Title: Citizens for Equitable and Responsible Government v. County of Hawai'i; County Clerk

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

‘***POR PUBLICATION*#*
eee

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

=--000:

—_—esSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSsess
CITIZENS FOR EQUITABLE AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT,

a Hawai'i nonprofit corporation; BRENDA J. FORD:
STANLEY A. BOREN; FLOYD H. LUNOQUIST; MARLENE E. LUNDQUIST;
RONALD C, PHILLIPS, Plaintiffs-Appellants

and

 

BEVERLY BYOUK and SANDRA W. SCARR, Plaintiffs-Appellees
COUNTY OF HAWAI'T; COUNTY CLERK, COUNTY OF HAWAI'I; LLOYD

VAN DE CAR, CHAIRMAN, COUNTY OF HAWAI'I 2001
REAPPORTIONNENT COWMISSION, Defendants-Appellees

 

wo, 25614 a F
Ze 8
wortow ror seconsroenasn «= SBOP
(erv. No. 0171-0092) BP op oF
ae 2 OE
SEPTEMBER 22, 2005 J 3
I

(By: Levinson, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.7

With Nakayama, J., Dissenting, With Whon Moon, C.J., Joins)

Plaintifts-Appellants Citizens for Equitable and

Responsible Government, Brenda J. Ford, Stanley A. Boren, Floyd
H. Lundquist, Marlene E. Lundquist, and Ronald C. Phillips

(collectively, Appellants) filed a motion for reconsideration

(the motion) of this court’s July 22, 2005 published opinion (the
‘***POR PUBLICATION***

opinion), in which a majority of this court affirmed the decision
of the circuit court of the third circuit (the court) to uphold
the reapportionnent plan of the County of Hawaii 2001 :
Reapportionment Commission (the Commission). Citizens for
Eguitable & Responsible Gov't, No. 25614, slip op. at 25 (Haw.
July 22, 2008).

I.

In the motion, Appellants argue that (1) this court
cannot substitute its findings for that which the Commission and
the court should have, but did not, make, (2) this court cannot
refer to the public testimony of Julie Jacobson, a person who is
not a menber of the Commission, as evidence of the Commission’ s
unarticulated intent, (3) this court’s substituted justification
for deviations in excess of 10% is no justification at all, (4)
lack of good faith and honesty was subsumed in Appellants’
assignment of error, (5) the plan is invalid if the plan is
constitutionally defective, and (6) this court’s conclusion that
the court and the Commission erred in using the wrong population
base, means that it should simply reverse the court’s judgment.
Accordingly, Appellants request that this court (1) strike any
reference to Jacobson’s testimony, (2) strike all references to
the purported justification of the Commission for offering a plan
with deviations in excess of 108, (3) reverse the court's
Judgment, and (4) invite the parties to submit further pleadings
as may be appropriate to the amended decision. For the reasons
discussed herein, the motion for reconsideration is granted in

2
‘**#POR PUBLICATION*#*

 

part as to the reference to the Jacobson testimony, but denied in

 

all other respects.
n.

Addressing firet Appellants’ second point, the
challenge to Jacobson’s testimony, Appellants maintain that this
court “relie(d] upon the testimony of a person who is NOT a
member of the Conmission{, Jacobson,] to justify the . .
Conmission’'s action below” and that “[s]uch reliance is
inconsistent with” Dines v, Pacific Insurance Co., 78 Hawai'i
325, 893 P.2d 176 (1995). (Capitalization and emphasis in
original.) However, the opinion does not state that Jacobson was
‘a member of the Conmission, but identifies her as a Hawai'i

County Councilmember, It may be assumed that Jacobson’ s

 

‘4

 

timony apprised the Commission of how using a total population

base can achieve inclusiveness and equal representation. The

   

opinion refers to Jacobson’s testimony as follow:
Iije cannot say that no rational basis underlay the 10
deviation because, skin to the approach exenplified by the
Commission nenber's testinony in Kiley, the Commission in
fhe instant case, by using "totel” population, evidenced an
Entent £0 achieve inclusiveness and equal representation

  

For at the second meeting of the Commission, Hawai'i
County Counciinenber duile Jacobson testified in favor of
Sgeing the population ae the basis for the districting,”

stating thet,

 

each human being hag needs for the government serves
sie] ana it doesn’t aatter if you're one day old, if
you're 99 years old, if you vote or don’t vote, or any
Bther of those variables ach person needs to be
considered and I think especially with the complexity

 

Hawai's Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 40(b) (2005) provides
‘that a notion for reconsideration “shall state with particularity the points
of law or fact that the moving party contends the court has overlooked er
Risepprehenced, together with @ brief argument on the points raised.”

3
 

FOR PUBLICATION
os

of infrastructure issues, that we deal with, that's why it’s

Important,

 

Opinion at 22.*

Also, Appellants state for the first time in the motion
that Jacobson later retracted the statement quoted in the opinion
by rejecting the Commission’s plan. It should be noted that
Appellants did not challenge Jacobson’s testimony in their reply
brief, even though Defendants-Appellees, County of Hawai'i,
county Clerk, County of Hawai'i, and Lloyd Van De Car, Chairman
of the Commission (collectively, County Appellees), cited to
Jacobson’s testimony in their answering brief. Appellants,
therefore, failed to raise Jacobson’s supposed retraction of the
quoted statement that they tardily do now.

However, it appears that Jacobson had recanted the
quoted statement. Appellants state that at the Commission's
final meeting on December 18, 2001, Jacobson “rejected her own
statement.” (Emphasis in original.) Upon review of the record
on appeal, it appears that Jacobson’s Decenber 18, 2001 testimony
was never made part of the record.’ Appellants have since
attached the subsequent Jacobson testimony to their motion as
Appendix 32, as well as a declaration by their attorney, which

certifies that the attached minutes “are public documents . . .

+ pppellants attach Jacobson’s Ju
motion as Appendix 31, but the testimony 1s

 

22, 2001 testimony to their
Feady part of the record:

 

> County Appellees attached excerpts from the December 18, 2001
transcripts £0 their menorandus in opposition to Appellants’ motion for chenge
of venue, But Jacsbaon’s testimony oh pages 9-13 was not included.

 

 

 
 

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that are found on the County of Hawaii website at Hawaii
county.com.” Although the subsequent Jacobson testimony need not
be considered by this court, see Orso v, City & County of
Honolulu, 55 Haw. 37, 38, 514 P.2d 859, 860 (1973) ("[A] question
involving evidence not in the record cannot be reviewed on
appeal.”) (citation omitted), in light of the fact that Jacobson
retracted her statement, a fact only now raised by Appellants,
this court grants.Appellants’ request to strike any reference to
the Jacobson testimony.‘ In doing so we observe that it is a
fundamental and elementary proposition that counsel is obligated
to present an accurate record on appeal.

aun.

In their firet point, Appellants argue that it is the
“commission's constitutional obligation, not this [cJourt’s
burden, to offer evidence that justifies a plan that contains
deviations in excess of 10%, that favor pre-existing [cJounty
[clouncil districts and that ‘fractures’ the judicial district of
Puna.”* (Emphasis in original.) Appellants maintain that this
court “overlook[ed) . . . that officials in Rileviv. Baxter

 

+ in their response to the motion, County Appellees maintain that
Jacobson’ s testimony "war given at sn earlier meeting of the Commission before
any particular plan was before it. she later spoke in support of @ particular
Plan but aid not epacifically address the population issue. What she was
Elearly recanting was the plan she herself submitted to the Comission to
consider." To renove any Goubt regarding this matter, however, We believe the
better course is to excise such testimony.

 

 

 

+ the argunent that the redistricting plan “fractures” the judicial
district of Puna is addressed infra, Part IV.

5
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eee
County Election Commission, 843 S.W.2d 831 (Ark. 1992),] actually
testified to the court to explain their reason for offering a
plan that contained deviations in excess of 10% [and that] .
[nleither the trial court nor the appellate court in Riley

is for official

 

searched through the record to fathom the b
action.”

To the contrary, this court did not “overlook” the fact
that the conmission menber in Biley “actually testified” inasmuch
‘as the opinion expressly states that “[a]t the hearing before the
trial court, a commission menber testified that ‘the overriding
principle’ followed by the commission in redistricting ‘was equal
representation.'” Slip op. at 21 (quoting Riley, 843 $.W.2d at
833) (emphasis added). The rule extrapolated from Bile was that
a redistricting plan survives equal protection scrutiny where its
variation is “only slightly over the acceptable 108 variation(,]”
land “the commission's ‘systematic approach . . . reveal(s]
rational policy of redistricting.’” Id, (quoting Riley, 843
$.W.24 at 833) (emphasis added).

The opinion agrees with Appellants that “the Commission
did not address the deviation question because it was working
from the ‘total’ as opposed to ‘resident’ population base, which
presented only an 6.62% deviation.” Id, at 22. But, it was
decided that similar to Riley, “the 10.89% total deviation of the
Conmission’s plan is ‘only slightly over the acceptable 108

variation[,]” id. at 21, and “akin to the approach
 

/*FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

exenplified by the commission menber’s testimony in Riley, the
commission in the instant case, by using @ ‘total’ population,
evidenced an intent to achieve inclusiveness and equal
representation.” Id, at 22 (emphasis added).

Even without the Jacobson testimony, which is stricken,

 

Commissioner Mark Van Pernis’s “motion to ‘include all peopl:
which was “put to a vote and carried, evidenc[ed) that the

Commission was motivated by inclusiveness, as opposed to a

 

discriminatory purpose.” Id. Moreover, the opinion cites to
three additional criteria for redistricting as mandated by
section 3-17(f) of the Charter of the County of Hawaii (the
Charter). See id, at 23, As the opinion notes, “Appellants
[did) not contend that the Commission failed to consider [these]
other redistricting criteria under the Charter or that such
criteria would not support a slightly greater deviation than the
10% prima facie threshold.” Id.

Additionally, County Appellees, in their memorandum in
opposition to the motion for reconsideration, now identify parts
of the record as evidence that the Commission was guided by these
other Charter-mandated criteria. First, the reapportionment plan
itself reflects the Commission’s consideration of the “permanent
and easily recognizable features” criterion, Charter § 3-
17(£) (3), inasmuch as the written descriptions of each of the
designated council districts refer to streams, shorelines, and

other geographical features.
‘#**F0R PUBLICATION*#*
eee
Second, at their final meeting on December 18, 2001,
the commissioners made statements that evidence serious

consideration of all four criteria. One commissioner related the

Commission’s task of balancing the equal representation criterion

 

with the other three criteria:

‘Since the Big Teland population is not equally spread
out geographically throughout the Island, cbvicusly the
Gistricts cannot be geographically
dition to being sumerically equal.

fand controversy can result. "Some people or qroups want a

 

  

es “a =
pecan ce oe ee a Seer oom deration So
est of the ialand.
2k ns ne 1
allot its peaple in making the best plan. such plans would
a = a

(Emphasis added.) Another commissioner expressed the

Commission's motivation to adopt a plan ensuring that, consistent

with the provisions of Charter sections 3-17(f) (1) and (2), “(lo

district shall be drawn to unduly favor or penalize 2 person or

political faction” and that districts would be “contiguous and

compact”:
I have no doubt in ay mind that we did the very best we
Gould with creating, you know, a3

districts as possible...
owe dig as a charter mandate, we did the very best

we could wherever possible to create a [sic] cospact ang

fas we could. We nade concerted efforts
PENG eemmunities and subdivisions together. Again, here
land there, there [sic] wasn’t absolutely do-able because of
the census tracts and numbers and all the other issues. But
Thave no coube in ny mind that we did our very, very best.
we aad the
Nery best we could, ali of the Talend and aii the

(Emphases added.) Pursuant to Riley, these statements, made by

"ZT nave no doubt in my mind that

the Commission members themselves, justify the slightly greater
‘s**POR PUBLICATION*#*
see
than 10% deviation.‘ Accordingly, this court did not “overlook”

 

or “misapprehend” the Riley holding.”
w.

In their third point, Appellants argue that while the
Conmission’s reliance on the total population base “reflects the
underiying principle of the one man - one vote doctrine, it does
not describe a rational state policy” inasmuch as it “allows an
apportioning body to create legislative districts under which
pre-existing districts (and the incunbents therein) are favored
and [to] ‘fracture’ well-known communities of interests because

of administrative convenience!.]* (Emphasis in original.)

«ence, as County Appellees maintain, "it would be a futile
exercise to renand to ask commissioners for a reagon which they have already
Expressed in the vote on the motion at the June 22, 2001 meeting.”

 

 

> tnasmach ae the reapporticnaent plan and the commissioners’

testimony are part of the record, this court may rely on these grounds to
affirm the court's Judgnent. See Delos Reves vs Kubovama, 76 Hawas't 137,
{40,670.20 1281, 126¢ (1994) {Tis court may affirm a grant of summary
Sodgment on any ground appearing in the record, even if the circuit court did
ot rely on its").

 

 

* appellants argue as follows:

in offering ite justification for the County
Reapportionment Commission’ plan (in substitution of the
Conmission’s omission), this Court states that the
Comission’s purpose mist have been to use a total
popelation base that would give every man, woman, child,
Egearcerated felon, soldier, depencent of @ soldier,
Fesident alien and othe tation.”
‘the underlying principle

St does not describe &
Paeional state policy. Mor does it explain how that state
policy 4 in fact legitimately ad
Prima facie unconstitutional beca
fan ~ one vote doctrine of Keeping populations es equal as
possible to avoid the danger of diluting vote

‘The extension of this statement is that the one man ~
one vote principle allows an apportioning body to create
{egisiotive districts under which prevexisting districts
(and the incumbents therein) are favored and that “fracture”
Well-known conmunities of interests because of

 

 

    
    

 

 

 

 

(continued.

 
‘***POR PUBLICATION®#*
ee
Appellants’ motion attempts to clarify what was

obviously ambiguous in their appellate briefs -- the possibly
problematic effect of the redistricting plan on “communities of
interest.”? According to the motion, the redistricting plan

allegedly “fractures” the “judicial” district of Puna:

[t)he judicial district of Puna with 31,307 countable people
{D8f.2ctured” by asaigning portions of “upper” Puna along
ith portions of the adjoining judicial district of South
Hilo bo County Counes] District #3 and by assiging other
portions ef "upper" Puna along with all of the adjoining
Jealetal district of Ka‘y and portions of the non=adjoining,
Aistent judicial disteict of South ona to County council
District #6, As # result, residents of Puna have one
Fesident councilor and mist “share” two councilors with
Sther adjoining districts who nay or may not be a resident
Of Puna, ‘This is a classic example of vate dilution of
Eesidents of one district in favor of resicants of other
districts,

‘Es'a result, residents of the “upper” Puna, whose
population may justify a single councilor of its’ ow, find
Efeir Incerests submerged into the adjoining and distant
Jusicial aistricts of South Hilo, Xa", and South Kona.
More significantly, Council Districts #1, 2, 3, and 4 are
Senoninated by "Hilo interests,” with a statistically

 

 

 

 

continued)
venience, the only articulated reason
found in the County Reapportionsent Commission's records.
No court hes ever subscribed to such a conclusion.

(emphases in original.) It should be noted that the opinion did not reference
Sevory man, wonan, child, incarcerated felon, soldier, dependent of « soldier,
Tesldent eiien and others," as Appellants imply in the quote above. The
Opinion did not employ euch a List. Indeed, Appellants stated as a point of
error chat “the 2001 County Reapportionment Commission should have used
population base that excluded nonresident ailitary personnel end their
Bependente and nonresident atudents,” (emphases added), groups which the
opinion dia discuss.

 

 

+ appellants contend that “Zable Two, reproduced in Opening Brief,
Appendix 25, shows how the judicial districe of Puna with 21,307 countable
People is fractured." "(Emphasis in original.) But Table Two, without
Explanation, does not convey the specific contention that Pune was
Nfeactured.* in fact, Appellants id not utilize Table Two for this
proposition. Appellants referenced Table Two on three occasions in their
Opening brief, The first end second references, stating that “I
Censeqvence of not excluding these persons fron the population base is set
forth in Table One and Table Two," and that *[t]he statistical significance of
the #10 noneesidents who are located in the District of South Milo is shown in
eble Two,” were cryptic at best. In the third reference, Appellants utilized
Table Two to” *show{] the nunber of persons who fall below or above the ideal
ftean for each council district,” not to point out that Puna was being
“eractred.”

 

 

 

10
 

‘***FOR PUBLICATION
significant number of non-resident students (who should have
Been excluded) in the judicial district of south Hilo
(Emphasis in original.)
While this explanation may have raised a concern,

Appellants withdrew these arguments in the January 6, 2003

stipulation to amend first amended complaint and for entry of

 

judgment. The stipulation state:

Plaintiffs and Defendants herein stipulate to the
lanendnent of the First Anended Complaint filed here on March

62002 a8 followa:
{plaineités withdraw and delete Paragraphs 12.2 to

 

aes
2. Plaintigés withdraw and delete Paragraphs 12.3 to

lan

Teineitss” pulatior

‘hs a result, the Order for Summary Jusgment entered
herein onthe population base that the County of Hawali 2002
Respporssonnent Comisaion used disposes of all issues

fein leaving no other issues left for decision.

    

(Emphasis added.) Specifically, the stipulation withdrew, inter

alia, the following allegations:

Mo Rational or Gbiective Methedoicay

12.0. When the public provided information and
recommendations on the assigonent of communities of interest
fo specific Council Districts that differed from the 1981
Council District boundaries and the Commission's fixed
geographical “starting points,” the Commission rejected the
Public's input and recomendations, continued to rely upon
fhe existing 1991 Council District boundaries and its
arbitrar(illy fixed geographical “starting points” and
Justified its adoption of the 2001 Reapportionment Plan by
Using arbitrary and inconsistent criteri

I2t. "Aa a congequence, the Commission’ s 2003
Reapportionsent Plan (1) keeps incunbents in Council
Districts based on the 1991 Council District boundars
despite changes in the population for the County of Hawaii
‘ince 1991,

and. (2) dilutes the representative power of some communitige
‘of interest while inflating the representative cover of

 

 

 

 

n
 

12.4. Tor moze than 100 years, governmental units in
Hawaii have used the traditional land districts of the
Teland of Hawaii, now know ag the judicial districts, to
Srganize government agencies and to administer government
programs.

T2k. ‘these traditional land districts, or judicial
districts, are the Districts of North Bile, South Rilo,
Puna, Ka", South Kona, Noreh Kona, South Kohala, North
Kohala and Hanakual.}

121. Furthermore, distinct communities of inte:
have developed and exist within these traditional land
districts, o judicial districts

$2%m. “alenough the reapportionment principles tn
Acticl ivy Section # of the Hawail State Constitution state
that a reapportioning body shall avoid "[w)here practicable,
Suomergence of an area ina larger district wherein
Substantially different socio-economic interests
predominate,” the Commission did not identity or consider
the socio-economic interests of communities that could be
Gcternined fron public sources available to the Comission
Gn subjects such as education, employment and poverty
Tevels, or the effect of including communities of differing
socio-economic interest into designated Council Districts.

Yorn, Ae _a consequence, even though reasonable end
practicable alternatives existed and even though the public
fad provided the Commission with background information on
the Sittering soclovecenomic interest of communities, the
Connission rejected such alternatives and information end,
Using ite arbitrary geographical “starting points” and 1992
Council District boundaries, submerged communities of
{nterest. in certain areas into a larger district wherein
substantially different. socio-economic interest, predominate
This consequence is reflected in the Commission's action

. (1) divided communities in the upper tor

Bose cea sao

 

 

 

ot

 

 

  

 

 

 

(Some emphases added and some in original.) As observed in the

opinion, “(t]he effect of the parties’ stipulation . . . was ‘to
withdraw Appellants’ allegations that the . . . Commission failed
to use a ‘rational or objective methodology’ - . . al ful

submerged communities of interest into larger districts but not

Appellants’ allegations as to the population base that the . .

Commission used.” Slip op. at 5 n.3 (brackets omitted) (emphasis

12
 

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added) .
Appellants’ withdrawal of the argument that the
redistricting plan submerges communities of interests into larger
districts where different socio-economic interests predominate
precludes a resurrection of that argument on appeal, especially
on a motion for reconsideration. See Amfac, Inc. v. Waikiki
Beachcomber Inv. Co., 74 Haw. 85, 114, 839 P.2d 10, 27 (1992)

(The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to allow the

nt new evidence and/or arguments that could not

 

parties to prt

have been presented during the earlier adjudicated motion.”);

Briggs v, Hotel Corp,, 73 Haw. 276, 287 n.7, 831 P.2d 1335, 1342
n.7 (1992) ("We again remind litigants that a motion for

 

reconsideration is not the time to relitigate old matters.”).
Hence the alleged “vote dilution” of Puna residents is not
properly before this court, having been withdrawn by stipulation.
This court, then, did not “overlook” the “fracturing” of the
judicial district of Puna because it was not a part of the
appeal.

As to Appellants’ contention that “the only articulated
reason found in the County Reapportionment Commission's records”
was “administrative convenience,” as discussed supra, it must be
reiterated that (1) Commissioner Van Pernis’s “motion to ‘include
all people,’" which was “put to a vote and carried, evidencled]
that the Commission was motivated by inclusiveness as opposed to
a discriminatory purpose[,]” slip op. at 22, and (2) the opinion
cites to three additional criteria for redistricting mandated by

3
 

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section 3-17(£) of the Charter required to be considered by the
Commission. See id, at 23, Moreover, the “administrative
convenience” argument was not presented as a discernible legal
argument in Appellants’ briefs" and, hence, need not have been
addressed. Norton vs Admin, Dir, of the Court, 80 Hawai'i 197,
200, 908 P.2d 545, 548 (2995) (disregarding a particular
contention for lack of a “discernible argument in support of that
position, in violation of Rule 28(b)(7) of the Hawai'i Rules of
Appellate Procedure”).
ve

In their fourth point, Appellants disagree with this
court’s statement that “Appellants do not argue, nor point to
evidence in the record, that the Commission did not ‘make an
honest and good faith effort to construct districts . . . of
equal population as is practicable[.]’" Slip op. at 24 (citation
omitted). Appellants assert in the motion that the lack of good
faith and honesty argument was “subsumed” in their assignment of

error and incorrectly assert that they “argued in their Opening

 

at the end of their reply brief, Appellants stated that
“{clonvenience, not substantive lex, dictated the outcone of the final
Redistricting Plan." Tals 3 ¢ id not establish that the Coma:
guided by administrative convenience in creating Legislative district
Again, Appellants did not assert that the Comission failed to consider the
other valia criteria as mandated under the Charter. AS the opinion observes,
“related objections were apparently waived shen Appellants stipulated te
withdraw the clains that the Commission failed to use a ‘rational or objective
ethodology" and ‘wrongfully submerged communities of interest into larger
Gistrices,’ .-. , thereby abandoning any claim that the Commission incorrectly
applied the other three criteria in Charter section 3-17(f)."" Slip op. at 23
Ei

 

ton

 

       

   

 

 

uu
‘+#*POR PUBLICATION*#*
Brief{"] . . . [that the Commission] made no effort, even when

informed of the risks that it was taking by using the wrong
population base, [sic] the Commission proceeded anyway - because
of administrative convenience, because it was too difficult and
‘time-consuming to do otherwise.”

‘The fact remains, however, that Appellants did not
expressly make a “lack of good faith and honesty” argument.
Moreover, even if this court were to accept Appellants’
contention that such an argument was “subsumed” in its assignment
of error, it would not alter this court’s conclusion that “(what
remains is Appellants’ conclusory statement that the
‘commission's records do not reflect any evidence that justifies
the [Clommission’s action to adopt a (redistricting [plan that
has deviations that exceed the ideal mean by more than 108."
Slip op. at 24, Indeed, as County Appellees observe, the
Commission’s inclusion of the deviation charts in the
veapportionment plan is “indicative of the good faith effort of
the Commission to achieve equal representation by keeping the
deviations at no more than five percent.”? Hence, this point is
without merit.

vr.

In their fifth argument, Appellants maintain that

 

the tem “convenience” first appeared in the reply brief, not the
opening brief a Appellants state, and it does not appear Appellants’ used the
fem “adninistrative convenience.” ‘See supra note 10:

 

1% Ysing the total population base, the deviation percentage of each
istrict does not exoeed 58 and, therefore, does not exceed the 108 threshold.

15,
 

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“{a}ithough this Court states that [Appellants] did not assert
that the County Reapportionment Commission’s plan is invalid, if
the plan is constitutionally defective, the plan cannot be
valid.” But the opinion, in addition to pointing out that
Appellants did not argue that the use of the wrong population
base alone invalidated the Conmission’s plan, also observed that
“{elven if Appellants had argued that the plan was void for being
based on the wrong population, . . . the language of Charter
section 3-17(£) (4) would bring us back to the constitutional
question.” Slip op. at 18. Accordingly, the opinion proceeds to
address the question of whether, “when nonresident military
personnel, their dependents, and university students are excluded
from the population base, ‘deviations emerge in the
(rledestricting [p]lan that exceed constitutional limits.’” Id.
‘Thus, the opinion is in agreement with Appellants’ contention
that if the plan was constitutionally defective, it would be
invalid. A majority of this court did “not believe that that
[was] the case, however.” Id, Such matters, then, were not
“overlooked” or “misapprehended.”

vi.

Finally, Appellants argue that “[i]n the usual case,
this Court would remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings{,]” but because “the trial judge is no longer sitting
and the County Reapportionment Commission has been dissolved|,)

. . . this Court should simply reverse the trial court’s judgment
below[, and u]pon such reversal, the parties may then apply to

16
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this Court for further relief as the circumstances may warrant.

In light of the disposition herein, these matters need not be

addressed, and in any event, appear irrelevant to the decision.
vin.

Therefore, based on the foregoing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for
reconsideration is granted as to the request to strike the
reference to the Jacobson testimony, and, therefore, the
paragraph beginning on line 12 from the top of page 22 of the
opinion shall be amended by striking the words after “Commission”
on Line 12 through line 20 and striking the word “then” on line
21, leaving the sentence beginning on line 12 to read:

For at the second meeting of the Commission,
Commissioner Mark Van Fernis made 2 motion to "include all
people”: “{R]11 the people that the census counted is
[ncludes because, whether they vote or not, or wether
they're young of old, military or not, they all use county
services, they all pay taxes in sone form or shape and they
11 need representations.”

‘The Clerk of the Court is directed to incorporate the
foregoing changes in the original opinion and take all necessary
steps to notify the publishing agencies of these changes.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion is denied in all

 

Michael J. Matsukawa, on

the motion for Slane lear

plaintiffs-appellants.

Patricia K. O'Toole,
Deputy Corporation Counsel,

County of Hawai'i, for Bosce Bat ty

defendants-appellees,

vv