Title: State v. Breitzman

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2017 WI 100 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1610-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Ginger M. Breitzman, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 371 Wis. 2d 760, 886 N.W.2d 593 
(2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 1, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 20, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Rebecca F. Dallet 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed and an oral argument by Hannah Schieber Jurrs, assistant 
state public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Donald V. Latorraca, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief were Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and Maura F.J. 
Whelan, assistant attorney general.  There was an oral argument 
by Donald V. Latorraca. 
 
 
2017 WI 100
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP1610-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2013CF270) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Ginger M. Breitzman, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 1, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.  This is a review of an 
unpublished 
decision 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
State 
v. 
Breitzman, No. 2015AP1610-CR, unpublished slip op., (Wis. Ct. 
App. Aug. 16, 2016), which affirmed the Milwaukee County circuit 
court's1 
denial 
of 
Ginger 
Breitzman's 
("Breitzman") 
postconviction motion challenging her convictions for child 
neglect under Wis. Stat. § 948.21(1)(2013-14)2 and disorderly 
conduct under Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1). 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Rebecca F. Dallet presided. 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the (2013-
14) version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
In a criminal action by the State, Breitzman was 
charged with, and convicted of, five crimes relating to her 
negative interactions, confrontations, abuse, and neglect of her 
son, J.K., during the time period ranging from November 2011 
through 
December 
2012: 
(1) 
Physical 
Abuse 
of 
a 
Child 
(Intentional 
Causation 
of 
Bodily 
Harm) 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.03(2)(b); (2) Physical Abuse of a Child (Intentional 
Causation of Bodily Harm) under § 948.03(2)(b); (3) Child 
Neglect (Bodily Harm) under Wis. Stat. § 921.21(1)(b); (4) Child 
Neglect (Misdemeanor) under Wis. Stat. § 948.21(1)(a); and (5) 
Disorderly Conduct under Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1).   
¶3 
In the circuit court, Breitzman filed a postconviction 
motion under Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(h) seeking judgments of 
acquittal for counts three, four, and five.  For all three, she 
argued that there was insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction.  Additionally, she argued that defense counsel at 
trial had been ineffective because he failed to move for 
dismissal of count five for disorderly conduct on free speech 
grounds, pursued a defense theory of reasonable parental 
discipline in opening remarks that was inconsistent with 
Breitzman's plan to deny striking J.K., and failed to object to 
testimony regarding other-acts evidence.  Following a Machner3 
hearing, the circuit court granted the motion for judgment of 
acquittal as to count three and denied the motion as to counts 
                                                 
3 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
3 
 
four and five, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to 
sustain the convictions on counts four and five and that counsel 
had not been ineffective at trial.   
¶4 
In the court of appeals, Breitzman challenged the 
circuit court's denial of her postconviction motion as to counts 
four and five, again challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
and 
asserting 
that 
defense 
counsel 
at 
trial 
had 
been 
ineffective.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court. 
¶5 
On petition to this court, Breitzman seeks review of 
the denial of her ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  In 
this regard, we note that Breitzman's claim does not raise a 
facial or as-applied challenge to the disorderly conduct 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 947.01.  A facial challenge would argue 
that "profane conduct," as listed in § 947.01(1), is not 
actionable as a crime because profanity is protected speech.  An 
as-applied challenge would argue that Breitzman's profane 
conduct in this case was not actionable as a crime because it 
was protected speech.  Breitzman argues neither.  Breitzman only 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
4 
 
argues that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.4  
Thus, while this case touches on an interesting issue of free 
speech law, we reserve full analysis of what constitutes profane 
speech and whether profane speech is otherwise protected as free 
speech for another day and confine our analysis here to the 
ineffective assistance of counsel issue presented, briefed, and 
argued by the parties. 
¶6 
The ineffective assistance of counsel issue raised 
requires consideration of whether counsel was ineffective for 
any of the following reasons: (1) failing to move to dismiss the 
disorderly conduct charge on the basis that it violated 
Breitzman's constitutional right to free speech; (2) failing to 
                                                 
4 We further note that the standard for establishing that a 
statute is unconstitutional is high; because we assume the 
constitutionality 
of 
statutes, 
"the 
party 
challenging 
a 
statute's constitutionality must prove that the statute is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt."  See State v. 
Smith, 
2010 
WI 
16, 
¶8, 
323 
Wis. 2d 377, 
780 
N.W.2d 90.  
Additionally, 
where 
a 
statute 
has 
been 
authoritatively 
interpreted 
by 
this 
court, 
the 
party 
challenging 
that 
interpretation must establish that our prior interpretation was 
"objectively wrong."  See Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Romanshek, 
2005 WI 67, ¶45, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417 (noting that 
"stare decisis concerns are paramount where a court has 
authoritatively interpreted a statute").  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 947.01 has been upheld by this court against facial and as-
applied challenges on free speech grounds on numerous occasions. 
See infra ¶52.  Moreover, when an authoritative interpretation 
of a statute has stood for many years, stare decisis concerns 
take on even greater significance.  See id., ¶52; see also 
Bauman v. Gilbertson, 7 Wis. 2d 467, 469-70, 96 N.W.2d 854 
(1959) (holding that it was not proper to depart from stare 
decisis where the interpretation stood for 11 years).  Here, our 
interpretation of § 947.01 as constitutional has stood as law 
for nearly 50 years.  See infra ¶52. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
5 
 
present opening remarks consistent with Breitzman's anticipated 
testimony; and (3) failing to object to testimony regarding 
other uncharged conduct. 
¶7 
As to the first, we conclude that trial counsel's 
failure to move to dismiss the disorderly conduct charge on the 
basis that it violated Breitzman's constitutional right to free 
speech was not deficient performance, and thus not ineffective 
assistance of counsel, because whether profane conduct that 
tends to cause or provoke a disturbance is protected as free 
speech is unsettled law. 
¶8 
As to the second, we conclude that trial counsel's 
theory of reasonable parental discipline, as presented in 
opening remarks, was not deficient performance, and thus not 
ineffective assistance of counsel, because it reflected trial 
counsel's reasonable expectations, which were rationally based 
on discussions with Breitzman, and it was part of a reasonable 
trial strategy. 
¶9 
As to the third, we conclude that trial counsel's 
failure to object to testimony regarding uncharged conduct was 
not deficient performance, and thus not ineffective assistance 
of counsel, because declining to object was part of a reasonable 
trial strategy. 
¶10 Because we conclude that trial counsel's performance 
was not deficient, we need not address whether, in the context 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, there was prejudice to 
Breitzman, and we decline to do so. 
¶11 Thus, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
6 
 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶12 To give proper perspective on the narrow issues we 
address 
here, 
it 
is 
important 
to 
outline 
the 
charges, 
allegations, and evidence presented to the jury, as well as the 
theory of defense and strategy of trial counsel. 
¶13 The State charged Breitzman with the following five 
counts: (1) Physical Abuse of a Child (Intentional Causation of 
Bodily Harm) under Wis. Stat. § 948.03(2)(b), as to striking 
J.K. in the face, resulting in a bloody nose, for J.K.'s failure 
to wash the floor; (2) Physical Abuse of a Child (Intentional 
Causation of Bodily Harm) under § 948.03(2)(b), as to striking 
J.K. in the face, resulting in a bruise, for J.K.'s failure to 
prepare a meal; (3) Child Neglect (Bodily Harm) under Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.21(1)(b), as to Breitzman's failing to seek medical care 
for J.K. when he was sick for a week with vomiting and diarrhea; 
(4) Child Neglect (Misdemeanor) under § 948.21(1)(a), as to 
Breitzman's locking J.K. out of the house during the winter; and 
(5) Disorderly Conduct under Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1), as to 
Breitzman's engaging in "profane conduct, under circumstances in 
which such conduct tended to cause a disturbance."5  Breitzman 
entered pleas of not guilty and the case was set for a jury 
trial.  At trial, the State's primary witness was J.K., 
Breitzman's son.  
                                                 
5 The criminal complaint was filed on January 12, 2013, and 
Breitzman entered pleas of not guilty on May 20, 2013.  On 
January 31, 2013, Breitzman waived her right to a preliminary 
hearing.  An amended information was filed on May 20, 2013.   
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
7 
 
¶14 As to the first charge, for physical abuse, J.K. 
testified that he had been sweeping the floor while also trying 
to keep an eye on his three-year-old little sister.  Breitzman 
wanted him to hurry up sweeping the floor, but his sister was 
running around the house and throwing things on the floor, in 
J.K.'s words, "being a three year old."  Then, when Breitzman 
came into the room and saw that he was not sweeping "right or 
fast enough," she grabbed the broom and struck him on the side 
of his head with her fist (she could not reach his face because 
he had raised his hands defensively when she grabbed the broom), 
telling him he never did anything right and calling him a "piece 
of shit" and the "dog of the house."   
¶15 As to the second charge, also for physical abuse, J.K. 
testified that he could not recall the precise date on which 
Breitzman struck him, but he remembered clearly the bloody nose 
that resulted because it lasted three minutes and he had to go 
find something to stem the flow.  He said that Breitzman had 
seemed angry with him when she came into his room and then 
struck him in the face when he would not get out of bed, calling 
him a "fuck face" and a "retard."  When she left, he remembers 
crying and that he did not know what he'd done wrong.   
¶16 As to count three, for child neglect, J.K. testified 
that, on or about November 18, 2012, he became very ill.  He had 
been vomiting almost every hour and had diarrhea, both of which 
appeared to have blood in them.  When he told Breitzman this, 
she said she would get him a Gatorade at the end of the week if 
he was still sick.  He testified that he was sick like this for 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
8 
 
six-to-seven days, but when he asked Breitzman if he could go to 
the doctor, she refused.  This prompted him to call friends and 
post on Facebook seeking help.   
¶17 As to count four, also for child neglect, J.K. 
testified that, in the winter of 2011-2012, he could not get 
into the house when he got home from school because his mother 
had locked the doors.  The weather that morning had been warmer, 
so he had not taken a coat with him to school; the weather grew 
cooler over the course of the day, however, and it was cold when 
he returned home at about 3:30 p.m.  Finding the house locked, 
he testified that he knocked on the front and back doors and 
rang the doorbell for about three minutes to no avail.  J.K. 
said he could tell that Breitzman was home because her car was 
in the driveway, but she did not come to the door so he crawled 
under the grill cover on the porch for shelter.  He continued to 
ring the doorbell every fifteen minutes, but spent approximately 
four hours outside, huddling under the grill cover to keep from 
freezing.   
¶18 As to the fifth charge, for disorderly conduct, J.K. 
testified that, when he got home from school on December 4, 
2012, he put a bag of popcorn in the microwave, but ended up 
burning it and having to throw it away.  When Breitzman got home 
about a half hour later, he was on the phone with his best 
friend, D.M., and, when he heard Breitzman come through the 
door, he hid his phone in his pocket because he was afraid she 
would be mad.  He testified that, when she smelled the burned 
popcorn and saw the bag in the trash can, she sought him out and 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
9 
 
told him he always messed things up, calling him a "fuck face," 
"retard," and a "piece of shit."  He defended himself by saying 
that he had not done it on purpose, but Breitzman persisted 
saying she "[didn't] give a fuck."  He then asked Breitzman to 
stop calling him names, which she responded to by threatening to 
kick him out of the house.  Later that night he called D.M. back 
crying and needing someone to talk to.   
¶19 Over the course of J.K.'s testimony, he further 
testified that it was a daily occurrence to be called "retard" 
and "fuck face."  He also testified that he had not had glasses 
or treatment for his lazy eye since second grade and had not 
been to the dentist since he was five; that there was a lock on 
the refrigerator at home and he could not get lunch at school 
because Breitzman would not complete the paperwork for free 
lunches; and that Breitzman struck J.K. once when they were in 
the car because he disagreed with her about who had taught him a 
song when he was younger.  The latter came up during trial 
counsel's cross-examination: 
Q 
You just have a problem with frequent nosebleeds? 
A 
From what it appears.  But this was after the 
incident when she hit me in the car and my nose was 
bleeding on me. 
Q 
By the way, was she driving the car at the time? 
A 
Yes, sir. 
Q 
And where were you located? 
A 
I was in the passenger's seat. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
10 
 
Q 
And so it was her attempt to slap you, she was 
hitting you with the back of her hand at that time? 
A 
She hit me with the back of her hand. 
Q 
She couldn't have hit you with the palm of her hand 
because there wasn't quite a way to do that, right, 
so she actually had to go this way? 
A  Yes, sir.[6] 
¶20 The State also introduced evidence to corroborate 
J.K.'s testimony: J.K.'s best friend, D.M., testified that over 
the course of about six months, J.K. went from "always happy and 
nice" to "more stressed out and tired and just more sad."  
Specifically, when J.K. called him back on the night of 
December 4, 2012, he said that J.K. seemed "beat down" and that 
he had "never heard [J.K.] cry before."  D.M. also testified 
that J.K. had a bruise for about a week at the time of the 
second allegation of abuse; J.K.'s girlfriend, A.G., also 
verified this. 
¶21 J.K.'s neighbor also testified.  She said she had sent 
over Gatorade and crackers in response to J.K.'s Facebook post 
about being ill——she had had some on hand because her daughter 
had been sick with the flu.  She was also the one J.K. called 
looking for a place to stay when Breitzman kicked him out on 
December 4, 2012. 
¶22 Additionally, the State called J.K.'s high school 
counselor and the West Allis detective who investigated J.K.'s 
                                                 
6 In this exchange, the questions were asked by Breitzman's 
trial counsel and were answered by J.K. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
11 
 
claims.  The counselor testified that J.K. met with him on 
November 29, 2012, and told him about what had been going on at 
home, that he was tired of being called "retarded" and a "[f]uck 
face" and being "smacked in the head" by his mother.  J.K. then 
met with a detective from the West Allis Police Department on 
December 11, 2012.  In investigating J.K.'s claims, the 
detective interviewed Breitzman.  The detective testified that 
Breitzman admitted that she called J.K. names, slapped and 
backhanded J.K., and did not allow J.K. to have a key to the 
house.   
¶23 Breitzman's general defense to these allegations and 
charges was that J.K. was lying and that he was a rebellious and 
irresponsible teenager.  She attributed this behavior to the 
fact that his father had rejected him and that J.K. had a new 
girlfriend.7  Specifically, as to counts one and two, Breitzman 
denied striking J.K., and said that the bruise had been the 
result of him dropping a dumbbell on his face.  As to count 
three, Breitzman testified that J.K. was not sick for a week, 
that she told him there were crackers and Gatorade available, 
and that the redness in his vomit and diarrhea was fruit punch 
Gatorade, not blood.  As to count four, Breitzman confirmed that 
                                                 
7 The defense called two additional witnesses, Ramona Smith 
and Dan Percifield——both long-time friends of Breitzman.  Smith 
testified that J.K. had been well-behaved up until the last few 
years, when he became more defiant.  Percifield also testified 
that 
J.K.'s 
relationship 
with 
Breitzman 
had 
deteriorated 
recently, attributing it to J.K.'s new girlfriend. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
12 
 
she knew what time J.K. got home from school, that she had 
locked the doors to the house, that she did not let J.K. have a 
key, and that she chose to take a nap at that time; but she 
defended her actions by pointing out that there were any number 
of businesses close by where J.K. could have gone to wait.  As 
to count five, Breitzman said that her conduct was justified 
because J.K. had scorched the microwave when he burned the 
popcorn and he "was belligerent with [her]." 
¶24 Breitzman further testified that she did call J.K. 
"retarded," a "piece of shit," and a "fuck face," but not 
regularly;8 that she did not get J.K. glasses because she did not 
have insurance and because he would not wear them when he did 
have them; that J.K. did not have lunch because he could not 
remember to bring home the form and did not make his own lunch, 
and that J.K. always had the code to the lock on the 
refrigerator, which was just in place to make him think before 
eating; and that she did strike J.K. in the uncharged incident 
in the car.  Breitzman also testified that she would generally 
discipline J.K. by grounding him or by taking away phone and/or 
video game privileges, but would resort to physical violence if 
she 
thought 
he 
was 
lying 
to 
her, 
talking 
back, 
being 
belligerent, or if he did not check in when he was out.  She 
testified that she never struck him just to hurt him.  In short, 
                                                 
8 Smith 
characterized 
this 
name-calling 
as 
"jok[ing] 
around."  Percifield testified that he had heard Breitzman call 
J.K. these names on numerous occasions.   
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
13 
 
Breitzman's defense was that J.K. could not be believed, and 
that, as a single parent, she "did what [she] thought [she] had 
to do."   
¶25 At trial, the testimony was bookended by attorneys' 
arguments.  As pertains to the ineffective assistance of counsel 
issue presented here, Breitzman's trial counsel argued in his 
opening remarks as follows: 
[W]hat's really at the base of this is the question of 
the instructions that the Court gives you, have any of 
these been met or not?  You will also be getting later 
on an instruction which is very important to this 
case, and it is going to be very important when you 
get to the defense case, and that is the question of 
reasonable parental discipline privilege, it's a jury 
instruction, number 950, 950, that's very important 
because this is eventually what this comes down 
to. . . .  
Was she intentionally trying to inflict pain beyond 
the right of a parent to inflict pain and, yes, read 
chapter or read Jury Instruction 950 when you get it, 
it actually refers to a parent's right to inflict, 
that means cause pain, and we know you can cause pain 
a million ways.  You can slap someone if they are 
disrespectful to you.  You can smack someone hard on 
the back of their butt.  You can hit them on the side 
of their head. . . . You are going to have a couple of 
days of evidence to consider as to whether my client 
is a criminal or just a struggling parent, and I 
believe the evidence will show that she is not a 
criminal . . . .9 
As is general practice, the circuit court instructed the jury 
that attorney arguments are not evidence: 
                                                 
9 We note that, although Breitzman was present for opening 
remarks and trial, neither the trial nor the Machner hearing 
transcripts reflect that she expressed any dissatisfaction with 
trial counsel's statement. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
14 
 
Remarks of the attorneys are not evidence.  If 
the remarks suggested facts not in evidence, disregard 
the suggestion.   
Consider 
carefully 
closing 
arguments 
of 
the 
attorneys but their arguments and conclusions and 
opinions are not evidence. 
¶26 On May 23, 2014, the jury convicted Breitzman of all 
five counts.  After the verdict, the circuit court entered the 
judgments of conviction. 
¶27 On February 6, 2015, Breitzman filed a postconviction 
motion, seeking judgments of acquittal for counts three, four, 
and five.  For all three, she argued that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction.  Additionally, she argued that 
defense counsel at trial had been ineffective because he failed 
to move for dismissal of count five for disorderly conduct on 
free speech grounds, pursued a defense theory of reasonable 
parental discipline in opening remarks that was inconsistent 
with Breitzman's plan to deny striking J.K., and failed to 
object to testimony regarding other-acts evidence.  On May 29, 
2015, the circuit court held a Machner hearing on the motion, at 
which both trial counsel and Breitzman testified. 
¶28 As to his failure to challenge the disorderly conduct 
charge on free speech grounds, trial counsel testified that he 
had contemplated moving to dismiss count five for disorderly 
conduct on free speech grounds, but decided not to because it 
was "too shallow and there wasn't enough guts to it."  
¶29 As to his assertion of the reasonable parental 
discipline 
theory 
of 
defense, 
Breitzman's 
trial 
counsel 
testified as follows:  
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
15 
 
Q 
Prior to the commencement of the actual jury trial, 
you asked for the Court to include within the 
opening 
statements 
the 
reasonable 
discipline 
defense; isn't that true? 
A 
 . . . yes. 
Q 
Why did you ask for that? 
A 
Because it was the only major defense position I 
believed we could take, regardless of all the 
charges, because jurors . . . [are] really trying 
to decide which side is telling the truth in the 
end . . . and the major morality of this case was 
whether he had a struggling mother doing the best 
she could or whether we had a mother engaged in 
abuse . . . .  
 
That's 
why 
I 
included 
the 
recommendation 
originally, and the client saw the wisdom of 
it. . . .[10] 
¶30 As to his failure to object to other-acts evidence, 
Breitzman's trial counsel further testified as follows: 
Q 
Was there a reason why you did not file a motion in 
limine pretrial to preclude any reference to these 
other allegations of her bad behavior? 
A 
The heart of her defense was that she had a 
rebellious child.  She was a single mom with very 
limited economic resources.  She had another child 
she had to take care of.  She had had a very 
difficult set of circumstances she was dealing 
with.  She had loved her son and had had a good 
relationship with him until a point in time, a year 
or two before where he suddenly became rebellious, 
which she attributed to either school friends or 
girlfriends, and things had gone downhill from 
there. 
                                                 
10 In this exchange, the questions were asked by Breitzman's 
appellate counsel and were answered by Breitzman's trial 
counsel. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
16 
 
 
When we talked about how to approach the defense, 
her concern was that a jury would see that she was 
doing the best she could.  She did not think in 
advance 
that 
anything 
she 
did 
to 
him 
was 
wrong. . . . And I believed her that she didn't at 
the time believe that she was engaged in criminal 
activity.  She was just doing her best as a parent. 
Q 
Was there any reason, other than that then, why you 
did not object when discussion of the things we've 
just 
talked 
about, 
these 
allegations 
of 
bad 
behavior on her part, were then brought up at 
trial? 
A 
The plan for the defense is that we believe the 
son's story, or expression of these things, would 
go to such an extended or aggravated or aggrandized 
extent that he would lose credibility, and then she 
would take the stand and show what really happened, 
that she cared for her son, that these were 
difficult, times of rebellion.  
 
. . .  
 
So 
the 
best 
approach 
would 
be 
to 
be 
very 
transparent about it with the jury and to not sit 
there and make lots of objections on things that 
would be overruled and become obvious and rather 
let the jury see what is the other side here. . . . 
 
The facts were what they were, and we would 
approach the defense very transparently.[11] 
¶31 Breitzman also testified at the Machner hearing; her 
testimony focused on her understanding of the reasonable 
parental discipline defense and the other acts that might come 
up.  As to the reasonable parental discipline defense, she 
testified as follows:  
                                                 
11 In this exchange, the questions were asked by Breitzman's 
appellate counsel and were answered by Breitzman's trial 
counsel. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
17 
 
Q 
Did [trial counsel] ever talk to you about arguing 
reasonable parental discipline in this case? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
Okay. Did he tell you this is what he intended to 
argue? 
A 
Yes.[12] 
Breitzman said, however, that she told trial counsel she had not 
struck J.K. on the two charged occasions.  She also said that 
she told him she would admit to striking J.K. in the uncharged 
incident in the car if it came up, but that she did not want it 
raised.  On cross-examination, Breitzman confirmed that she 
agreed 
to 
trial 
counsel's 
reasonable 
parental 
discipline 
defense: 
Q 
And did you agree to asserting the reasonable 
discipline defense at trial? 
A 
Yes . . . .[13] 
¶32 As to other acts, Breitzman testified that she knew 
her statements about striking J.K. to discipline him——which she 
made in the interview with the detective——would likely come up, 
and that she discussed with trial counsel the fact that the 
trial would likely come down to her word against J.K.'s.  She 
also confirmed that, although she was present during opening 
remarks, she never voiced any objection to the court regarding 
                                                 
12 In this exchange, the questions were asked by Breitzman's 
appellate counsel and were answered by Breitzman. 
13 In this exchange, the questions were asked by the State 
and were answered by Breitzman. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
18 
 
her trial counsel's introduction of the reasonable parental 
discipline defense. 
¶33 On 
July 
17, 
2015, 
the 
circuit 
court 
granted 
Breitzman's motion as to count three14 but denied Breitzman's 
motion as to counts four15 and five.16  As to count four, the 
circuit court held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain 
the conviction because it is the "parent's responsibility to 
provide shelter.  It's not a child's responsibility to find 
alternative shelter."  As to count five, the circuit court held 
that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction 
because there was ample testimony that Breitzman's profane 
conduct did tend to cause a disturbance, and in fact did cause a 
disturbance. 
                                                 
14 Count three was the charge for Child Neglect (Bodily 
Harm) under Wis. Stat. § 948.21(1)(b), as to Breitzman's failure 
to seek medical care for J.K. when he was sick for a week with 
vomiting and diarrhea.  The circuit court found that there was 
insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction because the State 
had not proven Breitzman's inaction was a substantial factor in 
harming J.K., specifically that there was no evidence that, had 
Breitzman taken J.K. to the doctor, it would have made a 
difference.  Judgment of acquittal on count three was entered on 
July 24, 2015. 
15 Count four was for Child Neglect (Misdemeanor) under Wis. 
Stat. § 948.21(1)(a), as to Breitzman's locking J.K. out of the 
house during the winter. 
16 Count five was for Disorderly Conduct under Wis. Stat. 
§ 947.01(1), as to Breitzman's engaging in "profane conduct, 
under circumstances in which such conduct tended to cause a 
disturbance." 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
19 
 
¶34 As to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 
circuit court held that there was no ineffective assistance.  
With regard to the failure to move for dismissal of the 
disorderly conduct charge on free speech grounds, the circuit 
court found that there was no prejudice because it would have 
denied any motion made on the basis that Breitzman's profanity 
had no social value and very clear detrimental effects.17  With 
regard to admission of other-acts evidence, the court found that 
there was no deficient performance because it was J.K., not 
Breitzman's trial counsel, who introduced the uncharged incident 
in the car, and that her trial counsel's decision not to object 
on that occasion and on others was part of a reasonable strategy 
to challenge J.K.'s credibility.  Similarly, the circuit court 
found that trial counsel's reasonable parental discipline theory 
was not prejudicial because his discussion of it was vague and 
brief during opening statements.  The circuit court further held 
that there was no aggregate prejudice, in part because it 
specifically instructed the jury on other acts and limited its 
instruction on reasonable parental discipline to the context of 
other acts. 
¶35 On August 3, 2015, Breitzman filed notice of appeal.  
On August 16, 2016, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
                                                 
17 We note that this type of balancing has been rejected as 
a valid method of determining constitutionality under the First 
Amendment.  See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 
(2010).  Because we affirm on other grounds we need not address 
the propriety of the circuit court's reasoning here. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
20 
 
court's denial of Breitzman's postconviction motion.  See 
Breitzman, unpublished slip op., ¶26.  The court of appeals held 
that, as to the free speech claim, there was no prejudice 
because the motion would have been unsuccessful, id., ¶22; that, 
as to trial strategy, there was no prejudice because the 
reasonable parental discipline theory was limited to the 
uncharged incident where Breitzman did not deny striking J.K., 
id., ¶24; and that, as to other-acts evidence, there was no 
deficient performance because counsel's decision not to object 
was strategic, deliberate, and reasonable, id., ¶23. 
¶36 On September 15, 2016, Breitzman filed a petition for 
review in this court.  On March 13, 2017, we granted the 
petition.  Our review here is limited to Breitzman's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, which argues that her trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the disorderly 
conduct charge on the basis that it violated Breitzman's 
constitutional right to free speech, for failing to present a 
theory of defense in opening remarks consistent with Breitzman's 
anticipated testimony, and for failing to object to other-acts 
evidence. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶37 "Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, a criminal defendant is guaranteed 
the right to effective assistance of counsel."  State v. 
Lemberger, 2017 WI 39, ¶16, 374 Wis. 2d 617, 893 N.W.2d 232 
(quoting State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶21, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 
805 N.W.2d 334).  The same right is guaranteed under Article I, 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
21 
 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Whether a defendant 
was denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question 
of law and fact.  See State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶21, 264 
Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305. The factual circumstances of the 
case and trial counsel's conduct and strategy are findings of 
fact, which will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous; 
whether counsel's conduct constitutes ineffective assistance is 
a question of law, which we review de novo.  Id.  To demonstrate 
that counsel's assistance was ineffective, the defendant must 
establish that counsel's performance was deficient and that the 
deficient performance was prejudicial.  See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  If the defendant fails to 
satisfy either prong, we need not consider the other.  Id. at 
697. 
¶38 Whether trial counsel performed deficiently is a 
question of law we review de novo.  See State v. Domke, 2011 WI 
95, ¶33, 337 Wis. 2d 268, 805 N.W.2d 364.  To establish that 
counsel's performance was deficient, the defendant must show 
that it fell below "an objective standard of reasonableness."  
See Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶19.  In general, there is a strong 
presumption that trial counsel's conduct "falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance."  State v. Carter, 
2010 WI 40, ¶22, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695.  Additionally, 
"[c]ounsel's decisions in choosing a trial strategy are to be 
given great deference."  Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶26. 
¶39 Whether any deficient performance was prejudicial is 
also a question of law we review de novo.  See Domke, 337 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
22 
 
Wis. 2d 268, ¶33.  To establish that deficient performance was 
prejudicial, the defendant must show that "there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome."  See Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶20.   
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶40 In evaluating Breitzman's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, we consider three acts——or failures to act——of 
Breitzman's trial counsel:  (A) trial counsel's failure to move 
for dismissal of count five for disorderly conduct on free 
speech grounds; (B) trial counsel's failure to present opening 
remarks consistent with Breitzman's anticipated testimony; and 
(C) trial counsel's failure to object to testimony regarding 
other uncharged conduct.  
¶41 As to the first, we conclude that trial counsel's 
failure to move to dismiss the disorderly conduct charge on the 
basis that it violated Breitzman's constitutional right to free 
speech was not deficient performance, and thus not ineffective 
assistance of counsel, because whether profane conduct that 
tends to cause or provoke a disturbance is protected as free 
speech is unsettled law. 
¶42 As to the second, we conclude that trial counsel's 
theory of reasonable parental discipline, as presented in 
opening remarks, was not deficient performance, and thus not 
ineffective assistance of counsel, because it reflected trial 
counsel's reasonable expectations, which were rationally based 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
23 
 
on discussions with Breitzman, and it was part of a reasonable 
trial strategy. 
¶43 As to the third, we conclude that trial counsel's 
failure to object to testimony regarding uncharged conduct was 
not deficient performance, and thus not ineffective assistance 
of counsel, because declining to object was part of a reasonable 
trial strategy. 
¶44 Because we conclude that trial counsel's performance 
was not deficient, we need not address whether, in the context 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, there was prejudice to 
Breitzman, and we decline to do so. 
¶45 Thus, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
 
A.  Trial Counsel Was Not Deficient For Failing  
To Move For Dismissal Of The Disorderly Conduct Count  
On Free Speech Grounds. 
¶46 We consider first whether trial counsel's failure to 
move to dismiss the disorderly conduct charge on the basis that 
it violated Breitzman's constitutional right to free speech 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
¶47 Breitzman argues that the failure to raise a free 
speech claim was ineffective assistance because the disorderly 
conduct charge was based on the content of Breitzman's speech in 
the privacy of her home, which did not fall within one of the 
narrow categories of unprotected speech.  The State argues that 
the failure to raise a free speech claim was not ineffective 
assistance because Breitzman has not demonstrated that, as a 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
24 
 
matter of settled law, she had a right to engage in profane 
conduct that tends to cause or provoke a disturbance.18 
¶48 We conclude that trial counsel's failure to move to 
dismiss the disorderly conduct charge on the basis that it 
violated Breitzman's constitutional right to free speech was not 
deficient performance, and thus not ineffective assistance of 
counsel, because whether profane conduct that tends to cause or 
provoke a disturbance is protected as free speech is unsettled 
law. 
¶49 At the outset, we note that, for trial counsel's 
performance to have been deficient, Breitzman would need to 
demonstrate that counsel failed to raise an issue of settled 
law.  "[F]ailure to raise arguments that require the resolution 
of unsettled legal questions generally does not render a 
lawyer's services 'outside the wide range of professionally 
competent 
assistance' 
sufficient 
to 
satisfy 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment."  Lemberger, 374 Wis. 2d 617, ¶18 (quoting Basham v. 
United States, 811 F.3d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir. 2016)).  Rather, 
"ineffective assistance of counsel cases should be limited to 
situations where the law or duty is clear . . . ."  Id., ¶33 
(quoting State v. McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d 68, 85, 519 N.W.2d 621 
(Ct. App. 1994)).  Thus, we turn to the question of whether the 
                                                 
18 We note that Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1) is not limited to 
public places: "Whoever, in a public or private place . . . ."  
Thus, the fact that Breitzman was in the privacy of her home 
does not necessarily affect our analysis. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
25 
 
law is clear that profane conduct that tends to cause or provoke 
a disturbance is protected as free speech.  It is not. 
¶50 An individual is guaranteed the right to free speech 
under Article I, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which 
states in relevant part that "[e]very person may freely 
speak . . . his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible 
for the abuse of that right . . . ."  The same right is 
guaranteed under the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, which states in relevant part that "Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."  "Despite 
the differences in language between these two provisions, we 
have found no differences in the freedoms that they guarantee."  
State v. Robert T., 2008 WI App 22, ¶6, 307 Wis. 2d 488, 746 
N.W.2d 564. 
¶51 The First Amendment case law applicable to profanity 
and 
disorderly 
conduct 
finds 
root 
in 
Chaplinsky 
v. 
New 
Hampshire, which held: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited 
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which 
have 
never 
been 
thought 
to 
raise 
any 
Constitutional problem.  These include the lewd and 
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting 
or 
"fighting" 
words——those 
which 
by 
their 
very 
utterance 
inflict 
injury 
or 
tend 
to 
incite 
an 
immediate breach of the peace. . . . [S]uch utterances 
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and 
are of such slight social value as a step to truth 
that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.   "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is 
not in any proper sense communication of information 
or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
26 
 
punishment as a criminal act would raise no question 
under that instrument." 
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)). 
¶52 In a series of cases post-Chaplinsky, this court 
upheld 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 947.01 
against 
numerous 
free 
speech 
challenges.  In State v. Zwicker we held that § 947.01 (1967-
68)19 did not violate defendants' free speech rights because 
"[i]t rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom 
for speech . . . extends its immunity to speech or writing used 
as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal 
statute."  41 Wis. 2d 497, 513, 164 N.W.2d 512 (1969).  In State 
v. Maker we again upheld § 947.01 (1967-68), noting that any 
challenge to the disorderly conduct statute based on words 
spoken or conduct engaged in must balance "the right to maintain 
the 
public 
peace" 
with 
"the 
imperative 
to 
protect 
constitutionally assured personal freedoms."  48 Wis. 2d 612, 
615, 180 N.W.2d 707 (1970).  In State v. Werstein we upheld 
§ 947.01 (1971-72) once again, emphasizing that "[i]t is the 
combination of conduct and circumstances that is crucial in 
applying the statute to a particular situation"; "convictions 
for 
being 
'otherwise 
disorderly' 
result[] 
from 
the 
inappropriateness 
of 
specific 
conduct 
because 
of 
the 
circumstances involved," namely, where "demeanor could be deemed 
                                                 
19 The operative language of subsection (1) of the statute, 
which is at issue here, has not changed substantially since 
these cases were decided. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
27 
 
abusive or disturbing in the eyes of reasonable persons."  60 
Wis. 2d 668, 672-74, 211 N.W.2d 437 (1973); see also State v. 
Becker, 51 Wis. 2d 659, 664-65, 188 N.W.2d 449 (1971); State v. 
Givens, 28 Wis. 2d 109, 121-22, 135 N.W.2d 780 (1965). 
¶53 The United States Supreme Court, however, soon after 
issuing Chaplinsky, narrowed its holding.  See Terminiello v. 
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).  In Terminiello, the Court held 
that 
"freedom 
of 
speech, 
though 
not 
absolute . . . is 
nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless 
shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious 
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or unrest."  Id.  But see Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476, 482-83 (1957) ("[At the time of ratification] all of 
[the] States made either blasphemy or profanity, or both, 
statutory crimes. . . . In light of this history, it is apparent 
that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not 
intended to protect every utterance.").20 
                                                 
20 In response, Breitzman cites to Duncan v. United States, 
48 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1931), for the proposition that "[t]he 
question of what constitutes profane language . . . is usually 
dealt with as a branch of the common-law offense of blasphemy."  
Presumably, 
Breitzman 
cites 
this 
case 
to 
undermine 
the 
constitutionality of a statute which regulates speech rooted in 
archaic norms of propriety.  We do not address this issue here, 
however, as Breitzman has not raised a claim that her speech was 
not profane, or that the statute is facially unconstitutional or 
unconstitutional as-applied to her; her claim here is limited to 
whether defense counsel was ineffective for failing to make such 
a challenge. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
28 
 
¶54 Similarly, while we need not adopt any of the 
following tests for the purposes of our review today, we note 
that our more recent case law could be read to restrict 
statutory regulation of speech to the well-defined categories of 
unprotected speech: fighting words,21 speech that incites others 
into imminent lawless action,22 obscenity,23 libel and defamatory 
speech,24 and true threats25.26  See State v. Douglas D., 2001 WI 
47, ¶17, 243 Wis. 2d 204, 626 N.W.2d 725; State v. A.S., 2001 WI 
48, ¶16, 243 Wis. 2d 173, 626 N.W.2d 712 ("[The defendant's] 
speech can be prosecuted only if [it] is one of the limited 
                                                 
21 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
22 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
23 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
24 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
25 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
26 See also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 
(2012) (adding "speech integral to criminal conduct," "child 
pornography," "fraud," and "speech presenting some grave and 
imminent threat the government has the power to prevent" as 
other content-based restrictions that have been permitted).  
With regard to content-based restrictions, Breitzman also cites 
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 660 
(2004) for the proposition that the Constitution "demands that 
content-based 
restrictions 
on 
speech 
be 
presumed 
invalid . . . and that the Government bear the burden of showing 
their constitutionality."  We express no opinion here, however, 
as to the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 947.01 with regard 
to whether it is a content-based restriction or otherwise, 
because Breitzman has not made a facial or as-applied challenge 
to the statute; her claim here is limited to whether defense 
counsel was ineffective for failing to make such a challenge. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
29 
 
categories of speech that fall outside the protections of the 
First Amendment."); cf. Douglas D., 243 Wis. 2d 204, ¶24, 
(noting that Wis. Stat. § 947.01 is "a recognition of the fact 
that in some circumstances words carry with them proscribable 
nonspeech elements," i.e., "conduct"); State v. Schwebke, 2002 
WI 55, ¶¶29-31, 253 Wis. 2d 1, 644 N.W.2d 666 (holding that the 
disorderly conduct statute does not only apply to public 
disruptions).  The depth and breadth of these restrictions on 
free speech are not so settled in Wisconsin law that counsel's 
performance could be deemed deficient in this case. 
¶55 Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has 
rejected any balancing test that may be inferred from its 
historical descriptions of unprotected categories of speech as 
being "of such slight social value . . . that any benefit that 
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality."  See United States v. Stevens, 
559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 383 (1992) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572)); see also 
Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011); cf. 
Brown, 564 U.S. at 792 (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472) 
("'Maybe there are some categories of speech that have been 
historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically 
identified or discussed as such in our case law.'"). 
¶56 This body of case law does not promulgate a clear 
standard as to whether a charge under Wis. Stat. § 947.01, based 
on profane conduct that tends to cause or provoke a disturbance, 
violates the constitutional right to free speech.  And, because 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
30 
 
Breitzman does not raise a facial or as-applied challenge to the 
disorderly conduct statute,27 we are confined to considering the 
narrower issue of whether the law was so well settled that 
counsel's performance was legally deficient.  See State v. 
Castillo, 213 Wis. 2d 488, 492, 570 N.W.2d 44 (1997) ("An 
appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible 
grounds.").  In that regard, trial counsel was not ineffective 
for not moving to dismiss the disorderly conduct charge, because 
doing so would have required that there be a resolution of an 
unsettled question of law.  See Lemberger, 374 Wis. 2d 617, ¶18. 
¶57 We recognize, however, that the use of profanity alone 
is not enough to sustain a charge for disorderly conduct.  A 
charge for disorderly conduct has two elements: first, that the 
defendant "engage[d] in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, 
boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct"; 
second, that the defendant's conduct "tends to cause or provoke 
a disturbance."  See Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1).  Profanity alone 
might satisfy the first element, but it does not likely satisfy 
the second element.  Thus, it is not profanity alone that is 
being regulated by the statute. 
¶58  We also note that the charge against Breitzman was 
not just that she engaged in "profane conduct," but that she 
"did engage in profane conduct, under circumstances in which 
                                                 
27 See supra ¶5, n.4. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
31 
 
such conduct tended to cause a disturbance . . . ."28  To be 
clear, the crime of disorderly conduct under Wis. Stat. § 947.01 
requires more than profane speech alone.  See Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971) (holding that wearing a 
jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" did not disturb the 
peace where the words were the only conduct, in part because 
there 
was 
"no 
evidence 
that 
persons 
powerless 
to 
avoid 
appellant's conduct did in fact object to it").  But, as is 
clear from the testimony here, Breitzman was not charged with 
disorderly conduct solely because she swore at her son in the 
privacy of her home; rather she was charged and convicted of 
disorderly conduct because her profane conduct was that which, 
under the circumstances presented, tended to cause or provoke a 
disturbance.  See Werstein, 60 Wis. 2d at 673-74 ("[C]onvictions 
for 
being 
'otherwise 
disorderly' 
result[] 
from 
the 
inappropriateness 
of 
specific 
conduct 
because 
of 
the 
circumstances involved," namely where "demeanor could be deemed 
abusive or disturbing in the eyes of reasonable persons"). 
¶59 Here, the jury heard evidence of other occasions where 
Breitzman called J.K. a "fuck face," "retard," and "piece of 
shit"——and on two of the five occasions charged, this profanity 
was punctuated by physical abuse.  Conviction on count one, for 
                                                 
28 Additionally, we note that the State could have charged 
Breitzman with more than "profane conduct," as it is one of many 
options under the statute.  Had the State done so, Breitzman 
acknowledged at oral argument that the constitutional question 
here would not be in issue. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
32 
 
physical abuse, was supported by testimony that Breitzman struck 
J.K. on the side of the head when he was not sweeping "right or 
fast enough," calling him a "piece of shit" and the "dog of the 
house."  Conviction on count two, also for physical abuse, was 
supported by testimony that Breitzman came into J.K.'s room and 
struck him in the face when he would not get out of bed, calling 
him a "fuck face" and a "retard."  
¶60 The jury also heard testimony from J.K.'s best friend 
about the impact this had on J.K., who went from "always happy 
and nice" to "more stressed out and tired and just more sad."29  
A situation need not escalate to violence for the reasonable 
person to determine that the profanity tended to cause or 
provoke a disturbance.30  Simply stated, were this case about 
profanity alone, isolated from the context and conduct out of 
which the charge arose, and had Breitzman made a constitutional 
challenge to the validity of the statute vis-à-vis profanity 
alone, we might be confronted with the need to resolve a free 
speech argument.  But that is just not this case; rather 
                                                 
29 Additionally, J.K. testified that these interactions with 
his mother made him feel worthless, often making him cry, 
ultimately causing him to report this home situation to his 
counselor at school and to the police. 
30 "It is not necessary that an actual disturbance must have 
been committed from the defendant's conduct.  The law requires 
only that the conduct be of the type that tends to cause or 
provoke a disturbance under the circumstances as they then 
existed.  You must consider not only the nature of the conduct, 
but also the circumstances surrounding that conduct.  What is 
proper under one set of circumstances may be improper under 
other circumstances."  See Wis JI——Criminal 1900 (2016). 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
33 
 
Breitzman's conduct, "because [of] the circumstances involved," 
could rightfully "be deemed abusive or disturbing in the eyes of 
reasonable persons."  Werstein, 60 Wis. 2d at 673-74. 
¶61 In sum, Breitzman has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel's performance was deficient because the law in this area 
is unsettled.  Additionally, Breitzman's conduct was more than 
just profanity, and the law does not support the notion that, 
because Breitzman engaged in profane conduct, she is to be 
protected from prosecution regardless of the fact that the 
circumstances tended to cause or provoke a disturbance.  Thus, 
her trial counsel's performance did not fall below the objective 
standard of reasonableness.  
 
B.  Trial Counsel Was Not Deficient For Failing  
To Present Opening Remarks Consistent With  
Breitzman's Anticipated Testimony. 
¶62 We consider second the issue of whether defense 
counsel's theory of reasonable parental discipline at trial 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in light of 
Breitzman's denial that she struck J.K. on the two charged 
occasions.   
¶63 Breitzman argues that it was inconsistent to argue in 
opening remarks that striking J.K. was reasonable parental 
discipline where she planned to testify that she did not strike 
J.K. on the two charged occasions, and that, but for this 
inconsistency, the jury would have been presented with a more 
straightforward credibility comparison.  The State argues that 
Breitzman's counsel's theory of reasonable parental discipline, 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
34 
 
as presented in the opening remarks, was not ineffective 
assistance because it was short, vague, and struck a careful 
balance between Breitzman's plan to deny that she struck J.K. on 
the two charged occasions and trial counsel's reasonable 
anticipation that the uncharged incident in the car would likely 
arise during testimony; moreover, Breitzman agreed with this 
strategy and any unfair prejudice was addressed by the circuit 
court's jury instruction that attorney arguments are not 
evidence.   
¶64 We 
conclude 
that 
defense 
counsel's 
theory 
of 
reasonable parental discipline, as presented in opening remarks, 
was 
not 
deficient 
performance, 
and 
thus 
not 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel, because it reflected trial counsel's 
reasonable 
expectations, 
which 
were 
rationally 
based 
on 
discussions with Breitzman, and it was part of a reasonable 
trial strategy. 
¶65 At the outset, we note that, for trial counsel's 
performance to have been deficient, Breitzman would need to 
overcome the strong presumption of reasonableness of her defense 
counsel's 
trial 
strategy 
by 
demonstrating 
that 
counsel's 
incorporation of the reasonable parental discipline defense was 
irrational or based on caprice.  Trial strategy is afforded the 
presumption of constitutional adequacy.  See, e.g., Balliette 
336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶26; State v. Maloney, 2005 WI 74, ¶43, 281 
Wis. 2d 595, 698 N.W.2d 583.  "Reviewing courts should be 
'highly deferential' to counsel's strategic decisions and make 
'every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting effects of 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
35 
 
hindsight, 
to 
reconstruct 
the 
circumstances 
of 
counsel's 
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's 
perspective at the time.'"  See Domke, 337 Wis. 2d 268, ¶36 
(quoting Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶22).  "This court will not 
second-guess a reasonable trial strategy, [unless] it was based 
on an irrational trial tactic or based upon caprice rather than 
upon judgment."  Id., ¶49.  In fact, where a lower court 
determines that counsel had a reasonable trial strategy, the 
strategy "is virtually unassailable in an ineffective assistance 
of counsel analysis."  State v. Maloney, 2004 WI App 141, ¶23, 
275 Wis. 2d 557, 685 N.W.2d 620.  Thus, we turn to the question 
of whether trial counsel's defense theory of reasonable parental 
discipline was an irrational trial tactic or based on caprice.  
It was not. 
¶66 The parties focus their arguments on defense counsel's 
opening remarks, which discussed the jury instruction for 
reasonable parental discipline and framed the issue as "whether 
[Breitzman] is a criminal or just a struggling parent[.]  I 
believe 
the 
evidence 
will 
show 
that 
she 
is 
not 
a 
criminal . . . ." 
¶67 Trial counsel testified at the Machner hearing that he 
pursued the reasonable parental discipline theory in part 
because of his concern about the credibility battle that would 
play out at trial.  He also testified that he discussed the 
reasonable parental discipline theory with Breitzman, and 
Breitzman testified that she agreed to it.  Trial counsel did 
not specifically recall whether Breitzman had categorically 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
36 
 
denied striking J.K. on the two charged occasions, but did 
recall that it was important to Breitzman to bring up the 
uncharged incident in the car to explain J.K.'s level of 
animosity toward his mother such that he would falsely accuse 
her of abuse and neglect.31   
¶68 Given this testimony, defense counsel's decision to 
incorporate the theory of reasonable parental discipline in his 
opening remarks was not ineffective assistance.  First, "[i]n 
light of the not uncommon practice of lawyers to argue 
inconsistent theories, we cannot say that the decision [to do 
so] deprive[s a defendant] of the right to constitutionally 
effective assistance, irrespective of whether we or the trial 
court view that strategy as the best."  State v. Marks, 2010 WI 
App 172, ¶17, 330 Wis. 2d 693, 794 N.W.2d 547; see also Brown v. 
Dixon, 891 F.2d 490, 494–95 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that it was 
not ineffective assistance of counsel where the defense theory 
was that "Brown either did not commit the murders or did so 
while drunk" because "the use of inconsistent defenses was 
objectively reasonable under prevailing professional norms"). 
¶69 Second, trial counsel's decision was based on a 
discussion with Breitzman about her relationship with J.K. and 
the evidence that she expected and wanted to come out at trial; 
                                                 
31 At the Machner hearing, defense counsel testified that 
"[s]he also told me that she believed that [the car incident] 
was part of the . . . animus [] he had against her to try to 
create these other issues such as when he was injured lifting 
dumbbells and claimed she had struck him, et cetera."   
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
37 
 
therefore, it was not based on caprice.  Nor was it irrational: 
the record reflects that the State pled a number of other acts 
in its criminal complaint, including the uncharged incident in 
the car; that Breitzman in fact wanted this other act to come in 
to establish J.K.'s motive to lie; and that Breitzman never 
unequivocally told trial counsel that she intended to deny 
striking J.K. on the two charged occasions.32  Thus, it was 
rational for her trial counsel to formulate a strategy and argue 
a theory of defense with the expectation that some other acts 
would come out at trial.  Such a strategy had to account for the 
possibility that Breitzman's credibility would be undermined by 
evidence of other acts, and giving the jury an alternate ground 
for acquittal in the event that they had doubts about 
Breitzman's credibility and questions about the other acts was a 
reasonable means of accommodating such contingency. 
¶70 Additionally, there are many aspects of a trial which 
make its outcome uncertain and we cannot let our judgment of 
trial strategy be clouded by the clarity of hindsight.  See, 
e.g., 
Domke, 
337 
Wis. 2d 268, 
¶36 
("Reviewing 
courts 
should . . . make every effort to eliminate the distorting 
                                                 
32 In this regard, we note that the circuit court found that 
defense counsel's testimony at the Machner hearing was credible.  
In light of Breitzman's bias, both from hindsight and as an 
interested party, we cannot hold that such a finding was clearly 
erroneous.  See State v. Shata, 2015 WI 74, ¶31, 364 Wis. 2d 63, 
868 N.W.2d 93 ("[T]his court will not exclude the circuit 
court's articulated assessments of credibility and demeanor, 
unless they are clearly erroneous."). 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
38 
 
effects of hindsight.")  We have concluded here that defense 
counsel's decision to argue the reasonable parental discipline 
defense in his opening remarks was not ineffective based on the 
record.  We note that the record also reflects that Breitzman's 
trial counsel adjusted his strategy based on the development of 
evidence at trial: after Breitzman's testimony concluded, her 
trial counsel adjusted course, successfully advocating for the 
inclusion of reasonable parental discipline as a therapeutic 
instruction for other acts and limiting his discussion of 
reasonable parental discipline during closing argument to the 
other acts.33  These adjustments were appropriate. 
¶71 In sum, Breitzman has failed to demonstrate that her 
trial counsel's performance was deficient because pursuing a 
theory of reasonable parental discipline was rationally based on 
counsel's discussions with Breitzman and his expectations for 
what evidence would come out at trial.  Additionally, when trial 
                                                 
33 After 
testimony 
concluded 
on 
day 
two, 
and 
before 
testimony began on day three, the circuit court conferred with 
the parties outside the presence of the jury regarding jury 
instructions.  The court expressed concern that there was not 
enough evidence to give the reasonable parental discipline 
instruction because Breitzman was denying striking J.K. on the 
two charged occasions.  The State agreed.  Defense counsel 
argued that the instruction was appropriate because the State 
had introduced other acts, namely the uncharged incident in the 
car, which entitled Breitzman to assert the reasonable parental 
discipline defense.  The court ultimately agreed to incorporate 
part of the jury instruction for the reasonable parental 
discipline defense, see Wis JI——Criminal 950 (2014), as a 
therapeutic instruction responsive to other acts.  See infra 
¶78. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
39 
 
did not proceed in accordance with counsel's expectations, he 
adjusted course and the court's limiting instructions——discussed 
below——appropriately addressed any potential juror confusion.  
Thus, trial counsel's performance did not fall below the 
objective standard of reasonableness.  
 
C.  Trial Counsel Was Not Deficient For Failing To Object To  
Testimony Regarding Other Uncharged Conduct. 
¶72 We consider third the related issue of whether trial 
counsel's failure to object to testimony regarding other 
uncharged conduct constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
¶73 Breitzman argues that the failure to object to 
testimony about acts other than those underlying the charges was 
ineffective assistance because the testimony was inadmissible 
"other acts" evidence under Wis. Stat. § 904.04 and, but for 
admission, the jury would have been presented with a more 
straightforward credibility comparison.  The State argues that 
the failure to object was not ineffective assistance because 
allowing this testimony was a reasonable means of accomplishing 
trial counsel's strategy to undermine J.K.'s credibility by 
depicting him as a rebellious teenager who was making grandiose 
allegations; moreover, Breitzman agreed with this strategy.   
¶74 We conclude that trial counsel's failure to object to 
testimony 
regarding 
uncharged 
conduct 
was 
not 
deficient 
performance, and thus not ineffective assistance of counsel, 
because declining to object was part of a reasonable trial 
strategy. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
40 
 
¶75 At the outset, we note that this is again a question 
of trial strategy, and, as such, that Breitzman must overcome 
the strong presumption of reasonableness afforded to trial 
counsel's 
decisions 
regarding 
trial 
strategy; 
for 
trial 
counsel's performance to have been deficient, Breitzman would 
need to demonstrate that counsel's decision not to object to 
other acts was inconsistent with a reasonable trial strategy, 
that is, that it was irrational or based on caprice.  As noted 
above, 
trial 
strategy 
is 
afforded 
the 
presumption 
of 
constitutional adequacy.  See, e.g., Balliette 336 Wis. 2d 358, 
¶26; Maloney, 281 Wis. 2d 595, ¶43.  "Reviewing courts should be 
highly deferential to counsel's strategic decisions and make 
every effort 'to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, 
to 
reconstruct 
the 
circumstances 
of 
counsel's 
challenged 
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective 
at the time.'"  See Domke, 337 Wis. 2d 268, ¶36 (quoting Carter, 
324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶22).  "This court will not second-guess a 
reasonable 
trial 
strategy, 
[unless] 
it 
was 
based 
on 
an 
irrational trial tactic or based upon caprice rather than upon 
judgment."  Id., ¶49.  In fact, where a lower court determines 
that counsel had a reasonable trial strategy, the strategy "is 
virtually unassailable in an ineffective assistance of counsel 
analysis."  Maloney, 275 Wis. 2d 557, ¶23.  Thus, we turn to the 
question of whether trial counsel's failure to object to other-
acts evidence was an irrational trial tactic or based on 
caprice.  It was not. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
41 
 
¶76 Here, the trial strategy was to demonstrate that J.K. 
was making false and grandiose allegations against Breitzman.  
As a part of this strategy, trial counsel did not object to 
other acts involving slapping, failing to provide medical care, 
and/or profanity, because he intended for that evidence to 
undermine J.K.'s credibility and cast Breitzman as a single 
parent doing the best she could with a rebellious teenager.  In 
other words, the testimony as to other acts was central to the 
defense's strategy for bolstering Breitzman's credibility, and 
its theory of reasonable parental discipline, because, for the 
defense to be successful, the jury needed to understand the 
context of the relationship between Breitzman and J.K. so as to 
appropriately assess credibility and determine culpability.  
Thus, failing to object to other acts testimony was not 
deficient performance because it was rational in light of trial 
counsel's strategy and theory. 
¶77 In general, it can be quite effective for a defendant 
to say 'I did this and I did that, but I did not do what the 
State has charged me with,' because it tends to establish a 
defendant's credibility.  But, there are many aspects of a trial 
which make its outcome uncertain and we cannot let our judgment 
of trial strategy be clouded by the clarity of hindsight.  See, 
e.g., 
Domke, 
337 
Wis. 2d 268, 
¶36 
("Reviewing 
courts 
should . . . make every effort to eliminate the distorting 
effects of hindsight.").  Furthermore, Breitzman agreed to the 
defense theory of reasonable parental discipline and "[a]n 
accused cannot follow one course of strategy at the time of 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
42 
 
trial and if that turns out to be unsatisfactory complain [she] 
should be discharged or have a new trial."  Cross v. State, 45 
Wis. 2d 593, 605, 173 N.W.2d 589 (1970).  Thus, Breitzman cannot 
now complain just because a strategy that was reasonable at the 
outset turned out to be unsuccessful. 
¶78 Additionally, the circuit court gave jury instructions 
that limited any unfair prejudice that may have resulted from 
the other acts testimony.  With regard to other acts, the court 
instructed as follows: 
Evidence 
has 
been 
presented 
regarding 
other 
conduct of the defendant for which the defendant is 
not on trial. . . . If you find that this conduct did 
occur, you should consider it only on the issues of 
intent and context or background.  You may not 
consider this evidence to conclude that the defendant 
has a certain character or a certain character trait 
and that the defendant acted in conformity with that 
trait or character with respect to the offense charged 
in this case. 
The evidence was received by [sic] the issues of 
intent, that is, whether the defendant acted with the 
state of mind that is required for the offense 
charged, and to prove context or background that is to 
provide a more complete presentation of the evidence 
related to the offense charged. 
With regard to the uncharged incident in the car, the court 
additionally instructed as follows: 
As to [the] striking of [J.K.] with the back of 
the hand in the car, discipline of a child is an 
issue.  The law allows a person responsible for the 
child's welfare to use reasonable force to discipline 
that child.  Reasonable force is that force which a 
reasonable person would believe is necessary.   
Whether a reasonable person would have believed 
that the amount of force used was necessary and not 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
43 
 
excessive must be determined from the standpoint of 
the defendant at the time of the defendant's acts. 
The standard is what a person of ordinary 
intelligence and prudence would have believed in the 
defendant's position under circumstances that existed 
at the time of the alleged offense. 
These limiting instructions were sufficient to address any 
unfair prejudice that may have resulted from the other acts 
testimony, and in fact bolstered Breitzman's defense regarding 
reasonable parental discipline.  See State v. Marinez, 2011 WI 
12, ¶41, 331 Wis. 2d 568, 797 N.W.2d 399 ("We presume that 
juries comply with properly given limiting and cautionary 
instructions, and thus consider this an effective means to 
reduce the risk of unfair prejudice to the party opposing 
admission of other[-]acts evidence."). 
¶79 In sum, Breitzman has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel's performance was deficient because admission of other 
acts testimony was central to a reasonable defense theory and 
strategy.  Additionally, any unfair prejudice was appropriately 
addressed by limiting instructions from the court.  Thus, 
defense counsel's performance did not fall below the objective 
standard of reasonableness. 
 
D.  We Need Not Consider Prejudice Because  
Trial Counsel Was Not Deficient. 
¶80 To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, 
a 
petitioner 
must 
establish 
both 
that 
counsel's 
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was 
prejudicial.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.   
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
44 
 
¶81 Where the petitioner fails to satisfy either prong of 
the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis we need not 
consider the other.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.  Because 
we conclude that Breitzman has not established that trial 
counsel's performance was deficient, we need not address 
whether, in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
the alleged errors individually or cumulatively prejudiced 
Breitzman, and we decline to do so. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶82 On petition to this court, Breitzman sought review of 
the denial of her ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  In 
this regard, Breitzman's claim did not raise a facial or as-
applied challenge to the disorderly conduct statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 947.01.  A facial challenge would have argued that "profane 
conduct," as listed in § 947.01(1), is not actionable as a crime 
because profanity is protected speech.  An as-applied challenge 
would have argued that Breitzman's profane conduct in this case 
was not actionable as a crime because it was protected speech.  
Breitzman argued neither.  Breitzman only argued that her trial 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance.  Thus, while this case 
touched on an interesting issue of free speech law, we confined 
our analysis to the ineffective assistance of counsel issue 
presented, briefed, and argued by the parties. 
¶83 The ineffective assistance of counsel issue raised 
required consideration of whether counsel was ineffective for 
any of the following reasons: (1) failing to move to dismiss the 
disorderly conduct charge on the basis that is violated 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
45 
 
Breitzman's constitutional right to free speech; (2) failing to 
present opening remarks consistent with Breitzman's anticipated 
testimony; and (3) failing to object to testimony regarding 
other uncharged conduct. 
¶84 As to the first, we conclude that trial counsel's 
failure to move to dismiss the disorderly conduct charge on the 
basis that it violated Breitzman's constitutional right to free 
speech was not deficient performance, and thus not ineffective 
assistance of counsel, because whether profane conduct that 
tends to cause or provoke a disturbance is protected as free 
speech is unsettled law. 
¶85 As to the second, we conclude that trial counsel's 
theory of reasonable parental discipline, as presented in 
opening remarks, was not deficient performance, and thus not 
ineffective assistance of counsel, because it reflected trial 
counsel's reasonable expectations, which were rationally based 
on discussions with Breitzman, and it was part of a reasonable 
trial strategy. 
¶86 As to the third, we conclude that trial counsel's 
failure to object to testimony regarding uncharged conduct was 
not deficient performance, and thus not ineffective assistance 
of counsel, because declining to object was part of a reasonable 
trial strategy. 
¶87 Because we conclude that trial counsel's performance 
was not deficient, we need not address whether, in the context 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, there was prejudice to 
Breitzman, and we decline to do so. 
No. 
2015AP1610-CR   
 
46 
 
¶88 Thus, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2015AP1610-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶89 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  The court's 
opinion is a very narrow decision limited to the facts of the 
case and the issues the defendant raised.   
¶90 This case does not decide a facial or as-applied 
challenge 
to 
the 
disorderly 
conduct 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 947.01.  Breitzman made no such challenge.   
¶91 Additionally, in this court, Breitzman does not 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 
conviction; Breitzman accepts the jury's finding that her 
profane conduct tended to cause or provoke a disturbance within 
the meaning of the statute. 
¶92 The 
claim 
in 
the 
instant 
case 
is 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Breitzman claims that trial counsel was 
ineffective because counsel failed to raise a First Amendment 
defense to Breitzman's disorderly conduct charge. 
¶93 The majority opinion holds against Breitzman on this 
claim, relying on the "unsettled law" rubric.  The majority 
opinion asserts that defense counsel was not ineffective because 
"whether profane conduct that tends to cause or provoke a 
disturbance is protected as free speech is unsettled law."  
Majority op., ¶7.   
¶94 I write to make two points:  (1) Nothing in the 
majority opinion should be read as commenting on the merits of 
the underlying First Amendment defense; and (2) The "unsettled 
law" 
doctrine 
guiding 
the 
determination 
of 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel is not sufficiently protective of a 
No.  2015AP1610-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
defendant's constitutional and statutory rights to effective 
counsel.     
¶95 The bench and bar should be working for a better 
standard for determining the adequacy of representation. 
¶96 I write further on a different topic, namely, my 
practice in participating or not participating in a case 
depending on my participation in various aspects of the 
decision-making process.  I write on this topic in the instant 
case in which I am participating because a majority of the court 
insists that a justice who does not participate in a case merely 
state on the court record the fact of non-participation or 
withdrawal from participation and not state grounds for non-
participation.     
¶97 Lawyers and litigants should know that it is my 
practice not to participate in a decision when I do not fully 
participate in every stage of the decision-making process.  
Thus, for example, if I were present at oral argument but did 
not participate in the decision conference, I would be shown as 
not participating in the decision.  
¶98 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.    
 
No.  2015AP1610-CR.ssa 
 
1