Title: Volz v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Volz v. State1985 WY 168707 P.2d 179Case Number: 85-34Decided: 10/17/1985SCOTT C. VOLZ, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
SCOTT C. VOLZ, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, J. 
K

 
 
Bert T. 
Ahlstrom, Jr., Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Asst. Atty. Gen., (argued) for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Scott C. Volz pled 
guilty to a charge of aggravated homicide by vehicle under § 6-2-106(b), W.S. 
1977, 1984 Cum.Supp.1 and was sentenced to not less than 
two nor more than five years in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     The issue as stated by 
the appellant is:

"Whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant to the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary under the law and the facts of this case (a) by failing to consider 
probation; and/or (b) generally, by the sentence imposed."

THE 
FACTS

[¶4.]     On the evening of 
August 3, 1984, appellant, who was then nineteen, drove his automobile to a 
party at Vedauwoo, a public park west of Cheyenne, Wyoming. He drank four or five beers at the 
party. He then returned to Cheyenne, where, while driving his automobile, 
he struck an eighteen-year-old bicyclist from behind. The bicyclist died at the 
scene from injuries sustained in the accident. Appellant immediately reported 
the collision, and subsequently a blood sample taken from the appellant revealed 
a blood alcohol content of .13%. Appellant had been driving approximately 70 
miles per hour through Cheyenne at the time of the accident and left 
skid marks over 350 feet in length from the point of impact. Appellant was 
charged with being under the influence of intoxicating liquor while driving a 
motor vehicle and causing the death of Brian Kembell, the charge being 
aggravated vehicular homicide contrary to § 6-2-106(b), W.S. 1977, 1984 
Cum.Supp., supra.

[¶5.]     Appellant was arraigned 
and entered a plea of guilty to the charge. At the arraignment, the prosecuting 
attorney advised the court that originally a probationary period of seven to ten 
years was going to be recommended, but that had changed when appellant filed his 
motion under § 7-13-203, W.S. 1977.2 The court informed appellant that 
it was not bound by any particular sentence or any recommendations of the 
prosecuting attorney and directed that the victim's father should be given 
notice of the time and place of the sentencing hearing. A Motion for Sentencing 
Pursuant to Section 7-13-203, W.S. 1977, supra, was filed and an "Investigation 
Summary" prepared and submitted to the court. At the sentencing hearing, 
defendant's attorney stated to the court:

"Mr. Volz accepts his 
responsibility, and driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol was, in 
fact, the cause of the accident. But there are a lot of other circumstances that 
I am asking the court to take into consideration.

* * * * * 
*

"At the time this offense 
occurred, and at this time, Mr. Volz is a full-time college student. The 
presentence report indicates, as well as the motion which was filed on behalf of 
Mr. Volz for sentencing under this particular statute, Mr. Volz had been drafted 
by the Kansas City Royals baseball club.

* * * * * 
*

"I would submit to the 
court that the tragedy of this situation would only be compounded by the tragedy 
of placing Mr. Volz in prison. He has the obvious potential and commitment to 
excel as a student, as well as to excel in a sports career, and to make a person 
of himself that other people can look up to."

The victim's 
father then asked to address the court and he stated:

"My son was 18. I mean, 
if you want to talk about his son being able to continue his education, to 
continue his life, my son doesn't have that opportunity. He had scholarships. He 
was an art student. He doesn't have that opportunity anymore to do those 
things.

"This is not an accident. 
Getting hit under the D.W.I. influence is not an accident. I don't think we can 
say that. 

Because once you take 
that intoxicant and once you get behind the wheel of that automobile, you are 
responsible for what happens.

"If this is the case, if 
it's an accident, any of us can get in a car and say, gee, I can walk away, Your 
Honor, and I don't think that is true. I don't think that is what this society 
is made out of.

"I'm not done with this 
whole thing yet. I mean, I'm working very strongly with the state legislators. 
I'm doing a lot of traveling on my own, spending the money. I think it's time it 
quits. I mean, we killed 38,000 people on alcohol related 
accidents."

FAILURE TO CONSIDER 
PROBATION

[¶6.]     The issue of whether 
probation was properly considered is implicitly involved in the case at bar 
since it is intertwined in the complex sentencing process. This court has held 
that the "imposition * * * of probation lies within the sound discretion of the 
district court, and we will not reverse the actions of the district court unless 
that discretion is abused." Gronski v. 
State, Wyo., 700 P.2d 777, 778 (1985); Minchew v. State, Wyo., 685 P.2d 30, 33 
(1984).

[¶7.]     Appellant contends that 
the trial court's comments reflect that he mistakenly believed he had no choice 
but to sentence to confinement because of the legislative mandate in 
drunk-driving cases. To put this issue in proper perspective, it is necessary to 
reflect upon just what was said. The court stated:

"The court is of the view 
that this is a tragic thing in the lives of two families: your family and 
yourself, and the family of the victim. The court is not helping you in any way 
by sentencing you to confinement, other than to suggest that our legislature has 
shown a desire to make this offense a serious one in our society. They have done 
so by making it different to kill a human being while in violation of the 
statutes relating to driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, making it different in that case from the other cases of a 
negligent homicide by vehicle which does not involve driving under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor. This is a clear legislative mandate to this court, that 
the legislature requires that courts pursue these types of offenses differently 
than the ordinary negligent homicide. "I am extremely sorry that it is my duty 
to carry out what I conceive to be the legislative mandate and requirement. It 
isn't that it is something that I necessarily believe is appropriate in every 
case, but I do not believe that I can ignore it in a case in which there is no 
doubt that the accident occurred as a result of your driving a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. You have so told the court, 
your counsel has so told the court, and the facts seem to indicate 
that."

[¶8.]     This court first 
commented on the probation issue in Sanchez v. State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 1130 
(1979). In that case we held:

"[A] trial judge must 
give consideration to the application [for probation] and grant or deny the same 
in the exercise of sound legal discretion. The refusal of the application must 
not be based upon mere whim or caprice nor upon any ground not sanctioned by the 
law." Id. at 
1137.

In Sanchez, this 
court quoted sections of the A.B.A. Standards, Sentencing Alternatives and 
A.B.A. Standards, Probation which indicated one of the factors to consider in 
imposing the sentence was whether granting probation "would unduly depreciate 
the seriousness of the offense." 592 P.2d  at 1138.

[¶9.]     In the case at bar, the 
trial court did not set forth explicitly the reasons for denying probation. 
While this court in Daniel v. State, 
Wyo., 644 P.2d 172 (1982), strongly suggested that the trial court explicitly set forth the 
reasons for denial, there is not a requirement to do so. This court has 
recognized that other facts may be even more persuasive than a mere recitation 
that probation was considered. Kenney v. 
State, Wyo., 605 P.2d 811, 812 (1980). 

[¶10.]  This issue of the amount of consideration 
which must be given probation has been raised repeatedly. This court in Beaulieu v. State, Wyo., 608 P.2d 275 
(1980), stated:

"The fact that probation 
was requested and the appearance of a probation plan in the presentence report 
can lead to no conclusion but that the court could not avoid giving it 
consideration. No particular amount of consideration is required. There need be 
no specific entry into the record of reasons why probation is denied nor does 
the word `probation' even need be mentioned by the court if it can be determined 
from the proceedings that it has been considered, however 
slightly."

In the case at 
bar, the request for probation was brought to the court's attention several 
times. At the arraignment an oral sentencing agreement for probation was 
discussed and soon after a written motion for sentencing pursuant to § 7-13-203, 
W.S. 1977, was filed. This was almost two months before the sentencing hearing. 
The court requested a presentence report, and Volz was asked at the sentencing 
hearing if he would like to call the court's attention to or explain anything 
further in the report. Additionally, at the sentencing hearing the appellant 
asked to be allowed to "go on" with his schooling and career, and his counsel 
made a plea for probation. These facts clearly show that the court thoroughly 
considered the request for probation even though the court did not explicitly 
say so.

[¶11.]  The trial court did discuss the 
"legislative mandate" regarding drunk drivers who kill. Appellant contends that 
these statements reflect an approach to sentence based upon generalizations 
about types of offenses. In Sanchez v. 
State, supra, 592 P.2d  at 1138, this practice of generalizing was condemned. 
It was stressed that the probation decision should be based on the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case. In the case at bar when the trial court's 
comments are considered along with the facts and circumstances, they do not show 
generalization about the type of offense. Rather, they simply point to the 
seriousness of this offense. Further, the court not only referred to the 
legislative mandate but also indicated that the mandate is not appropriate in 
every case. This remark specifically reveals that it did not generalize. 
Moreover, this court has recognized if probation would unduly depreciate the 
seriousness of the offense, a prison sentence is appropriate. Sanchez v. State, supra, 592 P.2d  at 
1138.

[¶12.]  As reflected in the judicial sentencing 
information system sheet, the trial court by imposing the sentence was stressing 
the seriousness of the offense and trying to deter others. In Ventling v. State, Wyo., 676 P.2d 573, 576 
(1984), we pointed out that deterrence to others is a permissible objective. The 
court stated:

"`There is no decision in 
the criminal process that is as complicated and difficult as the one made by the 
sentencing judge. A sentence prescribes punishment, but it also should be the 
foundation of an attempt to rehabilitate the offender, to insure that he does 
not endanger the community, and to deter others from similar crimes in the 
future. Often these objectives are mutually inconsistent, and the sentencing 
judge must choose one at the expense of the others.'" (Quoting 4 Wharton's 
Criminal Procedure § 609, p. 207 n. 14 (12th ed. 1976.))

[¶13.]  In the case at bar, it is unfortunate 
that the objective of rehabilitation of this appellant could not be allowed to 
prevail over the necessity of deterrence of drunk drivers of our society. The 
trial court determined that the seriousness and widespread nature of this 
problem required that deterrence take priority over rehabilitation under the 
facts of the present case.

[¶14.]  A review of the record, the trial court's 
comments and the facts surrounding the sentencing reflects that probation was 
given appropriate consideration by the court and, therefore, there was no error 
in the sentencing. 

IMPOSITION OF 
SENTENCE

[¶15.]  The standard this court follows on review 
of sentencing is well established. This court will not reverse a sentence which 
is within the statutory limits absent a clear abuse of discretion. Kallas v. State, Wyo., 704 P.2d 693 
(1985); Wright v. State, Wyo., 703 P.2d 1102 (1985); Munden v. State, 
Wyo., 698 P.2d 621, 626 (1985); Young 
v. State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1985); Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 692 P.2d 911, 930 
(1984); Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 991, 1008 (1984); Ventling v. 
State, supra, 676 P.2d  at 574; Eaton 
v. State, Wyo., 660 P.2d 803, 806 (1983); Taylor v. State, Wyo., 658 P.2d 1297, 
1299 (1983); Wright v. State, Wyo., 
670 P.2d 1090, 1092 (1983); Daniel v. 
State, supra, 644 P.2d  at 178; Cyrus 
v. State, Wyo., 639 P.2d 900, 903 (1982); Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107, 1112 (1981); Jones v. State, 
Wyo., 602 P.2d 378, 380 (1979); Hanson v. 
State, Wyo., 590 P.2d 832, 836 (1979); Smith v. State, Wyo., 564 P.2d 1194, 
1202 (1977); Daellenbach v. State, 
Wyo., 562 P.2d 679, 683 (1977); Bird v. 
State, 36 Wyo. 532, 257 P. 2, 3 (1927); State v. Sorrentino, 36 Wyo. 111, 253 P. 14, 16 (1927).

[¶16.]  This court in Ventling v. State, supra, reiterated the 
definition of "abuse of discretion" which applies to sentencing 
review:

"`"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. * * *'" Wright v. State, supra, 670 P.2d  at 
1092, quoting Martinez v. State, 
Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980)." 676 P.2d  at 575.

[¶17.]  While sentencing involves consideration 
of two broad categories - the circumstances surrounding the crime, and the 
character of the criminal, Young v. 
State, supra, 695 P.2d  at 1057; Ventling v. State, supra, 676 P.2d  at 
575 - after reviewing the record, we hold that the trial court gave proper 
consideration to both of these categories.

[¶18.]  Section 6-2-106(b), W.S. 1977, 1984 Cum. 
Supp., provides a maximum penalty of twenty years in the penitentiary for this 
offense. The sentence of two to five years in the penitentiary is well within 
the bounds set by the legislature.

[¶19.]  Additionally, appellant fails to show 
where the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason under the circumstances or 
committed an error of law. A comparison of the sentence imposed, two to five 
years with the statutory maximum of twenty years, reflects the court's 
consideration of the circumstances surrounding the crime and the character of 
the criminal.

[¶20.]  Thus, under the facts of this case, 
probation was properly considered and denied, and the sentence is appropriate 
since it was within the statutory limits.

[¶21.]  For the above reasons, we hold that the 
sentence imposed was not an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion.

[¶22.]  Affirmed.

1 Section 6-2-106(b), W.S. 
1977, 1984 Cum. Supp., reads:

"A person is guilty of 
aggravated homicide by vehicle and shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years, if, while driving a motor 
vehicle in violation of W.S. 31-5-233, he unlawfully causes the death of another 
person and the violation is the proximate cause of the 
death."

Section 
31-5-233, W.S. 1977, 1984 Cum.Supp., reads in part:

"(a) It is unlawful for 
any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, to a degree which 
renders him incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle, to drive or have actual 
physical control of any vehicle within this state.

"(b) Upon the trial of 
any criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been 
committed by any person while driving a vehicle while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, the amount of alcohol in the person's blood at the time 
alleged as shown by chemical analysis of the person's blood, urine, breath, or 
other bodily substance shall give rise to the following 
presumptions:

* * * * * 
*

"(iii) If there was at 
that time ten one-hundredths of one percent (0.10%) or more by weight of alcohol 
in the person's blood, it shall be presumed that the person was under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor, to a degree which renders him incapable of 
safely driving a motor vehicle * * *."

2 Section 7-13-203, W.S. 
1977, reads in relevant part:

"If any person is found 
guilty of or pleads guilty to any felony except murder, sexual assault in the 
first or second degree or arson of a dwelling house or other human habitation in 
the actual occupancy of a human being, the court shall ascertain whether the 
offense of which the accused is guilty is his first offense, the extent of moral 
turpitude involved in the act committed, and other facts and circumstances 
relating to the accused as he may desire to know. If the court is satisfied that 
he was a person of good reputation before the commission of the offense charged 
and had never before been convicted of any felony, and that if permitted to go 
at large would not again violate the law, the court may in its discretion, by an 
order entered of record, delay passing sentence and then parole the person and 
permit him to go at large upon his own recognizance, conditioned that he will 
personally appear and report to the court twice in each year at times and places 
fixed in the order and that he will demean himself while at large in a 
law-abiding manner and live a worthy, respectable life, and that he will not 
leave the state without the consent of the court. The court, if satisfied at the 
time of appearance, that the person has demeaned himself in a law-abiding manner 
and lived a worthy, respectable life, may by an order of record, continue parole 
for the period of five (5) years, at the expiration of which the court shall 
enter an order finally discharging the person, and no further proceedings shall 
be had upon such verdict or plea. At any time after the expiration of one (1) 
year from the date of the original parole the court shall have the power in its 
discretion to terminate parole and finally discharge the person and annul the 
verdict or plea of guilty."

This section was 
probably superseded by § 7-13-301, W.S. 1977, as pointed out in Sorenson v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1031, 1038 
n. 6 (1979).