Title: In re Stowe Club Highlands

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

IN_RE_STOWE_CLUB_HIGHLANDS.94-322; 164 Vt 272; 668 A.2d 1271

[Opinion Filed 22-Sep-1995]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 26-Oct-1995]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 94-322


In re Stowe Club Highlands                        Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Lamoille Superior Court

                                                  February Term, 1995



Alan W. Cook, J.

Harold B. Stevens, Stowe, for appellant

Leighton c. Detora, pro se, Barre, appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       DOOLEY, J.  Stowe Club Highlands (SCH), successor in interest to
  Robinson Springs Corporation (RSC), and owner of a real estate development
  in Stowe,(FN1) appeals from a decision of the Lamoille Superior Court which
  denied a subdivision permit to develop twenty-two acres for a single-family
  house.  The superior court decision was reached in an appeal from the Stowe
  Planning Commission brought by an adjoining landowner within the
  development, Leighton Detora.(FN2)  SCH argues that the superior court erred
  in ruling that the proposed permit is 1) prohibited by the applicable
  setback requirement of the Stowe zoning ordinance, and 2) that the area in
  which the house would be developed has been irrevocably dedicated as open
  space. Although we agree that SCH's second argument is correct, we affirm
  the decision of the trial

 
  
  court based on the prohibition on constructing the house within the
  setback area.

       The area in issue is a small part of a larger development, originally
  proposed by Nolex, Inc. on a 235-acre parcel called the Stowe Club
  property.  Although the mix has changed over time, the development plan has
  included a hotel, single-family lots and townhouses.  The original proposal
  received conditional use approval from the Stowe zoning board and site-plan
  approval from the planning commission, as well as an Act 250 permit from
  the district environmental commission.  While owned by Stowe Club
  Associates, after purchase from Nolex, Inc., it received partial
  subdivision approval to enable sale of twenty single-family lots.  One of
  these lots was purchased by Leighton Detora from Chittenden Trust Company,
  which took the development from Stowe Club Associates.  The current
  controversy arose when RSC purchased the development property, excluding
  single-family lots which had already been sold, and started to pursue
  seriously new permits to complete the development.  These included
  subdivision permits from the planning commission, covering all of the
  property and uses, and a new conditional use permit from the zoning board
  to reflect the modifications in the proposal.

       The Stowe Club property lies within an agricultural and rural
  residential zoning district. The district normally allows residential
  developments only on large lots but authorizes, as a conditional use, a
  resort planned unit development (PUD), subject to specific conditions in
  the zoning ordinance.  The Stowe Club development has been treated as a PUD
  and received conditional use permits on that basis.

       This case involves only a small part of the development, a twenty-two
  acre meadow in the northeast corner of the Stowe Club property.  Detora's
  property abuts this meadow.  The meadow contains a barn, with a mobile home
  in it, which was in existence when the original permits were obtained by
  Nolex, Inc.  Although there was discussion of using the barn as a riding
  stable, it has apparently been unused at least since 1982 when the Nolex,
  Inc. development was originally proposed.  At its nearest point, the barn
  is approximately seventy-five feet from the boundary line with the
  northern neighbor.

  

       From the first permit, the meadow was to be dedicated to agricultural
  use, as well as to contain a septic field.  None of the conditions for the
  many Stowe permits states this explicitly although this intention is
  contained in the minutes of meetings and in findings.  It is stated
  explicitly in the Act 250 permit.  There is very little mention of the barn
  in any of the proceedings.

       The official "boundary plan" on which the subdivision permits are
  based shows a 200-foot "green belt" surrounding the Stowe Club development
  on the outer edges of the property, and this "green belt" goes around the
  eastern and northern portions of the meadow.  The barn lies within the
  green belt.

       This case arose when RSC proposed to subdivide out the meadow as a
  single-family lot and to build a house and stable in the footprint of the
  barn.  Detora objected, arguing that the meadow had been reserved as open
  space and a house could not be built on the barn site because it lies
  within a 200-foot non-waivable setback from the line with the northern
  neighbor.  The planning commission rejected these arguments and approved
  the subdivision, and this action was followed by conditional use approval
  by the zoning board of the lot as subdivided.(FN3)  On appeal, the superior
  court accepted both of Detora's arguments and reversed the grant of the
  subdivision permit.

       Our review of the issues raised by SCH is complicated by the way the
  case was approached by the superior court.  On appeal from a planning
  commission decision, the court must conduct a de novo trial.  See 24 V.S.A.
  §§ 4472(a), 4475.  This standard requires the court to approach the case as
  if it were the planning commission, without regard to what had been done
  before by the planning commission.  See Chioffi v. Winooski Zoning Bd., 151
  Vt. 9, 11, 556 A.2d 103, 104-05 (1989); In re Poole, 136 Vt. 242, 245,