Title: State v. Ploof

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

STATE_V_PLOOF.92-276; 162 Vt. 560; 649 A.2d 774


 [Filed 16-Sep-1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers
 are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109
 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609- 0801 of any errors in order that
 corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                                     No. 92-276


 State of Vermont                          Supreme Court

                                           On Appeal from
   v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                           Unit No. 2, Franklin Circuit

 Richard Ploof                             June Term, 1994


 Edward J. Cashman, J.

 Howard E. VanBenthuysen, Franklin County State's Attorney, St. Albans, for 
  plaintiff-appellee

 Dori Jones, Burlington, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant appeals from an order of the Franklin District
 Court denying his motion to strike his sentence, following his conviction of
 second degree murder.  We affirm. 

     Defendant was accused of stabbing and killing Timothy Papineau, following
 a failed marijuana transaction, and was charged with second-degree murder in
 September 1990.  He immediately moved for a competency evaluation, which was
 completed about a month later by psychiatrist William Woodruff, who reported
 to the court and the parties that he believed defendant was competent to stand
 trial.  Dr. Woodruff examined defendant again prior to a status conference in
 March 1991, and a third time in June 1991. 

      Defendant represented himself from the middle of April to the middle of
 June, 1991, at which time the court ruled that he was not competent to
 represent himself.  The court stated: 

         After much consideration of the facts and issues, the Court
         concludes that the Defendant should be represented by a public
         defender.  This action will protect the Defendant and utilize the
         legal safeguards available to him.  Moreover, there is enough in
         the Court's eyes to question his competency to conduct a

 

         reasonable defense.  Therefore, the Court reappoints the Public
         Defender until the Court is satisfied that he is sufficiently
         competent to represent himself.

     In November 1991, defendant changed his plea to guilty, pursuant to a
 plea agreement, but no claim of incompetency was then raised by defendant or
 his attorney, or by the State or the court.      

     Still represented, defendant was sentenced in December 1991.  At the
 sentencing hearing, the State revealed two incident reports it had received a
 short time earlier concerning defendant. The following colloquy ensued: 

       [State's Attorney]:  Just to indicate to The Court at least so the
     record is clear that upon information and belief, the State had
     received information that Mr. Ploof might be contemplating some
     kind of outburst or demonstration or something even more sinister
     for his appearance, either for the visitation or for the court
     appearance. Our concern is the safety of everyone here, that we
     wanted to alert The Court and Mr. Dunham to that possibility, in
     light of the fact that the sheriff may have to adjust to some more
     stringent controls.

        THE COURT: Well, you are not required to make any
      comments, but certainly we will give you that opportunity.

        [Defendant's Counsel]:  Well, Your Honor, my client is
      expecting that he would of course have his leg shackles on during
      his visit this morning, but not to be restrained as he is currently,
      at least during the visit. We have no concerns that he has anything
      in mind other than having the best possible visit with the family .
       . . .

      The sentencing proceeding occurred without incident, and defendant was
 given a sentence  consistent with the plea agreement of twenty years to life,
 split to serve twenty-five years. 

      Defendant moved twelve days thereafter to strike the sentence, on
 grounds that he had  been incompetent at the time of sentencing.  His motion
 stated, in relevant part, with respect to  defendant's state on the date of
 sentencing: 

            1. At the time of sentencing, Richard Ploof's sole goal was to
         be sentenced so that his life was in order so that he could promptly
         commit suicide.  He planned to end his life in open court as soon
         as sentence was pronounced.  However, in order to secure his last
         visits, he had to promise to abandon the plan.  This left Richard
         Ploof in a total state of mental confusion.

 

            2. During the two weeks prior to sentencing, Richard Ploof was
         suicidal and injured himself on several occasions, including
         Thanksgiving.

            3. Richard Ploof was not competent at sentencing.

     The trial court rejected defendant's assertion that he had been suicidal
 on the date of sentencing, finding instead that the defendant intended to
 obtain further concessions from the state in the plea bargaining that
 continued right up to sentencing.  The court also found that just prior to the
 sentencing hearing, the court specifically asked defendant and the State
 whether either had any concern about defendant's competency, and neither side
 indicated any such concern. 

     The court concluded that defendant had waived his rights to assert
 incompetency at the sentencing hearing by not raising the issue and that
 during sentencing, the trial court did not have reason to believe that
 defendant may not be competent to stand trial within the meaning 13 V.S.A. 
 4817.  The present appeal followed. 

     Defendant contends first that the court violated V.R.Cr.P. 11(c) and his
 due process rights by accepting his guilty plea without determining that he
 understood the nature of the charges and the minimum and maximum penalties, in
 violation of V.R.Cr.P. 11(c)(1) and (2). Defendant did not raise this issue at
 sentencing, nor did he raise it in his post-sentencing motion, supplemental
 motion, or proposed findings.  It is therefore understandable that the trial
 court did not rule on the issue in the decision from which the present appeal
 has been taken.  We held in State v. Thompson, No. 92-036 (Vt. June 3, 1994)
 that "an issue under Rule 11(c), alleging violations in taking a plea, absent
 plain error, demands a factual record and opportunity for the trial court to
 grant relief before this Court may properly review it."  See also State v.
 Doleszney, 139 Vt. 80, 81,