Title: State v. Hicks

State: tennessee

Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court

Document:

666 S.W.2d 54 (1984) STATE of Tennessee, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Delbert HICKS, Defendant-Appellant. Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Knoxville. March 5, 1984. J. Andrew Hoyal, II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for plaintiff-appellee; William M. Leech, Jr., Atty. Gen., of counsel. J. Scott McCluen, Harriman, for defendant-appellant. BROCK, Justice. Under a four-count indictment the defendant was convicted of two counts of *55 aggravated rape, one of a stepdaughter, and the other of a stepson, and received sentences of 20 years each which were ordered to run concurrently. In the first count of the indictment it was charged that: This motion for a bill of particulars was denied by the trial court as was defendant's motion for a new trial which, in part, alleged error of the trial court in denying the motion for a bill of particulars. The Court of Criminal Appeals, in a two-to-one decision, Judge Daugherty dissenting, concluded that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for a bill of particulars, finding no abuse of discretion. We granted review at the request of the defendant to consider the bill of particulars issue. Rule 7(c), Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, (effective July 13, 1978), provides: The drafting committee's comment to this rule is as follows: Our rule closely parallels Rule 7(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides: Tennessee criminal procedure did not provide for a bill of particulars prior to the adoption of Rule 7(c) in 1978. Moreover, there has been little or no development of case law regarding Rule 7(c) since its adoption. However, we may look for guidance to the Federal cases construing the 1966 revision of Federal Rule 7(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and to cases from other states. This is true although it has been aptly observed: *56 We note with approval the following observations found in 1 C. Wright Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal, § 129 (1982) at 434: Many are the "grounds" advanced that are held to be insufficient for ordering a bill of particulars; but, motions seeking a particularization of the time and place of the alleged offense are routinely granted as being necessary in order for the defendant to know against what he must defend, what the prosecution intends to prove. United States v. Giramonti, 26 F.R.D. 168 (D.C.Conn. 1960); United States v. Wilson, 20 F.R.D. 569 (D.C.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Baker Brush Company, 197 F. Supp. 922 (D.C.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Macleod Bureau, 6 F.R.D. 590 (D.C. Mass. 1947); United States v. Tedesco, 441 F. Supp. 1336 (D.C.Pa. 1977); 41 Am.Jur.2d *57 Indictments and Informations § 169 (1968). The issue before us is not whether the indictment in this case was legally sufficient but whether or not the defendant's timely motion for a bill of particulars respecting the time and place of the offenses charged should have been granted under Rule 7(c), Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. We are of the opinion that the defendant's motion should have been granted and that the trial court committed reversible error in denying that motion. King v. United States, 402 F.2d 289, 292 (10th Cir.1968). We quote approvingly from the dissenting opinion of Judge Daugherty in the instant case: We agree and we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in denying defendant's motion for a bill of particulars. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and that of the trial court are reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for a new trial. Costs incurred upon appeal are taxed against the appellee. FONES, C.J., and COOPER, HARBISON and DROWOTA, JJ., concur. [1] Prior to the 1966 revision, the Federal rule provided for a bill of particulars only "for cause."