Title: KEASTER v BOZIK

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-187 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 BRUCE E . KEASTER and JANET M. KEASTER, husband and wife, Plaintiffs and Respondents, VS. ANDY BOZIK, a single man; FEDERAL LAND BANK OF SPOKANE, et al., Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade. Honorable John McCarvel, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Robert J. Emrnons, Great Falls, Montana For Respondents: Graybill, Ostrem, Warner and Crotty, Great Falls, Montana Submitted on briefs: November 26, 1980 Decided: K B 1 1 , 1981 Filed: fE8 : b M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . Bruce E. and J a n e t Keaster brought t h i s a c t i o n f o r s p e c i - f i c performance of a real estate o p t i o n i n t h e Cascade County District Court on A p r i l 14, 1978. The D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d a judgment r e q u i r i n g d e f e n d a n t Andy Bozik t o comply w i t h t h e terms o f t h e o p t i o n and awarding a c t u a l damages of $15,300 to t h e p l a i n t i f f s and $5,200 to t h e d e f e n d a n t . Defendant Andy Bozik a p p e a l s . Bruce Keaster, t h e buyer, and Andy Bozik, t h e s e l l e r , e n t e r e d i n t o an o p t i o n t o purchase real estate on A p r i l 15, 1977. The o p t i o n c o n t a i n e d a l e g a l d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y , 899 acres of B o z i k ' s l a n d . The agreement was a s t a n - d a r d Farm Home A d m i n i s t r a t i o n (FHA) o p t i o n c o n t r a c t and included t h e f o l l o w i n g t e r m . "The o f f e r h e r e i n s h a l l remain i r r e v o c a b l e f o r a p e r i o d of s i x months from t h e d a t e hereof and s h a l l remain i n f o r c e t h e r e a f t e r u n t i l one (1) y e a r from t h e d a t e hereof u n l e s s earlier ter- minated by t h e S e l l e r . The S e l l e r may t e r m i n a t e t h i s o f f e r a t any t i m e a f t e r t h e s i x ( 6 ) months' i r r e v o c a b l e p e r i o d provided h e r e i n by g i v i n g to t h e Buyer t e n ( 1 0 ) d a y s ' w r i t t e n n o t i c e of i n t e n t i o n to t e r m i n a t e a t t h e a d d r e s s of t h e Buyer. Acceptance of t h i s o p t i o n by t h e Buyer w i t h i n t e n ( 1 0 ) days af ter such n o t i c e is r e c e i v e d by him s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e a v a l i d accep- t a n c e of t h e o p t i o n . " The o p t i o n s i g n e d on A p r i l 15, 1977, s t a t e d a con- s i d e r a t i o n of "$5.00 i n hand paid and o t h e r v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n " and f u r t h e r provided t h a t " t h i s o p t i o n is g i v e n t o e n a b l e t h e Buyer to o b t a i n a l o a n i n s u r e d o r made by t h e United S t a t e s of America, a c t i n g through t h e Farmers Home Admini- s t r a t i o n , United S t a t e s Department of A g r i c u l t u r e . . . f o r t h e purchase of s a i d p r o p e r t y . I t is agreed t h a t t h e Buyer's e f f o r t s t o o b t a i n a l o a n c o n s t i t u t e a p a r t of t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r t h i s o p t i o n . . ." The sales p r i c e w a s $200,000, $56,000 as a down payment and $144,000 o v e r 30 y e a r s a t 6% i n t e r e s t ( a n n u a l payment of $10,461.00). The c o n t r a c t w a s amended on A p r i l 26, 1977, to make t h e c o n t r a c t payable o v e r 20 y e a r s a t an annual payment of $12,554.57. On May 2, 1977, K e a s t e r and Bozik signed a " d e c l a r a t i o n of i n t e r e s t and agreement" acknowledging t h e o p t i o n to p u r c h a s e . T h i s document was recorded w i t h t h e Cascade County c l e r k and r e c o r d e r on May 25, 1977. I n e a r l y A p r i l of 1978, r e s p o n d e n t Bruce Keaster a t t e m p t e d t o e x e r c i s e t h e o p t i o n . A p p e l l a n t Andy Bozik r e f u s e d to convey t h e p r o p e r t y . Following t h e commencement of t h i s a c t i o n on A p r i l 1 4 , 1978, Andy Bozik f i l e d a c o u n t e r c l a i m s e e k i n g r e f o r m a t i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t and a c t u a l damages f o r Keaster's use of h i s p a s t u r e . The damages arose from a s e p a r a t e t r a n s a c t i o n and a r e n o t a n i s s u e h e r e . T r i a l commenced on J a n u a r y 1 7 , 1980. During t h e pro- c e e d i n g s r e s p o n d e n t ' s c o u n s e l i n t r o d u c e d e v i d e n c e of a c t u a l dama- g e s s u f f e r e d by Keaster af ter t h e f i l i n g of t h e complaint. H e s o u g h t to amend t h e p l e a d i n g s to i n c l u d e a p r a y e r f o r damages f o r loss of c r o p s and p a s t u r a g e occasioned by t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s r e f u s a l t o convey t h e p r o p e r t y . The District Court allowed t h e amendment. Testimony adduced a t t r i a l r e v e a l s t h a t Bruce Keaster and Andy Bozik m e t s e v e r a l t i m e s i n l a t e March or e a r l y A p r i l of 1977 i n n e g o t i a t i n g t h e o p t i o n . Keaster proposed a n o p t i o n which pro- v i d e d f o r a $60,000 down payment and i n t e r e s t a t 4%. Bozik r e f u s e d t h e down payment amount f o r income t a x r e a s o n s and o b j e c t e d t o t h e i n t e r e s t rate. The t r a n s c r i p t a l s o r e v e a l s t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t n e v e r a t t e m p t e d to g i v e a w r i t t e n n o t i c e of t e r m i n a t i o n . Bozik t e s t i f i e d t h a t a l t h o u g h Keaster and Roger Smith, t h e F H A county s u p e r v i s o r , t o l d him t h a t w r i t t e n n o t i c e was r e q u i r e d , he b e l i e v e d a n oral n o t i c e was s u f f i c i e n t s i n c e t h e document was n e v e r n o t a r i z e d . I n a d d i t i o n Bozik t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had a copy of t h e o p t i o n agreement f o r t h e e n t i r e p e r i o d . A p p e l l a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t he t o l d t h e respondent and Roger Smith more t h a n s i x months a f t e r t h e o p t i o n was signed t h a t he was n o t going t o sell. K e a s t e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e f i r s t t i m e he l e a r n e d of t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s i n t e n t i o n n o t to comply w i t h t h e o p t i o n was on A p r i l 6, 1978. K e a s t e r s t a t e d t h a t on t h a t day he p r e s e n t e d a w r i t t e n n o t i c e of a c c e p t a n c e of t h e o p t i o n , a n ear- n e s t money check f o r $1,000 and a buy-sell agreement t o Bozik a t B o z i k ' s r e s i d e n c e . The n o t i c e of a c c e p t a n c e was d r a f t e d by r e s p o n d e n t ' s a t t o r n e y and d a t e d A p r i l 5, 1978, and t h e check was d a t e d A p r i l 6, 1978. Bozik t e s t i f i e d t h a t K e a s t e r p r e s e n t e d t h e check to him on A p r i l 14, 1978, and t h a t he had never s e e n t h e o t h e r documents. The FHA c e r t i f i e d and approved Bruce and J a n e t K e a s t e r f o r a l o a n of $46,000 p r i o r to t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e o p t i o n p e r i o d . The K e a s t e r s had a l s o arranged t o borrow $10,000 from a t h i r d p a r t y and had arranged to o b t a i n $56,000 from t h e B e l t V a l l e y Bank f o r t h e down payment u n t i l t h e y r e c e i v e d t h e l o a n p r o c e e d s from t h e F H A and t h e t h i r d p a r t y . A t t r i a l con£ l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d r e g a r d i n g t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s of t h e p a r t i e s and t h e i r conduct b e f o r e and af ter t h e s i g n i n g of t h e agreement and a t t h e t i m e of t h e attempted e x e r c i s e of t h e o p t i o n . Of primary s i g n i f i c a n c e is a n o r a l agreement t h a t t h e p a r t i e s intended Bozik t o have t h e use of a house and garage on t h e p r o p e r t y f o r a s long a s he d e s i r e d . Bruce K e a s t e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e t h e o p t i o n c o n t r a c t was executed it was agreed t h a t Andy Bozik would have t h e use of t h e house and g a r a g e , b u t n o t t h e use of t h e o t h e r b u i l d i n g s . H e understood t h a t Bozik was to have "something l i k e " a l i f e e s t a t e i n t h e house and g a r a g e . When asked why t h i s p r o v i s i o n w a s not i n c l u d e d i n t h e o p t i o n , he t e s t i f i e d t h a t it was h i s i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h i s p r o v i s i o n would be p u t i n upon c l o s i n g . Andy Bozik t e s t i f i e d t h a t it was h i s understanding t h a t none of t h e b u i l d i n g s were t o be included i n t h e s a l e . - 4 - The District Court e n t e r e d its f i n d i n g s of f a c t , conclu- s i o n s of l a w and judgment on February 15, 1980. The c o u r t found t h a t t h e p a r t i e s had agreed t h a t Andy Bozik would have t h e use and occupancy of t h e house and g a r a g e l o c a t e d on t h e p r o p e r t y f o r as long as he chooses to l i v e t h e r e ; t h a t t h e o p t i o n w a s n e v e r revoked a c c o r d i n g to its terms; t h a t Bruce Keaster gave w r i t t e n n o t i c e of h i s a c c e p t a n c e of t h e o p t i o n on A p r i l 6, 1978; t h a t Andy Bozik breached t h e o p t i o n agreement on t h e same d a t e by r e f u s i n g t o sell; t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s became e n t i t l e d to t h e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y e x c e p t t h e house and g a r a g e on A p r i l 6, 1978; t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s were e n t i t l e d to $15,300 f o r t h e loss of p r o f i t s f o r t h e 1978 and 1979 c r o p s e a s o n s ; and t h a t Andy Bozik was e n t i t l e d to $5,200 f o r p a s t u r e r e n t a l a r i s i n g from a s e p a r a t e t r a n s a c t i o n . The c o u r t concluded t h a t t h e o p t i o n w a s v a l i d and p r o p e r l y e x e r c i s e d and t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s were e n t i t l e d to s p e c i f i c performance of t h e agreement. Andy Bozik was g i v e n " t h e use and occupancy of t h e r e s i d e n c e and g a r a g e f o r as long as he chooses to l i v e t h e r e . " A p p e l l a n t Bozik asserts numerous s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of error which can be c o n s o l i d a t e d i n t o t h e f o l l o w i n g major i s s u e s : 1) Whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n a l l o w i n g t h e amendment of t h e c o m p l a i n t d u r i n g t h e t r i a l t o i n c l u d e damages f o r l o s s of t h e use of t h e p r o p e r t y ? 2 ) Whether t h e r e was a d e q u a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o s u p p o r t s p e c i f i c enforcement of t h e o p t i o n ? 3 ) Whether t h e o p t i o n was s u f f i c i e n t l y complete and def i- n i t e to af f o r d t h e remedy of s p e c i f i c performance? The i s s u e concerning amendment of t h e c o m p l a i n t d u r i n g t r i a l is governed by t h e second s e n t e n c e of Rule 1 5 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., which states: "If e v i d e n c e is o b j e c t e d to a t t h e t r i a l on t h e ground t h a t it is n o t w i t h i n t h e i s s u e s made by t h e p l e a d i n g s , t h e c o u r t may allow t h e p l e a d i n g s t o be amended and s h a l l do so f r e e l y when t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e merits of t h e a c t i o n w i l l be s u b s e r v e d t h e r e b y and t h e o b j e c t i n g p a r t y f a i l s t o s a t i s f y t h e c o u r t t h a t t h e admission of such e v i d e n c e would p r e j u d i c e him i n m a i n t a i n i n g h i s a c t i o n or d e f e n s e upon t h e merits. The c o u r t may g r a n t a c o n t i n u a n c e to e n a b l e t h e o b j e c t i n g p a r t y t o meet such e v i d e n c e ." I t is w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t whether to allow s u c h amendment. Nothing i n t h e record i n d i c a t e s an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . A t t r i a l , B o z i k ' s c o u n s e l o b j e c t e d to admission of t e s t i m o n y by Keaster as to damages f o r t h e use of t h e p r o p e r t y and f o r loss of prof its f o r t h e crop s e a s o n s of 1978 and 1979, and f u r t h e r o b j e c t e d to t h e Keaster's motion to amend t h e p l e a d i n g s . The t r i a l c o u r t allowed an o f f e r of proof and r e s e r v e d r u l i n g u n t i l b r i e f s were submitted a f t e r t r i a l . The d e c i s i o n of t h e c o u r t t o allow t h e amendment was based upon t h e p r a y e r i n t h e complaint f o r "such o t h e r and f u r t h e r r e l i e f as t h e C o u r t deems j u s t and p r o p e r . " A p p e l l a n t claims he w a s denied t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to p r e p a r e h i s case on t h e i s s u e and t h e r e f o r e was denied due p r o c e s s . H e f u r t h e r states t h a t r e s p o n d e n t knew of t h e claim p r i o r to t r i a l and should have f i l e d a supplemental p l e a d i n g or amended t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r . Respondent asserts t h a t a p p e l l a n t could n o t have been s u r p r i s e d by a c l a i m f o r damages which flowed n a t u r a l l y from a p p e l l a n t ' s r e f u s a l to perform t h e c o n t r a c t . The amendment s o u g h t by t h e K e a s t e r s d u r i n g t r i a l d i d n o t change t h e t h e o r y of l i a b i l i t y or a f f e c t t h e e n t i r e complexion of t h e l a w s u i t , as d i d t h e amendments s o u g h t and r e f u s e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n B r o t h e r s v. S u r p l u s T r a c t o r P a r t s C o r p o r a t i o n ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 1 Mont. 412, 506 P.2d 1362, and Montgomery v. Gehring ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 1 4 5 Mont. 278, 400 P.2d 403. It is w i t h i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n to allow amendment of t h e p l e a d i n g s d u r i n g t r i a l i f t h e o b j e c t i n g p a r t y f a i l s to show t h a t an amendment would r e s u l t i n p r e j u d i c e . The f a i l u r e of r e s p o n d e n t s to f i l e a supplemental p l e a d i n g o r to amend t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r as soon as t h e damages a c c r u e d is n o t i n i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t to compel d e n i a l of a motion t o amend d u r i n g t r i a l . Union I n t e r c h a n g e , I n c . v. P a r k e r ( 1 9 6 0 ) , 138 Mont. 348, 357 P.2d 339. While Rule 16, M.R.Civ.P., states t h a t t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r is to c o n t r o l t h e s u b s e q u e n t c o u r s e of a c t i o n , it f u r t h e r p r o v i d e s f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n a t t h e t r i a l . A p p e l l a n t is i n no p o s i t i o n to complain of a d e n i a l of due p r o c e s s s i n c e he made no motion f o r a c o n t i n u a n c e to e n a b l e him t o defend a g a i n s t Keaster's claim f o r damages. Union I n t e r c h a n g e , s u p r a , and C l a c k v. Clack ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 98 Mont. 552, 4 1 P.2d 32. With r e g a r d t o t h e second i s s u e , a p p e l l a n t relies upon s e c t i o n 27-1-415 ( I ) , MCA, which p r o v i d e s : " S p e c i f i c performance cannot be enforced a g a i n s t a p a r t y t o a c o n t r a c t . . . "(1) i f he h a s n o t r e c e i v e d an a d e q u a t e con- s i d e r a t i o n f o r t h e c o n t r a c t . " I t is argued t h a t f i v e d o l l a r s is n o t a d e q u a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r a c o n t r a c t t h a t "ties up" land worth $200,000 f o r one y e a r . T h i s argument, however, d i s t o r t s t h e f a c t s . The o p t i o n r e c i t e d con- s i d e r a t i o n of f i v e d o l l a r s and o t h e r v a l u a b l e cons i d e r a t i o n . The b u y e r s ' e f f o r t s t o o b t a i n an F H A l o a n e x p r e s s l y c o n s t i t u t e d p a r t o f t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The o p t i o n was i r r e v o c a b l e f o r s i x months, a f t e r which t h e a p p e l l a n t could have revoked by g i v i n g w r i t t e n n o t ice. I n s u p p o r t of h i s argument, A p p e l l a n t Bozik cites Rude v. Levy ( 1 9 0 8 ) , 4 3 Colo. 482, 96 P. 560, wherein it w a s h e l d t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of one d o l l a r was i n a d e q u a t e f o r an o p t i o n to p u r c h a s e l a n d worth $900. W e d e c l i n e to f o l l o w t h i s view. The p a r t i e s , from e q u a l b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n s , agreed upon t h e amount o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n which t h e y deemed s u f f i c i e n t to s u p p o r t t h e o p t i o n . I n t h e absence of e v i d e n c e of f r a u d , i f t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e f o r t h e land is a d e q u a t e , even nominal c o n s i d e r a t i o n is a d e q u a t e to s u p p o r t an o p t i o n . Brooks v. LeGrand (Okla. 1 9 6 7 ) , 435 P.2d 142. See also Honeyfield v. Lambeth (Mo.App. 1 9 7 5 ) , 519 S.W.2d 342; Board of C o n t r o l of E a s t e r n Michigan Univ. v. Burgess ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 45 Mich.App. 183, 206 N.W.2d 256; A l l e n v. Rakes ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 359 Mass. 1, 267 N.E.2d 628. The c o n s i d e r a t i o n r e c i t e d by t h e o p t i o n was s u f f i c i e n t to create a v a l i d c o n t r a c t a s w e l l as ade- q u a t e t o allow t h e e q u i t a b l e remedy of s p e c i f i c performance. A p p e l l a n t n e x t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e c o n t r a c t w a s n o t suf- f i c i e n t l y complete and d e f i n i t e to be af f o r d e d t h e remedy of s p e c i f i c performance. S e c t i o n 27-1-412(6), MCA, p r o v i d e s : "The f o l l o w i n g o b l i g a t i o n s cannot be s p e c i f i - c a l l y e n f o r c e d : " ( 6 ) a n agreement t h e terms of which are not s u f f i c i e n t l y c e r t a i n to make t h e p r e c i s e act which is t o be done c l e a r l y a s c e r t a i n a b l e . " A p p e l l a n t Bozik asserts t h a t t h e o p t i o n was d e f i c i e n t f o r t w o r e a s o n s . F i r s t , he asserts t h a t t h e use and occupancy of t h e house and g a r a g e o r t h e e x c l u s i o n of a l l t h e b u i l d i n g s w a s a material element l e f t o u t of t h e c o n t r a c t . Second, it is a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o s p e c i f y a d a t e f o r t h e down payment, t h e a n n u a l payments and t h e commencement of i n t e r e s t is f a t a l . On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e respondent contends t h a t a l l t h e material e l e m e n t s of t h e c o n t r a c t are included and t h a t any terms not i n c l u d e d i n t h e c o n t r a c t are collateral. I t must be noted a t t h e o u t s e t t h a t t h e o p t i o n c o n t r a c t as w r i t t e n and s i g n e d by t h e p a r t i e s c o n t a i n s no ambiguity and is s u f f i c i e n t l y d e f i n i t i v e to be c a p a b l e of s p e c i f i c enforcement when one l o o k s s o l e l y to t h e f o u r c o r n e r s of t h e i n s t r u m e n t . The o p t i o n c o n t r a c t c o n t a i n s a l e g a l p r o p e r t y d e s c r i p t i o n , e x p r e s s e s t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r t h e g r a n t of t h e o p t i o n , s t a t e s t h e terms f o r a r e v o c a t i o n , p r o v i d e s t h e t i m e i n which t h e o p t i o n is e x e r c i s a b l e , r e v e a l s t h e purchase p r i c e i n c l u d i n g t h e amount of down payment and a n n u a l payment, and states t h e i n t e r e s t rate. I n a d d i t i o n t h e c o n t r a c t states t h a t it i n c l u d e s a f u l l s t a t e m e n t o f any r e s e r v a t i o n s or e x c e p t i o n s and f u r t h e r h a s l e f t blank a c l a u s e t h a t states " I n s e r t h e r e c o n d i t i o n s p e c u l i a r t o t h i s par- t i c u l a r t r a n s a c t i o n ." I n h i s c o u n t e r c l a i m , A p p e l l a n t Bozik s o u g h t r e f o r m a t i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t t o i n c l u d e a r e s e r v a t i o n of t h e farm house, g a r a g e and o t h e r o u t b u i l d i n g s t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e land upon which t h e b u i l d i n g s are l o c a t e d . H e a l l e g e d t h a t by mutual m i s t a k e and i n a d v e r t e n c e t h i s material p a r t of t h e c o n t r a c t between t h e par- t i e s was o m i t t e d from t h e w r i t i n g . A t t r i a l t h e t e s t i m o n y concerning t h e p a r t i e s ' i n t e n t i o n s w i t h r e g a r d to t h e b u i l d i n g s was c o n f l i c t i n g . K e a s t e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t d u r i n g t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s p r i o r to t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e o p t i o n , t h e p a r t i e s agreed t h a t Bozik was to have t h e r i g h t to u s e t h e house and g a r a g e f o r as long as he wanted to l i v e t h e r e . H e understood t h e house and g a r a g e were n o t to be excluded from t h e sale, b u t Bozik would have "something l i k e " a l i f e estate. Bozik t e s t i f i e d t h a t p r i o r to e x e c u t i n g t h e o p t i o n he had t o l d Keaster t h e b u i l d i n g s were n o t f o r sale. H i s t e s t i m o n y a l s o r e v e a l e d t h a t he was under f i n a n c i a l p r e s s u r e s to sell t h e p r o p e r t y , and t h a t t h o s e p r e s s u r e s had diminished s u b s e q u e n t to t h e d a t e of t h e o p t i o n agreement. By September of 1977, Bozik no l o n g e r wanted t o s e l l any of h i s p r o p e r t y . On t h e b a s i s of t h e e v i d e n c e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t found t h a t t h e p a r t i e s had reached a mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t Bozik would b e allowed to use t h e house and g a r a g e f o r as long as he d e s i r e d . According to Rule 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P.: " . . . F i n d i n g s of f a c t s h a l l n o t be set a s i d e u n l e s s c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s , and due r e g a r d s h a l l b e g i v e n t o t h e o p p o r t u n i t y of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o judge of t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e w i t n e s s e s . " There is s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . Without s t a t i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t it was doing so, t h e t r i a l c o u r t reformed t h e c o n t r a c t t o reflect t h e i n t e n t i o n s of t h e p a r t i e s as it found them t o be a t t h e t i m e t h e c o n t r a c t w a s e x e c u t e d . When by mutual m i s t a k e t h e agreement of t h e p a r t i e s is n o t c o n t a i n e d i n t h e w r i t t e n i n s t r u m e n t , t h e i n s t r u m e n t may be reformed s o as t o e x p r e s s t h a t i n t e n t i o n . S e c t i o n 28-2-1611, MCA. The t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t reach beyond t h e e v i d e n c e to s u p p l y a t e r m n o t agreed upon by t h e p a r t i e s . The e v i d e n c e showed t h a t t h e p a r t i e s had a g e n e r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t Bozik would be a l l o w e d to remain i n h i s home, b u t t h e y had n o t determined w h e t h e r Bozik was to have a l i f e estate or some o t h e r i n t e r e s t . Both p a r t i e s b e l i e v e d t h e y c o u l d make t h e n e c e s s a r y changes i n t h e documents a t t h e t i m e of c l o s i n g . However, s i n c e t h e a p p e l l a n t r e f u s e d to honor t h e o p t i o n when it was e x e r c i s e d , t h e proposed c o n t r a c t f o r deed was n o t f i n a l i z e d and e x e c u t e d . A s a r e s u l t t h e o r a l agreement was n o t reduced to w r i t i n g . It was w i t h i n t h e e q u i t a b l e power of t h e t r i a l c o u r t to c o r r e c t t h i s mistake by reforming t h e c o n t r a c t , and t h e n s p e c i f i c a l l y e n f o r c i n g it. S e c t i o n 28-2-1614, MCA. The c o n t r a c t as reformed was s u f f i c i e n t l y d e f i n i t e and complete w i t h r e g a r d to t h e s u b j e c t matter t o allow s p e c i f i c performance . A p p e l l a n t f u r t h e r c o n t e n d s t h e o p t i o n was i n c o m p l e t e i n t h a t it f a i l e d t o s p e c i f y d a t e s f o r t h e down payment, t h e a n n u a l payments, and t h e commencement of t h e i n t e r e s t on t h e unpaid b a l a n c e . The o p t i o n c o n t r a c t as f i n a l i z e d by t h e p a r t i e s i n c l u d e d t h e f o l l o w i n g t e r m : "The t o t a l p u r c h a s e p r i c e f o r s a i d p r o p e r t y is Two Hundred Thousand D o l l a r s ; s a i d amount p a y a b l e . . . $56,000.00 a s a down payment; b a l a n c e of $144,000.00 o n a c o n t r a c t f o r deed, p a y a b l e a t t h e rate of $12,554.57 p e r annum f o r t h e t e r m of 20 y e a r s . I n t e r e s t a t 6% p e r annum. Copy of t h e proposed c o n t r a c t a t t a c h e d h e r e t o . " I t is clear from t h e proposed c o n t r a c t f o r deed t h a t t h e p a r t i e s c o n t e m p l a t e d t h e making of t h e down payment on t h e d a t e t h e c o n t r a c t w a s e x e c u t e d , w i t h i n t e r e s t t o commence on t h a t d a t e . The d a t e s u p p l i e d by t h e proposed c o n t r a c t f o r t h e a n n u a l payments was December 1 of each y e a r , commencing i n 1978. The b u y - s e l l agreement t e n d e r e d a t t h e t i m e of t h e a t t e m p t e d e x e r c i s e o f t h e o p t i o n provided t h a t p o s s e s s i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y was to be d e l i v e r e d on A p r i l 15, 1978, which was t h e end of t h e o p t i o n p e r i o d . - 1 0 - The f a c t t h a t t h e s e terms were n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y e x p r e s s e d i n t h e o p t i o n c o n t r a c t does n o t r e n d e r t h e o p t i o n u n e n f o r c e a b l e . I t is w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t a b s o l u t e c e r t a i n t y i n e v e r y d e t a i l is n o t a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r s p e c i f i c performance. Gropp v. L o t t o n ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 160 Mont. 415, 503 P.2d 661; S t e e n v. Rustad ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 2 Mont. 96, 313 P.2d 1014. Those matters which are c o l l a t e r a l or which go to t h e performance of t h e c o n t r a c t are n o t e s s e n t i a l and need n o t be e x p r e s s e d i n t h e c o n t r a c t . S t e e n v. Rustad, s u p r a ; Johnson v. E l l i o t ( 1 9 5 0 ) , 1 2 3 Mont. 597, 218 P.2d 703. When t h e t i m e of performance is n o t s p e c i f i e d , a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e w i l l be i m p l i e d . S e c t i o n 28-3-601, MCA. The t r i a l c o u r t h a s t h e i n h e r e n t power to set up a s c h e d u l e f o r t h e performance of t h e o b l i g a t i o n s and t h e commencement of i n t e r e s t . Rogers v. Relyea ( 1 9 7 9 ) t Mont . , 601 P.2d 37, 36 St.Rep. 1706. These a d j u s t m e n t s are n e c e s s a r y to implement t h e d e c r e e of s p e c i f i c performance. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is a£ f irmed, and t h e case is remanded f o r f u r t h e r o r d e r s s p e c i f i c a l l y e n f o r c i n g t h e c o n t r a c t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n . Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: T h i s cause was submitted p r i o r t o J a n u a r y 5, 1981.