Title: In the Matter of Valerie Gomez v. Joseph A. Stout

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

- 1 -
=================================================================
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
No. 136  
In the Matter of Valerie Gomez,
    Respondent-Appellant,
        v. 
Joseph A. Stout, &c., et al.,
    Appellants-Respondents.
Thomas G. Gardiner, for appellants-respondents.
Jonathan Lovett, for respondent-appellant.
CIPARICK, J.:
Petitioner Valerie Gomez has worked for Westchester
County since 1979.  On January 17, 2001, she began working as an
Assistant Games Manager at Rye Playland -- an amusement park
owned by the County of Westchester and operated by its Department
of Parks, Recreation and Conservation.  However, on or about May
- 2 -
No. 136
1  Petitioner's disciplinary hearing began on November 25,
2002 and was completed on April 13, 2005.
2 It was alleged, among other things, that she had been
discourteous in dealing with customers, changed her scheduled
shifts without authorization, failed to record her breaks,
violated the Parks Department attendance policy by signing out
before the end of her scheduled shifts, failed to punch her time
sheet, failed to register or record items she had sold on behalf
of the Parks Department and committed other violations of Parks
Department standard operating procedures.  
- 2 -
2, 2002, petitioner was served with disciplinary charges pursuant
to Civil Service Law § 75 alleging she had committed forty-three
specifications of misconduct and/or incompetence.  
At petitioner's disciplinary proceeding,1 her employer,
respondent Joseph A. Stout, Commissioner of the Westchester
County Department of Parks, Recreation and Conservation, and
members of his family testified about an alleged incident that
occurred at Rye Playland's skating rink in April 2002.2  The
Hearing Officer sustained all forty-three charges against
petitioner and recommended that petitioner should be terminated
from her employment. 
Stout, being conflicted as he and family members had
testified at the hearing, designated respondent Ralph Butler, the
Commissioner of the Westchester County Department of Public
Works, to review the hearing record and to render the final
determination as to whether petitioner would be disciplined. 
Butler agreed with the recommendation of the hearing officer and
determined that petitioner should be terminated from her
- 3 -
No. 136
3    Westchester County Charter § 134.41 requires that "[t]he
commissioner shall appoint a deputy commissioner who shall act
for the commissioner in the case of his absence or inability to
perform his duties."
- 3 -
employment.  In a letter dated November 2, 2005, Stout notified
petitioner of Butler's determination and informed her that she
was terminated.   
Petitioner commenced this Article 78 proceeding in
Supreme Court challenging the termination of her employment.  She
sought annulment of the determination and retroactive
reinstatement to the County payroll as an Assistant Games
Manager, Grade VII, effective November 2, 2005, the date of
termination.  Pursuant to CPLR 7804 (g), Supreme Court
transferred the matter to the Appellate Division.  
The Appellate Division granted the petition and
annulled the determination terminating her employment on
jurisdictional grounds.  The court concluded that Stout erred,
after properly disqualifying himself, when he designated Butler
to act as his agent for the purpose of reviewing the report and
recommendation of the Hearing Officer and issuing the final
determination.  The Appellate Division held that, pursuant to the
Westchester County Charter § 134.413 and Civil Service Law § 75,
the only individual authorized to act in his absence was his
Deputy Commissioner.
The court remitted the matter back to Commissioner
Stout "for the appointment of a duly-qualified individual
- 4 -
No. 136
- 4 -
authorized to review the recommendation of the Hearing Officer"
(51 AD3d 1021, 1022 [2d Dept 2008]).  The court did not address
the issues of whether petitioner was entitled to reinstatement or
back pay and benefits.  Neither did the court conduct a
substantial evidence review as it annulled the determination on
jurisdictional grounds.  We granted both sides leave to appeal
and now modify the order of the Appellate Division. 
Civil Service Law § 75 (2) states, in pertinent part,
that an employee disciplinary proceeding 
"shall be held by the officer or body having
the power to remove the person against whom
such charges are preferred, or by a deputy or
other person designated by such officer or
body in writing for that purpose.  In case a
deputy or other person is so designated, he
shall, for the purpose of such hearing, be
vested with all the powers of such officer or
body and shall make a record of such hearing
which shall, with his recommendations, be
referred to such officer or body for review
and decision"
(id.).  Relying on the statute, the County asserts that
Commissioner Stout's recusal and the designation of Butler was
necessary in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety and
that Stout's designation of Butler was lawful. 
The language of Civil Service Law § 75 (2) clearly
provides that, where the officer or body having power to remove
an employee designates someone else to conduct a hearing, the
record shall "be referred to such officer or body for review and
decision" (id.).  It makes sense that the decision whether
sanctions against an employee are warranted should be made by an
- 5 -
No. 136
- 5 -
official that has knowledge of the employee's duties and
responsibilities, as well as an understanding of what
disciplinary measures have been previously imposed on other
employees for similar types of infractions.  Although it is true
that Civil Service Law § 75 (2) does not explicitly state what
the officer or body should do where a disqualifying conflict
exists, it clearly requires that the power to discipline be
delegated, if necessary, within the governmental department's
chain of command.  
Indeed, we have held it essential that any
determination as to whether misconduct occurred and the
appropriate penalty to be imposed be made by "the official upon
whom has been imposed the power to remove or mete out the
discipline" (Matter of Simpson v Wolansky, 38 NY2d 391, 394
[1975]).  However, in order to ensure a civil servant a fair
hearing, courts have crafted an exception requiring the
conflicted officer or body bearing the responsibility of
discipline to designate an impartial agent authorized to act in
his or her stead (see e.g. Matter of McComb v Reasoner, 29 AD3d
795, 799-800 [2d Dept 2006]; Matter of Martin v Platt, 191 AD2d
758 [3d Dept 1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 652 [1993]).  That
delegation can only be made to a qualified individual.  
The County urges us to hold that the judicially created
exception encompasses the ability to appoint an agent with duties
comparable to those of the recusing officer even where the
- 6 -
No. 136
- 6 -
designee has no supervisory authority over that particular
employee.  We reject the County's arguments and decline to expand
this judicially created exception to allow a personally involved
officer or body unfettered discretion to designate a municipal
department head with no supervisory authority over the affected
employee.  In this case, the Westchester County Charter § 134.41
requires Commissioner Stout to designate a Deputy Commissioner
within his own department to act for him in situations where he
is either absent or unable to perform his duties.  Thus, we
conclude that the Appellate Division was correct in annulling
Commissioner Butler's determination and in remitting the matter
to Commissioner Stout to appoint a duly-qualified individual --
here the Deputy Commissioner -- to render a determination on the
same hearing record.
Petitioner also seeks reinstatement with back pay and
benefits.  The County argues that any award of back pay and
benefits should await the determination of Commissioner Stout's
new designee, and should not be awarded at all unless the new
penalty imposed, if any, is less severe than termination.  We
disagree and hold that petitioner is entitled to be reinstated
with back pay and benefits.  
In Matter of Wiggins v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y.
(60 NY2d 385 [1983]) we stated that 
"[a] disciplinary proceeding will be voided
and the status quo ante restored when there
has been some error that taints the entire
proceeding.  This would not be an isolated
- 7 -
No. 136
- 7 -
mistake, but rather would strike at
fundamental concerns such as jurisdiction or
bias of the presiding officers"
(id. at 388-389).  Further, in Matter of Sinicropi v Bennett (60
NY2d 918 [1983]), we applied the principle stated in Wiggins to a
case in which a determination of dismissal had been annulled for
procedural error, but a later order of dismissal was upheld.  We
decided that the employee was entitled to back pay for the period
between the earlier and later termination decisions.  We conclude
that Wiggins and Sinicropi control this case, and petitioner here
is entitled to back pay, even if the proceedings against her
eventually lead to termination of her employment.    
Hence, we conclude that this matter should be remitted
to Supreme Court for an order restoring petitioner's employment
with the Westchester County Parks Department as an Assistant
Games Manager, Grade VII, and to determine the amount of back pay
and benefits owed to her.  As the determination here was
annulled, we need not consider the merits of the underlying
disciplinary proceeding and whether the determination was
supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be modified, with costs to petitioner, by remitting to Supreme
Court for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion
herein and, as so modified, affirmed.
- 1 -
Matter of Valerie Gomez v Joseph A. Stout, as Commissioner of the
Westchester County Department of Parks, Recreation and
Conservation, et al.
No. 136
SMITH, J. (concurring):
I join the Court's unanimous opinion, but write
separately to express my unhappiness with the result we are
forced to reach.
Petitioner was dismissed from her position in November
- 2 -
No. 136
- 2 -
2005.  A Hearing Officer has recommended that her dismissal be
upheld.  For the reasons the Court's opinion explains, a Deputy
Commissioner must now decide whether to follow that
recommendation.  But even if the recommendation is followed,
petitioner will still get back pay for the four years following
her dismissal -- four years during which she has not done a day's
work for the County.  If the dismissal was justified, this is
surely an excessive burden to impose on the County for a
procedural error.
But the result is compelled by our decision in
Sinicropi v Bennett (60 NY2d 918 [1983]).  Sinicropi seems wrong
to me.  It also seemed wrong to Justice O'Connor, who wrote the
Appellate Division decision that we affirmed in that case
(Sinicropi v Bennett, 92 AD2d 309 [2d Dept 1983]).  Though
believing himself bound by precedent, Justice O'Connor --
dissenting persuasively from his own holding -- pointed out that
the decisions allowing back pay in situations like this
unjustifiably expand the relief that would have been available at
common law.  The remedy for an employee whose dismissal is
procedurally flawed should be prompt reinstatement, not pay for
no work.  Justice O'Connor argued for the principle that, until
and unless an employee is reinstated, "no claim for back pay
[should] be honored even if the employee's dismissal [is]
declared invalid" (id. at 316).
Justice O'Connor invited a "re-examination" of the
- 3 -
No. 136
- 3 -
analysis on which the precedents he thought himself bound to
follow were based (id. at 310).  Unfortunately, our Court did not
accept the invitation.  We affirmed in a one paragraph
memorandum, with the conclusory statement that the discharged
employee was entitled to "the salary she would have earned for
the period between the original termination decision (which was
annulled) and the subsequent termination decision" (60 NY2d at
920).  I think this was a mistake, but there is nothing we can do
about it now.  The problem is one that only the Legislature can
fix. 
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order modified, with costs to respondent-appellant Gomez, by
remitting to Supreme Court, Westchester County, for further
proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so
modified, affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Ciparick.  Chief Judge
Lippman and Judges Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur,
Judge Smith in a separate concurring opinion.
Decided October 15, 2009