Title: IN THE INTEREST OF ANO: SLB V. JEO

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE INTEREST OF ANO: SLB V. JEO2006 WY 74136 P.3d 797Case Number: C-05-13Decided: 06/23/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
IN THE 
INTEREST OF ANO:

 
 
SLB,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
JEO,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Ann M. Rochelle of Shively, Taheri & 
Rochelle, PC, Casper, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
John M. Burman, Faculty Director; John D. Chambers, Student Intern; UW 
Legal Services Program, Laramie, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Chambers.

 
 

Guardian 
Ad Litem:

            
Jacqueline K. Brown, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Mother (SLB) 
filed a petition to terminate biological father's (JEO) parental rights to the 
child (ANO) pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005), 
which allows termination of the parent-child relationship upon a showing by 
clear and convincing evidence the child has been left in the care of another 
person without provision for the child's support and without communication from 
the absent parent for a period of at least one year.  Following a trial, the district court 
entered an order denying the petition on the ground no showing was made JEO left 
the child in SLB's care without provision for the child's support as required by 
§ 14-2-309(a)(i). Rather, the district court concluded, the child was placed in 
SLB's custody by court order following a divorce proceeding, which also provided 
for support by ordering JEO to make monthly support payments.  In reaching this result, the district 
court cited In the Matter of Parental 
Rights of SCN and NAN, 659 P.2d 568, 573-74 (Wyo. 1983) as controlling law. 
 SLB appeals the district court's 
order, claiming SCN should be 
overruled.  We decline to overrule 
SCN and affirm the district court's 
order.     

  

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      SLB presents the 
following issue for our review:

 
 
Did 
Appellant-Mother demonstrate that Appellee-Father made only occasional support 
contributions; had only incidental communication; and that the child had been 
"left in the care of another without provision for support and without 
communication from the absent parent for a period of at least one (1) year" 
under Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-309 (a)(i)?

 
 
JEO 
states the issues as follows:

 
 
I.          
Whether the district court abused its discretion in applying the Wyoming 
Supreme Court precedent from In re 
Parental Rights of SCN, in holding that Appellant failed to meet the 
threshold requirement of showing that Appellee placed his daughter in the care 
of another without provision for the child's support under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(i)?

 
 
II.          
Whether a child in the legal and physical custody of a parent pursuant to 
a divorce decree and for whom child support payments are being made by a third 
party due to the impossibility/inability of the non-custodial parent to earn 
money, has been "supported" under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(i)?

 
 
III.         
Whether a parent seeking to terminate the parental rights of the other 
parent for failure to communicate for a period of at least one (1) year who is 
complicit in the interference with such communication attempts can prevail under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(i)?

 
 
The 
guardian ad litem appointed to represent ANO joined in the brief filed by 
SLB.

 
 
FACTS

            

[¶3] SLB 
and JEO were married and had one child, ANO, born February 23, 1998.  The couple divorced on June 4, 1999. 
 The decree awarded SLB sole custody 
of ANO, ordered JEO to make monthly child support payments and allowed JEO 
visitation with the child. 

 
 
[¶4] On 
November 8, 2004, SLB filed a petition for termination of JEO's parental rights. 
 As grounds for the petition, SLB 
alleged ANO had been left in her care without provision for support or 
communication from JEO for a period of at least one year as provided in § 
14-2-309(a)(i).  JEO filed a 
response to the petition in which he denied leaving the child in her mother's 
care without provision for support or communication for a year. 

 
 
[¶5] On 
April 20, 2005, the district court held a trial on the petition.  Both parties presented evidence and 
argument.  The district court issued 
a decision letter finding JEO had not exercised visitation, had only limited 
contact with ANO since September of 2002, and was in arrears on his child 
support payments.  However, citing 
SCN, the district court concluded JEO 
did not leave the child in SLB's care without provision for support as required 
by § 14-2-309(a)(i).  Rather, the 
district court concluded the child was placed in SLB's care by a Colorado divorce court 
which awarded her custody of the child and ordered JEO to pay child support. 
 The district court stated:  "The fact that [JEO] either failed to or 
was unable to pay that child support (or, for that matter, unable to maintain 
regular communication with [ANO]) is not relevant in light of this Court's 
inability to get past the first prong in the analysis of § 14-2-309(a)(i)."  In conformity with its decision letter, 
the district court entered an order denying the petition for termination of 
JEO's parental rights. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
 [¶6]  SLB asks this Court to overrule a 
holding of a prior case.  In 
considering whether to overrule a prior decision, we have said:  

 
 
We 
consider the doctrine of stare 
decisis to be an important principle which furthers the "evenhanded, 
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on 
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the 
judicial process." 

 
 
Nevertheless, 
we should be willing to depart from precedent when it is necessary "to vindicate 
plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." When 
precedential decisions are no longer workable, or are poorly reasoned, we should 
not feel compelled to follow precedent.  
Stare decisis is a policy 
doctrine and should not require automatic conformance to past decisions.  

            

Goodrich 
v. Stobbe, 908 P.2d 416, 420 (Wyo. 1995) (citations omitted).   

 
 
[¶7]  When reviewing decisions terminating 
parental rights, we apply the following standards:

 
 
      Due to the 
tension between the fundamental liberty of familial association and the 
compelling state interest in protecting the welfare of children, application of 
statutes for termination of parental rights is a matter for strict 
scrutiny.  As part of this strict 
scrutiny standard, a case for termination of parental rights must be established 
by clear and convincing evidence.  
Clear and convincing evidence is that kind of proof that would persuade a 
trier of fact that the truth of the contention is highly probable.  Rigorous though this standard may be, we 
apply our traditional principles of evidentiary review when a party challenges 
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination.  Thus, we examine the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party prevailing below, assuming all favorable 
evidence to be true while discounting conflicting evidence presented by the 
unsuccessful party.  

 
 

SLJ v. 
Dep't of Family Serv., 2005 
WY 3, ¶ 19, 104 P.3d 74, 79-80 (Wyo. 2005).     

 
 
[¶8]  Resolution of the issues SLJ presents also requires application 
of our standards for interpreting statutory language:

 
 
We look 
first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine if the statute 
is ambiguous.  A statute is clear 
and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree 
on its meaning with consistency and predictability.  Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it 
is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.  Ultimately, whether a statute is 
ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court.  

 
 
When a 
statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory 
construction.  Instead, our inquiry 
revolves around the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according 
to their arrangement and connection.  
In doing so, we view the statute as a whole in order to ascertain its 
intent and general purpose and also the meaning of each part.  We give effect to every word, clause and 
sentence and construe all components of a statute in pari materia.  

 
 
We 
endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's intent.  When examining a statute, we presume 
that the legislature enacts legislation with full knowledge of existing law and 
with reference to other statutes and decisions of the courts.  Such legislation should, therefore, be 
construed in a way that creates a consistency and harmony within the existing 
law.  

 
 

SLJ, ¶ 20, 
104 P.3d  at 80.

 
 
[¶9]  Finally, we review a district court's 
decision concerning the termination of parental rights for abuse of 
discretion.  SCN, 659 P.2d  at 571.  In determining whether there has been an 
abuse of discretion, the ultimate question is whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did.  
Id.  

   

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10] 
SLB contends the district court's ruling enables a parent who does not care for, 
has no communication with and contributes nothing to the support of his or her 
child to avoid termination of his or her parental rights even though those three 
factors constitute grounds for termination under Wyoming law.  To the extent SCN supports this result, SLB urges this 
Court to overrule it.  Whether or 
not we choose to overrule precedent, SLB asserts we have not always followed SCN in other cases and should not follow 
it now.  JEO contends the district 
court properly applied SCN and there 
is no reason for this Court to overrule SCN.

 
 
[¶11]  We begin our discussion by looking at 
applicable Wyoming statutory law and the cases applying 
it.   Section 14-2-309(a)(i), the provision 
upon which SLB relied in her petition for terminating JEO's parental rights, 
provides as follows:

 
 
§ 
14-2-309. Grounds for termination of parent-child relationship; clear and 
convincing evidence.

 
 
(a)  The parent-child relationship may be 
terminated if any one (1) or more of the following facts is established by clear 
and convincing evidence:

(i)           
the 
child has been left in the care of another person without provision for the 
child's support and without communication from the absent parent for a period of 
at least one (1) year. In making the above determination, the court may 
disregard occasional contributions, or incidental contacts and 
communications;

 
 
Pursuant 
to this provision, parental rights may be terminated if clear and convincing 
evidence shows:  1) the child has 
been left in the care of another; 2) without provision for support; and 3) 
without communication from the absent parent for at least one year.  This provision was at issue in SCN, just as it was the focus of the 
petition and order here.  

 
 
[¶12]  In SCN, the Court was asked to review a 
district court's dismissal of a termination petition filed by mother on the 
basis of father's lack of support and communication. There, as in the present 
case, the parents were divorced, mother was awarded custody and father was 
ordered to pay child support.  Mother claimed father only made three 
child support payments and had only incidental contact with the child in the 
year preceding the termination action.  On appeal from the district court's 
dismissal of her petition, mother claimed three child support payments by father 
within one year did not qualify as support under § 14-2-309(a)(i).  This Court affirmed the district courts 
order dismissing the petition, stating:

 
 
To 
terminate parental rights under § 14-2-309(a)(i), the district court must decide 
. . . that a minor child has been "left * * * * without provision for the 
child's support."

 

The 
facts in this case indicate that the two minor children were placed in the 
custody of [mother] by the court that granted the divorce. The children were not 
left in [mother]'s care by [father]. Further, the same order that placed the 
children in [mother]'s custody also provided for their support by ordering 
[father] to make monthly support payments. In view of those facts, the fact that 
[father] failed to make all but four1 monthly support payments is not 
relevant here where the court could not get past the threshold question 
presented in the statute. [Father]'s failure to pay regularly would be relevant 
under an adoption-without-consent proceeding or in an action to compel payment, 
but not here where the children have been placed in one parent's custody and the 
action to terminate parental rights is against the non-custodial parent. To hold 
otherwise would ignore our rule of strict construction in these cases and would 
allow § 14-2-309(a)(i) to be used in a manner for which it was not 
intended.

 
 

SCN, 659 P.2d  at 573 (footnote added).  On 
this basis, we held the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
dismissing the termination petition.  SLB asks us to overturn this holding, 
arguing it thwarts the purpose of the termination statutes because it allows a 
parent who does not care for, support or communicate with his child for at least 
one year to retain his parental rights despite the clear statutory intent to 
allow termination of parental rights under those circumstances. 

 
 
[¶13] We 
agree with the interpretation of the phrase "left in the care of another" and 
decline the invitation to overrule SCN.  The phrase "left in the care of another" 
as used in § 14-2-309(a)(i) suggests an element of control or action on the part 
of the absent parent, an element that is not present when the parents divorce 
and the divorce court awards custody to one of them.  In SCN, the child was not "left in the care 
of another" but was placed in the custody of one parent as a result of a custody 
determination in a divorce proceeding.  Under these circumstances, the mother was 
unable to show clear and convincing evidence the child was "left in the care of 
another" as the provision requires.  Thus, dismissal of the petition was 
proper. 

 
 
[¶14] 
The legislature appears to have concurred with this interpretation. When this 
Court interprets a statute and the legislature makes no material legislative 
change in the provision thereafter, the legislature is presumed to acquiesce in 
the Court's interpretation.  Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec. Power 
Co-op., 2005 WY 108, ¶ 22, 118 P.3d 996, 1008 (Wyo. 2005).  If this Court incorrectly interpreted 
the legislature's intent, "legislative action to clarify the statutes and 
correct the court's decision would seem a likely result."  Albertson's, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 
2001 WY 98 ¶ 21, 33 P.3d 161 (Wyo. 2001).  Although the legislature has amended § 
14-2-309 at various times, it has not changed subsection (a)(i).  Absent some indication to the contrary 
from the legislature, we presume the Court correctly applied the provision in SCN and we will not overrule the 
decision.

 
 
[¶15] In 
the alternative, SLB asserts we have not consistently applied SCN in subsequent cases and should not 
do so now.  She cites EBH  v. Hot Springs Dep't. of Fam. Serv., 2001 WY 
100, ¶ 18, 33 P.3d 172, 180 (Wyo. 2001) and SLJ, ¶ 25, 104 P.3d  at 81-82. 

 
 
[¶16] 
In EBH, the child was in the care of 
his mother, who lived apart from the child's father, when the Department of 
Family Services (DFS) took him into protective custody.  Subsequently, DFS filed a petition to 
terminate the parental rights of both the mother and the father on three grounds 
specified in § 14-2-309(a):  (i) the 
child was left in the care of another without support or communication; (iii) 
neglect; and (v) he was in foster care for the last twenty-two months.  The district court granted the petition 
and father appealed.  This Court 
affirmed, holding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of 
father's rights on all three grounds.

 
 
[¶17]  Addressing § 14-2-309(a)(i), the 
provision at issue in the present case, father claimed in EBH  the provision did not apply because he 
did not leave the child in the care of another; rather, he claimed, DFS took the 
child from the mother.  Under the 
facts presented, we concluded this distinction was irrelevant. We said:  

 
 
The 
statute simply requires the child to have "been left in the care of another 
person[.]" There is no specification of fault or explanation for why the child 
has been left in the care of another person. The undisputed fact is that IH was 
left in the care of another person, DFS, not the absent parent. That is all the 
statute requires.   

 
 

EBH, ¶ 18, 
33 P.3d  at 180.  SLB asserts this 
conclusion is inconsistent with the holding in SCN because the earlier case treated the 
"left in the care of another" language as a threshold issue to be decided while 
the later case treated it as one of three concurrent conditions that must be 
shown. 

 
 
[¶18]  Whether or not the "left in the care of 
another" language is treated as a threshold issue or one of three necessary 
conditions to termination, we do not find EBH inconsistent with SCN.  EBH involved a termination petition 
filed by DFS after the child was left in foster care by both parents without 
provision for support or communication from them for over a year.  It did not involve court ordered 
placement of the child in the custody of one parent pursuant to a divorce decree 
as was the case in SCN.  Reiterating what we said in paragraph 13 
above, the phrase "left in the care of another" suggests an element of control 
or action on the part of the absent parent; that element is not present when a 
divorce court awards custody to one parent. In the context of a divorce and 
custody order, the child has not been "left in the care of another."  In SCN, the court placed the child in the 
care of the mother; in EBH, the 
father left the child in the care of DFS after the child was taken from the 
mother.  Section 14-2-309(a)(i) 
speaks to the latter situation.  We 
concluded in SCN it was not intended 
to speak to the former situation.  
We see no reason to depart from that conclusion 
now.

 
 
[¶19] 
Given the fundamental nature of parental rights, we do not believe § 
14-2-309(a)(i) was intended as a mechanism to enable a parent who has custody of 
a child pursuant to a divorce decree to bring about the termination of the 
non-custodial parent's parental rights.  
Instead, the statute was intended to allow termination of parental rights 
under subsection (a)(i) when the child has been "left in the care of another" 
(as opposed to ordered into the custody of the other parent) without provision 
for support or communication for at least one year. 

 
 
[¶20]  SLB also cites SLJ in support of her contention that 
this Court has not consistently followed SCN and should not do so here.  In SLJ, the mother left the children with 
the paternal grandmother while she looked for a job and a place to live.  While the children were with the 
grandmother, the parents divorced.  The court awarded father custody of the 
children and ordered mother to pay child support.  Despite the custody order, the children 
remained with the grandmother because father was in and out of jail.  Not long after the divorce, grandmother 
was appointed temporary guardian of the children with the parents' consent.   When allegations of abuse were 
made against grandmother, DFS took the children into protective custody.  One year later, and six years after 
mother left the children with grandmother, DFS filed a petition for termination 
of paternal rights.  We found these 
facts sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that mother "left the 
children in the care of another" as provided in § 14-2-309(a)(i). 

 
 
[¶21]  Like EBH, SLJ did not involve a termination action 
filed by a custodial parent against a non-custodial parent.  Additionally, although there was a 
custody order in SLJ, the children 
never lived with the custodial parent.  Instead, the mother left them in the care 
of the grandmother before the divorce and that is where they remained after the 
divorce until they were taken into protective custody.  SLB argues, however, that SLJ, like SCN, involved a court-ordered child 
support provision and yet, we concluded without reference to SCN, the evidence established the 
children were left in the care of another without provision for support.  To be consistent with SCN, SLB asserts, evidence of the child 
support provision should have been sufficient to defeat the claim that the 
children were left "without provision for support." 

 
 
[¶22] SLJ is not relevant to the issue before 
us.  Unlike the situation here, 
where the child was placed in SLB's 
custody by court order in the divorce proceeding, the mother in SLJ left the children in the care of 
another.  This factor, along with 
the other factors specified in § 14-2-309(a)(i), led to the termination of her 
parental rights.  In the present 
case, as in SCN, the mother cannot 
show the first factor specified in the statute; therefore, we do not reach the 
second factor.  Because SLB cannot 
show the child was left in the care of another, it is unnecessary to consider 
whether provision was made for his support.

 
 
[¶23]  In upholding the district court's order, 
we do not ignore SLB's assertion that this result allows a non-custodial parent 
who fails to pay court ordered child support to retain his parental rights.  We emphasize, however, the right to 
associate with one's child is a fundamental right.  The termination statutes were not 
intended as an avenue for a divorced parent to deprive his or her former spouse 
of that fundamental right, except under the circumstances expressly stated and 
strictly construed.  Other more 
appropriate, less onerous avenues are available under Wyoming law for securing 
child support payments from a parent who fails to pay.  Additionally, Wyoming's adoption 
statute provides a mechanism for terminating the rights of a parent who is 
uninvolved in a child's life when circumstances exist to support termination 
under that statute.   

 
 
[¶24]  Affirmed.     

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Mother 
claimed father made only three child support payments.  The district court concluded he made four 
support payments.