Title: Wyoming Dept. of Employment, Div. of Unemployment Ins. v. Patrick

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Wyoming Dept. of Employment, Div. of Unemployment Ins. v. Patrick1991 WY 124818 P.2d 54Case Number: 91-79Decided: 09/25/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, 
DIVISION OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, PETITIONER,

 
 
v.

 
 
THE HONORABLE H. HUNTER PATRICK, 
RESPONDENT.

 
 
William G. Hibbler, Sr. Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Casper, for 
petitioner.

 
 
Richard J. Albanese, DeputyParkCountyAtty., Cody, for 
respondent.

 
 
Before URBIGKIT, C.J., CARDINE 
and MACY, JJ., and SPANGLER and TAYLOR, District Judges. 

 
 
OPINION

 
 

SPANGLER, District 
Judge.

 
 

[¶1.]      Petitioner 
Wyoming Department of Employment, Division of Unemployment Insurance was granted 
a Writ of Certiorari to review a search warrant issued by Respondent District 
Judge H. Hunter Patrick. The warrant authorized a warden for the Wyoming Game 
and Fish Department to search the EmploymentSecurityCommissionBuilding in Casper. The warden was authorized to seize 
records "pertaining to John R. Billings dba Open Creek Outfitting for the year 
1990, including quarterly wage reports for all four quarters of 1990; and all 
records kept by the Employment Security Commission for the year 1990 for account 
no. 050382004."

 
 

[¶2.]      The accompanying 
affidavit alleged that information had been received indicating Mr. Billings 
allowed nonresident hunters to hunt without guides or to be guided by persons 
without valid Wyoming guide licenses. The warden sought 
information as to the identity of the firm's employees.

 
 

[¶3.]      Petitioner filed 
a motion to quash the search warrant. After a hearing, Respondent denied the 
motion. Petitioner now asks this Court to reverse the Respondent's order. We 
will deny the relief sought in the petition.

 
 

[¶4.]      The issue is 
framed by Petitioner as follows:

 
 
     Whether W.S. § 
27-3-603 prohibits disclosure, pursuant to a search warrant, of confidential 
information obtained from an employer in accordance with the Wyoming Employment 
Security Law [W.S. § 27-3-101 through § 27-3-704] and contained within the files 
of the Wyoming Department of Employment, Division of Unemployment 
Insurance?

 
 
Wyo. Stat. § 27-3-603 (1991) 
states:

 
 
    Except as otherwise 
provided, information obtained from any employing unit or individual pursuant to 
this act and any determination of benefit rights shall not be disclosed in a 
manner which reveals the identity of the employing unit or individual. The 
confidentiality limitations of this section do not apply to transfers of 
information between the divisions of the department of employment so long as the 
transfer of information is not restricted by federal law, rule or contract. Any 
employee who discloses information outside of the department in violation of 
federal or state law may be terminated without progressive 
discipline.

 
 

[¶5.]      The exceptions to 
confidentiality contained in § 27-3-603 are further enlarged in Wyo. Stat. § 
27-3-607 (1991). That section allows access to Petitioner's records upon the 
request of a number of entities, including any federal agency administering 
public works programs or public employment assistance, any state or political 
subdivision if wage information is determined to be necessary by federal 
regulation, any state or local child support enforcement agency, the United 
States Department of Agriculture and any state food stamp agency, the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development and other public housing agencies, the Railroad 
Retirement Board, any state or federal agency administering public employment 
services, unemployment compensation laws, or federal tax laws, the United States 
Bankruptcy Trustee, the State Auditor's office, the Workers' Compensation 
Division, the Industrial Siting Administration, and the Economic Development and 
Stabilization Board.

 
 

[¶6.]      Section 
27-3-607(c)(v) contains another exception to the confidentiality 
requirement:

 
 
(c) The department 
may:

 
 
* * * * * *

 
 
     (v) Allow access to 
information obtained pursuant to the administration of this act to the division 
of criminal investigation of the attorney general's office, upon a written 
request by the director which demonstrates there is a reasonable basis to 
believe the health or safety of a person is in danger and the information may 
lead to the elimination of that danger[.]

 
 

[¶7.]      Given all these 
exceptions to the confidentiality of unemployment insurance records, it would be 
an anomaly to conclude that a purpose of the confidentiality statute is to 
protect the records from search warrants. Wyo. Stat. § 7-7-101 (1987) contains 
the general authority for issuance of search warrants. This power is subject to 
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution; article 1, section 4 of 
the Wyoming Constitution; W.R.Cr.P. 40; and numerous Court decisions. It is not 
reasonable to interpret the statutes to say that a game warden who complies with 
the strict requirements of obtaining a search warrant from a judge or a court 
commissioner cannot obtain records which are apparently only a telephone call 
away for a host of other government agents who do not need to establish probable 
cause or obtain judicial authorization.

 
 

[¶8.]      The parties do 
not cite any cases dealing directly with the issuance of search warrants for 
confidential government records. Reference is made to cases in which such 
records are subpoenaed. The results in those situations are various, depending 
in many instances upon the wording of particular statutes. It should be noted 
that the requirements for obtaining a search warrant are generally more exacting 
than those for obtaining a subpoena.

 
 

[¶9.]      Petitioner 
includes Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570 (Wyo. 1990), in this line of cases. In that 
case, this Court adopted a procedure for judicial review of certain confidential 
records which had been subpoenaed by the defense in a criminal trial. The ruling 
was that the trial judge is to focus on the privileged materials at issue, on 
the defendant's ability to gather such evidence from other sources, and on how 
the privileged evidence may relate to the defendant's theory of the 
case.

 
 

[¶10.]    From the rule in Gale, 
Petitioner argues that there should be an inquiry into whether the information 
contained in confidential records can be obtained elsewhere. The statutes 
governing unemployment insurance records do not place such a restriction upon 
any of the various agencies which have access. We are not aware of any case 
demanding that such an inquiry be made before the issuance of a search warrant 
generally. Finally, we are not confronted in this instance with the competing 
claims of due process and confidential records of a personal and sensitive 
nature as were before the Court in Gale.

 
 

[¶11.]    We do not find the purpose of 
our laws is to shield the records of the Division of Unemployment Insurance from 
search warrants. The relief sought by Petitioner is 
denied.

 
 

CARDINE, J., files a dissenting opinion in 
which URBIGKIT, C.J., joins.

 
 
CARDINE, Justice, dissenting, with 
whom URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, joins.

 
 

[¶12.]    I dissent. The decision of 
the court today allowing the State to obtain by search warrant what the State is 
prohibited from obtaining by statute will have a significant, detrimental impact 
upon the operation and functioning of the Unemployment Insurance Commission. 
Some employers may refuse to report at all. Perhaps they cannot be required to 
report if incrimination results. Reports furnished will be suspect, accuracy 
doubtful. The Commission will encounter difficulty assembling correct 
information and data necessary to determining change in contribution and benefit 
rates and funding liability for future benefits payments.

 
 

[¶13.]    Pursuant to W.S. 
27-3-602(a)(i), the Commission is empowered to adopt rules, make expenditures, 
require reports, make investigations and take other like action. The State 
requires that an employer report much data and information upon the express 
promise and covenant that the employer will have a right of privacy in such 
information and the identity of the employee will not be disclosed per W.S. 
27-3-603, which states in part:

 
 
"Except as otherwise provided, 
information obtained from any employing unit or individual pursuant to this act 
and any determination of benefit rights shall not be disclosed in a manner 
which reveals the identity of the employing unit or individual." (emphasis 
added)

 
 
Thus, the State assures 
confidentiality. Now the State itself, acting through its prosecuting attorney, 
dishonors that assurance and seeks the very information it agreed would be 
confidential. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution protect people against unreasonable search 
and seizure. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution protect against self-incrimination. These 
two provisions of the state and United States constitutions function 
in tandem to assure significant rights and freedoms to the populace. Thus, 
Davis v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 582, 587, 66 S. Ct. 1256, 1258, 
90 L. Ed. 1453 (1946), stated:

 
 
"[The law of searches and seizures] 
reflects a dual purpose - protection of the privacy of the individual, his right 
to be let alone; protection of the individual against compulsory production of 
evidence to be used against him. Boyd v. United 
States, [116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886)]; 
Weeks v. United States, [232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 
(1914)]. And see Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S. Ct. 494 [90 L. Ed. 614, 166 A.L.R. 531 (1946)]."

 
 

[¶14.]    The United States 
Constitution sets a minimum or a floor for constitutional rights guaranteed to 
the people. The State of Wyoming may not diminish these protections 
against unreasonable search and seizure and against self-incrimination, but it 
may expand these rights and afford greater protection against their violation 
than does the federal Constitution. Thus, the United States Supreme Court, in 
discussing the application of exclusionary rules involving the Fourth 
(unreasonable search and seizure) and Fifth (self-incrimination) Amendments to 
the United States Constitution, in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489, 92 S. Ct. 619, 627, 30 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1972), stated:

 
 
"Of course, the States are free, 
pursuant to their own law, to adopt a higher standard. They may indeed differ as 
to the appropriate resolution of the values they find at 
stake."

 
 

[¶15.]    The Wisconsin Supreme Court, 
in a case involving the effect of a state statute affording greater protections 
to wiretap communications than the United States Supreme Court had allowed in 
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S. Ct. 1122, 28 L. Ed. 2d 453 (1971), 
stated:

 
 
"While such expectation of privacy 
may not have a constitutional basis under White, that is immaterial since this 
recognition of confidentiality is important in the process of discovering the 
legislative intent in an area of eavesdropping which was condemned by the common 
law. In considering a statute, the court must seek the legislative intent as 
disclosed from the language of the statute in relation to its scope, history, 
context, subject matter, and object intended to be remedied or accomplished. 
Scanlon v. City of Menasha (1962), 16 Wis.2d 437, 114 N.W.2d 791." 
State ex rel. Arnold v. CountyCourtofRockCounty, 51 Wis.2d 434, 187 N.W.2d 354, 357 
(1971).

 
 
The court then, granting greater 
protection than the federal government for evidence gathered by electronic 
surveillance (wiretapping) held that:

 
 
"Arnold's conversations were 
privileged in character by statute and their admission in evidence by means of 
tape recordings would be in violation of the Wisconsin Electronics Surveillance 
Control Law * * *." Id. 187 N.W.2d  at 357. See also State v. 
Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 627 (Me. 1972), and 
State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657, 664 
(1971).

 
 
The Wyoming legislature has, by enactment of W.S. 
27-3-601 through 27-3-610 evidenced an intent to afford greater rights to 
employers than might otherwise be identified.

 
 

[¶16.]    I agree that the seminal 
issue presented for resolution by the court is the question of legislative 
intent in the adoption of W.S. 27-3-603. The issue is identified in the majority 
opinion as whether it is

 
 
"reasonable to interpret the 
statutes to say that a game warden [by search warrant] cannot obtain records [of 
an employer] * * *." Maj. op. at 55.

 
 

[¶17.]    We look first to the statute 
to determine legislative intent. If the statute is plain and unambiguous, there 
is no need to go beyond it. The intent of the legislature will be ascertained as 
nearly as possible from the words and language used in the statute, which must 
be viewed in light of its objective and purpose. Department of Revenue and 
Taxation, Motor Vehicle Div. v. Andrews, 671 P.2d 1239 (Wyo. 1983). We follow the 
rule that, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must 
accept and apply the plain meaning of that language. State v. Denhardt, 760 P.2d 988, 989-90 (Wyo. 1988); Phillips v. State, 760 P.2d 388 (Wyo. 
1988). When the words used are unambiguous, a court risks an impermissible 
substitution of its own views for the intent of the legislature if it interprets 
or construes statutes on a basis other than the language invoked by the 
legislature. Our precedent demonstrates that this rule is an absolute. If the 
language selected by the legislature is sufficiently definitive, that language 
establishes the rule of law. Any additional construction can be resorted to only 
if the wording is ambiguous or unclear to the point of demonstrating obscurity 
with respect to the legislative purpose or mandate. Blue Cross Ass'n v. Harris, 
664 F.2d 806 (10th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Statewide Collections, Inc., 778 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 
1989). This inhibition upon statutory construction offers assurance that the 
legislative efforts and determinations of elected representatives will be 
effective without judicial adjustment or gloss. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Board of 
Equalization, 813 P.2d 214 (Wyo. 1991). Moreover, we must construe a 
legislative enactment in such a manner as to give effect to all of its 
provisions. In accomplishing this task, we presume that the legislature intended 
that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not 
surplusage. United States v. 
Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir. 1987).

 
 

[¶18.]    The clear language of Art. 6 
of the unemployment compensation statutes demonstrates a legislative intent and 
purpose that confidential information revealed in compliance with the 
Commission's rules and requirement of law is not discoverable by search warrant 
for the purpose of criminal prosecution.

 
 

[¶19.]    Wyoming Statute 27-3-603 
provides in part:

 
 
"Except as otherwise provided, 
information obtained from any employing unit or individual pursuant to this 
act and any determination of benefit rights shall not be disclosed in a 
manner which reveals the identity of the employing unit or 
individual." (emphasis added)

 
 
Disclosure "otherwise provided" is 
found in W.S. 27-3-607 as follows:

 
 
(a)(i) to federal agencies to assure 
compliance with federal regulations governing expenditure of funds paid to the 
State under 42 U.S.C. § 501 et seq.;

(a)(ii) to any federal agency 
administering public works programs or public employment 
assistance;

(a)(iii) to agencies for the purpose 
of determining eligibility for assistance under 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., 
Division of United States Health and Human Services;

(a)(iv) to any state or child 
support enforcement agency pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 654;

(a)(v) to the United States 
Department of Agriculture and any food stamp agency; and

(a)(vi) to the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development as required by the McKinney Homeless Act of 1988 § 
904(c).

 
 
Information to the above agencies 
must be supplied upon request, and the agency must agree that, with respect to 
paragraphs (a)(iv) and (a)(v), information supplied be used only for 
establishing and collecting child support obligations or locating individuals 
and for determining an applicant's eligibility for benefits under the food stamp 
program. Information supplied under (a)(i) through (a)(iii) is for the purpose 
of determining rights and benefits to and for expenditure of funds under federal 
programs. The Act also contains requirements for confidentiality and penalties 
for improper disclosure and use of the information. W.S. 27-3-602(d); W.S. 
27-3-603.

 
 

[¶20.]    Subsection (c) of W.S. 
27-3-607 provides that the department may disclose copies of records to the 
Railroad Retirement Board; agencies administering public employment services, 
unemployment compensation laws, or federal tax laws, and to the office of the 
United States bankruptcy trustee; to the state auditor's office and the Division 
of Worker's Compensation to be used only for the detection of improper or 
fraudulent claims or the determination of potential tax liability or employer 
compliance with notification, registration, certification, or other 
requirements.

 
 

[¶21.]    The above provisions for 
disclosure of specified information, when read in pari materia with W.S. 
27-3-603, providing for confidentiality, evidences a clear intent on the part of 
the legislature to disclose such information for specific purposes only, such as 
determining the right to public assistance, eligibility for assistance, 
eligibility for food stamps, locating and enforcing child support obligations, 
and comparing information to better administer the unemployment compensation 
laws and benefit programs. The Act evidences a rather clear intent of the 
legislature to permit disclosure for the purpose of ascertaining the right to 
benefits under the several federal and state programs and to determine 
eligibility for benefits under those programs. There can be found no expression 
of intent to permit the disclosure of this confidential information for the 
purpose of prosecution under criminal statutes totally unrelated to unemployment 
compensation.

 
 

[¶22.]    The intent of the legislature 
that this confidential information not be disclosed for such criminal 
prosecutions is further demonstrated in W.S. 27-3-607(c)(v), which provides that 
the Division of Criminal Investigation, upon written request demonstrating a 
reasonable basis to believe the health and safety of a person is in danger, may 
request information for the purpose of elimination of that danger. The 
Department, in its discretion, may release the information; and, if released, 
such information may be used by the Division of Criminal Investigation, not for 
the prosecution of crime, but only to eliminate danger to the health and safety 
of a person. If legislative intent had been to make this information available 
for any criminal prosecution, it surely would have provided for its release to 
the state's chief law enforcement agency - but it declined to do 
so.

 
 

[¶23.]    The final, clear, conclusive 
expression of legislative intent with respect to the confidentiality of 
information provided in W.S. 27-3-603 is found in W.S. 27-3-602(c), (d) and (e) 
providing for obtaining information through subpoena, testimony, depositions, 
and production of books, papers or other records. Subsection (d) provides for 
the issuance of a subpoena for attendance of witnesses, taking of testimony, and 
production of books, papers or other records. Subsection (d) provides for 
compliance with the subpoena by order of a district court, and, upon refusal to 
appear and produce evidence, for punishment of contempt by fine and 
imprisonment. Subsection (e) of the statute then provides that a person shall 
not

 
 
"be incriminated for providing 
testimony or evidence under subsection (c) of this section except for perjury 
committed during testimony."

 
 
Thus, a person supplying information 
pursuant to subpoena or order of the court will not incriminate himself. Perhaps 
in the future an employer would be wise to submit reports and information to the 
Commission only pursuant to subpoena or court order. The above statutes, read in 
pari materia, plainly demonstrate a legislative intent that information supplied 
because of compulsion will not incriminate the supplier.

 
 

[¶24.]    It is clear from reading 
together W.S. 27-3-601 through 27-3-610 that honest, truthful, accurate reports 
of data and information are necessary to the Commission to establish a sound 
actuarial compensation system, set the amount of contributions necessary to fund 
the system, and provide a fund against liability for future benefit payments. 
The intent of this legislation was to assure the filing of accurate reports of 
information and data by providing for confidentiality and providing also that 
information be disclosed only for limited necessary purposes in administering 
other acts, benefits and entitlements - not for the purpose of criminal 
prosecution. 

 
 

[¶25.]    These legislative enactments 
provide for restrictions on disclosure and for severe penalties for unauthorized 
disclosure or use of information for purposes other than for which disclosed. 
The intent of the legislature clearly was to assure that data and information 
disclosed pursuant to compulsion could not be used to incriminate a person 
except with respect to the truthfulness of the information itself. The data and 
information supplied to the Commission is in all instances subject to compulsion 
by statute, rule, regulation, subpoena, or court order. Thus, the person 
supplying the information may not be prosecuted for violation of criminal 
statutes outside of and unrelated to the Unemployment Compensation 
Act.

 
 

[¶26.]    I am convinced that the 
information supplied by the employer in this case may not be obtained by search 
warrant or otherwise for the purpose of prosecuting the individual for violation 
of game and fish laws, rules or regulations. When this identical question was 
presented to the court in State, ex rel. Employment Security Comm'n v. Leimback, 
(No. 86-155, Order Granting Writ of Certiorari, Denying Application for Writ of 
Prohibition, and Reversing Order Allowing Search Warrant and Quashing Search 
Warrant, June 27, 1986), we held the information now sought could not be 
obtained by search warrant. We were correct then and are wrong now. I would 
reverse the order of the district court and quash the search warrant.