Title: In re J.T.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re J.T., Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-3654.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-3654 
IN RE J.T. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re J.T., Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-3654.] 
Criminal law—An inoperable pistol that is not used as a bludgeon or otherwise 
used, possessed, or carried as a weapon is not a “deadly weapon” for 
purposes of R.C. 2923.12, which prohibits carrying a concealed weapon—
Conviction vacated. 
(No. 2014-0449—Submitted February 24, 2015—Decided September 10, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, 
No. C-130434. 
_______________________ 
O’NEILL, J. 
{¶ 1} The juvenile in this matter was carrying a broken pistol in his 
waistband that was no longer capable of firing a round.  That fact 
notwithstanding, he was charged with carrying a concealed deadly weapon and 
was found delinquent.  Today, we apply a common-sense reality check to that fact 
pattern.  When a person has an inoperable handgun tucked into his or her 
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waistband and does not use it as a bludgeoning implement, it is not a deadly 
weapon.  While it had been designed as a deadly weapon in that it was meant to 
fire a potentially lethal projectile, its essence as a deadly weapon ended when it 
became inoperable.  In effect, since it was inoperable, it was no different from a 
stone or a brick.  If it had been used as a bludgeon or otherwise used, possessed, 
or carried as a weapon, it could be considered a deadly weapon. As nothing more 
than a heavy object tucked into a waistband or a pocket, however, it was not.  Just 
as it would be improper to convict someone of carrying a concealed weapon 
simply because he had a stone in his pocket, it is also improper to convict 
someone of that crime simply for having an inoperable pistol tucked into his 
waistband. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} On March 17, 2013, Cincinnati Police Officer Frank Boggio was 
called to a location where a large group of juveniles had gathered.  Boggio 
approached the group and stopped two males who were wearing dark hooded 
sweatshirts.  One of them was appellant, J.T.  Officer Boggio noticed a rather 
large bulge around J.T.’s waistband.  Officer Boggio patted down J.T. and felt a 
gun tucked into his waistband.  J.T. admitted that he had a gun, and the officer 
removed a loaded Hi-Point 9mm handgun from J.T.’s waistband. 
{¶ 3} That same day, Officer Boggio filed a complaint alleging that J.T., a 
minor, was delinquent for carrying a concealed deadly weapon on his person, a 
fourth-degree felony.  On April 8, 2013, just prior to trial, the charge was 
amended to a first-degree misdemeanor because it had been determined that the 
gun was inoperable.  J.T. was found to be delinquent.  The magistrate stated that 
“[e]vidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the 
firearm in his waistband” and that “[t]he weapon was inoperable but was still 
capable of being used as a deadly weapon.”  J.T. was found to have violated R.C. 
2923.12, which prohibits carrying a concealed weapon. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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{¶ 4} On April 22, 2013, J.T. timely filed written objections to the 
magistrate’s decision.  On May 22, 2013, the trial court heard oral arguments on 
J.T.’s objections.  The juvenile court subsequently overruled the objections and 
adopted the magistrate’s decision.  J.T. filed an appeal in the First District Court 
of Appeals on July 15, 2013.  In his appeal, J.T. argued that an inoperable pistol 
carried in one’s waistband and not brandished or used in any way is not a “deadly 
weapon” within the statutory meaning.  On February 7, 2014, the First District 
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.  The court stated that “[i]t is 
beyond cavil that the pistol had been designed as a weapon.  And the arresting 
police officer testified that the pistol was a heavy, blunt object—evidence that the 
pistol was capable of inflicting deadly harm.”  We accepted J.T.’s discretionary 
appeal.  139 Ohio St.3d 1416, 2014-Ohio-2487, 10 N.E.3d 737.   
Analysis 
{¶ 5} The key question in this appeal is whether a person can be convicted 
of carrying a concealed weapon when the handgun being carried is inoperable and 
was not used as a bludgeon or otherwise used, possessed, or carried as a weapon.  
We must conclude that the answer is no.  To hold to the contrary would 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the operability of a gun is completely 
irrelevant.  A gun could always be used as a bludgeon, so even an antique war 
relic would have to be considered a deadly weapon.  Surely this was not the 
outcome intended by the legislature. 
{¶ 6} R.C. 2923.12(A) prohibits the carrying of a concealed weapon, 
including a “deadly weapon” or a handgun.  R.C. 2923.11(A) provides, “ ‘Deadly 
weapon’ means any instrument, device, or thing capable of inflicting death, and 
designed or specially adapted for use as a weapon, or possessed, carried, or used 
as a weapon.”  The First District Court of Appeals seemed to hang its hat on the 
fact that the gun J.T. had in his waistband had been designed as a weapon.  It then 
found that the gun, while inoperable, was capable of deadly harm through use as a 
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bludgeon, as it “was a heavy, blunt object.”  This reasoning reflects skewed logic.  
While the gun in question was no doubt designed as a weapon, the design was for 
the gun to shoot a projectile from the barrel at a high rate of speed.  It was not 
designed to be used as a bludgeon, like a club or nightstick.  The fact that the gun 
was inoperable means that it had lost the sole function for which it had been 
designed.  It was no longer a deadly weapon unless there was some evidence 
presented that it was used as a bludgeon or otherwise used, possessed, or carried 
as a weapon.  There was not.  Hence, it was no more of a deadly weapon than is a 
laptop computer or a briefcase, yet attorneys are not routinely arrested for 
carrying concealed weapons as they enter our courthouses. 
{¶ 7} This court has previously held that a pistol must be operable or 
readily rendered operable at the time of the offense in order to be a “firearm” that 
would support a firearm specification under former R.C. 2929.71, Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 261, 142 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3109.  State v. Murphy, 49 Ohio St.3d 206, 208, 
551 N.E.2d 932 (1990), citing State v. Gaines, 46 Ohio St.3d 65, 545 N.E.2d 68 
(1989), syllabus.  While the present case does not involve a firearm specification, 
there is no valid basis to distinguish between guns for purposes of a firearm 
specification and for the statute prohibiting carrying a concealed weapon.  To 
allow an inoperable handgun to be considered a per se deadly weapon would be 
an unintended expansion of the statute.  The General Assembly has shown that it 
is capable of crafting a statute that penalizes someone for carrying a gun whether 
it is operable or inoperable.  R.C. 2923.122(C), the statute prohibiting weapons 
within a school zone, states, “No person shall knowingly possess an object in a 
school safety zone if * * * [t]he object is indistinguishable from a firearm, 
whether or not the object is capable of being fired.” 
{¶ 8} Clearly, the legislature could have used similar language in R.C. 
2923.11(A) if it had intended the crime of carrying a concealed weapon to include 
January Term, 2015 
 
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possession of an inoperable handgun.  The fact that it chose not to include such 
language should not be ignored.   
Conclusion 
{¶ 9} Based upon the foregoing analysis, an inoperable pistol that is not 
used as a bludgeon is not a “deadly weapon” for purposes of R.C. 2923.12, which 
prohibits carrying a concealed weapon.  Accordingly, there was insufficient 
evidence to support appellant’s finding of delinquency for carrying a concealed 
weapon.  The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the finding of 
delinquency is vacated. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would dismiss the appeal as having been 
improvidently accepted. 
_________________ 
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Gordon 
Magella, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Rachel 
Lipman Curran, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
_________________