Title: Cone v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

285 So. 2d 12 (1973)
Clifford CONE and Nathaniel Sanders, Petitioners,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 42760.

Supreme Court of Florida.
March 7, 1973.
Rehearing Denied December 4, 1973.
C. David Fonvielle and John Wayne Hogan, Asst. Public Defenders, for petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and H. Tucker Cotton and William E. Whitlock, III, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
We review on conflict certiorari the per curiam without opinion decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in the case of Cone v. State, 265 So. 2d 108.
The question presented is whether the trial court erred in imposing upon defendants herein separate concurrent sentences (1) for the offense of armed robbery (life imprisonment) and (2) for the offense of displaying or using a firearm during the commission of the robbery (twenty years imprisonment) on the ground that according to the record proper herein each of the two offenses was a facet or phase of the same transaction or crime and the only sentence that should have been imposed was for the highest offense, i.e., armed robbery.
Petitioners contend the decision of the District Court conflicts with Simmons v. State, 151 Fla. 778, 10 So. 2d 436, and Easton v. State, DCA2d, 250 So. 2d 294, which hold that "where an information contains more than one count, but each is a facet or phase of the same transaction, only one sentence may be imposed, and for the higher offense."
Inspection of the record proper reveals the information filed in this case reads in salient part as follows:
The reasonable inference to be drawn from the two counts of the information is that the two violations charged, robbery under F.S.Section 813.011, F.S.A., and the displaying or using of a firearm under F.S. Section 790.07(2), F.S.A., occuring on June 10th, 1971, were a part of the same transaction or crime involving the robbery of Barbara Kash. Having ascertained from the record proper the ostensible fact that the two crimes charged were a part of the same criminal act, we adverted to the transcript of testimony and a cursory inspection thereof confirmed the conclusion we drew from the language of the information that the two crimes charged were facets of the same criminal act.
On authority of Simmons v. State and Easton v. State, supra, the cause is remanded with directions that the sentence below be amended by eliminating therefrom the part sentencing defendants to "twenty years as to possession of firearm while engaged in a criminal offense."
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C.J., and ERVIN, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
ROBERTS and ADKINS, JJ., dissent.