Title: Garmon v. King Coal Co., Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

409 So. 2d 776 (1981)
Nile GARMON, et al.
v.
KING COAL CO., INC.
80-487.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 11, 1981.
Rehearing Denied January 22, 1982.
B. Don Hale and Roy W. Williams, Jr., Cullman, for appellants.
Finis E. St. John, III of St. John & St. John, Cullman, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
This is the second time this case has been here. The case was first tried in Circuit Court before a jury and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs Nile and Jimmy Garmon, appellants here. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the Garmons against the defendant, King Coal Company, and King Coal appealed. This *777 Court reversed and remanded the cause to the Circuit Court "for further proceedings not inconsistent" with its opinion. King Coal Co. v. Garmon, 388 So. 2d 886 (Ala. 1980). After remand, King Coal Company filed a motion for summary judgment "based upon the ruling of the Alabama Supreme Court, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, and the record of the trial of this case previously held, a copy of which is on file in the office of the circuit clerk." The Court granted King Coal's motion for summary judgment and stated in its order, inter alia, as follows:
After studying this Court's opinion in this cause on the initial appeal, we can understand why the learned trial judge concluded that this Court had effectively rendered the cause on the contract claim. Unfortunately, this Court, in addressing appellee's theory of the case (that the contract was one of sale and covered by Alabama's Commercial Code), chose some language which was inappropriate, and which we now see was responsible for causing the trial court to conclude that the Garmons were not entitled to a new trial on their contract claim.[1]
It is understandable, in view of these statements in the original opinion, why the trial judge decided that the Garmons were foreclosed on their contract claim. This Court's original opinion should not have been so construed.
In its original opinion, this Court did agree with King Coal's argument that the contract was not a contract for the sale of goods, and this Court did hold that the trial court erred in failing to grant King Coal's motion for a new trial. We might point out that King Coal did not file a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which would have presented essentially the same legal question presented to the trial judge on the motion for summary judgment.
On the original appeal, King Coal, in brief, argued, as follows:
King Coal, in its brief, also contended:
In a reply brief to a brief filed by the Garmons, King Coal argued:
In view of the above, it is apparent that the question of whether King Coal was entitled to a judgment, as a matter of law, was not presented; therefore, this Court's conclusion, on original appeal, that King Coal was entitled to a new trial on the contract claim should not have been construed as foreclosing the Garmons from having a new trial on the contract claim. The question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support any claim under the contract was not before this Court. The claim of the Garmons for lost profits, however, was before this Court and was resolved, adverse to the Garmons. They are not entitled to relitigate any claim of loss profits.
In view of the above, we now set out the legal standard which the learned trial judge should have applied in this case, since he was reviewing a motion for summary judgment that the jury verdict in the appealed case was against the weight and preponderance of the evidence. That standard is contained in Long v. Bankers Life and Casualty Company, 294 Ala. 67, 311 So. 2d 328 (1975), where this Court was faced with a factual setting very similar to the factual setting presented in this case. There, this Court set forth the law which is applicable when a trial judge is considering the effect of an appellate court reversal and remandment on subsequent relitigation, when the appellate court has exercised its discretion in ruling that a jury verdict was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. In Long v. Bankers Life and Casualty Company, this Court opined as follows:
This Court's original reversal and remandment was based upon a determination that the verdict was contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence on the theory advanced by the Garmons that the contract was one for the sale of goods. This Court did not have before it a question of whether King Coal was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In the first place, King Cole filed no motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict, and the question of rendition of the cause was not presented to this Court. For a discussion of the standard of judicial and appellate review of motions for a new trial and motions for judgments notwithstanding a verdict, see, Casey v. Jones, 410 So. 2d 5 (Ala.1981).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the judgment of the trial court granting King Coal's motion for summary judgment is due to be reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C. J., and JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
[1]  In the original opinion, this Court framed the issue:

"Was there adequate evidence to sustain the finding that the defendant breached a contract? We think not."
This Court also opined:
"We are aware that this Court has stated many times that verdicts are presumed to be correct and `that no ground in a motion for a new trial is more carefully scrutinized and more rigidly limited than that the verdict is contrary to the weight or preponderance of the evidence.' Deal v. Johnson, 362 So. 2d 214 (Ala. 1978). When a verdict is against the weight or preponderance of the evidence, and is wrong and unjust, this Court may grant a new trial. After reviewing the evidence in this case, we are of the opinion that the Garmons failed to prove by competent evidence that King Coal breached its contract obligations. The evidence is undisputed that the Garmons failed to show that they had produced coal which would meet the contract specifications. The penalty for non-compliance in this case was shown to be rejection of the coal. This Court is convinced that the finding that the defendant breached the contract is wrong and unjust. King's motion for a new trial should have been granted."
King Coal Co., Inc. v. Garmon, 388 So. 2d 890 (Ala. 1980).