Title: Richard F. Allen, individually and as commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections v. Mary Barksdale et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:09/18/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2009
____________________
1080242
____________________
Richard F. Allen, individually and as commissioner of the
Alabama Department of Corrections
v.
Mary Barksdale et al.
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court 
(CV-07-900654)
BOLIN, Justice.
Richard F. Allen, in his individual capacity and in his
official capacity as commissioner (hereinafter referred to as
"the commissioner")  of the Alabama Department of Corrections
1080242
2
("DOC"), appeals from a summary judgment ordering the
commissioner to release certain reports regarding prison
incidents to the Southern Center for Human Rights (hereinafter
"SCHR") and Mary Barksdale.  We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On October 30, 2006, SCHR sent a written request to DOC,
seeking incident reports regarding assaults and murders of
several inmates at Donaldson Correctional Facility.  The
request was pursuant to the Alabama Open Records Act, § 36-12-
40 and -41, Ala. Code 1975.  On November 14, 2006, SCHR again
requested the reports from DOC.  On November 17, 2006, SCHR
requested the same reports and also sought reports on the
assault of another inmate.  On January 4, 2007, DOC responded
to SCHR's requests.  DOC stated that the information requested
was part of an inmate's file and that inmates' files were not
considered public records.  In support of its contention that
the records did not come under the purview of the Open Records
Act, DOC cited Tarlton v. United States, 430 F.2d 1351 (5th
Cir. 1970), and an opinion of the Alabama Attorney General.
(Op. Att'y Gen. No. 1979-328).    
1080242
3
On March 15, 2007, SCHR sent a letter to the commissioner
expressing 
concerns 
about the conditions 
at Donaldson
Correctional Facility and relating 50 reports it had received
from inmates regarding assaults and other crimes at the
facility.  SCHR also stated that blocking access to the
reports, which it said involved a significant public-health
crisis at the facility, might lead to litigation.  On April
27, 2007, SCHR met with the commissioner.  DOC provided SCHR
with a summary of certain incidents from the facility but did
not provide the records. 
On August 6, 2007, 32-year-old Farron Barksdale, who
suffered 
from 
schizophrenia, 
was 
sentenced 
to 
life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder
of two police officers.  On August 8, 2007, Barksdale was
transported to Kilby Correctional Facility.  Several days
later, Barksdale was found in his cell comatose.  On August
21, 2007, Barksdale died.  According to the record, the cause
and circumstances surrounding Barksdale's death were unknown,
and DOC employees had made comments to members of the media
speculating on the cause of Barksdale's death.  
1080242
4
On August 31, 2007, Mary Barksdale, Farron's mother, on
behalf of her son, requested the incident report and other
documents from the commissioner regarding Farron's death.  On
September 7, 2007, the commissioner denied the request,
stating that the documents were part of the inmate's file and
that there was an attorney general's opinion providing that
unless there is a court order, no persons or agencies "other
than criminal justice types" should receive information from
an inmate's file.     
On September 20, 2007, SCHR, representing six inmates
from 
Donaldson 
Correctional Facility, along with Mary
Barksdale (the inmates and Barksdale's mother are hereinafter
referred to as "the inmates"), sued the commissioner, alleging
that he was in violation of the Open Records Act for failure
to 
comply 
with 
their 
request 
for 
certain 
documents.
Specifically, the inmates asked for disclosure of all public
records, including prison-incident reports regarding Farron
Barksdale's death, an assault on inmate Michael Castillo at
St. Clair Correctional Facility, and several stabbings,
beatings, and deaths at Donaldson Correctional Facility, which
were addressed in the complaint.  On October 1, 2007, the
1080242
5
inmates filed a motion for an injunction, compelling the
commissioner to comply with their requests.  In the motion,
the inmates also sought certain investigative reports they
were unable to obtain from any other source as provided for in
§ 12-21-3.1(c), Ala. Code 1975.  On October 24, 2007, the
commissioner filed a motion to dismiss, claiming State
immunity, State-agent immunity, and discretionary-function
immunity.  He also argued the inmates failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.  On October 31, 2007, the
attorney general filed an amicus curiae brief in support of
the commissioner's motion to dismiss.  On November 7, 2007,
the Alabama District Attorney's Association also filed an
amicus curiae brief in support of the commissioner.
On November 9, 2007, the inmates filed a motion in
opposition to the commissioner's motion to dismiss.  The trial
court held a hearing, and on January 18, 2008, the trial court
denied the commissioner's motion to dismiss.
On March 7, 2008, the commissioner filed his answer to
the complaint.  On April 18, 2008, The Hunstville Times
newspaper filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the
inmates.  On July 31, 2008, the commissioner moved for a
1080242
6
summary judgment.  On September 15, 2008, the inmates filed a
response to the commissioner's motion and a cross-motion for
a summary judgment.  In their summary-judgment motion, the
inmates stated that the commissioner may, on a case-by-case
basis, redact information from a document or withhold a
document if the commissioner can show that release of the
information would cause a specific threat to public safety.
Both parties presented depositions and other materials in
support of their respective summary-judgment motions.
On 
October 
7, 
2008, 
the 
trial 
court 
denied 
the
commissioner's motion for a summary judgment and granted the
inmates' summary-judgment motion.  The trial court stated:
"[T]he records requested are ordered produced subject to [the
commissioner's] retaining the right to redact sensitive
information on a case by case basis if the [commissioner]
reasonably believes the release of information will subject a
person to specific threat or harm, or if the release will
jeopardize a pending criminal investigation or the release
will violate any state or federal law."  The commissioner
appeals.
Standard of Review
1080242
7
The standard of review for a ruling on a motion for a
summary judgment is well settled:
"'A summary judgment is proper when
there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.  Rule
56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. The burden is on
the moving party to make a prima facie
showing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that it is entitled to a
judgment 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
law. 
 
In
determining whether the movant has carried
that burden, the court is to view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and to draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of that party.  To
defeat 
a 
properly 
supported 
summary
judgment motion, the nonmoving party must
present "substantial evidence" creating a
genuine issue of material fact--"evidence
of such weight and quality that fair-minded
persons in the exercise of impartial
judgment can reasonably infer the existence
of the fact sought to be proved." Ala. Code
1975, § 12-21-12; West v. Founders Life
Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870,
871 (Ala. 1989).'
"... Questions of law are reviewed de novo." 
Pritchett v. ICN Med. Alliance, Inc., 938 So. 2d 933, 935
(Ala. 2006)(quoting Capital Alliance Ins. Co. v. Thorough-
Clean, Inc., 639 So. 2d 1349, 1350 (Ala. 1994)).
Analysis
1080242
8
Section 36-12-40, Ala. Code 1975, a part of the Open
Records Act, provides:
"Every citizen has a right to inspect and take
a copy of any public writing of this state, except
as otherwise expressly provided by statute. Provided
however, registration and circulation records and
information concerning the use of the public, public
school or college and university libraries of this
state shall be exempted from this section. Provided
further, any parent of a minor child shall have the
right to inspect the registration and circulation
records of any school or public library that pertain
to his or her child. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
records 
concerning 
security 
plans, 
procedures,
assessments, measures, or systems, and any other
records relating to, or having an impact upon, the
security 
or 
safety 
of 
persons, 
structures,
facilities, or other infrastructures, including
without limitation information concerning critical
infrastructure (as defined at 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e)
as amended) and critical energy infrastructure
information (as defined at 18 C.F.R. § 388.113(c)(1)
as amended) the public disclosure of which could
reasonably be expected to be detrimental to the
public safety or welfare, and records the disclosure
of which would otherwise be detrimental to the best
interests of the public shall be exempted from this
section.  Any public officer who receives a request
for records that may appear to relate to critical
infrastructure or critical energy infrastructure
information, 
shall 
notify 
the 
owner 
of 
such
infrastructure in writing of the request and provide
the owner an opportunity to comment on the request
and on the threats to public safety or welfare that
could reasonably be expected from public disclosure
on the records." 
Section 36-12-41, Ala. Code 1975, a part of the Open Records
Act, states: "Every officer having the custody of a public
1080242
9
writing which a citizen has a right to inspect is bound to
give him, on demand, a certified copy of it, on payment of the
legal fees thereof, and such copy is admissible as evidence in
like cases and with like effect as the original writing."   
The Open Records Act does not define the term "public
writing."  However, in Stone v. Consolidated Publishing Co.,
404 So. 2d 678, 681 (Ala. 1981), this Court stated with regard
to the Open Records Act that a "public writing is such a
record as is reasonably necessary to record the business and
activities required to be done or carried on by a public
officer so that the status of such business and activities can
be known by [the] citizens."   
The legislature in § 41-13-1, in creating a State Records
Commission, defined the term "public records":
"As used in this article, the term 'public
records' shall include all written, typed or printed
books, papers, letters, documents and maps made or
received in pursuance of law by the public officers
of the state, counties, municipalities and other
subdivisions of government in the transactions of
public business and shall also include any record
authorized to be made by any law of this state
belonging or pertaining to any court of record or
any other public record authorized by law or any
paper, pleading, exhibit or other writing filed
with, in or by any such court, office or officer."
1080242
10
Although § 41-13-1 is included in title 41, which regulates
the retention and disposal of public records, "we doubt the
Legislature intended to make a distinction between a 'public
writing' and a 'public record.'"  Stone v. Consolidated
Publishing, supra, 404 So. 2d at 680.  However, this Court has
used the definition in Stone.  See Ex parte Gill, 841 So. 2d
1231, 1233-34 (Ala. 2002); Birmingham News Co. v. Muse, 638
So. 2d 853, 854 (Ala. 1994); and Chambers v. Birmingham News
Co., 552 So.2d 854, 856 (Ala. 1989).
In Stone, this Court stated: "Courts must balance the
interest of the citizens in knowing what their public officers
are doing in the discharge of public duties against the
interest of the general public in having the business of the
government 
carried 
on 
efficiently 
and 
without 
undue
interference."  404 So. 2d at 681.  In Stone, we also stated
that some records kept by public officials may not be within
the purview of § 36-12-40, including: "[1] [r]ecorded
information received by a public officer in confidence, [2]
sensitive 
personnel 
records, 
[3] 
pending 
criminal
investigations, and [4] records the disclosure of which would
be detrimental to the best interests of the public."  Id.  "It
1080242
11
is clear from the wording of § 36-12-40 that the legislature
intended that the statute be liberally construed."  Chambers,
552 So. 2d  at 856.  
In Ex parte Perch, [Ms. 1080131, February 20, 2009]   
So. 3d      (Ala. 2009), this Court held, with regard to an
inmate's request for certain public writings:
"Section 36-12-40 is referred to as the Open
Records Act ('the Act').  The Act 'is remedial and
should therefore be liberally construed in favor of
the public.'  Water Works & Sewer Bd. of Talladega
v. Consolidated Publ'g, Inc., 892 So. 2d 859, 862
(Ala. 2004).  The Act provides, in relevant part,
that '[e]very citizen has a right to inspect and
take a copy of any public writing of this state,
except as otherwise expressly provided by statute.'
'No statute denies this right to inmates or felons.'
Ex parte Gill, 841 So. 2d 1231, 1233 (Ala. 2002).
The term 'public writing,' as the Court of Criminal
Appeals recently acknowledged, 'has been interpreted
to include judicial records.'  State v. Martin, 4
So. 3d 1196, 1201 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008)(holding
that trial exhibits are public records and that,
therefore, 
a 
requester 
'was 
not 
required 
to
establish good cause before he was entitled to
inspect the trial exhibits')."
(Emphasis added.)
In the present case, the inmates are seeking copies of
records documenting incidents occurring inside the prison
system.  According to the deposition of Paul Yarbrough,
director of the intelligence and investigations division
1080242
12
(hereinafter "the I & I division") of DOC, corrections
officers  generally write incident reports that document
anything that happens in a correctional facility.  Incident
reports may be written as a result of inmates gambling, a
fistfight, an inmate failing a urine test, or a search of an
inmate.  More serious incidents, such as an inmate's death,
may be forwarded to the I & I division.  The investigation by
the I & I division results in a report.  Yarbrough testified
that investigations by the I & I division are usually
completed within 30 days of the day they are received.  He
stated that the I & I division investigated Farron Barksdale's
death and that the investigation was still pending and had
been pending for nine months at the time of the deposition.
Yarbrough had been instructed by his counsel not to testify as
to whether a report had been generated in the investigation of
Barksdale's death.  We note that there was evidence in the
record indicating that certain serious assaults, such as
stabbings involving inmates, were not investigated by the I &
I division and that in those cases only an incident report was
generated.   
1080242
13
The commissioner testified that no incident reports
generated by employees of DOC are made available to the
public.  When asked if there was a "blanket" policy
prohibiting the disclosure of incident reports under the Open
Records Act, he responded that it was DOC's policy not to
release any incident reports.      
We note that § 14-3-9(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides that
corrections officers have a duty to report to the I & I
division all violations of the law relating to prisons that
may come to their attention.  Section 14-3-9 further provides
that, where applicable, the I & I division shall refer such
violations to the appropriate district attorney.  
The commissioner argues that § 12-21-3.1(b), Ala. Code
1975, provides a statutory exemption for all incident reports
generated inside a prison: 
"Law enforcement investigative reports and related
investigative material are not public records. Law
enforcement investigative reports, records, field
notes, witness statements, and other investigative
writings or recordings are privileged communications
protected from disclosure."
"[T]he party refusing disclosure shall have the burden of
proving that the writings or records sought are within an
1080242
In Water Works & Sewer Board of Talladega v. Consolidated
1
Publishing, Inc., 892 So. 2d 859 (Ala. 2004), Consolidated
Publishing sued the Water Works Board of the City of Talladega
and the custodian of its records to obtain certain records
pursuant to the Open Records Act.  The Board argued that
because it was a public corporation, it was not subject to the
Act.  The trial court held that the Board was subject to the
Act but that some of the records sought were excluded from Act
because 
those 
records 
involved 
pending 
criminal
investigations.  Both parties appealed.   This Court held that
the Board was subject to the Act because it performed a
municipal function and that the employees of the Board were
subject to the Act.  We went on to address whether certain
records were properly excluded.  This Court stated that it was
unclear what records the trial court exempted from disclosure
under the Stone pending-criminal-investigation exemption;
however, the records exempted appeared to include documents
not covered by § 12-21-3.1(b).  We remanded the cause for the
trial court to consider whether those documents were included
in the documents exempted under § 12-21-3.1. 
14
exception and warrant nondisclosure of them."  Chambers, 552
So. 2d at 856-57.
We are mindful that this Court in Stone recognized a
pending criminal investigation as an exception to the Open
Records Act, and that in 1998 the legislature adopted § 12-21-
3.1 as a statutory exemption.   We note that there are
1
numerous specific statutes exempting from public inspection
certain records, including, but not limited to, juvenile and
youthful-offender records, identity of Medicaid recipients,
records of a banking board, hospital records produced by
subpoena, probation reports (unless ordered released by a
1080242
15
court), reports of certain diseases, and tax returns and
financial statements.  See, respectively, § 12-15-101 et seq.,
Ala. Code 1975; § 22-6-9, Ala. Code 1975; § 5-3A-11, Ala. Code
1975; § 12-21-6, Ala. Code 1975; § 15-22-53(b), Ala. Code
1975; § 22-11A-2, -14 and -22, Ala. Code 1975; and § 40-2A-10,
Ala. Code 1975.  However, we disagree with the commissioner
that all incident reports generated by DOC employees are
exempt from the Open Records Act under § 12-21-3.1(b).  
This Court made clear that in relation to the Open
Records Act, the judicially created exceptions set out in
Stone, supra, must be narrowly construed.  See  Ex parte
Department of Transp., 757 So. 2d 371, 374 (Ala. 1999)("The
right of the public to inspect and copy a 'public writing' is
broad and the exceptions thereto are narrow and limited.");
Chambers v. Birmingham News, 552 So. 2d at 856 (holding that
the exemptions set forth in Stone should be strictly
construed).  Although § 12-21-3.1 is a statutory exemption,
it is nonetheless an exception to the Open Records Act and
thus should also be narrowly construed.  This conclusion is
in keeping with the broad general policy of open government.
The document reflecting the work of government belongs to the
1080242
16
public, and, although exceptions to disclosure of such
documents are necessary, any exceptions should be narrowly
construed.  In other words, the Open Records Act favors
disclosure, and exemptions to that Act, including those
created by statute, must be narrowly construed.
Section 12-21-3.1(b) clearly exempts law-enforcement
investigative reports and related material from public
disclosure.  In this case, the incident reports, which
identify occurrences within a prison, must be compared to an
investigative report prepared by the I & I division.  An
incident report documents any incident –-  from the mundane
to the serious -- whereas an investigative report by the I &
I division reflects a close examination of an incident and a
systematic inquiry and may lead to criminal prosecution.  The
commissioner's refusal to release incident reports to the
general public is not protected by § 12-21-3.1(b).  In
contrast to an incident report, an investigative report
produced by the I & I division would be protected by § 12-21-
3.1(b), as the inmates concede.   Even the legislature, in
requiring under § 14-3-9 that certain crimes be reported to
the I & I division and that the I & I division could then
1080242
17
determine if the violation should be referred to a district
attorney, did not consider all incident reports as synonymous
with investigative reports.
In addition to certain incident reports, the inmates also
seek certain investigative reports, and the trial court
ordered that the requested records be produced.  The inmates
argue that although some investigative reports are protected
from disclosure under § 12-21-3.1(b), the inmates are
entitled, under § 12-21-3.1(c), Ala. Code 1975, to the
investigative reports they have requested. 
 
Section 12-21-3.1(c) provides:
"(c) Under no circumstance may a party to a
civil or administrative proceeding discover material
which is not authorized discoverable by a defendant
in a criminal matter. Noncriminal parties may upon
proper motion and order from a court of record:
Secure photographs, documents and tangible evidence
for examination and copying only by order of a court
imposing such conditions and qualifications as may
be necessary to protect a chain of custody of
evidence; 
or 
protect 
the 
prosecutors', 
law
enforcement 
officers', 
or 
investigators' 
work
product; or to prevent the loss or destruction of
documents, objects, or evidence. Such discovery
order may be issued by a court of record upon proof
by substantial evidence, that the moving party will
suffer 
undue 
hardship 
and 
that 
the 
records,
photographs or witnesses are unavailable from other
reasonable sources."
1080242
18
The inmates argue that the investigative reports of the I &
I division are completely unavailable to them without a
subpoena 
and 
that 
the 
information 
contained 
in 
the
investigative reports are unavailable by any other means
because inmate victims are often unable to provide critical
information including the dates, names of witnesses, names of
perpetrators, 
and 
the 
punishment 
taken 
against 
the
perpetrators.  They argue that several witnesses to the
incidents in the complaint as to which the inmates seek
reports are unknown and unknowable except through the
investigative reports.  The inmates argue that they have
limited access to information within the prison by any other
means and that prison personnel are unlikely to make
statements for fear of reprisal or potential legal liability.
This Court has addressed § 12-21-3.1(c) as it concerns a
request by a party in a civil proceeding for an investigative
report.  In Ex parte Alabama Department of Mental Health &
Mental Retardation, 840 So. 2d 863 (Ala. 2002), the issue
presented 
was 
whether 
a 
report 
prepared 
by 
internal
investigators employed by the Department of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation was afforded protection under § 12-21-3.1.
1080242
19
A patient at a state-run mental-health facility was strangled
in her room.   One of the employees, who was terminated for
failing to conduct a bed check and for falsifying medical
records relating to the patient's death, sued the Department
and its commissioner.  The employee requested reports
completed by the Department's investigative division. The
Department argued that the investigative report was not
discoverable unless the employee showed that she was unable,
without undue hardship, to obtain the substantial equivalent
of the information contained in the reports by other means.
This Court noted that the Department's internal investigators
were charged with all the powers of police officers and were,
therefore, entitled to protection from civil subpoena, except
upon a showing that the information contained in the reports
could not be obtained from other sources without undue
hardship.  The employee argued that she had shown undue
hardship.  However, the employee made only conclusory
statements and failed to show undue hardship.  This Court
noted that the trial court should have conducted an in camera
inspection of the reports to determine whether the statements
contained in the reports were relevant and whether the
1080242
20
information was such that it could not be obtained from
another source without undue hardship.  We further stated:
"Undue hardship might include, among other things,
the unavailability of a witness whose statement
cannot be obtained from another source; the lack of
access to patients who had given statements to the
BSI investigators or the impossibility of obtaining
the equivalent of those statements from patients
because 
of 
a 
patient's 
physical 
or 
mental
deterioration; the refusal of patients or hospital
staff to make a statement to [the employee] for fear
of reprisal by the hospital; or the refusal of
patients or staff members or even former staff
members to speak to [the employee] out of fear of
self-incrimination."
840 So. 2d at 869.  
Rather then respond to the inmates' argument regarding
undue hardship under § 12-21-3.1(c), the commissioner argues
that disclosure of all incident reports and all investigative
reports is barred by § 12-21-3.1(b).  Failure to argue an
issue waives that issue and precludes its consideration on
appeal.  Boshell v. Keith, 418 So. 2d 89 (Ala. 1982).   
Next, the commissioner argues that the plain language of
§ 36-12-40 provides an exception for "records concerning
security 
plans, 
procedures, 
assessments, 
measures, 
or 
systems,
and any other records relating to, or having an impact upon,
the security or safety of persons, structures, facilities, or
1080242
21
other 
infrastructures, 
including 
without 
limitation
information concerning critical infrastructures ... and
critical 
energy 
infrastructure 
information 
...."
Specifically, the commissioner argues that disclosure of the
information in  the incident reports would lead to potential
disturbances in prisons and could lead to inmates seeking
retaliation against other inmates, which, he says, would
compromise security in the prison system.  This exception,
added by the legislature in 2004, clearly refers to records
regarding public infrastructure and limits  public disclosure
of sensitive information affecting public safety and national
security.  This prohibition against disclosure, narrowly
construed, does not encompass the concerns raised by the
commissioner.  We note that had the inmates been seeking
copies of the security system or the security procedures for
a prison, this exemption would have applied.  Moreover, the
commissioner testified:
"Q.  Okay. In your responses to [the inmates']
interrogatories you state that, 'There are incidents
where inmates and employees have been threatened due
to incident reports being written or investigations
being conducted.'  Tell me about one such incident.
"A. That's just been told to me.  I don't -- I
can't give you an incident.
1080242
22
"Q. Okay.  So you're not aware -- you are not
aware of any such incident; is that correct?
"A. Not personally, no.
"Q. Who -- who told you that?
"A. General counsel.
"Q. Okay.  So your lawyers -- and did they tell
you about the specific incident or did they tell you
that there were incidents that occurred?
"A. They just told me it happens from time to
time."
The commissioner, as the party refusing to disclose the
requested records, had the burden of proving that the records
sought are within an exception and warrant nondisclosure.  His
testimony does not support his contention that disclosure of
the records impacts prison security.  Moreover, the trial
court's order allows the commissioner to redact information
that would  subject a person to specific threat or harm or if
the release of the information will jeopardize a pending
criminal investigation or violate any state or federal law.
Last, the commissioner argues that investigations would
be compromised if all incident reports are subject to the Open
Records Act because:
"[t]here would also be a chilling effect on the
investigative process by the correctional officers
1080242
23
and the I & I division if they believed every
incident report would be subject to public access
under the Open Records Act.  The investigative
process would possibly not be as accurate or
extensive as it is presently.  Officers would not
pursue leads with vigor as they do now.  Also,
officers 
would 
be 
less 
likely 
to 
fully 
and
completely report an incident or the security
measures they took to remedy an incident or breach
in security.  This would impact how a supervisor
monitors the trends within his/her institution."
(Commissioner's brief, pp. 26-27.)  Suffice it to say, we find
it hard to believe that a corrections officer would neglect
his or her job because the public would have access to certain
records reflecting actions of the officer as a government
employee.
Conclusion
Citizens are entitled to information regarding the
affairs of their government.  Alabama's Open Records Act first
appeared in the 1923 Code of Alabama and represents a long
history of openness.  The Open Records Act is remedial and
should therefore be construed in favor of the public.  The
statutory and judicially created exceptions generally protect
an individual's privacy, the integrity of a criminal
investigation, public safety and security, or privileged
information.  The exceptions to the Open Records Act should
1080242
24
be strictly construed, because the purpose of the Open Records
Act is to permit the examination of public writings and
records.  The trial court's order permitting redaction by the
commissioner of any sensitive information in the requested
records safeguards any interest the commissioner has in
protecting inmates or DOC employees from a specific threat or
harm.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, and Murdock, JJ., concur.