Title: Palo v. Palo

State: south-dakota

Issuer: South Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

299 N.W.2d 577 (1980) Debra R. PALO, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Bruce C. PALO, Defendant and Appellant. No. 12907. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Considered on Briefs November 26, 1980. Decided December 17, 1980. *578 Thomas M. Frankman of Willy, Pruitt, Matthews, Farrell, Frankman & Johnson, Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and appellee. Steve Jorgensen, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellant. MORGAN, Justice. The trial court granted appellee a divorce from appellant and divided the parties' property. Appellant appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion for a continuance of the trial date under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act (Act). We affirm. Both parties were, at all times material herein, members of the military service. Appellee commenced an action for divorce while both parties were in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Appellant answered, but before the sixty-day cooling off period[*] had lapsed, both parties were transferred to Germany. On July 20, 1979, appellant's lawyer received a copy of an order setting the trial date for August 14, 1979. The following Monday, July 23, 1979, appellant's lawyer sent appellee's lawyer a letter saying that appellant could take advantage of the Act. Appellant's lawyer waited, however, until July 27, 1979, to write to appellant to advise him of the trial date. Appellee received notice of the trial date and she immediately made arrangements to travel to the United States for the trial. She had no leave time accrued and no money for the flight, so she made arrangements to borrow from future leave time and from the military bank. By August 2, 1979, appellant had received notice of the exact trial date. He responded by letter to his attorney, setting out his reasons for wanting to take advantage of the Act. His reasons were as follows: Just prior to commencement of the trial on August 14, 1979, appellant's lawyer moved that appellant be allowed to take advantage of the Act. Appellant's letter stating why he would not be present at the trial was incorporated in an affidavit by his counsel in support of the motion. After hearing counsels' arguments on the matter, and after hearing testimony by appellee as to how she was able to be present although also stationed in Germany without sufficient money or leave time available to be present at the trial, the trial court determined that appellant should not be allowed to take advantage of the Act since it was not appellant's inability to be present at the trial that precluded him from being present, but rather that it was his unwillingness to be present. The trial court then proceeded with the trial. *579 At the close of the trial, the trial court granted appellee a divorce from appellant and divided the property. Appellant appeals from the trial court's determination that he could not take advantage of the Act. The Act, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 521 (1968), reads: In Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 63 S. Ct. 1223, 87 L. Ed. 1587 (1943), the United States Supreme Court construed the Act. The Court made the following conclusions: In State v. Wilson, 234 Minn. 570, 572, 48 N.W.2d 513, 514-515 (1951), the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated: In Norris v. Superior Court of Mohave County, 14 Ariz.App. 183, 185, 481 P.2d 553, 555 (1971), the court said: A similar situation is presented in this case. Here appellant not only failed to show that he was unable to obtain leave, but he also failed to show that he had even tried to obtain leave. Appellant did not show his actual unavailability or that his rights would be adversely affected by his absence at the trial. Accordingly, we affirm. All the Justices concur. [*] See SDCL 25-4-34.