Title: State v. Ramunas

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Ramunas, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4199.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-4199 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. RAMUNAS, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Ramunas, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4199.] 
Certification of conflict dismissed as having been improvidently certified. 
(No. 2021-1380—Submitted July 13, 2022—Decided November 29, 2022.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Delaware County, 
No. 20 CAA 12 0054, 2021-Ohio-3191. 
__________________ 
{¶ 1} Sua sponte, the certification of conflict is dismissed as having been 
improvidently certified. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY, J., as to Part I. 
_________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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FISCHER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 2} I respectfully dissent from the decision to dismiss this appeal as 
having been improvidently certified.  I agree with the first point made in the other 
dissenting opinion: by dismissing this appeal, we lose an opportunity to respond to 
a certified-conflict question and to provide Ohio’s courts with guidance in an area 
of law that has proved challenging for those courts.  See dissenting opinion of 
DeWine, J., ¶ 1. 
{¶ 3} Rather than dismiss this case as having been improvidently certified, 
I would conclude that when the record contains evidence demonstrating that 
burglary and theft offenses caused separate and distinct harms to a victim, then for 
purposes of R.C. 2941.25, the offenses of burglary and theft are not allied offenses 
of similar import.  I would accordingly answer the certified-conflict question in the 
negative, reverse the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals, and reinstate 
the judgment of the trial court. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 4} From December 2019 to February 2020, appellee, Kristen Ramunas, 
was an employee of an assisted-living facility where she stole credit cards, jewelry, 
and personal items from six elderly residents.  She was indicted on two counts of 
second-degree-felony burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2); three counts of 
fifth-degree-felony theft, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1); three counts of fourth-
degree-felony theft, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1); and two counts of fourth-
degree-felony identity fraud, in violation of R.C. 2913.49(B)(2). 
{¶ 5} Ramunas pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offenses of burglary, 
third-degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(3), and to the remaining 
counts in the indictment. 
{¶ 6} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court raised the issue whether the 
burglary and theft offenses should be merged.  Appellant, the state, maintained that 
the offenses should not be merged, because the harm from burglary is different than 
January Term, 2022 
 
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the harm from theft.  The state also argued that when Ramunas trespassed into the 
victims’ rooms that the burglaries were complete, whereas the thefts were not 
complete until Ramunas either disposed of the stolen items or did something that 
otherwise indicated that the stolen items would not be returned to the victims.  
Ramunas countered that the burglary and theft offenses should be merged because 
her purpose in committing the burglaries and thefts was the same. 
{¶ 7} The state then presented testimony from a few of the victims’ family 
members.  The son-in-law of a married couple that was victimized by Ramunas 
informed the court that his in-laws had been “seriously impacted in regards to the 
trust that they [had] lost in their living situation and [in] the staff that remain[ed] 
behind.”  He also expressed the impact of his in-laws’ loss of their belongings, 
specifically the emotional impact occasioned by the theft of his father-in-law’s 
wedding ring.  He stressed that it was not the loss of the ring’s monetary value but 
what it represented—68 years of marriage—that was so significant. 
{¶ 8} The trial court concluded that the burglary and theft offenses should 
not be merged, because each offense had a separate purpose and resulted in a 
separate harm.  It reasoned that burglary impacts a person’s ability to live 
peacefully within his or her own residence, which is different from the impact of 
theft. 
{¶ 9} The trial court sentenced Ramunas to an aggregate prison term of four 
and a half years.  The court imposed a nine-month prison sentence for each burglary 
offense, to run concurrently with the six-month prison sentence imposed for each 
of the burglary-related theft offenses.  The court also imposed a six-month prison 
sentence for each of the remaining theft and identity-fraud offenses, to run 
consecutively to one another and to the sentences imposed for the burglary and 
burglary-related theft offenses. 
{¶ 10} The Fifth District reversed, finding that the trial court erred by not 
merging the burglary and burglary-related theft offenses.  2021-Ohio-3191, ¶ 20.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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It examined this court’s holding in State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-
995, 34 N.E.3d 892, and concluded that the harm caused by the burglaries was not 
separate and identifiable from the harm caused by the thefts.  2021-Ohio-3191 at  
¶ 19.  It reasoned that Ramunas’s sole intent in entering the victims’ rooms was to 
steal and that therefore, her conduct and the animus for entering the rooms and for 
stealing the items were identical.  Id. at ¶ 18.  The appellate court stated that to find 
that the harm caused by the burglaries was separate and identifiable from the harm 
caused by the thefts would nullify R.C. 2941.25, the allied-offenses statute.  Id. at 
¶ 19. 
{¶ 11} The Fifth District certified its judgment to this court as being in 
conflict with the judgment of the Fourth District in State v. Gillman, 2015-Ohio-
4421, 46 N.E.3d 130 (4th Dist.), which held that theft offenses and burglary 
offenses are not allied offenses of similar import subject to merger.  We determined 
that a conflict exists and ordered the parties to brief the following question: 
 
“If an individual trespasses in an occupied structure when 
any person other than an accomplice of the offender is present or 
likely to be present with the sole purpose of committing a theft 
offense therein, are the burglary and the resulting theft offense allied 
offenses of similar import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25?” 
 
165 Ohio St.3d 1531, 2022-Ohio-280, 180 N.E.3d 1155, quoting the Fifth District’s 
October 14, 2021 entry. 
II.  LAW AND ANALYSIS 
A.  The parties’ arguments 
{¶ 12} In this case, the state argues that the burglary and theft offenses 
caused separate and identifiable harms to the victims and, therefore, are not allied 
offenses of similar import.  While the two offenses are often committed during the 
January Term, 2022 
 
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same course of conduct, the state contends that their imports are significantly 
different.  The state contends that a person’s sense of safety and security in his or 
her home is violated when that person’s residence is burglarized.  And the person’s 
feelings arising from that violation are not lessened if the burglar does not take any 
of the person’s possessions or if the economic harm caused by the burglary is 
minimal or nonexistent.  The state maintains that the legislature recognizes the 
significant harm that burglary inflicts on the victim and that it treats the offense of 
burglary more severely than the offense of theft. 
{¶ 13} In support of its argument, the state points to the analysis employed 
by the Fourth District in Gillman and that court’s finding that one of the victims in 
that case identified a harm resulting from the burglary offense that was separate 
from the harm caused by the theft offense.  In Gillman, the defendant was charged 
with burglary and theft.  Id. at ¶ 4.  In deciding whether the offenses merged, the 
Fourth District examined our decision in Ruff and, with respect to whether the 
offenses were of similar import, concluded that it was necessary to examine 
whether each offense resulted in a separate and identifiable harm.  Gillman at ¶ 21.  
The court then considered the testimony of one of the victims at sentencing.  See 
id. at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 14} The victim testified that her sense of privacy had been “invaded and 
compromised,” which the Fourth District determined to be a harm resulting from 
the burglary offense.  Id., 2015-Ohio-4421, 46 N.E.3d 130, at ¶ 23.  The victim also 
informed the trial court that she had suffered economic damage, which the Fourth 
District classified as a harm resulting from the theft offenses.  Id.  Lastly, the victim 
stated that her “ ‘sense of safety and well-being ha[d] been greatly compromised,’ ” 
which the Fourth District found to be harms relating to both the burglary and theft 
offenses.  Id. 
{¶ 15} Based on this testimony, the Fourth District determined that the 
victim had identified harm resulting from the burglary offenses that was separate 
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from the harm resulting from the theft offenses.  Id.  Therefore, the appellate court 
concluded that the offenses were of dissimilar import and should not be merged.  
Id. at ¶ 24. 
{¶ 16} The state contrasts the Fourth District’s analysis in Gillman with the 
analysis employed by the Fifth District in this case, arguing that the Fifth District 
failed to examine the record or consider whether separate harms were inflicted by 
Ramunas’s burglary and theft offenses.  The state criticizes the Fifth District for 
not applying part of the test outlined by this court in Ruff because the appellate court 
reasoned that considering harm in that manner would result in merger never being 
appropriate, see 2021-Ohio-3191 at ¶ 19. 
{¶ 17} Ramunas counters that offenses are of similar import and cannot 
cause separate harms if one offense is incident to the other.  To determine if an 
offense is incident to another requires an examination of the offender’s conduct.  
Ramunas argues that when the offender’s conduct demonstrates that the harm 
caused by one offense is incident to another offense, the offenses are allied.  Here, 
the state used Ramunas’s purpose to steal to establish the offense of burglary, and 
stealing was her only criminal purpose.  Ramunas maintains that there is no separate 
and identifiable harm, because the burglary was committed for the sole purpose of 
committing theft. 
{¶ 18} Ramunas also argues that the state’s assertion that the degree of the 
offense signifies that burglary and theft cause separate harms is irrelevant.  The 
focus in an allied-offenses analysis is not on the difference in the degree of the 
offenses or the different punishment imposed for each offense.  If it were, Ramunas 
maintains, then only offenses of the same degree would merge. 
B.  Ohio’s allied-offenses framework 
{¶ 19} In Ohio, the legislative statement on multiple punishments is found 
in R.C. 2941.25, which provides: 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
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(A) Where the same conduct by [a] defendant can be 
construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, 
the indictment or information may contain counts for all such 
offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one. 
(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more 
offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or 
more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or 
with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may 
contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be 
convicted of all of them. 
 
{¶ 20} The other dissenting opinion advocates for a return to this court’s 
pre-Ruff precedent to conduct an allied-offenses analysis.  See dissenting opinion 
of DeWine, J., at ¶ 40.  It may be that this court should revisit Ruff and, in light of 
the experience of Ohio’s courts in applying that precedent, either fine-tune the 
approach set forth in Ruff or abandon it altogether.  In this case, however, neither 
party has advocated for a departure from the Ruff approach, and both the state and 
Ramunas have asked this court to apply Ruff to reach a decision in their respective 
favors.  Nor have we received briefing from any amicus in support of either party.  
Because altering or abandoning the Ruff approach would significantly impact 
Ohio’s criminal law, I would defer revisiting the viability of the Ruff approach until 
we are presented with a case in which we have received full briefing on the issue 
and this court can make a fully informed decision. 
{¶ 21} I accordingly would apply the existing allied-offenses framework to 
resolve the conflict before us in this case.  We have established a tripartite test to 
determine whether a defendant can be convicted of multiple offenses under R.C. 
2941.25.  This test requires a court to ask three questions: “(1) Were the offenses 
dissimilar in import or significance? (2) Were they committed separately? and (3) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Were they committed with separate animus or motivation?  An affirmative answer 
to any of [these questions] will permit separate convictions.  The conduct, the 
animus, and the import must all be considered.”  Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-
Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, at ¶ 31; see also id. at paragraphs one through three of 
the syllabus. 
{¶ 22} We have rejected a bright-line rule for analyzing the issue of 
multiple punishments because a one-size-fits-all rule will not work in every 
situation.  Id. at ¶ 30.  Rather, an allied-offenses analysis must be driven by the facts 
of each case.  “[T]he analysis must focus on the defendant’s conduct to determine 
whether one or more convictions may result, because an offense may be committed 
in a variety of ways and the offenses committed may have different import.”  Id. 
C.  Dissimilar import 
{¶ 23} Our focus here is on whether the offenses of burglary and theft 
committed by Ramunas are dissimilar in import.  There are two circumstances in 
which offenses will be deemed dissimilar in import, making sentences for multiple 
counts permissible.  The first circumstance is “[w]hen a defendant’s conduct 
victimizes more than one person [because] the harm for each person is separate and 
distinct.”  Id. at ¶ 26.  The second circumstance is when a defendant’s conduct 
against a single victim constitutes two or more offenses and “the harm that results 
from each offense is separate and identifiable from the harm of the other offense.”  
Id.  Therefore, we have held that “two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist 
within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct constitutes 
offenses involving separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense is 
separate and identifiable.”  Ruff at ¶ 26.  Whether the offenses have similar import 
will be revealed by “[t]he evidence at trial or during a plea or sentencing hearing.”  
Id. 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
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D.  Burglary and theft are of dissimilar import 
{¶ 24} In this matter, we should decide whether the harms that resulted from 
Ramunas’s conduct in committing burglary and theft are separate and identifiable.  
I would conclude that the evidence demonstrates that Ramunas’s conduct resulted 
in separate harms and, therefore, the offenses should not be merged. 
{¶ 25} One harm suffered is the violation and loss of the victims’ sense of 
trust and security in their personal living spaces at the assisted-living facility.  This 
harm resulted from Ramunas’s entering the victims’ living spaces for the purpose 
of stealing.  The victims would have suffered this harm even if Ramunas had not 
stolen any property; therefore, the harm caused by the burglaries is independent of 
and unrelated to the harm caused by the thefts. 
{¶ 26} A second harm inflicted on the victims resulted from the loss of their 
valuables, which was caused by Ramunas’s stealing the victims’ possessions.  And 
this harm was twofold.  The victims not only experienced economic harm by being 
deprived of the stolen items’ monetary value, but they also suffered emotional 
harm, which was particularly acute because some of the items taken (e.g., one 
victim’s wedding ring) had significant sentimental value. 
{¶ 27} The evidence in this matter reveals that the victims suffered separate 
and distinct harms as the result of Ramunas’s burglary and theft offenses.  
Therefore, under these particular facts, the offenses of burglary and theft are of 
dissimilar import and should not be merged. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 28} I would hold that when the record contains evidence demonstrating 
that burglary and theft offenses caused separate and distinct harms to a victim, then 
for purposes of R.C. 2941.25, the offenses of burglary and theft are not allied 
offenses of similar import.  I accordingly dissent from the court’s entry.  I would 
answer the certified-conflict question in the negative, reverse the judgment of the 
Fifth District Court of Appeals, and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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_________________ 
DEWINE, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 29} We accepted this case to resolve a conflict in the courts of appeals.  
The conflict question asks how to apply the test announced in State v. Ruff, 143 
Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, to determine whether a 
defendant’s crimes are allied offenses of similar import.  See 165 Ohio St.3d 1531, 
2022-Ohio-280, 180 N.E.3d 1155.  But rather than give the lower courts an answer, 
a majority of this court votes today to dismiss this appeal as having been 
improvidently certified.  In doing so, it passes up an opportunity to provide clarity 
in an area of the law that has proved particularly challenging for Ohio’s trial courts, 
courts of appeals, and even this court.  And by retreating from that opportunity now, 
the majority leaves a demonstrably erroneous decision in place. 
{¶ 30} The lower courts have asked for guidance.  The case has been fully 
briefed and argued.  And none of the traditional reasons for dismissing an appeal 
apply.  There is nothing preventing this court from deciding this case; it simply 
lacks the will to do so.  I would resolve the conflict question certified to us by the 
Fifth District Court of Appeals.  Because a majority of this court instead decides to 
punt, I dissent. 
I.  This case presents a conflict between the courts of appeals, and we should 
resolve it 
{¶ 31} While working as a housekeeper at an assisted-living facility, 
Kristen Ramunas snuck into the rooms of six elderly residents and stole credit cards 
and other personal belongings.  One of the victims was an 89-year-old woman 
suffering from dementia.  Ramunas had not been assigned to clean the woman’s 
room and was not authorized to be inside it.  The victim’s family members told the 
trial court that while inside the woman’s room, Ramunas pulled a black onyx ring 
off the woman’s finger and removed a cross necklace from around the woman’s 
neck. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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{¶ 32} Ramunas pleaded guilty to multiple counts of burglary under R.C. 
2911.12(A)(3) and theft under R.C. 2913.02(A)(1).  The question presented in this 
case is whether the burglary and theft offenses with respect to each victim are allied 
offenses of similar import subject to merger. 
{¶ 33} The merger of offenses is governed by R.C. 2941.25.  That statute 
provides: 
 
(A) Where the same conduct by [a] defendant can be 
construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, 
the indictment or information may contain counts for all such 
offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one. 
(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more 
offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or 
more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or 
with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may 
contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be 
convicted of all of them. 
 
R.C. 2941.25. 
{¶ 34} Although the language of the statute hasn’t changed since its 
enactment in 1972, see Am.Sub.H.B. 511, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866, 1994, 
Ohio’s courts have long struggled with how to determine whether multiple offenses 
qualify as allied offenses of similar import.  The guidance offered by this court has 
charitably been described as “accordion-like.”  Richard R. Parsons, Punish Once, 
Punish Twice: Ohio’s Inconsistent Interpretation of Its Multiple Counts Statute, 36 
Cap.U.L.Rev. 809, 812 (2008).  This court’s most recent effort to address the 
confusion was in Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892.  There, 
this court concluded that the question whether multiple offenses are of similar or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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dissimilar import depends on the defendant’s particular conduct in committing 
them.  Id. at ¶ 26.  The court explained that “two or more offenses of dissimilar 
import exist within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct 
constitutes offenses involving separate victims or if the harm that results from each 
offense is separate and identifiable.”  Id. 
{¶ 35} In this case, the Fifth District acknowledged that under Ruff, it was 
required to determine whether Ramunas’s burglary offenses produced a harm that 
was “separate and identifiable” from the harm caused by the thefts.  2021-Ohio-
3191, ¶ 19.  But the court expressed concern that under the Ruff approach, one crime 
could always be said to create a harm distinct from the other, such that no two 
crimes would ever merge.  Id.  Thus, the court of appeals focused instead on 
whether Ramunas committed the crimes through separate conduct or with a 
separate animus.  See id. at ¶ 18, 20.  Concluding that Ramunas committed the 
burglary and theft offenses as part of a single course of conduct, the court of appeals 
held that the offenses shared a similar import and must be merged.  Id. at ¶ 20. 
{¶ 36} The Fourth District Court of Appeals reached the opposite 
conclusion in State v. Gillman, 2015-Ohio-4421, 46 N.E.3d 130, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.), a 
case with very similar facts.  The defendant in Gillman broke into the victims’ 
cabins and stole property from inside.  Like Ramunas, the defendant pleaded guilty 
to burglary and theft.  But the Fourth District took a different approach in its 
application of Ruff.  It pointed to one victim’s statement at sentencing that her 
“sense of privacy had been ‘invaded and compromised.’ ”  Gillman at ¶ 23.  Based 
on this, the court of appeals concluded that the burglary resulted in a harm that was 
“separate and identifiable” from the economic loss caused by the theft.  Id. 
{¶ 37} The Fourth District likewise expressed doubts about the Ruff test.  
The court of appeals commented that application of the test “results in parsing” the 
harms caused by the offenses (something that this court has previously advised 
against).  Gillman at ¶ 23, fn. 1, citing State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-
January Term, 2022 
 
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Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 56 (“We decline the invitation of the state to parse 
[the defendant’s] conduct into a blow-by-blow in order to sustain multiple 
convictions * * *”).  But the court of appeals explained that despite these 
misgivings, it was “bound to apply the most recent test set forth by the Ohio 
Supreme Court in determining the merger issue.”  Id. 
{¶ 38} The facts of the two conflict cases are the same in all meaningful 
respects.  In both cases, the defendants trespassed into the victims’ residences with 
the intent to steal and followed through on that intent by taking property from the 
premises.  And in both cases, the defendants pleaded guilty to the offenses, so the 
factual record is limited.  Yet the courts of appeals reached opposite conclusions 
regarding whether the defendants’ burglary and theft offenses were of similar or 
dissimilar import, due largely to their conflicting views of the analysis required 
under Ruff.  The Fifth District thus issued an order certifying that its decision in this 
case conflicts with the Fourth District’s decision in Gillman, and this court voted 
to accept the case and resolve the conflict.  165 Ohio St.3d 1531, 2022-Ohio-280, 
180 N.E.3d 1155. 
{¶ 39} Now, nine months after finding that a conflict exists and over four 
months after hearing oral argument in this case, a majority of this court determines 
that there is no longer any cause to issue a decision.  I disagree.  Our rules provide 
that this court may dismiss a case as having been improvidently certified if it later 
finds that “there is no conflict” or that “the same question has been raised and 
passed upon in a prior appeal.”  S.Ct.Prac.R. 8.04; see also Williamson v. Rubich, 
171 Ohio St. 253, 259, 168 N.E.2d 876 (1960) (dismissal is warranted when the 
“case presented on the merits is not the same case as presented on motion to 
certify”).  But nothing has changed about this case since the time it was accepted.  
The conflict remains.  The issue has not been addressed in another appeal.  The 
matter has been preserved, and the question is squarely before us.  See Klujn v. 
McCloud, 156 Ohio St.3d 419, 2019-Ohio-1334, 128 N.E.3d 203, ¶ 27 (DeWine, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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J., dissenting).  The courts of appeals have asked for an answer.  We should give 
them one. 
II.  We should return to the statutory language and our pre-Ruff precedent 
{¶ 40} The answer I would provide is that because Ruff was wrongly 
decided and has proved to be unworkable, we should return to the language of the 
statute and our pre-Ruff caselaw. 
A.  The statute requires us to consider the offenses in the abstract 
{¶ 41} The issue presented in this appeal is how to determine if a 
defendant’s conduct “constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar import,” R.C. 
2941.25(B), or whether the defendant’s conduct can be “construed to constitute two 
or more allied offenses of similar import,” R.C. 2941.25(A).  In the respective 
provisions, the terms “similar import” and “dissimilar import” modify the word 
“offenses.”  To decide whether a defendant’s actions amount to offenses of similar 
or dissimilar import, then, we must first determine whether the offenses themselves 
are of similar or dissimilar import.  That requires us to look at the offenses in the 
abstract. 
{¶ 42} When Ramunas broke into the victims’ rooms and stole their 
belongings, she committed burglary under R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) and theft under R.C. 
2913.02(A)(1).  So, how do we determine whether those offenses, in the abstract, 
have a similar or dissimilar import? 
{¶ 43} R.C. 2941.25 supplies the meaning of “similar import.”  R.C. 
2941.25(A) establishes a prohibition against cumulative punishments: when a 
defendant, by the same conduct, commits multiple “allied offenses of similar 
import,” the defendant may be convicted of only one of those offenses.  Conversely, 
R.C. 2941.25(B) authorizes multiple punishments in some circumstances.  When a 
defendant commits multiple “offenses of dissimilar import,” he may be convicted 
of each offense.  But even when a defendant commits “two or more offenses of the 
same or similar kind,” he may still be convicted of multiple offenses if they were 
January Term, 2022 
 
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“committed separately or with a separate animus as to each.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  
R.C. 2941.25(B). 
{¶ 44} Thus, offenses are “allied offenses of similar import” when they are 
“of the same or similar kind.”  Indeed, this court has consistently understood the 
phrase “same or similar kind” in division (B) to refer to the term “allied offenses of 
similar import” in division (A).  See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 6 Ohio St.3d 416, 418, 
453 N.E.2d 593 (1983) (“In the event that the court finds the offenses being 
compared are allied offenses of similar import,” it must then determine “whether 
the offenses were committed separately or with a separate animus as to each”); 
State v. Williams, 124 Ohio St.3d 381, 2010-Ohio-147, 922 N.E.2d 937, ¶ 16 (“If 
the offenses are allied, the court proceeds to the second step and considers whether 
the offenses were committed separately or with a separate animus”); Ruff, 143 Ohio 
St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, at ¶ 20 (“R.C. 2941.25(B) sets forth 
three categories in which there can be multiple punishments: (1) offenses that are 
dissimilar in import, (2) offenses similar in import but committed separately, and 
(3) offenses similar in import but committed with separate animus”). 
{¶ 45} It is not surprising that the statute asks whether the offenses are of 
the “same or similar kind.”  As this court has explained, the enactment of R.C. 
2941.25 was “an attempt to codify the judicial doctrine of merger.”  State v. 
Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427, 2013-Ohio-4982, 999 N.E.2d 661, ¶ 11, citing 
State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 131, 397 N.E.2d 1345 (1979).  That doctrine 
rests on the premise that “ ‘a major crime often includes as inherent therein the 
component elements of other crimes.’ ”  Logan at 131, quoting State v. Botta, 27 
Ohio St.2d 196, 201, 271 N.E.2d 776 (1971).  Under the doctrine of merger, when 
“ ‘one crime necessarily involves another, * * * the offense so involved is merged 
in the offense of which it is a part.’ ”  Botta at 201, fn. 1, quoting 21 American 
Jurisprudence 2d 90 (1965). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 46} Consistent with that understanding, the rule first announced by this 
court was that “for two crimes to constitute allied offenses of similar import, * * * 
[t]he offenses and their elements must correspond to such a degree that commission 
of the one offense will result in the commission of the other.”  Logan at 128, citing 
State v. Donald, 57 Ohio St.2d 73, 386 N.E.2d 1341 (1979).  In adopting that rule, 
we noted that “in many cases a single criminal act could constitute two or more 
similar crimes.”  Id. at 130.  And we recognized that the General Assembly had 
“attempted to remedy this problem by enacting R.C. 2941.25.”  Id. at 130-131. 
{¶ 47} Take, for instance, the crimes of theft and receiving stolen property.  
Theoretically, any time a person commits a theft, he could be said to have 
simultaneously received stolen property.  See Maumee v. Geiger, 45 Ohio St.2d 
238, 243-244, 344 N.E.2d 133 (1976).  Yet, we have explained that under the 
doctrine of merger, “as to the principal offender who steals a motor vehicle, any 
acts of receiving or concealing the same motor vehicle knowing it to have been 
stolen are considered merged into the crime of auto theft itself.”  Botta at 204.  This 
court has understood the General Assembly to have enacted R.C. 2941.25 “in 
conformity with” the merger analysis described in Botta.  Geiger at 242.  We have 
therefore held that “[a]lthough receiving is technically not an included offense of 
theft, it is, under R.C. 2941.25, an ‘allied offense of similar import.’ ”  Id. at 244. 
{¶ 48} Similarly, we have said that “implicit within every forcible rape” is 
a restraint of the victim’s liberty sufficient to establish the offense of kidnapping.  
Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d at 130, 397 N.E.2d 1345.  In other words, in committing rape, 
the defendant’s conduct could also be “construed to constitute” the offense of 
kidnapping.  See R.C. 2941.25(A).  Those offenses are therefore allied offenses of 
similar import, and as such, the defendant may not be convicted of both rape and 
kidnapping if they were committed by the same act and with the same immediate 
motive.  Logan at 131-132.  But if the rape and kidnapping offenses were, from a 
January Term, 2022 
 
17 
factual standpoint, committed through separate conduct or with different motives, 
the defendant may be punished for both.  Id. 
{¶ 49} This analysis is not unlike that used by the United States Supreme 
Court as a means of determining whether two crimes constitute the same offense 
for double-jeopardy purposes.  The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution has been understood to prohibit the 
imposition of “ ‘multiple punishments for the same offense’ ” during a single 
proceeding.  Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 
(1983), quoting N. Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 
L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 
794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989).  When “the same act or transaction 
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions,” courts consider whether 
“each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not” to determine 
whether a defendant may be punished for two offenses or only one.  Blockburger 
v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).  This court’s 
original allied-offenses test implicitly incorporates the analysis set forth in 
Blockburger: if a defendant is found guilty of two offenses and both offenses do 
not contain an element distinct from the other, then the commission of the one 
offense must necessarily result in the commission of the other. 
{¶ 50} In short, R.C. 2941.25(B) provides “a clear indication of the General 
Assembly’s intent to permit cumulative sentencing for the commission of (1) 
offenses of dissimilar import and (2) offenses of similar import committed 
separately or with separate animus.”  State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St. 3d 447, 2008-
Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 17.  The import is determined by the offenses 
themselves.  If the offenses do not share a similar import, the analysis ends.  It is 
only when the offenses are of similar import that we proceed to the next step and 
consider the defendant’s particular conduct in committing them. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
B.  The test announced in Ruff deviates from the statute’s plain language 
{¶ 51} In Ruff, this court abandoned its longstanding precedent that the 
import of the offenses involves a review of the offenses in the abstract.  The court 
concluded instead that courts “must focus on the defendant’s conduct” to determine 
whether two offenses are allied offenses of similar import, Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 
114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E. 3d 892, at ¶ 30, explaining that offenses are of 
dissimilar import if they involve “separate victims or if the harm that results from 
each offense is separate and identifiable,” id. at ¶ 26. 
{¶ 52} This was a misstep.  Whether the defendant’s conduct involved 
separate victims or resulted in separate harms is relevant under the statute, but not 
to the question whether the offenses are allied offenses of similar import.  Rather, 
those considerations relate to the next part of the analysis: whether the defendant 
committed the offenses separately or with a separate animus as to each.  As the 
justice concurring in judgment only in Ruff explained, the court “collapse[d] into a 
single analysis” what are in reality distinct inquiries under the statute—the import 
of the offenses and the defendant’s conduct in committing them.  Id. at ¶ 42 
(French, J., concurring in judgment only).  By looking to the particular facts of the 
case to evaluate the import of the offenses, the court in Ruff deviated from the plain 
language of R.C. 2941.25. 
{¶ 53} Ruff’s 
fact-specific—and 
extrastatutory—approach 
has 
unnecessarily confused what should be a straightforward inquiry.  That this case is 
before us as part of a certified conflict simply highlights that point.  Moreover, the 
test established in Ruff is unworkable in practice.  It allows judges nearly unbridled 
discretion to merge or not merge offenses based on how broadly or narrowly the 
judge chooses to categorize the harm that a particular victim suffers from an 
offense.  As a result, it virtually guarantees that offenders who commit the same 
offenses (like Ramunas and the offender in Gillman) will suffer widely disparate 
results with respect to whether their offenses must merge. 
January Term, 2022 
 
19 
C.  The statutory test is simpler and produces more reliable results 
{¶ 54} The analysis required by the statute is far simpler than the Ruff 
analysis and produces far more reliable results.  I would therefore return to 
comparing the offenses in the abstract to determine their import, applying the tests 
set forth in Blockburger, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306, and in this 
court’s early R.C. 2945.21 precedent: that is, if “the commission of one offense will 
necessarily result in commission of the other, then the offenses are allied offenses 
of similar import,” State v. Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625, 886 
N.E.2d 181, ¶ 26.  See also Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d at 128, 397 N.E.2d 1345. 
{¶ 55} The offenses in this case are not allied offenses of similar import.  
Ramunas was convicted of burglary under R.C. 2911.12(A)(3).  That statute 
prohibits a person from (1) trespassing, (2) in an occupied structure or in a 
separately secured or separately occupied portion of an occupied structure, (3) by 
force, stealth, or deception, (4) with the purpose to commit any criminal offense 
therein.  She was also convicted of theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), which 
provides, “No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or services, 
shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services * * * 
[w]ithout the consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent.” 
{¶ 56} It is apparent under even the most cursory review of these crimes 
that they are not of the same kind.  Both require proof of multiple elements that the 
other does not.  See Blockburger at 304.  And neither offense is implicit in the 
commission of the other.  See Logan at 130-132.  A person who breaks into a house 
with the intent to steal something but finds nothing worth taking commits a burglary 
but not a theft.  And a person who enters with permission commits only a theft 
when that person makes off with the resident’s possessions. 
{¶ 57} Because the offenses of burglary and theft are not allied offenses of 
similar import, the inquiry ends there.  They are not subject to merger under R.C. 
2941.25. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 58} The Fifth District Court of Appeals erred in concluding that 
Ramunas’s burglary and theft convictions must be merged.  I would therefore 
reverse its judgment and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.  By choosing to 
dismiss the case rather than decide it, this court allows an improper sentence to 
stand and ensures that the manner in which the allied-offenses analysis is applied 
to a particular defendant will depend largely on what county he happens to be 
prosecuted in.  I respectfully dissent. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in Part I of the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Melissa A. Schiffel, Delaware County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mark C. 
Sleeper, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Campbell Law, L.L.C., and April F. Campbell, for appellee, Kristen 
Ramunas. 
_________________