Title: KES, f/k/a KET V. CAT

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KES, f/k/a KET V. CAT2005 WY 29107 P.3d 779Case Number: 04-39Decided: 03/10/2005
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                                                   

 
 
 
 
KES, 
f/k/a KET,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
CAT,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
            
Douglas W. Weaver, Wheatland, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
            
James A. Hardee, Douglas, Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and STEBNER, D.J.(Ret.)

 
 
 
 
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After about 
seventeen years of marriage, Mother and Father divorced.  Mother was awarded custody of the 
parties' only child (the Child), who was almost eight years old.  A year later, because Mother was 
suffering from psychological problems, Mother and Father agreed that Father 
would take temporary custody of the Child.  
The Child remained with Father until Father was called into active 
military duty, at which time the Child returned to Mother subject to stringent 
mental health care and monitoring requirements.  When Father returned from active duty, a 
custody hearing was held.  The 
district court modified the original decree and granted custody to Father.  Mother appeals from that order.  We affirm in part and reverse in 
part.

 

 
 
[¶2]      Both Mother 
and Father present the following two issues for our 
review:

 
 
1.         
Did Father meet his burden of showing a material change in 
circumstances?

 
 
2.         
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in changing custody of the Child 
to Father?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mother and 
Father divorced in March 2000 and Mother was awarded custody of the Child.  After the divorce, Mother began to 
experience psychological problems, which, by her own admission, rendered her 
incapable of adequately caring for the Child.  Mother and Father jointly petitioned for 
a temporary change of custody, which petition the district court granted in 
April 2001.

 
 
[¶4]      Soon after the 
order granting temporary custody to Father was entered, Mother went to her 
parents' home in Oklahoma to seek medical attention.  There she was diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder, ordered to undergo counseling, and prescribed medication.  Mother then moved to Kansas where she began 
living with a friend, who supported her while she was ill.

 
 
[¶5]      In March 2002, 
while she was living in Kansas, Mother filed a petition to regain 
custody of the Child.  Before this 
petition could be heard, however, Father was called into active duty with the 
National Guard.  An abbreviated 
hearing was held, after which the district court granted Mother custody of the 
Child while Father was on active duty, but ordered that the Child be returned to 
Father upon his return.  The order 
also contained a number of conditions relating to Mother's mental and physical 
health that she would be required to observe while the Child was in her 
custody.

 
 
[¶6]      Mother and the 
Child stayed in Kansas until December 2002, 
when they moved back to Oklahoma.  Mother reported that she returned to 
Oklahoma to 
help care for an ailing grandmother, and to be close to C.S., whom she married 
in January 2003.  Father returned 
from military service and on August 22, 2003, a custody hearing was held.  Prior to any testimony, Father requested 
by oral motion that the district court judge speak with the Child alone in 
chambers.  Mother objected, claiming 
that the Child was not competent to testify and that Father had not allowed her 
to see the Child the day before the hearing.  The judge granted Father's motion and 
conducted a private interview with the Child, in which interview the Child 
expressed a desire to remain in Father's custody.

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court ultimately awarded Father custody.  
The decision letter noted that while the evidence presented indicated 
that Mother was currently capable of providing adequate care for the Child, the 
district court was concerned with Mother's "downplaying of the significance of 
her prior mental condition."  The 
other factor cited in support of Father's custodial award was the Child's stated 
preference to remain in Father's custody.

 
 
[¶8]      Mother filed a 
timely appeal.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      We review custody 
modification proceedings as follows:

 
 
It 
has been our consistent principle that in custody matters, the welfare and needs 
of the children are to be given paramount consideration.  Scherer [v. Scherer], 931 P.2d [251,] 254 [(Wyo.1997)]; 
Rowan v. Rowan, 786 P.2d 886, 890 (Wyo.1990); see also Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo.1995) and Fink v. Fink, 685 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo.1984).  The determination of the best interests 
of the child is a question for the trier of fact.  "We do not overturn the decision of the 
trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of 
a violation of some legal principle."  
Fink, 685 P.2d  at 
36.

 

 
A 
court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances.  
Pinther v. Pinther, 888 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Wyo.1995) 
(quoting Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 440 (Wyo.1993)).  Our review entails evaluation of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court's decision, and we 
afford to the prevailing party every favorable inference while omitting any 
consideration of evidence presented by the unsuccessful party.  Triggs [v. Triggs], 920 P.2d [653,] 657 [(Wyo.1996)]; 
Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 351 (Wyo.1994).  Findings of fact 
not supported by the evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the great 
weight of the evidence cannot be sustained.  Jones v. Jones, 858 P.2d 289, 291 (Wyo.1993).  Similarly, an abuse of discretion is 
present "when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored.'"  Triggs, 920 P.2d  at 657 (quoting Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 996 
(Wyo.1993)).

 
 

Reavis v. 
Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Change 
in Circumstances

 
 

[¶10]   In order to obtain modification of 
the divorce decree, Father bore the burden of demonstrating that: (1) a material 
change in circumstances affecting the Child's welfare had occurred since the 
entry of the initial decree, and that (2) modification was in the Child's best 
interests.  Clark v. Alexander, 
953 P.2d 145, 150 (Wyo. 1998); 
Wilcox-Elliot v. Wilcox, 924 P.2d 419, 421 (Wyo. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Clark v. 
Alexander, 953 P.2d 145 (Wyo. 
1998); 
Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (LexisNexis 2003).  
With respect to the change in circumstances, the district court stated: 
"[t]hus, this Court believes that the multiple changes in living circumstances 
in [the Child]'s life which have been caused by her parents has resulted in a 
substantial change in circumstance far beyond that which was contemplated by the 
[original] order."

 
 

[¶11]   Mother asserts that "there are no 
factual findings, and in fact no evidence that these multiple changes in living 
circumstances in [the Child]'s life' have been sufficiently harmful to the minor 
child."  Mother argues that in order 
to establish a substantial change in circumstances a party must prove harm to 
the child.  Although many times a 
change in circumstances warranting modification of custody will arise as the 
result of some action or inaction by one parent that is harmful to the child, 
this is not the standard.  Rather, 
the test is whether the change in circumstances "affects the child's welfare . . 
.."  JRS v. GMS, 2004 WY 60, 
¶ 10, 90 P.3d 718, 723 (Wyo. 2004).  No showing of harm to the child is 
required.  For example, in 
Thompson v. Thompson, 824 P.2d 557, 559 (Wyo. 1992), we 
upheld a finding of changed circumstance warranting modification of custody 
where the child had been properly cared for and neither parent had deteriorated 
in parenting abilities, but rather one parent had "surged far ahead in her 
personal development and ability to serve as a parent."  See also Jackson v. Jackson, 
2004 WY 99, 96 P.3d 21 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶12]   Mother's position that a showing of 
harm or detriment to the child is required before a change in circumstances can 
be established is the only argument she makes on appeal with respect to that 
issue.  Because that is not the 
statutory standard, and because there was sufficient evidence of a material 
change in circumstances, we uphold the district court's finding that a material 
change in circumstances occurred.  
That leaves us to examine whether the modification was in the Child's 
best interests.  The district 
court's decision letter indicated that the Child's stated custodial preference 
was a significant factor in its decision.  
In fact, the Child's preference and Mother's minimizing of her mental 
condition were the only two factors cited in awarding custody to Father.  We will therefore turn to whether the 
evidence of that preference was properly obtained and 
considered.

 
 
Private 
Interview with the Child

 
 
[¶13]   Mother claims that the district 
court abused its discretion when it conducted a private, in camera, interview 
with the Child over Mother's objection.  
In support of this argument, Mother asserts that the district court did 
not adequately determine the Child's competency to testify, and that because the 
Child had been with Father for the two months prior to the hearing and Father 
did not allow the Child to see Mother the night before the hearing, the district 
court's decision to conduct the interview over Mother's objection was 
unreasonable.

 
 

[¶14]   We have long held that "the trial 
judge may interview a child to determine its preference as to living with either 
the mother or the father, provided that the child is of sufficient age to 
understand the effect of the expression of such preference, though an expression 
of such preference is not conclusive."  
Douglas v. Sheffner, 79 Wyo. 172, 
331 P.2d 840, 844 (1958), superseded on 
other grounds by In Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d 1369 (Wyo. 
1990).  When a private interview occurs, the 
district court must "state in his decision the preference expressed by the 
child, if any, and further state as to whether or not and to what extent the 
statements of the child have been taken into consideration in arriving at the 
decision."  Id. at 845.  Whether obtained in open court or in 
camera, the child's expression of a preference must be considered.  Wilcox-Elliott, 924 P.2d  at 
421.

 
 
[¶15]   With respect to the private 
interview in the present case, the district court's decision letter 
stated:

 
 
The 
Court had the opportunity to speak with [the Child].  As noted hereinbefore, she appeared to 
be very bright and mature for an eleven year old.  Without hesitation, [the Child] 
expressed her desire to remain in the custody of her father in Wheatland.  This was based on her relationship with 
her father, stepmother, and stepsisters.  
[The Child] did, however, indicate that she loves her mother and likes 
[C.S.] very much.

 
 
This 
Court believes that given [the Child's]'s level of maturity, her wishes should 
be given some deference.  [The 
Child] is the one who has been subjected to the numerous changes described 
above.  Her opinion as to which of 
those settings is the most stable, safe, and happiest for her is a unique 
perspective.  She is the only one 
who has had to undergo all of the changes of the last almost 3 
years.

 
 
These 
statements indicate that the district court judge met with the Child, that the 
Child stated her preference to remain with Father, and that the preference was 
given "some deference."  While these 
statements comply with the requirements set out in Douglas, our analysis cannot end there.  In Douglas, 331 P.2d  at 843, unlike here, both 
parties consented to the in camera interview.

 
 

[¶16]   In a custody case, when a parent 
objects to a private interview between the child and the judge, due process 
implications arise.  Gennarini v. 
Gennarini, 2 Conn.App. 132, 477 A.2d 674, 675 (1984).  A parent's right to associate with and 
rear his or her child has been recognized as a 
"liberty interest protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United 
States, and . . . is found in Wyo. Const. art. 
1, § 6, which provides, [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law.'"  
Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Wyo. 1995).  With respect to the interests at stake 
in a custody proceeding, one author stated:

 
 
In sum, 
custody litigation imperils parents' fundamental right to enjoy their children's 
companionship and to direct their children's upbringing.  This peril is magnified by the 
difficulty of regaining physical custody once lost.  The great weight of the parental liberty 
interest, together with the significant deprivation of that interest inherent in 
a loss of physical custody, entitles parents to custody procedures that meet the 
requisites of due process.

 
 

Cynthia 
Starnes, Swords in the Hands of Babes: Rethinking Custody Interviews After 
Troxel, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 115, 149 (2003).  In addition, we have stated 
that:

 
 
"One of 
the basic elements of due process is the right of each party to be apprised of 
all the evidence upon which an issue is to be decided, with the right to 
examine, explain or rebut such evidence. And, the right to hear and controvert 
all evidence upon which a factual adjudication is to be made includes the right 
to hear and cross-examine witnesses."

 
 

Matter 
of SAJ, 942 P.2d 407, 410 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting In Interest of 
BLM, 902 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Wyo. 1995)).  When a judge interviews a child in 
private without the consent of a parent, that parent is deprived of due process 
inasmuch as he or she is unable to hear the evidence, and is not given an 
opportunity to explain or rebut statements made by the 
child.

 
 

[¶17]   In spite of the due process 
implications, in camera interviews are widely used as a means of discovering a 
child's custodial preference.  
Lesauskis v. Lesauskis, 111 Mich.App. 811, 314 N.W.2d 767, 768 
(1981); 
Cynthia Starnes, supra, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. at 117.

 
 
The 
principle justifications advanced for the practice are the necessity of 
ascertaining the child's preferences and feelings to the trial court's very 
sensitive determination of custody and visitation, and the need to obtain that 
information in a way which will maximize the child's freedom of expression and 
avoid the trauma of requiring an expression of those preferences and feeling in 
the ordinary adversarial setting or in the presence of parents about whom the 
child is expressing them.

 
 

Gennarini, 
477 A.2d  
at 676.

 
 

[¶18]   While these private interviews can 
be a valuable tool in assessing a child's best interests, they can also be 
problematic as they create tension between two social interests.  S. Bernstein, Annotation, Propriety 
of Court Conducting Private Interview with Child in Determining Custody, 99 
A.L.R.2d 954, 955 (1965).

 
 
On one 
side there is the fundamental principle of Anglo-Saxon law that the decision 
must be based on evidence produced in open court lest the guaranty of due 
process be infringed, while on the other there is the conviction of those 
trained in the social and medical sciences that the informal procedure of 
obtaining the infant's preference, outlook, and interest in the calm of the 
judge's chambers, away from the pressure of the parents, provides best for the 
welfare of the child and of society as a whole.

 
 

Id. 
(footnote omitted).  Various 
procedures have been developed in an 
attempt to resolve this conflict.  
Barbara A. Atwood, The Child's Voice in Custody Litigation: An 
Empirical Survey and Suggestions for Reform, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 629, 640-41 
(2003).

 
 
A 
growing majority of states now require, either by statute or by judicial 
holding, that in camera conversations with children be recorded.  In a few states, a record must be made 
only if a party requests it, but in other states the presence of a court 
reporter is mandatory and cannot be waived by the parties. Some states, 
moreover, require that parties' lawyers be allowed to attend the in 
camera interview.  Within the 
group of states requiring a record, most require that the record be made 
available to the parties before a custody determination is rendered, recognizing 
that information obtained in the in camera interview may play a 
determinative role in a judge's custody ruling without any guarantee of its 
accuracy.  In a few states, courts 
seal the record of the interview for appellate review in an effort to protect 
children's confidentiality while still providing a basis for appellate 
scrutiny.  . . .  [A] substantial minority of states still 
affords judges discretion to interview children privately in chambers, without 
making any record whatsoever of the interview.

 
 

Id. 
at 
643-44 (footnotes omitted).  
Numerous variations on these procedures have also been developed.  See Watermeier v. Watermeier, 462 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (La.App. 1985) (attorneys allowed to attend the 
interview and ask questions during the competency examination; however, once 
child determined to be competent the attorneys may remain in the interview as 
observers only); Molloy v. Molloy, 247 Mich.App. 348, 637 N.W.2d 803, 
810-11 (2001), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 466 Mich. 852, 643 N.W.2d 574 (2002) (record of private interview sealed for 
appellate review; however any information revealed in the interview exceeding 
the scope of the child's preference and affecting the custody decision must be 
disclosed to parents at the time of hearing); and In re Michael C., 557 A.2d 1219, 1220 (R.I. 1989) (transcript of private interview read to 
parents and their counsel who then were allowed to cross-examine child by 
submitting written questions which were then read to the child by the 
court).

 
 

[¶19]   Wyoming's current procedure for private 
interviews between a judge and a child in a custody proceeding requires that the 
district court's decision letter reflect the child's preference and indicate how 
much weight was assigned to that preference.  Douglas, 331 P.2d  at 845.  While this requirement provides some 
protection for parents' fundamental rights in the event of an appeal, it does 
nothing to protect their due process right to "be apprised of all the evidence 
upon which an issue is to be decided, with the right to examine, explain or 
rebut such evidence.'"  Matter of 
SAJ, 942 P.2d  at 410 (quoting In Interest of BLM, 902 P.2d at 
1291).  Under the current procedure, parents 
have no way of knowing the contents of the interview or of challenging the 
manner in which the interview was conducted or the reliability of the 
information revealed therein.

 
 

[¶20]   In order to ameliorate this 
problem, we hold that if one or both parents object to a private interview 
between the child and judge in a custody proceeding, no such interview should 
take place.1  Rather, the parties or the district 
court should fashion a suitable alternate procedure for obtaining evidence of 
the child's custody preference.  In 
some instances, in-court testimony may be appropriate.  An interview with the child in chambers, 
either with counsel present or recorded in some fashion, may also suffice.  Additionally, a neutral third party may 
be appointed with the consent of the parties to speak with the child and to 
report to the court or to the parties.  
While any one of the above-mentioned procedures, if properly carried out, 
could be appropriate in particular circumstances, this list of examples is not 
intended to be exhaustive.   
Because each custody case involves unique parties and circumstances, the 
parties or the district court may fashion any procedure that effectively 
protects the parents' due process rights and minimizes the stress and trauma to 
the child.  In doing so, the balance 
must weigh in favor of the child's best interests.  Consequently, if the parties do not 
consent to a reasonable method of obtaining evidence of the child's preference, 
the court may conduct an interview in chambers, with counsel present, and with 
attention paid to the method most likely to preserve the parents' right to due 
process under the circumstances.  
Finally, in every instance where a child's preference is considered by 
the district court, the record should reflect the child's competency to testify, 
the child's stated custodial preference, and the weight given to that 
preference. See Billingsley v. State, 2003 WY 61, ¶¶ 10-11, 69 P.3d 390, 
395 (Wyo. 2003) and Douglas, 331 P.2d  at 845.2

 
 

[¶21]   We conclude that, in the instant 
case, the district court abused its discretion by conducting a private interview 
with the Child over Mother's objection and without any safeguarding of Mother's 
due process rights.  We have said 
that where sufficient evidence exists 
to sustain a finding in a case tried by the court without a jury, admission of 
incompetent evidence is not a ground for reversal.  Pinther v. Pinther, 888 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Herman v. 
Speed King Mfg. Co., 675 P.2d 1271, 1279 (Wyo. 1984).  However, because a 
child's unequivocally stated preference is a factor that the district court must 
consider when deciding a child's best interests, we cannot simply ignore evidence of that preference as 
we review whether the district court properly made its determination.  Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1291 (Wyo. 1993) (district court abused its discretion by 
not acknowledging and giving weight to child's stated wishes).  That is especially true where, as here, 
the district court specifically relied upon that preference.

 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶22]   Mother's post-divorce psychological 
problems, coupled with the temporary custody arrangements necessitated by 
Father's active duty assignments, constituted a material change in circumstances 
that affected the Child's welfare.  
Consequently, we affirm the district court's finding in that regard.  The decision to change custody, however, 
was an abuse of discretion because the district court relied upon an improper in 
camera interview with the Child in determining the Child's custody 
preference.

 
 
[¶23]   We affirm the order of the district 
court finding a material change in circumstances, but we reverse the order 
changing custody of the Child to Father, and remand to the district court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

  1A parent's consent or failure to 
object to the interview acts as a waiver of his or her right to object.  S. Bernstein, supra, 99 A.L.R.2d 
at 956 ("[w]here a private interview is held 
pursuant to the consent of the parties, either in fact or in law, the general 
rule is that any claimed error is waived and the interview cannot be used as the 
basis for subsequently attacking the custody award"); see also Jones 
v. Jones, 903 P.2d 545, 548 (Wyo. 1995).

 
 

2The extent of the competency finding 
in the instant case appears to be the statement in the decision letter that 
"[the Child] appeared to be very bright and mature for an eleven year old."  We caution that such is not a sufficient 
application of the Billingsley test.