Title: In re William S.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

In re William S. 
[Cite as In re William S. (1996), _____ Ohio St.3d _____.] 
Juvenile law -- Custody -- Termination of parental rights action -- R.C. 
2151.414(E) -- Permanent custody may not be granted, when. 
- - -  
Permanent custody may not be granted unless the trial court finds clear and 
convincing evidence that one or more of the eight enumerated factors in 
R.C. 2151.414(E) exist. 
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(No. 94-2068 -- Submitted December 12, 1995-- Decided March 4, 1996.) 
Certified by the Court of Appeals for Erie County, No. E-93-58. 
 
 
Appellant, Erie County Department of Human Services, appeals the 
decision of the court of appeals which reversed the decision of the trial court.  
Appellee, Karen Storch, is the natural mother of minors William (born October 3, 
1985), Edward (born July 17, 1987), Jane (born May 12, 1989), and Robert (born 
May 22, 1990).  William Storch, Jr., the natural father of all four children and 
appellee’s former husband, has been incarcerated in the state prison system since 
 
 
 
 
2 
August 1990.  His earliest possible release date is in 1997.  In response to 
allegations of neglect, appellant first investigated the family situation in February 
1990.  Appellant referred the case to the Ohio Department of Health for home 
visits.  Appellant’s next contact with the family was in May 1990, upon neglect 
allegations brought by the local police department.  Appellant’s investigation 
substantiated the allegations of neglect.  Appellant worked with appellee by 
providing homemaker services, protective day care and transportation.  However, 
after a short time, Robert was evaluated as a “failure to thrive” child.  Appellee 
voluntarily agreed to place Robert in the temporary custody of appellant for a 
thirty-day period.  On July 6, 1990, Robert returned to the custody of appellee.  
Appellant continued to work with appellee on her parenting and housekeeping 
skills, but her skills continued to be poor and inappropriate. 
 
On August 8, 1990, when Robert was found with cigarette burns on his toes, 
appellant petitioned the court for custody of the children.  The court awarded 
custody to appellant which placed the three oldest children with their paternal 
grandparents and Robert temporarily with foster care.  Subsequently Robert was 
placed with his paternal grandparents.  On November 12, 1990, appellant 
 
 
 
 
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developed a case plan, the goal of which was to reunite the family.  The plan 
included relative placement, homemaker services, case management and protective 
day care. 
 
On February 6, 1992, appellant initiated this case by filing complaints for 
permanent custody.  On April 2, 1992, appellant filed a case plan, the purpose of 
which was to reunite the family.  The plan identified specific problems with 
appellee’s parenting and housekeeping skills, including unsuitable housing, 
inadequate housekeeping skills, and failure to control the children’s behavior.  
Appellee was cooperative in fulfilling the case plan requirements, but because of 
her lower intelligence she could not make significant progress in counseling and 
parenting.  She was unable to understand the needs of children with specific 
problems. 
 
Because appellant believes that appellee has indicated a lack of commitment 
to the children and an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for 
the children, it moved, on September 15, 1992 and on October 27, 1992, for 
permanent custody of the children.  On July 8, 1993, the trial court granted 
permanent custody of the children to appellant.  On January 27, 1994, the trial 
 
 
 
 
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court, upon the father’s request, entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
The trial court found that appellee is limited in her cognitive functioning and has 
little insight, if any, into her own plight or the needs and conditions of her 
children; has not provided stable and consistent housing both for herself and for 
her children; has with minor exception never maintained gainful employment 
during her adult life; and is unable or unwilling to address the special needs of her 
children.  The court concluded that appellee “is unable to provide an adequate 
permanent home for the children at the prsent [sic] time and in the foreseeable 
future and has failed for a period of years after the children’s removal to remedy 
the conditions which prompted their removal.”  The court ordered the children to 
be placed in appellant’s permanent care, custody and control.  The court of appeals 
reversed. 
 
Finding its judgment in conflict with the judgment of the Ninth District 
Court of Appeals’ decision in In re Higby (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 466, 611 
N.E.2d 403, the court of appeals entered an order certifying a conflict.  This cause 
is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict exists. 
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Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and G. Stuart O’Hara, 
Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Erie County Public Defender’s Office and Mary M. Bower, for appellee. 
 
Ghada Halasa, Guardian Ad Litem. 
 
Jeffrey D. Ginther, urging reversal for amici curiae, John and Katherine 
Alexander, foster parents. 
 
Alice Robie Resnick, J.   
 
The issue certified for our review is whether, in a termination of parental 
rights action, R.C. 2151.414(E) permits a trial court to find that a child cannot be 
placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed 
with his parents, absent a determination, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
one of the eight predicate findings in R.C. 2151.414(E) exists. 
 
Initially we note that in interpreting the statutory provisions pertaining to 
Juvenile Court, we must carry out the purposes of the statute as stated in R.C. 
2151.01: 
 
“The sections in Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code * * * shall be liberally 
interpreted and construed so as to effectuate the following purposes: 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
“(A)  To provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical 
development of children subject to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code; 
 
“(B)  To protect the public interest in removing the consequences of 
criminal behavior and the taint of criminality from children committing delinquent 
acts and to substitute therefor a program of supervision, care, and rehabilitation; 
 
“(C)  To achieve the foregoing purposes, whenever possible, in a family 
environment, separating the child from its parents only when necessary for his 
welfare or in the interests of public safety * * *.” 
 
When a public children services agency files a motion for permanent 
custody, R.C. 2151.414(A) directs the court to conduct a hearing.  In order to 
terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to the agency, R.C. 
2151.414(B) requires that: 
 
“* * * the court determine[], * * * by clear and convincing evidence, that it 
is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the 
agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following 
apply: 
 
 
 
 
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“(1)  the child is not abandoned or orphaned and the child cannot be placed 
with either of his parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with his 
parents; 
 
“(2)  The child is abandoned and the parents cannot be located; 
 
“(3)  The child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who are 
able to take permanent custody.” 
 
R.C. 2151.414(E) sets forth guidelines for determining whether a child 
cannot be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable period of time or  
should not be placed with his parents: 
 
“* * * [T]he court shall consider all relevant evidence.  If the court 
determines, by clear and convincing evidence, * * * that one or more of the 
following exist as to each of the child’s parents, the court shall enter a finding that 
the child cannot be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time or 
should not be placed with his parents: 
 
“(1)  Following the placement of the child outside his home and 
notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to 
assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be 
 
 
 
 
8 
placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly for a 
period of six months or more to substantially remedy the conditions causing the 
child to be placed outside his home.  In determining whether the parents have 
substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental 
utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and 
rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to the 
parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and 
maintain parental duties[;] 
 
“(2)  The severe and chronic mental illness, severe and chronic emotional 
illness, severe mental retardation, severe physical disability, or chemical 
dependency of the parent makes the parent unable to provide an adequate 
permanent home for the child at the present time and in the foreseeable future; 
 
“(3)  The parent committed any abuse as described in section 2151.031 of 
the Revised Code against the child, caused the child to suffer any neglect as 
described in section 2151.03 of the Revised Code, or allowed the child to suffer 
any neglect as described in section 2151.03 of the Revised Code between the date 
 
 
 
 
9 
that the original complaint alleging abuse or neglect was filed and the date of the 
filing of the motion for permanent custody; 
 
“(4)  The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by 
failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do 
so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate 
permanent home for the child; 
 
“(5)  The parent is incarcerated for an offense committed against the child or 
a sibling of the child; 
 
“(6)  The parent is incarcerated at the time of the filing of the motion for 
permanent custody or the dispositional hearing of the child and will not be 
available to care for the child for at least eighteen months after the filing of the 
motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing; 
 
“(7)  The parent is repeatedly incarcerated and the repeated incarceration 
prevents the parent from providing care for the child; 
 
“(8)  The parent for any reason is unwilling to provide food, clothing, 
shelter, and other basic necessities for the child or to prevent the child from 
 
 
 
 
10 
suffering physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or physical, emotional, or mental 
neglect.” 
 
R.C. 2151.414(E) requires the trial court to find that the child cannot be 
placed with either of his or her parents within a reasonable time or should not be 
placed with the parents once the court has determined by clear and convincing 
evidence that one or more of the eight factors exist.  Once the trial court finds 
from all relevant evidence that one of the eight factors exists, it then must consider 
whether permanent commitment is in the best interest of the child.  R.C. 
2151.414(B).  Only then may it grant permanent custody of the child to the 
agency. 
 
By listing eight factors, the General Assembly contemplated the specific 
parameters which would allow the trial court to permanently terminate parental 
rights.  The statute does not include discretionary language or language that would 
allow the trial court discretion to consider other factors that would justify 
terminating parental rights.  Appellant asserts that by directing the court to 
“consider all relevant evidence,” the General Assembly intended that the court 
have the discretion to consider factors other than the eight specifically 
 
 
 
 
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enumerated.  However, we interpret this cited phrase as simply a direction to the 
trial court delineating the evidence that it may consider when determining the 
existence of any one or more of the eight factors.  The phrase is not meant to give 
the trial court unbridled discretion to come up with its own factors that would 
justify terminating parental rights.  If that had been the intention of the General 
Assembly, it would have concluded R.C. 2151.414(E) by stating, “and any other 
circumstance.” 
 
In the case at bar, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that 
the children “cannot be placed with any one of their parents within a reasonable 
period of time and should not be placed with any one of them.”  The court listed 
two justifications for permanently terminating appellee’s parental rights:  (1) that 
appellee is unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the children, and (2) 
that appellee failed for a period of years after the children’s removal to remedy the 
conditions which prompted their removal.   
 
The first reason given by the trial court does not clearly fall within any of 
the eight factors.  Nowhere is it stated that “a parent is unable to provide an 
adequate permanent home.”  Since permanent custody is an extreme measure, the 
 
 
 
 
12 
specific factor must be established by clear and convincing evidence.  While factor 
eight uses the term “unwilling,” it cannot be said that unwilling and unable are 
synonymous.  Thus, the first basis given by the trial court is not an enumerated 
factor and cannot be relied upon. 
 
The second reason the trial court gave for the permanent termination of 
parental rights was, “[Appellant] failed for a period of years after the children’s 
removal [from the home] to remedy the conditions which prompted the removal.”  
The present case was tried on the February 6, 1992 complaints, which indicated 
that removal from the home was necessary because of the abuse to Robert, 
represented by the cigarette burns inflicted upon him, and fear that the remaining 
children might be subject to similar abuse.  This being the specific reason for the 
removal, it must then be determined whether the appellee has “*** failed 
continuously and repeatedly for a period of six months or more to substantially 
remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside his home.”  R.C. 
2151.414(E)(1). 
 
The court of appeals observed that: 
 
 
 
 
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“At trial appellee attempted to show that the children were removed from 
the home as the result of all of the problems listed on the November 12, 1990 case 
plan.  However, even though this plan was introduced into evidence, the testimony 
of the caseworker assigned to appellant’s family at the time the children were 
removed clearly indicates that the reason for removal was the burn on Robert’s 
toes and the concern that the other three children might be in danger of similar 
abuse should they remain in the home.  This testimony is in conformity with other 
testimony that the original complaints which prompted removal cited Robert as 
abused and the other three children as neglected.  It also conforms with logic in 
that the burn to Robert’s toes is the only circumstance named in the November 
1990 case plan which did not exist prior to the children’s removal.  Therefore, 
based on the evidence presented, the only reasonable conclusion which may be 
drawn is that the children were removed from the home because of the abuse to 
Robert, represented by the burns inflicted upon him, and the fear that the 
remaining children might be subject to similar abuse.” 
 
The November 1990 case plan listing all four children dealt in part with the 
abuse of Robert and concern for the other children.  Appellee took and apparently 
 
 
 
 
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passed a polygraph regarding the burns, according to the testimony of her 
caseworker.  Additionally, the caseworker testified that the appellee’s roommate at 
that time failed a polygraph concerning the cigarette burn incident.  The roommate 
no longer shares appellee’s residence.  From the foregoing, apparently appellee’s 
roommate caused the abuse and threat of abuse.  Since she no longer resides with 
appellee, there can be found no clear and convincing evidence establishing that 
appellee failed to remedy the condition which led to the children’s removal from 
the home.  Resultantly, none of the eight enumerated factors of R.C. 2151.414(E) 
has been established in the case sub judice. 
 
We hold that permanent custody may not be granted unless the trial court 
finds clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the eight enumerated 
factors in R.C. 2151.414(E) exist. 
 
In conclusion, we also concur in the following observation of the court of 
appeals: 
 
“Assuming for the sake of argument only, that evidence exists that appellant 
is incapable of coping with all four children together or the two oldest boys who 
may have severe learning disorders or behavioral problems, this should not serve 
 
 
 
 
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to cause the removal of all four children from the natural mother.  The worst 
accusations that have been made against appellant are that she is simply unable to 
cope with the special needs of her two oldest children, and that she is 
‘overwhelmed’ with the responsibility of rearing all four children together.  
Judicial reaction to these accusations should be no greater than warranted, and 
judicial response should be the least intrusive that is available.  Each child at issue 
here is an individual and should be treated as an individual.” 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents. 
 
WRIGHT and COOK, JJ., separately dissent. 
 
WRIGHT, J., dissenting.  The majority finds that the eight statutory 
factors in R.C. 2151.414(E) are the only factors that a court can examine when 
determining custody in a matter such as this one.  To the contrary, the plain 
language of R.C. 2151.414(E) requires courts to “consider all relevant evidence.”1  
Indeed, the presence of any of the eight statutory factors merely compels a 
 
 
 
 
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mandatory finding that the child should not be placed with his or her parents; it 
does not prevent a court from examining other factors.  Further, the majority’s 
narrow interpretation of R.C. 2151.414(E) does not accord proper weight to the 
overall purpose of R.C. Chapter 2151, namely, the care, protection and 
development of children.2  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1 R.C. 2151.414(E) provides: 
 
“In determining at a hearing *** whether a child cannot be placed with 
either of his parents within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed 
with his parents, the court shall consider all relevant evidence.  If the court 
determines, by clear and convincing evidence, *** that one or more of the 
following exist as to each of the child’s parents, the court shall enter a finding that 
the child cannot be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time or 
should not be placed with his parents:   
 
 
 
 
17 
 
“(1) *** [T]he parent has failed continuously and repeatedly for a 
period of six months or more to substantially remedy the conditions causing the 
child to be placed outside his home *** [;] 
 
“(2)  The severe and chronic mental illness, severe and chronic 
emotional illness, severe mental retardation, severe physical disability, or chemical 
dependency of the parent makes the parent unable to provide an adequate 
permanent home for the child at the present time and in the foreseeable future; 
 
“(3)  The parent committed any abuse as described in section 2151.031 
of the Revised Code against the child, caused the child to suffer any neglect as 
described in section 2151.03 of the Revised Code, or allowed the child to suffer 
any neglect as described in section 2151.03 of the Revised Code between the date 
that the original complaint alleging abuse or neglect was filed and the date of the 
filing of the motion for permanent custody; 
 
“(4)  The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the 
child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when 
able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate 
permanent home for the child; 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
“(5)  The parent is incarcerated for an offense committed against the 
child or a sibling of the child; 
 
“(6)  The parent is incarcerated at the time of the filing of the motion 
for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing of the child and will not be 
available to care for the child for at least eighteen months after the filing of the 
motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing; 
 
“(7)  The parent is repeatedly incarcerated and the repeated 
incarceration prevents the parent from providing care for the child; 
 
“(8)  The parent for any reason is unwilling to provide food, clothing, 
shelter, and other basic necessities for the child or to prevent the child from 
suffering physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or physical, emotional, or mental 
neglect.”  [Emphasis added.] 
 
2 R.C. 2151.01 states, in pertinent part: 
 
“The sections in Chapter 2151 of the Revised Code *** shall be 
liberally interpreted and construed so as to effectuate the following purposes: 
 
“(A)  To provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical 
development of children subject to Chapter 2151 of the Revised Code; 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
“(B)  To protect the public interest in removing the consequences of 
criminal behavior and the taint of criminality from children committing delinquent 
acts and to substitute therefor a program of supervision, care, and rehabilitation; 
 
“(C)  To achieve the foregoing purposes, whenever possible, in a 
family environment, separating the child from its parents only when necessary for 
his welfare or in the interest of public safety[.]”