Title: Matter of M M R M YINC

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

FILED
January 29 2008
DA. 07-0513
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA.
2008 MT 22N

FILED

IN THE MATTER OF
08
MMM. and RM, JAN 2.9 20
ith
Youths In Need Of Care. Se St

 

APPEALFROM: District Cour of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause Nos. DN-06-04C, DN-06-05C
Honorable John C. Brown, Presiding Judge

 

COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:

Jim Wheelis, Chief Appellate Defender, Lisa S. Korchinski,
‘Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee

Hon, Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Tammy K. Plubell, Assistant
‘Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Marty Lambert, Gallatin County Attomey; Kimberly Dudik,
Deputy County Attomey, Bozeman, Montana

 

Submitted on Briefs: January 4, 2008
Decided: January 29, 2008

Filed: \ A
Hil
ferk ~
(Chief Justice Karla M, Gray delivered the Opinion ofthe Cour.

$1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(€)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be
cited as precedent, It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court and its case ttle, Supreme Court cause number and disposition shall be included in

this Court's quarterly list of non

 

ible cases published in the Pacific Reporter and

{2 __D.M. appeals from the order entered by the Eighteenth Judicial District Court,
Gallatin County, terminating his parental rights to M.M. and R.M. upon determining he
had failed to successfully complete a stipulated and court-epproved treatment plan, and it
‘was unlikely that his condition or conduct would change within a reasonable time. On
appeal, D.M. relies on Jn re D.B., 2007 MT 246, 339 Mont. 240, 168 P.3d 691, for the

proposition that the State of Montana has the burden of proving it met its duty to act in

 

good faith in developing and executing an appropriate treatment plan, and that duty does
not end once the district court has approved the treatment plan. See Jn re D.B.,4|30. He

also highlights our observation in Jn re D.B., 4 36, that most treatment plans are divided

 

into multiple phases of specific duration with specific deadlines assigned to tasks.
Finally, he relies on the following language from Jn re D.B.:

The lack of deadlines in any treatment plan gives [the State] a great deal of
uachecked discretion in determining whether the parent has satisfactorily
complied with the plan, In light of the fundamental liberty interest a parent
has in the custody of their [sic} children, due process requires the inclusion
of a timeline for completion of goals and tasks in treatment plan,

 

 
Inre D.B., $37. In reply to the State's argument that In re D.B. concerned a parent with
disabilities, D.M. concedes he does not have disabilities, but maintains Jn re D.B. does
not limit the foregoing principles regarding the State's duty of good faith to cases
involving parents with disabilities.

{BD Maasserts the treatment plan—which was stipulated and approved before D.M.
hhad undergone any evaluations of his need for chemical dependency treatment—did not

set deadlines for chemical dependency treatment and other tasks, He also argues the

 

social worker did not act in good faith by failing to: (1) tell D.M. that being sober would

 

be a prerequisite to successfully completing some other tasks; (2) prioritize inpatient
‘treatment for D.M. over his pregnant and homeless spouse (R.M.’s birth mother), in
relation to a facility rule prohibiting simultaneous inpatient treatment of spouses; (3) refer
DM. to an outpatient chemical dependency treatment program, although they had
discussed @ problem with transportation that apparently related to D.M.’s move to a
community with no outpatient treatment programs and his lack of a driver's license; (4)
inform D-M., after losing contact with him, that the inpatient treatment facility had closed
his file because it had not received necessary medical records; (5) provide D.M. with a
second referral to anger management classes after D.M. leamed the initially-referred
program no longer offered the classes; (6) prioritize parenting classes for DM. over
M's birth mother, although D.M. never enrolled in a parenting class at any time; and
(7) advise. DM. that clarifying his legal status—as recommended in his
neuropsychological evaluation—by serving an out-of-state parole violation sentence and

pleading guilty in a Montana criminal proceeding would result in a “Catch-22” in that he
‘could not complete other aspects of his treatment plan in the allotted six months. DM.
does not contest the District Court's findings that he did not successfully complete

several other treatment plan tasks, which included maintaining requisite contact with the

 

Department of Public Health and Human Services, establishing a stable home, avoiding
criminal conduct and verifying lawful employment.

{4 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), of
our 1996 Intemal Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, which provides for
‘memorandum opinions. It is manifest on the face of the briefS and the record that this
appeal is without merit because the pertinent legal issues are clearly controlled by settled
Montana law that the District Court correctly interpreted, sufficient evidence clearly
supports the District Courts findings of fact, and the District Court clearly did not abuse
its discretion in terminating D.M.’s parental rights.

5 Affirmed.

 

We concur: