Title: Silver v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTE:
Donna Silver v. State of Maryland, No. 98, September Term, 2010
Hilton Silver v. State of Maryland, No. 99, September Term, 2010
CRIMINAL LAW—SENTENCING—RESTITUTION—The court may not impose
restitution for alleged crimes that have been nolle prossed, unless the defendant knowingly
and explicitly agrees to pay such restitution as part of a valid and enforceable plea agreement.
DISCOVERY—VIOLATIONS—REMEDIES—A trial court has discretion in deciding
whether to strike a state’s witness’s testimony because of a discovery violation by the state.
In this case, the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to strike.  The
court provided the defendant with the discovery material and a reasonable opportunity to
examine it.  
EVIDENCE—OTHER CRIMES—In animal cruelty case regarding one horse, photos
admitted of other animals also owned by defendant prejudicial error.  The State did not
introduce the evidence in order to show the defendants’ propensity to abuse animals, or to
prove the charged crime with evidence of past crimes. 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case Nos. 03-K-09-5388, 03-K-09-538890
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 98
September Term, 2010
                                                                             
DONNA SILVER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                             
No. 99
September Term, 2010
______________________________________
HILTON SILVER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                             
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Adkins, J.
                                                                             
             Filed:    June 20, 2011
1We have consolidated and rephrased the questions as appropriate.  The Silvers filed
separate Petitions for Writ of Certiorari, both of which contained a challenge to the
restitution order.  The evidentiary issues, listed above as questions two and three, were
presented only in Hilton Silver’s petition.  
In this animal cruelty case, we must determine whether, under the rule in Walczak v.
State, 302 Md. 422, 488 A.2d 949 (1985), which prevents a trial court from ordering
restitution relating to dropped charges, a defendant convicted of cruelty toward one horse
may be required to pay restitution for other horses he allegedly neglected.  The Petitioners,
Donna and Hilton Silver, owned three horses who were found by police in terrible health.
One of the horses had to be euthanized on the property, and the other two were sent to a
rescue farm for rehabilitation.  Police charged the Silvers with three counts of animal cruelty.
The Silvers entered plea bargains in District Court sitting in Baltimore County, pursuant to
which they each pleaded guilty to one count of animal cruelty, and the State did not pursue
the remaining counts. 
After being sentenced by the District Court, however, the Silvers appealed for a de
novo trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.  The State did not re-file charges for the
dropped counts, thus pursuing only the charge relating to the horse that died.  At trial, the
Circuit Court heard evidence regarding the condition of the other two horses and convicted
the Silvers each of one count of animal cruelty.  As a condition of probation, the Court
ordered the Silvers to pay restitution to veterinarian who euthanized one horse, and to the
rescue farm for the costs of caring for the surviving horses.  The Silvers petitioned for a writ
of certiorari from this Court, and we granted to answer the following questions:1  
1) 
Did trial court err in imposing criminal restitution for
2
offenses for which the petitioner was not convicted?
2) 
Where the prosecutor failed to provide discovery of a
written report prepared by the State’s witness, relating to the
offense charged, did the trial court err in admitting testimony of
that witness?
3) 
Did the trial court err in admitting photographs depicting
alleged other offenses for which petitioner was not being
prosecuted?
We shall hold that the court was not permitted to order restitution for the other horses
with regard to whom the defendants were not convicted of a crime, and vacate that order.
We shall hold that the Circuit Court’s evidentiary decisions and sentence were otherwise
valid, and thus affirm the rest of its judgmentd.
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
On March 20, 2009, Kerry Boller drove down Frys Lane in Randallstown, Maryland,
on her way to visit a friend and former neighbor, and passed the property of Donna and
Hilton Silver, the defendants in this case.  Ms. Boller knew the Silvers’ property well, having
looked after the Silvers’ horses while they were on vacation the year before.  On that day,
as she passed, she noticed a large white object in the yard, covered by a blue tarp.  She then
observed that the Silvers’ white horse was missing from the horse paddock.  Ms. Boller
talked to her former roommate on Frys Road, and encouraged her to contact the police.
Five days later, after receiving the complaint, Joyce Barnett reported to the Silvers’
property.  Barnett is an experienced Animal Control officer for Baltimore County, and the
owner of horses herself.  As she pulled in the driveway, she saw two horses in the pasture
3
whose ribs were visible under their skin.  As she walked through the yard, she then saw what
she thought to be a dead horse lying under a blue tarp.  
Yet, as she approached the horse, it snickered at her, as a dog would wag its tail.  The
horse–Calypso–attempted to lift her head off the ground, but other than that was unable to
move.  Calypso’s ribs were showing, and her back and hips were covered with burrs.  The
ground around Calypso’s head and feet was dug out, as the horse had been kicking and
rocking back and forth attempting to get up.  Behind the horse, there was a large pile of
manure.  It was apparent that she had been lying there for days. 
Barnett went to the house and knocked on the door.  Donna Silver came to a window.
After being questioned, Mrs. Silver told Barnett that the horse had fallen down a few days
earlier, and that they had been unable to get the horse up, and could not afford a veterinarian.
Soon after, Hilton Silver returned.  He was visibly upset that Barnett had blocked his
driveway, and refused to answer questions about Calypso.  Barnett thus moved her vehicle
onto the grass, and attempted again to discuss the horse with Mr. Silver.  He said that after
the horse had fallen down, they had tried to lift him up, even getting a neighbor to try and lift
him with his tractor.  After these attempts failed, Mr. Silver covered Calypso with a blue tarp,
and “came out every day to see if it was still alive.”
Barnett told the Silvers that the horse needed to be euthanized, immediately.   The
Silvers continued to refuse a veterinarian, and asked Barnett if she could just shoot the horse
to save the veterinarian’s fee.  Barnett requested a police dispatch, at which time Officer
Heather Carpen reported to the Silvers’ property.
4
 When Carpen arrived, Mr. Silver was still upset.  He told both officers that it was
“none of [their] business about the horses[,]” and that he “wanted [them] off of his property.”
Carpen reiterated that the horse needed to be euthanized, and Mr. Silver asked Carpen to just
shoot her.  After talking with her supervisors, Carpen told Mr. Silver that she was not
allowed to shoot the horse, but that he, as the owner of the horse, could.  Silver called some
of his neighbors, asking to borrow a gun, but none of his neighbors wanted to get involved.
Carpen and Barnett then attempted to contact veterinarians, and ask if they would
accept monthly payments in lieu of a fee up front, so that the Silvers could afford to have the
horse euthanized, while Barnett’s supervisor sought approval to have the County pay for a
euthanization.  Eventually, Barnett got in touch with a veterinarian’s office in Hampstead,
who agreed to accept monthly payments, and sent Dr. Klebe, an associate veterinarian, to the
site.  Dr. Klebe arrived shortly thereafter.
The veterinarian’s diagnosis was grim:
[Calypso’s] body was covered in burrs.  She was
obviously severely emaciated. . . . 
[S]he had a rapid eye movement that I could see where
the pupil flickers back and forth in a horizontal fashion, and
that’s called nystagmus, and that indicates some sort of
neurological compromise.  She had crusts around her eyes . . .
[which] usually indicates significant dehydration, and also soft
trauma.
* * *
[I]t was clear from the dull color of her gums she was in
sever and prolonged shock.  
She also had sores on body from being recumbent for so
long and trying to drag herself around on the ground.
5
* * * 
[S]he was in shock which causes kind of global pain in the body.
She was having difficulty breathing.  She was probably
in kidney failure, which is also very, very painful to the point
where she was having neurological deficit, so her mensuration,
her appreciation of the world, was substantially impaired.  
Dr. Klebe observed that Calypso had been in that position for an extended period of
time: 
There was a large quantity of feces around the mare’s
hind quarters. . . . She had obviously been there for a
considerable period of time to defecate in that quantity.  There
were also marks on the ground where the mare had attempted to
drag herself around a little bit.  You could see the impression her
body left as she kind of slowly wiggled along the ground.  
* * * 
[I]t was obvious that her condition hadn’t come about in
one or two days, or even one or two weeks, probably even one
or two months.  It had to have been really prolonged neglect
[and] prolonged starvation[.]
Dr. Klebe concluded that Calypso was “too far gone to try and rehabilitate[,]” and “was
suffering from a point where it wasn’t human to try to prolong her condition[.]”
Despite Dr. Klebe’s agreement to accept monthly payments of $10 for the
euthanization fee, the Silvers refused, wanting instead to wait for representatives from the
Animal Welfare Society of Howard County, who apparently had agreed to perform the
euthanization for free.  The Society, however, had never performed a euthanization before,
and Barnett and Dr. Klebe did not feel comfortable leaving the task to them.  Instead, Dr.
2The Circuit Court judge limited testimony on this topic at trial at the request of the
Silvers’ counsel.  Additional information regarding their custody was revealed at the
sentencing hearing.
6
Klebe decided to euthanize Calypso for free.
Because of Calypso’s medical condition, euthanizing her was difficult, as described
by Dr. Klebe at trial:
I had to use a fair amount [of barbiturate].  For an
average, actually a thousand pound horse, we use about a
hundred cc dose.  In her case I had to use more.  I think it was
closer to 150 cc’s. . . . [b]ecause she was in such poor
circulatory condition.  She was in such complete shock.  We can
put a hundred cc’s in, but if her heart isn’t pumping the blood
properly to distribute this drug to the tissues, it is not going to be
effective, so we had to use a massive overdose on her in order
to be able to accomplish what the drug should do in a healthy
horse.
A few days after Calypso was euthanized, Barnett returned to the Silvers’ property to
discuss the other two horses on the property.2  Those horses, a Chesnut and a Bay Arabian,
exhibited similar, though not as extreme, symptoms of malnourishment and neglect.  The
Silvers refused to turn the horses over to Animal Control.   Instead, the State obtained a
warrant to confiscate the horses, and transported the two horses to Days End Farm in Howard
County.
In May 2009, the State charged Hilton and Donna Silver each with three counts of
animal cruelty, pursuant to Maryland Code (2002, 2007 Cum. Supp.), Section 10-604(a)(5)
3Section 10-604(a)(5)(ii) of the Criminal Law Article (“CL”) provides: “(a)
Prohibited. -- A person may not: * * * (5) if the person has charge or custody of an animal,
as owner or otherwise, unnecessarily fail to provide the animal with nutritious food in
sufficient quantity, necessary veterinary care, proper drink, air, space, shelter, or protection
from the weather.”
4Drawing its name from North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970),
such a plea is “a guilty plea containing a protestation of innocence.” Marshall v. State, 346
Md. 186, 189 n.2, 695 A.2d 184, 185 n.2 (1997), citing Pennington v. State, 308 Md. 727,
728 n.1, 521 A.2d 1216, 1216 n.1 (1987). 
5“A nolle prosequi, or nol pros, is an action taken by the State to dismiss pending
charges when it determines that it does not intend to prosecute the defendant under a
particular indictment.” State v. Huntley, 411 Md. 288, 291 n.4, 983 A.2d 160, 162 n.4 (2009)
(citing Ward v. State, 290 Md. 76, 83, 427 A.2d 1008, 1012 (1981)). “[A] nolle prosequi
discharges the defendant on [that particular] charging document or count which was nolle
prossed, . . . [but] does not preclude a prosecution for the same offense under a different
charging document or different count.” Ward, 290 Md. at 84, 427 A.2d at 1012-13.
6The District Court further ordered the Silvers to pay $275 restitution to Dr. Klebe for
euthanizing Calypso, and $9,950 to Baltimore County for rehabilitating the other two horses.
They were each fined $1,000, with the entire amount suspended, and sentenced to one year
of probation.
7
of the Criminal Law Article (“CL”).3  The initial trial proceedings were held in the District
Court on August 4, 2009.  Before that hearing, the State reached plea deals with the Silvers;
the Silvers would enter Alford guilty pleas4 to one count of animal cruelty (the one regarding
Calypso), and the State would not pursue the charges regarding the other two horses.  At the
hearing, pursuant to the deal, both Donna and Hilton Silver pled guilty to one count of animal
cruelty, and the other counts were “nolle prossed” by the State’s Attorney.5  The District
Court judge then heard a stipulated statement of facts,  and sentenced the Silvers to serve six
days of imprisonment over the course of three weekends.6  The Silvers filed a timely appeal
7In “a criminal case in which sentence has been imposed or suspended following a
plea of nolo contendere or guilty, . . . an appeal [of a district court judgment to the circuit
court] shall be tried de novo.” Md. Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 12-401(f) of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP); see also Maryland Rule 7-102(a), et seq.
(establishing procedure for appeal).
8At that point, Mr. Silver denied any ownership of the horses, so he declined to
formally release them.
9The defendants both waived their rights to a jury trial.  
10The Silvers were represented separately in the Circuit Court.
11The Court observed that the animal cruelty statute provided: “As a condition of
sentencing, the court may order a defendant convicted of violating this section to participate
in and pay for psychological counseling.”  See CL § 10-604(b)(2).  
8
for a de novo trial to the Circuit Court of Baltimore County.7  After the District Court
hearing, Mrs. Silver “signed over” the horses to Animal Control.8 
The Circuit Court held a de novo bench trial on April 27, 2010.9  At trial, counsel for
the Silvers10 attempted to limit any testimony regarding the horses other than Calypso,
arguing that it was irrelevant because those charges had been nolle prossed.  The trial judge
denied those requests, allowing testimony regarding the condition of those horses, stating “I
admit it for the purposes of not necessarily the prosecution of other crimes, but I believe its
[relevant] to the determination with respect to the expert opinion of the officer.”  
The Circuit Court convicted both of the Silvers of animal cruelty.  The Court then set
in a hearing date, and ordered a pre-sentencing investigation, including psychological
examinations.11  The Circuit Court held the sentencing hearing on August 2, 2010.  Relevant
here, counsel for each of the Silvers objected to a restitution order regarding the two
12In the hearing, the Circuit Court stated that it was “payable to Baltimore County[,]”
but the restitution orders signed by the court were payable directly to the caregiver, Days End
Horse Farm Rescue, Inc.
13The Circuit Court recommended work release for both of the defendants and
staggered the sentences.
14This Court has certiorari jurisdiction in “any case in which a circuit court has
rendered a final judgment on appeal from the District Court[.]” CJP § 12-305; see also State
v. Monroe, 82 Md. App. 65, 70, 570 A.2d 338, 340 (1990) (review by certiorari is the “sole
additional avenue of review” in such a case).
9
surviving horses.  Counsel for Hilton Silver stated:
[T]he other two horses were not the subject of this
proceeding . . . . [and restitution] may only be ordered with
qualifications as [an] indirect sentence for a criminal delinquent
act.  The only crime that this Court had before it was the neglect
of the one specific horse.  . . . . I think that any restitution that
the Court orders has to be limited to the one horse[.]
Counsel for Donna Silver similarly stated that “any request for restitution[] as it relates to the
other two horses is improper[.]”  The Circuit Court disagreed, stating “we’re at sentenc[ing]
now, and I’m allowed to consider a wide range of things[,]” and then ordered the $16,781
of restitution regarding those horses.12  The Circuit Court then sentenced each defendant to
84 days of imprisonment, suspending all but 60 days for Hilton Silver, and 30 days for
Donna Silver.13
The Silvers separately petitioned for certiorari from this Court,14 both of which we
granted.  See Silver v. State, 417 Md. 125, 9 A.3d 1 (2010).  
DISCUSSION
I. 
Restitution Orders
15Restitution in criminal cases is permitted, by statute, as part of a sentence.  See
Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 11-603 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”)
(restitution allowed for losses occurring “as a direct result of the crime or delinquent act”).
Restitution is also available as a condition of probation.  See CP § 6-221 (“[T]he court may
suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation on the
conditions that the court considers proper.”).  Here, the record demonstrates that the Circuit
Court ordered the restitution as a condition, stating that “the conditions of probation are joint
and several[:] [r]estitution to Dr. Klebe in the amount of $275, and to Baltimore County in
the amount of $16,718.68.”
16Although, technically, separate statutes govern sentencing and probation, restitution
orders at either stage must meet the “direct result” requirement of CP Section 11-603.  See
Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 862 A.2d 419 (2004).  In Pete, we “harmoniz[ed]” our
interpretation of the two statutes, consistent with our practice of interpreting statutes in “full
awareness” of related statutes.  See id. at 65, 862 A.2d at 429. 
10
Both Donna and Hilton Silver argue that the trial court exceeded its authority when
it ordered them, as a condition of probation,15 to pay restitution for the care of animals with
regard to whom animal cruelty charges were not pursued by the State.
We review the trial court’s restitution order for abuse of discretion.  See Goff v. State,
387 Md. 327, 350, 875 A.2d 132, 146 (2005); In re Delric H., 150 Md. App. 234, 240, 819
A.2d 1117, 1121 (2003).  Although, generally, a trial court has broad power to order
conditions of probation, its discretion has limits, and we have previously invalidated certain
restitution orders.  See Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 862 A.2d 419 (2004) (restitution order
regarding damaged police cruiser was inappropriate for conviction of second degree assault
because the damage was not a “direct result” of the assault);16 Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460,
473, 918 A.2d 506, 513 (2007) (restitution order invalid because “[i]t had no evidentiary
basis and [defendant] was never given the opportunity, prior to its entry, to contest or defend
17Also at issue in Walczak was whether the defendant preserved the restitution issue,
since he did not challenge it below.  See Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 425-26, 488 A.2d
950 (1985).  We held that “when the trial court has allegedly imposed a sentence not
permitted by law, the issue should ordinarily be reviewed on direct appeal even if no
objections was made in the trial court.”  Id. at 427, 488 A.2d at 951.  
11
against it.”).
Relevant here, we have previously addressed when it is permissible to order restitution
for alleged crimes of which the defendant was not convicted, in Walczak v. State, 302 Md.
422, 488 A.2d 949 (1985) and Lee v. State, 307 Md. 74, 512 A.2d 372 (1986).  Those cases
control here.  
In Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 488 A.2d 949 (1985), we held that a trial court may
not order a criminal defendant to pay restitution to a victim of a crime for which he was not
convicted.  Id. at 433, 488 A.2d at 954.  There, Walczak was alleged to have robbed two
victims at gunpoint, and agreed to plead guilty to one count of robbery with a deadly weapon
if the State would nolle pros the remaining charges.  At sentencing, the Circuit Court ordered
Walczak to pay restitution to both victims as a condition of probation.  Id. at 424, 488 A.2d
at 950.  At the time, Walczak did not object, and signed the order of probation which
required the restitution payments to both victims.  On appeal to this Court, Walczak argued
that the restitution order was improper.17  We reviewed the statutes governing the imposition
of restitution, and concluded:
Clearly. . . restitution is punishment for the crime of
which the defendant has been convicted.  Restitution depends on
the existence of that crime, and the statute authorizes the court
to order restitution only where that court is otherwise authorized
18In Lee, the defendant was charged in a two-count indictment with having forged a
check in the amount of $198 and with theft of $3,155.  Lee v. State,  307 Md. 74, 76, 512
A.2d 372, 373 (1986).  The defendant pleaded guilty to the forgery count and, in return, the
prosecutor agreed to nolle pros the theft count.  At trial, the prosecutor informed the court
that as part of a plea agreement, Lee would make a full admission of guilt, and that the
prosecution would “reserve the right ‘to seek restitution to victims in these cases.’” Id. at 76,
512 A.2d at 373.  Lee signed an “‘Order of Probation’” in which he agreed to pay restitution
of $3,155, the amount of loss charged in the nolle-prossed theft count.
12
to impose punishment.   
Id. at 429, 488 A.2d at 952.  Walczak thus limits the sentencing court’s ability to order
restitution to other alleged victims. 
The general rule in Walczak is subject to one narrow exception.  In Walczak, we
observed that some courts allow more expansive restitution orders “in cases in which a
defendant has entered a plea agreement for restitution of greater amounts than those involved
in the crime for which conviction was had.”  Walczak, 301 Md. at 432 n.3, 488 A.2d at 954
n.3.  One year after Walczak, we considered such a plea agreement in Lee v. State, where the
question presented was “whether, in light of Walczak . . . , a defendant in a criminal case
may, as part of a plea agreement, lawfully be ordered to pay restitution in an amount greater
than that involved in the crime of which he was convicted.” 307 Md. 74, 75-76, 512 A.2d
372, 373 (1986).18  We first observed that allowing restitution as part of plea bargaining
served important policy goals, especially in multi-count indictments.
[P]lea-bargaining in situations involving multi-count
indictments would be severely restricted.  If a defendant could
not consent to make restitution for the actual loss caused by his
or her conduct relating to the indictment, and have such be a
condition of any probation he or she might receive, then the
19An examination of the record in Lee shows that the plea recital in that case did not
include agreement by Lee to any specific restitution amount.  The prosecutor stated that the
agreement was that Lee would plead guilty to forgery under the first count in the indictment,
and “the State would reserve its right to allocate [sic] - - particularly to seek restitution to
victims in these cases.”  Lee’s defense counsel then responded that these were the terms.
From this, we observe that Lee requires an agreement to pay certain victims, although the
exact sum may not be contained in the plea recital.  
13
government would have little reason to dismiss indictment
counts in order to limit a defendant’s potential period of
incarceration.  More importantly, however, it would frustrate the
rehabilitation goals of the probation system.
Id. at 80-81, 512 A.2d at 375 (quoting United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907 (D.
Md. 1981)).  We applied these principles in light of our earlier decision in Walczak:
In the present case. . . [t]he guilty plea was in pursuance
of a plea agreement, the State agreeing to nol-pros the theft
count upon the further understanding with the defendant that he
would expressly consent, as a condition of probation, to the
payment of full restitution for the theft offense.  Thus, in
addition to the forgery conviction, there was a judicial
admission of guilt to the criminal acts underlying the theft loss,
together with Lee’s consent to make restitution in the full
amount – all as part of a plea agreement between the parties. 
Id. at 81, 512 A.2d at 376.  Walczak and Lee thus instruct that a restitution order regarding
alleged crimes for which the defendant was not convicted is valid only if the defendant freely
and voluntarily agrees to make restitution to victims of the other, alleged crimes as part of
a plea agreement.19  
Applying the standards of Walczak and Lee in this case, it is clear that the Circuit
Court’s order of restitution for the surviving horses was invalid.  The restitution order was
not part of a plea agreement, and the Silvers never agreed to pay for the rehabilitation of the
14
two surviving horses.  This case, therefore, falls under the general rule of Walczak, and the
court was only permitted to order restitution relating to the crimes of which each of the
Silvers was convicted.  
The State claims that the restitution order in this case was valid because the “Silvers
accept[ed] [] responsibility for the damages caused as to all counts[.]”  According the State,
“the record shows that [the] Silver[s] acknowledged [their] responsibility—pursuant to an
Alford plea in District Court—for the conduct underlying the other counts giving rise to the
harm for which the restitution was ordered[.]”  Alternatively, the State argues that by
accepting the Circuit Court’s imposition of conditions of probation, and in return for a
reduced sentence, the Silvers have waived any claim that the restitution was unauthorized.
The State has, in effect, asked for an expansion of the Lee exception to cases where the
defendant has acknowledged, at any point in the criminal proceedings, some general
responsibility for the underlying, allegedly criminal, conduct, even though that defendant has
not agreed to pay restitution.
The foundation of our decision in Lee, however, was not the defendant’s general
admission of guilt, but his specific agreement to pay restitution as part of the plea bargaining
process.  As such, the State’s arguments on this point are addressed and effectively rebutted
by Walczak.  Indeed, the plea agreement to which the Silvers agreed in the District Court is
indistinguishable from the plea deal in Walczak, where the defendant agreed to plead guilty
to one count, and the State agreed to drop the remaining counts. Under the State’s argument,
Walczak, too, would have “acknowledged [his] responsibility . . .  for the conduct underlying
20Because we find that the Silvers’ plea agreements below would not remove this case
from Walczak, we do not reach the Silvers’ alternative argument that their appeal to Circuit
Court foreclosed the State from relying on their plea arrangements in the District Court.  
15
the other counts giving rise to the harm for which the restitution was ordered[,]” and
“accept[ed] the challenged restitution as a condition of probation in lieu of serving a portion
of a sentence of incarceration.”  Walczak’s restitution order, however, was still invalid.  So
too is the order in this case.20  
The State further warns that this holding “create[s] the ability for a defendant to ‘game
the system[,]’” by agreeing to certain probation terms involving restitution as part of a plea
bargain, but then avoiding any obligation to pay by invoking the Walczak rule.  We are not
convinced.  The problem here is less a result of the Silvers “gaming the system,” and more
the result of a procedural mistake by the State.  The Silvers clearly signaled an intent to
contest their guilt in the Circuit Court, as they were entitled to by law, by filing a timely
appeal.  At that point, the State was completely free to re-file, in the Circuit Court, the
charges that had been nolle prossed in the District Court.  Had the State re-filed those
charges, it would have preserved the full range of sentencing options, including restitution
for those counts, and avoided this procedural quandary.  Unfortunately, it did not.  Adopting
the State’s appellate position, in contrast, would allow the State to request criminal penalties
for criminal charges without proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was
guilty of those crimes.  We decline to open that door.  
     As Walczak and Lee have long since established, the State may request, in plea
21 Silver’s main defense at trial was that he did not own the horses.  The Circuit Court,
however, agreed with the State and rejected Mr. Hilton’s defense, observing that “[t]he
[statute] under which both defendants [were charged states] [‘if] a person has charge or
custody of an animal, as owner or otherwise[.’] [T]he ‘otherwise’ is far encompassing, and
I find there’s sufficient evidence in this case to indicate that Mr. Silver as well as Mrs. Silver
[fall within the statute.]”
16
negotiations, that a criminal defendant agree to pay restitution for related, though uncharged,
crimes.  If the defendant freely and voluntarily agrees to pay such restitution, it is permissible
under Lee.  Where, as here, the defendant does not agree to pay restitution to the victims of
the other alleged crimes, the State must charge and convict the defendant of those crimes
before requesting restitution.  Finally, if a defendant agrees to a plea deal in District Court,
but then exercises his right to a de novo appeal in Circuit Court, the State should take the
necessary steps to protect its interests and preserve its sentencing options.  
II. 
Admission of Carpen’s Testimony
In addition to the restitution issues, Hilton Silver raisedstwo evidentiary issues on
appeal.  First, Hilton Silver objects to the Circuit Court’s admission of Officer Carpen’s
testimony, arguing that the prosecutor failed to provide Carpen’s written report prior to trial.
The alleged discovery violation was raised during Silver’s counsel’s cross-examination of
Carpen, when Silver’s counsel learned that much of Carpen’s testimony was contained in a
report that the State apparently did not provide to Silver.  Silver alleges that the State’s
failure to turn over the document prejudiced Hilton Silver’s “ownership” defense.21 
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(3) requires the State to provide the “name and . . . the address
of each State’s witness whom the State’s Attorney intends to call to prove the State’s case
17
in chief or to rebut alibi testimony, together with all written statements of the person that
related to the offense charged[.]”  Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(1) further requires the State to
produce “[a]ll written and all oral statements of the defendant and any codefendant that relate
to the offense charged[.]”  When the State fails to provide the necessary documents, the
Circuit Court may select one of the following options:
[T]he court may [1] order that party to permit the discovery of
the matter not previously disclosed, [2] strike the testimony to
which the undisclosed matter relates, [3] grant a reasonable
continuance, [4] prohibit the party from introducing in evidence
the matter not disclosed, [5] grant a mistrial, or [6] enter any
other order appropriate under the circumstances.
Md. Rule 4-263(n).  Importantly, the same section provides that “[t]he failure of a party to
comply with a discovery obligation . . . does not automatically disqualify a witness from
testifying[,]” and that “disqualification is within the discretion of the trial court.”
(emphasis added).   As the statutory language suggests, we apply an abuse of discretion
standard to a Court’s decision whether to strike testimony due to a discovery violation.  See,
e.g., McLennan v. State, 418 Md. 335, 352–53, 14 A.3d 639, 649 (2011).
After a close examination of the record, we find no merit in Silver’s arguments that
the Circuit Court abused its discretion in denying the motion to strike the testimony.  Indeed,
it is hard to see how this information “surprised” or “prejudiced” his case.  Clearly, the
Silvers were aware of the State’s claim that Calypso, and the other horses, were owned by,
or in the custody of, the Silvers.  Moreover, Mr. Silver were given time to consider this
testimony, an opportunity to cross-examine the State’s witnesses regarding the ownership
18
issues, and the opportunity to call his own witness—his daughter—to testify regarding his
relative level of custody over the horses.  Even if Silver’s counsel was surprised by Carpen’s
claim that Hilton Silver had vaccinated the horses, this testimony was but one of many
indicia of Silver’s ownership that the State introduced at trial.  It is entirely within the
discretion of the Circuit Court to deny a motion to strike a witness’s testimony, and that
discretion was not abused here.  Accordingly, we find no error in the Circuit Court’s decision
to deny Silver’s motion to strike.
 
Hilton Silver also argues that, even if denying the motion to strike would otherwise
be within the Circuit Court’s discretion, the Circuit Court failed to exercise that discretion
and justify its decision to do so.  Silver quotes Nelson v. State, 315 Md. 62, 70, 553 A.2d
667, 671 (1989), where we stated: “If the judge has discretion, he must use it and the record
must show that he used it.”  On review, a court must be able to determine that the judge did
not merely apply some predetermined position.  As the cases cited by Silver demonstrate, a
Circuit Court is required to give its due attention to alleged discovery errors and, when
appropriate, select an option for remedying that error from those listed in Maryland Rule 4-
263(n).
We disagree with Silver, however, and find that the Circuit Court did exercise its
discretion in this case.  After the discovery issue was raised, the Circuit Court directed the
State to provide the material to the defendants, and gave the Silvers time to review the
documents in question.  The Circuit Court heard both the Silvers’ and the State’s position on
the matter.  The Circuit Court then chose to remedy the alleged discovery violation by
19
“order[ing] that party to permit the discovery of the matter not previously disclosed,” and by
“grant[ing] a reasonable continuance[.]”  Here, the court did not apply some predetermined
position, but instead saw that the Silvers were provided with the discovery material and given
an opportunity to examine it, apparently to the satisfaction of the Silver’s counsel.  Our
precedents do not require a trial court to engage in a prolonged and formal analysis of
prejudice whenever a discovery error is alleged.  Instead, a court is required to hear the
arguments of the parties and determine the correct remedy, as the court did in this case.  
III. 
Admission of the Evidence Regarding the Surviving Horses
As a final matter, Hilton Silver argues that there was prejudicial error when the Circuit
Court admitted “other crimes” evidence consisting of photographs of the two horses who
survived.  As Silver notes, Md. Rule 5-404(b) limits the admissibility of evidence of “other
crimes,” and states: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”  Silver cites
Emory v. State, 101 Md. App. 585, 601, 604, 647 A.2d 1243, 1251, 1253 (1994), where the
Court of Special Appeals stated that “[t]he starting proposition with respect to ‘other crimes’
evidence is that it should be excluded[,]” and that “[i]n terms of appellate review, this is a
legal ‘call’ as to which the trial judge is either right or wrong.  There is no deference
extended[.]”  
 Maryland Rule 5-404(b) is designed to prevent the State from
bring[ing] in ‘out of left field’ the fact that on some other
occasion the defendant committed a crime.  The danger being
guarded against is that such past behavior will be offered to
22Under this reasoning in Odum, we permitted the State to introduce evidence of an
entire criminal “transaction,” including armed robbery, kidnapping, carjacking, and murder,
even though only kidnapping was being tried at that time.  Odum v. State, 412 Md. 593, 614,
989 A.2d 232, 244-45 (2010). 
20
show and will be used by a jury to conclude that the defendant
has a propensity to commit crime.
Odum v. State, 412 Md. 593, 611, 989 A.2d 232, 242 (2010).  As we recognized in Odum,
these concerns do not necessarily apply to all “evidence of  what happens at a crime scene[,]”
and that such evidence may be admitted even though it might show “some possible crime in
addition to the one literally charged[.]” Id.22
Examining the disputed evidence in this case, we find that the concerns of Maryland
Rule 5-404(b) are not present.  The State did not introduce evidence of the condition of the
other horses in order to show the Silvers’ propensity to abuse animals, so as to prove they
abused Calypso.  Nor were the photos evidence of “past crimes.”  Instead, the photos and
testimony regarding the surviving horses are merely “crime scene” evidence.  Indeed, the
neglect of those two horses was intertwined and part of the same criminal episode.
Admission of those photos, therefore, does not “engage the gears of ‘other crimes’ evidence
law[,]” and was appropriate even though it may have “shown some possible crime in addition
to the one literally charged.”  Odum, 412 Md. at 611, 989 A.2d at 242.  We agree with the
State, therefore, that the neglect of the surviving horses was not an “other crime” so as to
render that evidence presumptively inadmissible.
In any event, any error was harmless.  The overwhelming majority of the evidence
23This conclusion is only fortified by our holding with regard to restitution.  In
vacating the Circuit Court’s restitution order to the rescue farm, we have blunted any
practical impact that improper consideration of those photos might have caused.  
21
admitted at trial concerned Calypso’s health.  The evidence showed that Calypso had
collapsed in the yard, in severe shock and extreme malnourishment, and had spent five days
wriggling along the ground, trying to get up, such that she had dug out holes in the ground
around her feet and head.  We do not see how a fleeting mention of two underweight horses
in the yard had any more than a negligible effect on the Circuit Court.  We hold that any error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.23 
CONCLUSION
A circuit court may not order restitution for crimes of which the defendant has not
been convicted, unless the defendant has expressly agreed to pay such restitution as part of
a valid plea agreement.  Here, the defendants were not convicted of animal cruelty toward
the surviving horses, and did not agree to pay restitution for the care of those horses.  It was
therefore beyond the Circuit Court’s authority to order that restitution.  
The Circuit Court’s judgment was otherwise valid.  Restitution was permitted for the
euthanization of the horse with regard to whom the defendants were convicted of animal
cruelty.  The Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Silvers a short
continuance and opportunity to examine belatedly delivered discovery documents, denying
their motion to strike.  The Circuit Court did not err in admitting photographs of the
surviving horses.  This evidence was not “other crimes” evidence introduced to show a
22
propensity to commit the crime charged.  Even if the court erred in admitting the
photographs, that error would have been harmless given the overwhelming evidence
regarding Calypso’s condition.    
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
ORDERING 
PETITIONERS 
TO 
PAY
RESTITUTION TO DAYS END RESCUE FARM
VACATED. 
 
JUDGMENT 
OTHERWISE
AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE SPLIT EQUALLY
BETWEEN THE PARTIES.