Title: Becksted v. People

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

292 P.2d 189 (1956) Douglas Paul BECKSTED, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. No. 17641. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. January 9, 1956. Rehearing Denied January 30, 1956. *190 Leslie A. Gifford, Aurora, for plaintiff in error. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Norman H. Comstock, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error. MOORE, Justice. Plaintiff in error, to whom we will hereinafter refer as defendant, was accused of first degree murder by information filed in the district court of Adams county. He entered pleas of not guilty, and not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the crime. Pursuant to the provisions of C.R.S. 1953, 39-8-3, which since has been repealed, defendant first was tried on the issue raised by the plea of not guilty. This trial resulted in a verdict of guilty of first degree murder with imposition of the death penalty. Thereafter, the issues raised by the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity were tried to the same jury which returned a verdict that defendant was sane. Motions for a new trial were heard and overruled, and judgment was entered directing that defendant be put to death in the gas chamber at the Colorado state penitentiary. Defendant, seeking reversal of the judgment, brings the case to this Court for review by writ of error. Some ten assignments of error are argued by counsel for defendant as being sufficient to require a reversal of the judgment. However, due to the fact that retrial of the case will be under different procedures as prescribed by chapter 118, Session Laws of Colorado 1955, we find it unnecessary to consider all of the assignments of error on which counsel for defendant relies; accordingly, the statement of facts will be limited to those bearing upon the questions determined by this opinion. Upon the first trial, and after the people had rested their case, counsel for defendant called Dr. Macdonald, a duly qualified expert and one of the psychiatrists at Colorado General Hospital under whose observation *191 defendant had come during his commitment to that institution as required by law following the entry of the plea of insanity. During his examination the following statements appear in the record: *192 "The Court: As far as his physical condition, that can be brought out at the other trial or he can testify himself. He is here. The foregoing events give rise to the first question hereinafter considered. After the verdict of guilty of first degree murder with imposition of the death penalty had been returned, the trial court permitted the jury to separate and return on the following day to consider the evidence to be offered on the issue of insanity. Testimony of experts was received and the parties rested. During consideration of the instructions to be given the jury, the question arose as to whether the proceeding was civil or criminal in character. In the course of the discussions in chambers between court and counsel the following took place: Thereupon the court excused the jurors and directed them to return on October 14th (a delay of five days) to be sworn to try the issue of sanity. An order was entered "vacating" all proceedings of October 9th on that issue. October 14, 1955, the jurors returned and counsel for defendant objected to trial of the sanity issue before them. His objection, and the court's ruling thereon, are, inter alia, as follows: "Mr. Sarvas: We object to this Jury going on ahead on this case. We feel it is improper, prejudicial, and *193 absolutely out of order. They entered a verdict a week ago as to the extreme penalty and since that time they have been free to talk to other people, to read the newspapers, to listen to the radio, television, all the reports, and everything that had gone on. And even if we were to assume that they had free and open minds at that time, they certainly cannot have now. As far as this Defendant is concerned, it is very unfair. It is very prejudicial and I cannot find language strong enough to object to going ahead with this Jury. We want the Court to realize our feelings in the matter and know that we are protesting and protesting strongly against this same Jury hearing the matter. Thereupon evidence was presented by experts who testified that defendant was "legally sane." One expert testified, inter alia: "I think that Mr. Becksted does suffer from a psychiatric condition; but it is a condition which as a rule does not respond to treatment in a hospital other than for a brief period of examination." He was characterized by one psychiatrist as a "psychopathic personality," which is "a condition which does not amount to insanity." At the conclusion of the evidence instructions were given on the theory that the issue to be determined was civil in character. No instruction informed the jury that if it entertained a reasonable doubt concerning the sanity of defendant he should be given the benefit of such a doubt. The jury was not informed that upon the issue of sanity it must believe from the evidence that defendant was sane beyond a reasonable doubt before returning a verdict that he was sane. Strange as it may seem, no objections or exceptions were made to the instructions as given, and no instructions tendered upon this subject were refused. The foregoing incidents give rise to the second question hereinafter considered. At the conclusion of the first trial on the issues raised by the plea of not guilty, counsel for defendant tendered an instruction covering the crimes of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. The court refused to submit for consideration by the jury any instructions upon those offenses. The refusal to instruct on these offenses gives rise to the third question hereinafter considered. First: In the trial of one accused of first degree murder who has entered pleas of "not guilty" and "not guilty by reason of insanity," where the issues raised by the latter plea are separated from the former for purposes of trial; upon trial of the issues raised under the "not guilty" plea is accused entitled to introduce all competent evidence, including that of experts, which is relevant to the question of whether he lacked the mentality to form the specific malicious intent which is an essential ingredient in the crime of first degree murder, namely, the specific intent deliberately and premeditatedly to unlawfully take the life of another? *194 This question is answered in the affirmative. To pin point the error disclosed by the record before us we need only to quote therefrom a few lines. Counsel for defendant had called a psychiatrist from the Colorado General Hospital who had examined defendant at length. He started to question him concerning his mental condition. The district attorney objected. Defendant's attorney informed the court that the offered evidence was "important" and made clear his purpose with the statement, "* * * the doctor is able to make a statement or statements based upon his observation as to the ability of this defendant to form an intent as far as this particular action is concerned." The court in rejecting the evidence said: "That is not here. He will not be permitted to testify to that." The court erred. The district attorney was badly mistaken in his concept of the law when he insisted upon the exclusion of the evidence which clearly was admissible under numerous decisions of this Court and other courts of last resort. In the case of Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 22 P.2d 1109, 1112, this Court said, inter alia: Similar language was used by this Court in Brennan v. People, 37 Colo. 256, 86 P. 79. In Battalino v. People, 118 Colo. 587, 199 P.2d 897, 901, we quoted with approval from 26 Amer.Juris. page 228, section 105, as follows: In Berger v. People, 122 Colo. 367, 224 P.2d 228, 238, this Court said, inter alia: In Leick v. People, 131 Colo. ___, 281 P.2d 806, 811, we said, inter alia: Our opinion in the Leick case was not announced until after the case at bar had been tried, and court and counsel cannot be charged with lack of familiarity with it, but the law quoted from that opinion has been fundamental and well established in this jurisdiction for many years. We regret that we must say once more that which has heretofore been said over and over again for the guidance of trial courts and prosecuting officers: A defendant in a first degree murder case has the right, without reference to a plea of insanity, to establish mental deficiency as bearing upon his capacity to form the specific intent essential to first degree murder. Just so long as trial courts and district *195 attorneys overlook or misapprehend our decisions and deny that right to persons accused of murder, this Court will be compelled to reverse judgments of guilt; the taxpayers of the several counties will continue to bear the heavy costs of second trials in murder cases; and ultimate justice will continue to be delayed. Second: In the prosecution of a charge of first degree murder in which the accused has entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity as well as that of not guilty, and where a separate trial is had upon the issue of insanity; is that trial to be conducted as a "civil' action? This question is answered in the negative. In a criminal case the defendant can assert as many defenses as can be supported by evidence. If affirmative defenses such as self defense or alibi are presented the issues thereon are tried as part of the criminal case, and if any such defense raises in the mind of a jury a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt he should be acquitted. The defense of insanity stands upon the same footing. The fact that this issue has been separated from other questions for the purpose of trial does not make a civil case out of that which is tendered as a defense to an accusation of crime. In the instant case, when the trial court proceeded to dispose of the issue of insanity as a "civil" matter, permitted the jury to separate for a period of five days, and failed to give an instruction that the jury must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was sane before a verdict to that effect could be returned, reversible error was committed. Here again the court has frequently announced the law applicable to the question. In Martz v. People, 114 Colo. 278, 162 P.2d 408, we held that although sanity is presumed in the first instance, and the district attorney is not obliged to offer evidence of sanity in his case on direct, the burden of proving that defendant was sane beyond a reasonable doubt is on the people. In Mundy v. People, 105 Colo. 547, 100 P.2d 584, we held that the statute requiring accused to specifically plead insanity as a defense, to avail himself thereof, changed only the method of raising that question, and the substance of the accused's constitutional right to a jury trial on that question was preserved. In Graham v. People, 95 Colo. 544, 38 P.2d 87, we held that if the jury has a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused is sane, he should be found not guilty. In Carter v. People, 119 Colo. 342, 204 P.2d 147, 150, we said, inter alia: Counsel on both sides overlooked the foregoing basic principles in the trial of the instant case, and the record contains no assignment of error upon the question under consideration. We have raised this question on our own motion to the end that possible error may be avoided upon the retrial of the case. Third: Did the trial court err in refusing to submit to the jury the issues of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter? This question is answered in the affirmative. We will not lengthen this opinion by quoting from the record evidence which required submission of instructions to the jury covering the offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Suffice it to say that there was evidence which, if believed by the jury, would have warranted a verdict of guilty as to either of those offenses. Defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed upon his theory of the case. The distinguishing features between murder of either the first or second degree, and manslaughter, are the ingredients of malice and deliberation required in the former which are absent in the latter. In this connection evidence shown by the record in the instant case raised issues of fact requiring determination by the jury under proper instructions concerning the law applicable to voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. The judgment is reversed.