Title: Stalkup v. State Dept. of Environmental Quality (DEQ

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Stalkup v. State Dept. of Environmental Quality (DEQ1992 WY 110838 P.2d 705Case Number: 91-89, 91-90Decided: 08/31/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Rodney L. STALKUP; George 
William Snodgrass; and Phyllis J. Snodgrass, 

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

STATE of Wyoming 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (DEQ); and Rissler & McMurry Company, a 
Wyoming Corporation,

 Appellees 
(Defendants).

RISSLER & McMURRY 
COMPANY, a Wyoming Corporation, 

Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

Rodney L. 
STALKUP; George William Snodgrass; and Phyllis J. Snodgrass, 

Appellees

Appeal from District 
Court, Natrona County, William A. Taylor, J.

Jeffrey C. 
Gosman, Casper, for appellants in No. 91-89 and appellees in No. 
91-90.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Mary B. Guthrie, Deputy Atty. Gen., Steve Jones, Sr. Asst. Atty. 
Gen. and John Coppede, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee State of Wyo. 
Dept. of Environmental Quality in No. 91-89.

Donald J. 
Rissler of Brown, Raymond & Rissler, Casper, for Rissler & McMurry Co., 
appellee in 

Nos. 91-89 
and appellant in 91-90.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      This appeal 
involves a challenge by adjoining landowners under the Wyoming Environmental 
Quality Act (Act) to a limestone mine and mine haul road planned by Rissler 
& McMurry Company (Rissler) and approved by the State of Wyoming Department 
of Environmental Quality (DEQ). Rissler filed a notification and consent, but 
was not required to comply with several of the usual permitting requirements 
because it was exempt from those requirements and instead proceeded under the 
Act's ten-acre exemption. Appellants filed suit, arguing that the DEQ improperly 
approved Rissler's mining operation, and that Rissler was not in compliance with 
the Act. The district court dismissed appellants' suit.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellants raise 
the following issues:

1. The court erred in 
finding the action improperly venued against Rissler & McMurry Co., 
hereinafter referred to as ("Rissler").

2. The court erred in 
finding the action improperly venued against the Department of Environmental 
Quality, hereinafter referred to as ("DEQ").

3. The court erred in 
dismissing the action, if improperly venued against any party.

4. The court erred in 
finding that the attorney general or the county attorney of any county must 
bring the action under Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-902.

5. The court erred in 
dismissing the action for failure to provide defendants 60 days notice under 
Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-902(c)(i) before filing suit.

6. Compliance with the 
provisions of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is not a precondition to 
maintaining a suit under Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-902 against the private defendant, 
Rissler.

7. Compliance with the 
provisions of the Wyoming Governmental Tort Claims Act is not a precondition to 
maintaining a suit under Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-902 against the defendant, 
DEQ.

8. Under the standards 
applicable to the motion to dismiss, the court erred in finding that there were 
no violations by the defendant, Rissler, of any rule, regulation, order or 
permit of the Environmental Quality Act and that the DEQ had not violated any 
nondiscretionary act or duty.

     (a) The Supreme Court 
decision in Wymo Fuels v. Edwards, 723 P.2d 1230 (Wyo. 1986) does not control 
the consent issue as it applies to the 10 acre exemption.

[¶4]      Appellee Rissler 
states the issues in the following way:

I. Whether the court 
erred in ruling appellants' cause of action was improperly venued.

II. Whether the court 
erred in ruling appellants failed to provide the necessary sixty (60) day notice 
requirement of Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-902.

III. Whether the court 
erred in ruling that only the attorney general can bring a claim pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-901.

     A. Can a private 
citizen bring a claim pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-901?

     B. If a private 
citizen can bring a claim pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-901, does a private 
citizen have to comply with the Wyoming Governmental Tort Claims 
Act?

IV. Whether appellants 
state a cause of action pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-902.

     A. Is permission 
required from the appellants under Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-401(e)(vi)?

     B. Are appellants an 
"affected landowner" once condemnation is complete?

     C. Did the legislature 
intend to restrict the usefulness of the ten acre small mining 
permit?

     D. Could appellants 
maintain an action pursuant to Public Law 95-87 as worded on August 3, 
1977?

V. Whether the appellee, 
Rissler & McMurry Company, is entitled to sanctions pursuant to Rule [10.05] 
of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure?

[¶5]      Appellee DEQ 
raises the following issues:

I. Whether the Wyoming 
Environmental Quality Act provides for a private right of action to recover 
civil penalties.

II. Whether a district 
court is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction by a party's failure to follow 
the statutory requirements in pursuing a cause of action under the Wyoming 
Environmental Quality Act.

III. Whether the 
appellants' allegations that the DEQ violated the Environmental Quality Act were 
based on an erroneous reading of the Act and contrary to the caselaw in this 
jurisdiction.

FACTS

[¶6]      Rissler wanted to 
open a limestone quarry in the Bessemer Bend area of Natrona County, Wyoming; 
the land on which the mine would sit is owned by the State of Wyoming. Rissler 
obtained a limestone mining lease from the state. After obtaining the surface 
owner's consent, Rissler filed "Limited Mining Operations Notification of 
Operator and Consent of Surface Owner and Lessee" under the ten-acre exemption 
with the DEQ. The notice and consent that Rissler filed is distinct from a 
mining permit. The notice and consent procedure is used when the mine operation 
qualifies for the ten-acre exemption and is then exempt from the permit 
procedure. DEQ approved Rissler's notification and consent of limited mining 
operations on August 18, 1989.1

[¶7]      After the DEQ 
approval, Rissler began negotiations with appellants who were adjoining 
landowners. Rissler sought an easement across appellants' adjoining land for a 
mine haul road to the planned limestone quarry. Rissler and appellants were not 
able to agree on an arrangement for a mine haul road, so Rissler initiated 
condemnation proceedings.

[¶8]      Rissler was 
successful in the condemnation action and obtained a condemned thirty-foot 
surface easement across appellants' land for construction of a roadway in order 
to operate its limestone quarry. The day after the condemnation order was 
entered, appellants filed a complaint under the Act collateral to the 
condemnation action. Appellants named both Rissler and DEQ in their complaint in 
which they demanded that DEQ and Rissler comply with the permitting process and 
requested civil penalties and attorney fees.

[¶9]      Rissler filed a 
motion to dismiss on the basis of improper venue, lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Rissler also moved for costs and attorney fees under Wyo. Stat. § 1-14-128 
(1988). DEQ also filed a motion to dismiss arguing that appellants did not have 
standing, the state was immune from a claim for damages, venue was improper, and 
appellants failed to provide the DEQ with the sixty-day prerequisite notice 
under the Act.

[¶10]   The district court granted DEQ's 
and Rissler's motions to dismiss. The court found, inter alia, that the 
complaint did not comply with the requirements of section 901 of the Act because 
it was improperly venued, that appellants had not provided required notice for 
the section 902 portion of their complaint, and it was not brought by a county 
attorney or the attorney general. The court dismissed the complaint, holding 
that appellants were not affected landowners under Wymo Fuels v. Edwards, 723 P.2d 1230 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶11]   Appellants appealed, seeking review 
of the district court's dismissal. Rissler filed a cross-appeal challenging the 
district court's decision not to award sanctions for baseless pleadings against 
appellants and seeking appellate costs and penalties under W.R.A.P. 
10.05.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶12]   The standard of review for summary 
judgment will be used to review the claims of appellants.

We review a summary 
judgment in the same light as the district court, using the same materials and 
following the same standards. Summary judgment is proper only when there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.

American 
Holidays, Inc. v. Foxtail Owners Ass'n, 821 P.2d 577, 578 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting 
Zmijewski v. Wright, 809 P.2d 280, 282 (Wyo. 1991)).

[¶13]   The parties in this appeal differ 
on the standard of review appropriate for this case. Appellants assert that the 
appropriate standard is the standard applicable to motions to dismiss, urging 
this court to liberally construe the pleadings in their favor and accept all 
facts in their complaint as true. DEQ argues that the motion to dismiss standard 
of review is inapplicable because the district court considered matters outside 
the pleadings and, therefore, the motion was automatically converted into a 
motion for summary judgment.

[¶14]   Our Wyoming rule 
provides:

If, on a motion asserting 
the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for 
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, 
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

Wyo.R.Civ.P. 
12(b) (emphasis added).

[¶15]   This court has held that a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is converted to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment 
if materials outside the pleadings are considered. Cranston v. Weston County 
Weed and Pest Bd., 826 P.2d 251, 254 (Wyo. 1992); Mostert v. CBL & Assoc., 
741 P.2d 1090, 1097 (Wyo. 1987). If affidavits are considered, conversion occurs 
automatically. Cranston, 826 P.2d  at 254 (citing Torrey v. Twiford, 713 P.2d 1160, 1162-63, 1165 (Wyo. 1986)).

[¶16]   Seven exhibits, including one 
affidavit, were submitted by appellees at the hearing on the motions to 
dismiss.2 Appellants also submitted materials 
outside of the pleadings in the form of two affidavits. None of the parties made 
a specific and explicit motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. The 
district court did not explicitly consider whether conversion had been 
accomplished. However, because affidavits were submitted by both parties and 
considered by the district court, conversion occurred automatically. 
Accordingly, this court will review the result below under the standard of 
review for motions for summary judgment.3

[¶17]   This court has taken notice of 
conversion on appeal in previous cases. See Brebaugh v. Hales, 788 P.2d 1128, 
1133-34 (Wyo. 1990); Kirby Bldg. Systems v. Independence, Etc., 634 P.2d 342, 
344-45 (Wyo. 1981); Wyoming Ins. Dept. v. Sierra Life Ins. Co., 599 P.2d 1360, 
1362 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶18]   The summary judgment standard of 
review is further justified because appellants themselves filed affidavits in 
the district court in response to appellees' motion to dismiss. Normally "the 
non-movant must have ten days to respond to the converted motion prior to any 
hearing on it." Shriner Hosp. for Crippled Children, Inc. v. First Sec. Bank, 
835 P.2d 350, 366 (Wyo. 1992) (citations omitted). However, appellants not only 
failed to object on the record to acceptance and consideration of the affidavit 
and exhibits submitted by appellees but also submitted two affidavits of their 
own. In all, three affidavits and six extra-pleading exhibits, a total of fifty 
pages, were accepted and considered by the district court without objection from 
any party. Any objection to the notice provided was waived by the submission of 
affidavits by appellants and their failure to object on the record to the 
district court's acceptance of affidavits and extra-pleading 
exhibits.

[¶19]   We have recognized waiver in 
analogous circumstances. In Matter of Estate of Obra, 749 P.2d 272, 275 (Wyo. 
1988), supporting materials were filed late and not with the motion for summary 
judgment contrary to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and the Uniform Rules 
for the District Courts. However we found this procedural defect waived and 
stated: 

Objection to the trial 
court's consideration of the depositions in summary-judgment determination at 
the scheduled hearing is not presented to us by anything of record. Appellants 
could have objected at the summary-judgment hearing, moved to strike the 
depositions or deny their consideration, or asked for a continuance of the 
summary-judgment hearing. * * * Lacking any recorded action of appellant to 
object to the court's consideration of the depositions and responsive 
affidavits, any formal defects in filing schedule were waived. Davenport v. 
Epperly, supra, 744 P.2d 1110 [(Wyo. 1987)].

Estate of Obra, 
749 P.2d  at 276. See also, Davenport v. Epperly, 744 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Wyo. 1987) 
(issues "not called to the attention of the trial court will not be considered 
on appeal"). Federal courts have also recognized that the ten-day notice 
requirement can be waived. In Summers v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988) the Tenth Circuit stated "[t]he 10-day rule contained 
in Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c) is not an absolute and can be waived. * * * In our view, 
the 10-day rule was waived in the instant case." Summers, 864 F.2d 700, 703 
(10th Cir. 1988). See also, Davis v. City of Chicago, 841 F.2d 186, 189 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (in summary judgment context appellant "bears the sole responsibility 
for the lack of discovery because he failed to alert the District Court by 
asking for a continuance or taking any other action which would have resulted in 
additional discovery time. He is thereby precluded from raising that issue 
here."). Therefore, a nonmoving party can waive the ten-day notice rule when he 
submits affidavits himself and fails to object or request additional discovery 
time pursuant to Rule 56(f). Such a waiver took place here.

[¶20]   We rule that the "12(b)(6) motion 
was therefore effectively, if not formally, treated as a motion for summary 
judgment" and we will review it accordingly. Herbert v. Saffel, 877 F.2d 267, 
270 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting George v. Kay, 632 F.2d 1103, 1106 (4th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029, 101 S. Ct. 1738, 68 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1981)).

DISCUSSION

[¶21]   Four motions made in this court 
were still pending after oral argument. In regard to those motions we make the 
following dispositions: The motion made by appellee Rissler to strike 
appellants' motion to dismiss Rissler's cross-appeal in case No. 91-90 is 
granted. The motion to dismiss Rissler's cross-appeal in case No. 91-90 is 
denied. Appellee Rissler's motion to strike portions of appellants' brief is 
denied. Appellants' motion to take judicial notice is denied in part because the 
newspaper article submitted does not stand for the proposition appellants want 
us to judicially notice. Although we conditionally granted the motion to 
supplement the record with the U.S.G.S. topographic map for purposes of oral 
argument, we now deny that motion.

[¶22]   The question about the U.S.G.S. 
topographic map was raised by appellants' counsel for the first time on appeal. 
The map was to have been submitted with Rissler's application for approval of 
limited mining operations, and appellants argued that it had not been submitted. 
This argument proved not only improper before this court, but also misleading. 
When faced with the actual maps at oral argument, appellants' counsel was unable 
to demonstrate the noncompliance. Thus, this contention is without merit. After 
Rissler was forced to show the map was submitted, appellants' counsel argued 
that DEQ or Rissler had altered evidence in the record. Because the relevant 
point was graphically made at oral argument by one of the justices on this 
court, we will not engage in a lengthy discussion of this misleading issue 
raised by appellants' counsel.

[¶23]   Two initial matters merit 
discussion to describe the context of this lawsuit. Additionally, it is 
important to remember that Rissler obtained permission to mine through the Act's 
ten-acre exemption, not through a permit.

[¶24]   The Act requires mine operators to 
obtain a permit from DEQ before commencing mining operations. Wyo. Stat. § 
35-11-405(a) (1988). Compliance with the permit requirement of Act is not 
required if the mining operations for certain nonmetallic minerals will affect 
only ten acres or less. Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-401(e)(vi).4 The difference between the 
procedure required for a permit and for a ten-acre exemption is a crucial one 
that appellants failed to recognize. Once having qualified for the ten-acre 
exemption, a mine operator is exempt from all requirements applicable to the 
permit procedure.

[¶25]   Thus, outside the permitting 
process, there are two requirements under the Act that apply to an operator 
proceeding under the ten-acre exemption. A mine operator can commence mining 
operations without obtaining a permit, provided he has written permission from 
the surface owner and lessee and has notified DEQ before commencing 
mining.

[¶26]   Here, Rissler satisfied the notice 
and consent requirements of the ten-acre exemption.5 The surface owner of this 
particular tract was the State of Wyoming, consenting in writing through the 
Wyoming State Land and Farm Loan Office. Appellants argue that consent of the 
lessee was not obtained as required under the ten-acre exemption requirement. 
Storey, the lessee, leased a portion of this particular tract from the State of 
Wyoming under a grazing and agricultural lease. Under this lease agreement, 
Storey expressly waived any interest under the lease that would have required 
Rissler to obtain Storey's written consent. The lease reserved for the state the 
right to lease the premises for mining and gave the state the right to declare 
cancellation of the lessee's interest on all or any portion required for mining 
purposes. It also appears that this particular lease expired January 1, 1992, at 
5:00 p.m., making the interest purportedly affected even less 
substantial.

[¶27]   Appellants also argue that because 
they owned land adjoining the mine site through which a mine haul road would 
pass, they are "affected landowners" under the Act and their consent is 
required. Although appellants' land initially qualified under the definition of 
"affected land"6 under the Act, the status of their 
land changed substantially after the condemnation proceeding.

[¶28]   On November 14, 1990, the district 
court issued an order and judgment which condemned a thirty-foot easement across 
appellants' property for a mine haul road. In Wymo Fuels, this court held, 
"after condemnation of such an easement the owner of the servient estate is not 
a surface owner for purposes of the mining permit application statute * * *." 
Wymo Fuels, 723 P.2d  at 1231. There, DEQ had ruled that surface landowner 
consent was not required "because if it were, the right acquired pursuant to the 
eminent domain proceeding would be defeated." Wymo Fuels, 723 P.2d  at 1231. That 
rationale is directly applicable here. We reaffirm and extend our holding from 
Wymo Fuels to procedures under the ten-acre exemption. Under Wymo Fuels, once 
particular lands have been condemned, those lands are no longer "affected lands" 
under the Act and those owners are no longer "surface owners" for purposes of 
the Act. Here, as in Wymo Fuels, appellants were left with no interest which 
required protection under the Act after the condemnation order was entered. Wymo 
Fuels, 723 P.2d  at 1236.7

[¶29]   Count I of appellants' complaint 
was filed pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-901(a) (1988):

     Any person who 
violates * * * any provision of this act, or any rule, regulation, standard or 
permit adopted hereunder or who violates any determination or order of the 
council pursuant to this act or any rule, regulation, standard, permit, license 
or variance is liable to either a penalty of not to exceed ten thousand dollars 
($10,000.00) for each day during which violation continues, * * * which may 
be recovered in a civil action, and the person may be enjoined from 
continuing the violation as hereinafter provided. (emphasis 
added).

Subsection (q) 
of section 901 provides: "All actions pursuant to this article shall be brought 
in the county in which the violation occurred or in Laramie county by the 
attorney general in the name of the people of Wyoming."

[¶30]   Appellants alleged in their 
complaint that civil penalties should be imposed because the required consents 
were not obtained and that Rissler "utilized the 10 acre exemption to circumvent 
the lawful permitting process" because "Rissler knew that its mining operations 
* * * could not be accomplished within 10 acres." The complaint also alleged 
that the DEQ "approved the permit at a time when they knew it was 
invalid."

[¶31]   None of these allegations are 
sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a material question of fact or law 
and, thus, the district court was correct in dismissing the complaint. A plain 
reading of section 901(q) makes clear that any action must be brought by the 
attorney general in the name of the people of Wyoming. Even if the allegations 
in the complaint were true, the only way appellants could bring this action is 
if they could somehow prove that they were the attorney general of Wyoming and 
thus the authorized party to bring an enforcement action under section 901. 
Since appellants were unable to satisfy the facial requirements of section 901, 
the complaint was properly dismissed and appellees were entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law as to Count I of the complaint.

DEQ AND 
IMMUNITY

[¶32]   Appellants argue that even if Count 
I of their complaint was properly dismissed because section 901 only provides a 
civil penalties cause of action for the attorney general, then they were instead 
suing on a theory of "common law negligence" seeking civil penalties. This 
alternative theory is raised for the first time on appeal and was not pled in 
the complaint. Counsel's use of this new theory on appeal is neither supported 
by the record, logic or the law. Negligence must be specifically pled, and, even 
when it is, the remedy is civil damages not civil 
penalties.

[¶33]   An additional barrier exists with 
respect to appellants' alleged "common law negligence" action against the DEQ. 
In Wyoming, state governmental entities are generally immune from tort 
liability. City of Laramie v. Facer, 814 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1991). The Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act provides the exclusive avenue for a negligence remedy 
against a state governmental entity. Dee v. Laramie Co., 666 P.2d 957, 958 (Wyo. 
1983); Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-101 et seq. (1988 & Supp. 1991).

[¶34]   The Governmental Claims act 
requires timely submission of a claim to the specific governmental entity before 
bringing suit on the claim. Dee, 666 P.2d  at 958. Assuming for purposes of 
argument that appellants' claim would fall into one of the exceptions to the 
general immunity of the Act, appellants failed to submit a claim to DEQ before 
filing suit as required by the statute.8 No claim appears in the record. 
Therefore, were we to accept the proposition that appellants were pursuing a 
"common law negligence" action although they had not pled it in their complaint, 
such an action would be procedurally barred under the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act.

[¶35]   Counts II and III of the complaint 
were made pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-902:

(a) Except as provided in 
subsection (c) of this section, any person having an interest which is or may be 
adversely affected, may commence a civil action on his own behalf to compel 
compliance with this act only to the extent that such action could have been 
brought in federal district court under Section 520 of P.L. 95-87, as that law 
is worded on August 3, 1977:

     (i) Against any 
governmental entity, for alleged violations of any provisions of this act or of 
any rule, regulation, order or permit issued pursuant thereto, or against any 
other person for alleged violations of any rule, regulation, order to permit 
issued pursuant to this act; or

     (ii) Against the state 
of Wyoming, department of environmental quality, for alleged failure of the 
department to perform any act or duty under this act which is not discretionary 
with the department.

(b) Actions against the 
state of Wyoming, department of environmental quality, pursuant to this section 
shall be filed in the district court for Laramie county. Actions against any 
governmental entity, or any other person pursuant to this section shall be filed 
in the district court for the county in which the violation is alleged to have 
occurred.

(c) No action pursuant 
to this section may be commenced:

     (i) Prior to sixty 
(60) days after the plaintiff has given notice in writing of the violation and 
of his intent to commence the civil action to the department and the alleged 
violator, except that such action may be brought immediately after such 
notification if the violation complained of constitutes an imminent threat to 
the health or safety of the plaintiff or would immediately affect a legal 
interest of the plaintiff; or

     (ii) If the 
department, through the attorney general, has commenced a civil action to 
require compliance with the provisions of this act, or any rule, regulation, or 
permit issued pursuant to this act, but in any such action any person may 
intervene as a matter of right. (emphasis added).9

[¶36]   Sections 901 and 902 provide for 
very distinct legal remedies. Section 901 is designed to allow the attorney 
general to seek civil penalties against those who violate portions of the Act.10 Section 902 is a citizen suit 
provision which allows private citizens to litigate in order to accomplish 
compliance with the Act.

[¶37]   Although a citizen may sue under 
section 902, he can only seek to compel compliance with the Act and may not seek 
damages. In Counts II and III, which were both filed under section 902, 
appellants requested civil penalties or punitive damages. From the plain 
language of section 902, civil penalties are not available under section 902 
and, therefore, Counts II and III were properly dismissed. Appellees were 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the section 902 claims.

[¶38]   The section 902 portions of the 
complaint also requested that DEQ and "Rissler be required to comply with the 
permitting process * * *." Rissler was proceeding under the ten-acre exemption 
and was not required to comply with the permitting process; therefore, the 
complaint was properly dismissed.

[¶39]   Appellants' complaint also 
requested Rissler's "application for permission to mine under the 10 acre 
exemption * * * be declared null and void and in violation of that statute and 
the rules and regulations promulgated in connection therewith * * *." Again, 
appellants have misunderstood the requirements of the Act. Under the ten-acre 
exemption an operator is required to "notify the land quality division of the 
department of environmental quality of the location of the land to be mined 
before commencing operations." Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-401(e)(vi). The statute 
required Rissler to provide DEQ with notice, which had been done. There are no 
facts which appellants did or could allege that would change our finding on this 
matter of law.

[¶40]   The district court was also correct 
concluding that even if the section 902 count was proper it was improperly 
venued against DEQ and thus deprived the district court of jurisdiction. Section 
902 requires that any action brought against DEQ to compel compliance must be 
brought in Laramie County. Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-902(b) (1988). The action against 
DEQ was filed in Natrona County and was, therefore, improperly venued. 
Noncompliance with clear statutory requirements deprives the court hearing the 
case of subject matter jurisdiction or the ability to issue a valid judgment. 
Matter of TRG, 665 P.2d 491, 498 (Wyo. 1983). Therefore, the portion of the 
action against DEQ was not properly before the Natrona County District Court and 
was properly dismissed as a matter of law.

[¶41]   Even if appellants sought the 
proper type of relief, they failed to follow the notice requirements. The 
statute requires the party seeking relief to provide the department and the 
violator with notice of its intention to file suit sixty days before filing 
suit. Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-902(c)(i) (1988); Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. Elmore 
Livestock Co., 669 P.2d 505, 510-11 (Wyo. 1983). Appellants sent notice to DEQ 
of their intention to file suit on November 12, 1990, and sent a second notice 
on November 27, 1990. Appellants filed their complaint on November 15, 1990; 
therefore, the notice sent by appellants did not satisfy the statutory notice 
requirements.11

APPELLATE 
SANCTIONS

[¶42]   Rissler seeks appellate sanctions 
pursuant to the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure:

     When, in a civil case, 
the judgment or final order is affirmed, appellee shall recover the cost for 
typewriting and reproducing his brief * * *. If the court certifies that there 
was not reasonable cause for the appeal, there shall also be taxed * * * a 
reasonable fee * * * to the counsel of the appellee, and to the appellee damages 
in such sum as may be reasonable, not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) 
* * *.

Wyo.R.App.P. 
10.05.

[¶43]   Although many of the allegations 
and arguments made by appellants' counsel are specious and without merit, we 
decline to award appellate sanctions in this case. Lange v. Lawyer's Title Co., 
741 P.2d 109, 113 (Wyo. 1987).

CROSS-APPEAL

[¶44]   Along with the motion to dismiss 
filed by Rissler, Rissler also requested costs and attorney fees pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. § 1-14-128:

     In any civil action 
whether based on tort, contract or otherwise, the signature of an attorney or 
party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or 
other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed 
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in the facts and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or 
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in 
the cost of litigation.

Wyo. Stat. § 
1-14-128 (1988 & Supp. 1991).

[¶45]   The district court made its 
determination that an award of attorney fees was not warranted, and we agree. 
Therefore, the district court's decision not to award attorney fees is 
affirmed.

CONCLUSION

[¶46]   Appellants' claims have been 
carefully reviewed, and we hold they are without merit. Once the condemnation 
was successful appellants did not have a remaining legal interest which was 
cognizable under the Act. In addition, appellants did not comply with the 
statutory requirements of the Act. The remedies appellants sought were not 
available under the provisions of the Act; thus, appellees were entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. The summary judgment dismissal by the district 
court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Technically, DEQ was 
only approving a notification and consent of limited mining operations, not a 
permit, since a permit application was not submitted. Despite this important 
distinction, DEQ's approval letter mistakenly refers to approval of a mine 
permit which is not accurate. This erroneous reference did not substantively 
change the procedures.

2 No transcript of the 
motion to dismiss hearing appears in the record on appeal.

3 Although this motion was 
converted to summary judgment and we consider it in that posture, we note that 
even considered under the standard of review for motions to dismiss, the 
district court's decision would be valid. In reviewing motions to 
dismiss,

[t]he court must accept 
the facts as alleged in the plaintiff's complaint as true, and view them in the 
light most favorable toward the appellant. Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County 
Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 1990). Appellant's pleadings must be 
liberally construed, and the court will sustain a dismissal of a complaint only 
if it shows on its face that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under any 
set of facts. Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Wyo. 1987); 
Johnson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Hartford, Conn., 608 P.2d 1299, 
1302 (Wyo. 1980).

Condict v. Lehman, 837 P.2d 81, 82 (Wyo. 1992).

4 The ten-acre exemption 
provides:

(e) The provisions of 
this article shall not apply to any of the following activities:

* * * * * *

     (vi) Surface mining 
operations, whether commercial or noncommercial, for the removal of sand, 
gravel, scoria, limestone, dolomite, shale, ballast or feldspar from an area of 
ten (10) acres or less of affected land if the operator has written permission 
for the operation from the owner and lessee, if any, of the surface; provided 
that the operator shall notify the land quality division of the department of 
environmental quality of the location of the land to be mined before commencing 
operations[.]

W.S. § 35-11-401(e)(vi) 
(1988).

5 Although appellants 
allege that Rissler did not comply with required procedures, technically no 
violation could have occurred at the time the complaint was filed. The ten-acre 
exemption requires that the two types of notice be given "before commencing 
[mining] operations." Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-401(e)(vi) (1988). Therefore, if 
Rissler were to commence mining operations before satisfying the notice 
requirements, it would be in violation only on the day it commenced mining. At 
the time of oral argument counsel represented that no actual mining operations 
had begun. Therefore, Rissler could not have been in violation at the time the 
complaint was filed or when this appeal was taken.

6 Under the Act, "affected 
land" means "the area of land from which overburden is removed, or upon which * 
* * access roads, haul roads will be disturbed as a result of the operations." 
Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-103(e)(xvi) (1988 & Supp. 1991).

7 Appellants concede that 
Wymo Fuels "stands in the way of the consent issue." (appellants Stalkup and 
Snodgrass, No. 91-90, cross-appeal brief at 11).

8

"No 
action shall be brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the 
claim upon which the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized 
statement in writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error 
or omission * * *."

Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-113(a) 
(1988 & Supp. 1991).

9 Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-902 
makes explicit reference to § 520 of Pub.L. 95-87, which provides in pertinent 
part:

CITIZEN SUITS

Sec. 520. (a) Except as 
provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person having an interest which 
is or may be adversely affected may commence a civil action on his own behalf to 
compel compliance with this Act -

     (1) against the United 
States or any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent 
permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution * * *.

     (2) against the 
Secretary or the appropriate State regulatory authority to the extent permitted 
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution * * *. (emphasis 
added).

Surface Mining Control 
& Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub.L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445.

10 Adjoining landowners 
concede this proposition in their brief by saying "No case law has specifically 
interpreted the statute although my research of the statutory history in 
preparation of my brief below reveals that the latter interpretation [that an 
action under section 901 may only be brought by the attorney general in the 
county in which the violation occurred or in Laramie county] is probably 
correct." (Appellee Brief, No. 91-90, at 14)

11 Appellants allege that 
there was an imminent threat which justifies their failure to satisfy the notice 
requirement. Even if this were accurate, the failure to satisfy the other 
section 902 requirements makes the district court's dismissal justified even if 
Rissler's activities constituted an "immediate threat." The allegation of 
immediate threat is dubious given the nature of the violations appellants 
alleged and given the fact that DEQ's Air Quality Division issued Rissler an air 
quality permit for the quarry, finding it would have limited impacts on public 
health and safety.