Title: State v. Dilts

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: December 18, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
    v.
RANDY EVERETT DILTS,
Petitioner on Review.
(99CR-0172; CA A106034; SC S49525)
    En Banc
    On review from the Court of Appeals.*
    Argued and submitted September 5, 2003.
    Daniel M. Carroll, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With him on
the brief was David E. Groom, Acting Executive Director, Office
of Public Defense Services.
    Daniel J. Casey, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With him
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
    BALMER, J.
    The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
    *Appeal from Coos County Circuit Court, Michael J. Gillespie, Judge. 179 Or App 238, 39 P3d 276 (2002).
BALMER, J. 
         In this criminal case, we are asked to consider whether
defendant's sentence was consistent with federal constitutional
requirements as interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US
466, 120 S Ct 2348, 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000). 
         Defendant pleaded guilty to assault in the third
degree.  ORS 163.165.  The trial court found that the crime was
racially motivated and imposed an upward departure sentence under
the Oregon Felony Sentencing Guidelines (sentencing guidelines). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to 36 months' imprisonment
and an additional 36-month period of post-prison supervision. 
Defendant appealed from that sentence, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.  State v. Dilts, 179 Or App 238, 39 P3d 276 (2002). 
Defendant sought review, arguing that the trial court violated
his state and federal jury trial rights and his federal due
process rights by imposing a departure sentence based on a fact
not pleaded in the indictment or proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. (1)  We allowed review and, for the reasons stated
below, now conclude that the trial court's imposition of an
upward departure sentence did not violate defendant's federal
constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. (2)
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         We take the undisputed facts from the Court of Appeals
opinion and from the record.  In January 1999, while incarcerated
in the Coos County Jail, defendant struck another inmate with a
plastic toilet brush in the presence of a third inmate who was
aiding defendant.  The state charged defendant with assault in
the third degree, a Class C felony, and defendant pleaded guilty
to that charge.  The parties did not negotiate a plea agreement,
but did stipulate that defendant's criminal history and his
current crime of conviction made him subject to a penalty range
of between 15 and 18 months imprisonment under the sentencing
guidelines.  The trial court accepted that stipulation.  
         Because defendant's sentence lies at the heart of this
case and the trial court imposed that sentence under the
sentencing guidelines, it is necessary first to explain how the
sentencing guidelines operate.  As this court has noted
previously, the sentencing guidelines "serve as the primary means
through which courts determine an offender's sentence for felony
offenses."  State v. Ferman-Velasco, 333 Or 422, 425, 41 P3d 404
(2002).  In 1985, the legislature created the Oregon Criminal
Justice Council (commission) to develop recommendations for
criminal sentencing. (3)  Or Laws 1985, ch 558, §§ 2-3.  The
commission's efforts produced a sentencing guidelines grid that
calculates a defendant's sentence on the basis of two factors: 
the seriousness of the crime of conviction and the defendant's
criminal history.  This court has described the operation of the
grid system as follows:
"A 'Crime Seriousness Scale' serves as the vertical
axis of the grid.  Most felonies fall within one of the
11 categories on the Crime Seriousness Scale.  A
'Criminal History Scale' serves as the horizontal axis
of the grid.  The Criminal History Scale is made up of
nine categories, ranging from 'minor misdemeanor or no
criminal record' to 'multiple (3+) felony person
offender.'  The appropriate sentence for a given felony
conviction is determined by (1) locating the
appropriate category for the crime of conviction on the
Crime Seriousness Scale; (2) locating the appropriate
category for the convicted offender on the Criminal
History Scale; and (3) locating the grid block where
the two categories intersect.  Each grid block contains
what is called a 'presumptive sentence' * * *."   
State v. Davis, 315 Or 484, 487, 847 P2d 834 (1993) (footnote
omitted); see also OAR 213-004-0001 (describing operation of
sentencing grid); OAR 213-003-0001(16) (defining "presumptive
sentence" as "the sentence provided in a grid block * * * by the
combined effect of the crime seriousness ranking of the current
crime of conviction and the offender's criminal history").
         The sentencing guidelines control the sentences for
felonies committed after November 1, 1989.  ORS 137.669.  The
commission created the guidelines as administrative rules, but,
because the legislature approved them in 1989, they have the
authority of statutory law.  State v. Langdon, 330 Or 72, 74, 999
P2d 1127 (2000); Or Laws 1989, ch 790, § 87.  Under the
guidelines, a sentencing judge may impose a sentence that is an
upward or downward departure from the presumptive sentence for a
crime on finding "substantial and compelling reasons" that
justify imposing such a departure.  OAR 213-008-0001.  See also
OAR 213-003-0001(8) (defining "durational departure" as "a
sentence which is inconsistent with the presumptive sentence as
to term of incarceration * * * ").  The rules provide a list of
aggravating and mitigating factors that a sentencing judge may
consider in determining whether substantial and compelling
reasons exist to impose a departure sentence.  OAR 213-008-0002. 
One such aggravating factor is that "[t]he offense was motivated
entirely or in part by the race, color, religion, ethnicity,
national origin or sexual orientation of the victim."  OAR 213-008-0002(1)(b)(K).  A judge may not impose a departure sentence
that exceeds more than twice the maximum duration of the
presumptive sentence or that exceeds the statutory maximum
indeterminate sentence described in ORS 161.605.  OAR 213-008-0003(2).
         ORS 161.605 sets out the maximum indeterminate prison
terms for Class A, B, and C felonies:
"The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment for a felony is as follows: 
"(1) For a Class A felony, 20 years. 
"(2) For a Class B felony, 10 years. 
"(3) For a Class C felony, 5 years. 
"(4) For an unclassified felony as provided in the
statute defining the crime." 
         As noted above, defendant pleaded guilty to assault in
the third degree.  ORS 163.165 is the substantive statute that
defines that offense.  That statute provides, in part: 
"(1) A person commits the crime of assault in the
third degree if the person:
"* * * * *
"(e) While being aided by another person actually
present, intentionally or knowingly causes physical
injury to another;
"* * * * *
"(2) Assault in the third degree is a Class C
felony." 
         With that background in mind, we return to the facts of
this case.  As noted, defendant entered a guilty plea to third-degree assault, and the parties stipulated that the presumptive
sentence for his crime under the sentencing guidelines was 15 to
18 months.  At defendant's sentencing, the state argued that the
trial court should impose an upward durational departure from
that presumptive sentence, based on the aggravating factor that
defendant's crime was motivated, at least in part, by the
victim's race or color. (4)  See OAR 213-008-0002(1)(b)(K). 
The prosecutor told the court that the victim had asserted that
defendant had addressed him by use of a racial slur before the
assault.  The prosecutor also read into the record portions of a
letter that defendant had written to a friend after the assault
had occurred in which defendant had referred to the victim by use
of a racial epithet.  Defendant denied that the assault had been
racially motivated, but did not deny that he had made the comment
or had written the letter.  However, he asserted that he had made
the comments in question during the "heat of an argument" and in
response to derogatory statements that the victim had made to
him. 
         The trial court found that defendant's offense was
motivated in part by the victim's race.  Based on that
aggravating factor, the trial court imposed an upward departure
sentence of 36 months in prison and an additional 36-month period
of post-prison supervision.  That prison sentence constituted the
maximum durational departure possible under the sentencing
guidelines, or double the presumptive incarceration term of 15 to
18 months. (5)
DEFENDANT'S FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS (6)
         Defendant argues that, under the United States Supreme
Court's decisions in Apprendi and Ring v. Arizona, 536 US 584,
122 S Ct 2428, 153 L Ed 2d 556 (2002), the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution require that any
factual aspect of a crime, other than a defendant's prior
criminal convictions, that allows a sentencing judge to increase
the penalty for that crime beyond the maximum sentence authorized
by statute must be pled in the accusatory instrument and proved
by the state beyond a reasonable doubt.  Defendant contends that
his sentence was increased above the statutory maximum on the
basis of an aggravating fact found by the trial court -- that his
assault was racially motivated -- that was not alleged in the
indictment and that the state did not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt.  For those reasons, he argues, the sentence imposed on him
violates his federal constitutional rights. (7)
         The state responds that defendant's sentence is both
within the range that the sentencing guidelines authorize and is
less than the five-year statutory maximum sentence applicable to
Class C felonies under ORS 161.605(3).  Under the state's
interpretation of those administrative rules and statutes,
defendant's sentence does not exceed the prescribed statutory
maximum penalty.  For that reason, the state asserts that the
aggravating fact that led to the imposition of the departure
sentence did not need to be alleged in the indictment or proved
beyond a reasonable doubt and, therefore, defendant's sentence
does not violate the Due Process Clause as interpreted in
Apprendi.  As we will explain in greater detail, we agree with
the state and reject defendant's arguments to the contrary.
         We begin with a discussion of Apprendi.  In that case,
the defendant fired several shots into the home of an African-American family who had moved into his previously all-white New
Jersey neighborhood.  After he confessed to the shooting, the
defendant made a statement, which he later retracted, that he did
not want that family in his neighborhood because they were "black
in color."  530 US at 469.  A grand jury returned a 23-count
indictment charging the defendant with offenses that stemmed from
a number of incidents, including the shooting.  None of the
counts referred to New Jersey's "hate crime" statute or alleged
that the defendant had acted with a racially biased purpose.  Id. 
         Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pleaded
guilty, inter alia, to second-degree possession of a firearm for
an unlawful purpose on one of the charges, based on the shooting
described above.  Id. at 469-70.  That offense carried a maximum
sentence of 10 years under New Jersey law.  Id. at 468.  In the
plea agreement, the state reserved the right to request the court
to impose a higher "enhanced" sentence for that offense on the
ground that the defendant had committed the crime with a "biased
purpose" under the state's separate "hate crime" statute.  Id. at
470.  That statute authorized the court to extend the term of
imprisonment for second-degree offenses to "between 10 and 20
years" if the trial judge found by a preponderance of the
evidence that the offender had acted with a purpose to intimidate
because of the victim's race or color.  Id. at 468.  That 10-to-20-year sentencing range was identical to the sentencing range
that New Jersey provided for crimes of the first degree.  Id. at
491.  In the plea agreement, the defendant had "reserved the
right to challenge the hate crime sentence enhancement on the
ground that it violate[ed] the United States Constitution."  Id.
at 470. 
         The sentencing judge held an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of the defendant's "purpose" for the shooting and found by
a preponderance of the evidence that he had committed his crime
with a biased purpose.  Id. at 470-71.  Based on that finding,
the judge held that the "hate crime enhancement" applied and
sentenced the defendant to a 12-year term of imprisonment.  Id.
at 471.
         The New Jersey appellate courts affirmed, and the
United States Supreme Court granted certoriari.  The defendant
argued that the Due Process Clause required that the finding of
bias that was the basis for his hate crime sentence had to be
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt under In re Winship,
397 US 358, 90 S Ct 1068, 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970) (Due Process
Clause of Fourteenth Amendment requires state to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases).  530 US at 471.  The
Supreme Court agreed and vacated the sentence, holding that,
because the trial court's finding of racial animus increased the
penalty for the crime "beyond the prescribed statutory maximum"
that the defendant would have been subject to without that
finding, the question whether the defendant had committed the
crime with a racially biased purpose had to "be submitted to a
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. at 490.  That
procedure was required to satisfy the notice and jury trial
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 476-77.
         The Court stated that, "[o]ther than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. at 490. 
Apprendi extended to state criminal cases the rationale of the
Court's earlier decision in Jones v. United States, 526 US 227,
119 S Ct 1215, 143 L Ed 2d 311 (1999), in which the Court had
interpreted a federal criminal statute as establishing elements
of distinct offenses to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt, rather than viewing those elements as sentencing factors
for the trial judge. (8)   
         Although the Court in Apprendi emphasized that the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments compelled its holding, and
further emphasized that "Winship's due process and associated
jury protections extend, to some degree, 'to determinations that
[go] not to a defendant's guilt or innocence, but simply to the
length of his sentence[,]'" id. at 484 (quoting Almendarez-Torres
v. United States, 523 US 224, 251, 118 S Ct 1219, 140 L Ed 2d 350
(1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)), the Court also stated that
judicial discretion and factfinding may continue to be exercised
in sentencing, provided that doing so does not expose the
defendant to a sentence that exceeds the prescribed statutory
maximum penalty:
"We should be clear that nothing in [the history of
common-law felony sentencing] suggests that it is
impermissible for judges to exercise discretion --
taking into consideration various factors relating both
to offense and offender -- in imposing a judgment
within the range prescribed by statute.  We have often
noted that judges in this country have long exercised
discretion of this nature in imposing sentences within
statutory limits in the individual case. * * * [O]ur
periodic recognition of judges' broad discretion in
sentencing  * * * has been regularly accompanied by the
qualification that that discretion was bound by the
range of sentencing options prescribed by the
legislature."  
530 US at 481 (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted).
         Since Apprendi, a majority of the Court has maintained
that judicial factfinding and discretion in sentencing, within
statutory sentence limits, can be exercised without violating
constitutional jury trial or due process protections.  In Harris
v. United States, 536 US 545, 122 S Ct 2406, 153 L Ed 2d 524
(2002), for example, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
federal mandatory minimum sentencing in light of Apprendi. (9) 
In a plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy, speaking for four
members of the Court, stated:
"Judicial factfinding in the course of selecting a
sentence within the authorized range does not implicate
the indictment, jury-trial, and reasonable-doubt
components of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments."
536 US at 558. (10)  Thus, a plurality of the Court held that,
during sentencing, a trial court may take into account
traditional sentencing factors that the court has found by a
preponderance of the evidence without violating the Sixth or
Fourteenth Amendments as interpreted in Apprendi, provided that
the sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum
penalty that the legislature authorized for the defendant's crime
of conviction.  See also id. at 549 ("After the accused is
convicted, the judge may impose a sentence within a range
provided by statute, basing it on various facts relating to the
defendant and the manner in which the offense was committed. 
Though these facts may have a substantial impact on the sentence,
they are not elements [of a crime], and are thus not subject to
the Constitution's indictment, jury, and proof requirements."). 
         Defendant's contention that his departure sentence is
unconstitutional under Apprendi has some superficial appeal in
light of the obvious factual similarities between the two cases. 
Both defendants decided to plead guilty, rather than to exercise
their right to a trial by jury.  Like Apprendi, the trial court
in defendant's case made a finding that defendant's crime was
motivated in part by racial animus and exercised the court's
authority to impose a longer sentence as a result of that finding
than defendant otherwise would have received.  However, as we
shall explain, the crucial difference between the sentence that
the defendant in Apprendi received and the sentence imposed on
defendant is that defendant's sentence did not exceed the
prescribed statutory maximum penalty for the offense to which he
pleaded guilty, i.e., third-degree assault.  By contrast, as the
Court in Apprendi emphasized, under New Jersey's hate crime
statute, the defendant received not only a sentence that exceeded
the prescribed statutory maximum penalty for the second-degree
offense for which he was convicted, but that statute subjected
him to a sentence that the state provided for crimes of the first
degree.  530 US at 491. (11)
         Resolving whether defendant's sentence exceeds the
prescribed statutory maximum penalty for the offense to which he
pled guilty is a question of statutory interpretation. 
         Defendant argues that, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the upper end of the range of the presumptive
sentence under the guidelines for a particular offense
constitutes the prescribed statutory maximum penalty for purposes
of applying Apprendi.  Because the 36-month sentence that he
received exceeded the 15-to-18 month presumptive sentence
contained in the sentencing guidelines grid block, defendant
alleges that his sentence was invalid.  He asserts that the
presumptive sentence is both mandatory and constitutes the
statutory maximum sentence.  
         Defendant notes that, after November 1, 1989, courts
must impose determinate sentences for felonies and that, in
almost all cases, those sentences are to be determined by the
sentencing guidelines.  See ORS 137.669 (sentencing guidelines
are mandatory and constitute presumptive sentences); ORS
137.010(1) (trial courts shall impose sentences in accordance
with guidelines unless otherwise specifically provided by law);
ORS 137.120(2) (same).  Because the maximum prison terms for
felony convictions set out in ORS 161.605 apply to only
indeterminate sentences, not determinate sentences, defendant
contends that those indeterminate maximums cannot be the maximum
statutory limits for determinate sentences imposed under the
sentencing guidelines for felonies committed after the
guidelines' effective date.  
         In addition, defendant reasons that, because ORS
137.120(2) requires convicted felons to be sentenced under the
guidelines, any relevant statutory maximum sentences for those
crimes also must be located within the sentencing guidelines. 
Somewhat inconsistently, however, defendant rejects the notion
that the maximum departure sentence constitutes the maximum
statutory penalty, even though the sentencing guidelines
themselves set out those departure sentences, see, e.g., OAR
213-008-0001, and, as previously noted, those guidelines have the
authority of statute.  Instead, defendant insists that the
statutory maximum sentence is the presumptive sentence.
         To prevail under his proposed framework, defendant must
demonstrate that, by making the sentences at the upper end of
each grid block "presumptive," the legislature intended those
sentences to be the maximum sentences that a court can impose in
the absence of additional facts found by a jury or admitted by
the defendant.
         To ascertain the intent of the legislature, we begin by
examining the text and context of the statutes and administrative
rules at issue.  As we discuss below, we conclude that neither
the wording nor the structure of the sentencing guidelines or the
related statutes support defendant's assertion that the
legislature intended the presumptive sentences in the sentencing
guidelines to constitute the statutory maximum sentences for the
offenses to which they apply.  Not only do the sentencing
guidelines themselves authorize trial judges to impose sentences
that depart from those presumptive sentences, but, in addition,
the text of the related statutes demonstrates that the
legislature did not intend to supplant the preexisting maximum
indeterminate sentence lengths for felonies set out in ORS
161.605 when it enacted the guidelines.
         We first consider the statute that provides that the
sentencing guidelines "shall control the sentences" for all
crimes committed after their effective date and that those
sentences are "presumptive."  ORS 137.669.  That statute
explicitly exempts durational departure sentences from that
directive:
"* * * Except as provided in ORS * * * 137.671, the
incarcerative guidelines and any other guidelines so
designated by the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission shall
be mandatory and constitute presumptive sentences."
(Emphasis added.)  ORS 137.671(1) grants a court the authority to 
"impose a sentence outside the presumptive sentence or
sentence range made presumptive under ORS 137.669 for a
specific offense if it finds there are substantial and
compelling reasons justifying a deviation from the
presumptive sentence."  
         The provision that excepts departure sentences from the
presumptive sentences in the sentencing guidelines' grid is
contained in the same statute on which defendant relies to assert
that "presumptive" and "mandatory" are the functional equivalent
of "maximum."  Because a durational departure sentence can exceed
the presumptive sentence for an offense, defendant's contention
that the legislature intended the presumptive sentence to be the
maximum sentence is untenable.
         Moreover, the sentencing guidelines themselves provide
for departure from the presumptive sentence.  For example, the
administrative rule that states the purposes and principles of
the sentencing guidelines expressly reserves judicial discretion
to deviate from presumptive punishments:
"Sentencing guidelines are intended to forward the
objectives described in section (1) [to punish each
offender appropriately and to insure the security of
the people in person and property within the limits of
correctional resources] by defining presumptive
punishments for felony convictions, subject to judicial
discretion to deviate for substantial and compelling
reasons; and presumptive punishments for post-prison or
probation supervision violations, again subject to
deviation."
OAR 213-002-0001(2) (emphasis added).  Similarly, the
administrative rule that requires judges to impose the
presumptive sentence also grants them leeway to depart from it:
"* * * [T]he sentencing judge shall impose the presumptive
sentence provided by the guidelines unless the judge finds
substantial and compelling reasons to impose a departure."  OAR
213-008-0001. 
         Defendant's proposed interpretation would require us to
conclude that the legislature structured a sentencing scheme that
established the presumptive sentences as "maximums," above which
a judge may not sentence a defendant unless based on facts found
by a jury or admitted by the defendant, and yet also authorized
judges to depart from those presumptive "maximums" and even
provided factors on which to base such departures.  See OAR 213-008-0002 (nonexclusive list of mitigating and aggravating
departure factors).  We do not agree with defendant's premise. 
Had the legislature intended the presumptive sentences under the
sentencing guidelines to be the maximum sentences, it would not
have set out in such precise detail the many ways in which a
judge may impose sentences that are greater (or less) than those
presumptive sentences.  The clear implication from the statutory
sentencing scheme is that a departure sentence that is less than
the statutory maximum penalty set out in ORS 161.605 for the
particular class of felony involved does not exceed the
"prescribed statutory maximum sentence," as that term is used in
Apprendi, because the statutory maximum penalty itself exists
outside of the presumptive sentence framework and, indeed,
outside the sentencing guidelines themselves.
         Defendant also is mistaken in his assertion that the
presumptive sentences established under the guidelines for a
particular offense are the "maximums" because those sentences are
"mandatory."  ORS 137.669 specifies that only the sentencing
guidelines, not the presumptive sentences themselves, are
mandatory:  "Except as provided in ORS 137.637 and 137.671, the
incarcerative guidelines * * * shall be mandatory and constitute
presumptive sentences."  (Emphasis added.)  That the
incarcerative guidelines "shall be mandatory" has a meaning
independent of the adjoining concept that those guidelines also
"constitute presumptive sentences."  By making the sentencing
guidelines "mandatory," we understand the legislature to have
intended ORS 137.669 to require judges to use the guidelines in
calculating what sentence to impose.  However, two clear
exceptions to the imposition of the presumptive sentence are
listed in the statute.  First, under ORS 137.637, if a statutory
determinate sentence is longer than that authorized by the
guidelines, then the statutory determinate sentence must be
imposed. (12)  Second, as discussed previously, ORS 137.671
authorizes a court to impose a departure sentence if it finds
that substantial and compelling reasons justify a deviation from
the presumptive sentence.  The "presumptive sentences" in the
sentencing guidelines therefore are not "mandatory" when
substantial and compelling reasons justify deviation from the
presumptive sentence or when a determinate sentence of greater
duration than that of the presumptive sentence is authorized or
required by statute.  
         The legislature has established different classes of
felonies and different sentencing maximums as penalties for those
crimes.  See ORS 161.605.  The sentencing guidelines serve to
control the sentencing judge's discretion, and they do so in
concert with the limits of the maximum indeterminate sentences in
ORS 161.605.  As defendant himself described, those indeterminate
lengths for prison terms operate as the absolute outer boundaries
for sentences imposed pursuant to the guidelines, and they
therefore constitute the "prescribed statutory maximum sentences"
for purposes of Apprendi.
         The explicit incorporation of the ORS 161.605
indeterminate sentences throughout the sentencing guidelines and
related statutes further indicates that the legislature
considered those sentences to be the statutory maximums, even
after it had adopted the guidelines.  For example, as noted
earlier, OAR 213-008-0003(2) provides, in part: 
"* * * In no case may the [durational departure]
sentence exceed the statutory maximum indeterminate
sentence described in ORS 161.605."
Similarly, OAR 213-005-0002(4) provides that post-prison
supervision and incarceration time may not exceed "the statutory
maximum indeterminate sentence for the crime of conviction * * *
described in ORS 161.605," and directs sentencing judges to
reduce post-prison supervision as necessary to "conform the total
sentence length to the statutory maximum."  The latter reference
is particularly noteworthy, because, there, the legislature did
not identify the statutory maximum set out by ORS 161.605 as the
indeterminate maximum; rather, the legislature referred to it
simply as "the statutory maximum."  Such phrasing strongly
suggests that the legislature established only one maximum -- the
indeterminate sentence limit for felonies set by ORS 161.605 --
and that that was not superseded by the presumptive sentences in
the sentencing guidelines. (13)
         Even if we agreed with defendant that the prescribed
statutory maximum must be located within the sentencing
guidelines themselves for crimes committed after November 1,
1989, we still would find his sentence to be constitutionally
acceptable, because it accords with the durational departure
restrictions that the guidelines set.  As discussed above, OAR
213-008-0003(2) limits durational departures to not more than
double the maximum presumptive prison term. (14)  Defendant's
36-month prison sentence was double the maximum 18-month
presumptive prison term for his felony conviction and therefore
falls within the boundaries that the sentencing guidelines
set. (15)
         Thus, we agree with the state and with the Court of
Appeals that, under the sentencing guidelines, a convicted felon
faces the possibility of a sentence not merely within the
presumptive sentence range set out in the grid block applicable
to that offense, but within the range established by the
permissible upward and downward departures from the presumptive
sentence, up to and including the maximum term for that class of
felony as established in ORS 161.605.  That is true whether the
defendant's conviction is based on a jury verdict or a guilty
plea.  We hold that ORS 161.605 establishes the maximum penalty
authorized by the legislature and that defendant's sentence did
not exceed that prescribed statutory maximum.  His sentence,
therefore, is constitutional under Apprendi.  
         Defendant also argues that his sentence is
unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona.  In his view, Ring holds
that, if an offender's crime of conviction carries a maximum
sentence that may be imposed only if certain additional findings
are made, then, under Apprendi, a court may use those findings as
grounds to impose that maximum sentence only if a jury made those
findings of fact beyond a reasonable doubt, the offender admitted
them in pleading to the indictment, or the findings were based on
the fact of a prior conviction.
         We reject defendant's contention that Ring renders
defendant's sentence unconstitutional.  Ring was a death penalty
case in which the state's capital sentencing scheme required a
judge to make certain findings of fact in a special evidentiary
hearing in order for a defendant to be eligible for a death
sentence.  The maximum penalty that could be authorized by a
jury's guilty verdict, therefore, was life imprisonment.  536 US
at 597.  The Supreme Court held that such a scheme violated the
Sixth Amendment in light of the reasoning in Apprendi.  The Court
held that "Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as
'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,'"
i.e., capital murder, and therefore that the Sixth Amendment
required such factors to be found by a jury.  Id. at 609 (quoting
Apprendi, 530 US at 494, n 19).  In Apprendi, the Court similarly
had noted that the judge's finding of fact in that case exposed
the defendant, who had pled guilty to a second-degree offense, to
a penalty range commensurate to that imposed for first-degree
offenses.  Apprendi, 530 US at 491.  In contrast, defendant here
pled guilty to a Class C felony and, as our foregoing discussion
explains, received a sentence below the statutorily authorized
maximum punishment -- found in ORS 161.605 -- for an offense of
that class. 
         Moreover, the same day that Ring was decided, the Court
also decided Harris, discussed above, in which a majority of the
Court indicated that the role of judicial discretion and
factfinding in sentencing may continue to be exercised in a
meaningful way, provided that that exercise does not lead to the
imposition of a sentence outside of the statutory limits in an
individual case.  Harris, 536 US at 558 (plurality opinion); id.
at 569 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).  Although we perceive some degree of analytical
tension between Apprendi, Ring, and Harris, we conclude that our
holding here is not inconsistent with any of them.
         In addition to claiming that his sentence contravened
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, defendant contends that his
indictment violated those same provisions because it did not
allege specifically a fact upon which the legislature has
conditioned an increase in the prescribed statutory maximum
sentence.  Defendant asserts that, under Apprendi and Ring, the
substantial and compelling grounds that provide the basis for a
judge to impose a departure sentence are actually elements of an
enhanced crime rather than sentencing factors and therefore must
be alleged in the indictment and proved by the state beyond a
reasonable doubt unless defendant waives or admits to them. 
According to defendant, because the indictment in his case failed
to allege that his crime was racially motivated, and that fact,
found by the judge, provided the substantial and compelling
reason on which the judge imposed a departure sentence,
defendant's indictment was constitutionally defective.  Because,
as discussed above, we have held that defendant's sentence was
not enhanced above the statutory maximum sentence, defendant
cannot maintain that the judicially found fact of racial
motivation is one that increased the maximum statutory penalty to
which he was subject.  We therefore reject defendant's argument
that his indictment was constitutionally defective. 
         As defendant acknowledges in his brief, this court
rejected his argument previously in State v. Terry, 333 Or 163,
188-89, 37 P3d 157 (2001).  The defendant in that case was
sentenced to death after the jury found that he "deliberately"
had caused the death of the victim.  The defendant contended
that, because the jury had to find the element of
"deliberateness" to make him eligible for the death penalty,
Apprendi required that that element be alleged in the indictment. 
Id. at 184-85.  This court held that, because the statutory
scheme for the crime of aggravated murder made the prescribed
maximum statutory penalty a sentence of death, such a sentence
was not a penalty enhancement under Apprendi and, therefore, the
state was not required to allege deliberateness in the
indictment.  Id. at 188-89. 
         In State v. Oatney, 335 Or 276, 66 P3d 475 (2003), this
court revisited the holding in Terry after the Supreme Court's
decision in Ring v. Arizona (16) and concluded that "Ring does
not require revision of this court's analysis of Apprendi that is
set out in State v. Terry."  335 Or at 297 (holding that
"deliberateness" was not element of capital aggravated murder
that had to be charged in indictment).  Although defendant
insists that the holding in Terry must be reconsidered in light
of Ring, he articulates no reason why the analysis in Oatney was
incomplete.
         Although juries made the determination that exposed the
defendants in Terry and Oatney to the increased penalty, (17)
whereas defendant here was sentenced based on his guilty plea and
the findings of the court, those cases nevertheless provide
guidance here.  The "enhanced penalty" in Terry and Oatney was
the death penalty.  This court held that, because the indictments
charged the defendants in those cases with aggravated murder, and
the possible penalties for aggravated murder were life in prison
with the possibility of parole, life in prison without the
possibility of parole, and the death penalty, the prescribed
"maximum statutory penalty" was death.  Thus, neither case was
inconsistent with Apprendi.  See Terry, 333 Or at 188-89; Oatney,
335 Or at 296-97.  As explained below, the same analysis applies
to defendant's arguments that his indictment was constitutionally
defective.
         Defendant was indicted for and pleaded guilty to a
Class C felony, assault in the third degree.  That guilty plea
exposed defendant to the possibility that he would receive any
sentence up to the statutory maximum that ORS 161.605 sets. 
Defendant's sentence fits squarely within that limitation:  The
36-month term of incarceration that he received was less than the
five-year statutory maximum sentence that ORS 161.605 prescribes
for a Class C felony. (18)  Thus, even though the trial court's
finding that defendant's crime was racially motivated justified a
departure from the presumptive sentence to which defendant was
subject, that finding did not increase the sentence beyond the
maximum penalty that the legislature authorized.  For that
reason, like the statutory aggravating factor of "deliberateness"
in the aggravated murder cases of Terry and Oatney, defendant's
racial animus in committing the assault did not have to be
alleged in the indictment, because that fact did not lead to an
increase in the prescribed statutory maximum punishment.  
CONCLUSION 
         For the reasons set out above, we hold that ORS 161.605
establishes the prescribed statutory maximum sentence for
defendant's crime.  Because defendant's sentence did not exceed
that maximum, neither that sentence nor his indictment deprived
him of any of his rights under the federal constitution. (19)
         The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. In the Court of Appeals, defendant also challenged the
departure sentence on evidentiary grounds.  The Court of Appeals
held that sufficient evidence in the record supported the trial
court's factual finding that defendant's offense was motivated in
part by the victim's race.  State v. Dilts, 179 Or App 238, 242,
39 P3d 276 (2002).  Defendant did not raise that issue in his
petition for review, and we do not address it. 
2. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury * * * and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation * * *."  The Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides, in part:  "[N]or shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."  The Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US 145, 88 S Ct 1444, 20 L
Ed 2d 491 (1968).
3. The Oregon Criminal Justice Council later was renamed
the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission.  Or Laws 1995, ch 420, §
1.
4. The state also sought an upward durational departure
based on defendant's use of the toilet brush as a weapon. 
However, because defense counsel objected and the sentencing
judge apparently did not take the weapon into account in imposing
an upward departure sentence on defendant, we do not consider
that issue on review.
5. The sentence of 36 months' post-prison supervision
contravened OAR 213-005-0002, which prohibits the imposition of
prison and post-prison supervision terms that together total more
than the statutory maximum indeterminate sentence described in
ORS 161.605, which here was five years or 60 months.  Defendant's
combined prison and post-prison supervision sentence was 72
months.  However, defendant conceded in the Court of Appeals that
he did not preserve that issue, and he does not challenge his
sentence on that ground in this court. 
6. The Court of Appeals declined to address defendant's
state statutory and constitutional arguments because it found
that he had referred to the statutes and constitutional
provisions only "in passing" and had "failed to develop his
arguments based on those provisions."  179 Or App at 243, n 1. 
We likewise elect not to address defendant's state arguments
because he fails to develop them with sufficient particularity
before this court.
7. Defendant also asserts without elaboration that his sentence
violated his rights under the Due Process Clause to be tried only
for the crime charged and to have adequate notice of the severity
of the penalty to be imposed, as well as his rights under the Due
Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment to be sentenced fairly in
a nonarbitrary and noncapricious manner.  However, defendant does
not develop those constitutional claims, and we therefore decline
to address them.  See State v. McNeely, 330 Or 457, 468, 8 P3d
212, cert den, 531 US 1055 (2000) (declining to address
constitutional claims asserted but not developed).
8. In its opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals
summarized Jones as follows: 
"[I]n Jones, the Court considered whether the federal
carjacking statute, 18 USC § 2119, 'defined three
distinct offenses or a single crime with a choice of
three maximum penalties, two of them dependent on
sentencing factors exempt from the requirements of
charge and jury verdict.'  The Court noted that the
second and third paragraphs of the statute not only
provided for 'steeply higher' penalties, but that the
imposition of those penalties depended on 'further
facts (injury, death) that seem[ed] quite as important
as the elements in the principle paragraph (e.g., force
and violence, intimidation).'  The Court concluded
that, in order to avoid constitutional concerns under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
jury trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, the
'better reading' of the statute was that it established
three distinct offenses, the elements of each of which
must be charged by indictment and proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt."
Dilts, 179 Or App at 249, n 8 (internal citations omitted).  The
Court in Jones noted that, "under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that
increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt."  526 US at 243, n 6.  The Apprendi Court held that "[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in this case
involving a state statute."  530 US at 476.
9. In Harris, the Court reaffirmed its earlier decision in
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 US 79, 91 L Ed 2d 67, 106 S Ct 2411
(1986) (sustaining statute that increased minimum penalty for
crime, though not beyond statutory maximum, when sentencing judge
found, by preponderance of evidence that defendant there had
possessed firearm), in light of Apprendi.
10. Justice Breyer, who did not join the quoted portion of
the plurality opinion in Harris, but who concurred in the
judgment, stated that a sentencing judge could exercise an even
broader range of discretion when considering sentencing factors
than did the plurality:  "[T]he Sixth Amendment permits judges to
apply sentencing factors -- whether those factors lead to a
sentence beyond the statutory maximum (as in Apprendi) or the
application of a mandatory minimum (as here)."  Harris, 536 US at
569 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). 
11. Of the state appellate courts that have considered
departure sentences under sentencing guidelines similar to those
that Oregon employs, at least two have interpreted Apprendi as we
do today and have upheld those departure sentences as
constitutional.  See State v. Gore, 143 Wn2d 288, 21 P2d 262
(Wash 2001); State v. Blakely, 111 Wn App 851, 47 P3d 149 (Wash
App 2002) (following holding in State v. Gore), rev denied, 148
Wn2d 1010, 62 P3d 889 (Wash 2003), cert granted, 124 S Ct 429,
157 L Ed 2d 309 (Oct 20, 2003); Ashby v. State, 2002 WL 977444
(Minn App 2002); Jackson v. State, 2002 WL 31835460 (Minn App
2002), rev denied (Nov 18, 2003) (on post-conviction review). 
One state appellate court has diverged from that approach and
concluded that the imposition of any departure sentence based on
a fact not found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury is
inconsistent with Apprendi.  State v. Gould, 271 Kan 394, 23 P3d
801 (Kan 2001).
12. ORS 137.637 provides:
    "When a determinate sentence of imprisonment is required or
authorized by statute, the sentence imposed shall be the
determinate sentence or the sentence as provided by the rules of
the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, whichever is longer."
13. We also think it significant that the legislature used
the term "maximum" to describe only the sentence lengths in ORS
161.605 and not those in ORS 137.669 (making guidelines mandatory
and guideline sentences presumptive).  As noted above, ORS
161.605 provides that the "maximum" term of imprisonment for a
Class C felony -- such as third-degree assault -- is five years. 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that five years'
imprisonment is the "prescribed statutory maximum" sentence for
the crime to which defendant pleaded guilty.  See State v. Adams,
315 Or 359, 365, 847 P2d 397 (1993) (court regarded as
significant fact that legislature used different wording in
related portion of sentencing guidelines statute); In the Matter
of Perlenfein and Perlenfein, 316 Or 16, 22-23, 848 P2d 604
(1993) (when legislature or agency uses particular term in one
provision of statute or regulation, but omits that term in
parallel and related provision, court infers that legislature did
not intend term to apply in provision from which it is omitted).
14. OAR 213-008-0003(2) provides, in part:
    "A durational departure from a presumptive prison term shall
not total more than double the maximum duration of the
presumptive prison term. * * *"
15. In some instances, the sentence limits in ORS 161.605
will not affect a departure sentence imposed on a defendant
because, as in this case, twice the maximum prescribed sentence
for the defendant's offense will be less than the maximum
statutory indeterminate sentence set out in ORS 161.605 for that
class of felony.  See OAR 213-008-0003(2) (limiting durational
departure sentences to no more than double maximum duration of
presumptive prison term and not to exceed statutory maximum
indeterminate sentence in ORS 161.605).  However, the maximum
statutory indeterminate sentence is the sentence when the maximum
possible departure sentence is greater than the maximum
indeterminate sentence for the offense of conviction.  For
example, the crime of sexual abuse in the second degree, ORS
163.425, is a Class C felony; therefore, under ORS 161.605(3),
the maximum statutory sentence that a court can impose on a
defendant convicted of that offense is five years or 60 months. 
However, under the sentencing guidelines, the criminal history of
a defendant convicted of second-degree sexual abuse could warrant
a presumptive sentence of between 31 and 36 months.  A trial
court seeking to impose the maximum departure sentence on such a
defendant would be unable to impose twice the presumptive
sentence -- between 62 and 72 months -- because that sentence
would exceed the 60-month limit on Class C felonies in ORS
161.605(3).
16. In Ring, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment requires that the aggravating factors necessary for the
imposition of the death penalty must be found by a jury because
they operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a
greater offense.
17. The juries in Terry and Oatney, by finding the
defendants guilty of aggravated murder in the guilt phase of
their capital trials, made the defendants eligible for the death
penalty.  ORS 163.105(1)(a); ORS 163.150(1)(a).
18. Moreover, as previously discussed, defendant's sentence
was also within the sentencing guidelines' internal check on
durational departures, limiting departure sentences to no more
than double the presumptive sentence for the crime of conviction. 
His 36-month sentence was exactly double the 18-month presumptive
sentence for the grid block in which his crime seriousness and
criminal history placed him.
19. We express no opinion as to what result we would reach
in a challenge to a sentence that exceeds the sentencing
guidelines maximum for durational departures but is within the
prescribed statutory maximum sentence set by ORS 161.605.  We
note only that such a sentence would not present an Apprendi
problem, because it would be within the authorized sentencing
range, and that would present a different issue from the one
before us here.