Title: Morningstar Marinas/Eaton Ferry, LLC v. Warren County

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA12-1287 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 20 August 2013 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Durham County 
No. 10 CRS 57148 
LESTER GERARD PACKINGHAM 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 30 May 2012 by 
Judge William Osmond Smith in Durham County Superior Court.  
Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 May 2013. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
David L. Elliott, for the State. 
 
Glenn Gerding, for defendant. 
 
 
ELMORE, Judge. 
 
 
Lester Gerard Packingham (defendant), a registered sex 
offender, appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury conviction 
for accessing a commercial social networking Web site, pursuant 
to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5 (2011).  Defendant challenges the 
statute as unconstitutional.  For the reasons stated herein, we 
agree.  Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court. 
 
 
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I. Background 
Chapter 14, Article 27A of our general statutes governs the 
Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Programs (the 
Registry).  “The General Assembly recognizes that sex offenders 
often pose a high risk of engaging in sex offenses even after 
being released from incarceration or commitment and that 
protection of the public from sex offenders is of paramount 
governmental interest.”  N.C. Gen. Stat § 14-208.5 (2011). 
Accordingly, the stated purpose of the Registry is to protect 
the public and children from the risk of recidivism by sex 
offenders and to aid “law enforcement officers’ efforts to 
protect 
communities, 
conduct 
investigations, 
and 
quickly 
apprehend offenders” because sex offenders “pose significant and 
unacceptable threats to the public safety and welfare of 
children.”  Id.  
As part of the Registry, persons convicted on or after 1 
January 1996 of sexually violent offenses or certain offenses 
against minors must register as a sex offender.  In doing so, 
they must provide the sheriff’s office in the county in which 
they reside with all pertinent personal information set forth in 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.7(b) (2011).  “Registration shall be 
maintained for a period of at least 30 years following the date 
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of initial county registration unless the person, after 10 years 
of registration, successfully petitions the superior court to 
shorten 
his 
or 
her 
registration 
time 
period 
under 
G.S. 
14.208.12A.” 
 
N.C. 
Gen. 
Stat. 
§ 
14-208.7(a)(2) 
(2011).  
Alternatively, “[a]ny person who is a recidivist, who commits an 
aggravated offense, or who is determined to be a sexually 
violent predator” is required to register under the Sexually 
Violent Predator Registration Program.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
208.6A (2011).  A violation of the registration requirements is 
a Class F felony.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.11 (2011).   
On 1 December 2008, the General Assembly enacted N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 14-202.5 as part of the Protect Children from Sexual 
Predators Act.  NC B. Summ., 2008 Reg. Sess. S.B. 132.  The 
statute bans the use of commercial social networking Web sites 
by any registered sex offender: 
(a)  Offense. --  It is unlawful for a sex 
offender who is registered in accordance 
with Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the 
General Statutes to access a commercial 
social networking Web site where the sex 
offender knows that the site permits minor 
children to become members or to create or 
maintain 
personal 
Web 
pages 
on 
the 
commercial social networking Web site. 
 
(b)  For the purposes of this section, a 
“commercial social networking Web site” is 
an Internet Web site that meets all of the 
following requirements: 
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(1)  Is operated by a person who derives 
revenue from membership fees, advertising, 
or other sources related to the operation of 
the Web site. 
 
(2) 
Facilitates 
the 
social 
introduction 
between two or more persons for the purposes 
of friendship, meeting other persons, or 
information exchanges. 
 
(3)  Allows users to create Web pages or 
personal profiles that contain information 
such as the name or nickname of the user, 
photographs placed on the personal Web page 
by the user, other personal information 
about the user, and links to other personal 
Web 
pages 
on 
the 
commercial 
social 
networking Web site of friends or associates 
of the user that may be accessed by other 
users or visitors to the Web site. 
 
(4)  Provides users or visitors to the 
commercial 
social 
networking 
Web 
site 
mechanisms to communicate with other users, 
such 
as 
a 
message 
board, 
chat 
room, 
electronic mail, or instant messenger. 
 
(c)  A commercial social networking Web site 
does not include an Internet Web site that 
either: 
 
(1)  Provides only one of the following 
discrete services: photo-sharing, electronic 
mail, instant messenger, or chat room or 
message board platform; or 
 
(2) 
 
Has 
as 
its 
primary 
purpose 
the 
facilitation 
of 
commercial 
transactions 
involving goods or services between its 
members or visitors. 
 
(d) 
 
Jurisdiction. 
-- 
The 
offense 
is 
committed in the State for purposes of 
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determining 
jurisdiction, 
if 
the 
transmission that constitutes the offense 
either 
originates 
in 
the 
State 
or 
is 
received in the State. 
 
(e)  Punishment. -- A violation of this 
section is a Class I felony. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5 (2011). 
 
In the case sub judice, defendant was convicted of taking 
indecent liberties with a child in 2002.  Accordingly, he became 
a registered sex offender.  In 2010, in an effort to enforce 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5, the Durham Police Department began 
investigating 
profiles 
on 
the 
Web 
sites 
Myspace.com 
and 
Facebook.com for evidence of use by registered sex offenders.  
An officer recognized defendant in a profile picture belonging 
to Facebook user “J.R. Gerard,” then confirmed that defendant 
was the person who created the profile page.  Thereafter, 
defendant was indicted on 20 September 2012 for maintaining at 
least one personal Web page or profile on Facebook.com in 
violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5. 
At a pretrial hearing, defendant moved to dismiss the 
charge on the basis that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5 was 
unconstitutional.  The trial court joined defendant’s motion 
with a similar motion made by another defendant.  Superior Court 
Judge Michael R. Morgan denied the joint motion, finding that 
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the statute was constitutional as applied to both defendants.  
He declined to rule on the statute’s facial constitutionality 
for want of jurisdiction.  Defendant in the case sub judice, and 
the other defendant, filed a joint appeal with this Court, which 
we denied on 22 June 2011. 
On 30 May 2012, a jury found defendant guilty of accessing 
a commercial social networking Web site.  Defendant was 
sentenced to 6 to 8 months imprisonment, suspended, and placed 
on 12 months of supervised probation.  Defendant now appeals. 
II. Analysis 
On appeal, defendant challenges N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5 
(2011) on the basis that it violates his federal and state 
constitutional rights to free speech, expression, association, 
assembly, 
and 
the 
press 
under 
the 
First 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments.  Additionally, he asserts that the statute is 
overbroad, vague, and not narrowly tailored to achieve a 
legitimate government interest.  We agree. 
This case presents the single legal question of whether 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5 is unconstitutional.  “The standard 
of review for questions concerning constitutional rights is de 
novo.  Furthermore, when considering the constitutionality of a 
statute 
or 
act 
there 
is 
a 
presumption 
in 
favor 
of 
-7- 
 
 
constitutionality, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of 
the act.”  State v. Daniels, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 741 S.E.2d 
354, 363 (2012), appeal dismissed, review denied, 738 S.E.2d 389 
(N.C. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
A. Level of Scrutiny 
The statute plainly involves defendant’s First Amendment 
rights as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment because 
it bans the freedom of speech and association via social media. 
“[A] statute regulating the time, place and manner of expressive 
activity 
is 
content-neutral 
in 
that 
it 
does 
not 
forbid 
communication of a specific idea.”  State v. Petersilie, 334 
N.C. 169, 183, 432 S.E.2d 832, 840 (1993) (quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5 (2011) is 
content neutral because it restricts access to commercial social 
networking Web sites without any reference to the content or 
type of speech disseminated or posted thereon.   See Turner 
Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497 
(1994).  Content-neutral regulations are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny: they must be both “narrowly tailored to achieve a 
significant 
governmental 
interest” 
and 
“leave 
open 
ample 
alternative channels for communication of the information.”  
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 105 L. Ed. 2d 
-8- 
 
 
661, 675 (1989).  In the instant case, we conclude that the 
statute is not narrowly tailored; accordingly, we decline to 
address whether the statute leaves open alternative channels for 
communication.  See Doe v. Prosecutor, 705 F.3d 694, 698 (7th 
Cir. 2013). 
B. Narrow Tailoring 
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that a narrowly tailored 
statute “targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of 
the evil it seeks to remedy.  A complete ban can be narrowly 
tailored, but only if each activity within the proscription's 
scope is an appropriately targeted evil.”  Frisby v. Schultz, 
487 U.S. 474, 485, 101 L. Ed. 2d 420, 485 (1988) (citation 
omitted).   
[T]he requirement of narrow tailoring is 
satisfied so long as the . . . regulation 
promotes a substantial government interest 
that would be achieved less effectively 
absent the regulation . . . .  So long as 
the 
means 
chosen 
are 
not 
substantially 
broader 
than 
necessary 
to 
achieve 
the 
government’s interest, . . . the regulation 
will not be invalid simply because a court 
concludes that the government’s interest 
could be adequately served by some less-
speech-restrictive alternative. 
 
Ward, 491 U.S. at 799-800, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 680-81 (quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  The State must also “demonstrate 
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that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and 
that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a 
direct and material way.”  Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 664, 
129 L. Ed. 2d at 532.  
At 
the 
outset, 
we 
note 
that 
this 
is 
the 
first 
constitutional challenge to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5 heard 
before this Court.  As such, we find several federal court 
decisions addressing the constitutionality of similar statutes 
to be persuasive.  Most recently, in Doe v. Prosecutor, 705 F.3d 
694 (7th Cir. 2013), the Seventh Circuit declared Indiana Code § 
35-42-4-12 (2011) to be unconstitutional: the statute prohibited 
registered sex offenders convicted of offenses involving a minor 
(including, inter alia, child molesting, possession of child 
pornography, and sexual conduct in the presence of a minor) from 
using social networking websites, instant messaging services, 
and chat programs.  It defined a “social networking web site” as 
a Web site that: 
   (1) facilitates the social introduction 
between two (2) or more persons; 
 
   (2) requires a person to register or 
create an account, a username, or a password 
to become a member of the web site and to 
communicate with other members; 
 
   (3) allows a member to create a web page 
or a personal profile; and 
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   (4) 
provides 
a 
member 
with 
the 
opportunity 
to 
communicate 
with 
another 
person. 
 
The term does not include an electronic mail 
program or message board program. 
 
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-4-12 (2011).  Additionally, the statute 
provided a defense to a prosecution if the registered offender: 
   (1) did not know that the web site or 
program allowed a person who is less than 
eighteen (18) years of age to access or use 
the web site or program; and 
 
   (2) upon discovering that the web site or 
program allows a person who is less than 
eighteen (18) years of age to access or use 
the web site or program, immediately ceased 
further use or access of the web site or 
program. 
 
Id.  Calling the statute “overinclusive” and a complete 
“social media ban,” the Seventh Circuit concluded that, though 
content neutral, the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve 
the state’s interest because it broadly prohibited substantial 
protected speech rather than specifically targeting the evil of 
improper communications to minors: 
[T]here is nothing dangerous about Doe’s use 
of social media as long as he does not 
improperly 
communicate 
with 
minors.  
Further, 
there 
is 
no 
disagreement 
that 
illicit communication comprises a minuscule 
subset of the universe of social network 
activity.  As such, the Indiana law targets 
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substantially more activity than the evil it 
seeks to redress. 
 
Prosecutor, 705 F.3d at 698-99.  
Similarly, Nebraska statute Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-322.05(1) 
(2012) made it unlawful for certain registered sex offenders “to 
knowingly and intentionally use[] a social networking web site, 
instant messaging, or chat room service that allows a person who 
is less than eighteen years of age to access or use [it].”  Neb. 
Rev. Stat. § 28-322.05(1) (2012).  Only those registered 
offenders convicted of offenses targeting minors were subject to 
the statutory ban.  See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4001.01(13) (2012).  
The statute defined a “social networking web site” as: 
[A] web page or collection of web sites 
contained on the Internet (a) that enables 
users or subscribers to create, display, and 
maintain 
a 
profile 
or 
Internet 
domain 
containing 
biographical 
data, 
personal 
information, 
photos, 
or 
other 
types 
of 
media, (b) that can be searched, viewed, or 
accessed by other users or visitors to the 
web site, with or without the creator's 
permission, 
consent, 
invitation, 
or 
authorization, and (c) that may permit some 
form 
of 
communication, 
such 
as 
direct 
comment 
on 
the 
profile 
page, 
instant 
messaging, or email, between the creator of 
the profile and users who have viewed or 
accessed the creator's profile[.] 
 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4001.01(13) (2012).   
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Upon review, the U.S. District Court in Nebraska held that 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-322.05 was not narrowly tailored because it 
“burden[s] substantially more speech than is necessary to 
further 
the 
government’s 
legitimate 
interests.” 
 
Doe 
v. 
Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1112 (D. Neb. 2012) (citation 
omitted) (alteration in original).  The District Court reasoned 
that, even if the ban was applicable only to the most common and 
notable social networking sites, such as Facebook.com and 
Myspace.com, it nevertheless prohibited an enormous amount of 
expressive activity on the internet: “[T]he ban potentially 
restricts 
the 
targeted 
offenders 
from 
communicating 
with 
hundreds of millions and perhaps billions of adults and their 
companies despite the fact that the communication has nothing 
whatsoever to do with minors.”  Id. at 1111; see also Doe v. 
Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596, 607 (M.D. La. 2012) (holding that 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:91.5 (2012) was unconstitutional, in 
part because “[t]he sweeping restrictions on the use of the 
internet for purposes completely unrelated to the activities 
sought to be banned by the Act impose severe and unwarranted 
restraints on constitutionally protected speech. More focused 
restrictions that are narrowly tailored to address the specific 
conduct sought to be proscribed should be pursued.”). 
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C. Legitimate State Interest 
Turning now to the case at hand, it is undisputed that the 
State has a significant interest in protecting minors from 
predatory behavior by sex offenders on the internet.  North 
Carolina requires sex offenders to register in the sex offender 
database because “the protection of [] children is of great 
governmental interest.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.5 (2011).  
However, while enacted to further a legitimate state interest, 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5, as it stands, is not narrowly 
tailored.  
i. Substantially Broad Application   
First, defendant argues that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5 is 
not narrowly tailored, in part  
because 
it 
treats 
all 
registered 
sex 
offenders 
the 
same, 
regardless 
of 
the 
offense committed, the victim’s age, whether 
a computer was used to facilitate or commit 
the offense, the likelihood of reoffending, 
and regardless of whether the person has 
been 
classified 
as 
a 
sexually 
violent 
predator.  It burdens more people than 
needed to achieve the purported goal of the 
statute.  
 
We agree.  We begin by noting that Article 27A demonstrates 
the legislature’s intent to distinguish between sex offenders 
based on the character of their convictions: 
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It is the further objective of the General 
Assembly to establish a more stringent set 
of 
registration 
requirements 
for 
recidivists, persons who commit aggravated 
offenses, and for a subclass of highly 
dangerous sex offenders who are determined 
by a sentencing court with the assistance of 
a board of experts to be sexually violent 
predators.  
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6A (2011).  Accordingly, our general 
statutes contain various restrictions that are only applicable 
to specified subsets of sex offenders.  See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
14-208.18(c) (2011) (governing premises restrictions that apply 
only to registered sex offenders who commit an offense defined 
in Article 7A or against a child under the age of 16);  N.C. 
Gen. 
Stat. 
§ 
14-208.22 
(2011) 
(requiring 
only 
offenders 
classified as “sexually violent predators” to provide additional 
identifying factors, offense history, and documentation of 
psychiatric treatment);  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.23 (2011) 
(requiring only “sexually violent predators” to register for 
life);  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.40A (2011) (allowing courts to 
implement satellite-based monitoring if (i) the offender has 
been classified as a sexually violent predator (ii) the offender 
is a recidivist, (iii) the conviction offense was an aggravated 
offense, (iv) the conviction offense was a violation of N.C. 
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Gen. Stat. §§ 14-27.2A or 14-27.4A, or (v) the offense involved 
the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor.).  
In contrast, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5 applies equally to 
every registered sex offender in the state, regardless of 
whether the offender committed any sexual offense involving a 
minor. For example, registered sex offenders convicted of 
misdemeanor sexual battery of an adult, pursuant to N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 14-27.5A (2011), and those convicted of attempted rape 
of an adult, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.6 (2011), may 
not access any commercial social networking Web site.  Thus, the 
application of this statute is neither conditional upon showing 
that the offender previously used a social networking Web site 
to target children, nor does it require a showing that the 
offender is a current threat to minors.  Accordingly, the 
statute is not narrowly tailored because it fails to target 
those offenders who “pose a factually based risk to children 
through the use or threatened use of the banned sites or 
services.”  Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 1111.  In essence, it 
burdens more people than necessary to achieve its purported 
goal. 
We note that in Doe v. Prosecutor and Doe v. Nebraska, the 
challenged statutes were applicable only to those registered sex 
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offenders whose offenses involved a minor.  Nevertheless, the 
courts concluded that the statutes were not narrowly tailored, 
in part, because they also banned a broad scope of internet 
activity.  As such, tailoring N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5 to 
those offenders who “pose a factually based risk to children” 
does not cure the statute’s fatal flaw.  Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 
2d at 1111.  Its overbroad application to all registered sex 
offenders is merely one example of how, when judged against the 
First Amendment, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5 is not narrowly 
tailored, and thus unconstitutional.   
ii. Substantially Broad Scope    
Defendant asserts that an additional 
First Amendment 
concern is the fact that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5 arbitrarily 
prohibits a broad scope of internet activity.  We agree. 
“Expansively written laws designed to protect children are 
not exempt from the constitutional requirement of clarity under 
both the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause[.]”  Id. at 
1112.  Due process requires that laws give people of ordinary 
intelligence fair notice of what conduct is prohibited.  Grayned 
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972).   
The lack of such notice in a law that 
regulates expression raises special First 
Amendment concerns because of its obvious 
chilling effect on free speech. . . . 
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[G]overnment may regulate in the area of 
First Amendment freedoms   only with narrow 
specificity[.] These principles apply to 
laws 
that 
regulate 
expression 
for 
the 
purpose of protecting children.  
 
Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 2011 U.S. 4802, 37-38, 180 L. Ed. 
2d 708, 725 (2011) (quotations and citations omitted).  Vague 
criminal statutes are disfavored because they restrict the 
exercise of First Amendment freedoms.  Reno v. American Civil 
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 138 L. Ed. 2d 874 (1997). 
Here, the State fails to make a convincing argument as to 
why the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.  N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 14-202.5(b) defines “social networking Web site[s]” as 
being 1) “commercial” in that they “derive[] revenue,” 2) 
“social” because they promote the introduction of individuals, 
and 3) facilitative of “networking” by allowing users to create  
personal profiles or have mechanisms that allow users to 
communicate with others, “such as message board[s], chat 
room[s], electronic mail, or instant messenger.”  N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 14-202.5(b) (2011).  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5(c) 
provides two exceptions: 1) an offender may access a Web site 
that provides one discrete service, including photo-sharing, 
electronic mail, instant messenger, chat room or message board, 
or 2) he may visit a Web site that is primarily intended to 
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facilitate commercial transactions between members or visitors.  
N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-202.5(c)(1-2) (2011). 
The construction of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5(b) lacks 
clarity, is vague, and certainly fails to give people of 
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.  We 
assume that persons of ordinary intelligence would likely 
interpret the statute as prohibiting access to mainstream social 
networking sites such as Facebook.com and Myspace.com.  However, 
the 
ban 
is 
much 
more 
expansive. 
 
For 
example, 
while 
Foodnetwork.com contains recipes and restaurant suggestions, it 
is also a commercial social networking Web site because it 
derives 
revenue 
from 
advertising, 
facilitates 
the 
social 
introduction between two or more persons, allows users to create 
user profiles, and has message boards and photo sharing 
features.  Additionally, the statute could be interpreted to ban 
registered sex offenders from accessing sites such as Google.com 
and Amazon.com because these sites contain subsidiary social 
networking pages:  they derive revenue from advertising; their 
functions facilitate the social introduction of two or more 
people; and they allow users to create personal profiles, e-mail 
accounts, or post information on message boards.  Thus, 
registered sex offenders may be prohibited from conducting a 
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“Google” search, purchasing items on Amazon.com, or accessing a 
plethora of Web sites unrelated to online communication with 
minors.  In its overall application, the statute prohibits a 
registered sex offender whose conviction is unrelated to sexual 
activity involving a minor from accessing a multitude of Web 
sites that, in all likelihood, are not frequented by minors.  
Furthermore, while the definition of “commercial social 
networking Web site” in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5(b) is 
overbroad and vague on its face, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5(a) 
is similarly vague.  This portion of the statute makes it 
unlawful for the offender to “access” a Web site where he 
“knows” that the site permits minor children to become members.  
The term “access” is defined as “[t]he act of approaching.”  
American Heritage Dictionary 8 (3ed. 1997).  Accordingly, the 
statute is violated by merely pulling up a prohibited Web site, 
regardless of whether the offender searches the site or 
immediately leaves it upon recognizing that he is banned from 
its use.  Furthermore, by its plain language, it is assumed that 
every offender inherently “knows” which Web sites are banned.  
However, given the vague definition of “commercial social 
networking Web site” and its broad reach, it is fundamentally 
impossible to expect an offender, or any other person, to “know” 
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whether he is banned from a particular Web site prior to 
“accessing” it.  Moreover, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5 contains 
no defense to prosecution should a sex offender unintentionally 
access a banned Web site.  Finally, should a registered sex 
offender have active Facebook, Amazon, or other accounts at the 
time of his conviction, the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
14-202.5 makes it unlawful to login to close the accounts.  
Accordingly, we conclude that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5 is 
unconstitutionally vague on its face and overbroad as applied. 
D. Additional Safeguards 
Finally, we note that our General Assembly has enacted laws 
aimed at protecting children on the internet without abridging 
First Amendment freedoms:  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.3 (2011) 
prohibits solicitation of a child by a computer or other 
electronic device to commit an unlawful sex act; N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 14-196.3 (2011) prohibits cyber-stalking; and Article 27A 
requires registered sex offenders to provide the State with 
“[a]ny online identifier the person uses or intends to use,” 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.7(b)(7) (2011).  Accordingly, “[w]ith 
little difficulty, the state could more precisely target illicit 
communication, as the statutes above demonstrate.”  Prosecutor, 
705 F.3d at 700.  
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III. Conclusion 
 In sum, we conclude that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5 is not 
narrowly tailored, is vague, and fails to target the “evil” it 
is intended to rectify.  Instead, it arbitrarily burdens all 
registered 
sex 
offenders 
by 
preventing 
a 
wide 
range 
of 
communication and expressive activity unrelated to achieving its 
purported goal.  The statute violates the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of free speech, and it is unconstitutional on its face 
and as applied.  Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s 
judgment. 
VACATED. 
Judges GEER and DILLON concur.