Title: McCluskey v. Thompson

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

363 So. 2d 256 (1978) Helen L. McCLUSKEY, Administratrix of the Estate of Carol McCluskey, Deceased, v. A.J. THOMPSON et al. BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION and the Travelers Insurance Company v. Helen L. McCLUSKEY etc. Nos. 50002, 50011. Supreme Court of Mississippi. September 20, 1978. Rehearing Denied November 1, 1978. *257 John B. Clark, Daniel, Coker, Horton, Bell & Dukes, Jackson, for Bechtel Power Corp. and Travelers Ins. Co. Teller, Biedenharn & Rogers, Landman Teller, Vicksburg, for McCluskey. Watkins & Eager, Hassell H. Whitworth, Jackson, for A.J. Thompson et al. EN BANC. SUGG, Justice, for the Court: Mrs. Helen L. McCluskey brought suit in the Circuit Court of Warren County, against A.J. Thompson, et al., who were coemployees of the decedent, Carol McCluskey, for the alleged wrongful death of the decedent. According to the declaration, plaintiff's husband, Carol McCluskey, was employed by Bechtel Power Corporation which was engaged in the construction of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Plant located in Claiborne County. On July 1, 1975, a portable light plant, weighing about 3,000 pounds, fell from a crane and killed McCluskey. A.J. Thompson demurred to the declaration on the grounds that they owed no individual duty to the decedent and that the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act bars a common law tort suit against them as fellow employees for the work-related injuries and death suffered by the decedent. In sustaining the demurrer, the trial court stated "[i]t is the court's opinion that the purpose and spirit and philosophy of the Workmen's Compensation Act was to make compensation the exclusive remedy of the employee where he is injured by the employer or any of the employees." Plaintiff appealed. The other appellants, Bechtel and Travelers, were named in the declaration as defendants because they paid workmen's compensation benefits to the plaintiff, as the widow of McCluskey. Bechtel and Travelers claimed they would be entitled, pursuant to section 71-3-71 Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), to "the first fruits of the net of any recovery, from such third party defendants here sued." The declaration sought to have them "assert such, if any, claims which they may have in the premises." Bechtel and Travelers demurred on the ground that suit against them was precluded by section 71-3-9 Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), and requested that they be dismissed as defendants without prejudice to their rights to later intervene as plaintiffs under section 71-3-71 Mississippi *258 Code Annotated (1972). In overruling their demurrer the trial court found that although section 71-3-71 establishes a right to intervention, it puts no time limit on the exercise of this right. Finding this to be an undesirable "situation of uncertainty," the trial court "in its common law discretion" ordered that Bechtel and Travelers either intervene within thirty days as party plaintiffs, or disclaim any interest in the proceeds of any recovery by plaintiff. They now appeal from that order. There are two issues on appeal here: (1) Whether the trial court erred in finding that workmen's compensation is the exclusive remedy of the employee where he suffers a work-related injury as a result of the negligence of a coemployee; and (2) Whether the trial court erred in setting a time limit within which an employer or insurer must intervene under section 71-3-71 Mississippi Code Annotated (1972) or disclaim any interest in a third party suit. The question of whether an employee who is injured because of the negligence of a fellow servant can sue his negligent fellow servant or is limited to benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act was considered in Stubbs v. Green Brothers Gravel Co., Inc., 206 So. 2d 323 (Miss. 1968). Stubbs sued Green Brothers Gravel Co., Inc. and its employee, Jamie Brown, and alleged that he was injured when his vehicle was struck by a truck driven by Brown which was owned by Green. He also alleged that Brown was not keeping a proper lookout, did not have his vehicle under control or in proper repair, and these negligent acts were contributing proximate causes of plaintiff's injuries. Green and Brown denied the charges and specially pled two defenses in bar of the action. The first defense was that Stubbs was an employee of Green, his injuries occurred in the scope of his employment, and the Workmen's Compensation Act was Stubbs' exclusive remedy. The second defense was that Brown and Stubbs were fellow servants of Green at the time of the collision, and each was engaged in the performance of his duties within the scope of his employment at the time of the collision. The trial court sustained the first defense and held that the Workmen's Compensation Act was Stubbs' exclusive remedy. On appeal, we affirmed and stated: We held that Stubbs' exclusive remedy was under the Workmen's Compensation Act and dismissed his tort action against both his employer and his fellow servant. Our holding in Stubbs prohibited recovery by an injured employee against his fellow servant because his exclusive remedy was under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The opinion did not assign reasons for holding Stubbs' exclusive remedy was under the Workmen's Compensation Act. We therefore deem it necessary to discuss the effect and purposes of the Act. If plaintiff could recover from a fellow servant of the decedent, it would permit an employer or compensation insurer to shift the burden of workmen's compensation benefits to a fellow servant.[1] *259 The Workmen's Compensation Act was designed to compensate victims of industrial accidents and aid in their rehabilitation and restoration to health and vocational opportunity. Section 71-3-1 Mississippi Code Annotated (1972). The Workmen's Compensation Act represents a wide departure from common law because the Act precludes a common law tort action by an employee against his employer but, in return, assures the employee an award without the necessity of showing fault or negligence on the part of the employer. The legislature has substituted a no-fault compensation system to replace the common law action by employees against employers and thus determined that the cost of this no-fault compensation should be borne by the employing industry. This brings into play the concept of enterprise liability and logically places the burden of providing compensation for industrial injuries upon the employer. Compensation for industrial injuries is rightfully placed upon the employer because, (1) industrial injuries are causally related to the fact of employment, and (2) the employer is in a position to pass this cost to society in the form of higher prices. If the plaintiff in this action is permitted to recover from the fellow servants of the deceased employee, the employer and carrier would be fully reimbursed for all benefits paid the statutory beneficiaries of the deceased employee. This would effectively transfer the ultimate burden of providing compensation from the industry, where it belongs, to fellow servants, where it does not belong. We have held that any construction given to the Workmen's Compensation Act must be sensible as well as liberal. Deemer Lumber Co., et al. v. Hamilton, 211 Miss. 673, 52 So. 2d 634 (1951); Lucedale Veneer Co. v. Rogers, 211 Miss. 613, 48 So. 2d 148 (1950) (suggestion of error overruled 211 Miss. 613, 53 So. 2d 69 (1951)). Another familiar rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature must be determined by the total language of the statute and not from a segment considered apart from the remainder. Brady v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 342 So. 2d 295, appeal dismissed 434 U.S. 804, 98 S. Ct. 32, 54 L. Ed. 2d 61 (Miss. 1977); Miss. Public Service Commission v. City of Jackson, 328 So. 2d 656 (Miss. 1976); McCaffrey's Food Market, Inc. v. Mississippi Milk Commission, 227 So. 2d 459 (Miss. 1969). Also, the intent of the legislature must be determined by studying words used in a statute in context. Akers v. Johnson's Estate, 236 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1970). When these rules of statutory construction are applied to the Workmen's Compensation Act in its entirety, it is apparent that the legislature did not intend to allow an employer or compensation insurer to recover compensation benefits paid by them from a fellow servant of the injured employee. A number of other states have reached the same conclusion and construed their Workmen's Compensation Acts as a bar to a negligence action by a covered employee seeking damages for the same injuries against a coemployee. Those decisions generally hold that such suits would destroy the purposes of workmen's compensation. For example, in Madison v. Pierce, 478 P.2d 860 (Mont. 1970) an injured employee received a compensation award and then sued three officers and the foreman of her corporate employer. The Montana Compensation Act reserved the injured employee's right to sue: "Some persons or corporations other than his employer." The defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment asserting that the compensation act provided the exclusive remedy for the injured employee. The trial court sustained the motion for summary judgment and the Montana Supreme Court in affirming, stated: *261 In Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1952) the North Carolina Supreme Court stated: Other cases could be cited to the same effect, but the two quoted above fortify our holding that the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act should be construed to bar a suit by an injured employee against a fellow servant when the plaintiff is covered by the Act. Plaintiff contends her suit is maintainable under section 71-3-71 Mississippi Code Annotated (1972) which provides in part the following: It is argued that the terms of a statute must be given their common meaning, and a statute which is in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, and must not be extended beyond what is clearly indicated by its express terms or by necessary implication. A similar argument was advanced in Madison v. Pierce, supra, and disposed of in the following language: We agree that the terms of a statute must be given their common meaning; however, we must recognize that the Workmen's Compensation Act is an entirely new system replacing the fault based system of tort with the no-fault system of enterprise liability. From a practical standpoint, the uncertainty of an injured employee being fully compensated by a jury verdict based on a tort action alleging negligence against his employer is replaced by the certainty of recovery in a fixed sum, although the fixed sum may be less than his actual injuries and may be less than an amount that might be fixed by a jury. We should no longer cling to the concept that a statute in derogation of common law must be interpreted strictly. Dean Roscoe Pound, one of the legal giants of this century, addressed this concept in his *262 monumental work, Jurisprudence, as follows: We agree with the views expressed by Dean Pound quoted above. To do otherwise relegates statutes to a secondary status, a position we no longer accept. Dean Pound suggested four ways in which courts might deal with a legislative innovation: The suggestion made by Dean Pound seventy years ago with respect to the construction of legislative acts was the practice in this state many years before Dean Pound wrote on the subject. An example of this is our treatment of the statute commonly referred to as the "woman's law" which was first enacted February 15, 1839 and amended February 28, 1946. Chapter 34, Articles 4 and 7, Hutchinson's Mississippi Code. Clarke v. McCreary, 20 Miss. 347 (1849) involved the title to slaves who came into the possession of the wife of McCreary in September, 1839 after the "woman's law" went into operation in April, 1839. The question was whether property inured to the separate use of Mrs. McCreary or whether title to the slaves vested absolutely in Mr. McCreary under the common law; or descended in accord with the statute. In determining this question, the Court held that the common-law right of a husband to the personal property of his wife was changed by the act. The Court stated: The same statute was considered in Olive, Admr. v. Walton, 33 Miss. 103 (1857) where the Court stated: There are other cases construing the "woman's law" but the two cited are sufficient examples of the principle that this *264 Court received the statute into the body of the law, not only as a rule to be applied, but as a principle from which to reason, and that common law on the same subject must give way to statutes. A more recent example of the operation of this principle of receiving a statute into the body of the law is our recognition of the right of a wife to recover for loss of consortium caused through negligent injury to her husband by a third party. In Tribble v. Gregory, 288 So. 2d 13 (Miss. 1974), we stated: Other cases involving this principle are found in our law but our treatment of the "woman's law" and the wife's right to consortium serve as sufficient examples of the principle that throughout the history of this state we have received statutes into the body of the law both as a rule to be applied and as a principle from which to reason. Dean Pound's suggestion was not innovative so far as Mississippi is concerned because we have consistently applied this principle in construing statutes in derogation of the common law. Our Workmen's Compensation Act in its entire concept is a departure from the common law. It represents long and patient study by experts, careful consideration by conferences, discussions in periodicals and in the press, and intelligently conducted hearings before legislative committees. The result was a carefully drafted Act which substituted a no-fault compensation system to replace the common law action by employees against employers. We have repeatedly held that any construction given the Act should be sensible and liberal with the view of carrying out the purposes of the Act. We should not focus the microscope of judicial analysis on a few words in the entire Act, and in the process erode the overriding purpose of the Act. Our Act and the common law right to sue a fellow employee for negligence, as opposed to an intentional tort, cannot coexist, so the common law right to sue a fellow employee where the injured employee is covered by the Act must give way. The final issue with which we are faced concerns the correctness of the trial court's order overruling the demurrers by Bechtel Power Corporation and The Travelers Insurance Company to the declaration which named them as defendants and which stated that pursuant to section 71-3-71 Mississippi Code Annotated (1972) they were "... required to assert such, if any, claims which they may have in the premises." In its order overruling the demurrers and motions to dismiss the declaration, the trial court gave Bechtel and The Travelers thirty days either, to intervene, or disclaim any interest in the lawsuit. The demurrers and motions to dismiss as to Bechtel and Travelers should have been sustained. Bechtel, as the employer, was not subject to suit [section 71-3-9 Mississippi Code Annotated (1972)]; and the declaration did not state a cause of action against Travelers but only stated that Travelers was required to assert any claim which it might have. *265 Bechtel and Travelers correctly argue that section 71-3-71 Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), which establishes the right of intervention, makes intervention optional and does not require that the right be exercised at any particular time. Cf. McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir.1970); Litton Systems, Inc. v. Murphree, 301 So. 2d 850 (Miss. 1974); Powe v. Jackson, 236 Miss. 11, 109 So. 2d 546 (1959). Therefore, it was improper for the lower court to set a time limit of thirty days on the right of these appellants to intervene. AFFIRMED ON APPEAL OF PLAINTIFF, MRS. HELEN L. McCLUSKEY, IN NO. 50,002; REVERSED ON APPEAL OF DEFENDANTS BECHTEL AND TRAVELERS, IN NO. 50,011, AND RENDERED. ALL JUSTICES CONCUR. [1] Section 71-3-71 Mississippi Code Annotated (1972) provides in part as follows: An employer or compensation insurer who shall have paid compensation benefits under this chapter for the injury or death of the employee shall have the right to maintain an action at law against any other party responsible for such injury or death, in the name of such injured employee or his beneficiaries, or in the name of such employer or insurer, or any or all of them.