Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Pincus

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. PINCUS. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Pincus (1995), ___ Ohio St. 3d ___.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension with credit for time 
of voluntary interim suspension — Convictions for drug abuse — 
Habitual late payment of attorney registration fees — Failure to 
complete required amount of continuing legal education hours for 
1989-1990 biennium period and late payment of resulting sanction — 
Practicing law while not registered as an attorney. 
(No. 94-2348--Submitted September 12, 1995--Decided December 6, 1995.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 93-03. 
 
In an amended complaint filed on February 7, 1994, relator, Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent, Michael Allen Pincus, last 
known address, Lakewood, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0008519, with 
five counts of professional misconduct involving violations of, inter alia, 
DR 1-102(A)(3) (illegal conduct involving moral turpitude) and 1-
102(A)(6) (conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law); and 
Gov.Bar R. VI(1) (failure to timely register as an attorney), VII(2)(A) 
(unauthorized practice of law), and X(3) (failure to comply with continuing 
legal education requirements).  A panel of the Board of Commissioners on 
 
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Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”) heard the matter 
on October 7, 1994. 
 
The parties stipulated at the hearing to most of the facts alleged in the 
complaint.  With respect to the first two counts, the stipulations established 
that, on March 18, 1992, respondent was convicted of driving under the 
influence (“DUI”) and sentenced to ninety days in jail.  Eighty-seven days 
of his sentence and a $200 fine were suspended on the condition that he 
complete one year of probation and attend Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) 
meetings. 
 
On April 13, 1992, due to conduct arising out of the same incident 
that led to his DUI conviction, respondent was indicted for one count of 
drug abuse in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a fourth-degree felony.  
Respondent pleaded no contest to the indictment and was granted treatment 
in lieu of conviction.  He was placed on probation for eighteen months and 
ordered to attend Narcotics Anonymous (“NA”), obtain psychiatric 
counseling, and submit to random testing for substance abuse.  On 
November 19, 1993, respondent pleaded guilty to another charge of drug 
abuse arising from his possession of cocaine.  On December 17, 1993, he 
 
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was sentenced to six month’s incarceration for the second drug-abuse 
conviction and six month’s incarceration, to be served concurrently, for 
having failed to successfully complete the rehabilitative probation ordered 
for his first drug-abuse charge.  On April 13, 1994, respondent was granted 
shock probation and placed on probation for two years. 
 
With respect to the third count, the stipulations established that 
respondent paid his attorney registration fees for the 1987-1989 biennium 
period over one year late, that he paid his registration fees for the 1989-
1991 biennium period over three years late, and that he paid his fees for the 
1991-1993 biennium period almost one year late. 
 
With respect to Count IV, the stipulations established that respondent 
failed to complete the required amount of continuing legal education credit 
hours for the 1989-1990 biennium period, that he was fined $610 as a 
sanction, and that he did not pay this sanction until February 26, 1993. 
 
With respect to Count V, the stipulations established that respondent 
was not registered as an attorney in Ohio from September 1, 1987 to 
September 13, 1988, but nevertheless practiced law, providing 
representation in at least five separate cases. 
 
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From this evidence, the panel concluded that respondent had violated 
DR 1-102(A)(3) and (6), and Gov.Bar R. VI(1), VII(2)(A), and X.  In 
recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the panel considered 
testimony and correspondence from many of respondent’s professional 
acquaintances and friends, all of whom described his honesty, integrity and 
competence.  The panel also considered respondent’s efforts to recover from 
alcohol and cocaine addiction, which included his frequent attendance at 
AA or NA meetings and his submission to random testing for substance 
abuse.  The panel was convinced of respondent’s sincere desire to maintain 
sobriety and was impressed with his support system.  However, it was 
concerned that respondent had been in recovery, which he distinguished 
from the sobriety he had apparently maintained since his incarceration, only 
six months.  Indeed, respondent readily confessed that he had a strong 
dependence on counseling and support meetings and that he needed to 
attend such meetings nearly every day. 
 
Respondent’s comparatively brief recovery period, coupled with his 
prior relapse during the rehabilitation period offered after his first drug-
abuse conviction, persuaded the panel to reject the sanction respondent 
 
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suggested -- a two-year suspension, with one year stayed, providing 
respondent complies with various conditions during a probation period of 
unspecified length.  The panel instead recommended, consistent with 
relator’s suggestion, that respondent receive an indefinite suspension from 
the practice of law.  The board agreed, adopting the panel’s findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and recommendation. 
 
Geoffrey Stern, Disciplinary Counsel, and Lori J. Brown, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Koblentz & Koblentz, Richard S. Koblentz and Peter A. Russell, for 
respondent. 
 
Per Curiam.  Upon review of the record, we concur in the board’s 
findings of misconduct.  We also agree with its recommendation, but with 
some modification. 
 
Under Gov.Bar R. V(5)(A), attorneys in this state are subject to an 
automatic interim suspension from the practice of law upon conviction of a 
felony; however, in respondent’s case, no order of interim suspension was 
ever issued.1  Notwithstanding this, respondent stopped practicing law 
voluntarily at least as of his sentencing in December 1993 because he no 
 
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longer trusted his commitment to his clients or his judgment on their behalf..  
For this reason, we are inclined to temper the indefinite suspension we agree 
is appropriate for respondent’s misconduct and allow credit for his self-
imposed interim suspension from the date of his sentencing. 
 
Accordingly, we order that respondent be suspended indefinitely from 
the practice of law in Ohio, but he is granted credit for the time of his 
voluntary interim suspension from December 17, 1993.  Costs taxed to 
respondent. 
 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., CONCUR. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and COOK, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
COOK, J., concurring and dissenting.  I would indefinitely suspend 
respondent with no credit for time served. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
 
                                          
 
1 Pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(5)(A), a judgment entry of conviction was 
certified to this court for respondent’s first drug-abuse conviction, but an 
order of interim suspension did not follow, apparently due to his treatment 
 
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in lieu of conviction.  The judgment entry for respondent’s second drug-
abuse conviction was not certified, nor was the judgment entry for the first 
conviction recertified upon sentencing.