Title: Bearden v. State, ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.,

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Bearden v. State, ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.,1994 WY 15868 P.2d 268Case Number: 93-119Decided: 02/09/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of:

Annette 
BEARDEN,

Appellant 
(Employee/Claimant),

v.

STATE 
of Wyoming, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,

Appellee 
(Objector/Defendant).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

 

Representing 
appellant,

Robert 
A. Nicholas of Hettinger & Leedy, Riverton.

Representing 
appellee,

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Kenneth E. Spurrier, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., and Thomas C. Bancroft, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

MACY, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Annette 
Bearden requested an administrative hearing after the Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division refused to pay part of her claimed medical bills. The 
hearing examiner denied Ms. Bearden's claim, and on appeal the district court 
affirmed the hearing examiner's decision. In essence, we are asked to determine 
whether substantial evidence existed to support the hearing examiner's 
conclusion that Ms. Bearden's neck injury was not a work-related compensable 
injury.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Ms. Bearden 
presents the following issues for our review: 

1. 
Is [Ms. Bearden's] cervical injury work related and therefore compensable under 
the Wyoming Worker[']s Compensation Act?

2. 
The underlying factual issue that must be resolved to answer this question 
is:

Did 
[Ms. Bearden's] original injury to her lumbar spine cause the subsequent injury 
to her cervical spine, and if so, is it compensable?

[¶4]      In February 1990, 
Ms. Bearden, then a Wyoming State Training School employee, injured her back 
while she was trying to break a disabled patient's fall. She promptly reported 
her back injury to her employer and began receiving medical treatment paid for 
by the Workers' Compensation Division.

[¶5]      Approximately 
four months later, as she was leaving her home to return a performance 
evaluation to her employer, Ms. Bearden tripped on a nail which was protruding 
from the floor of her porch. She fell, aggravated her back injury, and also 
injured her neck. Ms. Bearden did not report her neck injury to either her 
employer or the Workers' Compensation Division.

[¶6]      The Workers' 
Compensation Division continued to pay for Ms. Bearden's medical care until, 
approximately ten months after she injured her neck, she had her neck x-rayed 
and underwent an MRI in order to have her neck injury diagnosed. The Workers' 
Compensation Division denied Ms. Bearden's claim for payment of expenses related 
to the neck injury.

[¶7]      Ms. Bearden 
contends that, because she was on her way to deliver a performance evaluation to 
her employer, she injured her neck during the course of her employment and that 
the injury was, therefore, compensable. The hearing examiner found that Ms. 
Bearden was not acting within the scope of her employment when she tripped on 
the nail and that her neck injury was excluded from coverage by Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi) (Supp. 1993).

[¶8]      Section 
27-14-102(a)(xi) defines "injury" for worker's compensation 
purposes:

(xi) 
"Injury" means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging 
and includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising 
out of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises 
occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in 
places where the employer's business requires an employee's presence and which 
subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the 
business.

Standard 
of Review

[¶9]      The scope of our 
review of administrative decisions is limited by Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c) 
(1990). In this instance:

Our 
task is to examine the entire record to determine if substantial evidence exists 
to support the hearing examiner's findings. We will not substitute our judgment 
for that of the hearing examiner if his decision is supported by substantial 
evidence. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind 
might accept in support of the agency's conclusions.

Romero 
v. Davy McKee Corporation, 
854 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo. 1993) (citing Farman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 841 P.2d 99, 102 (Wyo. 1992)).

[¶10]   Ms. Bearden contends that her neck 
injury was compensable either because she was in the course of her employment at 
the time she injured her neck or alternatively because her work-related back 
injury caused her neck injury.

Course 
of Employment

[¶11]   Ms. Bearden testified at her 
hearing that she was required to return her performance evaluation, along with 
her comments, to her employer. She also testified that, by "go[ing] out of the 
house and get[ting] some air outside," she was following her doctor's order to 
become more active. The record fails to reveal that Ms. Bearden's employer or 
her doctor required her to hand deliver the evaluation. The record does reveal, 
however, that, when Ms. Bearden injured her neck, she was not in the course of 
her employment, in a place her employer required her to be, or in or about her 
employer's premises. 

[¶12]   We hold that the record contained 
substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's findings that Ms. Bearden 
incurred her neck injury outside the scope of her employment and that 
compensation for her injury was thus excluded by § 27-14-102(a)(xi).

Work-Related 
Injury

[¶13]   Ms. Bearden also contends that her 
neck injury was compensable because her work-related back injury caused that 
injury. She claims that she tripped on the nail and injured her neck because the 
back injury caused her to drag her feet and because the back injury was her 
reason for hand delivering the evaluation.

[¶14]   As part of her burden of proof at 
the hearing, Ms. Bearden had to prove the existence of a causal connection 
between the neck injury and the course of her employment. Johnson v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 798 P.2d 323 (Wyo. 1990). A 
"causal connection exists when there is a nexus between the injury and some 
condition, activity, environment or requirement of the employment." Id. at 325 
(citing Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885, 891 (Wyo. 
1984)).

[¶15]   Ms. Bearden testified at the 
hearing that, because of her back injury, she was dragging her feet when she 
tripped on the nail. The medical evidence considered by the hearing examiner,1 however, gives conflicting accounts 
about Ms. Bearden's ability to walk. Two doctors examined Ms. Bearden after she 
injured her back and before she injured her neck. The first doctor reported 
three examinations: "3/20/90: . . . She really gets around quite well. . . . 
With ambulation, she walks normally"; "4/2/90: . . . She is walking well"; and 
"5/9/90: . . . Since she stopped taking the Feldene, she has noted increased 
back pain and some other psychosomatic type symptoms such as trembling, shaking, 
sweating and that sort of thing." The second doctor reported one examination: On 
April 6, 1990, "she says she can walk about fifteen feet and then she has to 
stop to rest because of the numbness increasing down the legs."

[¶16]   The hearing examiner must assess 
the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence. We will not substitute 
our judgment for that of the hearing examiner if his decision is supported by 
substantial evidence. Romero, 854 P.2d  at 61. We hold that the record contained 
sufficient evidence for the hearing examiner to find that Ms. Bearden's neck 
injury resulted from the condition of the house and not from her prior medical 
treatment or prior medical condition.

[¶17]   Ms. Bearden asks us to adopt a 
"quasi-course of employment" analysis used by other jurisdictions to test for 
compensable injuries. She claims that the hearing examiner did not apply this 
analysis and that, if he had, she would have prevailed.

[¶18]   Under the proposed test, injuries 
are compensable if they arise out of "quasi-course" activities. Those activities 
are defined as:

activities 
undertaken by the employee following upon his injury which, although they take 
place outside the time and space limits of the employment, and would not be 
considered employment activities for usual purposes, are nevertheless related to 
the employment in the sense that they are necessary or reasonable activities 
that would not have been undertaken but for the compensable injury. "Reasonable" 
at this point relates not to the method used, but to the category of activity 
itself.

1 
ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 13.11(d) at 3-542 
(1993).

[¶19]   Contrary to Ms. Bearden's claim, 
however, the hearing examiner did consider the proposed test. He 
found:

The 
unusual fact situation of this case in which the employee is homebound because 
of an injury she incurred within the scope of her employment creates an 
expectation that any subsequent injury resulting from her initial injury would 
be covered. I do not disagree with this; however, in this case, it appears the 
injury was the result of a condition of her house when she tripped on a nail and 
fell when exiting that house. She was not within the scope of her employment. 
The injury she received was not a result of her medical treatment nor medical 
condition and she certainly was not within the course of her 
employment.

In 
effect, the hearing examiner found that the "but for" causation requirement of 
the proposed test was not met, that Ms. Bearden did not hand deliver the 
evaluation form because she had a back injury, and that the back injury did not 
cause Ms. Bearden to injure her neck. Because the proposed test would not 
control the outcome of this case, we do not find it necessary to consider, in 
the abstract, the merit of the "quasi-course of employment" test proposed by Ms. 
Bearden.

Summary

[¶20]   The record contains substantial 
evidence to support the hearing examiner's findings that Ms. Bearden's neck 
injury did not arise out of or within the scope of her employment and that her 
earlier back injury did not cause her neck injury. The hearing examiner's 
findings were not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law. Section 16-3-114(c).

[¶21]   Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 
Ms. Bearden gave the only testimony at the hearing. The hearing examiner took 
judicial notice of the contents of the court file.