Title: ROBERT E. FOSTER AND LAURA FOSTER v. LORAINE WICKLUND, As Personal Representative of the Estate of MAYME I. LESTUM, DECEASED

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROBERT E. FOSTER AND LAURA FOSTER v. LORAINE WICKLUND, As Personal Representative of the Estate of MAYME I. LESTUM, DECEASED1989 WY 165778 P.2d 118Case Number: 88-279Decided: 07/31/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROBERT E. FOSTER AND 
LAURA FOSTER, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

LORAINE WICKLUND, AS 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MAYME I. LESTUM, DECEASED, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

Kaye Willis, 
Laramie, for appellants.

John B. Scott of 
Smith, Stanfield and Scott, Laramie, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and 
GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     A real estate 
development plan controversy intermixing residential and commercial usage 
created this litigation between the estate of the developer and the purchaser of 
residential homesite lots. Issues of proper party and mootness are presented for 
review in this factually simple, although litigatively complex 
proceeding.

[¶2.]     Appellants assess their 
issues as whether:

I. * * * the Estate of 
Mayme I. Lestum [developer] was a proper party to this 
action?

II. * * * Mayme I. Lestum 
breached her contract with the appellants [homesite 
occupants]?

[¶3.]     Restated, appellee 
Loraine Wicklund (Wicklund) as personal representative of the Estate of Mayme I. 
Lestum adds that "Appellants' claim against the Lestum Estate is moot."1

[¶4.]     These properties are in 
the small mountain community of Woods Landing near the Colorado border in Albany County, Wyoming. Mayme I. Lestum developed a 
subdivision with a resale system based on 99-year lease arrangements.2 Appellants Robert E. Foster and 
Laura Foster (Foster) acquired four lots within the developed area by a 1973 
conveyance instrument for use to provide access to other lands which they owned. 
The conveyance instrument provided in part:

There shall be no 
business of any kind operated or conducted in this area.

* * * No services, for 
which remuneration is received, shall be conducted on these premises, or result 
from the occupancy of the premises.

* * * * * 
*

* * * Lots located 
between the highway and the river are to be used for houses 
only.

Foster then 
explained the next developments by statement in appellate 
brief:

In 1978, Appellants 
leased a small 150' X 100' lot from Mrs. Lestum located across Highway 10 
immediately west of their property for the purpose of a summer home for their 
daughter. The lease, like all the others in the area, was a 99-year residential 
lease. A year later, Mrs. Lestum refused Appellants' rent money on the lot 
leased for their daughter. She had leased the same lot and the surrounding five 
acres to Robert and Wanda Dowdy for the purpose of a log-peeling business, B 
& W Forest Products. Using the same standard lease form, Mrs. Lestum and/or 
Mr. Dowdy crossed out all clauses relating to residential property and entered 
into a ten-year business lease.

[¶5.]     Within a context of a 
somewhat abbreviated record, it is apparent that Robert J. Dowdy and Wanda Dowdy 
(Dowdy) and their lumbering business, B & W Forest Products, came into 
conflict with Foster, including contention of trespass and maintenance of 
nuisance. Foster objected to the business lease arrangement periodically and 
expressively.

[¶6.]     Following a 1987 notice 
of and request to abate nuisance, Foster, in January 1988, filed this lawsuit 
against Wicklund as personal representative of the Estate of Mayme I. Lestum and 
Robert J. Dowdy and Wanda Dowdy, both individually and doing business as B & 
W Forest Products. In the three count complaint, Foster alleged that the 
maintenance of the sawmill was a nuisance and was in violation of the provisions 
of the Foster lease, a similar nuisance claim was made against Dowdy and, in 
count three of the complaint, claim was made against Dowdy for trespass, with a 
prayer requesting:

1. That the Court order 
the immediate abatement and removal of the business known as B & W Forest 
Products.

2. That the Court enter 
judgment against the Defendants and each of them, jointly and severally, in the 
sum of $200,000 for damages to Plaintiff's quiet enjoyment or such other sum as 
a jury may deem sufficient.

3. That the Court enter 
an Order of Permanent Injunction as will forbid B & W Forest Products, their 
employees or agents from trespass upon Plaintiff's 
property.

[¶7.]     First occurring in the 
course of case development was a dismissal of the claims against the Estate of 
Mayme I. Lestum by order of the trial court on the basis that the personal 
representative was "not a proper party." The June 21, 1988 decision letter 
stated in part:

First of all, the Court 
cannot see any basis for requiring Loraine Wicklund as personal representative 
of the Estate of Mayme I. Lestum, deceased, to continue to defend this case. The 
Estate is not a proper party, either necessary o[r] appropriate and should be 
dismissed for all purposes.

[¶8.]     The dismissal occurred 
without request in pleading, except for the pro forma defense of failure to 
state a claim contained in Wicklund's answer. Following the dismissal of 
Wicklund from the litigation, settlement between Dowdy and Foster was achieved 
by a stipulation to resolve all issues in their part of the lawsuit as 
correlated to agreed expiration of the Dowdy lease. In dispositive part, the 
stipulation provided:

1. Each of the parties 
specifically represents that this Stipulation and Consent has as its sole 
purpose the amicable settlement of their dispute with respect to the operation 
of B & W Forest Products.

2. This Stipulation and 
Consent has been made as a result of representations each to the other 
concerning the noise and disturbance generated by the operation of B & W 
Forest Products. Each party has been represented by legal counsel and each 
understands the force and effect of this Stipulation and Consent, and the 
provisions contained herein. Each party executes this Stipulation and Consent of 
his or her own free will with the intention that it be binding as long as B 
& W Forest Products operates in its present location which is directly 
across Highway 10 from Plaintiffs' residence. The parties agree that this 
Stipulation and Consent will be submitted to the District Court and incorporated 
into an Order which will constitute a complete settlement between the parties 
with respect to the operation of B & W Forest 
Products.

* * * Defendants have 
notice that the Mayme Lestum Estate does not plan to renew the ten-year lease to 
B & W Forest Products that will expire on January 17, 1990. Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs agree that the log peeler need not be moved back away from the 
highway as agreed on July 11, 1988. However, Defendants agree that if a new site 
for B & W Forest Products is not found before January 17, 1990, Defendants 
will on that date cease operation of B & W Forest Products at its present 
site.

[¶9.]     Following the June 1988 
dismissal of Wicklund from the lawsuit and the October settlement between Foster 
and Dowdy, the trial court held in its dispositive judgment 
that:

1. The Estate of Mayme 
Lestum is not a proper party to this action.

2. The priority of the 
Dowdy-Lestum business lease is not affected by the language of nearby 
residential leases.

3. The Stipulation and 
Consent entered into by Plaintiffs and Defendants Robert and Wanda Dowdy 
constitutes a fair and equitable settlement of the remaining issues in this 
action.

This final 
judgment, designated Order Incorporating Stipulation and Consent and Order of 
Final Settlement, filed October 13, 1988, effected a dismissal of the remaining 
issues of the lawsuit and constituted the final court action from which the 
present appeal is now taken. Foster appeals by first attacking the conclusion 
that the estate was an improper party and then objects to trial court finding 
number two.3 We are less than assured whether 
the second word of that clause is typographically misstated and should have been 
"propriety" rather than "priority" but, for the purpose of our decision, either 
term will be deemed applicable with no difference in concept now presented in 
present appellate briefing by any party.

[¶10.]  It is clear by observation that any 
litigable controversies between Dowdy, individually, the lumber operation and 
Foster had been settled in full. Whether successors in interest to the estate 
property ever make another business lease for the property is hypothetical and 
calls for an advisory opinion as to what its potential effect might be for 
whatever lease might be made. No party is present in this litigation by the 
pending appeal which would necessarily be involved in any future lease after 
completion of the probate of the Estate of Mayme I. Lestum. Factual status of 
the litigation after stipulated settlement between Foster and Dowdy and 
cancellation of the Lestum/Dowdy lease is accurately assessed by Wicklund in a 
discussion in appellate brief of mootness:

It should be noted that 
having actually resolved the issue of the continuation of the business, 
Appellants now contend that their "primary goal" is to determine whether or not 
the "promises" in their lease are enforceable. * * * Appellants even go so far 
as to state that they are interested in whether future businesses could be 
located across the highway from their residence. Not only was this issue not 
raised in the Complaint, but it asks this Court to speculate as to any future 
potential use of the property in question[].

[¶11.]  First, nothing remained to litigate in 
the first clause of the complaint prayer in order to abate the B & W Forest 
Products business. That issue was settled. Likewise, in third claim, the need or 
propriety of an injunction was also foreclosed. The nonexistent business could 
neither be abated nor enjoined and the lease would shortly end by amicable 
agreement. Inquiry then remains whether the claim in the second paragraph of the 
prayer remains viable:

2. That the Court enter 
judgment against the Defendants and each of them, jointly and severally, in the 
sum of $200,000 for damages to Plaintiff's quiet enjoyment or such other sum as 
a jury may deem sufficient.

Obviously, this 
issue between Foster and Dowdy had also been resolved in the stipulation. The 
quandary we are presented is disposition without settlement as to the estate and 
its personal representative, Wicklund, earlier excused from the litigation by 
her dismissal as an improper party.

[¶12.]  Before relating this case status to 
Foster's arguments, it is beneficial to review the historical posture adopted by 
this court about advisory opinions and mootness disposition. We are called to 
revisit Graham v. Wyoming Peace Officer Standards and Training Com'n, 737 P.2d 1060 (Wyo. 
1987) which is surprisingly similar to this appeal. In Graham, the litigant had 
no covered employment, and in this case, no offending lease exists. If we are to 
pursue contended violations of the subdivision plan, there is nothing except 
future possibilities which could define a controversy as only to become existent 
if an offensive use should occur. In Graham, 737 P.2d  at 1062-63, we defined the 
settled structure of Wyoming law:

This court has repeatedly 
said that it will not issue advisory opinions. State ex rel. Schwartz v. Jones, 
61 Wyo. 350, 
157 P.2d 993 (1945) is directly in point and controlling. See also Northern 
Utilities, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 617 P.2d 1079 (1980); Belondon v. State ex rel. 
Leimback, Wyo., 
379 P.2d 828 (1963); and Cheever v. Warren, 70 
Wyo. 296, 249 P.2d 163 (1952).

[¶13.]  We have last restated this principle in 
1985, in Gulf Oil Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 
Wyo., 693 P.2d 227, 233 (1985):

"We have often repeated 
the universal rule that a reviewing court will dismiss a case when, pending 
appeal, an event occurs which renders a cause moot and makes a determination of 
the issues unnecessary. Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of 
Wyoming, Wyo., 620 P.2d 139, 140 (1980); State 
ex rel Schwartz v. Jones, 61 Wyo. 350, 157 P.2d 993, 995 (1945). Appellate 
courts will not hand down decisions which cannot be given effect or which 
pertain to matters that may arise in the future. Northern Utilities, Inc. v. 
Public Service Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 617 P.2d 1079, 1085 (1980); Belondon 
v. State ex rel. Leimback, Wyo., 379 P.2d 828, 829 
(1963)."

[¶14.]  Our review of the mootness deterrent to 
continued litigation was further reconsidered not only in Ballard v. Wyoming 
Pari-Mutuel Com'n of State of Wyo., 750 P.2d 286 (Wyo. 1988), but also in the 
three handicapped children education cases, Natrona County School Dist. No. 1 v. 
McKnight, 764 P.2d 1039 (Wyo. 1988); State v. Cochran, 764 P.2d 1037 (Wyo. 
1988); and Natrona County School Dist. No. 1 v. Ryan, 764 P.2d 1019 (Wyo. 1988). 
See also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S. Ct. 592, 98 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1988), Justice Rehnquist concurring and Justice Scalia dissenting. In this 
appeal, we have neither the identity of parties nor the probability of 
reoccurrence.

[¶15.]  Evaluation of a mootness status initially 
embraces the consideration of a future lease not yet executed and secondly, the 
prayer for damages. With discontinuance of the business use and an unknown 
future for events and parties, no arena remains which would provide for a case 
or controversy, except a potentiality which we are asked to anticipate by 
rendering an advisory opinion. Any future controversy regarding disputes as to 
business use of the property previously occupied by the lumber business must be 
solidified from issues then developed with whoever may then be the contesting 
litigants. We determine that with the termination of the contested lease and 
settlement between Foster and Dowdy, no justiciable issue of subdivision "plan" 
and violation of covenants for quiet enjoyment, if any, remain. We will not 
anticipate by advisory opinion any existence or non-existence of impedance to 
whatever future use of Lestum "subdivision" properties develop.4

[¶16.]  Unfortunately, this does not end our 
appellate journey. Recognizing that the initial complaint did include both 
injunction and damage, we are challenged by Foster to find a proper basis to 
sustain the conclusion of the trial court that Wicklund was also not a proper 
party as to a damage claim. That remaining problem would involve the estate as a 
successor to obligation of the lessor/developer. At the stage of the litigation 
when it occurred, the decision of the trial court to dismiss Wicklund was 
clearly erroneous, since she was the only proper party for either assessment of 
liability from continued use of the property or continued maintenance of an 
alleged nuisance. These damage claims considering the contention of violation of 
the development plan by intermixing a business lease or previous damage from 
violation of a covenant of quiet enjoyment could only be adjudicated against the 
personal representative of the estate. In this conclusion, we agree with Foster. 
See W.S. 2-7-104, which provides:

Actions for the recovery 
of any property, real or personal, or for the possession thereof, or for the 
destruction, wasting, conversion, injury, taking or carrying away thereof, or to 
quiet title thereto, or to determine any adverse claim thereon, and all actions 
founded upon contract, may be maintained by and against the personal 
representative in all cases in which the action might have been maintained by or 
against their respective testators or intestates.

See also W.S. 
2-7-706, 1-4-101 and 1-4-102, which relate to the survival of causes of action 
and W.S. 2-7-718, providing for suit against the personal representative. 
Johnson v. Wold, 475 P.2d 714 (Wyo. 1970); 
Castor v. Rice, 71 Wyo. 99, 254 P.2d 189 (1953). In this case, a 
claim had been filed with the personal representative and duly rejected before 
the lawsuit was commenced.

[¶17.]  Following rendition of the decision 
letter to remove Wicklund, entry of the official order was delayed to permit 
briefing of Wicklund's proper party status. Responsive to the opportunity, 
Foster stated in part:

Plaintiffs assert that 
Mayme Lestum breached two separate contracts: (1) She leased to B & W Forest 
Products the same land already leased to Plaintiffs, and (2) she breached the 
provisions in Plaintiffs' first lease which promised no businesses in the area. 
Plaintiffs, therefore, have grounds for an action against Mayme Lestum and 
therefore, against her estate.

In present 
appellate brief, Foster's contentions are addressed:

A particularly harassing 
trespass by the employees of B & W provoked Fosters to seek relief through 
the judicial system. They asked for damages from the Lestum Estate in the event 
that B & W continued to operate and they were forced to relocate. Their 
primary goal is to determine whether or not the promises in their lease are 
enforceable. If the lessor (or the lessor's estate) is dismissed as a Defendant 
to the action, Appellants have no remedy.

The nuisance issue was 
resolved to Appellants' satisfaction when B & W agreed to move the log 
peeler back away from the highway, thus lessening the noise. Appellants find it 
interesting that the Estate chose the very next day to inform B & W that the 
business lease would not be renewed in 1990. However, Appellants are interested 
in determining whether future businesses could be located across the highway 
from their residence. If the Estate is dismissed as a party, Appellants will 
have no way to determine their rights under their lease.

No argument is 
now postulated by Foster that they seek to return to the initial lawsuit to 
continue claims for damages against the developer and her estate for loss of 
quiet enjoyment or nuisance adversity in times now passed. The reach of the 
appeal is prospective and we have not only an interpretive relation to a future 
lease, but damage issues which would invoke diminution of quiet enjoyment 
resulting from that hypothetical future lease. Clearly, what might occur in the 
future is not now validly presented as an actual issue invoking a case in 
controversy. Furthermore, we are not justified in reversal of the trial court to 
resurrect rights to claim damage for past wrongs. Lacking claim for past 
damages, nothing remains for our adjudication as present issues in 
controversy.5 Graham, 737 P.2d 1060. See also 
Wyoming Health Services, Inc. v. Deatherage, 773 P.2d 156 (Wyo. 
1989).

[¶18.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 In broad perspective, 
appellants present an appeal from the trial court proceeding which includes 
three stages:

1. Dismissal of the 
developer from the litigation - claimed to be an erroneous improper party 
decision;

2. Proceeding mooted when 
settlement made with the offending occupant of a lot by terminated use and 
discontinued tenancy; and

3. Substantive decision 
by the trial court validating the "terminated lease."

Appellants pretermit the 
mootness question to attack both dismissal and substantive decisions. 
Conversely, appellee defends the decision in trial court through substantive 
decision and interjects mootness for appeal, but not to invalidate the 
substantive judgment entered after she was no longer a party and when the 
controversy had already ended with lease termination.

2 Pursuant to W.S. 
34-1-102, the 99-year lease constitutes a conveyance of real 
estate.

3 It may be that we 
misapprehend the primary concerns which caused Foster to present this appeal. In 
accord with our discussion of mootness which will hereafter determine this 
appeal and avoid our consideration of the substantive issue of any use 
limitation on the Dowdy lot by virtue of other documents in subdivision building 
scheme questions, see 7 Thompson on Real Property § 3163 at 125 (1962), we do 
not find validity in trial court finding number two since the Estate of Mayme I. 
Lestum had been dismissed and the effect of the stipulation was to terminate the 
Dowdy lease. It was a decision lacking litigants or issues when included in the 
judgment. Wyoming Health Services, Inc. v. Deatherage, 773 P.2d 156 (Wyo. 
1989).

4 It does not appear that 
the project was statutorily subdivided by a filed plat. Legal descriptions shown 
are by metes and bounds and are referenced to quarter section subdivision 
descriptions. See W.S. 34-12-102.

5 The legal questions 
detailing litigant preclusion to continue an action against the landlord after 
settlement with the tenant who provided the offending use will also not now be 
addressed in this forum; albeit interesting, but neither briefed nor 
dispositive.