Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSERVATORSHIP AND GUARDIANSHIP OF CPR, a Minor; and AR, a Minor: TR V. LVM and ARM

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSERVATORSHIP AND GUARDIANSHIP OF CPR, a Minor; and AR, a Minor: TR V. LVM and ARM2009 WY 76209 P.3d 879Case Number: S-08-0108Decided: 06/09/2009Modified: 06/18/2009
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE CONSERVATORSHIP AND GUARDIANSHIP OF CPR, a Minor; and AR, a 
Minor:TR,Appellant(Respondent),v.LVM and 
ARM,Appellees(Petitioners).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Gregory 
L. Winn of Schilling & Winn, P.C., Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Janet 
L. Tyler, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Chief Justice. 

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, T.R. 
(Mother), appeals a district court's decision and order finding her unfit and 
appointing Appellees, L.V.M. and A.R.M. (Grandparents), who are the children's 
paternal grandparents, guardians of her two minor children, A.R. and C.R.   We affirm the district court's 
decision.  

 
 
Issues

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Did the district court abuse its 
discretion when it admitted certain printouts from the internet, a letter from a 
physician who was not present at the proceedings, and testimony from lay 
witnesses regarding a medical condition?

 
 
2.   Did the district court abuse its 
discretion when it denied a motion to bifurcate the trial and considered the 
question of Mother's unfitness and the question of appointment of Grandparents 
as guardians in one proceeding?

 
 
3.   Was the district court's finding 
that Mother was unfit inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, or 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence?

 
 
4.   Was the district court's finding 
that it was in the best interests of the children to appoint Grandparents as 
their guardians inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, or contrary 
to the great weight of the evidence?

 
 
Facts

 
 
[¶3]      Mother and Father 
met when they were 17 and 18 years old, respectively.  Mother became pregnant with A.R. in 
January of 2003 and the couple married in June of 2003.  The marriage was a troubled one, and at 
one point Mother obtained a restraining order against Father while she was still 
pregnant with A.R.  Mother went into 
labor early and was flown to Denver for emergency care.  A.R. was born prematurely at 34 weeks in 
August of 2003.  A.R. had some 
medical problems as an infant, for which he was flown to Denver for surgical 
treatment.  When A.R. was 
approximately one year old, a visit to a specialist confirmed that he had 
neurofibromatosis, a genetic condition from which Father also suffered.  C.R. was born in April of 2005.  C.R. has no known medical conditions, 
although he will have to be monitored for symptoms of neurofibromatosis and 
should be tested for the disease at some point.  In December of 2004, Father died in a 
car accident in which his only brother was also killed.  In June of 2006, Grandparents brought 
this action requesting that the district court declare Mother unfit and appoint 
Grandparents guardians of the children.  
The court held a hearing on December 5, 2007, and continued the hearing 
on December 12, 2007.  On December 
26, 2007, the district court issued a decision letter finding Mother unfit and 
appointing Grandparents as guardians of A.R. and C.R.  This appeal followed. 

 
 
Discussion

 
 
1.     Did the district court 
abuse its discretion when it admitted certain printouts from the internet, a 
letter from a physician who was not present at the proceedings, and testimony 
from lay witnesses regarding a medical condition?

 
 
[¶4]      The decision of 
whether or not to admit evidence lies within the discretion of the trial 
court.  Three Way, Inc. v. Burton Enters., Inc., 
2008 WY 18, ¶ 29, 177 P.3d 219, 228 (Wyo. 2008).  We will not disturb the trial court's 
ruling absent abuse of that discretion.  
McCabe v. R.A. Manning Constr. 
Co., Inc., 674 P.2d 699, 706 (Wyo. 1983).  Mother's counsel timely objected to each 
piece of evidence at issue.  

 
 
[¶5]      Mother first 
contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted printouts 
from the internet as evidence of a proper immunization schedule.  We agree that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it admitted that material into evidence.  The document was an unverifiable 
printout from the internet and the only foundation that could be laid for it was 
a description of the Google search Grandmother performed in order to find the 
information.  The district court 
appears to have admitted the document under the theory that it could take 
judicial notice of the facts contained therein.

 
 
[¶6]      W.R.E. 201 
governs judicial notice of adjudicative facts.  Under the rule, "[a] judicially noticed 
fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) 
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) 
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned."  
W.R.E. 201(b).  This printout 
was admitted to prove the proper schedule of immunizations for A.R. and 
C.R.  This is not a fact that is 
"generally known."  A printout from 
an unverified source on the internet, which has not been authenticated by a 
medical expert, cannot be categorized as a source of information "whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned."  
It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to take judicial notice 
of the facts contained in this document under Rule 201.  However, we find that the error was 
harmless1 because the properly admitted 
medical records showed that Mother did not comply with her own doctor's schedule 
with respect to vaccinations, and because Mother admitted on the stand that the 
doctor had to restart the series of childhood vaccines for A.R. and C.R. because 
Mother did not comply with the schedule.

 
 
[¶7]      The second piece 
of evidence that Mother claims should not have been admitted is a letter from 
Father's doctor describing the treatment of his neurofibromatosis.  Mother's counsel objected on the basis 
that the letter was hearsay.  The 
district court expressed concern as to whether any proper foundation had been 
laid for admission of the letter.  
We agree with the district court's first instincts on this matter.  This letter was offered as a description 
of neurofibromatosis and as proof of the sort of precautions and restrictions 
that should have been in place with regard to A.R.  The letter was written by a doctor who 
had never examined A.R. and contained specific recommendations for a different 
patient (A.R.'s father).  It was 
written approximately five years before A.R. was born and ten years before the 
time of trial.  The doctor did not 
testify.  Neither party has advanced 
an exception to the hearsay rule that would allow admission of such a 
document.  Although we find that it 
was an abuse of discretion for the district court to admit the document, we 
again find that the error was harmless because the district court did not rely 
on information in the letter to reach its conclusions.

 
 
[¶8]      Finally, Mother 
contends that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed 
Grandmother to testify about her knowledge of neurofibromatosis.  The district court overruled Mother's 
objection and limited Grandmother's testimony to her personal knowledge, much of 
which she derived from her experience raising a son with neurofibromatosis.  Unlike the letter and the internet 
printouts, this evidence was offered to show Grandmother's fitness to act as 
guardian, and not as medical evidence.  
We find that the district court acted properly and did not abuse its 
discretion by admitting this testimony. 

 
 
2.     Did the district court 
abuse its discretion when it denied a motion to bifurcate the trial and 
considered the question of Mother's unfitness and the question of appointment of 
Grandparents as guardians in one proceeding?

 
 

[¶9]                             
In certain circumstances, the district court may order a bifurcated 
trial:

 
 
(b) 
Separate trials.--The 
court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate 
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial 
of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any 
separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, 
third-party claims, or issues. 

 
 
W.R.C.P. 
42(b).  The decision to order 
separate trials is within the discretion of the district court and will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is found. Carlson v. 
Carlson, 836 P.2d 297, 305 
(Wyo. 1992); Tremblay v. Reid, 700 P.2d 391, 398 (Wyo. 1985). 

 
 

State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 
882 P.2d 813, 829 (Wyo. 1994).

 
 

A 
court abuses its discretion only 
when it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. The burden is placed upon the party who is 
attacking the trial court's ruling to establish an abuse of discretion, and the 
ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.

 
 
Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; 
it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the 
circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.

 
 

Ringolsby 
v. Johnson, 
2008 WY 127, ¶¶ 12-13, 193 P.3d 1167, 1169-70 (Wyo. 2008) (quotation marks and 
citations omitted).

 
 
[¶10]   In order to show that the trial 
court abused its discretion, Mother would have to show that the district court's 
refusal to bifurcate the trial was outside the bounds of reason based on the 
criteria set forth in W.R.C.P. 42(b).  
She cites to an adoption case, In 
re adoption of RHA, 702 P.2d 1259 (Wyo. 1985), in which we found that the 
district court acted within its discretion when it bifurcated adoption 
proceedings to resolve the question of whether a father's consent was required 
before the adoption.  The district 
court in that case bifurcated proceedings to protect the identity of the 
adoptive parents, and because once father's parental rights were terminated, he 
was a stranger to the latter proceedings.  
Id. at 1264.  Mother's comparison is inapt, as a 
guardianship does not involve two separate cases with separate parties, but 
instead is a single proceeding in which two separate determinations of fact must 
be made.  

 
 
[¶11]   While it may be appropriate to 
bifurcate guardianship proceedings in some situations, Mother has not presented 
any evidence that she was prejudiced under the above standard by the failure to 
bifurcate the trial.  In the instant 
case, the determination of Mother's fitness required extensive testimony from 
the same witnesses who would be required to testify as to the best interests of 
the children in the appointment of Grandparents as guardians.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it decided not to bifurcate the trial under these 
circumstances.  

 
 
3.     Was the district 
court's finding that Mother was unfit inconsistent with the evidence, clearly 
erroneous, or contrary to the great weight of the 
evidence?

 
 
[¶12]   Our standard of review for an 
evidentiary proceeding is well established.  We presume the district court's findings 
of fact are correct and will not set them aside unless the findings are 
inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, or contrary to the great 
weight of the evidence.  
Additionally, we review a district court's conclusions of law de novo.  In re guardianship of MEO, 2006 WY 87, ¶ 
17, 138 P.3d 1145, 1150 (Wyo. 2006).  

 
 
[¶13]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-104 
(LexisNexis 2007) states, "The court may appoint a guardian if the allegations 
of the petition as to the status of the proposed ward and the necessity for the 
appointment of a guardian are proved by a preponderance of the evidence."  

 
 
[I]n 
the context of an involuntary guardianship proceeding where the proposed ward is 
a minor, a best interests inquiry is not triggered until the district court 
determines that the minor needs a guardian.  A child with a parent has a natural 
guardian and is not in need of a court-appointed guardian, unless the court 
determines that the child's natural guardian is not fit.

 
 

In 
re MEO, 
2006 WY 87, ¶ 55, 138 P.3d  at 1161.

 
 
[¶14]   The district court found Mother 
unfit and stated,

 
 
There 
was overwhelming evidence presented that, at this stage of her life, [Mother] is 
incapable of placing the needs of [A.R. and C.R.] above her own desires.  She engages in inappropriate and 
dangerous relationships, has a transient lifestyle, lacks stability, refuses to 
cooperate with [A.R.'s early intervention program and the public health 
department], and lacks the ability to understand or focus on the needs of her 
children.

 
 
Mother 
contends that the district court's finding that Mother was unfit was 
inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, or contrary to the great 
weight of the evidence.  

 
 
[¶15]   Several people testified at trial 
that Mother exhibited a pattern of neglect or inappropriate behavior with 
respect to the boys.  Grandfather 
testified that Mother lived with them after A.R. was born and that he and 
Grandmother had to remind her constantly to attend to the child's needs.  The boys' aunt (Aunt), who was engaged 
to and had a child by Father's brother, testified that Mother smoked marijuana 
when she was pregnant with C.R. and later in the presence of C.R. while A.R. was 
also in the house.  Aunt also 
testified that Mother kept drug paraphernalia in the house.  Aunt further testified that Mother left 
one of the children in an infant swing overnight, that Mother refused to feed 
A.R. anything other than infant formula until he was more than a year old, that 
Mother left A.R. when he was hurt and had to be taken to the hospital, and that 
A.R. was extremely reluctant to be returned to the custody of his mother after 
spending time with others.  Aunt 
talked about seeing the boys out without proper clothing and said that they 
looked dirty and that "they would have diapers so full it was like she hadn't 
changed them[.]"  Aunt described an 
incident where she ran into Mother and one of Mother's boyfriends at the 
laundromat.  She said that "[A.R.]'s 
car seat was saturated with urine, and the music was loud.  [C.R.] was in the backseat crying. . . 
."  At the time of trial, Aunt had 
not had close contact with Mother and the children for nearly two years, though 
she did see them frequently around town.

 
 
[¶16]   Mother and Grandmother both 
testified that Mother and Father had a difficult marriage and separated a number 
of times because of their differences.  
Father and Grandmother contacted DFS during at least one of the 
separations and expressed concern for the welfare of the children who were in 
Mother's custody at the time.  One 
of these separations occurred shortly before Father and A.R. were supposed to 
fly to Michigan to see a genetic specialist regarding the 
neurofibromatosis.  Mother left both 
children with Grandparents for several days after she and Father had a fight but 
refused to allow A.R. to accompany his father to see the 
specialist.

 
 
[¶17]   Grandmother testified that Mother 
ignored A.R. while she was living with Grandparents after A.R. was born.  Grandmother was concerned that Mother 
neglected basic tasks of caring for the child unless prompted and that her 
parenting practices did not improve with time.  Grandmother recounted an incident 
shortly after A.R. was life-flighted to Denver for surgery where she noticed 
"black mildew on the side of [A.R.'s] bottle from not washing it, just remaking 
it."  At that point, Mother and 
Father were separated, and Grandmother and Father reported the incident to 
DFS.

 
 
[¶18]   Grandmother stated that Mother has 
allowed a number of her boyfriends to live with the family since Father's death, 
including one "gentleman living with her who was underage at that time."  She testified about the same incident 
discussed by Aunt, in which the boys were in a car with "music blaring" and 
A.R.'s diaper was saturated to the point that his car seat was also soaked.  Grandmother changed the child's diaper 
"right there standing up" and had to warn Mother's boyfriend at the time to keep 
his lit cigarette away from the baby's head.  Grandmother also testified that she felt 
it was irresponsible for Mother to leave her children in the care of her two 
sisters.  She described a particular 
incident in which Mother's sister was supposed to give C.R. to Grandmother at 
the local recreation center but apparently left C.R. with an employee of the 
center instead, with no clothing but a diaper and with no extra diapers, 
bottles, or blankets and without telling Grandmother she had left the 
child.  Grandmother testified that 
Mother had admitted to abusing prescription drugs.  Grandmother also said that she had to 
take A.R. to his follow-up appointments after he injured his hand, and that he 
missed the last appointment after his injury because Mother overslept and didn't 
take him.  Grandmother made a final 
request for DFS to take action after she noticed a welt on A.R.'s leg.  Grandmother had also been estranged from 
Mother for almost two years at the time of trial but she testified that she did 
see the family several times a week in public.

 
 
[¶19]   A social worker who worked with the 
family also testified that she made several home visits to try to ensure that 
the boys were receiving proper medical care.  She testified that the "condition of the 
home was terrible and unkept [sic] with fast-food garbage lying around."  The house smelled heavily of smoke.  Mother's behavior on one of the visits 
caused the social worker to suspect that she was under the influence of 
drugs.  The social worker spoke with 
Mother several times about the importance of taking A.R. for specific exams to 
check for complications of the neurofibromatosis.  At the time of trial Mother had not 
taken A.R. to an appropriate specialist, despite repeated attempts to motivate 
her to take her child to the doctor, including offers by the social worker to 
pay all costs of transportation.

 
 
[¶20]   The district court also heard 
testimony from an early intervention teacher at A.R.'s special education 
center.  The teacher testified that 
Mother refused to attend meetings for A.R.'s individual education plan (IEP) and 
that she had taken him out of the program.  
Mother testified that she had taken A.R. out of the program because she 
planned to move and that she was waiting for the end of the guardianship 
proceedings to do so.  She also 
testified that she intended to find an equivalent program in California but that 
she had not made any arrangements to find a program in advance of the move.  At the time of trial, A.R. had been out 
of school for two weeks. 

 
 
[¶21]   The pediatrician who had been 
treating A.R. and C.R. testified that Mother brought the children in regularly 
for visits and for treatment when they were sick.  The doctor also testified that he does 
not treat neurofibromatosis and that Mother must work independently with 
specialists for that aspect of A.R.'s care.  The doctor's testimony was general and 
he was unable to recall details of the children's care or to answer most 
specific questions because he was not asked to present his records for use 
during his testimony.  The medical 
records, which were later admitted into evidence, include a list of referrals 
and recommendations from a genetic specialist who saw A.R. in February of 
2007.

 
 
[¶22]   The boys' aunt, Mother's sister, 
testified that Mother has a loving relationship with both of her children.  She testified that there are four adults 
living in a three-bedroom apartment with the two children, and that Mother, A.R. 
and C.R. share a bed with the boys' maternal grandmother.  None of the adults in the house 
work.  She also testified that, 
while the family vehicles are not in good operating condition, there are 
vehicles available for taking the children to medical 
appointments.

 
 
[¶23]   The boys' maternal grandmother also 
testified at trial.  She does not 
work because she is disabled.  She 
testified that Mother's relationship with the children is a good one.  She admitted that the family smokes 
around the children but said that they do try to limit the children's exposure 
to second-hand smoke by leaving the room to smoke.

 
 
[¶24]   The bulk of the testimony on the 
children's current living conditions came from Mother.  She was not working at the time of trial 
and had not worked very much since the birth of her children.  She testified that she had enrolled A.R. 
in an early intervention program to help him with speech delays and so that he 
would get along with other children.  
She testified that both children are generally healthy and that she takes 
them to the doctor when they are sick.  
She testified that she and the boys were living with her boyfriend before 
they moved in with her mother.  She 
testified that she was ordered by the court to take a drug test for this case 
and that her blood, urine, and hair tested negative for drugs.  She testified that she does not drink 
alcohol, but when confronted with photographs and comments from her Myspace 
page, admitted that she does.  
Mother stated that she plans to move to California with her current 
boyfriend and the children.  She 
admitted that she did not attend the IEPs for A.R. and said that she could not 
attend either of the two yearly IEPs because both children were sick.  Mother testified that she took the boys 
for their early childhood inoculations but that the doctor had to start the 
series over because she missed time-sensitive 
appointments.

 
 
[¶25]   In her initial responses to 
requests for admission, Mother denied that anyone smoked around the children, 
however, at trial, Mother admitted that her entire family smokes around the 
children.  She stated that she only 
recently decided to allow smoking around the boys.  She admitted that she did not tell the 
doctor that the boys were exposed to smoke when he asked her during visits for 
their recurrent respiratory infections.  
She testified that she intended to limit smoking around the boys as soon 
as the proceedings were over.

 
 
[¶26]   Mother said that she was not 
complying with the specialist's recommendation to have A.R.'s blood pressure 
checked every six months to ensure that he was not suffering from complications 
of neurofibromatosis.  She testified 
that her current boyfriend had a criminal history and that she was pregnant with 
his child.  Mother admitted that her 
boyfriend was out of town because of an outstanding warrant for his arrest and 
said that she believed the charge was assault.

 
 
[¶27]   The district court set forth and 
applied the proper legal standard and the appropriate burden of proof in its 
decision letter.  The court found 
that Mother was unfit, particularly focusing on her failure to seek proper care 
for A.R.  There was testimony from 
multiple witnesses, including a social worker involved with the family and 
A.R.'s teacher, that Mother was unwilling to cooperate with medical and other 
professionals who could provide the specialized care that A.R. needs.  Grandparents presented overwhelming 
evidence that Mother has exhibited a consistent pattern of not providing 
adequate care for her children.  
This is especially dangerous for A.R., whose genetic condition requires 
careful monitoring and specialized care.  
The only evidence Mother presented to refute the claims that she is not 
providing necessary medical care to her children was the testimony of her family 
doctor.  The district court found 
the doctor's testimony unpersuasive.  
The doctor had not reviewed the children's files before he testified and 
was unable to answer most of the questions about their medical histories.  Since counsel did not issue a subpoena duces tecum to require the 
doctor to present his files at the time of his testimony, the doctor testified 
without access to the children's charts.  
It is clear from his testimony that his independent recollection of the 
children's medical history was vague, at best.  He did not recall, for example, that the 
children had to restart an entire series of vaccinations because of missed 
appointments, a fact Mother admitted.  
He could not recall which of the boys had been born prematurely, and did 
not remember that he had not delivered A.R.   

 
 
[¶28]   Mother testified in her own behalf 
but she admitted to giving inaccurate and misleading answers several times 
during her testimony.  Mother's 
testimony reflects her failure to cooperate with the guardian ad litem.  She has allowed a number of boyfriends 
to live with her children, one of whom was arrested at the home during a welfare 
check.  She currently lives with her 
mother and two sisters in an apartment in which the children share a bed with 
their mother and maternal grandmother.  
None of the adults work and none of them have transportation.  Mother testified that this was a 
temporary situation pending her move to California with her current 
boyfriend.  However, that boyfriend 
had been arrested and was out of state at the time of trial.  Mother testified that she had no way of 
reaching him and that she did not know if he was incarcerated.  Her mother and sister testified that she 
had a loving relationship with her children, but did not testify about any of 
the specific allegations of neglect or about Mother's failure to provide medical 
care for her children.  

 
 
[¶29]   The district court found that, 
while it is apparent that Mother loves her children, the evidence at trial 
showed that she is not willing to parent or capable of parenting them at this 
time.  Given the state of the 
evidence as set forth above, we cannot conclude that the district court's 
finding that Mother is presently unfit was inconsistent with the evidence, 
clearly erroneous, or contrary to the great weight of the 
evidence

 
 
4.     Was the district 
court's finding that it was in the best interests of the children to appoint 
Grandparents as their guardians inconsistent with the evidence, clearly 
erroneous, or contrary to the great weight of the 
evidence?

 
 
[¶30]   As stated above, we presume the 
district court's findings of fact are correct and will not set them aside unless 
the findings are inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, or contrary 
to the great weight of the evidence.  
Additionally, we review a district court's conclusions of law de novo.  In re MEO, 2006 WY 87, ¶ 17, 138 P.3d  at 
1150.  

 
 
[¶31]   The district court found that it 
was in the best interests of the children to appoint Grandparents as 
guardians.  The entirety of Mother's 
argument on this issue is set forth in one page of her brief.  She points out that Grandparents smoke, 
that they have admitted to past drug use, that Grandfather has been convicted of 
driving under the influence three times, and that both Grandparents have had 
multiple marriages.

 
 
[¶32]   Grandmother was one of the primary 
caretakers for the children before she was estranged from Mother, often taking 
them for days at a time.  She 
attended the birth of C.R.  
Grandmother admitted that both grandparents smoke but testified that they 
no longer smoke in the house.  She 
also said that she used drugs at one point in her life, but that she had not 
used drugs at all in ten years.  
Grandmother testified extensively about her personal experience with 
raising a child with neurofibromatosis and about the steps she had taken, and 
was prepared to take again, to make sure that the child received proper medical 
care and therapy.  Grandfather is 
A.R.'s godfather.  Grandfather 
admitted to being a recovering alcoholic, but testified that he had completed 
outpatient treatment for his problem and that he stopped drinking two years 
before the trial.  Grandfather 
admitted to experimenting with illegal drugs twenty-five or thirty years 
ago.  Grandparents provided 
financial and emotional support to Mother and both children before they were 
estranged from Mother.

 
 
[¶33]   The court does not reach the 
question of the best interests of the child in a guardianship proceeding 
involving a minor until it first determines that the natural parents are unfit 
to raise the child.  In re MEO, 2006 WY 87, ¶ 55, 138 P.3d  at 
1161.  The analysis is not a 
comparative one so we will not, as Mother has requested we do, 
compare Grandparents' situation to Mother's.  At the time the district court appointed 
Grandparents as guardians, Mother had been declared unfit and the children had 
been found to be in need of a guardian.  
Grandparents alone petitioned for guardianship.  We do not find that the district court's 
determination that it was in the best interests of A.R. and C.R. to appoint 
Grandparents as guardians is inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, 
or contrary to the great weight of the evidence  

 
 
Conclusion

 
 
[¶34]   We find that the district court 
abused its discretion in admitting certain pieces of evidence at trial, but that 
the error was harmless because the district court did not rely on that evidence 
in making its decision.  The 
district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a motion to bifurcate 
the trial.  The court's findings 
that Mother was unfit and that it was in the best interests of A.R. and C.R. to 
appoint Grandparents as guardians were not inconsistent with the evidence, 
clearly erroneous, or contrary to the great weight of the evidence.  We affirm.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1W.R.A.P. 
9.04 dictates that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not 
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the reviewing 
court."