Title: JEFFERY LYNN SMITH V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JEFFERY LYNN SMITH V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 2199 P.3d 1052Case Number: S-07-0267Decided: 01/13/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 

JEFFERY 
LYNN SMITH,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Michael 
H. Reese, Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Reese.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. 
Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      A jury found 
Jeffery Lynn Smith guilty of second degree murder and concluded he was a 
habitual criminal.  The district 
court sentenced him to life in prison.  
On appeal, Mr. Smith claims there was insufficient evidence to convict 
him; the State violated his Fifth Amendment rights and engaged in prosecutorial 
misconduct by referring to his refusal to voluntarily submit a sample for DNA 
testing; the district court erred by excluding evidence of alternative suspects; 
the habitual criminal statute, as applied to him, violated the constitutional 
prohibition against ex post facto 
laws; and he should have been granted a change of venue.

 
 
[¶2]      We conclude the 
evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict and the district court did 
not commit any reversible errors.  
Consequently, we affirm.      

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      The issues for 
our consideration are:  

 
 
            
1.         
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. 

 
 
2. 
        
Whether the prosecutor violated Mr. Smith's constitutional right to 
remain silent when he elicited testimony about, and commented upon, Mr. Smith's 
refusal to voluntarily submit a sample for DNA testing.

 
 
3. 
        
Whether the trial court erred when it excluded evidence of alternative 
suspects. 

 
 
4. 
        
Whether the habitual criminal statute, as applied in this case, violated 
constitutional protections against ex 
post facto laws or was otherwise not applicable. 

 
 
5.         
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Smith's motion for a 
change of venue after an article about the case appeared in the Casper Star 
Tribune on the first day of the trial.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      On April 28, 
1986, Tammy Dively's dead body was discovered near Hat Six Road off Interstate 
25 in NatronaCounty.  An autopsy revealed that she had 
suffered multiple injuries, including blunt force trauma to her skull and 
injuries suffered from being run over by a vehicle.  The coroner ruled the death a 
homicide.  The coroner took 
biological samples from the victim's vaginal pool, which tested positive for 
seminal fluid.  Although several 
persons of interest, including Mr. Smith, were interviewed, no arrests were made 
at that time.       

 
 
[¶5]      In 2006, 
investigators located Mr. Smith, who was in jail in Nebraska, and again 
interviewed him.  The investigators 
asked him to submit a sample for DNA testing.  He refused, but the officers obtained a 
search warrant and took a DNA sample anyway.  Tests revealed the seminal fluid 
retrieved from Ms. Dively's body was Mr. Smith's.      

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Smith was 
charged with second degree murder and being a habitual criminal.  The district court convened a jury trial 
on May 7, 2007.  At the conclusion 
of the trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the second degree murder 
charge.  The jury also determined 
Mr. Smith was a habitual criminal.  
The district court sentenced him to serve life in prison, and he 
appealed.                   

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 

1.      
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶7]      Mr. Smith was 
convicted of second degree murder.  
Second degree murder is statutorily defined as: "Whoever purposely and 
maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being is guilty of 
murder in the second degree[.]"  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104 (LexisNexis 2007).  
The jury in this case was instructed:

 
 
The 
elements of the crime of Second Degree Murder are:

 
 
1.   On or about April 28, 
1986;

2.   In Natrona County, Wyoming;

3.   The Defendant, Jeffery Lynn 
Smith;

4.   Purposely 
and;

5.   Maliciously;

6.   Killed Tammy 
Dively.

 
 
If 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the Defendant 
"guilty" of Second Degree Murder.

 
 
If, 
on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any 
of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should 
find the Defendant "not guilty" of Second Degree Murder.  

 
 
[¶8]      In determining 
whether there was sufficient trial evidence to sustain a conviction, we apply 
the following standard of review:

 
 
In 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence . . . , we examine and accept as true 
the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it. 
We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by the defendant.  We do not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a jury could have reasonably 
concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  This standard applies 
whether the supporting evidence is direct or circumstantial.  

 
 

Martin 
v. State, 2007 
WY 2, ¶ 32, 149 P.3d 707, 715 (Wyo. 2007), citing Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 16, 123 P.3d 543, 549 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. Smith 
maintains that there was insufficient evidence that he committed the 
homicide.  The day after the murder, 
April 29, 1986, officers interviewed Ms. Dively's young daughter.  She identified a house in the 
neighborhood where she said one of her mother's friends lived.  She told the investigators that she 
thought her mother had gone to the house the previous evening to purchase 
marijuana.   

 
 
[¶10]   Mr. Smith was one of the men who 
lived in the house the daughter identified, and the officers interviewed him 
shortly after the murder.  A 
transcript of the interview was admitted into evidence at trial.  Mr. Smith told officers that Ms. Dively 
had come to his house the night she died, asking for his roommate.  He said she left after he told her his 
roommate was not home.  Mr. Smith 
stated that he did not know Ms. Dively very well.    

 
 
[¶11]   In 2006, investigators located Mr. 
Smith, who was in jail in Nebraska, and again interviewed him.  During that interview, he contradicted 
his earlier statements by saying that he did not know Ms. Dively at all.  Pursuant to a warrant, the investigators 
obtained a sample of Mr. Smith's DNA.  
  

 
 
[¶12]   Contrary to Mr. Smith's statement 
that he did not know Ms. Dively, DNA testing established that they had engaged 
in sexual contact prior to her death.  
The Natrona County Coroner, James Thorpen, M.D., testified that 
spermatozoa and prostatic acid phospatase, which are components of seminal 
fluid, were found on the vaginal swab taken during the autopsy.  Kevin Noppinger, the State's DNA expert, 
testified that the DNA test results excluded everyone on earth except Mr. Smith 
as the donor of the semen discovered in Ms. Dively's body.  The medical experts also testified that, 
while spermatozoa may be discovered in the vaginal pool for several days after 
sexual activity, prostatic acid phospatase will generally dissipate within 24 to 
30 hours after sexual contact.  The 
vaginal swabs were taken 19 ½ hours after Ms. Dively's death was reported.  Dr. Thorpen testified that the fact that 
prostatic acid phospatase was found in Ms. Dively's vaginal pool was consistent 
with sexual activity between the victim and Mr. Smith shortly before her 
death.    

 
 
[¶13]   Lawrence "Larry" Malone, a friend 
of Ms. Dively's, testified that between 6:15 and 6:30 p.m. on the evening of her 
death, he witnessed her get into a blue truck with a white cab.  He believed the truck was a GMC or 
Chevrolet, model year somewhere between 1967 and 1972.  Consistent with Mr. Malone's testimony, 
Ms. Dively's daughter testified that she had looked out the window and saw her 
mother walking toward a blue pickup.  
She stated that was the last time she saw her mother alive.  Ms. Dively's lifeless body was 
discovered by a passerby around 7:45 p.m. that same night.    

 
 
[¶14]   In 1986, Mr. Smith owned a truck 
consistent with Mr. Malone's description.  
Mr. Malone testified that a photograph of Mr. Smith's truck looked like 
the truck he saw the victim getting into.  
He also stated that the man driving the truck had brown hair and part of 
it flipped over one eye.  A 
photograph of Mr. Smith from 1989 introduced into evidence at trial resembled 
the man Mr. Malone described as the driver of the truck.  

 
 
[¶15]   Mr. Smith argues that the evidence 
that he committed the murder was circumstantial and, in order to conclude he 
murdered Ms. Dively, the jury had to improperly add inference to inference.  Our law is clear that, in reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we do not distinguish between direct and 
circumstantial evidence.  Rawle v. State, 2007 WY 59 ¶ 28, 155 P.3d 1024, 1031 (Wyo. 2007).  
Furthermore, as our standard of review states, reasonable inferences are 
allowed.  

 
 
A 
permissible inference has been described as follows:

 
 
An 
inference is a process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition is deduced 
fairly and logically from other facts proven or admitted.  An inference is truly evidence.  The weight to which it is entitled 
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case * * *.  

 
 

Story 
v. State, 
721 P.2d 1020, 1025 (Wyo.), cert. denied,  479 U.S. 962, 107 S. Ct. 459, 93 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1986).

 
 

Seeley 
v. State, 959 P.2d 170, 176 (Wyo. 1998).  

 
 
[¶16]   The trial evidence showed that Mr. 
Smith was not truthful with officers about his relationship with Ms. 
Dively.  He clearly knew her better 
than he admitted, as the DNA evidence established he had engaged in sexual 
contact with her.  Mr. Smith argues 
that the evidence of sexual contact does not prove that he killed Ms. Dively 
because the medical evidence established that they could have had sex many hours 
before her death.  It is true that 
one of the inferences which could have been drawn from the medical evidence was 
that Mr. Smith and the victim engaged in consensual sex several hours before her 
murder.  However, it was also 
reasonable for the jury to infer from the medical evidence that the time of the 
sexual activity between Ms. Dively and Mr. Smith was just prior to her death, 
strongly suggesting that he murdered her.  
That inference is also supported by the trial evidence that Ms. Dively 
got into a pickup, like one Mr. Smith owned, with a man that resembled him 
shortly before her death.  

 
 
[¶17]   When evidence is presented that is 
capable of producing conflicting inferences, the determination of which 
inference is proper should be left to the jury.  See, e.g., Michaelis v. State, 2005 WY 80, ¶ 3, 115 P.3d 1098, 1100 (Wyo. 2005).  This 
is not a case where the jury had to engage in speculation or conjecture to 
conclude that Mr. Smith murdered Ms. Dively.  Instead, the evidence, although 
circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences emanating from it was 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict.  
On this record, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the State 
proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, Mr. Smith was Ms. Dively's 
murderer.

 
 
[¶18]   Cases from other jurisdictions 
support our decision that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude 
Mr. Smith murdered Ms. Dively.  Walker v. 
State, 651 S.E.2d 12 (Ga. 2007) had facts remarkably similar to 
those presented here.  The victim 
was killed in 1989 and the medical examiner collected samples of sperm from the 
victim's vagina during the autopsy.  
Twelve years later, the swabs were sent for testing.  The test revealed that the DNA on the 
swab matched Mr. Walker's profile, which was already in a DNA database.  The trial evidence also revealed that, 
at the time of the victim's death, Mr. Walker frequently stayed at his 
grandmother's home, just a block away from the park near where the victim's body 
was discovered.  Mr. Walker had also 
been observed in the park a few days after the murder.  Id. at 14.  

 
 
[¶19]   Mr. Walker submitted that the 
evidence against him was insufficient because it was "completely circumstantial" 
and did not exclude other reasonable hypotheses which would have supported his 
innocence.  Id.  
Like Mr. Smith, he maintained that the evidence could have supported 
the inference that he had consensual sex with the victim and then, later, 
someone else killed her.  The court 
ruled that the role of interpreting the evidence belonged to the jury and the 
jury's decision would be reversed only if it was unsupportable as a matter of 
law.  The court said that the jury 
was entitled to "reject as unreasonable the theoretical possibilities that 
Walker had a 
consensual encounter" with the victim and find, from the evidence presented, 
that the defendant murdered the victim.   Id. at 14-15.  See also, People v. Saxon, 871 N.E.2d 244, 251-52 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2007)  (concluding it 
was appropriate for the fact finder to infer the defendant was the perpetrator 
from evidence that he had sexual intercourse with the victim and other 
contradicted circumstantial evidence).    

 
 
[¶20]   Mr. Smith also argues there was 
insufficient evidence that he acted purposely.  The judge instructed the 
jury:

 
 
            
"Purposely" means intentionally.

 
 
            
"Malice" means that the act constituting the offense charged was done 
intentionally, without legal justification or excuse or that the act was done in 
such a manner as to indicate hatred, ill-will, or hostility towards 
another.

 
 
            
To prove Second Degree Murder the State must prove that the Defendant 
acted Purposely and Maliciously.  
However, the State is not required to prove that the Defendant intended 
to kill.  

 
 
[¶21]   Ms. Dively's body was found 
approximately 50 feet off the road.  
Dr. Thorpen testified that Ms. Dively had been hit on the head more than 
once, resulting in severe head trauma.  
She was subsequently run over by a vehicle at least twice.  Deborah Lougee, a forensic scientist 
with the Montana Department of Justice, studied the tire track evidence and 
confirmed that Ms. Dively could have been run over more than once.    

 
 
[¶22]   Dr. Thorpen testified the "[m]anner 
of death was multiple severe traumatic injuries with collapse and herniation of 
both lungs, ruptured liver with massive abdominal hemorrhage, and blow to the 
right head with basilar skull fracture."  
He stated that the head injury could have been lethal, if she did not 
receive medical treatment, but the compression injuries from being run over were 
definitely lethal.  Dr. Thorpen 
stated that the medical evidence did not indicate that Ms. Dively's death was 
accidental.      

 
 
[¶23]   There is no question that this 
evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that the homicide was 
committed purposely and with malice.  
As the jury was instructed, purposely means that the act was 
intentional.  In the context of 
second degree murder purposely simply means the act was not committed 
"carelessly, inadvertently, accidentally, negligently, heedlessly or 
thoughtlessly."  Butcher, ¶ 20, 123 P.3d  at 550, quoting 
Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 28, ¶ 18, 86 P.3d 851, 857 (Wyo. 2004), which quoted State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1138 
(Wyo. 1993).   Similarly, 
malice means that the act was done intentionally, without legal justification or 
excuse or was accomplished in such a manner as to indicate hatred, ill-will or 
hostility towards another.  The jury 
reasonably could have concluded that when Mr. Smith hit Ms. Dively on the head 
multiple times, ran over her at least twice and left her on the side of the road 
to die, he acted purposely and with malice.  Mr. Smith's argument to the contrary is 
not plausible.

 
 

2.         
Prosecutorial References to Defendant's 
Refusal to Submit Sample for DNA Testing 

 
 
[¶24]   The prosecutor referred to Mr. 
Smith's refusal to submit a sample for DNA testing in his opening statement and 
closing argument and also elicited testimony about Mr. Smith's refusal from the 
lead investigator.  Mr. Smith claims 
the prosecutor's questions and comments violated his constitutional right to 
remain silent and amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. 

 
 
[¶25]   The Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to remain silent, 
so as not to incriminate himself.  
Wyoming 
Constitution Art. I, § 11 provides similar protection.  See, e.g., Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 389 
(Wyo. 1995) 
(on rehearing).  The prosecutor 
violates a defendant's due process rights if he comments upon the accused's 
silence in order to infer guilt.  See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 
(1976); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291, 106 S. Ct. 634, 88 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986).  Our standard of 
review on questions involving interpretation of constitutional rights is de novo.  See State v. Naples, 2006 WY 125, ¶ 9, 143 P.3d 358, 361 
(Wyo. 2006).  

 
 
[¶26]   In addressing a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct, our focus is on the prejudice suffered by the 
defendant.  In Gabbert v. State, 2006 WY 108, ¶ 21, 141 P.3d 690, 697 (Wyo. 2006), abrogated on 
other grounds by Granzer v. State, 
2008 WY 118, 193 P.3d 266 (Wyo. 2008), we described our standard of review 
as follows:

 
 
When 
reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the entire record must be 
considered.  Whether such misconduct 
is reviewed on the basis of harmless error,  W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and  W.R.A.P. 9.04, or on the basis of plain 
error,  W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and  W.R.A.P. 9.05, our primary focus is 
whether an accused's case has been so seriously prejudiced by the error that a 
fair trial has been denied.   
Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, 
¶ 38, 123 P.3d 543, 554 (Wyo. 2005);  
Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, ¶ 
56, 98 P.3d 143, 157 (Wyo.2004).  
This involves a determination as to whether, "based on the entire record, 
a reasonable possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict 
might have been more favorable to the accused."   Lopez, ¶ 56, 98 P.3d  at 157.   [The appellant] bears the burden 
of establishing prejudicial error.   
Butcher, ¶ 39, 123 P.3d  at 
554.

 
 

See 
also, 
Szymanski v. State, 2007 WY 139, ¶ 
27, 166 P.3d 879, 886 (Wyo. 2007).          

 
 
[¶27]   The United States Supreme Court has 
expressly ruled that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, i.e., 
the right to remain silent, only extends to testimonial or communicative 
evidence.  In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
761, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966), the Supreme Court  explained that blood evidence obtained 
from a suspect's body is not testimonial or communicative evidence and does not, 
therefore, fit within the Fifth Amendment privilege. 

 
 
[T]he 
privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against 
himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or 
communicative nature, and . . . the 
withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in question in this case did not 
involve compulsion to these ends.

 
 

Id.  

 
 
[¶28]   Expanding upon Schmerber, the Supreme Court ruled in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 
564, 103 S. Ct. 916, 74 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1983), that the state court improperly held 
an implied consent statute which allowed a defendant's refusal to submit to a 
blood alcohol test to be used as evidence against him violated the privilege 
against self-incrimination.  
Although the decision considered South Dakota's implied consent statute, the 
Supreme Court's decision was not dependent upon the statutory language.  Instead, the Supreme Court recognized 
that protecting the defendant from being compelled to testify against 
himself is the lynchpin of the Fifth Amendment protection.   Id. 

 
 
[¶29]   In Neville, the defendant had been given 
the option of taking the test or refusing.  
The defendant was not, however, specifically informed that, if he 
refused, his refusal could be used as evidence against him.  Id. at 555-56.  While the Court recognized the choice 
was not always an easy one for a defendant, using his refusal against him did 
not implicate Fifth Amendment concerns.  
The Court explained: 

 
 
            
[T]he values behind the Fifth Amendment are not hindered when the state 
offers a suspect the choice of submitting to the blood-alcohol test or having 
his refusal used against him.  The 
simple blood-alcohol test is so safe, painless, and commonplace, see Schmerber [v. California], 384 U.S. [757], 771, 
86 S.Ct. [1826], at 1836 [16 L. Ed. 2d 908], that respondent concedes, as he must, 
that the state could legitimately compel the suspect, against his will, to 
accede to the test.  Given, then, 
that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is clearly legitimate, the action 
becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a second option of refusing the 
test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice.  Nor is this a case where the State has 
subtly coerced respondent into choosing the option it had no right to compel, 
rather than offering a true choice.  
To the contrary, the State wants respondent to choose to take the test, 
for the inference of intoxication arising from a positive blood-alcohol test is 
far stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the 
test.

 
 
. 
. . .   We hold, therefore, that a refusal to 
take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is 
not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the privilege 
against self-incrimination.

 
 

Id. 
at 
563-64.

 
 
[¶30]   This Court has expressly adopted 
the same principles with respect to Art. I, § 11 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  In City of Laramie v. Mengel, 671 P.2d 340, 
345-46 (Wyo. 
1983), we held that introduction of evidence that the defendant refused to take 
a blood alcohol test did not violate his state constitutional right against self 
incrimination.    

 
 
[¶31]   In Deno v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 753, 
760 (Ky. 
2005), the Kentucky Supreme Court applied a similar rationale in a case 
involving a request for a DNA sample.  
The court concluded the Fifth Amendment was not implicated when the trial 
court admitted into evidence the appellant's refusal to provide a DNA sample and 
allowed the prosecutor to argue such refusal was indicative of guilt.  Id.  
See also, Ferega v. State, 
650 S.E.2d 286, 288 (Ga. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that "[t]he element of 
coercion necessary to trigger Fifth Amendment protection was clearly absent" 
where the defendant was specifically told that field sobriety tests were 
voluntary and he refused to take them). 

 
 
[¶32]   Here, the investigators asked Mr. 
Smith to voluntarily give a DNA sample; after he refused, they obtained a 
warrant to obtain the sample.  The 
DNA sample and the associated test results were not testimonial or communicative 
evidence and the State could compel him to provide the sample.  By giving him the choice of providing a 
sample or refusing, the State did not coerce him and the evidence of his refusal 
did not fall within the Fifth Amendment protection.  We conclude, therefore, the prosecutor 
did not violate Mr. Smith's privilege against self-incrimination or commit 
prosecutorial misconduct by eliciting testimony about, or commenting upon, his 
refusal to voluntarily provide a sample for DNA testing.1   

 
 
3.         
Alternative Suspect Evidence

 
 
[¶33]   Mr. Smith claims the district court 
committed reversible error when it denied him the opportunity to present 
evidence of alternative suspects.  
Prior to the trial, Mr. Smith indicated that he planned to introduce 
evidence that Barney Myers or Charles Wentz had murdered Ms. Dively.  The State filed a motion to exclude 
evidence of alternative suspects.  
The district court ordered Mr. Smith to provide an offer of proof, and he 
proffered the following:

 
 
Barney 
Myers

 
 
In 
1995 Gary Myers contacted the Sheriff's Office regarding a lead with the death 
of Tammy Dively.  During the 
interview, Gary 
implicated his father, Barney Myers.  
Barney Myers lived across the road and catty-corner from Tammy 
Dively.  Barney also had a 1969 Blue 
Chevy pickup with a white cab in 1986 and during the time that Tammy Dively 
passed away.  Barney's wife also let 
her granddaughter play with Tammy Dively's daughter.  She would also provide food to Tammy on 
occasion.  Barney was believed to 
have assisted Tammy Dively when she needed a lift to go shopping. 

 
 
            
Gary Myer's belief that his father had something to do with the murder 
was triggered by his father shooting at his mother and other various statements 
that he had made about getting rid of women previously.

 
 
            
During the interview with Gary Myers on March 9, 1995, he stated that 
when his father would go fishing, Barney would discuss that he would get rid of 
his wife the way he had other women by sending them down the river.  Gary Myers brought in pictures of the 
truck and his father.  The pictures 
revealed that the truck at one point in time had black rims.  Gary Myers further explained that his 
father had the truck detailed and new tires and rims put on the truck the day 
after Tammy Dively's death.

 
 
            
Gary Myers stated that the tires that his father had removed were in good 
condition and didn't need to be replaced.  
Gary 
remembered this particularly because the Sheriff's Office had asked his father 
about the truck right before he and his father were going fishing.  He remember[ed] that his father had not 
mentioned the detailing and replacing the tires on the truck to the Sheriff's 
Office, and he thought that this was odd.

 
 
            
He also stated that his father had several affairs.  He also stated his father had pictures 
of naked young women in the home next to his bed.  He wasn't sure if there was a picture of 
Tammy Dively or not.

  

            
The Sheriff's Office had executed a search warrant on the home of Barney 
Myers and the Blue pickup truck in 1995.  
The Sheriff's Office took numerous pictures of the truck in 1995, and the 
truck was in good condition at that time.  
There was a little rust, but the truck was manufactured in 
1969.

 
 
            
The Sheriff's Office asked if Barney would submit a DNA sample, and he 
did.  The DNA sample did not match 
the sample of the semen.

 
 
            
In an interview with Georgia Williams[,] a person believed to be at 
Tammy's home, and one of the people to see Tammy the last time before her 
untimely death, Georgia indicated that the truck she saw Tammy get into was 
parked across the street.  The truck 
was a Blue pickup with a white cab.  
She also indicated that the person who owned the truck used to help Tammy 
run errands.  When she was shown a 
picture of Barney Myers' truck, she stated that it looked like the truck that 
Tammy had gotten into.  The only 
caveat was the truck she saw Tammy get into was a 4X4, and the picture she was 
shown looked to her like a two wheel drive.

 
 
            
When the Sheriff's Office interviewed Barney's wife, they indicated that 
they were 80-90% sure that he was the one who committed the 
murder.

 
 

Charles 
(Chuck) Wentz Jr. 
  

 
 
When 
Investigator Mike Steinberg reopened the Dively case in February of 2006, he 
considered Mr. Wentz to be the possible murderer.  Mr. Smith's proffer stated: 

 
 
Wentz's 
cousin Michael Day told law enforcement that Wentz confessed to him that he had 
run over and killed a female out on Hat Six Road.  Most telling is that Wentz did not make 
this confession days, weeks, or months after the death of Tammy Dively, but on 
the very night she died.  Not only 
did Day tell police officers that Wentz confessed to running someone over, Day 
also provided information to law enforcement that Day was present when Wentz 
returned home after running the woman over.  He told law enforcement that Wentz's 
vehicle had blood on it and that Wentz urged Day to help him clean out Wentz's 
garage so the vehicle could be hidden.  
Day stated specifically that there was a spot of blood on the bumper of 
Wentz's vehicle.  That Wentz tried 
to rub this spot of blood off but discovered it was a chip where the chrome was 
gone.  Wentz then had Day help him 
remove the bumper from the vehicle.  
Day reports that Wentz then purchased a new bumper and headlight the next 
day.  Day supplied law enforcement 
the locations of the purchases but there is nothing provided through discovery 
which indicates whether this information was verified or ruled out.  This information is extremely important 
because although Day would have no way of knowing it, Divel[y] had suffered 
severe blunt force trauma to her head, trauma which could have been caused by 
being struck by a bumper as she was being run over.

 
 
 In his statements Day tells law 
enforcement that on the day Tammy was killed, Wentz went out looking for 
marijuana.  At the earlier hearing 
the prosecutor in this case admitted that the evidence at trial will be that 
Tammy Dively went out looking for marijuana on the day she was killed as well; a 
fact that was not reported in the newspapers.  This is circumstantial evidence which 
goes to opportunity and motive; evidence the jury should be allowed to hear as 
to the possibility that Divel[y] and Wentz could have met up [and] looked for 
marijuana together.  

 
 
Day 
also told investigators about a paper bag that Wentz did not want anyone to see 
or to know what the bag contained.  
The jury will hear evidence that Tammy Dively was not wearing a bra when 
her body was found[,] an item which would easily have fit in the bag.  Additionally there will be evidence that 
on the day she died, Tammy Dively had cashed her income tax check.  Although seventy dollars was found on 
her body her check was for several hundred dollars a portion of which is 
unaccounted for, at least in the discovery provided by the State thus far.  This becomes probative because Day tells 
investigators that in days immediately following Dively's death Wentz was 
flashing money around like a big shot.  
Day further tells investigators that this was very unusual because they 
were always broke.  Once again this 
is probative circumstantial evidence which serves to corroborate Day's version 
of events.

 
 
Finally, 
even after twenty years of investigation the prosecution cannot supply any 
evidence as to why Mr. Smith would have taken Dively to Hat Six Road.  However, the same is not true of Charles 
Wentz.  There is evidence that Wentz 
at one time, not long before Dively['s] death lived on Coal Creek 
Road.  
Coal Creek 
Road ends where Hat Six Road begins with the dividing 
line being Interstate 25.  
Coal Creek 
Road heads north, Hat Six south.  Therefore Wentz would have been familiar 
with the Hat Six Road area.  Day 
also mentions an individual who [was] know[n] as the "Mountain Man" who lived in 
the Coal Creek/Hat Six area and sold marijuana around the time of Dively's 
death.  More circumstantial evidence 
that the jury, as the fact finders in the case[,] should be allowed to 
consider.

  

[¶34]   The district court conducted a 
pre-trial hearing pursuant to W.R.E. 104 (a) and (c).2  It concluded that the evidence about 
Barney Myers, except evidence that he "owned a particular truck and gave Dively 
rides" was inadmissible under W.R.E. 403.  
The district court also ruled that Mr. Day's proposed testimony regarding 
Mr. Wentz's statements was inadmissible hearsay.  The court stated that the other 
proffered evidence about Mr. Wentz as an alternative suspect was not admissible 
under W.R.E. 403 because its probative value was very small while the 
possibility of confusion of the issues and misleading the jury was high.      

 
 
[¶35]   Mr. Smith maintains on appeal that 
the district court denied his constitutional right to present a complete 
defense, pursuant to the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, when it prohibited him from presenting evidence implicating Barney 
Myers and/or Chuck Wentz in Ms. Dively's death.  To the extent Mr. Smith's argument 
involves a constitutional issue, we review it de novo.  Bush v. State, 2008 WY 108, ¶ 58, 193 P.3d 203, 217 (Wyo. 2008); Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 320, 328 (Wyo. 2004).  The 
issue of whether the evidence was properly excluded, however, is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.  Bush, ¶ 58, 193 P.3d  at 217; Vigil, ¶ 17, 98 P.3d  at 177.  "A trial court abuses its discretion 
when it could not have reasonably concluded as it did.  In this context, reasonably' means 
sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without being arbitrary or capricious."  Szymanski, ¶ 15, 166 P.3d  at 883 
(citations omitted).  

 
 
[¶36]   Mr. Smith argues that the district 
court arbitrarily applied a more stringent evidentiary standard to him, as a 
criminal defendant, to procure admission of evidence than it applied to the 
State.  He points to many cases in 
which courts have declared unconstitutional rules that impose, without 
justification, a greater evidentiary burden on defendants than the 
prosecution.  For example, the 
United States Supreme Court ruled in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1967), that a rule which allowed an accomplice to 
testify for the state but not for a defendant was unconstitutional.  In Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 
126 S. Ct. 1727, 164 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2006), the Supreme Court decided that a rule 
which prevented a criminal defendant from presenting evidence of alternative 
suspects if the state's case were sufficiently strong deprived the defendant of 
his constitutional right to present a defense.   

 
 
[¶37]   In preparing his brief, Mr. Smith 
did not have the benefit of our recent decision in Bush.  Analyzing Holmes and other alternative suspect 
evidence cases, we stated:

 
 
The 
United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense.  
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 1246, 90 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1986); Hannon, ¶ 62, 84 P.3d  at 346. "[T]he 
Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that 
serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they 
are asserted to promote."  Holmes, 547 U.S.  at 
327.  However, the Constitution does 
not prevent trial judges from applying well-established rules of evidence to 
exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors 
such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the 
jury.  Id.  The Constitution permits judges to 
exclude evidence that is repetitive, only marginally relevant, or poses an undue 
risk of harassment, prejudice or confusion of the issues. Id.  "A specific application of this 
principle is found in rules regulating the admission of evidence proffered by 
criminal defendants to show that someone else committed the crime with which 
they are charged."  Id.

 
 

Bush, 
¶ 
59, 193 P.3d  at 217-218.  This Court 
recognized in Bush that the district 
court should apply our standard rules of evidence in determining whether 
alternative suspect evidence is "legal" and, therefore, admissible.  Id., ¶ 71, 193 P.3d  at 220.  Discussing Wyoming law and cases 
from other jurisdictions on the admissibility of alternative suspect evidence, 
we stated that the proffered evidence must demonstrate a direct nexus between 
the alternative suspect and the crime charged.  Id., ¶¶ 60-64, 193 P.3d  at 218-20.  See also, Grady v. State, 2008 WY 144, ¶ 13, ___ 
P.3d ___ (Wyo. 2008).  

 
 
[¶38]   The district court did not apply a 
more stringent or different standard to Mr. Smith to gain admission of his 
alternative suspect evidence than it did to the State for admission of its 
evidence.  The court considered Mr. 
Smith's proposed alternative suspect evidence in a pre-trial hearing, just like 
its many other pre-trial rulings, some of which benefited the State and some of 
which did not.  It applied 
Wyoming's 
typical rules of evidence, including Rules 401, 402, 403 and 804, in ruling that 
Mr. Smith's proposed alternative suspect evidence was not admissible.  Unlike the cases cited by Mr. Smith, 
Wyoming courts 
do not impose an unfair burden upon the defendant to gain introduction of 
alternative suspect evidence.  

 
 
[¶39]   We turn now to the district court's 
specific rulings on the alternative suspect evidence proposed by Mr. Smith.  The district court concluded that the 
evidence pertaining to Mr. Myers, except "evidence that [he] owned a particular 
truck and gave [Ms.] Dively rides, [was] inadmissible under WRE 403."3  Rule 403 states:  "Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence."   The 
district court stated that the probative value of the evidence was small 
because, at most, it remotely showed an opportunity and potential motive.  On the other side of the equation, the 
district court ruled that the evidence "would present a substantial risk of 
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury and waste of time." 

 
 
[¶40]   The district court also indicated 
that Mr. Smith did not show a direct nexus between Barney Myers and the murder 
of Ms. Dively.  That lack of nexus 
is apparent in the proffer quoted above.  
Gary Myers' suggestions that his father was involved in the murder were 
speculative.  He did not provide any 
specific facts linking his father to the murder.  Gary Myers' proposed testimony that 
Barney had shot at his wife (Gary's mother) and that Barney had made general 
statements about "getting rid of women" did not link him to the murder at issue 
here.  

 
 
[¶41]   The potentially relevant evidence 
that Barney Myers owned a truck similar to the one described by Mr. Malone and 
gave Ms. Dively rides was not rejected by the district court in its ruling.  In fact, Barney Myers testified at trial 
and stated that he knew Ms. Dively, his wife had watched her daughter, she lived 
across the street from them, and he had owned a 1969 white and blue Chevrolet 
truck.    

 
 
[¶42]   The only other arguably relevant 
evidence was Gary Myers' statement that his father replaced the tires and had 
the truck detailed shortly after the murder.  The district court ruled that evidence 
was inadmissible under Rule 403.   
The court explained that the probative value of the evidence was slight 
in that Gary Myers' testimony was largely speculative.  In contrast, according to the district 
court, the possible prejudice from the evidence was great.  "Such evidence would tempt responsive 
evidence, and the focus of the trial may move from the guilt or innocence of the 
Defendant to unrelated matters about . . . whether [Barney Myers] really needed 
or bought new tires."    

 
 
[¶43]   We certainly cannot say that the 
district court abused its discretion when it concluded the probative value of 
the proposed evidence about the changes to the truck was slight as compared to 
its prejudicial value.  The evidence 
did not directly connect Barney Myers' truck to the murder.  Although Gary Myers' testimony may have 
suggested that Barney Myers made the changes to the truck to avoid detection as 
Ms. Dively's murderer, such a suggestion was pure speculation on this 
record.  

 
 
[¶44]   Turning to Mr. Smith's proposed 
evidence identifying Mr. Wentz as an alternative suspect, the district court 
described Mr. Day's statements in its order granting the State's motion to 
exclude the alternative suspect evidence.4  We paraphrase the district court's 
relevant findings as follows:  

 
 

·         
On 
August 24, 1987 Mr. Day met with a detective and requested the State to drop 
pending charges against him in return for providing evidence about other 
crimes.  At first, he offered 
evidence about burglaries and drug deals.  
After the officer told him that information on homicides "was best to 
obtain a deal with," he stated that he knew about a hit and run where a male was 
killed.  The detective said the only 
unsolved hit and run involved a woman named Tammy.  Mr. Day said that he had information 
about the death, which he said involved a two wheel drive greenish blue 
pickup.

 
 

·         
The 
next day, his story changed.  He 
said that Mr. Wentz had run over "Tammy" with his Chevrolet Blazer after she 
rejected his sexual advances.  He 
said that Wentz, who was intoxicated at the time, told him that the incident 
happened, "about a year and a half, two years, three years or something like 
that" before April, 1986.  Later, 
Mr. Day stated that he did not know when it occurred.  He also stated that Mr. Wentz replaced 
the front bumper and front axles because of damage from "four wheeling."  Although they checked Wentz's former 
residence, investigators did not locate any of the discarded parts. 

 
 

·         
In 
1998, Mr. Day, then an inmate at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, gave law 
enforcement more information in hopes of getting favorable treatment.  He said Mr. Wentz told him that he had 
hit a woman with his truck.  Mr. Day 
also claimed that he helped clear a space in the garage for Mr. Wentz's vehicle 
and that the bumper and grill were covered with blood.  According to Mr. Day, Mr. Wentz removed 
the bumper and replaced a broken headlight.  This time, Mr. Day said the hit and run 
occurred in 1988, 1989, or 1990, and Mr. Wentz had "quite a lot of cash after 
the incident."  Mr. Day also stated 
that another man, Hans Lobdell, was with Mr. Wentz when he hit the woman.  Investigators contacted Mr. Lobdell who, 
although contradicting Mr. Day's statement in other ways, confirmed seeing a 
dent on Wentz's white Ford pickup.  
Mr. Lobdell said that Wentz had told him he had hit a badger, but he 
thought the dent was too high for a badger.

 
 

·         
In 
2007, Mr. Day again talked to investigators and contradicted many of his earlier 
statements.  He stated this time 
that Mr. Wentz was driving a white Ford pickup, he did not know what he hit and 
the incident was an accident.  

 
 
[¶45]   Mr. Day's testimony relating Mr. 
Wentz's confession to running over someone was hearsay.  Thus, in order to be considered "legal" 
evidence as required by Holmes and Bush, it had to fall within a hearsay 
exception.  Wyoming Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(3) provides that hearsay statements against interest may be admissible 
under certain circumstances.

 
 
(b) 
Hearsay Exceptions.   The following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
(3) 
Statement Against Interest.  A statement which was at the time of its making so 
far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far 
tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a 
claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not 
have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.  A statement tending to expose the 
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not 
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statement.

 
 
[¶46]   In order to be admissible under the 
hearsay exception, the declarant must be unavailable as a witness, the statement 
must be self-inculpatory, and there must be corroborating circumstances clearly 
indicating the trustworthiness of the statement.  W.R.E. 804(b)(3).  See also, Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1178 
(Wyo. 1998); Johnson v. State, 930 P.2d 358, 366-68 
(Wyo. 
1996).  Mr. Wentz, the declarant, 
was unavailable as a witness because he was deceased at the time of trial.  Moreover, Mr. Wentz's statement that he 
had hit someone was, obviously, self-inculpatory as a person would not make such 
a statement unless he believed it to be true.  The district court did not, however, 
believe that the third elementcorroborating circumstances clearly indicating 
the trustworthiness of the statementhad been satisfied.       

 
 
[¶47]   The requirement of trustworthiness 
of a hearsay statement was discussed in Johnson.  Although our comments in Johnson were in the context of another 
hearsay exception, the principles are relevant for evaluating trustworthiness in 
the context of the statement against interest exception.

 
 
Determining 
the trustworthiness of a hearsay statement involves 

 
 
an 
evaluation of the corroborating facts which further indicate veracity of the 
statement, the circumstances and conditions under which the statement was made, 
the incentive which the declarant may have had to be truthful or untruthful, and 
any factors contributing to the reliability of the report as related by the 
witness.   United 
States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3d 
Cir.1978).  Whether a hearsay 
statement is sufficiently trustworthy is a matter within the sound discretion of 
the trial court.  State v. Whyde, 30 Wash. App. 162, 632 P.2d 913 (1981).  

 
 

Crozier 
v. State, 
723 P.2d 42, 48 (Wyo.1986).   

 
 

Johnson, 
930 P.2d  at 367-68.        

 
 
[¶48]   Discussing the trustworthiness of 
Mr. Day's statements, the district court ruled:

 
 
Smith's 
proffered evidence . . . fails to meet the third requirement of WRE 
804(b)(3).  This last sentence of 
WRE 804(b)(3) prevents a defendant from simply stating that some unavailable 
third party confessed to a crime.  
Smith cannot introduce Wentz'[s] statement to exculpate himself unless 
corroborating circumstances "clearly" indicate the trustworthiness 
of the statement.  The Court finds 
no circumstances which corroborate the trustworthiness of the statement Day 
claims Wentz made.

 
 
            
Smith suggests that several "facts" provide corroboration for the 
trustworthiness of Wentz'[s] statement.    He claims that Wentz had a 
lot of money after Dively's death, implying Wentz got the money from 
Dively.  However, most of Day's 
versions of the Wentz statement indicate that the incident was a hit and run, 
and that Wentz didn't stop.  It 
hardly is corroboration for Day to claim Wentz had money from an unknown 
source.  Smith argues corroboration 
is found in the fact that Wentz had an opportunity to know the area where Dively 
died, and that he had a paper bag that he kept secret.  Neither of these facts makes it any more 
likely that Wentz said what Day claims he did.  Day claims he saw blood on Wentz'[s] 
truck, and that Wentz cleaned it and removed the bumper.  All of this "corroboration" comes 
exclusively from Day, whose credibility is questionable, at best.  Day's own version(s) of what happened do 
not provide corroboration which clearly indicates the trustworthiness of 
Wentz'[s] statement.  

 
 
[¶49]   The district court's decision was 
thoughtful and well-reasoned.  There 
was no evidence outside of Mr. Day's statement to corroborate Mr. Wentz's 
declaration.  Had there been 
independent corroborative circumstances, such as another witness's statement 
about, or actual recovery of, the vehicle, the missing automotive parts, the 
money or the mysterious paper bag, then the result may have been different.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion by refusing to allow Mr. Day to testify about Mr. Wentz's hearsay 
statement.  

 
 
[¶50]   Moreover, the district court 
properly ruled that the remainder of Mr. Day's testimony was inadmissible under 
W.R.E. 403.  As the district court's 
recitation of the facts and Mr. Smith's proffer make clear, Mr. Day's several 
statements were inconsistent in material ways, including the gender of the 
victim, the year of the incident (varying from years before the murder to 1990), 
the type of vehicle, and the nature of the incident (intentional as opposed to 
accidental).  The contradicting 
stories definitely undermine the probative value of Mr. Day's testimony.  See generally, Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 72 
(Wyo. 1989), 
overruled on other grounds by Large v. State, 2008 WY 22, 177 P.3d 807 
(Wyo. 2008), (stating the probative value of a statement is undermined by a 
corrupting influence).  Moreover, 
although the evidence may suggest that Mr. Wentz was involved in a hit and run, 
without Mr. Day's hearsay testimony that Mr. Wentz confessed to killing Ms. 
Dively, it does not specifically link him to Ms. Dively or this particular 
incident.   

 
 
[¶51]   With regard to the prejudicial 
value of Mr. Day's testimony, we agree with the district court's 
assessment:  "It is highly probable, 
almost certain, that issues in the case will become more complicated and 
confusing, and focus will shift far from the guilt or innocence of Smith, if 
evidence about Mr. Day and his various statements is admitted."  On this record, we certainly cannot say 
that the district court abused its discretion by excluding Mr. Day's proposed 
testimony under W.R.E. 403.  

 
 

4.      
Habitual 
Criminal

 
 
[¶52]   Mr. Smith claims that the 
application of the habitual criminal statute in this case violated the 
constitutional protection against ex post 
facto laws.5  The question of whether a statute is 
constitutional is one of law.  Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, ¶ 7, 88 P.3d 1050, 1056 (Wyo. 2004).  Our 
standard of review is, therefore, de 
novo.  We presume statutes to be 
constitutional and resolve any doubt in favor of constitutionality.  Stanton v. State, 2006 WY 31, ¶ 13, 130 P.3d 486, 491 (Wyo. 2006).  "The party 
challenging the statute bears the burden of proving it is 
unconstitutional."  Id.  The burden is heavy and the challenger 
must clearly and exactly show the unconstitutionality beyond any reasonable 
doubt.  Id.

 
 
[¶53]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201 
(LexisNexis 2007) requires enhancement of a sentence if the defendant is a 
habitual criminal: 

 
 
(a) 
A person is an habitual criminal if:

 
 
            
(i) He is convicted of a violent felony;  and

 
 
            
(ii) He has been convicted of a felony on two (2) or more previous 
charges separately brought and tried which arose out of separate occurrences in 
this state or elsewhere.

 
 
(b) 
An habitual criminal shall be punished by imprisonment 
for:

 
 
            
(i) Not less than ten (10) years nor more than fifty (50) years, if he 
has two (2) previous convictions;

 
 
            
(ii) Life, if he has three (3) or more previous convictions. 

 
 
[¶54]   The jury determined Mr. Smith was a 
habitual criminal and, because he had been convicted of three other felonies, 
the district court sentenced him to serve life in prison.   He claims that the application of 
the habitual criminal statute in his case was unconstitutional because the jury 
was allowed to consider crimes he committed after the instant offense.  The evidence admitted during the 
habitual criminal phase of the trial established that Mr. Smith had been 
convicted:

 
 

·         
in 
1983 for felony burglary committed in NatronaCounty in September 
1982;

·         
in 
1989 for felony first degree sexual assault committed in NatronaCounty in January 1989; 
and

·         
in 
2006 for felony aggravated motor vehicle theft committed in Colorado in May 
2006.

 
 
Obviously, 
two of the three crimes were committed, and the resulting convictions occurred, 
after Ms. Dively's murder in 1986.  

 
 
[¶55]   Wyo. Const. Art. 1, § 35 and 
United 
States Const. Art. 1, § 10 prohibit the passage 
of ex post facto laws.  The United States Supreme Court has 
defined an ex post facto law as:  "any statute . . .  which makes more burdensome the 
punishment for a crime, after its commission, . . . is prohibited as ex post facto.'"  Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 
53 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1977), quoting Beazell v. 
Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S. Ct. 68, 70 L. Ed. 246 (1925).  See also, In Interest of Jones, 500 P.2d 690, 692 
(Wyo. 1972) (stating "[t]he constitutional interdiction of ex post facto laws reaches out to every 
law which deprives the accused of any substantial right or immunity possessed by 
him at the time when he is said to have committed the offense charged.").    

 
 
[¶56]   This Court considered a classic ex post facto law in Loomer v. State, 768 P.2d 1042 
(Wyo. 
1989).  Mr. Loomer was convicted of 
aggravated robbery and kidnapping for events that took place on March 21, 
1987.  Id. at 1044.  The district court included a provision 
in Mr. Loomer's sentence requiring him to reimburse the county for the costs of 
his prosecution.  Id. at 1048-49.  The statute which allowed courts to tax 
costs in a criminal case did not go into effect until May 22, 1987.  Because Mr. Loomer committed his crimes 
prior to the effective date of the statute allowing taxation of the costs of 
prosecution as punishment for a crime, we held that the assessment of such costs 
in his case violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.  Id.  

 
 
[¶57]   Here, the habitual criminal 
statute, in its present form, was adopted by the legislature in 1983.  Mr. Smith committed this crime in 
1986.  Thus, this case does not 
present as a classic ex post facto 
case.  Instead, Mr. Smith's argument 
focuses more on the statutory language used in § 6-10-201, which states that a 
person is a habitual criminal if he has been "convicted of a violent felony" and 
"convicted of a felony on two (2) or more previous charges separately brought 
and tried which arose out of separate occurrences in this state or 
elsewhere."  He argues that 
"previous charges" means felonies committed before the crime for which he was 
being tried.  Mr. Smith phrases his 
argument as:  "We maintain that 
previous' means previous to the date of the offense and not the conviction and 
if previous means prior to the date of conviction that such punishment violates 
the ex post facto laws of the United States and 
the State of Wyoming."   

 
 
[¶58]   In Green v. State, 784 P.2d 1360, 1365 
(Wyo. 1989), 
we stated that "[t]he statute does not require that a crime be previously 
committed, only that there be [a] previous conviction[]."  Thus, in Green it was appropriate for the jury to 
consider, in a habitual criminal proceeding, a prior conviction even though the 
crime from which the conviction arose was committed after the offense on 
trial.  Id.  
Our precedent clearly establishes that, under the language of § 
6-10-201, the district court properly allowed consideration of Mr. Smith's prior 
convictions, despite the fact that two of those offenses were committed after he 
murdered Ms. Dively.  

 
 
[¶59]   In considering Mr. Smith's argument 
that this interpretation of the statute amounts to creation of an ex post facto law, we note that the 
habitual criminal statute does not create a separate offense, but is simply a 
sentence enhancement for the offense at issue.  Many years ago, the United States 
Supreme Court explained that habitual criminal statutes provide enhanced 
penalties for defendants who repeatedly commit crimes.  See Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732, 
68 S. Ct. 1256, 92 L. Ed. 1683 (1948).  
This Court offered a similar explanation in Urbigkit, 2003 WY 57, ¶ 56, 67 P.3d 1207, 1227 (Wyo. 2003):

 
 
The 
intent behind Wyoming's habitual criminal statute is to 
provide enhanced punishment to an individual who has engaged in a pattern of 
violent criminal conduct. . . . A habitual criminal statute does not punish a 
defendant for his previous offenses but for his persistence in crime, and it has 
been said that to be a habitual criminal involves a status rather than the 
commission of a separate offense.'  Evans [v. State], 655 P.2d [1214,] 1220-21 
[(Wyo.1982)] (quoting 39 Am.Jur.2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent 
Offenders, § 2, pp. 308-310 (1968)).  

 
 
[¶60]   Section 6-10-201 does not 
retroactively increase the punishment for conduct committed before its passage; 
it also does not retroactively increase the punishment for the previous 
convictions.  Instead, the habitual 
criminal statute simply enhances the punishment for the offense currently before 
the court based upon the defendant's criminal record.  The fact that the conduct which was 
prosecuted in the earlier convictions actually occurred after the conduct giving 
rise to the current offense does not change the operation of the habitual 
criminal statute to make it unconstitutionally retroactive.  Indeed, if we were to decide otherwise, 
a defendant could avoid habitual criminal classification by effectively evading 
prosecution for a period of time.  
That is not the intent or purpose behind the constitutional prohibition 
against ex post facto laws.  We conclude, therefore, that the 
application of the habitual criminal statute in this case was not 
unconstitutional.          

 
 
5.         
Change of Venue

 
 
[¶61]   Mr. Smith moved for a change of 
venue on the first day of trial based upon an article published in the Casper 
Star Tribune that morning.  The 
article apparently referred to Mr. Smith's prior conviction for sexual 
assault.  The district court had 
previously ruled in a pre-trial hearing that evidence of the conviction was not 
admissible, under W.R.E. 404(b), in the guilt phase of the trial.  The judge was concerned that the 
information in the article, if it had been read by the venire, essentially 
undermined his liminal ruling that the State could not introduce evidence of the 
prior conviction.  The district 
judge took the defense motion for a change of venue under advisement and the 
parties proceeded with voir 
dire.     

 
 
[¶62]   The judge ordered that each juror 
who had read or heard of a news account about the case be questioned 
individually outside the presence of the rest of the jury pool.  The jurors were queried about what they 
recalled from the news account and whether they could remain impartial in light 
of the knowledge they had gained.  
The court ruled:

 
 
Those 
who read today's story  I am only going to be concerned about the ones who 
recall or read the portion about his prior conviction; and I am convinced that 
the ones who said I looked at the story and was unable to recall the prior 
conviction either didn't recall it or didn't read it.  It was in the end of the story; and I am 
convinced they are okay.  

 
 
            
I am going to excuse the three [who commented about the prior 
conviction].

 
 
            
 And I agree with you, 
[prosecutor], that this doesn't fit the statutory definition of grounds for 
excusal for cause; but I also believe strongly the court made a limine ruling; 
and to have them potentially say in the jury room, you know, the guy was 
convicted once before, voids that ruling in limine; and it really would need to 
--- We would need to let the defense deal with that ahead of 
time.

 
 
            
This is going to avoid the problem, so I will excuse those three, and we 
will call someone to replace them, and we will go on from there. 

 
 
[¶63]   Although the parties do not direct 
us to a specific ruling in the record, the district court apparently denied the 
motion for a change of venue because a jury was seated and the trial 
proceeded.  Mr. Smith claims the 
district court erred when it failed to grant his motion for a change of 
venue.

 
 
[¶64]   We review the denial of a motion 
for change of venue using the abuse of discretion standard.  Urbigkit, ¶ 26, 67 P.3d  at 1220.  We will not interfere with the trial 
court's decision unless the trial court acted in a manner exceeding the bounds 
of reason under the circumstances.  
Nixon v. State, 994 P.2d 324, 
326-27 (Wyo.1999). 

 
 
[¶65]   A criminal defendant is entitled 
"to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed."  Wyo. Const. Art. 1, § 10.  Similarly, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-7-102(a) 
states that "[e]very criminal case shall be tried in the county in which the 
indictment or offense charged is found, except as otherwise provided by 
law."  See also W.R.Cr.P. 18.6  However, there is a procedure for a 
change of venue when local prejudice prevents a defendant from receiving a fair 
trial.  W.R.Cr.P. 21(a) 
states:

 
 
(a) 
Prejudice Within County.  Upon 
timely motion of the defendant, the court shall transfer the proceeding as to 
that defendant to another county, but only if the court is satisfied that there 
exists within the county where the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice 
against the defendant that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial 
trial in that county.

 
 
[¶66]   This Court has adopted a two-part 
test to determine whether a change of venue should be granted on the basis of 
pre-trial publicity.  First, we 
consider the nature and extent of the publicity.  Secondly, we analyze the difficulty or 
ease encountered by the district court in selecting a jury "along with the 
amount of prejudice which actually appears during voir dire examination.'"  Urbigkit, ¶¶ 26-27, 67 P.3d  at 1220, 
quoting Sides v. State, 963 P.2d 227, 
231 (Wyo. 1998) which quoted Murry v. 
State, 713 P.2d 202, 208 (Wyo. 1986).   The defendant usually has the 
responsibility of proving actual prejudice in order to obtain a change of 
venue.  Id. at ¶ 26, 67 P.3d  at 1220.  We will only invoke a presumption of 
prejudice in extreme cases where the pre-trial publicity is "so inflammatory as 
practically to dictate the community's opinion."  Carothers v. State, 2008 WY 58, ¶ 11, 
185 P.3d 1, 8-9 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶67]   Applying our two-part test for 
motions for a change of venue, we first consider the nature and extent of the 
publicity.  In this case, there was 
apparently only one article in the Casper Star Tribune on the morning of the 
first day of trial.  Thus, the 
publicity was not extensive.  
However, the nature of the information in the article, especially the 
reference to the excluded prior conviction, was troublesome and could have 
potentially tainted the jury panel.  

 
 
[¶68]   The second part of the test directs 
us to analyze the relative difficulty or ease encountered by the district court 
in selecting a jury, taking into account the amount of prejudice which actually 
appeared during voir dire 
examination.  Here, there were 
several jurors who had read or heard about the article.  Those jurors were questioned 
individually outside the presence of the other jurors.  Some expressed concerns and/or 
prejudices arising from the information they had read.  With regard to those who stated that 
they were aware of the prior conviction, the judge simply dismissed them.   

 
 
[¶69]   While the judge was correct in 
stating that the potential jurors' exposure to the information about Mr. Smith's 
prior conviction, alone, may not have technically fallen within the allowable 
causes for dismissal from the jury panel,7 he felt that the danger of tainting 
the jury was so great that dismissal was justified.  The potential jurors who were aware of 
the article but did not specifically refer to the information about the prior 
conviction were simply questioned about whether they could put aside the 
information and decide the case based upon the evidence presented at trial.    

 
 
[¶70]   The record does not reflect that it 
took an especially long time to seat a jury.  The entire voir dire process, including the 
individual questioning of the jurors who had read the article, took less than 
half a day.  Additionally, the voir dire process did not result in 
excusing a great number of jurors because they were prejudiced by the 
coverage.  Only three jurors were 
excused because they recalled the information in the article about Mr. Smith's 
prior conviction.8  There is simply no indication in the 
record that it was especially difficult to seat a jury or that the jury panel, 
as a whole, was actually prejudiced by the limited publicity.  

 
 
[¶71]   The judge in this case obviously 
faced an awkward situation when the article placed his earlier liminal ruling in 
jeopardy.  His response to the 
problem was thoughtful. By dismissing the potential jurors who recalled the 
information about the prior conviction, the district court arguably afforded Mr. 
Smith more protection than was required under the relevant statutes.  Moreover, the jury was seated without 
any significant problems and the record does not demonstrate that the jury panel 
was actually prejudiced by the pretrial publicity.  We conclude the judge carefully 
considered the circumstances and crafted an appropriate response to the 
publicity thereby minimizing the potential prejudice to the defendant.  The trial judge did not abuse its 
discretion by rejecting Mr. Smith's motion for a change of venue.        

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶72]   There was sufficient evidence for 
the jury to find Mr. Smith guilty of second degree murder.  The evidence that he was the perpetrator 
of the crime and committed it purposely and with malice was adequate under our 
law.  Additionally, the prosecutor 
did not violate Mr. Smith's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by eliciting 
testimony and commenting on his refusal to voluntarily provide a sample for DNA 
testing.  The Fifth Amendment 
protection does not apply to non-testimonial evidence such as a DNA sample and 
Mr. Smith was not coerced into refusing to give the sample.   

 
 
[¶73]   The district court properly applied 
Wyoming's 
well-known rules of evidence to exclude Mr. Smith's alternative suspect 
evidence.  The evidence that Mr. 
Myers potentially killed Ms. Dively was more prejudicial than probative under 
W.R.E. 403.  Mr. Smith's proposed 
evidence that Mr. Wentz was the killer was properly excluded as hearsay and 
under Rule 403.  

 
 
[¶74]   The application of Wyoming's habitual 
criminal statute to enhance Mr. Smith's sentence by using two convictions which 
occurred after he committed the crime in this case did not violate his 
constitutional protections against ex 
post facto laws.   Finally, 
the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Smith's motion 
for a change of venue.  He was 
unable to demonstrate the jury panel was prejudiced against him to justify a 
change of venue.  

 

[¶75]   Affirmed.    

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The State 
candidly admits that eliciting testimony and commenting about a suspect's 
refusal to give a sample for DNA testing may violate a defendant's Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.   See, e.g., United States v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 
794 (10th Cir. 1999) (ruling that asking the jury to draw adverse inferences from 
a refusal to consent to a search may be impermissible under the Fourth 
Amendment); Deno v. Commonwealth of 
Kentucky, 177 S.W.2d 753, 762 (Ky. 2005) (stating that a defendant's 
pre-arrest refusal to provide a sample for DNA testing could not be used as 
evidence of his guilt under the Fourth Amendment).  Mr. Smith, however, waived this issue by 
failing to raise it at trial or on appeal.  
See, e.g., Lindsay v. State, 2005 WY 34, ¶ 26, 108 P.3d 852, 859 (Wyo. 2005).  
Moreover, Mr. Smith was not prejudiced from any such error because the 
arguably improper evidence and argument were very limited in the context of the 
entire trial and the other evidence of his guilt was convincing.  

 
 

2W.R.E. 104 
states, in relevant part:

 
 
(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally. 
  Preliminary questions concerning 
the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or 
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the 
provisions of subdivision (b).  In 
making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those 
with respect to privileges.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
            
(c) Hearing of Jury.   . . . Hearings on other preliminary 
matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require or, when an 
accused is a witness, if he so requests.

 
 

3The district 
court further cautioned that it had "not determined that the evidence about 
ownership or rides is admissible.  
It only ha[d] determined that such evidence is not inadmissible under WRE 
403." 

 
 

4It appears 
that the district court considered some materials that are not included in the 
record on appeal.  Mr. Smith does 
not, however, contest the district court's description of the evidence.     

 
 

5Mr. Smith 
also suggests that the application of the habitual criminal statute in his case 
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment and the statute is unconstitutionally 
vague.  He does not support these 
aspects of his argument with cogent argument or pertinent authority.  Thus, we will not consider them.  See, e.g., Adams v. State, 2005 WY 94, ¶ 10, 117 P.3d 1210, 1215 (Wyo. 2005); Blakeman v. 
State, 2004 WY 139, ¶¶ 25-27, 100 P.3d 1229, 1236 (Wyo. 2004).   

 
 

6W.R.Cr.P. 18 
states:

 
 
Except as 
otherwise permitted by statute or by these rules, the prosecution shall take 
place in the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or 
in the municipality whose ordinance is alleged to have been violated.  The court shall fix the place of trial 
with due regard to the convenience of the defendant and the witnesses and the 
prompt administration of justice.

 
 

7Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-105 
(LexisNexis 2007) states the grounds for dismissal of a potential juror for 
cause in criminal case:

 
 
(a) The following is good 
cause for challenge to any person called as a juror in a criminal 
case: 

            
(i) 
That he was a member of the grand jury which found the 
indictment;

            
(ii) That he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused, or is biased or prejudiced for or against the 
accused;

            
(iii) In a case in which the death penalty may be imposed, he states that 
his views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair 
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his oath or affirmation 
and the instructions of the court;

            
(iv) That he is a relation within the fifth degree to the person alleged 
to be injured, or attempted to be injured, by the offense charged or to the 
person on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted, or to the 
defendant;

            
(v) That he has served on a petit jury which was sworn in the same cause 
against the same defendant, and which jury either rendered a verdict which was 
set aside, or was discharged after hearing the 
evidence;

            
(vi) That he has served as a juror in a civil case brought against the 
defendant for the same act;

            
(vii) That he has been subpoenaed as a witness in the case. 

(b) The same 
challenges for cause shall be allowed in criminal prosecutions that are allowed 
to parties in civil cases.

 

Section 
7-11-105(b) refers to the challenges for cause in a civil case.  Those bases for challenge are set out in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-203:

 
 
(a) 
Challenges for cause may be taken on one (1) or more of the following grounds: 

            
(i) A lack of any of the qualifications prescribed by statute which 
render a person competent as a juror;

            
(ii) Relationship by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree to 
either party;

            
(iii) Standing in the relation of debtor or creditor, guardian or ward, 
master or servant, or principal or agent to either party, or being a partner 
united in business with either party, or being security on any bond or 
obligation for either party;

            
(iv) Having served as a juror or a witness in a previous trial between 
the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then a witness 
therein;

            
(v) Interest on the part of the juror in the event or question involved 
in the action, but not an interest of the juror as a member or citizen of a 
municipal corporation;

            
(vi) Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to 
the merits or the main question of the action.  The reading of newspaper accounts of the 
subject matter before the court shall not disqualify the juror either for bias 
or opinion;

            
(vii) The existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity or 
bias for either party. 

 
 

8A couple other jurors were excused for 
reasons which are not completely clear in the record.  One juror, who was dismissed during the 
voir dire process because of a 
previous experience with violent crime, also indicated that he did not believe 
he could set aside his preconceived opinion which he said was "due to the Casper 
Star Tribune."  (Vol. I, pp. 27-28, 
33-36).