hold under a totality of the circumstances that a 
reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the encounter and drive away." State v. 
Murphy, 42 Kan. App. 2d 933, 943, 219 P.3d 1223 (2009) (Greene, J., dissenting). 
 
No one initiates a conversation with the expression "By the way" unless they are 
referring back to some previous encounter. It is a phrase conveying continuity of a 
previous topic of conversation. The officer's use of the phrase in this instance would lead 
a reasonable person to believe that whatever followed was an extension of the traffic stop 
—a related question or a forgotten detail. As Justice Beier aptly stated in our dissent in 
Thompson, the majority "expects far too much chutzpah from a person in the defendant's 
position." 284 Kan. at 814. A reasonable person would not feel free to disregard the 
question, get in his or her car and drive away. 
 
With due respect to the majority, I would find that Murphy's consent to the search 
was given during an illegal extension of the initial traffic stop. 
 
BEIER and JOHNSON, JJ., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.