Title: Richardson v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CLEVELAND RICHARDSON, 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 630, 2006 
 
Defendant Below-   
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
§ 
ID # 0511009920A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  June 11, 2007 
   Decided:  July 24, 2007 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
This 24th day of July 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
(1)  
Appellant Cleveland Richardson appeals his Superior Court 
convictions of Attempted Murder First Degree, Robbery First Degree, Burglary 
First Degree, Conspiracy Second Degree, and four counts of Possession of a 
Firearm During Commission of a Felony.  Richardson raises five issues on appeal, 
three of which challenge the trial court’s jury instructions on accomplice liability.  
Richardson first contends that the Superior Court erred by providing an accomplice 
liability instruction that implied an objective standard for conviction.  Second, he 
contends that the accomplice liability instruction was incomplete.  Third, 
 2
Richardson contends that the trial court erred by failing to include an instruction 
pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 274.  Fourth, Richardson argues that his convictions were 
not supported by sufficient evidence.  Finally, Richardson contends that the trial 
court gave a flawed burglary instruction.  We find no merit to Richardson’s 
arguments and affirm. 
(2)  
At 9:30 pm on November 9, 2005, Thomas Morganstern was asleep in 
his second floor bedroom.  At about midnight, he woke up when an intruder, later 
identified as Cleveland Richardson, entered his bedroom with a flashlight.  The 
victim’s dog stirred and Richardson fled down the stairs.  Morganstern grabbed a 
loaded pistol and chased after him. 
(3)  
When Morganstern reached the bottom of the steps, he saw 
Richardson and his accomplice, Stephen Norwood, in the dark living room.  
Morganstern and Norwood exchanged gunfire.  Norwood fired at least one round 
past Morganstern.  Norwood was killed and Richardson was seriously injured as a 
result of the gunfire.  
(4)  
Richardson was arrested and charged with Attempted Murder First 
Degree as well as other related offenses on November 10, 2005.  His jury trial 
began on June 20, 2006.  At the prayer conference, defense counsel argued that 
certain aspects of the trial judge’s instructions, particularly those dealing with 
accomplice liability, were flawed and incomplete.  The trial judge rejected 
 3
counsel’s arguments.  The jury ultimately found Richardson guilty of Attempted 
Murder First Degree, Robbery First Degree, Burglary First Degree, Possession of a 
Firearm During the Commission of a Felony and Conspiracy Second Degree.  
Richardson’s motion for judgment of acquittal was denied and he was sentenced to 
life imprisonment for Attempted Murder.   
 
(5)  
Richardson first contends that the trial judge erroneously instructed 
the jury on accomplice liability.1  Specifically, he contends that because the trial 
judge inserted the term “reasonably” in the instruction, the judge “essentially made 
Richardson strictly liable for his companion’s [acts].”2  We review a trial judge’s 
jury instructions de novo.3  “A defendant has no right to have the jury instructed in 
a particular form.  However, a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed with 
a correct statement of the substantive law.”4   
                                          
 
1 The jury was instructed as follows: 
It is the law that when two or more people agree to commit a crime and it is 
reasonably foreseeable that another crime or crimes not specifically agreed on in 
advance might reasonably be committed while they were committing the crime 
they contemplated, and if the other crime or crimes aid or further [sic] the 
originally contemplated crime, then they are both responsible for committing the 
incidental or consequential crime or crimes. 
2 The trial judge rejected this argument, explaining that the jury was first asked to decide whether 
Richardson “subjectively, intended to commit a nighttime, house burglary with an accomplice.”  
Next, the jury was asked “to decide, objectively, whether a burglar in Defendant’s position could 
reasonably foresee, under all the circumstances, that during the burglary an occupant might 
appear, a weapon might be produced, and someone . . . would be killed.” 
3 Guy v. State, 913 A.2d 558, 563 (Del. 2006). 
4 Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278, 1282 (Del. 1991) (citing Miller v. State, 224 A.2d 592, 596 
(Del. 1996)). 
 4
 
(6)  
Section 271 of the Delaware Criminal Code imposes accomplice 
liability on an individual who, “intending to promote or facilitate the commission 
of the offense . . . aids, counsels or agrees or attempts to aid the other person in 
planning or committing it.”5  As this Court explained in Claudio, “[t]he inquiry 
under § 271 is not whether each accomplice had the specific intent to commit 
murder, but whether he intended to promote or facilitate the principal’s conduct 
constituting the offense. . . .  As long as the result was a foreseeable consequence 
of the underlying felonious conduct their intent as accomplices includes the intent 
to facilitate the happening of this result.”6   
(7)  
This Court upheld an instruction similar to the one given in this case 
in Collins v. State.7  We re-affirmed that holding in Chance v. State.8  Under 
Section 271, a defendant does “not have to specifically intend that the result, a 
killing, should occur.”9  Thus, in this case, the State was not required to prove that 
Richardson subjectively foresaw the consequential crime.  Instead, it need only 
prove that it was reasonable for someone in Richardson’s position to foresee the 
                                          
 
5 11 Del. C. § 271(2)(b). 
6 Claudio, 585 A.2d at 1282. 
7 655 A.2d 1224 (Del. 1995) (TABLE) (“if you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
a principal-accomplice relationship existed between the participants with respect to the robbery 
and you find that it is reasonably foreseeable that as a consequence of the robbery other offenses 
might be committed in furtherance of the robbery, then all participants are equally responsible 
for the consequential crime or crimes without the jury having to find a defendant specifically 
intended the result of the consequential crime of crimes.”) (emphasis added). 
8 685 A.2d 351, 358 (Del. 1996). 
9 Claudio, 585 A.2d at 1282. 
 5
consequential crime.  Therefore, the Superior Court’s jury instruction was a correct 
statement of the substantive law.  
(8)  
Richardson’s second and related argument, that the accomplice 
liability instruction given in this case was “anorexic,” must also fail.  At trial, he 
requested the pattern instruction on accomplice liability.  The Superior Court 
instead used an instruction similar to the one approved by this Court in Claudio.  A 
defendant is only entitled to an instruction that is a correct statement of the law.  
The instruction given in Claudio satisfies that standard.10  In addition, Richardson 
does not in any way argue the given instruction undermined the jury’s ability to 
render a verdict.11 
(9)  
Third, Richardson contends that the Superior Court erred by failing to 
provide an instruction pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 274.  Richardson argues that 
because the jury was instructed pursuant to Section 271, he was entitled, as a 
matter of law, to a Section 274 instruction.   
(10)  Section 274 provides that, “[w]hen, pursuant to § 271 . . . 2 or more 
persons are criminally liable for an offense which is divided into degrees, each 
person is guilty of an offense of such degree as is compatible with that person’s 
                                          
 
10 Id. at 1281-83. 
11 See Bishop v. State, 593 A.2d 589 (Del. 1991) (TABLE) (“Although some inaccuracies may 
appear in the jury instructions, this Court will reverse only if such deficiency undermined the 
ability of the jury ‘to intelligently perform its duty in returning a verdict.’” )(quoting Flamer v. 
State, 490 A.2d 104, 128 (Del. 1984)). 
 6
own culpable mental state.”12  An instruction under Section 274 is only appropriate 
“when the underlying offenses can be divided into degrees with different mental 
states for each degree.”13  First degree robbery, second degree robbery14 and 
attempted murder15 all require intentional conduct.  Because the underlying 
offenses in this case all require the same mens rea, the requested instruction was 
properly denied. 
(11)  Richardson next contends that the Superior Court erred by denying his 
motion for judgment of acquittal because there is insufficient evidence to support 
his convictions of attempted murder, robbery and other weapons offenses.  The 
trial judge denied Richardson’s motion, finding that the State adduced 
“overwhelming” evidence to support the convictions.  We review the Superior 
Court's denial of Richardson’s motion for judgment of acquittal de novo to 
determine “whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light 
                                          
 
12 11 Del. C. § 274. 
13 Coleman v. State, 765 A.2d 950 (Del. 2000) (TABLE). 
14 Id.; see also 11 Del. C. §§ 831-32. 
15 Attempt to commit a crime requires “the same grade and degree as the most serious offense 
which the accused is found guilty of attempting.”  11 Del. C. § 531.  The mens rea element of 
attempt, however, always requires intent.  Specifically:  
A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if the person: (1) intentionally 
engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the attendant 
circumstances were as the person believes them to be; or (2) intentionally does or 
omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as the person believes them 
to be, is a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the 
commission of the crime by the person. 
Id. 
 7
most favorable to the State, could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of all the elements of the crime.”16  In doing so, we do not distinguish 
between direct and circumstantial evidence.17 
(12)  The evidence in this case, viewed in a light most favorable to the 
State, supports Richardson’s convictions. The evidence demonstrated that 
Richardson and his accomplice broke into a home in the middle of the night for the 
purposes of taking whatever they could find.  It was reasonable for the jury to infer 
that Richardson knew that his accomplice was carrying a weapon.  The evidence 
also demonstrated that Richardson’s accomplice engaged in a gunfight with the 
victim.  This evidence sufficiently supports Richardson’s convictions. 
(13)  Finally, Richardson contends, for the first time on appeal, that the 
Superior Court’s instruction on first degree burglary was flawed because it failed 
to indicate that Richardson had to know that his accomplice was armed with a 
deadly weapon.  Because he is raising this argument for the first time on appeal, 
we review for plain error.18  “Under the plain error standard of review, the error 
complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to the defendant’s substantial rights so 
                                          
 
16 Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 988-89 (Del. 2004) (citing Cline v. State, 720 A.2d 891, 892 
(Del. 1998)). 
17 Id. 
18 Coleman, 765 A.2d at 950. 
 8
as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process in order to be 
considered.”19 
(14)  The Superior Court gave the following instruction: 
Delaware law defines the offense of burglary first degree as follows:  
“A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when the person 
knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling at night with 
intent to commit a crime therein and when in effecting entry or when 
in the building or in immediate flight therefrom the person or another 
participant in the crime is armed with a deadly weapon.” 
 
In order to find defendant guilty of burglary first degree, therefore, 
you must find that all the following elements have been established 
beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
First, defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a building.  And 
second, the place where defendant entered or remained unlawfully 
was a dwelling.  And third, defendant acted knowingly.  And fourth, 
defendant’s actions occurred at night.  And fifth, defendant intended 
to commit a crime in the dwelling.  In this case, the alleged crime is 
theft.  And sixth, defendant, or a participant in the crime, while 
entering, remaining in, or leaving the dwelling was armed with a 
firearm, a deadly weapon. 
 
(15)  After instructing the jury on burglary, the Superior Court provided an 
instruction on possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.  The 
court explained the elements as follows: 
First, defendant committed a felony.  In this count, the underlying felony 
charged is attempted murder first degree.  And second, while committing the 
felony, Steven Norwood possessed a firearm.  A firearm is any object 
capable of discharging a bullet through a gun barrel.  And three, defendant 
                                          
 
19 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (1986). 
 9
acted knowingly.  Defendant acted knowingly if he was aware that he was 
committing a burglary with Steven Norwood and it was reasonably 
foreseeable that Norwood possessed a firearm or that Norwood, defendant, 
or both of them would possess a firearm during the felony.  In this count, as 
I mentioned, the felony is attempted murder first degree. 
 
(16)  Jury instructions must be viewed as a whole.20  Viewed in their 
entirety, the instructions in this case adequately informed the jury of the required 
state of mind for conviction.  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                          
 
20 Flamer, 490 A.2d at 128.