Title: Phillips v. Southeast 4-H Educational Ctr.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 
Koontz, JJ., and Stephenson, Senior Justice 
 
MISTY ANN HAYS PHILLIPS, EXECUTOR 
  OF THE ESTATE OF RICHARD WILLIAM PHILLIPS, 
  DECEASED 
 
 
 
OPINION BY  
v.  Record No. 980444 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.  
 
 
 
January 8, 1999 
SOUTHEAST 4-H EDUCATIONAL CENTER, INC., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SUSSEX COUNTY 
Robert G. O'Hara, Judge 
 
 
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the trial 
court erred in striking the plaintiff's evidence at the 
conclusion of the plaintiff's case-in-chief.  We also determine 
whether the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence 
proffered by the plaintiff's expert witness. 
I 
 
Misty Ann Hays Phillips, Executor of the Estate of Richard 
William Phillips, deceased (the Plaintiff), filed an action 
against Southeast 4-H Educational Center, Inc. (the Center), 
Susan Morlino, and Nicole Gipson (collectively, the Defendants) 
for the wrongful death of Richard William Phillips.  The 
Plaintiff alleged that Richard's death by drowning was caused by 
the Defendants' negligence. 
 
The case was tried to a jury, but, at the conclusion of the 
Plaintiff's case-in-chief, the trial court struck the 
Plaintiff's evidence and entered judgment for the Defendants.  
We awarded the Plaintiff this appeal. 
II 
 
 
In reviewing the trial court's decision to strike the 
Plaintiff's evidence, we will view the evidence, and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff.  See Mullins v. Virginia 
Lutheran Homes, 253 Va. 116, 119, 479 S.E.2d 530, 532-33 
(1997). 
 
The Center operated a 25-yard swimming pool in Sussex 
County.  Morlino was the pool's senior lifeguard and manager, 
and Gipson was a lifeguard.  Both lifeguards had the required 
certificates in lifesaving and cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
(CPR). 
 
Richard was 32 years old.  He was about six feet four 
inches tall and a strong swimmer. 
 
Morlino, who was called by the Plaintiff as an adverse 
witness, testified that, on the day before Richard drowned, she 
had observed him swim underwater the length of the pool and back 
several times.  When Richard completed each lap, he came to the 
surface of the water, took a breath of air, turned, and swam 
another lap.  After several laps, Richard stopped swimming.  
Before coming to the water's surface, however, he had held his 
 
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breath and had lain on the bottom of the pool in the shallow end 
for a brief period. 
 
The following day, May 30, 1993, Morlino and Gipson were on 
duty as lifeguards.  Morlino again observed Richard, who was 
accompanied by Richard Wayne Parkllan, swimming in the pool. 
After about 30 minutes, Parkllan got out of the pool and sat on 
the deck.  Richard, who was then the only person in the pool, 
continued to swim. 
 
As he had done the previous day, Richard began to swim laps 
underwater.  He continued to swim laps for 15 to 20 minutes 
while Morlino watched.  After completing one of the laps, 
Richard stood in the shallow end of the pool, which is three 
feet deep, and then went back under the water.  As Richard sat 
under the water, Morlino noticed bubbles coming to the surface.
 
When the bubbles disappeared and Richard did not come to 
the water's surface, Morlino became concerned.  Within 
"moments," Morlino jumped into the pool to ascertain Richard's 
condition.  With Parkllan's assistance, Morlino pulled Richard 
out of the pool and onto the deck.  Gipson telephoned for 
emergency response personnel. 
 
Richard was not breathing and had no pulse, so Morlino and 
Parkllan alternated in administering CPR.  Approximately 10 
minutes later, they were relieved by a rescue squad member.  
While CPR was being administered, Richard vomited, but he 
 
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remained unconscious.  The rescue squad took him to a hospital 
where he was pronounced dead.  An autopsy revealed that the 
cause of death was drowning. 
 
The Plaintiff called Gerald M. Dworkin as an expert 
witness.  Dworkin was qualified as an expert in water safety and 
as an emergency medical technician (EMT) with training in 
defibrillation.  Dworkin testified that, in his opinion, the two 
lifeguards breached the acceptable standard of care in failing 
to sit in the elevated lifeguard chairs, to recognize signs of 
passive drowning, and to effect a timely rescue.  Dworkin 
further testified that it was his opinion that the Center's 
management breached the acceptable standard of care in failing 
to have site-specific training and to have a standard operating 
procedure. 
III 
 
We first consider whether the trial court erred in 
excluding a portion of Dworkin's testimony.  Dworkin would have 
opined that, after a victim stops breathing, his heart continues 
to beat for several minutes.  Dworkin would have opined further 
that, if Richard had been removed from the water within 30 
seconds of the onset of drowning, he would have had a heartbeat, 
CPR would have been unnecessary, and artificial respiration 
would have been successful.  The trial court excluded this 
 
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testimony, concluding that this involved a medical opinion and 
that Dworkin was not qualified to render such an opinion. 
 
Whether a proffered expert opinion should be excluded is a 
matter that rests within the sound discretion of a trial court.  
The court's decision to exclude such testimony will not be 
reversed on appeal unless the record clearly establishes that 
the expert was qualified to express the opinion.  Grubb v. 
Hocker, 229 Va. 172, 176, 326 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1985). 
 
Although the record shows that Dworkin was an EMT and 
experienced in CPR and water safety, we cannot say that the 
record clearly establishes that he was qualified to opine that 
Richard would have survived had he been removed from the water 
within 30 seconds of the onset of drowning.  The opinion 
requires technical knowledge in the field of medicine, and, 
therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its 
discretion in excluding this testimony. 
IV 
 
We now consider the principal issue in this appeal; that 
is, whether the trial court erred in striking the Plaintiff's 
evidence.  Ordinarily, negligence and proximate cause are jury 
issues.  They become questions of law, however, when reasonable 
minds could not differ about the conclusions to be reached.  
Poliquin v. Daniels, 254 Va. 51, 57, 486 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1997). 
 
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Generally, the owner of a swimming pool to which the 
general public is invited for a fee  
must exercise ordinary care for the safety of his 
patrons.  He must make reasonable provisions to guard 
against those accidents which common knowledge and 
experience teach are likely to befall those engaged in 
swimming and other aquatic sports for which he has 
provided facilities, but the owner is not an insurer 
of the safety of his patrons. 
Blacka v. James, 205 Va. 646, 649, 139 S.E.2d 47, 50 (1964). 
 
Depending upon the circumstances involved, an owner of a 
swimming facility may have a duty "to station qualified 
lifeguards at the [facility] to supervise patrons and rescue 
those in peril," and, "[i]n such case, the [facility] owner is 
liable for the negligence of lifeguards in the performance of 
their duties."  S & C Company v. Horne, 218 Va. 124, 128-29, 235 
S.E.2d 456, 459 (1977).  A lifeguard's duty is twofold.  "First, 
he has some duty to observe swimmers for signs of distress; 
second, he has some duty at some point to attempt rescue of 
those in distress."  Id. at 129, 235 S.E.2d at 459.  In the 
performance of the second duty, a lifeguard must exercise the 
care that an ordinarily cautious lifeguard would exercise under 
similar circumstances.  Id. 
 
In the present case, Morlino, called by the Plaintiff as an 
adverse witness, testified that she and Gipson were able to see 
Richard from their positions on the pool's deck, that they were 
watching Richard the entire time he was in the pool, and that 
 
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they responded promptly when they realized that Richard was in 
distress.  Morlino's testimony is uncontradicted; therefore, the 
Plaintiff is bound by it.  See Retail Property Investors, Inc. 
v. Skeens, 252 Va. 36, 41, 471 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1996).  The only 
evidence in the present case to suggest that the Defendants were 
negligent comes from the opinions of Dworkin. 
 
The Plaintiff's theory of recovery is that Morlino and 
Gipson were negligent in not recognizing Richard's 
unconsciousness sooner and that, if they had, Richard could have 
been saved.  Dworkin testified that, when Richard was lying 
motionless on the bottom of the pool and bubbles were coming to 
the surface of the water, this "was a pretty good indication 
that there was a problem."  Dworkin further testified that 
lifeguards should be active in their surveillance by practicing 
the "10/20 second rule."  According to Dworkin, this rule 
requires a lifeguard to assess every situation for 10 seconds 
before determining whether action is necessary and reassessing 
that situation within 20 seconds.  He opined that, because the 
lifeguards "observed the bubbles, observed the lack of movement, 
and actually timed this for a minute's time before they . . . 
effected the rescue," they breached the 10/20-second rule and, 
therefore, were negligent. 
 
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Viewing, as we must, Dworkin's testimony in the light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff, we conclude that the Defendants' 
alleged negligence is a jury issue. 
But mere proof of an accident and negligence does not 
establish a cause of action.  There must be in 
addition a causal connection between the negligence 
and the . . . death complained of.  Evidence tending 
to show a causal connection must be sufficient to 
remove the case out of the realm of speculation and 
conjecture and into the realm of legitimate inference 
before submitting it to a jury for its determination. 
Blacka, 205 Va. at 650, 139 S.E.2d at 50.  Thus, in the present 
case, the Defendants' alleged negligence must have a causal 
connection with Richard's drowning, and, in the absence of a 
showing that the Defendants' negligence was the proximate cause 
of the death, there can be no recovery.  
We have carefully examined the record to find evidence 
tending to show that the Defendants' alleged negligence 
proximately caused Richard's death, and we find none.  At oral 
argument, Plaintiff's counsel was asked to pinpoint in the 
record evidence of causation.  Counsel directed this Court to a 
portion of Dworkin's testimony wherein he testified that, if 
Richard had had a pulse when he was removed from the water and 
artificial respiration had been timely undertaken, then "there 
[was] a good chance that [he was] going to recover."  (Emphasis 
added.)  We can only speculate, however, when Richard's pulse 
stopped, and we do not think that an undefined "good chance" of 
 
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recovery removes the issue of causation from the realm of 
speculation and conjecture.  Therefore, we hold that the trial 
court did not err in striking the Plaintiff's evidence. 
V 
 
Accordingly, the trial court's judgment will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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