Title: Diatchenko v. District Attorney

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11688 
SJC-11689 
 
GREGORY DIATCHENKO & another1  vs.  DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE 
SUFFOLK DISTRICT & others.2 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JEFFREY S. ROBERIO. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 6, 2014. - March 23, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Sentence, Parole, Assistance of counsel, 
Judicial review.  Due Process of Law, Sentence, Parole, 
Assistance of counsel.  Parole.  Practice, Criminal, 
Sentence, Parole, Assistance of counsel.  Witness, Expert. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on March 19, 2013. 
 
 
The case was reported by Botsford, J. 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on March 10, 2014. 
 
 
The case was reported by Botsford, J. 
 
                     
 
1 Jeffrey S. Roberio, intervener. 
 
 
2 Chair of the Massachusetts Parole Board (board) and 
Commissioner of Correction (commissioner). 
2 
 
 
 
Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for Gregory Diatchenko & another. 
 
Robert C. Thompson, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Amy L. Karangekis, Assistant Attorney General, for 
Massachusetts Parole Board. 
 
John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for District 
Attorney for the Suffolk District. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Kenneth J. Parsigian for Citizens for Juvenile Justice & 
others. 
 
David J. Apfel, Kristen A. Kearney, Kunal Pasricha, & 
Katherine Connolly Sadeck for Campaign for the Fair Sentencing 
of Youth & others. 
 
Afton M. Templin for Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  In Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the 
Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (2013) (Diatchenko I), this court 
considered the constitutionality of a life sentence without 
parole when applied to a juvenile homicide offender,3 and, 
following Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), determined 
that the mandatory imposition of such a sentence violates the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments in the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as art. 26 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.4  Diatchenko I, supra 
                     
 
3 The term "juvenile homicide offender" refers in this 
opinion to a person who has been convicted of murder in the 
first degree and was under the age of eighteen at the time that 
he or she committed the murder. 
 
 
4 This court also concluded in Diatchenko v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 671 (2013) 
(Diatchenko I), that the discretionary imposition of a sentence 
 
3 
 
at 668.  The court held that a juvenile homicide offender who is 
convicted of murder in the first degree and receives a mandatory 
sentence of life in prison must be afforded a "meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation," and this opportunity must come through 
consideration for release on parole.  Id. at 674, quoting Graham 
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). 
 
The court's opinion in Diatchenko I has given rise to 
questions concerning how the opportunity for release on parole 
will be protected for juvenile homicide offenders.  
Specifically, Gregory Diatchenko and Jeffrey S. Roberio,5 each of 
whom was convicted of murder in the first degree many years ago 
for a crime committed when he was seventeen years old,6 argue 
that in order to ensure that their opportunity for release 
through parole is meaningful, they must have, in connection with 
a petition for release before the parole board (board), access 
to counsel, access to funds for counsel and for expert witnesses 
                                                                  
of life in prison without parole violates art. 26 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which forbids the 
infliction of "cruel or unusual punishments." 
 
 
5 As discussed infra, in September of 2014, Roberio moved to 
intervene as a petitioner in Gregory Diatchenko's case, and the 
motion was allowed. 
 
 
6 For further discussion of the crimes for which Diatchenko 
and Roberio were convicted, see Commonwealth v. Diatchenko, 387 
Mass. 718 (1982), and Commonwealth v. Roberio, 428 Mass. 278 
(1998), S.C., 440 Mass. 245 (2003). 
4 
 
because they are indigent, and an opportunity for judicial 
review of the decision on their parole applications.  For the 
reasons discussed below, we agree in substance with Diatchenko 
and Roberio.7 
 
1.  Procedural history.  a.  Diatchenko.  In March of 2013, 
Diatchenko filed the present action in the county court, seeking 
a declaration that, because he was convicted of murder in the 
first degree and was seventeen at the time he committed the 
offense, his mandatory sentence of life without parole was 
unconstitutional following the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.  The single justice 
reported the case to the full court. 
 
The court issued its opinion in December, 2013.  See 
Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 655.  Having determined that juvenile 
homicide offenders could not validly be sentenced to life in 
prison without parole, the court turned to the task of finding 
an appropriate way to achieve a constitutionally permissible 
result, while still recognizing the Legislature's primary role 
                     
 
7 We acknowledge the two amicus briefs submitted in support 
of Diatchenko and Roberio by Citizens for Juvenile Justice, the 
Children's League of Massachusetts, Prisoners' Legal Services of 
Massachusetts, the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, 
the Justice Resource Institute, the Coalition for Effective 
Public Safety, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and 
Economic Justice, Professor Daniel Medwed, and the Hon. Gail 
Garinger (ret.); as well as the amicus brief submitted in 
support of Diatchenko by the Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
5 
 
in establishing sentences for criminal offenses.  The approach 
we took was to declare invalid, as applied to juvenile homicide 
offenders, certain language in G. L. c. 265, § 2, creating an 
exception to parole eligibility for those convicted of murder in 
the first degree and leaving in full effect the remainder of the 
statute that imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.  
See Diatchenko I, supra at 673.  The result was that any 
juvenile offender previously convicted of murder in the first 
degree, including Diatchenko, became eligible for parole after 
serving fifteen years of his or her sentence.  See id.  See also 
G. L. c. 265, § 2, as amended through St. 1982, c. 554, § 3; 
G. L. c. 127, § 133A, as amended through St. 1965, c. 766, § 1.  
Because Diatchenko had already served approximately thirty-one 
years of his life sentence, he became eligible for parole 
immediately.  See Diatchenko I, supra.8 
 
Pursuant to the opinion's rescript, the case was remanded 
to the single justice with the direction to enter a judgment 
                     
 
8 In Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676 (2013), decided 
the same day as Diatchenko I, the remedy in Diatchenko I was 
extended to include juvenile offenders sentenced to life in 
prison for murder in the first degree going forward, such that 
they also are entitled to a parole hearing.  Brown, supra at 
688.  The Legislature has since responded to these decisions by 
amending G. L. c. 265, § 2, and G. L. c. 127, § 133A, to 
incorporate into the statutes parole eligibility for juvenile 
offenders convicted of first-degree murder.  See G. L. c. 265, 
§ 2, as amended through St. 2014, c. 189, § 5; G. L. c. 127, 
§ 133A, as amended through St. 2014, c. 189, § 3. 
6 
 
consistent with the court's opinion in the case and to "take 
such further action as is necessary and appropriate."  On 
February 27, 2014, Diatchenko filed a motion for entry of a 
judgment that would include a number of orders of specific 
relief, and also filed a motion for funds to retain an expert in 
connection with his hearing before the board.  The district 
attorney for the Suffolk District (district attorney), the chair 
of the board, and the Commissioner of Correction (commissioner) 
filed oppositions.  After a hearing, the single justice reserved 
and reported Diatchenko's case as well as Roberio's case, next 
discussed, to the full court. 
In connection with the Diatchenko case, the single justice 
reported the following questions: 
"1.  Whether, in order to ensure that the petitioner and 
other similarly situated juvenile homicide offenders 
receive the 'meaningful opportunity to obtain release' that 
is required by the court's opinion [in Diatchenko I], they 
must be afforded: 
 
"a.  the right to assistance of counsel at their parole 
hearings, including the right to have counsel appointed if 
they are indigent; and 
 
"b.  the right to public funds, if they are indigent, in 
order to secure reasonably necessary expert assistance at 
the hearings. 
 
"2.  Whether, in order to ensure that the petitioner and 
other similarly situated juvenile homicide offenders 
receive the 'meaningful opportunity to obtain release' that 
is required by the court's opinion, there must be an 
opportunity for the petitioner or a similarly situated 
individual who is denied parole to obtain judicial review 
7 
 
of the parole board's decision, and if so, what form the 
judicial review will take." 
 
 
b.  Roberio.  Following the Supreme Court's decision in 
Miller, in June, 2013, Roberio sought relief from his mandatory 
sentence of life without parole by moving in the Superior Court 
for resentencing under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001).  He also filed a motion for funds pursuant to 
rule 30 (c) (5) to pay an expert neuropsychologist for 
assistance in connection with his motion for resentencing.  The 
motion for funds was allowed, but Roberio's motion for 
resentencing was stayed pending the release of our decision in 
Diatchenko I, at which point he was resentenced to life with 
parole eligibility after fifteen years in prison.  Because 
Roberio had been in prison for more than fifteen years, he was 
immediately eligible for parole. 
 
On February 27, 2014, Roberio filed another motion for 
funds pursuant to rule 30 (c) (5) to retain the services of a 
second neuropsychologist because the previous neuropsychologist 
had died; Roberio sought to retain the expert in order to 
continue to seek to have his sentence reduced to a term of years 
or, alternatively, to assist him in connection with seeking 
parole.  A second Superior Court judge allowed the motion after 
hearing, but stayed the order to permit the Commonwealth to seek 
relief from the single justice.  On March 10, 2014, the 
8 
 
Commonwealth filed a petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, challenging the orders allowing Roberio's requests for 
funds to retain the experts.  As indicated, on May 23, 2014, the 
single justice reserved and reported the Roberio case to the 
full court for decision, to be paired with the Diatchenko case.  
In September, 2014, Roberio filed a motion to intervene in the 
Diatchenko case.  The single justice allowed the motion. 
 
2.  Suggestion of mootness.  "Litigation ordinarily is 
considered moot when the party claiming to be aggrieved ceases 
to have a personal stake in its outcome."  Acting Supt. of 
Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, 431 Mass. 101, 103 (2000), 
quoting Attorney Gen. v. Commissioner of Ins., 403 Mass. 370, 
380 (1988).  The chair of the board, the commissioner, and the 
district attorney suggest that the case is moot with respect to 
Diatchenko because on October 31, 2014, the board approved his 
application for parole, and therefore, they contend, Diatchenko 
no longer has a personal stake in the resolution of the present 
case.  See Massachusetts Parole Board, No. W38579, at 1 (Oct. 
31, 2014).  However, Diatchenko has not yet been released on 
parole; rather, the board required that Diatchenko first spend 
twelve months in a lower security prison before he may be 
released, so that he may "transition gradually to the 
community."  Id. at 7.  Since Diatchenko has not yet been 
released, he continues to have a personal stake in the outcome 
9 
 
of the case, and therefore his petition is not moot.  Moreover, 
Roberio has been permitted to intervene in the Diatchenko case, 
and he has not yet had a parole hearing.  Even if the case were 
moot as to Diatchenko, therefore, it is not moot with respect to 
Roberio.  We proceed to consider the reported questions and 
related claims raised on their merits. 
 
3.  Discussion.  a.  Right to assistance of counsel.  The 
first reported question asks whether a juvenile homicide 
offender must be afforded the assistance of counsel in 
connection with his or her initial parole hearing.9  It is 
important to view the question in context.  The court's 
conclusion in Diatchenko I, that juvenile homicide offenders 
could not permissibly be subjected to life in prison without any 
opportunity for parole, flowed from the "fundamental '"precept 
of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and 
proportioned" to both the offender and the offense,'" a central 
tenet of the Eighth Amendment and of art. 26.  Diatchenko I, 466 
Mass. at 669, quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463.  Drawing from 
the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions that focused 
on the requirement of proportional sentencing of youth, and in 
                     
 
9 The reported questions do not specify the initial parole 
hearing, but we understand that to be the intended focus, and 
consider it as such.  We therefore do not consider here whether 
the procedural rights that we discuss in this opinion only apply 
with respect to a juvenile homicide offender's initial parole 
hearing. 
10 
 
particular the decisions in Miller and Graham,10 Diatchenko I 
observed that "children are constitutionally different from 
adults for purposes of sentencing" and that the "distinctive 
attributes of juvenile offenders" render suspect the traditional 
justifications for imposing sentences of life without parole on 
these individuals.  Diatchenko I, supra at 670-671, quoting 
Miller, supra at 2465.  Therefore, in Diatchenko I, we held that 
Diatchenko and all juvenile homicide offenders serving mandatory 
life sentences deserve at least a "meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation," and that accordingly, at the appropriate time, 
they must be considered for parole suitability.  Diatchenko I, 
supra at 671, 674, quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.  In other 
words, the conclusion we reached was that parole eligibility is 
an essential component of a constitutional sentence under art. 
26 for a juvenile homicide offender subject to mandatory life in 
prison.11 
                     
 
10 In Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012), as 
noted previously, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits 
mandatory sentences of life without parole for those who were 
under the age of eighteen at the time they committed murder; in 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010), the Court held that 
those who committed a nonhomicide offense before the age of 
eighteen can never receive such sentences. 
 
 
11 Justice Spina's dissent argues that because Miller refers 
specifically to the requirement of proportionality in 
 
11 
 
 
In general, there is no constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in a grant of parole.  See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the 
Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); Quegan 
v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 423 Mass. 834, 836 (1996); Greenman 
v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 405 Mass. 384, 388 n.3 (1989).  
However, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that in some cases, 
a liberty interest in parole requiring at least some minimal due 
process rights may derive from language in a State's parole 
statute that creates a "protectible expectation of parole."  See 
Greenholtz, supra at 11-12 (statutory language and structure of 
Nebraska parole statute created expectancy of release 
constituting liberty interest entitled to protection of due 
process clause).  See also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 
369, 371-372, 381 (1987). 
 
Here, G. L. c. 127, § 130, does not create an expectation 
of release through parole, as Justice Spina's dissent points 
out.  See post at    .  Rather, what is at issue is art. 26's 
                                                                  
"sentencing," unless a parole hearing is viewed as part of the 
sentencing process, there can be no constitutional basis for the 
procedural protections in parole hearings that the petitioners 
seek.  See post at    .  However, in concluding that all 
juvenile homicide offenders must have access to a "meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release," Diatchenko I identified under 
art. 26 a substantive requirement concerning the nature of the 
sentences that juvenile homicide offenders must receive.  See 
Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 671, 674, quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 
75.  This requirement goes beyond the procedural issue that 
Miller identified under the Eighth Amendment. 
12 
 
requirement that a juvenile homicide offender serving a 
mandatory life sentence be provided a meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release, so that his or her sentence is not effectively 
one of straight life in prison -- an outcome that art. 26 
prohibits.  In this context, where the meaningful opportunity 
for release through parole is necessary in order to conform the 
juvenile homicide offender's mandatory life sentence to the 
requirements of art. 26, the parole process takes on a 
constitutional dimension that does not exist for other offenders 
whose sentences include parole eligibility.12 
Thus, for example, in the case of an adult defendant 
convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to a term of not less 
than sixteen nor more than twenty years in prison, the defendant 
                     
 
12 The fact that the opportunity for release through parole 
is essential in order to guarantee the constitutionality of a 
juvenile homicide offender's mandatory sentence of life in 
prison does not "transform[] the conduct of the parole hearing 
into part of the sentencing process" in this context, as Justice 
Spina's dissent suggests.  See post at    .  Rather, for a 
juvenile homicide offender -- as for virtually any offender 
except an adult convicted of murder in the first degree -- the 
offender's sentence is fixed at the time of sentencing, and the 
opportunity to seek parole is merely a component of the sentence 
that the offender receives from a judge.  See Commonwealth v. 
Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 298-299, 302 (2014).  See also G. L. 
c. 279, § 24.  Our decision today does not undermine this 
relationship between sentencing and parole, but rather explores 
further the purpose that parole eligibility serves in the 
context of a juvenile homicide offender’s mandatory life 
sentence, and the additional protections that juvenile homicide 
offenders require in order to ensure that that purpose is fully 
achieved. 
13 
 
would be eligible for parole in sixteen years,13 but if the 
defendant were denied a meaningful opportunity for release on 
parole, this would not render the sentence cruel or unusual and 
therefore unconstitutional under art. 26.  This is so because a 
State has no obligation to provide a parole system, see 
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7-8, and if the defendant were to serve 
his or her entire sentence of twenty years with no opportunity 
at all for release on parole, that would have been a permissible 
sentence for the judge to have imposed at the outset.  The same 
is not true for juvenile homicide offenders; under G. L. c. 265, 
§ 2, they must be sentenced to life in prison, but art. 26 does 
not allow either the Legislature or a judge to sentence such an 
offender to life in prison without the possibility of parole.14 
                     
 
13 See G. L. c. 127, § 133; G. L. c. 279, § 24. 
 
 
14 Justice Spina's dissent emphasizes, post at    , that our 
decisions in Diatchenko I, Brown, Commonwealth v. Ray, 467 Mass. 
115 (2014), and Commonwealth v. Keo, 467 Mass. 25 (2014), each 
applied the mandatory life sentence as specified in G. L. 
c. 265, § 2, for murder in the first degree to juvenile homicide 
offenders, albeit with the added instruction that these 
offenders must be eligible for parole in accordance with the 
parole statute.  See Ray, supra at 140; Keo, supra at 46-47.  
See also Diatchenko I, supra at 674 ("At the appropriate time, 
it is the purview of the . . . board to evaluate the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, including 
the age of the offender, together with all relevant information 
pertaining to the offender's character and actions during the 
intervening years since conviction.  By this process, a juvenile 
homicide offender will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to 
be considered for parole suitability").  From this, the dissent 
concludes that these decisions stand for the propositions that 
 
14 
 
 
We turn, then, to the question of what is procedurally 
required in order to protect a juvenile homicide offender's 
expectation of "a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based 
on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."  Graham, 560 U.S. 
at 75.15  "The extent of procedural due process which must be 
                                                                  
the existing parole procedures already afford a meaningful 
opportunity for release and that juvenile homicide offenders are 
"entitled only to the same parole hearing process as other 
inmates."  See post at    .  The dissent then contends that 
today's decision improperly changes course and affords something 
more.  See post at    .  We disagree that we have changed 
course.  The cited decisions focused explicitly on the 
substantive punishment that the defendants in those cases must 
receive; in none of them did the court address any issue 
regarding the nature of the parole process for juvenile homicide 
offenders.  See Diatchenko I, supra at 674 n.18 ("The heart of 
this case is the constitutional validity of Diatchenko's 
sentence for murder in the first degree").  Moreover, as 
discussed infra, nothing in this opinion suggests that the 
procedures described in G. L. c. 127, § 133A, no longer apply to 
juvenile homicide offenders.  Rather, today's decision 
identifies additional procedural protections that must be 
afforded to these offenders within the context of the existing 
parole process, and an opportunity for a limited review of the 
board's decision. 
 
 
Similarly, today's decision in no way conflicts with the 
Supreme Court's holdings in Miller and Graham.  Each of those 
cases addressed a specific context in which the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the imposition of a sentence of life without parole on 
a juvenile offender.  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471; Graham, 
560 U.S. at 75.  Parole was not the subject of Miller and 
Graham; life without parole was.  Those cases leave open the 
question of how to ensure that Miller's and Graham's requirement 
of a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release" for certain 
juvenile offenders is to be realized.  See Miller, supra at 
2469; Graham, supra at 75. 
 
 
15 We emphasize that the offender does not have a 
protectable expectation that he or she necessarily will be 
 
15 
 
afforded in any situation varies with the nature of the private 
and governmental interests at stake . . . , but basic to due 
process is the right to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.'"  Department of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 379 
Mass. 1, 3-4 (1979) (J.K.B.), quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 
U.S. 545, 552 (1965).  This court has concluded, for example, 
that an "indigent parent facing the possible loss of a child 
cannot be said to have a meaningful right to be heard in a 
contested proceeding without the assistance of counsel."  
J.K.B., supra at 4.  See Adoption of Meaghan, 461 Mass. 1006, 
1007-1008 (2012) (where child's guardians filed petition for 
adoption that, if granted, would terminate parental rights, both 
nonconsenting indigent father and consenting child entitled to 
appointed counsel to provide meaningful opportunity to be 
heard).  See also Guardianship of V.V., 470 Mass. 590, 592-593 
(2015).  For reasons we discuss next, the court's reasons for 
deeming appointment of counsel necessary in this context are 
instructive here:  "[t]he petition may well involve complex 
questions of fact and law, and require the marshalling and 
rebutting of sophisticated expert testimony"; and "[p]rovision 
                                                                  
released at a particular time, or even at all.  See Diatchenko 
I, 466 Mass. at 674.  As discussed infra, the determination of 
whether a juvenile homicide offender merits parole requires 
consideration of many factors, which may or may not indicate 
that release is appropriate for any particular individual. 
16 
 
of appointed counsel not only safeguards the rights of the 
parents, but it assists the court in reaching its decision with 
the 'utmost care' and 'an extra measure of evidentiary 
protection,' required by law."  J.K.B., supra, quoting Custody 
of a Minor (No. 1), 377 Mass. 876, 877, 884 (1979). 
 
By statute, the board is required to determine an 
individual's suitability for parole based on whether there is, 
in the opinion of the board, a "reasonable probability that, if 
[a] prisoner is released with appropriate conditions and 
community supervision, the prisoner will live and remain at 
liberty without violating the law and that release is not 
incompatible with the welfare of society."  G. L. c. 127, § 130.  
The decision is a discretionary one for the board "with which, 
if otherwise constitutionally exercised, the judiciary may not 
interfere."16  See Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 302 
(2014).  In rendering a parole decision, the board is entitled 
to obtain significant amounts of information, including the 
following:  recommendations from parole staff; the inmate's 
prior criminal record; reports concerning the nature and 
circumstances of the offense, such as police reports, grand jury 
                     
 
16 We return to this point infra.  Nothing in this opinion 
is intended to suggest that a judge or a court has the authority 
to decide whether a particular juvenile homicide offender is 
entitled to release on parole; judicial review is limited to the 
question whether the board has "constitutionally exercised" its 
discretion.  Cole, 468 Mass. at 302. 
17 
 
minutes, and trial transcripts; victim statements; information 
about the inmate's physical, medical, mental, and psychiatric 
status; disciplinary reports; classification reports; work 
evaluations; and records of educational achievements.  See 120 
Code Mass Regs. § 300.05 (1997).  See also G. L. c. 127, § 135.  
The Department of Correction (department) maintains much of this 
information in a so-called "six-part folder" for the individual 
inmate that dates back to when the inmate was first detained in 
a Massachusetts correctional institution.  See 103 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 155.07, 155.08 (2004).  However, an inmate's access to 
certain evaluative information contained in this folder as well 
as other types of information available to the board may be 
restricted.  See 103 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 155.10, 157.08 (2005); 
120 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 301.04, 500.06 (2001). 
 
The full board conducts initial parole hearings for 
individuals serving life sentences.  120 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 301.06(1) (2001).  Notice of the hearing is provided to 
government officials, including the Attorney General, the office 
of the district attorney in whose district the inmate's sentence 
was imposed, the chief of police of the municipality where the 
crime was committed, and the Executive Office of Public Safety, 
as well as to the victim or the victim's immediate family 
members.  See G. L. c. 127, § 133A; 120 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 301.06(3) (2001).  During the parole hearing, the inmate or 
18 
 
his or her representative has an opportunity to make an opening 
statement, and then the inmate responds to questions from the 
board.  120 Code Mass. Regs. § 301.06(4) (2001).  The board also 
may pose questions to any individual who appears in support of 
the inmate.  Id.  After the inmate has completed his or her 
presentation, the victim or victim's family has an opportunity 
to speak, as do public officials, and the board is tasked with 
eliciting "available evidence and testimony unfavorable to the 
inmate upon any relevant subject."  Id.  The board may permit 
the inmate to make a closing statement and may allow parties to 
submit memoranda or other documentation after the hearing.  120 
Code Mass. Regs. §§ 301.06(4), (5) (2001).  The board permits 
attorneys to represent inmates serving life sentences at their 
parole hearings, although currently there is no provision for 
providing counsel to those who are indigent.17  120 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 300.08 (1997). 
 
The question the board must answer for each inmate seeking 
parole, namely, whether he or she is likely to reoffend, 
requires the board to weigh multiple factors and consider a wide 
                     
 
17 The board and the commissioner recognize in their brief 
that "certain benefits flow from access to counsel and experts," 
and therefore have taken no position on the first two questions 
reported by the single justice in the Diatchenko case.  The 
district attorney for the Suffolk District, however, argues that 
Diatchenko and Roberio are not entitled to counsel, funds to 
retain counsel, or funds to retain experts. 
19 
 
variety of evidence.  In the case of a juvenile homicide 
offender -- at least at the initial parole hearing -- the task 
is probably far more complex than in the case of an adult 
offender because of "the unique characteristics" of juvenile 
offenders.  Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 674.  See Miller, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2464.  A potentially massive amount of information bears 
on these issues, including legal, medical, disciplinary, 
educational, and work-related evidence.  In addition, although a 
parole hearing is unlike a traditional trial in that it does not 
involve direct and cross-examination of witnesses by attorneys, 
because the inmate's parole application may well be opposed by 
both the victim's family and public officials, it would be 
difficult to characterize this as an uncontested proceeding. 
 
Thus, like a proceeding to terminate parental rights, a 
parole hearing for a juvenile homicide offender serving a 
mandatory life sentence involves complex and multifaceted issues 
that require the potential marshalling, presentation, and 
rebuttal of information derived from many sources.  See J.K.B., 
379 Mass. at 4.  An unrepresented, indigent juvenile homicide 
offender will likely lack the skills and resources to gather, 
analyze, and present this evidence adequately.18  Furthermore, 
                     
 
18 A juvenile homicide offender -- who will have spent his 
or her entire adult life and presumably some of his or her 
teenage years in prison -- also will likely need to overcome a 
 
20 
 
although parole hearings are not contested in the strictest 
sense, the juvenile homicide offender seeking parole is likely 
to be required to overcome arguments by both victims' family 
members and government officials opposed to the offender's 
release; the former of these parties may present as particularly 
sympathetic, while the latter will likely have greater advocacy 
skills than the offender seeking parole.19 
 
In sum, given the challenges involved for a juvenile 
homicide offender serving a mandatory life sentence to advocate 
effectively for parole release on his or her own, and in light 
of the fact that the offender's opportunity for release is 
critical to the constitutionality of the sentence, we conclude 
                                                                  
host of personal challenges in order to be able to present a 
persuasive case for parole on his or her own.  The challenges 
could include a lack of formal education, as well as undeveloped 
critical thinking and organizational skills; a history of 
trauma, drug use, or mental illness; a limited ability to access 
his or her own psychiatric or other record information regarding 
the impact or context of this history; and balancing the need to 
take responsibility and express remorse for the crime, while at 
the same time pointing out all the factors that may have made 
him or her, as a juvenile, less morally culpable.  See Russell, 
Review for Release:  Juvenile Offenders, State Parole Practices, 
and the Eighth Amendment, 89 Ind. L.J. 373, 419-421 (2014).  An 
especially significant challenge is likely to be the juvenile 
offender's isolation from the outside community, making it 
difficult to present a solid release plan.  See id. at 421. 
 
 
19 Additionally, as noted in the context of parental rights 
termination cases, the availability of counsel in a case may 
help to clarify for the decision maker some of the more 
complicated issues involved.  See Department of Pub. Welfare v. 
J.K.B., 379 Mass. 1, 4 (1979). 
21 
 
that this opportunity is not likely to be "meaningful" as 
required by art. 26 without access to counsel. 
 
Turning to the question of appointment of counsel for 
indigent juvenile homicide offenders like Diatchenko and 
Roberio, G. L. c. 211D, § 5, authorizes the Committee for Public 
Counsel Services (committee) to maintain a system for 
appointment of counsel at any stage of a criminal or noncriminal 
proceeding in which "the laws of the commonwealth or the rules 
of the supreme judicial court require that a person in such 
proceeding be represented by counsel . . . provided . . . that 
such person is unable to obtain counsel by reason of his 
indigency."  In light of our conclusion here that a juvenile 
homicide offender serving a mandatory life sentence must have 
access to counsel in connection with an initial application for 
parole, § 5D offers legislative authorization and an appropriate 
mechanism, through the work of the committee, for the 
appointment of counsel for indigent juvenile homicide 
offenders.20 
                     
 
20 We acknowledge that Quegan v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 
423 Mass. 834 (1996), appears to contradict this conclusion.  
See id. at 840 ("[The Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(CPCS)] has no right, however, to represent an indigent prisoner 
before the parole board unless there is a criminal proceeding 
pending in which CPCS represents the prisoner and representation 
of the prisoner-defendant before the parole board is appropriate 
in order to protect the defendant's interests in the pending 
criminal matter").  However, Quegan was decided in the context 
 
22 
 
 
b.  Access to funds for expert witnesses.  The second 
reported question concerns access to expert witnesses.21  
Diatchenko and Roberio contend that, like access to counsel, it 
is necessary, in order to secure a meaningful opportunity for 
release, to have access to the assistance of expert witnesses.  
Specifically, they argue that, as juvenile offenders convicted 
of murder, they need experts to be able to explain and offer 
opinions on issues concerning the relationship between 
neurobiological immaturity and culpability in general as well as 
factors relating to each of their individual and family 
circumstances that may help both to explain past conduct and 
assess future risk of reoffending.  As this court acknowledged 
in Diatchenko I, scientific research on adolescent brain 
development has revealed "myriad significant ways that this 
development impacts a juvenile's personality and behavior," some 
of which suggest decreased moral culpability for certain 
                                                                  
of a prisoner seeking parole who had no constitutionally 
protected interest that entitled him to any due process 
protections.  See id. at 836, 839.  Here, we have concluded that 
a juvenile homicide offender is entitled to representation by 
counsel in connection with the initial parole hearing.  Legal 
representation of an indigent juvenile homicide offender is thus 
required by law.  See id. at 839. In addition, the court in 
Quegan was interpreting a section of G. L. c. 211D that has 
since been repealed by the Legislature.  See id.; G. L. c. 211D, 
§ 14, repealed by St. 2011, c. 68, § 117. 
 
 
21 The second reported question, in substance, raises many 
if not all of the issues of concern to the Commonwealth in its 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition in the Roberio case. 
23 
 
juvenile homicide offenders or indicate a greater potential for 
them to mature to a point where they no longer engage in the 
behaviors that led to their crimes.  See Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. 
at 669-670.22  While the assistance of a psychologist or other 
expert witness may not be necessary for every juvenile homicide 
offender serving a life sentence who seeks parole, in some cases 
such assistance may be crucial to the juvenile's ability to 
obtain a meaningful chance of release.23 
                     
 
22 See also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-2465 (research on 
adolescents showing "transient rashness, proclivity for risk, 
and inability to assess consequences . . . both lessened a 
child's 'moral culpability' and enhanced the prospect that, as 
the years go by and neurological development occurs, his 
'deficiencies will be reformed'" [citation omitted]); Graham, 
560 U.S. at 68 ("[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science 
continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and 
adult minds.  For example, parts of the brain involved in 
behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence"). 
 
 
23 Roberio's case offers a good example of how a juvenile 
homicide offender's mental health and cognitive development 
history could become a central issue in a parole hearing.  At 
Roberio's second murder trial, he presented a defense that, at 
the time of his crime, he lacked the substantial capacity to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law due to an 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, an oppositional 
defiant disorder, and a learning disability, all of which were 
exacerbated by alcohol use.  See Commonwealth v. Roberio, 440 
Mass. 245, 247 (2003).  A psychological reevaluation of Roberio 
in 2013, when he was forty-four years old, suggested to the 
neuropsychologist performing the evaluation that many of the 
neurological and behavioral challenges Roberio experienced in 
his teenage years had resolved.  In these circumstances, it may 
be essential that Roberio be in a position to present the board 
with an expert opinion explaining the path of his apparent 
growth in cognitive and emotional maturity and its relationship 
to the question of whether he would be likely to reoffend if 
 
24 
 
 
Neither G. L. c. 211D, § 5, nor any other statute expressly 
authorizes the expenditure of funds for expert witnesses to 
assist such a juvenile in the context of a parole hearing.  
Roberio argues that the allowance of the fee request is 
authorized under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (5), which in relevant 
part provides:  "The court, after notice to the Commonwealth and 
an opportunity to be heard, may also exercise discretion to 
allow the defendant costs associated with the preparation and 
presentation of a motion under this rule."  However, we agree 
with the Commonwealth that in its current form, rule 30 (c) (5) 
does not authorize the allowance of funds to a defendant to 
retain an expert witness in connection with a parole hearing, 
because a parole hearing is not a "motion under this rule [i.e., 
rule 30]."24 
 
It is also the case that G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A–27G, the 
statutory provisions generally authorizing the payment of public 
funds to cover costs and fees of indigent litigants, apply most 
directly to costs and fees relating to court proceedings, not 
proceedings before administrative or executive agencies like the 
                                                                  
released on parole.  As previously indicated, the board 
acknowledges that the availability of expert witnesses may be 
beneficial in the parole hearing context. 
 
 
24 The motions specifically described in Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), are a motion under 
rule 30 (a) for immediate release or to correct sentence and a 
motion for a new trial under rule 30 (b). 
25 
 
board.  See, e.g., Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 89230 v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 452 Mass. 764, 778-780 (2008).  In 
addition, this court has held that G. L. c. 261, § 27C (4), 
provides "extra fees and costs," including funds for expert 
witnesses,25 only in the context of a "prosecution, defense or 
appeal."  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davis, 410 Mass. 680, 684 
(1991).  See also Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 569 
(2003).  However, these cases have generally addressed the 
availability of costs for indigent defendants pursuing 
nonconstitutionally mandated procedures.26  Moreover, even where 
a defendant's right to a particular postconviction procedure is 
not constitutionally guaranteed, as is the case, for example, 
with motions for a new trial, this court has still required that 
indigent defendants nevertheless have meaningful access to 
whatever postconviction proceedings the State makes available.  
See Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 261-262 (1983).27  
                     
 
25 General Laws c. 267, § 27A, defines "extra fees and 
costs" as including fees for expert assistance. 
 
26 See Commonwealth v. Davis, 410 Mass. 680, 684 & n.7 
(1991) (posttrial motion at issue was not "constitutionally 
mandated," and therefore indigent defendant had "no 
constitutional right to State funding to support investigations 
in anticipation of such a motion"). 
 
 
27 Justice Spina's dissent notes that the result in 
Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 261 (1983), was that 
counsel was not guaranteed for every defendant seeking to file a 
motion for a new trial, but that provision of counsel to 
 
26 
 
See also Reporter's Notes to Rule 30 (c) (5), Mass. Rules of 
Court, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 223 (Thomson Reuters 
2014) (discussing 2001 amendments to rule 30 allowing judges 
discretion to authorize costs for indigent defendants pursuing 
postconviction procedures). 
 
Because the postconviction proceeding at issue here, a 
parole hearing for a juvenile homicide offender, is required in 
order to ensure that an offender's life sentence conforms to the 
proportionality requirements of art. 26, the proceeding is not 
available solely at the discretion of the State.  Rather, it is 
constitutionally mandated, and as such, it requires certain 
protections not guaranteed in all postconviction procedures.  It 
is appropriate, therefore, to construe G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A–27G, 
to authorize a Superior Court judge, upon motion of a parole-
eligible, indigent juvenile homicide offender, to allow for the 
                                                                  
indigent defendants was within the discretion of the motion 
judge.  See post at    .  While that is true, Conceicao 
emphasized that because "a State has no obligation to provide a 
procedure enabling defendants to make motions for a new trial, 
it need not place poor and wealthy defendants on an absolutely 
equal level in terms of the services available to them in 
pursuing a motion for a new trial."  Conceicao, supra.  Since 
art. 26 requires that juvenile homicide offenders have a 
meaningful opportunity for release through parole, that 
reasoning does not apply here.  Rather, we cite Conceicao and 
Reporter's Notes to Rule 30 (c) (5), Mass. Rules of Court, Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, at 223 (Thomson Reuters 2014), for the 
premise that judges have discretion to authorize costs to 
defendants when necessary to guarantee meaningful access to 
postconviction procedures. 
27 
 
payment of fees to an expert witness to assist the offender in 
connection with his or her initial parole proceeding in certain 
limited contexts -- specifically, where it is shown that the 
juvenile offender requires an expert's assistance in order 
effectively to explain the effects of the individual's 
neurobiological immaturity and other personal circumstances at 
the time of the crime, and how this information relates to the 
individual's present capacity and future risk of reoffending.  
The judge may exercise discretion to do so when the judge 
concludes that the assistance of the expert is reasonably 
necessary to protect the juvenile homicide offender's meaningful 
opportunity for release.28 
 
c.  Availability of judicial review.  The third reported 
question asks whether there must be an opportunity for judicial 
review of a decision denying parole to a juvenile homicide 
offender and, if so, what form judicial review will take.  The 
board, the commissioner, and the district attorney argue that 
art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights prohibits 
judicial review in this context.  Article 30 requires strict 
separation of judicial and executive powers, and the power to 
                     
 
28 We request this court's standing advisory committee on 
the rules of criminal procedure to propose a procedure that will 
permit an indigent juvenile homicide offender to seek funds for 
an expert witness or witnesses to support the offender's 
requests for parole, consistent with this opinion. 
28 
 
grant parole, being fundamentally related to the execution of a 
prisoner's sentence, lies exclusively within the province of the 
executive branch.  See Cole, 468 Mass. at 302-303; Commonwealth 
v. Amirault, 415 Mass. 112, 116-117 (1993).  However, as we have 
noted, the right of the executive branch to exercise this power 
without intervention from the judiciary is subject to the 
provision that the power must be "constitutionally exercised."  
See Cole, supra at 302.  This is not to suggest that the board 
is unconstitutionally exercising this power currently,29 or is 
likely to do so in the future, but only that this court retains 
the responsibility with respect to parole hearings to ensure 
that any constitutional requirements are met.  Thus, this court 
has never held that art. 30 precludes any type of judicial 
review of parole board decisions.  In fact, Massachusetts courts 
have engaged in limited review of parole proceedings, 
consistently if not frequently.  See, e.g., Quegan, 423 Mass. at 
835 (prisoner sought declaration that board may not consider 
refusal to admit guilt in parole determination); Greenman, 405 
Mass. at 386 (prisoner challenged basis of parole denial as 
beyond board's statutory authority); Blake v. Massachusetts 
Parole Bd., 369 Mass. 701, 702 (1976) (prisoner sought 
                     
29 We agree with Justice Cordy's dissent that there is no 
"hint" in this record that the board is exercising its authority 
in an unconstitutional manner.  See post at    . 
29 
 
declaration of right to appear personally before board in order 
to argue for early parole eligibility); Doucette v. 
Massachusetts Parole Bd., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 532 (2014) 
(prisoner pursued civil rights claim alleging violation of due 
process in parole revocation proceeding as well as certiorari 
action challenging merits of board's decision to revoke 
parole).30,31 
 
As previously stated, the parole hearing acquires a 
constitutional dimension for a juvenile homicide offender 
because the availability of a meaningful opportunity for release 
on parole is what makes the juvenile's mandatory life sentence 
constitutionally proportionate.  In this particular context, 
judicial review of a parole decision is available solely to 
                     
 
30 It bears noting that courts frequently rule on certiorari 
petitions by prisoners claiming that the Department of 
Correction (department) has violated their constitutional 
rights.  See, e.g., Ciampi v. Commissioner of Correction, 452 
Mass. 162, 163 (2008); Puleio v. Commissioner of Correction, 52 
Mass. App. Ct. 302, 305-306 (2001); Drayton v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 135-137 (2001).  The board is 
located within the department (although not subject to its 
jurisdiction).  See G. L. c. 27, § 4.  Given this, it is 
difficult to accept the proposition that actions of the 
department are subject to judicial review to assure compliance 
with the Federal and State Constitutions, but that art. 30 
prohibits any form of judicial review of decisions of the board. 
 
 
31 The chair of the board and the commissioner point out 
that a judge may not "revise or revoke sentences when the parole 
board does not act in accordance with a judge's expectations."  
See Commonwealth v. Amirault, 415 Mass. 112, 116 (1993).  We 
agree, and we do not suggest anything to the contrary in this 
case. 
30 
 
ensure that the board exercises its discretionary authority to 
make a parole decision for a juvenile homicide offender in a 
constitutional manner, meaning that the art. 26 right of a 
juvenile homicide offender to a constitutionally proportionate 
sentence is not violated.32 
 
That being said, the art. 26 right of a juvenile homicide 
offender in relation to parole is limited.  To repeat:  it is 
not a guarantee of eventual release, but an entitlement to a 
meaningful opportunity for such release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation.  See Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 
674.  That entitlement arises directly from the recognition that 
                     
 
32 In light of Diatchenko I, the board has adopted 
guidelines for parole determinations for juvenile homicide 
offenders serving life sentences, and these guidelines take into 
account the unique characteristics of youth.  See Massachusetts 
Parole Board, Guidelines for Life Sentence Decisions (updated 
Mar. 3, 2014), available at http://www.mass.gov/eopss/agencies/ 
parole-board/guidelines-for-life-sentence-decisions.html 
[http://perma.cc/K33Z-YSEA].  The board is to be commended for 
doing so, but its adoption of guidelines does not preclude or 
render unnecessary the need for judicial review.  The guidelines 
are not binding and are subject to change.  More importantly, 
the board is not in a position to make a determination that the 
art. 26 right of a juvenile homicide offender to a proportionate 
sentence has been protected. 
 
 
Nor does the existence of appeal procedures before the 
board adequately protect this right.  The board's regulations 
permit inmates denied parole to request an appeal before the 
same hearing panel that rendered the initial denial, or to 
request reconsideration by a staff member of the board.  See 120 
Code Mass. Regs. §§ 100.00, 304.1 (2001).  Neither of these 
processes provides the same opportunity for review by a neutral 
decision maker that judicial review affords. 
31 
 
children are constitutionally different from adults, with 
"diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform," 
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464, based on their "distinctive 
attributes" of youth.  See Diatchenko I, supra at 660, 671.  
These include children's "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped 
sense of responsibility, leading to recklessness, impulsivity, 
and heedless risk-taking"; vulnerability "to negative influences 
and outside pressures, including from their family and peers; 
. . . limited contro[l] over their own environment[;] . . . 
[lack of] the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, 
crime-producing settings"; and unique capacity to change as they 
grow older (citations and quotations omitted).  Id. at 660.  
Absent consideration of these attributes, a juvenile homicide 
offender may not be permitted a real chance to demonstrate 
maturity and rehabilitation.  See id. at 675 (Lenk, J., 
concurring), citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.  The purpose of 
judicial review here is not to substitute a judge's or an 
appellate court's opinion for the board's judgment on whether a 
particular juvenile homicide offender merits parole, because 
this would usurp impermissibly the role of the board.  Rather, 
judicial review is limited to the question whether the board has 
carried out its responsibility to take into account the 
attributes or factors just described in making its decision. 
32 
 
 
With this in mind, we consider the form of judicial review 
of a board decision denying initial parole to a juvenile 
homicide offender.  Diatchenko and Roberio suggest that judicial 
review in this context should be in the nature of certiorari, as 
described in G. L. c. 249, § 4, rather than through an action 
for declaratory relief under G. L. c. 231A.  We agree that 
certiorari is appropriate here, although we do not agree with 
their view of the scope or standard of that review. 
 
"[A] complaint for declaratory relief is an appropriate way 
of testing the validity of regulations or the propriety of 
practices involving violations of rights, which are consistent 
and repeated in nature. . . .  It is not, however, an 
appropriate remedy where the validity of an adjudication . . . 
in an individual case is being challenged.  There relief in the 
nature of certiorari is to be sought."  (Citation omitted.)  
Averett v. Commissioner of Correction, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 280, 
287 (1988), S.C., Averett, petitioner, 404 Mass. 28 (1989).  See 
Grady v. Commissioner of Correction, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 126, 135-
136 (2013).  As discussed, the type of limited judicial review 
contemplated would focus on the parole determinations relating 
to a particular juvenile homicide offender.  It thus falls into 
the category of cases appropriate for certiorari review. 
 
The standard of review to be applied is a separate 
question, because the "standard of review for an action in the 
33 
 
nature of certiorari depends on 'the nature of the action sought 
to be reviewed.'"  Rivas v. Chelsea Hous. Auth., 464 Mass. 329, 
334 (2013), quoting Black Rose, Inc. v. Boston, 433 Mass. 501, 
503 (2001).  See G. L. c. 249, § 4.  Because the decision 
whether to grant parole to a particular juvenile homicide 
offender is a discretionary determination by the board, see 
Cole, 468 Mass. at 302; G. L. c. 127, § 130, an abuse of 
discretion standard is appropriate.  See Forsyth Sch. for Dental 
Hygienists v. Board of Registration in Dentistry, 404 Mass. 211, 
217 (1989) (review of discretionary administration or decision 
in certiorari action limited to whether act or decision was 
"arbitrary and capricious"); Doucette, 86 Mass. App. Ct. at 541.  
See generally L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 
(2014).  The question for the reviewing judge will be whether 
the board abused its discretion in the manner in which it 
considered and dealt with "the distinctive attributes of youth 
[that] diminish the penological justifications for imposing the 
harshest sentences on juvenile offenders," as they relate to the 
particular circumstances of the juvenile homicide offender 
seeking parole.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.  Accord Diatchenko 
I, 466 Mass. at 671.  In this context, a denial of a parole 
application by the board will constitute an abuse of discretion 
only if the board essentially failed to take these factors into 
account, or did so in a cursory way.  A judge may not reverse a 
34 
 
decision by the board denying a juvenile homicide offender 
parole and require that parole be granted.  Rather, if the judge 
concludes that the board's consideration of the juvenile 
offender's status as a juvenile and the distinctive attributes 
of his or her youth did constitute an abuse of discretion -- was 
arbitrary and capricious -- a remand to the board for rehearing 
would be appropriate.33 
 
It remains for us to address Diatchenko's argument that 
juvenile homicide offenders seeking review of a parole denial 
should be able to bring an action for certiorari to a single 
justice of this court as a matter of course.  Although this 
court and the Superior Court have concurrent jurisdiction to 
entertain actions in the nature of certiorari under G. L. 
c. 249, § 4, as with most original actions for certiorari, these 
actions are most appropriately brought in the Superior Court. 
 
Finally, we summarize the scope of our opinion in this 
case, and clarify what the opinion does not say.  First, we 
                     
 
33 Justice Spina, in his dissent, expresses concern that 
without the affirmative power to grant parole after a denial by 
the board, this limited form of judicial review has the 
potential to result in an endless cycle of board hearings and 
actions for certiorari, until the board ultimately grants 
parole.  See post at    .  This outcome is unlikely.  Given the 
limited scope of judicial review in this context, and the 
deference that must be afforded to the board, we think decisions 
to vacate a parole denial will be rare; moreover, should that 
occur, we assume that at a new hearing, the board will remedy 
the error or errors that caused the matter to be remanded. 
35 
 
consider here only the initial parole hearing available to 
juvenile homicide offenders.  For the reasons discussed supra, 
the procedural protections of representation by counsel and the 
opportunity to obtain expert assistance in connection with that 
initial parole hearing are necessary for such offenders in light 
of their mandatory life sentences and the constitutional 
requirement of proportionality in sentencing.  See Diatchenko I, 
466 Mass. at 669-671; id. at 675 (Lenk, J., concurring).  In 
Commonwealth v. Okoro, post     ,     (2015), also decided 
today, and for the same reasons, we afford the same procedural 
protections to juvenile offenders convicted of murder in the 
second degree, who also are subject to mandatory life sentences 
with eligibility for parole.  Nothing in this opinion, however, 
is intended to suggest that any other class of offenders is also 
entitled to these protections in connection with the parole 
hearing process. 
 
Second, in affording juvenile homicide offenders the 
procedural protections at issue here, we emphasize that the 
determination whether to grant a parole application of an 
individual juvenile homicide offender is, and remains, a 
discretionary decision for the board to make.  As previously 
noted, that standard is governed by G. L. c. 127, § 130, which 
prohibits a prisoner from receiving parole unless the board 
concludes that if the prisoner is released, "the prisoner will 
36 
 
live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that 
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society." 
Third, and relatedly, the board remains fully authorized to 
determine, consistent with legislative mandates,34 the rules and 
procedures it deems appropriate for the conduct of its parole 
hearings, and free to reach whatever decision in each case it 
deems appropriate.  The dissents suggest that in establishing 
minimal requirements of due process for juvenile homicide 
offenders in their parole hearings, the court interferes 
unnecessarily and improperly with the operations of the parole 
board, an executive agency, trenching on principles of 
separation of powers.  Post at    ,    .  Our decision does not 
commit this offense.  Insofar as we conclude that the provision 
of counsel and of funds for expert witnesses is required for 
juvenile homicide offenders, these are procedures whose sole 
purpose is to protect the constitutional entitlement that these 
juvenile offenders have to a meaningful opportunity for parole 
release.35  Finally, the limited judicial review provided here 
does not authorize judges to substitute their judgment with 
respect to the parole release decision for the board's.  As 
                     
34 See, e.g., G. L. c. 127, §§ 130, 133A. 
 
35 As we have noted, see note 17, supra, the chair of the 
board and the commissioner recognize "certain benefits 
flow[ing]" from these procedures, and do not view them as 
interfering with the board's authority. 
37 
 
discussed, the judiciary's only role in these cases will be to 
ensure that the board's determination whether to grant or deny 
parole to a juvenile homicide offender is "constitutionally 
exercised," Cole, 468 Mass. at 302, in the sense that the board 
properly has taken into account the offender's status as a child 
when the crime was committed. 
 
4.  Applicability of this decision.  Diatchenko and Roberio 
appear to confine their requests to the limited group of 
individuals who were convicted of murder in the first degree and 
sentenced to mandatory life without parole prior to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Miller, and who became eligible for parole 
pursuant to this court's decision in Diatchenko I.  We do not 
share the view that the decision in this case applies only to 
that limited group.  Rather, it applies more generally to all 
juvenile offenders convicted of murder. 
 
5.  Conclusion.  The matter is remanded to the county 
court, where the single justice will enter a judgment consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
SPINA, J. (dissenting, with whom Cordy, J., joins).  I 
respectfully dissent from the decision of the court today.  The 
court has misconstrued Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the 
Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 674 (2013) (Diatchenko I), which 
required only a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release" in 
the form of a parole hearing for juveniles convicted of murder 
in the first degree.  The court instead has created a path by 
which such an offender may obtain, as of right, access to 
counsel, funds for expert witnesses, and, if denied parole, 
judicial review of the decision of the parole board (board).  
The solution at which the court arrives today ignores previous 
statements of the law on this matter.  Our decision in 
Diatchenko I did not create a significant liberty interest in 
the outcome of the parole hearing.  Diatchenko I stood solely 
for the proposition that the exception to parole eligibility in 
G. L. c. 127, § 133A, no longer applies to Gregory Diatchenko 
and Jeffrey S. Roberio and left the remainder of the statutory 
scheme unchanged.  That statutory scheme continues to apply 
unaltered to them and similarly situated inmates. 
 
1.  Meaningful opportunity.  In Diatchenko I, we addressed 
the United States Supreme Court's holding in Miller v. Alabama, 
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), that juveniles convicted of murder in 
the first degree could no longer receive life sentences without 
2 
 
the possibility of parole unless a court determined they were 
incorrigible.  We adopted the language in Miller, first 
expressed in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010), that a 
juvenile offender receiving a life sentence must receive "some 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation."  Inherent in this line of cases is 
the judicial recognition that "children are constitutionally 
different from adults for purposes of sentencing."  Diatchenko 
I, 466 Mass. at 670, quoting Miller, supra at 2464.  The Supreme 
Court reasoned that a sentence of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole removes any penological justification for 
the sentence because it "forswears altogether the rehabilitative 
ideal."  Graham, supra at 74. 
 
The court says "the meaningful opportunity for release 
through parole is necessary in order to conform the juvenile 
homicide offender's mandatory life sentence to the requirements 
of art. 26 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights]."  Ante 
at    .  I agree.  After Diatchenko I, a juvenile convicted of 
murder in the first degree, like every juvenile who is sentenced 
to incarceration, is eligible for parole, whereas before such a 
juvenile was not.  The thrust of Diatchenko I was an expectation 
of parole eligibility, and no more. 
 
The court improperly synthesizes two premises to arrive at 
a more significant but now constitutionally untenable 
3 
 
conclusion.  The court correctly recognizes that (1) children 
are "constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 
sentencing" and (2) that a life sentence for a juvenile 
convicted of murder in the first degree is cruel and unusual 
under art. 26 without a meaningful opportunity for release 
through a demonstration of rehabilitation.  Fusing these 
propositions together, the court concludes that the "meaningful 
opportunity" for release for juveniles convicted of murder in 
the first degree has a "constitutional dimension" that exists 
for no others and requires "additional procedural protections."  
Ante at    & n.14.  This conclusion is erroneous because the 
court applies the first premise to the second when, in fact, the 
second premise flows from the first. 
 
The court states that other sentences, except life 
sentences for juveniles convicted of murder in the first degree, 
"include parole eligibility."  Ante at    .  The opposite is 
true.  Parole is an executive action separate and distinct from 
a judicial sentence.  See Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 
302 (2014) ("[The granting of parole] is a function of the 
executive branch of government with which, if otherwise 
constitutionally exercised, the judiciary may not interfere").  
Cf. Simms v. State, 65 Md. App. 685, 689 (1986) ("A parole is an 
act of executive clemency.  It does not involve the sentencing 
function or any other judicial function").  Cf. also Knight v. 
4 
 
United States, 73 F.3d 117, 119 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
519 U.S. 827 (1996) ("Parole is an extension of the 
[c]onstitutional grant of clemency power given to the 
President"); State v. Hewett, 270 N.C. 348, 352 (1967) 
("Probation relates to judicial action taken before the prison 
door is closed, whereas parole relates to executive action taken 
after the door has closed on a convict").  Were Massachusetts to 
abandon its system of parole, art. 26 would only require that 
juveniles convicted of murder in the first degree -- and thus 
sentenced to life -- be afforded some opportunity for release 
from imprisonment through a demonstration of rehabilitation, the 
only constitutionally available penological justification for 
the State's harshest penalty.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 ("this 
mandatory punishment [of life without parole] disregards the 
possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most 
suggest it").  In such a hypothetical scenario, art. 26 would 
not require parole for any juvenile sentenced to a term of years 
because that sentence -- or any other lesser sentence -- has a 
penological justification other than rehabilitation.  See id. at 
2465-2466 (outlining penological justifications of sentences as 
applied to juveniles). 
 
In constitutionally guaranteeing that juveniles convicted 
of murder in the first degree are eligible for parole, we have 
already previously respected juveniles' constitutional 
5 
 
distinctiveness from adults convicted of murder in the first 
degree by the imposition of a sentence that is not cruel and 
unusual.  By imposing today these additional procedural 
protections, the court reaches beyond the judicial function of 
sentencing to regulate the conduct of the initial parole hearing 
itself, the manifestation of the executive prerogative to 
execute the sentence.  In so doing, the court transforms the 
conduct of the parole hearing into part of the sentencing 
process, at least for juveniles convicted of murder in the first 
degree, and implicates the action of the board in the sentence 
itself. 
 
The Legislature never intended such a relationship between 
sentence and parole.  Moreover, it is something that we 
expressly said in Cole, 468 Mass. at 302, is forbidden, because 
sentencing is "a quintessential judicial power."  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 461 Mass. 256, 264 (2012).  In Cole, 
we held that the executive branch's imposition of punishments 
under G. L. c. 127, § 133D (c), against those who violated 
community parole supervision for life improperly interfered with 
the judicial power to impose a sentence.  Cole, supra.  Today we 
are dealing with the opposite scenario, in which the court 
subsumes the executive power to regulate the conduct of a parole 
hearing into part of the sentencing process. 
6 
 
 
If the court's decision should be considered not to have 
rendered the conduct of the initial parole hearing of a juvenile 
convicted of murder in the first degree part of the sentencing 
process, then the court's justification for "additional 
procedural protections" in such a hearing fails because 
"children are constitutionally different from adults for 
purposes of sentencing" (emphasis added).  Diatchenko I, 466 
Mass. at 670, quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.  Parole is not 
part of the sentencing process and thus the parole hearing need 
not recognize the difference between children and adults for 
purposes of art. 26. 
 
The Supreme Court specifically identified traditional 
parole hearings as capable of providing that "meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release."  Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.  In 
both Graham and Miller, the Court even went so far as to 
explicitly state that "a State is not required to guarantee 
eventual freedom."  Miller 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Graham, supra.  
The term "meaningful opportunity" was a warning that the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution "forbid[s] States 
from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders 
never will be fit to reenter society" (emphasis added).  Graham, 
supra.  "The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility 
that [a juvenile convicted of murder in the first degree] will 
remain behind bars for life."  Id.  Read together these cases 
7 
 
stand for the proposition that Diatchenko and Roberio, and 
similarly situated inmates, must be afforded a standard parole 
hearing, and by implication, this hearing will provide these 
individuals with the "meaningful opportunity" of release. 
 
This warning is in congruence with the Court's previous 
statements that "no constitutional or inherent right of a 
convicted person to be conditionally released before the 
expiration of a valid sentence" exists.  Greenholtz v. Inmates 
of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).  
Accord Quegan v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 423 Mass. 834, 836 
(1996).  Indeed, in Diatchenko I we recognized that "[o]ur 
decision should not be construed to suggest that individuals who 
are under the age of eighteen when they commit murder in the 
first degree necessarily should be paroled once they have served 
a statutorily designated portion of their sentences."  
Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 674.  These statements cannot be 
reconciled with the court's reasoning today that the "process" 
of the initial parole hearing of a juvenile convicted of murder 
in the first degree "takes on a different constitutional 
dimension that does not exist for other offenders whose 
sentences include parole eligibility."  Ante at     . 
 
Absent the recognition of a new liberty interest in the 
outcome of parole, the court does not explain the constitutional 
necessity of these additional protections but simply inserts a 
8 
 
new "constitutional dimension."  This "constitutional dimension" 
identified by the court is the foundation for the new 
constitutional rule that juveniles convicted of murder in the 
first degree require different procedural protections from those 
given to other offenders.  The court provides juveniles under a 
mandatory life sentences with enhanced procedures that no others 
receive, yet there has been no suggestion that the parole 
hearing others receive falls short of a meaningful opportunity.  
We have never previously stated or hinted at such a difference 
in procedural safeguards.  In Diatchenko I, we determined that 
the appropriate remedy to the defendant's challenge under Miller 
was to leave intact as much of the statutory scheme designed by 
the Legislature as possible, so far as it remained 
constitutional.  Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 673.  Accordingly, 
we struck down only the provision making juveniles ineligible 
for parole and let the remaining provisions of the statute 
stand.  Id.  In Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676 (2013), and 
Commonwealth v. Ray, 467 Mass. 115 (2014), we affirmed our 
intent to interfere with the enacted legislation as little as 
possible and do nothing more than invalidate the exception for 
parole eligibility. 
 
In Brown, this court held that the rules of severability 
require trial judges to apply the parole statute as written with 
the exclusion of the one unconstitutional provision.  Brown, 466 
9 
 
Mass. at 680.  In so doing, this court upheld the trial judge's 
decision to impose "as much of the sentencing scheme set forth 
in [the statute] as would be permissible in light of Miller's 
prohibition against mandatory sentences of life without parole 
for juveniles."  Id.  We would not have instructed trial judges 
to apply the statute in a manner that preserved as much of the 
expressed intent of the Legislature as possible if we intended 
to create a process different from that provided for in the 
then-existing statutory scheme. 
 
More recently, in Ray, we expressed a view that the normal 
procedures governing consideration of parole release would apply 
to juveniles convicted of murder in the first degree.  Ray, 467 
Mass. at 139-140.  "Pursuant to our holding in Diatchenko, . . . 
the defendant's life sentence remains in force, but the 
exception in G. L. c. 265, § 2, rendering him ineligible for 
parole, no longer applies.  The defendant is eligible for parole 
in accordance with the terms of G. L. c. 127, § 133A."  Id.  See 
Commonwealth v. Keo, 467 Mass. 25, 47 (2014) ("the lesser 
punishment under G. L. c. 265, § 2, of mandatory life in prison 
with the possibility of parole, set pursuant to the parole 
eligibility statute in effect at the time of the juvenile 
offender's crime, would apply").  This language strongly 
suggests that the court intended for the remainder of the 
statutory scheme to apply to Diatchenko and Roberio and that 
10 
 
they are entitled only to the same parole hearing process as 
other inmates. 
 
Undoubtedly, Diatchenko and Roberio have a right to a 
"hearing that shall afford [them] a meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release," Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 674, but only via 
the same processes and established procedures that all other 
inmates serving life sentences have, and not through a new 
liberty interest in parole with accompanying greater 
constitutional protections.  The court today seemingly "ignores 
the distinction, adopted by the Supreme Court, between 
[potentially] being deprived of a liberty that one already has 
and being denied a conditional liberty that one desires."  
Greenman v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 405 Mass. 384, 388 n.3 
(1989). 
 
Moreover, in Diatchenko I, we outlined the process 
necessary to afford a juvenile convicted of murder in the first 
degree such a "meaningful opportunity," saying only that 
"it is the purview of the Massachusetts parole board to 
evaluate the circumstances surrounding the commission of 
the crime, including the age of the offender, together with 
all relevant information pertaining to the offender's 
character and actions during the intervening years since 
conviction.  By this process, a juvenile homicide offender 
will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be considered 
for parole suitability." 
11 
 
466 Mass. at 674.1  We did not hold that the Massachusetts 
Constitution requires a new kind of parole hearing; and we said 
nothing about changing the standard process in any respect (much 
less requiring appointed counsel or granting funds for expert 
testimony) in order for the juvenile offender to obtain his 
"meaningful opportunity."  Instead, we said that a process that 
considers the above mentioned factors provides juvenile 
offenders with a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release." 
 
This understanding is in line with decisions of 
Massachusetts and Federal courts that have long held that the 
possible release arising under the parole statute does not 
create a liberty interest in parole.  See Greenman, 405 Mass. at 
388 n.3 ("The individual characteristics of the Massachusetts 
statutory parole scheme do not give rise to a liberty interest 
under Federal law").  See also Doe v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 
82 Mass. App. Ct. 851, 858 (2012) ("A prisoner in the 
Commonwealth does not have a liberty interest in the future 
                     
 
1 The parole board (board) updated its "Guidelines for Life 
Sentence Decisions," available at http://www.mass.gov/eopss/ 
agencies/parole-board/guidelines-for-life-sentence-
decisions.html [http://perma.cc/K33ZYSEA], most recently on 
March 3, 2014.  These guidelines reflect the mandates of our 
decision in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk 
Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (2013) (Diatchenko I), specifically 
providing that "an inmate who committed the offense as a 
juvenile will be evaluated with recognition of the distinctive 
attributes of youth, including immaturity, impetuosity, and a 
failure to appreciate risks and consequences." 
12 
 
grant of parole"); Lynch v. Hubbard, 47 F. Supp. 2d 125, 127-128 
(D. Mass. 1999) (Massachusetts parole statute's negative 
phrasing prevents an expectation or presumption of release).  
Essentially, under G. L. c. 127, § 133A, Diatchenko and Roberio 
do not have an expectation or presumption of release and 
Diatchenko I did nothing to overtly change the statutory scheme.  
If we had intended to create an entirely new liberty interest in 
parole where there had been none previously, we would have 
explicitly said so.  We did not, and Diatchenko I did not create 
a liberty interest in parole for juveniles convicted of murder 
in the first degree. 
 
2.  Right to counsel.  The court concludes that juveniles 
convicted of murder in the first degree who seek parole 
constitutionally are entitled to representation by counsel 
because a parole hearing is a contested, complex proceeding 
similar to that involving the termination of parental rights.  
Therefore, because juveniles convicted of murder in the first 
degree -- imprisoned at a young age -- are unlikely to advocate 
as fully as possible for themselves and a parole hearing is 
similar to a proceeding terminating parental rights, the court 
concludes that constitutionally guaranteed access to counsel 
best ensures that the parole hearing is a "meaningful 
opportunity."  I disagree. 
13 
 
 
The court's analogy between parental right termination 
proceedings and parole hearings does not withstand closer 
scrutiny.  The proceedings we examined in Department of Pub. 
Welfare v. J.K.B., 379 Mass. 1 (1979), can result in the loss of 
rights to conceive and raise one's children -- rights that are 
"essential . . . basic civil rights of man . . . far more 
precious . . . than property rights."  Id. at 3, quoting Stanley 
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).  In J.K.B., supra at 4, 
we affirmed that one cannot lose a right without due process, 
and we ensured that due process be observed by access to counsel 
for indigent parents.  Parole hearings, however, do not result 
in the loss of any rights.  As explained above, an expectation 
of parole simply does not exist in these proceedings and our 
decision in Diatchenko I has not changed that fact.2  Without an 
                     
 
2 The court's acknowledgment that Quegan v. Massachusetts 
Parole Bd., 423 Mass. 834, 840 (1996), contradicts its proposed 
funding mechanism and its rationalization that a juvenile 
convicted of murder in the first degree is entitled to 
representation "thus required by law" stems from characterizing 
the plaintiff in Quegan as "a prisoner seeking parole who had no 
constitutionally protected interest that entitled him to any due 
process protections."  Ante at    n.20.  The only reason Quegan 
contradicts the court's conclusion that G. L. c. 211D, § 5, is 
the appropriate authorization mechanism is because the court 
baldly asserts that the class of inmates at issue requires a 
different sort of parole hearing with additional procedural 
protections from a hearing available to any other class applying 
for parole.  Juveniles convicted of murder in the first degree 
do not merit anything more than a chance to appear before the 
board in the same manner as other inmates do.  To grant them 
greater protection creates a perverse incentive. 
14 
 
expectation of parole, a juvenile convicted of murder in the 
first degree has no protected liberty interest, or right, to 
lose.3 
 
Our decision in Diatchenko I did not suggest that the 
current parole process did not adequately provide a "meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release."  We most certainly did not 
suggest that publicly funded counsel is necessary to protect 
one's interest in a fair hearing.  The right to counsel based in 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not 
traditionally have an application to parole hearings.  The 
United States Supreme Court explicitly noted that the right to 
counsel does not extend to postconviction collateral 
proceedings, see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 
(1963), and that "[i]n the context of parole . . . the 
procedures required are minimal."  Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. 
Ct. 859, 862 (2011). 
                     
 
3 We also consistently have held in our cases dealing with 
postconviction rights in other contexts that a defendant is not 
entitled to a full array of due process.  See Commonwealth v. 
Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 569 (2003) (no right to public funds to 
obtain postconviction relief); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 430 
Mass. 260, 264 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1194 (2000) (no 
absolute right to counsel in moving for new trial); Commonwealth 
v. Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 263-264 (1983) (no absolute right 
to appointed counsel in obtaining postconviction relief under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 [2001]). 
15 
 
 
We consistently have rejected claims that an inmate is 
entitled to counsel at parole hearings.  See Cole, 468 Mass. at 
306; Quegan v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 423 Mass. 834, 840 
(1996) (no right to representation before board unless there is 
independent and pending criminal proceeding that could be 
affected by parole proceedings).4  Parole is not a part of the 
criminal prosecution or the adversarial process, but rather 
arises subsequently and is supervised by an executive 
administrative agency rather than the court.  Because parole is 
separate and apart from criminal proceedings for those convicted 
of murder in the first degree as juveniles, the full breadth of 
due process rights, including the right to counsel, does not 
apply during such hearings. 
 
Further, at this juncture, Diatchenko and Roberio have not 
made a sufficient showing that the parole hearing process 
available to them is inadequate or that the unique skills of a 
lawyer are necessary in order to have a "meaningful opportunity 
to obtain release."  This is particularly so given that the 
                     
 
4 Courts in other jurisdictions similarly have rejected 
claims that an inmate is entitled to counsel at parole release 
hearings.  See Warren v. United States Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 
183, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Holup v. Gates, 544 F.2d 82, 85 (2d 
Cir. 1976); Bearden v. South Carolina, 443 F.2d 1090, 1095 (4th 
Cir. 1971).  Hawaii is the only State to grant a right to 
counsel at parole release and review hearings by statute.  Haw. 
Rev. Stat. § 706-670(3)(b), (c).  Should the Massachusetts 
Legislature take similar action, the debate here would be moot. 
16 
 
current parole process requires the board to consider the 
circumstances of the crime, including whether Diatchenko and 
Roberio were juveniles at its commission, and whether they have 
been rehabilitated.  Additionally, numerous inmates convicted of 
murder in the second degree as juveniles have been paroled after 
release hearings conducted without the aid of appointed counsel.  
While "lifer hearings" certainly require considerable 
preparation, the board is not called upon to resolve disputed 
issues of fact, strict rules of evidence do not apply, and 
witnesses need not be subjected to cross-examination. 
 
The court maintains that an attorney is needed to collect 
materials pertaining to a juvenile homicide offender's criminal 
history and personal development after conviction.  However, at 
the time of a parole hearing, the factual record in these cases 
already has been well established either in a trial transcript 
or in a decision of this court.  Additionally, the Department of 
Correction (department) keeps a historical record containing 
detailed medical, psychiatric, and disciplinary records in each 
inmate's six-part folder.  103 Code Mass. Regs. § 155.07 (2014).  
These records are available to Diatchenko and Roberio before 
their hearings and to the board for review.5  See G. L. c. 127, 
                     
 
5 The court highlights that an inmate's access to this 
information may be restricted.  Ante at    .  The issue of what 
may or may not be restricted in these circumstances is best left 
 
17 
 
§ 135; 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 157.08 (2005); 120 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 300.05(1)(i) (1997).  Finally, and notably, the court 
does not suggest that the statutory standard for granting parole 
or the requirements for membership to the board are 
unconstitutional. 
 
3.  Expert witness funds.  The court also concludes that a 
parole-eligible juvenile convicted of murder in the first degree 
may petition a Superior Court judge to authorize the payment of 
fees to retain an expert witness to explain effectively "the 
effects of the individual's neurobiological immaturity and other 
personal circumstances at the time of the crime, and how this 
information relates to the individual's present capacity and 
future risk of reoffending."  Ante at    .  The majority derives 
this right from the same mistaken interpretation that a 
"meaningful opportunity" of parole grants juveniles convicted of 
murder in the first degree more rights in a parole hearing than 
any other class of inmate.  For substantially the same reasons 
that a juvenile convicted of murder in the first degree is not 
guaranteed access to counsel, neither is he or she guaranteed 
access to funds for expert witness testimony. 
                                                                  
to another day, but I note that the Department of Correction 
must "make every effort to disclose all evaluative information 
which is reasonably segregable from" certain enumerated 
categories to an inmate.  103 Code Mass. Regs. § 157.08(4) 
(2005). 
18 
 
 
The power to allocate and direct public funding among 
competing public purposes is traditionally within the purview of 
the Legislature.  See Opinion of the Justices, 430 Mass. 1201, 
1202 (1999); County of Barnstable v. Commonwealth, 422 Mass. 33, 
45 (1996).  The court construes G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A-27G, as 
authorizing the expenditure of public funds because the parole 
hearing at issue is constitutionally mandated.  Ante at    .  
For support, the court cites our cases that guaranteed 
"meaningful access to whatever postconviction proceedings the 
State makes available" for indigent defendants who sought 
postconviction relief.  Ante at    , citing Commonwealth v. 
Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 261-262 (1983).  At issue in Conceicao 
was the question whether "meaningful access" included access to 
counsel as of right.  Id. at 258.  We concluded that the 
decision to grant access to counsel for the preparation of a 
motion for a new trial was within the discretion of the motion 
judge.  Id. at 262.  We recommended counsel only in the event 
the defendant demonstrated a colorable or meritorious issue.  
Id.  Importantly, we recognized that not every inmate need be 
placed on exactly the same footing as any other by providing 
counsel in order to guarantee meaningful access.  Id. at 261. 
 
General Laws c. 261, § 27C (4), echoes the legislative 
acknowledgment that "meaningful access" does not necessarily 
require the blanket authorization of public funds in support of 
19 
 
a defendant's efforts following his direct appeal.  This section 
authorizes provision of public funds needed by an indigent 
applicant for an "effective . . . prosecution, defense or 
appeal."  Yet funds under the statute are generally not 
available to support a defendant's effort to obtain 
postconviction relief, because those proceedings are not a part 
of the prosecution, defense, or appeal.  See Commonwealth v. 
Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 569 (2003). 
 
Finally, according to its enabling statute, members of the 
board must come from a diverse background, including the fields 
of psychology or psychiatry.  G. L. c. 27, § 4.  Additionally, 
at least one member of the board must now have experience in 
forensic psychology, St. 2014, c. 189 (1), and the board must 
consider scientific and technical factors at its hearings.  The 
board now is obligated to consider youth-related factors in 
order to fulfil the mandates of both Miller and Diatchenko.6  
These requirements assist in ensuring that Diatchenko's and 
Roberio's hearings provide a truly "meaningful opportunity" for 
release, without a need for their own experts. 
 
4.  Certiorari.  The court today establishes judicial 
review of the denial of parole to a juvenile convicted of murder 
in the first degree through an action for certiorari.  
                     
 
6 As noted previously, the board has updated its guidelines 
to reflect our decision in Diatchenko I.  See note 1, supra. 
20 
 
Certiorari is available when there is "(1) a judicial or quasi-
judicial proceeding, (2) from which there is no other reasonably 
adequate remedy, and (3) a substantial injury or injustice 
arising from the proceeding under review."  Indeck v. Clients' 
Sec. Bd., 450 Mass. 379, 385 (2008).  Such review conflicts with 
our previous understanding of the separation of powers enshrined 
in art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  "The 
granting of parole, or conditional release from confinement, is 
a discretionary act of the parole board" and "is a function of 
the executive branch of government with which, if otherwise 
constitutionally exercised, the judiciary may not interfere."  
Cole, 468 Mass. at 302.  See Stewart v. Commonwealth, 413 Mass. 
664, 669 (1992).  We previously have stated that a statute that 
"impermissibly allocates a power held by only one branch to 
another" violates art. 30.  Cole, supra.  Today's holding 
violates art. 30 because it permits a judge to "nullify the 
discretionary actions of the parole board."  Commonwealth v. 
Amirault, 415 Mass. 112, 116-117 (1993).  Accord Woods v. State 
Bd. of Parole, 351 Mass. 556, 559 (1967) ("Even by a writ of 
mandamus, the board may be required merely to consider a 
prisoner's petition for parole.  The board may not be required 
to exercise any discretion for the benefit of a prisoner"). 
 
As detailed above, Diatchenko I did not create any 
additional rights for a juvenile convicted of murder in the 
21 
 
first degree more expansive than those possessed by any other 
class of inmate.  The use of certiorari to ensure that a parole 
hearing provides a "meaningful opportunity" for release ignores 
the existence of a "reasonably adequate remedy."  Indeck, 450 
Mass. at 385.  An inmate may seek relief from decisions of the 
board by means of an action for declaratory relief under G. L. 
c. 231A.  See Gangi v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 468 Mass. 323, 
324 (2014); Massachusetts Parole Bd. v. Brusgulis, 403 Mass. 
1010, 1011 (1989).  Chapter 231A provides inmates with the 
opportunity to challenge the "practices or procedures [of the 
board] . . . alleged to be in violation of the Constitution of 
the United States or of the constitution or laws of the 
commonwealth."  G. L. c. 231A, § 2.  Accordingly, Diatchenko, 
Roberio, and similarly situated inmates may contest the board's 
practices that fail to consider the unique characteristics of 
juvenile offenders as well as displayed growth and change from 
adolescence, as required by Diatchenko I. 
 
Certiorari is limited to correcting substantial errors of 
law that affect material rights and are apparent on the record.  
Gloucester v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 408 Mass. 292, 297 (1990).  
The only material right at stake to juveniles convicted of 
murder in the first degree is the expectation of parole 
eligibility, not the substance of the board's decision.  
Moreover, the use of certiorari permits the reviewing court only 
22 
 
to affirm or set aside a decision of the tribunal whose actions 
are under review.  Commonwealth v. Ellis, 11 Mass. 462, 466 
(1814) ("this Court . . . can only affirm the proceedings . . . 
or quash them"); Commonwealth v. Blue-Hill Turnpike Corp., 5 
Mass. 420, 423 (1809) ("on certiorari we can enter no new 
judgment"); Melvin v. Bridge, 3 Mass. 305, 306 (1807) ("If the 
Court were to consider these proceedings as certified on a 
certiorari, the plaintiff in error could not be relieved, as a 
judgment for costs could not be rendered, but only the 
proceedings affirmed or quashed").  Consequently, lacking any 
affirmative power, a court could only set aside a decision of 
the board and then remand the matter to the board, a process 
that could be repeated ad infinitum until the board grants 
parole.  See Woods, 351 Mass. at 559.  Not only are courts ill-
equipped to decide whether parole should be granted, but such a 
decision -- both historically and legally -- has been reserved 
for the executive branch. 
 
The court notes that judicial review by an action for 
certiorari would not encompass whether a particular juvenile 
convicted of murder in the first degree is entitled to release 
on parole but rather would be limited to the question whether 
the board has "constitutionally exercised" its discretion.  Ante 
at     n.16, citing Cole, 468 Mass. at 302.  If the reviewing 
judge is not concerned with the individual outcome of the matter 
23 
 
before him or her, then the judge is by default only reviewing 
the procedure of that matter.  "[A] complaint for declaratory 
relief is an appropriate way of testing the validity of 
regulations or the propriety of practices involving violations 
of rights, which are consistent and repeated in nature."  Nelson 
v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 379, 388 n.12 (1983).  
This mechanism has been utilized in previous challenges to the 
procedures by which the board exercises its discretion.  See 
Quegan, 423 Mass. at 835; Blake v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 369 
Mass. 701, 702-703 (1976). 
 
The court -- and Diatchenko and Roberio -- do not contend 
that the board has failed in this respect such that a request 
for declaratory relief is warranted at this time.  Importantly, 
the review process for granting parole is currently based on 
comprehensive, individualized assessments.  In determining 
whether a particular inmate is suitable for parole, the board is 
charged by statute with ascertaining the extent to which the 
inmate has been rehabilitated, and the extent to which, if 
released, he or she would pose a risk to the community.7  See 
                     
 
7 "Decisions of the Executive Branch, however serious their 
impact, do not automatically invoke due process protection; 
there simply is no constitutional guarantee that all executive 
decisionmaking must comply with standards that assure error-free 
determinations."  Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & 
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).  "[T]he state may be 
specific or general in defining the conditions for release and 
 
24 
 
G. L. c. 127, § 130.  The board performs a "risk and needs 
assessment" as well.  Id.  In so doing, it has the authority to 
review and evaluate an inmate's entire record.  See Greenman, 
405 Mass. at 387.  As required by statute, the board must be 
provided with the complete criminal record of the inmate as well 
as reports on the inmate's social, physical, mental, and 
psychiatric condition and history.  G. L. c. 127, § 135.  
Moreover, in making its determination, the board "shall consider 
whether, during the period of incarceration, the prisoner has 
participated in available work opportunities and education or 
treatment programs and demonstrated good behavior."  G. L. 
c. 127, § 130.  Finally, the board "shall also consider whether 
risk reduction programs, made available through collaboration 
with criminal justice agencies would minimize the probability of 
                                                                  
the factors that should be considered by the parole authority.  
It is thus not surprising that there is no prescribed or defined 
combination of facts which, if shown, would mandate release on 
parole. . . .  In parole releases . . . few certainties exist.  
In each case, the decision differs from the traditional mold of 
judicial decision-making in that the choice involves a synthesis 
of record facts and personal observation filtered through the 
experience of the decision maker and leading to a predictive 
judgment as to what is best both for the individual inmate and 
for the community.  This latter conclusion requires the board to 
assess whether, in light of the nature of the crime, the 
inmate's release will minimize the gravity of the offense, 
weaken the deterrent impact on others, and undermine respect for 
the administration of justice.  The entire inquiry is, in a 
sense, an 'equity' type judgment that cannot always be 
articulated in traditional findings" (footnote omitted).  Id. 
at 8. 
25 
 
the prisoner re-offending once released."  Id.  All inmates are 
provided subsequent parole hearings if parole is initially 
denied.  120 Code Mass. Regs. § 300.01 (1997).  These hearings 
are open to the public and parole-eligible offenders serving 
life sentences are permitted representation by counsel.  120 
Code Mass. Regs. §§ 300.02(2), 300.08 (1997).  Eventually, the 
board's decision becomes a public record.  G. L. c. 127, § 130. 
 
Further, in January, 2014, in response to Miller, the 
Legislature passed "An Act relative to juvenile life sentences 
for first degree murder" (act).  St. 2014, c. 189.  The act 
imposed a series of statutory changes affecting juveniles 
convicted of murder in the first degree including new sentencing 
and parole eligibility standards; mandating that at least one 
member of the board have experience in forensic psychology; 
authorizing the department to provide treatment and programming 
for youthful offenders irrespective of their crimes or duration 
of incarceration; and allowing the placement of qualified 
youthful offenders in a minimum security correctional facility, 
irrespective of their life sentence.  The act further 
established a commission to 
"study and determine the usefulness and practicality of 
creating a developmental evaluation process for all cases 
of first degree murder committed by a juvenile [between the 
ages of fourteen and eighteen].  The evaluation process 
shall determine the developmental progress and abilities of 
the juvenile offender at the time of sentencing and parole 
eligibility and the parole board shall utilize the 
26 
 
evaluation process for future parole decisions regarding 
the juvenile offender." 
 
 
In addition, the board, on its own initiative, amended its 
"Guidelines for Life Sentence Decisions" (guidelines) in light 
of Diatchenko I, requiring consideration of age-related factors 
in all parole cases involving juveniles convicted of murder in 
the first degree and incorporating the specific factors that the 
concurring justices considered when evaluating parole 
suitability for such individuals.  See note 1, supra.  
Accordingly, inmates like the defendant now must be "evaluated 
with recognition of the distinctive attributes of youth, 
including immaturity, impetuosity, and a failure to appreciate 
risks and consequences."  See Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 675 
(Lenk, J., concurring).  The guidelines now provide that the 
board can and should consider, among other things, the specific 
facts of the crime and rehabilitation.  Finally, in determining 
whether the inmate has been rehabilitated, the guidelines 
provide that the board shall consider his or her conduct while 
incarcerated. 
 
Had this court intended to directly oversee the board's 
consideration of parole, we would have specifically provided 
guidance concerning the proper balance of the necessary factors 
or when to find that parole is warranted.  Yet, we declined to 
do so, specifically holding that it was in the board's "purview" 
27 
 
to evaluate the unique circumstances and conditions of the 
defendant.  Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 674.  See Doe v. 
Massachusetts Parole Bd., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 851, 861 (2012).  
This the board has done by revising its guidelines.  
Accordingly, a complaint for declaratory relief remains the best 
manner to ensure the meaningfulness of parole hearings by 
allowing challenges to procedural elements of these hearings 
such as the guidelines.  See Nelson, 390 Mass. at 388 n.12.  
There has been no showing that declaratory relief would be 
appropriate at this time. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
CORDY, J. (dissenting, with whom Spina, J., joins).  I join 
and agree completely with Justice Spina's dissent.  I write 
separately only to underscore my strongly held view that the 
judicial branch should not intrude on what is plainly an 
executive branch function in the absence of a showing that that 
branch has failed to fulfil its legal or constitutional 
obligations.  There is not a hint of such a showing in this 
case.  To the contrary, all indicators of executive branch 
intentions support the conclusion that "meaningful 
opportunit[ies] to obtain release" on parole have been and will 
continue to be provided to individuals serving life sentences 
for murders they committed when they were juveniles.  There is 
no demonstrated need for the court to construct and order funded 
a special parole and appellate process for such prisoners.1 
 
While the directives in the court's ruling regarding 
counsel, appeals, and the funding of experts may seem relatively 
benign to some, in unnecessarily intruding on the functions of 
another branch the court steps over the line that separates the 
powers accorded to each in our constitutional structure -- a 
separation we have proudly proclaimed as a necessary element of 
a constitutional democracy that ensures our government shall be 
                     
 
1 Indeed, as the court's opinion has noted, Gregory 
Diatchenko already has been granted parole. 
2 
 
one of laws and not of men.2  In doing so, the court also fails 
to accord the other branches the respect necessary to the proper 
functioning of a government where each has its own 
constitutional responsibilities.  While the role of the 
judiciary may often include being a check on the other branches 
when they exceed or fail in the execution of those 
responsibilities, it is distinctly not to exercise them.3  
Although we occasionally declare that the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights creates certain duties in other branches, 
such as ensuring a meaningful opportunity for release on parole, 
we leave it to those branches "to define the precise nature of 
the task[s] which they face in fulfilling" those duties.  
McDuffy v. Secretary of the Exec. Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 
545, 620 (1993).  To hold that such a meaningful opportunity can 
only occur in the context of a parole hearing with counsel 
appointed, experts on retainer, and a special appellate process, 
                     
 
2 See art. 29 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
 
 
3 Last year, we were quick to declare that the community 
parole supervision for life law (G. L. c. 127, § 133D [a]) was 
an unconstitutional delegation of a quintessential judicial 
function, sentencing, to the parole board, an executive branch 
of government, in violation of the constitutional separation of 
powers clause at issue here.  Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 
294, 302 (2014).  In so doing, we also underscored and confirmed 
that the granting of parole is "a discretionary act" and a 
"function of the executive branch of government with which, if 
otherwise constitutionally exercised, the judiciary may not 
interfere" (emphasis added).  Id. 
3 
 
is to declare that we know best how to perform the tasks 
constitutionally assigned to others, in the absence of any 
evidence of failure or excess.4  This substitution at this 
juncture of our judgment for that of the parole board as to the 
expertise and advocacy necessary for it to properly exercise its 
executive discretion is a slippery slope, and one down which we 
should not embark. 
 
                     
 
4 There is no suggestion in the court's opinion that the 
standard for determining an individual's suitability for parole 
for persons convicted of murder when they were juveniles is any 
different from the standard of suitability that any other 
prisoner must satisfy in order to obtain release on parole, 
i.e., that there is a "reasonable probability that, if the 
prisoner is released with appropriate conditions and community 
supervision, the prisoner will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that release is not incompatible 
with the welfare of society."  G. L. c. 127, § 130.