Title: State v. Brewer

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

129 S.E.2d 262 (1963) 258 N.C. 533 STATE of North Carolina v. Pierce Oliver Kidd BREWER, Robert A. Burch, Robert M. Burch, George Masefield, Martin J. Hamilton, Walter Schoenfeldt, Pfaff & Kendall, a corporation, Traffic and Street Sign Company, a corporation. No. 441. Supreme Court of North Carolina. February 1, 1963. *265 Atty. Gen. T. W. Bruton and Asst. Atty. Gen. Harry W. McGalliard, for the State. Seawell & Harrell, by Bernard A. Harrell, Raleigh, for defendant appellant Brewer. William T. Hatch, and Elbert Richard Jones, Jr., Raleigh, for defendant appellants Robert A. Burch and Robert M. Burch. PARKER, Justice. All the defendants, except the corporate defendants, charged in the indictment, prior to pleading to the indictment, filed a joint written motion to quash the indictment, and each and every count therein. The motion to quash covers more than fourteen *266 pages in the record. The motion to quash avers that the first count in the indictment should be quashed for the following reasons: One. It shows on its face the offense charged is a misdemeanor which it alleges occurred on or about 1 August 1957, and therefore the prosecution is barred by the two-year Statute of Limitations, G.S. § 15-1. Two. It "contains within one count three separate and distinct averments of conspiracy: (a) a conspiracy to violate G.S. § 14-353; (b) a conspiracy that the defendants, with the exception of Robert A. Burch, conspired to offer and promise money to Robert A. Burch, with the intent and purpose of influencing his activities in relation to his employer's business; (c) the defendants, other than Robert A. Burch, conspired that Robert A. Burch would accept money or other gratuities." This is duplicity and a failure to comply with the requirements of G.S. § 15-152. Three. It fails to comply with the requirements of G.S. § 15-153. Four. G.S. § 14-353, upon which the indictment is based, is unconstitutional and repugnant to the "due process of law" clause of section one of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and to "the law of the land" clause of Article I, section 17, of the North Carolina Constitution, in that the statute is so vague and indefinite, it is void for uncertainty, and further the statute constitutes an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State. The motion to quash alleges that the remaining eleven counts in the indictment should be quashed for substantially the same reasons as the first count in the indictment should be quashed. The court denied the joint motion to quash the indictment and each and every count therein, and the defendants who made the motion excepted. Whereupon, all the defendants entered pleas of Not Guilty. Defendants Brewer and the two Burches assign as errors the denial to quash the counts in the indictment upon which they were convicted. Defendant Brewer has filed a brief. The defendants Burch have filed a joint brief. In the two briefs the first question presented for decision is: Whether or not the prosecution of the first count in the indictment is barred by G.S. § 15-1. Defendant Robert M. Burch was acquitted on the first count. The part of the statute relevant to appellants' contention is: "* * * all misdemeanors except malicious misdemeanors, shall be presented or found by the grand jury within two years after the commission of the same, and not afterwards * * *." The statute has a proviso, which is not applicable here. A violation of G.S. § 14-353 is explicitly stated by the statute to be a misdemeanor. The State makes no contention that a violation of G.S. § 14-353 is a malicious misdemeanor. In fact, a violation of this statute is not a malicious misdemeanor. State v. Frisbee, 142 N.C. 671, 55 S.E. 722. In this jurisdiction a conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor is a misdemeanor. State v. Abernethy, 220 N.C. 226, 17 S.E.2d 25. "As soon as the union of wills for the unlawful purpose is perfected, the offense of conspiracy is complete." State v. Knotts, 168 N.C. 173, 188, 83 S.E. 972, 979. "No overt act is necessary to complete the crime of conspiracy," State v. Davenport, 227 N.C. 475, 494, 42 S.E.2d 686, 699, or as stated in State v. Whiteside, 204 N.C. 710, 169 S.E. 711, "the `conspiracy' is the crime and not its execution." The indictment was found at the April Assigned Term 1962 of Wake County superior court, and the trial term was the June 1962 Term of said court. The first count in the indictment charges that all the defendants "on or about the 1st day of August, 1957, as well before as after said *267 date, and continuing from said date until on or about the 1st day of February, 1962 * * * unlawfully and willfully and with common design and set purpose and in a secret manner, did combine, confederate, scheme, agree and conspire together and with each other * * *." Appellants argue that in North Carolina a criminal conspiracy is a completed crime as soon as the union of wills for the unlawful purpose is perfected, that no overt act is necessary to complete the crime of conspiracy, that count one in the indictment alleges that the conspiracy existed and was completed on or about "the 1st day of August 1957," that the indictment was found at the April Assigned Term 1962, and, therefore, the prosecution on the first count in the indictment is barred by G.S. § 15-1. Defendant Brewer and defendant Robert A. Burch were convicted on the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh counts in the indictment, all of which charge overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy charged in the first count of the indictment on the following dates respectively: Fifth count, on or about 1 June 1960; sixth count, on or about 16 June 1960; seventh count, on or about 23 August 1960; eighth count, on or about 23 August 1960; ninth count, on or about 1 February 1961; tenth count, on or about 1 February 1961; eleventh count, on or about 1 June 1961. Defendant Robert M. Burch was acquitted on counts five and six In United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 31 S. Ct. 124, 54 L. Ed. 1168, the first count of the indictment alleges "that the defendants in error and others named, on December 30, 1903, and from that day until the day of presenting the indictment (July 1, 1909), have engaged in an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade in refined sugar among the several states of the Union * * *. It then sets forth, at length, the means by which the alleged purpose was to be accomplished, and what are put forward as overt acts done in pursuance of the plan." Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, speaking for the Court, said in replying to a contention of the defendants in error similar to the contention made here: In substantial accord with the Kissel case, see Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 32 S. Ct. 793, 56 L. Ed. 1114; Brown v. Elliott, 225 U.S. 392, 32 S. Ct. 812, 56 L. Ed. 1136. In Pinkerton v. United States, 5 Cir., 145 F.2d 252, W. Daniel Pinkerton and Walter G. Pinkerton were indicted with three others on a conspiracy charge to violate certain specified sections of the Internal Revenue Code of the United States. The indictment contained only one count, and charged that the conspiracy set forth had existed continuously from the 12th day of August, 1938, until the 27th day of June, 1943, and within three years of the finding of the indictment which was returned by the grand jury on February 19, 1944. There were nineteen overt acts charged in the indictment, the first six of which, it is without dispute, were committed more than three years before the return of the indictment. The two Pinkertons were convicted and appealed. The Court in its opinion said: In Scarlett v. State, 201 Md. 310, 93 A.2d 753, Scarlett, Harry Gross and Horace B. Cann were tried in December 1951 on an indictment charging that on 1 January 1947, and thence continually until 20 August 1951, they unlawfully conspired together and with certain other persons to violate the lottery laws of the State of Maryland. The jury found Scarlett and Gross guilty, and Cann not guilty. In February 1952, the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City granted them a new trial. At the second trial in March 1952, the jury found Scarlett guilty, and Gross not guilty. From a sentence of imprisonment Scarlett appealed. In affirming the judgment below, the Court, so far as relevant here, said: The authorities are in conflict as to when the Statute of Limitations operates to bar a prosecution for conspiracy. Some Courts take the view that a conspiracy is not a continuing offense in the sense that each overt act will remove the bar of the Statute of Limitations against the original *270 conspiracy. Other Courts take the view, and this seems to be in accord with the weight of later authorities, and in our opinion is the better view, that a conspiracy may be a continuing crime and that it is a continuing offense until its abandonment or success, or as long as any concerted action pursuant to the conspiracy continues, or as long as there is a course of conduct in violation of law to effectuate its purpose, or when the plot contemplates bringing to pass a continuous result that will not continue without the continuous co-operation of the conspirators to keep it up, as long as there is such continuous co-operation pursuant to the conspiracy. In brief, that the conspiracy is a continuing offense so that the State of Limitations is tolled as to the original conspiracy each time an overt act is committed in furtherance of the purpose and design of the conspiracy. Annotation 97 A.L.R. 137; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 227(3), p. 592; 11 Am.Jur., Conspiracy, sec. 25. In all three of these works many cases are cited which support the texts. The criminal offense of conspiracy is complete in North Carolina, as we have stated above, and at common law, as soon as the confederacy or combination is formed. In many jurisdictions, however, the common law rule is modified by statutes requiring that to constitute the crime of conspiracy there must be an unlawful agreement and an overt act to effect the object of the agreement. This is true of the crime of conspiracy as defined in the Federal Criminal Code. Annotation 62 A.L.R.2d 1369. In this annotation on p. 1372 it is said: State v. Christianbury, 44 N.C. 46, cited and relied upon by defendant Brewer in his brief, is clearly distinguishable. In that case, "the acts which are charged in the indictment, as constituting the offense, took place more than two years before the prosecution was commenced." In the instant case count one in the indictment charges the conspiracy as continuing from on or about 1 August 1957 until on or about 1 February 1962, and in other counts in the indictment overt acts in furtherance of the purpose and design of the conspiracy and in effectuating its unlawful purpose are charged as having been committed by the alleged conspirators on or about 1 June 1960, 16 June 1960, 23 August 1960, 1 February 1961, and 1 June 1961, all within two years of the finding of the indictment as a true bill by the grand jury at the April Assigned Term 1962 of Wake County superior court. Defendants have not seen fit to bring up any of the evidence at the trial or the charge of the court. We decide here that a conspiracy may have a continuance in time, and count one and the indictment here allege that the conspiracy did so continue with the commission of overt acts by the alleged conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy and to effectuate its unlawful purpose within two years of the finding of the indictment. The trial court correctly overruled defendants' motion to quash the first count in the indictment on the ground that a prosecution on such count was barred by G.S. § 15-1. In the two briefs of appellants the second question presented for decision is: Did the trial court err in refusing to quash the indictment on the ground that G.S. § 14-353, upon which the indictment is based, is unconstitutional and repugnant to the "due process of law" clause of section one of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, *271 and to "the law of the land" clause of Article I, section 17, of the North Carolina Constitution, in that the statute is so vague and indefinite, it is void for uncertainty, and on the further ground that the statute constitutes an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State? The General Assembly at its 1913 Session enacted Chapter 190 of the Public Laws of North Carolina, which is entitled "An act to prohibit influencing agents, employees and servants." Section one of this act is codified as G.S. § 14-353, and section two of this act is codified as G.S. § 14-354. G.S. § 14-353 reads: G.S. § 14-354 provides that a witness may be required to give self-criminating evidence in respect to the crime denounced in G.S. § 14-353, but, if he does, no suit or prosecution can be based thereon, except for perjury committed in so testifying. Appellants may challenge the constitutionality of G.S. § 14-353 by a motion to quash the indictment, which charges a violation of this statute. State v. Glidden Co., 228 N.C. 664, 46 S.E.2d 860; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 96, pp. 343-344. The General Assembly of North Carolina, unless it is limited by constitutional provisions imposed by the State or Federal Constitution, has the inherent power to define and punish any act as a crime, because it is indisputably a part of the police power of the State. The expediency of making any such enactment is a matter of which the General Assembly is the proper judge. The remedy for unjust or unwise legislation, not obnoxious to constitutional objections, if such be enacted, is to be found in a change by the people of their representatives, according to the methods provided by the Constitution and the laws of the State. However, the act of the General Assembly declaring what shall constitute a crime must have some substantial relation to the ends sought to be accomplished. State v. Yarboro, 194 N.C. 498, 140 S.E. 216; People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301, 92 A.L.R. 1223; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 13; 14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, secs. 16 and 22; Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, 1957, Vol. I, sec. 16. In passing upon the constitutionality of G.S. § 14-353, we start with the presumption that it is constitutional, and it must be so held by this Court, unless it is in conflict with some constitutional provision of the State or Federal Constitution. State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 114 S.E.2d 660; State v. Lueders, 214 N.C. 558, 200 S.E. 22. "We cannot overturn a statute because we do not like it; for our likes and dislikes *272 affect us as citizens, not as judges." Wright v. Hart, 182 N.Y. 330, 353, 75 N.E. 404, 412, 2 L.R.A.,N.S., 338, 350, 3 Ann.Cas. 263, 271. The books are filled with statements by the Courts of the rule that a crime must be defined in a penal statute with appropriate certainty and definiteness. In Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322, the Court said: This is said in Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 72 S. Ct. 329, 96 L.Ed. 367: This Court said in State v. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 122 S.E.2d 768, quoting from Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, 1957, Vol. I, sec. 18: To the same effect, 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 24(2)a; 14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, sec. 19. See also, State v. Partlow, 91 N.C. 550; State v. Morrison, 210 N.C. 117, 185 S.E. 674; State v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Co., 210 N.C. 742, 188 S.E. 412. So far as known, after a diligent search by us, by the Attorney General and his staff, and by learned counsel who appear for appellants, no case involving the provisions of G.S. §§ 14-353 and 14-354 has been before this Court. Twelve states have statutes prohibiting the general practice of bribery in commercial relationships or influencing agents, employees and servants in commercial relationships, analogous to our statute codified as G.S. §§ 14-353 and 14-354: Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. In addition to statutes of this general type, there are seventeen states which have statutes making it a crime to bribe a particular type of employee, notably agents or employees in charge of purchasing or hiring: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, *273 Texas, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin. CONTROL OF NONGOVERNMENTAL CORRUPTION BY CRIMINAL LEGISLATION, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 108, p. 848, (1960), where on pp. 864 and 866 a chart gives the names of the states and sets forth the specific statutes. Incidentally, North Carolina has statutes making athletic corruption a crime. G.S. §§ 14-373, 14-374, 14-375, 14-376, and 14-377. The New York statute outlaws the corruption of employees, agents and servants and of purchasing and hiring agents in particular. The University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 108, p. 852, states: "Since this statute [New York] is broadest in scope, has been more widely enforced than any other, and has served as a prototype for the legislation of several other states, it will be dealt with in some detail." In note 29 to this sentence it states that Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin, all have statutes similar to New York's. The note specifies the statute of each state, and gives G.S. § 14-353 for North Carolina. So far as the briefs of counsel and our research disclose, none of these statutes substantially similar to G.S. § 14-353 has been challenged on constitutional grounds, except the New York statute in People v. Davis (Court of Special Sessions, New York County), 160 N.Y.S. 769. The New York statute, New York Penal Law, sec. 439, reads: The second section of the statute is substantially similar to G.S. § 14-354 in respect *274 to a person required to give selfcriminating evidence. The information in the Davis case charged that on 21 April 1914, in violation of section 439 of the Penal Law, Albert Davis The defendant demurred to the information, upon the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a crime, and urged that the last clause of section 439 of the Penal Law, under which the information in this case was drawn, is repugnant to Article I, section 10, of the Constitution of the United States, and to the 14th Amendment thereto, and is therefore null and void, and that said clause is likewise repugnant to Article I, sections 1 and 6, of the Constitution of the State of New York. Article I, section 1, of the Constitution of the State of New York provides: Section 6 of the same Article reads: The Court in an opinion by Russell, C. J., concurred in by Collins and O'Keefe, JJ., said: The Court rejected all three assertions of unconstitutionality: (1) No violation of equal protection was found because the statute "affects alike all persons similarly situated"; (2) constitutional freedom of contract may be limited by police power; and (3) as to the propriety of the exercise of the police power in this situation, the Court said: The State of New York in the trial court convicted a basketball referee and a union official on a charge of violating Penal Law, section 439. These convictions were upset on appeal because the acts committed by the defendants did not fall within the class of persons at which the statute was directed. People v. Levy, 283 App. Div. 383, 128 N.Y.S.2d 275, (1954); People v. Graf, 261 App.Div. 188, 24 N.Y.S.2d 683. In the Levy case, it is stated: In People v. Jacobs, 309 N.Y. 315, 130 N.E.2d 636, (1955), a professional photographer who had been convicted for giving money to a ship's purser to get a list of incoming passengers on an information charging a violation of Penal Law, section 439, secured a reversal on appeal, because the State failed to show that the interest of the purser's employer was involved. The Court said: In these three cases it seems no question was raised as to the constitutionality of Penal Law, section 439; if so, it does not appear in the reported cases. Use of the New York statute in civil proceedings has been more frequent. Sirkin v. Fourteenth St. Store, 124 App.Div. 384, 108 N.Y.S. 830, involved a fact situation which is typical. The plaintiff sold and delivered a quantity of goods to the defendant and, upon failure of payment for the goods, brought an action for the price. Defendant sought dismissal on the grounds that the contract of sale was the result of a bribe which had passed between plaintiff and defendant's purchasing agent in violation of the Penal Code, section 384r, in respect to corrupt influencing of agents, employees or servants, which is substantially similar to the present New York Penal Law, section 439. Defendant buyer admitted that he suffered no injury because of the bribe but insisted that the Court should refuse to enforce the contract of sale on "broad moral grounds." The Court agreed, holding that if a buyer can show that the bribe and the contract of sale were parts of the same transaction the sale will be considered void and the Court will leave the parties as it finds them. The Court said: The rule of Sirkin, that a contract of sale entered into as the result of bribing an employee will not be enforced against the buyer, has become well established in New York. Kraus v. H. Pacter & Co., 134 Misc. 247, 234 N.Y.S. 687; Bolotin v. Jefferson, 98 Misc. 603, 163 N.Y.S. 59; General Tire Repair Co. v. Price, Sup., 115 N.Y.S. 171. *276 Stone v. Freeman, 298 N.Y. 268, 82 N.E.2d 571, was a broker's action for commissions earned in arranging sale of clothing to French Purchasing Mission by defendant, in which counterclaims were filed alleging defendant's agreement to pay and payment of certain sums to plaintiff on his agreement to divide them with purchaser's representative, and praying return to defendant of unpaid part of such representative's agreed share. The counterclaims plainly allege a conspiracy to violate section 439 of the Penal Law of the State of New York. The Court held that the motion to dismiss the counterclaims in the amended answer should be granted. In its opinion the Court said: "For no court should be required to serve as paymaster of the wages of crime, or referee between thieves." In Donemar, Inc. v. Molloy, 252 N.Y. 360, 169 N.E. 610, it was held that where a seller of merchandise entered into a corrupt bargain with employee of purchaser for the payment of secret commissions in effecting a settlement, the purchaser was entitled to recover amount of secret commissions, regardless of whether there was disparity between value of goods received and consideration paid in settlement of claim. The Court said: G.S. § 14-353 is divisible into four parts. First, it provides that "[a]ny person who gives, offers or promises to an agent, employee or servant any gift or gratuity whatever with intent to influence his action in relation to his principal's, employer's or master's business" shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. (Emphasis supplied.) The intent specified is an essential element of the offense. The acts prohibited are stated in words sufficiently explicit, clear and definite to inform any man of ordinary intelligence what conduct on his part will render him liable to its penalties. If a person does the prohibited act or acts specified in this part of the statute with the intent explicitly stated therein, he is guilty of what is commonly called "commercial bribery." In American Distilling Co. v. Wisconsin Liquor Co., 7 Cir., 104 F.2d 582, 123 A.L.R. 739, the Court said: "The vice of conduct labeled `commercial bribery,' as related to unfair trade practices, is the advantage which one competitor secures over his fellow competitors by his secret and corrupt dealing with employees or agents of prospective purchasers." Surely a violation of this part of G.S. § 14-353 is related to unfair trade practices, and is an unfair method of competition. The contention of defendants that the language of this part of the statute is so broad as to prohibit the customary habit of tipping is untenable. Customary tipping is in obedience to custom or in appreciation of service, and is done with no intent to influence the action of the person receiving the tip in relation to his or her employer's business, and as to tipping done in such a manner the statute is not applicable. However, it is possible that a person by tipping an agent, servant or employee with the intent specified in this part of the statute could bring himself within its penalties: e. g., by giving substantial amounts or considerations and calling them tips. The second part of the statute provides that "any agent, employee or servant who requests or accepts a gift or gratuity or a promise to make a gift or to do an act beneficial to himself, under an agreement or with an understanding that he shall act in any particular manner in relation to his principal's, employer's or master's business" shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. (Emphasis *277 supplied.) The agreement or understanding in the words emphasized is an essential element of the offense. Although this part of the statute employs general terms, the words used are sufficiently explicit and definite to convey to any man of ordinary intelligence and understanding an adequate description of the prohibited act or acts, and to inform him of what conduct on his part will render him liable to its penalties. The plain intent and purpose of this part of G.S. § 14-353 is to prohibit any agent, employee or servant from being disloyal and unfaithful to his principal, employer or master. The Holy Bible in the New Testament, St. Matthew, chapter 6, verse 24 (King James Version), says: "No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other." A statement of an eternal truth. The third and fourth parts of G.S. § 14-353 refer to a commission, discount or bonus received by any agent, employee or servant under the circumstances therein specified and to any person who gives or offers such an agent, employee, or servant such commission, discount or bonus. The indictment charges the defendants with a violation of the first two parts of G.S. § 14-353. It is so stated in defendants' briefs. We are here concerned with the first two parts of G.S. § 14-353, which are divisible and separable from the remainder of the statute. In our opinion, and we so hold, the first two parts of G.S. § 14-353, which the indictment charges the defendants violated, are not repugnant to the "due process of law" clause of section one of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and to "the law of the land" clause of Article I, section 17, of the North Carolina Constitution, and are a reasonable and proper exercise of the police power of the State. The activities necessary to accomplish the offenses prohibited by G.S. § 14-353, and similar statutes, require no violence, embody no traces in lasting form, and frequently, if not almost entirely, have no witnesses other than persons implicated or potentially implicated. Once completed, they leave few persons, if any, aware of being damaged. The enforcement problems, which arise from the very nature of the offenses, are extremely difficult, because of lack of evidence. This is probably the prime reason why so few persons have been prosecuted for violating these statutes. In view of the structure of modern business organizations and the demands made upon the individual by present-day business, both the opportunities, and the practice of bribing or unlawfully influencing the agents and employees of others seem to be increasing. There is general agreement that where an agent or employee receives money or other considerations from a person in return for the agent's or employee's efforts to further that person's interests in business dealings between him and the principal or employer, such an act or acts on the part of the agent or employee and on the part of the person who gives the money or other consideration to the agent or employee should be prohibited. For articles in respect to the acts prohibited by G.S. § 14-353, and similar statutes, and "commercial bribery" and influencing of employees, see: Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 46, p. 599 (1961-2), "Commercial Bribery: The Need for Legislation in Minnesota"; University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 108, p. 848 (1960), "Control of Nongovernmental Corruption by Criminal Legislation"; Harvard Law Review, Vol. 45, p. 1248 (1931-2), "Bribery in Commercial Relationships"; Columbia Law Review, Vol. 28, p. 799 (1928), "Commercial Bribery." In the Minnesota Law Review Article, p. 630, there is set forth a Proposed Commercial Bribery Statute. We set forth section 1, *278 subdivisions 1 and 2, of the Proposed Statute because of its similarity with the first two parts of G.S. § 14-353: Defendant Robert M. Burch assigns as error the denial by the trial court of his motion to set aside the verdict against him of guilty of counts seven, eight, nine, ten and eleven as charged in the indictment, on the ground that the jury found him not guilty of count one in the indictment, and therefore the verdict is inconsistent. Counts seven, eight, nine, ten and eleven in the indictment are set forth in thirteen pages in the record. All of these counts charge the defendants Brewer and Robert A. Burch and Robert M. Burch and others with specific substantive offenses in violation of G.S. § 14-353 and with overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy alleged in the first count in the indictment. Count seven in the indictment is typical of counts two through twelve, both inclusive, in the indictment. The jury's verdict was that defendant Brewer "is guilty of violation of G.S. § 14-353 as charged in the 7th count in the bill of indictment." The jury returned an identical verdict on the seventh count in the indictment against defendant Robert A. Burch and also against defendant Robert M. Burch. Count seven is as follows: There is an obvious and substantial distinction between count one in the indictment and the other eleven counts in the indictment, in that the gist of the first count is the alleged conspiracy to violate G.S. § 14-353 and not the acts done in pursuance thereof (State v. Christianbury, supra; Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 447, 28 S. Ct. 163, 170, 171, 52 L. Ed. 278, 290; Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 33 S. Ct. 226, 57 L. Ed. 450; United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 35 S. Ct. 682, 59 L. Ed. 1211; Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, Anderson Ed., 1957, Vol. I, Conspiracy, section 87, where many cases from the states are cited in support of the text), and the gist of the eleven other counts is the alleged specific substantive acts done by the defendants in violation of G.S. § 14-353 (Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S. Ct. 1180, 90 L. Ed. 1489; Kelly v. United States, 6 Cir., 258 F. 392, certiorari denied 249 U.S. 616, 39 S. Ct. 391, 63 L.Ed. 803). As stated above, in North Carolina "no overt act is necessary to complete the crime of conspiracy" (State v. Davenport, supra), and "the `conspiracy' is the crime and not its execution" (State v. Whiteside, supra). It is perfectly plain that two distinct offenses were alleged, and one may be convicted both of the substantive offenses which were the object of the conspiracy, and of the conspiracy, even though the substantive offenses were alleged as the overt acts necessary to convict for conspiracy. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S. Ct. 1180, 90 L. Ed. 1489. In the Pinkerton case in the Supreme Court a single conspiracy was charged and proved. Some of the overt acts charged in the conspiracy count were the same acts charged in the substantive counts. Each of the substantive offenses found was committed pursuant to the conspiracy. Petitioners therefore contend that the substantive counts became merged in the conspiracy count, and that only a single sentence not exceeding the maximum two-year penalty provided by the conspiracy statute could be imposed. To state the matter differently, they contended that each of the substantive counts became a separate conspiracy count but, since only a single conspiracy was charged and proved, only a single sentence for conspiracy could be imposed. The Court in rejecting their contention said: This is said in Annotation 37 A.L.R. 778: Conspiracy alleged may fail in proof, as well as proven conspiracy may fail in execution. Failure, then, to prove the existence of a conspiracy alleged to have been formed to commit a particular character of crime cannot affect the right of the State, regardless of conspiracy, to prove that a crime of the same character was actually committed. This is well within settled rules of the doctrine of conspiracy. State v. McCullough, 244 N.C. 11, 92 S.E.2d 389; Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S. Ct. 1180, 90 L. Ed. 1489; Kelly v. United States, supra; 15 C.J.S. Conspiracy § 90, p. 1135. The offense charged in the first count and the offenses charged in the other eleven counts in the indictment are not the same in law and in fact. Although the State failed to prove that Robert M. Burch was one of the conspirators and was guilty of the conspiracy *282 alleged against him in count one in the indictment, he could still be convicted of the substantive offenses committed by him in violation of G.S. § 14-353, as charged against him in counts two through twelve, both inclusive. The State failed to convict him on counts five, six and twelve, but did convict him on counts seven, eight, nine, ten and eleven. The verdict of the jury against Robert M. Burch is not inconsistent. In the Kelly case two indictments were returned: One charging a conspiracy to defraud the United States, and the other charging the commission of acts of fraud, which was the object of the alleged conspiracy. The cases were consolidated for trial. Under the conspiracy indictment there was a verdict of not guilty. Under the second indictment, comprising nine counts, there was a verdict of guilty against each defendant. Sentences were pronounced, and they appealed. Defendants contended "that the conspiracy and overt acts alleged in the first indictment so far involved the frauds alleged in the second one as to require acquittal also under it, and hence that the findings and the verdict of the jury under the second indictment are `in fundamental and irreconcilable conflict with the findings and verdict of the jury' under the first one." The Court in rejecting the contention said: It is significant that defendant Robert M. Burch saw fit not to bring up on appeal the State's evidence of the substantive acts committed by him in violation of G.S. § 14-353 in respect to counts seven, eight, nine, ten and eleven in the indictment, on which counts he was found guilty, and to contend that the State's evidence on those counts was insufficient to carry the case to the jury against him, or the charge of the court. We have written at length, because, so far as we know, the constitutionality of statutes substantially similar to G.S. § 14-353 has not been challenged, except in the New York case of People v. Davis. In 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant, § 639, entitled "Bribing Servant with Intent to Influence His Relation with Master," it is said: "The validity of such statutes has been upheld * * *." In support of the text it cites one case, the New York case of People v. Davis, Sp.Sess., 160 N.Y.S. 769. Incidentally, the statutes of the following States somewhat similar to our G.S. § 14-353 do not contain language like the New York statute, "without the knowledge and consent of the principal, employer or master of such agent, employee or servant": Connecticut, Conn.Gen.Rev.Stat. § 53-266; Massachusetts, Mass.Ann.Laws, ch. 271, § 39; Michigan, Comp.Laws 1948, sec. 750.125; Rhode Island, R.I.Gen.Laws Ann., secs. 11-7-3 and 11-7-4; South Carolina, S.C.Code, sec. 16-570; Washington, Wash. Rev.Code, secs. 49.44.060 and 49.44.070; and Wisconsin, Wis.Stat.Ann., sec. 134.05. All the assignments of error by defendant Brewer, all the assignments of error by defendant Robert A. Burch, and all the assignments of error by defendant Robert M. Burch have been considered, and all and every one of them are overruled. All the judgments entered against defendant Brewer, all the judgments entered against defendant Robert A. Burch, and all the judgments entered against defendant Robert M. Burch are Affirmed. HIGGINS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.