Title: Commonwealth v. Bresilla

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-10837 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ELYSEE BRESILLA. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 10, 2014. - January 16, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Evidence, Firearm, Identification, 
Relevancy and materiality.  Identification.  Constitutional 
Law, Identification.  Due Process of Law, Identification of 
inanimate object.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Motion 
to suppress, Identification of defendant in courtroom, 
Conduct of prosecutor, Argument by prosecutor, Request for 
jury instructions, New trial. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 6, 2006. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Diane 
M. Kottmyer, J; the cases were tried before Sandra L. Hamlin, 
J., and a motion for a new trial, filed on August 12, 2011, was 
considered by her. 
 
 
 
James W. Rosseel for the defendant. 
 
Fawn D. Balliro Andersen, Assistant District Attorney 
(Nicole L. Allain, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  In the early morning hours of March 28, 2006, 
Doowensky Nazaire was shot and killed in front of a night club 
2 
 
in Cambridge.  Although the firearm was never recovered, the 
evidence implicating the defendant, Elysee Bresilla, as the 
shooter was substantial.  Within minutes of the shooting, 
Cambridge police officers found the defendant crouching in the 
yard of a nearby residence.  Within an hour, the police had 
performed a showup with a witness who identified the defendant 
as the shooter.  Two eyewitnesses who knew the defendant came 
forward and identified him as the shooter.  The defendant's 
hands tested positive for gunshot primer residue.  In the path 
of flight described by numerous witnesses, the police found the 
defendant's discarded brown leather jacket.  On the night of the 
shooting, two witnesses identified that jacket as the one worn 
by the shooter. 
 
The defendant was indicted on charges of murder in the 
first degree under theories of premeditation and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, and possession of a firearm without a 
firearm identification (FID) card, in violation of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (h) (1).  The defendant filed motions to suppress the 
identifications of himself and his jacket, which motions were 
denied.  At trial, the defendant primarily challenged the 
identification evidence and the procedures employed by the 
Cambridge police in obtaining that evidence.  A jury convicted 
the defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of 
3 
 
deliberate premeditation, and he was sentenced to a mandatory 
term of life without the possibility of parole. 
 
On appeal, the defendant raises numerous claims of error, 
including a contention that the Cambridge police should have 
presented witnesses with a "jacket lineup."  We reject that 
contention and find no reversible error arising from the 
defendant's other claims.  Although evidence of inappropriate 
conduct by some of the investigating police officers was brought 
out during the course of the proceedings, we conclude that there 
is an insufficient basis for exercising our authority under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the defendant's conviction. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  The murder.  We recite the facts in 
the record, reserving certain details for our analysis of the 
issues raised on appeal.  See Commonwealth v. Raposa, 440 Mass. 
684, 686 (2004).  On the evening of March 27, 2006, the victim, 
Francillon Dabady, and Mackenson Mathurin went to a night club 
in Cambridge.  All three were acquainted with the defendant:  
the victim was the defendant's former roommate; Dabady had met 
the defendant at the victim's home; and Mathurin attended grade 
school with the defendant and, on the night of the shooting, 
conversed with him inside the club.  As the club closed, the 
victim, Dabady, and Mathurin, along with many other patrons, 
filed out onto Massachusetts Avenue. 
4 
 
 
On leaving the club, Dabady and Mathurin observed a man 
(whom they later identified as the defendant), holding a 
semiautomatic firearm, cross the street toward the crowd, aim 
the weapon at the victim, and fire multiple shots.  One bullet 
struck the victim and sent him to the ground.  Then, standing 
almost above the victim, the man shot him a second time before 
fleeing in the direction of a nearby video store.  The Cambridge 
police were promptly notified of the shooting and, within one 
minute, Officer Mark McHale arrived at the night club. 
 
Officer McHale was approached by a crowd of people shouting 
descriptions of the shooter.  From the noise, Officer McHale 
distilled a description of a black male wearing a white T-shirt 
and baseball hat, which he then broadcast across Cambridge 
police radio.  Sergeant John Gardner heard the broadcast and, 
within minutes, observed a black male fitting the description 
running down Essex Street, a few blocks away from the site of 
the shooting.  Less than four minutes after being alerted to the 
shooting, Cambridge police officers found the defendant, clad in 
a white T-shirt and white baseball hat with dark pinstripes, 
crouching among the shrubs of a yard on Essex Street. 
 
Meanwhile, Officer McHale was speaking with a witness named 
Daniel Jacobs.  Jacobs claimed to have had a clear view of the 
shooter.  After learning that a potential suspect had been 
apprehended, Officer McHale asked Jacobs if he would be willing 
5 
 
to observe a person who had been stopped in the area.  Jacobs 
agreed, confirmed his understanding of the precautionary 
advisements given by Officer McHale, and traveled to Essex 
Street in Officer McHale's police cruiser.  Although Officer 
McHale observed alcohol on Jacobs's breath, he determined that 
Jacobs was capable of providing an accurate statement and 
performing a reliable identification.  On viewing the defendant, 
who was surrounded by police officers but did not appear to be 
handcuffed, Jacobs stated, "That's the guy." 
 
As these events unfolded, other Cambridge police officers 
scoured the area in search of other evidence of the murder.  In 
the parking lot behind the video store, which was located 
between the night club and the yard where the defendant was 
apprehended, the police found a multicolored button-up shirt and 
a light brown leather jacket with a fur collar and fur cuffs.  
One of the officers broadcast a description of the jacket over 
the police radio.  The defendant overheard the broadcast and 
stated, "That's my jacket." 
 
As the police secured the scene around the jacket, two 
other witnesses to the shooting, Sonny Bhatia and Fabio Mendes, 
were walking to their automobile, which was parked in the same 
parking lot.  Bhatia and Mendes saw the jacket, and each 
identified it as the one worn by the shooter.  David Vicini, the 
doorman at a nearby restaurant, reported seeing a man wearing a 
6 
 
light brown jacket with a fur collar standing over the victim, 
shooting.  Other witnesses variously recalled seeing a brown 
leather jacket, a black leather jacket, a "bubble" jacket, or no 
jacket at all.  Despite these inconsistencies, however, most of 
the descriptions were generally consistent with the defendant 
and the articles of clothing found in the parking lot.  The 
victim was transported to a hospital, where he died from his 
wounds at approximately 3 A.M.  The defendant was transported to 
the Cambridge police station, where his hands were swabbed for 
gunshot primer residue testing.  Cambridge police officers 
questioned the defendant regarding the whereabouts of the gun, 
to which he responded, "I don't think you guys gonna find any 
guns."  The defendant's booking photograph was placed in 
photographic arrays to be shown to several of the witnesses to 
the shooting. 
 
On the same morning, Cambridge police arranged for 
Detective Daniel McNeil, a so-called "blind presenter," to 
conduct a photographic array procedure with Dabady.  Dabady 
explained that an array was unnecessary, as he already knew the 
shooter.  Nonetheless, Detective McNeil read to Dabady a list of 
advisements from the Cambridge police photographic 
identification checklist and presented him with a sequential 
array.  Dabady identified the defendant as the shooter, which 
McNeil recorded on the checklist. 
7 
 
 
McNeil then conducted photographic array procedures with 
Mendes and Bhatia.  Although each selected the defendant's 
photograph, neither was able to express confidence that the 
person in the photograph was the shooter.  Approximately one 
month later, a different blind presenter, Detective Donald 
Mahoney, conducted a sequential photographic array procedure 
with Mathurin, who, along with Dabady, had been with the victim 
on the night of the shooting.  Mahoney recited each of the 
advisements and Mathurin identified the defendant as the 
shooter.  In addition, Cambridge police presented the 
defendant's sister, Shelly Bresilla, with a photograph of the 
jacket found in the parking lot.  She recognized the jacket and 
the cellular telephone contained in one of its pockets as gifts 
she had given to the defendant. 
 
b.  The motions to suppress.  Prior to trial, the defendant 
moved to suppress the showup identification by Jacobs, the 
photographic identifications by Dabady and Mathurin, and the 
jacket identifications made by Bhatia and Shelly Bresilla.  A 
three-day evidentiary hearing was held on the motions.  At some 
point during the course of the hearing, Detective Mahoney 
approached Bhatia in the hallway and showed him some photographs 
from the photographic array procedure in which Bhatia previously 
participated.  Although both witnesses were sequestered, 
Detective Mahoney asked Bhatia if he remembered which photograph 
8 
 
he had selected and, when Bhatia responded in the negative, 
Detective Mahoney pointed to a photograph of the defendant and 
informed Bhatia that he had selected that photograph. 
 
The motion judge sanctioned the Commonwealth by precluding 
Bhatia from identifying the defendant at trial either directly 
or through a photographic array, while preserving the 
defendant's right to elicit before the jury Bhatia's inability 
to positively identify the defendant's photograph.  The motion 
judge also suggested that a midtrial voir dire be conducted to 
ensure that Bhatia would not make a surprise identification of 
the defendant during his testimony. 
With respect to the merits of the motion to suppress, the 
judge found no error in the showup procedure used with Jacobs 
given the ongoing threat to public safety, the use of cautionary 
advisements by Detective McHale, Jacobs's professed ability to 
identify the shooter, and the fact that the showup occurred 
within one hour of the shooting.  The judge also determined that 
the defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing that the 
photographic arrays shown to Dabady and Mathurin were 
unnecessarily suggestive, noting that the police had used blind 
presenters, that precautionary advisements had been given, and 
that both witnesses were already familiar with the defendant.  
The judge likewise rejected the defendant's challenge of the 
jacket identifications, concluding that the circumstances did 
9 
 
not render this the "extreme case" alluded to in Commonwealth v. 
Simmons, 383 Mass. 46, 51 (1981), S.C., 392 Mass. 45, cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 196 (1984) (in "extreme case," suggestiveness 
of identification procedure of inanimate objects might rise to 
denial of due process). 
 
c.  The trial.  The Commonwealth presented substantial 
evidence of the defendant's culpability, including the showup 
identification by Jacobs, the photographic identifications by 
Dabady and Mathurin, and the jacket identifications made by 
Mendes and Bhatia in the video store parking lot.  The 
Commonwealth's expert witnesses opined that the jacket tested 
positive for the defendant's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), that 
both of the defendant's hands tested positive for gunshot 
residue primer, and that the ammunition recovered from the scene 
was consistent with having been fired from a Luger semiautomatic 
pistol.  The jury also heard the testimony of Jacobs, who was 
standing within feet of the victim; Dabady and Mathurin, who 
knew the defendant and indentified him as the shooter; Bhatia, 
Mendes, and Vicini, who identified the jacket as the one worn by 
the shooter; and Shelly Bresilla, who identified the jacket and 
cellular telephone as items that she had given to her brother as 
gifts. 
During the trial, defense counsel learned that, just prior 
to trial, the prosecutor had conducted witness preparation 
10 
 
sessions with Bhatia, Mendes, and Vicini in which he showed each 
witness a photograph of the jacket found in the parking lot to 
determine whether they could still identify it.1  Defense counsel 
then moved to preclude the in-court identification of the jacket 
by Mendes and Vicini, arguing essentially that such testimony 
would be the product of a highly prejudicial showup photographic 
identification.  The prosecutor countered that he properly asked 
each witness if they recognized the jacket depicted on the 
photograph in the context of trial preparation.  The judge 
denied the defendant's motion, concluding there was no 
misconduct and no prejudice. 
Also during the trial, defense counsel noticed 
discrepancies between the original eyewitness photographic 
identification forms regarding the defendant that were entered 
in evidence and the copies provided to the defendant in 
discovery.  Several of the originals apparently had been altered 
with "whiteout" and reflected new or different information.  
Defense counsel moved to dismiss the case on grounds of 
prosecutorial misconduct or, in the alternative, to stay the 
proceedings pending an investigation into the Cambridge police 
procedures used in building the case against the defendant. 
                     
 
1 Defense counsel learned of this during the Commonwealth's 
direct examination of Fabio Mendes, which was prior to the 
testimony of Sonny Bhatia and David Vicini. 
11 
 
The judge held a midtrial, two-day evidentiary hearing 
outside the presence of the jury.  At the hearing, defense 
counsel extensively cross-examined Detective McNeil and Sergeant 
John Boyle, the officer who had been in charge of the 
investigation.  Each denied any knowledge regarding the 
modifications made to the witness identification forms, and the 
judge denied the defendant's motion.  At the conclusion of the 
trial, the defendant requested that the jury be given specific 
instructions regarding police misconduct and the fallibility of 
eyewitness identifications of physical evidence.  These requests 
were denied as well, although the judge did allow defense 
counsel to argue those points to the jury.  The judge also 
extensively instructed the jury regarding the factors that 
generally affect eyewitness identification testimony.  The jury 
found the defendant guilty of the firearm violation and murder 
in the first degree on a theory of premeditation. 
d.  Motion for a new trial.  The defendant moved for a new 
trial on grounds that the Cambridge police failed to adhere to 
department protocols with respect to the photographic 
identifications and that the Commonwealth failed to timely 
disclose its pretrial jacket identification sessions, which, in 
any event, violated due process because the photograph of the 
jacket was presented alone rather than in an array of jacket 
photographs. 
12 
 
In light of the midtrial evidentiary hearing, the judge 
denied the defendant's motion without holding an additional 
hearing.  The judge concluded that the procedural lapses of the 
Cambridge police with respect to filling out the eyewitness 
identification forms were minor, did not prejudice the 
defendant, and -– in one instance -– actually benefited him.  
Citing the Simmons case, she ruled that the witness preparation 
sessions did not violate due process and, further, that the 
amended through 442 Mass. 1518 (2004), did not apply to 
identifications of inanimate objects and, even if it did, the 
defendant was not prejudiced by any delay in the disclosure.  On 
appeal, the defendant assigns error to various rulings related 
to the motions to suppress, evidentiary rulings at trial, the 
prosecutor's closing, the judge's jury instructions, and the 
denial of the motion for new trial.  We affirm. 
 
2.  Discussion.  "When this court reviews a defendant's 
appeal from the denial of a motion for a new trial in 
conjunction with his direct appeal from an underlying conviction 
of murder . . . , we review both under G. L. c. 278, § 33E."  
Commonwealth v. Burgos, 462 Mass. 53, 59, cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 796 (2012). 
 
a.  The jacket identifications.  The defendant argues that 
the admission of the jacket identifications violated due process 
and rule 14.  In Simmons, 383 Mass. at 51, we observed that 
13 
 
although the principles applicable to pretrial identifications 
of suspects do not ordinarily extend to out-of-court 
identifications of inanimate objects, "in an extreme case, the 
degree of suggestiveness of an identification procedure 
concerning an inanimate object might rise to the level of a 
denial of due process."  The defendant contends that this is 
such a case.  We do not agree. 
 
In the Simmons case, a rape victim had told the police 
"that her attacker's vehicle was 'a small vehicle, a Volkswagen-
type of vehicle.'"  Id. at 49.  The Commonwealth was concerned 
that the victim would be unable to identify the defendant's 
vehicle, which was a Ford Mustang.  Id. at 47-49.  Prior to 
trial, the victim was escorted to and shown the vehicle by the 
police.  Id. at 47.  At trial, the victim described the 
perpetrator's vehicle as a Ford Mustang.  Id. at 49.  In 
concluding that the showup procedure employed by the police was 
not marked by fundamental unfairness, we noted that the evidence 
did not demonstrate that the victim had been contemporaneously 
instructed as to the ownership of the vehicle.  Id. at 53. 
 
The jacket identifications in this case were significantly 
less suggestive than the automobile identification in the 
Simmons case.  First, the parking lot identifications of the 
jacket made by Bhatia and Mendes just after the shooting were 
critical to the ongoing police effort to apprehend an armed 
14 
 
murderer on the loose.  There can be no serious argument that, 
in such a situation, the police were required to present the 
witnesses with a jacket lineup.  Second, given that the trial 
did not take place until nearly four years after the shooting,2 
it was reasonable for the prosecutor, during trial preparation, 
to show Bhatia and Mendes a photograph and to inquire whether 
they would be able to make an in-court identification of the 
jacket that they had identified in the parking lot on the night 
of the murder.  It was also reasonable to ask Vicini whether he 
recognized the jacket in the photograph, where he had described 
it to police right after the shooting. 
 
The defendant points out that, unlike in the Simmons case, 
it would not have been burdensome for the Commonwealth to 
arrange either a jacket lineup or a photographic array of 
jackets in advance of trial.  That may be so, but that is not 
the governing standard.  Our observation regarding the 
feasibility of an automobile lineup in the Simmons case was but 
one of several distinctions we drew between identifications of 
people and property.  Id. at 52.  The finer point was that, 
unlike people, tangible objects are typically not unique, and 
thus identifications of the latter provide only indirect 
                     
 
2 The delay is explained, in part, by the fact that the 
defendant was sent to Bridgewater State Hospital, apparently on 
two occasions, for evaluation of his competency to stand trial.  
See G. L. c. 123, § 15. 
15 
 
evidence of the defendant's guilt.  Id.  By comparison, the 
"chances of fundamental unfairness are greater in the former 
situation. Identification of a defendant directly tends to prove 
the case against him."  Id. 
 
In this case -– and in sharp contrast to Detective 
Mahoney's inappropriate conduct in the hallway during the motion 
to suppress hearing -– the prosecutor simply showed a picture of 
the previously identified jacket to the witnesses and asked 
whether they recognized it.  We find nothing fundamentally 
unfair or suggestive about the procedures employed by either the 
police or the prosecutor with respect to the jacket.  As in the 
Simmons case, the Commonwealth was not required to create a 
photographic array of jackets as part of its preparation for 
trial. 
 
 The defendant posits that, even if the identifications 
themselves were not unduly suggestive, the Commonwealth's 
failure to disclose them violated the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963).  In that case, the United States Supreme 
Court held "that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."  
Id. at 87.  We have clarified that "[w]here such evidence is 
disclosed belatedly, 'it is the consequences of the delay that 
16 
 
matter, not the likely impact [of the evidence].'"  Commonwealth 
v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 486 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Wilson, 381 Mass. 90, 114 (1980).  The threshold issue, however, 
is whether the evidence was in fact exculpatory.  See 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Mass. 706, 714 (2010). 
 
The defendant reasons that the trial testimony of Mendes 
and Vicini constituted exculpatory impeachment evidence because 
it was more damaging than their original statements to the 
police.  See Commonwealth v. Vieira, 401 Mass. 828, 832 (1988), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Ellison, 376 Mass. 1, 22 (1978) 
("Although the evidence was more incriminating than the earlier 
statements, it was exculpatory in the sense that the variance 
with the previous statements permitted 'challenge[] [to] the 
credibility of a key prosecution witness'").  We are not 
persuaded.  Contrary to the defendant's recitation of the 
evidence, Mendes did identify the jacket in the video store 
parking lot as the one worn by the shooter.  Moreover, although 
Vicini had previously only described the jacket to the police, 
the defendant was on notice of the Commonwealth's intention to 
elicit a jacket identification from Vicini at trial.  However, 
even if the defendant were correct that the Commonwealth was 
obliged to disclose the pretrial photographic identification of 
the jacket, he was not prejudiced by the fact of the delay in 
that disclosure. 
17 
 
The defendant complains that he did not have the benefit of 
this "new" testimony when cross-examining Jacobs, Jeanne Pinette 
(an eyewitness), and Officer Janie Munroe (who found the 
jacket).  Yet, if the exculpatory character of the testimony lay 
in its capacity to impeach its source, it is unclear how the 
defendant would have used that evidence effectively against 
Jacobs, Pinette, and Munroe.  See Vieira, 401 Mass. at 832.  In 
contrast, defense counsel was able to cross-examine Bhatia, 
Mendes, and Vicini -- the sources of the purportedly 
inconsistent testimony.  See Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 377 Mass. 
887, 895 (1979) ("As to the problem of preparation, the cross-
examination of [the witness] was not only extended but 
searching, and we do not think it would have been materially 
improved by earlier warning about the witness's departure from 
the written statement").  There is no apparent basis to conclude 
that a restructured cross-examination of any of the witnesses -– 
based on an earlier disclosure -– would have "create[d] a 
reasonable doubt that would not otherwise have existed."  
Commonwealth v. St. Germain, 381 Mass. 256, 263 (1980), quoting 
Wilson, 381 Mass. at 114.  The defendant also makes much of the 
varying descriptions of the jacket that were relayed to the 
jury.  Yet, any such inconsistencies go to weight rather than 
its admissibility.  See Simmons, 383 Mass. at 50-51.  There was 
no due process violation. 
18 
 
In addition, the trial judge correctly determined that any 
nondisclosure was not in bad faith.  "When the ground for a 
continuance or exclusion of evidence involves late disclosure by 
the prosecution, without any showing of bad faith on its part 
(as is the case here), a defendant is required to show material 
prejudice from the disclosure before a new trial can be 
considered."  Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 426 Mass. 67, 70 (1997).  
Defense counsel was able to cross-examine vigorously Bhatia, 
Mendes, and Vicini regarding the pretrial jacket identification 
procedures.  The photograph was not presented to any of the 
three in an unduly suggestive manner and, therefore, there was 
little risk that the in-court identifications were premised on 
the witness preparation session rather than the witnesses' 
memories of what they had observed on the night of the shooting.  
Contrast Commonwealth v. Jones, 423 Mass. 99, 105 (1996) ("We 
too reject the Commonwealth's argument that the evidence was 
clear and convincing that [the witness's] in-court 
identification had a source independent of what the Commonwealth 
implicitly concedes were two highly suggestive pretrial 
encounters").  Consequently, the delay did not affect materially 
the jury's consideration of the evidence or the defendant's 
ability to challenge that evidence. 
b.  The photographic arrays.  The defendant also assigns 
error to the admission of the photographic arrays conducted with 
19 
 
Dabady, Mathurin, Mendes, and Bhatia.3  The judge acting on the 
motion to suppress "articulated the correct standard, placing on 
the defendant the burden of proving that the identification 
procedures were '"so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to 
irreparable mistaken identification" as to deny the defendant 
due process of law.'"  Commonwealth v. Echavarria, 428 Mass. 
593, 596 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Venios, 378 Mass. 24, 
27 (1979).  Based on the state of the evidence at that juncture, 
her findings of fact were accurate and her conclusions of law 
were sound. 
Over the course of the trial, additional facts came to 
light, specifically the modifications to the identification 
forms that appeared after the motion to suppress hearing, where 
defense counsel pointed out several mistakes that had been made 
in filling them out.  Yet, whether these modifications were a 
result of mere sloppiness or affirmative misconduct, they did 
not affect the conditions under which the photographic arrays 
were conducted.  The judge had discretion in fashioning a 
remedy, which she exercised by permitting defense counsel to 
extensively cross-examine the officers regarding the changes.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hine, 393 Mass. 564, 573 (1984) 
(remedy for police misconduct should be tailored to cure 
                     
 
3 The motion judge ordered that Bhatia was not permitted to 
identify the defendant or any of the photographs he picked out 
of the photographic array during his trial testimony. 
20 
 
prejudice to defendant); Commonwealth v. Williams, 6 Mass. App. 
Ct. 923, 924 (1978) (remedy for police misconduct committed to 
discretion of trial judge).  In so doing, defense counsel cast 
considerable doubt over the thoroughness and integrity of the 
police investigation and eliminated any prejudice inuring to the 
defendant by way of the modifications.4 
In his motion for new trial, the defendant buttressed his 
initial suppression arguments with the additional irregularities 
uncovered at trial.  The motion judge, who was also the trial 
judge, determined that any error did not prejudice the 
defendant.  Several of the changes, such as the addition of file 
numbers and the name of the person who composed the arrays, were 
completely innocuous.  Moreover, the modification to the 
identification form signed by Mendes benefited the defendant by 
more overtly indicating that Mendes was unable to identify the 
perpetrator.  Although it is accurate to say that the police 
officers who presented the photographic arrays failed to 
indicate on the form which advisements were given to each 
witness, it is also accurate that the evidence at trial plainly 
established that each witness was read the full menu of 
advisements and was asked to state how certain he was of the 
                     
 
4 The changes were not even remotely inculpatory, but, 
because they existed, defense counsel was able to use them 
largely to his advantage. 
21 
 
identification.  See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 
782, 798 (2009). 
The fact that Dabady and Mathurin already knew the 
defendant at the time they made the photographic identifications 
of him, and that that information was not written on the 
identification forms, lacks constitutional significance.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Carr, 464 Mass. 855, 871 (2013) 
("witnesses knew the defendant from the neighborhood and 
witnessed the shooting in broad daylight; it is unlikely that 
suggestiveness would have played much of a role in their 
identifications").  Although the one-month delay in the Mathurin 
array was not ideal, it was not so lengthy as to render the 
identification procedure unduly suggestive.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Funderberg, 374 Mass. 577, 582 (1978) (two-month 
lapse not suggestive).  Further, Detective McNeil's continued 
status as a blind presenter following the photographic 
identification made by Dabady was "properly a matter of the 
weight of the identification evidence . . . rather than of 
admissibility."  Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 797.5  Looking at 
the evidence as a whole, we conclude that the defendant was not 
                     
 
5 Moreover, whatever the slight effect Detective McNeil's 
errant remark of "that's good" (made after Mendes selected a 
photograph) had on the suggestiveness of the array, its force 
was blunted by Mendes's failure to make a positive 
identification. 
22 
 
deprived of due process by the manner in which the photographic 
identifications of him were made. 
 
c.  The showup.  The defendant next renews his claim of 
error with respect to the showup identification of Jacobs.  "We 
have repeatedly held that, although inherently suggestive, one-
on-one confrontations in the immediate aftermath of a crime need 
not be suppressed."  Commonwealth v. Walker, 421 Mass. 90, 95 
(1995).  Such one-on-one identification procedures will pass 
muster so long as there was "good reason" for the police to 
employ them.  Commonwealth v. Austin, 421 Mass. 357, 361 (1995).  
"Relevant to the good reason examination are the nature of the 
crime involved and corresponding concerns for public safety; the 
need for efficient police investigation in the immediate 
aftermath of a crime; and the usefulness of prompt confirmation 
of the accuracy of investigatory information, which, if in 
error, will release the police quickly to follow another track."  
Id. at 362. 
 
The crime involved in this case was homicide -– potentially 
murder -– by means of a semiautomatic firearm fired in the midst 
of a crowd of people.  The police had not located the firearm 
and the perpetrator was still at large, late at night, in a 
densely populated city.  Within less than one hour, the police 
had located a suspect who roughly matched the descriptions 
supplied by witnesses, as well as a witness who claimed he could 
23 
 
recognize the shooter if given the opportunity.  It is difficult 
to imagine a scenario presenting a more compelling reason to 
conduct a showup procedure. 
 
The defendant acknowledges the exigency of the situation, 
but asserts that the showup was conducted in an unnecessarily 
suggestive manner.  The defendant identifies Jacobs as the 
primary source of this suggestiveness. "The question raised by a 
motion to suppress identification testimony," however, "is not 
whether the witness might have been mistaken, but whether any 
possible mistake was the product of improper suggestions by the 
police."  Commonwealth v. Watson, 455 Mass. 246, 251 (2009).  In 
Commonwealth v. Phillips, 452 Mass. 617, 628 (2008), we held 
that the "facts that [the defendant] had been detained in a 
police wagon, was handcuffed, and was flanked by two police 
officers during the investigation did not render the procedure 
unnecessarily suggestive." 
Here, at the time of the showup, the defendant stood in the 
fresh air with his hands behind his back and, although there 
were police officers nearby, the defendant did not appear to be 
detained.  The circumstances of the showup in this case were 
less suggestive than the circumstances in the Phillips case.  
See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 218 
(2014).  Jacobs may or may not have been a reliable witness, but 
that was a question for the jury, who were thoroughly instructed 
24 
 
on the subject by the trial judge.  See Commonwealth v. Francis, 
390 Mass. 89, 100-101 (1983).  Detective McHale had to make a 
judgment call in the face of an ongoing threat to public safety, 
and we find no error in his exercise of that judgment.  He gave 
Jacobs all of the advisements, confirmed that he understood 
them, and then recorded all of the information required by the 
showup identification form.  See Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 
798.   The showup procedure was valid. 
 
d.  The challenged testimony.  The defendant next contends 
that the admission of prejudicial testimony of two of the 
Commonwealth's witnesses constituted reversible error.  
Specifically, he casts "Sergeant [Edward J.] Frammartino's 
testimony about white, frothy sputum coming out of (the 
victim's) mouth and all over the place, and the chemist's 
extensive and illustrated testimony about the blood-stained pink 
shirt," as appealing to the sympathies of the jury.6  Because 
this testimony was not relevant to the identity of the shooter, 
the defendant contends that his objection at trial should have 
been sustained. 
 
"Evidence is relevant if it has a rational tendency to 
prove a material issue."  Commonwealth v. Dunn, 407 Mass. 798, 
807 (1990).  "The weighing of the prejudicial effect and 
                     
 
6 The defendant does not appeal the admission in evidence of 
the bloody shirt, which exhibited fourteen holes, or the 
photographs of that bloody shirt. 
25 
 
probative value of evidence is within the sound discretion of 
the trial judge, the exercise of which we will not overturn 
unless we find palpable error."  Commonwealth v. Bonds, 445 
Mass. 821, 831 (2006).  The boundaries of relevance are not 
defined solely by the defendant's theory of the case.  In other 
words, the defendant's misidentification theory did not relieve 
the Commonwealth of its burden of proving each element of its 
prima facie case of murder in the first degree.  See 
Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 380 Mass. 840, 841-842 (1980) ("It 
is incontrovertible that the burden is on the Commonwealth to 
prove or disprove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements 
constituting the crime of murder that were in issue in this 
case"). 
 
In order to meet its burden with respect to the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, the Commonwealth's "evidence [had 
to] be of such a character as to show that the crime was 
committed under circumstances indicating something more than 
ordinary atrocity or cruelty, and manifesting a degree of 
atrocity or cruelty which must be considered as aggravated and 
extreme."  Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 265 Mass. 382, 388 (1928).  
In evaluating whether the Commonwealth met that standard, the 
jury were permitted to consider: 
"the defendant's indifference to or pleasure in the 
victim's suffering, the victim's consciousness and degree 
of suffering, the extent of injuries inflicted, the number 
26 
 
of blows, the manner and force by which the blows were 
delivered, the weapon used by the defendant, and the 
disproportion between the means necessary to cause death 
and the means employed." 
 
Commonwealth v. Semedo, 422 Mass. 716, 721 (1996), citing 
Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983).  Evidence 
probative of extreme atrocity or cruelty will often be gruesome, 
but that fact alone is insufficient to render the evidence 
inadmissible.  Commonwealth v. Ramos, 406 Mass. 397, 406-407 
(1990). 
Sergeant Frammartino's testimony regarding the white, 
frothy sputum and breathing difficulties of the victim as he lay 
dying was relevant to consciousness and degree of suffering.  
See Semedo, 422 Mass. at 721.  The chemist's testimony regarding 
the photographs clarified which of the fourteen holes in the 
shirt were consistent with the travel of bullets, which was 
relevant to the extent of the injuries, the number of blows, and 
the weapon used to inflict them.  See id.  The judge did not 
abuse her discretion in determining that the relevance of each 
witness's testimony was not outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 375 Mass. 308, 313-314 
(1978) (no error in admission of both photographic and verbal 
testimony illustrating nature of murder victim's wound). 
 
e.  The prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant also 
challenges two aspects of the Commonwealth's closing argument.  
27 
 
First, he accuses the prosecutor of improperly speculating that 
the "defendant wasn't alone that night.  He was talking to 
friends.  Don't you think that's who he ditched the gun -- or, 
handed the gun off to?"  Second, he contends that the prosecutor 
shifted the burden of proof by commenting on the defendant's 
unhelpfulness during the police investigation.  Because defense 
counsel objected to both of the challenged remarks at trial, we 
review for prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 
Mass. 491, 500 (1997), S.C., 427 Mass 298 (1998), and 428 Mass. 
39 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998).  "The cumulative 
effect of all the errors in the context of the entire argument 
and the case as a whole is considered in making this 
determination."  Id. 
 
"The rules governing prosecutors' closing arguments are 
clear in principle."  Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516 
(1987).  Prosecutors may not refer to facts not in evidence or 
make statements that shift the burden of proof to the defendant.  
Commonwealth v. Amirault, 404 Mass. 221, 238-240 (1989).  "A 
prosecutor may, however, in closing argument, analyze the 
evidence and suggest what reasonable inferences the jury should 
draw from that evidence."  Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 412 Mass. 
505, 509 (1992).  Because the line separating speculation and 
inference is often a fine one, "we must and do recognize that 
closing argument is identified as argument, the jury 
28 
 
understand[] that, instructions from the judge inform the jury 
that closing argument is not evidence, and instructions may 
mitigate any prejudice in the final argument."  Kozec, 399 Mass. 
at 517. 
 
The prosecutor was entitled to offer a response to defense 
counsel's closing argument regarding the failure by police to 
locate the gun.  See Commonwealth v. LeFave, 407 Mass. 927, 939 
(1990) (prosecutor has right of retaliatory reply).  As there 
was no direct evidence that the defendant "ditched the gun," the 
prosecutor asked the jury to draw an inference based on the 
following facts that were in evidence:  (1) the police were 
unable to locate the gun; (2) when asked about the location of 
the gun, the defendant indicated that the police would not find 
it; (3) the defendant discarded articles of his clothing in the 
aftermath of the shooting; and (4) the defendant told the police 
that he was with his friends outside the night club at the time 
of the shooting.  In light of these facts, as well as the 
substantial evidence that the defendant was the shooter, the 
jury were permitted to infer that the defendant handed the gun 
off to a friend. 
 
The prosecutor was also entitled to respond to defense 
counsel's criticism of the police investigation, which 
characterized the police as more interested in building a case 
against the defendant than in finding the actual perpetrator.  
29 
 
See LeFave, 407 Mass. at 939.  The defendant told the police 
that he was with his friends outside the night club at the time 
of the shooting.  In express rebuttal to defense counsel's 
charge, the prosecutor recounted the Cambridge police 
department's unsuccessful attempts to contact these friends to 
confirm the defendant's alibi.  The defendant contends that this 
"signal[ed] to the jury that the defendant ha[d] an affirmative 
duty to bring forth evidence of his innocence."  Commonwealth v. 
Tu Trinh, 458 Mass. 776, 787 (2011).  We disagree. 
 
The cases cited by the defendant are not on point.  In 
Commonwealth v. Buzzell, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 362, 370 (2001), the 
prosecutor observed to the jury that defense counsel had failed 
to offer an explanation for the "uncontested" evidence against 
the defendant.  As we explained in Commonwealth v. Borodine, 371 
Mass. 1, 10 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977):  
"References to certain facts as 'uncontested' are improper when 
the defendant himself is the only one who can contradict the 
evidence."  In Tu Trinh, 458 Mass. at 788, the prosecutor opined 
to the jury that "to come in here and point the finger at the 
Boston police department because it's easy to do is just not 
fair and it's not right."  This constituted improper argument 
because it suggested that defense counsel's strategy was 
inappropriate.  We held that the trial judge mitigated any 
prejudice by instructing the jury that "[w]hat [the prosecutor] 
30 
 
meant to say . . . was, in his view, based on the state of the 
evidence and the circumstances of this case[,] that it was 
unwarranted, not that it was not right or unfair."  Id. at 789 & 
n.21. 
 
By comparison, the prosecutor in this case did not comment 
on the defendant's failure to contradict "uncontested" evidence, 
nor did he imply that it was improper for defense counsel to 
attack the thoroughness of the police investigation.  Rather, he 
argued that defense counsel's assertion was not supported by the 
evidence.  This was permissible.  Viewing the prosecutor's 
statements in context, there is no basis to conclude that the 
burden of proof was shifted from the Commonwealth to the 
defendant. 
 
f.  The requested jury instructions.  The defendant argues 
that the judge erred in denying three requested jury 
instructions.  We find no error.  Two of the requested 
instructions, which the defendant captions "Omissions in Police 
Investigations" and "Missing or Tampered with Evidence," were 
intended to address certain purported failures or inadequacies 
in the police investigation.  These requested instructions are 
accurately characterized as a so-called Bowden instruction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Tolan, 453 Mass. 634, 652 (2009) ("[Commonwealth 
v Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 486 (1980)] instruction permits jurors 
31 
 
to consider evidence . . . of police failure to take certain 
investigatory steps"). 
 
On a number of occasions, we have said that the Bowden 
instruction may be given in the judge's discretion, but it is 
never required.  See e.g., Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 463 
Mass. 581, 598 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 
Mass. 678, 687 (2003) ("such an instruction is 'never required 
under our case law'"); Commonwealth v. Perez, 460 Mass. 683, 692 
(2011), quoting Williams, 439 Mass. at 687 ("as we have often 
stated, 'a judge is not required to instruct on the claimed 
inadequacy of a police investigation'").  All Bowden requires, 
we have said, is that the judge not remove from the jury's 
consideration the issue of claimed failure or inadequacy.  
Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. at 598. 
 
Here, the judge did not prevent defense counsel from 
arguing the inadequacies of the police investigation to the 
jury.  Indeed, defense counsel took full advantage of the 
opportunity.  The issue was properly before the jury, and the 
judge's instructions provided a sufficient legal framework for 
the jury to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of 
each witness. There was no abuse of discretion.  Perez, 460 
Mass. at 692. 
 
The defendant captions the third requested instruction, 
"Identification of Physical Evidence."  He contends that this 
32 
 
instruction anticipated our holding in Commonwealth v. Franklin, 
465 Mass. 895, 912 (2013), that, when requested, a "variation of 
the approved identification instruction" should be given where 
"eyewitnesses have provided a physical description of the 
perpetrator or his clothing."  Id.  The new rule articulated in 
the Franklin case arose in the context of our observation "that 
eyewitness identification may be an important issue at trial 
even where no eyewitness made a positive identification of the 
defendant as the perpetrator, but where eyewitnesses have 
provided a physical description of the perpetrator or his 
clothing."  Id.  Nonetheless, we concluded that the "absence of 
a specific identification instruction was not likely to have 
influenced the jury's verdicts and, therefore, did not result in 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  Id. at 
914. 
 
The defendant does not directly argue that the Franklin 
case should be applied retroactively, and we need not reach that 
issue, as the defendant suffered no prejudice from the omission.  
See Commonwealth v. Dyous, 436 Mass. 719, 730 (2002).  The trial 
judge instructed the jury extensively regarding eyewitness 
identification testimony.  The instruction covered numerous 
factors to consider when evaluating such testimony, including 
lighting, distance, whether the witness had seen or known the 
person in the past, the witness's capacity and opportunity to 
33 
 
make the observation, and the length of time between the 
observation and the testimony.  Although the judge did not 
assign explicitly this framework to identifications of physical 
evidence, the concepts were transferable readily. 
 
Moreover, defense counsel was permitted to argue this very 
point during his closing argument and, in fact, did so 
extensively.  In light of defense counsel's vigorous argument, 
the court's instructions on eyewitness identification testimony, 
and the strong evidence implicating the defendant as the 
shooter, we conclude that the absence of the modified 
instruction "did not influence the jury, or had but very slight 
effect."  Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 729 (2010), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994). 
 
g.  The motion for a new trial.  The defendant's final 
argument is that he was erroneously deprived of an evidentiary 
hearing in connection with his motion for a new motion.  "The 
decision to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion for a new 
trial is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial 
judge."  Commonwealth v. Britto, 433 Mass. 596, 608 (2001).  A 
"judge may rule on the issue or issues presented by such motion 
on the basis of the facts alleged in the affidavits without 
further hearing if no substantial issue is raised by the motion 
or affidavits."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3), as appearing in 
435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  "In determining whether a 'substantial 
34 
 
issue' meriting an evidentiary hearing under rule 30 has been 
raised, we look not only at the seriousness of the issue 
asserted, but also to the adequacy of the defendant's showing on 
the issue raised."  Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 253, 257-
258 (1981). 
The issues raised by the defendant's motion and the 
accompanying affidavit of trial counsel were the pretrial jacket 
identifications, the protocol lapses by the Cambridge police, 
and the altered identification forms.  Those issues were 
thoroughly explored through evidentiary hearings both prior to 
and during the trial.  The judge did not abuse her discretion in 
concluding that an additional hearing would have been cumulative 
and unnecessary.  Britto, 433 Mass. at 608. 
 
h.  G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the record in 
accordance with G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to determine whether there 
is any basis to set aside or reduce the verdict of murder in the 
first degree or to order a new trial, regardless of whether such 
grounds were raised on appeal.  During that review, we 
encountered questionable actions by the police,7 and several 
                     
 
7 As indicated above, we conclude that the various lapses in 
protocol and judgment by the Cambridge police department in this 
case were appropriately addressed at each stage of the 
proceedings below. 
 
35 
 
erroneous evidentiary rulings.8  We conclude, however, that these 
errors did not give rise to a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Accordingly, we decline to exercise our 
authority under § 33E to order a new trial or reduce the degree 
of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
                     
 
8 One of these rulings pertained to the identification 
testimony of Daniel Jacobs.  The trial judge entirely precluded 
defense counsel from using Jacobs's medical records to impeach 
the credibility of his observations on the night of the 
shooting.  Just six weeks prior to the shooting, Jacobs had been 
admitted to a hospital specializing in the treatment of 
psychiatric illness and chemical dependency.  The hospital 
records reveal a history of bipolar disorder and poly-substance 
abuse.  During his stay, Jacobs also complained of intermittent 
blurred vision, exhibited inconsistent memory, and engaged in 
unstable behavior that resulted in his being chemically 
restrained on two occasions.  Given the temporal proximity of 
Jacobs's stay to the night in question, the records may very 
well have cast doubt among the jury regarding Jacobs's ability 
to accurately perceive and describe the events he allegedly 
witnessed on the night of the shooting.  Commonwealth v. Caine, 
366 Mass. 366, 369 (1974) ("mental impairment, as well as 
habitual intoxication and drug addiction, may be the subject of 
proper impeachment if it is shown that such factors affect the 
witness's capacity to perceive, remember, and articulate 
correctly").  Therefore, we disagree with the judge's conclusion 
that the records were not relevant. 
 
 
Nevertheless, this error does not require reversal because 
defense counsel was permitted and able to broadly and 
effectively impeach Jacobs's credibility.  On cross-examination, 
Jacobs admitted to prior convictions for drug possession, to 
having substance abuse problems, to drinking on the night of the 
shooting, to misremembering the date and time of his arrival at 
the night club, and to many inconsistencies between his trial 
testimony and grand jury testimony.  Moreover, given the 
strength of the Commonwealth's other evidence, we conclude that 
the additional, disallowed source of impeachment could not have 
affected the jury's decision.  See Commonwealth v. Morales, 461 
Mass. 765, 784-785 (2012). 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  new trial affirmed.