Title: People v. Pulliam

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 89141-Agenda 1-May 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								LATASHA PULLIAM, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 18, 2002.
	 
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County,
defendant, Latasha Pulliam, was convicted of murder, two counts
of aggravated criminal sexual assault, and two counts of
aggravated kidnapping, in connection with the sexual assault and
death of a six-year-old girl. After a bifurcated sentencing hearing,
the same jury found that defendant was death-eligible and that
there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition
of the death penalty. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced
defendant to death for the murder conviction and to three
consecutive prison terms of 60, 30, and 15 years for the remaining
convictions. On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant's
convictions and sentences. People v. Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d 261
(1997). The United States Supreme Court subsequently denied
defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Pulliam v. Illinois,
522 U.S. 921, 139 L. Ed. 2d 243, 118 S. Ct. 314 (1997).
	Defendant then filed a pro se petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1996))
and requested the appointment of counsel. After counsel was
appointed, defendant filed an amended post-conviction petition,
challenging her death sentence on a number of grounds. The
circuit court dismissed defendant's amended post-conviction
petition without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant's appeal to this
court ensued. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). For the reasons that
follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the
circuit court, and remand the cause to that court for an evidentiary
hearing in light of the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. ___, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335,
122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002), to determine whether defendant is
mentally retarded and therefore, under Atkins, may not be
executed.
BACKGROUND
	This court has previously set forth the evidence presented at
defendant's trial in our opinion on direct appeal. Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d 261. Therefore, we will discuss here only those facts necessary
to resolve the issues involved in this appeal.
	Defendant gave a signed, court-reported confession following
her apprehension after the commission of the crime. Defendant's
statement revealed that, on March 21, 1991, defendant took six-year-old Shenosha Richards to defendant's apartment. There,
defendant placed Shenosha in a bedroom with defendant's
boyfriend and codefendant, Dwight Jordan. Defendant then went
to the kitchen to use cocaine. When defendant returned to the
bedroom, Shenosha was on the floor crying with her underwear
down to her knees. Jordan was behind her attempting to attain an
erection. Jordan then picked up a shoe polish bottle and inserted
it into the victim's rectum. Defendant then placed the straight end
of a hammer into Shenosha's vagina while Jordan continued
inserting the shoe polish bottle into her rectum. Defendant and
Jordan continued this assault for 10 minutes. Shenosha was crying,
and when defendant put her hand over Shenosha's mouth,
Shenosha attempted to scream. Defendant then took an electrical
cord, wrapped it around Shenosha's neck, and began strangling
her.
	Defendant eventually took Shenosha to an empty apartment
down the hall, where Shenosha told the defendant that she would
not tell anyone, except she would have to tell her parents. At that
point, defendant pulled the cord tighter around the victim's neck
and continued tightening it for 10 minutes. Because defendant
heard knocking at her apartment down the hall, she put Shenosha
in a closet in the empty apartment. Defendant returned to the
closet a few minutes later and noticed that Shenosha was no longer
breathing. Defendant then hit Shenosha over the head with a
hammer three or four times. After placing Shenosha in a garbage
can, defendant struck the victim over the head with a two-by-four
and then attempted to cover the victim's body with garbage.
	The medical evidence revealed that in all Shenosha suffered
42 distinct injuries. She had two puncture wounds to her chest,
which damaged her lungs and coronary artery, and lacerations on
her head, which penetrated to her skull. She also had numerous
lacerations to her anus and vaginal area. Shenosha's injuries were
consistent with the conduct described in defendant's confession.
	After the State rested, defendant presented the testimony of
Dr. Mark Moulthrop, a clinical psychologist. Moulthrop noted that
he examined defendant in April 1994 and that he reviewed her
educational records from her childhood. He testified about the
results of the various psychological and IQ tests that were given to
defendant through the years. A report of a psychological
evaluation conducted by the board of education when defendant
was five years old revealed that she was mentally impaired and
that she was placed in special classes. Defendant was given the
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children on three separate
occasions as a child. That testing revealed that, when defendant
was 11 years old, her verbal scale IQ was 72, her performance
scale IQ was 77, and her full scale IQ was 72. At age 13, defendant
had a verbal scale IQ of 72, a performance scale IQ of 86, and a
full scale IQ of 77. Defendant was again administered the
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children at age 15. At that time,
her verbal scale IQ was 66, her performance scale IQ was 87, and
her full scale IQ was 74. Moulthrop attributed the increase in
defendant's IQ score after age 11 to "the practice effect," which
means that she did better on the performance portion of the test
because she had had the opportunity to take the same test more
than once over the years. Dr. Moulthrop gave defendant the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale test during his April 1994
examination, revealing that her full scale IQ was 69. He concluded
that defendant placed within the mildly mentally retarded range,
which would be an IQ of 75 or below, or possibly 70 or below
"depending on the system," down to an IQ of 55. Moulthrop then
explained the difficulties that a person in this range of mental
capacity would have in life. Finally, Moulthrop noted that he did
not believe defendant was "malingering" during his examination
of her.
	In rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of forensic
psychologist Paul K. Fauteck. Dr. Fauteck was appointed by the
court in 1991 to conduct a psychological examination of
defendant. He testified that he believed defendant's full scale IQ
was 74 and that she was not mildly mentally retarded. He said that
the demarcation line for mild mental retardation was an IQ of
under 70. He classified defendant as a "malingerer" because she
faked mental illness and mental impairment during his
examination of her. He further stated that he believed defendant
likely malingered during the 1994 examination by Dr. Moulthrop.
	Dr. Fauteck further testified that he based his assessment of
defendant's IQ on her previous IQ tests and on some screening
questions he asked her. He explained that he did not administer
another IQ test to defendant because the previous ones were
adequate and because it would be "frankly silly to administer an
I.Q. test to someone that you know is malingering, that is not
going to perform their best on the test." Fauteck defined a
malingerer as someone who either pretends to have a mental
disease or defect that they do not in fact have or exaggerates a
mental disease or defect that they do have. Dr. Fauteck cited
several examples from his observation of defendant during the
examination to support his conclusion that defendant was
malingering.
	At the close of all the evidence, the jury found defendant
guilty on the charges of first degree murder, aggravated criminal
sexual assault, and aggravated kidnapping. At the conclusion of
the first phase of a separate sentencing hearing, the same jury
found defendant eligible for the death penalty based on the
statutory aggravating factors that the murder was committed
during the course of aggravated criminal sexual assault and
aggravated kidnapping (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6))
and the victim was under the age of 12 and her death resulted from
exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(7)). The cause then
proceeded to the hearing in aggravation and mitigation.
	The State presented evidence in aggravation from several
witnesses. Juilett Brown-Perry, a social worker employed by the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), testified that
defendant was placed in state facilities when she was a youth, and
she often ran away from them. On one occasion, defendant and
another girl, who was also under the care of the state, ran away
together. Defendant brought the girl to the residence of
defendant's 27-year-old boyfriend. There, defendant physically
forced the girl to have oral, anal, and vaginal sex with the 27-year-old man. The girl was also forced to perform oral sex on
defendant.
	Dreszina Jarrett testified that she was incarcerated with
defendant at the Cook County jail in March 1991. During that
time, defendant told Jarrett about the murder and sexual assault of
Shenosha. Defendant also told Jarrett about the details of the
crime, including that she used a wooden door stopper with a nail
in it to jab Shenosha in the chest. According to Jarrett, defendant
never shed any tears when telling about the crime.
	Gloria LaFay Anderson, a Cook County sheriff's department
officer, testified that in the mid-part of 1991 defendant sexually
assaulted a female inmate. Defendant beat the woman and forced
her to have oral sex. Anderson could not file a report about the
incident because the victim was too scared to talk about it.
	The State also presented evidence that defendant's baby
daughter, Patrice, was twice hospitalized, once for injuries
consistent with physical abuse, and once for injuries consistent
with both physical and sexual abuse. The first incident occurred on
March 19, 1989, when defendant's daughter suffered second
degree burns from having her buttocks dipped and scalded in hot
water. The child was kept in the same diaper after the burn for
over 16 hours, which would have been extremely painful and
which caused the child to run a 105 degree fever. The child
remained in the hospital burn unit for almost one month.
	Defendant's daughter Patrice was again brought to the
hospital on February 16, 1990. The examining physician observed
numerous injuries on the child's body. She had a number of head
injuries, including two black eyes and "a very well-defined linear-type of bruise with very sharp edges." The doctor noted the burn
wound to the child's buttocks, but also noticed bruising to the
buttocks that indicated a blow from an object. The child also had
cigarette burns on her arms. Both of the child's thighs had multiple
fingernail marks. Upon examination of the child's vaginal area, the
doctor noted a fresh abrasion to the lip of the vagina and two fresh
tears to the hymen. Defendant's explanations for the injuries were
not consistent with the injuries themselves, and defendant had no
explanation for the injuries to her daughter's vaginal area.
	Dr. Fauteck testified on behalf of the State in aggravation that,
based on both his examination of defendant on October 7, 1991,
and his review of the facts of the case, it was his opinion that
defendant did not suffer from a mental illness at the time the
crimes were committed. Instead, he testified that defendant was a
"sexual sadist," with borderline intellectual functioning and
antisocial personality disorder. He described a sexual sadist as a
person who sexually enjoys inflicting pain and suffering on
another person. He noted that in its severe form it tends to get
worse over time and is "virtually untreatable."
	In mitigation, Linda Sobotka, a sentencing advocate for the
public defender's office, testified that she investigated and did a
social history of defendant. Sobotka contacted defendant's parents
and attempted to contact various relatives. She also spoke with
DCFS workers and jail guards about defendant. She also reviewed
numerous documents from DCFS, Hargrove Hospital, Cook
County jail, and the Chicago board of education. Sobotka noted
that defendant was born in 1971 to Joseph and Renee Pulliam,
who were teenagers at the time. Defendant was born prematurely
and spent the first two months of her life in an incubator. The
family lived with Joseph's mother for the first three or four years
before moving out on their own. The couple had a son, Joseph Jr.,
who reportedly died of sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) as an
infant.
	Sobotka further testified that shortly after moving out of
Joseph's parent's house and after Joseph Jr. died, Renee began
drinking and became very violent in her disciplining of defendant.
Because Joseph was mostly either working or attending school,
Renee stayed home and raised defendant. When defendant went to
kindergarten she was found to be educable but mentally
handicapped. Around that same time, according to a report from
the Chicago board of education (the board), defendant had many
old scars, bruises, and lacerations on her face and arms. After
testing at age seven, the board noted that defendant was in need of
therapeutic intervention because of family problems.
	Sobotka stated that around age 10 Renee began beating
defendant "continuously" and was drinking more heavily. At that
time, Joseph filed for divorce because he would come home from
work and find Renee in the apartment with different men. When
defendant was 12 years old, her paternal grandmother, who
seemed to be a positive influence, died. Defendant was also raped
at age 12 by one of Renee's boyfriends. When Joseph found out
about the incident, he took defendant to Wisconsin to live with
him. A few months later, in August 1984, defendant was brought
back to Chicago and admitted to Hargrove Hospital suffering from
depression and "behavioral problems." Testing conducted at the
hospital revealed that defendant was four or five grade levels
behind in school. Defendant talked to the hospital staff about the
abuse that she suffered at her mother's hands. She said that she felt
responsible for the beatings and was concerned her mother would
be caught. In 1986, at the age of 15, defendant was impregnated by
one of Renee's boyfriends, who was 37 years old. When she was
three months pregnant, defendant was again admitted to the
hospital for depression.
	Sobotka also testified that Joseph received guardianship of
defendant's child, Antoinette, after she was born. Defendant,
however, began living on the street, using cocaine and marijuana.
Defendant eventually became pregnant again by another one of
Renee's boyfriends. Patrice was born to defendant in 1988 and
was addicted to cocaine. Eventually the child was taken away from
defendant, and defendant moved in with Jordan, who was 47 years
old at the time. Jordan physically abused defendant.
	On cross-examination, the State questioned Sobotka about her
knowledge of defendant's abuse of Patrice and her knowledge of
the other aggravating evidence presented by the State. On redirect
examination, Sobotka testified that there were numerous reports
that Renee abused defendant. She noted that defendant had cuts,
lacerations, and bruises on her body as a child, and once Renee put
a hole in a wall by banging defendant's head into it. Sobotka
further testified that in a presentence investigation report,
defendant indicated that defendant's mother began sexually
abusing defendant at the age of five or six. Renee performed oral
sex on defendant and had defendant perform oral sex on Renee.
When Joseph went to work, Renee engaged in sex with various
men and made defendant watch. On re-cross-examination,
Sobotka acknowledged that defendant's allegations that she had
been sexually abused by Renee were not made until after
defendant was placed in custody for the crimes against Shenosha.
	Dr. Jeffrey Teich, a psychiatrist, also testified on behalf of
defendant in mitigation. Dr. Teich recounted defendant's social
history and that defendant was abused as a child by her mother. He
noted that defendant was raised without an effective support
system in a violent and unpredictable home, where she was
physically and sexually abused. He concluded that defendant was
mildly mentally retarded and had an antisocial personality
disorder. He explained the extent of defendant's mental capacity,
including that defendant could understand concrete, but not
abstract, concepts.
	Additionally, three Cook County jail guards testified in
mitigation about defendant's behavior while incarcerated. They
noted that defendant was aggressive and physically dirty when she
first entered the system, but her conduct and appearance changed
over time. She became quieter and more friendly and polite toward
other inmates and guards. She improved her personal hygiene as
well.
	Finally, the defense presented in mitigation the testimony of
defendant's father, Joseph Pulliam. Joseph testified that Renee
physically abused defendant when she was a child. Renee often
kept defendant out of school because she did not want teachers to
discover the injuries left by the abuse. He noted that the abuse
began when defendant was five or six years old and that it
continued for the next 10 years. Joseph stated that his mother was
a positive influence upon defendant, but Renee counteracted that
influence. He acknowledged that Renee had always exerted more
influence over defendant than he had.
	At the close of the sentencing hearing, the jury unanimously
found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude
imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the trial court
sentenced defendant to death.
	After the resolution of defendant's direct appeal and the
denial of defendant's petition for writ of certiorari before the
United State's Supreme Court, defendant filed an original and then
an amended petition for post-conviction relief in the circuit court
of Cook County. Defendant's amended petition for post-conviction relief raised seven claims, challenging only her
sentence of death.
	Defendant devoted the bulk of her amended petition for post-conviction relief to allegations that her trial counsel was
ineffective at the aggravation-mitigation phase of the sentencing
hearing because he failed to conduct a complete investigation into
the mitigating evidence and then failed to present to the jury the
evidence that would have been uncovered by a more thorough
investigation. Defendant alleged, inter alia, that trial counsel was
ineffective in the following ways: (1) he failed to obtain
defendant's early childhood hospital records, which suggested
defendant may have been sexually abused when she was 22
months old and that she may have suffered lead poisoning at age
2; (2) he failed to fully investigate the circumstances surrounding
the death of defendant's brother, Joseph Jr., suggesting that the
cause of the baby's death may have been due to abuse by Renee
rather than SIDS; (3) he failed to present additional evidence that
Renee sexually abused defendant to rebut any claim that defendant
recently fabricated her claim that Renee had sexually abused her;
(4) he presented an inaccurate picture of defendant's early
childhood by portraying Joseph as a responsible father when
evidence existed that Joseph helped to conceal the abuse
committed by Renee; (5) he failed to interview and present the
testimony of numerous additional witnesses, including an expert
witness, who could have provided information about defendant's
abusive upbringing and the impact that it had on her; and (6) he
failed to present evidence showing that defendant had organic
brain damage.
	Defendant's amended post-conviction petition includes a
number of supporting affidavits and exhibits. In that regard,
records from Michael Reese Hospital show that defendant was
hospitalized when she was 22 months old with a 104 degree fever
and that she had experienced a near-drowning incident in the
bathtub. Defendant had various marks on her body indicative of
physical abuse. She also had a perineal rash around her vagina.
Renee and Joseph gave conflicting reports about the bathtub
incident, and the parents were referred to social service for
suspected child abuse. Defendant was eventually discharged to the
care of her parents, but was to be "closely followed up by social
service." Eight months later, defendant was again
hospitalized-this time for ingesting iron pills. It was also noted
that defendant had a high lead content in her blood. Hospital staff
apparently did not consider whether defendant was an abused child
at this time even though she had a rash on her face caused by
"window sealer." Joseph informed the hospital that defendant's
previous admission was due to a cold and fever.
	Defendant attached the affidavit of Donna Crowell Bryant to
her post-conviction petition. In her affidavit, Bryant stated that she
was not contacted by trial counsel, but if she had been, she would
have been willing to testify that she had a seven-year relationship
with Joseph that began in 1982. According to Bryant, defendant
was repeatedly abused both physically and sexually by Renee.
Joseph admitted to Bryant that Renee tried to drown defendant in
the bathtub on one occasion, which resulted in defendant being
taken to the hospital. Bryant also stated that Joseph told her that
Joseph Jr. actually died from Renee suffocating the child and not
from SIDS. When defendant was five years old, Renee had
defendant performing and receiving oral sex. Joseph and his
mother knew about the abuse, but they ignored it and covered it
up.
	Another affidavit attached to defendant's petition was that of
Juliett Brown Perry, the DCFS social worker who testified on
behalf of the State at defendant's sentencing hearing. Perry noted
that she became defendant's caseworker when defendant was
about 12 years old. According to Perry, defendant told her that
Renee, Renee's boyfriend, and defendant all slept in the same bed
together and had sex. Perry further noted that Renee was an
alcoholic, and Joseph was always working. Perry stated that she
would have been willing to testify about these matters, but she was
not contacted by trial counsel for the defense.
	Defendant further attached a letter of Janice J. Ophoven,
M.D., a psychological expert, who reviewed the various
documents in the case, including the Michael Reese Hospital
records. Based on her review, Dr. Ophoven concluded that
defendant was clearly the victim of repeated and severe physical
and sexual abuse. Among the factors Ophoven relied upon to form
her conclusion that defendant was sexually abused was the
perineal rash noted when defendant was 22 months old and the
sexually transmitted disease and pregnancy at ages 13 and 15. She
opined that this type of abuse leads to tragic and long-term
consequences for children and is a well recognized and direct
factor leading to abusive behavior as an adult. Ophoven further
noted that Joseph Jr.'s death was highly suspicious and "there
[was] insufficient evidence to exclude homicide."
	Defendant also includes the 1979 report of Dr. Christel
Lembke, who conducted a psychiatric examination of defendant
at the request of the board of education. Lembke noted in the 1979
report that defendant "suffered early medical complications and
[it] must [be] assume[d] that she has a considerable amount of
brain damage."
	Additionally, defendant included with his post-conviction
petition the letters of Drs. Mark Moulthrop and Jonathan L. Hess.
Dr. Moulthrop stated that based on a review of information not
available to him at trial, he concluded that defendant had the
following risk factors for brain damage in early childhood:
maternal alcoholism during pregnancy, premature birth, febrile
seizures and anoxia due to submersion in the bathtub, ingestion of
iron and lead, blows to the head, and illicit drug use. Dr. Hess
concluded in his letter that, based on his review of defendant's
records, defendant has "verifiable brain dysfunction," which
affects her ability to control her behavior.
	Finally, defendant presented the affidavit of Gary Copp. Copp
stated in his affidavit that he represented defendant as counsel at
her trial and at her capital sentencing hearings. Copp noted that he
did not obtain Lembke's 1979 report or defendant's Michael Reese
Hospital records, and his failure to do so was not a matter of trial
strategy. He stated that if he had obtained Lembke's report and the
Michael Reese records, he would have provided those documents
to the defense experts.
	The trial court dismissed all of the claims of defendant's
amended petition without an evidentiary hearing. From that
dismissal, defendant appeals to this court. See 134 Ill. 2d R.
651(a).
ANALYSIS
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.
(West 1998)) provides a means by which a defendant may
challenge his conviction for violations of federal or state
constitutional rights. People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 447
(2001). An action seeking post-conviction relief is a collateral
proceeding, not an appeal from the underlying judgment. People
v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 89 (1999). To be entitled to post-conviction relief, a defendant must establish a substantial
deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights in the
proceedings that resulted in the conviction or sentence being
challenged. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999).
Because a proceeding brought under the Act is a collateral attack
on a judgment of conviction, all issues actually decided on direct
appeal are res judicata and all issues that could have been raised
in the original proceeding but were not are waived. People v.
Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371 (1996).
	A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition as a matter of right. People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 370-71 (1996). An evidentiary hearing is warranted
only where the allegations of the petition, supported where
appropriate by the trial record or accompanying affidavits, make
a substantial showing that a defendant's constitutional rights have
been violated. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528. In determining whether
to grant an evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in the
petition and in accompanying affidavits are taken as true. Morgan,
187 Ill. 2d  at 528. A trial court's determination regarding the
sufficiency of the allegations contained in a post-conviction
petition are reviewed de novo. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528.
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
	Defendant first contends that she was denied the effective
assistance of trial counsel because her attorney failed to conduct
an adequate investigation into mitigation evidence and failed to
sufficiently develop evidence that defendant was abused at a
young age, was severely neglected by both parents, and suffered
from organic brain damage. Defendant claims that if counsel had
presented the additional mitigation evidence, along with expert
testimony to explain the effect the abuse and brain damage would
have had on defendant, there is a reasonable probability that the
jury would have found the evidence sufficient to preclude
imposition of the sentence of death.
	To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must satisfy the two-part test set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984). A defendant first must establish that his counsel's
performance was so deficient that his representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 688,
80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. Once a defendant
establishes that his counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, he also must demonstrate that there is
"a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at
2068.
	Defense counsel has a duty to make a reasonable investigation
for mitigation evidence to present at a capital sentencing hearing,
or he must have a sound reason for failing to make a particular
investigation. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 541 (1999).
Nevertheless, review of trial counsel's decisions regarding the
presentation of mitigating evidence is highly deferential. People
v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 513-14 (1998). Strategic choices made
by defense counsel following a thorough investigation into the law
and facts relevant to a defendant's plausible options are virtually
unassailable. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 514. However, where the lack
of mitigating evidence presented at a defendant's trial is not
attributable to strategy, but is instead attributable to counsel's
failure to properly investigate evidence and to prepare a defense,
such deference is not warranted. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 514.
	Even where counsel's performance is deficient due to the
failure to investigate mitigating evidence and present it to the jury,
the defendant must still demonstrate prejudice to sustain a claim.
People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 536 (1995). In evaluating
prejudice in the capital sentencing context, the appropriate
question is whether there is a "reasonable probability that, absent
the errors, the factfinder *** would have concluded that the
balance of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not
warrant death." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698,
104 S. Ct.  at 2068-69. In making this determination, a court must
consider the totality of the evidence, and a death sentence that is
only mildly supported by the record is more likely to have been
affected by errors in investigating and presenting mitigation than
one with overwhelming record support. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at
536, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695-96, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698-99, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069.
	After carefully comparing the proposed additional mitigation
evidence and arguments in support of defendant's post-conviction
petition with that offered by trial counsel at defendant's sentencing
hearing, we conclude that the proposed additional evidence and
argument is essentially cumulative of that presented by trial
counsel at the sentencing hearing and does not give rise to a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the sentencing hearing
would have been different.
	The jury in this case heard testimony from three different
witnesses in mitigation that defendant was abused as a child by her
mother. Linda Sobotka testified that Renee became very violent in
her disciplining of defendant after Joseph Jr. died. She noted that,
when defendant began school at age five, reports indicated that
defendant had many old scars, bruises, and lacerations on her face
and body. She also told the jury that there were numerous reports
that Renee abused defendant, including that Renee began sexually
abusing defendant around the age of five or six by having her
engage in oral sex. Joseph confirmed that defendant was
physically abused by Renee for a continuous 10-year period,
beginning around age five. Dr. Teich likewise recounted
defendant's social history and that she had been abused as a child
by her mother. This evidence of abuse heard by the jury was
significant and was not controverted by any other evidence in the
case. We simply do not believe that there is a reasonable
probability that presentation of the additional evidence cited by
defendant would have resulted in a sentence other than death in
view of the awful nature of the crimes in this case and the criminal
history and character of defendant.
	Although there was no evidence presented by trial counsel
that Joseph covered up Renee's abuse, there was evidence that
Joseph worked constantly and basically played little part in
defendant's life other than attempting to protect her from further
rapes by Renee's boyfriends. In that regard, Joseph admitted at the
sentencing hearing that he was aware that Renee was abusing
defendant as a child and was keeping her home from school so that
the abuse would not be discovered. Thus, additional evidence that
Joseph covered for Renee's abuse or that he was not a good father
and never provided a proper, nonabusive home environment
would not have increased the probability of a different verdict.
	There was also ample evidence presented in mitigation at the
sentencing hearing about defendant's mental capabilities. Dr.
Moulthrop noted that the defendant's IQ was 69, placing her in the
mildly mentally retarded range. He testified extensively about the
difficulties a person with defendant's mental capacity would have,
and explained why the defendant could not have been malingering
during his examination. Dr. Teich also testified extensively in
mitigation as to defendant's mild mental retardation. Thus, the
diagnosis of organic brain damage in the affidavit of Dr. Hess is
not compelling enough to suggest the probability of a different
verdict.
	Defendant's most strenuous argument on appeal is that trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence that
defendant was sexually abused before the age of five. She
contends that counsel should have retained an expert to explain the
effect that such abuse, in the critical and formative years of
childhood, would have had on defendant.
	Initially, we note that evidence of a turbulent and abusive
childhood or of psychological and developmental problems is not
inherently mitigating. People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 24
(September 27, 2001); People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 491
(1996). A jury receiving such evidence might regard it as
aggravating because it suggests that the defendant might present
a danger in the future as a result of his or her background. People
v. Montgomery, 192 Ill. 2d 642, 673 (2000). In the instant case, Dr.
Fauteck testified in aggravation that defendant is a sexual sadist,
who obtains sexual gratification by inflicting pain and suffering on
others. He noted that the condition tends to become aggravated
with time and is incurable. The testimony that defendant is a
sexual sadist and the suggestion that she is a future threat to
society is not contradicted by any of the affidavits or exhibits
presented by defendant's post-conviction pleadings. Thus,
evidence that defendant was physically and sexually abused during
childhood, leading to impulsive or compulsive conduct in
connection with the charged offenses, would not necessarily have
been viewed as mitigating. Instead, it may very likely have been
viewed as aggravating. See Hickey, slip op. at 24 (trial counsel was
not ineffective in failing to present evidence of the abusive
behavior of the defendant's parents where such evidence could
suggest defendant might be a danger in the future).
	Even if the evidence proposed by defendant could be viewed
as mitigating and as necessary corroboration to rebut the State's
efforts at trial to minimize the abuse and mental deficiencies
suffered by defendant, we do not find that this proffered evidence
creates a reasonable probability that the outcome of the sentencing
determination would have been altered absent trial counsel's
failure to present it. We must assess prejudice in a realistic manner
based on all of the evidence. Thus, it is not proper to focus solely
on the potential mitigating evidence. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 538.
As numerous cases illustrate, the nature and extent of the evidence
in aggravation must also be considered. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at
538 (citing a number of decisions of this court and of various
federal courts for the principle that the heinous nature of the
offense and the presence of various aggravating circumstances
may negate a defendant's claim of prejudice in connection with the
failure to present mitigating evidence).
	Here, we conclude that in light of the overwhelming evidence
in aggravation, including the heinous nature of the offenses, there
is no reasonable probability that the introduction of the potentially
mitigating evidence set forth by defendant's amended post-conviction petition would have altered the jury's sentencing
decision. Defendant's crimes were awful in the extreme.
Defendant lured a helpless six-year-old child to defendant's
apartment, where defendant perpetrated unspeakable acts of horror
against the child, ignoring all of the child's pleas for mercy. An
expert attributed the child's death to 42 distinct injuries arising
from a combination of strangulation, puncture wounds to the
chest, and blunt head trauma. Furthermore, the jury heard evidence
that over the course of a five- or six-year period, defendant
sexually and physically assaulted three other girls, including her
own baby. Given the overwhelming aggravating evidence in this
case and the arguably cumulative nature of the proposed
mitigating evidence, there was no realistic probability that the
proposed mitigating evidence would have persuaded the jury that
the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors did not warrant
the death penalty. See Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 539.
	The Illinois cases relied upon by defendant are distinguishable
and do not support her position. In People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138 (1995), this court held that the defendant was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective
in failing investigate possible mitigating evidence to present at the
sentencing hearing. Unlike the present case, however, trial counsel
in Orange failed to present any mitigating evidence even though
there was a great deal of mitigating evidence that could have been
presented. Moreover, trial counsel in that case admitted that he did
not attempt to contact any witnesses in mitigation. The defendant
in Orange, unlike the instant defendant, had a very limited
criminal history, which involved nonviolent crime that occurred
more than 15 years earlier (People v. Orange, 121 Ill. 2d 364, 386
(1988)).
	In People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248 (1989), this court held
that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because
counsel failed to present mitigation testimony that would have
added "considerable cogency and force" to his cause. The reason
offered by defense counsel for not presenting the testimony was
that the would-be witnesses did not meet defense counsel's criteria
for testifying because they failed to pledge that they were
theoretically opposed to the death penalty in all cases. This court
observed that "the decision not to introduce possible mitigation
simply because the mitigation witnesses do not oppose the death
penalty is so strange that we believe an evidentiary hearing to
determine the truth of this allegation is required." Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d  at 282. It was also found to be significant in Caballero that
defendant had no prior criminal history and had been a model
student prior to his crimes. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d  at 280. While we
recognize that in Caballero the defendant's part in the killing of
three rival gang members in an act of revenge was reprehensible,
the quantum of aggravating evidence in the instant case clearly
distinguishes this case from Caballero. See Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 
at 539-40.
	People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168 (1992), is likewise
distinguishable. There, defense counsel did not conduct any
investigation into the defendant's background for possible
mitigation evidence. Despite having in his possession two
scholastic aptitude reports that indicated that the defendant had a
full scale IQ of just 62 at age 8 and a full scale IQ of 77 at age 11,
defense counsel failed to present this information to the sentencing
jury. Additionally, a diligent investigation would have revealed
that the defendant was abandoned during childhood by his family.
Under these circumstances, this court concluded that there was a
reasonable probability that had the jury known of the mitigating
evidence that defense counsel failed to investigate and present, it
would not have found that the death penalty was warranted. Perez,
168 Ill. 2d  at 195. In contrast to Perez, the sentencing jury in the
instant case heard ample evidence in mitigation regarding
defendant's mental deficiency and abusive upbringing. The weight
of the aggravating evidence also makes the case at bar clearly
distinguishable from Perez. See Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 539-40.
	In People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500 (1999), defendant
senselessly shot and killed two acquaintances. Unlike the
extensive mitigation presented to the jury in the instant case, the
mitigation presented by the defense in Morgan consisted of two
unprepared character witnesses whose testimony comprised only
10 pages of transcript. Defense counsel completely failed to
conduct any investigation into defendant's background, which
would have revealed the existence of significant mitigation
evidence that defendant had an abusive childhood and was
afflicted with severe lifelong brain damage and neurological
impairments. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 546-47, 549. Given these
facts, this court determined that a breakdown occurred in the
aggravation-mitigation phase of the sentencing proceeding,
causing serious doubt as to the propriety of defendant's sentence.
Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 557.
	In contrast to the above-discussed cases, defense counsel here
presented six witnesses who testified in mitigation at the
sentencing hearing and one witness who testified in mitigation at
the guilt phase of defendant's trial. The testimony of defendant's
two experts alone accounted for a total of 170 pages of transcript.
The sentencing jury was presented with significant evidence of
defendant's background, abusive childhood, and diminished
mental capacity. The additional proposed mitigation was largely
cumulative of what had been presented, and the nature of the
crime and the aggravating evidence weighed more heavily against
the defendant here than it did in the cases discussed above.
	We find that the instant case more closely resembles People
v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509 (1995). There, the murder entailed a
"horrifying and despicable attack on a defenseless child
accomplished by deception of the child's mother." Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 539. We held that "[i]n light of the overwhelming
aggravating circumstances, the introduction of potentially
mitigating evidence of defendant's background and mental and
emotional health would not have been sufficient to change the
jury's sentencing decision." Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 539. While it
could be argued that the aggravating evidence in that case
surpasses even the overwhelming nature of the aggravating
evidence in the present case, it should also be noted that defense
counsel in Coleman essentially failed to present any mitigating
evidence, while defense counsel in the present case placed ample
mitigation before the jury. We find that Coleman supports the
result here. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err
in dismissing defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing
on the bases discussed above.
II. State's Use of Fitness Examination in Aggravation

	Defendant next argues that Dr. Fauteck's testimony
concerning the 1991 fitness examination was improperly admitted
during the aggravation-mitigation phase of defendant's sentencing
hearing. Defendant argues that the admission of Dr. Fauteck's
testimony violated her constitutional rights. Relying upon Estelle
v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359, 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981),
defendant argues that her rights were violated because she was not
advised that her statements to Dr. Fauteck during the examination
could be used against her.
	As previously noted, the scope of post-conviction relief is
limited, through considerations of waiver and res judicata, to
"constitutional matters which have not been, and could not have
been, previously adjudicated." People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335,
346 (1992). Defendant raised, and this court rejected, the same
argument on defendant's direct appeal. See Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d  at
279-81. In the prior appeal, this court found that defendant had
waived the issue by failing to object either at trial or at the
sentencing hearing, and the issue did not amount to plain error.
Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d  at 278-80. This court further rejected
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in connection
with trial counsel's failure to object at trial and at sentencing.
Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d  at 278, 280. Because defendant's arguments
were raised and rejected in the prior appeal, they are now barred
by the principle of res judicata. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d  at 458.
	Nevertheless, defendant argues that post-conviction relief is
not precluded on this issue, claiming that the proposed additional
mitigation evidence she supplies with her post-conviction petition
demonstrates prejudice when considered cumulatively with the
improper testimony about the fitness evaluation. We disagree.
	Initially, we note that defendant is mistaken in her assumption
that Dr. Fauteck's testimony was improper. In the course of its
plain error analysis on direct appeal, this court cited Buchanan v.
Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 97 L. Ed. 2d 336, 107 S. Ct. 2906 (1987),
and noted that "because defendant was the first to introduce
psychiatric evidence, admission of testimony concerning the
fitness examination did not deprive her of a fundamental right."
Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d  at 280. We continue to adhere to that
statement. Defendant's reliance on Estelle is unavailing. As we
observed in People v. West, 137 Ill. 2d 558 (1990), "[t]he [United
States Supreme] Court subsequently limited the breadth of Estelle
to 'the "distinct circumstances" of that case' when it decided
Buchanan." West, 137 Ill. 2d  at 591, quoting Buchanan, 483 U.S. 
at 422, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 355, 107 S. Ct.  at 2917.
	In Estelle, a court-appointed psychiatrist went beyond simply
reporting to the court on the issue of competence based on his
examination of the defendant and testified for the prosecution at
the penalty phase of the capital sentencing hearing on the crucial
issue of the defendant's future dangerousness. Estelle, 451 U.S.  at
467, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 372, 101 S. Ct.  at 1875. The Court held that
in such a situation, the defendant's fifth amendment rights were
violated by the failure to administer to the defendant, before the
examination, the warning required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). Estelle, 451 U.S.  at 466-69, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 371-73, 101 S. Ct.  at 1874-76.
	The Court in Estelle, however, specifically noted that the
defense did not offer any psychiatric testimony at trial. Estelle, 451 U.S.  at 466, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 371, 101 S. Ct.  at 1874. Buchanan
distinguished Estelle on that basis, holding that the prosecution
may constitutionally offer evidence from a court-ordered fitness
examination when the defendant presents psychiatric or "mental
status" evidence. Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d  at 280; West, 137 Ill. 2d  at
591-92. Moreover, the Court noted that when defense counsel
agrees to a court-appointed examination, it is presumed that
counsel understands the ramifications of placing the defendant's
mental status at issue. Buchanan, 483 U.S.  at 424-25, 97 L. Ed. 2d 
at 356-57, 107 S. Ct.  at 2918-19.
	In the case at bar, Dr. Fauteck was appointed by the court at
the behest of defendant to conduct the examination. Thereafter, it
was defendant who first introduced mental competence and
psychiatric testimony into the case. See Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d  at 278,
280. Accordingly, we find that no error occurred. We further find
that even if the introduction of Dr. Fauteck's testimony could be
deemed improper, it did not amount to plain error given the nature
of the overwhelming aggravating evidence presented against
defendant. Defendant's proposed mitigation does not alter that
conclusion.
III. Prejudicial Impact of Book Cover Shown at Sentencing
	Defendant next argues that her appellate counsel was
ineffective in failing to argue that she was prejudiced at sentencing
by the introduction of a book discovered by police in her
apartment entitled The Force of Sex. At trial, the State was
allowed to show the jury the cover of the book in question over
defense counsel's objection. This court held on appeal that the trial
court erred in admitting the book into evidence, but the error was
harmless because the properly admitted evidence of defendant's
guilt was overwhelming. Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d  at 276-77. Defendant
now argues that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to
raise the matter in connection with any prejudicial impact the book
might have had at sentencing because the "very title of the book
corroborates the prosecution's theory in aggravation that
[defendant] is a sexual sadist."
	As noted, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on
deficient representation of a criminal defendant are assessed in
accordance with the two-prong test established in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984). Where it is possible to resolve an ineffective assistance
claim on the basis of the second prong of the test-that the
defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel's allegedly
defective performance-the claim may be decided against the
defendant without consideration of whether counsel's performance
was actually deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at
699, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069. Again, the second prong of Strickland
requires the defendant to establish that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068.
	Here, we conclude that the omissions upon which defendant
bases her ineffective assistance claim did not result in prejudice
within the meaning of Strickland. The jury was permitted to view
only the cover of the book at trial. The book was not presented to
the jury at sentencing, and the jury was not allowed access to the
book during any of its deliberations. More importantly, the
defendant does not contest the label "sexual sadist" that was
placed upon her by the State's expert. Indeed, defendant ostensibly
adopts the diagnosis of sexual sadism through the report of Dr.
Berlin presented with her post-conviction petition, but argues that
it should be considered a mitigating factor. Under these
circumstances and in light of the overwhelming aggravating
evidence presented by the State, we do not find that there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the sentencing proceeding
would have been altered in the absence of the error in showing the
book cover to the jury at trial.
IV. Verdict Form
	Defendant next argues that her death sentence must be
vacated and the cause remanded for a new sentencing hearing
because the verdict form used for the felony-murder aggravating
factor improperly omitted the requisite mental state as set forth in
section 9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code) (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)). Defendant maintains that
her trial and appellate attorneys were ineffective for failing to raise
the issue.
	Defendant's argument is without merit. This court has
repeatedly held that where a jury finds a defendant death-eligible
based upon multiple aggravating factors, the jury's determination
will be upheld if at least one of the verdict forms is valid. People
v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 226-27 (1999); People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 503-04 (1998); People v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 57-58
(1998); People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 67-69 (1998); People v.
Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 320-22 (1998). Here, defendant was
found eligible for the death penalty based on the additional
aggravating factor that the murder victim was under 12 years of
age and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38,
par. 9-1(b)(7)). There is no question that the jury's verdict form
was valid with respect to the presence of this aggravating factor.
	People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467 (1998), is directly on point
and controls the outcome here. In Terrell, the defendant argued
that the jury improperly found him eligible for the death penalty
because the verdict form omitted the required mental state for
eligibility under section 9-1(b)(6). This court held, however, that
the jury's verdict based on the aggravating factor set forth in
section 9-1(b)(7) independently established the defendant's
eligibility for the death penalty regardless of the validity of the
verdict on the felony-murder aggravating factor of section
9-1(b)(6). Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d  at 504.
	Defendant's reliance upon People v. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d 498
(1992), and People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995), is misplaced.
In Ramey, the jury instruction used for the felony-murder
aggravating factor omitted the requisite mental state. In reversing
the defendant's death sentence, this court noted that a defendant
can be found eligible for the death penalty only if the jury
unanimously finds that the State had proven beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of at least one of the eight statutory
aggravating factors. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d  at 544. Because the
requisite finding had not been made by a trier of fact at any other
stage of the proceeding, the defendant was entitled to a new
sentencing hearing. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d  at 544-47. Ramey, of
course, does not alter the rule that a defendant can be found death-eligible as long as an independent aggravating factor is properly
found to exist.
	People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995), is also
distinguishable. In Mack, this court remanded for a new death
eligibility hearing because of a similar defect in the verdict form.
Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 538. Mack, however, did not involve a
situation like the present case where other aggravating factors
supported the jury's sentence.
	As additional matter, we note that the defendant contends that
section 9-1(b)(7) of the Code is unconstitutionally vague. We
rejected precisely the same argument in defendant's direct appeal.
Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d  at 286-87. This court has repeatedly upheld
section 9-1(b)(7) against similar vagueness challenges since first
considering the issue 14 years ago. See, e.g., Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d at
502-03; People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 62-64 (1998); People v.
Fair, 159 Ill. 2d 51, 80-82 (1994); People v. Odle, 128 Ill. 2d 111,
139-41 (1988). Defendant cites no case law to support her
argument, and we decline to reconsider our previous rulings here.
V. Response to Question from Jurors
	Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in its response
to a note the jury sent to the judge during the course of its
deliberations at the penalty phase of defendant's sentencing
hearing. After deliberating for 2½ hours, the jury sent the court the
following query: "What happens if we cannot reach a unanimous
decision on either verdict?" Defense counsel requested that the
court respond to this question by giving the jury the following
answer: "According to the law, if you are not unanimous, you are
to sign the verdict that says you are not unanimous and it is a no
death verdict." The trial court declined the request, and instead
instructed the jury in writing as follows: "You have your
instructions. Keep deliberating."
	In rejecting the same argument on direct appeal that defendant
now raises, this court stated:
			"We believe that the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in refusing defendant's requested instruction
and in directing the jury to continue deliberating.
Immediately before beginning its deliberations on
defendant's sentence, the jury was instructed as follows:
'You may not sign a verdict imposing a death sentence
unless you unanimously vote for it.' Because the
instructions given to the jury concerning unanimity were
readily understandable and sufficiently explained the
relevant law, we hold that the court did not err in the
manner in which it responded to the jury's inquiry."
Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d  at 285.
	Defendant acknowledges that this court rejected her same
argument on direct appeal, but now contends that res judicata
should not be invoked to bar her claim because her amended post-conviction petition raises new matters outside the record to
support her argument. In that regard, defendant offers (1) a 1996
magazine article explaining the 1994 study of Shari Diamond, a
study which analyzes possible juror confusion over death penalty
jury instructions, (2) the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 145 L. Ed. 2d 727, 120 S. Ct. 727 (2000), and (3) the decision of this court in People v. Alvine,
173 Ill. 2d 273 (1996).
	Turning first to the 1994 Diamond study, we note that it
cannot be characterized as a new matter. The study was available
at the time of defendant's direct appeal. See People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 56-57 (1996). Defendant argues in the alternative that if
the study was available, appellate counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel in failing to present it. We disagree.
	Although appellate counsel apparently did not reference the
study in that appeal, counsel did argue that the Illinois Pattern Jury
Instructions given at both stages of defendant's sentencing hearing
unconstitutionally failed to guide the jury's discretion, citing the
federal decision in United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 806 F. Supp. 705 (N.D. Ill. 1992). In Free, the district court found a
similar study by Professor Hans Zeisel persuasive in finding that
jurors were confused over Illinois death penalty instructions.
However, that ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 1993). This
court on direct appeal in the instant case rejected defendant's
argument based on Free (Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d at 287), as this court
has done with other similar arguments on numerous occasions (see
Brown, 172 Ill. 2d  at 55-56 (listing 10 cases that have rejected
Free and the Zeisel study).
	In Brown, this court also considered and rejected a
defendant's argument that confusion in the pattern death penalty
instructions rendered them constitutionally infirm. The defendant
supported his argument in that case with the Diamond study. This
court affirmed the defendant's death sentence, finding the study
unpersuasive and refusing to remand for an evidentiary hearing on
the matter. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d at 56-57; accord People v. Hobley,
182 Ill. 2d 404, 467-70 (1998). Given the flaws in the Diamond
study noted in Brown and Hobley, we do not believe that the
failure to present the study would have impacted the outcome of
defendant's direct appeal. Accordingly, defendant was not
prejudiced under Strickland.
	Defendant also argues that principles of res judicata are
inapplicable here because the Supreme Court's subsequent
decision in Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 145 L. Ed. 2d 727,
120 S. Ct. 727 (2000), amounts to a change in the law. We
disagree with defendant's assertion that Weeks requires a different
outcome in the present case than the one reached on direct appeal.
In Weeks, the Court considered the question of "whether the
Constitution is violated when a trial judge directs a capital jury's
attention to a specific paragraph of a constitutionally sufficient
instruction in response to a question regarding the proper
consideration of mitigating circumstances." Weeks, 528 U.S.  at
227, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 733, 120 S. Ct.  at 729. The Weeks Court held
that the trial court acted properly, and the constitution did not
require anything more. Weeks, 528 U.S.  at 234, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at
738, 120 S. Ct.  at 733.
	Defendant does not rely upon the holding of Weeks but
instead relies upon factual differences between that case and the
present one. We do not find, however, that the facts of Weeks
require a different result here. In Weeks, the jury sent the judge a
note on the second day of its deliberations asking the following
question:
		" 'Does the sentence of life imprisonment in the State of
Virginia have the possibility of parole, and if so, under
[sic] what conditions must be met to receive parole?' "
Weeks, 528 U.S.  at 228, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 734, 120 S. Ct. 
at 730.
The judge answered as follows:
		" 'You should impose such punishment as you feel is just
under the evidence, and within the instructions of the
Court. You are not to concern yourselves with what may
happen afterwards.' " Weeks, 528 U.S.  at 228, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 734, 120 S. Ct.  at 730.
	Deliberations continued for another five hours, at which point
the jury asked the following additional question:
		" 'If we believe that [the defendant] is guilty of at least 1
of the alternatives, then is it our duty as a jury to issue the
death penalty? Or must we decide (even though he is
guilty of one of the alternatives) whether or not to issue
the death penalty, or one of the life sentences? What is the
Rule? Please clarify?' " (Emphases in original.) Weeks,
528 U.S.  at 229, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 734, 120 S. Ct.  at 730.
The judge responded as follows: " 'See second paragraph of
Instruction #2 (Beginning with "If you find from ...").' " Weeks,
528 U.S.  at 229, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 734, 120 S. Ct.  at 730. The judge
explained to defense counsel his answer to the jury's question,
noting that his answer could not be made any clearer than the
instruction and so he simply referred the jury to the instruction.
	When comparing the present case with Weeks, we note that
the possibility of juror confusion was greater in Weeks than in the
present case. The question the jury asked the trial court here is
similar to the first question asked in Weeks. The jurors wanted to
know what would happen if they could not reach a unanimous
decision on either verdict. The answer to that inquiry is that
defendant would receive a sentence other than death, which would
lead to the further question, "What would that sentence be?" The
trial court in Weeks responded to a similar question by referring
the jury generally to its instructions. The Court focused only on the
second question from the jury in Weeks in considering whether the
judge's response was appropriate. The jury's second question in
Weeks essentially showed that it was confused about whether it
had discretion not to impose the death penalty even if it had found
the presence of one of the statutory aggravating factors necessary
to impose death.
	In discussing the second jury question, the Court noted that a
jury is presumed to follow its instructions. Weeks, 528 U.S.  at 234,
145 L. Ed. 2d  at 738, 120 S. Ct.  at 733. It further found it
important that after receiving the judge's answer, the jury did not
respond that it still did not understand its role. Finally, the Court
noted that the jury deliberated for two more hours after receiving
the answer so it was unlikely that it thought it was required to give
the death penalty upon finding an aggravating circumstance.
Weeks, 528 U.S.  at 235, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 738, 120 S. Ct.  at 734.
	In the present case, the trial court referred the jury to the
constitutionally sufficient instructions, as the trial court did in
Weeks. Although the jury did not deliberate long after receiving
the trial court's response, the jury also did not inform the court that
it still did not understand its role. A trial court may exercise its
discretion and properly decline to answer a jury's inquiries where
the instructions are readily understandable and sufficiently explain
the relevant law. Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d  at 285. We find nothing in
Weeks that would change our conclusion on direct appeal that the
trial court properly exercised its discretion in responding to the
jury and that the instructions given concerning unanimity were not
confusing, but were instead readily understandable and sufficiently
explicative of the relevant law (Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d at 285).
	Defendant additionally argues that appellate counsel was
ineffective in failing to cite People v. Alvine, 173 Ill. 2d 273
(1996), for the proposition that instructions may be found to be
confusing to the jury even though those instructions are otherwise
legally valid. Defendant does not sufficiently explain how this case
would alter our conclusion on direct appeal that the instructions at
issue were not confusing. We find Alvine to be factually
distinguishable and unhelpful to the plaintiff's argument.
Accordingly, we do not find that counsel was ineffective in failing
to cite Alvine.
VI. Hearing Required on Defendant's Mental Capacity
	Lastly, we note that the United States Supreme Court recently
held in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. ___, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002), that the execution of mentally retarded criminals
is excessive and violates the eighth amendment of the United
States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII). Atkins was decided
after the parties filed their briefs in the instant case. Although there
was some evidence in the record that defendant may be mildly
mentally retarded, the parties did not address the issue of whether
a mentally retarded criminal can be executed. Applying Atkins to
the present case, we hold that the instant cause must be remanded
to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether
defendant is mentally retarded.
	In Atkins, the Court noted in a footnote the definitions of
mental retardation as defined by the American Association of
Mental Retardation (AMMR) and the American Psychiatric
Association (APA), and stated that " '[m]ild' mental retardation
is typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 50-55 to
approximately 70." Atkins, 536 U.S. at ___ n.3, 153 L. Ed. 2d  at
342 n.3, 122 S. Ct.  at 2245 n.3. In another footnote, the Court
stated that "[i]t is estimated that between 1 and 3 percent of the
population has an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower, which is
typically considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual
function prong of the mental retardation definition." Atkins, 536
U.S. at ___ n.5, 153 L. Ed. 2d  at 342 n.5, 122 S. Ct.  at 2245 n.5.
The Court further stated the following:
			"[C]linical definitions of mental retardation require not
only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also
significant limitations in adaptive skills such as
communication, self-care, and self-direction that became
manifest before age 18." Atkins, 536 U.S. at ___, 153 L. Ed. 2d  at 348, 122 S. Ct.  at 2250.
	In Atkins, the Court recognized that there was conflicting
evidence in the record on the issue of whether Atkins was in fact
mentally retarded. The defense expert evaluated Atkins prior to
trial and concluded that he was mildly mentally retarded. His
conclusion was based on a review of court and school records and
the administration of the Wechsler Intelligence Test, which
indicated that Atkins had a full scale IQ of 59. The State, on the
other hand, presented an expert witness in rebuttal, who opined
that Atkins was not mentally retarded, but was of average
intelligence, at least. The State's expert did not administer an
intelligence test.
	In remanding the cause to the Supreme Court of Virginia for
further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion, the Atkins
Court stated the following:
			"To the extent there is serious disagreement about the
execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in
determining which offenders are in fact retarded. In this
case, for instance, the Commonwealth of Virginia
disputes that Atkins suffers from mental retardation. Not
all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so
impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded
offenders about whom there is a national consensus. As
was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright, with regard to
insanity, 'we leave to the State[s] the task of developing
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction
upon its execution of sentences.' 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416-417 (1986)." Atkins, 536 U.S. at ___, 153 L. Ed. 2d  at
347-48, 122 S. Ct.  at 2250.
	In Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 91 L. Ed. 2d 335, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986), which Atkins cites as authority for leaving to
the States the " 'appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional
restriction upon its execution of sentences,' " the Supreme Court
declared that the execution of insane inmates violates the eighth
amendment. Atkins, 536 U.S. at ___, 153 L. Ed. 2d  at 348, 122 S. Ct.  at 2250, quoting Ford, 477 U.S.  at 416-17, 91 L. Ed. 2d  at 351,
106 S. Ct.  at 2605. In that case, the Court remanded the habeas
corpus proceeding of a Florida state death-row inmate to a federal
district court for a de novo evidentiary hearing on the question of
competence to be executed. Ford, 477 U.S.  at 416-18, 91 L. Ed. 2d  at 351-52, 106 S. Ct.  at 2605-06.
	As noted above, Atkins was decided after both briefing and
oral argument had concluded in this case. Moreover, defendant has
not sought leave to supplement this appeal with any arguments
relating to Atkins. Nevertheless, we clearly recognize the relevance
of Atkins to this case. Indeed, as in Atkins, the experts in this case
expressly disagreed on the question of whether defendant was
mildly mentally retarded; defendant's expert testified that she was,
and the State's expert testified that she was not. More importantly,
in light of this disagreement between the experts, we recognize
that the filing of a subsequent post-conviction petition asserting
Atkins is inevitable, and that a hearing on that petition will be
necessary. Consequently, in the interests of judicial economy, we
choose to remand this cause to the circuit court for a de novo
evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant is mentally
retarded and therefore, under Atkins, may not be executed.
	As a final matter, we emphasize that this case is before us on
review under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The appropriate
remedy here is simply a remand for a hearing under Atkins. It
would not be appropriate for this court to usurp the authority of the
legislature by fashioning procedural and substantive standards in
relation to the Atkins hearing. Such matters are best left to the 
determination of the legislature following discussion and debate.
The legislature may choose to eventually adopt procedural
standards to govern Atkins issues that arise prior to conviction and
sentence. We recognize that the circuit courts will have to conduct
these hearings, at least for the time being, without definitive
guidance from the legislature or from this court. In the meantime,
we will review all such cases, including post-conviction cases, to
ensure that due process standards have been satisfied.
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of
Cook County dismissing defendant's post-conviction petition
without an evidentiary hearing is affirmed in part and reversed in
part. In light of Atkins, we remand the cause for a de novo
evidentiary hearing before the circuit court to determine whether
defendant is mentally retarded.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
	The majority correctly reverses in part the judgment of the
circuit court and remands this cause for an evidentiary hearing in
light of the United States Supreme Court decision in Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. __, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
Nonetheless, for the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v.
Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 39-43 (September 27, 2001)
(Kilbride, J., dissenting), and People v. Simpson, No. 85084, slip
op. at 35-39 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I
believe that the majority fails to grant defendant the
constitutionally required relief of a new trial conducted in
accordance with the new supreme court rules governing capital
cases. The procedures in capital cases prior to this court's adoption
of the new rules were inherently unreliable and did not adequately
protect a defendant's constitutional rights. Consequently, since the
new rules were promulgated to address the deficiencies of
constitutional dimension that regularly occurred under the old
system, the rules must be applied retroactively to all capital cases.
See People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 220-21 (1997).