Title: Miles v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Jody Lee Miles v. State of Maryland, No. 42, September Term, 1998.
[Evidence – Statutory Exclusionary Rule Under the Maryland Wiretapping Act; Criminal
Procedure – Communications With Jury.  Scope and meaning of the words “evidence derived
therefrom” in CJ § 10-405, held:  attenuation doctrine of Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
jurisprudence applies to statutory exclusionary remedy as well.  Whether trial court may
paraphrase the contents of a communication from the jury to the trial court in consultation with
counsel prior to re-instructing the jury under Md. Rule 4-326(c), held:  the requirements of
Md. Rule 4-326(c) will be met so long as counsel and defendant had opportunity for
meaningful input and an opportunity to inspect the jury note prior to the judge’s re-instruction
of jury on the record in open court.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 42 
September Term, 1998
JODY LEE MILES
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Bell, C.J., Eldridge and  Raker, JJ., dissent
Filed:    September 18, 2001
On April 2, 1997, appellant Jody Lee Miles shot and killed Edward Atkinson during a
robbery.  Appellant was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County from
March 9 through March 12, 1998, after the case was removed from the Circuit Court for
Wicomico County, and convicted of felony homicide, robbery with a deadly weapon, robbery
and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.  A sentencing hearing was
conducted on March 17-18, 1998.  Appellant was sentenced to death on March 19, 1998.  This
case is before this Court on automatic appeal pursuant to Maryland Code, Art. 27, § 414 (1957,
1996 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.) and Maryland Rule 8-306(c).  We find no errors that tainted the
proceedings.  Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s convictions and the sentence of death.  
I.  FACTS
On April 2, 1997, Edward Joseph Atkinson was shopping at the Structure Store and
Small’s Formal Wear located at a mall in Salisbury, Maryland.  While arranging to pick up
tuxedos at Small’s for a musical theater production he was directing, he received a page.
Atkinson immediately left the mall.  Later that day, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Harry Hughes,
Jr., a resident of Old Bradley Road in Mardela Springs, Maryland, saw Atkinson driving a black
Toyota Camry down Old Bradley Road.  Within fifteen minutes, Hughes heard a single gunshot.
On the same day, Atkinson failed to show up for dinner at his home with his parents and
for his evening play rehearsal.  His mother, Dorothy Atkinson, notified the Maryland State
Police that her son was missing.  The next day, April 3, 1997, at approximately 9:00 p.m.,
Maryland State Police officers located Atkinson’s Toyota near Old Bradley Road and found
a cowboy boot print in the area.
In the morning of April 4, 1997, Robert Wayne Atkinson, the victim’s brother, and his
friend who had joined the search, Sean Thomas Mooney, returned to Old Bradley Road to comb
the area for additional information concerning Edward Atkinson’s whereabouts.  After
following footprints on the ground, Robert Wayne Atkinson discovered his brother’s body in
2
a wooded area.  Later that same day, Robert Wayne Atkinson and Sean Mooney also saw a gray
colored car driven by the appellant heading towards the crime scene off of Old Bradley Road.
The police arrived on the scene and determined that Edward Atkinson had been shot once in the
back of the head and dragged to the location where his body was found.  The police noticed
several additional cowboy boot prints near the body matching the one found the night before
by the victim’s car, as well as scuff marks indicating a struggle at the side of the road.  The
police also discovered that Atkinson’s pockets had been emptied, but a search of the wooded
area surrounding the crime scene failed to produce the victim’s wallet and keys.
In contacting his brother’s credit card companies to report the theft, Robert Wayne
Atkinson learned that the cards had been used after his brother had been reported missing.  The
cards had been used on April 3, 1997, at a Wal-Mart ATM in Cambridge, Maryland, at the Tru
Blu gas station in Harrington, Delaware, at the Structure and J.C. Penney stores in the Dover
Mall, and at Shuckers Pier 13 Restaurant in Dover, Delaware.  The personnel interviewed at
these locations described the credit card holder as a white male, approximately 6’1” to 6’3”
tall, having medium length dirty blonde to brown hair, and wearing white jeans or pants with a
white shirt and cowboy boots.  (Two of the Tru Blu gas station attendants subsequently
identified appellant as the Atkinson card user.)  Composite sketches of the suspect were drawn
and circulated on local news stations.  During the next two weeks, news reports specifically
mentioned the sighting of the murder suspect at the Tru Blu gas station.
On April 15, 1997, James Towers (a resident of Caroline County) was in his home
monitoring the police and fire department radio transmissions with his scanner.  Towers’
scanner was capable of picking up cellular phone conversations.  At some point between 8:30
and 9:30 p.m., Towers overheard a conversation on his scanner where a male and female
discussed the importance of staying away from the Tru Blu gas station in Harrington, Delaware.
3
Because he thought this conversation might be related to the news story about the murder,
Towers tape-recorded the conversation.  Towers notified the Maryland State Police about the
tape, who promptly picked up the tape from Towers’ residence.
The tape of the phone conversation included a discussion of concealing evidence, as
well as descriptions of the geographic area surrounding the couple’s home.  Deputy Ronald
Russum of the Caroline County Sheriff’s Department listened to the tape and identified the
female voice as Jona Miles, who turned out to be appellant’s wife.  Detective James Fraley of
the Delaware State Police identified the voices as Jody and Jona Miles, based on his previous
contacts with both individuals.
By April 22, 1997, after locating Jona Miles’s residence, the Maryland and Delaware
State Police applied for search warrants for 292 Cole Britt Lane, Harrington, Delaware and
27880 Whiteleysburg Road, Greensboro, Maryland, properties owned by Jona Miles and her
parents.  The police executed the warrants on the same day.  During the search of the
properties, the police seized several items of clothing belonging to appellant and his 1996 W-2
tax statement as well as other papers, a razor, telephone bills, phone numbers from a caller
identification box, and other pieces of note paper.  
Later that day, the police placed Jona Miles under arrest and questioned her at the
Caroline County Sheriff’s Department.  Jona Miles gave a statement to the police and assisted
them in ascertaining her husband’s whereabouts.  She also signed a consent to search form
authorizing Corporal Fisher of the Maryland State Police Force to search her trailer located
on her parents’ property at 27880 Whiteleysburg Road.  Pursuant to the consent to search
form, the police seized one pair of black men’s jeans and one pair of tan Structure dress pants.
Jona Miles admitted that within a week after April 2, 1997, she had thrown two
Structure shirts in a dumpster near Route 404 in Centreville, Maryland, and a few days later she
1
The report of the medical examiner and his subsequent testimony at trial, however,
concluded that based on gun powder residue found in the soft tissue of the wound, Mr.
Atkinson died from a contact gun shot wound.  
4
had accompanied her husband as he disposed of his cowboy boots in a dumpster behind a
shopping center in Milford, Delaware.  Ms. Miles also dumped a handgun, holster and
ammunition left by her husband in the Choptank River near Denton, Maryland.  With the
assistance of Ms. Miles, the State Police were able to recover the gun in its holster and the
ammunition, but were not able to find the clothing.  As a result of information given to them
by Jona Miles, the police arrested appellant while he was driving a gray Chevrolet Cavalier on
Carmichael Road near a farm where he had been working.  The contents of the car, including
a cellular phone and the vehicle registration card, were inventoried and seized.
During the evening of April 22, 1997, Corporal William V. Benton and Trooper John
Psota began interviewing appellant, after he was advised of his Miranda rights.  Within minutes
of the beginning of the questioning, appellant admitted that on April 2, 1997, he met Edward
Atkinson at a rest area near Old Bradley Road.  Appellant claimed that he had been sent by a
loan shark to collect a package from Atkinson, which the victim did not produce.  He stated that
he became scared when Atkinson, who, at appellant’s direction, had his back to appellant the
entire time, reached inside his jacket.  Appellant, concerned that Atkinson had a gun, fired one
shot striking the victim in the back of the head.1  Afterwards, appellant found and removed
Atkinson’s wallet and two briefcases from the car.  Although appellant returned to the scene
on April 4, 1997 with the intention of burying Atkinson’s body, he fled when he saw all of the
police cars in the area.
On May 9, 1997, appellant was indicted and charged with felonious homicide, robbery
with a deadly weapon, robbery, first-degree assault, and use of a handgun in a crime of violence
in Wicomico County.  On July 29, 1997, the state filed a notice of its intention to seek a
5
sentence of death pursuant to Maryland Code, Art. 27, § 412(b).  On October 2, 1997, the case
was transferred for trial to the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County.  The trial court heard
pre-trial suppression motions pursuant to Rule 4-452 on January 28, 1998 and February 23-24,
1998, wherein appellant sought to suppress the contents of the taped cellular phone
conversation with his wife, the items seized pursuant to the search warrant executed in the
early afternoon of April 22, 1997, the items seized pursuant to Jona Miles’s consent to search,
the gun and its accessories, appellant’s confession, and his cellular telephone seized pursuant
to a post-arrest inventory of his vehicle. 
Based on these motions, the trial court ruled to suppress the taped cellular phone
conversation as well as evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant where the affidavit of
probable cause made explicit reference to the facts contained in the cellular phone
conversation as a violation of the Maryland Wiretapping Statute, Maryland Code, Section 10-
401 et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (1977, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2000
Supp.).  The trial court refused to suppress the remaining evidence, reasoning that the language
“evidence derived therefrom” as contained in the statutory exclusionary provision of the
Maryland Wiretapping Act did not include evidence provided by Jona or Jody Miles.  On March
12, 1998, the jury entered a guilty verdict for first-degree felony murder, robbery with a deadly
weapon, robbery and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.  Appellant was
acquitted on the charge of first-degree premeditated murder.  Shortly after midnight on March
19, 1998, the jury sentenced appellant to death.  The trial court merged the robbery conviction
into the armed robbery count and imposed a five-year concurrent sentence for the handgun
count.  Appellant filed a Motion for New Sentencing and/or Imposition of Life Sentence in
Lieu of Death Sentence on March 26, 1998.  The trial court held a hearing on this motion on
May 7, 1998.  The motion was denied on July 7, 2000.
6
II.  ISSUES
On appeal, appellant urges reversal on the following eight grounds:
I.
Did the trial court err in denying, in part, appellant’s motion to suppress pursuant
to the Maryland Wiretapping Act, Maryland Code, § 10-401 et seq. of the
Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article?
II.
Did the trial court err in failing to fully disclose the contents of a jury note sent
to the judge after seven hours of sentencing deliberations?
III.
When, after seven hours of deliberations, the jury asked the trial court what to
do if they were not unanimous, is it improper for the trial court to instruct the
jury that unanimity is an absolute prerequisite and fail to instruct the jury that it
could report its lack of unanimity?
IV.
Did the trial court improperly limit what the jury could consider as mitigating
evidence under section 8(b) of the sentencing form in the instructions provided
to the jury?
V.
Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury during sentencing that it
must find, as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance, that appellant was
acquitted of premeditated murder?
VI.
Were there ambiguities and inconsistencies present in the sentencing verdicts
which would require that appellant’s death sentence be vacated?
VII.
Did the trial court err in excusing four jurors for cause?
VIII.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to grant defense counsel’s
motion for mistrial when it was discovered that the jurors had seen appellant in
shackles?
Facts relevant to each issue are set forth as necessary in our consideration of the issues below.
2 
At the suppression hearing and at all subsequent proceedings the parties have referred
to the telephone used by appellant, Jody Miles, as a cellular telephone.  Jona Miles used a land-
line telephone in her home. 
7
III.  SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE UNDER
THE MARYLAND WIRETAPPING ACT
A motions hearing was conducted on January 28, 1998, in the Circuit Court for Queen
Anne’s County.  As pertains to the issues on appeal before this Court, the motions hearing
before the trial court involved the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of the Maryland
State Police having secured and used a recording made by a private citizen of a cellular phone
conversation between Jona and Jody Miles on April 15, 1997.2    Appellant argued that the
Maryland Wiretap Statute protects all phone conversations, cellular or otherwise.  See
Maryland Code, § 10-401, et seq., of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article  (1977, 1998
Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.).  Furthermore, appellant argued that evidence obtained in violation of
Section 10-402 must be excluded from evidence at trial.  Appellant also argued for the
suppression of evidence seized pursuant to search warrants executed at Jona Miles’s home,
from appellant’s car following his arrest, as well as suppression of the gun, ammunition and
holster recovered by the Maryland State Police in the Choptank River and the statements given
to police by both Jona and Jody Miles as evidence derived from the unlawful interception of
the cellular phone conversation.  
At the suppression hearing, the trial court heard testimony from James Towers, the
private citizen who taped the cellular phone conversation between Jona and Jody Miles and
turned the recording over to the Maryland State Police.  Towers testified that he had purchased
his Radio Shack scanner several years prior to the recording of the conversation between the
appellant and Jona Miles.  The scanner in question was commercially available in Radio Shack
stores and could monitor up to four hundred channels.  Towers explained that he took his
8
scanner to the now defunct Kent Communications in Dover, Delaware, for alterations to
enhance its functioning.  Towers testified that his scanner could pick up transmissions from
cellular phones, cordless phones, emergency services such as police, fire and ambulance
communications, and radio stations.  Prior to April 15, 1997, Towers had never recorded a
transmission received by his scanner and turned it over to the police.
Because the affidavits of probable cause used to obtain search warrants for Jona Miles’s
property contained explicit references to the taped conversation, the trial court suppressed the
contents of the phone conversation as well as all items seized pursuant to the search warrants.
The trial court permitted the State to introduce the evidence to which Jona Miles led the
police, namely the .22 caliber gun and its accessories, as well as the confession of appellant,
Jody Miles.  Appellant argues that this evidence should have been suppressed because of its
connection to the wiretapped conversation.  We disagree, based upon the attenuation doctrine
and its application to this case.
In 1977, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance Act (the Maryland Act), codified at Section 10-401 et seq. of the Courts &
Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code.  The Maryland Act makes the following
conduct unlawful:
(1)
Wilfully intercept, endeavor to intercept, or procure any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or
electronic communication;
(2)
Wilfully disclose, or endeavor to disclose, to any other person
the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication,
knowing or having reason to know that the information was
obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication in violation of this subtitle; or
(3)
Wilfully use, or endeavor to use, the contents of any wire, oral,
or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know
that the information was obtained through the interception of a
wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this
subtitle.
3
The Federal Act defines “‘wire communication’” as “any aural transfer made in whole
or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of
wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception
(including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any
person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or
foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce and
such term includes any electronic storage of such communication.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(1).
“‘Oral communication’ means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic communication.”
 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).  “‘Intercept’ means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any
wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or
other device.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(4)(1970, 2000 Repl. Vol.).
9
Maryland Code, § 10-402(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (1977, 1998 Repl.
Vol., 2000 Supp.).  See Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 342-43, 748 A.2d 478, 487-88 (2000);
State v. Mazzone, 336 Md. 379, 382, 648 A.2d 978, 979 (1994); Mustafa v. State, 323 Md.
65, 69, 591 A.2d 481, 483 (1991); Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11, 15-16, 537 A.2d 612, 614,
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832, 109 S. Ct. 90, 102 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1988).
The model for the Maryland Wiretapping Act was Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2000)(the Federal Act).  The Federal
Act was designed to balance the protection of an individual’s privacy with the enforcement of
criminal laws.  See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 151, 94 S. Ct. 977, 982, 39 L. Ed.
2d 225, 234 (1974); Ricks v. State, 321 Md. at 13, 537 A.2d at 613.  The Federal Act sets
forth minimum national standards prohibiting both law enforcement officials and private
individuals from intercepting and using the contents of oral and wire communications, while
allowing law enforcement officials following specific procedures and under specific
circumstances concerning the investigation of criminal offenses to obtain a court order to
intercept wire and oral communications related to the commission of a crime.3 
The Maryland Wiretapping Act provides broader protection than Title III in that
Maryland requires consent from all parties before a conversation may be taped or otherwise
4
The General Assembly recently enacted Chapter 370 of the 2001 Maryland Laws, which
eliminates the former language of subsection (b) of Section 10-405 of the Wiretapping Act,
and inserts new language stating:
If any wire or oral communication is intercepted in any state or any political
subdivision of a state, the United States or any territory, protectorate, or possession of
the United States, including the District of Columbia in accordance with the law of that
jurisdiction, but that would be in violation of this subtitle if the interception was made
in this state, the contents of the communication and evidence derived from the
communication may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding
in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body,
legislative committee, or other authority of this state, or any political subdivision of
this state if:
(1)
At least one of the parties to the communication was outside the state during the
communication;
(2)
The interception was not made as part of or in furtherance of an investigation
conducted by or on behalf of law enforcement officials of this state; and
(3)
All parties to the communication were co-conspirators in a crime of violence
as defined in Article 27, § 643B of the Code.
The new legislation also includes a provision in Section 10-407(c)(2) which would allow an
individual who receives information concerning an intercepted wire, oral, or electronic
communication under the same criteria listed in the new Section 10-405(b) to “disclose the
contents of the communication or the derivative evidence while giving testimony under oath
or affirmation in any proceeding held under the authority of this state...”.  These amendments
to the Maryland Wiretapping Act will take effect on October 1, 2001.
10
intercepted in the absence of a court order authorizing law enforcement officials to conduct
a wiretap.  See Wood v. State, 290 Md. 579, 583, 431 A.2d 93, 95 (1981); see e.g., Richard
Gilbert, A Diagnosis, Dissection, and Prognosis of Maryland’s New Wiretap and Electronic
Surveillance Law, 8 U. Balt. L. Rev. 183, 221 (1979)(explaining that “as written [the Maryland
Act] guarantees to the people of Maryland, insofar as the state, itself, is concerned, greater
protection from surreptitious eavesdropping and wiretapping than that afforded the people by
the Congress”).  At the times relevant here, the Maryland Wiretapping Act applied so long as
at least one party to the conversation was physically located within the State of Maryland
during the phone call.4  See Mustafa, 323 Md. at 70, 591 A.2d at 483 (applying the Maryland
Wiretapping Act to the taping of a conversation by one party to the conversation who was
located in the District of Columbia and speaking with a person located in Maryland).
5
18 U.S.C. § 2515 provides as follows:
“Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in
evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the
United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information
would be in violation of this chapter.”  (1970, 2000 Repl. Vol.).
11
Therefore, people using telephones in Maryland “may ordinarily rely on the fact that their
conversation will not be surreptitiously recorded or, at the very least, that,  unless done in
strict conformance with the State law, a recording of their conversation will not be admitted
into evidence in any Maryland court.”  See Perry v. State, 357 Md. 37, 61, 741 A.2d 1162,
1175 (1999)(emphasis in original). 
Although the Maryland Wiretapping Statute is grounded, to some extent, in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, it contains its own exclusionary provision in Section 10-405 to
deter law enforcement officials from unlawful or unauthorized interception of wire and oral
communications.  This section provides as follows:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted,
no part of the contents of the communication and no evidence
derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial,
hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative
committee, or other authority of this State, or a political
subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information would be
in violation of this subtitle.
Maryland Code, § 10-405 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (1977, 1998 Repl.
Vol.).  The exclusionary rule of Section 10-405 mirrors the language of the Federal Act’s
exclusionary provision, as both provisions contain prohibitions against the use of not only the
unlawfully intercepted communication, but also the “evidence derived therefrom.”
5
We now consider the application of the Maryland Wiretapping Act and its internal
exclusionary provision to the facts of this case.  On April 15, 1997, appellant called home to
6
At the pre-trial motions hearing, in their briefs before this Court, and at oral argument
the parties have referred to the communication device used by appellant as a cellular telephone.
7
With regard to the use of the term “switching stations” in the Federal Act, the Senate
has stated that it “makes it clear that cellular communications—whether they are between two
cellular telephones or between a cellular telephone and a ‘land line telephone’—are included
in the definition of ‘wire communications’ and are covered by the statute.”  See FISHMAN AND
MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING, § 2:13 (2nd ed. 1995)(quoting Senate Rpt. No.
99-541 at 11, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code, Cong. & Admin. News 3555, 3565)(internal
quotations omitted).
12
his wife, Jona Miles, from a cellular phone in his car.6  The conversation taped by Mr. Towers
emanates from this call.  The issue of whether a cellular phone call is protected under the
Maryland Wiretapping Statute is a matter of first impression.  The Maryland Act defines a
“wire communication” as “any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of
facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like
connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of a
connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person licensed to engage in
providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of communications.”  § 10-
401(1)(i).  The transmission of a cellular phone communication to an ordinary telephone line
involves the sound waves of the conversation being transmitted over the cellular phone
company’s designated frequency to the cellular phone carrier’s transmitter, which sends the
signal over a land-based wire to the ordinary telephone.  See generally RAYMOND C.V.
MACARIO, CELLULAR RADIO-PRINCIPLES AND DESIGN, (2nd ed. 1997).  The use of the cellular
phone company’s transmitter as a switching station for converting the communication to a
land-based telephone line places cellular phone technology within the definition of a “wire
communication” under Section 10-401(1)(i).7  Furthermore, the Maryland Wiretapping Act
specifically provides for the imposition of fines to punish persons who intercept cellular
phone conversations.  See § 10-402(e). The relevant portion states as follows:
8
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, _____ U.S. _____, 121 S. Ct. 1753, 149 L. Ed. 2d 787 (2001),
the United States Supreme Court specifically recognized that the Federal Wiretapping Act
applies to cover the interception of conversations taking place on cellular and cordless
telephones.  Id. at ____, 121 S. Ct. at 1759, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 799; see also Nix v. O’Malley,
160 F.3d 343, 348 (6th Cir. 1998) and McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236, 1240-41 (6th Cir.
1995).
13
“...[A] person who violates subsection (d) of this section is
subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for
not more than 5 years, or both.
(2)  If an offense is a first offense under paragraph (1) of this
subsection and is not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for
purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private
commercial gain, and the wire or electronic communication with
respect to which the offense occurred is a radio communication
that is not scrambled or encrypted, and:…(ii) The communication
is the radio portion of a cellular telephone communication, a
public land mobile radio service communication, or a paging
service communication, the offender is subject to a fine of not
more than $500.”  
Code, § 10-402(e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.8  
Because we have determined that cellular phone communications with land phones are
protected under the Maryland Wiretapping Act, we must address the existence and extent of
any violations of the statute by the Maryland State Police requiring exclusion of the taped
cellular phone conversation and any “evidence derived therefrom.”  See § 10-405.  Although
Mr. Towers testified at the suppression hearing that he did not know that it was unlawful for
him to tape the cellular phone conversation between appellant and his wife, we have held that
an intentional interception of such a communication violates the Maryland Wiretapping Act.
See Deibler v. State, 365 Md. 185, 199,776 A.2d 657, 665 (2001)(holding that “an
interception that is not otherwise specifically authorized is done willfully if it is done
intentionally – purposely”).  What is clear from Mr. Towers’s testimony at the pre-trial
suppression hearing is that he believed the conversation was related to the news story of the
murder of Edward Atkinson he had heard previously that day and that the police might be
14
interested in acquiring the information.  Although the police were not involved in the initial
listening to or the taping of the conversation, the police were aware that the conversation had
been taped by Mr. Towers without the consent of the parties to the conversation.  This Court
discussed the interplay of the statutory exclusionary rule with the other provisions of the
subtitle in Perry, wherein we stated:
To 
determine 
whether 
the 
disclosure 
of 
an 
intercepted
communication is in violation of the subtitle [for purposes of the
exclusionary rule of § 10-405], it is necessary to look at § 10-
402(a)(2) and § 10-407.  The former makes it unlawful for any
person to “wilfully disclose” to any other person the contents of
a wire communication “knowing or having reason to know that the
information was obtained through the interception of a
wire…communication in violation of this subtitle.”  Section 10-
407(c), however, provides, in relevant part, that any person who
has received, “by any means authorized by this subtitle,” any
information concerning a wire communication “intercepted in
accordance with the provisions of this subtitle,” may disclose the
contents of that communication, or the derivative evidence, while
giving testimony in court under oath or affirmation.
357 Md. at 63, 741 A.2d at 1176.  In the instant case, the Maryland State Police did not receive
the tape or have authorization to play the tape.  Because the actions of the Maryland State
Police were not authorized by the statute, we need not determine the willfulness of the police
in disclosing the information contained within the tape under Section 10-402(a)(2), for as we
have noted, “[w]hether the interception was done willfully or non-willfully, the violation of the
person’s right to privacy was the same.”  Perry, 357 Md. at 66, 741 A.2d at 1178. 
The Maryland State Police used the tape of the cellular phone conversation between
Jona and Jody Miles for two investigatory purposes in violation of Section 10-405, as they
used the tape for voice recognition and to provide facts to set forth in the affidavit for probable
cause to search property belonging to Jona Miles and her parents.  With regard to the issue of
voice recognition, the State asserts that use of the tape to provide voice recognition as an
investigative tool does not violate the Fourth Amendment.  We agree with the State’s argument
15
that under a Fourth Amendment analysis there can be no privacy expectation in one’s voice.
See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14, 93 S. Ct. 764, 771, 35 L. Ed. 2d 67, 79
(1973)(noting that “the physical characteristics of a person’s voice, its tone and manner, as
opposed to the content of a specific conversation, are constantly exposed to the public”).
Nevertheless, a person’s voice is part and parcel of the contents of the conversation.  The
Maryland Wiretapping Act provides broader protection than the Fourth Amendment in that it
makes it unlawful to “wilfully use, or endeavor to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or
electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was
obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of
this subtitle.”  Maryland Code, § 10-402(3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
(emphasis added).  Thus, the parties’ voices in the conversation would be protected under the
statute.  See Perry, 357 Md. at 70, 741 A.2d 1162, 1180 (1999)(holding that the tape itself
and testimony identifying the voices on a tape recording of phone conversation made in
violation of Section 10-402 is inadmissible under Section 10-405).  
In the instant case, the Maryland State Police disclosed the contents of the tape to two
police officers.  Deputy Ronald Russum of the Caroline County Sheriff’s Department listened
to the tape of the cellular phone conversation and was able to identify the female caller as Jona
Miles based on his previous contact with her.  Detective James Fraley of the Delaware State
Police identified the male caller as appellant, Jody Miles, and the female caller as Jona Miles
based on voice identification from prior contact with both individuals and from facts discussed
in the conversation which disclosed the relative geographic location of the female caller. Thus,
the police, as an “authority of this State,” violated Section 10-405 by using the contents of the
communication when they listened to the tape to engage in voice identification of Jona and
Jody Miles.  Therefore, we agree with the trial court’s decision to suppress the taped cellular
9
In addition to the protections of the Maryland Wiretapping Statute, the taped cellular
phone conversation between Jona and Jody Miles would have to be suppressed as privileged
marital communications.  This Court noted that, “[c]ommunications between husband and wife
occurring during the marriage are deemed confidential if expressly made so, or if the subject
is such that the communicating spouse would probably desire that the matter be kept secret,
either because its disclosure would be embarrassing or for some other reason.”  Coleman v.
State, 281 Md. 538, 542, 380 A.2d 49, 52 (1977).  The privilege remains intact even when the
marital communication involves criminal activity.  See id. at 545, 380 A.2d at 54.  The
legislature intended to preserve the marital privilege regardless of whether a communication
was intercepted by an eavesdropper or by law enforcement officials pursuant to a court order.
See Maryland Code, § 9-105 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (1977, 1998 Repl.
Vol., 2000 Supp.) (providing that “one spouse is not competent to disclose any confidential
communication between the spouses occurring during their marriage”).  See also,  Mazzone,
336 Md. at 389-90, 648 A.2d at 983. Thus, while Jona Miles would not have been incompetent
to testify as to the matters discussed in the taped cellular phone conversation, appellant, by
virtue of the privilege contained in § 9-105 could have successfully precluded such testimony
by his wife.  See Brown v. State, 359 Md. 180, 183, 753, A.2d 84, 85-86 (2000).
10
At the motions hearing on January 28, 1998, appellant raised the issue that the marital
privilege would bar the testimony of Mr. Towers had he been called to testify at trial
16
phone conversation and any reference thereto from use at trial under Section 10-405.9  
Subsequent to the voice identification of Jona and Jody Miles by the police, Detective
Fraley and Detective Alfred Parton of the Delaware State Police prepared an affidavit and
application for a search warrant for the property belonging to Jona Miles and her parents.  In
establishing probable cause in the warrant application, Detective Fraley and Detective Parton
made explicit reference to the facts contained in the taped cellular phone conversation, as well
as disclosing to the Delaware magistrate that the facts were ascertained through listening to
a tape made by a private citizen who intercepted the cellular phone call on his scanner.  The
search warrant was approved by a Delaware Justice of the Peace and executed on April 22,
1997 at 2:15 p.m., during which the police seized over twenty-four items belonging to
appellant.  We conclude that, because the contents of the cellular phone conversation were
disclosed in the affidavit of probable cause to obtain a search warrant for Jona Miles’s property
in violation of Section 10-405, all evidence seized pursuant to execution of this warrant was
properly suppressed at trial.10
concerning the facts he learned from listening to the telephone conversation between Jona and
Jody Miles, referring to this Court’s decision in Mazzone, 336 Md. 379, 658 A.2d 978.  We
need not reach this issue as the trial court pursuant to the Maryland Wiretapping Act, Section
10-405, properly suppressed the contents of the conversation.
17
We must now consider the scope and application of the statutory exclusionary rule set
forth in Section 10-405 with regard to the interpretation of the language “evidence derived
therefrom” as we consider whether the trial judge erred in allowing the evidence obtained from
leads provided by Jona Miles, including appellant’s black jeans and tan dress pants, and the
murder weapon and its accessories to be introduced in evidence at trial.  For purposes of
analyzing the phrase “evidence derived therefrom,” we note that the primary illegality was the
interception of the cellular phone call by James Towers on April 15, 1997.  See Deibler, 365
Md. at 199, 776 A.2d at 665.   Appellant argues that the language “evidence derived therefrom”
requires the exclusion of all evidence obtained after listening to the tape, based on the belief
that were it not for the violation of the wiretapping statute in listening to the unlawfully
intercepted tape, the police would not have discovered the identities of Jona and Jody Miles
resulting in both parties arrests, confessions, and additional production of evidence.  The State
argues the same principles underlying the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), apply to the interpretation of the language “no
evidence derived therefrom” under the statutory exclusionary rule based on the fact that the
statutory exclusionary rule is a preventive or deterrent device, such that rulings regarding the
exclusion of evidence under Section 10-405 must be narrow enough to accomplish the
deterrence goals without sacrificing valid investigatory evidence and material attenuated from
taint. 
When considering the scope of a piece of legislation, this Court has stated, “the
legislative intent of a statute primarily reveals itself, through its very own words.”  Derry, 358
18
Md. at 335, 748 A.2d at 483.  If the statutory language “is plain and free from ambiguity, and
expresses a definite and simple meaning,” there is no need to look elsewhere to discern
legislative intent.  See Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 417, 722 A.2d 887, 895 (1999).
However, this Court has frequently noted:
While the language of the statute is the primary source for
determining legislative intention, the plain meaning rule of
construction is not absolute; rather, the statute must be construed
reasonably with reference to the purpose, aim, or policy of the
enacting body.  The Court will look at the larger context,
including the legislative purpose, within which statutory language
appears.  Construction of a statute which is unreasonable,
illogical, unjust, or inconsistent with common sense should be
avoided.
Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992)(citations omitted). 
Prior to enactment of the current Maryland Wiretapping Act, this Court considered the
scope of the exclusionary provision of the Federal Act as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2515.  See
Carter v. State, 274 Md. 411, 423-24, 337 A.2d 415, 422-23 (1975).  Following our decision
in State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 272, 292 A.2d 86, 95 (1972), where this Court had concluded
that wiretapping cases must be considered under whichever statute was more constricting, we
examined the facts of Carter under the Federal Act which was more-restrictive than the 1956
Maryland Wiretapping Act.  See Carter, 274 Md. at 426, 337 A.2d at 424.  In Carter, the
police had used illegal electronic surveillance in investigating the drug activities of the
defendant, included the facts ascertained through the unlawful surveillance in an affidavit for
probable cause to obtain a search and seizure warrant for defendant’s apartment, and failed to
disclose to the issuing judge the fact that the information contained in the warrant was the
product of an unauthorized wiretap in violation of the Maryland and Federal Wiretapping Acts.
Id. at 419-20, 337 A.2d at 420.  We found:
The weight of authority in the state courts is in accord with the
view that evidence derived as a result of a prior illegal search for,
19
or seizure of, property, or knowledge gained through such an
illegal search and seizure, cannot be used, because of its taint, as
a valid basis to justify the existence of probable cause in a
subsequent search and seizure warrant.  See Annot., 143 A.L.R.
135-140 (1943); Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531, 569 (1956).
Thus, if any conversation of Carter or any conversation overheard
upon his premises-whether he was present and participating in it
or not-was subjected to a search and seizure by the use of any
wire tap or eavesdropping device, in violation of his rights under
the Fourth Amendment, as explicated in Alderman v. United
States, supra, in Silverman v. United States, supra, and Katz v.
United States, supra, any information garnered as “fruits” of
such primary illegality and “come upon” by the “exploitation” of
that illegality cannot, under the holdings in Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v United States, supra, Nardone v. United States, supra,
Wong Sun v. United States, supra, and Alderman v. United
States, supra, be used as derivative evidence for an application
for a search and seizure warrant; to hold otherwise would permit
the prosecution to use knowledge acquired in violation of the
Fourth Amendment and “gained by its own wrong.”  The doctrine
of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” although it excludes evidence
obtained from or as a consequence of lawless official acts does
not apply however if such evidence is “obtained from an
independent source,” or such “connection may have become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint.” 
Id. at 438-39, 337 A.2d at 431.  Thus, we applied a Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
analysis to use of evidence derived from an unlawful wiretap in holding that in cases where an
affidavit of probable cause to issue a search warrant contained facts tainted by the illegal
conduct of the police in the unlawful interception of telephonic communications, an
evidentiary hearing must be conducted to determine whether the facts were the fruits of the
poisonous tree or whether the taint had been purged by discovery of the facts through an
independent source or attenuated from the original unlawful conduct.  See Carter,  274 Md.
at 443, 337 A.2d at 434 (citing United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297,
92 S. Ct. 2125, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1972); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S. Ct.
961, 22 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1969); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 58 S. Ct. 275, 82 L.
Ed. 314 (1937); People v. Mendez, 281 N.Y.S.2d 608 (2d Dept., 1967)); see also Washburn
20
v. State, 19 Md. App. 187, 201-202, 310 A.2d 176, 184 (1973). 
In adopting the Federal Act, Congress did not intend to alter or circumvent the
attenuation doctrine in adopting a statutory exclusionary rule.  See United States v. Giordano,
416 U.S. 505, 528-29, 94 S. Ct. 1820, 1833, 40 L. Ed. 2d 341, 360-61 (1974).  In Giordano,
the Supreme Court emphasized the relevance of the attenuation doctrine to the exclusionary
provision of the Federal Act by citing a portion of S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 96,
106 (1968) which specifically noted that:
Section 2515 of the new chapter imposes an evidentiary sanction
to compel compliance with the other prohibitions of the chapter.
… The provision must, of course, be read in light of section
2518(10)(a) discussed below, which defines the class entitled to
make a motion to suppress.  It largely reflects existing law.  It
applies to suppress evidence directly (Nardone v. United States,
302 U.S. 379 (1937)) or indirectly obtained in violation of the
chapter.  (Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).)
There is, however, no intention to change the attenuation rule.
… Nor generally to press the scope of the suppression role
beyond present search and seizure law. … But it does apply
across the board in both Federal and State proceeding[s]….   And
it is not limited to criminal proceedings.  Such a suppression rule
is necessary and proper to protect privacy. …  The provision thus
forms an integral part of the system of limitations designed to
protect privacy.  Along with the criminal and civil remedies, it
should serve to guarantee that the standards of the new chapter
will sharply curtail the unlawful interception of wire and oral
communications.” 
Giordano, supra, 416 U.S. at 529-30, n.17, 94 S. Ct. at 1833, n. 17, 40 L. Ed. 2d at 360-61,
n. 17 (emphasis added).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has adopted the procedure
of having a “taint hearing” regarding evidence resulting from a wiretap violation wherein the
claimant has the initial burden of establishing a taint and the government may demonstrate that
the taint was purged.  See United States v. Apple, 915 F.2d 899, 906 (4th Cir. 1990).  Thus, not
all evidence obtained following an unlawful wiretap must be suppressed under the federal
21
statutory exclusionary rule.  
Therefore, we find that the scope and meaning of the words “no evidence derived
therefrom” as used in the statutory exclusionary rule of the Maryland Wiretapping Act are best
analyzed under the attenuation doctrine arising out of cases concerning unlawful searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment.  See Ferguson v. State, 301 Md. 542, 548, 483 A.2d
1255, 1257-58 (1984)(discussing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407,
9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963)).  Under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, evidence tainted by
Fourth Amendment violations may not be used directly or indirectly against the accused.  See
Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341, 60 S. Ct. at 268, 84 L. Ed. at 312.  However, there must be a “cause-
and-effect” relationship or nexus between the “poisonous tree and its alleged fruit,” so as to
prevent “an indiscriminate lapse into the logical flaw of post hoc; ergo, propter hoc (after
this; therefore, because of this).”  State v. Klingenstein, 92 Md. App. 325, 360, 608 A.2d 792,
810 (1992), cert. granted, 328 Md. 462, 615 A.2d 262 (1992), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
330 Md. 402, 624 A.2d 532 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 918, 114 S. Ct. 312, 126 L. Ed.
2d 259 (1993)(internal quotations omitted). 
In balancing the protections of the Fourth Amendment with the need for effective law
enforcement, the Supreme Court has recognized three methods of purging the taint of the
original unlawful conduct in cases where the exclusionary rule applies.  First, evidence
obtained after initial unlawful governmental activity will be purged of its taint if it was
inevitable that the police would have discovered the evidence.  See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
431, 444, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 387 (1984).  Second, the taint will be
purged upon a showing that the evidence was derived from an independent source.  See United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239-242, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1938-1940, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 1164-
1166 (1967).  The third exception, and the one relevant to the case sub judice, will allow the
22
use of evidence where it can be shown that the so-called poison of the unlawful governmental
conduct is so attenuated from the evidence as to purge any taint resulting from said conduct.
See Wong Sun,  371 U.S. at 488, 83 S. Ct. at 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 455.  
In B r o w n  v .
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975), the Supreme Court analyzed
the application of the attenuation doctrine “at the crossroads of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.”  Id. at 591, 95 S. Ct. 2256, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 420.  We adopted the test for
attenuation, as set forth in Brown, in Ferguson v. State, 301 Md. at 549, 483 A.2d at 1258
(considering the application of the attenuation doctrine to extrajudicial and in-court
identification testimony given by the victim of a robbery, where the accused was arrested
without probable cause).
In Brown, the Supreme Court developed a three factor test for analyzing whether
statements given in custody after the accused waives his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), must be excluded as fruits of an unlawful
arrest where the accused was arrested without probable cause.  See Brown, 422 U.S. at 591-92,
95 S. Ct. at 2256, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 420.  In discussing the purpose of the exclusionary rule the
Court stated:
The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.  Its purpose is to
deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to
disregard it.  Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.
Ct. 1437, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 (1960).  But despite its broad
deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been
interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all
proceedings or against all persons.  United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. at 348, 94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561. 
Id. at 599-600, 95 S. Ct. at 2260, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 425 (internal quotations omitted).  The Court
found that although receipt of Miranda warnings alone is not per se dispositive of the issue
of attenuation, it is an important factor in assessing the voluntariness of a confession.  See id.
23
at 603, 95 S. Ct. at 2261, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 427.  The Court held that an analysis of attenuation
also requires consideration of the following factors:  1)  the proximity between the actual
illegality and the evidence sought to be suppressed; 2) the presence of intervening factors; and
3) the flagrancy of the governmental misconduct involved in the case.  See id. at  603-604, 95
S. Ct. at 2261-2262, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 427.  
In Brown, two police officers who had been investigating a recent murder, arrested the
defendant without probable cause for the purpose of questioning him about the murder.  Id. at
592, 95 S. Ct. at 2256, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 420.  To accomplish this task, the police broke into the
defendant’s apartment, searched it, then waited for the defendant to return to his apartment
where the officers held him at gunpoint and placed him under arrest.  Id. at 593, 95 S. Ct. at
2256-2257, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 421.  Following his arrest, the defendant waived his Miranda rights
and gave two inculpatory statements to the police.  Id. at 594-96, 95 S. Ct. at 2257-2258, 45
L. Ed. 2d at 421-422.  In holding that the defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights alone was
insufficient, as an intervening factor, to purge the taint of the defendant’s illegal arrest, the
Court emphasized the purposefulness of the official misconduct involved by explaining:
The impropriety of the arrest was obvious; awareness of that fact
was virtually conceded by the two detectives when they
repeatedly acknowledged, in their testimony, that the purpose of
their action was ‘for investigation’ or for ‘questioning.’  The
arrest, both in design and in execution, was investigatory.  The
detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the
hope that something might turn up.  The manner in which Brown’s
arrest was effected gives the appearance of having been calculated
to cause surprise, fright, and confusion.
 Id. at 605, 95 S. Ct. at 2262, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 428. 
The United States Supreme Court further refined its analysis of the attenuation doctrine
set forth in Brown v. Illinois, to include an exploration of voluntariness.  See United States
v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276-77, 98 S. Ct. 1054, 1060, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268, 277 (1978).  The
24
case involved a police officer’s unauthorized search of a cash register in a local flower shop
and discovery of an envelope containing evidence relating to the gambling activities of
Ceccolini.  The police officer immediately questioned the clerk at the flower shop concerning
the identity of the owner of the envelope without revealing to the clerk what it contained.  Four
months later the FBI interviewed the flower shop clerk who related what had occurred with the
police officer.  Thereafter, the Government introduced testimony of the flower shop clerk,
who volunteered to testify, at a perjury trial of Ceccolini.  Ceccolini argued that the testimony
of the clerk should have been suppressed as “fruit” of the police officer’s unlawful search of
the register at the shop.  
The trial court suppressed the testimony of the flower shop clerk which was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  The Supreme Court reversed, citing Brown
v. Illinois, in stating, “[e]ven in situations where the exclusionary rule is plainly applicable, we
have declined to adopt a “per se or ‘but for’ rule” that would make inadmissible any evidence,
whether tangible or live-witness testimony, which somehow came to light through a chain of
causation” originating with constitutionally violative conduct.   Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276, 98
S. Ct. at 1060, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 277.  In Ceccolini, the court eloquently defined the role that
“logical” causation has to the defining question:
This, of course, makes it perfectly clear, if indeed ever there was
any doubt about the matter, that the question of causal connection
in this setting, as in so many other questions with which the law
concerns itself, is not to be determined solely through the sort of
analysis which would be applicable in the physical sciences.  The
issue cannot be decided on the basis of causation in the logical
sense alone, but necessarily includes other elements as well. 
Id. at 274, 98 S. Ct. at 1059, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 276.
The Court identified the voluntary aspect of a witness’s testimony as a break in the chain
of taint emanating from the unlawful conduct because an individual has the “attributes of will,
25
perception, memory and volition.”  Id. at 277, 98 S. Ct. at 1060, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 277 (quoting
Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954, 84
S. Ct. 1632, 12 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1964))(footnotes omitted).  The significance of a volitional act
of a human being under the exclusionary rule cannot be underestimated because:
[t]he proffer of a living witness is not to be mechanically equated
with the proffer of inanimate evidentiary objects illegally seized.
The fact that the name of a potential witness is disclosed to
police is of no evidentiary significance, per se, because the living
witness is an individual human personality whose attributes of
will, perception, memory and volition interact to determine what
testimony he will give.  The uniqueness of this human process
distinguishes the evidentiary character of a witness from the
relative immutability of inanimate evidence.
Id. at 277, 98 S. Ct. at 1060-1061, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 277 (quoting Smith v. United States, 324
F. 2d at  881-882). 
In assessing the voluntariness of the witness’s conduct under the attenuation doctrine
of the exclusionary rule, the Court explained:
Witnesses are not like guns or documents which remain hidden
from view until one turns over a sofa or opens a filing cabinet.
Witnesses can, and often do, come forward and offer evidence
entirely of their own volition.  And evaluated properly, the degree
of free will necessary to dissipate the taint will very likely be
found more often in the case of live-witness testimony than other
kinds of evidence.
Id. at 276-277, 98 S. Ct. at 1060, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 277.  Thus, the voluntariness of a person’s
actions in providing evidence or testimony should be considered as an intervening factor under
the attenuation doctrine.  See id. at 278-279, 98 S. Ct. at 1061, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 278. This is true
even if a putative defendant is involved because exclusion of testimony is a perpetual disability:
Another factor which not only is relevant in determining the
usefulness of the exclusionary rule in a particular context, but
also seems to us to differentiate the testimony of all live
witnesses –  even putative defendants –  from the exclusion of the
typical documentary evidence, is that such exclusion would
perpetually disable a witness from testifying about relevant and
26
material facts, regardless of how unrelated such testimony might
be to the purpose of the originally illegal search or the evidence
discovered thereby.  
Id. at 277, 98 S. Ct. at 1061, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 277-78.  We follow the lead of the numerous
federal circuits and states that have applied Ceccolini.  See Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d
158, 174 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 121 S. Ct. 2191, 149 L. Ed. 2d 1023
(2001); United States v. McKinnon, 92 F.3d 244, 247 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1099, 117 S. Ct. 784, 136 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1997); United States v. Hooton, 662 F.2d 628, 632-
33 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1004, 102 S. Ct. 1640, 71 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1982);
United States v. Stevens, 612 F.2d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921,
100 S. Ct. 3011, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (1980); State v. Bravo, 762 P.2d 1318, 1327 (Ariz. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1039, 109 S. Ct. 1942, 104 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1989); People v. Briggs,
709 P.2d 911, 917 (Colo. 1985).  
The first evidence we must consider is that provided by Jona Miles, who led the police
to the discovery of the murder weapon and its accessories in the Choptank River, to appellant’s
clothing and to appellant’s whereabouts on the day of his arrest.  When Jona Miles was arrested
on April 22, 1997, the police gave Jona her Miranda warnings, and she agreed to give a
statement to the police.  An individual may validly waive his or her Fifth Amendment rights by
making incriminating statements subsequent to receiving the warnings required by Miranda.
See United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1150 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
914, 107 S. Ct. 315, 93 L. Ed. 2d 289 (1986).  While an individual’s waiver of
Miranda warnings taken alone would be insufficient to purge the taint of the original unlawful
conduct under a Fourth Amendment analysis, Jona Miles’s conduct with regard to her actions
following her statement to the police, manifesting those uniquely human attributes of
perception, memory and volition, were “sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary
11
Prior to receipt of the tape from James Towers, the police had already conducted
investigations at the stores where the victim’s credit cards had been used following his
disappearance.  The police ascertained a physical description of the suspect and circulated it
on the local news stations.  The victim’s brother had also provided police with a description
matching appellant based on his sighting on April 4, 1997, when he discovered his brother’s
body.  Sergeant Bruce Dana and Corporal Cynthia Dougherty of the Maryland State Police also
witnessed appellant talking on his cell phone in the gray car near the crime scene that same day.
Although Jona Miles’s voluntary assistance in ascertaining appellant’s whereabouts on the day
of his arrest helped police to locate him more rapidly, the police had already physically
identified their suspect.
12
Appellant and the State only produced excerpts of Jona Miles’s statement in the record,
which are numbered as pages 2, 11, 19, 25 and 43. 
27
taint” associated with the intercepted phone call.  Brown, 422 U.S. at 602, 95 S. Ct. at 2261,
45 L. Ed. 2d at 426 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486, 83 S. Ct. at 416-417, 9 L. Ed. 2d at
454)(internal quotations omitted).  
Following her statement to the police, Jona Miles took the police to the Choptank River
to show them where she had disposed of the murder weapon and its accessories, as well as to
a dumpster located off of Route 404 near the Choptank River in Denton, Maryland where she
had disposed of appellant’s clothing.  She also provided the police with information concerning
appellant’s whereabouts to assist them in effectuating the arrest.11  Upon searching the
dumpster, the police found that it had been emptied.  However, a team of divers was able to
recover the weapon and ammunition from the river.  The murder weapon, a .22 caliber gun, was
admitted in evidence at trial as State’s Exhibit 11, and the box of ammunition found with it in
the river was admitted as State’s Exhibit 12.
The police did not coerce Jona Miles in any way, nor did they offer her any leniency in
order to induce her statement or compel her to lead them to evidence.  Based on our review
of the excerpts of Jona Miles’s statement contained in the record,12 the police never
confronted Jona Miles with the fact that they possessed a tape of the cellular phone
conversation between her husband and her.  The evidence obtained as a result of Jona Miles’s
28
voluntary conduct need not be suppressed even though the  unlawful police conduct in listening
to the tape of the cellular phone conversation “was one step in a series of events” leading up
to Jona Miles’s statement and production of evidence.  Hooton, 662 F.2d at 632(citing United
States v. Leonardi, 623 F.2d 746, 752 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928, 100 S. Ct.
3027, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1123 (1980).  Any taint emanating from the original unlawful disclosure
of Jona Miles’s voice to the police in the taped cellular phone conversation in violation of the
Maryland Wiretapping Act dissipates at the point where she took the Maryland State Police on
a guided tour of the locations where she had disposed of evidence.  
We also must consider the temporal relationship of Jona Miles’s assistance to the
police to the unlawful disclosure of the cellular phone conversation under the Maryland
Wiretapping Act.  The first factor of the Brown v. Illinois test of attenuation examines the
proximity between the time of the initial illegality and the ascertainment of the evidence that
a defendant is seeking to suppress.  See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-604, 95 S. Ct. at 2261-2262,
45 L. Ed. 2d at 427.  The Supreme Court has not set forth “any mathematically precise test for
determining at what point the taint has been purged by the lapse of time.”  Ferguson,  301 Md.
at 550, 483 A.2d at 1259.  Intervening factors or acts following the original unlawful conduct,
however, should be considered in assessing attenuation.  See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-604, 95
S. Ct. at 2261-2262, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 427.  In Brown, the defendant’s confession was suppressed
based in part on the fact that the confession took place less than two hours after the “primary
illegality” of defendant’s unlawful arrest, with no intervening circumstances.  See id. at 604-
05, 95 S. Ct. at 2262, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 428.  The original illegality complained of in the instant
case took place on April 15, 1997, when James Towers tape recorded the cellular phone
conversation between Jona and Jody Miles and turned it over to the police.  Both Jona and Jody
Miles were not arrested until seven days later.  In the interim, and without knowledge that her
29
conversation with appellant had been recorded by a private citizen, Jona Miles disposed of the
clothing that appellant purchased with the victim’s credit card at Structure in a dumpster off
of Route 404 near Denton, Maryland, and threw the .22 caliber gun, holster, and ammunition
into the Choptank River.  Jona Miles engaged in two volitional acts with regard to this
evidence, first in throwing them away and second in leading the police to the locations wherein
she had disposed of them.  In both instances, Jona Miles’s conduct weighs of equal
significance, as she made conscious choices on both occasions to do what she did.  
  Because Jona Miles disposed of the evidence subsequent to the cellular phone
conversation and not only disclosed the location of the gun in her statement to the police, but
physically took the police to the Choptank River, her conduct with regard to the gun and its
accessories was completely free and independent from the information the police may have
learned from the taped cellular phone conversation.   The dissent concludes that Jona Miles’s
statement and assistance to the police was as a result of being confronted with evidence
obtained by the police from the illegally intercepted phone conversation.  The record, however,
does not reflect any disclosure by the police of the fact that they possessed the taped cellular
phone conversation.  Furthermore, the excerpts in the record of the taped phone conversation
contain no references to the Structure store at the Dover Mall, the murder weapon or the
Choptank River, all of which were facts that came to be known to the police through their
independent investigation.  Therefore, there was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in
admitting the murder weapon and its accessories to which Jona Miles led the police, as Jona
Miles’s voluntary actions purged the taint from the original unlawful disclosure of the taped
cellular phone conversation by the police to obtain the initial search warrant under Section 10-
405 of the Maryland Wiretapping Act.
We now consider the admission in evidence at trial of appellant’s black jeans and tan
30
dress pants.  Following her arrest, Jona Miles signed a Caroline County Sheriff’s Department
consent to search and seize form authorizing the police to conduct a second search of her
trailer.  During this second search, Corporal Lee Ann Fisher of the Maryland State Police
found and seized one pair of black men’s jeans in the rear bathroom clothes hamper and one
pair of tan dress pants from Structure on the front porch.  These items were admitted jointly
at trial as State’s Exhibit 21.  Appellant argues that the two pairs of pants should have been
suppressed at trial as derivative evidence stemming from the Maryland State Police’s
unauthorized use of the taped cellular phone conversation.  We disagree.  An individual may
voluntarily waive his or her Fourth Amendment rights, through “an intervening act free of
police exploitation of the primary illegality” which is “sufficiently distinguishable from the
primary illegality to purge the evidence of the primary taint.”  See Carson,  793 F.2d at 1147-
48.  The intervening factor of an individual’s voluntariness under Fourth Amendment analysis
applies equally to purging the taint associated with the taped cellular phone conversation in the
case at bar.  Jona Miles’s voluntariness must be considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances.  See Gamble v. State, 318 Md. 120, 125, 567 A.2d 95, 98 (1989)(citing
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2048, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 863
(1973)).  
At the time Jona Miles signed the consent to search and seize form, she knew that she
could be charged with criminal conduct for concealing and destroying evidence on behalf of
her husband.  However, she chose to assist the police, without any promise of leniency, in the
investigation.  Furthermore, a person in custody may still give valid consent to a search.  See
Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 402, 545 A.2d 1281, 1290 (1988)(citing United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S. Ct. 820, 828, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598, 609 (1976)).  Thus, the fact
that Jona Mles was under arrest at the time she gave her statement to police and signed the
31
consent to search form does not negate the voluntary nature of her actions.  Considering the
totality of the circumstances, Jona Miles waived her Fifth and Fourth Amendment rights and
purged the taint of the original illegality of the taped cellular phone conversation by
volunteering information to the police and signing a consent form authorizing the police to
return to her trailer and conduct further investigation and seizure of evidence.  Thus, the trial
judge did not err in allowing the admissibility in evidence of the black jeans and tan Structure
dress pants.
We now consider appellant’s arrest and statement to police.  Appellant argues that the
trial judge erred in admitting in evidence at trial his post-arrest confession, maps he drew of
areas where he disposed of evidence and property belonging to the victim, and his cellular
telephone, which had been seized pursuant to a post-arrest police inventory of the gray 1984
Chevrolet Cavalier appellant had been driving at the time of his arrest.
In the days following Edward Atkinson’s murder, the Maryland State Police and
Atkinson’s family and friends gathered evidence about the murderer and his whereabouts.  By
April 4, 1997, the victim’s brother, Wayne Atkinson, had provided the police with information
concerning all of the victim’s credit card accounts, and had determined that the credit card had
been used at the Tru Blu gas station in Harrington, Delaware after his brother’s disappearance.
Wayne Atkinson went to the Tru Blu and questioned one of the employees who gave him a
description of the card user and the card user’s car.  The physical description matched that of
appellant.  On April 4, 1997, following the discovery of Edward Atkinson’s body, Wayne
Atkinson, his friend, Sean Mooney, and Sergeant Bruce Dana and Corporal Cynthia Dougherty
of the Maryland State Police all witnessed a gray Chevy Cavalier with Delaware temporary
tags, driven by a white male with short dark hair in his  twenties talking on a “bag style” cellular
telephone in the area of the crime scene.
32
Subsequent investigation confirmed the information learned by the police in the first
few days of the investigation.  The Atkinson family turned over all credit card information to
the police, who conducted investigations into the purchases made with the victim’s credit
cards.  Those investigations included interrogation of the manager and several employees of
the Tru Blu, the manager of Structure at the Dover Mall who sold clothing to appellant, the
clerk at J. C. Penney’s in the Dover Mall who sold appellant a diamond ring, and a waitress and
patrons at Shucker’s Pier 13 Restaurant in Dover where appellant purchased food with the
victim’s credit card.  All of the merchants provided the police with copies of the receipts from
the purchases made by appellant, as well as matching physical descriptions of the appellant.
Based on this information, and on detailed assistance from one of the patrons from Shucker’s,
the police produced a composite sketch of appellant that was circulated by the local media.
All of this information was known to the police before James Towers taped the cellular phone
conversation between Jona and Jody Miles.  
Once appellant had been arrested and brought to the Caroline County Sheriff’s
Department, Corporal William V. Benton of the Maryland State Police interviewed him.
Before questioning commenced, Corporal Benton presented appellant with the Maryland State
Police Advice of Miranda Rights Form.  The Miranda warnings were read to appellant and he
acknowledged that he understood his rights prior to signing and dating the form.   Corporal
Benton asked appellant general questions for a few minutes, and then asked him if he knew
Edward Atkinson.  When appellant denied knowing Atkinson, the following dialogue took
place:
Benton:
Jody, would it surprise you if I told you there was
a picture of you at the Wal-Mart in Cambridge?
Wal-Mart has a camera system inside.  There’s an
ATM inside.  We’ve got a guy that was killed on
April the 2nd, 1997.  His name was Edward
Atkinson.  Okay?  His brother was riding on that
33
road on, I believe, it was April the 4th and saw a
little silver car with Delaware temporary tags with
a white male, with brown hair and talking on a cell
phone riding on Old Bradley Road.  He tried to get
the police to stop that car at that time.  For some
reason, they were taking down the crime scene and
they did not.  We have reason to believe that was
your car that was on Old Bradley Road on that
particular day.  Okay, it’s the 3
rd or 4th of April.
And to get back to my point, Wal-Mart in
Cambridge has a camera and they have an ATM in
the Wal-Mart.  Our victim’s credit cards were
attempted on April the 2nd, 6:59 and 7:00.  And the
photo we have at the Wal-Mart looks an awful lot
like you.
Miles:
I don’t believe that.
Benton:
Well, whether you believe it or not, it’s the truth.
Also, at J. C. Penney’s store in Dover, the jewelry
section.  There was a ring purchased with our
victim’s credit card.  There’s a photo there that
looks an awful lot like you.  There’s bubbles
everywhere in that ceiling and they have a ton of
cameras.  Coming in you kept your back to it a
little bit, but you couldn’t keep it all the way to it.
You walked up to the – when you’re walking down
the aisle.  It shows a perfect photo.  The Harrington
Tru Blu, you had a pair of whitish colored slacks,
black cowboy boots, and white shirt that’s buttoned
up.  They’ve seen you in there.  They’ve seen you in
there using the victim’s credit card.
Miles:
I have a white shirt –
Benton:
I’m not done.  The Structure store in Dover Mall.
There’s a ton of Structure clothing that was
purchased with our victim’s credit card.  The
description they give fits that of you.  I’m not here
to bull crap you around, I’m being honest with you.
We’ve done a search warrant on your house today.
We’ve recovered Structure pants, Structure jeans,
Structure shirt that was hidden in Larry’s closet.
Okay?
Miles:
You’re going to find Structure clothes in –
Benton:
I’m not going to find this brand new Structure shirt
that was hid in Larry’s closet.  We’ve recovered a
gun from right down here in the river, a little 22
with a long barrel on it.  Okay?  We’ve recovered
13
At this time, the police had not yet recovered the gun from the Choptank River.  When
the police searched the dumpster on Route 404 with Jona Miles, the dumpster was empty.
Although the police did not actually have photographs of appellant at these various stores, they
did have physical descriptions from store employees as well as receipts of purchases made by
appellant with the victim’s credit cards.
34
clothes from a dumpster right down on 404.13  So,
we’re not in here playing games.  You’re a smart
person; I’m a smart person.  But, I’m here to tell
you there’s a reason why everything happens.
Okay?  What I’m here to ask you is for you to tell
us why things happen.  I know you killed Edward
Joseph Atkinson.  Okay, I’m not going to sit here
and play dumb with you and let you play dumb with
me.  We’re adult men, it’s time to find out why.
I’m not interested in sending you to prison for the
rest of your life but I want to know why you killed
this man.  He’s a pillar in the community, he was
active with Community Players and now he’s dead.
Jody, I don’t think you’re a bad person.  Yeah,
you’ve been arrested.  I know that and you know
that.  But things happen for a reason.  Was
somebody pushing you to kill this man?
Shortly thereafter, appellant gave the following account of the events of April 2, 1997:
Miles:
I don’t know what the deal was.  It don’t necessary
have to be money, it could be drugs, it could be a
lot of things.  I don’t know.  I don’t know that part
of it. I just know that I was supposed to meet the
man.  You know, like you said.  There was no
struggle.
Benton: 
Okay.
Miles:  
The man showed up and there he was.  When I was
asking him for the stuff, all I said was, you know, I
need the package.  That’s all he told me.  And then
he tried to tell me he didn’t have it, he didn’t have
none of it and anything like this and when he went
to reach in his jacket, I was standing right behind
him.  And he went to reach in his jacket, I didn’t
know what he was getting.
Benton:
So, what did you do?
Miles: 
That’s when it happened.
Benton: 
That’s when what happened?
Miles: 
That’s when he got shot.
Benton: 
So, you shot him?
Miles: 
Yeah.
35
Appellant subsequently admitted to attempting to use the victim’s credit cards at the ATM in
Wal-Mart, to purchase gas at the Tru Blu, clothing at Structure in the Dover Mall, a diamond
ring for Jona Miles at J. C. Penney’s in the Dover Mall, and food at Shucker’s Pier 13
Restaurant in Dover, Delaware.  After he finished his statement, appellant volunteered to draw
maps for the police of the location where he stated he had thrown away the victim’s wallets and
briefcases. 
Appellant demonstrated a willingness to provide information and to locate physical
evidence related to the crime through his voluntary statement to the police.  See Ceccolini,
435 U.S. at 276-77, 98 S. Ct. at 1060, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 277.  He received his Miranda warnings
in both written and oral form prior to signing a statement waiving his Fifth Amendment rights,
and confirmed in his taped confession that he understood his rights and agreed to give a
statement to the police.  The police never showed any of the illegally-seized evidence gathered
prior to Jona Miles’s arrest in questioning appellant.  See United States v. McKinnon, 92 F.3d
at 248.  He confessed to the murder of Edward Atkinson shortly after the interview
commenced.  Appellant could have stopped the questioning at any point during the interview,
but he went so far as to draw maps for the police of the locations of evidence related to the
murder.  
With regard to the second-prong of the Ceccolini-Brown test, the police never
mentioned the intercepted cellular phone conversation to induce appellant’s statement.  The
police never disclosed in questioning appellant the contents of the cellular phone conversation,
nor the fact that Jona Miles had given them a statement.  The dissent excerpts a portion of the
interrogation where Corporal Benton informed appellant that the police had seized a new
Structure shirt and other clothing purchased at the Structure store with the victim’s credit
cards.  While the police had, in fact, seized this evidence, they did not show it to appellant just
36
as the police officer in Ceccolini did not show the florist clerk the envelope with money and
gambling slips and never made any reference to its contents.  Although the seizure of the shirt
itself had been accomplished through executing the search warrant based in part on the
information contained in the taped cellular phone conversation, the police already possessed
copies of receipts from appellant’s purchases from their investigation at the Structure store.
One of the Structure receipts, entered in evidence at trial as State’s Exhibit 16-C, lists all of
the items purchased by appellant with the victim’s credit card, including a shirt.  
The dissent asserts that our analysis “seems to flirt with either independent source or
inevitable discovery analysis.”  Diss. Op. at 4, n. 2.  The independent source doctrine has been
applied in case law generally to refer to all evidence acquired in a lawful fashion, untainted by
any illegal evidence-gathering activity of the state.  See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S.
796, 813-14, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3390, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599, 614 (1984).  This refers to evidence
which is different from the evidence originally obtained by unlawful means.  Id.  The doctrine’s
original application in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182,
64 L. Ed. 319 (1920), however, referred to situations where the evidence acquired through
untainted means is identical to that which had been obtained through unlawful evidence
gathering.  See id. at 391-92, 40 S. Ct. at 182-83, 64 L. Ed. at 321.  Therein Justice Holmes
explained:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence
in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not
be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.  Of
course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become
sacred and inaccessible.  If knowledge of them is gained from an
independent source they may be proved like any others...
Id. at 392, 40 S. Ct. at 183, 64 L. Ed. at 321.  Thus, the independent source doctrine, similar
in effect to the attenuation doctrine, seeks to balance the need to deter unlawful conduct of law
enforcement with the public interest in justice by “putting police in the same, not a worse,
37
position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.”  Nix v.
Williams, 467 U. S. at 443, 104 S. Ct. at 2509, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 387(emphasis in original).  This
is accomplished “by allowing the introduction of evidence discovered initially during an
unlawful search if the evidence is discovered later through a source that is untainted by the
initial illegality.”  United States v. May, 214 F.3d 900, 906 (7th Cir. 2000).
In the case before us, we are not concerned with after-acquired untainted evidence
which would inspire invocation of the independent source doctrine.  Instead, we find it
significant that the facts used by the police in questioning appellant were all facts learned by
the police through lawful investigative means prior to receiving the tape of the cellular phone
conversation from Mr. Towers.  The focus of the inquiry concerning the extent of the taint
running from the unlawfully intercepted cellular phone conversation should rest with the use
which was made of it as opposed to a wide-sweeping prohibition concerning the facts
articulated therein.  See United States v. Grosenheider, 200 F. 3d 321, 329-30 (5th Cir.
2000)(explaining that the fact that the investigator had effectively seized defendant’s harddrive
by maintaining possession of a computer containing evidence of the defendant’s use of child
pornography while a warrant for a search of the hard-drive was being obtained did not require
exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to a validly authorized and executed search warrant
because the investigator did not make any use of the computer prior to obtaining a warrant for
the search).  
Appellant’s decision to give a statement to the police was voluntary; in fact, it was the
product of a volitional act rather than a product of exploitation and manipulation of the
unlawful evidence gained from the cellular phone conversation.  See Carson, 793 F.2d at
1147-1148.  The balancing approach to attenuation which has evolved from Brown v. Illinois
requires consideration of a totality of the circumstances, including the demeanor of the
14
Although we consider the lack of police involvement in obtaining the tape of the
cellular phone conversation between Jona and Jody Miles as a factor in dissipating the taint of
38
individual throughout the interrogation, the extent of the individual’s cooperation with the
police, and personal circumstances unique to the age, knowledge and experience of the
individual.  See United States v. Wellins, 654 F.2d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 1981).  At the time
appellant waived his Miranda rights and gave his confession, he was not under the influence
of drugs or alcohol.  This was not a situation involving a “caged rabbit” who manifested fear and
anxiety over his predicament.  On the contrary, throughout his confession, appellant remained
relaxed and cooperative and never indicated that he wished to stop talking or take a break. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that, “In view of the deterrent purposes of the
exclusionary rule, consideration of official motives may play some part in determining
whether application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate after a statutory or constitutional
violation has been established.”  Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 135-136, 98 S. Ct.
1717, 1722-1723, 56 L. Ed. 2d 168, 176-77 (1978)(interpreting the federal wiretapping
statute)(emphasis in original).  This concept is embodied in the third factor of the Brown v.
Illinois test, which requires an examination of the flagrancy of the police misconduct in
obtaining evidence from Jona and Jody Miles.  See Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S. Ct. at 2262,
45 L. Ed. 2d at 427; United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1242 (5th Cir. 1978)(applying
Brown and Ceccolini in holding that the lower court did not err in denying defendant’s motion
to suppress where the record indicated that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his
Miranda rights and gave a confession and “the government’s conduct was not flagrant or
reprehensible”) .  
The Maryland State Police never authorized or requested that James Towers record
appellant’s cellular phone conversation, nor did the police assist Mr. Towers in the
interception.14  The dissent’s analysis of attenuation verges on a traditional tort analysis of
this evidence on subsequent evidence received in the case, we decline to go so far as to adopt
the “clean hands doctrine” of United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391 (6th Cir. 1995).  In
Murdock, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that where the government took no
part in unlawful interceptions in violation of the Federal Wiretapping Statute, there would be
a “clean hands” exception to the statutory exclusionary rule embodied in Section 2515.  See
id. at 1404.
39
proximate cause which while tempting, is inappropriate to an assessment of attenuation of the
taint of unlawful police conduct under Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.   See
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276, 98 S. Ct. at 1060, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 277.
Although Section 10-405 mandates the exclusion of the tape and its contents from
evidence, it would completely contravene the statutory goal to apply a per se exclusion to all
evidence obtained thereafter as a result of pursuing an investigation and from the voluntary
conduct of witnesses or suspects who provide additional evidence.  See United States v.
Salgado, 807 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 1986)(“The exclusionary rule is a sanction, and sanctions
are supposed to be proportioned to the wrongdoing that they punish.”).  Here, the police did
exactly what anyone would have expected them to do.  
The conduct of the Maryland State Police in listening to the tape of the cellular phone
conversation provided to them by James Towers is completely distinguishable from the
flagrant and purposeful misconduct of the police officers in Brown who arrested someone for
the sole purpose of engaging in a factual fishing expedition to link that person to an ongoing
murder investigation.  See Brown, 422 U.S. at 592, 95 S. Ct. at 2256, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 420.  It
cannot be said that James Towers, the private citizen who intercepted appellant’s cellular phone
conversation, “acted as an instrument or agent of the state.”  State v. Abdouch, 434 N.W.2d
317, 323 (Neb. 1989)(quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487, 91 S. Ct.
2022, 2049, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 595 (1971).  “The [exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent,
not to repair.  Its purpose is to deter – to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
40
only effectively available way – by removing the incentive to disregard it.”  Elkins, 364 U.S.
at 217, 80 S. Ct. at 1444, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 1677.  At the hearing on appellant’s pretrial motion to
suppress, the trial court aptly stated, “the horrifying thing about the whole situation, really, is
that if the police had done nothing, having this information, I cannot imagine what would have
been thought by the public.”  The information contained in the cellular phone conversation led
the police to believe that appellant and his wife were conspiring to get rid of the evidence.  To
construe the Wiretapping Act to require us to hold under the unique facts and circumstances
of this case that the police should have refrained from listening to the tape provided by Mr.
Towers and sat idly by while appellant and his wife eliminated evidence of the crime would
produce a result which is “unreasonable, illogical, inconsistent with common sense, and
absurd.”  Edgewater Liquors, Inc. v. Liston, 349 Md. 803, 811, 709 A.2d 1301, 1304 (1998).
While “the Brown test does not require that each of the factors set forth be resolved
in favor of the Government” in order to render evidence admissible under the attenuation
doctrine, we find that considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, the
balance falls in favor of the State.  See United States v. Wellins, 654 F.2d at 554.  We
therefore conclude that the trial judge properly drew the line between the taint of the original
illegality of the unlawfully intercepted cellular phone conversation by a private citizen and
found attenuation from the taint commencing with Jona Miles’s voluntary statement and
assistance to the police, and appellant’s voluntary confession to the murder of Edward
Atkinson.
IV.  RULE 4-326
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on March 18, 1998, the jury began deliberations in the
sentencing phase of the trial.  During the course of the deliberations, the jury sent out three
notes.  The clerk received the first note at 4:25 p.m. and the second note at 7:48 p.m.,
15
Section V of the sentencing form stated as follows:
Each individual juror shall weigh the aggravating circumstances found
unanimously to exist against any mitigating circumstances found
unanimously to exist, as well as against any mitigating circumstance
found by that individual juror to exist.
We 
unanimously 
find 
that 
the 
State 
has 
proven 
BY 
A
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE that the aggravating
circumstances marked “proven” in Section III outweigh the mitigating
circumstances in Section IV.
Section VI of the sentencing form required the jury to determine whether to impose a
“Life Imprisonment” or “Death” penalty based on the jury’s responses in each of the previous
sections of the sentencing form.
41
requesting beverages and inquiring as to dinner arrangements.  The third note, received at 11:20
p.m., contained the following question:
Section V – Para. 2
If we are not unanimous, do we enter no automatically or do we
need to be unanimous that no is the answer.
Section VI 
How can we answer this question if we were not unanimous on
the no vote.15
The trial court informed counsel of receipt of the note and summarized the contents of
the note for counsel:
[T]he thrust of the communication is that the jury is
uncertain as to whether they must be unanimous with respect to
part 5 – or Section V, paragraph 2, which is the one very clearly
– because they do have to be unanimous – I don’t know what
they’re talking about in Part 2 but be that as it may.  
All right.  I think that what we should do is to read them
again the instructions with respect to parts – or to Sections V and
VI, that seems, to me, [to] make good sense.  I see no reason to
backtrack and go over things.  I think that we can safely assume –
I think we should assume that they have winded their way through
I through IV in some fashion that is consistent with the
instruction.  And where they are hung up is their desire to be
clarified on whether or not they must reach a conclusion on No.
16
It is clear from the record that the order meant to refer to Md. Rule 4-326(c).
42
5.  All right.
Neither the State nor defense counsel read the note or requested to inspect the note at that
time.  After hearing no objections to his proposed re-instruction of the jury, the trial court
reviewed the instructions for Sections V and VI, and advised the jury “your determination in
Section V must be unanimous.  Until all 12 of you agree on whether the answer is yes or no,
do not go to Section VI.”  The jury returned to finish deliberations, and returned a sentence of
death at approximately 1:42 a.m. on March 19, 1998. 
Appellant filed a Motion for New Sentencing And / Or Imposition of a Life Sentence
In Lieu of Death Sentence on March 26, 1998 postulating that Maryland Rule 4-326(c)
requires the trial judge to repeat verbatim the contents of the jury note for the record.  The
failure to do so, according to appellant, deprived him of the ability to propose the following:
1)  Declare a mistrial based on jury deadlock after reasonable deliberation; 2) Request that the
jury be instructed to move on to Section VI to determine whether a sentence of life with or
without parole should be imposed; or 3) Request a modified Allen Charge, as approved by
Booth v. State, 327 Md. 142, 159, 608 A.2d 162, 170 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 988, 113
S. Ct. 500, 121 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1992), to reflect that the jurors were unable to agree on Section
V.  On July 7, 2000, the trial court denied the motion in a written order that stated, “Beyond
any doubt, the Court did not follow the plain direction of Rule 4-316(c), as explicated in Allen
v. State, 77 Md. App. 537 in that one of the communications was not read verbatim into the
record.”  (emphasis in the original).16  In denying the motion, the trial court concluded that the
summary provided on the record by the trial court did not differ from the substance of the note
such that “the oversight was purely technical in nature.” 
The relevant provision, Maryland Rule 4-326(c)(2000 Supp.) provides:
17
Rule 8-131(a) provides:   “Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue
unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but
the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid
the expense and delay of another appeal.”
43
The court shall notify the defendant and the State’s Attorney of
the receipt of any communication from the jury pertaining to the
action before responding to the communication.  All such
communications between the court and the jury shall be on the
record in open court or shall be in writing and filed in the action.
Appellant argues that Rule 4-326(c) requires complete, verbatim communication to counsel
of the contents of any communication between the jury and the court.  The State contends that
defense counsel’s failure to request to inspect the jury note prior to the trial judge’s re-
instruction of the jury bars consideration of this issue on appeal.  In the alternative, the State
asserts that the trial judge’s failure to disclose the contents of the jury note in its entirety is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
With respect to preservation of the issue, it is clear that Maryland Rule 8-131 governs
the scope of review available in this Court.17  Review is typically limited to questions raised
in and decided by the lower court.  See Young v. State, 220 Md. 95, 99, 151 A.2d 140, 143
(1959), cert. denied 363 U.S. 853, 80 S. Ct. 1634, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1735 (1960).  We have
exercised our discretion in some cases including some death penalty cases, to determine all
questions briefed and argued by the appellant before this Court even when not tried and decided
by the lower court.  See Bartholomey v. State, 260 Md. 504, 513, 273 A. 2d 164, 169 (1971),
modified, 408 U.S. 938, 92 S. Ct. 2870, 33 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1972), reh’g denied, 409 U.S. 901,
93 S. Ct. 180, 34 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1972).  Although defense counsel did not object to the
summarization of the jury note at the time the note was received, the issue of the trial judge’s
failure to comply with Rule 4-326(c) was raised by counsel and decided by the trial court as
part of appellant’s post-trial motion and was briefed and argued in this Court.  
44
With respect to the reading of a communication to the jury, this Court recently stated:
The rules governing communications between the judge and the
jury are basic and relatively simple to adhere to in practice.  If a
judge receives a communication from the jury or wishes to
communicate with the jury, he or she is required to notify the
parties.  See Md. Rule 4-326(c).  The communication with the
jury shall be made in open court on the record or shall be made in
writing and the writing shall become part of the record.  See Md.
Rule 4-326(c).  Putting aside certain exceptions not relevant
here, the defendant has a recognized right to be present during
communications between the judge and the jury during his trial.
See Md. Rule 4-231(b); Stewart v. State, 334 Md. 213, 224-25,
638 A.2d 754, 759 (1994); Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 211,
438 A.2d 1301, 1306 (1981)(“a criminal defendant’s right to be
present at every stage of his trial is a common law right [and] is
to some extent protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution”).  These rules are not abstract guides.
They are mandatory and must be strictly followed.  See Taylor v.
State, 352 Md. 338, 344, 722 A.2d 65, 68 (1998); Stewart, 334
Md. at 222, 638 A.2d at 758.
Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 322, 765 A.2d 97, 122-23 (2001).
Here the trial court did not give “full” notification of the contents of the note, because
the trial court did not read the note verbatim but merely provided a summary of its contents
prior to his discussion with counsel.  Reading of the jury note in open court is not the only
method of complying with Maryland Rule 4-326(c), as the rule may also be satisfied by filing
written communications from the jury to the court in the case file for the action.  The filing
of the written communication with the action allows the parties to inspect the communication
for themselves if they so desire.  A failure to provide an opportunity for inspection in order
to develop an appropriate response may provide the basis for an error.  See Smith v. State, 66
Md. App. 603, 624, 505 A.2d 564, 574, cert. denied, 306 Md. 371, 509 A.2d 134 (1986).  In
Allen v. State, 77 Md. App. 537, 551 A.2d 156 (1989), cert. denied, 320 Md. 15, 575 A.2d
742 (1990), the Court of Special Appeals held that a trial judge must read the contents of any
jury communication to the State and defense counsel before allowing the defendant to accept
45
a majority verdict in a situation where the reading of the communication in its entirety would
have resulted in his not accepting a majority verdict.  See Allen, at 546, 551 A.2d at 160. 
In the present case, the trial judge’s failure to read the note, although not a violation per
se of Rule 4-326(c), should be reviewed in determining whether the judge’s summarization
prejudiced the defendant.  The circumstances surrounding the re-instruction of the jury indicate
that appellant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s actions.  Appellant was present when the
trial court re-instructed the jury regarding Sections V and VI of the sentencing form in
compliance with Md. Rule 4-231.  See Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 36, 139 A.2d 209, 214
(1958)(explaining that in Maryland “there can be no valid trial or judgment” unless the
defendant has been afforded the right to be present at all stages of the proceedings, including
when being re-instructed by the trial court).  However, we have stated that, “[w]here the right
of confrontation is not implicated, and where there is involved no other right requiring
intelligent and knowing action by the defendant himself for an effective waiver, a defendant
will ordinarily be bound by the action or inaction of his attorney.”  Williams, 292 Md. at 219,
438 A.2d at 1310.  In the matter now before this Court, neither party objected to the contents
of the re-instruction of the jury either prior to re-instruction or prior to the jury rendering its
sentencing verdict.  Although appellant asserts that defense counsel would have responded
differently had counsel been made aware of the actual contents of the jury note rather than the
trial judge’s summary, there is nothing on the face of the note which indicates that the jury was
deadlocked or otherwise incapable of reaching a decision.  Furthermore, the trial court’s
response to the note indicates that the trial judge did not perceive any jury deadlock which
would have warranted a mistrial, that the jurors had deliberated for an unreasonable amount of
time, or that the jurors were unable to reach a unanimous decision with regard to Section V.
Thus, appellant received the same response from the trial court as he would have received even
46
if he had requested to review the contents of the jury note and presented his motion.
Therefore, the appellant was not prejudiced by the failure of the trial court to read the note to
counsel prior to re-instruction of the jury.
V.  JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON UNANIMITY
In both the original sentencing instructions and the re-instruction by the trial judge after
receipt of the jury note at 11:20 p.m., the trial court informed the jury “your determination in
Section V must be unanimous.  Until all 12 of you agree on whether the answer is yes or no,
do not go to Section VI.”  Although the parties approved the sentencing form prior to the trial
judge’s instruction of the jury, appellant now takes exception to the language requiring
unanimity.  Appellant argues that if a jury has deliberated for a significant period of time and
requests guidance on how to proceed if the jury is not unanimous, the trial court should be
required to instruct the jury that it may simply report its lack of unanimity to the court on the
sentencing form. 
In sentencing proceedings for criminal acts where the State seeks imposition of the
death penalty, “[t]he determination of the court or jury shall be in writing, and, if a jury, shall
be unanimous and shall be signed by the foreman.”  Maryland Code, Art. 27, § 413(i)(1957,
1996 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.).  Section 413(k)(2) further provides, “[i]f the jury, within a
reasonable time, is not able to agree as to whether a sentence of death shall be imposed, the
court may not impose a sentence of death.”  
Determination of the reasonableness of the length of deliberations rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court.  See Booth, 327 Md. at 154, 608 A.2d at 167.  Thus, “[t]he
Maryland trial judge presiding over a capital sentencing proceeding before a jury basically
retains the traditional role of determining whether the jury is hung.”  Id.  The trial court may
consider the nature of the decision before the jury, and the length of the trial in determining
47
whether the jury has exceeded a reasonable time for deliberations.  See Colvin-El v. State, 332
Md. 144, 181-82, 630 A.2d 725, 744 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1227, 114 S.Ct. 2725,
129 L.Ed.2d 849 (1994)(finding no error in the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the jury and
enter a sentence of life imprisonment after the jury sent note to the court requesting
clarification on the need for unanimity on Sections IV and V of the verdict sheet following
eleven and a half hours of deliberations over a two-day period).  The jury in the instant case had
deliberated approximately seven hours before submitting the note in question to the court at
11:20 p.m.
Appellant asserts that instructing the jury in the midst of deliberations concerning the
consequences of a jury’s failure to render a unanimous decision does not present the same
dangers as providing a similar instruction prior to deliberation where the court may fear that
a juror might refrain from making a decision for a little more than a reasonable amount of time
so as to prevent imposition of the death penalty, or in the converse, the jury may act hastily in
deliberations without giving due consideration to the evidence in rushing towards a death
sentence.  In Calhoun v. State, 297 Md. 563, 468 A.2d 45 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 993,
104 S. Ct. 2374, 80 L Ed. 2d 846 (1984), we stated:
Giving the instruction to the jury before deliberation could
prompt someone to hold out for just a bit more than a reasonable
time to insure that the death penalty was not imposed.  It likewise
could cause a jury to rush through its deliberations to avoid being
called back by the court and told that because a reasonable time
had passed without a verdict the sentence would be life
imprisonment.
Calhoun, 297 Md. at 595, 468 A.2d at 60; see also Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19, 58, 702 A.2d
699, 718 (1997), aff’d after remand, 360 Md. 650, 759 A.2d 764 (2000), cert. denied, ____
U.S. ____, 121 S. Ct. 864, 148 L. Ed. 2d 776 (2001); Bruce v. State, 328 Md. 594, 622, 616
A.2d 392, 406 (1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963, 113 S. Ct. 2936, 124 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1993);
48
Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 642-643, 612 A.2d 258, 265 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 931,
113 S. Ct. 1312, 122 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1993); Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 771, 506 A.2d
580, 623 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 873, 107 S. Ct. 38, 93 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1986).  The
United States Supreme Court has declined to mandate that an instruction on the consequences
of jury deadlock routinely be given in all capital cases, explaining, “the Eighth Amendment
does not require that the jurors be instructed as to the consequences of their failure to agree.”
Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381, 119 S. Ct. 2090, 2098, 144 L. Ed. 2d 370, 382,
reh’g denied, 527 U.S. 1058, 120 S. Ct. 22, 144 L. Ed. 2d 826 (1999).  Unless and until the
jury makes an unambiguous declaration that it is unable to come to a unanimous decision, the
same dangers of undue jury influence as expressed in Calhoun and its progeny remain.  The
record indicates that the trial judge did not find a clear statement of deadlock from the jury;
thus the situation did not warrant mid-deliberation instruction on the failure of unanimity.
The jury presented the trial judge in the instant case with a note concerning the
application of Sections V and VI of the sentencing form.  The judge’s discussion with counsel
on the record following receipt of the jury note and his subsequent re-instruction of the jury
shows that the judge perceived that the jury was seeking clarification, not that he perceived a
jury deadlock.  Where the trial judge has exercised discretion and found that the jury has not
exceeded a reasonable amount of time in deliberations nor an inability to reach a unanimous
decision, the court is not required to provide an instruction to the jury concerning imposition
of a life sentence in lieu of death.  
After re-instruction, the jury returned to deliberate for approximately two hours before
rendering a verdict.  The jury unanimously found that the State had proven that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and unanimously determined the
sentence to be death.  Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s failure upon receiving
49
the 11:20 p.m. jury note to provide an instruction to the jury that it could report its lack of
unanimity. 
VI.  CONSIDERATION OF MITIGATING
FACTORS UNDER THE SENTENCING
FORM AND JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
At appellant’s request, the trial judge instructed the jury that, “[a]ny factor which causes
you to feel sympathy or mercy toward the defendant may be considered by you to be a
mitigating factor, so long as such factors are supported by the evidence and are considered by
you to be within the framework of the verdict sheet.”  Appellant specifically requested this
instruction regarding mitigating factors and raised no objection to the trial judge’s instructions
or the sentencing form at trial, but now asserts that the instructions and language of the
sentencing form may have improperly restricted the jury’s consideration of mitigating factors
to those facts received in evidence.  Generally, appellant’s specific request of this instruction
combined with a failure to properly object to it during the sentencing proceedings would
constitute a waiver of any objection to the instruction.  Although this issue was not properly
preserved for appeal, appellant briefed and argued this issue in his appeal to this Court,
accordingly, we will exercise our discretion to consider the jury’s findings pursuant to Article
27, § 414(e) of the Maryland Code, which provides:
Considerations by Court of Appeals.—In addition to the
consideration of any errors properly before the Court on appeal,
the Court of Appeals shall consider the imposition of the death
sentence.  With regard to the sentence, the Court shall determine:
(1)
Whether the sentence of death was imposed under
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary factor;
(2)
Whether the evidence supports the jury’s or
court’s 
finding 
of 
a 
statutory 
aggravating
circumstance under § 413(d); and
(3)
Whether the evidence supports the jury’s or
court’s finding that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances.
50
See Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 728, 415 A.2d 830, 847 (1980)(explaining that in capital
cases, Section 414(e) directs the Court to consider the factors enumerated therein in addition
to those otherwise properly raised before the Court on appeal).  
The sentencing authority, whether it is a judge or jury, must consider the existence of
mitigating circumstances in rendering a sentencing verdict.  See Tichnell, 287 Md. at 729, 415
A.2d at 848.  In so considering, the sentencing authority may take into account any facts or
circumstances concerning the defendant including but not limited to the evidence presented
at the merits and sentencing phases of trial in deciding whether a death sentence would be
appropriate.  See Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 474-475, 499 A.2d 1236, 1254 (1985), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 3310, 92 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1986).  The mitigating
circumstances do not have to outweigh the aggravating circumstances in order to avoid
imposition of the death penalty.  See White v. State, 322 Md. 738, 746-47, 589 A.2d 969, 973
(1991).  Rather, if the sentencing authority has found mitigating circumstances, the death
sentence shall be imposed only if the sentencing authority finds that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.  See Code, Art. 27, § 413(h)(1) and (2).
Prior to allocution, the trial judge informed the jury that, “the evidentiary portion of this
phase is now concluded.  Under the law, the Defendant has a right to address you.”  
Appellant then gave the following allocution pursuant to Md. Rule 4-343:
I really don’t know how I got myself in this position.  Everyone
I know would say that I’m a nice person.  I try to help everyone
and I never tried to hurt anyone on purpose.  In the event that I did
get angry, you heard that I would result to walking down the street
or walking away from any problems I had.  That was one thing I
just had a hard time trying not to get angry towards people.
I don’t get enjoyment out of hurting anyone, and anyone can tell
you that I try not to do that.  I get enjoyment out of making people
laugh, smile, and have a good time.  If I ever saw a person in need
and I could help them, I would definitely try to do that.  This is
one reason why people don’t see me doing anything like this.
51
People say and do things that they all regret.  I’m sure everybody
has.  This one is at the top of my very long list.  I wish that I could
change the things that’s happened but I can’t do that.  You can’t
imagine the guilt or sorrow I feel or the pain that the Atkinson
must be going through, and I feel just terrible for it but  I can’t
change anything that’s happened.
It’s been said that I had a lot of problems as a child that continued
on through my adult life.  And at a very early age I resorted to
constant drinking and illegal activities to support myself and my
alcoholic habits.  I would try to hide the truth by lying to
policemen, by stealing, or just doing anything illegal to get what
I need to support my alcohol habit.
Now, I sit and think with the exception of a very few I try to think
of my so-called friends.  I never really had so-called friends.  I
had a lot of drinking buddies or maybe bar-room acquaintances
but never friends.
Alcohol has ruined my life, my kid’s lives, and my relationship
with others, and now a large amount of people associated with
Mr. Atkinson.  I still can’t believe I’m standing here convicted of
murder when I would never hurt anyone intentionally.  I regret all
the mistakes I’ve made, and I know I can’t makeup for them now.
I regret the Atkinsons have loss a son, a brother, and a friend.
I know from what I heard Mr. Atkinsons he had a lot of friends,
his mother.  People could have learned a lot from what he had to
offer in the theater and just his friends.  I did not know Mr.
Atkinson and I’m sure that it is not only my loss but others as
well.  I have a terrible feeling of guilt about Mr. Atkinson’s death.
I was able to see some of the pictures you have viewed as
evidence as far as the autopsy and as far as the crime scene went.
I get chills every time I see his picture on TV, in the paper, or just
in my mind.  I wake up in the middle of the night seeing those
same pictures, just with all the regrets I have over everything.
I can’t believe that I got myself into any kind of situation like this.
I care about people and I care about life itself, and I can’t say how
sorry I am for the death of Mr. Atkinson or how sorry I am for his
family and for his friends.  I also have regrets with what this has
done to my kids and people close to me.
People close to me have made comments and they said if they had
done things differently in the past with any situation as far as I
went that maybe things wouldn’t be this way today.  Maybe if my
upbringing was a little bit differently then I wouldn’t be 
in this situation today.  I don’t blame anybody entirely.  I blame myself.  I take
full responsibility for my actions.
52
I can’t sit here—you did hear things about my mother.  I couldn’t
sit here and blame my mother for anything.  I mean, true, she did
things that maybe everybody else thinks is wrong, but there’s
other people like yesterday you had my sister testified; she turned
out fine.  I can’t blame anyone but I can only myself and my
responsibility that I took in this, my drinking problems that I took
whenever I constantly did anything I could to drink.
I want to make it clear also that I have no anger towards any of
you jury members.  You did exactly what you were asked to do.
You sat there and listened and weighed the evidence like you were
told and then you come up with a fair decision.  I also wanted it to
be known that I have no anger towards Davis Ruark or Sam
Vincent, who are only doing the job that they support to uphold.
In the decision I know that the Atkinsons are going to seek
closure, and in a way I don’t know that they can ever get closure
in any decision that’s made.  Bill Cosby I have a article that he
wrote that said – and the loss of his son, any time you bring – lose
somebody you bring into this world there will never be any
closure.  I have never really got gotten over the loss of my twins.
And regrettably no matter what you decide I’m sure that none of
the Atkinsons will ever have complete closure either.  For this I
am truly sorry.  Thank you for your time.
In Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) we noted that “the allocutory
process provides a unique opportunity for the defendant himself to face the sentencing body,
without subjecting himself to cross-examination, and to explain in his own words the
circumstances of the crime and his feelings regarding his conduct, culpability, and sentencing.”
Harris, at 358, 509 A.2d at 127.  The sentencing authority may consider the content of the
defendant’s allocution in determining the existence of mitigating factors.  See Harris v. State,
312 Md. 225, 254, 539 A.2d 637, 651(1988)(finding that the trial court improperly instructed
the jury that it was “to decide the case only on…evidence”). 
In the instant case, the trial judge instructed the jury with regard to mitigating
circumstances as follows:
In Section IV each of you must determine for yourself whether
any mitigating circumstances exist in this case.  For the purpose
of this sentencing proceeding a mitigating circumstance is
53
anything about the Defendant or about the facts of the case that in
fairness or in mercy may make the death sentence an
inappropriate penalty for this Defendant…This procedure that I
have just outlined in broad form is to make certain that each of
you gives individual consideration to any mitigating circumstance
you personally find.  Let me say that again because that’s
important—that each of you gives individual consideration to any
mitigating circumstances you personally find as well as to any
mitigating circumstance that all of you unanimously find.
* * * * *
In 
determining 
whether 
any 
mitigating 
circumstances
exist, consider all the evidence presented regardless of who
introduced it.  Mitigating circumstances must be proven but need
not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  A mitigating
circumstance need only be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. 
* * * * *
[Section] 
8(a) 
should 
contain 
every 
mitigating
circumstance other than the other seven that all of you
unanimously find to exist by a preponderance of the evidence.  In
8(b) record every mitigating circumstance that at least one but
not all of you find have been proven by a preponderance of the
evidence.  Any factor that you wish causes you to feel sympathy
or mercy toward the Defendant may be considered by you to be
a mitigating factor so long as such factor is considered by you to
be within the framework of the verdict sheet.
Appellant asserts that the references to evidence in the judge’s instructions regarding
mitigating factors combined with the judge’s statement prior to the allocution that the
“evidentiary portion” of the sentencing proceeding had concluded may have mislead the jurors
into thinking that they could only consider facts gleaned from the evidentiary portion of the
sentencing phase and trial in weighing mitigating factors, and not, for example, the appellant’s
allocution.  Appellant also questions the trial judge’s instruction that mitigating factors may
be considered so long as the jury found it “to be within the framework of the verdict sheet.”
Because the language of Section IV of the sentencing form states, “Based upon the evidence,
we make the following determinations as to mitigating circumstances,” appellant argues that
54
the jury did not give proper weight to his allocution.
In considering the appropriateness of sentencing instructions, we have stated:
“[A]ttention should not be focused on a particular portion lifted out of context, but rather its
adequacy is determined by viewing it as a whole.”  State v. Foster, 263 Md. 388, 397, 283
A.2d 411, 415 (1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 908, 92 S. Ct. 1616, 31 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1972).
While there is no constitutionally prescribed method of instructing a jury, we have stated, “It
is sufficient from a constitutional standpoint if it is clear from the entire charge considered
in context that a reasonable jury could not have misunderstood the meaning and function of
mitigating circumstances.”  State v. Calhoun, 306 Md. 692, 741, 511 A. 2d 461, 486 (1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910, 107 S. Ct. 1339, 94 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1987)(quoting Peek v. Kemp,
784 F.2d 1479, 1494 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939, 107 S. Ct. 421, 93 L. Ed.
2d 371 (1986)).
Read as a whole, we find that the sentencing instructions urged the jury to consider all
of the facts, evidence and circumstances concerning the appellant that may have been
mitigating factors, including mitigating factors not listed on the sentencing form.  Appellant
urged the inclusion of the sentencing instruction for mitigating factors using the language
“within the framework of the verdict sheet,” and the trial judge gave the requested instruction.
We have previously stated that “[d]efendants, including those in death penalty cases, will
ordinarily not be permitted to ‘sandbag’ trial judges by expressly, or even tacitly, agreeing to
a proposed procedure and then seeking reversal when the judge employs that procedure; nor
will they freely be allowed to assert one position at trial and another, inconsistent position on
appeal.”  Burch v. State, 346 Md. 253, 289, 696 A.2d 443, 461, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1001,
118 S. Ct. 571, 139 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1997).  The fact that Section IV of the sentencing form
uses the language “[b]ased upon the evidence,” pursuant to Rule 4-343, does not impermissibly
55
limit the sentencing authority’s consideration of mitigating factors to items formally received
by the court as evidence in either the trial or sentencing phases.  The trial judge may use the
word “evidence” in instructing the jury as to mitigating circumstances.  The trial judge
correctly instructed the jury that the standard of proof for determining the existence of
mitigating circumstances was by a preponderance of the evidence.  See Code, Art. 27, § 413(g).
Furthermore, an examination of the completed sentencing form refutes appellant’s
argument.  Part 8(b) of Section IV allowed the jury to write in any mitigating factors found by
at least one, but fewer than all twelve jurors.  See Code, Art. 27, § 413(g)(8).  Under this
provision of the sentencing form, the jury listed “chaotic, disruptive, and violent childhood[;]
accepts full responsibility for act and shows remorse[;] life imprisonment without parole is
sufficient[;] mercy shown to defendant.”  The jury’s finding of these mitigating factors
indicates that the jurors considered the substance of the allocution, as it was the only
opportunity appellant took to address the jury.  We considered these same issues in Conyers
v. State, 354 Md. 132, 729 A.2d 910, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 910, 120 S. Ct. 258, 145 L. Ed.
2d 216 (1999), where we found that, “[t]he thoroughness of the trial judge’s instructions
effectively precluded a juror from not considering a factor he or she perceived as mitigating
because it was not ‘raised by the evidence.’”  Conyers, 354 Md. at 173, 729 A.2d at 932.  Thus,
we find no error in the trial judge’s instructions or in the sentencing form warranting reversal
of appellant’s death sentence.
VII.  REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT JURY THAT IT MUST FIND, AS
A NON-STATUTORY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE, THAT
APPELLANT WAS ACQUITTED OF PREMEDITATED MURDER
Pursuant to dicta in Brooks v. State, 104 Md. App. 203, 228, 655 A.2d 1311, 1323
(1995), cert. denied, 339 Md. 641, 664 A.2d 885 (1995), appellant requested the following
instruction at the sentencing phase of the trial:
56
In your deliberations in the guilt-innocence phase of this trial you
determined that Jody Miles was not guilty of premeditated
murder.  That finding is a mitigating factor which must be listed
under No. 8, and must be weighed and considered by you in
reaching a determination of sentence.
The trial court declined to give the requested instruction mandating the finding of a mitigating
factor, and instead focused the jury’s attention on the issue of acquittal for premeditated
murder as a potential mitigating factor by providing the following instruction:
Also, in connection with this eighth category, which is, again,
involves mitigating circumstances which you find in addition to
the seven which you must consider there, you should give careful
consideration to whether or not the circumstances surrounding
the murder of Mr. Atkinson in light of your finding of lack of
premeditation constitute mitigating circumstances.
If all of you find that the circumstances surrounding the death of
Mr. Atkinson constitute mitigating circumstances, record such
circumstance in 8(a) or record such circumstance in 8(b) if at
least one but not all of you find it has been proven – that has been
proven beyond – or by a preponderance of the evidence.  Now,
that is not –that is a direction for you to consider since you found
there was no premeditation whether there were other mitigating
circumstances or circumstances which you believe to have been
mitigating in the murder of Mr. Atkinson.
At the conclusion of the sentencing instructions, appellant excepted to the instructions based
on the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury that it must find the acquittal of premeditated
murder as a mitigating factor.  The trial court responded as follows:
I think that the question is squarely pitched to the jury. I think
that’s what Brooks means.  I, for one, would be loathed to tell the
jury either that it must – The Court must not reach a mitigating
conclusion because I think that to me is of the essence of
allowing the jury to do it.  It’s the essence of the sentencing
function.  So, I will respectfully overrule the objection.
As noted, in Brooks, the Court of Special Appeals’s comments regarding the mandatory
inclusion of a non-statutory mitigating factor in a sentencing determination was dicta, as the
issue of mitigating factors under the Maryland sentencing scheme had not been raised before
57
the court.  See Brooks, 104 Md. App. at 229, 655 A.2d at 1323 (explaining that “[a]s we noted
at the outset, appellant has not been sentenced to death, and the imposition of the death penalty
under the particular circumstances of her case is not at issue”).  The trial court cannot mandate
that a jury find a mitigating factor under Section 413(g)(8).  See Johnson v. State, 303 Md.
487, 518, 495 A.2d 1, 17 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093, 106 S. Ct. 868, 88 L. Ed. 2d
907 (1986)(explaining that requiring a jury to find a mitigating factor as a matter of law “would
obliterate the jury’s discretion under the provision and jettison the clear legislative intent”).
The mandatory mitigating factors which must be considered under the sentencing scheme in
capital cases are those set forth in Section 413(g)(1)-(7).  Any other facts, evidence, or
circumstances urged by appellant to be mitigating circumstances under Section 413(g)(8) have
not been deemed mandatory mitigating factors by the Legislature.  Permissive mitigating
factors are defined solely by the sentencing authority, whether it is a jury or judge, in
exercising its judgment and may be included on the sentencing form pursuant to Section
413(g)(8).  See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2967, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973,
992 (1978)(holding in order to meet the constitutional requirements of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, “a death penalty statute must not
preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors”); Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 150,
507A.2d 1072, 1087, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890, 107 S. Ct. 292, 93 L. Ed. 2d 265
(1986)(explaining that “[t]he intention is, as we see it, simply that the jury may itself set forth
any facts not listed on the submitted form which it believes constitute a mitigating factor”).
We have explained that in death penalty cases where the appellant asserts that the
sentencing authority failed to consider or find mitigating factors, “the standard of review is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
58
sentencing authority could have concluded that the accused failed to prove the claimed
mitigating circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence.”  See Stebbing v. State, 299 Md.
331, 362, 473 A.2d 903, 918 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 900, 105 S. Ct. 276, 83 L. Ed. 2d
212 (1984)(emphasis in original).  In the matter now before us, the trial judge, when he gave
the instructions concerning the sentencing form, directed the jury’s attention to the fact that
they had acquitted appellant of premeditated murder.  The jury was well aware of the fact that
appellant had been acquitted of premeditated murder, as the same jury heard both the merits
phase and the sentencing phase of the trial.  Because the mitigating circumstance of acquittal
of premeditated murder is permissive, rather than mandatory, it is well within the realm of
possibility that a reasonable sentencing authority could conclude that although the prosecution
did not prove its case for premeditated murder at trial, the accused nevertheless committed
murder by violently taking the life of another human being without provocation.  The
sentencing form requires the jury to balance the aggravating and mitigating factors it finds, and
in so doing, the jury may exercise the conscience of the community in affording greater weight
to the criminal conduct.  Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s refusal to issue
appellant’s requested jury instruction, and no prejudice to appellant in the jury’s consideration
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances absent the requested instruction.
VIII.  WHETHER THERE ARE AMBIGUITIES
AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE SENTENCING VERDICTS
REQUIRING APPELLANT’S DEATH SENTENCE TO BE VACATED
Appellant argues that the combination of the contents of the third jury note, the trial
judge’s response to the note, and the inclusion of the statement “[l]ife imprisonment without
parole is sufficient” under Section IV, part 8(b) of the sentencing form demonstrates that the
jury arbitrarily imposed a sentence of death in this case, requiring that the sentence be vacated.
The facts of this case place appellant’s criminal conduct within the framework of Maryland’s
18
Article 27, § 410 provides:
All murder which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to
perpetrate, any rape in any degree, sexual offense in the first or second degree, sodomy,
mayhem, robbery, carjacking or armed carjacking, burglary in the first, second, or third
degree, kidnapping as defined in §§ 337 and 338 of this article, or in the escape or
attempt to escape from the Maryland Penitentiary, the house of correction, the
Baltimore City Detention Center, or from any jail or penal institution in any of the
counties of this State, shall be murder in the first degree.
19
The aggravating factors set forth in Code, Art. 27, § 413(d) are as follows:
(1)
The victim was a law enforcement officer who was murdered while in the
performance of his duties;
(2)
The defendant committed the murder at a time when he was confined in any
correctional institution;
(3)
The defendant committed the murder in furtherance of an escape or an attempt
to escape from or evade the lawful custody, arrest, or detention of or by an
officer or guard of a correctional institution or by a law enforcement officer;
(4)
The victim was taken or attempted to be taken in the course of a kidnapping or
abduction or an attempt to kidnap or abduct;
(5)
The victim was a child abducted in violation of § 2 of this article;
(6)
The defendant committed the murder pursuant to an agreement or contract for
remuneration or the promise of remuneration to commit the murder;
(7)
The defendant engaged or employed another person to commit the murder and
the murder was committed pursuant to an agreement or contract for
remuneration or the promise of remuneration;
(8)
At the time of the murder, the defendant was under sentence of death or
imprisonment for life;
(9)
The defendant committed more than one offense of murder in the first degree
arising out of the same incident;
(10)
The defendant committed the murder while committing or attempting to commit
a carjacking, armed carjacking, robbery, arson in the first degree, rape or sexual
offense in the first degree.
59
capital punishment statute.  His conviction for the first-degree murder of Edward Atkinson was
based on the felony murder rule.  See Code, Art. 27, § 410 (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.).18  At trial,
the jury determined that appellant was a principal in the first-degree in the murder.  The
aggravating factor found by the jury in its sentencing deliberations was that appellant
committed the murder while he was robbing Mr. Atkinson.  See Code, Art. 27, § 413(d).19
With regard to mitigating circumstances, the jury unanimously found that appellant had not
60
previously committed a crime of violence.  See § 413(g)(1).  Under Section IV, part 8(b),
some of the jurors listed four additional mitigating circumstances:  “chaotic, disruptive, and
violent childhood[;] accepts full responsibility for act and shows remorse[;] life imprisonment
without parole is sufficient[;] mercy shown to defendant.”  The jury unanimously voted to
impose a death sentence.
We have held the felony murder rule embodied in Section 413(d)(10) to be a
constitutional aggravating factor.  See  Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576, 615, 755 A.2d 1088,
1109 (2000); Calhoun v. State, 297 Md. at 629, 468 A.2d at 77.  Not all crimes defined as
felonies under the Maryland Code are included within those offenses enumerated under the
felony murder statute.  See Code, Art. 27, § 410.  The felony murders qualifying as an
aggravating factor pursuant to Section 413(d)(10) are a select group derived from Section 410,
thus narrowly restricting the class of death-eligible felony murders to those felonies deemed
most serious by the Legislature, and to those convicted as principals in the first-degree.  See
Calhoun, 297 Md. at 625-626, 468 A.2d at 75.  Thus, reading all relevant portions of the
statute, the death penalty may only be imposed in Maryland in a narrow class of cases.  See id.
at 624, 428 A.2d at 74.
The circumstances surrounding the murder of Edward Atkinson fall within that narrow
class of criminal activity eligible for the death penalty under Maryland law.  In capital cases,
the Maryland sentencing scheme requires the jury to carefully weigh the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances such that a death sentence shall only be imposed where a unanimous
jury finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.  See
Code, Art. 27, § 413(h), (i).  The statute contemplates a weighing of the gravity of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, not merely a numerical tally of whether the
mitigating circumstances listed on the sentencing form outnumber the aggravating
20
Article 21 provides as follows:
That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of the
accusation against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in due time (if required)
to prepare for his defence; to be allowed counsel; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have process for his witnesses; to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath;
and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be
found guilty.
61
circumstances.  See Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 83, 622 A.2d 727, 729-730
(1993)(affirming imposition of a death sentence where the trial court found the existence of
a single aggravating factor under Section 413(d)(10) outweighed the mitigating circumstance
of Section 413(g)(4) that defendant could not appreciate the criminality of his conduct due to
mental incapacity and five additional mitigating circumstances under Section 413(g)(8));
Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 473 A.2d 903 (affirming death sentence and finding that
sentencing authority was not required to find statutory mitigating circumstances despite
defendant’s age at time of crime (19), extensive proof of defendant’s history of substance
abuse, mental illness and other cognitive impairment, and defendant’s apology and promise that
she would never do anything again which would result in her imprisonment).  The record before
us supports the jury’s conclusion that the statutory aggravating circumstance in Section
413(d)(10), the “defendant committed the murder while committing…a robbery...” outweighed
the mitigating circumstances.  Thus, we do not find any ambiguities or inconsistencies in the
sentencing verdict.
IX.  JUROR STRIKES FOR CAUSE
Appellant contends that four potential jurors were excluded from the venire panel in
violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the principles established in
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1968), and Morgan
v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1992), and Article 21 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.20  We disagree.
Maryland Code, Constitutions Article (1958, 1981 Repl. Vol.).
62
The trial court conducted voir dire from February 23-26, 1997, and excused four
potential jurors from the panel.  Appellant asserts that none of the four potential jurors had
clearly demonstrated through their answers to questioning from counsel and the court that their
views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair their ability to serve as jurors.
We review the trial court’s dismissal of the potential jurors for an abuse of discretion.
Appellant argues that Fatima Johnson should not have been stricken for cause because
she never indicated she would be unable to impose the death penalty.  Relevant portions of Ms.
Johnson’s voir dire are as follows:
The Court: 
Now, have you formed or do you have any general attitude about
the death penalty or about capital punishment?
Juror:  
No, I haven’t formed anything, but well – I don’t know if I could
sentence anybody to death.  I don’t know if I could.  Depends on
what the outcome is going to be.  I don’t know.
* * *
The Court:
Suppose that you heard the testimony about what the penalty
should be –that is, you heard background about the defendant, and
other testimony as to what the penalty should be, you heard the
instructions from the judge, you heard from the lawyers arguing
both sides of it, you got back and you talked with the other jurors
and then, in you[r] own mind, you felt the death penalty was
proper and allowed by law, would you be able then to vote for it?
Juror:  
I don’t know.  I really don’t know.
* * *
The State:  
Do you have any particular religious or moral convictions about
the death penalty?
Juror:  
No.  I just don’t feel in my heart I could do it to anybody.
The State:  
Are there any circumstances under which you could impose the
death penalty?
63
Juror:  
Only circumstances I could do it if somebody had did it to my
family, my child, my husband.   But I wouldn’t want that case, so,
like I said, I don’t know, until I hear what really went on.
* * *
Defense:  
-- are your feelings such that it would in any way affect your
ability to be fair and impartial in determining guilt or innocence?
Juror:  
I could be fair.
Defense:  
You know, with regard to the question of the death penalty, do
you have a totally closed mind to being persuaded by either side
as to whether the sentence should be death or life – we know it’s
going to be hard, but the question is do you have a closed mind –
Juror:  
No, it’s not closed, but I don’t know if I could say I want someone
killed.  I mean, you know, I don’t know if I could.
* * *
The State:  
If I could ask one follow up.  The judge is going to tell you what
the law is and you will determine what the facts are. Would you
be able to follow the law that the judge instructs you, on the law
that the judge says is the law in the State of Maryland?
Juror:  
Yes, I think I could.
The State:  
Even if it included the possibility of imposition of the death
penalty.
Juror:  
I don’t know.
Appellant also seeks reversal on the basis of the voir dire responses provided by
Michael Diffendal, on the basis of alleged ambiguities in Mr. Diffendal’s responses to
questioning:
The Court:  
So you don’t know whether you would be able to, based upon what
you heard and the instructions of the judge as to your
responsibilities with respect to the law, if you concluded that the
death penalty was proper, you do not know whether would even
then be able to –
Juror:  
I don’t know, at this point.
The Court:  
-- vote for it?  I’m not asking you whether you thought you could
64
find it was proper, but if you did find it was proper, you are not
sure –
Juror:  
I’m not sure.
The State:  
As the judge indicated, he would instruct you or tell you what the
law was, and you would listen to the facts and determine what the
facts were.  Please correct me if I’m wrong, the impression I got
from your last answer is regardless of what the judge instructed
you as to the law, that you may [] not be in a position to vote for
the death penalty?
Juror:  
I guess what I’m saying right now is that I don’t know when it
came down to the final making a decision, whether I could or not.
I have never really considered it in detail.  It’s a big responsibility.
* * *
Defense:  
Sir, just to follow up a little bit more, obviously this is all in a
vacuum, and it’s difficult for anyone who has to make that kind of
a decision.  Can you conceive of any case where the State could
convince you that the facts were so bad and the individual was so
bad and he deserved the death penalty, you could vote for it?
Juror:  
I think that could be a possibility, depending on what the evidence
was, but I can’t sit here and say it would be, and it’s something of
great responsibility, and something I’ve never had to consider
prior to this.
Appellant also asserts error with regard to the responses of potential juror Katherine
Bishop on the basis that the following responses in voir dire did not indicate that she would be
unable to vote for a sentence of death:
The Court:  
If you were convinced at the end of that proceeding or persuaded
that under the law as the judge had given it to you and under the
facts which you heard at the original trial with regard to guilt or
innocence, the portion of the trial that had to do with the penalty,
that the death penalty was proper, could you vote for it?
Juror: 
Whew.  I honestly don’t know if I could.  That is as close as I can
get for you.  I can’t give you a yes or no.  I don’t make decisions
like that, and I can only say that  -- I am not sure.
* * *
65
Juror:  
Are you asking me if I could vote for the death penalty?
The Court:  
Yes.
Juror:  
Not the three choices just the death penalty?
The Court:  
Yes.
Juror:  
I am not sure I could.  I am not a big what if, person.  That is my
honest answer.
The Court:  
Again I am making it easy for you.  I’m telling you that you have
concluded that it would be proper –
Juror:  
What are you asking me?
The Court:  
-- could you vote for the death penalty?
Juror:  
Not as it stands now.
* * *
Defense:  
When you say not as it stands now can you explain that?
Juror:  
I am a person that I can’t live through your experience, I have to
hear what is going on and he’s asking me what if and I am not a
good what if person.  Things could change.  I guess I am saying if
I heard the evidence and thought maybe this would be appropriate,
maybe I could.  But I just can’t -- I’m not a blanket person.  I don’t
see things in black and white, I wish I did it would make my life
easier.
Defense:  
Sure.  Obviously it’s very difficult for anyone.  At a sentencing
proceeding, evidence will be presented and jurors may disagree.
And I know you’re not a good what if person, but do you see that
there could be a set of circumstances where the State could
convince you that the case was bad enough and the facts were bad
enough that you could vote for death?
Juror:  
Not based on what I feel now, probably not.
Defense:  
And that would be based on what set of feelings if I might ask?
Juror:  
I just don’t think anyone has the right, individual or government,
to take somebody else’s life.  But as I said I have never been
personally challenged, nobody’s ever hurt anyone in my
immediate family.  I could change my convictions probably like
that (indicating by snapping fingers).
66
Defense:  
Are you open to be persuaded by the State or completely closed
to persuasion?
Juror:  
I’m always open.
Appellant also argues that the responses of potential juror Tina Buttner do not indicate
an inability to apply the law.  The relevant portions of her voir dire are as follows:
The Court:  
The next question I have is have you formed any opinions for or
against the death penalty?
Juror:  
Not yet.  I don’t think I’m old enough to make that kind of a
decision, just yet…
* * *
The Court:  
…So you hear all this, you hear the evidence about what the
penalty should be, you hear the judge’s instructions, you hear the
argument of the lawyers and then you go in the jury room and
discuss the matter with the other jurors and during all that, you
become convinced that in this case, the made up case, that the
death penalty would be proper.  Would you be able to vote for it?
Juror:  
Oh, gee.  Oh, gosh.  That is very hard.  That is a hard decision.
The Court:  
Well it is a hard decision.
Juror:  
Um, I don’t know.  I probably couldn’t do that.  I probably
couldn’t.  I think I would be – I don’t know.  I don’t know.  I think
I might have -- I don’t know.  I guess I have that regard for human
life, I don’t think I could just—
The Court:  
You don’t think you could be persuaded to do that?
Juror:  
No, I don’t think I could.
* * *
Defense:  
Can you conceive of any set of facts where the State could
convince you the individual perpetrating the crime was bad
enough and the crime itself was bad enough that you could vote
for the death penalty?
Juror:  
I don’t know.  I think I probably – it would be really really hard for
me to say that I would want the death penalty for anybody,
regardless of the crime that they committed.  Unless of course
it’s a mass murder or something.  Intentionally killing hundreds
67
of people.  Serial killers I could probably vote for the death
penalty.
Under Maryland law and the United States Constitution, appellant was entitled to a fair
and impartial jury.  See Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650, 666, 759 A.2d 764, 772 (2000), cert.
denied, ____ U.S. ____, 121 S. Ct. 864, 148 L. Ed. 2d 776 (2001); Evans v. State, 333 Md.
660, 668, 637 A.2d 117, 121, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 833, 115 S. Ct. 109, 130 L. Ed. 2d 56
(1994); Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 138, 383 A.2d 389, 396, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852,
99 S. Ct. 158, 58 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1978).  The standard for exclusion as a juror is that “a
[potential] juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment
unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a
juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”  Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,
420, 105 S. Ct. 844, 850, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 849 (1985)(quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38,
45, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581, 584 (1980)); see Ware, 360 Md. at 666, 759
A.2d at 772; see also King v. State, 287 Md. 530, 535, 414 A.2d 909, 912 (1980); Grossfeld
v. Braverman, 203 Md. 498, 501, 101 A.2d 824, 825 (1954); Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133,
141, 88 A.2d 556, 560 (1952); Lockhart v. State, 145 Md. 602, 615-16, 125 A. 829, 833-34
(1924).
The decision to excuse a potential juror for cause is left to the sound discretion of the
trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal except for an abuse of discretion.  See Ware,
360 Md. at 666, 759 A.2d at 772.  The trial court is in the best position to assess potential
jurors and strike them from the panel if needed by taking into consideration the potential
jurors’ demeanors and credibility.  See id.  In capital punishment cases, the trial court must
consider the potential juror bias arising from venire panel members who possess strong beliefs
concerning imposition of the death penalty.  See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173, 106
S. Ct. 1758, 1764, 90 L. Ed. 2d 137, 147 (1986)(holding that “the Constitution does not
68
prohibit the States from ‘death qualifying’ juries in capital cases”); Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. at 522-23, 88 S. Ct. at 1777, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 785; Evans, 333 Md. at 668, 637 A.2d
at 121; Grandison, 305 Md. at 724-25, 506 A.2d at 599-600.  
In the instant case, each one of the four potential jurors indicated varying levels of
inability or unwillingness to consider the death penalty as an appropriate sentence.  As he
excused each of these potential jurors, the trial judge commented on his perception of the
jurors.  With Ms. Johnson, the trial judge was “particularly persuaded by the fact that she
indicates that however she feels, her decision does not involve anything that the Court will tell
her.”  The trial judge found that Mr. Diffendal could not say what he would do even when given
the opportunity to conjure up the most extreme situation, such that he indicated that he would
not be able to follow the judge’s instructions.  Ms. Bishop, though indicating at the conclusion
of questioning that she was “always open,” in the court’s impression did so simply “to indicate
her lack of total intransigence.”  Ms. Buttner could only tentatively qualify her willingness to
accept the death penalty as an appropriate punishment for “mass murder,” regardless of the
requirements of the law.  Furthermore, the trial judge observed Ms. Buttner’s nervousness
throughout questioning, as she gritted her teeth so much that the trial judge queried as to what
was the matter with her.  For the reasons indicated, we find no abuse of discretion of the trial
judge in striking these four potential jurors for cause.
X.  THE APPELLANT IN SHACKLES:
During the second day of trial on March 10, 1998, appellant was transported to the
courtroom for the afternoon session wearing leg and arm shackles.  In order to reach the
courtroom from the hallway, the appellant had to walk by the jury room where the door
inadvertently remained open a few inches.  Appellant alleged that he was observed by some of
the jurors.  Appellant moved for a mistrial, although he did not request that the jurors be polled
69
to determine if any of them had actually seen appellant walking down the hallway in shackles.
The trial judge denied the motion for mistrial.
We have stated that, “a defendant is entitled to an individualized evaluation of both the
need for shackling and the potential prejudice therefrom.”  Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30,
85, 665 A.2d 223, 250 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148, 116 S. Ct. 1021, 134 L. Ed. 2d
100 (1996)(citing Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 583 A.2d 218 (1990)).  We review the trial
judge’s denial of the motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion.  The general rule that a
mistrial should be granted only for “manifest necessity” is well settled.  See State v.
Crutchfield, 318 Md. 200, 207-08, 567 A.2d 449, 452-53 (1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905,
110 S. Ct. 1926, 109 L. Ed. 2d 289 (1990)(quoting United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
579, 580, 6 L. Ed. 165 (1824)).  Because the trial judge “is ordinarily in a uniquely superior
position to gauge the potential for prejudice in a particular case,” the trial judge is afforded
broad discretion in determining the appropriateness of granting the motion for mistrial.
Watters v. State, 328 Md. 38, 50, 612 A.2d 1288, 1294 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1024,
113 S. Ct. 1832, 123 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1993).  For the reasons set forth below, no manifest
necessity existed in this case.
The decision as to the method and extent of courtroom security is left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge.  See Whittlesey, 340 Md. at 84, 665 A.2d at 249.  This discretion
extends to the hallways and corridors leading to and from the courtroom, as the structure of
the courthouse and the security available in the building may bear on the trial judge’s decision
to utilize shackles on the accused.  On review we must ask “whether the measures utilized were
reasonable and whether, given the need, such security posed an unacceptable risk of prejudice
to the defendant.”  Bruce v. State, 318 Md. 706, 721, 569 A.2d 1254, 1262 (1990), aff’d, 328
Md. 594, 616 A.2d 392 (1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963, 113 S. Ct. 2936, 124 L. Ed. 2d
70
686 (1993)(citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 572, 106 S. Ct. 1340, 1347, 89 L. Ed.
2d 525, 536-37 (1986)). 
The Queen Anne’s County Courthouse, constructed more than two hundred years ago,
presents particular difficulties in obscuring shackled prisoners from public view.  The prisoner
transport vehicles must park on the public street such that all prisoners must be walked across
the Courthouse square and enter the building through the front (and only) door to the
Courthouse.  The trial judge explained the inherent difficulties of the Queen Anne’s County
Courthouse in his denial of appellant’s motion for mistrial:
I simply do not feel that one fleeting glimpse, in the meantime,
for the past two days, and at the hearing, when each of the jurors
was here when we had the public selection of the jurors and when
each juror was interviewed privately, the defendant has been there
really indistinguishable from the rest of us…and he has been here
and he’s been walking back and forth in this courtroom
unshackled to the numerous—and not inordinate, I don’t mean
that when I say numerous, but there have been a number of
conferences here at the bench and he is really pretty free to go.
I have had occasion to look and I was—I have been very
impressed over the years and I was again yesterday, at how really
good the detention people are in making themselves obscure…we
don’t even know how many, if any of the jurors saw the defendant.
But if they did, the only thing that he had on was a pair of leg
irons, which are designed to keep someone from fleeing, when
they’re in transit.
* * *
But, I don’t think that when – first of all, they know that he is on
trial for first degree murder.  They know that he is in some sort
of custody, and they cannot be so naïve as to assume that he is
being transported back and forth on the outside on the honor
system, because it just isn’t that way.  If they are, they’re some
jurors, but I simply cannot believe that they were.  I think it was
a most unfortunate event and it was unnecessary I think, frankly,
but I think it was a – its magnitude was so small, it was a star, light
years away in present significance, and – A, and B, any other
significance or any other thing, it just – because you see, the
example that I gave you before of a juror coming back from lunch
and they happen to be coming back from lunch at the same time
that they’re bringing the defendant from the detention center, I
71
cannot avoid that.  There is no way possible to avoid that because
there is only one way for any human being to get to the second
floor courtroom, and it goes for jurors, it goes for guards, it goes
for judges, it goes for everybody else.  There is just no other way.
Unless one comes up the fire escape and I have never really seen
anyone on the fire escape.  It’s outside.  Besides, the window isn’t
even double hung and we have never been able to get it up, so
heaven help us if we have a fire.
* * *
[W]hen one comes up the stairs, the single stairway to the second
floor, one is in the hall, and that hallway runs virtually the entire
width of the building.  To one’s left is about one quarter of that
long hall, at the end of which is a door, which takes up the entire
end on the left, which is the door to the judge’s secretaries
office.  If one turns to the right, at the very end of that hall, again,
there is a door, taking up the entire area of the end of the hall,
which is the door to the jury room.  And then, right adjacent to
that door is the door to come into the courtroom that the people
from the detention center bring the defendant in, in that door, to
the courtroom, and then through a portion of the courtroom to the
– another room, which is the detention room where his
transportation accessories are removed, and this would include
over coats, rain coats, hats or whatever one is traveling with, and
it just so happens that a very necessary traveling accessory of a
prisoner is leg irons and hand cuffs, and why is that, it’s to protect
everybody and make sure that the person doesn’t escape.  It isn’t
a question of whether I think that Mr. Miles is going to escape,
but, it’s just – most of us are taught over the centuries that we
don’t deal in promises, so I really think that while unfortunate, the
situation is absolutely diminimus and I’m glad the jury didn’t hear
it, because it’s inconceivable to me that a juror thought anything
about it.  Frankly I think if they had seen the defendant walking
around the hall, with nothing on they would have been astonished,
and so, as I said, the detention center people are extremely
careful when they are in the courtroom to be themselves
unobtrusive, and, since I have been here, at least, the rule has been
that we don’t have hand cuffs and leg irons in the courtroom,
unless they have called me in advance and said there is a strong
reason for it, that someone it violent.”
Thus, the trial judge balanced the need to have basic security in shackling appellant
while being transported to and from the courtroom while preserving the appellant’s right to a
fair trial and sentencing by having all shackles removed in the courtroom.
72
Appellant misplaces his reliance on Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 25
L. Ed. 2d 353 (1970)(discussing the constitutionality of binding and gagging a disruptive
defendant in the courtroom during his trial), and Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S. Ct.
1340, 89 L. Ed. 2d 525 (discussing the presence of uniformed state police troopers sitting
behind defendants for security purposes).  Both Allen and Flynn involved events taking place
inside the courtroom, while the jury was present.  In the present case, no extraordinary security
measures were taken.  At all times during the trial and sentencing the appellant wore ordinary
clothing and appeared before the jury in the courtroom unshackled.
As we stated in Bruce v. State, “[t]his one inadvertent viewing of Appellant in
handcuffs…did not result in any prejudice to defendant’s right to a fair trial.”  318 Md. at 721,
569 A.2d at 1262.  Because the jury was never polled to determine whether there was actual
prejudice, and there are no facts on the record which indicate an unacceptable risk of prejudice
to the appellant in using shackles during prisoner transport, we decline to infer that the jurors
who may have witnessed appellant walk down the hall, if any, were biased against the appellant
and therefore, find no abuse of discretion. 
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE
PAID BY APPELLANT.
Dissenting Opinion follows:
Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County
Criminal No. 4789
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 42
September Term, 1998
_____________________________________________
_
JODY LEE MILES
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
_____________________________________________
_
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
JJ.
_____________________________________________
21Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.
Vol., 2000 Supp.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
74
_
Dissenting Opinion by Raker, J., in which Bell, C.J. and
Eldridge, J.,  join
_____________________________________________
_
Filed:    September 18, 2001
I respectfully dissent.   I would reverse appellant’s convictions for first degree felony
murder, robbery with a deadly weapon, robbery, and use of a handgun in the commission of a
crime of violence.  
The Circuit Court erred in refusing to suppress all of the evidence that was derived from
appellant’s unlawfully intercepted cellular telephone communication in violation of the
exclusionary command contained in the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance
Act, Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.) § 10-405 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article.21  Specifically, the State failed to carry its burden to prove that the
evidence obtained from Jona Miles, appellant’s wife, and appellant’s subsequent statement to
police were sufficiently purged of the taint of the primary illegality of the wiretap and the
evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant derived therefrom that they did not constitute
-2-
“fruit of the poisonous tree” under the attenuation doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States,371
U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), and its progeny.
The Circuit Court suppressed the tape recording of the phone conversation between
Jona and Jody Lee Miles because it was seized illegally in violation of the Maryland
wiretapping statute, § 10-401, et seq.  No one disputes this finding of the trial judge.  The judge
also found, and the State also does not dispute, that the evidence seized pursuant to the search
warrant executed on April 22, 1997 was unlawfully seized because it was derivative of the
illegal wiretap and, thus, was excluded pursuant to the exclusionary mandate of § 10-405.
Therefore, the sole question presented by this appeal, with respect to appellant’s pretrial
motion to suppress, is whether the remaining evidence obtained subsequent to the illegal
wiretap and search warrant was admitted improperly in evidence at appellant’s trial because it
was derived from the illegally intercepted communication in violation of the exclusionary
command of § 10-405.
While the statutory exclusionary rule of § 10-405 is not dependent upon the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d
1081 (1961), the constitutional “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is helpful in interpreting
the scope of the exclusionary prohibition against admission of evidence “derived from” an
illegal wiretap.  See maj. op. at 18-21; United States v. Spanuolo, 549 F.2d 705, 711-12 (9th
Cir. 1977) (interpreting the federal wiretap statute as codifying the “fruit of the poisonous
tree” doctrine with respect to its exclusionary provision); United States v. Wac, 498 F.2d
1227, 1232 (6th Cir. 1974) (interpreting the words “derived therefrom” in the federal wiretap
statute as a codification of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine); Carter v. State, 274 Md.
411, 422, 337 A.2d 415, 422 (1975) (applying the Wong Sun doctrine to a violation of the
Maryland wiretap statute).  As a result, the exclusionary rule “applies to any ‘fruits’ of a
constitutional violation – whether such evidence be tangible, physical material actually seized
in an illegal search, items observed or words overheard in the course of the unlawful activity,
or confessions or statements of the accused obtained during an illegal arrest and detention.”
United States v. Crews, 445, U.S. 463, 470, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 1249, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1980)
(footnotes omitted).
It is black letter law that once a defendant has demonstrated the existence of a primary
illegality, such as the illegal wiretap in this case, the burden shifts to the government to prove
that the resulting evidence was not derived from that illegality.  See Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 183, 89 S. Ct. 961, 972, 22 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1969); United States v.
Parker, 722 F.2d 179, 184 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598, 601 (9th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Cella, 568 F.2d 1266, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1978); State v. Pau’u,
824 P.2d 833, 836 (Haw. 1992); Carter, 274 Md. at 443, 337 at 434; Commonwealth v.
Cephas, 291 A.2d 106, 110 n.4 (Pa. 1972); Hart v. Commonwealth, 269 S.E.2d 806, 809 (Va.
1980).  As this Court stated in Carter:
Although initially the petitioner must go forward with
evidence to show that the facts in the affidavit were obtained as
“fruits of the poisonous tree,” if it is established that any such
illegal wire tap or eavesdrop was employed, it then becomes the
ultimate burden of the prosecution to show that such facts were
discovered independently, untainted by any such illegal wire tap
or eavesdropping, or were so “attenuated as to dissipate the taint”
of the primary illegality.
Carter, 274 Md. at 443, 337 A.2d at 434.
The government can demonstrate that the taint of the primary illegality has been purged
in three ways: (1) by demonstrating that the causal nexus between the illegality and the
22The majority seems to flirt with either independent source or inevitable discovery analysis,
without explicitly doing so, by arguing that the police had other investigatory leads directing
them to appellant, see maj. op. at 38, and by describing Jona Miles’s cooperation as voluntary
assistance.  See id. at 29-31.  Nonetheless, the State has failed to meet its burden of
demonstrating either that the evidence used to convict appellant was derived from a source
independent of the primary illegality in this case or that the evidence used at appellant’s trial
would have been discovered absent the illegally taped telephone conversation and subsequent
search warrant.  The majority’s allegation that “the police had already physically identified their
suspect,” id. at 28 n.11, merely because they had a physical description of a person who had
been seen near the crime scene during the police investigation, is a far cry from the proof
necessary to make the derivative evidence resulting from the illegal seizures in this case
admissible.
-3-
subsequently discovered evidence is sufficiently attenuated so that the taint has been
dissipated, see Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88, 83 S. Ct. at 417; 9 L. Ed. 2d 441; (2) by
demonstrating that the subsequently discovered evidence was obtained from a source
independent of the primary illegality, see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242, 87 S. Ct.
1926, 1940, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967); or (3) by demonstrating that, absent the illegality, the
State still inevitably would have discovered the later evidence.  See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
431, 444, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984); United States v. Ramirez-
Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989); Parker, 722 F.2d at 184.  In this case, neither
the State nor the majority alleges an independent source for the disputed evidence or inevitable
discovery; therefore, the admissibility of the evidence obtained from Jona Miles and
appellant’s confession is dependent solely upon application of the attenuation doctrine.22
This Court examined the attenuation doctrine in the context of the Fourth Amendment
in Ferguson v. State, 301 Md. 542, 483 A.2d 1255 (1984).  In that case, the police had
illegally arrested the petitioner without probable cause.  As a result, at the petitioner’s ensuing
trial, the court suppressed the physical evidence seized from his person at the time of his
arrest, but the trial court permitted the victim’s identification of the petitioner, both at the time
of his arrest and in court, to be admitted in evidence, and the petitioner was subsequently
-4-
convicted of armed robbery and related offenses.  See id. at 546-47, 483 A.2d at 1257.
This Court reversed the petitioner’s conviction, ruling that the trial court had erred in
not suppressing the extrajudicial identification testimony as the fruit of the petitioner’s
unlawful arrest, see id. at 552, 483 A.2d at 1260, although it upheld the court’s admission of
the in-court identification of the petitioner because it had an “independent source.”  See id. at
556, 483 A.2d at 1262.  We found that the causal relationship between the illegal arrest and
the subsequent extrajudicial identification of the petitioner was not sufficiently attenuated,
primarily on the basis of the temporal proximity between the arrest and the identification, the
lack of any meaningful intervening circumstance to break the causal connection, and the
purposefulness of the police conduct in conducting the identification “showup.”  See id. at
550-52, 483 A.2d at 1259-60.
In 
examining 
the 
Wong 
Sun 
attenuation 
doctrine, 
courts 
repeatedly 
utilize
consequential language, such as “exploitation,” “direct result,” “chain of events,” “link,”
“nexus,” “impetus,” “connection,” “causation,” “inducement,” “basis,” and “product” to describe
the necessary relationship between a primary illegality and evidence derived therefrom.  In
assessing attenuation, courts examine the facts and circumstances of each case in considering
four factors: the giving of Miranda warnings; the temporal proximity of the illegality to the
confession; the presence of intervening circumstances; and the purpose and flagrancy of the
illegal police conduct.  See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261-62,
45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975); Parker, 722 F.2d at 186; Ferguson, 301 Md. at 549, 483 A.2d at
1258; State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d 361, 368 (R.I. 1983). 
In my view, there was no sufficient attenuation to purge the primary taint of the illegal
oral acquisition.  All of the subsequent evidence presented at the trial was the product of the
primary illegality, and the State failed to satisfy its burden to prove attenuation.  While Jona
23The majority accuses this dissent of verging “on a traditional tort analysis of proximate cause
. . . .”  Maj. op. at 39-40.  We agree that the attenuation doctrine does not require a strict but-
for test of causation.  Nonetheless, in determining the admissibility of derivative evidence
under the Maryland wiretap statute, courts are guided by the statutory exclusionary command
that no evidence “derived from” any intercepted communication may be received in evidence.
See § 10-405.  Under the attenuation doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
the question of whether evidence derives from an illegally intercepted transmission is a
question of causation.  See discussion supra pp. 5-6.
-5-
Miles and appellant both were given their Miranda warnings, an application of the remaining
Brown factors makes clear that the temporal proximity between the illegal wiretap and search
warrant and the derivative evidence, the lack of intervening circumstances, and the
purposefulness of the illegal police conduct all strongly indicate a direct causal nexus between
the illegally seized evidence and the subsequent evidence used by the State at trial. 
The illegal wiretap and subsequent search and seizure led the police almost immediately
to appellant – the police identified the voices of Jona Miles and appellant on the basis of the
taped conversation; the search and seizure warrant for appellant’s residence was issued within
a week of the taped phone conversation having been turned over to the police, on the basis of
the contents of that conversation; Jona Miles’s custodial interview was conducted the same
day, during which she consented to subsequent searches and seizures and described to police
where she had disposed of the murder weapon; appellant was arrested later that evening and
confessed after a brief custodial interrogation during which he was confronted with evidence
that the police had against him, including the illegally seized evidence; and the police
recovered the gun the following day.
Without the primary illegality, it is unlikely that the police would have identified
appellant.  There certainly were no intervening circumstances to lead them to his door.23  The
police knew or, at the very least, they should have known, that the tape of appellant’s telephone
conversation was obtained in violation of the statute and should not have exploited it further
-6-
to obtain the search warrant for his residence.
Emphasizing the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule, the majority asserts that
the police conduct in this case did not constitute flagrant and purposeful misconduct.  See maj.
op. at 40, stating that “the police did exactly what anyone would have expected them to do.”
I disagree.  The intercepted conversation plainly was obtained in contravention of the wiretap
statute.  As the majority concedes, “the police were aware that the conversation had been taped
. . . without the consent of the parties to the conversation.”  Maj. op. at 14.  Even if, for some
reason not apparent on this record, the police did not know that its further use was illegal, they
certainly should have.  The law in Maryland is certainly clear that the use of the contents of an
unlawfully taped conversation is, in itself, an unlawful act.  See § 10-402 (a).  
The majority attempts to distinguish the police misconduct in this case from that in
Brown, see id., but the attempt amounts to a distinction without a difference.  In Brown, the
Court found the police conduct to be purposeful and flagrant because the arrest of the
petitioner was obviously improper and investigatory in purpose since it was used to effectuate
a search of his home as a search incident to his arrest.  See Brown, 422 U.S. at 604-05, 95 S.
Ct. at 2262, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416.  The police conduct in this case is directly comparable – the
police listened to an obviously illegally taped conversation and then used its contents to
effectuate the search of appellant’s home and seize evidence of his involvement in the murder.
The only real difference between the two situations is that, in Brown, the police search was a
warrantless one – a meaningless distinction for the purpose of assessing the purposefulness
and flagrancy of the actions of the police.  
In addition, the majority claims that construing the wiretap statute to preclude police
use of the taped conversation in this case would produce an unreasonable result.  See maj. op.
at 41.  On the contrary, such exclusion is mandated by this Court’s holdings in Mustafa v.
-7-
State, 323 Md. 65, 591 A.2d 481 (1991), and Perry v. State, 357 Md. 37, 741 A.2d 1162
(1999).  In implicitly creating, despite its protestations to the contrary, see maj. op. at 39 n.14,
a new “clean hands” exception to the exclusionary rule of the Maryland wiretap statute, the
majority appears to be overruling at least portions of Mustafa and Perry sub silentio.
Mustafa arose in a context similar to that of the case at bar, when a private citizen, who
was not acting at the direction of law enforcement, turned over an intercepted conversation to
police.  See Mustafa, 323 Md. at 71, 591 A.2d at 484.  Unlike this case, in which the
interception was unquestionably illegal, the communication at issue in Mustafa was
intercepted lawfully in Washington, D.C.  Nonetheless, this Court held that wiretap evidence
intercepted pursuant to more lenient statutory enactments of other jurisdictions is not
admissible in Maryland courts unless it complies with Maryland’s more restrictive standards.
See id. at 74, 591 A.2d at 485.  In doing so, we specifically held: 
The exclusionary provision § 10-405 of the Maryland Act
precludes the admission of evidence which was not lawfully
intercepted.  The language of this section is unambiguous, and
provides for no exceptions.  There is no indication that the
legislature intended to adopt anything but an “all-encompassing
exclusionary rule which it unequivocally fashioned in § 10-405.”
Id. at 73-74, 591 A.2d at 485 (internal citations omitted).
In Perry, this Court held, inter alia, that there was no coconspirator exception, nor
wilfulness requirement, to the exclusionary command of §10-405.  See Perry, 357 Md. at 60-
67, 741 A.2d at 1174-78.  In Perry, the telephone conversations that the State sought to
introduce in evidence had been taped by one of the alleged participants in the crime and had
been discovered and seized pursuant to a valid search warrant.  See id. at 43, 741 A.2d at 1165.
In fact, we specifically noted that “[t]here is no doubt that [the police officer] received the tape
by an authorized means; he acquired it through execution of a search warrant, the validity of
which is not in dispute.  The question, then, is whether the interception . . . was ‘in accordance
24In fact, the Maryland General Assembly acquiesced in this Court’s broad interpretation of §
10-405 when it amended the enumerated offenses of § 10-402 and § 10-406 of the Maryland
wiretap statute in 2000, after this Court’s decisions in Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 591 A.2d
-8-
with the provisions of the subtitle.’”  Id. at 63, 741 A.2d at 116.  Once again, this Court
reiterated its strict interpretation of § 10-405 in Mustafa, emphasizing that “[a]ny exception
that would make an interception lawful or that would preclude an aggrieved person from
moving to suppress an unlawful interception must be ‘specifically’ provided for in the Act . .
. .”  Id. at 62, 741 A.2d at 1175.  
The analysis of the exclusionary provision in Mustafa and Perry applies with equal
force to the evidence derived from an illegal wiretap in this case because § 10-405 places the
contents of illegally intercepted communications on equal footing with evidence “derived
therefrom.”  See § 10-405 (“Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted,
no part of the contents of the communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be
received in evidence . . . .”) (emphasis added).
The majority concludes that the “balance” of factors determining admissibility of the
evidence falls in favor of the State.  See maj. op. at 41.  That determination, however, is a
legislative one and not for this Court to make.  
In enacting the strict exclusionary provisions of § 10-405, the General Assembly made
the public policy determination of the appropriate balance between the needs of law
enforcement and the privacy interests of the citizens of Maryland in their wire
communications.  The Legislature did not choose to adopt the type of sliding scale
exclusionary rule that the majority now espouses.  As we explained in Perry, “[t]he Legislature
has made unmistakably clear that, except as otherwise specifically provided in the subtitle, wire
communications are not to be intercepted without the consent of all parties.”  Perry, 357 Md.
at 65, 741 A.2d at 1177.24  This is true because “[t]he exclusionary provision operates only
481 (1991), and Perry v. State, 357 Md. 37, 741 A.2d 1162 (1999), but did not amend the
exclusionary provision of § 10-405.  See 2000 Maryland Laws ch. 288, at1690-91 (codified
as amended at Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.) §§ 10-402, 10-406 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article).
-9-
upon the communication itself, depriving it of evidentiary value, rather than against the person
or property of the interceptor.”  Id. at 66, 741 A.2d at 1177-78.  Likewise, the fact that the
police did not participate in the taping of the conversations at issue in this case is irrelevant
to the question of whether their use of the illegally obtained recordings was permissible or
whether evidence derived therefrom is admissible in a Maryland court.
The record of the suppression hearing in this case shows clearly that the State failed to
carry its burden to prove attenuation.  Unfortunately, the record from the suppression hearing
contains only a few fragmentary excerpts of the illegally wiretapped conversation and the
subsequent police interviews of Jona Miles and appellant, which makes it difficult to determine
with any certainty the extent to which the primary illegality was exploited in obtaining this later
evidence.  Cf. maj. op. at 28 n.12 (acknowledging fragmentary state of Jona Miles’ statement
in the record).  Nonetheless, since the State bears the burden of proving attenuation, this
paucity of evidence should not work to appellant’s detriment.  Furthermore, the record before
us contains evidence affirmatively demonstrating a substantial nexus between the illegal
wiretap and resulting search of appellant’s residence and the evidence obtained from Jona
Miles and appellant.  
It is important to remember that the analysis of whether evidence to which objection
is made was obtained by exploitation of the primary illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint depends primarily upon weighing the facts in
the particular case.  See United States v. Finucan, 798 F.2d 838, 843 (1st Cir. 1983); 5
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.4 (3rd ed. 1996).  The excerpts from the police
-10-
interview with Jona Miles, who was under arrest at the time as an accessory in the alleged
crime, demonstrate that police specifically used the contents of the wiretapped conversation
in eliciting Ms. Miles’s statements.  At different points in the interview, the police informed
Ms. Miles that they knew that appellant had called her and told her to get rid of the gun, that she
and appellant had talked about his resemblance to the composite photographs that had been
broadcast on the local news, and that appellant had informed Ms. Miles that he was at a
particular friend’s house when the composites appeared on television, and the police made
reference to another friend, “Becky,” whose suspicions about the crime appellant and Ms.
Miles had discussed during the wiretapped conversation.
During the police interview of Jona Miles, the following exchange occurred regarding
the contents of the illegally taped conversation between appellant and Ms. Miles about
disposing of the murder weapon and the composite photographs on television:
[POLICE]:
The same night he called and told you to
get rid of the gun –
JONA MILES:
I saw – no.  I saw him in the afternoon.  I
saw him on the noon news.  I was at a
patient’s house.
[POLICE]:
Okay.  Was it the same day that he talked to
you that night and told you to get rid of
the gun?  That you saw the composites?
JONA MILES:
Probably.
[POLICE]:
Okay, so probably on the 15th, which is the
day before your doctor’s appointment, you
saw the composites?
JONA MILES:
All I remember is it was on the noon news.
[POLICE]:
Okay.
JONA MILES:
I remember that.
[POLICE]:
That night, Jody called you, you two talked
-11-
about the comparisons between him and
the composites:
JONA MILES:
Uh-huh.
(emphasis added).
The police also interviewed Jona Miles using her cellular telephone conversation with
appellant regarding the night that he saw the composites on television at a friend’s house:
[POLICE]:
The night the composites were shown on
TV, he told you he was at somebody’s
house.  Whose house was he at?  He said
he didn’t really want to look at the TV
and act too interested.
JONA MILES:
Cooper’s.  Cooper’s.
[POLICE]:
Jimmy K. Cooper?
JONA MILES:
Uh-huh.
(emphasis added).
Later on in the interrogation, police returned to the subject of appellant’s telephone
conversation with Jona Miles about the composites being shown on television:
[POLICE]:
Okay.  When you – why were you so
worried and why were you so grateful that
Jody called you that night he called you
after the composites were up?  You said
you were on pin and needles waiting for
you [sic] to call because you were
worried.
JONA MILES:
Just wondering if something happened to
him.
(emphasis added).
During their illegally taped cellular telephone conversation, appellant and Jona Miles
engaged in the following discussion:
FEMALE VOICE:
Are you sure you’re going to be okay down
there:
25Although the reference to “Becky” may seem to be innocuous, it is the effect of being
confronted with the contents of the illegally taped telephone conversation that creates the
sense of the futility of noncooperation in the suspect, independent of the incriminating nature
of those contents.
-12-
MALE VOICE:
I don’t know.  You know, I was almost
thinking about having you call Becky and
tell her to leave me a key somewhere.
FEMALE VOICE:
That might not be a good idea.
MALE VOICE:
Why?
FEMALE VOICE:
Because she asked questions last night.  If
anything had come up.  Yes, she did bring it
up to me.  You knew she would.  I told you
she would.
MALE VOICE:
Did anything come up what?
FEMALE VOICE:
Huh?
MALE VOICE:
Anything come up what?
FEMALE VOICE:
Remember what you told me you all talked
about when I left?
MALE VOICE:
Yeah.
FEMALE VOICE:
Yeah.  She just asked me about if you’d
heard anything.  I said no.  Everything’s
cool.  I said everything’s fine, why?  And
she brought it up the other day.
The police also exploited this illegally obtained information during their interrogation
of Jona Miles:
[POLICE]:
Who is Becky?  Who’s Becky that’s a friend of
yours?25
MILES:
Rebecca Chips.
 
The majority sidesteps the crucial causation analysis by pointing out that the police
never confronted Jona with “the fact that they possessed the taped cellular phone
-13-
conversation.”  Maj. op. at 30.  This assertion, however, in no way negates the fact that the
police confronted her with the contents of those tape recorded conversation.  In that way, Ms.
Miles’ statements to police were nonetheless derived from the taped conversations and,
therefore, inadmissible under § 10-405.
Stressing that Ms. Miles voluntarily waived her Miranda rights, the majority asserts
that any taint emanating from the illegal wiretap was attenuated in two ways.  First, the majority
states that the taint dissipated when Jona Miles attempted to dispose of the evidence of the
crime.  See maj. op. at 29-30.  Second, the majority asserts that the taint dissipated at the point
at which  Ms. Miles “took the Maryland State Police on a guided tour of the locations where
she had disposed of evidence.” Id. at 29.
Courts have universally agreed that the giving of Miranda warnings alone cannot per
se purge the taint of a prior illegality.  See Parker, 722 F.2d at 186; People v. Hines, 575 P.2d
414, 416 (Colo. 1978); State v. Abdouch, 434 N.W.2d 317, 328 (Neb. 1989); State v.
Jennings, 461 A.2d 361, 368-69 (R.I. 1983); Hart, 269 S.E.2d at 809; State v. Williams, 249
S.E.2d 758, 764 (W. Va. 1978).  The voluntary waiver of Miranda rights is but one factor to
be considered in assessing attenuation.  In fact, the Court’s specific holding in Brown, upon
which the majority relies for its finding of attenuation, was that Miranda warnings issued for
the purposes of protecting a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights are not sufficient, in
themselves, to purge the taint of a Fourth Amendment violation.  See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603,
95 S. Ct. at 2261, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416.  
Furthermore, Brown dealt with a situation where the petitioner’s statements to police
had been tainted by his illegal arrest.  In deciding that question, the Supreme Court devoted a
significant portion of the opinion to discussing the distinction between taint analysis under
Wong Sun and the Fourth Amendment and voluntariness under Miranda and the Fifth
26In fact, the majority notes that the police did not coerce Ms. Miles, offer her leniency, or
compel her to lead them to evidence.  See maj. op. at 28.  These questions, while crucial to
determining whether her statement was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment, are insufficient
to establish attenuation of the violation of her statutory privacy rights under the Maryland
wiretap statute.
-14-
Amendment.  See Brown, 422 U. S. at 597-99, 95 S. Ct. at 2258-59, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416.  
The majority here makes the same mistake as the Illinois state courts did in Brown –
conflating the question of the voluntariness of appellant’s statement with the question of
whether that statement was the result of prior illegal police conduct.26  If anything, the causal
connection between a suspect’s statement and illegal police conduct will be stronger when the
prior police conduct is an illegal search and seizure, rather than an illegal arrest, because of
the inherent pressure to confess generated by a suspect’s being confronted with tangible
evidence that is the result of the illegal search.  See discussion and cases cited infra pp. 23-28.
Any assessment of the voluntariness of the actions of Jona Miles or appellant must take place
against the backdrop of their having been confronted with the fruits of the illegally recorded
phone conversation and search and seizure resulting therefrom.
The majority also asserts that Jona Miles’ actions in disposing of evidence after the
taped phone conversation and in leading the police to the locations of the destroyed evidence
somehow attenuated the connection between her statements and the illegally wiretapped
conversation.  See maj. op. at 29-30.  This assertion is opaque, at best, and simply begs the
question of why Jona Miles made statements to police and led them to the inculpatory
evidence.  Jona Miles’ conduct was the result of being confronted with the evidence that the
police had obtained from the illegally wiretapped conversation.  Her attempts to dispose of
evidence of the crime, if anything, demonstrate that, had it not been for the illegally obtained
telephone conversation that led the police to her, she never would have come forward on her
own and cooperated with the investigation, particularly given her own criminal liability as an
27Attempting to dispute the claim that the record excerpts establish that Ms. Miles’ conduct
was the result of being confronted with the illegally obtained evidence, the majority points out
that the excerpts of the taped phone conversation contain no references to the Structure store
at the Dover Mall, the murder weapon, or the Choptank River, “all of which were facts that
came to be know to the police through their independent investigation.”  Maj. op. at 30.  Again,
the majority here appears to be engaging in independent source analysis without explicitly
stating so.  More importantly, for the purpose of attenuation doctrine, the police, in fact, did
not come to discover the murder weapon in the Choptank River through “independent
investigation,” but rather solely as the result of Ms. Miles’ statements to them.  Were it not
for the illegally wiretapped conversation and the subsequent use thereof by police, there would
have been no evidence linking appellant to the murder in this case.
-15-
accessory.  Not only does her disposal of evidence not fulfill the State’s burden to prove
attenuation of the causal link between the illegal wiretap and subsequently obtained evidence,
it effectively rebuts it.27  Ultimately, the majority concludes that Ms. Miles’ actions following
her statements to the police manifested the “uniquely human attributes of perception, memory
and volition,” which were sufficient to purge her confession of the taint of the primary
illegality.  Id. at 27.  I fail to see how those characteristics have any bearing on attenuation in
that they are utterly irrelevant to the question of whether her statements were the result of the
illegally recorded conversation.
We turn next to appellant’s statement to police.  The majority stresses that the police
never showed any of the illegally-seized evidence gathered prior to Jona Miles’s arrest in
questioning appellant.  See id. at 36.  Nonetheless, the question is not whether the police
visually paraded the evidence in front of appellant, but whether they used it during questioning
in order to obtain his confession, which they did when they discussed the evidence with him.
The majority asserts that “[t]he police never disclosed in questioning appellant the contents of
the cellular phone conversation, nor the fact that Jona Miles had given them a statement.”   Id.
The mere fact that the police did not disclose to appellant the existence of the illegal wiretap
does not mean that his confession was not derived therefrom pursuant to § 10-405.  During the
interrogation, the police confronted appellant with evidence that they seized as a result of the
-16-
illegal wiretap and subsequent search of appellant’s residence, a fact that even the majority
does not deny.  The trial court ruled that the search of appellant’s residence was illegal, as the
warrant was based on the illegal wiretap, and the State did not appeal that ruling.  
The excerpts of the police interrogation of appellant demonstrate that the police
informed appellant specifically that they had seized the clothes that he purchased with the
victim’s Structure credit card (pursuant to the tainted search warrant) and that they had
recovered the gun from the river and more clothing from a dumpster (as a result of Jona Miles’
statements, which themselves are derivative of the illegal wiretap):
[POLICE]:
We’ve done a search warrant on your house today.
We’ve recovered Structure pants, Structure jeans,
Structure shirt that was hidden in Larry’s closet.
Okay? 
MILES:
You’re going to find Structure clothes in –
[POLICE]:
I’m not going to find this brand new Structure shirt
that was hid in Larry’s closet.  That belongs to you.
We’ve recovered a gun from right down here in the
river, a little 22 with a long barrel on it.  Okay?
We’ve recovered clothes from a dumpster right
down on 404.  So, we’re not in here playing games.
You’re a smart person; I’m a smart person.  But,
I’m here to tell you there’s a reason why everything
happens.  Okay?  What I’m here to ask you is for
you to tell us why things happen.  I know you killed
Edward Joseph Atkinson.  Okay, I’m  not going to
let you sit here and play dumb with you and let you
play dumb with me.  We’re adult men, it’s time to
find out why.  I’m not interested in sending you to
prison for the rest of your life but I want to know
why you killed this man.
The majority attempts to minimize this disclosure by stressing again that the police did
not show the seized clothing to appellant.  See maj. op. at 36.  I simply fail to fathom how
informing appellant that they had seized the damning evidence from his home is any more
attenuated from the illegal search and seizure than actually placing it in front of him, nor am
-17-
I aware of cases from any jurisdiction that recognize this distinction.
The majority also attempts to minimize the impact of the disclosure by pointing out
that, although the clothing was illegally obtained, the police already had receipts from the
Structure store itemizing the clothing that had been purchased with the victim’s credit card.
See id. at 36-37.  This is precisely why the seized evidence, with which police confronted
appellant, was so damning.  The items seized from appellant’s home, in conjunction with the
receipts that the police already had from the Structure store, directly inculpated appellant in
the crime.  Clearly, any admissions by appellant, in light of this illegally obtained evidence,
were not sufficiently attenuated to be purged of the taint of the primary illegality.
During the interrogation of appellant, the police also referred to his being at the house
of certain of his friends when the composite photographs were displayed on the news and to
who was present at the time, information specifically obtained from the wiretapped
conversation between appellant and Jona Miles.  The following conversation transpired
between appellant and Jona Miles during their taped cellular telephone call:
MALE VOICE:
There’s a mess of cops up here.
FEMALE VOICE:
Over where?
MALE VOICE:
On the other side of Denton.  But, ah, you
know, they sat right there, Jim and Kay, and
had a face and a picture and looking right
dead at it, you know, I was sitting right next
to the television so it’s like side by side.
FEMALE VOICE:
Uh-huh.
MALE VOICE:
And they said it looked like Richard,
whoever Richard is.  So, you know, it’s sort
of iffy.
During the police interrogation of appellant, the following exchange occurred:
MILES:
I was at different people’s houses.  I lay a
composite at these houses and I’d make sure I was
-18-
there when the news hit.  And –
[POLICE]:
One of them being Jim McKay [sic]?
MILES:
Yeah.
[POLICE]:
Okay.
MILES:
And I sat there and, you know, they sat right there
and they said it looked like some other guy.  They
said (inaudible).
[POLICE]:
Richard?
MILES:
Yeah.
It is mindboggling how the majority can assert, given this factual record, that the
statements of Jona Miles and appellant, as well as the physical evidence derived therefrom, are
not the direct result of the illegally wiretapped conversation and the search executed on its
basis.  
The majority again appears to confuse derivative evidence attenuation analysis, under
the Fourth Amendment and Maryland wiretap statute, and the question of voluntariness under
the Fifth Amendment with respect to appellant’s statements to police.  The majority
emphasizes that appellant’s statement was voluntary and volitional based on his demeanor
during the interrogation, the extent of his cooperation with the police, and his personal
circumstances of age, knowledge and experience.  See maj. op. at 38-39.  As we explained
supra, while voluntariness is one factor to be considered under Brown, it is hardly
determinative of the question of whether appellant’s statements were derived from the illegally
recorded conversation and subsequent search of his residence – a question that, in my view,
is not sufficiently dealt with in the majority opinion. 
The chronology of events in this case is very similar to those reviewed by the Supreme
Court of Nebraska in Abdouch.  In that case, the defendant was convicted of manufacturing
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marijuana after the trial court had suppressed evidence from an illegal search of her residence
but admitted her subsequent custodial statements after finding that they were freely and
voluntarily made.  See Abdouch, 317 N.W.2d at 321.  The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed
the defendant’s conviction, finding that her statements to police were “fruit of the poisonous
tree” of the illegal police search because the police had detailed for her, during their
interrogation, the evidence that was seized before the defendant admitted her participation in
the marijuana production.  See id. at 329.  In doing so, the court emphasized the significant
differences, for the purposes of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, between a custodial
statement resulting from an illegal arrest and one resulting from an illegal search, concluding
that, when a suspect is confronted with evidence discovered during an illegal search, there has
clearly been an exploitation of the primary illegality because, once the suspect has realized the
evidence that the police have seized, that realization plays a significant role in encouraging him
or her to confess by demonstrating the futility of remaining silent – because the suspect has,
in effect, been “caught red-handed.”  See id. at 327-28.  
Furthermore, the court made clear that, while giving Miranda warnings to a suspect is
a factor to be considered in attenuation analysis, the warnings alone are not sufficient to break
the causal chain between the illegality and subsequent confession, particularly where the
primary illegality was an illegal search and seizure.  The court noted that the warnings cannot
neutralize the inducement to confess that is furnished by confronting the suspect with illegally
obtained evidence that demonstrates guilt and the futility of remaining silent.  See id. at 328;
cf. Pau’u, 824 P.2d at 835-36 (holding that the government’s burden to show that a confession
is voluntary is particularly heavy when the defendant is under arrest and that the waiver is
invalid if it is induced by a prior illegality).
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reached a similar conclusion in Jennings.  In that
-20-
case, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter and possession of a firearm while
committing a crime of violence, in part on the basis of a detailed confession that he made to
police.  See Jennings, 461 A.2d. at 363.  The trial court had suppressed physical evidence
taken during an illegal search of the defendant’s apartment, but had admitted the defendant’s
subsequent confession that he gave after the police had confronted him with the illegally seized
evidence.  See id. at 364.  The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reversed the defendant’s
conviction, finding that his confession had been tainted by the exploitation of the illegal search
of his dwelling.  See id. at 368.  The court held that the exclusionary rule applies “when the
giving of a statement is induced by confronting a suspect with illegally seized evidence,” unless
the state can show attenuation.  See id.  The court also found that voluntariness was “merely
a threshhold requirement,” id., such that giving Miranda warnings alone “does not per se make
any subsequent statement sufficiently a product of free will to break the causal connection
between the confession and the unlawful action.”  Id.  The court concluded:
The record discloses that the confession was made immediately
upon defendant’s being confronted with the information that the
police had possession of the gun as a result of an illegal search
and seizure.  There was no time lapse.  There were no intervening
events to break the causal chain other than the reading of the
Miranda warnings, which does not per se purge the taint of the
illegality.  Additionally, the use of the product of the illegal
police conduct to induce defendant to change his story has the
quality of purposefulness which the Fourth Amendment seeks to
protect against.  A reading of the record reveals that the
defendant’s sudden willingness to incriminate himself was the
result of his being confronted with the illegally seized evidence.
We therefore find that the confession was obtained by the
exploitation of the illegal search and seizure.
Id. at 369 (footnote omitted).
This case is also similar to Williams, in which the defendant was convicted of first
degree murder after the trial court had denied his motion to suppress the victim’s watch, which
he alleged had been seized illegally, and all of his inculpatory statements made subsequent to
-21-
that seizure.  See Williams, 249 S.E.2d at 760.  The Supreme Court of West Virginia reversed
his conviction.  After finding that the watch had been seized illegally, the court went on to rule
that the defendant’s confessions also should have been suppressed because they were induced
by the illegally seized evidence.  See id. at 764.  The court found that the defendant’s first
confession was made immediately after being confronted with the victim’s watch and was,
therefore, a product of the exploitation of the illegality.  See id.  The court then found that the
prosecution had failed to meet its burden of showing that the defendant’s subsequent
confessions were not the product of the first.  See id.  The court concluded:
There is no evidence demonstrating a break in the causative link
running between the confessions in this case.  The State did not
meet its burden, and we must presume each confession was the
product of the preceding illegalities.  The fact that Miranda
warnings were given prior to each confession is not sufficient
standing alone to purge the primary taint of the illegal search and
seizure.  Had the defendant also been informed that the victim’s
watch and his first confession could not be introduced at trial
against him in the State’s case in chief, a different outcome might
obtain as to the subsequent confessions.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Also similar is Commonwealth v. Johnson, 379 A.2d 72 (Pa. 1977), in which the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that a suspect’s statement to police was derivative of an
illegal search and should have been suppressed.  In that case, the appellant was convicted of
rape, conspiracy, and second degree murder after the trial court granted his motion to suppress
certain evidence seized by police, but admitted his subsequent inculpatory statement.  See id.
at 73.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that, since the search of the appellant’s house
was illegal, his subsequent statement was inadmissible because the Commonwealth failed to
establish that it was sufficiently purged of any taint from the unlawful activity.  See id.  The
court found:
In this case, the typewritten statement used against
-22-
appellant at trial was obtained as a direct result of the unlawful
search.  The police obtained the statement as a result of three
factors: (1) appellant’s arrest and the extended 
custodial
interrogation which followed; (2) confrontation of appellant with
the fact that evidence had been obtained during the unlawful
search of his house; and (3) confrontation of appellant with
information obtained from [his coconspirator].
Id. at 76.  The court held that the appellant’s custody and arrest were the direct product of the
illegal search because the police did not suspect the appellant until after the search was
conducted and because evidence found in the illegal search formed the basis for probable cause
to arrest him.  See id.  The court found that the appellant’s incriminating statements were
derivative of the illegal search because they were obtained after he was confronted with
evidence found during the illegal search.  See id.  Finally, the court found that the appellant’s
statements were also derivative of the illegal search because they were made after he was
confronted with information given to the police by his coconspirator, which in turn was the
result of the illegal search.  See id. at 77.  Clearly, the same analysis applies almost verbatim
to the case at bar.  Cf. United States  v. Johns, 891 F.2d 243, 245-46 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
that attenuation is a question of the substantiality of the taint – if the role of the illegality is
insubstantial, then suppression is inappropriate, but if the illegality is “the impetus for the chain
of events” leading to the derivative evidence, then it is “too closely and inextricably linked to
the discovery for the taint to have dissipated”); United States v. Cales, 493 F.2d 1215, 1215-
16 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that derivative evidence must be suppressed if an illegal wiretap
tended “significantly to direct the investigation toward the specific evidence sought to be
suppressed”); Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308, 318 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding
that the defendant’s confession was the direct result of the illegal discovery of narcotics and
that the taint of the illegally seized evidence had not been removed); United States v. Schipani,
289 F. Supp. 43, 62 (EDNY 1968), aff’d, 414 F.2d 1262 (2nd Cir. 1969)  (“If illegally secured
-23-
information leads the government to substantially intensify an investigation, all evidence
subsequently uncovered has automatically ‘been come at by exploitation of that illegality.’  The
unlawful search has set in motion the chain of events leading to the government’s evidence.”);
State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259, 263 (Mo. 1985) (holding that the defendant’s palm and finger
prints and statements were properly suppressed because they resulted from an unlawful arrest
and search).
The majority relies upon United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S. Ct. 1054, 55
L. Ed. 2d 268 (1978), as support for the proposition that the link between the illegal wiretap
and the evidence obtained from Jona Miles and appellant was sufficiently attenuated.  See maj.
op. at 24-27.  In fact, citing Ceccolini, the majority asserts that “the voluntariness of a person’s
actions in providing evidence or testimony should be considered as an intervening factor under
the attenuation doctrine.”  Id. at 26.   The majority’s reliance on Ceccolini  is misplaced.  The
Supreme Court in Ceccolini found that there was sufficient attenuation between an illegal
search and the live testimony of a witness at trial, see  Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 273, 98 S. Ct. at
1058-59, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268, but did so because it found that the evidence indicated
“overwhelmingly that the testimony given by the witness was an act of her own free will in no
way coerced or even induced by official authority” as a result of the illegal search.  Id. at 279;
98 S. Ct. at 1062; 55 L. Ed. 2d 268.  Most significantly, in reaching that conclusion, the Court
specifically emphasized that the illegally obtained evidence was not used in questioning the
witness.  Moreover, substantial periods of time elapsed between the time of the illegal search
and the initial contact witness and the testimony at trial; the witness’s identity and her
relationship to the defendant were well known to the investigators prior to the illegal search;
and the police did not conduct the illegal search and seizure with the intent of finding a witness
to testify against the defendant.  See id. at 279-80, 98 S. Ct. at 1062, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268.
-24-
Clearly, none of those factors outlined by the Supreme Court exist in this case.  
Furthermore, Ceccolini deals with the application of the attenuation doctrine to live-
witness testimony at trial.  The exploitation of the illegal search in this case led the police not
merely to the live-witness testimony of a particular witness, but to appellant’s identity, the
identity of an accessory (Jona Miles), the murder weapon, and other physical evidence.  In fact,
the Ceccolini analysis is informed by the degree of free will exercised by the witness in
testifying.  The Supreme Court noted that “the greater the willingness of the witness to freely
testify, the greater the likelihood that he or she will be discovered by legal means.  Witnesses
are not like guns or documents which remain hidden from view until one turns over a sofa or
opens a filing cabinet.”  Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276; 98 S. Ct. at 1060; 55 L. Ed. 2d 268.  The
question of whether Jona Miles could have testified, had the trial judge suppressed all of the
derivative evidence (including her statement to police), is the only question on which Ceccolini
would shed light.  
This rationale was shared by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Ramirez-Sandoval,  872 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989).  In that case, the United States
District Court suppressed physical evidence and contemporary statements discovered as the
result of an illegal search, but permitted witness testimony regarding identification of the
defendants and their illegal immigration scheme pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine.
See id. at 1394.  Citing Ceccolini, the Court of Appeals ruled that the testimony should not
have been admitted, either on the basis of the attenuation doctrine or inevitable discovery.  See
id. at 1396.  With respect to attenuation, the court found that the testimony had been induced
by the illegal search.  See id. at 1397.  The court distinguished Ceccolini as follows:
This case is unlike Ceccolini.  First, the illegally obtained
documentary evidence was clearly used by Officer Torres in
questioning the witnesses.  Second, no time elapsed between the
illegal search and the initial questioning of the witnesses.  Third,
-25-
the identities of the witnesses were not known to those
investigating the case.  In all likelihood, the police and the INS
would never have discovered these witnesses except for Torres’
illegal search.  Finally, although the testimony was voluntary in
the sense that it was not coerced, it is not likely that these
witnesses would have come forward of their own volition to
inform officials that they were illegally transported into the
country by the appellant.  It seems clear that their testimony was
induced by official authority as a result of the illegal search.
Id.  
Clearly, all four of the distinguishing factors identified by the Court of Appeals (use
of the illegally obtained evidence in questioning, lack of time lapse, discovery of the identity
of witnesses solely by means of the illegal search, and no independent reason to come
forward) exist just as strongly in the case of Jona Miles’s and appellant’s statements to police.
See United States v. Rubalcava-Montoya, 597 F.2d 140, 143 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that,
under Ceccolini, since there was no evidence in the record that the prosecution witnesses made
an independent decision to come forward and since they were discovered as a direct result of
an illegal search, the government failed to rebut the logical inference that the search induced
their testimony); United States v. Marder, 474 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that
“if the identity of a government witness and his relationship to the defendant are revealed
because of an illegal search and seizure, the testimony of such witness must be excluded”
unless the government can show an independent source or attenuation, including the
consideration of whether the witness would have come forward on her own); United States v.
Tane, 329 F.2d 848, 853 (2nd Cir. 1964) (holding that the grand jury testimony of the
defendant’s coconspirator was derivative of an illegal wiretap because the witness’s identity
was derived from the wiretap, the witness was unwilling to testify or inculpate himself until the
wiretap conversation was revealed, and the government did not show attenuation sufficient to
break the nexus between the tap and the testimony); Cephas, 291 A.2d at 111 (“The primary
-26-
question . . . is not whether the witness voluntarily plead guilty and testified, rather it is why
she chose to do this. . . . [T]hese choices on her part flowed directly from the exploitation of
the search and thus the taint remains . . . .  For the police to conduct an illegal search during
which they discover physical evidence and a witness . . . , and for a court to suppress the
physical evidence but not the witness would seemingly be allowing the authorities to do
indirectly what they cannot do directly.”).
The State has failed to meet its burden of showing that the taint of the prior illegal
wiretap and illegal search had been dissipated or that there was an independent source for the
evidence.  Accordingly, I would reverse the Circuit Court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to
suppress all of the evidence derived from the illegal wiretap of his cellular telephone
conversation, including the evidence obtained from Jona Miles and appellant’s statement to
police.
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge join in this dissenting opinion.