Title: COREY J. JOST, M.D., and BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF SHERIDAN COUNTY, a County Memorial Hospital and Body Corporate V. CAREAN L. GOSS and LEO GOSS, Husband and Wife

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

COREY J. JOST, M.D., and BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF SHERIDAN COUNTY, a County Memorial Hospital and Body Corporate V. CAREAN L. GOSS and LEO GOSS, Husband and Wife2010 WY 104Case Number: S-10-0149Decided: 07/29/2010
April 
Term, A.D. 2010

 
 
COREY 
J. JOST, M.D., and BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF SHERIDAN 
COUNTY, a County Memorial Hospital and Body 
Corporate,Petitioners,v.CAREAN L. GOSS and LEO GOSS, 
Husband and Wife,Respondents.

 
 
Order 
Granting Petition For Writ of Review

 
 

[¶1]      This 
matter 
came before the Court upon a "Petition for Writ of Review," filed herein July 8, 
2010.  After a careful review of the 
petition, the "Response to Petition for Writ of Review," and the file, this 
Court finds it appropriate to rule on this matter without further briefing.   This Court finds that the petition 
should be granted and that the district court's "Order Denying Motion to Dismiss 
filed Herein by Defendants Jost and Memorial Hospital" should be reversed, in 
part.  While this Court agrees with 
much of the district court's analysis, this Court finds that it must clarify the 
analysis in this matter.  This Court 
also finds that it must make clear that further district court proceedings are 
necessary to determine if the Gosses' claim was presented in a timely 
fashion.

 
 
[¶2]      Petitioners' 
motion to dismiss is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113, which provides in 
pertinent part:

 
 
W.S. 
§ 1-39-113.  Claims 
procedure.

 
 
   (a) No action shall be brought 
under this act against a governmental entity unless the claim upon which the 
action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized statement in writing 
within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, except 
that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two (2) years after 
discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can establish 
that the alleged act, error or omission was:

(i) 
  Not reasonably discoverable 
within a two (2) year period; or

(ii) 
The claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the 
two (2) year period despite the exercise of due diligence.

 
 
[¶3]      Under this 
statute, the first question to be answered is the date of the act, error, or 
omission.  The date of the act, 
error, or omission should not be confused with the date of discovery of 
the act, error, or omission.  Here, 
the district court did not examine the date of the act error or omission.  In Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414, 417 
(Wyo. 1985), this Court held that, with respect to the statute of limitations 
found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107,  "the act, error or omission which starts 
the running of the statute of limitations against medical malpractice actions is 
the termination of the course of treatment for the same or related illnesses or 
injuries."  In future proceedings, 
the district court should determine the date of the act error or omission.  However, for purposes of this order, 
this Court will assume the date of the act, error, or omission was March of 
2007.  According to Mrs. Goss' 
affidavit, she was "under Dr. Jost's care for my continuing, severe abdominal 
pain from early October, 2006 through some date in February or March, 2007" 
 

 
 
[¶4]      Once the date of 
the act, error, or omission is determined, the next question is whether the act, 
error or omission was discovered within two years of the date.  If the discovery was made within two 
years, then the claim must be presented within the two-year period.  (Unlike Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a)(iv), Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 does not include a six-month extension period for claims 
discovered in the second year of the two year period.)  Here, the Petitioners argue that the 
alleged negligence was discovered on April 18, 2007.  The Gosses claim the alleged negligence 
was discovered on April 24, 2008.  
The district court used the latter date in its analysis.  Assuming that March 2007 is the date of 
the act, error, or omission, it makes no difference which of those two dates is 
correct.   Both dates are 
within two years of the act, error, or omission of March of 2007.  Stated another way, because discovery 
was made in the two year period, any governmental claim should have been 
presented by March of 2009, assuming the Gosses knew or should have known by 
then that Dr. Jost was a government employee.  

 
 
[¶5]      The problem here 
is that the Gosses apparently did not know, by March of 2009, that Dr. Jost was 
a government employee.  The Gosses 
assert they did not know that fact until April 13, 2009.  Assuming that date to be accurate, then 
that date may be the date of discovery.  
In that respect, this case is similar to Romero v. Schulze, 974 P.2d 959, 965 
(Wyo. 1999), where this Court concluded:

 
 
Romero 
did not discover that Dr. Schulze was an employee of the hospital until November 
19, 1996.  The two-year 
notice-of-claim period under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, therefore, 
commenced on that date, and the summary judgment entered because of the failure 
to timely serve the notice of claim is reversed.  

 
 
(Importantly, 
Dr. Schulze completed care on November 14, 1994, meaning the employment 
relationship in Romero was discovered 
after expiration of the two-year period.  Id. at fn. 1.)  

 
 
[¶6]      Assuming the 
Gosses did not discover the employment relationship until April 13, 2009, (over 
two years after the act, error, or omission), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-119(a)(i) 
and (ii) require further analysis.  
In other words, the Gosses' claim may be timely, but only if they 
discovered the employment relationship over two years after the act, error, or 
omission AND either (A) the employment relationship was "[n]ot reasonably 
discoverable" within a two-year period OR (B) the Gosses failed to 
discover the employment relationship within the two-year period "despite the 
exercise of due diligence."  

 
 
[¶7]      As the district 
court appeared to recognize, these questions are generally not appropriate for 
summary adjudication.  In Heimer v. Antelope Valley Improvement, 
2010 WY 29, ¶ 18 (Wyo. 2010), this Court noted that "[t]he application of the 
discovery rule to a statute of limitations involves a mixed question of law and 
fact; consequently, the entry of summary judgment on the issue of when a statute 
of limitations commences to run is typically inappropriate."  

 
 

[¶8]      With the 
foregoing in mind, this Court turns to the district court's decision.  In its decision letter, the district 
court wrote:

 
 
After 
a careful review of the record and accepting [the Gosses] allegations that they 
did not discover the alleged act, error, or omission until April 24, 2008, the 
Court finds that they timely filed their governmental claim within the two year 
period.  Similarly, applying summary 
judgment standards, the Court finds that a material question of fact exists with 
respect to date upon which [the Gosses] discovered the alleged act, error or 
omission.

While 
the discovery of the employment relationship may be of little consequence based 
on the Court's above finding, the Court nonetheless finds that a material 
question of fact also exists as to when [the Gosses] discovered the 
relationship.  
*****

 
 
[¶9]      This Court finds 
two problems with the district court's ruling.  First, in the first quoted paragraph, 
the district court appears to be using the date of discovery of the act, error, 
or omission as the date of the act, error, or omission.  As noted, the district court did not 
determine (even for the limited purpose of a motion to dismiss) the date of the 
act, error, or omission.  That date 
must be determined before it can be concluded that the Respondents "timely filed 
their governmental claim within the two year period."

 
 
[¶10]   With respect to the second 
paragraph, this Court disagrees with the district court that the date of 
discovery of the employment relationship "may be of little consequence."  Instead, as in Romero v. Schulze, this Court finds that 
the date of discovery of the employment relationship is crucial to the 
analysis.  This Court finds that, 
with respect to these two rulings, the district court's order should be 
reversed.  It is, therefore, 

 
 

[¶11]   ORDERED 
that the Petition for Writ of Review, filed herein July 8, 2010, be, and hereby 
is, granted; and it is further

 
 

[¶12]   ORDERED 
that the district court's "Order Denying Motion to Dismiss filed Herein by 
Defendants Jost and Memorial Hospital," filed June 24, 2010, be and hereby is, 
reversed, to the extent noted above; and it is further

 
 

[¶13]   ORDERED 
that this matter is remanded to the district court for proceedings consistent 
with this order.

 
 

[¶14]   DATED 
this 29th day of July, 
2010.

 
 
                                                                        
BY THE COURT:

                                                                        

                                                                        
MARILYN S. KITE

            
                                                                        
Chief 
Justice