Title: Davis v. City of Casper

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Davis v. City of Casper1985 WY 203710 P.2d 827Case Number: 84-272, 85-4, 85-5Decided: 12/18/1985JOE DAVIS AND KAREN DAVIS, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

THE CITY OF CASPER; NATRONA COUNTY, WYOMING; THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF NATRONA COUNTY, WYOMING; APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS), 

BARNARD REALTY COMPANY, A PARTNERSHIP; WILLIAM N. BARNARD, INDIVIDUALLY; ROBERT N. BARNARD, INDIVIDUALLY: BRETTON CORPORATION; SCOTT KEY AND BARBARA DIVINE, DBA GOLDEN KEY CONSTRUCTION; KELLY HEIGHTS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; JERRY RESSLER, INDIVIDUALLY; AND MILE HI REALTY, INC. (DEFENDANTS). 

ROY COHEE AND BARBARA COHEE, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

THE CITY OF CASPER; NATRONA COUNTY, WYOMING; THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF NATRONA COUNTY, WYOMING; APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS), 

BARNARD REALTY COMPANY, A PARTNERSHIP; WILLIAM N. BARNARD, INDIVIDUALLY; ROBERT N. BARNARD, INDIVIDUALLY; BRETTON CORPORATION; J.E. PEIRCE, INDIVIDUALLY; AND J.E. PEIRCE CONSTRUCTION, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION (DEFENDANTS). 

DENNIS CLIMER AND MARY CLIMER, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

THE CITY OF CASPER; NATRONA COUNTY, WYOMING; THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF NATRONA COUNTY, WYOMING; APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS), 

BARNARD REALTY COMPANY, A PARTNERSHIP; WILLIAM N. BARNARD, INDIVIDUALLY; BRETTON CORPORATION; AND J.E. PEIRCE CONSTRUCTION, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION (DEFENDANTS).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOE DAVIS AND KAREN 
DAVIS, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

THE CITY OF CASPER; 
NATRONA COUNTY, WYOMING; THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF NATRONA COUNTY, 
WYOMING; APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS), 

BARNARD REALTY COMPANY, A 
PARTNERSHIP; WILLIAM N. BARNARD, INDIVIDUALLY; ROBERT N. BARNARD, INDIVIDUALLY: 
BRETTON CORPORATION; SCOTT KEY AND BARBARA DIVINE, DBA GOLDEN KEY CONSTRUCTION; 
KELLY HEIGHTS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; JERRY RESSLER, INDIVIDUALLY; AND MILE HI 
REALTY, INC. (DEFENDANTS). 

ROY COHEE AND BARBARA 
COHEE, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

THE CITY OF CASPER; 
NATRONA COUNTY, WYOMING; THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF NATRONA COUNTY, 
WYOMING; APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS), 

BARNARD REALTY COMPANY, A 
PARTNERSHIP; WILLIAM N. BARNARD, INDIVIDUALLY; ROBERT N. BARNARD, INDIVIDUALLY; 
BRETTON CORPORATION; J.E. PEIRCE, INDIVIDUALLY; AND J.E. PEIRCE CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION (DEFENDANTS). 

DENNIS CLIMER AND MARY 
CLIMER, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

THE CITY OF CASPER; 
NATRONA COUNTY, WYOMING; THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF NATRONA COUNTY, 
WYOMING; APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS), 

BARNARD REALTY COMPANY, A 
PARTNERSHIP; WILLIAM N. BARNARD, INDIVIDUALLY; BRETTON CORPORATION; AND J.E. 
PEIRCE CONSTRUCTION, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Daniel Spangler and R.M. 
Forrister, J.J.

 
 
Ronald A. 
Kastanek, Casper, for appellants 
(plaintiffs).

Patricia M. 
Baird (argued), of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, for 
appellee (defendant), City of Casper.

William S. Bon 
(argued) and Cameron S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, Casper, 
for appellees (defendants), Natrona 
County and Bd. of County Com'rs of Natrona County.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE*, ROONEY** BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

* Retired November 1, 
1985.

** Retired November 30, 
1985.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The appellants, 
Davises, Climers, and Cohees, all homeowners in the Kelly-Gate Addition of 
Casper, appeal the district court's dismissal of appellees, the City of 
Casper, NatronaCounty, and the Board of County 
Commissioners from their negligence suits. Not dismissed from these suits are 
the construction and realty companies that built the homes in the addition; they 
are not involved in this appeal. There are two issues on appeal. First, we must 
decide whether the appellants are barred from suing Natrona County and the Board 
of County Commissioners because of their failure to comply with § 1-39-113(a), 
W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum.Supp., which is the claims procedure section of the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act. Second, we must determine whether the statute of 
limitations provision of the claims act, § 1-39-114, W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum.Supp., 
bars their suit against the City. We will affirm the district court's dismissal 
of all three appellees from the suit.

FACTS

[¶2.]     During 1976, officials 
of the City of Casper and NatronaCounty inspected and approved various 
stages in the development of the Kelly-Gate Addition. In 1977, the Cohees, 
Davises, and Climers each purchased a home in the addition. They discovered in 
the spring of 1981 that their basements leaked. They all filed claims with the 
City of Casper within two years of the damage as 
required by § 1-39-113(a), supra, the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act.

[¶3.]     None of appellants 
filed a timely claim as required by § 1-39-113(a), supra, with NatronaCounty or the CountyCommissioners. In April of 1984, the 
Davises filed a complaint in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court joining as defendants the City of Casper, NatronaCounty, the CountyCommissioners, and the builders and 
realtors with whom they had dealt. The Climers and Cohees filed a similar 
negligence suit in August of 1984.

[¶4.]     The City, County, and 
Board of Commissioners each moved the district court for dismissal of the suit 
against them. The court granted each of the motions. The court applied the 
claims act to the suits and held that the initial claims filed by the appellants 
against the County and Board of Commissioners were untimely and, therefore, 
barred. In addition, the court held that the appellants' civil suits against the 
City had been filed after the statute of limitations of the claims act had 
run.

THE DISMISSAL OF 
NATRONACOUNTY AND THE COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS

[¶5.]     Section 1-39-104(a), 
W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum. Supp., of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act gives 
immunity from tort liability to governmental entities and public employees 
acting in the scope of their employment "except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 
through 1-39-112." Thus, there can be no tort suit against governmental entities 
unless expressly permitted by the act. Hurst v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1130, 1132 
(1985).

[¶6.]     Even when there is an 
exception to immunity in the act under which suit is allowed, the plaintiff must 
comply with an important procedural hurdle. Section 1-39-113(a) of the claims 
act provides:

"No action shall be 
brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the claim upon which 
the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized statement in 
writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, 
except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two (2) years 
after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can 
establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

"(i) Not reasonably 
discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

"(ii) The claimant failed 
to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period 
despite the exercise of due diligence."

[¶7.]     The appellants, the 
County, and the CountyCommissioners assume that the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act and, therefore, § 1-39-113(a) of the act, does not apply to claims 
that have arisen prior to the effective date of the act. Although we note that 
this section does not expressly limit itself to post-claims-act torts, we agree 
with the parties that it should be so limited. Section 1-39-113(a) should be 
given purely prospective effect so that the section's procedural rules govern 
only tort victims who have notice of those rules. Also, § 1-39-113(a) is 
inextricably linked to § 1-39-114, the statute of limitations section, which is 
explicitly limited in application to post-claims-act torts. We, therefore, hold 
that the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, including the two-year claim filing 
period found in § 1-39-113(a), supra, only governs claims that accrue after June 
30, 1979, the effective date of the act.

[¶8.]     The question still to 
be answered in this case is whether the tort claims, on which appellants sued, 
accrued before or after June 30, 1979. The appellants argue that the torts 
occurred in 1976 when the governmental officers committed negligent acts. They 
believe that a tort can occur without damage. In our recent decision in 
Anderson v. Bauer, Wyo., 
681 P.2d 1316, 1321 (1984), we held otherwise. We stated that, "[e]ach 
homeowner's cause of action accrued on or about the date water seepage was first 
noticed and damage occurred * * *." (Emphasis added.) In other words, a tort is 
not complete and actionable until all the elements, duty, breach, proximate 
cause, and damage, are present. Duke v. Housen, Wyo., 
589 P.2d 334, 340-341 (1979).

[¶9.]     In this case, the 
appellants admit that they did not notice the damage before the spring of 1981. 
Nor do they claim that the damage occurred before that time.1 Their causes of action accrued in 
the spring of 1981 when damage occurred. It was necessary that they present 
their claims to NatronaCounty and the Board of Commissioners 
within the two-year period provided in § 1-39-113(a), supra, in other words, by 
the spring of 1983.2 They did not do so and are barred 
from bringing their action because a failure to file a timely claim is an 
absolute bar to suit. Lafferty v. Nickel, 
Wyo., 663 P.2d 168, 172 (1983).

THE DISMISSAL OF THE CITY 
OF CASPER

[¶10.]  The claims procedure statute discussed 
above, § 1-39-113(a), does not bar the appellants' suits against the City of 
Casper. The 
appellants all filed claims against the City within two years of the date upon 
which they discovered the water in their basements and suffered 
damage.

[¶11.]  A timely claim, however, is not the only 
procedural requirement of the claims act. The act's statute of limitations, § 
1-39-114 provides in part:

"Except as otherwise 
provided, actions against a governmental entity or a public employee acting 
within the scope of his duties for torts occurring after June 30, 1979 which are 
subject to this act shall be forever barred unless commenced within one (1) year 
after the date the claim is filed pursuant to W.S. 
1-39-113."

Appellants filed 
suit against the City more than a year after they timely filed their claims; 
and, according to the provisions of § 1-39-114, supra, the actions are barred by 
the one-year limitation period.3 The suit against the City was, 
therefore, properly dismissed by the court.

[¶12.]  Affirmed.

1 There is some evidence 
that the Davises discovered some leakage in 
August of 1980, but in any case, the Davises' damage did not occur until after June 
30, 1979.

2 Both a county and a 
board of county commissioners are defined as governmental entities in the act. 
Section 1-39-103(a), W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum.Supp.

3 The Davises filed two claims. 
Their lawsuit was filed within a year after the untimely claim but not within a 
year after their timely claim. We will ignore an untimely claim for purposes of 
the act's statute of limitations calculations.