Title: DAVIS v. CITY OF CHEYENNE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DAVIS v. CITY OF CHEYENNE2004 WY 4388 P.3d 481Case Number: 03-100Decided: 04/21/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE STATEMENT

OF 
TERMINATION OF:

 

RICHARD 
S. DAVIS,

 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

CITY 
OF CHEYENNE,

 

Appellee(Respondent).

 

 

The 
Honorable E. James Burke, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
J.C. DeMers, Cheyenne, Wyoming. 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
William G. Hibbler, Special Assistant City Attorney, Cheyenne, Wyoming. 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE and VOIGT, JJ., and YOUNG, 
DJ.

 

KITE, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      The City of 
Cheyenne (City) terminated Richard S. Davis (Davis) from his employment as 
transit manager after four years.  
Following a hearing, the Cheyenne personnel commission (commission) 
affirmed the termination decision.  
Mr. Davis sought review in district court, which affirmed the decision of 
the commission.  Claiming the 
commission erred in several respects and its decision was not supported by 
substantial evidence, Mr. Davis appeals to this Court.  We find no error and 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Mr. Davis raises 
the following issues:

 

A.        Did 
the Personnel Commission agency's failure to address numerous issues constitute 
an arbitrary and capricious action in violation of Appellant's right to a fair 
hearing?

 

B.        Were 
the contested case proceedings conducted in a manner contrary to law or deny 
Appellant due process by considering allegations not specified in the notice of 
termination?

 

C.        Did 
the Personnel Commission commit errors of law or violate its own rules and 
regulations to the detriment of Appellant?

 

D.        Did 
the violation of its own rules by the City of Cheyenne deny Appellant due 
process by improperly determining that matters were final and 
non-appealable?

 

E.        Did 
the Cheyenne Personnel Commission violate Appellant's First Amendment right to 
free speech or take action on the basis of other protected communications, 
thereby requiring reversal of its determination to approve the employment 
termination?

 

F.         
Were the agency findings supported by substantial evidence and 
sufficiently detailed as required by the Administrative Procedures 
Act?

 

G.        Did 
the accumulation of error create a reasonable possibility that in the absence of 
error the outcome may have been more favorable to Appellant or result in damage 
to the integrity, reputation and fairness of the justice 
process?

 

[¶3]      The City states 
the issues as follows:

 

I.          
Whether the City of Cheyenne's Personnel Commission violated Appellant's 
due process rights when it terminated his employment with the 
City.

 

II.          
Whether the decision of the Personnel Commission is based on substantial 
evidence.

 

III.         
Whether the City of Cheyenne denied Appellant's free speech 
rights.

 

IV.        
Whether the Personnel Commission properly declined to decide if 
Appellant's termination constituted a violation of federal 
law.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Mr. Davis was 
hired as the transit manager for the City in November 1997.  He received written notification of his 
termination on December 3, 2001.  
Among the reasons given for his termination were failure to timely submit 
a report upon which federal grant money was dependent, allegations by female 
employees that he engaged in sexual harassment, allegations that he engaged in 
non-work related activities during work hours, unprofessional and antagonistic 
communication with the city attorney's office, failure to communicate 
effectively with his employees and his supervisor's loss of confidence in Mr. 
Davis' ability to effectively manage the transit division.

 

[¶5]      In accordance 
with the personnel rules, Mr. Davis requested a hearing before the commission to 
contest the termination.  A hearing 
was held on February 19, 2002.  The 
commission heard the testimony of seven city employees, including Mr. 
Davis.  After the hearing, on April 
24, 2002, the commission issued findings of fact, conclusions of law and an 
order affirming Mr. Davis' termination.

            

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶6]      We review agency 
action following contested case hearings in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2003), which provides:

 

(c)  To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 

. . 
.

 

(ii)  Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:  

 

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 

. 
. .

 

(E) Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

 

State 
ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Legarda, 
2003 WY 130, ¶ 9, 77 P.3d 708, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 2003).  Our review is also governed by the 
following standards:

 

We 
do not afford any special deference to the district court's decision when we 
review a matter initiated before an administrative agency.  Rather, this court reviews the case as 
if it came directly from the administrative agency.  Our review must focus on the evidence 
and consider the reasonableness of the agency's exercise of judgment while 
determining if the agency committed any errors of law.  If the agency committed any errors of 
law, this court must correct them.

 

            
Further, in appeals where both parties submit evidence at the 
administrative hearing, appellate review is limited to application of the 
substantial evidence test.  This 
court is required to review the entire record in making its ultimate 
determination on appeal.  The 
substantial evidence test to be applied is as follows:

 

            
"In reviewing findings of fact, we examine the entire record to determine 
whether there is substantial evidence to support an agency's findings.  If the agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency and must uphold the findings on appeal.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence."  Newman 
[v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 
2002 WY 91, ¶12, 49 P.3d 163, ¶12 (Wyo. 2002)] (quoting State ex rel. 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. v. Jensen, 2001 WY 51, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 1133, ¶ 10 (Wyo. 2001)).

 

            
Even when the factual findings are found to be sufficient under the 
substantial evidence test, . . . this court may be required to apply the 
arbitrary and capricious standard as a "safety net" to catch other agency action 
which prejudiced a party's substantial right to the administrative proceeding or 
which might be contrary to the other WAPA review standards.   

 

Id., 
¶ 
10.  To survive judicial review, the 
record of a contested agency action must contain such factual findings as would 
permit a court to follow the agency's reasoning from the evidentiary facts on 
record to its eventual legal conclusions.  
Newman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division, 2002 WY 91, ¶ 16, 49 P.3d 163, ¶ 16 (Wyo. 2002).  Similarly, a contested case hearing must 
provide, and the record of that proceeding must document, information sufficient 
to the making of a reasonable decision.  
Absent such information, the agency decision must be set aside.  Id.  

 

[¶7]      Of further 
relevance to our review, we have said: 

 

In contested 
cases conducted before administrative agencies, the deference that normally is 
accorded the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the administrative 
agency, and we do not adjust the decision of the agency unless it is clearly 
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence on record. This is so 
because, in such an instance, the administrative body is the trier of fact and 
has the duty to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of 
witnesses.  

 

Id., 
¶ 26.  With these standards in mind, 
we address Mr. Davis' claims in the order he raises them.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

1.         
Denial of due process by agency's failure to address Mr. Davis' 
proposed findings and conclusions

 

[¶8]      Mr. Davis claims 
the commission violated his right to due process in not addressing his proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in its written decision.  After the hearing, the commission 
ordered Mr. Davis and the City to submit proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  The commission 
did not incorporate Mr. Davis' proposed findings and conclusions in its written 
decision and he asserts there is nothing in the record demonstrating it 
considered them.  He further asserts 
the record is silent as to the commission's reasons for rejecting them.  He claims the absence of such from the 
record shows the commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in upholding his 
termination.

 

[¶9]      The City contends 
the commission had no obligation to adopt Mr. Davis' proposed findings and 
conclusions and was entitled to give them the weight it felt they deserved.  The City further asserts there is no 
authority for Mr. Davis' argument that an agency violates due process or acts 
arbitrarily and capriciously by declining to adopt a party's findings and 
conclusions.  Finally, the City 
argues there is no evidence that the commission did not consider Mr. Davis' 
findings and conclusions in reaching its decision.

 

[¶10]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110 
(LexisNexis 2003) addresses findings of fact and conclusions of law made by an 
agency following contested case hearings.1  That section provides in relevant 
part:

 

            
A final decision or order adverse to a party in a contested case shall be 
in writing or dictated into the record. The final decision shall include 
findings of fact and conclusions of law separately stated.  Findings of fact if set forth in 
statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of 
the underlying facts supporting the findings. . . .

 

Applying 
this provision, we have said an agency is required to make findings of basic 
facts upon all material issues and upon which its ultimate findings of fact or 
conclusions are based.  Scott v. 
McTiernan, 974 P.2d 966, 969 (Wyo. 1999).  We also have said each ultimate fact or 
conclusion must be thoroughly explained in order to facilitate judicial 
review.  Legarda, ¶ 13.  We have not said, and the statute does 
not require, that an agency must expressly state why it rejected a party's 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, nor have we concluded that the 
failure to do so constitutes a violation of due process or is arbitrary and 
capricious.  It would seem to be 
implicit in an agency's adoption of one party's findings and conclusions that 
the agency did not find persuasive the evidence presented in support of the 
opposing party's proposed findings and conclusions.  Absent some direct evidence that a 
party's proposed findings were given no consideration, an agency's failure to 
adopt or address them does not equate with arbitrariness. 

 

[¶11]   Mr. Davis filed twenty-three pages 
of proposed findings and conclusions.  
In his argument before this Court, he does not identify which of those 
proposed findings and conclusions the commission improperly failed to consider 
or include in its findings and conclusions.  Reviewing them in their entirety, some 
of Mr. Davis' findings are immaterial to the issue of whether his termination 
was warranted.  For example, Mr. 
Davis' findings include a paragraph describing his work history prior to 
becoming transit manager and several more paragraphs identifying his 
accomplishments while serving as transit manager. While such evidence was 
relevant and admissible at the hearing, it is not material to this Court's 
understanding of the commission's reasoning for affirming the termination.  Other of Mr. Davis' findings allege 
facts that were not established by or misstate the evidence presented.  Still others are more in the form of 
conclusions of law than findings of fact and are not an accurate statement of 
either.  Some findings were more in 
the form of argument than actual facts shown by the evidence.  One of his findings, for example, 
states: "It was reasonably expected by Mr. Davis that Ms. Jording would complete 
the Section 15 Report and have the report filed . . . by October 28, 2001."  From our review of the record, we are 
not persuaded that the evidence established that Mr. Davis could have reasonably 
expected Ms. Jording to complete the report by October 28.

 

[¶12]   In contrast, the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order issued by the commission comprised eleven 
pages.  Although many of the 
findings appear to be taken from the City's proposed findings, the evidence in 
the record directly supports those findings, they bear on material issues in the 
proceeding and clearly form the basis for the commission's ultimate findings and 
conclusions.  Additionally, the 
commission's findings of basic fact, together with the record before us, 
provides a rational basis from which this Court is able to follow the 
commission's reasoning from the evidentiary facts on record to its eventual 
legal conclusions.  We have 
said:  

 

In 
discharging its duty under § 16-3-110, the agency must "make findings of basic 
facts upon all of the material issues in the proceeding and upon which its 
ultimate findings of fact or conclusions are based." Pan American Petroleum 
Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 446 P.2d 550, 
555 (Wyo.1968).  This Court needs to 
know "why" an agency decided the way it did.  When an agency does not make adequate 
findings of basic fact, we do not have a rational basis upon which to review its 
ultimate findings and conclusions.

 

Legarda, 
¶ 13.  We hold the commission met 
this standard  it made findings of basic facts upon all the material issues in 
the proceeding and upon which its ultimate findings and conclusions were 
based.  From reviewing the record 
and the commission's findings, we are able to discern why the commission 
affirmed the termination.  The 
commission's findings give us an adequate basis upon which to review its 
ultimate findings and conclusions.  
Therefore, Mr. Davis' first claim is without merit.    

  

 

2.         
Error in commission's consideration of allegations not contained in 
termination notice

 

[¶13]   Mr. Davis contends the commission 
improperly considered evidence of alleged misconduct that was not contained in 
the termination notice.  
Specifically, Mr. Davis refers to the commission's finding that he used a 
computer belonging to the City to send an e-mail message to his wife in which he 
referred to an assistant city attorney as "an incompetent *_*_*_*_*_*_*!!!"  Based upon this finding of fact, the 
commission concluded Mr. Davis violated city personnel rules prohibiting use of 
city property for personal business and requiring employees to work 
cooperatively and harmoniously with other employees.  He asserts the commission's reliance on 
this evidence as a basis for affirming his termination violated the City's 
personnel rules and his constitutional right to due process, and was arbitrary 
and capricious. 

 

[¶14]   The City concedes that Mr. Davis 
had a property interest in his employment as transit manager entitling him to 
due process.  The City argues, 
however, that no violation of city rules or due process occurred nor was the 
commission's reliance on the evidence arbitrary and capricious because Mr. Davis 
had adequate notice that the City intended to use the e-mail and then placed the 
e-mail into evidence himself.  As 
evidence of adequate notice, the City points to the statement of termination 
paragraph referencing Mr. Davis' alleged participation in non-work related 
activities as one of the reasons for his termination and its disclosure 
statement submitted in advance of the hearing, which it asserts included a copy 
of the e-mail. 

 

[¶15]   The termination notice did not 
specifically enumerate the non-work related activities that Mr. Davis admitted 
he engaged in during work hours.  
Instead, the notice stated as the third reason for 
termination:

 

Allegations 
by three employees that you play games on your Palm Pilot and participate in 
other non-work related activities during duty hours for which you were 
issued a letter of reprimand on September 28, 2001.2  (Violation of City Personnel Rules and 
Regulations, Chapter XII, Section 1 A. 11.) (emphasis 
added).

 

Chapter 
XII, Section 3.C of the personnel rules provided in relevant 
part:

 

Prior 
to dismissing an employee, the employee's department head and the personnel 
director will meet with the employee and explain the reasons for the intended 
action, providing an opportunity for the employee to respond to the proposed 
termination.  The employee will 
receive a written statement of termination that provides notification of the 
reasons for the proposed action and an effective date. . . 
.

 

The 
Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act further provides:

 

§ 
16-3-107.  Contested cases; general 
procedure.

 

   (a) In any contested case, all parties 
shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing after reasonable notice served 
personally or by mail.

    (b)  The notice shall include a statement 
of:

 

   . . .

 

      (iv) A short and 
plain statement of the matters asserted. 

 

[¶16]   It was not until after Mr. Davis' 
termination, in the City's pre-hearing disclosure statement, that the "other 
non-work related" activities were identified.3  Then, Mr. Davis admitted that he did 
cross word puzzles, personal bank business and personal e-mails during work 
hours.  Mr. Davis was not informed 
specifically about the e-mail until after his December 3 termination.  It is this lack of notice that he claims 
was arbitrary and capricious and violated the personnel policies and due 
process.     

 

[¶17]   We said in Lucero v. 
Mathews, 901 P.2d 1115, 1120 (Wyo. 1995) that public employees must be given 
notice sufficient to afford them a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of 
the opposing party and meet them.  
"The notice must contain adequate and specific notice of the charges for 
which the employee is being terminated."  
Id.  The notice must 
be sufficient to afford the employee "a real and meaningful opportunity to 
respond to every charge or allegation brought against him as a basis for 
termination."  Id. Absent an 
opportunity to respond to every allegation that is the basis for termination, a 
public employee has not been given a real and meaningful opportunity to be heard 
and is deprived of due process.  
Id. 

 

[¶18]   Based on these standards, we held 
in Powell v. Board of Trustees of Crook County School District No. 
1, 550 P.2d 1112 (Wyo. 1976) that the school board violated an employee's 
due process when it charged him with violating policies involving student 
discipline and then, without notice or a hearing, terminated him for inability 
to control student conduct.  Quoting 
Glenn v. Board of County Commissioners, Sheridan County, 440 P.2d 1, 4 (Wyo. 1968) we said:  "The 
important question is whether the parties had fair notice of the issues 
involved."   

 

[¶19]   We hold that Mr. Davis' due process 
rights were not violated by the City's failure to specifically reference the 
e-mail to his wife in the December 3 termination notice.  The termination notice mentioned Mr. 
Davis' use of his palm pilot "and other non-work related activities," putting 
him on notice that the palm pilot was not the only non-work related activity at 
issue.  By the time of the hearing, 
Mr. Davis was aware that the City had listed the e-mail as an exhibit and 
intended to rely upon it as one of the reasons for his termination.  Mr. Davis raised no objection to the 
e-mail prior to or during the hearing.  
The record supports the commission's decision affirming the termination. 

 

 

3.                  
Violation 
of personnel rules to Mr. Davis' detriment

 

[¶20]   Mr. Davis claims the City violated 
the personnel rules and his right to due process in failing to follow the 
progressive discipline procedure contained in the rules.  Specifically, he claims the City 
violated Section 3.A of the personnel rules, which 
provided:

 

Written 
reprimand.  A supervisor may censure 
an employee for cause by providing a written reprimand (correction interview) to 
the employee specifying the reason(s) for the reprimand, noting previous verbal 
warnings or discussions, as appropriate, and informing the employee of the 
corrective action necessary to avoid further discipline.  The original of the written correction 
interview will be placed in the employee's file in the Human Resources Office. 

 

Mr. 
Davis asserts the City did not issue a letter of reprimand within the meaning of 
this provision and it was error for the commission to conclude otherwise and to 
further conclude that he did not timely grieve the letter, making it final and 
non-appealable. 

 

[¶21]   Mr. Davis also contends the City 
violated the personnel rules governing investigations of sexual harassment 
allegations.  He claims the city 
attorney's office did not adequately perform or document its investigation as 
required by Section 3.F.4 of the personnel rules, which 
states:

 

            
During the investigation, reasonable efforts to substantiate the 
allegation will be made, including objective examination of the conduct of all 
involved parties, and detailed documentation by the investigator of all 
investigatory action taken, including express documentation of the investigation 
results.

 

Mr. 
Davis asserts, because of the City's failure to comply with its rules, the 
commission should not have considered the results of the investigation.  Mr. Davis also claims there was no 
credible evidence establishing that his use of his palm pilot and the other 
non-work related activities to which he admitted constituted unsatisfactory work 
performance within the meaning of Chapter XII, Section 1.A.11.      

 

[¶22]   The City argues that the personnel 
rules did not require a letter of reprimand to be placed in Mr. Davis' 
file.  The City contends such action 
is discretionary, as evidenced by the use of the word "may" in the first 
sentence of Section 3.A.  The City 
further contends Mr. Smith's decision not to place the reprimand in Mr. Davis' 
file has no bearing on whether his termination was warranted.  Finally, the City claims the question of 
whether Mr. Davis grieved or appealed the reprimand is irrelevant to the issue 
of whether he was properly terminated for conduct that he admitted to at the 
hearing.  Essentially, the City 
contends there was sufficient evidence warranting Mr. Davis' termination for 
cause without the administration of discipline in progressive 
stages.

 

[¶23]   We agree that the City was not 
required under the personnel rules to issue Mr. Davis a letter of reprimand or 
administer discipline in progressive stages.  The rules are clear that while the 
department head was expected to attempt to follow progressive discipline 
procedures, immediate termination was permissible in some circumstances.  Section 2.A of the rules 
provided:

 

A.     The 
department head shall, except in cases of flagrant employee behavior where 
termination would appear to be a reasonable result for this type of action, 
attempt to administer employee discipline in progressive stages to seek 
corrective results. . . .

 

B.     . 
. . Depending on the severity of the action, any step in Section 3 may be 
utilized.

 

Section 
3 provided for three types of discipline  written reprimand, suspension and 
termination.  Section 3.C.1 allowed 
the department head the discretion to terminate an employee "if the nature and 
extent of the just cause is such that other disciplinary action is not 
appropriate." 

 

[¶24]   The record in this case reflects 
that Mr. Davis was counseled in September 2001 concerning allegations of sexual 
harassment and mismanagement, which had resulted in a loss of confidence in him 
by his subordinates.  The record 
also reflects that two months later the City learned that the transit 
department, under Mr. Davis' management, failed to complete a report upon which 
a $600,000 grant was dependent.  
Although Mr. Davis testified that he delegated the responsibility for 
preparing and submitting the grant to his subordinate, other evidence 
established that the responsibility for preparing grants was one of the transit 
manager's essential functions and the City paid for Mr. Davis to receive 
training in preparing the grant.  
From the evidence in the record before us, we are not inclined to 
second-guess the commission's conclusion, based upon its observation of the 
witnesses and opportunity to weigh their credibility, that termination without 
further warning or suspension was warranted and in compliance with the personnel 
rules.    

     

 

4.         
Violation of Mr. Davis' First Amendment right to free 
speech

 

[¶25]   Mr. Davis asserts the commission 
violated his right to free speech in that its decision to uphold his termination 
was based in part on protected communications with the city attorney's office on 
matters of public concern (i.e. access of disabled persons to public pedestrian 
routes and safety issues) and a protected communication with his wife, which he 
alleges also involved a matter of public concern (the competency of the city 
attorney).  The City responds 
alternatively that the speech at issue was not protected, this Court should 
decline to address the question because it was not raised below and this Court 
cannot consider the question because it is not properly before 
us.

 

[¶26]   Our general rule is that we will 
not consider claims raised for the first time on appeal.  Cooper v. Town of Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 1208 (Wyo. 2000).  We 
recognize only two exceptions to that rule:  when the issue raises jurisdictional 
questions or it is of such a fundamental nature that it must be considered.  Id.  On this basis, in WW 
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 356 (Wyo. 1998), we 
declined to consider a substantive due process claim because it was not raised 
below.  We said:  "This court has taken a dim view of a 
litigant trying a case on one theory and appealing it on another. . . . Parties 
are bound by the theories they advanced below."  Id.

 

[¶27]   Mr. Davis did not claim his First 
Amendment rights were violated in the hearing before the commission.  The first mention of such a violation 
occurred in his petition for review to the district court.  The authority of the district court, and 
this Court, is limited to the issues raised before the agency.  Fisch v. Allsop, 4 P.3d 204, 209 
(Wyo. 2000). Because Mr. Davis did not claim his First Amendment rights were 
violated when the commission heard the matter, we decline to address the 
issue.            

 

 

5.         
Agency findings not supported by substantial 
evidence

 

[¶28]   Mr. Davis claims the commission's 
findings 5 through 21 were not supported by substantial evidence and are fatally 
flawed because they assert ultimate facts rather than basic facts as required by 
our holding in In re Billings v. State Board of Outfitters and Guides, 
2001 WY 81, ¶ 14, 30 P.3d 557, ¶ 14 (Wyo. 2001).  The City asserts substantial evidence 
was presented that Mr. Davis violated several personnel rules and performed his 
job in a deficient manner fully justifying the commission's decision to 
terminate him.  The City further 
contends the commission's order contains sufficient information about each 
ultimate fact for this Court to determine upon what basis it reached the 
ultimate facts and conclusions and, therefore, satisfies the requirements set 
forth in our prior case law. 

 

[¶29]   Having examined the entire record 
as we are required to do to determine whether there is substantial evidence to 
support the commission's findings, we conclude the commission's decision was 
supported by substantial evidence; that is, we find sufficient relevant evidence 
which a reasonable mind might accept as supporting Mr. Davis' termination.  There is a great deal more in the record 
before us than a scintilla of evidence supporting his termination.  Although standing alone some of the 
reasons given by the City for terminating Mr. Davis in our view would not 
warrant termination, considering the record as a whole we hold that the decision 
to terminate was supported by substantial evidence.  Giving due deference to the commission's 
opportunity to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the 
witnesses, we hold the findings and conclusions are not clearly contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence on record. 

 

 

6.         
Cumulative error

 

[¶30]   Mr. Davis claims the accumulation 
of error in the commission proceedings necessitates reversal because a 
reasonable possibility exists that absent the error his termination may have 
been reversed or because the error damaged the integrity and fairness of the 
process.  As set forth in the 
discussion above, we find in the record before us substantial evidence 
supporting the commission's decision.  
Additionally, we are not persuaded from our review of the record that the 
commission committed error in the manner in which it addressed the issues as 
framed by Mr. Davis.

 

[¶31]   Affirmed.                    
  

 

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107(o) also refers to findings as 
follows:

 

(o)     The 
record in a contested case must include:

. . 
.

(iv)  Any proposed findings 
or exceptions thereto:

(v)   Any opinion, 
findings, decision or order of the agency . . . . 

 

2The 
September 28, 2001, letter also referenced Mr. Davis playing games on his palm 
pilot "or engaging in other activities not related to the job." Like the 
termination notice, it did not enumerate the "other activities." 

 

3The 
City claims the e-mail was attached to its pre-hearing disclosure statement. The 
disclosure statement contained in the record before this Court has no 
attachments. However, it is apparent from the hearing transcript that Mr. Davis 
knew prior to his testimony that the City had submitted exhibits of e-mails from 
him to his wife.