Title: In re Reeves

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 5/9/05 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
) 
S110887 
In re JAMES GREEBE REEVES 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/3 G028823 
 
on Habeas Corpus. 
) 
 
 
) 
Orange County 
____________________________________) 
Super. Ct. No. M9108 
 
Penal Code section 29331 offers state prisoners who participate in 
qualifying work, training and educational programs the privilege of earning 
“worktime credit” (id., subd. (a)) against their sentences.  Ordinarily, the 
maximum rate at which a prisoner may earn worktime credit is 50 percent, or one 
day’s credit for each day’s participation.2  Other statutes make worktime credit 
unavailable, or available only at a reduced rate, to prisoners convicted of 
designated offenses.  (E.g., §§ 2933.1 [violent offenses], 2933.2 [murder].)  This 
case concerns section 2933.1, subdivision (a),3 which provides that “any person 
who is convicted of a felony offense listed in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 [i.e., 
a violent offense] shall accrue no more than 15 percent of worktime credit, as 
defined in Section 2933.”4   
                                              
1  
All further citations to statutes are to the Penal Code, except as noted. 
2  
Prisoners assigned to conservation camps may earn two days’ worktime 
credit for each day’s service.  (§ 2933.3.)   
3  
Hereafter section 2933.1(a). 
4  
Section 2933.1(a) uses the term “worktime credit” to refer to the type of 
postsentence credit created, and expressly given that name, by section 2933.  This 
opinion uses the term only in that statutory sense.  To avoid confusion, we note the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
2
The question before us is whether section 2933.1(a) restricts petitioner’s 
ability to earn worktime credit against a concurrent sentence for a nonviolent 
offense.  Petitioner has completed a five-year term for the violent offense that 
made the section applicable and is now serving the remainder of a concurrent 10-
year term for a nonviolent offense.  We hold that section 2933.1(a) limited to 15 
percent the rate at which petitioner could earn worktime credit as long as he was 
serving the term for the violent offense, even though the concurrently punished 
nonviolent offense would not by itself have caused the section to apply; but once 
petitioner completed the term for the violent offense he became prospectively 
eligible to earn credit at a rate unrestricted by the section.  We therefore reject both 
the People’s harsher and petitioner’s more lenient interpretations of the section. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On March 18, 1999, following a jury trial, the Orange County Superior 
Court sentenced petitioner to 10 years in state prison for the offense of possessing 
a controlled substance for sale, plus enhancements.5  In a separate proceeding on 
April 6, 1999, pursuant to a guilty plea, a different judge of the same court 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
term “worktime credit” is sometimes used in a nonstatutory sense to refer to 
presentence credit awarded for willingness to perform assigned labor (§ 4019, 
subd. (b)), in order to distinguish it from presentence credit awarded for 
compliance with rules and regulations (id., subd. (c)).  (E.g., People v. Cooper 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 38, 40.)  Both forms of presentence credit are also sometimes 
referred to as “conduct credit.”  (E.g., ibid.) 
5  
The 10-year sentence represents the middle term of two years for 
possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; see 
§ 18), two years for committing that felony for the benefit of a criminal street gang 
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), three years for having served three prior prison terms 
(§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and three years for having committed a prior drug-related 
offense (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (b)).   
 
 
3
sentenced petitioner to five years for the offense of assault with a deadly weapon  
other than a firearm, plus an enhancement.6  Because the assault caused great 
bodily injury, it triggered the 15 percent credit limitation of section 2933.1(a) as a 
“violent felony” described in section 667.5, subdivision (c).  The judge at the 
second sentencing proceeding did not state that the two sentences would run 
consecutively; hence, the Penal Code made them concurrent by operation of law.7  
(§ 669, 2d par.)   
Petitioner was committed to state prison in 1999.  At that time, the 
Department of Corrections (Department) calculated his release date as October 19, 
2006.  The Department based this decision on its understanding that section 
2933.1(a) applied fully to both of petitioner’s sentences so that he would accrue 
only 15 percent worktime credit for the entire duration of his prison commitment, 
even after completing the shorter, five-year sentence for the violent felony.  
Petitioner challenged the Department’s decision in a petition for habeas corpus.  
The superior court, reasoning that section 2933.1(a) had no effect on petitioner’s 
sentence for the nonviolent offense, granted the writ and ordered the Department 
to recalculate petitioner’s release date.  The Court of Appeal affirmed, and we 
granted review. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Our role in construing section 2933.1(a), as with any statute, is to ascertain 
the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.  We accomplish 
this task if possible by giving the words of the statute their usual, ordinary 
                                              
6  
The five-year sentence represents the lower term of two years for assault 
with a deadly weapon other than a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) plus three years for 
causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.7).   
7  
The subsequently prepared minute order and abstract of judgment reflect 
the court’s implicit decision to sentence concurrently. 
 
 
4
meanings.  (People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1276.)  This case turns on the 
meaning of the phrase, “any person who is convicted of a [violent] felony offense 
. . . .”  (§ 2933.1(a).) 8  As will appear, the effort to apply this seemingly plain 
language to the case at hand reveals ambiguities the Legislature apparently did not 
foresee.   
The People argue that petitioner “is convicted” of a violent felony offense 
for purposes of calculating worktime credit because he served a term for a violent 
offense during his current prison commitment, even though he has completed that 
term and would be eligible for release, were it not for the time remaining on his 
longer concurrent sentence for a nonviolent offense.  Petitioner, echoing the lower 
courts’ conclusions, contends that section 2933.1(a) has never restricted his ability 
to earn worktime credit against the longer concurrent sentence because, for 
purposes of that sentence, he is not convicted of a violent felony offense.  Other 
                                              
8  
Section 2933.1 provides in full:   
 
“(a) Notwithstanding any other law, any person who is convicted of a 
felony offense listed in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 shall accrue no more than 
15 percent of worktime credit, as defined in Section 2933. 
 
“(b) The 15-percent limitation provided in subdivision (a) shall apply 
whether the defendant is sentenced under Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 
1170) of Title 7 of Part 2 or sentenced under some other law.  However, nothing in 
subdivision (a) shall affect the requirement of any statute that the defendant serve 
a specified period of time prior to minimum parole eligibility, nor shall any 
offender otherwise statutorily ineligible for credit be eligible for credit pursuant to 
this section. 
 
“(c) Notwithstanding Section 4019 or any other provision of law, the 
maximum credit that may be earned against a period of confinement in, or 
commitment to, a county jail, industrial farm, or road camp, or a city jail, 
industrial farm, or road camp, following arrest and prior to placement in the 
custody of the Director of Corrections, shall not exceed 15 percent of the actual 
period of confinement for any person specified in subdivision (a). 
 
“(d) This section shall only apply to offenses listed in subdivision (a) that 
are committed on or after the date on which this section becomes operative.” 
 
 
5
possible interpretations of the section also exist, as we shall explain.  Accordingly, 
the conclusion that section 2933.1(a) is ambiguous, at least as applied to the facts 
of this case, seems inescapable.  Indeed, petitioner expressly argues the statute is 
ambiguous, and the Attorney General conceded the point during oral argument.   
Because section 2933.1(a) is ambiguous, we may look beyond its language 
to other evidence that helps to elucidate the Legislature’s purpose, such as the 
statute’s background and history.  (People v. Canty, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1266, 
1277.)  The purpose that motivated the section’s enactment, however, is clear only 
in the broadest terms:  The Legislature wished to protect the public by delaying the 
release of prisoners convicted of violent offenses.  (Stats. 1994, ch. 713, § 2, 
p. 3448 [declaration of urgency].)  The general observation that a law was 
intended to delay release does not, in the face of ambiguous statutory language, 
answer the specific, practical questions of how long and under what circumstances 
release is to be delayed.  Neither does the legislative history reveal any specific 
consideration of the problem of applying credits to concurrent sentences.  Under 
these circumstances, lacking definitive guidance in the statute’s language or 
history, “our aim [must be] to provide . . . a construction [of the statute] which is 
faithful to its language, which produces fair and reasonable results in a majority of 
cases, and which can be readily understood and applied by trial courts.”  (In re 
Joyner (1989) 48 Cal.3d 487, 495.)  This is the practical approach to identifying 
legislative intent that we have followed in other cases addressing unforeseen 
difficulties in the implementation of California’s statutory credit system.  (Ibid.; 
see also People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 28-29; People v. Bruner 
(1995) 9 Cal.4th 1178, 1194-1195.)9 
                                              
9  
When a statute is capable of more than one construction, “ ‘[w]e must 
. . . give the provision a reasonable and commonsense interpretation consistent 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
6
In searching for a reasonable construction of section 2933.1(a), we may at 
the outset reject a construction that, while arguably consistent with the section’s 
language, is almost certainly not what the Legislature intended.  The phrase, “any 
person who is convicted of a [violent] felony offense” (§ 2933.1(a)), might 
conceivably refer simply to a point of historical fact.  Read in this way, the statute 
would disqualify, for all time, any person who has ever been convicted of a violent 
offense from earning more than 15 percent worktime credit.  Neither the People 
nor petitioner endorses this reading of the section.  We may reasonably reject it 
because the Legislature typically uses different language when it intends to impose 
a continuing disability based on criminal history.  Credit restrictions, 
enhancements and alternative sentencing schemes based on criminal history 
usually employ the past perfect tense (“has been convicted” or “previously has 
been convicted”) rather than the present tense (“is convicted”).  (E.g., §§ 667, 
subds. (a)(1) & (b), 667.51, subd. (d), 667.6, subd. (a), 667.71, subd. (a), 2933.5, 
subd. (a)(1).)  Similarly, section 2933.5 withholds all worktime credits from a 
“person who is convicted” and also “previously  has been convicted two or more 
times” of a designated felony.  (Id., subd. (a)(1), italics added.)  We have relied on 
this observation about the Legislature’s practice to resolve other statutory 
ambiguities, as when we determined that a statute referred to current rather than 
past convictions in making any “person convicted of murder, rape or any other 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
with the apparent purpose and intention of the lawmakers, practical rather than 
technical in nature, which upon application will result in wise policy rather than 
mischief or absurdity.’ ”  (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 744, 
quoting Marshall M. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 48, 55.)   
 
 
 
7
serious felony” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1732.5) ineligible for commitment to the 
Youth Authority.  (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1008-1010.)   
We may also reasonably reject the parties’ interpretations of section 
2933.1(a).  Both create unacceptable tension with the statutory language, and 
neither is entirely fair and reasonable. 
As mentioned, the People argue that section 2933.1(a) restricts petitioner’s 
ability to earn worktime credit against his concurrent term for the nonviolent 
offense even though he has completed his term for the violent offense that caused 
section 2933.1(a) to apply.  The People reject petitioner’s and the lower courts’ 
view that the section applies on an offense-by-offense basis.  In the People’s view, 
section 2933.1(a) applies to offenders rather than to offenses, and applies to a 
designated offender’s entire period of confinement, provided the offender at some 
point during that period serves time for a violent offense.  An offender’s time in 
prison, the People argue, must for purposes of credits be regarded as “a single, 
unitary period of confinement,” regardless of “whether that period of confinement 
is based upon multiple convictions or separate crimes.”  Reading section 2933.1(a) 
in this way, petitioner’s total time in state prison would be eight years and six 
months, which represents the longer, 10-year concurrent term for a nonviolent 
offense minus 15 percent worktime credit.   
We agree with the People’s interpretation of section 2933.1(a) in some 
respects but not in others.  We may confidently assume that an offender serving a 
sentence that combines consecutive terms for violent and nonviolent offenses is 
subject to the credit restriction imposed by section 2933.1(a) for the entire 
sentence.  Under the Determinate Sentencing Act (§ 1170 et seq.), multiple 
consecutive determinate terms must be combined into a single, “aggregate term of 
imprisonment for all [such] convictions” (§ 1170.1, subd. (a)) that merges all 
terms to be served consecutively and complies with the rules for calculating 
 
 
8
aggregate terms (e.g., one-third the base term for subordinate terms and specific 
enhancements applicable to subordinate terms (ibid.)), whether or not the 
consecutive terms arose from the same or different proceedings (ibid.); see also 
§ 669, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.452).  To suggest that a prisoner serving an 
aggregate term serves the component terms and enhancements in any particular 
sequence would be a meaningless abstraction.  For this reason, when an aggregate 
term includes time for a violent offense, at any point during that term the prisoner 
literally “is convicted of a [violent] felony offense” (§ 2933.1(a)) and actually is 
serving time for that offense.  Accordingly, a restriction on credits applicable to 
“any person who is convicted of a [violent] felony offense” (ibid.) logically 
applies throughout the aggregate term.   
The People’s effort to apply the same logic to concurrent terms is not 
convincing.  A court that decides to run terms consecutively must create a new, 
“aggregate term of imprisonment” (§ 1170.1, subd. (a)) into which all the 
consecutive terms merge, but no principle of California law merges concurrent 
terms into a single aggregate term.  Section 1170.1, which articulates the statutory 
mandate and authority for creating aggregate consecutive terms, says nothing 
about concurrent terms.  Furthermore, a later sentencing court may not change a 
prior sentencing court’s discretionary decision to make a particular term 
concurrent rather than consecutive.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.452(3).)10  The 
                                              
10  
The Penal Code, by use of the plural form “terms,” implicitly recognizes 
that a prisoner can have multiple terms that do not merge.  For example, “[t]he 
Department of Corrections shall advise the court pronouncing the second or other 
subsequent judgment of the existence of all prior judgments against the defendant, 
the terms of imprisonment upon which have not been completely served.”  (§ 669, 
3d par., italics added.)  Moreover, when a court sentences without knowledge of 
existing terms, it may within 60 days thereafter “determine how the term of 
imprisonment upon the second or other subsequent judgment shall run with 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
9
Determinate Sentencing Law, in short, does not support the People’s argument 
that all of an inmate’s overlapping terms necessarily constitute a single, unified 
term of confinement for purposes of worktime credit. 
Neither do the other statutes on which the People rely support their 
argument.  Section 667.5, subdivision (g), defines “prior separate prison term for 
purposes of this section” (italics added) as including both concurrent and 
consecutive terms.  But the section has nothing to do with credits; its purpose is to 
avoid enhancing a sentence for a “prior separate prison term” (§ 667.5, subd. (a)) 
more than once for a single prior stay in prison.  Section 2933, the statute 
authorizing worktime credits, begins by stating the Legislature’s intent that 
persons convicted and sentenced under the Determinate Sentencing Act “serve the 
entire sentence imposed by the court, except for a reduction in the time served” for 
performance in qualified work programs.  (Id., subd. (a).)  But the section does not 
provide that separate, concurrent sentences merge for purposes of credits.  Neither 
does section 2900, subdivision (a), which simply provides that “[t]he term of 
imprisonment fixed by the judgment . . . commences to run only upon the actual 
delivery of the defendant into the custody of the Department of Corrections 
. . . .”11   
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
reference to the prior incompleted [sic] term or terms of imprisonment.”  (Id., 2d 
par., italics added.)   
11  
The dissent, relying on older decisions interpreting the specific language of 
sentencing schemes that have long since been repealed, unsuccessfully attempts to 
construct a nonstatutory general rule to the effect that all of a prisoner’s terms 
merge for purposes of credits.  (See dis. opn. of Chin, J., post, at pp. 4-6, citing In 
re Cowen (1946) 27 Cal.2d 637, In re Albori (1933) 218 Cal. 34, Ex Parte Dalton 
(1875) 49 Cal. 463.)  None of the cited cases offers any assistance in interpreting 
the different language of section 2933.1(a) or the present Determinate Sentencing 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
10
The People also attempt to derive their proposed rule that all of a prisoner’s 
overlapping terms must, for purposes of credits, be viewed as a single, unitary 
period of confinement from the language of section 2933.1.  The specific language 
on which the People rely, however, appears not in subdivision (a) but in 
subdivision (c), and it concerns not postsentence worktime credits under section 
2933 but presentence credits under section 4019.  Section 2933.1, subdivision 
(c),12 provides that “the maximum credit that may be earned against a period of 
confinement in, or commitment to, a county jail [or other local facility] following 
arrest and prior to placement in the custody of the Director of Corrections, shall 
not exceed 15 percent of the actual period of confinement for any person specified 
in subdivision (a).”  (Italics added.)  Thus, a person who spends time in 
presentence (including pretrial) confinement and is eventually convicted of a 
violent offense may earn, as a credit against his prison sentence, no more than 15 
percent of the actual time he spent in presentence confinement, regardless of the 
offenses for which he was charged.  This was the holding of  People v. Ramos 
(1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 810, 815-817 (Ramos).  All other published decisions 
addressing the same issue about presentence credits have followed Ramos.  
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
Act (§ 1170 et seq.).  Neither can any guidance be found in more recent decisions 
using the term “aggregate sentence” in a nonstatutory, colloquial sense as 
including concurrent terms while not addressing the question before us.  (See dis. 
opn. of Chin, J., post, at pp. 6-7, fn. 3, citing People v. Williams (2004) 34 Cal.4th 
397, 401, People v. McFarland (1989) 47 Cal.3d 798, 801, People v. Bruce G. 
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1236, People v. Cole (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1672, 
1674, and People v. Parrott (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1119, 1122.)   
12  
Hereafter section 2933.1(c). 
 
 
11
(People v. Duran (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 267, 270; People v. Aguirre (1997) 56 
Cal.App.4th 1135, 1141; People v. Palacios (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 252, 255-256.) 
The People insist that Ramos, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 810, disposes of the 
different issue before us.  It does not.  The defendant in Ramos, after a period of 
presentence confinement, was convicted of a variety of violent and nonviolent 
offenses and sentenced to a single, aggregate term of 22 years, which included 
among other things an eight-month consecutive term for a nonviolent offense.  
(Id., at p. 814.)  The defendant argued that section 2933.1(c) did not affect his 
ability to earn credit under section 4019 for presentence custody attributable to his 
nonviolent offenses.  Assuming the correctness of that argument, the defendant 
further contended that he had accrued presentence credit at two different rates:  the 
reduced rate of 15 percent against the portion of his presentence confinement 
attributable to the violent offense, and at a higher rate (see § 4019, subd. (f)) 
against the portion attributable to the nonviolent offense.  (Ramos, at p. 817.)  The 
court reasonably rejected these arguments because “the language of section 2933.1 
[did] not support Ramos’ position.”  (Ramos, at p. 817.)  Section 2933.1, the court 
reasoned, “limits to 15 percent the maximum number of conduct credits[13] 
available to ‘any person who is convicted of a felony offense listed in Section 
667.5.’  That is, by its terms, section 2933.1 applies to the offender not to the 
offense and so limits a violent felon’s conduct credits irrespective of whether or 
not all his or her offenses come within section 667.5.”  (Ramos, supra, at p. 817, 
quoting § 2933.1(a).)   
The Ramos court’s statement that “section 2933.1 applies to the offender 
not to the offense” (Ramos, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 810, 817) makes sense in the 
                                              
13  
That is, pretrial credits under section 4019.  See page 1, footnote 4, ante. 
 
 
12
context in which the court spoke—that of presentence credits authorized by 
section 4019 and limited by section 2933.1(c).  A period of presentence 
confinement is indivisibly attributable to all of the offenses with which the 
prisoner is charged and of which he is eventually convicted.  The defendant’s 
argument in Ramos would have required the court to parse such a single, unitary 
period of presentence confinement into hypothetical, overlapping terms eligible to 
earn credit at different rates.  Such a result finds no support in the language of 
subdivision (c), which limits the credits a prisoner may earn against an “actual 
period of confinement” (§ 2933.1(c), italics added) following arrest and before 
sentencing.  The People here, departing from the actual holding of Ramos, would 
read subdivision (c) as if it qualified subdivision (a) by defining all of a prisoner’s 
postsentence time in state prison as a single “actual period of confinement” 
(§ 2933.1(c)) for purposes of postsentence worktime credit.  Although subdivision 
(c) does refer to subdivision (a),14 it does so “only to clarify the intended target 
population” of subdivision (c).  (People v. Aguirre, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 1135, 
1140.)  In other words, subdivision (c) explains that its limitation on presentence 
credit takes effect only when a person who has served “an actual period of 
[presentence] confinement” (§ 2933.1(c)) becomes, by subsequent conviction of a 
violent offense in a proceeding to which the presentence custody is attributable, a 
“person specified in subdivision (a)” (§ 2933.1(c), italics added), namely, a 
“person who is convicted of a [violent] felony offense” (§ 2933.1(a)).  Subdivision 
                                              
14  
“Notwithstanding Section 4019 [which authorizes presentence credits] or 
any other provision of law, the maximum credit that may be earned against a 
period of confinement in, or commitment to, a county jail [or other local facility] 
following arrest and prior to placement in the custody of the Director of 
Corrections, shall not exceed 15 percent of the actual period of confinement for 
any person specified in subdivision (a).”  (§ 2933.1(c), italics added.) 
 
 
13
(c) says nothing at all about postsentence credit.  Thus, to read subdivision (c) as 
limiting postsentence credits or qualifying subdivision (a), as the People here 
would read it, finds no support in the relevant statutory language.     
The People attempt to find evidence of legislative intent supporting their 
position in a letter written by Assemblyman Richard Katz, who sponsored the bill 
that became section 2933.1 (Assem. Bill No. 2716 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.)), to the 
Clerk of the Assembly and printed by unanimous consent in the Assembly Journal 
after both houses of the Legislature had passed the bill.  But the letter itself is 
ambiguous.  In it, the author states:  “This letter is to clarify my intent, and that of 
the Legislature, in writing and enacting AB 2716 . . . to ensure that the maximum 
reduction [for worktime credits] . . . from a defendant’s term of imprisonment 
imposed as a result of a violent felony . . . be fifteen percent.  [¶]  In enacting 
Penal Code section 2933.1, it is my intent and that of the Legislature to ensure that 
the maximum fifteen percent reduction apply to a defendant’s entire term of 
imprisonment, so long as the defendant has been convicted of at least one violent 
felony . . . .”  (Assemblyman Richard Katz, letter to Dotson Wilson, Chief Clerk 
of Assem., August 31, 1994, printed at 6 Assem. J. (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) 
p. 9353.)  The letter’s first sentence, which refers to “a defendant’s term of 
imprisonment imposed as a result of a violent felony” (ibid., italics added), might 
be read as supporting petitioner’s argument that section 2933.1(a) applies on an 
offense-by-offense basis.  The letter’s second sentence, which refers to an “entire 
term” (Assemblyman Richard Katz, letter to Dotson Wilson, supra, italics added), 
has two possible meanings:  it could mean that the restriction applies to a 
prisoner’s entire term for a violent offense, even if the term is an aggregate term 
(see § 1170.1, subd. (a)) combining consecutive terms for both violent and 
 
 
14
nonviolent offenses; 15 or, using the word “term” in a less formally correct sense, 
it could refer to a prisoner’s entire period of confinement in state prison, as the 
People here argue.  The letter offers no basis for resolving the ambiguity; nor does 
it specifically address the question of whether the credit restriction proposed in the 
bill would apply to a separate, concurrent term for a nonviolent offense.   
Of no more assistance in the present case is Governor Wilson’s message to 
the Assembly upon signing the bill that became section 2933.1.  The Governor 
wrote that the “bill would limit to 15% the credit inmates in state prison or local 
custody could earn to reduce their prison sentences for violent crimes.”  
(Governor’s message to Assem. on Assem. Bill No. 2716 (Sept. 21, 1994) 6 
Assem. J. (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) p. 9490.)  This brief, general statement, which 
does not specifically address the treatment of concurrent terms, is consistent with 
both the People’s and petitioner’s interpretations of section 2933.1.   
The People’s reading of section 2933.1(a) creates tension with the statutory 
language in this way:  Because petitioner has already served the term for the 
violent offense that caused the section to apply, the statement that he “is convicted 
                                              
15  
Indeed, to say precisely this may well have been the author’s intention.  
The concern had been expressed that the proposed legislation might require the 
Department of Corrections to calculate separate rates of credit accrual for “violent 
offenses running consecutively to non-violent offenses”—something the 
Department’s computer system was apparently unable to do and would therefore 
need to have been done manually.  (Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2716 
(1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 30, 1994, p. 3.)  The same concern had been raised 
by the California Probation, Parole and Correctional Association while the original 
version of the bill that became section 2933.1 (Assem. Bill No. 113 (1993-1994 
Reg. Sess.); see p. 19, fn. 18, post) was pending in the Legislature.  (Executive 
Director Susan Cohen, Cal. Probation, Parole and Correctional Assn., letter to 
Assemblyman Richard Katz, Apr. 15, 1993.)   
 
We grant the People’s request for judicial notice of the legislative history of 
section 2933.1.   
 
 
15
of a [violent] felony offense” (ibid.) is true only as a matter of historical fact, i.e., 
he was once convicted of a violent offense.  But we have already rejected, as 
contrary to the Legislature’s probable intent, the argument that section 2933.1(a) 
treats a conviction for a violent offense as a continuing disability that restricts an 
offender’s ability to earn worktime credits even after he has served his sentence 
for that offense.  Except in this inapplicable sense, to say that petitioner at the 
present time “is convicted” (ibid.) of a violent offense is not correct.  Today, his 
conviction for the violent offense gives the Department no claim to his physical 
custody; but for the time remaining on the separate, concurrent term for the 
nonviolent offense, he would be entitled to release.  For the same reason, given the 
statute’s ambiguity, the People’s interpretation of section 2933.1(a) is not entirely 
fair (to petitioner or others in his situation) or reasonable.  (People v. Buckhalter, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th 20, 28-29; People v. Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th 1178, 1194-1195; 
In re Joyner, supra, 48 Cal.3d 487, 495.)16   
                                              
16  
At oral argument, the People questioned whether our interpretation of 
section 2933.1(a) could readily be applied by the Department.  We have no reason 
to doubt that it can be.  The Department calculates a prisoner’s earliest possible 
release date (EPRD), adjusted for worktime credit, by reference to a “controlling 
term.”  (Cal. Dept. of Corrections, Operations Manual (2000) § 73030.8.13.)  
Petitioner’s shorter concurrent term for the violent offense properly controlled the 
rate at which he accrued worktime credit only until he completed that term.  
Thereafter, the longer concurrent term for the nonviolent offense—the term which 
alone gave the Department a valid claim to petitioner’s continuing physical 
custody—properly controlled his future ability to earn worktime credit.  The 
Department’s rules for calculating worktime credit already provide that a 
prisoner’s “EPRD is projected each time . . . there is a change in credit earning 
status.”  (Ibid.)  Under our interpretation of section 2933.1(a), the expiration of a 
term for a violent offense, leaving only a concurrent term for a nonviolent offense, 
constitutes a change in credit earning status.   
 
The dissent, noting that the Department’s current practice in awarding 
worktime credit differs from our conclusion about how credit should be awarded, 
questions on that basis whether the Department can readily apply our holding.  
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
16
Petitioner’s own interpretation of section 2933.1(a) also creates tension 
with the statutory language and is likewise neither fair nor reasonable.  Following 
the lower courts, petitioner interprets section 2933.1(a) as having no effect 
whatsoever on his concurrent sentence for the nonviolent offense.  As a result, 
petitioner continues, he has from the time he entered prison accrued credit at two 
different rates—15 percent on the term for the violent offense and 50 percent on 
the term for the nonviolent offense.  Reading section 2933.1(a) in this way, 
petitioner’s total time in custody would be five years, which represents the 10-year 
term for a nonviolent offense minus 50 percent credit.  Petitioner concedes, as he 
must, that section 2933.1(a) applies to the term for the violent offense, but he 
denies the section has any practical impact on the duration of his commitment to 
state prison.  This is because he has already served the credit-adjusted term for his 
violent felony offense (four years and three months, or five years minus 15 percent 
credit) and because the longer, credit-adjusted term for the nonviolent offense will, 
as he reads section 2933.1(a), keep him in prison a total of only five years—
exactly the same time he would have served had he never been convicted of and 
sentenced for the violent offense.   
Petitioner’s interpretation of section 2933.1(a) would rob the section of any 
effect in his own case and thus entirely frustrate, if only in similar cases, the 
Legislature’s purpose of delaying the release of violent offenders.  Petitioner’s 
interpretation thus cannot be described as fair (to the People) or reasonable.  
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
(Dis. opn. of Chin, J., post, at pp. 20-21.)  That the Department recognizes it must 
already track changes in credit earning status suggests it can apply our holding.  In 
any event, the Department has no power to adopt a regulation or practice that 
conflicts with a final, authoritative judicial interpretation of section 2933.1(a).   
 
 
17
(People v. Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th 20, 28-29; People v. Bruner, supra, 9 
Cal.4th 1178, 1194-1195; In re Joyner, supra, 48 Cal.3d 487, 495.)  Petitioner’s 
interpretation also creates tension with the statutory language, in this way:  During 
any period of time when petitioner is serving time in prison for both the violent 
offense and the nonviolent offense, petitioner most certainly “is convicted of a 
[violent] felony offense” (§ 2933.1(a), italics added) in every relevant sense.  
Thus, to permit him to accrue worktime credit during such a period of 
imprisonment at the rate of 50 percent for any purpose literally conflicts with the 
language of section 2933.1(a).     
The arguments supporting petitioner’s interpretation of section 2933.1(a) 
are not persuasive.  Petitioner first argues that worktime credit is accrued on an 
offense-by-offense basis, at least when the offenses are punished with separate, 
concurrent terms.  He bases this argument on the so-called strict causation rule, 
under which a prisoner “is not entitled to credit for presentence confinement 
unless he shows that the conduct which led to his conviction was the sole reason 
for his loss of liberty during the presentence period.”  (People v. Bruner, supra, 9 
Cal.4th 1178, 1191, italics added.)  Thus, for example, a prisoner who serves a 
period of presentence custody on Florida charges is not entitled to credit against 
his subsequent prison sentence on California charges, even though a California 
hold was in effect throughout the period of presentence custody.  (In re Joyner, 
supra, 48 Cal.3d 487, 492.)  “Taking the logic that credits should be allocated to 
the term for which they accrued and applying it to the credits limitation situation 
here,” petitioner argues, “results in a sensible general rule that the credits 
limitation applies to the term of imprisonment that is based on a qualifying 
offense.”  The argument lacks merit.  The strict causation rule has no recognized 
application outside the context of presentence credits.   
 
 
18
Petitioner next argues that the rule of lenity compels us to adopt his 
interpretation of section 2933.1(a).  We disagree.  “[A]lthough true ambiguities are 
resolved in a defendant's favor, an appellate court should not strain to interpret a 
penal statute in defendant’s favor if it can fairly discern a contrary legislative 
intent.”  (People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 58.)  As we have explained, 
petitioner’s interpretation of section 2933.1(a) would require us literally to violate 
the statute’s command that “any person who is convicted of a [violent] felony 
offense . . . shall accrue no more than 15 percent of worktime credit” (ibid.), at 
least during the period of custody when petitioner is actually convicted of and 
serving a term for a violent offense.  Moreover, as we have also explained, 
petitioner’s interpretation of the section would leave the section without any effect 
on his own sentence, thus frustrating the Legislature’s goal of ensuring that violent 
felons serve a great portion of their sentences.   
In any event, resort to the rule of lenity is unnecessary.  An interpretation of 
section 2933.1(a) exists that is faithful to its language and to what we know of the 
Legislature’s purpose, produces fair and reasonable results, and can be readily 
understood and applied.  Lacking definitive guidance in the language or history of 
the statute, our aim must be to identify such an interpretation.  (E.g., In re Joyner, 
supra, 48 Cal.3d 487, 495.)  As mentioned at the outset, we interpret the section as 
follows:  Section 2933.1(a) limits to 15 percent the rate at which a prisoner 
convicted of and serving time for a violent offense may earn worktime credit, 
regardless of any other offenses for which such a prisoner is simultaneously 
serving a sentence.17  On the other hand, section 2933.1(a) has no application to a 
                                              
17  
Unless, of course, one of those other offenses more severely restricts the 
prisoner’s ability to earn worktime credit.  (E.g., § 2933.2, subd. (a) [eliminating 
worktime credit altogether for persons convicted of murder].) 
 
 
19
prisoner who is not actually serving a sentence for a violent offense; such a 
prisoner may earn credit at a rate unaffected by the section. 18    
Our interpretation is more faithful to the language of section 2933.1(a) than 
is either the People’s or petitioner’s interpretation.  Unlike the People’s 
interpretation, our interpretation does not require us to treat a person who is no 
longer subject to imprisonment for a violent offense as a person who “is 
convicted” (§ 2933.1(a)) of such an offense.  Unlike petitioner’s interpretation, our 
interpretation does not require us to treat a person who is currently serving time 
for a violent offense as a person who is not convicted of such an offense.  Our 
interpretation is also faithful to what we know of the Legislature’s purpose 
because it effectively limits the rate at which petitioner and others in his situation 
                                              
18  
The dissent argues that if the Legislature in passing section 2933.1(a) had 
“wanted to limit the statute’s application as the majority now does, it knew how to 
do so expressly.”  (Dis. opn. of Chin, J., at p. 8, fn. 4.)   
As evidence, the dissent 
offers the language of Assembly Bill No. 2306 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) (as 
amended Apr. 21, 1992), which would have provided that a defendant convicted 
of a specified offense “shall accrue no more than 15 percent worktime credit 
against his or her term of imprisonment for that offense . . . .”  (Id., § 1, italics 
added; see dis. opn. of Chin, J., at p. 8, fn. 4.)  In fact, the italicized language 
would not have codified our interpretation of section 2933.1(a); it would have 
codified the interpretation of petitioner, who argues that section 2933.1(a) applies 
on an offense-by-offense basis.  (See ante, pp. 4, 16 et seq.)  Rejecting petitioner’s 
argument, we interpret section 2933.1(a) as applying to a prisoner’s entire 
sentence, so long as the prisoner is serving time for a violent offense.  (See ante, 
p. 18 et seq.)   
 
Furthermore, the bill to which the dissent refers was never enacted; nor did 
it become section 2933.1 by subsequent amendment.  Instead, the bill died in 
committee in an earlier session of the Legislature and never came to a vote on the 
floor.  (6 Assem. J. (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) p. 10419.)  Section 2933.1, as enacted 
and codified, was introduced as Assembly Bill No. 113 during the 1993-1994 
Regular Session and was, later in the same session, redesignated and enacted as 
Assembly Bill No. 2716.  To attempt to infer a subsequent Legislature’s collective 
knowledge and intent from language that an earlier and differently composed 
Legislature, acting as a whole, neither adopted nor rejected is irrational.   
 
 
20
can earn worktime credit while serving sentences for violent offenses.  Under our 
interpretation, petitioner will accrue credit at the rate of 15 percent against his first 
five years in prison and at the rate of 50 percent for his second five years.  He will 
thus serve a total of six years and nine months, which represents five years minus 
15 percent credit, plus five years minus 50 percent credit.19  Our interpretation is 
fair and reasonable both to the People, because it imposes a real restriction on a 
violent offender’s ability to earn worktime credits, and to petitioner, because the 
restriction ends when the term for the violent offense has been served.20  Of 
course, our interpretation of section 2933.1 leaves the Legislature free to amend 
the section if and as it chooses.  
                                              
19  
The proposed, credit-adjusted term of six years and nine months is shorter 
than the term proposed by the People (eight years and six month) and longer than 
the term proposed by petitioner (five years). 
20  
The dissent erroneously asserts that, under our interpretation, petitioner will 
serve less time in prison “because [he] committed a nonviolent felony in addition 
to the violent felony,” and that our interpretation of section 2933.1 is thus “unfair 
to the People and absurd.”  (Dis. opn. of Chin, J., post, at p. 17, italics in original.)  
What the dissent apparently means is that section 2933.1(a) does not restrict 
petitioner’s ability to earn credits as much as it theoretically might, because 
petitioner’s three one-year enhancements for having served prior prison terms are 
attached to the sentence for the nonviolent felony instead of to the sentence for the 
violent felony.  This unusual circumstance, however, is the result not of our 
holding in this case but of the second sentencing court’s discretionary decision not 
to run the new sentence for the violent felony consecutively to the existing 
sentence for the nonviolent felony.  (See § 669.)  Had the court done so, the longer 
base term for the violent felony (two, three or four years; see § 245, subd. (a)(1)) 
would necessarily have become the principal term (§ 1170.1, subd. (a)), the shorter 
base term for the nonviolent felony (18 months, or two or three years; see § 18) 
would necessarily have become the subordinate term (§ 1170.1, subd. (a)), the 
prior prison term enhancements would necessarily have attached to the principal 
term (ibid.), and the 15 percent credit limitation of section 2933.1(a) under our 
holding would have applied to petitioner’s entire consecutive sentence.     
 
 
21
 
III. DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed in part and reversed in 
part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views set 
forth herein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
Throughout this proceeding, the parties have offered two conflicting 
constructions of Penal Code section 2933.1, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 
2933.1(a)).1  Petitioner argues that the 15 percent sentence credit limit under that 
statute applies only to the sentence he received for his conviction of assault with a 
deadly weapon—which qualifies under section 667.5, subdivision (c)(8), as a 
violent felony because he inflicted great bodily injury on his victim—and does not 
apply to the sentence he received for possession of a controlled substance, which 
does not qualify as a violent felony.  The People, on the other hand, argue that the 
15 percent credit limit fully applies to both sentences.  I agree with the People 
because, as I demonstrate below, their construction is consistent with the statutory 
language, the legislative history, and 130 years of California case law interpreting 
California sentence credit statutes under both determinate and indeterminate 
sentencing schemes. 
The majority rejects both constructions and, conjuring up its own, holds 
that section 2933.1(a)’s credit limit applied to the sentence for petitioner’s drug 
possession conviction only “as long as [petitioner] was serving the term for the 
violent offense,” and became inapplicable “once [he] completed the term for the 
                                              
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
 2
violent offense.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.)  However, the majority’s interpretation 
is inconsistent with the language of the statute viewed in its statutory context and 
in light of our case law.  Instead, the majority’s interpretation is based on language 
that the Legislature could have adopted, but chose not to.  The majority’s 
interpretation is also inconsistent with the relevant legislative history.  Finally, and 
ironically, although the majority asserts that its interpretation is “fair and 
reasonable” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 18), the results produced by its interpretation are 
neither.  Here, for example, under the majority’s interpretation, petitioner will 
actually serve less total time in prison because he committed a second crime—the 
drug possession offense—than he would have served had he committed only one 
crime—the assault.  Surely, the Legislature did not intend to grant defendants a 
windfall for committing additional crimes.  For these reasons, I dissent. 
 
I.  Background Facts 
 
 
The procedural history of this action is important in understanding the 
consequences of the majority’s holding.  On January 19, 1999, in case No. 
98HF0516, defendant was convicted by guilty plea of assault with a deadly 
weapon other than a firearm.  At the same time, he admitted one enhancement 
under section 12022.7 for inflicting great bodily injury and four enhancements 
under section 667.5, subdivision (b), for serving four separate prior prison terms 
for felonies.  Sentencing in the case was set for March 12, 1999.  
 
Sentencing did not occur as scheduled on March 12.  Instead, petitioner 
went to trial in case No. 98WF0354, which charged the drug possession offense, 
one enhancement under section 186.22 for committing the offense for the benefit 
of a criminal street gang, one enhancement under Health and Safety Code section 
11370.2 for a prior drug-related offense, and three enhancements under Penal 
Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), for serving three separate prior prison terms 
for felonies.  On March 18, 1999, petitioner was convicted of the drug possession 
 
 3
offense and the enhancement allegations were found true.  On the same date, the 
court imposed a 10-year prison sentence in the drug possession case, which 
included two years for the substantive offense, two years for the gang 
enhancement, three years for the prior drug-related offense, and three years under 
section 667.5, subdivision (b), for the three prior prison terms petitioner had 
served. 
 
Three weeks later, on April 6, 1999, the court sentenced petitioner in the 
assault case.  It imposed a five-year prison sentence, which included two years for 
the assault conviction and three years for inflicting great bodily injury.  Although, 
as noted above, petitioner had earlier admitted the four enhancements alleged 
under section 667.5, subdivision (b), for serving prior prison terms, the court 
struck three of these enhancements because enhancements for the same prior 
prison terms had been imposed three weeks earlier in the drug possession case.  
The court struck the remaining enhancement at the People’s request in the interests 
of justice.  The minute order from the sentencing hearing, as well as the abstract of 
judgment, specified that the sentence was concurrent with the sentence in the drug 
possession case. 
II.  The Statutory Language Supports the People’s Construction, Not 
the Majority’s 
 
 
“As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task 
here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. 
[Citation.]  We [must] begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain 
and commonsense meaning.  [Citation.]  We do not, however, consider the 
statutory language ‘in isolation.’  [Citation.]  Rather, we [must] look to ‘the entire 
substance of the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and purpose of the 
provision . . . .  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]  That is, we [should] construe the words in 
question ‘ “in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the 
statute . . . .”  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]  We must harmonize ‘the various parts of a 
 
 4
statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular clause or section in the 
context of the statutory framework as a whole.’  [Citations.]”  (People v. Murphy 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.)   
 
Contrary to what the majority opinion might lead one to believe, applying 
these principles here is relatively simple.  Section 2933.1(a) provides that 
“[n]otwithstanding any other law, any person who is convicted of a felony offense 
listed in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 shall accrue no more than 15 percent of 
worktime credit, as defined in Section 2933.”  I agree with the majority that this 
provision applied to petitioner’s sentences in both cases here because of his assault 
conviction, and the question becomes, “for how long.”  The answer is found in 
section 2933, which section 2933.1(a) specifically references.  Section 2933, 
subdivision (a), expresses the Legislature’s general “intent” that a prisoner 
“sentenced to the state prison under Section 1170 serve the entire sentence 
imposed by the court,” and then qualifies that intent by providing for “worktime 
credit reductions from [the prisoner’s] term of confinement.”  (Italics added.)  
Here, petitioner’s term of confinement—i.e., the period of time he is to spend in 
prison—is 10 years, which is the longer of the concurrent sentences imposed.  
Given that section 2933.1(a) limits accrual of “worktime credit, as defined in 
Section 2933,” and that section 2933, subdivision (a), refers to a defendant’s 
“entire sentence” and his or her “term of confinement,” it is reasonable to 
conclude that the Legislature intended section 2933.1(a)’s limitation to apply to 
petitioner’s entire 10-year term of confinement.  
 
This conclusion is consistent with 130 years of California case law 
involving interpretation of our sentence credit statutes.  In Ex Parte Dalton (1875) 
49 Cal. 463, 465, we construed a statute providing that work and good behavior 
credits “shall be deducted from ‘the entire term of penal servitude to which [the 
prisoner] has been sentenced.’ ”  We held that the phrase “entire term of penal 
servitude” referred to the total prison time collectively imposed for all of the 
prisoner’s current convictions, not to the separate periods imposed for each 
 
 5
conviction.  (Ibid.)  We explained that each separate period “is but a part of the 
entire term” and that “[w]hatever deduction is to be made for good behavior [and 
work], is not to be taken from the beginning or the middle, but from the end of the 
entire term.”  (Ibid.)  When we decided Dalton in 1875, California had a 
determinate sentencing scheme similar to the determinate sentencing scheme in 
effect today.2  However, almost 60 years later, when the indeterminate sentencing 
law was in effect, we followed Dalton and reached the same conclusion in 
interpreting a statute that, using the same phrase now found in section 2933, 
provided for credit reductions from the prisoner’s “ ‘term of confinement.’ ”  (In 
re Albori (1933) 218 Cal. 34, 36 (Albori).)  This phrase, we explained, “conveys 
the thought of a ‘continuous period of imprisonment’ and . . . should be construed 
to have the same effect . . . as the expression ‘entire term of penal servitude.’ ”  
(Id. at p. 37.)   
 
We later followed Albori in In re Cowen (1946) 27 Cal.2d 637 (Cowen).  
There, defendant was convicted in one action of attempted robbery, and was 
convicted in a separate action of rape and robbery.  (Id. at p. 639.)  He received 
concurrent sentences for the rape and robbery convictions, and a consecutive 
sentence for the attempted robbery conviction.  (Ibid.)  Following Albori, we held 
that the phrase “term of confinement” in the then operative credit statute referred 
to “the total term of confinement” imposed for all current convictions, rather than 
“the separate terms” imposed for separate convictions.  (Cowen, at p. 643.)  We 
also held that “for the purposes of allowing and forfeiting credits,” a prisoner with 
concurrent sentences for two convictions and a consecutive sentence for another  
                                              
2  
California’s indeterminate sentencing law was adopted in 1917.  (Stats. 
1917, ch. 527, p. 665.)  “Prior to 1917, California had a ‘definite’ sentencing 
system.”  (Note, Senate Bill 42 and the Myth of Shortened Sentences for 
California Offenders:  The Effects of the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act 
(1977) 14 S. Diego L.Rev. 1176, 1178.) 
 
 6
“is undergoing a single, aggregate term of confinement . . . .”  (Id. at p. 647.)  
Finally, we explained that whether a prisoner is serving consecutive sentences, or 
is serving “concurrent sentences for crimes committed on separate occasions, 
perhaps in separate counties, the sentences are . . . ‘coalesced into one.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
 
These decisions strongly support the conclusion that section 2933.1(a)’s 
credit limit applies throughout petitioner’s entire period of confinement.  “The 
Legislature . . . is deemed to be aware of statutes and judicial decisions already in 
existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof.  [Citation.]  
Where a statute is framed in language of an earlier enactment on the same or 
analogous subject, and that enactment has been judicially construed, the 
Legislature is presumed to have adopted that construction.  [Citation.]”  (People v. 
Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329.)  Thus, in using the phrase “term of 
confinement” in section 2933, subdivision (a), and in expressly incorporating that 
phrase into section 2933.1(a), “the Legislature undoubtedly intended to convey the 
same meaning” we gave to that identical phrase in construing the sentence credit 
statutes at issue in Albori and Cowen.3  (People v. Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 
329.) 
                                              
3  
Given these decisions, the majority is simply incorrect in stating that “no 
principle of California law merges concurrent terms into a single aggregate term.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.)  As I have noted, Dalton was decided in 1875, when 
California had a determinate sentencing scheme, and was followed in Albori, 
when California had an indeterminate sentencing scheme.  Nothing in the 
determinate sentencing law (DSL) in effect since 1976 abrogates these decisions 
or is inconsistent with their analyses.  Section 1170.1, subdivision (a), which the 
majority discusses (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 8-9), merely specifies the formula for 
calculating “[t]he aggregate term” for multiple convictions when consecutive 
sentences are imposed.  It does not establish, or even suggest, that the collective 
term for concurrently sentenced felony convictions is not “a single, unified term of 
confinement for purposes of worktime credit.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9.)  On the 
contrary, since adoption of the DSL, both this court and our Courts of Appeal have 
continued to refer to the combined sentence for concurrent terms as an “aggregate” 
term or sentence.  (E.g., People v. Williams (2004) 34 Cal.4th 397, 401; People v. 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 7
 
Further supporting this conclusion is the specific language of two other 
sentence credit statutes that appear in the same article as section 2933.1.  Section 
2933.6, subdivision (a), provides that “a person who is placed in a Security 
Housing Unit or an Administrative Segregation Unit for [specified] misconduct 
. . . is ineligible to earn work credits or good behavior credits during the time [the 
person] is in the Security Housing Unit or the Administrative Segregation Unit for 
that misconduct.”  (Italics added.)  Section 2934 provides that prisoners subject to 
section 2931 who waive their right to sentence credits under that statute “shall 
retain only that portion of . . . credits . . . attributable to the portion of the sentence 
served by the prisoner prior to the effective date of the waiver.”  (Italics added.)  
The Legislature passed section 2933.6 in 1992 (Stats. 1992, ch. 1175, § 1, p. 
5514), and it passed section 2934 in 1982 (Stats. 1982, ch. 1234, § 5, p. 4552).  
Thus, in 1994, when it passed section 2933.1 and placed it in the same article as 
sections 2933.6 and 2934, the Legislature clearly knew how to, but did not, adopt 
language that would have made section 2933.1(a)’s credit limit applicable only 
“during the time” (§ 2933.6) a prisoner is confined for the violent felony 
conviction or during that portion of a prisoner’s current prison confinement 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
McFarland (1989) 47 Cal.3d 798, 801; People v. Bruce G. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 
1233, 1236; People v. Cole (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1674; People v. Parrott 
(1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1119, 1122.)  The majority offers no persuasive reason for 
disregarding any of the decisions I have cited or discussed (see maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 9, fn. 11), and fails to cite a single decision supporting its contrary view.  The 
majority also errs in asserting that “when an aggregate term” of a consecutively 
sentenced prisoner “includes time for a violent offense, at any point during that 
term the prisoner . . . actually is serving time for that offense.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 8.)  Under the majority’s view, a consecutively sentenced defendant may, and 
often will, serve more time for a given offense than the statutory maximum for 
that offense.  Again, the majority cites no authority for its assertion. 
 
 8
“attributable to” (§ 2934) the violent felony conviction.4  As we recently explained 
in construing the same article of the Penal Code at issue here, “ ‘[w]here a statute 
referring to one subject contains a critical word or phrase, omission of that word or 
phrase from a similar statute on the same subject generally shows a different 
legislative intent.’  [Citation.]”  (In re Young (2004) 32 Cal.4th 900, 907.)  Thus, 
that the Legislature omitted from section 2933.1(a) the type of limiting language 
found in sections 2933.6 and 2934 is additional evidence the Legislature did not 
intend to impose the limit on section 2933.1(a) the majority now writes into that 
statute. 
Also supporting the People’s construction is the Court of Appeal’s decision 
in People v. Ramos (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 810 (Ramos), which the majority 
generally endorses.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11-12.)  Ramos construed subdivision 
(c) of section 2933.1, which states: “the maximum credit that may be earned 
against a period of confinement in . . . a county jail [or other local facility] . . . 
following arrest and prior to placement in the custody of the Director of 
Corrections, shall not exceed 15 percent of the actual period of confinement for 
any person specified in subdivision (a).”  In Ramos, the defendant, who was 
ultimately sentenced to consecutive sentences for both violent and nonviolent 
felonies, argued that section 2933.1, subdivision (c), did not limit accrual of credit 
for presentence confinement as to his nonviolent felony conviction.  (Ramos, 
supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 817.)  In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned:  
                                              
4  
As proposed during the 1991-1992 Regular Session of the Legislature, 
section 2933.1(a) provided that a defendant convicted of a specified offense could 
earn no more than 15 percent worktime credit against his sentence “for that 
offense.”  (Assem. Bill No. 2306 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 21, 
1992, § 1.)  Although this language would have imposed a somewhat different 
limitation than the one the majority now judicially writes into the statute, it is 
additional evidence that had the Legislature, when it passed section 2933.1 at the 
next Regular Session, wanted to limit the statute’s application as the majority now 
does, it knew how to do so expressly. 
 
 9
“[T]he language of section 2933.1 does not support [the defendant’s] position.  
The statute applies ‘[n]otwithstanding Section 4019 or any other provision of the 
law’ and limits to 15 percent the maximum number of conduct credits available to 
‘any person who is convicted of a felony offense listed in Section 667.5.’  That is, 
by its terms, section 2933.1 applies to the offender not to the offense and so limits 
a violent felon’s conduct credits irrespective of whether or not all his or her 
offenses come within section 667.5.  The Legislature could have confined the 15 
percent rule to the defendant’s violent felonies if that had been its intention.  (Cf. § 
2900.5, subd. (b), limiting presentence credits to the custody ‘attributable to 
proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been 
convicted.’)”  (Ramos, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 817, italics added.)   
The majority’s attempt to distinguish Ramos is unpersuasive.  The majority 
finds that the Ramos court “reasonably rejected” the defendant’s position in that 
case based on “ ‘the language of section 2933.1’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 11), but 
asserts that the court’s statement “that ‘section 2933.1 applies to the offender not 
to the offense’ [citation] makes sense [only] in the context” there at issue:  
“presentence credits.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11-12.)  However, the majority’s 
analysis ignores the fact that the statement in question—that “section 2933.1 
applies to the offender not to the offense” (Ramos, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 
817)—was based on the language of subdivision (a) of section 2933.1—“any 
person who is convicted of a [violent] felony”—which is the very provision at 
issue here.  The majority’s analysis also overlooks the fact that the Ramos court’s 
observation about the Legislature’s ability to write a more limited statute is 
equally applicable here; as explained above, the Legislature knew how to, but did 
not, adopt language making section 2933.1(a)’s accrual limit applicable only 
“during the time” (§ 2933.6) a prisoner is confined for the violent felony 
conviction or during that portion of a prisoner’s current prison confinement 
“attributable to” (§ 2934) the violent felony conviction.  This omission becomes 
especially significant given the majority’s interpretation of section 2933.1, 
 
 10
subdivision (c); if, as the majority correctly concludes, the credit limit of that 
subdivision applies to the entire period of presentence confinement “regardless of 
the offenses . . . charged” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 10), then surely the Legislature, 
had it intended subdivision (a) to operate differently with respect to postconviction 
confinement, would have adopted language expressly so providing.  That it did not 
do so supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended the two subdivisions to 
operate in the same manner.  Thus, the language of section 2933.1(a), viewed in 
the context of the rest of the statute, the other statutes expressly incorporated into 
section 2933.1(a), the other statutes in the same article as section 2933.1(a), and 
our case law for 130 years, clearly supports the People’s construction of the 
statute.   
Ignoring the statutory context and our prior decisions, the majority rejects 
the People’s construction because it purportedly “creates tension with the statutory 
language” of section 2933.1(a).  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  In reaching this 
conclusion, the majority first asserts that a prisoner who has “served the term for 
the violent offense . . .  ‘is convicted of a [violent] felony offense’ [citation]” 
within the meaning of the statute “only” in the following “sense”:  “as a matter of 
historical fact.”  (Id. at pp. 14-15.)  The majority next asserts that this “sense” is 
“inapplicable” given the majority’s “reject[ion]” earlier in its opinion of an 
interpretation that “treats a conviction for a violent offense as a continuing 
disability that restricts an offender’s ability to earn worktime credits even after he 
has served his sentence for that offense.”  (Id. at p. 15.)  According to the majority, 
the tension exists because, “[e]xcept in this inapplicable sense, to say that 
petitioner at the present time ‘is convicted’ [citation] of a violent offense is not 
correct.”  (Ibid.)   
The majority’s analysis is flawed in several respects.  First, the 
interpretation that the majority rejects at the beginning of its opinion is not, as the 
majority later asserts, that a conviction for a violent offense “[is] a continuing 
disability that restricts an offender’s ability to earn worktime credits even after he 
 
 11
has served his sentence for that offense.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15, italics added.)  
Had that been the interpretation the majority earlier rejected, the People’s 
construction would not merely create tension with the statutory language, it would 
be in direct conflict with that language.  Instead, as a careful reading of the 
majority opinion discloses, the earlier rejected interpretation is that a violent 
felony conviction makes section 2933.1(a)’s credit limit applicable “for all time” 
and that the statute establishes “a continuing disability based on criminal history.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6, italics added.)  Second, the People’s construction does not 
create tension with the statutory language, as actually construed earlier in the 
majority’s opinion, because contrary to the majority’s assertion, it is not true that a 
prisoner who has “served the term for the violent offense . . . ‘is convicted of a 
[violent] felony offense’ [citation]” within the meaning of the statute “only” in one 
“sense”: “as a matter of historical fact.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 14-15.)  As I have 
demonstrated, even after a prisoner has “served the term” (ibid) for a qualifying 
violent offense, he or she “is convicted of” a violent felony offense (§ 2933.1, 
subd. (a)) in another sense:  with regard to his or her current “term of 
confinement” as that phrase, which is incorporated by reference into section 
2933.1(a), is used in section 2933.  Understood in this sense, the statutory 
language is perfectly consistent with both the People’s construction of the statute 
and the majority’s holding that section 2933.1(a) is not applicable “for all time . . . 
based on criminal history.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.)  Thus, contrary to the 
majority’s assertion, there is no tension between the statutory language and the 
People’s construction. 
The majority’s assertion that its construction is “faithful to the [statute’s] 
language” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 19) is also incorrect.  In making this assertion, the 
majority explains that its interpretation does not treat a prisoner “who is no longer 
subject to imprisonment for a violent offense as a person who ‘is convicted’ 
(§ 2933.1(a)) of such an offense.”  (Ibid.)  However, the statute does not state that 
its credit limit applies only while the prisoner is “subject to imprisonment for a 
 
 12
violent offense.”  (Ibid.)  Nor does it state, as the majority elsewhere suggests, that 
the credit limit applies only while a person convicted of a violent offense “actually 
is serving time for that offense.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.)  As I have already 
explained, when it passed section 2933.1, the Legislature clearly knew how to 
adopt language conveying this limitation in scope, but chose not to.  By writing 
this limiting language into the statute, the majority exceeds our proper role as a 
court in construing statutes, which “is simply to ascertain and declare what is in 
terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted . . . .”  
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1858, italics added; see also Security Pacific National Bank v. 
Wozab (1990) 51 Cal.3d 991, 998 [“insert[ing]” additional language into a statute 
“violate[s] the cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must not add 
provisions to statutes”].)5  By contrast, as I have demonstrated, the People’s 
construction is faithful to the statutory language read in context and as it has been 
construed for 130 years. 
III.  The Legislative History Supports the People’s Construction, Not 
the Majority’s 
 
To the extent the statutory language, viewed in the context of the statutory 
framework and our relevant decisions, is ambiguous, the legislative history 
supports the People’s construction. 
At the outset, it is noteworthy that the majority cites nothing in the 
legislative history that supports its construction.  For good reason:  there is 
nothing.  Nothing in the legislative history suggests that the Legislature intended 
to establish the two-tiered credit system the majority adopts.  Nor does anything 
suggest that the Legislature intended to establish different credit rules depending 
                                              
5  
“A different set of considerations and limitations governs the reformation 
of statutes to preserve their constitutionality.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Garcia 
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 15, fn. 9.) 
 
 13
on whether convictions are sentenced concurrently or consecutively.  Yet, this is 
the effect of the majority’s conclusion that section 2933.1(a)’s credit limit would 
have applied to petitioner’s entire term of confinement had he been sentenced 
consecutively rather than concurrently.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 7-8.) 
On the other hand, in several respects, the legislative history undermines 
the majority’s analysis and supports the People’s construction.  First, it confirms 
the People’s view, which was adopted in Ramos based solely of the statutory 
language of section 2933.1(a), that the Legislature intended section 2933.1 to 
apply “to the offender not to the offense.”  (Ramos, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 
817.)  In a statement of urgency enacted with the statute, the Legislature declared 
that the statute’s purpose is “to protect the public from dangerous . . . offenders 
who otherwise would be released.”  (Stats. 1994, ch. 713, § 2, p. 3348, italics 
added.)  Similarly, the Senate Rules Committee’s third reading analysis of the bill 
containing section 2933.1 explained that the statute’s purpose is to prevent 
“violent and sexual offenders . . . from receiving more than 15% worktime credit.”  
(Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill 
No. 2716 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 6, 1994, p. 3, italics added.)  
Another legislative analysis explained:  “The bill’s intent is for those persons 
committing certain serious crimes for the first or second time to serve as much as 
possible their full-term sentence.  This bill would limit the maximum work-time 
credit earned, not to exceed 15% of the actual period of confinement.  [¶] . . . 
[S]erious felony offenders will get their ‘true punishment’ by serving the most of 
their actual sentence.”  (Cal. Youth and Adult Correctional Agency, analysis of 
Assem. Bill No. 113 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 31, 1994, p. 2, 
italics added.)6  These statements demonstrate the Legislature’s intent that section 
                                              
6  
Section 2933.1, as it was enacted in 1994, was initially proposed in 
identical language in the January 31, 1994, version of Assembly Bill No. 113 
(1993-1994 Reg. Sess.).  The proposed statute was later inserted in Assembly Bill 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 14
2933.1 apply “to the offender not to the offense” (Ramos, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 817) with respect to both presentence and postconviction confinement, not, as 
the majority asserts without basis, only with respect to the former.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 11-12.)    
Second, the legislative history confirms that the Legislature intended 
section 2933.1(a) to apply precisely as the People argue it applies:  to petitioner’s 
entire term of confinement.  After the Legislature passed the statute but before it 
was enrolled and sent to the Governor for signature, the Assembly, on “unanimous 
consent,” printed a “statement of legislative intent . . . in the [Assembly] Journal” 
regarding the statute.  (6 Assem. J. (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) p. 9353.)  The 
statement of intent, which took the form of a letter to the Chief Clerk of the 
Assembly from the statute’s author, Assembly Member Richard Katz, declared:  
“In enacting Penal Code section 2933.1, it is my intent and that of the Legislature 
to ensure that the maximum fifteen percent reduction apply to a defendant’s entire 
term of imprisonment, so long as the defendant has been convicted of at least one 
violent felony . . . .”  (6 Assem. J. (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) p. 9353, italics added.)  
This statement of intent directly confirms what is evident from the rest of the 
legislative history and the language of the statute viewed in its statutory context 
and in light of our case law:  the Legislature intended and understood that “so long 
as the defendant has been convicted of at least one violent felony,” the 15 percent 
credit limit of section 2933.1(a) would be “appl[ied] to a defendant’s entire term 
of imprisonment.”  (6 Assem. J. (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) p. 9353.)  Here, that entire  
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
No. 2716 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.).  (See In re Carr (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1525, 
1532-1533.)  The analysis of the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency that I have 
cited above was contained in the files of the Assembly Republican Caucus. 
 
 15
term of imprisonment includes petitioner’s confinement for the drug possession 
conviction. 
Unlike the majority, I do not find this statement of intent to be 
“ambiguous.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.)  The majority concedes that the 
statement “could refer to a prisoner’s entire period of confinement in state prison, 
as the People here argue.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  However, the majority 
speculates, the statement also “could” be referring merely to “an aggregate term” 
under section 1170.1, subdivision (a), that “combin[es] consecutive terms for both 
violent and nonviolent offenses.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13-14.)  The majority’s 
speculation regarding the latter meaning is highly implausible, given that the 
statement of intent does not refer to section 1170.1, to the concept of an aggregate 
term, or to consecutive sentences.  Nothing in the statement of intent even 
suggests that the Legislature intended to distinguish between consecutive and 
concurrent terms with respect to the statute’s operation, or that it wanted the 
statute’s credit limit “to apply to a defendant’s entire term of imprisonment” (6 
Assem. J. (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) p. 9353) only if that entire term resulted from 
consecutive sentences.  Indeed, the conclusion that the Legislature did not have 
this intent is consistent with a fact stressed by the majority:  the statement of intent 
does not “specifically address” the statute’s application “to a separate, concurrent 
term for a nonviolent offense.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  The statement of intent 
does not specifically address either concurrent or consecutive sentences because 
the Legislature did not intend to distinguish between the two.  Thus, in my view, 
the majority is straining to find ambiguity where no real ambiguity exists.  In any 
event, even were the majority correct that some ambiguity exists, the People’s 
interpretation is far more plausible than the majority’s.7 
                                              
7  
In speculating that the printed statement of intent was referring only to 
consecutive sentences, the majority primarily relies on a statutory analysis 
prepared by the California Department of Corrections (CDC).  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 16
In short, the legislative history, like the statutory language, supports the 
People’s construction. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
p. 14, fn. 15.)  However, the cited analysis was completed and submitted on 
August 30, 1994, after the relevant language of the printed statement of intent was 
proposed on August 29, 1994.  (See Gregory Totten, Exec. Director of Cal. Dist. 
Attys. Assn., letter to Kathy Van Osten, Aug. 29, 1994, at p. 1.)  Moreover, the 
cited analysis was not submitted to the Legislature, but was sent to the Governor 
as an enrolled bill report analyzing the already passed bill and recommending that 
he sign it.  (Cal. Youth and Adult Correctional Agency, Cal. Dept. of Corrections, 
Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2716 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 30, 
1994, p. 3.)  For these reasons, it is doubtful that the statement of intent was 
addressing the concern raised in the enrolled bill report the majority cites.  The 
majority errs in asserting that concerns about the statute’s application specifically 
to consecutively sentenced defendants were raised earlier by the California 
Probation, Parole and Correctional Association.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14, fn. 15.)  
The April 1993 letter the majority cites for its assertion (ibid.) made no reference 
to consecutively sentenced defendants or to any difficulty in applying the statute 
specifically to such defendants.  Rather, it cryptically complained that the statute 
would require “probation officers . . . to calculate a prisoner’s full confinement 
time and then recalculate jail and prison time separately at the 15 percent 
reduction, thereby adding to their workload.”  (Executive Director Susan Cohen, 
Cal. Probation, Parole and Correctional Assn., letter to Assemblyman Richard 
Katz, Apr. 15, 1993.)  This concern was later restated verbatim in a letter dated 
June 24, 1993.  (Executive Director Susan Cohen, Cal. Probation, Parole and 
Correctional Assn., letter to Assemblyman Richard Katz, June 24, 1993.)  A 
subsequent letter, dated July 28, 1993, clarified that the concern “raised in” the 
prior letters was that “probation officer[s]” would have to calculate “jail credits” 
for “certain prison-bound inmates”—i.e., those subject to section 2933.1—
“differently from other sentenced prisoners[],” such as those “who will be serving 
their full sentence in the jail.”  (Executive Director Susan Cohen, Cal. Probation, 
Parole and Correctional Assn., letter to Assemblyman Richard Katz, July 28, 
1993.)  Thus, the letter the majority cites raised the “same concern” as the enrolled 
bill report (maj. opn., ante, at p. 14, fn. 15) only in the sense it noted that the 
statute would require additional work.  The cited letter is simply unrelated to the 
relevant language in the statement of intent and sheds no light on that language, 
which was published on August 31, 1994, more than a year after the letter was 
sent. 
 
 17
IV.  The Majority’s Conclusion Produces Absurd and Unfair Results 
that the Legislature Did Not Intend 
Lacking statutory language, legislative history, or case law to support its 
interpretation, the majority ultimately relies only on its own sense of fairness.  
According to the majority, the People’s interpretation “is not entirely fair” to 
petitioner and others in his situation because it would make section 2933.1(a)’s 
credit limit applicable even after petitioner’s “conviction for the violent offense 
gives the [CDC] no claim to his physical custody.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.)  On 
the other hand, the majority asserts, its interpretation is “fair . . . to the People, 
because it imposes a real restriction on a violent offender’s ability to earn 
worktime credits.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.) 
In reality, the result in this case of applying the majority’s interpretation is 
both unfair to the People and absurd; under it, because petitioner committed a 
nonviolent felony in addition to the violent felony, section 2933.1(a)’s credit limit 
will actually apply for a shorter period of time, and his actual time in prison will 
actually be less, than if he had committed only the violent felony.  As noted 
earlier, when the second sentencing court imposed sentence for the violent felony 
conviction, it struck three one-year enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision 
(b), for prior prison terms because enhancements for these same prior prison terms 
had been imposed three weeks earlier in the drug possession case.  Had these three 
one-year enhancements been imposed in connection with the violent felony 
conviction, petitioner’s sentence for that conviction would have been eight years 
instead of five, section 2933.1(a)’s credit limit would have applied for all eight of 
those years, and petitioner would have had to serve 81.6 months in prison (which 
is 85 percent of eight years).  According to the majority, because the three 
enhancements were imposed in connection with the nonviolent felony conviction 
instead of the violent felony conviction, section 2933.1(a)’s credit limit does not 
apply to the three years petitioner received for these enhancements and petitioner 
must serve only 81 months in prison.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.)  Thus, assuming 
 
 18
that the second sentencing court correctly struck the enhancements—and the 
majority does not contend otherwise—under the majority’s interpretation, 
petitioner will actually serve less time in prison because he committed an 
additional, albeit nonviolent, offense.  Unlike the majority, I do not consider this 
result to be fair to the People, rational, or consistent with what the majority 
concedes was the Legislature’s intent in passing section 2933.1(a):  “to protect the 
public by delaying the release of prisoners convicted of violent offenses.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 5, italics added.)  In this regard, the majority’s reading of the 
statute violates a basic rule of statutory interpretation:  we must “avoid a 
construction that would produce absurd consequences, which we presume the 
Legislature did not intend.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 
896, 908.)  By contrast, the People’s construction is consistent with the 
Legislature’s intent and is fair to petitioner because it makes section 2933.1(a)’s 
credit limit applicable to the three years petitioner would have received for the 
enhancements in the violent felony case but for the fact that they were fortuitously 
imposed three weeks earlier in the nonviolent felony case. 
The majority errs in asserting that this absurd result is simply a product of 
“the second sentencing court’s discretionary decision” to sentence petitioner 
concurrently, and “not of [the majority’s] holding in this case.”  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 20, fn. 20.)  It is true that, under the majority’s analysis, section 2933.1(a)’s 
credit limit would have applied to the enhancements had the second sentencing 
court sentenced petitioner consecutively.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20, fn. 20.)  
However, a second sentencing court does not have unlimited discretion to sentence 
a defendant consecutively, and must specify adequate grounds for doing so in a 
statement of reasons.  (People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 934; People v. 
Bradford  (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 20.)  Assuming that a desire to ensure section 
2933.1(a)’s application to the enhancements would have been a legally adequate 
 
 19
reason in this case, I doubt the Legislature intended to make this a driving factor in 
a court’s decision to sentence a defendant consecutively rather than concurrently.8  
In any event, under the People’s construction, section 2933.1(a)’s credit limit 
would apply to the enhancements notwithstanding the second sentencing court’s 
decision to sentence petitioner concurrently.  Thus, contrary to the majority’s 
assertion, the fact that section 2933.1(a) does not apply to petitioner’s 
enhancements most certainly is “the result of . . . of [the majority’s] holding in this 
case.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20, fn. 20.) 
In any event, putting aside the fact that the People’s construction would not 
be unfair to petitioner and that the majority’s interpretation is unfair to the People, 
the majority errs in basing its conclusion on whether the People’s construction is 
“entirely” fair to petitioner and others in his situation.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.)  
As the majority elsewhere recognizes, one of the considerations we sometimes 
look to in construing credit statutes is whether a proposed construction, in addition 
to being “ ‘faithful to [the statute’s] language, . . . produces fair and reasonable 
results in a majority of cases’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 5, italics added), not whether 
it is entirely fair in a particular kind of case.  Indeed, we have expressly 
“recognize[d] that any rule or combination of rules is likely to produce some 
incongruous results and arguable unfairness when compared to a theoretical state 
of perfect and equal justice.”  (In re Joyner (1989) 48 Cal.3d 487, 495.)  I have 
already shown that the majority’s interpretation is not faithful to the statute’s 
language viewed in statutory context and in light of our case law.  Nor will it 
produce fair and reasonable results in a majority of cases.  In my view, it is neither 
fair nor reasonable to have one credit rule for violent offenders who are 
concurrently sentenced, and a different rule for violent offenders who are 
                                              
8  
Ironically, the majority’s holding, although premised on purported fairness 
to defendants like petitioner, may actually work to their disadvantage by 
encouraging courts to sentence them consecutively instead of concurrently. 
 
 20
consecutively sentenced.  Indeed, the majority fails even to attempt to explain why 
the Legislature would have wanted to draw this distinction.  Moreover, where a 
nonviolent felony and a violent felony are committed in connection with each 
other, there is nothing unfair or unreasonable about limiting credits earned by a 
concurrently sentenced violent offender during his or her entire term of 
confinement.  Although the offenses petitioner committed in this case were 
unrelated, the majority’s rule is not so limited; it applies to all cases involving 
concurrent sentencing.  Because the People’s construction, rather than the 
majority’s, will produce fair and reasonable results in the majority of cases—and 
is faithful to the statutory language and consistent with the legislative history—we 
should adopt the People’s construction even were the majority correct that the 
result of applying it is not entirely fair to petitioner in this case.  
Finally, I have serious doubt about the majority’s assertion that its 
interpretation “can be readily understood and applied.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  
The majority is correct that this is an additional consideration—along with the 
statutory language and the reasonableness of the results—we sometimes look to in 
construing credit statutes.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5, citing In re Joyner, supra, 48 
Cal.3d at p. 495.)  However, the majority is incorrect in asserting that its 
interpretation satisfies this consideration.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  In this 
regard, the majority errs in suggesting that its interpretation fits easily within the 
existing procedures of the CDC.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15, fn. 16.)  As the 
majority notes, according to the CDC’s Operations Manual, the CDC “calculates a 
prisoner’s earliest possible release date . . . , adjusted for worktime credit, by 
reference to a ‘controlling term.’  [Citation.]”  (Ibid.)  The Operations Manual also 
specifies that “[t]he term which retains the person in custody the longest shall be 
the controlling term.”  (Cal. Dept. of Corrections, Operations Manual (2000) 
§ 73030.7.8.)  Thus, under existing CDC procedures, the controlling term here for 
purposes of determining sentence credits is the longer term imposed for 
petitioner’s nonviolent offense.  However, according to the majority, 
 
 21
“[p]etitioner’s shorter concurrent term for the violent offense properly controlled 
the rate at which he accrued worktime credit only until he completed that term,” 
and “the longer concurrent term for the nonviolent offense . . . properly controlled 
his . . . ability to earn worktime credit” thereafter.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15, fn. 
16.)  This discrepancy between the CDC’s actual practice and the majority’s 
analysis undermines the majority’s view about the simplicity of its interpretation. 
By contrast, the People’s construction surely “can be readily understood 
and applied.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18, italics added.)  Moreover, as I have 
already shown, the People’s construction, unlike the majority’s interpretation, also 
is faithful to the statutory language and consistent with the legislative history, and 
would produce fair and reasonable results in both this and the majority of cases.   
For all of these reasons, I would adopt the People’s construction.  I therefore 
dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
BAXTER, J. 
BROWN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Reeves on Habeas Corpus 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 102 Cal.App.4th 232 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S110887 
Date Filed: May 9, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: Ronald P. Kreber 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Robert 
M. Foster, Laura Whitcomb Halgren, Steven T. Oetting, David Delgado-Rucci and 
Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant Department of 
Corrections. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
David K. Rankin, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Suzanne 
Rothlisberger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent James 
Greebe Reeves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Lynne G. McGinnis 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West “A” Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2223 
 
David K. Rankin 
555 West Beach Street, Suite 300 
San Diego, CA  92101-2939 
(619) 696-0282