Title: Tableau Fine Art Group v. Joseph J. Jacoboni

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC01-943
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TABLEAU FINE ART GROUP, INC., and
TOD TARRANT,
Petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH  J. JACOBONI, et al.,
Respondents.
[May 22, 2003]
CORRECTED OPINION
QUINCE, J.
We have for review Tarrant v. Jacoboni, 780 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 3d DCA
2001), a decision of the Third District Court of Appeal, which the Third District
certified to be in express and direct conflict with the Fifth District Court of
Appeal’s decision in Anderson v. Glass, 727 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). 
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  For the reasons which
follow, we approve the Third District’s decision in Tarrant, but we find that a
motion for judicial disqualification must be ruled on within thirty days of its filing
1.  The Calder Mobile is a sculpture by Alexander Calder.
2.  A hearing was held on July 25, 2000, on Jacoboni’s motion for leave to
amend his complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages.  Jacoboni filed the
motion pursuant to section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes (1999), which provides in
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with the court. 
MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Joseph Jacoboni (Jacoboni) filed suit in circuit court against Tableau Fine
Art Group and Tod Tarrant (petitioners) for actions arising out of the sale of a
piece of art called the Calder Mobile.1  Jacoboni sued petitioners, alleging civil
theft, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation.   
Petitioners denied that they made any material misrepresentations to any of
the parties.  Petitioners maintained that Jacoboni’s agent, Robert Lombard, knew
that the seller of the Calder Mobile, Maria Stone, was represented by an agent,
Dawn Gideon.  Petitioners claimed that Ms. Gideon gave Tarrant the right to
present the piece to interested parties.  Additionally, petitioners alleged that Robert
Lombard, Jacoboni’s agent, was aware of other factual inaccuracies surrounding
the transaction.
Subsequently, based on testimony given by Tarrant at a deposition, Jacoboni
filed a motion to amend his complaint in order to add a claim for punitive
damages.2  Jacoboni argued that petitioners falsely represented through oral and
relevant part:  “In any civil action, no claim for punitive damages shall be permitted
unless there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the
claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages.”
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verbal communications that they had the exclusive right to sell the Calder Mobile;
that the owner wanted $1.6 million for the mobile; and that Tarrant’s commission
would only amount to $50,000.  In actuality, petitioners never had the exclusive
right to sell the piece of art, and the actual selling price for the piece of art was $1.3
million.  Jacoboni alleged that petitioners kept the $50,000 commission and the
extra $300,000 for themselves.
Petitioners filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge on August 3, 2000.   In
the motion, petitioners alleged that the judge made remarks during the hearing on
the motion for punitive damages which created a well-founded fear that they would
not receive a fair trial.  At a hearing on September 28, 2000, the judge promised that
a ruling on the disqualification motion would be rendered in a few days.  On
November 20, 2000, the trial judge denied the motion.  Petitioners sought a writ of
prohibition in the Third District Court of Appeal.
The Third District denied petitioners’ request for a writ of prohibition. 
Petitioners had argued that based on the Fifth District’s decision in Anderson v.
Glass, 727 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), the trial judge’s delay in ruling on the
disqualification motion should have resulted in the automatic granting of the motion. 
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The Third District disagreed with the Fifth District’s interpretation of Florida Rule
of Judicial Administration 2.160(f), but granted petitioners’ request for certification
of direct conflict.  See Tarrant v. Jacoboni, 780 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). 
LAW AND ANALYSIS
At issue in this case is whether Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160
requires the automatic granting of a motion for disqualification when a judge fails to
rule immediately on the motion.  Essentially this case turns on the interpretation of
the meaning of the word “immediate” as used in rule 2.160.  The rule provides in
relevant part:
     (e)  Time.  A motion to disqualify shall be made within a
reasonable time not to exceed 10 days after discovery of the facts
constituting the grounds for the motion and shall be promptly
presented to the court for an immediate ruling. . . .
     (f)  Determination--Initial Motion.  The judge against whom an
initial motion to disqualify under subdivision (d)(1) is directed shall
determine only the legal sufficiency of the motion and shall not pass
on the truth of the facts alleged.  If the motion is legally sufficient, the
judge shall immediately enter an order granting disqualification and
proceed no further in the action.  If any motion is legally insufficient,
an order denying the motion shall immediately be entered.
Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160(e)-(f) (emphasis added).
Additionally, section 38.10, Florida Statues (2000), gives parties the right to
seek disqualification of a trial judge for bias or prejudice.  The statute reads:
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Whenever a party to any action or proceeding makes and files an
affidavit stating fear that he or she will not receive a fair trial in the court
where the suit is pending on account of the prejudice of the judge of
that court against the applicant or in favor of the adverse party, the
judge shall proceed no further, but another judge shall be designated in
the manner prescribed by the laws of this state for the substitution of
judges for the trial of causes in which the presiding judge is
disqualified. 
Rule 2.160 governs the process for judicial disqualification, while section 38.10
controls the substantive right.  See Cave v. State, 660 So. 2d 705, 707 (Fla. 1995).
The disqualification rules are designed to keep the courts free from bias and
prejudice.  See Suarez v. State, 115 So. 519, 519 (Fla. 1928).  This Court has
observed that the disqualification statute and rules are designed to ensure confidence
in the judicial system, “as well as to prevent the disqualification process from being
abused for the purposes of judge-shopping, delay, or some other reason not related
to providing for the fairness and impartiality of the proceeding.” Livingston v. State,
441 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1983).  Therefore, the rules permit trial courts to
conduct only a “bare determination of legal sufficiency” in order to prevent an
adversarial atmosphere from developing between the judge and the litigant.  Bundy
v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla. 1978).
Petitioners urge this Court to adopt the holding of the Fifth District in
Anderson v. Glass, 727 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).  In Anderson, the
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petitioner filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge in a child support action.  The
trial judge considered the matter for more than thirty days before entering an
ordering denying the motion.  The Fifth District granted the petitioner’s request for a
writ of prohibition, finding that rule 2.160(f) required a trial judge to rule upon such
motions “without delay.”  The court reasoned that “[t]he rule recognizes that
prompt rulings promote public confidence in the impartiality of the trial judge while
delayed rulings not only slow the litigation process but call into question the trial
judges motives.”  Id. at 1147.
In the instant case, the Third District disagreed with the Fifth District’s
reasoning in part because it found no other case besides Anderson that interpreted
rule 2.160(f) in a similar manner.  See Tarrant, 780 So. 2d at 345.  The Third District
noted that most trial judges, as part of general practice, enter immediate rulings on
disqualification motions.  However, the court found nothing in the rule which
prevented a trial judge from taking extra time to consider a motion in order to
perform research or to review memoranda filed by the parties.  The Third District
reasoned that a bright-line rule was unnecessary, because if a judge takes a motion
under advisement for too long a period, a party has a number of options, such as
the right to file a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel a ruling by the trial
judge.
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However, this Court’s decision in Fuster-Escalona v. Wistosky, 781 So. 2d
1063 (Fla. 2000), supports the Fifth District’s reasoning in Anderson.  In Fuster-
Escalona, this Court considered whether the failure of a judge to rule on a
disqualification motion for more than one year provided a basis for a motion to
dismiss for failure to prosecute pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420
(e).  In beginning its analysis, this Court noted that it has always “strictly applied”
the procedural requirements of rule 2.160(f).  This Court then went on to explain the
meaning behind the immediacy requirement of rule 2.160(f):
[T]he rule provisions concerning “immediate” resolution have been
accorded their plain meaning, which the Court has explained requires
action that is “prompt” and “with dispatch.”  Livingston v. State, 441
So.2d 1083, 1085 (Fla. 1983).  Our comment on the adoption of rule
2.160 emphasizes a trial judge’s responsibility to act quickly on such a
motion: “We find the motion [to disqualify]  should be ruled on
immediately following its presentation to the court.”  Florida Bar re
Amendment to Fla. Rules of Judicial Admin., 609 So.2d 465, 466 (Fla.
1992).  When a trial court fails to act in accord with the statute and
procedural rule on a motion to disqualify, an appellate court will vacate
a trial court judgment that flows from that error.
Id. at 1065.  As an additional matter, this Court found that the lower court’s focus
on the petitioner’s failure to request a hearing on the disqualification motion was
inappropriate.  While this Court acknowledged that the petitioner should have
requested a hearing to ensure that the trial court considered his motion, it noted that
the rules did not require such a request to be made.  Accordingly, this Court held
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that the failure of the trial judge to give an immediate ruling on the motion to
disqualify violated rule 2.160.  We agree with this reasoning.
While no case explicitly defines “immediate” as used by rule 2.160, an
examination of the rule’s history is instructive.  Prior to the adoption of Florida Rule
of Judicial Administration 2.160, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.432 governed the
procedure for judicial disqualification.  Rule 1.432, which was repealed October 8,
1992, effective January 1, 1993, provided in part:
     (d) Determination.  The judge against whom the motion is directed
shall determine only the legal sufficiency of the motion.  The judge shall
not pass on the truth of the facts alleged.  If the motion is legally
sufficient, the judge shall enter an order of disqualification and proceed
no further in the action.  
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.432 (1992).  Rule 2.160 added new language which required a trial
judge to rule immediately on the legal sufficiency of a disqualification motion.  This
Court rejected proposed language that gave a judge greater time for consideration: 
“[W]e do not adopt that portion of the committee’s recommendation allowing a
judge to defer ruling on a disqualification motion until after completion of the
evidence or receipt of the verdict.  We find the motion should be ruled on
immediately following its presentation to the court.”  Fla. Bar re Amendment to Fla.
Rules of Jud. Admin., 609 So. 2d 465, 466 (Fla. 1992). 
Thus, based upon the reasoning of Fuster-Escalona and the history behind
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the enactment of the rule, we hold that a motion for judicial disqualification filed
pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160 must be ruled on within
thirty days following its presentation to the court.  We believe that thirty days gives
the trial court sufficient time to determine the sufficiency of a motion.  A litigant who
files a motion for disqualification should not be required to file a petition for a writ
of mandamus to compel a trial judge to provide a ruling on the motion.  However,
because this holding is to apply prospectively, we approve the decision of the Third
District.  Additionally, we request that the Florida Bar Judicial Administration Rules
Committee draft an amendment to rule 2.160 consistent with the opinion in this case.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, J., and SHAW, Senior Justice, concur.
PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Third District - Case No. 3D00-3552
Perry M. Adair of Becker & Pollakoff, P.A., Miami, Florida,
for Petitioners
Gary M. Pappas and Jeffrey A. Cohen of Carlton Fields, P.A., Miami, Florida,
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for Respondents