Title: State of Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Mitchell

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

STATE OF ARKANSAS OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT as Assignee of Andrea Kolen v.
Garry MITCHELL

97-51                                              ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered October 23, 1997


1.   Courts -- rules of decision -- stare decisis. -- The supreme court is
     bound to prior case law under the doctrine of stare decisis;
     the policy behind stare decisis is to lend predictability and
     stability to the law; precedent governs until it gives a
     result so patently wrong, so manifestly unjust, that a break
     becomes unavoidable; the test is whether adherence to the rule
     would result in great injury or injustice.

2.   Process -- substituted service -- strict compliance with rules or statutes
     mandatory. -- Substituted service is a departure from the common
     law, and rules or statutes providing for it are mandatory and
     to be complied with exactly.

3.   Process -- substituted service -- most certain mode of conveying actual
     notice to absent defendant. -- Strict construction of the
     substituted-service rule is the most certain mode of conveying
     actual notice to an absent defendant.

4.   Words & phrases -- "usual place of abode" defined. -- One's usual place
     of abode means the place where a person lives or has his home,
     that is, his fixed permanent home; the place to which he has,
     whenever he is absent, the intention of returning.
5.   Process -- service at appellee's mother's house constituted insufficient
     notice. -- Applying its definition of place of abode, the
     supreme court held that appellee had his usual place of abode
     in a trailer, at which address he lived and paid rent and
     utilities; in light of its holdings that the rule for
     substituted service of process must be complied with exactly,
     and because appellee intended the trailer as his fixed and
     permanent home, the supreme court held that service of process
     at his mother's house was insufficient for the purpose of
     proper notice.

6.   Courts -- rules of decision -- liberal construction of meaning of usual
     place of abode rejected. -- Although the supreme court noted that
     a change in rules to place a liberal construction on the
     meaning of dwelling house or usual place of abode to include
     a "reasonable notice" component might become appropriate in
     the future, it chose to proceed with caution and rejected a
     departure from the settled rule.

7.   Process -- substituted service -- strictly construed rule did not unduly
     burden conscientious plaintiff. -- The supreme court concluded that
     the strictly construed substituted-service rule did not unduly
     burden a conscientious plaintiff.

8.   Process -- service insufficient to give notice -- default judgment void ab
     initio. -- Because service of process was insufficient to give
     notice, the supreme court held that the default judgment
     against appellee was void ab initio.

9.   Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- doctrine discussed. -- The
     doctrine of sovereign immunity comes from Article 5, section
     20, of the Arkansas Constitution, which provides that "[t]he
     State of Arkansas shall never be made Defendant in any of her
     courts"; the doctrine of sovereign immunity is rigid, and
     immunity may be waived only in limited circumstances; under
     the doctrine, the State possesses jurisdictional immunity from
     suit; where the suit is one against the State and there has
     been no waiver of immunity, the trial court acquires no
     jurisdiction.

10.  Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- exceptions. -- The supreme
     court has recognized exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign
     immunity where an act of the legislature has created a
     specific waiver of immunity and where the State is the moving
     party seeking specific relief.

11.  Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- test for determining whether
     suit is one against State. -- Under the test for determining
     whether a suit is one against the State, where the relief
     sought by a decree operates to control the action of the State
     or subjects it to liability, the suit is in effect a suit
     against the State and cannot be maintained without State
     consent. 

12.  Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- appellee had claim against
     State. -- The supreme court concluded that appellee, in seeking
     a refund of previously paid child support, had a claim against
     the State and that if appellant agency were ordered to refund
     the monies, the only source of payment would be the State
     Treasury; such a judgment would subject the State to
     liability, making the State a defendant as contemplated by the
     prohibition in Ark. Const. art. 5,  20; as such, the suit was
     one against the State that could not be maintained unless the
     State had waived its immunity defense.

13.  Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- not waived when appellant
     agency subjected itself to court's jurisdiction to enforce child support. -
     - The supreme court determined that appellant agency did not
     become a moving party for the purpose of waiver when it
     initiated a paternity and child-support action against
     appellee; pursuant to statutory law, appellant agency was
     obligated to subject itself to the jurisdiction of the court
     to procure and enforce child support for the custodial parent;
     in so doing, it did not voluntarily waive sovereign immunity.

14.  Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- doctrine barred appellee's
     claim. -- Where appellee had not sought permission to sue the
     State, and the State had not waived its immunity, the supreme
     court held that the trial court was correct in ruling that
     appellee's claim was barred by the doctrine of sovereign
     immunity.  

15.  Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- supreme court did not have
     jurisdiction to order State to refund appellee's child-support payments. -
     - Under the principles of sovereign immunity, the supreme
     court did not have jurisdiction to order the State to refund
     appellee's child-support payments.  


     Appeal from Poinsett Chancery Court; Ralph Wilson, Jr.,
Chancellor; affirmed.
     Mona Mizell, for appellant/cross-appellee.
     Mike Everett, for appellee/cross-appellant.

     Ray Thornton, Justice.
     This case involves two issues:  the interpretation of Arkansas
Rules of Civil Procedure relating to personal service inside the
State, and sovereign immunity as a bar to appellee's claim against
the State.  
     Rule (4)(d)(1) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that substituted service of process may be made on an
individual by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint "at
his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person
residing therein who is at least 14 years of age . . .." 
Appellant, the State of Arkansas Office of Child Support
Enforcement (OCSE) asks us to adopt a liberal interpretation of the
phrase, "dwelling house or usual place of abode."  The rules do not
define these terms.
     OCSE, acting on a paternity complaint against appellee, Garry
Mitchell, served process on Mitchell by handing the summons and
complaint to his mother at her house on 714 Lindsey, in Marked
Tree, Arkansas.  The evidence showed that Mitchell used his
mother's address for his mailing address, but that he lived at 507
Sam Anderson, in Marked Tree.  When Mitchell failed to appear at
the paternity hearing, a default judgment was entered under which
Mitchell's wages were garnished for child support.  Mitchell
immediately filed a motion to have the judgment set aside, claiming
that he was not properly served and that he was not the child's
father as alleged by the child's mother in the complaint.  Mitchell
failed to request an abeyance of support payments.
     Six months later, the trial court suspended Mitchell's wage
garnishment pending the outcome of genetic testing for paternity. 
By this time, Mitchell had paid $1377 in support to OCSE.  When the
paternity results showed that Mitchell could not be the child's
father, OCSE moved to dismiss its paternity complaint.  Mitchell
counterclaimed for return of the support payments on the basis that
he had not been properly served.  The trial court held that service
of process was invalid because Mitchell did not live at the
location where process was delivered; therefore, the judgment for
paternity and child support was void ab initio.  Further, it found
that Mitchell was precluded from suing the State for return of
payments under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  OCSE appeals
the judgment of the trial court on the validity of service of
process, and Mitchell crossappeals the sovereign immunity ruling. 
We affirm on both points.
     OCSE asks the court to broaden the meaning of the phrase,
"dwelling house or usual place of abode" to include that location
which could be reasonably calculated to provide notice to defendant
of a pending action against him.  OCSE supports its argument with
two opinions from other jurisdictions.  In Doyle v. Barnett,