Title: P. v. Willis

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 6/3/02
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
)
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
)
)
S079245
v.
)
)
Ct.App. 5 F026866
GARY WAYNE WILLIS,
)
)
Kern County
Defendant and Appellant.
)
Super. Ct. No. 66919
__________________________________ )
We granted review in this case to determine whether federal constitutional
principles require the suppression of evidence discovered by a state parole officer
and police during a search they conducted without a warrant under the erroneous
belief that defendant Gary Wayne Willis was on parole and subject to a
warrantless search condition.  On the facts of this case, we agree with the Court of
Appeal that the so-called good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not
apply.  Because the Court of Appeal found the evidence admissible and affirmed
defendant’s conviction under a legal theory that the Attorney General concedes is
erroneous, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 27, 1996, while working out of the Bakersfield Police
Department as part of the Kern County Narcotics Enforcement Team, Officer
Joseph Mullins received a telephone call from an employee of a Bakersfield motel.
The motel employee advised Mullins of “a high level of phone and foot traffic”
involving room 221, which was registered to defendant.  This information was
2
significant to Mullins because he knew from experience that narcotics dealers
commonly conduct transactions at rented motel rooms.
Mullins checked “department records,” which indicated that defendant had
several prior arrests and/or convictions involving narcotics.  Mullins also checked
“the local criminal justice information system,” which indicated that defendant
was required to register as a sex offender.  Finally, Mullins “checked the parole
book,” or “parole listing,” “in the Bakersfield Police Department,” which
indicated that defendant was on parole.  According to Mullins, the “parole book”
was “provided to the Police Department every month.”  The “listing” Mullins
checked on March 27 was dated either March 6 or March 16.  Mullins then
conveyed all of this information to Diane Mora, a state parole officer from the
California Department of Corrections (CDC), and showed her “the parole list.”
Mora told Mullins “the list indicated [that defendant] was on active parole,” and
she “directed” Mullins “to make a search” of defendant’s motel room.
Mora and Mullins then went to the motel “to conduct a parole search,”
accompanied by Detective Hood of the Kern County Sheriff’s Department and
Officer Silvius of the Bakersfield Police Department.  At the motel, Mullins
confirmed from motel records that room 221 was registered to defendant and that
there were “several phone calls in and out of that motel room.”  Hood knocked on
the door of room 221.  Defendant asked who was there.  Hood replied, “[I]t’s
Bill.”  Defendant responded, “Bill who, fuck you.”  Hood replied, “[I]t’s the
police, open the door, please.”  Neither Hood nor anyone else announced their
purpose.  Defendant then opened the door.
When the door opened, Mullins saw “a large sheath knife” on defendant’s
belt, a hypodermic syringe on a dresser in the room (which he later determined
was empty), and a woman named Kathleen Moye.  Accompanied by Mullins and
Silvius, Mora and Hood entered the room and announced their intention to
conduct a parole search.  Defendant did not invite them in or give them permission
to search.  He informed them he had been discharged from parole in June 1995,
3
and that they could not do a parole search.  He directed their attention to a
certificate of discharge from the CDC, which correctly showed that he had, in fact,
been discharged from parole nine months earlier, on June 29, 1995.
Because “the parole listing indicated [defendant] was on parole,” Mullins
did not consider the certificate to be “conclusive of [defendant’s] parole status.”
Mullins asked Mora to use the telephone in the motel office to check defendant’s
parole status and he escorted defendant to a walkway outside of the room.1
Mullins felt that Mora was the proper person for this task because she had been a
parole officer for several years and was “better acquainted with the workings of
the system and how to confirm through the [CDC] with their [sic] records in
Sacramento the true status.”
While Mullins and defendant were outside, Silvius, who had remained in
the room with Hood and Moye, advised Mullins that Moye appeared to be under
the influence of narcotics.  Consistent with this information, Moye said that she
had “used this afternoon,” and she identified a briefcase in the room that she said
contained “a speed pipe.”  Mullins then announced that he had enough information
to obtain a search warrant and asked defendant to consent to a search “to save us
the time and trouble of obtaining a search warrant.”  According to Mullins,
defendant eventually admitted the briefcase contained methamphetamine and
consented to a search of both the room and the briefcase.  After defendant and
Mullins reentered the room, Silvius broke the briefcase’s combination lock,
opened the briefcase, and inside found narcotics, syringes, spoons and a set of
scales.  Defendant was then arrested.
                                                
1 
Mullins indicated at the suppression hearing that defendant directed
attention to the parole discharge certificate after they moved to the outside
walkway, but the Court of Appeal’s opinion states otherwise and the Attorney
General did not challenge that factual statement in a rehearing petition.
4
Defendant was subsequently charged by information with possession of a
controlled substance for purpose of sale (Pen. Code, § 11378) and misdemeanor
possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, §  11364).2  Defendant
moved to suppress the evidence discovered in his motel room, arguing that the
warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  In opposition, the prosecution argued that the search was valid for
numerous reasons, primarily consent.  Alternatively, the prosecution argued that
even if the search was not valid, because the police “acted in good faith reliance
on Parole’s representations,” the evidence should not be excluded.  After
argument, the trial court denied the suppression motion by a minute order that
stated no reasons.  A jury subsequently convicted defendant of possessing a
controlled substance for sale and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the initial entry into the motel
room was unconstitutional because the officers did not have a search warrant,
defendant was not on parole, and he did not consent to the entry.  It also rejected
the Attorney General’s argument that even though the search was constitutionally
invalid, the exclusionary rule does not apply because the police relied in good faith
on the information that defendant was on parole.  The court reasoned that the
inaccurate information regarding defendant’s parole status was “attributable to the
police executing the search,” because Mora was an “adjunct of the law
enforcement team” in that she “actively participated in the search” and, as a state
parole officer, is a “peace officer” under California law.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the suppression
motion, reasoning that the unconstitutional entry did not taint the police’s
subsequent reasonable actions that actually led to discovery of the evidence.
                                                
2 
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.  The
information also charged possession of a controlled substance (§ 11377, subd. (a)).
The trial court later dismissed that charge on the prosecution’s motion.
5
According to the court, the police “were authorized to ‘freeze’ the motel room”
after the illegal entry while Mora investigated defendant’s parole status, they
obtained “additional information” from their interactions with defendant and Mora
during the freeze that “amounted to probable cause” to obtain a search warrant,
“were authorized to secure the room to prevent destruction of evidence until” they
obtained a warrant, and received consent to search the room and the briefcase
before they could take steps to obtain a warrant.  Thus, the court concluded, the
evidence “was not the fruit of an unlawful parole search, but instead of prudent
lawful police work.”
Both defendant and the People petitioned for rehearing.  In the People’s
petition, the Attorney General repeatedly conceded that the police acted
unconstitutionally in entering the motel room.  However, he argued that the court
erred in holding that the police’s good faith reliance on the information regarding
defendant’s parole status did not render the exclusionary rule inapplicable.
Defendant, in his petition, argued in part that the court’s “freezing” theory was
both procedurally improper—because the Attorney General had never raised it—
and substantively incorrect.  The court denied the petitions.
Defendant and the People petitioned for review.  We granted both petitions.
DISCUSSION
Federal constitutional standards generally govern our review of claims that
evidence is inadmissible because it was obtained during an unlawful search.  (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d); People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 674.)  The
Attorney General concedes that under those standards, the initial entry into
defendant’s motel room “was unconstitutional” because there was no search
warrant, no valid parole condition in effect, and no other applicable exception to
the warrant requirement to justify the warrantless search.  The Attorney General
also concedes that the evidence recovered during the unconstitutional search is not
admissible under the Court of Appeal’s “freezing” theory.  He explains that
because “a Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the officers entered [the]
6
motel room,” “it is irrelevant” that the observations they made after the illegal
entry “during the freezing period” may have established probable cause to support
issuance of a search warrant.  The Attorney General’s explanation is consistent
with existing law.  (See Murray v. United States (1988) 487 U.S. 533, 540
[observations made after unlawful warrantless entry “cannot be used to establish
probable cause” for a search warrant]; Burrows v. Superior Court (1974) 13
Cal.3d 238, 251 [consent to search given “immediately following an illegal entry
or search” is invalid because it “is inseparable from the unlawful conduct”];
People v. Roberts (1956) 47 Cal.2d 374, 377 [search warrant based on
observations made after unlawful entry is invalid].)  Accordingly, we need not and
do not examine either of these questions further.
However, the Attorney General argues that the evidence is admissible under
what is commonly known as the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule,
which the United States Supreme Court announced and applied in a trilogy of
cases, United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 (Leon), Illinois v. Krull (1987)
480 U.S. 340, 355 (Krull), and Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S. 1 (Evans).3  In
these cases, the high court explained that the exclusionary rule does not, and
cannot, cure the constitutional violation, which is fully accomplished by the illegal
search itself.  (Evans, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 10; Leon, supra, 468 U.S at p. 906.)
Rather, the exclusionary rule “operates as a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment rights through the rule’s
general deterrent effect.  [Citations.]”  (Evans, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 10.)  Thus, its
“ ‘prime purpose’ ” is to “ ‘effectuate’ ” the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee
                                                
3 
We have previously noted that the term “good faith exception” may be
somewhat of a misnomer, because the exception focuses on the objective
reasonableness of an officer’s conduct.  (People v. Machupa (1994) 7 Cal.4th 614,
618, fn. 1; see Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 355.)  Nevertheless, we use the term
because of its common acceptance by commentators and courts, including the high
court itself.  (See Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 353.)
7
against unreasonable searches or seizures by “deter[ring] future unlawful police
conduct.”  (Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 347.)  Moreover, because the exclusionary
rule is a “remedial device,” its application is “restricted to those situations in
which its remedial purpose is effectively advanced.”  (Ibid.)  Thus, application of
the exclusionary rule “ ‘is unwarranted’ ” where it would “ ‘not result in
appreciable deterrence.’ ”  (Evans, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 11.)
In Leon, the high court held that where police officers act in objectively
reasonable reliance on a search warrant that is issued by a detached and neutral
magistrate but is later found to be invalid for lack of probable cause, the deterrent
effect of exclusion is insufficient to warrant the exclusionary rule’s application.
(Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 900.)  In reaching this conclusion, the court
considered exclusion’s potential effect first on judicial officers who issue
warrants, and then on police officers who execute warrants and on the policies of
their departments.  (Id. at pp. 916-918.)  Regarding the former, the court
concluded that for three reasons, the potential behavioral effect on judicial officers
is insufficient to justify exclusion.  (Id. at p. 916.)  “First, the exclusionary rule is
designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and
magistrates.  Second, there exists no evidence suggesting that judges and
magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that
lawlessness among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of
exclusion.  [¶]  Third, and most important, [there is] no basis . . . for believing that
exclusion . . . will have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or
magistrate.  Many of the factors that indicate that the exclusionary rule cannot
provide an effective ‘special’ or ‘general’ deterrent for individual offending law
enforcement officers apply as well to judges or magistrates.  And, to the extent
that the rule is thought to operate as a ‘systemic’ deterrent on a wider audience, it
clearly can have no such effect on individuals empowered to issue search
warrants.  Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as
neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal
8
prosecutions. . . .  Imposition of the exclusionary sanction is not necessary
meaningfully to inform [them] of their errors, and . . . admitting evidence obtained
pursuant to a warrant while at the same time declaring that the warrant was
somehow defective will [not] in any way reduce [their] professional incentives to
comply with the Fourth Amendment, encourage them to repeat their mistakes, or
lead to the granting of all colorable warrant requests.”  (Id. at pp. 916-917, fns.
omitted.)
Regarding exclusion’s potential effect on individual law enforcement
officers and the policies of their departments, the high court explained generally
that the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule “ ‘necessarily assumes that
the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct . . . .’ ”
(Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 919.)  Thus, exclusion is proper “ ‘only if it can be
said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged
with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional . . . .’ ”  (Ibid.)  Given these
underlying principles, the court concluded that exclusion will not further the
exclusionary rule’s ends where “an officer acting with objective good faith has
obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope.
In most such cases, there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter.  It is the
magistrate’s responsibility to determine whether the officer’s allegations establish
probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be
expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination or his
judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient.  ‘[O]nce the
warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to
comply with the law.’  [Citation.]  Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error,
rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth
Amendment violations.”  (Id. at pp. 920-921, fns. omitted.)  Thus, “the marginal or
nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively
9
reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the
substantial costs of exclusion.”  (Id. at p. 922.)
However, suppression remains appropriate where an officer’s reliance on a
search warrant was not “objectively reasonable,” i.e., the officer had “no
reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued.”  (Leon,
supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 922-923.)  “ ‘Grounding the [good faith exception] in
objective reasonableness . . . retains the value of the exclusionary rule as an
incentive for the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct themselves in
accord with the Fourth Amendment.’  [Citations.]”  (Id. at p. 919, fn. 20.)  Thus, in
determining whether the good faith exception applies, “[i]t is necessary to consider
the objective reasonableness, not only of the officers who eventually executed a
warrant, but also of the officers who originally obtained it or who provided
information material to the probable-cause determination.”  (Id. at p. 923, fn. 24.)
For example, the court cautioned, “[n]othing” in Leon “suggests” that an officer
may use “a ‘bare bones’ affidavit” to obtain a warrant “and then rely on colleagues
who are ignorant of the circumstances under which the warrant was obtained to
conduct the search.  [Citation.]”  (Ibid.)  Moreover, the good faith exception does
not apply “where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role,”
where the affidavit was “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,’ ” or where the warrant was
“so facially deficient—i. e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or
the things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it
to be valid.”  (Id. at p. 923.)  Thus, courts must determine “on a case-by-case
basis” whether the circumstances of an invalid search pursuant to a warrant require
the exclusionary rule’s application.  (Id. at p. 918.)  “[T]he government has the
burden of establishing ‘objectively reasonable’ reliance [citation] . . . .”  (People v.
Camarella (1991) 54 Cal.3d 592, 596 (Camarella).)
Three years after Leon, the high court in Krull used a similar analysis in
finding the good faith exception applicable where “officers act in objectively
10
reasonable reliance upon a statute authorizing warrantless administrative
searches,” and the statute is later “found to violate the Fourth Amendment.”
(Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 342.)  The court first reasoned that excluding
evidence obtained under these circumstances “would have as little deterrent effect
on the officer’s actions” as would excluding evidence obtained in objectively
reasonable reliance on a search warrant.  (Id. at p. 349.)  “Unless a statute is
clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be expected to question the judgment of
the legislature that passed the law.  If the statute is subsequently declared
unconstitutional, excluding evidence obtained pursuant to it prior to such a judicial
declaration will not deter future Fourth Amendment violations by an officer who
has simply fulfilled his responsibility to enforce the statute as written. . . .
‘Penalizing the officer for the [legislature’s] error, rather than his own, cannot
logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.’
[Citation.]”  (Id. at pp. 349-350.)
Nor, the court reasoned in Krull, is exclusion justified by its potential effect
on legislators.  (Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 350.)  First, “legislators, like judicial
officers, are not the focus of the [exclusionary] rule,” which is “aimed at deterring
police misconduct.”  (Ibid.)  Second, there is no “evidence to suggest that
legislators ‘are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment.’  [Citation.]
Although legislators are not ‘neutral judicial officers,’ as are judges and
magistrates [citation], neither are they ‘adjuncts to the law enforcement team.’
[Citation.]”  (Id. at pp. 350-351.)  In performing their duty to establish a criminal
justice system, “legislators’ deliberations of necessity are significantly different
from the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer ‘engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 351.)
Moreover, they must “take an oath to support the Federal Constitution” and courts
must presume that they act constitutionally.  (Ibid.)  Finally, there is “no reason to
believe that applying the exclusionary rule will have” a significant deterrent effect
on legislators.  (Id. at p. 352.)  “Legislators enact statutes for broad, programmatic
11
purposes, not for the purpose of procuring evidence in particular criminal
investigations.  Thus, it is logical to assume that the greatest deterrent to the
enactment of unconstitutional statutes . . . is the power of the courts to invalidate
such statutes.  Invalidating a statute informs the legislature of its constitutional
error, affects the admissibility of all evidence obtained subsequent to the
constitutional ruling, and often results in the legislature’s enacting a modified and
constitutional version of the statute, as happened in this very case.  There is
nothing to indicate that applying the exclusionary rule to evidence seized pursuant
to the statute prior to the declaration of its invalidity will act as a significant,
additional deterrent.”  (Ibid.)  In any event, any “incremental deterrent” effect of
exclusion in this context, when “weighed against the ‘substantial social costs’ ” of
exclusion, is insufficient to justify the exclusionary rule’s application.  (Ibid.)
As in Leon, the court in Krull stressed that the good faith exception does
not apply if the officer does not act reasonably, and that “the standard of
reasonableness . . . is an objective one; [it] does not turn on the subjective good
faith of individual officers.  [Citation.]”  (Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 355.)  Thus,
“a law enforcement officer [cannot] be said to have acted in good-faith reliance
upon a statute if its provisions are such that a reasonable officer should have
known that the statute was unconstitutional.  [Citation.]”  (Ibid.)  Nor can “[a]
statute . . . support objectively reasonable reliance if, in passing the statute, the
legislature wholly abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional laws.”
(Ibid.)
More recently, in Evans, the high court discussed the good faith exception
as applied to court employees.  There, upon entering the defendant’s name into a
computer terminal during a traffic stop, a police officer received notice of an
outstanding arrest warrant.  During the ensuing arrest, the officer found marijuana
in the defendant’s car.  The police then reported the arrest to the justice court,
which advised that the arrest warrant had been quashed 17 days before the arrest.
The defendant later moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the good faith
12
exception did not apply because police error, rather than judicial error, caused the
invalid arrest.  (Evans, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 4.)  Testimony at the suppression
hearing indicated that the error in the police computer may have been caused by a
court clerk in failing to inform the sheriff’s office that the warrant had been
quashed, rather than by a records clerk in the sheriff’s office.  (Id. at p. 5.)  The
trial court made no factual finding on this issue, holding that exclusion was
required whether the error was caused by the court clerk or by the police.  (Ibid.)
The Arizona Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and “rejected” a
“ ‘distinction . . . between clerical errors committed by law enforcement personnel
and similar mistakes by court employees.’  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 6.)
The high court in Evans held that the refusal of the Arizona courts to
distinguish between errors of the police and errors of the court was “contrary to
the reasoning” of Leon and Krull.  (Evans, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 14.)  The court
explained that under those cases, “[i]f court employees were responsible for the
erroneous computer record, the exclusion of evidence at trial would not
sufficiently deter future errors so as to warrant such a severe sanction.”  (Ibid.)
Under these circumstances, exclusion “could not be expected to alter the behavior
of the arresting officer,” because he “ ‘[was] bound to arrest’ ” and “ ‘would [have
been] derelict in his duty if he’ ” had not.  (Id. at p. 15.)  Nor, the high court
reasoned, could exclusion be justified by its effect on court clerks.  “First, . . . the
exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police
misconduct, not mistakes by court employees.  [Citations.]  Second, [the
defendant] offer[ed] no evidence that court employees are inclined to ignore or
subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires
application of the extreme sanction of exclusion.  [Citations.]  To the contrary, the
Chief Clerk of the Justice Court testified at the suppression hearing that this type
of error occurred once every three or four years.  [Citation.]  [¶]  Finally, and most
important, there is no basis for believing that application of the exclusionary rule
in these circumstances will have a significant effect on court employees
13
responsible for informing the police that a warrant has been quashed.  Because
court clerks are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime [citation], they have no stake in the
outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.  [Citations.]  The threat of exclusion
of evidence could not be expected to deter such individuals from failing to inform
police officials that a warrant had been quashed.  [Citations.]”  (Id. at pp. 14-15.)
Because the Arizona courts ordered suppression without determining whether
police or court employees were responsible for the computer error, the high court
therefore reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.  (Id. at p.
16.)
The Attorney General correctly contends that under these cases, application
of the exclusionary rule depends on the source of the error or misconduct that led
to the unconstitutional search and whether, in light of that source, the deterrent
effect of exclusion is sufficient to warrant that sanction.  (See Krull, supra, 480
U.S. at p. 360, fn. 17 [whether exclusionary rule applies “in a particular context
depends significantly upon the actors who are making the relevant decision that
the rule is designed to influence”].)  As to the source of the error here, the
Attorney General states that the “sparse record” leaves “the precise duties and
responsibilities of the person or persons responsible” for the error “unknown.”
However, he argues the evidence “strongly suggests that the source of the
erroneous information was the Department of Corrections.”  In his initial briefing
in the Court of Appeal, the Attorney General focused mainly on Mora, arguing
that “it makes no sense to apply the exclusionary rule . . . where the negligence or
mistake was due to a parole agent’s mistaken direction to police to conduct a
search.”  As we have noted, the Court of Appeal disagreed, finding the good faith
exception inapplicable because Mora was “an adjunct of the law enforcement
team.”  The Attorney General now attributes the error to an “anonymous
employee” of the CDC, “presumably an unsworn data entry clerk” who was
“responsible for maintaining and updating the [parole] list.”  In making this
14
argument, the Attorney General cites Mullins’s testimony and several Penal Code
provisions relating to the CDC’s authority and duties.
We agree with the Attorney General that the “sparse record” is inconclusive
regarding the source of the error in this case.  The testimony the Attorney General
cites is of little help.  Mullins testified that the “parole book” he checked was
“provided to the Police Department every month.”  However, Mullins did not
indicate who provided the parole book; his vague statement does not point to the
CDC as the source any more than it points to some police agency other than the
Bakersfield Police Department.  Mullins also testified that Mora told him “the list
indicated [that defendant] was on active parole, and directed [him] to make a
search of [defendant’s] motel room,” and that he believed Mora was the proper
person to determine defendant’s parole status because she was “better acquainted
with the workings of the system.”  Again, this testimony does not identify the
source of the parole listing or even exclude some other police agency as that
source.
The statutes the Attorney General cites are of marginal help at best.
Section 3056, which states merely that “[p]risoners on parole shall remain under
the legal custody of” the CDC, provides little support for the conclusion that the
CDC prepared the parole listing Mora and Mullins reviewed.  Section 3058.5
requires the CDC to “provide within 10 days, upon request, to the chief of police
of a city or the sheriff of the county, information available to the department . . .
concerning persons then on parole who are or may be residing or temporarily
domiciled in that city or county.”  However, the record contains no evidence that
the Bakersfield Police Department made an information request pursuant to
section 3058.5 or that the parole listing Mullins and Mora reviewed was prepared
and provided by the CDC in response to such a request.  Section 3003 requires the
CDC to provide “local law enforcement agencies” with available information
“regarding a paroled inmate who is released in their jurisdictions.”  However,
section 3003 did not impose this requirement statewide until after the search in
15
this case, so it is irrelevant to determining the source of the error here.  (See Stats.
1997, ch. 680, § 2.)
In any event, even if the record suggested that the CDC prepared the parole
list, it does not indicate who was responsible for the parole list’s error regarding
defendant’s parole status or how the error occurred.  The record contains no
evidence suggesting that a data entry clerk, rather than a parole officer, prepared
the parole list, or that the error in the list was caused by the person who prepared
it, rather than by a parole officer who failed to update defendant’s file or forward
the information to the appropriate person.  The Attorney General recognized this
ambiguity in his rehearing petition in the Court of Appeal, asserting that the source
of the error here was “the anonymous parole agent (or, more likely, the unsworn
data entry clerk) who failed to update the parole book sent to police departments.”
Indeed, the record does not even foreclose the possibility that Mora herself
prepared the list, or that she failed to update the records in June 1995 when
defendant was discharged from parole and then simply forgot about his discharge
when she ordered and conducted the search of his motel room nine months later in
March 1996.4  Thus, we agree with the Attorney General that “the sparse record”
here fails to show “the precise duties and responsibilities of the person or persons
responsible” for the error.
However, we do not agree with the Attorney General that defendant bore
the burden of producing evidence on this question and, therefore, he is responsible
for the record’s inadequacy.  Where, as here, the prosecution invokes the good
faith exception, the government has “the burden . . . to prove that exclusion of the
evidence is not necessary because of [that] exception.”  (People v. Turnage (Ill.
                                                
4 
The record is unclear as to whether Mora was defendant’s parole agent.
Defendant testified at the suppression hearing that when Mora and the police
entered his room, they asserted that Mora was his “agent of record.”  He also
testified that in response, he denied that Mora had been his parole officer.
16
1994) 642 N.E.2d 1235, 1241 (Turnage).)  Thus, “the government has the burden
of establishing ‘objectively reasonable’ reliance” under Leon.  (Camarella, supra,
54 Cal.3d at p. 596.)  Establishing that the source of the error acted objectively
reasonably is part of that burden.  (See Turnage, supra, 642 N.E.2d at p. 1241
[state failed to satisfy its burden where it relied only on arresting officer’s good
faith and offered no evidence that those who sought invalid warrant or signaled its
vitality acted objectively reasonably]; cf. Commonwealth v. Hecox (Mass.App.Ct.
1993) 619 N.E.2d 339, 341-344 (Hecox) [government failed to satisfy its burden
where it offered no evidence that police were not at fault in failing to correct their
records]; Ott v. State (Md. 1992) 600 A.2d 111, 119 & fn. 5 [government failed to
satisfy its burden where it offered no evidence of the length of time reasonably
necessary to update information in sheriff’s computer, which depends in part on
who had responsibility for keeping information current].)
The Attorney General errs in asserting that in Leon, Krull, and Evans, the
high court “repeatedly hinted that it is the defendant who bears the burden of
production” regarding the source of the error and his or her duties.  The discussion
the Attorney General cites from those cases relates not to whether a defendant has
offered evidence to identify the source of the error, but to whether the record
contains evidence that the identified source of the error is inclined to subvert or
ignore the Fourth Amendment.  (Evans, supra, 514 U.S. at pp. 14-15 [defendant
“offers no evidence that court employees are [so] inclined”]; Krull, supra, 480
U.S. at p. 351 [“There is no evidence suggesting,” and “we are given no basis for
believing that legislators are [so] inclined”]; Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 916
[“there exists no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are [so]
inclined”].)  Moreover, in establishing the good faith exception, the high court
stated in Leon that “[w]hen officers have acted pursuant to a warrant, the
prosecution should ordinarily be able to establish objective good faith without a
substantial expenditure of judicial time.”  (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 924, italics
added.)  Numerous courts, including this one, have cited this statement from Leon
17
in holding that the government has the burden to prove facts warranting
application of the good faith exception.  (Camarella, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 596;
U.S. v. Corral-Corral (10th Cir. 1990) 899 F.2d 927, 932; U.S. v. Maggitt (5th Cir.
1985) 778 F.2d 1029, 1034; U.S. v. Conner (N.D. Iowa 1996) 948 F.Supp. 821,
852; U.S. v. Turner (D.Vt. 1989) 713 F.Supp. 714, 721, fn. 6; Hoay v. State
(Ark.Ct.App. 2001) 55 S.W.3d 782, 785; Turnage, supra, 642 N.E.2d at p. 1241.)
Our conclusion regarding the burden of proof is also consistent with the
high court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.  There, the court
held in part that if a person indicates before or during a custodial interrogation that
he or she wants to consult with an attorney before speaking to police, then “the
interrogation must cease.”  (Id. at p. 474; see id. at pp. 444-445, 473-474.)  The
court also held that “[i]f the interrogation continues without the presence of an
attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.
[Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 475.)  The court explained that this burden “is rightly on
[the] shoulders” of the government because it “is responsible for establishing the
isolated circumstances under which the interrogation takes place and has the only
means of making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during
incommunicado interrogation . . . .”  (Ibid.; see also Brown v. Illinois (1975) 422
U.S. 590, 604 [prosecution bears “burden of showing” that evidence is not the fruit
of illegal arrest or search and is therefore admissible].)  Similarly, in this case,
because the government is responsible for establishing the circumstances under
which the error and the warrantless search occurred and is in a much better
position to obtain evidence regarding those circumstances, the burden rightly falls
on its shoulders.  (Cf. State v. Mance (Wash.Ct.App. 1996) 918 P.2d 527, 530
[state has “burden of proving” that police’s delay in failing to correct their records
“was reasonable,” because the relevant facts are peculiarly within their knowledge
and control].)  We therefore disagree with the Attorney General’s assertion that
18
defendant bore the burden of producing evidence to identify the source of the error
and his or her duties.  The prosecution bore the burden of proof on this point, and
it failed to sustain that burden.  (Cf. United States v. Hoffman (9th Cir. 1979) 607
F.2d 280, 284 [government does not satisfy its burden of justifying warrantless
search “by leading a court to speculate about what ‘may’ or ‘might’ have been the
circumstances surrounding the warrantless search”].)
In any event, we conclude that the exclusionary rule applies in this case
whether the source of the error was Mora, as the Attorney General contended in
the Court of Appeal, or a CDC data entry clerk, as the Attorney General now
speculates.  As to Mora, we begin, as Leon, Krull, and Evans direct, by
considering exclusion’s potential effect on the behavior of parole agents.
According to the high court, the “most important” question is whether there is a
basis to believe that exclusion under the circumstances here will have a significant
effect on parole agents.  (Evans, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 15; Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at
p. 916.)  Under the high court’s analysis, a key consideration in answering this
question is whether parole agents are “adjuncts to the law enforcement team.”
(Evans, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 15; Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 350-351; Leon,
supra, 468 U.S. at p. 916.)
On the record here, we agree with the Court of Appeal that Mora was, in
fact, an adjunct to the law enforcement team.  Like the Court of Appeal, we first
find it significant that Mora, as a CDC parole officer, is “a peace officer[]” under
California law.  (§ 830.5.)  Her authority as a peace officer extends to “the
rendering of mutual aid to any other law enforcement agency.”  (§ 830.5, subd.
(a)(5).)  Thus, she often works hand in hand with police, as she did in this case.
Her authority also “extend[s]” to parole conditions and transportation of any state
parolee, escapes by any state inmates or wards, and “violations of any penal
provisions of law which are discovered while performing” her “usual or
authorized duties.”  (§ 830.5, subd. (a)(4).)  She may “carry firearms” under
specified terms and conditions (§ 830.5), and may make arrests with or (under
19
specified circumstances) without a warrant (§ 836).  Under section 3067, a
California parolee must agree “to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer
or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search
warrant and with or without cause.”  (§ 3067, subd. (a); see also Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 15, § 2511, subd. (b).)  According to the relevant legislative history, the
Legislature passed section 3067 “to provide for search of parolees by law
enforcement officers without cause” and to “give . . . local law enforcement
officers the tools they need to adequately supervise . . . parolees.”5  (Sen. Com. on
Crim. Proc., Report on Assem. Bill No. 2284 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) June 25,
1996, p. 4, italics added.)  Under state regulation, Mora must “seize[]” any
“contraband or evidence of illegal activity” she discovers while “conducting”
these searches and, under specified circumstances, may “delegate[]” her “authority
to search or arrest a parolee . . . to another law enforcement agency.”  (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 15, § 3701.1, subds. (a), (d).)  Before exercising her authority, she was
required to “satisfactorily complete an introductory course of training prescribed
by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training.”  (§ 832.)  Finally,
“while engaged in the performance of [her] duties . . . and for the purpose of
carrying out the primary function of [her] employment,” Mora’s authority as a
peace officer “extends to any place in the state.”  (§ 830.5.)  While transporting
prisoners or apprehending escaped prisoners, she is a “peace officer” even when
acting outside of California.  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3291, subd. (c).)
Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have looked to these
provisions in considering the nature of California parole officers.  Citing section
830.5, we have explained that a parole officer’s “status . . . as a peace officer” is
                                                
5 
Section 3067 was enacted in August 1996.  However, parole agreements
have included equivalent search conditions since well before the search of the
defendant’s room in March 1996.  (See, e.g., People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d
505, 528, fn. 10 [similar search condition in 1980 parole agreement].)
20
one of the “sources” of a parole officer’s “authority to restrain [a] parolee.”  (In re
Law (1973) 10 Cal.3d 21, 24, fn. 2.)  We have also explained that the “purpose” of
section 830.5 is “to authorize the named persons to exercise the statutory powers
of a peace officer.”  (Dyas v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 628, 635-636, fn.
3.)  In Cabell v. Chavez-Salido (1982) 454 U.S. 432, the high court reviewed some
of these California statutes and found that “the unifying character of all categories
of peace officers,” including “parole . . . officers” under section 830.5,  “is their
law enforcement function.”  The court also reasoned that “[t]he general law
enforcement character of all California ‘peace officers’ is underscored by the fact
that all have the power to make arrests, § 836, and all receive a course of training
in the exercise of their respective arrest powers and in the use of firearms. § 832.”
(Cabell, supra, 454 U.S. at pp. 443-444.)  Thus, based on California statutes, the
high court concluded that persons classified under California law as peace officers,
including parole agents, serve a “law enforcement function” and have a “general
law enforcement character.”  (Ibid.)
Like the Court of Appeal, we also find it significant that Mora took an
active role in the search in this case.  As we have explained, Mullins did not make
the decision to search; Mora authorized the search and directed Mullins to carry it
out after he presented her with the parole list and the information he had received.
Mora then went to defendant’s motel room with police to conduct a search for
evidence of narcotics activity.  She and the police officers were acting with a unity
of purpose:  investigating crime.  Thus, as relevant to applying the exclusionary
rule, Mora bears little resemblance to the neutral and detached judicial officers and
court clerks in Leon and Evans.  Nor does she resemble the legislators in Krull,
who, the high court found, do not act “for the purpose of procuring evidence in
particular criminal investigations.”  (Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 352.)  Unlike
those actors, Mora is an adjunct to the law enforcement team when she, as a peace
officer under California law, conducts or participates in a search, and the threat of
exclusion can be expected to alter her behavior.  (Cf. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at pp.
21
914, 923 [good faith exception does not apply where “the issuing magistrate
wholly abandon[s] his judicial role” and becomes “ ‘adjunct law enforcement
officer’ ” by acting as a member of search party that is essentially a police
operation].)
The Attorney General asserts that this conclusion is inconsistent with the
high court’s decision in Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott (1998)
524 U.S. 357 (Scott).  There, the court held that the exclusionary rule does not
apply in parole revocation hearings where police officers or parole officers
conduct an illegal search.  (Id. at pp. 362-369.)  Specifically, the Attorney General
quotes the following passage in the court’s opinion:  “Parole agents, in contrast to
police officers, are not ‘engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime,’ [citation]; instead, their primary concern is whether their parolees should
remain free on parole.  Thus, their relationship with parolees is more supervisory
than adversarial.  [Citation.]  It is thus ‘unfair to assume that the parole officer
bears hostility against the parolee that destroys his neutrality; realistically the
failure of the parolee is in a sense a failure for his supervising officer.’
[Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 368.)
Unlike the Attorney General, we find that Scott supports our conclusion.
Immediately after the passage the Attorney General quotes, the high court
observed that “in some instances parole officers may act like police officers and
seek to uncover evidence of illegal activity . . . .”  (Scott, supra, 524 U.S. at p.
369.)  As we have explained, the record shows that Mora acted here in precisely
that capacity.  The high court then stated in Scott that when parole officers “act
like police officers and seek to uncover evidence of illegal activity, they (like
police officers) are undoubtedly aware that any unconstitutionally seized evidence
that could lead to an indictment could be suppressed in a criminal trial.”  (Scott,
supra, 524 U.S. at p. 369, italics added.)  Accordingly, the court continued, any
evidence the parole officers in Scott uncovered during an illegal search “could
have been inadmissible at trial if [the defendant] had been criminally prosecuted.”
22
(Ibid., italics added.)  This statement necessarily implies the court’s conclusion
that as to parole agents who conduct searches, exclusion in a criminal trial would
alter their behavior—i.e., deter them—enough to justify applying the exclusionary
rule in a criminal trial; otherwise, under Leon, Evans, and Krull, which predated
Scott, exclusion would be improper even in a criminal trial.  Thus, Scott directly
supports the conclusion that if Mora made the error that led to the illegal search of
defendant’s motel room, the exclusionary rule applies in this criminal proceeding.
Indeed, our research indicates that both before and after Evans, courts have
uniformly held that the exclusionary rule applies in a criminal proceeding where a
parole officer obtains evidence during an unconstitutional search.  For example,
the federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently applied the exclusionary rule
where parole officers, assisted by police whom the parole officers had invited
along, conducted an unconstitutional search.  (U.S. v. Payne (6th Cir. 1999) 181
F.3d 781, 784 (Payne).)  Regarding the exclusionary rule’s deterrence objective,
the court explained that the “zone of interest” of the parole officers who
“primarily” conducted the search was “distinct from, but overlap[ped] with, an
interest in enforcing the drug laws.  Although the parole officer is interested in the
parolee’s rehabilitation, the officer is also charged with monitoring compliance
with various restrictions, including restrictions on the use of drugs.  As in this
case, parole officers often work closely with the police.  Exempting evidence
illegally obtained by a parole officer from the exclusionary rule would greatly
increase the temptation to use the parole officer’s broad authority to circumvent
the Fourth Amendment.”  (Id. at p. 788.)  Both this court and others have similarly
applied the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings where a parole officer
conducts an unconstitutional search.  (People v. Superior Court (Stevens) (1974)
12 Cal.3d 858, 860-861; Commonwealth v. Gayle (Pa. 1996) 673 A.2d 927, 929-
932; State ex rel. Corgan v. King (Okla.Crim.App. 1994) 868 P.2d 743, 747-748;
Commonwealth v. Elliott (Ky.Ct.App. 1986) 714 S.W.2d 494; People v.
Candelaria (N.Y.App.Div. 1978) 406 N.Y.S.2d 783, 786.)  We have not found,
23
and the Attorney General has not cited, a single case holding to the contrary.
Thus, exclusion is required here if we focus on Mora as the source of the error, as
the Attorney General did in his briefing in the Court of Appeal.
The discussion in Payne suggests another distinction between this case and
Leon, Evans, and Krull, in terms of the deterrent effect of applying the
exclusionary rule.  In Leon and Evans, the court reasoned that exclusion for errors
by judges, magistrates, and court clerks cannot be expected to alter the behavior of
police officers, who are in no position to question court directives.  (Evans, supra,
514 U.S. at pp. 15-16; Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 920-921.)  As Leon more fully
explains, an officer ordinarily “cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s
probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is
technically sufficient.  ‘[O]nce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more
the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law.’  [Citation.]  Penalizing
the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically
contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.”  (Leon, supra, 468
U.S. at p. 921.)  In Krull, the court similarly reasoned that because arresting
officers “cannot be expected to question the judgment of [a] legislature that
passe[s] [a] law” authorizing warrantless searches, exclusion where an officer
relies on such a statute cannot be expected to alter the officer’s behavior.  (Krull,
supra, 480 U.S. at p. 350.)
By contrast, in this case, Mullins could have done more than simply rely on
Mora’s review of the parole list.  As the high court has explained, the Fourth
Amendment “was in large part a reaction to the general warrants and warrantless
searches that had so alienated the colonists and had helped speed the movement
for independence.”  (Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 761.)  Thus, a
warrantless entry of the home is the “ ‘chief evil’ ” to which the Fourth
Amendment is directed.  (Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 748.)
Nevertheless, Mora, who may not have even been defendant’s parole agent (see
fn. 4, ante), apparently did nothing more than look at the parole list and confirm
24
that it said what Mullins already knew it said:  that defendant was on parole.
Essentially, Mora “ ‘serve[d] merely as a rubber stamp’ ” for Mullins.  (Leon,
supra, 468 U.S. at p. 914.)  Although Mullins and Mora were not in the field
dealing with an unfolding situation when Mullins first received the information
about defendant and consulted Mora, neither made any further attempt to verify
the information on the parole list—by, for example, reviewing defendant’s case
file or checking the CDC’s Sacramento records—before going to the motel and
entering defendant’s room to conduct a search knowing they had no warrant.
Thus, exclusion here is more likely to alter police behavior than it was in the high
court cases.6  As Leon explained, “ ‘refusing to admit evidence gained’ ” from
“ ‘negligent[] conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right’ ” will
“ ‘hope[fully] instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future
counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused.’ ”  (Id. at p.
919; see also Evans, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 17 (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.) [police
must “have acted reasonably in their reliance on the recordkeeping system
itself”].)  On the other hand, as the Sixth Circuit reasoned in Payne, declining to
apply the exclusionary rule “would greatly increase the temptation to use the
parole officer’s broad authority to circumvent the Fourth Amendment.” 7  (Payne,
supra, 181 F.3d at p. 788.)
                                                
6 
As we later more fully explain, since 1997, the Legislature has required the
CDC to provide local law enforcement agencies with direct and continuous access
to specified CDC parole information, including date of discharge, through
computer link.  (See § 3003, subd. (e).)
7 
We also note that in Evans, the record contained evidence that the type of
error involved there “occurred ‘on[c]e every three or four years,’ ” and that “once
the court clerks discovered the error, they immediately corrected it [citation], and
then proceeded to search their files to make sure that no similar mistakes had
occurred [citation].”  (Evans, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 15.)  The record here contains
no evidence regarding these matters.  (Cf. id. at p. 17 (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.)
[“it would not be reasonable for the police to rely . . . on a recordkeeping system,
their own or some other agency’s, that has no mechanism to ensure its accuracy
(footnote continued on next page)
25
Our conclusion regarding the exclusionary rule’s applicability in this case is
the same even if we assume, as the Attorney General now speculates, that the error
was the fault of a CDC data entry clerk responsible for maintaining and updating
the parole list.  Again, the most important consideration is whether there is a basis
to believe that exclusion under these circumstances will have a significant effect
on such clerks, which turns in part on whether they are adjuncts to the law
enforcement team.  As a matter of logic, CDC clerks responsible for preparing or
updating the parole list are adjuncts to the law enforcement.  As we have
explained, in California, all parolees are subject by law to warrantless search by
parole officers.  (§ 3067; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2511, subd. (b).)  As we have
also explained, in carrying out such searches, parole officers from the CDC are
exercising a law enforcement function and are part of the law enforcement team.
Logically, then, employees of the same department who support parole officers in
carrying out this law enforcement function—by preparing and maintaining parole
lists indicating who is on active parole and subject to warrantless search—must be
considered to be adjuncts to the law enforcement team.
Moreover, by statute, CDC employees responsible for parole records play a
similar role in supporting the work of other California law enforcement officers—
including police—who are also authorized by law (§ 3067) to conduct warrantless
searches of parolees.  Since 1981, section 3058.5 has required the CDC to provide
information about parolees to city police chiefs and county sheriffs on request.
(See Stats. 1981, ch. 1111, § 5, p. 4340.)  By 1986, the CDC was reporting that
law enforcement agencies in most cities and in all counties were routinely
requesting and receiving information under this statute.  (Assem. Com. on Public
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from previous page)
over time and that routinely leads to false arrests, even years after probable cause
for any such arrest has ceased to exist (if it ever existed)”].)
26
Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3110 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) April 14, 1986, p. 2;
Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3110 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) p.
3.)
In 1997, the Legislature enacted section 3003, which greatly expanded the
CDC’s duty to provide parole information to police and other law enforcement
agencies.  (See § 3003, subd. (e); Stats. 1997, ch. 680, § 2.)  That statute directs
the CDC to “release[] . . . to local law enforcement agencies” available
information, including date of parole and discharge, “regarding a paroled inmate
who is released in their jurisdictions.”  (§ 3003, subd. (e)(1); Stats. 1997, ch. 680,
§ 2.)  It also specifies that the released information “shall come from the statewide
parolee data base,” “shall be provided utilizing a computer-to-computer transfer in
a format usable by a desktop computer system,” and “shall be continually
available to local law enforcement agencies upon request.”  (§ 3003, subd. (e)(2),
(3); Stats. 1997, ch. 680, § 2.)  The statute also provides that the CDC “shall be . . .
primarily responsible for, and shall have control over, the program, resources, and
staff implementing” the required computer transfer system, which is known as
“the Law Enforcement Automated Data System (LEADS).”  (§ 3003, subd. (k);
Stats. 1997, ch. 680, § 2.)  In an uncodified section of the 1997 legislation that
enacted these requirements, the Legislature declared its “intent . . . to establish a
statewide Law Enforcement Automated Data System (LEADS) to provide up-to-
date information regarding parolees to local law enforcement agencies . . . .”
(Stats. 1997, ch. 680, § 1.)
The Legislature passed section 3003 as the culmination of a pilot project for
computer transfer of parole information from the CDC to local law enforcement
agencies in San Bernardino County.  (See Stats. 1997, ch. 680, § 1; Stats. 1994,
ch. 904, § 1, p. 4552; Stats. 1993-1994, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 56, §§ 1, 3, pp. 8787,
8791.)  In 1995, when the Legislature considered expanding the project, it was told
that the information the CDC was providing through the computer link was
proving to be a valuable and useful law enforcement tool for investigating and
27
fighting crime.  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading
analysis of Assem. Bill No. 752 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 12,
1995; Sen. Com on Crim. Proc., Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 752 (1995-1996 Reg.
Sess.) July 11, 1995, p. 4; Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No.
752 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) April 4, 1995, pp. 1-2.)  Two years later, when the
project was made statewide, the CDC told the Legislature, among other things,
that LEADS is “valuable to detectives” because it “allows [them] to search parolee
information if a parolee is a prime target in criminal investigations, as they
historically have been.”  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Report on Assem. Bill No.
1275 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) July 12, 1997, p. 5.)  The Legislature was also told
that LEADS “enhances law enforcement’s ability to carry out the mandate of . . .
earlier legislation [giving] priority to the safety of the community . . . .”  (Id. at pp.
3-4.)
In passing these statutes, the Legislature has thus made clear its view that
CDC employees who provide police with parole information are integral parts of
the law enforcement team, and it has acted to recognize, formalize, and facilitate
that relationship.  These considerations reinforce our conclusion that CDC
employees who prepare and maintain parole lists intended for distribution to
police and other law enforcement officers—which indicate who is on parole and
who may be searched without a warrant—are adjuncts to the law enforcement
team and that exclusion’s deterrent effect is sufficient to justify applying the
exclusionary rule.
Our conclusion is also supported by our decision in People v. Ramirez
(1983) 34 Cal.3d 541 (Ramirez).  There, we found the exclusionary rule applicable
where a police officer arrested and searched the defendant based on a check with
“the police computer system” that showed an outstanding arrest warrant, and an
inquiry after the search showed that the warrant “had been recalled some six
months earlier . . . .”  (Id. at pp. 543-544.)  In reaching this conclusion, we
“reject[ed] the People’s argument that [the arresting officer’s] good faith reliance
28
on information communicated to him through ‘official channels’ should validate
the arrest and search.”  (Id. at p. 544.)  After reviewing numerous federal and state
authorities, we concluded:  “[L]aw enforcement officials are collectively
responsible for keeping [“ ‘official’ ”] channels free of outdated, incomplete, and
inaccurate warrant information.  That the police now rely on elaborate
computerized data processing systems to catalogue and dispatch incriminating
information enhances rather than diminishes that responsibility.  [¶]  . . . [Thus],
[t]he test, under these circumstances, is not merely the good faith of the individual
officer in the field, but the good faith of law enforcement agencies of which he is a
part.”  (Id. at p. 552.)  When “ ‘the police . . . are at fault in permitting the records
to remain uncorrected,’ ” they “ ‘may not rely upon incorrect or incomplete
information . . . .’ [Citation.]”  (Id. at pp. 545-546.)  We then found that exclusion
was required because the arrest that led to the search was “made on the basis of
data [that] a law enforcement agency knew or should have known were in error
because of inadequate or negligent record-keeping.”  (Id. at p. 552.)
Ramirez fully supports application of the exclusionary rule in the case now
before us.  Under Ramirez, if, as the Attorney General contends, a CDC employee
other than Mora—either a parole officer or a clerk—was responsible for the error
here, then defendant’s parole discharge nine months before the search was within
the CDC’s collective knowledge, and we cannot conclude that Mora acted in
objective good faith in authorizing and conducting the warrantless search of
defendant’s motel room.  Similarly, because, as we have found on the record here,
the relevant CDC employees were adjuncts to the law enforcement team, we
cannot conclude that the police officers acted in objective good faith in assisting
Mora in that warrantless search.
The Attorney General argues that “subsequent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court have seriously undermined [Ramirez’s] validity.”  Noting
that Evans “placed great weight on the actual source of the error,” he asserts that
Ramirez “is suspect” because it did not focus on this question and did not consider
29
who was responsible for updating the records or notifying the police about recalled
warrants; instead, it “simply assumed,” without “articulat[ing] any [supporting]
facts or evidence,” that the police alone were responsible for the error.  “Indeed,”
the Attorney General speculates, “since” Ramirez involved “a recalled bench
warrant,” “there exists at least the possibility that court personnel may have played
some role contributing to the inaccuracy of the police database.”  The Attorney
General also asserts that under Evans, “police reliance upon erroneous information
may establish a Fourth Amendment violation,” but “does not require strict
application of the exclusionary rule,” and that Ramirez is “flaw[ed]” in that “it
failed to appreciate this admittedly fine distinction.”
Unlike the Attorney General, we find nothing in Evans or in any other high
court decision that undermines Ramirez’s application in the case now before us.
As the Attorney General correctly suggests, Ramirez would be inconsistent with
Evans if Ramirez held that exclusion is required where a judge or a court
employee commits an error.  However, there is no basis for the Attorney General’s
speculation that Ramirez involved such an error, and our opinion there indicates
otherwise.  Analytically, we concluded in Ramirez that in determining an arrest’s
validity, we must “examine[] the relationship between the conduct of the arresting
officer and the underlying source of the probable cause determination.”  (Ramirez,
supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 551.)  We therefore disapproved a California Court of
Appeal decision to the extent it “assert[ed] that courts must look only to the
perceptions of the officer in the field, rather than trace his [or her] probable cause
determination to its source in the law enforcement system . . . .”  (Ramirez, supra,
34 Cal.3d at p. 550.)  We also concluded that the governing test required inquiry
into “the good faith of law enforcement agencies of which [the arresting officer] is
a part.”  (Id. at p. 552.)  Given this analytical framework, we undoubtedly would
have noted that a judge or court employee, rather than a law enforcement agency,
made the error had the record contained any evidence to support that conclusion.
Instead, we first specifically noted that the error appeared in “the police computer
30
system.”  (Id. at p. 543.)  We then applied the exclusionary rule notwithstanding
the good faith of the arresting officer, because he acted on data “a law
enforcement agency knew or should have known were in error because of
inadequate or negligent record-keeping.”  (Id. at p. 552.)  We also explained that
the defendant’s arrest was invalid because “ ‘the police may not rely upon
incorrect or incomplete information when they are at fault in permitting the
records to remain uncorrected.’  [Citation.]”  (Id. at pp. 545-546.)  Thus, the
Attorney General’s speculation about the source of the error in Ramirez is
groundless.
In any eve nt, even were the Attorney General correct that we merely
assumed in Ramirez the police caused the error, the principles we applied there
based on that understanding are fully consistent with Leon, Krull and Evans.  As
we have explained, those cases teach that for purposes of the exclusionary rule, we
must distinguish between errors of law enforcement and those of judges, court
employees, and legislators.  In Ramirez, we drew precisely this distinction in
rejecting the People’s reliance on Michigan v. DeFillippo (1979) 443 U.S. 31, 37-
38, which affirmed the validity of an arrest under an ordinance later declared
unconstitutional.  We found DeFillippo “distinguishable,” explaining that an arrest
for violating an ordinance later found unconstitutional is “fundamentally different
from” an arrest “made in reliance on the erroneous police communication that a
warrant [is] outstanding.”  (See Ramirez, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 546.)  In the
former case, we reasoned, there is “no police misconduct to deter,” because the
officer has a duty to enforce the ordinance until it is stricken.  (Ibid., italics added.)
Thus, we explained, “penalizing the police for legislative errors” would not
“advance[]” the exclusionary rule’s goal of deterring “law enforcement
misconduct.  [Citation.]”  (Ibid.)
The high court cases also teach that “the standard of reasonableness” for
determining an officer’s good faith “is an objective one” —whether “ ‘the law
enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge,
31
that the search was unconstitutional.’ ”  (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 919 & fn. 20;
see also Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 348-349.)  Leon further explains that in
determining whether this standard was met, “[i]t is necessary to consider the
objective reasonableness, not only of the officers who eventually executed a
warrant, but also of the officers who originally obtained it or who provided
information material to the probable-cause determination.”  (Leon, supra, 468 U.S.
at p. 923, fn. 24.)  For example, the court cautioned, “[n]othing” in Leon
“suggests” that an officer may use “a ‘bare bones’ affidavit” to obtain a warrant
“and then rely on colleagues who are ignorant of the circumstances under which
the warrant was obtained to conduct the search.  [Citation.]”  (Ibid.)  Again,
Ramirez is in accord, reasoning:  “[A]n officer in the field may rely on information
communicated to him by fellow officers to establish probable cause to arrest.
[Citation.]  However, if we impute to the arresting officer the collective
knowledge of law enforcement agencies for the purpose of establishing probable
cause, we must also charge him with knowledge of information exonerating a
suspect formerly wanted in connection with a crime.”  (Ramirez, supra, 34 Cal.3d
at p. 547.)
Finally, Leon teaches that the exclusionary rule should not be applied where
exclusion cannot be expected to serve “as an incentive for the law enforcement
profession as a whole to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth
Amendment.’  [Citations.]”  (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 919, fn. 20, italics
added.)  Again, Ramirez is consistent; we there concluded that if police are
collectively at fault for an inaccurate record that results in an unconstitutional
search, then exclusion “is consistent with the deterrence goal of the exclusionary
rule.”  (Ramirez, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 547.)  “[F]ocus[ing] not on the actions of
the arresting officer but on the conduct of law enforcement generally,” we
explained that “[s]uppressing the fruits of an arrest made on a recalled warrant will
deter further misuse of the computerized criminal information systems and foster
32
more diligent maintenance of accurate and current records.”  (Ibid.)  Thus, we
disagree with the Attorney General that the high court cases undermine Ramirez.
Contrary to the Attorney General’s suggestion, the California appellate
decisions he discusses are consistent with our conclusion.  All of them recognize
that notwithstanding the high court cases, Ramirez remains good law insofar as it
holds that the good faith exception does not apply where law enforcement is
collectively at fault for an inaccurate record that results in an unconstitutional
search.  (See In re Arron C. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1369, 1372 [citing
Ramirez in reaffirming that the exclusionary rule applies “where a police officer
conducts a search on the basis of faulty information from police sources,” and
stating that a juvenile probation officer is an adjunct to the law enforcement team
where he “becomes enmeshed in law enforcement activities” by “actively
participat[ing] in a search”]; People v. Downing (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1641,
1654, fn. 19 [Ramirez is “still precedential and not conflicting with Leon”];
Miranda v. Superior Court (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1628, 1636 [Ramirez was not
“eroded” by Leon and “remains precedential” after Leon and Krull where “error
[is] generated by the police department itself”]; People v. Howard (1985) 162
Cal.App.3d 8, 20 [same result required by Ramirez and by Leon, which
“recogniz[ed] . . . the ‘collective knowledge of law enforcement’ rationale”].) 8
Our conclusion is also in accord with numerous decisions from other
jurisdictions holding that Ramirez’s collective knowledge principle is fully
consistent with both the exclusionary rule’s deterrence objective and the high
court’s decisions on the good faith exception.  In State v. White (Fla. 1995) 660
                                                
8 
We express no opinion regarding the specific application of Ramirez or the
specific holding in any of these cases, because it is unnecessary to do so here.  We
similarly express no opinion about the conclusion reached in any of the decisions
we discuss that involved facts different from the facts before us.  We consider
those decisions only as they are relevant to our analytical approach here.
33
So.2d 664, 667-668, the Florida Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule
where the police’s failure to update their records led to the defendant’s arrest on a
warrant that had already been served.  The court held that the good faith exception
was “inapplicable” under these circumstances because “it was within the collective
knowledge of the sheriff’s office that the warrant was void” and “the arresting
officers are charged with knowledge that they had no authority to arrest the
defendant.” (Id. at p. 668.)  The court reasoned:  “This type of police negligence
fits squarely within the class of governmental action that the exclusionary rule was
designed to deter . . . .  Suppression of evidence seized pursuant to police
computer errors will encourage law enforcement agencies to diligently maintain
accurate and current computer records.”  (Id. at p. 667, fn. omitted.)
In State v. Gough (Ohio Ct.App. 1986) 519 N.E.2d 842, 846, an Ohio
appellate court found the good faith exception inapplicable where police executed
an arrest warrant issued on the basis of information that was incorrect due to
“negligence, inaccuracies, or inadequacies in record-keeping procedure” by “law
enforcement personnel at [a] jail.”  The court explained that in Leon, the high
court recognized and affirmed the collective knowledge principle Ramirez applied.
(Id. at p. 845.)  The court also explained that where that principle applies, “there is
police conduct to deter.”  (Ibid.)  Finally, the court reasoned that failure to apply
the exclusionary rule “would . . . encourage careless, perhaps deliberately
neglectful, record keeping.”  (Id. at p. 846.)
In State v. Mayorga (Tex.App. 1996) 938 S.W.2d 81, 83, a Texas Court of
Appeals considered how the collective knowledge principle would apply where a
police officer arrested the defendant based on incorrect radio information from a
police dispatcher that there were outstanding arrest warrants for the defendant.
After reviewing Evans, the court concluded that “the Leon analytical framework
does not support a categorical exception to the federal exclusionary rule for
mistakes made by police dispatchers.  Unlike court clerks or judges, police
dispatchers are in continuous radio contact with the officers on duty.  They are
34
adjuncts to the law enforcement team with a stake in the outcome of criminal
prosecution.  They directly provide the warrant information upon which an officer
in the field depends to make an arrest; their misconduct or carelessness can be
significantly affected by the threat of exclusion.  Because we recognize the
exclusionary rule as an important tool to help prevent impingement on Fourth
Amendment rights, we decline to create another exception to the rule for errors
caused by police personnel.”  (Mayorga, at pp. 83-84.)
Finally, in Turnage, the Illinois Supreme Court found the good faith
exception inapplicable despite the subjective good faith of the officer who arrested
the defendant on a duplicative and invalid warrant.  (Turnage, supra, 642 N.E.2d
at p. 1241.)  The court explained that “[t]he appropriate focus” under Leon “is not
on the conduct of the arresting officer, but on the conduct of those who obtained
the warrant and informed the arresting officer of its continued vitality.”  (Ibid.)
The court further explained that the invalid warrant had been procured by “the
State’s Attorney,” who is a “member[] of the law enforcement team . . . .”  (Id. at
p. 1240.)  The court then found the good faith exception inapplicable because the
government offered no evidence to show that “the State’s Attorney who sought
issuance of the warrant or the sheriff’s department that signaled its vitality
harbored an objectively reasonable belief that the warrant was valid.”  (Id. at p.
1241.)  The court reasoned that suppression on these facts “would further the
deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule.  Specifically, exclusion of evidence
where the State’s Attorney or the sheriff’s department may be charged with
knowledge of the repetitive nature of a warrant will deter fishing expeditions and
provide an incentive to  keep accurate records.”  (Id. at p. 1241.)  These cases all
support the continued viability of Ramirez’s collective knowledge analysis.  (See
also Hecox, supra, 619 N.E.2d at p. 342 [“[m]ost courts” hold that the good faith
exception “does not apply” where incorrect information leading to invalid arrest is
due to police error, in which case “there is police misconduct to deter”].)
35
In summary, for the reasons discussed, we agree with the Court of Appeal
that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply in this case.9
In her concurring opinion, Justice Brown argues we should reach this
conclusion on the ground that once defendant stated he was not on parole and
offered what he claimed was a discharge certificate, the officers could not have
had an objectively reasonable belief their conduct was lawful.  For several reasons,
we disagree.  Neither the Court of Appeal in its opinion, nor the parties in their
petitions for review or briefs, addressed this theory, which, no less than our
analysis, would establish a constitutional principle.  By contrast, the Court of
Appeal decided, and the parties have fully briefed and argued, the issue we have
addressed.  Moreover, Justice Brown’s theory is questionable under decisions of
both this court and the United States Supreme Court.  (See Hill v. California
(1971) 401 U.S. 797, 799-805 [because false identifications are not uncommon,
police had a reasonable, good faith belief that arrestee was the person they wanted,
notwithstanding his claim he was someone else and his proffered identification];
Michel v. Smith (1922) 188 Cal. 199, 208 [police need not “accept the word of
persons about to be arrested,” because such persons “make whatever statements
. . . best serve[] [their] purpose in escaping arrest”].)  Justice Brown cites no case
ordering suppression on similar facts or using a similar theory.10
                                                
9 
Given our conclusion, we need not, and do not, consider defendant’s
argument that Leon’s good faith exception applies to an invalid warrantless search
only if the error that led to the search is attributable solely to a court employee or
the Legislature.
10 
Nor does Justice Brown explain how our analysis is “ ‘oblivious or hostile
to . . . common sense’ ” (conc. opn. of Brown, J., post, at p. 5), in requiring
suppression where police and parole officers conducted a warrantless search of
someone who, nine months before the search, was discharged from parole and
“regain[ed] full Fourth Amendment protection.”  (Conc. opn. of Brown, J., post, at
p. 3.)
36
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the matter is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
MORENO, J.
MOORE, J.*
                                                
* 
Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division 3,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.
1
CONCURRING OPINION BY BROWN, J.
In my view, once defendant informed the officers he was no longer on
parole and displayed his certificate of discharge, they could not have had an
“objectively reasonable belief” that their conduct was lawful.  (United States v.
Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 918 (Leon); see Illinois v. Krull (1987) 480 U.S. 340,
349.)  In the absence of objective reasonableness, the prosecution cannot rely on
the Leon good faith exception to avoid imposition of an exclusionary remedy for
an illegal search.  It is therefore unnecessary to make any generalized
pronouncements as to the circumstances in which parole officers or California
Department of Corrections (CDC) clerks might be “adjuncts to the law
enforcement team” (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 917), thereby precluding
application of Leon’s good faith rationale.
In Leon, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that one predicate of
any good faith exception is the objective reasonableness of the officer’s conduct.
(See Leon, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 919, fn. 20.)  “[R]eliance on the magistrate’s
probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he
issues must be objectively reasonable, [citation] and it is clear that in some
circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the
warrant was properly issued.”  (Id. at pp. 922-923, fns. omitted.)  “Accordingly,
our good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question
whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was
2
illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.  In making this determination, all of
the circumstances . . . may be considered.”  (Id. at p. 922, fn. 23.)
In the present context, this standard of reasonableness requires the officer to
have a firm basis for believing the defendant is on parole and subject to a search
condition.  For example, in People v. Tellez (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 876, 880, the
evidence was “uncontradicted that the officers were informed by appellant’s
parole officer and appellant, that he was in fact on parole [with a search
condition].  Their reliance on this information was reasonable and they acted
thereon in good faith.”  Therefore, the court refused to suppress evidence
recovered in a subsequent search even though the appellant’s parole status had
terminated several months earlier.  (Ibid.; see People v. Washington (1982) 131
Cal.App.3d 434, 439; cf. Hill v. California (1971) 401 U.S. 797, 804 [arrest and
search incident thereto upheld even though officers arrested wrong individual
because “the officers’ mistake was understandable and the arrest a reasonable
response to the situation facing them at the time”].)
In this case, the officers relied entirely on the “parole listing” provided by
the CDC, which they made no attempt to verify through some primary source.
(Cf. Hill v. California, supra, 401 U.S. at pp. 802-803.)  Although they contacted
Officer Mora, she apparently was not defendant’s parole officer and acted as no
more than a “ ‘rubber stamp’ ” (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 914), merely
confirming what little secondary information the officers already knew.
Moreover, when they attempted to execute the search, defendant verbally
challenged their authority to proceed without a warrant and in support of his
assertions presented his certificate of discharge from the CDC, a document the
3
officers had no reason to think was falsified.1  (Cf. Hill v. California, supra, 401
U.S. at p. 803 & fn. 7.)  Mora had no definitive response to defendant’s claim and
apparently did not examine the certificate.
Given “all of the circumstances” (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 922, fn. 23),
no “reasonably well trained officer” (ibid.) would have proceeded without first
confirming defendant’s parole status, either prior to embarking for the motel or, at
the latest, when informed of defendant’s discharge.  While defendant may not
have been a disinterested source of this information, he certainly was a
knowledgeable one the officers had no legitimate reason to disregard.  The
constitutional justification for subjecting parolees to warrantless searches is
predicated on the administrative needs of the parole system in “monitoring [the]
transition from inmate to free citizen.”  (People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743,
752.)  Once an individual has successfully made this transition, he regains full
Fourth Amendment protection, which law enforcement must recognize and
respect.  Other than a warrant issued on probable cause or some other exception to
the warrant requirement, defendant’s parole search condition provided the basis on
which the officers could conduct a reasonable search of his motel room.  It was
therefore incumbent on them to resolve the uncertainty of his status to ensure a
valid search.
                                                
1
It is clear from the record that defendant immediately informed the officers
he had been discharged from parole when they came to his motel room.  While it
is somewhat less clear exactly when he presented his certificate of discharge, it
reasonably appears he did so at a point when the officers could have suspended
their activities and resolved his parole status before searching.  In any event, since
the prosecution had the burden to justify the search (People v. Camarella (1991)
54 Cal.3d 592, 596), any deficiency in this regard would not be defendant’s
responsibility.
4
Since the officers did not act “in the objectively reasonable belief that their
conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment” (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 918), it
is unnecessary to determine whether the statutory scheme delineating the duties and
authority of parole officers renders them adjuncts of the law enforcement team when
they accompany police officers in executing a parole search.  (Maj. opn., ante, at
pp. 18-20.)  Notwithstanding these provisions, “[p]arole agents, in contrast to police
officers, are not ‘engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,’
[citation]; instead, their primary concern is whether their parolees should remain free
on parole.”  (Pa. Bd. of Parole v. Scott (1998) 524 U.S. 357, 368; see People v. Reyes,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 752-753.)  In discharging this responsibility during the
transition period, parole officers must both assess the efficacy of rehabilitation and
protect the public.  (Reyes, at pp. 752-753.)  It is primarily for these reasons, not law
enforcement purposes, that they have peace officer status—with its attendant
authority to carry firearms, make arrests, etc.—in relation to their supervisory duties.
Granted, in some instances they may assist or cooperate with law enforcement for the
purpose of uncovering evidence of illegal activity.  (See United States v. Richardson
(9th Cir. 1988) 849 F.2d 439, 441; see also Pa. Bd. of Parole, at p. 369.)  But courts
should suppress evidence only when the facts clearly establish that a parole officer
has acted in a law enforcement capacity.  (Cf. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 918
[“suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a
case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the
purposes of the exclusionary rule”].)
I similarly do not endorse the unqualified characterization of CDC clerks
who prepare and disseminate the parole listings as adjuncts of law enforcement.
(See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 25-28.)  Nothing in the language or legislative history
of Penal Code section 3003, or any other statute cited by the majority, supports the
conclusion the Legislature intended—simply by requiring CDC clerks routinely to
5
provide department records to local law enforcement—that they would become
enmeshed in the “often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime” (Arizona v.
Evans (1995) 514 U.S. 1, 15) thereby narrowing the scope of the good faith
exception.  The legislation merely sought to regularize and make more efficient
the previously ad hoc process of local agencies requesting the information as
needed.  The function of CDC clerks remains to assist in the department’s
discharge of its responsibilities to parolees and the public, not law enforcement.
The constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures was
motivated by the abhorrence of the general warrants and writs of assistance that in
England and the American colonies symbolized governmental overreaching and abuse
of authority.  (See Steagald v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 204, 220.)  In the
criminal context, the courts have chosen to enforce this prohibition by the
exclusionary rule, while at the same time recognizing the “substantial social costs” it
exacts.  (See Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 907 & fn. 6.)  For this reason, and because
the rule “renders the Fourth Amendment contemptible in the eyes of judges and
citizens” (Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles (1994) 107 Harv. L.Rev. 757,
799) and “may well ‘generat[e] disrespect for the law and administration of justice’ ”
(Leon, at p. 908), we should avoid formulating overbroad Fourth Amendment
principles that ultimately are “oblivious or hostile to the common sense of common
people” and “often abandon[ed] . . . to avoid absurdity.”  (Amar, Fourth Amendment
First Principles, at p. 759.)  Here, however, the officers’ unreasonable conduct falls
squarely within the intended scope of the Fourth Amendment.  Assuming the
exclusionary rule is a constitutionally appropriate remedy (see id. at pp. 785-800),
suppression of the evidence seized here vindicates rather than breeds contempt for
constitutional rights.
BROWN, J.
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Willis
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 71 Cal.App.4th 530
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S079245
Date Filed: June 3, 2002
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Superior
Judge: Clarence Westra, Jr., and Kenneth C. Twisselman II
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Carlo Andreani, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Daniel J. Tokaji for ACLU of Southern California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for  Respondent:
Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson and David P. Druliner, Chief
Assistant Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Stan Cross and Patrick J.
Whalen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Carlo Andreani
582 Market Street, Suite 811
San Francisco, CA  94104
(415) 398-9870
Patrick J. Whalen
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street, Suite 125
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550
(916) 324-2785