Title: Ex parte James Antuam Blackman.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: June 12, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1190105
____________________
Ex parte James Antuam Blackman
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: James Antuam Blackman
v.
State of Alabama)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CC-18-4329, CC-18-4330, CC-18-4480,
CC-18-4481, and CC-18-4482)
PER CURIAM.
James Antuam Blackman petitions this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing Judge James Patterson of the Mobile Circuit
Court ("the trial court") to set aside an order setting
Blackman's case for trial, to reinstate Blackman's guilty plea
1190105
that the trial court withdrew sua sponte, and to proceed to
sentencing Blackman on his guilty-plea convictions. Because
the trial court's sua sponte withdrawal of Blackman's guilty
plea subjects Blackman to double jeopardy and thus divests the
trial court of jurisdiction to conduct a trial, we grant the
petition and issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
Blackman, an employee of the City of Prichard, was
indicted by the Mobile County grand jury on 47 separate
charges, including 22 counts of first-degree theft of
property, 9 counts of second-degree theft of property, 9
counts of third-degree theft of property, 3 counts of
fourth-degree theft of property, and 4 counts of using his
official position for personal gain. At a hearing on March 7,
2019, Blackman entered a blind guilty plea to all counts.1
Blackman, his attorney, and the trial court signed the
"Explanation of Rights and Plea of Guilty" form, commonly
known as an Ireland form.2  The trial court entered an order
1A blind guilty plea is defined as "[a] guilty plea made
without the promise of a concession from either the judge or
the prosecutor." Black's Law Dictionary 1392(11th ed. 2019)
2See Ireland v. State, 47 Ala. App. 65, 250 So. 2d 602
(Ala. Crim. App. 1971).
2
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accepting Blackman's plea and adjudicating him guilty,
stating:
"This Court having ascertained that [Blackman]
understands his constitutional rights, the nature of
the crimes charged in the indictment and the
consequences of his Best Interest Plea of Guilty,
[Blackman]  understandingly and voluntarily waives
his 
constitutional 
rights 
and 
pleads 
guilty.
[Blackman] with the assistance of his attorney
informed the Court that there are no issues reserved
for appeal."
The trial court set a sentencing hearing for May 6, 2019, and
ordered a presentence investigation. According to Blackman,
the 
convictions 
are 
subject 
to 
Alabama's 
presumptive
sentencing standards, see § 12-25-30 et seq., Ala. Code 1975,
which, he states, mandate a non-prison sentence for his
convictions. 
On March 9, 2019, the State of Alabama filed a motion
seeking the trial court's consent to prove aggravating factors
at 
sentencing 
to 
depart 
from 
the 
non-prison-sentence
recommendation in the presumptive sentencing standards.3
3The term "aggravating factors" is defined in § 12-25-
34.2(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, as "[s]ubstantial and compelling
reasons justifying an exceptional sentence whereby the
sentencing court may impose a departure sentence above the
presumptive 
sentence 
recommendation 
for 
an 
offense.
Aggravating factors may result in dispositional or sentence
range departures, or both, and shall be stated on the record
by the court."
3
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Citing the Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards
Manual, effective October 1, 2016, promulgated by the Alabama
Sentencing 
Commission 
("the 
sentencing-standards 
manual"), 
the
State acknowledged that the prosecutor is generally required
to give the defendant notice of intent to present aggravating
factors seven days before trial but that the sentencing-
standards manual allows the trial court to consent to notice
at any time for good cause shown if the defendant is provided
an opportunity to research and rebut the prosecutor's
request.4 The State asserted that it could establish good
cause because, it says, Blackman "unexpectedly rejected the
State's [plea-deal] offer" at the March 7, 2019, hearing,
4As of the date of this opinion, the sentencing-standards
manual 
is 
published 
at 
the 
following 
Web 
address:
https://sentencingcommission.alacourt.gov/. The sentencing-
standards manual at page 29 states as follows regarding notice
of aggravating factors: 
"The prosecutor shall give the defendant notice of
aggravating factors no less than seven (7) days
before trial.  Once given, notice is deemed
sufficient for any future trial settings. For good
cause shown, notice may be given at any time with
the consent of the trial court, provided the
defendant is given an opportunity to research and
rebut the aggravating factor. Notice can be waived."
The aggravating factors that may justify departure from the
standards are set forth at page 30 of the sentencing-standards
manual. 
4
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which, it asserted, negated the customary triggering event of
the trial. The State also asserted that Blackman had waived
the seven-day notice requirement by pleading guilty prior to
his trial date. The State further asserted that consenting to
the State's notice of aggravating factors would not prejudice
Blackman because, it argued, the grounds for the aggravating
factors were apparent from the indictments and Blackman would
have the opportunity to research and rebut the aggravating
factors before the sentencing hearing. On March 12, 2019,
without a response from Blackman, the trial court granted the
State's motion.
On April 12, 2019, Blackman filed an objection to the
State's motion, arguing that the State's notice of its intent
to prove aggravating factors was untimely and that allowing
the State the opportunity to prove aggravating factors after
the trial court's acceptance of the guilty plea would render
that plea involuntary because, he asserted, he was not given
proper notice of the sentencing range before pleading guilty. 
Blackman stated that he
"entered his plea believing that the [presumptive
sentencing standards] would apply since the State
had not given notice of intent to assert aggravating
factors. However, aggravating factors -- if proven
–- would give the [trial] court the option of a
departure 
sentence 
pursuant 
to 
the 
statutory
5
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sentencing range. If the State is excused from its
failure to give timely notice (or at least any
notice prior to the plea), then it would mean Mr.
Blackman could not have knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily entered his pleas. Accordingly, a
sentence 
outside 
the 
presumptive 
[sentencing
standards] would be unconstitutional ...."
Blackman, however, did not request an opportunity to withdraw
his guilty plea, and he did not otherwise seek to set aside
his guilty-plea convictions entered by the trial court.
On April 15, 2019, the trial court entered an order
setting aside its March 12, 2019, order allowing the State to
prove aggravating factors. The trial court further stated that
"Mr. Blackman's plea was obviously not entered 'freely,
voluntarily, and 
knowingly.' 
Therefore, 
the 
court 
considers 
it
WITHDRAWN, and so orders." The trial court reset a disposition
date for May 2, 2019. On April 16, 2019, Blackman filed a
motion to set aside the trial court's April 15, 2019, order
insofar as it sua sponte withdrew his guilty plea. Blackman
asserted that he did not request that his guilty plea be
withdrawn and that he did not intend for the trial court to
withdraw his guilty plea. Blackman cited Rule 14.4(e), Ala. R.
Crim. P.,5 among other legal authority, in arguing that the
5Rule 14.4(e) states: 
"The court shall allow withdrawal of a plea of
6
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trial court acted beyond its authority in sua sponte ordering
the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Blackman further argued
that the trial court's withdrawal of his guilty plea provided
the State "another 'bite at the apple'" and an opportunity to
pursue a departure from the presumptive sentencing standards.6 
On April 18, 2019, the trial court entered an order
denying Blackman's motion to set aside its April 15 order. 
The trial court stated, among other things:
"Because Mr. Blackman correctly pointed out that a
defendant must be apprised of the correct maximum
and minimum sentences for his guilty plea to be
'knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily' 
entered,
and because this court may have mistakenly granted
the state's motion to prove aggravating factors
after Mr. Blackman had already pled guilty, and
after reviewing the principles set forth in Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 240 (1969), and the
frankly 'goofy' procedural posture of this case now,
undersigned decided to go back in time and do a 'do
over' and therefore ordered Mr. Blackman's plea
vacated as well."
guilty when necessary to correct a manifest
injustice. Upon withdrawal of a guilty plea, the
charges against the defendant as they existed before
any amendment, reduction, or dismissal made as part
of 
a 
plea 
agreement 
shall 
be 
reinstated
automatically."
6Blackman also states in his petition that, after the
trial court vacated his guilty plea, the State filed another
notice of intent to prove aggravating factors, which, he
states, the trial court granted on April 22, 2019. 
7
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The trial court noted that, because Blackman had stated in his
motion to set aside that he "'could not have knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered his pleas'" and that
"'a sentence outside of presumptive [sentencing standards]
would be unconstitutional,'"  Blackman was "obviously ...
telling [the trial court] ... that his plea was not given
freely, 
voluntarily, 
and 
knowingly." 
The trial 
court
concluded: "Because of these facts, and because I am supposed
to facilitate and not prevent justice, this Court ... VACATED
Mr. Blackman's prior guilty plea." The trial court went on to
explain that "[t]his is essentially a 'do-over' like kids used
to do on the play yard. We are back to where we were before
Mr. Blackman decided to plead to anything."
According to Blackman, at a hearing on May 2, 2019, he
informed the trial court that he stood on his previously
entered guilty plea, and he renewed his argument that the
trial court lacked the authority to set it aside. That same
day, the trial court entered an order setting Blackman's case
for trial on November 12, 2019. 
On October 29, 2019, Blackman filed a petition for a writ
of mandamus in the Court of Criminal Appeals. On October 31,
2019, that court, by order, dismissed Blackman's petition as
8
1190105
untimely. Ex parte Blackman (CR-19-0080, Oct. 31, 2019), ___
So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim App. 2019)(table). On November 4, 2019,
Blackman filed in this Court a petition for a writ of mandamus
and a motion to stay the trial-court proceedings. On November
8, 2019, a majority of this Court granted Blackman's motion to
stay the trial-court proceedings.
Standard of Review 
"This Court has held that an accused's constitutional
right[] against being twice placed in jeopardy cannot be
adequately protected by appellate review and that the writ of
mandamus is appropriate in a case in which the petitioner
argues that former jeopardy bars a retrial on the charges
against him." Ex parte Head, 958 So. 2d 860, 865 (Ala.
2006)(citing Ex parte Roberts, 662 So. 2d 229, 231 (Ala.
1995)).
Under Rule 21(e)(1), Ala. R. App. P., a decision of the
Court of Criminal Appeals on an original petition for a writ
of mandamus may be reviewed de novo by this Court. 7
7Rule 21(e)(1) provides: 
"A decision of a court of appeals on an original
petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition or
other extraordinary writ (i.e., a decision on a
petition filed in the court of appeals) may be
9
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"Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ
that will be issued only when there is: 1) a clear
legal right in the petitioner to the order sought;
2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the
lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court. Ex parte AmSouth
Bank, N.A., 589 So. 2d 715 (Ala. 1991); Ex parte
Day, 584 So. 2d 493 (Ala. 1991)."
Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503
(Ala. 1993).
Discussion
At issue in this case is whether the trial court's sua
sponte withdrawal of Blackman's guilty plea has subjected
Blackman to further jeopardy in violation of the double-
jeopardy protections of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The Fifth Amendment provides that no
person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb." The Double Jeopardy Clause
"protects against a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal, against a second prosecution for the same
reviewed de novo in the supreme court, and an
application for rehearing in the court of appeals is
not a prerequisite for such review. If an original
petition for extraordinary relief has been denied by
the court of appeals, review may be had by filing a
similar petition in the supreme court (and, in such
a case, in the supreme court the petition shall seek
a writ directed to the trial judge). ..."
10
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offense 
after 
conviction, and 
against 
multiple 
punishments 
for
the same offense." Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466
U.S. 294, 306–07 (1984). See also Arizona v. Washington, 434
U.S. 497, 503 (1978) ("A State may not put a defendant in
jeopardy twice for the same offense."). This Court has also
held that "[j]eopardy attaches on a guilty plea when the plea
is accepted and entered by a court with jurisdiction." Ex
parte Wright, 477 So. 2d 492, 493 (Ala. 1985)(citing Odoms v.
State, 359 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978)).
In his petition, Blackman contends that jeopardy attached
when the trial court accepted and entered his guilty plea on
March 7, 2019. Blackman argues that the trial court's sua
sponte withdrawal of his guilty plea was unauthorized under
the law and that, as a consequence, his constitutional right
against being subjected to prosecution again for the same
offense has been violated by the trial court's order setting
the case for trial.  Blackman argues that his double-jeopardy
claim divests the trial court of jurisdiction to conduct a
trial and that his guilty plea is due to be reinstated.
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether
Blackman's petition for the writ of mandamus filed in the
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Court of Criminal Appeals on October 29, 2019, was untimely,
thus depriving that court of jurisdiction and, in turn,
depriving this Court of jurisdiction to review his mandamus
petition filed in this Court. Pursuant to Rule 21(a)(3), Ala.
R. App. P., a mandamus petition 
"shall be filed within a reasonable time. The
presumptively reasonable time for filing a petition
seeking review of an order of a trial court or of a
lower appellate court shall be the same as the time
for taking an appeal. If a petition is filed outside
this presumptively reasonable time, it shall include
a statement of circumstances constituting good cause
for the appellate court to consider the petition,
notwithstanding that it was filed beyond the
presumptively reasonable time." 
Under Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., an appeal must
generally be taken within 42 days of the entry of the order or
judgment 
being 
appealed. 
Blackman 
challenges the 
trial 
court's
authority to enter the April 15, 2019, order in which it sua
sponte ordered the withdrawal of Blackman's guilty plea and
the April 18, 2019, order in which it denied his motion to
reinstate his guilty plea and to proceed with sentencing. He
further challenges the trial court's jurisdiction to proceed
with a trial, thus attacking the trial court's authority to
enter the May 2, 2019, order setting the case for trial.
12
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Blackman further asserts that he does not have an adequate
remedy by way of an appeal. See Ex parte Head, supra.
The State correctly notes that Blackman filed his
mandamus petition in the Court of Criminal Appeals well
outside the presumptively reasonable time after the trial
court's April 15, 2019, April 18, 2019, and May 2, 2019,
orders. Accordingly, the State contends that Blackman's
petition in this Court is due to be dismissed. The State also
contends that, even if Blackman's petition is 
not 
time-barred,
Blackman has an adequate remedy by way of appeal and that,
therefore, mandamus relief is unavailable. 
Blackman, however, argues that, pursuant to this Court's
decision in Ex parte K.R., 210 So. 3d 1106 (Ala. 2016), he was
not required to file his petition within the presumptively
reasonable time prescribed by Rule 21(a)(3) because his
petition implicates the trial court's jurisdiction.8 In Ex
parte K.R., this Court held that the timeliness of a petition
for a writ of mandamus challenging the trial court's
8Blackman also included in his petition a statement of
circumstances that he asserts constitutes good cause for this
Court to consider his untimely petition. Because we determine
that Blackman's claims are jurisdictional, we pretermit
discussion of those circumstances.
13
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jurisdiction was filed beyond the presumptively reasonable
time is "insignificant because 'we take notice of the lack of
jurisdiction ex mero motu.'" 210 So. 3d at 1112 (quoting Ruzic
v. State ex rel. Thornton, 866 So. 2d 564, 568–69 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2003), citing also Lawrence v. Alabama State Pers. Bd.,
910 So. 2d 126, 128 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004)).  See also Ex parte
Madison Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 261 So. 3d 381, 385 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2017)("[A] petition for the writ of mandamus that
challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court to enter the
order sought to be vacated need not be filed within the
presumptively reasonable period prescribed by Rule 21."
(citing Ex parte K.R., 210 So. 3d at 112)). Thus, in
accordance with this Court's decision in Ex parte K.R., a
petition 
for 
a 
writ 
of 
mandamus 
filed 
outside 
the
presumptively reasonable time set forth in Rule 21(a)(3)
nonetheless may be considered by an appellate court insofar as
the 
petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court.
We must determine whether Blackman's double-jeopardy claim is
jurisdictional. If it is jurisdictional, we will consider the
merits of his petition pursuant to K.R. If it is not
14
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jurisdictional, then his untimely filing of a petition
constitutes a waiver of his right to mandamus review.
This Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have
recognized that certain, but not all, double-jeopardy claims
are jurisdictional and are not subject to waiver by the
defendant.  See, e.g., Heard v. State, 999 So. 2d 992 (Ala.
2007)(concluding that a double-jeopardy claim pertaining to
simultaneous convictions for greater and lesser-included
offenses 
was 
jurisdictional 
and, 
therefore, that 
the 
defendant
did not waive his double-jeopardy claim). See also Ex parte
Benefield, 932 So. 2d 92 (Ala. 2005);  Ex parte Robey, 920 So.
2d 1069 (Ala. 2004); Straughn v. State, 876 So. 2d 492 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2003); and Rolling v. State, 673 So. 2d 812 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1995). In Ex parte Benefield, this Court concluded
that a defendant's double-jeopardy claim was directed to the
jurisdiction of the trial court to enter a judgment convicting
him 
of first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree rape because
first-degree sexual abuse was a lesser-included offense of
first-degree rape. In a special concurrence, Justice Stuart
addressed the scope of jurisdictional double-jeopardy claims:
"I note that today's holding should not be
interpreted as establishing that all double-jeopardy
15
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claims are jurisdictional. For example, if a
double-jeopardy claim is viable before trial, then
the defendant must object by pretrial motion, or the
double-jeopardy claim is foreclosed. Rolling v.
State, 673 So. 2d 812, 815 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
Judge Shaw recognized the consistent application of
this 
distinction 
between 
jurisdictional 
and
nonjurisdictional 
double-jeopardy 
claims 
in 
Straughn
v. State, 876 So. 2d 492, 508–09 (Ala. Crim. App.
2003), stating:
"'Since the decision in Rolling[ v.
State, 673 So. 2d 812 (Ala. Crim. App.
1995)], this Court has continued to hold
that 
certain 
double-jeopardy 
claims
implicate the jurisdiction of the trial
court and, therefore, are not subject to
waiver. 
Like Rolling, 
most of those
decisions 
involved 
simultaneous 
convictions
for both a greater and a lesser-included
offense.
"'However, caselaw from both this
Court and the Alabama 
Supreme 
Court
recognizes 
that 
generally 
other
double-jeopardy 
claims 
are 
singularly
constitutional 
in 
nature 
and 
are,
therefore, subject to waiver.'"
932 So. 2d at 94–95 (citations and emphasis omitted).   
The 
present 
case 
does 
not 
involve 
simultaneous
convictions for both a greater and a lesser-included offense; 
it involves the continued prosecution of the same offenses to
which the defendant has already pleaded guilty.  The Court of
Criminal Appeals has addressed this as a jurisdictional issue
in Jackson v. State, 659 So. 2d 994 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). In
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Jackson, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that an
involuntary withdrawal of a defendant's guilty plea invokes a
double-jeopardy claim that divests the trial court of
jurisdiction to retry a defendant on the same charge to which
the defendant pleaded. In Jackson, the defendant, who had
initially been charged with escape in the first degree,
pleaded guilty to escape in the second degree, and the trial
court accepted his plea. The State moved to withdraw the
defendant's guilty plea, and the trial court granted the
motion and tried the case. The defendant was found guilty of
escape in the first degree, and the trial court sentenced him
to 15 years in prison.  On appeal of the conviction, the Court
of Criminal Appeals stated that Rule 14.4(e), Ala. R. Crim.
P.,
"contemplates that only the party pleading guilty
may request to withdraw the plea.  We agree with the
Nevada Supreme Court, which stated in Parker v.
State, 100 Nev. 264, [265,] 679 P.2d 1271, 1272
(1984): 'Like the decision to enter a plea of
guilty, the decision to seek withdrawal of the plea
and proceed to trial is personal to the accused.'
(Emphasis added.)."
Jackson, 659 So. 2d at 995. The court held that the
defendant's 
"constitutional 
protection 
against 
double 
jeopardy
was violated. Jeopardy attached when the [defendant's] plea
17
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was 'accepted and entered by the court with jurisdiction.' Ex
parte Hergott, 588 So. 2d 911 (Ala. 1991)." 659 So. 2d at 995.
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded: "Consequently, any
proceedings following the restoration of the case to the trial
docket by the court on the state's motion were beyond the
court's jurisdiction; the judgment of conviction of escape in
the first degree and the sentence imposed as a result of that
conviction are to be set aside." Id.  The court remanded the
cause to the trial court with instructions to conduct a new
sentencing hearing on the defendant's original conviction
pursuant to his guilty plea of escape in the second degree.
Id. See also Wright v. State, 664 So. 2d 240 (Ala. Crim. App.
1995)(relying on Jackson to conclude that the trial court
impermissibly granted the State's motion to withdraw the
defendant's guilty plea and remanding the cause to the trial
court to set aside the defendant's conviction and sentence, to
reinstate the defendant's guilty plea, and to conduct a new
sentencing hearing). See also  State v. Savage, 961 So. 2d
181, 187 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006)(concluding, among other
things, that the trial court had "no grounds to invalidate the
guilty-plea proceedings and to dismiss the indictment" as a
18
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result of misnomer of the defendant in the indictment, that
jeopardy had attached when the defendant's guilty plea was
accepted, and that the only matter to be resolved by the trial
court after entry of the guilty plea was the defendant's
sentence).
Applying the aforementioned authority, we conclude that
Blackman's double-jeopardy claim is aimed directly at the
trial court's jurisdictional authority to proceed with a 
trial
on the very counts to which Blackman has pleaded guilty. Once
Blackman's guilty plea was accepted and entered by the trial
court, jeopardy attached. See Ex parte Wright, 477 So. 2d at
493. See also Ex parte Peterson, 890 So. 2d 990, 993 (Ala.
2004)(explaining that, after a defendant entered a valid
guilty plea to felony murder, "jeopardy attached to the
felony-murder 
conviction, 
prohibiting 
any 
further 
prosecution"
of the defendant for the same offense). Absent a voluntary
withdrawal of his guilty plea, Blackman was not subject to
further prosecution by the State, and the trial court is
without jurisdiction to proceed with the trial. The ultimate
question presented by Blackman's petition, therefore, is
whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to set the matter
for and to proceed with the trial. Because his double-jeopardy
19
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claim implicates the trial court's jurisdiction, his petition
for a writ of mandamus is not procedurally barred as untimely.
Ex parte K.R., 210 So. 3d at 1112.
Whether Blackman was appropriately advised of the
potential minimum and maximum sentences for his convictions,
whether his guilty plea was truly voluntarily entered, and
whether the State provided adequate notice of its intent to
prove aggravating factors at sentencing are not questions
currently before this Court.9  The subject of our review is
whether the trial court's sua sponte withdrawal of Blackman's
guilty plea and subsequent decision to set his case for trial
has subjected Blackman to twice being put in jeopardy in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. We conclude that it has. The
9See Durr v. State, 29 So. 3d 922, 925 (Ala. Crim. App.
2009)(holding the defendant's plea to be involuntary when the
defendant was not advised of the applicable sentencing range
and remanding the cause so that defendant would "have the
opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea and to enter another
plea after he has been informed of the applicable sentencing
range" (emphasis added)). See also Williams v. State, 155 So.
3d 326, 330 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014), and Laakkonen v. State,
[Ms. CR-17-1146, April 12, 2019] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim.
App. 2019). See further Hyde v. State, 185 So. 3d 501, 512–13
(Ala. Crim. App. 2015)(holding that the trial court exceeded
its discretion in imposing a prison sentence and departing
from the presumptive sentencing standards when there were no
aggravating factors or other evidence before it justifying a
departure from the non-prison recommendation).  
20
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trial court lacked the authority to withdraw Blackman's guilty
plea on its own motion. No provision for such a procedure
exists in the law.  The decision whether to withdraw the
guilty plea and to proceed to trial was a decision only
Blackman was entitled to make. Jackson, 659 So. 2d at 995.
That decision-making power does not shift to the trial court
in the face of what the trial court perceives to be an
involuntary guilty plea. In addition, as discussed supra, the
acceptance and entry of Blackman's guilty plea has divested
the trial court of jurisdiction to set the matter for a trial.
After accepting and entering Blackman's guilty plea, the only
remaining matter pending under the trial court's jurisdiction
was the imposition of Blackman's sentences. See Savage, 961
So. 2d at 183.  Accordingly, Blackman's guilty plea entered
and accepted by the Court on March 7, 2019, is due to be
reinstated, the trial court must vacate its May 2, 2019, order
setting the case for trial, and the trial court must proceed
to sentencing. 
Conclusion
Blackman has demonstrated a clear legal right to the
relief he seeks. Accordingly, we issue the writ and direct the
trial court to set aside its May 2, 2019, order setting the
21
1190105
case for trial, to reinstate Blackman's guilty plea, and to
proceed to sentencing on Blackman's guilty-plea convictions. 
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED. 
Bolin, Wise, Bryan, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Parker, C.J., and Sellers and Mendheim, JJ., concur in
the result.  
Shaw, J., dissents.
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1190105
SHAW, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.  This Court is directing the
trial court to reinstate the guilty plea of the petitioner,
James Antuam Blackman, who contends that it was not knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered.  I do not believe that
the petitioner has demonstrated a clear legal right to such
relief.  
This petition was filed too late.  The timeliness of a
petition for a writ of mandamus can be excused if it
challenges the trial court's jurisdiction.  The decision in Ex
parte Jackson, 659 So. 2d 994 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994), appears
to 
indicate that Blackman's claim is jurisdictional in 
nature. 
In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty to escape in the
second degree.  The State filed a motion to withdraw that
plea, which the trial court granted.  Rule 14.4(e), Ala. R.
Crim. P., states, in pertinent part: "The court shall allow
withdrawal of a plea of guilty when necessary to correct a
manifest injustice."  The court in Jackson construed this to
mean that "[t]he rule contemplates that only the party
pleading guilty may request to withdraw the plea" and that the
trial court thus erred in granting the State's motion to set
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it aside.  659 So. 2d at 995.10  The court went on to hold that
further proceedings violated the defendant's double-jeopardy
rights and that the trial court also lacked jurisdiction:
"The appellant's constitutional protection against
double jeopardy was violated. Jeopardy attached when
the appellant's plea was 'accepted and entered by
the court with jurisdiction.' Ex parte Hergott, 588
So. 
2d 
911 
(Ala. 
1991). 
Consequently, 
any
proceedings following the restoration of the case to
the trial docket by the court on the state's motion
were beyond the court's jurisdiction ...."
Jackson, 659 So. 2d at 995.
I have concerns that Jackson was incorrectly decided.  As
discussed in the main opinion, some double-jeopardy claims are
jurisdictional in nature; those generally involve claims of
"simultaneous 
convictions 
for 
both 
a 
greater 
and 
a
lesser-included offense."  Straughn v. State, 876 So. 2d 492,
508 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).  Generally, the "failure to file
a pretrial motion raising a double jeopardy claim forecloses
subsequent assertion of that issue"; this rule applies "only
if the double jeopardy claim is viable prior to trial." 
Rolling v. State, 673 So. 2d 812, 815 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995). 
10I see nothing in the rule strictly limiting who may be
allowed to withdraw the plea and would be cautious in finding
a rigid rule that, if the trial court notices a manifest
injustice, it is barred from acting to correct that injustice
without a formal motion to withdraw filed by the defendant.
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Further, in Ex parte Ziglar, 669 So. 2d 133, 135 (Ala. 1995),
this Court held that because the defendant in that case did
not raise a double-jeopardy objection in the trial court, his
challenge to a third trial on the same charge was waived: "A
defense of double jeopardy must be timely raised at trial, or
else it is waived."
Blackman's claim that jeopardy attached when he pleaded
guilty and that he cannot be placed in jeopardy again, like
the claim in Jackson, is essentially the same type of claim in
Ziglar: he is twice being placed in jeopardy for the same
offense.  Such claims fall into the category of waivable
double-jeopardy issues that do not impact the jurisdiction of
the trial court.  The contrary rationale behind the holding in
Jackson, however, is unclear.  The Jackson court held that
"[j]eopardy attached when the appellant's plea" was entered
and that the trial court was without jurisdiction to proceed
to withdraw the plea without the defendant's consent.  659 So.
2d at 995.  This suggests that the defendant essentially
waives the attachment of jeopardy and the denial of further
jurisdiction when the defendant withdraws his or her guilty
plea.  But if the attachment of jeopardy is waivable by a
defendant, then it does not create a jurisdictional barrier to
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further proceedings contrary to the plea.  See Heard v. State,
999 So. 2d 992, 1006 (Ala. 2007) (holding that violations of
double-jeopardy rights that implicate a trial court's
jurisdiction "could not be waived").11  In other words, if the
trial court retains jurisdiction over the case when a
defendant, 
after 
jeopardy 
attaches, consents 
to 
the 
withdrawal
of his plea, then the attachment of jeopardy similarly would
not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction if the plea is
withdrawn without the defendant's consent.  A trial court's
act of withdrawing a plea without a defendant's consent might
be erroneous, but I see no rationale for holding that it
deprives the trial court of jurisdiction.12
The decision in Jackson is precedent, but it is not
binding on this Court.  Cf. Diversicare Leasing Corp. v.
Hubbard, 189 So. 3d 24, 39 n.1 (Ala. 2015), and Ala. Code
11The decision in Ex parte Hergott, 588 So. 2d 911 (Ala.
1991), which Jackson cites, contains nothing suggesting that
a double-jeopardy violation stemming from a trial court's
erroneous decision to withdraw a guilty plea implicates its
jurisdiction.
12This Court has recognized that, in the past, the
appellate courts of this State have erroneously categorized
issues as affecting jurisdiction when they do not.  See
generally Ex parte BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 159 So. 3d 31
(Ala. 2013), and Ex parte Seymour, 946 So. 2d 536 (Ala. 2006). 
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1975, § 12-3-16.  Further, its substantive holding is not
applied in this case; rather, it is used to bypass a
procedural barrier to Blackman's petition.  Consequently, I 
do
not believe that Jackson excuses the tardiness of the petition
here. 
As to the substantive issue in this case, Blackman 
contends that the trial court erred by sua sponte withdrawing
his guilty plea.  As noted in the main opinion, after Blackman
pleaded guilty, the State sought consent from the trial court
to show aggravating factors that would allow departure from
the 
non-prison 
sentence 
specified 
in 
the 
presumptive
sentencing standards, which consent the trial court granted. 
Blackman filed an objection in which he argued, among other
things:
"As discussed at length above, a defendant must be
apprised of the correct maximum and minimum
sentences for his guilty plea to be knowingly,
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily 
entered. 
 
Mr.
Blackman entered his plea believing that the
sentencing guidelines would apply since the State
had not given notice of intent to assert aggravating
factors. However, aggravating factors –- if proven
–- would give the Court the option of a departure
sentence pursuant to the statutory sentencing range.
If the State is excused from its failure to give
timely notice (or at least any notice prior to the
plea), then it would mean Mr. Blackman could not
have knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
entered his pleas. Accordingly, a sentence outside
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the presumptive guidelines would be unconstitutional
under the aforementioned case law."
(Citation omitted; emphasis added.) 
The trial court could have construed this as an argument
that, if the trial court intended to allow the State to show
aggravating factors, then the plea had not been knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered because Blackman
arguably did not know the correct possible minimum and maximum
range of punishment.  In such circumstances, I believe that a
trial court, considering the substance of the filing, could
have construed it as a motion to withdraw the plea.
However, the trial court, in its April 15, 2019, order
withdrawing the plea, also set aside its consent to allow the
State to prove aggravating factors.  Thus, it removed the very
basis for making the plea involuntary and subject to
withdrawal.  Further, in a subsequent order denying a motion
by Blackman to set aside its April 15 order, the trial court
seemed to make clear that it was acting on its own motion. 
That aside, according to Blackman, the State later sought
consent again to prove aggravating factors, and the trial
court "granted" consent on April 22, 2019.  So, under those
circumstances, Blackman is asking this Court to reinstate a
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guilty plea that, as the case stands, he argues was not
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary when entered.  He 
contends
that he may waive the issue concerning the involuntariness of
his plea; indeed, by having this Court reinstate it, he may
have waived his ability to withdraw it in the future or have
it set aside if he is sentenced to prison.  But I disagree
that he has a clear legal right to seek reinstatement of the
plea in an untimely petition for a writ of mandamus.  Thus, I
respectfully dissent from granting the petition and issuing
the writ.
29