Title: Hartford Cas. Ins. v. Swift Distrib., Inc.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 6/12/14 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE    ) 
COMPANY,  
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
)  
 
 
 
) 
S207172 
 
v. 
)  
 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B234234 
SWIFT DISTRIBUTION, INC. et al., 
)  
 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County  
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
)  
Super. Ct. No. BC442537 
 
 
) 
 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Hartford Casualty Insurance Company (Hartford) issued a commercial 
general liability policy to Swift Distribution, Inc., doing business as Ultimate 
Support Systems (Ultimate), that covered ―personal and advertising injury.‖  This 
term included claims arising from ―[o]ral, written, or electronic publication of 
material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person‘s or 
organization‘s goods, products or services.‖  Ultimate, which sells the Ulti-Cart, 
was sued in federal district court by Gary-Michael Dahl (Dahl), the manufacturer 
of the Multi-Cart.  The suit included allegations of patent and trademark 
infringement, false designation of origin, and damage to business, reputation, and 
goodwill. 
When Ultimate tendered defense of the suit to Hartford, Hartford denied 
coverage on the ground that the suit did not allege that Ultimate had disparaged 
Dahl or the Multi-Cart.  The Court of Appeal agreed with Hartford that it had no 
2 
duty to defend and expressly disagreed with the reasoning in Travelers Property 
Casualty Company of America v. Charlotte Russe Holding, Inc. (2012) 207 
Cal.App.4th 969 (Charlotte Russe).  We granted review to clarify the principles 
governing the scope of a commercial general liability insurer‘s duty to defend an 
insured against a claim alleging disparagement. 
We hold that a claim of disparagement requires a plaintiff to show a false or 
misleading statement that (1) specifically refers to the plaintiff‘s product or 
business and (2) clearly derogates that product or business.  Each requirement 
must be satisfied by express mention or by clear implication.  Because Dahl‘s suit 
contains no allegation that Ultimate clearly derogated the Multi-Cart, we find no 
claim of disparagement triggering Hartford‘s duty to defend, and we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
I. 
Ultimate sells a product called the Ulti-Cart, a multi-use cart marketed to 
help musicians load and transport their equipment.  On January 26, 2010, Dahl 
filed an action in federal district court against Ultimate (the Dahl action).  The 
complaint alleged that Dahl held multiple patents on a similar convertible 
transport cart called the Multi-Cart, which he had sold commercially since 1997.  
The Multi-Cart was described as a collapsible cart capable of being manipulated 
into multiple configurations and typically used to transport music, sound, and 
video equipment.   
According to the complaint, Ultimate impermissibly manufactured, 
marketed, and sold the Ulti-Cart, and thereby infringed on Dahl‘s patents and 
trademarks and diluted the Multi-Cart trademark.  Dahl asserted that Ultimate‘s 
false and misleading advertisements and use of a ―nearly identical mark‖ were 
likely to cause consumer confusion or mistake, or to deceive the public ―as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association‖ of the two parties.  He also alleged unfair 
3 
competition, misleading advertising, breach of contract, and claims based on the 
violation of two nondisclosure agreements.  The complaint attached Ultimate‘s 
advertisements, which did not name the Multi-Cart or any other product. 
Ultimate delivered the suit to Hartford for defense under the commercial 
liability policy issued by Hartford for the period of January 29, 2009 to January 
29, 2010 (the Hartford policy).  The Hartford policy‘s insuring agreement 
provided:  ―We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to 
pay as damages because of . . . ‗personal and advertising injury‘ to which this 
insurance applies.  We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against 
any ‗suit‘ seeking those damages.  However, we will have no duty to defend the 
insured against any ‗suit‘ seeking damages for . . . ‗personal and advertising 
injury‘ to which this insurance does not apply.‖  It defined ―personal and 
advertising injury,‖ in pertinent part, as ―injury . . . arising out of . . . [o]ral, written 
or electronic publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization 
or disparages a person‘s or organization‘s goods, products or services.‖  The 
insuring agreement did not provide a definition for the term ―disparages.‖ 
Ultimate argued that the Dahl action involved a claim of disparagement 
covered by the Hartford policy‘s definition of ―personal and advertising injury.‖  
But Hartford found no potential claim of disparagement and denied any duty to 
defend or indemnify Ultimate in the underlying litigation.  Citing Total Call 
Internat., Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 161 (Total Call), 
Hartford‘s counsel explained in a letter to Ultimate that there could be no 
disparagement in the absence of a specific statement about a competitor‘s goods.  
It further found that any possibility of coverage would have been precluded by the 
policy‘s exclusion provisions, one of which denied coverage for personal or 
advertising injuries arising out of violations of intellectual property rights. 
4 
On July 27, 2010, Hartford filed a complaint seeking a declaratory 
judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Ultimate in the Dahl action.  
The complaint argued that the allegations in the underlying action did not satisfy 
the elements of a disparagement offense.  While the action was pending, the court 
in the Dahl action granted Ultimate‘s motion for summary adjudication on the 
claims of patent infringement, and the Dahl action settled.  Hartford and Ultimate 
each filed motions for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary 
adjudication.  The superior court granted Hartford‘s motion for summary 
judgment. 
Ultimate appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.  The Court of Appeal 
observed that the Dahl action did ―not allege that Ultimate‘s advertisements 
specifically referred to Dahl by express mention‖ and that ―Dahl did not allege 
that Ultimate‘s publication disparaged Dahl‘s organization, products, goods, or 
services‖ by reasonable implication.  Because ―Dahl was precluded from recovery 
on a disparagement theory,‖ the court reasoned, ―Dahl alleged no claim for 
injurious false statement or disparagement that was potentially within the scope of 
the Hartford policy coverage for advertising injury,‖ and Hartford had no duty to 
defend Ultimate in the underlying action.  Further, the Court of Appeal 
―disagree[d] with the theory of disparagement apparently recognized‖ in Charlotte 
Russe, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th 969, although it acknowledged that Charlotte 
Russe was distinguishable on its facts. 
We granted review. 
II. 
A trial court properly grants a motion for summary judgment where ―all the 
papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.‖  (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 437c, subd. (c).)  ―Because this case comes before us after the trial court granted 
5 
a motion for summary judgment, we take the facts from the record that was before 
the trial court when it ruled on that motion.  [Citation.]  ‗ ―We review the trial 
court‘s decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and 
opposing papers except that to which objections were made and sustained.‖ ‘  
[Citation.]  We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing 
summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that 
party.‖  (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037.) 
As discussed below, we conclude that the Court of Appeal correctly 
decided the issue before us. 
A. 
An insurer‘s duty to indemnify and its duty to defend an insured ―lie at the 
core of the standard policy.‖  (Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. 
Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 945, 958.)  The duty to defend is broader than 
the duty to indemnify.  (Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 
1076, 1081 (Horace Mann).)  ―Unlike the obligation to indemnify, which is only 
determined when the insured‘s underlying liability is established, the duty to 
defend must be assessed at the very outset of a case.  An insurer may have a duty 
to defend even when it ultimately has no obligation to indemnify, either because 
no damages are awarded in the underlying action against the insured, or because 
the actual judgment is for damages not covered under the policy.‖  (Ringler 
Associates Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1185 
(Ringler).) 
The duty to defend is guided by several well-established principles.  An 
insurer owes a broad duty to defend against claims that create a potential for 
indemnity under the insurance policy.  (Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 
263, 277–278.)  An insurer must defend against a suit even ― ‗where the evidence 
suggests, but does not conclusively establish, that the loss is not covered.‘ ‖  
6 
(Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 299 
(Montrose).) 
―Determination of the duty to defend depends, in the first instance, on a 
comparison between the allegations of the complaint and the terms of the policy.  
[Citation.]  But the duty also exists where extrinsic facts known to the insurer 
suggest that the claim may be covered.‖  (Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. MV 
Transportation (2005) 36 Cal.4th 643, 654.)  This includes all facts, both disputed 
and undisputed, that the insurer knows or ― ‗becomes aware of‘ ‖ from any source 
(Delgado v. Interinsurance Exchange of Automobile Club of Southern California 
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 302, 308) ―if not ‗at the inception of the third party lawsuit,‘ 
then ‗at the time of tender‘ ‖ (Swain v. California Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 99 
Cal.App.4th 1, 8).  ―Moreover, that the precise causes of action pled by the third 
party complaint may fall outside policy coverage does not excuse the duty to 
defend where, under the facts alleged, reasonably inferable, or otherwise known, 
the complaint could fairly be amended to state a covered liability.‖  (Scottsdale, 
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 654.)  Thus, ―[i]f any facts stated or fairly inferable in the 
complaint, or otherwise known or discovered by the insurer, suggest a claim 
potentially covered by the policy, the insurer‘s duty to defend arises and is not 
extinguished until the insurer negates all facts suggesting potential coverage.‖  (Id. 
at p. 655.)  In general, doubt as to whether an insurer owes a duty to defend ―must 
be resolved in favor of the insured.‖  (Ringler, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1186.) 
While the duty to defend is broad, it is ―not unlimited; it is measured by the 
nature and kinds of risks covered by the policy.‖  (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 
Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 19 (Waller).)  In an action seeking declaratory relief 
concerning a duty to defend, ―the insured must prove the existence of a potential 
for coverage, while the insurer must establish the absence of any such potential.  
In other words, the insured need only show that the underlying claim may fall 
7 
within policy coverage; the insurer must prove it cannot.‖  (Montrose, supra, 6 
Cal.4th at p. 300.)  Thus, an insurer may be excused from a duty to defend only 
when ― ‗the third party complaint can by no conceivable theory raise a single issue 
which could bring it within the policy coverage.‘ ‖  (Ibid., italics omitted.)  In a 
―mixed‖ action, where some claims are potentially covered while others are not, 
―the insurer has a duty to defend as to the claims that are at least potentially 
covered.‖  (Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 47.) 
B. 
In determining whether a claim creates the potential for coverage under an 
insurance policy, ―we are guided by the principle that interpretation of an 
insurance policy is a question of law.‖  (Waller, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 18.)  
―Under statutory rules of contract interpretation, the mutual intention of the parties 
at the time the contract is formed governs interpretation.  (Civ. Code, § 1636.)‖  
(AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 807, 821–822.)  In determining 
this intent, ―[t]he rules governing policy interpretation require us to look first to 
the language of the contract in order to ascertain its plain meaning or the meaning 
a layperson would ordinarily attach to it.‖  (Waller, at p. 18.)  We consider the 
― ‗clear and explicit‘ meaning of these provisions, interpreted in their ‗ordinary 
and popular sense,‘ unless ‗used by the parties in a technical sense or a special 
meaning is given to them by usage.‘ ‖  (AIU, at p. 822.)  We must also ―interpret 
the language in context, with regard to its intended function in the policy.‖  (Bank 
of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1265.) 
The issue in this case is whether the Dahl action against Ultimate included 
a claim of disparagement covered by the Hartford policy.  According to section 
629 of the Restatement Second of Torts (1977), ―[a] statement is disparaging if it 
is understood to cast doubt upon the quality of another‘s land, chattels or 
intangible things, or upon the existence or extent of his property in them, and ¶ 
8 
(a) the publisher intends the statement to cast the doubt, or ¶ (b) the recipient‘s 
understanding of it as casting the doubt was reasonable.‖  The term 
―disparagement‖ in the context of an insurance policy, in light of its proximity to 
the terms ―libel‖ and ―slander,‖ suggests it may be understood as a common law 
tort:  Whereas defamation, which includes libel and slander, concerns damage to 
the reputation of a person or business, disparagement concerns damage to the 
reputation of products, goods, or services.  (See Total Call, supra, 181 
Cal.App.4th at p. 169.)  Yet the torts of disparagement and defamation ― ‗protect 
different interests and have entirely different origins in history.‘ ‖  (Polygram 
Records, Inc. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 543, 548–549.) 
Disparagement emerged from the common law tort doctrine of slander of 
title.  In Burkett v. Griffith (1891) 90 Cal. 532, the court described slander of title 
as an action ―against one who falsely and maliciously disparages the title of 
another to property, whether real or personal, and thereby causes him some special 
pecuniary loss or damage.  In order to maintain the action, it is necessary to 
establish that the words spoken were false, and were maliciously spoken by the 
defendant, and also that the plaintiff has sustained some special pecuniary damage 
as the direct and natural result of their having been so spoken.‖  (Id. at p. 537; see 
Hill v. Allan (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 470, 489 [―Disparagement or slander of title 
is a publication made without a privilege or justification of matter that is untrue 
and is disparaging to another‘s property in land, chattels or intangible things under 
such circumstances as would lead a reasonable man to foresee that the 
conduct . . . results in pecuniary loss from the impairment of vendability thus 
caused.‖]; The Law of Commercial Disparagement:  Business Defamation’s 
Impotent Ally (1953) 63 Yale L.J. 65, 75.)  The doctrine expanded to include 
statements disparaging the quality of property rather than simply its ownership, a 
form of disparagement commonly referred to as trade libel.  (See Erlich v. Etner 
9 
(1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 69 (Erlich).)  Eventually, disparagement came to 
encompass a broader theory of economic or commercial injury caused by a false, 
derogatory statement.  (See Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984 & 1988 supp.) 
§ 128, pp. 962–963; Trade Libel:  Theory and Practice Under the Common Law, 
the Lanham Act, and the First Amendment (1999) 89 Trademark Rep. 826, 827.) 
―Confusion surrounds the tort of ‗commercial disparagement‘ because not 
only is its content blurred and uncertain, so also is its very name.  The tort has 
received various labels, such as ‗commercial disparagement,‘ ‗injurious 
falsehood,‘ ‗product disparagement,‘ ‗trade libel,‘ ‗disparagement of property,‘ 
and ‗slander of goods.‘  These shifting names have led counsel and the courts into 
confusion, thinking that they were dealing with different bodies of law.  In fact, all 
these labels denominate the same basic legal claim.‖  (5 McCarthy on Trademarks 
and Unfair Competition (4th ed.) § 27:100, fn. omitted.)  Disparagement is often 
included now as ―a specific example of the more general principle of injurious 
falsehood.‖  (Reinhard, The Tort of Disparagement and the Developing First 
Amendment (1987) 1987 Duke L.J. 727, 729; see id. at p. 729, fn. 21 [comparing 
the Restatement of Torts (1938), which titled Division Six as ―Disparagement,‖ 
with the Restatement Second of Torts (1977), which titled Division Six as 
―Injurious Falsehood (Including Slander of Title and Trade Libel)‖].)  Under the 
definition of an injurious falsehood, ―[o]ne who publishes a false statement 
harmful to the interests of another is subject to liability for pecuniary loss resulting 
to the other if ¶ (a) he intends for publication of the statement to result in harm to 
interests of the other having a pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should 
recognize that it is likely to do so, and ¶ (b) he knows that the statement is false or 
acts in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.‖  (Rest.2d Torts, § 623A.) 
California courts have defined disparagement in the commercial liability 
context by reference to the common law.  In Nichols v. Great American Ins. 
10 
Companies (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 766 (Nichols), the policyholders were sued by 
California Satellite Systems (Calsat), an official distributor of the Home Box 
Office (HBO) entertainment service, for selling and distributing devices to 
illegally intercept the HBO signal.  Calsat sought injunctive relief, claiming 
irreparable injury from loss of business opportunities, reputation, and good will to 
its exclusive HBO license.  (Id. at p. 770.)  In considering the scope of 
disparagement under a ―personal injury‖ provision, the court quoted Erlich, supra, 
224 Cal.App.2d 69, which defined the tort of trade libel as ―an intentional 
disparagement of the quality of property, which results in pecuniary damage to 
plaintiff. . . . ‗Injurious falsehood, or disparagement, then, may consist of the 
publication of matter derogatory to the plaintiff‘s title to his property, or its 
quality, or to his business in general.‘ ‖  (Id. at p 
. 73.)  The court in Nichols noted 
that trade libel ―requires (at a minimum):  (1) a publication; (2) which induces 
others not to deal with plaintiff; and (3) special damages.‖  (Nichols, at p. 773.)  
The court then held that ―[t]he necessary element of a defamatory publication or 
utterance is missing from the complaint and cannot be supplied by reference to 
reports in which the defamatory innuendo appears only inferentially.‖  (Id. at 
p. 775.) 
In Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. J. Lamb, Inc. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1017, 
the court interpreted a ―personal injury‖ provision with a disparagement clause 
like the one at issue here as providing coverage for ―product disparagement and 
trade libel as well as defamation.‖  (Id. at p. 1035.)  The underlying complaint 
alleged that Lamb, the policyholder, contacted the competitor‘s costumers and 
falsely accused the competitor‘s products of infringing on his patent.  The court 
noted that ―the term ‗disparagement‘ has been held to include statements about a 
competitor‘s goods that are untrue or misleading and are made to influence 
potential purchasers not to buy.  [Citation.]‖  (Ibid.)  It continued:  ―Whether 
11 
characterized as a trade libel or product disparagement, an injurious falsehood 
directed at the organization or products, goods, or services of another falls within 
the coverage of the [insurance] policy.‖  (Ibid.)  Quoting the definition of trade 
libel stated in Nichols, the court concluded that allegations in the underlying 
complaint ―clearly constituted a ‗publication of matter derogatory to the plaintiff‘s 
title to his property, or its quality, or to his business in general.‘ ‖  (Ibid., quoting 
Nichols, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 773.) 
These cases and others have understood disparagement, for purposes of 
commercial liability insurance coverage, to mean a knowingly false or misleading 
publication that derogates another‘s property or business and results in special 
damages.  (See, e.g., Cort v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Companies, Inc. (9th 
Cir. 2002) 311 F.3d 979, 986; Microtec Research, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 
(9th Cir. 1994) 40 F.3d 968, 972; Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., Inc. v. 
Centennial Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 1988) 838 F.2d 346, 351 (Aetna); Burgett, Inc. v. 
American Zurich Ins. Co. (E.D.Cal. 2011) 830 F.Supp.2d 953, 962 (Burgett); 
E.piphany, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (N.D.Cal. 2008) 590 F.Supp.2d 
1244, 1252 (E.piphany); Lindsey v. Admiral Ins. Co. (N.D.Cal. 1992) 804 F.Supp. 
47, 52.)  
C. 
In evaluating whether a claim of disparagement has been alleged, courts 
have required that the defendant‘s false or misleading statement have a degree of 
specificity that distinguishes direct criticism of a competitor‘s product or business 
from other statements extolling the virtues or superiority of the defendant‘s 
product or business.  As explained below, disparagement involves two distinct but 
related specificity requirements.  A false or misleading statement (1) must 
specifically refer to the plaintiff‘s product or business, and (2) must clearly 
12 
derogate that product or business.  Each requirement must be satisfied by express 
mention or by clear implication. 
In California, these requirements guided the reasoning of our decision in 
Blatty v. New York Times Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1033 (Blatty), where we held 
under the First Amendment that all injurious falsehoods ―must specifically refer 
to, or be ‗of and concerning,‘ the plaintiff in some way.‖  (Id. at p. 1042.)  The 
plaintiff in Blatty, an author, sued the New York Times for damages, claiming the 
newspaper had improperly left the author‘s book off its best seller‘s list.  The court 
held that the best seller‘s list could not ―be reasonably understood to refer to Blatty 
or his novel by implication.‖  (Id. at p. 1046.)  We explained that where the 
―injuriously false [publication] concerns a group — here, books currently in print 
and their authors — the plaintiff faces a ‗difficult and sometimes insurmountable 
task.  If the group is small and its members easily ascertainable, [the] plaintiff[] 
may succeed.  But where the group is large . . . the courts in California and other 
states have consistently held that plaintiffs cannot show that the statements were 
―of and concerning them.‖ ‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  Further, the court said that ―Blatty‘s claims 
also fail to effectively allege falsehood‖ because ―the Times did not make the 
crucial false representation of which he complains — viz., that the list was an 
accurate compilation of actual book sales.‖  (Ibid., fn. 2.)  Thus, the court held that 
Blatty failed to sufficiently allege an injurious falsehood because the best seller‘s 
list did not expressly or by clear implication (1) refer to Blatty‘s novel or (2) 
derogate Blatty‘s novel by suggesting it was not a best seller. 
Although Blatty, which involved a media defendant, relied heavily on the 
First Amendment value of maintaining ―a broad zone of protection‖ for the press 
(Blatty, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1041), the court used some language that could be 
read to apply more broadly to ordinary commercial disputes.  In response to 
Blatty‘s argument that First Amendment concerns were inapplicable because the 
13 
best seller‘s list was commercial speech, the court said the list was not commercial 
speech and ―[i]n any event, . . . commercial speech is not excluded from First 
Amendment protections.‖  (Id. at p. 1048, fn. 3.)  Further, the court said that ―the 
various limitations rooted in the First Amendment are applicable to all injurious 
falsehood claims and not solely to those labeled ‗defamation‘ ‖ because ―although 
such limitations happen to have arisen in defamation actions, they do not concern 
matters peculiar to such actions but broadly protect free-expression and free-press 
values.‖  (Id. at p. 1043.) 
Soon after Blatty was decided, its reasoning was applied to a disparagement 
claim against a nonmedia defendant.  In Hofmann Co. v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours 
& Co. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 390 (Hofmann), the court applied Blatty to a suit by 
a developer alleging that employees of a toxic chemical plant had committed trade 
libel and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage by publicly 
criticizing a housing development that the developer had planned to build next to 
the plant.  (Id. at p. 403.)  The dispute in Hofmann did not involve free press 
values, although it did involve free expression on a matter of public concern and a 
plaintiff (the developer) who ―possesse[d] the attributes of a public figure.‖  (Id. at 
p. 404.) 
Subsequently, the court in Total Call, citing Hofmann and Blatty, applied 
the specific reference requirement to a purely commercial dispute involving 
allegations of product disparagement, among other claims.  (Total Call, supra, 181 
Cal.App.4th at p. 170.)  The issue in Total Call was whether an insurer owed a 
duty to defend against a suit by two competitors alleging that Total Call sold 
prepaid telephone cards that did not provide the number of minutes advertised.  
(Id. at p. 165.)  The insurance policy at issue, like the Hartford policy here, 
―provide[d] coverage for ‗product disparagement and trade libel as well as 
defamation.‘  [Citation.]‖  (Id. at p. 169.)  In evaluating whether the suit had 
14 
sufficiently alleged disparagement, the court took note of the specific reference 
requirement set forth in Blatty and said:  ―[T]he court [in Blatty] explained that ‗all 
injurious falsehood claims‘ sounding in defamation, however framed, are subject 
to requirements rooted in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
([Blatty, supra,] 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1043–1045, italics added.)  These requirements 
cannot be avoided by ‗creative pleading‘ that ‗affix[es] labels other than 
defamation to injurious falsehood claims.‘  (Id. at p. 1045.)  Among these 
requirements is the demand that the injurious falsehood ‗specifically refer[]‘ to the 
derogated person or product.  (Id. at p. 1046.)  To meet this demand at the 
pleading stage, a plaintiff must allege that ‗the statement at issue either expressly 
mentions him or refers to him by reasonable implication.‘  (Ibid.)‖  (Total Call, at 
p. 170.) 
The court in Total Call denied coverage after finding that Total Call‘s 
advertisements did not specifically refer to the plaintiffs in the underlying action 
expressly or by reasonable implication.  (Total Call, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 171.)  Although Total Call‘s advertisements falsely communicated to consumers 
the number of minutes they would receive, ―this sort of communication, by itself, 
carries no implication that [the competitors‘] comparable cards cost more or less 
than [Total Call‘s] cards; to ascertain such information, a consumer would have to 
consult [the competitors‘] own advertising.‖  (Ibid.)  Further, the court explained 
the allegation that ―[Total Call‘s] falsehoods injured [the competitors‘] reputation 
by reducing [their] market share and damaging the industry‘s collective 
reputation‖ was not sufficient to meet the specific reference requirement.  (Ibid.) 
The court in Total Call did not examine whether the First Amendment 
concerns that limit restraints on false or misleading media speech apply with equal 
force to restraints on false or misleading commercial speech.  (Cf. Central Hudson 
Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm’n (1980) 447 U.S. 557, 563 (Central Hudson) 
15 
[―[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial 
messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.‖].)  
Nevertheless, even if the result is not compelled by the First Amendment, we 
believe Total Call was correct to apply the specific reference requirement to a 
disparagement claim against a nonmedia defendant in a purely commercial 
dispute.  In the commercial context, as in the media context, ―[t]he ‗of and 
concerning‘ or specific reference requirement limits the right of action for 
injurious falsehood, granting it to those who are the direct object of criticism and 
denying it to those who merely complain of nonspecific statements that they 
believe cause them some hurt.‖  (Blatty, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1044.)  This 
limitation serves the important objective of forestalling ― ‗vexatious lawsuits‘ ‖ 
over perceived slights that do not specifically derogate or refer to a competitor‘s 
business or product.  (Ibid.)  Applying the specific reference requirement would 
not cause false or misleading commercial statements to go undeterred, as such 
statements may still result in liability under various claims other than 
disparagement, including patent or trademark infringement, false advertising, or 
unfair competition.  (See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a); Bus. 
& Prof. Code, §§ 17500, 17505, 17200.)  What distinguishes a claim of 
disparagement is that an injurious falsehood has been directed specifically at the 
plaintiff‘s business or product, derogating that business or product and thereby 
causing that plaintiff special damages. 
D. 
The specificity requirements discussed above significantly limit the type of 
statements that may constitute disparagement, especially since advertisements and 
promotional materials often avoid express mention of competitors.  Nevertheless, 
courts have found certain kinds of statements to specifically refer to and derogate 
a competitor‘s product or business by clear implication. 
16 
In E.piphany, supra, 590 F.Supp.2d 1244, the court held that an insurer had 
a duty to defend where a competitor had sued the insured, E.piphany, for falsely 
claiming to be ―the ‗only‘ producer of ‗all Java‘ and ‗fully J2EE‘ software 
solutions, which was an ‗important differentiator‘ between competing products, 
even though some competitors offered products with these exact features.‖  (Id. at 
p. 1253.)  The court held that these false statements ―clearly and necessarily 
implied the inferiority of Sigma‘s competing products‖ and that ―[t]he fact that the 
‗injurious falsehoods‘ alleged were only directed at Sigma by implied comparison 
with [E.piphany‘s] products does not alter this outcome.‖  (Id. at pp. 1253–1254.)  
Relying on E.piphany, the court in Burgett, supra, 830 F.Supp.2d 953 similarly 
found that an insured was ―potentially liable for disparagement by implication‖ 
when faced with a suit alleging it had made a false claim to be ―the only owner‖ of 
a particular trademark.  (Id. at p. 964.) 
These cases suggest that the related requirements of derogation and specific 
reference may be satisfied by implication where the suit alleges that the insured‘s 
false or misleading statement necessarily refers to and derogates a competitor‘s 
product.  A publication that claims a superior feature of a business or product as 
distinct from all competitors, such as a claim to be the ―only‖ producer of a certain 
kind of software or the ―only‖ owner of a trademark, may be found to clearly or 
necessarily disparage another party even without express mention.  To find 
specific reference in these circumstances is consistent with limiting disparagement 
claims ―to those who are the direct object of criticism and denying it to those who 
merely complain of nonspecific statements that they believe cause them some 
hurt.‖  (Blatty, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1044.) 
The claim of disparagement recognized in Charlotte Russe, by contrast, 
appears to depart from the specificity requirements set forth above.  There, an 
apparel manufacturer, People‘s Liberation, filed an action for fraud, breach of 
17 
contract, and restitution against a clothing store, Charlotte Russe, which it had 
enlisted to be the exclusive retailer of the brand.  The complaint alleged that 
Charlotte Russe‘s heavy discounts on its premium apparel suggested to consumers 
that People‘s Liberation products were of inferior quality.  The court rejected the 
insurer‘s contention that coverage was defeated because the underlying pleadings 
did not allege an ― ‗injurious false statement disparaging [the manufacturer‘s] 
products.‘ ‖  (Charlotte Russe, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 979.)  The court found 
sufficient the allegations that the People‘s Liberation brand was a premium good 
and that Charlotte Russe had ―published prices‖ that implied they were not, 
thereby reasoning that the underlying complaint ―pled that the implication carried 
by the Charlotte Russe parties‘ pricing was false.‖  (Ibid.) 
In the case before us, the Court of Appeal disagreed with Charlotte Russe 
as follows:  ―We fail to see how a reduction in price — even a steep reduction in 
price — constitutes disparagement.  Sellers reduce prices because of competition 
from other sellers, surplus inventory, the necessity to reduce stock because of the 
loss of a lease, changing store location, or going out of business, and because of 
many other legitimate business reasons.  Reducing the price of goods, without 
more, cannot constitute a disparagement; a price reduction is not ‗an injurious 
falsehood directed at the organization or products, goods, or services of 
another . . . .‘  [Citation.]‖  (Fn. omitted.)  We agree with this reasoning.  There is 
no question that Charlotte Russe‘s discounted prices on People Liberation‘s 
clothing specifically referred to People Liberation‘s product.  But a mere reduction 
of price may suggest any number of business motivations; it does not clearly 
indicate that the seller believes the product is of poor quality.  Disparagement by 
―reasonable implication‖ (Blatty, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1046; Total Call, supra, 
181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 170–171) requires more than a statement that may 
conceivably or plausibly be construed as derogatory to a specific product or 
18 
business.  A ―reasonable implication‖ in this context means a clear or necessary 
inference.  Charlotte Russe‘s prices did not carry an implication clear enough to 
derogate People Liberation‘s product for purposes of a disparagement claim.  We 
disapprove Charlotte Russe, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th 969 to the extent it is 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
III. 
We now consider whether the Court of Appeal was correct to conclude that 
the Dahl action did not allege disparagement within the meaning of the Hartford 
policy.  In other words, did the facts and pleadings known or reasonably inferable 
by Hartford show a potential claim for express or implied disparagement?  
Ultimate appears to advance two separate theories of disparagement.  The first 
focuses on Dahl‘s claim that the similarity of the Ulti-Cart‘s design and product 
name to the Multi-Cart‘s design and product name led consumers to confuse the 
Ulti-Cart with the Multi-Cart.  The second contends that Ultimate‘s 
advertisements included false statements of superiority that implied the inferiority 
of the Multi-Cart.  We address each theory in turn. 
A. 
The Court of Appeal concluded that ―[e]ven if the use of ‗Ulti-Cart‘ could 
reasonably imply a reference to ‗Multi-Cart,‘ . . . Ultimate‘s advertisement 
contained no disparagement of ‗Multi-Cart.‘ ‖  We conclude that the Court of 
Appeal was correct.  Consumer confusion resulting from the similarity of the Ulti-
Cart to the Multi-Cart may support a claim of patent or trademark infringement or 
unfair competition in certain circumstances, but it does not by itself support a 
claim of disparagement.  Even if the Ulti-Cart was named and designed to mimic 
the Multi-Cart, that fact does not derogate or malign the Multi-Cart in any way. 
There is no coverage for disparagement simply because one party tries to 
sell another‘s goods or products as its own.  In Aetna, supra, 838 F.2d 346, for 
19 
example, the complaint alleged that the policyholder had engaged in unfair 
competition by advertising a competitor‘s animal tags as its own.  (Id. at p. 349.)  
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the underlying action failed to allege any 
publication ―which directly cast aspersions‖ on the underlying plaintiff‘s product 
or business.  (Id. at p. 351, citing Nichols, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 774.)  Thus, 
the court found no duty to defend against a claim of disparagement where the 
gravamen of the claim was that the policyholder had ― ‗palmed off‘ ‖ the 
competitor‘s products as its own.  (Aetna, at p. 351.) 
Similarly, a party‘s attempt to copy or infringe on the intellectual property 
of another‘s product does not, without more, constitute disparagement.  In 
Homedics, Inc. v. Valley Forge Insurance Company (9th Cir. 2003) 315 F.3d 
1135, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a claim of patent infringement 
constituted disparagement triggering a duty to defend under California law.  The 
underlying suit involved a claim by a company, Nikken, alleging that a 
competitor, Homedics, had infringed its patent on a therapeutic magnetic device 
used in alternative medical procedures.  (Id. at p. 1137.)  Finding no duty to 
defend, the court reasoned:  ―It does not follow that because an entity imitated the 
design of a product, it is, therefore, disparaging it.  In point of fact, it‘s quite the 
opposite — as has been oft said:  imitation is the highest form of flattery.‖  (Id. at 
p. 1142.)  Homedics also noted with approval the Court of Appeal‘s statement in 
Maxconn, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1267 that ―[t]he 
absence of any express reference to patent infringement in the policy would lead a 
reasonable layperson to the conclusion that patent infringement is not covered.‖  
(Id. at p. 1276.) 
Ultimate relies on Michael Taylor Designs, Inc. v. Travelers Property 
Casualty Company of America (N.D.Cal. 2011) 761 F.Supp.2d 904 (Michael 
Taylor), affd. (9th Cir. 2012) 495 Fed.Appx. 830, where the district court found a 
20 
duty to defend against a disparagement claim.  There, a furniture designer, 
Rosequist, claimed that a furniture retailer, Michael Taylor Designs (MTD), 
distributed promotional materials that included photographs of Rosequist‘s high-
quality furniture and then sold low-quality ― ‗cheap synthetic knockoffs‘ ‖ in its 
showroom.  (Michael Taylor, supra, 761 F.Supp.2d at p. 907.)  This ― ‗bait-and-
switch‘ ‖ routine allegedly confused and misled consumers as to the origin of the 
furniture and diluted and tarnished Rosequist‘s trade dress.  (Ibid.)  The court 
observed that the allegation that customers would be ―steered‖ to imitation 
products ―fairly implies some further statements, presumably oral, were being 
made by MTD personnel to convey the information that the imitation products 
were the Rosequist furniture depicted in the brochures.‖  (Id. at p. 912.)  Under 
these circumstances, the court concluded that Rosequist had sufficiently alleged a 
claim of disparagement, triggering a duty to defend under the insurance policy 
held by MTD.  (Ibid.) 
Whatever the merits of Michael Taylor‘s reasoning, the facts in this case do 
not include the kind of bait-and-switch tactics alleged in Michael Taylor.  There is 
neither any specific allegation in the Dahl action nor any fact reasonably known to 
Hartford that clearly implies the inferiority of the Ulti-Cart to the Multi-Cart.  It is 
true that Dahl, in a February 12, 2010 memorandum in support of a motion for a 
temporary restraining order, claimed that the Multi-Cart had become ―widely 
recognized as an industry leading utility cart in the music performance industry‖ 
and that Ultimate was now marketing a ―knock-off‖ of the Multi-Cart.  Dahl also 
noted Ultimate‘s intent ―to expand into [Dahl‘s] markets with similar pricing and 
with millions of dollars [sic] worth of Chinese carts planned to be dumped in the 
United States with lower pricing.‖  However, in claiming patent and trademark 
infringement, Dahl repeatedly asserted that the two products were ―nearly 
identical, folding transport carts.‖  Indeed, Dahl‘s claims relied heavily on the fact 
21 
that the mark and design of the two products were nearly indistinguishable.  A 
false or misleading statement that causes consumer confusion, but does not 
expressly assert or clearly imply the inferiority of the underlying plaintiff‘s 
product, does not constitute disparagement.  Because the alleged likeness of the 
two products did not derogate the Multi-Cart, we reject Ultimate‘s theory of 
disparagement based on consumer confusion over the product name and design. 
B. 
Ultimate also contends that several phrases in its 2010 product catalog 
disparage the Multi-Cart by asserting the superiority of the Ulti-Cart.  As Ultimate 
notes, the 2010 product catalog states that ―Ultimate Support designs and builds 
innovative, superior products,‖ that the company provides ―unique support 
solutions that are crafted with unparalleled innovation and quality and 
accompanied by superior customer service,‖ and that the Ulti-Cart has ―patent-
pending folding handles and levers.‖  Ultimate suggests that these phrases imply 
that the Multi-Cart is inferior and that ―patent-pending‖ suggests ―that Dahl does 
not have proprietary rights to its product.‖ 
The Court of Appeal did not address these statements, instead noting that 
potential disparagement should be assessed by reference to the ―allegations of the 
Dahl complaint, Dahl‘s application for a temporary restraining order, and Dahl‘s 
responses to interrogatories to the terms of the Hartford insurance policy.‖  But, as 
discussed above, a duty to defend may be supported not only by the allegations in 
the complaint but also by facts alleged, reasonably inferable, or otherwise known 
to the insurer.  Ultimate‘s new product catalog was produced by Dahl in the 
underlying action and referenced in his complaint.  Thus, the contents of the 
catalog were reasonably known to Hartford and should be considered in 
determining whether the Dahl action set forth a possible claim of disparagement. 
22 
Even so, however, no disparagement claim is apparent.  Ultimate contends 
that the phrase ―patent-pending‖ when combined with words like ―innovative,‖ 
―unique,‖ ―superior,‖ and ―unparalleled‖ suggests the superiority of the Ulti-Cart 
and, by implication, the inferiority of the Multi-Cart.  But these words considered 
in their context do not support Ultimate‘s contention.  Although the phrase 
―patent-pending folding handles and levers‖ appears on the page of the catalog 
describing the Ulti-Cart, the words ―innovative,‖ ―unique,‖ ―superior,‖ and 
―unparalleled‖ appear on pages providing general descriptions of the company, 
and they are most reasonably understood as generic assertions of the company‘s 
excellence.  For example, ―superior‖ does not necessarily imply a derogatory 
comparison; it may be used to describe something ―[o]f great value or excellence; 
extraordinary‖ (American Heritage Dict. (4th ed. 2000) p. 1737) or ―notably 
excellent of its kind: surpassingly good‖ (Webster‘s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) 
p. 2294).  Similarly, ―patent-pending‖ does not guarantee that a patent will be 
granted or that the product is of higher quality.  Contrary to Ultimate‘s claims, 
these statements are not specific enough to call into question Dahl‘s proprietary 
rights in his product or to suggest that the Ulti-Cart has any unique feature that is 
an ― ‗important differentiator‘ between competing products.‖  (E.piphany, supra, 
590 F.Supp.2d at p. 1253.)  Rather, the phrases at issue appear to be more ―akin to 
‗mere puffing,‘ which under long-standing law cannot support liability in tort.‖  
(Consumer Advocates v. Echostar Satellite Corp. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1351, 
1361, fn. 3.) 
Were we to adopt Ultimate‘s theory of disparagement, almost any 
advertisement extolling the superior quality of a company or its products would be 
fodder for litigation.  Proliferation of such litigation would interfere with ―the free 
flow of commercial information‖ (Va. Pharmacy Board v. Va. Consumer Council 
(1976) 425 U.S. 748, 765) and ―the informational function of advertising‖ 
23 
(Central Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 563), which are essential to informed 
choice in our free enterprise economy.  In light of the important purposes of 
commercial speech, specificity requirements serve to narrow the range of 
publications in the marketplace that may rise to the level of a legally actionable 
injurious falsehood. 
CONCLUSION 
Our holding clarifies and limits the scope of an insurer‘s duty to defend a 
policyholder against a possible claim of disparagement, as that term is used in a 
commercial general liability policy.  Of course, an insurer and its insured may 
contract for any broader coverage to which they mutually agree.  Here, because 
the facts and pleadings were not sufficient to support a possible claim of 
disparagement, there was no duty to defend under the Hartford policy.  We affirm 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
LIU, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KENNARD, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________ 
* 
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Hartford Casualty Insurance Company v. Swift Distribution, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 210 Cal.App.4th 915 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S207172 
Date Filed: June 12, 2014 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Debre Katz Weintraub 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Little Reid & Karzai, Eric R. Little, M. Catherine Reid and Najwa Tarzi Karzai for Defendants and 
Appellants. 
 
Amy Bach; Dickstein Shapiro, Kirk A. Pasich and Kimberly A. Umanoff for United Policyholders as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Nossaman, Kurt W. Melchior and S. Ashar Ahmed for Bullpen Distribution, Inc., and Jon Brill as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Caldwell Leslie & Proctor, Christopher G. Caldwell, Andrew Esbenshade and Kelly L. Perigoe for 
Charlotte Russe Holding, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Gauntlett & Associates and David A. Gauntlett as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Steven W. Murray as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Dentons US, Michael Barnes; Tressler, David Simantob, Elizabeth L. Musser; Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & 
Feld and Rex S. Heinke for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
McCurdy & Fuller, Laura J. Ruettgers and David C. Hungerford for Ironshore Specialty Insurance 
Company as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Wiley Rein, Laura A. Foggan, Edward R. Brown; Sinnott, Puebla, Campagne & Curet and Randolph P. 
Sinnott for Complex Insurance Claims Litigation Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
Kutak Rock, Christopher D. Glos, Bradley J. Baumgart and Jean-Paul Assouad for American Guarantee & 
Liability Insurance Company as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Horvitz & Levy, Peter Abrahams and Mitchell C. Tilner for American Insurance Association as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Eric R. Little 
Little Reid & Karzai 
3333 Michelson Drive, Suite 310 
Irvine, CA  92612 
(949) 333-1699 
 
Rex S. Heinke 
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld 
2029 Century Park East, Suite 2400 
Los Angeles, CA  90067 
(310) 229-1030