Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: ELEANOR L. PERRY V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: ELEANOR L. PERRY V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2006 WY 61134 P.3d 1242Case Number: 05-54Decided: 05/16/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF:

 
 
ELEANOR 
L. PERRY,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY 
AND COMPENSATION DIVISION,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Edward Grant, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Bernard Q. Phelan, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kristi M. 
Radosevich, Assistant Attorney General.  

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; HILL, C.J., files a dissent, in which 
BURKE, J., joins.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Eleanor L. Perry 
appeals from the district court's order affirming the Office of Administrative 
Hearings' (OAH) denial of her claim for worker's compensation benefits.  The OAH hearing examiner denied her 
claim in accordance with the test enunciated in Smith v.  Husky Terminal Restaurant, Inc., 762 P.2d 1193 (Wyo. 1988), because she was injured while 
violating a safety regulation.  We 
conclude OAH properly applied the Smith 
test to Ms. Perry's claim and there was substantial evidence to support 
OAH's factual findings.  
Consequently, we affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Ms. Perry 
articulates a single issue on appeal:

 
 
When an 
employee deviates from a prescribed safety rule resulting in injury, should 
worker['s] compensation benefits be denied?

 
 
The 
Division phrases the issue a little differently:

 
 
In 
limited situations, an employee can be found to have acted outside the scope of 
employment by violating a work restriction when the four elements in Smith v. Husky Terminal Restaurant, Inc., 
762 P.2d 1193 (Wyo. 1988) are present.  The issue presented in this appeal is 
whether the hearing examiner's application of Smith to Perry's case was in accordance 
with law[.] 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On October 7, 
2003, Ms. Perry began work as a certified nurse assistant (CNA) for Mountain 
Towers Healthcare and RehabilitationCenter (MountainTowers) in Cheyenne.  
MountainTowers is a nursing home 
facility.  When she began work, Ms. 
Perry had just finished her training as a CNA, which included education about 
proper lifting techniques.  On her 
first day of work, Ms. Perry attended MountainTowers' employment orientation.  The orientation included instructions 
for lifting patients who required help.  
Ms. Perry was informed that certain patients where classified as 
"two-person lifts," meaning that two people were required in order to lift the 
patient.  MountainTowers had a written policy forbidding its 
employees from lifting a patient classified as a "two-person lift" alone, and 
Ms. Perry signed a document acknowledging the policy.  The policy was intended to protect 
MountainTowers' employees and 
patients.  The policy stated that, 
if another employee was not available to help with a two-person lift, the 
employee was to make the patient comfortable and wait for assistance.  Ms. Perry was informed that violating 
the two-person lift policy could result in termination from employment with 
MountainTowers.   

 
 
[¶4]      On October 26 
through 27, 2003, Ms. Perry was working a night shift, from 10:00 p.m. through 
6:00 a.m.  During that shift, there 
were typically only three people on staff per floor  two CNAs and one licensed 
practical nurse (LPN).  At 
approximately 2:30 a.m., Ms. Perry was making the rounds to check on patients, 
when one patient requested assistance in using the bathroom.  The patient was classified as a 
"two-person lift" so Ms. Perry sought help.  The other CNA was assisting another 
patient and could not immediately help Ms. Perry.  The LPN refused to help her because 
lifting was not part of her job duties.  
Ms. Perry offered the patient a bed pan, but the patient refused and 
insisted upon getting up to use the bathroom.    

 
 
[¶5]      Ms. Perry 
assisted the patient to the bathroom and, at some point in the process as she 
was lifting the patient, the wheelchair moved.  In order to prevent the patient from 
falling, Ms. Perry twisted and strained her lower back.  She felt the strain but did not 
experience pain until after she had finished her shift and returned home.  She was scheduled to work the next 
night, but called in and said she was unable to work because she had injured her 
back.    

 
 
[¶6]      Ms. Perry filed a 
report of injury in which she stated she injured her lower back when she was 
"transferring a 2 person transfer by [herself] and twisted and strained [her] 
back the wrong way while trying not to drop [the] resident as her wheelchair 
started to move even with [the] locks on."  
She sought medical treatment from various doctors for her back injury and 
requested worker's compensation benefits as a result of the injury.  MountainTowers objected to Ms. Perry's request for 
worker's compensation benefits, and the Division issued a final determination 
denying Ms. Perry's request for benefits on several bases.   

 
 
[¶7]      The case was 
referred to OAH, and a hearing examiner held a contested case hearing on May 6, 
2004.  The Division argued there 
were several reasons to deny Ms. Perry's request for worker's compensation 
benefits, including:  Ms. Perry 
failed to timely report her injury to her employer and to the Division, her back 
injury was preexisting, her back injury did not occur while she was at work, and 
she was injured while violating a safety regulation.  The hearing examiner found Ms. Perry had 
reported her injury in a timely fashion, she was injured while at work, and she 
did not suffer from a preexisting condition which would prevent her from 
obtaining worker's compensation benefits.  
However, the hearing examiner found Ms. Perry had violated MountainTowers' safety rule prohibiting unassisted 
two person lifts and concluded, under the holding in Smith, she was not entitled to worker's 
compensation benefits.  Ms. Perry 
petitioned the district court for review of the OAH decision, and the district 
court affirmed.  She, subsequently, 
filed a notice of appeal from the district court's order.   

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      "When 
considering an appeal from a district court's review of agency action, we accord 
no special deference to the district court's conclusions.  Instead, we review the case as if it had 
come directly to us from the administrative agency.'"  Newman v. State ex. rel Wyo. Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 7, 49 P.3d 163, 166 (Wyo. 2002) quoting French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 
1027 (Wyo. 1998).

 
 
[¶9]      Ms. Perry and the 
Division each presented evidence to OAH.  
Upon appeal from a contested case hearing where both parties have 
presented evidence, we apply the substantial evidence standard to review the 
agency's findings of fact.  See KG Constr., Inc. v. Sherman, 2005 WY 
116, ¶ 9,  120 P.3d 145, 147-48 
(Wyo. 2005); Robbins v. State ex rel. 
Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2003 WY 29, ¶ 18, 64 P.3d 729, 732 
(Wyo. 2003).  Substantial evidence 
is more than a scintilla of evidence.  
It consists of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in 
support of the agency's conclusions.  
Id.  However, even if the factual findings are 
found to be supported by substantial evidence, the ultimate agency decision may 
still be found to be arbitrary or capricious for other reasons.  Thus, the appellate court does not 
examine the record only to determine if there is substantial evidence to support 
the agency's decision, but it also must examine all of the evidence in the 
record to determine whether the hearing examiner could have reasonably made its 
finding and order.  Newman, ¶ 24, 49 P.3d  at 172. 

 
 
[¶10]   An administrative agency's conclusions of law 
are not entitled to the same deference as its factual findings.  Diamond B Serv's, Inc. v. Rohde, 2005 WY 
130, ¶ 12, 120 P.3d 1031, 1038 (Wyo. 2005).  We review an agency's conclusions of law 
de novo, and "we will affirm an 
agency's legal conclusion only if it is in accordance with the law."  Id. quoting DC Production Service v. Wyo. Dep't of 
Employment, 2002 WY 142, ¶ 7, 54 P.3d 768, 771 (Wyo. 2002).  

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶11]   Ms. Perry claims the hearing 
examiner erred by ruling that she should be denied benefits for violating the 
two-person lift rule.  The hearing 
examiner relied upon our decision in Smith in concluding Ms. Perry was not 
entitled to worker's compensation benefits.  Smith was a cook at a truck stop 
restaurant and had previously suffered back pain, although it was not clear her 
prior back pain was job related.  Smith, 762 P.2d  at 1194-95.  She sought medical treatment for her 
back condition, and her physician ordered her not to lift anything weighing more 
than fifteen pounds.  Id.  at 1195.  Smith's employer received a letter from 
her doctor containing the lifting restriction and discussed the restriction with 
her.  The doctor's letter was posted 
above the manager's desk, and Smith was instructed "to have someone else lift 
any heavy items for her if that became necessary."  Id.  
One night, Smith attempted to drain a bucket of marinated chickens 
and injured her back.  Id. at 
1195.  She sought worker's 
compensation benefits for her injury, but her employer objected because her 
injury resulted from her violation of the lifting restriction.  Id. 
at 1196.   The district court 
denied benefits,1 and Smith appealed.  

 
 
[¶12]   In reviewing the case, we looked to 
the definition of an "injury" which qualifies for compensation under the 
worker's compensation system.  The 
statutory definition of a compensable injury requires that an injury "arise out 
and in the course of employment."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (LexisNexis 2005).  The determination of whether an injury 
arose out of and in the course of employment is a question of fact.  Farman v.  State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 841 P.2d 99, 102 (Wyo. 1992).  In considering the employer's defense 
that Smith violated a known safety rule, we stated:  "[p]recedent concerning the type of 
misconduct that is a deviation from the scope of a particular employment focuses 
on whether the employee knowingly does certain work specifically prohibited, as 
opposed to an employee's doing authorized work in an unauthorized way."  Smith, 762 P.2d  at 1196.   We stated:

 
 
Professor 
Larson articulates this distinction as the difference between a work restriction 
on the ultimate work to be done and a 
work restriction concerning the method by which the ultimate work is to 
be done.  1A A. Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law, § 31.00 at 6-8 to 6-14 (1985).  A specific restriction on the ultimate 
work to be done can restrict a task of the same character as other tasks which 
are not prohibited, and still place the prohibited task outside the scope of an 
employment.  

 
 

Id.  (some 
citations omitted).  In order to 
help with making that distinction, we adopted the following test in Smith:

 
 
[A]n 
employee can be found to have acted outside the scope of employment by violating 
a work restriction when the following elements are shown:  (1) the employer expressly and carefully 
informs the employee that she must not perform a specific task or tasks while in his 
employ;  (2) the employee knows and 
understands the specific restriction imposed;  (3) the employer has not knowingly 
continued to accept the benefit of a violation of the restriction by the 
employee;  and, (4) the injury for 
which benefits are claimed arises out of conduct that clearly violates the 
specific restriction.

 
 

Id. 
at 1196-97.  We recognized the test 
is restrictive and "there are limited situations in which an employer can put on 
evidence to refute an employee's preponderance showing that the work causing her 
injury occurred within the scope of her employment because a work restriction 
was violated."  Id.  
at 1196. 

 
 
[¶13]   In the case at bar, the hearing 
examiner found Ms. Perry had violated the rule prohibiting her from performing a 
two-person lift unassisted and, under Smith, she was not entitled to benefits. 
 The factual record clearly supports 
the hearing examiner's conclusion.  
The first and second elements of the Smith test require the employer 
expressly and carefully inform the employee she must not perform a specific task 
while in its employ and the employee know and understand the restriction.  At the contested case hearing, Lacrecia 
Patterson, MountainTowers' executive director, testified all 
employees receive instruction on safety policies when they are hired.  MountainTowers had a written policy stating the 
two-person lift restriction, and Ms. Perry signed a document acknowledging the 
policy.  Ms. Perry testified that, 
at her employment orientation, MountainTowers instructed she was not to perform a 
two-person lift without assistance.  
She acknowledged performing a two-person lift alone was a serious 
violation of MountainTowers' safety policies, which could 
result in disciplinary action, including termination.  Obviously, there was ample evidence to 
support a finding that the first two elements were 
satisfied.

 
 
[¶14]   The third element of the Smith test is the employer did not 
knowingly accept the benefit of a violation of the restriction by the 
employee.  This element was 
contested at the hearing.  Ms. Perry 
testified she was instructed to honor the patients' rights to privacy and she 
believed, at the time she was injured, she was complying with the requirement by 
helping the patient use the restroom.  
She also testified the "graveyard shift" was habitually understaffed, 
causing her to have to choose between honoring the patient's rights and 
complying with the two-person lift restriction.  In fact, she testified she had violated 
the two-person lift rule several times in her short tenure with MountainTowers.  Thus, she claimed MountainTowers accepted the benefit of her 
violation of the two-person lift restriction.    

 
 
[¶15]   The record contains no evidence to 
support Ms. Perry's claim the graveyard shift was understaffed in accordance 
with industry or legal standards.  
Furthermore, Ms. Perry did not testify she had notified MountainTowers prior to her injury about the 
perceived staffing problem.  
Although evidence showing other employees routinely violated the 
two-person lift policy may have supported Ms. Perry's claim of understaffing, no 
such evidence exists in the record.  
To the contrary, Ms. Patterson denied knowledge of prior incidences of 
employees violating the two-person lift rule, and she testified violating the 
policy was a serious breach of MountainTowers' employment regulations which could 
result in termination of employment.  
Ms. Patterson also testified MountainTowers did not benefit from violation of 
the rule because it placed both the employee and the patient at risk.      

 
 
[¶16]   With regard to this particular 
incident, Ms. Perry did not testify as to how long she and the patient would 
have had to wait for assistance from the other CNA.  Instead, she simply asserted she was 
required to violate the safety regulation in order to make the patient 
comfortable and to comply with her obligation to respect the patient's right to 
privacy.  In doing so, she injured 
herself and nearly dropped the patient, which were exactly the dangers the 
policy was designed to prevent.  Substantial evidence supports the hearing 
examiner's conclusion that MountainTowers did not knowingly accept the 
benefit of Ms. Perry's violation of the two-person lift 
restriction.

 
 
[¶17]   The record also supports the 
hearing examiner's finding the final element of the Smith test was satisfied.   Ms. Perry admitted her back injury 
occurred because she performed a two-person lift by herself.  She strained her back when she twisted 
to prevent the patient from falling.  
In fact, Ms. Perry's own statement in her employee incident report 
acknowledged her violation of  the 
policy caused her injury.  One 
question on the report asked:  "What 
were you doing at the time of the incident, and what could you have done to 
prevent this incident?"  Her 
handwritten answer stated:  "I could 
[have] had 2 people to help with the transfer if the other CNA would have 
helped. . . ."  

 
 
[¶18]   Ms. Perry seems to acknowledge the 
record supports the hearing examiner's factual findings, and she does not 
seriously contest those findings.  
Instead, she approaches the issue from another angle by arguing her 
injury arose out of and in the course of her employment because her violation of 
the lifting rule was not a departure from the ultimate work to be performed but 
was merely an unauthorized method of performing the ultimate work.  Relying on Professor Larson's treatise, 
she claims her injury is compensable because she violated a proscribed means or 
method of performing the ultimate work but she did not stray from the ultimate 
work she was hired to perform.  
Specifically, Ms. Perry claims her act in performing a two-person lift 
without assistance was part of her ultimate work, which included lifting 
patients and helping them to the restroom.  
She argues the unassisted two-person lift was simply a prohibited method 
of performing her ultimate work, and she is, therefore, entitled to worker's 
compensation benefits. 

   

[¶19]   As we recognized in Smith, the distinction between whether a 
restriction is upon the ultimate work to be done versus a restriction on the 
method to accomplish the ultimate work is not always easy to make.  The difficulty is in determining the 
ultimate work to be accomplished by the worker.  Professor Larson described the problems 
as follows:

 
 
§ 33.02 
Misconduct Which Is Not a Deviation from Employment

 
 
                        
[1]  Distinction Between 
Prohibited Thing and Method

 
 
We 
have here to do with a simple distinction: that between "thing" and 
"method."  Rules and prohibitions 
may define the ultimate "thing" which claimant is employed to do, or they may 
describe the methods which he may or may not employ in accomplishing that 
ultimate "thing."  The only tricky 
feature of this distinction is that it can, by a play upon words, be converted 
into a contradiction of itself.  For 
example, it seems clear enough that if the claimant's main job is to lift flour 
sacks, the raising of the flour sacks is the "thing" for which he is 
employed.  If, in violation of 
instruction, he rigs up a rope hoist to do the job, it should be clear enough 
that his departure is merely from the method prescribed. 

 
 
Yet 
the argument will sometimes be seen that the violation is one of a rule limiting 
the "thing," because the "thing" for which the claimant is employed is "to lift 
flour sacks by hand and not by hoist." Of course, by so blending ultimate object 
and method, one can convert all instructions on method into delimitations on the 
scope of employment, and end by reducing the distinction to absurdity.  

 
 
2 
Larson's Worker's Compensation Law, § 33.02 [1] (2005).  

 
 

[¶20]   Recognizing the inherent difficulty 
with distinguishing between the ultimate work and a method of performing the 
ultimate work, we adopted the test articulated in Smith to provide a methodology for 
making that distinction.  The Smith test is restrictive and only 
limits the scope of employment, and thereby the compensability of the injury, 
when the rule against performing a certain task has been clearly communicated to 
the employee and the employer has not knowingly accepted the benefit from the 
employee's violation of the rule.  
This is consistent with cases from other jurisdictions which recognize a 
specifically delineated safety rule may limit the scope of employment so long as 
it is clearly explained to the employee.  
Compare, Ramsdell v. Horn, 781 P.2d 150 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (allowing worker's compensation benefits to 
epileptic employee who violated employer's general directive not to work "up 
high") with Bill Lawley Ford v. Miller, 
672 P.2d 1031 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (denying benefits to family of 
intoxicated worker who was killed while working after he had been expressly 
directed to cease working).  See also, Saunders v. Industrial Comm'n, 705 N.E.2d 103 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (denial of benefits to worker injured while 
riding double on a forklift in violation of employer's clear directive); Scheller v. Industrial Comm'n, 656 P.2d 1279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (denying benefits to security worker who pursued 
criminals off the employer's premises in violation of employer's prohibition 
against leaving the premises).  See also, L. Sharp, Violation of Employment Rule as Barring 
Claim For  Workers' 
Compensation, 61 
A.L.R.5th  375 (1998) (collecting 
cases).  

 
 
[¶21]   When compared with the facts of Smith, Ms. Perry's actions were 
similarly outside the scope of her employment and constituted a prohibited 
"thing" not a "method".   Ms. 
Perry was specifically directed not to perform a two-person lift alone.  She was clearly aware of the rule and 
the fact the patient was classified as a two-person lift.  Ms. Perry knew she was violating the 
rule, doing a prohibited thing and risking termination from her position when 
she did it.  The dissent in Smith argued the evidence was unclear as 
to whether the bucket of chicken Ms. Smith lifted exceeded the fifteen-pound 
weight limitation.  Smith, 762 P.2d  at 1198-99 (Urbigkit, J. 
dissenting).  No similar uncertainty 
existed in this case.   

 
 
[¶22]   Although her argument is not well 
developed, Ms. Perry seems to also argue the test articulated in Smith is inconsistent with the concept 
that the worker's compensation system is not intended to be a fault-based 
system.  As we have explained in 
prior opinions, the worker's compensation system in Wyoming is authorized by 
Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and provides tort immunity to employers 
in exchange for employees receiving a type of industrial-accident 
insurance.  Spera v. State, ex rel., Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 713 P.2d 1155, 1156 
(Wyo. 
1986).  Thus, the worker's 
compensation system is not a tort-based system but is, instead, based upon 
contract.  Id. 

 
 
"The 
amendment to Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and subsequent enabling 
legislation did not contemplate that tort law would hold any office in the 
Worker's Compensation Act except that the employer could defend against claims 
of the injured employee on the grounds that he or she was culpably 
negligent.  Soon after the amendment 
to Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, this court said that the Wyoming worker's 
compensation scheme was in the nature of an industrial-accident 
policy."

 
 

Id., 
quoting 
Cottonwood Steel Corp.  v. Hansen, 655 P.2d 1226, 1236 
(1982).

 
 
Instead 
of suing his employer for negligence and having to prove duty, breach, proximate 
cause, and damages, the worker in our state must file for worker's compensation 
benefits for which his employer is ultimately liable.  Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 
Wyo., 687 P.2d 885, 888 (1984).  Essentially, the 
system provides disability insurance coverage for the worker.  His right to benefits arises when 
certain conditions precedent occur, primarily, when he suffers a disabling 
work-related injury."        

 
 

Spera, 
713 P.2d  at 1157 (emphasis added).  
Thus, the concept of fault does not enter the calculation so long as the 
employee is engaged in work-related activities when injured.2  The principles of Smith look at the threshold question  
whether the injury occurred while the employee was engaged in a task which is 
part of the employee's work.  Until 
that requirement is satisfied, the employee does not qualify for his contractual 
right to worker's compensation benefits.  
Thus, the Smith ruling simply 
delineates a method for determining the parameters of the work which is covered 
by worker's compensation; it does not inappropriately incorporate fault 
principles into the worker's compensation analysis.  

 
 
[¶23]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1At the time 
Smith was decided the district court 
sat as the fact finder.  The 
worker's compensation system was subsequently revised by the legislature, and 
OAH was designated to conduct the contested case proceedings under the Worker's 
Compensation Act.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-101 et. seq. (LexisNexis 
2005).

  

2The Division 
apparently argues on appeal that Ms. Perry's claim also could be denied pursuant 
to  § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (C), because 
her injury resulted solely from her culpable negligence.   The statutory defense of culpable 
negligence was not addressed during the administrative hearing.   Consequently, we will not consider 
that argument for the first time on appeal.   See Holloway v. Wyo. Game and Fish Comm'n, 2005 WY 144, ¶ 
12, 122 P.3d 959, 962 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

HILL, 
Chief Justice, dissenting, with whom BURKE, Justice, joins.

 
 
[¶24]   I respectfully dissent because I am 
not convinced that we should continue to recognize or apply the now dated and 
largely discredited rule that we adopted in Smith v. Husky Terminal Restaurant, 
Inc., 762 P.2d 1193, 1196-97 (Wyo. 1988).  Moreover, even if this Court is to 
continue to recognize that rule, it is my view that it does not apply to the 
circumstances of this case.  In Smith, we set out the rule in these 
terms:

 
 
Considering 
this precedent, it is apparent that there are limited situations in which an 
employer can put on evidence to refute an employee's preponderance showing that 
the work causing her injury occurred within the scope of her employment because 
a work restriction was violated.  We 
hold that an employee can be found to have acted outside the scope of employment 
by violating a work restriction when the following elements are shown:  (1) the employer expressly and carefully 
informs the employee that she must not perform a specific task or tasks while in his employ;  (2) the employee knows and understands 
the specific restriction imposed;  
(3) the employer has not knowingly continued to accept the benefit of a 
violation of the restriction by the employee;  and, (4) the injury for which benefits 
are claimed arises out of conduct that clearly violates the specific 
restriction.

 
 

Smith, 762 P.2d  at 1196 (emphasis in original).

 
 
[¶25]   We cited these facts, proved up by 
Smith's employer, as falling within the reach of the rule:

 
 
In this 
case the presence of these four elements is supported by sufficient 
evidence.  Before [Smith] began 
working as a cook, which she was doing when she reinjured her back, her employer 
gave her specific and express instructions not to lift anything heavier than 
fifteen pounds.  Her employer did 
not rehire her as a cook until it received written confirmation from her doctor 
of what her physical capabilities would be.  Her employer discussed this with her and 
posted her doctor's letter above the manager's desk.  Employee's own testimony was that she 
understood the restriction on lifting the bucket of chickens; further, she had 
asked other restaurant employees to drain the bucket of chickens for her on 
occasion before she injured herself at work.  Employee considered this restriction on 
the night of her injury, as illustrated when she tried to awaken Mr. Stockmeyer 
to lift the bucket for her before she tried to lift it herself.  Employee failed to present any evidence, 
other than her own opinion, to substantiate her fear that by failing to drain 
the chickens she might be fired.  
Employer was not shown to have accepted the benefit of any previous 
violation of the specific lifting restriction before employee injured herself 
lifting the bucket.  The district 
court heard all of the testimony and determined that employee, despite her 
complete understanding of the lifting restriction, disregarded the restriction 
and caused the type of injury the restriction was intended to prevent.  We must accept these findings of fact by 
the district court; they support the conclusion that employee's injury did not 
occur within the scope of her employment.

 
 

Smith, 762 P.2d  at 1197.

 
 

[¶26]   To begin with, I conclude that this 
case got a bit off track from the very outset because of the loose use of 
technical trade terminology that needed to be treated more precisely.  Central to the occupation of nursing is 
the matter of "patient handling" or "patient transfers."  See, e.g., 
http://www.uvsc.edu/nurs/reportPhysicalDemands.html (Patient Transfers); 
http://www.hlth.gov.bc.ca/assisted/pdf/guidelines/pdf (Definitions and 
Selections of Safe Client Transfer/Lift);  
Delmar's Fundamental & Advanced Nursing Skills (2nd ed. 
2004), Skill 4-17, Assisting from Bed to 
Wheelchair, Commode, or Chair; Sandra F. Smith, Donna J. Duell, and Barbara 
C. Martin, Clinical Nursing Skills, Basic to Advanced Skills (2004); and Audrey 
Nelson, Ph.D., RN, FAAN (Director, Patient Safety Center of Inquiry, Ergonomics 
Research Laboratory, VAMC Tampa FL), Safe 
Patient Handling and Movement.  
Of course, we may not  and do 
not rely on these extra-record materials as evidence in this case.  See Tarraferro v. Wyoming Medical 
Commission, 2005 WY 155, ¶ 14, 123 P.3d 912, 918 (Wyo. 2005)  Nonetheless, we include them here to 
illustrate the kind of evidence that is missing in this case and, furthermore, 
to demonstrate that the Division's theory of the case, i.e., that "the 
employer expressly and carefully inform[ed] the employee that she must not 
perform a specific task or tasks while in his employ" is not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record, as well as the invalidity of the Division's 
argument that the incident at issue was outside the course and  scope of Perry's 
employment.

 
 

[¶27]   Moreover, I am unable to conclude 
that Perry knew 
and understood the specific restriction imposed, simply because the record does 
not include any specifics about the employer's rule.  Furthermore, Perry claimed that her 
employer had knowingly continued to accept the benefit of violations of that 
restriction by her, and the only evidence that rebuts that was the employer's 
disclaimer that it was "not aware of" any such behavior.  Finally, my conclusion is that the 
injury for which benefits are claimed arose out of conduct that was in the 
employer's best interests, that the rule is primarily for the protection of 
patients (and only of secondary benefit for employees) and could not have 
violated the specific restriction, because the restriction was at best general 
and in no way confined Perry's work efforts by carefully defined or specialized 
instruction.

 
 

[¶28]   As we noted in Smith, 762 P.2d at 1196:  "[T]here are 
limited situations in which an employer can put on evidence to refute an 
employee's preponderance showing that the work causing her injury occurred 
within the scope of her employment because a work restriction was 
violated."  In her opening 
statement, Perry's attorney more or less conceded that Perry had performed a 
"two-person lift."  Of course, one 
person cannot do a "two-person lift" because by definition it requires two 
persons.  As the materials we cited 
above ably demonstrate, there are a number of alternatives to a "two-person 
lift," many of which require only one person.  In this instance, the great weight of 
the evidence suggested that Perry decided that the circumstances that presented 
themselves to her required her to do a patient transfer, or patient assist, that 
required only one person, because she was the only person available to do the 
task at the time the task needed to be done.  Perry testified that she had done such 
transfers or assists on several other occasions.  What Perry described in her testimony is 
what is generally called a pivot assist from bed to wheelchair (which may also 
be done from wheelchair to commode, from commode to wheelchair, and from 
wheelchair back to bed).  The 
difficulty, or emergency, arose only when the wheelchair moved and the patient 
began to fall, apparently because the wheelchair brakes had not been set or were 
inoperative.

 
 

[¶29]   It was the employer's position that 
Perry had received "extensive training" and clearly understood "lifting."  Perry denied that she had been afforded 
"extensive training:"  "[T]he only 
orientation we had on lifting was looking at a book showing us proper ways of 
lifting.  No techniques.  We were told to sign it to state we were 
showed the proper ways of lifting."  
Perry made it very clear in her testimony that it was her professional 
assessment at the time this event occurred that she needed to assist the patient 
at issue so that the patient could use the bathroom.  The materials that were used in this 
"training" process, if indeed there were any, are not a part of this record on 
appeal.  The record on appeal also 
provides no information about the patient that Perry was assisting, so it is at 
best speculation that the patient required a "two-person lift" in order to be 
transferred from her bed to a wheelchair.

 
 
[¶30]   For the most part, the Division 
relied on Perry's testimony that she knowingly violated the "two-person lift" 
rule in order to refute her prima facie case that she was injured in the course 
and scope of her employment.  It is 
my view that Perry's testimony does not support the Division's position and, as 
noted above, the training materials and the exact status of the patient in 
question were not made a part of the record by the Division.  The Executive Director of Mountain 
Towers Healthcare and RehabilitationCenter testified for the Division.  There is no indication in the record 
that she possessed any special skills or expertise with respect to patient 
handling or patient transfers.  It 
came as no surprise to the Executive Director that there were only three 
employees available to provide care, during the nighttime hours, to the 
approximately 50 residents on the floor where Perry worked (This accident 
occurred at about 2:30 a.m.).  When 
asked if she was present at the orientation that Perry attended, the Executive 
Director admitted that she was not.  
When asked if the orientation normally included lifting techniques, the 
best answer she could give was, "As far as I know, yes."  The Executive Director also testified 
that during the day, most of the residents on the floor where Perry worked "are 
up ambulating," (Thus, there is increased staffing during the day, whereas at 
night the patients are in bed, so staffing is considerably reduced.).  From the record extant, it is a fair 
conclusion that the patient at issue in this matter was at least partially 
ambulatory, whether the time of day was daytime or 
nighttime.

 
 
[¶31]   It is of some significance that 
after Perry filed her claim for worker's compensation benefits, Mountain Towers 
notified the Division that it was "formally objecting to this workman's [sic] 
compensation claimdue to the fact the employee failed to report the incident, 
there are no witnesses to the incident, she failed to report to the facility to 
fill out an employee incident report until November 5, 2003."  Thus, the matter of the employer rule 
was not broached in MountainTowers' "formal" objection.  We also note that it is painfully clear 
that there was at least one witness to the incident (the patient), other than 
Perry, but neither Mountain Towers nor the Division attempted to present 
evidence from that witness or about that witness/patient.

 
 
[¶32]   In its final determination, the 
Division noted that there are "inconsistencies between what [Perry] reported and 
information from [Perry's] employer."  
The inconsistencies are not identified.  The Division also stated that the 
employer had no record of the occurrence, and that the incident did not meet the 
definition of an injury.  The 
Division also noted that it had not received all medical notes/documentation, 
although what it deemed to be missing was not identified.  The final determination went on to note 
that Perry had not timely reported to her employer or the Division.  The Division intimated that Perry 
suffered from a preexisting injury.  
Thus, the Division denied the claim on those bases.

 
 
[¶33]   Perry challenged the final 
determination and her case was set for hearing.  In its pretrial disclosure statement, 
the Division raised ten issues:  
(1)  That Perry had the 
burden of proof as to each essential element necessary to sustain her claim for 
benefits; (2) that Perry didn't timely report the injury to the employer; (3) 
that Perry did not timely report the injury to the Division; (4) that failure to 
report indicates that no injury occurred; (5) that Perry only worked for the 
employer for 20 days and was absent three times during that time period; (6) and 
(7) that Perry engaged in doctor shopping; (8) the Division found it 
inexplicable that Perry could get to work on 17 days, but could not get to her 
employer to report her injury (this was cleared up because Perry could not 
ambulate during some of this time on account of her injury, and because there 
was also a blizzard at the time that prevented Perry from getting to town to 
file a report); (9) that Perry had a preexisting condition; and (10) that Perry 
violated an employer's rule by single-handedly performing a two person 
lift.

 
 
[¶34]   The hearing officer concluded that 
Perry proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she was injured in the 
course of her employment and that her testimony was credible in all respects, as 
well as that all of her reports were timely, that she did not have a preexisting 
injury, and that she had not "doctor shopped."  However, the hearing officer also 
concluded that Perry's violation of the employer's  "two-person lift" rule "takes her 
outside the course and scope of her employment."  Thus, her claim for worker's 
compensation benefits was denied.  
Perry appealed to the district court under W.R.A.P. 12, and the district 
court affirmed the determination made by the hearing 
officer.

 
 
[¶35]   The next step in this analysis is 
to explore the underpinning of our decision in Smith and to ascertain what the vitality 
of that decision is today, and, in particular, what application it has to the 
circumstances presented here.  In Smith, our decision relied in 
significant part on a citation to Professor Larson's treatise.  Smith, 762 P.2d  at 1196.  This is what Professor Larson's treatise 
has to say on that subject now:

 
 
§ 33.02 
Misconduct Which Is Not a Deviation from Employment

 
 
[1]  Distinction Between Prohibited Thing and 
Method

We have 
here to do with a simple distinction: that between "thing" and "method."  Rules and prohibitions may define the 
ultimate "thing" which the claimant is employed to do, or they may describe the 
methods which he may or may not employ in accomplishing that ultimate 
"thing."  The only tricky feature of 
this distinction is that it can, by a play upon words, be converted into a 
contradiction of itself.  For 
example, it seems clear enough that if the claimant's main job it to lift flour 
sacks, the raising of the flour sacks is the "thing" for which he is 
employed.  If, in violation of 
instruction, he rigs up a rope hoist to do the job, it should be clear enough 
that his departure is merely from the method prescribed.

Yet the 
argument will sometimes be seen that the violation is one of a rule limiting the 
"thing," because the "thing" for which the claimant is employed is "to lift 
flour sacks by hand and not by hoist."  
Of course, by so blending ultimate object and method, one can convert all 
instructions on method into delimitations of scope of employment, and end by 
reducing the distinction to absurdity.  
One can say that a lineman is employed only to repair lines while he has 
his gloves on, that an errand boy is employed to deliver a message by way of 
Street A and not by way of street B, and that an oiler is employed to oil only 
machines that are standing still and not those that are in motion.  Actually, as the review of cases below 
will show, this sophistry has had very little success, and the great weight of 
present authority respects the plain meaning of the distinction between method 
and ultimate objective.

 
 
            
[2]  Prohibited Methods, Tools, or 
Materials

 
 
            
A brief catalog of the kinds of forbidden misconduct which, since they 
related only to method, have not blocked compensation, will serve to show better 
than anything else the extent to which modern compensation law has eliminated 
the employee-fault concept from the test of compensability.  Each of the following items of conduct 
was not only rash in itself, but was specifically forbidden by the 
employer:  sitting upon a fender to 
operate a dangerous machine instead of standing as ordered; climbing onto a 
basketball goal to paint the roof of a gymnasium; attempting to move a large 
metal charging board with a forklift; operating a meat-grinding machine with the 
guard removed; oiling machinery in motion; using alcohol to light a fire; 
carrying a gun; reaching into a machine without stopping it; speeding up 
iron-moulding to do five-hours' work in four; jumping a railing instead of 
following a stairway; climbing a fence rather than walking 300 feet to the gate; 
getting on or off a moving vehicle; riding on top of the cab of a truck or on 
the running board; leaving a trolley in such condition that it might move when a 
connection was made; washing a car with inflammable liquid without disconnecting 
the battery; failing to use a respirator and getting lead poisoning from fumes; 
using an emery wheel for a job for which the employer had said it was 
unsuitable; using sulphuric acid to clean a urinal instead of Gold Dust; 
climbing a tree without tying oneself in with a rope; and pouring gasoline into 
the tank of a motor while the motor was running.  At least one court has even included 
becoming intoxicated in the category of forbidden misconduct that will not 
preclude compensation.

 
 
            
There are almost no contra 
holdings.  The case of Plumb v. Cobden Flour Mills Company 
Limited, denying compensation to a foreman who used a rope and revolving 
shaft to lift flour sacks when the pile became too high, is so distinctly out of 
line with other British decisions on forbidden method that it probably is of no 
present importance.  And the 
Massachusetts 
cases denying compensation to the claimants who jumped on or off moving vehicles 
were based on a different principle, the now obsolescent "added risk" 
doctrine.

 
 
2 
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 33.02[1] and [2] at 33-10  33-12 
(2005).

 
 
[¶36]   Along these same lines, in the 
case, Fondulac Nursing Home v. Industrial 
Commission, 99 Ill. 2d 519, 77 Ill.Dec. 447, 460 N.E.2d 751 (Ill. 1984), the Illinois 
Supreme Court held as follows.  
Nurse Levi returned to work at a nursing home after recovering from a 
back injury.  She was repeatedly 
instructed not to lift patients.  
Two weeks after she returned to work, Levi was making rounds which 
involved assisting patients who wanted to go to sleep.  A patient who was normally able to 
ambulate asked Levi for help in pivoting from her wheelchair to her bed.  Levi assumed she could help the patient 
without actually "lifting" her.  
However, in the course of the maneuver the patient collapsed or commenced 
to fall, and in order to save the patient from dropping to the floor, Levi held 
on to her and lifted her into bed.  
Levi reinjured her back in the process.  The Illinois Supreme Court reversed a 
decision of the Industrial Commission to deny benefits on the basis that the 
determination that Levi's back injury did not arise out of and in the course of 
her employment was against the manifest weight of the 
evidence:

 
 
            
Even assuming that the claimant undertook a task she was not authorized 
to perform when she attempted to help the patient, the fact that the employer 
has in general terms forbidden an employee to undertake an act is not by itself 
sufficient to remove the act from the scope of the employment.   In this case the evidence demonstrates 
that she would not have lifted the patient had an emergency not arisen when the 
patient started to fall.  The 
claimant faced a choice at that point of coming to the rescue of the patient or 
doing nothing and thereby preventing bodily injury to herself but allowing the 
patient to sustain an injury, perhaps a severer one, while under the care of 
Fondulac.  Her decision and conduct 
at the time of the emergency served her employer's interest as well as that of 
the patient by protecting Fondulac's patient and saving Fondulac from a possible 
suit for injuries the patient might otherwise have 
suffered.

Because 
what the claimant did in this case was in the vital interest of Fondulac as her 
employer and was not a gross deviation from the ordinary tasks of a nursing home 
employee, it was consequently not beyond the scope of her employment, even if it 
may have exceeded the limitations placed upon her by 
Fondulac.

 
 

Id., 460 
N.E.2d at 753-54; and see generally King 
v. Grand Cove Nursing Home, 640 So. 2d 348, 352 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1994) 
(worker's compensation benefits affirmed where nurse violated "lifting" policy, 
but employer did not show that the safety device was provided solely as a guard 
or protection for the employee and that the employee had knowledge of its 
function and adequacy and deliberately failed to use it.  Also, employer failed in its burden to 
show that claimant had a willful and wanton intent to injure herself.). 

 
 
[¶37]   Although not referenced by either 
party here, this subject is thoroughly annotated.  Linda A. Sharp, Annotation, Violation of Employment Rule as Barring 
Claim for Workers' Compensation, 61 A.L.R.5th 375, esp. §§ 5, 
10[b], and 14[b] (1998 and Supp. 2005).  
Smith is included in that 
annotation as a case that stands generally for the proposition that an 
employment rule sets the boundaries of employment, and when violated, results in 
noncompensability because the accident did not arise out of or in the course of 
employment.  It is given more 
detailed consideration in a section that concerns cases dealing with 
prohibitions against doing another's work, when unrelated to the employee's work 
(Smith was expected to have other fellow employees lift the buckets of chickens, 
although in rushed and hectic circumstances, which only benefited the employer, 
she thoughtlessly picked up a bucket of chickens.).  That annotation further demonstrates 
that our decision in Smith is not in 
line with the modern cases on this subject.  It is of some significance as well that 
the Smith case itself, as well as the 
other cases we cited in it in 1988 to justify its resolution, have never since 
been cited in support of the rule adopted therein  in this jurisdiction or in 
any other.

 
 
[¶38]   In sum, I think this Court should 
consign the rule articulated in Smith 
to history or specifically limit its application to the rare sorts of instances 
condoned by reason and good conscience.  
If the Court is not inclined to do that, I deem it readily recognizable 
that it should not be applied to the circumstances of Perry's 
case.

 
 

[¶39]   For these reasons, I would reverse 
the order of the district court affirming the hearing examiner and direct that 
the district court remand the case to the hearing examiner and the Division with 
directions that Perry's claim for benefits be paid.