Title: Petition of Padget

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Petition of Padget1984 WY 33678 P.2d 870Case Number: 83-168Decided: 03/28/1984IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF THOMAS M. PADGET, ESQ. MARTELL J. HILDERBRAND, ESQ., IN HIS CAPACITY AS CAMPBELL COUNTY AND PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, APPELLANT (RESPONDENT), A.G. McCLINTOCK, ESQ., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF WYOMING, (RESPONDENT),

v.

THOMAS M. PADGET, ESQ., APPELLEE (PETITIONER).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
PETITION OF THOMAS M. PADGET, ESQ. MARTELL J. HILDERBRAND, ESQ., IN HIS CAPACITY 
AS CAMPBELL COUNTY AND PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, APPELLANT (RESPONDENT), A.G. 
McCLINTOCK, ESQ., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
(RESPONDENT),

v.

THOMAS M. PADGET, ESQ., 
APPELLEE (PETITIONER).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

Jack Sundquist, 
Gillette, for 
appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ. 

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This case arises from 
the refusal of the county and prosecuting attorney, appellant herein, to obey a 
district court order directing him to prosecute a former undercover agent for 
perjury. The appeal is from a finding by the district court that the prosecutor 
was in contempt of court for such refusal.

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

[¶3.]     Between September, 
1982, and April, 1983, the Campbell County Sheriff's Office employed a narcotics 
informant named Dennis Sharkey. During part of this period, Mr. Sharkey worked 
as an undercover contact, introducing deputies to controlled substance dealers. 
As a result of his work, Mr. Sharkey subsequently testified many times in the 
prosecution of offenses to which he was a witness. One such preliminary hearing, 
at which Mr. Sharkey testified, resulted in a dismissal of the charges for 
failure to establish probable cause. Also as a result of that preliminary 
hearing, appellee-petitioner, Mr. Padget, the defense attorney for the defendant 
who was the subject of the above-mentioned preliminary hearing, filed with the 
district court a motion to compel prosecution for perjury based on statements 
made by Mr. Sharkey at said preliminary hearing, which were not borne out by the 
transcripts made from the tape recordings taken of the incident. Mr. 
Hilderbrand, the Campbell County Attorney to whom the order compelling 
prosecution was directed, refused to comply with said order and was found to be 
in contempt of court for his refusal.

[¶4.]     The issue in this 
appeal is not whether Mr. Sharkey is guilty of perjury, but rather, as worded by 
the appellant, Mr. Hilderbrand:

"May the district court, 
pursuant to Wyoming Statute Section 7-6-110 (W.S. 1981), order and compel Mr. 
Hilderbrand as Campbell County and Prosecuting Attorney to charge and prosecute 
a criminal case or is such order a violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine embodied in Article 2, Section 1 of the Wyoming 
Constitution?"

[¶5.]     Art. 2, § 1, of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides for the powers of the 
government of the state to be divided into three distinct departments - 
legislative, executive, and judicial, and

"no person or collection 
of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the 
others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or 
permitted."

[¶6.]     The executive function 
is to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Art. 4, § 4, Wyoming Constitution. The 
county and prosecuting attorney is a member of the executive branch of 
government, not the judicial, even though he is also an attorney, and thus an 
officer of the court. People v. District 
Court in and for County of 
Larimer, 186 Colo. 335, 527 P.2d 50, 52 (1974). In counties where there is no district attorney, the county and 
prosecuting attorney has all of the jurisdiction, responsibilities and duties of 
the district attorney, § 18-3-302(b), W.S. 1977, (Cum. Supp. 1983), and these 
include exclusive jurisdiction to:

"Act as prosecutor for 
the state in all felony, misdemeanor and juvenile court proceedings arising in 
the counties in his district, and prosecute such cases in the district courts 
and courts of limited jurisdiction or in other counties upon a change of venue." 
Section 9-1-804(a)(i), W.S. 1977.

[¶7.]     In the present case, 
the prosecuting attorney, appellant, investigated an alleged act of perjury, and 
came to the conclusion that, for whatever reason, a prosecution was not 
warranted. Mr. Padget thereupon filed a motion requesting prosecution under 
either § 7-6-110, W.S. 1977, or in the alternative, § 9-2-505(c), W.S. 1977.1 

[¶8.]     The district judge 
ordered the county attorney to prosecute the case by virtue of the authority 
purportedly given to him by § 7-6-110, which reads as 
follows:

"The judge of the 
district court may, upon affidavits filed, or other satisfactory proof to him 
made, of the commission of any crime or offense, require the county and 
prosecuting attorney to prosecute any criminal by information for such crime or 
offense, and may compel, by attachment, fine or imprisonment, either for a 
stated period, or until there shall be a compliance with his order, on the part 
of the county and prosecuting attorney, a compliance with the order and 
requirement of such judge, and such order may be made in open court, or in the 
vacation and recess of such court."

[¶9.]     It is clear that the 
initial question as to whether or not charges should be brought in a criminal 
action must be answered by the executive branch of the state, whose duty it is 
to see that the laws of the state are "faithfully 
executed."

"The prosecutive decision 
traditionally has been exercised by the executive department, Confiscation Cases, 74 
U.S. ([7] Wall.) 454, 19 L. Ed. 196 
(1869), and an attempt by the judicial branch of government to exercise that 
authority by purporting to foreclose the refiling of a criminal charge in the 
absence of a constitutional or statutory proscription is constitutionally 
prohibited as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine." State v. Faltynowicz, Wyo., 660 P.2d 368, 377 
(1983).

"(a) The decision to 
institute criminal proceedings should be initially and primarily the 
responsibility of the prosecutor." 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, (1982 
Supp.), § 3-3.4.

[¶10.]  Even though the following cases deal with 
factual situations differing from that on appeal here, their analysis of the 
separation of powers is helpful to us.

"The People contend that 
our holding constitutes an invasion of the charging process, an area 
traditionally reserved to the prosecutor, because we have abridged his 
discretion in deciding `what crime is to be charged or if any crime is to be 
charged.' (People v. Sidener, 58 Cal. 2d 645, 658, 25 Cal. Rptr. 697, 375 P.2d 641.) This argument 
overlooks the fact that the magistrate's determination follows the district attorney's decision 
to prosecute. As stated in Tenorio, 
`When the decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to 
acquittal or to sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature.' ([People v.] Tenorio, supra [3 Cal. 3d 89], at p. 94, 
89 Cal.Rptr. [249] at p. 252, 473 P.2d [993] at p. 996.)" (Emphasis in 
original.) Esteybar v. Municipal Court 
for Long Beach Judicial District of Los Angeles County, 5 Cal. 3d 119, 95 Cal. Rptr. 524, 485 P.2d 1140, 1145 (1971).

"* * * Such strict 
application of [certain] sections would preclude a prosecutor from making a 
judgment - either for purely subjective reasons or as the result of discussions 
which might have been initiated by an arrestee - not to file a formal charge 
against or prosecute the arrestee. However, a prosecutor is vested with the 
obligation and authority to make those judgments. In both People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal. 3d 89, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249, 473 P.2d 993 and Esteybar 
v. Municipal Court (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 119, 95 Cal. Rptr. 524, 485 P.2d 1140, 
this court struck down under the separation of powers doctrine legislative 
attempts to subject an exercise of judicial power to prosecutorial concurrence. 
But in both cases it was recognized that the prosecutor - as representative of 
the executive - is vested with discretion to forego prosecution in the first 
instance. [Citations.] `Thus, Esteybar 
and Tenorio stand as clear and 
explicit authority for the proposition that the decision of when and against 
whom criminal proceedings are to be instituted is one to be made by the 
executive, to wit, the district attorney.' (People v. Municipal Court (1972) 27 Cal. App. 3d 193, 204, 103 Cal. Rptr. 645.) * * *" (Emphasis in original.) Hoines v. Barney's Club, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 603, 170 Cal. Rptr. 42, 620 P.2d 628, 633 (1980).

 

[¶11.]  Just stating that the initial 
determination of whether to prosecute a case rests with the prosecutor is not 
enough. It must also be recognized that the prosecutor necessarily exercises 
considerable discretion in making that determination.

"The prosecutor has broad 
discretion to decide whether or not prosecution of an alleged crime will serve 
the public interest. [Citations.] He may, and should, consider a wide range of 
factors that bear on the merits of prosecution - the nature of the offense, the 
nature and severity of the sanctions that will be imposed upon conviction, the 
personal circumstances of the accused, the expense of prosecution and congestion 
in the courts. * * *" (Footnote omitted.) Hoines v. Barney's Club, Inc., supra, 
620 P.2d  at 635 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).

"A prosecutor's 
discretion in charging, deferring or requesting dismissal is limited by 
pragmatic factors, but not by judicial intervention. See Miller and Tiffany, 
Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision: A Study of Current Practices, 1964 
Wn.U.Law Quarterly 1." People v. District 
Court in and for County of Larimer, supra, 527 P.2d  at 
52.

[¶12.]  The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 
supra, also outline some of the factors to be considered by the prosecutor in 
deciding whether or not to charge, and such standards indicate the 
inappropriateness of unqualifiedly prosecuting every alleged criminal 
offense.

"(a) It is unprofessional 
conduct for a prosecutor to institute, or cause to be instituted, or to permit 
the continued pendency of criminal charges when it is known that the charges are 
not supported by probable cause. A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be 
instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence 
of sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction.

"(b) The prosecutor is 
not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might support. The 
prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the 
public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence 
may exist which would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which 
the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising his or her discretion 
are:

"(i) the prosecutor's 
reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;

"(ii) the extent of the 
harm caused by the offense;

"(iii) the disproportion 
of the authorized punishment in relation to the particular offense or the 
offender;

"(iv) possible improper 
motives of a complainant;

"(v) reluctance of the 
victim to testify;

"(vi) cooperation of the 
accused in the apprehension or conviction of others; and

"(vii) availability and 
likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction." ABA Standards, supra, § 
3-3.9(a) and (b).2

[¶13.]  The statute here in question, § 7-6-110, 
supra, gives the district court the power to make the charging decision for the 
prosecuting attorney - indeed to order the prosecuting attorney to prosecute 
when he has reached the opposite conclusion. However, the statute does not 
require the district court to take into account the same considerations that the 
prosecuting attorney does, as noted above. We think it is clear that as the 
charging decision is properly within the scope of duty of the executive branch, 
it is a violation of Art. 2, § 1, of the Wyoming Constitution for this decision 
to be made by the judicial branch. Once the decision to prosecute has been made, 
then the judiciary becomes involved, but not before.

[¶14.]  This is not to say that the citizens of 
our state are without recourse if they feel the prosecuting attorney is not 
exercising his discretion in their best interests. There are several remedies. 
One obvious remedy is that district and county attorneys hold elective offices; 
if their constituents are unsatisfied, they are free to express their feelings 
at the voting polls. Another remedy is § 9-1-603(c), W.S. 19773 which provides for the attorney 
general, at the request of the board of county commissioners, or the district 
judge, to investigate any matter which the district or county attorney fails or 
refuses to act upon. Relief was requested pursuant to this section by the 
appellee herein, but was not granted by the district 
judge.

[¶15.]  Section 9-1-603 differs from § 7-6-110 in 
that it is not an abrogation of the executive function by the district court, 
but rather a check on the county attorney through a method of independent review 
of the matter by another agency in the executive department. The attorney 
general, placed in the role of prosecutor, then is constrained to act with 
proper regard given to the same considerations mentioned above. If he decides 
prosecution is not warranted, the decision rests with him, and the district 
court cannot compel prosecution, just as it cannot compel the county attorney to 
prosecute.

[¶16.]  The same distinction is true of § 
9-1-805, W.S. 1977,4 which permits the court to direct 
or permit any member of the bar to act in the place of the district attorney 
when the district attorney is interested or refuses to act. This allows the 
court to name another prosecutor, who assumes the same duties and 
responsibilities as the county attorney. The critical point is that another 
prosecutor assumes these duties, and that is allowable; it is not allowable for 
the district court to assume these duties - the latter is not permissible under 
our constitutionally mandated separation of powers.

[¶17.]  Inasmuch as § 7-6-110 is an 
unconstitutional violation of Art. 2, § 1, of the Wyoming Constitution, the 
order of the district court compelling prosecution pursuant to § 7-6-110 is 
reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1 This section has been 
renumbered and is now § 9-1-603(c), W.S. 1977 (October 1982 
Replacement).

2 See Commentary to § 
3-3.9, ABA Standards, supra, for further discussion.

3 Section 9-1-603(c) 
provides:

"(c) Upon the failure or 
refusal of any district or county attorney to act in any criminal or civil case 
or matter in which the county, state or any agency thereof is a party, or has an 
interest, the attorney general may, at the request of the board of county 
commissioners of the county involved or of the district judge of the judicial 
district involved, act on behalf of the county, state or any agency thereof, if 
after a thorough investigation the action is deemed advisable by the attorney 
general. The cost of investigation and the cost of any prosecution arising 
therefrom shall be paid out of the general fund of the county where the 
investigation and prosecution take place. The attorney general shall also, upon 
direction of the governor, investigate any matter in any county of the state in 
which the county, state or any agency thereof may be interested. After 
investigation, the attorney general shall submit a report of the investigation 
to the governor and to the district or county attorney of each county involved 
and may take such other action as he deems appropriate."

4 Section 9-1-805 
provides:

"When the district 
attorney is interested or refuses to act in a prosecution, the court may direct 
or permit any member of the bar to act in the district attorney's 
place."