Title: State v. Stevens

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Stevens (2002-447); 176 Vt. 613; 848 A.2d 330

2004 VT 23

[Filed 10-Mar-2004]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 1-Apr-2004]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2004 VT 23

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-447

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 2003

  State of Vermont                     }     APPEALED FROM:
                                       }      
                                       }     District Court of Vermont,
       v.                              }     Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit
                                       }  
  Peggy A. Stevens                     } 
                                       }     DOCKET NO. 1481-11-01 Wrcr

                                             Trial Judge: Paul F. Hudson

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Defendant Peggy Stevens appeals an order from the Windsor
  District Court denying her motion to suppress evidence of the condition of
  animals seized pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 354(b)(3).  The court found that
  defendant consented to the search of the animals and, in any event, the
  search and seizure was justified by exigent circumstances.  The court also
  found that defendant failed to timely seek waiver of a requirement to post
  security to avoid forfeiture of the animals.  We conclude that the search
  was consensual and that defendant waived her opportunity for the animals to
  be held in custodial care, and affirm.

       ¶  2.  There is no dispute about the underlying facts.  On August 7,
  2001, a neighbor was passing by defendant's home.  It was an extremely hot
  day, and the neighbor was aware that defendant kept numerous animals in a
  kennel-like structure on her property.  Concerned that the animals were
  overheating, he decided to check the kennel.  When he inspected the kennel,
  he found the windows nearly closed and the one fan he could see
  inoperative, and he heard the animals whimpering.  He promptly called the
  Bethel State Police.

       ¶  3.  Sergeant Jocelyn Stohl and Trooper Peter Gravaltis responded
  to the call.  Sergeant Stohl introduced herself and explained she was there
  to check the animals.  Appellant stated she knew the police would be coming
  by, and Stohl responded, "then it shouldn't be a problem."  Defendant then
  went into her house, retrieved the kennel key, and unlocked the door.  At
  no time did Stohl inform defendant she could refuse the inspection, nor did
  Stohl obtain verbal or written consent to enter the kennel.  
   
       ¶  4.  Inside the kennel, Stohl found nineteen animals.  Most of the
  kennel windows were closed, the fans inside the kennel provided limited air
  circulation, a strong ammonia smell filled the air, and the outside
  temperature exceeded ninety degrees.  The animals were panting, and the
  cats and small dogs could not reach their water.  After checking the
  kennel, Stohl asked defendant if there were additional animals inside
  defendant's home.  Defendant told Stohl there were, and Stohl asked if she
  could see them.  Inside defendant's home, Stohl found twenty-four animals
  kept in padlocked cages in a small room.  No windows were open, no fans
  were inside, many of the animals were without water, the cages were dirty,
  and a heavy ammonia odor was present. 

       ¶  5.  After her inspection of defendant's kennel and home,
  Stohl determined the animals required protective custody.  Pursuant to 13
  V.S.A. § 354(b)(3) (an officer who determines an animal's life is in
  jeopardy may seize the animal without a warrant), Stohl removed most of
  defendant's animals.  Two days later, Stohl returned to defendant's home
  with a search warrant and seized the remaining animals. 

       ¶  6   Defendant was charged with six counts of cruelty to
  animals under 13 V.S.A. § 352(4).  The State then moved under § 354(d) "for
  an order requiring [defendant] to forfeit any and all rights in the
  animal[s] prior to final disposition of the criminal charge."  Pursuant to
  State's motion, a hearing was held in the Windsor District Court.  At the
  hearing, defendant opposed the State's motion arguing that Stohl's initial
  search of her kennel was in contravention of her Fourth Amendment rights. 
  Specifically, defendant argued that this was a warrantless search and none
  of the exceptions to the warrant requirement applied because defendant did
  not consent to the search and Stohl did not act pursuant to emergency
  circumstances.  Consequently, defendant contended that all evidence of the
  animals should be suppressed as derivative of the initial illegal search
  and her animals should be returned. 

       ¶  7.  The district court denied defendant's motion to suppress,
  finding both that defendant consented to the search and that Stohl acted
  under emergency circumstances.   Accordingly, the court granted the State's
  motion and ordered that defendant forfeit the animals.  Under 13 V.S.A. §
  354(f), if a criminal defendant posts a $30.00 per animal security deposit
  within forty-eight hours after the hearing, the seized animals will remain
  in custodial care until the disposition of the criminal charges.  This
  requirement can be waived by the court for good cause shown, but if the
  requirement is not waived and the security deposit is not paid, the court,
  upon motion by the state, must order the animals immediately forfeited. 
  Id. 

       ¶  8.  In this case, defendant filed a motion to waive the security
  deposit requirement six days after the district court's decision was
  issued.  The district court denied defendant's motion as untimely, found
  there was no good cause for defendant's failure to pay the security
  deposit, and ordered the animals immediately forfeited.  Following a jury
  trial, defendant was acquitted on all six counts of cruelty to animals.
  (FN1)  This appeal followed.
   
       ¶  9.  In this appeal, defendant argues that the district court
  erred because: (1) defendant did not consent to the initial search; (2)
  Stohl did not act pursuant to emergency circumstances; and (3) defendant's
  motion to waive the security deposit was timely.  Because defendant's
  counsel conceded at oral argument that the motion to waive the security
  deposit was untimely, we address the third issue only summarily.

       ¶  10.  Recently, in State v. Lawrence, 2003 VT 68,  9, 14 Vt. L. Wk.
  221, we explicitly adopted a two-step approach for reviewing appeals from
  denials or grants of motions to suppress:  "We will apply a clearly
  erroneous standard to the trial court's underlying historical facts, while
  reviewing the ultimate legal conclusion . . . de novo."  We employ the
  Lawrence standard in considering the issues before us.

       ¶  11.  The State grounds the validity of the search of the kennel
  and house first on defendant's consent.  "[T]he inquiry in a consent search
  context is restricted to whether the consent was voluntary, not whether
  there was a 'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver of a constitutional right." 
  State v. Zaccaro, 154 Vt. 83, 88, 574 A.2d 1256, 1259 (1990) (citing
  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,