Title: Michael A. Luciani v. Angelina Montemurro-Luciani

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  93-2899 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
In re the marriage of: 
 
Michael A. Luciani, 
 
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Angelina Montemurro-Luciani, 
 
 
Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 MAR 7, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part and reversed in part. 
 
 
 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of a published decision 
of the court of appeals which affirmed in part and reversed in 
part the judgment of divorce granted in the circuit court for 
Kenosha County, Bruce E. Schroeder, Judge.  See Luciani v. 
Montemurro-Luciani, 191 Wis. 2d 67, 528 N.W.2d 477 (Ct. App. 
1995).  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
maintenance provision requiring the respondent-appellant Dr. 
Angelina Montemurro-Luciani (Dr. Montemurro) to pay the appellant-
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
2 
respondent Michael A. Luciani (Luciani) $1,000 per month for 36 
months.  It reversed the income tax exemption provision as well as 
the circuit court's child support award based on the statutory 
percentage guideline standards requiring Luciani to pay 24% of his 
income to Dr. Montemurro for support for the parties' two minor 
children.  Id. at 72-73.   
 
The issue we consider on review is whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it did not deviate from 
the percentage guideline standards, where the payee earns a 
substantially greater income than the payer.  We hold that in the 
case of a high-income payee, the percentage standards set by 
administrative regulation
1 presumptively apply, absent a payer's 
showing of unfairness by the greater weight of the credible 
evidence.  We conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
applying the percentage standards, and therefore reverse that part 
of the decision of the court of appeals addressing the issue of 
child support.  We affirm the court of appeals' decision regarding 
the award of maintenance as well as the tax exemption provision. 
 
The couple, Luciani and Dr. Montemurro, were married in 1986, 
each at age 32.  Dr. Montemurro was in the second year of her 
medical residency program when the parties were married.  In 1988, 
upon the completion of this program, Dr. Montemurro established 
her own private medical practice in Kenosha.   Luciani was 
                     
     
1  See Wis. Admin. Code § HSS 80.03 (June 1993). 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
3 
employed as a lab technician at Modine Manufacturing Company in 
Racine throughout the course of the marriage.  The income tax 
returns for 1987 reported near equal earnings of $22,000 for both 
parties.  However, as Dr. Montemurro's medical practice began to 
expand, so too did the disparity between the parties' respective 
incomes: 
 
 
 
 
  Luciani  
  Dr. Montemurro 
 
1987  
     $ 22,000  
  $  22,000 
 
1988  
 
  26,571  
     14,273 
 
1989  
 
  25,789  
     69,060 
 
1990  
 
  31,342  
     121,809 
 
1991  
 
  29,393  
     131,915 
 
1992  
 
  33,177  
     132,857
2 
 
The divorce action was filed on June 6, 1991.  The marriage 
had produced two children, ages four and three at the time of the 
trial, who reside with Dr. Montemurro.  The circuit court approved 
the parties' stipulation to joint legal custody and primary 
physical placement with Dr. Montemurro.  The children's physical 
placement with Luciani is approximately 117 overnights per year, 
consisting of 32% of the overnight placement, and an additional 49 
nonovernight days per year.  Dr. Montemurro has the children for 
the remaining 68% of the  overnight placement. 
                     
     
2  As noted by the court of appeals, the figures provided 
above are understated in some years in comparison to the gross 
income reported on the parties' W-2 forms.  Both Luciani and Dr. 
Montemurro took advantage of available contributions to a 
retirement plan as well as a tax deferred stock plan.  Luciani, 
191 Wis. 2d at 72 n.1. 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
4 
 
In January 1993, a trial was held in this matter involving a 
number of issues including property division, debt allocation, 
attorney's fees, beneficiary designations, and placement of the 
children during certain holiday periods.  We are primarily 
concerned on this review with the nature of the dispute regarding 
the proper amount of child support Dr. Montemurro is entitled to 
receive as the high-income payee with custody of the children a 
majority of the time. 
 
Dr. Montemurro argued that the circuit court was required, in 
accordance with Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1j) (1993-94),
3 to determine 
the proper amount of child support payments according to the 
percentage standards established by the Department of Health and 
Social Services (DHSS).  See Wis. Admin. Code § HSS 80.03(1)(b) 
(June 1993).
4  Additionally, she urged the circuit court to 
calculate Luciani's support obligations pursuant to the shared-
                     
     
3  Section 767.25(1j) provides: 
 
 
Except as provided in sub. (1m), the court shall 
determine child support payments by using the percentage 
standard established by the department of health and 
social services under s. 46.25(9). 
     
4  Section HSS 80.03(1)(b) provides: 
 
 
Determining 
child 
support 
using 
the 
percentage 
standard . . . . The percentage of the payer's base or 
adjusted base that constitutes the child support 
obligation shall be:   
 
 
 
 . . .  
 
 
 
(b)  25% for 2 children; 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
5 
time payer provision of the child support percentage standard 
under Wis. Admin. Code §§ HSS 80.02(23) and 80.04(2) (June 1993). 
 In accord with this method, Dr. Montemurro requested an annual 
support amount of $8,133.84, or approximately 24% of Luciani's 
gross income.
5   
 
Luciani argued that the circuit court should not apply the 
percentage standards in this case.  Asserting that the court 
should consider the substantial physical placement of the children 
with him pursuant to the parties' stipulation and the significant 
disparity between the parties' incomes, Luciani maintains that the 
court should have deviated from the presumptive application of the 
percentage standards, as allowed under Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1m) 
(1993-94).
6  In determining whether to deviate from the standards, 
the statute sets out 16 factors for the court to consider when 
addressing this question.  See § 767.25(1m)(a)-(i) (1993-94).  If 
                     
     
5  Application of the straight percentage standards would 
require Luciani to pay 25% of his gross income towards child 
support.  However, because Luciani has the children for 32% of the 
overnight placement, the court is required to reduce this figure 
in accord with the "shared-time" formula provided in § HSS Table 
80.04(2)(b) (i.e., 93.34%).  Luciani's proper support obligation 
is therefore 24% of his gross income. 
     
6  Section 767.25(1m) provides: 
 
 
Upon request by a party, the court may modify the amount 
of child support payments determined under sub. (1j) if, 
after considering the following factors, the court finds 
by the greater weight of the credible evidence that use 
of the percentage standard is unfair to the child or to 
any of the parties: 
 
 
 
. . . . 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
6 
the court finds that application of the percentage standards would 
be unfair, Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1n) (1993-94)
7 requires the court 
to state in writing or on the record the alternative support 
amount, as well as the basis for the modification.  Luciani 
claimed that applying the percentage standards in this case would 
be fundamentally unfair, as Dr. Montemurro's income greatly 
exceeded his own.  Luciani proposed that the court obligate each 
party to provide necessary support while the children were 
physically placed with each respective parent. 
 
Following the trial, a judgment of divorce was granted on 
September 22, 1993.  In the initial decision issued by the circuit 
court, Luciani's child support obligation was established by 
straight application of the percentage standards, although it did 
not specify a precise dollar amount.  The particular subsection of 
the circuit court's decision regarding child support is provided 
in full: 
While there is certainly a huge disparity in the incomes of 
these two parties, there is nothing in the evidence 
which would warrant a finding that unfairness will 
result to Dr. Montemurro, Mr. Luciani or the children by 
                     
     
7  Section 767.25(1n) provides: 
 
 
If the court finds under sub. (1m) that use of the 
percentage standard is unfair to the child or the 
requesting party, the court shall state in writing or on 
the record the amount of support that would be required 
by using the percentage standard, the amount by which 
the court's order deviates from that amount, its reasons 
for finding that use of the percentage standard is 
unfair to the child or the party, its reasons for the 
amount of the modification and the basis for the 
modification. 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
7 
application 
of 
the 
legally-prescribed 
formula 
for 
computing the child support obligation.  Indeed, I feel 
that deviation would have a strong potential for damage 
to the relationship of the parties: of Dr. Montemurro 
feeling 
that 
Mr. 
Luciani's 
parental 
rights 
are 
diminished because she is carrying the whole financial 
load; of the children feeling that their father is less 
important than their mother or disinterested in them or 
unwilling to sacrifice for them; of Mr. Luciani feeling 
that he is not carrying his fair share.  All of these 
can be avoided with Mr. Luciani paying support in accord 
with the formula, and it is therefore adopted as the 
Court's order.  
 
In response to concerns expressed by the parties in letter 
briefs following the decision, the circuit court thereafter issued 
a 
supplemental 
decision 
clarifying 
that 
Luciani's 
support 
obligation was in fact intended to be based on the shared-time 
provisions of the Administrative Code, thereby reducing his 
support to 24% of gross income based on the percentage of 
overnight placement attributed to him.  In addition, the court 
confirmed its initial decision that there was no evidence or 
testimony presented that would warrant a finding that employment 
of the percentage guideline standards would be unfair to the 
children or either party.  The court rejected Luciani's request to 
deviate based upon a claim of unfairness.   
 
In support of its original decision to adhere to the 
percentage standards, the circuit court examined several of the 
statutorily identified factors which would permit deviation if 
demonstrated by the greater weight of the credible evidence.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1m)(a)-(i) (1993-94).  The court articulated 
its analysis of such factors by noting that there was no evidence 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
8 
presented that the children's welfare would suffer, that either 
party lacked financial resources sufficient to make the prescribed 
support contributions, or that Luciani would be unable to support 
himself at the same level he enjoyed during the marriage after 
payment of the child support.  Moreover, the court stated that it 
had considered the cost of daycare, the substantial period of 
physical placement with Luciani and Dr. Montemurro's far greater 
earning capacity.  Declining to deviate from the percentage 
standards, the court further stated: 
It is important to note that while it may appear to some that 
it is "unfair" for Mr. Luciani to be required to pay 
such a large percentage of his income when his ex-wife 
is earning a much higher income, that this is no more 
"unfair" than it is for someone who earns the same 
salary as Mr. Luciani and who also lives apart from two 
children to pay far more than Mr. Luciani because his 
ex-wife earns far less than Dr. Montemurro. 
In affirming this decision, the circuit court also reiterated the 
non-economic considerations encompassed in the initial decision 
relating to the potential damage to the parties' relationship and 
the negative perception of Luciani that may have been harbored by 
the children if the court were to deviate from application of the 
percentage standards.  Along with the order for child support, the 
circuit court ordered Dr. Montemurro to pay Luciani $1,000 per 
month in maintenance for 36 months. 
 
Luciani appealed the circuit court's order.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the issue of maintenance but reversed the child 
support portion of the decision.  The court of appeals criticized 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
9 
the initial decision, expressing dissatisfaction with the circuit 
court's principal reliance on the non-statutory, non-economic 
concerns rather than an in-depth economic analysis of the raw 
financial data available in the record.  Luciani, 191 Wis. 2d at 
76.   
 
The court of appeals expressed similar concern with the 
supplemental decision as well.  The court concluded that it was 
couched in non-statutory conclusionary language that lacked the 
appropriate examination of the disparate incomes and the financial 
effects of substantial physical placement with Luciani.  Id. at 
76.  Furthermore, the court expressed a troubling concern with its 
reading of the circuit court's decision as stating that the 
disparity between the parties' incomes has no bearing on the 
question of adherence to the percentage standards.  Id. at 76-77. 
 The court voiced its disagreement with such a proposition, noting 
that Hubert v. Hubert, 159 Wis. 2d 803, 465 N.W.2d 252 (Ct. App. 
1990) had specifically cautioned against the robotistic use of the 
percentage standards, especially in high-income cases.
8  Id. at 
814.   
 
The appellate court's decision concluded that the circuit  
                     
     
8  The court of appeals recognized that this particular case 
was the converse of the Hubert decision, as here the payee (Dr. 
Montemurro), not the payer (Luciani), was the high-income earner. 
 Nevertheless, the court stated that consideration of "the earning 
capacity of each parent" was an express factor under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.25(1m)(hs) (1993-94) to be considered upon a request to 
deviate from the percentage standards, and disagreed with its 
reading of the circuit court treatment of the issue as irrelevant. 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
10 
court "erred in the exercise of its discretion by treating the 
parties' disparate incomes as an irrelevant factor and by failing 
to analyze the economic consequences of the support order in light 
of the parties' budgets, incomes and nearly equal child placement
9 
provisions."
10  Id. at 77-78.   
                     
     
9  The court of appeals' representation of the child 
placement as `nearly equal' is unsupported by the record. Under 
the shared- time payer formula, the determinative criteria 
utilized to calculate a child support obligation is overnight 
care. In this case, Luciani has the children for a total of 117 
overnights and 49 nonovernight days per year. See discussion, at 
p. 3. The record illustrates that during the 49 nonovernight days, 
Luciani has the children for only one-sixth of the day (4 hours), 
while Dr. Montemurro is responsible for the remaining five-sixths 
(20 hours).  The court of appeals has mistakenly considered the 
117 
and 
49 
figures 
collectively 
((117+49)/365)= 
45%) 
to 
characterize Luciani's placement obligation as `nearly equal.' In 
fact, the children's total overnight placement with their father 
is less than one-third. Even if one were to consider the 
supplementary hours generated as a result of the additional 49 
nonovernight days per year (196 hours), the total physical 
placement with the father would equal only 34%, a figure which 
cannot fairly be characterized as `nearly equal' by the court of 
appeals nor the dissent. 
 
 
Furthermore, if Luciani had been concerned about the proper 
calculation of the additional 49 nonovernight days in which he had 
the children for four hours, he could have sought relief under 
Wis. Admin. Code § HSS 80.02(25) (June 1993) which recognizes that 
physical placement arrangements exist where additional costs are 
incurred, but no overnight care is provided.  The note to this 
subsection therefore provides: "[u]pon request of one of the 
parties the court may determine that the physical placement 
arrangement other than overnight care is the equivalent of 
overnight care." No such request was made in the present case.  
     
10  The court of appeals did note, however, that it was not 
concluding that the shared-time provisions of the percentage 
standards were not applicable in this case, rather, because the 
circuit court did not adequately analyze the financial data, it 
failed to provide substantial reasons for adherence to the 
guidelines.  Luciani, 191 Wis. 2d at 78. 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
11 
 
The determination of appropriate child support is committed 
to the sound discretion of the circuit court.  Weidner v. W.G.N., 
131 Wis. 2d 301, 315, 388 N.W.2d 615 (1986); Prosser v. Cook, 185 
Wis. 2d 745, 751, 519 Wis. 2d 649 (Ct. App. 1994).  Whether the 
trial court properly exercised its discretion is a question of 
law.  Seep v. Personnel Comm'n, 140 Wis. 2d 32, 38, 409 N.W.2d 142 
(Ct. App. 1987).  "An appellate court will sustain a discretionary 
act if it finds that the trial court (1) examined the relevant 
facts, (2) applied a proper standard of law, and (3) using a 
demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach."  State v. Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 
2d 432, 440, 529 N.W.2d 225 (1995); see also Loy v. Bunderson, 107 
Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982); Stephen L.N. v. Kara 
L.H., 178 Wis. 2d 466, 477, 504 N.W.2d 422 (Ct. App. 1993).   
 
The circuit court is required to determine the appropriate 
award of child support by application of the percentage standards 
mandated under Wis. Stat. § 46.25(9) (1993-94) as established in § 
HSS 80.04(2).  See Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1j) (1993-94).  In Weidner, 
this court referred to the Department of Health and Social 
Services Memorandum to Members of the Wisconsin Judiciary in 
interpreting 
the 
proper 
application 
of 
the 
child 
support 
percentage standards: 
According to the Department, these percentage standards are 
an evidentiary shortcut for establishing the need of the 
child for support.  The standards, establish ` . . .   
the cost of maintaining a child as an equivalent to that 
percentage of the family income and disposable assets 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
12 
that a parent shares with children in his or her 
custody.' 
 
Weidner, 131 Wis. 2d at 318 (citing DHSS Memorandum to Members of 
the Wisconsin Judiciary, December 20, 1983, Attachment I at 3).  
This court's recent decision in Grohmann v. Grohmann, 189 Wis. 2d 
532, 525 N.W.2d 261 (1995) clarified the presumptive nature of the 
percentage standards where we stated: "[a]bsent a showing of 
unfairness, courts must determine a parent's child support 
obligation by using the percentage standard established by the 
Department of Health and Social Services . . . ."  Id. at 536. 
 
The framework of the statute permits the court to modify the 
otherwise presumptive calculation if it is demonstrated by the 
greater weight of the credible evidence that application of the 
percentage standards would be unfair to the children or either of 
the parties, see Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1m) (1993-94).  When 
presented with a party's challenge to application of the 
percentage standards, circuit court judges in exercising their 
discretion, are to consider the statutory factors set forth by the 
legislature in Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1m), and articulate the basis 
for their decision to either remain within the guidelines or allow 
a modification.  The circuit court's articulation of its reasoning 
process is essential in reaching a reasonable determination and to 
aid this court in reviewing the discretionary decision.  See 
Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 215, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984).
11  
                     
     
11  The court of appeals' decision in Schnetzer v. Schnetzer, 
174 Wis. 2d 458, 497 N.W.2d 772 (Ct. App. 1993) attempted to 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
13 
The burden of proof before the court lies with the party 
requesting the modification under the percentage standards.   
 
Dr. Montemurro challenges the court of appeals' decision to 
reverse the child support award on two fronts.  First, she argues 
that Luciani failed to prove by the greater weight of the credible 
evidence that application of the percentage standards resulted in 
unfairness to him.  Secondly, she asserts that the court of 
appeals' decision has held that in high-income cases, the circuit 
court must make a threshold determination that the guidelines are 
to be utilized, rather than presumptively applying the percentage 
standards.  She asserts that this represents an improper, 
judicially-legislated shift in the prescribed methodology that the 
percentage standards presumptively apply unless a showing of 
unfairness has been established. 
(..continued) 
clarify the burden on the circuit courts when strictly applying 
the percentage standards. The Schnetzer case dealt with a post-
judgment child support modification action, in which Mr. Schnetzer 
contended that the circuit court had abused its discretion in 
applying the percentage standards. The appellate court held that 
the factors provided in Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1m) (1989-90) "need to 
be demonstrably considered only where the trial court deviates 
from the percentage standards." Id. at 463. Rather, where the 
court elects "not to deviate from the percentage standards, the 
court, in exercising its discretion, need only articulate its 
reason and base its decision on facts of record and the correct 
legal standard." Id.  We find that the above-quoted language 
improperly suggests that a circuit court, in considering a party's 
challenge to the presumptive application of the percentage 
standards, is not required to articulate its analysis of the 
statutory factors found in Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1m), except where 
it decides to deviate from the guidelines. This interpretation of 
the proper role of the circuit court is contrary to our holding in 
the present case, and we therefore overrule the language expressed 
in Schnetzer. 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
14 
 
Here, the circuit court exercised a rational mental process 
in examining the list of factors provided under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.25(1m) (1993-94) which produced a reasonable conclusion that 
application of the 24% child support obligation would not be 
unfair to Luciani.  The court's supplemental decision provides a 
discussion of the statutory factors at length, and makes a number 
of factual determinations which support its decision that the 
evidence in the record did not warrant a finding of unfairness.  
The circuit court's findings included the following: (1) the 
parties were not lacking financial resources sufficient to make 
the prescribed contributions for the welfare and support of the 
minor children; (2) Luciani had submitted no evidence to show that 
he will be unable to support himself at a level equal to that 
enjoyed during the marriage after payment of the child support 
obligation; (3) Luciani was under no obligation to support any 
other person; (4) financially, the children would not be reduced 
to a lower living standard than that enjoyed during the marriage; 
(5) the cost of daycare had been considered by the court; (6) the 
payment of health insurance premiums imposed no substantial burden 
on Luciani; (7) the period of physical placement with Luciani had 
been considered by the court, and (8) the far greater earning 
capacity of Dr. Montemurro had also been considered.   
 
In addition, the court reiterated the previously mentioned 
non-economic relationship concerns expressed in the initial 
decision of April 8, 1993.  The court found these facts pertinent 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
15 
to the mental and emotional development of the children, and 
considered them as other factors relevant to the determination of 
what was in their best interest.  See Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1m)(i). 
 The circuit court therefore balanced the welfare of the children 
against any perceived unfairness to Luciani in reaching a reasoned 
conclusion from the facts of the record. 
 
Dr. Montemurro argues that the circuit court made appropriate 
findings of the relevant child support factors to support the 
monetary award under Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1m), and that Luciani 
failed to demonstrate by the greater weight of the credible 
evidence that unfairness would result if the percentage standards 
were employed.  She distinguishes the court of appeals' reliance 
upon the language in Hubert by arguing that although this is a 
high-income case, the support award does not so far exceed the 
needs of the child so as to produce an absurd result.   
 
In Hubert, the ex-wife of a cardiac surgeon with an annual 
income of over $1,000,000 asked the circuit court to determine 
child support by straight application of the percentage standards. 
 The circuit court determined that such application would be 
unfair to the husband, and modified the award accordingly.
12  
Hubert, 159 Wis. 2d at 814.  The court of appeals reversed, 
holding that the circuit court had failed to consider several 
                     
     
12  The circuit court ordered Mr. Hubert to pay $4,000 per 
month in child support ($48,000 annually), which was substantially 
lower than the 25% figure ($250,000 annually) prescribed by the 
percentage standards. 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
16 
factors weighing against deviation, including the economic level 
the children would have enjoyed had the marriage continued.  Id.   
 
Relying on Parrett v. Parrett, 146 Wis. 2d 830, 841-42, 432 
N.W.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1988) for the proposition that courts may 
deviate from the percentage standards if an award will exceed the 
children's needs, the court of appeals noted that "[w]e agree that 
in cases where the parties have a substantial marital estate and 
income far beyond the average income of most people, the 
robotistic utilization of the percentage standards may give absurd 
results."  Hubert, 159 Wis. 2d at 814.  The language in Hubert 
that both Luciani and the court of appeals rely upon came from the 
court's  recognition that a case may exist where application of 
the percentage standards would result in a child support award far 
beyond the child's needs, thereby justifying deviation from the 
general rule of strict adherence.  The facts of the case at bar, 
however, in light of the lack of evidence presented by Luciani, do 
not produce the absurd result that is contemplated by the court in 
Hubert.  Luciani's challenge to the circuit court's order relates 
more to his contention that his former wife should bear the total 
burden of child support simply because of her substantially higher 
income.
13 
                     
     
13  We note that Luciani's position on appeal before this 
court is seemingly contrary to that exhibited at the circuit court 
level, in which he proposed that the court obligate each party to 
provide necessary support while the children were physically 
placed with each respective parent.  See supra, p.6. 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
17 
 
In this case, the circuit court's application of the 
percentage standards was by no means "robotistic," as suggested by 
the court of appeals, as it considered the relevant statutory 
factors in determining Luciani's support obligation. 
 
Luciani, however, maintains that the circuit court failed to 
consider the disparity of the parties' incomes, as well as the 
statutory 
factors, 
constituting 
an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion. 
 
The 
essence 
of 
Luciani's 
challenge 
is 
that 
application of the percentage standards in this case will produce 
an absurd result.  He suggests to this court that the record is 
"replete with evidence" which supports this claim, and therefore 
seeks a modification of the child support obligation as determined 
under Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1j).   
 
Reviewing the record in light of Luciani's claim, we examine 
the evidence presented to the circuit court to demonstrate that 
unfairness would result.  The burden of demonstrating that a 
modification of the child support award is warranted in a 
particular case rests with the requesting party, not the circuit 
court.
14  The evidence presented by Luciani to support his claim 
for unfairness rests primarily on the figures contained within the 
financial disclosure statement and his testimony at trial. 
                     
     
14  Contrary to Luciani's argument that the issue of his 
having met his burden of proof has not yet been addressed by the 
circuit court, we find that it is precisely the issue before us, 
as we consider whether the circuit court abused its discretion in 
finding that the record lacked any evidence to support a claim for 
unfairness. 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
18 
 
In his financial disclosure statement, Luciani represented to 
the court that his annual childcare expenses (i.e., daycare) would 
slightly exceed $10,000.  However, when questioned about the 
validity of this figure by opposing counsel, Luciani modified the 
child care claim to an average of $30 per week or $1,560 per year. 
 He admitted that he has custody of the children on alternating 
weekends from January through May, and September through December, 
and therefore incurs no child care expenses during this time.  
Such expenses would be confined to the months of June and August, 
during which time Luciani would take vacation, and perhaps his 
parents visiting from Florida would care for the children, as they 
had done for an entire summer in the past.  These salient factors 
would significantly reduce the already deflated child care expense 
estimate offered to the court by Luciani.  It is clear that the 
claimed figures in the financial disclosure statement were not 
supported by the testimony at trial. 
 
On further cross-examination, a number of additional figures 
were also reduced.  Luciani's claimed housing expense was 
$1,124.30, but he testified that his actual monthly rent was $650, 
a fixed cost unaffected by the presence of the children.  The 
claimed utility expense of $195 was reduced to $150.  In addition, 
Luciani testified that he incurred clothing expenses for the 
children in the amount of $20 per week and approximately $10 per 
week in medical supplies.  This was the extent of the evidence 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
19 
provided by Luciani in support of his request to modify the child 
support obligation. 
 
In fact, a comprehensive review of the record in this case 
further evidences testimony by Luciani which seemingly undermines 
his challenge that the child support order is patently unfair.  
Luciani initially testified that his annual budget would require a 
figure of $36,500, based upon income and liabilities in his 
financial disclosure statement.  This computation, however, 
included the erroneous claim of child care expenses in the amount 
of $200 per week.  As indicated above, Luciani's testimony 
dramatically reduced this figure to only $30 per week.  Subsequent 
to being alerted to this discrepancy by opposing counsel, Luciani 
amended the budget claim to an annual figure of $27,600. 
 
Upon a cursory inspection, this figure would appear to exceed 
Luciani's after-tax income of $22,000, resulting in the alleged  
`forced impoverishment' suggested by the dissent.  Dissent, at 2. 
 However, the $22,000 figure significantly underrepresents the 
income available to Luciani.  The dissent has failed to appreciate 
the fact that he will also receive an additional $12,000 annually 
($1,000/month), in the form of maintenance from Dr. Montemurro.  
When coupled with the $22,000, this "income" will produce an 
annual budget that exceeds the $27,600 figure that Luciani 
testified he needed at trial.
15  Moreover, the discretionary income 
                     
     
15  We note that the circuit court maintenance award is 
payable for 36 months. Upon the expiration of this period, if 
Luciani feels that he can no longer meet his child support 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
20 
produced by this maintenance award will certainly allow Luciani to 
provide the children with gifts, entertainment, and vacations as 
he sees fit, allaying the relationship concerns expressed by the 
dissent.  Dissent, at 2.  We find that the record in this case 
clearly does not support Luciani's claim of unfairness, nor does 
it sustain the dissent's conclusion of a `basic inequity'.  
Dissent, at 5.
16 
(..continued) 
obligations under the current order, he may seek revision under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.263 (1993-94) which provides: 
 
Notice of change of employer; change of address; change in 
ability to pay. 
 
Each order for child support, family support or maintenance 
payments shall also include an order that the payer 
notify the clerk of court, within 10 days, of any change 
of employer and of any substantial change in the amount 
of his or her income such that his or her ability to pay 
child 
support, 
family 
support 
or 
maintenance 
is 
affected. 
 
In order to secure such a revision in his child support 
obligation, Luciani would be required to prove a substantial 
change in circumstances. See Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1) (1993-94). At 
that time, the judge would then consider the relative change in 
economic condition along with the statutory factors utilized to 
calculate child support, and determine if a modification of the 
child support award is warranted. 
     
16  The dissent bases this conclusion upon a reference to a 
1992 study authored by Melli and Brown, in which they conclude 
that the shared-time formula produces inequitable results where 
the non-primary parent's time share approaches equal and where the 
non-primary parent has a lower income.  The example from the study 
as cited by the dissent, however, is in stark contrast to the 
facts of the present case regarding placement. In the study case, 
the father's overnight placement was 190 days, while the mother's 
was 175, a difference of only 15 days. This placement arrangement 
was correctly characterized as `nearly equal.'  Here, Dr. 
Montemurro's overnight placement was 248 days, while Luciani's was 
117, a difference of approximately 131 days.   
 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
21 
 
The circuit court was next presented with testimony regarding 
Dr. Montemurro's expenditures for the children as well as a 
multitude of other expenses.  Dr. Montemurro was making regular 
payments on her medical school loans ($36,000 balance), the home 
mortgage ($84,000 balance; $1,100/month), and payments on a 
business loan for her medical practice ($51,000 balance).  In 
addition to the initial loan to open her practice, Dr. Montemurro 
was similarly making payments on corporate debts of nearly 
$44,000).  To this figure we further attach the court ordered 
$1,000 monthly maintenance award payable to Luciani for 36 months.  
 
With respect to the children, Dr. Montemurro had purchased 
the majority of their clothes, paid for counseling, guardian ad 
litem fees, and school tuition of $1,600 in addition to weekly 
child care expenses throughout the year.  The physical placement 
stipulation between the parties had placed the children with Dr. 
Montemurro during the week other than the months of June and 
August.  The total cost for those expenses associated with Dr. 
(..continued) 
 
Given this disparity in figures, it is inconceivable for the 
dissent to suggest that the physical placement arrangement in the 
present case is precisely analogous to the case study example. 
Dissent, at 3-4. See also supra, n.9.  Moreover, the annual income 
after child support of the mother in the study placed her below 
the poverty line, supporting the conclusion that the result was 
`tremendously inequitable.' Luciani, on the other hand, is 
receiving $1,000 monthly in maintenance over three years, and has 
an annual budget which exceeds that to which he testified he would 
need at trial. While we recognize that a disparity in income does 
exist, the facts of the present case do not fit the dramatic 
example provided by the case study and relied upon by the dissent. 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
22 
Montemurro's continuing care for the children was approximately 
$1,100 per week. 
 
The parties had a final opportunity to offer additional 
support for their position when required to submit letter briefs 
to the court following the initial decision.  Luciani's letter 
brief reiterated his position at trial, and though replete with 
allegations of unfairness, neglected to provide the appropriate 
figures to support these claims.   
 
After reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the circuit 
court properly concluded that Luciani had failed to prove by the 
greater weight of the credible evidence that the presumptive 
application of the percentage standards would be unfair to the 
children or either party.  The court of appeals' decision stated 
that it believed that the circuit court had found the disparity of 
the parties' incomes to be an irrelevant consideration on the 
question of adherence to the percentage standards.  Luciani, 191 
Wis. 2d at 77.  This interpretation is mistaken.  The circuit 
court's supplemental decision clarified that the disparity in 
income 
does 
not 
automatically 
trigger 
deviation 
from 
the 
percentage standards.  Rather, it is but one of many factors that 
the court considers after receiving a modification request.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 767.25 (1m)(hs) (1993-94).
17 
                     
     
17  At the time of the trial, Wisconsin's shared-time payer 
formula, as promulgated in the administrative code, did not 
consider the income of the primary custodial parent.  Rather, it 
only dealt with the income of the lesser-time parent.  The new 
shared-time formula in Wis. Admin. Code § HSS 80, effective  
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
23 
 
The recent decision by the court of appeals in Kjelstrup v. 
Kjelstrup, 181 Wis. 2d 973, 512 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1994) 
demonstrates that where the parent with primary custody earns a 
higher income, it does not necessarily follow that "unfairness" 
results when the circuit court does not deviate from the 
percentage standards.  In Kjelstrup, the court commissioner 
increased Susan Kjelstrup's child support award, at a post-
judgment modification hearing, to equal the percentage standard.  
Id. at 974.  Rod Kjelstrup petitioned, and the court reduced the 
commissioner's award, stating that the application of the 
percentage standards would be unfair given the recent disparity in 
the parties' incomes.   
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed 
the 
decision of the circuit court because it deviated from the 
percentage standards by relying solely upon the income discrepancy 
among the parents.  Id. at 976.  In its analysis, the court 
referred to the preface of Wis. Admin. Code § HSS 80 to note the 
circuit court's error.  The preface to the chapter provides as 
follows: 
The [percentage of income] standard is based on the principle 
that a child's standard of living should, to the degree 
(..continued) 
March 1, 1995, does not consider the income of both parents until 
the lesser-time parent is over the 40% threshold in overnight 
placement. Luciani is presently at 32%. See Margaret W. Hickey, 
"New Rules for Child Support Obligations," 68 WIS. LAW. 15 (Apr.  
1995); Marygold S. Melli, "Child Support by Shared-Time Parents: 
Why a Simple Offset Formula is Wrong," 15 WIS. J. FAM. L. 41 (Apr. 
 1995) (characterizing the new administrative rule in shared-time 
cases as a progressive effort in addressing issues raised by the 
author in prior articles, regarding the need to recognize the 
changing economic burdens of shared parenting). 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
24 
possible, not be adversely affected because his or her 
parents are not living together. It [the standard] 
determines the percentage of a parent's income and 
potential income from assets that parents should 
contribute toward the support of children if the family 
does not remain together. The standard determines the 
minimum amount each parent is expected to contribute to 
the support of their children. It expects that the 
custodial parent shares his or her income directly with 
their children.  
Id. (citing § HSS 80 Preface).  In the present case, Luciani 
similarly seeks to have the support obligation modified because 
Dr. Montemurro earns a greater income.  This argument fails to 
recognize the assumption that underlies application of the 
percentage standards, as stated above.  Dr. Montemurro is presumed 
to contribute at least 25%
18 of her income to the children's 
support, thereby reducing the income disparity that Luciani relies 
upon.  And further, as made clear by the decision in Kjelstrup, 
disparity in the parties' incomes, by itself, is not sufficient to 
require the court to deviate from strict adherence to the 
percentage standards.  Absent a showing that such disparity will 
adversely affect the children or the parties in some demonstrative 
manner, it is simply one among a number of factors to be 
considered by the court when a request to deviate from the 
percentage standards is presented. 
 
We conclude that the circuit court reviewed the disparity of 
the parties' incomes, the amount of physical placement with 
Luciani, as well as other relevant factors, and exhibited a 
                     
     
18  See Kjelstrup, 181 Wis. 2d at 977. 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
25 
reasoned process in concluding that deviation from the percentage 
standards was not warranted in this case.  The circuit court did 
not err in exercising its discretion, and we therefore reverse the 
court of appeals on this issue. 
 
Finally, we address Dr. Montemurro's contention that the 
court of appeals ignored the statutory presumption of the 
percentage standards and implicitly rewrote the statute to require 
the circuit court to make a threshold determination that the 
guidelines are to be utilized, thereby improperly shifting the 
burden of proof away from Luciani. 
 
The court of appeals' error is exhibited in a series of 
footnotes, which set forth the issue presented by this review: 
On a somewhat similar theme, Angelina contends that the 
amount of support to be paid by the payer under the 
guidelines is not influenced by the income of the payee. 
 We agree.  The standards expect that the custodial 
parent share his or her income directly with the 
children. . . . Here, however, the issue is whether the 
family court properly chose to adhere to the standards 
in the first instance.  It is not whether the court 
correctly computed Michael's support obligation under 
the standards.  This is a subtle but important 
distinction.  (Emphasis added.) 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
26 
Luciani, 191 Wis. 2d at 77 n.5.  The appellate court's reversal of 
the percentage standards statutory presumption in a high-income 
payee case is further evidenced by the following passage: 
Angelina argues that Michael's attack is on the mechanics of 
the shared-time formula . . . . We disagree.  Michael 
makes no argument that the family court's computation of 
his support obligation under the shared-time payer 
formula was flawed.  Rather, he argues against the 
application of the shared-time payer formula on a 
threshold basis.  (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 77-78 n.6. 
 
The appellate court's decision implies that the previously 
existing presumptions regarding application of the percentage 
standards are inapplicable in high-income disparity cases.  The 
decision has attempted to shift the established burden of proof in 
cases where unfairness is alleged, from the requesting party to 
the circuit court.  The circuit court would now be required to 
conduct 
its 
own 
threshold 
investigation 
to 
determine 
the 
appropriateness of the percentage standards in a high-income case, 
regardless of the amount of evidence presented by the requesting 
party.  This approach ignores the administrative regulation and 
stated presumptions underlying the statute, see Kjelstrup, 181 
Wis. 2d at 977, as well as case law interpreting the percentage 
standards as an evidentiary shortcut to be utilized in determining 
the relative needs of the child for support.  Weidner, 131 Wis. 2d 
at 318. 
 
The court of appeals' dissatisfaction with the shared-time 
payer formula on the basis that neither the Wisconsin Statutes nor 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
27 
the Administrative Code consider the income of the custodial 
parent, is not the relevant inquiry in light of the nature of the 
support guidelines as adopted in Wisconsin.  The rules promulgated 
by DHSS are consistent regardless of the noncustodial parent's 
status as a shared-time payer or a simple payer: the custodial 
parent's income is generally not considered under Wisconsin law.  
See supra, n.17.  Future revisions to the mechanics of the support 
statutes and the shared-time payer formula in high-income cases is 
properly left to the province of the legislature. 
 
The obligation to support one's children is a basic one.  
Luciani's contention that he should be relieved of this burden 
simply because his ex-wife earns a substantially higher income 
runs contrary to the paramount goal of child support, namely, 
securing the best interest of the children.  Kuchenbecker v. 
Schultz, 151 Wis. 2d 868, 875, 447 N.W.2d 80 (Ct. App. 1989).  We 
recognize the role that income disparity may play in a particular 
case, but under the facts before us, it is only relevant where 
Luciani can demonstrate that he is unable to pay the court ordered 
child support or that such disparity in income will adversely 
affect the children or himself.  The circuit court properly 
concluded that he has failed to do so in this case.  Luciani's 
claim of unfairness is unsupported by the facts, as he enjoys an 
annual budget which exceeds that figure which he testified at 
trial would be required to maintain himself and the children.   
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
28 
 
The language in Wis. Stat. § 767.25 (1993-94) is clear.  The 
circuit court is required to determine the appropriate amount of 
child support by application of the percentage standards.  
However,  a requesting party's showing of unfairness by the 
greater weight of the credible evidence will allow the court to 
deviate from this presumptive application.     
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
 
No. 93-2899 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.  (dissenting).  I agree completely 
with the sound legal analysis written by the majority.  Where I 
disagree is with the application of the law to the facts of this 
case.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
 
The economic facts are somewhat difficult to glean from this 
record, particularly because the circuit court made no specific 
economic 
analysis 
or 
findings 
other 
than 
some 
conclusory 
references.  What we do glean from the record is the following.    
 
Husband Michael Luciani has aftertax monthly income of 
approximately $1900 ($22,000 annually).  Wife Dr. Angelina Luciani 
has aftertax monthly income of approximately $8300 ($100,000 
annually).   Mr. Luciani has the children for approximately 117 
overnight days and 49 nonovernight days per year, a placement 
characterized by the court of appeals as a "nearly equal child 
placement provision."  Marriage of Luciani v. Montemurro-Luciani, 
191 Wis. 2d 67, 77, 528 N.W.2d 477 (1995).
19  He pays $650 a month 
rent for a home for himself and his children when they are with 
him.  From the statement of facts presented by Dr. Luciani's 
attorney to the court of appeals, we further learn that Mr. 
                     
     
19  The majority takes issue with this conclusion of the court 
of appeals, stating that it is "unsupported by the record. . . .  
In fact, the children's total overnight placement with their 
father is less than one-third."  See majority op. at 10, fn. 9.  
Of course, the one-third figure is accurate, but only with respect 
to overnight placement.  Mr. Luciani also has the children for 49 
nonovernight days (4 hours per day).  Although this is not equal 
time, it is certainly arguable that this placement approaches it. 
 
No. 93-2899.wab 
 
 
 
2 
Luciani spends about $150 monthly for utilities and $130 monthly 
for child care.   
 
The majority affirms the circuit court decision that says Mr. 
Luciani must pay approximately $680 a month in child support.   
Taking into account his rent, utilities, and child care, this 
leaves him with approximately $290 a month for himself (and his 
children when they are with him) for expenses such as food, car, 
gasoline, 
clothing, 
car 
insurance, 
health 
insurance, 
life 
insurance, and incidentals.  It leaves him with little or no 
discretionary income to spend on gifts, entertainment, vacations 
and the like for either himself or the children.  We compare this 
to his wife who will have more than ample discretionary income to 
bestow upon the children, a fact that will certainly resonate with 
them as they get older.   
 
On the face of it, this result is tantamount to forced 
impoverishment of one spouse while the other spouse has ample 
income to live exceedingly well.
20  Without further economic 
                     
     
20  Although the circuit court provided a maintenance award of 
$1000 a month, maintenance is payable for only 36 months.  After 
that, according to the circuit court, "maintenance shall be 
barred."  At that time, the two children will be ages 8 and 9. 
   
 
Although the majority argues that Mr. Luciani may seek 
revision after the maintenance expires, the family court's order 
that "maintenance shall be barred" leaves scant hope that such 
request would be viewed with favor absent some change in 
circumstance other than the termination of maintenance. 
 
No. 93-2899.wab 
 
 
 
3 
analysis by the circuit court with respect to the circumstances of 
each party, this result could hardly be more inequitable. 
 
What we have here is a situation in which the non-primary 
parent with a substantially lower income than the primary parent 
has a time share with the children that approaches equal time.  
Such a situation was directly addressed in a 1992 study authored 
by Marygold S. Melli and Pat Brown under a contract between the 
Wisconsin Department of Health & Social Services and the Institute 
for Research on Poverty, entitled "Child Support in Shared 
Physical Custody in Wisconsin:  Present Guidelines and Possible 
Alternatives." 
 
In addressing the shared-time formula, the authors state that 
the formula results in inequitable award calculations in two 
situations:  one, where the non-primary parent's time share 
approaches equal; two, where the non-primary parent has a lower 
income.  Where both situations are present, as they are here with 
husband Luciani, the authors state unequivocally:  "the resulting 
support award, as calculated by the formula currently in effect, 
produces markedly inequitable results."  Id. at 15 (emphasis 
added). 
 
The authors use an example, outlined more fully below,
21 in 
which the mother is the non-primary parent with $3000 less income 
                     
     
21  The authors state: 
 
In this case, a mother who has her children living in her 
 
No. 93-2899.wab 
 
 
 
4 
than the father, but, after paying support consistent with the 
current formula, ends up with nearly $10,000 less yearly income 
than the father.  The authors' conclusion is that this is 
"tremendously inequitable" to the mother.  Id. at 17. 
 
Here, the facts are different from their example only with 
respect to who the non-primary parent is (and of course gender 
should make no difference) and the amount of the income disparity 
(which is far greater here than in the example where the authors 
found the disparity to be "tremendously inequitable" to the 
mother). 
 
There is a way for this court to resolve the inequity:  put 
teeth into the statutory provision which permits the court to 
deviate from the standards if the court finds by the greater 
weight of the credible evidence that the use of the standards is 
unfair to the children or the party requesting such deviation.  
(..continued) 
home for 15 fewer days over the course of a year than 
the father, and who has a yearly income of $16,000 
versus a yearly income of $19,000 for the father, would 
be ordered to pay the father $3,282 per year using the 
formula currently in effect.  The family incomes which 
would result after the child support transfer are, for 
the father, $22,292; for the mother, $12,718.  The 
disparity in family finances which results from the 
application of the current shared custody child support 
formula would be tremendously inequitable in this case 
for the mother and the children.  
 
Melli, Child Support in Shared Physical Custody, at 17 (emphasis 
added). 
 
No. 93-2899.wab 
 
 
 
5 
See Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1m).  To do so requires far more fact 
finding than is presented by this record.  
 
I conclude that Judge Nettesheim, writing for a unanimous 
court of appeals, got it exactly right.  That court concluded that 
the circuit court "erred in the exercise of its discretion . . . 
by failing to analyze the economic consequences of the support 
order in light of the parties' budgets, incomes and nearly equal 
child placement provisions." Id.  Even a cursory look at both 
circuit court decisions compel this conclusion.  Not one figure is 
cited.  There is no analysis whatsoever.  All statements are 
conclusory.   
 
The majority says Mr. Luciani failed to prove by the greater 
weight of the credible evidence that the presumptive application 
of the percentage standards would be unfair to either the parties 
or the children.  What more does he need to produce other than the 
above described facts to establish basic inequity?  These facts, 
on their face, are more than enough evidence to overcome the 
presumption.  I agree with the court of appeals that this case 
must be sent back for further economic analysis.  High income 
disparity 
cases 
present 
significant 
problems 
of 
fairness, 
requiring a high degree of economic analysis.  Without such 
analysis, at the very least a perception of unfairness will 
inevitably linger.  Accordingly, I dissent.     
 
   
 
No. 93-2899.wab 
 
 
 
6 
 
    
 
No. 93-2899.wab 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
93-2899 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
In Re the Marriage of: 
 
 
 
 
Michael A. Luciani, 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Angelina Montemurro-Luciani 
 
 
 
 
Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  191 Wis. 2d 67, 528 N.W.2d 477 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
March 7, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 1, 1995 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
BRUCE E. SCHROEDER 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
BABLITCH, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the respondent-respondent-petitioner there was 
a brief by Donald E. Mayew, and Phillips, Richards, Mayew & 
Corrigall, S.C., Kenosha and oral argument by Donald E. Mayew. 
 
 
For the petitioner-appellant there was a brief by Thomas W. 
Anderson, Jr. and Anderson, Sumpter & Anderson, S.C., Kenosha and 
oral argument by Thomas W. Anderson, Jr.