Title: State ex rel. Davic v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Davic v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4569.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-4569 
THE STATE EX REL. DAVIC, APPELLANT, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY COURT OF 
COMMON PLEAS, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Davic v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 
Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4569.] 
Prohibition—Inmate had adequate remedies in ordinary course of law to raise 
alleged errors of which he complains, and trial court had subject-matter 
jurisdiction over his criminal case—Court of appeals’ dismissal of 
complaint affirmed. 
(No. 2023-0588—Submitted November 14, 2023—Decided December 19, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 22AP-301, 
2023-Ohio-1195. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Bradford S. Davic, appeals the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals’ judgment dismissing his complaint for a writ of prohibition under Civ.R. 
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12(B)(6).  Davic also requests oral argument.  Appellee, the Franklin County Court 
of Common Pleas (“trial court”), asks us to affirm the Tenth District’s judgment 
and to declare Davic a vexatious litigator under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B). 
{¶ 2} Because Davic failed to state a valid claim in prohibition, we affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals.  We deny Davic’s motion for oral argument 
and the trial court’s request to declare Davic a vexatious litigator. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 3} In November 2010, a Franklin County grand jury indicted Davic on 
five counts of rape, one count of importuning, and one count of gross sexual 
imposition.  Each rape count included a sexually-violent-predator specification, and 
all seven counts of the indictment specified that Davic’s victim was under 13 years 
of age. 
{¶ 4} In April 2011, Davic agreed to plead guilty to importuning, gross 
sexual imposition, and four counts of rape.  In exchange for Davic’s plea of guilty, 
the state agreed that a nolle prosequi be entered as to one count of rape and all the 
sexually-violent-predator specifications.  The guilty-plea form signed by Davic and 
his attorney states that the maximum prison terms for the offenses to which he was 
pleading guilty totaled 53 years to life. 
{¶ 5} The trial court held a plea-and-sentencing hearing in April and May 
2011.  At the hearing, the trial court noted that Davic had signed a guilty-plea form 
and asked Davic whether he understood what he had signed.  Davic responded 
affirmatively but stated that his understanding was that he was agreeing “to a plea 
deal that was going to be a sentence of * * * ten years to a life sentence.”  Later in 
the hearing, however, Davic replied “Yes, sir” when the trial court asked Davic 
whether he understood that the total maximum sentence he could receive was 53 
years to life in prison. 
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{¶ 6} The trial court sentenced Davic to an aggregate term of 40 years to 
life in prison, lifetime registration as a Tier III sex offender under R.C. 2950.01(G), 
and a mandatory five-year term of postrelease control.  Davic’s convictions were 
affirmed on appeal.  State v. Davic, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-555, 2012-Ohio-
952, appeal not accepted, 132 Ohio St.3d 1482, 2012-Ohio-3334, 971 N.E.2d 960.  
Since then, Davic has tried unsuccessfully to either correct his sentence or withdraw 
his guilty plea.  See, e.g., State v. Davic, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-1000, 2016-
Ohio-4883 (affirming denial of motion for resentencing), appeal not accepted, 147 
Ohio St.3d 1508, 2017-Ohio-261, 67 N.E.3d 824; State v. Davic, 10th Dist. 
Franklin No. 18AP-569, 2019-Ohio-1320 (affirming denial of motion to correct 
sentence), appeal not accepted, 156 Ohio St.3d 1478, 2019-Ohio-3148, 128 N.E.3d 
241; State v. Davic, 2021-Ohio-131, 166 N.E.3d 681 (10th Dist.) (affirming denial 
of Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw guilty plea), appeal not accepted, 164 Ohio 
St.3d 1404, 2021-Ohio-2742, 172 N.E.3d 174; State v. Davic, 10th Dist. Franklin 
No. 11AP-555, 2021 Ohio App. LEXIS 3649 (Oct. 19, 2021) (denying motion for 
leave to file delayed application for reconsideration), appeal not accepted, 165 
Ohio St.3d 1525, 2022-Ohio-258, 179 N.E.3d 1290. 
{¶ 7} Davic commenced this action in the Tenth District in May 2022, 
seeking a writ of prohibition ordering either that he be immediately released from 
prison or that his criminal case be remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings.  Davic argued that the trial court had lacked jurisdiction to sentence 
him based on “a non-existent, unenforceable plea contract.”  Invoking contract-law 
principles, Davic alleged that there had been no “meeting of the minds” with respect 
to the “core terms” of his plea agreement with the state. 
{¶ 8} The trial court filed a motion to dismiss Davic’s complaint under 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and asked the court of appeals to declare him to be a vexatious 
litigator.  The trial court’s sole arguments in support of the motion to dismiss were 
that (1) Davic had had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law by way 
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of appeal to raise his arguments regarding the validity of the plea agreement and 
(2) Davic’s R.C. 2969.25(A) affidavit describing each civil action and appeal he 
had filed during the previous five years was inadequate.  The matter was referred 
to a court-of-appeals magistrate, who recommended granting the motion to dismiss.  
The magistrate recommended dismissal on the basis that Davic had had an adequate 
legal remedy at law by way of appeal to contest the voluntariness of his plea 
agreement.  The magistrate declined to recommend that Davic be declared a 
vexatious litigator but warned him that “his continued filing of appeals, original 
actions, and any other actions that are not reasonably grounded in fact or warranted 
by law may result in his being declared a vexatious litigator pursuant to R.C. 
2323.52.”  Davic filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. 
{¶ 9} The court of appeals overruled Davic’s objections and dismissed his 
prohibition complaint.  The court agreed with the magistrate that the trial court had 
not patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over Davic’s sentencing and 
that Davic had had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to challenge any defects 
in his plea. 
{¶ 10} Davic appealed to this court as of right and also requests oral 
argument.  The trial court asks this court to declare Davic a vexatious litigator under 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B). 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Davic’s Motion for Oral Argument 
{¶ 11} Oral argument is not mandatory in this case, but we have discretion 
to grant it under S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02(A).  In exercising this discretion, we consider 
“whether the case involves a matter of great public importance, complex issues of 
law or fact, a substantial constitutional issue, or a conflict among courts of appeals.”  
State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 111 Ohio St.3d 118, 2006-Ohio-
5339, 855 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 15.  This case involves none of those elements.  The 
dispositive issue in this case is whether the trial court had subject-matter 
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jurisdiction to accept Davic’s guilty plea and to sentence him.  Because oral 
argument is not necessary to illuminate that issue, we deny Davic’s motion. 
B.  Court of Appeals’ Dismissal of Davic’s Prohibition Complaint 
{¶ 12} We review de novo a court of appeals’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal of 
an extraordinary-writ action.  State ex rel. Zander v. Judge of Summit Cty. Common 
Pleas Court, 156 Ohio St.3d 466, 2019-Ohio-1704, 129 N.E.3d 401, ¶ 4.  Dismissal 
is appropriate if it appears beyond doubt, taking all factual allegations in the 
complaint as true, that the relator can prove no set of facts entitling him to 
extraordinary relief.  Id. 
{¶ 13} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Davic must establish that (1) 
the trial court exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power was 
unauthorized by law, and (3) denial of the writ would result in injury for which no 
adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Jones v. 
Paschke, 168 Ohio St.3d 93, 2022-Ohio-2427, 195 N.E.3d 1031, ¶ 6.  The third 
element is not required if the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked 
jurisdiction.  Id.  If jurisdiction was patently and unambiguously lacking, a writ of 
prohibition will issue to correct a judgment issued by a court that lacked 
jurisdiction.  State ex rel. V.K.B. v. Smith, 142 Ohio St.3d 469, 2015-Ohio-2004, 32 
N.E.3d 452, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 14} In this case, Davic argues that his guilty plea and plea agreement 
were unenforceable because there was no “meeting of the minds as to all of the 
essential terms of the agreement.”  Specifically, Davic argues that he was not 
adequately notified of the mandatory consecutive sentences that were applicable to 
the crimes to which he had pleaded guilty or the sex-offender registration and the 
postrelease-control requirements of his sentence.  Accordingly, Davic argues that 
his guilty plea was “void” and that the trial court therefore was divested of 
jurisdiction to sentence him.  Davic also contends that the trial court’s lack of 
jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous. 
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{¶ 15} Davic is wrong.  “There is a distinction between a court that lacks 
subject-matter jurisdiction over a case and a court that improperly exercises that 
subject-matter jurisdiction once conferred upon it.”  Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio 
St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 10.  “Once a tribunal has jurisdiction 
over both the subject matter of an action and the parties to it, ‘* * * the right to hear 
and determine is perfect; and the decision of every question thereafter arising is but 
the exercise of the jurisdiction thus conferred * * *.’ ”  (Ellipses sic.)  State ex rel. 
Pizza v. Rayford, 62 Ohio St.3d 382, 384, 582 N.E.2d 992 (1992), quoting 
Sheldon’s Lessee v. Newton, 3 Ohio St. 494, 499 (1854).  An error in the exercise 
of jurisdiction “renders the court’s judgment voidable, not void.”  State v. Harper, 
160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 26.  And extraordinary 
relief is not available to attack a voidable judgment.  See id. (“Generally, a voidable 
judgment may be set aside only if successfully challenged on direct appeal”). 
{¶ 16} In this case, there is no question that the trial court had subject-matter 
jurisdiction over Davic’s criminal case.  The indictment alleged that Davic 
committed felony offenses in Franklin County, and pursuant to R.C. 2931.03, a 
court of common pleas possesses subject-matter jurisdiction in all felony cases, 
State ex rel. Boler v. McCarthy, 170 Ohio St.3d 392, 2023-Ohio-500, 213 N.E.3d 
690, ¶ 9.  The validity of Davic’s guilty plea, which is the foundation of his 
arguments, is not a matter that calls into question the subject-matter jurisdiction of 
the trial court. 
{¶ 17} Davic complains, at most, of error in the trial court’s exercise of its 
existing  jurisdiction.  See Dunbar v. State, 136 Ohio St.3d 181, 2013-Ohio-2163, 
992 N.E.2d 1111, ¶ 15 (conviction based on invalid guilty plea was error in exercise 
of jurisdiction).  But Davic had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the 
law—including a direct appeal, a petition for postconviction relief, and a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea—to raise the alleged errors of which he complains.  See 
State ex rel. Parker v. Russo, 158 Ohio St.3d 123, 2019-Ohio-4420, 140 N.E.3d 
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602, ¶ 21; Shie v. Leonard, 84 Ohio St.3d 160, 161, 702 N.E.2d 419 (1998).  
Therefore, the court of appeals correctly dismissed Davic’s complaint for failure to 
state a valid claim in prohibition. 
C.  Vexatious Litigator 
{¶ 18} The trial court asks us to declare Davic to be a vexatious litigator 
under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B).  Under Rule 4.03(B), we may declare a party to be 
vexatious if that party “habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause 
engage[d] in frivolous conduct.” 
{¶ 19} We deny the trial court’s request.  The trial court’s only basis for the 
request to declare Davic vexatious is the observation that he “has filed numerous 
appeals and post-judgment actions alleging similar arguments” to those raised in 
this appeal.  However, under Rule 4.03(A), to be declared a vexatious litigator in 
this court, a party must have engaged in frivolous conduct in an appeal or other 
action in this court.  We decline to declare Davic a vexatious litigator at this time 
because the trial court does not argue that Davic has engaged in frivolous conduct 
in this court. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 20} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals, deny Davic’s motion for oral argument, and deny the trial court’s request 
to declare Davic to be a vexatious litigator. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, 
and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Bradford S. Davic, pro se. 
G. Gary Tyack, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brandon Coy 
Hendrix, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
_________________