Title: Bednash v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARK BEDNASH, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 180, 2011 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 1002013141 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                         Submitted: May 18, 2012 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: June 19, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 19th day of June 2012, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Mark Bednash, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s April 1, 2011 sentencing order.  We find no merit to the appeal.  
Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in January 2011, Bednash entered a 
plea of guilty to the charge of Manslaughter.  On February 25, 2010, Bednash, who 
was driving while under the influence of several prescription drugs, jumped the 
median on Route 13 near Smyrna, Delaware and ran directly into another vehicle, 
killing both of its occupants.  In exchange for the guilty plea, the State dismissed a 
 
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second charge of Manslaughter and one count each of Reckless Endangering in the 
First Degree, Driving While Intoxicated and Failure to Have Proof of Insurance.  
Bednash was sentenced to 25 years of Level V incarceration, to be suspended after 
22 years for decreasing levels of supervision.  This is Bednash’s direct appeal.1  
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Bednash advances several claims, which may fairly be 
summarized as follows: a) his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to 
ensure that the information contained in the presentence report (“PSI”) was 
accurate and by failing to conduct an independent investigation to identify 
mitigating factors for sentencing purposes; b) the sentencing judge imposed 
sentence with a closed mind, as evidenced by the fact that she did not properly 
consider his mental health problems as a mitigating factor, and based her decision 
on unreliable information contained in the PSI; and c) his sentence was 
disproportionate, resulting in a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
 
(4) 
Bednash’s first claim is that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance in connection with his guilty plea.  It is well-settled that this Court will 
not entertain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that is advanced for the 
                                                 
1 By Order dated December 14, 2011, the Court granted Bednash’s request to proceed pro se in 
this appeal.  Supr. Ct. R. 26(d) (iii).  
 
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first time on direct appeal.2  Because this claim has not yet been adjudicated by the 
Superior Court, we decline to address it in this proceeding. 
 
(5) 
Bednash’s second claim is that the sentencing judge abused her 
discretion by imposing sentence with a closed mind and by basing her decision on 
unreliable information in the PSI.  The sentencing judge imposes sentence with a 
closed mind when the sentence is based upon a preconceived bias without 
consideration of the nature of the offense or the character of the defendant.3  The 
sentencing judge must have an open mind for receiving all information bearing on 
the question of mitigation.4  The Court will not find an abuse of discretion on the 
part of the sentencing judge unless it is clear that he or she relied on impermissible 
factors or exhibited a closed mind.5 
  
(6) 
Bednash’s claim of abuse of discretion on the part of the sentencing 
judge is belied by the transcript of the sentencing hearing, which reflects that the 
judge considered evidence of Bednash’s mental health problems and his history of 
addiction as possible mitigating factors.  However, instead of viewing Bednash as 
a victim, the judge held him responsible for failing to take advantage of the 
opportunities he had to address his addictions.  Merely because the judge did not 
accept Bednash’s interpretation of his situation does not mean that she viewed the 
                                                 
2 Duross v. State, 494 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Del. 1985). 
3 Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 2003). 
4 Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 513 (Del. 1999). 
5 Weston v. State, 832 A.2d at 746. 
 
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evidence with a closed mind.  Moreover, there is no evidence that the judge relied 
on inaccurate or unreliable information.6  In the absence of any evidence of an 
abuse of discretion, we conclude that Bednash’s first claim is without merit.       
 
(7) 
Bednash’s third, and final, claim is that his sentence was 
disproportionate, resulting in a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  The Eighth Amendment prohibits those punishments that are 
either disproportionate to the crime committed or excessive.7  This Court has ruled 
that proportionality review is restricted to those rare cases in which a threshold 
comparison of the crime and the sentence leads to an inference of gross 
disproportionality.8   
 
(8) 
The General Assembly has determined that a Class B felony such as 
Manslaughter merits a penalty of from 2 to 25 years at Level V.  As such, 
Bednash’s sentence was within the limits set by the Legislature.9  Moreover, given 
the circumstances of Bednash’s crime, which involved the violent taking of two 
innocent lives, we find no disproportionality in the sentence imposed.  We, 
therefore, conclude that Bednash’s third claim also is without merit. 
 
                                                 
6 To the extent that Bednash faults his counsel with failing to assure the accuracy of the 
information in the PSI, that claim will not be addressed in this proceeding. 
7 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 n.7 (2002). 
8 Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d 894, 908 (Del. 2003) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 
1005 (1991)). 
9 Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d at 912-13. 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice