Title: Mohan v. Norris

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Mohan v. Norris, No. 88, Sept. Term 2004.  Opinion by Harrell, J.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER’S BILL OF
RIGHTS (LEOBR) - EXCLUSION FROM PROTECTION OF PROBATIONARY POLICE
OFFICERS - ALTHOUGH PERMANENTLY CERTIFIED BY THE MARYLAND
POLICE TRAINING COMMISSION, A POLICE OFFICER ON PROBATIONARY
STATUS WITH HIS OR HER POLICE AGENCY EMPLOYER UPON INITIAL
EMPLOYMENT BY THAT DEPARTMENT IS DENIED, AS A RESULT OF THAT
PROBATIONARY STATUS, THE PROTECTIONS OF THE LEOBR 
A police officer, although permanently certified by the Maryland Police Training
Commission, nonetheless is denied the protections of the Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of
Rights while that officer is in a probationary status with his or her police agency employer
as the result of the original hiring by that particular department.
Circuit Court for Prince  George ’s County
Case # CAE03-13795
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 88
September Term, 2004
ANDREW A. MOHAN
v.
EDWARD T. NORRIS, et al.
Bell, C.J.
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed:   April 4, 2005
1The MPTC, initially established by the Legislature in 1966, serves principally a
statewide training oversight function for virtually all Maryland State and local law
enforcement officers.  
We issued a writ of certiorari in this case to consider whether a police officer,
although unconditionally certified by the Maryland Police Training Commission (“MPTC”),
nonetheless is denied the protections of the Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights
(“LEOBR”) during that officer’s initial probationary status as required by his or her
employing police agency.  For reasons to be explained, we conclude that such an officer,
while in a probationary status with his or her police agency employer upon his or her initial
hiring by that employer, is denied, as a result of that probationary status, the protections of
the LEOBR, irrespective of his or her certification status with the MPTC.
I.
In December 1997, Andrew A. Mohan graduated from the Prince George’s County
Police Municipal Academy and was hired as a police officer by the Town of Edmonston
Police Department.  Before assuming duties with that department, Mohan was issued a
provisional certification card by the Maryland Police Training Commission.1  Mohan
remained in this provisional status while an officer with the Town of Edmonston until
September 1998, when he departed to join the Town of Cheverly Police Department.  The
MPTC issued Mohan a permanent certification card at this juncture.
On 7 January 2002, Mohan was hired by the Maryland Department of State Police
(“State Police”), and received a permanent certification card from the MPTC for this new
employment.  Two days later, he signed an “Agreement” with the State Police outlining the
2As discussed infra, a statute establishes a two year probationary period for police
employees of the State Police.  Md. Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Art. 88B, § 18 (recodified,
without substantive change, at Md. Code (2003), § 2-403 of the Public Safety Article).
Although the Agreement between Mohan and the State Police does not reference this statute,
the probationary requirement in the Agreement reiterates the statutorily imposed probationary
period.
2
terms of his employment, which included a 24 month probationary period.2  The probationary
period, according to the Agreement, would be in effect during Mohan’s further training at
the Maryland State Police Academy and would continue after his assumption of regular
duties with the State Police.
During this probationary period, Mohan was served on 29 July 2003 with two
documents, each entitled “Maryland State Police Probationary Trooper Record of
Disciplinary Action,” charging him with violating various rules, policies, and procedures of
the State Police.  The documents informed Mohan that, as a result of the alleged infractions,
he would be suspended summarily for a total of 11 days.  Mohan requested that he be given
a hearing on the charges pursuant to the rights outlined in the LEOBR, codified at the time
at Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27, §§ 727 - 734D (recodified,
without substantive change, at Md. Code (2003), §§ 3-101 - 3-113 of the Public Safety
Article).  His employer responded that the LEOBR excluded from its coverage probationary
employees; therefore, Mohan was not entitled to its protections because, at the time of the
alleged infractions, he was still a probationary employee of the State Police.
3
On 13 August 2003, Mohan filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County a
complaint for an ex parte injunction and issuance of a show cause order against Colonel
Edward T. Norris, then-Secretary of the Maryland State Police, and the Department.  A show
cause order was issued and an expedited hearing held.  Through the efforts of the trial judge,
an Assistant Attorney General representing Secretary Norris and the Department was notified
and appeared for the hearing, though no written answer was filed.  There appearing to be no
dispute as to facts material to the case, the hearing proceeded upon oral argument of counsel
on the question of law presented.  The trial judge ruled from the bench that Mohan was a
probationary employee, as defined by the State Police Act, Md. Code (1957, 1998 Repl.
Vol.), Art. 88B, § 18 (recodified, without substantive change, at Md. Code (2003), § 2-403
of the Public Safety Article), and was therefore not entitled to the protections of the LEOBR.
A confirming written order denying the injunctive relief was entered ultimately. The Court
of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  Mohan v. Norris, 158 Md. App. 45,
854 A.2d 259 (2004).  Mohan petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted,
383 Md. 569, 861 A.2d 60 (2004), to consider the following question:
Did the Court of Special Appeals err in determining that a police
officer, permanently certified by the Maryland Police Training
Commission, may nonetheless be excluded from the protections
of the Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights due to the
officer’s probationary status as imposed by a hiring agency?
3Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent citations to the provisions of the LEOBR
shall refer to the Public Safety Article reference numbers. 
4
II.
Mohan’s question is one of statutory interpretation and, as such, is purely a matter of
law.  Salamon v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 379 Md. 301, 307, 841 A.2d 858, 862 (2004).
Our standard of review, therefore, is de novo.  Id.; see also Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599,
604, 861 A.2d 78, 80-81 (2004) (stating that “[b]ecause our interpretation of . . . provisions
of the Maryland Code . . . are appropriately classified as questions of law, we review the
issues de novo to determine if the trial court was legally correct in its rulings on these
matters”).  
III.
Three statutory schemes are the foci of our analysis in this case. At the center of the
controversy is the Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights (“LEOBR”), codified at the time
of the proceedings below at Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27, §§ 727-
734D (recodified, without substantive change, at Md. Code (2003), §§ 3-101 - 3-113 of the
Public Safety Article).3  The LEOBR was enacted in 1974 as the nation’s first comprehensive
statutory scheme intended to provide certain procedural protections to “law enforcement
officers,” as that term is defined in the statute, during any investigation, charging, and
subsequent hearing that could lead to disciplinary sanctions.  Baltimore City Police Dep’t v.
Andrew, 318 Md. 3, 12, 566 A.2d 755, 759 (1989); see also Byron L. Warnken, The Law
5
Enforcement Officers’ Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination, 16 U. Balt. L. Rev.
452, 489-98 (1987) (outlining the history and provisions of the LEOBR and chronicling the
failed attempts in the U.S. Congress, prior to the enactment of the LEOBR in Maryland, to
enact a national bill of rights for law enforcement officers).  These procedural protections
include, among others, the right to be informed in writing of the nature of an investigation
prior to any interrogation, the right to reasonable limitations on the structure, time, and place
of an interrogation,  the right to a complete written or transcribed record of any interrogation,
the right to be notified of the name of any witness and all charges and specifications against
the officer not less than ten days prior to any hearing, and the right to a copy of the
investigatory file and any exculpatory information.  § 3-104.  If an investigation results in the
recommendation of some disciplinary or punitive action against a law enforcement officer,
the LEOBR, with limited exceptions, entitles an officer to a hearing before a hearing board
composed of at least three other police officers.  § 3-107.  Procedures governing the hearing
include the right to cross-examination and the power of the hearing board to compel the
attendance of witnesses through subpoenas.  Id. If, after a hearing and a finding of guilt, the
hearing board determines that a disciplinary or punitive sanction is appropriate, the board
makes recommendations to the chief of police of the appropriate police agency, who then
must review the recommendations and issue a final order within 30 days.  § 3-108.  A final
order may be appealed to the local  circuit court and, thereafter, to the Court of Special
Appeals.  § 3-109.  If a law enforcement officer is denied any of the rights afforded by the
4Mohan relied on this provision in seeking relief in the Circuit Court.
5Because Mohan’s appeal does not concern the validity of his MTPC certification
status, this exception is not relevant to the resolution of this matter.
6
LEOBR, he or she may apply to a circuit court for an order directing the law enforcement
agency to show cause why a right should not be granted.4  § 3-105.
In 1977, the Legislature amended the LEOBR in order to deal with the relationship
between it and other statutes providing alternative remedies for police officers facing
disciplinary sanctions. 1977 Md. Laws, Chap. 366; Moats v. City of Hagerstown, 324 Md.
519, 526-27, 597 A.2d 972, 975-76 (1991).  The new section provided:
Except for the administrative hearing process provided for in
[Article 41, § 4-201] concerning the certification enforcement
power of the Police Training Commission,[5] the provisions of
this subtitle shall supercede any State, county or municipal law,
ordinance, or regulation that conflicts with the provisions of this
subtitle, and any local legislation shall be preempted by the
subject and material of this subtitle.
1977 Md. Laws, Chap. 366 (as amended by 1981 Md. Laws, Chap. 679) (recodified, without
substantive change, at § 3-102).  The Court in Moats relied on this language to conclude that
the LEOBR was a law enforcement officer’s “exclusive remedy in matters of departmental
discipline.”  324 Md. at 530, 597 A.2d at 977.
This “exclusive remedy,” however, may be invoked only by a “law enforcement
officer,” who, at the time of the LEOBR’s enactment, satisfies the definition of “any person
who, in his official capacity, is authorized by law to make arrests and who is a member of”
any of a number of statutorily recognized police agencies, including the State Police.  1974
6The full text of the pertinent portion of the 1975 amendment provides that “‘[l]aw
enforcement officer’ does not include an officer serving in a probationary status except when
allegations of brutality in the execution of his duties are made involving an officer who is in
a probationary status.”  1975 Md. Laws, Chap. 809.  Although the exact nature of Mohan’s
alleged infractions is unclear from the record, he claimed at the Circuit Court hearing that the
charges against him did not involve allegations of brutality.
7 Upon the recodification of the LEOBR, without substantive change, in 2003 into the
Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code, the language of the exclusionary definitions was
reformatted and slightly modified to read as follows:
(2) “Law enforcement officer” does not include: …
(iv) an officer who is in probationary status on initial entry into
the law enforcement agency except if an allegation of brutality
in the execution of the officer’s duties is made.  
§ 3-101(e)(2)(iv).  
The Revisor’s Note states that “the reference to initial entry into the ‘law enforcement
agency’ is substituted for the former reference to initial entry into the ‘Department’ because
this provision is not limited to officers who are entering a particular police department, but
covers officers entering any law enforcement agency listed in paragraph (1)(ii) of this
subsection.”
7
Md. Laws., Chap. 722 (codified, without substantive change, at § 3-101(e)).  In 1975, the
statute was amended to exclude expressly from the LEOBR’s coverage “an officer serving
in a probationary status.”6 1975 Md. Laws, Chap. 809.  That definition was further amended
in 1977 to provide that the term “probationary status” would include “only an officer who
is in that status upon initial entry into the Department.”7  1977 Md. Laws, Chap. 366.
The Department of State Police was created by the Legislature in 1935 upon the
enactment of the State Police Act (“SPA”) (the second statute important to our analysis), and
became a principal department of the Maryland State Government by virtue of an amendment
to the SPA in 1994.  1935 Md. Laws, Chap. 303; 1994 Md. Laws, Chap. 165.  At the time
of the proceedings below, the SPA was codified at Md. Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Art.
8Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent citations to the provisions of the SPA shall
refer to the Public Safety Article reference numbers. 
9This authority expressly includes, among others, the following powers:
(1) to “establish standards, qualifications, and prerequisites of
character, training, education, and experience for employees of
the [State Police],” § 2-204(b)(6);
(2) to establish ranks and grades, and to “designate the authority,
responsibility, and duties of [such ranks and grades],” §§ 2-
204(b)(7)-(8);
(3) to “appoint, promote, reduce in rank or civilian
classification, reassign, reclassify, retire, and discharge any
employee of the [State Police] in the manner required by law,”
§ 2-204(b)(9);
(4) to “regulate attendance, conduct, training, discipline, and
procedure for employees of the [State Police],” § 2-204(b)(10);
and
(5) to “provide systems for periodic evaluation and improvement
of the performance and physical condition of employees . . . .”
§ 2-204(b)(11).
8
88B (recodified, without substantive change, at Md. Code (2003), §§ 2-101 - 2-703 of the
Public Safety Article).8  The SPA provides that the State Police “has the general duty to
safeguard the lives and safety of all persons in the State, to protect property, and to assist in
securing to all other persons the equal protection of the laws.” § 2-301(a).  The affairs and
operations of the State Police are supervised and directed by a Secretary, who is appointed
by, and reports to, the Governor.  § 2-202.   The Secretary also is granted authority to “adopt
rules necessary to . . . promote the effective and efficient performance of the duties of the
[State Police] [and to] ensure the good government of the [State Police] and its employees.” 9
§ 2-205.
10The SPA distinguishes between “police employees” and “civilian employees.”  §§
2-101(c), (i).  The SPA defines “police employees” as those employees possessing “the same
powers, privileges, immunities, and defenses as [those possessed by] sheriffs, constables,
police officers, and other peace officers . . . at common law and may now or in the future
exercise within their respective jurisdictions.”  § 2-412(b).  A “civilian employee” is defined
as “an employee of the [State Police] other than a police employee.”  § 2-101(c).
11Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent citations to the provisions of the MPTCA
shall refer to the Public Safety Article reference numbers. 
9
Since its initial adoption in 1935, the SPA has imposed a probationary period on all
State police employees,10 commencing with the date of their appointment to the State Police.
Md. Code (1935 Supp.), Art. 88B, § 10.  Initially, the SPA provided for a probationary period
of one year, during which the Superintendent (later Secretary) possessed authority to
discharge police employees at his or her discretion.  Id.  In 1945, the probationary period was
extended to two years.  1945 Md. Laws, Chap. 294. 
Mohan’s argument relies heavily on the provisions of the Maryland Police Training
Commission Act (“MPTCA”) (the third statutory scheme of significance to this case),
codified at the time of his discipline at Md. Code (1957, 1997 Repl. Vol.), Art. 41, § 4-201
(recodified, without substantive change, at Md. Code (2003), §§ 3-201 - 3-218 of the Public
Safety Article).11  The MPTCA, originally enacted in 1966, establishes the Maryland Police
Training Commission (“MPTC”) as an agency within the Maryland State Department of
Public Safety and Correctional Services. § 3-202. The MPTC has authority and powers over
all aspects of police training, including establishing and certifying police training schools,
10
and prescribing the curriculum, eligibility requirements, and standards of operations at such
schools.  § 3-207. 
The MPTC also possesses statutory authority to certify as police officers those
individuals who “satisfactorily meet[] the standards of the [MPTC]” or an equivalent training
program in another State.  § 3-209.  After an individual meets the MPTC’s minimum
standards, as set forth in the MPTCA and regulations promulgated pursuant to it, he or she
becomes certified as a police officer and receives a “permanent appointment” from the
MPTC.  § 3-215(a)(2).  Without a certification by the MPTC, a person is prohibited, with
limited exceptions, from being employed as a police officer by the State, a county, or a
municipality.  § 3-216; see Stanford v. Maryland Police Training and Corr. Comm’n, 346
Md. 374, 390, 697 A.2d 424, 431-32 (1997) (holding that “termination of employment [with
a police agency] invalidates an individual’s certification as a police officer” under the
MPTCA).   The MPTC, however,  also possesses the authority to grant a qualified individual
a “probationary appointment” as a police officer for a period not to exceed one year “to
enable the individual seeking permanent appointment to take a training course required by
[the MPTCA].”  § 3-215(c). 
The meaning of “probationary appointment” for MPTC purposes is further defined
in the  regulations adopted by the MPTC pursuant to the MPTCA.  These regulations define
“probationary period” as “a period of a maximum of 365 days under [§ 3-215(c)], Annotated
Code of Maryland: (i) During which a police officer with a provisional certification . . . may
11
perform [his or her] duties while obtaining the training specified in this chapter; and (ii)
Which ends the earlier of 365 days or upon completion of mandated training.”  COMAR
12.04.01.01(13)(a).   The regulations add that the term “probationary period” “does not relate
to or restrict a probationary period that may be imposed by the hiring agency.”  Id.
12.04.01.01(13)(b).
The MPTCA also contains a preemption provision similar to that found in the
LEOBR.  Section 3-218 of the MTPCA states that “[t]his subtitle supercedes any law,
ordinance, or regulation of the State, a county, or a municipal corporation that conflicts with
this subtitle.”  
IV. 
A.
Mohan contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred in determining that, although
he held a “permanent appointment” from the MPTC, he was nonetheless “in probationary
status” for purposes of the LEOBR because, at the time of charging and summary discipline
in this case, he occupied the status of a probationary employee under the SPA.  He claims
that once an officer receives a “permanent appointment” from the MPTC, he or she no longer
is “in probationary status” for purposes of the LEOBR.  Support for his position is found, as
the argument continues, in Moore v. Town of Fairmount Heights, 285 Md. 578, 403 A.2d
1252 (1979), in which this Court interpreted the term “probationary” as used in both the
LEOBR and the MPTCA.  Mohan argues that Moore settled, once and for all, that
12
“probationary status,” as used in the LEOBR, refers solely to the one year “probationary
period” provided for in the MPTCA.  We do not share his interpretation or agree with his
application of that case.
1.
Moore concerned a police officer, Robert M. Moore, who first was hired by the Town
of Fairmount Heights in May 1970.  Although Moore was discharged by the Town in
October 1974, he was reinstated in April 1976.  In February 1978, Moore began a training
course at the Prince George’s County Police Academy, the completion of which was a
prerequisite for certification by the MPTC.  One month later, Moore was accused of cheating
on an examination at the police academy and was informed that he would be dismissed from
the academy as a result of the accusation.  Moore withdrew from the academy.  His
employment with the Town of Fairmount Heights was terminated.  After being denied by the
Town a hearing under the LEOBR, Moore brought an action in the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County and requested a show cause hearing as to why the Town should not be
required to provide him with such a hearing.  The Circuit Court held that, because Moore had
not completed the training course required for permanent certification, he was precluded
from attaining a non-probationary status under the MPTCA and thus was ineligible for the
protections of the LEOBR. 
In reviewing the Circuit Court’s judgment, the Court of Appeals in Moore was called
upon to interpret the meaning of the phrase “probationary status” in the LEOBR.  Although
12The MPTCA was amended in 1981 to reflect the holding in 
Moore.  1981 Md. Laws,
Chap. 679.  This amendment provides that “[a] law enforcement agency may not employ an
individual as a police officer for a period not exceeding 1 year unless the individual is
certified by the [MPTC].”§ 3-216.
13
the LEOBR did not define “probationary status,” the Court found instructive the definition
of “probationary period” found in the MPTCA, which provided for a probationary period of
up to 365 days during which a person seeking a permanent appointment was to complete a
police training course.  Id. at 582-83, 403 A.2d at 1254-55.  Moore argued that he could not
be in a probationary status because he was never informed, by either his employer or the
MPTC, that he was in a “probationary status” and that furthermore he had been employed by
the Town as a police officer for more than 365 days.  The Court, however, concluded that,
no matter how long the length of service with a particular agency, the language of the
MPTCA led to one conclusion: “one cannot attain permanent status (and thus, non-
probationary status) until he has finished the training course [mandated by the MPTCA].”12
Id. (construing §§ 3-215(b)-(c)) (emphasis in original).
2.
Mohan argues that the Court’s reliance in Moore on the MPTCA definition  precludes
the application of any other definition of “probationary status” in his case.  He points
specifically to the following language in Moore:
[T]he reasonable interpretation of the clause [in the LEOBR],
that probationary status includes only an officer in that status
upon initial entry into the Department, is that it applies only to
those who have once attained permanent status. 
13Mohan’s application of Moore to his situation with the State Police is also highly
problematic when one considers that Moore’s 1979 interpretation of the MPTCA did not
consider that since 1945 the State Police, by act of the General Assembly, imposed a two year
(continued...)
14
285 Md. at 585, 403 A.2d at 1256.
Because he obtained a permanent certification from the MPTC as a police officer in 1998,
Mohan perceives that he is precluded from again being deemed “in probationary status” for
purposes of the LEOBR.  Mohan’s interpretation of Moore, however, represents a strained
reading.  
In Moore, the Court was asked to determine how the “probationary period” found in
the MPTCA was to be applied to the “probationary status” exclusion found in the LEOBR.
Instead of linking the probationary provision in the LEOBR exclusively to the MPTCA, the
language in Moore pointed to by Mohan merely represents the Court’s conclusion that a
police employee, in a “probationary period” under the MPTCA, remains thus upon his or her
initial entry into a particular police department until that employee attains a permanent
appointment from the MPTCA.  Moore does not hold, contrary to Mohan’s arguments, that
a permanently certified police officer is precluded from being placed “in probationary
status,” within the meaning and purposes of the LEOBR, through the application of a
probationary period imposed by a hiring agency.  Moore sought simply to harmonize the two
statutes, and thus analyzed only “probationary” as used in the MPTCA.  Nowhere in Moore
did we hold that the definition of “probationary” in the MPTCA was to be the exclusive
definition or application of a probationary status for purposes of the LEOBR.13 
13(...continued)
probationary period for new police employees.  Supra at 9.
15
3.
The Court in Moore also undertook to determine the meaning of the term “initial
entry” as used in the LEOBR, in light of the meaning of “probationary appointment” as used
in the MPTCA.  Id. at 585, 403 A.2d at 1256. Moore argued that because the definition of
“probationary status” found in the LEOBR included “only an officer who is in that status
upon initial entry into the Department,” he was not a probationary police officer because he
initially entered the Town’s police department in 1970.  The Court rejected that argument,
reasoning that, although Moore’s eight years of probationary status were “highly unusual,”
the Court was bound by the language in the MPTCA that clearly indicated a person could
become an unconditional police officer only by completing the required training course.  Id.
Despite Moore’s lengthy employment with the Town, the Court determined that his “initial
entry” into the Town police department was when he was rehired in 1976.  Id.  The Court
held that, at the time of his termination, Moore lacked the statutory qualifications for
“permanent status,” and thus, through the mere passage of time, could not “attain such status
by something analogous to a prescriptive right.”  Id.  The Court also rejected Moore’s
argument for the reason that the Legislature could not have intended to sanction a system in
which “a probationary police officer could, with the cooperation of his employer, obtain
permanent status by the simple expedient of leaving his employment and then being rehired.”
Id.
16
Mohan continues here by arguing that this aspect of Moore actually supports his
position that once a person obtains a permanent certification as a police officer, he or she
may no longer be considered an officer in a probationary status in his or her “initial entry into
the Department.”  Mohan finds comfort in the following language in Moore:
In other words, [the clause limiting “probationary status” to
those in that status “upon initial entry into the Department’]
would protect permanent officers who receive transfers or
promotions, precluding giving them a probationary status in
their new assignments.
Id.
Again, he misinterprets the sense of the Court’s words.   Although the Court recognized that
the plain language of the MPTCA and the LEOBR did not resolve all issues relating to
Moore’s status, the Court sought to interpret both statutes so as to give both full effect.  Id.
Construing both statutes harmoniously, the Court found that, for purposes of the MPTCA,
any police officer who does not achieve permanent status would remain in his or her “initial
entry” into a department, and therefore “in probationary status,” until he or she achieves
permanent status by meeting the relevant requirements of the MPTCA.  Id.  The Court
concluded that, in light of this, once an officer attains permanent status, he or she is
precluded from being placed “in probationary status” with regard to the MPTC upon a
transfer or promotion within the same police agency.   Id.  
Mohan, however, construes this language as suggesting that the “initial entry”
provision in the LEOBR contemplates that a police officer will be “in probationary status”
14Mohan offers no case authority, other than Moore, in support of his argument that
the MPTCA dictates the sole definition of “probationary status” to be used in understanding
the similar phrase used in the LEOBR.  Nor does Mohan offer any case law that endorses his
interpretation of Moore.   We, however, found a few cases in which courts accepted that the
LEOBR does not extend to police employees who are subject to a probationary period
imposed by the hiring agency, independent of the probationary period imposed by the
MPTCA.  See, e.g., Behan v. Gagliano, 84 Md. App. 719, 721 n.3, 581 A.2d 854, 855 n.3
(1990) (finding that because “[a]ppellee had been a Baltimore County police officer for just
under two years, . . . [a]ppellee was on probationary status [under Baltimore County Code
and regulations, and] therefore, he was not entitled to any of the administrative protections
set forth in [the LEOBR]”).
Furthermore, in Carroll v. Town of University Park, No. 97-2529, 1998 WL 390617,
at *1 (4th Cir. June 29, 1998), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the
question of whether a town police department could extend the probationary period of a
police officer, as imposed by the town ordinances.  In determining that the town did not
violate the officer’s right to procedural due process in extending her probationary period and,
during that period, terminating her employment without a hearing, the court engaged in the
following analysis regarding potential application of the LEOBR:
Carroll had no property interest in her continued employment [as
a police officer] with the Town.  Her employment agreement
specifically provided that she was probationary and could be
terminated at any time.  The LEOBR, which provides procedural
protections for law enforcement officers related to termination
and disciplinary measures, by its express terms does not apply
(continued...)
17
at only one time during his or her entire law enforcement career, no matter how many
successive employers there may be – that is, when that officer is hired by his or her first law
enforcement agency.  Although Moore certainly narrowed the definition of “initial entry”
with respect to those officers already hired by a singular agency, nowhere did the Court
indicate that a police officer holding a permanent certification by the MPTC may not be
placed in a “probationary status” as a result of being newly hired by a different or subsequent
police agency. 14
14(...continued)
to probationary officers.  Carroll began her employment with the
Town on January 11, 1993, and her contract specifically
provided that she would be on probationary status for one year.
Accordingly, she was still on probationary status when the Town
extended her initial probationary status by ninety days on
January 3, 1994, and not within the protections of the LEOBR.
1998 WL 390617, at *2 (citations omitted).
18
We conclude, therefore, that, even though he was permanently certified by the MPTC,
Mohan was in his “initial entry” into the employment of the State Police in January 2002.
Although Mohan’s permanent status certainly prevented him from being placed again “in
probationary status” for purposes of the MPTCA, such certification status was no barrier to
being placed “in probationary status,” for purposes of the LEOBR, by his new police
employer.
B.
Adopting Mohan’s interpretation and application of Moore as limiting “probationary
status” in the LEOBR to the maximum one year probation defined in the MPTCA would
render the “probationary status” language in the SPA ineffective and superceded.  Such a
result is at the heart of Mohan’s claim, as his argument apparently rests, in part, on his
contention that the use of the term “probationary status” in the SPA is in conflict with the use
of the same term in the LEOBR.
As this argument goes, any attempt to apply another definition of “probationary” for
purposes of the LEOBR than that appearing in the MPTCA would conflict with the MPTCA.
Mohan relies on a section in the MPTCA stating that its provisions “supercede[] any law,
19
ordinance, or regulation of the State, a county, or a municipal corporation that conflicts with
this subtitle.”  § 3-218.  He contends that this language precludes the application of the two
year “probationary status” imposed by the SPA.
The preemption language of the MPTCA is not in play, however, for the simple
reason that there is no conflict between the two statutes.  Although the MPTCA and the SPA
both contain references to “probationary” status, we do not agree that the probationary period
found in the SPA conflicts in any way with the implementation of a MPTC-imposed
probation. 
The probationary periods found in the MPTCA and the SPA are imposed for different
reasons, and are applied to differing, non-conflicting situations.   The MPTCA was enacted
in 1966 “in an effort by the legislature to improve the educational and clinical training of
police officers,” and concerns itself primarily with those police officers new to the
profession.   Stanford, 346 Md. at 381, 697 A.2d at 427.  The MPTCA guarantees that all law
enforcement officers who receive a permanent certification, no matter by which agency they
are hired, receive a uniform minimum standard of certification and possess the skills and
training necessary to execute common law enforcement functions properly.  §§ 3-207, 3-209.
Unlike the minimum two year probation imposed by the SPA, the probationary period
imposed by the MPTCA is not necessarily fixed in duration, except at the maximum.  The
MPTCA “probationary period” ends “the earlier of 365 days or upon completion of mandated
training.” § 3-215(c); COMAR 12.04.01.01(13)(a)(ii).  This is a function of its distinct
15The training-oriented purpose of the MPTCA-imposed “probationary period” further
is buttressed by the fact that if a probationary police officer does not complete the prescribed
training course within 365 days of the beginning of his or her employment with a particular
police agency, that officer is prohibited by the MPTCA from continuing his or her
employment with that agency.  § 3-216.
20
purpose, which is to provide a period during which a person may execute law enforcement
functions while he or she receives the mandated training necessary to receive a permanent
certification from the MPTC. § 3-215(c); Stanford, 346 Md. at 385, 697 A.2d at 429.   This
provisional certification scheme allows police agencies to utilize new hires without having
their entry into the force delayed until the completion of their training mandated by the
MPTCA.  Due to this underlying purpose, this “probationary period” ends when a
probationary officer fulfills the mandatory training and receives a permanent appointment
from the MPTCA.15  § 3-215; COMAR 12.04.01.01(13)(a)(ii).
The probationary period imposed by the SPA, on the other hand, is imposed
automatically by statute for two years, without regard to the prior experience, training, or
background of the new hire. § 2-403. This probationary period, during which a probationary
officer may be discharged or otherwise disciplined at the discretion of the Secretary of the
State Police, does not fulfill solely a further training requirement, but rather gives effect to
the authority and oversight that the SPA grants the Secretary over the State Police.  §§ 2-204,
2-205.
With these distinct purposes in mind, we find that the two statutorily-imposed
probationary periods do not conflict with one another, even if they may be applied
21
concurrently to a particular police employee.  Mohan’s view that the probationary provision
in the SPA overlapping or supplementing the MPTCA provision is preempted by the
MPTCA and the LEOBR finds no support in the actual language of the statutes. We are
unable to identify any language in either the LEOBR or the MPTCA that suggests that the
MPTCA was intended as the only definition of “probation” that is applicable to § 3-101(e)
of the LEOBR.  Furthermore, there is no language in the LEOBR reflecting Mohan’s
interpretation of Moore that simply because a police officer completes his or her minimum
training required by the MPTCA that officer is precluded from being placed in a probationary
status upon his or her initial entry into a subsequent police agency or department.
Had the Legislature desired to limit the term “in probationary status” solely to the
definition found in the M PTCA, it easily could have done so.  It, however, did not include
such a limitation.   In seeking a disposition of the present case in his favor, Mohan essentially
asks us to add language to the LEOBR that is not there.  The language of the LEOBR
expressly excludes from the application of the statute those officers “in probationary status.”
We therefore abide by this language and conclude that a police officer placed “in
probationary status” by his or her employer is also “in probationary status” as that phrase is
used in the LEOBR. Thus, the LEOBR’s protections are unavailable. 
C. 
The available and relevant legislative history supports our view that the Legislature
16In his brief, Mohan argues that “[h]ad the legislature disagreed with the Court’s
conclusion in Moore v. Town of Fairmount Heights that ‘probationary’ in the LEOBR has
the same meaning as does that term in the MPTCA, it had an opportunity to clarify the
meaning of ‘probationary’ in [an] amendment to the LEOBR provision.”  Petitioner’s Brief
at 18.
The assumption underlying Mohan’s argument is, of course, that he correctly
characterizes our holding in Moore.  We believe the Legislature’s inaction in this regard was
because Moore, despite Mohan’s claims, did not take a position either way on the
applicability of the probationary language in the SPA to the LEOBR. Although the
Legislature amended the MPTCA within two years in apparent response to the Moore
holding, this amendment acted to clarify the perceived ambiguities and conflicts highlighted
by the Court between the LEOBR and the MPTCA by providing that  “[a] person may not
be employed as a police officer by any law enforcement unit for a period to exceed 12
months unless that person is certified [as a police officer] by the [MPTC].”  1981 Md. Laws,
Chap. 679.  This language directly addressed the analysis engaged in by the Court in Moore
involving its interpretation of the term “initial entry” in the LEOBR.  This amendment
ensured that any police officer that did not complete the training course mandated by the
MPTCA within a year could not be employed as a police officer, eliminating the possibility
of a reoccurrence of the circumstances present in Moore.  The Legislature, however,
apparently saw no need to amend or clarify the “probationary status” language in the LEOBR
(or the MPTCA) to implicate officers that were covered by a particular agency’s definition
of “probation” because the holding in Moore simply did not extend to officers, such as
Mohan, who were placed in a probationary status by a new agency under provisions other
than the MPTCA.
17The previous language, originally enacted in 1935, was as follows: 
All of the police employees appointed to the Department [of
State Police] shall be probationer, and on probation for a period
(continued...)
22
contemplated the application of the SPA-imposed “probationary status” to the LEOBR.16  In
1968, the language of the SPA was amended, among other reasons, for the purpose of
“provid[ing] for the qualifications, manner of appointment, probationary status,
compensation, promotion, suspension, demotion, and termination of employment of
employees of the [State Police].”  1968 Md. Laws, Chap. 547.  The relevant provision
regarding probationary State Police employees was rewritten17 to state:
17(...continued)
of one year from the date of appointment.
Md. Code (1935 Supp.), Art. 88B, § 10, as enacted by 1935 Md. Laws, Chap. 303.
23
All police employees, including persons appointed to the [State
Police] for training prior to regular assignment as a police
employee, shall remain in a probationary status for a period of
two years from the date of appointment to the [State Police]. . .
. The Superintendent [later Secretary] may discharge an
employee in probationary status for any cause which he, in his
sole discretion, deems sufficient.
Id.  (codified, without substantive change, at the time of the proceedings below, at Md. Code
(1957, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Art. 88B, § 18) (recodified, without substantive change, at § 2-403)
(emphasis added).  This language regarding the “probationary status” of new appointees to
the State Police was in effect when the Legislature amended the LEOBR in 1975 to exclude
from its coverage probationary officers.  The provision that was added to the LEOBR
contained the following language:
“Law enforcement officer” does not include an officer serving
in a probationary status except when allegations of brutality in
the execution of his duties are made involving an officer who is
in a probationary status.
1975 Md. Laws, Chap. 809 (codified, without substantive change, at the time of the lower
proceedings at Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 727(c)) (recodified, without
substantive change, at § 3-101(e)(2)(iv)) (emphasis added).
When the LEOBR was enacted initially, and indeed when it was amended in 1975 to
exclude police officers “in a probationary status,” the Legislature implicitly was aware that
the SPA imposed a two year “probationary status” on new State Police troopers.  We believe
18We note also that, upon recodification of the SPA and LEOBR in 2003 into the
Public Safety Article, the phrase, “in a probationary status,” was changed in both statutes to
“in probationary status.” § 2-403; § 3-101(e)(2)(iv).
24
that it is no coincidence that the Legislature used the exact language found in the SPA, “in
a probationary status,” to describe the class of police officers that it intended to exclude from
the coverage of the LEOBR.18  This similarity leads us to but one conclusion – that the
LEOBR, as amended in 1975, excluded from its coverage not only those police officers who
are placed in a probationary period by the MPTCA, but also those officers such that are “in
probationary status” as imposed by the SPA.
This conclusion becomes even clearer when one examines the regulations
promulgated by the MPTC pursuant to the M PTCA.  § 3-208.  It is a well established rule
of statutory construction that, in determining the meaning of a statute, we give some
deference to the interpretation of the agency, in this case the MPTC, charged with the
administration of a statute.  Stanford, 346 Md. at 389, 697 A.2d at 431.  We find in the
MPTC regulations, first adopted in 1997, language that supports the notion that the MPTCA
merely provides a non-exclusive definition of probation.  24:17 Md. Reg. 1215 (1997).
COMAR 12.04.01.01(13)(b) states:
(b) “Probationary period” does not relate to or restrict a
probationary period that may be imposed by the hiring agency.
This language is a clear statement by the MPTC that it does not construe the MPTCA
probationary provisions to conflict with, or supercede, probationary provisions of greater
duration, such as that in the SPA, imposed by a hiring agency.
25
In the years since this regulation was adopted, there have been several amendments
to the MPTCA.  None of these amendments, however, contradict the MPTC’s regulatory
interpretation of the MPTCA’s non-exclusive probationary provision, an interpretation that
is inconsistent with the position advocated by Mohan.  We note that “[l]egislative
acquiescence in the Commission’s treatment [of the nonexclusivity of the MPTCA’s
definition of probation] is yet further confirmation that the General Assembly intends the
same result.”  Stanford, 346 Md. at 390, 697 A.2d at 431. 
D.
Mohan maintains, however, that applying the SPA “probationary status” provision to
the LEOBR will yield results inconsistent with the purpose of the LEOBR.  Mohan fairly
observes that the LEOBR is a remedial statute and, as such, should be “liberally construed
to effectuate the statute’s remedial purpose.”  Petitioner’s Brief at 10; Caffrey v. Dept. of
Liquor Control, 370 Md. 272, 306, 805 A.2d 268, 288 (2002); see Moats, 324 Md. at 530,
597 A.2d at 977 (describing the LEOBR as a “comprehensive remedial scheme”).
Nonetheless, in Baltimore City Police Department v. Andrew, 318 Md. 3, 566 A.2d 755
(1989), we described the legislative purpose behind the LEOBR:
In enacting the LEOBR, the legislature sought to guarantee
specified procedural safeguards to certain law enforcement
officers subject to investigations that might lead to disciplinary
actions.  Any law enforcement officer covered by the LEOBR is
entitled to the protections it offers with respect to a departmental
inquiry that could lead to disciplinary sanctions.
Id. at 12, 566 A.2d at 759 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
26
Although its status as a remedial statute compels us to construe liberally the LEOBR
in a way designed to give full effect to its purpose, we are restricted by the boundaries
established by the language of the statute itself.  See Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835
A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003) (stating that “[a] court may neither add nor delete language so as to
reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may
it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its
application”). The procedural protections granted by the LEOBR are conferred on members
of specified police agencies, but denied to those police officers “in probationary status.” §
3-101(e)(2)(iv). In construing a statute to give its full protections to the class or classes of
persons it was intended to protect, we necessarily inquire as to who the statute was designed
to protect.   We need not consider, however, the proper way to construe the LEOBR with
respect to Mohan because, as our analysis here indicates, the LEOBR expressly excludes
from its coverage law enforcement officers, such as Mohan, who have been placed in a
probationary status by a police agency upon their initial entry into that department.  Id.
Mohan ripostes, however, that allowing individual agencies to impose their own
probationary periods for purposes of the LEOBR would be inconsistent with the purpose of
the LEOBR because it would lead to a lack of uniformity in the application of the LEOBR
throughout the many law enforcement agencies in the State.  Were that allowed, Mohan
claims that it would be possible for a police officer, permanently certified by the MPTC, to
change police agencies so often that he or she would spend his or her entire, peripatetic law
27
enforcement career without ever being covered by the LEOBR.  This interpretation, Mohan
argues, is inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent because it would lead to a chilling effect
on the ability of law enforcement agencies to attract experienced police officers.
Although one of the underlying purposes of the LEOBR is to provide a uniform
system of police discipline throughout the State, Moats, 324 Md. at 528, 597 A.2d at 976, we
may not overlook, in determining the scope of its coverage, all of the language of the statute.
By excluding from coverage police officers “in probationary status,” the LEOBR appears to
reflect a legislative decision to provide each individual police agency with the authority to
prescribe its own probationary period during which that particular police agency has the
autonomy to impose disciplinary sanctions, including dismissal, without implicating the
protections of the LEOBR.  See § 3-102(c) (stating that the LEOBR “does not limit the
authority of the chief to regulate the competent and efficient operation and management of
a law enforcement agency by any reasonable means including transfer and reassignment if
. . . that action is not punitive in nature [and where] the chief determines that action to be in
the best interests of the internal management of the law enforcement agency”).  Mohan’s
interpretation of Moore, that the LEOBR precludes MPTC-permanently certified police
officers from being placed in a “probationary status” by any subsequent employer, however,
interferes with this autonomy granted by the statute to the particular police agencies.   
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE PAID
BY PETITIONER.
28