Title: State vs. Blanton

State: tennessee

Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court

Document:

FILED June 15, 1998 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Court Clerk IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE 1 AT NASHVILLE 2 3 STATE OF TENNESSEE, ( 4 ( 5 Plaintiff-Appellee, ( 6 ( Cheatham Circuit 7 ( 8 v. ( Hon. Allen W. Wallace, 9 ( Judge 10 ( 11 JAMES BLANTON, ( No. 01S01-9605-CC-00093 12 ( 13 Defendant-Appellant. ( 14 15 16 17 18 CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION 19 20 21 22 I concur with the rejection of the defendant’s claim that 23 the statute under which he was sentenced is unconstitutional, and I 24 concur in affirming the conviction of first degree murder. However, 25 I would modify the punishment to life imprisonment because the 26 sentence of death in this case is excessive or disproportionate to 27 the penalty imposed in similar cases. 28 29 I 30 31 Before addressing the issue of proportionality, I am first 32 compelled to comment on the defendant’s claims attacking the 33 constitutionality of the death penalty. As in earlier cases, the 34 defendant offers an often-repeated series of arguments against the 35 sentence of death, all of which have been as often rejected by the 36 Court. The lawyers for death row inmates, as well as the Court, 37 -2- appear disengaged from any mutual consideration of meaningful 1 issues. 2 3 For almost eight years, I have expressed grave concern 4 about Tennessee’s implementation of the death penalty. See State v. 5 Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 191-201 (Tenn. 1991) (Reid, C.J., 6 dissenting). Although I have concurred in the imposition of the 7 death penalty in several cases, see, e.g., State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 8 679 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Mann, 959 S.W.2d 503 (Tenn. 1997); State 9 v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 516 10 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1993); the 11 constitutionality of this form of punishment and of the laws 12 providing for its imposition have not been finally settled. 13 14 It is an accepted principle that the enactments of the 15 General Assembly are presumed constitutional. Vogel v. Wells Fargo 16 Guard Services, 937 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tenn. 1996); Petition of 17 Burson, 909 S.W.2d 763, 775 (Tenn. 1995). Whenever the 18 constitutionality of a statute is attacked, this Court is required 19 to indulge every presumption in favor of its validity and resolve 20 any doubt in favor of, rather than against, the constitutionality of 21 the act. Dorrier v. Dark, 537 S.W.2d 888, 891 (Tenn. 1976). 22 Despite this well-settled rule of constitutional law, capital 23 defendants have repeatedly argued that the death penalty is 24 unconstitutional without presenting any basis sufficient to rebut 25 the presumption of constitutionality. 26 27 -3- For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that 1 “an evolving sense of decency” determines the standard of protection 2 afforded by the prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments” 3 found in the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 4 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S. Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed. 2d 630 5 (1958); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed. 2d 6 346 (1972). At the same time, the Court has refused to hold that 7 the imposition of the death penalty by a state is per se cruel and 8 unusual punishment and thereby prohibited by the federal 9 constitution. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 10 49 L.Ed. 2d 859 (1976). As I noted in Black, however, the 11 determinations of the United States Supreme Court set only a minimum 12 standard and do not limit this Court’s authority to provide greater 13 protection under the Tennessee Constitution. 815 S.W.2d at 192 14 (citing Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Tenn. 1988) and Miller 15 v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tenn. 1979)). Therefore, despite the 16 presumption of constitutionality, should it be shown that the death 17 penalty offends the “standard of decency” existing in Tennessee, the 18 death penalty would be barred under our state constitution. See 19 State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 351 (Tenn. 1992) (Reid, C.J., 20 concurring and dissenting). Yet attorneys representing defendants 21 in capital cases have never offered this Court any definitive or 22 empirical evidence to establish such a “standard.” These are 23 factual issues that can be resolved only by proof; and in the 24 absence of proof, there is no basis on which this Court can assess 25 contemporary values in Tennessee under either the federal or state 26 constitutions. See State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d at 583 (Reid, C.J., 27 -4- concurring); State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d at 264 (Reid, C.J., 1 concurring). 2 3 In Black, I likewise indicated that the method of 4 implementing a sentence of death in this State is also 5 constitutionally suspect. 815 S.W.2d at 199-201. After reviewing 6 the historical background of electrocution as a means of execution, 7 I opined that the case should be remanded to allow the defendant “to 8 present evidence to the [trial] court on the constitutional issue of 9 whether electrocution per se is cruel and unusual punishment under 10 Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution.” While this is an 11 issue of grave concern, it is one that cannot be decided without 12 some evidence of the nature of death by electrocution. 13 Nevertheless, no proof has ever been presented to the trial courts 14 on this issue so that this Court might determine whether 15 electrocution is “cruel and unusual punishment” under the state 16 constitution. 17 18 The burden rests upon the party challenging the 19 constitutionality of a statute to rebut the presumption of 20 constitutionality. This burden has not been carried by those 21 asserting the unconstitutionality of capital punishment in this 22 State. As in prior cases, there is no basis in the record presently 23 before the Court upon which the Court can make a determination that 24 the death penalty violates or does not violate contemporary 25 standards of decency in Tennessee or make a determination that death 26 by electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment. 27 -5- II 1 2 The first duty of this Court is to examine each case and 3 apply the law fairly and dispassionately and thereby render justice 4 under the law. To this purpose, the Court, and each justice, 5 examines the record and reviews the law, giving attention to the 6 statutory issues and assignments made by the defendant in each case. 7 8 The Court has a concomitant responsibility which is 9 equally important, that is, to defend the integrity of the state’s 10 judicial system and its judgments. Review of the decisions of the 11 United States Supreme Court and the opinions of the federal circuit 12 and district courts shows that the sentences imposed under the 13 capital sentencing schemes of the various states receive the highest 14 scrutiny from the federal courts. It is the duty of this Court to 15 interpret the statutes enacted by the General Assembly and 16 particularly capital sentencing statutes so as to render convictions 17 under state law which are consistent with the minimum standards of 18 the federal constitution and are, therefore, impregnable against 19 challenges in the federal courts. Nevertheless, this Court 20 continues to countenance admitted errors that offend the federal 21 constitution in the trial of capital cases and thereby puts at risk the 22 convictions and sentences of some of the state’s most culpable offenders. 23 24 A primary example is the Court’s response to challenges to 25 the constitutional validity of the so-called “heinous, atrocious or 26 cruel” aggravating circumstance, particularly as it existed prior to 27 1While the 1989 amendment of this aggravating circumstance replacing “depravity of mind” with “serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death” appears to provide a meaningful standard for determining the appropriateness of death as a penalty, State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d at 526 (Reid, J., concurring), the Court’s continued broad application of this circumstance may threaten its constitutionality. See State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 361- 362 (Reid, J., dissenting). -6- its amendment in 1989. See T.C.A. § 39-2-203(i)(5) (1982).1 In the 1 past, this Court has repeatedly and without analysis held that this 2 aggravating circumstance is not constitutionally vague or overbroad 3 and refused to respond to the developments of federal constitutional 4 law that required further refinement of the law pertaining to this 5 aggravating circumstance. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 6 239, 252 (Tenn. 1989) (responding to Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 7 356, 108 S. Ct. 1353, 100 L.Ed. 2d 372 (1988)). The Court has 8 persisted in this course despite dissent by its members, see State 9 v. Shepherd, 902 S.W.2d 895, 909 (Tenn. 1995) (Reid, J., 10 dissenting); State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 271-272 (Tenn. 11 1994)(Reid, C.J., dissenting); State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 12 485-490 (Tenn. 1993) (Daughtrey , J., dissenting); Black, supra, 815 13 S.W.2d at 195-197 (Reid, C.J., dissenting), and warnings from 14 justices of the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Barber v. 15 Tennessee, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 1177, 130 L.Ed. 2d 1129 (1995) 16 (Stewart, J. concurring) (finding the instruction on “depravity” 17 adopted in State v. Williams, 690 S.W.2d 517 (Tenn. 1985), “plainly 18 impermissible” under Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S. Ct. 19 1759, 64 L.Ed. 2d 398 (1980)). The Court’s refusal to respond to 20 such criticism places in peril all sentences, including that imposed 21 in the present case, that are based upon findings of this 22 2In the same vein, a similar failure to respond to the holdings in McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 103 L.Ed. 2d 269 (1990), and Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed. 2d 384 (1988), may threaten the validity of past convictions. See Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843, 849 (6th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that Tennessee’s instructions on mitigating circumstances may violate McKoy and Mills). -7- aggravating circumstance under the pre-1989 statute.2 1 2 III 3 4 I would find that the sentence of death in this case “is 5 excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar 6 cases, considering both the nature of the crime and the defendant.” 7 Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D). 8 9 In State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1997), this Court 10 set forth the analysis it would follow in performing comparative 11 proportionality review of capital cases. Although I have expressed 12 my view that Bland marked only “an important first step in 13 articulating a structured review process” for comparative review, 14 see State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 676 (Reid, J., dissenting), it 15 appears that Bland now provides the entire framework within which 16 questions of comparative proportionality will be addressed by the 17 Court. See, State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d at 699; State v. Mann, 959 18 S.W.2d at 513. In the present opinion, the majority of the Court 19 has undertaken a lengthy comparison of this case with other first 20 degree murders, both capital and life cases, under the Bland 21 analysis to find, as it has in almost all of the approximately 120 22 preceding cases, that the sentence of death is not disproportionate. 23 In my opinion, application of even the modest procedure outlined in 24 -8- Bland requires that the sentence in this case be declared excessive 1 and disproportionate. 2 3 Under Bland one of the factors listed for comparison is 4 “the defendant’s involvement or role in the murder.” 958 S.W.2d at 5 667. No prior case in which the death penalty has been imposed in 6 this state has presented such a paucity of evidence regarding the 7 role of the defendant in the killing. A distinctive feature of this 8 case is that it is based entirely upon circumstantial evidence. The 9 proof establishes that the defendant was one of a group of three 10 escaped convicts who were in the immediate area of the murders at 11 the time the offenses occurred. It supports the finding by the jury 12 that a member or members of this group killed the victims. It 13 establishes that shortly after the murders the group arrived in 14 Memphis, Tennessee, in the victims’ automobile, which contained one 15 of the murder weapons. However, it does not establish that the 16 defendant himself killed the victims or was an active participant in 17 the killings. While physical evidence reveals the method and manner 18 of the victims’ deaths, nothing in the proof identifies the actual 19 killer or elucidates the individual roles of the three escapees in 20 the Vesters’ deaths. In short, there is no proof of the defendant’s 21 role in the killings. Items taken from residences where the 22 physical evidence indicates that the defendant was present were 23 found at the Vesters’ home, but there is no proof that the defendant 24 was present at the scene of the Vesters’ murders. 25 26 The majority acknowledges that this is a case “where the 27 -9- evidence did not positively identify the shooter.” It cites to four 1 other cases, State v. Sample, 680 S.W.2d 447 (Tenn. 1985); State v. 2 McKay, 680 S.W.2d 447 (Tenn. 1985); State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126 3 (Tenn. 1981); and State v. Strouth, 620 S.W.2d 467 (Tenn. 1981), to 4 support its conclusion that a sentence of death has previously been 5 affirmed in such a case. However, examination of these four cases 6 shows that they are not similar to the present case in this respect. 7 8 McKay and Sample were co-defendants in the robbery of a 9 “sundry store” in Memphis during which two persons were killed. An 10 eyewitness, whom Sample had attempted to kill during the offense, 11 identified both men as being present in the store. The eyewitness 12 also testified that he saw McKay shoot one of the victims and heard 13 Sample, who was standing next to the other victim, announce that “I 14 ought to kill all you son-of-bitches” and instruct McKay to “kill 15 every son-of-a-bitch in here” before the defendants started 16 shooting. McKay and Sample are not cases in which the proof did not 17 positively identify the shooter or disclose the defendant’s active 18 participation in the murder. 19 20 In the other two cases, Dicks and Strouth were co- 21 defendants who were tried separately. The two were involved in the 22 robbery of a shop in Kingsport, Tennessee, during which the store 23 owner suffered a severe blow to his head and a fatal knife wound to 24 his throat. The opinions in the two cases indicate that both 25 defendants gave statements to the police implicating the other and 26 that, despite Dicks’ assertions that he had remained outside in a 27 -10- car during the robbery, physical evidence established that both men 1 had been inside the shop. Upholding the sentences of death in both 2 cases, this Court noted in Dicks, 615 S.W.2d at 130, that, based 3 upon the evidence, a jury could reasonably find that the defendant 4 Dicks was an “active participant” in the robbery and murder of the 5 victim. 6 7 As noted earlier, the evidence in this case neither 8 circumstantially nor directly establishes that the defendant 9 participated in the murder. In short, the record is completely 10 silent on this point. In this respect, there is no “similar” case 11 in which the death penalty has been upheld by this Court since the 12 enactment of the present capital punishment statute. Under these 13 circumstances the sentence in this case is the sort of “aberrant 14 death sentence” comparative proportionality review is meant to guard 15 against. 16 17 IV 18 19 The constitutionality of the death penalty in a case of 20 this sort depends upon proof of the nature of the defendant’s 21 participation in the felony and the killings. See State v. Branam, 22 855 S.W.2d 563, 570-571 (Tenn. 1993); see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 23 U.S. 137, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 24 458 U.S. 782, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed. 2d 1140 (1982). The absence 25 of any evidence of the defendant’s role in the murders in this case 26 is most disturbing. The Court, without so much as a nod to federal 27 -11- constitutional law or prior Tennessee constitutional law, has 1 abandoned any requirement that the sentencing phase of the trial 2 accomplish genuine narrowing of the class of death-eligible 3 defendants. State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 354 (Reid, C.J., 4 concurring and dissenting). Under Enmund and Tison, the federal 5 constitution allows the death penalty only for a defendant who 6 himself kills, attempts to kill, or intends that a killing take 7 place or that lethal force will be imposed, or for any defendant 8 whose personal involvement in the felony underlying the murder is 9 substantial and who exhibits a reckless disregard or indifference to 10 the value of human life. In Branam, this Court held that imposition 11 of the death penalty was disproportionate and unconstitutional under 12 the Eighth Amendment where there was no evidence to show that the 13 defendant was ever in possession of the murder weapon or personally 14 approached or confined the victim at any time during the robbery and 15 that, although the evidence indicated that the defendant was aware 16 that the triggerman was armed, there was “nothing in the record to 17 establish the defendant’s mental state as one of ‘reckless 18 indifference,’ as that term is used in Tison.” 855 S.W.2d at 571. 19 The proof in this case regarding the defendant’s involvement in the 20 killings is equally lacking and critical questions relating to the 21 defendant’s involvement in the crime are left entirely to 22 speculation. The Court has, by affirming the sentence of death in 23 this case, abandoned even the pretense of limiting the sentence of 24 death to a “demonstrably smaller and more blameworthy” class of 25 murderers. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S. Ct. 1853 26 (1988). In my view, the sentence violates both the federal and 27 -12- state constitutions. 1 2 For these reasons, I would modify the defendant’s sentence 3 to life imprisonment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(d)(2). 4 5 _____________________________ 6 Lyle Reid, Special Justice 7