Title: JAMES F. WESTWOOD v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JAMES F. WESTWOOD v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 4693 P.2d 763Case Number: 83-202Decided: 01/15/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
JAMES F. WESTWOOD, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, R.M. Forrister, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Wyoming Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Cr. Div., John Renneisen, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., and Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS*, C.J., and ROONEY**, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The major issue 
asserted in this case is whether there was sufficient authentication of a pair 
of school scissors to justify their admission into evidence as the 
instrumentality of the crime in a trial on a charge of aggravated assault and 
battery. A secondary issue is raised concerning the sufficiency of the evidence 
of the appellant's ability, in light of evidence of alcohol or controlled 
substance intoxication, to form the intent necessary to sustain a conviction of 
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. We conclude that the record supports the 
ruling of the district court in admitting the scissors into evidence. The record 
also encompasses evidence which structures a question of fact as to the impact 
of the appellant's intoxication upon his ability to form a specific intent, and 
this question was submitted to the jury under a proper instruction. We affirm 
the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposed after appropriate verdicts 
of guilty by the jury.

[¶2.]     In his brief Westwood 
states the issues as follows:

"1. Whether the trial 
court erred in admitting into evidence the scissors in State's Exhibit 
1.

"2. Whether the evidence 
as to the necessary element of intent was insufficient to sustain the conviction 
on the unauthorized use of an automobile charge."

The State of 
Wyoming agrees 
with Westwood's statement of the issues in this case.

[¶3.]     The facts of this case 
are illustrative of why citizens in our society are becoming increasingly 
reluctant to assume the role of a Good Samaritan. On April 4, 1983, two young 
female school teachers were returning to Casper 
from an Easter vacation trip to Montana. The weather was inclement, possibly 
approaching blizzard conditions. Near Midwest 
they observed a man flagging them down, and after they stopped they ascertained 
that his car was hopelessly stuck in a snowdrift in the median between the two 
lanes of the interstate highway. They offered him a ride into Casper, which he accepted, 
and after securing his vehicle he got into the car with the two young 
ladies.

[¶4.]     As they were traveling 
south to Casper 
at one point he laid his hands on the young women's faces, ostensibly to 
demonstrate how cold he was, but this action caused some feelings of 
intimidation on their part. He then said that he wanted them to return him to 
his vehicle so that he could obtain some of his personal effects. Because of the 
weather the driver, who also owned the car, demurred and later refused to 
attempt to turn around and go back to Westwood's vehicle. Westwood then became 
more insistent, demanding and even belligerent. Alarmed by his behavior, the 
driver pulled off the road and asked him to get out of the car. At that juncture 
he began striking her and stabbing her with a pair of school scissors. The young 
women then exited the vehicle and ran away from it, fearful of their lives. 
Westwood moved to the driver's seat and drove off.

[¶5.]     The two young teachers 
were able to flag down a passing truck, and the driver agreed to let them ride 
into Casper. As 
they entered Casper they fortuitously observed Westwood go 
by. The truck driver followed the car briefly and then pulled into the Smart 
Stop, a gasoline station and convenience store, to permit the owner of the 
vehicle to notify the police. While they were inside, Westwood drove the car up 
to the gas pumps, and the truck driver pulled his rig in front of it while the 
assistant manager of the store moved his vehicle behind it to immobilize the 
car. Westwood then was apprehended by police officers. They conducted an 
investigation at that location, and obtained a pair of school scissors with 
sharp points from the vehicle which Westwood had taken.

[¶6.]     Following his arrest 
Westwood was charged with aggravated assault and battery in violation of § 
6-4-506(b), W.S. 1977,1 and in a second count he was 
charged with a violation of § 31-11-102, W.S. 1977.2 After being bound over at his 
preliminary examination Westwood was arraigned in the district court. He entered 
pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency and 
then was sent to the WyomingStateHospital for an examination 
and evaluation. After he returned to Casper he was tried by a jury and convicted of 
both counts. He then was sentenced to not less than two nor more than six years 
imprisonment in the state penitentiary on the aggravated assault charge, and a 
concurrent sentence of one year in the Casper jail on the unauthorized use of a motor 
vehicle count also was imposed. Westwood's appeal is from that judgment and 
sentence.

[¶7.]     Westwood first protests 
the admission into evidence of State's Exhibit Number 1, a pair of school 
scissors. (Actually the exhibit was an envelope in which the pair of school 
scissors had been placed.) The argument presented by Westwood is that there was 
insufficient authentication of the scissors. The Wyoming Rules of Evidence serve 
as our point of departure for the discussion of this issue. While authentication 
is controlled by Article IX of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, the problem 
appropriately is considered as one of relevance under Rule 402, W.R.E.,3 and even more specifically whether 
the condition of fact, i.e., that the object in question is what its proponent 
claims, has been satisfied as required by Rule 104(b), W.R.E.4 See 5 Louisell and Mueller, Federal 
Evidence, § 505, p. 12 (1981). The pertinent provisions of Rule 901, W.R.E., 
provide:

"(a) General provision. - The requirement of 
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is 
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in 
question is what its proponent claims.

"(b) Illustrations. - By way of illustration 
only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication 
or identification conforming with the requirements of this 
rule:

"(1) Testimony of Witness 
with Knowledge. - Testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to 
be;

* * * * * 
*

"(4) Distinctive 
Characteristics and the Like. - Appearance, contents, substance, internal 
patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with 
circumstances;"

[¶8.]     The record discloses 
that at the time she was stabbed the victim looked down and Westwood had school 
scissors in his hand. He hit her with the scissors at least twice in her 
recollection, once in the right shoulder and again closer to her neck. The 
scissors penetrated her winter coat and T-shirt and broke her skin. At the time 
Westwood was apprehended the officer showed the scissors to the victim. He asked 
her if those were the scissors, and she said that they 
were.

[¶9.]     An officer for the 
Casper Police Department saw the scissors in the defendant's possession at the 
Smart Stop. He also saw a female police officer for the Casper Police Department 
take them from Westwood. He then witnessed that officer turn them over to a 
deputy for the Natrona County Sheriff's Department. This police officer 
described them as an elementary school type of scissors, perhaps four or five 
inches long. The deputy for the Natrona County Sheriff's Department testified 
that he took possession of a pair of scissors at the Smart Stop. They were given 
to him by the female officer for the Casper Police Department. He took them to 
the Natrona County Sheriff's Department and placed them in the evidence locker. 
The envelope which was marked as State's Exhibit 1 is the envelope in which he 
placed the scissors when he put them in the evidence locker in the sheriff's 
department.

[¶10.]  With the record in this state the trial 
court refused to admit the scissors into evidence over the objection of 
Westwood. The victim then was recalled, and she testified in this 
vein:

"Q. I am going 
to show you what has been marked as State's Exhibit No. 1 and ask you if you 
recognize any portion of that exhibit?

"A. Yes, I do. 

"Q. And what do you 
recognize?

"A. Those are the 
scissors that I was stabbed with.

"Q. On how many occasions 
have you seen them?

"A. The only other time I 
saw them was when the officer asked me to identify them.

"Q. And where was that 
at?

"A. At the Smart Stop 
here in Casper."

With this 
additional testimony the trial court then admitted the scissors in evidence as 
State's Exhibit Number 1.

[¶11.]  The commentaries with respect to the 
article concerning authentication and identification in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence after which the Wyoming Rules of Evidence are patterned indicate that 
no dramatic change was intended by the codification of the rules respecting 
authentication. It is said Rule 901 "assumes the survival of the careful 
skepticism characteristic of the common law, under which the proponent must 
prove that a matter is what he claims it to be, even if its appearance or 
content is consistent with that claim. But the burden is not a heavy one, and 
the most significant provision in the Rule - that contained in subdivision 
(b)(4) on circumstantial authentication - goes as far toward generalizing the 
principle of self authentication as would be possible without abandoning 
altogether the basic premise that some sort of authenticating proof should be 
required." 5 Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence, p. 12 (1981). A proper 
interpretation of the provisions of Rule 901, W.R.E., with respect to 
authentication should preserve the bias in favor of admissibility which is 
manifested in Rule 401, W.R.E., et seq., relating to relevancy and 
admissibility, as well as in other related rules. International Merger and Acquisition 
Consultants, Inc., v. Armac Enterprises, Inc., 531 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1976); 
Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 
Inc., 525 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1976), on rehearing 540 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 
1976), appeal after remand 610 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1980), reh. denied 614 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1980), new trial granted on remand 487 F. Supp. 647 (E.D.Tex. 
1980), order at 87 F.R.D. 712 (E.D.Tex. 1980), affirmed 644 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 
1981), reh. denied 650 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1981), appeal after remand 687 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1982), reh. denied 693 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1982); 1 Louisell and 
Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 91, p. 639 (1981). See McCabe v. R.A. Manning Construction Company, 
Inc., Wyo., 674 P.2d 699 (1983); Lee v. State, Wyo., 556 P.2d 217 (1976) 
(Thomas, J., specially concurring), and authorities there cited; 5 Louisell and 
Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 507, p. 31 (1981).

[¶12.]  This court held prior to the adoption of 
the Wyoming Rules of Evidence that in considering the admission of controlled 
substances the State has the burden of showing that there is a reasonable 
certainty the evidence has not been tampered with or altered and that it is the 
evidence upon which the prosecution bases its case. Further quoting from 22 
C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 712, p. 961, and cases there cited, the court adopted 
the proposition that a prima facie showing of identity in connection with the 
crime is necessary and sufficient to warrant the admission into evidence of the 
instrument or weapon as the one with which a crime was committed, and that 
generally positive proof or positive identification is not required. DeLuna v. State, Wyo., 501 P.2d 1021 
(1972). In Lofton v. State, 
Wyo., 489 P.2d 1169 (1971), cert. denied 406 U.S. 949, 92 S. Ct. 2049, 32 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1972), 
the court had held that a positive identification of a firearm as the one with 
which an armed robbery had been committed is not required. The standard appears 
to be that adopted in Friesen v. 
Schmelzel, 78 Wyo. 1, 318 P.2d 368 (1957), which is that the article may be 
received if it is satisfactorily identified, and it is shown to the satisfaction 
of the court that there is no substantial change in the article which would 
render the evidence misleading. In our judgment these requirements were 
satisfied with respect to the school scissors. Our reading of the record 
persuades us that the district court properly could have admitted the scissors 
upon the basis of the testimony of the two police officers alluded to 
previously.

[¶13.]  In an abundance of caution, however, the 
trial court also required further identification by the victim. In United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224 
(9th Cir. 1980), the court held that testimony which was not entirely free from 
doubt, but to the effect that the witness was pretty sure that the ax in 
question was the weapon the defendant used against him, that he saw the ax in 
the defendant's hand, and that he was personally familiar with this particular 
ax because he had used it in the past, was sufficient to satisfy the provision 
in Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) that authentication as a condition of 
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 
matter in question is what its proponent claims. That court held that the rule 
is satisfied once a prima facie case has been made on the issue. Similarly it is 
our conclusion that in this case there is testimony by witnesses with knowledge, 
i.e., the two police officers, that the scissors were taken from Westwood at the 
Smart Stop and were given to the deputy of the Natrona County Sheriff's 
Department, who placed them in the evidence locker. This is sufficient to 
support a finding that the scissors are what the proponent claims them to be. 
Furthermore, the appearance of the scissors taken in conjunction with the 
circumstances about which the witnesses testified leads to a conclusion of 
authenticity. We hold there was no error in admitting the scissors into 
evidence.

[¶14.]  In his second argument Westwood points to 
testimony of the two school teachers to the effect that he had been indulging in 
alcohol or drugs, slurred his words, and appeared to be spaced out. Other 
testimony was that he was high, drunk and smelled like alcohol, and his actions 
were described as crazy. Westwood, of course, testified that he was on a 
three-day drunk prior to the commission of these offenses and that he had a 
history of alcoholism stretching over several years. Westwood contends that this 
evidence precludes the jury from finding that he was capable of forming the 
specific intent required for the offense of unauthorized use of an automobile. 
The State asserts the standard for examining evidence upon review which requires 
us to accept as true the evidence submitted by the State of Wyoming, giving that 
evidence every favorable inference which reasonably and fairly may be drawn from 
it, and leaving out of consideration entirely the evidence of the defendant in 
conflict with that evidence. The State's position is that when viewed in this 
light there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict of the 
jury.

[¶15.]  We are satisfied in this instance that 
the question of the effect of Westwood's intoxication upon his ability to form a 
specific intent appropriately was submitted to the jury pursuant to Instruction 
Number 13, which advised the jury as follows:

"Voluntary intoxication 
is no excuse for the commission of a crime. However, pertinent portions of the 
Wyoming Statutes provide that `Where a crime rests in intention, the inebriated 
condition of the Defendant at the time of committing the offense may be proved 
to the jury, as bearing upon the question of intention.' "Thus, evidence that a 
Defendant acted or failed to act while in a state of intoxication is to be 
considered in determining whether or not the Defendant acted, or failed to act, 
with specific intent as charged."

While there is 
no question that the evidence which Westwood alludes to was part of the record, 
there also is evidence that at the time he secured the ride from his victims 
Westwood had the presence of mind to shut off his lights and lock his vehicle. 
He was able to walk in a normal manner without difficulty. He was able to enter 
the back seat of a rather small vehicle without any problems. He spoke 
coherently during the course of the time he was in the victim's vehicle. He was 
able to comment upon events which were occurring while they traveled, including 
an opportunity to turn the vehicle around and go back north on the interstate in 
accordance with his demands. He was able to drive the victim's vehicle from the 
point where he appropriated it into Casper. He did not seem to be abnormal in the 
observation of the police officer from the City of Casper.

[¶16.]  Our examination of the record satisfies 
us under the circumstances that the claim of Westwood that the evidence was 
insufficient as a matter of law to permit a finding of an ability to form a 
specific intent is illfounded. The trial court properly submitted the question 
to the jury as a question fact, and it was resolved against Westwood. There is 
sufficient evidence in the record to sustain that 
determination.

[¶17.]  The judgment and sentence of the trial 
court based upon the jury's verdicts of guilty on the two counts is 
affirmed.

1 Section 6-4-506(b), W.S. 
1977:

"(a) Without dangerous weapon. - If any 
person shall unlawfully and maliciously inflict upon another person, any 
grievous bodily harm the person so offending shall be fined not more than one 
thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or be confined in the county jail not more than one 
(1) year, or both.

"(b) With dangerous weapon. - Whoever, while 
armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon including an unloaded firearm, 
maliciously perpetrates an assault or an assault and battery upon any human 
being, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or be 
imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than fourteen (14) years, or 
both."

2 Section 31-11-102, W.S. 
1977:

"Any person who without 
specific authority of the owner or his duly authorized and accredited agent 
willfully, wantonly, or maliciously takes possession of, or drives, propels or 
takes away, or attempts to take possession of, drive, propel, or take away an 
automobile, the property of another, for the purpose of temporarily making use 
of the automobile, or who knowingly aids, abets or assists another in so doing, 
upon conviction, is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by 
imprisonment in county jail for not more than one (1) 
year."

3 Rule 402, W.R.E., 
provides as follows:

"All relevant evidence is 
admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute, by these rules, or by other 
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible."

4 Rule 104(b), W.R.E., 
provides as follows:

"(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. - When 
the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, 
the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence 
sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the 
condition."