Title: Commonwealth v. Feliz

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12545 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ERVIN FELIZ. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 5, 2018. - March 26, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Obscenity, Child pornography.  Sex Offender.  Global Positioning 
System Device.  Practice, Criminal, Probation.  
Constitutional Law, Sex offender, Search and seizure.  
Search and Seizure, Probationer, Expectation of privacy. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 3, 2015. 
 
 
A motion in opposition to the imposition of global 
positioning system monitoring as a condition of probation was 
heard by Robert B. Gordon, J., and a motion for reconsideration 
was considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
David R. Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for the defendant. 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Sarah M. Joss, Special 
Assistant Attorney General, for Massachusetts Probation Service, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
Eric Tennen, for Massachusetts Association for the 
Treatment of Sexual Abusers & another, amici curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  After pleading guilty to possession and 
distribution of child pornography, the defendant was sentenced 
to five concurrent five-year terms of probation, and two 
concurrent two and one-half year sentences of incarceration, 
which were suspended for five years.  In accordance with the 
terms of G. L. c. 265, § 47, which requires judges to impose 
global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of 
probation for individuals convicted of most sex offenses, the 
sentencing judge imposed GPS monitoring as a condition of the 
defendant's probation.  The defendant opposed the condition of 
GPS monitoring when it was imposed, arguing that mandatory GPS 
monitoring constituted an unreasonable search in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, a different Superior Court judge found 
G. L. c. 265, § 47, facially constitutional, and also rejected 
the defendant's as-applied challenge.  The defendant appealed, 
and we allowed his petition for direct appellate review. 
 
The defendant argues that, as applied to him, the condition 
of mandatory GPS monitoring, pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 47, 
constitutes an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment 
3 
 
 
and art. 14.  We consider this argument in light of the United 
States Supreme Court's holding that GPS monitoring is a search.  
See Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1370 (2015).  We 
conclude that G. L. c. 256, § 47, is overinclusive in that GPS 
monitoring will not necessarily constitute a reasonable search 
for all individuals convicted of a qualifying sex offense. 
 
Article 14 requires an individualized determination of 
reasonableness in order to conduct more than minimally invasive 
searches, and GPS monitoring is not a minimally invasive search.  
To comport with art. 14, prior to imposing GPS monitoring on a 
given defendant, a judge is required to conduct a balancing test 
that weighs the Commonwealth's need to impose GPS monitoring 
against the privacy invasion occasioned by such monitoring. 
 
We conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, the 
Commonwealth's particularized reasons for imposing GPS 
monitoring on this defendant do not outweigh the privacy 
invasion that GPS monitoring entails.  Accordingly, as applied 
to this defendant, GPS monitoring is an unconstitutional search 
under art. 14.1 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Prior proceedings.  The defendant was 
arrested in December 2014; he was arraigned in the District 
                     
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Massachusetts 
Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers and the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the 
amicus brief of the Massachusetts Probation Service. 
4 
 
 
Court on charges related to possession and distribution of child 
pornography and was placed on pretrial release with GPS 
monitoring.  In March 2015, the defendant was indicted on 
charges of two counts of possession of child pornography, in 
violation of G. L. c. 272, § 29C, and five counts of 
distribution of child pornography, in violation of G. L. c. 272, 
§ 29B (a).  He was arraigned in the Superior Court in April 
2015, and placed on pretrial probation, with conditions, 
including reporting to a probation officer, in person, once per 
week.  The condition of GPS monitoring was waived at that time, 
on the defendant's motion, and the GPS device was removed.  In 
April 2016, the defendant pleaded guilty to all of the charges.  
A Superior Court judge sentenced him to five concurrent five-
year terms of probation and two concurrent terms of 
incarceration of two and one-half years in a house of 
correction, suspended for five years.2 
 
At the time of his guilty pleas, the defendant was given 
notice of his obligation to register as a sex offender; 
registration also was imposed as a condition of probation.  As 
statutorily mandated, see G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178P, the 
                     
 
2 The judge also ordered that the defendant could apply for 
early termination of probation after four years of full 
compliance with the imposed conditions. 
 
5 
 
 
defendant thereafter registered as a sex offender, and was 
classified as a level one offender.3 
 
General Laws c. 265, § 47, mandates that any person placed 
on probation for numerous enumerated sex offenses4 is required to 
wear a GPS device.  See Commonwealth v. Guzman, 469 Mass. 492, 
496 (2014) ("G. L. c. 265, § 47, applies to any defendant who 
has been convicted of a predicate offense and sentenced to a 
term of probation").  Accordingly, the sentencing judge imposed 
GPS monitoring as a condition of the defendant's probation.  The 
judge also imposed additional conditions of probation, including 
that the defendant not reside with anyone under the age of 
sixteen; not work or hold a job that would involve contact with 
children under sixteen; and remain 300 feet away from schools, 
parks, and day care centers. 
                     
3 Individuals classified as level one sex offenders have 
been determined to pose a low risk of reoffending and a low 
degree of danger to the public.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (a) 
("Where the board determines that the risk of reoffense is low 
and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public is not such 
that a public safety interest is served by public availability, 
it shall give a level [one] designation to the sex offender"). 
 
4 General Laws c. 6, § 178C, defines "[s]ex offense" to 
include "dissemination of visual material of a child in a state 
of nudity or sexual conduct" and "possession of child 
pornography." 
 
6 
 
 
 
At sentencing, the defendant signed an order of probation 
conditions and a GPS equipment liability acceptance form.5  In 
signing the order of probation conditions, the defendant 
certified that he had "read and understood the above conditions 
of probation," and would "agree to obey them."  The defendant 
was fitted with a GPS monitoring device in accordance with the 
terms of probation.  On the day he was sentenced, the defendant 
filed a motion seeking to waive imposition of GPS monitoring as 
a condition of probation; he argued that the mandatory GPS 
monitoring requirement of G. L. c. 265, § 47, constitutes an 
unconstitutional search and seizure under art. 14 and the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Commonwealth opposed the motion. 
 
In February 2017, a different Superior Court judge held a 
three-day evidentiary hearing to assess the reasonableness of 
the defendant's statutorily imposed condition of GPS monitoring.  
The judge heard testimony from the defendant concerning his 
experience as a probationer subject to GPS monitoring; expert 
                     
5 The GPS monitoring contract indicates that no exclusion 
zones were applied to the defendant's GPS device, and that, 
because he lives in a city, where it is virtually impossible not 
to be within 300 feet of a park or school when traveling on any 
city street, the defendant was not precluded from passing by a 
school or park, but would be considered in violation if he 
loitered in or near such a location.  This is consistent with 
the probation officer's testimony at the hearing on the 
defendant's motion to waive GPS monitoring, and the judge's 
comment that actually issuing an alert every time the defendant 
passed by a park or school would be impractical and "over-
alerting." 
7 
 
 
testimony, by Commonwealth and defense experts, on social 
science research on rates of recidivism for contact and 
noncontact sex offenders; and testimony about the nature of GPS 
monitoring generally in Massachusetts.6 
 
In April 2017, the judge denied the defendant's motion.  
The defendant filed a timely appeal.  In February 2018, the 
defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, seeking to 
supplement the record with additional evidence concerning issues 
experienced with the day-to-day use of the GPS device, and 
difficulties with connectivity to the central monitoring 
station.  This motion was allowed in part, and denied in part; 
the motion judge amended his findings of fact to include 
reference to a subset of additional GPS alerts that the 
defendant had experienced.  In March 2018, the judge issued 
amended findings and rulings.  The defendant appealed to the 
Appeals Court from the partial denials; the Appeals Court 
thereafter consolidated the defendant's pending appeals.  The 
defendant also sought direct appellate review before this court.  
In June 2018, we allowed the defendant's petition for direct 
appellate review, and transferred the consolidated appeals to 
this court. 
                     
6 Six witnesses testified at the hearing, including the 
defendant, two probation officers, an employee of the electronic 
monitoring program office, and two expert psychologists. 
8 
 
 
 
b.  GPS monitoring.  We summarize the facts as found by the 
motion judge, supplemented by uncontested facts in the record 
and testimony credited by the motion judge that does not 
contravene the judge's findings.  See Commonwealth v. Jones-
Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015).  We "accept subsidiary 
findings based partly or wholly on oral testimony, unless 
clearly erroneous."  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 
646 (2018). 
 
More than 3,900 individuals in the Commonwealth, on 
probation, pretrial release, and parole, are subject to court-
ordered GPS monitoring, some of them pursuant to G. L. c. 265, 
§ 47. 
 
Probationers subject to GPS monitoring in the Commonwealth 
are fitted either with a one-piece or a two-piece GPS device, 
usually worn around the ankle.  The probation service uses the 
electronic monitoring program (ELMO) to supervise offenders 
placed on GPS monitoring.  ELMO operates a monitoring center 
located in Clinton, staffed by probation service employees.  
ELMO probation service employees work in conjunction with 
probation officers who are assigned to supervise individuals 
placed on GPS monitoring. 
 
The GPS devices used by ELMO store information about a 
wearer's latitude and longitude, gathered via communication with 
a network of satellites.  This information is uploaded through a 
9 
 
 
cellular telephone network to computers at the ELMO monitoring 
center that are running third-party monitoring software.  The 
timing of uploads depends on many factors, including 
connectivity with the satellites used in the GPS component of 
the system, issues with the cellular telephone service provider, 
and connectivity and timing issues with the ELMO center.  
According to the corporation that currently leases GPS devices 
to the Commonwealth, the location data gathered by its GPS 
monitoring equipment is ninety percent accurate within thirty 
feet.7  See Commonwealth v. Thissell, 457 Mass. 191, 198 n.15 
(2010), citing National Space–Based Positioning, Navigation, and 
Timing Coordination Office, The Global Positioning System. 
 
A GPS-monitored person's location information continuously 
is gathered and uploaded to ELMO computer systems.  ELMO 
employees generally review a probationer's location information 
only when the ELMO monitoring software generates an "alert."  
Even when no alert is generated, however, ELMO employees are 
able to look up and retrieve a probationer's historical location 
data.  The alert notifies an ELMO assistant coordinator that one 
of several issues has arisen with respect to a given GPS device, 
and prompts the assistant coordinator to address the issue by 
                     
7 The Commonwealth has not conducted independent testing to 
assess the accuracy of the GPS monitoring hardware or software 
that it uses. 
10 
 
 
attempting to contact the probationer.  Any of several kinds of 
alert may lead to the issuance of an arrest warrant for a 
probationer, if probation employees are unable to "resolve" the 
alert in a timely manner.8 
 
When a probationer subject to GPS monitoring has been told 
to stay away from certain addresses, a probation department 
employee may be able to enter a specific "exclusion zone" into 
the ELMO monitoring system.  If an exclusion zone is entered, 
the system will trigger an alert when a GPS-monitored individual 
enters that zone.  The system permits entry of exclusion zones 
by specific addresses.  The system does not permit entry of more 
general exclusion zones, such as "parks" or "schools"; to 
approximate that type of restriction, the street addresses of 
the pertinent parks or schools would have to be entered 
manually. 
                     
 
8 As the motion judge explained, 
 
"Assistant Coordinators are called upon to exercise some 
level of discretion to determine in the first instance 
whether the situation presents a bona fide compliance 
concern.  If the probationer cannot be reached, the 
Assistant Coordinator will contact his Probation Officer.  
If an alert activates after hours and the Probation Officer 
cannot be located, an on-call Chief Probation Officer is 
available to address the matter.  Arrest warrants are 
pursued and issued only if the alert cannot be explained 
and cleared after a substantial period of time, and that 
period of time will vary depending upon the nature of the 
alert." 
11 
 
 
 
It is common for a GPS monitoring device to issue alerts 
related to cellular or satellite connection, as well as the 
integrity of the device itself.  Many alerts occur because of 
events unrelated to a defendant's efforts to comply with 
conditions of probation.  For instance, when a defendant's 
device loses its signal connection with the cellular telephone 
network, an "unable to connect" alert is triggered.  If the GPS 
device is within cellular network coverage, but loses connection 
to the satellite network, a "motion, no GPS" alert is triggered.  
If the device becomes cut or broken for any reason, it will 
trigger a "tampering" alert.  While a GPS device is expected to 
retain a battery charge for approximately twenty-four hours, 
battery life may decline, and may result in common "charging 
alerts" when battery life runs low.  Each time an alert is 
triggered, the probationer must communicate with a probation 
employee to attempt to resolve the issue.  If the issue is not 
resolved, the probationer risks being subject to an arrest 
warrant and possible arrest.9 
                     
9 According to the probation service's own estimates, on any 
given day, it is monitoring approximately 5,000 individuals, 
more than 3,400 of whom are subject to GPS monitoring.  On any 
given day, the approximately fifty probation staff members must 
respond to approximately 1,700 alerts.  Although in some cases 
this may reflect more than one alert for a given individual, in 
general, this number is roughly thirty-four percent of the total 
individuals monitored, and approximately one-half of the total 
number of individuals subject to GPS monitoring, and includes 
alerts for GPS monitoring of pretrial probationers; probationers 
12 
 
 
 
At the time of the evidentiary hearing, approximately ten 
months after postconviction monitoring had begun, the defendant 
had experienced at least thirty-one alerts.10  A number of these 
alerts involved power disconnection and the failure of the 
defendant's GPS device to maintain a satellite connection.  The 
alerts were resolved after periods of time ranging from 
approximately thirty minutes to six hours, and none of them had 
resulted in the defendant's arrest.11 
                     
convicted of a range of different offenses, including sex 
offenses; and individuals subject to remote alcohol monitoring. 
 
10 In February 2018, the defendant submitted evidence to the 
motion judge that, between September 2016 and February 2018, his 
GPS monitoring device had issued 166 alerts.  Citing the need 
for "finality of judgments and the efficient use of court 
resources," the motion judge amended his findings of fact to 
include only the eighteen additional GPS alerts that had been 
triggered before the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing in 
February 2017.  The judge did not make any finding that the 
probation department reports concerning later alerts were in any 
way unreliable or not credible. 
 
11 The defendant also sought to introduce at the hearing, 
and included in his record appendix, probation reports of alerts 
generated during the five months that he was on pretrial GPS 
monitoring.  Because those reports were preconviction, the judge 
did not consider them at the hearing, and also did not make any 
determination with respect to their credibility.  In its filings 
in the Superior Court, the Commonwealth agreed that the 
defendant had been subject to alerts at least three or four 
times per week during that period, as a result of connectivity 
issues in the neighborhood where he lives and works.  
Examination of those reports shows that, on numerous occasions, 
resolution of the alerts took many hours; the defendant was at 
times ordered to go outside and walk around in order to obtain a 
signal; and multiple warrants for his arrest issued when he 
still was not able to obtain one, while following the 
13 
 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  In this case, the defendant argues that 
GPS monitoring, imposed pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 47, 
constitutes an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment 
and art. 14. 
 
a.  Standard of review.  We review a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a statute de novo.  See Commonwealth v. 
McGhee, 472 Mass. 405, 412 (2015).  "In accordance with canons 
of statutory construction, a statute is presumed to be 
constitutional."  Id.  See Luk v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 415, 
431 (1995).  "[T]he historic fact of the Legislature's choice," 
however, "does not relieve us of our constitutional obligation 
to review the validity of a search and seizure in light of art. 
14."  Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 75 (1987).  
Generally, "when the constitutionality of a statute is 
challenged, the question to be decided is whether the statute is 
unconstitutional as applied in the particular case."  United 
States v. Ferrara, 771 F. Supp. 1266, 1282 (D. Mass. 1991). 
 
b.  GPS monitoring as a constitutional search.  In 2015, 
the United States Supreme Court established that "a State . . . 
conducts a search when it attaches a device to a person's body, 
without consent, for the purpose of tracking that individual's 
movements."  Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1370.  The petitioner in that 
                     
instructions provided by probation.  Ultimately, all of the 
alerts were resolved and the warrants were recalled. 
14 
 
 
case had been placed on GPS monitoring after being classified as 
a recidivist sex offender.  Id. at 1369.  Because only 
"unreasonable" searches violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court 
remanded the matter so that the North Carolina court could 
determine "whether the State's monitoring program is 
reasonable -- when properly viewed as a search." 12  Id. at 1371. 
 
Following remand, the North Carolina Court of Appeals 
interpreted Grady to require "case-by-case determinations of 
reasonableness, now . . . referred to as 'Grady hearings,'" at 
which the State must provide "sufficient record evidence to 
support" a finding that GPS monitoring imposed by State statute 
"is reasonable as applied to this particular defendant" 
(emphasis in original).  See State v. Grady, 817 S.E.2d 18, 23, 
26 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (Grady II).  The court concluded that 
the State's burden of establishing that GPS monitoring is 
reasonable includes a requirement (without explanation as to how 
that is to be accomplished) that the State provide evidence that 
GPS monitoring actually is effective in protecting the public 
                     
12 Probationers retain a reasonable, albeit diminished, 
expectation of privacy.  See Commonwealth v. Moore, 473 Mass. 
481, 482 (2016); Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 402 Mass. 789, 795 
(1988).  The defendant in State v. Grady, 817 S.E.2d 18, 24 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2018), arguably had a higher expectation of 
privacy because he had completed his sentence and was not on 
probation.  North Carolina's GPS monitoring program applies not 
only to individuals under State penal supervision, but also to 
people with a prior conviction who are "not otherwise subject to 
any direct supervision by State officers."  See id. 
15 
 
 
against recidivism by sex offenders.  Id. at 27-28.  See State 
v. Griffin, 818 S.E.2d 336, 338, 342 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018).  In 
assessing reasonableness, the court has looked to evidence 
regarding a "defendant's current threat of reoffending," Grady 
II, supra at 26, and has evaluated whether the State presented 
"evidence concerning its specific interest in monitoring [a 
given] defendant,"13 id. at 27. 
                     
 
13 The South Carolina Supreme Court similarly interpreted 
the decision in Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1370 
(2015), to require "an individualized inquiry into the 
reasonableness of the [GPS monitoring] search in every case," 
because "of the widely varying circumstances that may lead to 
automatic, mandatory electronic monitoring imposed for 
[misdemeanor] failure to register" as a sex offender in 
accordance with the requirements of South Carolina's sex 
offender registry act.  See State v. Ross, 423 S.C. 504, 513 
(2018). 
 
 
Other jurisdictions to have considered the issue have taken 
varying approaches, often in the context of a more 
particularized statute requiring monitoring of a specific subset 
of sex offenders.  See, e.g., Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 
931, 933-937 (7th Cir. 2016) (imposition of GPS monitoring 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 301.48, requiring sex offenders 
released from civil commitment to submit to GPS monitoring under 
specific circumstances, was reasonable where qualifying sex 
offenses involved sexual contact with children and defendant was 
recidivist sex offender); Doe No. 1 v. Coupe, 143 A.3d 1266, 
1274-1279 (Del. Ch. 2016), aff'd, 158 A.3d 449 (Del. 2017) 
(applying three-part "special needs" framework to determine that 
mandatory GPS monitoring of "Tier III," highest risk, sex 
offenders was reasonable); State v. Kane, 2017 VT 36, ¶¶ 26-31 
(GPS monitoring condition was reasonable where monitored 
individual on probation had removed her son from his legal 
guardian and transported him across State lines, and probation 
conditions required probationer to stay away from son's school 
and residence). 
16 
 
 
 
In Guzman, 469 Mass. at 498, we heard a constitutional 
challenge to G. L. c. 265, § 47, and concluded that the statute 
does not violate due process.  Because the record in Guzman was 
"too sparse to permit an adequate assessment" of the defendant's 
claim that GPS monitoring infringed upon his right to be free of 
unreasonable searches and seizures, we did not address that 
claim.  Id. at 497.  Our decision in Guzman does not alter the 
inquiry we must make in this case, to determine whether 
imposition of ongoing, mandatory GPS monitoring (searching) of 
all persons convicted of a sex offense of any type in the 
Commonwealth is "reasonable" under art. 14 and the Fourth 
Amendment.14  In Guzman, supra, we discussed mandatory GPS 
monitoring, as required by G. L. c. 265, § 47, as a 
legislatively imposed "punishment[] for a given offense," and, 
consequently, considered "only whether that mandatory sentence 
meets the rational basis test."  Guzman, supra, citing 
Commonwealth v. Therriault, 401 Mass. 237, 241-242 (1987).  
After considering the Legislature's reasons for deciding to 
impose mandatory GPS monitoring, we concluded that the GPS 
monitoring requirement of G. L. c. 265, § 47, had a rational 
basis and therefore did not offend due process.  See Guzman, 
                     
14 See People v. Hallak, 310 Mich. App. 555, 578-579, 583 
(2015), rev'd on other grounds, 499 Mich. 879 (2016) (assessing 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness of GPS monitoring apart from 
classifying GPS monitoring as legislatively imposed sanction). 
17 
 
 
supra at 500.  Because the defendant in Guzman did not raise the 
issue, we did not address whether "the mandatory imposition of 
GPS monitoring could in some circumstances constitute a 
punishment 'disproportionate to the magnitude of the crime' in 
question."  Id. at 497 n.8, quoting Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 369 
Mass. 242, 247–248 (1975).  We nonetheless have characterized 
the effects of GPS monitoring pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 47, as 
"singularly punitive."  See Commonwealth v. Selavka, 469 Mass. 
502, 505 n.5 (2014). 
 
c.  GPS monitoring as a warrantless search.  No probable 
cause and warrant requirement inheres in G. L. c. 265, § 47.  
Indeed, GPS monitoring, as here, is imposed on probationers 
without recourse to probable cause and a search warrant.  It has 
become axiomatic that not all searches require a warrant and 
probable cause to be "reasonable," and therefore 
constitutional.15  See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 
(2013); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) ("The 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness . . .").  
                     
15 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has determined 
that "[a] State's operation of a probation system . . . may 
justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause 
requirements."  See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873–874 
(1987).  See also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 
489 U.S. 602, 640 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that 
"the searches in . . . Griffin . . . were supported by 
individualized evidence suggesting the culpability of the 
persons"). 
18 
 
 
The reasonableness of a search is assessed under the "totality 
of the circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the 
search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon 
reasonable privacy expectations."  Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371.  
In this case, the question is whether imposition of GPS 
monitoring on this defendant itself is reasonable, and thus 
constitutional, under the Fourth Amendment and art. 14,16 given 
the government's strong interests both in protecting the public 
from sexual predators and in rehabilitating convicted sex 
offenders. 
 
To be sure, we previously have upheld certain programmatic, 
suspicionless searches as constitutional -- but only when those 
searches minimally invaded already diminished expectations of 
privacy.  Where we upheld the constitutionality of roadblock 
seizures intended to locate impaired drivers, for instance, we 
emphasized that the result we reached did not "open[] the door 
for suspicionless searches and seizures in other contexts."  
Commonwealth v. Shields, 402 Mass. 162, 167 (1988).  See Landry 
v. Attorney Gen., 429 Mass. 336, 350 (1999), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 1073 (2000) (upholding mandatory, minimally invasive 
deoxyribonucleic acid [DNA] searches for identification purposes 
                     
16 This is a question distinct from asking whether discrete 
searches of data that has been collected by GPS monitoring may 
be reasonable.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 481 Mass.    ,     
(2019). 
19 
 
 
as constitutional for convicted persons with low expectations of 
privacy in their identity).  See also Horsemen's Benevolent & 
Protective Ass'n v. State Racing Comm'n, 403 Mass. 692, 703 
(1989).  Cf. Guiney v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 411 Mass. 328, 
342 (1991). 
 
In sum, when the government seeks to conduct a search that 
is more than minimally invasive, art. 14 requires an 
individualized determination of reasonableness.  For reasons 
that we outline infra, GPS monitoring is not a minimally 
invasive search.  Accordingly, art. 14 requires individualized 
determinations of reasonableness in order to impose GPS 
monitoring as a condition of probation.  Mandatory, blanket 
imposition of GPS monitoring on probationers, absent 
individualized determinations of reasonableness, is 
unconstitutional under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
 
d.  Balancing test to assess constitutional reasonableness.  
To determine whether it is reasonable for the government to 
conduct a search absent probable cause, courts conduct a 
balancing test that weighs "the need to search or seize against 
the invasion that the search or seizure entails."17  Commonwealth 
                     
17 In certain narrow circumstances, the United States 
Supreme Court has upheld suspicionless searches as 
constitutional under a "closely guarded category" known as the 
"special needs exception" to the Fourth Amendment.  See Chandler 
v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).  We have yet to justify 
20 
 
 
v. Catanzaro, 441 Mass. 46, 56 (2004).  See Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006), quoting Knights, 534 U.S. 
at 118-119; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1968); Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 472 Mass. 767, 776 (2015); Landry, 429 Mass. at 348, 
citing Guiney, 411 Mass. at 331-332. 
 
As a probationer, the defendant lawfully may be subjected 
to reasonable restraints on "freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding 
citizens."  See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119.  See also Commonwealth 
v. Pike, 428 Mass. 393, 402 (1998).  Consequently, with respect 
to the Fourth Amendment and art. 14, the defendant possesses a 
diminished expectation of privacy relative to the general 
population.  See Knights, supra at 119-120; Commonwealth v. 
Moore, 473 Mass. 481, 485 (2016).18  The defendant's status as a 
probationer informs our assessment of both "the degree to which 
[a search] intrudes upon an individual's privacy" and "the 
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests."  See Knights, supra at 119. 
                     
searches of individuals on the basis of the special needs 
exception, and decline to do so here. 
 
18 This court also has interpreted art. 14 to prohibit 
suspicionless searches of parolees, thus extending the 
protections of art. 14 beyond those of the Fourth Amendment.  
Moore, 473 Mass. at 482. 
21 
 
 
 
Nonetheless, the government does not have an "unlimited" 
ability to infringe upon a probationer's still-existing, albeit 
diminished, expectations of privacy.  See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 
483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987).  "[T]he fact of 'diminished privacy 
interests does not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of 
the picture entirely.'"  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2206, 2219 (2018), quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 
392 (2014).  Furthermore, that an individual has been convicted 
of a crime does not eliminate the person's reasonable 
expectation of privacy under art. 14.  See Commonwealth v. 
LaFrance, 402 Mass. 789, 794-795 (1988).19 
 
 In light of the foregoing, we consider the extent to which 
GPS monitoring of this particular defendant advances the 
Commonwealth's interests in rehabilitation of the probationer 
and protection of the public, and the extent of the incremental 
privacy intrusion occasioned by GPS monitoring on the 
defendant's diminished, but still extant, expectations of 
privacy as a probationer.  See Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 
                     
19 In LaFrance, 402 Mass. at 790, we struck down as 
unconstitutional a special condition of probation that required 
a probationer to "[s]ubmit to any search of herself, her 
properties or any place where she then resides or is situate, 
with or without a search warrant, by a probation officer or by 
any law enforcement officer at the direction or by the request 
of the probation officer."  Id. at 791 n.2.  We concluded that 
individual searches of a probationer could be proper under 
art. 14 if conducted on the basis of reasonable suspicion of 
wrongdoing.  Id. at 792. 
22 
 
 
934-935 (7th Cir. 2016) (considering "the incremental effect of 
the challenged statute on the [defendant's] privacy").  Whether 
the government's interest in imposing GPS monitoring outweighs 
the privacy intrusion occasioned by GPS monitoring, thus 
constituting a reasonable search, depends on a constellation of 
factors.  Because reasonableness depends "on the totality of the 
circumstances," Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371, no one factor will be 
dispositive in every case. 
 
We conclude that, in the circumstances here, the 
Commonwealth's particularized reasons for imposing GPS 
monitoring on this defendant do not outweigh the privacy 
intrusion occasioned by the requirement of GPS monitoring.  
Therefore, imposing GPS monitoring on this defendant would 
violate the requirements of art. 14. 
 
e.  Signing conditions of probation does not alter art. 14 
analysis.  The fact that the defendant signed a probation 
contract acceding to a statutorily mandated condition of GPS 
monitoring does not change our constitutional analysis.  See 
Guiney, 411 Mass. at 341 (consent to search is "virtually 
meaningless unless the consent requirement [is] 'reasonable'").  
See also O'Connor v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 408 Mass. 324, 329 
(1990) ("the plaintiff would not be barred from relief if his 
consent to be the subject of a search and seizure were 
unreasonably required as a condition of his employment"); United 
23 
 
 
States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 609 (9th Cir. 2016) ("We have 
already held that a probationer's acceptance of a search term in 
a probation agreement does not by itself render lawful an 
otherwise unconstitutional search of a probationer's person or 
property"). 
 
With respect to GPS monitoring in particular, we previously 
have described imposition of GPS monitoring under G. L. c. 265, 
§ 47, as taking place without the consent of the monitored 
person.  See Commonwealth v. Cory, 454 Mass. 559, 570 (2009) 
("There is no context other than punishment in which the State 
physically attaches an item to a person, without consent and 
also without consideration of individual circumstances, that 
must remain attached for a period of years").  Further, "[t]he 
coercive quality of the circumstance in which a defendant seeks 
to avoid incarceration by obtaining probation on certain 
conditions makes principles of voluntary waiver and consent 
generally inapplicable."  LaFrance, 402 Mass. at 791 n.3. 
 
Thus, where a probationer accedes to a contract of 
probation that includes statutorily mandated GPS monitoring, or 
signs a GPS equipment contract to establish that monitoring, the 
acceptance cannot be viewed as consent, where imposition of GPS 
monitoring itself does not meet the requirements of art. 14.  
Accordingly, to determine whether GPS monitoring of a 
probationer who signed a contract for GPS monitoring is 
24 
 
 
reasonable, we conduct "the same type of art. 14 analysis that 
would have been required without the consent."  Guiney, 411 
Mass. at 341.  See Moore, 473 Mass. at 487 n.6 (parole board may 
not create conditions of release that "contract around" 
requirements of art. 14, because to do so "inappropriately 
[would] allow the parole board to compel a parolee, keen to 
commute his or her sentence, to accept a condition that would 
unnecessarily and unreasonably limit his or her art. 14 privacy 
rights"). 
 
f.  Government interests.  "The prevention of sexual 
exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government 
objective of surpassing importance."  New York v. Ferber, 458 
U.S. 747, 757 (1982).  In addition, the Commonwealth has a 
"vital interest in rehabilitating convicted sex offenders," 
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33 (2002), in part because 
rehabilitation protects the public, by reducing the possibility 
of future offenses. 
 
As relevant here, the Commonwealth also has a vital 
"interest in protecting the children exploited by the [child 
pornography] production process."  Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002).  The reproduction and 
dissemination of child pornography itself harms the children who 
are depicted and revictimized with each viewing.  Paroline v. 
United States, 572 U.S. 434, 440 (2014), quoting Ferber, 458 
25 
 
 
U.S. at 759.   Therefore, the government's interest remains 
strong where the sex offense in question is an online, 
noncontact offense.  "[C]hild pornography is 'a permanent 
record' of the depicted child's abuse, and the 'harm to the 
child is exacerbated by [its] circulation."  Paroline, supra, 
quoting Ferber, supra.  Separately, "[t]he demand for child 
pornography harms children in part because it drives production, 
which involves child abuse."  Paroline, supra at 439-440. 
 
g.  Privacy infringement.  Probationers who have been 
convicted of sex offenses are subject to monitoring in numerous 
ways apart from GPS monitoring.20  Nonetheless, GPS monitoring 
results in "a far greater intrusion on the defendant's liberty 
than that associated with traditional probation monitoring."  
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 22 (2010).  See Cory, 454 
Mass. at 570-571.  That probationers subject to GPS monitoring 
                     
20 Probation service records about a given probationer "may 
at all times be inspected by police officials of the towns of 
the commonwealth."  G. L. c. 276, § 90.  Probation officers 
enforce probation conditions through means that may include home 
visits.  In this case, the defendant is required to report to a 
probation officer in person once every fourteen days, and to 
provide verification of his current address and income.  Like 
all convicted sex offenders, the defendant was required to 
register with the Sex Offender Registry Board, G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178D, and to provide it with personal identifying information, 
including, among other things, his "name[s], aliases used, date 
and place of birth, sex, race, height, weight, eye and hair 
color, social security number, home address, any secondary 
addresses and work address and, if the sex offender works at or 
attends an institution of higher learning, the name and address 
of the institution."  G. L. c. 6, § 178D (a), (e). 
26 
 
 
have a more limited entitlement to privacy does not render GPS 
monitoring minimally invasive when applied to them. 
 
In Landry, 429 Mass. at 350, we determined that subjecting 
individuals who had been convicted of a crime, and thus 
possessed "a low expectation of privacy in their identity," to a 
"minimally invasive [DNA] test," which can provide "an extremely 
accurate record of identification," constituted a minimal 
infringement of privacy in the individuals' identity.  We 
further determined that the privacy infringement occasioned by 
such a test was "outweighed by the strong State interest in 
preserving a positive recorded identification of convicted 
persons."  Id. 
 
GPS monitoring, however, gathers much more information than 
the identity-related test at issue in Landry, and gathers this 
information over a much longer period of time.  The experience 
of accommodating a device that remains attached to the body for 
a prolonged period of time differs materially from the one-time, 
minimal physical intrusion occasioned by a properly conducted 
DNA test.  While being monitored using a GPS device, a 
probationer is subject both to the physical intrusion of the GPS 
device and the effects of that intrusion.  The physically 
intrusive dimensions of GPS monitoring are relevant to assessing 
both privacy infringement as well as the "nature" of the GPS 
27 
 
 
search, see Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371, and its "manner of 
execution."  See King, 569 U.S. at 448. 
 
As presently conducted, GPS monitoring intrudes upon the 
defendant's personal privacy in a number of ways.  On several 
occasions, to regain a lost satellite connection, probation 
employees have instructed the defendant to walk around outside 
at various times of day or evening.  This has included requiring 
the defendant to leave his job and walk around outside during 
work hours, risking potential economic consequences, including 
loss of employment.  He has been telephoned multiple times at 
work when a signal was lost, and has attempted to arrange for 
another employee voluntarily to handle his immediate tasks when 
he was required to be away from his desk attempting to obtain a 
connection.  The motion judge determined that individuals 
subject to GPS monitoring experience "frequent" charging alerts; 
that signal and connectivity alerts are "not uncommon"; and that 
"practical problems and life inconveniences" can "arise as a 
result" of "limitations of ELMO's alerts system."  This level of 
intrusion on a probationer's person cannot be deemed "minimally 
invasive." 
 
In addition, GPS tracking amasses "a substantial quantum of 
intimate information about [a] person."  United States v. Jones, 
565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012).  GPS monitoring gathers vastly more 
information than otherwise would be collected in accordance with 
28 
 
 
a defendant's other conditions of probation.  As currently in 
use in the Commonwealth, GPS devices collect one data point of 
latitude and longitude per minute.  In addition to collecting 
points of latitude and longitude, to determine a precise 
location, GPS devices collect information about a wearer's speed 
of travel, such that it is possible to tell if a person is 
driving, running, or walking.  This detailed data is stored for 
an indefinite amount of time.  GPS location data "is detailed, 
encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled."  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2216.  It is also because this detailed and "encyclopedic" 
data is stored indefinitely, and because examination practices 
are subject to change and presently are unregulated by statute, 
that the continuous collection of detailed location data through 
GPS monitoring cannot be termed minimally invasive. 
 
As mentioned, we have observed that "[t]he GPS monitoring 
mandated by G. L. c. 265, § 47, is not like other conditions of 
probation . . . [in that] the imposition of GPS monitoring is 
singularly punitive in effect."  Selavka, 469 Mass. at 505 n.5.  
See Cory, 454 Mass. at 560 (retroactive application of GPS 
monitoring to individuals placed on probation for qualifying sex 
offenses before G. L. c. 265, § 47, took effect violated ex post 
facto provisions of Massachusetts and United States 
Constitutions). 
29 
 
 
 
h.  Assessing the balance in this case.  The government's 
strong interest in protecting the public from sex offenders 
forms a critical component of the balancing test to determine 
whether imposition of GPS monitoring on this particular 
defendant was reasonable.  To comply with art. 14, however, the 
Commonwealth also must establish how GPS monitoring, when viewed 
as a search, furthers its interests.  The "State must produce a 
particularized reason for the need for . . . searches and 
seizures."  Landry, 429 Mass. at 348, citing Guiney, 411 Mass. 
at 331-332.  Ultimately, the particularized reasons for a search 
must "outweigh[] the degree of invasiveness occasioned by [the 
State's] action."  Landry, supra. 
 
In this case, the Commonwealth's particularized reasons for 
imposing GPS monitoring on this specific defendant, who was 
convicted of noncontact sex offenses, do not outweigh the 
privacy intrusion occasioned by GPS monitoring.  This defendant 
has no psychiatric diagnosis indicating a compulsion toward 
sexually deviant activity; no history of violations of probation 
or terms of pretrial release; no exclusion zone entered into the 
ELMO system capable of generating real-time alerts for real-time 
monitoring; and no geographically proximate victim.  The 
Commonwealth justifies imposition of GPS monitoring on this 
defendant based on the potential use of GPS data as a tool to 
investigate commission of sex crimes should they occur, and the 
30 
 
 
deterrence that comes from a defendant knowing that his precise 
location can be ascertained if he were to commit future crimes.  
The Commonwealth, however, has not presented evidence sufficient 
to indicate that this defendant poses a threat of reoffending, 
or otherwise of violating the terms of his probation.  See Grady 
II, 817 S.E.2d at 26.  Under these circumstances, in the context 
of this case, GPS monitoring constitutes an unreasonable search 
under art. 14. 
 
Following an individualized classification hearing that was 
conducted before the hearing on the defendant's motion for 
reconsideration, the Sex Offender Registry Board classified the 
defendant as a level one sex offender.  That the defendant was 
assigned this classification level means that the hearing 
examiner determined that he posed a low risk of reoffense and a 
low degree of risk to the public.  By contrast, sex offenders 
designated level two or level three are deemed to pose a 
moderate or high risk of reoffending and a concomitant degree of 
risk to the public. 
 
At the time of the hearing on the motion to remove 
imposition of GPS monitoring, the defendant was thirty-three 
years old and had no prior record of a sex offense.  The motion 
judge credited testimony by a psychological expert, who 
previously had evaluated the defendant, that Internet offenders 
without an antisocial behavioral disorder present a low to 
31 
 
 
moderate risk of committing a contact sex offense.21  The 
expert's earlier evaluation of the defendant in this case, 
conducted before the defendant's guilty pleas and sentencing, 
concluded that, in the expert's opinion, the defendant "would 
not meet the diagnostic criteria as codified in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth 
Edition[,] . . . for a mental disorder that is paraphilic in 
nature."  After his evaluation, the expert determined that the 
defendant was "not a significant sexual offense recidivism risk 
(contact or non-contact sexual offenses) going forward in time."  
The Commonwealth's expert testified similarly as to the absence 
of this type of mental disorder. 
 
Evidence produced at the hearing showed that the defendant 
spent approximately sixteen months on pretrial supervision.  
Throughout that time, of which approximately the first five 
months were spent on GPS monitoring, the defendant did not 
violate any condition of his pretrial supervision.  The 
                     
21 We observe that some courts in other jurisdictions have 
considered the question of categorical treatment of all sex 
offenders as a homogeneous group, for purposes of issues such as 
treatment, GPS monitoring, and risk of recidivism, and have 
concluded that a categorical approach may be inappropriate.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for 
example, noted that "failure to distinguish between contact and 
possession-only offenders . . . may go against the grain of a 
growing body of empirical literature indicating that there are 
significant . . . differences between these two groups."  United 
States v. Apodaca, 641 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
565 U.S. 901 (2011). 
32 
 
 
defendant's compliance, for sixteen months, with the terms of 
his pretrial probation would have provided no suggestion at 
sentencing that he would fail to comply with the terms of 
probation after being sentenced.  When a second hearing was held 
to assess the reasonableness of the GPS monitoring condition, 
after the defendant had been on posttrial GPS monitoring for 
approximately nine months, the defendant had not violated the 
terms of his probation. 
 
We emphasize that the defendant's circumstances differ 
substantially from cases in other jurisdictions where GPS 
monitoring of a sex offender has been upheld as a reasonable 
search.  For instance, in Belleau, 811 F.3d at 931, GPS 
monitoring was deemed to constitute a reasonable search where a 
defendant had sexually assaulted young children and was 
determined to suffer from a mental disorder that made "it likely 
that [the defendant would] engage in one or more acts of sexual 
violence" (citation omitted).  Statutorily mandated GPS 
monitoring also has been deemed reasonable where it is 
applicable only to individuals assigned to the "most severe" 
risk assessment tier, who have committed crimes such as rape and 
sexual abuse of a child under age thirteen.  See Doe v. Coupe, 
143 A.3d 1266, 1270, 1279 (Del. Ch. 2016), aff'd, 158 A.3d 449 
(Del. 2017). 
33 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth asserts that GPS monitoring facilitates 
the probationary goals both of rehabilitation and of protection 
of the public.  Rehabilitation of the probationer and protection 
of the public are "distinct [goals of probation], because a 
probation condition that protects the public from the defendant 
may not advance the likelihood of his rehabilitation."  Goodwin, 
458 Mass. at 15–16.  See Eldred, 480 Mass. at 95; Griffin, 483 
U.S. at 875.  In this case, however, the Commonwealth's 
purported reasons for imposing GPS monitoring are insufficient.  
See Landry, 429 Mass. at 348. 
 
The Commonwealth contends that, generally, GPS monitoring 
can promote compliance with the terms of probation by verifying 
that a defendant lives at the address he provides to the 
probation service every fourteen days.  GPS monitoring also 
might verify that the defendant is going to work as he should 
be, and is completing any rehabilitative programs; it also 
otherwise might serve as "concrete proof that a probationer is 
doing well on probation."  Although such verification well may 
be possible in theory, capacity constraints and existing 
monitoring protocols indicate that GPS monitoring is not 
currently used in this manner.  The motion judge determined that 
"[l]aw enforcement is only accessing [GPS] collected 
information when it might reveal what a probationer 
was doing during a specific moment in time where there 
is reason to believe that a sex offender may be 
involved in a probation violation (viz., when an alert 
34 
 
 
issues); or, less frequently, when a crime has been 
committed in a geographic area that suggests a 
probationer may have been involved" (emphasis in 
original). 
 
In its amicus brief, the probation service confirms this method 
of operation, and asserts that it "monitors GPS by investigating 
and responding to 'alerts.'"  Thus, in the circumstances of this 
case, the Commonwealth has not established how the condition of 
GPS monitoring assists in the defendant's rehabilitation.22  See 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (to 
assess whether search is reasonable, we "consider 'whether 
the . . . action was justified at its inception'; . . . [and] 
whether the search as actually conducted 'was reasonably related 
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference 
in the first place'"). 
 
The Commonwealth asserts also that GPS monitoring "furthers 
the substantial government interest in protecting the public, 
especially children."  The motion judge described several 
hypothetical situations in which he believed that GPS monitoring 
might deter at least some sex offenders, including online 
noncontact sex offenders, from recidivism.  The judge explained 
that, 
                     
 
22 As the probation service notes, a judge conceivably might 
impose curfews at progressively later hours over time, using GPS 
monitoring as an incentive, to serve rehabilitative ends.  In 
this case, however, because the defendant has no curfew, GPS 
monitoring cannot serve curfew-related rehabilitative purposes. 
35 
 
 
"because the [ELMO] system is collecting location data 
in an undifferentiated manner, law enforcement can 
examine a GPS device's points after a given crime has 
been committed, and thereby determine if the subject 
probationer was at the scene at the time of such 
crime's commission.  Thus, while an alert will not 
necessarily issue in real time whenever a probationer 
happens to pass within 300 feet of a park, school or 
day care center -- which would create an obvious 
problem of over-alerting, given the ubiquity of these 
venues in the modern city -- the ability of law 
enforcement to connect a probationer to a particular 
site post hoc means that GPS is both a useful tool of 
crime detection and a deterrent to crimes a given 
probationer might otherwise be tempted to commit" 
(emphasis in original; footnote omitted). 
 
Where, as here, a defendant's exclusion zones have not been 
entered into the ELMO monitoring system, however, and where, as 
the judge found, even if it were feasible, doing so "would 
create an obvious problem of over-alerting, given the ubiquity 
of these venues in the modern city," GPS monitoring's deterrent 
potential appears linked primarily to its possible post hoc 
investigative use.  As stated, the Commonwealth has not put 
forth sufficient evidence to suggest that this particular 
defendant would be reasonably likely to violate the terms of his 
probation absent the deterrent effect of GPS monitoring, or that 
such post hoc investigative use may become necessary.  The 
absence of evidence demonstrating a risk of recidivism anchored 
in facts related to this particular defendant tilts the balance 
against concluding that GPS monitoring is a reasonable search.  
36 
 
 
In these circumstances, the government interests do not outweigh 
the privacy infringement occasioned by GPS monitoring. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The matter shall be remanded to the 
Superior Court for entry of a modified order of probation that 
does not include GPS monitoring. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.