Title: State of Alabama v. Gail Beaird et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 06/15/07 State v. Gail Beaird
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1050832
_________________________
State of Alabama
v.
Gail Beaird and Marilyn Beaird
Appeal from Walker Circuit Court
(CV-01-792)
WOODALL, Justice.
The State of Alabama ("the State") appeals from a "final
order and decree of condemnation" awarding $2,594,525 plus
prejudgment interest to Gail Beaird and Marilyn Beaird in
1050832
2
compensation for the taking of real estate owned by the
Beairds.  We affirm.
I. Factual Background
The Beairds own and operate Cordova Clay Company, which
mines clay and coal on property owned by the Beairds and
others.  On August 21, 2001, the State filed in the Walker
County Probate Court a petition to condemn a portion of a
377.42-acre tract of land owned by the Beairds for a right-of-
way to construct a highway known as "Corridor X," which will
ultimately link Birmingham with Memphis, Tennessee.  The
probate court appointed a three-member commission to assess
the damages and compensation to which the Beairds were
entitled.  The commission assessed damages of $90,600, and the
probate court issued an order condemning the property with
title to be transferred to the State upon deposit of that
amount in the probate court.  The Beairds appealed to the
circuit court for a jury trial, challenging only the amount of
compensation.  
The principal issue at trial involved the value, and, in
particular, the method of valuation, of layers of coal and
clay 
that 
lie 
beneath 
the 
Beairds' 
property. 
More
1050832
3
specifically, the top layer is a 15-foot layer of "red burning
clay."  The second layer is a 10-inch layer of "New Castle
coal."  Approximately 30 feet beneath the second layer is a
27-inch layer of "Mary Lee coal."  Directly underneath the
Mary Lee coal seam is a 48-inch layer of "Mary Lee clay." The
clay is suitable for the manufacture of brick and tile, and it
is undisputed that at the time of the taking, August 21, 2001,
Cordova Clay was extracting these materials from an area
adjacent to the condemned property.  These materials are
hereinafter referred to collectively as "minerals."  
Cordova Clay is nearly the only company mining clay in
Alabama.  In the year of the condemnation, Cordova Clay mined
approximately (1) 7,000 tons of red burning clay, (2) 150,000
tons of Mary Lee clay, and (3) 36,000 tons of coal.  The area
subject to the mineral-valuation dispute, namely, the area
effectively lost to the Beairds for mining, consisted of
approximately 100 acres.  This area included (1) the right-of-
way itself, (2) a 200-foot buffer zone, or setback, on either
side of the right-of-way, and (3) two tracts of land that were
"cut off" by the right-of-way (this area is hereinafter
referred to collectively as "the affected property").
1050832
4
Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking
to preclude testimony as to the "values [of the minerals]
created by [calculating the] unit values of [the minerals] in
place."  That motion was denied.  
At trial, both sides of the dispute focused on the value
of the minerals beneath the affected property.  The State
attempted to prove that those minerals had no value at all,
taking the position that they could not be economically
extracted.  Indeed, although the State argues that the current
valuation would be the difference between the fair market
value of the entire property before the taking and the fair
market value of the remainder of the property after the
taking, the State offered no evidence as to the value of the
minerals beneath the property unaffected by the condemnation
(hereinafter referred to as "the remainder property").
The Beairds sought to prove the value of the minerals
beneath the affected property arithmetically.  Specifically,
they calculated the cubic feet per acre of each mineral,
multiplied that figure by the total acreage, multiplied that
volume by the weight of the mineral per cubic foot, and
divided by 2,000 to determine the total tonnage of each of the
1050832
5
four minerals.  They then multiplied the tonnage by a royalty
rate to arrive at the value of each mineral.  Finally, they
added the four subtotals thus obtained to determine the total
royalty value of the minerals beneath the affected property.
Using this formula, Gail Beaird testified that the mineral
value of the affected property was $2,736,968.  This figure
was based on Gail Beaird's testimony that included in the
taking were 2,721,978 tons of red burning clay, 1,337,112 tons
of Mary Lee clay, and 417,928 tons of coal.
At various times throughout this testimony, the State
objected on the ground stated in its motion in limine, namely,
that such an arithmetic calculation of the "unit values of
[the minerals] in place" was an inappropriate means of valuing
mineral-bearing property.  Its objections were overruled.
The surface value of the affected property was calculated
differently.  The Beairds calculated the value of the entire
surface of the property before the taking at $566,130, and
after the 
taking 
at $400,007, 
with 
a 
difference 
of
approximately $166,000.  Thus, the Beairds presented evidence
indicating that, based on their before and after calculations,
the surface value of the affected property was $166,000.
1050832
6
At the close of all the evidence, the State moved to
exclude all evidence as to the value of the minerals beneath
the affected property, on the ground that the Beairds had
failed to offer testimony of the mineral value of the
remainder property, thus allegedly violating the valuation
formula set forth in the Alabama Eminent Domain Code, Ala.
Code 1975, § 18-1A-1 et seq., specifically § 18-1A-170.  It
also objected to certain jury instructions requested by the
Beairds on the ground that the instructions allowed the jury
to consider the Beairds' arithmetic unit-value calculation of
the value of the minerals, which, the State reiterated, was
invalid.  The court overruled the State's objection.
After the jury returned its verdict of $2,594,525 and a
"final order and decree of condemnation" was entered on that
verdict, the State moved for a new trial.  The State contended
that proper valuation evidence was never presented to the jury
and that the jury was allowed to consider improper valuation
evidence.  The trial court denied the motion, and the State
appealed.
II. Issues
1050832
7
The State presents two issues on appeal, both of which
concern only the valuation of the Beairds' mineral interests.
First, it contends that the Beairds, in attempting to value
their mineral estate, failed to present evidence that complies
with the "before-and-after" rule of § 18-1A-170.  Second, it
insists that the trial court erred in allowing the Beairds to
present "evidence of damages to minerals by the 'unit-times-
price' method" of valuation.  State's brief, at 3.
A. Before-and-After Rule
As to the first issue, the State insists that "[t]he
trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider the award
of compensation in violation of [§ 18-1A-170]."  The State's
brief, at 35.  Section 18-1A-170 prescribes the valuation
formula applicable in the case of a partial taking, as is the
case here.  That section provides: 
"(a) An owner of property acquired by eminent
domain is entitled to compensation determined under
the standards prescribed in this article.
"(b) If there is a partial taking, the valuation
rule is the difference between the fair market value
of the entire property before the taking and the
fair market value of the remainder after the
taking."
(Emphasis added.)
1050832
8
The State argues:
"For the [Beairds] to be due an award for
minerals, they were required by the statute to first
establish the fair market value of all of the
minerals under the entire property from which the
acquisition was made.  Then, they were required to
establish the fair market value of the remainder of
the property after the acquisition.  This, the
Beairds simply failed to do."
State's brief, at 36-37 (emphasis added).  For the following
reasons, we pretermit consideration of this issue.
In an eminent-domain case, "[n]o party has the burden of
proof on the issue of the amount of compensation."  Ala. Code
1975, § 18-1A-153.  The operation of this rule is explained in
the Commentary to § 18-1A-153:
"This section is identical to [the Uniform
Eminent Domain Code] Section 904, and it probably
changes the law in Alabama regarding the risk of
nonpersuasion.
"It seems difficult to assign an intelligible
meaning to the concept of 'burden of proof' in the
eminent domain context, since the pleadings are not
required to allege or deny the amount of the
compensation claimed, and the ultimate standard of
decision is the constitutional rule of 'just
compensation.'  The amount of compensation that is
'just' 
is 
essentially 
an 
objective 
market-
established 
fact, 
although 
the 
practical
difficulties of marshalling persuasive evidence of
that fact are often formidable.  From a realistic
view, the trier of fact ordinarily is presented with
varying and usually (or at least often) inconsistent
opinions as to value, together with disparate
1050832
9
supporting 
data; 
the 
ultimate 
determination
necessarily reflects the weight and degree of
credibility accorded to these circumstances, [and]
no rational policy basis exists for assigning
presumptive validity to the amount specified either
in the condemnor's offer or in the property owner's
demand, thereby requiring the adverse party to
assume the burden of controverting that figure.
"By declaring that neither party has the burden
of proof on the compensation issue, this section in
effect requires the trier of fact to make its
determination upon the basis of all relevant
evidence presented on the issue, without regard to
its source, and without assuming that either party
has a greater burden of persuasion than the other.
"This section is intended to eliminate any
formal burden of proof on all issues directly
relating to the amount of compensation, including
subsidiary issues affecting valuation and damages.
The burden of producing evidence, as distinguished
from the risk of nonpersuasion, is not affected, but
remains upon the proponent of a particular issue.
For example, a defendant who claims that there is a
probability of imminent rezoning of his property for
a higher and more valuable use, or that substantial
damage will accrue to the remainder of his property
in a partial taking case, will have the obligation
to adduce evidence supporting his position on those
issues.  Absent such production, the trier of fact
will necessarily reach its conclusions from the
other party's evidence alone.  Conversely, if the
condemnor contends that recent increases in property
value were in fact caused by public knowledge of the
project for which the property is being taken, and
should thus be excluded from consideration, it will
have the duty initially to produce relevant evidence
in order to have that contention properly submitted
to the trier of fact.
1050832
10
"The rule of this section does not affect the
burden of proof on issues other than the amount of
compensation."
(Emphasis added.) 
Under the equal-burden rule of § 18-1A-153, the burden is
the State's, as much the property owner's, to present
testimony of value in the proper formula.  In this case, the
State seeks to penalize the Beairds for failing to offer
testimony as to the mineral value of the entire property,
although the State, itself, did not purport to do so.  The
State cannot take comfort, as it attempts to do, in the fact
that it ascribed no value to the minerals under the affected
property.  It is undisputed that the Beairds were mining
minerals under the remainder property at the time of the
taking.  In other words, it is undisputed that the mineral
estate of the remainder property had value, which the State
ignored.  The State's litigating position that the mineral
value of the affected property was zero is entirely unrelated
to the State's burden to present evidence of the mineral value
of the remainder property.  Thus, the State's method of
mineral valuation differed in no relevant respect from that of
the Beairds.  Indeed, the logic of the State's argument would
1050832
11
apply as forcefully for excluding the State's valuation
evidence.
In an eminent-domain case, a condemnor that proffers
valuation evidence derived from an allegedly improper formula
cannot be heard to complain when the condemnee offers evidence
based on the same formula.  State v. Waller, 395 So. 2d 37
(Ala. 1981) (the State could not complain of the admission of
allegedly improper "income approach to valuation," where the
same evidence was previously introduced by the State).  Cf.
Murray v. Alabama Power Co., 413 So. 2d 1109, 1115 (Ala. 1982)
("a party cannot introduce evidence in a case and on appeal
assert that the trial court committed reversible error by
admitting 
that 
evidence"). 
 More 
specifically, a condemnor may
not, itself, offer only evidence of the fair market value of
the condemned parcel, and then, after the close of all the
evidence, insist, as the State has done here, on the exclusion
of the condemnee's evidence of value of the condemned parcel
on the ground that no evidence was presented as to the value
of the entire property.  Consequently, the State is not
entitled to relief on this issue.
B. Unit-Times-Price Method of Valuation
1050832
12
The State next contends that the Beairds were not
entitled to "introduce[] a purely arithmetic valuation of
minerals in place, without testimony as to market and without
testimony as to the present fair market value of those
minerals as of the date of the taking."  State's brief, at 43
(emphasis in original).  Stating the argument another way, the
State insists that the Beairds could not properly show the
value of the property on the date of the taking by "the
arithmetic sum of all the royalty payments that might be
produced in the next hundred years without discount to present
value."  The State's brief, at 45 (emphasis added).  
The Beairds insist that their valuation method was
consistent with Alabama law.  They also point out that when
the State negotiates short-term leases with mining companies
for the extraction of coal from State-owned land, royalty
payments due the State are not reduced to present value.  
The State "agrees that it considers quantities and
royalty rates in valuing minerals and that a jury may consider
the quantity and quality of the remaining coal and its fair
market value per unit."  Reply brief, at 20 (some emphasis
added).  According to the State, however, the "one element
1050832
13
sorely lacking in the Beairds' calculation [is] an adjustment
to present value."  Id. at 30 (emphasis added).  It is evident
that the State has changed its position on this issue since
trial.
Throughout the trial, the State argued that the Beairds'
arithmetic calculation of the "unit values of [the minerals]
in place" was an inappropriate means of valuing mineral-
bearing property.  Now, however, the State concedes that "a
jury may consider the quantity and quality of the remaining
[minerals] and [their] fair market value per unit," reply
brief, at 20 (emphasis added), so long as the calculation is
"adjust[ed] to present value."  Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
It is well settled that a party "cannot try the case on
one theory and then appeal on a different theory."  Kershaw v.
Knox Kershaw, Inc., 523 So. 2d 351, 359 (Ala. 1988).  See also
Kent v. Sims, 460 So. 2d 144 (Ala. 1984); Vaughn v. Thomas,
372 So. 2d 1309 (Ala. 1979).  More recently, this Court
explained:
"'"[F]airness to all parties requires a litigant to
advance his contentions at a time when there is an
opportunity to respond to them factually, if his
opponent chooses to; ... the rule promotes efficient
trial proceedings; ... reversing for error not
preserved permits the losing side to second-guess
1050832
14
its tactical decisions after they do not produce the
desired result; and ... there is something unseemly
about telling a lower court it was wrong when it
never was presented with the opportunity to be
right.  The principal rationale, however, is
judicial economy. There are two components to
judicial economy: (1) if the losing side can obtain
an appellate reversal because of error not objected
to, the parties and public are put to the expense of
retrial that could have been avoided had an
objection been made; and (2) if an issue had been
raised in the trial court, it could have been
resolved there, and the parties and public would be
spared the expense of an appeal."'"
Ex parte Elba Gen. Hosp. & Nursing Home, Inc., 828 So. 2d 308,
314 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Cantu v. State, 660 So. 2d 1026, 1032
(Ala. 1995) (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), quoting in turn State v. Applegate, 39 Or. App. 17, 21,
591 P.2d 371, 373 (1979)(emphasis added in Ex parte Elba)). 
It is undisputed that the jury's calculations were not
reduced to reflect present value.  It is also uncontroverted
that the State did not request a jury charge on present value.
In essence, therefore, the State is seeking a new trial on the
ground that the jury did not adjust its award to reflect
present value, when it neither relied on that theory in the
trial court, requested a charge requiring a reduction to
present value, nor objected to the absence of such an
instruction.  Had the State tried its case on the theory on
1050832
15
which it now relies, "'"the parties and public [might have
been] spared the expense of an appeal."'"  Id.  
In that connection, it is also well established that a
party may not obtain a reversal for the failure of the trial
court to give an instruction that was not requested.  Herbert
v. Huie, 1 Ala. 18 (1840).  See also Ala. R. Civ. P. 51;
Madison v. Weldon, 446 So. 2d 21, 29 (Ala. 1984); Wren v.
Blackburn, 293 Ala. 393, 397, 304 So. 2d 187, 191 (1974) ("The
remedy of the party, who desires that a jury be instructed on
a particular point of law, is to request a written charge.").
For these reasons, the State is not entitled to relief on the
second issue.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons expressed in this opinion, the State has
presented no reason for reversal of the trial court's
judgment.  That judgment is, therefore, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.