Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Jay Andrew Felli

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 73 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP3382-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Jay Andrew Felli, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent-Cross-
Appellant, 
     v. 
Jay Andrew Felli, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST FELLI 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 22, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 12, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-cross-respondent there were 
briefs by Terry E. Johnson, Heidi M. Miller, and Peterson, 
Johnson & Murray, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Terry E. 
Johnson. 
 
For the complainant-respondent-cross-appellant there were 
briefs by Robert G. Krohn and Roethe Krohn Pope LLP, Edgerton, 
and oral argument by Robert G. Krohn. 
 
 
2006 WI 73
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP3382-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Jay Andrew Felli, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent- 
          Cross-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Jay Andrew Felli, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant- 
          Cross-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 22, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Jay Andrew Felli has appealed 
from 
a 
referee's 
report 
concluding 
that 
he 
engaged 
in 
professional misconduct and recommending that his license to 
practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for a period of 18 
months.  The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) has cross-
appealed, arguing that the referee's findings that there was 
insufficient evidence to prove three of the counts alleged in 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
2 
 
the OLR's complaint are clearly erroneous.  In addition, the OLR 
asserts that the recommended 18-month suspension inadequately 
addresses the severity of the misconduct and that the gravity of 
the offenses supports revocation of Attorney Felli's license to 
practice law. 
¶2 
We conclude that all of the referee's findings of 
fact, including those challenged by the OLR, are supported by 
satisfactory and convincing evidence.  We also agree with the 
referee's conclusions of law that Attorney Felli engaged in 
professional misconduct.  We conclude, however, that the 
appropriate discipline for the misconduct is a three-year 
suspension of Attorney Felli's license to practice law rather 
than the 18-month suspension recommended by the referee.  We 
further agree with the referee that the costs of the proceeding, 
which total $33,400.72 as of January 19, 2006, should be 
assessed against Attorney Felli. 
¶3 
Attorney Felli was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1994 and practices in Brookfield.  In 1998 he 
received a private reprimand for failure to timely pay his 
Wisconsin State Bar dues.  In 2005 he received a public 
reprimand for failing to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness 
in 
representing 
a 
client 
and 
making 
misrepresentations 
to 
the 
OLR. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Felli, 2005 WI 58, 281 Wis. 2d 25, 697 
N.W.2d 42. 
¶4 
On December 30, 2004, while the prior disciplinary 
proceeding was still pending, the OLR filed a second complaint 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
3 
 
against Attorney Felli and also filed a motion seeking a 
temporary suspension of Attorney Felli's license on the ground 
that his continued practice of law posed a threat to the 
interests of the public and the administration of justice.  This 
court denied the OLR's motion for a temporary suspension, but 
concluded that the motion raised significant concerns such that 
the court deemed it appropriate to expedite the disposition of 
the underlying proceeding. 
¶5 
The OLR's complaint alleged 15 counts of misconduct 
involving three client matters.  All of the cases involved 
estate planning.  Two financial planners, Stanley Zurawski and 
Ramzi Raad, were partners in a company called Lincoln Financial 
Planning.  Zurawski and Raad presented financial planning 
seminars to target audiences 55 years of age and older.  
Sometime between 1995 and 1997 they decided to include an 
attorney in their seminars so they could refer clients back and 
forth.  They asked Attorney Felli, who was married to Zurawski's 
cousin, to join them in the financial planning seminars.   
¶6 
The 
first 
client 
matter 
detailed 
in 
the 
OLR's 
complaint involved Attorney Felli's representation of R.W.  In 
1996 R.W. had executed a will, filed with the Milwaukee County 
Probate Court, leaving her estate, which was valued at more than 
one million dollars at the time of her death two years later, to 
the Wisconsin Conservatory of Music and the Milwaukee Ballet 
Company.  R.W. appointed her neighbor and his wife as her 
personal representatives.   
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
4 
 
¶7 
R.W. attended an estate planning seminar at which 
Attorney Felli and Zurawski made presentations.  Attorney Felli 
and Zurawski recommended that R.W. use trusts to carry out the 
charitable bequests.  Attorney Felli prepared a revocable living 
trust and a charitable remainder unitrust that R.W. executed on 
June 18, 1997.  The Wisconsin Conservatory of Music was named as 
the sole beneficiary under both trusts.  R.W. herself was named 
as the original trustee of the living trust, with her neighbor 
and his wife as successor trustees.  The neighbors were also 
appointed as the trustees of the charitable unitrust.  R.W. 
executed a pour-over will that left any remaining assets at the 
time of her death to the living trust.  A year later Attorney 
Felli prepared amendments to the trusts that deleted the 
Wisconsin Conservatory of Music as the sole beneficiary and 
substituted Civic Music as the beneficiary.   
¶8 
In 
June 
1998 
Zurawski's 
sister 
founded 
and 
incorporated a new piano school.  Zurawski was initially on the 
school's board of directors.  On July 13, 1998, less than one 
month after the last amendments to R.W.'s estate planning 
documents had been prepared and executed, Attorney Felli 
prepared new amendments removing Civic Music as the beneficiary 
of the trusts and naming Zurawski's sister's piano school as the 
sole beneficiary.  The piano school did not apply for tax-exempt 
status until September 1998 and did not receive tax-exempt 
status until March 1999.  The amendments dated July 13, 1998, 
also changed the trustees of both trusts and removed the 
neighbor's wife as a co-trustee and appointed Attorney Felli as 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
5 
 
co-trustee of R.W.'s charitable remainder unitrust and as 
successor co-trustee of her living trust upon R.W.'s disability 
or death.   
¶9 
Attorney 
Felli 
did 
not 
discuss 
with 
R.W. 
any 
alternative trustees, such as financial institutions, nor did he 
question her about her reasons for appointing him as co-trustee 
with her neighbor, nor did he suggest that the neighbor might 
serve as sole trustee.   
¶10 R.W. died on September 19, 1998, without having 
executed further changes to her estate plan and leaving the 
piano school as the sole beneficiary.  Upon R.W.'s death, 
Attorney Felli served as co-trustee for both trusts, did legal 
work for the estate and trusts, and managed the estate and trust 
bank accounts.  Zurawski handled trust investment accounts.   
¶11 An attorney sent a copy of R.W.'s obituary notice to 
the Milwaukee County Probate Court and wrote to the Wisconsin 
Conservatory of Music and the Milwaukee Ballet Company to inform 
them that R.W. had a will on file with the court naming their 
organizations as beneficiaries of her estate.  In January 1999 
those organizations filed a petition for administration of 
R.W.'s 1996 will.  On February 23, 1999, Attorney Felli filed 
the 1997 pour-over will, an objection to the probate of the 1996 
will, and a petition for probate of the 1997 will.  Various 
challenges to the 1997 will and trusts ensued, all of which were 
eventually settled with payments to the challengers by the 
estate and/or trusts.  Attorney Felli retained outside counsel 
to represent the estate and trusts in those contests. 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
6 
 
¶12 A section of the living trust document required the 
trustees to submit at least a semiannual report to beneficiaries 
regarding trust receipts, disbursements, and distributions.  The 
trust's books and records were also to be made available for 
inspection by the trust beneficiaries.  The piano school 
received some distributions from the R.W. living trust between 
1998 and 2001.  Apparently no distribution was larger than 
$25,000.   
¶13 In late 2001 Attorney Felli gave instructions to 
Zurawski to liquidate about $130,000 in trust assets.  On 
December 19, 2001, the piano school's attorney wrote to Attorney 
Felli requesting that the school's accountant be allowed to 
review trust accounting records.  The following day Attorney 
Felli informed the piano school it was being terminated as a 
trust beneficiary.  The piano school was never provided with any 
accountings or records, and it received no further distributions 
from the trusts other than a lump sum payment in settlement of a 
civil 
action 
subsequently 
brought 
by 
the 
school. 
 
Upon 
termination of the piano school as a beneficiary, for a period 
of time there were no beneficiaries to whom the trustees were 
required to make distributions or accountings.   
¶14 In January 2004 a grievance was filed with the OLR by 
Zurawski's sister.1  In the course of the OLR's investigation, 
Attorney Felli was requested to provide, among other things, 
                                                 
1 The record indicates that Zurawski and Attorney Felli had 
a falling out but that Attorney Felli remains on good terms with 
Raad. 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
7 
 
trust documents, an accounting of the $130,000 that had been 
liquidated, an inventory of trust and estate assets, and an 
accounting of all legal fees, trustee fees, and other amounts 
Attorney Felli had paid himself or his law firm out of R.W.'s 
trust and estate assets.   
¶15 Attorney Felli responded to the OLR on March 30, 2004, 
but failed to provide any documents.  After a follow-up request 
on April 16, 2004, Attorney Felli provided documents related to 
the living trust but not to the charitable remainder unitrust.  
In response to a third request from the OLR, on June 2, 2004, 
Attorney Felli provided a copy of the charitable remainder 
unitrust document and one amendment that was dated after R.W.'s 
death.  Attorney Felli explained his initial failure to provide 
unitrust 
documents 
by 
representing 
to 
the 
OLR 
that 
the 
charitable remainder unitrust had been combined with the living 
trust at the time of R.W.'s death, but this statement was false 
since Attorney Felli had executed an amendment to the unitrust 
six months after R.W.'s death and assets were still being held 
in a separate unitrust investment account as late as 2002, four 
years after R.W. died. 
¶16 With regard to the OLR's request for an accounting of 
the $130,000 in funds that Zurawski said he had liquidated in 
the latter part of 2001, Attorney Felli originally represented 
that he had used the $130,000 to pay approximately $35,000 for 
legal fees to outside counsel, $2500 for legal fees to himself, 
and $50,000 to $55,000 for distributions to the piano school.  
Attorney Felli represented that the balance was held in the 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
8 
 
trust's operating account.  When the OLR requested more 
information, Attorney Felli 
provided 
a 
second 
accounting.  
Rather than showing that he had received $2500 for legal fees as 
he 
had 
represented 
in 
the 
first 
accounting, 
the 
second 
accounting itemized five checks payable to Attorney Felli's law 
firm totaling over $26,000.   
¶17 Bank account records established that neither of 
Attorney Felli's accountings was correct.  After subpoenaing 
bank records, the OLR learned that during the same time period 
covered by Attorney Felli's accounting, he wrote checks to 
himself or his law firm in excess of $86,000.  Attorney Felli's 
accounting to the OLR misrepresented the payee on two checks he 
had written to himself.  Attorney Felli's accounting showed that 
check 1087 for $7961 was payable to the Gonyo Law Offices, when 
in fact the check was payable to the Felli Law Offices.  
Attorney Felli's accounting also showed that check 1090 for 
$5000 was paid to Attorney David DeToffel, when in fact that 
check was also payable to the Felli Law Offices.   
¶18 Attorney 
Felli's 
accounting 
referenced 
two 
liquidations from trust investment accounts:  $60,000 that was 
liquidated in April of 2001 and $65,000 that was liquidated in 
May of 2001.  The bank records showed that in addition to these 
two liquidations, another $100,750 was liquidated between July 
and December 2001.  Attorney Felli's accounting made no 
reference 
to 
receiving 
the 
latter 
funds 
and 
offered 
no 
accounting of how the funds were disbursed. 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
9 
 
¶19 The OLR also requested Attorney Felli to produce a 
schedule of assets transferred to the R.W. living and charitable 
remainder unitrust during R.W.'s lifetime, an inventory of trust 
assets at the time of R.W.'s death, and an inventory of R.W.'s 
estate assets.  Attorney Felli never provided the OLR with any 
of this information.   
¶20 With respect to the OLR's request for an accounting of 
all legal fees Attorney Felli had paid himself from R.W.'s 
estate and trusts, Attorney Felli provided the OLR with a 
billing printout showing that during a 14 1/2 month period 
starting just before R.W. died, from mid-September 1998 through 
November 30, 1999, Attorney Felli had earned and billed legal 
fees of $105,961.56.  He also provided the OLR with sporadic 
bills between May 1, 2000, and July 31, 2001.  He provided no 
billing records after August 1, 2001, although he apparently 
continues to represent the trusts, and the R.W. probate 
proceeding is still pending. 
¶21 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Felli's representation of 
R.W.: 
COUNT ONE—By preparing trust documents and subsequent 
trust amendments that named himself as a co-trustee of 
the [R.W.] Living Trust and the [R.W.] Charitable 
Remainder Unitrust, Felli prepared legal documents 
which required that the lawyer's services be used in 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
10 
 
relation to that document, in violation of SCR 
20:7.3(f).2 
COUNT TWO—By charging over $105,000.00 for legal fees 
to the [R.W.] estate and trusts for a 14 1/2-month 
period, Felli charged fees that were unreasonable and 
clearly excessive, in violation of SCR 20:1.5.3 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:7.3(f) provides that "[e]xcept as permitted under 
SCR 11.06, a lawyer, at his or her instance, shall not draft 
legal documents, such as wills, trust instruments or contracts, 
which require or imply that the lawyer's services be used in 
relation to that document." 
3 SCR 20:1.5 provides:  Fees. 
 
(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable.  The 
factors 
to 
be 
considered 
in 
determining 
the 
reasonableness of a fee include the following: 
 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty 
and difficulty of the questions involved, and the 
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
 
(3) the 
fee 
customarily 
charged 
in 
the 
locality for similar legal services; 
 
(4) the 
amount 
involved 
and 
the 
results 
obtained; 
 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client 
or by the circumstances; 
 
(6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client; 
 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and 
 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
 
(b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented 
the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be 
communicated to the client, preferably in writing, 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
11 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
before or within a reasonable time after commencing 
the representation. 
 
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the 
matter for which the service is rendered, except in a 
matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by 
paragraph (d) or other law.  A contingent fee 
agreement shall be in writing and shall state the 
method by which the fee is to be determined, including 
the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the 
lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, 
litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the 
recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted 
before or after the contingent fee is calculated.  
Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer 
shall provide the client with a written statement 
stating the outcome of the matter and if there is a 
recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the 
method of its determination. 
 
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement 
for, charge, or collect a contingent fee: 
 
 
(1) in 
any 
action 
affecting 
the 
family, 
including 
but 
not 
limited 
to 
divorce, 
legal 
separation, annulment, determination of paternity, 
setting of support and maintenance, setting of custody 
and physical placement, property division, partition 
of marital property, termination of parental rights 
and adoption, provided that nothing herein shall 
prohibit a contingent fee for the collection of past 
due amounts of support or maintenance. 
 
 
(2) for representing a defendant in a criminal 
case 
or 
any 
proceeding 
that 
could 
result 
in 
deprivation of liberty. 
 
(e) A division of fee between lawyers who are not 
in the same firm may be made only if: 
 
 
(1) the division is in proportion to the 
services performed by each lawyer or, by written 
agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint 
responsibility for the representation; 
 
 
(2) the client is advised of and does not 
object to the participation of all the lawyers 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
12 
 
COUNT THREE—By representing [R.W.], her trusts and 
estate when Felli's independent professional judgment 
on behalf of his client was influenced by his own 
pecuniary 
interests 
in 
acquiring 
control 
and 
possession of [R.W.]'s assets for himself and for the 
family of a financial advisor with whom he had a close 
working 
relationship, 
Felli's 
representation 
of 
[R.W.], her trusts and estate was materially limited 
by the interests of a third party and his own 
financial interests, in violation of SCR 20:1.7(b).4 
COUNT FOUR—By administering [R.W.]'s trusts in such a 
way that he terminated all trust beneficiaries and 
then paid himself at least $374,000 of [R.W.]'s 
assets, Felli 
engaged 
in 
conduct 
which 
involved 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).5 
                                                                                                                                                             
involved and is informed if the fee will increase as a 
result of their involvement; and 
 
 
(3) the total fee is reasonable. 
4 SCR 20:1.7(b) provides:  Conflict of interest: general 
rule.   
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation 
of 
that 
client may 
be 
materially 
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another 
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own 
interests, unless:  
 
(1) the 
lawyer 
reasonably 
believes 
the 
representation will not be adversely affected; and   
 
(2) the client consents in writing after 
consultation.  When representation of multiple clients 
in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation 
shall include explanation of the implications of the 
common representation and the advantages and risks 
involved. 
5 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
13 
 
COUNT FIVE—By willfully failing to provide relevant 
information, 
answer 
questions 
fully, 
and 
furnish 
requested documents in his responses to OLR, and by 
making misrepresentations in his disclosures to OLR, 
Felli violated SCR 22.03(6).6 
¶22 The second client matter detailed in the OLR's 
complaint involved Attorney Felli's representation of L.D.  L.D. 
was introduced to Attorney Felli in early 1998.  L.D. had been 
blind since she was ten years old and was living at the Badger 
Home for the Blind.  In a will dated May 14, 1987, L.D. had 
appointed her brother, A.D., to be her personal representative.  
On March 12, 1998, L.D. executed a will prepared by Attorney 
Felli.  The will included bequests to family members and several 
charities and named A.D. as personal representative.  On the 
same date, L.D. executed documents making her brother her 
financial and health care power of attorney.   
¶23 In early 1999 Attorney Felli and Zurawski met with 
L.D. to discuss the creation of a charitable remainder unitrust 
to carry out L.D.'s charitable bequests.  At that time, 
according to a memo prepared by Zurawski, L.D.'s primary assets 
consisted of some annuities and a brokerage account totaling 
$136,000.  On February 17, 1999, L.D. executed a will and 
charitable remainder unitrust prepared by Attorney Felli.  The 
                                                 
6 SCR 22.03(6) provides:  Investigation.   
(6) In the course of the investigation, the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance. 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
14 
 
will appointed L.D.'s brother as her personal representative, 
and the trust document appointed Attorney Felli as trustee.  
Attorney Felli acknowledged to the OLR that he did not discuss 
with L.D. any alternatives to his appointment as trustee, such 
as the use of a corporate trustee, friend, or relative.   
¶24 Attorney Felli does not have billing records for the 
L.D. matter but said he received legal fees of between $1500 and 
$2000 for his work.  After the charitable remainder unitrust was 
executed, Attorney Felli never spoke with L.D. again.  Pursuant 
to the unitrust, Attorney Felli, as trustee, was required to 
make annual distributions to L.D. in the amount of 5 percent of 
the market value of the trust assets, as valued on the first day 
of each taxable year.  Attorney Felli and Zurawski arranged to 
have an annual disbursement equal to 5 percent of the trust's 
initial total value taken from one fund that charged no penalty 
for withdrawal.  Attorney Felli should have performed an annual 
accounting allowing him to make annual adjustments and ensure 
that L.D. was receiving 5 percent, but he failed to perform such 
accountings.  He also never filed fiduciary income tax returns 
for the trust.   
¶25 The L.D. trust granted "reasonable compensation" to 
the trustee.  Zurawski arranged for disbursements totaling 2 
percent of the initial trust value to Attorney Felli, from which 
Attorney Felli was to draw his fees.  In the beginning of 
calendar year 2000, Attorney Felli received an annuity check 
payable to the trust in the amount of $2395.72.  Attorney Felli 
opened a checking account as trustee and deposited the annuity 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
15 
 
payment to that account.  He then wrote two checks to himself 
for trustee fees, one in the amount of $720 and another in the 
amount of $1125.  In 2001 Attorney Felli deposited another check 
in the amount of $2395.72 into the checking account and again 
wrote two checks to himself for trustee fees, one for $500 and 
the other for $2000.  In 2002 Attorney Felli deposited another 
$2395.72 check and wrote himself checks for $800 and $2000. 
¶26 On November 7, 2002, L.D. removed Attorney Felli as 
trustee of her trust and replaced him with her brother.  
Attorney Felli was notified of his removal via a letter from the 
brother's attorney dated November 18, 2002. 
¶27 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Felli's representation of 
L.D.: 
COUNT SIX—By preparing a charitable remainder unitrust 
that named himself as trustee, Felli drafted a legal 
document which required that the lawyer's services be 
used in relation to that document, in violation of SCR 
20:7.3(f). 
COUNT SEVEN—By failing to investigate and inform 
[L.D.] of the suitability of a charitable remainder 
trust, by failing to advise [L.D.] about the risks of 
creating a charitable remainder trust with respect to 
her potential eligibility for Title XIX benefits, by 
failing to advise [L.D.] that she could consider 
corporate trustees or individuals other than Felli as 
a trustee, by failing to see that assets named in 
Schedule A of the trust were timely transferred to the 
trust, by transferring an asset to the trust that was 
not included in Schedule A without the knowledge or 
consent of the donor, by failing to file tax returns 
for the trust, and by failing to prepare annual trust 
accountings and make quarterly distributions to [L.D.] 
as required under the terms of the trust, Felli failed 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
16 
 
to provide competent representation to a client, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.1.7 
COUNT EIGHT—By failing to investigate and inform 
[L.D.] of the suitability of a charitable remainder 
trust, by failing to advise [L.D.] about the risks of 
creating a charitable remainder trust with respect to 
her eligibility for Title XIX benefits, and by failing 
to advise [L.D.] that she could consider corporate 
trustees or individuals other than Felli as trustee, 
Felli failed to explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.4(b).8   
COUNT NINE—By failing to arrange timely transfer of 
trust assets to [L.D.]'s trust and by failing to 
obtain a timely employer identification number for the 
trust, Felli failed to act with reasonable diligence 
and promptness in representing a client, in violation 
of SCR 20:1.3.9 
COUNT TEN—By having a personal pecuniary interest in 
receiving annual trustee fees from a trust he created 
for [L.D.] without determining whether the trust was 
in his client's best interests, Felli represented a 
client when the representation of that client might be 
materially limited by his own interests, in violation 
of SCR 20:1.7(b). 
COUNT 
ELEVEN—By 
creating 
a 
Charitable 
Remainder 
Unitrust for [L.D.], that provided no financial or tax 
benefits to his client but personally benefited Felli; 
by paying himself over $7,000.00 from a trust annuity 
when he rendered little or no trustee services to 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:1.1 provides that "[a] lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client. Competent representation 
requires 
the 
legal 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness 
and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."  
8 SCR 20:1.4(b) provides that "[a] lawyer shall explain a 
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client 
to make informed decisions regarding the representation."  
9 SCR 20:1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."  
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
17 
 
warrant such payment; by failing to provide his client 
or successor counsel with any accounting information 
including checks written to himself; and by failing to 
turn over to the successor trustee an annuity check 
that was sent to Felli after he had been discharged as 
trustee, 
Felli 
engaged 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  
¶28 The 
final 
client 
matter 
detailed 
in 
the 
OLR's 
complaint involved Attorney Felli's representation of W.G.  W.G. 
used Raad's services to handle investments for her.  Sometime in 
2001 W.G. and Raad discussed the possibility of her giving him a 
gift or bequest in addition to the commissions he earned on her 
transactions.  Raad had researched how W.G. might properly give 
him such a benefit and determined it should be done through a 
trust.  In April 2002, when W.G. was in her 80s, Raad purchased 
an annuity worth about $30,000 for her.  Raad suggested to W.G. 
that she change her estate plan to include a trust, and W.G. 
agreed.  Raad told her she could appoint as trustee of the trust 
the lawyer who would draft the trust, and he recommended 
Attorney Felli.  Raad's purpose in referring W.G. to Attorney 
Felli was to have him set up a trust that would facilitate W.G. 
giving Raad money. 
¶29 Attorney Felli prepared estate planning documents for 
W.G., which she signed in May 2002.  The documents included a 
new will, a living trust, a financial power of attorney, and a 
health care power of attorney.  A provision in the trust was a 
bequest to Raad giving him the proceeds of the annuity he had 
purchased for W.G. about a month earlier.  Although Attorney 
Felli had met W.G. less than a month before preparing the 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
18 
 
documents, the documents he prepared appointed himself not only 
as successor trustee to W.G. for her living trust, but also as 
personal representative of her estate, as her financial power of 
attorney with immediate authority to act on her behalf, as 
nominated guardian in the event she became incompetent, and as 
her alternative health care power of attorney. 
¶30 Attorney Felli said he did not solicit appointment to 
the various fiduciary positions in W.G.'s estate plan, but that 
Raad had done so.  Attorney Felli said he did discuss 
alternatives with her, but that discussion failed to elicit the 
name of I.B., a personal friend of W.G. for 50 years and the 
person named as her personal representative in her 1998 will, as 
well as her power of attorney and health care power of attorney.  
Attorney Felli said I.B.'s name never came up in his discussions 
with W.G. 
¶31 The W.G. living trust was 66 pages in length.  W.G. 
did not sign or initial any of the first 65 pages, and her 
signature appeared only on the last page.  Attorney Felli was 
the only witness to the document.  The will Attorney Felli 
prepared for W.G. left all of her estate assets to the living 
trust "dated May 15, 2002," although the living trust W.G. 
signed was dated May 16, 2002.  Raad and Attorney Felli served 
as witnesses to W.G.'s signature on the will.   
¶32 The trust was funded with all of W.G.'s property that 
was permitted by law to be held in trust.  The will poured over 
any of W.G.'s assets at the time of her death to the living 
trust.  The living trust gave all trust property not previously 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
19 
 
distributed, such as the specific bequest to Raad, to W.G.'s 
minor grandnieces and nephews on her death.  It gave her trustee 
significant discretion as to what distributions would be made to 
those heirs before each reached age 25.   
¶33 W.G.'s health care power of attorney named a friend of 
W.G. as her primary health care agent and named Attorney Felli 
as her alternate health care agent.  The primary health care 
agent was not provided with a copy of the document or asked to 
sign it.  The only agent who signed the document and agreed to 
act as W.G.'s health care agent was Attorney Felli.  Raad and 
Attorney Felli served as witnesses to W.G.'s signature on the 
health care power of attorney and stated they were not entitled 
to, and did not have a claim on, the principal's estate.  Both 
Attorney Felli and Raad were aware that Raad had been left a 
substantial bequest under W.G.'s trust.  I.B. was never informed 
she had been replaced as the personal representative in W.G.'s 
will and as her power of attorney and health care power of 
attorney. 
¶34 On May 24, 2002, an insurance company issued a $1750 
check to W.G. for a policy she had acquired through Raad.  The 
check was endorsed by W.G. and signed over to the Felli Law 
Offices, evidently as payment for Attorney Felli's legal 
services.  Using his power of attorney, Attorney Felli sent a 
change of beneficiary form to the insurance company changing the 
primary beneficiary to the W.G. Living Trust dated May 16, 2002, 
J.A. Felli, Trustee.  In fact, W.G., not Attorney Felli, was the 
trustee of the trust at that time.  Attorney Felli did not 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
20 
 
provide the insurance company with a copy of the trust agreement 
as they required. 
¶35 After preparing the May 2002 documents, Attorney Felli 
had no further contact with W.G. beyond a possible phone call or 
two related to the insurance check or the transfer of assets to 
the trust.  Around April 2003 I.B. spoke to W.G. about her taxes 
and W.G. showed I.B. the documents that had been prepared by 
Attorney Felli.  I.B. then worked with another attorney to 
prepare new estate planning documents for W.G., effectively 
voiding all documents prepared by Attorney Felli.   
¶36 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Felli's representation of 
W.G.: 
COUNT TWELVE—By preparing a will that appointed Felli 
as personal representative of [W.G.]'s estate, by 
preparing a living trust that appointed Felli as 
successor trustee upon [W.G.]'s death or disability, 
by preparing a power of attorney that gave Felli 
immediate 
authority 
to 
handle 
[W.G.]'s 
financial 
affairs and authority to immediately act as trustee of 
[W.G.]'s living trust, and that nominated him to serve 
as guardian in the event of [W.G.]'s incapacity, and 
by 
preparing 
a 
medical 
power 
of 
attorney 
that 
appointed Felli as a health care agent, Felli drafted 
legal documents which require or imply that the 
lawyer's services are to be used in relation to that 
document, in violation of SCR 20:7.3(f). 
COUNT THIRTEEN—By preparing a will for [W.G.] that 
gave her assets to a nonexistent May 15, 2002, living 
trust; by failing to have the primary health care 
agent execute [W.G.]'s health care power of attorney; 
by appointing himself, a stranger to [W.G.], as 
proposed guardian, power of attorney, and alternative 
health care agent; by using a witness to [W.G.]'s 
health care power of attorney who falsely stated that 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
21 
 
he did not have a claim on [W.G.]'s estate; and by 
preparing a trust that Felli himself acknowledged he 
expected [W.G.] to change at any time, Felli failed to 
provide competent representation to a client, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.1. 
COUNT FOURTEEN—By preparing estate planning documents 
under which Felli and the financial advisor, who was a 
business associate of Felli's, stood to financially 
benefit 
from 
execution 
of 
the 
documents, 
Felli 
represented 
a 
client 
in 
such 
a 
way 
that 
his 
representation of the client was materially limited by 
the interests of a third party and the lawyer's own 
interest, in violation of SCR 20:1.7(b). 
COUNT FIFTEEN—By preparing legal documents for [W.G.], 
an 87-year-old woman whom Felli had just met, that 
gave Felli immediate financial control over all of 
[W.G.]'s 
assets and 
appointed Felli as 
personal 
representative of [W.G.]'s estate, trustee of her 
trust, health care power of attorney, and nominated 
guardian upon [W.G.]'s incapacity and by bequeathing 
to the financial advisor and business associate of 
Felli, an annuity that the financial advisor had just 
sold to [W.G.], Felli engaged in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶37 Attorney 
John 
Nicholas 
Schweitzer 
was 
appointed 
referee in the matter and a hearing was held in April 2005.  The 
referee issued his report on May 31, 2005.  The referee noted 
that the central activity that led to all of the charges in the 
OLR's complaint was Attorney Felli's preparation of estate plans 
that required or implied his services, a prima facie violation 
of SCR 20:7.3(f).  The referee said the dispute between the OLR 
and Attorney Felli centered on the exception to SCR 20:7.3(f) 
created by this court in State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 
196 N.W.2d 733 (1972).  The referee noted that Gulbankian 
explained: 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
22 
 
It is clear an attorney cannot solicit either 
directly or by any indirect means a request or 
direction of a testator that he or a member of his 
firm be named executor or be employed as an attorney 
to probate the estate.  In those fairly rare cases 
where a client, because of the unusual familiarity of 
the attorney with the testator's business or family 
problems or because of a relationship that transcends 
the ordinary client-attorney relationship, asks his 
attorney to act as executor or to provide for his 
employment 
to 
probate 
the 
estate, 
there 
is 
no 
solicitation.  
. . . . 
. . . We do not hold that a lawyer may not draft 
a will in which he is designated as executor or 
contains a direction to the executor to employ him 
. . . if in fact that is the unprompted intent of his 
client; but the number of times this will occur will 
be few and the percentage in total of such wills drawn 
low.   
Id. at 610-12. 
¶38 The referee said Gulbankian stands for the proposition 
that there must be a legitimate reason for the attorney to be 
chosen over all other potential executors or trustees.  He said 
that in the absence of evidence that Attorney Felli had a 
significant relationship or an unusual familiarity with the 
testator's affairs, he must be found to have violated the 
prohibition on drafting documents, especially wills or trusts, 
that require or imply the use of his own services. 
¶39 The referee noted that the OLR presented expert 
testimony on the topic from Attorney Lewis Perlson, who 
specializes in estate planning and wrote part of a handbook on 
estate planning in Wisconsin.  Attorney Perlson expressed the 
opinion that many of Attorney Felli's actions violated supreme 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
23 
 
court rules, although Attorney Perlson himself testified that he 
serves as trustee on a small number of trusts set up by his 
clients.   
¶40 The referee noted that at the time of the hearing in 
this case all three of Attorney Felli's clients were unavailable 
as witnesses.  R.W. had died, L.D. was in a nursing home with a 
poor memory, and W.G. was in a care facility with the beginning 
of dementia at age 90.  Other witnesses were called to testify 
about Attorney Felli's representation of those three clients, 
and evidence was presented from three other clients on the 
question of whether Attorney Felli routinely suggested himself 
as trustee or personal representative or power of attorney 
without exhaustively exploring other alternatives.   
¶41 The referee said the question of whether Attorney 
Felli or Raad suggested appointing Attorney Felli in the various 
fiduciary capacities was irrelevant since Gulbankian prohibits 
both direct and indirect solicitation; Attorney Felli made as 
many as 400 joint presentations with Raad and Zurawski; and the 
business relationship that existed between Attorney Felli and 
Raad and Zurawski meant that the suggestion by Raad or Zurawski 
that Attorney Felli be appointed would qualify as an indirect 
solicitation.   
¶42 The referee noted that the testimony of three of 
Attorney Felli's other clients showed a pattern in which 
Attorney Felli failed to investigate alternative trustees and 
either offered his own services or allowed Raad and Zurawski to 
make the suggestions.  The referee reasoned that the testimony 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
24 
 
from these other clients reinforced the likelihood that on the 
three occasions charged in the OLR's complaint, Attorney Felli 
either offered his services or made only a halfhearted effort to 
investigate other alternatives.   
¶43 The referee said the fact Attorney Felli was unaware 
of the existence of W.G.'s friend, I.B., showed that Attorney 
Felli "failed miserably to meet his obligation" to investigate 
other alternatives to appointing himself in various fiduciary 
capacities.  The referee said Raad's testimony regarding his 
involvement in the W.G. case was at points to be self-serving, 
and the referee said Raad's testimony that he did not really 
know he was being left something by W.G. was patently false and 
established Raad as a person whose truthfulness was not to be 
relied upon.  In the referee's opinion, Attorney Felli's 
representation of W.G. represented the "clearest and worst 
violation of the three presented in the complaint."  The referee 
found that all four counts in the OLR's complaint relating to 
Attorney Felli's representation of W.G. were proven by clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence. 
¶44 With respect to Attorney Felli's representation of 
L.D., the referee found that Counts Six, Seven, and Eight of the 
OLR's 
complaint 
were 
proven 
by 
clear, 
satisfactory, 
and 
convincing evidence.  The referee said there was no evidence 
that Attorney Felli discussed any alternatives to naming himself 
as trustee, and the referee found that Attorney Felli failed to 
explain matters to the extent reasonably necessary to permit 
L.D. to make informed decisions.   
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
25 
 
¶45 The referee found there was insufficient evidence to 
support the allegations contained in Counts Nine, Ten, and 
Eleven of the OLR's complaint regarding Attorney Felli's 
handling of the L.D. matter.  The referee said the arrangement 
whereby 2 percent of the trust value was withdrawn annually to 
cover Attorney Felli's fees was not shown to be fraudulent, and 
he found there was insufficient proof that the $7145 Attorney 
Felli received during the three years he served as trustee of 
L.D.'s trust was unreasonable.  
¶46 With respect to Attorney Felli's representation of 
R.W., the referee found there was sufficient proof to support 
the allegations in Counts One, Three, and Five of the OLR's 
complaint.  The referee said there was no evidence that Attorney 
Felli discussed any alternative to himself serving as trustee 
and that Attorney Felli violated SCR 20:7.3(f) in preparing 
R.W.'s estate plan.  The referee also found that by representing 
R.W., her trust and estate, when Attorney Felli's independent 
professional judgment on behalf of R.W. was influenced by the 
pecuniary interests of the family of a financial advisor with 
whom Attorney Felli had a close working relationship, Attorney 
Felli's representation was materially limited by the interests 
of a third party and by his own financial interests, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.7(b).  The referee further found that by 
willfully failing to provide relevant information, failing to 
answer questions fully, failing to furnish requested documents 
in his responses to the OLR, and by making misrepresentations to 
the OLR, Attorney Felli violated SCR 22.03(6).   
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
26 
 
¶47 The referee concluded that the OLR failed to meet its 
burden of proof with respect to Counts Two and Four of the 
complaint.  The referee said the OLR's allegations that Attorney 
Felli charged the R.W. estate fees that were unreasonable was 
too speculative to satisfy the burden of proof.  The referee 
said Attorney Felli's testimony regarding the allegedly chaotic 
state of affairs in R.W.'s house and in her finances after her 
death was unrefuted, and Attorney Felli testified that he 
invested hundreds of hours defending the trust against the 
various lawsuits that were filed.  The referee agreed, however, 
that Attorney Felli's accounting was incomplete and confusing 
and 
that 
some 
of 
the 
testimony 
strongly 
suggested 
a 
misappropriation of funds, as alleged in Count Four of the 
complaint, and an attempt by Attorney Felli to escape detection 
by preventing the examination of trust records by the piano 
school or others. 
¶48 In discussing the appropriate discipline to be imposed 
for Attorney Felli's misconduct, the referee noted that the OLR 
requested the revocation of Attorney Felli's license.  Attorney 
Felli asked for a public reprimand or, at most, a 60-day 
suspension.  The referee noted that the purpose of discipline is 
to prevent further misconduct by the attorney, deter other 
attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct, and to foster the 
rehabilitation of the offender.  The referee said anything less 
than a lengthy suspension would fail to impress on Attorney 
Felli the need to practice law with more attention paid to the 
rules of procedure and professional conduct.  The referee said: 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
27 
 
This referee's visceral reaction to the evidence 
of an attorney feathering his own nest, and the nests 
of his close associates, at the expense of his clients 
and their best interests, was that revocation would be 
too lenient.  This is partly because Mr. Felli showed 
no 
hint 
of 
acknowledging 
that 
he 
might 
have 
overstepped the bounds, nor any remorse over having 
tried to take advantage of a vulnerable population and 
a very small loophole in the law, which he stretched 
to the breaking point and far beyond, for his own 
benefit and the benefit of his business associates.  
Revocation would also be lenient, however, in that it 
would leave him in various positions of trust granted 
to him by a still-unknown number of clients, for which 
he could not be held accountable as a member of the 
legal profession. 
Although Mr. Felli's reprehensible actions amply 
justify revocation, it is possible that he can learn 
to conform his behavior to accepted standards.  This 
suggests leaving open the possibility of reinstating 
his license in less than five years for the purpose of 
rehabilitation. 
 
In 
addition, 
the 
prospect 
of 
reinstating 
his 
license 
might 
encourage 
him 
to 
discharge his various duties under some of his 
clients' 
estate 
plans 
conscientiously 
and 
punctiliously, and to prepare an accounting of his 
management of the assets placed in his care . . . I 
recommend a suspension of eighteen months.   
The referee also recommended that Attorney Felli pay the full 
costs of the proceeding. 
¶49 Attorney Felli has appealed all of the referee's 
conclusions of law finding that he violated any supreme court 
rules.  Attorney Felli's principal argument is that the referee 
misinterpreted and misapplied SCR 20:7.3(f) and this court's 
decisions in Gulbankian and Schmeling v. Devroy, 109 Wis. 2d 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
28 
 
154, 325 N.W.2d 345 (1982).10  Attorney Felli notes that in 
Gulbankian, the attorneys filed 135 wills, 71 of which directed 
their employment.  The Gulbankians contended their clients had 
spontaneously directed that they appoint themselves, and they 
noted since they spoke the same language as their clients and 
shared 
a 
common 
ethnic 
background 
they 
shared 
a 
closer 
relationship than ordinarily exists between other attorneys and 
clients.  This court declined to infer that the Gulbankians 
solicited the probate of the various estates. 
¶50 Attorney Felli argues that Gulbankian did not hold 
that an attorney is presumed to have acted unethically and bears 
the burden of proving he had a significant relationship or an 
unusual familiarity with the testator's affairs.  He argues one 
reason R.W., L.D., and W.G. all selected him to serve in a 
fiduciary capacity was because there was no other logical choice 
since none of the women had husbands, none had children, R.W. 
and W.G. had no family members living in Wisconsin, and L.D. had 
only a distant relationship with a brother in the state.   
¶51 Attorney Felli points out that the referee found that 
the practice of the OLR's expert witness also appeared to be 
improper as indirect solicitation.  Attorney Felli asserts that 
any error on his part should be seen as a product of the 
                                                 
10 In Schmeling v. Devroy, 109 Wis. 2d 154, 325 N.W.2d 345 
(1982), Justice Steinmetz, in a dissent, highlighted the 
importance and difficulty of drawing a line between an unusual 
familiarity with a client's affairs, which would justify a 
departure from the rule under Gulbankian and an attorney's usual 
familiarity with a client's affairs. 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
29 
 
uncertainty as to the interpretation and scope of the rules 
rather than a disregard for or intentional violation of the 
rules.  He contends there is no direct evidence that he 
persuaded any of the clients to name him in any fiduciary 
capacity.  He says even assuming his testimony in this regard is 
not accepted, there is no evidence as to how and why the various 
appointments were made (since none of the three clients were 
available to testify at the hearing) and he argues the OLR 
cannot prove allegations by clear, convincing, and satisfactory 
evidence by an inference of questionable value without any 
substantiating testimony.  Attorney Felli asserts he did have a 
substantial relationship with all three clients and that he 
worked with R.W. for at least 13 months and had been L.D.'s 
lawyer for over one year at the time he prepared the charitable 
trust for her. 
¶52 Attorney Felli also argues that the OLR failed to meet 
its burden of proof of showing he violated SCR 20:1.7(b) in his 
handling of the R.W. and W.G. matters by having his professional 
judgment influenced by his relationship with the Zurawski 
family.  He again notes that since R.W. did not testify, it can 
never be known for sure why she chose the piano school run by 
Zurawski's sister as the beneficiary.  Attorney Felli also 
asserts he did not have a conflict of interest in the W.G. 
matter simply because Raad, with whom Attorney Felli had a 
longstanding business relationship, stood to financially benefit 
from the W.G. trust.   
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
30 
 
¶53 Attorney Felli further argues that the referee's 
finding that he willfully failed to cooperate with the OLR 
during its investigation is clearly erroneous.  He contends 
there was ample evidence that he tried to satisfy the OLR's 
numerous, detailed requests for information.  He also asserts 
that there is insufficient proof that he violated SCR 20:1.1 by 
not providing L.D. with competent representation.  He says he 
was not a tax expert, but Zurawski's wife, an accountant, who 
did L.D.'s personal taxes, failed to remind him that the split 
interest tax form had to be filed.   
¶54 Attorney Felli says if L.D. was harmed in any way it 
was only that she was assessed a modest annual fee and any 
shortcomings in his performance with regard to the tax forms do 
not rise to the level of a disciplinary rule violation.  With 
respect to the OLR's claim that Attorney Felli failed to provide 
competent representation because he did not prepare an annual 
trust accounting for L.D., Attorney Felli says it was not 
improper for him to rely on Zurawski to do the mathematical 
calculations and paperwork. 
¶55 Attorney Felli also asserts there was insufficient 
proof that he violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by allowing Raad to witness 
W.G.'s power of attorney and by failing to identify W.G. as a 
client during the OLR's investigation.  Attorney Felli says the 
evidence shows that Raad's attestation, when he witnessed W.G.'s 
power of attorney, that to the best of his knowledge he was not 
entitled to and had no claim on the principal's estate, was 
"technically true" since no one ever told Raad he was a 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
31 
 
beneficiary under W.G.'s estate plan.  Attorney Felli says even 
assuming Raad knew he was going to benefit from the W.G. trust, 
there was still nothing improper about Raad signing the W.G. 
health care power of attorney as a witness.   
¶56 Attorney Felli argues that even if all counts of 
misconduct found by the referee should be affirmed by this 
court, the recommended 18-month suspension is much too harsh.  
He notes that nearly all of the counts of misconduct found by 
the referee concerned the solicitation claim and he argues that 
the limits as to when and in what context a lawyer can mention 
to a client that the lawyer could serve as a trustee are 
unclear, so the discipline imposed in this case should be 
mitigated by the fact that it occurred in a "gray area" in legal 
ethics.   
¶57 In response to the arguments raised in Attorney 
Felli's appeal, the OLR argues the referee appropriately 
interpreted and applied existing law in determining that 
Attorney Felli violated SCR 20:7.3(f) as to each of the three 
clients.  The OLR says Gulbankian was one of those "rare cases" 
where the attorney and clients had a common ethnic background 
and a close personal relationship leading to this court's 
conclusion that solicitation had not occurred.  The OLR says the 
facts of this case are dramatically different.  It says in each 
instance, Attorney Felli met the elderly clients at financial 
planning seminars at which he worked "hand in glove" with Raad 
and Zurawski. 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
32 
 
¶58 The OLR says in each instance Attorney Felli had no 
pre-existing personal or professional relationship with the 
elderly clients.  The OLR says Attorney Felli and the financial 
planners made income off the efforts of the other.  The OLR says 
there was no legitimate reason for Attorney Felli, a virtual 
stranger, to be chosen by these clients over other potential 
executors or trustees; Attorney Felli directly, or indirectly 
through the financial planners, solicited his service in such 
capacities, and contrary to Attorney Felli's statements, there 
were other logical choices, individuals or institutions, to 
serve in the fiduciary capacities filled by Attorney Felli. 
¶59 The 
OLR 
also 
argues 
that 
Attorney 
Felli's 
representation of R.W. and W.G. was materially limited by the 
interests of third parties and by Attorney Felli's own financial 
interests, in violation of SCR 20:1.7(b).  The OLR argues at no 
time did Attorney Felli make sufficient written disclosures to 
his clients concerning these conflicts.  The OLR also argues 
that by failing to provide the OLR with relevant information and 
by making misrepresentations to the OLR, Attorney Felli violated 
SCR 22.03(6). 
¶60 The OLR cross-appealed the referee's legal conclusions 
that there was a failure of proof as to Counts Two, Four, and 
Ten of the OLR's complaint.  The OLR also appealed from the 
referee's recommended 18-month license suspension and asserts 
that revocation of Attorney Felli's license is appropriate.   
¶61 The OLR argues that the evidence submitted in the R.W. 
matter supports a finding that Attorney Felli's fees were 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
33 
 
unreasonable.  The OLR notes that the referee acknowledged the 
investigator's challenge in making sense of records that bore 
almost no relationship to information she had received from 
Attorney Felli, and the OLR says in effect Attorney Felli has 
received the benefit on the fee question out of the confusion he 
created.  The OLR says the only thing that is speculative is how 
much more money Attorney Felli may have received from the R.W. 
estate and trusts beyond what he admits charging.  The OLR says 
the figures the investigator used to determine that Attorney 
Felli had taken at least $374,000 from the R.W. estate and trust 
are fully documented.   
¶62 The OLR notes the only independent expert testimony on 
the subject of the reasonableness of Attorney Felli's fees was 
offered by the OLR's expert, Attorney Perlson, who said it 
seemed to be impossible that someone would take so long a time 
to carry out the duties that were described in the billings.  
The OLR says although Attorney Felli spoke in general terms 
about the chaotic state of affairs in R.W.'s house and finances 
following her death, he produced nothing at the hearing that 
would substantiate or justify the amounts he charged.  The OLR 
says while the referee found its investigator's conclusions 
about the billings were too speculative based on the information 
provided, it was Attorney Felli himself who provided the 
information. 
¶63 The 
OLR 
says 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
essentially lead to but one conclusion:  Attorney Felli acted 
dishonestly or deceitfully in handling R.W.'s affairs and paying 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
34 
 
himself fees.  The OLR contends there was a premeditated scheme 
on Attorney Felli's part to systematically acquire control over 
R.W.'s assets over a period of time.  It says the piano school 
was named a beneficiary under circumstances suggesting a cozy 
relationship between Zurawski's family and Attorney Felli.  Once 
the piano school was in place as a beneficiary, the OLR says 
even Zurawski and his sister became suspicious of Attorney 
Felli's activities and one day after the piano school requested 
an opportunity to review trust accountings, as it was entitled 
to do under the trust, Attorney Felli sent a letter summarily 
suspending the school as a beneficiary. 
¶64 The OLR says Attorney Felli clearly did not want 
anyone to obtain an accounting of the R.W. trust since such an 
accounting would have shown significant withdrawals of funds by 
Attorney Felli.  The OLR says in the course of its investigation 
it repeatedly asked Attorney Felli to provide an accounting of 
the assets he was administering and the amounts he had paid 
himself and he offered various excuses why he could or would not 
do so:  his co-trustee objected, he did not keep the information 
in the ordinary course of business, and he was still in the 
process of assembling information.  The OLR says it presented 
Attorney Felli with its calculations, which showed he had taken 
at least $374,000 from the R.W. estate and trust, and while he 
offered general criticism he provided no specific information 
concerning any inaccuracies nor any independent summaries or 
conclusions of his own.  The OLR says the documents in the 
record lead to but one conclusion:  Attorney Felli used his 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
35 
 
control over R.W.'s assets to pay himself a sizable percentage 
of her estate.   
¶65 The OLR also argues it is undisputed that Attorney 
Felli had a personal pecuniary interest that conflicted with 
L.D.'s interests, in violation of SCR 20:1.7(b).  The OLR says 
given L.D.'s modest income there were no significant tax savings 
resulting from a possible charitable deduction and the result is 
that Attorney Felli prepared trust documents which were of no 
benefit to L.D. but which served as a vehicle for Attorney Felli 
to receive ongoing annual trustee fees of over $2000 per year at 
L.D.'s expense.   
¶66 The OLR argues that the referee's recommended 18-month 
suspension inadequately addresses the severity of Attorney 
Felli's misconduct.  The OLR says contrary to Attorney Felli's 
argument that any misconduct he might have committed occurred in 
a "gray area" in ethics, Attorney Felli positioned himself in a 
fiduciary capacity in his clients' estates contrary to the 
unambiguous guidelines set forth in Gulbankian.  It says there 
is a pattern of misconduct with respect to the three clients 
since all of them were unmarried, elderly, and without any close 
family.  The OLR says after being introduced to the three women 
by financial planners with whom he had a long and close 
professional relationship, over time Attorney Felli positioned 
himself in various fiduciary capacities permitting him to make 
important personal decisions for his clients and to avail 
himself of their assets.  The OLR notes that Attorney Felli is 
an experienced attorney who does not have available the defense 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
36 
 
of being a novice who was in over his head.  It argues that 
under the circumstances revocation of Attorney Felli's license 
is appropriate. 
¶67 This court will adopt a referee's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The 
court may impose whatever sanction it sees fit regardless of the 
referee's recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.  
The referee's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, and we 
adopt them.  We also agree with the conclusions of law that flow 
from the referee's findings of fact.   
¶68 Attorney Felli's conduct in appointing himself as a 
trustee and/or personal representative in the three client 
matters violated SCR 20:7.3(f) and did not fall under the 
limited exceptions carved out in Gulbankian.  Unlike the 
attorneys in Gulbankian, who shared a common ethnic background 
with their clients and had served as longtime attorneys for the 
clients, Attorney Felli's contact with the three clients was 
very limited.  He met all three women at financial planning 
seminars conducted jointly with Raad and/or Zurawski, and he 
drafted the wills and trusts naming himself in various fiduciary 
capacities 
soon 
after 
meeting 
the 
women. 
 
The 
unusual 
familiarity with the testators' affairs that excused the 
attorney's conduct in Gulbankian simply does not exist here.   
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
37 
 
¶69 We also agree with the referee's conclusion that 
Attorney Felli violated SCR 20:1.7(b) by representing R.W. under 
circumstances where Attorney Felli's independent professional 
judgment was influenced by his own pecuniary interests in 
acquiring control of R.W.'s assets for himself and/or for 
Zurawski's sister's piano school.  Similarly, we agree that by 
preparing estate planning documents for W.G. under the terms of 
which both Attorney Felli and his associate, Raad, stood to 
benefit financially, Attorney Felli also violated SCR 20:1.7(b).   
¶70 The referee's other findings of fact, which led to his 
conclusion that Attorney Felli violated SCR 22.03(6) by making 
misrepresentations to the OLR in the R.W. matter; that he 
violated 
SCR 
20:1.1, 
by 
failing 
to 
provide 
competent 
representation to L.D. and W.G.; and that he violated SCR 
20:8.4(c), by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation in his representation of W.G. are 
also supported by the record and we adopt them.   
¶71 After careful review of the record, we reject the 
arguments made in the OLR's cross-appeal, and we affirm the 
referee's findings of fact which led to his conclusions of law 
that the OLR failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to 
Counts Two, Four, and Ten of the complaint.  We uphold the 
referee's conclusions with respect to Counts Two and Four of the 
complaint with some reluctance.   
¶72 The evidence regarding the amounts Attorney Felli 
charged the R.W. estate and trusts is very disturbing.  The 
OLR's expert witness, Attorney Perlson, opined that the fees 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
38 
 
charged 
by 
Attorney 
Felli 
were 
unreasonable 
and 
clearly 
excessive.  The referee said Attorney Felli's testimony about 
the chaotic state of affairs in the R.W. case was unrefuted.  
While the referee agreed that the accounting provided by 
Attorney Felli in the R.W. matter was incomplete and confusing, 
and that some of the evidence strongly suggested Attorney Felli 
misappropriated funds, he ultimately concluded that the OLR 
failed to prove by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence 
that Attorney Felli engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.   
¶73 As previously noted, the referee found that Attorney 
Felli engaged in misconduct by failing to fully cooperate with 
the OLR in its investigation of the R.W. case, and the referee 
speculated that Attorney Felli might have made a conscious 
tradeoff and decided not to provide complete information to the 
OLR to prevent the referee from finding that Attorney Felli 
mishandled R.W.'s funds.  We concur with the referee's comment 
that it is possible such a conscious tradeoff was made, and we 
are deeply troubled by that possibility.  However, we are 
required to adopt a referee's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous and based on the record before us we are 
unable to say that the referee's findings of fact with respect 
to Counts Two and Four of the complaint were clearly erroneous.  
Consequently, we are required to adopt the findings of fact as 
well as the resulting conclusions of law.   
¶74 Even though we adopt all of the referee's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, we disagree with the referee as to 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
39 
 
the appropriate sanction.  The misconduct found by the referee 
is extremely serious.  Along with the two financial planners, 
Attorney Felli targeted vulnerable elderly women and either 
directly or indirectly through the financial planners solicited 
his service in various fiduciary capacities.  Unlike the 
situation in Gulbankian, Attorney Felli did not have a close 
personal relationship with any of these clients.  At the time 
Attorney Felli drafted the will and trust for R.W., she already 
had two trustees.  After the co-trustees divorced, the husband 
could have continued as the sole trustee and there was no 
particular reason to appoint Attorney Felli.  L.D. had a brother 
who had been named a fiduciary in her prior wills.  W.G. had 
previously named her friend, I.B., as her fiduciary.  There is 
no reason those persons could not have continued to act in a 
fiduciary capacity, nor is there any evidence that Attorney 
Felli discussed the possibility of naming those persons or 
naming an institution to serve in the fiduciary capacities 
ultimately filled by Attorney Felli himself.   
¶75 In light of the seriousness of Attorney Felli's 
misconduct, we believe that the 18-month suspension recommended 
by the referee is too lenient.  Instead, given the egregiousness 
of Attorney Felli's behavior, we conclude that a three-year 
suspension of his license to practice law in this state is 
called for.  We hope that that period of suspension will help 
him understand and accept the responsibilities of the legal 
profession and the ethical constraints placed upon its practice.  
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
40 
 
In addition, we agree with the referee that Attorney Felli 
should pay the full costs of the proceeding.11   
¶76 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Attorney Jay Andrew 
Felli to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for three years 
commencing July 27, 2006, as discipline for his professional 
misconduct.   
¶77 IT FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of 
this order, Attorney Jay Andrew Felli pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs 
are not paid within the time specified and absent a showing to 
this court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, 
the license of Jay Andrew Felli to practice law in Wisconsin 
shall remain suspended until further order of the court. 
¶78 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jay Andrew Felli comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 
person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
                                                 
11 In a motion objecting to costs, Attorney Felli argues 
that because the referee found that the OLR failed to meet its 
burden of proof with respect to five of the 15 counts alleged in 
the complaint this court should exercise its discretion and 
award something less than the full costs.  We decline to depart 
from the general practice of imposing the full costs on a 
disciplined lawyer. 
No. 
2004AP3382-D   
 
 
 
1