Title: Hamill v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Hamill v. State1997 WY 134948 P.2d 1356Case Number: 96-252Decided: 12/05/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

ANTHONY R. HAMILL, 

Appellant (Defendant), 

 

v. 

 

The STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County 

The 
Honorable Terrence L. O'Brien, Judge

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Anthony R. 
Hamill, Pro Se.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

William U. 
Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Lori L. Gorseth, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

TAYLOR, Chief 
Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant 
challenges the district court's denial of his second motion to correct an 
illegal sentence. Finding that the issue raised on appeal is barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata, we 
affirm.

 

I. 
ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant, 
Anthony R. Hamill (Hamill), asserts four issues in this pro se 
appeal:

 

I.          
Whether the trial court abused [its] discretion by applying the doctrine 
of res judicata where the issue had never been raised in any court nor has the 
issue been decided on the merits.

II.          
Whether the trial court abused [its] discretion by assuming to 
retroactively apply a law that was in effect at the time of 
sentencing.

III.         
Whether the trial court abused [its] discretion by assuming the court 
could re-sentence appellant to three times the original 
sentence.

IV.        Whether the 
trial court abused [its] discretion by imposing one extended sentence for the 
three convictions.

 

[¶3]      Appellee, State 
of Wyoming (State), presents two issues:

 

I.          
Whether the doctrine of res judicata was applicable to appellant's motion 
to correct an illegal sentence.

II.          
Whether the district court was correct in denying appellant's motion to 
correct an illegal sentence as appellant's sentence is not 
illegal.

 

II. 
FACTS

 

[¶4]      On February 23, 
1979, Hamill was convicted of three counts of first-degree sexual assault and 
sentenced to a consolidated term of not less than twenty years nor more than 
forty-five years at the Wyoming State Penitentiary for all three counts.1 On appeal to this court, Hamill's 
conviction was affirmed in all respects. Hamill v. State, 602 P.2d 1212 (Wyo. 
1979). Hamill did not raise any issue regarding his consolidated sentence on 
direct appeal.

 

[¶5]      In 1980, Hamill 
filed his first motion relating to his sentence. At that time, he requested that 
his sentence be reduced or, alternatively, that his sentence be suspended. A 
second motion for reduction of sentence was filed in 1981 based on Hamill's 
involvement in Alcoholics Anonymous. Both motions were denied by the district 
court and neither mentioned the issue of the impropriety of a consolidated 
sentence.

 

[¶6]      Eleven years 
after his conviction, Hamill filed his first motion to vacate or set aside an 
illegal sentence. In his petition, Hamill alleged his sentence: (1) violated the 
United States and Wyoming Constitutions; (2) was based on erroneous information 
regarding his prior criminal record; and (3) prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced 
his sentencing. After a telephone hearing with Hamill present, the petition was 
denied on June 20, 1991. An appeal of the district court's decision was 
dismissed by this court as it was not timely filed. Again, Hamill did not raise 
any issue regarding the consolidated sentence.

 

[¶7]      On June 5, 1996, 
Hamill filed a second motion to correct an illegal sentence. In his second 
petition, Hamill contended his sentence was illegal under the holding of Stambaugh v. State, 613 P.2d 1237, 1243 
(Wyo. 1980), which found that a single consolidated sentence for multiple sex 
offenses under Wyo. Stat. § 6-4-306(b) and (c) (Rpl. 1977) was inappropriate.2 After a hearing on the second 
petition, the district court denied Hamill's petition as barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata. This timely appeal 
followed.

 

III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      It is a 
longstanding rule that issues which could have been raised in an earlier 
proceeding are foreclosed from subsequent consideration. Kallas v. State, 776 P.2d 198, 199 (Wyo. 1989); Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1261 (Wyo. 1988). 
Unless Hamill can show good cause why the issue was not raised at an earlier 
opportunity, the court may decline to consider the issue. Kallas, 776 P.2d  at 
199; Cutbirth, 751 P.2d  at 1261.

 

[¶9]      A motion to 
correct an illegal sentence is ordinarily addressed to the sound discretion of 
the district court. The district court's decision is entitled to considerable 
deference unless there is no rational basis for the court's conclusions. Brown v. State, 894 P.2d 597, 598 (Wyo. 
1995) (quoting Fortin v. State, 622 P.2d 418, 420 (Wyo. 1981)). However, if the sentence is ab initio illegal, discretion is 
limited. Parker v. State, 882 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Wyo. 1994). A sentence within the statutory parameters will not be 
set aside on review absent an abuse of the sentencing discretion afforded to the 
trial court. Garcia v. State, 908 P.2d 413, 414 (Wyo. 1995); Seeley v. 
State, 715 P.2d 232, 242 (Wyo. 1986).

 

[¶10]   This court has recognized that an 
illegal sentence is one which exceeds the relevant statutory maximum. Garcia, 908 P.2d  at 414; Seeley, 715 P.2d  at 242; Capwell v. State, 686 P.2d 1148, 1154 
(Wyo. 1984). We have also recognized an illegal sentence as one which orders 
post-incarceration restitution absent statutory authority. Parker, 882 P.2d  at 1228 (citing Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 
247-48 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985)).

 

IV. 
DISCUSSION

 

[¶11]   The district court found that 
Hamill's claim was barred under the principles of res judicata. Hamill counters that res judicata is not a bar to an illegal 
sentence because W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) provides that 

"[t]he court may correct an 
illegal sentence at any time." Hamill argues, without authority, that because an 
illegal sentence is plain error and he has not alleged this particular error in 
any previous petition, the principles of res judicata do not 
apply.

 

[¶12]   Contrary to Hamill's assertion, the 
doctrine of res judicata is not limited to only those issues which were actually 
decided in an earlier proceeding. Issues which could have been raised in an earlier 
proceeding may also be foreclosed from subsequent consideration. Kallas, 776 P.2d  at 199; Cutbirth, 751 P.2d  at 1261. Thus, unless 
Hamill can show good cause why the issue was not raised at an earlier 
opportunity, or that the interests of justice require consideration of his 
claim, the court may refuse to consider the issue in a later 
proceeding.

 

[¶13]   The record discloses that Hamill 
filed two motions challenging aspects of his sentence after our decision in Stambaugh, 613 P.2d 1237 was 
published.3 Thus, any issues regarding Hamill's 
sentencing which were identified in Stambaugh could, and should, have been 
raised on several occasions prior to his second petition to correct his 
sentence.

 

[¶14]   Hamill fails to articulate any 
reason why this issue was not raised in his earlier petitions regarding his 
sentencing. In fact, Stambaugh 
specifically mentioned Hamill's case ten years prior to Hamill's first petition 
to correct his allegedly illegal sentence.4 Even so, Hamill makes no attempt to 
explain why he did not challenge his consolidated sentence in his petition filed 
in 1990 nor does he allege ignorance of the Stambaugh decision at that 
time.

 

[¶15]   Neither do the interests of justice 
require consideration of Hamill's claim. Wyo. Stat. § 6-4-306 authorized the 
district court to sentence Hamill to no less than five years nor more than life 
on each of the three counts. Thus, the district court was authorized to sentence 
Hamill to up to three consecutive life terms. It is apparent that Hamill's 
original sentence of twenty to forty-five years was well within the statutory 
parameters.

 

[¶16]   On consideration of Hamill's claim 
in the instant petition to correct his sentence, the district court reviewed the 
record relating to Hamill's original sentencing. Based on that review, the 
district court determined that in the event Hamill's original sentence must be 
reconsidered, the initial sentencing court intended Hamill's consolidated 
sentence to consist of three terms of twenty to forty-five years to be served 
concurrently.

 

[¶17]   Hamill argues that under Stambaugh, his sentence must be broken 
into "thirds." We disagree. Nothing in Stambaugh states that a consolidated 
sentence must be corrected to provide consecutive terms for each conviction. 
Neither is there any evidence in the sparse record provided on appeal which 
contradicts the district court's conclusion that concurrent sentences were the 
intention of the sentencing court.5 Therefore, were this case to be 
remanded to the district court, the conclusion that Hamill's sentence was 
intended to function as three concurrent terms of twenty to forty-five years due 
to the nature of his crimes is certainly founded on a rational basis and within 
the term allowed by statute.

 

[¶18]   Finally, Hamill contends that if 
his sentence is construed as three concurrent terms, it constitutes a three-fold 
increase in the severity of his punishment which "is clearly onerous and 
vindictive." However, Hamill must spend the same time in prison whether his 
sentence is designated as a consolidated term of twenty to forty-five years on 
three counts, or a term of twenty to forty-five years for each count to run 
concurrently. Therefore, even if Hamill's claim was considered and his sentence 
remanded to the district court, the punishment would remain the same. Turner v. State, 624 P.2d 774, 775 (Wyo. 
1981).

 

[¶19]   Since Hamill's original sentence is 
clearly within the statutory parameters, Garcia, 908 P.2d  at 414; Seeley, 715 P.2d  at 242, and Hamill has 
shown no good cause why he failed to challenge his consolidated sentence in two 
earlier proceedings, we find that the district court did not err in finding 
Hamill's claims barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Brown, 894 P.2d  at 598; Duffy v. State, 837 P.2d 1047, 1053 
(Wyo. 1992) (a contention in one case that a sentence was unlawful, followed by 
a contention that it is unlawful for other reasons is barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata); Kallas, 776 P.2d  at 
199; Mower v. State, 770 P.2d 233, 233-34 (Wyo. 1989) (failure to raise illegal sentence in first petition 
regarding sentencing issues without good cause bars future consideration under 
the doctrine of res judicata); see also Wyo. Stat. § 7-14-103 
(1997).

 

V. 
CONCLUSION

 

[¶20]   The district court is affirmed in 
all respects.

 

Footnotes

1 Hamill was sentenced under Wyo. Stat. § 
6-4-306 (Rpl. 1977), which provided in relevant 
part:

(a) A person convicted of sexual assault 
who does not qualify under the criteria of subsection (b) of this section shall 
be punished as follows:

(i) For sexual assault in the first 
degree, imprisonment for not less than five (5) nor more than fifty (50) 
years;

(ii) For sexual assault in the second 
degree, imprisonment for not less than one (1) nor more than twenty (20) 
years;

* * *

(b) A person who is convicted of sexual 
assault shall be punished by the extended terms of subsection (c) of this 
section if:

(i) He is being sentenced for two (2) or 
more separate acts of sexual assault in the first or second 
degree;

* * *

(c) Whenever any of the circumstances 
set out in subsection (b) of this section exist, the court shall impose sentence 
as follows:

(i) For sexual assault in the first or 
second degrees, imprisonment for not less than five (5) years nor more than 
life[.]

2 A consolidated sentence imposes one 
sentence combining multiple convictions without designation of a specific term 
for each specific charge.

3 Hamill argues that his sentence imposed 
in 1979 is illegal because it is a consolidated sentence for multiple 
convictions contrary to the legislative intent of Wyo. Stat. § 6-4-306, as 
interpreted under Stambaugh, 613 P.2d 1237.

 

In Stambaugh, the defendant was convicted 
of two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of sexual assault, and one count 
of procuring a minor to engage in illicit sexual intrusion. At sentencing on the 
two counts of sexual assault, the district court assumed that our decision in Hamill, 602 P.2d 1212 confirmed a 
mandate by the legislature that sentencing under Wyo. Stat. § 6-4-306 be 
consolidated. Therefore, the district court sentenced the defendant to not less 
than thirty years nor more than fifty years, "said sentence being a consolidated 
sentence on the two counts." Stambaugh, 613 P.2d  at 1238. The 
district court continued:

"In the event the Supreme Court rules 
that a consolidated sentence on the two counts is not appropriate, then the 
Defendant is sentenced to not less than fifteen (15) years and not more than 
twenty-five (25) years on each of said counts" * * * said sentences to run 
consecutively.

Id. On 
appeal, we interpreted the intent of the legislature when enacting the 
sentencing statute and found:

 

The language of this section does not 
reflect the intention of the legislature to direct imposition of a general or 
consolidated sentence, rather it reflects the intention to establish minimum and 
maximum incarceration limits under designated conditions and to enact a form of 
a habitual criminal act.

* * *

* * * The consolidated part of the 
sentence was inappropriate because the trial court felt that it was mandated to 
make a consolidated sentence. Since there was no such mandate, the purpose for 
it fails and it becomes "inappropriate."

Id. at 
1242-43 (footnotes omitted). As a result, we upheld that part of the sentence 
which imposed consecutive sentences for each count.

4 See Stambaugh, 613 P.2d  at 1243 n. 
11.

5 We are provided with a few pages of the 
original sentencing transcript from Hamill's sentencing in 1979. In that 
transcript, the district court opined that under the "extended" terms of Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-4-306(b) and (c), the court was required "to make one sentence; the 
three verdicts of guilty and three counts are combined for the purpose of 
sentencing." There is no mention of the district court's intent as to whether 
the sentence was to be three consecutive terms or three terms to be served 
concurrently.