Title: State v. Taylor

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA13-458 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed:  18 March 2014 
 
 
MORNINGSTAR MARINAS/EATON 
FERRY, LLC, 
     Petitioner 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Warren County 
No. 12 CVS 180 
WARREN COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA 
and KEN KRULIK, WARREN COUNTY 
PLANNING AND ZONING ADMINISTRATOR, 
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, 
     Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by respondents from order entered 13 September 2012 
by Judge Robert H. Hobgood in Warren County Superior Court.  
Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 November 2013. 
 
Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., by John H. Carmichael, 
for petitioner-appellee. 
 
Turrentine Law Firm, PLLC, by Karlene S. Turrentine, for 
respondents-appellants. 
 
 
DAVIS, Judge. 
 
 
Warren County and Ken Krulik (“Mr. Krulik”), in his 
official capacity as the Warren County Planning and Zoning 
Administrator (collectively “Respondents”), appeal from the 
trial court’s order issuing a writ of mandamus in favor of 
Morningstar 
Marinas/Eaton 
Ferry, 
LLC 
(“Morningstar”) 
in 
-2- 
 
connection with a zoning dispute.  After careful review, we 
affirm the trial court’s order. 
Factual Background 
The 
facts 
relevant 
to 
this 
appeal 
are 
as 
follows:  
Morningstar operates a full-service marina on a 5.03 acre parcel 
of land (“the Morningstar Property”) located at 1835 Eaton Ferry 
Road in Littleton, North Carolina.  The Morningstar Property is 
zoned commercial in the Lakeside Business District under the 
Warren 
County 
Zoning 
Ordinance 
(“the 
Ordinance”). 
 
Its 
commercial marina offers wet slips and dry storage for boats and 
a fuel dock.  The Morningstar Property is located off of a small 
cove of Lake Gaston and is approximately 145 feet across the 
cove from land owned by East Oaks, LLC (“East Oaks”).  
Approximately 8.5 acres of the East Oaks property is zoned 
residential (“the Residential Property”) under the Ordinance.  
Adjacent to the Residential Property is a 1.91 acre parcel of 
land owned by East Oaks and zoned commercial (“the Commercial 
Property”).  The Commercial Property is improved with a boat 
storage building from which East Oaks operates a dry storage 
facility. 
East Oaks filed a petition for a conditional use permit 
seeking to build 36 townhouses on the Residential Property.  In 
its petition, East Oaks included a site plan for the proposed 
use showing the townhouses, roads, and a drive (“the Drive”) 
-3- 
 
that connects the Commercial Property and the Residential 
Property.  The record indicates that the Drive was to be used 
for the purpose of transporting boats from the dry storage 
facility located on the Commercial Property to the boat launch 
area located on the Residential Property. 
Before the Warren County Board of Adjustment (“BOA”) ruled 
on East Oaks’ petition for a conditional use permit, Mr. Krulik 
reviewed the Ordinance and issued a formal determination on 21 
April 
2011 
(“the 
21 
April 
Determination”), 
finding 
that 
townhouses were a permitted use in a residential district as a 
single-family dwelling.  As such, East Oaks withdrew its 
application for the conditional use permit and secured a 
standard zoning permit to begin construction. 
Morningstar appealed the 21 April Determination to the BOA, 
asserting that neither the townhouses nor the Drive portions of 
East Oaks’ site plan were permitted under the Ordinance.  
Because the 21 April Determination did not expressly address the 
Drive portion of East Oaks’ site plan, on 12 May 2011, 
Morningstar 
requested 
that 
Mr. 
Krulik 
issue 
a 
formal 
determination as to whether East Oaks’ proposed use of the Drive 
would constitute a commercial use of the Residential Property in 
violation of the Ordinance.  In an email dated 10 June 2011, Mr. 
Krulik responded, “I am not going to make a determination on 
this . . . .  [because] it is not a relevant issue to my 
-4- 
 
determination on townhouses as a permitted use or issuing the 
zoning permit.” 
On 15 August 2011, the BOA heard Morningstar’s appeal and 
voted unanimously to reverse the 21 April Determination and to 
revoke East Oaks’ zoning permit.  On 12 September 2011, East 
Oaks filed a petition for writ of certiorari in Warren County 
Superior Court seeking judicial review of the BOA’s decision 
reversing the 21 April Determination.  On 14 October 2011, the 
Honorable Robert H. Hobgood entered a consent order whereby East 
Oaks and Warren County agreed to reinstate East Oaks’ zoning 
permit and adopt Mr. Krulik’s interpretation of the Ordinance so 
as to allow East Oaks to develop the property pursuant to its 
site plan.  Morningstar was not a party to the consent order, 
and the trial court concluded as a matter of law that 
“Morningstar is not a ‘person aggrieved’ pursuant to N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 153A-345(b)” and that the “Warren County Board of 
Adjustment had no jurisdiction or authority to hear the appeal 
of Morningstar.” 
One week earlier, on 7 October 2011, Morningstar filed its 
initial petition for writ of mandamus to compel Mr. Krulik to 
issue the requested formal determination regarding the Drive.  
In Respondents’ answer, they denied Morningstar’s right to 
petition for writ of mandamus but also attached a formal 
-5- 
 
determination from Mr. Krulik dated 16 November 2011 (“the 16 
November Determination”), which stated, in pertinent part, that 
[w]hile I did not make a specific 
determination as to whether the use of the 
concrete 
drive/easement 
constitutes 
a 
commercial use of the East Oaks property in 
violation of the Ordinance, my issuance of 
the 
East 
Oaks 
zoning 
permit 
. 
. 
. 
necessarily required that I determine the 
submitted use of the entire property covered 
by the permit is not restricted by the 
Warren County Zoning Ordinance. 
 
The drive is shown as a “20’ wide 
private 
access 
easement” 
on 
East 
Oaks’ 
development 
plans. 
 
Warren 
County’s 
Ordinance does not specifically regulate 
easements 
— whether or not they cross 
varying zoning jurisdictions. . . . [T]o my 
knowledge, there has been no attempt by 
Warren County to regulate such easements 
through its zoning regulations. 
  
After 
Mr. 
Krulik 
issued 
the 
16 
November 
Determination, 
Morningstar dismissed its petition for writ of mandamus without 
prejudice. 
Thereafter, Morningstar noticed its appeal of the 16 
November Determination (“the Drive Appeal”).  By letter dated 17 
January 2012, Warren County’s attorney advised Morningstar that 
the Drive Appeal would not be placed on the BOA’s agenda.  On 14 
May 2012, Morningstar filed another petition for writ of 
mandamus in Warren County Superior Court, seeking — this time — 
to compel Respondents to place the Drive Appeal on the BOA’s 
agenda for a hearing on the merits.  On 13 September 2012, Judge 
-6- 
 
Hobgood granted Morningstar’s petition and issued a writ of 
mandamus ordering Respondents to place the appeal on the BOA’s 
agenda.  Respondents filed a timely notice of appeal to this 
Court. 
Analysis 
As an initial matter, Respondents argue that the 16 
November Determination was not a “new” determination from which 
Morningstar could appeal to the BOA because it merely echoed Mr. 
Krulik’s 21 April Determination.  We disagree.  The 21 April 
Determination did not explicitly address the use of the Drive.  
Moreover, 
in 
its 
first 
petition 
for 
writ 
of 
mandamus, 
Morningstar alleged:  “As of the date of this Petition, Mr. 
Krulik has not issued the requested formal determination 
[regarding the Drive].”  Respondents admitted this allegation in 
their 
answer 
and 
then 
— 
referencing 
the 
16 
November 
Determination — provided that “such formal determination is 
hereto attached.”  Thus, we consider Mr. Krulik’s 16 November 
letter to be a formal determination from which Morningstar may 
appeal. 
We now turn our attention to whether the criteria for the 
issuance of a writ of mandamus were satisfied.  “A writ of 
mandamus 
is 
an 
extraordinary 
court 
order 
to 
a 
board, 
corporation, inferior court, officer or person commanding the 
performance of a specified official duty imposed by law.”  
-7- 
 
Graham Cty. Bd. of Elections v. Graham Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 212 
N.C. App. 313, 322, 712 S.E.2d 372, 379 (2011) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  A writ of mandamus is the proper 
remedy when (1) the party seeking relief has “a clear legal 
right to the act requested;” (2) the respondent has “a legal 
duty to perform the act requested;” (3) the act at issue is 
“ministerial in nature and [does] not involve the exercise of 
discretion;” (4) the respondent has failed to perform the act 
requested and the time for performance has expired; and (5) 
there is no legally adequate alternative remedy.  In re T.H.T., 
362 N.C. 446, 453-54, 665 S.E.2d 54, 59 (2008).  “A court cannot 
refuse a petition for writ of mandamus when it is sought to 
enforce a clearly-established legal right.”  Id. at 453, 665 
S.E.2d at 59. 
Here, Respondents’ primary contention is that mandamus was 
not appropriate because Morningstar lacked standing to appeal 
Mr. Krulik’s 16 November Determination and, as such, did not 
have a “clear legal right” to have its appeal placed on the 
BOA’s agenda.  However, because we believe that Mr. Krulik had a 
statutory duty to transmit Morningstar’s appeal to the BOA and 
that the existence — or nonexistence — of standing is a legal 
determination that must be made by the BOA, we affirm the trial 
court’s order issuing a writ of mandamus compelling Respondents 
to place the appeal on the BOA’s agenda. 
-8- 
 
At all times relevant to this action, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
153A-3451 provided, in relevant part, as follows: 
(b) A zoning ordinance . . . adopted 
pursuant to the authority granted in this 
Part 
shall 
provide 
that 
the 
board 
of 
adjustment shall hear and decide appeals 
from and review any order, requirement, 
decision, 
or 
determination 
made 
by 
an 
administrative official charged with the 
enforcement of that ordinance.  Any person 
aggrieved or any officer, department, board, 
or bureau of the county may take an appeal.  
Appeals 
shall 
be 
taken 
within 
times 
prescribed by the board of adjustment by 
general rule, by filing with the officer 
from whom the appeal is taken and with the 
board of adjustment a notice of appeal, 
specifying the grounds thereof.  The officer 
from 
whom 
the 
appeal 
is 
taken 
shall 
forthwith transmit to the board all the 
papers constituting the record upon which 
action appealed from was taken. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-345(b) (emphasis added).  The purpose of 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-345 is “to provide a right of review, and 
statutes providing for review of administrative decisions should 
be liberally construed to preserve and effectuate that right.”  
Mize v. Cty. of Mecklenburg, 80 N.C. App. 279, 283, 341 S.E.2d 
767, 769 (1986). 
Neither N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-345 nor any other provision 
of North Carolina law confers upon a zoning administrator the 
power to make a legal decision as to whether a party seeking to 
                     
1 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-345 was in effect during the time period 
relevant to the present action but has since been repealed.  
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-388 now governs appeals to county boards 
of adjustment. 
-9- 
 
appeal to the BOA from a zoning decision is a “person aggrieved” 
for standing purposes.  North Carolina law does, however, 
mandate that the zoning administrator transmit the record of an 
appeal to the BOA if the appeal is taken within the prescribed 
time period.  Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-345(b), a 
zoning administrator has no discretion regarding whether to 
perform his duty of transmitting the record to the BOA once the 
appeal has been noticed.  Instead, as quoted above, the statute 
expressly states that the zoning administrator from whom the 
appeal is being taken “shall forthwith transmit to the board all 
the papers constituting the record upon which action appealed 
from was taken.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-345(b) (emphasis 
added).  The Warren County Zoning Ordinance — in accordance with 
§ 153A-345(b) — also specifically provides that “[a]ppeals from 
the enforcement and interpretation of this ordinance . . . shall 
be filed with the Zoning Administrator, who shall transmit all 
such records to the Board of Adjustment.”  Warren County, N.C., 
Zoning Ordinance § IX-4 (emphasis added). 
Our appellate courts have consistently held that the use of 
the word “shall” in a statute indicates what actions are 
required or mandatory.  See Multiple Claimants v. N.C. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 361 N.C. 372, 378, 646 S.E.2d 356, 360 
(2007) (“It is well established that the word ‘shall’ is 
generally imperative or mandatory.”  (citations and quotation 
-10- 
 
marks omitted)); Internet E., Inc. v. Duro Communications, Inc., 
146 N.C. App. 401, 405-06, 553 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2001) (“The word 
‘shall’ is defined as ‘must’ or ‘used in laws, regulations, or 
directives to express what is mandatory.’” (citation omitted)).  
As such, we conclude that the act of placing Morningstar’s 
appeal on the BOA agenda is ministerial in nature and does not 
involve any discretion on the part of the zoning administrator. 
 
We also hold that Morningstar has a legal right to have its 
appeal transmitted to the BOA and placed on the agenda.  
Morningstar appealed the 16 November Determination on 14 
December 2011.  In accordance with the provisions of the Warren 
County Zoning Ordinance, Morningstar filed its appeal with Mr. 
Krulik, the officer from whom the appeal was taken, and included 
a $150.00 filing fee for the appeal.  See Warren County, N.C., 
Zoning Ordinance § IX-4 (“Appeals from the enforcement and 
interpretation of this ordinance . . . shall be filed with the 
Zoning Administrator . . . .”); id. at § IX-2 (listing $150.00 
as fee for appeals to the BOA).  Because Morningstar complied 
with the requirements for taking an appeal, it had a right to 
have its appeal placed on the BOA’s agenda.  See id. at § IX-3 
(“The Board of Adjustment shall have the following powers and 
duties . . . [t]o hear and decide any appeal from and review any 
order, requirement, decision, or determination made by the 
Zoning Administrator.”); id. at § IX-4 (“The Board of Adjustment 
-11- 
 
shall fix a reasonable time, not to exceed 30 days, for the 
hearing of the appeal . . . .”). 
Mr. Krulik, as the zoning officer from whom the appeal was 
taken, therefore had a statutory duty to transmit the appeal to 
the BOA.  This duty was mandatory, as indicated by the use of 
the word “shall,” and did not involve the exercise of 
discretion.  Because Mr. Krulik failed to comply with the 
statutory mandate and instead made clear his unwillingness to do 
so, 
mandamus 
was 
Morningstar’s 
only 
available 
remedy.  
Morningstar’s ability to appeal to the BOA was foreclosed by Mr. 
Krulik’s refusal to place the appeal on the BOA’s agenda.  
Moreover, Morningstar could not appeal the substance of the 
zoning administrator’s decision directly to the superior court 
because only BOA decisions are subject to judicial review.  See 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-345(e2) (“Each decision of the board is 
subject to review by the superior court by proceedings in the 
nature of certiorari.” (emphasis added)). 
The trial court’s order compelling Respondents to place 
Morningstar’s 
appeal 
on 
the 
BOA 
agenda 
does 
not 
allow 
Morningstar to circumvent the requirement of standing.  To the 
contrary, its order fully recognizes that in accordance with § 
153A-345, Morningstar must establish that it is an aggrieved 
party in order to have the merits of its appeal heard by the 
BOA.  We believe the order correctly provides that the 
-12- 
 
determination of whether Morningstar has standing to appeal must 
be made by the BOA rather than by Mr. Krulik.  We express no 
opinion as to whether Morningstar does or does not possess 
standing to appeal because that issue is not before us. 
Smith v. Forsyth Cty. Bd. of Adjust., 186 N.C. App. 651, 
652 S.E.2d 355 (2007), the case the dissent relies upon in 
concluding that mandamus was not appropriate, did not involve a 
petition for a writ of mandamus or in any way address the 
authority of a zoning administrator to make a determination as 
to standing.  Rather, the issue in Smith was whether the 
superior court correctly dismissed the petitioner’s appeal from 
a BOA decision for lack of standing.  Id. at 652, 652 S.E.2d at 
357.  This Court concluded that the petitioner’s application to 
the BOA appealing the zoning officer’s decision had not alleged 
special damages as required in order for the petitioner to 
qualify as a “person aggrieved.”  Id. at 654-55, 652 S.E.2d at 
358. 
We do not read Smith as suggesting that a zoning officer 
would have the authority to refuse to transmit an appeal to the 
BOA based simply on his own belief that the appellant lacked 
standing.  We cannot agree with the dissent that our holding in 
Smith somehow confers a gatekeeper role onto zoning officers 
given that such a role is nowhere conferred by statute or, for 
that matter, identified in our decision in that case.  Rather, 
-13- 
 
we believe that Smith is consistent with the notion that it is 
the BOA that has the duty of determining whether a party has 
made the requisite showing of standing such that the merits of 
the appeal may be reached. 
Standing is a question of law.  Cook v. Union Cty. Zoning 
Bd. of Adjust., 185 N.C. App. 582, 588, 649 S.E.2d 458, 464 
(2007).  A determination of standing involves a determination of 
“whether a particular litigant is a proper party to assert a 
legal position.”  Id.  As such, we are unable to conclude that a 
zoning officer is vested with the authority to make such legal 
determinations 
regarding 
standing, 
particularly 
where 
the 
result, as here, would be to insulate that very same officer’s 
decision from review. 
Respondents also contend that their motion to dismiss the 
petition for writ of mandamus was improperly denied because (1) 
Morningstar failed to join a necessary party (East Oaks); and 
(2) Morningstar’s petition for mandamus was merely an attempt to 
bypass the fact that the time period for appealing the 21 April 
Determination 
or 
the 
consent 
order 
reinstating 
that 
determination had already passed.  We are not persuaded by 
either of these arguments. 
“A necessary party is one whose presence is required for a 
complete determination of the claim, and is one whose interest 
is such that no decree can be rendered without affecting the 
-14- 
 
party.”  McCraw v. Aux, 205 N.C. App. 717, 719, 696 S.E.2d 739, 
740, disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 617, 705 S.E.2d 362 (2010).  
As we have explained above, the present action commenced when 
Morningstar attempted to appeal the 16 November Determination 
and Mr. Krulik refused to place the appeal on the BOA’s agenda.  
Morningstar then sought a writ of mandamus directing Respondents 
to perform the ministerial, nondiscretionary task of placing the 
appeal on the BOA’s agenda for a hearing.  The order issuing 
mandamus in no way addressed the merits of any substantive 
issues concerning (1) whether Morningstar was an aggrieved party 
with standing to appeal; or (2) whether East Oaks’ use of the 
Drive is permitted under the Warren County Zoning Ordinance.2  
Rather, as Morningstar notes, the present action is “a purely 
procedural issue between Morningstar and the Respondents.” 
Respondents nevertheless assert that under N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 160A-393, Morningstar was required to name East Oaks as a 
respondent.  See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393(e) (2013) (“If the 
petitioner is not the applicant before the decision-making board 
whose decision is being appealed, the petitioner shall also name 
that applicant as a respondent.”).  However, the scope of N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 160A-393 is specifically limited to appeals in the 
                     
2 The trial court’s order issuing mandamus specifically explains 
that “[t]his Order only directs that a hearing be conducted by 
the Warren County Board of Adjustment but does not direct that 
Board concerning the merits of the case.” 
-15- 
 
nature of certiorari from decision-making boards to superior 
courts and, thus, does not apply to the present action for 
mandamus.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393(a) (“This section applies 
to appeals of quasi-judicial decision-making boards when that 
appeal is to superior court and in the nature of certiorari . . 
. .”).  As such, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that 
“the Warren County Zoning Board of Adjustment and East Oaks, LLC 
are not necessary parties to this mandamus action.  The parties 
sought to be compelled to take action in this mandamus action 
are the Respondents.” 
Finally, Respondents argue that the trial court improperly 
denied their motion to dismiss because Morningstar only sought 
mandamus in an attempt to take an untimely appeal of the 
substance of the 21 April Determination.  Respondents correctly 
state that “[a]n action for mandamus may not be used as a 
substitute for an appeal.  This extraordinary remedy is not a 
proper instrument to review or reverse an administrative board 
which 
has 
taken 
final 
action 
on 
a 
matter 
within 
its 
jurisdiction.”  Snow v. N.C. Bd. of Architecture, 273 N.C. 559, 
570, 160 S.E.2d 719, 727 (1968) (citations, quotation marks, and 
italics omitted). 
However, 
as 
previously 
discussed, 
the 
16 
November 
Determination — unlike the 21 April Determination — specifically 
addresses the Drive, and was, in fact, a formal determination 
-16- 
 
concerning the Drive.  Once the 16 November Determination was 
made, Morningstar attempted to bring a timely appeal to the BOA 
but was prevented by Mr. Krulik from doing so.  We therefore 
cannot agree with Respondents’ argument that Morningstar’s 
petition for mandamus was filed “for the sole purpose of getting 
around the appeal deadline [for the 21 April Determination] 
which had passed.”  Accordingly, this argument is overruled. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s 
order issuing a writ of mandamus compelling Respondents to place 
Morningstar’s appeal on the BOA’s agenda.  Because we hold that 
the trial court properly issued the writ of mandamus, we also 
affirm the trial court’s denial of Respondents’ motion for 
attorneys’ fees. 
AFFIRMED. 
Judge McCULLOUGH concurs. 
Judge ELMORE dissents by separate opinion. 
NO. COA13-458 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed:  18 March 2014 
 
 
MORNINGSTAR MARINAS/EATON FERRY, 
LLC, 
     Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Warren County 
No. 12 CVS 180 
-17- 
 
WARREN COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA and 
KEN KRULIK, WARREN COUNTY PLANNING 
AND ZONING ADMINISTRATOR, IN HIS 
OFFICIAL CAPACITY, 
     Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
ELMORE, Judge, dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that 
Mr. Krulik had a statutory duty to transmit the appeal to the 
Board of Adjustment (BOA) pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-
345.  As a result, I would reverse the trial court’s order 
granting petitioner’s writ of mandamus.  I concur in all other 
aspects of the majority opinion. 
The majority is correct in that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-345 
mandates that any person aggrieved by a zoning decision shall be 
afforded a statutory right of review before the BOA.  This Court 
has defined a “person aggrieved” as “one adversely affected in 
respect of legal rights, or suffering from an infringement or 
denial of legal rights.”  Cnty. of Johnston v. City of Wilson, 
136 N.C. App. 775, 779, 525 S.E.2d 826, 829 (2000)  (citations 
and quotations omitted).  “It is well settled that an appeal may 
only be taken by an aggrieved real party in interest.”  Id. 
While the majority argues that Smith v. Forsyth County Bd. 
of Adjustment is inapposite to the outcome of the instant case, 
I disagree.  186 N.C. App. 651, 652 S.E.2d 355 (2007).  In 
-18- 
 
Smith, we specifically looked to whether the petitioner had 
standing to appeal a zoning determination from the Zoning 
Officer to the BOA.  To establish standing to appeal, this Court 
required that an aggrieved party “show either some interest in 
the property affected,” or, if plaintiffs are adjoining property 
owners, “they must present evidence of a reduction in their 
property values.  Mere proximity to the site of the zoning 
action at issue is insufficient to establish ‘special damages.’”  
Id. at 654, 652 S.E.2d at 358.  We concluded that because the 
petitioner’s application to the BOA for appeal of the Zoning 
Officer’s decision failed to allege that the zoning decision had 
decreased the value of the petitioner’s property or would do so 
in the future, the petitioner “failed to allege, or show, 
special damages; therefore, she did not have standing to appeal 
from the Zoning Officer to the [BOA].”  Id. at 654-55, 652 
S.E.2d at 358.  
I read Smith as suggesting that the Zoning Officer is 
vested with authority to refuse to transmit an appeal to the BOA 
if 
the 
appealing 
party’s 
application 
is 
devoid 
of 
any 
allegations of special damages, namely a decrease in property 
value.  Without alleging special damages in an application for 
appeal, the appealing party cannot demonstrate that it is 
aggrieved, and therefore the Zoning Officer may unilaterally 
dismiss the appeal for want of standing.  Simply put, to fall 
-19- 
 
under the purview of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-345, Morningstar 
must have shown that it was aggrieved, which it could have done 
by alleging special damages in its appeal of the 16 November 
determination.  However, Morningstar neglected to do so.  
Without alleging special damages, Morningstar is not “aggrieved” 
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-354, and it had no standing to 
appeal. 
 
Thus, 
Mr. 
Krulik 
was 
not 
compelled 
to 
place 
Morningstar’s appeal on the BOA’s agenda.  
Further, 
without 
standing, 
Morningstar 
could 
not 
demonstrate a “clear legal right” to petition for writ of 
mandamus.  Because Morningstar failed to satisfy the first 
element of mandamus, the trial court erred in granting its 
petition.  Accordingly, the trial court’s order should be 
reversed.