Title: State ex rel. Regional Convention & Sports Complex Authority v. Honorable Michael D. Burton

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE ex rel. REGIONAL CONVENTION 
) 
and SPORTS COMPLEX AUTHORITY, 
) 
) 
Relator, 
) 
) 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC96225 
) 
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL D. BURTON, ) 
) 
Respondent.  
) 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN MANDAMUS 
The Regional Convention and Sports Complex Authority (the Authority) seeks a 
writ of mandamus compelling the circuit court to stay arbitration of the Authority’s claims 
in its petition for declaratory judgment and to reinstate the cause on the circuit court’s 
docket.  This Court quashes the preliminary writ of mandamus. 
I. Factual and Procedural History
The Authority leased a training facility to the St. Louis Rams, LLC, in Earth City.  
The Authority filed a three-count petition for declaratory judgment against the Rams, 
seeking to void provisions in the lease granting the Rams an option to purchase the training 
facility for $1.   
Opinion issued November 21, 2017
2 
 
 
The Rams filed a motion to compel arbitration, arguing the Authority’s claims fall 
within the scope of the lease’s arbitration provisions found in paragraph 45 of schedule I 
of the lease.  Paragraph 45 requires arbitration of “[a]ll disputes between the Parties hereto 
arising out of this Lease.” Schedule I of the lease provides, in relevant part: “Any 
controversy, dispute or claim between the Parties hereto including, without limitation, any 
claim arising out of, in connection with, or in relation to the interpretation, performance or 
breach of this Lease shall be settled by arbitration …. Such arbitration shall be the exclusive 
dispute resolution mechanism.”  The Authority filed a motion to stay arbitration, arguing 
the lease does not require arbitration of the declaratory judgment action. The Authority 
relied on an attorney fee provision in the lease authorizing fees for a party seeking relief  
in a “proceeding to … declare rights” under the lease and subsequently obtaining a 
“judgment.”  The Authority also noted other lease provisions referring to the right of a 
party “to institute suit,” the right of a party to obtain “cumulative … remedies at law or in 
equity,” and “litigation between the Parties concerning this Lease.” 
 
The circuit court sustained the Rams’ motion to compel arbitration, overruled the 
Authority’s motion to stay arbitration, and dismissed the underlying action.  The Authority 
then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the court of appeals seeking to stay 
arbitration and reinstate the declaratory judgment action on the circuit court’s docket.  After 
the court of appeals issued a preliminary writ and made the writ permanent following 
additional briefing and argument, this Court transferred the case pursuant to article V, § 10 
of the Missouri Constitution.  
 
 
3 
 
II. Analysis 
This Court has the authority to “issue and determine original remedial writs,” such 
as the extraordinary writ of mandamus.  See Mo. Const., art. V, § 4.1.  “[A] writ of 
mandamus is an appropriate mechanism to review whether a motion to compel arbitration 
was improperly sustained.”  State ex rel. Hewitt v. Kerr, 461 S.W.3d 798, 805 (Mo. banc 
2015).  “A litigant seeking ‘relief by mandamus must allege and prove that he has a clear, 
unequivocal, specific right to a thing claimed.’” Id.  This court reviews whether a circuit 
court should have granted a motion to compel arbitration de novo.  Eaton v. CMH Homes, 
461 S.W.3d 426, 431 (Mo. banc 2015).   
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which governs the applicability and 
enforceability of arbitration agreements, “evinces a liberal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements so that disputes might be resolved without resort to the courts.”1  Dunn Indus. 
Grp., Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 112 S.W.3d 421, 427 (Mo. banc 2003).  As such, any 
doubts as to arbitrability are to be resolved in favor of arbitration.  Id. at 429.  Arbitration 
clauses may be broad or narrow.  Id. at 428.  A narrow arbitration provision limits 
arbitration to specific disputes; a broad provision covers all disputes arising from the 
contract.  Id.  “Where an arbitration clause is broad and contains no express provision 
excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, only the most forceful evidence of a 
purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail.”  Id. at 429 (citing United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1960)).        
                                              
1  The Rams moved in the circuit court to compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA, and the 
Authority has not disputed the applicability of the FAA. 
4 
 
In determining whether a specific dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration 
agreement, this Court must rely on the principles of contract interpretation so as to ascertain 
the intention of the parties and to give effect to that intent.  Id. at 428.  “The terms of a 
contract are read as a whole to determine the intention of the parties and are given their 
plain, ordinary, and usual meaning.”  Id.  “Additionally, each term of a contract is construed 
to avoid rendering other terms meaningless.”  Id.  In analyzing these disputes, this Court 
will determine whether “the specific dispute falls within the substantive scope of [the 
arbitration] agreement.”  Id. at 427-28.   
The arbitration clause in this case provides, in relevant part: “All disputes between 
the Parties hereto arising out of this Lease shall be subject to the provisions of, and 
adjudicated in accordance with, the Arbitration Agreement attached hereto …. ”  The 
arbitration agreement provides, in relevant part: “Any controversy, dispute, or claim 
between the Parties hereto including, without limitation, any claim arising out of, in 
connection with, or in relation to the interpretation, performance or breach of this Lease 
shall be settled by arbitration …. Such arbitration shall be the exclusive dispute resolution 
mechanism.”  The Authority argues the arbitration provisions are not broad because other 
parts of the lease contain terms referring to litigation, and, even if broad, the parties 
intended to exclude declaratory relief claims from arbitration. 2   
                                              
2  The Authority further contends the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because it is 
not supported by consideration. This argument is without merit. “Consideration consists 
either of a promise (to do or refrain from doing something) or the transfer or giving up of 
something of value to the other party.”  Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc., 450 S.W.3d 770, 774 
(Mo. banc 2014) (internal quotations omitted).  Additional consideration for an arbitration 
5 
 
This Court must look at the lease provisions the Authority contends contradict a 
broad reading of the arbitration clause.  While section 26 mentions “remedies at law,” this 
provision is prefaced by language subjecting it to the arbitration provisions.  The language 
in section 41, which addresses instituting litigation in the context of making payments 
“under protest,” does not apply to this case.  The reference in section 30 that pertains to 
prevailing parties who receive a “judgment” is in the “Attorneys’ Fees” section, and is not 
meant to indicate how the prevailing party obtains his relief but rather establishes that 
attorney fees are available. Finally, the language in section 28 (“Any litigation between the 
Parties hereto … concerning this Lease shall be initiated in the City or County of  
St. Louis ….”) may create a conflict, but, in light of the arbitration language in schedule I 
of the lease, the intent is to control where litigation must be initiated when the parties seek 
to enforce their rights under the arbitration provisions.  As this case illustrates, arbitration 
agreements often land in court when parties seek to enforce their rights under such 
agreements.       
Although there are inconsistencies in the lease agreement, the parties’ intent to 
arbitrate disputes involving the lease is clear.  “Language excluding certain disputes from 
arbitration must be clear and unambiguous or unmistakably clear.”  Dunn, 112 S.W.3d at 
429.  The language cited by the Authority does not unambiguously or unmistakably 
exclude a declaratory judgment action from the arbitration provision.  Rather, the language 
of the arbitration provisions is broad.  Because there is not the “most forceful evidence” of 
                                              
clause is unnecessary “as long as the contract as a whole meets the consideration 
requirement.”  Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 426, 433 (Mo. banc 2015).   
6 
 
the parties’ intent to exclude the claim from arbitration, any doubt as to arbitrability must 
be resolved in favor of the application of the arbitration clause.  See id. 
III. Conclusion 
 
The preliminary writ of mandamus is quashed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W. Brent Powell, Judge 
 
All concur.