Title: In re Complaint Against Resnick

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Complaint Against Resnick, 108 Ohio St.3d 160, 2005-Ohio-6800.] 
 
 
IN RE COMPLAINT AGAINST RESNICK, JUSTICE. 
[Cite as In re Complaint Against Resnick,  
108 Ohio St.3d 160, 2005-Ohio-6800.] 
Judicial misconduct — Driving while under the influence of alcohol — Public 
reprimand. 
(No. 2005-2396 — Submitted December 7, 2005 — Decided December 28, 
2005.) 
ADJUDICATION by the Supreme Court of Ohio pursuant to Rule II  
of the Rules for the Government of the Judiciary. 
__________________ 
 
SHAW, J. 
 
{¶1} 
This is an adjudication, pursuant to Gov.Jud.R. II(2) through (4), of a 
formal disciplinary complaint filed against an incumbent justice of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio.  In this circumstance, Gov.Jud.R. II(2)(B)(3)(a) provides that the 
Chief Justice of the Courts of Appeals shall convene the panel described in 
Gov.Jud.R. II(4) to “hear and decide” the complaint.  Gov.Jud.R. II(4) provides that 
all members of the Supreme Court of Ohio are disqualified from hearing or 
determining any matter in the proceeding and that the Supreme Court shall be 
composed of a panel consisting of the Chief Justice of the Courts of Appeals and the 
presiding judge of each of the 12 appellate districts of Ohio.  In the event that any one 
of the 12 presiding judges is unable to serve, the most senior judge of that court of 
appeals shall serve instead. 
 
{¶2} 
On May 5, 2005, relator, Jeffrey R. McQuiston, was duly appointed as 
a special investigator by the Chief Justice of the Courts of Appeals and was charged 
with the task of conducting a complete investigation into an incident involving 
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respondent, Justice Alice Robie Resnick, which occurred on January 31, 2005.  The 
appointment of relator followed the determination of a panel of three presiding 
judges of the courts of appeals that there was sufficient cause to warrant further 
investigation into this incident pursuant to Gov.Jud.R. II(2)(B)(2) and (3)(a). 
 
{¶3} 
Based on this investigation, relator filed a formal complaint against 
respondent on November 7, 2005.  In the complaint, relator alleged that respondent’s 
conduct on January 31, 2005, which led to her arrest and subsequent conviction of 
the offense of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, violated 
Canon 2 of the Judicial Code of Conduct, which provides, “A judge shall respect and 
comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”  The day that the 
complaint was filed, Justice Resnick filed her answer admitting each allegation of the 
complaint, including the Canon 2 violation. 
 
{¶4} 
Also on November 7, 2005, the parties jointly submitted to this court 
the “Agreement for Consent to Discipline with Attached Affidavit.”  The agreement 
contains a number of stipulations by relator and respondent.  In particular, the parties 
stipulate to the admission of the facts alleged in the complaint and stipulate that 
respondent’s conduct on January 31, 2005, violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct.  The parties further stipulate to certain matters in mitigation and agree that 
the recommended sanction in this matter should be a public reprimand, subject to 
acceptance by this court. 
 
{¶5} 
Attached to the agreement is the personal affidavit of Justice Resnick, 
in which she admits to the truth of the facts set out in the complaint and the 
agreement, admits to committing the Canon violation as alleged, admits that grounds 
exist for the imposition of a sanction upon her, and agrees to the imposition of a 
public reprimand. Also attached to the agreement as exhibits A and B, respectively, 
January Term, 2005 
3 
are the judgment entry of respondent’s conviction for driving while under the 
influence of alcohol and respondent’s curriculum vitae. 
 
{¶6} 
In sum, as a result of this investigation and complaint, relator and 
respondent now submit their agreement for consent to discipline for approval and 
final disposition of this matter by the court in lieu of any further hearing. Upon 
consideration, it is our determination that the agreement for consent to discipline be 
accepted by the court without further hearing. 
 
{¶7} 
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing complaint, answer, agreement, 
stipulations, affidavit, and exhibits and the joint recommendation of the parties, it is 
the unanimous determination of the court by clear and convincing evidence that 
respondent, Alice Robie Resnick, violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct 
as alleged in the complaint.  It is further the unanimous determination of the court 
that a public reprimand is the appropriate disciplinary sanction to entirely conclude 
all aspects of this case. 
 
{¶8} 
Respondent, Alice Robie Resnick, is hereby publicly reprimanded for 
her conduct on January 31, 2005. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
DOAN, ABELE, BOGGINS, SINGER, DONOFRIO, BLACKMON, BROWN and FORD, 
JJ., concur. 
 
FAIN, C.J., BROGAN and YOUNG, JJ., concur separately. 
SLABY, J., concurs in judgment. 
MIKE FAIN, C.J. of the Ohio Courts of Appeals Judges Association and of the 
Second Appellate District. 
RUPERT A DOAN, J., of the First Appellate District. 
JAMES A. BROGAN, J., of the Second Appellate District. 
STEPHEN R. SHAW, J., of the Third Appellate District. 
PETER B. ABELE, J., of the Fourth Appellate District. 
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JOHN F. BOGGINS, J., of the Fifth Appellate District. 
ARLENE SINGER, J., of the Sixth Appellate District. 
GENE DONOFRIO, J., of the Seventh Appellate District. 
PATRICIA BLACKMON, J., of the Eighth Appellate District. 
LYNN C. SLABY, J., of the Ninth Appellate District. 
SUSAN BROWN, J., of the Tenth Appellate District. 
DONALD R. FORD, J., of the Eleventh Appellate District. 
WILLIAM W. YOUNG, J., of the Twelfth Appellate District. 
__________________ 
 
FAIN, C.J., concurring. 
 
{¶9} 
Because we are both the initial and final judicial tribunal charged with 
adjudicating this disciplinary complaint, I deem it to be our duty to determine, 
independently of the recommendation of the parties, both whether an ethical violation 
occurred and what the appropriate sanction for that violation should be.  I therefore 
find it appropriate to set forth my reasoning for concluding that a public reprimand is 
the appropriate sanction in this matter. 
 
{¶10} First, I accept the stipulation that Justice Resnick violated Canon 2 
when she operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.  In this 
connection, I note that “[m]embers of the judiciary have an even greater duty [than do 
other lawyers] to obey the law, and the breach of that duty has been met with the full 
measure of our disciplinary authority.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Connor, 105 Ohio 
St.3d 100, 2004-Ohio-6902, 822 N.E.2d 1235, ¶ 18. 
 
{¶11} With respect to the proper sanction, I note that in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Connor, the respondent, a common pleas judge, was suspended from the 
practice of law as a result of a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol.  
In that case, however, there were aggravating circumstances, the respondent having 
had two prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol — one fewer 
January Term, 2005 
5 
than three years previously — and the six-month suspension from the practice of law 
was itself stayed on conditions.  In the case before us, the parties have stipulated that 
there are no aggravating factors.  I am aware that media accounts of Justice Resnick’s 
arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol included references to statements that 
she reportedly made to the arresting officer, while still under the influence, that might 
be construed as an attempt to persuade the officer to release her because of her high 
judicial office.  While such statements could certainly constitute an aggravating 
circumstance, they are not part of the record before us.  Neither in the original 
complaint in this matter, nor in the formal complaint, nor in the parties’ stipulation of 
facts is there any allusion to these reported statements.  Like any court, we are limited 
to the facts in evidence before us and cannot properly consider matters that we have 
heard only from the media. 
 
{¶12} The parties have stipulated to the following mitigating factors: 
 
{¶13} “a. Respondent’s absence of a prior disciplinary record:  No other 
disciplinary actions, allegations or complaints have been filed against her since her 
admission to the bar in 1964. 
 
{¶14} “b. Respondent’s absence of any dishonest or selfish motive. 
 
{¶15} “c. Respondent’s timely and good faith effort to rectify the 
consequences of her violation.  She pled guilty to all charges filed against her, asked 
for no special treatment, and did not seek temporary driving privileges.  She fully and 
completely served and complied with the conditions of her sentence. 
 
{¶16} “d. Respondent’s full cooperation in the disciplinary investigation and 
proceedings. 
 
{¶17} “e. Respondent’s excellent character and fine reputation. 
 
{¶18} “f. Respondent has had a distinguished legal career including many 
years of service on the bench, and has been the recipient of numerous honors for her 
service to the legal profession.” 
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{¶19} Cynthia Gray, a nationally recognized authority on the subject of 
judicial discipline, has written about discipline imposed upon judges for driving 
while intoxicated.  Gray, Discipline for Driving While Intoxicated (Winter 2003), 24 
JCR 2.  In that article, Gray writes, “Although some states privately reprimand a 
judge for a first-time drunk-driving offense [an option not available under Ohio’s 
disciplinary scheme], the cases from 2002 are consistent with past decisions from 
many states holding that a public reprimand or admonition is the appropriate sanction 
for a first offense but that a harsher sanction, such as censure or suspension, is 
justified if there are aggravating factors such as multiple incidents or an attempt to 
avoid arrest by asserting the judicial office.” 
 
{¶20} There are no aggravating factors of record in the case before us. 
 
{¶21} In view of the facts that Justice Resnick has consented to the 
disciplinary sanction of a public reprimand, that there are no aggravating factors of 
record, that there are numerous mitigating factors to which the parties have 
stipulated, and that a public reprimand appears to be the most severe sanction 
typically imposed upon a judge who commits a first-time driving-while-intoxicated 
offense without any aggravating circumstances, I conclude that a public reprimand is 
the appropriate disciplinary sanction in this case. 
 
{¶22} It is unfortunate that a long and distinguished career at the bar and on 
the bench must suffer the blemish of a public reprimand.  Nevertheless, I consider it 
the duty of this tribunal to issue a public reprimand to the respondent, who, as a 
justice of the Ohio Supreme Court, is under the highest duty to uphold the law. 
 
DOAN, BROGAN, ABELE and YOUNG, JJ., concur in the foregoing concurring 
opinion. 
__________________ 
SLABY, J., concurring in judgment. 
January Term, 2005 
7 
 
{¶23} I concur in the concurring opinion, but write separately.  I agree with 
both the majority and the concurring opinion as to the final judgment, given what is 
before us.  However, I believe that we should have had a full, open hearing on this 
matter pursuant to Gov.Jud.R. II(2)(B)(3)(a).  Although there are substantial 
stipulations of fact, there may be some unanswered questions as to how the 
investigator came to the conclusions and recommendations that he presented to the 
panel. Therefore, I concur in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Jeffrey R. McQuiston, for relator. 
David W. Zoll, for respondent. 
______________________