Title: State v. Rheaume

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Rheaume (2002-400); 176 Vt. 413; 853 A.2d 1259

2004 VT 35

[Filed 09-Apr-2004]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

       	
                                 2004 VT 35

                                No. 2002-400

  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court
  	
                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Franklin Circuit

  Roy M. Rheaume	                         November Term, 2003

  James R. Crucitti, J.

  Derk A. Wadas, Franklin County Deputy State's Attorney, St. Albans, for
    Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Deputy Defender
    General, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ.

        
       ¶  1.  DOOLEY, J.   Defendant Roy Rheaume was convicted by a jury of
  driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), 13 V.S.A. § 1201; this DUI
  conviction was defendant's third and accordingly classified as a felony. 
  See 23 V.S.A. § 1210(d) (person convicted of three or more DUIs  shall be
  fined not more than $2,500 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
  both); 13 V.S.A. § 1 ("any offense whose maximum term of imprisonment is
  more than two years . . . is a felony").  Prior to his jury trial where he
  was convicted, defendant moved to suppress statements concerning his
  identity.  These statements were made in response to questions asked by a
  Vermont State Trooper during processing.  In an effort to suppress the
  statements, defendant argued that his Miranda rights were violated because
  he was read the Miranda warnings and subsequently invoked his right to
  silence prior to questioning by the processing trooper.  The trial court
  denied defendant's motion finding that "there was no violation of the
  defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, rights under the Vermont Constitution
  or the Vermont Public Defender Act by the process followed by the trooper." 
  At the enhancement proceeding, the prosecution used defendant's date of
  birth and social security number to identify him and show that he had two
  prior DUI convictions.  Defendant now appeals his felony conviction and the
  trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the statements.  We affirm.

       ¶  2.  On August 31, 2001, a Vermont State Trooper pulled over a
  speeding vehicle.  After the vehicle stopped, the driver, later identified
  as Roy Rheaume, fled the vehicle and ran into a cornfield.  The trooper
  gave chase, but was unable to see anything in the cornfield.  Other
  troopers arrived on the scene and began searching for defendant.  After
  approximately thirty minutes, defendant was found sleeping in the
  cornfield.  The troopers who apprehended defendant detected a strong odor
  of alcohol on defendant's breath and saw that he had difficulty walking. 
  Defendant was arrested for DUI.
   
       ¶  3.  Following the arrest, the troopers took defendant to the
  station for processing, which was videotaped by the processing trooper. 
  Before defendant was given Miranda warnings, the processing trooper asked
  defendant several questions. (FN1)  After defendant answered these
  questions, the trooper read defendant the Miranda warnings.  In response to
  the warnings, defendant stated that he did not wish to speak with the
  trooper and that he wanted an attorney.  Following this request, the
  processing trooper telephoned the on-call public defender.  While the
  trooper had the attorney on the telephone, the trooper asked defendant his
  name and date of birth.  The trooper also informed the attorney, in
  defendant's presence,  that if defendant submitted to a breath test he
  could be released, but if he refused he would be lodged.  Defendant then
  spoke with the attorney and agreed to take the breath test.  After
  defendant spoke with the attorney, the trooper, continuing to process
  defendant, asked him for his address and social security number.  Defendant
  answered the processing questions, apparently truthfully.

       ¶  4.  Using defendant's date of birth and social security number, the
  trooper obtained copies of defendant's two prior DUI convictions: one in
  1981 and one in 1997.  Following a breath test, the trooper charged
  defendant with a  third DUI offense - a felony.  

       ¶  5.  After charges were filed, defendant moved through counsel to
  suppress the statements and the results of the breath test and to dismiss. 
  The trial court considered the motion during defendant's civil suspension
  hearing.  Subsequent to the hearing, the parties agreed that the court
  should consider the evidence presented in support of suppression in the
  civil suspension hearing in deciding defendant's motion to suppress
  evidence in the criminal case.  The court granted defendant's motion to
  suppress the breath test because of the trooper's statement to the on-call
  attorney that if defendant refused the breath test he would be lodged, but
  denied his motion to suppress the statements concerning his identity.  The
  court entered judgment in the civil suspension case in  defendant's favor
  and set the criminal case for trial before a jury.  
   
       ¶  6.  Pursuant to the procedures first outlined in State v.
  Cameron, 126 Vt. 244, 249-50,