Title: Sturman v. First Nat. Bank

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Sturman v. First Nat. Bank1986 WY 214729 P.2d 667Case Number: 86-117Decided: 12/11/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Janice L. STURMAN, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
Torrington, Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, GoshenCounty, John T. Langdon, 
J.

Maren K. Felde 
and Roger C. Elletson of Elletson, Doby and Felde, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Michael E. 
Warren of Sawyer, Warren & Kautz, Torrington, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     First National Bank of 
Torrington, appellee, filed an action to recover certain secured property 
pursuant to the terms of six promissory notes, two security agreements, and a 
financing statement signed by Janice Sturman, appellant. Following several 
hearings on the matter, the district court granted summary judgment for the 
bank. From that judgment, appellant now appeals to this 
Court.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Since 1971, the bank 
has financed the operations of the Sturman ranch in Goshen County, Wyoming. Between April 30 and September 10, 
1985, following her husband's death, appellant obtained credit from the bank on 
six separate occasions. As evidenced by six promissory notes, appellant agreed 
to repay the principal amount of the loans, $205,900, plus interest by November 
30, 1985. The notes also provided that the loans were secured by all of 
appellant's livestock, feed, machinery, equipment, and crops. As evidence of the 
bank's secured interest in her property, appellant also signed two security 
agreements and a financing statement. The security agreements provided in part 
that:

"[I]f any attempt shall 
be made to sell the collateral or remove the same from [Goshen] [C]ounty without 
the written consent of the Secured Party or its assigns, or if at any time 
Secured Party or its assigns reasonably deem themselves insecure or unsafe; then 
Secured Party or its assigns, at its option, may declare the obligations 
immediately due and payable * * *."

[¶4.]     On November 7, 1985, 
the bank filed a complaint for replevin and a motion for prejudgment seizure. In 
support thereof, the bank filed affidavits alleging that it had a secured 
interest in approximately 200 head of cattle belonging to appellant, that it 
believed the cattle were being weighed in preparation for sale to a Kansas 
buyer, and that pursuant to the security agreements and § 1-34-103, W.S. 1977, 
it was entitled to possession of the cattle. The district court entered an order 
for delivery of the property, commanding the sheriff of GoshenCounty to stop the sale and take 
possession of the cattle. Pursuant to § 1-34-103 et seq., the matter was set for 
hearing.

[¶5.]     At the hearing on 
November 13 and 15, 1985, the district court found that there was probable cause 
to believe that appellant was preparing to sell or remove the secured livestock 
with the intent to hinder or delay the bank in the collection of the amounts 
owed. The court also found that probable cause existed to believe that the 
remaining secured property might be sold and that the proceeds from such sale 
would not be applied to the promissory notes. In an order filed November 25, 
1985, the court directed the sheriff to take possession of the secured property 
remaining in appellant's possession and authorized the bank to proceed in its 
replevin action. On the same day, the bank filed a request for issuance of a 
writ of attachment and a motion for an order to show cause why appellant should 
not be held in contempt of court. In support of its motion to show cause, the 
bank filed an affidavit alleging that appellant violated the court's order 
directing her to deliver the secured livestock remaining in her possession by 
filing a labor and feed lien on the livestock and demanding payment of the lien 
from the bank in the amount of $475,550. On November 25, 1985, the district 
court entered an order directing appellant to appear on December 5 to show cause 
why she should not be held in contempt. In support of its request for the 
issuance of a writ of attachment, the bank filed an affidavit alleging that 
appellant had deposited $42,000 in Rocky Mountain Federal Savings & Loan 
Association in Torrington, which sum was subject to 
attachment. The bank also requested that a writ of garnishment issue to Rocky 
Mountain Federal. Pursuant to §§ 1-15-102 and 1-15-110, W.S. 1977, the district 
court issued an order of attachment against the property and estate of appellant 
and a writ of garnishment directing the sheriff to serve a garnishee notice and 
summons on Rocky Mountain Federal.

[¶6.]     On November 27, 1985, 
appellant filed a petition for a temporary restraining order and preliminary 
injunction in which she requested that the bank be restrained from attaching or 
garnishing assets outside the scope of the court's prejudgment attachment order. 
Among the assets claimed to be outside the scope of the order were $10,000 in 
Veteran's benefits and $2,400 held in trust for the United Church of Christ. In 
addition, on December 4, 1985, appellant filed a motion to discharge the writs 
of attachment and garnishment. After a hearing on December 11, 1985, the 
district court found:

"1. [The bank's] Writs of 
Attachment and Garnishment filed herein are valid and [appellant's] petition for 
temporary restraining orders and motions to quash the Writs of Attachment and 
Garnishment are denied.

"2. The attachment and 
replevin bonds filed by the [bank] are sufficient pursuant to W.S. § 
1-34-107.

"3. [Appellant's] claimed 
exemption of $10,000.00 for Veteran's benefits is denied on the basis that [she] 
failed to establish that funds on deposit in the Rocky Mountain Federal Savings 
& Loan were `Veteran[']s benefits'.

"4. [Appellant's] claimed 
exemption of $2,400.00 for certain funds held in trust for the United Church of 
Christ is denied on the basis that no evidence that a trust was ever established 
was presented to the Court.

"5. The [labor and feed] 
lien filed by [appellant] pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 29-7-102 is 
invalid."

[¶7.]     The question of 
appellant's remaining liability to the bank was then set for trial. On December 
16, 1985, appellant filed her answer and counterclaim in which she denied the 
allegations set forth in the bank's complaint. In addition, appellant raised two 
affirmative defenses: (1) failure of consideration in that the bank did not 
actually lend her money but simply made a credit entry in its books, and (2) 
fraud in that the bank had made false and misleading statements since 1971 in 
order to cause her and her husband to enter into loan arrangements detrimental 
to their interests. Appellant also counterclaimed against the bank for fraud, 
deceit and misrepresentation, failure of consideration, bad faith in contract, 
bad faith in tort, intentional interference with a contractual relationship, 
conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She later amended 
her answer to include the additional counterclaim of wrongful replevin and 
garnishment. In its reply, the bank generally denied appellant's claims and 
raised the affirmative defense that her counterclaim failed to state a claim and 
was frivolous as a matter of law. On January 21, 1986, the bank moved the 
district court to enter summary judgment on its complaint. Appellant filed a 
resistance to the bank's motion for summary judgment. In support thereof, she 
filed a memorandum of law, eight affidavits, three depositions, and a number of 
exhibits. A hearing on the motion was held February 17, 1986, and on March 24, 
1986, the court entered summary judgment for the bank. With respect to the 
bank's complaint and appellant's counterclaim, the district court found as 
follows:

"1. [Appellant] executed 
and delivered to the First National Bank, Torrington, Wyoming, (`Bank') six (6) 
promissory notes dated April 30, 1985, May 15, 1985, June 24, 1985, July 11, 
1985, August 7, 1985, and September 10, 1985, in the total amount of $205,900.00 
and as of March 18, 1986, after crediting net proceeds from sale of assets 
secured to the Bank, there remained due and owing to the Bank on said promissory 
notes the sum of $65,223.55 in principal and interest, together with attorney 
fees and costs to January 21, 1986, in the amount of $13,813.34, for a total sum 
of $79,036.89, which is due and owing to [the Bank] from 
[appellant].

"2. [Appellant's] 
affirmative defenses and counterclaims interposed in this action are without 
merit, present no genuine issue as to any material fact to support [appellant's] 
contentions and such counterclaims should be dismissed with 
prejudice."

[¶8.]     On the basis of these 
findings, the court ordered in relevant part:

"A. That [the bank] have 
and recover judgment against [appellant] in the sum of $79,036.89 as of this 
date;

"B. That [appellant's] 
counterclaims be and the same are hereby dismissed with prejudice; 
and

"C. That the Clerk of 
Court shall release [the bank's] replevin bond and return all money the [bank] 
has posted and the [bank] is hereby released from any and all liability 
resulting from its replevin action."

[¶9.]     On appeal from that 
judgment, appellant raises the following issues:

"I. A CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST EXISTS BETWEEN THE APPELLEE'S ATTORNEY AND THE 
APPELLANT.

"II. THE PREJUDGMENT 
ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT STATUTES WERE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO JANICE 
STURMAN IN VIOLATION OF HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION.

"III. APPELLEE WAS 
GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 56 OF THE WYOMING RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. THAT SAID SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED BASED ON THE 
EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND APPELLEE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW."

I

[¶10.]  The attorney representing the bank in 
this action against appellant is also a member of the bank's loan committee and 
board of directors. At the November 13 and 15 hearing, appellant contended, as 
she does before this Court, that, as a member of the board of directors, 
counsel's primary duty is to protect the bank's depositors. According to 
appellant, counsel cannot satisfy his duty to the bank's depositors if he is 
simultaneously representing the bank in an action against one of its 
depositors.

[¶11.]  There is no question that board members 
have a duty to protect their depositors. Morrison v. State Bank of Wheatland, 58 
Wyo. 138, 126 P.2d 793 (1942). However, the diligent collection of debts owed to the bank does 
not, as appellant claims, conflict with that duty. Foremost among board members' 
duties to depositors is the maintenance of the bank's solvency which necessarily 
includes the collection of debts, even from the bank's own depositors. In the 
present case, the board had ample reason to believe that appellant did not 
intend to repay the $205,900 extended to her and, in fact, that she was 
intentionally hindering the bank's efforts to collect the amount owed. Under 
these circumstances, it would have been a violation of the board members' duty 
to their depositors not to have acted to collect the debt. For these reasons, we 
find no conflict of interest between counsel's representation of the bank in 
this action and his duty to bank depositors as a member of the board of 
directors.

II

[¶12.]  Appellant states the second issue as 
follows:

"THE PREJUDGMENT 
ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT STATUTES WERE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO [HER] IN 
VIOLATION OF HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION."

In actuality, 
however, her argument touches upon a spectrum of claims, some of which relate to 
the constitutionality of the statutes or the manner in which they were applied 
in this case, and some of which do not. In the course of her argument, appellant 
questions whether:

A. Section 1-15-102 is 
unconstitutional in that it allows the clerk of court to issue a writ of 
attachment;

B. Section 1-15-102 is 
unconstitutional in that it allows a writ of attachment to issue on the basis of 
a conclusory affidavit;

C. Section 1-15-102 was 
unconstitutionally applied in this case, because the affidavits filed by the 
bank were conclusory and did not set forth specific facts supporting the claim 
for relief;

D. Upon her denial of the 
grounds for attachment set forth in the bank's affidavit, the burden of proof 
shifted back to the bank to provide additional evidence supporting its claim for 
relief, and the bank failed to satisfy that burden;

E. The attachment was 
improper, because the bank did not prove the existence of a debt; 
and

F. The attachment of 
additional assets belonging to appellant was improper, because there was no 
showing that the proceeds from the sale of the cattle were insufficient to 
satisfy the debt.

[¶13.]  With respect to the claim that § 1-15-102 
is unconstitutional because it allows the clerk of court to issue a writ of 
attachment, it is well established that:

"A party has standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse 
impact on his own rights. As a general rule, if there is no constitutional 
defect in the application of the statute to a litigant, he does not have 
standing to argue that it would be unconstitutional if applied to third parties 
in hypothetical situations." County Court of Ulster 
County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 
2223, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1979).

See also Stagner 
v. Wyoming State Tax Commission, Wyo., 682 P.2d 326 (1984). In the present 
case, the alleged defect in the statute was not applied to appellant. The writ 
of attachment was issued by the district judge, not the clerk of court. 
Therefore, appellant does not have standing to contend that the statute is 
unconstitutional in that it allows the clerk of court to issue a writ of 
attachment.

[¶14.]  Appellant's next two assertions, that § 
1-15-102 is unconstitutional or was at least unconstitutionally applied in that 
the writ of attachment was issued on the basis of conclusory affidavits, are 
also without merit. This action arose out of the bank's efforts to recover 
possession of property in which it had a security interest. The relevant 
statutory sections under which the bank proceeded provide in pertinent 
part:

Section 1-34-101, W.S. 
1977.

"The possession of 
specific personal property may be recovered in an action in district or county 
court as provided by law subject to jurisdictional limits of county 
courts."

Section 1-34-102, W.S. 
1977.

"(a) An order for the 
delivery of property to the plaintiff shall be issued by the court in which the 
action is brought following a hearing and when there is filed an affidavit of 
the plaintiff, his agent or attorney, showing:

"(i) A description of the 
property claimed;

"(ii) That the plaintiff 
is the owner of the property, or has special interest therein, and if the 
ownership or interest is special or partial, the fact shall be 
stated;

"(iii) That the property 
is wrongfully detained by the defendant;

"(iv) That it was not 
taken upon any process issued against the plaintiff, or if taken under such 
process that the property was exempt from execution expressly or upon demand or 
selection by the plaintiff, and is not held for a tax, or if held for a tax that 
it is not held for any tax legally assessed or levied against the 
plaintiff."

Section 1-34-103(a), W.S. 
1977.

"If the affidavit alleges any of the grounds 
for attachment stated in W.S. 1-15-401, the court shall issue an order for 
delivery of the property described in the affidavit without a hearing. In 
other cases a hearing shall be held before the order of delivery is issued." 
(Emphasis added.)

Section 1-15-401, W.S. 
1977.

"(a) A creditor may bring 
an action on his claim before it is 
due, and have an attachment against the property of the 
debtor:

"(i) When a debtor has 
sold, conveyed or otherwise disposed of, or is about to sell, convey or 
otherwise dispose of his property, or is about to remove his property or a 
material part thereof, with the intent to cheat or defraud his creditors or to 
hinder or delay them in the collection of their debts; or

"(ii) When a debtor is 
about to become a nonresident of the state." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶15.]  Under these provisions, the bank clearly 
was entitled to seek a writ of attachment before the debt was due and an order 
for delivery of the property without a hearing. The affidavit filed by the bank 
in support of its complaint for replevin showed in part:

1. A description of the 
property claimed by reference to the attached financing 
statement;

2. That the bank had a 
perfected security interest (a special interest) in the described 
property;

3. That the property was 
not detained wrongfully by the defendant; and

4. That the property was 
not taken upon any processes issued against the plaintiff.

The affidavit 
filed by the bank in support of its motion for prejudgment seizure showed in 
relevant part:

"4. That Plaintiff is 
entitled to the immediate possession of approximately 200 head of livestock * * 
* which are owned by the Defendant.

"5. That the approximate 
value of [said] cattle is $45,000.00.

"6. That the basis of 
Plaintiff's right of possession of the above-described property is based on a 
security agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit `A' and by 
reference is incorporated herein.

"7. That Affiant has been 
informed by L.E. Anderson that the Defendant intends to have the 
above[-]described property removed from Goshen County, Wyoming, [on] or about 
the 7th day of November, 1985.

"8. That Plaintiff never 
consented to Defendant's selling said livestock or removing the same from Goshen 
County, Wyoming.

"9. That the propos[ed] 
sale of said livestock without the Plaintiff's consent is a violation of the 
attached security agreement * * * and is made with the sole intent of defrauding 
the Plaintiff or to hinder or delay it in the collection of its 
debts."

[¶16.]  Thus, the allegations set forth in the 
affidavits and exhibits are not conclusory as appellant claims. They clearly 
demonstrate that appellant obtained credit from the bank, that she pledged her 
livestock as security for that credit, that the bank was told appellant intended 
to remove the cattle from the county without consent, and that appellant's 
actions violated the security agreement, entitling the bank to seek prejudgment 
relief. As appellant herself states, in order to pass constitutional muster, the 
affidavits filed in support of a prejudgment seizure must set forth specific 
facts supporting the claim for relief. We find the affidavits in this case to be 
entirely sufficient in that respect.

[¶17.]  Having concluded that the affidavits are 
not conclusory and that the manner in which the statutes were applied to 
appellant was constitutional, we also conclude that appellant does not have 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that it 
allows a writ of attachment to issue on the basis of a conclusory 
affidavit.

[¶18.]  Appellant's next contention is that 
because she positively denied the grounds for relief set forth in the bank's 
affidavit, the burden of proof shifted back to the bank to produce additional 
evidence in support of its claim. Appellant relies on Collins v. Stanley, 15 
Wyo. 282, 88 P. 620 (1907), and Smith v. Varel Manufacturing Company, Wyo., 378 P.2d 680 (1963), wherein this Court stated that an additional burden of proof 
rests upon the plaintiff when the grounds for attachment are positively denied 
by the defendant in the affidavit supporting the motion to 
discharge.

[¶19.]  In the present case, appellant filed a 
motion to discharge the writs of attachment and garnishment on December 4, 1985. 
In a supporting affidavit, appellant denied that she was

"about to remove her 
property out of the jurisdiction of this Court with intent to defraud her 
creditors; that she [was] about to convert her property into money for the 
purposes of placing it beyond the reach of her creditors; that she [was] about 
to dispose of her property with the intent to defraud her creditors; that she 
[had] property which she conceal[ed]."

[¶20.]  At the hearing following appellant's 
denial, the bank produced evidence that: (1) appellant signed the six promissory 
notes; (2) she agreed to pay the amounts due by November 30, 1985; (3) she 
signed two security agreements and a financing statement in which she pledged 
her property as security for the credit she obtained from the bank; (4) the 
security agreements provided that if the bank reasonably deemed itself insecure, 
it was entitled to accelerate payment of the debt; (5) the security agreements 
also provided that appellant must notify the bank before selling or removing any 
of the property; (6) appellant agreed to sell her 1985 calf crop in November to 
a buyer from Kansas; (7) appellant did not notify the bank of her plans to sell 
the calf crop to a Kansas buyer; (8) only $300 of the original $205,900 loan 
remained in appellant's account; (9) three times in the past appellant had sold 
property without the bank's consent and did not apply the proceeds to the debt; 
and (10) appellant filed suit in federal court seeking a recision of the debt. 
In addition, evidence was presented that, in late November 1985, she transferred 
the titles to her 1984 Mercury and 1968 motor home to her son, and she 
transferred accounts to different institutions for no apparent reason. Given 
this evidence, we find that the bank sufficiently satisfied its burden of proof 
under the standard enunciated in Collins and Smith.

[¶21.]  Appellant's next argument is that the 
issuance of the writ of attachment was improper because the bank failed to prove 
the existence of a debt. As we already have indicated, appellant testified that 
she signed six promissory notes which entitled her to obtain credit in the 
amount of $205,900, plus interest. In addition, she testified that she agreed to 
repay the amount by November 30, 1985. She testified further that, as of 
November 13, only $300 of the amount borrowed remained in her account. Despite 
her own testimony that she spent $205,600 of the amount loaned to her, appellant 
claims that no debt exists because the bank did not give her money but merely 
made a credit entry in her account. We are not persuaded. As appellant indicated 
in her own testimony, the effect of the credit entry was no different than if 
she had received cash. There simply is no question that the bank proved the 
existence of a debt.

[¶22.]  Finally, appellant contends that the 
attachment of additional assets belonging to her was improper prior to sale of 
the cattle, because there was no showing that the proceeds from that sale would 
be insufficient to satisfy her indebtedness. We do not agree. At the time the 
writs of attachment and garnishment issued, the district court had before it 
evidence that appellant's cattle were worth approximately $45,000. The court 
also had before it evidence that appellant owed the bank $219,171.39 plus 
interest pursuant to the terms of the promissory notes. This evidence, when 
combined with all of the evidence indicating that appellant was attempting to 
avoid repayment of her debt, clearly constitutes sufficient grounds for the 
issuance of a writ of attachment as provided in §§ 1-15-101(a)(vi), (vii), and 
(viii) and 1-15-102(a)(iii), W.S. 1977.

III

[¶23.]  The final question we must decide is 
whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the 
bank. As appellant contends, summary judgment is proper only if, upon reviewing 
the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and other material properly contained in 
the record, the court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), 
W.R.C.P. When reviewing a summary judgment,

"[w]e look at the record 
from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving 
him every favorable inference which may be drawn from * * * the * * * material 
[contained] in the record." Wyoming Recreation Commission v. Hagar, Wyo., 711 P.2d 402, 404 (1985).

"[The] party moving for a 
summary judgment has the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material 
fact. A material fact is one which, if proved, would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of the cause of action or 
defense asserted by the parties." Id. (citation omitted.)

[¶24.]  Viewing the record before us in the light 
most favorable to appellant, we are unable to find a genuine issue of material 
fact which makes summary judgment improper. The material facts, those which 
would refute or establish an essential element of the cause of action, are not 
in dispute. Both parties agree that appellant obtained credit from the bank, 
signed six promissory notes the terms of which required her to repay the loan by 
November 30, 1985, pledged her property as security for the loan, and signed 
security agreements which provided that she could not sell or remove the 
collateral without the written consent of the bank. In addition, there is no 
dispute that appellant thereafter attempted to sell a portion of the secured 
property to a Kansas buyer without notifying the bank and attempted to avoid 
repayment of the loan in a variety of ways, including seeking recision of the 
debt in federal court.

[¶25.]  Despite the absence of dispute on these 
material facts, appellant contends that numerous other issues of material, 
disputed fact exist which make summary judgment improper. She contends that 
"[e]ach and every allegation in the Complaint for Replevin and prejudgment 
attachment was conclusory in nature," and "[n]one of them were supported by 
specific facts." To illustrate, the bank alleged in its complaint that it loaned 
appellant $205,900. Appellant contends that the bank did not loan her $205,900, 
and therefore an issue of fact exists as to this allegation. We have already 
said that we are not persuaded by appellant's claim that no debt exists because 
the bank merely credited her account instead of actually giving her "money" or 
"dollars." Whatever appellant may choose to call it, she was able to pay for her 
needs by writing checks on her account to the tune of $205,600, which she would 
not have been able to do but for the bank's "credit entry." Appellant admits 
that the bank extended credit to her account, that she wrote checks on that 
account, and that only $300 of the amount extended remains in her account. 
Therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of the 
loan. Our conclusion on that issue also helps to resolve appellant's claim that 
a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the security agreements 
are supported by valuable consideration. It is well established that the 
performance of an act by one not legally obligated to perform is sufficient 
consideration since it is a legal detriment although it may not be an actual 
detriment. 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts § 97 (1964). Thus, we have said that the 
making of a loan constitutes valuable consideration. Laibly v. Halseth, Wyo., 
345 P.2d 796 (1959). In the present case, the bank advanced $205,900 to 
appellant, and she fully expended for her benefit all but $300 of that amount. 
On the basis of that transaction, we have already concluded that a loan existed. 
Thus, there was valuable consideration, and the security agreements are 
valid.

[¶26.]  Appellant also alleges that a genuine 
issue of material fact exists with respect to the meaning of the security 
agreements. Summary judgment is proper where the language of an agreement is 
plain and unambiguous. Sannerud v. First National Bank of Sheridan, Wyo., 708 P.2d 1236 (1985). In the present case, the language of the instruments signed by 
appellant is plain and unambiguous. The instruments clearly required appellant 
to obtain written consent from the bank before attempting to sell the secured 
property or remove it from the county, and they clearly entitled the bank to 
declare the loan immediately due if it deemed itself insecure. Appellant's 
contention that she did not read the instruments before signing them and that 
the bank failed to point out the important provisions is without merit. A person 
signing a contract cannot avoid it on the ground that he did not read it. Laird 
v. Laird, Wyo., 597 P.2d 463 (1979).

[¶27.]  Appellant next contends that a question 
of fact exists as to whether she attempted to sell or remove the secured 
property from Goshen County. Appellant's own testimony clearly shows that she 
entered into an agreement with a Kansas buyer to sell her 1985 calf crop on or 
about November 7 and was in the process of delivering the calves to the feed lot 
when the sheriff stopped the sale.

[¶28.]  Contrary to her last claim, appellant 
then admits that she attempted to sell the cattle to a Kansas buyer but contends 
that she did not violate the security agreements by doing so because she and her 
husband always sold their cattle at this time of year without the bank's 
consent, and the bank never objected. Appellant's argument fails to take into 
account that portion of the security agreements which allows the bank to 
accelerate payment of the debt if at any time it reasonably deems itself 
insecure. Within the limits of that provision and § 34-21-127, W.S. 1977, the 
bank was entitled to declare the loan due regardless of the parties' prior 
course of conduct. Section 34-21-127 provides that the power to accelerate 
payment of a debt must be exercised in good faith. Good faith is defined as 
honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. Section 
34-21-120(a)(xix), W.S. 1977. In the present case, the bank deemed it 
inadvisable to continue financing appellant's operations in 1986. After 
informing appellant of that decision, the bank learned that appellant was filing 
an action in federal court to have the debt rescinded. In addition, upon 
reviewing appellant's file, the bank discovered that she had fewer cattle in 
August than she had in April, indicating that she sold some without informing 
the bank or applying the proceeds to her indebtedness. The bank also discovered 
that appellant made three deposits from cattle sales in 1985 and yet made no 
payments on the loan. On the basis of these events and the discovery that 
appellant was about to sell her entire calf herd in November without consent, 
the bank accelerated the due date of the debt and brought the replevin action. 
Under these circumstances, we have no hesitation in finding that the bank in 
good faith deemed itself insecure and properly declared the obligation 
due.

[¶29.]  On August 7, 1985, appellant submitted a 
tentative plan to the bank in which she indicated that she was considering 
reducing the size of her operation by selling some of her cattle and equipment 
and leasing part of her land. Then, on August 28, 1985, she submitted a second 
proposal which described an even greater reduction in her operation. On 
September 5, 1985, appellant received a letter from the bank which 
said:

"At our recent Board of 
Director's meeting, we discussed your loan with us to some length, and I thought 
that I should inform you that it is not our intent to finance your 1986 ranching 
operation, but that we will be looking forward to your repaying us in 
full.

"At this time, your debt 
to us including interest, is $209,631.38, and of course, additional funds will 
be needed from now until livestock is 
sold, likewise, there will also be additional 
interest.

"We regret finding it 
necessary to give you this notice, but I do feel that it should be beneficial to 
you in your timing and marketing." 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶30.]  Appellant now claims that these written 
exchanges create a question of fact as to whether she sought and received the 
bank's consent to sell the cattle to a Kansas buyer. Again, appellant's own 
testimony demonstrates that she did not tell the bank that she intended to sell 
the cattle to a Kansas buyer.

"Q Why did you not notify 
the bank that you were going to sell these to a Kansas 
buyer?

"A We had never notified 
the bank on the exact day that we are going to sell our calves in the 
fall."

Thus, there is 
no genuine issue of material fact as to whether she had the bank's consent to 
sell the cattle.

[¶31.]  Appellant also claims that a disputed 
issue of fact exists because, under the terms of the promissory notes, payment 
was not due until November 30, 1985, and the bank seized the cattle on November 
7, 1985. The security agreements clearly provide for acceleration of the debt if 
any attempt is made to sell the collateral or remove it from the county or if at 
any time the secured party reasonably deems itself insecure. As we have already 
indicated, the bank was entitled to accelerate the debt on either of those 
grounds. The terms of the promissory notes are clear and unambiguous as to 
acceleration of the debt; therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact 
concerning the bank's early seizure of the property.

[¶32.]  In the final portion of her brief, 
appellant claims that her affirmative defenses and counterclaim contain numerous 
issues of material fact prohibiting summary judgment.

[¶33.]  Appellant's first affirmative defense is 
that the security agreements are invalid for lack of consideration because the 
sum the bank credited to her account was merely a credit entry or paper transfer 
and not really money or dollars. We addressed this issue earlier in the opinion 
and will not do so again here.

[¶34.]  Appellant's second affirmative defense is 
that the bank knowingly and with reckless disregard for the truth made false and 
misleading statements and promises of material fact which induced her to enter 
into loan agreements detrimental to her interests. In support of her claim, 
appellant alleges generally that the bank promised that it would act in her best 
interest and assist, advise, and cooperate in the management of her financial 
affairs and that by refusing to finance her 1986 operations and calling her debt 
due early, the bank somehow defrauded, deceived, or misled her. There is 
absolutely nothing in the record to support this claim. Instead, the record 
reflects that, until the fall of 1985, the bank cooperated fully with appellant 
in the management of her financial affairs. Despite a "[n]ot always 
satisfactory" relationship, the bank financed the ranching operations of 
appellant and her husband for approximately 14 years. After appellant's husband 
died, the bank extended the credit necessary to keep the ranch going until 
appellant indicated her intent to wind up or reduce the size of her operations 
and find other employment. Only when it became evident that appellant was 
attempting to avoid repayment of her debt did the bank accelerate payment of the 
loan. Under these circumstances, we find no intent to defraud. Appellant's claim 
that the bank somehow induced her to enter into loan agreements detrimental to 
her interest is likewise without merit. Appellant's own testimony clearly 
demonstrates that she and/or her husband went to the bank to obtain financing; 
the bank did not come to them. She testified further that although the bank 
agreed to finance her operations for 1985, there was no such agreement for 1986. 
Thus, her claim that the bank deceived her into believing she had a continuing 
line of credit also lacks merit. We also find nothing to support appellant's 
claim that, by not disclosing essential terms of the security agreements, the 
bank somehow lied to her. We have already said that the agreements are clear and 
unambiguous; appellant's failure to read them will not support a finding that 
the bank lied to her.

[¶35.]  Finally, we are not persuaded by 
appellant's claim that the bank fraudulently altered the loan documents after 
she signed them. We have said that:

"A material alteration of 
an instrument made after its execution by a party offering it into evidence, 
which alteration was not consented to by the other party, nullifies the 
instrument as a legal obligation. An alteration is material if 
it:

"`* * * destroys the 
identity of the instrument or of the contract evidenced thereby, or which so 
changes its terms as to give it a different legal effect from that which it 
originally had, and thus works some change in the rights, obligations, interest, 
or relations of the parties. * * *' 4 Am.Jur.2d Alteration of Instruments § 5, 
pp. 6-7 (1962)." Starrett v. Shepard, Wyo., 606 P.2d 1247, 1252-53 (1980) 
(citations omitted).

[¶36.]  In the present case, although the 
evidence does disclose that notations were made on some of the documents, none 
of the notations enlarged or diminished the rights or obligations of the 
parties. The security instruments, for example, covered all of appellant's 
machinery. Therefore, the notation adding two items of machinery to the list of 
secured property did not enlarge appellant's obligation under the agreements and 
does not constitute a material alteration nullifying the 
agreements.

[¶37.]  Throughout her testimony, appellant was 
asked repeatedly to give specific examples of the bank's efforts to defraud, 
deceive, and mislead her. Her answers were generally vague and nonresponsive. 
She stated that she couldn't "remember right off-hand" what facts the bank 
concealed from her; she would have to "go through [her] records" to know what 
information the bank failed to disclose; she "would have to think about [it] for 
a while" to know what statements made by the bank misled her; but she was "sure 
there [were]" untrue statements made by the bank. Given this testimony and the 
other evidence contained in the record, we are unable to find a genuine issue of 
material fact making summary judgment improper on appellant's affirmative 
defense of fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit.

[¶38.]  Turning next to appellant's counterclaim, 
we find that the first two counts are identical to the affirmative defenses 
discussed immediately above; therefore, there is no need to address them again 
here. In support of her claims of bad faith in contract and bad faith in tort, 
appellant points to the fact that:

"[The bank] never pointed 
out to her that she should read the back or that there was anything on the back 
of the security agreement. She was never allowed any time in which to look it 
over and it was never expressed how important it was.

"33. That [the bank] 
purposely and willfully disregarded her rights under the contract and frustrated 
the purpose of the operating loan by manipulating the contract provisions, of 
which she had no knowledge, to [its] benefit and to her 
detriment.

"34. That she trusted 
[the bank] to protect her financial health; she trusted [its] advice concerning 
the operating loan because she had known her husband was dealing with [it] for 
many years. She specifically trusted [it] to help her after her husband's death 
to try to run the ranch.

"35. That she never felt 
like she had any bargaining power or any say in any matter; she merely signed 
whatever [the bank] required her to sign because she felt [the bank] knew more 
about it."

 

These 
allegations are merely a restatement of those previously considered and 
dismissed by this Court as unsupported by the record. There is absolutely no 
evidence which suggests that the bank manipulated the contract provisions to its 
benefit and to appellant's detriment. That appellant may have trusted the bank 
and may have been in a weaker bargaining position is not enough to create a 
genuine issue of material fact with respect to her claims of bad faith in 
contract and bad faith in tort.

[¶39.]  Appellant next contends that her claim 
that the bank intentionally interfered with her contractual relationship with 
the Kansas buyer raises a genuine issue of material fact. Again, we find no such 
issue. The sale was stopped by the sheriff pursuant to a court order and in 
accordance with the terms of the security agreements and the Wyoming prejudgment 
attachment statutes. There being no dispute as to these facts, summary judgment 
was proper as to appellant's claim of interference with a contractual 
relationship.

[¶40.]  In the fifth count of her counterclaim, 
appellant alleges that the bank is guilty of conversion as a result of the 
replevin action because the bank was not entitled to possession of the cattle. 
We have reiterated throughout this opinion that the security agreements clearly 
entitled the bank to seize the secured property if it deemed itself insecure or 
appellant attempted to sell or remove the cattle from the county. Pursuant to 
those agreements, the bank sought and obtained prejudgment judicial relief in 
accordance with the controlling statutes. Thus, there is no genuine issue of 
material fact as to appellant's claim of conversion.

[¶41.]  Appellant also contends that an issue of 
fact exists as to her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In 
order to demonstrate the intentional infliction of emotional distress, appellant 
must prove that the bank "`by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or 
recklessly cause[d her] severe emotional distress.'" Leithead v. American 
Colloid Company, Wyo., 721 P.2d 1059, 1065 (1986), quoting § 46 of the 
Restatement, Second, Torts (1965). Outrageous conduct is defined as conduct 
which goes beyond all possible grounds of decency, is regarded as atrocious, and 
is utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Id. It is for the court to 
determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably 
be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. 
Id.

[¶42.]  In the present case, appellant's 
affidavit states that she was "in total shock, grief-stricken, and totally lost" 
following her husband's death; that "she had a deep feeling of emptiness and * * 
* felt hurt and scared and was in pain"; that "[s]he could not function normally 
for months * * * and was very lonely"; and that the bank "inflicted intentional 
emotional distress upon her by forcing her to negotiate loans, just after her 
husband's death, without explaining to her the repercussions, conditions or 
requirements." We already have said that there is no evidence to support 
appellant's contention that the bank "forc[ed] her" to negotiate loans. Given 
the circumstances, we do not find the bank's efforts to collect the amount due, 
pursuant to the instruments signed by appellant and in accordance with Wyoming 
statutes, to be extreme or outrageous. That appellant was suffering from 
emotional distress due to her husband's death and her uncertain financial 
situation is not sufficient to present a jury question as to intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, summary judgment was 
proper.

[¶43.]  As indicated previously, after the 
district court issued the order for delivery of property, appellant filed a feed 
and labor lien on the cattle and demanded that the bank pay her for feed and 
storage. The district court held the lien invalid, and appellant now contends 
that a jury should have decided the matter rather than the court. Appellant 
provides absolutely no cogent argument or authority for the proposition that the 
lien was valid; therefore, we would ordinarily decline to address the issue. 
However, because appellant's actions are clearly prohibited by the terms of the 
security agreements, we affirm the district court's finding that appellant's 
lien is invalid.

The security agreements 
expressly state:

"Debtor convenants and 
agrees: that, except for the security 
interest hereby granted, the collateral described herein is free and clear 
of all liens, security interests, and other encumbrances * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

Even assuming 
that appellant could create a valid lien on her own property, the language of 
the security agreements clearly prohibits her from doing so in the present case. 
To hold otherwise would be to render the terms of the security agreements and 
the bank's security interest meaningless.

[¶44.]  Appellant also takes issue with the 
manner in which the sale of the cattle was ultimately conducted. The affidavits 
in support of her claim allege that the cattle were sold at a "bad time" and 
that the condition of the cattle had deteriorated between the time they were 
seized and the sale. Section 34-21-966, W.S. 1977, requires that the sale of 
collateral must be commercially reasonable as to method, manner, time, place, 
and terms. Section 34-21-966(b), W.S. 1977, provides in 
part:

"The fact that a better 
price could have been obtained by a sale at a different time or in a different 
method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to 
establish that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable 
manner."

[¶45.]  In the present case, the security 
agreements provided:

"Where the collateral is 
livestock, it is agreed that a commercially reasonable means of disposing of the 
collateral shall include sale of such collateral in the customary manner on the Denver, 
Colorado or Omaha, Nebraska livestock markets or through a licensed livestock sales ring 
in Wyoming * * *." (Emphasis added.)

[¶46.]  There is no dispute that the sale was 
made through Torrington Livestock Commission Company, Inc., a licensed livestock 
sales ring in Wyoming. There is also no dispute that the sale occurred one week 
after the sheriff took possession of the cattle. Applying the language of § 
34-21-966 quoted above, appellant's claim that the cattle should not have been 
sold between Thanksgiving and New Year's Day is not sufficient to establish that 
the sale was commercially unreasonable. The bank complied with the statutory 
requirements and the terms of the security agreements. The agreements signed by 
appellant did not require the cattle to be marketed as a reputation herd nor did 
they require them to be sorted by age. Appellant makes no showing that such 
procedures are "customary" within the meaning of the agreements. Therefore, 
nothing in the record supports her contention that the sale was commercially 
unreasonable, and we find summary judgment proper.

[¶47.]  In addition, as the trial court stated in 
its decision letter:

"[T]he defendant had the 
opportunity, at the time of the proposed sale of the calves to [the Kansas 
buyer], to [consummate] said sale simply by agreeing to pay the plaintiff. For 
reasons unknown to the Court but not at issue here, this was not done. Defendant 
had the opportunity to post a redelivery bond after the replevin act and recover 
all of her property. Once again this was not done. Having failed to do any of 
these things defendant will not be heard to say that she could have obtained a 
better price or done a better job of caring for the property during the period 
between levy and sale so as to raise an issue of fact against the plain 
statement and purpose of Sec. 34-21-966(b) * * *."

[¶48.]  Appellant's final claim before this Court 
is that the bank wrongfully replevined her property and that she has been 
damaged. This claim was adequately addressed earlier in this opinion; therefore, 
we decline to address it here.

[¶49.]  To summarize our response to the array of 
issues presented by appellant in support of her claim that summary judgment 
should not have been granted, we refer to what was said in Spurlock v. Ely, 
Wyo., 707 P.2d 188, 191 (1985):

"[E]ven though we must 
consider the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion 
for summary judgment and give him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the 
facts, any inferences drawn must be based 
on facts in the record. `[A]n inference which is contrary to direct testimony is 
insufficient to support a finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists,' 
[Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, Wyo.,] 671 P.2d [334,] 337 [1983]." 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶50.]  In the present case, the vast majority of 
appellant's "facts" are, quite simply, contrary to the direct testimony and 
other evidence contained in the record and are, therefore, insufficient to raise 
a genuine issue of material fact. For that reason, we find that the district 
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the bank on its complaint 
and against appellant on her counterclaim was entirely 
proper.

[¶51.]  Throughout the course of these 
proceedings, appellant has referred many times to the importance of this case, 
not only to her personally but also to the entire farming community in the 
United States. The theme of her claims is "[t]hat the family farming sector of 
the nation * * * is being targeted for extinction by the private money 
monopolists." We are sensitive to the plight of the American family farm. We are 
fully aware that nationwide individuals like appellant are losing their land, 
their homes, and their way of life. However, no matter how much appellant would 
like to convince us otherwise, we find that the bank acted properly throughout 
its dealings with appellant. In addition, appellant was afforded every 
opportunity to present her case. Four hearings were held, the witnesses called 
by the parties testified and were cross-examined extensively, numerous 
affidavits, depositions, and exhibits were introduced, and counsel for both 
parties submitted extensive legal briefs and memoranda in support of their 
claims. Under these circumstances, we find no denial of due 
process.

[¶52.]  Affirmed.