Title: State ex rel. Gil-Llamas v. Hardin

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Gil-Llamas v. Hardin, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-1508.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-1508 
THE STATE EX REL. GIL-LLAMAS ET AL. v. HARDIN, PRESIDENT, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Gil-Llamas v. Hardin, Slip Opinion No.  
2021-Ohio-1508.] 
Elections—Mandamus—Writ of mandamus sought to compel Columbus City 
Council to submit to city electors a proposed municipal ordinance on the 
May 4, 2021 primary-election ballot—Council abused its discretion in 
finding relators’ initiative petition insufficient—Although relators are not 
entitled to writ ordering council to place proposed ordinance on the May 4 
ballot, relators are entitled to limited writ ordering council to find initiative 
petition sufficient and to proceed with process for an initiated ordinance 
under Columbus City Charter—Limited writ granted. 
(No. 2020-1466—Submitted March 30, 2021—Decided April 29, 2021.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
FISCHER, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 1} Relators, Irene Gil-Llamas, Christina L. Gonzaga, Tyrone Spence, 
Udell Hollins, and ProEnergy Ohio, L.L.C., seek a writ of mandamus to compel 
respondents, the members of the Columbus City Council—Columbus City Council 
President Shannon G. Hardin, President Pro Tempore Elizabeth Brown, and council 
members Rob Dorans, Mitchell J. Brown, Shayla Favor, Emmanuel V. Remy, and 
Priscilla R. Tyson (collectively, “the council”)—to submit to city of Columbus 
electors a proposed municipal-ordinance initiative on the May 4, 2021 primary-
election ballot.  The council declined to submit the initiative to the electors because 
it found relators’ initiative petition deficient in form. 
{¶ 2} We hold that relators have demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence that the council abused its discretion in finding relators’ initiative petition 
insufficient.  Although relators are not entitled to the full relief that they seek in 
mandamus—a writ ordering the council to place the proposed ordinance on the May 
4, 2021 primary-election ballot—we hold that relators are entitled to a limited writ 
of mandamus ordering the council to find the petition sufficient and to proceed with 
the process for an initiated ordinance under Columbus City Charter Section 43-1 et 
seq. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Overview of the Initiative Process Under the Columbus City Charter 
{¶ 3} Under the home-rule powers granted to municipalities by the Ohio 
Constitution, a municipality’s charter may contain provisions that govern the 
initiative and referendum process for local ordinances.  State ex rel. Harris v. 
Rubino, 155 Ohio St.3d 123, 2018-Ohio-3609, 119 N.E.3d 1238, ¶ 15-16; see 
generally Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, Sections 3 and 7.  The Columbus City 
Charter does so.  See Charter Sections 42 through 42-15 and 43 through 43-4. 
{¶ 4} When an initiative petition proposing a Columbus ordinance is filed 
with the city, the city attorney must advise the city council on the legal sufficiency 
of the petition.  Id. at Section 42-9.  Further, the city clerk must forward the petition 
January Term, 2021 
 
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to the board of elections and the board must determine the number of valid 
signatures on the petition.  Id.  Upon receipt of a report regarding the number of 
valid signatures on the petition, the council must determine the sufficiency of the 
petition.  Id. at Section 43-1.  If the council finds the petition sufficient, it must vote 
within 30 days to either adopt the proposed ordinance or submit it to a vote of the 
city’s electors.  Id. 
B.  Relators’ Proposed Ordinance 
{¶ 5} Gil-Llamas, Gonzaga, Spence, and Hollins are members of a 
committee formed by ProEnergy Ohio, L.L.C., whose purpose is to gather 
signatures for an initiative petition proposing a Columbus ordinance and to support 
the ordinance’s passage.  The proposed ordinance would require the city to establish 
four separate funds totaling $87 million, including (1) a $10 million “Energy 
Conservation and Energy Efficiency Fund,” (2) a $10 million “Clean Energy 
Education and Training Fund,” (3) a $10 million “Minority Business Enterprise 
Clean Energy Development Fund,” and (4) a $57 million “Columbus Clean Energy 
Partnership Fund.” 
{¶ 6} On October 16, 2020, relators filed their initiative petition with the 
city clerk under Columbus City Charter Section 42-7.  As required by Charter 
Section 42-9, the city clerk forwarded a copy of the petition to the city attorney and 
the Franklin County Board of Elections.  The board certified the petition as 
containing a sufficient number of valid signatures for placement on the ballot.  The 
city attorney, however, advised the council that the petition was deficient under 
Charter Section 42-2(e), because it did not include a title that sufficiently described 
the content of the proposed ordinance.  Consistent with the city attorney’s 
advisement, the council found that relators’ initiative petition failed to meet the 
mandatory requirements established in the Columbus City Charter and passed an 
ordinance stating that relators’ initiative would not be submitted to the Columbus 
electors. 
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{¶ 7} Relators commenced this action on December 4, 2020, seeking a writ 
of mandamus to compel the council to submit the proposed ordinance to the electors 
on the May 4, 2021 primary-election ballot.  This court denied the council’s motion 
to dismiss, granted an alternative writ, and set a schedule for the submission of 
evidence and merit briefs.  161 Ohio St.3d 1424, 2021-Ohio-320, 162 N.E.3d 803.  
The parties filed evidence and merit briefs.  Relators also filed “supplemental 
evidence” and “amended evidence” beyond the deadline for the submission of 
evidence and without leave of court.  Relators filed objections to the council’s 
evidence, and the council filed a motion to strike relators’ supplemental evidence.  
Relators also filed a motion to expedite this matter. 
II.  EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 
{¶ 8} Before we address the merits of this case, we resolve several 
evidentiary issues that have arisen during the course of this litigation.  For the 
reasons stated below, we overrule relators’ objections to the council’s evidence, 
grant the council’s motion to strike relators’ supplemental evidence, and sua sponte 
strike relators’ amended evidence. 
A.  Relators’ Objections to the Council’s Evidence 
{¶ 9} Relators object on relevance grounds to two pieces of evidence 
submitted by the council: (1) Exhibit A-5, which is a copy of an envelope 
postmarked November 25, 2020, and addressed to Gonzaga at the Columbus 
address listed on the precirculated copy of relators’ initiative petition, and which is 
marked “return to sender” and has a forwarding address in Houston, Texas, and (2) 
Exhibit B, which is a certified copy of a Franklin County indictment of “John A. 
Clark Jr. AKA John Alexander Clarke Jr.” for felony election falsification and 
felony tampering with records.  We overrule relators’ objections to that evidence. 
{¶ 10} Relators argue that Exhibit A-5, the copy of the envelope submitted 
by the council, is not relevant to whether Gonzaga was a Columbus elector when 
the initiative petition was circulated for signatures, because the mailing of the 
January Term, 2021 
 
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envelope occurred after the initiative petition was filed.  Relators also argue that 
Exhibit A-5 is “a transparent attempt to accuse the Relators of lying that Ms. 
Gonzaga was a resident and elector of the City of Columbus,” and is inadmissible 
under Evid.R. 403(A) because its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues.  The council argues that 
Exhibit A-5 is directly relevant to whether Gonzaga was a qualified elector of 
Columbus. 
{¶ 11} Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Evid.R. 401.  We agree with the council that the envelope exhibit is 
relevant in this matter and is thus admissible under Evid.R. 402 (relevant evidence 
is generally admissible) and that its probative value outweighs any alleged undue 
prejudice and does not confuse the issues, Evid.R. 403(A).  Therefore, we overrule 
relators’ objections to the admission of the council’s Exhibit A-5. 
{¶ 12} Relators also argue that the council’s Exhibit B, the certified copy of 
the indictment, is inadmissible because it is irrelevant and is unduly prejudicial and 
confuses the issues before this court.  The council argues that this evidence is 
relevant to its argument that the proposed ordinance’s title is misleading.  It is true 
that Exhibit B has little relevance regarding whether the proposed ordinance’s title 
is misleading or is otherwise invalid under Columbus City Charter Section 42-2(e).  
But this court considers only relevant, material, and competent evidence.  See State 
v. Bays, 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 28-29, 716 N.E.2d 1126 (1999) (the court is presumed 
to have considered only relevant, material, and competent evidence; the court is 
presumed to have been unaffected by allegedly inflammatory evidence).  Therefore, 
we overrule relators’ objection to the council’s Exhibit B. 
 
 
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B.  The Council’s Motion to Strike Relators’ Supplemental Evidence 
{¶ 13} On March 2, 2021, relators filed supplemental evidence—an 
affidavit of relator Gonzaga—to rebut any assertion that Gonzaga was not a 
qualified elector of Columbus, Ohio.  The council moved to strike that evidence as 
untimely because it was filed after this court’s deadline for submitting evidence.  
Relators oppose the council’s motion to strike the evidence, arguing that they are 
entitled to present rebuttal evidence under this court’s decision in Phung v. Waste 
Mgt. Inc., 71 Ohio St.3d 408, 410-411, 644 N.E.2d 286 (1994), and that in any 
event, S.Ct.Prac.R. 3.13 allows them to amend their evidence.  Thus, relators argue 
that their supplemental evidence was timely filed.  Relators are wrong. 
{¶ 14} This court’s decision in Phung is inapposite.  In Phung, we held that 
in the context of a trial, a party has “an unconditional right” to present rebuttal 
evidence in response to evidence submitted in the opposing party’s case-in-chief.  
Id. at 411.  But this is an extraordinary-writ proceeding in which this court ordered 
the parties to submit “any evidence they intend[ed] to present” by a deadline, 161 
Ohio St.3d 1424, 2021-Ohio-320, 162 N.E.3d 803.  And relators’ reliance on 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 3.13(A) is misplaced.  Although that rule allows a party to “make 
corrections or additions to a previously filed document,” division (B) of the rule 
provides that the revised document “shall be filed within the time permitted by the[] 
rules,”  S.Ct.Prac.R. 3.13(B).  Because we set a deadline for the submission of 
evidence under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.05, which relators failed to meet, relators’ 
submission of its supplemental evidence was untimely.  Finally, relators failed to 
seek leave of this court to file the supplemental evidence.  Accordingly, we grant 
the council’s motion to strike relators’ supplemental evidence. 
C.  We Strike Relators’ Untimely Amended Evidence 
{¶ 15} Relators filed their amended evidence to make corrections and add 
to their earlier filed evidence.  Relators purported to file their amended evidence 
under S.Ct.Prac.R. 3.13(A), declaring that the submission “relat[es] back” to their 
January Term, 2021 
 
7
original evidence filing.  But relators are mistaken, as there is no provision in 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 3.13(A) allowing evidence to relate back to earlier filed evidence.  
Because relators’ submission of the amended evidence was untimely, they had to 
first seek leave of this court before they submitted their amended evidence.  
Because they did not do so, we will not consider the amendments to relators’ 
evidence submitted on March 11, 2021. 
D.  Relators’ Argument that Certain Facts in Their Complaint Are 
Uncontroverted 
{¶ 16} Relators also argue that even in the absence of their supplemental 
and amended evidence, Gonzaga’s status as a qualified elector of Columbus and 
the content of the signed version of their initiative petition filed with the city on 
October 16, 2020, are still uncontroverted.  Specifically, relators argue that because 
the council did not file an answer to relators’ complaint within 14 days after this 
court denied the council’s motion to dismiss the complaint, the facts alleged by 
relators in their complaint should be deemed admitted under Civ.R. 8(D).  See also 
Civ.R. 12(A)(2)(a) (when a defendant files a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer 
to a complaint, the responsive pleading is due within 14 days after notice of the 
court’s denial of the motion). 
{¶ 17} In original actions filed in this court, the Rules of Civil Procedure 
supplement this court’s rules of practice “unless [they are] clearly inapplicable.”  
S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.01(A)(2)(b).  In this case, Civ.R. 12(A)(2)(a) is clearly 
inapplicable.  When we denied the council’s motion to dismiss, we granted an 
alternative writ and set a schedule for the presentation of evidence and briefing 
under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.05.  The grant of an alternative writ supersedes the operation 
of Civ.R. 12(A)(2)(a).  Simply put, our rules do not contemplate an answer being 
filed after we grant an alternative writ.  When denying a motion to dismiss and 
ordering a respondent to file an answer to the complaint in an original action, this 
court has specified such a procedure and not granted an alternative writ.  See, e.g., 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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State ex rel. Moir v. Kovack, 142 Ohio St.3d 1474, 2015-Ohio-2104, 31 N.E.3d 
653; State ex rel. Schiffbauer v. Banaszak, 141 Ohio St.3d 1486, 2015-Ohio-842, 
26 N.E.3d 822.  Accordingly, the council’s failure  to file an answer to the 
complaint is of no consequence here. 
{¶ 18} In sum, the factual allegations in relators’ complaint are not deemed 
admitted.  The evidence properly before this court consists of relators’ evidence 
filed on February 16, 2021, and the council’s evidence filed on February 23.  
Relators’ supplemental and amended evidence is stricken. 
III.  ANALYSIS OF RELATORS’ MANDAMUS CLAIM 
{¶ 19} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, relators must establish (1) a 
clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of 
respondents to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of the law.  State ex rel. Oberlin Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. Talarico, 
106 Ohio St.3d 481, 2005-Ohio-5061, 836 N.E.2d 529, ¶ 11.  Relators must prove 
those requirements by clear and convincing evidence.  State ex rel. Scott v. Franklin 
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 139 Ohio St.3d 171, 2014-Ohio-1685, 10 N.E.3d 697, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 20} In order for relators to establish a clear legal right to relief and a clear 
legal duty of the council to provide it, relators must show that the council engaged 
in fraud or corruption or abused its discretion in refusing to submit the proposed 
ordinance for placement on the ballot.  See State ex rel. Nauth v. Dirham, 161 Ohio 
St.3d 365, 2020-Ohio-4208, 163 N.E.3d 526, ¶ 11-13.  Because relators do not 
allege fraud or corruption, this court must determine whether relators have shown 
that the council abused its discretion.  Id. at ¶ 13.  We hold that relators have met 
that burden. 
 
 
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A.  The Council Abused Its Discretion in Finding Relators’ Petition 
Insufficient 
1.  Absence of the Signed Petition Is Not Fatal to Relators’ Claim 
{¶ 21} The council argues that relators cannot show an entitlement to 
mandamus relief because the signed version of the initiative petition that relators 
filed with the city of Columbus on October 16, 2020, is not in evidence.  Relators 
included with their complaint and evidence a copy of only the precirculated 
petition.  Although relators attempted to file with this court the signed version of 
the petition as Exhibit 10 to their amended evidence, as discussed above, this court 
must disregard the amended evidence because it was untimely filed without leave 
of court, see 161 Ohio St.3d 1424, 2021-Ohio-320, 162 N.E.3d 803.  Nevertheless, 
the question of the sufficiency of the petition is still before this court. 
{¶ 22} Relators submitted as evidence the precirculated copy of the petition, 
which was filed with the city clerk in October 2019.  The parties do not dispute that 
relators also filed with the city clerk a copy of the initiative petition with the 
electors’ signatures on October 16, 2020, which was forwarded to the city attorney 
for review.  The city attorney reviewed the copy and reported the alleged 
deficiencies in the petition to the council on November 6, 2020.  Notably, the city 
attorney stated: “The form and content of the part-petitions filed on October 16, 
2020 are the same as that of the pre-circulation filing * * *.”  Thus, we may examine 
the content of the precirculated version of the petition submitted as evidence in 
order to determine the sufficiency of the signed version of the petition. 
2.  The Council Abused Its Discretion in Determining that the Petition Is  
Insufficient for Failure to Comply with the Columbus City Charter’s Requirement 
for the Title of the Proposal 
{¶ 23} The council specifically rejected relators’ proposal for placement on 
the ballot for failure to comply with the title requirement for proposed ordinances 
under Section 42-2(e) of the Columbus City Charter.  More specifically, the council 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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argues that the proposed ordinance’s title omits a reference to (1) the establishment 
of a “Minority Business Enterprise Clean Energy Development Fund” and (2) the 
fact that the ordinance would delegate the city’s contracting authority to private 
parties. 
{¶ 24} The purpose of the title requirement is to immediately alert signers 
to the nature of the proposed legislation.  See State ex rel. Carrier v. Hilliard City 
Council, 144 Ohio St.3d 592, 2016-Ohio-155, 45 N.E.3d 1006, ¶ 12.  While 
omitting a title altogether is a fatal defect “because it interferes with a petition’s 
ability to fairly and substantially present the issue and might mislead electors,” 
Christy v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, 77 Ohio St.3d 35, 38, 671 N.E.2d 1 (1996), 
the council does not argue that the proposed ordinance completely lacks a title.  
Rather, the council contends that the proposed ordinance’s title does not adequately 
summarize the totality of its substance.  The council further emphasizes that the 
title requirement in Charter Section 42-2(e) is more demanding than those for 
municipal-ordinance-initiative titles under R.C. 731.31. 
{¶ 25} Although Charter Section 42-2(e), which requires a title to “clearly 
and without argument describe the proposed ordinance,” controls over the general 
provisions regarding ordinance initiatives in the Revised Code,  see R.C. 731.41,  
the council’s argument that relators’ title omits required information is problematic, 
if not unreasoned, on its face.  The proposed ordinance’s title, which is more than 
150 words long as it is, already sufficiently describes the substance of the proposed 
ordinance.  The title states that the proposed ordinance would require the city 
auditor to transfer from the general fund (1) $10 million to an “Energy Conservation 
and Energy Efficiency Fund,” (2) $10 million to a “Clean Energy Education and 
Training Fund,” (3) $10 million for the purpose of funding a minority-business-
development program, and (4) $57 million for the purpose of funding an electricity-
subsidy program for Columbus residents.  The title therefore describes the 
ordinance and what it would principally do: provide for the expenditure of $87 
January Term, 2021 
 
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million for specific purposes.  The title more than adequately describes the 
substance of the proposed ordinance. 
{¶ 26} The omission in the title of the name of the minority-business-
development fund sought to be created (the “Minority Business Enterprise Clean 
Energy Development Fund”) does not make the title’s description of the ordinance 
inaccurate.  Nor does the title’s lack of a specific reference to the fact that the 
ordinance would potentially cause funds to be transferred to private entities for 
expenditure render the title deficient. 
{¶ 27} At its core, the proposed ordinance calls for the city to allocate a 
significant amount of public funds for specific purposes relating to clean energy 
and minority-business enterprises involving clean energy.  The title states the 
amount of money that the ordinance would commit the city to spend and the 
purposes of the expenditures.  While the mechanics of how the money would be 
spent is significant as a matter of city policy, the omission of this detail from the 
title of the proposed ordinance does not make the title deficient under Section 42-
2(e) of the Columbus City Charter. 
{¶ 28} Perhaps recognizing this, the council essentially argues that the title 
is deficient because it does not fully capture every facet of the proposed ordinance.  
But the Columbus City Charter requires a title, not a summary.  See Charter Section 
42-2(e) and (f). 
{¶ 29} Indeed, Charter Section 42-2(e) specifically requires a proposal to 
have a title and Charter Section 42-2(f) expressly rejects the requirement of a 
summary.  It is only in the event that the council finds that an initiative petition 
satisfies the Charter’s requirements and submits the proposed ordinance to the 
electors that “city council shall prescribe a brief summary of [the proposed 
ordinance], which shall be accurate, shall not be misleading, and shall be without 
material omission or arguments.”  (Emphasis added).  Id. at Section 43-3.  In 
contrast, a title need only “describe the proposed ordinance.”  Id. at Section 42-
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2(e).  While the features of the proposed ordinance cited by the council might be 
required for a summary of the ordinance, their omission does not render its title 
deficient under the Columbus City Charter. 
{¶ 30} The council also argues that the title of the proposed ordinance 
rendered the petition misleading.  But absent evidence that the title had the potential 
to mislead the initiative petition’s signers, the title’s failure to capture every detail 
of the proposed ordinance is not a basis for invalidating the petition.  See Christy, 
77 Ohio St.3d at 38, 671 N.E.2d 1; Stutzman v. Madison Cty. Bd. of Elections, 93 
Ohio St.3d 511, 515, 757 N.E.2d 297 (2001).  Crucially, the council presents no 
such evidence here. 
{¶ 31} Instead, the council argues that the title “could have easily misled 
signatories” because the title does not specify that the proposed ordinance would 
result in a “marked departure from typical public expenditure and procurement 
practices.”  That argument, though, overlooks the fact that the full text of the 
proposed ordinance was included with the part-petitions that were circulated for 
signatures. 
{¶ 32} “Generally, inclusion of the full text of an amendment or ordinance 
on a petition satisfies all constitutional and statutory requirements * * * because the 
full text * * * usually fairly and substantially presents the issue to petition signers.”  
State ex rel. Hackworth v. Hughes, 97 Ohio St.3d 110, 2002-Ohio-5334, 776 
N.E.2d 1050, ¶ 33.  In this case, that means that relators provided signatories with 
the specific information the council complains is missing from the title. 
{¶ 33} Thus, while it is true that under the home-rule powers granted to 
municipalities by the Ohio Constitution, municipalities have some authority to 
enact their own procedures and requirements as to initiative petitions, Rubino, 155 
Ohio St.3d 123, 2018-Ohio-3609, 119 N.E.3d 1238, at ¶ 15-16, in this case, the 
council applied Section 42-2(e) of the Columbus City Charter unreasonably to 
require the title to be so detailed as to be a summary of the proposed ordinance, 
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even though the Charter does not require a summary.  For these reasons, the 
council’s decision finding the petition insufficient as to its form was an abuse of 
discretion. 
3.  The Composition of the Committee’s Membership Did Not Create a Deficiency 
in Relators’ Initiative Petition 
{¶ 34} The council also argues that relators’ initiative petition is deficient 
because, in their view, relator Gonzaga was not a qualified elector of the city of 
Columbus, and Williams has passed away and “is no longer a petition committee 
member.”  These arguments are without merit. 
{¶ 35} Charter Section 42-3 requires an initiative petition to “bear the 
names of five qualified electors of the city of Columbus, who shall represent the 
petitioners in all matters relating to such petitions and shall be known as the petition 
committee.”  Gonzaga and Williams are two of the committee members listed on 
the initiative petition. 
{¶ 36} Relying on a returned envelope submitted as evidence showing a 
Houston, Texas forwarding address for Gonzaga, the council contends that 
Gonzaga is no longer a qualified elector and that relators thus failed to abide by 
Columbus City Charter Section 42-3.  However, relator Gil-Llamas has testified by 
affidavit that Gonzaga was a qualified elector of Columbus when the initiative 
petition was circulated.  The council’s evidence does not refute this testimony.  All 
that the returned envelope shows is that Gonzaga had a forwarding address in 
Houston, Texas on November 25, 2020, after the initiative petition had been filed 
with the city.  The forwarding address does not necessarily mean that Gonzaga was 
no longer a qualified elector of Columbus at that time, much less that she was no 
longer a qualified elector during the time that the initiative petition was circulated 
and filed.  Therefore, this is not a valid reason to find relators’ petition insufficient. 
{¶ 37} The council also argues that because Williams has passed away, the 
petition committee lacks a sufficient number of members under the Columbus City  
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Charter.  The filing of the petition, the city attorney’s issuance of its memorandum 
regarding the petition, the Franklin County Board of Elections’ certification of the 
petition, and the city clerk’s reading of the signature-validation report all predated 
Williams’s death.  The council found the petition insufficient on the same day that 
Williams passed away.  The evidence thus demonstrates that Williams was a 
qualified elector at all times pertinent to the petition process.  Had the council not 
abused its discretion, Williams’s death would not be an issue here. 
{¶ 38} But regardless, the council’s arguments regarding the composition 
of the committee are without merit.  The council makes a sweeping argument that 
Williams’s death caused the petition committee to have an insufficient number of 
members and that the petition was therefore invalid, but it provides no legal support 
for that argument.  This court will not supply such support on its behalf.  We 
therefore reject the council’s assertion that Williams’s death is a valid reason to 
find relators’ petition insufficient. 
4.  Relators Are Entitled to a Limited Writ of Mandamus 
{¶ 39} For the reasons set forth above, the council abused its discretion in 
finding relators’ petition insufficient.  But for a writ to issue, relators must 
demonstrate that they are entitled to the relief sought.  Oberlin Citizens for 
Responsible Dev., 106 Ohio St.3d 481, 2005-Ohio-5061, 836 N.E.2d 529, at ¶ 11.  
“[T]he relator has the burden to show the existence of a legal right and a legal duty 
that are clear.”  State ex rel. Syx v. Stow City Council, 161 Ohio St.3d 201, 2020-
Ohio-4393, 161 N.E.3d 639, ¶ 27. 
{¶ 40} Relators argue that the council was wrong to find their petition 
insufficient, and they seek a writ of mandamus “ordering [the council] to submit 
Relators’ proposed Columbus City Ordinance for a vote of the electors in the May 
4, 2021 Primary Election.”  But relators cannot demonstrate a clear legal right to 
have the proposed ordinance submitted to the Columbus electors at the May 4 
primary election. 
January Term, 2021 
 
15 
{¶ 41} If the council had found relators’ initiative petition sufficient, 
Columbus City Charter Section 43-1 dictates what would have happened next: 
 
Should the council find [an ordinance-initiative] petition sufficient, 
it shall vote within thirty days to either adopt the proposed ordinance 
without alteration, or by ordinance forthwith order and provide for 
the submission of such proposed ordinance in its original form to a 
vote of the electors of the city. 
 
{¶ 42} Thus, the city council’s finding that a petition is sufficient does not 
automatically mean that the proposed initiative goes on the ballot.  Rather, a 
sufficiency finding by the city council triggers a requirement that it take further 
action—adopting the ordinance or submitting it to the electors—within 30 days. 
{¶ 43} And even if the council had found relators’ petition sufficient and 
decided to submit it to the electors, the proposed initiative would not necessarily go 
on the May 4 primary-election ballot.  If the council, by ordinance, chooses to 
submit a proposed initiative to the electors, the Charter provides the following: 
 
The aforesaid ordinance [submitting the proposed ordinance 
to the electors] shall require that such proposed ordinance be 
submitted at the next regular municipal election if one shall occur 
not less than sixty nor more than one-hundred-twenty days after its 
passage.  If no such election will be held within the period herein 
provided, the council shall, at its sole discretion, order and provide 
for the submission of such proposed ordinance to a vote of the 
electors of the city at either a special election within such period, or 
at the next regular municipal election. 
 
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(Emphasis added.)  Columbus City Charter Section 43-2.  Thus, even if the council 
had found relators’ petition sufficient on November 25, 2020 (i.e., the date of the 
ordinance finding relators’ petition insufficient), and voted within 30 days to 
submit the proposed ordinance to the electors, there was no “regular municipal 
election” that occurred within the 60-to-120-day parameter mandated in Charter 
Section 43-2.  See id. at Section 41(a) (defining “regular municipal elections” as 
those occurring in November of odd-numbered years).  Thus, under Charter Section 
43-2, it was within the council’s “sole discretion” to either order a special election 
or submit the initiative for a vote at the next regular municipal election, which will 
occur on November 2, 2021.  To the extent that relators seek a writ of mandamus 
ordering the council to submit the proposed ordinance at a special election on the 
May 4 primary-election ballot, they are not entitled to such relief, because the 
calling of a special election is at the council’s sole discretion.  A writ of mandamus 
will not issue to control the discretion of a municipality’s legislative authority.  
State ex rel. Obojski v. Perciak, 113 Ohio St.3d 486, 2007-Ohio-2453, 866 N.E.2d 
1070, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 44} But this court will not entirely foreclose relators’ request for relief.  
In addition to the specific relief sought by relators, they have also requested “such 
other relief that this Court deems just and proper.”  Just and proper relief is a limited 
writ of mandamus ordering the council to proceed with relators’ initiative petition 
under the process set forth for initiated ordinances under Columbus City Charter 
Section 43-1 et seq. 
{¶ 45} This ruling is not unprecedented for this court.  Indeed, this court has 
granted a limited writ of mandamus under similar circumstances.  See, e.g., State 
ex rel. Dunn v. Plain Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 159 Ohio St.3d 139, 2020-
Ohio-339, 149 N.E.3d 460, ¶ 26 (granting a “limited writ of mandamus” ordering 
performance of “duties required by law for the potential placement of the proposal” 
on the ballot).  Because the council abused its discretion in finding relators’ 
January Term, 2021 
 
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initiative petition insufficient, a limited writ of mandamus requiring the council to 
go forward with the process set forth in Charter Section 43-1 et seq. is appropriate. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 46} We hold that the council abused its discretion in finding relators’ 
initiative petition insufficient and grant relators a limited writ of mandamus 
ordering the council to find the petition sufficient and to proceed with the process 
for an initiated ordinance under Columbus City Charter Section 43-1 et seq.  And 
as noted above, we overrule relators’ objections to the council’s evidence and grant 
the council’s motion to strike relators’ supplemental evidence.  We sua sponte strike 
relators’ amended evidence and deny relators’ motion to expedite as moot. 
Limited writ granted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DEWINE, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
BRUNNER, J., dissents. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 47} In this case, relators, Irene Gil-Llamas, Christina L. Gonzaga, 
Tyrone Spence, Udell Hollins, and ProEnergy Ohio, L.L.C., seek a writ of 
mandamus ordering respondents, Columbus City Council President Shannon G. 
Hardin, President Pro Tempore Elizabeth Brown, and council members Rob 
Dorans, Mitchell J. Brown, Shayla Favor, Emmanuel V. Remy, and Pricilla R. 
Tyson (collectively, “the council”), “to submit Relators’ proposed Columbus City 
Ordinance for a vote of the electors in the May 4, 2021 Primary Election.”  This is 
the only specific mandamus relief that relators seek.  The majority determines that 
relators cannot have that relief.  That determination should end this case.  Therefore, 
I dissent from the majority’s judgment granting a limited writ. 
{¶ 48} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, relators must establish (1) a 
clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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respondents to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of the law.  State ex rel. Oberlin Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. Talarico, 
106 Ohio St.3d 481, 2005-Ohio-5061, 836 N.E.2d 529, ¶ 11.  Relators must prove 
those requirements by clear and convincing evidence.  State ex rel. Scott v. Franklin 
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 139 Ohio St.3d 171, 2014-Ohio-1685, 10 N.E.3d 697, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 49} Relators argue that the council was wrong to find their petition 
insufficient, and they seek a writ of mandamus “ordering [the council] to submit 
Relators’ proposed Columbus City Ordinance for a vote of the electors in the May 
4, 2021 Primary Election.”  But in this case, we need not reach the question whether 
the council erred in finding the initiative petition insufficient.  The majority agrees 
that even if relators’ petition is sufficient under the Columbus City Charter, they 
have not shown a clear legal right to have their petition submitted to the Columbus 
electors at the May 4 primary election or a clear legal duty on the part of the council 
to submit it at the election. 
{¶ 50} But despite that determination, the majority grants relators 
something that they do not seek: an order instructing the council to find relators’ 
initiative petition sufficient and to follow the Columbus City Charter’s process for 
the consideration of an initiated ordinance.  Even if the council had found relators’ 
initiative petition sufficient of its own volition, Columbus City Charter Section 43-
1 does not require the council to place the proposal on the May 4, 2021 ballot.  
Nothing further can happen until the council either adopts the ordinance itself 
without alteration or “by ordinance forthwith order[s] and provide[s] for the 
submission of such proposed ordinance in its original form to a vote of the electors 
of the city.”  Id.  Charter Section 43-2 then states: 
 
The aforesaid ordinance [submitting the proposed ordinance 
to the electors] shall require that such proposed ordinance be 
submitted at the next regular municipal election if one shall occur 
January Term, 2021 
 
19 
not less than sixty nor more than one-hundred-twenty days after its 
passage.  If no such election will be held within the period herein 
provided, the council shall, at its sole discretion, order and provide 
for the submission of such proposed ordinance to a vote of the 
electors of the city at either a special election within such period, or 
at the next regular municipal election. 
 
 (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 51} Therefore, in granting the limited writ, the majority forces the 
council to decide either to adopt the proposed ordinance itself or to determine at 
which election it should be put before the people for a vote.  If only relators had 
thought to ask for that relief, it might be appropriate.  But today, the majority 
provides the mandamus request as well as the relief.  That decision is counter to the 
core elements of a mandamus claim: “[I]n a mandamus case, the relator has the 
burden to show the existence of a legal right and a legal duty that are clear.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Syx v. Stow City Council, 161 Ohio St.3d 201, 2020-
Ohio-4393, 161 N.E.3d 639, ¶ 27.  It is not the province of this court to take on 
relators’ burden in mandamus. 
{¶ 52} The majority explains that this court has issued a limited writ before, 
offering the example of State ex rel. Dunn v. Plain Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 
159 Ohio St.3d 139, 2020-Ohio-339, 149 N.E.3d 460.  In that case, citizens sought 
a writ of mandamus ordering a school board to certify to the board of elections a 
proposal to transfer territory from one school district to another and an order 
compelling the elections board to place the proposal on the March 17, 2020 ballot, 
id. at ¶ 1, 2, 6.  In granting a limited writ, this court required the school board to 
forward the proposal to the board of elections, but we did not order the board of 
elections to put the proposal on the ballot, because the board of elections had 
remaining statutory duties to review and examine the petition under R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
20 
3501.11(K)(1) and to perform any other duties required by law for the potential 
placement of the proposal on the March 17, 2020 ballot.  Id. at ¶ 26.  This court 
concluded, “If the board determines that the petition otherwise meets the 
requirements established by law, then it shall place the proposal on the March 17 
ballot notwithstanding the 90-day requirement set forth in R.C. 3311.242(B)(2).”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. 
{¶ 53} Therefore, the ultimate aim of the mandamus complaint in Dunn—
the placement of the transfer proposal on the March 17, 2020 ballot—was 
enforceable in mandamus.  And the relators in Dunn had specifically sought the 
relief this court ordered against the school board.  This court did not order the next 
step of relief that the relators sought against the board of elections. 
{¶ 54} Here, relators do not seek separate relief from different 
governmental entities such that relief as to only one of those entities is appropriate.  
And, unlike in Dunn, the ultimate aim of relators’ mandamus complaint in this case 
is not achievable. 
{¶ 55} Relators are required to seek appropriate relief in mandamus.  In 
State ex rel. Maxcy v. Saferin, 155 Ohio St.3d 496, 2018-Ohio-4035, 122 N.E.3d 
1165, the relators sought a writ of mandamus ordering the board of elections to 
place a proposed city-charter amendment on the ballot; the board of elections had 
rejected the proposed amendment because it contained provisions that it said were 
beyond the power of the city to enact by initiative.  Id. at ¶ 1, 5.  This court held 
that the board of elections did not have the authority to determine whether a 
proposed amendment to a municipal charter falls within the scope of authority to 
enact via initiative.  Id. at ¶ 13, 22.  We held that a board of elections plays only a 
ministerial role once a city council has passed an ordinance to place a proposed 
charter amendment on the ballot.  Id. at ¶ 19.  Even though this court held that the 
board of elections did not have the power to keep the proposed ordinance off the 
ballot, we did not grant a writ of mandamus ordering the proposed charter 
January Term, 2021 
 
21 
amendment to be placed on the ballot, because the city council had failed to pass 
an ordinance submitting the proposed ordinance to the electors.  Id. at ¶ 19-24.  We 
determined, “The city council failed to fulfill that duty in the first instance, but 
relators have not named it as a party in this mandamus action or sought a writ 
compelling it to comply with that duty.” Id. at ¶ 22.  The relators in Maxcy had 
therefore failed to seek the correct relief, and despite the fact that they were correct 
that the board of elections had acted outside its authority, we did not order the 
proposed charter amendment to be placed on the ballot. 
{¶ 56} Like the relators in Maxcy, relators here did not seek the correct 
relief.  So why would we engage in an act beyond the requested relief?  Relators 
have no legal right and the council has no legal duty to place the proposed ordinance 
on the ballot for the May 4, 2021 election.  It is unnecessary for this court to decide 
more than that.  Simply denying the writ is consistent with our duty not to issue 
advisory opinions and is faithful to  “ ‘the cardinal principle of judicial restraint—
if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more,’ ” State ex 
rel. LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 
462, ¶ 51, quoting PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement 
Administration, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C.Cir.2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part 
and in judgment). 
{¶ 57} Therefore, because I would deny relators’ request for a writ of 
mandamus and would not issue a limited writ, I dissent. 
_________________ 
Fitrakis & Gadell-Newton, L.L.C., Robert J. Fitrakis, and Constance A. 
Gadell-Newton, for relators. 
Zach Klein, Columbus City Attorney, and Richard N. Coglianese and 
Rebecca E. Wilson, Assistant City Attorneys, for respondents. 
_________________