Title: SOTOLONGO-GARCIA v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SOTOLONGO-GARCIA v. STATE2002 WY 18560 P.3d 687Case Number: 02-28Decided: 12/31/2002

 

 

 

JORGE T. 
SOTOLONGO-GARCIA,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Mary 
B. Guthrie, Cheyenne, WY.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Rebecca A. Lewis, 
Special Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant Jorge 
T. Sotolongo-Garcia appeals his convictions for  possession with intent to deliver 
marijuana and conspiracy to deliver marijuana.  Appellant asserts the jury was presented 
with insufficient evidence to support the verdict on both charges.  Satisfied with the evidence as reflected 
by the record, we affirm.

 

 

ISSUE

 

[¶2]                  
Was evidence sufficient to permit the jury to find appellant guilty of 
possession with intent to deliver marijuana and conspiracy to deliver 
marijuana?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      A traffic stop on 
I-80 in Laramie County revealed two occupants, one of which was appellant, 
and  77 pounds of marijuana.  Appellant claims  he was just along for the 
ride.

 

[¶4]      Appellant's 
partner, Steven Nevling, was a car mechanic in San Diego, California who 
repaired cars for drugs or money.  
Pursuing his chosen career, he worked on a 1994 Mitsubishi Gallant for a 
man called "Alan."  Nevling had 
known Alan for about three months.  
Nevling also knew Alan was in the drug business because Alan supplied 
Nevling with drugs.  Nevling, 
however, had previously met appellant only one time through an introduction by 
Alan.  

 

[¶5]      While working on 
the Mitsubishi, Nevling was approached by Alan and asked if he would drive the 
car to Iowa in return for $1,500 and a quarter ounce of methamphetamine.  Alan explained that his original driver 
could not, for whatever reason, make the trip.  After agreeing, Nevling and Alan met 
three individuals who loaded the trunk with marijuana.  Alan then instructed Nevling to follow 
him to the home where Nevling was first introduced to appellant.  At the home, Nevling was informed that 
appellant would join him on the trip.  

 

[¶6]      At this juncture, 
appellant got into Alan's car, and Nevling was instructed  to follow appellant and Alan.  Nevling  did so until they passed through an 
immigration checkpoint, after which appellant joined Nevling in the 
Mitsubishi.  Alan gave appellant 
$300 for expenses, along with a cell phone, and appellant and Nevling began 
their journey to Iowa.

 

[¶7]      Nevling drove 
from San Diego to Las Vegas.  
Appellant then drove to Rock Springs, whereupon Nevling again took 
over.  During the trip, the cell 
phone rang several times.  Appellant 
would speak in Spanish to the caller, and a couple of times Nevling heard 
appellant use the word "mota," which is Spanish slang for marijuana. 

 

[¶8]      West of Rawlins, 
appellant became ill.  Nevling 
called 911 and got directions to the hospital.  Having delivered appellant to the 
hospital, being low on cash, and not knowing  who to contact once he reached Iowa, 
Nevling used the cell phone to call Alan.  
He was told to stay with appellant.  
Later, again on the cell phone with Alan, Nevling was told to get the 
phone to appellant.  He did so, and 
appellant spoke with Alan.  Sometime 
after that, appellant left the hospital against medical advice, and they 
continued their journey. 

 

[¶9]      The twosome was 
stopped fifteen miles west of Cheyenne because the 1994 Mitsubishi lacked 
working taillights and  Nevling was 
driving erratically.  They both 
claimed not to know the other.  The 
interior of the car exuded an overwhelming odor of diesel fuel, a ruse sometimes 
used to mask the scent of drugs from dogs.  
A canine unit was called to the scene and, after the dog alerted, 
officers found about twenty bricks of marijuana in the trunk.  When questioned later, appellant 
admitted he knew there were drugs in the car but said they belonged to 
Nevling.    

 

[¶10]   The State entered into a plea 
agreement with Nevling, who, pursuant to that agreement, testified against 
appellant at trial.  

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶11]               
When addressing a claim that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the 
conviction for a crime, we apply the following standard:

 

            
This Court assesses whether all the evidence which was presented is 
adequate enough to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in 
the light most favorable to the State.  
We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are 
applying this rule; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable 
and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as 
the jury actually did.

 

This 
inquiry does not require a court to determine whether it believes that the 
evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Rather, the relevant question is 
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  
This standard gives the trier of fact the responsibility to fairly 
resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable 
inferences from the facts.  "Once a 
defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as 
weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon 
judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution."

 

Willis 
v. State, 
2002 WY 79, ¶8, 46 P.3d 890, ¶8 (Wyo. 2002) (citations 
omitted).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Possession 
with intent to deliver

 

[¶12]   Appellant's brief questions only 
the "possession" element and does not challenge the element of "intent to 
deliver."  Possession is proved when 
the prosecution establishes that the accused either individually or 
jointly with another exercised dominion and control over the 
substance, had knowledge of its presence, and had knowledge that the substance 
was a controlled substance.  Wise 
v. State, 654 P.2d 116, 119 (Wyo. 1982).  Direct evidence of actual possession of 
the substance is not required.  
Constructive possession is sufficient and can be proved by circumstantial 
evidence linking together a series of facts which results in  a reasonable inference that the 
defendant had the necessary control over and knowledge of the drugs.  Houghton v. State, 6 P.3d 643, 
647 (Wyo. 2000); Wise, 654 P.2d  at 119.  

 

[¶13]   Clearly, the evidence, as recited 
in the facts, not only reaches the sufficiency threshold but borders on 
overwhelming.  Appellant was a prior 
acquaintance of Alan; it was Alan who arranged for the marijuana to be 
transported; appellant shared in the driving chores; appellant remained in 
contact with Alan by cell phone throughout the journey; appellant was given the 
cash by Alan to pay for the expenses of the trip; appellant had the contact 
information once they reached their destination in Iowa; and appellant said he 
knew there were drugs in the car.  
This evidence not only supports the possession but the intent to deliver 
as well.

 

Conspiracy 
to deliver marijuana

 

[¶14]   The elements of a conspiracy 
involving a controlled substance are:  
(1) at least a tacit understanding between the defendant and a 
coconspirator to commit an act violative of Wyoming's controlled substances act, 
and (2) intent by the defendant to commit the elements of the offense which 
was the object of the understanding.  
Due to the covert nature of the crime, circumstantial evidence may be 
relied upon to establish the conspiracy.   Gilliam v. State, 890 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Wyo. 1995).  The amended 
information in this case alleges that appellant conspired with "Steven Nevling 
and others whose full identities are presently unknown to commit the crime of 
Delivery of Marijuana."  "All that 
is required is that a participant know of the others' existence and their 
activities to further the conspiracy.'"  
Marquez v. State, 12 P.3d 711, 716 (Wyo. 2000) (citations 
omitted).

 

[¶15]   Once again, a review of the 
evidence presented clearly ties appellant to both Nevling and Alan in a 
conspiracy to deliver marijuana.  
Appellant's real argument is that Nevling was not credible because of his 
plea agreement with the State.  
However, 

 

[w]e 
have consistently held that even though it is possible to draw other inferences 
from the evidence presented, it is the responsibility of the jury to resolve 
conflicts in the evidence.  The 
factfinderin this case, a jurydid that.  
The jury is entitled to weigh and disregard the evidence intended to 
discredit the witnesses for the State.  

 

Willis, 
¶15 (quoting Broom v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 642 (Wyo. 
1985)).

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶16]   Appellant's trial counsel said it 
best in closing when he told the jury, "this case does come down to Mr. 
Nevling's testimony because if you believe him, then you can find Mr. Sotolongo 
guilty, but you have to believe him."  
Apparently the jury did.

 

[¶17]   Affirmed.