Title: State v. Anderson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Anderson, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2089.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-2089 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. ANDERSON, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Anderson, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2089.] 
Criminal sentencing—Community-control sanction may not be combined with 
prison term for same offense—Order to have no contact with victim is 
community-control sanction. 
(No. 2014-0674 —Submitted March 10, 2015—Decided June 3, 2015.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Summit County, 
No. 26640, 2014-Ohio-1206. 
_________________________ 
KENNEDY, J. 
I.  Introduction 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we resolve a conflict between the Eighth and Ninth 
District Courts of Appeals on a question that the appellant states as follows: “If a 
defendant is sentenced to prison for a term of incarceration, does the trial court 
have authority to issue against the defendant, a ‘no contact’ order with the 
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victim?”  We answer the question in the negative.  A trial court cannot impose a 
prison term and a no-contact order for the same felony offense.  Accordingly, we 
vacate the trial court’s no-contact order.   
II.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} A jury found appellant, David Anderson, guilty of kidnapping in 
violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4) and rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), both 
first-degree felonies.  The trial court imposed a mandatory prison term of ten 
years for the rape and a discretionary term of seven years for the kidnapping and 
ordered the sentences to be served consecutively.  The trial court also ordered 
Anderson to have no contact with the victim. 
{¶ 3} On appeal, Anderson argued that “the trial court committed 
reversible and plain error when it ordered Anderson [to] have ‘no contact’ with 
the prosecuting witness.”  Anderson relied on State v. Holly, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 
No. 95454, 2011-Ohio-2284. 
{¶ 4} The court of appeals stated that “[w]hile the imposition of a no 
contact order may under certain circumstances function as a community control 
sanction, there is nothing to indicate that it may only function as a community 
control sanction.”  2014-Ohio-1206, ¶ 34.  The court continued, “While there is 
no statutory provision expressly authorizing the imposition of a no contact order, 
this Court finds it is significant that there is no provision prohibiting the 
imposition of such an order.”  Id.  After reasoning that a no-contact order serves 
the “overriding purposes of felony sentencing,” the court of appeals held that “a 
trial court may impose a no contact order as part of its sentence.”  Id. at ¶ 35 and 
39.  Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed Anderson’s sentences. 
{¶ 5} The Ninth District Court of Appeals found that its decision was in 
conflict with decisions of the Eighth District Court of Appeals in Holly and State 
v. Rogers, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 97093 and 97094, 2012-Ohio-2496.  We 
agreed and accepted the case for review. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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III.  Analysis 
{¶ 6} In the Eighth District’s opinions in Holly and Rogers, the court could 
“find no authority in Ohio sentencing law to allow for [a no-contact order] when 
imposing a prison term.”  Holly, 2011-Ohio-2284, at ¶ 21; Rogers, 2012-Ohio-
2496, at ¶ 34.  Instead, it held, “[O]nce the trial court imposed a prison term and 
executed [the defendant’s] sentence, the authority to impose any ‘no contact’ 
order following [the defendant’s] release from prison lies with the Adult Parole 
Board.”  Holly at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 7} The Ninth District Court of Appeals held in this case that while there 
is no authority expressly permitting a court to impose a no-contact order as a 
sanction for a criminal offense, there is also no authority that expressly prohibits a 
trial court from doing so.  2014-Ohio-1206, ¶ 34. Finding that a no-contact order 
satisfies the purposes of felony sentencing and relying on the lack of any authority 
prohibiting its imposition as a sanction for a criminal offense, the court of appeals 
held that a no-contact order could be imposed as part of a sentence. 
{¶ 8} The conflict question asks, “If a defendant is sentenced to prison for 
a term of incarceration, does the trial court have authority to issue against the 
defendant, a ‘no contact’ order with the victim?”  Answering that question in light 
of the appellate court’s holding requires the examination of several issues, 
including (1) where do courts draw their authority to impose sentences for 
criminal offenses? (2) is a no-contact order a community-control sanction? and (3) 
if a no-contact order is a community-control sanction, can it be imposed along 
with a prison term for the same offense? 
{¶ 9} We begin our analysis by examining where a trial court draws its 
authority to impose criminal sentences. 
Authority for Criminal Sentencing 
{¶ 10} “[A] sentence is a penalty or combination of penalties imposed on a 
defendant as punishment for the offense he or she is found guilty of committing.  
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State v. Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318, 2012-Ohio-1908, 972 N.E.2d 509, ¶ 28. 
“Judges have no inherent power to create sentences.”  State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio 
St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 22, citing Griffin & Katz, Ohio 
Felony Sentencing Law, Section 1:3, at 4, fn. 1 (2008), and Woods v. Telb, 89 
Ohio St.3d 504, 507-509, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000).  Rather, judges are duty-
bound to apply sentencing laws as they are written. Id. 
{¶ 11} In 1974, in enacting R.C. 2901.03, the General Assembly 
abrogated common-law criminal liability by requiring that all criminal offenses be 
codified.  State v. Collins, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-77614, 1979 WL 208641, * 1 
(Mar. 7, 1979).  R.C. 2901.03 provides: 
 
(A) No conduct constitutes a criminal offense against the 
state unless it is defined as an offense in the Revised Code. 
(B) An offense is defined when one or more sections of the 
Revised Code state a positive prohibition or enjoin a specific duty, 
and provide a penalty for violation of such prohibition or failure to 
meet such duty. 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 12} Consequently, “ ‘the only sentence which a trial judge may impose 
is that provided for by statute * * *.’ ”  State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75, 471 
N.E.2d 774 (1984), quoting Colegrove v. Burns, 175 Ohio St. 437, 438, 195 
N.E.2d 811 (1964), see also State v. Morris,  55 Ohio St.2d 101, 112, 378 N.E.2d 
708 (1978), citing Toledo Mun. Ct. v. State ex rel. Platter, 126 Ohio St. 103, 184 
N.E. 1 (1933) (“It has long been recognized in this state that the General 
Assembly has the plenary power to prescribe crimes and fix penalties”). 
{¶ 13} As stated by the Indiana Supreme Court, because “ ‘sentencing is a 
creature of the legislature * * * courts are limited to imposing sentences that are 
January Term, 2015 
 
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authorized by statute, rather than only being limited to sentences that are not 
prohibited by statute.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  Wilson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 759 
(Ind.2014), quoting Wilson v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1221, 1224 (Ind.2013) (Robb, 
C.J., dissenting). 
{¶ 14} “In 1990, the General Assembly enacted legislation authorizing the 
creation of the Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission and instructed it to develop 
and recommend to the General Assembly a comprehensive criminal sentencing 
structure.”   Woods, 89 Ohio St.3d at 507, 733 N.E.2d 1103, citing R.C. 181.21 
and 181.23.  Pursuant to the commission’s recommendations, in 1995, the 
General Assembly enacted Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136 
(“SB 2”).  Id. at 507, 508.  “This legislation reflected the state’s first 
comprehensive revision of Ohio’s criminal code since 1974, and it altered both 
the definitions of criminal offenses and the sentencing system.”  State v. Bates, 
118 Ohio St.3d 174, 2008-Ohio-1983, 887 N.E.2d 328, ¶ 5,  citing State v. Foster, 
109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 34, and Woods at 507-508. 
{¶ 15} SB 2 enacted the following provisions that address felony 
sentencing: R.C. 2929.11 (purposes of felony sentencing), 2929.12 (factors to 
consider in felony sentencing), 2929.13 (guidelines for imposing felony 
sentences), 2929.14 (prison terms), 2929.15 (guidelines for imposing community-
control sanctions), 2929.16 (residential community-control sanctions), 2929.17 
(nonresidential community-control sanctions),  2929.18 (financial community-
control sanctions), and 2929.19 (felony-sentence hearings). 
{¶ 16} None of these felony-sentencing statutes expressly provide that a 
no-contact order is an available sanction for a felony offense, and our research 
fails to locate any statute that expressly authorizes such a sanction for a criminal 
offense. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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A No-Contact Order Is a Community-Control Sanction 
{¶ 17} Ohio courts have recognized that a no-contact order is a 
community-control sanction.  E.g. State v. Snyder, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-12-83, 
2013-Ohio-2046, ¶ 55; State v. Schwartz, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-12-060, 2013-
Ohio-3958, ¶ 9-12; State v. Marcum, 4th Dist. Hocking Nos. 11CA8 and 11CA10, 
2012-Ohio-572, ¶ 11; State v. Simms, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2009-02-005, 
2009-Ohio-5440, ¶ 25; and State v. Loveless, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2002CA16, 
2002-Ohio-5380, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 18} The community-control statutes for felony offenses (R.C. 2929.16, 
2929.17, and 2929.18) state that the community-control sanctions “include, but 
are not limited to, the following” and then give examples.  “The statutory phrase 
‘including, but not limited to,’ means that the examples expressly given are ‘a 
nonexhaustive list of examples.’  (Emphasis sic.)”  State v. Anderson, 138 Ohio 
St.3d 264, 2014-Ohio-542, 6 N.E.3d 23, ¶ 45, quoting State v. Muncie, 91 Ohio 
St.3d 440, 448, 746 N.E.2d 1092 (2001). 
{¶ 19} A “sentencing court has broad discretion to shape community 
control sanctions provided that the sanctions are constitutionally and statutorily 
permitted.”  Katz, Lipton, Gianneli, and Crocker, Baldwin’s Ohio Practice, 
Criminal Law, Section 119:2 (3d Ed.2014).   
  
{¶ 20} The parties do not dispute that a no-contact order is a community-
control sanction.  Their only disagreement is whether the trial court can impose a 
term of imprisonment and a community-control sanction of no contact for the 
same felony offense. 
For a Felony Offense, a Term of Imprisonment and Community-Control 
Sanctions Are Alternatives 
{¶ 21} “Prior to S.B. 2, it was a regular practice in felony sentencing to 
impose a prison sentence and then suspend the sentence and grant probation with 
specific terms and conditions.”  State v. Hoy, 3d Dist. Union Nos. 14-04-13 and 
January Term, 2015 
 
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14-04-14, 2005-Ohio-1093, ¶ 18.  “ ‘ “Prior to 1995 Senate Bill 2, it was quite 
appropriate for a judge to treat probation as a contract for leniency. * * * 
Probation was conditioned on good behavior. Violation of that probation was a 
breach of contract with the sentencing judge.  For the breach, the judge could 
properly impose the suspended prison sentence—even for the most trivial 
violation of probation.” ’ ”  State v. Wolfe, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008-CA-00064, 
2009-Ohio-830, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Gilliam, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 98 CA 30, 
1999 WL 740248 (June 10, 1999), quoting Griffin and Katz, Ohio Felony 
Sentencing Law, Section T5.36, at426-427 (1998 Ed.). 
{¶ 22} “[O]ne of the overriding goals of SB 2 was ‘truth in sentencing,’ 
meaning that the sentence imposed by the judge is the sentence that is served, 
unless altered by the judge. This was primarily accomplished by two methods: 
eliminating indefinite sentences and eliminating parole.”  Woods, 89 Ohio St.3d at 
508, 733 N.E.2d 1103.  “With the passage of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 in 1995, 
community control replaced probation as a possible sentence under Ohio’s felony 
sentencing law.”  State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 
1201, ¶ 16, citing Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Cleary, 93 Ohio St.3d 191, 192, 754 
N.E.2d 235 (2001), fn. 1.  Therefore, options for felony sentencing after SB 2 
included prison terms and community-control sanctions.  See R.C. 2929.14, 
2929.16, 2929.17, and 2929.18. 
{¶ 23} “[C]urrent felony sentencing statutes, contained primarily in R.C. 
2929.11 to 2929.19, require trial courts to impose either a prison term or 
community control sanctions on each count.”  State v. Berry, 2012-Ohio-4660, 
980 N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.), citing State v. Williams, 3d Dist. Hocking No. 
5-10-02, 2011-Ohio-995, ¶ 17; see also State v. Vlad, 153 Ohio App.3d 74, 2003-
Ohio-2930, 790 N.E.2d 1246, ¶ 13 (7th Dist.); State v. Miller, 12th Dist. Butler 
No. CA2010-12-336, 2011-Ohio-3909, ¶ 20; and State v. Jacobs, 189 Ohio 
App.3d 283, 2010-Ohio-4010, 938 N.E.2d 79, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.); and Katz, Lipton, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Gianneli, and Crocker, Baldwin’s Ohio Practice, Criminal Law, Section 119:2 (3d 
Ed. 2014) (“To emphasize the break with past assumptions, the [post–SB 2 
felony-sentencing] statutes no longer discuss ‘suspension’ of sentence; rather, the 
alternative to a sentence of imprisonment is a sentence of community control 
sanctions.”  [Emphasis added]). 
{¶ 24} In State v. Riley, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-98-38, 1998 WL 812044 
(Nov. 12, 1998), the court found support for its holding that prison and 
community-control sanctions are alternative punishments for a felony offense in 
former R.C. 2929.13 and 2929.19.  H.B. No. 122, 147 Ohio Laws, Part I, 383.  
See also State v. Kinsey, 7th Dist. Monroe No. 826, 2001 WL 567170, *2 (May 
16, 2001); and State v. Smith, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-980887, 1999 WL 
728533, *2 (Sept. 17, 1999). 
{¶ 25} First, Riley examined former R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(a), which 
addressed sentencing for fourth- and fifth-degree felonies.  Riley quoted the 
statute:  
 
“[I]f the court [finds any one of the factors listed in division 
(B)(1), subsections (a)-(h)], and if the court, after considering the 
[seriousness and recidivism] factors set forth in section 2929.12 of the 
Revised Code, finds that a prison term is consistent with the purposes 
and principles of sentencing * * * and finds that the offender is not 
amenable to an available community control sanction, the court shall 
impose a prison term upon the offender.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
(Bracketed material sic.)  Riley at *2. 
{¶ 26} Next, the court in Riley considered former R.C. 2929.19(B).  In 
examining R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(a), the court first quoted the statute: “ ‘[I]f the 
sentencing court determines at the sentencing hearing that a prison term is 
January Term, 2015 
 
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necessary or required, the court shall * * * [i]mpose a stated prison term * * *.’ ”  
Id.  Alternatively, R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) provided: “If the sentencing court 
determines at the sentencing hearing that a community control sanction should be 
imposed and the court is not prohibited from imposing a community control 
sanction, the court shall impose a community control sanction * * *.” 
{¶ 27} The court in Riley concluded:  
 
The statute is clear[;] if the court makes the requisite findings 
determining that prison is necessary or required, then that court “shall * 
* * [i]mpose a stated prison term.”  R.C. § 2929.19(B)(3).  Conversely, 
if the court determines that a community control sanction should be 
imposed, “the court shall impose a community control sanction.”  R.C. 
§ 2929.19(B)(5).  Further indication that these alternatives are mutually 
exclusive is the requirement in R.C. § 2929.13(B)(2)(a) that before a 
court imposes a prison term it must find that the fourth or fifth degree 
felony “offender is not amenable to an available community control 
sanction.” 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  Id. at *3. 
{¶ 28} While R.C. 2929.13 and 2929.19 have been amended numerous 
times since Riley and the other cases mentioned above were decided, the current 
versions of the felony-sentencing statutes, including R.C. 2929.13 and 2929.19, 
continue to reflect that the General Assembly intended prison terms and 
community-control sanctions to be alternative sanctions.  For example, under the 
current version of R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a), for a qualifying fourth- or fifth-degree 
felony, a court “shall sentence the offender to a community control sanction * * * 
if all” of the listed criteria apply, e.g., “[t]he offender previously has not been 
convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony.”  (Emphasis added.)  Alternatively, a 
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court “has discretion to impose a prison term * * * if any” of a different list of 
criteria apply, such as “[t]he offender committed the offense while having a 
firearm on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control.”  R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(b). 
{¶ 29} Moreover, 
for 
first- 
and 
second-degree 
felonies, 
R.C. 
2929.13(D)(1) provides that a prison term is the presumed sentence, but division 
(D)(2) specifies that upon making certain findings, a court may impose a 
community-control sanction or sanctions “instead of a prison term.” 
{¶ 30} R.C. 2929.19 likewise continues to support the interpretation that a 
court must impose either a prison term or community control for a felony offense.  
Except for renumbering (B)(5) to (B)(4), the language relied upon in Riley 
remains unchanged today. 
{¶ 31} Accordingly, the General Assembly intended prison and 
community-control sanctions as alternative sentences for a felony offense.  
Therefore, we hold that as a general rule, when a prison term and community 
control are possible sentences for a particular felony offense, absent an express 
exception, the court must impose In this appeal, we resolve a conflict between the 
Eighth and Ninth District Courts of Appeals on a question that the appellant states 
as follows: “If a defendant is sentenced to prison for a term of incarceration, does 
the trial court have authority to issue against the defendant, a ‘no contact’ order 
with the victim?”  We answer the question in the negative.  A trial court cannot 
impose a prison term and a no-contact order for the same felony offense.  
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s no-contact order.   
IV.  Conclusion 
{¶ 32} Anderson was convicted of two first-degree felonies: rape and 
kidnapping.  The trial court imposed prison terms for both offenses.  The court 
also imposed a no-contact order.  Because a court cannot impose a prison term 
and a community-control sanction for the same offense, and no exception allows 
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otherwise, we hold that the trial court erred in imposing the no-contact order.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and vacate the no-
contact order. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
___________________________ 
Dennis P. Will, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and Natasha Ruiz 
Guerrieri, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Neil P. Agarwal, for appellant. 
Eric M. Hedrick, Assistant Ohio Public Defender, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Ohio Public Defender. 
____________________________