Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Thomas

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Thomas, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5582.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-5582 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. THOMAS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Thomas, Slip Opinion No.  
2020-Ohio-5582.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, namely 
communicating ex parte with a judicial officer or other official as to merits 
of a case during proceeding when not authorized by law or court order—
Public reprimand. 
(No. 2020-0467—Submitted July 22, 2020—Decided December 9, 2020.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2019-039. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Joan Jacobs Thomas, of North Olmsted, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0033645, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1984. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
{¶ 2} In July 2019, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Thomas with 
violating three professional-conduct rules relating to an ex parte letter she sent to a 
judge’s staff attorney.  Although the parties entered into factual stipulations, 
Thomas denied that she violated any rules, and the matter proceeded to a hearing 
before a three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct.  The panel 
unanimously dismissed one alleged rule violation and recommended dismissing an 
alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).1  A majority of the panel 
also recommended dismissing an alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from communicating ex parte with a judicial officer or other 
official as to the merits of a case during the proceeding unless authorized by law or 
court order).  One panel member dissented from that conclusion and issued findings 
supporting a Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) violation and, after considering the relevant 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, recommended that Thomas be publicly 
reprimanded. 
{¶ 3} The board issued a report accepting the panel’s recommendation to 
dismiss the Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) charge but adopting the dissenting panel member’s 
findings relating to the Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) violation.  The board also adopted 
the dissenting panel member’s recommendation that we publicly reprimand 
Thomas.  Thomas objects to the board’s report, primarily arguing that relator failed 
to prove the Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) violation by clear and convincing evidence. 
{¶ 4} For the reasons explained below, we overrule Thomas’s objections 
and adopt the board’s finding of misconduct and recommended sanction. 
 
 
                                                 
1. Gov.Bar R. V(12)(G) provides that if a unanimous hearing panel finds that the evidence is 
insufficient to support a charge, the panel may order on the record or in its report that it be dismissed.  
As an alternative to a unanimous dismissal, Gov.Bar R. V(12)(H) provides that a hearing panel may 
refer its findings of fact and recommendations for dismissal to the board for review. 
January Term, 2020 
 
3
Misconduct 
{¶ 5} From late 2016 through 2018, Thomas represented in a divorce case 
a woman whose husband was in a relationship with—and later married—D.V.  
While testifying at an April 2, 2018 hearing, the husband mentioned that D.V. was 
in the process of adopting a minor child.  By that time, Thomas had developed a 
negative opinion of D.V., and the court had prohibited D.V. from having any 
contact with the parties’ children. 
{¶ 6} Upon learning of the potential adoption, Thomas researched records 
at the county clerk of court’s office and discovered that D.V. had moved to 
intervene in another couple’s dissolution proceeding to obtain legal custody of their 
child.  Judge Sherry Glass of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic 
Relations Division, was presiding over the case, and a magistrate had scheduled a 
final, uncontested hearing for May 24, 2018.  The parents of the child had agreed 
to transfer custody to D.V., and the court had neither appointed a guardian ad litem 
nor referred the matter to Family Court Services2 for an investigation.  Thomas had 
significant concerns about a child living with D.V., and although Thomas had no 
role or involvement in D.V.’s custody matter, Thomas believed that Judge Glass 
needed to be alerted that an investigation should be conducted. 
{¶ 7} On April 24, 2018, Thomas called relator seeking advice about the 
situation and spoke to an assistant disciplinary counsel.  Although Thomas and the 
assistant disciplinary counsel dispute the substance of some of that conversation, 
they agree that the assistant disciplinary counsel advised Thomas to contact the 
county children’s-services agency and not to contact “the judge directly” or “the 
court directly” about her concerns.  Thomas believed that contacting the children’s-
                                                 
2. Family Court Services is a department of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic 
Relations Division, and provides services such as mediation, investigations, home inspections, and 
seminars. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
services agency was not an adequate option and thereafter searched for other 
alternatives for raising her concerns to Judge Glass. 
{¶ 8} On May 2, 2018, Thomas attended a “Brown Bag It Legal Luncheon” 
hosted by Judge Glass, who held the monthly luncheons so that local attorneys 
could discuss general legal topics in an informal manner.  During the luncheon, 
Thomas proposed a hypothetical based on D.V.’s custody matter—but without 
using any names or specific facts—and sought guidance from the attendees 
regarding how someone who was not involved in the matter could alert the court to 
concerns about the proposed arrangement. 
{¶ 9} Luncheon attendees agreed that it would be inappropriate to directly 
contact the judge presiding over the case.  At her disciplinary hearing, Thomas 
testified that Judge Glass then stated that if the matter were before her, she would 
want a detailed letter sent to her staff attorney so that the judge would not see it.  
According to Thomas, Judge Glass explained how her staff attorney handles ex 
parte letters and stated that if her staff attorney determined that any action was 
necessary based on a letter, the letter would be shared with the litigants.  Thomas 
further testified that at the end of the luncheon, Judge Glass patted her on the back 
and stated, “Now you get that letter out.” 
{¶ 10} Judge Glass and her staff attorney, Amy Barnes, also testified at 
Thomas’s disciplinary hearing and disputed that the judge had invited or suggested 
sending a letter to her staff attorney in response to Thomas’s hypothetical.  Judge 
Glass and Barnes acknowledged that at the luncheon, the judge outlined her office’s 
protocol for handling ex parte letters.  Specifically, the judge testified that she told 
the group that her office “[i]nevitably” receives letters “from a concerned 
grandmother, a neighbor,” a detention home, or the county jail and that in an effort 
to shield her from such communications, her staff attorney reviews them and either 
returns them or takes necessary action.  Judge Glass also testified that she would 
never say, “Get that letter in” because she does not want or encourage such letters. 
January Term, 2020 
 
5
{¶ 11} After the luncheon, Thomas saw D.V.’s counsel in the courthouse, 
expressed to him her concerns about D.V., and advised him that she might send a 
letter to the court in D.V.’s custody case.  On May 16, 2018, Thomas sent a four-
page letter to the fax number for Judge Glass’s chambers but addressed the letter to 
Barnes.  The letter began as follows:  “I am sending this correspondence to you 
since it is ex parte communication and I do not wish to expose the Judge to a 
situation wherein she feels the need to recuse herself from this matter.  I trust you 
can determine the necessary steps to take from here.”  Thomas then detailed her 
concerns about D.V.’s proposed custody arrangement.  Thomas “implore[d] th[e] 
court to appoint a very aggressive and thorough Guardian ad Litem and to seek a 
referral to [Family Court Services] to thoroughly investigate” the matter.  Thomas 
did not send a copy of the letter to D.V.’s counsel, nor did her letter indicate that 
she copied the parties in the matter.  At her disciplinary hearing, Thomas admitted 
that she sent the letter with the goal of causing Judge Glass to appoint a guardian 
ad litem and refer the matter for an investigation. 
{¶ 12} Upon receiving the letter, Barnes treated it as an ex parte 
communication and followed Judge Glass’s protocol for handling such material.  
Barnes described the letter to Judge Glass, and the judge scheduled a hearing for 
July 31, 2018.  At the previously scheduled May 24 hearing, a magistrate advised 
D.V. and her counsel—the other parties had failed to appear—that the court had 
“obtained information from a different source” and that the matter would be 
rescheduled for a hearing before Judge Glass. 
{¶ 13} D.V.’s counsel thereafter asked Thomas whether she had sent her 
letter to the judge and requested a copy.  Thomas admitted sending the letter but 
refused to provide him with a copy.  According to Thomas, she invited D.V.’s 
counsel to view the letter in her office but advised him that she did not want him to 
share a copy with D.V., who Thomas believed would retaliate against her if she saw 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
the letter.  Thomas testified that she was fearful of D.V. and that D.V. had 
previously threatened her in court. 
{¶ 14} D.V.’s counsel first received a copy of the letter at the July 31, 2018 
hearing when Judge Glass distributed copies to the parties.  During that hearing, 
the judge informed the parties that she had not personally reviewed the ex parte 
communication but that her staff attorney had determined that certain issues raised 
in the letter should be addressed.  The judge later referred the matter to Family 
Court Services for an investigation and an inspection of D.V.’s home.  A few 
months later, Family Court Services submitted its report to the court, and on 
October 23, 2018, a magistrate determined that it was in the best interest of the 
child to be placed in the legal custody of D.V.  A few months prior to that 
determination, D.V. had filed a grievance against Thomas. 
{¶ 15} The board found the evidence undisputed that Thomas sent a detailed 
letter to Judge Glass’s staff attorney regarding the merits and facts of a pending 
case with the intent to cause the judge to take certain actions.  In doing so, the board 
noted, Thomas had deprived D.V. of the opportunity to review the letter, consult 
her attorney about its contents, or formulate a legal strategy regarding how to 
respond.  Thomas’s argument that her letter was not ex parte, the board concluded, 
would suggest the existence of a “recognized channel of communications” through 
which an attorney may directly communicate with a court about the merits of a case 
without notifying the other litigants in the matter, as long as the communication is 
addressed to the staff attorney and not the judge.  The board therefore found that 
Thomas violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i). 
Thomas’s first objection 
{¶ 16} As her first objection, Thomas argues that relator failed to prove that 
she willfully violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) because “the evidence at hearing 
demonstrated” that her letter to Barnes “was provided according to a protocol 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
established by the very court to which the communication was submitted” and that 
Thomas had “followed that protocol.”  We disagree. 
{¶ 17} Thomas, Judge Glass, and Barnes testified that at the brown-bag 
luncheon, Judge Glass discussed her office’s protocol for handling ex parte letters.  
But the fact that Judge Glass had publicly discussed an internal protocol for 
handling ex parte communications did not authorize Thomas—an officer of the 
court—to send one.  In other words, it was unreasonable for Thomas to presume 
that the existence of the protocol created an avenue for her to communicate with 
the judge through her staff attorney without including the parties to the case and 
their counsel. 
{¶ 18} And although Thomas testified that Judge Glass had stated that she 
would want a detailed letter sent to her staff attorney, both Judge Glass and Barnes 
denied that the judge had invited or requested such a letter.  Judge Glass testified 
that receiving ex parte letters “puts [the court] in a dilemma,” that “the whole 
system is in place so it doesn’t happen,” and that “[w]e don’t want letters.”  Barnes 
testified that “[a]t no time at the luncheon was Attorney Thomas directed or at no 
time did anyone * * * say to her, ‘It’s fine if you go ahead and contact Judge Glass’s 
staff attorney or send something to Judge Glass.’ ”  Thus, the hearing evidence did 
not demonstrate that Thomas “followed” any protocol established by Judge Glass.  
And even according to Thomas’s version of the events at the luncheon, she never 
suggested that Judge Glass instructed her to refuse to provide copies of the letter to 
D.V.’s counsel. 
{¶ 19} Even if Judge Glass had instructed Thomas to send an ex parte letter 
to a court, Thomas would not be absolved of responsibility for her own part in the 
misconduct.  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Stuard, 121 Ohio St.3d 29, 2009-Ohio-261, 
901 N.E.2d 788, we found that a judge and an assistant prosecutor had engaged in 
improper ex parte communications after the judge instructed the prosecutor to draft 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
the judge’s sentencing opinion and the prosecutor complied—all outside the 
presence of defense counsel. 
{¶ 20} “[W]hile it may be permissible for a private citizen to write to a 
judge about a pending case, it is improper for an attorney not representing a party 
in the case to directly or indirectly communicate with a judge to influence the 
outcome of pending litigation.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Detty, 96 Ohio St.3d 57, 
2002-Ohio-2992, 770 N.E.2d 1015, ¶ 5 (finding that such conduct amounted to 
professional misconduct but without addressing the prohibition against ex parte 
communications).  Thomas’s conduct was similarly improper, and her 
unreasonable belief that she was somehow following a protocol for submitting ex 
parte communications to Judge Glass’s court does not justify a departure from the 
board’s conclusion.  We therefore overrule Thomas’s first objection. 
Thomas’s second objection 
{¶ 21} As her second objection, Thomas argues that her letter to Barnes falls 
outside the ambit of Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i).  As noted above, that rule prohibits 
an attorney from communicating “ex parte” with “a judicial officer or other official 
as to the merits of the case during the proceeding.” 
{¶ 22} Thomas first asserts that her letter was not ex parte.  The Rules of 
Professional Conduct do not specifically define “ex parte,” see Prof.Cond.R. 1.0, 
but the Code of Judicial Conduct defines an “ex parte communication” as “a 
communication, concerning a pending or impending matter, between counsel or an 
unrepresented party and the court when opposing counsel or an unrepresented party 
is not present or any other communication made to the judge outside the presence 
of the parties or their lawyers” (emphasis added), Jud.Cond.R. Terminology. 
{¶ 23} Rather than the code’s definition, Thomas cites a dictionary 
definition of “ex parte” as meaning “of or from one side or party.”  Her letter falls 
outside this definition, Thomas argues, because it merely urged the court to 
consider all individuals involved in the nonadversarial custody arrangement.  
January Term, 2020 
 
9
Thomas also asserts that she notified D.V.’s counsel before sending the letter, she 
offered him an opportunity to view it but he “simply was not interested,” and he 
ultimately received a copy from the court. 
{¶ 24} The content of Thomas’s letter, however, undercuts her current 
characterization of it.  In the letter, Thomas described the communication as “ex 
parte.”  She sent the letter to “alert the court to many issues concerning [D.V.’s] 
becoming the custodial parent” and included allegations about the conditions of 
D.V.’s home, her treatment of her children, her mental health, her financial 
condition, and her marital status.  After identifying those issues, Thomas requested 
that the court appoint a “very aggressive and thorough” guardian ad litem and refer 
the matter for an investigation “so that this child may be protected and have some 
chance in life.”  The child, Thomas continued, “deserve[d] to have th[e] court be 
aware of this information * * * so that th[e] court has the opportunity to thoroughly 
investigate what would serve her best interest instead of three people [presumably, 
D.V. and the child’s parents] who have self serving interests deciding her fate for 
her.” 
{¶ 25} Contrary to Thomas’s contention, her letter presented a one-sided 
view of D.V. and advocated that “the court”—which is Judge Glass—take certain 
actions on behalf of the child.  An attorney’s interjecting such information into a 
pending adjudicative proceeding—outside the presence of other counsel and 
parties—amounts to an ex parte communication. 
{¶ 26} In addition, D.V.’s counsel certainly showed interest in the letter.  
He requested a copy by telephone and in two separate e-mails to Thomas, one of 
which she admitted to ignoring.  Regardless, whether D.V.’s counsel could have 
done more to obtain a copy of the letter is irrelevant.  As the board concluded, if 
Thomas had simply served her letter on the parties, “these proceedings would have 
been avoided as there would have been no ex parte communication.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
{¶ 27} Thomas next argues that Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) does not apply to 
ex parte communications directed to a judge’s staff attorney.  She cites the rule’s 
comments, which note that the rule applies to an attorney’s contact “with persons 
serving in an official capacity in the proceeding, such as judges, masters, 
magistrates, or jurors.”  Prof.Cond.R. 3.5, Comment [2].  Thomas argues that 
because Barnes was not serving in any “official capacity” in D.V.’s custody case, 
Thomas did not violate Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i). 
{¶ 28} In response to this argument, relator points out that Barnes is a sworn 
magistrate for Judge Glass and therefore a “judicial officer.”  But Judge Glass and 
Barnes testified that Barnes had reviewed Thomas’s letter in her capacity as the 
judge’s staff attorney—not as a magistrate. 
{¶ 29} We have not previously applied Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) to an 
attorney’s communications with a judge’s staff attorney—although we have found 
that the rule prohibits an attorney from engaging in indirect ex parte 
communications with a judge.  In Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Malley, 137 Ohio 
St.3d 161, 2013-Ohio-4566, 998 N.E.2d 470, an attorney requested that the county 
auditor—who personally knew the judge presiding over a case involving the 
attorney—request that the judge issue certain rulings that would assist the attorney 
in settling the matter.  We found that the attorney’s indirect communication with 
the judge violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)—even though the county auditor was not 
a “judicial officer” and had no “official capacity” in the case.  Id. at ¶ 11, 14. 
{¶ 30} We have also found that a judge can violate Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A)—
the rule in the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting judges from initiating, 
receiving, permitting, or considering ex parte communications—based on 
communications between the judge’s staff and an attorney.  In Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Salerno, 156 Ohio St.3d 244, 2019-Ohio-435, 125 N.E.3d 838, defense counsel 
had texted a judge’s bailiff requesting a reduction in a defendant’s bond.  The judge 
thereafter reduced the bond amount—without informing the prosecutor of the text 
January Term, 2020 
 
11 
messages.  At her disciplinary hearing, the judge testified that she did not initially 
believe that the messages were improper “because they came to her through her 
bailiff.”  Id. at ¶ 12.  But the judge later acknowledged—and we found—that “the 
text messages were improper ex parte communications.”  Id. at ¶ 12-13, 19. 
{¶ 31} Thomas argues that O’Malley and Salerno are distinguishable 
because unlike the attorney in O’Malley, she had no malicious motive and unlike 
the attorney in Salerno, she never wanted Judge Glass to see her letter and, in fact, 
the judge never saw it and was not influenced by it.  But nowhere in O’Malley did 
we state that the attorney’s motive for engaging in the ex parte communication was 
a determining factor for the Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3) violation.  Thomas’s belief that 
she was protecting the child’s interests did not justify her decision to dispense with 
established rules designed to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings.  And 
contrary to Thomas’s contention, Judge Glass was influenced by Thomas’s letter:  
the judge testified that she referred the matter for an investigation because of the 
information contained in the letter.  Regardless, Salerno is relevant here because in 
that case, the judge violated the prohibition against ex parte communications as a 
result of an attorney’s contact with the judge’s staff—which contradicts Thomas’s 
argument that a judge and her staff attorney should be considered as separate for 
purposes of ex parte communications.3 
                                                 
3. See also 2 Restatement of the Law 3d, The Law Governing Lawyers, Section 113, Comment d 
(2000) (the rule prohibiting an attorney from engaging in ex parte communications “also applies to 
indirect communications, as through a judge’s clerk”); Disciplinary Counsel v. Stafford, 131 Ohio 
St.3d 385, 2012-Ohio-909, 965 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 85 (O’Donnell, J., concurring) (recognizing that the 
comments to Section 113 of the Restatement prohibit ex parte communications “between * * * 
counsel and the judge’s staff”); Kaufman v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., D.Colo. No. 05-cv-02311-
WDM-MEH, 2008 WL 4980360, *3 (Nov. 19, 2008) (“I consider chamber’s staff, including law 
clerks, to be an extension of the judicial officer and to be covered by” the prohibitions on ex parte 
communications in Rule 3.5 of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct and a similar local court 
rule); Adams v. Naphcare, Inc., E.D.Va. No. 2:16-cv-229, 2016 WL 6699136, *5 (Nov. 14, 2016) 
(“Both the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct and Canons of Judicial Ethics prohibit ex parte 
communications between an attorney and a judge (and the judge’s staff) regarding the merits of a 
case”); Kamelgard v. Am. College of Surgeons, 385 Ill.App.3d 675, 679, 895 N.E.2d 997 (2008) 
(“the judge’s law clerk is an extension of the judge” for purposes of the prohibition on ex parte 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
{¶ 32} In the end, we cannot accept Thomas’s contention that no rule 
violation occurred here because she addressed the letter to the judge’s staff attorney, 
who Thomas claims had no “official capacity” in the proceeding.  Thomas’s letter 
plainly requested that the court take official action, and Thomas testified that she 
sent the letter with the goal of causing Judge Glass to issue certain orders that only 
the judge—not her staff attorney—could issue.  While Thomas may not have 
intended for the letter itself to be provided to the judge, she certainly sought to have 
enough of its substance conveyed to the judge to influence the judge’s handling of 
the case.  We therefore overrule Thomas’s second objection. 
{¶ 33} Having overruled Thomas’s objections, we agree with the board that 
Thomas violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) by communicating ex parte with Judge 
Glass’s staff attorney with the objective of passing information on to the judge.  
Thomas sent Barnes a letter including significant factual allegations about D.V. 
with the goal of causing Judge Glass to take certain actions—all without copying 
D.V.’s counsel on the letter.  In other words, Thomas, knowing that directly 
communicating with Judge Glass would be improper, attempted to use the judge’s 
staff attorney as a conduit to pass along the information.  Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i)’s 
prohibition against ex parte communications protects the integrity of the justice 
system.  As the board found, to conclude that Thomas acted appropriately because 
she addressed her letter to Barnes rather than Judge Glass would suggest “that there 
exists this back-channel method of communicating concerns to a court on pending 
legal matters” and could lead to a process in which attorneys “could seek to lobby 
and influence the judge handling the case by sending communications regarding 
the case to the judge’s administrative staff.” 
                                                 
communications); Martinez-Jones v. Dulce Indep. Schools, D.N.M. No. CIV-07-0703 JB/WDS, 
2008 WL 2229472, *5 (Mar. 5, 2008) (“Attorneys and pro se parties are prohibited from all ex parte 
communication with the judge or judge’s staff”). 
January Term, 2020 
 
13 
{¶ 34} We adopt the board’s finding of misconduct.  We also accept the 
board’s recommendation to dismiss the Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) charge. 
Sanction 
{¶ 35} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 36} The board found one aggravating factor—that Thomas had refused 
to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(7).  
As for mitigating factors, the board found that Thomas has a clean disciplinary 
record, had lacked a selfish or dishonest motive, had exhibited a cooperative 
attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and had submitted evidence of good 
character and reputation.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (2), (4), and (5). 
{¶ 37} Thomas objects to the aggravating factor.  She points to the board’s 
findings that (1) she clearly viewed Judge Glass’s explanation of her protocol for 
handling ex parte letters as a “green light” to correspond directly with Barnes, (2) 
she took active steps to avoid directly communicating with Judge Glass, and (3) she 
perceived that the judicial process had not allowed for sufficient inquiry into the 
child’s best interests.  Based on these findings, Thomas argues, her failure to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct should not be an aggravating 
factor. 
{¶ 38} Thomas’s objection here highlights her intent and motive.  The board 
credited her for lacking a selfish or dishonest motive and recognized that she 
appeared genuinely driven by a desire to protect the child.  But despite Thomas’s 
good intentions, she had an obligation to communicate with the court in an 
appropriate manner.  At her disciplinary hearing, Thomas testified that she did not 
understand how D.V. could have been affected by Judge Glass’s ordering an 
investigation based on Thomas’s letter without giving D.V. an opportunity to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
review it or respond.  And in her objections, Thomas continued to assert that “there 
was no avenue other than following the judge’s protocol, which was the appropriate 
avenue.”  Because Thomas has not acknowledged that her actions were in any way 
inappropriate, we overrule her objection to the aggravating factor. 
{¶ 39} Considering Thomas’s lengthy and otherwise unblemished legal 
career and her evidence of good character and reputation, the board recommends 
that we publicly reprimand her.  We conclude that a public reprimand is consistent 
with the sanctions that we have imposed for comparable misconduct and therefore 
adopt the board’s recommended sanction.  See, e.g., Stuard, 121 Ohio St.3d 29, 
2009-Ohio-261, 901 N.E.2d 788 (publicly reprimanding an assistant prosecutor for 
engaging in ex parte communications with a judge in a death-penalty case); 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Sauter, 96 Ohio St.3d 136, 2002-Ohio-3610, 772 N.E.2d 
620 (publicly reprimanding a judicial law clerk who had engaged in an ex parte 
communication with counsel in a case pending before the law clerk’s judge). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 40} For the reasons explained above, Joan Jacobs Thomas is publicly 
reprimanded for violating Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i).  Costs are taxed to Thomas. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, and 
DONNELLY, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
 
STEWART, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 41} I agree with the majority of the hearing panel of the Board of 
Professional Conduct that relator, disciplinary counsel, has failed to show by 
clear and convincing evidence that respondent, Joan Thomas, violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) when she sent a letter to Judge Sherry Glass’s staff 
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
attorney.  Accordingly, I would not adopt the board’s finding of misconduct or 
impose the sanction it recommended. 
Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) does not prohibit the type of communication at 
issue here 
{¶ 42} Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) states that “[a] lawyer shall not * * * 
communicate ex parte with * * * a judicial officer or other official as to the merits 
of the case during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court order.”  
The rule’s comments explain that the rule prohibits communications with those 
serving in an “official capacity” during the proceeding, “such as judges, masters, 
magistrates, or jurors.”  Prof.Cond.R. 3.5, Comment [2].  What all these individuals 
have in common is that they have decision-making authority over cases; staff 
attorneys and other court personnel do not.  Indeed, as the majority opinion 
acknowledges, this court has never before applied Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) to an 
attorney’s communications with a judge’s staff attorney.  Perhaps one reason for 
this is that nothing in Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) or its comments explicitly prohibits 
such communications. 
{¶ 43} Thus bereft of any helpful language in the rule, the majority looks to 
other disciplinary decisions of this court for support for its holding.  But the cases 
it relies on are distinguishable. 
{¶ 44} For instance, in Disciplinary Counsel v. Salerno, 156 Ohio St.3d 
244, 2019-Ohio-435, 125 N.E.3d 838, we found that a judge violated her duty under 
Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A)4 when she reduced a defendant’s bond amount based on text 
                                                 
4. Jud.Cond.R. 2.9 states: 
 
(A) A judge shall not initiate, receive, permit, or consider ex parte 
communications, except as follows: 
(1) When circumstances require it, an ex parte communication for 
scheduling, administrative, or emergency purposes, that does not address 
substantive matters or issues on the merits, is permitted, provided the judge 
reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, substantive, or tactical 
advantage as a result of the ex parte communication; 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
messages that defense counsel had sent to the judge’s bailiff.  In his texts, defense 
counsel explained that his client’s initial bond was substantially higher than a 
codefendant’s and asked whether the discrepancy was a mistake and, if so, whether 
it could be corrected by the end of the day.  The bailiff replied that he would pass 
the information along to the judge to find out whether the bond amount was correct 
and explained that if the bond indeed needed correction, then the judge, not the 
bailiff, would have to do it.  After receiving defense counsel’s text inquiry from her 
bailiff, the judge reduced the defendant’s bond without first notifying the 
prosecutor of her intent to do so or of the inquiry. 
{¶ 45} Although we referred to the text messages as “ex parte” 
communications in Salerno, id. at ¶ 11, we never found that defense counsel 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) by sending them.  And apparently, no 
                                                 
(2) A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law 
applicable to a proceeding before the judge, if the judge gives notice to the parties 
of the person consulted and the subject-matter of the advice solicited, and affords 
the parties a reasonable opportunity to object or respond to the advice received;  
(3) A judge may consult with court staff and court officials whose 
functions are to aid the judge in carrying out the judge’s adjudicative 
responsibilities, or with other judges, provided the judge makes reasonable efforts 
to avoid receiving factual information that is not part of the record and does not 
abrogate the responsibility personally to decide the matter;  
(4) A judge, with the consent of the parties, may confer separately with 
the parties and their lawyers in an effort to settle matters pending before the judge;  
(5) A judge may initiate, receive, permit, or consider an ex parte 
communication when expressly authorized by law to do so;  
(6) A judge may initiate, receive, permit, or consider an ex parte 
communication when administering a specialized docket, provided the judge 
reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, substantive, or tactical 
advantage while in the specialized docket program as a result of the ex parte 
communication. 
(B) If a judge receives an unauthorized ex parte communication bearing 
upon the substance of a matter, the judge shall make provision promptly to notify 
the parties of the substance of the communication and provide the parties with an 
opportunity to respond. 
 
Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A) and (B). 
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
disciplinary proceedings were brought against defense counsel for sending the text 
messages to the bailiff. 
{¶ 46} The majority maintains that Salerno supports the court’s decision in 
this case because without the attorney’s ex parte communications with the bailiff, 
the judge would not have violated Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A).  According to the majority, 
this fact “contradicts Thomas’s argument that a judge and her staff attorney should 
be considered as separate for purposes of ex parte communications.”  Majority 
opinion at ¶ 31.  I am not persuaded by the court’s analysis on this point.  To begin 
with, nothing in our decision in Salerno suggests that we understood the bailiff to 
be an extension of the judge in that case.  Furthermore, it does not necessarily 
follow that just because the judge violated her duty under Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A) when 
she acted upon a communication sent to her bailiff, the attorney must also have 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) by sending the communication.  A judge’s duty 
under Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A) is more precise and broader than an attorney’s duty under 
Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i).  Under Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A), a judge must avoid acting 
on any ex parte communication that comes into his or her possession—directly, 
indirectly, or by sheer accident—unless and until the judge shares the 
communication with the parties and the parties are allowed to respond, see 
Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(B).  This duty is different from an attorney’s duty under 
Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) to avoid engaging in ex parte communications with 
certain people—specifically, the judge or other decision-makers—on substantive 
aspects of the case. 
{¶ 47} That a judge may not act on a matter in response to any ex parte 
communication, regardless of how the communication came to the judge’s 
attention, makes perfect sense.  We cannot have a justice system in which a court 
acts on information that is not made known to all parties and before they are given 
the opportunity to respond.  But not every violation by a judge of his or her duty 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
under Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A) means that there has been some corresponding ex parte-
communication violation on the part of an attorney. 
{¶ 48} The majority’s reliance on Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Malley, 137 
Ohio St.3d 161, 2013-Ohio-4566, 998 N.E.2d 470, is also misplaced.  In that case, 
we found that O’Malley violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) by having the county 
auditor, a personal acquaintance of the judge, speak to the judge on his behalf and 
request that the judge rule on pending motions in a way that was beneficial to 
O’Malley’s client.  By engaging the county auditor to do his bidding, O’Malley was 
able to communicate with the decision-maker indirectly through another person. 
{¶ 49} There is an important difference between what happened in 
O’Malley and what happened in this case.  Here, Thomas specifically directed her 
letter to the judge’s staff attorney to avoid implicating the judge in any improper 
communication.  The first sentence of the letter makes sure that the staff attorney 
is aware that the letter is directed to her and not the judge specifically because it is 
an ex parte5 communication that Thomas did not want the judge to see.  The second 
sentence of the letter states, “I trust you can determine the necessary steps to take 
from here.”  Only then does the letter go on to explain why a guardian ad litem 
should be appointed to represent the child’s interests and why a family-services 
investigation is warranted.  Thomas left it up to the staff attorney to decide what to 
do with the letter.  The staff attorney could have sent it back to Thomas with no 
comment, sent it back to Thomas with instructions to file it and serve it on the 
parties, or do what she did here—screen the communication in such a way that 
                                                 
5. Because the Rules of Professional Conduct do not define the term “ex parte,” the majority applies 
a definition of “ex parte communication” used in the Code of Judicial Conduct.  It is worth noting, 
however, that the terminology section of the Code of Judicial Conduct makes clear that the 
definitions it sets forth are meant to apply specifically to those words as used within the Code of 
Judicial Conduct.  Jud.Cond.R. Terminology.  Accordingly, there is no logical reason for the 
majority to reject the dictionary definition of “ex parte” supplied by Thomas or to assume that 
Thomas understood her letter to be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct even though 
she referred to her letter as an ex parte communication. 
January Term, 2020 
 
19 
prevented the judge from seeing or hearing the prejudicial facts alleged in the letter 
while allowing the judge to decide whether the parties should be notified and 
whether any further action should be taken.  These particular facts do not show that 
Thomas used the staff attorney as a conduit for improperly communicating with the 
judge as the attorney did in O’Malley. 
{¶ 50} Furthermore, if this court is going to take the position that 
Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) prohibits ex parte communications with a judge’s 
nondecision-making staff—because staff is nothing more than an extension of the 
judge—then under no circumstances should staff be allowed to screen 
communications sent to chambers.  But this court has explicitly condoned that 
practice as a reasonable measure taken by judges to avoid seeing ex parte 
communications.  See State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Whitmore, 83 
Ohio St.3d 61, 63, 697 N.E.2d 640 (1998). 
{¶ 51} Lastly, the majority fails to show that it is a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 
3.5(a)(3)(i) for an attorney who is not representing a party in the pending matter to 
communicate with the court.  Indeed, in all cases the majority opinion cites except 
for one, a lawyer representing a party to the action did the communicating.  See 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Stuard, 121 Ohio St.3d 29, 2009-Ohio-261, 901 N.E.2d 
788 (prosecutor in the case communicating with judge); O’Malley, 137 Ohio St.3d 
161, 2013-Ohio-4566, 998 N.E.2d 470 (attorney of record in the case indirectly 
communicating with judge); Salerno, 156 Ohio St.3d 244, 2019-Ohio-435, 125 
N.E.3d 838 (defense counsel in the case communicating with bailiff); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Stafford, 131 Ohio St.3d 385, 2012-Ohio-909, 965 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 81-91 
(O’Donnell, J., concurring) (attorney of record in the case communicating with 
judge);6 Kaufman v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., D.Colo. No. 05-cv-02311-WDM-
                                                 
6. The majority opinion cites 2 Restatement of the Law 3d, The Law Governing Lawyers, Section 
113, Comment d, and Justice O’Donnell’s concurring opinion in Stafford, which cites the same, as 
support for the court’s conclusion that an attorney’s communication with court staff violates the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
MEH, 2008 WL 4980360 (Nov. 19, 2008) (attorney of record in the case 
communicating with law clerk); Adams v. Naphcare, Inc., E.D.Va. No. 2:16-cv-
229, 2016 WL 6699136 (Nov. 14, 2016) (attorney of record in the case 
communicating with law clerks); Kamelgard v. Am. College of Surgeons, 385 
Ill.App.3d 675, 895 N.E.2d 997 (2008) (attorney of record in the case 
communicating with law clerk); see also Martinez-Jones v. Dulce Indep. Schools, 
D.N.M. No. CIV-07-0703 JB/WDS, 2008 WL 2229472, *5 (Mar. 5, 2008) (citing 
court’s pro se-litigant guide, which states that attorneys and pro se litigants may not 
engage in ex parte communications with a judge’s staff but explains that “[e]x parte 
communication occurs when one of the parties to a lawsuit exchanges information 
with the assigned judge (1) without the opposing party being present, or (2) without 
the knowledge and consent of the opposing party” [emphasis added]). 
{¶ 52} The only case the majority opinion cites that presents facts even 
remotely similar to those of this case is Disciplinary Counsel v. Detty, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 57, 2002-Ohio-2992, 770 N.E.2d 1015.  In that case, we adopted the board’s 
conclusion that Detty had violated former DR 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) and 1-
102(A)(6) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on 
the lawyer’s fitness to practice law) when Detty approached a judge who was 
                                                 
prohibition on ex parte communications.  In doing so, the majority overlooks the fact that Section 
113, Comment c explicitly states that “[a]n ex parte communication is one that concerns the matter, 
that is between a lawyer representing a client and a judicial officer, and that occurs outside of the 
presence and without the consent of other parties to the litigation or their representatives.”  
(Emphasis added.)  This court should not cherry-pick which comments in the Restatement to focus 
on and which to ignore, merely to find support for its decision.  Nor should it choose arbitrarily 
which definition of “ex parte” it wishes to apply.  See majority opinion at ¶ 22 (adopting the Code 
of Judicial Conduct’s definition of “ex parte communication”).  “The Ohio Rules of Professional 
Conduct are rules of reason,” Prof.Cond.R. Scope [14], not games of chance.  To comply with a 
rule, one has to understand what the rule prohibits and what it allows.  If we, the highest court in the 
state, are reduced to reliance on authorities outside the rule to understand the import of words used 
in the rule, maybe the rule is insufficiently clear to place an attorney on notice of its requirements 
until we, using the outside sources we select, have explicated them. 
January Term, 2020 
 
21 
presiding over a divorce proceeding to discuss his concerns about the way the case 
was being handled—in particular, that the magistrate was willing to allow the 
divorcing couple’s children holiday visitation with their father despite accusations 
of child abuse.  Although Detty was not counsel to either party in the divorce 
proceeding, he was the romantic partner of the plaintiff-wife.  Important to note 
about this case is that Detty was not found to have violated DR 7-110, the precursor 
to Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i).  This tends to show that Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) 
applies only to attorneys representing parties in the case who communicate with the 
judge ex parte, while other rules regulate the same conduct of attorneys who neither 
represent a party to an action nor are a party themselves. 
There is no reason for a public reprimand 
{¶ 53} Even if I agreed with the majority’s conclusion that Prof.Cond.R. 
3.5(a)(3)(i) impliedly prohibits communications between an attorney and a 
judge’s staff, I would see no reason to sanction Thomas given the unique facts 
of this case.  Gov.Bar R. IV(1) makes clear that only a willful breach of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct shall be punished by a public reprimand, suspension, 
disbarment, or probation.  I fail to see how Thomas willfully breached her duty 
under Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i) when the language of the rule does not prohibit her 
actions and she seemed to have believed that if she followed the court’s protocol 
for screening ex parte communications, it would stop the contents of the 
communication from reaching the judge.  Indeed, it is telling that despite lawyers’ 
ethical duty under Prof.Cond.R. 8.3 to report rule violations when they see them, 
neither Judge Glass nor the staff attorney nor counsel for D.V. (the intervenor in 
the dissolution case) reported Thomas’s communication as a potential violation of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Instead, it was D.V. who filed the grievance 
against Thomas once she became aware of the letter—and before she even knew of 
the letter’s contents. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
{¶ 54} Furthermore, the majority opinion fails to acknowledge a number 
of relevant facts that warrant consideration in this matter.  Thomas found 
herself in the unique and undesirable position of being privy to some 
information about D.V.’s personal life that called into question her fitness to 
parent.  Specifically, Thomas knew: that D.V. had had children removed from 
her custody in the past and had been prohibited by court order from having 
contact with her stepchildren; that D.V. was not financially secure and had 
recently declared bankruptcy; that D.V. had intervened in a dissolution 
proceeding to gain legal custody of the couple’s six-year-old special-needs 
child and that the couple was not contesting the transfer; that that child was not 
the couple’s biological child and that she had spent time in foster care before 
being adopted by the couple along with the child’s two biological siblings; that 
the uncontested transfer of custody involved only the six-year-old and not her 
siblings, which meant that the child would be removed from her parents’ home 
where her biological siblings resided only to be placed with D.V., a person with 
whom she had no biological or legal relationship; that this matter was 
proceeding through the courts in an uncontested fashion and that in fact the 
only person that had any legal representation whatsoever was D.V., the 
intervenor; and that the court had not appointed a guardian ad litem to represent 
the child, nor had the court ordered any neutral investigation into whether D.V. 
was fit to parent.  These factors at least demonstrate Thomas’s cause for 
concern. 
{¶ 55} In light of these facts—and considering also that Thomas has 
never in 36 years of practice been subjected to discipline and acted here with 
no ill motive—there is no discernible reason to sanction her.  It might even be 
said that her concern and her efforts are in line with what lawyers are supposed 
to do.  Thomas relayed information she knew regarding the well-being of a 
child and did so in as unobtrusive a manner as possible, and in a way that 
January Term, 2020 
 
23 
maintained the court’s impartiality.  Because of her concern for the child, she 
suggested that a guardian ad litem be appointed or a neutral investigation be 
conducted—one or the other of which was in fact proper under the 
circumstances—and she did it because she could discern no other option.7 
{¶ 56} Accordingly, I would find that Thomas did not violate Prof.Cond.R. 
3.5(a)(3)(i) when she sent the letter to the judge’s staff attorney and that she 
should not be sanctioned.  Because the majority decides otherwise, I dissent. 
_________________ 
Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Karen H. Osmond and 
Matthew A. Kanai, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Winter Trimacco Co., L.P.A., Richard C. Alkire, and Dean Nieding, for 
respondent. 
_________________ 
                                                 
4. The majority opinion seems to suggest that Thomas should have contacted the county children’s-
services agency to report her concerns.  However, the record before us shows that this was not a 
realistic option because generally, children’s services gets involved only when a specific incident 
of child abuse or neglect has been reported.  That was not the issue here.  The majority’s suggestion 
that Thomas could have avoided violating the Rules of Professional Conduct by filing the 
communication with the court and serving it on the parties is also unpersuasive.  As noted above, 
Thomas was not a party in the case and was not counsel to any party in the case.  Her communication 
to the judge’s staff attorney was made out of concern for a child’s well-being and only after Thomas 
had explored how best to communicate that concern.