Title: Bunta v. Superior VacuPress, LLC

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Bunta v. Superior VacuPress, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4363.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-4363 
BUNTA, APPELLEE, v. SUPERIOR VACUPRESS, L.L.C.; MAST, APPELLANT;  
ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Bunta v. Superior VacuPress, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No.  
2022-Ohio-4363.] 
Conversion and unjust-enrichment claims brought by member of limited-liability 
company after its dissolution—Trial court erred in denying motion for 
directed verdict. 
(No. 2021-0066—Submitted February 8, 2022—Decided December 9, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Holmes County, No. 20CA006, 
2020-Ohio-5500. 
_____________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., announcing the judgment of the court. 
{¶ 1} This discretionary appeal involves a civil dispute over a dissolved 
limited-liability company.  The trial court denied appellant Firman Mast’s 
(“Firman’s”) motion for a directed verdict on appellee Vasile Bunta’s claims of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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conversion and unjust enrichment, and a jury returned a verdict against Firman on 
those claims.  The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed.  Because we determine 
that the trial court erred in denying Firman’s motion for a directed verdict on the 
conversion and unjust-enrichment claims, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and enter judgment on those claims in favor of Firman. 
Relevant Background 
Creation and Operation of Superior VacuPress, L.L.C. 
{¶ 2} In 2013, during a long car trip, Firman and Bunta began discussing 
the benefits of drying lumber with vacuum kilns.  Bunta was trained as an electrical 
engineer, and through his experience working in the lumber-exporting business, he 
had become familiar with the vacuum-drying process, which involves pulling 
moisture from freshly cut lumber with heat and suction to prevent the lumber from 
warping and splitting.  On that trip, Bunta explained to Firman the benefits of 
placing cut lumber in a vacuum kiln and the potential profits available from 
investing in this kind of technology.  He explained that vacuum drying involves 
less drying time and results in less warping or splitting of the lumber than traditional 
drying methods.  At the time, Bunta operated his own lumber-export business, and 
he informed Firman that he had suppliers and customers in the lumber industry.  
Firman owned a roofing business at the time and was interested in the vacuum kilns 
as another business venture. 
{¶ 3} After the initial discussions, Firman and Bunta agreed to go into the 
lumber-drying business together; this business was later named Superior VacuPress 
(“VacuPress”).  From January to April 2014, Bunta worked on the business plan, 
created the plant layout, and assembled technical data about the kilns.  Bunta also 
introduced Firman to Jim Parker, Bunta’s contact at the company from which 
VacuPress planned to purchase the vacuum kilns.  Firman, on the other hand, 
worked on securing financing and property for building the plant.  He discussed the 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
3 
business with his father, Dennis Mast (“Dennis”), and Dennis permitted Bunta and 
Firman to build VacuPress’s facility on his land. 
{¶ 4} For financing, Firman and Bunta consulted with Commercial and 
Savings Bank.  Firman testified that the bank’s representative told him that Bunta 
could not be an owner in VacuPress, because of his “bad credit.”  Consequently, 
Firman signed the loan documents personally and as manager of VacuPress.  
Firman used his personal and business assets as collateral for the loan, but because 
those assets were not adequate backing to secure financing, Dennis cosigned the 
loans and mortgaged his farm as additional collateral.  The bank ultimately 
provided multiple loans totaling $1,433,000 and issued a line of credit to 
VacuPress. 
{¶ 5} In April 2014, Firman and Dennis signed the operating agreement for 
VacuPress, which listed both as members and assigned Firman as the manager of 
the company.  In exchange for Dennis’s cosigning the loans and permitting 
VacuPress’s facility to be built on his land, Dennis received a 15 percent interest in 
VacuPress.  Firman received the remaining 85 percent interest in the company.  
Notably, Bunta was not made a member under the 2014 operating agreement.  
Nevertheless, Bunta helped set up the equipment for the business, and his efforts 
contributed to the company’s first vacuum kiln becoming operational in December 
2014. 
{¶ 6} Around January 2015, Bunta and Firman discussed receiving no 
compensation during the beginning of VacuPress’s operation but tentatively agreed 
that if the company was earning enough money in future months, then they could 
each draw $2,000 a month and could later increase their draw to $4,000 a month.  
As they worked to get VacuPress off the ground, Bunta’s original lumber-export 
company started to struggle financially and was unable to pay its outstanding 
balances to various lumber mills. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 7} In December 2015, Firman issued a capital call for reimbursement of 
the money that he had personally put into the company.  There were discussions at 
that time that Bunta and Mervin Mast (“Mervin”), Firman’s brother, were to 
become members of VacuPress and thus would be included in the capital call 
according to their respective expected interests in the company.  Bunta had an 
expected interest of 30 percent, and thus was required to pay $33,354.  In response 
to the capital call, Bunta paid $10,000 to VacuPress from his lumber-export 
company.  The parties dispute whether Bunta paid the remainder of his share of the 
capital call. 
{¶ 8} In January 2016, a document titled “Amended and Restated Operating 
Agreement,” which made Bunta and Mervin members of the company, was 
executed by all four members.  The result was the following ownership makeup: 
Firman owned 45.9 percent, Bunta owned 30 percent, Dennis owned 13.5 percent, 
and Mervin owned 10.6 percent. 
{¶ 9} Soon after Bunta became a member, Firman started to receive phone 
calls from his business contacts complaining about Firman’s association with Bunta 
and Bunta’s failure to pay outstanding debts from his lumber businesses.  More 
specifically, Firman testified that certain lumber mills and suppliers to whom Bunta 
owed money said they would not sell lumber to VacuPress.  Consequently, Firman 
called a member meeting in March 2016 to discuss the financial difficulties facing 
VacuPress.  Prior to that meeting, Bunta approached Firman about receiving 
payment for work he performed in creating VacuPress in 2014 and 2015.  Firman 
told Bunta to provide invoices for that work, and Bunta brought the invoices to the 
March meeting.  Bunta secretly recorded that meeting, and the recording was 
played at trial.  At the meeting, Firman, Dennis, and Mervin confronted Bunta and 
encouraged him to resolve his debts with the lumber mills.  Bunta stated that his 
outstanding debts were “none of [Mervin’s] business” and demanded an exit plan 
from VacuPress. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
5 
{¶ 10} Following that March meeting, Bunta stopped working for, and 
broke off his relationship with, VacuPress.  VacuPress continued to struggle 
financially.  Specifically, the company had difficulty making monthly payments on 
its loans, and no member received any draws.  In April 2016, Firman sent Bunta a 
letter that demanded the remainder of Bunta’s share of the capital call and listed 
VacuPress’s liabilities and assets to demonstrate that the liabilities exceeded the 
value of the assets.  Subsequently, Firman offered Bunta a $20,000 buyout, which 
Bunta did not accept. 
Dissolution of VacuPress and Creation of Superior Lumber, L.L.C. 
{¶ 11} In August 2016, Firman notified the members in writing that 
VacuPress would be “liquidated and dissolved” and its “affairs * * * wound up.”  
A few months later, in November 2016, Firman created Superior Lumber, L.L.C., 
also a lumber-drying business, with Firman, Dennis, and Mervin as members.  
Firman transferred the assets and debts from VacuPress to Superior Lumber.  
Before Firman could do so, the bank, which was VacuPress’s primary creditor, 
required him to sign an assumption agreement.  Under that agreement, Superior 
Lumber was made fully responsible for the repayment of the loans owed by 
VacuPress, Firman, and Dennis.  In January 2017, the Ohio Secretary of State 
received notification that VacuPress had been dissolved.  On January 1, 2017, 
Superior Lumber began operations. 
Trial and Appeal to the Court of Appeals 
{¶ 12} In June 2017, Bunta filed suit against VacuPress, Superior Lumber, 
Firman, Mervin, and Dennis, asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty, 
conversion, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment.  Bunta also brought claims for 
declaratory judgment, judicial dissolution, and an accounting, but he later 
voluntarily dismissed these claims.  Bunta later dismissed VacuPress as a 
defendant, and the court granted a directed verdict in favor of Mervin.  We limit 
the recitation of the procedural history for purposes of this appeal, but the full 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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description can be found in the court of appeals’ decision, see 2020-Ohio-5500, 163 
N.E.3d 1153, ¶ 20-27. 
{¶ 13} The matter proceeded to a three-day jury trial.  The heart of Bunta’s 
theory at trial was that he was not compensated when Firman dissolved VacuPress.  
Bunta argued that the Masts had never had any intention of liquidating VacuPress 
and that, under the guise of having no money, they had “cheat[ed]” Bunta out of 
his 30 percent membership interest in VacuPress by forming Superior Lumber and 
transferring all of VacuPress’s assets and debts to the new company.  Bunta offered 
expert testimony from Michael Oesch, who testified that based on the value of 
Superior Lumber as stated in Firman’s 2017 personal financial statement, a 30 
percent interest in the company was valued at $500,000. 
{¶ 14} Firman maintained that transferring VacuPress’s assets and 
liabilities to Superior Lumber was his only option as manager of VacuPress.  He 
testified that he was unable to find a buyer for VacuPress’s assets and explained 
that the vacuum kilns are used by only a few companies in the world, which limited 
the pool of potential buyers.  Firman further stated that, as he had explained in his 
April 2016 letter to Bunta, selling the company’s assets would not have covered the 
liabilities owed to creditors; VacuPress would still have owed half a million dollars 
to creditors if it had been liquidated.  Because Firman and his father had personally 
signed for the bank loans and because Firman did not believe that Bunta would pay 
his share of the debt if VacuPress liquidated, based on Bunta’s alleged failure to 
pay the remainder of the capital call, Firman believed that his “only option at that 
time was to form Superior Lumber and take on the liabilities.”  The bank’s 
representative, Steven Kilpatrick, also testified that there was no equity in the 
equipment based on its depreciation and the fact that “nobody else in [the] area was 
using that type of equipment at the time” and, therefore, selling the equipment 
would likely have resulted in a substantial loss. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
7 
{¶ 15} During the trial, Firman moved for a directed verdict on Bunta’s 
conversion and unjust-enrichment claims; the trial court denied the motion.1  
Relevant here, the jury returned verdicts against Firman on the conversion and 
unjust-enrichment claims, awarding damages to Bunta for both claims.2  The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Firman on Bunta’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim.  
The trial court journalized the jury’s verdict. 
{¶ 16} Firman appealed to the Fifth District.  Regarding Bunta’s conversion 
claim, he argued that the claim was barred as a matter of law because Bunta had 
failed to identify any personal property allegedly converted by Firman.  The Fifth 
District disagreed.  In doing so, it relied on this court’s decision in Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St.2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976), 
rev’d on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977), which 
concluded that in addition to tangible chattels, “intangible rights which are 
customarily merged in or identified with some document may also be converted,” 
id. at 226-227.  The court of appeals emphasized that there is no “bright line test” 
for determining whether property can be the subject of a conversion action but that 
the court must look to see if the intangible property is identifiable.  2020-Ohio-
5500, 163 N.E.3d 1153, at ¶ 45.  It concluded that Bunta’s membership interest in 
VacuPress was identifiable intangible property because Firman transferred the 
assets and debts of VacuPress to Superior Lumber and Oesch (Bunta’s expert) was 
able to calculate the value of Bunta’s 30 percent membership interest in VacuPress 
from the value of Superior Lumber.  Id. at ¶ 48-49. 
 
1. While the trial court never explicitly ruled on Firman’s proffered motion for a directed verdict, 
we treat the trial court’s failure to rule on the motion as a denial of the motion.  See Minocchi v. 
Minocchi, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2003CA00431, 2004-Ohio-4635, ¶ 9 (“When a trial court fails to rule 
on a motion, the motion is considered denied”). 
 
2. The jury returned verdicts in favor of Dennis and Superior Lumber on the unjust-enrichment and 
conversion claims and in favor of Dennis on the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim.  The jury also 
returned verdicts in favor of Dennis, Firman, and Superior Lumber on the civil-conspiracy claims. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8 
{¶ 17} The court of appeals also rejected Firman’s argument that Bunta’s 
unjust-enrichment claim was barred because the relationship between the parties 
was governed by the terms of the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement.  It 
concluded that “Bunta used his technological knowledge and business expertise to 
assist Firman Mast in the creation of VacuPress,” id. at ¶ 64, and therefore, 
reasonable minds could come to differing conclusions as to whether Bunta 
conferred benefits on Firman before they entered into the operating agreement, id. 
at ¶ 67.  For these reasons, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 
{¶ 18} We accepted Firman’s discretionary appeal, which presents two 
propositions of law.  See 162 Ohio St.3d 1427, 2021-Ohio-1202, 166 N.E.3d 26.  
In Firman’s first proposition, he contends that compensation for a membership 
interest in a dissolved limited-liability company cannot be the subject of 
conversion.  In his second proposition, he asserts that a manager of a limited-
liability company who complies with his or her duties under the operating 
agreement in dissolving the company cannot be liable for conversion of a 
membership interest or for unjust enrichment. 
Analysis 
{¶ 19} A motion for a directed verdict should be granted when after 
construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, the court 
finds that reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion and that conclusion 
is in favor of the moving party.  Civ.R. 50(A)(4).  A trial court’s decision on a 
motion for a directed verdict is a question of law that we review de novo.  See 
Rieger v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 157 Ohio St.3d 512, 2019-Ohio-3745, 138 N.E.3d 
1121, ¶ 8.  Although a motion for a directed verdict does not present a question of 
fact, “it is necessary to review and consider the evidence” when deciding such a 
motion.  Ruta v. Breckenridge-Remy Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 66, 430 N.E.2d 935 (1982), 
paragraph one of the syllabus, citing O’Day v. Webb, 29 Ohio St.2d 215, 280 
N.E.2d 896 (1972), paragraph three of the syllabus. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
9 
The Conversion Claim 
{¶ 20} Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over property to 
the exclusion of the rights of the owner or the withholding of the property from the 
owner’s possession under a claim inconsistent with the owner’s rights.  See 
Zacchini, 47 Ohio St.2d at 226, 351 N.E.2d 454.  In Zacchini, this court concluded 
that although the original rule at common law permitted only tangible chattels to 
be subject to conversion, “it is now generally held that intangible rights which are 
customarily merged in or identified with some document may also be converted.”  
Id. at 226-227.  Examples include bank passbooks, deeds, and drafts.  Id. at 227. 
{¶ 21} In Zacchini, we concluded that the plaintiff’s image as a “human 
cannonball,” which a news program broadcasted in a 15-second film clip, was not 
an intangible asset subject to conversion, largely because it was too difficult to 
identify what right had been “taken,” id.  “[Was] it the right to perform the act, to 
view it, to present it on television, to license its filming, or some other right?”  Id.  
We explained, “The distinguishing characteristic of conversion is the forced 
judicial sale of the chattel or right of which the owner has been wrongfully 
deprived.”  Id.  Accordingly, we held that the plaintiff’s conversion claim failed, 
and we cautioned that while “[j]udicial ingenuity could perhaps award damages and 
find a res said to be sold,” extending the scope of conversion to the rights claimed 
by the plaintiff, which “are more appropriately considered under wholly distinct 
legal principles,” would be “confusing, unnecessary, and improper.”  Id. 
{¶ 22} Here, Firman contends that Bunta’s conversion claim must fail 
because Bunta’s membership interest in VacuPress is not the type of intangible 
property that is subject to conversion.  More specifically, Firman asserts that Bunta 
possesses no property right subject to conversion, because VacuPress’s debts 
exceeded the value of its assets at the time of dissolution and, therefore, Bunta’s 
membership interest, which included the right to share in the profits, had no value.  
Firman contends that holding otherwise would go directly against this court’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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warning in Zacchini about extending conversion claims to rights that are better 
considered under “wholly distinct legal principles,” id., 47 Ohio St.2d at 227, 351 
N.E.2d 454. 
{¶ 23} Bunta first takes issue with Firman’s use of the term “dissolution,” 
arguing that Firman did not liquidate and dissolve VacuPress in the traditional way.  
Rather, Bunta asserts, Firman “rolled over” VacuPress’s assets and liabilities into 
Superior Lumber, thereby converting Bunta’s 30 percent membership interest, 
which includes the right to compensation for his membership interest upon 
dissolution.  Bunta further argues that “[a] member’s right to compensation for its 
membership interest at dissolution is exactly the type of intangible property” 
contemplated in Zacchini and is subject to conversion because it is easily 
identifiable. 
{¶ 24} As a preliminary matter, we note that at the heart of Bunta’s 
argument is a frustration with how Firman handled the winding down and 
dissolution of VacuPress and the creation of Superior Lumber.  But that issue is not 
before us.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of Firman on Bunta’s claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty, finding that Firman had held the authority to wind up and 
dissolve VacuPress and had not breached any duty in doing so.  Bunta did not 
appeal from the trial court’s judgment.  Therefore, we assume for the purposes of 
this appeal that the dissolution of VacuPress was proper. 
{¶ 25} The threshold inquiry for a conversion claim is whether there exists 
some property interest or right.  The parties present diverging characterizations of 
the property interest at issue here.  Firman characterizes Bunta’s conversion claim 
as seeking damages for compensation for Bunta’s membership interest in a 
dissolved limited-liability company.  And he asserts that a claimed right to 
compensation is “not the type of intangible asset that is subject to conversion.”  
Bunta, on the other hand, believes that his property interest subject to conversion 
was not a purely economic interest but, rather, a conversion of his personal property 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
11 
in the form of his membership interest in VacuPress.  Stated differently, Bunta 
believes that his membership interest in VacuPress was converted to Superior 
Lumber: “Bunta’s 30 [percent] membership interest in Superior VacuPress was 
converted by [Firman] when he rolled Superior VacuPress assets and debts into 
Superior Lumber.”  He further emphasizes that “[a] member’s right to 
compensation for a membership interest at dissolution” is intangible property. 
{¶ 26} To determine how to characterize the nature of the property interest 
at issue, we look to the operating agreement and any relevant statutes in effect when 
the operating agreement was executed—here, January 2016.  In January 2016, 
“membership interest” in a limited-liability company was defined by statute as “a 
member’s share of the profits and losses of [the] limited liability company and the 
right to receive distributions from that company.”  Former R.C. 1705.01(H), 2012 
Sub.H.B. No. 48.3  The Amended and Restated Operating Agreement for VacuPress 
adopted this statutory definition of a membership interest.  Also in January 2016, 
former R.C. 1705.17, Sub.S.B. No. 74, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 634, 699,4 stated, 
“A membership interest in a limited liability company is personal property.” 
{¶ 27} The Amended and Restated Operating Agreement for VacuPress 
provided that “the Company shall continue in existence until terminated as provided 
in Section 15.1 of this Agreement.”  Section 15.1 set forth three possible 
termination events that would trigger the company’s liquidation and dissolution.  
Upon a termination event—here it was the decision of the manager, Firman, to 
dissolve VacuPress—the winding-up process was triggered.  The company 
manager was to oversee the process, and like the version of Ohio’s Limited 
Liability Company Act in effect in January 2016, Section 15.3 of the Amended and 
 
3. R.C. 1705.01 was repealed effective January 1, 2022, 2020 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 276, Sections 3 and 
4, but was in effect when the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement was executed. 
    
4.  R.C. 1705.17 was repealed effective January 1, 2022, 2020 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 276, Sections 3 
and 4, but was in effect when the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement was executed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Restated Operating Agreement required the dissolving company to first distribute 
its assets to satisfy the company’s obligations to its creditors.  See former R.C. 
1705.46(A)(1), (B), Sub.S.B. No. 74, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, at 734.5  Only after 
the company had satisfied its creditors could it distribute “the balance, if any, to the 
[members] in accordance with their Capital Account balances.”  See also former 
R.C. 1705.46(A)(3).  The Amended and Restated Operating Agreement provided 
that the company would continue in existence “until its assets [had] been distributed 
in accordance with Section 15.3” and stated that the company “shall terminate” 
when a certificate of dissolution is filed with the secretary of state. 
{¶ 28} Based on the above, two things are clear.  First, Bunta’s right to 
compensation for his membership interest at dissolution was available only if the 
value of VacuPress’s liquidated assets exceeded the value of its obligations.  And 
the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that this was not the case.  At trial, 
Firman testified that he was unable to find someone to buy VacuPress’s assets, that 
the vacuum kilns were “specialized equipment,” which limits the number of 
potential buyers, and that selling the company’s assets would not have resulted in 
enough funds to cover the debts owed to its creditors.  Firman explained that in 
2016, he “did research and put a market value to all the assets” and that after 
comparing that amount with the roughly one million dollars the company owed to 
creditors, he determined that even if VacuPress liquidated, it would still owe half a 
million dollars in obligations.  The letter Firman sent to Bunta in April 2016 also 
indicated that the value of the company’s obligations was more than the value of 
its assets. 
{¶ 29} Kilpatrick, the bank’s representative, corroborated Firman’s 
statements.  He testified that there was no equity in the equipment because “the 
original cost of the equipment was actually less than what [the bank was] owed on 
 
5. R.C. 1705.46 was repealed effective January 1, 2022, 2020 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 276, Sections 3 and 
4, but was in effect when the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement was executed.  
January Term, 2022 
 
 
13 
those equipment loans” and “nobody else in [the] area was using that type of 
equipment at the time.”  Additionally, there was testimony that VacuPress did not 
own the property its facility was built on and, thus, if the company liquidated, it 
would receive no compensation for its facility. 
{¶ 30} Bunta did not present evidence that there was a market for 
VacuPress’s equipment or other assets, that there were interested buyers, or that the 
value of the company’s assets exceeded its debts at the time of dissolution.  In fact, 
Bunta dismissed his accounting claim, which would have established whether he 
had a right to compensation for his membership interest in VacuPress at the time 
of dissolution.  Moreover, Bunta’s expert, Oesch, focused his testimony on the 
value of Superior Lumber, the company that assumed VacuPress’s assets and 
liabilities, rather than on the value of VacuPress’s assets compared to its debts at 
the time of dissolution.  Indeed, Oesch admitted that he never did a valuation of 
VacuPress as of the time of its dissolution.  In short, Bunta presented no evidence 
at trial that he had any right to compensation for his membership interest in 
VacuPress at the time it was dissolved. 
{¶ 31} Second, it is clear from the language of the Amended and Restated 
Operating Agreement that VacuPress’s existence continued until its assets were 
distributed in accordance with the terms of the agreement and its existence 
terminated when the certificate of dissolution was filed with the secretary of state.  
There is no dispute properly before us over whether those events occurred.  And 
nothing in the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement or the relevant statutes 
indicates that anyone’s membership interest in VacuPress continued beyond the 
company’s termination.  Bunta cites no authority supporting such a finding.  
Moreover, as Bunta concedes, he is not a member of Superior Lumber.  Bunta’s 
disagreement with how VacuPress was dissolved does not identify a res, intangible 
or otherwise, that could be the subject of a conversion claim. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 32} The court of appeals relied on the Second District Court of Appeals’ 
decision in Schafer v. RMS Realty, 138 Ohio App.3d 244, 741 N.E.2d 155 (2d 
Dist.2000), which held that a minority partner’s partnership interest was intangible 
property subject to conversion and upheld a jury’s determination that the interest 
had been wrongly converted.  In Schafer, the majority partners had issued a capital 
call, activating a provision within the partnership agreement that diluted the interest 
of any partner who did not meet the capital call.  Id. at 255.  Because the minority 
partner could not raise the amount of money required for the capital call, his 25 
percent partnership interest was reduced to 6 percent.  Id.  A jury found that the 
majority partners had converted the minority partner’s partnership interest, and the 
Second District affirmed.  Id. at 255, 286.  In doing so, the Second District reasoned 
that “the correct approach is to analyze the particular type of intangible asset, to see 
if allowing a conversion claim makes sense.”  Id. at 285.  And it concluded that the 
conversion claim made sense because the minority partner’s partnership interest 
was identified in the partnership agreement and because the evidence at trial 
established that the minority partner had had a 25 percent interest in the only 
partnership asset, a five-acre commercial property.  Id. at 286-287. 
{¶ 33} We find Schafer distinguishable from the present case in several 
ways.  First, Schafer involved a partnership interest, which included “ ‘rights in 
specific partnership property,’ ” id. at 285, quoting former R.C. 1775.23, and the 
property interest converted was the minority partner’s 19 percent interest in the 
partnership’s only asset, the five-acre commercial property.  Schafer at 287.  The 
intangible-property interest converted was therefore easily identifiable; the 
majority partners converted the minority partner’s 19 percent interest in that 
commercial property.  Id.  Moreover, in Schafer, the minority partner’s interest in 
the partnership had not been reduced because the partnership was terminated or 
dissolved but because the majority partners had made a wrongful capital call.  Id. 
at 286-287.  Last, in addition to the conversion claim, the jury in Schafer found the 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
15 
majority partners had breached their fiduciary duties owed to the minority partner 
for the wrongful capital call and their failure to disclose information.  Id. at 280. 
{¶ 34} Contrary to the suggestion in the opinion concurring in judgment 
only, we do not “conflate[] damages with the availability of a conversion claim,” 
opinion concurring in judgment only, ¶ 48.  As noted above, the threshold inquiry 
for a conversion claim is whether there indeed exists some property right.  To 
determine whether an intangible-property right may be subject to conversion, the 
right needs to be identifiable; the court must be able to identify what has been taken.  
Zacchini, 47 Ohio St.2d at 227, 351 N.E.2d 454.  As a result, we discuss the issue 
of compensation at the time of dissolution because that is how the parties framed 
the intangible property right that was taken.  We agree with the opinion concurring 
in judgment only that a membership interest includes the right to share in profits 
and losses and to receive distributions from the company and is “more than simply 
the member’s share of the company’s net assets,” opinion concurring in judgment 
only at ¶ 50-51.  Yet the only right included in Bunta’s membership interest that 
Bunta identified as taken was his “right to compensation for [his] membership 
interest at dissolution.”  And Bunta failed to establish that he had such a right. 
{¶ 35} Because there is no evidence that Bunta’s personal property was 
converted, the trial court erred in denying Firman’s motion for a directed verdict.  
Although we decline to adopt the bright-line rule that a member’s claimed right to 
compensation for his or her membership interest at dissolution can never be 
intangible property subject to conversion, as Firman proposes, we nevertheless 
caution courts to be wary of conversion claims so inherently intertwined with 
contract principles.  To rephrase our warning in Zacchini, though “[j]udicial 
ingenuity” could perhaps award damages and find a res said to be sold, not all 
intangible rights are subject to being converted, and courts must be careful not to 
extend the scope of conversion to rights that are “more appropriately considered 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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under wholly distinct legal principles” lest the extension lead to “confusing, 
unnecessary, and improper” results.  Id. at 227. 
The Unjust-Enrichment Claim 
{¶ 36} A successful claim of unjust enrichment requires a showing that (1) 
a benefit was conferred by the plaintiff on the defendant, (2) the defendant had 
knowledge of the benefit, and (3) the defendant retained the benefit under 
circumstances in which it was unjust to do so without payment.  See Hambleton v. 
R.G. Barry Corp., 12 Ohio St.3d 179, 183, 465 N.E.2d 1298 (1984).  Unjust 
enrichment is an equitable claim based on a contract implied in law, see Hummel v. 
Hummel, 133 Ohio St. 520, 525-528, 14 N.E.2d 923 (1938), the purpose of which 
“is not to compensate the plaintiff for any loss or damage suffered by him but to 
compensate him for the benefit he has conferred on the defendant,” Hughes v. 
Oberholtzer, 162 Ohio St. 330, 335, 123 N.E.2d 393 (1954).  Generally, Ohio law 
does not permit recovery under the theory of unjust enrichment when an express 
contract covers the same subject matter.  Id.  (“It is generally agreed that there 
cannot be an express agreement and an implied contract for the same thing existing 
at the same time”).  “The mere fact that issues exist as to the creation of the contract 
or the construction of its terms does not alter this rule.”  Caras v. Green & Green, 
2d Dist. Montgomery No. 14943, 1996 WL 407861, *10 (June 28, 1996). 
{¶ 37} Firman contends that the Amended and Restated Operating 
Agreement for VacuPress controlled the relationship between Firman and Bunta 
and therefore bars Bunta’s unjust-enrichment claim.  Further, he asserts that Bunta 
received recognition for his initial assistance with starting VacuPress when he was 
given a membership interest in the company. 
{¶ 38} Bunta counters that the operating agreement does not preclude his 
unjust-enrichment claim, because Bunta provided services to VacuPress before he 
became a member and because he was never paid for those services.  More 
specifically, at trial, Bunta argued that the benefits he conferred on Firman included 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
17 
providing technical knowledge and business expertise in the lumber-drying 
business, introducing Firman to his contact Jim Parker at the company where 
VacuPress purchased the vacuum kilns, and drawing up VacuPress’s business plan 
and the plant layout.  He contended that he provided these benefits without payment 
between 2014 and 2015, before he was a member of VacuPress, and that Firman, 
in turn, used the benefits to create and operate VacuPress and later to create 
Superior Lumber. 
{¶ 39} The doctrine of unjust enrichment is limited when an express 
contract exists that concerns the same subject because “ ‘the parties have fixed their 
contractual relationship in an express contract,’ ” and thus, “ ‘there is no reason or 
necessity for the law to supply an implied contractual relationship between them.’ 
”  Champion Contracting Constr. Co., Inc. v. Valley City Post No. 5563, 9th Dist. 
Medina No. 03CA0092-M, 2004-Ohio-3406, ¶ 25, quoting Gehrke v. Smith, 12th 
Dist. No. CA92-10-027, 1993 WL 243816, *2 (July 6, 1993).  Bunta and Firman 
fixed their relationship in an express contract, the Amended and Restated Operating 
Agreement, and that agreement concerns the same subject as Bunta’s unjust-
enrichment claim. 
{¶ 40} The Amended and Restated Operating Agreement identified 
VacuPress as a limited-liability company formed in April 2014, designated Bunta 
as a member of VacuPress effective January 2016, and established the procedures 
and systems to “govern the relationship” between the members of VacuPress and 
between VacuPress and its members.  More specifically, the operating agreement 
set forth how the members of VacuPress would receive compensation and under 
what conditions.  For example, the operating agreement specified, “[T]he Company 
will distribute Distributable Cash to the [members] in proportion to their respective 
Unit ownership at such times as the Manager shall determine in good faith” and 
“Net Profit or Net Loss for each fiscal year shall be allocated to the [members] in 
proportion to their respective Unit ownership.”  We therefore conclude that any 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
compensation that Bunta expected for the benefits he conferred on Firman in the 
creation and establishment of VacuPress was clearly within the scope of the 
Amended and Restated Operating Agreement, and the fact that those services were 
performed prior to Bunta’s becoming a member under that agreement is irrelevant.  
See Caras, 1996 WL 407861, at *10. 
{¶ 41} Moreover, “ ‘[a] person is not entitled to compensation on the 
ground of unjust enrichment if he received from the other that which it was agreed 
between them the other should give in return.’ ”  Ullmann v. May, 147 Ohio St. 
468, 478, 72 N.E.2d 63 (1947), quoting Restatement of the Law, Restitution, 
Section 107, Comment a (1937).  The court of appeals noted that prior to the March 
2016 meeting, Bunta informed Firman that he wanted to be paid for the work he 
performed for VacuPress in 2014 and 2015 and that Bunta brought invoices for 
such work to that meeting.  2020-Ohio-5500, 163 N.E.3d 1153, at ¶ 63.  It 
concluded that this evidence suggested that Bunta used his expertise to assist 
Firman in the creation of VacuPress and “expected future compensation as a 
member of VacuPress but received nothing when he was squeezed out of 
VacuPress.”  Id. at ¶ 64.  Yet the invoices Bunta brought to the March meeting were 
created on March 21, 2016, over two months after Bunta became a member of 
VacuPress.  Further, Bunta admitted at trial that he did not request payment for his 
work on the initial setup of VacuPress prior to submitting those invoices.  Bunta 
directs this court to no other evidence to support the assertion that he expected 
anything other than becoming a member of VacuPress and receiving the 
compensation therefrom for the services he provided in creating and establishing 
VacuPress. 
{¶ 42} Bunta never asserted that he was not of sound mind or under duress 
when he entered into and signed the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement.  
See Ullmann at 477-478.  If Bunta believed that he should have received back pay 
for the services he provided prior to becoming a member in addition to receiving a 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
19 
30 percent membership interest and the compensation due therefrom, then he could 
have contracted for it.  And if Bunta wanted to ensure future compensation as a 
member of VacuPress, he could have requested that the Amended and Restated 
Operating Agreement include provisions securing as much.  But he did not, and he 
cannot now turn to rules of equity for compensation because VacuPress was 
dissolved sooner than he expected.  See Valentine v. Cedar Fair, L.P., __ Ohio 
St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-3710, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 18.  To permit otherwise would 
potentially allow Bunta to recover more than he bargained for and would open the 
floodgates for actions claiming unjust enrichment. 
{¶ 43} Because there was an express and valid contract between Firman and 
Bunta that covered the same subject as Bunta’s unjust-enrichment claim, we hold 
that the trial court erred in denying Firman’s motion for a directed verdict. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 44} There is insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support Bunta’s 
claims of conversion and unjust enrichment against Firman.  We therefore hold that 
the trial court erred in denying Firman’s motion for a directed verdict on those 
claims and that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment.  
Accordingly, we reverse the Fifth District Court of Appeals’ judgment and enter 
judgment on those claims in favor of Firman. 
Judgment reversed. 
DONNELLY and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY 
and DEWINE, JJ. 
BRUNNER, J., dissents. 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 45} I agree with the lead opinion’s analysis of the unjust-enrichment 
claim.  However, I disagree with its analysis of the conversion claim because I 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
would adopt the bright-line rule that the lead opinion rejects and would hold that a 
membership interest governed by an operating agreement can never be subject to a 
conversion claim.  Accordingly, I concur in judgment only. 
{¶ 46} A membership interest memorialized by an operating agreement 
cannot be subject to a conversion claim, because operating agreements lay out the 
circumstances under which a manager may wind up and dissolve a company and 
how the manager is to do so.  Because the operating agreement defines the parties’ 
obligations and membership rights, a member must bring any “conversion” claim 
as a breach of the terms of the operating agreement. 
{¶ 47} In this case, appellee, Vasile Bunta, did properly bring a claim under 
the terms of the operating agreement against appellant, Firman Mast, for breach of 
fiduciary duty, but the jury found in Firman’s favor on that claim.  Logically, 
because the jury found that Firman acted in good faith and did not breach his 
fiduciary duty when he dissolved Superior VacuPress, L.L.C., (“VacuPress”), 
Firman cannot be liable for conversion of Bunta’s membership interest.  However, 
if the jury had found that Firman had breached his fiduciary duty in dissolving the 
company, it still could not have awarded Bunta damages for conversion, because 
that would constitute a double recovery.  Therefore, I would hold that the existence 
of the operating agreement bars Bunta’s claim for conversion. 
{¶ 48} The lead opinion declines to adopt the bright-line rule that “a 
member’s claimed right to compensation for his or her membership interest at 
dissolution can never be intangible property subject to conversion” but determines 
that in this case, Bunta’s conversion claim is barred.  Lead opinion, ¶ 35.  The lead 
opinion reasons that Bunta’s conversion claim is barred because VacuPress’s 
liabilities exceeded the value of its assets at the time of its dissolution and therefore 
Bunta was not entitled to any compensation.  But that approach conflates damages 
with the availability of a conversion claim and misconstrues Bunta’s claim. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
21 
{¶ 49} By concluding that Bunta has no conversion claim because 
VacuPress’s liabilities exceeded the value of its assets, the lead opinion is actually 
taking issue with the amount of damages that were assessed by the jury, but that 
issue is not before this court.  Firman’s propositions of law are as follows: 
 
1. Compensation for a membership interest in a dissolved 
limited liability company cannot be the subject of conversion. 
2. Limited liability company managers who comply with 
their duties under the operating agreement in dissolving the 
company cannot be liable for conversion of a membership interest 
or unjust enrichment. 
 
In other words, the issue before this court is whether conversion claims are ever 
available in cases such as this one, when an operating agreement exists.  By 
declining to adopt the bright-line rule, the lead opinion would answer the issue 
before this court by holding that conversion claims for membership interests are 
available even when a company is governed by an operating agreement.  The lead 
opinion then improperly dives into the issue of damages, which was an issue that 
was determined by the jury and is not contained in either proposition of law that we 
accepted for review. 
{¶ 50} Furthermore, the lead opinion states that it analyzes VacuPress’s net 
assets because the only right Bunta identifies as having been taken was his right to 
compensation at dissolution.  Lead opinion at ¶ 34.  But that is not true.  Bunta 
alleges that Firman converted his ongoing membership interest in VacuPress, not 
his share of compensation upon dissolution.  Former R.C. 1705.01(H) defines 
“membership interest” as “a member’s share of the profits and losses of a limited 
liability company and the right to receive distributions from that company.”  2012 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
Sub.H.B. No. 48.  The right to share in profits and losses and to receive distributions 
from the company is a future interest that goes far beyond the value of the 
company’s current net assets.  This principle is obvious when one considers the fact 
that Firman and the other members of VacuPress decided to essentially retain their 
membership interests in VacuPress by becoming members of the new company, 
Superior Lumber, L.L.C. 
{¶ 51} A membership interest in a limited-liability company is worth more 
than simply the member’s share of the company’s net assets.  However, when an 
operating agreement exists that sets forth when and how the manager may wind up 
the company, a membership interest memorialized by that operating agreement 
cannot be subject to a conversion claim.  Rather, the member must bring his or her 
claim under the terms of the operating agreement.  Bunta did so here.  The jury 
simply found that Firman did not breach his fiduciary duty in dissolving VacuPress. 
{¶ 52} Because the operating agreement set forth when and how VacuPress 
could be dissolved, the trial court erred when it denied Firman’s motion for a 
directed verdict on the conversion and unjust-enrichment claims, and the decision 
of the Fifth District should be reversed.  Because the lead opinion declines to adopt 
a bright-line rule and instead analyzes issues that are not before this court, I concur 
in judgment only. 
KENNEDY and DEWINE, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Eques, Inc., Thomas D. White, and Matthew A. Kearney, for appellee. 
Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., L.P.A., Owen J. Rarric, and 
Matthew P. Mullen, for appellant. 
_________________