Title: Patterson v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 08/17/2012
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2012
____________________
1110633
____________________
Dawn Elaine Patterson and Brooks Patterson
v.
Consolidated Aluminum Corporation and Lonza America, Inc.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-09-902645)
STUART, Justice.
Dawn Elaine Patterson and her husband Brooks Patterson
appeal the judgment entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court
dismissing 
their 
claims 
against 
Consolidated 
Aluminum
Corporation ("CAC") and its corporate owner Lonza America,
1110633
Inc. ("Lonza"), as being barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.  We affirm.
I.
On September 11, 2008, Dawn Patterson was diagnosed with
malignant mesothelioma.  On August 13, 2009, the Pattersons
initiated 
this 
legal 
action, 
alleging 
that 
Dawn's 
mesothelioma
was caused by exposure to asbestos.  The Pattersons did not
allege that Dawn had been directly exposed to materials
containing asbestos at her home or workplace; rather, they
alleged that Dawn was a victim of secondary exposure to
asbestos as a result of her close contact with her father,
Jerry Dison, and her grandfather, Melvin Lester, who they
alleged had worked around materials containing asbestos for
many years and who had allegedly brought home the asbestos
dust that ultimately caused Dawn's mesothelioma.  The
Pattersons 
accordingly 
named 
Dison's 
and 
Lester's 
employers 
as
defendants 
in 
their 
complaint, 
as 
well 
as 
various
manufacturers of asbestos-containing products that Dison and
Lester were alleged to have been exposed to in the course of
their employment.  The complaint also asserted claims against
unknown defendants that had not yet been identified.  This
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1110633
appeal concerns only Dawn's claims against the employers of
her father, Dison.
Among the defendants named in the Pattersons' complaint
were "Phelps-Dodge Corporation a/k/a Phelps-Dodge Industries
a/k/a Phelps-Dodge Wire & Cable Group" (hereinafter referred
to as "Phelps-Dodge"), and Nichols Wire, Inc.  Dison began
working for Phelps-Dodge in Florence in 1965, and, although he
did not thereafter change jobs, the facility in Florence at
which he worked changed ownership and names several times over
the years, and, when he retired in 2004, he was formally
employed by Nichols Wire.  On December 29, 2009, the
Pattersons submitted Dison's Social Security employment
records to the trial court establishing that Dison had been
employed by Phelps-Dodge  from 1965 to 1971; by CAC from 1971
1
to 1983;  by Nichols-Homeshield, Inc., from 1983 to 1990;  and
2
3
by Nichols Wire from 1991 to 2004.  Both Dawn and Dison
These records indicate that the proper formal name of the
1
entity that employed Dison during this time was "Phelps-Dodge
Aluminum Products Corporation."
The Social Security records for this period also refer
2
to Lonza, because Dison's employer was formally recorded as
"Consolidated Aluminum Corp, Alusuise Lonza America In[c]."
Dison also received wages from Nichols-Homeshield Ltd.
3
Partnership in 1985 and 1986.
3
1110633
confirmed the accuracy of these records in depositions given
in February 2010.  When, during her deposition, an attorney
representing a defendant that is not a party to this appeal
asked Dawn where her father had worked, she responded that
"[h]e worked for Nichols Wire, which before it was Nichols
Wire, it was Consolidated Aluminum [or CAC] and it was also
called Phelps Dodge."  Dison likewise confirmed in his
deposition that he had worked for CAC from 1971 to 1983.
On February 22, 2010, the Pattersons received a response
to discovery requests submitted to Nichols Wire.  In response
to an interrogatory regarding its corporate history, Nichols
Wire stated that it was formed as a corporate entity in 1991
after which it purchased the Florence facility where Dison
worked and other assets from Nichols-Homeshield, which, "upon
information and belief," was a subsidiary of Quanex
Corporation.  On February 24, 2010, the Pattersons filed an
amended complaint adding Quanex as a defendant "individually
and as successor in interest to Nichols-Homeshield."  They
also added as a defendant in that amended complaint Ormet
4
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Corporation "individually and as successor in interest to
[CAC]."4
The Pattersons allege that they thereafter served
discovery requests upon Quanex and that the responses they
received from Quanex on January 19, 2011, alerted them for the
first time that CAC and Lonza were potentially liable
parties.   Accordingly, on April 20, 2011, the Pattersons
5
moved the trial court to allow them to amend their complaint
to substitute CAC and Lonza for fictitiously described
defendants.  The trial court granted their request, and on May
9, 2011, the Pattersons filed their second amended complaint,
identifying CAC and Lonza as defendants for the first time.
On August 15, 2011, CAC and Lonza moved the trial court
to dismiss the Pattersons' claims against them on the ground
that those claims were barred by the applicable statute of
It is not clear what information led the Pattersons to
4
state a claim against Ormet, or when or how they acquired that
information.
Those responses are not part of the record, although the
5
Pattersons have attached an excerpt from those responses to
their appellate brief.  However, evidence attached to or
otherwise described in an appellate brief but "not made a part
of the record on appeal" is not properly before this Court. 
Spradlin v. Drummond, Inc., 548 So. 2d 1002, 1005 (Ala. 1989). 
5
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limitations.  Specifically, they argued that the Pattersons'
claims accrued on September 11, 2008 –– when Dawn was
diagnosed with mesothelioma –– and that, pursuant to § 6-2-38,
Ala. Code 1975, the Pattersons accordingly had two years from
that date, or until September 11, 2010, to state claims
against any parties alleged to be responsible for their
injuries.  The second amended complaint naming CAC and Lonza
as defendants was filed on May 9, 2011 –- nearly eight months
after that period had expired –– and, CAC and Lonza argued,
the Pattersons were not entitled to substitute CAC and Lonza
in the place of fictitiously named defendants in the
Pattersons' earlier timely filed complaint because, CAC and
Lonza alleged, the Pattersons had not acted with due diligence
to identify fictitiously named defendants or to amend their
complaint 
after 
fictitiously 
named 
defendants 
were 
identified. 
The Pattersons filed a response to CAC and Lonza's motion
to dismiss, denying that they had not acted with due diligence
and arguing that the trial court properly allowed their second
amended complaint pursuant to Rules 9(h) and 15(c), Ala. R.
Civ. P.  Rule 9(h) states:
"When a party is ignorant of the name of an opposing
party and so alleges in the party's pleading, the
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1110633
opposing party may be designated by any name, and
when that party's true name is discovered, the
process and all pleadings and proceedings in the
action may be amended by substituting the true
name."
Moreover, pursuant to Rule 15(c), an amendment of a complaint
relates back to the date of the original complaint if the
provisions of Rule 9(h) are satisfied.  See Committee Comments
on 1973 Adoption of Rule 15, Ala. R. Civ. P. ("An amendment
substituting a real party for a fictitious party relates back
provided that the provisions of Rule 9(h) are satisfied.").
On November 15, 2011, the trial court conducted a hearing
on CAC and Lonza's motion to dismiss, and, on December 20,
2011, the trial court entered an order granting the motion,
stating:
"The defendants [CAC] and [Lonza] have filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that the claims stated
against them in this case are barred by the statute
of limitations.  The court, having reviewed the
motion and exhibits submitted by the defendants,
having examined the briefs and exhibits of counsel
for [the Pattersons] and these defendants regarding
this motion and having heard oral argument of the
motion from counsel for the parties involved, treats
the motion as a motion for summary judgment, since
the motion and responses rely on matters outside the
pleadings. Having reviewed the issue, the court
hereby grants the motion to dismiss, which is
treated as a motion for summary judgment, and
dismisses the claims of the [the Pattersons] against
the defendants [CAC] and [Lonza] with prejudice."
7
1110633
The trial court further certified its judgment as final
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and, on January 31,
2012, the Pattersons filed their notice of appeal to this
Court.
II.
The trial court properly treated CAC and Lonza's motion
to dismiss as a summary-judgment motion because evidence
outside the pleadings was considered.  We therefore review the
judgment entered disposing of that motion pursuant to the
standard of review we apply to summary judgments.  We
described that standard in Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party,
897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala. 2004):
"This Court's review of a summary judgment is de
novo.  Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
886 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003).  We apply the same
standard of review as the trial court applied.
Specifically, we must determine whether the movant
has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that the movant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule
56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.
2004).  In making such a determination, we must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant.  Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758
(Ala. 1986).  Once the movant makes a prima facie
showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
produce 'substantial evidence' as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact.  Bass v.
8
1110633
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12."
III.
The Pattersons argue that the trial court erred by
entering a judgment in favor of CAC and Lonza on a statute-of-
limitations 
ground 
because, 
the 
Pattersons 
contend, 
the 
claims
they asserted in their second amended complaint were timely in
light of the relation-back principles of Rules 9(h) and 15(c). 
This Court discussed those principles in Ex parte Griffin, 4
So. 3d 430, 436 (Ala. 2008), stating:
"This Court has held with regard to Rule 9(h) and
the relation-back principles of Rule 15(c), Ala. R.
Civ. P., that the plaintiff must state a cause of
action against the fictitiously named party in the
body of the original complaint; that the plaintiff's
ignorance of the true identity of the party intended
to be sued is 'in the sense of having no knowledge'
of the party's identity at the time the complaint
was filed; and that the plaintiff must have used due
diligence in attempting to discover the identity of
the fictitiously named party.  Columbia Eng'g Int'l
Ltd. v. Espey, 429 So. 2d 955, 958 (Ala. 1983).  To
be entitled to the benefit of the relation-back
principles, the plaintiff must act with due
diligence to ascertain the fictitiously named
defendant's true name and to promptly amend the
complaint to correctly identify that defendant.  The
due-diligence standard, as stated in Davis v. Mims,
510 So. 2d 227, 229 (Ala. 1987), 'is whether the
plaintiff knew, or should have known or was on
notice, that the substituted defendants were in fact
the parties described fictitiously.'"
9
1110633
Thus, in order for the relation-back doctrine to apply and
justify the substitution of a defendant for a fictitiously
named party after the limitations period has run, the
plaintiff seeking such substitution must establish: (1) that
it stated a cause of action against the defendant in the body
of the original complaint, albeit identifying the party only
as a fictitiously named party; (2) that it was ignorant of the
defendant's identity at the time the original complaint was
filed; (3) that it exercised due diligence to identify the
fictitiously named party; and (4) that it promptly amended its
complaint once it knew the identity of the fictitiously named
party.  Id.  The absence of evidence establishing any one of
these factors is sufficient to support a trial court's
judgment 
disallowing 
the 
outside-the-limitations-period
substitution.
In this case, the Pattersons argue that there is
substantial evidence establishing each of these four factors. 
CAC and Lonza do not challenge the Pattersons' assertion that
they were ignorant of CAC and Lonza's identity at the time
they filed their original complaint but contest the
Pattersons' arguments with regard to each of the other three
10
1110633
factors.  Because we agree that the Pattersons did not move
promptly to amend their complaint to substitute CAC and Lonza
as defendants after they knew or should have known that CAC
and Lonza were the parties described fictitiously in the
original complaint, we limit our analysis to that factor.
The Pattersons argue that, at the time they filed their
original 
complaint, 
they 
reasonably 
believed 
that 
Nichols 
Wire
bore responsibility for Dison's, and by extension Dawn's,
exposure to asbestos because Nichols Wire had become Dison's
final employer in 1991 when it acquired the facility he worked
at, and, the Pattersons state, they believed that at the same
time it acquired all liabilities for harm done to people on
those premises by the previous employers.  They further state
that they did not become aware that other parties were
potentially liable for Dawn's injuries until receiving the
discovery responses of Nichols Wire that implicated Quanex. 
Two days after receiving those responses, they moved to amend
their complaint to add Quanex as a defendant and, again they
state, they believed at that time that they had named all
liable parties.  Only when Quanex subsequently provided its
responses to discovery in January 2011, the Pattersons argue,
11
1110633
did they learn that CAC and Lonza might have some liability,
and they therefore moved to amend their complaint to
substitute them as defendants.  Even though they were aware of
CAC's existence before that time, the Pattersons argue, they
were unaware of its potential liability.  Thus, they argue,
they exercised due diligence at all times, and the
substitutions should be permitted under Rule 9(h) and Rule
15(c).
However, the Pattersons' claims are belied by the facts
in the record.  First, although the Pattersons state that they
believed that Nichols Wire had acquired all liability for
asbestos exposure at Dison's workplace when it purchased the
facility and that they accordingly "had no reason to suspect
that there even were any other liable premises defendants [or]
to search for any," this argument ignores the fact that the
original complaint also named Dison's first employer at the
Florence facility, Phelps-Dodge, as a premises-liability
defendant based on its control of that facility.  Pattersons'
brief, p. 21.  The Pattersons were on notice by at least
December 2009 that CAC and/or its corporate parent Lonza had
employed Dison at the same facility for several years because
12
1110633
at that time Dison's Social Security records identifying CAC
and Lonza were submitted into the record, yet the Pattersons
made no effort at that time to substitute CAC or Lonza as a
defendant even though the basis for finding them liable would
have been the same as the basis for finding Phelps-Dodge, who
was named as a defendant in the original complaint, liable.
Second, when the Pattersons filed their first amended
complaint in February 2010 adding Quanex as a defendant (only
two days after receiving the discovery first identifying
Quanex), they also asserted a new claim against a previously
unidentified company, Ormet Corporation, stating:
"Ormet 
Corporation, 
individually 
and 
as
successor 
in 
interest 
to 
[CAC], 
produced,
distributed, 
manufactured, 
installed, 
insured,
owned, and/or maintained or controlled the premises,
facilities 
and 
worksites 
containing 
asbestos-
containing products and/or materials, including
their 
own 
asbestos-containing 
products 
and/or
materials and asbestos-containing products and/or
materials produced or manufactured by others."
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, in February 2010, the Pattersons
apparently had some knowledge of potential liability on the
part of CAC because they asserted a claim against Ormet based
on its status as successor in interest to CAC.  A claim
asserted against CAC and or Lonza at that time would have been
13
1110633
timely; however, such a claim was not made in spite of the
apparent knowledge of the identify of CAC and at least a
partial understanding of its role.  No "fair-minded person in
the exercise of impartial judgment" could reasonably conclude
that the Pattersons did not have any knowledge of CAC's
potential liability at that time.  West v. Founders Life
Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989). 
Yet the Pattersons nevertheless waited until May 2011 –– 
approximately 15 months after they should have known that CAC
and Lonza were entities to be substituted for fictitiously
named defendants and 8 months after the statute of limitations
had expired –– to seek to substitute CAC and Lonza as
defendants.  We accordingly conclude that the Pattersons are
not entitled to the benefit of the relation-back doctrine
because they did not exercise due diligence to amend their
complaint promptly once two of the fictitiously named parties
in that complaint were identified as CAC and Lonza.  The trial
court accordingly did not err in entering a judgment in favor
of CAC and Lonza.  See Ex parte Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 7
So. 3d 999, 1004 (Ala. 2008) ("[The plaintiff] plainly failed
to comply with the rules governing fictitious-party practice
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in his overall delay in ascertaining [the petitioner's]
identity and in waiting seven months after 
obtaining knowledge
of the identity of [the petitioner] as a defendant to amend
his complaint." (emphasis added)); and Sherrin v. Bose, 608
So. 2d 364, 366 (Ala. 1992) (affirming judgment for the
defendant 
on 
statute-of-limitations 
ground 
where 
the 
plaintiff
"waited almost 10 months before amending the complaint" after
defendant was identified (emphasis added)).
IV.
The Pattersons' initiated a lawsuit on August 13, 2009,
against various companies that manufactured or utilized
products containing asbestos, approximately 11 months after
Dawn was diagnosed with mesothelioma on September 11, 2008. 
That lawsuit did not specifically identify CAC or Lonza as
defendants; however, on May 9, 2011, the Pattersons sought to
amend their complaint to substitute them for fictitiously
named defendants.  The trial court initially allowed the
amendment but, in response to a motion filed by CAC and Lonza,
subsequently held that the Pattersons' claims against them
were barred by the statute of limitations.  We agree; because
the Pattersons did not promptly move to amend their complaint
15
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to substitute CAC and Lonza as defendants after learning of
their identity and potential liability, they are not entitled
to the benefit of the relation-back doctrine.  The judgment
entered by the trial court in favor of CAC and Lonza is
accordingly affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Malone, C.J., and Parker, Shaw, and Wise, JJ., concur.
16