Title: Leslie J. Schatz v. Gary R. McCaughtry

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 80 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0793 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Leslie J. Schatz,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Gary R. McCaughtry,  
 
Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 167 
Reported at:  256 Wis. 2d 770, 650 N.W.2d 67 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 13, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Callaway   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-respondent-petitioner the cause was 
argued by Thomas J. Dawson, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the petitioner-appellant there was a brief by T. 
Christopher Kelly and Kelly & Habermehl, S.C., Madison, and oral 
argument by T. Christopher Kelly. 
 
 
2003 WI 80 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0793  
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 3116) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Leslie J.  
Schatz,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Gary R. McCaughtry,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent- 
          Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, State of 
Wisconsin, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision 
that reversed the circuit court's dismissal of a petition for a 
writ of certiorari filed by Leslie Schatz, a prisoner at the 
Waupun Correctional Institution.1  Schatz's petition sought 
                                                 
1 State ex rel. Schatz v. McCaughtry, 2002 WI App 167, 256 
Wis. 2d 770, 650 N.W.2d 67 (reversing an order of the circuit 
court for Dane County, Richard J. Callaway, Judge). 
 
No. 
01-0793   
 
2 
 
review of three disciplinary decisions.  The circuit court 
dismissed the petition sua sponte under Wis. Stat. § 802.05(3) 
(1999-2000)2 for failure to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted. 
¶2 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
Schatz's 
constitutional right to due process was violated when the 
circuit court dismissed the petition sua sponte without giving 
Schatz prior notice of its intent to do so and an additional 
opportunity to be heard.  We agree with the State that the 
circuit court's dismissal of the petition did not violate 
Schatz's right to due process because Wis. Stat. § 802.05(3) 
provides constructive notice of the potential for a sua sponte 
dismissal for failure to state a claim and there are procedural 
safeguards that protect against erroneous sua sponte dismissals.  
We also conclude that the sua sponte dismissal did not violate 
Schatz's constitutional right to equal protection of the law. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the court of appeals. 
I 
¶3 
Schatz, 
an 
inmate 
at 
the 
Waupun 
Correctional 
Institution acting pro se, filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari with the Dane County circuit court.  The petition 
requested review of three prison disciplinary decisions, each of 
which was based on a separate conduct report. 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-0793   
 
3 
 
¶4 
As required by the initial pleading review procedure 
created by Wisconsin's Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)3 and 
codified in Wis. Stat. § 802.05(3), the circuit court reviewed 
Schatz's petition, including copies of the conduct reports, the 
disciplinary committee decisions, and other supporting materials 
that Schatz provided with the petition.  It determined that the 
petition failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted.  It therefore exercised its authority under Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.05(3) to dismiss the petition sua sponte without requiring 
the defendant to file an answer. 
¶5 
The court issued a memorandum decision explaining its 
analysis.  Its decision summarized each of the three conduct 
reports and the disciplinary proceeding that occurred as a 
result of each report.  The court's decision recounted Schatz's 
assertions that the disciplinary decisions were invalid because 
of the untimely delivery of notice of hearings, the lack of 
evidence to support the charges, a retaliatory purpose for the 
charges, and the improper use of hearsay.  The petition also 
claimed that there were "numerous due process violations" 
throughout the process. 
¶6 
The first disciplinary decision concluded that Schatz 
disobeyed an order.  The circuit court determined that Schatz 
was time barred from challenging this decision because he had 
not filed the petition within the statutory time period.  It 
cited Wis. Stat. § 893.735 which provides that an action seeking 
                                                 
3 1997 Wis. Act 133. 
No. 
01-0793   
 
4 
 
a remedy available by certiorari made on behalf of a prisoner is 
barred unless commenced within 45 days after the cause of action 
accrues. 
 
The 
court 
noted 
that 
Schatz's 
most 
recent 
administrative denial of his challenge of the first disciplinary 
decision was July 29, 2000.  Schatz filed the petition for a 
writ of certiorari on November 21, 2000, 71 days past the 
deadline.  Therefore, with respect to the first disciplinary 
decision, the court determined that because of the late filing, 
Schatz failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
¶7 
The second and third disciplinary decisions also 
concluded that Schatz had disobeyed an order.  The circuit court 
observed that, although the petition alleged that the second and 
third conduct reports were retaliation for Schatz's partial 
success in the outcome of the first conduct report, the petition 
failed to allege any specific facts showing retaliation.  It 
also determined that there were no procedural errors except 
possibly one which was harmless, there was sufficient evidence 
to support the disciplinary decisions, and there was no improper 
use of hearsay evidence.   
¶8 
Accordingly, having reviewed and analyzed the petition 
and the supporting materials, the court found that the petition 
did not state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  It 
therefore 
dismissed 
the 
petition 
sua 
sponte 
pursuant 
to 
§ 802.05(3)(b). 
¶9 
Schatz 
appealed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
dismissal 
asserting that his rights were violated because he had not 
received notice and an opportunity to be heard by the court 
No. 
01-0793   
 
5 
 
before it dismissed his petition.  The court of appeals 
construed this claim as challenging the constitutionality of the 
procedure that the circuit court used in dismissing Schatz's 
petition sua sponte pursuant to § 802.05(3).  It appointed 
counsel to further address this issue on Schatz's behalf and 
asked for supplemental briefing from both parties. 
¶10 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
dismissal of the petition.  It first noted that § 802.05(3) does 
not address whether a circuit court must provide a prisoner with 
notice and an opportunity to be heard before it dismisses a 
prisoner's action or special proceeding sua sponte pursuant to 
§ 802.05(3).  State ex rel. Schatz v. McCaughtry, 2002 WI App 
167, ¶7, 256 Wis. 2d 770, 650 N.W.2d 67.  The court then 
determined that State ex rel. Sahagian v. Young, 141 Wis. 2d 
495, 415 N.W.2d 568 (Ct. App. 1987), was controlling and that 
the lack of prior notice and an opportunity to be heard violated 
Schatz's right to due process.  Schatz, 256 Wis. 2d 770, ¶14.  
Having reversed the dismissal on due process grounds, the court 
of appeals did not address the issue of whether the dismissal 
violated Schatz's right to equal protection of the law.  Id., ¶4 
n.4. 
II 
¶11 This case presents us with an opportunity to examine a 
circuit court's use of the PLRA's pleading review procedure to 
dismiss sua sponte a prisoner's petition for a writ of 
certiorari.  The initial issue presented is whether Schatz's 
constitutional right to due process required that the circuit 
No. 
01-0793   
 
6 
 
court give him notice and an additional opportunity to be heard 
before sua sponte dismissing his petition for failure to state a 
claim.  Additionally, we address the issue of whether the sua 
sponte dismissal violated Schatz's constitutional right to equal 
protection of the law.  Each of these issues presents a question 
of law subject to independent appellate review.  State ex rel. 
Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 629, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998). 
¶12 We 
first 
describe 
the 
initial 
pleading 
review 
procedure created by the PLRA and next examine precedent that is 
relevant to our due process analysis.  Then, we analyze Schatz's 
due process and equal protection arguments and conclude that the 
dismissal of Schatz's petition violated neither his right to due 
process nor his right to equal protection of the law. 
III 
¶13 The circuit court dismissed Schatz's petition pursuant 
to the PLRA's initial pleading review procedure which is 
applicable to actions or special proceedings commenced by a 
prisoner.  The PLRA defines "prisoner" as any person who is 
incarcerated, imprisoned, arrested, or otherwise detained in a 
correctional institution or by a law enforcement officer, 
subject to certain specified exceptions none of which are 
applicable to this case.  See Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2. 
¶14 Under the review procedure, when a prisoner commences 
an action or a special proceeding, the circuit court reviews the 
prisoner's initial pleading to consider whether there are 
grounds to dismiss the action or special proceeding without 
No. 
01-0793   
 
7 
 
requiring the defendant to answer the pleading.  The procedure 
is codified in Wis. Stat. § 802.05(3)(a) and (b) which provide: 
(a)  A court shall review the initial pleading as soon 
as practicable after the action or special proceeding 
is filed with the court if the action or special 
proceeding is commenced by a prisoner, as defined in 
http://folio.legis.state.wi.us/cgi-
bin/om_isapi.dll?clientID=120781&hitsperheading=on&infobase=stats01.nfo&ju
mp=801.02%287%29%28a%292.&softpage=Document 
- 
JUMPDEST_801.02(7)(a)2.s. 801.02(7)(a)2. 
(b)  The court may dismiss the action or special 
proceeding 
under 
http://folio.legis.state.wi.us/cgi-
bin/om_isapi.dll?clientID=120781&hitsperheading=on&infobase=stats01.nfo&ju
mp=802.05%283%29%28a%29&softpage=Document 
- 
JUMPDEST_802.05(3)(a)par. 
(a) 
without 
requiring 
the 
defendant 
to 
answer 
the 
pleading 
if 
the 
court 
determines that the action or special proceeding meets 
any of the following conditions: 
1. 
 
Is 
frivolous, 
as 
determined 
under 
http://folio.legis.state.wi.us/cgi-
bin/om_isapi.dll?clientID=120781&hitsperheading=on&infobase=stats01.nfo&ju
mp=814.025%283%29&softpage=Document 
- 
JUMPDEST_814.025(3)s. 
814.025(3). 
2.  Is used for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass, to cause unnecessary delay or to needlessly 
increase the cost of litigation. 
3.  Seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is 
immune from such relief. 
4.  Fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. 
¶15 The PLRA was designed to address the costly problems 
caused 
by 
excessive 
or 
otherwise 
inappropriate 
prisoner-initiated litigation.  The objectives of the PLRA 
include enhancing judicial economy, protecting defendants from 
needlessly 
expending 
resources 
to 
defend 
this 
type 
of 
No. 
01-0793   
 
8 
 
litigation, and reducing the taxpayer expense associated with 
such litigation.  See State ex rel. Cramer v. Court of Appeals, 
2000 WI 86, ¶¶38-40, 236 Wis. 2d 473, 613 N.W.2d 591.   
¶16 The initial pleading review procedure advances these 
objectives by permitting circuit courts to dispose of a prisoner 
lawsuit at the initial pleading stage of the suit if the circuit 
court determines that the lawsuit is frivolous, is being used 
for an improper purpose, seeks monetary damages from a defendant 
who is immune from such relief, or fails to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. 
¶17 The language of § 802.05(3) does not require a circuit 
court to give a prisoner notice of an intent to dismiss and an 
additional opportunity to be heard prior to exercising its 
authority under § 802.05(3) to dismiss the initial pleading for 
failure to state a claim.  However, this does not end the 
analysis because Schatz is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 1 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution from being deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law.  See Martin v. Richards, 
192 Wis. 2d 156, 198 n. 6, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995).   
¶18 Due process requires that there be an opportunity to 
be heard upon such notice and proceedings as are adequate to 
safeguard the right for which the constitutional protection is 
invoked.  Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).  Schatz 
argues that he has a constitutionally protected right to file a 
petition for a writ of certiorari and that the circuit court's 
No. 
01-0793   
 
9 
 
sua sponte dismissal deprived him of this right without adequate 
notice and opportunity to be heard.   
IV 
¶19 To provide context for our review of the due process 
issue, we describe relevant cases that address the right of due 
process as it applies to sua sponte dismissals.  No Wisconsin 
cases directly address the due process concerns raised by a 
circuit court's sua sponte dismissal pursuant to the PLRA for 
failure to state a claim.  However, Wisconsin case law that 
examines sua sponte dismissals outside of the PLRA recognizes 
that, in certain circumstances, the constitutional right to due 
process is not offended when a circuit court dismisses a 
complaint sua sponte without giving the plaintiff notice of the 
court's intent to order such a dismissal and an additional 
opportunity to be heard. 
¶20 In Neylan v. Vorwald, 124 Wis. 2d 85, 368 N.W.2d 648 
(1985), this court examined whether a plaintiff's right to due 
process was violated by a circuit court's sua sponte dismissal 
based on the plaintiff's failure to prosecute.  The case 
involved two separate actions that were not being actively 
prosecuted, as reflected in the record.  The circuit court sua 
sponte dismissed both actions for failure to prosecute.  The 
plaintiff argued that there was no failure to prosecute as 
evidenced by letters and telephone calls between the attorneys, 
most of which did not involve the court.  Id. at 88-89. 
¶21 In analyzing the sua sponte dismissal, this court 
noted the following language in Wis. Stat. § 805.03 on which the 
No. 
01-0793   
 
10 
 
dismissal was based: "For failure of any claimant to prosecute, 
. . . the court in which the action is pending may make such 
orders in regard to the failure as are just . . . ."  Id. at 90-
91 n.5.  It then cited the United States Supreme Court decision 
of Link v. Wabash Railroad Company, 370 U.S. 626 (1962), for the 
proposition that, in certain circumstances, constructive notice 
of the potential for a sua sponte dismissal, as opposed to 
actual notice, may be sufficient to satisfy due process.  
Accordingly, the court stated that the case turned on whether 
§ 805.03 provided such constructive notice: 
In this regard, the Court in Link stated it may not be 
necessary to provide actual notice and a hearing where 
the party has constructive notice through other means, 
orders or rules of the court as to what the specific 
consequences of his conduct may be.  In this case, 
because sec. 805.03, Stats., by its language does not 
provide the constructive notice required under Link, 
actual notice to the parties of the court's dismissal 
for failure to prosecute is required. 
Neylan, 124 Wis. 2d at 90. 
¶22 The Neylan court determined that there were no clear 
standards, such as a specific time period, articulated in Wis. 
Stat. § 805.03 that would have placed a party on constructive 
notice as to when the party risks dismissal for failure to 
prosecute.  Id. at 90-91.  Accordingly, it concluded that the 
dismissal was improper because the statute did not give adequate 
notice to a plaintiff as to what would constitute failure to 
prosecute.  Id. 
¶23 The case of Sahagian v. Young followed on the heels of 
Neylan.  The court of appeals relied on that case as the basis 
No. 
01-0793   
 
11 
 
for its conclusion that the circuit court's sua sponte dismissal 
violated Schatz's right to due process.  Sahagian was a pre-PLRA 
case in which a prisoner filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari seeking review of a prison disciplinary decision.  
The circuit court affirmed the prison's disciplinary decision on 
the merits in a memorandum decision and order. 
¶24 The court of appeals concluded that Sahagian's right 
to due process was violated because he was not given an 
opportunity to make an argument to the court prior to the entry 
of the order, other than the argument contained in his petition.  
Sahagian, 141 Wis. 2d at 501.  The court noted that a petition 
for a writ of certiorari is generally not intended to fully set 
forth a petitioner's arguments of the merits, and thus Sahagian 
was not given an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time in 
a meaningful manner.  Id. 
¶25 Of more recent vintage are two federal cases that 
inform our discussion of procedural safeguards to protect 
against erroneous sua sponte dismissals and which satisfy due 
process requirements.  The court in Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 
1278 (10th Cir. 2001) dealt specifically with the due process 
issue as it relates to the sua sponte dismissal of a prisoner's 
complaint under the federal Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 
1995.  That act created a screening process similar to the 
initial pleading review procedure set forth in § 802.05(3).  In 
Curley, a state prisoner in New Mexico filed a complaint in 
federal district court.  The district court construed the 
lawsuit as asserting an Eighth Amendment violation in which 
No. 
01-0793   
 
12 
 
prison 
officials 
created 
unconstitutional 
conditions 
of 
confinement by failing to prevent or monitor inmate-to-inmate 
correspondence.  Such correspondence was alleged to be a 
mechanism that inmates used to plan violence against other 
inmates. 
¶26 The district court dismissed the complaint under 28 
U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 
which 
provides 
that 
a 
federal 
district court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any 
time the court determines that the action fails to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted.  The Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals addressed whether the district court violated Curley's 
due process rights by dismissing his complaint without providing 
prior notice or an opportunity to amend it.  It concluded that 
the sua sponte dismissal of the complaint was not a violation of 
due process.  Id. at 1284.  The court noted that Curley was not 
prevented from bringing a meritorious claim.  Id. 
¶27 According to the Tenth Circuit, the federal rules of 
civil procedure provided adequate procedural safeguards to 
protect against erroneous dismissals.  Under the federal rules, 
a litigant whose complaint has been dismissed with prejudice can 
file a motion to alter or amend the judgment or a motion for 
relief from judgment.  Id.  The litigant can also bring an 
appeal, in which the Court of Appeals conducts plenary review of 
the sufficiency of the complaint.  Id. 
¶28 Another federal case, Blaney v. West, 209 F.3d 1027 
(7th 
Cir. 
2000), 
is 
helpful 
in 
analyzing 
the 
role 
of 
post-judgment relief in satisfying due process requirements.  
No. 
01-0793   
 
13 
 
Blaney 
brought 
an 
age 
discrimination 
claim 
against 
the 
Department of the Army.  His attorney did not properly serve the 
government.  The district court dismissed the case sua sponte 
for failure to serve the defendant.  Blaney appealed the 
dismissal. 
¶29 In analyzing whether the dismissal was a violation of 
due process, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals observed that, 
after the dismissal, Blaney's counsel could have filed a Rule 
59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment or a Rule 60(b) 
motion to relieve him from a final judgment.  Id. at 1032.  
Blaney's attorney did in fact file a motion for relief from 
judgment, but after consideration the district court ultimately 
denied the motion.  Id.  The Seventh Circuit concluded that the 
original sua sponte dismissal was not a violation of due 
process: 
The lack of notice before the entry of judgment 
certainly did not rise to the level of a violation of 
due process in this case because Blaney received 
notice 
from 
the 
judgment 
itself 
and 
had 
ample 
opportunity after entry of the judgment to make his 
case to the district court. 
Id. 
V 
¶30 In light of the language of § 802.05(3) and the case 
law regarding due process, we now analyze whether Schatz's right 
to due process was violated in this case.  With respect to 
notice, it is apparent from Neylan and Link that, in certain 
circumstances, constructive notice can be sufficient to satisfy 
due process.  Neylan, 124 Wis. 2d at 90; Link, 370 U.S. at 632.  
No. 
01-0793   
 
14 
 
Schatz does not dispute this.  Rather, Schatz argues that 
constructive notice did not exist in this case.  He asserts 
that, according to Link, the existence of constructive notice 
turns "to a considerable extent, on the knowledge which the 
circumstances show such party may be taken to have of the 
consequences of his own conduct."  Link, 370 U.S. at 632.  
Schatz 
contends 
that 
§ 802.05(3) 
does 
not 
provide 
such 
constructive notice.  We disagree. 
¶31 The language of § 802.05(3) states that, with respect 
to an action commenced by a prisoner, the court "shall review 
the initial pleading as soon as practicable" and "may dismiss 
the action or special proceeding . . . without requiring the 
defendant to answer the pleading if the court determines that 
the action or special proceeding . . . [f]ails to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted."  This expressly puts 
prisoners on notice that a circuit court will examine the 
initial pleading and may, without further briefing or hearing on 
the matter, dismiss the complaint if the court determines that 
the initial pleading fails to state a claim.  Accordingly, 
Schatz had constructive notice that his petition could be 
dismissed if it did not state a claim. 
¶32 Schatz and the court of appeals rely heavily on 
Sahagian to support the position that due process requires that, 
despite the notice created by § 802.05(3), the court give 
additional notice of its intent to dismiss and an additional 
opportunity to be heard.  This reliance is misplaced.  A key 
distinction between the circuit court's ruling in Sahagian and 
No. 
01-0793   
 
15 
 
the dismissal that occurred in this case is that the circuit 
court in Sahagian dismissed the petition before the enactment of 
the PLRA.  Unlike here, there was no statute to be applied by 
the Sahagian court that specifically authorized the sua sponte 
dismissal ordered by the court.  As a result, Sahagian had no 
constructive notice of the potential that the court would 
dismiss his petition.  Thus, the court of appeals erred in 
concluding that Sahagian controlled the outcome of this case and 
required a finding that Schatz's due process rights were 
violated. 
¶33 In addition to the constructive notice created by 
§ 802.05(3), Schatz's right to due process is further protected 
by the existence of procedural safeguards against erroneous sua 
sponte dismissals.  An initial safeguard is the standard that a 
court is required to apply when considering whether to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim.  The standard for deciding whether 
a certiorari petition is sufficient to order a return is the 
same standard used to decide whether a complaint states a claim.  
State ex rel. Luedtke v. Bertrand, 220 Wis. 2d 574, 580, 583 
N.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1998).  It requires that the circuit court 
construe the petition liberally and consider dismissal only if 
it is quite clear that no relief can be had under any legal 
theory.  Id. at 581-82; Evans v. Cameron, 121 Wis. 2d 421, 426, 
360 N.W.2d 25 (1985); Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 87 
Wis. 2d 723, 731, 275 N.W.2d 660 (1979). 
¶34 In dismissing a prisoner's complaint for failure to 
state a claim, the circuit court may consider whether the 
No. 
01-0793   
 
16 
 
petition can be salvaged by amendment.  In Wiegal v. Sentry 
Indemnity Company, 94 Wis. 2d 172, 184-85, 287 N.W.2d 796 (1980) 
(citation omitted), this court stated that refusal to allow an 
amendment would be an erroneous exercise of discretion: (1) when 
justice requires an amendment of the pleadings, or (2) when it 
appears that an omission is material and that such omission or 
failure is through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect. 
¶35 Further, procedural safeguards exist in that the 
dismissal order provides notice to the prisoner of the reason 
for the dismissal and the prisoner can request that the circuit 
court reexamine its decision to dismiss the petition.  This can 
be done through a request for reconsideration or a motion for 
relief from the order under Wis. Stat. § 806.07.  As recognized 
in Curley and Blaney, these post-judgment opportunities to 
present arguments before the trial court are a source of 
ensuring that an individual's right to due process is protected.  
Curley, 246 F.3d at 1284; Blaney, 209 F.3d at 1032. 
¶36 In addition, in cases where the dismissal is without 
prejudice and the time limitation for filing the petition has 
not expired, a prisoner could re-file the petition.  In the case 
at bar, the circuit court did not state whether the petition was 
being dismissed with or without prejudice.  At oral argument, 
the State acknowledged that the complaint in this case was 
dismissed without prejudice.4  We conclude that, in the 
                                                 
 
4 At oral argument, the following discussion occurred: 
 
No. 
01-0793   
 
17 
 
circumstances of this case, the dismissal of the petition with 
respect to the second and third disciplinary decisions was 
without prejudice.5  Generally, when a dismissal for failure to 
state a claim does not specify whether it is with or without 
prejudice and the defects in the dismissed complaint can be 
cured by a subsequent complaint, the dismissal should not be 
treated as a bar to the filing of the subsequent complaint.  
Taylor v. Matteson, 86 Wis. 113, 56 N.W. 829 (1893). 
¶37 In many circumstances in which the petitioner timely 
filed the original petition, the petitioner will not be 
foreclosed by the 45-day statute of limitations from having an 
opportunity to re-file after a dismissal without prejudice.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Chief Justice Abrahamson:  The decision that Judge 
Callaway gave here, isn't it on the merits? 
Assistant Attorney General:  No, it appears because of 
the record and because of the extensiveness of the 
decision, one might think at first blush it was.  But 
it was a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim. 
Chief Justice Abrahamson:  OK, so it's without 
prejudice is what you're saying.  Without prejudice 
because it's a motion to dismiss, doesn't mean you 
can't file a new complaint.  Is that right? 
Assistant Attorney General:  Exactly.  Mr. Schatz in 
this case could have done a number of things.  He 
could have sought to amend his petition.  He could 
have sought a reconsideration of the decision by Judge 
Callaway.  He could have sought relief from judgment. 
5 With regard to the first disciplinary decision, the 
circuit court concluded that Schatz failed to state a claim 
because he had not filed the petition within the statutory time 
period.  It is unclear from the record whether Schatz would be 
able to advance any argument that could cure this defect. 
No. 
01-0793   
 
18 
 
Under Wis. Stat. § 893.13(2), the statute of limitations will be 
tolled from the date the petitioner filed the original petition 
until the "final disposition" of the petition as defined in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.13(1).6   
¶38 Finally, the prisoner has the right to appeal the 
dismissal order.  Wis. Stat. § 808.03 provides that ". . . a 
final order of a circuit court may be appealed as a matter of 
right to the court of appeals unless otherwise expressly 
provided by law."   
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.13 provides: 
893.13 Tolling of statutes of limitation. 
(1) In this section and ss. 893.14 and 893.15 "final 
disposition" means the end of the period in which an 
appeal may be taken from a final order or judgment of 
the trial court, the end of the period within which an 
order for rehearing can be made in the highest 
appellate court to which an appeal is taken, or the 
final order or judgment of the court to which remand 
from an appellate court is made, whichever is latest. 
(2) A law limiting the time for commencement of an 
action is tolled by the commencement of the action to 
enforce the cause of action to which the period of 
limitation applies.  The law limiting the time for 
commencement of the action is tolled for the period 
from the commencement of the action until the final 
disposition of the action. 
(3) If a period of limitation is tolled under sub. (2) 
by the commencement of an action and the time 
remaining after final disposition in which an action 
may be commenced is less than 30 days, the period 
within which the action may be commenced is extended 
to 30 days from the date of final disposition. 
No. 
01-0793   
 
19 
 
¶39 In examining the procedural avenues, we note that a 
dismissal for failure to state a claim is a dismissal that is 
counted toward the three strikes provision in § 801.04(7)(a), 
which 
creates 
additional 
restrictions 
on 
the 
ability 
of 
prisoners to file future lawsuits.  Obviously, a request for 
reconsideration or a motion for relief from judgment will not 
result in an additional strike.  Further, to the extent a 
prisoner may re-file a petition that has been dismissed without 
prejudice for failure to state a claim, any subsequent dismissal 
of the re-filed petition will not result in an additional 
strike, provided that all of the claims set forth in the 
re-filed petition arose out of the transaction, occurrence, or 
event set forth in the original petition. 
¶40 To notify prisoners of the procedural safeguards that 
exist to protect against erroneous sua sponte dismissals, we 
recommend that a citation to this decision be added to the form 
dismissal order used by Wisconsin circuit courts in prisoner 
litigation cases. 
VI 
¶41 Finally, Schatz argues that the sua sponte dismissal 
of his petition violated his constitutional right to equal 
protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 1 of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
Generally, 
unless 
a 
legislative 
classification affects a fundamental right or is based on a 
suspect 
criterion, 
the 
standard 
used 
in 
reviewing 
the 
constitutionality of the legislative classification is the 
No. 
01-0793   
 
20 
 
rational basis test, that is, whether the classification bears a 
rational relation to some legitimate end.  State ex rel. Kahn v. 
Sullivan, 2000 WI App 109, ¶9, 235 Wis. 2d 260, 613 N.W.2d 203; 
Group Health Coop. of Eau Claire v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 
229 Wis. 2d 846, 856, 601 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1999). 
¶42 Schatz concedes that the rational basis test is the 
appropriate test to analyze his equal protection claim.  He 
argues that this test is not satisfied because no legitimate end 
is advanced by denying prisoners the procedural protections that 
are available to non-prisoner litigants.  We disagree. 
¶43 The State has a legitimate interest in deterring 
non-meritorious lawsuits and preserving judicial resources.  
Kahn, 235 Wis. 2d 260, ¶10.  As noted above, the objectives of 
the 
PLRA 
include 
enhancing 
judicial 
economy, 
protecting 
defendants 
from 
needlessly 
expending 
resources 
to 
defend 
inappropriate prisoner-initiated litigation and reducing the 
taxpayer expense associated with such litigation.  See Cramer, 
236 Wis. 2d 473, ¶¶38-40.  The initial pleading review procedure 
advances these objectives by permitting circuit courts to 
dispose of a prisoner lawsuit at the initial pleading stage of 
the suit if the circuit court determines that the lawsuit is 
frivolous, is being used for an improper purpose, seeks monetary 
damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief, or 
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
¶44 Distinguishing between prisoners and non-prisoners is 
a rational means of limiting meritless litigation because "it 
has been recognized that prisoners . . . account for a 
No. 
01-0793   
 
21 
 
disproportionate amount of meritless litigation." (citations 
omitted)  Kahn, 235 Wis. 2d 260, ¶10.  In concluding that the 
federal PLRA was rationally related to the legitimate state 
interest of curbing abuse of the federal judicial system, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted the differences between 
prisoners 
and 
non-prisoners 
that 
create 
a 
far 
greater 
opportunity for abuse of the judicial system: 
 
Prisoners are not similarly situated to non-prisoners.    
. . .  They often have free time on their hands that 
other litigants do not possess. . . . [T]here has been 
a far greater opportunity for abuse of the federal 
judicial system in the prison setting. 
Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 234 (4th Cir. 1997). 
¶45 We therefore determine that the classification created 
by the PLRA, as applied in this case, bears a rational relation 
to a legitimate end.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
dismissal of Schatz's petition did not violate his right to 
equal protection of the law. 
¶46 Finally, Schatz asserts that, if we do not affirm the 
court of appeals decision, we should remand this case to the 
court of appeals to address the issue of whether the circuit 
court erred in denying his request for substitution of judge.  
Although not argued or briefed in this court, Schatz maintains 
the issue is preserved because he raised it in his initial 
briefs at the court of appeals.  The State counters that this 
issue has been waived.  Because the court of appeals decided the 
case on other grounds, it did not discuss whether the denial was 
error or whether Schatz waived his right to appeal this issue.  
No. 
01-0793   
 
22 
 
We 
therefore 
remand 
to 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
for 
such 
determinations. 
¶47 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court's sua 
sponte dismissal of Schatz's petition for a writ of certiorari 
did not violate his right to due process or his right to equal 
protection of the law.  Here, due process is satisfied because 
of the constructive notice created by Wis. Stat. § 802.05(3)(b), 
together with the post-dismissal procedures available to the 
prisoner.  Equal protection is satisfied because the application 
of the PLRA's initial pleading review procedure in this case 
satisfies the rational basis test.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
court of appeals decision and remand to the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals. 
 
 
No. 
01-0793   
 
 
 
1