Title: PEOPLE OF MI V DEON LAMONT CLAYPOOL

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 22, 2004 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 122696 
DEON LAMONT CLAYPOOL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
TAYLOR, J.   
The issue in this case is whether it is permissible 
for Michigan trial judges, sentencing under the legislative 
sentencing guidelines pursuant to MCL 769.34, to consider, 
for the purpose of a downward departure from the guidelines 
range, police conduct that is described as sentencing 
manipulation, 
sentencing 
entrapment, 
or 
sentencing 
escalation. 
These 
doctrines 
are 
based 
on 
police 
misconduct, which, alone, is not an appropriate factor to 
consider at sentencing. 
Rather, we hold that, pursuant to 
People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247; 666 NW2d 231 (2003), if it 
can be objectively and verifiably shown that police conduct 
 
 
or some other precipitating cause altered a defendant’s 
intent, that altered intent can be considered by the 
sentencing judge as a ground for a downward sentence 
departure. 
Because information of this sort was noted by 
the sentencing judge in this case, but it is not clear that 
it was used properly, we vacate the decision of the Court 
of Appeals in part and remand this case to the trial court 
for resentencing or rearticulation on the record of the 
court’s reasons for the departure. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This case arose from a series of sales of crack 
cocaine by defendant to an undercover police officer. 
An 
acquaintance of defendant’s in the drug trade introduced 
him to an undercover officer as a potential customer. 
On 
March 8, 2001, the officer bought 28.35 grams of crack 
cocaine for $1,100. 
On March 12, 2001, he bought 49.2 
grams for $2,000. 
Finally, on March 14, 2001, he bought 
127.575 grams for $4,000. 
Defendant was arrested and 
charged with delivery of 50 or more, but less than 225, 
grams of cocaine, reflecting the third sale. 
2  
 
 
                                                 
 
Defendant pleaded guilty to this charge.1  The offense 
carries a statutorily mandated minimum sentence of ten 
years 
of 
imprisonment.2
 
However, 
according 
to 
the 
legislative sentencing guidelines and the former MCL 
333.7401(4),3 the statutorily mandated minimum ten-year 
sentence for this offense can be reduced or “departed 
from,” as it is described, if certain conditions set forth 
in MCL 769.34(3)4 are met. 
1 Defendant also pleaded guilty to charges concerning
the first and second buys in the series and various other
offenses that he committed during the time surrounding the
series of buys. 
However, the present appeal involves only
defendant’s sentence for the third offense described above,
delivery of 50 or more, but less than 225, grams of
cocaine. 
2 Former MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), in effect at the time
of this action. See 1996 PA 249. 
3 See MCL 769.34(2)(a). When the trial court imposes a
mandatory minimum sentence that exceeds the statutory
sentencing guidelines range, it is not departing from the
statutory sentencing guidelines. 
Thus, in this case,
although the sentence imposed exceeds the recommended 
sentence range, the trial court does not have to articulate
"substantial and compelling" reasons to justify its upward
departure from the guidelines. 
However, because the trial
court departed downward from the mandatory minimum, it must
articulate such reasons to justify this downward departure
from the mandatory minimum. See former MCL 333.7401(4). 
4 These conditions are: 
A court may depart from the appropriate
sentence range established under the sentencing
guidelines [MCL 777.1 et seq.] if the court has a
substantial 
and 
compelling 
reason 
for 
that 
departure and states on the record the reasons
for departure. 
All of the following apply to a
departure: 
3  
 
 
                                                 
 
At the sentencing hearing, the defense requested a 
downward departure from the statutorily mandated ten-year 
minimum sentence on the bases that defendant has a limited 
criminal 
history 
(only 
one 
criminal 
conviction 
for 
misdemeanor retail fraud) for his age of twenty-six5 and 
that he has an addiction to cocaine, which was costly and 
jeopardized his ability to pay for his home. In this case, 
defense counsel also argued that the police had manipulated 
defendant by making repeated purchases for increasing 
quantities 
of 
cocaine 
and 
that, 
by 
doing 
so, 
they 
“escalated” the sentence to which defendant would be 
subjected. 
In particular, defense counsel argued that the 
undercover police officer did not arrest defendant after 
either of the initial buys, but went back to him repeatedly 
(a) The court shall not use an individual's 
gender, 
race, 
ethnicity, 
alienage, 
national 
origin, legal occupation, lack of employment,
representation 
by 
appointed 
legal 
counsel,
representation 
by 
retained 
legal 
counsel,
appearance in propria persona, or religion to
depart from the appropriate sentence range. 
(b) The court shall not base a departure on
an 
offense 
characteristic 
or 
offender 
characteristic already taken into account in 
determining the appropriate sentence range unless
the court finds from the facts contained in the 
court 
record, 
including 
the 
presentence
investigation report, that the characteristic has
been given inadequate or disproportionate weight.
[MCL 769.34(3).] 
5 There was a dispute concerning whether defendant’s
age was twenty-six or twenty-nine at the time of the
offenses, but resolution of this issue is not necessary to
our analysis. 
4  
 
 
to purchase cocaine. 
The defense argued that the officer 
even paid defendant at least $500 more than the going rate 
to persuade him to sell a larger quantity of crack cocaine 
than he otherwise would have sold. 
The 
prosecutor 
countered 
that 
the 
officer 
had 
legitimate 
law 
enforcement 
reasons 
for 
the 
repeated 
purchases. 
Those reasons were that many usual sellers of 
large amounts only will sell small amounts to new buyers, 
and, thus, it is only by working up to larger amounts that 
law enforcement can in fact determine what type of seller 
the suspect is. 
The prosecutor, however, did not address 
the defense’s distinct claim that no matter what the police 
motivation may have been, the fact that the police paid 
defendant $500 over the market price was the sole reason 
defendant’s intent to sell changed from selling a lesser 
amount to selling a greater amount. 
At the conclusion of these arguments, the trial court 
found substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the 
mandatory minimum sentence on the basis of defendant’s age, 
minimal criminal history, and stable employment history of 
approximately two years, and, finally, on the basis of the 
fact that, in the court’s view, defendant had been 
“escalated” and precluded from getting substance abuse 
treatment earlier. The trial court did not indicate if the 
compelling nature of this escalation factor was the view 
that the police conduct itself was somehow offensive or 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
that the police had overcome the will of a small dealer by 
the lure of more money and created a greater criminal out 
of someone who otherwise would have remained a lesser 
criminal. 
The court then departed downward two years from 
the statutorily mandated minimum sentence of ten years and 
sentenced 
defendant 
to 
eight 
to 
twenty 
years 
of 
imprisonment. 
The prosecutor appealed and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed, holding that all but one of the stated reasons of 
the trial court, defendant’s employment, were substantial 
and compelling reasons for a downward departure.6
 In a 
brief analysis, the Court agreed with the trial court’s 
decision to depart downward on the basis of “escalation,” 
citing People v Shinholster, 196 Mich App 531; 493 NW2d 502 
(1992). 
Citing the short treatment of this issue in 
Shinholster, supra at 535, the Court stated that “while not 
constituting entrapment, purposeful[] escala[tion] [of] the 
defendant’s crime” is a permissible reason for a downward 
departure from a mandatory minimum sentence. Slip op at 2. 
The Court of Appeals also noted that in People v Fields, 
448 Mich 58; 528 NW2d 176 (1995), “three of the four 
6 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 18,
2002 (Docket No. 238984). 
6  
 
 
 
   
   
                                                 
 
justices in the majority agreed that [escalation] was a 
permissible factor to consider . . . .” Slip op at 2 n 3.7 
This Court granted the prosecutor leave to appeal. We 
framed the issues on appeal as 
whether “sentencing manipulation” or “escalation” is a 
substantial and compelling reason justifying a downward 
departure from a statutorily imposed mandatory minimum 
sentence, and whether a trial court may consider the 
legislative 
sentencing 
guidelines 
recommendation 
when 
determining the degree of a departure, which has already 
been 
determined 
to 
be 
supported 
by 
substantial 
and 
compelling reasons. [468 Mich 944 (2003).][8] 
7 Specifically, the Fields Court stated in reference to 
Shinholster: 
[T]he Court found that the government’s
actions, although not rising to the level of
entrapment, purposefully escalated the crime. 
This last factor is of particular importance in
our 
approval 
of 
the 
resolution 
reached 
in 
Shinholster. 
As 
a 
mitigating 
circumstance 
surrounding the offense, it weighs heavily in
favor 
of 
a 
deviation 
[departure] 
from 
the 
statutory minimum. [Fields, supra at 79.] 
However, the present Court of Appeals panel properly
pointed out that this was merely a plurality decision
without binding effect because the fourth justice signing
the lead opinion, Justice Boyle, authored a concurring
opinion in which she refused to approve of the lead 
opinion’s discussion of Shinholster. 
Fields, supra at 81­
82. 
8 Both parties agree that, with respect to the latter
issue presented on appeal, the trial court did not 
impermissibly consider the legislative guidelines in the
manner described here. Thus, neither party requests relief 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
To decide whether sentencing manipulation, sentencing 
entrapment, or sentencing escalation could ever be a 
substantial and compelling reason for a departure as a 
matter of law, we must interpret the former MCL 333.7401(4) 
and the general legislative sentencing guidelines provision 
in MCL 769.34(3). 
Statutory interpretation is subject to 
review de novo. 
People v Phillips, 469 Mich 390, 394; 666 
NW2d 657 (2003). 
A trial court’s decision that a 
particular 
factor 
is 
sufficiently 
substantial 
and 
compelling for a departure is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Babcock, supra at 269-270. 
III. ANALYSIS 
In 
Michigan, 
the 
Legislature 
has 
established 
sentencing guidelines. 
See MCL 769.31 et seq. 
The 
underlying approach of the guidelines is that the person to 
be sentenced is first placed in a narrow sentencing 
compartment based on rigid factors surrounding the offense 
and offender variable statuses. 
Then the individual is 
eligible to be removed from such “default” compartments on 
the basis of individualized factors. See Babcock, supra at 
263-264. 
In 
cases 
involving 
controlled 
substances, 
on this issue, and the issue is moot. See Crawford v Dep’t 
of Civil Service, 466 Mich 250, 261; 645 NW2d 6 (2002)
(“‘An 
issue 
is 
moot 
where 
circumstances 
render 
it 
impossible for the reviewing court to grant any relief.’”
[Citation omitted.]). 
8  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
however, the Legislature has also established statutorily 
mandated minimum sentences. 
See the former MCL 333.7401. 
Under both provisions, MCL 769.34(3) and the former MCL 
333.7401(4), departure from a guidelines range or mandatory 
sentence is permissible. 
See MCL 769.34(2)(a). 
All these 
provisions allow a downward departure if the court has a 
“substantial and compelling reason” for the departure. 
This Court has determined that this statutory language 
means that there must be an “‘objective and verifiable’ 
reason that ‘keenly or irresistibly grabs our attention’; 
is of ‘considerable worth’ in determining [the appropriate 
sentence]; 
and 
‘exists 
only 
in 
exceptional 
cases.’”9 
Babcock, supra at 257-258, quoting Fields, supra at 62, 67­
68. 
9 Although some individualized factors may not, in the
final analysis, constitute a sufficiently "substantial and
compelling" basis for moving a person outside the original
compartment, that should not preclude the trial court from
considering whatever individualized factors that it sees as
relevant. 
While it is possible, as the Chief Justice
argues, that some factors can never be "substantial and
compelling" because they can never be objective and 
verifiable, we are reluctant to characterize too many
factors in this way because there are simply too many
combinations of factual circumstances for us to feel 
confident in forever precluding consideration of some 
particular factor. 
As a practical matter, it also seems
that the upshot of the Chief Justice's viewpoint is that
everything will have to be litigated twice through the
appellate process—first, to address whether a factor is one
that can ever be "substantial and compelling," and, second,
to consider whether it is "substantial and compelling" in
the circumstances of a specific case. 
One of the virtues 
of the majority position is that it would sharply reduce
the first of these classes of litigation. 
9  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
It is clear from the legislative sentencing guidelines 
that, as discussed in Babcock, supra at 263-264, the focus 
of the guidelines is that the court is to consider this 
criminal 
and 
this 
offense. 
As 
Babcock 
said 
after 
discussing the roots of our nation’s attachment to the 
concept of proportionality in criminal sentencing: 
“The 
premise of our system of criminal justice is that, 
everything else being equal, the more egregious the 
offense, and the more recidivist the criminal, the greater 
the punishment.” Id. at 263. 
Because of this approach, police misconduct, on which 
the 
doctrines 
of 
sentencing 
manipulation, 
sentencing 
entrapment, and sentencing escalation are based,10 is not an 
10 The federal definition of sentencing manipulation
can be found in United States v Shephard, 4 F3d 647, 649
(CA 8, 1993). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that sentencing manipulation occurs
when “the government stretche[s] out the investigation
merely to increase the sentence [a defendant] would 
receive.” 
Although Michigan has not defined sentencing
manipulation by case law, a majority of state courts 
addressing the issue has adopted similar language as the
functioning definition of the term. 
See, e.g., People v
Smith, 31 Cal 4th 1207, 1211-1212; 7 Cal Rptr 3d 559; 80
P3d 662 (2003). 
Sentencing entrapment has been discussed by our Court
of Appeals in People v Ealy, 222 Mich App 508, 510-511; 564
NW2d 168 (1997). 
There, the Court of Appeals referred to
the definition from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit: 
“[S]entencing entrapment occurs when a
defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser
offense, is entrapped in committing a greater offense 
subject to greater punishment.” 
United States v Staufer,
38 F3d 1103, 1106 (CA 9, 1994) (citations and quotation
marks omitted. 
10  
 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
appropriate factor to consider at sentencing. 
Police 
misconduct, standing alone, tells us nothing about the 
defendant. 
However, if the defendant has an enhanced 
intent that was the product of police conduct or any other 
precipitating factor, and the enhanced intent can be shown 
in 
a 
manner 
that 
satisfies 
the 
requirements 
for 
a 
sentencing 
departure 
as 
outlined 
in 
Babcock, 
it 
is 
permissible for a court to consider that enhanced intent in 
making a departure.11 
In the cases discussing sentencing manipulation and
sentencing entrapment, reference is occasionally made to
sentencing “escalation.” No Michigan case has defined this
term, nor has any other court of which we are aware.
However, 
we 
believe 
that 
contextually, 
sentencing
escalation can mean either sentencing manipulation or 
sentencing entrapment, as defined above. 
The Chief Justice states that the substantive defense 
of 
entrapment 
is 
akin 
to 
the 
sentencing 
entrapment
doctrine. 
This is not the case. 
The substantive defense 
of entrapment in Michigan is a complete bar to prosecution.
See People v Johnson, 466 Mich 491, 493-494, 498; 647 NW2d
480 (2002). 
The doctrine of sentencing entrapment, as
defined in the federal courts, merely allows a downward
departure from a sentence. 
Thus, the two concepts have
distinct effects—dismissal of the charges on one hand 
versus a (perhaps slightly) lower sentence on the other. 
11 A sentencing departure may be from either a sentence
under a sentencing guidelines range or a statutorily
mandated minimum sentence. 
Although Babcock is primarily
concerned with the sentencing guidelines, its reasoning is
equally applicable to this statutorily mandated minimum
sentence case. 
See id. at 257 (acknowledging applicable
statutorily mandated minimum sentences and citing Fields as 
a mandatory minimum case). 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
IV. APPLICATION TO THIS CASE  
The trial court in this case concluded, without more, 
that the defendant was “escalated.” 
It is not clear 
whether the court was thinking about defendant’s intent or 
the police conduct. 
Thus, resentencing or rearticulation 
of the court’s reasons for departure on this factor is 
required because, under MCL 769.34(3), “it is not enough 
that 
there 
exists 
some 
potentially 
substantial 
and 
compelling reason to depart from the guidelines range. 
Rather, this reason must be articulated by the trial court 
on the record.” 
Babcock, supra at 258 (emphasis in 
original). 
Moreover, a trial court must articulate on the 
record 
a 
substantial 
and 
compelling 
reason 
why 
its 
particular departure was warranted. 
Id. at 259-260. 
The 
trial court is instructed to do this on remand. 
Further, we hold that two of the other reasons for 
departure 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
articulated 
are 
not 
substantial and compelling: (1) defendant’s employment for 
two years, and (2) that at defendant’s age of twenty-six 
years he had only one previous criminal conviction. 
With regard to the employment factor, we agree with 
the Court of Appeals that “defendant’s employment as a taxi 
cab driver . . . for a period of less than two years . . . 
does not ‘keenly’ or ‘irresistibly’ grab one’s attention 
and, therefore, does not warrant a downward departure.” 
12  
 
 
                                                 
Slip op at 2, quoting Fields, supra at 67. Thus, we affirm 
the Court of Appeals on this issue. 
Nor does the fact that defendant only had one previous 
criminal conviction (misdemeanor retail fraud) until he 
reached the age of twenty-six12 “‘keenly’ or ‘irresistibly’ 
grab[] our attention.” 
Babcock, supra at 257-258, quoting 
Fields, supra at 67. 
The trial judge stated that he was 
“impressed” that defendant had made it to the advanced age 
of twenty-six with only one previous criminal conviction of 
a minor nature. 
We are not. 
We do not believe that the 
age of twenty-six is particularly old to not yet have a 
more lengthy criminal record. Thus, the trial court abused 
its discretion in this regard. Babcock, supra at 269-270. 
If a trial court articulates multiple reasons for 
departure, some of which are substantial and compelling and 
some of which are not, and the appellate court cannot 
determine if the sentence departure is sustainable without 
the offending factors, remand is appropriate. 
Id. at 260­
261.13  Accordingly, we remand this case for resentencing or 
12 Our analysis holds even if defendant were actually
twenty-nine at the time of these offenses. See n 5. 
13 The Court of Appeals failed to adhere to this
directive by failing to consider whether the trial court
would have departed and would have departed to the same
degree without the employment factor that the Court of
Appeals found to be insubstantial and noncompelling. Thus,
even if the Court of Appeals properly deemed “escalation”
to be a substantial and compelling factor for departure in
this case, the Court should have considered whether the
trial 
court’s 
departure 
was 
sustainable 
without 
the 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
rearticulation on the record of the trial court’s reasons 
for departure. 
On remand, defendant may argue any factor 
left unaddressed by our decision today, and, under the 
standards of Babcock, that his intent in committing the 
crime was also a proper factor for consideration. 
V. THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S OPINION 
The Chief Justice is in agreement with our holding 
that 
police 
conduct 
alone 
cannot 
be 
considered 
at 
sentencing, and she is in agreement with the result of 
remanding for resentencing in this case. 
However, the 
Chief Justice disagrees with part of our rationale and 
contends that we are employing the subjective factor of 
intent to determine whether a sentencing departure is 
warranted in a particular case. 
That 
is, 
she 
believes 
that 
because 
intent 
is 
subjective, it can never be shown to have been altered in 
an objective and verifiable way. 
We disagree. 
For 
example, if under surveillance a defendant is importuned to 
sell more of an illegal substance than he wished and it is 
clear that he would not have sold it absent the buyer’s 
pleas to do so, the tape of their conversations could well 
establish in an objective and verifiable fashion the change 
in the defendant’s intent. Similarly, if there is evidence 
offending factor of employment, and, if the Court could not
do so, it should have remanded the case to the trial court
for resentencing or rearticulation of the reasons for 
departure. 
14  
 
 
 
 
that after a physical assault the assailant helped the 
victim by securing medical assistance, this could establish 
objectively and verifiably an immediate repudiation of his 
previous criminal intent. 
This is all to say that the 
trial court cannot depart from the mandatory minimum 
sentence or guidelines sentence without basing its decision 
on some actual facts external to the representations of the 
defendant himself. 
While objectively and verifiably 
showing an altered intent will not be easy, nevertheless, 
we 
do 
not 
believe 
that 
the 
Legislature’s 
statutory 
sentencing scheme forecloses outright the consideration of 
a defendant’s altered intent at sentencing. 
Moreover, we do not consider the intent element of 
this crime to be “nullified” by allowing a trial judge to 
consider altered intent as a factor for sentence departure, 
as the Chief Justice states, post at 5. 
The crime of 
delivery of a controlled substance of a particular amount 
is a general intent crime. 
See People v Mass, 464 Mich 
615, 627; 628 NW2d 540 (2001). 
Thus, the only intent 
required to be convicted of the offense is the intent to 
deliver a controlled substance. 
The accused need not have 
the intent to sell a particular amount of the substance. 
Rather, that a particular amount was in fact sold is 
sufficient to convict the accused of delivery of that 
amount under the statute. 
See id. at 626, citing People v 
Quinn, 440 Mich 178, 189; 487 NW2d 194 (1992). 
15  
 
 
 
 
Therefore, our approach does not nullify an element of 
the offense. 
The element of intent to sell drugs is left 
untouched; indeed, defendant himself admitted that he sold 
drugs. 
However, defendant’s intent concerning the amount 
of drugs he sold may have been altered in this case when 
the police repeatedly returned to him to buy ever­
increasing amounts, if those amounts were in fact greater 
than what defendant originally intended to sell. 
The Chief Justice asserts that by considering the 
defendant’s intent at the time of sentencing we are evading 
the Legislature’s determination that the specific intent of 
the individual not be considered for the purpose of 
conviction. 
Yet, we are not doing that. 
We are 
considering the defendant’s intent for the purpose of 
sentencing. 
It seems obvious that the sentencing stage is 
different from the trial stage. 
Indeed, the latitude for 
the 
trial 
court 
in 
sentencing 
to 
consider 
things 
inadmissible at trial can be found in the Legislature’s 
requirements of what a presentence report can contain. 
A 
presentence report prepared pursuant to MCL 771.14 can 
include hearsay, character evidence, prior convictions, and 
alleged criminal activity for which the defendant was not 
charged or convicted. 
Moreover, the sentencing guidelines 
themselves, MCL 769.34(3), use this approach by empowering 
the trial court to consider virtually any factor that meets 
the substantial and compelling standard. 
Certainly this 
16  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
encyclopedic grant allows the consideration of matters 
broader than those matters already before the court at 
trial, because if it did not, the statute would be 
conveying 
no 
greater 
authority 
than 
that 
previously 
possessed. 
Such 
a 
construction 
of 
the 
statute, 
a 
construction that makes the statute meaningless, should be 
avoided. 
See Sweatt v Dep’t of Corrections, 468 Mich 172, 
183; 661 NW2d 201 (2003).14 
14 The Chief Justice argues that the United States
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Blakely v Washington,
542 US ___; 124 S Ct ___; ___ L Ed 2d ___ (2004), affects
this case. 
We disagree. 
Blakely concerned the Washington
state determinate sentencing system, which allowed a trial
judge to elevate the maximum sentence permitted by law on
the basis of facts not found by the jury but by the judge.
Thus, the trial judge in that case was required to set a
fixed sentence imposed within a range determined by
guidelines and was able to increase the maximum sentence on
the basis of judicial fact-finding. 
This offended the 
Sixth 
Amendment, 
the 
United 
States. 
Supreme 
Court 
concluded, because the facts that led to the sentence were
not found by the jury. Blakely, supra at ___. 
Michigan, in contrast, has an indeterminate sentencing
system in which the defendant is given a sentence with a
minimum and a maximum. 
The maximum is not determined by
the trial judge but is set by law. MCL 769.8. The minimum 
is based on guidelines ranges as discussed in the present
case and in Babcock, supra. 
The trial judge sets the
minimum but can never exceed the maximum (other than in the
case of a habitual offender, which we need not consider
because Blakely specifically excludes the fact of a 
previous conviction from its holding). 
Accordingly, the
Michigan system is unaffected by the holding in Blakely
that was designed to protect the defendant from a higher
sentence based on facts not found by the jury in violation
of the Sixth Amendment. 
Justice O’Connor in her dissent in Blakely raised a 
concern similar to the one the Chief Justice now raises,
but the majority in that case made clear that the decision 
17  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
In light of the applicable sentencing statutes and our 
recent decision in Babcock, we vacate the decision of the 
Court of Appeals in part and remand this case to the trial 
court for resentencing or rearticulation of the court’s 
reasons for departure, consistent with this opinion. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Stephen J. Markman 
did not affect indeterminate sentencing systems. The Court 
stated: 
JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR 
argues 
that, 
because 
determinate sentencing schemes involving judicial
factfinding entail less judicial discretion than
indeterminate schemes, the constitutionality of
the latter implies the constitutionality of the
former. 
Post, at 1-10. 
This argument is flawed
on a number of levels. 
First, the Sixth 
Amendment by its terms is not a limitation on
judicial power, but a reservation of jury power.
It limits judicial power only to the extent that
the claimed judicial power infringes on the 
province of the jury. 
Indeterminate sentencing
does 
not 
do 
so. 
It 
increases 
judicial
discretion, to be sure, but not at the expense of
the jury's traditional function of finding the
facts essential to lawful imposition of the 
penalty. Of course indeterminate schemes involve 
judicial factfinding, in that a judge (like a
parole board) may implicitly rule on those facts
he deems important to the exercise of his 
sentencing discretion. 
But the facts do not 
pertain to whether the defendant has a legal
right to a lesser sentence—and that makes all the
difference insofar as judicial impingement upon
the traditional role of the jury is concerned.
[Blakely, supra at ___ (emphasis added).] 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
   
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 122696 
DEON LAMONT CLAYPOOL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
CORRIGAN, C.J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Although I agree with the result of the majority’s 
decision, I cannot agree with its analysis. Any sentencing 
departure that endorses an inherently subjective factor 
such 
as 
the 
defendant’s 
intent 
cannot 
satisfy 
our 
Legislature’s requirement that any sentencing departures be 
based on objective and verifiable factors. 
I continue to 
believe that sentencing escalation or entrapment is merely 
the entrapment defense asserted at sentencing rather than 
before trial and that these related concepts have no valid 
legal foundation. 
Further, I agree with the majority that 
the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Blakely 
v Washington, 542 US ___ ; ___ 124 S Ct ___ ; ___ L Ed 2d 
___ (2004), does not invalidate Michigan’s indeterminate 
sentencing scheme as a whole. 
Nonetheless, the majority’s 
 
 
 
 
 
sweeping language regarding judicial powers to effect 
departures (not limited to downward departures) will invite 
challenges to Michigan’s scheme; it appears to conflict 
with principles set out in Blakely. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The 
concepts 
of 
“sentencing 
entrapment” 
or 
“escalation” originated in the federal circuit courts of 
appeals as arguments in support of a departure from the 
federal sentencing guidelines. 
See United States 
Lenfesty, 923 F2d 1293, 1300 (CA 8, 1991) (“We are not 
prepared to say there is no such animal as ‘sentencing 
entrapment.’ 
Where outrageous official conduct overcomes 
the will of an individual predisposed only to dealing in 
small quantities, this contention might bear fruit.”); 
United States v Staufer, 38 F3d 1103, 1108 (CA 9, 1994) 
(“We are persuaded that ‘sentencing entrapment may be 
legally 
relied 
upon 
to 
depart 
under 
the 
Sentencing 
Guidelines,’ . . . [citing United States v Barth, 990 F2d 
422, 424 (CA 8, 1993)].”). 
Sentencing entrapment “occurs 
when ‘a defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor 
or lesser offense, is entrapped in committing a greater 
offense subject to greater punishment.’” Staufer, supra at 
1106, citing United States v Stuart, 923 F2d 607, 614 
(CA 9, 1991). 
2  
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Michigan, the concept of sentencing entrapment or 
escalation was first approved in People v Shinholster, 196 
Mich App 531; 493 NW2d 502 (1992). 
In Shinholster, the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
approved 
of 
the 
consideration 
of 
sentencing “escalation” in departing from a mandatory 
minimum 
sentence, 
holding 
that 
among 
those 
factors 
authorizing a departure was “that the government’s actions— 
although not rising to the level of entrapment—purposefully 
escalated the crime.” Id. at 535. 
The theory of “escalation” was again discussed in 
People v Ealy, 222 Mich App 508; 564 NW2d 168 (1997). 
In 
Ealy, the defendant argued that “the police committed 
sentencing 
entrapment 
by 
wrongfully 
inducing 
him 
to 
participate in transactions involving escalating amounts of 
cocaine and exposing him to greater penalties.” 
Id. at 
510. 
The Court in Ealy applied the current objective test 
for entrapment to the “escalation” claim: 
In 
Michigan, 
entrapment 
is 
analyzed
according to a two-pronged test, with entrapment
existing if either prong is met. 
The court must 
consider whether (1) the police engaged in 
impermissible conduct that would induce a law­
abiding person to commit a crime in similar 
circumstances, or (2) the police engaged in 
conduct so reprehensible that it cannot be 
tolerated. [Id.] 
The Court in Ealy also quoted the federal circuit test for 
sentencing entrapment and held that the facts in the case 
3  
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
 
did not support application of the theory because the 
police did nothing more than present defendant with the 
opportunity to commit the offenses at issue. 
Id. at 510­
511. The Court stated that “the delay in [the defendant’s] 
arrest was justified on the ground that an earlier arrest 
would have impaired the ability of the police to conduct an 
ongoing undercover narcotics investigation.” Id. at 511. 
The only precedent from this Court involving the 
concept of sentencing escalation is People v Fields, 448 
Mich 58, 79; 528 NW2d 176 (1995), in which three justices 
approved of the adoption in Shinholster of the concept of 
“escalation” as a mitigating factor surrounding an offense.1 
Thus, the entrapment defense and the concept of 
sentencing entrapment or escalation are two sides of the 
same coin. 
The effect of the entrapment defense is to 
absolve 
of 
responsibility 
those 
whose 
conduct 
the 
Legislature 
has 
deemed 
criminal, 
and 
the 
effect 
of 
sentencing entrapment or escalation is to partially absolve 
of responsibility those whose conduct the Legislature has 
1 Justice BOYLE concurred, but declined to join in the
approval of Shinholster, stating that it was 
dicta with a vengeance. 
The question whether
defendant’s 
successive 
criminal 
acts 
not 
involving police entrapment can amount to a 
mitigating circumstance is far too significant to
be resolved in the context of a record that does 
not present that question. [Id. at 82 n 1.] 
4  
 
 
 
 
determined warrants a specific minimum penalty. 
The 
similarity of the two concepts can be seen in Ealy, in 
which the Court of Appeals applied the general entrapment 
test in evaluating the defendant’s claim of sentencing 
escalation. 
Indeed, sentencing entrapment or escalation is often 
used to effectively nullify an element of a crime for which 
the defendant was convicted by purporting to lessen or 
eliminate the defendant’s intent. 
This is no different 
than the application of the entrapment defense before 
trial. 
Evidence regarding the nature and extent of 
defendant’s intent is only a proper subject for the case­
in-chief, when determining whether the elements of a crime 
have been established. 
Reviewing a defendant’s subjective 
intent at sentencing can amount to a nullification of a 
conviction, or at least an element of a crime, without 
procedural protections. 
In cases in which only a general intent is required, 
the Legislature has already determined that the specific 
intent of the individual defendant is irrelevant for the 
purpose of a conviction. 
If the intent is irrelevant at 
the initial stage for the purpose of the conviction, it 
cannot be used at sentencing as an end-run around the 
Legislature’s decision. 
Here, the Legislature determined 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
that those who intend to distribute drugs assume the risk 
of punishment according to the amount distributed. 
It is 
not for this Court to make a different policy decision upon 
sentencing. 
II. THE VALIDITY OF THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 
For the reasons stated in my dissenting statement in 
People v Maffett, 464 Mich 878 (2001), I believe that the 
judicially crafted entrapment defense—in all its forms—is 
without constitutional foundation. 
Once a “defendant has 
engaged in conduct constituting all the elements of a 
criminal offense, as defined by the Legislature,” this 
Court does not then have the authority to conclude that the 
Legislature did not intend that the defendant be punished 
or that the prosecution should be barred as a matter of 
policy. 
Id. at 895. 
To do so runs afoul of settled 
principles 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
as 
well 
as 
principles of separation of powers. Id. at 895-896. 
Sentencing entrapment or escalation is no different. 
Once a defendant has committed an offense that the 
Legislature has determined requires a certain minimum 
punishment, this Court lacks any authority to determine 
that the Legislature did not really “mean” to apply that 
punishment to the defendant or that the legislatively 
mandated punishment should not be applied as a matter of 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
policy. 
“The regulation of law enforcement practices 
involved in the investigation and detection of crime falls 
within the police power of the legislative branch,” not 
within the implied judicial powers or rulemaking authority 
of this Court under Const 1963, art 6, §§ 1, 5. 
Id. at 
897-898. 
Just 
as 
“[t]he 
assignment 
of 
criminal 
responsibility is undeniably a matter of substantive law” 
reserved for the Legislature, id. at 898, so is the 
allocation of criminal punishment. 
For this Court to 
refuse to apply a legislatively mandated minimum sentence 
would 
impermissibly 
usurp 
both 
the 
legislative 
and 
executive functions, in violation of Const 1963, art 3, 
§ 2. 
Both the general entrapment defense and the concept of 
sentencing entrapment or escalation require a court to 
“disregard the law” and bar prosecution or the imposition 
of punishment if the court forms the opinion that the crime 
has been instigated or escalated by government officials. 
See id. at 898. The judicial branch lacks the authority to 
disregard the law or supervise law enforcement procedure. 
Therefore, the general entrapment defense and the concept 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
of sentencing entrapment and escalation are without valid 
legal foundations and should be abrogated.2 
III. SENTENCING ENTRAPMENT OR ESCALATION AND OUR LEGISLATIVELY 
MANDATED SENTENCING SCHEME 
As this Court noted in People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 
255-256; 666 NW2d 231 (2003), the promulgation of statutory 
sentencing guidelines has changed the legal landscape: 
Under the statutory sentencing guidelines, a
departure is only allowed by the Legislature if
there is a “substantial and compelling reason”
for doing so. 
MCL 769.34(3). Accordingly, since
the 
enactment 
of 
the 
statutory 
sentencing
guidelines, the role of the trial court has 
necessarily been altered. Before the enactment of
these guidelines, the trial court was required to
choose a sentence within the statutory minimum
and maximum that was “proportionate to the 
seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the
offense and the offender.” 
[People v Milbourn,
435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990)]. Following
the enactment of these guidelines, the trial 
court is required to choose a sentence within the
guidelines range, unless there is a “substantial
and compelling” reason for departing from this
range. Consequently . . . the role of the Court
of Appeals has also changed from reviewing the 
trial 
court’s 
sentencing 
decision 
for 
“proportionality” to reviewing the trial court's 
2 The majority mischaracterizes my position as agreeing
with the notion that “police conduct alone cannot be 
considered at sentencing . . . .” 
Ante at 15. 
My
position, however, is broader than that. 
As previously
explained, I disagree with the concept of sentencing
entrapment or escalation altogether regardless whether such
“entrapment” or “escalation” resulted from police conduct
alone or police conduct and some other factor. 
It is the 
very notion of sentencing entrapment and escalation with 
which I disagree and which is without any valid legal
foundation, 
not 
the 
fact 
that 
such 
“entrapment” 
or 
“escalation” ultimately stems from police conduct. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
sentencing decision to determine, first, whether
it is within the appropriate guidelines range
and, second, if it is not, whether the trial
court 
has 
articulated 
a 
“substantial 
and 
compelling” reason for departing from such range. 
For a reason to be “substantial and compelling,” it must be 
“objective and verifiable.” Id. at 257-258. 
Although the majority attempts to conform to the 
legislative 
requirements 
by 
requiring 
objective 
and 
verifiable proof that police conduct (or any other general 
cause) influenced the defendant’s intent, the fact remains 
that the departure is, in fact, based on the defendant’s 
intent, which is an inherently subjective factor. I cannot 
fathom how a person’s subjective intent can ever be 
considered objective or verifiable. 
“Intent” is defined as “the state of a person’s mind 
that directs his or her actions toward an objective.” 
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). 
The 
state of a defendant’s mind is an inherently subjective 
factor and cannot suffice as an objective and verifiable 
factor for a sentencing departure. 
Subjective intent or 
motivation 
cannot 
satisfy 
Babcock, 
no 
matter 
how 
“objectively” the defendant presents his version of the 
state of his mind. 
Therefore, the concept of sentencing 
9  
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
entrapment or escalation is at odds with our legislatively 
mandated sentencing scheme.3 
In addition, although I agree with the majority that 
Blakely, supra, does not invalidate our sentencing scheme, 
I question the majority’s sweeping statements in section V 
of its opinion responding to my dissent. 
The majority 
states that the Legislature has provided sentencing courts 
latitude to consider factors inadmissible at trial. 
Ante 
at 17. 
The majority also opines that such latitude is 
evident from the Legislature’s directive regarding what 
information may be included in a presentence report. 
The 
majority continues: 
A presentence report prepared pursuant to
MCL 
771.14 
can 
include 
hearsay, 
character 
evidence, prior convictions, and alleged criminal
activity for which the defendant was not charged
or 
convicted. 
Moreover, 
the 
sentencing
guidelines themselves, MCL 769.34(3), use this
approach 
by 
empowering 
the 
trial 
court 
to 
consider virtually any factor that meets the 
substantial and compelling standard. 
Certainly
this encyclopedic grant allows the consideration
of matters broader than those matters already
before the court at trial, because if it did not, 
3 To the extent that the majority is actually talking
about a defendant’s motive, and not intent, there may be
situations in which objective and verifiable evidence of
motive will keenly and irresistibly grab the court’s 
attention and justify a sentencing departure. 
Under the 
facts of this case, however, I question how defendant’s
subjective decision to sell drugs of varying amounts from
his employer’s vehicle on company time can be considered an
objective and verifiable factor that keenly or irresistibly
grabs the court’s interest. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
the 
statute 
would 
be 
conveying 
no 
greater
authority than that previously possessed. 
[Ante 
at 17-18.] 
Although I agree that Blakely does not implicate our 
sentencing scheme, the full scope of the Blakely decision 
has yet to be determined. 
Given the response to Blakely, 
it appears likely that the issue of mandatory minimum 
sentences will need to be settled. See Laurie P. Cohen and 
Gary 
Fields, 
High-Court 
Ruling 
Unleashes 
Chaos 
Over 
Sentencing, The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2004. 
Given 
the lack of any definitive statement by the United States 
Supreme Court regarding mandatory minimum sentences, I 
believe 
that 
sweeping 
statements 
of 
broad 
judicial 
authority, like those quoted above, may serve only to 
borrow trouble. 
The majority’s broad assertions of 
judicial power are not necessary to the disposition of this 
case and may unnecessarily subject our sentencing scheme to 
future criticism. In short, although Michigan’s sentencing 
scheme is not currently affected by Blakely, I believe the 
wisest course is to act circumspectly to avoid making our 
scheme vulnerable when the time inevitably comes to 
evaluate mandatory minimum sentencing schemes. 
IV. APPLICATION 
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), at the time of this action, 
provided for a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years for 
11  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
this sort of drug offense. Former MCL 333.7401(4) provided 
that the court could depart from the minimum term of 
imprisonment “if the court finds on the record that there 
are substantial and compelling reasons to do so.” 
Again, 
we noted in Babcock that “substantial and compelling” was a 
legal term of art that required, among other things, that 
the reason be objective and verifiable.4 
The finding of sentencing entrapment or escalation 
here was based solely on the trial court’s subjective 
assessment of the defendant’s subjective intent. 
This 
finding cannot be considered objective and verifiable, and 
4 MCL 769.34(2)(a) provides, in relevant part: 
If a statute mandates a minimum sentence for 
an individual sentenced to the jurisdiction of
the department of corrections, the court shall
impose sentence in accordance with that statute.
Imposing a mandatory minimum sentence is not a
departure under this section. 
If a statute 
mandates a minimum sentence for an individual 
sentenced to the jurisdiction of the department
of corrections and the statute authorizes the 
sentencing judge to depart from that minimum 
sentence, imposing a sentence that exceeds the
recommended sentence range but is less than the
mandatory minimum sentence is not a departure
under this section. [Emphasis added.] 
Although the sentence after departure here did exceed the
recommended sentencing guidelines range, it is irrelevant
that the sentence would not be considered a departure under
MCL 769.34 because former MCL 333.7401(4) imposed a 
separate requirement that the departure be supported by
substantial and compelling reasons. 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
so the departure from the mandatory minimum sentence cannot 
be considered valid under MCL 333.7401(4). 
Therefore, I 
agree that resentencing is required. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The judicially created entrapment defense and the 
concepts of sentencing entrapment and escalation have no 
valid legal foundation. Reviewing a defendant’s subjective 
intent at sentencing amounts to a nullification of a 
conviction, or possibly of an element of a crime, without 
procedural protections. 
Further, any departure based on 
sentencing entrapment or escalation is necessarily based on 
the defendant’s subjective intent and, thus, cannot be 
considered objective and verifiable. Therefore, departures 
based on the concept of sentencing entrapment or escalation 
violate 
the 
statutory 
requirements 
for 
a 
sentencing 
departure. 
Maura D. Corrigan 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 122696 
DEON LAMONT CLAYPOOL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority’s 
conclusion 
that 
a 
sentencing 
judge 
may 
consider 
whatever 
individualized 
factors the judge believes are relevant. I also agree with 
the majority’s determination that Blakely v Washington, 542 
US __; 124 S Ct __; __ L Ed 2d __ (2004), does not appear 
to affect scoring systems that establish recommended 
minimum sentences, such as we have in Michigan. 
Moreover, 
I tend to agree with the lead opinion’s ultimate rationale. 
The lead opinion notes that sentencing entrapment and 
sentencing manipulation are distinct theories. 
However, 
the lead opinion then concludes that the same test is to be 
employed in cases of sentencing entrapment and in cases of 
 
 
 
sentencing manipulation. I must respectfully disagree with 
such an approach. 
In United States v Lora, 129 F Supp 2d 77, 89-90 (D 
Mass, 2001), the court aptly noted: 
Some 
courts 
and 
scholars, 
however,
distinguish 
between 
sentencing 
factor 
manipulation and sentencing entrapment. . . .
Under 
this 
approach, 
sentencing 
factor 
manipulation 
may 
exist 
regardless 
of 
the 
defendant's predisposition. The doctrine focuses
exclusively on the motives of law enforcement
authorities in manipulating the sentence, as when
an agent delays an arrest with the purpose of
increasing the defendant's sentence. . . . 
One 
commentator illustrated the distinction: 
“An example of ‘sentencing entrapment’ would
be when a government agent offers a kilogram of
cocaine to a person who has previously purchased
only gram or ‘user’ amounts, for the purpose of
increasing the amount of drugs for which he 
ultimately will be held accountable. On the other
hand, an example of ‘sentencing manipulation’ 
would be when an undercover agent continues to
engage in undercover drug purchases with a 
defendant, 
thereby 
stretching 
out 
an 
investigation which could have concluded earlier,
for 
the 
sole 
purpose 
of 
increasing 
the 
defendant's 
sentencing 
exposure, 
or 
when 
an 
undercover agent insists that a defendant ‘cook’
powder cocaine into ‘crack,’ well-knowing that
sentences for dealing in crack are significantly
higher than sentences for dealing in powder
cocaine.” 
Amy Levin Weil, “In Partial Defense of Sentencing
Entrapment,” 7 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 172, 174 
(1995) (footnotes omitted). 
In any event, the
sentencing entrapment and manipulation doctrines
both require a finding of improper motive on the
part of the government before a departure is
warranted. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
Rather than vacating and remanding, I would simply 
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
The trial 
court stated on the record that the downward departure was 
based on substantial and compelling reasons that were 
objective and verifiable. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed and specifically found that the stated reason for 
departure at issue here, sentencing manipulation (also 
referred to as sentencing escalation), was substantial and 
compelling, as well as objective and verifiable. The panel 
noted, “Thus, it objectively appears that the police made 
additional purchases that resulted in escalating the 
seriousness 
of 
the 
offenses 
of 
which 
defendant 
was 
convicted. 
This fact is verified in the PSIR . . . .” 
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 18, 2002 
(Docket No. 238984), p 3. 
Because I believe such 
determinations to have been proper and, thus, the test set 
forth in People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247; 666 NW2d 231 
(2003), was met, I would affirm the decision of the Court 
of Appeals. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 122696 
DEON LAMONT CLAYPOOL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
WEAVER, J. (dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to 
vacate the Court of Appeals decision and remand this case 
for resentencing. 
Consistent with my opinions in People v 
Daniel1 and People v Babcock,2 I would consider all relevant 
factors, including police conduct, when determining whether 
there is a substantial and compelling reason to depart from 
the sentencing guidelines ranges, and I would not limit how 
the factor of police conduct may be considered.3 
1 People v Daniel, 462 Mich 1, 22-23; 609 NW2d 557
(2000)(Weaver, C.J., dissenting). 
2 People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 280-284; 666 NW2d 231
(2003)(Weaver, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part). 
3 The majority holds that while police misconduct may
not be considered, an “enhanced intent” that results from 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Applying the reasoning of my opinion in Babcock to the 
facts of this case, I would conclude that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in departing downward from the 
sentencing guidelines range because the trial court’s 
sentence in this case was within the principled range of 
outcomes.4  Therefore, I would affirm the Court of Appeals 
decision affirming defendant’s sentence. 
But I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v 
Washington, 542 US ___; 124 S Ct ___; ___L Ed 2d ___ 
(2004), which considered whether facts that increase the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
sentence must be submitted to the jury, does not affect 
Michigan’s 
scoring 
system, 
which 
establishes 
the 
recommended minimum sentence. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
police misconduct may be considered when determining
whether to depart from the guidelines ranges. 
Ante at 1,
11-12. 
The 
majority 
opinion 
does 
not 
explain 
how 
sentencing courts are to distinguish practically between
police misconduct, which is an impermissible consideration
under its analysis, and the “enhanced intent” that results
from 
police 
misconduct, 
which 
is 
a 
permissible
consideration under its analysis. 
4 Babcock, supra at 282-283. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 122696 
DEON LAMONT CLAYPOOL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
YOUNG, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I concur with the majority opinion to the extent that 
it purports to disallow consideration of the concepts of 
sentencing 
entrapment, 
sentencing 
manipulation, 
and 
sentencing escalation. 
However, I believe that the core 
tenet espoused by the majority——that a defendant’s so­
called “altered intent” may constitute an objective and 
verifiable factor that may be considered in departing from 
a 
statutorily 
mandated 
minimum 
sentence——is 
directly 
contrary 
to 
the 
principles 
this 
Court 
so 
recently 
reaffirmed in People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247; 666 NW2d 231 
(2003).
 Accordingly, although I concur in the majority’s 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
decision to remand for resentencing, I dissent from its 
analysis.1 
I. CONSIDERATION OF POLICE CONDUCT 
Although the majority states that police misconduct, 
standing alone, is not an appropriate factor to consider at 
sentencing, it nevertheless allows consideration of any 
police conduct that can be “objectively and verifiably 
shown” to have “altered a defendant’s intent.” 
Ante at 1­
2. 
I believe that this is an internally inconsistent 
holding and that it constitutes an expansion of the 
substantive defense of entrapment, a judicially created 
defense that I believe is violative of the doctrine of 
separation of powers and therefore invalid for the reasons 
expressed by Chief Justice CORRIGAN in her dissenting 
statement in People v Maffett2 and her opinion dissenting in 
part in the instant case. 
Not only does the majority’s 
holding permit the inappropriate extrapolation of the 
substantive entrapment defense into the sentencing context, 
it broadens the defense in that (1) it permits (indeed, it 
1 In addition, I concur in footnote 14 of the 
majority’s opinion, ante at 18, and agree that Michigan’s
sentencing system is unaffected by the holding in Blakely v
Washington, 542 US ___; 124 S Ct ___; ___ L Ed 2d ___
(2004). 
2 464 Mich 878 (2001). 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
requires) 
application 
of 
a 
subjective, 
rather 
than 
objective, assessment of the defendant’s response to police 
conduct, and (2) it does not even require impermissible or 
reprehensible 
police 
conduct, 
the 
hallmark 
of 
the 
traditional entrapment defense.3
 Moreover, I agree with 
Chief Justice CORRIGAN that the rejection of a legislatively 
mandated sentence requirement based on a court’s ad hoc 
assessment of police conduct impermissibly usurps both 
legislative and executive authority. See post at 6-8. 
II. INTENT IS NOT AN “OBJECTIVE” FACTOR 
Under former MCL 333.7401(4), a departure from the 
statutorily mandated minimum ten-year sentence applicable 
to defendant is permitted if the court has a “substantial 
and compelling reason” for the departure. 
In Babcock, 
supra, this Court adopted and reaffirmed, as an animating 
construction of the legislative sentencing guidelines, the 
People v Fields4 definition of “substantial and compelling 
reason”: a reason that is both objective and verifiable and 
that “‘keenly’” or “‘irresistibly’” grabs the court’s 
3 Michigan’s objective entrapment defense requires a
showing that either (1) the police engaged in impermissible
conduct that would induce a law-abiding person to commit a
crime in similar circumstances or (2) the police engaged in
conduct so reprehensible that it cannot be tolerated. 
People v Johnson, 466 Mich 491, 498; 647 NW2d 480 (2002). 
4 448 Mich 58; 528 NW2d 176 (1995). 
3  
 
 
 
  
 
  
                                                 
 
attention.5 
Babcock, supra at 257-258, quoting Fields, 
supra at 67. 
The majority opines that a defendant’s “enhanced 
intent,” if it “can be shown in a manner that satisfies the 
requirements for a sentencing departure as outlined in 
Babcock,” is a factor that may properly be considered in 
departing from a mandatory minimum sentence. 
Although the 
majority does not dispute that intent is inherently 
subjective, it nevertheless holds that intent, if “shown” 
or “established” in “an objective and verifiable way,” 
becomes a proper factor for consideration under Babcock. 
Ante at 12, 15-16. 
Thus, the majority presents two 
hypothetical examples in which evidence, other than the 
defendant’s own representations as to his intent, is 
presented to support the defendant’s claim that his intent 
was altered before or after he committed a crime; under 
such circumstances, the majority holds, the defendant’s 
intent has been objectively and verifiably shown.6 
Id. 
5 In turn, the Fields Court adopted the test for
“substantial and compelling” as announced by our Court of
Appeals in People v Hill, 192 Mich App 102; 480 NW2d 913
(1991). See Fields, supra at 62. 
6 The examples proffered by the majority aptly 
illustrate the inconsistency of its holding. 
Consider the 
first example, in which there is evidence that a defendant
sells more of an illegal substance than he was initially
prone to sell because the buyer has pleaded for more. Ante 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The primary flaw in the majority’s analysis, in my 
view, 
is 
that 
it 
conflates 
the 
separate 
Babcock 
requirements of objectivity and verifiability into a single 
evidentiary requirement. 
Again, Babcock requires that the 
factor itself be both objective and verifiable. 
The 
majority, however, takes the view that if there is an 
objective and verifiable showing of the existence of a 
factor, Babcock is satisfied. I disagree. 
at 15. 
It is entirely beyond me how such evidence 
demonstrates that the defendant’s intent was “altered” by
external factors. 
Rather, the defendant, at the time he
committed the offense, intended to sell whatever amount of 
the illegal substance he, in fact, sold; the buyer’s pleas
simply provided a motivation for the defendant’s decision 
to commit the crime of selling a larger amount. 
Under the 
majority’s 
view, 
the 
defendant’s 
presentation 
of 
a 
videotape depicting him reluctantly pulling the trigger of
a gun and killing a victim in response to an accomplice’s
urgings would presumably support a downward departure from
a mandatory sentence or from the sentencing guidelines
range. I cannot subscribe to such an extreme view. 
In the second example proffered by the majority there
is evidence that the defendant, after assaulting the 
victim, secures medical assistance. Ante at 16. I am at a 
loss to understand how this evidence of the defendant’s 
post-crime 
behavior 
demonstrates 
that 
his 
intent 
in 
committing the crime was altered. 
Again, as in the prior
example, the defendant intended to do precisely what he did
at the time he committed the crime. 
Rather, this example
seems to approve of sentencing consideration of remorse, a
factor that the Fields Court specifically held lacked 
objectivity. Fields, supra at 80. Moreover, the fact that
a defendant dials 911 after slashing a victim’s throat
would certainly not “keenly” or “irresistibly” grab this 
writer’s attention. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
A subjective factor such as intent is not somehow 
transformed into an objective factor simply because it can 
be supported by evidence other than the defendant’s own 
representations. 
Although the existence of such external 
evidence might well render a particular factor verifiable, 
an otherwise subjective factor will remain subjective, even 
in the face of a mountain of proof.7  The adoption of the 
Fields/Babcock test was intended to preclude consideration 
of such subjective factors. 
I cannot subscribe to the 
majority’s 
sub 
silentio 
repudiation 
of 
the 
Babcock 
requirement of objectivity. 
Accordingly, on remand, I would preclude the trial 
court from considering as a proper sentencing factor 
defendant’s intent. 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Maura D. Corrigan 
7 For example, much like intent, a defendant’s remorse 
is a subjective state-of-mind factor that may not be 
properly considered at sentencing. 
See Fields, supra at 
80. Remorse would not be somehow transformed into a proper
sentencing factor by virtue of tangible or otherwise 
external evidence, such as testimony that the defendant
cries himself to sleep every night or that he wrote 
apologetic letters to the victim’s family. In such a case,
the remorse would be verifiable, but it would not be
objective. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 122696 
DEON LAMONT CLAYPOOL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
KELLY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I agree with Justice Cavanagh's concurrence. However, 
I do not believe the Court should take a position on the 
application 
of 
Blakely 
v 
Washington1 
to 
Michigan's 
sentencing scheme. The issue was neither raised nor briefed 
in this case. It is a jurisprudentially significant issue. 
I would not decide it without full briefing and oral 
argument. 
Marilyn Kelly 
1 542 US ___; 124 S Ct ___; ___ L Ed 2d ___ (2004).