Title: Whalen v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
LAWRENCE P. WHALEN,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 540, 2002
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for Sussex County
§  Cr.A. Nos. S99-05-0001; 0002;
§                     0003; 0004; 0005
§
Submitted: December 20, 2002
  Decided:   March 25, 2003
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices
O R D E R
This 25th day of March 2003, upon consideration of the appellant’s
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Lawrence P. Whalen, filed an appeal
from the Superior Court’s November 28, 2001 denial of his motion for
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The
plaintiff-appellant, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment of
1SUPR. CT. R. 25(a).
2Whalen entered a plea of nolo contendere to these five lesser-included charges
pursuant to a plea agreement.  SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 11(e) (1) (C). 
3SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 35(b).
4Whalen v. State, Del. Supr., No. 408, 1999, Holland, J. (May 18, 2000).
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the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Whalen’s
opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and AFFIRM.
(2)
In 1995, Whalen was convicted of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in
the Second Degree.  In October 1998, Whalen was indicted on the charge of
Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child.  In May 1999, Whalen was convicted of
five counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Third Degree.2  He was
sentenced to a total of 5 years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after
1 year for 4 years at Level III probation.  Whalen did not file a direct appeal
from his convictions or sentences.  
(3)
In August 1999, Whalen moved for modification of his sentence,3
which was denied by the Superior Court.  This Court affirmed the Superior
Court’s judgment, but remanded the matter to the Superior Court for the
purpose of clarifying whether Whalen’s probationary sentences would be
served consecutively or concurrently with the probationary portion of his prior
sentence.4  Whalen subsequently filed an appeal from the Superior Court’s
5Whalen v. State, Del. Supr., No. 346, 2000, Holland, J. (Aug. 30, 2000).
6Whalen v. State, Del. Supr., No. 451, 2000, Walsh, J. (Jan. 19, 2001).
7Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del.1993).  In various motions filed in the
Superior Court, including his postconviction motion, Whalen also argued that he was denied
due process, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, he was improperly denied counsel in the
re-sentencing proceeding and he was improperly denied his right to conditional release. 
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modified sentencing order, which was dismissed as untimely by this Court.5  In
August 2000, Whalen again moved for reduction of his sentence.  This Court
affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of Whalen’s repetitive motion.6 
(4)
In this appeal, Whalen claims that: a) the Superior Court lacked
jurisdiction over the lesser-included charges against him; b) the charges were
time-barred; c) the charges violated double jeopardy; d) his classification as a
Tier III sex offender was improper; e) each charge should have been brought
separately; f) his plea was involuntary; g) the conditions of his probation were
improper; h) the sentence imposed exceeded the TIS guidelines; and i) his
counsel provided ineffective assistance.  To the extent that Whalen has not
argued other grounds to support his appeal that were raised previously, those
grounds are deemed waived and will not be considered by this Court.7
(5)
Whalen’s claim that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the
charges against him is without merit.  The Superior Court’s jurisdiction over
the lesser-included misdemeanor charges of third degree sexual misconduct
8Slater v. State, 606 A.2d 1334, 1337-39 (Del. 1992).
9DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 205(h) (2).
10SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (4).
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derived from its jurisdiction over the original felony charge of continuous
sexual abuse of a child.8  Furthermore, to the extent Whalen argues that the
Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the lesser-included misdemeanor
charges because he was not timely indicted on those charges, that claim is also
without merit, since the period of limitation had not run on those charges.9 
(6)
All of Whalen’s claims regarding his sentences are procedurally
barred.  Whalen previously raised claims that his classification as a Tier III sex
offender was improper, that the conditions of his probation were improper and
that the Superior Court exceeded the TIS guidelines in sentencing him in his
two unsuccessful Rule 35(b) motions.  He is, thus, barred from presenting those
repetitive claims in this appeal.10
(7)
Whalen’s claim that his plea was involuntary is not supported by
the record.  The plea agreement, the guilty plea form and the transcript of the
plea colloquy all clearly reflect that Whalen understood the nature of the plea
and its consequences, was satisfied with the representation provided by his
counsel and, therefore, knowingly and voluntarily entered the plea.  Absent
11Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del.1997).
12Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 311-12 (Del. 1988).
13Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d at 631.
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clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Whalen is bound by the
representations he made at the time the plea was entered.11 
(8)
Whalen’s claims that the lesser-included charges to which he
entered a plea of nolo contendere violated double jeopardy and should have
been brought separately involve alleged errors or defects occurring prior to the
entry of the plea.  Because Whalen’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily
entered, he has waived any right to pursue these claims in this appeal.12
(9)
Whalen’s final claim is that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance at the time his plea was entered.  In order to prevail on that claim,
Whalen must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s professional errors,
he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on proceeding to
trial.13  The record in this case provides no such evidence.  
(10)
It is manifest on the face of Whalen’s opening brief that this
appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled
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by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated,
clearly there was no abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The
judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. Norman Veasey
Chief Justice