Title: Snow v. Snow

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12102 
 
JACQUELYN D. SNOW  vs.  WINTHROP E. SNOW. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     October 6, 2016. - February 9, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Divorce and Separation, Alimony, Foreign divorce. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint filed in the Berkshire Division of the Probate 
and Family Court Department on August 25, 2014. 
 
 
The case was heard by David J. Dacyczyn, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Brigid M. Hennessey (Buffy D. Lord also present) for the 
husband. 
 
Lindsay D. DiSantis (David R. Cianflone also present) for 
the wife. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The wife in this case did not pursue her claim 
for alimony during the divorce proceeding, but sought and 
obtained an alimony award more than four years after the divorce 
judgment.  We conclude that, in such circumstances, the 
 
2 
durational limit of general term alimony under G. L. c. 208, 
§ 49 (b), starts to run on the date that the alimony was 
awarded, not on the date of the divorce judgment or on the date 
temporary alimony was awarded.  We also conclude that the income 
earned from overtime pay must be considered in making an initial 
alimony award determination under G. L. c. 208, § 34, regardless 
of whether that determination is made before or after the 
divorce judgment.  Finally, we conclude that, where a judge 
awards alimony under § 34, the judge must specifically address 
the issue of health insurance coverage for the recipient spouse 
as required by § 34. 
 
Background.  Jacquelyn D. Snow (wife) and Winthrop E. Snow 
(husband) were married in New York in 1991, and separated in 
January, 2008.  They have no children.  The husband commenced 
the divorce action in the New York Supreme Court in May, 2008, 
claiming "constructive abandonment" by the wife.1  The wife was 
initially represented by counsel, but her attorney's motion to 
withdraw was allowed by the judge in September, 2009.  After the 
wife failed to answer the husband's verified complaint, comply 
with discovery obligations, and appear for her deposition, the 
judge found her in default and entered a judgment for divorce on 
July 21, 2010, in accordance with N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 211 
                     
 
1 In New York, the Supreme Court is the supreme trial court.  
See N.Y. Const. art. VI, §§ 3, 7. 
 
3 
(McKinney 2016) ("A final judgment shall be entered by default 
for want of appearance or pleading, . . . only upon competent 
oral proof or upon written proof that may be considered on a 
motion for summary judgment").  As to alimony (which New York 
characterizes as "maintenance"), the judge found that the wife 
requested maintenance of $1,000 per week on her statement of net 
worth "but did not pursue the claim," so no maintenance was 
awarded. 
 
On August 25, 2014, the wife filed a pro se complaint for 
modification of a foreign divorce in the Probate and Family 
Court in Massachusetts, where both parties were then domiciled.2  
She asked that the final judgment of divorce be modified "with 
respect to alimony, which was not addressed."  She explained 
that circumstances had changed in that the husband had been 
supporting her with payments of $1,000 per week since September, 
2013, but he had stopped such payments in June, 2014, and, as a 
result, she was homeless and living in her automobile. 
 
On January 22, 2015, the judge entered a temporary alimony 
order awarding the wife $850 per week, commencing on January 23, 
2015.  After trial, the judge entered a "Judgment of 
Modification" on May 5, 2015, awarding the wife $810 per week in 
general term alimony, to commence on May 8, 2015, until December 
                     
 
2 After filing the complaint, the wife was represented by 
counsel. 
 
4 
21, 2029, or the death of one of the parties, whichever came 
first.  The judge also ordered the husband to secure a life 
insurance policy, designating the wife as the beneficiary, in 
the amount of $520,000, to be reduced by $40,000 annually during 
the alimony payment period. 
 
In determining the duration of alimony, the judge found 
that the length of the marriage was approximately 224 months 
(eighteen years and eight months) and that the durational limit 
of alimony under G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b) (4), was 179 months 
(fourteen years and eleven months).3  The judge ordered alimony 
for the full durational limit, commencing on the date of the 
first temporary alimony payment. 
 
In determining the amount of general term alimony, the 
judge considered the factors set forth in G. L. c. 208, § 53 
(a),4 and determined that alimony should be approximately thirty-
                     
 
3 Under G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b) (4), the durational limit of 
general term alimony for a marriage of more than fifteen but 
less than or equal to twenty years is no longer than eighty per 
cent of the number of months of the marriage. 
 
 
4 General Laws c. 208, § 53 (a), provides:  "In determining 
the appropriate form of alimony and in setting the amount and 
duration of support, a court shall consider:  the length of the 
marriage; age of the parties; health of the parties; income, 
employment and employability of both parties, including 
employability through reasonable diligence and additional 
training, if necessary; economic and non-economic contribution 
of both parties to the marriage; marital lifestyle; ability of 
each party to maintain the marital lifestyle; lost economic 
opportunity as a result of the marriage; and such other factors 
as the court considers relevant and material." 
 
5 
five per cent of the difference between the husband's and wife's 
weekly incomes.  The judge calculated the husband's income as 
his then-current base pay; the judge did not include any 
overtime in the calculation because he found that overtime 
income did not significantly affect the parties' economic status 
at "the time of the divorce judgment and throughout the 
marriage." 
 
The judge did not address the issue of health insurance, 
but found that the wife was "not eligible for health insurance 
through the husband's employer at this time." 
 
Both parties appealed from the judgment, and we transferred 
the case to this court on our own motion.  On appeal, the 
husband contends that the judge erred by commencing the 
durational limit of alimony on the date of the first temporary 
alimony payment (January 23, 2015) rather than on the date of 
the New York judgment of divorce (July 21, 2010).  The wife 
agrees that the judge erred in his selection of the commencement 
date, but she claims that the appropriate commencement date 
should have been the date of the award of general term alimony 
in the judgment of modification (May 5, 2015).  The wife also 
contends that the judge erred in failing to include overtime pay 
in his alimony calculation and in failing to make a 
determination as to health insurance coverage. 
 
6 
 
Discussion.  Before we address the parties' claims of 
error, we must first address a preliminary question that affects 
these claims:  was the wife's petition for alimony a complaint 
for modification of an alimony judgment under G. L. c. 208, 
§ 37, or an initial complaint for alimony under G. L. c. 208, 
§ 34? 
There are several relevant differences between the two 
forms of complaint.  Where a spouse files an initial complaint 
for alimony, before or after the divorce, the judge is required 
to consider all the factors identified in G. L. c. 208, 
§ 53 (a), in determining the amount and duration of alimony.  
G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a).  See George v. George, 476 Mass. 65, 71 
(2016), citing Duff-Kareores v. Kareores, 474 Mass. 528, 535 
(2016).  The spouse seeking alimony for the first time need not 
demonstrate a material change in circumstances.  See Cherrington 
v. Cherrington, 404 Mass. 267, 270 (1989); Kinosian v. Kinosian, 
351 Mass. 49, 52 (1966); Talbot v. Talbot, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 
456, 460 (1982).  Where the issue of alimony was earlier 
adjudicated and the judge made the requisite findings based on 
the statutory factors, modification of the amount or duration of 
an award of general term alimony may occur only where a party is 
able to demonstrate "a material change of circumstances 
warranting modification."  G. L. c. 208, § 49 (e).  See Buckley 
v. Buckley, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 716, 719 (1997) ("where the trial 
 
7 
court has previously passed on the issue of alimony in the 
divorce judgment," any change in alimony must be accomplished 
through complaint for modification). 
 
Here, the wife, before she retained counsel, characterized 
her complaint as one seeking modification.  But the title or 
form of the complaint is not dispositive; "it is to be treated 
in accordance with its essential substance."  Baird v. Baird, 
311 Mass. 329, 331 (1942) (petition that had been described as 
"for modification" treated as initial complaint for alimony).  
Nor is the timing of the complaint conclusive; under § 34, an 
initial complaint for alimony may be made either in the divorce 
action or "upon a complaint in an action brought at any time 
after a divorce." 
 
The husband contends that the issue of alimony was 
adjudicated in the New York divorce action because the wife 
initially requested maintenance and the judge awarded no 
maintenance.  But the judge made clear that the wife "did not 
pursue the claim" for maintenance, and declared that he did not 
award maintenance to the wife because she was capable of self-
support and ultimately did "not seek maintenance" from the 
husband.  If the request for alimony had been pursued, the judge 
in New York, like his counterpart in Massachusetts, would have 
had a statutory obligation to consider specific factors in 
determining the duration and amount of maintenance.  See N.Y. 
 
8 
Dom. Rel. Law § 236(6) (McKinney Supp. 2010).  But the judge in 
New York did not address any of those factors in denying 
maintenance because, at the time of judgment, the wife no longer 
sought alimony.  "We do not believe that, if alimony is not 
requested during the divorce proceedings, we should 
automatically assume that it was not warranted in the 
circumstances or hold that each party has waived all opportunity 
to demonstrate that it was then warranted."  Cherrington, 404 
Mass. at 270 n.6.  Where, as here, the wife did not pursue her 
request for maintenance and the judge in New York made no 
findings based on the statutory factors in awarding no 
maintenance, we conclude that the wife's complaint in 
Massachusetts was an initial complaint for alimony rather than a 
complaint for modification.5 
 
1.  Commencement of durational limit.  Under the Alimony 
Reform Act of 2011, St. 2011, c. 124 (reform act), "[i]f the 
length of the marriage is [twenty] years or less, but more than 
[fifteen] years, general term alimony shall continue for not 
longer than [eighty] per cent of the number of months of the 
                     
 
5 Our conclusion would be different if the New York judge 
had considered each of the statutory factors and determined 
based on the circumstances that no maintenance award was 
appropriate.  In such a case, the spouse who sought alimony 
would have had a full and fair adjudication on the merits of the 
claim for alimony, and factual findings would have been made 
that a subsequent judge could consider in deciding whether there 
has been a material change in circumstances justifying 
modification of that alimony judgment. 
 
9 
marriage" unless the judge makes a written finding that 
deviation beyond this time limit is required in the interests of 
justice.  G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b) (4).  In Holmes v. Holmes, 467 
Mass. 653, 659 (2014), we concluded that the durational limit 
starts to run from the date of the award of general term alimony 
in the judgment of divorce rather than the date that temporary 
alimony was first awarded.  We reasoned that "general term 
alimony may commence only on the issuance of the judgment 
declaring the termination of the marriage," and that 
"[t]emporary alimony is not general term alimony" because it may 
commence before the spousal relationship has been legally 
terminated.  Id. 
 
In Holmes, however, alimony was sought in the divorce 
complaint and general term alimony was awarded as part of the 
divorce judgment; here, the divorce judgment issued before the 
initial complaint for alimony was filed and before any alimony 
was awarded.  The husband relies on this distinction in claiming 
that the durational limit is triggered by the issuance of the 
divorce judgment in New York, not the award of temporary or 
general term alimony.  We disagree. 
   
To determine when the Legislature intended the durational 
limit of general term alimony to commence, "we look first to the 
language of the relevant statute, which is generally the 
clearest window into the collective mind of the Legislature."  
 
10 
Holmes, 467 Mass. at 659.  "'[A] statute must be interpreted 
according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all 
its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the 
language, considered in connection with the cause of its 
enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the 
main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of 
its framers may be effectuated.'"  Rodman v. Rodman, 470 Mass. 
539, 541 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 464 Mass. 
365, 368 (2013). 
 
Under G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b), "general term alimony shall 
continue for not longer than" a fixed percentage of the number 
of months of the marriage.  General term alimony cannot 
"continue" unless it has previously been awarded.  The plain 
language of the statute makes the commencement of the durational 
limitation period dependent on the award of general term 
alimony.  See Holmes, 467 Mass. at 659.  Thus, until a judge has 
awarded general term alimony, the duration of general term 
alimony does not begin to run. 
 
That same plain language dictates that the durational 
limits commence on the award of general term alimony, not on the 
award of temporary alimony, which, as noted in Holmes, is 
separate and distinct from general term alimony.  In determining 
that the durational limit commenced on the award of temporary 
alimony, the judge relied upon the mistaken premise that the 
 
11 
wife's action was a complaint for modification rather than an 
initial complaint for alimony.  The judge further noted that 
temporary relief was warranted because of the wife's "dire 
financial predicament," and declared that the husband should be 
"given credit against the alimony duration limits."  Even though 
the judge erred in concluding that the durational limits 
commenced on the award of temporary alimony, nothing bars the 
judge on remand from determining that the husband should be 
credited for his payment of temporary alimony and that alimony 
payments should end on or about the date he declared as the 
durational limit (December 21, 2029).  A judge in his or her 
discretion, applying the requisite factors in § 53 (a), "may 
determine that the appropriate duration of alimony is less than 
the presumptive maximum without a written finding that deviation 
from the presumptive maximum is required in the interests of 
justice" (emphasis in original).  Holmes, 467 Mass. at 658.  See 
G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a) (in determining appropriate duration of 
alimony, judge may consider other factors that are "relevant and 
material"). 
 
2.  Overtime.  In adjudicating an initial complaint for 
alimony, the income of both parties is one of the statutory 
factors that a judge is required to consider, and the amount of 
general term alimony "should not generally exceed the 
recipient's need or [thirty] to [thirty-five] per cent of the 
 
12 
difference between the parties' gross incomes established at the 
time of the order being issued."  G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a), (b).  
With exceptions not relevant here, "income shall be defined as 
set forth in the Massachusetts child support guidelines."  G. L. 
c. 208, § 53 (b).  See Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass. 230, 242-
244 (2014).  Under the guidelines, "income is defined as gross 
income from whatever source," and specifically includes 
"salaries, wages, [and] overtime."  Child Support Guidelines 
§ I(A)(1)(a) (Aug. 1, 2013).  Therefore, in determining an award 
of alimony on an initial complaint for alimony, a judge must 
consider the parties' income, including overtime. 
 
However, in adjudicating a complaint for modification of an 
alimony judgment, "[i]ncome from . . . overtime work shall be 
presumed immaterial to alimony modification if . . . the . . . 
overtime began after entry of the initial order."  G. L. c. 208, 
§ 54 (b).  Because the judge erroneously characterized the 
wife's petition as a complaint for modification, the judge in 
determining the alimony award considered only the husband's 
overtime income "[a]t the time of the divorce judgment and 
throughout the marriage"; he did not consider the husband's 
overtime income after the divorce judgment and at the time of 
trial on what we now recognize as the wife's initial complaint 
for alimony.  This was error.  On remand, the judge must 
consider the husband's postdivorce judgment overtime income in 
 
13 
determining the award of alimony on the wife's initial complaint 
for alimony.  Cf. George, 476 Mass. at 70 ("a judge should 
evaluate the circumstances of the parties in the here and now"). 
 
3.  Health insurance coverage.  The wife claims that the 
judge erred in failing to make a determination as to health 
insurance coverage.  Under the New York divorce judgment, the 
wife is responsible for securing her own health insurance.  The 
Massachusetts judge recognized the practical consequences of 
that aspect of the judgment, finding that the wife had not seen 
a doctor since 2002 and had not seen a dentist since 1997.  
However, apart from noting that the wife is not presently 
eligible for health insurance through the husband's employer, 
the judge did not address the issue of how the wife would obtain 
health insurance coverage, and the judgment did not mention it.  
Implicitly, the wife remains responsible for securing her own 
health insurance coverage.  We agree with the wife that, where 
the judge was adjudicating an initial complaint for alimony, the 
judge erred in failing explicitly to make a determination 
regarding the wife's health insurance coverage. 
 
Under § 34, the statute that governs the adjudication of an 
initial complaint for alimony: 
"When the court makes an order for alimony on behalf of a 
spouse, said court shall determine whether the obligor 
under such order has health insurance or other health 
coverage available to him through an employer or 
organization or has health insurance or other health 
 
14 
coverage available to him at reasonable cost that may be 
extended to cover the spouse for whom support is ordered.  
When said court has determined that the obligor has such 
insurance or coverage available to him, said court shall 
include in the support order a requirement that the obligor 
do one of the following:  exercise the option of additional 
coverage in favor of the spouse, obtain coverage for the 
spouse, or reimburse the spouse for the cost of health 
insurance.  In no event shall the order for alimony be 
reduced as a result of the obligor's cost for health 
insurance coverage for the spouse." 
 
G. L. c. 208, § 34. 
 
We describe the legislative evolution of these provisions.  
In 1983, as part of his over-all effort to address chronic 
shortfalls in the collection of State revenues, Governor Michael 
Dukakis proposed legislation that he characterized as a "Revenue 
Enforcement and Protection Program."  See J. Brouder & G. 
McDowell, Paying for Massachusetts:  Tax Evasion and the 
Underground Economy 10 (1983), available at 
https://archive.org/details/payingformassach00mass 
[https://perma.cc/PQ3J-7AA8] (Brouder & McDowell).  Among the 
legislation that emerged from that proposal was St. 1983, 
c. 233, § 77, which amended G. L. c. 208, § 34, by adding the 
following provision: 
"When the court makes an order for alimony on behalf of a 
spouse, and such spouse is not covered by a private group 
health insurance plan, said court shall determine whether 
the obligor under such order has health insurance on a 
group plan available to him through an employer or 
organization that may be extended to cover the spouse for 
whom support is ordered.  When said court has determined 
that the obligor has such insurance, said court shall 
include in the support order a requirement that the obligor 
 
15 
exercise the option of additional coverage in favor of such 
spouse." 
 
The Department of Revenue estimated that this provision, along 
with ten other sections related to divorce, alimony, and child 
support, would save $4 million per year in State expenditures.  
Brouder & McDowell, supra at 35. 
 
Five years later, in 1988, Governor Dukakis proposed 
legislation for what he called "the first universal health care 
program in the nation; a commitment to assure health security 
for all of our citizens by 1992."  Letter from Michael S. 
Dukakis to Senate and House of Representatives (Jan. 6, 1988) 
(submitted with 1988 House Doc. No. 300).  Among the legislation 
that emerged from that over-all effort was St. 1988, c. 23, 
§ 67, which amended § 34 by deleting the two sentences added by 
St. 1983, c. 233, § 77, and replacing them with the three 
sentences regarding health insurance in the current § 34, whose 
language was left unchanged by the 2011 reform act. 
 
The reform act, however, included St. 2011, § 124, § 3, a 
new statute which inserted c. 208, § 53, into the General Laws 
and which provides in relevant part: 
"In setting an initial alimony order, or in modifying an 
existing order, the court may deviate from duration and 
amount limits for general term alimony and rehabilitative 
alimony upon written findings that deviation is necessary.  
Grounds for deviation may include:  . . . (3) whether the 
payor spouse is providing health insurance and the cost of 
health insurance for the recipient spouse . . . ." 
 
 
16 
G. L. c. 208, § 53 (e). 
 
From this legislative history, we discern that the 
legislative purpose behind St. 1983, c. 233, § 77, was to reduce 
the burden on the public arising from divorced spouses without 
health insurance.  The substantive scope of St. 1988, c. 23, 
§ 67, was broader in keeping with the over-all purpose of that 
legislation to move toward universal health coverage at a 
reasonable cost. 
 
We do not attempt in this opinion to harmonize the 
potential conflict between § 34, which bars a judge from 
reducing the amount of alimony because of the expense incurred 
in providing health insurance coverage for the recipient spouse, 
and § 53 (e), which expressly allows a judge to deviate from the 
amount limits for general term alimony because of the cost 
incurred by the payor spouse in providing health care coverage 
to the recipient spouse.  Nor do we opine as to whether the 
judge's obligation to order the provision of health insurance 
coverage under § 34 applies where the recipient spouse is 
eligible for such coverage only through the Health Connector 
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, P.L. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), or its Massachusetts counterpart, "An 
Act providing access to affordable, quality, accountable health 
care," St. 2006, c. 58, both of which were enacted long after 
the relevant provisions of § 34.  The parties did not brief 
 
17 
these issues, and no amicus brief was submitted.  Rather, we 
limit our opinion to the claim of error presented by the wife, 
and conclude that, where a judge awards alimony under § 34, the 
judge must specifically address the issue of health insurance 
coverage for the recipient spouse by making the determination 
required under § 34, and, where appropriate under the statute, 
by including the provision of health insurance coverage within 
the judgment.  See Zeh v. Zeh, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 267-268 
(1993) ("Given these statutory requirements and the critical 
importance and expense of health insurance, a judge's findings 
and orders under § 34 expressly should reflect compliance with 
the statute and make provision for the requisite coverage or 
reimbursement"). 
 
Conclusion.  The case is remanded to the Probate and Family 
Court with instructions to reevaluate the alimony judgment in 
light of our opinion and enter a new judgment accordingly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.