Title: Dawson v. City of Casper

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Dawson v. City of Casper1987 WY 7731 P.2d 1186Case Number: 86-218Decided: 01/28/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
DAVID DAWSON, APPELLANT 
(APPELLANT/DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
CITY OF CASPER, APPELLEE 
(APPELLEE/PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the municipal 
court.

 
 
David A. Dawson, pro se.

 
 
Richard H. Peek, 
Casper, for appellee.

 
 
Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

 
 

MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant David Dawson, 
acting pro se, asks this Court to address a variety of claims arising from his 
municipal court speeding conviction. This conviction was previously affirmed on 
appeal to the district court. We also affirm.

 
 

[¶2.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues for our review:

 
 
"1) Jurisdiction over the 
Person of the Accused has been challenged by the Accused and never been proven 
to the Court by the Prosecution.

 
 
"2) The Municipal Court 
denied the Accused his Right to a jury trial in this Criminal 
Prosecution.

 
 
"3) The Municipal Court 
denied the Accused his Right to unfettered Counsel of Choice who is not beholden 
to his adversaries by being an Officer of the Court and Member of the 
Bar.

 
 
"4) The Municipal Court 
did not and has not yet adequately advised the Accused of the nature of the 
Issue at Law wherein the Accused caused harm to another Individual and the 
possible consequences which could arise out of it.

 
 
"5) The Municipal Court 
denied the Accused his Rights `Sua Sponte' in that the Accused has suffered a 
loss of Substantive Rights of which the Accused has not been 
advised.

 
 
"6) The Municipal Court 
denied Demands of the Accused without testimony or argument from the Prosecution 
thus showing itself to be biased against the Accused." (Record references 
omitted.)

 
 

Appellee City of Casper sets forth the following 
issues:

 
 
"1. DID THE MUNICIPAL 
COURT FOR THE CITY OF CASPER, WYOMING HAVE JURISDICTION 
OVER THE APPELLANT AND THE SUBJECT MATTER?

 
 
"2. DID THE APPELLANT 
HAVE A RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL?

 
 
"3. DID APPELLANT HAVE A 
RIGHT TO HAVE A NON-LAWYER REPRESENT HIM IN THE PROCEEDING IN THE TRIAL 
COURT?

 
 
"4. CAN THIS COURT FIND 
REASONABLE CAUSE FOR THIS APPEAL?"

 
 

[¶3.]     On March 25, 1986, 
appellant was cited by an officer of the Casper police department for driving 53 miles 
per hour in a 40-mile-per-hour zone. In accordance with the citation, appellant 
appeared in municipal court on April 7, 1986, at which time he filed numerous 
motions and supporting briefs. The municipal court denied each of the motions 
and entered a plea of not guilty on appellant's behalf. Prior to trial, 
appellant again inundated the court with motions, bills of exception, and 
supporting briefs. The court denied the motions and refused to sign the bills of 
exception. After trial on May 20, 1986, the court found appellant guilty of 
speeding and fined him $25. On appeal to the district court, appellant's 
conviction was affirmed.

 
 

[¶4.]     With regard to 
appellant's claim that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction, we have 
said:

 
 
"Article 5, § 1, of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming authorizes the legislature to 
establish subordinate courts. Municipal courts are created pursuant to § 
5-6-101, W.S. 1977. Section 5-6-102, W.S. 1977, then provides that municipal 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the ordinances of cities 
and towns which occur within the city limits." Nollsch v. City of Rock Springs, Wyo., 724 P.2d 447, 448 
(1986).

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellant was stopped 
in Casper and 
charged with violating § 31-5-301, W.S. 1977, as adopted by § 24-1 of the Casper 
City Code. Thus, appellant's claim that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction 
to hear the case is without merit.

 
 

[¶6.]     Appellant's second 
claim is likewise without merit. We have previously held that "a crime 
punishable by any jail term, regardless of length, is a serious crime subject to 
the constitutional right to a jury trial." Brenner v. City of Casper, Wyo., 723 P.2d 558, 561 (1986). In the present 
case, appellant was not subject to a jail term, and consequently he was not 
entitled to a jury trial. Nollsch v. City of Rock Springs, supra.

 
 

[¶7.]     Appellant claims next 
that he was denied his right to counsel of choice and that the municipal court 
refused to allow anyone other than a member of the bar to represent him. Section 
5-2-118, W.S. 1977, authorizes this Court to adopt rules and regulations 
governing the practice of law in Wyoming. Pursuant to that section, this Court 
has adopted Rule 18 of the Amended Rules Providing for the Organization and 
Government of the Bar Association of the Attorneys at Law of the State of 
Wyoming, which 
provides in relevant part:

 
 
"(b) Only members of the 
Wyoming State 
Bar shall engage in the practice of law within this state, except 
that:

 
 
"(1) Members of the bar 
of any other state, district or territory of the United States may be admitted 
to practice with reference to a specific case * * *, but he shall not be 
permitted to enter his appearance * * * in any court * * * of the state, unless 
he shall have associated with him in such action or proceeding an active member 
of the Wyoming State Bar. * * *

 
 
"(2) Any person may act 
pro se in a matter in which he is a party.

 
 
"(3) An eligible law 
student may engage, as an intern, in the practice of law under the general 
supervision of an active member of the Wyoming State Bar * 
*.

 
 
"(4) An eligible law 
student may engage, as an intern, in the practice of law for indigent persons 
only under the general supervision of a professor of law designated for such by 
the Dean of the University of Wyoming Law School * * *.

 
 
"(5) An eligible law 
student may engage, as an intern, in the practice of law under the Prosecution 
Assistance Program of the University of Wyoming Law School * * 
*.

 
 
"(6) A person studying 
law in the office of a member of the Wyoming State Bar pursuant to § 33-5-105, 
W.S. 1977, may engage as an intern in the practice of law under the general 
supervision of the lawyer under which he is studying * * 
*."

 
 
Thus, the municipal court 
was without authority to allow anyone to represent appellant unless he or she 
satisfied the requirements of Rule 18, supra.

 
 

[¶8.]     As the Superior Court 
of Pennsylvania stated:

 
 
"In this case, appellant 
would place himself above the constitution, above the Supreme Court 
administrative rulings and above the law in designating a non-lawyer to defend 
him. It might be argued that the appellant would get the representation he 
deserved in such a designation, but the law, particularly in criminal cases, 
will, whenever possible, protect the individual from his own folly." 
Commonwealth v. Carroll, Pa.Super., 517 A.2d 980, 981 
(1986).

 
 

[¶9.]     With respect to 
appellant's remaining arguments, we have said:

 
 
"It is the responsibility 
of an appellant to present relevant authority and cogent argument, and it is not 
enough to identify potential issues and expect this court to flesh them out. 
There are many precedents for the proposition that this court will not consider 
issues which are not supported with cogent argument or pertinent authority. In 
the past this court has not hesitated to invoke this rule against pro se 
litigants. The appellant in this case does appear pro se, but no special 
consideration is to be given a litigant who presents his own case." Freeman v. 
Town of Lusk, Wyo., 717 P.2d 331, 332 (1986) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
In light of this 
precedent and because appellant fails to present relevant authority or cogent 
argument, we decline to address appellant's remaining 
arguments.

 
 

[¶10.]  Affirmed.