Title: Schneider v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JEFFREY A. SCHNEIDER, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 738, 2009      
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0906002133 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  July 21, 2010 
 
 
Decided:     August 19, 2010 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 19th day of August 2010, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1. Jeffery A. Schneider (“Schneider”) appeals from the denial by the 
Superior Court of his Motion to Suppress Evidence.  Schneider claims that the 
Superior Court erred, because the police trooper who performed the search did not 
have a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop and search him.  We find no error 
and affirm. 
2. On June 2, 2009, an anonymous informant called the police.  The 
informant reported that Schneider was drinking alcohol in the driver’s seat of a 
green van, in an elementary school little league field parking lot, during a game.  
 
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Delaware State Police Trooper Amy Lloyd (“Officer Lloyd”) responded to the call, 
and met with the informant in the parking lot for about thirty seconds.  According 
to Officer Lloyd, the informant reported that she had seen Schneider drinking in 
his car, and that she knew Schneider because she had “partied with him in the past 
. . . [and] hung out with him before.”  Officer Lloyd also testified that “[i]t didn’t 
appear that [the informant] knew [Schneider] very well.”  There is no record that 
the informant ever identified herself to Lloyd.  
3. Before Officer Lloyd was able to question the informant further, the 
green van left the parking lot, and Lloyd followed it.  Although Officer Lloyd did 
not observe Schneider break any laws or drive erratically, she stopped his van and 
arrested Schneider for driving while intoxicated. 
 
4. Schneider moved in his Superior Court criminal proceeding to suppress 
the evidence seized as a result of the motor vehicle stop.  The Superior Court 
denied the motion,1 and this appeal followed. 
 
5. On appeal, Schneider claims that the Superior Court erroneously denied 
his motion to suppress, because the unidentified informant’s report did not create a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion to search and seize him.   Schneider asserts 
that his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure, and his 
                                          
 
1 State v. Schneider, 2009 WL 3327226, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2009). 
 
 
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corresponding right under Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution2 were 
violated. 
6. This Court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress for abuse of 
discretion.3  Where, however, “the denial of motion to suppress evidence [is] based 
on an allegedly illegal stop and seizure, we conduct a de novo review to determine 
whether the totality of the circumstances, in light of the trial judge’s factual 
findings, support a reasonable and articulable suspicion for the stop.”4 
7. For the search and seizure of Schneider’s van to be constitutional, the 
informant’s report must have sufficiently established “a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that a crime has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.”5  Whether 
an anonymous “tip suffices to give rise to reasonable suspicion depends on both 
the quantity of the information it conveys as well as the quality . . . of that 
                                          
 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . .); DEL. CONST. 
art. I, § 6 (“The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. . . .”).  We do not address the alleged violation of the 
Delaware Constitution, because it was not fully and fairly presented to this Court as an issue on 
appeal.  See Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285, 291 (Del. 2005). 
 
3 Pendelton v. State, 990 A.2d 417, 419 (Del. 2010).  
 
4 Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Del. 2008). 
 
5 Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1217 (Del. 2000) (holding that an anonymous tip of 
erratic driving was sufficiently reliable to establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, 
making a vehicular stop constitutional); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that 
brief stops by law enforcement officers based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity do 
not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution). 
 
 
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information, viewed under the totality of the circumstances.”6  Here, the record 
shows, the information the anonymous informer reported was of sufficient quantity 
and quality to justify the vehicular stop. 
8. The informant reported that she saw Schneider drinking alcohol.  The 
informant also identified Schneider’s van by oral description and by pointing at it.  
That provided enough information for Officer Lloyd accurately to identify the 
vehicle and the alleged criminal activity.  Thus, the “quantity” requirement for a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion is satisfied. 
9. “With respect to the quality of the information, the key issue is the 
degree of the reliability of that information.”7  “The [U.S.] Supreme Court has long 
emphasized that a primary determinant of a tipster’s reliability is the basis of his 
knowledge.”8  Here, the informant based her report on direct observation—a  
 
                                          
 
6 Bloomingdale, 842 A.2d at 1217 (quoting United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 
2001)). 
 
7 Bloomingdale, 842 A.2d at 1217; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
 
8 United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d at 734; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) 
(“an informant’s ‘veracity,’ ‘reliability,’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ are all highly relevant in 
determining the value of [the informant’s] report.”). 
 
 
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reliable basis of knowledge.9  The basis of the informant’s knowledge having been 
firmly grounded, the quality of her report turns on the informant’s identity and the 
reasonableness of Officer Lloyd’s reliance on the informant’s report.  The record 
shows that although the informant was unidentified, Lloyd acted reasonably in 
relying on her information. 
10. The United States Supreme Court has held that “[a]nonymous tips . . . 
are generally less reliable than tips from known informants. . . .”10  Not all 
anonymous tips are equal, however.  A “tip given face to face is more reliable than 
an anonymous telephone call. . . .  [W]hen an informant relates information to the 
police face to face, the officer has an opportunity to assess the informant’s 
credibility and demeanor.”11 
 
11. Here, the informant called the police to report the information regarding 
Schneider’s alleged activities, and then waited in the parking lot to confirm her 
                                          
 
9 Lloyd testified that the informant observed Schneider drinking alcohol in the elementary school 
little league field parking lot.  The Superior Court also relied on the informant’s alleged personal 
knowledge of Schneider, from “part[ying] with him in the past . . . [and hanging] out with him,” 
to establish the reliability of the informant’s basis of knowledge.  State v. Schneider, 2009 WL 
3327226, at *1, *5.  This Court finds the informant’s direct observations to be a sufficiently 
reliable basis.  We need not decide whether the informant’s relationship with Schneider 
contributed to her basis of knowledge or her reliability.  
 
10 Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000). 
 
11 United States  v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 354 (3rd Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 
 
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earlier report.  The informant made no attempt to conceal her identity.12  She 
voluntarily approached Officer Lloyd and answered all of her questions.  The 
informant remained unidentified, in part because Schneider abruptly left the 
parking lot, leaving Officer Lloyd to choose between continuing to question the 
informant or stop Schneider’s van.  Because the informant risked identification and 
took no action to conceal her identity, those factors support the reliability, and thus 
the quality, of her information. 
12. The quantity and quality of the informant’s report must be “viewed 
under the totality of the circumstances.”13  In Bloomingdale v. State,14 this Court 
explained that, “when deciding whether an anonymous tip of erratic driving 
provided reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, courts should balance the 
government’s interest in responding immediately to reports of unsafe driving, 
against the comparatively modest intrusion on individual liberty that a traffic stop 
entails.”15  Similarly, driving while under the influence of alcohol “poses a 
                                          
 
12 Cf. State v. Satter, 766 N.W.2d 153 (S.D. 2009) (holding that a tip from an unidentified 
informant, who reported to a police officer in person, was sufficient to justify the search and 
seizure of a motor vehicle under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution).  In 
evaluating the quality of an unidentified informant’s tip, the South Dakota Supreme Court valued 
that the informant made no effort to conceal his identity.   Id. at 156. 
 
13 Bloomingdale, 842 A.2d at 1217. 
 
14 Id. 
 
15 Id. at 1221.  
 
 
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potentially imminent threat of harm to the public,”16 and requires this Court to 
achieve the same balance.  Here, Schneider pulled out of the parking lot only thirty 
seconds after Officer Lloyd began talking with the informant.  Officer Lloyd 
wisely chose to pursue Schneider and stop his van, rather than continue to question 
the informant and risk the potential result of allowing a person to drive under the 
influence of alcohol.17  
13. In summary, the informant provided Officer Lloyd a sufficient quantity 
and quality of information during their face-to-face encounter.  To avert any risk of 
a reportedly intoxicated man driving near a little league baseball field, Officer 
Lloyd stopped Schneider’s van, based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion 
that Schneider was driving under the influence.  Therefore, the Superior Court did 
not err in denying Schneider’s Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                          
 
16 Id.   
 
17 One of the significant circumstances was Schneider’s proximity to an elementary school little 
league field while a game was in progress.  That circumstance weighed in favor of performing 
the stop.