Title: THOMPKINS v FULLER

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 82-396 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MOFJTANA 1983 S. DENNIS THOP4PKINS, d/b/a PYRAMID BUILDERS I P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, DAVID FULLER, COb!lMISSIONER O F THE DEPARTMENT O F L A B O R AND II\lDUSTRY, STATE O F MONTANA, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Lake, The Honorable James B. Wheelis, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Paul J. Van T r i c h t argued, Dept. of Labor, Heilena Montana For Respondents: Thomas Hoover argued, Big Fork, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Joseph PJ. Duffy argued, Great F a l l s , Montana (Montana S t a t e Bldg. Trades Council) submitted: A p r i l 21, 1983 Decided: J u l y 21, 1983 F i l e d : Jut 2 1 1983 Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . The Department of Labor and I n d u s t r y a p p e a l s a d e c i s i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of Lake. T h i s d i s p u t e d e a l s w i t h t h e amount of wages paid by a b u i l d i n g c o n t r a c t o r t o h i s employees on a s t a t e - f inanced c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o j e c t . E s s e n t i a l l y , t h i s case i n v o l v e s i n t e r p r e - t a t i o n of Montana's L i t t l e "Davis-Bacon A c t , I 1 s e c t i o n s 18-2-401, e t . s e q . , MCA ( 1 9 7 9 ) , which r e q u i r e s c o n t r a c t o r s on p u b l i c pro- j e c t s t o pay t h e i r employees " t h e s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages . . . a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e county o r l o c a l i t y i n which t h e work is being performed." S e c t i o n 18-2-403(1), MCA, ( 1 9 7 9 ) . I n i t i a l l y , w e note t h a t t h e 1979 s t a t u t e s a r e a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s c a s e . W e a f f i r m t h e judgment with t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . I n 1980 t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Montana l e t c o n t r a c t s f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a r e s e a r c h l a b o r a t o r y a t Yellow Bay on Flathead Lake. The respondent was accepted a s t h e mechanical c o n t r a c t o r . P r i o r t o t h i s time, respondent was p r i m a r i l y involved i n res iden- t i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n . The l a b o r a t o r y was h i s f i r s t c o n t r a c t w i t h a governmental e n t i t y . The respondent was not a s i g n a t o r y t o any c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement, and a l l of h i s employees were nonunion. The c o n t r a c t r e q u i r e d t h e respondent t o abide by t h e l a b o r laws of t h e S t a t e of Montana; s p e c i f i c a l l y , he was r e q u i r e d t o pay h i s employees t h e " s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e " (SPR) a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e county or l o c a l i t y i n which t h e work was being performed. The c o n t r a c t language was taken from v a r i o u s p a r t s of Montana's L i t t l e Davis-Bacon A c t . Concerning h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , he con- t a c t e d a K a l i s p e l l a t t o r n e y who reviewed t h e c o n t r a c t . Nothing was d i s c u s s e d concerning t h e SPR p r o v i s i o n . Respondent a l s o t a l k e d t o t h e p r o j e c t a r c h i t e c t and a c o n t r a c t o r f r i e n d who had been coaching him. Through t h e s e d i s c u s s i o n s he b e l i e v e d himself t o be i n f u l l compliance w i t h Montana law. C o n s t r u c t i o n began and t h e r e a f t e r t h e S t a t e r e c e i v e d a complaint t h a t respondent was not paying h i s employees t h e SPR. The complaint was made by the b u s i n e s s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r the c a r p e n t e r s union of Northwest Montana. The union r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t e s t i f i e d i n p a r t a s follows: "Q. Did you have a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Thompkins on t h i s p r o j e c t ? A. Yes, I encouraged him t o j o i n the Union. "Q. Did you encourage him t o j o i n t h e Union? A . I d i d . "Q. What d i d you t e l l him when he wouldn't j o i n t h e Union? A. I s a i d I ' d have t o do m y job and whatever was a v a i l a b l e t o m e t o t r y and g e t him t o j o i n . "Q. And what d i d you do? A. I r e p o r t e d it t o t h e Department of Labor t h a t I d i d n ' t think he was paying p r e v a i l i n g wage. " The S t a t e i n v e s t i g a t e d and concluded t h a t the complaint was l e g i t i m a t e . Below is a c h a r t showing t h e wages t h a t were a c t u a l l y p a i d by t h e respondent and t h e wages which t h e S t a t e c l a i m s should have been paid a s t h e SPR. W A G E S ACTUALLY "STANDARD PREVAILING RATE" EMPLOYEE J O B PAID AS DETERMINED BY THE STATE Mar t o n c a r p e n t e r $9.00/hour C a r p e n t e r s : Becker c a r p e n t e r $9.00/hour 12.05/hour--5/1/79-4/30/80 Ryland c a r p e n t e r $8.00/hour 13.02/hour--5/1/80-4/30/81 Thompkins c a r p e n t e r $ll.OO/hour Hale l a b o r e r $6.00/hour Laborers : Raudebaugh c a r p e n t e r / s a l a r i e d l o . 55/hour--7/1/79-6/30/80 s u p e r i n t e n d e n t 11,45/hour--7/1/80-6/30/81 The S t a t e c l a i m s t h a t it considered t h r e e sources of i n f o r - mation t o determine t h e SPR: (1) wage r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n compiled by t h e Employment S e c u r i t y ~ i v i s i o n ; (2) Davis-Bacon r a t e s p u b l i s h e d by t h e United S t a t e s Department of Labor; and ( 3 ) l o c a l c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreements. However, t h e r a t e s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e S t a t e were taken verbatim from number t h r e e , c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreements. According t o t h e S t a t e , t h e r e was l i t t l e v a r i a t i o n between t h e t h r e e s o u r c e s , and i n such c a s e s it has been t h e p o l i c y t o adopt r a t e s from t h e bargaining agreements. The respondent commenced t h i s a c t i o n by seeking a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment i n the D i s t r i c t Court. The S t a t e f i l e d an answer and c o u n t e r c l a i m praying f o r an o r d e r r e q u i r i n g Thompkins t o pay p a s t due wages and p e n a l t i e s and a t t o r n e y f e e s . Thompkins sought summary judgment but h i s motion was denied. A nonjury t r i a l was h e l d a f t e r which t h e D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d judgment i n favor of t h e p l a i n t i f f / c o n t r a c t o r . The Commissioner Labor and I n d u s t r y t h e n appealed. The a p p e l l a n t h a s r a i s e d the following i s s u e s : (1) whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by not adopting t h e commissioner's d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e ; ( 2 ) whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t o r y p h r a s e "work of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r ; " ( 3 ) whether t h e admission of h e a r s a y evidence was r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r ; and ( 4 ) whether t h e award of a t t o r n e y f e e s t o respondent was p r o p e r . W e a d d r e s s t h e s e i s s u e s i n t u r n . A p p e l l a n t ' s f i r s t i s s u e is r a i s e d i n response t o t h e f o l l o w i n g comment by t h e D i s t r i c t Court: "Defendant [ a p p e l l a n t ] a r g u e s t h a t o n l y t h e Commissioner of t h e Department of Labor and I n d u s t r y h a s t h e a u t h o r i t y t o determine t h e p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages i n a given a r e a . Defendant i g n o r e s t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e s t a t u t e : 'The Montana Commissioner may deter- mine . . . ' M.C.A. 518-2-402(1979) . . . Because t h e power t o determine the p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages is not e x c l u s i v e l y t h a t of t h e Commissioner, t h a t power, a t t h e time the par- t i e s e n t e r e d i n t o t h e c o n t r a c t i n q u e s t i o n , r e s t e d a l s o with t h e p l a i n t i f f , s u b j e c t t o t h e s t a n d a r d s s e t o u t i n the a p p l i c a b l e laws. The i s s u e , t h e n , on which p l a i n t i f f ' s r e q u e s t f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment t u r n s , is whether plain- t i f f r a t h e r than t h e defendant h a s made t h e proper d e t e r m i n a t i o n of what t h e i r c o n t r a c t term ' s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages' a s d e f i n e d i n M.C.A. S 18-2-401 ( a ) (1979) means. The i s s u e , c o n t r a r y t o d e f e n d a n t ' s p o s i t i o n , i s not whether and under what s t a n d a r d s t h i s Court may review a d e c i s i o n o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e agency. " P l a i n t i f f ' s r e q u e s t f o r a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment would be a r e q u e s t f o r a review of a d e c i s i o n or d e t e r m i n a t i o n of an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e agency i f i n f a c t t h e commissioner of l a b o r had determined t h e standard p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages f o r t h e job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s i n q u e s t i o n . But t h e commissioner d i d not make t h e d e t e r - mination he was a u t h o r i z e d t o make under M.C.A. 5 18-2-402(1)(1979)." The D i s t r i c t Court obviously viewed t h e problem a s one of c o n t r a c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Here, t h e c o n t r a c t required t h e respon- d e n t t o pay h i s employees t h e SPR y e t t h e r e were no s p e c i f i c h o u r l y r a t e s contained i n t h e c o n t r a c t . The c o u r t focused on whether respondent, a s a c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t y , p r o p e r l y i n t e r p r e t e d t h e c o n t r a c t term "standard p r e v a i l i n g r a t e ." The a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t : (1) it d i d make a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e SPR and its d e t e r m i n a t i o n should have been granted d e f e r e n c e by t h e c o u r t , and ( 2 ) t h e respondent d i d not have t h e s t a t u t o r y power t o determine the r a t e . T h a t power rests exclu- s i v e l y with t h e a p p e l l a n t . W e a g r e e with a p p e l l a n t ' s second p o i n t ; t h e respondent was n o t empowered by s e c t i o n 18-2-402(1), MCA, ( 1 9 7 9 ) , t o determine t h e s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages. The s t a t u t e i n q u e s t i o n s t a t e d : " [ t ] he Montana commissioner of l a b o r may determine t h e s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages i n t h e county o r l o c a l i t y i n which t h e c o n t r a c t is t o be performed." S e c t i o n 18-2-402(1), MCA, ( 1 9 7 9 ) . The D i s t r i c t Court i n c o r r e c t l y concluded t h a t s i n c e t h e power is p e r m i s s i v e i n t h a t t h e "commissioner . . . may determine t h e . . . r a t e , " it must a l s o be nonexclusive. A j u d g e ' s t a s k i n c o n s t r u i n g s t a t u t e s is "simply t o a s c e r t a i n and d e c l a r e what is i n terms o r i n s u b s t a n c e contained t h e r e i n , n o t t o i n s e r t what has been omitted . . ." S e c t i o n 1-2-101, MCA. The c o u r t c l e a r l y v i o l a t e d t h i s p r i n c i p l e . The s t a t u t e s a y s n o t h i n g about being nonexclusive. On t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e h i s t o r y of t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n would i n d i c a t e o t h e r w i s e . The o r i g i n a l v e r s i o n of Montana's L i t t l e Davis-Bacon A c t was e n a c t e d i n 1931. S i n c e then it has been amended s e v e r a l times. Montana's A c t is analogous t o the Federal Davis-Bacon A c t which was a l s o enacted i n 1931. T h i s kind of l e g i s l a t i o n has a s one of its purposes t h e p r o t e c t i o n of l o c a l l a b o r markets. The a c t pre- v e n t s c o n t r a c t o r s from importing cheap l a b o r t o t h e d e t r i m e n t of l o c a l workers. T h i s purpose is achieved by r e q u i r i n g c o n t r a c t o r s t o pay t h e r a t e of wages p r e v a i l i n g i n t h e l o c a l i t y . To a l l o w p o t e n t i a l l y s e l f - s e r v i n g c o n t r a c t o r s t o determine t h e r a t e would d e f e a t t h e l e g i s l a t i v e purpose. A s t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court noted i n a c a s e c o n s t r u i n g t h e F e d e r a l Davis-Bacon A c t : " [ t ] he language of t h e A c t and its l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y p l a i n l y show t h a t it was not t o bene- f i t c o n t r a c t o r s , b u t r a t h e r t o p r o t e c t t h e i r employees from substandard e a r n i n g s by f i x i n g a f l o o r under wages on government p r o j e c t s . Congress sought t o accomplish t h i s r e s u l t by d i r e c t i n g t h e S e c r e t a r y of Labor t o d e t e r m i n e , on t h e b a s i s of p r e v a i l i n g r a t e s i n t h e loca- l i t y , t h e a p p r o p r i a t e minimum wages f o r each p r o j e c t . " United S t a t e s v. Binghamton C o n s t r u c t i o n Co. ( 1 9 5 4 ) , 347 U.S. 171, 176-77. 74 S.Ct. 438, 98 L.Ed. 594. W e hold t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t y t o d e t e r m i n e t h e SPR rests exclu- s i v e l y w i t h t h e commissioner of l a b o r under t h e s t a t u t e . W e a l s o conclude t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court was i n c o r r e c t i n allowing t h e c o n t r a c t o r t o determine t h e SPR i n t h e absence of such a d e t e r - m i n a t i o n by t h e commissioner. While we a g r e e w i t h t h e commissioner's c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e respondent d i d not have t h e s t a t u t o r y power t o d e t e r m i n e t h e SPR, t h i s c o n c l u s i o n by t h e c o u r t is n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e d r e a s o n s . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t it d i d make a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e SPR and t h a t its f i g u r e s should have been accepted u n l e s s they were shown t o be a r b i t r a r y o r c a p r i c i o u s . Here, t h e c o u r t focused on c o n t r a c t p r i n c i p l e s ; framing t h e i s s u e a s whether t h e respondent made t h e proper d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t term " s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e . " I n o t h e r words, t h e c o u r t reasoned t h a t t h e respondent, a s a c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t y had t h e power t o pay h i s employees a t t h o s e r a t e s which he b e l i e v e d would meet t h e c o n t r a c t requirements. However, t h i s power is n o t t h e same a s t h a t granted t o t h e commissioner under s t a t u t e . The commissioner d e r i v e s h i s power from s t a t u t e , whereas t h e respondent d e r i v e s h i s power from t h e c o n t r a c t . The D i s t r i c t Court confused t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n . T h i s is probably t h e reason t h e c o u r t i n t e r p r e t e d t h e s t a t u t e a s it d i d . Notwithstanding t h i s con£ u s i o n , t h e D i s t r i c t Court reached t h e c o n c l u s i o n . Consequently, t h e e r r o r was harmless. Next, a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t it d i d make a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e SPR and t h a t its f i g u r e s should have been accepted u n l e s s t h e y were shown t o be a r b i t r a r y or c a p r i c i o u s . The focus of t h i s argument concerns t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s t a n d a r d of review. The D i s t r i c t Court would have been o b l i g a t e d t o a f f i r m t h e agency d e t e r m i n a t i o n even i f it found it t o be an a r b i t r a r y and c a p r i - c i o u s s t a n d a r d of j u d i c i a l review. S t a t e ex. r e l . Montana Wilderness A s s o c i a t i o n v. Board of N a t u r a l Resources and Conservation ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mont. , 648 P.2d 734, 39 St.Rep. 1238. T h i s s t a n d a r d r e c o g n i z e s agency e x p e r t i s e and p r o h i b i t s a c o u r t from s u b s t i t u t i n g its judgment f o r t h a t of an agency. I t h a s been argued t h a t wage f i g u r e s of t h e Commissioner d i d not e x i s t a t t h e time of c o n t r a c t i n g . T h e r e f o r e , on t h i s b a s i s , t h e r e was n o t an agency d e c i s i o n . W e do not e n t i r e l y a g r e e . The evidence shows t h a t r a t e s a r e not set f o r i n d i v i d u a l pro- jects. The a p p e l l a n t determines p r e v a i l i n g r a t e s each y e a r d u r i n g May or June. According t o a p p e l l a n t , when a c o n t r a c t is e n t e r e d i n t o , t h e s e r a t e s become a p p l i c a b l e and t h e c o n t r a c t o r t h e n has a duty t o c o n t a c t t h e department t o f i n d o u t what he should pay h i s employees. Appellant r e l i e s on t h i s p r a c t i c e t o show an agency d e c i s i o n deserving of d e f e r e n c e . W e cannot a c c e p t t h i s argument. W e hold t h a t even though t h e s t a t e ' s f i g u r e s e x i s t e d a t t h e time of c o n t r a c t i n g , t h e i r mere e x i s t e n c e cannot be held t o c o n s t i t u t e an agency d e c i s i o n . Under t h e b a s i c c o n t r a c t p r i n c i p l e s a p a r t y cannot be bound t o terms he is not aware o f . There must be meeting of t h e minds o r mutual a s s e n t on a l l of t h e e s s e n t i a l terms. Chadwick v. Giberson ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 618 P.2d 1213, 37 St.Rep. 1723. Here t h e c o n t r a c t s t a t e d : " [ t l h e s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wage, t h a t p a i d by o t h e r c o n t r a c t o r s i n t h e a r e a , must be paid f o r work performed. " The respondent, unexperienced i n p u b l i c works p r o j e c t s , read t h i s language and concluded t h a t h i s wage r a t e s were w i t h i n t h e range of r a t e s p r e v a i l i n g i n t h e a r e a . Respondent cannot be h e l d t o payment of s p e c i f i c r a t e s t h a t d i d n o t appear i n the c o n t r a c t of which he had no knowledge, b u t o n l y existed somewhere within the bureaucracy. W e note t h a t t h i s problem has been corrected by the legislature. The current law requires a l l bid specifications and contracts to contain the spe- c i f i c r a t e s payable by contractors. Section 18-2-422, MCA, (1981). W e hold the D i s t r i c t Court did not error i n its refusal t o adopt the commissioner 's rates. The next issue raised by appellant is whether the D i s t r i c t Court erred i n its interpretation of the statutory phrase, "work of a similar character." The s t a t u t e which contains the disputed phrase s t a t e s : "'Standard prevailinq - - r a t e of wages . . . applicable to the county or l o c a l i t y in which the work is being performed,' means those waqes which are paid i n the county or locality by other contractors for work of 2 similar - character performed i n that county or locality by each c r a f t , c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , or type of worker . . ." ( emphasis added ) Section 18-2-401(5)(a), MCA, ( 1 9 7 9 ) . Appellant's argument is somewhat confusing. A t one place i n the b r i e f , appellant argues that "work of a similar character" r e f e r s to similar public works projects. Furthermore, a t t r i a l , various witnesses for the s t a t e t e s t i f i e d t h a t the phrase means similar public works. Our problem is this; i n these instances it appears t h a t appellant is construing the statutory phrase to include only public works. However, i n another portion of its b r i e f , appellant lists several public works and commercial construction projects that it claims were of a similar character t o the Yellow Bay Project. For analysis of t h i s issue, w e w i l l assume t h a t appellant does not distinguish between public and private projects. The s t a t u t e makes no distinction i n t h i s regard, nor should we. Therefore, appellant's argument can be stated as follows: the statutory phrase "work of a similar character" refers to projects as a whole, either public or pri- vate, and not as the court found, to the various components or individual labor of projects. I f w e were to accept appellant's definition, the s t a t u t e could be paraphrased as follows; " 'standard prevailing r a t e of wages . . . means t h o s e wages . . . which a r e paid . . . by o t h e r c o n t r a c t o r s . . . [on s i m i l a r p r o j e c t s ] i n t h a t county o r loca- l i t y . . ." According t o a p p e l l a n t , t h e r e were s e v e r a l p u b l i c and commercial p r o j e c t s which were s i m i l a r . These i n c l u d e work done on t h e Ronan S c h o o l , t h e S a i n t I g n a t i u s Water Improvement P r o j e c t , a Polson i n d u s t r i a l b u i l d i n g , t h e Lake County Courthouse, t h e B and B S t o r e i n P o l s o n , and Ready Mix C o n c r e t e i n Polson. On t h e o t h e r hand, i f t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s d e f i n i t i o n were a c c e p t e d , t h e s t a t u t e would read: " ' s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages . . . means t h o s e wages . . . which a r e paid . . . by o t h e r c o n t r a c t o r s . . . [ f o r s i m i l a r t y p e s of l a b o r ] i n t h a t county o r l o c a l i t y . . ." W e a g r e e with a p p e l l a n t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . "Work of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r " r e f e r s t o p r o j e c t s a s a whole. C l e a r l y , t h e f e d e r a l law and accompanying r e g u l a t i o n s have focused on t h e type of pro- ject r a t h e r t h a n t h e type of i n d i v i d u a l l a b o r . However, we n o t e t h a t t h e language of t h e F e d e r a l A c t is d i f f e r e n t . The analogous f e d e r a l p r o v i s i o n s t a t e s : " s p e c i f i c a t i o n s f o r e v e r y c o n t r a c t . . . s h a l l c o n t a i n a p r o v i s i o n s t a t i n g t h e minimum wages t o be p a i d . . . based upon wages . . . p r e v a i l i n g . . . on p r o j e c t s o f - - a c h a r a c t e r s i m i l a r . . .I1 40 U.S.C. s e c t i o n 2 7 6 ( a ) , ( 1 9 6 4 ) . The use of t h e word " p r o j e c t s " would c e r t a i n l y d i c t a t e t h e f o c u s o f t h e F e d e r a l A c t . Montana's A c t u s e s t h e word "work" r a t h e r than " p r o j e c t s . " A r e a d i n g of t h e A c t l e a d s us t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t "work" is synonomous w i t h " p r o j e c t s .I1 For example, s e c t i o n 18-2-403 ( l ) , MCA, ( 1 9 7 9 ) r e a d s : " I n any c o n t r a c t l e t f o r s t a t e , county, muni- c i p a l , s c h o o l , o r heavy highway c o n s t r u c t i o n , s e r v i c e s , r e p a i r , o r maintenance work . . . t h e r e s h a l l be i n s e r t e d i n t h e c o n t r a c t a pro- v i s i o n r e q u i r i n g t h e c o n t r a c t o r . . . t o pay t h e s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages . . . i n e f f e c t and a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e county o r loca- l i t y i n which t h e work is being performed." (emphasis added) The word "work" r e f e r s t o " s t a t e , county, m u n i c i p a l , s c h o o l , o r heavy highway c o n s t r u c t i o n , s e r v i c e s , r e p a i r , o r maintenance work." W e f i n d t h e word "work" r e f e r s t o t h e e n t i r e p r o j e c t f o r which t h e c o n t r a c t is l e t . Another example is s e c t i o n 18-2-401 ( 5 ) ( b ) , MCA, ( 1 9 8 1 ) . "When work of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r is not being performed i n t h e county or l o c a l i t y , t h e s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages . . . s h a l l be t h o s e r a t e s e s t a b l i s h e d by c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreements i n e f f e c t i n t h e county o r l o c a l i t y . . . " I f t h e f o r e g o i n g s e c t i o n is t o have any meaning, "work" must mean " p r o j e c t s . " I f "work" r e f e r r e d t o i n d i v i d u a l l a b o r it would be d i f f i c u l t t o imagine any purpose f o r t h e r u l e . Where could one f i n d a county or l o c a l i t y where a b s o l u t e l y no i n d i v i d u a l l a b o r is being performed by c a r p e n t e r s , l a b o r e r s , plumbers, o r whatever t h e a p p l i c a b l e t r a d e , i n o r d e r f o r t h e r u l e t o apply. However, c o u n t i e s o r l o c a l i t i e s could e a s i l y f a i l t o have s i m i l a r on-going p r o j e c t s such a s highway c o n s t r u c t i o n . W e could imagine a s i t u a t i o n where l a b o r e r s a r e performing t h e same k i n d s of t a s k s on d i f f e r e n t p r o j e c t s . For example, a l a b o r e r working f o r a r e s i d e n t i a l c o n t r a c t o r could spend h i s t i m e h a u l i n g b r i c k s , a s could a l a b o r e r working on a s t a t e o f f i c e b u i l d i n g . The o n l y d i f f e r e n c e could be t h e r a t e of pay. The former could be e a r n i n g $6 p e r hour while t h e l a t t e r could be e a r n i n g $10 p e r hour; t h e d i f f e r e n c e between union and nonunion wages. Then, i f t h e commissioner were required t o determine t h e p r e v a i l i n g r a t e f o r l a b o r e r s working on a s t a t e financed labora- t o r y , based on r a t e s paid by c o n t r a c t o r s f o r i n d i v i d u a l l a b o r of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r , which r a t e would be a p p r o p r i a t e ? Should t h e commissioner be o b l i g a t e d t o c o n s i d e r whether o r not t h e l a b o r e r s working on t h e l a b o r a t o r y w i l l be hauling b r i c k s ? W e think n o t . I t o n l y makes sense t h a t "work of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r " cannot r e f e r t o i n d i v i d u a l l a b o r . I f the t o t a l p r o j e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is used i n t h e above example, the commissioner need o n l y d e t e r - mine whether t h e l a b o r a t o r y is more s i m i l a r t o an o f f i c e b u i l d i n g o r a r e s i d e n c e . While t h i s example is s i m p l i f i e d , it i l l u s t r a t e s t h e n e c e s s i t y of d e f i n i n g work of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r t o mean s i m i l a r p r o j e c t s . A p p e l l a n t p o i n t s o u t , and w e a g r e e , t h a t " [ t l h e Montana ' L i t t l e Davis-Bacon' A c t was designed t o p r e s e r v e t h e e x i s t i n g wage p a t t e r n s i n t h e a r e a , t h e e x i s t i n g wage d i f - f e r e n t i a l between commercial and r e s i d e n t i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n .'I Although we a g r e e with a p p e l l a n t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of "work of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r " we do not f i n d e r r o r . W e do r e c o g n i z e why a p p e l l a n t r a i s e d t h e i s s u e . Appellant was prompted by a c u r i o u s s t a t e m e n t made by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. The c o u r t s t a t e d : " t h i s c o u r t can o n l y conclude t h a t work of c a r p e n t e r s , l a b o r e r s and s u p e r i n t e n d e n t s i n r e s i d e n t i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n is of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r t o t h a t which p l a i n t i f f ' s employees performed on t h e Yellow Bay P r o j e c t . That is, t h e s i m i l a r i t y is between the type of l a b o r involved and not t h e type (i.e., government or p r i v a t e ) of p r o j e c t involved." T h i s comment by t h e c o u r t is an i n c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e phrase "work of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r ." W e cannot understand why t h e c o u r t made t h e s t a t e m e n t . The c o u r t ' s a n a l y s i s of t h e i s s u e and its p r e v i o u s s t a t e m e n t s a r e c l e a r l y c o n t r a r y . T h i s s t a t e m e n t is nothing more than v e r b i a g e , and c e r t a i n l y not of t h e n a t u r e on which t o p r e d i c a t e e r r o r . What t h e t r i a l c o u r t s a i d , and what t h e c o u r t d i d , a r e two d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . From our f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n , it is e v i d e n t t h a t what t h e c o u r t d i d was p r o p e r . Here, t h i s D i s t r i c t Court a s f a c t f i n d e r a t t a c h e d s i g n i f i - cance t o two kinds of evidence. F i r s t was t h e testimony of James Thompson, t h e p r o j e c t a r c h i t e c t . Thompson t e s t i f i e d a s f o l l o w s : "Q. Would you e x p l a i n t h e n a t u r e of t h e b u i l d i n g t h a t was b u i l t , J i m ? Whether it was frame, l o g , what kind of a b u i l d i n g was it t h a t we're t a l k i n g about h e r e ? A. It was b a s i c a l l y a r e l a t i v e l y simple s t r u c t u r e , c o n c r e t e block, e x t e r i o r w a l l s , open westbound s t y l e j o i s t s with a c o n c r e t e f l o o r poured over them f o r t h e f l o o r over a crawl space. The roof s t r u c t u r e was wood with a metal covering, t h e metal roof covering, t h e e x t e r i o r f i n i s h of t h e b u i l d i n g was a foam w i t h a type of s t u c c o f i n i s h over it. "Q. Would you c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e job a s a tech- n i c a l one o r a simple one? A. I would say t h e job was r e l a t i v e l y simple and could be broken down i n t o a s e r i e s of s u b c o n t r a c t s . T h a t it was a series of s u b c o n t r a c t s t h a t made it simple. "Q. A l l r i g h t , would a c o n t r a c t o r with suf- f i c i e n t e x p e r i e n c e t o b u i l d a r e s i d e n c e o r apartment house have t h e working knowledge t o complete t h i s p r o j e c t . A. Most c e r t a i n l y . "Q. Very w e l l , p u t t i n g up t h e block and p u t t i n g up t h e s h e e t rock i n t h i s b u i l d i n g , is t h a t any d i f f e r e n t t h a n p u t t i n g up block o r s h e e t rock i n a home o r i n a commercial b u i l d i n g ? A. No. "Q. I t ' s one i n t h e same. A. One i n t h e same. " I n view of t h e above-quoted evidence t h e c o u r t , i n its c o n c l u s i o n s of law, s t a t e d : " [ t l h e 'work of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r ' t o be performed, . . . was r e s i d e n t i a l t y p e c o n s t r u c t i o n . " (emphasis added) I n e x p l a i n i n g t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , t h e c o u r t s a i d : " [ t l h e record r e v e a l s t h a t t h e employees whose wages a r e a t i s s u e . . . were capable of b u i l d i n g a r e s i d e n c e . James Thompson, t h e p r o j e c t a r c h i t e c t , t e s t i f i e d t h a t g c o n t r a c t o r c a p a b l e of workinq one - r e s i d e n t i a l b u i l d i g - - was a l s o q u a l i f i e d - t o perform t & c o n t r a c t . . ." (emphasis added) S i n c e t h e Yellow Bay p r o j e c t was much l i k e b u i l d i n g a resi- dence, t h e c o u r t found i m p o r t a n t t h e evidence concerning r a t e s p a i d by r e s i d e n t i a l c o n t r a c t o r s i n Lake County. The Court d i s c u s s e d t h e evidence a s follows: "The o n l y evidence on t h e record r e g a r d i n g whether p l a i n t i f f [ p a i d p r e v a i l i n g wages] is t h a t introduced by p l a i n t i f f . The following is p l a i n t i f f ' s summary of t h a t evidence. "'To make an e f f o r t t o determine what t h e pre- v a i l i n g wage is i n Lake County t h e p l a i n t i f f c a l l e d Mr. Doug Stam, l o c a l manager of t h e s t a t e job s e r v i c e o f f i c e . I n t r o d u c e d i n t o e v i d e n c e was a list prepared by Mr. Stam which c o n t a i n e d names of 50 c o n t r a c t o r s and he opined t h a t approximately 1 5 o f t h e s e contrac- t o r s were c a p a b l e of completing t h e Yellow Bay job. Mr. Stam a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t he knew of h i s p e r s o n a l knowledge t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n t r a c t o r s i n Lake County were paying t h e i r employees t h e following wages : ' "'CONTRACTOR CARPENTERS LABORERS Mr. Durand $10.00 $7.00 Mr. Olson 9.00 7.00 Mr. Feeber 8.00 6.00 Mr. McCrum 8.00 5.00 Mr. Galy 8.00 - 10.00 4.00 - 5.00 Mr. Baker 8.00 - 11.00 4.50 - 6.00' " ' P l a i n t i f f c a l l e d t o t h e s t a n d t h e following c o n t r a c t o r s and t h e y t e s t i f i e d they paid t h e i r employees t h e following wages : ' "'CONTRACTOR CARPENTERS LABORERS Wallace Olsen $ 8.00 - 10.00 $4.00 - 6.00 A l l e n Smith 11.00 + f r i n g e s 8.00 Dennis Paulson 7.00 ---- Daniel J u r y 6.00 - 8.00 5.00 Don Whiting 7.00 - 8.00 5.00 - 6.00 Dan Baker 7.00 - 8.00 ----I " ' A l l of t h e c o n t r a c t o r s l i s t e d above a r e resi- d e n t s of Lake County, Montana; a l l t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e y d i d r e s i d e n t i a l b u i l d i n g (James Thompson t e s t i f i e d t h a t any c o n t r a c t o r t h a t c o u l d b u i l d a r e s i d e n c e could have handled t h i s p u b l i c p r o j e c t ) and t h e wages l i s t e d a r e t h o s e paid by t h e c o n t r a c t o r s d u r i n g t h e year 1980. Each c o n t r a c t o r employed from 1 - 8 employees d u r i n g t h e year 1980. The d e f e n d a n t h a s taken t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages i n t h e a r e a is $11.13 p l u s f r i n g e b e n e f i t s ( u n i o n s c a l e ) . Only one c o n t r a c t o r t e s t i f i e d from Lake County ( A 1 Smith) who pays h i s employees union s c a l e and t h o s e employees work o n l y on a p a r t time b a s i s . V i r t u a l l y a l l o t h e r c o n t r a c t o r s were non-union and a l l w i t n e s s e s who t e s t i f i e d i n c l u d i n g A 1 Smith, t h e s o l e union c o n t r a c t o r , were unaware of any o t h e r union c o n t r a c t o r i n Lake County.' " T h i s summary a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t s t h e evidence i n t r o d u c e d r e g a r d i n g wages. I t shows t h a t a m a j o r i t y of t h e c a r p e n t e r s i n Lake County r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s s u r v e y who work on r e s i d e n t i a l - t y p e c o n s t r u c t i o n a r e paid $7.00 - $9.00 an hour and t h a t l a b o r e r s a r e paid $4.00 - $6.00 a n hour. Presumably, t h e d i f f e r e n c e s r e p r e s e n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n i n d i v i d u a l t r a i n i n g and e x p e r i e n c e . "From t h e s e a v e r a g e s it is a p p a r e n t t h a t p l a i n t i f f p a i d t h e p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages i n Lake County f o r r e s i d e n t i a l - t y p e c o n s t r u c t i o n f o r c a r p e n t e r s and a l a b o r e r . " I n view of t h e two t y p e s of e v i d e n c e , t h e c o u r t reasoned a s f o l l o w s : The testimony of t h e a r c h i t e c t e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e Yellow Bay p r o j e c t was much l i k e b u i l d i n g a r e s i d e n c e , t h e r e f o r e , t h e Yellow Bay p r o j e c t is of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r t o r e s i d e n t i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n . Consequently, t h e s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages must be those wages which a r e paid i n t h e county o r loca- l i t y by o t h e r c o n t r a c t o r s involved i n r e s i d e n t i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n . T h i s reasoning is e x a c t l y what is c a l l e d f o r i n s e c t i o n 1 8 - 2 - 4 0 1 ( 5 ) ( a ) , MCA, ( 1 9 8 1 ) . The c o u r t ' s a n a l y s i s c l e a r l y r e c o g n i z e s t h a t "work of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r " means t h e t o t a l p r o j e c t , n o t t h e v a r i o u s k i n d s of l a b o r involved. W e a g r e e w i t h t h a t s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . W e do n o t understand why t h e c o u r t made t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t " t h e s i m i l a r i t y is between t h e type of l a b o r involved and n o t t h e type . . . of p r o j e c t involved." I n its c o n c l u s i o n of law number s i x t h e c o u r t u n e q u i v o c a l l y s t a t e d : " [ t l h e 'work of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r ' t o be performed under M.C.A. 518-2-401(3)(a) (1979) was r e s i d e n t i a l type c o n s t r u c t i o n . " These s t a t e m e n t s a r e c o n f l i c t i n g . I n such a s i t u a t i o n w e must g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e s t a t e m e n t which makes v a l i d t h e c o u r t ' s a n a l y s i s . A p p e l l a n t ' s argument is r e a l l y a m a n i f e s t a t i o n of its d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e "work of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r " t o be performed was r e s i d e n t i a l type construc- t i o n . W e n o t e t h a t t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of r e s i d e n t i a l construc- t i o n is one of s e v e r a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s used by t h e S e c r e t a r y of Labor under t h e F e d e r a l Davis-Bacon A c t . A p p e l l a n t goes t o g r e a t l e n g t h s t o i n s t r u c t t h i s Court on t h e h i s t o r y and development of t h e Davis-Bacon A c t . According t o a p p e l l a n t , t h i s Court should s u p p o r t " u n i f o r m i t y between s t a t e and f e d e r a l r e g u l a t i o n s and procedures." Presumably, p a r t of t h a t u n i f o r m i t y would be r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e United S t a t e s Department of L a b o r ' s v a r i o u s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of c o n s t r u c t i o n . The compliance o f f i c e r of t h e Labor S t a n d a r d s D i v i s i o n of t h e Department of Labor and I n d u s t r y t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e F e d e r a l Davis-Bacon r a t e s a r e determined f o r t h r e e d i f f e r e n t t y p e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n ; r e s i d e n t i a l , b u i l d i n g , and heavy and highway. Y e t when asked about r e s i d e n t i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n Montana, t h e w i t n e s s r e p l i e d : "Okay, w e l l , f i r s t of a l l , we d o n ' t use r e s i d e n t i a l . W e h a v e n ' t had a need. Okay, b u i l d i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n would be any type of b u i l d i n g . " W e do not a t t e m p t t o d e f i n e " r e s i d e n t i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n " f o r t h e commissioner, nor do w e hold t h a t t h e s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h i s kind of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . W e o n l y hold t h a t t h e evidence supported t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e Yellow Bay l a b o r a t o r y was "of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r " t o r e s i d e n t i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n . W e f u r t h e r hold t h a t t h e evidence supported t h e c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e respondent had paid t h e " s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages." Next, a p p e l l a n t c h a l l e n g e s t h e admission of what h a s been l a b e l e d t h e "Stam survey." A t t r i a l , Mr. Stam, t h e manager of t h e l o c a l job s e r v i c e o f f i c e , t e s t i f i e d concerning t h e r a t e of wages p a i d by c o n t r a c t o r s t o c a r p e n t e r s and l a b o r e r s i n Lake County. The b a s i s of h i s testimony came from a t e l e p h o n e survey conducted by himself t h e day b e f o r e . H e c o n t a c t e d s e v e r a l l o c a l c o n t r a c t o r s and asked them what t h e i r wage r a t e s were. H e t e s t i f i e d a t l e n g t h concerning t h e i r responses. The evidence was c l e a r l y h e a r s a y b u t was admitted over o b j e c t i o n p u r s u a n t t o Rule 8 0 3 ( 2 4 ) , Mont.R.Evid., which a l l o w s a s e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e hearsay r u l e " s t a t e m e n t [ s ] n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y covered by any of t h e f o r e g o i n g e x c e p t i o n s b u t having comparable c i r c u m s t a n t i a l guaran- t e e s of t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s . " W e hold t h a t it was e r r o r t o admit t h e testimony because t h e e v i d e n c e d i d not have comparable g u a r a n t e e s of t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s . I n d e t e r m i n i n g whether o r not t h e evidence should be a d m i t t e d , t h e Commission on Rules of Evidence noted t h a t " [ t l h e g u a r a n t e e o f t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s set o u t i n t h e Commission Comments t o each of t h e o t h e r e x c e p t i o n s [of Rule 8031 is t h e c r i t e r i a t o be used i n d e t e r m i n i n g whether t o a p p l y t h i s open-ended e x c e p t i o n and f i n d a 'comparable c i r c u m s t a n t i a l g u a r a n t e e of t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s . ' I' W e have reviewed t h e o t h e r e x c e p t i o n s contained i n Rule 803 and f i n d t h a t t h e Stam testimony should have been excluded. For example, one of t h e e x c e p t i o n s d e a l s with v a r i o u s k i n d s of p u b l i c r e c o r d s and r e p o r t s . Rule 803 ( 8 ) Mont.R.Evid. Under t h i s e x c e p t i o n , d a t e c o m p i l a t i o n s of an agency a r e a d m i s s i b l e i f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n is t h e r e s u l t of a regularly-conducted a c t i v i t y o r a duty imposed by law. The Commission Comments t o e x c e p t i o n ( 8 ) r e f e r t o g u a r a n t e e s of t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s under e x c e p t i o n ( 6 ) ; "The g u a r a n t e e of t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s is provided by t h e n a t u r e of t h e record and t h e cir- cumstances of p r e p a r a t i o n , enhanced by s y s t e m a t i c checking, by r e g u l a r i t y and con- t i n u i t y which produce h a b i t s of p r e c i s i o n , by a c t u a l e x p e r i e n c e of b u s i n e s s i n r e l y i n g upon them, o r by a d u t y t o make an a c c u r a t e record a s p a r t of a c o n t i n u i n g job o r o c c u p a t i o n . ' " A n n o t a t i o n s t o Mont .R.Evid. Commission Comments t o Rule 803 ( 6 ) , p. 285. Exception number ( 8 ) is p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p r o p r i a t e t o our c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e Stam testimony s i n c e t h e evidence c o n s i s t e d o f d a t a compiled by a s t a t e employee. There is no doubt t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e d i d n o t meet t h e g u a r a n t e e s of t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s . Even though t h e evidence was i n a d m i s s i b l e , t h e e r r o r was harmless. Under Rule 61, M.R.Civ.P., " [ n l o e r r o r i n e i t h e r t h e admission o r e x c l u s i o n of evidence . . . is ground f o r . . . d i s t u r b i n g a judgment o r o r d e r , u n l e s s r e f u s a l t o t a k e such a c t i o n a p p e a r s t o t h e c o u r t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e . The c o u r t a t e v e r y s t a g e of t h e proceeding must d i s r e - g a r d any e r r o r or d e f e c t i n t h e proceeding which does not a f f e c t t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s . " T h i s r u l e was intended t o p r e v e n t r e v e r s a l s based on incon- s e q u e n t i a l e r r o r s . Where s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e h a s been done, t h e l i t i g a t i o n should be ended. Copenhaver e t a l . v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. ( 1 9 1 1 ) , 42 Mont. 453, 113 P. 467. The admission of t h e c o n t e s t e d h e a r s a y evidence d i d not af f e c t s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e a p p e l l a n t because t h e evidence was cumulative. The respon- d e n t c a l l e d s i x l o c a l c o n t r a c t o r s t o t e s t i f y concerning t h e i r wage r a t e s f o r c a r p e n t e r s and l a b o r e r s . A l l of t h e c o n t r a c t o r s were Lake County r e s i d e n t s and t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e y performed r e s i d e n t i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n . Five of t h e s i x c o n t r a c t o r s paid t h e i r employees a t r a t e s s i m i l a r t o t h e r a t e s paid by respondent. From t h i s evidence, t h e c o u r t could l o g i c a l l y conclude t h a t respondent had p a i d t h e s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages. The "Stam survey" was not needed. F i n a l l y , w e c o n s i d e r whether t h e c o u r t abused its d i s c r e t i o n i n awarding a t t o r n e y f e e s t o t h e r e s p o n d e n t ? I n t h e c o u r t ' s memorandum it is s t a t e d : " P l a i n t i f f [respondent] h a s r e q u e s t e d t h i s C o u r t t o award him a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . . . he is n o t e n t i t l e d t o a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s on s t a t u t o r y grounds . . . However, a s a n e q u i t a b l e measure, t h e Court may p r e v e n t a p a r t y from b e a r i n g t h e unconscionable burden of funding a l a w s u i t , even one a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e , which is t h e r e s u l t of u n j u s t p o l i c y . " I t h a s long been t h e r u l e i n Montana t h a t i n t h e absence of agreement between t h e p a r t i e s o r s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i z a t i o n , a suc- c e s s f u l p a r t y is not e n t i t l e d t o an award of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . N i k l e s v. Barnes ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 153 Mont. 113, 454 P.2d 608. T h i s g e n e r a l r u l e is a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s c a s e . The t r i a l c o u r t a t t e m p t e d t o r e l y on its e q u i t a b l e power i n making t h e award. T h i s was e r r o r . W e r e c o g n i z e a very narrow e x c e p t i o n t o t h e above r u l e . A District Court does have e q u i t a b l e power t o award a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s where t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y h a s been forced i n t o a n a c t i o n t h a t is f r i v o l o u s and u t t e r l y w i t h o u t m e r i t . Wilson v. Department of N a t u r a l Resources and Conservation (1982 ) , Mont . , 648 P.2d 766, 39 St.Rep. 1294. C l e a r l y , t h e excep- t i o n is not a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s c a s e . The award of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s is vacated and t h e remainder of t h e judgment is a f f i r m e d f o r t h e reasons s t a t e d h e r e i n . We concur: Justices Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy concurring in part, and dissenting in part. I concur (1) the Commissioner has exclusive power to determine the standard prevailing rates of wages under the State's statutes; ( 2 ) that "work of a similar character" refers to projects and not to types of labor; (3) that the Stam "Survey" was inadmissible; and (4) that no attorney's fees should be awarded. Otherwise, I p u t as much distance as possible between m e and everything else that i s said in the majority opinion. I t i s easy to expose the sophistry of the majority. One need only ask, "If Yellow Bay Laboratory were a federal project, would Thompkins have had to pay Davis-Bacon wage-rates?" The answer i s a resounding "yes". A t the same time as the Yellow Bay project, contractors on the federally-funded Lake County Courthouse and Ronan School project paid Davis-Bacon wages based on the federal determinations. Here the State Commissioner had promulgated standard prevai 1 ing wage-rates applicable to Yellow Bay Laboratory. Thompkins did not pay the wage- rates. H e clearly violated State law and the terms of his contract with the State. Almost universally i t i s recognized right, suitable, and expedient that state Little Davis-Bacon acts and the federal Davis-Bacon Act be construed in harmony. See Associated General Contractors v. State of N e w Hampshire, 306 A2d 204 ( N H 1973). The purpose of the state act i s to safeguard existing minimum wage standards and prevent unfair competition. Sec. 39-1-401 MCA. I t i s incredible that a court of this level would state that here the Commissioner had indeed determined standard prevailing wage-rates which existed a t the time the Yellow Bay Laboratory contract was entered into, and then to state that the State's wage figures are not a part of that contract. "There must," says the majority, "be a meeting of the minds or mutual assent on all of the essential terms." T o assume t h a t this contractor, counseled b y an attorney, was so naive as not to know what "standard prevailing wage-rates" meant i s itself naivete of the farthest reach. The issue should not be so simply dismissed on the mere grounds there was no mutual consent to the standard prevailing wage-rates. The provisions of subsisting statutes in force and applicable to contract are incorporated in the contract much as those specifically set forth therein. Valier Company v. State, 123 Mont. 329, 215 P2d 966 (1950). Therefore, Thompkins contracted if he paid less than the standard p r e v a i l i n g wayes "as established under the pub1 i c works contract", he f o r f e i t e d Twenty-five (25) Do1 l a r s per day f o r each underpaid worker. Section 18-2-407, MCA. He contracted t h a t the Commissioner of Labor may s e t the standard p r e v a i l i n g wage-rates. Section 18-2-402, MCA. Since Thompkins was n o t a signator t o any c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement, he contracted t o pay "negotiated fringe benefits" t o h i s employees as wages by undertaking a s t a t e public-works contract. Section 18-2-405, MCA. These s t a t u t o r y provisions were p a r t and parcel of t h i s c o n t r a c t w i t h the State whether s p e c i f i c a l l y stated i n h i s contract o r not. It i s n o t an excuse t h a t the standard prevai 1 i n g wage-rate "existed i n the bureaucracy" as the ma,jori ty states. It was Thompkins' s t a t u t o r y and contractual duty t o comply w i t h t h e findings o f the l a w f u l l y established bureaucracy a c t i n g under s t a t u t o r y d i r e c t i v e s . The inconvenient existence o f these s t a t u t e s and decisional c o n t r a c t law proved no d e t e r r e n t t o the d i s t r i c t court, and i s now no bar t o the m a j o r i t y . One o f the prime objects o f the S t a t e ' s L i t t l e Davis-Bacon Act i s t o prevent contractors from t a k i n g advantage o f the excess l a b o r pool i n a depressed l o c a l i t y . P i t t i n g worker against worker i n competition f o r the few jobs a v a i l a b l e by f o r c i n g them t o bargain i n d i v i d u a l l y f o r the wages on p u b l i c contracts i s n o t good business o r good p o l i c y for the State o r any o f i t s subdivisions. Prevention of c u t t h r o a t worker competition i n the s t r u g g l e t o survive i s something the courts ought t o p r o t e c t i n the noblest ~erformance o f t h e i r duty. The m a j o r i t y f a i l s i t s duty here. I d i s s o c i a t e myself from t h i s r e s u l t e n t i r e l y . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge, by assessing a t t o r n e y ' s fees against the Commissioner where no s t a t u t o r y o r equitable basis e x i s t e d f o r a t t o r n e y ' s fees, seemed determined t o punish the State. This court, by side-stepping contract law, punishes the workers and awards the c o n t r a c t o r a f a t t e r p r o f i t from t h e i r r i g h t f u l due. F i n a l l y , t h i s court errs, as d i d the d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge, when i t holds t h a t b u i l d i n g the Yellow Bay Laboratory was the same as b u i l d i n g a house. Rare indeed i s the house ( i t would be a c a s t l e ) where the mechanical sub-contract, t h a t p o r t i o n o f the p r o j e c t b i d and won by Thompkins, amounts t o Two Hundred T h i r t y - f i v e Thousand (235,000) Do1 l a r s out o f a Hal f - M i l l i o n Do1 1 a r p r o j e c t . (The plumbing contract was One Hundred Twenty Thousand (120,000) Do1 1 ars ; the e l e c t r i c a l about Eighty Thousand (80,000) Do1 l a r s . ) Edgar Guest said, "It takes a heap o' l i v i n ' t o make a house a home." It takes more than l i v i n ' , i t takes a heap o ' plumbin' and a heap o' h e a t i n ' and c o o l i n ' t o make a house a lab. (See Odgen Nash: "Come Clean, Mr. Guest".) But i t does n o t take a Class A Contractor's License t o b u i l d a house, and t h a t i s what State law required f o r a p r o j e c t the s i z e o f Yellow Bay Laboratory, Section 15-50-204, MCA. This c o u r t and the d i s t r i c t c o u r t should have confined the search f o r p r e v a i l i n g wage-rates t o the wages paid i n the l o c a l i t y by the class o f contractors e l i g i b l e t o b u i l d the p r o j e c t , t h a t i s , Class A Contractors. 4 - & . B & J u s t i c e John C. Sheet$ W e Concur i n the Dissent: a n i e l J. Shea