Title: State v. Stevens

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 97 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP2057-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
David W. Stevens, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 330 Wis. 2d 833, 794 N.W.2d 926 
(Ct. App. 2010 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 7, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert G. Mawdsley 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs (Opinion filed).  
ROGGENSACK and GABLEMAN, J.J., join concurrence.  
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs in part and dissents 
in part (Opinion filed).  
   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Paul LaZotte, assistant state public defender, and oral 
argument by Paul LaZotte.  
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Sally 
L. Wellman and the brief was filed by Mark A. Neuser, assistant 
attorneys general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen. 
 
 
2012 WI 97
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP2057-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2008CF761) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
David W. Stevens, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.    This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Stevens, 
No. 2009AP2057-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 
2010).  The Circuit Court for Waukesha County, Robert G. 
Mawdsley, Judge, suppressed an incriminating statement that 
David W. Stevens (Stevens) made to police during custodial 
interrogation.  The court of appeals reversed, holding that even 
though Stevens invoked his right to counsel during questioning, 
he later initiated conversation with his police interrogator and 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
2 
 
thereafter knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his 
rights before making the incriminating statement.  Id., ¶18. 
¶2 
The issues presented for review are (1) whether any of 
the constitutional protections recognized in Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966), were violated under the unusual facts of 
this case, and (2) whether the court of appeals was correct in 
disregarding State v. Middleton, 135 Wis. 2d 297, 399 N.W.2d 917 
(Ct. App. 1986) in its analysis, on grounds that Middleton was 
overruled by State v. Anson, 2005 WI 96, 282 Wis. 2d 629, 698 
N.W.2d 776. 
¶3 
The facts giving rise to this review may be summarized 
as follows: The suspect was arrested and taken into police 
custody.  After receiving a Miranda warning and waiving his 
Miranda rights, the suspect began to answer questions.  He then 
invoked his right to counsel and the questioning ceased.  When 
the police interrogator escorted the suspect back to his holding 
cell, 
the 
suspect 
initiated 
a 
request 
to 
continue 
the 
interrogation "to clear [the] matter up."  He said he would be 
willing to waive his right to an attorney.  Instead of resuming 
questions, the police interrogator left the police station on 
other business.  During the interrogator's absence, the suspect 
did not ask for his attorney or request that someone contact an 
attorney for him.  However, before the interrogator returned, 
the suspect's attorney on a prior charge arrived at the police 
station and asked to see the suspect.  She was refused access by 
an officer who was unaware of any of the conversations between 
the suspect and the absent police interrogator, including the 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
3 
 
suspect's request for counsel.  After the attorney left, the 
police interrogator returned to the police station to resume the 
questioning——after first administering a new Miranda warning to 
the suspect and receiving a waiver of the suspect's Miranda 
rights.  In the ensuing interrogation, the suspect made an 
incriminating statement.  He was not aware when he made the 
statement that his attorney on the prior charge had visited the 
police station and tried to see him. 
¶4 
We conclude that David Stevens withdrew his request 
for an attorney by voluntarily initiating a request to resume 
the questioning.  He knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
provided an incriminating statement to his interrogator after he 
was given a second Miranda warning.  Although Stevens validly 
invoked his right to counsel, he cancelled his invocation of 
that right by initiating a dialogue in which he asked to 
continue the interrogation.  This cancellation of the request 
for counsel was confirmed by the fact that Stevens made no 
effort to secure counsel while his interrogator was absent, by 
his recorded agreement that he initiated the conversation asking 
to resume questioning, and by his waiver of the right to counsel 
after receiving a second Miranda warning. 
¶5 
We also conclude that the decision in Blum v. 1st Auto 
& Casualty Insurance Co., 2010 WI 78, ¶13, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 
N.W.2d 78, did not require the court of appeals to disregard 
Middleton in its analysis because Anson overruled Middleton only 
to the extent that "it held a circuit court may take additional 
evidence at [a Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968)] 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
4 
 
hearing."  However, Middleton is factually distinguishable from 
this case and is now completely overruled on the merits. 
¶6 
Because we determine that Stevens' Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination and his equivalent right 
under Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution were 
not violated, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶7 
The law in this case is highly fact-dependent.  
Consequently, we set out the facts with particularity. 
¶8 
On July 22, 2008, David Stevens, a 19-year-old 
convicted sex offender, was involved in an incident with an 
eight-year-old Waukesha girl in a swimming pool at an apartment 
complex in the city.  The incident occurred shortly after 5:00 
p.m. 
¶9 
Around 7:00 p.m., two City of Waukesha officers were 
dispatched separately to the girl’s home.  They met with the 
girl, her parents, and her older sister.  Officers Michael 
Carpenter and Cory Fossum were told that the girl had been 
swimming in the pool when she was approached in the water by a 
young man who appeared to be about 17.  The girl described the 
man as "creepy."  She said the man asked to play with her.  He 
grabbed her three or four times and ran his hands up and down 
the girl's sides.  She did not assert that the young man had 
touched her private areas.  The girl got out of the pool, 
crying, and told her older sister what had happened.  The two 
wrote down the license plate of the man's car, which the older 
sister described as an orange vehicle with spray paint on it. 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
5 
 
¶10 The two officers followed up their interview by going 
to the parking area of the apartment complex where they 
eventually located the car.  As the officers looked for a 
vehicle identification number, Stevens came out of an apartment 
building and told them to get away from his car. 
¶11 This exchange was the first interaction between police 
officers and Stevens concerning the incident.  Stevens, who 
appeared to be wearing a swimming suit under his jeans, gave his 
name as David Stevens.  Officer Carpenter asked him whether he 
had been at the pool.  He admitted that he had.  When asked 
about the girl, Stevens first denied any contact with a young 
girl, then told the officers that he saw a girl swimming in the 
deep end of the pool and grabbed her to pull her to safety 
because he was afraid she might not be able to swim.  Challenged 
on this version of the facts, Stevens acknowledged rubbing his 
hands up and down the girl's sides and asking her to play.  He 
eventually admitted having gratifying sexual thoughts about the 
girl but said he left the pool because he realized his behavior 
was wrong. 
¶12 When Stevens gave his name, Officer Fossum went to his 
squad car to run an identity check on his computer.  He later 
returned to the scene to ask Stevens about a pending felony 
charge of failing to update his residency information with the 
sex offender registry.  Stevens acknowledged the charge and 
explained why he was required to register——he had committed the 
offense of fondling a 5-year-old girl when he was 14.   
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
6 
 
¶13 Shortly 
thereafter, 
Officer 
Carpenter 
arrested 
Stevens, placed him in his squad car, and transported him to the 
Waukesha police station where he was confined in a holding cell 
overnight.  The arrest occurred sometime before 10:00 p.m.  
Stevens was not questioned in the squad car or at the police 
station. 
¶14 Stevens did not have a fixed residence.  He indicated 
that he had been kicked out of his mother's house, was homeless, 
and was temporarily staying with friends at the apartment 
complex. 
¶15 The following day, July 23, at 10:30 a.m., Stevens was 
interviewed by Detective Rick Haines who had been assigned to 
the case by Lieutenant Detective William H. Graham, Jr.  
Detective Haines had been a police officer for more than 25 
years and was working in the sensitive crimes unit of the 
Waukesha Police Department.  The interview was electronically 
recorded.  Stevens received and waived his Miranda rights before 
he began to answer questions.  He agreed specifically to make a 
voluntary statement.  Detective Haines warned Stevens that he 
would be asking him some "pointed questions about some things 
you[']ve been involved in."  In response to a question, Haines 
replied: "You[']re going to be charged with something, you know, 
but to what degree or as far as what specifically, that[']s to 
be determined, all right?"   
¶16 Over the course of the interrogation, Stevens admitted 
having physical contact with the young girl.  He admitted 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
7 
 
bumping into the girl intentionally once or twice, and wrapping 
his hands around her stomach.  
¶17 Stevens then said, "I[']m starting to feel a little 
uncomfortable, like I want a lawyer here or something."  
Detective Haines inquired further whether Stevens wanted a 
lawyer and Stevens replied: "I think I want to talk to my 
lawyer."  Detective Haines treated Stevens' statements as an 
invocation of the right to counsel and ceased the interrogation.  
The interrogation ended at 10:35 a.m., meaning that it had 
lasted about five minutes.   
¶18 Detective Haines stepped out of the interview room 
briefly, then returned to escort Stevens back to the holding 
cell.  During the short walk to the cell, Stevens indicated that 
he had changed his mind, that he wanted to clear the matter up 
and wanted to continue speaking to Haines.  Detective Haines 
explained that he was not able to continue immediately and that, 
in any event, he could not resume the questioning unless Stevens 
waived his right to an attorney.  According to Haines, Stevens 
replied that it was his intention once again to waive his right 
to an attorney.  Before Detective Haines left, Stevens said: 
"Make sure you come back, make sure you come back because I want 
to talk to you."  Detective Haines assured Stevens he would 
return.  At that point, Detective Haines left to interview the 
complaining witness.   
¶19 At approximately 1:00 p.m., Attorney Jenny Yuan, a 
public defender, came to the police department, seeking to meet 
with Stevens, but Lieutenant Graham denied her access.  Attorney 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
8 
 
Yuan went to the police station after Stevens' mother called her 
at 12:07 p.m., and left a message that Stevens was in custody 
for an alleged sexual assault.  Lieutenant Graham later 
testified that he believed he had called Stevens' mother that 
morning to let her know that Stevens was in custody, inasmuch as 
he had had contact with the mother before.  Lieutenant Graham 
testified that he denied Attorney Yuan access to Stevens because 
"I know that [Stevens] made no request for her.  So how she 
ended up at the police department, the request had to come 
through somebody else."   
¶20 Attorney Yuan, in turn, testified later that she "was 
not allowed to see Mr. Stevens."  She was at the station because 
she had been called by Stevens' mother and "was representing 
him . . . on pending cases" and "wanted to know if he was being 
questioned or if he had asked for me."  Attorney Yuan was told 
"[t]hat [she] would have to speak with Detective Haines and that 
he wasn't in the department at that time."  Attorney Yuan left a 
written message for Detective Haines at the station.  She also 
left a voicemail for him after returning to her office. 
¶21 Detective 
Haines completed his interview of the 
complaining witness at the C.A.R.E. Center1 and returned to the 
police station.  There he met with Lieutenant Graham, but 
neither man could recall later whether there had been any 
discussion of Attorney Yuan's attempt to meet with Stevens. 
                                                 
1 The C.A.R.E. center is a child advocacy center in Waukesha 
County that provides services to child abuse victims.  It is a 
multi-agency collaboration that provides several services on-
site including forensic interviews. 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
9 
 
¶22 At approximately 3:00 p.m., Detective Haines went to 
the holding cell to ascertain whether Stevens still wished to 
answer questions.  Stevens said that he wanted to continue.  
This willingness is reflected in the transcript of the second 
recorded interview. 
DETECTIVE HAINES:  Okay, David, I brought you back up 
here because you indicated to me that you had a change 
- - 
MR. STEVENS: Uh huh [affirmative]. 
DETECTIVE HAINES: - - a change of heart and that you 
wished to speak with me.  Let it be clear that you 
approached me with that and I did not approach you 
with this? 
MR. STEVENS: Yes. 
DETECTIVE HAINES:  Is that accurate? 
MR. STEVENS: That is clear.  
DETECTIVE HAINES: . . . Again, David, I am aware of 
the fact that our last interview ended when you 
invoked your Constitutional right to an attorney, and 
you had indicated to me that you wish to waive that 
right and speak to me now about this matter? 
MR. STEVENS:  Yeah. 
DETECTIVE HAINES:  Is that accurate? 
MR. STEVENS: I[']m afraid, but I[']m still willing to 
push forward because — — 
 
. . . .  
DETECTIVE HAINES: — — whether you[']d like to speak 
with me . . . . Again, I make no promises.  I make no 
threats.  I make no issue.  You approached me with 
your intention of speaking with me further and again, 
I would be happy to speak with you.  I[']d be happy to 
take down any information that you have to offer, but 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
10 
 
I guess for the record, this was your idea, correct?  
Yes or no? 
MR. STEVENS: Yes. 
¶23 Detective Haines then went through eight questions 
embodying the rights against self-incrimination set out in 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.  Stevens waived his rights and agreed 
again "to make a voluntary statement." 
¶24 Detective Haines then elicited additional information 
from Stevens.  Stevens admitted that he had intentionally 
touched the victim with his "intimate parts" three or four times 
for the purpose of sexual gratification.   
¶25 Detective Haines then requested that Stevens give a 
written statement.  Stevens gave a statement to Detective 
Haines.  Haines wrote out the statement, and Stevens reviewed it 
and signed it.  
¶26 The written statement is on a form titled "Waukesha 
Police Department Criminal Complaint Statement Form," dated July 
23, 2008, at 3:00 p.m.  It lists and acknowledges constitutional 
rights and contains the written statement.  The statement 
provides a few additional details about the incident including 
the name of the apartment complex, the victim's name and 
approximate age, and the desire of Stevens to get mental health 
treatment rather than go to jail.  The form notes that the 
interrogation ended at 3:40 p.m.   
¶27 The second interrogation, conducted in mid-afternoon, 
and the written statement signed by Stevens are at issue in this 
case. 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
11 
 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶28 The State filed a criminal complaint against Stevens 
on July 24, 2008.  It charged him with First Degree Sexual 
Assault——sexual contact with a child under the age of 13, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e),2 and Felony Bail Jumping, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(b).  The court found probable 
cause for a bindover at a preliminary examination on August 7, 
after hearing testimony from Detective Haines. 
¶29 On 
November 
17, 
Stevens 
moved 
to 
suppress 
all 
statements he made to law enforcement officers.  He also sought 
an evidentiary hearing on his motion.  This led to hearings 
before Judge Mawdsley on April 1, April 29, and June 11, 2009, 
where most of the facts cited in Section I were developed. 
¶30 Judge Mawdsley's oral findings of fact——on June 25——
are consistent with the facts recited in Section I.  However, 
Judge Mawdsley was impressed by the testimony of Lieutenant 
Graham: "Graham testified credibly that if in fact he had known 
that Mr. Stevens had invoked his right to have . . . contact 
with his counsel[,] then he would have definitely allowed 
Attorney Yuan to have contact . . . with the defendant."  Judge 
Mawdsley added: 
 
I think the key case here . . . is the Middleton 
case, and the key factor here is that the second 
waiver 
of 
rights 
did 
not 
have 
any 
information 
communicated to the defendant . . . that his attorney 
had appeared and that his attorney wanted to speak to 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
12 
 
him, or just the fact that the attorney had appeared 
might have been sufficient. 
 
So basically in my opinion the State . . . failed 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
[Stevens'] change of heart to speak to an attorney 
would have continued if he had been given that 
knowledge.  (Emphasis added). 
¶31 Relying 
heavily 
on 
Middleton, 
Judge 
Mawdsley 
determined that because information about Attorney Yuan's visit 
was not disclosed to Stevens before the second interview, 
Stevens' second waiver of his Miranda rights "was not a knowing 
waiver," thus requiring suppression of everything in the second 
interview.  He ruled, in effect, that Stevens could not waive 
his 
Miranda 
rights 
without 
having 
information 
about 
the 
attorney's visit. 
¶32 On August 7, 2009, the State filed a notice of appeal 
under Wis. Stat. § 974.05(1)(d)2., challenging the circuit 
court's 
decision 
to 
suppress 
some 
of 
Stevens' 
custodial 
statements.  That same day, the State (via the Assistant 
District Attorney) moved to supplement the factual record.  
Together with its notice of appeal, the Department of Justice 
filed a motion with the court of appeals to remand the case to 
the circuit court to give the circuit court authority to 
supplement the factual record.  The court of appeals granted 
this motion. 
¶33 After several delays, the circuit court held a hearing 
on the motion to supplement the record.  This motion was 
vigorously resisted by the defendant and denied by the court, 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
13 
 
even though the State complied with a court directive to submit 
an offer of proof.  The offer of proof read in part: 
 
The State of Wisconsin, by Assistant District 
Attorney Lloyd V. Carter, . . . filed a motion in the 
above case to supplement the factual record generated 
on April 1, 2009; April 29, 2009; and June 11, 2009.  
The 
Court 
rendered 
its 
decision 
regarding 
the 
defendant's motions on June 25, 2009 at or shortly 
after 11:00 a.m. 
 
On June 25, 2009, after receiving the Court's 
decision, Assistant District Attorney Lloyd V. Carter, 
along with legal intern Bryan Bayer were returning to 
the 
Waukesha 
County 
District 
Attorney 
office 
facilities on the ground floor of the courthouse when 
they were approached by a person recognized by ADA 
Carter as the mother of David W. Stevens (believed to 
be Kathryn A. Stevens . . . ).  ADA Carter further 
recognized this individual as having been present at 
all of the aforementioned evidentiary hearing dates 
and this female subject did identify herself as the 
mother of defendant, David W. Stevens.  Kathryn 
Stevens 
did 
initiate 
conversation 
with 
ADA 
Carter . . . .  Kathryn Stevens went on to state that 
she 
wished 
she 
had 
an 
opportunity 
to 
provide 
information to the Court earlier when [Lieutenant] 
Detective Graham and Attorney Yuan had testified 
relative to the evidentiary motions that had just been 
decided in Branch 11.  Kathryn Stevens further went on 
to provide unsolicited statements that the reason she 
had contacted the Public Defender's office and asked 
Attorney Yuan to go to the City of Waukesha Police 
Department to see her son was because she had received 
a telephone call from her son who was in custody at 
the City of Waukesha Police Department and that her 
son had requested that she contact his attorney, who 
represented him on another matter.  Upon receiving 
this information, ADA Carter asked a few clarifying 
questions and confirmed Kathryn Stevens' position, 
that the defendant had called her from the City of 
Waukesha jail and asked her to contact Attorney Yuan 
to come see him. 
 
ADA Carter believed this factual assertion by 
Kathryn Stevens to be both material and relevant to 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
14 
 
the Court's decision rendered earlier that date, which 
decision 
was 
made 
without 
the 
benefit 
of 
this 
additional factual information.   
(Emphasis added.) 
¶34 Neither Stevens' counsel nor the circuit court wanted 
any part of supplementing the record with new evidence.  On 
November 11, 2009, the court issued a final order:  "The Court 
finds that the testimony shall not be re-opened.  The offer of 
proof fails to provide facts which would change the court's 
original decision."  Consequently, there is no evidence in the 
record that Stevens ever called his mother and asked her to 
contact the attorney who represented him in another matter.  The 
defendant's 
counsel 
strongly 
opposed 
the 
introduction 
of 
evidence to support this proposition, and the State refused to 
stipulate to it.  Thus, such evidence was not considered by the 
court of appeals,  Stevens, No. 2009AP2057-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶16 n.4, and will not be considered by this court. 
¶35 As noted, in an unpublished opinion, the court of 
appeals reversed the circuit court's decision to suppress 
evidence, and it remanded the case for trial.  Id., ¶1.  The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination 
that 
Stevens 
initiated 
contact 
with 
his 
interrogator was not erroneous.  Id., ¶13.  It ruled that 
Stevens' lack of knowledge regarding whether the attorney had 
visited the police station did not affect whether his waiver was 
knowing.  Id., ¶15.  In the end, the court of appeals held that 
the suppression order was reversed "[b]ecause Stevens initiated 
contact with the police and knowingly, intelligently and 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
15 
 
voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment right to counsel."  Id., 
¶18. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶36 When we review a decision to suppress statements made 
to police, we accept the "circuit court's findings of historical 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous."3  State v. Ward, 2009 WI 
60, ¶17, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236.  We review de novo the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts.  Id. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
¶37 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads in part that: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself."  U.S. Const. 
amend. V. 
¶38 This element of the amendment has been incorporated 
into the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the States.  Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). 
¶39 Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
contains a parallel provision: "No person . . . may be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or 
herself."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 8. 
¶40 This court has normally construed the right against 
self-incrimination in Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution to be consistent with the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the federal right.  State v. Jennings, 
                                                 
3 The circuit court's findings of fact were not clearly 
erroneous; thus we are bound by them. 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
16 
 
2002 WI 44, ¶¶37-42, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142 (citing 
cases).   
A. The Right to Counsel Under Miranda v. Arizona 
¶41 In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court dealt with 
the question of what  
restraints society must observe consistent with the 
Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for 
crime. . . . [And] 
with 
the 
admissibility 
of 
statements 
obtained 
from 
an 
individual 
who 
is 
subjected to custodial police interrogation and the 
necessity 
for 
procedures 
which 
assure 
that 
the 
individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to 
incriminate himself. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439.    
¶42 The Miranda Court focused on pre-charge custodial 
interrogation4 which the Court had held, two years earlier, is a 
critical stage in criminal proceedings.  Escobedo v. Illinois, 
378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964).5  The Court described the nature and 
setting of custodial interrogation at length, stressing "the 
inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere," Miranda, 
                                                 
4 The Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 
defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody 
or 
otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way."  Id. at 444. 
5 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430 (1986), clarified the 
constitutional source of the rights described in Miranda, 
disavowing a Sixth Amendment basis for those rights.  Pre-charge 
custodial interrogation is undoubtedly an important point in 
criminal procedure but because it precedes the filing of a 
criminal charge, it does not trigger a Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
17 
 
384 U.S. at 468, including psychological coercion.  Id. at 445-
56. 
We have concluded that without proper safeguards the 
process 
of 
in-custody 
interrogation 
of 
persons 
suspected or accused of crime contains inherently 
compelling pressures which work to undermine the 
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak 
where he would not otherwise do so freely.  In order 
to combat these pressures and to permit a full 
opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-
incrimination, the accused must be adequately and 
effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of 
those rights must be fully honored. 
Id. at 467. 
Our aim is to assure that the individual's right to 
choose between silence and speech remains unfettered 
throughout the interrogation process.  
Id. at 469. 
¶43 To ensure that the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination is not lost in these circumstances, the Court 
declared that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether 
exculpatory 
or 
inculpatory, 
stemming 
from 
custodial 
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of 
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against 
self-incrimination."  Id. at 444. 
¶44 The Court said that police are free to use any "fully 
effective means . . . to inform accused persons of their right 
of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise 
it," id., but the Court prescribed a constitutionally sufficient 
method to protect that right and others——the now well-known 
Miranda warning:  "Prior to any questioning [of a person in 
custody], the person must be warned that he has a right to 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
18 
 
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as 
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of 
an attorney, either retained or appointed."  Id. 
¶45 The Court restated and amplified its holding later in 
the opinion: 
 
To summarize, we hold that when an individual is 
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and 
is subjected to questioning, the privilege against 
self-incrimination 
is 
jeopardized. 
 
Procedural 
safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, 
and unless other fully effective means are adopted to 
notify the person of his right of silence and to 
assure that the exercise of the right will be 
scrupulously 
honored, 
the 
following 
measures 
are 
required.  He must be warned prior to any questioning 
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything 
he says can be used against him in a court of law, 
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, 
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be 
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so 
desires.  Opportunity to exercise these rights must be 
afforded to him throughout the interrogation.  After 
such warnings have been given, and such opportunity 
afforded 
him, 
the 
individual 
may 
knowingly 
and 
intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer 
questions or make a statement.  But unless and until 
such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the 
prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result 
of interrogation can be used against him. 
Id. at 478-79 (emphasis added).6 
                                                 
6 The Court was careful to limit the "burdens" of its 
holding so that it would "not constitute an undue interference 
with a proper system of law enforcement."  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
481.  The Court specifically noted that the decision "does not 
mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must have 
a 'station house lawyer' present at all times to advise 
prisoners."  Id. at 474. 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
19 
 
¶46 The precise Constitutional status of the Miranda 
warning remains somewhat unsettled.  Compare New York v. 
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984), with Dickerson v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).  But the purpose of a Miranda 
warning is not in question: It is to ensure that a suspect's 
privilege 
against 
self-incrimination 
when 
in 
custody 
is 
protected, so that if the suspect chooses to speak and makes an 
incriminating 
statement, 
the 
statement 
will 
be 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  The suspect must understand that he 
has the right to remain silent. 
¶47 The majority opinion in Miranda is more than 60 pages 
long.  It represents a compelling statement of constitutional 
principles to protect defendants from official overreaching in 
criminal cases.  It also contains enduring guidelines of the 
procedures that law enforcement officers are expected to follow 
in conducting custodial interrogations.  At the same time, the 
Miranda decision is filled with ambiguities and internal 
conflicts.  Like other landmark decisions, Miranda could not 
anticipate, and does not provide answers for, every possible 
fact situation.  The present case is like a law school exam 
question that tests conflicting principles and challenges the 
court to synthesize and reconcile the decisions in a number of 
key Supreme Court and Wisconsin Supreme Court cases that have 
interpreted Miranda over the past four decades. 
¶48 Among the most important conclusions in Miranda is 
that 
once 
an 
individual 
invokes 
the 
right 
to 
counsel, 
interrogation must cease.  Id. at 444-45.  "If [a suspect] 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
20 
 
indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he 
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be 
no questioning."  Id.  "Once warnings have been given, the 
subsequent procedure is clear.  If the individual indicates in 
any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he 
wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease."  Id. at 
473-74. 
¶49 This rule was firmed up in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 
U.S. 477 (1981).7  Robert Edwards was charged with three 
felonies, including first-degree murder.  In custody he promptly 
asserted his right to counsel and his right to remain silent.  
Nonetheless, the police, without furnishing him an attorney, 
returned the following day to confront Edwards and secure an 
incriminating statement from him.  The Edwards Court determined 
that once an accused invokes his right to counsel under Miranda, 
the police must cease interrogation until counsel is present 
unless the accused himself initiates further communication with 
the police.  Id. at 484-85.   
¶50 Post-Miranda cases have frequently presented questions 
about whether an accused has, in fact, invoked his right to 
counsel after receiving a Miranda warning and, if he has, 
whether law enforcement has faithfully honored that right.  
These issues are not presented in this case because Stevens 
                                                 
7 Edwards v. Arizona was decided under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments 
with 
respect 
to 
counsel, 
self-
incrimination, and custodial interrogation,  451 U.S. 477, 478-
80 (1981), even though the case involved interrogation after a 
criminal complaint had been filed. 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
21 
 
clearly invoked his right to counsel and Detective Haines 
honored that right. 
¶51 Instead, 
this 
case 
poses 
the 
question 
whether 
Detective Haines was entitled to approach Stevens and ask for 
permission to resume interrogation in light of intervening 
events.  Edwards explained that once an accused has expressed 
"his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, [he] 
is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until 
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused 
himself 
initiates 
further 
communication, 
exchanges, 
or 
conversations with the police."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶52 The Edwards Court did not adopt the assertion in 
Justice Powell's concurring opinion that "police legitimately 
may inquire whether a suspect has changed his mind about 
speaking to them without an attorney."  Edwards, 451 U.S. at 490 
(Powell, J., concurring).  On the contrary, police may not 
"inquire" until the accused himself has initiated further 
communication with them, opening the door to further discussion.8  
When the accused initiates communication with police, the 
paradigm is reset and police may explore whether the accused is 
willing to answer questions.  They may proceed with custodial 
interrogation if the accused again is given a Miranda warning 
                                                 
8 "The Edwards rule is 'designed to prevent police from 
badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted 
Miranda rights.'"  Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 129 S. 
Ct. 2079, 2085 (2009) (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 
350 (1990)). 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
22 
 
and again waives his Miranda rights.  See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 
462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983) (plurality opinion).9 
¶53 The Edwards rule has been described as a prophylactic 
"bright-line 
rule 
to 
safeguard" 
the 
right 
against 
self-
incrimination.  Once the right to counsel has been invoked, a 
waiver of that right is acceptable if and only if the suspect 
initiates communication with police.  Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 
638, 644, 646 (1984).10 
¶54 Here, there is no question that Stevens initiated 
conversation with Detective Haines.  Detective Haines carefully 
documented that initiation and also informed Stevens of the 
Miranda safeguards a second time and obtained a new waiver.  
There appears to be no dispute that these procedures would be 
                                                 
9 The plurality opinion in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 
(1983), explains that the initiation of conversation by an 
accused does not amount to a waiver of the previously invoked 
right to counsel in the sense that police may begin or resume 
questioning without administering a new Miranda warning or 
otherwise being prepared to show that any statements offered by 
the accused are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Id. at 
1044-46. 
The concurrence/dissent seeks to transform Bradshaw into a 
rule that an accused's invocation of the Fifth Amendment right 
to counsel remains completely intact, no matter what the accused 
says to withdraw or cancel that invocation, until he is given 
and waives a second Miranda warning.  Chief Justice Abrahamson's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶¶112, 123.  This is not what Bradshaw 
holds or implies. 
10 In State v. Hambly, 2008 WI 10, 307 Wis. 2d 98, 745 
N.W.2d 48, the court discussed what constitutes sufficient 
initiation 
by 
an 
accused 
individual 
to 
permit 
further 
interrogation.  Id., ¶¶67-90.  The sufficiency of the initiation 
in this case is not before us. 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
23 
 
unassailable 
if 
Detective 
Haines 
had 
sought 
to 
resume 
interrogation immediately. 
¶55 Stevens asserts, however, that Detective Haines could 
not resume questioning, even with an explicit waiver from 
Stevens, because Stevens was not informed and did not know that 
his attorney in a different case had attempted to see him.  He 
cites Middleton to support this contention.  Stevens contends 
that Waukesha police had a constitutional duty to give the 
attorney access to Stevens or at least inform Stevens that the 
attorney was trying to see him.  Stevens argues that without the 
benefit of conferring with counsel or being informed that 
counsel had attempted to see him, he could not make a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver, and police had no right to 
approach him to ask for one. 
¶56 This argument requires the court to examine additional 
cases.  The Supreme Court has held that defendants can waive the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, even if already represented, 
without speaking to counsel about the waiver.  Michigan v. 
Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 353 (1990); see also Montejo v. Louisiana, 
556 U.S. 778, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2085 (2009) ("The defendant may 
waive the right whether or not he is already represented by 
counsel; the decision to waive need not itself be counseled.").  
If a person can waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
without speaking to counsel about the waiver, an individual 
should be able to waive his Fifth Amendment right inasmuch as 
the individual——who is still uncharged——normally does not yet 
have counsel. 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
24 
 
¶57 Here, Stevens was not represented by counsel on either 
of the new charges because he had not yet been charged.  
Attorney Yuan had not yet been appointed on new charges. 
¶58 Thus, 
the 
critical 
issue 
is 
whether 
Stevens' 
invocation of the right to counsel at 10:35 a.m. on July 23 
somehow survived his almost immediate initiation of conversation 
with his interrogator in which he emphatically asked to resume 
the questioning and expressed his willingness to withdraw his 
request to speak with his attorney by waiving his Miranda 
rights.  It should be noted that Stevens' initiation occurred 
before his attorney in the prior case appeared at the police 
station and before she even learned that Stevens was in custody.  
Did Stevens' invocation at 10:35 a.m. require that Attorney Yuan 
be given access to him at 1:00 p.m., notwithstanding Stevens' 
initiation of conversation with Detective Haines shortly after 
10:35 a.m.? 
¶59 The Supreme Court's decision in Moran v. Burbine, 475 
U.S. 412 (1986) is helpful.  It addressed a situation in which 
an attorney attempted to see a person in custody——before the 
person was charged——and was not only denied access but also 
misled by police.  The issue in Burbine was "whether a 
prearraignment confession preceded by an otherwise valid waiver 
must be suppressed . . . because [police] failed to inform the 
suspect of [an] attorney's efforts to reach him."  Burbine, 475 
U.S. at 420.  The Court held that the statement need not be 
suppressed.  Id.   
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
25 
 
¶60 In Burbine, Cranston, Rhode Island, police arrested a 
man in connection with a burglary and sought to question him 
about an unrelated murder.  Id. at 416.  That evening, the 
accused's sister contacted the Public Defender's Office, and an 
Assistant Public Defender followed up by contacting police and 
notifying them that she would serve as the accused's counsel 
during any lineup or questioning.  Id. at 416-17.  Police 
assured the attorney that they would not question the accused 
until the next day.  Id. at 417.  The accused was unaware that 
his sister had contacted an attorney and unaware that an 
attorney had contacted police on his behalf.  Id.  Later that 
day, the accused waived his Miranda rights and admitted to the 
murder.  Id. at 417-18. 
¶61 The Court held that the incriminating statement did 
not need to be suppressed.  Id. at 420.  The Court noted that 
the accused's waiver of his rights was voluntary.  Id. at 421-
22.  The Court stated: 
 
Events occurring outside of the presence of the 
suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no 
bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly 
relinquish a constitutional right. . . .  No doubt the 
additional information would have been useful to 
respondent; perhaps even it might have affected his 
decision to confess.  But we have never read the 
Constitution to require that the police supply a 
suspect with a flow of information to help him 
calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to 
speak or stand by his rights. 
Id. at 422.   
¶62 In explaining its decision, the Court went on further 
to say: 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
26 
 
 
Nor do we believe that the level of the police's 
culpability in failing to inform respondent of the 
telephone call has any bearing on the validity of the 
waivers.  In light of the state-court findings that 
there was no "conspiracy or collusion" on the part of 
the police, we have serious doubts about whether the 
[First Circuit] Court of Appeals was free to conclude 
that their conduct constituted "deliberate or reckless 
irresponsibility." 
 
But 
whether 
intentional 
or 
inadvertent, the state of mind of the police is 
irrelevant to the question of the intelligence and 
voluntariness of respondent's election to abandon his 
rights. 
 
Although 
highly 
inappropriate, 
even 
deliberate deception of an attorney could not possibly 
affect a suspect's decision to waive his Miranda 
rights unless he were at least aware of the incident.  
Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 481 (1964) 
(excluding confession where police incorrectly told 
the suspect that his lawyer "'didn't want to see' 
him").  Nor was the failure to inform respondent of 
the telephone call the kind of "trick[ery]" that can 
vitiate the validity of a waiver.  Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 476.  Granting that the "deliberate or reckless" 
withholding of information is objectionable as a 
matter of ethics, such conduct is only relevant to the 
constitutional validity of a waiver if it deprives a 
defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to 
understand 
the 
nature 
of 
his 
rights 
and 
the 
consequences of abandoning them.     
Id. at 423-24 (citations omitted). 
¶63 The Court in Burbine "decline[d] the invitation to 
further extend Miranda's reach" to require "the reversal of a 
conviction if the police are less than forthright in their 
dealings with an attorney or if they fail to tell a suspect of a 
lawyer's unilateral efforts to contact him."  Id. at 424.  Such 
a rule would "ignore[] the underlying purposes of the Miranda 
rules."  Id.  The Court also expressed concern about the ripple 
effect such a rule would have and the myriad questions such a 
rule would raise.  Id. at 425.  Thus, "[b]ecause neither the 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
27 
 
letter nor purposes of Miranda require[d]" it, the Court was 
"unwilling to expand the Miranda rules to require the police to 
keep 
the 
suspect 
abreast 
of 
the 
status 
of 
his 
legal 
representation."  Id. at 427. 
¶64 In the course of its decision, the Burbine Court 
stated that "the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination 
is . . . a personal one that can only be invoked by the 
individual whose testimony is being compelled."  Id. at 433 n.4.  
In other words, in pre-charge circumstances, a third-party such 
as an attorney, a family member, or a friend may not invoke, on 
behalf of the suspect, the suspect's constitutional right to 
request the presence of an attorney.  Only the suspect may 
invoke that right.   
¶65 The Burbine analysis was affirmed in State v. Hanson, 
136 
Wis. 2d 195, 
401 
N.W.2d 771 
(1987), 
and 
Ward, 
318 
Wis. 2d 301.  The Hanson case specifically rejected an appeal 
that the court interpret Article I, Section 8(1) of the 
Wisconsin Constitution to require law enforcement authorities to 
inform a suspect that there is an attorney available and asking 
to see him.  The Court said: 
 
Hanson requests that this court hold that law 
enforcement 
personnel 
violated 
his 
rights 
under 
Article I, sec. 8(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution by 
questioning Hanson without his "appointed" counsel's 
consent or presence and failing to inform Hanson that 
counsel was trying to see him. 
 
. . . .  
 
We do not believe that the suspect's knowledge of 
the location of a particular counsel can affect the 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
28 
 
intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights as 
described in Miranda warnings.  Since the knowledge of 
the location of counsel adds no constitutional rights, 
does not alter the facts of the case as the suspect 
knows them, and does not give rise to any coercive 
influence by the police, such knowledge is not 
relevant to the suspect's voluntary decision to waive 
his rights.  Although a suspect who was ready to waive 
his rights might change his mind when told an attorney 
was waiting to see him, the critical factor would be 
the convenience of seeing the attorney, not the 
intelligent perceived need for legal counsel.  Since 
the 
convenience 
of 
the 
defendant 
is 
not 
constitutionally 
protected, 
the 
location 
of 
a 
particular attorney is not constitutionally required 
information.11 
Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d at 207-08, 211-12. 
¶66 There are compelling reasons why an attorney under the 
Fifth Amendment is different from an attorney under the Sixth 
Amendment.  The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is grounded in 
the text of the amendment.  It attaches "only at or after the 
initiation 
of 
adversary 
judicial 
proceedings 
against 
the 
defendant."  United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984).  
"[O]nce the adversary judicial process has been initiated, the 
Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel 
present at all 'critical' stages of the criminal proceedings."  
Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085 (citing United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 
(1932)).  Once the right has attached, the police may not 
                                                 
11 The Hanson court also stated: "We agree with the United 
States Supreme Court that an event occurring outside the 
presence of the defendant and entirely unknown to him can have 
no 
bearing 
on 
his 
capacity 
to 
comprehend 
and 
knowingly 
relinquish a constitutional right."  State v. Hanson, 136 
Wis. 2d 195, 217, 401 N.W.2d 771 (1987). 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
29 
 
interfere with the efforts of a defendant's attorney to act as a 
"medium" between the suspect and the State during interrogation.  
Burbine, 475 U.S. at 428 (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 
176 (1985)).   
¶67 The Fifth Amendment does not address the right to 
counsel in its text.  Rather, the Fifth Amendment establishes a 
person's right not to "be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself."  While a suspect's right to remain 
silent 
undoubtedly 
applies 
to 
pre-charge 
custodial 
interrogation, the suspect's right to counsel before a charge is 
filed is derivative of the Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent.  It serves as a prophylactic to shore up the privilege 
against self-incrimination.  The Court in Miranda said that "the 
need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege 
comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to 
questioning, but also to have counsel present during any 
questioning if the defendant so desires."  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
470 (emphasis added). 
¶68 In short, a suspect in custody may remain silent by 
declining to answer questions, by asserting his right to remain 
silent, or by invoking his right to an attorney to help him 
remain silent.  But the suspect must invoke the right to counsel 
to assure that interrogation is not only terminated but also may 
not be resumed except at the personal initiation of the suspect.  
If a suspect wishes to be placed on the constitutional 
equivalent of a "do not call" list, he must invoke the right to 
counsel so that the police may not approach him to ask 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
30 
 
questions.  If interrogation is terminated because a defendant 
has invoked the right to counsel, the actual need for counsel is 
substantially eliminated, and thus counsel may not be appointed 
until the defendant appears in court.  There is no need to 
suppress a defendant's statements if the police have not asked 
him questions.   
¶69 In 
Hanson, 
this 
court 
held 
that 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution provides no further protections beyond Burbine that 
would 
require 
police 
to 
tell 
suspects 
of 
an 
attorney's 
availability to see them.  Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d at 208-12.  The 
court stated: 
 
If this information were required, distinctions 
between suspects would unfairly develop depending on 
whether third persons were able to engage the services 
of an attorney.  A new area of law would develop 
regarding 
actions 
of 
police 
in 
particular 
fact 
situations, i.e., was the attorney in the building, 
was the attorney on the telephone, was the attorney on 
his way to the building, was the attorney not 
immediately available but would be by a definite time, 
would a substitute attorney satisfy the requirement.  
Another line of cases could develop around who 
requested such representation: the accused's family, 
friends, or perhaps a criminal accomplice, or the 
attorney himself who has a reduced caseload. 
Id. at 212.   
¶70 This brings us back to the present case.  This case is 
distinguishable from Burbine, Hanson, and Ward on the simple 
fact that at 10:35 a.m. Stevens invoked the right to counsel.  
If nothing else had happened, Detective Haines would not have 
been able to approach Stevens again, would not have been able to 
ask him whether he was willing to talk, and would not have been 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
31 
 
able to administer a new Miranda warning.  This follows the rule 
in Edwards.  See also Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988); 
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) ("[W]e now hold 
that when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and 
officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel 
present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his 
attorney."). 
¶71 But something else happened.  First, after Detective 
Haines 
terminated 
the 
interrogation, 
Stevens 
spontaneously 
initiated conversation with his interrogator and asked to 
continue the questioning——to clear the matter up.  When 
Detective Haines explained that he was not able to continue 
immediately and that he could not resume the questioning unless 
Stevens waived his right to an attorney, Stevens replied that it 
was his intention to waive his rights again.  He said to 
Detective Haines, as the detective was leaving: "Make sure you 
come back, make sure you come back because I want to talk to 
you."  Detective Haines assured Stevens that he would return. 
¶72 Second, there is no evidence in the record that 
Stevens changed his mind during the four plus hours between the 
time when Detective Haines left and the time he returned.  There 
is no evidence that he made any effort to secure counsel while 
Detective Haines was absent.  On the contrary, Lieutenant Graham 
testified that "I know that [Stevens] made no request" for 
Attorney Yuan. 
¶73 Finally, Stevens affirmed his desire to continue 
talking; and after receiving his Miranda warning a second time, 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
32 
 
he waived his rights.  This encounter was recorded and the 
recording has been transcribed. 
¶74 Thus, Stevens withdrew his request for counsel.  He 
cancelled his invocation of the right to counsel by initiating a 
dialogue in which he asked to continue the interrogation.  This 
cancellation was confirmed by the fact that Stevens made no 
effort to secure counsel while his interrogator was absent, by 
repeating his desire to continue discussion, and by waiving the 
right to counsel after receiving a second Miranda warning. 
¶75 In Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. at 156, the Court 
explained that "Edwards does not foreclose finding a waiver of 
Fifth Amendment protections after counsel has been requested, 
provided 
the 
accused 
has 
initiated 
the 
conversation 
or 
discussions with the authorities."  (Emphasis added.)  This case 
represents a textbook example of that exception. 
¶76 In Miranda, the Court observed that "Interrogation 
still takes place in privacy.  Privacy results in secrecy and 
this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in 
fact goes on in the interrogation rooms."  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
448.  Here, however, all interrogation was recorded.  More 
important for our purposes is the fact that Stevens' initiation 
of conversation is confirmed in a recording along with his 
second waiver of Miranda rights.  The evidence of what went on 
in the interrogation room is not secret.   
¶77 Consequently, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Stevens' 
Fifth 
Amendment 
privilege 
against 
self-incrimination 
and 
his 
equivalent right under Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
33 
 
Constitution were not violated and that Stevens' oral and 
written statements should not be suppressed.    
B. Blum and Middleton 
¶78 This case presents a collateral issue that requires 
comment: 
Whether 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
was 
correct 
in 
disregarding 
Middleton 
in 
its 
analysis, 
on 
grounds 
that 
Middleton was overruled by Anson, 282 Wis. 2d 629, ¶¶13, 31. 
¶79 In its unpublished per curiam opinion in this case, 
the court of appeals observed in a footnote that: 
 
Our forthcoming analysis spends no time on State 
v. Middleton, 135 Wis. 2d 297, 399 N.W.2d 917 (Ct. 
App. 1986), because that case was overruled in State 
v. Anson, 2005 WI 96, ¶13, 282 Wis. 2d 629, 698 
N.W.2d 776.  Our supreme court made clear in Blum v. 
1st Auto & Cas. Ins. Co., 2010 WI 78, ¶56, 326 
Wis. 2d 729, 
786 
N.W.2d 78, 
that 
a[n] 
overruled 
decision of this court has no precedential value 
whatsoever.  Therefore, Middleton is out of the mix. 
Stevens, No. 2009AP2057-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶11 n.3. 
¶80 This court's decision in Blum in 2010 provided a 
standard that the court of appeals and this court could apply in 
evaluating the precedential value of a prior court of appeals 
decision that this court subsequently overruled.  In two places 
in the opinion, the court concluded that "[a] court of appeals 
decision loses all precedential value when it is overruled by 
this court."  Blum, 326 Wis. 2d 729, ¶¶3, 57.  The court now 
reaffirms this principle as a general rule.  Hence, if this 
court overrules a court of appeals decision without further 
comment, the court of appeals decision has no precedential 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
34 
 
value.  The policy reasons for this rule are explained in Blum.  
Id., ¶¶46-56. 
¶81 Part of our reason for a bright-line rule was to 
"eliminate the confusion that has surrounded" the question of 
what remains precedent, id., ¶53, and to spare courts the burden 
of trying to figure out "precisely which holdings in court of 
appeals decisions are still good law."  Id., ¶54. 
¶82 It must be acknowledged, however, that our Blum 
decision did not eliminate all "confusion" because of the fact 
that four times we used a qualifying "unless" clause in the 
discussion, 
namely, 
"unless 
this 
court 
expressly 
states 
otherwise," id., ¶42, "Unless this court explicitly states 
otherwise," id., ¶46, "unless it expressly states otherwise," 
id., ¶54, and "unless this court expressly states that it is 
leaving portions of the court of appeals decision intact," id., 
¶56.   
¶83 These "unless" clauses provided direction to this 
court to state its intent as clearly as possible if it wishes to 
overrule only part of a decision.  However, we have come to 
realize that applying these "unless" clauses to past cases in 
which 
this 
court 
failed 
to 
overrule 
a 
decision 
without 
qualification is not always easy and may require interpretation 
if there is any serious doubt about this court's intent. 
¶84 Anson's overruling of Middleton illustrates the point.  
Middleton was a lengthy decision.  It contained an extensive 
discussion of whether defendant Middleton had invoked the right 
to counsel after his arrest by calling his wife and asking her 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
35 
 
to contact "Gregory Hunsader" who happened to be a local 
attorney.  Middleton, 135 Wis. 2d at 304.  A sheriff's deputy 
overheard this call but did not share what he had heard with the 
officers interrogating Middleton.  Attorney Hunsader later 
showed up at the jail but was denied access to Middleton, and 
Middleton was not told of the attorney's presence before he made 
some of his admissions to officers.  Middleton never explicitly 
invoked the right to counsel.  The court of appeals agreed, id. 
at 310, but it concluded that some of Middleton's statements 
(after the attorney came to the jail) had to be suppressed 
because of the failure of officers to advise him "that the 
specific attorney he had directed his wife to contact had 
arrived."  Id. at 313.  However, Middleton's other statements, 
if made before the attorney's arrival, might stand. 
¶85 A second section of the opinion——plainly delineated as 
a 
different 
section——dealt 
with 
the 
fact 
that 
Middleton 
testified at trial after the incriminating statements had been 
admitted.  Was this testimony "impelled" by the state's use of 
tainted evidence?  Id. at 317.  If so, was Middleton's 
"impelled" testimony harmless error?  The court of appeals 
determined that the trial court could hold an evidentiary 
hearing on remand to determine whether Middleton's testimony was 
"impelled by those admissions" under Harrison v. United States, 
392 U.S. 219 (1968).  Middleton, 135 Wis. 2d at 323. 
¶86 In Anson, this court ruled "that a Harrison hearing is 
not an evidentiary hearing and overrule[d] the court of appeals' 
decision in Middleton to the extent it held a circuit court may 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
36 
 
take additional evidence at such a hearing.  We hold that a 
Harrison hearing is a paper review during which a circuit court 
makes findings of historical fact based on the record."  Anson, 
282 Wis. 2d 629, ¶13 (emphasis added).  "[W]e overrule the court 
of appeals' decision in Middleton, to the extent it holds that 
the circuit court may conduct a full evidentiary hearing when 
engaging in a Harrison analysis."  Id., ¶31 (emphasis added); 
see also id., ¶57. 
¶87 Looking at the narrow language of the Anson decision 
as applied in the broad context of the Middleton case, we 
conclude that the Anson court did not overrule the entire 
Middleton decision, and we believe it would be unreasonable to 
hold that it did.  The court clearly identified the portion of 
the Middleton opinion that it found objectionable, and it 
overruled Middleton to that extent.  The language used appears 
to leave the rest of Middleton unaffected.  Therefore, we must 
conclude 
that 
the 
court of appeals was not correct in 
disregarding Middleton on grounds that, because of Anson, 
Middleton had "no precedential value whatsoever."  
¶88 On the other hand, the court of appeals was correct on 
the merits in not relying on Middleton.  First, the Middleton 
court ruled that the defendant did not invoke the right to 
counsel.  Middleton, 135 Wis. 2d at 310.  Here, Stevens did 
invoke the right to counsel but then cancelled the invocation.  
Second, the Middleton court said that notwithstanding the fact 
that the defendant did not invoke his Miranda rights, he did 
initiate "the events which led to a specific attorney's coming 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
37 
 
to the jail."  Id. at 312.  Not so, Stevens.  Attorney Yuan came 
to the jail as the result of a call from Stevens' mother, not a 
call directly or even indirectly from Stevens.  Third, in 
Middleton, a deputy heard Middleton make a call and his 
knowledge was attributed to all other officers.  If knowledge of 
Stevens' invocation at 10:35 a.m. should have been attributed to 
all other officers in the Waukesha department, so also should 
his cancellation of the invocation moments later. 
¶89 The two cases are very different on their facts, so 
that Middleton would not influence the decision in Stevens.  
Moreover, the Middleton decision was effectively repudiated by 
United States District Judge Barbara Crabb in an unpublished 
opinion involving Middleton in 1992, Middleton v. Murphy, No. 
91-C-0751-C, unpublished op. (W.D. Wis. Jan. 28, 1992).  The 
Seventh Circuit agreed with Judge Crabb, attaching her full 
opinion to its brief opinion in 1993, Middleton v. Murphy, No. 
91-C-0751-C, unpublished op. 996 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. June 21, 
1993).  We include Judge Crabb's opinion as an appendix to this 
decision.   
¶90 Because we agree with Judge Crabb's conclusion that 
Douglas Middleton's confessions were voluntary and that Burbine 
was incorrectly applied in Middleton's case, we overrule State 
v. Middleton in its entirety.   
¶91 In 2010, after a great deal of internal discussion, 
the Blum court made a determination that overruled court of 
appeals decisions should have no precedential value unless this 
court expressly states that it is leaving portions of the court 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
38 
 
of appeals decision intact.  We realize now that it is much 
easier to apply this rule prospectively than it is to apply it 
retroactively.12  We think the Blum rule should be applied 
retroactively but with the following caveat.   
¶92 The 
"overruled 
unless" 
test 
cannot 
be 
applied 
retroactively with the same rigor that it can be applied 
prospectively because, before the Blum decision, this court did 
not have any agreed upon language to partially overrule a court 
of appeals decision, except an announcement that the court is 
                                                 
12 For example, how might a strict application of the Blum 
rule apply to a past decision of this court that overruled two 
court of appeals cases, but did so utilizing different language 
without the guidance of Blum?  E.g., Colby v. Columbia Cnty., 
202 Wis. 2d 342, 363 & n.11, 550 N.W.2d 124 (1996) ("Because the 
court of appeals in Fox[ v. Smith, 159 Wis. 2d 581, 464 
N.W.2d 845 (Ct. App. 1990)] failed to follow the precedent 
established by this court in Maynard and its progeny, we hold 
that the Fox decision is overruled.") ("We similarly overrule 
that portion of Schwetz[ v. Employers Ins. of Wausau,] 126 
Wis. 2d [32,] 37 n.4, 374 N.W.2d 241 [(Ct. App. 1985)], which is 
in conflict with the remainder of our holding in the present 
case.") (emphasis added). 
A different problem would be presented by a case that used 
very broad language in overruling court of appeals decisions.  
E.g., State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 486, 351 N.W.2d 469 
(1984): 
In so doing we specifically overrule and repudiate the 
entire line of cases stemming from State v. Booth, 98 
Wis. 2d 20, 295 N.W.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1980), which hold 
that the destruction of the breathalyzer test ampoule 
warrants the suppression of the test results and which 
rely on the theory that a used ampoule is testable to 
determine 
blood alcohol and can supply material 
evidence 
in 
respect 
to 
a 
defendant's 
guilt 
or 
innocence. 
Id. (emphasis added.)  
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
39 
 
"withdrawing" language from a decision.  Thus, as noted above, 
courts may have to interpret cases from this court that were 
decided 
prior 
to 
Blum 
to 
determine 
whether 
an 
opinion 
"overruling" a court of appeals decision really intended to 
overrule the entire decision or only a portion of it. 
¶93 In cases prior to Blum, if this court did not use any 
qualifying language in overruling a court of appeals decision, 
it probably intended to overrule the decision in its entirety, 
as Blum holds.  However, if this court utilized qualifying 
language, it probably intended something less than a total 
overruling and the surviving portion of the partially overruled 
decision may be cited as precedent.  
¶94 It is to be hoped that the Blum issues we discuss here 
will not surface very often.   
V. CONCLUSION 
¶95 We conclude that David Stevens withdrew his request 
for an attorney by voluntarily initiating a request to resume 
the questioning.  He knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
provided an incriminating statement to his interrogator after he 
was given a second Miranda warning.  Although Stevens validly 
invoked his right to counsel, he cancelled his invocation of 
that right by initiating a dialogue in which he asked to 
continue the interrogation.  This cancellation of the request 
for counsel was confirmed by the fact that Stevens made no 
effort to secure counsel while his interrogator was absent, by 
his recorded agreement that he initiated the conversation asking 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
40 
 
to resume questioning, and by his waiver of the right to counsel 
after receiving a second Miranda warning. 
¶96 We also conclude that the decision in Blum v. 1st Auto 
& Casualty Insurance Co., did not require the court of appeals 
to disregard Middleton in its analysis because Anson overruled 
Middleton only to the extent that "it held a circuit court may 
take additional evidence at [a Harrison v. United States] 
hearing."  However, Middleton is factually distinguishable from 
this case and is now completely overruled on the merits. 
¶97 Because we determine that Stevens' Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination and his equivalent right 
under Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution were 
not violated, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
 
 
2
 
 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
 
 
3
 
 
No. 
  2009AP2057-CR 
 
 
 
4
 
No.  2009AP2057-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶98 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion insofar as it concludes that (1) Stevens' 
privilege against self-incrimination, guaranteed by both the 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution, was not violated; and 
(2) this court's decision in Blum v. 1st Auto & Casualty 
Insurance Co., 2010 WI 78, ¶56, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78, 
did not require the court of appeals to disregard State v. 
Middleton, 135 Wis. 2d 297, 399 N.W.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1986), in 
its entirety.  I concur and write separately to clarify the 
majority opinion's discussion of Blum at ¶¶91-94.   
¶99 In Blum, a majority of this court concluded that "a 
court of appeals decision expressly overruled by this court no 
longer retains any precedential value, unless this court 
expressly states that it is leaving portions of the court of 
appeals decision intact."  326 Wis. 2d 729, ¶56.  Quite 
obviously, prior to Blum, no court could have known that it was 
expected to utilize magic language when partially overruling a 
court of appeals decision.  In short, the Blum rule can be 
understood only with common sense in mind.  In applying the 
rule, 
we 
simply 
must 
determine 
whether 
the 
court, 
in 
"overruling" a court of appeals decision, intended to overrule 
the entire decision or only a portion thereof.   
¶100 I respectfully concur in order to clarify the Blum 
rule. 
No.  2009AP2057-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
¶101 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶102 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  I join the majority opinion with respect 
to the discussion of the "Blum issue" at ¶¶91-94.  I dissent 
from the rest of the opinion relating to the Miranda issue.  
¶103 As the majority notes with regard to the Miranda 
issue, "[t]he present case is like a law school exam question."  
Majority op., ¶47.  The case presents a fact situation not 
previously faced by this court or, as best I can determine, by 
any other court.  The members of this court, like law students, 
have to reach a decision on the basis of past cases (not 
directly on point), constitutional principles, and pragmatic 
concerns. 
¶104 Here 
are 
the 
basic 
facts: 
 
During 
an 
initial 
interrogation, after receiving the first Miranda warnings, 
Stevens invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.  The 
questioning stopped——as it should.  Shortly thereafter, Stevens 
expressed interest in cancelling his invocation of the right to 
counsel and in resuming discussion with the detective.  He had 
the right to do so.  Stevens was placed in a cell.  Several 
hours passed before a law enforcement officer returned to talk 
with Stevens.  During this several-hour hiatus, Stevens' 
attorney arrived at the police station.  The police officers 
failed to inform Stevens of his attorney's arrival and refused 
to allow the attorney to see Stevens.  When the law enforcement 
officers returned to talk with Stevens, Stevens was given the 
Miranda warnings, waived his rights, and made statements that he 
now seeks to suppress.       
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶105 This court must determine whether the law enforcement 
officers violated the Fifth Amendment when they failed to inform 
Stevens of his attorney's arrival after Stevens expressed 
interest in cancelling his invocation of his right to counsel 
but before he received a second Miranda warning and waived his 
right to counsel.  In other words, does a suspect's initiation 
of conversation with law enforcement officers after the suspect 
invokes the right to counsel constitute a waiver of the right to 
counsel in the absence of a second Miranda warning?1     
¶106 The facts of the present case differ from prior cases.  
As the majority acknowledges, this case is distinguishable from 
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), State v. Hanson, 136 
Wis. 2d 195, 401 N.W.2d 771 (1987), and State v. Ward, 2009 WI 
60, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236.  In these cases, the 
suspects never explicitly invoked their right to counsel while 
in custody.  Majority op., ¶70.  For the same reason, the 
present case is distinguishable from State v. Middleton, 135 
Wis. 2d 297, 399 N.W.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1986), which seems to play 
a major role in the majority opinion.   
¶107 With regard to the fact situations presented by Moran, 
Hanson, Ward, and Middleton, I agree with the majority opinion 
that the United States Supreme Court and this court have held 
that a suspect who has not invoked the right to counsel does not 
                                                 
1 The majority states the issue as follows:  "[T]he critical 
issue 
is 
whether 
Stevens' 
invocation 
of 
the 
right 
to 
counsel . . . survived 
his 
almost 
immediate 
initiation 
of 
conversation with his interrogator in which he emphatically 
asked to resume the questioning . . . ."  Majority op., ¶58. 
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
have the right to be informed that counsel who intends to 
represent the suspect is available to speak with the suspect, 
and counsel need not be given the opportunity to speak with the 
suspect. 
¶108 With regard to the different fact situation presented 
in the instant case, I disagree with the majority.  Unlike the 
majority, I conclude that Stevens' Fifth Amendment rights were 
violated.  My conclusion, like the majority's to the contrary, 
is driven by a synthesis of principles derived from federal and 
state case law.  My conclusion is also driven by the federal and 
state constitutional provisions enshrining the right against 
self-incrimination 
(including the right to counsel during 
custodial interrogation) and by the pragmatic need to minimize 
the 
grave 
personal 
and 
societal 
harms 
flowing 
from 
the 
impairment of these rights.  The line between encouraging 
voluntary, true confessions and coercing confessions, whether 
true or false, is narrow.  Today's majority is all too willing 
to ignore that line.2 
I 
¶109 The majority appears to acknowledge, and I agree, that 
once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, not only must 
interrogation cease, but the suspect also has a right to be 
informed that an attorney has arrived at the station to speak 
with him.  Majority op., ¶¶67-70.  The United State Supreme 
Court declared in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), that 
                                                 
2 As I explain in Part IV, below, even if I agreed with the 
majority's Fifth Amendment analysis, I would conclude that the 
Wisconsin Constitution warrants a different result. 
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
once a suspect invokes his or her right to counsel, "the 
individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney 
and to have him present during any subsequent questioning."3  
Miranda thus provides that a suspect has two rights to counsel:  
(1) The right to consult with counsel prior to questioning; and 
(2) the right to have counsel present during any questioning.4       
¶110 According to the majority opinion, law enforcement did 
not have to inform Stevens that his attorney had arrived because 
Stevens "cancelled" his request for counsel.  And how did 
Stevens 
cancel 
his 
invocation 
of 
his 
right 
to 
counsel?  
According to the majority opinion at ¶4, Stevens "cancelled his 
invocation of that right by initiating a dialogue in which he 
asked to continue the interrogation."  See also majority op., 
¶74.  The majority explains that Stevens' "cancellation of the 
request for counsel was confirmed by the fact that Stevens made 
                                                 
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966).  
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Middleton v. Murphy, No. 
92-1498, unpublished slip op. (7th Cir. June 21, 1993) also 
indirectly supports the proposition that a suspect who has 
invoked the right to counsel must be informed that an attorney 
has arrived.  The district court (whose opinion was attached to 
the 
Seventh 
Circuit's 
decision) 
stated 
that 
"[b]ecause 
petitioner did not invoke his right to counsel when he called 
his wife, and then waived the right when he was given his 
Miranda warnings, the interrogating officers were not required 
to inform him when the lawyer arrived at the station."  
Middleton, No. 92-1498, unpublished slip op. at 7 (7th Cir. June 
21, 1993) (emphases added).  The converse is also true:  If the 
petitioner did invoke his right to counsel and had not yet 
waived that right, the interrogating officers were required to 
inform him that his lawyer had arrived.  
4 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470; Florida v. Powell, 130 
S. Ct. 1195, 1206 (2010).  
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
no effort to secure counsel while his interrogator was absent, 
by his recorded agreement that he initiated the conversation 
asking to resume questioning, and by his waiver of the right to 
counsel after receiving a second Miranda warning."  Majority 
op., ¶4.  
¶111 In the present case, counsel appeared at the police 
station before Stevens "confirmed" his cancellation of his 
invocation of the right to counsel.  Stevens' counsel appeared 
at the police station asking to see Stevens before Stevens 
waived his right to counsel after the second Miranda warning.  
Majority op., ¶¶19, 73-74.  As I explain below, the majority's 
conclusion that Stevens lost the rights he had gained by 
invoking the right to counsel merely by initiating conversation 
with the police, as opposed to both initiating conversation with 
the police and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving 
the right to counsel, is not compelled by precedent.  
¶112 I conclude that Stevens' invocation of his right to 
counsel 
during 
interrogation 
lasted 
until 
he 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived that right.  In this case, 
Stevens' only effective waiver came after the second Miranda 
warning.  Stevens' waiver of counsel came after Stevens' counsel 
appeared at the police station to speak with Stevens.  I 
therefore conclude that Stevens' Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel was violated when law enforcement failed to advise 
Stevens that counsel was available to speak with him. 
¶113 My conclusion is supported by the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
(1983).  In Bradshaw, eight justices (the four in the plurality 
and the four in dissent) agreed that in order for the 
interrogation of a suspect to continue without counsel once the 
suspect 
has 
invoked 
his 
or 
her 
right 
to 
counsel, 
two 
requirements must be met: (1) the suspect must, on his or her 
own accord, reopen dialogue with his interrogators; and (2) the 
suspect must again knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waive his Miranda rights.5   
¶114 According to eight justices in Bradshaw, the suspect's 
mere initiation of conversation with law enforcement does not 
suffice to show a waiver of the previously asserted right to 
counsel.  Rather, two steps must be analyzed before the suspect 
loses the rights he gained by invoking the right to counsel:  
the initiation step and the waiver step.6 
                                                 
5 See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983) 
(plurality opinion); Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1054 n.2 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). 
"The only dispute between the plurality and the dissent in 
this case concerns the meaning of 'initiation' for purposes of 
Edwards' per se rule."  Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1054 n.2 
(Marshall, J., dissenting).  
6 The plurality and dissenting justices agreed on this 
point.   
As the plurality in Bradshaw stated, the lower court "was 
wrong in thinking that an 'initiation' of a conversation or 
discussion by an accused not only satisfied the Edwards rule, 
but ex proprio vigore suffices to show a waiver of a previously 
asserted right to counsel.  The inquiries are separate, and 
clarity of application is not gained by melding them together."  
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045.   
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶115 I recognize that the present case is not governed 
precisely by Bradshaw.  In Bradshaw, the Court did not address 
the right of a suspect to be informed of an attorney's arrival.  
I do not claim that Bradshaw is on all fours with the present 
case.  Nevertheless, Bradshaw is instructive and supports my 
conclusion.   
¶116 Bradshaw addressed one of the rights gained by 
invoking the right to counsel——the right not to be subjected to 
further interrogation——and held that the right stays with the 
suspect until the suspect initiates further conversation and the 
police obtain a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver by 
giving the suspect a Miranda warning.7 
¶117 The present case addresses another right gained by a 
suspect who invokes the right to counsel——the right to be 
                                                                                                                                                             
The dissenting justices in Bradshaw agreed, stating: "If an 
accused has himself initiated further communication with the 
police, it is still necessary to establish as a separate matter 
the existence of a knowing and intelligent waiver under Johnson 
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)."  Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 
1054 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
The majority opinion refers to Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 
1039 (1983) in ¶52.  The majority explains Bradshaw as follows:  
"When the accused initiates communication with police, the 
paradigm is reset and police may explore whether the accused is 
willing to answer questions.  They may proceed with custodial 
interrogation if the accused again is given a Miranda warning 
and again waives his Miranda rights." 
7 "[T]he question would be whether a valid waiver of the 
right to counsel . . . had occurred, that is, whether the 
purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so 
under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary 
fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue 
with the authorities."  Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045 (quoting 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 n.9 (1981). 
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
informed of an attorney's arrival at the station.  To be 
consistent with Bradshaw, this court should hold that this 
right, 
like 
the 
right 
not 
to 
be 
subjected 
to 
further 
interrogation, 
stays 
with 
the 
suspect 
until 
the 
suspect 
initiates further conversation and the police obtain a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver. 
¶118 Bradshaw teaches that a suspect does not automatically 
waive his Fifth Amendment right to counsel by simply initiating 
a conversation regarding the investigation.8  A suspect's 
cancellation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel (after 
having invoked the right to counsel) requires a two-prong 
analysis.  Separate inquires must be made and both prongs must 
be satisfied before the suspect loses the rights he gained by 
invoking the right to counsel.9  
¶119 This court followed the Bradshaw two-prong analysis 
for continuation of interrogation of a suspect who has invoked 
his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.  In State v. Hambly,10 the 
court held that after a suspect effectively invokes his Fifth 
Amendment Miranda right to counsel, the State must meet two 
criteria to renew interrogation: 
(A) 
The State has the burden to show that the suspect 
initiated further conversation with law enforcement. 
                                                 
8 Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044.  
9 The majority alludes to the two required steps under 
Bradshaw and Hanson at ¶¶52 and 74. 
10 See State v. Hambly, 2008 WI 10, ¶¶69–70, 307 Wis. 2d 98, 
745 N.W.2d 48.  
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
(B) 
The State has the burden to show that the suspect 
waived the right to counsel voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently; that is, the waiver of counsel must be 
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of a 
known right.11 
¶120 In Hambly, as in the present case, the first criteria 
was satisfied.  The Hambly court then examined the facts to 
determine whether Hambly's waiver of his right to counsel after 
the second Miranda warnings were given was knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary.12 
¶121 In 
the 
present 
case, 
when 
Stevens 
initiated 
conversation with the detective shortly after invoking his right 
to counsel, according to the law enforcement officer, Stevens 
said that "it was his [Stevens'] intention once again to waive 
his right to an attorney."  See majority op., ¶¶18, 71.  Stevens 
is not quoted as, or treated as, knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waiving his right to counsel at the moment when he 
initiated conversation with law enforcement officers.   
¶122 The majority opinion does not assert that Stevens' 
initiation of conversation with the law enforcement officer was 
a valid waiver of his right to counsel.  The majority opinion 
does not claim that Stevens waived his right to counsel before 
he was given the second Miranda warning.  Nothing in the record 
establishes 
that 
Stevens 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
                                                 
11 Hambly, 307 Wis. 2d 98, ¶¶68-70. 
12 Id., ¶¶98, 99. 
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel before he was given the 
second Miranda warning.   
¶123 Thus when Stevens' attorney arrived at the police 
station before the second Miranda warnings were given, Stevens 
had not yet effectively cancelled his invocation of the right to 
counsel.        
¶124 The 
majority 
opinion 
incorrectly 
treats 
Stevens' 
initiating communications with law enforcement as a per se 
cancellation of his earlier invocation of the right to counsel.  
Stevens' initiating communications with law enforcement did not, 
in and of itself, constitute a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of the previously invoked right to counsel.  
Initiating conversation with law enforcement simply made it 
possible for there to be a subsequent knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.   
¶125 The record demonstrates that the police did not obtain 
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to 
counsel until after Stevens' counsel appeared at the police 
station.  Therefore, during the interval between Stevens' 
initiating conversation with the police and the second Miranda 
warning, Stevens' invocation of the right to counsel was still 
in existence and he had a right to be informed that his attorney 
had arrived and to consult with his attorney if he wished to do 
so.  This right was violated in the present case.  
¶126 The majority does not apply the principles of Bradshaw 
and Hambly to the present case.  The majority treats a suspect's 
initial invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel as a 
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
nullity once the suspect initiates conversation with law 
enforcement.  The majority has no authority to support this 
thesis.  The majority pieces together snippets from case law not 
addressing the issue presented in the instant case to support 
its conclusion that we may treat the invocation of the right to 
counsel as if it never occurred because the defendant merely 
initiated conversation with law enforcement. 
¶127 The majority complains that my dissent "transform[s] 
Bradshaw into a rule that an accused's invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel remains completely intact, no matter 
what the accused says to withdraw or cancel that invocation, 
until he is given and waives a second Miranda warning."  
Majority op., ¶52 n.9.  The majority misstates my position. 
¶128 My position is that a suspect's invocation of the 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel remains intact until (1) the 
suspect, on his or her own accord, reopens dialogue with the 
interrogators, and (2) the suspect knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waives his or her Miranda rights.  See ¶¶112-117, 
supra.  This interpretation of Bradshaw and application of 
Bradshaw to the present case properly recognizes the sanctity of 
a suspect's invocation of the right to counsel and the crucial 
importance of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of 
that right.   
¶129 It seems likely that a suspect's initiation of 
conversation will usually be followed almost immediately by the 
interrogators' obtaining a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
waiver of the right to counsel from the suspect (typically by 
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
administering Miranda warnings).  In the present case, however, 
there was a significant gap between the suspect initiating 
conversation and the suspect knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waiving the right to counsel.  The waiver did not 
occur until hours later (after counsel had arrived at the 
station) when the second Miranda warnings were given.  
¶130 Thus, I conclude that Stevens' statements during the 
second custodial interrogation were obtained in violation of 
Miranda, Edwards, and Bradshaw, and should have been suppressed.  
As I see it, precedent more strongly commands the outcome I urge 
than the outcome the majority reaches. 
II 
¶131 In addition to precedent, my conclusion is supported 
by the historical importance of the protections offered by the 
Fifth Amendment and the longstanding tradition of protecting the 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel, once invoked, with particular 
vigilance. 
¶132 The Fifth Amendment embodies the privilege against 
self-incrimination, which is "the essential mainstay of our 
adversary system."13  "[O]ur accusatory system of criminal 
justice demands that the government seeking to punish an 
individual 
produce 
the 
evidence 
against 
him 
by 
its 
own 
independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient 
of compelling it from his own mouth."14  Because of its 
                                                 
13 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.   
14 Id. 
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
fundamental importance, "the privilege has consistently been 
accorded a liberal construction."15   
¶133 In order to honor fully the privilege against self-
incrimination, Miranda requires police to inform suspects of 
both the right to silence and the right to counsel, among other 
things, before custodial interrogation may occur.  Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 479.  Although the right to silence is a crucial element 
of the privilege against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court 
has confirmed that "additional safeguards are necessary when the 
accused asks for counsel."16 
                                                 
15 Id. at 461.  
16 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981).  
See also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979): 
Whether it is a minor or an adult who stands accused, 
the lawyer is the one person to whom society as a 
whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of 
that person in his dealings with the police and the 
courts. For this reason, the Court fashioned in 
Miranda the rigid rule that an accused's request for 
an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth 
Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation 
cease. 
At least one state has held that once a suspect invokes the 
right to counsel, he is incapable of waiving that right outside 
the presence of counsel.  See People v. Cunningham, 400 
N.E.2d 360 (N.Y. 1980). 
The importance of the right to counsel in Wisconsin is 
evidenced by our legislature's criminalizing the denial of 
access to an attorney for a person in custody in certain 
situations.  See Wis. Stat. § 946.75 ("Whoever, while holding 
another person in custody and if that person requests a named 
attorney, denies that other person the right to consult and be 
advised by an attorney at law at personal expense, whether or 
not such person is charged with a crime, is guilty of a Class A 
misdemeanor.").  Wisconsin Stat. § 946.75 is not implicated by 
the facts of record in the present case. 
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
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¶134 This court should interpret and apply the Fifth 
Amendment 
and 
the 
relevant 
precedent 
with 
the 
goal 
of 
maintaining, rather than shrinking, the Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel.  Consistent with the United States Supreme Court's 
declaration in Miranda, this court should construe precedent in 
favor of protecting the right to counsel.  The majority fails at 
this task.  
III 
¶135 The third reason for my conclusion is the pragmatic 
concern that underlies the right to counsel and justifies 
treating an invocation of the right to counsel with great 
respect.   
¶136 Although the United States Supreme Court has stated 
that voluntary confessions are "'an unmitigated good,' essential 
to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and 
punishing those who violate the law,"17 the Court has also 
recognized that "the pressure of custodial interrogation is so 
immense that it 'can induce a frighteningly high percentage of 
people to confess to crimes they never committed.'"18  The 
presence of counsel is a safeguard against the possibility of 
false confessions.   
                                                 
17 Maryland 
v. 
Shatzer, 
130 
S. Ct. 1213, 
1222 
(2010) 
(quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991)). 
18 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2401 (2011) 
(quoting Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 321 (2009) 
(citing Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False 
Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 891, 906-07 
(2004))) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455 n.23). 
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶137 When 
a 
false 
confession 
leads 
to 
a 
wrongful 
conviction, not only is the wrongfully convicted person harmed, 
but so is society.  A wrongful conviction enables the guilty 
person to evade capture and commit more crimes.  A wrongfully 
imprisoned individual costs the taxpayers substantial sums of 
money for trial, incarceration, and later exoneration in some 
cases.   
¶138 False confessions are, unfortunately, unexceptional.  
Almost a quarter of the approximately 2,000 exonerations studied 
in a 2012 report involved a defendant who either falsely 
confessed 
or 
was 
falsely 
accused 
by 
a 
co-defendant 
who 
confessed.19  According to recent data from the Innocence 
Project, 
approximately 25 percent of wrongful convictions 
overturned by DNA evidence in the United States have involved 
some form of false confession.20  Wisconsin is not immune to the 
risk of false confessions and false convictions.21   
                                                 
19 See Saumel R. Gross & Michael Shaffer, National Registry 
of Exonerations, Exonerations in the United States, 1989–2012 41 
(2012). 
20 See Innocence Project,  False Confessions & Recording of 
Custodial 
Interrogations, 
available 
at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/False_Confessions__Recor
ding_Of_Custodial_Interrogations.php 
(last 
visited 
June 
29, 
2012). 
21 Of 891 individual exonerations listed by the 2012 study, 
Wisconsin had the eighth highest number of any state, with 21 
exonerations. Saumel R. Gross & Michael Shaffer, National 
Registry of Exonerations, Exonerations in the United States, 
1989–2012 35 (2012).   
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
¶139 For the reasons discussed above, I conclude that the 
majority errs in its application of the Fifth Amendment in the 
present case. 
IV 
¶140 In any event, even if I agreed with the majority's 
Fifth Amendment analysis, which I do not, I would rely on the 
Wisconsin Constitution to reach a different result.  As I noted 
in my dissent in Hanson, the United States Supreme Court in 
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 428, expressly invited the states 
to promulgate their own rules governing the conduct of their 
police officers to protect the individual rights of citizens.22  
Wisconsin should accept that invitation.   
¶141 As Justice Crooks noted in his dissent in Ward and as 
I noted in Hanson, we have serious concerns about the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Moran.  The majority 
decisions 
in 
Hanson 
and 
Ward 
unfortunately 
provide 
an 
opportunity, and perhaps even an incentive, for law enforcement 
officers to prevent individuals from meaningfully exercising the 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel during custodial interrogation.    
¶142 Like United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul 
Stevens' dissenting opinion in Moran, I conclude that allowing 
law enforcement officers to withhold from a suspect the fact 
that an attorney has arrived or to deceive a suspect's attorney 
places the choice of whether an attorney will be present during 
                                                 
22 State v. Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d 195, 220, 401 N.W.2d 771 
(1987) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 
475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986)). 
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
questioning in the hands of the law enforcement officers, not 
the individual being questioned.  This outcome flies in the face 
of the Fifth Amendment protections that Miranda was meant to 
enforce.23  
¶143 This court should reconsider its prior decisions 
regarding the obligation that law enforcement officers have to 
keep suspects informed of an attorney's availability.  This 
court should join the many state courts that have rejected the 
United States Supreme Court's Moran decision and granted more 
                                                 
23 Moran, 475 U.S. at 453 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
robust constitutional protections to their people under their 
state constitutions or laws.24  
¶144 For the reasons stated, I write separately. 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446, 452 (Conn. 
1988) ("[A] suspect must be informed promptly of timely efforts 
by counsel to render pertinent legal assistance."); Bryan v. 
State, 571 A.2d 170, 176 (Del. 1990) ("[A] purported waiver can 
never satisfy a totality of the circumstances analysis when 
police do not even inform a suspect that his attorney seeks to 
render legal advice."); People v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 923, 930 
(Ill. 1994) ("[W]hen police, prior to or during custodial 
interrogation, refuse an attorney appointed or retained to 
assist a suspect access to the suspect, there can be no knowing 
waiver of the right to counsel if the suspect has not been 
informed that the attorney was present and seeking to consult 
with him." (quoted source omitted)); State v. Reed, 627 
A.2d 630, 643 (1993) ("[W]hen, to the knowledge of the police, 
such an attorney is present or available, and the attorney has 
communicated a desire to confer with the suspect, the police 
must make that information known to the suspect before custodial 
interrogation 
can 
proceed 
or 
continue." 
(quoted 
source 
omitted)); West v. Commonwealth, 887 S.W.2d 338, 343 (Ky. 1994) 
("[T]here is no logical basis for distinguishing between an 
attorney requested by an accused and an attorney requested, as 
in 
this 
case, 
by 
a 
family 
member 
on 
behalf 
of 
the 
accused . . . ."); People v. Bender, 551 N.W.2d 71, 79 (Mich. 
1996) ("[I]n order for a defendant to fully comprehend the 
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of his 
decision to abandon it, he must first be informed that counsel, 
who could explain the consequences of a waiver decision, has 
been retained to represent him."); Dennis v. State, 990 
P.2d 277, 286 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) ("[C]ommon sense and 
fundamental fairness suggest the fact of the attorney's presence 
is important information a suspect would use in determining 
whether to waive or invoke his rights."); Commonwealth v. 
Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 179 (Mass. 2000) ("When an attorney 
identifies himself or herself to the police as counsel acting on 
a suspect's behalf, the police have a duty to stop questioning 
and 
to 
inform 
the 
suspect 
of 
the 
attorney's 
request 
immediately."); State v. Roache, 803 A.2d 572, 579 (N.H. 2002) 
("[I]nterrogating officers have a duty to stop questioning the 
suspect and inform the suspect that the attorney is attempting 
to contact him or her."). 
No.  2009AP2057-CR.ssa 
 
1