Title: Commonwealth v. Libby

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11831  
 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  BRIAN LIBBY. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.      May 7, 2015. - July 1, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Due Process of Law, Sex offender, Pretrial 
detainees.  Statute, Construction.  Words, "Prisoner." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on November 6, 2014. 
 
 
The case was reported by Duffly, J.  
 
 
 
Eric Tennen (Michael F. Farrington with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
Canan Yesilcimen, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The issue on appeal is whether the 
Commonwealth may file a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, 
§ 12, to civilly commit someone as a sexually dangerous person 
(SDP) who previously was convicted of a "sexual offense," as 
defined under G. L. c. 123A, § 1, but is currently in custody 
2 
only because he was unable to post bail in a pending criminal 
case.  We conclude that the Commonwealth may file an SDP 
petition under § 12 against a person who has been convicted of a 
sexual offense only where the person is in custody because of a 
criminal conviction, an adjudication as a delinquent juvenile or 
youthful offender, or a judicial finding that the person is 
incompetent to stand trial.  The Commonwealth may not file such 
a petition where, as here, the defendant is in custody only 
because he is awaiting trial, unless a judge has found the 
defendant incompetent to stand trial.  
 
Background.  The defendant, Brian Libby, was convicted in 
2002 of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of 
fourteen, which qualifies as a "sexual offense" under G. L. 
c. 123A, § 1, and was sentenced to two and one-half years in a 
house of correction.  He was subsequently convicted of other 
offenses, but was not serving a sentence on any of these 
convictions when he was indicted on October 11, 2013, for 
failure to register as a sex offender, subsequent offense.   At 
his arraignment in the Superior Court, a judge set bail in the 
amount of $5,000.  The defendant has been unable to post bail on 
this pending indictment, and has remained in custody for that 
reason alone awaiting trial.  
 
On May 12, 2014, the Commonwealth filed an SDP petition for 
civil commitment pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 12.  The defendant 
3 
moved to dismiss the petition for "failure of jurisdiction," 
claiming that the district attorney is not authorized to file a 
petition against the defendant when he is in custody only 
because he is "a homeless person charged with a crime and unable 
to afford . . . bail."  The judge denied the motion.  Citing 
Commonwealth v. Gillis, 448 Mass. 354, 358-359 (2007), and 
Commonwealth v. Allen, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 862, 864 (2009), the 
judge concluded that § 12 "contemplates" the SDP commitment of 
persons previously convicted of a sexual offense "who are 
currently serving a criminal sentence or who face pending 
charges and are awaiting trial."  The defendant sought 
interlocutory review of the denial of the motion to dismiss, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The single justice reserved and 
reported the case without decision for determination by the full 
court.   
 
Discussion.  We briefly summarize the relevant provisions 
of G. L. c. 123A regarding the civil commitment of a person 
found to be a "sexually dangerous person," as defined in § 1.1  
                                                          
 
 
1 A "sexually dangerous person" (SDP) is defined as    
 
 
 
"any person who has been (i) convicted of or adjudicated as 
 
a delinquent juvenile or youthful offender by reason of a 
 
sexual offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or 
 
personality disorder which makes the person likely to 
 
engage in sexual offenses if not confined to a secure 
 
facility; (ii) charged with a sexual offense and was 
 
determined to be incompetent to stand trial and who suffers 
 
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which 
4 
The procedure for filing an SDP petition is set forth in § 12.  
Under § 12 (a), an "agency with jurisdiction"2 must notify in 
writing the relevant district attorney3 and the Attorney General 
six months prior to the release of three categories of persons.4  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
makes such person likely to engage in sexual offenses if 
 
not confined to a secure facility; or (iii) previously 
 
adjudicated as such by a court of the commonwealth and 
 
whose misconduct in sexual matters indicates a general lack 
 
of power to control his sexual impulses, as evidenced by 
 
repetitive or compulsive sexual misconduct by either 
 
violence against any victim, or aggression against any 
 
victim under the age of [sixteen] years, and who, as a 
 
result, is likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury on 
 
such victims because of his uncontrolled or uncontrollable 
 
desires."   
 
G. L. c. 123A, § 1. 
 
 
2 An "agency with jurisdiction" is defined as   
 
 
"the agency with the authority to direct the release of a 
person presently incarcerated, confined or committed to the 
department of youth services, regardless of the reason for 
such incarceration, confinement or commitment, including, 
but not limited to a sheriff, keeper, master or 
superintendent of a jail, house of correction or prison, 
the director of a custodial facility in the department of 
youth services, the parole board and, where a person has 
been found incompetent to stand trial, a district 
attorney."   
 
G. L. c. 123A, § 1. 
 
 
3 The relevant district attorney is the "district attorney 
of the county where the offense occurred."  G. L. c. 123A, 
§ 12 (a).  
  
 
4 Where a person "is returned to prison for no more than six 
months as a result of a revocation of parole or . . . is 
committed for no more than six months, such notice shall be 
given as soon as practicable following such person's admission 
to prison."  G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (a).   
5 
The three categories are (1) "a person who has ever been 
convicted of or adjudicated as a delinquent juvenile or a 
youthful offender by reason of a sexual offense as defined in 
[§] 1, regardless of the reason for the current incarceration, 
confinement or commitment"; (2) a person charged with such a 
sexual offense who "has been found incompetent to stand trial;" 
and (3) a person charged with "any offense," who "is currently 
incompetent to stand trial," and who "has previously been 
convicted of or adjudicated as a delinquent juvenile or a 
youthful offender by reason of a sexual offense."  G. L. 
c. 123A, § 12 (a).  If the district attorney or the Attorney 
General determines that the "prisoner or youth in the custody of 
the department of youth services is likely to be a sexually 
dangerous person as defined in [§] 1," the district attorney or 
the Attorney General at the request of the district attorney may 
file an SDP petition "in the superior court where the prisoner 
or youth is committed or in the superior court of the county 
where the sexual offense occurred."  G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (b).   
 
It is plain from the statute that the relevant district 
attorney or the Attorney General may file an SDP petition only 
against a person who is included within the three categories of 
persons for whom notice must be given of their impending 
release.  See Gillis, 448 Mass. at 357 ("In general, the 
triggering event for SDP commitment is the impending release, 
6 
usually from prison, of a sex offender"); Commonwealth v. 
Nieves, 446 Mass. 583, 586 (2006) (SDP commitment process 
"begins" with agency with jurisdiction giving notice six months 
prior to release of person previously convicted of sexual 
offense); Commonwealth v. McLeod, 437 Mass. 286, 290-291 (2002).  
Where the defendant here has not been found incompetent to stand 
trial, the Commonwealth contends that the defendant falls within 
the first category.  The Commonwealth's argument essentially 
rests on two grounds.   
 
First, the Commonwealth notes that the first category 
includes any person convicted or adjudicated of a sexual offense 
who is currently incarcerated, confined, or committed, 
"regardless of the reason for the current incarceration, 
confinement or commitment."  Because the defendant previously 
was convicted of a sexual offense and is in confinement awaiting 
trial due to his failure to post bail, the Commonwealth 
maintains that he meets these criteria.   
 
Second, the Commonwealth notes that § 12 (b) permits a 
district attorney to file an SDP petition against a "prisoner," 
and that we have said that "[t]he word 'prisoner,' in its 
'common and approved usage,' refers to an individual who is 
either serving a criminal sentence or awaiting trial."  Gillis, 
448 Mass. at 358-359, citing 12 Oxford English Dictionary 513 
(2d ed. 1989) ("one who is kept in custody . . . as the result 
7 
of a legal process, either as having been condemned to 
imprisonment as a punishment, or as awaiting trial for some 
offence"), Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1804 
(1993) ("a person held under arrest or in prison"), and Black's 
Law Dictionary 1213 (7th ed. 1999) ("A person who is serving 
time in prison"; "[a] person who has been apprehended by a law-
enforcement officer and is in custody, regardless of whether the 
person has yet been put in prison").  
 
In determining whether § 12 permits an SDP petition to be 
filed against a person previously convicted of a sexual offense, 
who is competent to stand trial, and is in custody awaiting 
trial, we apply familiar principles of statutory interpretation, 
"informed by the rule that '[l]aws in derogation of the liberty 
or general rights, of the citizen . . . are to be strictly 
construed.'"  Gillis, supra at 357, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Beck, 187 Mass. 15, 17 (1904).  "Narrowly construing the SDP 
statute, as with other statutes in derogation of liberty, not 
only helps avoid possible constitutional due process problems,  
. . . but also helps ensure that individuals are not deprived of 
liberty without a clear statement of legislative intent to do 
so" (citation omitted).  Gillis, supra.  Applying the required 
strict construction of § 12, we conclude that it does not permit 
an SDP petition to be filed against a person previously 
convicted of a sexual offense who is in custody awaiting trial, 
8 
where there has been no finding that the person is incompetent 
to stand trial.   
 
As to the Commonwealth's first argument, we note that the 
phrase, "regardless of the reason for the current incarceration, 
confinement or commitment," was added to § 12 (a) through an 
amendment in 2004.  See St. 2004, c. 66, § 8.  Before that 
language was added, we had declared in McLeod, 437 Mass. at 286, 
that § 12 (a) did not apply to "persons convicted of sexual 
offenses who have completed and been released from those 
sentences but who are later serving sentences for crimes that 
are not statutorily enumerated 'sexual offenses.'"  In that 
case, the defendant had been convicted of aggravated rape and 
kidnapping, but had completed the sentences for those crimes, 
and was in a house of correction serving time for convictions 
that were not sexual offenses when the SDP petition was filed.  
Id. at 287.  We determined that "[t]he thrust of the statutory 
scheme [was] that commitment petitions should be brought against 
persons currently incarcerated for sexual offenses who are about 
to be released into the community but who, because they are 
sexually dangerous, are likely to commit another sexual offense, 
and, therefore, should not be released."  Id. at 291.  We noted 
that "[w]ere we to conclude otherwise, any defendant serving a 
sentence for any crime who had ever in the past committed an 
enumerated sexual offense, no matter how temporally distant, 
9 
would be eligible for civil commitment, contingent on that 
defendant's current mental condition."  Id. at 292. 
 
The 2004 amendment revised § 12 (a) to do precisely that.  
The legislative history suggests that the Legislature did not 
intend by this amendment to do more than allow an SDP petition 
to be filed against a person convicted of a sexual offense who 
was serving a sentence for a nonsexual offense, or who was found 
incompetent to stand trial on a nonsexual offense.5  See 
Memorandum from William J. Meade, Deputy Chief Counsel, and 
                                                          
 
 
5 We note that, in 2002, Alexandra Zapp was brutally 
murdered at a rest stop on a Massachusetts highway by a person 
previously convicted of a sexual offense who had recently been 
released from incarceration following a conviction of a 
nonsexual offense.  See Lambiaso, "Ally Zapp" Law, Signed by 
Romney, Grants New Powers Over Offenders, State House News 
Service, Apr. 7, 2004.  Press reports after her murder noted 
that the law did not allow the district attorney to file an SDP 
petition before the person's release, because he was serving a 
sentence on a nonsexual offense.  See Confining the Dangerous, 
Boston Globe, July 20, 2002, at A.12 (prosecutors' attempt to 
civilly commit Zapp murder suspect failed because SDP law was 
interpreted to deny SDP petition "if the most recent offense for 
which [a person previously convicted of a sexual offense] is 
held is not a sex crime"); Lambiaso, supra ("Romney and 
lawmakers say the law is needed to close a loophole in the 1999 
civil commitment statute that prevents judges from keeping 
criminals in jail if they previously committed a sex crime but 
were serving a sentence for something non-sexual").  See also 
Testimony of Lieutenant Governor Kerry Healey before the Joint 
Committee on the Judiciary (testifying in favor of 2004 
amendment to SDP law and stating, "It is an honor to sit beside 
Ms. Andrea Casanova, Alexandra Zapp's mother.  Her involvement 
in this issue will help to keep her daughter's memory alive and 
protect innocent people from sexually dangerous individuals"); 
State House News Service, (Senate Sess.), Oct. 7, 2003 
(Statement of Sen. Brian A. Joyce that proposed amendment to SDP 
law "relates to the Zapp murder" and that "[t]he murderer could 
have been civilly committed under [the proposed] bill").  
10 
Daniel B. Winslow, Chief Legal Counsel, to Senior Staff of the 
Executive Department (Apr. 7, 2004) (McLeod opinion highlighted 
limitations of pre-2004 SDP law by holding that person 
previously convicted of sexual offense was ineligible for civil 
commitment "because the offense for which the [person] was 
serving a sentence at the time the commitment petition was filed 
was not a statutorily-enumerated 'sexual offense'" [emphasis 
added]); Testimony of Lieutenant Governor Kerry Healey before 
the Joint Committee on the Judiciary (2004 amendment to SDP law 
"allows district attorneys to file petitions to civilly commit 
incarcerated persons as sexually dangerous persons, regardless 
of the purpose of their current incarceration.  For example, an 
individual serving time for assault and battery could be civilly 
committed based on prior sex offenses").  Although the language 
added was broader than "incarceration," and included 
"confinement or commitment," we need not interpret that language 
to include all those confined awaiting trial to avoid rendering 
the words superfluous.  Confinement "may refer to persons in 
custody who are incompetent to stand trial for an offense."  
Gillis, 448 Mass. at 361.  Commitment may refer to a commitment 
to the department of youth services following a juvenile 
adjudication.  See id. at 361, 363-364 (SDP petition may not be 
filed against individual who had completed his criminal sentence 
and was civilly committed due to mental illness); G. L. c. 123A, 
11 
§ 1 ("agency with jurisdiction" defined as "agency with the 
authority to direct the release of a person presently 
incarcerated, confined or committed to the department of youth 
services").   
 
The 2004 amendment also added a third category of persons 
who may be subject to an SDP petition:  a person charged with 
"any offense," who "is currently incompetent to stand trial," 
and who "has previously been convicted of or adjudicated as a 
delinquent juvenile or a youthful offender by reason of a sexual 
offense."  St. 2004, c. 66, § 9.  If the first category included 
all persons convicted of sexual offenses who were in custody 
awaiting trial, there would be no reason for the Legislature to 
add this third category, which includes only the narrow subset 
of those awaiting trial on any offense who were found to be 
incompetent.   
 
Moreover, if the Legislature intended the addition of the 
phrase, "regardless of the reason for the current incarceration, 
confinement or commitment," to permit an SDP petition to be 
filed against a person previously convicted of a sexual offense, 
who is confined awaiting trial without being found incompetent, 
the Legislature would have amended the requirement that an 
"agency with jurisdiction" give written notice six months prior 
to such person's release.  Such a notice requirement reasonably 
could not be applied to a person who is in custody only because 
12 
of an inability to post bail, who could obtain immediate release 
upon posting bail.  The Legislature in § 12 (a) recognized that 
six months' prior notice may not be practicable in certain 
circumstances, but it limited those circumstances to two:  "the 
case of a person who is returned to prison for no more than six 
months as a result of a revocation of parole or who is committed 
for no more than six months."  If the Legislature had 
contemplated that an SDP petition could be filed after a 
person's arrest while that person was in custody awaiting a bail 
determination or seeking the funds to post bail, it would have 
recognized this possibility in its notice provision. 
 
As to the Commonwealth's second argument, we acknowledge 
the dictum in Gillis, 448 Mass. at 358-359, that included those 
"awaiting trial" in the dictionary definition of the word 
"prisoner."  We also recognize that "prisoner" is a word that is 
not defined in G. L. c. 123A, § 1, but is used in § 12 (b), 
which provides that "the district attorney . . . may file a 
petition alleging that the prisoner or youth is a sexually 
dangerous person."  But we are not persuaded that this means 
that the Legislature intended to permit the filing of an SDP 
petition against someone who is in custody awaiting trial and 
who has not been found incompetent.       
 
The issue in Gillis was whether an SDP petition may be 
filed against a person previously convicted of a sexual offense 
13 
who was no longer serving a sentence but was civilly committed 
for mental illness.  448 Mass. at 355-356.  The adoption of the 
dictionary definition of "prisoner" supported our conclusion 
that a person who was civilly committed was not a "prisoner" as 
that word is used in § 12 (b); we did not need to decide whether 
a person held in custody awaiting trial was a "prisoner."  Id. 
at 359.  Moreover, it would be unreasonable to strip the words 
"prisoner or youth" from their context in § 12 (b), apply their 
dictionary definitions, and conclude that the Legislature 
intended that a district attorney may file an SDP petition 
against any prisoner or youth, as those words are commonly used.  
Those words are plainly a shorthand reference to the three 
categories of persons identified in § 12 (a) who are subject to 
the filing of an SDP petition, and are limited in scope to those 
three categories of persons.   
 
For all these reasons, we conclude that interpreting the 
first category of persons subject to the filing of an SDP 
petition to include all persons previously convicted of a sexual 
offense who are in custody awaiting trial would be inconsistent 
with other provisions in § 12 and unsupported by the legislative 
history.  It also would raise serious practical problems that 
would complicate the already complex SDP petition procedure.  
Under the Commonwealth's interpretation, an SDP petition could 
be filed against a person previously convicted of a sexual 
14 
offense who is in custody awaiting trial, regardless of how 
minor the charge, even if the person has yet to appear at 
arraignment or is awaiting the arrival of family members to post 
bail.  This could invite an unseemly race to file the SDP 
petition before the defendant posted bail, and might provide the 
Commonwealth with an incentive to delay the arraignment or 
hinder the posting of bail to allow it the time needed to file 
the petition.  Moreover, the Commonwealth's interpretation would 
mean that an SDP proceeding would likely occur at the same time 
as a criminal proceeding, and that an acquittal in the criminal 
case would not end the SDP proceeding.  It would also mean that 
a defendant who was unable to afford bail would be more 
vulnerable to the filing of an SDP petition than a comparable 
defendant with the means to post bail.   
 
Because G. L. c. 123A, § 12, must be strictly construed, a 
clear statement of legislative intent is needed to permit an SDP 
petition to be filed against those in custody awaiting trial who 
were not found incompetent.  See Gillis, 448 Mass. at 357.  We 
conclude that there is nothing close to a clear statement of 
legislative intent to do so.  As a result, the SDP petition 
against the defendant must be dismissed.6  
                                                          
 
 
6 If the defendant were to be convicted of the pending 
charge and sentenced to a period of incarceration, the 
Commonwealth, pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 12, would not be 
15 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons given, we remand the case to 
the county court for entry of a judgment allowing the 
defendant's petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and 
directing the entry of a judgment in the Superior Court 
dismissing the Commonwealth's petition for commitment pursuant 
to G. L. c. 123A, § 12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
barred from filing a new SDP petition against him prior to his 
release from incarceration.