Title: Wagner v. Patterson

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

73 Wn.2d 582 (1968) 440 P.2d 162 HAZEL M. WAGNER, Respondent, v. JOHN H. PATTERSON, Appellant.[*] No. 38831. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. April 18, 1968. Allen Lane Carr (of Clodfelter, Lindell & Carr), for appellant. Horace H. Davis, for respondent. *583 HAMILTON, J. In this action, plaintiff (respondent) alleged the defendant (appellant) committed two separate batteries[1] upon her person, the first on May 1, 1964, and the second on January 4, 1965. She asserted that these acts of the defendant activated and aggravated a pre-existing arthritic condition of the cervical area of her spine which, in turn, caused pain and disability and required medical treatment and hospitalization. Defendant denied the batteries and attributed any suffering, disability, and resultant medical expense to plaintiff's own fault or physical condition. Trial was had before the superior court sitting without a jury. The trial judge resolved the conflicts in the evidence in favor of the plaintiff, and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law assessing plaintiff's damages to be in the amount of $10,000, including medical expenses, loss of earnings as well as pain and suffering. Judgment was accordingly entered. Defendant's motion for new trial was denied and this appeal followed. Although eight assignments of error are made, defendant's primary contentions revolve about his claim that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence and considered in the award of damages plaintiff's medical and hospital bills, which were substantial in amount. In this respect, defendant contends that plaintiff failed to establish that the respective amounts were either "necessary" or "relevant." Defendant does not challenge the reasonableness of the charges, or that the bills were in fact incurred. Basically, defendant mounts his attack against the "necessity" for the expenditures involved upon the assertion that no causal relationship was established between the batteries charged to him and the physical conditions for which plaintiff was treated and hospitalized. In short, he contends that there is insufficient medical testimony to support a finding that the batteries caused an aggravation of the plaintiff's pre-existing arthritic condition and/or gave rise to the need for treatment and hospitalization. *584 We cannot agree with defendant. Concerning the causal relationship between the batteries and aggravation of plaintiff's arthritic condition, plaintiff's treating physician testified as follows: Concerning the need for hospitalization, the treating physician stated: On cross-examination, the doctor further amplified his reason as follows: This testimony fully meets the tests of causal relationship and the necessity for medical treatment and hospitalization outlined in Miller v. Staton, 58 Wn.2d 879, 365 P.2d 333 (1961) and Shipman v. Foisy, 49 Wn.2d 406, 302 P.2d 480 (1956). The trial court did not err in admitting into evidence the medical and hospital bills or in considering such bills in connection with the award of damages. Defendant's contention going to the question of "relevancy" of the bills springs from the fact that while in the hospital, plaintiff received some treatment for a pre-existing and chronic genito-urinary infection and diabetic condition. In this vein, defendant asserts that the expenses attributable to these unrelated conditions were not appropriately segregated from those hospital and medical expenses otherwise related to the alleged batteries. He predicates this assertion upon the case of Wappenstein v. Schrepel, 19 Wn.2d 371, 142 P.2d 897 (1943), wherein this court stated the following rule, at 375: Again we cannot agree with defendant. [1] The plaintiff's treating physician testified, as heretofore indicated, that plaintiff's hospitalization was primarily focused upon physical conditions which he attributed to the *586 traumatic episode involved. And, he stated that concurrent treatment of her chronic conditions was necessarily secondary and incidental to her hospitalization. Concerning a breakdown of the costs attributable to the secondary treatment, the doctor testified: From the foregoing, we are satisfied that (a) the doctor's testimony established a prima facie segregation of the incidental expense, and (b) the extent or amount of the incidental expense revealed by the doctor's testimony is not of such magnitude as to import a degree of prejudice requiring reversal of the judgment and a remand for new trial. Defendant's remaining assignments of error are directed to findings of fact, which we find from the record to be amply supported by substantial evidence. The judgment is affirmed. FINLEY, C.J., HUNTER and NEILL, JJ., and LANGENBACH, J. Pro Tem., concur. [*] Reported in 440 P.2d 162. [1] Although the parties refer to the acts complained of as assaults, the torts complained of are more properly characterized as batteries. See Restatement (Second) Torts §§ 18 and 21 (1965).