Title: Bottero v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co.

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

316 Pa. Superior Ct. 62 (1983) 462 A.2d 793 Alvira BOTTERO, Appellant, v. The GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA COMPANY, INC. and Abe Greenberg, and Ivyridge Investment Corporation. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued March 22, 1983. Filed July 1, 1983. Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied October 13, 1983. *64 Julius E. Fioravanti, Philadelphia, for appellant. James C. Stroud, Philadelphia, for appellees. Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ. POPOVICH, Judge: This is an appeal from an order of the trial court denying a petition to open judgment which was filed by appellant, Alvira Bottero.[1] We affirm. The facts in this case are as follows: Appellant-plaintiff filed a summons in trespass on December 22, 1978, after she had fallen in a shopping center which was owned by two of the defendants, Abe Greenberg and Ivy Ridge Investment Corporation. Appellee-defendant, The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc. (A & P) rented one of the stores in the shopping center, and appellant fell some distance from the A & P store. Appellant served notice on A & P; however, no service was effectuated on the other two defendants. Approximately a year and a half later, on April 29, 1980, appellee filed a rule on appellant to file a complaint. However, no complaint was filed. Six weeks later, on July 8, 1980, a non pros was entered against appellant for failing to file a complaint. Over one year later, on October 14, 1981, appellant filed a petition to open judgment. However, before appellant filed the petition, another procedural scenario developed. On or *65 about October 15, 1980, the trial court denied appellant's request to extend the time for filing a certificate of readiness. The trial court ordered the certificate to be filed no later than October 30, 1980. On October 21, 1980, appellant filed a certificate of readiness even though neither a complaint had been filed nor had service been effectuated on the remaining two defendants. Approximately ten months later, the matter was assigned to arbitration and listed for an arbitration hearing. The hearing never was held because no complaint had been filed and judgment of non pros already had been entered. This appeal followed. Appellant does not dispute the fact that notice was given. Rather, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to open the judgment of non pros because no further notice of intent to enter the judgment was given, because the default and delay was excused by counsel's illness and personal problems, and because counsel immediately attempted to negotiate the opening of the default judgment. We reject appellant's contentions. In determining whether a court has ruled properly on a petition to open judgment, we have said the following: Moreover, we recognize that: These factors must coalesce, and in any event, an appellate court may not reverse the trial court's ruling unless an abuse of discretion is evident from the record. Kophazy v. Kophazy, supra. When the above factors are applied to the instant case, it is clear that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's petition to open judgment. With respect to appellant's argument that she should have received further notice of appellee's intent to enter a non pros, the law imposes no such requirement. In accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 1037(a) appellee filed a praecipe for the trial court to enter a rule upon the appellant to file a complaint within twenty days "after service of the rule." When no complaint was filed, appellee petitioned the trial court to enter a judgment of non pros. The commentary to Pa.R.C.P. 237.1 contains the following appropriate language explaining why appellee did not have to give appellant further notice: In view of the above, a further notice of intent to enter a default was unnecessary. Appellant's allegation concerning the fact that counsel's illness and personal problems excused the default and delay is also without merit. In the petition to open, appellant alleged the following set of facts: The trial court examined these facts and said: Appellant has not offered any facts in opposition to the trial court's statements. Instead, appellant merely counters by stating that "[t]he courts have not been hesitant to open judgments caused by counsel's illnes or delay". Brief for Appellant at 8. Because appellant has failed to explain sufficiently his forwarding of a copy of a proposed complaint to counsel for the appellee during the time when he was alleged to be ill, the trial court's resolution of the credibility issue will not be disturbed. Appellant also contends that his petition to open judgment was filed promptly because counsel attempted to negotiate the opening of the judgment immediately. However, appellant conceded in the petition to open that "counsel for defendant, [appellee,] A & P, after receiving the copy of the Complaint herein and after discussing the matter with his principal, stated to your petitioner [, counsel for appellant,] that he was not in any position to enter into any stipulation to open the judgment because he did not have authority from his principal." PETITION TO OPEN JUDGMENT NON PROS" Allegation # 14. Additionally, the record shows that a letter from appellee's counsel dated August 22, 1980, states that "We [, appellee's counsel,] *70 cannot maintain this file indefinitely in the present status and if we do not receive the Complaint by August 29, 1980 we will close our file." "PETITION TO OPEN JUDGMENT NON PROS", Exhibit "C". Notwithstanding this information, appellant waited until over one year later, on October 14, 1981 to file a petition to open. Appellant argues that "[a]lthough [appellant's] counsel promptly began negotiations to open the judgment counsel for [appellees] equivocated and never delivered a clear refusal." Brief for Appellant at 5. However, the record shows that on August 20, 1981, appellee's attorney stated in a "ARBITRATION PROGRAM PETITION" that [a] judgment of non pros was entered in this matter on July 8, 1980 and notice was subsequently given. There is no controversy to arbitrate as the litigation ended over one year ago." "ARBITRATION PROGRAM PETITION" Allegation # 9. Then, in a letter dated October 13, 1981, appellee advised that the "matter be returned to the Prothonotary's office as a closed matter." However, even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the appellant, there was no statement in appellant's petition that negotiations were being conducted after August 20, 1981, when appellee's "ARBITRATION PROGRAM PETITION" was filed which stated that "[a] judgment of non pros was entered in this matter . . . [and that] there is no controversy to arbitrate as the litigation ended over one year ago" (emphasis added). As a result, the unexplained six week delay which occurred in filing appellant's petition to open was not timely, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant appellant's petition to open. In view of our disposition, there is no need to consider whether there were facts sufficient to allege a cause of action. Order of the trial court is affirmed. JOHNSON, J., concurs in the result. [1] The order appealed is an interlocutory one, from which an appeal may be taken as of right. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1).