Title: Leroy Riesch v. David Schwarz

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 11 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-0920 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Leroy Riesch,  
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
David Schwarz, Administrator, Division of  
Hearing and Appeals,  
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 15, 2005 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 5, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dodge   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel W. Klossner   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Christopher J. Cherella and Law Offices of Christopher J. 
Cherella, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Christopher J. 
Cherella. 
 
For the respondent-respondent the cause was argued by 
Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2005 WI 11 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-0920  
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 193) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Leroy Riesch,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
David Schwarz, Administrator, Division of  
Hearings and Appeals,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 15, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Leroy Riesch, 
seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals 
affirming an order denying a petition for writ of certiorari.1  
Riesch contends that the respondent, the Division of Hearings 
and Appeals, acted outside its jurisdiction and contrary to 
Wisconsin law by revoking his parole status.  Specifically, he 
claims that such a status never existed because he was not 
                                                 
1 State ex rel. Riesch v. Schwarz, No. 03-0920, unpublished 
order (Wis. Ct. App. March 22, 2004) (affirming an order denying 
a petition for writ of certiorari, entered in the circuit court 
for Dodge County, Daniel W. Klossner, Judge). 
No. 
03-0920   
 
2 
 
released 
from 
physical 
custody 
and 
placed 
on 
parole.  
Accordingly, he asserts that the State cannot revoke a status 
that never existed.   
¶2 
Although the issue in this case is now moot as to 
Riesch, we nevertheless address the merits of his argument 
because it is of great public importance and arises frequently 
enough to warrant a definitive decision to guide the circuit 
courts.  We determine that Riesch had attained the status of a 
parolee after reaching his mandatory release date, despite the 
fact that he was not released from physical custody.  Thus, we 
conclude that the Division of Hearings and Appeals did not act 
outside its jurisdiction or contrary to law when revoking his 
parole status.  We therefore affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
 
¶3 
In 1993, Riesch was sentenced to serve eight years in 
prison under the old, indeterminate sentencing system.  His 
mandatory release date was set for July 21, 1998.  In 
anticipation of this date, Riesch was provided with a copy of 
parole supervision rules on June 29, 1998.2   
 
¶4 
Under 
his 
parole 
supervision 
rules, 
Riesch 
was 
required to avoid unlawful activity and conduct that was not in 
the best interest of the public or his rehabilitation.  He was 
to abide by the rules of any detention or correctional facility 
                                                 
2 Our recitation of the background of the case is based in 
part upon the findings of fact of the Administrative Law Judge, 
David R. Braithwaite.  
No. 
03-0920   
 
3 
 
in which he was confined.  Furthermore, he was to give true and 
correct information in responses to inquiries by his agent.   
Riesch refused to sign these rules. 
 
¶5 
Prior to his release date, Riesch's parole agent 
determined that his client needed to reside at an approved 
halfway house or residence because of a need for treatment 
associated with his underlying conviction for sexual assault.  
After learning that he would need to participate in treatment 
programming at such a facility, Riesch stated that he would not 
do so.  Due to this recalcitrance, a parole hold was lodged 
against Riesch and he was transported on July 21, 1998, from 
prison to the Dodge County Jail. 
 
¶6 
Upon 
his 
arrival 
at 
the 
jail, 
Riesch 
was 
not 
cooperative with the staff and would not provide information 
regarding his medical status.  Additionally, he refused to sign 
fingerprint 
cards 
after 
his 
prints 
were 
taken. 
 
Riesch 
maintained that it was a violation of his constitutional rights 
to force him to sign anything. 
 
¶7 
Riesch's parole agent came to see him on July 27, 
1998, to obtain a written or verbal statement from him 
concerning his case.  The agent asked that Riesch be shackled 
before she talked to him.  Riesch became upset and would not see 
the agent, as he did not want to be shackled.  Consequently, he 
did not give a statement to her. 
 
¶8 
That same day, Riesch's parole agent initiated a 
revocation against Riesch on grounds that he failed to have a 
suitable residence, failed to cooperate with jail staff, failed 
No. 
03-0920   
 
4 
 
to obey jail rules, and failed to give a statement to the agent.  
On September 21, 1998, an Administrative Law Judge issued a 
written decision revoking Riesch's parole.  The Division of 
Hearings and Appeals (hereinafter "the Division") affirmed that 
decision. 
 
¶9 
On May 19, 1999, Riesch filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari, which was dismissed as untimely.  He appealed, and 
the court of appeals affirmed.  This court then denied the 
petition for review.  Riesch's counsel filed next a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus.  Subsequently, the parties stipulated 
that Riesch's petition for writ of certiorari should be 
reinstated.3 
 
¶10 After 
reinstating 
Riesch's 
petition 
for writ of 
certiorari, the circuit court denied the petition on the merits.  
In doing so, it relied upon the Macemon cases, State ex rel. 
Macemon v. McReynolds, 208 Wis. 2d 594, 561 N.W.2d 779 (Ct. App. 
1997) (Macemon I), and State ex rel. Macemon v. Christie, 216 
Wis. 2d 337, 576 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1998) (Macemon II).  Riesch 
appealed, and the court of appeals summarily affirmed the 
                                                 
3 Despite this stipulation, the State now asks this court to 
dismiss Riesch's appeal for want of subject matter jurisdiction.  
According to the State, when Riesch filed his petition for writ 
of habeas corpus, he was subject only to the restraint 
associated with being on probation, which was imposed in an 
unrelated case.  Like the court of appeals, we decline to 
address this argument.  We do so in part because this case is 
moot.  Additionally, we note that the record is unclear as to 
the circumstances surrounding Riesch's original disposition, 
that is, whether the probation imposed was for a different 
sentence or whether it was part of a continuous sentence.  Thus, 
we choose instead to focus on the underlying issue.  
No. 
03-0920   
 
5 
 
decision.  It deemed Macemon II controlling.  Riesch sought 
review of that decision and this court accepted his petition. 
 
¶11 Since granting the petition for review in this case, 
we have determined that the issue presented is moot as to 
Riesch.  "An issue is moot when its resolution will have no 
practical effect on the underlying controversy."  State ex rel. 
Olson v. Litscher, 2000 WI App 61, ¶3, 233 Wis. 2d 685, 608 
N.W.2d 425.  Riesch's issue satisfies this definition because he 
has been discharged from the conviction underlying his parole 
revocation, and that revocation did not delay the start of the 
probationary term he is now serving. 
 
¶12 Appellate courts generally decline to consider moot 
issues but may do so under certain circumstances.  State v. 
Morford, 2004 WI 5, ¶7, 268 Wis. 2d 300, 674 N.W.2d 349.  For 
example, this court has held that it may decide an otherwise 
moot issue if it is of great public importance or arises 
frequently enough to warrant a definitive decision to guide the 
circuit courts.  Id. (citing In re John Doe Proceeding, 2003 WI 
30, ¶19, 260 Wis. 2d 653, 660 N.W.2d 260).  In this case, the 
issue presented falls within these exceptions, and therefore, we 
reach its merits. 
II 
 
¶13 Certiorari review for parole revocation is limited to 
four questions:  "(1) whether the agency stayed within its 
jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; (3) whether 
its 
action 
was 
arbitrary, 
oppressive 
or 
unreasonable, 
representing its will, not its judgment; and (4) whether the 
No. 
03-0920   
 
6 
 
evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order or 
determination in question."  State ex rel. Thorson v. Schwarz, 
2004 WI 96, ¶12, 274 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 941.    
¶14 Here, 
Riesch's 
claim 
implicates 
the 
first 
two 
inquiries.  He submits that the Division acted outside its 
jurisdiction and contrary to law in revoking his parole status 
because he was not on parole at the time of revocation.  
Resolution of these matters present questions of law subject to 
independent appellate review.  See State ex rel. Curtis v. 
Litscher, 2002 WI App 172, ¶10, 256 Wis. 2d 787, 650 N.W.2d 43.   
III 
 
¶15 Riesch's arguments in this case present a single 
issue.  We must determine whether an inmate such as Riesch can 
have the status as a parolee and be subject to revocation 
proceedings even though he has not been released from physical 
custody. 
 
¶16 According to Riesch, he was not a parolee at the time 
of his revocation because he was not released from physical 
custody after reaching his mandatory release date.  He submits 
that custody and parole are mutually exclusive concepts.  Riesch 
further contends that, because inmates must be released on their 
mandatory release date, his transfer from a state correctional 
facility to a county jail on July 21, 1998, meant he was a 
prisoner rather than a parolee when he committed the acts 
underlying his revocation.  We address these arguments in turn.   
 
¶17 Riesch begins his analysis by examining the terms 
"custody" and "parole."  He relies on two sentence credit cases, 
No. 
03-0920   
 
7 
 
State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d 371, 340 N.W.2d 511 (1983), and 
State ex rel. Ludtke v. DOC, 215 Wis. 2d 1, 572 N.W.2d 864 (Ct. 
App. 1997), for the proposition that the terms are readily 
distinguishable. 
 
He 
advances 
that 
custody 
involves 
"incarceration, or deprivation of liberty," but that parole 
pertains to "the conditional privileges of freedom and liberty."  
Ludtke, 215 Wis. 2d at 11.  Because Riesch remained in custody 
at all times relevant to this case, he claims that he did not 
have "the conditional privileges of freedom and liberty" 
necessary to be considered paroled.  
   
¶18 Although we agree with Riesch that custody and parole 
are distinguishable in certain contexts, we reject the notion 
that the terms are always mutually exclusive.  A parole hold is 
a classic case in point.  For example, suppose Riesch had made 
it "out onto the streets" but was taken to the county jail as a 
result of a violation of his parole rules.  Until he went 
through the proper channels, including a final revocation 
hearing, he would possess the dual status of parolee and 
prisoner.  Thus, the concepts of parole and custody can and do 
overlap. 
 
¶19 Riesch's next argument is that the continuation of his 
custody after reaching his mandatory release date meant that he 
was a prisoner rather than a parolee when he committed the acts 
underlying his revocation.  He relies on two cases to support 
this assertion, State ex rel. Woods v. Morgan, 224 Wis. 2d 534, 
591 N.W.2d 922 (Ct. App. 1999) and Olson, 233 Wis. 2d 685.  
Riesch contends that those cases are much more relevant to his 
No. 
03-0920   
 
8 
 
factual scenario than the Macemon cases, upon which the lower 
courts relied.  
 
¶20 According 
to 
Riesch, 
the 
Macemon 
cases 
are 
distinguishable because they provided no clear indication as to 
the status of Macemon as a "prisoner" or a "parolee" at the time 
of his refusal to follow the rules of the Department of 
Corrections (DOC).  In the alternative, Riesch acknowledges that 
there may be a conflict between Macemon and the Woods and Olson 
cases.  He therefore asks this court to make clear that Macemon 
was "effectively reversed" insofar as it conflicts with Woods 
and Olson.   
 
¶21 We are not persuaded by Riesch's arguments.  Woods and 
Olson are unlike the present case because the inmates in those 
cases did nothing to warrant their continued detention at the 
time of their mandatory release date.  In contrast, the inmate 
in the Macemon cases, like Riesch, violated the conditions of 
his parole immediately and simultaneously with his mandatory 
release date.  Accordingly, a parole hold was placed on him and 
he was revoked, despite the fact that he was kept in continuous 
custody.4 
                                                 
4 Although Riesch questions the status of Macemon as a 
parolee, we do not.  In State ex rel. Macemon v. Christie, 216 
Wis. 2d 337, 338, 576 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1998), the court of 
appeals began its opinion by stating:  "Robert Macemon appeals 
from a circuit court order denying his writ of certiorari which 
challenged his parole revocation."  Furthermore, the court 
described that appeal as Macemon's "second challenge to his 
revocation."  Id.  Finally, it noted that in its earlier case it 
had "determined that Macemon's parole was revoked, not denied."  
Id. at 340-41. 
No. 
03-0920   
 
9 
 
 
¶22 In Woods, the inmate appealed an order denying his 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Woods had been incarcerated 
at the Racine Correctional Institution and was transferred to 
the Sherrer Correctional Center upon reaching his mandatory 
release date.  Four days after arriving at Sherrer, he made 
sexual overtures to another inmate and was placed on a parole 
hold.  The DOC determined that the Sherrer incident was a parole 
violation, revoked Woods's parole, and recommitted him to the 
Racine Correctional Institution. 
 
¶23 On appeal, Woods argued he was still a prison inmate 
when the State revoked his parole.  Although he had signed 
parole rules, was supervised by a parole agent, and was 
permitted to leave the facility with his agent, the court of 
appeals agreed that Woods was a prison inmate.   Woods, 224 Wis. 
2d at 536.  Significant to the court's decision was the fact 
that the conduct underlying Woods's parole hold took place 
several days after his mandatory release.  Id. at 538-40.  The 
State acknowledged that the record was silent as to why Woods 
was placed at Sherrer after reaching his mandatory release date.  
Id. at 536, n. 3. 
 
¶24 In Olson, the inmate petitioned the court of appeals 
for writ of habeas corpus after he was detained past his 
mandatory release date.  Olson had been transferred from one 
correctional facility to another on his release date because the 
DOC was unable to locate a suitable residence for him.  Again, 
there was no indication that Olson had done anything to warrant 
the continuous custody at that time.  Accordingly, the State 
No. 
03-0920   
 
10 
 
conceded that he was entitled to release when he reached his 
mandatory release date and that no statute or administrative 
rule authorized the DOC to detain him past that point.  The 
court of appeals agreed.  Olson, 233 Wis. 2d 685, ¶1.   
 
¶25 Unlike the inmates in Woods and Olson, Riesch engaged 
in conduct that warranted custody at the time of his mandatory 
release date.  Specifically, he committed the first of the 
violations underlying his parole by refusing to cooperate with 
his social worker at the Kettle Moraine Correctional Institution 
(KMCI) in arranging a suitable residence plan upon his release.  
This took place simultaneous to the date of his mandatory 
release, and a parole hold was immediately lodged against him.5  
In its decision, the Division explained why the DOC's action was 
not surprising in light of Riesch's failure to cooperate with 
his supervision plan: 
Mr. Reisch6 was placed in jail on his mandatory release 
date because he stubbornly refused to cooperate with 
the department's efforts to implement a suitable 
supervision plan.  His resistance to supervision began 
the very day he was given a copy of the rules of 
supervision, which he refused to sign and continued 
right up to the day of his release and beyond.  Based 
on his often stated objections to the parole planning 
process, I am satisfied that Mr. Reisch knew full well 
why he had been taken to jail rather than being simply 
released to the community.  The department was not 
required to wait until Mr. Reisch committed a crime 
                                                 
5 Both the Administrative Law Judge and the Division found 
that Riesch's violations began on his mandatory release date, 
July 21, 1998, and continued through July 27, 1998.   
6 Throughout its decision, the Division mistakenly refers to 
Riesch as "Reisch." 
No. 
03-0920   
 
11 
 
before it took steps to protect the public.  That is 
particularly true since Mr. Reisch was a sex offender 
who was totally rejecting active supervision.  That 
stubborn contempt for the parole supervision process 
could not be ignored and required active intervention 
to protect the public from the risk that Mr. Reisch 
might commit serious crimes if he were simply released 
to the community under his own terms.  His behavior 
left 
the 
department 
no 
real 
choice 
other 
than 
revocation of parole and further confinement. 
 
¶26 Because Riesch's first violation occurred immediately 
and simultaneously with his mandatory release date, we find the 
Macemon cases instructive.  In Macemon I, the inmate argued that 
the DOC unlawfully detained him beyond his scheduled release 
date.  The DOC had issued an order to hold Macemon in custody 
because of his refusal to wear an electronic monitoring bracelet 
and to participate in postconfinement sex offender treatment.  
The court of appeals held that the DOC had authority to require 
mandatory release parolees to submit to an electronic monitoring 
bracelet.  Macemon I, 208 Wis. 2d at 598.  It further concluded 
that the evidence reasonably supported the imposition of the 
DOC's two conditions.  Id. at 599  
 
¶27 In Macemon II, the inmate asserted, among other 
things, that he was denied the mandatory release to which he was 
entitled by statute.  The court of appeals dismissed this claim 
in summary fashion.  First, it noted that Macemon's parole was 
revoked, not denied, and therefore there was no factual basis 
for the claim.  Macemon II, 216 Wis. 2d at 341.  Second, it 
rejected an argument strikingly similar to the one advanced by 
Riesch in this case: 
No. 
03-0920   
 
12 
 
Macemon also argues that "release" never took place 
because he "has not been out of prison clothes 
. . . was handcuffed and leg shackled . . . [and] in 
continuous confinement without Release."  While it is 
true that Macemon has never made it "out onto the 
streets," his release from prison was processed.  
However, because he refused to wear a monitoring 
bracelet and to participate in postconfinement sex 
offender treatment, see State ex rel. Macemon v. 
McReynolds, 208 Wis. 2d 594, 595, 561 N.W.2d 779, 780 
(Ct. App. 1997), he was immediately taken into custody 
for failing to abide by the conditions of parole and 
taken to the Racine County Jail. 
 Id. at 341, n. 2. 
 
¶28 Neither Macemon I nor Macemon II stand for the 
proposition that a person can be revoked from parole before 
being granted parole status.  However, they do support the 
State's claim that a person can attain the status of a parolee 
without being released from physical custody.  Given the 
foregoing discussion, we are satisfied that Macemon rather than 
Woods and Olson control this case.  Even if Macemon were not 
controlling, however, we would still reject Riesch's claim.   
¶29 The holding Riesch seeks today is a bright-line rule 
that elevates form over substance.  He contends that inmates 
must always be released from physical custody before any 
revocation is commenced, regardless of whether they have signed 
parole rules, complied with parole rules, or cooperated with 
their agent.  In essence, he is asking for a ritual where the 
DOC releases uncooperative inmates just outside the prison walls 
on their mandatory release dates before subsequently placing 
parole holds upon them.  As the State succinctly stated at oral 
argument:  
No. 
03-0920   
 
13 
 
[W]hen your violation is instantaneous, occurring at 
the same minute, I think it would be really a charade 
to say, "well, we have to let this person go, take off 
the handcuffs, and walk 20 paces outside of the state 
correctional institution before we can slap the cuffs 
on him and take him to the nearest county jail to 
lodge a parole hold."  I don't think that makes any 
sense. 
We agree. 
 
¶30 In the end, we are mindful that the DOC is not free to 
hold inmates indefinitely for such problems as failure to find 
suitable housing on its part.  Olson, 233 Wis. 2d at 690.  
However, we also recognize that the DOC has substantial 
discretionary authority to develop the rules and conditions for 
release.  Macemon I, 208 Wis. 2d at 597.7  Where inmates violate 
these terms immediately and simultaneously with their scheduled 
mandatory release dates, the DOC should be able to maintain 
continuous custody, even though that person's status changes 
from a prisoner serving a sentence to a parolee detained on a 
parole hold.  That is precisely what happened in both this case 
and Macemon.  We therefore conclude that the Division did not 
act outside its jurisdiction or contrary to law when revoking 
Riesch's parole. 
IV 
¶31 In sum, we determine that Riesch had attained the 
status of a parolee after reaching his mandatory release date, 
despite the fact that he was not released from physical custody.  
                                                 
7 There is no indication that Riesch's parole rules here 
were either arbitrary or unreasonable.  If they were, then the 
arguments and the analysis would present a different case. 
No. 
03-0920   
 
14 
 
Thus, we conclude that the Division did not act outside its 
jurisdiction or contrary to law when revoking his parole status.  
We therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
03-0920   
 
 
 
1