Title: Dees v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

291 So. 2d 195 (1974)
James E. DEES, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 44235.

Supreme Court of Florida.
February 27, 1974.
Richard A. Krause, Ormond Beach, for petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Enoch J. Whitney, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, reported at 280 So. 2d 51. Conflict has been alleged between the decision sought to be reviewed and State v. Blakely[1] and Carlton v. State.[2] The petition for writ of certiorari reflected apparent jurisdiction in this Court. We issued the writ and have heard argument of the parties. Upon further consideration of the matter, we have determined that the cited decisions present no direct conflict as required by Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Constitution of the State of Florida, F.S.A. The writ must be, and hereby is, discharged, for reasons which will be set out below.
The facts of the case are as follows:
This proceeding arises from the appeal by the State of the trial court's order suppressing *196 evidence of stolen property in a criminal prosecution against petitioner.
Briefly, petitioner's wife met the officers, who were without a search warrant, at the door of the residence. She proceeded to give them some items that she identified to be stolen property. She then led them to various rooms and turned the items over to the officers, piece by piece.
In its order, trial court noted:
On appeal, the First District reversed the order of the trial court, holding:
In State v. Blakely, supra, the facts of which were accurately reported in the foregoing opinion of the First District, the Second District expounded upon the principles involved:
In Carlton v. State, supra, the other case cited for conflict, this Court held that:
In the Carlton case, this Court did hold that under the circumstances appearing in that case, the search and seizure were valid. Since, in that case, the search of the dwelling was permitted by the wife, after the husband had consented to a search by another officer on a previous day.
As the First District correctly held in the emphasized portions of its opinion in the instant case, noted above,[6] the particular facts of this case serve to distinguish it from those cases cited for conflict. Moreover, independent support for the substantive result reached by the First District is found within the rationale of the case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire,[7] decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in June, 1971. In Coolidge, faced with a highly analogous fact pattern, the Court observed:
We think the rationale of the Court in Coolidge is particularly applicable to the actions of petitioner's wife in the instant case.
Accordingly, no direct conflict having been demonstrated, the writ must be, and hereby is, discharged.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C.J., and ERVIN, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
[1]  230 So. 2d 698 (Fla.App.2d 1970).
[2]  111 Fla. 777, 149 So. 767 (1933).
[3]  280 So. 2d  at 51-52 (emphasis supplied.)
[4]  230 So. 2d  at 700.
[5]  149 So.  at 768.
[6]  See note 3, supra.
[7]  403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971).
[8]  Id. at 487-488, 91 S. Ct.  at 2048 (Emphasis supplied.)