Title: State v. Schmitt

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Schmitt, 101 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-37.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. SCHMITT, APPELLEE. 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE v.WEIRTZ, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Schmitt, 101 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-37.] 
Criminal procedure — Evidence — Driving under the influence — Law 
enforcement officer may testify at trial regarding observations made 
during a defendant’s performance of nonscientific standardized field 
sobriety tests. 
(Nos. 2002-1807 and 2002-2015 — Submitted September 24, 2003 — Decided 
January 21, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mercer County, No. 10-01-16, 2002-Ohio-
4615. 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Delaware County, No. 02-CA-C-06032, 
2002-Ohio-5294. 
__________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A law enforcement officer may testify at trial regarding observations made during 
a defendant’s performance of nonscientific standardized field sobriety 
tests. 
__________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J. 
{¶1} 
In case No. 2002-1807, in June 2001, a state trooper stopped a 
vehicle driven by defendant-appellee, Kevin K. Schmitt, on State Route 219 in 
Mercer County after observing Schmitt weaving and driving left of center.  The 
trooper smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Schmitt and observed that Schmitt 
was glassy-eyed and that his speech was slow.  The trooper conducted three field 
sobriety tests: the horizontal gaze nystagmus test (“HGN”), the one-leg-stand test, 
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and the walk-and-turn test.  During these exercises, the trooper observed 
Schmitt’s poor balance and inability to follow certain instructions.  Schmitt also 
took a portable breath test, which yielded a result of .143 percent.  Based upon the 
results of these tests and his observations, the trooper placed Schmitt under arrest 
for driving under the influence (“DUI”).  Schmitt refused to take a breathalyzer 
test. 
{¶2} 
Having been convicted of three DUI offenses within the last six 
years, Schmitt was indicted on a charge of a felony DUI pursuant to R.C. 
4511.19(A)(1).  Schmitt filed a motion to suppress all testimony related to the 
field sobriety tests.  For purposes of the motion, the parties stipulated that the field 
sobriety tests were not administered in strict compliance with National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) standards.  The trial court granted the 
motion to suppress.  In a two-to-one decision, the court of appeals for Mercer 
County affirmed the decision of the trial court, citing State v. Homan (2000), 89 
Ohio St.3d 421, 732 N.E.2d 952. 
{¶3} 
This cause is now before the court pursuant to our allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
{¶4} 
In case No. 2002-2015, in April 2002, another state trooper 
observed defendant-appellant, Daniel Weirtz, speeding and weaving on Route 23 
in Delaware County.  Upon stopping Weirtz, the trooper smelled a strong odor of 
alcohol on him and noticed that Weirtz had slurred and muttered speech.  Weirtz 
admitted that he had consumed four to five beers.  The trooper administered the 
HGN test, the walk-and-turn test and the one-leg-stand test.  The trial court later 
found that the HGN test was conducted in conformity with NHTSA standards and 
that Weirtz exhibited all six characteristics that signify intoxication.  However, 
the walk-and-turn test and one-leg-stand tests were not administered in 
compliance with the NHTSA standards. 
January Term, 2004 
3 
{¶5} 
Weirtz filed a motion to suppress any and all evidence obtained as 
a result of the stop, including the test results, statements he made, and 
“observations and opinions” of the trooper.  The trial court initially overruled the 
motion to suppress.  However, the court issued a subsequent entry in which it 
suppressed, for purposes of trial, any evidence concerning the “administration” of 
the walk-and-turn test and the one-leg-stand test.  In a two-to-one decision, the 
court of appeals for Delaware County reversed.  Although the court approved the 
trial court’s exclusion of the actual test results, it held that the trooper could 
testify as a lay witness about his observations regarding Weirtz’s performance on 
the tests. 
{¶6} 
This cause is now before the court upon our determination that a 
conflict exists. 
{¶7} 
In Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d 421, 732 N.E.2d 952, paragraph one of 
the syllabus, we held, “In order for the results of a field sobriety test to serve as 
evidence of probable cause to arrest, the police must have administered the test in 
strict compliance with standardized testing procedures.”  In reaching this holding, 
we noted that even minor deviations from the standardized procedures can bias 
the test results.  Quoting from an NHTSA manual, we stressed that “ ‘[i]f any one 
of the standardized field sobriety test elements is changed, the validity is 
compromised.’ ”  Homan, at 89 Ohio St.3d 425, 732 N.E.2d 952.  Therefore, we 
affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the improper 
administration of the tests made their results inherently unreliable. 
{¶8} 
We are initially asked to decide whether our holding in Homan 
precludes noncomplying field sobriety test results from admissibility at trial.  The 
state argues that Homan is limited in its scope and that it excludes only the test 
results for probable-cause purposes.  While we recognize that the holding of 
Homan addresses the probable-cause stage of litigation, we now extend our 
holding to the admissibility of such test results at trial.  Whether there is probable 
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cause to arrest depends upon whether an officer has sufficient information to 
cause a prudent person to believe that the suspect was driving under the influence.  
Id. at 427, 732 N.E.2d 952.  In the cases at bar, the issue is whether the elements 
of driving under the influence can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Since 
we required strict compliance with the field sobriety testing procedures to 
determine the lesser standard of probable cause, the same standard must apply to a 
determination of test-result admissibility at trial, where the standard of proof is 
higher and where the ultimate determination involves the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence.  Therefore, we hold that the lower courts properly suppressed the test 
results where the tests were not administered in accordance with standardized 
testing procedures. 
{¶9} 
Since our decision in Homan, the General Assembly has amended 
R.C. 4511.19.1  Under the amended statute, the arresting officer no longer needs 
to have administered field sobriety tests in strict compliance with testing 
standards for the test results to be admissible at trial.  Instead, an officer may now 
testify concerning the results of a field sobriety test administered in substantial 
compliance with the testing standards.  Id.  Consequently, we recognize that this 
portion of our decision will have limited applicability. 
{¶10} With regard to the second issue before us, the following question 
has been certified to our court:  “Does State v. Homan [2000], 89 Ohio St.3d 421, 
2000-Ohio-212 [732 N.E.2d 952], preclude a law enforcement officer from 
                                                 
1. {¶a} R.C. 4511.19(D)(4)(b) provides:   
 
{¶b} “In any criminal prosecution * * * for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section, 
* * * if a law enforcement officer has administered a field sobriety test * * * and if it is shown by 
clear and convincing evidence that the officer administered the test in substantial compliance with 
the testing standards * * *, all of the following apply:  
 
{¶c} (i)  The officer may testify concerning the results of the field sobriety test so 
administered. 
 
{¶d} (ii)  The prosecution may introduce the results of the field sobriety test so administered 
as evidence in any proceedings in the criminal prosecution * * *.” 
 
January Term, 2004 
5 
testifying at trial regarding observations made during a defendant’s performance 
of nonscientific standardized field sobriety tests when those tests are not 
administered in strict compliance with the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration Guidelines?”  The defendants contend that where the underlying 
tests were administered improperly, the reliability of the entire test process is 
called into question and all facts and circumstances related to the testing, 
including officer observation, are unreliable and should be suppressed.  
Conversely, the state argues that even if the test results are excluded, the 
observations made by the arresting officer during even flawed test administration 
are proper lay testimony admissible under Evid.R. 701. 
{¶11} In Homan, although we excluded the noncomplying field test 
results from our consideration, we nevertheless concluded that the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the defendant’s arrest supported a finding of probable 
cause.  In particular, we found relevant the officer’s observations of the 
defendant, including the fact that he observed erratic driving, that the defendant’s 
eyes were red and glassy, and that she smelled of alcohol.  Id., 89 Ohio St.3d at 
427, 732 N.E.2d 952.  These observations clearly fall within the realm of Evid.R. 
701, since they are rationally based on the perceptions of the witness and are 
helpful to a clear understanding of a fact in issue. 
{¶12} The certified conflict concerns whether an officer’s observations 
regarding a defendant’s performance on nonscientific field sobriety tests should 
likewise be admissible as lay evidence of intoxication.  It is generally accepted 
that virtually any lay witness, including a police officer, may testify as to whether 
an individual appears intoxicated.  Columbus v. Mullins (1954), 162 Ohio St. 419, 
421, 55 O.O. 240, 123 N.E.2d 422.  See, also, State v. McKee (2001), 91 Ohio 
St.3d 292, 296, 744 N.E.2d 737.  Such lay testimony is often crucial in 
prosecuting drunk driving cases.  Moreover, such evidence is relevant and 
admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 401 and Evid.R. 402.  Thus, courts have 
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recognized that “[t]o prove impaired driving ability, the state can rely on 
physiological factors (e.g., slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, odor of alcohol) and 
coordination tests (e.g., field sobriety tests) to demonstrate that a person’s 
physical and mental ability to drive is impaired.”  State v. Wargo (Oct. 31, 1997), 
Trumbull App. No. 96-T-5528, 1997 WL 703373. 
{¶13} The dissenting judge in Schmitt and the majority of the court in 
Weirtz, which relied upon the Schmitt dissent, understood what constitutes 
appropriate lay testimony.  In Schmitt, the dissenting judge, in arguing that the 
officer’s observations should not be suppressed, explained that the “performance 
of the psychomotor tests involves observations that parallel those that a layperson 
would make in assessing an individual’s sobriety.  Thus, a defendant’s ability to 
perform such simple tasks is within the juror’s common understanding.” 
{¶14} The nonscientific field sobriety tests involve simple exercises, such 
as walking heel-to-toe in a straight line (walk-and-turn test).  The manner in 
which a defendant performs these tests may easily reveal to the average layperson 
whether the individual is intoxicated.  We see no reason to treat an officer’s 
testimony regarding the defendant’s performance on a nonscientific field sobriety 
test any differently from his testimony addressing other indicia of intoxication, 
such as slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and odor of alcohol.  In all of these cases, 
the officer is testifying about his perceptions of the witness, and such testimony 
helps resolve the issue of whether the defendant was driving while intoxicated. 
{¶15} Unlike the actual test results, which may be tainted, the officer’s 
testimony is based upon his or her firsthand observation of the defendant’s 
conduct and appearance.  Such testimony is being offered to assist the jury in 
determining a fact in issue, i.e., whether a defendant was driving while 
intoxicated.  Moreover, defense counsel will have the opportunity to cross-
examine the officer to point out any inaccuracies and weaknesses.  We conclude 
that an officer’s observations in these circumstances are permissible lay testimony 
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under Evid.R. 701.  Therefore, we answer the certified question in the negative 
and hold that a law enforcement officer may testify at trial regarding observations 
made during a defendant’s performance of nonscientific standardized field 
sobriety tests. 
{¶16} Regarding case No. 2002-1807, we find that the trial court properly 
excluded the results of the noncomplying field sobriety tests.  However, the lower 
courts erred in suppressing the arresting officer’s trial testimony concerning his 
observations of the defendant’s performance of the nonscientific standardized 
field sobriety tests.  With regard to case No. 2002-2015, we affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals, which held that the arresting officer may not testify as to 
the results of the noncomplying field sobriety tests but may testify as to his 
observations of the defendant’s performance on these tests. 
Judgment reversed 
in case No. 2002-1807. 
Judgment affirmed 
in case No. 2002-2015. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶17} I agree with the majority to the extent it holds that even where a 
field sobriety test is not performed in exact compliance with standardized testing 
procedures, an officer’s observations of the defendant are admissible not only for 
purposes of demonstrating probable cause, but at trial as evidence of a 
defendant’s intoxication.  However, I continue to disagree with the majority’s 
conclusion that the threshold for admitting the results of the field sobriety test is 
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strict compliance with standardized testing procedures and its extension of this 
standard to the trial setting. 
{¶18} In State v. Homan (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 421, 430, 732 N.E.2d 
952, we held that a field sobriety test must strictly comply with standardized 
procedures for the results to support probable cause.  I dissented, arguing that 
field sobriety test results should be admissible for purposes of determining 
probable cause when the officer performs the test in substantial compliance with 
standardized testing procedures.  I noted that administering field sobriety tests in 
trying environmental conditions is difficult at best.  Therefore, I believed that 
rather than automatically rejecting test results for any deviation from standardized 
procedures, the better approach would be to require substantial compliance with 
standardized procedures and permit trial courts to determine whether the deviation 
prejudiced the defendant and warranted exclusion of the results.  I continue to 
adhere to this reasoning and believe that substantial compliance should also be the 
test for admissibility of field sobriety test results at trial.  My view in this case, as 
well as in Homan, is apparently shared by the General Assembly, as evidenced by 
its recent enactment of R.C. 4511.19(D)(4), which allows officer testimony and 
test results admitted in court proceedings if the prosecution can prove that the 
field sobriety test was conducted in substantial compliance with applicable testing 
standards by clear and convincing evidence.  However, because R.C. 4511.19 
applies prospectively only, I continue to voice my dissent. 
{¶19} Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
{¶20} I dissent from the majority’s holding that a police officer’s 
observations of an incorrectly administered field sobriety test can be used as 
evidence against an accused.  Field sobriety tests are not like breath or blood tests, 
where results are generated by an apparatus.  The results of a field sobriety test 
January Term, 2004 
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are generated from the observations of the officer.  There’s nothing fed into a 
computer with an objective result printed out.  The results are the officer’s 
observations.  Labeling an officer’s observations “test results” and making them 
inadmissible, but calling them “observations” and making them admissible, is 
inconsistent. 
{¶21} Of course, an officer’s observations not related to the 
administration of a sobriety test should be admissible.  The officers in these cases, 
for instance, noted that the accuseds smelled of alcohol and exhibited glassy eyes 
and slurred speech.  But we cannot have an officer testifying that he just happened 
to observe an accused’s attempt to walk heel-to-toe in a straight line, and noticed 
a little wobbling.  Are juries to believe that an accused would voluntarily stand on 
one leg and count while an officer was coincidentally observing?   
{¶22} To a trier of fact, an officer’s observations will carry virtually the 
same weight as field sobriety test results.  The majority therefore effectively guts 
this court’s decision in State v. Homan (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 421, 732 N.E.2d 
952. 
__________ 
 
Andrew J. Hinders, Mercer County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew K. 
Fox, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant in case No. 2002-1807. 
 
James A. Tesno, for appellee in case No. 2002-1807. 
 
Peter B. Ruffing, Delaware City Prosecutor, and Kyle Rohrer, Assistant 
City Prosecutor, for appellee in case No. 2002-2015. 
 
Saia & Piatt, P.L.L., Jon J. Saia and Brian C.M. Forbes, for appellant in 
case No. 2002-2015. 
 
William F. Schenck and Elizabeth A. Ellis, urging reversal in case No. 
2002-1807 and urging affirmance in case No. 2002-2015, for amicus curiae Ohio 
Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
__________