Title: Justice v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ALEX D. JUSTICE, 
 
§ 
 
 
§  
No. 34, 2013 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
Appellant, 
§  
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§  
the State of Delaware, in and for 
 
v. 
 
§  
Sussex County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§  
Cr. I.D. No. 1203006756 
 
 
§ 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted:  July 3, 2013 
Decided:  July 11, 2013 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 11th day of July 2013, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties and 
the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
Alex Justice, Sr., the defendant-below (“Justice”), appeals from a 
Superior Court sentencing order for Rape Second Degree and Unlawful Sexual 
Contact.  On appeal, Justice claims the trial court erred by refusing to suppress his 
statement to the police.  He urges that the State failed to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that when Justice waived his Miranda1 rights while 
intoxicated, he was capable of knowing what he told to the police, or that he 
                                                 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966). 
 
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voluntarily intended to disclose that information.  We find no merit to Justice’s 
appeal and affirm. 
2. 
On March 3, 2012, D.C.,2 a 13-year-old girl, encountered Justice, a 42-
year-old man, who was drinking a beer.  Justice offered to get D.C. something to 
drink.  D.C. agreed.  Justice bought a bottle of gin and beer, and he and D.C. went 
to an outdoor location.  D.C. was cold.  Justice told her that if she drank the gin, it 
would warm her up.  D.C. drank nearly the entire bottle.  Soon after, Justice began 
to kiss D.C., removed her underwear, and orally sodomized her.  
3. 
Justice invited D.C. back to his house.  D.C. refused, saying she needed 
to go home.  Justice’s son came to pick them up and dropped them off at Justice’s 
house.  Justice then repeatedly engaged in oral copulation and penile-vaginal 
intercourse with D.C., at least four times.  Three days later, a forensic nurse 
examiner at Peninsula Regional Medical Center examined D.C. and found semen 
in D.C.’s vagina.  The semen was later matched to Justice’s DNA.  
4. 
Justice was arrested on a warrant issued by the Delmar Police 
Department.  When Justice asked why he was being placed under arrest, the 
arresting officer replied that it was in connection with a rape charge.  Justice was 
taken to the station and given his Miranda warnings.  Justice then gave a statement 
to the effect that, some days earlier, he had sex with a 28-year-old woman named 
                                                 
2 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 10.2(9)(b), the minor child is identified only by her initials.   
 
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Honesty at his house.  Justice then gave an alibi for his activities on the day in 
question. 
5. 
Shortly after Justice gave his statement to the police, he appeared by 
videophone before a Justice of the Peace to determine bail.  The court issued a 
form order indicating the conditions of his release.  Justice did not sign the form on 
the space where designated.  Instead, the signature line contained the word 
“intoxicated.”  The form order was issued less than an hour after Justice signed his 
Miranda waiver.  
6. 
Justice was indicted on eight counts of Sex Offender Unlawful Sexual 
Contact Against a Child.  The trial was bifurcated, and the trial jury considered 
seven counts of Rape Second Degree and one count of Unlawful Sexual Contact 
Second Degree.  At the trial, the State sought to introduce Justice’s statement.  
Defense counsel objected, and the trial court overruled the objection.  The jury 
convicted Justice of one count of Rape Second Degree and Unlawful Sexual 
Contact Second Degree.  The jury acquitted Justice of all other charges. 
7. 
The trial court separately conducted a bench trial, determined Justice 
was a sex offender at the time of the offense, and sentenced him to life in prison.  
This appeal followed.  
 
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8. 
We review the Superior Court's denial of a motion to suppress for abuse 
of discretion.3  We review de novo the formulation and application of legal 
concepts to undisputed facts.4  “To the extent the trial court's legal decision is 
based on its own factual findings, it is reviewable to determine whether there was 
sufficient evidence to support the findings . . . .”5 
9. 
This Court has held that Miranda rights are effectively waived if the 
waiver was “voluntary in the sense that it was a product of free and deliberate 
choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception,” and was “made with a full 
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of 
the decision to abandon it.”6  We have repeatedly stated that “prior intoxication 
does not, per se, invalidate an otherwise proper waiver of Miranda rights.”7  “The 
State has the burden of showing not only that the defendant was advised of his 
Miranda rights but [also] that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights.”8 
                                                 
3 Seward v. State, 723 A.2d 365, 370 (Del. 1999). 
4 Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 860 (Del. 1999).  
5 Downs v. State, 570 A.2d 1142, 1144 (Del. 1990).  
6 Rambo v. State, 939 A.2d 1275, 1278-79 (Del. 2007) (internal citation omitted).  
7 Hubbard v. State, 16 A.3d 912, 919 (Del. 2011); see also Howard v. State, 458 A.2d 1180, 
1183 (Del. 1983) (“To the extent that he was intoxicated when he was questioned, that 
intoxication does not per se invalidate an otherwise proper waiver of rights.”) (citations omitted).  
8 Howard, 458 A.2d at 1183.  
 
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10. The police officer who informed Justice of his Miranda rights testified 
that he did not recall if Justice exhibited any odor of alcohol, slurred speech, or 
bloodshot eyes, nor did he notice that Justice had trouble maintaining balance 
while giving his statement.9  Justice was also responsive in his statement,10 wherein 
he gave a detailed and extensive alibi.11  The State adduced sufficient evidence to 
meet its burden of showing that Justice gave his statement voluntarily. 
11. Moreover, the only evidence of record indicating intoxication is the 
handwritten notation of “intoxicated” on the bail form.  The source of that notation 
is unknown both to the State and to Justice.  The police officer who processed 
Justice when the form was completed had no recollection of Justice being 
intoxicated or of writing “intoxicated” on the form.  That notation on the form does 
not outweigh the other evidence that Justice’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.   
12. Justice argues the trial court never conducted a full legal analysis of his 
state of mind at the time of his Miranda waiver.  This Court has never held that 
any particular form of colloquy is required at a suppression hearing.  The trial court 
                                                 
9 See Mealey v. State, 347 A.2d 651, 652-53 (Del. 1975) (finding an allegedly intoxicated 
defendant gave a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights, as the defendant appeared 
sober, was not incoherent, and had no difficulty speaking).  
10 See Fleming v. State, 609 A.2d 668, 1992 WL 135159, at *1-2 (Del. Mar. 11, 1992) (finding a 
knowing waiver of Miranda rights when, among other indicators, the defendant gave “focused 
and responsive answers” to police questions); Traylor v. State, 458 A.2d 1170, 1176 (Del. 1983) 
(holding that a defendant’s heroine intoxication did not render his Miranda warning invalid, as 
his “admissions and denials in his remarks . . . indicate his capacity and intent”). 
11 See Hubbard, 16 A.3d at 919 (finding a knowing and voluntary waiver when the defendant 
gave a “detailed” statement of his recollections of the arrest).  
 
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did not make a finding that Justice was intoxicated. Rather, it focused its analysis 
on the proposition that even if Justice was intoxicated, that fact—alone and without 
more—does not render the statement inadmissible.  We agree. 
13. Even if the knowing and voluntary character of Justice’s Miranda 
waiver was subject to doubt, and the admission of his statement was error, any 
error was harmless.  The State’s evidence established the relative ages of Justice 
and D.C., D.C. testified to the sexual encounter and, most significantly, the DNA 
evidence connected Justice’s DNA to the semen found in D.C.’s vagina.  The 
Superior Court did not err by denying Justice’s motion to suppress his statement to 
the police.  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
        Justice