Title: Bear v. Volunteers of America, Wyoming, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Bear v. Volunteers of America, Wyoming, Inc.1998 WY 114964 P.2d 1245Case Number: 97-13Decided: 09/14/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Jodie 
BEAR, Petitioner,

v.

VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA, WYOMING, INC., and Jerry 
Fletcher, Respondents.

 

Michael K. Shoumaker and 
Rene Botten, Sheridan, for Petitioner.

H.W. Rasmussen of Badley 
& Rasmussen, P.C., Sheridan, for Respondents.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

 

GOLDEN, Justice.

 [¶1] Following her discharge from employment with 
Volunteers of America, Wyoming, Inc. (VOA), Appellant Jodie Bear (Bear) brought 
suit claiming the discharge breached her employment contract, violated the terms 
of a federal grant and violated her civil rights. VOA was granted partial 
summary judgment, and this Court granted Bear's petition for review of that 
decision.

 

[¶2] We 
affirm.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶3] Bear presents these 
issues on appeal:

 

Breach of Contract 
Claim

 

 

          
1. There was a genuine issue of material fact that Jodie Bear was an 
"at-will" employee.

 

          
A. Ms. Bear had an express contract by virtue of the employment letter 
sent to her by Jerry Fletcher.

 

          
B. Ms. Bear was a third-party beneficiary by virtue of the federal 
grant.

 

          
C. Ms. Bear had an implied contract under Volunteers of America, Wyoming, 
Inc.'s personnel policies.

 

 Interference with a 
Contract

 

2. 
There was a genuine issue of material fact whether Jerry Fletcher, an agent of 
Volunteers of America, Wyoming, Inc., interfered with Ms. Bear's contract for 
his own advantage.

 

Violation of Due Process 
Rights

 

3. 
There was a genuine issue of material fact whether Ms. Bear had a property 
interest in her job that entitled her to a deprivation of property 
claim.

 

Promissory 
Estoppel

 

4. 
There was a genuine issue of material fact whether Volunteers of America, 
Wyoming, Inc. and Jerry Fletcher made specific promises to Ms. Bear upon which 
she detrimentally relied, and changed her position?

 

Breach of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing

 

5. 
There was a genuine issue of material fact on whether Volunteers of America, 
Wyoming, Inc. and Jerry Fletcher fired Ms. Bear in retaliation for "blowing the 
whistle" on their misappropriation and misuse of federal grant funds and 
breached the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.

 

 Punitive Damages

 

6. 
There was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Volunteers of America 
and Jerry Fletcher can be held liable for punitive 
damages.

 

[¶4] VOA restates the issues 
to be:

 

          
1. Was Jodie Bear an "at will" employee of Volunteers of 
America?

 

2. 
If Jodie Bear is found to be an "at will" employee can she state a cause of 
action on any of the seven theories set forth in her 
Complaint?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶5] In 1994, Jerry 
Fletcher, Chief Operating Officer (COO) and executive director of VOA, 
interviewed Bear for the position of probation program director at a salary of 
$21,000 per year. Bear considered this salary too low and contends the two 
agreed that if Bear set up a probation department to provide probation services 
to juveniles in the municipal, county, and district court systems in Sheridan 
County and secured permanent funding, her salary would be raised. Fletcher sent 
Bear a form letter entitled "Employment Letter" which set her hiring date as 
December 21, 1994, named her salary and identified her employment status to be 
probationary for a six month period at 
which time she would be reclassified as a permanent employee. Referring Bear to 
a handbook containing the personnel policies for the organization for further 
information, Fletcher signed the letter as executive director. Bear was given 
and read the VOA Personnel Policies but states that she was not given a first 
page containing a disclaimer.

 

[¶6] Federal law requires 
states to provide juveniles with services established under the Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 and provides federal grants to do so. 
Under Bear's direction, VOA secured a $253,000 federal grant which, beginning in 
October of 1995, funded probation services in Sheridan County. The grant 
specified that, as the designated project director, Bear could not be removed 
without compelling reasons and without the prior concurrence of the Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP).

 

[¶7] Although the 
application for the grant set Bear's salary at $28,000 per year, Bear states 
that Fletcher told her that he intended to raise her to $23,000 per year and 
increase the salary of his wife, also a VOA employee, by $5,000. Difficulties 
between Bear and the Fletchers had already developed during the time before the 
receipt of the grant, and apportionment of the funds from the grant appears to 
have escalated tensions. Other incidents occurred, and Bear approached a VOA 
board member and stated her intent to file a grievance. According to a Board 
member, a special board meeting was held on January 10, 1996, without the 
presence of Fletcher to address 
difficulties the Board was encountering regarding Fletcher's management of VOA. 
It was decided that Fletcher would be ordered not to terminate any personnel 
from VOA without the Board's prior approval, and one member suggested that Bear 
be asked not to file her grievance until this protection was in 
place.

 

[¶8] In a February 9, 1996, 
letter to a member of VOA's board of directors, Bear stated that she learned 
from members of the community that she was soon to be fired and had received 
letters of support from judges and others she routinely worked with regarding 
juvenile issues. Sometime after that, Bear wrote a lengthy grievance to the VOA 
board describing a number of incidents involving the Fletchers which she stated 
illustrated that the Fletchers attempted to divert grant funds from her program 
to other VOA programs and to themselves in violation of the terms of the grant; 
misused expense money, vacation time, and compensation time; had caused the 
wrongful dismissal of an employee; and were withholding her mail and phone 
messages from her. On March 28, 1996, the board instructed Fletcher not to 
receive mail other than his own; to provide Bear with monthly financial 
statements; to have his and the program director's signatures on all expense 
vouchers after all questions regarding the expense were resolved; to clarify the 
responsibilities of Fletcher and Bear regarding the program; and take steps to 
improve communication between the two. The board also agreed to review four 
vouchers questioned by Bear.

 

[¶9] Fletcher received a 
call in early August 1996 from a citizen of the community claiming that Bear was 
accusing Fletcher and VOA of misusing funds. He informed the Board and, at their 
direction, received an affidavit from the citizen describing Bear's 
actions.  The Board authorized 
Fletcher to terminate Bear's employment, and on August 6, 1996, Fletcher 
delivered a letter of employment termination to Bear which stated that her 
discharge was because of these accusations, her stated intention to establish a 
probation service independent of VOA, 
and her threatening and coercing people and violating confidentiality of youth 
in the probation program.  Fletcher 
had prepared a letter of resignation for Bear to sign, but she refused. She 
requested a hearing before the Board, which agreed to accept and review a 
written grievance from her but denied her request to appear before them with or 
without legal representation.

 

[¶10] Bear filed suit 
against VOA in district court on September 4, 1996, claiming violation of 
freedom of speech under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; deprivation of property without due 
process of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; breach of contract; promissory estoppel; 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and punitive 
damages. Her complaint contained a claim against Fletcher for intentional 
interference with a contract. VOA and Fletcher moved for summary judgment and, 
following a hearing, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Fletcher and VOA on all claims except for her freedom of speech claim. Bear 
filed a petition for writ of review with this Court, which was granted on 
January 28, 1997.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

Standard of 
Review

 

[¶11] Our review of a grant 
of summary judgment is the same as the district court. The movant has the burden 
of clearly demonstrating that there are no genuine issues as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 
934 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Wyo. 1997). Once a prima facie showing is made, the burden 
shifts to the party opposing the motion to present specific facts showing that a 
genuine issue of material fact does exist. Id.; Clark v. Industrial Co. of 
Steamboat Springs, Inc., 818 P.2d 626, 628 (Wyo. 1991). We examine the record 
from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give 
that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn 
from the record. Id.

 

 

 

Employment Contract 
Claims

 

[¶12] It is now settled law 
in Wyoming that employment is presumed to be at will; however, that presumption 
can be modified by an express or an implied-in-fact agreement. Brodie v. General 
Chemical Corporation, 934 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wyo. 1997); Loghry v. Unicover 
Corporation, 927 P.2d 706, 710 (Wyo. 1996). An employment handbook or personnel 
policies, letters of employment, performance evaluations and an employer's 
course of dealing may supply terms for an implied-in-fact employment contract 
which requires termination for cause only unless it contains a sufficient 
disclaimer. Loghry, 927 P.2d  at 710; Lincoln v. Wackenhut Corp., 867 P.2d 701, 
703 (Wyo. 1994). The test is whether there has been an objective manifestation 
of assent to an employment contract containing a job security provision. Davis, 
934 P.2d  at 1249. In this case, Bear claims that the VOA personnel policies, the 
employment letter, her performance evaluation, and the federal grant modified 
her at will status to one providing that she could not be dismissed from her 
employment without cause.

 

[¶13] The VOA personnel 
policies contained a disclaimer that Bear challenges as insufficient. Our review 
of it confirms that it is legally sufficient to preserve her at will status. The 
disclaimer of contract language is on page one, is capitalized and it clearly 
and unambiguously states that the policies are not a contract of employment, 
employment may be terminated at any time for any reason, and the employer has 
reserved the right to alter the policies' language at any time. Lincoln, 867 
P.2d at 703-04; Davis, 934 P.2d  at 1252. However, that legally sufficient 
disclaimer states in part:

 

Finally, no employee, manager, minister or officer of 
Volunteers of America of Wyoming, Inc., other than the COO or director, has any 
authority to offer, or enter into, an agreement for employment for a specific 
period of time with Volunteers of America of Wyoming, Inc., employees or 
applicants, or to make any agreement contrary to the above 
policy.

 

In Loghry, we held that this 
language in a disclaimer meant that only the company employee specified could 
alter at will status.  Loghry, 927 P.2d  at 711.

 

[¶14] Bear was hired on 
December 21, 1994. Her hiring followed a negotiation process in which she and 
Fletcher, COO and director of VOA, verbally agreed that if she accomplished 
certain things she would receive a higher salary and "permanent employment" 
following a six month probationary period. Fletcher sent Bear an "Employment 
Letter" which stated that following a satisfactory probation she would receive a 
letter of regular employment. When she began working, Bear was given a copy of 
the June 1994 personnel policies. Bear did accomplish what she had promised and 
received a raise in salary and, according to her evaluation conducted by 
Fletcher, was accorded "permanent employment." Bear contends this letter and the 
evaluation by the director alter her at will status.

 

[¶15] In Wilder v. Cody 
Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 218 (Wyo. 1994), this Court 
stated:

 

We 
hold that a claim by an employee that the employer promised "permanent" 
employment does not alter the at will presumption without additional 
consideration supplied by the employee or explicit language in the contract of 
employment stating that termination may only be for cause.

 

Wilder determined that 
parties could choose to provide that termination is for cause even in a contract 
of employment of indefinite duration. Id. For Wilder, the court found he had not 
provided additional consideration by changing employers, but ruled a question of 
fact existed regarding a promise to discharge only for cause in the words "as 
long as I did the work that was required." Id.

 

[¶16] Bear's accomplishments 
which resulted in her increased salary cannot be considered additional 
consideration. She simply did the job she was hired to do in exchange for 
compensation. The question is whether the employment letter and evaluation 
following her negotiations with Fletcher, who is authorized by the disclaimer to 
alter at will status, present the same situation as that which occurred in 
Wilder and establish a contract for indefinite duration but requiring good cause 
for discharge. If the use of the term "permanent employment" in documents signed 
by Fletcher is not sufficiently explicit to change VOA's unfettered right to 
discharge at any time and without cause, then this is a situation which simply 
falls under the rule of Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 699 P.2d 277, 282 (Wyo. 
1985), where this Court said that the employee's "[s]ubjective understandings 
and expectations do not establish an employment contract with a definite term of 
duration." Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 229 (Golden, J., concurring and dissenting); 
Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 704 (Wyo. 1985) (recognizing 
an implied employment contract). Unlike Wilder, we do not have any language 
explicitly stating an intent to promise job security to Bear, and we hold that 
her employment status was at will.  
See Davis, 934 P.2d  at 1249-52.

 

[¶17] Bear also contends 
that she did not receive the disclaimer when she was hired, and it is, 
therefore, ineffective for her. In her affidavit dated December 2, 1996, Bear 
states that she read and relied on these policies. She references to Exhibit B, 
which is a copy of the policies, including the disclaimer page. She says, "To my 
knowledge, I was never asked to sign a copy of these personnel policies until 
March 1996 when Julie Hutson asked me to sign the March 1996 version, which I 
refused." It is unclear from this record whether Bear had not read the 
disclaimer and was unaware of it or had read the disclaimer but had not signed 
one. Either of these situations presents 
the question of whether it matters if the employee knows of the particulars of 
an employer's distributed policies. We conclude it makes no legal 
difference.

 

[¶18] In Nicosia v. Wakefern 
Food Corp., 136 N.J. 401, 643 A.2d 554, 558-62 (1994), the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, a leading court in employment law, said that the fired employee did not 
have to know of either "for cause" provisions or disclaimer provisions in order 
to be covered by them. According to that court, the critical inquiry was whether 
the employer's manual as a whole, regardless of its actual receipt by the 
employee, gives rise to an implied contract of employment because of its terms - 
including most importantly those relating to employment security - and its wide 
distribution. . . .

 

An employee may not select among the provisions of a 
[sic] employment manual to determine which provision should give rise to 
enforceable contractual obligations. If Nicosia "seeks to rely on provisions in 
the employee handbook as the source of an implied contract of employment, then 
he must accept the agreement as a whole with its attendant responsibilities." . 
. . In this case, then, the eleven-page excerpt [which covered disciplinary 
procedures] must be considered in light of the entire [160-page] 
manual,

including the disclaimer [which appeared in the first 
paragraph on the manual's first page], even if Nicosia was unaware that the 
excerpt was part of a larger employment policy document.

 

Id. 643 A.2d  at 559 
(citation omitted). The court proceeded to review the disclaimer, of which the 
fired employee was unaware but which had been distributed to the workforce, and 
found it deficient. Id. at 559-62. The Nicosia court also decided Woolley v. 
Hoffmann-La Roche, 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985), which we have favorably cited in some of our employment decisions. 
In Woolley the court quoted favorably from Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980), which said that it 
does not matter that the employee knows nothing of the particulars of the 
employer's distributed policies. 
Woolley, 491 A.2d  at 1268. Reliance is presumed; a strict contractual analysis 
is not made because otherwise some employees would be protected and others would 
not. Id. at 1268 n. 10. And see Labus v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 740 F. Supp. 1053, 1060-62 (D.N.J. 1990). We are satisfied that VOA distributed the 
manual, including the first-page disclaimer, to its newly hired employees. 
Whether or not the employees read or signed it makes no legal difference. The 
disclaimer, as well as all provisions of the entire handbook, are binding on the 
employer and the employee, even if the employee is unaware of 
them.

 

[¶19] Finally, Bear asserts 
she was a third party beneficiary of the contract between VOA and OJJDP because 
of the following contract language:

 

The Project Director and key program personnel 
designated in the application shall be replaced only for compelling reasons and 
with the prior concurrence of the OJJDP. Approval of the successor is contingent 
upon submission of a resume and verified statement of most recent salary. 
Changes in other program personnel require only notification to the OJJDP with 
the same documentation as for the Project Director unless otherwise designated 
in the award document. Prior approval is required for Advisory Board members and 
consultants used in the project.

 

Bear was designated as the 
project director under the grant, and she contends this is sufficient to 
establish that she was a third party beneficiary of the 
contract.

 

There is no question that a promise may be made to 
one person for the benefit of another and a third-party beneficiary may enforce 
his rights under a contract, although not a party to nor specifically mentioned 
in the contract; but there is more to it than that.  An outsider claiming the right to sue 
must show that it was intended for his direct benefit. Otherwise he may be only 
an incidental beneficiary because the compelling provisions of a contract 
require that his claims be satisfied in order to protect another. However, an 
incidental beneficiary acquires no right of action against the promisor or 
promisee.

 

Wyoming Machinery Co. v. 
U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 614 P.2d 716, 720 (Wyo. 1980) (citing Peters 
Grazing Assoc. v. Legerski, 544 P.2d 449 (Wyo. 1975); Graham and Hill v. Davis 
Oil Company, 486 P.2d 240 (Wyo. 1971)).

 

[¶20] In Richardson 
Associates v. Lincoln-Devore, Inc., 806 P.2d 790 (Wyo. 1991), we considered 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 302 (1981) in determining whether a third 
person was an intended third-party beneficiary of a 
contract:

 

(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and 
promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition 
of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the 
intention of the parties and either

 

(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an 
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; 
or

 

(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee 
intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised 
performance.

 

          
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended 
beneficiary.

 

Richardson Associates, 806 P.2d  at 807. The contract between OJJDP and VOA addressed all aspects of 
establishing and administering the juvenile services to be funded by the grant. 
The purpose of the contract was to protect the grant funds. The one provision of 
the contract in this case addressing discharge of the project director was not 
intended to benefit that director, but was intended to further effectuate the 
protection of the grant funds by permitting OJJDP some control over the quality 
of personnel. Bear is an incidental beneficiary, not an intended beneficiary, 
and acquires no right of action against VOA.

 

Promissory 
Estoppel

 

[¶21] Promissory estoppel 
claims must show a clear and definite agreement; proof that the party urging the 
doctrine acted to its detriment in reasonable reliance on the agreement; and the 
equities support the enforcement of the agreement. Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706, 710 (Wyo. 1996). As we have just established, Bear was an at will 
employee, and, according to the disclaimer in the personnel policies, only the 
COO or the executive director had authority to alter this status. Bear recites 
six promises of job security that were 
made to her that require enforcement.

 

[¶22] The first two are 
based upon the "permanent employment" promise made by Fletcher in the interview 
and employment letter.  She claims 
that she detrimentally relied on this promise as one of job security and 
accepted employment with VOA and is substantially harmed if the promise is not 
enforceable. The analysis and conclusion of the legal effect of this term 
articulated in the preceding section does not change because the theory of 
recovery changes. It remains applicable that "permanent employment" without more 
is not a promise of job security.

 

[¶23] Next, Bear references 
a promise by the VOA board attorney that filing the grievance would not result 
in her discharge and a promise by the VOA that caused her to withhold filing her 
grievance until strengthened personnel policies were enacted that would 
safeguard her employment. As already discussed, only the COO or director of VOA 
was authorized to make any promises to Bear which would alter her at will 
status. Similar facts were presented in Loghry, and this Court held that where a 
disclaimer clearly specified the person and method of altering at will status, 
it is unreasonable for an employee to rely upon a promise of job security by 
another person or another method. 
Loghry, 927 P.2d  at 711. In this case, the specific disclaimer language 
obligates us to determine that it was unreasonable for Bear to rely on the 
promises of anyone but Fletcher.

 

[¶24] Finally, Bear claims 
that after she filed her grievance and the Board acted upon it, the Board 
promised that she would see financial statements and Fletcher promised her that 
"[he would] not make any decisions that affect the probation program without 
first discussing it with [Bear]." Although she states that she detrimentally 
relied upon these promises, it is unclear how she did or what damages she 
suffered when the promises were not kept. Demonstrating detrimental reliance and 
damages are necessary elements for establishing a claim of promissory estoppel. 
Because they are not demonstrated and our review of the record does not 
enlighten us, it appears that we can not further consider the 
issue.

 

Breach of the Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing

 

[¶25] Bear bases this claim 
on Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211 (Wyo. 1994), which 
recognized a tort claim of breach of the implied covenant when there is a 
special relationship of trust and reliance. Id. at 221. Wilder established that 
all contracts of employment contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Id. at 220. However, Bear contends that the basis of her claim is her 
discharge in retaliation for "whistleblowing and public policy." This Court 
discussed the "retaliatory" tort claim in Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 284 (Wyo. 1985), and adopted it in Griess v. Consolidated Freightways 
Corp. of Delaware, 776 P.2d 752 (Wyo. 1989). The theories of the tort claim of 
retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy and the tort claim of breach 
of the implied covenant are distinct and not to be 
confused.

 

[¶26] The special 
relationship of this tort can arise from "separate consideration, common law, 
statutory rights, or rights accruing with longevity of service. . . ." Wilder, 
868 P.2d  at 221. Our review of the record indicates no evidence of any factor 
that would present a genuine question of material fact on whether there was a 
special relationship of trust and reliance between VOA and Bear, and summary 
judgment is affirmed.

 

Interference With 
Contract

 

[¶27] Bear asserts that the 
district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Fletcher on her 
claim for intentional interference with a contract. The district court ruled: 
"Jerry Fletcher is an agent of VOA. Although Defendant Fletcher suggested 
terminating [Bear's] employment, VOA approved the dismissal. A separate claim 
against Fletcher is inappropriate herein."

 

[¶28] Intentional or 
tortious interference with a contract is defined as:

 

One who intentionally and improperly interferes with 
the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a 
third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform 
the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss 
resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the 
contract.

 

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 766 at 7 (1979). See also Davenport v. Epperly, 744 P.2d 1110, 1111-12 
(Wyo. 1987); Toltec Watershed Improvement District v. Johnston, 717 P.2d 808, 
813 (Wyo. 1986). In Wyoming, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the four 
elements of intentional or tortious interference with a contract: (1) that a 
valid contractual relationship existed; (2) that the interferer knew of the 
contractual relationship; (3) that intentional and improper interference induced 
or caused a breach or termination of the contractual relationship; and (4) that 
the party whose relationship was disrupted as a result of the breach was 
damaged. Examination Management 
Services, Inc. v. Kirschbaum, 927 P.2d 686, 697 (Wyo. 1996); Ames v. Sundance 
State Bank, 850 P.2d 607, 611 (Wyo. 1993).

 

[¶29] The third element of 
the tort requires that the plaintiff prove that the interference was both 
intentional and improper. The district court implicitly concluded that 
Fletcher's interference was justified because he was an agent of VOA and was 
acting on its behalf in terminating Bear's employment. Bear claims that 
Fletcher's interference was not justified because he was acting with an improper 
motive when he fired her for reporting his alleged misuse of funds to the VOA 
board.

 

[¶30] In considering a claim 
of intentional interference with a contract which was brought by one employee 
against a co-employee, we stated: "An employee of a company is not liable for 
the company's breach of contract on the theory that the employee induced such 
breach if he acts in his official capacity, on behalf of the company, and not as 
an individual for his own advantage." Davenport, 744 P.2d  at 1114. In other 
words, as long as the employee acted within the scope of his authority, his 
actions in recommending that another employee be discharged may be justified as 
a matter of law. Dynan v. Rocky Mountain Federal Savings and Loan, 792 P.2d 631, 
641 (Wyo. 1990).

 

[¶31] VOA was aware of the 
problems between Bear and Fletcher when Fletcher recommended that Bear be 
discharged. After Fletcher reported to the Board the telephone call he had 
received concerning Bear's accusations, the Board independently determined Bear 
should be discharged and directed Fletcher to terminate her employment. A member 
of the Board of Directors attended the meeting where Fletcher informed Bear that 
her employment was being terminated. Under these facts, it is clear that, 
although Fletcher initiated the process which led to Bear's discharge, it was 
the Board of Directors that actually decided to fire her.  Fletcher was simply acting as the Board's agent 
during the discharge process.

 

[¶32] Bear's arguments 
concerning this claim are essentially the same as those supporting her other 
employment contract claims.  "[A]n 
action of wrongful interference directed against an employee or an agent of one 
of the parties to the contract must merge into any action for breach of the 
contract because the act of the agent must be attributed to the principal." Id. 
See also Davenport, 744 P.2d  at 1114. The district court, therefore, properly 
granted a summary judgment in favor of Fletcher on Bear's claim for intentional 
interference with a 
contract.

 

Due 
Process

 

[¶33] The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of VOA on Bear's claim that she was deprived 
of a property interest without due process of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 
district court concluded that VOA acted under color of state law but that Bear 
did not have a property interest in her employment. Bear contends that she did 
have a property interest and that the district court erred by granting summary 
judgment in favor of Volunteers of America on her § 1983 due process claim. VOA 
argues that the district court improperly ruled that it was acting under color 
of state law. VOA did not, however, petition for a writ of review on the 
district court's ruling concerning 
whether or not it acted under color of state law and did not petition for a writ 
of review on its claims that the district court erred on Bear's freedom of 
speech and wrongful discharge claims. These issues are not properly before this 
Court at this time.

 

[¶34] The due process 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
protect individuals from arbitrary governmental deprivations of life, liberty, 
or property interests. Mondt v. Cheyenne Police Department, 924 P.2d 70, 74 
(Wyo. 1996); City Council of Laramie v. Kreiling, 911 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Wyo. 
1996). "The applicability of the constitutional guarantee of procedural due 
process depends in the first instance on the presence of a legitimate 'property' 
or 'liberty' interest within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution." Mondt, 924 P.2d  at 74.

 

"To have a property interest in a benefit, a person 
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more 
than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim 
of entitlement to it. . ..

 

Property interests, of course, are not created by the 
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by 
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as 
state law - rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that 
support claims of entitlement to those benefits."

 

Id. (quoting Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 
(1972)).

 

[¶35] Property interests may 
be created by statute or by contract. Id. An individual may have a protected 
property interest in public employment if his contract entitles him to have 
continued employment in the absence of sufficient cause for discharge. Id. An 
implied-in-fact contract which requires "reasonable cause" before dismissal 
gives the employee a reasonable expectation of continued employment and, 
consequently, creates a property interest. Abell v. Dewey, 870 P.2d 363, 368 
(Wyo. 1994). An individual who has a property interest may not be deprived of 
that interest without being afforded the due process protections. 
Id.

 

[¶36] In this case, we have 
determined that Bear did not have an employment contract for continued 
employment with VOA, and, therefore, we hold that she cannot have a protected 
property interest in her employment. We affirm the district court's order 
granting summary judgment on this issue.

 

Punitive 
Damages

 

[¶37] Punitive damages 
cannot be awarded when compensatory damages cannot be recovered. Cates v. Barb, 
650 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Wyo. 1982).

 

                                           
CONCLUSION

 

[¶38] Bear's at-will 
employment status was not modified, and she has not met the necessary elements 
to establish a claim of promissory estoppel, interference with a contract, due 
process or breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The 
district court properly granted summary judgment for VOA, and the order is 
affirmed.

 

 MACY, J., files a concurring in 
part and dissenting in part opinion, with whom THOMAS, J., 
joins.

 MACY, 
Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part, with whom THOMAS, 
Justice, joins.

 [¶39] I believe that a genuine issue of material fact 
exists as to whether or not Petitioner Jodie Bear was an at-will employee. I, 
therefore, dissent from the portion of the majority opinion which affirmed the 
trial court's summary judgment on that issue. I concur with the remainder of the 
majority opinion.

 

[¶40] Bear and Respondent 
Volunteers of America, Wyoming, Inc. agree that Bear was given a copy of the 
personnel policies when she was hired. Bear claims, however, that she does not 
remember having been presented with the first page of the personnel policies 
which contained the disclaimer. Volunteers of America asserts that Bear received 
a complete copy of the policies and was, therefore, bound by the disclaimer. The 
district court granted a summary judgment in favor of Volunteers of America on 
this issue, and the majority affirms the district court's 
decision.

 

[¶41] The disclaimer in this 
case contained places for the employee and the supervisor to sign. The record 
is, however, devoid of a copy of a disclaimer signed by Bear. Bear averred that 
she was not asked to sign a copy of the disclaimer until March 1996 and that she 
refused to do so then. Additionally, a Volunteers of America board member stated 
in his deposition that, although employees were routinely asked to sign 
disclaimers when they were employed, he never saw a copy of a disclaimer signed 
by Bear. The employer, of course, is not legally required to have its employees 
sign disclaimers; however, the conspicuous absence of a disclaimer signed by 
Bear gives validity to Bear's contention that she did not receive the 
disclaimer.

 

[¶42] The majority opines 
that whether or not an individual employee received actual notice of the 
particulars of her employer's personnel policies is irrelevant. The majority 
opinion cites Nicosia v. Wakefern Food Corporation, 136 N.J. 401, 643 A.2d 554 
(1994), as being support for its determination that the entire personnel 
policies, including the disclaimer, was binding on Bear, even if she was 
personally unaware of them. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that an employee 
was bound by the entire employment manual even though the employee had actually 
seen only a relatively small portion of the manual. 643 A.2d  at 558-59. The 
court reiterated many times, however, that it was important for the entire 
manual to be widely distributed to the employer's work force. 
Id.

 

[¶43] The Wyoming Supreme 
Court has stated that an employment handbook may effectively rebut the 
presumption that employment is at-will and create an implied-in-fact contract 
for continued employment. See, e.g., Loghry v. Unicover Corporation, 927 P.2d 706 (Wyo. 1996). We have also held that a conspicuous, clear, and unambiguous 
disclaimer makes an employee's reliance on other provisions of a handbook 
unreasonable and effectively sustains the at-will employment status. Lincoln v. 
Wackenhut Corporation, 867 P.2d 701 (Wyo. 1994). In determining whether a 
disclaimer is sufficient, we consider the disclaimer's prominence, its placement 
in relation to the other text in the manual, and the clarity of the disclaimer 
language. 867 P.2d  at 703-04.

 

[¶44] Volunteers of 
America's personnel policies included a list of causes for termination, a 
grievance procedure, and a probationary period for new employees. Its personnel 
policies, without the disclaimer, undoubtedly created an implied-in-fact 
contract for continued employment. Volunteers of America's work force was quite 
small. Evidence that one employee did not receive the disclaimer creates a 
factual question as to whether or not the entire personnel policies was widely 
distributed. Unless we are certain that the entire personnel policies, including the disclaimer, was 
widely distributed to the work force, we should not make it applicable to Bear. 
I would, therefore, reverse the summary judgment and remand the case for a trial 
on this issue.