Title: WAID v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WAID v. STATE2000 WY 15996 P.2d 18Case Number: 98-20Decided: 02/08/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
PAUL WAID and JO WAID; 
NORM SANTESSON and JO SANTESSON; WAID SERVICES, INC.; RICHARD SALCIDO and 
DEBORAH SALCIDO; and TED ADAMS and DONNA ADAMS, Appellants (Plaintiffs), 
v.STATE OF 
WYOMING, by and through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; and BURLINGTON 
NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellees (Defendants).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Washakie County, Honorable Gary P. Hartman, 
Judge.

S. Joseph Darrah 
and Joseph E. Darrah of Darrah & Darrah, P.C., Powell, Wyoming; and Brad 
Smith, Cody, Wyoming, representing appellants.William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Thomas C. Wilson, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jennifer A. Cudworth, Assistant Attorney 
General, Cheyenne, Wyoming, representing appellee State, by and through 
the Department of Transportation.

John A. Coppede 
of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, Cheyenne, Wyoming. representing appellee 
Burlington Northern Railroad Company.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] Paul Waid, 
Jo Waid, Norm Santesson, Jo Santesson, Waid Services, Inc., Richard Salcido, 
Deborah Salcido, Ted Adams, and Donna Adams (collectively the Waid group) appeal 
from a summary judgment entered in favor of the Wyoming Department of 
Transportation (WYDOT) and Burlington Northern Railroad Company (Burlington) in 
an action for inverse condemnation. Specifically, the Waid group contests the 
ruling, upon which the district court premised the summary judgment, that Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-26-516 (Lexis 1999) requires a permanent taking for inverse 
condemnation. As we analyze this statute, a permanent taking is not required, 
but the district court's grant of summary judgment can be, and it is, affirmed 
on other grounds. The Waid group failed to satisfy the time limit for filing a 
claim against WYDOT, as set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 (Michie 1988). 
The record demonstrates that there is no causal connection between Burlington's 
activities and any damage to the Waid group lands, nor does Burlington come 
within the category of one conducting activities on adjacent land for purposes 
of inverse condemnation under the statute. The Findings of Fact and Order 
Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment is 
affirmed.

[¶2] In the 
Brief of Appellant, filed on behalf of the Waid group, the issues are 
articulated in this way:

A. Did the District Court 
err in holding that defendants could defeat claims for inverse condemnation of a 
flooding easement, brought under W.S. § 1-26-516, by showing that they could 
take steps to prevent recurrence of flooding in the future without submitting 
evidence to support that claim?

B. Did the District Court 
err in granting summary judgments to all defendants on the issue of the taking 
of personal property without the Defendants submitting evidence in support of 
their motion?

C. Could the District 
Court have granted summary judgment on any of the other bases on which 
Defendants sought summary judgment?

[¶3] This 
Statement of the Issues is found in the Brief of Appellee Burlington Northern 
Railroad Company:

1. Whether the district 
court properly granted summary judgment against the Appellants on their inverse 
condemnation claims where the evidence showed the claims were based on two 
isolated instances of temporary flooding?

2. Whether the district 
court properly granted summary judgment against the Appellants on their inverse 
condemnation claim where the landowners as a matter of law failed to show that 
their properties were damaged for a public use?

3. Whether a landowner 
can maintain an inverse condemnation claim against a party for allegedly 
inversely acquiring a property right for which it did not possess the power to 
acquire directly through an eminent domain proceeding?

4. Whether this Court 
should affirm the district court's summary judgment against the Appellants on 
their inverse condemnation claims where the evidence failed to show that this 
Appellee's activities were the proximate cause of the Appellants' alleged 
damages?

[¶4] In the 
Brief of Appellee State of Wyoming, By and Through the Department of 
Transportation, the issues are stated to be:

1. Whether the district 
court was correct in granting summary judgment to Appellee State of Wyoming by 
finding that Appellants failed to show a permanent taking because Appellants' 
claims were based on a very few isolated instances of temporary flooding which 
served no public service.

2. Whether Appellants' 
claim was timely filed under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act pursuant to 
case authority and stipulated to by all parties when Appellants discovered they 
had a cause of action as early as the early 1980s and no later than 1987 when 
the alleged first flood occurred.

[¶5] This 
statement of arguments appears in the Reply Brief of 
Appellants:

Plaintiffs are not 
required to demonstrate permanent taking or public purpose in accordance with 
W.S. § 1-26-516.

[¶6] Appellants 
have timely filed their claims.

[¶7] The State 
cannot re-characterize appellant's claims in order to apply an otherwise 
inapplicable cause of action because appellants have proffered evidence of 
intentional conduct.

[¶8] The Waid 
group owns property lying to the east of U.S. Highway 20, which runs north and 
south along the west border of that property. Burlington owns a railroad track 
bed west of U.S. Highway 20, and operates trains upon that track. Upper Hanover 
Irrigation District (Upper Hanover) and Lower Hanover Canal Association (Lower 
Hanover) operate two irrigation systems that furnish water for agricultural use 
in the vicinity. In the early years of the 1980's, WYDOT raised the elevation of 
the highway by approximately ten feet. At the time the highway was raised, both 
WYDOT and Burlington replaced their existing culverts in that area with new 
culverts of the same size.

[¶9] In July of 
1987, a severe rain storm dropped three inches of water on and around the Waid 
group property in only about an hour. Faced with the deluge, Upper Hanover and 
Lower Hanover discharged water into Durkee Draw, a drainage that lies between 
U.S. Highway 20 and the Waid group property. The culvert under the highway could 
not accommodate all the water and carry it under the road, while the elevation 
of the road prevented water from passing over the top of the road. The water 
flowed to the east instead, flooding the Waid group property and causing 
extensive damage. A similar event occurred in May of 1993, which resulted in 
further damage to the Waid group property. A third flood threatened to occur in 
July 1994, but, on that occasion, Upper Hanover diverted water into an 
additional ditch. That diversion limited the flow into Durkee Draw, and the 
highway culvert was able to accommodate the water that then went down Durkee 
Draw.

[¶10] The Waid 
group filed claims with Upper Hanover, Lower Hanover, and WYDOT in February of 
1995, pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
1-39-101 through 1-39-120 (Michie 1988). On March 31, 1995, the Waid group filed 
a complaint in the district court alleging inverse condemnation pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-26-516 and asserting real and personal property damage together 
with diminution in value. Named as defendants in the action were Upper Hanover, 
Lower Hanover, Burlington, and WYDOT. Voluminous pleadings followed, including 
discovery, after which the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
all the defendants. Preferring not to defend the appeal in this case, Upper 
Hanover and Lower Hanover settled with the Waid group, and the Waid group 
pursued this appeal against Burlington and WYDOT.

[¶11] Recently, 
we have summarized our process for the review of summary judgments granted 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 56 in this way:

Our standard for the 
review of summary judgments is well established:

"When a motion for 
summary judgment is before the supreme court, we have exactly the same duty as 
the district judge; and, if there is a complete record before us, we have 
exactly the same material as did he. We must follow the same standards. The 
propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness 
of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
This court looks at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, giving to him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the 
facts contained in affidavits, depositions and other proper material appearing 
in the record.'" Reno Livestock Corporation v. Sun Oil Company (Delaware), Wyo., 
638 P.2d 147, 150 (1981). See also, Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, Wyo., 671 P.2d 334, 336 (1983).

"A summary judgment 
should only be granted where it is clear that there are no issues of material 
facts involved and that an inquiry into the facts is unnecessary to clarify the 
application of law. Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 542 P.2d 867 (1975). A material 
fact is one which has legal significance. Johnson v. Soulis, supra. It is a fact 
which would establish a defense. Wood v. Trenchard, Wyo.[,] 550 P.2d 490 (1976). 
After the movant establishes a prima facie case the burden of proof shifts to 
the opposing party who must show a genuine issue of material fact, Gennings v. 
First Nat'l Bank of Thermopolis, Wyo., 654 P.2d 154 (1982), or come forward with 
competent evidence of specific facts countering the facts presented by the 
movant. Matter of the Estate of Brosius, Wyo., 683 P.2d 663 (1984). The burden 
is then on the nonmoving party to show specific facts as opposed to general 
allegations. 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 
2727, p. 538. The material presented must be admissible evidence at trial. 
Conclusory statements are not admissible. Bancroft v. Jagusch, Wyo., 611 P.2d 819 (1980). We give the party defending the motion the benefit of any reasonable 
doubt." Roth v. First Security Bank of Rock Springs, Wyoming, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93, 
95 (1984).

Mercado v. 
Trujillo, 980 P.2d 824, 825-26 (Wyo. 1999).

[¶12] We examine 
this record from the point of view most favorable to the party who opposed the 
motion, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may 
fairly be drawn from the record. Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 934 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Wyo. 1997). The record review has satisfied this Court that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact that would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting an essential element of the claim or defense asserted 
by the parties. Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Campbell County School Dist., 816 P.2d 795, 799 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Doud v. First Interstate Bank of Gillette, 769 P.2d 927, 928 (Wyo. 1989)). We then determine whether the prevailing parties 
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In evaluating entitlement to 
judgment as a matter of law, we apply our rule that if the summary judgment can 
be upheld, under the record presented, upon any proper legal theory, we do so. 
Century Ready-Mix Co., 816 P.2d  at 799; Reeves v. Boatman, 769 P.2d 917, 918 
(Wyo. 1989).

[¶13] We turn 
initially to the rationale articulated by the district court for the grant of 
summary judgment to WYDOT and Burlington. In the course of its Findings of Fact 
and Order Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, the district court 
ruled that a permanent taking was a necessary element of a claim for inverse 
condemnation. The court invoked Goodman v. United States, 113 F.2d 914, 917 (8th 
Cir. 1940) in support of that determination. In Goodman, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that temporary flooding did not 
constitute a taking for purposes of presenting a claim under inverse 
condemnation. Indeed that is an accurate reading of Goodman, but this doctrine 
is not viable in Wyoming because of subsequent legislation and precedent making 
Goodman, its progenitors, and any progeny inapplicable with respect to inverse 
condemnation actions in Wyoming.

[¶14] In 1981, 
the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-26-501 through 1-26-516 
(Lexis 1999), became law. The final section of the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act 
was entitled "Action for inverse condemnation," and it 
provides:

When a person possessing 
the power of condemnation takes possession of or damages land in which he has no 
interest, or substantially diminishes the use or value of land, due to 
activities on adjoining land without the authorization of the owner of the land 
or before filing an action of condemnation, the owner of the land may file an 
action in district court seeking damages for the taking or damage and shall be 
granted litigation expenses if damages are awarded to the 
owner.

[¶15] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-26-516 (emphasis added). The Wyoming Eminent Domain Act encompasses the 
entire subject of eminent domain, and abrogates any earlier contrary decisions. 
L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Hot Springs, 790 P.2d 663, 
669 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶16] When this 
Court is tasked with the interpretation of a statute, we initially invoke this 
rule of statutory interpretation:

We endeavor to interpret 
statutes in accordance with the Legislature's intent. We begin by making an 
"inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection.'" Parker Land and Cattle Company 
v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting 
Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We construe the 
statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we 
construe together all parts of the statute in pari 
materia.

[¶17] State 
Dept. of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994). We 
have followed that rule consistently since it was articulated. Flores v. Flores, 
979 P.2d 944, 946 (Wyo. 1999); Cargill v. State, Dept. of Health, Div. of Health 
Care Financing, 967 P.2d 999, 1001 (Wyo. 1998); Hill v. Value Recovery Group, 
L.P., 964 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Wyo. 1998); State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div. v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 376 (Wyo. 1997). It is clear from the 
plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-516 that our legislature intended to 
allow recompense to an owner of property not only for permanent takings, but 
also for damage or diminution in value. The Waid group alleged all three of 
these premises for compensation in the complaint that was filed. We hold that, 
under the statute, no permanent taking is required in order for the Waid group 
to maintain the action for inverse condemnation. This ruling leads to a 
consideration of whether this Court can affirm the grant of summary judgment for 
WYDOT and Burlington under any other proper legal theory.

[¶18] The 
summary judgment in favor of Burlington can be upheld on the basis of the 
statutory language. The record discloses that U.S. Highway 20 runs along the 
western border of the Waid group property, and the railroad line lies to the 
west of the highway, separated from the Waid group property by U.S. Highway 20. 
The critical phrase in the inverse condemnation statute is "due to activities on 
adjoining land without the authorization of the owner of the land or before 
filing an action of condemnation." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-516. That phrase is 
set off by commas, and is separated from the preceding language by a comma 
leading to a grammatical interpretation that the legislature intended the phrase 
as a modifier for all preceding phrases. If the initial comma were not present, 
the language would properly be construed as modifying only the immediately 
preceding phrase. Tietema v. State, 926 P.2d 952, 954 (Wyo. 
1996).

[¶19] The rule 
with respect to a modifier, like this adverbial clause, is perhaps best stated 
in 2A Sutherland Statutory construction § 47.33 at 270 (5th ed. 
1992):

Referential and 
qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely 
to the last antecedent. The last antecedent is "the last word, phrase, or clause 
that can be made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence." 
Thus a proviso usually is construed to apply to the provision or clause 
immediately preceding it. The rule is another aid to discovery of intent or 
meaning and is not inflexible and uniformly binding. Where the sense of the 
entire act requires that a qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding 
or even succeeding sections, the word or phrase will not be restricted to its 
immediate antecedent.

[¶20] Evidence 
that a qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to all antecedents instead of only 
to the immediately preceding one may be found in the fact that it is separated 
from the antecedents by a comma. 

[¶21] (Footnotes 
omitted and emphasis added.) This proposition was quoted and applied in a 
dissenting opinion in Battlefield, Inc. v. Neely, 656 P.2d 1154, 1165 (Wyo. 
1983) (Thomas, J., dissenting), and it was relied upon as authoritative in 
Tietema, 926 P.2d  at 954.

[¶22] In a 
different grammatical context we said, speaking to the significance of the 
placement of a comma:

The application of 
commonly accepted rules of grammar would indicate that, by the proviso found in 
§ 12-6-102(a), which reads,

"[n]o adult shall 
transport, or have in his possession or control, any alcoholic liquor or malt 
beverage, with the intent of furnishing the same to any minor, while operating 
or occupying a motor vehicle,"

the legislature intended 
the phrase "while operating or occupying a motor vehicle" to modify the word 
"adult." Since the phrase is set off by a comma, it is a dangling elliptical 
clause unless it is assumed to refer to "adult," which is the subject of the 
main clause. J. Hodges & M. Whitten, Hodge's College Handbook (7th ed. 
1972). In contrast, if the comma were not there, the phrase would modify the 
word "minor." While it is true that a court does not sit as a "panel of 
grammarians" to review statutes, neither is the judiciary permitted to regard 
ordinary principles of English prose as irrelevant when construing a statute. 
Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 150, 80 S. Ct. 630, 633, 4 L. Ed. 2d 623, 
reh. denied 362 U.S. 972, 80 S. Ct. 953, 4 L. Ed. 2d 901 (1960). Individual members 
of this court have previously noted this concept. Battlefield, Inc. v. Neely, 
656 P.2d 1154 (Wyo. 1983) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Matter of Voss' Adoption, 
550 P.2d 481 (Wyo. 1976) (Guthrie, C.J., dissenting, with whom McClintock, J., 
joined). See also Kindler v. Anderson, 433 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 
1967).

State v. 
Denhardt, 760 P.2d 988, 990 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶23] Burlington 
emphasizes that the geography of the area forecloses a conclusion that it 
engaged in activity on land adjoining the Waid group property, and for that 
reason it is not a proper defendant in an inverse condemnation proceeding. We 
are satisfied that the legislature intended to enact the requirement that the 
defendant take, damage, or diminish by "activities on adjoining land without the 
authorization of the owner of the land or before filing an action of 
condemnation." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-516. The summary judgment in favor of 
Burlington is affirmed because it did not conduct activities on adjoining land. 
Indeed, scenarios can be visualized in which it would be desirable to permit an 
inverse condemnation when the activities were conducted on a non-adjoining 
parcel, but the consequences of that situation appropriately should be addressed 
to the legislature rather than to this Court.

[¶24] In 
addition, the circumstances of the flooding disclosed by the record appear to 
make it impossible for the proximate cause of the flooding to have been the 
culvert under the Burlington track. The water was blocked by the culvert under 
U.S. Highway 20, and the water backed up from that point. The actions of Upper 
Hanover and Lower Hanover in releasing water down Durkee Draw in the instance of 
a natural deluge could not have been reasonably anticipated by either WYDOT or 
Burlington, thus suggesting that neither owed a duty to the Waid group. We point 
to these as further bases for the grant of the summary judgment to Burlington, 
but our decision rests upon the construction of the 
statute.

[¶25] We turn 
then to the claim of inverse condemnation against WYDOT, and we begin with the 
proposition that the Waid group and the State agree that the time limits for 
filing claims set forth in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 1-39-101 through 1-39-120, apply to a claim against the State for inverse 
condemnation. Both parties rely upon Wyoming State Highway Dept. v. Napolitano, 
578 P.2d 1342, 1349 (Wyo.), appeal dismissed 439 U.S. 948 (1978), which predates 
both the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act and the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act. 
Even though reliance on Napolitano may be misplaced, we agree with the parties 
that the time limits articulated in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 apply. The 
relevant part of the statute provides:

(a) No action shall be 
brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the claim upon which 
the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized statement in 
writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, 
except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two (2) years 
after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can 
establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

(i) Not reasonably 
discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

(ii) The claimant failed 
to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period 
despite the exercise of due diligence.

[¶26] Early in 
the course of pleading their case, the Waid group conceded that claims for 
damage arising out of the 1987 flood were time barred. They contend, however, 
that the recurrence in 1993 started the time limit to run again, and gave them 
two years from that incident in which to file the statutory claims. This 
contention does not comport with the plain language of the statute, in which the 
time for filing a claim is measured not from the date damage occurs, but from 
the date on which the "act, error or omission" occurs, or when it is discovered 
by a claimant. For purposes of this case, it may be assumed that the Waid group 
had no suspicion that anything was amiss with respect to the highway until water 
inundated the property in 1987.1 There can be no doubt, however, 
that the Waid group discovered the "act, error or omission" which provided the 
basis of the claim of inverse condemnation no later than the date of the 1987 
flood. The situation had not changed by 1993, and although that flood caused 
additional damage, there was no new "act, error or omission," or a fresh 
discovery of such that would cause the statutory time period to start anew. It 
is clear that the two year time for filing claims under the statute began to run 
in July 1987, and it had expired by the time the Waid group filed claims with 
WYDOT in February 1995.
Footnotes
Footnotes

1 
In the initial complaint, the Waid group asserted that area residents requested 
a larger culvert when the State raised the level of the highway. The record, 
however, does not identify which area residents made that request, and, for that 
reason, we are willing to assume that no members of the Waid group were among 
them. We summarize our holding by reiterating the proposition that an action for 
inverse condemnation under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-516 does not require 
demonstration of a permanent taking by a claimant. The plain language of the 
statute, however, makes it applicable only to conduct on adjoining land. The 
requirement that a claim be presented pursuant to the procedure established by 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is applicable to inverse condemnation 
actions, and the claim must be filed within two years of the "act, error or 
omission" giving rise to the claim. The Findings of Fact and Order Granting 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment is affirmed, albeit upon different 
grounds than those presented by the district 
court.