Title: LONG v DILLON

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 83-215 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1984 ELIZABETH L. LONG, Plaintiff and Appellant, CLIFTON E. DILLON, HARRIET L. RYAN, GRANITE COUNTY TREASURER, and the GRANITE COUNTY CLERK & RECORDER, Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Third Judicial District, In and for the County of Granite, The Honorable Robert J. Boyd, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Terry A. Wallace, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: James Bartlett; Hash, Jellison, O'Brien & Bartlett, Kalispell, Montana J. Allen Bradshaw, Philipsburg, Montana Submitted on Briefs: November 10, 1983 Decided: March 29, 1934 Filed: MAR 2 3 1984 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy d e l i v e r e d t-he Opinion of t h e Court. E l i z a b e t h L. Long (Long) a p p e a l s from a summary judgment a g a i n s t h e r e n t e r e d i n t h e District Court, Third J u d i c i a l District, G r a n i t e County, on h e r claim t o set a s i d e and c a n c e l a t a x deed, and f o r o t h e r r e l i e f . Robert G. M i t c h e l l and Niola M. M i t c h e l l recorded a warranty deed i n June, 1971 i n G r a n i t e County, by which t h e y acquired r e c o r d t i t l e t o r e a l p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d f o r b r e v i t y a s Lot 13 i n Ranch Creek Meadows Two i n G r a n i t e County. The G r a n i t e County T r e a s u r e r assessed t-he r e a l p r o p e r t y on t h e County Assessment books f o r t h e y e a r 1975 i n t h e name of R. G. M i t c h e l l , c / o Gordon L. and E l i z a b e t h L. Long, and l e v i e d t a x e s f o r t h a t y e a r i n t h e sum of $48.04. The t a x e s w e r e n o t p a i d and t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y was s o l d a t a t a x s a l e . There being no b i d d e r a t t h e t a x sal-e, t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y was s t r u c k o f f t o G r a n i t e County a s purchaser on August 18, 1976 f o r t h e d e l i n q u e n t t a x e s . On June 15, 1978, a q u i t c l a i m deed was recorded w i t h t h e County Clerk and Recorder i n G r a n i t e County from Gordon I , . Long t o E l i z a b e t h L. Long. On June 15, 1979, t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y s t i l l remained unredeemed from t h e t a x s a l e . A t t h a t t i m e , C l i f t o n E. D i l l o n p a i d t h e T r e a s u r e r o f G r a n i t e County t h e amount f o r which t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y was s o l d t o G r a n i t e County, t o g e t h e r w i t h a l l subsequent d e l i n q u e n t t a x e s , p e n a l t i e s , c o s t s and i n t e r e s t s , amounting i n a l l t o t h e sum of $366.66, whereupon t h e County T r e a s u r e r o f G r a n i t e County assigned a l l of t h e c o u n t y ' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y t o Dillon. On J u l y 2 , 1979, D i l l o n prepared and mailed a n o t i c e of a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t a x deed, s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n compliance w i t h section 15-18-202, MCA, addressed to "R. G. Mitchell, c/o Gordon L. and Elizabeth L. Long". The notice was enclosed in an envelope and addressed to "R. G. Mitchell, c/o Gordon L. and Elizabeth L. Long, Rte. 1, Box 1465, Clinton, Montana, 59825" by certified mail, with returned receipt requested. The post office returned the unopened letter to Dillon with a notation thereon "Addressee Unknown." The affidavit of Long indicates that she received in the mail the certified letter which enclosed the notice, but that she did not open it because it was certified and because it was addressed to R. G. Mitchell instead of to Long. After the certified letter was returned, Dillon caused to be published in the Philipsburg Mail, a newspaper published in Granite County, a notice of application for tax deed substantia.lly in compliance with section 15-18-202 ( 3 ) , MCA, except that the notice is undated. The first publication occurred on July 12, 1979. On September 11, 1979, Clifton Dillon executed and filed with the Granite County Treasurer an affidavit of service of notice of application for tax deed (see section 15-18-202(5), and 204, MCA) which we quote in pertinent part: "Clifton Dillon, Being first duly sworn, deposes and says: That Notice of Application for Tax Deed on the following described property, to-wit: [here follows a description of the real pro pert.^] was served upon R. G. Mitchell & Gordon & Elizabeth Long, record owner of said land, by placing a copy of said Notice in a registered letter addressed with the last known mailing address of said R. G. Mitchell & Gordon & Elizabeth Long, postage prepaid, and mail-ed at the [Jnited States Post Office in Kalispell on July 2, 1979, which date was sixty (60) or more days prior to the date of application for a Tax Deed on said property;. . ." The affidavit as aforesaid, together with the unopened certified mail envelope was filed with the County Treasurer, who on September 11, 1979, issued a tax deed for the real property to Clifton E. Dillon in the manner prescribed in section 15-18-205, MCA. On January 21, 1981, Long filed a complaint against Dillon, the Granite County Treasurer and the Granite County Clerk and Recorder, alleging she had sought to redeem the property, but had been refused by the defendant County Treasurer. She sought cancellation of the tax deed, and damages for defamation of title to the land and for mental and emotional distress, plus attorneys fees. On March 29, 1982, a warranty deed from Robert G. Mitchell and Niola M. Mitchell was recorded deeding title to the real property to Gordon L. Long and Elizabeth L. Long, the plaintiff herein. Dillon moved the District Court for a summary judgment of dismissal. After considering the various affidavits and records on file the District Court granted the motion, relying on our case of Adkins v. Redeye (1981), 196 Mont. 114, 639 P.2d 485. The District Court noted that all tax notices, which Long was aware were due and payable yearly, had been received by her a.nd mailed in the same manner and form as the notice of application for tax deed which she had declined to accept. Judgment of dismissal was entered based on the order granting summary judgment and this appeal ensued. The single issue to be determined by us is whether Long, as an owner of the property here involved was properly served by Dillon with notice of his application for a tax deed. In pertinent part, section 15-18-202, MCA, provides: "Notice of application for tax deed - - - (1) The property sold for delinquent taxes or his assignee must. . . at least 60 days before he applies for a deed, serve upon the owner of the property purchased, if known, any purchaser of the property under contract for deed, if known,. . . a written notice stating that said property or a portion thereof has been sold for delinquent taxes giving. . . the time. . . when the purchaser will apply for a tax deed. . ." Unless such notice is given to the owner of the real property, the time for redemption continues indefinite]-y . Section 15-1 8-202 (1) ; Madden v. Zimmerman (1975) , 166 Mont. 285, 291, 532 P.2d 414; Beckman Brothers v. Weir (1947), 120 Mont. 305, 184 P.2d 347. In each county, an assessment book must be kept in which appears the names of the person to whom the property is assessed. Section 15-8-701, MCA. If the owners are absent or unknown, the assessment is made to unknown owners. 15-8-501, MCA. Once land is listed in the assessment. hook, it need not be described a second time, but any person claiming the same and desiring to be assessed therefor may have his name inserted with that of the person to whom such land is assessed.. Section 15-8-702, MCA. In the usua.1 course it seems that the names a.nd addresses of owners of the property are determined by the County Treasurer's office by referring to its records, which are ta.ken from the classification department's records, which are in turn taken from the Clerk and Recorder's records. (See Madden v. Zimmerman, supra, 166 Mont. at 288, 532 P.2d at 416). We have held that the burden falls to the tax payer to keep the taxing authorities informed of his interest in the land and his current address. Madden v. Zimmerman, supra, 166 Mont. at 289-90, 532 P.2d at 417. In Adkins v. Redeye, supra, the real property was assessed to Phillip Redeye, c/o Mrs. Geraldine Huey, 2400 Donovan, Rellingham, Washington. Adkins mailed a notice of application for tax deed to Redeye at the address shown on the assessment list and the notices were returned to Adkins marked "Moved - Not Forwardable." Adkins then published the statutory notice and proceeded to obtain the tax deed to the real property. It wa.s contended in the case that if Adkins had searched the probate judgment book, he would have found an order and decree of distribution which would have revealed the true owners of the property. This Court held, following the decision in Madden v. Zimmerman, supra, that the applicant for a tax deed is not required to search all of the legal records and to be on notice of all legal publications that may affect title to the property. While Adkins v. Redeye, supra, might seem to apply to the case at bar, there is a substantial difference. In his affidavit to procure the tax deed, Dillon stated that he had served notice of application for tax deed upon "R. G. Mitchell. and Gordon and Elizabeth L. Long" by mail. While he attempted to serve R. G. Mitchell by mail, it is not accurate to state that he had so served Gordon and Elizabeth Long. The command of section 15-18-202, MCA, is that a notice of application for tax deed must be served upon the owner of the property purchased, "if known." The statute is not limited to the names appearing on the assessment list, though we have held that a purchaser need not go beyond the records of the County Treasurer in determining the owner of property in cases such as this. Madden, supra. In Fariss v. Anaconda Copper Mining Company ( D.C. Mont. 1940), 31 F.Supp. 571-, Judge Pray noted that the term "owner" in a like statute included the plural if there is more than one owner. He also noted our holding in Small v. Hull (1934), 96 Mont. 525, 32 P.2d 4, that such a statute, so far as it attempts to bar the owner's right to attack a deed issued without notice of the appl-ication therefore, amounts to a taking of property without due process of law. When as here, the applicant for the tax deed recites in his affidavit that he has served by mail an owner of the property, and such statement is not accurate, the applicant's tax deed issued based on the affidavit is void and of no effect. We held in Lowery v. Garfield County (1949), 122 Mont. 571, 208 P.2d 478 that the giving of a notice to an owner is jurisdictional and unless the requirements of the law in respect to such notice are complied with a tax deed may not legall-y issue. In reaching this decision, we give no effect to the deed to Elizabeth J Lona from Gordon L. Long since that instrument was outside of the chain of title. Our decision is based upon the inaccuracy of Dillon's affidavit that he had served an owner by mail when in fact such service had not occurred. Under Lowery, supra, a tax deed based on such an affidavit may not stand. A second issue, raised by Dillon on appeal was that Long's appeal here was not timely. The contention is based on whether the 30 day period for appeal or the 60 day period provided when an officer or agency of a political subdivision is involved, is applicable. Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P. Dil-Ion contends there was no real controversy between Lonq and the officers of Granite County and therefore the 30 day limitation ought to apply. However, Rule 5 does not admit of such an exception. Since an officer or agency of a political subdivision is a party to this action, an appellant has 60 days from the service of notice of entry of judgment in which to file notice of appeal. That occurred here. This cause is affirmed in part and reversed in part. We affirm the order and judgment of the District Court granting summary judgment and di-smissing the complaint against the officers of Granite County. We reverse the summary judgment insofar as Long is concerned, and remand the cause to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. T n J e Concur: '3- I f)i'- - L 3, ? / d 6 L -/ ,LLc+F(( Chief Justice Justices Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. dissents as follows: I dissent. The majority bases its decision on an inaccurate statement in Dillon's affidavit of service. The majority concludes that because of this defect a tax deed issued based on the affidavit is void. This rationale avoids the real issue in this case: Who must a tax deed applicant notify under section 15-18-202, MCA? The statute specifically and exclusively sets forth the steps required of a tax deed applicant to notify the property owner. The statute requires service of notice "upon the owner of the property purchased, if known." "The owner" might mean the legal owner, the equita.ble owner, the owner as disclosed by the records of the Clerk and Recorder, any of the above, or - all of the above. I would hold that "owner" as used in this statute means the person appearing on the assessment list as the owner of the property. 72 Am. Jur. 2d 220, S924. The reasons for such a construction are fourfold. First, the phrase "if known" in subsection (1) of the statute indicates that the tax deed applicant does not have a burden to divine equitable owners where their interests are unknown. Second, subsection (2) of the statute requires that the "owner" is to be notified at the address disclosed by the nortgage records. I infer that the owner to be notified is the one who uses that address. Third, subsection (2) indicates that notification of any known owner is sufficient where the property is unoccupied. Thus, notification of an equitable owner should not be required in addition to notification of the record owner. Finally, cases which have discussed the duty owed by tax deed applicants for discovering owners entitled to notice, have limited that duty: "To r e q u i r e t h e p e t i t i o n e r t o search o t h e r o r a l l l e g a l records and t o be on n o t i c e of a l l l e g a l publications which may a f f e c t t i t l e t o t h e property would be onerous. . . Therefore t h e burden must f a l l t o t h e taxpayer t o keep t h e t a x i n g a u t h o r i t i e s informed of h i s i n t e r e s t i n t h e land and h i s - - - c u r r e n t address. l1 (emphasis added) Madd.en v. Zirnmerman (1975), 166 Mont. 285, 289-90, 532 ~ . 2 d 4 1 4 , 417. Adkins v. Redeye (1981), 196 Mont. 1 1 4 , 120, 639 Dillon gave t h e s t a t u t o r y n o t i c e with t h e proper d a t e s i n s e r t e d , by c e r t i f i e d mail t o t h e owners of t h e property a s disclosed by t h e record, u t i l i z i n g t h e address of record, namely, R. G. Mitchell, c / o Gordon L. and Elizabeth J,ong, Route 1, Box 1465, Clinton, Montana, 59825, and thereby s a t i s f i e d t h e s t a t u t o r y w r i t t e n n o t i c e requirement. Dillon s a t i s f i e d a l l requirements of an a p p l i c a n t f o r t a x deed a s a matter of law. I would t h e r e f o r e f i n d t h e decision of t h e D i s t r i c t Court granting summary judgment i n favor proper.