Title: Stokes, Jr. v. Cottrell

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:02/28/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1111006
____________________
Ex parte E'Stella Alexander Webb Cottrell
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Frank Stokes, Jr. 
v.
E'Stella Alexander Webb Cottrell et al.)
____________________
1111011
____________________
Ex parte Johnnie Mae Alexander Green et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Johnnie Mae Alexander Green et al. 
v.
E'Stella Alexander Webb Cottrell)
(Elmore Circuit Court, CV-03-321;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2101086; 2100920)
MOORE, Chief Justice.
E'Stella Alexander Webb Cottrell ("Cottrell"), on the one
hand, and Johnnie Mae Alexander Green, Lillie Robinson, Oscar
C. Alexander, Bertha Mae Humphrey, Shirley Alexander, Cathy
Alexander, Johnny Alexander, Jr., and Althea Alexander ("the
Alexander plaintiffs"), on the other, separately petition for
a writ of certiorari reversing the Court of Civil Appeals'
judgment overturning an award to them of three parcels of land
from the estate of Estelle Haggerty Alexander ("Estelle"). We
granted certiorari review, and we now reverse and remand.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In 1962, Estelle, who owned 6 parcels of land in Elmore
County consisting of 270 acres, died intestate. Estelle's
cousin and 
nearest 
next-of-kin, Larenda Jenkins, 
was
immediately vested with ownership of the land. See McCollum v.
Towns, 435 So. 2d 17, 19 (Ala. 1983) (noting that "real estate
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1111006, 1111011
vests immediately in the heirs at law," subject to the
decedent's debts). Living on the land at the time of Estelle's
death were Johnny Alexander, Sr., his family, and Cottrell.
Although Estelle had raised Johnny Sr. and Cottrell from
infancy, they were not her children, and she never adopted
them. The Elmore County Probate Court appointed Larenda
Jenkins administrator of Estelle's estate. In 1963 Cottrell
and Johnny Sr. filed a complaint seeking title to 100 acres of
Estelle's land on the theory that Estelle had intended them to
own it. Their action was dismissed in 1975 for lack of
prosecution. Cottrell moved off the property in 1965 and 
never lived there again.
In 1965 Larenda Jenkins died and was succeeded as
administrator 
by 
her 
granddaughter, 
Johnnie 
Mae 
Stokes. 
Stokes
died intestate in 1996. Frank Stokes, Jr., Johnnie Mae's son
("Stokes"), then assumed the duties of the administration of
Estelle's estate. Throughout this period the estate was not
formally closed. Johnny Sr. had eight children (seven of whom
are Alexander plaintiffs). Many of them grew up on the land
and continued to live there after his death in 1988.
3
1111006, 1111011
In 2002, Cottrell and Oscar C. Alexander, one of Johnny
Sr.'s sons, alleging that they were the lineal descendants and
thus heirs of Estelle, filed a petition seeking to be
appointed as administrators of Estelle's estate. After the
probate court issued letters of administration, Cottrell and
the 
Alexander 
plaintiffs 
(hereinafter 
referred 
to 
collectively
as "the plaintiffs") signed an agreement with a third party to
sell the 270 acres for $450,000. In 2003, the plaintiffs then
filed an action in the Elmore Circuit Court to quiet title to
the land in themselves. Stokes opposed that action and
presented evidence indicating 
that none of the 
plaintiffs 
were
Estelle's legal heirs but that he was an heir and entitled to
the property through intestate descent from Larenda Jenkins.
After the plaintiffs recanted their assertions of 
a 
biological
relationship with Estelle, the probate court vacated its
orders 
appointing 
Cottrell 
and 
Oscar 
Alexander 
as
administrators of the estate. The circuit court then set the
quiet-title action for trial based on the plaintiffs' newly
adopted theory of adverse possession. 
Following a bench trial, the court divided the six
parcels of land that constituted Estelle's estate, finding
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1111006, 1111011
that the plaintiffs and their ancestors had adversely
possessed three parcels ("the three parcels") by living on the
land and engaging in certain activities there but that the
heirs of Larenda Jenkins, as holders of legal title, were
entitled to the other three ("the farmed parcels"). All
parties appealed. Stokes attacked the settling of the three
parcels in the plaintiffs. Cottrell and the Alexander
plaintiffs 
separately 
cross-appealed, 
seeking 
title 
to 
all 
six
parcels between them. This Court deflected the appeal to the
Court of Civil Appeals. Holding that the plaintiffs'
possession of the land was permissive rather than adverse, the
Court of Civil Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment
in part and instructed the circuit court that title to all six
parcels should be quieted in Stokes and any other heirs of
Larenda Jenkins. Stokes v. Cottrell, 58 So. 3d 123 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2008), vacated in part sub nom., Ex parte Green, 58 So.
3d 135 (Ala. 2010). 
This Court granted the separate petitions for a writ of
certiorari filed by Cottrell and the Alexander plaintiffs.
Holding 
that 
unadjudicated 
issues 
rendered 
the 
circuit 
court's
judgment unappealable in 
part, 
this Court vacated the judgment
5
1111006, 1111011
of the Court of Civil Appeals reversing the award of the three
parcels to the plaintiffs and remanded the case for further
proceedings. Ex parte Green, 58 So. 3d 135 (Ala. 2010) ("Green
I"). This Court also quashed in part the writ it had issued to
review the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals affirming
the trial court's award of the farmed parcels to the heirs of
Larenda Jenkins. This Court held that Stokes's leasing of the
farmed parcels to third parties rendered the plaintiffs'
possession nonpeaceable and thus not amenable to 
a 
quiet-title
action. 58 So. 3d at 146-49 (citing § 6-6-560, Ala. Code
1975). 
On remand from the Court of Civil Appeals, the circuit
court did not revisit its original division of the land
between the plaintiffs and Stokes but did hold a hearing to
further allocate the three parcels, settling 50% of that land
in Cottrell and the other 50% in the Alexander plaintiffs. The
Alexander plaintiffs appealed, challenging the award of 
50% 
of
the three parcels to Cottrell. Stokes also appealed, seeking
reversal of the award of the three parcels to the plaintiffs.
Because the circuit court did not reexamine its award of three
parcels to each side, the Court of Civil Appeals simply
6
1111006, 1111011
adopted its original analysis from the first 
appeal. 
Reversing
the award of the three parcels to the plaintiffs, it quieted
title for the three parcels in the heirs of Larenda Jenkins.
The Court of Civil Appeals then dismissed as moot any review
of the circuit court's allocation of the three parcels as
between Cottrell and the Alexander plaintiffs. Green v.
Cottrell, [Ms. 2100920, Feb. 10, 2012] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala.
Civ. App. 2012).
We granted the petitions of  Cottrell and the Alexander
plaintiffs for certiorari review of the 2012 decision of the
Court of Civil Appeals.
II. Standard of Review
"Where a trial court hears ore tenus testimony,
as in this case, its findings based upon that
testimony are presumed correct, and its judgment
based on those findings will be reversed only if,
after a consideration of all the evidence and after
making all inferences that can logically be drawn
from the evidence, the judgment is found to be
plainly and palpably erroneous. The trial court's
judgment will be affirmed if there is credible
evidence to support the judgment. Furthermore, where
the trial court does not make specific findings of
fact concerning an issue, this Court will assume
that the trial court made those findings necessary
to support its judgment unless such findings would
be clearly erroneous. The presumption of correctness
is particularly strong in boundary line disputes and
adverse possession cases, because the evidence in
7
1111006, 1111011
such cases is difficult for an appellate court to
review."
Bearden v. Ellison, 560 So. 2d 1042, 1043-44 (Ala. 1990)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
III. Analysis
In Green I, we held that the plaintiffs could not
maintain an action to quiet title to the farmed parcels, which
the heirs of Larenda Jenkins had leased to third parties,
because the plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the statutory
requirement that they were in peaceable possession of the
farmed parcels. See § 6-6-560, Ala. Code 1975. The plaintiffs
have not sought certiorari review on this issue. Thus, the
only issue for decision is whether the Court of Civil Appeals
erred in overturning the circuit court's award of the three
parcels to the plaintiffs on an adverse-possession theory.
A. Quiet-Title Analysis
When a plaintiff seeking to quiet title establishes
peaceable possession, the burden then shifts to the defendant
to demonstrate valid legal title. Upon that demonstration the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show superior title by
adverse possession or a better deed. Wiggins v. Stapleton
Baptist Church, 282 Ala. 255, 257, 210 So. 2d 814, 816-17
8
1111006, 1111011
(1968). Sufficient evidence exists in the record from which
the circuit court could have found that the plaintiffs had
peaceable possession of the three parcels at the time they
filed the underlying action in 2003. The leases given by the
Jenkins heirs for third parties to farm and hunt and the
actual use of the land by the lessees could be interpreted to
apply to the entire property, i.e., the three parcels and the
farmed parcels, or to only the farmed parcels. Thus, credible
evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence
supported a 
finding 
of peaceable possession, even though other
evidence existed that would 
support 
a contrary conclusion. The
burden then shifted to Stokes to show valid legal title to the
three parcels. When Stokes provided evidence that title had
vested in him by intestate succession, the burden shifted back
to the plaintiffs to show that they held superior title by
deed or intestacy or through adverse 
possession. 
They provided
no evidence of possession of a deed to the land or vesting by
intestacy. Thus, "[t]he only other available method by which 
[Cottrell 
and] 
the 
Alexander 
plaintiffs 
could 
have 
established
superior title 
was through adverse possession." 
Stokes, 
58 So.
3d at 131.
9
1111006, 1111011
B. Adverse Possession 
When the initial possession is permissive, as it was in
this case, "'continued use will not ripen into adverse
possession by mere lapse of time.'" Stokes, 58 So. 3d at 132
(quoting Wadsworth v. Thompson, 912 So. 2d 529, 533 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2005)).
"In order to change possession from permissive to
adverse, the possessor must make a clear and
positive disclaimer or repudiation of the true
owner's title. The possessor must give the true
owner actual notice of such disavowal, or he must
manifest acts or declarations of adverseness so
notoriously that actual notice will be presumed."
Calhoun v. Smith, 387 So. 2d 821, 824 (Ala. 1980).
The Court of Civil Appeals analyzed this issue as
follows:
"We find no evidence of a repudiation or
disclaimer of this permissive use preceding the
filing of the 2003 quiet-title action by the
Alexander plaintiffs. The evidence establishes that
the Alexander plaintiffs lived on parcel 1,
maintaining only 3 to 4 acres of that 100-acre tract
for their personal use. They did not establish any
fencing on the property or post any notices on the
property to declare in any way that the property
belonged 
to 
them. 
They 
did 
not 
notify 
the
administrators or any other heir of Larenda Jenkins
that they claimed the property as their own.
"Additionally, the Alexander plaintiffs were
aware that the taxes assessed against the property
were paid by the administrators of Estelle's estate
10
1111006, 1111011
and then by Frank Stokes, Jr., from 1962 up until at
least the late 1990s and possibly until 2003, when
this quiet-title action was filed. The Alexander
plaintiffs accepted that benefit and continued
living on the land without cost until they decided
to pursue a quiet-title action.
"Further, the Alexander plaintiffs were aware
that the administrator was leasing the property to
third parties and that those leases applied to all
the property in Estelle's estate. In fact, the two
leases included in the record demonstrated the
permissive nature of the Alexander plaintiffs' use.
Johnnie Mae Stokes granted third parties the right
to farm, hunt, and fish on the property but reserved
to the Alexander plaintiffs the right to hunt and
fish on the property as well. This permissive use
was expressed in a lease agreement as late as 1993.
Further, one of the lessees testified that he had
run into Johnny Jr. while the lessee was on the
property and that Johnny Jr. had not inquired of him
why he was there and had not asked him to leave.
"Based on the record evidence, it appears that
the Alexander plaintiffs knew and acknowledged that
the administrators and Frank Stokes, Jr., exercised
control over the property and that third parties,
acting under the authority of Jenkins and the
Stokeses, were within their rights to be on the
property. Such acquiescence is inconsistent with the
exclusive, hostile, open, and notorious possession
of 
property 
required 
to 
establish 
adverse
possession.
"Because 
the 
Alexander 
plaintiffs' 
possession 
of
the property was permissive and because they
established no evidence of repudiation or disclaimer
of that permissive nature, their claim of adverse
possession failed as a matter of law."
Stokes, 58 So. at 132-33.
11
1111006, 1111011
However, contrary evidence existed from which the circuit
court could have found "a clear and positive disclaimer or
repudiation of the true owner's title." Calhoun, 387 So. 2d at
824. In particular, in 1963 Cottrell and Johnny Sr. sued
Larenda Jenkins in the Elmore Circuit Court "individually and
as administratrix of the estate of Estelle Alexander,"
alleging that Estelle had 
purchased the property identified as
parcel one in this case "while your complainants were minors,
holding it in trust for the said complainants." They further
alleged that "your complainants are the owners of the above
described real estate" and 
"den[ied] that said Larenda Jenkins
own[ed] any right, title or interest in and to said lands in
any 
capacity whatsoever ...." They requested that, "upon 
proof
of the material allegations of the bill, Your Honor will enter
an order vesting the legal title to the real estate described
in the Bill of Complaint in your complainants share and share
alike and that by said decree Your Honor will settle the title
to said lands ...."
The service of this action upon Larenda Jenkins
constituted "a clear and positive disclaimer 
or 
repudiation of
the true owner's title," but only as to the 100 acres
12
1111006, 1111011
constituting parcel one. Jenkins demurred to the complaint.
After Jenkins died in 1965, Johnny Sr. moved the court to
substitute her heirs as defendants. The suit languished,
perhaps because oral evidence is insufficient to establish
title to land, and was dismissed for lack of prosecution in
1975. In Green I Chief Justice Cobb dissented from this
Court's vacating the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment for lack
of an appealable final judgment. Accordingly, she addressed
the merits and stated:
"In 1965, Cottrell and Johnny Alexander, Sr., filed
a complaint, alleging that, during her lifetime,
Estelle had purchased 100 acres of the land for
their benefit and that, at the time of Estelle's
death, the property was being held in a constructive
trust for them. Competing inferences may be drawn
from the existence of the action and the fact that
the 
1965 
action 
was 
dismissed 
for 
lack 
of
prosecution. However, a finder of fact could
reasonably conclude that the action manifested a
disavowal of the record owner's title sufficient to
notify the record owner that Cottrell and Johnny Sr.
did not recognize the validity of the record owner's
title to at least 100 acres of the property."
58 So. 3d at 165-66. 
In addition to the effect of the 1963 quiet-title action 
in disclaiming title, the evidence cited by the Court of Civil
Appeals in support of a finding of permissive possession is
not unequivocal. For instance, "payment of the property taxes
13
1111006, 1111011
by the record title holder does not prevent adverse possession
of the property." Lilly v. Palmer, 495 So. 2d 522, 530 (Ala.
1986). Chief Justice Cobb framed the evidence as follows:
"In addition, the plaintiffs used the property
in whatever manner they pleased without accounting
to anyone for their use of it and without paying
rent. They lived on the property for several
generations, 
maintained 
improvements 
on 
it,
cultivated portions of it, drew water from it, kept
domestic livestock on it, cut timber on it, cut
firewood on it, hunted on it, fished on it, operated
a business on it, and buried their dead on it. Until
shortly before the trial of this case, a number of
the plaintiffs believed themselves to be, and openly
held themselves out to be, the grandchildren and
heirs of Estelle Haggerty Alexander.
 
"One 
could 
reasonably 
conclude 
from 
the 
evidence
that the plaintiffs clearly and openly held
themselves out to be the rightful owners of the
property, not merely permissive users."
58 So. 3d at 166.
The Court of Civil Appeals stated the ore tenus rule in
its standard-of-review section, Stokes, 58 So. 3d at 129, but
in its analysis of the evidence did not accord the circuit
court's findings the required deference. 
Were we deciding this
case in the first instance, we might well rule as the Court of
Civil Appeals did on the merits. However, showing due respect
to the judgment of the circuit court, as the ore tenus rule
requires, we conclude that credible evidence was presented to
14
1111006, 1111011
support the circuit court's allotment to the plaintiffs of the
three parcels, which included the 100-acre parcel at issue in
the 1963 quiet-title action. 
"[O]pposing inferences [are] to be finally resolved
by the decree of the trial judge who heard the
witnesses testify and whose conclusion has the force
and effect of a jury verdict. According the usual
presumption 
of 
correctness 
to 
the 
conclusion
attained by him, we would not be warranted in
disturbing his finding."
Stewart v. Childress, 269 Ala. 87, 94, 111 So. 2d 8, 14
(1959). See Lilly v. Palmer, 495 So. 2d at 530 (noting that
"it is a rare case when this Court will overturn a finding by
a trial judge who hears an adverse possession case presented
ore tenus").
IV. Conclusion
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals in
both case no. 2100920 and case no. 2101086. Our reversal of
the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment on the three parcels
(case no. 2101086)  revives the argument of the Alexander
plaintiffs that the trial court erred in awarding 50% of the
three parcels to Cottrell (case no. 2100920). The Court of
Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal of 
the 
Alexander plaintiffs
in case no. 2100920 as moot because it was reversing the award
15
1111006, 1111011
of the three parcels to the plaintiffs. Accordingly, on remand
of this case the Court of Civil Appeals is to decide the
issues presented in case no. 2100920.
1111006 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1111011 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Murdock and Shaw, JJ., concur in the result.
Bryan, J., recuses himself.*
*Justice Bryan was a member of the Court of Civil Appeals
when that court considered this case.
16