Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF MEO, a minor child: KO V. LDH and BJH (Petitioners), THE STATE OF WYOMING (Intervenor)

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF MEO, a minor child: KO V. LDH and BJH (Petitioners), THE STATE OF WYOMING (Intervenor)2006 WY 87138 P.3d 1145Case Number: C-05-11Decided: 07/20/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP 
OF  MEO, a minor 
child:

 
 
KO,

 
 
Appellant

(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
LDH and BJH,

 
 
Appellees

(Petitioners),

 
 
and

 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Intervenor).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The Honorable Jeffrey A. 
Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

John Burman, Faculty Director, and Robert J. 
Percifield, Student Intern, U.W. Legal Services Program, Laramie, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing Appellees:

Megan E. Overmann Goetz, of Pence & MacMillan, 
LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

            

Guardians 
Ad Litem:

Warren A. Lauer and April Jamison, of Lauer Law 
Office, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
State of 
Wyoming:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Robin Sessions 
Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Dan S. Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; Ellen Rutledge, Assistant Attorney General.          

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice.                                                                             

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, KO, 
("Mother"), challenges the appointment of Appellees, LDH and BJH, 
("Grandparents"), as temporary and permanent guardians of her daughter, 
MEO.  Mother contends the district 
court erred in establishing the temporary guardianship without a hearing and 
without proper notice to her.  
Mother also contends the district court erred in establishing the 
permanent guardianship without finding her to be an unfit parent.  In the absence of a finding of parental 
unfitness, Mother claims that the appointment of guardians for MEO was not 
authorized and violated Mother's fundamental rights as a parent.  For the reasons explained in this 
opinion, we agree with Mother that the district court erred in establishing the 
guardianship.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the order appointing Grandparents as MEO's 
guardians.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mother presents 
the following issues:

 
 

I.                     
Whether the district 
court entered its Order Appointing Temporary Guardians and Conservators in 
violation of Wyoming law.

 
 

II.                   
Whether the guardianship 
statute as interpreted by the district court violates substantive and procedural 
due process.

 
 

III.                  
Whether parental 
unfitness must be proved at a court hearing before a guardianship is granted to 
a non-parent.

 
 
Grandparents state the 
issues as:

 
 

I.                     
Whether the Court should 
consider interlocutory and non-appealable matters which are now 
moot.

 
 

II.                   
Whether the district 
court properly entered an order appointing guardians and conservators consistent 
with MEO's best interests and Appellant's constitutional 
rights.

 
 

III.                  
Whether Wyoming Statute 
Annotated § 3-2-104 is constitutional.

 
 
The State, as Intervenor, 
identifies a single issue:

 
 
Whether the Wyoming guardianship 
statutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-1-101 through 3-2-202, violate parents' 
procedural or substantive due process rights?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      MEO is a minor, 
born November 15, 1988.  KO 
("Mother") is the only living parent of MEO.1  In 1999, MEO moved with her mother to 
Laramie, Wyoming 
from Texas.  
After the move, MEO maintained a close relationship with extended family 
in Texas and 
typically spent time each summer visiting with Grandparents.2

 
 
[¶4]      During the summer 
of 2004, Mother and MEO traveled to Rhode Island on vacation.  From there, MEO traveled to Texas to visit 
Grandparents.  Her stay extended for 
the remainder of the summer.  Mother 
remained in Rhode Island and did not intend to 
return to Laramie until after the school year began.  Plans were made for MEO to return to 
Laramie to begin school and stay with an adult 
friend of Mother until Mother returned from Rhode Island.

 
 
[¶5]      In early 
September 2004, Grandparents became concerned that MEO was in Laramie without Mother. 
They contacted the Laramie police and reported MEO as an abandoned 
child.  The police contacted MEO and 
took her to the station.  Following 
an investigation, the police released her to the care of Mother's adult 
friend.

 
 
[¶6]      On Friday, 
September 10, 2004, Grandparents filed a petition to be appointed permanent 
guardians and conservators of MEO.3  That same day, they also filed a motion 
requesting to be appointed temporary guardians.  No hearing was requested on the motion 
for temporary appointment, and no hearing was scheduled.  The only pleading making any reference to 
a hearing was entitled "Notice of Deadline for Filing Objections," and 
provided:

 
 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN 
that [LDH] and [BJH] have filed in the Second Judicial District Court in and for 
Albany County, State of Wyoming, a Petition praying that they be appointed 
temporary and permanent Guardians and Conservators of [MEO and] that Letters of 
Guardianship and Conservatorship be issued to them.  On or after the . . . 29th 
day of November, 2004, at 9:00 o'clock a.m., the Court will enter an order after 
a hearing is heard on said Petition, in the Second Judicial District Courthouse, 
Laramie, Albany County, Wyoming. 

 
 
A summons was not 
requested or issued. Counsel for Grandparents filed a certificate of service 
indicating the petition and notice were mailed to MEO and Mother on September 
10, 2004, with a return receipt requested.    

 
 
[¶7]      During the 
weekend, Mother returned to Laramie and was told by a friend and MEO that 
Grandparents were seeking to be appointed as MEO's guardians.  The next business day, Monday, September 
13, 2004, Mother went to the post office and signed for her mail.4  Mother contacted the court and counsel 
for Grandparents in an effort to learn if a hearing was scheduled but was 
informed that the only hearing scheduled was set for November 29, 2004.  Unbeknownst to Mother, the district 
court entered an order on September 13, 2004, appointing Grandparents as 
temporary guardians of MEO.  Mother 
learned that the temporary guardianship had been established on September 15, 
2004, when Grandparents appeared at her home to take custody of MEO. 

 
 
[¶8]      On September 24, 
2004, counsel entered an appearance on behalf of Mother and requested an 
immediate hearing.  Mother also 
filed a motion requesting the appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) for 
MEO.  The district court entered its 
order appointing the GAL on September 30, 2004.

 
 
[¶9]      On October 4, 
2004, Mother filed a motion requesting an immediate hearing on the merits, or 
alternatively, termination of the temporary guardianship.  The GAL objected to an immediate 
hearing, requesting additional time to complete an investigation.  Grandparents filed a traverse to 
Mother's motion, referring to the notice filed at the time of the petition 
providing that a hearing on the merits would be conducted on November 29, 
2004.  On October 8, 2004, the 
district court denied Mother's motion and ordered that the temporary 
guardianship established on September 13, 2004, "shall remain in full force and 
effect pending final disposition of this matter to occur on or before November 
29, 2004."

 
 
[¶10]   On October 26, 2004, Mother filed 
several pleadings objecting to the guardianship and the procedural background to 
date.  She filed an affidavit 
discussing the notice she had received, or failed to receive, and asserting the 
petition included false allegations against her.  Additionally, she requested that the 
temporary guardianship be dissolved because the guardianship had been 
established ex parte, without a 
hearing, in violation of pertinent statutes and contrary to her fundamental 
parental rights and protections afforded to her by due process.  Because of Grandparents' expressed 
intent to take MEO to their home in Texas prior 
to the scheduled hearing on November 29, 2004, Mother requested an immediate 
hearing on her motion or an order requiring the Grandparents to remain in 
Wyoming with 
MEO.  In response, Grandparents 
advised the district court that they would remain in Wyoming.

 
 
[¶11]   On November 4, 2004, the district 
court held a brief hearing and received limited testimony concerning the 
circumstances of Mother's location and her knowledge of the proceedings from 
September 10-15, 2004.  The district 
court found that the temporary guardianship was not established in violation of 
the guardianship statutes.  On 
November 16, 2004, the district court entered its order denying Mother's motion 
to dissolve the temporary guardianship.

 
 
[¶12]   The parties stipulated to continue 
the November 29th hearing on the merits of the guardianship until 
December 2, 2004.  During that 
hearing, Grandparents presented testimony of several witnesses, and the district 
court interviewed MEO in camera.5  Grandparents completed their evidentiary 
presentation, but time constraints prevented Mother from presenting her 
case.  A second hearing was 
scheduled for December 23, 2004, when it was contemplated that Mother would 
present her case.  Subsequent to 
that scheduling, on December 14, 2004, Mother appealed from the November order 
denying her motion to dissolve the temporary guardianship.

 
 
[¶13]   After Mother filed her notice of 
appeal pertaining to the temporary guardianship, Guardians requested that the 
hearing scheduled for December 23, 2004, be vacated, claiming Mother's appeal 
deprived the district court of jurisdiction.  On December 22, 2004, the district court, 
finding lack of jurisdiction because of the appeal, entered an order vacating 
the scheduled evidentiary hearing.  
Mother then petitioned this Court for a writ of review. We granted the 
petition, and on January 26, 2005, issued an order reversing the district 
court's order vacating the hearing.6   A hearing on the merits of the 
guardianship was eventually scheduled for March 30, 2005. 

 
 
[¶14]   Instead of staying in Laramie until the postponed hearing in March, the 
Grandparents decided to return to their home in Texas.  
In December 2004, Grandparents and MEO relocated to Texas where MEO enrolled 
in high school.  On March 7, 2005, 
Mother filed a motion requesting that the district court establish a visitation 
schedule and asked for a prompt hearing on her request.  The district court held a hearing on 
March 11, 2005, and ordered that MEO spend time during her spring break with 
Mother in Laramie.

 
 
[¶15]   On March 30, 2005, the district 
court completed the hearing on the merits of the guardianship.  At the beginning of the hearing, Mother 
moved for judgment as a matter of law, asserting that Grandparents had failed to 
prove her unfit.  Grandparents 
denied they had the burden of proving parental unfitness and contended the 
inquiry was limited to a determination of MEO's best interests.  The district court took the matter under 
advisement.  At the hearing, MEO 
testified by telephone.  Mother also 
testified and presented the testimony of several witnesses. 

 
 
[¶16]   The district court issued a 
decision letter on May 27, 2005.  
The court found that Mother was not an unfit parent.  Nevertheless, the district court 
concluded a permanent guardianship was necessary because it was in MEO's best 
interests.  An order establishing 
the guardianship was entered on July 6, 2005.  This appeal followed.  After the instant appeal was filed, 
Mother's appeal from the order refusing to dissolve the temporary guardianship 
was dismissed.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 

[¶17]   We 
presume the district court's findings of fact are correct and will not set them 
aside unless the findings are inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous 
or contrary to the great weight of the evidence.  In 
re Estate & Guardianship of Paul K. Andrews v. United States Dep't of 
Veteran Affairs, 2002 WY 17, ¶ 15, 39 P.3d 1021, 1025-1026 (Wyo. 2002).  Additionally, we review a district 
court's conclusions of law de 
novo.  Id.  Construction of the guardianship 
statutes involves a question of law which we review de novo.  In 
re Guardianship of McNeel, 2005 WY 36, ¶ 11, 109 P.3d 510, 513 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶18]   Guardianship matters are controlled 
and governed exclusively by statute.  
State ex rel. Klopotek v. 
Dist. 
Court, 621 P.2d 223, 227 (Wyo. 1980).   Mother asserts the district court's 
reading and application of the statutes was erroneous.7  To resolve Mother's claims, we apply 
established principles of statutory interpretation:

We begin by making an 
inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection. We construe the statute as a 
whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all 
parts of the statute in pari materia. 
When a statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the 
plain and ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of 
statutory construction.

 
 

Shumway v. 
Worthey, 
2001 WY 130, ¶ 8, 37 P.3d 361, 365 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶19]   "Our rules of statutory interpretation require that we, in seeking legislative 
intent, must find a consistent and realistic intendment which includes the 
presumed desire of the legislature to recognize its 
legislative duty to act constitutionally."  Appleby v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 84, ¶ 28, 47 P.3d 613, 622 (Wyo. 
2002).  See also Kunkle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2005 WY 49, ¶ 11, 109 P.3d 887, 890 (Wyo. 2005).  That duty includes "providing for 
constitutionally guaranteed interests."  Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 
1081 (Wyo. 1993).  As a reviewing court, we have a duty to 
uphold the constitutionality of statutes which the legislature has enacted if 
that is at all possible, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of 
constitutionality.  In re Adoption of RHA, 702 P.2d 1259, 
1265 (Wyo. 
1985).

 
 

[¶20]   We 
recognize that the guardianship statutes may have application in a variety of 
circumstances.  Guardians may be 
appointed for a minor or for an incompetent person. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
3-2-101(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).  
Additionally, the powers of a guardian may be limited in nature or 
plenary. Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 3-2-104(b)(iv) (LexisNexis 2003). In this appeal, we are presented 
with a plenary involuntary guardianship of a minor established over her 
custodial parent's objection.  
Consequently, we are guided by important constitutional principles 
regarding the parent-child relationship.

 
 
[¶21]   The right to familial association 
is a fundamental right protected by both the Wyoming and the United States 
Constitutions.  TOC v. TND (In re TLC), 2002 WY 76, ¶ 
10, 46 P.3d 863, 868 (Wyo. 2002); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1213, 
31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 559 (1972).  We have 
recognized:

 
 
Parents enjoy a 
constitutionally protected fundamental right to "make decisions concerning the 
care, custody, and control of their children."  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 
147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000); see also Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Wyo. 1995).  This fundamental right has been 
recognized as a liberty interest protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and is also found in Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 6, which provides, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law."  
Michael, 900 P.2d  at 1147.  
In Troxel, the United States Supreme Court discussed this 
principle:

 

The liberty interest at 
issue in this casethe interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of 
their childrenis perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized by this Court.  More than 
75 years ago, in Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923), we held that the "liberty" 
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to "establish 
a home and bring up children" and "to control the education of their own."  Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925), we again held that the "liberty of parents and 
guardians" includes the right "to direct the upbringing and education of 
children under their control."

 

Troxel, 530 U.S.  at 
65, 120 S. Ct. 2054.  "It is 
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in 
the parents . . . .'"  Nulle v. 
Gillette-CampbellCounty Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1174 
(Wyo. 1990) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944)).

 
 

MBB v. 
ERW, 
2004 WY 134, ¶ 9, 100 P.3d 415, 418-419 (Wyo. 2004).   

 
 
Ex Parte Temporary 
Involuntary Guardianship

 
 
[¶22]   In her first issue, Mother contends 
that Grandparents obtained temporary guardianship of MEO without adherence to 
the statutory requirements for notice and a hearing.  She points to the language of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 3-2-106(a) (LexisNexis 2003) (emphasis added), which states: "Upon the 
filing of a petition for a temporary guardian and after a hearing the court may 
appoint a temporary guardian subject to any notice and conditions the court 
prescribes."  Mother asserts that 
the district court was required to hold a hearing before appointing temporary 
guardians and, in this case, no hearing was held.    

 

[¶23]   After the temporary guardianship 
had been in place for nearly two months, the district court considered Mother's 
procedural objections.  At that 
time, the district court considered the requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
3-2-106(a) and § 3-2-102 and affirmed its ex parte appointment of Grandparents as 
temporary guardians.  In response to 
Mother's challenge regarding the lack of notice she had received prior to the 
appointment, the district court stated:

 
 
   The crux of the argument here is 
that there was no formal notice to [Mother], and, essentially, a lack of due 
diligence to determine whether or not she was back in town.  Under the Statute, the Court is of the 
opinion that even had it known that she was in town, even had it  well, quite 
frankly, it could have said, even under those circumstances, notice was not 
required under the facts alleged in this Petition for this temporary 
guardianship.

 
 
Essentially, the district 
court determined that Mother was not entitled to notice of, or the right to 
appear at, any hearing that might have been held prior to appointment because 
the language of § 3-2-106(a), "subject to any notice and conditions the court 
prescribes," could mean "no notice."  

[¶24]   Additionally, the district court 
mentioned Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-102(b), which provides: 

 
 
Notice of filing of a 
petition for appointment of an involuntary guardianship shall be served on the 
proposed ward's parents, spouse and adult children who are known or who can be 
discovered with due diligence, except:

                                                                     

. . 
.

            

(ii) When for good cause 
the court determines that no notice is necessary if the proposed ward is under 
the age of eighteen (18) years.

 
 
Considering the exception 
in § 3-2-102(b)(ii), the district court determined that it was afforded 
discretion to dispense with the notice requirements because MEO was a 
minor.  The court concluded that 
"there are no constitutional requirements that a parent have notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before the Court may enter an order appointing a 
temporary guardian[], as is required in a more formal and strict 
proceeding."

 
 
[¶25]   Grandparents endorse the district 
court's rationale but urge us to avoid review.  They assert that any issues involving 
the temporary guardianship are now moot.  
Grandparents reason that all disputes between the parties were resolved 
when the district court appointed them permanent guardians of MEO, and upon that 
appointment, the temporary guardianship terminated and had no legal effect.8  They claim that any decision on this 
issue would not be meaningful to the parties or any future litigant.  Accordingly, Grandparents conclude that 
there is no justiciable controversy relating to establishment of the temporary 
guardianship.

 
 
[¶26]   We have previously considered the 
connection between Mother's challenge to the temporary guardianship and the 
order establishing the permanent guardianship.  Mother appealed the district court's 
refusal to terminate the temporary guardianship.  Once the guardianship was made 
permanent, Grandparents moved to dismiss the temporary guardianship appeal on 
mootness grounds.  On August 4, 
2005, we dismissed the appeal.  
However, our order of dismissal specifically allowed Mother to assert 
arguments she presented in the dismissed appeal, in this case.  Understandably, Mother appears to have 
relied upon our order in stating her first issue.  

 
 
[¶27]   In light of Grandparents' extensive 
briefing on mootness, we would be remiss if we did not examine whether a 
justiciable controversy is present.  
"A court should not hear a case where there has been a change in 
circumstances occurring either before or after a case has been filed that 
eliminates the controversy."  Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Thunder Basin 
Coal Co., 978 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Wyo. 1999) (citing International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 
279 v. Civil Service Comm'n of Fire Dep't of City of Cheyenne, 702 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Wyo. 1985)).

 
 
The doctrine of mootness 
encompasses those circumstances which destroy a previously justiciable 
controversy. This doctrine represents the time element of standing by 
requiring that the interests of the parties which were originally sufficient to 
confer standing persist throughout the duration of the suit. Thus, the central 
question in a mootness case is "whether decision of a once living dispute 
continues to be justified by a sufficient prospect that the decision will have 
an impact on the parties."

 
 

Southwestern Pub. Serv. 
Co., 978 P.2d  at 1143 (citations omitted). 

 
 
[¶28]   A case will not be considered moot 
when it presents a controversy capable of repetition yet evading review.  In 
re RM, 2004 WY 162, ¶ 9, 102 P.3d 868, 871 (Wyo. 2004).  The parties disagree whether this case 
is one "capable of repetition, yet evading review."  Under such a rationale two requirements 
must be met.  "First, the duration 
of the challenged action must be too short for completion of litigation prior to 
its cessation or expiration.  
Second, there must be a reasonable expectation that the same complaining 
party will be subjected to the same action again."  Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1449 
(10th Cir. 1987) (citing Illinois State 
Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 187, 99 S. Ct. 983, 992, 59 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1979); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 
149, 96 S. Ct. 347, 349, 46 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1975)).  Absent a finding of good cause, a 
temporary guardianship is statutorily limited to a maximum of one year, making 
it unlikely that litigation regarding a temporary guardianship could reach 
fruition before its expiration.9  Because MEO is still a minor, it is not 
outside the realm of reasonable possibility that Grandparents would continue to 
pursue guardianship of MEO. Additionally, other courts have rejected claims that 
temporary guardianship issues are mooted by the passage of time because of the 
importance of the interests involved and the perception that such controversies 
would rarely persist for the duration of appellate disposition.  E.g., Custody of Lori, 827 N.E.2d 716, 717 
(Mass. 2005); Jason S. v. Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr. (In re 
L.S.), 87 P.3d 521, 524 (Nev. 2004).    

 
 
[¶29]   Mother's claim does not concern a 
temporary circumstance that has since dissipated.  Mother continues to be deprived of the 
custody of her daughter, and by this appeal she challenges how those 
circumstances arose.  Considering a 
similar challenge to a permanent guardianship involving contentions that the 
preceding temporary guardianship had been established without notice, the 
Vermont Supreme Court concluded:

 
 
We think that the 
petitioners were entitled to notice and opportunity to present evidence of their 
circumstances, characters, and habits before an order should be made to deprive 
them of their natural right of guardianship over their minor child 
and their right to her services during her minority. They were entitled to 
have these considerations presented to the probate court as a guide to the 
exercise of its discretion in passing upon the question of 
guardianship.

 
 
The petitionee argues 
that the absence of notice is not now material, because in the present 
proceeding to vacate guardianship the petitioners Bioni have appeared and have 
been heard at length in the probate court and in the county court on appeal, and 
that the case has now been decided upon its merits and the guardian continued in 
office. But the issue in this proceeding was whether the appointment was 
invalid, by reason of the defects assigned, and not whether the welfare of Mary 
required . . . the continuance of the guardianship. The relative fitness of Mr. 
and Mrs. Bioni and of Mrs. Haselton was beside the point. The appointment of the 
latter having been made without notice, the proceedings in the probate court, 
for that purpose, were coram non judice and void.

 
 

Bioni v. 
Haselton, 134 A. 606, 608 
(Vt. 
1926).  

 
 
[¶30]   The record demonstrates that the 
temporary guardianship formed the basis for the district court's decision that 
is the subject of this appeal.  The 
district court awarded the care, custody, and control of MEO to Grandparents in 
September.  MEO moved to Texas a few months 
later.  The temporary guardianship 
created circumstances that were critically important to the district court's 
analysis of MEO's best interests following the hearing on March 30, 2005.  In its decision letter, the district 
court discussed MEO's best interests by comparing her experiences in Laramie to her circumstances in Texas.  The district court also emphasized MEO's 
testimony "that her strong desire is to remain in her current situation and she 
has stated a number of reasons for her preference."  The district court afforded considerable 
weight to this expressed preference.  
The district court used Grandparents' temporary guardianship as the 
measuring stick of MEO's best interests, and by that measure, Mother was 
permanently denied the care, custody, and control of her daughter.  We decline to view Mother's challenge to 
the temporary guardianship as moot where it is clear that the circumstances 
created by it directly impacted the permanent guardianship determination.  

 
 
[¶31]   Turning then to the merits of 
Mother's argument, we address the district court's conclusion that an 
involuntary temporary guardianship of a minor may be granted to third parties 
without notice to a parent and without a hearing.  The State, as Intervenor, asserts that 
when read properly, the guardianship statutes afford adequate procedural 
protections to a parent and are not constitutionally suspect.10  The State concludes that Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 3-2-102(b) requires that notice of the filing of an involuntary guardianship 
be given to the parents of the proposed ward and that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
3-2-102(d) requires that notice shall be given pursuant to the Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  According to the 
State, "[r]eading these statutes and the [Rules of Civil Procedure] together 
leads to the conclusion that a petition for an involuntary guardianship, 
temporary or permanent, must be served upon the proposed ward's parents."  Additionally, the State asserts that a 
parent will receive an opportunity to be heard because "[t]he plain language of 
[Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-106(a)] requires a hearing before the appointment of a 
temporary guardian, satisfying due process requirements in that regard."  The State asserts that the statutes are 
constitutional and afford adequate due process, if applied correctly.11  We agree.  In this case, however, we cannot 
conclude that the district court properly applied the 
statutes.

 

[¶32]   By statute, the notice of an 
involuntary guardianship proceeding "shall be given in accordance with the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and as ordered by the court." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
3-2-102(d).  There is no dispute 
that Mother was not served with notice that complied with the Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  Because there was 
no summons, Mother was not informed of the time period she had to respond, how 
to respond, or what the consequences might be if she failed to respond. W.R.C.P. 
4.  Had she been properly served and 
the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure followed, Mother would have had time to 
respond before the requested relief was granted.  As for the district court's 
interpretation of the "subject to any notice" language in § 3-2-106, we disagree 
that "any notice" can mean no notice.  
Read in conjunction with the notice requirements set forth in § 3-2-102 
applicable to involuntary guardianships, we conclude that the notice language of 
§ 3-2-106(a) authorizes the district court to prescribe additional or 
supplemental notice.  

 
 
[¶33]   At the November hearing, the 
district court appeared to rely upon the exception stated in § 3-2-102(b)(ii) in 
reaching its conclusion that Mother was not entitled to notice before the 
temporary guardianship was established.  
We note that § 3-2-102(b) lacks some linguistic and structural precision 
and question whether the exception to notice in subsection (b)(ii) applies in 
this context.  However, we need not 
reach that determination because the record is beyond dispute that prior to 
issuing the temporary guardianship order, the district court failed to make any 
finding of good cause to excuse the notice requirement.  We find nothing in the record presented 
to us suggesting that good cause existed to excuse notice to Mother prior to 
appointing Grandparents as guardians.

 
 
[¶34]   Mother's procedural challenge to 
the temporary guardianship implicates constitutional principles as well.  When a parent's fundamental liberty 
interest is at stake, the State must provide parents "with fundamentally fair 
procedures."  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982).  We have observed 
that:

 
 
. . . custody litigation 
imperils parents' fundamental right to enjoy their children's companionship and 
to direct their children's upbringing. This peril is magnified by the difficulty 
of regaining physical custody once lost. The great weight of the parental 
liberty interest, together with the significant deprivation of that interest 
inherent in a loss of physical custody, entitles parents to custody procedures 
that meet the requisites of due process. 

 
 

KES v. 
CAT, 
2005 WY 29, ¶ 16, 107 P.3d 779, 784 (Wyo. 2005).  Notice and the opportunity to be heard 
"are unquestionably incidental to affording due process of law." Barker Bros., Inc. v. Barker-Taylor, 823 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Wyo. 1992).  Thus, we have held that "a court must 
afford a parent notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before it can 
deny the parent custody of his or her children."  Loghry v. Loghry, 920 P.2d 664, 667 
(Wyo. 1996) (citing Hall v. Hall, 708 P.2d 416, 421 
(Wyo. 1985)). 
See also Jackson v. Jackson, 961 P.2d 393, 395 
(Wyo. 1998) 
("Parents are entitled to due process in custody and visitation matters, which 
includes adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.").  

 
 
[¶35]   Inexplicably, the district court 
concluded that Mother did not have a constitutional right to either notice or a 
hearing.  We recognize that due 
process is a somewhat fluid concept, but the district court's conclusion is 
inconsistent with these fundamental constitutional protections.  Due process requires that "notice and 
the opportunity to be heard must be appropriate to the nature of the case." 
 DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re "H" 
Children), 2003 WY 155, ¶ 39, 79 P.3d 997, 1008 (Wyo. 2003).  The notice and hearing opportunity must 
also be "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Jones v. Jones, 903 P.2d 545, 548 
(Wyo. 
1995).  Lack of notice is not, by 
any definition, meaningful notice.  

 
 
[¶36]   More significantly, the district 
court's failure to hold a hearing before making the temporary appointment 
deprived Mother of a meaningful opportunity to be heard.  The fact that a hearing was scheduled 
two months away provided little consolation. See Custody of Lori, 827 N.E.2d  at 721 
(court held that mother was deprived of due process where "the judge did not 
hold a hearing on the issue of the child's custody or the mother's unfitness 
before removing the child" and she "was not permitted to defend herself against 
the charge of unfitness at the time of removal" and an evidentiary hearing "did 
not occur until five months after the initial removal").  

 
 
[¶37]   Grandparents contend that the 
requirement for a hearing was met, arguing that the district court "considered 
evidence" as recited in its order appointing them on a temporary basis.   We find no merit in Grandparents' 
assertion. The recital in the order is merely pro forma.  There is no indication that any hearing 
was scheduled, noticed, held, or even contemplated, before the order 
issued.  We do not believe that, in 
the context of an involuntary guardianship of a minor, the "after a hearing" 
language in § 3-2-106(a) can be satisfied by a mere review of the allegations of 
the petition.  

 
 
[¶38]   When addressing fundamental 
parental rights of constitutional magnitude, courts "must accommodate to the 
keenest spirit of procedural due process."  
BDR v. BEB (In re BJB), 888 P.2d 216, 219 
(Wyo. 
1995).  "One of the basic elements 
of due process is the right of each party to be apprised of all the evidence 
upon which an issue is to be decided, with the right to examine, explain or 
rebut such evidence."  KES, ¶ 16, 107 P.3d  at 784. "[T]he right 
to hear and controvert all evidence upon which a factual adjudication is to be 
made includes the right to hear and cross-examine witnesses."  JLJ v. AFM (In re SAJ), 942 P.2d 407, 410 (Wyo. 
1997).  Consistent with these 
principles, we have cautioned that child custody and visitation issues should be 
determined after an evidentiary hearing.  
Id. at 410 (district court 
abused its discretion in modifying Mother's visitation without affording 
meaningful opportunity to be heard or providing for development of evidentiary 
record); In re Adoption of BBC, 849 P.2d 769, 773 (Wyo. 1993) (remand for hearing did not allow district court to 
establish guardianship without hearing).  

 
 
[¶39]   A hearing should have been afforded 
Mother to satisfy the basic element of due process even in the absence of a 
statutory requirement.  However, a 
hearing was a statutory requirement.  
The district court simply ignored the unambiguous requirement of § 
3-2-106(a) to hold a hearing before appointing Grandparents as guardians.12    

 
 
[¶40]   Mother has demonstrated that she 
has a fundamental interest that has been affected in an impermissible way.  Private action affecting a parent's 
interest in the care, custody, and control of her child may only be accomplished 
by court action taken pursuant to appropriate statutory authority.  MBB, ¶ 10, 100 P.3d  at 419.  The district court erred in appointing 
Grandparents temporary guardians of MEO without adherence to the statutory 
requirements regarding notice and a hearing.  Without affording Mother proper notice 
and an opportunity to be heard, the district court's establishment of the 
temporary guardianship lacked "fundamental fairness."  Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 289 (Wyo. 1989).  These procedural defects cast a shadow 
over the permanent guardianship as well. Mother presents additional arguments 
concerning the validity of the permanent guardianship that deserve our 
attention.

 
 
Permanent Involuntary 
Guardianship

 
 
[¶41]   In her second issue, Mother claims 
that the district court's order establishing the permanent guardianship of MEO 
violated her fundamental parental rights.  
She claims that guardianship of a minor should only be awarded to a 
non-parent over the objection of the parent if it is proven that the parent is 
unfit.  Mother claims that because 
she was found to be a fit parent, no guardianship was necessary.  In response, Grandparents state that the 
pertinent statutory language is plain and unambiguous in requiring only a best 
interests analysis.  

 
 
[¶42]   Under Wyoming's guardianship 
statutes, the district court may appoint a guardian for a proposed minor ward 
when it finds that the ward's status as a minor and the "necessity for the 
appointment of a guardian" have been "prove[n] by a preponderance of the 
evidence."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
3-2-104(a). When making an appointment, the district court must articulate its 
findings regarding the necessity of the guardianship. In re McNeel, ¶ 24, 109 P.3d  at 518. 

 
 
[¶43]   The parties disagree whether a 
minor's best interests, in the absence of a finding of parental unfitness, may 
create a "necessity" for a guardianship.  
Mother claims that unless a parent is unfit, a guardianship is not 
authorized.  According to 
Grandparents, a minor's interests trump the interests of the parent.  Grandparents contend that Mother's 
rights have not been infringed to a substantial degree because the guardianship 
is a temporary, court-monitored custody arrangement that did not sever Mother's 
parental rights.  Additionally, they 
argue that Mother's statutory interpretation is faulty because it injects 
language into the statute that is not there.  Grandparents assert that the plain 
language of the statute does not require that the district court make any 
finding concerning parental unfitness.  
Grandparents insist that the only standard in a guardianship proceeding 
is the minor's best interests.  
Thus, they conclude that "necessity" for a guardianship arises solely 
from an analysis of a minor's best interests.

 
 
[¶44]   The district court identified two 
possible standards for finding the necessity for a guardianship: 1) a finding of 
parental unfitness; or 2) a finding that it would be in the best interests of 
MEO.  The district court found that 
either standard seemed to be supported by Wyoming case law.   In its decision letter, the 
district court determined:

 
 
It is apparent from [In re Kosmicki, 468 P.2d 818, 823-824 
(Wyo. 1970)] that Wyoming, first, 
recognizes a presumption that the best interests of the child are served by 
establishing a parent as the guardian.  
Second, courts are to consider the evidence regarding whether that parent 
is unfit or if the best interests of the 
child are better served by placement with an alternate guardian.  Essentially, the parent enters the 
proceedings with the presumption in her favor; the guardians then must 
demonstrate, pursuant to the statutory standard, that the parent is not fit or that it is not in the child's best 
interests to return to the parent.

 
 
. . . Wyoming has determined 
the Court should continue with a best interests analysis in light of the concept 
that the interests of the parent are secondary to the interests of the 
child[.]

 
 
(Emphasis in original and 
footnote omitted.)  The district 
court quoted language from Morris v. 
Jackson, 212 P.2d 78, 82 (Wyo. 1949), stating " the child's welfare is the 
supreme consideration, irrespective of the rights and wrongs of its contending 
parents, although the natural rights of the parents are entitled to due 
consideration."  Additionally, the 
district court opined that a fifteen-year-old child could request appointment of 
her own guardian by filing a voluntary petition under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-105 
(LexisNexis 2003), requiring a determination of the child's best 
interests.

 
 
[¶45]   The district court concluded that 
it was required to apply both standards.  
First, it would determine if Mother had been proven to be an unfit 
parent.  If Mother was not unfit, 
the district court would next consider, "whether it would be in [MEO]'s best 
interests that she remain with her grandparents in any event."  Following that analysis, the district 
court found that Mother was not unfit but concluded that a guardianship was in 
MEO's best interests.  Mother claims 
that this two-part analysis was flawed.  
She argues that once the issue of her fitness was resolved in her favor, 
the district court should not have proceeded to analyze MEO's best 
interests.  Mother contends that if 
a parent is fit, there can be no finding that a guardianship for the child is 
"necessary" under § 3-2-104.

 
 
[¶46]   The "necessity" for appointment of 
a guardian is not further defined in the guardianship statutes. The term 
"necessity" means the "condition or quality of being necessary" or the "state . 
. . of being in need." American HeritageCollege Dictionary 929 (4th ed. 2004).  Necessary generally means essential or 
required.13 When appointing a guardian, 
the district court must state its findings concerning the "reasons why the ward 
is in need of a guardian."  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 3-2-104(b)(i).  

 
 
[¶47]   A parent is the natural guardian of 
her child.  State ex rel. Klopotek, 621 P.2d  at 
227.  For a minor, a court appointed 
guardian assumes the role of a parent.  
That relationship is described in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-201(e), which 
provides: "The guardian of a minor has the powers and responsibilities of a 
parent who has not been deprived of custody of his unemancipated minor 
child."  A determination by a 
district court that a minor is in need of a plenary guardian is, therefore, akin 
to a finding that the minor needs a parent.

    

[¶48]   Here, the district court found that 
MEO was "in need of a guardian."  
However, this finding was accompanied by a finding that Mother was not 
unfit.  The district court 
concluded: "Simply stated, the Court does not believe that the record in this 
matter would support a finding that [KO] is an unfit mother.  The Court 
concludes, therefore, that [KO] is not an unfit parent and that grounds for 
continuation of this guardianship do not exist on this basis."  Despite Mother's apparent ability and 
willingness to parent MEO, the district court determined that Grandparents 
should have that role.  The district 
court justified that decision by concluding that it would be in MEO's best 
interests.     

 
 
[¶49]   Throughout their argument, 
Grandparents emphasize the district court's findings that Mother did not serve 
MEO's best interests to the same extent they have.  In essence, they contend their ability 
to provide more for MEO supported the "necessity" for a different custodial 
arrangement for MEO.  They urge us 
to defer to the district court's discretionary appointment and affirm the 
guardianship.  However, Grandparents 
fail to recognize the constitutional implications of reading the statute in this 
way.  

 
 
[¶50]   The constitutional protections 
afforded to parents are not reserved for those who are perfect.  "The fundamental liberty interest of 
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not 
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents . . . ." Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 
753-54, 102 S. Ct.  at 1394-95.  "Even 
when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in 
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life."  Id.  "[S]o long as a parent adequately cares 
for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason . . . 
to further question the ability of that parent to make the  best decisions 
concerning the rearing of that parent's children."  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2061, 
147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000).14 

 
 
[¶51]   The district court's determination 
that a guardianship was warranted was based solely upon an analysis of MEO's 
best interests.  However, courts 
have denounced use of the best interests standard as the sole justification for 
altering a family unit, finding it at odds with a parent's 
rights.

 
 
We have little doubt that 
the Due Process Clause would be offended "[if] a State were to attempt to force 
the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their 
children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do 
so was thought to be in the children's best interest."

 
 

Quilloin v. 
Walcott, 
434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S. Ct. 549, 554, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1978) (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster 
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-863 (1977) (Stewart, 
J., concurring in judgment)).

  

Our case law does not 
permit destruction of a natural parent's fundamental right to the custody of his 
or her child based simply on the subjective determination of that child's best 
interest. Were we to allow such a result, the implications are obvious. Is it in 
a child's best interest that he or she be raised in an affluent family as 
opposed to an impoverished family? Would it be better that a child be raised by 
extremely intelligent parents rather than people of average intelligence? Is a 
child better off if that child is raised in a conventional life style rather 
than an unconventional life style? All of these factors could arguably be 
considered in determining the child's best interests. However, none even 
remotely justify denying a parent's constitutional and fundamental right to the 
custody of his or her child. 

 
 

In re Parenting of J.N.P. 
v. Knopp, 27 P.3d 953, 958 
(Mont. 
2001).  Indeed, " the best 
interests standard, taken to its logical conclusion, would place the minor 
children of all but the worthiest' members of society in jeopardy of a custody 
challenge."  Carla R. v. Tim H. (In re D.J.), 682 N.W.2d 238, 245 (Neb. 2004).  

 
 
[¶52]   Grandparents attempt to avoid 
constitutional implications by characterizing the guardianship as a minor 
infringement upon Mother's parental rights.  They deem it significant that Mother's 
rights have not been terminated and that she retained residual rights over 
MEO.  Although we agree that 
Mother's rights have not been terminated, we disagree that the infringement upon 
her rights is "minimal."  Pursuant 
to § 3-2-201(e), Grandparents essentially replaced Mother in MEO's daily 
life.  Losing custody of a child to 
a non-parent alters the parent-child relationship:

 
 
Under ordinary 
circumstances, a custody action by a third party against a natural parent is 
more like a termination action than a custody action between biological 
parents. Although visitation may be preserved, such an award destroys any 
pretense of a normal parent-child relationship and eliminates nearly all of the 
natural incidents of parenthood including the everyday care and nurturing which 
are part and parcel of the bond between a parent and child. 

 
 

Zack v. 
Fiebert, 
563 A.2d 58, 63 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1989).  

 
 
"Custody" may imply a 
temporary arrangement that theoretically could be changed as future 
circumstances might warrant.  But a 
change of custody may result in . . . a severance of child-parent ties . . . . 
 The day to day contact between the 
child and one having custody can create a relationship that may leave the birth 
parent almost an intruder.  All of 
the day to day interactions between a parent and child are bound to be 
diminished if not eliminated where the parent comes on the scene as a court 
permitted "visitor."

 
 

Barstad v. 
Frazier, 
348 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Wis. 1984). Contrary to Grandparents' 
assertions, the guardianship drastically changed Mother's relationship with MEO 
and impacted her fundamental parental rights.  

 
 
[¶53]   The district court relied on 
several Wyoming decisions that predate significant parental rights cases such as 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 
(1972), Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), and Troxel v. Granville, 
530 U.S. 57 (2000).  It is not 
surprising, then, that the decisional framework in those older cases is not cast 
in terms of a parent's fundamental rights.  
This Court did not condone removal of a child from a fit parent in any of 
the cases relied upon by the district court.  Although we have sometimes described the 
child's best interests as having "constitutional preeminence," we have done so 
in light of an adjudication of neglect or abuse, elevating the child's interests 
above the individual claims of the parent.  
E.g., In Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d 1369, 1375 
(Wyo. 1990) 
(minor was adjudicated a neglected child).  
 

 
 
[¶54]   The district court also suggested 
that the best interests standard was appropriate because of pending voluntary 
guardianship proceedings that would be determined by the best interests standard 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-105.15  However, MEO's petition for appointment 
of her own guardian cannot, by itself, defeat her Mother's legal right to 
custody and control.  State ex rel. Klopotek, 621 P.2d  at 
226-228.

[¶55]   We must determine the standard for 
appointment pursuant to § 3-2-104 with an understanding of the nature of a 
guardianship of a minor and in a manner that does not offend rights protected by 
the constitutions of our state and nation.  
With due regard for these considerations, we conclude that, in the 
context of an involuntary guardianship proceeding where the proposed ward is a 
minor, a best interests inquiry is not triggered until the district court 
determines that the minor needs a guardian.  A child with a parent has a natural 
guardian and is not in need of a court-appointed guardian, unless the court 
determines that the child's natural guardian is not fit.  Thus, "[o]nce the natural parent is 
deemed fit, the issue of custody is decided." Kay v. Rowland, 331 S.E.2d 781, 782 
(S.C. 1985).  

 
 
[¶56]   In this case, the district court 
did not find that Mother was an unfit parent.  At that point, Grandparents' petition 
should have been denied.  In the 
absence of a finding of parental unfitness, the district court's finding that a 
guardianship was necessary for MEO was clearly erroneous.  The district court erred by establishing 
the permanent plenary guardianship.16  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶57]   Mother did not receive the 
statutorily and constitutionally required notice and opportunity to be heard 
before the temporary guardianship of MEO was established. Because it did not 
find Mother unfit as a parent, the district court's determination that a 
guardianship was necessary, based solely upon a best interests analysis, was 
clearly erroneous.  The district 
court's order appointing Grandparents as MEO's guardians is reversed.  We remand this matter to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and for the entry of 
any orders necessary and appropriate to effect the termination of the 
guardianship.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1MEO's father 
died when she was five.

 
 

2Grandparents 
are MEO's maternal grandparents.

 
 

3The parties' 
arguments focus upon the guardianship and do not provide analysis pertaining to 
the conservatorship.  Accordingly, 
our opinion is limited to guardianship issues.  For the sake of brevity, we have omitted 
most references to "conservatorship" and "conservators" from our general 
discussion of the guardianship issues.

 
 

4Mother 
denies having received pleadings pertaining to the temporary guardianship at 
that time.

 
 

5Mother 
stipulated to MEO being interviewed in chambers, so long as it was recorded by 
the court reporter.  After the 
interview, the district court announced, sua sponte, that the record of the 
interview would be sealed and that it would not be provided to the parties in 
the absence of a very good reason.  
A transcript of the interview with MEO does not appear in the record on 
appeal.

 
 

6We concluded 
that the appeal from the temporary guardianship had not yet been docketed when 
the hearing was vacated.  Had the 
appeal been docketed, we concluded that the district court was not required to 
vacate the hearing on the merits of a permanent guardianship, recognizing a 
distinction between the temporary guardianship and the permanent guardianship 
proceedings.

 
 

7Several 
provisions of Wyoming's guardianship statutes are pertinent 
to our resolution of this appeal.  
The relevant statutes provide:

 
 
§ 
3-2-101. Petition for appointment of guardian.

 
 
(a) 
Any person may file with the clerk a petition for the appointment of a 
guardian.  The petition shall 
state:

 
 

(i)       
The 
name, age and address of the proposed ward;

 
 
            
(ii) The status of the proposed ward as a minor, an incompetent person or 
a mentally incompetent person and the reasons for the 
petition;

 
 
            
(iii) The name and address of the proposed guardian, and his 
qualification as a fit and proper person to serve as 
guardian;

 
 
            
(iv) The residence of the proposed ward in the county or his presence in 
the county;

 
 
            
(v) The facts to show that the best interest of the proposed ward 
requires the appointment of a guardian in this state;

 
 
            
(vi) The name and address of the person or facility having the care, 
custody or control of the proposed ward; and

 
 
            
(vii) The interests of the petitioner. 

 
 
 
 
§ 
3-2-102. Notice; when required; governed by rules of civil 
procedure.

 

(a) 
Notice of filing of a petition for appointment of an involuntary guardianship 
shall be served on the proposed ward, his custodian and the proposed 
guardian.

 

(b) 
Notice of filing of a petition for appointment of an involuntary guardianship 
shall be served on the proposed ward's parents, spouse and adult children who 
are known or who can be discovered with due diligence, 
except:

 

(i) When 
a petition is filed under W.S. 3-2-108; or

 

(ii) 
When for good cause the court determines that no notice is necessary if the 
proposed ward is under the age of eighteen (18) years.

 

(c) 
Notice shall be served on any other person as ordered by the 
court.

 

(d) 
Notice shall be given in accordance with the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 
and as ordered by the court.

 

 

§ 
3-2-104. Appointment of guardian.

 

(a) The 
court may appoint a guardian if the allegations of the petition as to the status 
of the proposed ward and the necessity for the appointment of a guardian are 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

 

(b) The 
order appointing a guardian shall state the findings of the court, 
including:

 

(i) The 
reasons why the ward is in need of a guardian;

 

(ii) The 
appointment of the guardian;

 

(iii) 
The duration of the appointment for a specified term or permanent, subject to 
W.S. 3-3-1101;

 

(iv) The 
limited or plenary duties of the guardian.

 
 
 
 
 § 
3-2-106. Appointment of a temporary or emergency 
guardian.

 

(a) Upon 
the filing of a petition for a temporary guardian and after a hearing the court 
may appoint a temporary guardian subject to any notice and conditions the court 
prescribes.

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
(LexisNexis 
2003).  Additionally, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 3-2-201(e) (LexisNexis 2003) states, in pertinent part: "The 
guardian of a minor has the powers and responsibilities of a parent who has not 
been deprived of custody of his unemancipated minor 
child."

 
 

8Additionally, Grandparents assert that Mother's complaint is moot because 
emergency ex parte guardianship 
procedures are now specifically authorized by statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
3-2-302(b) (LexisNexis 2005).  We 
find no merit in this argument because emergency appointments were authorized at 
the time Grandparents filed their petition.  However, Grandparents did not seek to 
obtain emergency guardianship.  
Rather, they sought temporary and permanent plenary guardianship of MEO. 
The newly enacted ex parte emergency 
procedures for guardianship limited to "educational, medical care and dental 
care purposes" are not relevant to our determination.  

 
 

9Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-106(c) 
(LexisNexis 2003) states:

 
 
(c) Except 
upon a showing of good cause, an order appointing a temporary guardian of a 
minor ward shall be limited to not more than one (1) 
year.

            

10In her 
appeal from the temporary guardianship proceedings, Mother challenged the 
constitutionality of the guardianship statutes. She has not made that assertion 
in the case sub judice. However, 
because of some lingering questions about the scope of Mother's claims in this 
appeal, the State intervened in defense of the statutes. 

 
 

11The State 
makes no comment concerning whether the statutory requirements were met in this 
case.

 
 

12It 
appears, in some ways, the district court treated the petition as if based upon 
an emergency, but the statutory provisions concerning emergency guardians was 
not cited nor followed.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
3-2-106(d) through (h).  Appointment 
of an emergency guardian must follow a hearing when possible, and appointment of 
a guardian ad litem is required 
immediately. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-106(d).  If harm may result to the ward before a 
hearing can be held, then an emergency guardian may be appointed without a 
hearing. Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 3-2-106(e). In that event, a hearing must be held within 72 hours 
of the appointment. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-106(e).  The exception for ex parte appointments in an emergency is 
very narrow. Even when that exception is supported by evidence, the statute 
requires reasonable notice, and the requirement for a hearing is not excused 
altogether.  Consistent with the 
signposts of due process, the emergency guardianship procedures provide for 
notice and a hearing.  Such 
provision highlights the flaws in the district court's reasoning that no notice 
or hearing was required before appointing Grandparents in a non-emergency.

 
 

13For example, 
as defined by the American Heritage 
College Dictionary 929 (4th ed. 2004), 
necessary means:

 
 
1. Absolutely essential. 
See Syns at indispensable. 
2. Needed to achieve a certain result or effect; requisite. 
3a. Unavoidably determined by conditions or circumstances. b. 
Logically inevitable. 4. Required by obligation, compulsion, or 
convention.

 
 

14In the 
context of guardianships, many courts recognize limited exceptions to this 
principle.  E.g., Barstad v. Frazier, 348 N.W.2d 479, 483 
(Wis. 1984) ("compelling reasons"); In re Guardianship of Williams, 869 P.2d 661, 670 (Kan. 
1994) ("highly unusual or extraordinary circumstances"); Worden v. Worden, 434 N.W.2d 341, 342 
(N.D. 1989) ("exceptional circumstances"); Thomas-Lott v. Earles, 55 P.3d 984, 994 
(N.M.App. 2002) ("exceptional circumstances"). Generally, these exceptions 
acknowledge a child's real family unit or emotional attachment, or take account 
of a biological parent's failure to accept parental responsibility.  E.g., In re Barros, 701 N.W.2d 402, 409 (N.D. 
2005) (voluntary guardianship constitutes exceptional circumstances); In re Buchholz, 326 N.W.2d 203, 207 
(N.D. 1982) (exceptional circumstances exist when custody dispute pits 
psychological parent against natural parent); Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 284 
(N.Y. 1976) (child in custody of nonparent for so long that psychological trauma 
of removal threatens child); Barstad v. 
Frazier, 348 N.W.2d 479, 489 (Wis. 1984) (compelling reasons include 
abandonment, persistent neglect of parental responsibilities, extended 
disruption of parental custody, or other extraordinary circumstances drastically 
affecting welfare of child).  In 
this case, these exceptions, and the rationale supporting them, have not been 
presented to us for consideration and do not appear applicable to MEO's 
circumstances when Grandparents petitioned for 
guardianship.

 
 

15Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-105(a) 
provides:

 

A guardian 
may be appointed by the court upon the petition of the proposed ward, including 
a minor who has reached the age of fourteen (14) years, if the court determines 
that the appointment is in the best interest of the 
petitioner.

 
 

16In arriving 
at this conclusion, we are also mindful that the law provides other, and more 
extensive, protections for children. E.g. Wyoming's Child Protection Act, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-3-201, et seq.  Mother also argued on appeal that 
Grandparents should not have been allowed to use guardianship proceedings to 
circumvent the Child Protection Act, claiming that it provides the exclusive 
means to divest a parent of custody in favor of a non-parent.  Other courts have considered similar 
arguments involving the proper role of probate courts and family or juvenile 
courts, with varying rationales and results.  E.g., Custody of Lori, 827 N.E.2d 716, 721 
(Mass. 2005) ("emergency removal of children should be treated the same 
regardless of which court is issuing the order"); In re Guardianship & Conservatorship for 
T.H.M., 640 N.W.2d 68, 72-73 (S.D. 2002) (guardianship cannot be used to 
bypass abuse and neglect statutes); Carr 
v. Prader, 725 A.2d 291, 296 (R.I. 1999) (probate courts may not award 
guardianship over objection of parent because they lack jurisdiction to divest 
parents of custody rights); In re 
Guardianship of Lupe C., 812 P.2d 365, 371 (N.M.App. 1991) (child neglect 
cannot be adjudicated in probate court because protections, rights, and services 
afforded to parents under state's child protection code are not guaranteed in 
guardianship proceedings).  However, 
we need not reach this issue to afford Mother her desired relief, so "its 
resolution must wait another day." Jordan v. Brackin, 2003 WY 151, ¶ 12, 79 P.3d 536, 538 (Wyo. 2003).