Title: Ewing v. Cargill, Inc.

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Donald EWING v. CARGILL, INC.

95-389                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 22, 1996


1.   Words & phrases -- scire facias defined. -- A scire facias is
     in the nature of a summons.

2.   Torts -- defamation -- statement that appellee had judgment
     against appellant did not constitute defamation per se. -- The
     statement that appellee had a judgment against appellant,
     without more, did not constitute defamation per se, i.e., did
     not amount to words that on their face and without the aid of
     extrinsic proof are recognized as injurious.

3.   Torts -- defamation -- distinction between words that are
     actionable per se and those that are not. -- Where the natural
     consequence of words is a damage, as if they import a charge
     of having been guilty of a crime, or of having a contagious
     distemper, or if they are prejudicial to a person in office,
     or to a person of a profession or trade, they are in
     themselves actionable; in other cases, the party who brings an
     action for words, must show the damage which was received from
     them.

4.   Torts -- defamation -- appellant not prejudiced by failure of
     trial court to give instruction on republication. -- Where
     there was a finding that the original statement did not defame
     appellant, the jury could not have concluded that appellee was
     liable for a republication of the statement; because appellant
     was not possibly prejudiced by the failure of the trial court
     to give the requested instruction on republication, the
     supreme court did not reverse.

5.   Torts -- defamation -- appellant not prejudiced by directed
     verdict on damages for loss of credit and damage to
     reputation. -- Where the jury determined that appellant was
     not defamed, he could not have been prejudiced by the trial
     court granting appellee's motion for directed verdict
     regarding damages for loss of credit and damage to reputation,
     and the supreme court did not reverse.
     Appeal from Pike Circuit Court; W.H. "Dub" Arnold, Judge;
affirmed.
     Benny M. Tucker, Michael S. Ewing, and Charles A. Yeargan, for
appellant.
     Smith, Stroud, McClerkin, Dunn & Nutter, by: W. David Carter,
for appellee.

     Robert H. Dudley, Justice. April 22, 1996   *ADVREP3*





DONALD EWING,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

CARGILL, INC.,
                    APPELLEE.



95-389


APPEAL FROM THE PIKE COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. 92-10,
HON. W.H. "DUB" ARNOLD, JUDGE,




AFFIRMED.



                   Robert H. Dudley, Justice.


     Appellant Donald Ewing filed this defamation suit against
Cargill, Inc., and, upon trial, the jury found that Ewing was not
defamed.  The trial court entered a judgment accordingly, and Ewing
appeals.  We affirm the judgment.
     The facts leading to the alleged defamation are as follows. 
Donald Ewing and his brother, Dr. Douglass Ewing, entered the
poultry business in 1979, as the operators of Ewing Farms, a
partnership, and Ewing Enterprises, Inc.  They purchased feed grain
from Cargill, Inc.  In 1980 and 1981, the Ewing brothers failed to
pay Cargill for the feed.  Cargill, Inc., subsequently filed suit
against "Douglass Ewing, Donald Ewing, and Ewing Enterprises, Inc." 
Donald Ewing filed a counterclaim.  The parties reached an
agreement by which Cargill would take a judgment against Dr.
Douglass Ewing, but would dismiss its suit against Donald Ewing and
Ewing Enterprises, Inc., and Donald Ewing would dismiss his
counterclaim against Cargill.  On April 14, 1981, Cargill took a
judgment against Dr. Douglass Ewing for a little over $63,000. 
However, the judgment did not mention Cargill's claim against
Donald Ewing or Ewing Enterprises, Inc., and it said nothing about
Donald Ewing's counterclaim against Cargill.  It was not until June
15, 1988, or seven years later, that these claims were actually
dismissed.  The judgment against Dr. Douglass Ewing was not
satisfied.  Cargill's attorneys wanted the judgment to survive as
long as possible. 
     On February 2, 1989, Cargill sued out a scire facias to revive
the judgment.  See Ark. Code Ann.  16-65-501 -- 505 (1987).  A
scire facias is in the nature of a summons.  Alexander v. Steel, 13
Ark. 392 (1853).  The style of the scire facias is "Cargill, Inc.
v. Douglass E. Ewing, et al.," but the body incorrectly states that
the judgment to be revived was "against Douglass E. Ewing, Donald
Ewing and Ewing Enterprises, Inc."  The crux of this defamation
suit is that the foregoing erroneous statement constituted
defamation of Donald Ewing.  Other parties were brought in,
including Cargill's attorneys, but they were dismissed prior to
trial. 
     Donald Ewing's first assignment is that the trial court erred
in refusing to instruct the jury that Cargill committed defamation
per se.  Appellant Ewing cites no case by this court holding that
a statement that a judgment exists against a plaintiff, without
more, constitutes defamation per se, and we are not aware of any
such case.  The statement that Cargill had a judgment against
Ewing, without more, did not amount to words that "on their face
and without the aid of extrinsic proof are recognized as
injurious."  See  Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Robinson, 233 Ark. 168,
178-179,