Title: Ex parte Sonia Blunt.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:  December 6, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1180372
____________________
Ex parte Sonia Blunt
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Matthew Langston, a minor child, and
Joshua Langston, a minor child, by and through
their father and next friend, Keith Langston
v.
Patsy Lowry et al.)
(Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, CV-12-901151)
PER CURIAM.
1180372
Sonia Blunt, a teacher in the Tuscaloosa City Schools 
system ("TCS"),1 petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to enter a summary
judgment in her favor on the basis of State-agent immunity as
to claims asserted against her by Keith Langston, as next
friend and father of Joshua Langston and Matthew Langston,
minors at the time the action was filed.2  We grant the
petition.
I.  Facts
On June 28, 2010, Marcus Crawford was a student in
Blunt's "credit-recovery" class offered by TCS at Northridge
High School ("Northridge") during the summer of 2010. 
According to TCS's 2009-2010 "Student/Parent Resource Guide
and Code of Student Conduct" ("resource guide"), the credit-
recovery program "is a course-specific, skill-based extended
learning opportunity for students who have been unsuccessful
in mastering content or skills required to have received
1In the materials before this Court, the entity that
operates the school system in the City of Tuscaloosa is
referred to as both "Tuscaloosa City Schools" and "Tuscaloosa
City Board of Education."
2At the time of the accident, Matthew had just completed
the eighth grade and Joshua had just completed first grade. 
Matthew is now 23 years old and Joshua is now 16 years old.
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course credit or earn promotion.  Credit recovery courses are
based on deficiencies rather than a repeat of the entire
course or courses failed."  Students had to meet certain
qualifications to 
be 
eligible 
for 
the 
credit-recovery program,
but the program was voluntary, not a requirement, for eligible
students.  
On June 28, 2010, at approximately 11:14 a.m., Crawford
informed Blunt that he had completed his course work for that
day.  According to Blunt, she did not speak to Crawford and
when he left the classroom she did not know where he was
going.  Crawford's version of events is markedly different. 
In an affidavit, Crawford stated:  "When I finished my work,
I told Ms. Blunt that I was leaving class.  She told me to go
to McDonald's [fast-food restaurant] to get her lunch and to
be back in no more than five to ten minutes.  I wasn't going
to get anything.  She asked me to go."  During his criminal
trial stemming from the accident that underlies this case,
Crawford expanded on this testimony:
"Q. How much time did y'all have for lunch?
"A. Well, class was over.  She just asked me to get
her something.  And they –-
"Q. Okay.  Who asked you to go get something?
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"A. The teacher.
"Q. The teacher.  Okay.  So the teacher, as y'all
were going to McDonald's, I guess said, 'Well, as
long as you're going, would you pick me up something
too?'  Is that about right?
"A. No.  She asked me.  I didn't want nothing.  They
-- the teacher asked me to get her something.  She
gave me her money to get her something.
"....
"Q. And you said she told you to be back when?
"A. No later than five or ten minutes."
Blunt adamantly denies that she asked Crawford to pick up
lunch for her at McDonald's.  She notes that Crawford's
testimony was contrary to testimony at Crawford's criminal
trial from fellow students Jestin White and Jessica White, who
stated that Jestin White was the one who asked Crawford to go
to McDonald's to get lunch.  Blunt adds that, in his statement
to police two days after the accident, Crawford made no
mention of being asked by Blunt to go to McDonald's.
It is undisputed that Crawford went to his vehicle in the
Northridge parking lot along with several companions and that
he drove to McDonald's and ordered food.  According to
Crawford and Jessica White, Crawford then drove his vehicle
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back in the direction of Northridge.  Crawford testified that
it took longer to get the food from McDonald's than he thought
it would and that he was in a hurry to get back to the school
campus because Blunt had told him to be gone no more than 5 or
10 minutes.  Approximately one mile from the Northridge
campus, on a two-lane public road, Crawford attempted to pass
a vehicle in front of him by crossing a double-yellow center
line and driving in the oncoming lane of traffic.  In doing
so, Crawford collided with a vehicle driven by Susan Kines
Langston, a TCS teacher, in which Matthew Langston and Joshua
Langston were passengers.  Susan Langston was killed in the
accident, and Matthew and Joshua were seriously injured and
eventually had to be life-flighted to Children's Hospital in
Birmingham.  
Crawford was charged, tried, and convicted of reckless
manslaughter for his actions in causing Susan Langston's
death.  He was sentenced to five years and nine months in
prison.  
On December 5, 2012, Keith Langston, as father and next
friend of Matthew and Joshua, filed the present action in the
Tuscaloosa Circuit Court against Blunt and Patsy Lowry,
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another TCS teacher who was an instructor at Northridge during
the summer of 2010.  Langston asserted claims of negligence
and wantonness against Blunt and Lowry for failing to follow
the "policies and procedures" of TCS, which failure allegedly
proximately caused the injuries sustained by Matthew and
Joshua Langston.3  
On November 16, 2016, Blunt and Lowry filed a summary-
judgment motion and supporting evidentiary materials in which
they asserted that they were entitled to State-agent immunity
for all claims asserted against them in their individual
capacities.  On November 30, 2016, Langston filed a response
in opposition to the summary-judgment motion.  In that
response, Langston contended, among other things, that Blunt
and Lowry were not entitled to State-agent immunity because,
he argued, they had violated detailed rules and regulations of
TCS.  On December 1, 2016, Blunt and Lowry filed a reply to
Langston's response.
3The estate of Susan Langston is not a party to this
action.  A separate action against Crawford was filed
asserting a wrongful-death claim; that action resulted in a
court-approved settlement.
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On the same date, Lowry and Blunt filed a "Motion to
Strike Portions of [Langston's] Evidentiary Submissions."  In
that motion, Lowry and Blunt asked the trial court to strike
portions of testimony from various witnesses as well as
several of Langston's document submissions.  One of those
documents 
was 
titled 
"Northridge High 
School 
Faculty 
Handbook"
("the faculty handbook").  In their December 1, 2016, motion
to strike, Lowry and Blunt contended that the faculty handbook
"does not qualify as admissible evidence under the business
records exception to the hearsay rule, has not otherwise been
properly authenticated, and [Langston has] not otherwise laid
a proper predicate for the admissibility of this document."
The next submission in this case occurred on January 28,
2018, when Langston filed a supplement to evidentiary
submissions and an amended response to the summary-judgment
motion.  Langston's amended response was identical to his
original response, except that it added a contention that
Alabama's Administrative Code dictated that a school year
consisted of both the regular academic year and the summer-
school session that followed the academic year.  On
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January 30, 2018, Lowry and Blunt responded to Langston's
argument based on the Alabama Administrative Code. 4
On January 31, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on
Lowry and Blunt's summary-judgment motion.  On January 7,
2019, the trial court entered an order granting Lowry and
Blunt's motion to strike certain portions of testimony from
various witnesses but denying Lowry and Blunt's motion to
strike the faculty handbook, concluding that "[q]uestions
relating to the Faculty Handbook go to weight to be given the
document rather than its admissibility."  The trial court also
entered a summary judgment in favor of Lowry as to all claims
asserted against her.  With respect to Blunt, the trial court
concluded: 
"Based upon the record before the Court, based
upon the written submissions of the parties, based
upon the arguments of counsel and based upon the
Court's own research into the issues in this case,
the Court hereby finds:
4Blunt and Lowry contended that the portion of the Alabama
Administrative Code cited by Langston, Regulation 29-3-1-
.02(9)(d) (Alabama State Board of Education), which provides
that "[a] school year consists of the regular academic year
plus the following summer school," "specifically pertains to
the time allotment in which a student may fulfill his or her
credit requirements" and that it does not impact the
definition of a school year in § 16-13-231, Ala. Code 1975, as
"180 full instructional day[s]."
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"....
"2.  That genuine issues of material fact do exist
regarding the claims as they relate to Defendant
Sonia Blunt and said Defendant is not entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.  Blunt's Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED."
(Capitalization in original.)
Blunt timely petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus
challenging the trial court's denial of her motion for a
summary judgment.
II.  Standard of Review
"'While the general rule is that the
denial of a motion for summary judgment is
not reviewable, the exception is that the
denial of a motion grounded on a claim of
immunity is reviewable by petition for writ
of mandamus.  Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d
794 (Ala. 1996)....
"'Summary judgment 
is 
appropriate only
when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and ... the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., Young v. La
Quinta Inns, Inc., 682 So. 2d 402 (Ala.
1996).  A court considering a motion for
summary judgment will view the record in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, Hurst v. Alabama Power Co., 675 So.
2d 397 (Ala. 1996), Fuqua v. Ingersoll–Rand
Co., 591 So. 2d 486 (Ala. 1991); will
accord the nonmoving party all reasonable
favorable inferences from the evidence,
Fuqua, supra, Aldridge v. Valley Steel
Constr., Inc., 603 So. 2d 981 (Ala. 1992);
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and will resolve all reasonable doubts
against the moving party, Hurst, supra, Ex
parte Brislin, 719 So. 2d 185 (Ala. 1998).
"'An appellate court reviewing a
ruling on a motion for summary judgment
will, de novo, apply these same standards
applicable in the trial court.  Fuqua,
supra, 
Brislin, 
supra. 
Likewise, 
the
appellate court will consider only that
factual material available of record to the
trial court for its consideration in
deciding the motion.  Dynasty Corp. v.
Alpha Resins Corp., 577 So. 2d 1278 (Ala.
1991), Boland v. Fort Rucker Nat'l Bank,
599 So. 2d 595 (Ala. 1992), Rowe v. Isbell,
599 So. 2d 35 (Ala. 1992).'"
Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 2002) (quoting
Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912–13 (Ala. 2000)).  A writ of
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when the
petitioner can demonstrate:  "'(1) a clear legal right to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.'"  Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541,
543 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So. 2d
1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)).
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III.  Analysis
Blunt contends that she is entitled to State-agent
immunity and that, therefore, the trial court erred in denying
her motion for a summary judgment.
"A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent's
"....
"(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in
releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons
of unsound mind, or educating students.
"Notwithstanding 
anything 
to 
the 
contrary 
in 
the
foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall
not be immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
"....
"(2) when the State agent acts willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his
or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation
of the law."
Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000) (emphasis in
subparagraph (5) added).
"This Court has established a 'burden-shifting'
process when a party raises the defense of
State-agent immunity.  Giambrone v. Douglas, 874
So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003).  In order to claim
State-agent immunity, a State agent bears the burden
of demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise
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from a function that would entitle the State agent
to immunity.  Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at 1052;
Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 709 (Ala. 2002).  If
the State agent makes such a showing, the burden
then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the State
agent acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
bad faith, or beyond his or her authority. 
Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at 1052; Wood, 852 So. 2d at
709; Ex parte Davis, 721 So. 2d 685, 689 (Ala.
1998).  'A State agent acts beyond authority and is
therefore not immune when he or she "fail[s] to
discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or
regulations, such as those stated on a checklist."' 
Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at 1052 (quoting Ex parte
Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000))."
Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006)
(emphasis added).
It is undisputed that Blunt sustained her initial burden
of 
demonstrating 
that 
Langston's 
claims 
concerning her 
actions
in supervising Crawford arise from a function that entitles
her to State-agent immunity, i.e., educating students in the
credit-recovery program at Northridge during the summer of
2010.  See, e.g., Ex parte Trottman, 965 So. 2d 780, 783 (Ala.
2007) 
(explaining 
that 
"[e]ducating students 
includes 
not 
only
classroom teaching, but also supervising and educating
students in all aspects of the educational process").  Under
our burden-shifting process, Langston then had the burden of
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demonstrating that Blunt acted willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond her authority.  
Langston contended that Blunt acted beyond her authority
by failing to follow detailed rules for supervising students,
particularly regarding 
when 
students 
could 
leave 
the 
classroom
before 
class 
ended 
and 
the 
procedures 
for 
leaving. 
Specifically, Langston argued that Blunt violated rules from
three sources by allowing Crawford to leave on June 28, 2010,
in the manner he did to get lunch.  The three sources are: 
(1) the 2010 Summer Programs Employment Handbook and Guide
("the summer-programs handbook"); (2) the resource guide; and
(3) the faculty handbook.  In this petition, Blunt contends
that the rules upon which Langston relied are either not
specific enough to limit Blunt's discretion or simply were not
in force during summer school in 2010.  We will examine the
parties' arguments pertaining to each source.
A.  The Summer-Programs Handbook
The summer-programs handbook contains a page titled "High
Hopes Summer Tutorials & Credit Recovery Program."  That page
provides a brief description of the credit-recovery program,
the cost for enrollment, the staff work hours, instructional
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hours, and salary information for teachers in that program.
The summer-programs handbook lists the "instructional hours"
as "10:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m."  
In the trial court, Langston contended that Blunt acted
beyond her authority by changing the instructional hours for
her summer-school class without permission from the TCS Board
of Education because it was undisputed that Blunt held her
class from 8:00 a.m. until 12:00 p.m. rather than during the
instructional hours stated in the summer-programs handbook.
Langston argues that if Blunt had maintained the correct
instructional hours, "Crawford would have still been sitting
in the classroom at 11:14 [a.m.] instead of getting lunch for
Blunt."  Langston's brief, p. 20.
Blunt counters that she received permission to alter the
instructional hours from Robert Coates, then TCS director of
secondary education.  Coates testified that he did not "recall
specifically" 
giving 
Blunt 
permission 
to 
change 
her
instructional hours but that "[i]t would not have been out of
the ordinary for those hours to change."  Coates explained
that the reason it would not be unusual was that 
"you had flexibility at different sites.  You have
different numbers of students and you have different
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number of teachers.  So there were some teachers who
because of the students that were coming may have
taught from 8:00 to 12:00 and there may have been
teachers who flexed their schedule from 1:30 to
3:00.  But we did allow the sites to make some
adjustments in order to accommodate students and
their individual schedules."
When he 
was 
specifically asked whether the instructional hours
had changed, Coates testified:
"A.  I know the -- the instructional hours, I don't
know if we officially changed those from 8:00 to
12:00.  But during the summer, we will have students
who can't either come at certain hours or have work
schedules that will conflict.  We do allow a lot of
flexibility because there are students who can only
come in the afternoons, students that can only come
in the morning.  Some students work in the mornings,
some students work in the afternoons.  So to
maximize participation, we are allowed a lot of
flexibility in the instructional hours."
In short, Coates repeatedly testified that "[t]he idea behind
the summer programs is to accommodate the students.  They [the
teachers] would have had the flexibility to make the changes
to accommodate the students that they were serving."
Dr. Isaac P. Espy, Jr., principal of Northridge at the
time of the accident, testified that his understanding was
that Coates had "approved an adjustment in school hours" for
the summer-school programs but that he did not recall seeing
anything in writing confirming the change.
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Sherri Shuttlesworth, a teacher at Northridge at the time
of the accident and now an assistant principal at Northridge,
testified that she taught in the summer-school programs during
the summer of 2009.  She stated that, during that summer, the
instructional hours were "either 9:00 to 1:00 or 8:00 to
12:00."
In addition to testimony from the foregoing witnesses,
Earnestine Tucker, a TCS Board of Education member at the time
of the accident, testified that such a change in instructional
hours would not be a violation of Board policy "[b]ecause
there is some flexibility based on the individual needs of the
schools and just so it is within the range of meeting those
hours there is some discretion that has to be allowed within
the framework of the policy."
Nothing in the summer-programs handbook indicates that
the instructional hours could not be altered for the benefit
of the students; it simply lists the instructional hours
without any further explanation.  In fact, both Espy and
Coates testified that the listing of the instructional hours
was primarily for the benefit of telling teachers the number
of hours for which they would be compensated during the summer
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session, not as a mandate for how long students were to remain
in class.  Indeed, the rest of the information on the page of
the summer-programs handbook addressing the credit-recovery
program focuses on teacher pay; nothing details teacher
supervision of students in the program.  Thus, all the
evidence presented indicates that Blunt did not violate a
detailed policy by scheduling different instructional hours.
Moreover, Blunt, Espy, and Shuttlesworth testified that
students enrolled in the summer-school programs could leave
class whenever they had completed their work for the day. 
Michael Daria, executive director of personnel for TCS at the
time of the accident and the current superintendent of TCS,
confirmed that it was also his understanding that summer-
school students could leave class whenever they wished
"subject to the classes they're in and what [the teachers]
have established for the operations."  Langston presented no
evidence contradicting that allowing students to leave class
was the regular practice during the summer session. 
It is undisputed that on June 28, 2010, Crawford had
finished his school work for the day when he told Blunt that
he was leaving class.  Thus, even if Blunt had used the
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instructional hours stated in the summer-programs handbook,
Crawford still would not have been prohibited from leaving
when he did.  In other words, no effective violation of a rule
in the summer-programs handbook occurred.
B.  The Resource Guide
In the trial court, Langston contended that Blunt acted
beyond her authority by allowing Crawford to leave school
without checking out according to the procedure dictated in
the resource guide.  Subsection J of the "Student Attendance
Policy" section of the resource guide addresses "Check-Out
from School."  Subsection J.1. states:  "Students who leave
school for any reason must check out through the principal's
office."  It is undisputed that Crawford did not check out
through the principal's office before he left the Northridge
campus on June 28, 2010.  Langston contends that Blunt failed
to enforce this detailed rule and that, in failing to do so,
she acted beyond her authority and is therefore not entitled
to State-agent immunity.
Blunt argues that the rule stated in subsection J.1. of
the "Student Attendance Policy" section in the resource guide
was not in force during the summer session.  Blunt contends
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that the check-out policy described in subsection J applied
only during the academic year, not during the summer session. 
Blunt testified that none of her students checked out through
the principal's office during summer school.  Blunt's
testimony was supported by testimony from Coates, Daria, and
Espy.  Coates testified that in the summer programs, "when
students completed the work for the day, I believe they were
checked out by the teachers, not through the principal's
office."  Daria testified that "[t]his document [the resource
guide] guides checking in and checking out for the defined 180
days as set forth in this student/parent resource guide and
code of student conduct."  Espy testified that "several"
sections of the resource guide "would not have been applicable
to the summer program."  Among the sections Espy testified did
not apply during the 
summer session were "tardies, checking-in
and checking-out of school," which he testified "would not
apply outside the regular school year."  Indeed, Espy
testified that, because the summer-school programs were
voluntary, he was not aware of "any policy by the [TCS] School
Board that would restrict a student's presence or attendance
in any summer program."  Espy also observed that "[t]here is
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no regulation in [the resource guide] that references a child
being required to attend a program outside of the regular
school year."
In contrast, Langston did not present any testimony or
evidence indicating that students who attended the summer
programs at Northridge (or any other City of Tuscaloosa
school) in 2010 checked out of school by first going to the
principal's office.  Instead, Langston asserts that several
witnesses, including Blunt, Coates, Tucker, and Espy, offered
contradictory testimony concerning whether the resource guide
applied during the summer programs.  He points to instances in
which those witnesses stated that the student code of conduct,
included in the resource guide, applied in the summer
programs.
However, a closer examination reveals that the witnesses
merely 
made 
a distinction between 
the 
administrative
procedures provided in the resource guide and the rules and
punishments dictated in the student code of conduct.  As Espy
explained, "students are subject to the Student Code of
Conduct when they're on school property or a school-sponsored
event," but several policies listed in the resource-guide
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portion of the document clearly applied only to the academic
year, which consisted of 180 days.  
The resource guide itself supports the foregoing
distinction. 
 
After 
a 
brief 
message 
from 
then 
TCS
Superintendent Joyce Levey to "Parents, Faculty, and Staff,"
the resource guide begins with the observation that "[o]ur
students spend a minimum of six hours a day in school and our
school year is 180 days."  The next page provides the
"Tuscaloosa City Schools 2009-2010 School Year Calendar Board
Approved 11/18/2008," which lists the day "Students return to
school" as "August 11, 2009," and the "Last Day for Students"
as "May 27, 2010."  The section titled "School Opening &
Closing Times" states that the "[o]fficial start time and end
times for school" with respect to "High School" are "8:00 a.m.
- 3:20 p.m."  The "Student Attendance Policy" section contains
several sections, such as "A. Absence from School," "D. Early
Warning Program for Unexcused Absence," and "E. Excessive
Unexcused Absences," that make sense only in the context of
the academic school year because of the compulsory attendance
requirement in the academic year.  A section titled "High
School Tardies" is similarly limited, stating that "High
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school students who accumulate five (5) or more check-
in/check-outs during the term will be required to submit an
official statement from the courts or a physician explaining
each absence for the remainder of the term."  (Emphasis
added.)  This portion of the resource guide also states:  "The
official school day for high school students is from 8:00 AM
until 3:20 PM.  Students arriving at school after 8:00 AM are
tardy."  
The foregoing excerpts from the resource guide illustrate
that several portions of the document applied only during the
180-day school academic year, and not during the summer
programs.  The "Student Attendance Policy" and "High School
Tardies" sections in particular address requirements for
students during the academic year.  
Given the context of subsection J.1. of the "Student
Attendance Policy" section, as well as the testimony from
multiple witnesses concerning its applicability, the evidence
before us dictates the conclusion that the requirement that
"[s]tudents who leave school for any reason must check out
through the principal's office" applied only during the
academic year and not during the summer program that Crawford
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was attending on June 28, 2010.  Therefore, Blunt did not act
beyond her authority by failing to require Crawford to check
out through the principal's office before he left the school
campus.  
C.  The Faculty Handbook
In the trial court, Langston contended that Blunt acted
beyond her authority by allowing Crawford to go to the
Northridge parking lot and to his car without having proper
authorization to do so.  A section of the faculty handbook
titled "M.1. Faculty and Staff Parking" provides:  "11.
Students are not to go to the parking lot or their vehicles
during the school day without a written pass from an
administrator and/or security personnel."  It is undisputed
that Crawford did not have a pass from an administrator or
security personnel before he went to the parking lot and got
into his car to go to McDonald's.  Langston contends that
Blunt failed to enforce this detailed rule and that, in
failing to do so, she acted beyond her authority and,
therefore, is not entitled to State-agent immunity.
In particular with respect to Blunt's alleged violation
of the rule stated in the faculty handbook, Langston contends
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that the situation is "strikingly similar in the facts,
argument, and analysis" to the situation in Ex parte Yancey,
8 So. 3d 299 (Ala. 2008).  Yancey involved injuries sustained
by Charles A. Coker, an 11th grade student at Southside High
School in Etowah County ("Southside"), which occurred when
Coker was ejected from the bed of a pickup truck on the
grounds of Southside.  Coker alleged that he was in the pickup
truck because Southside's head football coach and athletic
director, Brett Yancey, had instructed Coker and other
students in 
Yancey's first block weight-lifting class to clean
the weight room, locker room, and bathrooms located in the
field house and "to carry the filled trash barrels to the
school's [D]umpsters, which were located behind the school's
cafeteria, a relatively short distance from the field house."
8 So. 3d at 301.  Another student in the class, Matthew
Messer,
"retrieved his pick-up truck from a campus parking
lot and drove it to the field house, where the
students loaded the trash barrels onto the pick-up
truck.  Although Yancey testified that he routinely
allowed students to use their pick-up trucks to haul
the trash barrels to the [D]umpsters, he did not
specifically instruct the students -- including
Messer on this occasion -- to use one of their
vehicles to carry the trash barrels to the
[D]umpsters."  
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Id. 
(footnote omitted).  Coker's injuries occurred when Messer
was driving the pickup truck to the Dumpsters and the truck
hit a dip in the road.  The Court related:
"Yancey presented the affidavit of Jerome
Wilkens, a retired member of the Board, who
testified that the Board had no written policy
prohibiting students from leaving the school campus
in their vehicles during school hours.  Yancey
stated that students were permitted to leave campus
during school hours to attend vocational school,
baseball practice, and softball practice.  However,
the student handbook in effect at the time of the
incident provides under its general rules provision
that '[s]tudents are not permitted to go to a car or
parking lot without permission of Principal or
Assistant Principal.'  The student handbook also
provides the following with regard to parking rules:
'All students will come immediately into the school
after parking their cars, and shall not return to
the car until the end of the school day without
permission from the administration.  When possible
an administrator will accompany the student to the
car.'  Yancey stated that he was provided a copy of
the student handbook but that he had not read it.
..."
8 So. 3d at 302–03 (emphasis added).  
Coker contended that Yancey was not entitled to State-
agent immunity because he had not followed the rule in the
student handbook concerning students' going to their cars
during the school day.  One of Yancey's arguments with respect
to the applicability of the student handbook has some
relevance to this case.  He argued that the student handbook
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governed only students, not faculty.5  This Court flatly
rejected that argument.  
"The student handbook was provided to both
students and faculty alike.  Although the handbook
primarily references student conduct, it nonetheless
establishes by implication limits on the faculty's
authority.  In the context of a student-teacher
relationship, the teacher assumes the role of the
authority figure.  In order to function in that
role, the teacher assumes a duty pursuant to the
handbook to ensure that the student abides by the
limits placed on the conduct by the handbook.  For
example, if the handbook limits the student's
conduct by forbidding the student from returning to
his or her vehicle in the parking lot during the
school day, the teacher's authority with respect to
permitting or directing the student's conduct must
be correspondingly limited.  Otherwise, the teacher
would become complicit in the violation of the rule,
and the rule would be rendered meaningless.
Accordingly, we conclude that the student handbook
established 
limits 
on 
Yancey's 
authority 
in
exercising his judgment in educating students."
8 So. 3d at 306.  The Court ultimately concluded that Yancey's
authorizing the students to retrieve their vehicles from the
parking lot and to use their vehicles to haul trash was a
5Yancey also argued that, as director of athletics, he was
an "administrator" and that, therefore, he was allowed to give
the students permission to use their vehicles during the
school day.  The Court determined that Yancey could not
plausibly be considered an administrator as that term was
understood in the school system.
26
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"clear violation" of rules in the student handbook, 8 So. 3d
at 307, and it accordingly denied the petition.
Despite some similarity to the present case, one fact in
Yancey makes a crucial difference in 
analyzing the application
of State-agent immunity to educators.  In Yancey, it was
undisputed that Yancey had been given the student handbook and
that it governed student behavior on school grounds.  In
contrast, in this case Blunt unequivocally testified that she
was "not familiar with [the faculty handbook] and [had] never
been instructed by any administrator at Northridge or other
Board member or employee that I was expected to follow the
provisions of [the faculty handbook] during the summer of
2010."  Instead, the handbook with which Blunt was familiar
"was issued by Dr. Espy to each teacher and staff member at
Northridge at the beginning of each academic year and was
later turned in to the school’s office at the end of each
academic year."6  
The testimony of several other witnesses echoed Blunt's
testimony.  Espy testified "I don't believe I have ever seen
6It is undisputed that the faculty handbook issued by Espy
was not submitted into evidence in the trial court. 
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this document" when he was asked to identify the faculty
handbook.  More specifically, Espy was asked:
"Q.  So what we have here may not be the 2009 to
2010 Faculty Handbook?
"A.  It is not.
"Q.  Okay. Do you feel a hundred percent certain of
that?
"A.  One hundred percent."
Shuttlesworth testified that she "did not recall" there
being a faculty handbook for the summer of 2009 when she was
a teacher for the summer programs but that there was a faculty
handbook for the school academic year.  With respect to the
latter handbook, she stated:  "On the last day of school we
turned in our faculty handbooks to the secretary, and we
received the next school year's handbook when we returned in
August."  
Debbie Kizzire, who was the secretary at Northridge at
the time of the accident and who had the job of compiling the
handbook for the faculty, testified that she would collect the
handbooks from teachers at the end of the academic year and
would update them throughout the summer and then give them to
the teachers the first day of school the following academic
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year.  When shown the faculty handbook, Kizzire testified:
"That's not the handbook I make.  ...  Mine has a front page
that would have probably Northridge Jaguars, a picture of
something and a Jaguar, something every year.  And it would
have, like I said, the bell schedule, lunch schedule." 
Kizzire stated that she had "no idea" where the faculty
handbook came from.  
Marcia Irvin, a librarian who started at Northridge in
2003, testified that she did recognize portions of the faculty
handbook and that she had even written the part of it that
addressed the library.  However, Irvin stated that it was a
document that had been used when Margaret O'Neal was the
principal at Northridge in 2004.  O'Neal had wanted it placed
online "for faculty knowledge of forms and things like field
trip forms and medical forms and leave forms and she wanted it
to be electronic.  She wanted it to be online so that teachers
did not have to hunt around."  Irvin further explained:
"We only used it when Ms. O'Neal was there and I
think it was still online when Ms. [Jennifer] Box
who followed Ms. O'Neal, she was the acting
principal for like a year.  I think it was still
online then.  But we did not have it or I don't
remember it being online [after that].  But
Mr. [Eddie] Jaynes came after that [as principal],
he did not use the handbook."
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Irvin confirmed that when Espy became principal "he initiated
the three ring binder notebook and nothing was online at that
point in time.  He gave that three ring binder out at the
beginning of every year and took it up at the end of every
year."
A review of the faculty handbook itself reveals it to be
what perhaps could best be described as a chaotic document.
The table of contents does not closely correspond to the
sections in the document.  The document lists dates for events
as early as 2003 and as late as 2010. For example, one section
titled "Attendance Dates - Need new info for sch yr 2007-08"
lists the date "School Opens" as "August 11, 2005," and the
"Last Day for Students" as "May 25, 2006."  A later section
called "Calendar for the Year" lists dates for the 2007-2008
academic year.  Another later section lists "Teacher and Non-
Administrative Staff Supervision Assignments Northridge High
School 2005-2006."  One page lists a table of contents for
"Grading" for the 2007-2008 academic year, yet the page that
immediately follows it lists dates on which "Progress Reports"
would be issued for the 2009-2010 academic year.  Several
pages later is a section addressing "Staff Development" for
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the "2003-2004 School Year."  The document also includes a
"Tuscaloosa Schools Mentoring Guide 2005-2006."  
From all the submitted evidence, the one conclusion that
can be drawn is that whatever the faculty handbook may
represent, it was not a document that administrators or
faculty members at Northridge recognized as being in force at
any point in 2010.7  The inapplicability of the faculty
handbook is analogous to the situation presented in Ex parte
Trottman, 965 So. 2d 780 (Ala. 2007).  Trottman featured
claims of negligence and wantonness, as well as negligent
7Langston emphasizes in his brief that the trial court
denied Blunt's motion to strike the faculty handbook based on
a lack of authentication and that Blunt "could not and has not
appealed this evidentiary ruling ...."  Langston's brief,
p. 22 n.6.  In doing so, Langston implies that we cannot
review the applicability of the faculty handbook to Blunt. 
However, although it is true that "[m]andamus review of the
denial of a summary-judgment motion 'grounded on a claim of
immunity' is an exception to the general rule against
interlocutory review of the denial of summary-judgment
motions," it is also true that, "[i]n those exceptional cases,
'[w]e confine our interlocutory review to matters germane to
the issue of immunity.'"  Ex parte Simpson, 36 So. 3d 15, 22
(Ala. 2009) (quoting Ex parte Hudson, 866 So. 2d 1115, 1120
(Ala. 2003) (final emphasis added)).  Whether the faculty
handbook was a document with which Blunt should have been
familiar and was in force at the time she was supervising
Crawford are clearly matters germane to the issue of immunity.
Reviewing the trial court's order on summary judgment with
respect to Blunt's immunity requires an examination of the
applicability of the faculty handbook to Blunt.
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and/or wanton supervision or training, filed by T.W. on behalf
of her daughter, J.T., against a school principal, an
instructional assistant, and a school secretary.  The suit
arose out of an incident in which J.T. was checked out of
school and subsequently was sexually assaulted by an
18-year-old former student of the school, C.W., who had
falsely represented to the defendant instructional assistant
at the time of check-out that he was J.T.'s older brother. 
T.W. contended that, if the defendants had followed the check-
out 
procedures stated 
"in 
the 
1998–1999 
district-wide 
handbook
and the proposed 1999–2000 Mount Olive Elementary School
handbook," 965 So. 2d at 785, J.T. would not have been
permitted to leave with C.W.  
However, this Court concluded that T.W. had not
established that there was a check-out policy in place during
the time of the incident.
"Ross and Trottman ... presented evidence
indicating that there was not an official checkout
policy in place at Mount Olive Elementary School at
the time of the incident.  They submitted an
affidavit from Lee Henderson, the superintendent of
education for the Russell County Board of Education
at the time of J.T.'s assault.  He stated:
"'The 
Russell 
County 
Board 
of
Education did not have any policies,
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procedures, rules or regulations in place
regarding the checking out of students
during the 1999–2000 school year.  While
the Russell County Board of Education did
not require each school to have its own
handbook during the 1999–2000 school year,
we were in a transition period where each
school was in the process of formulating
its own handbook addressing the specific
needs of the school.  During this school
year, each principal, including Mr. Ross,
had the authority to put into effect those
procedures 
which 
best 
served 
the
circumstances 
of 
their 
community 
and
school.  Each principal also had the
authority to delegate the responsibility
for checking students out.'
"Thus, Henderson's affidavit establishes that there
was not a district policy regarding checking
students out of school.  Additionally, Ross and
Trottman presented evidence through the depositions
of Ross and other faculty and staff working at Mount
Olive Elementary School during the 1999–2000 school
year indicating that although there was a proposed
1999–2000 handbook for Mount Olive Elementary
School, the handbook was never adopted and there was
no school policy regarding checking students out of
school.  ...
"In light of the foregoing, T.W. has not
established that a specific checkout policy existed
at Mount Olive Elementary School at the time of the
incident; thus, she has not established that a
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
Ross and Trottman exceeded the scope of their
discretion by permitting J.T. to leave the school
grounds with C.W."
Id. at 785-86 (footnotes omitted).
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In this case, the faculty handbook is similar to the
"proposed" handbook 
in 
Trottman 
because 
Langston 
simply 
failed
to present any evidence indicating that the faculty handbook
was a document that anyone at Northridge referred to for
guidance in 2010.  Accordingly, Blunt was not bound by its
rule that "[s]tudents are not to go to the parking lot or
their vehicles during the school day without a written pass
from an administrator and/or security personnel."  
In sum, Langston failed to demonstrate the existence of
a detailed rule binding upon Blunt that would establish that
she acted beyond her authority when she allowed Crawford to
leave Northridge at the time and in the manner he did on
June 28, 2010.  In other words, Langston did not establish
that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
Blunt exceeded the scope of her discretion in supervising
students when she permitted Crawford to leave the school
grounds at 11:14 a.m. without checking out through the
principal's office or obtaining written permission from an
administrator or security personnel to access his car in the
campus parking lot.  Therefore, Blunt is entitled to State-
agent immunity from Langston's claims of negligence and
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wantonness for failing to follow "policies and procedures" of
TCS, which failure allegedly proximately caused the injuries
sustained by Matthew and Joshua.
IV.  Conclusion
Langston failed to demonstrate the existence of a
detailed rule binding upon Blunt that would establish that she
acted beyond her authority in supervising students when she
allowed Crawford to leave Northridge at the time and in the
manner he did on June 28, 2010.  Therefore, Blunt was entitled
to State-agent immunity from Langston's claims of negligence
and wantonness pertaining to her alleged violation of a TCS
policy or procedure.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers,
Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Mendheim, J., concurs specially.
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MENDHEIM, Justice (concurring specially).
I write separately to note that I read the main opinion
to be granting Sonia Blunt's petition for a writ of mandamus
only with respect to Keith Langston's claims that concern
Blunt's actions related to educating students, for which she
is entitled to State-agent immunity.  As I explain below, it
is apparent from the submissions to the trial court provided
to us in the petition that there is one claim that does not
fall into this category, i.e., a claim that concerns Blunt's
responsibility for 
Marcus 
Crawford's actions, 
for 
which 
State-
agent immunity is not available.
Langston's response in opposition to Blunt's summary-
judgment motion contained a section in which Langston argued
that "Crawford was acting as a servant of Blunt for purposes
of vicarious liability."  In that section, Langston contended
that, because Crawford had testified that Blunt gave him money
and told him to go to a McDonald's fast-food restaurant to get
lunch for her, substantial evidence existed that Crawford was
acting as a servant of Blunt at the time the accident occurred
and that Blunt was therefore "liable under the theory of
vicarious liability even for unlawful conduct of Crawford
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while he was engaged in the agency relationship for her
benefit." 
In her reply, Blunt provided two arguments in response to
Langston's contention that she was vicariously liable for
Crawford's actions.  First, she argued that, "even assuming
arguendo that he was running an errand for Ms. Blunt, his
decision to commit the felony of reckless manslaughter was
clearly outside of the line and scope of his duties.  As a
result, Ms. Blunt cannot be held liable for his criminal
actions."  Second, she contended that the trial court could
not "find that a factual dispute exists between Mr. Crawford's
criminal trial testimony and the testimony of Ms. Blunt"
because in his testimony during his criminal trial Crawford
simply testified that "a teacher" told him to get lunch for
the teacher at McDonald's.  Blunt argued that it could not be
inferred that Blunt was the teacher referred to in Crawford's
testimony.
On December 1, 2016, Langston submitted a motion seeking
to file a supplemental affidavit from Crawford.  In the
supplemental affidavit, Crawford named Blunt as the teacher
who gave him money and told him to get lunch for her at
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McDonald's on June 28, 2010.  On December 7, 2016, Blunt and
Patsy Lowry filed a motion to strike Crawford's affidavit.  In
that motion, they contended that the trial court should strike
the affidavit because, they said, it contained contradictory
testimony. 
As the main opinion notes, Langston later filed a
supplemental response to the summary-judgment motion.  Blunt
filed a reply to that response specifically addressing the new
contention asserted in Langston's amended response, but
otherwise chose to stand on her previously filed response.
Conspicuously absent from any of Blunt's submissions
related to her summary-judgment motion was any argument that
Langston had not pleaded a claim of vicarious liability in his
complaint.  To be clear, Langston did not state a claim of
vicarious liability in his complaint.  However, after he
raised vicarious liability in his response to the summary-
judgment motion, Blunt addressed the issue with arguments on
the merits.  Blunt did not object that the issue of vicarious
liability should not be considered because the facts
supporting it and a claim asserting it were not alleged in
Langston's complaint.  Likewise, when Langston submitted a
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belated affidavit from Crawford naming Blunt as the teacher
who had given him money and told him to get her lunch at
McDonald's -- the clear purpose of which was to support
Langston's argument for vicarious liability -- Blunt's motion
to strike Crawford's affidavit did not object that Crawford's
testimony 
should 
be 
rejected 
because 
Crawford's asserted 
facts
were not alleged in Langston's complaint.  In short, Blunt
never contended in the trial court in either of her two
replies to Langston's summary-judgment response or in her
motion to strike Crawford's affidavit that Langston never
pleaded vicarious liability in his complaint.
"It is well settled law in Alabama that implied
consent of the parties can be found when an opposing
party fails to object to the introduction of
evidence raising the disputed issue initially.
International Rehabilitation Associates Inc. v.
Adams, 613 So. 2d 1207, 1213 (Ala. 1993); Bischoff
v. Thomasson, 400 So. 2d 359 (Ala. 1981).  See
McDuffie v. Hooper,  294 Ala. 293, 315 So. 2d 573
(1975); Rafield v. Johnson, 294 Ala. 235, 314 So. 2d
695 (1975).  As noted in the Committee Comments to
Rule 15, Ala. R. Civ. P., 'Under the rule where
evidence is introduced or an issue raised with the
express consent of the other party, or without
objection from him, the pleadings "shall" be deemed
amended to conform to such evidence.'"
Hosea O. Weaver & Sons, Inc. v. Towner, 663 So. 2d 892, 896–97
(Ala. 1995).  Because Blunt failed to object to Langston's
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introduction of evidence and arguments concerning vicarious
liability and instead addressed the merits of that claim, the
complaint was deemed amended to conform to the evidence. 8
8I note that there is a conflict of authority in our cases
concerning whether Rule 15(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., applies only
at trial or if pleadings can be amended through implied
consent of the parties on motion for summary judgment.  In
Rector v. Better Houses, Inc., 820 So. 2d 75, 79 (Ala. 2001),
decided in June 2001, the Court stated that "where there is no
trial, Rule 15(b) cannot apply."  However, in Ex parte Neese,
819 So. 2d 584 (Ala. 2001), decided in October 2001, a
division of the Court consisting of Justices who had all
concurred in Rector, concluded that, under Rule 15(b), an
open-and-obvious defense raised by the defendant in her
summary-judgment motion in a slip-and-fall case was properly
considered by the trial court because "[t]here is no evidence
in the record that [the plaintiff] ever objected to the
introduction of the open-and-obvious defense at any time
before the entry of the summary judgment."  819 So. 2d at 589.
The conflict is not unique to this Court.  Federal courts
are likewise divided on the issue whether Rule 15(b), Fed. R.
Civ. P., applies only at trial or if the principle of amended
pleadings through implied consent of the parties applies at
the summary-judgment stage.  See, e.g., Ahmad v. Furlong, 435
F.3d 1196, 1203 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying Rule 15(b) to
summary judgment but noting many conflicting cases among the
federal circuits); Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d
1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that "[a] plaintiff may
not amend her complaint through argument in a brief opposing
summary judgment"); Handzlik v. United States, 93 F. App'x 15,
17 (5th Cir. 2004) (not selected for publication in the
Federal Reporter) (observing that "[i]n this circuit ... it
seems that Rule 15(b) may apply at the summary judgment
stage"); Baker v. Chicago Fire & Burglary Detection, Inc., 489
F.2d 953, 955 n.3 (7th Cir. 1973) (finding that, "[i]n a
proper case, where a motion for summary judgment is supported
by matters outside the pleadings, the court could deem the
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A claim of vicarious liability does not seek to hold
Blunt liable for her act of allegedly failing to keep Crawford
from leaving the school at the time and in the manner he did
-- an act for which Blunt is clothed with State-agent immunity
because it involves an aspect of her educating students.
Instead, it seeks to hold Blunt liable for Crawford's act of
hitting the vehicle being driven by Susan Langston.  See,
e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 643 So. 2d 551, 556
(Ala. 
1994) 
(defining 
"vicarious 
liability" 
as 
"liability that
the law imposes on one party for the wrongful conduct of
another").  This act does not implicate educating students,
and Blunt never presented in the trial court, nor does she
assert in her petition, an argument that this act involves a
another function that would entitle Blunt to State-agent
immunity.  Accordingly, Blunt was not entitled to a summary
judgment based on State-agent immunity with respect to
Langston's claim of vicarious liability, and the main opinion
does not purport to address that claim in any way.
answer amended to conform to the proof offered").
41