Title: Commonwealth v. Thomas

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12055 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MARCUS THOMAS. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     October 7, 2016. - February 13, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Identification.  Due Process of Law, 
Identification, Identification of inanimate object.  
Evidence, Identification, Identification of inanimate 
object.  Identification.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to 
suppress. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 3, 2015. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were considered by 
Edward J. McDonough, Jr., J. 
 
 
Applications for leave to prosecute interlocutory appeals 
were allowed by Spina, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the 
county of Suffolk, and the appeals were reported by him to the 
Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court granted an 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Heidi M. Ohrt-Gaskill, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Paul R. Rudof, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
2 
 
 
 
 
David Zhang, of China, Karen A. Newirth, of New York, 
Joshua Asher, of Illinois, & Radha Natarajan & Kirsten Mayer for 
The Innocence Project, Inc. & another. 
 
Anthony D. Mirenda, Michael J. Licker, Melissa A. Stewart, 
& Chauncey Wood for Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  These interlocutory appeals from two rulings 
on motions to suppress raise three substantial issues regarding 
eyewitness identification.  First, we consider what consequence, 
if any, is appropriate where a police officer who is showing a 
photographic array to an eyewitness fails to use the protocol 
that we outlined in Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 
782, 797-798 (2009), despite our declaration in that opinion 
that we "expect" police to use the protocol in the future.  
Second, we examine whether, based on subsequent research, we 
should revisit the conclusion we reached in Silva-Santiago, 
supra at 798-799, and confirmed in Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 
Mass. 590, 602-603 (2011), that the choice of a simultaneous 
rather than a sequential display of photographs in an array may 
be relevant to the weight to be given to an identification but 
does not affect its admissibility.  The third issue concerns the 
identification of an inanimate object -- a firearm.  We 
determine whether suggestive police questioning and subsequent 
police confirmation appropriately may result in suppression of 
the identification of a firearm as the firearm used by the 
defendant during the commission of the crime. 
3 
 
 
 
 
These issues arise in the context of cross interlocutory 
appeals:  the defendant's appeal of the denial of his motion to 
suppress the identification of him by an eyewitness, Brianna 
Johnson, who was familiar with the defendant and knew his first 
name; and the Commonwealth's appeal of the allowance of the 
defendant's motion to suppress the identification of a firearm 
by Johnson as the one used by the defendant in the commission of 
the crime.  We affirm the judge's ruling on both motions.1 
 
Background.  There was no evidentiary hearing conducted 
regarding the two motions to suppress.  The Commonwealth and the 
defendant instead submitted to the motion judge various 
exhibits, including a joint stipulation of facts and videotaped 
recordings of two interviews with Johnson, the first conducted 
on the evening of the incident and the second conducted four 
days later, after the defendant had been arrested and a firearm 
that had allegedly been in his possession had been found.  
Because we are in the same position as the motion judge to make 
findings, we do not limit the facts recited below to the facts 
found by the motion judge.  See Commonwealth v. Neves, 474 Mass. 
355, 360 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 
266 (2004) (where decision is based on recorded rather than live 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by The 
Innocence Project, Inc., and the New England Innocence Project; 
and by the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers. 
4 
 
 
 
testimony, "we will 'take an independent view' of recorded 
confessions and make judgments with respect to their contents 
without deference to the fact finder, who 'is in no better 
position to evaluate the[ir] content and significance'"). 
 
In Springfield early in the evening of September 21, 2014, 
the defendant was in the rear passenger seat of a vehicle driven 
by Tavis Humphrey-Frazer; Johnson sat in the front passenger 
seat.  According to Johnson, the defendant stated that he saw a 
particular individual among a crowd of people standing in front 
of a house on Smith Street.  Humphrey-Frazer turned the vehicle 
onto Smith Street and drove towards the group of people.  The 
defendant leaned out of the rear driver's side window  and fired 
one or two shots at the group before his firearm jammed, and 
then was able to fire one or two more rounds in the direction of 
the group.  The defendant's gunshots were met by return fire; a 
bullet penetrated a window of the vehicle and struck Humphrey-
Frazer in the head, killing him. 
 
Later that night, Springfield police Detectives Kevin Lee 
and Anthony Pioggia interviewed Johnson at the Springfield 
police station.  Johnson said that her cousin, Humphrey-Frazer, 
received a telephone call from "Marcus," who was a member of the 
same gang as was Humphrey-Frazer.  Humphrey-Frazer asked Johnson 
if she wanted to join him while he drove to pick up Marcus, and 
she agreed.  When asked to tell the detectives about Marcus, 
5 
 
 
 
Johnson said, "I don't know that much about him."  She explained 
that he was Humphrey-Frazer's friend, not her friend.  She said 
she did not see Marcus that often "because . . . [they] don't 
associate with the same people."  After saying that she had seen 
Marcus at a party, she added, "I just know it's him because he's 
known up here."  She said that Marcus "look[s] like he's 
[nineteen] or something," and is "kind of chunky."  She assured 
the detectives that she would recognize him if she saw him. 
 
The detectives then stopped the interview in order to 
perform an identification procedure.2  They presented Johnson 
with a computer screen that simultaneously displayed photographs 
of eleven individuals.  No cautionary warnings were given to 
Johnson; the detectives simply asked her to sit down, "[l]ook at 
the pictures . . . [a]nd if [she saw] somebody [she] 
recognize[d] in relation to [the] incident, to identify them if 
                                                          
 
 
2 The identification procedure occurred in a separate room 
in the police station and was not recorded.  Immediately 
afterward, the detectives asked Brianna Johnson to confirm the 
details and results of the procedure on the videotaped recording 
and to sign the photograph she had identified.  This recording 
suggests that the same detectives who conducted the interview 
with Johnson also administered the identification procedure.  
The defendant does not argue that the failure to use a double-
blind identification procedure requires suppression of the 
identification.  See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 
782, 797-799 (2009) (absence of double-blind identification 
procedure, where administering officer does not know which 
photograph depicts suspect, is relevant to weight of 
identification, not admissibility). 
6 
 
 
 
[she] could."3  Johnson picked a photograph of the defendant and 
signed a copy of that photograph. 
 
After the interview, an arrest warrant issued against the 
defendant.  On September 23, Detectives Lee and Pioggia saw the 
defendant in Springfield riding a motorized scooter and pursued 
him, using their lights and sirens in an attempt to cause him to 
stop.  The defendant drove the scooter to a grassy area and then 
drove back into the street, where he lost control of the scooter 
and was apprehended.4  The next morning, a canine unit from the 
State police searched the grassy area and found a nine 
                                                          
 
 
3 Later during the interview on September 21, 2014, the 
detectives asked Johnson to examine a separate photographic 
array in search of anyone whom she recognized to be among the 
group of persons on Smith Street in Springfield.  Before showing 
her these photographs, Detective Anthony Pioggia told her, "I 
have to go through . . . what's called an identification 
protocol . . . .  It's something that the courts ask that we ask 
people to read and hopefully understand before looking at pages 
of photographs like this." 
 
4 After the defendant had been arrested, he agreed to be 
interviewed and confirmed that he had been in the vehicle with 
Tavis Humphrey-Frazer at the time of the shooting.  The 
defendant argues that, because the arrest was based on Johnson's 
unconstitutional identification procedure, his statements should 
be excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
 
4 After the defendant had been arrested, he agreed to be 
interviewed and confirmed that he had been in the vehicle with 
Tavis Humphrey-Frazer at the time of the shooting.  The 
defendant argues that, because the arrest was based on Johnson's 
unconstitutional identification procedure, his statements should 
be excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
7 
 
 
 
millimeter handgun, loaded with a magazine containing twelve 
rounds of ammunition.5 
 
The next day, September 25, Detectives Lee and Pioggia 
brought Johnson back to the police station for a second 
interview.  At the first interview, Johnson had told the 
detectives that the firearm used by the defendant was "big" and 
"black" and looked like the gun carried by the detectives.  At 
the second interview, conducted by Detective Lee and Detective 
Timothy Kenney, Detective Lee started to question Johnson again 
about the gun when Detective Kenney interrupted and asked, "Can 
I go after something here at this juncture?"  Detective Kenney 
then placed a photograph of a gun onto the table in front of 
Johnson.  "That's probably it, yup," Johnson responded. 
Detective Kenney:  "That's probably it?" 
 
Detective Lee:  "Brianna, did you see him with this type of 
gun before?" 
 
Johnson:  "Wow." 
 
Detective Lee:  "Brianna?" 
 
Johnson:  "Hold on.  I'm thinking."  
 
Detective Lee:  "Okay.  I mean, the picture is the picture, 
right?  It's a photograph." 
 
Johnson:  "Yeah." 
 
                                                          
 
 
5 The record does not reflect whether this weapon was tested 
for the defendant's fingerprints or whether ballistics tests 
were conducted to determine if the gun fired any of the shots at 
the group on Smith Street. 
8 
 
 
 
. . . 
 
Detective Lee:  [Grabs photograph away]  "Let me show the 
camera what we're showing you, okay?  [Turning back to 
Johnson]  Black, right?  Black?" 
 
Johnson:  "Hold on." 
 
Detective Lee:  "All right." 
 
Johnson:  "I've got to look at it.  Yeah.  Is this the 
gun?" 
 
Detective Lee:  "You tell us.  Does it look like the gun he 
had?" 
 
Johnson:  "I think so, yeah.  Because I remember this 
part." 
 
Detective Lee:  "What do you remember?  What are you 
pointing to?" 
 
Johnson:  "This, this, this whole right here [pointing].  
It's like little scratches on it just like this." 
 
Detective Lee:  "And you remember those scratches?" 
 
Johnson:  "Yeah because I looked back when he was going 
like this, like that."  [Simulating a person trying to 
unjam a gun]6 
 
The conversation turned briefly to discuss the angle from which 
Johnson saw the defendant holding the weapon and struggling with 
it after it jammed.  Detective Kenney then asked Johnson to sign 
the photograph, and the discussion continued. 
Detective Lee:  "That's what you described even the night 
of the murder." 
 
Johnson:  "Wow." 
                                                          
 
 
6  The record does not include a photograph of the firearm, 
and the so-called "scratches" cannot easily be identified or 
seen on the videotape. 
9 
 
 
 
 
Detective Lee:  "You said a big black handgun." 
 
Johnson:  "Wow.  This is crazy." 
 
Detective Lee:  "Looks just like it, huh?" 
 
Johnson:  "It looks just like it." 
 
Detective Lee:  "Good." 
 
Johnson:  "Wow.  That's crazy." 
 
Detective Lee:  "We're smarter than you think, aren't we?" 
 
Johnson:  "Yeah." 
 
 
After a Hampden County grand jury returned indictments 
against the defendant on various charges, including three counts 
of armed assault with intent to murder, illegal possession of a 
firearm, and murder in the second degree,7 the defendant moved to 
suppress Johnson's identification of him and her identification 
of the firearm.  In denying the defendant's motion to suppress 
Johnson's identification of him, the judge concluded that it was 
"advisable" for the police to use the Silva-Santiago protocol 
before showing an eyewitness a photographic array because we had 
declared that we expected police to use the protocol.  But the 
judge declared that "this expectation is not black letter law 
                                                          
 
 
7 The Commonwealth does not allege that the defendant fired 
the bullet that killed Humphrey-Frazer.  Rather, it alleges that 
he is legally responsible for Humphrey-Frazer's death because he 
initiated the gunfight, and the "natural and probable 
consequence" of that conduct was that someone would shoot back.  
We do not address whether this theory is a legally valid basis 
to support a conviction of murder in the second degree. 
10 
 
 
 
that requires mandatory adherence."  He also concluded that the 
defendant did not show "that the absence of a protocol begets a 
finding of undue suggestiveness."  The judge also found that the 
police use of a simultaneous rather than a sequential display of 
photographs was not unnecessarily suggestive.  Where the 
defendant offered no evidence to suggest that the photographs in 
the array impermissibly distinguished the defendant or were 
otherwise suggestive, the judge concluded, based on the totality 
of the circumstances, that "the identification procedure 
employed by the police, though less than ideal, was not unduly 
suggestive." 
 
In allowing the defendant's motion to suppress Johnson's 
identification of the firearm, the judge found that the use of a 
single photograph in the identification procedure was unduly 
suggestive in the absence of exigent circumstances, and that 
this was "an extreme case" that "rises to the level of a denial 
of due process," rendering the identification of the firearm 
inadmissible on that ground alone.  The judge also found that 
the detectives made "repeated affirmative and confirmatory 
statements" that likely "hindered Johnson's ability to make an 
uninfluenced identification," and rendered the identification 
inadmissible under the common law of evidence as "unreliable, 
unfair, and prejudicial." 
11 
 
 
 
 
The defendant and the Commonwealth each applied for 
interlocutory review of the adverse ruling.  The single justice 
allowed both applications, and we granted the defendant's 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Motion to suppress Johnson's 
identification of defendant.  a.  Failure to follow protocol.  
In Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 797-798, we set forth a protocol 
to be used before a photographic array is provided to an 
eyewitness.  Under the protocol, police must make clear to an 
eyewitness that "he [or she] will be asked to view a set of 
photographs; the alleged wrongdoer may or may not be in the 
photographs depicted in the array; it is just as important to 
clear a person from suspicion as to identify a person as the 
wrongdoer; individuals depicted in the photographs may not 
appear exactly as they did on the date of the incident because 
features such as weight and head and facial hair are subject to 
change; regardless of whether an identification is made, the 
investigation will continue."  The protocol also "requires the 
administrator to ask the witness to state, in his or her own 
words, how certain he or she is of any identification."  Id. at 
798.  We declined to hold that the absence of such a protocol or 
comparable warnings in the identifications made in the Silva-
Santiago case required that they be found inadmissible, but we 
12 
 
 
 
declared that "we expect" such a protocol "to be used in the 
future."  Id. 
 
That expectation has largely been met.  A joint survey 
conducted in 2013 by the Massachusetts Chiefs of Police 
Association and the New England Innocence Project identified 253 
police departments that had policies regarding identification 
procedures, and eighty-five per cent of these policies 
"incorporated reform protocols."  Massachusetts Chiefs of Police 
Association & Massachusetts Major City Chiefs, A Response to the 
Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century 
Policing 13 (Sept. 2015), available at http://www.masschiefs. 
org/files-downloads/news-1/866-mcopa-mmcc-response-to-the-final-
report-of-the-president-s-task-force-on-21st-century-police/file 
[https://perma.cc/D4K5-EALZ].  See Supreme Judicial Court Study 
Group on Eyewitness Evidence:  Report and Recommendations to the 
Justices 103-104 (July 25, 2013), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/eyewitness–evidence–
report–2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/WY4M-YNZN].  In fact, this is 
the first case where the identification procedure was conducted 
after we announced the protocol in Silva-Santiago in which we 
have been asked to consider what consequence, if any, should 
arise from the failure to follow the protocol.  And, even here, 
the detectives followed the protocol where they showed Johnson 
photographs and asked her to identify anyone she recognized who 
13 
 
 
 
was among the group of people that were the apparent target of 
the defendant's gunfire; they failed to follow the protocol only 
where they showed her the array that included the defendant. 
 
The expectation we declared in Silva-Santiago was not 
intended as a prediction of future police conduct; it was meant 
as a warning that the failure to follow such a protocol may have 
consequence where the prosecution intends to offer an 
identification at trial that is procured without the benefit of 
such a protocol.  See Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 798, citing 
Commonwealth v. Diaz, 422 Mass. 269, 273 (1996) ("warning 'that 
the time may come when recording in places of detention . . . 
will be mandatory if a statement obtained during custodial 
interrogation is to be admissible'").  The superintendence 
authority of this court does not extend to law enforcement 
agencies; we cannot mandate what they must or must not do, but 
we can mandate what the consequence will be in a court of law 
where they fail to follow our guidance.  See Commonwealth v. 
DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 444-445 (2004) ("The issue . . . 
is not what we 'require' of law enforcement, but how and on what 
conditions evidence will be admitted in our courts.  We retain 
as part of our superintendence power the authority to regulate 
the presentation of evidence in court proceedings"). 
 
We have recognized "that the failure to provide warnings 
comparable to the protocol we adopted in Silva-Santiago . . . 
14 
 
 
 
'substantially increases risk of misidentification.'"  
Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 590, 602 (2011), quoting  
Report of Special Master at 22 (June 18, 2010), State vs. 
Henderson, N.J. Supreme Court, No. A-8-08.  Moreover, as part of 
our model jury instructions on eyewitness identification, 473 
Mass. 1051, 1056-1057 (2015), we instruct juries to evaluate an 
identification "with particular care" where the police failed to 
follow the Silva-Santiago protocol during the identification 
procedure, which reflects our recognition that there is a near 
consensus in the relevant scientific community that the failure 
to follow such a protocol increases the risk of 
misidentification.  See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 
366-367 (2015) ("a principle is 'so generally accepted' that it 
is appropriate to include in a model eyewitness identification 
instruction where there is a near consensus in the relevant 
scientific community adopting that principle").  See also id. at 
367 n.24. 
 
Therefore, the consequence of a failure to follow the 
Silva-Santiago protocol is twofold:  it affects a judge's 
evaluation of the admissibility of the identification; and, 
where it is found admissible, it affects the judge's 
instructions to the jury regarding their evaluation of the 
accuracy of the identification. 
15 
 
 
 
 
As to admissibility, under art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, an identification of a defendant must be 
suppressed where the defendant proves by a preponderance of the 
evidence that "the witness was subjected by the State to a 
pretrial confrontation . . . 'so unnecessarily suggestive and 
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification' as to deny the 
defendant due process of law."  Commonwealth v. Odware, 429 
Mass. 231, 235 (1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Otsuki, 411 Mass. 
218, 232 (1991).  In making this determination, the judge must 
examine the totality of the circumstances regarding the 
interaction between the witness and the police.  Odware, supra, 
quoting Otsuki, supra at 232-233.  Because the failure to follow 
the protocol needlessly increases the risk of a 
misidentification, an identification procedure without such a 
protocol is unnecessarily suggestive.  See Commonwealth v. 
Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 217 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Phillips, 452 Mass. 617, 628 (2008) ("Even where there is 'good 
reason' for a showup identification, it may still be suppressed 
if the identification procedure so needlessly adds to the 
suggestiveness inherent in such an identification that it is 
'conducive to irreparable mistaken identification'"); Walker, 
460 Mass. at 604 ("all-suspect array significantly and 
needlessly increases the potentially unjust consequences that 
may arise from a false positive identification").  But that 
16 
 
 
 
alone does not mandate its suppression, because the standard, to 
be judged based on the totality of the evidence of the police 
interaction with the witness, is whether the identification 
procedure was "'so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to 
irreparable mistaken identification' as to deny the defendant 
due process of law" (emphasis added).  Odware, supra, quoting 
Otsuki, supra at 232. 
 
In considering the degree of suggestiveness arising from 
the failure to follow the protocol, a judge may consider the 
witness's familiarity with the alleged wrongdoer.  The level of 
familiarity between a witness and the suspect is measured by 
factors such as the number of times the witness viewed the 
suspect previously; the duration, nature, and setting of those 
encounters; and the period of time over which the encounters 
occurred.  People v. Rodriguez, 79 N.Y.2d 445, 450-451 (1992).  
Where a witness saw the wrongdoer for the first time during the 
commission of the crime, the witness will examine a photographic 
array in search of the unknown person he or she saw during that 
incident.  But where, as here, the witness was familiar with the 
alleged wrongdoer from prior interactions and knew his first 
name, the witness will look at a photographic array in search of 
that person.  We cannot reasonably expect the witness to ignore 
her memory of what the person looked like based on prior 
interactions and focus only on what the person looked like 
17 
 
 
 
during the commission of the crime.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 242 (2014) ("there may be 'good reason' 
for the first identification procedure to be an in-court showup 
where the eyewitness was familiar with the defendant before the 
commission of the crime"; in this circumstance, "the in-court 
showup is understood by the jury as confirmation that the 
defendant sitting in the court room is the person whose conduct 
is at issue rather than as identification evidence"). 
 
To be sure, the witness might have been mistaken in 
thinking that the person she saw committing the crime was the 
person she knew; research has shown that the perception of 
familiarity is often unreliable.  See Model Jury Instructions on 
Eyewitness Identification, 473 Mass. at 1054 endnote h, citing 
Pezdek & Stolzenberg, Are Individuals' Familiarity Judgments 
Diagnostic of Prior Contact?, 20 Psychol. Crime & L. 302, 306 
(2014) ("twenty-three per cent of study participants 
misidentified subjects with unfamiliar faces as familiar, and 
only forty-two per cent correctly identified familiar face as 
familiar").  And we do not agree with the Commonwealth that the 
use of the protocol here "would not have provided any additional 
safeguards" because of Johnson's familiarity with "Marcus."  The 
photographic array potentially could have revealed that the 
"Marcus" she knew was a different "Marcus" from the person the 
police included in the array, or that her actual familiarity 
18 
 
 
 
with "Marcus" was less than the modest familiarity she 
described.  But we conclude that, where a witness believes he or 
she knows the perpetrator from prior interactions and knows the 
perpetrator's name, the risk of misidentification arising from 
the failure to follow the protocol is less than where the 
witness looks at an array in search of an unknown person he or 
she saw only during the commission of the crime.  Although the 
motion judge here did not do so, a judge properly may consider 
this familiarity in determining, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, whether the failure to follow the protocol was so 
unnecessarily suggestive as to deprive the defendant of due 
process.  We conclude that, in these circumstances, the 
detectives' failure to follow the protocol, standing alone, did 
not warrant suppression of Johnson's identification of the 
defendant. 
 
b.  Simultaneous versus sequential photographic array.  The 
defendant contends that the detectives' failure to adhere to the 
Silva-Santiago protocol was not the only source of needless 
suggestiveness, and that the identification procedure was 
unnecessarily suggestive because the eleven photographs in the 
array were shown to Johnson simultaneously rather than 
sequentially. 
 
We have twice examined the scientific arguments in support 
of sequential arrays.  In Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 798-799, 
19 
 
 
 
we acknowledged the debate among scholars and practitioners 
whether the sequential showing of photographs yields more 
accurate identification, and concluded that, "[w]hile that 
debate evolves, the choice of a simultaneous rather than a 
sequential display of photographs shall go solely to the weight 
of the identification, not to its admissibility."  In Walker, 
460 Mass. at 601, we revisited that conclusion and noted that 
the empirical research suggests that the rate of both accurate 
and inaccurate (i.e., true and false positive) identification is 
higher where eyewitnesses are shown a simultaneous array rather 
than an sequential array.  We declared: 
"What is not clear from the studies is whether, and in what 
circumstances, the use of the protocol in a simultaneous 
photographic lineup diminishes the risk of false positive 
identification to a rate comparable to or less than that in 
a sequential lineup.  We cannot determine whether a 
sequential display is superior to a simultaneous display 
and that the use of the latter is unnecessarily suggestive 
until we learn, at a minimum, whether the rate of false 
positive identification with the use of the protocol is 
significantly higher in simultaneous displays than in 
sequential displays." 
 
Id. at 602.  We therefore concluded that "it is still too soon 
to conclude that sequential display is so plainly superior that 
any identification arising from a simultaneous display is 
unnecessarily suggestive and therefore must be suppressed."  Id. 
at 602-603.  See State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 257-258 
(2011) ("For now, there is insufficient, authoritative evidence 
20 
 
 
 
accepted by scientific experts for a court to make a finding in 
favor of either [simultaneous or sequential lineup] procedure"). 
 
A recent study was the first of its kind to compare the 
accuracy of identifications arising from the display of 
simultaneous and sequential arrays during identification 
procedures conducted by police officers in the field where the 
witnesses received a warnings protocol and the administering 
officer did not know which photograph depicted the suspect. 
Wells, Steblay, & Dysart, Double-Blind Photo Lineups Using 
Actual Eyewitnesses:  An Experimental Test of a Sequential 
Versus Simultaneous Lineup Procedure, 39 Law & Hum. Behav. 1, 10 
(2015).8  The study's findings were consistent with findings in 
comparable nonfield studies in that eyewitnesses were more 
likely to identify the suspect in a simultaneous array than in a 
sequential array, but they were also more likely to identify 
someone who was known to be innocent.9  Although this study 
                                                          
 
 
8 The data set for this study consisted of 494 
identification procedures conducted in actual criminal cases by 
police departments in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina; 
Tucson, Arizona; San Diego, California; and Austin, Texas. 
Wells, Steblay, & Dysart, Double-Blind Photo Lineups Using 
Actual Eyewitnesses:  An Experimental Test of a Sequential 
Versus Simultaneous Lineup Procedure, 39 Law & Hum. Behav. 1, 4 
(2015) (Wells, Steblay, & Dysart).  The witnesses were presented 
with six photographs, including one suspect and five "known-
innocent fillers," in either a simultaneous or sequential array. 
Id. at 2, 11. 
 
 
9 Witnesses identified a suspect 1.5 per cent more often 
after viewing a simultaneous rather than a sequential array 
21 
 
 
 
suggests the modest superiority of sequential arrays to 
simultaneous arrays, other researchers have argued in favor of 
the simultaneous array based on a form of statistical analysis 
traditionally used in medical diagnostics.  See Amendola & 
Wixted, Comparing the Diagnostic Accuracy of Suspect 
Identifications Made by Actual Eyewitnesses from Simultaneous 
and Sequential Lineups in a Randomized Field Trial, 11 J. 
Experimental Criminology 263, 263 (2015); Carlson & Carlson, An 
Evaluation of Lineup Presentation, Weapon Presence, and a 
Distinctive Feature Using ROC Analysis, 3 J. Applied Res. in 
Memory & Cognition 45, 45 (2014); Mickes, Flowe, & Wixted, 
Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis of Eyewitness Memory:  
Comparing the Diagnostic Accuracy of Simultaneous Versus 
Sequential Lineups, 18 J. Experimental Psychol.:  Applied 361, 
361 (2012). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(27.5 per cent versus 26.0 per cent), a difference that is not 
statistically significant.  Wells, Steblay, & Dysart, supra at 
8. Over-all, witnesses selected photographs of known-innocent 
fillers more often in simultaneous displays than in sequential 
displays (17.8 per cent to 12.3 per cent), but this difference 
was not statistically significant.  Id.  However, if we look 
only at those witnesses who made an identification, 42 per cent 
chose a known-innocent filler with the simultaneous array 
procedure and 31 per cent chose a known-innocent filler with the 
sequential array procedure, and this difference is statistically 
significant.  Id. at 10, 12.  The authors noted the high error 
rate of identification in their study and "found the performance 
of these witnesses to be quite poor regardless of the procedure 
used."  Id. at 12. 
22 
 
 
 
 
In 2014, the National Academy of Sciences, based on its 
review of the scientific research, speaking of sequential versus 
simultaneous display, concluded that "the relative superiority 
of competing identification procedures . . . is unresolved," and 
recommended that "caution and care be used when considering 
changes to any lineup procedure, until such time as there is 
clear evidence for the advantages of doing so."  National 
Research Council of the National Academies, Identifying the 
Culprit:  Assessing Eyewitness Identification 3, 104, 118 
(2014).  The Department of Justice, in a memorandum dated 
January 6, 2017, from Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates, 
entitled "Eyewitness Identification:  Procedures for Conducting 
Photo Arrays," at 8, reviewed the relevant research and 
concluded that, until additional research is conducted, "it is 
not possible to say conclusively whether one identification 
method [simultaneous or sequential] is better than the other."  
We would not conclude that sequential display is the better 
procedure and that the use of a simultaneous display is 
unnecessarily suggestive unless there were a near consensus in 
the relevant scientific community to support such a conclusion.  
Gomes, 470 Mass. at 366-367.  Where there is not, the decision 
whether to use a simultaneous or a sequential procedure is best 
23 
 
 
 
left to law enforcement, and the choice will continue to bear on 
the weight of the identification, but not on its admissibility.10 
 
Because the failure to follow the Silva-Santiago protocol 
in these circumstances was not sufficient alone to warrant a 
finding that the identification procedure was so unnecessarily 
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification 
as to deny the defendant due process of law, and because the use 
of the simultaneous display was not unnecessarily suggestive, we 
affirm the judge's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress 
Johnson's identification of the defendant. 
 
2.  Motion to suppress Johnson's identification of firearm.  
The Commonwealth contends that the judge erred in suppressing 
Johnson's identification of the firearm after finding that the 
showing of a single photograph of a firearm to Johnson in the 
absence of exigent circumstances constituted a denial of due 
process.  Before evaluating this claim of error, we offer some 
perspective regarding the judge's decision. 
 
The judge suppressed Johnson's identification of the 
firearm as the firearm the defendant used to fire at the 
                                                          
 
 
10 Our model jury instructions on eyewitness identification 
direct juries to "evaluate the identification with particular 
care" where the police fail to follow a protocol that is 
established or recommended by the law enforcement agency 
conducting the identification procedure.  473 Mass. 1051, 1056-
1057 (2015).  A defendant may request such an instruction where 
a police department that has chosen the sequential method fails 
to employ it in an identification procedure. 
24 
 
 
 
bystanders from the back seat of the vehicle where Johnson was a 
front seat passenger.  We do not understand the judge's decision 
to bar her from testifying at trial to the description of the 
firearm she provided to the detectives before they showed her 
the photograph:  that the firearm was big and black and looked 
like the firearm carried by the detectives.  Moreover, the judge 
provided an alternative ground for finding Johnson's 
identification to be inadmissible based on our common law of 
evidence:  that the probative value of her identification was 
substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice arising from 
the detectives' questioning, which suggested that the firearm in 
the photograph was the firearm she had seen, and their 
subsequent statements, which confirmed her belief that it was 
the same firearm after she responded to their suggestions.  See 
Commonwealth v. Simmons, 383 Mass. 46, 51-52 (1981), S.C., 392 
Mass. 45, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 861 (1984) ("Even if 
constitutional considerations did not apply, an appropriate rule 
of evidence might require that an identification of an inanimate 
object not be admitted in evidence where the government used a 
highly suggestive identification procedure because the unfair, 
prejudicial, and unreliable quality of the identification would 
outweigh its probative value").  See also Commonwealth v. 
Carter, 475 Mass. 512, 518 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Johnson, 473 Mass. 594, 599 (2016) ("Even if otherwise 
25 
 
 
 
admissible, a judge may suppress identification evidence if 'its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice'").  The judge's evidentiary decision is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, where we ask 
"whether the judge's decision resulted from 'a clear error of 
judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision . . . 
such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives.'" Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 672 
(2015), quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 
(2014). 
 
The judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling the 
identification inadmissible under the common law of evidence.  
During the first interview, Johnson told the detectives that she 
did not see the firearm until the defendant leaned out the rear 
driver's side window and began firing, that she ducked when the 
shooting started, and that she did not know whether the gun was 
in the defendant's hand when he left the vehicle immediately 
after the shooting.  As noted, her description of the firearm 
provided no detail that would suggest that she could identify 
anything more than its type.  During the second interview, she 
was shown the photograph of the firearm immediately after she 
was again asked to describe the gun.  She initially said, 
"That's probably it," but moments later asked, "Is this the 
gun?"  The only identifying detail she noted on the firearm were 
26 
 
 
 
"little scratches," but she had said nothing earlier about 
seeing any scratches and the judge reasonably could have doubted 
that she could have seen them while the defendant was firing the 
weapon or clearing its jam.11  Where the identification of the 
firearm was unreliable, and where the witness's confidence in 
the identification was inflated by the detectives' confirmatory 
statements, the judge acted well within the bounds of discretion 
in ruling the identification inadmissible.  See Johnson, 473 
Mass. at 600 ("The danger of unfair prejudice arises because the 
accuracy of an identification tainted by suggestive 
circumstances is more difficult for a jury to evaluate"); 
Simmons, 383 Mass. at 51-52. 
 
Having affirmed the judge's ruling on evidentiary grounds, 
we now address the judge's due process analysis.  In Simmons, 
383 Mass. at 51, we recognized that, "in an extreme case, the 
degree of suggestiveness of an identification procedure 
concerning an inanimate object might rise to the level of a 
denial of due process."  We also recognized that there are three 
differences between the out-of-court identification of a 
defendant and an out-of-court identification of an inanimate 
object.  Id. at 52.  First, the "chances of fundamental 
                                                          
 
 
11 The photograph was briefly displayed for the video camera 
but we were unable to discern "little scratches" on the firearm 
from the videotaped recording, and the Commonwealth did not 
offer the photograph in evidence or include it in the record on 
appeal. 
27 
 
 
 
unfairness" are greater where a defendant is identified because 
that "directly tends to prove the case against him," but 
"[i]dentification of tangible property is only indirect proof of 
the defendant's guilt, even though its force may be most 
persuasive in certain instances."  Id.  Second, most tangible 
objects "are not unique," but "[t]here is only one person with 
the physical characteristics of the defendant."  Id.  Third, 
"[a] lineup of people is practical," but "[a] lineup of property 
may not be."  Id.  We therefore rejected "the notion that a 
lineup of inanimate objects is required in circumstances where a 
lineup of people would be required."  Id.  See Commonwealth v. 
Bresilla, 470 Mass. 422, 427, 431 (2015) (although 
identification of jacket worn by shooter was strong evidence 
that defendant was shooter, "Commonwealth was not required to 
create a photographic array of jackets"). 
 
Due process may be denied by admitting in evidence an 
identification of an inanimate object where, first, the police 
knew or reasonably should have known that identification of the 
object effectively identifies the defendant as the perpetrator 
of the crime and where, second, the police needlessly and 
strongly suggested to the witness that the object is the object 
at issue.  See Simmons, 383 Mass. at 51-52.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Spann, 383 Mass. 142, 148 (1981) ("Barring an extreme case of 
suggestiveness, perhaps involving improper statements by the 
28 
 
 
 
police in the course of such a procedure, a motion to suppress 
the photographic identification of a victim need not be 
allowed").  By recognizing that the identification procedure 
used to identify an inanimate object may implicate due process, 
we do not suggest that the identification procedure need be the 
same as the procedure used to identify a suspect; we have 
already made clear that a lineup of similar objects is not 
required even in the absence of a showing of exigency, and the 
judge erred in ruling otherwise.  See Bresilla, 470 Mass. at 
431; Simmons, supra at 52.  Where the judge rested his finding 
of a denial of due process solely on the failure of the police 
to use a photographic array of similar firearms, that finding 
cannot be sustained. 
 
However, because the identification of an inanimate object 
potentially may implicate due process, and because under our 
common law of evidence the probative value of any such 
identification must not be substantially outweighed by unfair 
prejudice, the police should take reasonable steps to avoid 
unnecessary suggestiveness in what will generally be a showup 
procedure, that is, the showing of the object alone or a single 
photograph of the object.  A police protocol would be valuable 
in guarding against needless suggestiveness in identification 
procedures involving an inanimate object and in ensuring that 
the fact finder learns with precision the nature of any 
29 
 
 
 
identification by the witness.  We urge police departments to 
devise such a protocol for the identification of inanimate 
objects where such an identification would persuasively 
inculpate a defendant. 
 
The identification protocol we adopted in our opinion in 
Silva-Santiago had been recommended to law enforcement 
authorities by the United States Department of Justice.  453 
Mass. at 798, citing United States Department of Justice, 
Eyewitness Evidence:  A Guide for Law Enforcement 19, 31-32, 33-
34 (1999).  But that protocol was created for the identification 
of a suspect in a lineup or a photographic array; it was not 
designed for a showup identification of an inanimate object.  To 
our knowledge, no protocol for the identification of inanimate 
objects has yet been devised by the Department of Justice or by 
any Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency, so it is 
prudent for us to tread carefully here.  We invite police 
departments to consider, in devising such a protocol, whether it 
should include the following elements:  (1) the witness should 
be asked to provide a verbal description of the object before 
the object or a photograph of the object is shown to the 
witness; (2) the officer should tell the witness that the object 
that will be shown to the witness may or may not be the object 
the witness described; (3) where any identification is made, the 
officer should ask the witness to state, in his or her own 
30 
 
 
 
words, how certain he or she is of the identification; and (4) 
the officer should obtain clarification from the witness as to 
whether the object is the actual object he or she saw, or 
whether it simply looks like the object he or she saw.  The 
identification procedure should be memorialized, preferably by a 
contemporaneous videotape or audio recording but alternatively 
by an interview report timely prepared. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, we affirm the 
denial of the defendant's motion to suppress Johnson's 
identification of him, and the allowance of the defendant's 
motion to suppress Johnson's identification of the firearm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.