Title: State ex rel. Witt v. Industrial Commission of Ohio

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Witt v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-1693.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-1693 
THE STATE EX REL. WITT, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO 
ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Witt v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No.  
2018-Ohio-1693.] 
Workers’ compensation—Claimant’s average weekly wage incorrectly calculated, 
resulting in overpayment of claim—Upon discovery of error, Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation adjusted claimant’s average weekly wage—
Industrial Commission affirmed adjustment and directed bureau to recoup 
overpayment from claimant’s future benefits—R.C. 4123.52 grants the 
bureau and the commission authority to exercise continuing jurisdiction—
Commission may modify former findings or orders if modification is 
justified—Court of appeals’ judgment denying writ of mandamus to compel 
commission to vacate its order affirmed. 
(No. 2017-0430—Submitted February 27, 2018—Decided May 2, 2018.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 15AP-804,  
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2017-Ohio-554. 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from the denial of a writ of mandamus in a workers’ 
compensation matter.  Prior to filing his complaint for a writ of mandamus, 
appellant, Billy R. Witt Jr., appealed a decision of the Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation recalculating his full weekly wage (“FWW”) and average weekly 
wage (“AWW”).  Appellee Industrial Commission upheld the recalculation and 
instructed the bureau to determine how much Witt had previously been overpaid 
and to recoup that amount through reduction of his future benefits. 
{¶ 2} Witt then filed the above-mentioned complaint for a writ of 
mandamus in the Tenth District Court of Appeals, seeking to compel the 
commission to vacate its order retroactively adjusting his benefit rate.  The court 
concluded that the bureau and the commission had had jurisdiction to correct the 
miscalculation in Witt’s FWW and AWW and that the commission had not abused 
its discretion in upholding the bureau’s adjustment of Witt’s benefit rate.  The court 
denied the writ of mandamus, and Witt appealed. 
{¶ 3} For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 4} On July 2, 1997, Witt was injured in a work-related motor-vehicle 
accident while employed by appellee Christian Morris Construction, Inc.  His 
workers’ compensation claim was initially allowed for a concussion, contusions 
and open wounds, and a sprained pelvis.  The commission subsequently allowed 
additional medical conditions. 
{¶ 5} The bureau initially calculated Witt’s FWW as $416.63 and his AWW 
as $365.86.  As of January 14, 2014, based on those calculations, Witt had been 
paid compensation in the amount of $196,163.98. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 6} In January 2014, Witt applied for permanent-total-disability 
compensation.  The commission granted the application and awarded compensation 
beginning November 19, 2013. 
{¶ 7} On March 2, 2015, the bureau notified Witt that it had recalculated 
his FWW and AWW after discovering that Witt’s benefit rates had previously been 
incorrectly calculated.  His FWW, originally set at $416.63, was now $422.81.  His 
AWW was adjusted from $365.86 to $263.83.  The bureau’s order stated that any 
overpayment that had resulted from the original miscalculation would be 
established by separate order once the wage-adjustment order was final. 
{¶ 8} Witt appealed the bureau’s order to the commission.  Following a 
hearing, a district hearing officer affirmed the bureau’s order and directed the 
bureau to adjust the compensation previously paid to Witt to take into account the 
new figures and to recoup any overpayment from Witt’s future benefits.  The 
district hearing officer rejected Witt’s argument that the doctrine of laches should 
prevent the bureau from adjusting the rate. 
{¶ 9} Witt appealed the district hearing officer’s order.  Following a 
hearing, a staff hearing officer modified the newly calculated AWW, increasing it 
from $263.83 to $325.00.  The staff hearing officer directed the administrator “to 
adjust compensation previously paid in this claim to take into account these new 
figures.  * * *  The recoupment from any future benefits, if this creates an 
overpayment, is limited to the non-fraud provisions of R.C. 4123.511(K).”  The 
staff hearing officer also rejected Witt’s argument that the doctrine of laches should 
apply to the recoupment of the overpayment.  The commission refused to hear 
Witt’s appeal from the staff hearing officer’s order. 
{¶ 10} Witt filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Tenth District 
Court of Appeals, alleging that the bureau lacked statutory authority to exercise 
continuing jurisdiction over his claim and that the commission’s decision to 
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retroactively adjust his benefits was unsupported by law and was an abuse of 
discretion. 
{¶ 11} In the court of appeals, a magistrate determined that the bureau did 
not have statutory authority to issue its order and that the court should issue a writ 
of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its order adjusting the benefit rates 
and to enter a new order holding that the bureau did not have jurisdiction to issue 
its March 2, 2015 order. 
{¶ 12} The commission filed objections to the magistrate’s decision.  First, 
the commission argued that the magistrate had erred in concluding that the bureau 
lacked authority to recalculate Witt’s FWW and AWW.  Second, the commission 
argued that the magistrate had erred in concluding that the bureau must file an 
application for either the bureau or the commission to exercise continuing 
jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 4123.52.  And third, the commission maintained that 
the magistrate had misinterpreted State ex rel. Drone v. Indus. Comm., 93 Ohio 
St.3d 151, 753 N.E.2d 185 (2001). 
{¶ 13} The court of appeals sustained the second and third objections, 
determined that the first objection was moot, and denied the writ of mandamus.  
The court concluded that the bureau and the commission had continuing jurisdiction 
to correct a miscalculation of an injured worker’s FWW and AWW and that there 
was no statutory requirement that the bureau first file a motion to do so.  The court 
noted that Drone recognized that the bureau may sua sponte exercise its continuing 
jurisdiction to correct a mistake and need not apply for permission to act.  2017-
Ohio-554, ¶ 17, citing Drone at 154.  Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the 
commission had not abused its discretion. 
{¶ 14} This matter is before the court on Witt’s appeal as of right. 
Legal Analysis 
{¶ 15} To be entitled to extraordinary relief in mandamus, Witt must 
establish a clear legal right to the relief requested, a clear legal duty on the part of 
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the commission to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy at law.  See State 
ex rel. Manpower of Dayton, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 147 Ohio St.3d 360, 2016-Ohio-
7741, 65 N.E.3d 751, ¶ 9.  So long as the commission exercises its discretion 
soundly and within legal bounds, mandamus is not an appropriate remedy.  State 
ex rel. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Indus. Comm., 38 Ohio St.2d 57, 62, 310 
N.E.2d 240 (1974). 
{¶ 16} Workers’ compensation benefits are paid based on the FWW and the 
AWW of the injured worker.  R.C. 4123.61.  The first 12 weeks of temporary-total-
disability compensation are based upon the injured worker’s FWW at the time of 
the injury.  Id.  If the injured worker is still entitled to compensation after 12 weeks 
of missed work, benefits are paid based on the injured worker’s AWW, id., a rate 
designed to provide a fair basis for an award for the loss of future compensation, 
State ex rel. Wireman v. Indus. Comm., 49 Ohio St.3d 286, 287, 551 N.E.2d 1265 
(1990).  The two dominant considerations when calculating an AWW are that the 
AWW provide “substantial justice” to the claimant and that it not provide a 
windfall.  Id. 
{¶ 17} Witt challenges the bureau’s authority to adjust his previously paid 
compensation beyond a two-year look-back period from the date it recalculated his 
FWW and AWW.  Witt argues that the bureau was required to file a motion or 
application for permission to adjust his compensation, but instead, the bureau 
issued an order in an attempt to exercise continuing jurisdiction.  According to Witt, 
the bureau lacked authority under R.C. 4123.52. 
{¶ 18} Witt also argues that because R.C. 4123.52 authorizes only the 
commission to modify former orders, the bureau should have requested a hearing 
to determine whether the commission had grounds to exercise its continuing 
jurisdiction in this matter.  Witt also contends that the commission failed to exercise 
its continuing jurisdiction within a reasonable time. 
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{¶ 19} Appellees maintain that both the bureau and commission have 
authority pursuant to R.C. 4123.52(A) to exercise continuing jurisdiction over 
claims and that the statute does not require the bureau to file a motion or application 
in advance.  The commission also maintains that Witt did not raise the question of 
continuing jurisdiction at the administrative level and thus he forfeited the issue.  
Finally, the commission contends that it heard this matter on Witt’s appeal from the 
bureau’s decision in the normal course under R.C. 4123.511, not by exercising 
continuing jurisdiction. 
{¶ 20} Witt focuses the majority of his argument on whether the bureau 
and/or the commission properly exercised continuing jurisdiction, an issue that 
neither the district hearing officer nor the staff hearing officer addressed.  Thus, it 
does not appear to have been raised during the administrative proceedings before 
the commission.  Nevertheless, Witt relies on the following provisions of R.C. 
4123.52: 
 
(A) The jurisdiction of the industrial commission and the 
authority of the administrator of workers’ compensation over each 
case is continuing, and the commission may make such modification 
or change with respect to former findings or orders with respect 
thereto, as, in its opinion is justified.  * * *  The commission shall 
not make any modification, change, finding, or award which shall 
award compensation for a back period in excess of two years prior 
to the date of filing application therefor. 
* * *  
(D)  This section does not affect the right of a claimant to 
compensation accruing subsequent to the filing of any such 
application, provided the application is filed within the time limit 
provided in this section. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 21} The court of appeals determined that there is no statutory 
requirement that the bureau file a motion to correct a calculation error.  The court 
also inferred from our decision in Drone that the bureau may sua sponte exercise 
its continuing jurisdiction to correct a mistake without applying for permission to 
act.  2017-Ohio-554, at ¶ 17, citing Drone, 93 Ohio St.3d at 154, 753 N.E.2d 185.  
Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the bureau had continuing jurisdiction to 
correct the miscalculation in Witt’s FWW and AWW and that the commission did 
not abuse its discretion when it upheld the bureau’s adjustment of Witt’s benefit 
rate. 
{¶ 22} We agree. 
{¶ 23} The plain language of R.C. 4123.52 grants authority to both the 
bureau and the commission to exercise continuing jurisdiction over a case, and the 
commission may modify former findings or orders if a modification is justified.  
R.C. 4123.52 does not require the bureau to file an application in order to exercise 
its authority.  Drone supports this conclusion. 
{¶ 24} Drone involved the bureau’s recalculation of the claimant’s AWW 
that revealed that for years, the claimant had received less compensation than she 
had been entitled to receive.  The bureau sua sponte issued an order adjusting the 
amount of the claimant’s compensation, but it limited the adjustments to the 
compensation she had received within two years of the bureau’s discovery of the 
error.  The claimant appealed the bureau’s order to the commission, claiming that 
the adjustments should be made to all the compensation she had received.  A staff 
hearing officer affirmed the bureau’s decision. 
{¶ 25} The claimant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, alleging that 
the commission and the bureau abused their discretion when they refused to adjust 
all the compensation she had received.  The court of appeals agreed and issued a 
writ compelling the commission to pay the claimant all the compensation she would 
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have received if the AWW had initially been calculated correctly less the amount 
she actually did receive.  This court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment. 
{¶ 26} The question in Drone was how far back the adjustment should 
apply.  The pertinent portion of R.C. 4123.52 states: “The commission shall not 
make any modification, change, finding, or award which shall award compensation 
for a back period in excess of two years prior to the date of filing application 
therefor.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 4123.52(A). 
{¶ 27} We determined in Drone that the statute of limitations set forth in 
R.C. 4123.52 is not triggered unless an application to modify is filed.  We also 
determined that the bureau may sua sponte exercise its continuing jurisdiction to 
correct a mistake and issue an order without filing an application.  Id., 93 Ohio 
St.3d at 154, 753 N.E.2d 185.  Consequently, we held that because the bureau had 
not filed an application to modify in that case, the two-year limitation period was 
never triggered and did not apply. 
{¶ 28} Here, as in Drone, the bureau did not file an application but simply 
issued an order indicating its recalculations, so, as in Drone, the two-year limitation 
period was not triggered.  Although Drone involved underpayments and this case 
involves overpayments, that difference has no effect on R.C. 4123.52’s grant of 
continuing authority to recalculate the wage rate.  Witt’s arguments that the bureau 
lacked authority because it failed to file an application lack merit. 
{¶ 29} In addition, Witt attempts to raise a laches defense by arguing in his 
brief that the bureau’s 18-year delay in recalculating his benefit rate was 
unreasonable.  But Witt failed to raise this issue in his complaint for a writ of 
mandamus in the court of appeals.  Therefore, he has forfeited that defense.  State 
ex rel. Spencer v. E. Liverpool Planning Comm., 80 Ohio St.3d 297, 299, 685 
N.E.2d 1251 (1997) (“In nonelection cases, laches is an affirmative defense which 
must be raised or else it is waived”). 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 30} Witt failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief requested 
or a clear legal duty on the part of the commission to provide it.  Therefore, the 
court of appeals properly denied his request for a writ of mandamus.  We affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, and 
DEGENARO, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only. 
_________________ 
Law Office of Thomas Tootle and Thomas Tootle, for appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Kevin J. Reis, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
Robert W. Bright, for appellee Christian Morris Construction, Inc. 
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