Title: McCandless v. Ramsey

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 111 
Docket: 
Was-18-28 
Argued: 
October 11, 2018 
Decided: 
July 11, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, HUMPHREY, and CLIFFORD,* JJ. 
Majority: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and, GORMAN, HJELM, and CLIFFORD, JJ. 
Concurrence/ 
     Dissent: 
MEAD, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
NANCY J. McCANDLESS 
 
v. 
 
JOHN RAMSEY et al.  
 
 
SAUFLEY, C.J. 
[¶1]  Twenty years ago, responding to concerns about the costs of 
providing places for people to board and ride horses, the Legislature 
established immunity from liability for certain injuries suffered through the 
risks inherent in equine activities.  See P.L. 1999, ch. 498, §§ 2-6 (effective 
Sept. 18, 1999) (codified at 7 M.R.S. §§ 4101, 4103-A (2018)); L.D. 2108, 
Summary (119th Legis. 1999).  We are asked for the first time to address the 
scope of that immunity. 
                                         
*  Although not present at the oral argument, Justice Clifford did participate in the development of 
this opinion.  See M.R. App. P. 12(a)(2) (“A qualified justice may participate in a decision even though 
not present at oral argument.”). 
 
2 
[¶2]  Nancy J. McCandless appeals from a summary judgment entered by 
the Superior Court (Washington County, Mallonee, J.) concluding that John and 
Tracy Ramsey’s daughter is immune from liability on McCandless’s complaint 
alleging that the child negligently rode a horse in an arena, causing injury to 
McCandless.  We affirm the Superior Court’s judgment holding that the 
immunity statute precludes the liability that could otherwise arise from the 
equine activities at issue here. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶3]  The basic facts are these: McCandless was standing on a track inside 
a riding arena when a horse ridden by the Ramseys’ ten-year-old daughter, 
after passing directly by McCandless three times, made contact with her during 
a fourth circuit.  McCandless fell and injured her wrist, and she has now sued 
the child through her parents, seeking damages for her injuries.   
[¶4]  The following details of the event are taken from the parties’ 
statements of material facts and reflect the record as viewed in the light most 
favorable to McCandless as the nonprevailing party.  See Avis Rent A Car Sys., 
LLC v. Burrill, 2018 ME 81, ¶ 2, 187 A.3d 583.  On July 7, 2010, McCandless went 
to a horse arena to watch children ride horses.  In the arena, a circular track one 
to two inches deep had been worn into the dirt and was visible to onlookers.  
 
3 
Horses were not restricted to this track, however, and they rode throughout the 
arena and near the doors to the barn in which the arena was situated. 
[¶5]  Spectators were accommodated in the interior of the barn, which 
included an observation room with a plexiglass window where people could 
observe the activities inside the structure.  McCandless had been sitting outside 
of the observation room in one of a set of folding chairs that were arranged 
along the side of the indoor arena away from the horses.   
[¶6]  McCandless got up from her seat and began walking from the folding 
chairs toward what she considered to be the most convenient barn exit.  On her 
way, McCandless walked around some hay bales, which McCandless admits 
caused her to walk in the area where people rode horses.   
[¶7]  The Ramseys’ daughter, then ten years old, was riding a horse she 
had not ridden before in the indoor arena area.  The girl completed three 
circuits in the arena, passing McCandless and others each time.  At some point 
during her fourth circuit in the arena, the horse was slow to respond to the child 
rider’s directions, and the horse made contact with McCandless when she was 
between five and fifteen feet from the barn door.  McCandless fell and injured 
her wrist.   
 
4 
[¶8]  On July 6, 2016, McCandless filed a complaint against the Ramseys 
“as parents” of their daughter seeking damages for medical bills, pain and 
suffering, lost enjoyment of life, and permanent impairment allegedly incurred 
due to the Ramseys’ daughter’s negligence.  See M.R. Civ. P. 17(b); Miller v. 
Miller, 677 A.2d 64, 67 (Me. 1996); see also 19-A M.R.S. § 1651 (2018).1  The 
Ramseys moved for summary judgment on the ground that McCandless’s 
negligence action was barred due to the statutory immunity provisions of 
7 M.R.S. §§ 4101 and 4103-A.   
[¶9]  The court granted the Ramseys’ motion for summary judgment, 
holding that section 4103-A(1) provides a broad immunity from liability for 
injuries arising out of equine activities under routine conditions.  The court 
concluded that none of the statutory exceptions to immunity applied.  See id. 
§ 4103-A(2)-(4).  McCandless filed a timely notice of appeal.  See 14 M.R.S. 
§ 1851 (2018); M.R. App. P. 2A, 2B(c)(1).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶10]  For purposes of summary judgment, we accept as true that the 
horse came in contact with McCandless and that McCandless was injured as a 
                                         
1  There has been no allegation of parental negligence.  Cf. Bedard v. Bateman, 665 A.2d 214 (Me. 
1995).  Nor has McCandless alleged that the Ramseys’ daughter “willfully or maliciously cause[d]” 
McCandless’s injuries.  Cf. 14 M.R.S. § 304 (2018). 
 
5 
result of that contact.  McCandless’s appeal concerns only whether the court 
properly interpreted and applied the immunity statutes to preclude her suit 
against the Ramseys’ daughter. 
 
[¶11]  We review this decision granting a summary judgment “de novo, 
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, to 
determine whether the parties’ statements of material facts reveal a genuine 
issue of material fact.”  Hilderbrand v. Wash. Cty. Comm’rs, 2011 ME 132, ¶ 7, 33 
A.3d 425.  “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence requires a 
fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the truth.”  Farrington’s 
Owners’ Ass’n v. Conway Lake Resorts, Inc., 2005 ME 93, ¶ 9, 878 A.2d 504. 
 
[¶12]  Because the person asserting the affirmative defense of immunity 
bears the burden of proof, see Hilderbrand, 2011 ME 132, ¶ 7, 33 A.3d 425, we 
review the summary judgment record to determine whether there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the Ramseys have established the 
applicability of the immunity provision as a matter of law, see M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); 
Stanley v. Hancock Cty. Comm’rs, 2004 ME 157, ¶ 13, 864 A.2d 169. 
[¶13]  We review de novo the trial court’s interpretation and application 
of the relevant statutes governing immunity.  See Perry v. Dean, 2017 ME 35, 
¶ 11, 156 A.3d 742; Bank of Am., N.A. v. Camire, 2017 ME 20, ¶¶ 12, 13, 155 A.3d 
 
6 
416.  “If the statute is unambiguous, we interpret the statute according to its 
unambiguous language, unless the result is illogical or absurd.”  Wawenock, LLC 
v. Dep’t of Transp., 2018 ME 83, ¶ 7, 187 A.3d 609 (quotation marks omitted).  
To the extent that there is any ambiguity in the statute, meaning that it could 
reasonably be interpreted in more than one way, we “consider the statute’s 
meaning in light of its legislative history and other indicia of legislative intent.”  
Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶14]  Maine’s Legislature enacted the immunity provisions at issue here 
in 1999.  See P.L. 1999, ch. 498, §§ 2, 5.  With certain exceptions, the statute 
provides that a person engaged in equine activity is immune from liability “for 
any property damage or damages arising from the personal injury or death of a 
participant or spectator resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities.”  
7 M.R.S. § 4103-A(1). 
[¶15]  McCandless concedes that the Ramseys’ daughter was a person 
engaged in equine activity and that McCandless was a spectator.  See id.  
McCandless argues, however, that a factual dispute exists as to whether her 
injury resulted from “the inherent risks of equine activities.”  Id.  Inherent risks 
of equine activities are, by statutory definition, “those dangers and conditions 
 
7 
that are an integral part of equine activities.”  Id. § 4101(7-A).  These dangers 
and conditions include, but are not limited to, the following: 
A.  The propensity of an equine to behave in ways that might result 
in damages to property or injury, harm or death to persons on or 
around the equine.  Such equine behavior includes, but is not 
limited to, bucking, shying, kicking, running, biting, stumbling, 
rearing, falling and stepping on; 
 
B.  The unpredictability of an equine’s reaction to such things as 
sounds, sudden movements and unfamiliar objects, persons or 
other animals;  
 
C.  Certain hazards such as surface and subsurface conditions; 
 
D.  Collisions with other equines or objects; and 
 
E.  Unpredictable or erratic actions by others relating to equine 
behavior. 
 
Id.2 
[¶16]  The circumstances that led to McCandless’s injury epitomize the 
types of risks that are inherent in equine activities.  The dangers or conditions 
inherent in equine activities certainly include the danger of being injured when 
a horse and rider pass too close to a spectator standing in the track of a horse 
arena.  A horse’s unanticipated resistance to the rider’s directions is part and 
                                         
2  Contrary to McCandless’s contention, the dangers and conditions inherent in equine activities 
relate to more than just a horse’s potential to act unpredictably.  See Zuckerman v. Coastal Camps, Inc., 
716 F. Supp. 2d 23, 31 (D. Me. 2010) (“[T]he inherent risks to equine activities listed in the statute 
pertain to the unpredictable nature of equine behavior, the unpredictable conduct of other 
individuals, and certain natural hazards . . . .” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 
8 
parcel of the “propensity of an equine to behave in ways that may result in . . . 
injury . . . to persons on or around the equine.”  Id. § 4101(7-A)(A).   
 
[¶17]  To the extent that there is any ambiguity, however, we must 
construe the statute in light of the legislative history.  The Legislature, in 
enacting the immunity provision, “revise[d] the equine activity laws to confirm 
that there are inherent risks involved in equine activities that are impracticable 
or impossible to eliminate due to the nature of equines.”  L.D. 2108, Summary 
(119th Legis. 1999).  The Committee on Agriculture, Conservation and 
Forestry, which recommended passage of the bill, accepted written materials 
from representatives of the Maine Equine Advisory Council, the Maine Equine 
Industry Association, and the University of Maine, and from owners of horses 
and equine facilities.  Hearing on An Act to Clarify the Equine Activity Law, L.D. 
2108, Before the Joint Standing Committee on Agriculture, Conservation & 
Forestry, 119th Legis. (Apr. 1999) (materials submitted by Jacquelyn 
Krupinksy, Sarah Brooks, Rick Shepherd, Jim Jaeger, Stephen G. Ulman, and 
James A. Weber).  These organizations and individuals urged the committee to 
recommend the law’s passage so that horse owners, and operators of 
horse-related businesses, could engage in equine activities without risking 
 
9 
excessive liability or facing exorbitant, possibly prohibitively expensive, 
insurance premiums.  Id. 
 
[¶18]  Interpreting the statute at issue as McCandless requests would 
thwart the entire purpose of the law to curtail liability for injuries arising from 
risks that are “impracticable or impossible to eliminate due to the nature of 
equines” and to allow reasonable access to insurance for those engaged in 
horse-related activities.  L.D. 2108, Summary (119th Legis. 1999); see Hearing 
on An Act to Clarify the Equine Activity Law, L.D. 2108, Before the Joint Standing 
Committee on Agriculture, Conservation & Forestry, 119th Legis. (Apr. 1999) 
(materials submitted by Jacquelyn Krupinksy, Sarah Brooks, Rick Shepherd, Jim 
Jaeger, Stephen G. Ulman, and James A. Weber).  Reading the statute not to 
provide immunity to the child in these circumstances would be unreasonable 
and against the intentions of the Legislature, and we will not construe the 
statute in such a manner.  See Wawenock, LLC, 2018 ME 83, ¶ 7, 187 A.3d 609. 
 
[¶19]  Given the particularized definition of the “inherent risks of equine 
activities” applicable here, and the legislative history available for purposes of 
interpreting any ambiguity in the statute, we conclude as a matter of law that, 
on the facts presented on summary judgment, immunity has attached.  See 
7 M.R.S. §§ 4101(7-A), 4103-A(1); cf. Merrill v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 1997 
 
10 
ME 180, ¶¶ 5, 7 & n.3, 698 A.2d 1042 (holding—when the statute did not define 
the term “risk of the dangers inherent in the sport” of skiing—that the issue of 
whether the plaintiff’s injuries arose from those risks was a question of fact 
(quotation marks omitted)).3 
[¶20]  The Ramseys’ daughter is therefore entitled to immunity unless 
one of the statutory exceptions to immunity applies.  See 7 M.R.S. 
§ 4103-A(2)-(4).  McCandless argues that two exceptions apply because (A) the 
Ramseys’ daughter acted recklessly in causing McCandless’s injury and 
(B) McCandless was in an area where horses would not be expected or that was 
a protected area for spectators.  See id. § 4103-A(2)(C), (4). 
A. 
Exception for Injuries Resulting from a Reckless Disregard for the Safety 
of Others 
 
[¶21]  Immunity will not lie if the party involved in equine activities 
“[c]ommit[ted] an act or omission that constitute[d] reckless disregard for the 
safety of others and that act or omission caused the injury.”  Id. § 4103-A(2)(C).4  
                                         
3  McCandless also argues that the trial court improperly placed on her the duty to demonstrate 
that her injury did not arise from an inherent risk of equine activity.  See Hilderbrand v. Wash. Cty. 
Comm’rs, 2011 ME 132, ¶ 7, 33 A.3d 425 (holding that the person asserting the affirmative defense 
of immunity bears the burden of proof).  We discern no such misapplication of the burden and, 
reviewing the summary judgment de novo, conclude that the material facts, viewed in the light most 
favorable to McCandless, show that McCandless’s injury resulted from the inherent risks of equine 
activity. 
 
4  Although not raised by the Ramseys, the heading for this exception suggests that it should apply 
only if a participant in equine activity—not a mere spectator—is injured.  Compare 7 M.R.S. 
 
11 
For purposes of the statute, “[a] person acts recklessly with respect to a result 
of the person’s conduct when the person consciously disregards a risk that the 
person’s conduct will cause such a result.”  17-A M.R.S. § 35(3)(A) (2018); see 
7 M.R.S. § 4103-A(2)(C). 
[¶22]  Although “conscious disregard” is a subjective state of mind that 
may be inferred from objective conduct, there are no facts on this record from 
which such a state of mind could be inferred.  See State v. Taylor, 661 A.2d 665, 
668 (Me. 1995); State v. Goodall, 407 A.2d 268, 280 (Me. 1979).  The Ramseys’ 
ten-year-old daughter was riding this particular horse for the first time.  When 
the girl approached McCandless on her fourth circuit, she attempted to steer 
the horse to avoid a collision, but the horse took longer than the girl expected 
to respond to her directions, and she had difficulty getting the horse to turn, 
which led to the collision at issue.  Although these facts may suggest negligence, 
and indeed it is negligence that McCandless has alleged in her complaint, they 
are not facts from which a trier of fact could find that McCandless was injured 
because the child consciously disregarded a known safety risk.   
                                         
§ 4103-A(2) (2018) (entitled, “Exceptions; participants”) with 7 M.R.S. § 4103-A(4) (2018) (entitled, 
“Exceptions; persons who are not participants”); but see 1 M.R.S. § 71(10) (2018) (“Abstracts of 
Titles, chapters and sections, and notes are not legal provisions.”).  Because we conclude that the 
exception is inapplicable for other reasons, we do not address this question further. 
 
12 
B. 
Exception for Injuries Occurring in Places Where Horses Would Not Be 
Expected or in Designated Spectator Locations 
 
[¶23]  McCandless next argues that the Ramseys’ daughter is not immune 
from liability because she either 
A.  Cause[d] injury . . . to a person who [was] not a participant and 
who [was] in a place where a reasonable person would not expect 
an equine activity to occur; or 
 
B.  Cause[d] injury . . . to a spectator and that spectator was in a 
place designated or intended by an activity sponsor as a place for 
spectators. 
 
7 M.R.S. § 4103-A(4). 
 
[¶24]  By McCandless’s own report, the incident occurred in an area 
where a reasonable person would expect equine activity to occur.  See id. 
§ 4103-A(4)(A).  Specifically, McCandless was standing in an area where horses 
were ridden, and she saw the Ramseys’ daughter ride directly past her three 
times before the accident.  The place where she stood was a place where equine 
activity was, in fact, occurring and where it could be expected to occur, and 
McCandless herself observed that equine activity was occurring there.   
 
[¶25]  Nor do the facts—viewed in the light most favorable to 
McCandless—show that McCandless was in a designated spectator area.  See id. 
§ 4103-A(4)(B).  A designated observation room was available, but the incident 
did not occur in that observation room.  In the arena grounds where 
 
13 
McCandless suffered her injury, there was no differentiation between horse 
traffic areas and pedestrian traffic areas.  Although the area near where 
McCandless stood was used by pedestrians to exit the arena, she was standing 
in an area that was intended to be used—and was actually being used—for 
equestrian activities and not an area “designated or intended . . . for spectators.”  
Id.  The specifically designated spectator area is not where McCandless was 
standing, or exiting from, when the collision occurred.   
[¶26]  Because the facts—viewed in the light most favorable to 
McCandless—show that no statutory exception to immunity applies, we 
conclude, as did the trial court, that the Ramseys’ daughter is entitled to 
immunity pursuant to section 4103-A(1) as a matter of law.  Cf. Zuckerman v. 
Coastal Camps, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 2d 23, 32-33 & n.5 (D. Me. 2010) (concluding 
that summary judgment was inappropriate because there were questions of 
material fact regarding the applicability of a statutory exception to immunity 
from liability for equine activities). 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
MEAD, J., with whom JABAR and HUMPHREY, JJ., join, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
 
[¶27]  I concur in part with, and respectfully dissent in part from, the 
Court’s opinion.  I do not disagree with the Court’s description of the immunity 
from liability for equine activities established by Section 4103-A of Title 7 of 
the Maine Revised Statutes and the court’s discussion of the objectives behind 
that statute.  It is clear that the Maine Legislature created a broad immunity, 
with narrow exceptions, for liability resulting from equine activities.  I diverge 
from the Court’s conclusions, however, based upon the Court’s application of 
our standard of review of summary judgments to two of the narrow 
exceptions.5  In reviewing the Superior Court’s granting of summary judgment 
de novo, and viewing the facts of this matter in the light most favorable to 
McCandless as we must, I would conclude that genuine issues of material fact 
exist regarding the application of two exceptions to the statutory immunity for 
equine activity.  I would vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand for 
trial on those limited issues only. 
[¶28]  Subsection 4 of 7 M.R.S. § 4103-A provides: 
4.  Exceptions; persons who are not participants.  Nothing in 
subsection 1 prevents or limits the liability of an equine activity 
                                         
5  I concur in the Court’s opinion in all other aspects. 
 
15 
sponsor, an equine professional or any other person engaged in an 
equine activity, if that equine activity: 
 
A.  Causes injury or death to a person who is not a participant 
and who is in a place where a reasonable person would not 
expect an equine activity to occur; or 
 
B.  Causes injury or death to a spectator and that spectator 
was in a place designated or intended by an activity sponsor 
as a place for spectators. 
 
 
[¶29]  Under subsection (4)(A), the Ramseys would not be immune from 
liability if McCandless’s injury occurred in a place where a reasonable person 
would not expect an equine activity to occur—an objective inquiry that is 
ordinarily entrusted in the first instance to the trier of fact, not an appellate 
court on a review of a summary judgment.  In their statement of material facts 
supporting their motion for summary judgment, the Ramseys asserted that the 
collision occurred in an area where it was typical to see horses.  This assertion, 
if uncontroverted, would be dispositive of the issue: the subsection (4)(A) 
exception would not be available to McCandless to avoid the immunity 
provided by 7 M.R.S. § 4103-A(1). 
[¶30]  McCandless properly controverted that fact, however, asserting 
that horses did not ride in the area regularly used by pedestrians to exit the 
building when pedestrians were present.  Accepting that fact, as we must, in the 
light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment has been 
 
16 
granted, McCandless has established, for the purposes of summary judgment 
review, that equine activities would not take place in the vicinity of the collision 
if pedestrians were present.  The questions of (1) whether or not this conditional 
practice actually existed, or (2) whether it indeed occurred on July 7, 2010, or 
(3) whether a reasonable person would have held McCandless’s opinions and 
perceptions at the moment of the collision, are categorically questions of fact 
that are exclusively the province of the finder of fact and cannot be resolved by 
summary judgment.6  See Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 7, 784 A.2d 18 
(“If material facts are disputed, the dispute must be resolved through 
fact-finding . . . .”). 
 
[¶31]  Additionally, the exception provided in subsection (4)(B) may also 
operate to avoid the immunity created in section 4103-A(1) if McCandless was 
in a place designated or intended as a place for spectators.  The undisputed facts 
establish that the indoor arena was located in a barn with an observation room 
                                         
6  The Court posits that because the Ramseys’ daughter had ridden the horse past McCandless in 
the same spot on three earlier occasions, this establishes that it is impossible, as a matter of law, that 
McCandless could ever prove that she was in an area where she would not expect equine activity to 
take place.  See Court’s Opinion ¶ 24.  Despite the fact that we may deem a litigant to have a steep 
challenge in proving a necessary element at trial, or find her assertions seemingly implausible, we 
may not superimpose our perceptions of the permissible inferences to be drawn from disputed facts 
in our appellate review of summary judgments.  See Rose v. Parsons, 2015 ME 73, ¶ 4, 118 A.3d 220 
(“[The s]ummary judgment process is not a substitute for trial, even if the likelihood of success at 
trial by one party or another is small.  When facts or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts 
are in dispute, the court must engage in fact-finding, and summary judgment is not available.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 
17 
from which spectators could observe the goings-on in the barn.  Additionally, 
folding chairs had been placed along the interior wall of the barn in the indoor 
arena; horses were not typically present in this area.  The parties do not dispute 
that the observation room and the chairs along the wall were designated as 
places for spectators. 
[¶32]  Prior to the incident, McCandless had been sitting in one of the 
folding chairs.  The collision occurred after she left the area of the chairs and 
was proceeding to the south barn exit to leave the arena.  The fact that the 
observation room and the folding chairs were located inside the building and 
could be accessed by a spectator only by entering or exiting through one or the 
other of the doors presents a plausible conclusion: the exit routes between the 
observation points and the doors may be deemed, by extension, places 
designated for spectators.  That conclusion, and the purely factual question of 
whether McCandless’s most direct exit route required her to pass through the 
area where the collision occurred are, again, questions of fact that cannot be 
determined on this summary judgment record. 
[¶33]  Because unresolved questions of material fact remain surrounding 
the issue of whether the subsection 4(A) or 4(B) statutory exceptions to liability 
apply, we should not conclude that the Ramseys are entitled to immunity under 
 
18 
section 4103-A(1) as a matter of law.  See Zuckerman v. Coastal Camps, Inc., 
716 F. Supp. 2d 23, 32 n.5 (D. Me. 2010). 
 
[¶34]  I would partially vacate the granting of summary judgment and 
remand for trial on the issues of whether the subsection 4(A) and 4(B) 
exceptions to immunity apply.  I would affirm the granting of summary 
judgment on all other issues relating to liability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arthur J. Greif, Esq. (orally), Gilbert & Greif, P.A., Bangor, for appellant Nancy J. 
McCandless 
 
Gregory S. Clayton, Esq. (orally), Primmer Piper Eggleston & Cramer PC, 
Camden, for appellees John Ramsey et al. 
 
 
Washington County Superior Court docket number CV-2016-14 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY