Title: Swackhammer v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Swackhammer v. State1991 WY 44808 P.2d 219Case Number: 90-88Decided: 04/09/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jason SWACKHAMMER, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Affirmed. 

Wyoming Public 
Defender Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, David Gosar, 
Assistant Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid 
Program, Deborah Gabriel, Student Director, and Donna A. Murray, Student 
Intern., for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Donald G. Moore, Legal Intern., for appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1.]     In this appeal, Jason 
Swackhammer challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at a probation 
revocation hearing to justify the order revoking his probation. A collateral 
issue is raised attacking the use of testimony reporting hearsay at the 
revocation hearing. In addition, the justification for revocation because of 
Swackhammer's departure from the state of Wyoming while awaiting transportation to the 
state penitentiary is challenged. We hold that no violation of Swackhammer's 
rights of due process as a probationer occurred because of the testimony 
reporting hearsay and that the evidence was sufficient to justify the revocation 
of his probation for the commission of a new offense. Since probation properly 
was revoked on the premise of a new offense, we do not consider the question of 
whether Swackhammer had permission to leave the state. We affirm the order of 
the district court revoking Swackhammer's probation.

[¶2.]     In his Brief of 
Appellant, Swackhammer states the following issues:

"I. Whether the district 
court erred by allowing hearsay testimony at defendant's probation revocation 
hearing on the issue of whether a condition of probation was 
violated.

"II. Whether the district 
court abused its discretion by determining the state had met its burden of proof 
when the evidence clearly showed that the state had not met the burden 
established by the Wyoming courts."

The State of 
Wyoming, in 
its Brief of Appellee, sets forth the following issue:

"Whether the district 
court properly exercised its discretion in determining sufficient evidence was 
presented at trial to justify appellant's probation revocation?"

[¶3.]     On October 20, 1989, 
the district court sentenced Swackhammer to a term of not less than two nor more 
than three years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. The sentence was imposed 
after Swackhammer entered a plea of guilty to one count of larceny in violation 
of § 6-3-301(a), W.S. 1977 (June 1988 Repl.). All but 30 days of Swackhammer's 
sentence was suspended by the trial court, and he was required to serve two 
years on probation after his release from the penitentiary. There were several 
conditions attached to the probation. Among those conditions were requirements 
that he obey the rules and regulations of the Wyoming Department of Probation 
and Parole; that he obey the law; and that he lead a worthy life during the 
period of probation.

[¶4.]     On December 4, 1989, 
the Department of Probation and Parole filed a petition for revocation of 
Swackhammer's probation and requested the issuance of a bench warrant. The 
grounds stated for seeking revocation were that Swackhammer had fled the 
jurisdiction of the court prior to beginning service of the thirty day 
penitentiary sentence and that he was alleged to have committed a second grand 
larceny prior to leaving the state. The bench warrant was issued, and 
Swackhammer was arrested and brought before the court.

[¶5.]     A revocation hearing 
was conducted at which the State produced evidence pertaining to the alleged 
larceny and Swackhammer's flight from the state. With respect to the larceny, 
the evidence showed that, on November 5, 1989, a resident of Evansville contacted the 
Evansville Police Department about some coin packaging materials he had found 
near a local river. The police retrieved the packaging materials, which were 
determined to be proof packages for uncirculated coins. Some of those contained 
address labels for C.K. Peterson at Evansville. Police officers then questioned 
Bryan Peterson, C.K. Peterson's son, about the coins. Bryan Peterson reported 
that about one-half of his parents' coins, which had been kept in a suitcase in 
a bedroom of their home, were missing and had been stolen. Further investigation 
by the officers disclosed that Swackhammer had recently purchased items at a 
local convenience store using uncirculated coins.

[¶6.]     After speaking a second 
time with Bryan Peterson, the officers endeavored to locate Swackhammer as a 
suspect in the larceny case. They were unable to find him because Swackhammer 
had left town with two runaway girls on his way to Arizona. After the 
parents of the girls contacted police officers, Swackhammer was apprehended near 
Las Vegas, New Mexico by the New Mexico State 
Police.

[¶7.]     Swackhammer testified 
at the revocation hearing and explained that there had been an occasion when he 
had watched Bryan Peterson force the door of his parents' bedroom, retrieve the 
suitcase from underneath the bed, open it, and remove coins that Bryan had then spent at a 
convenience store. Swackhammer stated that the incident leading to the 
accusation against him occurred later. On that occasion, Bryan again entered the 
Petersons' bedroom, after forcing the door, and removed some coin packets from 
the same suitcase. Bryan was going to break open the packets in 
the bedroom but, when he hesitated to do that, Swackhammer told him that he and 
Jessie Warberg would take the plastic cases down to the river and break them 
open for him. After this was accomplished, Swackhammer went to the convenience 
store and spent some of those coins. Swackhammer also testified that he was 
under the impression that the coins he received belonged to Bryan Peterson. He 
denied that the coin packets he broke open were marked with C.K. Peterson's 
name.

[¶8.]     The trial court ruled 
that Swackhammer had violated his probation by leaving the jurisdiction with 
stolen property and two juvenile girls and also by committing a new larceny. The 
court revoked Swackhammer's probation and reinstated his previous sentence of 
not less than two nor more than three years in the penitentiary. Swackhammer 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to revoke his probation on either of 
the grounds alluded to by the trial court. We are satisfied, and hold, that 
there was sufficient evidence to revoke Swackhammer's probation on the ground of 
the new larceny, and we do not need to resolve the question of whether 
Swackhammer received permission to leave the state as he claimed.

[¶9.]     We first consider 
Swackhammer's contention that his due process right to confront witnesses 
against him was violated when the court admitted testimony by police officers 
that reported hearsay. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that a 
probationer does have a right to confront witnesses against him in a probation 
revocation proceeding, and we have recognized and applied that ruling. In 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972), the 
Supreme Court of the United States held that, upon revocation of parole, the 
parolee is entitled to certain due process protections. Procedurally, those 
protections include the right to a preliminary hearing on probable cause to 
revoke parole followed by a final, less summary, revocation hearing. At each 
hearing stage, a parolee has a right to notice of the alleged violations, the 
right to appear and present evidence in his own behalf, a conditional right to 
confront adverse witnesses, a right to a hearing by an independent decision 
maker, and the right to receive a written report of the hearing. Morrissey. In 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973), the Supreme Court extended the same due process protections to 
probationers in probation revocation proceedings.

[¶10.]  These protections have been incorporated 
into Wyoming's 
statutes and applicable court rules. In Rule 33(f), W.R.Cr.P., the right to a 
hearing is recognized:

"(f) Revocation of 
probation. - The court shall not revoke probation except after a hearing at 
which the defendant shall be present and apprised of the grounds on which such 
action is proposed."

The 
Morrissey/Gagnon protections are codified in § 7-13-408, W.S. 1977 (June 1987 
Repl.), as applied to administrative revocation proceedings. The statute 
includes, among the protections furnished, a conditional right to confront the 
witnesses against the probationer:

"(c) With respect to any 
hearing pursuant to this section, the probationer, parolee or conditional 
releasee:

* * * * * *

"(iii) Shall have the 
right to confront and examine any person who has made allegations against him, 
unless the hearing officer determines that the confrontation would present a 
substantial present or subsequent danger of harm to the person; * * 
*."

The protections 
articulated in § 7-13-408, W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.), are intended to apply in 
administrative revocation proceedings but, by decisions of this court, they have 
been extended, with the exception of the separate preliminary hearing 
requirement, to proceedings in which the court acts on a petition for revocation 
filed by a county attorney or the Board of Probation and Parole. Mason v. State, 
631 P.2d 1051 (Wyo. 1981); Weisser v. State, 
600 P.2d 1320 (Wyo. 1979); Knobel v. State, 576 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 
1978).1 See Cooney v. ParkCounty, 
792 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶11.]  Swackhammer claims that his due process 
right of confrontation was violated when testimony containing hearsay was used 
against him at the probation revocation hearing. During the course of that 
hearing, one of the officers who investigated the alleged larceny of the rare 
coins testified, over an objection by counsel for Swackhammer, as 
follows:

"Q. What happened 
then?

"A. I contacted Bryan 
Peterson, Jason Swackhammer, Jessie Warberg at the residence, spoke with Bryan 
Peterson, son of C.K. Peterson, asked him if he knew why this packaging material 
would be down by the river, and if his parents owned any coins.

"Q. What 
next?

* * * * * *

"A. Peterson stated that 
his parents did own coins, he went into a bedroom, retrieved a suitcase from the 
bedroom, checked the contents. * * * He checked the suitcase and contents of the 
suitcase and reported at that time that approximately half of the contents of 
the suitcase, half of his parents' coins were missing and had been stolen from 
the residence."

At a later point 
in his testimony, the same officer reported a conversation with Jessie 
Warberg:

"Q. And what did that 
conversation entail, if anything?

* * * * * *

"A. Mr. Warberg indicated 
he was present and accompanied, while Jason Swackhammer stole the coins from the 
Peterson residence, and he accompanied Jason Swackhammer to the vicinity of the 
river in Evansville where the two of them broke the packaging material in two in 
order to obtain the coins from the material, and he accompanied Jason 
Swackhammer to the State of New Mexico and was present with him at the Santa Fe 
coin shop where Jason Swackhammer sold the uncirculated silver coins there in 
exchange for $93.15."

[¶12.]  These statements constitute hearsay, 
defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying 
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted." Rule 801(c), W.R.E. The declarants, Peterson and Warberg, were not 
present in court and could not be cross-examined concerning the validity of the 
statements that the officer reported. The question posed by Swackhammer is 
whether the admission of this hearsay evidence violated Swackhammer's due 
process right to confrontation.

[¶13.]  The use of hearsay did not, in and of 
itself, constitute reversible error. Rule 1101(b)(3), W.R.E., provides that the 
rules of evidence do not apply in probation revocation proceedings. As we 
explained in Collins v. State, 712 P.2d 368, 371 (Wyo. 1986):

"* * * [T]he right of 
confrontation and cross-examination in a revocation hearing is not as positive 
as it is in a criminal proceeding. The admission of hearsay evidence without 
confrontation of witnesses does not ipso facto amount to error in revocation 
proceedings."

[¶14.]  This rule does not stand for the 
proposition, however, that the use of hearsay in revocation proceedings is 
without established parameters. In Mason, 631 P.2d  at 1055-56, we stated rules 
for the use of hearsay evidence in such a situation:

"* * * While hearsay is 
not categorically barred from revocation hearings, the hearsay admitted in this 
case was improper.

"It is impossible for the 
defendant to test the accuracy and truth of the State's witnesses if they are 
not at the hearing to give their testimony. * * * Both the defendant and the 
social system have a stake in making sure the factual determination in a 
revocation hearing is not an arbitrary one but is based on facts which pass the 
Morrissey, truth-seeking test of cross-examination, * * *. In this case the only 
evidence presented was in the form of hearsay which the defense was unable to 
test and verify. This was a clear violation of the appellant's right to due 
process. Anaya v. State, [96] Nev. [119], 606 P.2d 156 (1980). The State 
must make a good-faith attempt to produce the witnesses at a probation- or 
parole-revocation hearing or else show cause why they cannot appear. If for some 
valid reason a witness is unavailable, whether or not the information may be 
introduced through hearsay will be determined by the use of a balancing test. 
This test will weigh the defendant's interest in confronting and cross-examining 
the witnesses against him with the practical difficulties of producing the 
witness. Anaya v. State, supra."

This case stands 
for two propositions: (1) probation revocation may not be based solely on the 
use of hearsay evidence; and (2) if hearsay evidence is admitted, the trial 
court must apply the indicated balancing test before receiving such evidence. In 
this case, the introduction of hearsay evidence met the first requisite of Mason 
because the revocation of probation was not premised solely on the hearsay 
evidence.

[¶15.]  Swackhammer's probation was revoked 
because the court found that he had committed a larceny. Swackhammer's own 
testimony, coupled with the direct observations of the officers, was used to 
establish the necessary elements of that offense. Larceny consists of 
"steal[ing], tak[ing] and carry[ing], lead[ing] or driv[ing] away property of 
another with intent to deprive the owner or lawful possessor." Section 
6-3-402(a), W.S. 1977 (June 1988 Repl.). Swackhammer testified that he did take 
coin packets from C.K. Peterson's house, broke them open, and spent some of the 
coins. One of the officers testified that the coin packets found by the river 
had C.K. Peterson's name on it. Thus, Swackhammer's revocation of probation was 
based on evidence other than hearsay evidence.

[¶16.]  Swackhammer, however, complains that the 
balancing test established for the use of hearsay by Mason was not followed in 
his case. He asserts, correctly, that the trial court did not analyze the 
evidence, after his objection at the hearing, to balance: (1) Swackhammer's 
right to cross-examine, (2) the practical difficulties of producing the 
declarant witnesses at the hearing, and (3) the reliability of the hearsay to be 
presented. Mason. In our view, there was sufficient independent evidence in this 
instance to support the decision of the trial court to revoke probation without 
any resort to the hearsay evidence. In light of that independent evidence, we 
hold that Swackhammer's right of confrontation was not infringed by the use of 
the hearsay, which was cumulative evidence, without applying the test 
established by Mason. See People in Interest of C.J.W., 727 P.2d 870 (Colo. App. 
1986).

[¶17.]  In a probation revocation proceeding, the 
duty of the court is to determine whether there are verified facts establishing 
a violation of the release agreement and, whether in light of any proven 
violation, the probation should be revoked. Mason. The evidence need not 
establish a violation of the conditions of probation beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Cooney, 792 P.2d 1287; Panesenko v. State, 706 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1985). All that is 
necessary is the court's conscientious judgment, after hearing the evidence, 
that a violation of probation has occurred. Panesenko; Longwell v. State, 705 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 
1985).

[¶18.]  The decision to revoke probation and 
impose a sentence is a decision left almost entirely to the sound discretion of 
the trial court. Such sentencing decisions are not disturbed on appeal unless 
the record discloses a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the sentencing 
court. Cooney; Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346 (Wyo. 1990); Schmidt v. State, 738 P.2d 1105 (Wyo. 1987); Gronski v. State, 700 P.2d 777 (Wyo. 1985). We have 
explained the standard in this way:

"`A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did.'" Mower v. State, 750 P.2d 679, 680-81 (Wyo. 1988), aff'd on collateral issue 770 P.2d 233 
(Wyo. 1989), citing Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980).

To the same 
effect is Ketcham v. State, 618 P.2d 1356 (Wyo. 1980).

[¶19.]  In addition to the appellant's own 
testimony, summarized above, the trial court had before it the testimony of the 
officers relating to the packages that had been found with C.K. Peterson's name 
on them. The court also had testimony from Jessie Warberg. Warberg stated that 
he and Swackhammer took the coin packages down to "the lake" and broke them 
open. Appellant relies extensively on Warberg's testimony on cross-examination 
to this effect:

"Q. When Jason came out 
of the house, what did he say?

"A. Something about 
Bryan, I think, 
gave him coins, I am not sure, it was a while back, it was vague.

"Q. Okay, something like 
Bryan gave him 
the coins?

"A. I am not sure, it was 
a while back."

[¶20.]  This testimony does not demonstrate the 
soundness of appellant's theory of the case. Swackhammer asserts that he did not 
steal the coins but received them from Bryan Peterson, thinking that they 
belonged to Bryan. Warberg didn't see that, and he had no 
more than Swackhammer's statement of the fact that Bryan Peterson gave 
Swackhammer the coins. The reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the 
information before the court are sufficient to demonstrate that Swackhammer 
knowingly participated in the larceny, whether Bryan Peterson was also involved 
or not. See Wells v. State, 613 P.2d 201 (Wyo. 1980) (intent to steal may be established 
by circumstantial evidence).

[¶21.]  As we already have noted, there is no 
requirement to establish the intent element of larceny beyond a reasonable doubt 
to justify revocation of appellant's probation. In Panesenko, 706 P.2d  at 275, 
we upheld the revocation of that defendant's probation for stealing a car 
battery, even though he claimed he had only "borrowed" it:

"Under well recognized 
principles the action of the trial court in revoking Panesenko's probation was 
proper even if there was a defect in establishing petit larceny beyond a 
reasonable doubt."

We hold that the 
trial court did not, in any way, abuse its discretion in revoking Swackhammer's 
probation in this case. The evidence established sufficient participation in a 
larceny to support the court's action.

[¶22.]  Swackhammer's next claim is that the 
district court abused its discretion by terminating his probation since the 
State had not met its burden of proving a violation of the conditions of that 
probation. Swackhammer's argument is that the State did not prove by sufficient 
evidence that he left the state without permission. As we have indicated, there 
is no need for us to consider this ground for revocation because the larceny, 
when established, furnished more than sufficient reason to revoke Swackhammer's 
probation and order the execution of the sentence originally 
imposed.

[¶23.]  The order revoking appellant's probation 
and imposing sentence is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 There is language in 
Knobel v. State, 576 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1978), and Weisser v. State, 600 P.2d 1320 
(Wyo. 1979), which could be perceived as suggesting that the protections of § 
7-13-408, W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.), and those articulated in Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972), and Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973), are applicable 
only to administrative revocation proceedings. Weisser. Subsequent cases cited 
in the text, however, have extended these protections to judicial proceedings as 
well, except for the requirement of a preliminary hearing, which the cases say 
can be fulfilled by the trial court's probable cause consideration in connection 
with the issuance of an arrest warrant. See, Knobel; Weisser. Whether they arise 
from statute or from constitutional due process considerations that are 
discussed in Morrissey and Gagnon, the due process rights must be afforded in a 
judicial revocation proceeding. Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051 (Wyo. 1981), Weisser, and 
Knobel all interpreted § 7-13-409, W.S. 1977, a predecessor to § 7-13-408, W.S. 
1977 (June 1987 Repl.).