Title: Juniper v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, 
JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
ANTHONY BERNARD JUNIPER 
      OPINION BY 
v. 
Record Nos. 051423 and 051424  
 JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
March 3, 2006 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
Everett A. Martin, Jr., Judge 
 
In these consolidated appeals, we consider the four capital 
murder convictions and death sentences imposed upon Anthony 
Bernard Juniper by the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, 
along with his convictions for statutory burglary and use of a 
firearm during the commission of a felony. 
In the first stage of a bifurcated trial conducted under 
Code § 19.2-264.3, a jury convicted Juniper of capital murder 
for each of the four killings, statutory burglary while armed 
with a deadly weapon, and four counts of use of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony.  In the penalty phase of the trial the 
jury “found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt” that 
Juniper “would commit criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing serious threat to society” and that his 
conduct in committing the offenses involved either “depravity of 
mind and/or aggravated battery to the victim beyond the minimum 
necessary to accomplish the act of murder.”1  The jury fixed 
                     
1 The jury found both depravity of mind and aggravated 
battery in three of the murders (Keshia Stephens, Rueben 
 
 
2
Juniper’s punishment at death for each capital murder 
conviction, life imprisonment for statutory burglary while armed 
with a deadly weapon, and one three-year and three five-year 
terms for the convictions for use of a firearm in the commission 
of a felony.  After reviewing the post-sentence report required 
by Code § 19.2-264.5, the trial court sentenced Juniper in 
accordance with the jury verdicts. 
Juniper appealed his convictions for the crimes other than 
capital murder to the Court of Appeals.  We certified that 
appeal (Record No.051424) to this Court under the provisions of 
Code § 17.1-409 for consolidation with the appeal of Juniper’s 
capital murder convictions (Record No. 051423) and the review of 
his death sentence mandated by Code § 17.1-313(A). 
After consideration of Juniper’s assignments of error, the 
record, the arguments of counsel, and the review required by 
Code § 17.1-313, we find no error in the judgment of the trial 
court and will affirm that judgment, including the sentences of 
death. 
I. FACTS AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Under well-settled principles of appellate review, we 
consider the evidence presented at trial in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial 
                                                                  
Harrison, III, and Shearyia Stephens), but only depravity of 
mind in the fourth murder (Nykia Stephens). 
 
 
3
court.2  Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 313, 541 S.E.2d 872, 
877, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1043 (2001); see also Lovitt v. 
Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 502, 537 S.E.2d 866, 870 (2000), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 815 (2001). 
A. 
GUILT PHASE 
 
On the afternoon of January 16, 2004, Keshia Stephens, her 
younger brother Rueben Harrison, III,3 and two of Keshia’s 
daughters, Nykia Stephens and Shearyia Stephens,4 were killed in 
Keshia’s apartment in the City of Norfolk.  When police arrived, 
they found that the door to Keshia’s apartment had been forcibly 
opened.  All four victims were discovered in the master bedroom; 
each had died as a result of gunshot wounds. 
Keshia was stabbed through her abdomen, shot three times, 
and grazed by a fourth bullet.  One bullet went through her 
intestine, kidney, and spine, causing spinal shock and leg 
paralysis.  Another bullet also passed through her intestines 
and then proceeded to her abdominal aorta and inferior vena 
cava, causing extensive bleeding. 
The stab wound did not fatally wound Keshia, but tore 
through the muscle of her abdominal wall.  There was a great 
                     
2 Juniper did not present any evidence during the guilt 
phase of the trial, with the result that all of the evidence 
came from the Commonwealth’s witnesses. 
3 The record contains several different spellings of Rueben 
Harrison, III’s first name.  We will spell his name “Rueben,” 
consistent with the indictment. 
 
 
4
deal of blood accompanying the wound, however, which led the 
medical examiner performing the autopsy to conclude that the 
stab wound was probably the first injury inflicted on Keshia.  
The stab wound was consistent with a wound that would have been 
caused by the knife blade found at the scene of the crime. 
Two-year old Shearyia was shot four times while in her 
mother’s arms.  Two bullets entered Shearyia’s body in the shin 
of her left leg, fractured the bone, and exited through her 
calf.  A third bullet entered and exited Shearyia’s body through 
her thigh.  The fourth bullet entered the crown of her head and 
passed through her brain, causing bone fragments to chip off. 
Rueben Harrison was shot three times.  One bullet struck 
his pelvic bone, and ricocheted through his body into his 
abdomen, liver, heart and lung, finally coming to rest in his 
armpit.  A second bullet hit his hip bone, and exited through 
the front of his leg.  A third bullet broke his femur bone, and 
exited his body at his front thigh.  The medical examiner 
testified that the broken bones would have caused excruciating 
pain and immediately disabled Rueben. 
Four-year old Nykia was shot one time behind her left ear.  
The bullet moved through her skull and cerebellum to the base of 
her skull, into her esophagus and trachea, causing substantial 
damage and bleeding, before exiting her chest.  The medical 
                                                                  
4 Shearyia Stephens was also known as Sheryia Benns. 
 
 
5
examiner testified that the bullet’s path was consistent with 
Nykia ducking her head and body toward the shooter prior to 
being shot.  In addition, the presence of blood in Nykia’s lungs 
indicated that she had taken one or two breaths between being 
shot and dying.  Her body was found lying on top of her uncle’s 
body. 
Evidence presented at trial showed that Juniper and Keshia 
had been involved in an on-again, off-again tumultuous 
relationship for approximately two years.  On the morning of the 
shootings, Juniper telephoned his friend, Renee Rashid, from his 
mother’s house where he was living at the time.  Juniper asked 
Rashid to drive him to Keshia’s apartment so that he could 
retrieve some of his belongings.  A short time later Rashid 
picked up Juniper at his mother’s house and drove him to 
Keshia’s apartment. 
 
Both Juniper and Rashid entered Keshia’s apartment, which 
was on the second floor of the apartment building.  Rashid saw 
four individuals in the apartment: Keshia, Rueben, who was 
asleep on the couch, and two of Keshia’s children, Nykia and 
Shearyia, who were preparing to take a bath.  After helping 
Juniper disconnect a DVD player, Rashid was talking to the two 
girls, but overheard Juniper and Keshia arguing in another room.  
Keshia repeatedly made comments such as, “[T]here’s nobody but 
you.  I told you I’m not seeing anybody but you.” 
 
 
6
 
After Rashid announced that she was leaving, Juniper 
followed her to the door of the apartment.  Hearing the door 
shut, Rashid assumed Juniper was behind her as she began to 
descend the apartment building steps.  But as she was going down 
the stairway outside Keshia’s apartment, Rashid heard a “loud 
boom” that she described as “sound[ing] like the door being 
kicked in.”  Not stopping to look behind her, Rashid hurried to 
her car.  While waiting in her car outside the apartment, Rashid 
heard Keshia crying and repeating her statement that she was not 
seeing anyone but Juniper.  Rashid sounded her horn to alert 
Juniper that she wanted to leave.  Juniper yelled at Rashid to 
“Go ahead” so she began to drive away.  As she drove away from 
the apartment she heard four “booms,” which she described as 
“sound[ing] like gunshots.” 
 
Rashid did not stop, but proceeded to Juniper’s mother’s 
house, and expressed her concern that Juniper had remained at 
Keshia’s apartment.  Juniper’s friend, Keon Murray, was there 
when Rashid arrived.  Juniper called his mother’s house and 
Murray talked to him on the telephone.  Murray observed that 
Juniper was calling from Keshia’s apartment because the Caller 
ID number matched Keshia’s telephone number.  Juniper told 
Murray that “They gone,” and that Keshia’s apartment was 
surrounded.  He also stated that he “killed them,” although he 
did not name particular individuals. 
 
 
7
Murray then called Tyrone Mings, a friend who lived near 
Keshia’s apartment building, and asked him to check Keshia’s 
apartment.  Mings walked to the apartment and observed that the 
front door appeared to have been kicked in.  Upon entering 
Keshia’s apartment, Mings testified that he saw Juniper standing 
in the living room with a white substance on his face and 
holding an automatic pistol.  When Mings asked Juniper about 
Keshia, Juniper directed Mings to the back of the apartment.  
Upon entering the master bedroom, Mings saw Rueben and a young 
girl lying on the bed.  Mings did not see Keshia and asked 
Juniper where she was.  Juniper told Mings she was “between the 
bed and the dresser.”  Mings returned to the bedroom and called 
to the people in the room, but no one answered.  Mings departed 
Keshia’s apartment, leaving Juniper in the living room, still 
holding the pistol.  Upon returning to his apartment, Mings 
called the police. 
 
In the meantime, Rashid and Murray picked up Juniper’s 
cousin (“Little John”) and drove to Keshia’s apartment.  Murray 
and Little John went to look for Juniper, while Rashid stayed in 
the car.  They returned to the car with Juniper, who sat in the 
front passenger seat next to Rashid, the driver.  Rashid 
described Juniper as being “jittery” and “breathing real hard.” 
Juniper kept looking in the mirrors, saying, “they’re behind us” 
throughout the car ride.  Murray stated that Juniper “look[ed] 
 
 
8
nervous,” “[l]ike he was in shock,” and that he had a powdery 
substance like cocaine on his face.  Juniper held a black and 
chrome automatic pistol in his right hand, resting on his lap. 
 
The police first arrived at Keshia’s apartment complex at 
12:50 p.m., after receiving a telephone call reporting possible 
gunshots.  The responding officer walked around the apartment 
building and spoke with two residents, but did not go up the 
stairway to Keshia’s apartment.  After conferring with a second 
police officer who had arrived on scene, both officers left the 
apartment complex believing the call to have been a false 
report. 
 
Mings observed the officers leave and called the police a 
second time.  Near 2:20 p.m. police officers again arrived at 
the apartment complex and this time went up the stairway to 
Keshia’s apartment.  Officer W.G. Snyder testified the “whole 
center part of the door was completely knocked . . . inward into 
the apartment, and wooden debris from the door was lying inside 
the apartment.”  The officers entered the apartment, and 
observed Nykia’s body lying across Rueben on the bed in the 
master bedroom.  They then observed Shearyia’s body lying across 
Keshia’s body on the floor beside the bed.  The officers 
received no response from any of them. 
 
Police investigators recovered a cigarette butt from the 
floor by the front door of Keshia’s apartment.  From the master 
 
 
9
bedroom where the bodies were located, investigators recovered a 
knife blade, a knife handle, and shell casings.  Shell casings 
were also found in a bathroom adjoining the master bedroom.   
 
A firearm and toolmark examinations expert testified that 
bullet casings found in the apartment and the bullets recovered 
from the victims’ bodies were fired from a single nine-
millimeter, Luger semi-automatic pistol.5  The expert also 
analyzed the recovered knife blade and knife handle and 
determined that the blade and handle were originally joined. 
A latent fingerprint expert testified a fingerprint found 
on the knife blade had “a minimum of 23 matching 
characteristics” to Juniper’s right thumbprint.  In addition, an 
expert in forensic serology and DNA analysis testified that 
Juniper’s DNA profile matched DNA from the knife handle6 and the  
cigarette butt.7 
The police obtained warrants for Juniper’s arrest and he 
surrendered voluntarily on January 26, 2005.  While incarcerated 
at the Hampton Roads Regional Jail awaiting trial, Juniper 
                     
5 The firearm was never recovered. 
6 Sixteen loci from the knife handle matched Juniper’s DNA 
profile.  The DNA expert testified that Juniper could not be 
excluded as the source of the DNA, with the odds of another 
individual having a matching DNA profile being one in greater 
than six billion individuals, the population of the world. 
7 Fifteen loci matched Juniper’s profile from the DNA on the 
cigarette butt; again, the DNA expert testified that Juniper 
could not be excluded as the source of the DNA, with the odds of 
 
 
10
admitted to a fellow inmate, Ernest Smith, that he committed the 
murders.  Smith testified that while the two were together in 
the medical pod at the Hampton Roads Regional Jail, Juniper 
confessed to shooting the four victims.  Smith testified that 
Juniper told him that he had killed the children because “he 
didn’t want to leave any witnesses at the scene of the crime.” 
B. 
PENALTY PHASE 
 
During the penalty phase, the Commonwealth introduced 
evidence of Juniper’s criminal record, which contained 
convictions for grand larceny, possession of cocaine, possession 
of marijuana, threatening to kill, disorderly conduct, failure 
to appear, and numerous motor vehicle violations.  The 
Commonwealth contended its evidence proved the aggravating 
factors of both future dangerousness and vileness. 
 
The Commonwealth also introduced evidence of Juniper’s 
violent behavior and unadjudicated criminal conduct.  Several of 
                                                                  
another individual having a matching DNA profile being one in 
greater than six billion individuals. 
 
 
11
the Commonwealth’s witnesses testified about Juniper’s 
tumultuous and abusive relationship with Keshia.  Ruqayyah 
Barnes described an incident that occurred at a night club in 
August 2003.  She was present when Juniper accused Keshia of 
“some guy looking at her, and so he started getting mad and 
calling her names.  He told her, ‘Bitch, get over here right now 
before I whoop your ass,’ and said, ‘That guy looking at you.’ ”  
Ruqayyah testified that Juniper was “screaming” these things to 
Keshia and “standing right in front of her face.”  According to 
her testimony, Juniper yelled at Keshia because “[t]hat nigger 
over there looking at you.” And accused Keshia of “f**king with 
him.” 
 
Ruqayyah also testified about an event in September 2003.  
She and Keshia returned from shopping when Juniper began 
fighting with Keshia.  He complained that Keshia and Ruqayyah 
were 
taking too long and [Keshia] don’t do s**t for no kids.  He 
do everything.  He feed them.  He do their hair.  He buy 
their clothes.  He do everything.  They’re his kids. . . . 
And then he pulled her by her hair and start screaming in 
her face about us being gone at the mall too long.  Then he 
punched her in her face.  She fell down on the floor.  She 
slid back in the hallway into the kitchen.  
 
Ruqayyah clarified that Juniper “just grabbed [Keshia’s] hair 
and yanked it real hard and she came closer to him.”  When 
Juniper punched Keshia, he did so “with a closed fist . . . 
right in her eye.” 
 
 
12
Ruqayyah’s sister, Malika T. Barnes, testified that in the 
spring of 2003, she witnessed Juniper trying to get Keshia’s 
attention, and when Keshia did not respond to her name, he said, 
“ ‘B, I know you heard me calling you,’ ” before “calling her a 
whole bunch of names.”  When Keshia sat down in the room where 
Malika and Juniper were located, Juniper “told [Keshia] to go 
back in the room.”  When Keshia did not leave, Juniper “grabbed 
her by her arm and got her, and guid[ed] her toward the room.” 
Malika also described an incident that occurred at the food 
store where Keshia worked.  Before Malika entered the store, 
Juniper told her that Keshia was cheating on him.  Juniper 
followed Malika into the store and “told Keshia to go to the 
back to get something, and she didn’t move fast enough to get 
it.”  So Juniper pulled Keshia’s arm as he “fuss[ed] and 
holler[ed] as usual.” 
In the summer of 2003, Malika witnessed Juniper “grabb[ing] 
Keshia’s arm.”  In clarifying what she saw, Malika stated that 
Juniper grabbed Keshia “[f]orcefully” and “grabbed her arm to 
direct her toward him.”  When Malika confronted Juniper for 
acting that way, Malika testified that Juniper responded, 
“ ‘That’s my bitch.’  ‘That’s my hoe.’  ‘When I tell my bitch to 
come here, that’s what I want her to do.’ ”  He then threatened 
to “f**k all [you] bitches up.” 
 
 
13
The assistant manager of the food store where Keshia worked 
recounted several verbal and physical altercations between 
Juniper and Keshia.  In January 2003, the assistant manager 
observed Juniper approach Keshia after she smiled at a customer.  
She testified that Juniper had told Keshia that he would “smack 
the s**t out [of] you, bitch, for smiling at the customer that 
went out.” 
The manager also described an incident she observed between 
Keshia and Juniper in the spring of 2003.  According to her 
testimony, Juniper  
punched [Keshia] in her face, and her wig came off.  She 
picked her wig back up and put it on.  By that time I was 
getting out [of] the car.  Keshia ran in the [food store], 
and I unlocked the office.  And I took her in the office, 
and I told her that he had to leave the premises or I was 
going to call the police.  After that he was barred from 
the store. 
 
The manager confirmed that by “punch” she meant that Juniper’s 
“right hand [was] balled up into a fist with [his] fingers 
curled into [his] palm.” 
 
In June 2003, police responded to a domestic dispute 
between Juniper and Keshia.  Juniper admitted to “slap[ping]” 
duct tape on Keshia’s arm, mouth, and head in order to “keep her 
quiet,” and confirmed that he had “done that before.”  Juniper 
was charged with abduction as a result of this incident, but the 
charges were not prosecuted because Keshia failed to appear in 
court. 
 
 
14
Other witnesses described Juniper’s conduct while 
incarcerated.  A deputy in the Norfolk Sheriff’s Department 
testified that when she informed Juniper that he did not have 
any mail that day, he responded by calling her “a cracker ass 
whore” and telling her to “Walk away, you f**kin’ bitch.  Carry 
your ass away, you f**kin’ bitch.” 
During a search of Juniper and his jail cell in April 2004, 
corrections officers found a large paper clip concealed under 
Juniper’s tongue.  Possession of the paper clip was prohibited 
contraband because it could be used as a weapon or handcuff key. 
In October 2004, Juniper attacked a sleeping inmate with a 
pillowcase containing dominoes and kicked the inmate in the 
ribs.  Juniper left the scene of the attack when challenged by 
another inmate and ran into an elderly inmate’s cell, whereupon 
he took the footrest from the inmate’s wheelchair.  Juniper then 
confronted the other inmates with the wheelchair footrest, 
threatening, “I kill you.”  It required several officers fifteen 
to twenty minutes to stop Juniper’s attack. 
 
Juniper offered evidence in mitigation including testimony 
from his older sister regarding the physical abuse that he 
suffered as a child from his stepfather, who sold drugs from the 
home where Juniper lived.  Juniper never met his actual father 
until he was 23 years old, and had no male role models growing 
up except his maternal grandfather.  Juniper’s sister and aunt 
 
 
15
testified that Juniper had a close relationship with his 
maternal grandfather and was greatly affected by the 
grandfather’s death when Juniper was a youth.  Witnesses also 
testified about Juniper’s generosity and caring relationship 
with several young children, including Keshia’s children. 
Dr. Thomas Pasquale, a clinical psychologist appointed to 
assist Juniper by performing a psychological assessment, 
testified as to his findings.  He found significant problems 
with Juniper's family of origin including the lack of a 
"consistent father figure" and a "withdrawn" and "emotionally 
absent" mother.  These inadequate relationships in addition to 
physical abuse caused Juniper to "fe[el] abandoned," have 
"difficult[y] trust[ing] people" and conclude that "if you're 
not in control, then you're likely to be harmed." 
Dr. Pasquale found that Juniper had an average I.Q. and was 
not a psychopath, but he determined that Juniper had "features 
of a characterological dysfunction, personality disorder which 
demonstrated a failure to adapt [and] develop."  Dr. Pasquale 
listed the characteristics of this personality disorder for the 
jury: 
Antisocial thought and behavioral patterns, 
difficulties with impulsivity, reliance on the more 
primitive defense mechanisms of denial and blame, an 
easily compromised conscience, problems with anger, 
mood instability, alcohol and drug abuse, and chronic 
difficulties with the legal system. 
 
 
 
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Dr. Pasquale diagnosed Juniper with depression, alcohol, cocaine 
and marijuana dependence, and antisocial personality disorder. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. 
PRELIMINARY ISSUES 
Juniper presents 33 assignments of error in this appeal.8  
We will initially dispose of those assignments of error that 
were not adequately preserved for appeal and therefore will not 
be considered. 
1. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR WAIVED, DEFAULTED, OR ABANDONED 
 
a. 
Motion for Forensic Expert 
 
Juniper contends "[t]he trial court erred in failing to 
entertain and rule upon Juniper's filed Motion for a Forensic 
Expert."  The record contains no such motion, although Juniper 
filed a document styled Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Appointment of Forensic Expert.  Juniper cites only the 
Memorandum in his argument on this assignment of error.  The 
trial court never ruled on Juniper's request for a forensics 
expert, but the record reflects no request for a ruling or that 
the trial court was ever alerted to the existence of the 
Memorandum.  Therefore, Juniper has waived any claim under this 
assignment of error because he was required to request a ruling 
from the trial court and he failed to do so.  Lenz v. 
 
 
17
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 463, 544 S.E.2d 299, 306, cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 1003 (2001) (failure to request ruling on 
pretrial motion waived issue on appeal); Riner v. Commonwealth, 
268 Va. 296, 323-25, 601 S.E.2d 555, 571-72 (2004) (failure to 
alert trial court to fact that it had ruled only on 
admissibility of primary hearsay in statement waived defendant's 
argument on appeal that the statement was inadmissible as second 
level hearsay). 
b. 
Motion for Change of Venue 
Juniper assigns error to the trial court's "denying" his 
motion for a change of venue and argues the trial court abused 
its discretion in doing so.  The Commonwealth responds that 
Juniper waived this argument on appeal because he failed to 
renew the motion prior to trial. 
In a pretrial motion for a change of venue Juniper's 
counsel stated, "We make [the motion] at this time anticipating 
that the Court is going to take it under advisement.  We will 
continue to make it as we . . . believe that the potential juror 
pool is tainted by [media] coverage."  The trial court took the 
motion under advisement, but Juniper never renewed the motion 
before the jury was empanelled. 
                                                                  
8 Juniper filed 34 separate assignments of error, but in his 
brief to this Court he withdrew Assignment of Error No. 4.  
Therefore, it will not be considered on appeal. 
 
 
18
[W]hen a change of venue motion is taken under 
advisement or continued until the jury is empaneled, 
it is incumbent on the party seeking a change of venue 
to renew the motion or otherwise bring it to the 
court's attention. Failure to do so implies 
acquiescence in the jury panel and is tantamount to 
waiver of the motion for change of venue. 
 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 423, 430-431, 587 S.E.2d 532, 
539 (2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 842 (2004) (citation 
omitted). 
Accordingly, Juniper has waived any claim under this 
assignment of error because he was required to timely renew the 
motion or bring the matter to the attention of the trial court, 
which he failed to do.  See id.; Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 
81, 94-95, 580 S.E.2d 834, 842 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 
1194 (2004). 
c. 
Motions to Produce Files 
In separate assignments of error, Juniper argues the trial 
court erred in refusing to compel the Commonwealth to produce 
its files from his prior criminal convictions and of 
unadjudicated bad acts that would be referenced in the penalty 
phase.  He also claims an entitlement to the files related to a 
prior prosecution of Rueben for rape. 
On appeal, Juniper argues the prior criminal conviction and 
unadjudicated bad acts files should have been produced because 
"to thoroughly investigate and to essentially reconstruct those 
35 . . . events was unduly burdensome, if not impossible."  As 
 
 
19
to Rueben’s files, Juniper's appellate argument is the "files 
cannot be reasonably recreated . . . and . . . his 
constitutional rights were violated by the failure to compel the 
file."  Neither argument was made to the trial court. 
At trial, Juniper made the same argument as the basis to 
grant both motions:  
Although the Defendant has an investigator available 
to him, the time to interview all the witnesses that 
would be essential to reconstructing the information 
contained in those files cannot [be] reasonably 
ascertained by the Defendant without extensive costs 
to the Commonwealth in the form of attorneys fees 
and/or investigator fees. 
 
This ground was reemphasized by defense counsel's oral argument 
that "it would be more economical for the Commonwealth if they 
would provide us with the files rather than having [defense 
counsel or the court-appointed investigator] have to try to 
reconstruct each of those separate 35 events."  In other words, 
Juniper's sole contention at trial for both motions is that 
granting the motions would save the Commonwealth money.9  This is 
obviously not the argument Juniper makes on appeal; therefore, 
consideration of either assignment of error is barred under Rule 
5:25.  See Buck v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 449, 452-53, 443 S.E.2d 
414, 416 (1994).  Furthermore, Juniper proffered no evidence or 
                     
9 Juniper has never contended that the Commonwealth failed 
to disclose any exculpatory evidence contained in any of the 
files that were the subject of the motions. 
 
 
20
explanation as to any nexus between Rueben’s rape conviction and 
any matter at issue in this case. 
d. 
Using “Exceedingly Difficult” Instead of “Substantially 
Impair” During Voir Dire 
 
Juniper also claims the trial court erred “by changing the 
standard death penalty voir dire partially through jury 
selection by using the phrase ‘exceedingly difficult’ instead of 
‘substantially impair.’  
 
Part of the way through voir dire of the potential venire, 
the trial judge stated, “When I ask these questions[,] instead 
of using [‘substantially impair,’] I’m going to start [using the 
term] [‘exceedingly difficult.’]  I think substantially impaired 
– I think it’s a legal term [and] I’m not sure the jurors 
understand what I’m talking about when I say that.”  Juniper’s 
counsel responded, “We don’t quarrel with that but the case law 
does use substantially impair.”  The trial judge then noted, “If 
you-all want to use it in your questions that’s fine, but I’ve 
just noticed when I’m asking the question their eyes seem to 
glaze over when I start saying things like that.”  Juniper’s 
counsel replied, “That’s fine.” 
 
This exchange clearly shows that Juniper’s counsel not only 
did not object to the trial court’s decision to alter the voir 
dire language, but acquiesced to it.  Consequently, Juniper has 
waived any right to appeal on this issue under Rule 5:25. 
 
 
21
e. 
Grant of Immunity to Keon Murray 
Juniper argues the trial court erred in "allowing the 
Commonwealth to grant immunity to witness Keon Murray with no 
notice, contrary to the law, and due process rights of 
[Juniper]." 
 
Keon Murray testified for the Commonwealth.  At the 
beginning of his testimony, he agreed that no "promises [had] 
been made to [him] by the Commonwealth in exchange for [his 
testimony]."  Murray testified that he was close to Juniper and 
his family and knew Keshia.  When questioned about the events on 
the day of the murders, Murray answered, "Your Honor, I plead 
the Fifth."  The trial court called a recess and outside of the 
presence of the jury, the Commonwealth stated its intention to 
offer Murray immunity.10  Defense counsel stated his objection as 
follows: 
I object to the procedure . . . on behalf of 
defendant, Mr. Juniper. 
 
. . . . 
 
The question is whether or not this procedure 
denies the defendant due process of the law.  
 
. . . . 
 
 
[T]hreatening [Murray] about his testimony is a 
denial of due process to Mr. Juniper.  That's the best 
argument I can make. 
                     
10 The Commonwealth determined Murray could incriminate 
himself as an accessory after the fact or give information that 
could lead to a charge of misprision of a felony offense. 
 
 
22
On appeal, Juniper argues the grant of immunity was an 
abuse of discretion because it prevented effective cross-
examination of Murray in violation of Juniper's due process 
rights under the Sixth Amendment.  Specifically, Juniper 
contends that "since the grant of immunity was 
contemporaneous with the witness's testimony," the defense 
lacked "[t]he pre-trial preparation and reflection 
required" to allow a full and fair examination of Murray. 
 
In response, the Commonwealth essentially argues that 
Juniper has waived this due process argument because he failed 
to assert a violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause in the trial court.  We agree with the Commonwealth 
because the record reflects Juniper never argued to the trial 
court the Confrontation Clause claims he now makes on appeal as 
the basis of his due process argument. 
 
As he acknowledges on appeal, Juniper's argument that the 
trial court's decision undermined his ability to cross-examine 
Murray, is actually a claim under the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause.  As such, a general assertion of a due 
process violation in the trial court is insufficient to preserve 
this argument for appeal.  See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 
273 (1994).  Therefore, Juniper has waived this assignment of 
error under Rule 5:25. 
f. 
Penalty phase jury instructions and verdict forms 
 
 
23
Juniper assigns error to the trial court “allowing 
instructions and verdict forms in the penalty phase regarding 
future dangerousness when the predicates were not proven and 
that unanimity is required to prove an aggravating factor for 
death.” 
On brief, Juniper argues only that the trial court was 
wrong in “refusing Instruction D-P8.”11  The Commonwealth 
contends that Juniper waived the argument regarding instruction 
D-P8 because the record does not indicate that Juniper ever 
submitted the instruction to the trial court, nor does Juniper 
mention the instruction during his arguments and objections 
regarding other refused jury instructions. 
The record supports the Commonwealth’s claims.  The only 
mention of instruction D-P8 in the record appears in the text of 
                     
11 Instruction No. D-P8 states: 
Part A 
 
If you can possibly reach a unanimous verdict, it is 
your duty to do so.  You should listen to the views and 
opinions of your fellow jurors and give consideration to 
what they say.  However, you should reach an agreement only 
if that can be done without sacrificing your individual 
judgment.  During your deliberations each of you should not 
hesitate to re-examine your own views and change your 
opinion if you are convinced it was wrong.  No juror, 
however, should give up his or her honest opinion solely 
because of the opinions of other jurors or for the mere 
purpose of returning a unanimous verdict. 
Part B 
 
In the event you cannot agree as to the sentence, the 
court will dismiss you and impose a sentence of 
imprisonment for life.  That life sentence will be a life 
sentence without the possibility of parole. 
 
 
24
the instruction and Juniper’s Memorandum in Support of 
Instruction No. D-P8, which is dated January 13, 2005.  Because 
the record does not show that the trial court ruled on 
Instruction D-P8 or that Juniper requested a ruling or objected 
to a ruling made, even if the assignment of error had 
corresponded to Juniper’s arguments regarding Instruction No. D-
P8, this Court would not consider the merits of the claim.  See 
Lenz, 261 Va. at 463, 544 S.E.2d at 306. 
2. 
ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED 
 
Included in Juniper’s assignments of error are arguments 
this Court has previously rejected on several occasions.  
Finding no reason to modify or revisit our expressed views on 
these issues, we adhere to our previous holdings and reject the 
following contentions. 
a. 
The Constitutionality of Virginia’s Capital Murder and 
Death Penalty Statutes 
 
Juniper challenges the constitutionality of Virginia’s 
capital murder and death penalty statutes, but cites only Code 
§ 19.2-264.4 and § 19.2-264.5.  All of the arguments Juniper 
posits in support of his assignment of error have been 
previously considered and rejected by this Court: 
(1) The terms “future dangerousness” and “vileness” are 
unconstitutionally vague, failing to provide the 
sentencer with meaningful instruction to avoid the 
arbitrary and capricious infliction of a death 
sentence.  Rejected in Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 
373, 387, 484 S.E.2d 898, 907, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 
 
 
25
1018 (1997) (“vileness”); Mickens v. Commonwealth, 247 
Va. 395, 403, 442 S.E.2d 678, 684, (“vileness” and 
“future dangerousness”), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds, 513 U.S. 922 (1994); see also Jackson v. 
Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 205-06, 590 S.E.2d 520, 
535-36, cert. denied, 543 U.S 891 (2004) (“future 
dangerousness”); Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 193, 
208, 576 S.E.2d 471, 480, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1019 
(2003) (“vileness” and “future dangerousness”). 
 
(1) The statutes impose unconstitutional barriers to 
a jury’s consideration of mitigation evidence.  
Rejected in Watkins v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 
490-91, 331 S.E.2d 422, 438 (1985), cert. denied, 
475 U.S. 1099 (1986); see also Swann v. 
Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 228, 441 S.E.2d 195, 
200, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 889 (1994). 
 
(2) The statutes are unconstitutional because they 
permit a sentencer to find future dangerousness 
based upon unadjudicated criminal conduct.  
Rejected in Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 
192, 209-10, 402 S.E.2d 196, 206, cert. denied, 
502 U.S. 902 (1991); see also Jackson, 267 Va. at 
206, 590 S.E.2d at 536. 
 
(3) The statutes permit consideration of a post-
sentence report that may infringe upon 
defendant’s right to due process, to confront 
accusers, to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment, and to effective assistance of 
counsel because the report may contain hearsay 
and permits the death sentence despite a showing 
of good cause that a life sentence is just and 
appropriate.  Rejected in O’Dell v. Commonwealth, 
234 Va. 672, 701-02, 364 S.E.2d 491, 507-08, 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988); Breard v. 
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 76, 445 S.E.2d 670, 
675-76, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971 (1994) (“good 
cause” for life sentence); see also Jackson, 267 
Va. at 206, 590 S.E.2d at 536 (rejecting both 
arguments). 
 
(2) The statutes deny individuals sentenced to death 
from meaningful appellate review.  Rejected in 
Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 253, 389 
S.E.2d 871, 876 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
 
 
26
881 (1990); see also Stockton, 241 Va. at 215-16, 
402 S.E.2d at 210. 
 
b. 
Denial of Motion for a Bill of Particulars – Penalty Phase 
 
 
Juniper assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his 
Motion for a Bill of Particulars to require the Commonwealth to 
describe the theory it intended to rely upon to prove the 
“vileness” factor at sentencing under Code § 19.2-264.2 and 
19.2-264.4(C).  But we have repeatedly held that the 
Commonwealth need only allege the elements of capital murder set 
forth in Code § 18.2-31 without providing the accused with 
notice of additional allegations or a bill of particulars 
regarding aggravating factors.  See, e.g., Muhammad v. 
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 493-94, 619 S.E.2d 16, 40 (2005) 
(“[I]n Virginia, if the indictment gives a defendant sufficient 
notice of the nature and character of the offense charged so he 
can make his defense, no bill of particulars is required . . . . 
[A]ggravating factors are not constitutionally required to be 
recited in a capital murder indictment.” (citations omitted)); 
see also Swisher v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 471, 480-81, 506 
S.E.2d 763, 768 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 812 (1999). 
 
The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Juniper’s motion for a bill of particulars.  See 
Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 372, 402 S.E.2d 218, 
223, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991). 
 
 
27
c. 
Conducting Voir Dire in Panels of Five 
 
Juniper also contends the trial court erred “in conducting 
voir dire of the potential jurors regarding questions of death 
in panels of five.”  His argument is based on the contention 
that individual voir dire “is the best process for ensuring that 
truly unbiased, unprejudiced jurors are chosen to sit in 
judgment of the defendant.”  We have previously ruled that the 
manner of conducting voir dire rests “within the [trial] court’s 
discretion.”  Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 410-11, 374 
S.E.2d 46, 50 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S 1028 (1989).  In 
Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 276-77, 427 S.E.2d 411, 
417-18, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 (1993), we expressly upheld 
the trial court’s discretion to question prospective jurors in 
panels of five.  Juniper makes no individualized claim of 
impartiality or prejudice as a result of the trial court’s 
manner of conducting voir dire.  Consequently, we find no reason 
to revisit our previous holdings on this issue. 
B. 
PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES 
 
1. 
REFUSAL TO DISQUALIFY THE COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY 
 
Juniper contends the trial court erred in failing to 
disqualify the Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Norfolk, 
John R. Doyle, III, because of his previous representation of 
Juniper in a criminal case ten years earlier.  In addition, 
Juniper challenges the trial court's denial of his request to 
 
 
28
cross-examine Doyle at the hearing on his disqualification 
motion. 
In 1994, Doyle represented Juniper on charges of escape 
without force and trespass.  Juniper pled guilty and entered 
into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth.  Juniper alleges 
Doyle's former representation in this unrelated matter created a 
conflict of interest in the case at bar which could be cured 
only by Doyle's disqualification from prosecuting him.  Juniper 
also argues he should have been allowed to cross-examine Doyle 
because Juniper carried the burden of proof on the 
disqualification motion.  See Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 
107, 138, 590 S.E.2d 537, 556, cert. denied, 543 U.S 892 (2004). 
 
At the hearing on the disqualification motion, Doyle 
represented to the trial court that he gained no privileged 
information from his prior representation of Juniper, harbored 
no animosity towards him as a result of that representation, and 
had no personal interest in the prosecution of the case at bar.  
Juniper made no argument and presented no evidence to the 
contrary.  Neither Doyle nor Juniper had a personal recollection 
of the prior representation.  Furthermore, Doyle represented 
that the Commonwealth would not use the record of that former 
conviction as evidence.  In response, Juniper agreed that this 
concession by the Commonwealth benefited him, but then made the 
argument that allowing Doyle to continue the prosecution did not 
 
 
29
"[do] justice . . . to the community represented by the jury 
which arguably should have that evidence."  Juniper does not 
repeat this argument on appeal, but simply contends Doyle's 
status as Commonwealth Attorney creates an undefined conflict of 
interest.  All of Juniper's arguments are meritless. 
The interest to be considered on a motion for 
disqualification of a prosecutor is the protection of the 
defendant's former attorney-client relationship and his right to 
a fair trial in the matter at hand.  See Powell, 267 Va. at 139, 
590 S.E.2d at 557 (Commonwealth's attorney need not be 
disqualified if defendant's antagonism had no "effect on his 
professional judgment in seeking fairly and impartially to see 
justice done"); Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 387, 394, 329 
S.E.2d 22, 26-27 (1985) (due process rights of criminal 
defendant violated when Commonwealth's Attorney who has conflict 
of interest relevant to defendant's case prosecutes defendant). 
Juniper has alleged no personal prejudice in the trial of 
his case as a result of the former attorney-client relationship 
with Doyle.  The trial court argument that Doyle's offer not to 
use his former conviction does an injustice to the jury and the 
community at large is irrelevant, if not frivolous.  The trial 
court thus did not err in denying Juniper's motion for 
disqualification nor in refusing his request to cross-examine 
Doyle at the hearing on that motion. 
 
 
30
2. 
REFUSAL TO FUND EXPERT WITNESSES 
Juniper separately assigns error to the trial court's 
denial of his motions to fund a corrections expert and 
mitigation expert in addition to those experts already appointed 
by the court.12 
Citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), and 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), Juniper contends that 
failure to provide funds for his requested experts excluded 
mitigation evidence in violation of his federal constitutional 
rights.  We disagree.  The cases Juniper cites establish the 
admissibility of specific mitigating evidence, not a 
constitutional mandate that certain expert assistance be 
provided an indigent defendant.13  See Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4-5 
(defendant's behavior during incarceration relevant to 
determination of future dangerousness); and Eddings, 455 U.S. at 
116 (background and mental and emotional development of youthful 
defendant must be considered a mitigating factor).  These cases 
provide no support for Juniper's argument that his 
                     
12 The trial court entered orders allowing Juniper to retain 
Wayne Kennedy as a special investigator for the defense, and 
appointing Dr. Thomas A. Pasquale, Ph.D., as a mental health 
expert "to assist defense counsel in the preparation and 
presentation of information concerning the defendant's history, 
character, or mental condition." 
13 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985), established a 
three part test to determine when the Constitution requires that 
certain expert assistance be provided an indigent defendant.  
 
 
31
constitutional rights were violated by the trial court's denial 
of his motion to fund mitigation and corrections experts. 
Instead, we note that while the Commonwealth is required to 
provide adequate expert assistance to indigent defendants in 
certain circumstances, it is not required to provide them with 
"all assistance that a non-indigent defendant may purchase." 
Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 211, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 
(1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1154 (1997). 
[A]n indigent defendant seeking the appointment of an 
expert has the burden of showing a particularized need 
therefor. The required showing must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, and a determination whether an 
adequate showing has been made is a matter that rests 
within a trial court's discretion. . . . A hope or 
suspicion that favorable evidence may be procured from 
an expert, however, is not sufficient to require the 
appointment of an expert. 
 
Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 161, 171, 477 S.E.2d 270, 276 
(1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1224 (1997) (citation omitted).  
The Commonwealth maintains that Juniper failed to show a 
particularized need for either of these experts.  We agree. 
 
With regard to the corrections expert, Juniper argued that 
such a person was "necessary to examine the defendant's 
background, behavior in the Norfolk City Jail and previous 
incarcerations and provide testimony and documents."  He 
proffered no reason why examination of such records could not be 
                                                                  
Juniper has made no argument under Ake that his requested 
experts are "basic tools of an adequate defense."  Id. 
 
 
32
adequately conducted by his counsel, investigator or mental 
health expert.  As Juniper failed to show a particularized need 
for a corrections expert, the trial court properly denied his 
motion. 
 
Juniper contended the mitigation expert could "locate 
essential witnesses and data, examine and evaluate testimony and 
documents."  In denying this motion, the trial court noted that 
the services of the requested mitigation expert were duplicative 
of those of the court appointed private investigator, Wayne 
Kennedy. 
I can't think of anybody who's better qualified to 
locate essential witnesses and data, examine and 
evaluate testimony and documents than [Wayne Kennedy] 
is.  I don't know how much money the court authorized 
for Mr. Kennedy when he was appointed, but [if there] 
are other things that you all think he needs to do and 
you need to come back, do so.  Wayne Kennedy is 
perfectly capable of doing these things, so that 
motion is denied. 
 
Although not receiving the particular expert he requested, 
Juniper, in fact, received the services he requested.  Thus, his 
motion for a mitigation expert was properly denied.  See Winston 
v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 564, 581, 604 S.E.2d 21, 30-31 (2004), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 107 (2005). 
3. 
REFUSAL TO PERMIT EXAMINATION OF INVESTIGATORS UNDER OATH 
 
The trial court denied Juniper's discovery request in a 
Motion to Examine Investigators Under Oath in which he sought to 
“ensure that law enforcement officials have not concealed 
 
 
33
exculpatory evidence . . . and that any and all such evidence 
will be available prior to trial.”  Juniper assigns error to 
this ruling arguing that the trial court abused its discretion.  
We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the 
motion sought material beyond the scope to which Juniper is 
entitled under Rule 3A:11 or any other provision of law. 
There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a 
criminal case, even where a capital offense is charged.  
Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 490-91, 404 S.E.2d 227, 
233, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991).  While a defendant has 
the right to exculpatory evidence in the Commonwealth's 
possession upon request, Stover v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 789, 
795, 180 S.E.2d 504, 509 (1971), Rule 3A:11 defines the other 
discovery available to the accused in a felony case.  See 
Hackman v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 710, 713, 261 S.E.2d 555, 558 
(1980) (decided under previous Rule 3A:14).  Under Rule 3A:11, a 
felony defendant is entitled to his own "written or recorded 
statements" made to law enforcement personnel, certain written 
reports in the possession of the Commonwealth, and "tangible 
objects . . . within the possession, custody, or control of the 
Commonwealth" which "may be material to the preparation of [the] 
defense."  Rule 3A:11(b).  The Rule specifically does not 
authorize discovery of "statements made by Commonwealth 
witnesses or prospective . . . witnesses to agents of the 
 
 
34
Commonwealth . . . in connection with the investigation or 
prosecution of the case."  Rule 3A:11(b)(2). 
Citing past instances in other cases when law enforcement 
failed to provide prosecutors with all exculpatory evidence in 
their possession, Juniper argues that he should be able to 
examine the Commonwealth's investigators at a pretrial hearing 
in order to determine independently if they have provided all 
Brady material to the Commonwealth's Attorney.  See Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  Juniper offers no authority 
to support this argument. 
It is "the individual prosecutor [who] has a duty to learn 
of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the 
government's behalf in the case, including the police."  Burns 
v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 328, 541 S.E.2d 872, 886, cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 1043 (2001) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 
419, 437 (1995)). Juniper admitted that "the Commonwealth's 
Attorney has apparently disclosed all exculpatory evidence," and 
he does not assert that any additional discoverable material 
actually exists or that he has any reason to believe that there 
is any which has not been disclosed. 
We agree with the Commonwealth that Juniper's motion is "a 
speculative search for evidence."  No statute or rule of court 
affords a defendant the right to use a pretrial hearing as a 
discovery vehicle in this manner.  Davis v. Commonwealth, 215 
 
 
35
Va. 816, 821, 213 S.E.2d 785, 788-89 (1975); see also Williams 
v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 724, 729, 160 S.E.2d 781, 784-85 
(1968).  Because granting Juniper's motion to examine the 
Commonwealth's investigators under oath would have allowed 
Juniper discovery which is not authorized under Rule 3A:11 or 
otherwise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the motion. 
4. 
JURY SELECTION ISSUES 
a. 
Limitation of Questions During Voir Dire 
In four separate assignments of error, Juniper contends the 
trial court abused its discretion by limiting his voir dire 
examination of prospective jurors.  Specifically, Juniper argues 
he should have been allowed to question potential jurors about 
(1) the age and sex of their children and grandchildren; (2) 
their educational coursework in psychology, psychiatry, or law; 
(3) their military experience, including courts martial; and (4) 
their “philosophical” beliefs.  Although Juniper argues the 
trial court abused its discretion, he also relies on the 
statutory right to examine potential jurors on issues of 
relationship, interest, opinion, or prejudice under Code § 8.01-
358. 
The Commonwealth responds there was no abuse of discretion 
and that parties only have a right to ask potential jurors 
questions “relevant to the [Code § 8.01-358] factors of 
 
 
36
relationship, interest, opinion or bias.”  The Commonwealth 
contends Juniper’s proposed questions were not relevant to any 
of those factors. 
The purpose of voir dire is to protect an accused’s 
constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury.  U.S. Const. 
Amends. VI and XIV; Va. Const. Art. I, § 8.  Code § 8.01-358 
expands upon these principles by providing, in relevant part: 
[t]he court and counsel for either party shall have 
the right to examine under oath any person who is 
called as a juror therein and shall have the right to 
ask such person or juror directly any relevant 
question to ascertain whether he is related to either 
party, or has any interest in the cause, or has 
expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any 
bias or prejudice therein . . . . 
 
Even so, parties do not have “an unlimited constitutional 
or statutory right to propound any question to a jury panel.  
Rather, the questions propounded during voir dire must be 
relevant to the factors prescribed in Code § 8.01-358.”  
Commonwealth v. Hill, 264 Va. 315, 319, 568 S.E.2d 673, 675 
(2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1202 (2003).  Thus, “[i]f an 
answer to the question would necessarily disclose, or clearly 
lead to the disclosure of the statutory factors of relationship, 
interest, opinion, or prejudice, it must be permitted.  
Questions which go beyond this standard are entirely within the 
trial court’s discretion.”  LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 
 
 
37
564, 581, 304 S.E.2d 644, 653 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S 1063 
(1984).  A party does not have a right to 
propound any question he wishes, or to extend voir 
dire questioning ad infinitum.  The court must afford 
a party a full and fair opportunity to ascertain 
whether prospective jurors ‘stand indifferent in the 
cause,’ but the trial judge retains the discretion to 
determine when the parties have had sufficient 
opportunity to do so. 
 
Id. 
i. Age and Gender of Juror’s Children and Grandchildren 
 
Juniper contends the trial court abused its discretion in 
restricting his voir dire of potential jurors by limiting 
inquiry about the specific age and gender of their children or 
grandchildren.  This limitation, Juniper argues, had the 
"potential for prejudice in contemplating punishment,” because 
of “a parent’s protective instincts toward his or her own 
children” in view of the young ages of Shearyia and Nykia. 
The Commonwealth argues that the question requesting the 
age and gender of a potential juror’s children and grandchildren 
was unnecessarily intrusive.  Furthermore, the Commonwealth 
avers that the actual voir dire of potential jurors ascertained 
whether they had children or grandchildren under the age of 14, 
and, if so, whether those jurors could fairly try the case.   
 
Although the trial court did not permit an open-ended 
inquiry, it did permit the panels of potential jurors to be 
asked:  “[D]o [any of] you have children or grandchildren under 
 
 
38
the age of 14?” and “Would the fact that those of you who have 
answered this question in the affirmative have children or 
grandchildren under the age of 14, given the statement of the 
case that was read to you by the Court . . . prevent you from 
giving both sides in this case a fair trial and . . . basing 
your verdict on the evidence?”  The trial court had informed the 
potential venire that "I expect that the Commonwealth will 
present evidence that the defendant shot and killed . . . Nykia 
Stephens who was four years old and Shearyia Stephens who was 
two years old."   
 
Juniper conceded at trial that a juror would not be struck 
for cause based solely upon the age or sex of that juror’s 
children.  He nonetheless contends the trial court abused its 
discretion in not permitting his requested inquiry.  We disagree 
with Juniper that the trial court abused its discretion. 
 
Juniper had the opportunity to ascertain from all potential 
jurors if they had a child or grandchild under the age of 14.  
He did not ask two of the ten panels this question at all, and 
in two panels only asked one or two of the potential jurors.  
All potential jurors in the remaining six panels were asked 
these questions. 
 
 
39
Furthermore, Juniper had the opportunity, in addition to 
the trial court’s examination on bias,14 to specifically inquire 
as to bias on the basis of the age of a juror’s progeny.  All 
prospective jurors who responded that having young children or 
grandchildren would affect their ability to be impartial were 
struck for cause without objection.  Juniper thus had full 
knowledge of those potential jurors who had not indicated bias 
or prejudice as a result of having young children or 
grandchildren and could consider this factor in exercising 
peremptory strikes if he so chose. 
 
Nonetheless, he argues, without citation to authority, that 
he should have been able to gather further information about the 
age and gender of the potential jurors’ children and 
grandchildren.  As we noted in an analogous voir dire context in 
LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 582, 304 S.E.2d at 653, “[s]uch attitudes 
might well be interesting to counsel, but they have no 
relationship to the juror’s ability to abide by the court’s 
                     
14 In addition to pursuing other specific areas of potential 
bias or prejudice, the trial court asked the panels variations 
of the following open-ended questions to determine the potential 
jurors’ impartiality and fairness:  “Do any of you know of any 
reason . . . why you could not or would not be able to fairly 
and impartially determine the facts of the case or abide by the 
instructions of the Court on capital murder sentencing issues?”  
“Do you know of any reason . . . even if I haven’t already asked 
you . . . that would prevent you from giving a fair and 
impartial trial to the Commonwealth and to Mr. Juniper based 
solely on the law and the evidence?” 
 
 
40
instructions, to find the facts impartially, and to apply the 
law to the facts conscientiously.” 
Our jurisprudence according deference to the trial court’s 
discretion in consideration of juror voir dire matters is long-
standing.  “Whether to permit a party to ask a question that 
goes beyond what is permissible under Code § 8.01-358 is a 
matter entirely within the trial court’s discretion.”  Powell, 
267 Va. at 143, 590 S.E.2d at 559; see also Green, 266 Va. at 
96-97, 580 S.E.2d at 843 (“When, as here, a trial court affords 
ample opportunity to counsel to ask relevant questions and where 
the questions actually propounded by the trial court were 
sufficient to preserve a defendant’s right to trial by a fair 
and impartial jury, we will generally not reverse a trial 
court’s decision to limit or disallow certain questions from 
defense counsel.”); Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 458, 470 
S.E.2d 114, 125, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996) (“[S]ince 
[the accused] had ample opportunity to ask relevant questions, 
and since the questions asked were sufficient to preserve [the 
defendant’s] right to trial by a fair and impartial jury, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to ask 
additional questions.”); LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 581, 304 S.E.2d 
at 653.  We see no reason not to accord deference to the trial 
court's ruling on this issue. 
 
 
41
 
In addition to our long-standing recognition of deference 
to the trial court’s discretion on matters of voir dire, we find 
instructive the decision of the Supreme Court of California, 
which examined a similar issue in People v. Box, 5 P.3d 130, 
146-47 (Cal. 2000), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (2001). 
 
Box involved a multiple homicide, one of the victims being 
a three-year-old boy.  Id. at 142.  Defendant’s counsel sought 
to ascertain in voir dire “whether the prospective jurors had 
young children or grandchildren.”  Id. at 147.  The trial court 
declined to permit that inquiry, but did make specific 
examination of the potential venire as to any bias based on one 
of the murder victims being a young child.  Id.  Finding that 
“the bias these inquiries sought to uncover was adequately 
addressed” by the trial court’s voir dire, the California 
Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion.  Id.; see also 
United States v. Joe, 831 F.2d 218, 221 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 1072 (1988). 
 
In the case at bar, Juniper’s counsel was permitted greater 
latitude of inquiry than in Box, having the ability to ascertain 
those potential jurors with children or grandchildren under the 
age of 14.  The trial court, and Juniper, made full inquiry as 
to any bias or prejudice on the part of such potential jurors.  
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 
refusal of Juniper’s requested inquiry. 
 
 
42
ii. Other Questions 
Juniper also contends he should have been able to inquire 
as to a juror’s educational background in the fields of 
psychology, psychiatry, or law because those studies could lead 
to impermissible “preconceived notions” regarding the testimony 
of Juniper’s expert witnesses or on matters of the law.  The 
Commonwealth responds that the specific questions Juniper 
proposed did not inquire as to whether the potential jurors had 
earned particular degrees, but whether they had "any education" 
in the particular fields.  The Commonwealth further questions 
the relevance of determining that “somebody once took Psych 101” 
to evaluate a juror’s potential bias. 
Juniper’s concerns regarding the potential jurors’ 
educational background in psychology, psychiatry, and law were 
adequately addressed by inquiring about the potential jurors’ 
occupations and, when necessary, for a description of their work 
responsibilities.  Little, if any, relevant information would 
have emerged from learning the specific coursework of a 
potential juror outside their particular career.  The trial 
court did not err in barring Juniper’s proposed questions. 
Juniper also assigns error to his inability to question 
potential jurors regarding their military experience, 
particularly as to courts martial.  He contends that such an 
inquiry could reveal whether potential jurors had a background 
 
 
43
in military law enforcement or the military justice system.  The 
Commonwealth argues that a juror’s generic military experience 
is irrelevant because “members of the armed forces generally 
have no role in the investigation or prosecution of crimes.”  
Furthermore, the Commonwealth contends any relevant concern 
regarding a background in military law enforcement was 
adequately covered by the trial court’s direct inquiry about law 
enforcement experience.15 
Juniper’s concerns were adequately covered by the trial 
court’s direct question to jurors about law enforcement service.  
A potential juror’s military experience would have had little, 
                     
15 The transcript of the voir dire depicts the relevant 
question and clarification asked of the entire panel of 
potential jurors: 
 
Have any of you or any member of your immediate 
family ever been employed in law enforcement?  I’ll 
try to give you some definition. 
 
Immediate family I would certainly think includes 
your husband, your wife, your parents, your children, 
any relative who lives with you.  I know some families 
are closer than others.  Any family member you feel 
especially close to, I’ll have to leave that up to 
your judgment. 
 
Law enforcement would include state, local 
police, sheriff’s department, correctional officers, 
FBI agents, ATF agents, military police, secret 
service agents, naval investigators.  I’m sure there 
are other agencies I haven’t thought of. 
 
Law enforcement officers don’t include lawyers 
unless they are prosecuting attorneys, but anyway, 
with those general definitions in mind I’ll restate 
the question. 
 
Have any of you or members of your immediate 
family ever been employed in law enforcement? 
 
 
 
44
if any, probative value, as the trial court confirmed that 
Juniper was never a member of the armed services.  To the extent 
that requesting the potential jurors’ military service would 
have shed light on their law enforcement experience, the trial 
court’s explanation of “law enforcement” covered any law 
enforcement experience while in military service. 
Lastly, we find no merit in Juniper’s assertion that the 
potential jurors should have been directly asked about their 
“philosophical” beliefs, which might affect their judgment as 
jurors.  The trial court asked a series of questions designed to 
alert jurors to possible bias from their opinions or beliefs 
that could influence their function as impartial triers of fact.  
Although “religious or moral” beliefs were specifically 
addressed in voir dire, the trial court also inquired as to “any 
opinion or belief” that would influence the potential jurors’ 
consideration of sentences of life or death and “any reason 
whatsoever” that would prevent them from affording Juniper a 
fair trial.  (Emphasis added.)  Juniper’s request is semantic 
irrelevance. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
permit Juniper to ask potential jurors any of the aforementioned 
questions. 
b. 
Failure to Strike Certain Jurors for Cause 
                                                                  
(Emphasis added.)  
 
 
45
Juniper assigns error to the trial court’s failure to 
strike four potential jurors: Henry, Colander, Ashby, and 
Molinaro.  Code § 8.01-358 and Rule 3A:14 facilitate an 
accused’s constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury 
by providing that members of the venire must “stand indifferent 
in the cause.”  A prospective juror 
must be able to give [the accused] a fair and 
impartial trial.  Upon this point nothing should be 
left to inference or doubt.  All the tests applied by 
the courts, all the enquiries made into the state of 
the juror’s mind, are merely to ascertain whether [the 
juror] comes to the trial free from partiality and 
prejudice. 
 
Wolfe, 265 Va. at 211, 576 S.E.2d at 482 (quoting Wright v. 
Commonwealth, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 941, 943 (1879)). 
On appeal, this Court generally gives deference to the 
trial court’s decision whether to strike a potential juror for 
cause.  Vinson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 467, 522 S.E.2d 
170, 176 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1218 (2000).  We do so 
“[b]ecause the trial judge has the opportunity, which we lack, 
to observe and evaluate the apparent sincerity, 
conscientiousness, intelligence, and demeanor of prospective 
jurors first hand . . . .”  Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 
123-24, 360 S.E.2d 352, 358 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1015 
(1988) (citing Calhoun v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 256, 258-59, 307 
S.E.2d 896, 898 (1983)).  Consequently, unless “manifest error 
 
 
46
appears in the record,” the trial court’s decision will not be 
disturbed.  Id. 
 
In reviewing whether a potential juror should have been 
removed from the venire, we consider “the prospective juror’s 
entire voir dire, not just isolated portions.”  Jackson, 267 Va. 
at 191, 590 S.E.2d at 527.  Guided by these principles, we 
review the entire voir dire of the four prospective jurors 
Juniper argues should have been stricken for cause. 
i. Juror Henry 
Juniper moved to strike prospective juror Henry for the 
“bias and prejudice” shown in his responses to whether he would 
consider life imprisonment without parole as an alternative to 
the death penalty.  Juniper asserts that prospective juror Henry 
was not successfully rehabilitated from his statement that he 
“would more likely favor the death penalty.”  Juniper contends 
Henry’s voir dire “demonstrated the type of preconceived opinion 
that the process of voir dire is designed to ferret out.” 
 
The Commonwealth submits that the totality of Henry’s voir 
dire indicates an open mind to consideration of a sentence of 
life imprisonment.  In particular, the Commonwealth notes that 
Henry stated that he did not know whether there were mitigating 
factors that would affect his decision and agreed that he would 
“consider all the alternative punishments prior to reaching a 
decision.” 
 
 
47
 
The record contains the following exchange: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  [You] are able to consider life 
imprisonment without parole as an alternative to the 
death penalty in this case? 
 
MR. HENRY:  Yes sir.  It’s possible, but I would more 
likely favor the death penalty. 
 
. . . . 
 
THE COURT:  You could consider life imprisonment 
without parole? 
 
MR. HENRY:  It’s within the realm of possibility, but 
not likely. 
 
. . . . 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Dr. Henry, would you restate what 
you said a moment ago? 
 
DR. HENRY:  I said it’s within the realm of 
possibility that I would – could see a sentence of 
life imprisonment, but most likely I would favor the 
death penalty based on what you’ve told me so far.  I 
don’t know if there are other mitigating factors that 
could come up, but in general, I would favor the death 
penalty. 
 
. . . . 
 
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]:  So, Dr. Henry . . . you 
know at the end when it comes time for a jury to 
deliberate the Court will give you instructions 
setting out the law, giving you guidance as to [how 
to] conduct your deliberations and you could follow 
the Court’s instructions including if the Court 
instructed the jury to consider all the alternative 
punishments prior to reaching a decision?  Is that 
fair to say? 
 
[DR. HENRY]:  Yes. 
 
 
In denying Juniper’s motion to strike Henry, the trial 
court stated, 
 
 
48
I gleaned from his answer he said he would be 
inclined to the death penalty if that is proven and 
the defendant is guilty of capital murder, but he 
could consider the other one. . . . I think Dr. 
Henry’s voir dire in its entirety [reflects] he’d be 
open to consider both penalties. 
 
 
Henry’s overall responses to voir dire questions relevant 
to this particular issue reveal that he could “stand indifferent 
in the cause” and would consider both the prosecution and 
defense’s evidence when determining the appropriate sentence for 
Juniper.  He unequivocally responded “yes” when asked if he 
would conduct deliberations as a juror according to the trial 
court’s instructions, and he mentioned that mitigating factors 
would play a role in determining Juniper’s sentence. 
As we have previously stated, “[t]he standard to be applied 
by a trial court in deciding whether to exclude or retain a 
prospective juror is whether the prospective juror’s views 
‘would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his 
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his 
oath.’ ”  Breard, 248 Va. at 77, 445 S.E.2d at 676 (quoting 
Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 246, 397 S.E.2d 385, 391 
(1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824 (1991)); see also Schmitt v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 139-41, 547 S.E.2d 186, 195-96 
(2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1094 (2002).  Henry satisfied 
this test by indicating that he could consider sentences both of 
life or death in accord with the evidence.  We also afford 
 
 
49
deference to the trial court’s observation that Henry’s 
responses showed he would “be open to consider both penalties.”  
Therefore, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s 
decision refusing to strike this juror for cause. 
ii. Juror Colander 
Juniper claims the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to strike prospective juror Colander from the venire 
because she had stated that it would cause hardship to be away 
from her position as a public school principal for the duration 
of the trial.  The Commonwealth counters Juniper’s assertion by 
observing that difficulty finding a replacement at work is 
“irrelevant to any disqualifier under §8.01-358.”  When refusing 
to strike Colander from the venire, the trial court expressed 
confidence that the Norfolk public school system could 
accommodate her absence. 
Juniper has not cited, nor does the record reflect, any 
basis for removing Colander for cause.  Decisions of the trial 
court regarding whether to retain or excuse potential jurors are 
entitled to great deference on appeal.  As such, we find no 
manifest error in the trial court’s decision rejecting Juniper’s 
motion to strike Colander as a juror. 
iii. Juror Ashby 
Juniper contends that prospective juror Ashby should have 
been struck for cause because her answers “indicated that she 
 
 
50
[could not] sit fairly and impartially as she [had] already 
formed opinions regarding Juniper and the evidence before the 
commencement of the trial.”  Specifically, Juniper cites Ashby’s 
statement that “it’s hard when kids are involved” and her 
knowledge of the case through media coverage to support this 
assertion. 
The Commonwealth responds that Ashby’s statements plainly 
show she had not formed an opinion and would fairly contemplate 
the evidence and instructions presented at trial.  The 
Commonwealth also relies on the trial court’s observation that 
although “[Ashby’s] answers at least regarding capital 
punishment were somewhat inconsistent,” her responses did not 
provide a “reason to strike.” 
The following colloquy occurred after Ashby indicated she 
had heard “something” about the case from media reports: 
[COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]: Has what you heard about it 
or the seriousness of the allegations made you to 
[sic] form an opinion about the guilt or innocence of 
the person who’s accused? 
 
[MS. ASHBY]:  No.  It haven’t [sic] made me form an 
opinion or nothing, but it’s hard when kids is 
involved.  I’ll put it that way.  So I can’t say.  I 
can’t form an opinion until all evidence is heard or 
what. 
 
[COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]:  So you would base your 
decision on the evidence that you will hear in the 
courtroom which may include the deaths of children and 
– but make your decision on what you hear in the 
courtroom?  You’re nodding your head yes? 
 
 
 
51
[MS. ASHBY]:  Yes. 
 
. . . . 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Ms. Ashby, based upon what you 
have heard or read, have you formed an opinion as to 
the guilt or innocence of Mr. Juniper? 
 
MS. ASHBY:  No.  No. 
 
The totality of Ashby’s voir dire reflects that she would 
not rely on any information she had read or heard about the case 
and that she had not formed an opinion regarding Juniper’s guilt 
or innocence.  As such, she would be able to “stand indifferent 
in the cause” and fairly and impartially perform the duties of a 
juror. 
Mere exposure to media coverage does not disqualify a 
potential juror as long as that individual can still fairly and 
impartially weigh the evidence presented at trial.  See Mu’Min 
v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 430 (1991); see also Wolfe, 265 Va. 
at 209-12, 576 S.E.2d at 480-82; Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 
172, 192-94, 563 S.E.2d 695, 709-10 (2002), cert. denied, 537 
U.S. 1123 (2003).  Consequently, we find that the trial court 
did not err in refusing to strike this potential juror. 
iv. Juror Molinaro 
Juniper’s final challenge is that prospective juror 
Molinaro should have been struck for cause because she was an 
acquaintance of the Commonwealth’s Attorney.  Juniper asserts 
that when asked if it “would affect her ability to sit fairly 
 
 
52
and impartially[, Molinaro] responded, ‘[I]’ve been thinking 
that since nine o’clock this morning, and I don’t think so.’ ”  
This exchange, Juniper contends, reflects Molinaro’s clear 
“inability to give an unequivocal answer in light of her 
familiarity to the prosecutor” and “illustrated her inability to 
be a qualified juror for Juniper.” 
The Commonwealth initially notes that Juniper misquotes 
Molinaro’s response to the question regarding her impartiality 
in such a way that suggests equivocation on Molinaro’s part that 
her actual response does not.  The record demonstrates 
Molinaro’s complete response was, “I’ve been thinking about that 
since nine o’clock this morning, and I don’t think so.”  
(Emphasis added).  From Molinaro’s actual response, the 
Commonwealth asserts that far from equivocation, her answers 
show “conscientious introspection with respect to possible bias 
before reaching the conclusion that she could be fair.”  In 
light of this showing of truthfulness and frankness, the 
Commonwealth contends the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to strike Molinaro. 
The record shows the following colloquy during Molinaro’s 
voir dire: 
THE COURT:  [W]hat’s the nature of your acquaintance 
with [the Commonwealth’s Attorney]? 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
53
MS. MOLINARO:  I know his wife from my work at 
Sentara.  I did – am I allowed to say I did put some 
signs up in yard[s] in the neighborhood when he was 
running for Commonwealth[’s] Attorney. 
 
THE COURT:  Do you believe your acquaintance with Mr. 
Doyle would in any way prejudice you in favor of the 
prosecution or impair your ability to give a fair and 
impartial trial to –  
 
MS. MOLINARO:  I’ve been thinking about that since 
nine o’clock this morning, and I don’t think so. 
 
. . . . 
 
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]:  . . . I just wanted to be 
sure we brought that all out.  In fact, you may be 
acquainted with [Defense Counsel] as well. 
 
[MS. MOLINARO]: I know of [Defense Counsel] through 
soccer. 
 
. . . . 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Can you be certain [that you would 
not be inclined or partial to the Commonwealth in this 
case]? 
 
[MS. MOLINARO]:  I feel certain that knowing him the 
little that I do, that I would be an impartial juror 
just because I have faith in myself, but the reason I 
have been asking is because I don’t do this very often 
and so I do not know, but I do not think. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  You threw me off. 
 
[MS. MOLINARO]:  Yeah.  Okay.  Well, you’re more 
experienced with screening jurors, but I think that I 
am an impartial juror. 
 
 
In rejecting Juniper’s motion to strike Molinaro, the trial 
court stated: 
I think she said she’d been thinking about it all 
morning.  The impression I got from observing her 
demeanor was I imagine she made up her mind she can be 
 
 
54
fair in this case. . . . If people who knew the 
Commonwealth’s attorney were disqualified from being 
on a jury, in most rural areas in this state you’d 
never have a criminal trial. 
 
 
Our previous decisions have generally held that 
relationship does not automatically disqualify a potential juror 
from being fair and impartial.  Wise v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 
322, 325, 337 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 
1112 (1986) (citing Calhoun, 226 Va. at 263, 307 S.E.2d at 900).  
The overarching consideration is whether the trial court erred 
in determining that the prospective juror would fairly and 
impartially decide the accused’s case.  See, e.g., Jackson, 255 
Va. 625, 640-41, 499 S.E.2d 538, 548 (1998), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1067 (1999) (upholding trial court’s refusal to strike a 
juror for cause when the juror’s husband was a first cousin of 
the Commonwealth’s attorney); Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 
324, 343, 468 S.E.2d 98, 109, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 951 (1996), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Morrisette v. Warden of 
the Sussex I State Prison, 270 Va. 188, 202, 613 S.E.2d 551, 562 
(2005) (upholding retention of juror when the Commonwealth’s 
attorney in a capital case formerly represented prospective 
juror in a matter and the prospective juror still regarded him 
as his “personal attorney”); Wise, 230 Va. at 325, 337 S.E.2d at 
717 (1985) (upholding retention of prospective juror who was the 
 
 
55
Commonwealth’s attorney’s “golfing buddy” and “long standing” 
friend). 
The voir dire of Molinaro demonstrates that after carefully 
considering her association with the Commonwealth’s Attorney, 
she could be impartial as a juror.  We do not find manifest 
error in the trial court’s conclusion that Molinaro would “stand 
indifferent in the cause” and act as an impartial and fair 
juror. 
c. 
Batson Challenges 
 
Juniper contends the trial court “erred in denying 
Juniper’s Batson challenge to jurors Mix, McClain, Bailey, 
Boddie and Dawley.”  “In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 
(1986), the United States Supreme Court held that excluding a 
potential juror solely on the basis of the juror’s race is 
purposeful discrimination and a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.”  Jackson, 266 Va. at 435, 587 S.E.2d at 
542. 
When a defendant makes a Batson challenge to the use of a 
peremptory strike, he must show that the individual “is a member 
of a cognizable racial group,” Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 262 
Va. 388, 394, 551 S.E.2d 306, 309 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 
1060 (2002) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96), and “make a prima 
facie showing that the peremptory strike was made on racial 
 
 
56
grounds.”  Jackson, 266 Va. at 436, 587 S.E.2d at 542.  Mere 
exclusion of members of a particular race by using peremptory 
strikes “does not itself establish such a prima facie case under 
Batson.”  Yarbrough, 262 Va. at 394, 551 S.E.2d at 309.  To 
establish a prima facie case, the defendant must also “identify 
facts and circumstances that raise an inference that potential 
jurors were excluded based on their race.”  Id. 
Once a prima facie case is put before the court, the burden 
shifts to the prosecution “to produce race-neutral explanations 
for striking the juror.”  The defendant can then argue that the 
prosecution’s explanations were purely a pretext for 
unconstitutional discrimination.  Jackson, 266 Va. at 436, 587 
S.E.2d at 542. 
Juniper offered no basis for his challenge that the strikes 
were racially motivated other than observing that the jurors 
were African-American.16  Nonetheless, the Commonwealth offered 
the following race-neutral explanations for exercising its 
peremptory strikes against the five jurors: 
                     
16 Although Mix, McClain, Boddie, and Dawley were African-
American, Juniper did not establish Bailey’s race.  He never 
inquired as to Bailey’s race or offered any evidence in that 
regard.  The trial court refused Juniper’s request that it find 
as a matter of fact that Bailey was African-American and found 
“[i]t appears Ms. Bailey is white.”  Juniper did not assign 
error to that finding and under Rule 5:17(c) he cannot challenge 
that finding on appeal. 
 
 
57
(1) 
India Mix was struck because she had been a 
client of one of Juniper’s attorneys in a prior 
criminal case. 
 
(2) 
The Commonwealth stated that it was “concern[ed]” 
by the fact that Charlotte McClain’s brother had 
been prosecuted in Norfolk by the Commonwealth 
Attorney’s Office the previous year resulting in 
a conviction. 
 
(3) 
Malia Bailey was struck due to “inconsistent” 
answers to questions regarding the possible 
imposition of the death penalty.  The prosecutor 
observed that at one point in the voir dire, Ms. 
Bailey “was pretty close” to crying as a result 
of the questioning regarding the death sentence 
and “said at one point it makes her sick to think 
about . . . the possible imposition of the death 
penalty.”  In addition, the Commonwealth cited 
Ms. Bailey’s on-going medical appointments 
related to breast cancer treatments. 
 
(4) 
Richard Boddie was struck because of his 
“affirmative [response] that it would be 
difficult to impose the death penalty.”  In 
addition, the Commonwealth noted that Mr. Boddie 
was the final potential alternate juror who had 
indicated “any difficulty” with the death 
penalty. 
 
(5) 
Michelle Dawley was struck because her brother 
had been convicted of murder 25 years ago, and 
the prosecutor believed that the conviction would 
affect her. 
 
The trial court concluded that Juniper failed to satisfy 
the threshold requirement of a prima facie showing that any of 
the strikes was racially motivated.  In making its decision, the 
trial court noted, “over the seven strikes the Commonwealth 
made, four were black, . . . three were white which is generally 
in fairly good proportion from the total mix on which they had 
 
 
58
to strike.”17  Even if a prima facie case had been made, however, 
the trial court found that the Commonwealth had provided a 
sufficient race-neutral reason to strike each prospective juror 
at issue. 
Our previous decisions recognize the “unique opportunity to 
observe the demeanor and credibility of potential jurors during 
voir dire,” and therefore afford the trial court’s determination 
whether the Commonwealth’s explanation is race neutral “great 
deference.”  Jackson, 266 Va. at 437, 587 S.E.2d at 543.  We 
will not reverse the trial court’s decision “unless it is 
clearly erroneous.”  Id. 
Even if we assume that Juniper made a prima facie showing, 
we find nothing in the record to support a conclusion that the 
trial court’s determination was clearly erroneous.  Far from 
being pretextual explanations, as Juniper contends, the 
Commonwealth’s reasons for dismissing each of the potential 
jurors directly related to valid race-neutral reasons.  
Furthermore, “the record supports the Commonwealth’s 
characterization of the statements made by the potential jurors 
in question.”  See Jackson, 266 Va. at 437, 587 S.E.2d at 543.  
                     
17 Even if Ms. Bailey were properly categorized as African-
American, using five of seven peremptory strikes to remove 
potential African-American jurors would not necessarily 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination or overcome the 
prosecution’s race-neutral explanations for its strikes.  See, 
 
 
59
Finding no basis for Juniper’s contention that the juror strikes 
were racially motivated, we will not disturb the trial court’s 
findings that Juniper had not established a prima facie case of 
racial discrimination and that the Commonwealth’s explanations 
for striking these jurors were race neutral. 
5. 
DENIAL OF SUBSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERT AND FINDING OF 
FAILURE TO COOPERATE 
 
 
The trial court granted Juniper's motion under Code § 19.2-
264.3:1(A) for the appointment of a mental health expert, Dr. 
Thomas A. Pasquale, to assist with his defense.  Pursuant to 
Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F), the trial court granted the 
Commonwealth's request for a similar expert, Dr. David Keenan.  
The trial court also advised Juniper that his refusal to 
cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert could result in the 
exclusion of testimony by his expert witness or notice to the 
jury that Juniper refused to cooperate with the Commonwealth's 
expert.  Juniper acknowledged to the trial court that he 
understood the requirements and the potential consequences for 
noncompliance.  Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(2). 
On December 29, 2004, the Commonwealth's expert, Dr. 
Keenan, met with Juniper.  Ten minutes into the meeting, 
"Juniper stood, turned around, banged on the glass, said a few 
things, banged on the glass."  Juniper became angry, cursed at 
                                                                  
e.g., Chandler v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 270, 276-77, 455 S.E.2d 
 
 
60
Dr. Keenan and told a guard that Dr. Keenan was "trying to set 
[him] up."  Juniper demanded that the guard remove him from the 
interview room.  The interview was thus terminated, and Dr. 
Keenan testified that he did not "believe [he could] get any 
useful information from Mr. Juniper" should they arrange another 
meeting. 
The Commonwealth then filed a motion under the provisions 
of Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(2) to bar Juniper from presenting 
expert testimony from Dr. Pasquale at sentencing or to permit 
the Commonwealth "to introduce evidence of the defendant's 
refusal to cooperate."  Juniper filed a motion to appoint a 
substitute expert for Dr. Keenan.  At the hearing on this 
motion, Juniper again acknowledged that refusal to cooperate 
with Dr. Keenan could result in either "tell[ing] the jury that 
[he] refused to cooperate or . . . exclud[ing] Dr. Pasquale."  
Though Dr. Keenan and Juniper's accounts of the interview 
questions differ, Juniper did not dispute that he refused to 
cooperate with Dr. Keenan or that he terminated the interview. 
Rather than asking that Juniper be prohibited from 
presenting his own expert testimony, the Commonwealth agreed to 
allow Juniper to present testimony from Dr. Pasquale as long as 
the jury was informed of his refusal to cooperate with Dr. 
Keenan.  The trial court found "as a matter of fact that Mr. 
                                                                  
219, 223-24, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 889 (1995). 
 
 
61
Juniper refused to cooperate with the evaluation requested by 
the Commonwealth," and ordered the sanction recommended by the 
Commonwealth. 
Juniper assigns error to the trial court's finding of 
failure to cooperate and the denial of his motion to appoint a 
substitute expert in place of Dr. Keenan.  Code § 19.2-
264.3:1(F)(2) explicitly provides that the choice of sanction is 
within the trial court's discretion.  Based on the record and 
Juniper's own admission that he made the decision to end the 
interview, the trial court's finding that Juniper refused to 
cooperate with Dr. Keenan was not erroneous.  Similarly, we find 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Juniper's motion to appoint a substitute expert.  See Mackall v. 
Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 247, 372 S.E.2d 759, 764 (1988), 
cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989) (indigent defendant not 
entitled to a second psychiatric examination at state expense 
where the Commonwealth already had paid for his first 
examination); Pruett v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266, 276-77, 351 
S.E.2d 1, 7 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987) (defendant 
“has no right to 'shop around' at state expense until he finds a 
doctor who will give him the opinion he wants”). 
C. 
GUILT PHASE 
 
1. 
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 
 
a. 
Fitzgerald Cross-Examination 
 
 
62
 
 
Juniper contends that the trial court erred by disallowing 
cross-examination of Terence Fitzgerald regarding "foot traffic" 
to and from Keshia's apartment. 
 
Fitzgerald, a friend of Keshia's, testified that he 
obtained and paid the rent for the apartment in which Keshia and 
her children lived.  On cross-examination, defense counsel 
attempted to ask Fitzgerald if the landlord had ever complained 
to him about "foot traffic" at Keshia's apartment.  The 
Commonwealth objected on hearsay and relevance grounds.  
Juniper's counsel responded that the inquiry was "simply offered 
to show why [Fitzgerald] . . . went and talked to Keshia[–] 
because he received a complaint, not for the truth of [the 'foot 
traffic' complaint]."  Fitzgerald was then asked if he "ever 
complained to Keshia about the traffic at the apartment" and the 
Commonwealth again objected.  Defense counsel then argued the 
question was relevant "as to whether or not someone else was 
there or had the opportunity to be involved in these crimes.  
You have high traffic," and represented that she planned "to 
introduce evidence that the [apartment] looked like it had been 
searched."  The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's 
objections. 
 
Juniper assigns error to these rulings because he alleges 
the trial court disallowed questioning which "would lead to 
 
 
63
relevant testimony tending to show [Juniper] did not commit the 
crime for which he was charged."  Juniper cites the following 
statement of law in support of this assertion: 
In Virginia, evidence that a crime was actually 
committed by someone other than the accused is 
admissible for the purpose of generating a reasonable 
doubt of the guilt of the accused. However, the 
evidence introduced must point directly to guilt of a 
third party. Thus, where there is a trend of facts and 
circumstances tending clearly to point out some other 
person as the guilty party, the [defendant] may 
introduce any legal evidence which is available 
tending to prove that another person committed the 
crime with which he is charged. The admissibility of 
circumstantial evidence tending to prove the guilt of 
a third person is left to the discretion of the trial 
court. Although circumstantial evidence tending to 
prove the guilt of a third party is to be liberally 
received, the evidence must be legally admissible. 
That is, the evidence must be relevant and material, 
and may not be hearsay. 
 
Weller v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 886, 890, 434 S.E.2d 330, 
333 (1993) (citations and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis 
added), aff’d in rehearing en banc, 443 S.E.2d 171 (1994).  In 
Weller, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court disallowing testimony that the defendant proffered to 
implicate a particular individual, on the grounds that such 
testimony was inadmissible hearsay and irrelevant.  Id. at 890-
91, 434 S.E.2d at 333-34. 
 
In this case, Juniper's attempted questioning of Fitzgerald 
did not implicate another particular individual in the murders.  
Defense counsel merely alleged that there were other people who 
 
 
64
came to the apartment at unknown times, but never proffered any 
evidence to support this claim.  As we have previously stated, 
[p]roffered evidence that merely suggests a third 
party may have committed the crime charged is 
inadmissible; only when the proffered evidence tends 
clearly to point to some other person as the guilty 
party will such proof be admitted. . . . [A] large 
discretion must and should remain vested in the trial 
court as to the admission of this class of testimony. 
 
Elliott v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 396, 424, 593 S.E.2d 270, 287 
(2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. 
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 681, 529 S.E.2d 769, 784, cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 981 (2000)). Thus, we find the trial court 
correctly excluded the "foot traffic" question because it did 
not tend "clearly to point to some other person as the guilty 
party."  Id. 
b. 
Admission of Exhibits 
Juniper assigns error to the trial court admitting exhibits 
130 and 136 into evidence on the grounds those exhibits were 
"prejudicial, inflammatory, and/or irrelevant."  He separately 
assigns error to the admission of exhibits 163-165 on the 
grounds those exhibits were also "prejudicial, inflammatory, and 
irrelevant."  In determining whether relevant evidence should be 
admitted, the trial court must apply a balancing test to assess 
the probative value of the evidence and any undue prejudicial 
effect of that evidence. Dandridge v. Marshall, 267 Va. 591, 
596, 594 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2004).  The determination to admit 
 
 
65
such relevant evidence rests within the trial court's sound 
discretion and will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing 
of an abuse of that discretion. Id.  The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits about which 
Juniper complains. 
 
Exhibits 130 and 136 are autopsy photographs of Shearyia 
that were admitted during the guilt phase of the trial.  Exhibit 
130 showed her leg with steel rods inserted to demonstrate the 
trajectory of the bullets.  Juniper argues the Commonwealth 
should have used a Styrofoam model to show bullet trajectory as 
it did with the other victims, instead of an actual photograph 
of the leg.  While admitting that Exhibit 130 is relevant, 
Juniper argues it is inflammatory and the prejudicial effect 
outweighs its probative value. 
Exhibit 136 depicts no injury to Shearyia, but shows magic 
marker ink on the side of her face as Rashid described.  Juniper 
argues that this exhibit is irrelevant and cumulative of Exhibit 
135, which also depicts no injury, but shows ink on Shearyia's 
back. 
Photographs of a victim are admissible to show motive, 
intent, method, malice, premeditation, and the atrociousness of 
the crime.  Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 92, 501 S.E.2d 
134, 138, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1046 (1998).  The fact that the 
 
 
66
photograph also relates to an undisputed issue does not render 
it irrelevant.  See Orbe v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 402, 519 
S.E.2d 808, 815 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1113 (2000) 
(Commonwealth could introduce photograph of victim's fatal wound 
even though defendant stipulated cause of death); see also 
Goins, 251 Va. at 459, 470 S.E.2d at 126 (photographs of victims 
at crime scene admissible over defendant's objection that they 
were irrelevant as identities of victims were not in dispute.). 
 
In Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 86, 452 S.E.2d 862, 
867, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 876 (1995), this Court affirmed the 
trial court's decision to admit into evidence photographs 
showing bullet trajectory over the defendant's objection that 
such evidence was cumulative of the medical examiner's 
description and diagram of the wounds.  We held that the 
"photographs were admissible because they further illustrate the 
location and nature of [the victim's] wounds and provide 
additional support to the medical examiner's conclusion . . . ."  
Id.  In this case, the Commonwealth represented, without 
contradiction, that the photograph was "the best evidence that 
we have to explain" the findings of the examining physicians.  
Furthermore, Exhibit 130 was "very important” because it 
permitted the jury to “understand how the wounds in the child 
correspond with the wounds on the mother."  Just as the 
Commonwealth in Joseph was not required to rely on a description 
 
 
67
and diagram of the victim's wounds, the Commonwealth could 
validly introduce a photograph of the victim showing bullet 
trajectory or a model of the victim's body for the same purpose.  
Thus, Exhibit 130 was properly admitted into evidence. 
 
The trial court determined that Exhibit 136 was admissible 
because it corroborated Rashid's testimony that Shearyia had 
black marker on her face on the morning of the murders.  A 
photograph may be admissible merely because it is "part of the 
facts of this particular case," Jackson, 267 Va. at 202, 590 
S.E.2d at 534, or because it corroborates witness testimony.  
See Brown v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 515, 519, 184 S.E.2d 786, 789 
(1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 940 (1972).  The 
trial court therefore did not err in admitting Exhibit 136. 
 
Exhibits 163 and 164 are photographs of firearms recovered 
from Juniper's residence during the execution of a search 
warrant by the Norfolk Police on April 27, 2001.  Exhibit 165 is 
a stipulation of the facts regarding items found in the search, 
signed by Juniper and the Commonwealth's Attorney as part of 
Juniper's plea agreement on charges of possession of cocaine and 
possession of marijuana.  Exhibits 163, 164, and 165 were 
introduced during the penalty phase of the trial.  While 
admitting that this evidence was relevant, Juniper argued to the 
trial court any relevance was outweighed by the prejudicial 
 
 
68
effect especially because the possession of firearms charges 
from that incident were nol prossed by the Commonwealth. 
 
In argument on brief, Juniper names the exhibits relating 
to this assignment of error as Exhibits 162-64. 
We do not consider any argument relating to the 
admissibility of Exhibit 162 as it was not included in any 
assignment of error.  Rule 5:17(c).  Neither do we consider if 
the trial court erred in admitting Exhibit 165 because that 
exhibit was never discussed on brief.  Powell, 267 Va. at 135, 
590 S.E.2d at 554 (failure to adequately brief assignment of 
error is considered a waiver.).  We consider only Juniper's 
argument that the trial court erred in admitting Exhibits 163 
and 164 into evidence.  We find the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in so doing. 
 
Juniper argues that admitting these photographs resulted in 
prejudice to him that outweighed their probative value.  He 
notes that the photographs depict weapons that were the subject 
of prior nol prossed charges, and "the weapon found was not the 
weapon used relating to the case at bar." 
The trial court ruled the photographs of the guns 
admissible and agreed with the Commonwealth that they were 
"relevant to the issue of a propensity for violence . . . 
association with a firearm [and] future dangerousness."  We find 
that the evidence supports the trial court's decision.  
 
 
69
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the photographs that are Exhibits 163 and 164.  
Furthermore, Juniper's argument that the photographs 
prejudicially refer to a weapon not associated with the crimes 
charged in the case at bar is made moot by his waiver of his 
assignment of error as to Exhibit 165, the stipulation of facts, 
which also mentions the weapons. 
c. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
 
Juniper assigns error to the trial court’s failure “to 
strike the Commonwealth’s evidence as to guilt” on the ground 
that “the witness testimony of Renee Rashid, Keon Murray and 
Tyrone Mings was inherently incredible and not worthy of 
belief.”  To support this claim, Juniper cites the “substantial 
gap” in time “from the criminal act to when [Mings and Murray] 
notified the police of their alleged knowledge of the events.”  
Juniper makes the same contention regarding Rashid’s delay of 
ten days before contacting an attorney and the police regarding 
her knowledge of the crimes. 
In addition, Juniper notes that Mings gave different 
versions of the events to the police and, if he had actually 
come upon Juniper “with a gun in his hand, and cocaine on his 
face with dead bodies in the room,” could have been Juniper’s 
fifth victim.  Lastly, Juniper claims that the Commonwealth’s 
case “was circumstantial in that the record is void of 
 
 
70
eyewitnesses to the shooting.”  Thus, Juniper argues the 
totality of the evidence “plac[ing] Juniper at the scene and the 
time of the incident, is inherently incredible.”  We disagree. 
Our oft-repeated statement regarding appellate review of 
witness testimony is, “[t]he trier of fact is the sole judge of 
the credibility of the witnesses, unless, as a matter of law, 
the testimony is inherently incredible.”  Walker v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 70-71, 515 S.E.2d 565, 575 (1999), 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1125 (2000) (citations omitted).  To be 
“incredible,” testimony “must be either so manifestly false that 
reasonable men ought not to believe it, or it must be shown to 
be false by objects or things as to the existence and meaning of 
which reasonable men should not differ.”  Cardwell v. 
Commonwealth, 209 Va. 412, 414, 164 S.E.2d 699, 701 (1968) 
(quoting Burke v. Scott, 192 Va. 16, 23, 63 S.E.2d 740, 744 
(1951)). 
The mere fact that a witness may have delayed in reporting 
knowledge of a case or given inconsistent statements during the 
investigation of a crime does not necessarily render the 
testimony unworthy of belief.  This circumstance is 
appropriately weighed as part of the entire issue of witness 
credibility, which is left to the jury to determine.  See 
Shelton v. Mullins, 207 Va. 17, 22, 147 S.E.2d 754, 757-58 
 
 
71
(1966); Bradley v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 1126, 1136, 86 S.E.2d 
828, 834 (1955). 
Rashid testified that she drove Juniper to Keshia’s 
apartment and left that location without him on the morning of 
the crime.  She also stated that she heard “booms” corresponding 
to the sound of gunshots as she left.  After returning with 
Murray and Little John to pick up Juniper, Rashid observed that 
Juniper was carrying a pistol that matched the description of 
the gun that both Mings and Murray testified they saw Juniper 
carrying in Keshia’s apartment. 
Mings testified that he found the door to Keshia’s 
apartment knocked in from the outside, which comports with the 
police officer’s description of Keshia’s door at the scene.  
Mings also testified that he saw Juniper inside the apartment 
and that Juniper had a powdery substance on his face.  This 
testimony is consistent with Murray’s testimony that Juniper had 
a powdery substance like cocaine on his face when Murray picked 
up Juniper from Keshia’s apartment a short time after Mings saw 
Juniper. 
Mings also testified that he saw Rueben and a young girl on 
the bed in the master bedroom.  He further testified that 
Juniper told him that Keshia was on the floor “between the bed 
and the dresser.”  The positions of these victims are consistent 
 
 
72
with their locations when the police first entered Keshia’s 
apartment. 
As noted, Murray’s testimony contained several facts that 
supported the testimony of both Rashid and Mings.  In addition, 
Murray’s testimony that Juniper confessed to him that “[t]hey 
gone” and he “killed them,” is supported by a second confession 
Juniper made to Ernest Smith while incarcerated at the Hampton 
Roads Regional Jail. 
Having reviewed the entire testimony of Renee Rashid, Keon 
Murray, and Tyrone Mings, we conclude that their testimony is 
not inherently incredible.  We next address Juniper’s more 
general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and the 
jury’s reliance on circumstantial evidence to support its 
verdict. 
Circumstantial evidence of guilt presented to the jury “is 
as competent, and entitled to the same weight, as direct 
testimony if such evidence is sufficiently convincing.”  
Chichester v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 311, 329, 448 S.E.2d 638, 
650 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1166 (1995) (quoting Derr v. 
Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 424, 410 S.E.2d 662, 668 (1991)).  
Thus, “[w]hile no single piece of evidence may be sufficient, 
the ‘combined force of many concurrent and related 
circumstances, each insufficient in itself, may lead a 
reasonable mind irresistibly to a conclusion.’ ”  Id., 448 
 
 
73
S.E.2d at 650 (quoting Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 
273, 257 S.E.2d 808, 818 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 
(1980)). 
In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain a verdict, the proof must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth.  Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 
at 337, 541 S.E.2d at 892.  Much of the evidence has already 
been detailed above and was not limited to the testimony of 
Rashid, Murray, and Mings.  As noted, Ernest Smith testified 
that Juniper confessed to him that he had killed the victims.  
Smith also stated that Juniper told him he killed the children 
because “he didn’t want to leave any witnesses at the scene of 
the crime.”  In addition, the Commonwealth presented evidence 
that Juniper’s DNA matched DNA found on the knife that was used 
to stab Keshia, and that Juniper’s fingerprint also matched a 
print retrieved from the knife. 
Considering all of this evidence, and the reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from it, we conclude that the 
evidence is sufficient to support a verdict of guilt.  We hold 
that the trial court did not err in denying Juniper’s motion to 
strike the evidence. 
2. 
JURY INSTRUCTION ISSUES 
Juniper contends the “trial court erred by instructing the 
jury as to ‘armed' burglary and not burglary.”  On brief, he 
 
 
74
argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to prove “[a]n 
essential element of armed burglary,” namely, “that [Juniper 
was] armed with a deadly weapon.”  It is further argued that 
“[e]ven if Juniper was the individual who kicked the door in, 
there is no evidence that he was armed with a weapon.” 
Juniper posits as the basis for his argument the 
proposition that Rashid’s testimony was inherently incredible 
and not worthy of belief.  To support this claim, Juniper cites 
Rashid’s admission on cross-examination that she “didn't notice 
any bulges in [Juniper’s] pants [or his] jacket . . . that 
suggested . . . that he had a gun . . . [o]r a box of bullets." 
The Commonwealth responds by asserting that Juniper waived 
his right to appeal the jury instruction on armed burglary 
because he did not object to the instruction when it was given.  
Furthermore, the Commonwealth contends that “[t]o the extent 
that [Juniper] argues that the court should have granted his 
motion to strike as to armed burglary, this argument is 
redundant of the argument made in Assignment of Error 26.” 
The record establishes that Juniper made a motion to strike 
the indictment for armed burglary at the close of the 
Commonwealth’s evidence, and he renewed the motion to strike at 
the close of all the evidence.  As such, Juniper preserved his 
right to appeal the trial court’s giving of instructions on the 
charge of armed burglary. 
 
 
75
The record reflects that the jury was instructed as 
follows: 
The defendant is charged with the crime of 
burglary while armed.  The Commonwealth must prove 
[four elements, the fourth being] [t]hat at the time 
of his entry he was armed with a deadly weapon. 
 
If you find the Commonwealth has proved all 4 
[elements], you shall find the defendant guilty of 
burglary while armed. 
 
If you find the Commonwealth has proved all 
[elements] but #4, you shall find the defendant guilty 
of burglary. 
 
This instruction is consistent with the trial court’s statements 
at the time it rejected Juniper’s motion to strike the charge of 
armed burglary.  The trial court explained its decision: 
I don’t find that any of the testimony heard is 
inherently incredible.  I’ll overrule the motions.  I 
think certainly the jury would have to be instructed 
on the burglary charge for armed burglary as well as 
unarmed burglary.  I think they could conclude from 
the evidence that no weapon was present at the time of 
entry, but they could also conclude that one was.  
It’s a factual question they have to decide. 
 
 
The armed burglary instruction properly set forth the legal 
definition of both armed burglary and the lesser-included 
offense of burglary.  An instruction accurately stating the law 
is nonetheless improperly given if it is “inapplicable to the 
facts and circumstances of the case.”  Hatcher v. Commonwealth, 
218 Va. 811, 813-14, 241 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1978).  “An 
instruction must be supported by more than a scintilla of 
evidence.”  Id. at 814, 241 S.E.2d at 758. 
 
 
76
As previously addressed in our discussion of the 
sufficiency of the evidence claim, admissible evidence was 
before the jury from Rashid, Murray, and Mings as to Juniper’s 
possession of an automatic pistol at Keshia’s apartment at the 
time of the crimes.  If so believed by the jury, this witness 
testimony was “more than a scintilla of evidence” necessary to 
support the armed burglary instruction.  None of the testimony 
was inherently incredible, and none of it reduced to a scintilla 
the amount of evidence indicating Juniper was armed with a 
deadly weapon upon entering Keshia’s apartment.  The instruction 
appropriately left the factual determination of whether the 
Commonwealth had sufficiently proven the fourth element of the 
crime – that at the time of his entry Juniper was armed with a 
deadly weapon – to the jury.  We thus find no error in the trial 
court’s decision to instruct the jury on armed burglary. 
D. 
PENALTY PHASE 
 
1. 
WITNESS TESTIMONY 
 
a. 
Notice of Unadjudicated Criminal Conduct 
 
Juniper argues the trial court abused its discretion with 
regard to certain testimony of Malika Barnes about instances of 
his unadjudicated conduct because there was no specific notice 
given by the Commonwealth.  He assigns error to the admission of 
that testimony. 
 
 
77
 
In accordance with Code § 19.2-264.3:2, the Commonwealth 
provided written notice to Juniper describing his unadjudicated 
acts of criminal conduct which the Commonwealth intended to 
present at the sentencing phase.  In accordance with the 
statute, the notice described each incident and gave the time 
and place such conduct was alleged to have occurred.  Juniper 
argues that the Commonwealth's notice was insufficient as to 
"the specific criminal acts, separate and distinct criminal 
acts" that allegedly occurred in two of the listed incidents. 
First, Juniper contends that while Malika testified that in 
the spring of 2003, Juniper entered the food store where Keshia 
worked and pulled her by the arm, the corresponding notice 
stated as follows: 
16. At diverse times during the Spring of 2003 at the 
Tinee Giant . . . the defendant did threaten to do 
bodily harm to Keshia Stephens (indicating that he 
would beat her ass). 
 
Second, Juniper alleges that Malika's testimony that in the 
Spring of 2003, at Juniper's mother's home, Juniper addressed 
Keshia as "bitch" and pulled her up out of a chair by her arm, 
did not correspond to the notice which stated as follows: 
15. During the Spring of 2003 at 1051 Kittrell Street 
in Norfolk, Virginia the defendant did assault and 
batter Keshia Stephens by grabbing her arm and 
forcefully pulling her out of a chair. 
 
 
 
78
At trial, Juniper argued that the notice was insufficient 
because it did not allege Juniper physically assaulted Keshia at 
the food store, nor did it charge Juniper verbally berated her 
at his mother's home, as Malika testified.  He contends: 
[A] physical assault and curse and abuse are not the 
same offenses.  They are routinely charged as separate 
offenses when they're in lower court. . . . And if 
they are separate offenses [and] we are noticed as to 
a verbal assault and [this witness] start[s] talking 
about grabbing and kicking and hitting, then we have 
not been given notice. . . . Notice I believe . . . 
should tell us what the offense is. 
 
 
The trial court addressed Juniper's argument as to only the 
food store incident, determining that a separate noticed 
incident18 which alleged Juniper slapped Keshia, gave the defense 
sufficient notice of the assault allegation. 
 
On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that because the noticed 
incidents advised Juniper of "two separate assaults that Spring 
at the Tinee Giant . . . [t]he trial court properly concluded 
that [Juniper] had fair notice of the Commonwealth's intent to 
prove . . . assault."  Furthermore, the Commonwealth contends 
that even if the notice was not sufficient to advise Juniper of 
the alleged incidents to which Malika testified, such error is 
                     
18 The incident to which the trial court referred is as follows: 
 
10. During February or March 2003 at the Tinee Giant 
. . . the defendant did threaten Keshia Stephens by 
indicating "wait until you get off work" and 
physically assault Keshia Stephens by slapping her in 
the face. 
 
 
79
harmless as Malika’s testimony was merely cumulative of other 
incidents of assault by Juniper.  We agree with the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The notice advised Juniper of four separate incidents at 
the food store, which together alleged one incident of verbal 
abuse, three counts of threatening bodily harm, and two assaults 
on Keshia.  Altogether, the Commonwealth noticed at least 11 
assaults, four incidents of verbal abuse, and at least eight 
occasions of threatening bodily harm by Juniper against Keshia.  
With regard to the discrepancy between Malika’s testimony and 
the food store incident, we agree with the trial court that the 
two other alleged assaults at the Tinee Giant were sufficient to 
notify Juniper of the unadjudicated assault conduct to which 
Malika testified.  We also find that Malika’s testimony that 
Juniper called Keshia a "bitch" at his mother's house is merely 
cumulative of the other incidents of alleged verbal abuse. 
b. 
Testimony of Rueben Harrison, Sr. 
 
Juniper contends the trial court “erred in refusing to 
allow Juniper to call witness Rueben Harrison, Sr. [the father 
of one of the decedents] regarding the imposition of the death 
penalty.”  Juniper asked the trial court to permit Harrison, Sr. 
to testify about remarks attributed to him by the news media to 
the effect “that as a Christian he cannot hope that jurors 
                                                                  
 
 
 
80
impose the death penalty.”  The trial court denied Juniper’s 
request. 
Juniper argues that Harrison, Sr.’s testimony should have 
been permitted because he was the father of one of the victims, 
and thus a “victim” permitted to testify under Code § 19.2-264.4 
and Code § 19.2-11.01.  Furthermore, Juniper contends the 
testimony Harrison, Sr. would have given was relevant under Code 
§ 19.2-299.1(vi), which permits victim impact testimony that 
“provide[s] such other information as the court may require 
related to the impact of the offense upon the victim.” 
The Commonwealth responds that Harrison, Sr.’s potential 
testimony does not fall within the scope of victim impact 
testimony authorized under Code § 19.2-299.1 and is not relevant 
to the ultimate decision of sentence, which is the sole province 
of the jury.  We agree with the Commonwealth. 
The opinion of Harrison, Sr. as to the appropriate sentence 
for Juniper is not an item encompassed within Code § 19.2-
229.1(i) through (vi),19 which sets forth the only factors about 
                     
19 Code § 19.2-299.1 states, in relevant part: 
A Victim Impact Statement . . . shall (i) identify the 
victim, (ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the 
victim as a result of the offense, (iii) identify the 
nature and extent of any physical or psychological 
injury suffered by the victim as a result of the 
offense, (iv) detail any change in the victim’s 
personal welfare, lifestyle or familial relationships 
as a result of the offense, (v) identify any request 
for psychological or medical services initiated by the 
 
 
81
which testimony by a victim are permitted.  See Code § 19.2-
264.4(A1). 
More importantly, witness opinion on what the jury should 
decide as the appropriate sentence in a given case is not 
admissible.  It is irrelevant to the sentencing decision, which 
is only for the jury to make.  A victim called as a witness by 
the Commonwealth would clearly not be permitted to opine as to 
his or her preferred sentence for the defendant.  Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830 n.2 (1991) (“Booth [v. Maryland] 
also held that the admission of a victim’s family members’ 
characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, 
and the appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.”); 
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508-09 (1987) (“The admission 
of these emotionally charged opinions as to what conclusions the 
jury should draw from the evidence clearly is inconsistent with 
the reasoned decisionmaking we require in capital cases.”); see 
also Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206, 217 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(“[T]he Payne Court did not alter Booth’s holding that admitting 
evidence of the victims’ opinions of the crime and of the 
appropriate sentence for the defendant violates the Eighth 
Amendment . . . .”). 
                                                                  
victim or the victim’s family as a result of the 
offense, and (vi) provide such other information as 
the court may require related to the impact of the 
offense upon the victim. 
 
 
82
The trial court did not err in excluding the requested 
testimony of Rueben Harrison, Sr. 
c. 
Dr. Pasquale's Testimony 
Juniper posits two assignments of error regarding the trial 
court's refusal to permit certain testimony by Juniper's mental 
health expert, Dr. Thomas Pasquale.  Initially, Juniper contends 
the trial court wrongfully excluded Dr. Pasquale's testimony as 
to Juniper's impulsiveness.  Second, he argues the trial court 
erred in not permitting Dr. Pasquale to testify regarding 
Juniper's risk assessment related to his future dangerousness in 
the context of a prison environment. 
i. Impulsiveness 
Juniper first maintains that Dr. Pasquale's testimony about 
impulsiveness did not, as the Commonwealth alleges, relate to 
premeditation which had been decided at the guilt phase.  
Rather, Juniper contends Dr. Pasquale testified to "his overall 
opinion that Defendant is an impulsive person and is possessed 
of an impulsive character."  He argues that Dr. Pasquale did not 
testify that Juniper's "actions with regard to the murder were 
an impulsive act."  We disagree. 
Prior to the Commonwealth's objection, Dr. Pasquale made 
references to impulsiveness, which he described as a trait of 
the preadolescent stage of development, an indicator of 
 
 
83
characterological disfunction, and a characteristic of anti-
social behavior, all of which he said applied to Juniper.  
However, defense counsel, near the end of his examination of Dr. 
Pasquale, moved from questions regarding a general evaluation of 
Juniper to Dr. Pasquale's opinion as to influences upon Juniper 
at the time of the offense. 
Q:  Now, I want to direct your attention more 
specifically to the issues before us in this case. 
Specifically, sir, and I'm referring you to page 
ten of your report.  Would you address the issue of 
. . . whether you have an opinion as to whether or not 
Mr. Juniper acted under extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance at the time of the offense? 
 
A:  What I had stated [in my report] are three 
questions that are being asked in reference to issues 
relevant to mitigation and risk.  The first one [was] 
did this person have a lot of stress, mental, 
emotional disturbance at the time of offense. 
 
And I said [in my report] that . . . he was in a 
highly emotional, abusive and troubling relationship 
with Ms. Stephens over a period of many months; that 
when you combine his attachment problems, his rage 
reactions, his need to control with a person that he's 
embroiled with, that a foundation for violence becomes 
built. 
 
Now, I went on to look at something else as 
well. . . . [T]hat . . . the issue of premeditated 
aggression may be questioned in contrast to an act of 
impulsivity. 
 
Q: 
Explain that if you would, Dr. Pasquale. 
 
A:  Well, it's the notion of how do I view Mr. 
Juniper behaving violently, being aggressive.  And 
. . . my interpretation was that he was a very 
impulsive person who might not put a lot of thought at 
all into doing something. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
 
 
84
The Commonwealth then objected, arguing that 
"[premeditation] has already been resolved with the guilt 
phase."  Juniper responded that Dr. Pasquale was not "testifying 
that [Juniper] lacked premeditation, but perhaps just putting it 
in context of the impulsivity that Dr. Pasquale has already 
testified to,20 not that there was an absence of [premeditation] 
in context." 
Dr. Pasquale testified that there was a difference between 
"premeditated aggression" and an "act of impulsivity."  However, 
any contrast between Juniper's alleged mental state at the time 
of the crime and the required element of premeditation is 
applicable only as it relates to Juniper's culpability, not his 
sentence.  We agree with the Commonwealth that Dr. Pasquale's 
testimony on this point would have been properly admissible only 
if Juniper were advancing a defense based upon mental disease or 
disorder in the guilt phase, which he did not.  See generally, 
Dandridge, 267 Va. at 596-97, 594 S.E.2d at 581-82; Bailey v. 
                     
20 On brief, Juniper argues that "Dr. Pasquale had already 
testified as to Defendant's impulsivity, without objection from 
the Commonwealth, when testifying with regard to Defendant's 
anti-social thought and behavioral patterns."  To the extent 
Juniper intends the Commonwealth had waived its objections to 
Dr. Pasquale's later testimony, he is incorrect.  Pasquale's 
prior testimony regarding impulsiveness as a general 
characteristic is substantially different from his later 
testimony that Juniper was affected by impulsivity at the time 
of the offense.  Thus, we find that the Commonwealth did not 
waive its right to object to Dr. Pasquale's impulsiveness 
 
 
85
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 734, 529 S.E.2d 570, 576, cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 995 (2000). 
The trial court ruled that Dr. Pasquale could not "render 
opinions on premeditation during the commission of the 
offenses."  We agree.  The trial court's exclusion of Dr. 
Pasquale's impulsiveness testimony regarding Juniper's state of 
mind at the time of the offense was not erroneous. 
ii. Risk Assessment 
 
Citing no case authority in the trial court or on appeal, 
Juniper contends the trial court abused its discretion when it 
refused to permit “Dr. Thomas Pasquale to testify regarding 
Juniper’s risk assessment related to his future dangerousness.”  
This claim of error goes to the trial court’s prohibition of 
proffered testimony from Dr. Pasquale, Juniper’s court appointed 
psychologist, that Juniper’s risk assessment for future 
dangerousness was different in a prison setting from that in an 
“open community.” 
 
Juniper asked the trial court “to allow Dr. Pasquale to 
give his opinion on [Juniper's] future dangerousness in the 
penitentiary.”  The Commonwealth had objected to this line of 
questioning arguing that “the question is in general terms would 
the defendant exhibit violent conduct in the future as opposed 
                                                                  
testimony as it related to Juniper's mental state at the time of 
the murders. 
 
 
86
to the question of could.”  (Emphasis added.)  Counsel argued 
the issue and Dr. Pasquale was examined by both parties and the 
trial court outside the presence of the jury. 
Juniper represented that Dr. Pasquale would testify “there 
is a difference in risk assessment which is to say future 
dangerousness or the prediction of future dangerousness in an 
open community such as the one we live in and in a prison 
environment such as the one Mr. Juniper will live in.”  The 
trial court responded by noting that “I would think the jurors 
could determine that without the need of expert testimony.  I 
think common sense would tell people that.”  The Commonwealth 
argued that in the context of future dangerousness “whatever is 
said by [the] expert has to refer to the character of the 
defendant, not the character of the prison or anything else.” 
 
In response to voir dire, Dr. Pasquale explained that his 
assessment of a defendant to evaluate future dangerousness would 
involve a number of factors.  “[W]hen you do the actuarial for 
the open community, you're asking about the person.  Did they 
live with their biological parents?  How did they go to school?  
Do they have a personality disorder?”  However, Dr. Pasquale 
then explained that “[t]here have only been two variables that I 
have described that have been shown to demonstrate some issue 
about workability in prison[:] age and past performance in 
incarceration.” 
 
 
87
 
While Juniper agreed he could not offer evidence on general 
prison conditions, he did not proffer from Dr. Pasquale or 
otherwise that there would be any testimony about how Juniper’s 
personal and specific characteristics would be reflected in his 
ability to adapt in prison or whether there was any past 
incarceration performance to evaluate.  Instead, Dr. Pasquale 
acknowledged his “ultimate testimony is that . . . there is less 
risk of the defendant acting out violently in prison than it 
would be the defendant acting out violently in the open 
community.”  Upon completion of counsels' arguments and the 
examination of Dr. Pasquale, and still outside the presence of 
the jury, Juniper made a proffer of Dr. Pasquale’s proposed 
testimony. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  If I [were] to ask you the 
question and if the Court were to allow it, your 
opinion would be that his risk assessment in the open 
community is high and his risk assessment in the 
prison setting is low to moderate? 
 
[DR. PASQUALE]:  Yes. 
 
 
The trial court then later permitted Juniper’s counsel to 
ask Dr. Pasquale this question in the presence of the jury: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  In your opinion is the risk 
assessment of Mr. Juniper’s future dangerousness 
dependent on or related to the circumstances of his 
environment? 
 
[DR. PASQUALE]:  Yes. 
 
 
 
88
However, the trial court did not allow any broader testimony 
from Dr. Pasquale on the subject of future dangerousness in a 
prison environment including the proffered question.  In 
rejecting Juniper’s request, the trial court observed “a 
determination of future dangerousness revolves around an 
individual defendant and a specific crime.”  We do not find 
error in the trial court’s ruling. 
 
We have held in our prior decisions that “what a person may 
expect in the penal system is not relevant mitigation evidence.”  
Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 310, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653, 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 873 (1999) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Walker, 258 Va. at 70, 515 S.E.2d at 574.  We 
have also been plain in establishing threshold requirements of 
relevance for the admission of evidence in mitigation 
particularly as it relates to the statutory factor of future 
dangerousness: such evidence should “concern the history or 
experience of the defendant.”  Cherrix, 257 Va. at 310, 513 
S.E.2d at 653; see also Burns, 261 Va. at 340, 541 S.E.2d at 
893-94. 
In Burns, we further delineated this concept while 
rejecting Burns’ claim seeking evidence on “daily inmate 
routine, general prison conditions.”  Id. at 338, 541 S.E.2d at 
892. 
 
 
89
Burns wanted to show, in rebuttal to the 
Commonwealth’s evidence of his future dangerousness, 
that his opportunities to commit criminal acts of 
violence in the future would be severely limited in a 
maximum security prison.  However, in Cherrix, we 
reiterated the principle that the United States 
Constitution “does not limit ‘the traditional 
authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, 
evidence not bearing on the defendant’s character, 
prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.’ ”  
Cherrix, 257 Va. at 309, 513 S.E.2d at 653 (quoting 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 n.12 (1978)).  
Thus, the relevant inquiry is not whether Burns could 
commit criminal acts of violence in the future but 
whether he would.  Indeed, Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and –
264.4(C) use the phrase “would commit criminal acts of 
violence.”  Accordingly, the focus must be on the 
particular facts of Burns’ history and background, and 
the circumstances of his offense.  In other words, a 
determination of future dangerousness revolves around 
an individual defendant and a specific crime. . . . 
 
Unlike the evidence proffered by Burns, the evidence 
in Skipper [v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986)] 
was peculiar to that defendant’s history and 
background. 
 
Id. at 339-40, 541 S.E.2d 893-94. 
In Bell, 264 Va. at 201, 563 S.E.2d at 714, we re-
emphasized the necessity that relevant mitigating evidence on 
the issue of future dangerousness must be based on the specific 
characteristics of the defendant.  In that context, evidence 
relating to a prison environment must connect the specific 
characteristics of the particular defendant to his future 
adaptability in that environment in order to be heard by the 
jury.  It must be "evidence peculiar to a defendant's character, 
 
 
90
history and background" in order to be "relevant to the future 
dangerousness inquiry . . ."  Id.  We further observed that 
[t]he testimony that Bell sought to introduce through 
the expert concerned the conditions of prison life and 
the kind of security features utilized in a maximum 
security facility.  That is the same kind of evidence 
that we have previously rejected as not relevant to 
the future dangerousness inquiry. . . . Nor is such 
general evidence, not specific to Bell, relevant to 
his “future adaptability” or as a foundation for an 
expert opinion on that issue. 
 
Id. 
 
The proffer of Dr. Pasquale’s testimony on future 
dangerousness in a prison setting fails to meet the test of 
relevance established in our prior cases.  Neither the actual 
proffer, counsel’s argument, nor Dr. Pasquale’s explanations on 
voir dire tie his proposed opinion testimony on future 
dangerousness in a prison environment to Juniper’s “history and 
background, and the circumstances of his offense,” Burns, 261 
Va. at 340, 541 S.E.2d at 893, to Juniper's "character, history 
and background" or was “specific to [Juniper], relevant to his 
'future adaptability.'” Bell, 264 Va. at 201, 563 S.E.2d at 714.  
While Dr. Pasquale may not have sought to offer specific 
evidence on a day in the life of a prisoner, as in Cherrix, he 
offered nothing to the trial court to support his opinion as 
being based on Juniper's individual characteristics that would 
 
 
91
affect his future adaptability in prison and thus relate to a 
defendant-specific assessment of future dangerousness.21 
 
The burden rested upon Juniper, as the proponent of Dr. 
Pasquale’s testimony, to make a threshold showing, in conformity 
with Bell and Burns, that an assessment of future dangerousness 
was grounded on Juniper's specific characteristics in the 
context of his future adaptability in a prison setting.  See 
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 268 Va. 161, 165, 597 S.E.2d 197, 199 
(2004) (party offering expert testimony must make proper proffer 
of testimony's admissibility).  Juniper failed to carry that 
burden.  The trial court thus correctly barred Dr. Pasquale’s 
generalized testimony and did not abuse its discretion in doing 
so. 
2. 
REJECTED PENALTY PHASE INSTRUCTIONS 
Juniper contends the trial court erred “by disallowing 
Juniper’s proposed instructions in the penalty phase regarding 
depravity of mind, aggravated battery, and mitigating evidence.”  
The three rejected instructions are: 
(Def. A) In deciding whether the Commonwealth has proven 
that the defendant’s conduct was outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it 
involved depravity of mind, you are instructed 
that depravity of mind is not proven by proof of 
                     
21 There was no issue in the case at bar, as existed in 
Skipper, 476 U.S. 1, as to evidence concerning Juniper’s actual 
adaptation to confinement while awaiting trial.  This subject 
was never mentioned at trial, and no contention is made in that 
regard by Juniper. 
 
 
92
an intentional killing.  Rather, depravity of 
mind means a degree of moral turpitude and 
psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in 
the definition of ordinary malic[e] and 
premeditation.  Ordinary malice is that state of 
mind which results in the intentional doing of a 
wrongful act to another without legal 
justification or excuse, at a time when the mind 
of the actor is under the control of reason.  
Ordinary premeditation is a specific intent to 
kill, adopted at some time before the killing, 
but which need not exist for any particular 
length of time. 
 
(Def. B) In deciding whether the Commonwealth has proven 
that the defendant’s conduct was outrageously 
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved an 
aggravated battery to the victim, you are 
instructed that an aggravated battery is not 
proven by proof of an intentional killing.  
Rather, an aggravated battery is a battery which, 
qualitatively and quantitatively, is more 
culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish 
an act of murder.  A battery is the actual 
infliction of corporal hurt on another.  A 
battery which causes death is a murder, but that 
fact, standing alone, does not make the battery 
an aggravated battery. 
 
(Def. C) If you unanimously find that the Commonwealth has 
proved an aggravating circumstance beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must go on to consider 
mitigating evidence.  Mitigating evidence is any 
fact or circumstance that, while it does not 
excuse or justify the offense, nonetheless in 
fairness and mercy may either extenuate or 
explain it or reduce the degree of the 
defendant’s moral culpability such that he should 
not be sentenced to death. 
Certain factors, if they exist, are made 
mitigating by law.  In this case, they are: 
 
1. That the defendant has no significant history 
of prior criminal activity. 
 
 
 
93
2. That the capital felony was committed while 
the defendant was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
 
3. At the time of the commission of the capital 
felony, the capacity of the Defendant to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
law was significantly impaired.  
 
You must consider the evidence bearing on 
each of these factors.  Each of you must then 
decide, individually, whether you find that the 
factor exists.  If you, individually, find that 
any of these factors does exist, that factor is 
mitigating and you must consider it in deciding 
upon sentence. 
Other factors, if they exist, may be 
mitigating.  You must consider all of the 
evidence offered in mitigation.  Each of you must 
then decide, individually, whether the evidence 
establishes the existence of any other factor and 
whether that factor is mitigating.  If you, 
individually, find that a factor exists and that 
it is mitigating, you must consider it in 
deciding sentence. 
 
In refusing the proposed instructions, the trial court 
stated, “I think other instructions that are being given 
adequately cover the subject instructions.” 
Juniper asserts that because each proposed instruction 
accurately states the law and substantially tracks either model 
jury instructions or instructions used in other cases, the trial 
court should have given his proposed instructions.  He also 
contends that giving a jury instruction regarding aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances without also instructing the jurors 
 
 
94
that the mitigating circumstances need not be unanimously found 
is unconstitutional.22 
The Commonwealth responds by asserting that the proposed 
instructions were “cumulative” and “redundant” of instructions 
given to the jury.  Specifically, the Commonwealth notes the 
substantially similar, and in cases identical, text in the 
following instructions given by the trial court: 
(1) “Depravity of Mind” means a degree of moral turpitude 
and psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in 
the definition of ordinary legal malice and 
premeditation. 
 
(2) An “aggravated battery” is a battery which, 
qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable 
than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of 
murder. 
 
(3) If you find that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt the existence of an aggravating 
circumstance, in determining the appropriate 
punishment, you should consider any evidence presented 
of circumstances which do not justify or excuse the 
offense but which in fairness or mercy may extenuate 
or reduce the degree of moral culpability and 
punishment. 
 
 
To the degree that the proposed instructions differed from 
those actually given, the Commonwealth argues that the proposed 
instructions would have impermissibly confused or misled the 
jury, suggested a particular response from the jury, or provided 
an incorrect statement of the law.  "Def. A," the proposed 
                     
22 Juniper apparently refers to Instruction CS-7 given by 
the trial court, but he fails to identify the specific 
instruction. 
 
 
95
instruction on depravity of mind, for example, included 
instructions on malice and premeditation, which are not relevant 
for consideration in the sentencing phase of the trial.  
Similarly, "Def. B," the proposed instruction on aggravated 
battery, “suggest[ed] resolution of the question in [Juniper’s] 
favor.”  As to proposed instruction “Def. C,” the Commonwealth 
argued this would mislead the jury because it suggested the 
listed mitigating factors had been determined to exist by the 
trial judge, which was not the case. 
 
After comparing the proposed instructions to those actually 
given, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing Juniper’s proposed instructions.  The language 
relevant and appropriate to Juniper’s case was “fully and 
fairly” covered by the instructions given to the jury.  
Instruction “Def. A” regarding malice and premeditation was 
superfluous and potentially confusing to the jury at the penalty 
stage because those factors are only at issue during the guilt 
phase of the trial.  The depravity of mind instruction that was 
given contained sufficient information for the jurors to 
understand that term.  Similarly, the jury was adequately 
instructed on what constitutes aggravated battery.  The 
additional information contained in the proposed instruction 
“Def. B” was unnecessary and suggestive. 
 
 
96
With regard to Juniper’s proposed instruction “Def. C,” we 
agree with the Commonwealth that the wording of the instruction 
would have misled the jury as to the existence of the listed 
mitigating factors because it implied that such factors had been 
established.  That determination was the responsibility of the 
jury.  Furthermore, we have previously rejected “the argument 
that the jury should have been instructed its finding of 
mitigating factors need not be unanimous” as being “unnecessary” 
and “confusing.”  Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 212, 257 
S.E.2d 784, 791 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980).  
“Since only by unanimous agreement can the death penalty be 
inflicted, a disagreement by one or more of the jurors as to the 
proper sentence would, by statute, result in life imprisonment.  
Code § 19.2-264.4(E).”  Id.  The differences between aggravating 
and mitigating factors, and their role in determining a sentence 
of death versus imprisonment for life, were sufficiently covered 
by the instructions given to the jurors by the trial court. 
Our previous decisions reflect that even if jury 
instructions contain accurate statements of law, a trial court 
does not abuse its discretion by refusing the instruction if it 
“is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case,” 
Hatcher, 218 Va. at 813-14, 241 S.E.2d at 758, or if it “would 
have created confusion and would have been misleading.”  Hubbard 
v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 1, 15, 413 S.E.2d 875, 883 (1992).  Nor 
 
 
97
does a trial court abuse its discretion by refusing a relevant 
instruction if the “granted instructions fully and fairly cover” 
the same legal principle.  Stockton, 227 Va. at 145, 314 S.E.2d 
at 384.  The trial court thus did not err in refusing Juniper’s 
proposed instructions. 
E. 
STATUTORY REVIEW UNDER CODE § 17.1-313 
 
 
Juniper’s initial assignments of error are that the 
sentence of death (1) “was imposed under the influence of 
passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor” and (2) “is 
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar 
cases, considering both the crime and the appellant.”  These 
assignments of error track nearly verbatim the mandatory review 
of a sentence of death which this Court must undertake under 
Code § 17.1-313(C)(1) and (2).  Accordingly, we consider 
Juniper’s assignments of error and our statutory review 
together. 
1. 
CODE § 17.1-313(C)(1): PASSION, PREJUDICE OR OTHER 
ARBITRARY FACTOR 
 
Juniper argues that the imposition of his death sentence 
demonstrates that the jury and trial court “were swept away on a 
tide of passion, prejudice and other arbitrary factors,” but 
cites no evidence from the record to support his contention.  
Juniper’s failure to make a “particularized argument that the 
jury’s verdict was not the product of a reasoned and 
 
 
98
dispassionate deliberation” is not dispositive because of our 
statutory mandate to review his sentence.  Elliott, 267 Va. at 
429, 593 S.E.2d at 291.  We have completed that review of the 
record and find no basis to conclude that the jury or trial 
court were influenced by passion, prejudice or other arbitrary 
factor in sentencing Juniper to death. 
2. 
CODE § 17.1-313(C)(2): EXCESSIVE OR DISPROPORTIONATE 
SENTENCE 
 
 
We must also determine whether the death sentence imposed 
upon Juniper is “excessive or disproportionate to the penalty 
imposed in similar cases.”  Code § 17.1-313(C)(2).  Juniper’s 
argument on this issue is again conclusory and without reference 
to any particular reason his sentence is excessive or 
disproportionate.  That failure on Juniper’s part does not 
affect our own proportionality review required by statute. 
 
We do not conduct a proportionality review to “insure 
complete symmetry among all death penalty cases.”  Muhammad, 269 
Va. at 532, 619 S.E.2d at 63 (quoting Orbe, 258 Va. at 405, 519 
S.E.2d at 817).  Nor do we seek to “understand why the trier of 
fact imposed the sentence of life” rather than a sentence of 
death.  Lewis v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 302, 312, 593 S.E.2d 220, 
226, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 904 (2004).  Our review is to 
“identify and invalidate the aberrant death sentence.”  
Muhammad, 269 Va. at 532, 619 S.E.2d at 63 (quoting Orbe, 258 
 
 
99
Va. at 405, 519 S.E.2d at 817).  We find no aberration in the 
case at bar. 
 
In conducting the proportionality review, we must determine 
whether “other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction generally 
impose the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes, 
considering both the crime and the defendant.”  Lovitt, 260 Va. 
at 518, 537 S.E.2d at 880 (quoting Johnson, 259 Va. at 683, 529 
S.E.2d at 786).  We have taken into account the circumstances of 
the crimes and of Juniper.  We have compared the record in the 
case at bar with the records of other capital murder cases, 
including those in which a sentence of life imprisonment was 
imposed, pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(E).  In particular, we have 
reviewed capital murder cases where a defendant killed more than 
one person as part of the same act or transaction, Code § 18.2-
31(7), and cases where a person age twenty-one or older killed a 
person under the age of 14, Code § 18.2-31(12), and where the 
sentence of death was imposed based upon the aggravating factors 
of vileness and future dangerousness. See, e.g., Zirkle v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 631, 553 S.E.2d 601 (2001) (capital murder 
of two persons, one of whom was under age of 14 by person age 21 
or older); Bramblett v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 263, 513 S.E.2d 
400, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952 (1999) (capital murder of family 
of four, including two children under age of 14); Stewart v. 
Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 427 S.E.2d 394, cert. denied, 510 
 
 
100
U.S. 848 (1993) (capital murder of more than one person, 
including wife and infant son); Goins, 251 Va. 442, 470 S.E.2d 
114 (capital murder of family of five, including three children 
under age of 14).  In each of those cases, this Court affirmed 
the sentences of death.23  Upon review, we conclude that 
Juniper’s sentence of death was not excessive or 
disproportionate to the sentences imposed by other sentencing 
bodies in the Commonwealth in comparable cases with comparable 
defendants. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
Upon review of the record and upon consideration of the 
arguments presented, we find no reversible error in the judgment 
of the trial court.  Furthermore, we find no reason to commute 
or set aside the sentences of death.  We will affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
                     
23 These cases are cited as examples, but “our 
proportionality analysis encompasses all capital murder cases 
presented to this Court for review and is not limited to these 
selected cases.”  Burns, 261 Va. at 345, 541 S.E.2d at 896-97 
(internal quotation mark omitted).