Title: BURNETT v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BRODEY A. BURNETT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 169Case Number: No. S-11-0081Decided: 12/28/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
BRODEY A. 
BURNETT,
Appellant 
(Defendant),
 
v.
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,
Appellee 
(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County
The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane M. Lozano, 
State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior 
Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Alden.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Pauling.
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
BURKE, J., delivers 
the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., files a special 
concurrence.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Brodey A. Burnett was 
convicted on one count of attempted second degree murder and two counts of 
aggravated assault and battery.  The 
trial court merged all three counts for purposes of sentencing, and sentenced 
Mr. Burnett to a prison term of twenty to thirty years.  Mr. Burnett appeals his conviction, 
focusing mainly on jury instructions he claims were improper.  We will affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]        
Mr. Burnett presents 
three issues, which we have reworded slightly:
 
1.                                            
Was the jury properly 
instructed on the elements of attempted second degree 
murder?
 
2.                                            
Was the jury properly 
instructed on the definition of “recklessly,” one of the elements of aggravated 
assault and battery?
 
3.                                            
Does the fact that 
the elements of attempted second degree murder and the elements of aggravated 
assault and battery are identical deny Mr. Burnett due process of 
law?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
On December 25, 2009, 
Willie Wheeler and his younger brother, Beau, spent the day snowboarding.  As they returned home to Lander that 
evening, Willie1 received a phone call from Amber 
Mefferd, whom he described as a “good friend.”  She invited Willie and Beau to join her 
and Alyssa Jurado at a party at another friend’s home in Riverton.  They agreed, and met Ms. Mefferd 
and Ms. Jurado at the party at about 10 p.m.  Because Willie had plans for the next 
day, the four decided to leave the party around midnight.  They were going to leave 
Ms. Jurado’s car at her mother’s home in Riverton, then all of them would 
take Willie’s SUV to his home in Lander.
 
[¶4]        
As they left the 
party, they saw Mr. Burnett standing near Ms. Jurado’s car.  Willie recognized Mr. Burnett from a 
previous encounter.  According to 
Willie’s testimony, Mr. Burnett “showed up” at a party at Willie’s home a 
few months earlier, and “Problems did arise.”  Beau also testified to a previous 
“confrontation with Mr. Burnett.”  
Nevertheless, Mr. Burnett asked them for a ride, saying that he wanted to 
“party out” with them at Willie’s home in Lander.  He was told there was not going to be a 
party at Willie’s home because they were all going home to get some sleep.  But Mr. Burnett was “insistent,” 
and Beau eventually agreed to give him a ride as far as Ms. Jurado’s 
mother’s home.  Mr. Burnett 
lived nearby, and Beau told him he could walk home from there.  They left, with Willie and 
Ms. Mefferd in Willie’s SUV, and Beau, Ms. Jurado, and Mr. Burnett in 
Ms. Jurado’s car.
 
[¶5]        
Beau testified that, 
during the ride to Ms. Jurado’s mother’s home, Mr. Burnett “was saying stuff 
about my brother and wanting to fight him and all of that.”  According to Ms. Jurado, Mr. 
Burnett was “yelling around.  He was 
just yelling.”  They arrived at Ms. 
Jurado’s mother’s house, and Beau parked Ms. Jurado’s car at the curb.  Willie stopped his SUV nearby.  Mr. Burnett exited Ms. Jurado’s car and 
approached Willie’s vehicle, asking Willie again for a ride to Lander to 
party.  Willie again told Mr. 
Burnett that they were not going to party, and refused to give him a ride.  Mr. Burnett responded by yelling at 
Willie and “pounding” on the windows of the SUV.  Apparently referring to their earlier 
encounter, Mr. Burnett asserted that “this stuff between us isn’t over,” and 
said it was time to finish it.  
Willie responded, “Okay, let’s settle it right here,” and stepped out of 
his SUV.  Preparing to fight with 
Mr. Burnett, Willie took off his jacket and handed it to Beau, who was 
standing nearby.  Willie provided 
this testimony about the incident that followed:
 
Q         
[by the Prosecutor]  After 
you tossed your jacket to Beau, what did you do?
 
A         
I started approaching Mr. Burnett.
 
Q         
And what happened?
 
A         
He pulled a knife.
 
Q         
He pulled a knife from where?
 
A         
Out of his front right pocket. . . .
 
Q         
What did you do when you saw that?
 
A         
I put my hands up and told Mr. Burnett, “Hey, we don’t need to do 
anything stupid tonight. You don’t want to ruin your life, you don’t want to 
ruin mine.  Just call it good and 
we’ll go from here.” . . .
 
Q         
Did you have anything in your hands?
 
A         
No, ma’am.
 
Q         
Where was Beau at that point?
 
A         
He was still at the back of the truck by the back doors, still about 
four, five [feet] away from me.
 
Q         
What did you do at that point after you told him you didn’t want any 
trouble?  What happened 
next?
 
A         
I went to . . . get a flashlight out of the back of my 
truck.
 
Q         
Why were you looking for a flashlight at that 
point?
 
A         
To defend myself. . . .
 
Q         
As you were reaching into that vehicle or looking for the flashlight that 
you described, what happened next?
 
A         
One of the girls, I don’t know which one it was, screamed, and I felt a 
large pound on my back.  I didn’t 
know what it was.  Thought it was 
just a punch.
 
[¶6]        
Ms. Mefferd and Ms. 
Jurado also thought Mr. Burnett had punched Willie in the back.  Beau, however, had seen the knife in Mr. 
Burnett’s hand, and yelled to Willie that he had been stabbed.  Beau tried to get Willie into the SUV 
and away from Mr. Burnett, but Mr. Burnett came at them again, cursing and 
lunging at them with the knife.  
After chasing them around the vehicle, Mr. Burnett “took off to the 
east.”  Willie and Beau jumped into 
the SUV, with Willie in the driver’s seat and Beau in the back seat.  Willie drove away.
 
[¶7]        
Willie drove only a 
short distance before he began coughing up blood.  He stopped the vehicle and started to 
get out so that Beau could drive.  
He collapsed to the ground.  
Beau helped him into the back seat, then got in behind the wheel.  As Beau started driving toward the 
hospital, Ms. Jurado called 911.  
When they arrived at the hospital, Willie was taken into the emergency 
room and received immediate medical attention.
 
[¶8]        
One of the doctors 
who treated Willie in the emergency room testified that Willie had suffered a 
stab wound near the middle of his back just to the left of his spine.  The doctors inserted a tube into 
Willie’s chest.  Willie continued to 
bleed through that tube, and his pulse rate stayed high, indicating that he was 
losing blood.  Willie eventually 
lost about three and a half liters of blood, the doctor testified, which was 
significant for a person whose normal blood volume would be about five 
liters.  The doctor termed such 
substantial blood loss as “dangerous” and “life-threatening.”  In addition, Willie’s lung remained 
collapsed – a condition the doctor termed “urgent” – and the doctors determined 
that he needed chest surgery.  
Because that surgery was generally not performed in the Riverton 
hospital, arrangements were made to send Willie on a Life Flight to Casper.  The surgery performed there revealed a 
laceration of the intercostal artery, a large artery “that runs along the rib, 
supplying the rib and the muscles around there.”  Willie was hospitalized for five days, 
and was released on January 1, 2010.
 
[¶9]        
Based on his 
observations, the doctor described Willie’s condition as critical due to his 
injuries.  He estimated that 
Willie’s odds of surviving the stabbing had been “no more than 50/50, based on 
the amount of blood loss, the continuing blood loss.”
 
[¶10]     
Before Willie was 
flown from the hospital in Riverton, he gave a statement to a police 
officer.  According to the officer, 
Willie said that he had been stabbed by Mr. Burnett, and also reported a 
“previous incident with Mr. Burnett where they had been in a physical 
altercation.”  Ms. Mefferd and 
Ms. Jurado also spoke to the police officer, reporting that Willie had been 
stabbed by Mr. Burnett.  An 
investigation at the scene revealed footprints in the fresh snow around where 
the vehicles were parked, and “a small spot that appeared to be blood on the 
ground in the snow.”  The police 
officer followed one set of prints, made by athletic shoes, going away toward 
the east, eventually leading to a house the officer recognized as belonging to 
Mr. Burnett’s mother and step-father.  
After a back-up officer arrived, the investigating officer knocked at the 
door, and the step-father answered.  
He said he did not think Mr. Burnett was there, but gave the 
officers permission to look inside.
 
[¶11]     
The officers found 
Mr. Burnett asleep on a couch in the basement.  They found a pair of black basketball 
shoes on the floor next to the couch, the soles of which were consistent with 
the prints the investigating officer had followed from the scene of the 
incident.  They found two knives on 
a table located near Mr. Burnett.  
The knife with a black blade had a substance on it that appeared to be 
blood.  The officers collected the 
shoes and the knives as evidence.  
They also took the blue jeans that Mr. Burnett had been wearing, and 
upon inspection, they found what appeared 
to be blood spots inside the front right pocket and outside the back right 
pocket. 
 
[¶12]     
Mr. 
Burnett was arrested and charged with attempted second degree murder.  He was also charged with one count of 
aggravated assault 
and battery inflicting serious bodily injury, and one count of aggravated 
assault and battery with a deadly weapon.  
After hearing the evidence summarized above, the jury convicted him on 
all three counts.  Because all three 
counts arose from the same incident, the district court ordered the counts 
merged for purposes of sentencing, and sentenced Mr. Burnett to a term of twenty 
to thirty years in prison.  Mr. 
Burnett asks this 
Court to 
review and reverse his conviction.
 
DISCUSSION
 
Jury Instructions – 
Standard of Review
 
[¶13]     
In his first two 
issues, Mr. Burnett challenges the jury instructions given by the district court 
in his trial.  The record reveals 
that Mr. Burnett did not object to any of the jury instructions 
at issue.  We therefore review these 
jury instructions for plain error.  
To establish plain error in regard to jury instructions, Mr. Burnett must 
show that the record clearly sets forth the jury instructions at issue; that 
those instructions clearly and obviously, not merely arguably, violated an 
established and unequivocal rule of law; and that the error materially 
prejudiced his right to a fair trial.  
Bloomfield v. 
State, 2010 WY 97, 
¶ 9, 234 P.3d 366, 369 (Wyo. 2010); Causey 
v. State, 
2009 WY 111, ¶ 18, 215 P.3d 287, 293 (Wyo. 2009).
 
[¶14]     
“When reviewing 
questions involving jury instructions, we afford the trial court significant 
deference.”  Bloomfield, ¶ 9, 234 P.3d  at 
369.  We do not single out 
individual jury instructions or parts of them, but rather, we consider the jury 
instructions as a whole.  Id.  The test of their adequacy is “whether 
the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime 
can be found to have been committed.”  
Id, ¶ 15, 234 P.3d  at 
373, quoting Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 
36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo. 2001).
 
Jury Instructions – 
Attempted Second Degree Murder
 
[¶15]     
Mr. Burnett satisfies 
the first prong of the plain error test, as the district court’s jury 
instructions are clearly set forth in the record.  Those pertaining specifically to 
attempted second degree murder read as follows:
 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
14
 
The defendant is 
charged in Count 1 in the Amended Information with Attempted Murder in the 
Second Degree. The pertinent parts of the statute concerning Attempt under which 
the defendant is charged in Count 1 reads in part as 
follows:
 
(a)          
A person is guilty of 
an attempt to commit a crime if:  
(i) With the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which is a 
substantial step towards commission of the crime.  A “substantial step” is conduct which 
[is] strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person’s intention to 
complete the commission of the crime[.]
 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
15
 
The defendant is 
charged in Count 1 in the Amended Information with Attempted Murder in the 
Second Degree.  The pertinent part 
of the statute concerning Murder in the Second Degree under which the defendant 
is charged in Count 1 reads in part as follows:
 
Whoever purposely and 
maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being is guilty of 
murder in the second degree[.]
 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
16
 
The elements of the 
crime of Attempt to Commit Murder in the Second Degree as charged in this case, 
are:
 
1.      
On or about the 
26th day of December, 
2009,
2.      
In Fremont County, 
Wyoming
3.      
The Defendant, BRODEY 
A BURNETT
4.      
Intending to commit 
the crime of Murder in the Second Degree, and [sic]
5.      
Did an act which was 
a substantial step towards committing the crime of Murder in the Second 
Degree.
 
If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant 
guilty.
 
If, on the other 
hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these 
elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the 
defendant not guilty.
 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
17
 
The term malice means 
that the act constituting the offense charged was done intentionally, without 
legal justification or excuse or that the act was done in such a manner as to 
indicate hatred, ill will, or hostility towards another.
 
“Maliciously” means 
acting in the state of mind in which an intentional act is done without legal 
justification or excuse.  The term 
“maliciously” conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility toward 
another.
 
“Purposely” means 
intentionally[.]
 
As used in 
Instruction 16, “substantial step” means conduct which is strongly corroborative 
of the firmness of the defendant’s intention to complete the commission of the 
crime.
 
[¶16]     
We must evaluate 
these instructions in light of the applicable statutes and our prior cases 
dealing with those statutes.  The 
Wyoming statute defining second degree murder provides, in relevant part, that 
“Whoever purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human 
being is guilty of murder in the second degree.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104 
(LexisNexis 2009).  A separate 
statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301(a), provides that:
 
(a)       A person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if:
(i)            
With the intent to 
commit the crime, he does any act which is a substantial step towards commission 
of the crime.  A “substantial step” 
is conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person’s 
intention to complete the commission of the crime.
 
Reading the language 
of these two statutes together, we have held that a person may be convicted of 
attempted second degree murder only if a jury makes two related findings:  first, that he intentionally performed 
an act constituting a substantial step toward completing the underlying crime of 
second degree murder; and second, that he acted “purposely and maliciously” as 
required by the statute defining second degree murder.  Bloomfield, ¶ 13, 234 P.3d  at 372; 
Reilly v. State, 2002 WY 156, 
¶ 12, 55 P.3d 1259, 1263 (Wyo. 2002).  
Thus, the instructions in Mr. Burnett’s case needed to inform the 
jury that, to convict him, it had to find that Mr. Burnett intentionally 
stabbed Willie, and that he did so purposely and maliciously.  See Blooomfield, ¶ 14, 234 P.3d  at 
373.
 
[¶17]     
Mr. Burnett focuses 
on Instruction No. 16.  He points 
out that it did not include acting purposely and maliciously on the list of the 
elements of the crime.  Accordingly, 
he claims that “the jury was not informed of the necessary elements of malice 
and purpose,” as set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104, and that his 
conviction was in error because the jury “never determined whether these had 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  

 
[¶18]     
Mr. Burnett is 
obviously correct that Instruction No. 16 did not include the words “purposely 
and maliciously.”  However, we do 
not evaluate Instruction No. 16 by itself, but consider it in context with the 
other instructions relating to attempted second degree murder.  Instruction No. 16 informed the 
jury that, to find Mr. Burnett guilty, it must find that he intended “to commit 
the crime of Murder in the Second Degree.”  
Instruction No. 15, immediately prior to the instruction on which 
Mr. Burnett focuses, informed the jury that a person must act “purposely and 
maliciously” to commit the crime of second degree murder.  Instruction No. 17, immediately 
following the instruction at issue, defined both purposely and maliciously.  These instructions, as a whole, 
adequately informed the jury that it must find Mr. Burnett had acted 
purposely and maliciously in order to convict him of attempted second degree 
murder.  Mr. Burnett has not 
demonstrated that these jury 
instructions were in clear and obvious violation of an established and 
unequivocal rule of law.  
Consequently, we do not conclude that they were plainly 
erroneous.
 
Jury Instructions – 
Aggravated Assault and Battery
 
[¶19]     
In a very short 
argument, Mr. Burnett contends that the district court inadequately instructed 
the jury on the definition of “recklessly” as related to the crime of aggravated 
assault and battery causing serious bodily injury.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) 
provides that a person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he “Causes 
or attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly 
or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value 
of human life.”  Based on this 
statutory language, we have previously held that, “in an aggravated assault and 
battery trial, the jury should be given an instruction defining 'reckless under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life’ 
rather than just 'reckless.’”  O’Brien v. State, 2002 WY 63, ¶ 21, 
45 P.3d 225, 232 (Wyo. 2002).
 
[¶20]     
Mr. Burnett points to 
the following definition of the term recklessly, given by the district court in 
Instruction No. 22:
 
“Recklessly” is 
defined as the following conduct:  A 
person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the harm he is accused of causing will occur, and the 
harm results.  The risk shall be of 
such nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the 
situation.
 
He complains that 
this definition does not incorporate the concept of “recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life,” as 
required for aggravated assault and battery.  
 
[¶21]     
His argument 
overlooks the other instructions relating to aggravated assault and battery that 
set forth precisely the language at issue:
 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
18
 
The defendant is 
charged in Count 2 in the Amended Information with Aggravated Assault and 
Battery.  The pertinent parts of the 
statute under which the defendant is charged in Count 2 read[] in part as 
follows:
 
(b)          
A person is guilty of 
aggravated assault and battery if he:  

 
(i)            
Causes serious bodily 
injury to another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life[.]
 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
19
 
The elements of the 
crime of Aggravated Assault and Battery, as charged in this case 
are:
 
1.    
On or about the 26th day of December, 
2009
2.    
In the County of 
Fremont, Wyoming.
3.    
The Defendant, BRODEY 
A BURNETT
4.    
Intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly under circumstances which showed an extreme 
indifference to human life
5.    
Caused serious bodily 
injury to another person, Willie Wheeler.
 
If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant 
guilty.
 
If, on the other 
hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these 
elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the 
defendant not guilty.
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Again, we do not focus 
solely on Instruction 22, as Mr. Burnett does, but on the instructions as a 
whole.  Bloomfield, ¶ 9, 234 P.3d  at 
369.  Considering all of the 
instructions, we conclude that the jury was adequately instructed on the element 
of “recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value 
of human life” for purposes of the crime of aggravated assault and 
battery.
 
[¶22]     
We also note that 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) provides that a person is guilty of 
aggravated assault and battery if he “Causes or attempts to cause serious bodily 
injury to another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.”  (Emphasis added.)  The legislature’s use of the word “or” 
indicates that any one of the three states of mind is sufficient to support a 
conviction.  In a special verdict 
form in Mr. Burnett’s case, the jury found that he had acted “intentionally,” and “knowingly,” and “recklessly under circumstances 
which showed extreme indifference to the value of human life.”  Thus, even if the district court had not 
properly instructed the jury on the definition of reckless, the jury’s findings 
that he acted intentionally and knowingly would be sufficient to sustain 
Mr. Burnett’s conviction.  We 
conclude that the jury instructions regarding aggravated assault and battery 
causing serious bodily injury were not in error and caused no prejudice to 
Mr. Burnett.
 
Elements of Attempted 
Second Degree Murder and Aggravated Assault and 
Battery
 
[¶23]     
In his third issue, 
Mr. Burnett claims that the elements of attempted second degree murder are 
identical to the elements of aggravated assault and battery.  He asserts that, because the two crimes 
are identical, it is left “to the whim of the prosecutor” to decide which crime 
to charge, and the prosecutor is free to make that decision on arbitrary and 
discriminatory bases.  This, Mr. 
Burnett claims, is a violation of his constitutional rights.  
 
[¶24]     
We do not agree that 
the elements of the two crimes are identical.  Mr. Burnett was charged with two 
separate counts of aggravated assault and battery.  The two counts were based on separate 
statutory provisions, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i), and Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-502(a)(ii), which provide that a person is guilty of aggravated 
assault and battery if he:
 
(i)    
Causes or attempts to 
cause serious bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; 
[or]
 
(ii)  
Attempts to cause, or 
intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly 
weapon.
 
[¶25]     
The second of these 
statutory provisions defines the crime of aggravated assault and battery with a 
deadly weapon.  Applying this 
definition, a person must use a deadly weapon to be convicted of this 
crime.  A person need not use a 
deadly weapon in order to be convicted of attempted second degree murder.  Plainly, these two crimes do not have 
identical elements.
 
[¶26]     
The other statutory 
provision defines the crime of aggravated assault and battery causing serious 
bodily injury.  Applying this 
definition, a person must act “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” in 
order to be convicted.  In contrast, 
to be convicted of attempted second degree murder as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 6-2-104 and 6-1-301, and as discussed under Mr. Burnett’s first 
issue, a person must act “purposely and maliciously.”  
 
[¶27]     
Mr. Burnett asserts 
that the term “purposely,” an element of attempted second degree murder, is 
synonymous with “intentionally” and “knowingly,” elements of aggravated assault 
and battery.  Section 21.01C of the 
Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions states that “'Purposely’ means 
intentionally,” providing support for Mr. Burnett’s assertion.  However, to be convicted of attempted 
second degree murder, a person must act both purposely and maliciously.  Bloomfield, ¶ 14, 234 P.3d  at 373; 
Guy v. State, 2008 WY 56, ¶ 38, 
184 P.3d 687, 698 (Wyo. 2008).  The 
term maliciously conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility toward 
another.  Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, 
¶ 24, 123 P.3d 543, 550-51 (Wyo. 2005).  Acting “maliciously” is an element of 
attempted second degree murder, but it is not an element of aggravated assault 
and battery causing serious bodily injury.  
The elements of the two crimes are not identical.
 
[¶28]     
We do not ignore the 
similarity between “maliciously” and “recklessly under circumstances manifesting 
extreme indifference to the value of human life.”  But even if these different elements of 
the two crimes were functionally equivalent, our precedent firmly establishes 
that the overlap does not violate Mr. Burnett’s constitutional rights.  In Johnson v. State, 2003 WY 9, ¶ 25, 
61 P.3d 1234, 1245 (Wyo. 2003), Mr. Johnson contended that two separate criminal 
statutes, one defining first degree felony murder and the other defining child 
abuse, punished “virtually identical conduct in two very disparate ways.”  Felony murder carried a potential death 
penalty, while child abuse was punishable by a maximum sentence of five years in 
prison.  Quoting dicta from Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420, 425 (Wyo. 
1984), Mr. Johnson asserted that “wherever two or more statutes provide 
different punishment for exactly the same criminal conduct, equal protection is 
violated.”  Johnson, ¶ 25, 61 P.3d  at 1245.  This is, in effect, the same argument 
now presented by Mr. Burnett.
 
[¶29]     
We squarely rejected 
Mr. Johnson’s argument in light of the United States Supreme Court decision in 
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S. Ct. 2198, 60 L. Ed. 2d 755 (1979), a case that dealt with two provisions 
prohibiting convicted felons from possessing firearms, one with a maximum 
penalty of two years and one with a maximum penalty of five years.  Although the United States Supreme Court 
agreed that the provisions were “overlapping,” it also noted that both 
provisions unambiguously specified the prohibited conduct and the penalties 
available upon conviction.  

 
That 
this particular conduct may violate both Titles does not detract from the notice 
afforded by each. Although the statutes create uncertainty as to which crime may 
be charged and therefore what penalties may be imposed, they do so to no greater 
extent than would a single statute authorizing various alternative punishments. 
So long as overlapping criminal provisions clearly define the conduct prohibited 
and the punishment authorized, the notice requirements of the Due Process Clause 
are satisfied.
 
Id. 
at 123, 99 S. Ct.  at 2204.  
With regard to equal 
protection rights, the Court wrote that, “when an 
act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under 
either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of 
defendants.”  Id. at 123-24, 99 S. Ct.  at 2204.  
 
[¶30]     
Following the lead of 
the United States Supreme Court in Batchelder, we held that overlapping 
criminal statutes did not violate Mr. Johnson’s federal or state rights to due 
process or equal protection.  Johnson, ¶ 32, 61 P.3d  at 
1248.  As Mr. Burnett concedes, we 
have approved and applied the Batchelder decision in numerous 
cases.  E.g. Worcester v. State, 2001 WY 82, 
¶ 26, 30 P.3d 47, 55-56 (Wyo. 2001); Duffy v. State, 789 P.2d 821, 826 (Wyo. 
1990); Kallas v. State, 704 P.2d 693, 
694-95 (Wyo. 1985).  
Mr. Burnett has not convinced us to depart from this 
precedent.
 
[¶31]     
Mr. Burnett’s 
conviction is affirmed.
 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice, specially 
concurring.
 
[¶32]   I concur in the majority opinion, 
writing separately only to note that I continue to believe that the sentences 
need not have merged.  See Winstead v. State, 2011 WY 137, 
¶ 16, 261 P.3d 743, 746 (Wyo. 2011) (Voigt, J., specially 
concurring).
 
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1Because the brothers 
have the same last name, we will refer to them by their first 
names.