Title: Grier v. Grier

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

616 So. 2d 337 (1993) Sharon P. GRIER v. Michael H. GRIER. No. 90-CA-1039. Supreme Court of Mississippi. April 1, 1993. *338 Phil R. Hinton, Wilson & Hinton, Corinth, for appellant. David L. Coleman, Corinth, for appellee. En Banc. DAN M. LEE, Presiding Justice, for the Court: The decision of the Chancellor in this case was originally affirmed per curiam, on August 26, 1992. However, on petition for rehearing, this Court was made aware that there exists among members of the bar practicing in this area, a perception of uncertainty in the law regarding the issue discussed below. Accordingly, the per curiam affirmance of August 26, 1992 is withdrawn and the following opinion issues in its stead. This case presents the important question of whether a property settlement agreement which was entered into by both parties in contemplation of severing their marriage by filing a joint complaint for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences ("no-fault") under Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (Supp. 1992) can be attached and enforced in an action other than irreconcilable differences. As we interpret this section, in the absence of an effective contractual provision to the contrary, all agreements in contemplation of no-fault divorce are voided when, for some reason, the irreconcilable differences proceeding fails and a party seeks a divorce on other grounds. In this case, the Chancellor declined to incorporate a prior property settlement, negotiated in anticipation of a no-fault divorce, into his decree granting a divorce for adultery. We affirm. On May 7, 1990, Sharon and Michael Grier filed a joint complaint, No. 26,680, for divorce based upon irreconcilable differences. In connection with this complaint, they also executed and filed an Agreement Concerning Child Custody, Child Support and Property Rights. Thereafter, before any action was taken by the lower court, Sharon filed a separate and distinct complaint, No. 26,809, on July 19, 1990, seeking divorce on the grounds of adultery. At the hearing on the second complaint, Sharon sought to have the property settlement agreement which was attached to the joint complaint for divorce based on irreconcilable differences enforced under the second complaint for divorce based on adultery. The divorce was granted but the Chancellor declined to enforce the property settlement agreement that was signed and negotiated in contemplation of the joint complaint for divorce based upon irreconcilable differences, stating: (emphasis added). Sharon Grier appealed the judgment below and this Court affirmed per curiam. Now, on petition for rehearing, this opinion issues to clarify the rule of law applicable to facts such as these. The only issue presented is the effect of the property settlement agreement entered into in connection with the irreconcilable differences complaint in the later, and separate, action for divorce on the grounds of adultery. The answer can be found in our statute on irreconcilable differences divorce and the cases applying it. The statute governing no-fault divorce provides, in pertinent part: Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (Supp. 1992). The statute's intent is to provide a less painful alternative to the traditional grounds for divorce which required the parties to publicly put on proof of sensitive private matters. Instead, under § 93-5-2, where the parties are agreeable, they may forego the aforementioned discomfort. The statute contemplates the simple filing of a complaint and various agreements as a "package deal." The cornerstone of the process is mutual consent. The parties bargain on the premise that reaching an agreement will avoid the necessity of presenting proof at trial. It would be fundamentally unfair to hold either of the parties to portions of the package after the foundation of the bargain is removed. For the foregoing reason, our prior cases have held that such agreements do not *340 have force of law unless and until they are approved by the chancellor. For instance, in McCleave v. McCleave, 491 So. 2d 522 (Miss. 1986), this Court upheld a chancellor's refusal to incorporate a prior custody agreement into a subsequent divorce decree. In McCleave, the parties entered into a child custody agreement in connection with their pending action for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. A few days later, Mr. McCleave learned that he had cause to pursue a divorce on other grounds. After a hearing, the chancellor granted the divorce on other grounds and awarded custody of the child to Mr. McCleave, notwithstanding the previous agreement between the parties to the contrary. McCleave, at 523 (emphasis added). The filing of the second complaint terminated not only the no-fault proceeding, but also any obligations under the agreement negotiated in anticipation of the no-fault divorce. Although a properly drafted agreement may be binding vis-a-vis the parties, the chancellor may elect, in his discretion, to modify its terms in a divorce decree. Miss. Const. art. IV, § 94. This is sometimes necessary to protect the parties individually and to ensure that the court is not used as a tool for implementing unconscionable contracts which are not fair to either party. Furthermore, all such agreements are subject to the court's approval. As the Chancellor held in the case sub judice: Additional support for our decision may be found in Traub v. Johnson, 536 So. 2d 25 (Miss. 1988). In Traub, the parties signed a property settlement agreement in November in contemplation of an irreconcilable differences divorce. Then, in December, one party presented the other with documents conveying additional property, which were duly executed. The chancellor never saw or approved the December agreements. In a later declaratory action, the chancellor ruled that the additional assignments and conveyances executed in December were not a part of the written agreement submitted to the chancery court and that, therefore, the December agreement was not enforceable. We affirmed, stating that: Traub, 536 So. 2d 25, 26 (citing Sullivan v. Pouncey, 469 So. 2d 1233 (Miss. 1985)). The Sullivan case cited in Traub also supports the principle that settlement agreements are not final unless approved by the court. The facts in Sullivan were slightly different in that the parties submitted one contract to the court while privately intending to be bound by another. In a later action to enforce the private agreement, the chancellor determined, based on general contract principles, that the private contract was binding. This Court reversed, and indicated that where a property settlement is entered into in contemplation of a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, there is more at work than general contract law. The governing statute injects the court into the process, making approval necessary. To quote from the opinion: Sullivan v. Pouncey, 469 So. 2d 1233, 1234 (Miss. 1985). Today we hold that a property settlement agreement executed in contemplation of a divorce based upon irreconcilable differences is unenforceable when one party withdraws from the irreconcilable differences proceeding and seeks a divorce on grounds other than irreconcilable differences. Much confusion may be avoided by inserting appropriate language within the property settlement agreement which specifically addresses this contingency. It is not our intent to limit the parties' rights to contract. However, the contract should specify, with particularity, within its four corners, whether it is to be limited to an irreconcilable differences divorce or whether it is intended to be binding in a divorce granted on any other grounds. The decision of the Chancellor is AFFIRMED. HAWKINS, C.J., and SULLIVAN, BANKS and McRAE, JJ., concur. PRATHER, P.J., dissenting with separate written opinion joined by PITTMAN, J. ROBERTS and SMITH, JJ., not participating. PRATHER, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion regarding the unenforceability of the property agreement entered into by the Griers. It is my opinion that such a decision impermissibly limits a husband's and wife's capacity to contract with one another. The requirement that a written property settlement be agreed upon by the parties in a no-fault divorce originates from Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (Supp. 1992). Section 93-5-2 provides for a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences: Pursuant to the above statute, the parties in the case sub judice drafted and signed an "Agreement Concerning Child Custody, Child Support and Property Rights." The agreement provides in part as follows: The chancellor found that the agreement was in "obvious contemplation of a no-fault divorce proceeding." In so finding, he added a subjective finding to the contract and thereby amended its terms. At no place within the four-corners of the contract was a contingency placed on the enforceability of this contract requiring the approval of the chancery court or the granting of a no-fault divorce. Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 349, 352 (Miss. 1990). It is my opinion that the majority's affirmance is in error because it subjects an otherwise valid contract to a subjective non-contract analysis. In my view a property settlement is like any other contract and the parties' intent should be interpreted applying the law of contracts. A property settlement is a contractual agreement governed by the law of contracts. Roberts v. Roberts, 381 So. 2d 1333, 1335 (Miss. 1980) ("The rules applicable to the construction of written contracts in general are to be applied in construing a postnuptial agreement"). "A true and genuine property settlement is no different from any other contract, and the mere fact that it is between a divorcing husband and wife, and incorporated in a divorce decree, does not change its character." East v. East, 493 So. 2d 927, 932 (Miss. 1986). This Court has upheld the freedom to contract and the right of sui juris married adults to enter into a valid and binding agreement regarding their property. Crosby v. Peoples Bank of Indianola, 472 So. 2d 951, 955 (Miss. 1985). In Crosby, a case factually postured as the case sub judice, this Court held: Id. at 955. In yet another case, Brown v. Brown, 566 So. 2d 718 (Miss. 1990), this Court followed the same holding as follows: Id. at 721. The law of these cases emanates from the seminal case of Stone v. Stone, 385 *343 So. 2d 610 (Miss. 1980), in which this Court held: Id. at 612. It is my opinion that the law of contracts controls this decision and that the majority opinion fails to follow the law set forth in the Crosby, Brown, and Stone opinions. In the instant case, the settlement agreement makes no mention of the enforceability of this contract being contingent on the granting of an irreconcilable divorce. Had the parties intended to have the contract contingent upon the court's approval of a no-fault divorce, the contract would have so stated. Instead, it clearly and succinctly states that it is a "complete settlement and distribution of all property rights heretofore existing between them and that the distribution is fair and equitable." This language should govern, and the Crosby, Brown, and Stone cases should control the outcome of this case. The majority erroneously relies on McCleave v. McCleave, 491 So. 2d 522 (Miss. 1986), for the proposition that a "property settlement" must be approved by the chancellor. In my opinion, McCleave is distinguishable from the case sub judice. In McCleave, this Court upheld the chancellor's decision to reverse the parties' prior custodial agreement and to grant custody of a minor child to Mr. McCleave. The decision at no time addresses the parties' "property settlement." The majority opinion is misplaced when it cites McCleave as support for its holding that property settlements of married adults are subject to modification. Traub v. Johnson, 536 So. 2d 25 (Miss. 1988) and Sullivan v. Pouncey, 469 So. 2d 1233 (Miss. 1985), also are distinguishable. Both Traub and Sullivan are premised on preventing a fraud on the court. In the instant case, no such fraud exists. These cases should not be read to allow a chancellor to invalidate an inherently binding contractual agreement on non-fraudulent, non-contractual grounds. This dissent does not diminish, in any way, the Chancery Court's authority to approve an agreement between divorcing parents with regard to their children. Children of divorcing parents are wards of the court and the court is charged with the duty to protect the children's best interests. See Owens v. Huffman, 481 So. 2d 231, 244 (Miss. 1985). Thus, matters relating to child custody and support are rightfully reviewed and approved by the chancellor to assure that the children's best interests are protected. Absent a showing of some contractual fault or perpetration of fraud on the court, this contract should be upheld as the parties' property settlement. The opinion of the majority places a limitation on the freedom of contract between married adults, sui juris, who are advised by counsel, to enter into a contract regarding division of their marital property. I respectfully dissent and would follow the Stone, Crosby, and Brown holdings previously announced by this Court. PITTMAN, J., joins this opinion.