Title: Pryor v. Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Servs.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Pryor v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-2907.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-2907 
PRYOR, APPELLEE, v. DIR., OHIO DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES, 
APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Pryor v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., Slip Opinion 
No. 2016-Ohio-2907.] 
R.C. 4141.282 does not require parties appealing from decisions of the 
Unemployment Compensation Review Commission to name all interested 
parties as appellees in the notice of appeal before the court of common pleas 
can exercise jurisdiction—To satisfy R.C. 4141.282(D) and trigger the 
appeal period, an order by the Unemployment Compensation Review 
Commission must not merely list interested parties but must expressly 
identify them as interested parties. 
(Nos. 2015-0767 and 2015-0770—Submitted January 27, 2016—Decided May 
11, 2016.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Summit County,  
No. 27225, 2015-Ohio-1255. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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_____________________ 
 
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} In this consolidated certified conflict and discretionary appeal by 
appellant, the director of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services 
(“ODJFS”), we address whether R.C. 4141.282 requires parties appealing from 
decisions of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission to name all 
interested parties as appellees in the notice of appeal before the court of common 
pleas can exercise jurisdiction.  We agree with the Ninth District Court of Appeals 
that R.C. 4141.282 does not require appellee, Marcus Pryor, to name all interested 
parties in order to perfect his appeal.  We hold that R.C. 4141.282 imposes only 
one jurisdictional requirement for perfecting an appeal from a commission 
decision:  “The timely filing of the notice of appeal shall be the only act required 
to perfect the appeal and vest jurisdiction in the court.”  R.C. 4141.282(C). 
{¶ 2} We also conclude that the commission’s practice of listing the names 
and addresses of parties who were sent a copy of its final decision without 
identifying whether those parties are “interested parties” fails to comply with R.C. 
4141.282(D).  R.C. 4141.282(D) states that “[t]he commission shall provide on its 
final decision the names and addresses of all interested parties.”   The commission’s 
July 24, 2013 decision listed the names and addresses of Pryor, the ODJFS director, 
and the United States Department of the Army, Pryor’s former employer.  The 
decision, however, failed to identify any party other than the director as an 
interested party who must be named as an appellee.  We therefore hold that the 
commission failed to comply with the procedural requirements of R.C. 
4141.282(D), and accordingly, Pryor’s time to appeal never started.  See Hughes v. 
Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 114 Ohio St.3d 47, 2007-Ohio-2877, 868 N.E.2d 246, 
paragraph one of the syllabus (an agency must “strictly comply” with the 
procedural requirements of R.C. 119.09 for serving the final order of adjudication 
upon the affected party before the appeal period can commence). 
January Term, 2016 
 
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{¶ 3} While we agree with the Ninth District that the naming of interested 
parties is not a jurisdictional requirement under R.C. 4141.282, we nevertheless 
reverse the Ninth District’s judgment to the extent that it reversed the common pleas 
court’s dismissal of Pryor’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and reinstated Pryor’s 
administrative appeal in the common pleas court.  Because Pryor’s time to appeal 
the commission’s decision never began, the common pleas court’s dismissal of the 
appeal was correct.  We remand the cause to the commission to issue a decision 
that complies with R.C. 4141.282(D).  Pryor may then refile a notice of appeal in 
the appropriate common pleas court in accordance with R.C. 4141.282. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 4} In January 2011, Pryor enlisted with the Army for a four-year term as 
a combat medic.  The Army honorably discharged Pryor in August 2012, before 
the completion of his full term of service, so that Pryor could enter an officer-
training program.  Pryor applied that same month to ODJFS for unemployment 
compensation. 
{¶ 5} The ODJFS Office of Unemployment Compensation initially 
determined on September 10, 2012, that Pryor was eligible for benefits.  After an 
appeal by the Army’s Human Resources Command, however, the director of 
ODJFS issued a redetermination on April 18, 2013, reversing ODJFS’s September 
10, 2012 decision and ordering Pryor to return $10,800 in overpaid benefits. 
{¶ 6} Pryor appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Review 
Commission, and the commission held a hearing on the matter in accordance with 
R.C. 4141.281.  The Army did not participate in the hearing.  A hearing officer 
affirmed the director’s April 18, 2013 redetermination. 
{¶ 7} On July 24, 2013, the commission issued a decision denying Pryor’s 
request to review the hearing officer’s findings.  In a section entitled “Appeal 
Rights,” the commission’s decision informed Pryor that if he appealed from the 
commission’s decision he “must name all interested parties as appellees in the 
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notice of appeal, including the Director of [ODJFS].”  The same paragraph of the 
decision informed Pryor that he had 30 days from the mailing date of the decision 
to file an appeal in the court of common pleas of the county where he resides or 
was last employed, as set forth in R.C. 4141.282.  The decision concluded with a 
notice that the decision was sent to Pryor, the Army, and the director of ODJFS and 
listed their addresses.  The commission’s decision did not indicate that any party 
other than ODFJS was an interested party who must be named in the appeal. 
{¶ 8} On August 23, 2013, Pryor filed an appeal in the Summit County 
Common Pleas Court in accordance with R.C. 4141.282.  While Pryor’s notice of 
appeal named the director of ODJFS as the appellee, he did not name the Army as 
a party to his appeal.  However, Pryor did file a separate document requesting the 
clerk of courts to serve his notice of appeal on the director of ODJFS and the Army.  
On December 31, 2013, the common pleas court granted the ODJFS director’s 
motion to dismiss, finding that because Pryor failed to name the Army as an 
interested party, his notice of appeal did not comply with R.C. 4141.282(D) and the 
court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction. 
{¶ 9} The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed and concluded that 
Pryor’s failure to name his former employer was not a jurisdictional defect.  The 
court held that R.C. 4141.282(C) sets forth only two requirements to perfect an 
appeal:  the appellant must timely file the notice of appeal, and the notice must 
identify the decision appealed from.  The court also concluded that the provisions 
in R.C. 4141.282(D) and (E) pertaining to the naming of interested parties and 
service of the notice of appeal do not impose conditions precedent to the vesting of 
subject-matter jurisdiction in the common pleas court. 
{¶ 10} The court certified that its judgment conflicted with the judgments 
in the following cases: Dikong v. Ohio Supports, Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
120057, 2013-Ohio-33; Mattice v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2d Dist. 
Montgomery No. 25718, 2013-Ohio-3941; Rupert v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family 
January Term, 2016 
 
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Servs., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-14-1139, 2015-Ohio-915; Hinton v. Ohio Unemp. 
Rev. Comm., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 14 MA 45, 2015-Ohio-1364; Luton v. Ohio 
Unemp. Revision Comm., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97996, 2012-Ohio-3963; 
Sydenstricker v. Donato’s Pizzeria, L.L.C., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2009-L-149, 2010-
Ohio-2953. 
{¶ 11} In accordance with S.Ct.Prac.R. 8.03, we determined that a conflict 
exists on the following question:  “When appealing an unemployment 
compensation decision to the trial court, are the requirements contained in R.C. 
4141.282(D), which explains how to name the parties, mandatory requirements 
necessary to perfect the appeal and vest the trial court with jurisdiction?”  143 Ohio 
St.3d 1415, 2015-Ohio-2911, 34 N.E.3d 928.  We also accepted the ODJFS 
director’s discretionary appeal asserting that R.C. 4141.282(D)’s requirements are 
jurisdictional requirements, 143 Ohio St.3d 1416, 2015-Ohio-2911, 34 N.E.3d 930, 
and we consolidated the two cases, 143 Ohio St.3d 1415, 2015-Ohio-2911, 34 
N.E.3d 928. 
ANALYSIS 
Requirements for perfecting an appeal under R.C. 4141.282 
{¶ 12} When a statute confers a right to appeal, the appeal can be perfected 
only in the mode the statute prescribes.  Zier v. Bur. of Unemp. Comp., 151 Ohio 
St. 123, 84 N.E.2d 746 (1949), paragraph one of the syllabus.  Compliance with the 
specific and mandatory requirements governing the filing of a notice of appeal “is 
essential to invoke jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas.”  Id. at paragraph 
two of the syllabus.  Accordingly, we must determine here whether R.C. 4141.282, 
the statute conferring a right to appeal from decisions of the Unemployment 
Compensation Review Commission, requires an appellant to name all interested 
parties in the notice of appeal in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the common 
pleas court.  We conclude that it does not. 
{¶ 13} R.C. 4141.282(A) through (E) reads as follows:   
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(A) THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE FOR APPEAL 
Any interested party, within thirty days after written notice 
of the final decision of the unemployment compensation review 
commission was sent to all interested parties, may appeal the 
decision of the commission to the court of common pleas. 
(B) WHERE TO FILE THE APPEAL 
An appellant shall file the appeal with the court of common 
pleas of the county where the appellant, if an employee, is a resident 
or was last employed or, if an employer, is a resident or has a 
principal place of business in this state. If an appellant is not a 
resident of or last employed in a county in this state or does not have 
a principal place of business in this state, then an appellant shall file 
the appeal with the court of common pleas of Franklin county. 
(C) PERFECTING THE APPEAL 
The timely filing of the notice of appeal shall be the only act 
required to perfect the appeal and vest jurisdiction in the court. The 
notice of appeal shall identify the decision appealed from. 
(D) INTERESTED PARTIES 
The commission shall provide on its final decision the names 
and addresses of all interested parties. The appellant shall name all 
interested parties as appellees in the notice of appeal.  The director 
of job and family services is always an interested party and shall be 
named as an appellee in the notice of appeal. 
(E) SERVICE OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Upon filing the notice of appeal with the clerk of the court, 
the clerk shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal upon all appellees, 
including the director. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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(Capitalization sic.) 
{¶ 14} Our starting point here is the statute’s text.  R.C. 4141.282(C) 
addresses the procedure for perfecting the appeal and expressly states that “[t]he 
timely filing of the notice of appeal shall be the only act required to perfect the 
appeal and vest jurisdiction in the court.”  When a statute is plain and unambiguous 
on its face, we need not resort to the rules of statutory construction; we must assume 
that the General Assembly meant what it said.  See State ex rel. Wise v. Ryan, 118 
Ohio St.3d 68, 2008-Ohio-1740, 886 N.E.2d 193, ¶ 26.  Here, the General 
Assembly has clearly stated in R.C. 4141.282(C) that the timely filing of the notice 
of appeal is the “only” jurisdictional requirement for perfecting an appeal.  The 
word “only” means just that. 
{¶ 15} The dissent interprets the word “shall” in R.C. 4141.282(D) as 
imposing the naming of all interested parties in the notice of appeal as an additional 
jurisdictional prerequisite.  This reading, however, ignores the plain legislative 
statement of jurisdiction in division (C).  The unequivocal language in the first 
sentence of R.C. 4141.282(C) precludes us from reading into the statute any 
additional jurisdictional requirements other than timely filing of the notice of 
appeal.  See Nucorp, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 64 Ohio St.2d 20, 
22, 412 N.E.2d 947 (1980) (declining to “find or enforce jurisdictional barriers not 
clearly statutorily or constitutionally mandated”). Although R.C. 4141.282 imposes 
various procedural requirements—among other things, the naming of interested 
parties, venue, and service—not every requirement, even if mandatory, is 
jurisdictional in nature.  See Spencer v. Freight Handlers, Inc., 131 Ohio St.3d 316, 
2012-Ohio-880, 964 N.E.2d 1030, ¶ 22 (failure to comply with party-naming 
requirement could lead to dismissal of a workers’ compensation appeal, but “that 
does not make the requirement jurisdictional”).  The question whether an 
appellant’s failure to name all interested parties may justify subsequent dismissal 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
of an appeal under R.C. 4141.282 is not before us.  Here, we need only determine 
whether that failure justifies dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 
{¶ 16} The director of ODJFS relies on Spencer to argue that the party-
naming requirement in R.C. 4141.282(D) is jurisdictional because it governs the 
content of a notice of appeal.  However, the director draws the wrong lesson from 
Spencer.  The outcome in Spencer did not rest on application of a content-based 
test to determine which statutory requirements were jurisdictional.  Rather, our 
inquiry focused on what the statute itself expressly stated as the sole requirement 
for perfecting an appeal. 
{¶ 17} The key statutory provision in Spencer stated that “ ‘[t]he filing of 
the notice of the appeal with the court is the only act required to perfect the 
appeal.’ ”  Spencer at ¶ 9, quoting R.C. 4123.512(A).  We therefore looked to the 
rest of the statute to see what “filing of the notice of the appeal” entailed:  “ ‘The 
notice of appeal shall state the names of the claimant and the employer, the number 
of the claim, the date of the order appealed from, and the fact that the appellant 
appeals therefrom.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 9, quoting R.C. 4123.512(B).  Because R.C. 
4123.512(A) expressly sets forth the “filing of the notice of the appeal” as the only 
jurisdictional requirement, we concluded that inclusion of the information required 
in the notice of appeal itself was the only condition precedent to vest jurisdiction.  
Id. at ¶ 15, 17.  Any additional requirements, including naming the administrator of 
workers’ compensation, the claimant, and the employer as parties to the appeal, 
addressed nonjurisdictional items imposed “in addition to or subsequent to a notice 
of appeal.”  Id. at ¶ 16-17, citing R.C. 4123.512(B).  Our determination in Spencer, 
therefore, did not depend on whether the statute addressed the contents of a notice 
of appeal; our inquiry focused on the wording of R.C. 4123.512(A), which 
expressly stated that the “filing of the notice of the appeal” is the only requirement 
for perfecting an appeal. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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{¶ 18} Unlike the more open-ended language examined in Spencer, R.C. 
4141.282(C) states that “[t]he timely filing of the notice of appeal shall be the only 
act required to perfect the appeal and vest jurisdiction in the court.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  The General Assembly has clearly stated that timely filing—and no other 
requirement related to the filing of a notice of appeal—is the only jurisdictional 
requirement under R.C. 4141.282.  While we recognized in Spencer that the naming 
of certain parties may be a jurisdictional requirement “in cases that involve statutes 
that clearly require such for jurisdiction,” Spencer at ¶ 19, this is not one of those 
cases. 
{¶ 19} For these reasons, we conclude that timely filing of the notice of 
appeal is the only jurisdictional requirement for perfecting an appeal under R.C. 
4141.282. 
Commission’s failure to identify all interested parties 
{¶ 20} We also conclude that the commission’s decision did not meet the 
procedural requirements of R.C. 4141.282(D) because it did not identify the Army, 
Pryor’s former employer, as an interested party.  Pryor’s 30-day period to appeal, 
therefore, never started. 
{¶ 21} We have consistently held that an administrative agency must 
strictly comply with the procedural requirements governing the issuance of its 
decision before the appeal deadline begins to run.  In Proctor v. Giles, 61 Ohio 
St.2d 211, 400 N.E.2d 393 (1980), we held that compliance by the Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review with the procedural requirements of former R.C. 
4141.28(O) was a necessary precondition to the running of the 30-day period to 
appeal.  In Sun Refining & Marketing Co. v. Brennan, 31 Ohio St.3d 306, 511 
N.E.2d 112 (1987), we concluded that an agency must comply with the procedural 
requirements in R.C. 119.09 before the 15-day appeal period begins to run.  Id. at 
308-309, citing Proctor. 
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{¶ 22} More recently, in Hughes, 114 Ohio St.3d 47, 2007-Ohio-2877, 868 
N.E.2d 246, we held that an agency must “strictly comply” with the procedural 
requirements of R.C. 119.09 for serving the final order of adjudication upon the 
affected party before the appeal period can commence.  Id. at paragraph one of the 
syllabus, citing Sun Refining.  In Hughes, the agency failed to serve a certified copy 
of its order upon the affected party, as required by R.C. 119.09.  Id. at ¶ 13-15.  The 
agency argued that the affected party was not prejudiced, because she did receive a 
copy of the order, but not a certified copy.  Id. at ¶ 11.  We rejected that argument 
and concluded that the agency failed to strictly comply with the procedural 
requirements of the statute.  Id. at ¶ 12-15. 
{¶ 23} Here, the commission’s July 24, 2013 decision failed to indicate that 
the Army was an interested party that Pryor must name in his notice of appeal.  R.C. 
4141.282(D) states: “The commission shall provide on its final decision the names 
and addresses of all interested parties.  The appellant shall name all interested 
parties as appellees in the notice of appeal.  The director of job and family services 
is always an interested party and shall be named as an appellee in the notice of 
appeal.”  In a section entitled “Appeal Rights,” the commission’s decision informed 
Pryor that “[t]he appellant must name all interested parties as appellees in the notice 
of appeal, including the Director of [ODJFS].”  The next paragraph informed Pryor 
that he had 30 days to appeal.  The final paragraph stated, “This decision was sent 
to the following,” followed by a list of the parties who received the commission’s 
decision—Pryor, the Army, and the director of ODJFS—and their addresses.  The 
last paragraph of the decision did not indicate that those individuals or entities were 
interested parties who must be named in the notice of appeal.  It merely indicated 
that they were sent a copy of the commission’s decision, much like the parties listed 
in a certificate of service.  Common sense tells us that listing the parties who will 
receive a copy of the commission’s decision—without expressly identifying them 
as interested parties—does nothing to advise a potential appellant and falls well 
January Term, 2016 
 
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short of the mandate in R.C. 4141.282(D) that the decision provide the names and 
addresses of all interested parties. 
{¶ 24} We conclude that the commission failed to comply with the 
procedural requirements in R.C. 4141.282(D), and therefore, Pryor’s 30-day appeal 
period never started to run.  Once the commission issues a decision that complies 
with R.C. 4141.282(D), Pryor may then refile a notice of appeal in the appropriate 
common pleas court in accordance with R.C. 4141.282. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 25} For the reasons above, we reverse the judgment of the appeals court 
and remand to the commission to issue a decision that complies with R.C. 
4141.282(D). 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
PFEIFER, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissents with an opinion. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents and would reverse the judgment of the Ninth 
District Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the Summit County 
Common Pleas Court. 
_________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 26} The majority employs two different standards to interpret two 
adjacent, parallel sentences in the same statutory section.  Because this approach is 
not supported by well-settled principles of statutory construction, I respectfully 
dissent. 
{¶ 27} The majority properly starts with the statute’s text but then veers off 
course in interpreting the following two sentences in R.C. 4141.282(D): 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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The commission shall provide on its final decision the names 
and addresses of all interested parties.  The appellant shall name all 
interested parties as appellees in the notice of appeal. 
 
{¶ 28} The majority concludes that the first sentence above constitutes a 
procedural requirement with which the Unemployment Compensation Review 
Commission must strictly comply in order to start Marcus Pryor’s 30-day appeal 
period.  Leaving aside the fact that there is no language in R.C. 4141.282(D) 
regarding the initiation of an appeal period, the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
phrase “[t]he commission shall provide” (emphasis added) establishes the 
mandatory nature of the requirement.  Here, the commission named all interested 
parties—Pryor, the United States Department of the Army, and Ohio Department 
of Job and Family Services (“ODJFS”)—with their addresses in its final decision.  
Its sole deficiency, according to the majority, was not labeling each an “interested 
party.” 
{¶ 29} But the majority rejects both a plain-language reading and strict-
compliance approach to interpret nearly identical language in the very next sentence 
of the statute when determining Pryor’s obligations.  The majority concludes that 
the phrase “[t]he appellant shall name all interested parties” (emphasis added) is 
not a mandatory requirement, thereby rendering that part of the statute meaningless.  
In fact, the majority concludes that Pryor’s only requirement to perfect an appeal 
was to timely file a notice of appeal under R.C. 4141.282(C) regardless of what 
information was included, or not included, in that notice of appeal. 
{¶ 30} Such a selective reading of the statute is not supported by the case 
law on which the majority relies.  See Hughes v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 114 
Ohio St.3d 47, 2007-Ohio-2877, 868 N.E.2d 246, ¶ 17 (“Just as we require an 
agency to strictly comply with the requirements of R.C. 119.09, a party adversely 
affected by an agency decision must likewise strictly comply with R.C. 119.12 in 
January Term, 2016 
 
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order to perfect an appeal.  As the proverb states, what is good for the goose is good 
for the gander”). 
{¶ 31} Nor is the majority’s reading of the statute supported by the 
principles of statutory construction.  It is a tenet of statutory construction that we 
give effect to the words used and refrain from inserting or deleting words.  
Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland, 37 Ohio St.3d 50, 53-54, 524 N.E.2d 441 
(1988).  And we give the words their plain and ordinary meaning.  The word “shall” 
has long been construed to make the provision in which it is contained mandatory.  
Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 271 N.E.2d 834 (1971), 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  Thus, the General Assembly’s use of the word 
“shall” in R.C. 4141.282(D) to describe the requirements upon both the commission 
and the appellant with respect to naming interested parties is mandatory in both 
contexts. 
{¶ 32} The statute means what it says.  And “shall” cannot be construed as 
having one meaning when applied to the commission and another when applied to 
Pryor.  Here, R.C. 4141.282(D) required the commission to provide in the final 
decision the names and addresses of all interested parties, specifically, Pryor, 
ODJFS, and the United States Department of the Army.  The commission did so.  
The statute also required Pryor to name all interested parties as appellees in the 
notice of appeal.  By failing to name the Army as an appellee, Pryor did not satisfy 
the statutory requirement.  Thus, he did not comply with a mandatory requirement 
regarding the contents of his notice of appeal. 
{¶ 33} It is troubling that the majority excuses this omission but then creates 
a mandatory requirement for the commission not found in the statute.  Under the 
guise of “common sense,” the majority concludes that in order to start the 30-day 
appeal period, the written notice of final decision must include, in addition to the 
names and addresses of all interested parties as the statute expressly requires, a label 
identifying the parties named as “interested parties.”  This requirement is not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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supported by the statutory language.  And if common sense is the guide, it would 
seem that Pryor should have been aware that his former employer—the Army—
would be an interested party to his unemployment-compensation appeal.  And it 
makes little sense that anyone other than interested parties would be listed on the 
commission’s notice of final decision. 
{¶ 34} It is unclear to me why the majority goes so far as to create an 
additional requirement for the initiation of the 30-day appeal period, particularly 
when Pryor did not argue for this additional requirement and the issue is not raised 
in the conflict question certified to us.  If, as the majority holds, all that is required 
to perfect an appeal is the timely filing of a notice of appeal, regardless of what 
information that notice contains, then the administrative appeal should not have 
been dismissed by the trial court for lack of jurisdiction.  The majority overreaches 
its limited role in statutory interpretation to reach its desired outcome. 
{¶ 35} To require the commission to strictly comply with a requirement to 
start the 30-day appeal period that is not plainly expressed in the statute and at the 
same time hold that Pryor does not have to comply with an explicit requirement 
regarding the contents of the notice of appeal is inequitable and contravenes basic 
principles of statutory construction.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
_________________ 
Marcus Pryor II, pro se. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, 
Stephen P. Carney and Peter T. Reed, Deputy Solicitors, and Susan M. Sheffield, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. 
Charles Cohara, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Southeastern Ohio 
Legal Services. 
Lori K. Elliott, urging affirmance for amicus curiae the Legal Aid Society 
of Southwest Ohio. 
January Term, 2016 
 
15 
Julie Cortes, urging affirmance for amicus curiae the Legal Aid Society of 
Cleveland. 
Janet E. Hales, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Poverty Law 
Center. 
Kathleen C. McGarvey, urging affirmance for amicus curiae the Legal Aid 
Society of Columbus. 
Julita L. Varner, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Legal Aid of Western 
Ohio. 
Michelle Wrona Fox, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Community 
Legal Aid Services, Inc. 
_________________