Title: MN v. STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MN v. STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2003 WY 13578 P.3d 232Case Number: C-03-3Decided: 10/24/2003
October 
Term, A.D. 2003

 
 

IN 
THE INTEREST OF MN, a minor:

 

MN,

 

Appellant(Respondent/Natural 
Mother),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT

OF 
FAMILY SERVICES,

 

Appellee(Petitioner).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Spangler, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Marcia 
E. Bean, Carrol S. Nelson, and Wendy S. Owens of Wyoming Legal Services, 
Inc.  Argument by Ms. 
Bean.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Dan S. 
Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Nicole G. Krieger, Special 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Krieger.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      The 
mother of MN, a minor child, appeals the district court order terminating her 
parental rights.  Mother primarily 
asserts that the district court erred when it found clear and convincing 
evidence upon which to terminate her parental rights.  Upon review, we 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      
Mother raises the following issues on appeal with which appellee State of 
Wyoming, Department of Family Services (State), essentially agrees: 
 

1.  Whether 
there is clear and convincing evidence that Appellee met the statutory 
requirements of Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-309(a)(iii).

 

2.  Whether 
Appellee violated the state and federal Constitutions and state law when it 
failed to follow its own internal rules, regulations and 
procedures.

 

3.  Whether 
Appellant's right to counsel at the initial hearing as required by Wyo. Stat. § 
14-3-422 was violated.

 

4.  Whether 
the District Court erred when it admitted certain laboratory tests without 
proper foundation or chain of custody established.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On May 12, 1999, 
a neglect petition was filed with the district court.  Although Mother requested appointment of 
an attorney, she was advised that the public defender's office did not handle 
such cases, and the court did not appoint an attorney for her.  Mother then admitted to the allegations 
of neglect.  In July 2000, Mother 
hired an attorney to represent her in the juvenile proceedings. 

 

[¶4]      On April 18, 
2002, the State filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to MN, 
and counsel was appointed for Mother.  
Mother retained separate counsel in late April 2002, at which time the 
court appointed counsel in the termination matter was allowed to withdraw.1  The State then filed an amended petition 
on May 1, 2002.  After a five-day 
trial, the district court terminated Mother's parental rights to MN pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309.  
This appeal followed.2  

 

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶5]      
When setting forth our standard of review for the granting of a petition 
to terminate parental rights we have said:
 

            
Due to the tension between the fundamental liberty of familial 
association and the compelling state interest in protecting the welfare of 
children, application of statutes for termination of parental rights is a matter 
for strict scrutiny.  TR v. 
Washakie County Dep't of Pub. Assistance & Soc. Servs., 736 P.2d 712, 
715 (Wyo. 1987). As part of this strict scrutiny standard, a case for 
termination of parental rights must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a) (Michie 1997); In Interest of JG, 742 P.2d 770, 773 (Wyo. 
1987); D.S. v. Dep't of Pub. Assistance & Soc. Servs., 607 P.2d 911, 
919 (Wyo. 1980).  Clear and 
convincing evidence is that kind of proof that would persuade a trier of fact 
that the truth of the contention is highly probable.  Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 982 
(Wyo. 1984).  Rigorous though this 
standard may be, we apply our traditional principles of evidentiary review when 
a party challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination.  Matter of SYM, 924 P.2d 985, 987 
(Wyo. 1996).  Thus, we examine the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, assuming all 
favorable evidence to be true while discounting conflicting evidence presented 
by the unsuccessful party. Id.; D.S. v. Dep't of Pub. Assistance & 
Soc. Servs., 607 P.2d at 919-20; In Interest of JG, 742 P.2d  at 
773.
 

In Re ZKP, 979 P.2d 953, 956 (Wyo. 1999); see also SD v. 
Carbon County Dep't of Family Servs., 2002 WY 168, ¶5, 57 P.3d 1235, ¶5 (Wyo. 2002); Matter 
of TLC, 2002 WY 76, ¶¶10-11, 46 P.3d 863, ¶¶10-11 (Wyo. 2002); In Re 
IH, 2001 WY 100, ¶14, 33 P.3d 172, ¶14 (Wyo. 2001). 
 

 

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Termination of Parental Rights
 

[¶6]      
The State's amended petition for termination of parental rights requested 
termination based on Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-309(a)(iii) and 14-2-309(a)(v) 
(LexisNexis 2001).3  The district court found clear and 
convincing evidence to support termination on both of these grounds.  Mother contends the decision of the 
district court should be reversed because the State did not present clear and 
convincing evidence that she neglected MN and the State did not make reasonable 
efforts to prevent the removal of MN from Mother or to reunify the family.  The State argues that more than adequate 
evidence exists to support the district court's ruling and that Mother simply 
improperly characterizes the evidence presented at trial.  

 

[¶7]      
Termination of parental rights pursuant to § 14-2-309(a)(iii) initially 
requires the establishment of parental abuse or neglect by clear and convincing 
evidence.  SD v. Carbon County 
Dep't of Family Servs., at ¶5.  "Abuse" means inflicting or 
causing physical or mental injury, harm or imminent danger to the physical or 
mental health or welfare of a child other than by accidental means, including 
abandonment, excessive or unreasonable corporal punishment, malnutrition or 
substantial risk thereof by reason of intentional or unintentional neglect, and 
the commission or allowing the commission of a sexual offense against a child as 
defined by law.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-202(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001).  
"Neglect" means "a failure or refusal by those responsible for the 
child's welfare to provide adequate care, maintenance, supervision, education or 
medical, surgical or any other care necessary for the child's well being."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-202(a)(vii) 
(LexisNexis 2001).   

 

[¶8]      The evidence 
presented to the district court showed that in 1996, when MN was two years old, 
the State received information that Mother was giving MN alcohol in an infant 
cup and shaking out and re-using diapers.  
In July 1997, the State received a report that MN was being watched by 
inappropriate male caregivers who were drinking and driving with MN and bringing 
her to the local bar, that MN's teeth had rotted, and that she was being fed a 
diet of only soda and candy.4  It was also reported that MN was left 
playing on the road while Mother was passed out in her car, that MN was being 
left on numerous occasions unattended in a bar while Mother drank, and MN was 
being transported in an unsanitary vehicle full of rotted food and garbage.  In October of 1997, law enforcement 
contacted the State again with concerns regarding MN's teeth.  In December of 1997, Mother took MN to 
visit her mother in Las Vegas, Nevada and, although MN was then three and a half 
years old, fed her primarily Coca Cola and sweets.  Mother also failed to monitor MN in the 
bathroom, which led to MN smearing feces all over a restroom.  

 

[¶9]      In January and 
February 1998, MN's daycare provider made two referrals to the State reporting 
that MN was arriving at the daycare hungry, dirty, and smelling like urine.  The daycare also reported that MN often 
had caked food on her, expressed concerns about her teeth, and reported that the 
only food Mother brought to the daycare were sweets.  MN was also developmentally behind other 
children of her age, had difficulty interacting with her peers, and would have 
lengthy screaming fits.  On May 28, 
1998, the State received a report that Mother and MN were living in a hazardous, 
filthy apartment filled with dog feces.  
The State investigated and found the apartment filled with flies, feces, 
garbage, and rotting food.  However, 
by then Mother and MN had vacated the apartment.  The State formally substantiated this 
claim.  In August of 1998, the State 
received complaints that Mother's campsite was a mess and that all MN was eating 
was candy, soda, and other sugary foods.

 

[¶10]   In February of 1999, the State 
received another complaint that Mother had dropped off MN on the doorstep of a 
co-worker's home without making any previous arrangements and drove off before 
anyone answered the door, leaving MN overnight.  It was also reported that MN's underwear 
was black with dirt, her sleeping bag was "filthy," and that Mother's apartment 
was filled with junk and had no food.  
The State formally substantiated these claims, leading to the instigation 
of neglect proceedings and Mother voluntarily placing MN with her aunt, Ms. 
Griffin.  

 

[¶11]   When MN, then almost five years of 
age, was placed at Ms. Griffin's home, she was unfamiliar with eating utensils, 
did not know what toilet paper was or how to use it, hoarded food despite being 
given sufficient food, and would go up to strangers to hug them and sit on their 
laps.  In December of 1999, MN was 
moved to a foster family home in Osmond, Wyoming, approximately five miles from 
Afton, Wyoming.  Mother could not be 
contacted regarding this change because she had moved and did not provide the 
State with contact information.  
When MN arrived at the new foster home, she had no top teeth, had bridges 
on her bottom teeth, and preferred to eat only sweets.  She would also scream for hours without 
any tears when she did not get her way, struggled with peer interaction, was 
underdeveloped, and preferred to be with adults all the time.  She continued to go up to strangers and 
hug them. 

 

[¶12]   In March of 2000, MN began seeing 
Gale Holtby, MA, LPC, a professional counselor specializing in the area of child 
maltreatment.  This counseling 
continued through the trial held in July 2002. Ms. Holtby diagnosed MN as being 
developmentally and emotionally delayed, having an attachment disorder, having 
difficulty connecting with others, and having a basic mistrust of the 
world.  Ms. Holtby further stated 
that MN suffered from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), that she 
had poor motor skills, and that she needed constant attention and prompting with 
hygiene and eating.  Ms. Holtby 
further testified that these difficulties were likely caused by the inconsistent 
care given by Mother, as MN's primary caregiver, during her first years of 
life.  

 

[¶13]   Mother 
criticizes the evidence presented at trial and characterizes it simply as a 
showing of five unsubstantiated reports of alleged neglect and two reports of 
neglect that were substantiated at low risk.  Therefore, Mother concludes that this 
factual foundation is insufficient to terminate her parental rights to MN.  We have previously recognized that in 
the ordinary parental rights termination case consideration must be given to a 
combination of factors, incidents, and conditions that demonstrate the neglect 
required to justify termination of parental rights.  Rarely do we find a single condition or 
incident that, standing alone, would justify termination.  Rather, neglect is usually manifested by 
numerous incidents and conditions extending over a considerable length of 
time.  See TR v. Washakie 
County Dep't of Pub. Assistance and Soc. Servs., 736 P.2d 712, 716 (Wyo. 
1987); Matter of MLM, 682 P.2d 982, 988 (Wyo. 1984).  
 

[¶14]   As in 
TR, the neglect in this case extended over a long period of time and is 
apparent by the occasions and conditions described by the witnesses and in the 
exhibits.  The record discloses 
long-term general neglect, and the detailed instances are adequate to show by 
clear and convincing evidence the failure to provide adequate care necessary for 
MN's well being.  Thus, at a 
minimum, neglect, if not abuse, is presented.  
 

[¶15]   We now address the second element, 
unsuccessful reasonable attempts to rehabilitate the family.  When family reunification is the case 
plan goal, the State has the responsibility reasonably to provide the services 
necessary to accomplish the specific goals and tasks called for before 
reunification can occur.  SD v. 
Carbon County Dep't of Family Servs., at ¶16; MB v. Laramie County Dep't 
of Family Servs. in Interest of LB, 933 P.2d 1126, 1129-30 (Wyo. 1997).  The record is filled with instances of 
the State meeting this responsibility.  

 

[¶16]   The State attempted to assist 
Mother following each report in 1997 and 1998, but Mother refused such 
assistance.  The State initiated a 
case plan and worked with Mother in February of 1998.  However, after a short period of time, 
Mother could not be reached.  In 
1997 and 1998, the State met with Mother on a number of occasions to discuss 
nutrition for MN and worked to help Mother obtain more stable employment and 
housing. 

 

[¶17]   Prior to the initiation of the 
juvenile court proceedings, the State initiated a second case plan and made 
repeated efforts to help Mother, providing her with Medicaid, money for daycare, 
food stamps, and other financial assistance.  The State also gave Mother additional 
education on nutrition, hygiene, and care of MN and encouraged Mother to work 
with the State Department of Vocational Rehabilitation (DVR) to develop job 
stability and low-income housing.  
Furthermore, the State worked with Mother to arrange and pay for dental 
care for MN. 

 

[¶18]   After the juvenile court 
proceedings commenced, the State initiated four separate case plans, but Mother 
failed to comply with these plans.  
A multidisciplinary team (MDT) was convened consisting of Mother, state 
caseworkers, Mother's mental health counselor, Mother's case manager, a 
psychologist, DVR, and MN's guardian ad litem.  An individual experienced in working 
with brain-injured individuals also provided training to the MDT and Mother's 
case manager because Mother had been diagnosed with a cognitive disorder and a 
moderate to severe brain injury.  
Despite numerous efforts by the State and the MDT to rehabilitate Mother, 
Mother failed to comply with the case plans, was generally uncooperative, and 
refused to participate in the many services offered to her. Ultimately, Mother 
became hostile and discontinued all services.  Mother's visitation with MN was also 
erratic and ultimately ceased.  

 

[¶19]   Mother 
complains that the State is required to make reasonable efforts to preserve the 
family prior to placement of the child outside the home and asserts that 
the State did not comply with this requirement.  However, the record discloses that the 
State did not formally remove MN from her home after the 1999 allegation of 
neglect.  To the contrary, MN was 
placed with Ms. Griffin, Mother's aunt, at Mother's request.  Indeed, Mother admits to this request 
and her intent to keep MN away from the State to prevent the State from 
intervening.  
 

[¶20]   In addition, 
Mother argues that the State did not use reasonable efforts to reunify the 
family, as the implemented case plans were not accessible, available, 
appropriate, and did not sufficiently account for Mother's known memory and 
cognitive difficulties.  The 
evidence presented at trial describes how the State on numerous occasions 
conducted one-on-one discussions with Mother addressing the State's concerns 
regarding proper care, nutrition, and supervision for MN and proper housing and 
stability.  Initially, Mother 
accepted the services that resulted in direct financial assistance, but rejected 
the services that required her to address lifestyle and parenting choices, 
contending that MN's care was not the State's concern.  Testimony at trial detailed the 
extensive attempts made to equip Mother with the skills she needed to 
effectively raise MN utilizing simplistic incremental steps. These plans were 
developed and approved by the entire MDT using a collaborative approach. 
Moreover, each of the case plans increasingly took into account the particular 
needs of Mother, as more information became available.  Nevertheless, Mother resisted these 
rehabilitative efforts.
 

[¶21]   The initial 
case plan required that Mother work with her case manager to develop a schedule 
to fit her work and personal needs; work on budgeting, housing and work 
opportunities; visit with MN regularly in person and via telephone; participate 
in regular counseling sessions; schedule a neuropsychological evaluation with 
DVR; and maintain regular contact with the State.  The next case plans developed included 
similar tasks but added finishing a parenting assessment; keeping transportation 
and insurance; and working with an attorney on other potentially available 
services.  Each of the case plans 
remained consistent in nature.  The 
State and the MDT went to great lengths to ensure that Mother understood the 
case plans, what was required of her, and that the objectives were reasonable 
and well suited to her needs.  

 

[¶22]   Mother's 
appointed counselor, John Beck, M.Ed., had over twelve years of experience as a 
counselor specializing in adults with mental illnesses, including persons with 
brain injury disorders and families in dysfunction.  Mr. Beck worked with Mother to help her 
understand MN's needs as contrasted to her own, on communication and its 
relationship to parenting, problem solving, and other parenting skills.  Mr. Beck, recognizing that Mother was 
resistant to counseling and had missed numerous sessions, arranged to meet with 
Mother after hours or during her lunch break and later accommodated Mother's 
request for half hour sessions, rather than full hour sessions, hoping that 
Mother would be more receptive.  
Mother was also assigned a case manager from the Jackson Hole Community 
Counseling Center to work with her on issues relating to general organization, 
budgeting, keeping appointments, and problem solving under the oversight of Mr. 
Beck.  Mother initially refused to 
work with the first counselor and another counselor was assigned who met with 
her at her worksite.  This new 
counselor received specialized training in working with brain-injured clients in 
the area of problem solving, organization, and basic skills.  The counselor met with Mother in 
Jackson, where she worked, and in Pinedale, where she lived.  
 

[¶23]   After the 
juvenile proceedings were commenced, Mother expressed some willingness to 
participate with the State, cooperate with the case plans, and was receptive to 
the services made available.  
However, Mother failed to participate in the offered services with 
regularity.  Mother then became more 
hostile towards the State and other service providers, did not cooperate with 
the MDT, and eventually rejected all rehabilitative services.  Mother also failed to maintain regular 
visitation with MN.  Regularly 
scheduled telephone calls with MN were often also missed by Mother. 

 
[¶24]   Mother's 
complaints that regular visitation was made difficult by distance, 
transportation problems, and State's unwillingness to facilitate her visits are 
unpersuasive.  The State 
accommodated Mother by offering transportation to Jackson and Pinedale on 
occasion and attempted to assist Mother in figuring out her transportation 
dilemma.  Critically, Mother was 
able to travel between Pinedale and Jackson for work, yet could not do so for 
visitation purposes. 
 

[¶25]   Throughout 
interaction with Mother, the State and the MDT assigned Mother appropriate case 
managers and helped set up and pay for evaluations in the substance abuse, 
psychological, neuropsychological, and parenting areas.  The State also provided Mother with 
assistance and transportation in obtaining low-income housing applications.  In addition, case workers conducted 
meetings with Mother at a restaurant after business hours where Mother felt more 
comfortable and her work schedule would not be interrupted.  At these meetings, the State reviewed 
Mother's progress and need for improvement in other areas.  A note taker was provided by DVR for 
Mother.  
 

[¶26]   Mother 
asserts that she was unable to understand the case plans because of her 
cognitive and memory problems.  
However, Mother testified at trial that she understood what it meant to 
obtain evaluations, see her counselor, and take the other actions required by 
the case plans.  Mother also 
testified that she understood the consequences that would result if she failed 
to comply with the case plan directives.  

 

[¶27]   We have 
previously recognized that at some point rehabilitative efforts become 
unreasonable.   "[I]t would 
seem unreasonable and not for the best interests of the child that professional 
welfare workers should be furnished to care for this child in the parental home 
on a twenty-four-hour basis for the many years until the child herself can be 
self-sufficient."  Matter of 
CM, 556 P.2d 514, 519 (Wyo. 1976).  
The record indicates that Mother, even after lengthy attempts at training 
and instruction, would not be able to care for MN without further significant 
assistance.  While we are empathetic 
to Mother's limitations due to a brain injury, we must consider the best 
interests and welfare of MN.  
Id., at 517; see also SD v. Carbon County Dep't of 
Family Servs., at ¶23. Mother failed 
to take advantage of the services provided to her, failed to meaningfully 
participate in the case plans, and failed to implement what she was taught. 
Thus, we hold the evidence was clear and convincing that the reasonable 
rehabilitative efforts were unsuccessful.  

 

[¶28]   Finally, we consider the last 
element of § 14-2-309(a)(iii), that MN's health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized should she be returned to mother's custody.  A child evaluation was completed which 
indicated that MN required a safe, stable, secure, and predicable 
environment.  Such environment would 
encompass repetition to help MN develop trust in others, decrease anxiety level, 
and change the behaviors associated with her attachment disorder.  While in foster care, MN's emotional 
health and basic ability to interact with others greatly improved, and MN made 
significant strides in terms of social skills, temper, and attention.  However, MN remained immature and had 
significant needs in terms of mental, emotional, and physical well being. 

 

[¶29]   From 1997, Mother's life has been 
unstable.  Mother was unable to hold 
down a job for more than a few months and had difficulty getting along with 
co-workers.  Since 1997, Mother has 
moved between thirteen different campsites, motel rooms, and apartments.  At the time of the trial, Mother had 
been living with a boyfriend who had at least four alcohol-related encounters 
with law enforcement, and, in 2001, the police were called twice to Mother's 
residence because of domestic disputes. Between October 2000 to July 2001, 
Mother had twenty-six positive drug screens for marijuana and one for 
methamphetamine.  

 

[¶30]   Despite the efforts of the State, 
Mother made minimal progress toward being able to meet MN's needs.  Mother also continued to have difficulty 
in identifying and anticipating MN's needs, avoiding problems, recognizing 
potential dangers, and organizing her life to provide consistency, stability, 
and safety. Mother also had problems with memory, reasoning, planning, anger, 
and attention, which made it difficult for her to be a parent.  Continued drug abuse by Mother caused 
her to be more unlikely to succeed as a parent.  Mother was simply unable to provide the 
level of care MN required, or to even meet MN's more basic fundamental needs. 

 

[¶31]   Accordingly, 
evidence was presented to the district court to establish that each of the three 
criteria required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) had been met by clear 
and convincing evidence.  Moreover, 
clear and convincing evidence was presented to the district court that the 
requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v) had also been met since MN had 
been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for at least fifteen 
of the most recent twenty-two months, and Mother was shown to be unfit to have 
custody and control of MN.  Parental 
rights may be terminated on a finding of just one of the stated subsections 
enunciated in § 14-2-309.  SD v. 
Carbon County Dep't of Family Servs., at ¶6; Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-2-309.
 

[¶32]   This court has recognized 
that:

 

            
We are not unsympathetic to the disabilities and hardships of the 
parents.  However, this case 
demonstrates a situation in which the best interest of the child and the 
fundamental rights of the parents diverge. While we zealously guard the 
fundamental right of parents to care for and associate with their children, we 
also recognize that a child has the fundamental right to live in an environment 
free from filth, health hazards, and danger; he also has the right to 
nourishment, education, and necessary medical attention.  Matter of MLM, 682 P.2d 982, 990 
(Wyo. 1984).  "When the rights of a 
parent and the rights of a child are on a collision course, the rights of the 
parent must yield."  Id.  
 

SD v. Carbon County Dep't of Family Servs., at ¶27

 

[¶33]   For the 
reasons stated above, we find that there was clear and convincing evidence 
presented to support the termination of parental rights.  
 

Alleged 
Violations of Rules and Regulations

 

[¶34]   Mother contends that the State did 
not comply with its own internal rules and regulations, thereby violating her 
constitutionally protected due process rights.  However, the State's procedural manual 
cited heavily by Mother as support for these violations is not a part of the 
appellate record.  The only rule 
violation established at trial was that the State was fifteen days late in 
creating a case plan on one occasion.  
Mother fails to demonstrate how this violation affected her fundamental 
rights or impacted the ultimate decision of the district court to terminate her 
parental rights to MN.  Therefore, 
we find that any non-compliance by the State in this case is harmless.  Furthermore, although Mother relies 
heavily on the case of MB v. Laramie County Dep't of Family Servs. in 
Interest of LB, 933 P.2d 1126, for support of her argument, that case is not 
dispositive.  In MB, this 
court held that the State's rule violations were both numerous and egregious, 
thus violating the parent's protected rights.  In this instance, any alleged violations 
by the State were minimal in nature.

 

[¶35]   Clearly, an agency must follow its 
own rules as they have the force and effect of law.  However, a person asserting an agency's 
rule violations must show how the breach denied her due process or violated her 
fundamental rights.

 

Failure 
to Appoint Counsel

 

[¶36]   Mother asserts that the court 
violated her right to counsel at the initial juvenile proceeding hearing and, 
thus, the district court was divested of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Specifically, Mother espouses that the failure to appoint counsel during the 
initial hearing is of such a serious nature that it undermines the State's 
entire termination case.  The State 
primarily argues that a neglect action is not a prerequisite to a termination of 
parental rights proceeding, and the two are separate and distinct.  The State further argues that there has 
been no showing that Mother's rights were prejudiced, or even impacted, and 
therefore the court's action must be characterized as harmless.  

 

[¶37]   Initially this court 
recognizes that termination proceedings are entirely separate and distinct from 
neglect proceedings, deriving their respective genesis from separate statutes 
and requiring different burdens of proof.  
In particular, a neglect action is not a mandatory prerequisite to 
termination of parental rights.  
Moreover, Mother has failed to show how the failure to appoint her 
counsel within the juvenile proceeding violated her due process rights regarding 
the termination proceedings.  
Indeed, Mother's admission of neglect in the juvenile proceeding did not 
relieve the State from proving by clear and convincing evidence that Mother's 
parental rights should be terminated.  
To the contrary, the State could not simply utilize Mother's admission of 
neglect in the juvenile proceeding but was required to show at trial that Mother 
neglected MN.  This court also notes 
that Mother was represented by counsel and afforded all procedural safeguards 
throughout the course of trial in the termination proceedings.  Although Mother relies heavily upon the 
holding in In re A.P., 734 N.E.2d 1107 (Ind.App. 2000), as authority for 
her argument, we do not find that case to be applicable.  In A.P., the court found numerous 
and substantial errors which effectively denied the parent fundamental due 
process. Substantial procedural irregularities amounting to a denial of due 
process simply did not occur in this instance.  The record does not reflect that Mother 
was prejudiced or injured by the failure to appoint her counsel at the initial 
juvenile proceeding.  Any error to 
appoint Mother counsel at the initial juvenile proceedings hearing must 
therefore be characterized as harmless. 

 

Evidentiary 
Issues

 

[¶38]   Finally, Mother contends that the 
district court erred when it admitted laboratory tests showing that she tested 
positive to the use of drugs without establishing sufficient authenticity or 
chain of custody regarding those results.  
The State points out that Mother admitted that she had positive drug 
screens every week for approximately ten months and asserts that Mother is again 
unable to show how the court's evidentiary ruling prejudiced her.  The State also argues that the test 
results were properly admitted for the limited purpose of showing what 
information was available to the State at the time. Furthermore, the State 
argues that the admission of this evidence is harmless as it was not the primary 
reason for the termination of parental rights, but rather many reasons are 
contained within the record which substantiate the district court's ruling.   

 

[¶39]   Review of the record indicates that 
the district court admitted the drug test results for only a limited purpose and 
that Mother eventually admitted to her numerous positive drug screens.  Furthermore, as indicated above, the 
district court's conclusion that Mother's parental rights to MN should be 
terminated was based on a large body of evidence presented to it over a five-day 
trial that showed that Mother had neglected MN and was unable to provide MN with 
basic health and safety within the prescribed statutory guidelines.  Nothing in the record indicates that the 
district court based its decision to terminate Mother's parental rights solely 
on the results of the drug tests at issue.  
Accordingly, we hold the limited admission of the drug test results 
amounts to harmless error.

 

 

[¶40]   Upon our careful review of the 
record, we hold that the judgment entered by the district court terminating the 
parental rights of Mother to MN is affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Apparently, 
the State initially filed a petition to terminate mother's parental rights on 
October 17, 2001.  This petition was 
eventually dismissed by the court upon Mother's appointed counsel filing a 
motion to dismiss. 

 

2Because 
Mother challenges the factual basis of the district court's ruling on appeal, 
further facts will be included in the body of this 
opinion.

 

3Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) provides that parental rights may be terminated if 
it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the child has been 
abused or neglected by the parent and reasonable efforts by an authorized agency 
or mental health professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the 
family, or the family has refused rehabilitative treatment, and it is shown that 
the child's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by returning to the 
parent.

      Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-2-309(a)(v) provides for the termination of parental rights if it is shown 
by clear and convincing evidence that the child has been in foster care under 
the responsibility of the state of Wyoming for fifteen of the most recent 
twenty-two months, and a showing that the parent is unfit to have custody and 
control of the child.  

 

4Statements 
were also made which gave concerns that MN may have also been sexually abused.