Title: State v. Johnsen

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  July 24, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

		Respondent on Review,

	v.

GLORIA JEAN JOHNSEN,

	Petitioner on Review.

(CC 96NB1336; CA A95345; SC S44606)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted May 7, 1998.

	Walter J. Ledesma, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With him on
the brief was Sally L. Avera, Public Defender.

	Kaye E. Sunderland, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review. 
With her on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Leeson, Justices.**  

	LEESON, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

	*Appeal from Coos County Circuit Court,

	Paula M. Bechtold, Judge.

	149 Or App 711, 945 P2d 1064 (1997).

	**Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.

		LEESON, J.

		The issue in this criminal proceeding is whether
payment of a civil penalty pursuant to ORS 30.875 is
"satisfaction for the injury" for the purpose of ORS 135.703 et
seq (civil compromise statutes).(1)  The Court of Appeals held that
such payment is not "satisfaction for the injury."  State v.
Johnsen, 149 Or App 711, 945 P2d 1064 (1997).  We conclude that
it is.  Accordingly, we reverse the contrary decision of the
Court of Appeals.

		On September 23, 1996, the state filed an information
charging defendant with the Class A misdemeanor of theft in the
second degree, ORS 164.045, for allegedly stealing merchandise
valued at $102.98 from a Fred Meyer store in Coos Bay.  On
October 17, defendant moved to dismiss the charge "on the grounds
of a civil compromise."  As evidence of "satisfaction for the
injury" under the civil compromise statutes, defendant attached a
copy of a receipt that she had received from a Fred Meyer
employee stating: "Civil Penalty of $252.98 was paid in Full as
of 10/2/96.  Thank you."(2)  Defendant did not request a hearing on
her motion to dismiss, and the state did not file a response to
that motion.  On October 22, the trial court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss and entered a judgment of dismissal.(3)  

		On October 28, the state moved to set aside the
judgment of dismissal, arguing that the trial court had granted
defendant's motion to dismiss based on civil compromise "before
checking with the DA's Office to see if we opposed such motion
and thus require[d] a hearing on the matter."  The state's
affidavit explained:

		"The State opposes dismissal of this case because
there has been no civil compromise.  Although Fred
Meyer has exercised its right to civil damages under
ORS 30.875, no civil compromise has been entered into. 
According to State v. Ha, 82 Or App 570 (1986) and
State v. Reetz, 142 Or App 421 (1996), a defendant is
not entitled to a dismissal under ORS 135.703 et seq
upon making payment to a store under ORS 30.875."

The court scheduled oral argument for November 22 on the state's
motion to set aside.  On November 7, the state requested that the
hearing date be moved to sometime before November 20, because the
state desired "to preserve its right to an appeal" from the
October 22 judgment.  On November 12, the trial court denied the
state's motion to change the hearing date and entered an order
denying the state's motion to set aside the October 22 judgment
of dismissal.

		The state appealed from the judgment of dismissal.  It
argued that, under State v. Ha, 82 Or App 570, 728 P2d 932
(1986), rev den 302 Or 657 (1987), payment of a civil penalty is
not sufficient evidence of satisfaction for the injury for the
purpose of the civil compromise statutes.  It also contended that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying the state's
motion to set aside the judgment, because the state was not
accorded "a reasonable opportunity to respond and request oral
argument" on defendant's motion to dismiss.   

		Defendant responded that, under State v. Dumond, 270 Or
854, 530 P2d 32 (1974), written acknowledgment of payment of a
civil penalty under ORS 30.875 is sufficient evidence of
satisfaction for the injury for the purpose of the civil
compromise statutes.  Defendant also argued that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the state's motion to set
aside the judgment and that the state did not properly preserve
its argument that it was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to
respond to defendant's motion to dismiss.  

		The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the
trial court had committed an error apparent on the face of the
record because, under Ha, "payment of a civil penalty, pursuant
to ORS 30.875, is not, by itself, sufficient evidence of a civil
compromise."  Johnsen, 149 Or App at 715 (emphasis in original). 
The court remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings. 

		The legal issue on review is whether payment of a civil
penalty under ORS 30.875 is sufficient evidence of satisfaction
for the purpose of the civil compromise statutes.  Resolution of
that issue is a matter of statutory construction.  See PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143
(1993) (explaining statutory construction methodology).  The
starting point of our analysis is the text and context of the
relevant civil compromise statutes.  Id. at 610-11.  

		ORS 135.703(1) provides, in part:

		"When a defendant is charged with a crime
punishable as a misdemeanor for which the person
injured by the act constituting the crime has a remedy
by a civil action, the crime may be compromised, as 
provided in ORS 135.705 * * *." 

ORS 135.705(1) provides, in part:

		"If the person injured acknowledges in writing, at
any time before trial on an accusatory instrument for
the crime, that the person has received satisfaction
for the injury, the court may, in its discretion, on
payment of the costs and expenses incurred, order the
accusatory instrument dismissed."  (Emphasis added.)

The statutory requirements for a civil compromise are that (1)
the crime is punishable as a misdemeanor, (2) a civil remedy
exists to compensate the victim, (3) the victim acknowledges in
writing before trial receipt of "satisfaction for the injury,"
and (4) the trial court exercises its discretion to dismiss the
accusatory instrument on payment of the costs and expenses
incurred. 

		In Dumond, this court interpreted the term
"satisfaction" in ORS 135.705(1) to mean that "the injured party
acknowledges in writing that he has received full payment of the
amount stolen from him."  Dumond, 270 Or at 858-59.  Five years
after Dumond, the legislature enacted ORS 30.875, which provides,
in part:

		"(1)(a) An adult * * * who takes possession of any
merchandise displayed or offered for sale by any
mercantile establishment * * * without the consent of
the owner and with the intention of converting such
merchandise * * * to the individual's own use without
having paid the purchase price thereof, or who alters
the price indicia of such merchandise, shall be civilly
liable to the owner for actual damages, for a penalty
to the owner in the amount of the retail value of the
merchandise * * * not to exceed $500, and for an
additional penalty to the owner of not less than $100
nor more than $250."  (Emphasis added.)

The state contends that the interpretation of "satisfaction" in
Dumond has no bearing on the resolution of this case because,
when Dumond was decided, ORS 30.875 did not exist and adoption of
that statute "chang[ed] the legislative landscape within which
the meaning of [the civil compromise statutes] must be assessed." 
 We disagree. 

		Enactment of ORS 30.875 gave merchants a new civil
remedy to recover damages from shoplifters.  That statute allows
merchants to seek recovery of actual damages, a civil penalty in
the amount of the retail value of the stolen goods up to $500,
and an additional civil penalty in an amount between $100 and
$250.  When it enacted ORS 30.875, the legislature did not refer
to the phrase, "satisfaction for the injury," in the civil
compromise statutes; nor did it give any indication that, by
enacting ORS 30.875, it intended to modify this court's
interpretation of "satisfaction" in Dumond.  In our view,
enactment of ORS 30.875 did not affect the context of Dumond's
interpretation of "satisfaction" in ORS 135.705, an
interpretation that the state does not question separately.  But
see Holcomb v. Sunderland, 321 Or 99, 105, 894 P2d 457 (1995)
(re-examination of prior statutory construction appropriate when
all stated bases of prior construction either no longer applied
or were no longer correct because of statutory revision).  The
interpretation of "satisfaction" in Dumond remains valid.

		As this court held in Dumond, for the purpose of civil
compromise, "satisfaction for the injury" consists of written
acknowledgment from the victim of receipt of full payment of the
amount stolen.  The state concedes that payment of a civil
penalty under ORS 30.875 necessarily includes full payment of the
retail value of the stolen merchandise.  It follows that written
acknowledgment from the merchant that a shoplifter paid the civil
penalty provided by ORS 30.875 is "satisfaction for the injury"
for the purpose of the civil compromise statutes.

		In this case, before defendant's trial on the
accusatory instrument, the merchant gave written acknowledgment
that it had received from defendant full payment of a civil
penalty.  That acknowledgment provided the trial court with
evidence of "satisfaction for the injury" under ORS 135.705.  The
state does not argue that theft in the second degree is not
punishable as a misdemeanor, that no civil remedy exists to
compensate the victim in this case, or that defendant failed to
pay the costs and expenses incurred.  The first three
requirements for civil compromise, described above, were
satisfied in this case.  

		The state's next assignment of error is that the fourth
requirement for civil compromise was not satisfied, because the
trial court abused its discretion in entering a judgment of
dismissal without giving the state an adequate opportunity to
respond to defendant's motion to dismiss.  As explained below, we
conclude that the state did not preserve that argument for
appeal.

		The affidavit supporting the state's motion to set
aside the judgment of dismissal stated that the trial court
"signed defendant's motion to dismiss based on civil compromise
before checking with the DA's Office to see if we opposed such
motion and thus require[d] a hearing on the matter."  The
affidavit then stated that the state "did, in fact, oppose
defendant's motion."  Neither the state's motion nor its
accompanying affidavit informed the trial court that the state
believed that the court had denied the state a reasonable
opportunity to respond to defendant's motion to dismiss.  The
state's contention that the trial court had a responsibility to
"[check] with" the district attorney's office before ruling on
defendant's motion is different from its argument on appeal that
the trial court did not give it a reasonable opportunity to
respond to that motion.  Consequently, the latter argument was
not preserved and we do not address it.  ORAP 5.45(2).

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

1. 	The texts of the relevant statutes are set out below.

2. 	The parties agree that reference to "civil penalty" in
that receipt is to the civil penalty provided for in ORS
30.875(1)(a).

3. 	UTCR 4.050 provides, in part:

		"(1)  There must be oral argument if requested by the
moving party in the caption of the motion or by a responding
party in the caption of a response."

We note that although there was a five-day period between
defendant's motion and entry of the trial court's order, two of
those days were Saturday and Sunday.  At most, the state had only
three working days to respond to defendant's motion.