Title: State v. Powell

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 115,457 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
KURT POWELL, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Except for a first time conviction, Jessica's Law requires a hard 25 life sentence 
for a defendant who is 18 years of age or older and convicted of the statutorily 
enumerated crime, which includes sex offenses. 
 
2. 
For a first time Jessica's Law conviction, K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6627(d)(1) 
provides discretion to sentence a defendant under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act 
if "the [sentencing] judge finds substantial and compelling reasons, following a review of 
mitigating circumstances, to impose departure." 
 
3. 
An appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion a district court's determination 
under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6627(d)(1) as to whether a defendant's mitigating 
circumstances are substantial and compelling reasons to depart from a hard 25 life 
sentence under Jessica's Law. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
4. 
A sentencing judge abuses discretion in deciding whether a defendant's mitigating 
circumstances are substantial and compelling reasons to depart under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 
21-6627(d)(1) when:  (i) a ruling is based on an error of law; (ii) a ruling is based on an 
error of fact, i.e., substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on 
which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based; or (iii) is 
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., no reasonable person would take the view 
adopted by the judge.  
 
5. 
A party arguing an abuse of discretion bears the burden of proving it occurred. 
 
6. 
K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6627(d) requires a sentencing judge to state on the record at 
the time of sentencing the substantial and compelling reasons for departure when 
departing from the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under Jessica's Law. The 
statute does not require the sentencing judge to explain a decision denying departure.  
 
7. 
A sentencing judge is not required to affirmatively state the judge did not weigh 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances when denying departure under K.S.A. 2017 
Supp. 21-6627(d)(1). 
 
8. 
A sentencing judge deciding whether there are substantial and compelling reasons 
to depart from Jessica's Law's hard 25 life sentence may consider evidence that might 
reasonably bear on the proper sentence for a particular defendant. 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
9.  
On review, an appellate court should disregard characterizations of evidence that 
might reasonably bear on a defendant's sentence for a first time Jessica's Law conviction 
as "aggravating." The question is whether the evidence relates to the decision to be made, 
i.e., whether the mitigating circumstances advanced both exist and supply a substantial 
and compelling reason to depart from the hard 25 life sentence. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 53 Kan. App. 2d 758, 393 P.3d 174 (2017). 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; STEPHEN J. TERNES, judge. Opinion filed August 24, 2018. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
Corrine E. Gunning, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellant.  
 
Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  The State challenges a Court of Appeals decision reversing a district 
court's denial of a request for downward departure from the hard 25 life sentence under 
Jessica's Law. A divided panel held the sentence must be vacated and reconsidered 
because the record was ambiguous as to whether the district court weighed evidence 
about an uncharged prior molestation against defendant's evidence in mitigation. State v. 
Powell, 53 Kan. App. 2d 758, 762, 393 P.3d 174 (2017). We disagree with the panel 
majority's rationale and reverse its decision because we discern no abuse of discretion. 
We affirm the district court's denial of the requested downward departure. In so holding, 
4 
 
 
 
we seek to clarify the process for district court consideration of motions to depart under 
Jessica's Law. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Kurt Powell pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a 
child under 14. At the plea hearing, he admitted inappropriately touching the victim, with 
intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires, when she was under 14 years old and he was 
over 18. The crime occurred between February and November 2013. The district court 
accepted the plea and found Powell guilty. The conviction carried a hard 25 life sentence 
under Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6627. K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5506(b)(3)(A); 
K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6627(a)(1). 
 
At sentencing, Powell requested a downward durational departure to 29.5 months' 
imprisonment. For this to happen, the district court would have needed to make a double 
departure:  once from the life sentence to the sentencing grid; and again from the 
applicable grid box to the requested term. To support this leniency, Powell relied on his 
lack of criminal history, his willingness to participate in available rehabilitation, his work 
history, his supportive family, and the fact he was truthful with police during the criminal 
investigation. Powell argued his victim, who was his daughter, had forgiven him; and he 
noted his family favored departure. Powell submitted an evaluation by Dr. Robert 
Barnett, a clinical psychologist. An acquaintance, Mark Berg, also testified for Powell. 
 
Barnett's report is not in the appellate record, but he testified Powell was a good 
candidate for departure based on statistical data about reoffense rates. He said Powell's 
chances for successful rehabilitation were enhanced by his work history, his supportive 
family, the lack of substance abuse problems, and the lack of a criminal history. Barnett 
said Powell had the necessary insight to understand his actions' consequences and to learn 
5 
 
 
 
from them. Barnett said Powell was not a pedophile because he was not a compulsive 
child molester and noted the victim was past puberty. Barnett believed Powell would 
benefit from sex offender treatment offered by the Department of Corrections and could 
get further helpful assistance on parole or probation. Barnett summed up his conclusions 
by stating:  "I'm not quite sure how he could be a better candidate [for departure]." 
 
On cross-examination, Barnett admitted he received his information only from 
Powell and his attorney. He explained he always asks offenders if they intend to reoffend. 
When questioned whether a history of molesting another child would cause Barnett to 
doubt his conclusion about Powell reoffending, Barnett said, "I understand there have 
been allegations in the past with Mr. Powell, but I don't think he was arrested or 
convicted of anything else." The State asked Barnett, "In the affidavit it says that he 
admitted to molesting his older stepdaughter. Did you remember that?" Barnett said he 
did not, was not sure what the prosecutor was referring to, and questioned whether the 
State was referring to an affidavit in this case or some other one. The prosecutor clarified 
she was referring to an affidavit in this case. Barnett acknowledged he missed that detail. 
He agreed such an admission would be "a big thing" but would not change his opinion. 
We note the probable cause affidavit in this case does not reference another victim, so 
based on the appellate record we are unsure what affidavit the prosecutor was discussing, 
or if it even exists. 
 
When questioned about Powell's present crimes, Barnett said he understood it was 
over-the-clothes fondling that happened more than one time. He said Powell did not tell 
him about confessing to touching his stepchild's genitals. Barnett said he needed more 
information about that to determine whether this would change his assessment and agreed 
there was clinical significance in the difference between the stepchild's allegations and 
over-the-clothes fondling. He said these details would not change his overall opinion on 
the likelihood of reoffending because sex offenders have a low recidivism rate. 
6 
 
 
 
 
Later, while cross-examining Barnett about whether Powell was a pedophile, the 
State asked, "He told you that he didn't actually molest his older stepdaughter. You took 
him at his word, didn't you?" Barnett said he did not ask about this, but said he 
 
"asked [Powell] if he had any history of accusations of sexual behavior. He said he was 
accused of touching his stepdaughter. No charges were brought. He added my first wife 
in 1998 accused me of molesting her daughter, but she just wanted me gone. That's the 
extent of it."  
 
Barnett said Powell told him he felt his attorney did not want him to talk about 
this. 
 
Powell's stepdaughter, M.L., testified for the State that Powell molested her until 
she was 12 years old. She said this included touching her breasts and vagina, attempting 
intercourse, making her touch his penis, and making her put his penis in her mouth. She 
did not remember when this abuse started. She "just grew up with it. It was just there." 
She said the abuse stopped when she found out it was wrong and told Powell to stop. She 
said he never apologized and continued making sexual comments to her after she was an 
adult. She believed Powell would reoffend because he abused her almost every night and 
did it again with the victim in this case. 
 
Berg was acquainted with Powell through church. He asked the court for leniency. 
He believed Powell wanted help and wanted to change. On cross-examination, Berg 
testified he did not know until the sentencing hearing that Powell molested M.L. 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
The district court's order denying downward departure 
 
The district court denied Powell's motion and imposed the hard 25 life sentence. 
The court's explanation, which is central to this appeal, stated: 
 
"With regard to the motion for departure, that motion lists essentially five reasons 
that they desire—or pardon me, that the defendant is asking the Court for a departure. 
First is a lack of criminal history. Second is the availability of rehabilitation efforts, and 
third is Mr. Powell's willingness to participate in those rehabilitative efforts. Fourth is his 
impressive work history and supportive family, and finally, that he was truthful with 
police from the beginning of this investigation. 
 
"I will point out that it's probably obvious to everyone in the courtroom that this 
case has a presumed sentence, and what it means for the sentencing judge is that that is a 
sentence that the Court is to hand down. That's what the law says. Obviously the motion 
was filed in an effort to persuade the Court not to impose that sentence. In order for the 
Court to grant that motion, I must find that there are substantial and compelling reasons 
to do so. 
 
"Let's look a little bit at those definitions. I will quote from State v. McKay. It is 
271 Kansas 725, 2001 case from the Supreme Court of Kansas. It says first in the context 
of departure sentences, the terms substantial and compelling have specific definitions. 
The term substantial refers to something that is real, not imagined, something with 
substance, not ephemeral.  
 
"The term compelling means that the Court is forced by the facts of the case to 
go beyond what status quo is, go beyond what is the statutory sentence. State versus 
Zuck, Z-U-C-K, 21 Kansas Appellate 597, a 1959 case states that as these definitions 
reflect, departure sentences are authorized only in extraordinary cases. 
 
"I rely on those definitions and in doing so, would repeat that the motion for 
departure needs to be supported by that type of information. After considering all of the 
8 
 
 
 
information presented today, the Court cannot find substantial and compelling reasons to 
depart from the presumed sentence. The presumed sentence in my opinion is just in this 
case. 
 
"I find the primary offense is Count 1 calling for a prison term of a life and post-
supervision duration of life. I would repeat again that the motion for departure is denied 
as the Court cannot find substantial and compelling reasons to grant the motion.  
 
"It is the judgment and order of this Court that you be sentenced as follows: With 
regard to Count 1, aggravated indecent liberties with a child less than 14 years of age, life 
imprisonment. Total term of incarceration will be life." (Emphasis added.) 
 
Powell timely appealed. See K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3608(c) (providing defendant 
may appeal within 14 days of district court judgment). He argued the district court abused 
its discretion when denying his departure motion by not following the required analytical 
framework set out in State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313, 342 P.3d 935 (2015). He stressed two 
deficiencies:  (1) failing to determine if mitigating circumstances existed; and (2) 
including aggravating circumstances and "inappropriate facts" in its analysis because the 
court said it "considered all of the information presented today." 
 
The panel decision reversing the district court 
 
A divided panel reversed the district court. The majority vacated the sentence and 
remanded for the district court to reconsider Powell's motion under what the majority 
perceived was the Jolly framework. Powell, 53 Kan. App. 2d at 762. Judge Thomas J. 
Malone dissented, arguing Jolly is analytically unsound, but noting the district court's 
decision complied all the same. 53 Kan. App. 2d at 770-71 (Malone, J., dissenting) 
(citing State v. McCormick, 305 Kan. 43, 378 P.3d 543 [2016] [Stegall, J., dissenting]). 
 
9 
 
 
 
In reversing, the majority did not squarely resolve Powell's argument that the 
district court should not have considered evidence about M.L.'s uncharged abuse. Instead, 
the majority characterized her testimony as an "aggravating" factor because it was 
unrelated to the crime for which Powell was being sentenced. 53 Kan. App. 2d at 762 
(noting M.L.'s testimony was "presented solely as an aggravating factor intended to offset 
the mitigating factors"). Importantly, the majority said it could not "definitively 
determine from the record whether the sentencing court considered Powell's claimed 
mitigating circumstances without weighing them against the State's aggravating 
circumstances." (Emphasis added.) 53 Kan. App. 2d at 762. The majority essentially held 
resentencing was necessary to affirmatively demonstrate compliance with Jolly. 53 Kan. 
App. 2d at 762. 
 
Disagreeing with the panel majority, Judge Malone argued against the result. He 
believed the record showed compliance with Jolly, noting the court first reviewed the 
mitigating circumstances advanced by defendant and then determined there were not 
substantial and compelling reasons to depart after considering all the facts. 53 Kan. App. 
2d at 770. Judge Malone viewed M.L.'s abuse not as an aggravating circumstance but as 
rebutting Barnett's expert testimony. 53 Kan. App. 2d at 767-68. He stated it was 
appropriate for the sentencing court to consider evidence about the stepdaughter's abuse 
because it might reasonably bear on the appropriate sentence. 53 Kan. App. 2d at 770. 
 
Judge Malone urged this court to grant review and "take the opportunity to further 
clarify how sentencing courts should conduct hearings on departure motions under 
Jessica's Law, what evidence can be presented by the State at such hearings, and how 
sentencing courts should consider the evidence in ruling on such motions." 53 Kan. App. 
2d at 771.  
 
10 
 
 
 
The State petitioned this court for review, which we granted. Jurisdiction is 
proper. See K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (providing for petitions for review of Court of Appeals 
decisions); K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Court of 
Appeals decisions upon petition for review). 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Our basic inquiry is whether the district court's sentencing order must be reversed 
simply because the court did not affirmatively declare that it reviewed Powell's 
mitigating circumstances without weighing them against aggravating circumstances. This 
is clear from the panel majority's holding that 
 
"because we cannot definitely determine from the record whether the sentencing court 
considered Powell's claimed mitigating circumstances without weighing them against the 
State's aggravating circumstances, we find it necessary to vacate Powell's sentence and 
remand for resentencing and for reconsideration of Powell's departure motion and, in 
reconsidering Powell's motion, to demonstrate compliance with Jolly." 53 Kan. App. 2d 
at 762. 
 
We divide our review into two parts. First, whether the sentencing court's failure 
to expressly state how it applied the Jolly framework is sufficient reason to require the 
district court to reconsider the departure motion. Second, whether the district court's 
consideration of Powell's prior, uncharged child sex crimes would establish the district 
court abused its discretion by considering facts immaterial to its determinations about 
whether there were substantial and compelling reasons for departure under K.S.A. 2017 
Supp. 21-6627(d)(1). 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
Standard of review 
 
Jessica's Law requires a hard 25 life sentence for a defendant who is 18 years of 
age or older and convicted of the statutorily enumerated crime, which includes sex 
offenses. K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6627(a)(1). But for a first time Jessica's Law conviction, 
a defendant may be sentenced under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act if "the 
[sentencing] judge finds substantial and compelling reasons, following a review of 
mitigating circumstances, to impose a departure." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 
21-6627(d)(1). If the district court finds substantial and compelling reasons to depart, the 
defendant may be sentenced to the otherwise applicable term of months on the grid 
instead of an indeterminate life sentence. See K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6804. 
 
An appellate court reviews a district court's determination as to whether there are 
substantial and compelling reasons to depart for abuse of discretion. Jolly, 301 Kan. at 
325. A district court abuses its discretion when:  (1) a ruling is based on an error of law; 
(2) a ruling is based on an error of fact, i.e., substantial competent evidence does not 
support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of 
discretion is based; or (3) a ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., no 
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the judge.  301 Kan. at 324. 
 
"Generally, the trial court's decision is protected if reasonable persons could differ upon 
the propriety of the decision as long as [it] is made within and takes into account the 
applicable legal standards. However, an abuse of discretion may be found if the trial 
court's decision goes outside the framework of or fails to properly consider statutory 
limitations or legal standards." (Emphasis added.) State v. Shopteese, 283 Kan. 331, 340, 
153 P.3d 1208 (2007). 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
The Jolly Framework 
 
In Powell's case, we focus on the panel majority's determination that the district 
court abused its discretion by making an error of law. See Powell, 53 Kan. App. 2d at 762 
("Failure to follow the statutory method for considering a departure from a Jessica's Law 
case is an error of law and constitutes an abuse of discretion."). Much of the panel's back-
and-forth with the dissent centers on our court's decision in Jolly and a later case, 
McCormick, 305 Kan. 43. We need to review both decisions to explain our outcome in 
Powell's appeal.  
 
The Jolly court concluded that when considering a departure motion under 
Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 21-4643's "plain language . . . instructs the sentencing court to 
conduct a review of the mitigating circumstances without balancing them against the 
aggravating ones." (Emphasis added.) Jolly, 301 Kan. at 322. The court explained:  
 
"'On structure, no balance between mitigators and aggravators such as that implied in 
K.S.A. 21-4716 or explicitly provided for in K.S.A. 21-4624(e) or K.S.A. 21-4635(b)-(d) 
is necessary when Jessica's Law is the starting point. The only way for Jessica's Law to 
operate is to intensify, if not lengthen, a sentence. It makes 25 years a mandatory 
minimum, unless certain mitigators justify a departure. Simply put, there is nowhere to go 
but to a less-intense place.'" 301 Kan. at 322 (quoting State v. Spencer, 291 Kan. 796, 
809, 248 P.3d 256 [2011]). 
 
Accordingly, the Jolly court "disapprove[d] of any language in [Kansas] caselaw 
that would indicate aggravating circumstances can be weighed against mitigating 
circumstances when considering departure." (Emphasis added.) 301 Kan. at 322. For the 
Jolly court, this meant that when considering a departure motion, the district court's 
decision-making framework requires it to first 
 
13 
 
 
 
"review the mitigating circumstances without any attempt to weigh them against any 
aggravating circumstances. Then, in considering the facts of the case, the court 
determines whether the mitigating circumstances rise to the level of substantial and 
compelling reasons to depart from the otherwise mandatory sentence. Finally, if 
substantial and compelling reasons are found for a departure to a sentence within the 
appropriate sentencing guidelines, the district court must state on the record those 
substantial and compelling reasons." 301 Kan. at 324. 
 
The Jolly decision arose from a Court of Appeals reversal of a departure sentence. 
To get to its result, the panel reassessed what the sentencing court relied on, discounting 
each factor's significance and then reweighing the evidence. And based on its 
reassessment, the panel determined the sentencing court abused its discretion in granting 
departure. 301 Kan. at 328. The Jolly panel added, 
 
"[W]e find that the aggravating factors in this case clearly outweigh Jolly's lack of a 
criminal record. He was a 43-year-old male who assumed the role of a lover with a 12-
year-old girl. He was a trusted adult family friend; she was a child. He knew of C.E.'s 
sexual abuse by her mother's boyfriend 1 month earlier and he took advantage of her 
vulnerability.  
 
"There were no substantial and compelling reasons for granting a departure 
sentence." (Emphasis added.) State v. Jolly, No. 106,680, 2012 WL 5519179, at *7 (Kan. 
App. 2012). 
 
On review, the Jolly court rejected the panel's reasoning and affirmed the 
departure sentence. The Jolly court first determined substantial competent evidence 
supported each mitigating factor. It then concluded, 
 
"The district court thus made no error in fact or law in its analysis. Essentially, 
the State's contention is that due to the facts of this case no reasonable person would 
grant Jolly a departure. Although other reasonable persons may not have granted the 
14 
 
 
 
departure, we find that a reasonable person could agree with the district judge's 
determination that a departure was warranted." 301 Kan. at 331. 
  
In McCormick, the district court discussed the defendant's mitigating evidence and 
then stated, "'The problem is there's an aggravating factor here,'" referring to the fact that 
the 13-year-old rape victim was intoxicated during the crime. (Emphasis added.)  
McCormick, 305 Kan. at 46. The district court followed this up by explaining:  
 
"'[E]ven though there are some substantial mitigating factors, I think it's just trumped by 
the . . .  evidence that this particular [13-year-old] was severely inebriated to the point 
where she couldn't . . . give consent. So I haven't heard anything that makes me think I 
should go ahead and . . . find substantial and compelling reasons for departure . . . ." 
(Emphasis added.) 305 Kan. at 46.  
  
A court majority held this explanation showed the district court applied the wrong 
legal standard by improperly weighing aggravating and mitigating factors when it 
"explicitly referred to the piece of evidence that persuaded him as an 'aggravating 
factor' . . . ." 305 Kan. at 50. 
 
Justice Caleb Stegall dissented, joined by Justices Marla Luckert and Eric Rosen. 
Justice Stegall argued Jolly and the McCormick majority improperly added a prohibition 
against weighing aggravating factors into K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-6627(d)(1)'s language. 
He noted the statute neither commands nor prohibits a weighing of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances and that the statute's "plain, unambiguous language . . . merely 
tells the district court judge to determine whether substantial and compelling reasons 
exist to grant a downward departure after reviewing the mitigating circumstances." 305 
Kan. at 52 (Stegall, J., dissenting). He also argued the majority put form over substance 
by acknowledging a sentencing court may consider how the crime was committed and the 
circumstances inherent in it, but nevertheless find reversible error when the district court 
15 
 
 
 
did that solely because the lower court "used the 'wrong' words to describe what [it] did." 
305 Kan. at 53. 
 
Judge Malone echoed those concerns in his dissent in Powell's case, noting the 
Jolly court's direction that sentencing courts not weigh aggravating circumstances against 
mitigators "is difficult to follow in real-life cases." Powell, 53 Kan. App. 2d at 769. He 
explained: 
 
"Powell's case provides a good example. Is the State allowed to present evidence at the 
departure hearing to rebut the defendant's evidence? If so, must the evidence presented by 
the State be limited strictly to the manner in which the defendant carried out the crime? 
How is the district court to consider the evidence presented by both parties in deciding 
the departure motion? In almost every hearing under the criminal code, parties are 
allowed to present conflicting evidence so the court will have all the relevant information 
to make an informed decision. Are we saying that departure hearings under Jessica's Law 
do not work this way?" 53 Kan. App. 2d at 769.  
 
Both Jolly and McCormick contain language that has resulted in mixed outcomes 
and conflicting reasoning in later Court of Appeals cases reviewing decisions denying 
Jessica's Law departures. Most of this comes from:  (1) Jolly's stated prohibition against 
weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, while sanctioning consideration of 
"the facts of the case," Jolly, 301 Kan. at 323-24; and (2) the McCormick court's concern 
that the district court applied the wrong standard, noting "where, as here, the district 
judge explicitly referred to the piece of evidence that persuaded him as an 'aggravating 
factor,' we cannot be wholly confident that the statutory command not to conduct 
weighing of aggravators and mitigators was followed," while allowing consideration of 
the "circumstances inherent in the crime." 305 Kan. at 50-51. 
 
16 
 
 
 
In dutifully trying to follow Jolly and McCormick, various Court of Appeals 
panels have discovered reversible error in cases that fall into three general categories. 
And yet another batch of cases find no error.  
 
The first is the McCormick-type case, in which the sentencing court expressly 
referred to aggravating factors when ruling. See, e.g., State v. Henning, No. 115,832, 
2017 WL 3837224, at *12 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion) ("The district court 
specifically considered the video tape, the State's primary piece of evidence, to be an 
'aggravating' circumstance causing the scale to have 'dropped like a rock.'"). 
 
The second category includes cases in which sentencing courts described their 
rulings as products of a weighing process but without referring to the facts—against 
which mitigating factors were balanced—specifically as aggravating circumstances. See, 
e.g., State v. Atkisson, No. 112,656, 2015 WL 6457797, at *1 (Kan. App. 2015) 
(unpublished opinion) (noting sentencing court weighed mitigating factors "'against the 
other items'"—i.e., "the facts that related charges occurred in multiple counties, this was 
not an isolated incident, and the age difference" between defendant and victim); State v. 
Berriozabal, No. 108,303, 2014 WL 1707417, at *15 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished 
opinion) (district court noted mitigation present from defendant's young age and 
insubstantial criminal history was "outweighed" by offenses' violent nature, repeated 
abuse, abuse of position of authority, failure to stop when asked, and fleeing county when 
caught; but it did not explicitly call these facts aggravating circumstances) vacated in 
part and remanded (Kan. S. Ct. order dated May 4, 2015) (unpublished). 
 
The third includes cases like Powell's in which the district court did not refer to 
either "aggravating circumstances" or "weighing," but the record failed to affirmatively 
show the court followed Jolly. See, e.g., State v. Anno, No. 116,350, 2017 WL 3947380, 
at *6 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion) (holding district court abused its discretion 
17 
 
 
 
because "[t]here [was] no point in the record at which the district court first considered 
the mitigating circumstances without any attempt to weigh them against aggravating 
factors"); State v. Sullivan, No. 114,369, 2016 WL 4413563, at *2-3 (Kan. App. 2016) 
(unpublished opinion) (vacating sentence for failing to follow Jolly framework when 
"district court made only very brief comments" and "gave no indication that it carried out 
the first step mandated by Jolly"); State v. Pulley, No. 112,631, 2015 WL 5750477, at *5 
(Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion) ("It seems from the record that the district court 
improperly considered aggravating circumstances, contrary to Jolly. At best, the record is 
ambiguous as to when the district court completed its determination as to the existence of 
mitigating factors."); State v. Albanil-Alvarado, No. 111,802, 2015 WL 5311922, at *2 
(Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion) (vacating sentence because record was 
insufficient for Court of Appeals to recognize if district court had followed Jolly's 
procedural steps; noting the district court said it had reviewed mitigating circumstances, 
but it seemed to have immediately moved on to consider other facts that were not 
presented as mitigators). 
 
In contrast with the third category, several Court of Appeals cases have upheld 
district court decisions denying departure even when the sentencing court did not 
expressly perform each Jolly step on the record. See, e.g., State v. Cessna, No. 115,999, 
2018 WL 386844, at *7 (Kan. App. 2018) (unpublished opinion) (holding district court 
did not abuse discretion when it "simply said, 'I do not find substantial and compelling 
reasons to depart'" without affirmatively showing it followed Jolly); State v. Ashbaugh, 
No. 116,426, 2017 WL 5180845, at *4 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion) 
(upholding district court's denial of defendant's departure motion when it ruled there were 
no substantial and compelling reasons to depart and noted victim impact statements 
showed damage defendant had caused to victims and their family; stating district court's 
"straightforward ruling gave no indication he had improperly considered or 'weighed' any 
'aggravating circumstances'"); State v. Cook, No. 113,768, 2016 WL 2609640, at *2-3 
18 
 
 
 
(Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion) (holding no abuse of discretion when district 
court simply ruled substantial and compelling reasons to depart did not exist and noted— 
after observing no need to find aggravating circumstances—that defendant and victims' 
ages supported denying departure).  
 
Given this assortment, it seems obvious Jolly and McCormick fail to chart a 
discernible path for our sentencing and reviewing courts to consistently follow when 
considering departure motions under Jessica's Law. We need to change that. 
 
Failure to perform Jolly steps on the record is not reversible error 
 
Turning to our first inquiry—whether the Jolly steps must be performed on the 
record—we agree with the State that the Powell majority erred when concluding reversal 
was required because the district court did not affirmatively disavow it was not weighing 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Powell's sentencing court did not expressly 
state it considered any facts as "aggravating," and it did not describe its process in 
reaching its ruling as "weighing."  But the panel majority nevertheless stated it could not 
"definitively determine from the record whether the sentencing court considered Powell's 
claimed mitigating circumstances without weighing them against the State's aggravating 
circumstances." (Emphasis added.) Powell, 53 Kan. App. 2d at 762. It held resentencing 
was required so the district court could show its compliance with Jolly. We disagree with 
the panel majority for two reasons. 
 
First, the statute does not oblige a district court to state its reasons for denying a 
departure motion. Indeed, K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6627(d)(1) requires just the opposite:  
"If the sentencing judge departs from [the] mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, 
the judge shall state on the record at the time of sentencing the substantial and 
compelling reasons for the departure." (Emphases added.) And while it is laudable for 
19 
 
 
 
district courts to explain the reasons for their rulings, those explanations are voluntary 
and have injected opportunity for challenge based on our language from Jolly and 
McCormick.  
 
The Powell panel majority cited Pulley, 2015 WL 5750477, for its understanding 
that ambiguity required reversal. Powell, 53 Kan. App. 2d at 762. In Pulley, the panel 
remanded for resentencing when the district court denied departure after considering 
evidence the defendant's crimes involved more than incidental contact with the victim 
and occurred over a larger time period than suggested by the factual basis for defendant's 
guilty plea to a single crime. Pulley, 2015 WL 5750477, at *5-6. As part of its rationale 
for reversal, the Pulley panel commented, 
 
"It seems from the record that the district court improperly considered 
aggravating circumstances, contrary to Jolly. At best, the record is ambiguous as to when 
the district court completed its determination as to the existence of mitigating factors. 
Although the State argues that the district court was simply considering mitigating factors 
in light of the facts of the case, we note that Pulley's prior diversion for a sex offense was 
not a fact inherent in the crime of conviction and appeared to have been viewed 
negatively by the district court. Because of the ambiguity in the record, we cannot tell 
whether Pulley's diversion was considered in the context of determining whether the 
mitigating factor in K.S.A. 21-4643(d)(1) was met, or if the district court viewed the 
diversion as an aggravating factor." (Emphases added.) Pulley, 2015 WL 5750477, at *5. 
 
But our pre-Jolly caselaw noted that "'[s]pecificity by the district court judge when 
making his or her determination is not statutorily required' unless the court decides 
departure is warranted." (Emphasis added.) State v. Harsh, 293 Kan. 585, 587, 265 P.3d 
1161 (2011) (quoting State v. Plotner, 290 Kan. 774, 780-81, 235 P.3d 417 [2010]); see 
also State v. Remmert, 298 Kan. 621, 631, 316 P.3d 154 (2014) ("Jessica's Law does not 
require a district court to state the reasons why it denied a departure motion."), 
20 
 
 
 
disapproved of on other grounds by Jolly, 301 Kan. at 322 ("[W]e disapprove of any 
language in our caselaw that would indicate aggravating circumstances can be weighed 
against mitigating circumstances when considering a departure in a Jessica's Law 
sentencing. See, e.g., Remmert, 298 Kan. at 630."); State v. Florentin, 297 Kan. 594, 601-
02, 303 P.3d 263 (2013) ("[A] judge is not required to state the reasons a departure 
motion is denied."), disapproved of on other grounds by Jolly, 301 Kan. at 322. Jolly 
does not purport to disturb this understanding.  
 
Second, the cases finding abuse of discretion based on the record's failure to 
affirmatively disclose the district court's application of the Jolly framework are oddly 
contrary to how abuse of discretion review is typically performed—namely, the general 
rule that a party arguing an abuse of discretion bears the burden of proving it. See, e.g., 
State v. Staten, 304 Kan. 957, 970, 377 P.3d 427 (2016) (defendant bears burden of 
proving abuse of discretion denying motion for new counsel); State v. Robinson, 303 
Kan. 11, 90, 363 P.3d 875 (2015), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Cheever, 306 
Kan. 760, 402 P.3d 1126 (2017); State v. Warren, 302 Kan. 601, 614, 356 P.3d 396 
(2015); State v. Hilt, 299 Kan. 176, 186, 191, 322 P.3d 367 (2014); State v. Plotner, 290 
Kan. 774, 777, 235 P.3d 417 (2010); State v. Wells, 289 Kan. 1219, 1227, 221 P.3d 561 
(2009); State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 519, 186 P.3d 713 (2008). And the same general rule 
applies to discretionary sentencing decisions including denying a motion to depart from 
Jessica's Law's hard 25 life sentence. State v. Seward, 289 Kan. 715, 722, 217 P.3d 443 
(2009) (holding defendant had the burden to demonstrate district court abused its 
discretion in denying a departure motion), disapproved on other grounds by Jolly, 301 
Kan. at 322-23; see also State v. Baker, 297 Kan. 482, 484, 301 P.3d 706 (2013) 
(defendant bore burden of proving abuse of discretion in district court's order that 
sentences would run consecutively, rather than concurrently); State v. Sampsel, 268 Kan. 
264, 271-72, 997 P.2d 664 (2000) (noting under pre-KSGA sentencing scheme burden on 
21 
 
 
 
party making claim to demonstrate departure sentence was product of partiality, 
prejudice, or improper motive and scope of appellate review is abuse of discretion). 
 
Similarly, in other contexts, a district court's failure to express each step of an 
applicable legal framework on the record has not required reversal for clarification. For 
example, district court discretion in motions for mistrial and motions to withdraw pleas is 
guided by legal frameworks like the one announced in Jolly. See Warren, 302 Kan. at 
608 (holding district court evaluating motion for mistrial must first decide whether 
prejudicial conduct created fundamental failure in proceeding; and, if so, whether it is 
possible to proceed without denying fair trial). Again, nothing in Jolly altered the general 
principles underlying abuse of discretion review. 
 
In sentencing Powell, the district court did not recite each step set forth in Jolly, 
although it articulated the mitigating circumstances Powell advanced. The district court 
did not make findings whether Powell proved his mitigators, but this is not enough 
standing alone to conclude the court abused its discretion. The district court identified the 
correct legal standard, i.e., whether substantial and compelling reasons to depart existed. 
And it gave no indication it was engaging in "weighing" or even that it considered any 
information presented to it as "aggravating." 
 
As Judge Malone correctly pointed out in dissent: 
 
"Was the State not entitled to rebut the evidence that Powell had presented at the 
hearing to support his departure motion? Of course, it was. And if the State was allowed 
to present rebuttal evidence, was the district court not allowed to consider the evidence in 
deciding the motion? Of course, it was. In ruling on Powell's departure motion, the 
district court expressly recited the mitigating factors set forth in the motion. The district 
court did not refer to the State's rebuttal evidence as 'aggravating circumstances'; in fact, 
the district court never used this term at the hearing. The district court never stated that it 
22 
 
 
 
had weighed aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances in denying 
Powell's motion. Instead, the district court merely stated that '[a]fter considering all of the 
information presented' at the hearing, it was unable to find substantial and compelling 
reasons to depart from the presumed sentence." Powell, 53 Kan. App. 2d at 767-68. 
 
Put simply, since reversal of a denial of a departure motion requires an abuse of 
discretion, and because the party alleging abuse of that discretion must demonstrate it, the 
only question on appeal is whether something in the record shows an abuse occurred. We 
address this question as to Powell's appeal in the next section. 
 
To be clear, we hold the panel majority erred when it reversed and remanded 
Powell's sentence because the district court did not affirmatively explain it was not 
weighing mitigating and aggravating circumstances when denying Powell's request for a 
Jessica's Law departure. Any precedent expressing a contrary view is in error. 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion 
 
We now turn to our second inquiry—whether the record demonstrates an abuse of 
discretion. The panel majority's reasoning suggests the district court's reliance on 
evidence that would constitute "aggravating circumstances" might demonstrate abuse of 
discretion. Powell, 53 Kan. App. 2d at 762. And the panel majority characterized 
Powell's uncharged abuse of M.L., as shown by her testimony and other evidence, as an 
aggravating circumstance. 53 Kan. App. 2d at 761-62. But this characterization falls 
victim to Justice Stegall's form-over-substance critique. McCormick, 305 Kan. at 53. The 
real question is whether the district court considered improper evidence in denying the 
departure motion, regardless of any label or characterization one might give that 
evidence. 
 
23 
 
 
 
The McCormick majority indicated that whether a fact is beyond the district court's 
reach in a departure ruling is a question of law that turns on interpreting K.S.A. 2017 
Supp. 21-6627(d)(1). 305 Kan. at 48 (argument sentencing court erred by considering a 
self-described aggravating factor when ruling on departure motion requires the court to 
conduct statutory interpretation). But as discussed, K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6627(d)(1) 
simply provides "the sentencing judge shall impose the mandatory minimum term of 
imprisonment . . . unless the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons, following a 
review of mitigating circumstances, to impose a departure." This statutory language fits 
neatly within the abuse of discretion paradigm. 
 
If the court based its ruling on information it was not entitled to consider as a 
matter of law, it abused its discretion by basing its ruling on an error of law. See Kuhn v. 
Sandoz Paraceuticals Corp., 270 Kan. 443, 456, 14 P.3d 1170 (2000) (noting questions 
of law presented when appellate court seeks to review the factors and considerations 
forming a discretionary decision, and stating "'[a] district court by definition abuses its 
discretion when it makes an error of law'"). Again, the issue is simply whether it was an 
abuse of discretion for the sentencing court to consider "all of the information presented 
today" as the district court explained. We identify no error.  
 
There are three reasons the district court could properly consider the prior-sex-
crime evidence in ruling on the departure motion:  (1) it was a "fact of the case" for the 
substantial and compelling reason determination because it showed the convicted crime 
was not an isolated incident, but rather part of Powell serially molesting children in his 
household; (2) it was relevant to whether Powell proved his claimed mitigating 
circumstances—in particular, his lack of criminal history and the likelihood he would not 
reoffend; and (3) it was introduced by the State for the court's use in deciding the motion 
and Powell failed to contemporaneously object to it, so he cannot now claim the 
evidence's introduction as a basis for reversal under K.S.A. 60-404. 
24 
 
 
 
 
Powell argues the evidence was not a fact of the case because it did more than just 
demonstrate his likelihood of reoffending and went so far beyond mere rebuttal that it 
amounted to raising an aggravating circumstance. But what does that mean and how 
could a court gauge when evidence crosses over into this perceived forbidden territory? 
Powell offers no explanatory case authority to support his claim. Instead, he seems to 
contend the State was to be strictly constrained in cross-examining Barnett and limited to 
arguing Powell failed to prove his mitigating factor. For its part, the panel majority 
characterized this uncharged prior crimes evidence as an aggravating factor because it 
deemed the evidence unrelated to how Powell committed the crime of conviction. Powell, 
53 Kan. App. 2d at 762. But this labeling does not accurately capture the distinction 
between permissible and impermissible considerations in ruling on a departure motion or 
supply the answer to the question posed. 
 
Powell's prior crimes with M.L. were material to the district court's decision 
whether to depart because they demonstrated how Powell carried out the convicted 
offense. As explained in Jolly, after reviewing the mitigating circumstances, when a 
district court is deciding a departure motion, it considers "[t]he facts of the case, . . . [and] 
determines whether the mitigating circumstances rise to the level of substantial and 
compelling reasons to depart from the otherwise mandatory sentence." Jolly, 301 Kan. at 
324. Something is "'"substantial"'" if it is "'"real, not imagined; something with substance 
and not ephemeral," while the term "'compelling' implies that the court is forced, by the 
facts of a case, to leave the status quo or go beyond what is ordinary."'" 301 Kan. at 323. 
Jolly does not explicitly define what constitute "the facts of the case" when a district 
court is considering whether the mitigating circumstances amount to substantial and 
compelling reasons to depart, but it broadly instructs: 
 
25 
 
 
 
"While [Jessica's Law] does not allow a weighing of aggravating factors against 
mitigating factors, the facts of the case—including any egregious ones—are essential for 
a judge to consider in deciding if a departure is warranted based on substantial and 
compelling reasons. Simply stated, a judge does not sentence in a vacuum. The 
sentencing judge is to consider information that reasonably might bear on the proper 
sentence for a particular defendant, given the crime committed, including the manner or 
way in which an offender carried out the crime. This includes those 'circumstances 
inherent in the crime and the prescribed sentence.' [Citation omitted.] Provided the 
sentence imposed is within the statutory limits, '"[i]t is the sentencing judge alone who 
determines the appropriate sentence to be imposed or other disposition of the case by 
exercising his or her best judgment, common sense, and judicial discretion after 
considering all of the reports, the defendant's background, the facts of the case, and the 
public safety."'" (Emphasis added.) 301 Kan. at 323-24. 
 
Moreover, the McCormick court reasoned that "[t]he manner in which a crime is 
committed and the circumstances inherent in the crime are not inevitably limited to the 
strict legal elements of the offense." (Emphasis added.) McCormick, 305 Kan. at 50. This 
suggests Jolly does not limit the type of evidence a district court may consider in 
determining whether departure is warranted, but only limits the manner in which the 
district court makes its decision. See 305 Kan. at 50-51 (rejecting argument that district 
court erred by considering Jessica's Law victim's intoxication in addressing departure 
motion because court may consider only strict legal elements of offense); 305 Kan. at 53 
(Stegall, J., dissenting) (arguing Jolly framework "is in actuality just a command to the 
district court judge not to describe what he or she is doing—viz., considering all of the 
circumstances—as 'weighing'"). McCormick also suggests the so-called "aggravating" 
circumstance in that case, i.e., the victim's intoxication, would have been a proper 
consideration had the court not used it as a fact to weigh against the defendant's 
mitigating circumstances. 305 Kan. at 50. 
 
26 
 
 
 
But these intellectual contortions just add credence to Judge Malone's observation 
that the Jolly court's direction that sentencing courts not weigh aggravating circumstances 
against mitigators "is difficult to follow in real-life cases." Powell, 53 Kan. App. 2d at 
769. In other words, an "aggravating" label or characterization should not control when 
reviewing departure decisions in Jessica's Law case for abuse of discretion. The real 
question becomes whether the evidence bears on the decision to be made, i.e., whether 
the mitigating circumstances advanced both exist and supply a substantial and compelling 
reason to depart from the hard 25 life sentence. Cf. State v. Thurber, 308 Kan. ___, 420 
P.3d 389 (2018) (noting for purposes of determining relevance, evidence is material if it 
tends to establish a fact that is both at issue and significant under the case's substantive 
law). 
  
Powell's prior crimes were material to the district court's ruling because they 
constituted information that might reasonably bear on the proper sentence. This is so 
because it reflected on Powell's background, public safety, and even the facts of the case. 
This context surely helped the court determine whether, in light of Powell's mitigation 
case, it was "'"forced . . . to leave the status quo or go beyond what is ordinary."'" 301 
Kan. at 323. For this reason, we are not persuaded by Powell's contention that the district 
court consulted facts unrelated to the case when it considered information outside his plea 
agreement. 
 
Powell relies on Pulley to press his point, but the Pulley panel concluded the 
district court abused its discretion in denying departure in part because a court may not 
"consider facts that are merely alleged in connection with a charge that is ultimately 
dismissed. Those facts have not been established either by admission or by trial." Pulley, 
2015 WL 5750477, at *6. That situation arose because Pulley pleaded guilty to one crime 
in exchange for the State dismissing another count, but at sentencing the court denied 
departure citing allegations in the probable cause affidavit concerning the dismissed 
27 
 
 
 
count. See State v. Atkisson, [this day decided] ("When discretionary decision requires 
fact-based determinations, a district court abuses its discretion when the decision is based 
on factual determinations unsupported by the evidence."). 
 
Pulley is distinguishable from Powell's case because Powell's abuse of M.L. was 
demonstrated by evidence presented to the sentencing court under oath and subject to 
challenge. In other words, it was presented as evidence. And had Powell's case gone to 
trial, this testimony already had been determined to be admissible in a pretrial ruling. See 
K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-455(d) (providing defendant's other acts of sexual misconduct are 
admissible and may be considered for their bearing on any matter to which relevant and 
probative).  
 
In addition to fitting within the facts-of-the-case mold, the prior crimes evidence 
was relevant to whether Powell proved his claimed mitigating circumstances, which 
included his lack of criminal history and the likelihood he would reoffend. Barnett even 
agreed there was clinical significance in the difference between M.L.'s allegations and 
over-the-clothes fondling. In Ashbaugh, a Court of Appeals panel addressed a defendant's 
argument that information cited in opposition to departure "went beyond the facts of the 
case and should not have been considered." Ashbaugh, 2017 WL 5180845, at *3. The 
panel's test—admittedly a case-by-case approach—turned on whether the unfavorable 
information related to the facts advanced in support of departure. The panel held it was 
permissible for the State to rebut defendant's arguments favoring departure "by noting 
incongruities and contradictions" in an evaluation on which defendant relied and through 
victim impact statements "to rebut . . . implications that [defendant's] family relationships 
could be reestablished if he were to be granted a departure sentence." 2017 WL 5180845, 
at *3. 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
The panel reasoned, 
 
"The evidence and arguments by the State would seem to clearly fall within the 
realm of information which reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for this 
particular defendant by filling the 'vacuum' potentially created had Ashbaugh's arguments 
gone unrebutted. Under these circumstances, a reasoned rebuttal does not rise to the level 
of an 'aggravating circumstance.'" 2017 WL 5180845, at *3. 
  
We agree with this view of the evidence's relationship to a particular mitigation 
case. Moreover, whether a mitigating circumstance exists is a fact question. See Jolly, 
301 Kan. at 326-331 (holding substantial competent evidence supported district court's 
finding that there were three mitigating circumstances supporting departure:  defendant 
did not have criminal history, took responsibility for crime, and was not risk to 
community). Applying this principle to Powell's case, the prior crimes evidence was 
relevant to the persuasiveness of Barnett's opinion that Powell was unlikely to reoffend. 
Even more pointedly, M.L.'s testimony contradicted Powell's claim based on his lack of 
prior convictions that he had no history of prior criminal conduct. 
 
Finally, this evidence was admitted solely on the departure issue and Powell failed 
to object to it. Under the contemporaneous objection rule,  
 
"A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision 
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless there 
appears of record objection to the evidence timely interposed and so stated as to make 
clear the specific ground of objection." K.S.A. 60-404.  
 
"[E]videntiary claims—including questions posed by a prosecutor and responses 
to those questions during trial—must be preserved by way of a contemporaneous 
objection for those claims to be reviewed on appeal." State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 349, 
29 
 
 
 
204 P.3d 585 (2009). Powell did not object, so he cannot now challenge the district 
court's ruling. See Wentland v. Uhlarik, 37 Kan. App. 2d 734, Syl. ¶ 6, 159 P.3d 1035 
(2007) ("The trial court cannot be accused of abusing its discretion in the admission of 
evidence when the complaining party failed to object and thereby give the trial court an 
opportunity to exercise its discretion on the matter."). 
 
In summary, the record does not establish the district court abused its discretion by 
improperly weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Unlike the district court 
in McCormick, the district court in Powell's case did not expressly refer to aggravating 
circumstances. The evidence adduced at sentencing was a fact of the case material to 
whether there were substantial and compelling reasons to depart, relevant to whether 
Powell proved his mitigating factors, and introduced without objection for the court's use 
in ruling on the motion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Because the record does not demonstrate the district court based its ruling on an 
error of law by applying an incorrect legal framework or by considering improper facts, 
we hold Powell failed to show the district court abused its discretion. The panel majority 
erred by vacating the sentence. We hold further that district courts considering a 
departure motion need not affirmatively state they are not weighing aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances. Language in our caselaw contrary to today's holding is no 
longer sound. 
 
We reverse the panel majority's decision. We affirm Powell's sentence. 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
* * *  
 
BEIER, J., concurring:  I concur in the result reached by the majority today and in 
most of its expressed rationale. 
 
I write separately only to distance myself from its statements that how a district 
judge labels or characterizes evidence or the fact it has been admitted to prove is of no 
moment. Such statements are, at best, overbroad, and at worst, wrong. They are also 
unnecessary to reach the correct outcome and promise more, rather than less, confusion 
in the district courts. 
 
The words a district judge uses to describe what he or she is deciding and why 
matter. Indeed, they are often all an appellate court has to go on when determining 
whether the judge adhered to the law. Appellate judges do not sit to determine what a 
lower court judge must have meant to say. They sit to determine what he or she did say 
and whether the words used demonstrate an error under the applicable standard of 
appellate review. 
 
Because I see no abuse of discretion in what the district judge did say here—with 
or without the majority's criticism and clarification of State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313, 342 
P.3d 935 (2015)—I agree that the Court of Appeals decision must be reversed and the 
district court judgment affirmed. 
 
NUSS, C.J., and JOHNSON, J., join the foregoing concurring opinion.