Title: Commonwealth v. Goncalves-Mendez

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12743 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WILSON GONCALVES-MENDEZ. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 7, 2019. - February 3, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure.  Search and 
Seizure, Motor vehicle, Impoundment of vehicle, Inventory, 
Fruits of illegal search.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to 
suppress. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Roxbury Division of 
the Boston Municipal Court Department on August 4, 2016. 
 
 
After transfer to the Central Division of the Boston 
Municipal Court Department, pretrial motions to suppress 
evidence were heard by Catherine K. Byrne, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Gants, C.J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to 
the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court granted an 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Julianne Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
2 
 
 
Chauncey B. Wood, Matthew R. Segal, Jessica Lewis, & Jessie 
Rossman, for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & 
another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The police properly stopped the defendant driver 
for a motor vehicle violation and arrested him on an outstanding 
warrant.  The officers ascertained that the sole passenger was a 
duly licensed and otherwise qualified driver.  Rather than 
inquire of the defendant as to whether he preferred to have the 
passenger take custody of and later move the vehicle from its 
location on a busy residential road to a safe spot, police 
arranged for it to be impounded, and then conducted an inventory 
search that yielded a gun.  The defendant acknowledged that the 
gun was his. 
 
The defendant's gun and his statements thereafter were 
suppressed in part because the impoundment was found by the 
motion judge to be unreasonable in the face of the passenger's 
availability to drive and the failure by police to ask the 
defendant whether the passenger taking custody of the vehicle 
would be a preferred alternative.  Citing the defendant's 
failure to ask police whether the passenger could take over for 
him, and the absence of any duty expressly recognized in extant 
case law for police to take affirmative steps in this regard, 
3 
 
the Commonwealth maintains on appeal that the suppression was 
error.  We affirm.1 
 
1.  Facts.  We recite the facts as found by the motion 
judge, supplemented occasionally with uncontested facts that are 
not inconsistent with the judge's findings, see Commonwealth v. 
Jessup, 471 Mass. 121, 127-128 (2015). 
 
At approximately 11 P.M. on August 4, 2016, two Boston 
police officers on patrol in a marked police cruiser observed a 
Honda Accord with what appeared to be a defective brake light 
being driven on Columbia Road.2  From the vehicle's registration 
number, the officers discovered that its registered owner, the 
defendant, had an outstanding misdemeanor default warrant for 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.  The officers 
then stopped the vehicle in the left-hand travel lane on 
Columbia Road in the Dorchester section of Boston. 
 
The defendant was the driver of the vehicle, and he was 
accompanied by one front seat passenger.  The officers asked 
both the defendant and his passenger for identification.  Upon 
conducting computer checks on the information provided, the 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts and the Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
2 As the officers learned after stopping the vehicle, the 
brake light was not actually defective but, rather, had been 
accidentally obscured by a piece of cardboard that had slipped 
in front of the light. 
4 
 
officers learned that the passenger's driver's license was 
valid, he had no outstanding warrants, and he was not a suspect 
in any other crimes; further, he did not appear to be under the 
influence of any intoxicating substances.  The passenger was 
polite and cooperative with police. 
 
One of the officers informed the defendant that, due to the 
default warrant, he was under arrest, and his vehicle would be 
towed.  The officers ordered both men out of the vehicle.  The 
defendant did not request that his passenger assume custody of 
the vehicle, and the officer did not offer this alternative.  As 
required by Boston police department policy, in preparation for 
impoundment, one of the officers searched the vehicle.  The 
officer found a firearm under the driver's seat; when the 
officer implied that both the defendant and the passenger would 
be arrested, the defendant said that the firearm was his.  The 
defendant was taken to the police station in a police cruiser 
and then questioned at the station.  The passenger ultimately 
was allowed to leave the scene. 
 
The defendant was charged with multiple firearms 
violations;3 he moved to suppress the evidence seized during the 
                     
 
3 The charges included carrying a loaded firearm without a 
license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); carrying a firearm without a 
license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); and possession of ammunition 
5 
 
inventory search of his vehicle and his subsequent statements to 
police, on the ground that both were fruits of an unlawful 
search.  A Boston Municipal Court judge concluded that the 
search was unlawful, and allowed the defendant's motions.4  The 
Commonwealth filed a petition to pursue an interlocutory appeal 
in the county court, challenging the suppressions.5  That appeal 
was allowed to proceed in the Appeals Court, and this court then 
allowed the defendant's petition for direct appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Whether the inventory search was 
lawful.  In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, "we 
accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear 
error 'but conduct an independent review of his [or her] 
                     
without a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (h) (1). 
 
4 The defendant separately argued that his statements should 
be suppressed as custodial statements made without adequate 
Miranda warnings, in violation of his rights under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 304 U.S. 436 (1966).  The judge ordered the statements 
be suppressed on this ground as well.  As we affirm the judge's 
order on the ground that the seizure of the vehicle was 
improper, we need not address the adequacy of the Miranda 
warnings. 
 
5 The Commonwealth, as mentioned in its brief, did not 
separately file a notice of appeal from the allowance of the 
defendant's motion to suppress statements within the requisite 
thirty-day period.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 15, as amended, 476 
Mass. 1501 (2017).  In this instance, however, the single notice 
of appeal was sufficient to address both motions, because the 
motion judge consolidated her rulings on the defendant's 
separate motions into a single order. 
6 
 
ultimate findings and conclusions of law'" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004). 
 
The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that a 
warrantless inventory search is lawful.  Commonwealth v. 
Oliveira, 474 Mass. 10, 13 (2016).  "A lawful inventory search 
is contingent on the propriety of the impoundment of the 
[vehicle]."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Brinson, 440 Mass. 
609, 612 (2003).  Impoundment must be undertaken for a 
legitimate, noninvestigative purpose, and must be "reasonably 
necessary based on the totality of the evidence."  See Oliveira, 
supra at 13-14. 
 
Because the defendant does not challenge the propriety of 
the stop, at issue here is whether impoundment was "reasonably 
necessary."6  Oliveira, 474 Mass. at 14.  The propriety of an 
impoundment turns on whether police reasonably could have 
concluded they had no lawful, practical alternative.  In our 
previous decisions, where impoundment was deemed reasonable 
                     
 
6 The impoundment was undertaken for a legitimate, 
noninvestigative purpose.  Police stopped the defendant's 
vehicle for a minor traffic violation.  See Commonwealth v. 
Buckley, 478 Mass. 861, 865-869 (2018); Commonwealth v. Bacon, 
381 Mass. 642, 644 (1980).  Immediately before executing the 
stop, police ran a check of the license plate and learned that 
the registered owner had an outstanding default warrant.  This 
led to the defendant's arrest.  The arrest, in turn, created the 
need to move the defendant's vehicle from the left-hand travel 
lane where it had been stopped.  See Commonwealth v. Brinson, 
440 Mass. 609, 615-616 (2003). 
7 
 
notwithstanding the presence of a passenger, the passenger was 
unable lawfully to assume custody of the vehicle.  See 
Commonwealth v. Eddington, 459 Mass. 102, 109-110 (2011) 
(passenger had been observed drinking); Commonwealth v. Ellerbe, 
430 Mass. 769, 775-776 (2000) (passenger did not have valid 
driver's license available); Commonwealth v. Caceres, 413 Mass. 
749, 751-752 (1992) (passenger was not authorized to drive in 
Massachusetts); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 409 Mass. 675, 676-677 
(1991) (passenger had outstanding warrants). 
 
Consistent with the established standard that impoundment 
be reasonable, we have held that police officers were required 
to honor an owner's or authorized driver's requested alternative 
to impoundment where doing so was "lawful and practical."  See 
Oliveira, 474 Mass. at 15.  We also have concluded that an 
inventory search of a defendant's personal belongings was 
unreasonable where police were independently aware of an 
alternative to seizing them.  See Commonwealth v. Abdallah, 475 
Mass. 47, 51-52 (2016) (inventory search of backpack was 
unreasonable where police were aware that hotel where defendant 
was arrested was willing to retain custody of his other 
belongings).7 
                     
 
7 Although Commonwealth v. Abdallah, 475 Mass. 47, 51-52 
(2016), involved the seizure and inventory search of a backpack 
rather than a vehicle, the underlying question -- whether the 
8 
 
 
In the present case, we discern no error in the judge's 
finding that the officers were aware that the defendant's 
passenger lawfully could have assumed custody of the vehicle, 
yet nonetheless told the defendant that his vehicle "would be 
towed."  The judge also found that police did not consider the 
alternatives to impoundment available under the motor vehicle 
inventory policy.  One option enumerated in the policy when 
officers arrest a driver is to "leave [the vehicle] with a 
person having apparent authority to assume control of it."  
Boston Police Department Rules and Procedures, Rule 103 § 31 
(1984).  Unlike when a vehicle is impounded, no inventory search 
is conducted in those circumstances, because there is no risk of 
false claims against the police or the towing company.  See id.  
The arresting officer here evidently believed that the Boston 
police impoundment policy was to tow a vehicle when it was not 
lawfully parked, and that the policy required an arrested driver 
affirmatively to request that custody be given to another 
individual before police were required to release the vehicle to 
that person. 
                     
seizure and warrantless search were reasonable -- is the same.  
Indeed, our analysis of that issue relied on our impoundment 
jurisprudence to support the conclusion that the seizure and 
inventory search of the backpack was unreasonable.  See id. at 
51-53, citing Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 474 Mass. 10, 13-14 
(2016).  See also Commonwealth v. Eddington, 459 Mass. 102, 108-
109 (2011); Commonwealth v. Ellerbe, 430 Mass. 769, 774-776 
(2000); Commonwealth v. Caceres, 413 Mass. 749, 751 (1992). 
9 
 
 
The Commonwealth concedes that transferring custody to the 
passenger was a reasonable alternative, one which the officers 
would have been required to honor had the defendant requested 
it.  Nonetheless, the Commonwealth argues that our jurisprudence 
has placed the burden on the defendant to propose an 
alternative. 
 
As the Commonwealth points out, to date we have not 
explicitly stated that police should inquire about alternatives 
to impoundment, at least where a passenger is present who 
lawfully could assume custody of the vehicle, absent a 
defendant's request.  In our prior cases where impoundment was 
deemed reasonable notwithstanding the presence of a passenger, 
however, the passenger was unable lawfully to assume custody of 
the vehicle.  See Eddington, 459 Mass. at 109-110; Ellerbe, 430 
Mass. at 775-776; Commonwealth v. Daley, 423 Mass. 747, 750 n.4 
(1996); Caceres, 413 Mass. at 751-752; Garcia, 409 Mass. at 675-
677.  We have never held that police may disregard a readily 
apparent alternative to impoundment simply because a defendant 
does not request that a passenger be allowed to leave with the 
vehicle. 
 
We conclude that, where officers are aware that a passenger 
lawfully could assume custody of a vehicle, it is improper to 
impound the vehicle without first offering this option to the 
10 
 
driver.8  Absent such an inquiry, the police cannot conclude that 
impoundment is "reasonably necessary."  Because no such inquiry 
was made here, the impoundment of the defendant's vehicle was 
improper.  Moreover, because the validity of an inventory search 
turns on the propriety of the underlying impoundment, the search 
was unlawful.  See Oliveira, 474 Mass. at 13. 
 
Although our holding in the present case in no way alters 
the established requirement that impoundment be reasonable, we 
nonetheless acknowledge that we have never before had occasion 
to articulate what is reasonable under the circumstances 
presented here.  Because the duty we articulate is not, strictly 
speaking, "dictated by precedent," it shall apply prospectively 
(citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 
433-434 (2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 832 (2016). 
 
b.  Whether the exclusionary rule should apply.  The 
Commonwealth argues that, even if the search was unlawful, the 
evidence should not be suppressed, because the police have never 
                     
 
8 Our holding applies only where police are aware that a 
passenger lawfully could assume custody.  Whenever police arrest 
the owner or an authorized driver of a vehicle, the better 
practice is to "inform the driver that the vehicle will be taken 
to a police facility or private storage facility for safekeeping 
unless the driver directs the officer to dispose of it in some 
lawful manner."  See Eddington, 459 Mass. at 112 (Gants, J., 
concurring).  We discern no burden merely in asking the 
question; indeed, this practice would appear to further the goal 
of minimizing the inconvenience and risks to law enforcement 
officers that are associated with impoundment. 
11 
 
had an affirmative duty to inquire whether a driver wishes a 
passenger to assume custody of a vehicle.  We do not agree. 
 
"The general rule is that evidence is to be excluded if it 
is found to be the 'fruit' of a police officer's unlawful 
actions" (citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Balicki, 436 
Mass. 1, 15 (2002).  The exclusionary rule serves to preserve 
"the integrity of the law" and to deter future constitutional 
violations.  See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 408 Mass. 43, 46 (1990).  
Although we have acknowledged exceptions to the rule where 
suppression would not further these ends, see Commonwealth v. 
Sbordone, 424 Mass. 802, 809-810 (1997), we discern no cause to 
do so here. 
 
The officers in the present case overlooked a readily 
apparent alternative to impoundment.  As a result, their 
decision to impound the defendant's vehicle fell short of the 
established requirement that impoundment be "reasonably 
necessary."  Moreover, the officers' apparent misunderstanding 
of the Boston police department's inventory policy does not 
justify unreasonable conduct.  The policy clearly allows for 
transfer of a vehicle to a third party, and does not condition 
this alternative on a driver requesting it. 
 
Based on this, we conclude that suppression is appropriate 
here, and that evidence directly obtained from the search of the 
vehicle properly was suppressed.  See Balicki, 436 Mass. at 15.  
12 
 
As to the defendant's subsequent statements, "[t]he exclusionary 
prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct 
products" of an unlawful search.  See id. at 16, quoting Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).  Accordingly, 
they, too, were "fruits" of the search, and properly were 
suppressed.  See Wong Sun, supra at 485-488. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order allowing motions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  to suppress affirmed.