Title: MARTIN L. WATERS and LESLIE WATERS vs. STATE OF IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 08–1258 
 
Filed June 25, 2010 
 
 
MARTIN L. WATERS and LESLIE WATERS, 
 
 
Appellees, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
and DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, 
 
 
Appellants. 
 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Madison County, Martha L. 
Mertz, Judge. 
 
 
The State appeals from an order by the district court directing the 
case to be scheduled for trial.  DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
VACATED AND DISTRICT COURT ORDER AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Richard E. Mull and 
Robin G. Formaker, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellants. 
 
 
Dean T. Jennings of Jennings Law Firm, Council Bluffs, and 
Jerry W. Katskee of Katskee, Henatsch & Suing, Omaha, Nebraska, for 
appellees. 
 
 
 
2 
 
CADY, Justice. 
 
In this appeal involving an action brought by two plaintiffs against 
the State of Iowa and other defendants to recover personal injuries 
resulting from a motor vehicle accident, we must decide whether any 
claims against the State remained for trial after the district court granted 
summary judgment for the State so as to support a subsequent order by 
the district court directing the State to proceed to trial.  We transferred 
the case to the court of appeals, who affirmed the order of the district 
court.  Upon our review, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals 
and affirm the order of the district court.   
 
I.  Background Facts and Proceedings. 
 
A severe winter storm swept across western and central Iowa on 
February 8, 2004, including the area where Interstate 80 traverses 
Madison County.  The storm continued to batter the area into the 
evening and early morning hours of the following day, producing surface 
ice and substantial amounts of snow and blowing snow.  Driving 
conditions on Interstate 80 deteriorated to the point where the Iowa State 
Patrol issued a ban on towing operations for portions of the interstate, 
including the area between mile markers 97 and 100 in Madison County.   
 
Donald Deeds was driving his Jeep Cherokee west on Interstate 80 
between mile markers 97 and 100 around 2:30 a.m. on February 9, 
when he lost control and slid off the traveled portion of the roadway.  The 
vehicle landed on its side in the median between the west and eastbound 
lanes.  Deeds was not hurt.  He abandoned his vehicle when a passing 
motorist provided him a ride to a nearby motel.  Deeds called 911 and 
informed the operator of the accident.   
 
Between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m. on February 9, Trooper Jody Elliott of 
the Iowa State Patrol came upon Deeds’ vehicle while on patrol.  He 
 
3 
 
stopped to investigate.  He determined the Jeep was within the median, 
no persons were at the scene, and the vehicle did not present a hazard to 
traffic.  He left and resumed his patrol.   
 
Around 5:15 a.m., Lance Madsen was driving his Ford Expedition 
on Interstate 80.  A passenger, Martin Waters, was sleeping in the front 
passenger seat.  As Madsen approached the area where Deeds had 
abandoned his vehicle, he lost control of his vehicle, and it collided with 
the Jeep.  Waters was injured as a result of the accident.   
 
Waters filed a lawsuit against Deeds, Madsen, and the State of 
Iowa for the injuries he sustained in the accident.  He separately 
included the department of transportation and the department of public 
safety as defendants.  His wife joined him in the lawsuit, claiming loss of 
spousal consortium.  Liability against the State was predicated on the 
claims that the State failed to remove the Deeds’ vehicle, failed to remove 
the snow from the roadway, and failed to warn or otherwise protect 
Waters from the hazard created by the snow and the Deeds vehicle.  In 
their petition, the Waters alleged the following particulars of negligence 
against the State and the two departments:  (1) failure to timely remove 
an obstruction (Deeds’ vehicle) from the highway; (2) failure to timely 
remove snow and ice from the highway; (3) failure to protect the traveling 
public; (4) failure to warn of an obstruction; (5) failure to warn of a 
slippery condition of the roadway; and (6) failure to follow snow, ice, and 
obstruction removal policies.  The Waters claimed the department of 
transportation and the department of public safety had statutory duties 
to remove vehicles that obstructed highway travel. 
 
The State moved for summary judgment.  It claimed the material 
facts of the case were not in dispute, and it was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  The State asserted multiple grounds in support of its 
 
4 
 
motion.  It first claimed the department of public safety had no duty to 
remove the Deeds vehicle, warn of the presence of the Deeds vehicle, or 
otherwise protect the Waters from the Deeds’ vehicle.  It next claimed the 
State was immune from claims of negligence relating to the failure to 
remove the Deeds vehicle and the failure to properly maintain the 
highway and warn of dangers presented by disabled vehicles.  In 
particular, the State asserted the department of public safety was 
immune from liability under the discretionary function doctrine for the 
claim of failing to remove the Deeds vehicle.  It further asserted the 
discretionary function doctrine also immunized the department of 
transportation from liability derived from its responsibilities to keep the 
highway free of snow and ice.  It further claimed the State did not breach 
its duty of care because it had no reasonable notice and opportunity to 
remove the Deeds vehicle prior to the accident as a matter of law.  The 
State also claimed the Waters failed to exhaust all administrative 
remedies before filing their tort claim against the State, as required by 
law.  The Waters contested the claims and provided evidence from an 
expert witness that the Deeds vehicle was actually located on the 
traveled portion of the roadway at the time of the accident.   
 
The district court entered a ruling on the motion for summary 
judgment by addressing each ground for summary judgment raised by 
the State.  It first held the Waters failed to provide notice to the 
department of transportation of their negligence claims based on their 
allegations of failure to remove the snow and properly maintain the 
highway.  It next held the State had no duty to remove the Deeds vehicle 
and prevent the accident.  The court further held the negligence claims 
involving failure to remove the Deeds vehicle, failure to protect the public 
by closing the highway, and failing to remove the snow and ice from the 
 
5 
 
highway involved discretionary acts that did not give rise to liability 
against the State under the Iowa Tort Claims Act.  Additionally, the court 
found the claims involving the failure to warn and failure to remove the 
ice and snow did not give rise to liability under the statutory exemptions 
to the assignment of fault to the state for failing to perform such acts.  
See Iowa Code § 668.10(1)–(2) (2003) (providing governmental immunity 
for snow removal and traffic control device placement).  Finally, the court 
concluded a jury question was presented on the State’s claim that it had 
no reasonable notice and opportunity to remove the Deeds vehicle prior 
to the accident.  The district court entered an order granting summary 
judgment on all claims raised by the State, but denied summary 
judgment on the issue of reasonable notice and opportunity.  This order 
was entered on January 15, 2008.   
 
Following the order, the Waters sought to mediate a resolution of 
the lawsuit with all parties.  The State declined to participate in 
mediation, asserting no claims were pending against the State following 
the order granting summary judgment.  The remaining parties proceeded 
to mediation.  
 
On July 17, 2008, the Waters filed a motion asking the district 
court to clarify the summary judgment order and reschedule the case for 
trial.  On July 28, the district court entered a calendar order declining to 
“change its ruling” and directing a new date be set for trial.   
 
The State made application for an appeal from the order directing 
the case to proceed to trial.  We granted permission to appeal and 
transferred the case to the court of appeals.   
 
On appeal, the State claims the district court erred in ordering the 
State to proceed to trial after granting summary judgment.  The Waters 
assert the district court only granted partial summary judgment.  They 
 
6 
 
argue its claim of negligence involving a failure to remove the Deeds 
vehicle survived summary judgment because it was separated into two 
claims, and the summary judgment ruling by the district court only 
dismissed one of the two claims.  The court of appeals affirmed the order 
of the district court and remanded for trial.  The State sought, and we 
granted, further review. 
 
II.  Standard of Review.   
 
This appeal requires us to decide if the district court erred in 
ordering the State to trial after granting summary judgment.  We do not 
review the merits of the underlying summary judgment ruling, but are 
tasked with interpreting the judgment to determine whether the order 
issued in response to the motion for clarification of the judgment 
improperly directed the State to proceed to trial.  Consequently, our 
review is for correction of errors at law.  Iowa R. App. P. 6.907.   
 
III.  Resolution of Appeal.   
 
The district court has power to change a judgment it has rendered 
by correcting perceived legal or factual errors, or to construe or interpret 
the judgment so that the record accurately expresses what was 
previously done.1
                                      
 
 
1The power to change a judgment can only be exercised while the district court 
has jurisdiction over the case and the parties.  Carroll v. Martir, 610 N.W.2d 850, 857 
(Iowa 2000). Additionally, the power should only be exercised with proper notice to the 
parties.  McVay v. Kenneth E. Montz Implement Co., 287 N.W.2d 149, 150 (Iowa 1980).  
Importantly, a district court cannot use its power to correct a perceived error in a 
judgment by exercising its power to construe the judgment.  Weissenburger v. Iowa Dist. 
Ct., 740 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Iowa 2007) (noting a court may not use a nunc pro tunc 
order to change the decision by correcting a judicial error). 
  See Carroll v. Martir, 610 N.W.2d 850, 857 (Iowa 2000) 
(reiterating district court’s power to correct perceived errors in its own 
judgments); see also Weissenburger v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 740 N.W.2d 431, 
434 (Iowa 2007) (explaining purpose of nunc pro tunc order is to correct 
a clerical error so that the judgment reflects what was actually done).  In 
 
7 
 
this case, the district court declined to exercise its power to change or 
construe the summary judgment in response to the motion for 
clarification.  Instead, the district court merely directed the parties to 
proceed to trial.  The State claims this directive constituted legal error 
because the prior summary judgment rendered by the district court 
disposed of all claims brought by the Waters against the State.  Thus, 
our task on appeal is to construe the summary judgment ruling entered 
by the district court to determine if any claims against the State survived 
the summary judgment.  The State’s application for interlocutory appeal 
did not challenge the merits of this summary judgment ruling.  To the 
contrary, the State’s application expressed its belief that the legal effect 
of the summary judgment ruling terminated the action brought against it 
by the Waters as it requested.   
 
A court decree is construed like any other written instrument.  
Local Bd. of Health v. Wood, 243 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Iowa 1976).  The 
determinative factor in construing a court decree is the intent of the 
court, which is derived from all parts of the judgment.  Id.  We strive to 
construe a judgment consistent with the language used in the judgment.  
Hemmer v. Bonson, 139 Iowa 210, 217, 117 N.W. 257, 259 (1908).  If the 
meaning of the decree is ambiguous, we resort to the pleadings and other 
proceedings to clarify the ambiguity.  Sutton v. Schnack, 224 Iowa 251, 
257, 275 N.W. 870, 873 (1937).  In the end, we seek to give effect to 
those matters that are implied as well as express.  Rinehart v. State, 234 
N.W.2d 649, 656 (Iowa 1975). 
 
The parties agree that most of the legal claims asserted by the 
Waters to support liability against the State did not survive summary 
judgment.  The Waters, however, maintain their allegation of negligence 
involving the failure of the department of transportation to remove the 
 
8 
 
Deeds vehicle was not addressed in the summary judgment.  The State 
asserts this particular claim was addressed and disposed of in two 
separate divisions of the summary judgment ruling.  First, it asserts the 
district court disposed of the claim when it ruled that the State had no 
actionable duty to the Waters to remove the Deeds vehicle under the 
public duty doctrine.  See Kolbe v. State, 625 N.W.2d 721, 729 (Iowa 
2001) (“We have routinely held that a breach of duty owed to the public 
at large is not actionable unless the plaintiff can establish, based on the 
unique or particular facts of the case, a special relationship between the 
State and the injured plaintiff . . . .” (Emphasis omitted.)).  Second, the 
State asserts the district court disposed of the claim when it ruled that 
the State was immune from any liability based on its failure to remove 
the Deeds vehicle under the discretionary function doctrine.  See Iowa 
Code § 669.14(1) (2003) (providing statutory immunity for State actors 
when performing discretionary functions).  We resolve both claims by 
first considering whether the district court intended to rule that the State 
and all its governmental subdivisions and actors had no actionable duty 
to the Waters to remove the vehicle.   
 
In determining the intended scope of the district court’s summary 
judgment ruling, we begin by looking to the allegations of negligence 
contained in the petition filed by the Waters together with the grounds 
asserted by the State to support summary judgment.  Importantly, the 
grounds for negligence alleged by the Waters in the petition included the 
failure of the “department of transportation and department of public 
safety” to timely remove the Deeds vehicle from the highway.  Clearly, the 
State’s motion for summary judgment sought judgment on the claim for 
negligence pertaining to the failure to remove the Deeds vehicle, but the 
motion did so only on two grounds.  The State argued no “special 
 
9 
 
relationship” existed “between the department of public safety” and the 
Waters to support the imposition of an actionable duty for the State to 
remove the Deeds vehicle.  It further argued “the State did not have a 
reasonable opportunity” to remove the vehicle prior to the accident.   
 
The motion for summary judgment reveals the State’s argument, 
that it had no duty to the Waters, was based entirely on the department 
of public safety’s responsibility, at the direction of the state trooper, to 
remove the Deeds vehicle.  The State did not additionally argue in the 
motion for summary judgment that the department of transportation, a 
separate governmental subdivision, also had no duty to the motoring 
public to remove disabled vehicles.  See Koehler v. State, 263 N.W.2d 
760, 765 (Iowa 1978) (recognizing duty of department of transportation 
to remove obstructions on highways); see also Iowa Code § 313.36 
(“Primary 
roads 
shall 
be 
maintained 
by 
the 
department 
[of 
transportation] . . . .”); id. § 319.1 (“The department [of transportation] 
. . . shall cause all obstructions in highways . . . to be removed.”).2
                                      
 
 
2The legislature repealed chapter 319 in 2006.  2006 Iowa Acts ch. 1097, § 19.  
The chapter was rewritten and reorganized in chapter 318 of the 2007 Code, and it 
remains there currently.  See Iowa Code ch. 318 (2009).   The amended version grants 
immunity to the county board of supervisors and department of transportation for 
claims related to removal of highway obstructions.  Id. § 4 (codified at Iowa Code §§ 
318.4, 318.5(4) (2009)).   
  In 
resisting the motion for summary judgment, the Waters asserted “the 
State” had an actionable duty to remove vehicles from highways because 
a special relationship was created with the motoring public pursuant to 
section 321.356.  See id. § 321.356 (authorizing peace officers to move or 
cause to be moved a vehicle standing upon a highway).  Consequently, 
while the Waters’ claim for negligence for failure to remove the vehicle 
targeted both the actions of the department of transportation and the 
department of public safety, the summary judgment proceedings 
 
10 
 
pertaining to this ground of negligence was only directed at the actions of 
the department of public safety.   
 
The pleadings and summary judgment proceedings are important 
in our search for intent because they put the language of the summary 
judgment ruling in context.  This context, in turn, reveals the district 
court only intended to address the existence of a duty imposed on the 
State through the department of public safety when it concluded the law 
did not impose a duty on the State to remove the Deeds vehicle.  
Moreover, the summary judgment ruling contained no directive 
expressing an intent to expand its judgment beyond the context of the 
pleadings.   
 
Similarly, we reject the State’s argument that the Waters’ claim for 
negligence predicated on failing to remove the Deeds vehicle did not 
survive summary judgment under the district court’s alternative finding 
that the State was immune from any liability derived from its decision to 
refrain from towing or removing the Deeds vehicle.  In its motion for 
summary judgment, the State argued it was immune from liability based 
on claims involving the exercise of discretionary immunity on the part of 
the department of public safety and its employees, as well as the 
department of transportation and its employees.  However, the claim of 
immunity urged by the State pertaining to the department of 
transportation’s exercise of discretionary functions was argued solely in 
the context of the department of transportation’s decision to refrain from 
removing snow and ice from the highway, and refraining from closing the 
highway to motorists.  The State did not additionally argue it was 
immune 
from 
liability 
for 
claims 
involving 
the 
department 
of 
transportation’s decision not to tow or remove the Deeds vehicle.  
Moreover, the district court did not use any language in its ruling to 
 
11 
 
extend the grant of summary judgment based on immunity to the 
decision by the department of transportation to refrain from towing or 
removing the Deeds vehicle.  Thus, both the context of the summary 
judgment proceedings and the language of the district court ruling 
revealed the district court did not intend to include the Waters’ 
negligence claim based on the department of transportation’s failure to 
remove the Deeds vehicle.   
 
All the language in the district court ruling concerning the absence 
of an actionable duty of care on the State to support negligence and the 
existence of immunity for the State, while sounding as a grant of 
complete summary judgment, did not apply to the Waters’ specific claim 
for negligence based on the failure of the department of transportation to 
remove the Deeds vehicle when placed in its proper context.  
Additionally, the district court did not otherwise expressly or impliedly 
declare the claim was included in the judgment.3
 
Nevertheless, the State asserts the Waters failed to argue and 
identify the presence of a separate claim for liability based on the 
department of transportation’s failure to remove the Deeds vehicle during 
the proceedings before the district court, which now precludes them from 
asserting the presence of such a claim on appeal to affirm the decision of 
  Under such 
circumstances, we cannot find any intent for the district court to have 
granted complete summary judgment. 
                                      
 
 
3The Waters assert the district court’s intent to exclude the claim for negligence 
involving the department of transportation’s failure to remove the Deeds vehicle from 
the summary judgment was further revealed when the district court rejected the State’s 
argument that it had no reasonable opportunity to remove the Deeds vehicle.  The 
Waters argue the district court would not have addressed the issue without impliedly 
recognizing an underlying duty of the department of transportation to remove the 
vehicle.  While such a deduction could be made, it is equally likely that the district 
court could have simply ruled on each alternative ground to make a full and complete 
ruling for the purposes of appeal.   
 
12 
 
the district court.  We recognize our preservation-of-error rule that 
appellate courts will not consider a matter raised for the first time on 
appeal, even if it is the only basis to uphold the ruling of the district 
court.  DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Iowa 2002).  Yet, we are 
construing a court decree in this case, not deciding the merits of the 
ruling.  Moreover, there was no reason for the Waters to identify their 
separate claim of liability based on the department of transportation’s 
failure to remove the Deeds vehicle in resisting the motion for summary 
judgment when the State never attacked this claim as grounds for 
summary judgment.   
 
Finally, the State argues the law does not recognize a duty for the 
department of transportation to remove disabled vehicles from a highway 
during a snowstorm of the magnitude experienced at the time of the 
accident that gave rise to the proceedings in this case.  It asserts that 
any thoughtful analysis of the law and the undisputed facts about the 
paralyzing weather conditions at the time of the accident would lead to 
the conclusion that no State agency responsible for the maintenance of 
highways was negligent for failing to remove the Deeds vehicle prior to 
the accident.  The State’s argument addresses a judgment on the merits 
that has not yet been rendered by the district court.  Our role in this 
appeal is not to rule on claims not presented to the district court, but to 
construe the judgment entered by the district court.   
 
IV.  Conclusion.   
 
We have considered all claims raised by the State.  We vacate the 
decision of the court of appeals and affirm the calendar entry order 
entered by the district court.   
 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED AND DISTRICT 
COURT ORDER AFFIRMED.