Title: Nunnery v. State

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

427 Nev., Advance Opinion G1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

EUGENE HOLLIS NUNNERY, No. 51870

wi FILED

‘THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent. oct 27 20

Sa.

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury

 

 

verdict, of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, two counts
of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, conspiracy to
commit robbery, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, two counts of
attempted robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and a sentence of
death. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Sally L. Loehrer,
Judge.
Affirmed.
David M. Schieck, Special Public Defender, and JoNell Thomas and Ivette

A. Maningo, Deputy Special Public Defenders, Clark County,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger,
District Attorney, and David L. Stanton and Naney A. Becker, Deputy
District Attorneys, Clark County,

for Respondent.

 

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and Robert E, Wieland, Senior
Deputy Attorney General, Carson City,
for Amicus Curiae Office of the Attorney General.

 

Richard A. Gammick, District Attorney, and Terrence P. McCarthy,
Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County,
for Amicus Curiae Washoe County District Attorney.

 

 
Jeremy T. Bosler, Public Defender, and John Reese Petty, Chief Deputy
Public Defender, Washoe County,
for Amicus Curiae Washoe County Public Defender.

Franny A. Forsman, Federal Public Defender, and Michael Pescetta,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Las Vegas,

for Amicus Curiae Office of the Federal Public Defender for the District of
Nevada.

Paola M. Armeni, Las Vegas,
for Amicus Curiae Nevada Attorneys for Criminal Justice.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION
By the Court, CHERRY, J.

A jury found appellant Eugene Nunnery guilty of multiple
charges and sentenced him to death for a first-degree murder conviction.
‘Nunnery raises numerous claims of error at the guilt and penalty phases
of his trial and challenges his death sentence. We conclude that none of
his claims warrant relief and therefore affirm the judgment of conviction.

In this opinion, we focus primarily on three of Nunnery’s
claims related to the penalty phase of the trial. First, we consider the
circumstances in which a district court may allow an untimely notice of
evidence in aggravation under SCR 250(4)(f). We hold that the district
court has discretion to allow an untimely notice of evidence in aggravation
upon a showing of good cause and that the relevant factors include the
danger of prejudice to the defense in its preparation as a result of the
untimely notice. Second, we consider whether the confidentiality

provision in NRS 176.156 precludes the admission of presentence

investigation reports at penalty hearings. We conclude that it does not

 

 
and that the admission of information in presentence investigation reports
is within the discretion of the trial judge. Third, we consider whether
‘Nunnery’s Sixth Amendment trial rights were violated when the district
court declined to instruct the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances before it could find him eligible for the death penalty. We
conclude that the district court did not err because the weighing of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not a factual determination
subject to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and because Nevada's statutory scheme
focuses on whether there are mitigating circumstances sufficient to
outweigh the aggravating circumstances, not whether the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances,

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

On the night of September 22, 2006, a group of five men were

 

in the parking lot of a Las Vegas apartment complex conversing and
listening to music when Nunnery and three other men! approached them
and demanded money. All four assailants were armed with guns. Three
of the victims took out their wallets and placed them on the ground, but
19-year-old Victor Ambriz-Nunez was unable to get his wallet out of his
pocket, and decided to run, prompting Nunnery and his companions to
begin firing their weapons. Nunnery grabbed Ambriz-Nuner’s uncle, Saul
Nunez, and shot him in the head at close range, killing him, He also fired

!Nunnery’s companions were George Brass, Brandon Bland, and
Carlton Fowler.

 

 
at the fleeing Cesar Leon, hitting him in the back of the head. At the
same time, Nunnery's companions were shooting at the other fleeing
victims. Leon survived, as did the remaining three vietims: Ambriz-
‘Nunez was able to escape without being hit and Leo Carlos and Leobardo
Ledesma both survived by falling to the ground and pretending that they
were dead. Before fleeing, Nunnery shot Nunez twice more to ensure that
he was dead.

A.coll phone dropped at the erime scene led the police to one of
Nunnery’s companions. During the subsequent search of an apartment
where Nunnery resided, investigators recovered a gun that was
forensically matched to shells recovered from the crime scene and the
bullet recovered from Nunez's head. Nunnery confessed to the crime
during an interview with police. In particular, he admitted to planning
the robbery and choosing the victims
shooting Leon,

8 well

 

to killing Saul Nunez and

 

Nunnery ws

 

charged with open murder for the shooting of
Saul Nunez based on three theories: (1) premeditation and deliberation,
(2) felony murder, and (3) aiding and abetting. In addition, he was
charged with attempted murder for the shooting of Cesar Leon, attempted
murder for shooting at the fleeing Victor Ambriz-Nunez or Leobardo
Ledesma, conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery, and two counts of
attempted robbery. The State elected to seek the death penalty, and
Nunnery was tried separately from his codefendants.

At the guilt phase of trial, the State presented the testimony
of the surviving victims, other eyewitnesses to the crime, investigating
officers, and the pathologist who performed the autopsy and concluded by

presenting Nunnery’s confession. The defense did not present any

 

 
evidence. After deliberating for two hours, the jury returned a verdict of
guilty on all counts? ‘The case then proceeded to a jury trial on the
penalty for the murder conviction.

‘The district court bifurcated the penalty hearing into two
phases. In the first phase, the jury heard evidence of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and weighed those circumstances; in the second
phase, the jury considered other evidence relevant to sentencing and
determined the sentence for the murder convietion.

During the first phase of the penalty hearing, the State
alleged six aggravating circums'

 

nnces based on the guilt-phase evidence:
Nunnery had been convicted of four violent felonies based on (1) the
attempted murder of Cesar Leon, (2) the attempted murder of Victor
Ambriz-Nunez or Leobardo Ledesma, (3) the armed robbery of Cesar Leon,
and (4) the attempted robbery of Leobardo Ledesma, NRS 200.033(2)(b);
(5) he “knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person,”
NRS 200.033(3); and (6) the murder was committed while he was engaged
in a robbery, NRS 200.033(4). In support of these aggravating
circumstances, the State moved to introduce all of the evidence that had
been presented at the guilt phase and did not present any additional
evidence.

As mitigating evidence, Nunnery presented testimony
concerning his childhood and mental health history. The defense called 14
witnesses, including members of Nunnery’s extended family, former
teachers, ex-girlfriends, investigators for the defense, and two expert

“The verdict form indicates that the jury unanimously found that
the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.

 
 

witnesses. Nunnery’s family members testified that his father had been a
drug addict and his mother had been an alcoholic, his mother died of an
overdose when he was young, and he and his siblings were taken from his
father and placed in foster care. In foster care, the children were
separated; Nunnery was moved frequently due to his behavior and
therefore lacked a stable living situation. Turning to his mental health,
Nunnery presented testimony regarding his intellectual functioning and
the possibility that he suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome, which refers
to the mental, physical, and growth problems that a child may experience
when a mother consumes alcohol during prognancy.® His former teachers
testified that Nunnery had some minor learning disabilities, while two
expert witnesses suggested that Nunnery exhibited effects that were
consistent with a mild form of fetal aleohol syndrome. According to Dr.
William Orrison, a neuroradiologist, an MRI showed that Nunnery had a
below-average number of connections in his corpus callosum, which was

consistent with fetal alcohol effect.‘ Dr. Thomas Kinsora, a clinical

8Fetal alcohol syndrome has been defined as the “well-known result
of alcohol abuse during pregnancy,” which consists of “fetal growth
retardation, central nervous system abnormalities including mild-to-
moderate mental retardation, congenital heart defects, and various
craniofacial abnormalities.” 5 Roscoe N. Gray, M.D., & Louise J. Gordy,
M.D., LL.B., Attorneys’ Textbook of Medicine § 17.34(1) (3d ed. 2010).

‘Fetal alcohol effect has been defined as “[a] milder form of the fetal
alcohol syndrome...,caused by an intake of moderate or even small
amounts of alcohol by a pregnant woman” and includes effects such as
“emotional problems, inability to cope in school or on the job, difficulty in
paying attention, insomnia, ete.” 2 J.B. Schmidt, M.D., Attorneys’
Dictionary of Medicine and Word Finder F-64 (2010).

 

 
xen ce

neuropsychologist, concurred with that opinion and further opined that
Nunnery has problems with impulse control and has a cognitive disorder,
but he admitted that the evidence did not show “full blown” fetal aleohol
syndrome.

‘The jury unanimously found that the State had proven all six
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. One or more jurors
found eleven mitigating circumstances: (1) Nunnery’s parents were drug
addicts, (2) he was born and raised in poverty, (3) his mother died at an
early age, (4) he was exposed to drug abuse and crime at an early age, (6)
his father abandoned the children, (6) he was raised without adequate
parental figures, (7) he had no extended family support, (8) he wa
separated from his siblings by the system, (9) he suffered from Low
Impulse Control, (10) he suffered from Attention Deficit Disorder, and (11)
he was a special education student. ‘The jury concluded that the
mitigating circumstances were not sufficient to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances,

During the second phase of the penalty hearing, the State
presented evidence related to Nunnery’s criminal history and a victim:
impact statement from Nunez’s brother. ‘The criminal-history evidence
included a prior conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance and
pending charges that included two other murders. One of the pending
‘cases involved a murder and robbery that occurred approximately 10 days
before the incident in this case under similar circumstances; the other
pending case involved the murder of a drug dealer and shooting of a 15-
year-old girl that had occurred the preceding month. Nunnery had
confessed to his involvement in those incidents and was facing trial in
both cases at the time of the penalty hearing. The jury also heard

 

 
testimony that Nunnery had confessed to involvement in two unsolved
armed robberies.

Nunnery’s presentation during the second phase focused on
sociological and penological evidence. Dr. Martin Sanchez-Jankowski, a
sociologist, testified regarding the relationship between poverty and
violence and the impact of growing up in a poor neighborhood such as the
one in which Nunnery was raised. A retired California corrections
‘employee described the conditions at Ely State Prison and the structured
and secured environment in which Nunnery would live if he received a life

sentence. One of Nunnery’s ex-girlfriends and his sister each briefly

 

testified about the positive impact he could have if he was sentenced to life

in prison, Finally, when given the opportunity to make

 

‘atement in
allocution, Nunnery admitted his guilt and expressed no remorse, telling
the jury:

T'm not sorry for what I did. I'm guilty. Td do it
again. I'm not sorry. I did that. Whether I get
the death penalty or life, hey, that’s what
happened. [The prosecutor] dropped all the
charges, I walk out of here right now, and Id do
the same thing.

After deliberating for two hours, the jury sentenced Nunnery to death for
the first-degree murder conviction. In a separate sentencing hearing, the
district court sentenced Nunnery to various prison terms for the
remaining convictions.
DISCUSSION
‘The primary issues addressed in this opinion involve the
penalty phase of the trial—the admission of evidence in aggravation that

was summarized in an untimely notice, the testimony regarding the

presentence investigation report, and the instruction on weighing of

 

 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We therefore address the
penalty-phase issues first. We then turn to the guilt-phase issues and,
finally, conclude with our mandatory review of the death sentence under
NRS 177.055(2).
Penalty-phase claims

Notice of evidence in aggravation under SCR 250(4)(f)

In a case in which the death penalty is sought, the State is
required by SCR 250(4)(f) to file a notice of evidence in aggravation “no
later than 15 days before trial is to commence.” The notice must
“summarize the evidence which the state intends to introduce at the
penalty phase of trial
means by which the evidence will be introduced.” SCR 250(4)(. Evidence
that is not summarized in the notice “shall not” be admitted “[aJbsent a
showing of good cause.” Id, “If the court determines that good cause has

and identify the witnesses, documents, or other

 

been shown to admit evidence not previously summarized in the notice, it
‘must permit the defense to have a reasonable continuance to prepare to
meet the evidence.” Id.

Here, the State filed its notice of evidence in aggravation on
March 12, 2008—12 days before the trial commenced on March 24, 2008.
Nunnery moved to prechide the State from presenting any evidence in
aggravation at the penalty phase based on its failure to file the notice in a
timely fashion. ‘The district court denied the motion, finding “good cause
to find excusable neglect” based on the sequence in which the three
murder cases were supposed to be tried and no prejudice to the defense
because similar notices had been filed months earlier in the two other

murder cases and all three cases involved the same attorneys. Nunnery

takes issue with the district court’s focus on lack of prejudice to the

 

 
oon

defense, arguing that lack of prejudice is not a relevant consideration, and
argues that the State failed to show good cause to justify its untimely
notice. Alternatively, he argues that he was prejudiced by admission of
the evidence summarized in the untimely notice, particularly the evidence
related to the two other pending murder cases, because, according to
Nunnery, without that evidence, “there is a reasonable probability that
the jury would not have returned a sentence of death.”

We have addressed SCR 250(4)({) in only one published
decision. In Mason v. State, 118 Nev. 554, 560-62, 51 P.3d 521, 625-26
(2002), we held that the rule applies to “other matter” evidence that is
admissible at a capital penalty hearing, not just evidence related to
We therefore concluded that the

 

jatutory aggravating circumstances.

 

district court erred in admitting evidence that had not been included in
the notice of evidence in aggravation “without determining whether there
was good cause for not providing notice of it earlier.” Id, at 562, 51 P.3d at
526. But we further determined that the error w:

harmless because the

   

defendant was not sentenced to death and the evidence was otherwise
admissible. Id, As a result, Mason did not address the meaning of good
cause for purposes of SCR 250(4)(1).

In that void, Nunnery turns to our decisions interpreting the
SCR 250(4)—the
provision that requires the State to file a notice of intent to seek the death

good-cause requirement in another notice provision

 

penalty within 30 days after the indictment or information is filed, SCR
250(4)(@). See, e.g., State v, Dist. Ct. (Marshall), 116 Nev. 953, 11 P.3d
1209 (2000). Under that provision, the district court has discretion to
“grant a motion to file a late . .. or... amended notice” of intent but only
“{ujpon a showing of good cause.” SCR 250(4)(d). In interpreting those

10

 

 
provisions, we have indicated that “[glood cause requires a reason
external to the prosecutor for [the] failure to serve notice,” Marshall, 116
Nev. at 968, 11 P.d at 1218 (quoting State v, Dearbone, 883 P.2d 303, 305
(Wash, 1994)), and that “nothing in the [notice of intent] rule suggests

 

that lack of prejudice to the defendant can supplant the express
requirement of a showing of good cause before the district court may grant
motion to file a late notice of intent to seek death,” id, at 967, 11 P.3d
1209 at 1217, Given this interpretation of the notice of intent provisions,
we held in Marshall that the district court had not manifestly abused its
discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in not allowing the State's
late notices of intent after finding no good cause based on the prosecutor's
workload and oversight in failing to timely file the notice or the complexity
of the case. Id, at 966-67, 11 P.3d at 1217.

We agree with Nunnery that there are some similarities
between the notice provisions in SCR 250(4)(c)-(d) and those in SCR
250(4)(f). In particular, both notice provisions use the phrase “good cause”
and both provide for a continuance for the defense to meet the allegations
or evidence when there has been a finding of good cause. But the
provisions differ in at least one relevant respect. SCR 250(4)(a)
specifically addresses a late or amended notice of intent, allowing the
district court to grant a motion to file a late or amended notice of intent
upon a showing of good cause, In contrast, SCR 250(4)(f) does not
specifically address a late or amended notice of evidence in aggravation;
instead, it allows the district court to admit “evidence not summarized in
the notice” only upon a showing of good cause. (Emphasis added.) If we
interpret this omission to preclude a late or amended notice of evidence in
aggravation while allowing the court to admit evidence that is not

u

 
om

included, it would lead to an absurd result: the rule would discourage the
State from filing a late or amended notice at all. We cannot countenance
e State v. Kopp, 118 Nev. 199, 204, 43 P.3d 240, 843
(2002) (observing general rule that statute should be interpreted to avoid
see also SCR 249(1) (“The rules set forth in this part shall

such a result,

 

 

absurd results)
be liberally construed to secure the proper and efficient administration of
the business and affairs of the court in the cases to which these rules
apply and to promote and facilitate the administration of justice by the
court.”), and neither party in this case appears to argue for such an
interpretation. Because the rule allows the district court to admit
evidence that is not summarized in a notice of evidence in aggravation
upon a showing of good cause, we conclude that the rule similarly allows a
late or amended notice of evidence in aggravation upon a showing of good
cause. This interpretation avoids an absurd result while adhering to the
policy and spirit of SCR 250(4)(, see SCR 250(1) ("The purposes of this
rule are; to ensure that capital defendants receive fair and impartial
trials... ; to minimize the occurrence of error in capital cases ...; and to
facilitate the just and expeditious final disposition of all capital cases.”),
which is intended to ensure that a defendant has advance notice of the
‘evidence in aggravation that he must be prepared to meet, see People v.
Taylor, 34 P.3d 937, 953 (Cal. 2001) (“The purpose of the notice provision
is to afford defendant an opportunity to meet the prosecutor's aggravating
evidence.”).

 

‘The policy and spirit behind SCR 250(4)() must also guide us
in giving meaning to the phrase “good cause” as used in that provision.
“[G]ood cause’ is a relative and highly abstract term” such that “its
meaning must be determined not only by the verbal context of the statute

12

 
in which the term is employed, but also by the context of the action and
procedures involved and the type of case presented.” Wray v. Folsom, 166
F. Supp. 390, 394 (W.D. Ark. 1958); see also Bailey v. Parish of Caddo, 716
So. 2d 528, 530 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (observing that good cause “is
frequently invoked and seldom defined” and that “its meaning is fixed by
the verbal context as well as the ‘actions and procedures involved”
(quoting Wray, 166 F, Supp. at 394). Although the two notice provisions
in SCR 250(4) require showings of good cause to justify a late or amended
notice, we are not convinced that they necessitate the same standard of
good caus

 

given the different purposes that the notices serve.

‘The notice of intent required under SCR 250(4)(c)-(d) puts the
defendant on notice that the State will seek the death penalty, which
carries with it the requirement that the State prove at least one statutory
aggravating circumstance, see NRS 175.554(1), (3); NRS_ 200.030(4)(a),
and triggers a panoply of rights, seo, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002), and procedures, see SCR 250, that otherwise would not apply. And
as we explained in Bennett_v, District Court, “[tJhe purpose of SCR
250(4)(€) is to protect a capital defendant's due process rights to fair and
adequate notice of aggravating circumstances, safeguard against any
abuse of the system, and insert some predictability and timeliness into the
process.” 121 Nev. 802, 810, 121 P.3d 605, 610 (2005). Recognizing the
importance of that notice, SCR 250(4)(d) provides a bright-line rule that in
no event can an initial notice of intent be filed later than 30 days before
trial. Based in part on that provision, we declined in Marshall to allow a
good-cause showing under SCR 250(4)(d) to be based on lack of prejudice
See 116 Nev. at 967, 11 P.3d at 1217. The bright-line rule and restriction
on lack of prejudice to establish good cause serve the purposes of this

13.

 

 
notice by “requir[ing] accountability and diligence by the State when
deciding what aggravators to pursue in the first instance.” Bennett, 121
Nev. at 810, 121 P.3d at 610.

In contrast, the notice of evidence in aggravation lets the

 

defendant know what evidence he must be prepared to meet at the penalty
hearing, similar to the more general disclosure of witnesses and experts
that are required in criminal cases under statutes such as NRS 174.234,
and the district court may admit evidence that is not summarized in the
notice upon a showing of good cause. SCR 250(4)(). ‘These provisions
reflect a less stringent approach to the notice of evidence in aggravation.
For example, unlike SCR 260(4)(d), these provisions do not draw an
express bright-line after which a notice cannot be filed or unnoticed
evidence cannot be admitted; instead, they allow for the admission of
unnoticed evidence upon a showing of good cause.

In the context of SCR 240(4)(f) and given the purpose of the
notice of evidence in aggraval

 

, we conclude that a broader range of
factors may be considered in determining good cause under SCR 250(4)(D,
including lack of prejudice to the defense. Our prior decisions addressing
good cause in the context of pretrial notice statutes that serve purposes
similar to SCR 250(4)(®) provide some guidance. For example, in Founts v,
State, this court identified a variety of factors to be considered in
assessing good cause for an untimely notice of alibi witnesses under
former NRS 174.087, including “whether an excuse was shown for the
omission,” “reasons why the proper notice was not given,” “surprise and its
consequent prejudicial effect upon [the other party's] investigation and
cross-examination of witnesses,” and “the prejudicial effect upon either

side by the admission or nonadmission of the testimony and the feasibility

 

 
of a postponement.” 87 Nev. 165, 169-70, 483 P.2d 654, 656 (1971); ef.
Raymond_v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 606-07 (7th Cir. 2007)
(applying factors adopted by Supreme Court in Pioneer Investment
Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395
(1993), for finding excusable neglect to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
6(b)(2): (1) the danger of prejudice to the nonmoving party; (2) the length
of the delay and its potential impact on the proceedings, (3) the reason for
the delay, including whether it was within the moving party’s control, and
(4) whether the moving party acted in good faith). We conclude that the
following factors are consistent with the purpose of the notice required by
SCR 250(4)()—they ensure that the defendant has sufficient notice to

 

prepare to meet the evidence while taking into consideration the reasons
for the delay—and therefore must be considered in determining whether
there is good cause for filing a late notice under SCR 260(4)(: (1) the
reason for the delay, including whether it was within the State's control,
(2) whether the State acted in good faith, (3) the length of the delay, and
(A) the danger of prejudice to the defendant. Although the absence of
prejudice is a relevant factor, we emphasize that the absence of prejudice
alone is never sufficient to constitute good cause to excuse the late filing of
a notice under SCR 250(4)(). Cf, MCI Telecommunications, 71 F.3d at
1097 (discussing good cause under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4). The
factors we identify today are nonexhaustive and a good-cause

8Some federal courts “have equated ‘good cause’ with the concept of
‘excusable neglect’ of [Rule 6(b)(2)].” MCI Telecommunications Corp, v.
Teleconcepts,_Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing good
cause for failure to timely serve complaint and summons under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4),

 

 
1 900

 

determination ultimately must take account of all relevant circumstances
surrounding the State's untimely filing. See Founts, 87 Nev. at 169, 483
P.2d at 656 (“Good cause’ for the exercise of such discretion may be shown
by a variety of factors and the particular situation presented by each ease
must be considered.”

We have indicated that a finding of good cause is within the
istrict court's discretion. See generally Marshall, 116 Nev. at 965-68, 11
P.8d at 1216-18; see also Butler v. State, 120 Nev. 879, 892, 102 P.3d 71,
80 (2004) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to district court’s finding

 

of good cause to excuse prosecution's failure to comply with notice
requirements under NRS 174.233); accord Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d
402, 407 (Mo. 1963) (“Good cause’ depends upon the circumstances of the
individual case, and a finding of its existence li

 

 

largely in the discretion

of the officer or court to which the decis committed”). The question

 

n

 

thus is not whether members of this court or other jw

 

would have
found good cause, but whether the district court abused its discretion. Cf.
Marshall, 116 Nev. at 966, 11 P.3d at 1216-17 (observing that State
offered colorable argument that “district court might have been within its
discretion if it had allowed the late filings” of notices of intent but that did
not establish “that the district court manifestly abused its discretion or
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in not allowing the late filings, as is
required for this court to grant extraordinary relief"). “An abuse of

  

discretion occurs if the district court's decision is arbitrary or capricious or
if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason.” Jackson v. State, 117 Nev. 116,
120, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001).

With this framework in mind, we turn to the circumstances

presented in this case, focusing first on the reasons for the delay, whether

16

 
d
hy

or

the State acted in good faith, and the length of the delay. The
prosecution's reason for the delay was that it was waiting for the trials in
the other two cases before deciding what evidence it would use at the
penalty phase in this case because with this case proceeding to trial last, it
‘would not be clear what evidence would be admissible or necessary in the
penalty phase of this trial until the other trials were complete.
Originally, this case was scheduled to be the I
trial, The first case filed ws

 

t of the three cases to go to

 

scheduled to go to trial in November 2007,
the second case filed was scheduled to go to trial in February 2008, and
this case was scheduled to go to trial in March 2008. The November trial
date for the first case was vacated in November 2007 and the following
month was scheduled to go to trial in July 2008. The February 2008 trial
date for the second case was vacated in February because this court had
granted a motion for a stay. The trial date for that case was not reset
until after the trial in this case, Thus, by February 19, 2008, more than
15 days before the trial date in this case, the trial order had changed so
that this case was scheduled to go to trial first. However, at the same
time, there was a pending motion in this case to strike 13 of the
aggravating circumstances from the notice of intent. That motion raised
issues similar to those raised in the other two cases, which resulted in
original writ proceedings in this court that were still pending in February
and March and had caused the delays in the trials of those cases, The

“In this, we note for example that the notice of intent included
aggravating circumstances based on convictions in the other cases. ‘The
State's ability to proceed on those aggravating circumstances and the

evidence that would be presented to establish them depended on
convictions in those cases,

Ww

 
district court orally ruled on the motion in this case on February 27, 2008,
and filed its written order on March 4, 2008, denying the motion in part
and refusing to stay the trial in this case. The scheduling issues
understandably created some problems given the unique complexities of
the multiple capital prosecutions of Nunnery, including the overlapping
challenges to the aggravating circumstances that had delayed the other
cases, and wore not entirely within the State's control. Although the
prosecution arguably knew by February 19, 2008, at the earliest, and
March 4, 2008, at the latest, that this case would be the first to be tried,

 

the delay thereafter in filing the notice of evidence in aggravation was not
significant, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the State
acted in bad faith. Ultimately, the notice was filed just three days late,
and the late filing does not appear to have had an impact on the
proceedings as the parties and the court had sufficient opportunity to
address any objections to the admissibility of the evidence.

Finally, as the district court found, there was no prejudice to
the defense as a result of the late filing. Contrary to Nunnery's
suggestion, prejudice in this context is not the impact that the evidence
summarized in the untimely notice had on the jury's penalty verdict, but
the impact that the untimely notice had on Nunnery’s ability to prepare to
‘meet the evidence in aggravation, which is the primary purpose that the
notice serves. See Butler, 120 Nev. at 892, 102 P.3d at 80 (addressing
good cause for prosecution's failure to comply with requirements for notice
of evidence in rebuttal to alibi evidence, NRS 174.233(2), (4), and noting
that defendant “failed to specify how he could have impeached [rebuttal

witness's] testimony even if given timely notice... and has therefore

shown no prejudice”). Similar notices of evidence in aggravation had been

 

 
 

filed in the other two cases and the same attorneys represented Nunnery
in all three cases. Defense counsel did not seek a continuance to prepare
to meet that evidence.

Considering all of the relevant factors, we are not convinced
that the district court abused its discretion. Although the district court
likely would have been within its discretion if it had denied the late filing,
under the totality of the circumstances presented, we cannot conclude that
the district court's decision to allow the late filing was arbitrary or
capricious or exceeded the bounds of law or reason. Therefore there was
no abuse of discretion,

Prosentence investigation reports

Relying on NRS 176.156(6) and Herman v. State, 122 Nev.
199, 128 P.3d 469 (2006), Nunnery argues that the district court erred by
allowing the State to present unfavorable evidence, including prior
convictions and his social history, from a presentence investigation report
(PSI) that had been prepared in another case. In Herman, a panel of this
court concluded that reading a list of the defendant's prior uncharged
arrests from a PSI report during the penalty phase of a noncapital murder
trial constituted plain error and warranted a new penalty hearing. Id.
208-09, 128 P.3d at 474-75. ‘The panel concluded that reading portions of

t

 

the PSI amounted to plain error because (1) it was “tantamount to
entering [the PSI] into and making it part of the public record” in violation
of NRS 176.166(6), id, at 208, 128 P.3d at 474; and (2) while Herman's

arrests for violent crimes were

 

relevant to the crime charged,”
information regarding other arrests was projudicial and had “no bearing
on Herman as a violent individual capable of murder.” [d, at 209, 128
P.3d at 475. Subsequently, capital defendants have raised claims, based

19

 
on Herman and NRS 176.166(5), that PSI evidence is inadmissible at
capital penalty hearings. There are two flaws in Herman that undermine
such claims.

First, Herman mistakenly suggests that NRS 176.156(6)
precludes the admission of PSI evidence. Prior to Herman, in Guy v.
State, 108 Nev. 770, 782, 839 P.2d 578, 586 (1992), this court rejected as
“untenable” an argument that NRS 176.156 rendered a PSI report
prepared in one of the defendant's prior cases inadmissible at his capital
penalty hearing, We reaffirm that holding, NRS 175.652 grants broad
discretion to the trial courts with regard to the admission of evidence at

 

penalty hearings in first-degree murder cases. And NRS 176.156(2)
explicitly permits the w
other political subdivisions of the State “for the limited purpose of
performing their duties, including, without limitation, conducting
hearings that are public in nature.” (Emphasis added.) The rule that PSI

 

of PSI reports by law enforcement agencies or

reports are not to be made a part of the public record does not preclude
isclosures that are allowed by NRS 176.156(2). See NRS 176.156(5).
Because the statute expressly permits the use of PSI reports at public

 

hearings, we disavow any language in Herman that can be read to support

the conclusion that NRS 176.156 renders PSI evidence inadmissible at a

 

penalty hearing,

Second, Herman focused on the information about prior
arrests and mistakenly suggested that the evidence was irrelevant at
sentencing. The court in Herman observed that some of the arrests
suggested a pattern of conduct that was relevant to the crime charged
(murder) but that other arrests had “no bearing on Herman as a violent
individual capable of murder.” Herman, 122 Nev. at 209, 128 P.8d at 475.

 
‘That decision fails to take sufficient notice of the district court's discretion
and the nature of the sentencing determination in considering whether
evidence is admissible at a penalty hearing. ‘The decision to admit
evidence at a penalty hearing is left to the discretion of the trial judge.?
See NRS 175.552; Guy, 108 Nev. at 782, 839 P.2d at 586. “NRS 175.552
establishes broad parameters as to what constitutes admissible evidence
at a penalty phase.” Guy, 108 Nev. at 782, 839 P.2d at 586. Consistent
with that breadth, we have stated that evidence of uncharged crimes may
be admitted at a capital penalty hearing
e.g., Guy, 108 Nev. at 782, 889 P.2d at 586; Robins v, State, 106 Nev. 611,
625-26, 798 P.2d 658, 567 (1990); Crump v, State, 102 Nev. 158, 161, 716
P.2d 1387, 1888 (1986); Gallego v. State, 101 Nev. 782, 791, 711 P.2d 856,
863 (1985). Such evidence is relevant because a sentencing determination
should be based on the entirety of a defendant's “character, record, and the
circumstances of the offense,” Browning v. State, 124 Nev. 517, 526, 188
P.3d 60, 67 (2008), but it may be excluded from a capital penalty hearing
it is “impalpable or highly suspect.” Gallego v, State, 117 Nev. 348, 369,
23 P.3d 227, 241 (2001) (police investigations of other crimes); see also
Leonard v, State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1214, 969 P.2d 288, 299 (1998) (police
investigation of crimes for which defendant has not been convicted);
Homick v, State, 108 Nev. 127, 138, 825 P.2d 600, 607 (1992) (evidence of
other pending homicide charges). It is of no concern whether the evidence

 

‘other matter” evidence. See,

 

 

"This discretion is not limited to capital penalty hearings; the
statutes that grant broad discretion regarding the admission of evidence
at a penalty hearing do not differentiate between capital and noncapital
hearings. See NRS 175.552-.556,

 

 

 
tends to show the defendant's guilt, as guilt is not the focus of a penalty
hearing. Browning, 124 Nev. at 526, 188 P.8d at 67. To the extent any
language in Herman suggested otherwise, we disavow it.

Here, Nunnery failed to object to the introduction of
unfavorable evidence from the PSI. We emphasize that a defendant must
object to any evidence in a PSI that he believes is unduly prejudicial or
otherwise inadmissible; otherwise, he forfeits appellate review of that
matter. See Browning, 124 Nev. at 683, 188 P.3d at 71, When there has
been no objection at trial, a defendant will be entitled to relief only if he

can show plain error—that an error is “so unmistakable that it is

apparent from a casual inspection of the record” and that the error

“affected his substantial rights.” Vega v. State, 126 Nev. _, _, 236
P.8d 632, 637 (2010) (quoting Nelson v. State, 123 Nev. 534, 543, 170 P.3d

517, 524 (2007). Nunnery failed to demonstrate any error, much less
plain error. The individual who prepared the PSI report testified

 

regarding her preparation of the PSI report and the information contained

in it, and defense counsel was able to cross-examine her. And the PST

 

report entered into evidence was redacted to remove references to prior
arrests that did not result in conviction, These procedures were proper,
and Nunnery fails to show that the testimony and documentary evidence

of his prior drug conviction and social history were inadmissible,

“The evidence that the panel found prejudicial in Herman is the
same kind of evidence given to every judge before a sentencing
determination. We are cognizant, however, that jurors may not be as
familiar as our trial court judges with PSI reports and their potential
pitfalls. As a result, trial judges must exercise care in admitting PSI
evidence. The district court did so here.

22

 
Weighing instruction
Nevada law provides that in cases in which the State secks
the death penalty, the jury must weigh aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. NRS 175.564(2), (3). Nunnery argues that he has a
constitutional right to a jury finding that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and he
thus takes issue with the district court’s refusal to so instruct the jury.
‘This is not the first time that we have spoken to whether the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies to the weighing of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but our prior decisions have
created an apparent conflict. This court had long rejected claims that the
weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in a death penalty
case was subject to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. See. e.,
DePasquale v, State, 106 Nev. $43, 852, 803 P.2d 218, 223 (1990). But the
issue found some new life after the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Apprendi v, New Jersey, 590 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), that any
fact other than a prior conviction “that incre

 

the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt,” and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,
589 (2002), that capital defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to a
jury determination of aggravating circumstances that make the defendant
cligible for the death penalty. Based on Ring, this court decided in
Johnson v, State, 118 Nev. 787, 59 P.3d 450 (2002), that the use of a three-
judge panel to find aggravating circumstances in capital cases was
‘unconstitutional because those findings must be made by a jury based on

the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. In doing so, we commented on

the elements of death eligibility under Nevada's death penalty scheme

 

 
 

and, although the issue had not been raised in that case, we indicated that
the weighing determination was subject to the same requirement:

Nevada statutory law requires two distinct
findings to render a defendant death-cligible: The
jury or the panel of judges may impose a sentence
of death only if it finds at least one aggravating
circumstance and further finds that there are no
mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh
the aggravating circumstance or circumstances
found. This second finding regarding mitigating
circumstances is necessary to authorize the death
penalty in Nevada, and we conclude that it is in
part a factual determination, not merely
discretionary weighing. So even though Ring
expressly abstained from ruling on any Sixth
Amendment claim with respect to mitigating
circumstances, we conclude that Ring requires &
jury to make this finding as well: If a State makes
an jinerease in a defendant's authorized
punishment contingent on the finding of a fact,
that fact—no matter how the State labels it—must
be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

 

 

Johnson, 118 Nev. at 802-03, 59 P.3d at 460 (internal quotations omitted).
When directly presented with the question more recently in McConnell v,
State (McConnell II), 125 Nev. 243, 254, 212 P.3d 307, 314-15 (2009), we
reached a contrary conclusion, stating that “(nothing in the plain
language of {the relevant statutory] provisions requires a jury to find, or
the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt that no mitigating
circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances in order to
impose the death penalty.” And we further observed that this court “has
imposed no such requirement.” Id, The holding in McConnell III thus
conflicts with the dicta in Johnson. We take this opportunity to resolve
this conflict and hold that even if the result of the weighing determination
increases the maximum sentence for first-degree murder beyond the

24

 
prescribed statutory maximum, it is not a factual finding that is
susceptible to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. Therefore,
we reaffirm McConnell III and overrule Johnson to the extent that it
suggests that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is
subject to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.

At the penalty phase of a capital trial in Nevada, the jury
determines whether any aggravating circumstances have been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt and whether any mitigating circumstances
exist. NRS 175.554(2), (4). If the jury unanimously finds that at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, the jury must also determine whether there are mitigating
circumstances “sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or
circumstances found.” NRS 175.554(3); see also NRS 175.554(4). As this
court observed in DePasquale, 106 Nev. at 852, 803 P.2d at 223, and
‘McConnell III, 125 Nev. at 254, 212 P.3d at 314-16, the relevant statutes
do not impose a burden of proof on the weighing determination, The only

mention of a burden of proof in the relevant statutes appears in NRS

 

175.554(4), but it clearly applies to the finding of aggravating
circumstances, not to the existence of mitigating circumstances or the
weighing of the two, Given the statutory silence, we turn to the premise
that the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Apprendi and Ring, requires
that a jury make the weighing determination based on proof meeting the

 

beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.

*Although the Court in Ring held that capital defendants have a
Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination that the aggravating
continued on next page...

 

 
Johnson indicates that the weighing determination “is in part
factual determination,” 118 Nev. at 802, 59 P.3d at 460, and therefore is
subject to the same Sixth Amendment requirements that the Court
applied to the finding of aggravating circumstances in Ring. That analysis
in Johnson is prefaced by the statement, oft-repeated in our cases, that
“Nevada statutory law requires two distinct findings to render a defendant
death-eligibl

(2) a finding that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficient to

  

(1) a finding of at least one aggravating circumstance and

outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found. 118 Nev.
at 802, 59 P.3d at 460, We then observed that the second finding
“regard{s] mitigating circumstances” and “is in part a factual
determination, not merely discretionary weighing,” id,, but we did not
describe what part is factual, When the “second finding” is broken down
to reflect all of the statutory requirements, the answer becomes apparent.
‘The “second finding” described in Johnson combines the determination
that mitigating circumstances exist, NRS 176.554(2)(b), with the
determination that “there are no mitigating circumstances sufficient to
outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found,” NRS
175.554(3). When separated, it is apparent that the factual determination
implicated in the “second finding” described by Johnson is the existence of

~ continued

circumstances have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt when death is
not an available sentence unless at least one aggravating circumstance is
found, 536 U.S. at 609, the Court expressly did not address the finding of
mitigating circumstances or the weighing of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, id, at 597 n.4.

 

 
mitigating circumstances. With that understanding, the conclusion that
the “second finding” is “in part a factual determination,” 118 Nev. at 802,
59 P.3d at 460, is correct to the extent that it refers to the finding of
mitigating circumstances.” That does not mean, however, that the
subsequent weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
involves a factual determination.

Although some state courts have characterized the weighing
determination itself as fact-finding, in large part, their reasons for doing
80 are not clear. The Colorado Supreme Court has done so without any
explanation. Woldt v. People, 64 P.8d 256, 265-66 (Colo, 2003). Similarly,
the Missouri Supreme Court has characterized the weighing
determination as fact-finding with little explanation, relying primarily on
Woldt and our dicta in Johnson. State v, Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 258-
61 (Mo. 2003). Perhaps the best explanation for this approach is
articulated by the dissenting judge in a Maryland case, Oken v, State, 835
A.2d 1105, 1163-65 (Md. 2003) (Raker, J., dissenting). The dissenter in
that case based his reasoning on three aspects of the Maryland death
penalty statute: (1) the statute included a burden of proof in the weighing
process and burdens of proof are commonly applied to factual findings, id.
at 1164;

  

(2) the Maryland Legislature had provided for automatic review
by the court of appeals of the jury's death sentence for “sufficiency of the

evidence,” indicating that the legislature did not view the weighing

WNunnery understandably does not suggest that this factual finding
is subject to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Because the finding
of mitigating circumstances does not increase the maximum punishment
that is available, Ring is of no relevance to that finding.

 

 

 
oe

determination as a “purely judgmental choice” since appellate review of
the sufficiency of the evidence is the traditional review for findings of fact,
id. at 1165; and (8) the repeated use of the word “find” in the Maryland
statute “suggests the determination of an observable fact,” id. at 1163.
‘The Nevada statutes, however, do not reflect the same considerations that,
convinced the dissenter in Oken that weighing involved a factual
determination. First, the Nevada Legislature did not specify any burden
of proof for the weighing determination. See NRS 175.554(3), (4); NRS
200.030(4)(a). Second, although the Nevada Legislature has provided for
automatic review of a death sentence by this court, it has required this
court to consider the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the
aggravating circumstances, not with respect to the death sentence in
general or the weighing determination in particular. See NRS 177.0552)
And third, while NRS 175.554(3) uses the word “finds” when referring to
the weighing determination, that word does not appear in the other two
the weighing determination (NRS
175.554(4) and NRS 200.030(4)(a)), and one of those provisions (NRS
176.564(4)) requires that the verdict identify the aggravating
circumstances “found” and “state that there are no mitigating

statutory provisions that addre

 

circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance[s].”
(Emphasis added.) Nevada's statutory scheme therefore provides no
support for the conclusion that the weighing determination involves fact-
finding.

Other courts have held that the weighing determination does
not involve fact-finding, focusing on the moral or judgmental character of

28

 
the weighing determination as support.!! They reason that “the weighing
process is not a fact-finding one based on evidence” but is instead “purely
1 judgmental one, of balancing the mitigator(s) against the aggravator(s)
to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment in the
particular case.” Oken, 835 A.2d at 1151 (quoting Borchardt v, State, 786
A.24 631, 652 (Md. 2001)); see also Higgs v. U.S,, 711 F, Supp. 2d 479, 640
(D. Ma. 2010) (explaining that weighing determination “is a normative
‘question rather than a factual one” because when weighing aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, jurors “draw upon their sense of community
norms in light of the totality of circumstances surrounding the criminal
and the crime” whereas “in order to find a first-order fact to be true, the
jurors must evaluate the evidence presented to determine whether they
believe in the truth of the fact beyond any reasonable doubt”); Ex parte
Waldrop, 859 So. 2d 1181, 1189 (Ala. 2002) (“[T}he weighing process is not

a factual determination or an element of an offense; instead, it is a moral

2Courts have reached this conclusion in cases decided both before
and after Apprendi and Ring. For examples of cases decided before
Apprendi/Ring, see Ford v, Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 1983)
(While the existence of an aggravating or mitigating circumstance is a
fact susceptible to proof under a reasonable doubt or preponderance
standard the relative weight is not.” (citation omitted)); Gerlaugh v. Lewis,
898 F. Supp. 1388, 1421 (D. Ariz. 1995); and Bonin v. Vasquez, 807 F.
Supp. 589, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1992) ("The existence of a fact can be
demonstrated at different standards of proof,” but the weighing of
aggravating and mitigating factors “is not susceptible to proof by either
party.” (quotation omitted)). For examples of cases decided after
Apprendi/Ring, see Higws v. U.S,, 711 F. Supp. 24 479, 639 (D. Md. 2010);
Ex parte Waldrop, 859 So. 2d 1181, 1189 (Ala. 2002); Ritchie v, State, 809
N.E.2d 268, 265 (nd. 2004); Oken v. State, 835 A2d 1105, 1151 (Md.
2003); and State v, Fry, 126 P.8d 516, 534 (N.M. 2005),

 

 

 
or legal judgment that takes into account a theoretically limitless set of
facts and that cannot be reduced to a scientific formula or the discovery of
a discrete, observable datum."). ‘This court used similar reasoning in
McConnell Ill, relying on pre-Apprendi/Ring Supreme Court decisions.
125 Nev. at 254, 212 P.3d at 315 (“As the United States Supreme Court
has stated, the jury's decision whether to impose a sentence of death is a
moral decision that is not susceptible to proof.” (citing Penry v, Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536

U.S. 804 (2002); Caldwell v, Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985))); see also
Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1216, 969 P.2d 288, 300 (1998) ("The

weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not
mathematical .. ..").
Further support for this view of the weighing determination a:

 

‘4 moral determination rather than a factual determination can be found in
the definition of “fact.” “Fact” has been defined as “[a] thing done; an
action performed or an incident transpiring; an event or circumstance; an
actual occurrence; an actual happening in time space or an event mental
or physical; that which has taken place.” Black's Law Dictionary 531-32
(Sth ed. 1979). The weighing determination does not involve the finding of
any facts; instead, weighing asks the sentencing body to balance facts that
have already been found (aggravating and mitigating circumstances) in
order to reach a conclusion or judgment. ee Webster's Ninth New
Collegial Dictionary 1337 (1983) (defining “weigh” as “to consider carefully
esp. by balancing opposing factors or aspects in order to reach a choice or

conclusion’).
In our estimation, our decision in McConnell III and those of
other courts concluding that the weighing determination is not a factual

 

 
 

=

 

finding present the better-reasoned view. We therefore conclude that the
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not a fact-finding
endeavor and disavow any prior language suggesting otherwise."
Accordingly, the district court did not err in refusing to give the requested
instruction."

In some instances, this court has used language that places a
“burden” on the State with respect to the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 365-
66, 23 P.3d 227, 239 (2001) (“To obtain a death sentence, the State must
prove beyond ‘a reasonable doubt that at least one aggravating
circumstance exists and that the aggravating circumstance or
circumstances outweigh any mitigating evidence.”); Witter v. State, 112
Nev. 908, 923, 921 P.2d 886, 896 (1996) (“[W]e read NRS 200.030(4) as
ating that the death penalty is an available punishment only if the
[Sltate can prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating
circumstance exists, and that the aggravating circumstance or
circumstances outweigh the mitigating evidence offered by the
defendant.”), receded from on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev.
215, 994 P.2d 700 (2000). To the extent that those decisions could be read
‘a8 support for the conclusion that the weighing determination involves
fact-finding because burdens of proof are typically reserved for factual
determinations, we clarify that this was not the court's intent and disavow
any language in Witter and its progeny as to any burden of proof related
to the weighing determination.

 

1SNunnery suggests that this holding brings into question the
continuing validity of this court’s authority to “reweigh” aggravating and
mitigating circumstances on appeal after invalidating an aggravating
circumstance. Reasoning that if weighing involves a moral judgment
rather than fact-finding, “it is not possible for this Court to say with any
kind of certainty that a juror would have reached the same conclusion in
the absence of an invalid aggravating circumstance,” Nunnery asks us to
overrule Canape v. State, 109 Nev. 864, 859 P.2d 1023 (1993), to the
extent that it allows appellate reweighing. We need not resolve this issue
here because the jury did not consider any invalid aggravating
circumstances, and we thus are not called upon to reweigh in this case.
continued on next page . .

31

  

 
0 nn

 

Inconsistent descriptions of the weighing determination

Nunnery's requested instruction was properly rejected for an

 

additional reason: it did not correctly state the weighing determination
required by the Nevada statutes. Nunnery requested an instruction
stating that death eligibility was contingent on the aggravating

circumstances outweighing the mitigating circumstances. This misstated

 

the statutory requirement, which is that “there are no mitigating
circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or
circumstances found.” NRS 175.554(3), (4); see also NRS 200.030(4).
Nunnery is not alone in this, as the same misstatement has occasionally
appeared in our opinions. Sec, e.g., Witter, 112 Nev. at 923, 921 P.2d at
896; McKenna v, State, 101 Nev. 388, 349 & n.14, 705 P.2d 614, 621 &
n.14 (1985). This misstatement of the weighing determination is of no
consequence in most instances because a conclusion that there are no
mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating

circumstances genes

 

lly equates to a conclusion that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The difference is of
consequence, however, in the theoretical 50-50 case, where the mitigating
and aggravating circumstances are of equal weight. Under the statutory

continued

Nonetheless, we note that Nunnery has provided no support for his
argument and that courts had characterized the weighing determination
as a moral judgment before Apprendi/Ring, see, ¢.g., Ford v. Strickland,
696 F.2d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 1983), but that characterization does not
appear to have brought into question the propriety of appellate reweighing
or harmless-error review before or after Apprendi/Ring.

32

 
 

articulation, the death penalty is still available in the 50-50 case because
the mitigating circumstances are not sufficient to outweigh the
aggravating circumstances. See Ybarra v. State, 100 Nev. 167, 173-76,
679 P.2d 797, 801-03 (1984) (discussing outcome of 50-50 case under
Nevada's statutory scheme). ‘The opposite is true under Nunnery’s

 

articulation—the death penalty would be removed as a sentencing option
in the 50-60 case because the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh
the mitigating circumstances. We take this opportunity to disavow any
language in our prior decisions that is inconsistent with the statutory
articulations of the weighing calculus. See NRS 175.554(8), (4); NRS
200.030(4)(a).1¢

 

“Nunnery suggests that the statutory weighing calculus violates
equal protection based on our inconsistent articulations of it. Compare
Evans v, State, 117 Nev. 609, 634, 28 P.3d 498, 516 (2001), with Witter,
112 Nev. at 923, 921 P.2d at 896. Despite our inconsistent articulations of
the weighing calculus, the statutory articulation has remained the same.
See NRS 200,030(4); NRS 175.564(3). And where, as here, the jury was
improperly instructed that the aggravating circumstances had to outweigh
the mitigating circumstances, the error inures to the defendant's benefit.
See Ybarra, 100 Nev. at 173-76, 679 P.2d at 801-03. We perceive no equal
protection violation.

We have reviewed Nunnery’s other assignments of error related to
the penalty-phase jury instructions and conclude that they lack merit.
‘The district court adequately instructed the jury on mitigating
circumstances and the instructions proffered by Nunnery were largely
duplicitous or unnecessary. And the district court did not err in failing to
instruct the jury that the mitigating circumstances did not have to be
found beyond a reasonable doubt where there was nothing in the
instructions to suggest that the mitigating circumstances were subject to
such a burden, there was no argument offered to that offect, and the
instructions explicitly applied the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to
the aggravating circumstances but did not attach that requirement to the

continued on next page...

 
 

(-death-to-more-thay jerson aggravator

 

Nunnery claims that the district court erred by allowing the
State to seek the “great risk of death to more than one person”
aggravator" on four grounds: (1) the State did not provide timely notice of
the aggravator, (2) the aggravator was based upon the imputed conduct of
Nunnery’s codefendants, (3) the notice of intent failed to include sufficient
factual information, and (4) there is insufficient evidence to support the

aggravator. Each of Nunnery’s claims lacks merit.

continued

 

mitigating circumstances. Cf. Jimenez v, State, 112 Nev. 610, 624-25, 918
P.2d 687, 695-96 (1996) (applying similar analysis to claim that trial court
erred in failing to instruct jury that mitigating circumstances did not have
to be found unanimously). Nunnery offers no authority that would require
the court to instruct the jury to conduct a second weighing determination
and reconsider its decision on death eligibility during the second phase of
the penalty hearing, and we therefore decline to consider his claim
regarding the trial court's refusal to give such an instruction. See
Maresca-v_State, 108 Nev. 669, 748 P.2d 3 (1987). Finally, the district
court was not required to give the jury an Allen charge before
deliberations, see Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. “92 601 (1896); Wilkins
v. State, 96 Nev. 367, 372-73, 609 P.2d 309, 312-13 (1980), because such
‘an instruction is intended to address deadlocked juries and is only
appropriately used when “absolutely necessary,” Staude v. State, 112 Nev.
1, 6, 908 P.2d 1373, 1377 (1996), modified on other grounds by Richmond
v. State, 118 Nev. 924, 930-32, 69 P.3d 1249, 1253-64 (2002). ‘There was
no deadlocked jury in this case and therefore no need for an Alllen charge.

 

 

°NRS 200.033(3) states that a murder is aggravated when a person
“knowingly create[s] a great risk of death to more than one person by
means of a weapon, devicel,] or course of action which would normally be
hazardous to the lives of more than one person.”

 

oc Sa
Untimely notice of evidence in aggravation

Nunnery claims that the district court should not have
permitted the great-risk-of-death aggravator because he was not given
timely notice of the evidence supporting it. As discussed above, the notice
of evidence in aggravation in this case was filed three days late. Nunnery
acknowledges that he was not prejudiced with regard to the other
aggravators because the notices of evidence previously filed in his other
cases were duplicative. However, he points out that because the great
risk-ofdeath aggravators in his other cases were based on the specific
facts of those separate crimes, the evidence used to support the aggravator
in this case was unique and thus not timely disclosed. We conclude that
no relief is warranted.

‘The notice of intent to seek the death penalty, which was filed
more than a year before trial, informed Nunnery that the great-risk-of-
death aggravator was based on the fact that Nunnery committed a robbery
and fired shots at several victims in a public place, All of the evidence
admitted at the guilt phase of trial. He
does not allege that any of the guilt-phase witness
noticed or that he wi

supporting the aggravator w:

 

 

wore untimely

 

unaware of their intended testimony. Therefore, he

fails to show that the late notice of evidence in aggravation prejudiced him

in his defense of the great-risk-of-death aggravator.
Theories of imputed liability

Nunnery claims that the district court erred by allowing the

   

 

State to base the great-risk-of-death aggravator on a theory of accomplice

35
on

 
liability because the State’s notice of intent did not specify that theory.§
Nunnery’s claim is without merit.

SCR 250(4)(c) states that a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty “must allege all aggravating circumstances which the state
intends to prove and allege with specificity the facts on which the state
will rely to prove each aggravating circumstance.” This means that a
defendant should not have to gather facts to deduce the State's theory for
‘an aggravating circumstance; the supporting facts must be stated directly
in the notice itself. Hidalgo v, Dist, Ct., 124 Nev. 330, 337, 184 P.3d 369,
875 (2008).

In this case, the State's notice of intent alleged the “great risk
of death to more than one person” aggravator based upon Nunnery’s

repeated firing of his weapon in a public place near numerous bystanders

 

‘The notice of evidence in aggravation described the same facts but stated
that “the gunfire by Nunnery and his codefendants created a great risk of
death to more than one person.” (Emphasis added.) Based partly on this
added language, Nunnery objected to the use of accomplice liability to

  

support the aggravator.

‘The district court did not err in overruling Nunnery’s objection
because the State did not seek the great-risk-of-death aggravator based on
a theory of imputed liability. The description of the course of action taken,

Nunnery also claims that the district court erred by permitting
aggravating circumstances based on imputed liability. However, Nunnery
fails to explain how the other five aggravators (four prior violent felony
convictions and a felony-murder aggravator based on robbery) were based
on theories of imputed liability rather than his own actions. Therefore, we
limit our discussion here to the great-risk-of-death aggravator.

non 36
ne

 

 
by Nunnery and his codefendants included in the notice of evidence in
aggravation did not suggest a “change of theory” to accomplice liability for

 

the aggravator; rather, the description elucidated the State's theory that
Nunnery’ course of conduet created a risk of death to multiple persons.
Although the prosecutor argued in closing that the jury could consider “the
collected behavior of all four individuals,” the prosecutor told the jury it

could do s0 only because Nunnery w.

 

the group’s leader and chose the
time and location of the crime. The descriptions of the conduct of
‘Nunnery’s codefendants included in the notice of evidence in aggravation
were not an attempt to base the aggravator solely on the codefendants’
conduct but to show how Nunnery was responsible for directing a course of
events that placed numerous innocent people at a high risk of death.

Insufficient detail in notice of intent to seck the death penalty

‘Nunnery claims that the great-risk-of-death aggravator should
have been stricken because the notice of intent to seek the death penalty
did not specify that the aggravator was based on allegations that other
persons were present near the crime scene when the shootings occurred.
Our review of the notice of intent demonstrates otherwise; the notice of
intent states that the aggravator was based on the crimes committed by
the defendant in a location “which the public has access to and which
several citizens are located nearby.”

‘Sufficiency of the evidence

Nunnery’s final challenge to this aggravator is that there is
insufficient evidence to support it. ‘The evidence presented at trial,
however, showed that Nunnery chose the victims and the location of the
armed robbery and fired his gun repeatedly and at multiple vietims while

numerous people, including children, were waiting at the nearby bus stop,

37

 

 
walking on the sidewalk, and standing on the balconies of the apartment
complex where the shootings occurred. ‘This evidence was sufficient for a
rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Nunnery knowingly
created a great risk of death to others as contemplated by NRS 200.033(8).
Evidence of fetal alcohol syndrome

Nunnery sought to bolster his case for mitigation based on
fetal alcohol syndrome through statements attributed to his cousin, Willie
Nunnery, Jr. According to a defense investigator, Willie said that
Nunnery’s mother drank alcohol throughout her pregnancy and that
Nunnery was small, wrinkly, and jittery when he was born, probably
prematurely. The defense asked the district court to allow the defense
investigator to testify to what Willie had told her when she interviewed
him at a detention center in southern California. ‘The district court
refused to admit the evidence because it lacked credibility. Nunnery takes
issue with that evidentiary decision.

Although “evidence which may or may not ordinarily be
admissible under the rules of evidence,” such as the hearsay testimony
offered by Nunnery’s defense investigator, “may be admitted in the

penalty phase of a capital trial,” the evidence is not admissible if it is

 

“supported solely by impalpable or highly suspect evidence,” Homick v.
State, 108 Nev. 127, 138, 826 P.2d 600, 607 (1992). The record
demonstrates that the evidence offered here is highly suspect: (1) neither

 

of Nunnery
that he had lived with the family when Nunnery was born was

iblings remembered a cousin named Willie; (2) Willie's claim

unsupported; (3) Willie would have been only ten years old at the relevant
time; (4) other witnesses who were adults at the time did not testify that

Nunnery had any medical problems when he was born; (5) evidence at

 

 
ne

trial had proven that other stories about Nunnery’s mother were untrue
(ex. Nunnery and his siblings had been told their mother had been raped
and killed when in fact she died from an overdose); and (6) the defense
investigator had been unable to acquire Nunnery’s birth records or any
other documentation showing that Nunnery’s mother drank or used drugs
while pregnant or verifying that Nunnery had health problems when he
was born, Based on the record and the district court's findings, we cannot
conclude that the

 

istrict court abused its discretion in excluding the
defense investigator's proffered testimony. See Harte v. State, 116 Nev.
1054, 1069, 13 P.3d 420, 430 (2000).
Juror misconduct

Nunnery claims that the district court erred by failing to
conduct a hearing to inquire into alleged juror misconduct and declare «
mistrial based on the misconduct, Our review of the record indicates that
the district court conducted an adequate inquiry into the alleged
misconduct, hearing testimony from an attorney who overheard several
jurors commenting that a defense expert was boring and had put them to
sleep. The defense did not ask the court to question any specific jurors;
rather, counsel suggested he was only making a record in consideration of
Nunnery’s future allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Under
the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the district court's inquiry was,
inadequate. See Viray v, State, 121 Nev. 159, 163, 111 P.3d 1079, 1082
(2005) (explaining that in exercising discretion to remove a juror for
violating an admonishment rather than declaring a mistrial, “a district
court must conduct a hearing to determine if the violation of the
admonishment occurred and whether the misconduct is prejudicial to the

defendant”). Moreover, the allegations of juror misconduct were

39

 
insufficient to warrant a mistrial. The jury had already deliberated twice
(during the guilt phase and the first phase of the penalty hearing), and the
second phase of the penalty hearing was almost complete. Although the
jurors’ familiarity appears to have contributed to a lapse in strict
compliance with the court's admonitions not to talk among themselves on
any subject related to the case, see NRS 175.401, we agree with the
district court that their comments that an expert's testimony was long and
boring were insufficient to demonstrate prejudice that would warrant
mistrial. See Meyer v. State, 119 Nev. 554, 565, 80 P.3d 447, 456 (2003)
(explaining that defendant must demonstrate prejudice based on intrinsic
jury misconduct and that “only in extreme circumstances will intrinsic
misconduct justify a new trial”). ‘There was no abuse of discretion in
denying the motion. See id, at 5661-62, 80 P.3d at 453 (stating that denial
of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct is reviewed for abuse of
discretion but that prejudicial effect of misconduct will be reviewed de

novo “where the misconduct involves allegations that the jury w:

 

xposed
to extrinsic evidence in violation of the Confrontation Clause”).
Jury's rejection of mitigating evidence

Nunnery claims that his death sentence must be reversed
because the jury acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting mitigating
circumstances that were clearly proven by the evidence. Specifically,
Nunnery claims that the jury should have found the following mitigating
circumstances: (1) he was abused by his father, (2) he assumed
responsibility for his siblings, (3) he moved to multiple residences before
the age of 16 and lacked a stable living environment, and (4) he accepted

responsibility and admitted to the crimes. We cannot agree with, and

 

have previously rejected, the premise that jurors are required to find

 
proffered mitigating circumstances simply because there is unrebutted
evidence to support them. See, e.g., Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 366-
67, 28 P.8d 227, 240 (2001); Hollaway v, State, 116 Nev. 782, 744, 6 P.3d
987, 995-96 (2000); Thomas v. State, 114 Nev. 1127, 1149, 967 P.2d 1111,
1125 (1998). Nevada law permits the jury to decide, even if the evidence
supports the factual basis for a mitigating circumstance, that the proposed
mitigating circumstance does not actually extenuate or reduce the
dofendant’s moral culpability. In this case, the jury found 11 mitigating
circumstances. Its failure to find all of the proffered mitigating
circumstances did not deprive Nunnery of his constitutional rights.
Constitutionality of the death penalty
Nunnery claims that the death penalty is unconstitutional

because (1) Nevada's death penalty scheme does not narrow the class of

 

persons eligible for the death penalty, (2) it constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment, and (8) executive clemency is unavailable. We have
previously rejected similar challenges to the death penalty. See, ex,
Thomas_v, State, 122 Nev, 1361, 1373, 148 P.8d 727, 785-86 (2006)
(reaffirming that Nevada's death penalty statutes sufficiently narrow the
class of persons eligible for the death penalty); Colwell v. State, 112 Nev.
807, 812-15, 919 P.2d 403, 406-08 (1996) (rejecting claims that Nevada's
death penalty scheme forecloses executive clemency or violates the Eighth
Amendment).
Guilt-phase claims
Jury selection
Nunnery claims that the district court erred by permitting a

peremptory challenge of the only African-American potential juror who

was not dismissed for cause in violation of Batson v, Kentucky, 476 U.S.
vee 41
orc,

 
79 (1986), and by dismissing three other potential jurors for cause.
Nunnery’s claims lack merit,

Peremptory challenge

‘An equal-protection challenge to the exercise of a peremptory
challenge is evaluated using the three-step analysis adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in Batson. Kaczmarek v, State, 120 Nev. 314, 332,
91 P.8d 16, 29 (2004); see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995)
(summarizing three-step Batson analysis). First,

 

‘the opponent of the

 

peremptory challenge must make out a prima facie case of discrimination.”
Ford v, State, 122 Nev. 398, 403, 182 P.Sd 574, 577 (2006). Next, “the
production burden then shifts to the proponent of the challenge to assert a
neutral explanation for the challenge.” Id, Finally, “the trial court must
then decide whether the opponent of the challenge has proved purposeful

discrimination.” Id, We review the district court's ruling on a Batson

 

challenge for an abuse of discretion. See Thomas v, State, 114 Nev. 1127,
1136-37, 967 P.2d 1111, 1117-18 (1998); Washington v, State, 112 Nev.

1067, 1071, 922 P.2d 547, 549 (1996).

Here, the State exercised its first peremptory challenge to
dismiss potential juror Besse, an African American, After all challenges
had been exercised, the district court asked whether there were any
objections. Defense counsel stated that “in an abundance of caution,” he
needed to make a record that striking Besse left no African Americans on
the jury panel. The district court then inquired as to the State's reasons

for removing the juror. In response, the prosecutor pointed to the juror’s

feelings about the death penalty and asked that his juror questionnaire be
made part of the record. The district court then asked whether defense

 

 
counsel had *
district court then found that there was “no pattern here.”

 

thing else,” receiving a brief “no” in response, ‘The

Although the district court should have made a clearer
statement of its reasoning on the third step of the Batson analysis as to
juror Besse (whether the defense had proven purposeful discrimination),
1e Kacamarek, 120 Nev. at 334, 91 P.3d at 30, we cannot conclude that
the district court abused its discretion based on this record. The State

 

 

 

offered a facially race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge—
the juror’s views on the death penalty. At the time, the defense did not
challonge the State's explanation as a pretext for racial discrimination,
but on appeal Nunnery suggests that the State's discriminatory intent is
apparent based on comparative juror analysis, which we have recognized
may be circumstantial evidence probative of a prosecutor's intent, Ford,
122 Nev. at 405, 132 P.3d at 578-79. Setting aside Nunnory’s failure to
ive juror analysis to the trial court's attention,"” it does

 

bring this comp:

not demonstrate purposeful discrimination.

"Tt is not entirely clear whether an appellate court is required to
conduct a comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal, but out
of an abundance of caution, we do so here, keeping in mind the inherent
limitations in reviewing such a claim for the first time based on the cold
appellate record. See generally People v. Lenix, 187 P.3d 946, 960-62 (Cal.
2008) (concluding that prior practice of refusing to engage in comparative
juror analysis for first time on appeal “unduly restricts review based on
the entire record” but acknowledging that “comparative juror analysis on a
cold appellate record has inherent limitations” that must be taken into
consideration); id, at 968 (Baxter, J., concurring) (observing that “Supreme
Court has not yet addressed whether a state court may deem a defendant
procedurally barred on appeal from relying on juror comparisons to
support a [Batson] third stage claim, if the defendant did not rely on such
comparisons at trial,” but given that lack of clarity, the best course is to

continued on next page .

 

43

 

 
Nunnery compares Besse’s views on the death penalty with
those of juror Vazquez, whom the State did not challenge; he asserts that
the two jurors had similar views and therefore the State's failure to
remove juror Vazquez demonstrates that its reason for removing juror
Besse was a pretext for purposeful discrimination against African-
American jurors, The record does not support Nunnery’s comparison. The
juror questionnaire used in this case asked whether the juror’s beliefs
were such that the juror would automatically vote against the death
penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances of the case and whether
the juror could consider all four forms of punishment in a murder case. In
his juror questionnaire, Besse marked “yes” in response to the first
‘question and wrote “no” in response to the second question. Besse gave a
conflicting answer during voir dire, indicating that he could vote for the
death penalty if it fit the crime, In contrast, juror Vazquez indicated in
his juror questionnaire that he would not automatically vote against the
death penalty and that he could consider all four forms of punishment.
His responses during voir dire were consistent with the responses on the
questionnaire, although he indicated some unwillingness to be the
foreperson in a capital case. Given Vazquer's consistent representations
that he could consider all penalties and Besse’s conflicting representations
about his willingness to vote for a death sentence, the comparison does not,

continued

“perform comparative juror analysis if requested and if the record is
adequate to permit comparisons, even when such an analysis was not
conducted at trial”

 

 
demonstrate that the State's challenge was improperly based on race. ‘The
district court therefore did not abuse its discretion.

Challenges for cause

Nunnery further claims that the district court erred by
dismissing three potential jurors for cause based on their views concerning
the death penalty. “Great deference is afforded to the district court in
ruling on challenges for cause,” Browning v. State, 124 Nev. 517, 530, 188
P.8d 60, 69 (2008), and this court will uphold a dismissal for cause where
it appears that a potential “juror’s opposition to the death penalty would
have prevented or substantially impaired the performance of his duties as
a juror,” id, at 531, 188 P.3d at 70; accord Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412, 424 (1985). The potential jurors at issue here unequivocally
expressed in their jury questionnaires and during voir dire that they could
not give meaningful consideration to the death penalty. Given the jurors’
steadfast refusal to consider the death penalty, we defer to the district

court.

 

Nunnery claims that the district court erred by denying a
motion for mistrial after the prosecution's examination of a detective
implied that Nunnery had been involved in other homicides. In the
challenged examination, the prosecutor asked the detective about
Nunnery’s statement, “I'm the last one, I'm the one who always cleaned
up. 'm the clean up.” (Emphasis added.) Although this language could
reasonably be interpreted to imply that Nunnery had been involved in

other crimes, like the district court, we are not convinced that this

 

language conveyed that Nunnery had been involved in other homicides.
Under the circumstances and given the brevity and vagueness of the

 

 
language, we cannot conclude that Nunnery has made the clear showing of
an abuse of discretion that would be required to overturn the district
court's decision to deny the motion for a mistrial. Randolph v. State, 117
Nev. 970, 981, 36 P.3d 424, 431 (2001) ("Denial of a motion for mistrial is
within the district court’s sound discretion, and this court will not

overturn a denial absent a clear showing of abuse.”).

 

Nunnery claims that several jury instructions given at the
guilt phase of his trial lessened the State's burden of proof because each
instruction did not independently advise the jury that the State had the
burden to prove each element of every crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Specifically, Nunnery challenges instructions containing phrases such as
“must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,” “{iJt is sufficient that each of
you find beyond a reasonable doubt,” and “[iJf you are convinced beyond
reasonable doubt,” because these phrases do not include language
reiterating that the State bears the burden of proof. Because three other
instructions informed the jury that the State bore the burden of proof and
the same need not be stated in every instruction, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion. See Higgs v. State, 126 Nev.
_. _, 222 P.3d 648, 661 (2010) (stating that decision to give or reject
jury instructions is reviewed for “an abuse of discretion or judicial error”)

 

 

Nunnery also argues that one jury instruction was improper
bocause it stated that the State had the burden of “proving beyond a
reasonable doubt every material element of the crime charged” without
specifying the elements that are material. This court has repeatedly
upheld such language. See, e.g, Morales v, State, 122 Nev. 966, 971, 143
P.3d 463, 466 (2006); Crawford v, State, 121 Nev. 744, 751, 121 P.3d 582,

 

 
4

 

586 (2005); Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 650, 119 P.8d 1225, 1233
(2005); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1209, 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998).
‘Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving this
instruction. See Higgs, 126 Nev. at __, 222 P.3d at 661.

‘Sufficiency of the evidence

Nunnery claims that there was insufficient evidence to

 

support his conviction for the attempted murder of Leobardo Ledesma
and/or Victor Ambriz-Nunez, “[A}fter viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution,” we conclude that “any rational [juror]
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” MeNair v, State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992)
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979),

Nunnery was charged with the attempted murder of Ambriz~

 

Nunez and/or Ledesma under the alternative theories that he directly

committed the crime or aided and abetted in its commission. Nunnery

 

does not dispute that his codefendants fired their guns at Ambriz-Nunez
and Ledesma but instead argues that because he did not shoot at them or
“yell at, encourage, or otherwise direct his codefendants” to do so, there is,
no evidence that he had the specific intent to kill them, which is required
for a conviction of attempted murder, see Sharma v, State, 118 Nev. 648,
56 P.3d 868 (2002). The record shows otherwise. Nunnery confessed to
planning the crime, which included directing his companions to bring their
‘guns, loading his gun with two types of ammunition in an effort to confuse
the police, and choosing the victims. He also admitted to shooting two of
the victims (Nunez and Leon) in the head with the intention of killing
them, Based on this evidence, a rational juror could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Nunnery either attempted to kill Ledesma and

47

 
Ambriz-Nunez or aided and abetted his companions with the intent that
they kill Ledesma and Ambriz-Nunez. The fact that Nunnery was focused
on killing two individuals while his companions shot at others does not
preclude a jury from finding that he had the intent that all of the victims
be killed. ‘The jury's verdict is supported by sufficient evidence."*
‘Mandatory review int to NRS 177.056(2

We are required by statute to review every death sentence and
determine whether (1) “the evidence supports the finding of an
2) “the sentence of death
was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any arbitrary

aggravating circumstance or circumstance

 

factor”; and (8) “the sentence of death is excessive, considering both the
crime and the defendant.” NRS 177.055(2\(@)-(e). After doing so here, we
affirm the death sentence.

First, we conclude that the evidence supports the finding of six
aggravating circumstances: (1) Nunnery had a prior violent felony
conviction for the attempted murder of Cesar Leon,"® (2) Nunnery had a
prior violent felony conviction for the attempted murder of Victor Ambriz-
Nunez and/or Leobardo Ledesma, (3) Nunnery had a prior violent felony
‘conviction for the armed robbery of Cesar Leon, (4) Nunnery had a prior
violent felony conviction for the attempted robbery of Leobardo Ledesma,
(6) Nunnery knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one

\sHaving considered the relevant factors, see Big Pond v, State, 101
Nev. 1, 3, 692 P.2d 1288, 1289 (1985), we reject Nunnery's claim of
‘cumulative error.

All four prior violent felony convictions included weapon
‘enhancements.

 

 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     

person, and (6) the murder was committed while Nunnery was engaged in
the commission of a robbery. All six aggravating circumstances were
based on the circumstances of the crime, to which Nunnery confessed. In
particular, Nunnery admitted to robbing and shooting at Cesar Leon,
trying to rob the other victims, and to murdering Saul Nunez during the
robbery. And while Nunnery challenges the evidence supporting the
aggravating circumstances for the attempted murder of Ambriz-Nunez
and/or Ledesma and for creating a great risk of death to more than one
person, we concluded above that sufficient evidence supports them. The
State proved all six aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.

Second, nothing in the record demonstrates that the jury's
verdict was the result of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.
Despite Nunnery’s claims that his penalty hearing was unfair on the
grounds outlined in this opinion, no error unduly prejudiced him or served
to inflame the jury.

Finally, we must consider whether the death sentence is
excessive. In doing so, we “consider{ ] only the crime and the defendant at
hand,” Dennis v. State, 116 Nev. 1075, 1084, 13 P.3d 434, 440 (2000), to
determine whether “the crime and defendant ... [are] of the class or kind
that warrants the imposition of death,” id, at 1085, 13 P.3d at 440. The
evidence presented at the penalty hearing revealed that in three separate
incidents within a matter of weeks Nunnery murdered three people.
Nunnery was shown to be a violent man with little regard for human life
and without any remorse for his actions. ‘The record demonstrates that
Nunnery committed a cold-blooded and unprovoked killing and has a
propensity toward violent behavior. We conclude that the death sentence

in this case is not excessive.

 
CONCLUSION
Our review of this appeal reveals no errors that would
warrant a new trial, either guilt phase or penalty phase. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of conviction.

   

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