Title: The Florida Bar v. Elizabeth Martinez-Genova

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

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Supreme Court of Florida  
No. SC04-2365 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
vs. 
ELIZABETH MARTINEZ-GENOVA, 
Respondent. 
[June 14, 2007] 
REVISED OPINION 
PER CURIAM. 
Upon consideration of the Bar’s motion for rehearing, we withdraw our 
previous opinion and issue the following opinion. 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that attorney Elizabeth 
Martinez-Genova be found guilty of professional misconduct and suspended from 
the practice of law.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. 
We approve the referee’s factual findings with regard to guilt on all rule 
violations.  However, we do not approve the referee’s recommended discipline 
because we find that a three-year suspension is insufficient because of the serious 
violations that she committed.  For the reasons that follow, Elizabeth Martinez­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Genova is disbarred from the practice of law in the State of Florida, effective, nunc 
pro tunc, October 20, 2004, the date on which Martinez-Genova was suspended by 
order of this Court. 
FACTS 
On December 16, 2004, The Florida Bar filed a two-count complaint against 
respondent Elizabeth Martinez-Genova.  In count one, the Bar alleged that 
Martinez-Genova intentionally misappropriated third-party funds and failed to 
maintain proper trust accounting procedures.  In count two, the Bar alleged that 
Martinez-Genova’s arrests for cocaine use and possession were a violation of rule 
4-8.4(b) (a lawyer shall not commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects) of the 
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.  After conducting a hearing, the referee issued a 
report in which she made the following findings and recommendations. 
Count I 
Martinez-Genova represented her client Gary Wyckle, President of Charter 
One Group, Inc. (Charter One), in a series of transactions with Juan Aramendia 
and Eduardo Solares of Nikita Investment Corporation (Nikita).  Charter One and 
Nikita entered into a conditional loan commitment agreement under which Charter 
One was to assist Nikita in obtaining a loan for $35 million to fund the acquisition 
of a pulp plant and saw mill in Guatemala.  This conditional loan commitment was 
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signed by Solares and Wyckle.  The commitment stated that the borrowers would 
deliver $60,000 to Charter One’s attorney, to be held in trust and credited to loan 
fees at closing.  Martinez-Genova testified that she believed that Wyckle asked her, 
as his attorney, to hold the funds because doing so would make Wyckle appear 
“more credible” to his business partners. 
Martinez-Genova did not sign the conditional loan commitment.  However, 
Martinez-Genova did approve sending, on her letterhead stationery stating that she 
was an attorney, two letters, dated February 11, 2004, and February 19, 2004, 
directing Aramendia and Solares to wire transfer their deposits to her bank 
account.  Both letters stated that the wire transfer funds would be credited to the 
loan commitment fee stipulated in the loan commitment.  On February 12, 2004, 
Solares wired $8000 to Martinez-Genova’s account.  On February 19, 2004, 
Aramendia wired an additional $52,000 to Martinez-Genova’s account. 
Ultimately, Charter One did not obtain financing on behalf of Nikita.  Charter One 
also failed to refund any of the $60,000 deposit. 
In response, Nikita retained Richard Brenner, who filed a complaint with 
The Florida Bar on August 28, 2004, regarding Martinez-Genova’s involvement in 
the failed loan transaction.  A Bar staff auditor examined Martinez-Genova’s sole 
bank account for the period of June 21, 2003, to August 23, 2004.  The auditor 
discovered that as of February 12, 2004, Martinez-Genova had a balance of 
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$11.04.  Then, on February 13, 2004, Martinez-Genova received a wire transfer in 
the amount of $8000 from Solares, acting under the name Helicopteros Del Norte. 
In the following days, Martinez-Genova made a $7700 over-the-counter cash 
withdrawal and several ATM withdrawals of smaller amounts.  As of February 17, 
2004, only $18.82 remained in Martinez-Genova’s account. 
On February 20, 2004, Martinez-Genova received a wire transfer in the 
amount of $52,000 from Aramendia.  During the following week, Martinez-
Genova made four over-the-counter cash withdrawals from her account totaling 
$25,150.  Martinez-Genova also authorized three wire transfers to Charter One and 
its designees totaling $26,103.  Finally, Martinez-Genova made a number of debit 
card purchases and ATM withdraws from her account during that same week.  On 
February 27, 2004, the balance in Martinez-Genova’s operating account was 
$327.50.  By March 8, 2004, Martinez-Genova had a balance of negative $26.96. 
Martinez-Genova testified that she agreed to act as Wyckle’s agent in the 
Nikita transaction in exchange for a fee of three percent of the $60,000 deposit. 
She claims to have only retained or spent her $1800 fee and to have given the 
balance of the cash she withdrew to Wyckle.  However, Martinez-Genova did not 
keep any records of the above transactions or document her fee. 
Martinez-Genova’s pattern of receiving third-party funds and disbursing 
them to herself or Wyckle resumed on May 13, 2004.  Beginning with a balance of 
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$1, Martinez-Genova received wire transfers totaling $59,800 over a three-month 
period.  From these funds, Martinez-Genova transferred $53,850 to American 
Escrow Company, LLC,1 which was owned by Gary Wyckle, withdrew $5811 in 
cash and used $139 to pay bank charges. 
After a hearing, the referee found Martinez-Genova guilty of violating Rule 
of Professional Conduct 4-8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and Rules Regulating Trust 
Accounts 5-1.1(a) (Nature of Money or Property Entrusted to Attorney), 5-1.1(b) 
(Application of Trust Funds or Property to Specific Purpose), 5-1.1(e) (Notice of 
Receipt of Trust Funds; Delivery; Accounting), 5-1.1(f) (Disputed Ownership of 
Trust Funds), 5-1.2(b) (Minimum Trust Accounting Records), 5-1.2(c) (Minimum 
Trust Accounting Procedures), and 5-1.2(d) (Record Retention). 
Specifically, the referee found that the deposit sent to Martinez-Genova by 
Nikita was to be held in trust according to the loan commitment and that despite 
this expectation of trust, Martinez-Genova “had a pattern of receiving third-party 
funds and simultaneously withdrawing and disbursing from those funds.”  The 
referee found that “third-party funds were not being used for their intended 
purpose” and that Martinez-Genova “willfully ignored her responsibilities as an 
attorney during the period in which she misappropriated money from third­
1. Martinez-Genova prepared American Escrow Company’s articles of 
incorporation and signed as its registered agent. 
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parties.”  Finally, the referee found that Martinez-Genova “knew that what she was 
doing was wrong” and noted that neither Martinez-Genova nor Wyckle had made 
restitution. 
Count II 
The Bar’s complaint also addressed Martinez-Genova’s history of drug use 
and repeated arrests for drug possession. Martinez-Genova was arrested three 
times for possession of cocaine between June 20, 2002, and June 4, 2004.  After 
the last arrest, Martinez-Genova was incarcerated and remained in custody until 
she was transferred to St. Luke’s Addiction Recovery Center, an in-patient drug 
treatment facility, in July 2004.  She remained in St. Luke’s until she was 
successfully discharged in September 2004.  The referee found that Martinez­
Genova’s drug use and possession violated Rule of Professional Conduct 4-8.4(b) 
(A lawyer shall not commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s 
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects). 
Applying the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the referee 
found four aggravating factors: (1) Martinez-Genova acted from a selfish motive— 
the support of her drug habit; (2) she displayed a pattern of misconduct over a 
substantial period of time; (3) she was involved in a series of improper 
transactions, amounting to multiple offenses; and (4) she caused actual harm to 
third parties without payment of restitution to them. 
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The referee found nine mitigating factors: (1) Martinez-Genova had personal 
and emotional problems including a cocaine addiction and clinical depression; (2) 
she cooperated with the Bar during its investigation; (3) she was inexperienced in 
the practice of law; (4) she made a good-faith effort to rectify the misconduct set 
out in Count II by voluntarily entering into a three-year contract with Florida 
Lawyers Assistance, Inc. (FLA); (5) she presented evidence of good character; (6) 
she had a mental disability (cocaine addiction, clinical depression); (7) she 
expressed remorse for her misconduct; (8) she entered into interim rehabilitation 
programs (three-year contract with FLA, outpatient therapy, Narcotics 
Anonymous); and (9) she had imposed upon her other penalties or sanctions 
(Martinez-Genova must attend Miami Behavioral meetings, submit to semiweekly 
drug tests, and attend Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous meetings 
for a period of one year by court order; Martinez-Genova suffered negative 
publicity in The Miami Herald; Martinez-Genova lost visitation with her son in 
part due to her drug use). 
Based on these factors and Florida case law, the referee recommended that 
Martinez-Genova be sanctioned by a three-year suspension, retroactive to the date 
of her emergency suspension, followed by a two-year period of probation if 
reinstated.  During this probationary period, Martinez-Genova would be required 
to participate in FLA, submit to mandatory semimonthly urine tests, participate in 
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outpatient therapy, and enroll in the Law Office Management Assistance Service 
(LOMAS) program regarding the operation of trust accounts.  Martinez-Genova’s 
trust transactions would be monitored by a suitable mentor during the probationary 
period.  The referee also recommended that the Bar’s costs be imposed against 
Martinez-Genova. 
The Bar filed a petition for review with this Court, seeking disbarment rather 
than the recommended discipline.  Martinez-Genova argues that suspension is 
appropriate given the referee’s findings of mitigating factors. 
ANALYSIS 
Neither party challenges the findings of fact or recommendations as to guilt. 
Accordingly, we approve without further discussion the referee’s recommendation 
that Martinez-Genova be found guilty of violating the above rules.  As to the 
recommended discipline, the Bar argues that case law requires this Court to reject 
the referee’s recommendation of discipline.  We agree. 
In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this Court’s scope of 
review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because 
ultimately it is the Court’s responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See Fla. 
Bar v. Lawless, 640 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 1994); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. 
Const.  However, generally speaking, this Court will not second-guess the referee’s 
recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law 
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and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  Fla. Bar v. McFall, 863 
So. 2d 303, 307 (Fla. 2003). 
In this case, existing law indicates that the referee’s recommendation of 
suspension is not sufficient discipline in accord with our case law in respect to a 
lawyer’s misuse of client funds.  Disbarment is the presumptive discipline for 
misuse of client funds because it is unquestionably one of the most serious offenses 
a lawyer can commit.  Fla. Bar v. Gross, 896 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2005); Fla. Bar v. 
Barley, 831 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 2002); Fla. Bar v. Tillman, 682 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 
1996); Fla. Bar v. Weinstein, 635 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1994); Fla. Bar v. Shanzer, 572 
So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 1991).  This presumption of disbarment is “exceptionally 
weighty when the attorney’s misuse is intentional rather than a result of neglect or 
inadvertence.”  Barley, 831 So.2d at 171. 
Martinez-Genova’s misuse of third-party funds was intentional.  Martinez­
Genova’s letters to Aramendia and Solares indicated that the wire-transferred 
funds, totaling $60,000, would be credited to the loan commitment fee.  Aramendia 
and Solares had a right to rely upon her not misusing the funds since the funds 
were sent to Martinez-Genova, who had sent them letters as an attorney.  The 
referee found the commitment fee was to be held in trust.  Yet, bank records 
indicate that on February 23, 2004, Martinez-Genova completed a withdrawal 
ticket for a $4500 cashier’s check and another for $8000 in cash.  A few days later, 
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on February 27, 2004, Martinez-Genova again completed two withdrawal tickets, 
one for a $6600 cashier’s check and another for $6050 in cash.  During this period, 
Martinez-Genova also initiated three separate wire transfers, totaling $26,103, to 
Charter One and its creditors.  Martinez-Genova could not have inadvertently 
walked into her bank branch and unintentionally made these withdrawals from her 
account. 
This Court agrees with the referee’s finding that Martinez-Genova “willfully 
ignored her responsibilities as an attorney during the period in which she 
misappropriated money from third-parties.”  As a result, Martinez-Genova’s 
misconduct is not analogous to negligent misappropriation cases such as Florida 
Bar v. Mason, 826 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 2002), and Florida Bar v. Wolf, 930 So. 2d 574 
(Fla. 2006), where this Court has found suspension to be an adequate sanction. 
In both Mason and Wolf the Court found that the attorneys’ 
misappropriations were due to mistakes in accounting practices and that there was 
no evidence that any clients ultimately sustained losses.  Mason, 826 So. 2d at 988; 
Wolf, 930 So. 2d at 578.  In contrast, Martinez-Genova kept no bank account 
records at all and intentionally withdrew funds that were to be held in trust. 
Moreover, Martinez-Genova has not made restitution to any of the injured parties. 
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The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions confirms that 
disbarment is the appropriate sanction in the present disciplinary action.  Section 
7.1 states: 
Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages 
in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the 
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious 
or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. 
The referee found that Martinez-Genova knowingly caused injury to members of 
the public for the benefit of herself and her client Wyckle.  Thus, disbarment is 
appropriate under the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
Martinez-Genova argues that the circumstances surrounding her 
misappropriation mitigate against disbarment.  This Court has considered whether 
an attorney’s personal and emotional problems, such as drug addiction, outweigh 
the seriousness of the attorney’s misconduct when determining what discipline to 
impose.  However, the Court finds mitigating factors to overcome the presumption 
of disbarment for misappropriation only in exceptional and unusual circumstances 
because this Court refuses to “excuse an attorney for dipping into his trust funds as 
a means of solving personal problems.”  Fla. Bar v. Shanzer, 572 So. 2d at 1384. 
For example, in Florida Bar v. Shuminer, 567 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1990), the 
Court disbarred an attorney who misappropriated client funds despite finding the 
mitigating factors present in the current action, personal and emotional problems, 
cooperation with the Bar, inexperience in the practice of law, good reputation, 
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mental impairment due to addiction, successful rehabilitation efforts, and remorse, 
plus the additional factors that Shuminer had no prior disciplinary history and he 
had made a good-faith effort at restitution.  Notwithstanding this long list of 
mitigating factors, the Court found that Shuminer “failed to establish that his 
addictions rose to a sufficient level of impairment to outweigh the seriousness of 
his offenses.”  Id. at 432. 
Similarly, in Florida Bar v. Clement, 662 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1995), the Court 
disbarred an attorney for intentional misappropriation where the attorney was 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder.  The Court held that Clement’s psychological 
disorder did not outweigh the seriousness of his misconduct because the referee 
found that Clement could distinguish right from wrong at the time of his 
misconduct.  Id. at 699. 
Martinez-Genova makes no more showing of impairment than Shuminer or 
Clement.  Just as Shuminer “continued to work effectively” during his struggle 
with alcoholism, the referee found that Martinez-Genova passed the Florida Bar 
Examination and handled a complex litigation case despite daily cocaine use. 
Shuminer, 567 So. 2d at 432.  And the referee found that, like Clement, Martinez-
Genova was able to distinguish right from wrong at the time of the 
misappropriation despite the effects of her drug addiction and depression. 
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Furthermore, Martinez-Genova’s situation is distinguishable from a case 
where this Court found an attorney’s personal problems to outweigh the 
seriousness of her misconduct.  In Florida Bar v. Tauler, 775 So. 2d 944, 947 (Fla. 
2000), the Court approved the referee’s recommendation of suspension and 
distinguished Shuminer and Shanzer after the referee found that Tauler was “less 
culpable” because her misconduct was the product of personal and emotional 
distress.  Specifically, the referee found that Tauler’s husband was the “prime 
mover” behind her wrongdoings.  Id.  Yet, in Tauler, we expressly cautioned that 
“without the unique mitigating circumstances presented in the instant case and 
Tauler’s clear commitment to providing legal assistance to those in need, we would 
not hesitate to disbar Tauler.” Id. at 949. 
Martinez-Genova’s case does not present the same unique mitigating 
circumstances as Tauler. Most notably, while Martinez-Genova has made no 
attempt at restitution, Tauler made timely and good-faith restitution.  Also, while 
Martinez-Genova has provided some pro bono assistance, Tauler dedicated 
hundreds of hours to assisting the poor prior to her suspension.  Finally, Martinez-
Genova has some history of misconduct, whereas the Court did not note any 
previous discipline in Tauler. 
Martinez-Genova’s struggle with drug addiction and clinical depression and 
her admirable progress towards rehabilitation are relevant to this Court’s 
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determination of discipline.  However, this is not a case where an attorney’s 
substance abuse and personal turmoil cast doubt on the knowing, intentional nature 
of his or her misconduct.  Upon review of all of the facts, prior case law, and the 
Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, we find disbarment to be the 
appropriate level of discipline. 
Finally, the referee recommended that costs in the amount of $8,235.52 be 
charged to Martinez-Genova.  The Bar has requested that the costs incurred in 
seeking appellate review of the referee’s erroneous recommendation of discipline 
also be charged to the respondent.  This Court has final discretionary authority to 
award costs.  Fla. Bar v. Lechtner, 666 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1996); Fla. Bar v. Bosse, 
609 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 1992).  In Lechtner, this Court explained: 
[G]enerally, when there is a finding that an attorney has been found 
guilty of violating a Rule Regulating the Florida Bar, the Bar should 
be awarded its costs.  Assessment of costs against a respondent who 
has violated the Rules of Discipline is a policy decision.  The choice is 
between imposing the costs of discipline on those who have violated 
our Rules of Professional Conduct or on the membership of the Bar 
who have not.  In these situations, it is only fair to tax those costs 
against the member who has violated the rules. 
666 So. 2d at 894 (citations omitted).  In the instant case, we agree that the Bar’s 
appellate costs were reasonable and necessary to correct the referee’s erroneous 
recommendation of discipline for such serious misconduct.  We further agree that 
these costs should be borne by the respondent as a matter of policy. 
CONCLUSION 
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Based on the above, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and 
recommendations as to guilt but reject the recommended discipline and instead 
order disbarment.  Accordingly, Elizabeth Martinez-Genova is hereby disbarred for 
a period of five years, effective nunc pro tunc, October 20, 2004, the effective date 
of the emergency suspension in Florida Bar v. Martinez-Genova, 888 So. 2d 19 
(Fla. 2004) (table).  Martinez-Genova may petition the Florida Board of Bar 
Examiners for readmission five years from the date of the suspension.  Judgment is 
entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399­
2300, for recovery of costs from Elizabeth Martinez-Genova in the amount of 
$12,651.61, for which sum let execution issue. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
WELL, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur. 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF DISBARMENT. 
WELLS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I concur in the majority’s decision to disbar attorney Elizabeth Martinez-
Genova because of the serious violations she committed.  However, I dissent from 
the majority’s decision to grant rehearing on the issue of costs and to award the Bar 
over $4000 in appellate costs. 
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As the majority correctly notes, generally, the Bar should be awarded its 
costs as a matter of policy where an attorney is found guilty of violating a Rule 
Regulating the Florida Bar.  Majority op. at 14-15 (citing Fla. Bar v. Lechtner, 666 
So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1996)).  However, no authority dictates that a respondent must 
always pay the Bar’s disciplinary costs.  To the contrary, rule 3-7.6(q)(3) of the 
Rules of Regulating the Florida Bar provides that when the Bar is successful, in 
whole or in part, in a disciplinary proceeding, the referee may assess the Bar’s 
costs against the respondent unless it is shown that the costs were unnecessary, 
excessive, or improperly authenticated.  This Court has repeatedly held that we 
have final discretionary authority to award costs and that we may consider whether 
an expense is reasonable and award or refuse to award that cost as sound discretion 
dictates.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Bosse, 609 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 1992); Fla. Bar v. 
Davis, 419 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1982). 
While I agree that the referee erred in not recommending disbarment in this 
case, I nevertheless believe that the Court should exercise its discretion to not 
impose the Bar’s appellate costs on Martinez-Genova due to the unique 
circumstances surrounding this appeal.  The referee found as mitigating factors that 
Martinez-Genova cooperated with the Bar in these proceedings and that she was 
genuinely remorseful for her actions.  Martinez-Genova stipulated to the factual 
allegations against her and admitted that she violated rule 4-8.4(b).  She accepted 
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the referee’s recommendations of guilt and discipline rather than petitioning this 
Court for review of the referee’s report.  After the Bar petitioned for review, she 
still did not challenge the referee’s findings of guilt or recommended discipline. 
At oral argument, Martinez-Genova’s counsel, appearing pro bono on her behalf, 
attempted to use that opportunity to argue regarding the Bar’s amended affidavit of 
costs before being told by this Court to focus on preventing her client from being 
disbarred. 
Given Martinez-Genova’s efforts to minimize the overall cost of these 
proceedings, I would exercise our discretion to not tax the Bar’s significant 
appellate costs to her.  Martinez-Genova clearly brought most of the expense of 
this disciplinary proceeding upon herself by violating the Rules Regulating the 
Florida Bar.  However, it is not at all clear, in my opinion, that Martinez-Genova 
caused the Bar’s appellate costs.  I would therefore approve the referee’s 
recommendation that judgment be entered for the Bar in the amount of $8,235.52. 
Moreover, I feel that it is inappropriate for the Court to grant rehearing in 
this case where the issue of the Bar’s appellate costs was explicitly and fully 
considered prior to the Bar’s motion for rehearing. 
CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur. 
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Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and Kenneth L. Marvin, Director of 
Lawyer Regulation, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, Barnaby Lee Min, Bar 
Counsel, The Florida Bar, Miami, Florida,
 
for Complainant 
Nancy C. Wear, Coral Gables, Florida, and Gary S. Glasser, Miami, Florida 
 
for Respondent 
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