Title: Folks v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOHN FOLKS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 563, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0306015047A 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: January 26, 2007 
 
 
 
 
Decided: February 26, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 26th day of February 2007, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, John Folks, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s September 25, 2006 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find 
no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
In January 2004, Folks was found guilty by a Superior Court 
jury of Robbery in the First Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon 
During the Commission of a Felony.  He was sentenced as a habitual 
offender to a total of 40 years of Level V incarceration.  On direct appeal, 
 
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this Court affirmed Folks’ conviction, but vacated his sentences on the 
ground that the State had not established Folks’ habitual offender status 
beyond a reasonable doubt.1  On remand, the Superior Court sentenced Folks 
on the robbery conviction to 12 years of Level V incarceration, to be 
suspended after 10 years for 2 years of probation, and on the weapon 
conviction to 10 years of Level V incarceration.  Those sentences were 
affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.2 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Folks claims that a) his robbery and weapon 
convictions constitute a violation of double jeopardy; b) the State violated 
his constitutional rights during the jury selection process; c) the Superior 
Court abused its discretion by permitting the State to file its response to his 
postconviction motion beyond the due date, ignoring his arguments, and 
failing to schedule an evidentiary hearing; and d) his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance at trial and on appeal. 
 
(4) 
Folks’ first claim is that his robbery and weapon convictions 
constitute a violation of double jeopardy.  Because Folks failed to present 
this claim in his direct appeal, it is barred in this proceeding3 unless he can 
                                                 
1 Folks v. State, Del. Supr., No. 291, 2004, Steele, C.J. (Apr. 25, 2005). 
2 Folks v. State, Del. Supr., No. 311, 2005, Steele, C.J. (Jan. 26, 2006). 
3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3). 
 
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demonstrate a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation.4  
This Court has consistently rejected the claim that concurrent convictions of 
robbery and weapon violations constitute a violation of double jeopardy.5  
Thus, in the absence of any evidence of a constitutional violation, we 
conclude that Folks’ first claim is procedurally barred.  
 
(5) 
Folks’ second claim is that the State violated his constitutional 
rights by preventing African-Americans from serving on his jury.6  Once 
again, because this claim was not raised in Folks’ direct appeal, it is barred 
in this proceeding7 unless he can demonstrate a miscarriage of justice 
because of a constitutional violation.8  In order to succeed on this claim, 
Folks must demonstrate that the prosecution improperly exercised its 
peremptory challenges with the intention of removing African-Americans 
from the venire.9  While Folks refers to the transcript of jury selection in 
support of his claim, the transcript does not reflect the existence of a 
constitutional violation.  In the absence of any such record evidence, we 
conclude that Folks’ second claim also is procedurally barred. 
                                                 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
5 Thomas v. State, 467 A.2d 954, 959 (Del. 1983). 
6 The record reflects that Folks is an African-American. 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3). 
8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
9 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986). 
 
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(6) 
Folks’ third claim is that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion in connection with his postconviction motion---specifically, by 
permitting the State to file its response to his postconviction motion beyond 
the due date, ignoring his arguments by failing to cite the cases he cited, and 
failing to schedule an evidentiary hearing.   
 
(7) 
While the record reflects that the Superior Court gave the State 
an extension in which to file its response to Folks’ postconviction motion, 
there is no evidence that the Superior Court abused its discretion in so 
doing.10  There is, furthermore, no evidence that, because it did not cite the 
same cases Folks did, the Superior Court ignored arguments made by Folks 
in his postconviction motion.  Rather, the Superior Court’s decision reflects 
that it properly addressed Folks’ claims and cited the appropriate authority in 
denying those claims.  Finally, there is no support for Folks’ claim that the 
Superior Court abused its discretion by determining that an evidentiary 
hearing was unnecessary to its decision on Folks’ postconviction motion.11    
 
(8) 
Folks’ final claim is that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance both at trial and on appeal.  In order to prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must demonstrate that 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
                                                 
10 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 45(b). 
11 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(h)(1) and (3). 
 
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and that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.12  Moreover, the defendant must 
make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk 
summary dismissal of his claims.13   
 
(9) 
To the extent Folks argues that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to assert a double jeopardy violation and a Batson 
violation, any such argument must fail.  Folks’ counsel cannot be faulted for 
failing to raise claims that have been determined to be without merit.  Folks 
claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to 
object to the Superior Court’s initial finding that he was a habitual offender.  
However, because Folks’ habitual offender sentence was vacated in his 
initial appeal,14 he cannot demonstrate that any error on the part of his 
counsel with respect to that sentence resulted in prejudice to him.  Folks’ 
various claims of error on the part of his counsel during the course of trial 
were properly denied by the Superior Court as too conclusory and vague to 
merit consideration.15  Finally, Folks claims that his appellate attorney 
“abandoned” him by filing a Rule 26(c) brief in his second appeal after re-
sentencing.  Rule 26(c) permits an attorney to withdraw if there is no merit 
                                                 
12 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
13 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1196 (Del. 1996). 
14 Folks v. State, Del. Supr., No. 291, 2004, Steele, C.J. (Apr. 25, 2005). 
15 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d at 1196. 
 
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to an appeal.  Here, this Court found no merit to Folks’ second appeal, 
thereby agreeing that counsel’s withdrawal was appropriate.16   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice     
 
 
                                                 
16 Folks v. State, Del. Supr., No. 311, 2005, Steele, C.J. (Jan. 26, 2006).