Title: Edwards v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Joe E. EDWARDS v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-10                                           ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                  Opinion delivered May 5, 1997


1.   Appeal & error -- order denying motion to dismiss for double jeopardy is
     appealable. -- An order denying a motion to dismiss based on
     double-jeopardy considerations is an appealable decision. 

2.   Constitutional law -- civil commitment results in significant deprivation
     of liberty requiring due process protection -- State's burden of proof. --
     Civil commitment results in a significant deprivation of
     liberty that requires due process protection; the burden of
     proof on the State for civil commitments is by clear and
     convincing evidence.

3.   Constitutional law -- when double-jeopardy protection attaches -- civil
     commitment does not meet double-jeopardy test -- trial court's denial of
     motion to dismiss for double jeopardy affirmed. -- Double-jeopardy
     protection attaches only when a person is put at risk of being
     punished twice for the same offense; the supreme court
     interpreted the "same offense" language, which is used in both
     the Arkansas and United States Constitutions, to require
     successive punishments for the same criminal activity; a civil
     commitment for evaluation and treatment because the patient
     may be harmful to himself and others simply does not meet the
     test of prior punishment for a criminal offense, even when the
     precipitating event for the commitment is a criminal event;
     the supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of
     appellant's motion to dismiss on the basis of double jeopardy.

4.   Appeal & error -- interlocutory appeal -- collateral-estoppel issue
     considered because Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates doctrine in criminal
     proceedings. -- Because the Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates
     the doctrine of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings,
     the supreme court considered the issue on interlocutory
     appeal.

5.   Estoppel -- collateral estoppel -- elements required to establish. --
     Generally speaking, collateral estoppel provides that when an
     issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and
     final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between
     the same parties in any future lawsuit; the supreme court has
     required proof of the following elements in order to establish
     collateral estoppel: (1) the issue sought to be precluded must
     be the same as that involved in the prior litigation; (2) the
     issue must have been actually litigated; (3) the issue must
     have been determined by a final and valid judgment; and (4)
     the determination must have been essential to the judgment. 

6.   Estoppel -- test for validity of collateral-estoppel defense to
     prosecution. -- To establish the validity of a collateral-
     estoppel defense to a criminal prosecution, a defendant must
     also prove: (1) that both adjudicatory entities are the same
     sovereign; and (2) that a factual issue essential to the first
     verdict is an essential element of the second charge.

7.   Mental health -- involuntary commitment -- basis for. -- The civil
     commitment statute provides at Ark. Code Ann.  20-47-207(c)
     (Repl. 1991), that a person may be committed involuntarily if
     it is determined that, based upon his conduct, he presents a
     "clear and present danger to himself or others" and that there
     is a "reasonable probability that such conduct will be
     repeated if admission is not ordered." 

8.   Criminal law -- lack of capacity -- affirmative defense -- defendant's
     burden to prove. -- A person may be acquitted for a criminal
     offense due to mental disease only if he lacked the capacity
     to form culpable intent under Ark. Code Ann.  5-2-312(a)
     (Repl. 1993), where "[i]t is an affirmative defense to a
     prosecution that at the time the defendant engaged in the
     conduct charged, he lacked capacity, as a result of mental
     disease or defect, to conform his conduct to the requirements
     of law or to appreciate the criminality of his conduct"; once
     the State proves the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
     doubt, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the
     affirmative defense of lack of capacity by a preponderance of
     the evidence.
9.   Estoppel -- State was not collaterally estopped from contending that
     appellant had capacity to form requisite criminal intent. -- Where the
     issue of appellant's capacity to form culpable intent at the
     time of the events for which he was charged had yet to be
     decided, and where the only issue actually litigated in the
     civil-commitment proceeding was whether appellant presented a
     clear and present danger to himself or others and not whether
     he lacked either the capacity to conform his conduct to the
     requirements of law or lacked the capacity to appreciate the
     criminality of his conduct, the supreme court held that
     because the two issues, which presented differing standards
     for mental illness, were not the same, the State was not
     collaterally estopped from contending that appellant had the
     capacity to form the requisite criminal intent on the date of
     the charged offense.

10.  Appeal & error -- interlocutory appeal -- purpose of -- other issues were
     premature. -- An interlocutory appeal was available in this
     situation only to protect against a person's being placed
     twice in jeopardy for the same criminal offense; issues
     pertaining to equitable estoppel, judicial estoppel, and due
     process did not warrant the protection of an interlocutory
     appeal, as did a double-jeopardy argument, and could be
     considered on direct appeal, if necessary.

     Appeal from Washington Circuit Court; Kim M. Smith, Judge;
affirmed.
     The Perroni Law Firm, P.A., by: Samuel A. Perroni and Patrick
R. James, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Clint Miller, Deputy Att'y
Gen. and Senior App. Advocate, for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     Appellant Joe E. Edwards has filed this interlocutory appeal
from the trial court's order denying his motion to dismiss on
grounds of double jeopardy, estoppel, and due process.  The trial
court correctly denied the motion to dismiss, and we affirm.
     On March 17, 1995, according to the criminal information filed
against him, Edwards abducted his attorney, David Stills.  During
a subsequent deposition, Detective Steve Parker of the Springdale
Police Department testified that on that date, he and Detective
Lester Coger of the same department responded to a call that an
individual, Steve Summers, had found a man who had been tied up on
Cambridge Street in Springdale.  The man was David Stills, and he
told Summers, according to Detective Parker:
     Joe's gone off the deep end.  He's accusing me of having
     sex with his wife and giving her drugs and said he was
     going to kill us both and then himself.
When Detective Parker arrived at the scene, he found neck ties and
duct tape on the ground next to Summers's car.
     On March 20, 1995, Detective Parker signed a Petition to
Involuntarily Admit Person with Mental Illness that had been
prepared by the Washington County Prosecutor's Office.  In the
petition, he averred that Edwards should be involuntarily admitted
to an appropriate facility for treatment of a mental illness based
on the following factual assertion:
          The Respondent kidnapped a victim at gun point, tied
     the victim up, then picked up his wife at her place of
     employment and returned her to his residence with the
     purpose of killing her and the other victim.
Detective Parker stated that Edwards presented a clear and present
danger to himself or others as defined by Ark. Code Ann.  20-47-
207(c)(1)-(2) (Repl. 1991).
     As a result of the petition, the probate court found that
there was probable cause to believe that Edwards presented a
potential danger to himself and to others and ordered the
Washington County Sheriff to take Edwards to the Ozark Guidance
Center for detention and evaluation.  As a result of the
evaluation, the staff psychiatrist at Ozark Guidance Center
determined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that
Edwards's mental and medical condition required immediate
hospitalization.  On March 27, 1995, after Edwards's counsel waived
a hearing on the matter, the probate court entered an order
committing Edwards to the Psychiatric Intensive Care Unit at
Baptist Medical Center in Little Rock for a period of 30 days.  In
doing so, the probate court again found that there was probable
cause that Edwards suffered from a mental disease and constituted
a clear and present danger to himself and to others.  On April 25,
1995, the probate court ordered Edwards's commitment extended for
an additional 90 days based upon his physicians' determination that
he required further treatment for his mental condition.
     On July 24, 1995, the date he was scheduled to be released,
Edwards was charged by the Washington County prosecutor with
kidnapping and terroristic threatening in connection with the
abduction of David Stills.  The probate court also ordered an
extension of his commitment until July 28, 1995, during which time
he would be released to the custody of a physician who was directed
to transport him to the Washington County sheriff's office for
arraignment on July 27, 1995.  Edwards was arraigned on that date.
     On September 15, 1995, Edwards moved to dismiss the criminal
charges on grounds of double jeopardy, estoppel, and violation of
his due process rights.  The prosecutor responded that Edwards's
counsel actually drafted the orders and solicited the aid of the
prosecuting attorney's office for Edwards's continued treatment at
Baptist Medical Center.  The State further contended that (1) the
estoppel theories did not apply because the involuntary admission
of a suspect of a crime does not constitute an adjudication of that
person's mental capacity to commit crime; and (2) Edwards was not
unduly deprived of his liberty for purposes of double jeopardy
because there was no "same offense" for former jeopardy and because
Edwards's counsel assisted in the orders for treatment at Baptist
Medical Center.
     A hearing was held on the motion, and following the hearing,
the trial court entered an order denying Edwards's motion.  In its
ruling from the bench, the trial court noted that the civil
commitment was not for an "offense," that civil commitment
proceedings and criminal proceedings involved different standards
and elements and were governed by different statutes, and that the
burden of proof for the two proceedings was different.
     Edwards filed this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's
order.

                       I. Double Jeopardy
     We first observe that it is well established that an order
denying a motion to dismiss based on double-jeopardy considerations
is an appealable decision.  Abney v. United States,