Title: Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Clevenger

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission, et al. v. Ty Clevenger, No. 64, September Term, 2017 
 
JURISDICTION — WRIT OF MANDAMUS — ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION INVESTIGATIONS — The Court of Appeals held that Bar Counsel’s 
decision not to investigate a complaint of attorney misconduct was part of an attorney 
disciplinary proceeding, falling under the Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction over 
attorney disciplinary matters.  Therefore, the circuit court, in which the Appellee filed a 
petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel Bar Counsel to investigate a complaint, 
lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition. 
 
 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
 
Case No. C-02-CV-16-003620 
Argued:  March 2, 2018 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 64 
 
September Term, 2017 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION,  
et al. 
 
v. 
 
TY CLEVENGER 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
 
Greene 
Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty, 
 
 
               JJ. 
 
 
 
                 Opinion by Barbera, C.J. 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: June 21, 2018
 
 
 
Jurisdiction is not a flashy or glamorous area of the law.  What it lacks in luster, 
however, it makes up for in fundamental importance in our legal system.  As a threshold 
issue, one of significant constitutional dimension, jurisdiction must be addressed before a 
cause of action may proceed. 
This case began when the Appellee, Ty Clevenger, submitted to the Attorney 
Grievance Commission of Maryland a complaint alleging professional misconduct by three 
Maryland-barred attorneys while they were representing former Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton.  The Office of Bar Counsel thereafter informed Mr. Clevenger that it would not 
undertake an investigation of the allegations in his complaint because he had no personal 
knowledge of the allegations presented and was not an aggrieved party or client.   
Mr. Clevenger filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court for Anne 
Arundel County, seeking to compel Bar Counsel to open an investigation into the alleged 
misconduct of the named attorneys.  The Attorney Grievance Commission and Bar Counsel 
(collectively, “the Commission”) filed motions to dismiss the petition and to seal the case 
to protect the confidentiality of the complaint and responses.  Mr. Clevenger opposed both 
motions.  The circuit court granted the motion to seal and denied the Commission’s motion 
to dismiss the petition.  Following a hearing on the merits of the mandamus petition, the 
circuit court ordered the Commission to investigate the allegations presented in the 
complaint.  The circuit court also vacated its previous order sealing the case. 
We granted a writ of certiorari to determine whether, before reaching the merits of 
the case, the circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition for writ of mandamus.  
For the reasons that follow, we hold that because this Court has original and exclusive 
 
2 
jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary matters, of which Bar Counsel’s decision to 
investigate a complaint is a part, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to consider and 
grant the mandamus petition and to order Bar Counsel to conduct an investigation of the 
allegations in Mr. Clevenger’s complaint. 
I. 
Facts and Procedural History 
A. The Initial Complaints 
Mr. Clevenger is a Texas-barred attorney residing in New York.  On September 1, 
2016, he sent a letter to the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland.  In the letter, he 
alleged that three Maryland attorneys who had worked for former Secretary of State 
Clinton had engaged in inappropriate conduct that violated the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules 
of Professional Conduct.  Specifically, Mr. Clevenger alleged that the attorneys violated 
Rules 19-308.3, 19-303.4(a), and 19-308.4(c) by destroying evidence related to ongoing 
federal investigations, failing to report the misconduct of the other attorneys, and engaging 
in conduct involving dishonesty.  The allegations appeared to Bar Counsel to be based 
solely on information derived from publicly available sources. 
On September 7, 2016, Mr. Clevenger sent a second letter, supplementing his 
complaint with additional information that he obtained from publicly available sources and 
alleging a further rule violation by one of the attorneys.  Nearly three weeks later, Deputy 
Bar Counsel Raymond A. Hein sent a letter to Mr. Clevenger declining to conduct an 
investigation.  Mr. Hein’s letter provided the following: 
 
3 
It appears that you have no personal knowledge of the allegations 
presented in your correspondence, nor are you a personally aggrieved client 
or party possessing material information that would assist this office in 
reviewing such allegations.  Under these circumstances, we decline to 
conduct an investigation of the named attorneys with you designated as the 
complainant. 
The Maryland Rules grant Bar Counsel authority to open a complaint 
on Bar Counsel’s own initiative.  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-707(b), the 
records of an investigation by Bar Counsel, including the existence and 
content of any complaint or response, are confidential.  In accordance with 
that rule, we are unable to provide you with additional information. 
 
By letter dated October 17, 2016, Mr. Clevenger replied, asserting that Bar 
Counsel’s actions failed to comply with Maryland law because, in his view, Bar Counsel 
was required by rule to conduct an investigation.  Mr. Clevenger also stated his belief that 
he had grounds to seek mandamus relief from the Court of Appeals.  On October 24, 2016, 
Mr. Hein responded that Bar Counsel could not provide Mr. Clevenger with any further 
information. 
B. The Petition for Writ of Mandamus 
On December 20, 2016, Mr. Clevenger, proceeding without the assistance of a 
Maryland-barred attorney, filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County a Petition 
for Writ of Mandamus (“Petition”).  He sought to have the circuit court compel Bar Counsel 
to conduct an investigation, arguing that then-effective Maryland Rule 19-711 required Bar 
Counsel to investigate every complaint that was not facially frivolous or unfounded.  The 
Commission moved to dismiss the Petition for lack of jurisdiction, among other grounds.  
It asserted that the Court of Appeals retains original and complete jurisdiction over all 
attorney disciplinary matters. 
 
4 
The circuit court denied the Commission’s motion to dismiss on July 25, 2017.  On 
September 11, 2017, the court held a hearing on the merits.  After hearing argument, the 
circuit court found that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Petition because it 
was not yet an attorney disciplinary matter and, thus, was not within the original and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.  The judge further ruled that Rule 19-711 
required Bar Counsel to investigate every complaint that was not frivolous, and Bar 
Counsel had made no claim or showing that Mr. Clevenger’s complaint was frivolous.  At 
the close of the hearing, the circuit court indicated that it would order Bar Counsel to 
conduct an investigation.  By a written order dated September 22, 2017, the court granted 
the Petition and ordered the Commission to investigate the allegations presented in Mr. 
Clevenger’s complaint. 
C. The Appeal 
The Commission noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals and a separate 
appeal to this Court.  The Commission also filed a petition for writ of certiorari and a 
motion to stay the circuit judge’s order.  Mr. Clevenger submitted a cross-petition.  We 
granted the Commission’s petition, denied Mr. Clevenger’s cross-petition, and granted the 
motion to stay.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Clevenger, 456 Md. 254 (2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
II. 
Discussion 
A. The Parties’ Contentions 
The Commission argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider a 
mandamus petition related to attorney discipline.1  The Commission begins with several 
bedrock principles:  First, “the power which a court possesses to hear and determine cases” 
is prescribed by “applicable constitutional and statutory pronouncements.”  First 
Federated Commodity Tr. Corp. v. Comm’r of Sec., 272 Md. 329, 335 (1974) (citations 
omitted).  Second, “[i]f, by the law that defines the authority of the court, a judicial body 
is given the power to render a judgment over that class of cases within which a particular 
case falls, the court has subject matter [or fundamental] jurisdiction.”  John A. v. Bd. of 
Educ. for Howard Cty., 400 Md. 363, 388 (2007) (citing First Federated Commodity Tr. 
Corp., 272 Md. at 335).  Third, where a particular court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction 
over a subject matter, no claim arising out of that subject matter or “class of controversies” 
may be heard by a different court.  First Federated Commodity Tr. Corp., 272 Md. at 335.   
The Commission notes that the Maryland Constitution empowers circuit courts to 
“hear and decide all cases at law and in equity,” except cases in which “by law jurisdiction 
has been limited or conferred exclusively upon another tribunal.”  St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 
Inc. v. Turnbull, 432 Md. 259, 274 (2013) (quoting First Federated Commodity Tr. Corp., 
272 Md. at 335)); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 1-501.  Regulation of matters 
                                                 
1 Because we decide this case on jurisdictional grounds, we need not recite the 
parties’ arguments relating to the merits of the dispute. 
 
6 
pertaining to attorney discipline, the Commission argues, has been conferred exclusively 
upon the Court of Appeals, so circuit courts are powerless to hear those matters.  The 
Commission looks to In re Application of Kimmer, 392 Md. 251 (2006), and Attorney 
Grievance Commission v. Pak, 400 Md. 567 (2007), to make the point.  Since 1898, “the 
Court of Appeals has had exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of, and admission to, 
the practice of law,” Kimmer, 392 Md. at 269, and “has original and complete jurisdiction 
over all attorney disciplinary matters arising from the conduct of a member of the Maryland 
State Bar,” Pak, 400 Md. at 599–600.  In the Commission’s view, “the investigation of a 
complaint alleging professional misconduct necessarily concerns an ‘attorney disciplinary 
matter . . . arising from the conduct of a member of the Maryland State Bar’” because Bar 
Counsel’s investigation is a “necessary predicate” either to the Commission taking action 
or to a disciplinary proceeding in the Court of Appeals.  See In re Application of Allan S., 
282 Md. 683, 689 (1978) (“Upon this Court falls the primary and ultimate responsibility 
for regulating the practice of law and the conduct and admission of attorneys in this 
State.”). 
The Commission argues that this Court’s “pervasive regulation of attorney conduct 
through its rulemaking authority” is further evidence that this Court’s exclusive jurisdiction 
extends beyond merely rendering decisions in attorney disciplinary matters.  The 
Commission points out that this Court has promulgated rules relating to the practice of law 
and legal ethics, created the Commission to administer attorney discipline, and vested Bar 
Counsel with exclusive responsibility to investigate and prosecute complaints of ethical 
rule violations.  The Commission concludes that because the Court of Appeals is the sole 
 
7 
entity responsible for regulating the practice of law, controlling bar admissions, 
disciplining attorneys, and promulgating rules governing those areas, the circuit court 
necessarily impinged on that jurisdiction by entertaining a mandamus action concerning 
attorney discipline. 
Mr. Clevenger does not dispute that this Court has original and exclusive 
jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings.  Rather, he asserts that because Bar 
Counsel declined to conduct an investigation, no attorney disciplinary proceeding ever 
commenced.  And, according to Mr. Clevenger, even if Bar Counsel had investigated his 
complaint, that action still would not constitute an attorney disciplinary proceeding.  Mr. 
Clevenger appears to argue that an attorney disciplinary proceeding only commences upon 
Bar Counsel’s filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of 
Appeals under Maryland Rule 19-721.  Mr. Clevenger avers that because no such petition 
was filed, the circuit court appropriately ordered Bar Counsel to investigate. 
Mr. Clevenger further argues that the Commission mischaracterizes the Kimmer 
decision.  The Commission, Mr. Clevenger argues, misreads Kimmer to mean that “the 
Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction over anything remotely related to admission or 
practice.”  Mr. Clevenger suggests that the Kimmer plaintiff sought a trial court order “that 
would effectively compel his admission to the bar.”  Here, by contrast, Mr. Clevenger 
sought merely to compel Bar Counsel to comply with a mandatory procedural rule that 
would not initiate an attorney disciplinary proceeding. 
 
 
 
8 
B. Analysis 
It is beyond question that this Court has original and complete jurisdiction over 
attorney disciplinary proceedings.  In Pak, a respondent attorney argued that the Court of 
Appeals was divested of jurisdiction in an attorney grievance case if a Peer Review Panel—
formed under then-effective Rule 16-742 (now Rule 19-719)—recommended to the 
Commission that no action should be taken against the attorney.  400 Md. at 576.  As did 
the circuit court at a hearing, we summarily rejected that argument, reaffirming that “[t]he 
Court of Appeals has original and complete jurisdiction over all attorney disciplinary 
matters arising from the conduct of a member of the Maryland State Bar.”  400 Md. at 599–
600 (citations omitted).  This principle has long been established in our jurisprudence.  
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. James, 385 Md. 637, 654 (2005) (“In proceedings 
involving attorney discipline, this Court has original and complete jurisdiction.”); Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276, 287 (1992) (same); Md. State Bar Ass’n v. 
Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 553 (1974) (explaining that “prior to 1970 . . . we reviewed 
disciplinary actions only on appeal at the instance of the respondent-attorney[,] and since 
that date . . . we assumed original and complete jurisdiction over these proceedings”). 
As noted above, Mr. Clevenger does not dispute that this Court’s jurisdiction 
encompasses the whole of attorney disciplinary proceedings.  Rather, he challenges the 
premise that Bar Counsel’s initial response to a complaint (whether it involves an 
investigation or not) is necessarily a part of an attorney disciplinary proceeding.  Thus, we 
must determine whether—and if so, to what extent—actions taken by Bar Counsel prior to 
 
9 
the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals may 
fairly be considered a part of attorney disciplinary proceedings. 
In Kimmer, an applicant for admission to the Maryland Bar sought an 
accommodation from the State Board of Law Examiners (“Board”) pursuant to the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., during the bar 
examination.  392 Md. at 257.  The Board denied his initial request and subsequent internal 
appeal.  Id. at 257–59.  Four days before the bar examination, Kimmer filed in circuit court 
a motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, in which he asked the 
court to require the Board to provide him with the accommodation.  Id. at 259–60.  The 
circuit court granted a temporary restraining order, finding in Kimmer’s favor on all four 
factors,2 including a likelihood of success on the merits.  Id. at 260.  The Board complied, 
and Kimmer received the accommodation during the examination.  Id. at 261.  After the 
examination, the Board informed Kimmer that it would not recommend his admission to 
the Maryland Bar until the merits of the dispute were resolved—i.e., until it was determined 
whether Kimmer was entitled under the ADA to an accommodation during the bar 
examination.  Id. 
Kimmer filed a motion for declaratory relief in the circuit court, in which “he, in 
effect, asked the [court] to make the temporary restraining order . . . permanent and, further, 
                                                 
2 Courts in Maryland must consider and balance four factors in determining whether 
to issue a temporary restraining order:  “(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on 
the merits; (2) the ‘balance of convenience’ determined by whether greater injury would 
be done to the defendant by granting the injunction than would result from its refusal; (3) 
whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction is granted; and (4) 
the public interest.”  Kimmer, 392 Md. at 260 n.13 (citations omitted). 
 
10 
for a ruling that the applicant be admitted to the Maryland Bar.”  Id.  The Board opposed 
the motion, arguing that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because the motion attempted 
to transform a temporary restraining order into permanent injunctive relief and was not 
accompanied by a proper complaint.  Id. at 262.  Before the circuit court ruled on the 
motion, the Board relayed to the Court of Appeals the names of the applicants who were 
successful on the bar examination.  Kimmer was on the list.  Id.  The Board then filed an 
exception to Kimmer’s admission, and in a subsequent letter to the Court, the Board argued 
that “[t]he qualification of an applicant for admission to the Bar is a matter which rests 
peculiarly within the jurisdiction of this Court.”  Id. at 263.  The Court of Appeals stayed 
proceedings in the circuit court pending a resolution of the matter.  Id. 
After reviewing the history of the regulation of the practice of law in Maryland, see 
id. at 263–69 (citing Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683 (1981)), this Court stated 
that “it has been clear, since 1898, that the Court of Appeals has had exclusive jurisdiction 
over the regulation of, and admission to, the practice of law.”  Id. at 269.  We concluded 
that the circuit court “simply had no jurisdiction over any aspect of the applicant’s bar 
admission, including the circumstances surrounding his bar examination,” and therefore 
sustained the Board’s exception.  Id. at 269, 275. 
We reach a similar conclusion here.  In Kimmer, our “exclusive jurisdiction over the 
regulation of . . . the practice of law,” id. at 269, included the ultimate decision whether to 
admit an applicant and the process by which applicants qualify to be admitted, id. at 278.  
By this same logic, our exclusive jurisdiction over “attorney disciplinary proceedings,” if 
it includes the ultimate decision whether to discipline an attorney, must also include the 
 
11 
manner in which those proceedings are initiated.  The idea that an “attorney disciplinary 
proceeding” only begins when Bar Counsel has filed a Petition for Disciplinary or 
Remedial Action does not exist in our case law or Rules.  Admittedly, most of the language 
in our cases is couched in terms of the ultimate issues of attorney misconduct and sanctions.  
See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Maignan, 390 Md. 287, 292 (2005) (“Original 
jurisdiction over attorney discipline matters resides in the Court of Appeals.  We determine, 
ultimately, whether an attorney has committed the misconduct charged by the Attorney 
Grievance Commission.”).  But other matters concerning attorney discipline, like how and 
whether Bar Counsel acts when a complaint is received, also “aris[e] from the conduct of 
a member of the Maryland State Bar.”  Pak, 400 Md. at 599–600; id. at 600 (“This Court 
is the ultimate arbiter of any claims concerning attorney misconduct in the State of 
Maryland.” (emphasis added)).   
Indeed, our Rules prescribe the roles of Bar Counsel and circuit court judges in 
attorney disciplinary matters.  Our power to issue rules concerning practice and procedure 
in Maryland courts derives from the Maryland Constitution, Md. Const., art. IV, § 18(a), 
and the General Assembly has recognized our broad authority to regulate the practice of 
law, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 1-201(a) (“The power of the Court of Appeals to make rules and 
regulations to govern the practice and procedure and judicial administration in that court 
and in the other courts of the State shall be liberally construed.”).3  This Court created the 
                                                 
3 We have acknowledged that the General Assembly “may act pursuant to its police 
or other legitimate power to aid the courts in the performance of their judicial functions” 
and “establish minimum criteria for the learning and character of persons admitted to the 
bar of this State.”  Waldron, 289 Md. at 699; see, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. 
 
12 
Attorney Grievance Commission and, subject to our approval, empowered it to appoint an 
attorney as Bar Counsel to investigate professional misconduct.  Md. Rules 19-702, 19-
703.  In 1997, in response to an inquiry from the General Assembly regarding the 
rulemaking authority of the Court of Appeals, the Attorney General rendered an opinion 
touching on this Court’s jurisdiction over the regulation of the practice of law: 
The Court of Appeals, in exercising its authority to regulate the 
practice of law and the discipline of attorneys, has the power to conduct a 
general investigation into the conduct and practices of attorneys whenever it 
has cause to believe that professional misconduct might have occurred. 
*  *  * 
The Commission is the prosecutorial arm of the Court, given the 
responsibility to supervise and administer the discipline of attorneys licensed 
to practice in this State.  The Commission, therefore, acts as the means by 
which the Court of Appeals controls the practice of law in Maryland. 
 
82 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 23, 26–27 (1997).  Because this Court, through Bar Counsel, has 
the exclusive power to conduct an investigation, a question about whether an investigation 
was properly conducted or declined under the relevant Rule—which we created and 
administer—is one that only this Court may consider.  
                                                 
§ 10-103(a) (“[T]he Court of Appeals shall adopt rules that govern the standards and 
procedures for admission to the Bar.”); Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 13-301 (“To aid in the exercise 
of its rulemaking powers, the Court of Appeals may appoint a standing committee of 
lawyers, judges, and other persons competent in judicial practice, procedure or 
administration.”).  See generally Kimmer, 392 Md. at 267 n.20.  In this regard, we were 
careful to note: 
There can be no doubt, however, that the deferential respect accorded the 
legislative branch by the judicial must neither undermine nor dilute the 
fundamental authority and responsibility vested in the judiciary to carry out 
its constitutionally required function, an aspect of which, as we have seen, is 
the supervision of practicing attorneys. 
Waldron, 289 Md. at 699. 
 
13 
Mr. Clevenger claims that he seeks only to compel the Commission to “comply with 
a procedural rule.”  The applicant in Kimmer advanced a similar argument.  392 Md. at 270 
(“[The applicant] says[] he merely used appropriate legal process to obtain ‘valid 
enforcement of his federal ADA rights,’ i.e. injunctive relief.”).  We rejected it there 
because the type of relief the applicant sought was inconsequential; it mattered only that 
he sought relief with respect to a bar admissions matter.  Id. at 271.  Here, as in Kimmer, 
this Court will not “relinquish[] our exclusive power over” attorney disciplinary matters 
“to any degree or extent.”  Id. at 278.  We do not share concurrent jurisdiction over bar 
admission matters with the circuit courts, id. at 271–73, nor do we share it over attorney 
disciplinary matters. 
Having decided that Bar Counsel’s initial decision to investigate—or not—is within 
the scope of an “attorney disciplinary proceeding,” we hold that the circuit court lacked 
jurisdiction to consider, let alone to grant, the petition for writ of mandamus. 
III. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, we hold that the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel 
County lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition for writ of mandamus because the Court 
of Appeals retains original and complete jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary 
proceedings.  As such, we do not address the second question presented, which assumes 
the circuit court had jurisdiction to address the Petition.   
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT 
COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL 
COUNTY 
REVERSED; 
CASE 
 
14 
REMANDED TO THAT COURT 
WITH 
THE 
DIRECTION 
TO 
DISMISS THE PETITION.  COSTS 
TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.