Title: In re F.S.T.Y.

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 129A19 
Filed 5 June 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: F.S.T.Y., A.A.L.Y. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a)(5) from two orders entered on 13 
December 2018 by Judge Mary F. Covington in District Court, Davidson County. 
Heard in the Supreme Court on 9 December 2019.  
 
Sheri Woodyard, for petitioner-appellee Davidson County Department of 
Social Services.  
 
Forrest Firm, P.C., by Brian C. Bernhardt, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.  
 
Richard Croutharmel for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
BEASLEY, Chief Justice. 
 
 
The issue before the Court is whether due process requires that a nonresident 
parent have minimum contacts with the State of North Carolina in order to establish 
personal jurisdiction over him or her for purposes of termination of parental rights 
proceedings. Because we hold that the status exception to the minimum contacts 
requirement applies to termination of parental rights proceedings, we affirm the trial 
court’s order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights.  
 
 
IN RE F.S.T.Y. AND A.A.L.Y. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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I. 
F.S.T.Y. (Florence) and A.A.L.Y. (Abigail)1 are twin sisters who were born in 
South Carolina in August 2004. Their mother, Laura, and respondent-father were 
unmarried when the twins were born but eventually married two months following 
the twins’ birth. In May 2007, respondent-father was incarcerated for burglary. Laura 
then moved Florence and Abigail to North Carolina. Davidson County Department of 
Social Services (DSS) became involved with Laura and the twins in January 2011, 
due to Laura’s substance abuse, homelessness, and improper care of the children. 
On 9 May 2016, a police officer conducted a traffic stop on a car containing 
Laura and the twins’ maternal grandmother. Both were arrested for possession of 
drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor child abuse, possession of heroin, and possession 
of cocaine. On 11 May 2016, DSS filed juvenile petitions alleging neglect and 
dependency of the twins. After a hearing, the court issued an order adjudicating the 
twins as neglected, placed the children in DSS custody, and ordered their mother and 
respondent-father to comply with a case plan.  
Respondent-father did not request representation and was not present at the 
adjudication hearing, but the court appointed an attorney to appear on his behalf. 
During the hearing, the court acknowledged that respondent-father was a resident of 
                                            
1 A pseudonym is used to protect the juveniles’ identities and for ease of reading. 
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South Carolina and ordered him to contact DSS upon his release from prison to set 
visitation. There were several hearings in the following months. Respondent-father 
was represented by an attorney at some of these proceedings; at others, he was not 
represented.  
Reunification efforts ceased following a hearing on 3 May 2017, and DSS filed 
termination of parental rights petitions on 3 November 2017. Subsequently, 
respondent-father filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial 
court ultimately denied respondent-father’s motion to dismiss and terminated his 
parental rights. The court found that respondent-father had not provided substantial 
financial assistance or care for the children before they were placed into DSS custody. 
Furthermore, respondent-father’s release date continued to be extended for 
infractions, and respondent-father failed to maintain contact with Florence and 
Abigail. 
Respondent-father appealed the trial court’s orders terminating his parental 
rights in both children, arguing that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to 
terminate his parental rights because he lacked minimum contacts with North 
Carolina.  
 
 
IN RE F.S.T.Y. AND A.A.L.Y. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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II. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from 
rendering valid judgments against nonresidents. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (citing Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 
U.S. 84, 91 (1978)). Due process requires that a nonresident against whom relief is 
sought be provided adequate notice of the suit and be subject to the personal 
jurisdiction of the court. Id. (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
313–314 (1950) and Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).  
Personal jurisdiction refers to a court’s authority to require an individual to 
appear in the forum and defend an action brought against the individual in that 
forum. Before a court can exercise power over the individual, due process generally 
requires that the nonresident possess sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum 
state so “that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.’ ”Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  
The minimum contacts requirement furthers two goals: (1) “it safeguards the 
defendant from being required to defend an action in a distant or inconvenient 
forum”; and (2) “it prevents a state from escaping the restraints imposed upon it by 
its status as a coequal sovereign in a federal system.” Miller v. Kite, 313 N.C. 474, 
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477, 329 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1985) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)). 
These protections are usually described in terms of “fairness” and “reasonableness.” 
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. The Supreme Court of the United States 
has explained that “reasonableness” requires that, while the burden on the 
nonresident is always a primary concern, other relevant factors, including the state’s 
interest, will be considered when appropriate. Id.  
In addition to satisfying the constitutional requirement, courts must also 
satisfy the state’s statutory requirements in order to render a valid judgment against 
a nonresident. North Carolina’s long-arm statute provides, in relevant part, that the 
State may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in actions “brought under 
Statutes of this State that specifically confer grounds for personal jurisdiction.” 
N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(2) (2019). 
The North Carolina Juvenile Code provides that the courts of this State shall 
have “exclusive original jurisdiction” over termination of parental rights cases 
involving “any juvenile who resides in, is found in, or is in the legal or actual custody 
of a county department of social services or licensed child-placing agency in the 
district” at the time of filing, provided that the requirements of N.C.G.S. §§ 50A-201, 
-203, or -204 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
(UCCJEA) are met. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 (2019).  
The UCCJEA is a uniform state law that has been adopted by nearly all fifty 
states, including North Carolina. The relevant language in the UCCJEA as adopted 
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by this State provides that “physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party 
or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child-custody determination.” 
N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(c) (2019).  
Respondent-father argues that although exercise of jurisdiction over him 
comports with North Carolina’s statutory requirements, those requirements do not 
comport with constitutional due process requirements. We disagree.  
This is an issue of first impression for the Court, and while this Court has not 
considered the requirements of due process as they relate to termination of parental 
rights, the Court of Appeals has developed a line of case law in which minimum 
contacts are required only in instances in which the child or children were born in 
wedlock. Compare In re Finnican, 104 N.C. App. 157, 162, 408 S.E.2d 742, 745 (1991), 
overruled on different grounds by Bryson v. Sullivan, 330 N.C. 644, 663, 412 S.E.2d 
327, 337 (1992) (holding that minimum contacts were required when the child was 
born in wedlock); and In re Trueman, 99 N.C. App. 579, 581, 393 S.E.2d 569, 570 
(1990) (stating the same rule); with In re Dixon, 112 N.C. App. 248, 252, 435 S.E.2d 
352, 354 (1993) (holding that minimum contacts are not required when the child is 
born out of wedlock and the father has not taken appropriate steps to legitimate the 
child, provide support for the child and mother, or establish paternity). 
In Trueman, the father and mother were married and had a child. Later, the 
parties separated, and the mother moved to North Carolina with the child. Trueman, 
99 N.C. App. at 581, 393 S.E.2d at 570. The district court in North Carolina entered 
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a judgment awarding the mother custody of the child and an absolute divorce from 
the father. Id. at 580, 393 S.E.2d at 570. The mother then filed an action for child 
support, which was granted and transferred to Wisconsin where the father resided. 
Id. at 581, 393 S.E.2d at 570. The father failed to make any payments, so the mother 
initiated a termination proceeding against him, and the termination was granted.. 
The father was not present for the custody, divorce, or termination proceedings. Id. 
The Court of Appeals relied on this Court’s decision in Miller v. Kite, 313 N.C. 
474, 329 S.E.2d 663 (1985), which held that determining whether personal 
jurisdiction exists requires the court to employ a two-step analysis. “First, it should 
be ascertained whether the statutes of this State allow our courts to entertain the 
action the plaintiff has brought against the defendant.”  Miller, 313 N.C. at 476, 329 
S.E.2d at 665. If so, the court must then determine if the minimum contact 
requirement is met. Id. at 476–77, 329 S.E.2d at 665. 
Thus in Trueman, the Court of Appeals held that although a suit to adjudicate 
a “status” between a parent and child was an in rem proceeding, the constitutional 
requirement, as set out in International Shoe, requires that a state’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over a nonresident be consistent with due process requirements.2 
                                            
2 The Court of Appeals continued to interpret due process in accordance with its 
decision in Trueman in cases involving children born in wedlock. See, e.g., In re Finnican, 104 
N.C. App. 157, 408 S.E.2d 742 (1991), overruled on different grounds by Bryson v. Sullivan, 
330 N.C. 644, 663, 412 S.E.2d 327, 337 (1992) (looking to its earlier decision in Trueman to 
hold that the nonresident-father, who was previously married to the mother when the child 
was born, was required to have minimum contacts with the State). 
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Trueman, 99 N.C. App. at 581, 393 S.E.2d at 570. Thus, the father’s “meager contacts” 
with the State were insufficient to support an exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
him for purposes of the termination proceeding. Id.  
In In re Dixon, however, the Court of Appeals began to recognize that in some 
circumstances “ ‘fair play and substantial justice’ do not necessitate minimum 
contacts with the forum state or notice to the party.” In re Dixon, 112 N.C. App. 248, 
251, 435 S.E.2d 352, 353 (1993). Specifically, the court in Dixon held that a 
nonresident-father’s parental rights can be terminated in the absence of minimum 
contacts with North Carolina if the child is born out of wedlock and the father has 
failed to establish paternity, legitimate his child, or provide substantial financial 
assistance or care to the child and mother. Id. at 251, 435 S.E.2d at 354.  
The Dixon court reasoned that “a father’s constitutional right to due process of 
law does not ‘spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and 
child’ but instead arises only where the father demonstrates a commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood.” Id. (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 
(1983)). 
While this Court has not addressed the issue of minimum contacts in 
termination of parental rights cases, we have considered it in a child support case. In 
Miller, the father moved to set aside a child support order increasing his child support 
obligations after failing to appear for the hearing. Miller, 313 N.C. at 476, 329 S.E.2d 
at 664. The father’s only contacts with the State were that his daughter had lived in 
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North Carolina for nine years, he had sent child support payments into the State, and 
he came to the State several times to visit his daughter. Id. at 478, 329 S.E.2d at 665.  
This Court focused on the concept of fairness and the “realization that a 
contrary result could prevent the exercise of visitation privileges of non-custodial 
parents.” Id. at 480, 329 S.E.2d at 667. We explained that it would not be fair to 
subject a parent to litigation in a forum where he has done nothing more than merely 
acquiesce to his children’s presence. Id. at 479, 329 S.E.2d at 666. Furthermore, we 
observed that while the State “has an important interest in ensuring that non-
resident parents fulfill their support obligations to their children living here,” if the 
minimum contacts standard were satisfied by merely visiting the child in the state or 
sending support payments into the State, non-resident parents would be forced to 
choose between fulfilling their obligations to their child or refraining from such 
contact with the child in order to avoid being subject to suit in the State. Id. at 480, 
329 S.E.2d at 667. 
The Court further explained that “defendant ha[d] engaged in no acts with 
respect to North Carolina by which he ha[d] purposefully availed himself of the 
benefits, protections and privileges of the laws of this State.” Id. at 480–81, 329 S.E.2d 
at 667. For those reasons, we held that the father’s support payments and visits to 
the State were insufficient to establish minimum contacts. Id. at 479–80, 329 S.E.2d 
at 666–67. 
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The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized that some cases 
warrant an exception to the traditional due process requirements. Specifically, the 
Court has held that “cases involving the personal status of the plaintiff, such as 
divorce actions, could be adjudicated in the plaintiff’s home State even though the 
defendant could not be served within the State.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 202 
(1977) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733–35 (1878)). The Court’s recognition 
of the status exception implies that minimum contacts are not required in status 
cases because jurisdiction is established by the status of the plaintiff, rather than the 
location of the defendant.  
The critical issue here is whether a child’s relationship to her parents is 
sufficient to allow adjudication, based on status, in her home state even though the 
parents would not otherwise be subject to personal jurisdiction there. The Supreme 
Court of the United States has not defined the limits of the status exception or 
explicitly recognized its application outside of divorce proceedings; however, it briefly 
discussed the issue of status in a custody case, May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).  
In May, the mother and the father were married and domiciled in Wisconsin. 
May, 345 U.S. at 530. After marital troubles arose, the couple agreed that the mother 
should take the children to Ohio until the two could resolve their disputes. Id. The 
mother later informed the father that she had decided not to return to Wisconsin. Id. 
The father filed suit in Wisconsin, seeking absolute divorce and custody of the 
children. Id. The mother made no appearance in the Wisconsin proceedings and the 
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father was awarded custody of the children. Id. at 531. The mother contested the 
validity of the custody decree. May, 345 U.S. at 530–31.  
Although the Court held that personal jurisdiction was needed over the mother 
and reversed the custody decree, Justice Frankfurter, in a concurrence, emphasized 
the narrowness of the holding. Id. at 535 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he only 
thing the Court decides . . . is that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require 
Ohio, in disposing of the custody of children in Ohio, to accept, in the circumstances 
before us, the disposition made by Wisconsin.”).  
In a dissent, Justice Jackson recognized the burden placed on a state that 
cannot constitutionally adjudicate controversies surrounding guardianship, despite 
the child being domiciled there. Specifically, he noted:  
Personal jurisdiction of all parties to be affected by a 
proceeding is highly desirable, to make certain that they 
have had valid notice and opportunity to be heard. But the 
assumption that it overrides all other considerations and 
in its absence a state is constitutionally impotent to resolve 
questions of custody flies in the face of our own cases.  
 
Id. at 541 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
Given the nature of the Court’s reasoning, many state courts have not viewed 
the holding in May as an absolute bar to exercising status jurisdiction in custody 
cases. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Leonard, 122 Cal. App. 3d 443, 451–452, 175 Cal. 
Rptr. 903, 907–08 (1981) (construing May as limited to whether a state is required to 
recognize a custody order under Full Faith and Credit Clause), abrogated by 
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McArthur v. Superior Court, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1287, 1293, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, (1991) 
(holding that May and its progeny require personal jurisdiction to modify the custody 
order of another state which has maintained jurisdiction); In re R.W., 2011 VT 124, 
¶¶ 28–29, 191 Vt. 108, 123–24, 39 A.3d 682, 692–93  (2011) (construing Frankfurter’s 
concurrence as a limitation to the reasoning of the majority). But see Rhonda 
Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. Ill. L. Rev. 813, 
874–79 (recognizing that Frankfurter’s view of what the Court decided in May is 
“widely accepted,” but arguing that the May majority opinion is incompatible with 
Frankfurter’s view and is good law as applied to custody decisions). 
Many courts have concluded that the Court would be receptive to applying the 
status exception in termination of parental rights cases. See, e.g., In re R.W., 2011 VT 
124, ¶ 31, 191 Vt. at 124–25, 39 A.3d at 693 (holding that status jurisdiction applies 
to cases involving termination of parental rights); In re Thomas J.R., 2003 WI 61 ¶ 2, 
261 Wis. 2d 217, 220–21, 663 N.W.2d 734, 736 (2003) (holding that the status 
exception applies in all custody matters, including termination); S.B. v. State, 61 P.3d 
6, 14–15 (Alaska 2002) (holding that using the status exception in termination 
proceedings does not violate that parent’s rights to due process); J.D. v. Tuscaloosa 
Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., 923 So. 2d 303, 310 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (holding that 
the “status exception to the requirement that the defendant have minimum contacts 
with the forum state applies to termination-of-parental-rights proceedings”). But see 
In re John Doe, 83 Haw. 367, 374, 926 P.2d 1290, 1297 (1996) (holding that exercising 
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personal jurisdiction over the nonresident mother would not comport with the notion 
of fair play and substantial justice given the absence of her contacts with the state).  
The purpose of termination of parental rights proceedings is to address 
circumstances where parental care fails to “promote the healthy and orderly physical 
and emotional well-being of the juvenile,” while also recognizing “the necessity for 
any juvenile to have a permanent plan of care at the earliest possible age.” N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1100. In North Carolina, the best interests of the child are the paramount 
consideration in termination of parental rights cases. See In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 
101, 109, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). Thus, when there is a conflict between the 
interests of the child and the parents, courts should consider actions that are within 
the child’s best interests over those of the parents. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1100(3). 
These considerations differ from the interests this Court considered in Miller, 
where the Court recognized that the notions of fair play and substantial justice 
dictate that minimum contacts are required to establish personal jurisdiction in 
custody proceedings between two parents, either of whom may be able to provide for 
the well-being of the child. In termination of parental rights proceedings, which 
necessarily involve a parent who does not provide appropriate care, fairness requires 
that the State have the power to provide permanence for children living within its 
borders.  
In circumstances where termination proceedings are appropriate, a child who 
is removed from his or her parents could face years of waiting in foster care or group 
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homes as the interested parties fight over jurisdiction. The inability to determine 
jurisdiction by favoring the child’s home state contradicts the fundamental principle 
of acting in the best interests of the child and inhibits the child’s home state from 
adjudicating termination of parental rights disputes. As another court has explained, 
“severance of a parent’s legal relationship to his or her child requires state 
intervention and is a matter of state concern. Thus, a child’s home state has 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the status of a child present even if the parent lacks 
minimum contact with the forum.” In re R.W., 2011 VT 124, ¶ 31, 191 Vt. at 125, 39 
A.3d at 693 (2011).  
If minimum contacts were mandatory in this case, the children would be 
required to travel to South Carolina where respondent-father resides and, pursuant 
to the UCCJEA, reside there for six months in order for South Carolina to obtain 
jurisdiction over the children. Thus, North Carolina would be required to relinquish 
departmental custody and remove the children from stable housing. Doing so would 
not only frustrate the State’s interest in promoting the best interests of the children 
but could also pose further complications regarding custody and make adoption 
impossible.  
Here, it is undisputed that respondent-father lacks contacts with North 
Carolina such that he would not normally be subject to our courts’ jurisdiction. 
However, his right to actively participate in the termination proceedings would not 
be eliminated by the Court’s implementation of the status exception. Indeed, the 
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burden imposed upon respondent-father, and nonresident parents in general, is 
mitigated by the State’s appointment of counsel to nonresident parents and the right 
to request participation in proceedings via phone or other remote technologies. Thus, 
in the context of a termination of parental rights proceeding, the protections usually 
afforded by the minimum contacts requirement are outweighed by the State’s interest 
in adjudicating the status of children who reside within the State.  
Upon considering the conflicting interests of the parent and child in 
termination proceedings, we join those states that have applied the status exception 
to the minimum contacts requirement in termination of parental rights proceedings. 
In doing so, we overrule the Court of Appeals’ decisions in In re Finnican, 104 N.C. 
App. 157, 408 S.E.2d 742 (1991) and In re Trueman, 99 N.C. App. 579, 393 S.E.2d 569 
(1990). To protect the best interests of children residing in North Carolina, the 
process of providing them a permanent, stable home should be afforded at least the 
same efficiency as a divorce proceeding. A conclusion to the contrary would ignore the 
realities of termination of parental rights proceedings and leave children with no 
practical forum to have their status adjudicated. 
Accordingly, we hold that due process does not require a nonresident parent to 
have minimum contacts with the State to establish personal jurisdiction for purposes 
of termination of parental rights proceedings.  
AFFIRMED.