Title: Seger v. For Women, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Seger v. For Women, Inc., 110 Ohio St.3d 451, 2006-Ohio-4855.] 
 
 
SEGER, APPELLEE, v. FOR WOMEN, INC. ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Seger v. For Women, Inc., 110 Ohio St.3d 451, 2006-Ohio-4855.] 
Civil procedure – Commencement of actions – Civ.R. 3(A) — Action is properly 
“commenced” for purposes of statutes of limitations once a complaint is 
filed, as long as service is obtained within one year of filing – Clerk’s 
failure, at plaintiff’s request, to serve complaint “forthwith” as required 
by Civ.R. 4(A) not grounds for dismissal of complaint. 
(No. 2005-0556 — Submitted January 10, 2006 — Decided October 4, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-040317, 2005-
Ohio-528. 
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PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} The complaint in this case alleges that beginning in 2001, 
appellees, For Women, Inc., Deanna L. Parobeck, M.D., Nancy M. Wozniak, 
M.D., TriHealth, Inc., Good Samaritan Hospital of Cincinnati, and various 
unknown colleagues, agents, and employees (collectively, “For Women”), 
provided medical services, including a hysterectomy, to appellant, Lynn J. Seger.  
Seger alleges that during the hysterectomy, a suture was incorrectly placed, 
blocking her ureter, the tube that connects the kidneys to the urinary bladder.  For 
Women sent Seger to a  urologist, and additional surgeries were performed to 
correct the problem.  Seger alleges that despite the corrective measures, she still 
suffers from incontinence and pain in her kidney area, that she lacks strength, and 
that she is unable to lead a normal life. 
{¶ 2} On March 27, 2003, Seger filed a complaint against For Women in 
the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas.  Even though Seger still did not 
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know which of the two named doctors was responsible for the incorrectly placed 
suture, she filed her complaint because there were only two days left before the 
expiration of the limitations period under R.C. 2305.113(B)(1).  Seger’s counsel 
requested the clerk of courts to hold the complaint without serving it.  The clerk 
stamped the cover of the complaint “Do Not Serve,” with the notation “Per Atty” 
and the date, “3/28/03.”  There is a similar handwritten notation on the complaint, 
with Seger’s counsel’s signature appearing below it. 
{¶ 3} The complaint remained in the clerk’s office for over four months, 
awaiting counsel’s request for service.  Even though Seger’s counsel had still been 
unable to identify the responsible doctor, on August 15, 2003, he requested 
service of the complaint.  Service was made to all named defendants not later than 
August 25, 2003. 
{¶ 4} In two separate motions, For Women moved to dismiss the 
complaint because service had not been demanded within the limitations period 
pursuant to R.C. 2305.17.  The trial court granted the motions. 
{¶ 5} Seger appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the judgment and 
remanded the cause.  The court concluded that all defendants had been served 
pursuant to Civ.R. 3(A) and, therefore, that the action had been properly 
commenced. 
{¶ 6} The cause is now before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
{¶ 7} In Ohio, “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with 
the court, if service is obtained within one year from such filing * * *.”  Civ.R. 
3(A).  This is in apparent conflict with R.C. 2305.17, which requires the filing of 
a praecipe with the complaint for an action to be considered “commenced.”  
Civ.R. 3(A) does not require a praecipe to be filed.  Because the Civil Rules 
govern procedure in Ohio, Seger did not need to comply with the praecipe 
January Term, 2006 
3 
requirement of R.C. 2305.17.  State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 108 Ohio St.3d 86, 
2006-Ohio-161, 840 N.E.2d 1062, ¶ 6 (“Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution states that the Supreme Court is vested with exclusive authority to 
‘prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of the state, which 
rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. * * * All laws in 
conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have 
taken effect.’  Pursuant to this constitutional authority, the court has adopted the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which ‘prescribe the procedure to be followed in all 
courts of this state in the exercise of civil jurisdiction.’  Civ.R. 1(A)”). 
{¶ 8} While conceding that the praecipe requirement of R.C. 2305.17 has 
been superseded by the Civil Rules, For Women argues that service outside the 
limitations period is not timely.  To the contrary, Civ.R. 3(A) plainly states that an 
action is commenced upon the filing of a complaint “if service is obtained within 
one year from” the filing of the complaint.  See Goolsby v. Anderson Concrete 
Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 549, 550, 575 N.E.2d 801 (“One clear consequence 
of Civ.R. 3(A) is that it is not necessary to obtain service upon a defendant within 
the limitations period * * *”).  
{¶ 9} For Women also argues that Civ.R. 3(A) should be read in 
conjunction with Civ.R. 4(A), which requires the clerk of courts, upon the filing 
of a complaint, to issue a summons for service upon the defendant “forthwith.”  
“Forthwith” means “[i]mmediately,” “without delay,” or “promptly.”  Black’s 
Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 680.  The clerk did not comply with Civ.R. 4(A).  
Counsel for Seger wanted to delay service to have more time to identify the 
responsible doctor.  We understand why counsel requested the clerk to hold the 
complaint without serving it.  But the clerk was not required to comply with 
counsel’s request, and should not have. 
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{¶ 10} The fact that the clerk has a “DO NOT SERVE” rubber stamp 
suggests that it is common practice in Hamilton County to serve complaints other 
than “forthwith.”  Though we cannot condone this general practice or the specific 
actions of the clerk in this case, this failure of the clerk is not grounds for 
dismissal of Seger’s complaint.  First, For Women was not prejudiced.  Seger’s 
action was timely commenced, and For Women received notice as prescribed by 
Civ.R. 3(A).  Second, to hold otherwise would lead to a host of potential 
problems, including determining on a case-by-case basis whether the clerk 
ordered service “forthwith,” and, if not, whether the delay was intentional or the 
result of negligence, and what the consequences of the delay should be.  Our 
conclusion is unaffected by Seger’s encouragement of the clerk to ignore the 
requirement of ordering service found in Civ.R. 4(A). 
{¶ 11} We conclude, as did the court of appeals, that Seger commenced 
her action in compliance with Civ.R. 3(A).  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, LUNDBERG STRATTON and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur separately. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, J., concurring. 
{¶12} I concur with the majority but write separately in order to 
emphasize two points.  First, there is no showing that the appellants in this case 
suffered any prejudice due to the appellee’s failure to cause the complaint to be 
served immediately.  Appellee served a 180-day letter on appellants prior to the 
expiration of the statute of limitations, notifying them that a lawsuit would likely 
be forthcoming. 
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{¶13} Second, and more important, I write in admonishment of an 
apparent practice that disregards the mandates of the Civil Rules. The Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the Disciplinary Rules suggest that attorneys who request that 
a clerk suspend service of a complaint may violate ethical rules of conduct.  
Civ.R. 1(B) requires this court to construe the Rules of Civil Procedure in a 
manner that “effect[s] just results by eliminating delay * * * and all other 
impediments to the expeditious administration of justice.”  Civ.R. 4(A) mandates 
that “[u]pon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith issue a summons 
for service upon each defendant listed in the caption.”  (Emphasis added.)  Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines “forthwith” as “[i]mmediately; without delay.”   Black’s 
Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 680.  The rule, therefore, explicitly requires the 
clerk to serve the complaint upon all listed defendants immediately and without 
delay, and gives the clerk no discretion to suspend that service.  Although Civ.R. 
4(A) further allows the plaintiff to request additional or separate summons at any 
time against any defendant, that allowance in no way affects the original duty of 
the clerk to serve the complaint immediately.  Even apart from the admonition in 
Civ.R. 1(B) that the rules should be interpreted and applied in a manner to ensure 
expeditious litigation, the plain language of the rule requires prompt and 
immediate service. 
{¶14} As noted by the majority, appellee’s reliance on Civ.R. 3(A) is 
misplaced, as that rule only provides an additional year in which to accomplish 
service as a fail-safe for serving an elusive defendant.  Read in conjunction with 
Civ.R. 1(B), this rule does not permit a plaintiff to suspend service for up to a 
year.  Instead, it grants plaintiffs a window of opportunity in which to locate and 
serve an evasive defendant. 
{¶15} Canon 7 of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility requires 
attorneys to represent clients “zealously within the bounds of the law.”  Prior to 
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this court’s decision in this matter, an attorney might arguably have sought to 
suspend service of a complaint without violating any Disciplinary Rules.  In the 
wake of this decision, however, members of the bar should be on notice that an 
attorney may violate DR 7-102(A)(2) by requesting suspension of service because 
he would be knowingly encouraging action that is “unwarranted under existing 
law.” 
{¶16} Further, a clerk has no discretion in carrying out the duties of the 
office; he or she is merely an arm of the court he or she serves.  State ex rel. 
McKean v. Graves (1914), 91 Ohio St. 23, 24, 109 N.E. 528.  The Civil Rules do 
not allow a clerk to suspend service for up to a year, but rather require immediate 
service, and the clerk violates his duties by failing to attempt prompt service.  The 
clerk does not have the authority to agree to service that is not “forthwith” as the 
rules require.  If the clerk may not suspend service, an attorney may act 
unethically by requesting or encouraging the clerk to act in violation of the rules.  
See DR 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting acts by attorneys that are prejudicial to the 
administration of justice). 
{¶17} With these additional principles in mind, I respectfully concur. 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, LUNDBERG STRATTON and LANZINGER, JJ., concur 
in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring. 
{¶18} I concur with the majority but write separately to emphasize that 
Civ.R. 4(A) addresses the duty of the clerk of courts.  “Upon the filing of the 
complaint the clerk shall forthwith issue a summons for service upon each 
defendant listed in the complaint.”  (Emphasis added.)  While a clerk may wish to 
accommodate an attorney’s request to delay service, the clerk has no such 
discretion. 
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{¶19} If members of the bar feel strongly about the need to delay service 
of complaints upon defendants, they may seek to change the rule by appropriate 
request to this court.  The rule as presently drafted, however, does not vest 
discretion in the clerk of courts to afford attorneys or parties special consideration 
when issuing service.  A clerk who does so violates the rule by failing to 
“forthwith” issue the summons for service upon the defendants listed in the 
complaint. 
__________________ 
 
Spraul, Veith & Doan Co., L.P.A., Daniel G. Spraul, and Holly Doan 
Spraul, for appellee. 
Calderhead & Associates, David C. Calderhead, and Stephanie D. 
Franckewitz, for appellants For Women, Inc. and Deanna L. Parobeck, M.D. 
Rendigs, Fry, Kiely & Dennis, L.L.P., and Felix J. Gora, for appellants 
Good Samaritan Hospital, TriHealth, Inc., and Nancy Wozniak, M.D. 
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