Title: Garcia v. Department of Housing & Community Development

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12507 
 
ROSANNA GARCIA1 & others2  vs.  DEPARTMENT OF 
HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 8, 2018. - October 11, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Department of Housing and Community Development.  Practice, 
Civil, Preliminary injunction, Class action.  Americans 
with Disabilities Act. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 9, 2016.  
 
 
A motion for a preliminary injunction was heard by Douglas 
H. Wilkins, J., and motions for reconsideration and for a stay 
of the preliminary injunction were heard by him. 
 
 
After consolidation in the Appeals Court of this case with 
an appeal from an order of a single justice of the Appeals 
allowing a motion to stay the preliminary injunction, the 
Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct 
appellate review.  
                     
 
1 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
 
2 Naikis Cepeda, Maria Luisa Amparo, Ana Monterola, Shanica 
Charles, and Dawn Didion, individually and on behalf of all 
others similarly situated; and Jocelin Gruilart, Marcia 
Prodoscimo, and Nora Ramirez, interveners. 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
Samuel M. Furgang, Assistant Attorney General (Kimberly A. 
Parr, Assistant Attorney General, also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Ruth A. Bourquin (Laura Massie also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
Lerae Kroon & Andrea M. Park, for Massachusetts Law Reform 
Institute & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  Certain low income families in Massachusetts 
facing the harsh reality of homelessness are served by an 
emergency shelter program, run, since 2009, by the defendant 
Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD).  This 
case is before us on an interlocutory appeal by DHCD of a class-
wide preliminary injunction concerning its operation of that 
shelter program.  The preliminary injunction in essence 
prohibits DHCD from following, in certain circumstances, its 
stated policy regarding the use of motels.  
 
The plaintiffs are among the roughly 3,500 people currently 
served by the emergency assistance (EA) program.  Their dire 
circumstances, affecting their families in different ways, give 
rise to various shelter needs which the program attempts to 
address.  The DHCD in recent years has greatly expanded the 
number of shelter beds provided across the State, and has used 
motel placements as a last resort only when overflow needs 
require it, or in limited exigent circumstances.  The plaintiffs 
contend that, in the process of reducing its reliance upon 
 
 
 
3 
motels, DHCD has violated Massachusetts statutes by failing 
promptly to place families in shelters within twenty miles of 
their home communities or to restore them to those communities 
as quickly as possible, and has violated the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), among other Federal statutes, by failing 
promptly to accommodate the plaintiffs' or their children's 
disabilities.   
 
Insofar as relevant to the challenged preliminary 
injunction, this case concerns those plaintiffs who have 
recognized needs under the ADA for shelter placements different 
from the ones in which they are currently housed, but whose 
needs are as yet unmet.  These needs include being closer to 
medical providers or being placed in a non-congregate setting to 
accommodate a behavioral, dietary, or other disability.  While 
DHCD has approved transfers to placements accommodating those 
disability needs "when administratively feasible," it has not 
yet implemented those transfers, despite the willingness of 
those affected to accept motel placements.  
 
A Superior Court judge certified the plaintiff class; the 
class includes every family who is eligible for, and has applied 
for, emergency shelter, but did not immediately receive a 
placement that both (1) was within twenty miles of its home 
community, and (2) satisfied a requested disability 
accommodation, if any.  The judge also certified a subclass, for 
 
 
 
4 
purposes of the ADA claims, of plaintiffs with a disability or 
whose child has a disability. 
 
Before the completion of discovery, the plaintiffs sought a 
class-wide preliminary injunction directing DHCD to use motels 
as EA placements to the extent necessary (1) to ensure that 
children are able to continue school in their home communities, 
(2) promptly to place families within twenty miles of their home 
communities; and (3) to meet the reasonable accommodations of 
class members with disabilities.  The judge allowed, in part, 
the motion for a class-wide preliminary injunction and ordered 
as follows:  
"1.  Notwithstanding its policy on motels, DHCD shall 
treat motels and hotels as available placements when 
implementing approved ADA accommodation requests in 
the EA program. 
 
"2.  If a hotel or motel placement will meet an 
approved ADA accommodation request for an EA-recipient 
household, and DHCD cannot provide that accommodation 
in any other way, then DHCD must place the household 
in a hotel or motel on at least an interim basis until 
it provides the accommodation through an approved 
contracted shelter, or otherwise."   
 
 
The class-wide preliminary injunction applies to a 
narrow group within the certified sub-class:  those EA 
participants whose ADA accommodation requests had been 
approved by DHCD, but not yet implemented, and whose 
requests could be satisfied by a motel placement.  The 
judge denied the motion for a preliminary injunction for 
 
 
 
5 
all other class members and on all other claims.  DHCD's 
appeal from the class-wide preliminary injunction is before 
us on a joint request for direct appellate review. 
 
The judge concluded that DHCD likely had violated three 
regulations promulgated under the ADA.  The first requires 
public entities to provide reasonable accommodations in order to 
avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.  See 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.130(b)(7) (2017).  The judge assumed that, where DHCD has 
made an individualized determination to transfer a family in 
order to accommodate a disability "when administratively 
feasible," the shelter bed where the family resides in the 
interim becomes "ADA noncompliant."  The judge then concluded 
that such shelter beds are not "available," within the meaning 
of DHCD's statutory mandate, which permits the use of motels 
when a shelter bed is not available.  "[W]e are cognizant that 
time presses sharply on a family with children struggling 
against destitution," Smith v. Commissioner of Transitional 
Assistance, 431 Mass. 638, 652 (2000), and do not doubt that 
disability needs among homeless families require urgent 
accommodation.  The judge erred, however, in concluding that any 
delay in providing an ADA accommodation is a per se violation of 
law.   
 
The judge concluded also that DHCD likely violated ADA 
regulations that prohibit public entities from providing 
 
 
 
6 
services or siting facilities in a manner that has the effect of 
discriminating on the basis of disability.  See 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.130(b)(1), (4) (2017).  This conclusion, however, was 
premised on a factual predicate that is not supported by the 
record.  
 
As a result, we conclude, based on the preliminary record, 
that the plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of succeeding on 
their claim that DHCD's motel policy violates the ADA by 
discriminating on the basis of disability.  See Packaging Indus. 
Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 617 (1980). Accordingly, 
the order of preliminary injunction shall be vacated and the 
matter remanded for further proceedings.3 
 
1.  Background.  a.  The EA program.  General Laws c. 23B, 
§ 30, requires DHCD to "administer a program of emergency 
housing assistance to needy families with children and pregnant 
wom[e]n with no other children . . . at locations that are 
geographically convenient to families who are homeless or at-
risk of homelessness."  As stated, approximately 3,500 families 
are served by the EA program; according to DHCD, it is the only 
Statewide emergency shelter program in the country.  
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Massachusetts Law 
Reform Institute, the Disability Law Center, and the Center for 
Public Representation. 
 
 
 
7 
 
DHCD must administer the EA program "[s]ubject to 
appropriation."  Id.  The Legislature appropriates funds for the 
program through two budgetary line-items, one of which contains 
a number of provisos; these provisos have the force of law.  See 
St. 2017, c. 47, § 2, line items 7004-0100, 7004-0101; Opinion 
of the Justices to the Senate, 375 Mass. 827, 834 n.2 (1978).  
The transfer proviso states, "if the closest available placement 
is not within [twenty] miles of the household's home community, 
the household shall be transferred to an appropriate shelter 
within [twenty] miles of its home community at the earliest 
possible date."  St. 2017, c. 47, § 2, line item 7004-0101.  The 
placement proviso similarly directs that, "an eligible household 
that is approved for shelter placement shall be placed in a 
shelter as close as possible to the household's home community."  
Id.  Pursuant to the education proviso, DHCD shall make "every 
effort" "to ensure that children receiving services . . . shall 
continue attending school in the community in which they lived 
before receiving services."4  Id.  Finally, the "motel proviso" 
                     
 
4 The education, placement, and transfer provisos do not 
apply if a household requests that it not be placed within 
twenty miles of its home community.  See St. 2017, c. 47, § 2, 
line item 7004-0101.  Pursuant to an additional proviso, DHCD 
"shall use its best efforts to ensure that a family placed by 
the emergency housing assistance program shall be provided with 
access to refrigeration and basic cooking facilities." See id. 
 
 
 
 
8 
requires that "funds shall be expended for expenses incurred as 
a result of families being housed in hotels due to the 
unavailability of contracted shelter beds."5  Id.  The 
authorizing statute also mentions the use of motels in the EA 
program.  See G. L. c. 23B, § 30. 
 
DHCD has promulgated regulations to implement the EA 
program.  See G. L. c. 23B, § 30 (A); 760 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 67.00 (2012).  Under DHCD's regulations, "[a]n EA household 
shall be placed in a family shelter when such shelter is 
available."  760 Code Mass. Regs. § 67.06(3)(b)(1).  "The EA 
household will be placed in an interim placement, such as 
shelter beyond [twenty] miles or a hotel/motel, only if 
appropriate [DHCD]-approved family shelter space is not 
available," and will be transferred to an approved family 
shelter within twenty miles of its home community at the 
"earliest date" possible.  760 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 67.06(3)(e)(1). 
 
The majority of the funding appropriated for the EA program 
is committed at the beginning of each fiscal year to pay for the 
cost of family shelters and related services.  Because the 
                     
 
5 In July, 2017, for the fiscal year 2018 budget that is at 
issue here, the Governor vetoed the motel proviso, in 
conjunction with vetoes of funding for several specifically 
named housing programs.  At the end of October, 2017, the 
Legislature overrode the Governor's veto. 
 
 
 
9 
amount authorized under the budget for a given fiscal year 
typically is insufficient to cover these costs for one full 
year, DHCD historically has entered into nine-month contracts 
with shelter providers, with the expectation that the 
Legislature will approve an increase in appropriation for the 
line item;6 in the past, DHCD has entered into shelter contracts 
as short as three days in length due to delays in enacting 
supplemental budgets.   
 
The EA program makes use of three types of family shelters, 
and uses motels when family shelter beds are unavailable.  
Congregate shelters serve multiple families and have 
professional support staff, as well as cooking facilities and 
common spaces.  Scattered-site shelters and co-shelters are 
apartments leased by DHCD service providers.  When DHCD 
contracts with shelter providers, it pays for a fixed number of 
each type of shelter unit for a fixed period of time, and is 
responsible for those costs regardless whether all of the units 
are ultimately used. 
 
The EA program previously was administered by the 
Department of Transitional Assistance.  That department utilized 
motels as shelter overflow capacity; it temporarily ended the 
                     
 
6 In fiscal year 2018, for example, the Legislature 
authorized a supplemental allocation of approximately $19.3 
million to the EA budget in April, 2018, a few months before the 
end of the fiscal year. 
 
 
 
10 
use of motels between 1996 and 1999, as well as from 2004 
through 2007.  When DHCD became responsible for administering 
the EA program in 2009, 842 EA families were placed in motels.  
According to DHCD, the executive branch has been committed to 
ending the use of motels since the 1990s, but overflow motel 
space was necessary to meet increased demand for emergency 
shelter during the "Great Recession" of 2007-2009. 
 
DHCD contracts with motel providers at a per diem rate for 
a specific number of days, subject to room availability, and 
only pays if a motel room is actually used.  Beginning in 
September, 2013, DHCD has expanded its family shelter capacity, 
thereby reducing reliance on motels.  DHCD views family shelters 
as a superior form of placement due to their relative safety and 
the ease with which DHCD can provide support and services in 
family shelters.  From September, 2013, through June, 2017, DHCD 
added 1,664 new family shelter units, an eighty-two per cent 
increase in the Commonwealth's family shelter capacity.  Nearly 
thirty per cent of the increase took place in Boston, which is 
the area of greatest need.  The number of families in the EA 
system who were placed in motels dropped from approximately 500 
 
 
 
11 
in June, 2016, to forty-two in July, 2017.  At the time of 
filing, DHCD had a contract with only one motel.7 
 
As a matter of policy, DHCD no longer assigns new EA 
families to motel placements, other than under a "rare 
exception."  While the record does not contain a definition of 
"rare exception," in its brief, and at oral argument, DHCD has 
acknowledged that it cannot entirely take motels off the table, 
as it were, and may need to place a family in a motel when the 
family is physically unable to access any vacant shelter units.   
 
b.  Disability accommodation in the EA system.  Title II of 
the ADA requires a public entity, such as DHCD, to provide 
reasonable accommodations to persons with disabilities where 
necessary to avoid discrimination.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-
12132; 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).  Once a family is deemed 
eligible for the EA program, DHCD asks whether any family member 
has a disability.  DHCD also inquires as to factors affecting a 
family's placement needs; this inquiry includes whether the 
family has any needs related to disability.  If a family 
indicates that one or more of its members has a disability, DHCD 
provides the family a form to request a disability 
accommodation.  The family can request a number of 
                     
 
7 DHCD monthly reports for calendar year 2018 indicate that, 
for the first six months of the year, 4,895 families entered EA 
programs, of which forty-seven families (one per cent) were 
placed in motels. 
 
 
 
12 
accommodations including, inter alia, transfer to a location 
closer to a medical provider; permission to have a service 
animal; non-congregate housing for a child whose disability 
requires a private environment; and physical modifications, such 
as a wheelchair ramp or grab bars. 
 
After receiving a request for an ADA accommodation, DHCD 
either makes a determination within thirty days, or engages in 
an "interactive process" with the EA participant to determine a 
reasonable accommodation.  DHCD approves a variety of 
accommodations, including requests for transfers to particular 
locations and to non-congregate housing, "when administratively 
feasible, taking into account the availability of placements and 
the level of need as compared to other granted accommodations of 
other participants."  The record indicates that when DHCD 
approves such a transfer, it notifies the EA family that the 
transfer will take place "when administratively feasible." 
 
c.  Prior proceedings.  The named plaintiffs filed their 
first amended complaint in December, 2016, on behalf of 
themselves and all others similarly situated.  The complaint 
contains claims that the DHCD (1) failed immediately to place 
families "who are eligible for immediate placement," in 
violation of St. 2016, c. 133, § 2, line item 7004-0101; 
(2) "failed to place" families as "close as possible" to their 
home communities, to "transfer families to within [twenty] miles 
 
 
 
13 
of their home communities 'at the earliest possible date,'" and 
to use "'best efforts' to ensure children can continue in school 
in their prior community," in violation of St. 2016, c. 133, 
§ 2, line item 7004-0101; (3) has engaged in "discrimination 
against families that include a qualified person with a 
disability" due to the insufficient number of family shelter 
units that can accommodate their disability needs in their home 
communities, in violation of the ADA and "related [S]tate and 
[F]ederal laws"; (4) has violated Title VIII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f), and the Fair Housing Act and 
related provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608(e)(5), 12705, and 1437; 
and (5) has failed to administer the EA program in a manner that 
is "fair, just and equitable," in accordance with G. L. c. 23B, 
§ 30.  The complaint asserts that the alleged violations are 
"occurring in substantial part because the [d]epartment has 
failed to create enough shelter units in the areas of highest 
demand and is exacerbating the problem by refusing to use motel 
rooms to keep families close to their prior communities or to 
otherwise accommodate the family's needs."  The plaintiffs 
sought class certification, damages, and declaratory and 
injunctive relief.   
 
In June, 2017, putative class member Maria Prodoscimo 
successfully moved to intervene; she sought preliminary 
individualized injunctive relief directing DHCD to transfer her 
 
 
 
14 
family to a location without stairs in the Greater Boston area.  
The judge preliminarily found8 that DHCD had been informed that 
Prodoscimo's son was scheduled to receive knee surgery that 
July, that his medical provider recommended that he take 
residence in a ground-floor apartment, that Prodoscimo's counsel 
accordingly had requested an ADA accommodation, and that DHCD 
had not responded to the request.  The judge ordered DHCD to 
transfer the Prodoscimos, by the following day, to a placement 
that did not require the use of stairs, within the Greater 
Boston area, and to use a motel if necessary.  The judge 
discussed the question "whether DHCD may adopt a policy refusing 
to assign families to hotel or motel placements," and concluded 
that "DHCD's policy choice regarding hotels is not part of the 
fundamental nature of the EA program authorized and directed by 
the Legislature." 
 
In July, 2017, the plaintiffs sought an emergency class-
wide preliminary injunction that would order DHCD to use motels 
as EA placements to the extent necessary (1) to ensure that 
children are able to continue school in their home communities, 
(2) promptly to place families within twenty miles of their home 
communities; and (3) to meet the reasonable accommodations of 
class members with disabilities.  The plaintiffs' motion 
                     
 
8 The evidence on which the judge based his preliminary 
findings of fact does not appear in the record before us. 
 
 
 
15 
identified additional individuals they claimed had been harmed 
by DHCD's alleged violations of State and Federal law, and who 
had not been named in the original complaint.  DHCD opposed the 
plaintiffs' emergency motion for a class-wide preliminary 
injunction, including class certification.  DHCD argued that its 
motel policy was a reasonable interpretation of its statutory 
mandate; and that a court order reversing DHCD's policy on 
motels would result in underutilization of existing shelter 
spaces, and would cause major disruption to the EA shelter 
system. 
 
In July, 2017, the judge held a hearing on the motion for 
an emergency class-wide preliminary injunction, and certified 
the following class: 
"All families who, from December 9, 2016 to the date 
of Final Judgment applied for or were residing in the 
EA shelter system (or had been granted a Temporary 
Emergency Shelter Interruption (TESI)) and met the 
Eligibility Requirements but did not Immediately 
receive a placement that both (1) was within [twenty] 
miles of the household's home community unless the 
household requests otherwise and (2) allowed a 
requested accommodation, if any, for a Qualified 
Person With A Disability Or A Handicap.  For Counts 3 
and 4, the court also certifies a subclass of families 
who include a Qualified Person With A Disability Or A 
Handicap.[9] 
                     
 
9 Counts 3 and 4 of the complaint allege that DHCD has 
engaged in "discrimination against families that include a 
qualified person with a disability" due to the insufficient 
number of family shelter units that can accommodate their 
disability needs in their home communities, in violation of the 
ADA and "related [S]tate and [F]ederal laws," and has violated 
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f). 
 
 
 
16 
 
"For purposes of class definition: 
"'Eligibility Requirements' are the requirements for 
placement under applicable law, including St. 2016, c. 133, 
[§] 2, [line] item 7004-0101, (and 2017 H. 1, [§] 2, [line] 
item 7004-0101), G. L. c. 23B, § 30 and implementing 
regulations found at 760 Code Mass Regs. [§§] 67.00 . . . 
 
"'Immediately,' for class definition purposes only, means 
'on the day of application.'  
 
"'a Qualified Person With A Disability Or A Handicap' shall 
have the same meaning as in Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. [§§] 12131 et seq.; the 
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.; and the Fair 
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. [§§] 3604(f), 3608(e)(5), 12705 and 
1437."  (Emphasis supplied.) 
 
The class-wide preliminary injunction before us only concerns 
certain members of the certified subclass.  On appeal, DHCD has 
not challenged the class certification.   
 
In August, 2017, while the motion for a class-wide 
preliminary injunction was under advisement, the plaintiffs 
filed an emergency motion seeking a preliminary injunction on 
behalf of eighteen individual class members.  These individuals 
included ten newly identified class members who had requested 
ADA accommodations which had been approved but which had not yet 
been implemented. 
 
Following a hearing, the judge allowed, in part, the 
emergency motion on behalf of these individual class members, 
prior to issuing the class-wide injunction.  He issued a 
preliminary injunction ordering DHCD immediately to transfer six 
 
 
 
17 
class members to locations that complied with their ADA 
accommodation requests, and to use motels if necessary.  In so 
doing, the judge granted relief to all of the plaintiffs whose 
ADA accommodation requests had been approved but not yet 
implemented, and who were willing to accept a motel placement.  
The judge concluded that, "[f]or those Moving Plaintiffs who 
would be appropriately placed in a motel, the only thing 
preventing a lawful ADA placement is DHCD's unilateral policy 
against using funds for motel placement."  DHCD did not 
challenge the issuance of the preliminary injunction on behalf 
of the individual class members.  
 
In September, 2017, the judge allowed, in part, the 
plaintiffs' emergency motion for a class-wide preliminary 
injunction, and issued the order that is now before us.  The 
judge stated that, "[t]he record in this case to date focuses 
more upon DHCD's policies themselves, than upon application of 
those policies."  He explained that he had "considered the 
factual submissions on the Individual Motion [on behalf of 
certain class members] in deciding the [class-wide] Motion, as 
those submissions shed light on DHCD's policies and the impacts 
upon EA recipients."   
 
The class-wide preliminary injunction provides relief only 
to those plaintiffs whose ADA accommodations had been approved.  
The preliminary injunction orders that:  
 
 
 
18 
"1.  Notwithstanding its policy on motels, DHCD shall 
treat motels and hotels as available placements when 
implementing approved ADA accommodation requests in 
the EA program. 
 
"2.  If a hotel or motel placement will meet an ADA 
accommodation request for an EA-recipient household, 
and DHCD cannot provide that accommodation in any 
other way, then DHCD must place the household in a 
hotel or motel on at least an interim basis until it 
provides the accommodation through an approved 
contracted shelter, or otherwise." 
 
 
Recognizing the need for discovery and a full adjudication 
on the merits, the judge denied preliminary relief on the 
plaintiffs' claims that DHCD had violated the education and 
transfer provisos, and its duty to administer the EA program "in 
a fair, just and equitable manner," in accordance with G. L. 
c. 23B, § 30; that portion of the motion was dismissed without 
prejudice to refiling on a more complete record.   
 
In October, 2017, DHCD filed an emergency motion for 
reconsideration; the plaintiffs opposed the motion.  The motion 
was denied.  DHCD simultaneously appealed, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 231, § 118, and sought a stay of the preliminary injunction 
before a single justice of the Appeals Court; the petition was 
allowed, and the requested stay was issued in December, 2017.  
The plaintiffs appealed from the order allowing that petition, 
and the two appeals were consolidated in the Appeals Court.  In 
March, 2018, we allowed the parties' joint application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
19 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  We review the 
allowance of a preliminary injunction to determine whether a 
motion judge abused his or her discretion.  See Packaging Indus. 
Group, Inc., 380 Mass. at 615.  The party seeking a preliminary 
injunction must show "(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; 
(2) that irreparable harm will result from denial of the 
injunction; and (3) that, in light of the [moving party's] 
likelihood of success on the merits, the risk of irreparable 
harm to the [moving party] outweighs the potential harm to the 
[nonmoving party] in granting the injunction."  Loyal Order of 
Moose, Inc., Yarmouth Lodge #2270 v. Board of Health of 
Yarmouth, 439 Mass. 597, 601 (2003), quoting Tri-Nel Mgt., Inc. 
v. Board of Health of Barnstable, 433 Mass. 217, 219 (2001).  
Where a party seeks to enjoin government action, the judge also 
must "determine that the requested order promotes the public 
interest, or, alternatively, that the equitable relief will not 
adversely affect the public."  Loyal Order of Moose, Inc., 
Yarmouth Lodge #2270, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Mass. 
CRINC, 392 Mass. 79, 89 (1984).   
 
"In conducting our review, we decide 'whether the judge 
applied proper legal standards and whether there was reasonable 
support for his evaluation of factual questions.'"  Fordyce v. 
Hanover, 457 Mass. 248, 256 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Fremont Inv. & Loan, 452 Mass. 733, 741 (2008).  On review, a 
 
 
 
20 
motion judge's "conclusions of law are subject to broad review 
and will be reversed if incorrect."  Fordyce, supra, quoting 
Packaging Indus. Group, Inc., 380 Mass. at 616.  "[W]here, as 
here, the judge's findings are based not on an assessment of 
witness credibility but 'solely on documentary evidence[,] we 
may draw our own conclusions from the record.'"  U.S. Bank Nat'l 
Ass'n v. Schumacher, 467 Mass. 421, 427 (2014), quoting 
Packaging Industries Group, Inc., supra. 
 
b.  The preliminary injunction.  The class-wide preliminary 
injunction granted relief only to those class members whose ADA 
accommodation requests had been approved by DHCD, but had not 
yet been implemented.  Specifically, it ordered DHCD to place EA 
participants with approved ADA accommodations in motels, if only 
a motel placement could satisfy a family's accommodation needs.  
As discussed, when DHCD approves a transfer to satisfy an ADA 
accommodation request, it notifies the EA participant that the 
transfer will take place "when administratively feasible."  The 
judge presumed that if an EA participant had requested a 
transfer as part of an ADA accommodation, and DHCD agreed to 
grant the transfer "when administratively feasible," then the 
shelter unit where the EA participant resides in the interim is 
"ADA noncompliant."  The judge then concluded that "the 
plaintiffs are likely to prove that an ADA-noncompliant shelter 
is not 'available' for purposes of the Motel Proviso."  The 
 
 
 
21 
judge therefore determined that, in such circumstances, DHCD 
must meet the ADA accommodation with a motel placement.  See St. 
2017, c. 47, § 2, line item 7004-0101 ("funds shall be expended 
for expenses incurred as a result of families being housed in 
hotels due to the unavailability of contracted shelter beds" 
[emphasis supplied]).  
 
c.  Likelihood of success on the merits.  Title II of the 
ADA prohibits a public entity such as DHCD from discriminating 
against a "qualified individual with a disability" on the basis 
of that individual's disability.  See Fry v. Napoleon Community 
Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 749 (2017); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 
509, 513 (2004); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12132.  The ADA does not 
require States to provide particular services but, rather, 
prohibits States from discriminating on the basis of disability 
in the provision of existing services.  See Rodriguez v. New 
York, 197 F.3d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 
864 (2000). 
 
The Department of Justice has promulgated regulations 
implementing Title II.  See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130.  The judge 
concluded that DHCD's motel policy likely violates 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.130(b)(7), which requires public entities to make 
reasonable accommodations to avoid discrimination on the basis 
of disability.  His conclusion, however, rested on the incorrect 
assumption that any delay in providing a reasonable 
 
 
 
22 
accommodation is per se unlawful.  The judge also concluded that 
DHCD's motel policy likely violates two other regulations, which 
prohibit public entities from providing services or siting 
facilities in a manner that has the effect of discriminating on 
the basis of disability.  See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1), (4).  
His conclusion with regard to these two regulations was premised 
on a factual predicate that is not supported by the record. 
 
i.  Reasonable accommodation.  A public entity must make 
reasonable modifications to its "policies, practices, or 
procedures," otherwise known as reasonable accommodations,10 when 
necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.  
See Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749, quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). 
"[I]t is enough for the plaintiff to suggest the existence of a 
plausible accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not 
clearly exceed its benefits."  Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 
F.3d 261, 280 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 936 (2004), 
quoting Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 
(2d Cir. 1995).  The determination whether an accommodation is 
reasonable is fact-specific, and made on a case-by-case basis.  
Dean v. University at Buffalo Sch. of Med. & Biomed. Sciences, 
804 F.3d 178, 189 (2d Cir. 2015).  A defendant, however, need 
                     
 
10 Title II uses the term "reasonable modification," a term 
which is interchangeable with "reasonable accommodation," and 
which represents an identical standard.  See McGary v. Portland, 
386 F.3d 1259, 1266 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004).   
 
 
 
23 
not provide even a facially reasonable accommodation that would 
"fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or 
activity."  See id. at 187, quoting Powell v. National Bd. of 
Med. Examiners, 364 F.3d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 2004).  See 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.130(b)(7).  A plaintiff can establish a violation of the 
ADA by showing that his or her request for a reasonable 
accommodation was denied.  B.C. v. Mount Vernon Sch. Dist., 837 
F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2016).   
 
As discussed, the judge's conclusion rested on the premise 
that, once DHCD has approved a requested transfer based on 
disability needs, the shelter unit where a family resides in the 
meantime is "ADA noncompliant."  DHCD, however, has decided that 
when an EA participant requests a transfer to satisfy a 
disability need, a transfer "when administratively feasible" is 
a reasonable accommodation.  The plaintiffs here do not directly 
challenge individual accommodations that have been approved by 
DHCD.  The judge nonetheless overrode DHCD's determination in 
presuming that only an immediate transfer would constitute a 
reasonable accommodation for the affected class members.  He 
erred in making this determination on a class-wide basis and on 
the limited preliminary record.  The ADA requires an 
individualized and fact-specific inquiry as to what constitutes 
a reasonable accommodation.  See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 
 
 
 
24 
U.S. 661, 688 (2001); National Fed'n of the Blind v. Lamone, 813 
F.3d 494, 508 (4th Cir. 2016).   
 
We do not doubt that, in some instances, DHCD's delay in 
providing an approved ADA accommodation may be unreasonable.  
"[U]nreasonable delay may amount to a failure to provide 
reasonable accommodations."  Valle-Arce v. Puerto Rico Ports 
Auth., 651 F.3d 190, 200-201 (1st Cir. 2011).  "[T]here are 
certainly circumstances in which a 'long-delayed accommodation 
could be considered' unreasonable and hence 'actionable under 
the ADA.'"  Mogenhan v. Napolitano, 613 F.3d 1162, 1168 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010), quoting Mayers v. Laborers' Health & Safety Fund of 
N. Am., 478 F.3d 364, 368 (D.C. Cir. 2007).11  DHCD cannot comply 
with its ADA obligations by granting putative accommodations, 
and then failing to implement them within a reasonable time.  
Like the determination whether an accommodation is reasonable, 
however, the question whether a delay is unreasonable is fact-
specific.  See Dean, 804 F.3d at 189; Selenke v. Medical Imaging 
of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1262-1263 (10th Cir. 2001).  
Determining whether unreasonable delay has occurred depends on 
                     
 
11 See Groome Resources Ltd., L.L.C. v. Jefferson, 234 F.3d 
192, 199 (5th Cir. 2000) (under Federal Fair Housing Act, 
"denial [of an accommodation] can be both actual or 
constructive, as an indeterminate delay has the same effect as 
an outright denial"); Jay v. Intermet Wagner Inc., 233 F.3d 
1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000) ("unreasonable delay in providing an 
accommodation can provide evidence of discrimination"). 
 
 
 
 
25 
the specific circumstances, including the length of delay, and 
whether the defendant has provided alternative accommodations in 
the interim.  Selenke, supra.  See id. at 1263 (employer did not 
violate ADA in delaying reasonable accommodation where it 
provided interim accommodations); Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 
621, 628 (11th Cir. 1998) (same).12  
 
DHCD construes "administratively feasible" to mean the time 
when a shelter unit that meets an approved accommodation becomes 
vacant.  There may well be instances, however, in which only an 
immediate transfer would constitute a reasonable accommodation.  
In such a case, waiting until it is "administratively feasible" 
to implement the transfer may deny an EA family a reasonable 
accommodation.  As DHCD recognizes, it must make exceptions to 
its general policy against reliance on motels, as, for example, 
when a family is unable physically to access any vacant shelter 
units; at oral argument before us, DHCD asserted that it takes 
whatever measures are necessary to ensure all placements, 
                     
 
12 The dissent misapprehends our conclusion regarding the 
judge's error.  According to the dissent, we misread the judge's 
preliminary injunction to require immediate transfers.  See post 
at    .  The judge's error, however, lies in his conclusion 
that, once DHCD agrees to provide an EA family with an ADA 
accommodation, the EA family's current placement immediately 
becomes "ADA noncompliant" and therefore is not "available" for 
purposes of the motel proviso.  As the dissent recognizes, such 
a placement may be considered "available" until an unreasonable 
time has elapsed.  See post at    . 
 
 
 
 
26 
whether interim or permanent, permit all family members physical 
access to the shelter unit.13 
 
In any event, the judge erred in concluding that the 
preliminary injunction would not "fundamentally alter" the EA 
program, because the order's first paragraph requires DHCD to 
treat motels as "available" when implementing ADA 
accommodations.  See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).  The motel 
proviso states that "funds shall be expended for expenses 
incurred as a result of families being housed in [m]otels due to 
the unavailability of contracted shelter beds."  See St. 
2017, c. 47, § 2, line item 7004-0101.  The judge interpreted 
this statutory language to require DHCD to use motels in the EA 
program when contracted shelter beds are unavailable and, as 
discussed, erroneously concluded that shelter beds that do not 
immediately meet an identified disability need are 
"unavailable."  DHCD, by contrast, interprets the motel proviso 
simply to authorize the use of motels when shelter beds are not 
                     
 
13 We observe that the obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodations to qualified individuals with disabilities is 
nondiscretionary under the ADA.  See Fry v. Napoleon Community 
Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 749 (2017).  In prioritizing transfer 
requests within the EA system, DHCD must be mindful that this 
mandate supersedes its duties to transfer EA families to within 
twenty miles of their home communities "at the earliest possible 
date," and to "make every effort" to keep children in their 
schools.  See St. 2017, c. 47, § 2. 
 
 
 
 
27 
available.  See 760 Code Mass. Regs. § 67.06(3)(e).  Because the 
motel proviso states that "funds shall be expended," not that 
"motels shall be used," DHCD's interpretation of its statutory 
mandate is reasonable, and is entitled to deference.14  See 
Peterborough Oil Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 474 
Mass. 443, 449 (2016).  The judge's order requiring DHCD to 
treat motels as always "available" when implementing ADA 
accommodations therefore conflicts with DHCD's reasonable 
interpretation of its statutory mandate, which authorizes the 
use of motels only if family shelter space is unavailable.  Cf. 
                     
 
14 The language of DHCD's regulation requires that families 
placed in motels comply with requirements during that placement 
to assist in transfer from an "interim" motel shelter to an 
approved family shelter.  Title 760 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 67.06(3)(e) provides, inter alia: 
 
 
"The EA household will be placed in an interim 
placement, such as shelter beyond [twenty] miles or a 
hotel/motel, only if appropriate [DHCD]-approved family 
shelter space is not available.  During this interim 
placement, the EA household must attend the family shelter 
interview(s) at family shelter(s) specified by the 
Department.  The household shall be advised at the time of 
placement that:  
 
 
"1.  it will be transferred from a shelter beyond 
[twenty] miles into an appropriate [DHCD-]approved family 
shelter within [twenty] miles of its community at the 
earliest possible date unless the EA household requests 
otherwise; or  
 
 
"2.  it will be transferred from another interim 
shelter into an appropriate [DHCD-]approved family shelter 
at the earliest possible date." 
 
 
 
 
28 
Bay Area Addiction Research & Treatment, Inc. v. Antioch, 179 
F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 1999) (Title 28 C.F.R. § 35.130[b][7] 
"requires reasonable modifications where necessary to avoid 
discrimination unless such modifications would fundamentally 
alter the statute in question").15 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs have not shown a 
likelihood of establishing, on a class-wide basis, that an 
immediate transfer to a motel would be a reasonable 
accommodation, and thus required by 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).  A 
fuller record would be required to determine whether DHCD 
unreasonably has delayed implementing ADA accommodations that it 
                     
 
15 We reject, however, DHCD's claim that it can fulfil its 
ADA obligations simply by providing some shelter to the 
plaintiffs, without regard to location.  DHCD's "interpretation 
[of the ADA], to the effect that a violation . . . could . . . 
be premised [only] on conduct that resulted in a complete 
exclusion from programs or a total denial of benefits, is overly 
narrow."  See Shedlock v. Department of Correction, 442 Mass. 
844, 854 (2004).  "At some level, the difficulties experienced 
in attempting to access programs and services become so great -- 
so laborious, so painful -- that a plaintiff's access has 
functionally been denied, even if the plaintiff could, at least 
in theory, get to and from the program or services."  Id. 
at 854-855.  Furthermore, the reasonableness of an accommodation 
"must be defined with reference to the plaintiff's facial 
entitlement to benefits."  See Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 282.  
EA families are facially entitled to be placed as close as 
possible to their home communities, and in "geographically 
convenient" locations, when possible; DHCD cannot satisfy its 
obligations merely by putting roofs over heads, anywhere in the 
Commonwealth.  See G. L. c. 23B, § 30; St. 2017, c. 47, § 2, 
line item 7004-0101; 760 Code Mass. Regs § 67.06(3)(c).   
 
 
 
 
29 
has approved, and whether those delays are a result of DHCD's 
policy of transferring EA participants with disabilities only 
when "administratively feasible."16   
 
ii.  Discriminatory provision of service and placement of 
facilities.  The judge concluded that DHCD's motel policy likely 
violates two additional ADA regulations.  See 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.130(b)(1)(ii), (iii) (public entity may not "[a]fford a 
qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to 
participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that 
is not equal to that afforded others" or "[p]rovide a qualified 
individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service 
                     
 
16 Nothing we say here suggests that a class-wide injunction 
could not issue to address any unreasonable delays in DHCD's 
provision of ADA accommodations.  The paucity of the record 
before us, however, renders unwise at present the modification 
the dissent would impose.  On a fuller record, a preliminary 
injunction that requires the use of a motel when an 
accommodation otherwise would be unreasonably delayed, such as 
the dissent proposes, may well be warranted.  The current 
record, however, does not show how many motel placements would 
be required, and at what expense; the cost of compliance with 
such an order might force DHCD dramatically and decisively to 
scale back its family shelter capacity in favor of motels.  The 
extent of this and other potential systemic impacts, and whether 
such shifts could even go so far as to "fundamentally alter the 
nature" of the EA program, are simply unknown at this juncture.  
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).  In addition, because the proposed 
modification would require DHCD to take what could be 
significant affirmative action, possibly with unintended adverse 
consequences, it runs afoul of the principle that a preliminary 
injunction "ordinarily is issued to preserve the status quo 
pending the outcome of litigation."  Doe v. Superintendent of 
Schs. of Weston, 461 Mass. 159, 164 (2011).   
 
 
 
 
30 
that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to 
obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach 
the same level of achievement as that provided to others"); 28 
C.F.R. § 35.130(4)(i)-(ii) ("A public entity may not, in 
determining the site or location of a facility, make 
selections . . . [t]hat have the effect of excluding individuals 
with disabilities from, denying them the benefits of, or 
otherwise subjecting them to discrimination; or . . . [t]hat 
have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially 
impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of the service, 
program, or activity with respect to individuals with 
disabilities"). 
 
The judge's conclusion concerning both regulations rested 
on his finding that "DHCD's policy of denying motel placements 
has shifted resources toward contracted shelter beds that 
present unique problems for persons with disabilit[ies] who need 
to visit their treatment providers.  To that extent, the 
resulting array of services is less suited to (i.e. less 
beneficial for) persons with disabilities than non-disabled 
persons."  The record, however, does not support this finding.  
See Fordyce, 457 Mass. at 256.17  The record shows only that DHCD 
                     
 
17 It is unclear if the plaintiffs submitted evidence to the 
judge that is not in the record before us, apart from the 
 
 
 
31 
has shifted resources from motels to shelter beds.  It is silent 
as to whether motels generally provide better access to the 
treatment providers of EA participants with recognized 
disability needs.  Nor does the record show whether the shift 
towards shelter beds has benefited EA participants without 
disabilities more than those with disabilities.18  A fuller 
                     
factual submissions made during the Prodoscimo proceeding, 
discussed supra.   
 
18 The judge further found, "[p]lacements of EA recipients 
with disabilities far from home has resulted in failure to 
obtain care and treatment, manifestations of treatable and 
avoidable symptoms (such as mental health episodes) that 
interfere with activities such as travel to school, hardship 
(such as climbing stairs against medical advice) and consumption 
of the household's limited resources to travel for treatment.  
EA recipients without disabilities do not experience those or 
similar impediments."  To the extent that the judge concluded 
that DHCD's motel policy has violated 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1) 
and (4) by resulting in a disparate impact on EA participants 
with disabilities, the preliminary record is insufficient to 
support such a determination.  "The basis for a successful 
disparate impact claim involves a comparison between two 
groups -- those affected and those unaffected by the facially 
neutral policy."  See Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep't, 352 
F.3d 565, 575 (2d Cir. 2003).  While the record certainly 
indicates that some EA participants with disabilities have 
experienced hardship, the record does not contain information 
regarding the EA participants who have not been affected by 
DHCD's motel policy, or the effect of the policy on EA 
participants without disabilities.  Whether "a quantitative or 
qualitative comparison," id. at 578, "there must be some 
analytical mechanism to determine disproportionate impact,"  id. 
at 576.  To prevail on a claim of a failure to provide a 
reasonable accommodation, however, a plaintiff need not show 
that the challenged policy has a disproportionate impact on 
people with disabilities.  See Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 273.   
 
 
 
 
32 
record would be needed in order to sustain the judge's 
conclusion.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs have not established a 
likelihood of showing that DHCD discriminated on the basis of 
disability by violating 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1) and (4).19 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Given that the plaintiffs have not shown a 
likelihood of succeeding on their claim that DHCD's motel policy 
violates the ADA by discriminating on the basis of disability, 
we do not reach the question whether the preliminary injunction 
appropriately balances the irreparable harm to each party, or 
promotes the public interest.  "[T]he preliminary injunction 
cannot survive if the plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the 
merits."  Fordyce, 457 Mass. at 266-267.  See Packaging Indus. 
Group, Inc., 380 Mass. at 617. 
                     
 
19 The plaintiffs also argue that DHCD violated the 
requirement that "[ninety] days before promulgating or amending 
any regulations, administrative practice or policy that would 
alter eligibility for or the level of benefits [of the EA] 
program, other than that which would benefit the clients," DHCD 
must notify the Legislature.  See St. 2017, c. 47, § 2, line 
item 7004-0101.  The judge initially concluded that the 
plaintiffs were likely to prevail on this claim, but on 
reconsideration observed that "[i]t may be debatable whether 
DHCD's decision to stop new hotel placements was a new policy 
that triggered the requirement to notify the Legislature under 
the Line Item, unless the change benefits recipients."  Insofar 
as it appears that the judge ultimately did not rely on this 
claim as a basis for entering preliminary relief, we do not 
address the matter further. 
 
 
 
33 
 
The order granting preliminary injunctive relief to the 
plaintiffs is vacated and set aside.  The matter is remanded to 
the Superior Court for further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (dissenting, with whom Budd, J., joins).  Under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Department of 
Housing and Community Development (DHCD) has an obligation to 
make reasonable accommodations when providing emergency shelter 
to individuals with disabilities.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12132; 
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2017).  The court today acknowledges 
this obligation, stating that DHCD must provide such 
accommodations "within a reasonable time."  Ante at    .  It 
also acknowledges that DHCD's current policy of transferring 
families that have requested disability-related accommodations 
only when "administratively feasible" is insufficient to satisfy 
this obligation, because in some cases it may effectively "deny 
. . . a reasonable accommodation."  Ante at    .  Nevertheless, 
the court chooses to leave DHCD's policy undisturbed.  The court 
concludes that, because a delay in providing an accommodation is 
not necessarily an ADA violation, and because the Superior Court 
judge incorrectly assumed otherwise, the order of preliminary 
injunction must be vacated in its entirety.  Ante at    .  I 
disagree.  Because DHCD is obligated under the ADA to provide 
accommodations within a reasonable time, and because its current 
policy falls short of that obligation, I would not vacate the 
order of preliminary injunction.  Rather, I would exercise our 
authority to modify the order, so that, in circumstances where 
(1) DHCD has determined that a family's current shelter does not 
 
 
 
2 
accommodate its disability-related needs, but (2) DHCD cannot 
"within a reasonable period of time" transfer the family to a 
shelter that does, and (3) a hotel or motel would provide the 
required accommodation, DHCD must place that family in a hotel 
or motel until a shelter that can accommodate the family's needs 
becomes available.  Such an order would respect DHCD's policy of 
using hotels and motels only as a last resort, while also 
respecting DHCD's obligation under the ADA to provide reasonable 
accommodations for homeless families with disability-related 
needs.  
 
Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from 
discriminating on the basis of disability when providing 
services.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12132.  A Federal regulation 
implementing Title II, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7), requires public 
entities to make "reasonable modifications in [their] policies, 
practices, or procedures," where necessary to avoid disability-
based discrimination, provided that such modifications do not 
"fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or 
activity" provided.  In administering the Emergency Assistance 
(EA) program, DHCD allows families with disability-related needs 
to request a transfer to another shelter if their current 
shelter does not accommodate their needs.  If approved, these 
transfers are effectuated when "administratively feasible."  For 
some families, a hotel or motel may provide the requested 
 
 
 
3 
accommodation because, for example, it has elevator access, or 
is closer to a medical provider, or provides a more private 
environment.  But, because DHCD's current policy is to use 
hotels and motels only as a last resort, when no family shelters 
are available, DHCD does not transfer these families to hotels 
or motels; instead, these families must remain in their current 
shelters without accommodation until a DHCD-approved family 
shelter becomes available.  In short, DHCD will only transfer 
families when it is "administratively feasible," and under its 
current policy a transfer is not "administratively feasible" if 
the only available placement would be in a hotel or motel.  The 
plaintiffs contend that, for these reasons, DHCD's motel policy 
represents a failure to provide reasonable accommodations, in 
violation of Federal law. 
 
In granting the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary 
injunction, the Superior Court judge agreed, concluding that 
DHCD's motel policy likely violated 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).  
The court rejects this conclusion, claiming that it "rested on 
the incorrect assumption that any delay in providing a 
reasonable accommodation is per se unlawful."  Ante at    .  The 
court emphasizes that whether an accommodation is "reasonable" 
under the ADA requires an individualized, fact-specific inquiry, 
and that -- although an unreasonable delay in providing an 
accommodation may itself constitute a failure to provide 
 
 
 
4 
reasonable accommodation -- whether a delay is "unreasonable" 
also requires an individualized, fact-specific inquiry.  Ante 
at    .  Thus, the court concludes that it was error for the 
judge to "presum[e] that only an immediate transfer would 
constitute a reasonable accommodation for the affected class 
members."  Ante at    . 
 
And indeed it would have been error, if that was what the 
judge had in fact presumed.  But I do not believe he did.  On 
the contrary, in concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to 
establish an ADA violation, the judge emphasized DHCD's 
substantial delay in effectuating approved transfers, writing:  
"DHCD is aware of, and has approved, requests for ADA 
accommodation for many class members, without actually providing 
the accommodation for many months -- sometimes more than six 
months."  In ordering the preliminary injunction, the judge also 
emphasized that, although DHCD "does not have to use a motel" to 
comply with the ADA, it must nevertheless provide "timely 
accommodation[s]" (emphasis added) -- not immediate 
accommodations -- for families with disability-related needs.1 
                     
 
1 I also do not believe that the judge concluded, as the 
court contends, that once DHCD approves a requested transfer as 
an ADA accommodation, the family's current shelter "immediately 
becomes 'ADA noncompliant'".  Ante at note 12.  See ante at    .  
I do not see where in his decision he makes such a claim.  The 
judge stated that "the plaintiffs are likely to prove that an 
ADA-noncompliant shelter is not 'available'" within the meaning 
 
 
 
5 
 
DHCD, for its part, seems to have inferred that the judge 
intended to require immediate transfers based on the wording of 
his order, which states that, under certain circumstances, "DHCD 
must place the household in a hotel or motel on at least an 
interim basis."  The order does not specify how promptly DHCD 
must make such a placement, and DHCD has alleged that, in the 
month following its issuance, several families have requested 
immediate transfers to motels, which DHCD has effectuated in 
order to avoid being held in contempt.  I am not convinced that 
this is what the judge intended.2 
                     
of the motel proviso, but did not state that a shelter becomes 
ADA-noncompliant as soon as a request for transfer is approved.  
Indeed, the judge did not fault DHCD for failing to make 
"immediate" transfers.  What he focused on was that DHCD had 
failed to implement approved transfers for a substantial period 
of time, in some cases for "more than six months." 
 
 
2 It is possible that the Superior Court judge believed 
that, because the order requires a hotel or motel placement only 
where the Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) 
has already determined that a transfer is a reasonable 
accommodation required under the ADA -- and because an 
accommodation is "reasonable" under the ADA where it is provided 
within a reasonable time -- the order already makes clear that 
such transfers need not be immediate.  In denying DHCD's 
emergency motion for reconsideration of the order, the judge 
stated that "the concept of reasonableness is already 
incorporated into the Order's description of circumstances 
calling for relief," which are based on "DHCD's own 
determination of the accommodation needed for each family -- a 
determination that itself is a finding of reasonableness."  At 
the same time, DHCD stated in its emergency motion that it 
understood the order to require immediate transfers, and the 
judge did not refute this interpretation.  If the judge indeed 
intended the order to require immediate transfers, I agree with 
the court that this was error. 
 
 
 
6 
 
Having said that, the preliminary injunction as currently 
worded is flawed because it is ambiguous.  I agree with the 
court that the ADA does not require DHCD to provide an 
accommodation as soon as it is requested, and that, to the 
extent that the preliminary injunction seems to require 
immediate transfers to a hotel or motel, it is overbroad.  This 
does not mean, however, that the plaintiffs are entitled to no 
preliminary relief at all.  As stated, the judge premised his 
conclusion that DHCD's policy likely violated 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.130(b)(7) on his factual finding that DHCD had failed to 
provide requested accommodations for "many months."  Implicit in 
his conclusion, then, was a determination that DHCD's delay in 
providing accommodations was, in many cases, "unreasonable" -- 
which, as the court recognizes, ante at    , would itself 
constitute a failure to provide reasonable accommodations in 
violation of Federal law.  See Valle-Arce v. Puerto Rico Ports 
Auth., 651 F.3d 190, 200 (1st Cir. 2011) ("[U]nreasonable delay 
[in providing accommodations] may amount to a failure to provide 
reasonable accommodations").  This conclusion was not, in my 
view, an abuse of discretion.  See Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. 
v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 615 (1980) ("[I]n reviewing the 
granting or denial of a preliminary injunction, the standard is 
whether the [lower] court abused its discretion" [citation 
omitted]).  Nor was it an abuse of discretion to conclude that 
 
 
 
7 
denial of a preliminary injunction would result in irreparable 
harm to the plaintiffs or that such risk outweighs the potential 
harm to DHCD in granting the injunction.  See id. at 617. 
 
I would therefore modify the order of preliminary 
injunction, rather than vacate it entirely, and clarify that 
DHCD need not provide an accommodation immediately, but must 
provide it within a reasonable time.  See G. L. c. 231, § 118 
(court has authority to "affirm, modify, [or] vacate" order of 
preliminary injunction on appeal).  Specifically, I would modify 
the second paragraph of the order to state: 
"2. If a hotel or motel placement will meet an ADA 
accommodation request for an EA-recipient household, and 
DHCD cannot within a reasonable period of time provide that 
accommodation in any other way, then DHCD must place the 
household in a hotel or motel on at least an interim basis 
until it provides the accommodation through an approved 
contracted shelter, or otherwise." 
 
 
So modified, the preliminary injunction would allow DHCD to 
maintain its policy of using hotels and motels only as a last 
resort.  This is because DHCD would be required to place a 
family in a hotel or motel only under certain narrowly defined 
circumstances:  first, if DHCD has approved a family's request 
for a transfer as a reasonable accommodation (meaning that DHCD 
has itself determined that the family's current shelter is not 
accommodating its needs); second, if DHCD is not able, within a 
reasonable time, to provide the requested accommodation through 
a DHCD-approved family shelter; and third, if placement in a 
 
 
 
8 
hotel or motel would provide the requested accommodation.  
Moreover, DHCD would be required to place that family in a hotel 
or motel only on an interim basis, until DHCD is able to provide 
the requested accommodation through a family shelter. 
 
For these reasons, the preliminary injunction would not 
require DHCD to "fundamentally alter" the EA program.  28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.130(b)(7).  The court writes that the judge's preliminary 
injunction would "'fundamentally alter' the EA program" -- 
placing it outside the scope of what is required under Federal 
law -- because it "requir[es] DHCD to treat motels as 
'available' when implementing ADA accommodations."  Ante at    .  
But under the modified terms of the preliminary injunction DHCD 
would only be required to treat motels as "available" where a 
family is entitled to accommodations under the ADA and there is 
no available family shelter that will provide the required 
accommodations within a reasonable time.  Thus, if DHCD has 
approved a family's request for a transfer, and there are two 
possible placements that would accommodate the family's needs 
within a reasonable time -- a motel and a family shelter -- DHCD 
could still implement its stated preference for family shelters 
and place the family in the shelter rather than the motel.  As 
the judge stated, "[o]nly if DHCD cannot find an alternative to 
motel placement that will accommodate an approved ADA request, 
 
 
 
9 
must it use a motel."3  And, even in those limited cases where it 
would have to place a family in a hotel or motel, DHCD would not 
need to do so longer than necessary:  as soon as a family 
shelter that provides the requested accommodation becomes 
available, DHCD would be permitted to transfer the family out of 
the hotel or motel and into that shelter. 
 
Thus, the preliminary injunction would allow DHCD to follow 
its stated policy and to use motels only as a last resort.4  What 
it would not allow is for DHCD to ignore its obligations under 
the ADA.  The motel proviso requires that "funds shall be 
expended for expenses incurred as a result of families being 
housed in hotels due to the unavailability of contracted shelter 
beds."  St. 2017, c. 47, § 2, line item 7004-0101.  Although 
this proviso does express a legislative preference for 
                     
 
3 In denying DHCD's emergency motion for reconsideration, 
the judge again clarified:  "If DHCD can provide accommodation 
without using hotels . . . , the Order fully allows it to do so.  
The Court, in fact, encourages DHCD to do so." 
 
 
4 The court warns that a preliminary injunction would "run[] 
afoul of the principle that a preliminary injunction 'ordinarily 
is issued to preserve the status quo pending the outcome of 
litigation.'"  Ante at note 16.  But this principle does not 
require us to preserve the status quo where it violates the law.  
As I have explained, the preliminary injunction here would 
preserve much of the status quo -- respecting DHCD's preference 
for family shelters over hotels and motels -- and alters DHCD's 
policies and practices only to the extent that they conflict 
with its obligations under the ADA.  Indeed, the only 
"affirmative action" that DHCD would be required to take is that 
which is already required under Federal law.  Id. 
 
 
 
10 
contracted family shelters, authorizing the use of motels only 
where such shelters are "unavailable," I agree with the judge 
that the Legislature did not mean for DHCD to refuse to transfer 
a family to a hotel or motel where doing so is the only way that 
it can fulfil its obligations under the ADA.  Where DHCD has 
approved a family's request for a transfer, because it has 
determined that the family's current shelter is not 
accommodating its needs, then that shelter must, after a 
reasonable time, be considered "unavailable" within the meaning 
of the proviso, because to keep the family in that shelter would 
violate Federal law.  Accordingly, requiring DHCD to transfer 
families to a hotel or motel, where such transfer would 
constitute a reasonable accommodation, and where DHCD is not 
able to provide that accommodation within a reasonable time in 
any other way, is not contrary to the motel proviso, and would 
not "fundamentally alter" the EA program. 
 
Moreover, the preliminary injunction would not foreclose 
the individualized, fact-specific determinations that are 
required under the ADA.  This is because relief under the order 
would be limited to circumstances where DHCD, by approving a 
requested transfer, has already made the individualized 
determination that a family's disability-related needs are not 
being accommodated in its current shelter.  As part of this 
determination, DHCD would also have to ascertain how promptly 
 
 
 
11 
such a transfer must be effectuated in order to constitute 
"reasonable accommodation" under the ADA.  As the court 
recognizes, although an accommodation must be provided within a 
reasonable time in order to be considered reasonable, what 
constitutes "a reasonable time" will vary depending on the 
specific circumstances.  Ante at    .  For example, if a family 
has requested a transfer to a wheel-chair accessible facility 
because one of its members is confined to a wheel-chair and is 
forced to crawl up the stairs in the family's current shelter, a 
prompt, if not immediate, transfer may be required to constitute 
a reasonable accommodation.  But, if a family has less urgent 
needs -- for example, if it has requested a transfer in order to 
be closer to a medical provider that it must visit twice a week 
-- there may be greater leeway.  Making these determinations 
should be feasible for DHCD, given that, as the court notes, it 
already engages in an "interactive process" with families in the 
EA program to determine what would be a reasonable accommodation 
in each case.  Ante at    .  And, if the plaintiffs believe that 
DHCD has erred in determining what constitutes a reasonable 
accommodation, and therefore has not provided the accommodation 
 
 
 
12 
"within a reasonable period of time," they can ask the court to 
rule on that issue on a case-by-case basis.5 
 
In vacating the order of preliminary injunction in its 
entirety, the court today reaches a conclusion that is in 
tension with its own reasoning.  The court recognizes that DHCD 
has an obligation under the ADA to provide reasonable 
accommodations, and that in order to be reasonable those 
accommodations must be provided "within a reasonable time."  
Ante at    .  It recognizes that that obligation is "non-
discretionary."  Ante at note 13.  And it recognizes that DHCD's 
current policy falls short of that obligation.  It recognizes 
that "waiting until [a transfer] is 'administratively feasible' 
. . . may deny [a] . . . family a reasonable accommodation," and 
that in some cases DHCD "must make exceptions to its general 
policy against reliance on motels."  Ante at    .  The court 
recognizes all of this, but stops short of the apparent 
conclusion, which is that DHCD cannot refuse to transfer 
families to hotels or motels where it is the only way to provide 
                     
 
5 To avoid undue or burdensome litigation relating to the 
preliminary injunction, the Superior Court judge may invite the 
parties to submit a joint protocol detailing the steps DHCD 
would take in order to provide the requested accommodations 
within a reasonable period of time.  Such a protocol may 
include, among other things, guidelines for determining what 
constitutes "a reasonable period of time" in different kinds of 
cases. 
 
 
 
13 
a reasonable accommodation.6  It vacates the order of preliminary 
injunction based on a single error that, in my view, the 
Superior Court judge may not even have made.  To the extent that 
there was an abuse of discretion here, it may be remedied with a 
simple modification of the order.  I would therefore exercise 
the authority, expressly granted to us by statute, to modify the 
                     
 
6 The court takes the view that "[t]he paucity of the 
[factual] record" makes a modification of the preliminary 
injunction "unwise at present."  Ante at note 16.  But the 
record before us already establishes the grounds for the very 
narrow preliminary injunction that I propose today.  This 
preliminary injunction would require only what the court has 
itself recognized is required under the ADA:  that DHCD, in 
administering the EA program, provide reasonable accommodations 
to individuals with disabilities, and that such accommodations 
be provided, not necessarily immediately, but within a 
reasonable time.  What else must the record show before we can 
ask that DHCD comply with Federal law? 
 
 
The court warns of the possible "unintended adverse 
consequences" of a preliminary injunction, writing that 
compliance with a preliminary injunction may entail significant 
expense, and may even "force DHCD dramatically and decisively to 
scale back its family shelter capacity in favor of motels."  
Ante at note 16.  But DHCD cannot be excused from its obligation 
to provide reasonable accommodations under the ADA simply 
because it might be expensive.  As the court itself recognizes, 
this obligation is "nondiscretionary."  Ante at note 13.  
Moreover, the preliminary injunction does not require DHCD to 
"scale back" family shelters in favor of hotels or motels.  To 
the contrary, it gives DHCD a choice:  DHCD can either provide 
the required accommodations through family shelters -- which may 
entail an expansion, rather than a reduction, of family shelter 
space -- or, if it is unable to do so, it can place families in 
hotels or motels until it is able to do so.  The bottom line is 
that DHCD must provide reasonable accommodations under the ADA, 
and if placing families in hotels or motels is the only way to 
provide those accommodations -- and again, nothing in the 
preliminary injunction prevents DHCD from finding another way to 
do so -- then that is what DHCD must do. 
 
 
 
14 
order and thereby ensure that DHCD fulfils its obligations under 
Federal law.  See G. L. c. 231, § 118.  For these reasons, I 
respectfully dissent.