Title: Massachusetts Port Authority v. Turo Inc.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13012 
 
MASSACHUSETTS PORT AUTHORITY  vs.  TURO INC. & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 8, 2021. - April 21, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Massachusetts Port Authority.  Airport.  Motor Vehicle, Lease 
agreement.  Injunction.  Practice, Civil, Preliminary 
injunction.  Immunity from Suit.  Trespass. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
June 3, 2019. 
 
A motion for a preliminary injunction was heard by Brian A. 
Davis, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Elizabeth B. Prelogar, of the District of Columbia, for 
Turo Inc. 
David S. Mackey (Christina S. Marshall & Melissa C. Allison 
also present) for Massachusetts Port Authority. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Daniel Reimer, of Colorado, for Airports Council 
International -- North America. 
 
Mason A. Kortz for Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press. 
 
 
1 RMG Motors LLC & John Doe Nos. 1 through 100. 
2 
 
 
Ryan Spear & Erin K. Earl, of Washington, & Thomas J. Tobin 
for Technology Network & others. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  The plaintiff, the Massachusetts Port 
Authority (Massport), and the defendants, Turo Inc. (Turo), RMG 
Motors LLC (RMG), and John Doe Nos. 1 through 100 (John Doe 
defendants) (collectively, defendants), have been in a dispute 
regarding the unregulated pick up and drop off of passengers at 
Boston's Logan International Airport (Logan Airport).  Massport 
eventually filed suit against the defendants.  Turo appeals from 
a preliminary injunction granted by a judge in the Superior 
Court in favor of Massport that restricts Turo from conducting 
any commercial activity at Logan Airport without written 
authorization from Massport. 
Turo contends that the judge erred in issuing the 
injunction for three reasons:  first, because Turo is immune 
from liability under 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), commonly known as 
§ 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA); second, because 
Massport was unlikely to succeed on its claim that, by 
facilitating the motor vehicle rental transactions at Logan 
Airport, Turo aided and abetted the other defendants' acts of 
trespass; and third, by concluding that Massport need not 
demonstrate irreparable harm to succeed on its motion for a 
preliminary injunction.  We disagree and therefore affirm the 
judge's order.  Having carefully considered the record before 
3 
 
us, however, a modification of the terms of the preliminary 
injunction is necessary to comply with the requirements of the 
CDA; the modification is detailed infra.2 
 
Background.  Massport is an independent public authority 
tasked with the control, operation, and maintenance of Logan 
Airport.  See St. 1956, c. 465, § 5.  Consonant with its 
authority, Massport has promulgated a set of regulations 
governing the operations of Logan Airport.  One such regulation 
prohibits any person, "unless duly authorized by the Executive 
Director" of Massport, from "[c]arry[ing] on any commercial 
activity or conduct[ing] operations of a commercial nature" that 
occur "in or upon any area of the Airport."  740 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 21.04(1)(b) (2013). 
Massport also has adopted several regulations and standard 
practices related to motor vehicle rentals that occur on airport 
grounds, including 740 Code Mass. Regs. § 23.08(1)(b) (2004), 
which states in relevant part:  "No Operator or Driver shall 
solicit or transact car rental business at Logan Airport except 
as authorized pursuant to a current and valid agreement 
specifically permitting such activities."  These agreements 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Airports 
Council International -- North America; Technology Network, 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Innovation Economy Alliance, 
Internet Association, NetChoice, Match Group, Inc., and Vimeo, 
Inc.; and Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. 
4 
 
require rental car companies to conduct operations at Logan 
Airport only from a central location.  To transport rental car 
users to and from the terminals to that location, Massport 
provides a shuttle system and concomitantly prohibits car rental 
pick-up and drop-off activity at the main airport buildings or 
the terminal curbsides to reduce traffic.  These agreements also 
require all rental car companies to pay to Massport various 
fees, which collectively generate more than $80 million in 
annual revenue. 
Turo describes itself as "an online platform that operates 
a peer-to-peer marketplace connecting [hosts] with [guests] 
seeking cars on a short-term basis."  Turo has no office, rental 
counter, or other physical presence at Logan Airport.  A guest 
seeking to rent a motor vehicle from a host would search Turo's 
website or available listings, select and book a particular 
vehicle, and then coordinate the pick-up location and time with 
the host.  Turo does not require its hosts to deliver vehicles 
to their guests, nor does Turo determine the parties' particular 
rendezvous location. 
Turo's hosts use its platform to list their privately owned 
vehicles for rent as well as to set their vehicles' 
availability, pricing, and pick-up and drop-off locations, 
including Logan Airport.  The John Doe defendants represent a 
number of unknown individual hosts who have utilized Turo's 
5 
 
platform to list and deliver vehicles for rent at Logan Airport.  
Turo's hosts, however, include not only individual vehicle 
owners, but also commercial car rental companies like defendant 
RMG.  Approximately once or twice per month, RMG uses Turo's 
platform to provide a number of luxury automobiles for rent by 
Turo's guests at Logan Airport. 
Turo's website describes "three options for meeting 
[guests]":  (1) delivery to a custom location; (2) delivery to 
nearby airports; or (3) pick up at the host's location.  Turo 
highlights on its website that it offers curbside pickup at 
Logan Airport by way of a designated "button" that allows its 
guests to directly search for vehicles available at Logan 
Airport.  Turo promotes both that it has more than 200 motor 
vehicles available to rent from Logan Airport and that its 
guests are able to meet their hosts at Logan Airport.  Indeed, 
this is one of the conveniences Turo touts as a distinct 
advantage it offers to travelers over traditional car rental 
agencies. 
Turo also extends an array of support services to its 
users.  For example, it offers its hosts payment-processing 
assistance, access to significant liability insurance coverage 
for their motor vehicles, and guest screenings, as well as 
emergency support for its users -- including roadside service 
that is available twenty-four hours per day, seven days per 
6 
 
week.  Moreover, Turo imposes rigorous eligibility standards for 
any vehicles listed for rent through its platform.  Turo also 
has adopted certain standardized policies applicable to all 
rentals, including policies regarding cancellations, cleaning, 
late returns, security deposits, smoking, pets, privacy, and 
terms of service. 
Despite the fact that Turo has refused Massport's repeated 
requests to enter into an agreement and has not otherwise 
received affirmative authorization from Massport for its 
operations, Turo has facilitated its hosts' and guests' vehicle 
rental transactions at Logan Airport since 2016.  Since then, 
Turo's volume of facilitated motor vehicle rentals at Logan 
Airport has increased steadily.  In 2018, Turo facilitated 3,783 
trips that involved vehicle "handoffs" at Logan Airport.  In 
2019, that number rose to 4,706, representing approximately one-
half of Turo's business in Boston. 
Prior to filing suit, Massport attempted unsuccessfully to 
enter into a written agreement with Turo to authorize and govern 
Turo's operations at Logan Airport; these efforts included cease 
and desist letters.  Turo consistently responded that, because 
it is not a car rental business, it is not subject to Massport's 
rules and regulations. 
 
Procedural history.  In June 2019, Massport commenced a 
civil action in the Superior Court, alleging that the defendants 
7 
 
were operating an unauthorized rental business at Logan Airport.  
In its amended complaint, Massport asserts violations of its 
regulations prohibiting commercial activity without 
authorization, 740 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 21.04(1)(b) and 
23.08(1)(b); common-law trespass; aiding and abetting trespass; 
unjust enrichment; and violations of G. L. c. 93A.  The prayer 
for relief sought preliminary and permanent injunctions, as well 
as damages and attorney's fees. 
Massport subsequently filed a motion for a preliminary 
injunction, seeking to enjoin the defendants' actions at Logan 
Airport.  After a nonevidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge 
granted Massport's motion for a preliminary injunction in 
January 2020.  The judge ruled that Turo was not immune from 
suit under § 230, that Massport had demonstrated a strong 
likelihood of success on the claim against Turo of aiding and 
abetting an ongoing trespass by the other defendants, and that 
Massport was not required to demonstrate irreparable harm in 
order to obtain a preliminary injunction because its claim was 
based on a continuing trespass to land.  In February of 2020, 
Turo filed a notice of appeal from the order granting the 
preliminary injunction.  Thereafter, Turo sought a stay of the 
injunction pending appeal; that motion was denied, and Turo's 
appeal from the order allowing the preliminary injunction 
8 
 
entered in the Appeals Court in June 2020.  We transferred the 
matter to this court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  We review a decision 
on a motion for a preliminary injunction to determine whether 
there was an error of law or whether the judge abused his or her 
discretion -- that is, whether the judge applied proper legal 
standards and whether there was reasonable support for the 
judge's evaluation of factual questions.  See King v. Town Clerk 
of Townsend, 480 Mass. 7, 9 (2018).  We consider the same 
factors as did the judge:  whether the party seeking the 
preliminary injunction is likely to succeed on the merits; 
whether irreparable harm will result from a denial of the 
injunction; and whether, in light of the moving party's 
likelihood of success on the merits, the risk of irreparable 
harm to the moving party outweighs the potential harm to the 
nonmoving party in granting the injunction.  See Garcia v. 
Department of Hous. & Community Dev., 480 Mass. 736, 747 (2018).  
"In conducting our review, we decide 'whether the judge applied 
proper legal standards and whether there was reasonable support 
for his evaluation of factual questions.'"  Fordyce v. Hanover, 
457 Mass. 248, 256 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. 
& Loan, 452 Mass. 733, 741 (2008).  The judge's conclusions of 
law are "subject to broad review and will be reversed if 
9 
 
incorrect" (citation omitted).  Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. 
Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 616 (1980). 
2.  Immunity under § 230.  Congress enacted § 230 of the 
CDA "to promote the continued development of the Internet and 
other interactive computer services," 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1), as 
well as "to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market 
that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation," 
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).  To that end, § 230 of the CDA provides 
that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider."  47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(1). 
 
Given Congress's stated intent, courts have construed § 230 
"to establish broad federal immunity to any cause of action that 
would make service providers liable for information originating 
with a third-party user of the service" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1062 (2007).  Nevertheless, 
courts "consistently [have] eschewed an expansive reading of the 
[CDA] that would render unlawful conduct 'magically . . . lawful 
when [conducted] online,' and therefore 'giv[e] online 
businesses an unfair advantage over their real-world 
counterparts.'"  HomeAway.com, Inc. v. Santa Monica, 918 F.3d 
10 
 
676, 683 (9th Cir. 2019) (HomeAway.com), quoting Fair Hous. 
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1164 & n.15 (9th Cir. 2008).  Indeed, even with the broad 
protections provided by the CDA, "an interactive computer 
service provider remains liable for its own speech" and for its 
own unlawful conduct.  Universal Communication Sys., Inc. v 
Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007).  See Erie Ins. 
Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 139-140 (4th Cir. 2019) 
(denying § 230 immunity because underpinning of claims was that 
online retailer was seller of defective product, rather than 
that it was publisher of speech in webpage offering product for 
sale); Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262-1263 
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (denying § 230 immunity based on claims that 
Internet service provider created fake profiles and sent actual 
but expired profiles). 
Immunity under § 230 of the CDA applies when "the defendant 
(1) is a provider or user of an interactive computer service; 
(2) the claim is based on information provided by another 
information content provider; and (3) the claim would treat the 
defendant as the publisher or speaker of that information" 
(quotations, citation, and alteration omitted).  Doe No. 1 v. 
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 (2017) (Backpage.com).  Turo maintains 
that it is immune from suit because the claims in Massport's 
11 
 
complaint are based on content created by hosts over which Turo 
has no control.  Turo contends, therefore, that Massport seeks 
to do precisely what the CDA prohibits:  to hold Turo liable for 
information furnished by another information content provider. 
There is no dispute that Turo is a provider of an 
interactive computer service within the meaning of the first 
prong of the immunity provision of the CDA.  Therefore, Turo is 
entitled to immunity if Massport's claims necessarily require 
that Turo be treated as the publisher or speaker of content 
provided by others.  Because Massport's claims are not 
predicated on third-party content, and because they do not seek 
to treat Turo as the publisher or speaker of its hosts' content, 
we hold that Turo is not entitled to immunity under either the 
second or third prong. 
 
The judge determined, and we agree, that Turo's immunity 
claims fail as to the second prong because Massport's claims 
against Turo regard the portion of the content on Turo's website 
advertising Logan Airport as a desirable pick-up or drop-off 
location, which was created by Turo itself.  As indicated, in 
pages of its own on its website, Turo offers travelers three 
options for pick-up and drop-off locations that expressly 
reference airport pickup and drop off:  "Owners deliver to 
nearby airports"; "Airport pickup [is] available -- Skip the 
12 
 
rental counter"; and a dedicated search button for vehicles 
specifically available at Logan Airport. 
Indeed, Turo's own content encouraging the use of Logan 
Airport as a desirable pick-up or drop-off location for its 
users is exactly the content Massport asserts is the basis for 
the claim of aiding and abetting.  Cf. Federal Trade Comm'n v. 
Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(information service provider liable for "development of 
offensive content only if it in some way specifically encourages 
development of what is offensive about the content").  Because 
this specific content was created by Turo, it cannot be 
construed reasonably as "information provided by another," 
Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 19, and Turo is not protected by 
§ 230's shield of immunity on the basis of this prong. 
 
As to the third prong, the judge ruled that immunity under 
§ 230 is not available to Turo because, rather than seeking to 
hold Turo liable as the publisher or speaker for its users' 
content, Massport's claims sought to hold Turo liable for its 
own role in facilitating the online car rental transactions that 
resulted in its customers' continuing trespass.  The record 
supports the judge's conclusion. 
The "ultimate question" in determining whether an 
interactive computer service provider like Turo is entitled to 
§ 230 immunity is whether "the cause of action necessarily 
13 
 
requires that the defendant be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of content provided by another."  Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 
at 19.  "Features . . . [that] reflect choices about what 
content can appear on the website and in what form" are 
"editorial choices that fall within the purview of traditional 
publisher functions," id. at 21, but more concentrated 
involvement in the transaction may fall outside that purview, 
see Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc., 934 F.3d 1093, 1098 
(9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2761 (2020); 
HomeAway.com, 918 F.3d at 682, 684. 
 
We find a recent decision of the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts instructive on this 
point.  In Airbnb, Inc. v. Boston, 386 F. Supp. 3d 113, 120 (D. 
Mass. 2019), the court considered whether Airbnb, Inc. (Airbnb), 
was shielded by § 230 from monetary fines for accepting booking 
fees for transactions posted by the website's users that 
involved booking apartment rentals that were prohibited by city 
ordinance.  The court held that the monetary fines imposed by 
the city were "aimed at regulating Airbnb's own conduct, and not 
at punishing it for content provided by a third party," and thus 
§ 230 immunity did not apply.  Id.  The court went on to explain 
that "[t]he fine is neither expressly tied to the content of the 
underlying listing, nor explicitly aimed at penalizing the 
manner in which Airbnb has structured its booking and payment 
14 
 
services.  It is triggered based on Airbnb's own conduct as a 
participant in the rental transaction . . . ."  Id. at 121.  The 
claim was not directed at Airbnb's acts as a publisher of third-
party rental listings, but rather at Airbnb's role "as an agent 
that books rental agreements between users and hosts and 
collects and distributes payments when such a deal is made."  
Id. at 120.  Thus, the court concluded, the monetary fines 
"reache[d] Airbnb in its capacity as a booking agent and payment 
processor," and "impose[d] no liability, nor require[d] any 
action, that necessarily [arose] from Airbnb's publication of 
content provided by another."  Id. at 122. 
 
Here, as in the Airbnb case, the record reflects that Turo 
serves a dual role as both the publisher of its users' third-
party listings and the facilitator of the rental transactions 
themselves, and in particular the rental transactions that occur 
on Massport's Logan Airport property.  Rather than focusing on 
what Turo allows its hosts to publish in their listings, 
Massport's claims pointedly focus on Turo's role as the 
facilitator of the ensuing rental transactions at Logan Airport, 
which is far more than just offering a website to serve as a go-
between among those seeking to rent their vehicles and those 
seeking rental vehicles.  Indeed, as the judge observed, in 
addition to allowing hosts to list their vehicles for rent, Turo 
also provides substantial ancillary services to its hosts, such 
15 
 
as collecting and remitting payments, offering (and mandating) 
liability insurance and roadside assistance that is available 
twenty-four hours per day and seven days per week, and screening 
guests before permitting them to rent a motor vehicle from a 
host. 
Turo minimizes its involvement in the challenged rental 
transactions by maintaining that it serves solely or principally 
as the recipient and processor of the payments intrinsic to the 
third-party listings.  Turo also suggests that courts repeatedly 
have rejected plaintiffs' attempts to avoid the immunity 
provisions of § 230 by asserting claims of aiding and abetting 
that seek to hold a website operator liable for others' content.  
See, e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967 
(N.D. Ill. 2009); Simmons vs. Danhauer & Assocs., LLC, U.S. 
Dist. Ct., No. 8:08–CV–03819–JMC (D.S.C. Oct. 21, 2010), aff'd, 
477 Fed. Appx. 53 (2012); Goddard vs. Google, Inc., U.S. Dist. 
Ct., No. C 08-2738 JF (PVT) (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008).  But 
Turo's reliance on these cases is misplaced because the immunity 
provisions of § 230 simply do not apply where Massport's 
complaint targets Turo's own conduct and the claims of aiding 
and abetting are not predicated on the publication of Turo's 
hosts' content.  See HomeAway.com, 918 F.3d at 682, 684.  See, 
e.g., Dart, supra. 
16 
 
Courts in other jurisdictions have reached similar 
conclusions.  For example, a Federal District Court in Los 
Angeles recently addressed this issue.  In that case, Turo 
sought declaratory relief on several grounds, among them a 
declaration whether it could be classified as a rental car 
company under a city ordinance.  Turo Inc. vs. Los Angeles, U.S. 
Dist. Ct., No. 2:18-CV-06055-CAS-GJSx (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2020), 
rev'd, U.S. Ct. App., Nos. 20-55729 & 20-55731 (9th Cir. Mar. 
10, 2021) (reversing solely on basis that defendant failed to 
demonstrate likelihood of irreparable harm such that injunction 
was warranted).  The defendant city counterclaimed, asserting 
that Turo had violated airport regulations, trespassed, and 
aided and abetted its users' trespass.  Turo Inc., U.S. Dist. 
Ct., supra.  As with Logan Airport, Los Angeles International 
Airport's regulations prohibit commercial activity on airport 
property without prior approval by the airport.  Id. 
The Federal District Court in California concluded that 
§ 230 did not bar the city's claims because the claims, as here, 
sought to hold Turo liable for its role in facilitating online 
rental car transactions, and not as the publisher or speaker of 
its users' listings.  See id.  The court relied upon the 
reasoning in HomeAway.com and its progeny, holding that 
"[b]ecause 'the Platforms face no liability for the content of 
the bookings' but 'only from' facilitating 'unlicensed 
17 
 
bookings,' [§] 230 does not immunize their claims."  Id., 
quoting HomeAway.com, 918 F.3d at 684. 
 
3.  Claim of aiding and abetting trespass.  The judge 
concluded that Massport likely would succeed on its claim 
alleging that Turo aided and abetted RMG and the John Doe 
defendants in trespassing at Logan Airport.  To prevail on a 
claim of aiding and abetting, Massport must demonstrate "(1) 
that [RMG and the John Doe defendants] committed the relevant 
tort; (2) that [Turo] knew [RMG and the John Doe defendants 
were] committing the relevant tort; and (3) that [Turo] actively 
participated in or substantially assisted in [the] commission of 
the tort."  Go-Best Assets, Ltd. v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 463 
Mass. 50, 64 (2012).  See Planned Parenthood League of Mass., 
Inc. v. Blake, 417 Mass. 467, 481, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868 
(1994), citing Kyte v. Philip Morris, Inc., 408 Mass. 162, 168-
169 (1990) (charge of aiding and abetting requires proof that 
defendant knew of substantial, supporting role in unlawful 
enterprise); Brown v. Perkins, 1 Allen 89, 98 (1861) ("any 
person who is . . . encouraging or exciting [a trespass] . . . 
or who in any way or by any means countenances or approves the 
same, is in law deemed to be an aider and abettor").  
Substantial assistance, in turn, may be established by 
demonstrating that the alleged abettor's actions were a 
"substantial factor" in the trespasser's "ability to perpetrate" 
18 
 
the trespass.  See Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F. 
Supp. 2d 1101, 1132, 1135 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (to prove claim of 
aiding and abetting, plaintiff must show defendant provided 
assistance that was substantial factor in causing harm 
suffered). 
 
Turo denies having the requisite intent to be liable for 
aiding and abetting a trespass and that it substantially 
assisted any trespass.  Massport claims that Turo knowingly has 
provided an avenue, along with substantial assistance, to its 
users to commit the ongoing trespass such that Turo equally may 
be held liable.  The judge agreed with Massport, and our own 
review of the record supports the judge's determination. 
 
Concerning the first element of the claim of aiding and 
abetting, a trespasser "is a person who enters or remains upon 
land in the possession of another without a privilege to do so 
created by the possessor's consent or otherwise."  Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 329 (1965).  The record makes clear that RMG 
and the John Doe defendants physically entered Logan Airport 
land to transact "car rental business" without obtaining 
Massport's authorization or consent.  These actions constitute a 
trespass; the judge's determination was not error.  Cf. New 
England Forestry Found., Inc. v. Assessors of Hawley, 468 Mass. 
138, 157 (2014), and cases cited ("The right that is most 
central to the 'bundle' of rights enjoyed by a private property 
19 
 
owner is not the freedom from an obligation to invite visitors, 
it is the affirmative right to exclude others from one's 
property"). 
 
Turning to the second element of aiding and abetting the 
tort of trespass, we similarly conclude that the record 
adequately supports the judge's determination that Turo knew of 
its users' ongoing trespass at Logan Airport.  Turo certainly 
knew that its website heralded hundreds of host vehicles 
available at Logan Airport and that it featured a button on its 
website that allowed its guests to specifically search for 
vehicles available at Logan Airport.3  Turo also acknowledges 
 
3 We emphasize that the utilization of search functionality 
by a provider does not categorically either secure or forfeit 
immunity under the CDA.  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit has held that § 230 protects a service 
provider from liability for traditional editorial functions as 
well as for the provider's website construction and operation.  
See Hiam v. HomeAway.com, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d 338, 346 (D. 
Mass. 2017), aff'd, 887 F.3d 542 (1st Cir. 2018).  See also Doe 
No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 2016), 
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 (2017) (describing lack of 
telephone number verification, rules about posting, and 
procedure for uploading photographs as "part and parcel of the 
overall design and operation of the website" and thus "editorial 
choices that fall within the purview of traditional publisher 
functions"); Universal Communication Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 
478 F.3d 413, 422 (1st Cir. 2007) (Lycos) ("If the cause of 
action is one that would treat the service provider as the 
publisher of a particular posting, immunity applies not only for 
the service provider's decisions with respect to that posting, 
but also for its inherent decisions about how to treat postings 
generally").  However, such immunity is not limitless.  An 
Internet service provider remains liable for its own speech, see 
Lycos, supra at 419, as Turo does here by creating speech 
 
20 
 
facilitating approximately ten rental transactions per day at 
Logan Airport in 2019 and attests that close to one-half of its 
business in Boston in 2019 came from Logan Airport listings. 
 
Additionally, since at least April 2016, Turo knew that 
Massport regarded these rental transactions as unauthorized 
violations of its rules and regulations, culminating in Massport 
sending Turo several cease and desist letters after Turo refused 
to execute a vehicle rental agreement.  Nonetheless, Turo 
persisted in facilitating the unauthorized transactions -- 
steadily growing its business in the ensuing years.  Certainly, 
these interactions between Massport and Turo put the latter on 
notice that the other defendants were trespassing and continuing 
to do so.  Accordingly, the judge's conclusion to this effect is 
supported by the record.4 
 
through the language of this search feature advocating for Logan 
Airport as a preferable location for its users to transact. 
 
 
4 Turo argues that this court's precedent suggests that 
Massport was required to demonstrate that Turo knew of the other 
defendants' intent to trespass and shared their intent.  Compare 
Go-Best Assets, Ltd. v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 463 Mass. 50, 64 
(2012) (Go-Best) (discussing three elements of claim of aiding 
and abetting without requiring finding of shared mental state), 
with Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Blake, 417 
Mass. 467, 481, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868 (1994) (violator of 
prohibition against aiding and abetting must share mental state 
of principal violator).  The judge, relying on the Go-Best 
formulation of the elements of aiding and abetting, did not 
address the issue of shared mental state, but our own review of 
the record indicates that there was ample factual support for a 
determination that Turo shared the mental state of the 
 
21 
 
 
Regarding the third element of aiding and abetting, the 
judge concluded that Massport demonstrated Turo's active 
participation in or substantial assistance of RMG's and the John 
Doe defendants' trespass at Logan Airport by providing the 
online platform that identifies Logan Airport as a pick-up or 
drop-off location, providing substantial liability insurance, 
and collecting payments from users for transactions occurring at 
Logan Airport.  According to Turo, this is much ado about 
nothing, and the mere existence of its platform or the ancillary 
services it provides cannot rise to the level of active 
participation or substantial assistance in the ostensible 
ongoing trespass by its users.  We disagree.  Taken together, 
Turo's broadcasting of airport handoffs along with its 
facilitation of these transactions when it knew or had reason to 
know that those actions offended Massport's rules and 
regulations more than supports the judge's conclusion that Turo 
actively participated in and substantially assisted the ongoing 
trespass of its hosts at Logan Airport. 
4.  Showing irreparable harm to obtain preliminary 
injunctive relief.  Last, Turo takes issue with the judge's 
conclusion that Massport need not show irreparable harm for a 
 
trespassing defendants based on the communications between Turo 
and Massport and on Turo's clear knowledge of the continuing and 
increasing use of Logan Airport as a desirable pick-up and drop-
off location by its users. 
22 
 
preliminary injunction to issue.  Turo argues that a plaintiff 
must demonstrate irreparable harm when pressing a motion for a 
preliminary injunction, in contrast to a litigant seeking a 
permanent injunction who has no such burden.  Massport contends 
that the judge did not err because, as the property owner, it 
need not show irreparable harm in a trespass case.  In any 
event, Massport argues that trespass to real property for any 
length of time is irreparable harm as a matter of law. 
 
Typically, to obtain preliminary injunctive relief, the 
moving party must show that "(1) success is likely on the 
merits; (2) irreparable harm will result from the denial of the 
injunction; and (3) the risk of irreparable harm to the moving 
party outweighs any similar risk of harm to the opposing party."  
Cote-Whitacre v. Department of Pub. Health, 446 Mass. 350, 357 
(2006).  "A plaintiff experiences irreparable injury if there is 
no adequate remedy at final judgment."  GTE Prods. Corp. v. 
Stewart, 414 Mass. 721, 724 (1993).  This court previously has 
stated that damages are typically inadequate in trespass cases 
and that continuing trespasses should be enjoined.  See 
Chesarone v. Pinewood Bldrs., Inc., 345 Mass. 236, 240 (1962); 
Ferrone v. Rossi, 311 Mass. 591, 593 (1942).  Consistent with 
this court's long-standing precedent that real property is 
unique, and that continuing trespass should be enjoined, the 
23 
 
judge did not err in concluding that Massport need not show 
irreparable harm to enjoin Turo's offending behavior.5 
 
5.  Scope of preliminary injunction.  The judge's 
preliminary injunction order addressed the difficult 
considerations raised by § 230 well.  Nevertheless, Turo 
contends that the order impermissibly requires it to remove its 
users' own content from its platform.  As discussed, we conclude 
that the order establishing the preliminary injunction properly 
addresses the considerations raised by § 230, with one 
limitation.  The order could be misread as requiring Turo to 
monitor and potentially to remove third-party content from its 
platform.  See HomeAway.com, 918 F.3d at 682.  Accordingly, the 
preliminary injunction order must be amended in one respect. 
 
The first numbered paragraph of the order currently 
prohibits Turo from "[l]isting or permitting motor vehicles to 
be listed on Turo's website, or by means of any other Turo 
application, as available for pickup or drop-off at Logan 
 
 
5 Massport argues in the alternative that, if a showing of 
irreparable harm is generally required to obtain a preliminary 
injunction enjoining a continuing trespass to land, as a 
government entity seeking to enforce a statute, Massport need 
not make such a showing according to our decision in LeClair v. 
Norwell, 430 Mass. 328, 331 (1999) (in suit brought by 
government seeking to enforce statute or declared policy of 
Legislature, showing of irreparable harm is not required).  
Because we conclude that Massport was not required to 
demonstrate irreparable harm based on the ongoing trespass to 
land, we need not reach this issue. 
24 
 
Airport."  On its face, the language "or permitting motor 
vehicles to be listed" could be understood to obligate Turo to 
monitor and potentially to remove its hosts' noncompliant 
content, an obligation that would appear to be prohibited by the 
CDA.  In order to preclude any possible confusion, the first 
numbered paragraph of the injunction must be modified to 
affirmatively restrain only Turo's conduct. 
 
Conclusion.  The first numbered paragraph of the order 
allowing the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is 
amended to state as follows: 
"1.  Listing motor vehicles on Turo's website, or by means 
of any other Turo application, as available for pickup or 
drop-off at Logan Airport." 
 
In all other respects, the terms of the preliminary injunction 
shall stand as ordered by the judge, and are affirmed.  The 
matter is remanded to the Superior Court, where any further 
proceedings concerning the preliminary injunction shall occur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.