Title: Custodian of Records for the Legislative Technology Services Bureau v. State

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 149 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-3063-W 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of a John Doe Proceeding 
Commenced by Affidavit Dated July 25, 2001: 
 
Custodian of Records for the Legislative  
Technology Services Bureau,  
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin and the Honorable  
Sarah B. O'Brien, presiding  
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
2004 WI 65 
272 Wis. 2d 208, 680 N.W.2d 792 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 15, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents. 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BUTLER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
2004 WI 149 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-3063-W  
(L.C. No. 
01 JD 6) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of a John Doe Proceeding 
Commenced by Affidavit Dated July 25,  
2001: 
 
Custodian of Records for the Legislative  
Technology Services Bureau,  
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin and the Honorable  
Sarah B. O'Brien, presiding  
 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 15, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
MOTION for reconsideration.  Reconsideration denied. 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   The State has moved for reconsideration 
of portions of our opinion in the above-captioned matter.  
Attention has been called to our application and construction of 
Wis. Stat. § 968.135 (2001-02)1 during the John Doe proceeding 
and to our application of Fourth Amendment principles to the 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
02-3063-W 
 
2
subpoena that was before us.  In response to the motion, as 
clarification of our discussion of § 968.135, we withdraw 
paragraphs 53-55 from the opinion issued June 9, 2004 and in 
their place substitute paragraphs 53-55 below. 
¶53 Because a John Doe proceeding is a criminal 
investigative tool, Unnamed Person No. 1, 260 Wis. 2d 
653, ¶22, we turn to Wis. Stat. § 968.135, entitled 
"Subpoena for documents."2  Section 968.135 requires a 
showing 
of 
probable 
cause 
to 
believe 
that 
the 
documents sought by the subpoena duces tecum will 
produce evidence relevant to potentially criminal 
activity.  While this probable cause determination 
differs from the purpose for which a John Doe 
proceeding is commenced, that is, to decide whether 
there is probable cause to believe that a crime 
actually has been committed and who committed it, see 
Reimann, 214 Wis. 2d at 621, 624, the question remains 
how the probable cause required by § 968.135 may be 
shown in a John Doe proceeding.   
¶54 In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 
327 U.S. 186 (1946), the United States Supreme Court 
explained that probable cause, as literally required 
in the case of a warrant, is shown in the context of a 
subpoena duces tecum if:  (1) the investigation is for 
a lawfully authorized purpose and (2) the documents 
requested are relevant to the inquiry.  See Walling, 
327 U.S. at 209; see also Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 
841.  In the case of a John Doe proceeding, the 
proceeding 
is 
lawfully 
authorized 
if 
the 
judge 
determines that the complainant makes a threshold 
showing sufficient to establish that the complainant 
has an objectively reasonable belief that a crime has 
been committed.  Reimann, 214 Wis. 2d at 623.  With 
this judicial determination, any document requested, 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 provides in relevant part: 
 
Upon the request of the . . . district attorney and 
upon a showing of probable cause under s. 968.12, a 
court shall issue a subpoena requiring the production 
of documents, as specified in s. 968.13(2). 
 
02-3063-W 
 
3
in order to be relevant to the inquiry, must focus on 
the factual assertions made to the judge at the 
commencement of the proceeding.  See Walling, 327 U.S. 
at 209; Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 841.  The necessary 
link between the documents requested and the suspected 
criminal activity under investigation is thus shown, 
affording probable cause to believe that the documents 
sought will produce evidence relevant to potentially 
criminal 
activity, 
as 
required 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.135.   
¶55 Accordingly, we conclude that any subsequent 
subpoena 
duces 
tecum 
issued 
in 
this 
John 
Doe 
proceeding satisfies the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 968.26 and 968.135 and the constitutional concerns 
regarding an overly broad subpoena explained above, 
when the affidavit submitted to request the subpoena 
for documents:  (1) limits the requested data to the 
subject matter described in the John Doe petition, 
Reimann, 214 Wis. 2d at 622; (2) shows that the data 
requested is relevant to the subject matter of the 
John Doe proceeding, Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 843; 
(3) specifies the data requested with reasonable 
particularity, Walling, 327 U.S. at 209; Hale, 201 
U.S. at 77; and (4) covers a reasonable period of 
time, Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 844.  Additionally, 
all of the communications to the John Doe judge must 
be made a part of the record.  See id. at 824-25. 
¶2 
The motion for reconsideration is denied without 
costs. 
¶3 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J., did not participate. 
 
No.  02-3063-W.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶4 
SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
State, supported by an amicus brief filed by the Wisconsin 
District Attorneys Association, does not ask the court to change 
its ultimate conclusions of law or its mandate.  Rather, the 
State and amicus argue that in the court's discussion of 
subpoenas duces tecum, the reference to the Fourth Amendment and 
the reference to the probable cause language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135 should be removed.  In the alternative, the State and 
the 
District 
Attorneys 
Association 
ask 
for 
at 
least 
an 
opportunity to brief the applicability of the Fourth Amendment 
and § 968.135 to John Doe subpoenas.   
¶5 
Neither the Fourth Amendment nor Wis. Stat. § 968.135 
was argued or briefed by the parties.  Nevertheless the court's 
decision gratuitously opined on these issues.  Maybe something 
was in the air, or water, but on several occasions3 in the spring 
of 2004 this court played the roles of both counsel and court 
and ignored the usual and uncontroversial appellate practice of 
requesting supplemental briefs.      
¶6 
The 
court 
should 
grant 
the 
State's 
reasonable 
requests:  Delete the unnecessary references to the Fourth 
Amendment and Wis. Stat. § 968.135 or order briefs on these 
issues.  I do not join the majority's rewriting of the opinion.  
The majority merely continues on an erroneous path, compounding 
                                                 
3 See Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 129, ¶¶4-8, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ 
N.W.2d ___ 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting 
on 
reconsideration); Beecher v. LIRC, 2004 WI 131, ¶¶3-8, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting on 
reconsideration). 
No.  02-3063-W.ssa 
 
2 
 
the harm that results from an unwise practice of constructing 
opinions without giving the parties the opportunity to brief the 
issues.  This erroneous appellate practice results, as one might 
expect, in erroneous and confusing substantive law in the 
present case. 
¶7 
Fourth Amendment.  The State agrees with the court's 
decision that a John Doe subpoena duces tecum cannot be 
unreasonably overbroad.  The State argues that relying on Fourth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence for 
this 
proposition, 
rather 
than 
relying on State v. Washington,4 is unnecessary and raises 
significant questions about the petitioner's standing to assert 
someone else's Fourth Amendment rights.  I agree.  The 
overbreadth issue 
should 
be 
decided 
on non-constitutional 
grounds.  If the court is to rely on the Fourth Amendment, the 
petitioner's standing becomes an open, unanswered question. 
¶8 
Wis. Stat. § 968.135.  The State persuasively argues 
on the basis of the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 968.135 and 
the legislative history that the probable cause standard in 
§ 968.135 does not apply to a John Doe subpoena duces tecum.  
Equally important, applying a probable cause standard to a John 
Doe subpoena just doesn't make sense.  A probable cause 
requirement 
frustrates 
the 
core 
purpose 
of 
a 
John 
Doe 
proceeding, namely to determine whether probable cause exists to 
believe a crime has been committed.     
                                                 
4 State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 266 N.W.2d 597 
(1978). 
No.  02-3063-W.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶9 
The rewrite stubbornly continues to rely on Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135 and now defines "probable cause" as used in § 968.135 
without analyzing the State's argument and without the benefit 
of briefs.  As I have previously written, "probable cause" has 
many meanings, depending on the particular proceeding.5  The 
rewrite, however, gives the words "probable cause" a peculiar, 
unexpected meaning, significantly different from its meaning in 
other proceedings.  Moreover, the result of the rewrite is that 
under the same statute, one definition of "probable cause" 
arises for purposes of John Doe proceedings and apparently 
another 
definition 
of 
"probable 
cause" 
arises 
for 
other 
proceedings.  Such a statutory interpretation is contrary to 
commonly understood rules of statutory interpretation.6 
¶10 As a result of its stubborn and erroneous reliance on 
Wis. Stat. § 968.135, the rewrite insists on a probable cause 
standard, but winds up defining the probable cause standard as 
relevance.  It would have been simpler, as the State requested, 
to delete the reference to probable cause and § 968.135 and 
adhere to the relevancy test for subpoenas duces tecum as 
clearly adopted in State v. Washington.  The Washington court 
stated quite simply: "The John Doe judge, and the court ordering 
production of the documents, have to determine whether the 
                                                 
5 See County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 317-27, 
603 N.W.2d 541 (1999) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
6 See, e.g., State v. Charles, 180 Wis. 2d 155, 159-60, 509 
N.W.2d 85 
(Ct. 
App. 
1993) 
("[T]he 
rule 
of 
statutory 
construction[ ] [is] that words or phrases appearing in the same 
statute shall be given the same meaning." (citation omitted)). 
No.  02-3063-W.ssa 
 
4 
 
documents sought are relevant to the topic of inquiry.  The test 
is whether the information sought is in some manner connected 
with the suspected criminal activity under investigation."7   
Approaching the issue relying on the precedent of Washington 
allows the court to avoid a contortionist position of bending 
§ 968.135 and itself out of all recognizable shape.      
¶11 For the reasons set forth, I do not join the rewrite. 
¶12 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
                                                 
7 Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 843. 
No.  02-3063-W.ssa 
 
1