Title: Ballinger v. Delaware River Port Authority

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

The DRPA is a bi-state agency that was created by a Congressionally-approved compact (compact) between New Jersey and Pennsylvania to develop and maintain bridges and port facilities between the two states. From April 1984 until February 1995, defendant DRPA employed the plaintiff as a non-union police officer. In November 1994, plaintiff noticed that pieces of furniture began appearing at the DRPA building where he was assigned to work. Apparently an agreement had been reached between the Camden Redevelopment Agency and DRPA that purportedly allowed certain DRPA employees to take items from the abandoned RCA building in Camden, but plaintiff was not aware of this agreement. Plaintiff overheard, however, a conversation between another officer and one of plaintiff's supervisors concerning the furniture. Plaintiff claimed that the officer said there was an old, abandoned RCA building in Camden where a security guard would let him go in and take whatever he wanted. Plaintiff knew that a few days prior to this conversation DRPA and Camden Police had been called to investigate burglaries and vandalism in the RCA building. Because plaintiff did not know how far up the ranks this situation went, he sought advice from a captain of the New Jersey State Police who was a long-time friend. Acting on his advice, plaintiff took pictures of the furniture and sent them with a letter to the captain. By communicating information about perceived illegal activities, plaintiff went outside of his chain of command as a DRPA police officer and thereby violated DRPA policies and procedures. The DRPA learned about plaintiff's independent investigation and correspondence with the State Police captain and, by letter dated February 8, 1995, terminated plaintiff for disregarding his chain of command and disclosing information about the DRPA to an outside agency. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that DRPA terminated his employment in violation of CEPA, and later amended the complaint to add CEPA claims against DRPA employees individually. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that CEPA does not apply to DRPA or its employees because DRPA cannot be subjected to the unilateral action of any one of its member states' legislatures. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that CEPA was not "substantially similar" to Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law such that the claim could proceed. Ballinger v. Del. River Port Auth., 311 N.J. Super. 317, 327-29 (App. Div. 1998)(Ballinger I). The trial court also denied plaintiff's cross-motion to file another amended complaint to include common law retaliatory discharge claims. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, instructing the trial court to compare the laws of New Jersey and Pennsylvania. On remand, the trial court dismissed the amended complaint finding no similarity in the common law of the two states that applied to this cause of action. The Appellate Division reversed in an unpublished decision (Ballinger II). The court subsequently amended its decision, on motion by the DRPA, to allow the claims against individual employees to proceed (Ballinger III). HELD : A bi-state agency is subject to the law of one of the member states, statutory or common law, if that law is substantially similar to the law of the other member state. Applying that test, the Delaware River Port Authority, a bi-state agency, is not liable to plaintiff under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, but is subject to plaintiff's common law claim for wrongful discharge. 1. When Congress approves an interstate compact, the agreement becomes the law of the Union. A bi-state entity created by such a compact is not subject to the unilateral control of any one of the states. A state's unilateral imposition of additional duties on the bi-state entity is impermissible absent express authorization in the compact or joint legislation by the creator states. (Pp. 6-8). 2. The corollary of the proposition that neither state may individually impose its will on the bi-state agency is that the agency may be made subject to complementary or parallel state legislation. Under that principle, one compact state's statute can be applied to the bi-state agency if it is substantially similar to an enactment of the other state. The principle applies even where the statutes at issue do not expressly refer to the bi-state agency. State courts in both New Jersey and Pennsylvania have recognized that complementary state legislation may be applied to DRPA and other bi-state agencies. Moreover, a recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found a duty by DRPA to bargain collectively because the New Jersey statutes and Pennsylvania statutes are complementary and parallel. Here, the Court applies the Third Circuit's holding and reaffirms its prior conclusion that the complementary or parallel legislation test is to be applied in determining whether the laws of one compacting state will apply to a bi-state agency. (Pp. 8 to 11). 3. Under the compact, DRPA has the express power to "sue and be sued." This provision is considered a waiver of sovereign immunity. If DRPA's authority to institute common law suits against others is derived from this power to sue, then logically the power to be sued infers the corollary proposition: a plaintiff can sue DRPA to enforce a common law claim. As the agent of each state, a bi-state agency is subject to all of its laws, statutory or common law, except insofar as the states agreed expressly or by fair implication to place it beyond them. As such, the common law can be applied to the extent it fills a void in the compact. However, to impose duties on DRPA, the common law of the two states involved in the compact, like the statutory law, must be substantially similar so that its application cannot be deemed a unilateral imposition. The Court holds that the substantial similarity test applies to common law claims as well as statutory law claims and affirms the decision in Ballinger I on that issue. (Pp. 11 to 16). 4. To be deemed substantially similar, CEPA and Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law must have adopted a substantially similar policy. These two laws, however, differ in scope, filing period, damages and the right to trial by jury and those difference reflect that the goals of the overriding legislative schemes are different. A fair reading of the two statutes indicates that they are not complementary or parallel so as to subject DRPA to CEPA. The Court agrees further with the court in Ballinger I that plaintiff's ineffective attempt to bring a CEPA claim does not constitute a waiver of common law causes of action. (Pp. 16 to 21). 5. In comparing the common law of the two states, it is clear that each permits a common law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of a clear mandate of public policy. Under the compact, DRPA police officers are required and are expected to function as would other police officers in either New Jersey or Pennsylvania. In those states, a fundamental duty of police officers is to use due diligence in discovering and reporting infractions of the law. Because plaintiff alleges that he was fired for investigating and reporting suspected criminal activity, he has stated a claim for wrongful discharge under the laws of both New Jersey and Pennsylvania. As such, the Court affirms Ballinger II. (Pp. 21 to 30). 6. Finally, in both New Jersey and Pennsylvania, a claim for wrongful retaliatory discharge may be considered a tort action and, in both states, an individual who personally participates in the tort may be held individually liable. For this reason, the Court affirms the judgment in Ballinger III denying immunity to the individual defendants for their own tortious conduct. The judgments of the Appellate Division in Ballinger I, II, and III are AFFIRMED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion. JUSTICE LONG did not participate. Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY, PAUL DRAYTON, VINCENT BORRELLI, RICHARD SULLIVAN, ALVIN WOODHOUSE, DAVID J. MCCLINTOCK and ALAN DANIELS, Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Respondents. Argued April 29, 2002 Decided June 25, 2002 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 311 N.J. Super. 317 (1998). Jennifer J. Platzkere argued the cause for appellants and cross-respondents (Blank Rome Comisky & McCauley, attorneys; Ms. Platzkere, Peter A. Gold and Sophia Lee, on the briefs). Mario A. Iavicoli argued the cause for respondent and cross-appellant. The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. This appeal presents two issues of first impression: first, whether the Delaware River Port Authority (DRPA) and its employees are subject to the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA); second, if they are not, whether they are subject to the New Jersey common law principle that protects employees from being discharged in violation of a clear mandate of public policy. Because DRPA is a bi-state agency, a unique creature of a federally approved compact between two states, this Court must determine as a threshold matter the proper methodology to apply in resolving when one state can impose obligations on a bi-state agency. A. . . . [T]he states did not create a governmental authority and cut the umbilical cord . . . . As the agent of each state, the [agency] is subject to all of its laws, whether of statutory or common law origin, except insofar as the states agreed expressly or by fair implication to place it beyond them. [State v. Murphy, supra, 36 N.J. at 186 (emphasis added) (requiring agency to produce transcripts in a criminal case, notwithstanding internal agency rule that transcripts were confidential).] We conclude that the common law can be applied to the extent it fills a void in the compact. See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 784, 118 S. Ct. 1726, 1737, 140 L. Ed. 2d 993 (1998) (resolving territorial dispute between New York and New Jersey regarding Ellis Island by following common-law rule [that] speaks in the silence of the Compact ). [J]ust as a state through its legislature may deal with specific circumstances menacing the peace by an appropriately drawn act, so the law of a state may be fitted to a concrete situation through the authority given by the state to its courts. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 297, 61 S. Ct. 552, 557, 85 L. Ed. 836 (1941) (citation omitted). The common law, unlike statutory law, is flexible and adapts itself to varying conditions. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383, 54 S. Ct. 212, 216, 78 L. Ed. 369 (1933); accord Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 438 (1993). And, undoubtedly, the common law is as much a part of the law of a state as is statutory law. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 445, 64 S. Ct. 208, 216, 88 L. Ed. 149 (1943) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 79, 58 S. Ct. 817, 822, 823, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938)). In this case, a legislative agreement between the states created the compact, but the application of common law allows the compact to function in a manner that is consistent with public expectations. In the past, DRPA has been both subject to and has asserted the common law. See, e.g., Kozikowski, supra, 397 F. Supp. at 1116-17 (asserting third-party complaint in personal injury action for indemnification against defendant who designed and constructed bridge); Bell, supra, 83 N.J. at 425 (allowing tort action for personal injuries arising from alleged negligent maintenance of bridge); Yancoskie v. Del. River Port Auth., 387 A.2d 41, 46 (Pa. 1978) (allowing suit in trespass for personal injuries arising from alleged negligent failure to follow safety standards in constructing bridge); Del. River Port Auth. v. Thornburgh, 585 A.2d 1123, 1124 n.1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (asserting claim and counterclaim for breach of contract against Pennsylvania Department of Transportation). In the process of asserting common law claims, the DRPA also has relied on changes in the common law since 1931 when the compact was formed. See, e.g., Thornburgh, supra, 585 A.2d at 1128 (relying on Pennsylvania Supreme Court case from 1957 regarding oral modification, and two cases from the 1980s regarding agency principles as applied to defendant Department of Transportation). Indeed, DRPA undoubtedly has benefited from the evolution of the common law. See, e.g., Textar Painting Corp. v. Del. River Port Auth., 296 N.J. Super. 251, 258 (Law Div. 1996) (dismissing complaint against DRPA after finding substantially similar common law in New Jersey and Pennsylvania from the 1950s through 1990s that favored competitive bidding). Although the common law may be a source of the imposition of duties on DRPA, the common law of those two states, like the statutory law, must be substantially similar so that its application not be deemed a unilateral imposition. See Local 68, supra, 147 N.J. at 444. That is the test that properly was applied by the Appellate Division in Ballinger I and Ballinger II. Since that time, the test has been recognized and applied by the federal courts. See Moore v. Del. River Port Auth., 80 F. Supp. 2d 264, 266, 269 (D.N.J. 1999) (applying the substantial similarity test in analyzing a common law employment claim brought against the DRPA). We hold that the substantial similarity test applies to common law claims as well as statutory law claims and now affirm the decision in Ballinger I on that issue. III. [O Rourke v. Commonwealth, Dep t of Corr., 778 A.2d 1194, 1202-03 (2001) (internal citations omitted).] In contrast, New Jersey s legislation is more far-reaching. The purpose of the CEPA is to protect employees who report illegal or unethical work-place activities. Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 158 N.J. 404, 417 (1999) (quoting Barratt v. Cushman & Wakefield of New Jersey, Inc., 144 N.J. 120, 127 (1996)). Therefore, beyond being simply a compensatory measure affecting only government action, CEPA establishes a statutory exception to the general rule that an employer may terminate an at-will employee with or without cause. Higgins, supra, 158 N.J. at 418. That exception, in turn, is intended to protect the public interest, namely the public health, safety, and welfare. Id. at 420, 421. Consequently, a fair reading of CEPA and the Whistleblower Law indicates that they are not complementary or parallel legislation so as to subject DRPA to CEPA. Having determined that CEPA does not apply to DRPA, we also express our agreement with the court in Ballinger I that Ballinger s ineffective attempt to bring a CEPA claim does not constitute a waiver of common law causes of action. The waiver provision in CEPA provides: Nothing in this act shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or remedies of any employee under any other federal or State law or regulation or under any collective bargaining agreement or employment contract; except that the institution of an action in accordance with this act shall be deemed a waiver of the rights and remedies available under any other contract, collective bargaining agreement, State law, rule or regulation or under the common law. [N.J.S.A. 34:19-8.] This Court previously has decided that the waiver provision does not prohibit a plaintiff from also asserting a common law claim that is distinct from the CEPA claim. Young v. Schering Corp., 141 N.J. 16, 25-26 (1995). As the Appellate Division in Ballinger I noted, Young expressly left open the question whether the statutory waiver is applicable if the CEPA claim is withdrawn or otherwise concluded prior to judgment on the merits. Id. at 32. We now answer that question. Since the decision in Young, the Appellate Division in Crusco v. Oakland Care Center, Inc., 305 N.J. Super. 605, 610 (1997), has concluded that the filing of a CEPA claim that was barred by the CEPA statute of limitations did not also bar plaintiff s right to subsequently bring a common law wrongful discharge claim. The Crusco court recognized that, as discussed above, CEPA was adopted as remedial legislation, designed to expand employee protection, and patently not to be used as a weapon to limit employees in vindicating their rights after suffering retaliation for conduct warranting protection. Ibid. (citing Barratt, supra, 144 N.J. at 127; Young, supra, 141 N.J. at 26; Abbamont v. Piscataway Bd. of Educ., 138 N.J. 405, 418 (1994)). The court in Ballinger I applied the logic of Crusco to conclude that Ballinger erroneously pled an unavailable CEPA claim, and thus no bar attaches in respect of other available claims of wrongful discharge. Ballinger I, supra, 311 N.J. Super. at 332. We agree with the Appellate Division that Crusco was decided correctly. The determination of whether a viable CEPA claim could be brought against DRPA could be made only by a court of law. This Court now having decided that the claim cannot be brought, plaintiff Ballinger should not now be denied any possible rights that may still exist under our state common law. Accordingly, we affirm Ballinger I. [Shick v. Shirey, 716 A.2d 1231, 1235-36 (Pa. 1998) (quoting Mamlin v. Genoe, 17 A.2d 407, 409 (Pa. 1941)).] In adopting a common law cause of action in New Jersey, the Pierce Court relied on Geary as well as case law from several other states. Pierce, supra, 84 N.J. at 67, 73. Pennsylvania courts, in turn, have relied on the language in Pierce quoted above, id. at 72, regarding the sources of public policy. See Yetter v. Ward Trucking Corp., 585 A.2d 1022, 1026 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1991); Darlington v. Gen. Elec., 504 A.2d 306, 319 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Cisco v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 476 A.2d 1340, 1343 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (quoting Pierce, supra, 84 N.J. at 72). Therefore, in comparing the common law of the two states, it is clear that each state permits a common law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of a clear mandate of public policy. We next address whether the public policy alleged here to have been breached, wrongful retaliation against a law enforcement officer for reporting suspected criminal activity, is a clear mandate of public policy that would be actionable in both states. Given that both states look to the same sources for public policy, the appropriate question becomes whether there is a dominant theme that appears from our legislation and case law? Bunk, supra, 144 N.J. at 191; accord Local 68, supra, 147 N.J. at 447 (finding that, [a]s a matter of public policy, the legislatures of both states have concluded that public employees should have the right of collective negotiation and that employers should not interfere with that right ). In dismissing Ballinger s common law claim, however, the trial court stated: [Counsel] mentioned the dominant theme and the Whistleblower statute in Pennsylvania and the CEPA statute in New Jersey. Both have the same dominant theme. If that were the test, then that would be all that is necessary to determine whether or not each state has a dominant theme or a public policy to advance. It s something like nobody s against Mom and apple pie. But that s not what the Appellate Division said in this case. They did a comparison of the statutory language in the Pennsylvania s Whistleblower statute and a comparison to -- to the New Jersey CEPA statute and I think that s what I m required to do here without regard to the dominant theme because everybody agrees as to the value of a dominant theme. We agree with the Appellate Division that the trial court took a too restrictive view of both the Pennsylvania common law and [the Appellate Division] directive. Where there is a dominant theme that clearly appears in the common laws of the creator states, failure to apply those laws would be the failure to apply so important a policy to an entity created by both states for their mutual benefit. Local 68, supra, 147 N.J. at 447. Both creator states in this case clearly regard the fundamental duty of a police officer to be enforcement of the laws. Ballinger, as a DRPA police officer, expressly has all of the powers . . . and all of the immunities of law enforcement in both states. N.J.S.A. 32:4-6; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, 3504.1. Thus, by the terms of the compact, Ballinger is held by the creator states to the same standard as all other state and local police officers, including the duty to investigate suspected criminal wrongdoing. Because Ballinger alleges that he was fired for investigating and reporting suspected criminal activity, Ballinger has stated a claim for wrongful discharge under the law of both New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Nonetheless, DRPA claims that the facts of this case would not support a cause of action in Pennsylvania. DRPA argues that Pennsylvania does not have a public policy claim for whistle blowing and cites a number of cases in support of that proposition. Those cases, however, are distinguishable. First, the cases involve civilians, not police officers, who had no statutory duty to blow the whistle . See McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 750 A.2d 283, 284 (Pa. 2000) (involving office manager who complained to superiors about breathing in air with toxic chemical levels); Spierling v. First Am. Home Health Servs., Inc., 737 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (finding that nurse had no statutory duty to seek out and report Medicare fraud by employer hospital), appeal denied, 786 A.2d 989 (2001). Moreover, the other cases that also involve civilians do not involve suspected illegal activity, see Holewinski v. Children s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 649 A.2d 712, 715 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 659 A.2d 560 (Pa. 1995) (involving hospital administrator who voiced concerns about proposed head of department), or the actual reporting of wrongdoing to a public agency, see McLaughlin, supra, 750 A.2d at 288 (noting that plaintiff failed to implicate public policy because complained of activity was not reported to state agency); Krajsa v. Keypunch, Inc., 622 A.2d 355, 359 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (involving plaintiff who only threatened to report overbilling to authorities). In contrast, the cases cited by plaintiff are instructive. For instance, Field v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 565 A.2d 1170, 1172-74 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), involved a wrongful discharge claim brought by an employee who was terminated after reporting deliberate radioactive discharge in excess of permitted levels to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The court found that the plaintiff had a valid cause of action under Pennsylvania common law because federal law required employees to report the violation and the matter was one of public concern. Id. at 1180. The Field court relied on other Pennsylvania cases, including Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978). In Reuther, the court recognized a common law wrongful discharge claim when an employee was terminated after serving jury duty as required by statute. Id. at 120-21. Ballinger, like the plaintiffs in Field and Reuther, had a statutory duty to enforce the law which, under the law of both states, is a paramount public duty. Accordingly, based on existing Pennsylvania case law, we disagree with DRPA that Ballinger s conduct is not protected. We therefore affirm Ballinger II. NO. A-35/86 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court RALPH S. BALLINGER, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY, PAUL DRAYTON, VINCENT BORRELLI, RICHARD SULLIVAN, ALVIN WOODHOUSE, DAVID J. MCCLINTOCK and ALAN DANIELS, Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Respondents. DECIDED June 25, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Coleman CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY