Title: Kenosha County Department of Human Services v. Jodie W.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 93 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2-NM 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights to  
Max G. W., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Kenosha County Department of Human Services, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jodie W., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite)  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 21, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Mary Kay Wagner 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: CROOKS, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Joseph W. Voiland, Lewis W. Beilin, Rebecca E. Frihart, and 
Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren s.c., Milwaukee, and oral argument 
by Joseph W. Voiland. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Mary M. Hart, assistant district attorney. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Cynthia A. Lepkowski on 
behalf of the Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Inc. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by John C. Talis, 
assistant corporation counsel, on behalf of the Dane County 
Department of Human Services. 
 
2006 WI 93
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2-NM  
(L.C. No. 
2004TP23) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights to  
 
Max G. W., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
 
 
Kenosha County Department of Human Services, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jodie W., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.     
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   Jodie W. (Jodie) seeks 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, which 
affirmed an order of the circuit court, the Honorable Mary K. 
Wagner, Kenosha County, terminating Jodie’s parental rights over 
Max W. (Max).  Kenosha County DHS v. Jodie W., No. 2005AP2-NM, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. March 30, 2005).   
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The circuit court concluded that it was in Max's best 
interest to terminate Jodie's parental rights.  The court 
determined that Max had been adjudged to be a child in 
continuing need of protection or services and had been outside 
the home for at least six months, that Jodie failed to meet the 
court-ordered conditions of return, that the department made 
reasonable efforts to assist Jodie in meeting those conditions, 
and that it was not likely that Jodie would meet the conditions 
of return within 12 months of the hearing.  Upon finding that 
grounds had been established, the circuit court made a finding 
of parental unfitness and terminated Jodie's parental rights 
over Max. 
¶3 
We conclude that the record does not clearly and 
affirmatively demonstrate that Jodie's no contest plea was 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered, and that 
therefore 
Jodie 
did 
not 
waive 
her 
challenge 
to 
the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a) (2003-04).1  We 
also conclude that the circuit court's finding of parental 
unfitness was based on an impossible condition of return, 
without 
consideration 
of 
any 
other 
relevant 
facts 
and 
circumstances particular to the parent, and is therefore 
contrary to a constitutionally permissible interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a).  Accordingly, we reverse the court of 
appeals. 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted.   
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
3 
 
I 
¶4 
Jodie is the natural birth mother of Max W., who was 
born on July 10, 2000.  Jodie was the sole caregiver for Max for 
the first two years of his life.2  Jodie was subsequently 
incarcerated in July 2002, based on convictions for operating 
while intoxicated, fourth offense, and for fleeing an officer.3  
She arranged for her mother to care for Max while she was 
incarcerated.  However, shortly after Jodie was sentenced, her 
mother contacted social services and informed them that she 
could no longer care for Max.  The record contains no evidence 
of previous involvement by social services. 
¶5 
Kenosha County filed a petition for protection or 
services on September 11, 2002, and on November 25, 2002, Max 
was found to be a child in need of protection or services 
(CHIPS), pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2).  Max was placed 
with a foster family on November 25, 2002.  Max continues to 
reside with this same foster family.   
¶6 
The circuit court entered a dispositional order on 
December 17, 2002.  In its order, the court included a written 
and oral explanation of conditions that Jodie would be required 
to meet in order for Max to be returned to her home.  The court 
also included warnings to Jodie regarding the grounds for 
termination of her parental rights (TPR) made applicable through 
the CHIPS order, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.356. 
                                                 
2 Max's father never assumed any responsibility for him. 
3 Jodie was released from prison on March 6, 2006. 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
4 
 
¶7 
The conditions required Jodie to (1) obtain, maintain 
and manage a suitable residence;4 (2) cooperate with the Division 
of Children and Family Services;5 (3) maintain regular contact 
with Max,6 (4) actively participate in services;7 (5) provide for 
                                                 
4 The form "Conditions for Safe Return" includes the 
following within the requirement that the parent maintain a 
suitable residence: (1) that the parent have sufficient food, 
clothing, bedding, and furniture to meet the needs of the child; 
(2) 
that 
the 
home 
have 
adequate 
heating, 
plumbing, 
and 
electricity; (3) that the home is adequately clean; and (4) that 
the parent demonstrate the ability to manage a household 
competently and independently in the areas of bill paying, 
budgeting, shopping, food preparation, and maintaining the home. 
5 The form "Conditions for Safe Return" includes the 
following for the requirement that the parent cooperate with the 
Division of Children and Family Services: (1) that the parent 
cooperate with the Division and service providers by informing 
them of any change in address, telephone number, employment, and 
material status within five days of such changes; (2) that the 
parent participate in case planning to meet the court-ordered 
conditions of return; (3) that the parent give the Department 
access to living quarters, notification of changes of household 
members, meeting with the social worker and service providers on 
a regular and as requested basis; (4) that the parent actively 
participate in the Division and Court permanency plan review 
process; 
(5) 
that 
the 
parent 
sign 
all 
releases 
and 
authorizations concerning educational medical and therapeutic 
services for the child; (6) that the parent sign all releases of 
information concerning court ordered services; and (7) that the 
parent not interfere with the placement of the child. 
6 The form "Conditions for Safe Return" includes the 
following for the requirement that the parent maintain regular 
contact with the child(ren): (1) that the parent demonstrates 
appropriate parenting skills 
as learned through 
parenting 
classes and programs; and (2) that the parent, if incarcerated, 
provides regular correspondence to the Division for the child. 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
5 
 
the financial needs of Max;8 (6) participate in a counseling 
program specifically designed to address issues of domestic 
violence; and (7) successfully complete any conditions of 
probation. 
¶8 
On April 22, 2004, the Kenosha County Department of 
Human Services (Department) filed a petition to terminate 
Jodie's parental rights, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2).  
Kenosha 
County 
asserted 
that 
(1) 
the 
Department 
made 
a 
reasonable effort to provide the services ordered by the court; 
(2) Jodie failed to meet the conditions for the safe return of 
Max to her home, specifically noting that Jodie remained 
incarcerated 
and 
therefore 
had 
not 
obtained 
a 
suitable 
residence; and (3) there was a substantial likelihood that Jodie 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 The form "Conditions for Safe Return" includes the 
following 
for 
the 
requirement 
that 
the 
parent 
actively 
participates in services: (1) that the parent successfully 
completes age appropriate parenting program and the ability to 
demonstrate an understanding of principles taught; (2) that the 
parent participates in counseling; (3) that the parent submits 
to random urine analysis as established by the Division or its 
designee, verifies all prescribed medications with the Division 
worker, and refrains from all alcohol and drug use; (4) that the 
parent 
completes 
an 
AODA 
assessment 
and 
treatment 
and 
successfully complies with recommendations made; and (5) that 
the parent provides verification to the Division of successful 
completion of services. 
8 The form "Conditions for Safe Return" includes the 
following for the requirement that the parent provides for the 
financial 
needs 
of 
the 
child(ren): 
(1) 
that 
the 
parent 
cooperates with the Fiscal Unit of the Division of Children and 
Family Services in determining and paying child support; and (2) 
that the parent cooperates with the Kenosha County Child Support 
Agency in genetic testing/establishment of paternity concerning 
the minor child. 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
6 
 
would not meet these court-ordered conditions for safe return 
within the next 12 months, specifically noting that Jodie 
remained incarcerated.   
¶9 
At Jodie's initial appearance, held on June 7, 2004,9 
Jodie denied the allegations of grounds for termination of her 
parental rights.  A jury trial was set for September 20, 2004.   
¶10 At the September 20, 2004, hearing, Jodie acknowledged 
that she could not meet the "suitable residence" conditions 
within 12 months because she would not be able to present any 
evidence that she might be released within the next 12 months, 
and therefore entered a no contest plea.  Although Jodie's plea 
was limited to the grounds portion, Jodie signed a form designed 
for persons contesting neither grounds nor final disposition.10  
                                                 
9 Jodie's initial appearance was originally scheduled for 
May 21, 2004.  At her May 21 hearing, Jodie filed certificates 
verifying that she had completed domestic violence education and 
parenting 
classes. 
Jodie 
also 
requested 
to 
have 
counsel 
appointed to represent her. The court continued the initial 
appearance until June 3, 2004. Because Jodie was not brought to 
the hearing on June 3, 2004, the court again continued the 
initial appearance until June 7, 2004.   
10 This case requires us to review the grounds phase in a 
termination of parental 
rights proceeding. 
Termination of 
parental rights proceedings involve two phases. Sheboygan County 
D.H.H.S. v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶24, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 
N.W.2d 402.  In the first phase, the court determines whether 
grounds exist to terminate a parent's rights to his or her 
child.  During the grounds phase, "the parent's rights are 
paramount."  Id. (citations omitted).  Moreover, during the 
grounds phase, "the burden is on the government, and the parent 
enjoys a full complement of procedural rights."  Id. 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
7 
 
Jodie modified the plea form, specifically noting that she 
disagreed that alternatives to termination of her parental 
rights were available and explicitly contesting disposition.11 
¶11 Without hearing any testimony or evidence supporting 
the allegations in the petition,12 the circuit court accepted 
Jodie's plea and determined that sufficient grounds had been 
established to find Jodie to be an "unfit" parent based upon her 
failure to meet the conditions of return established in the 
CHIPS order.   
¶12 On October 22, 2004, the court held a dispositional 
hearing.  Although the court had already made a finding of 
parental unfitness, the court took testimony on the allegations 
                                                                                                                                                             
If the court determines that grounds for termination of 
parental rights have been proven, thereby finding the parent 
unfit, the court proceeds to the second phase and determines 
whether it is in the child's best interest to terminate parental 
rights.  In this dispositional phase of the TPR proceeding, the 
entire focus of the proceeding shifts to the best interest of 
the child.  Id., ¶4.   
11 We note that in Dane County D.H.S. v. P.P., we recently 
upheld a finding of parental unfitness that was rooted in the 
children's prior adjudication as children in need of protection 
or services under Wis. Stat. § 48.31 when the parent "chose not 
to contest any of these predicate steps."  Dane County D.H.S. v. 
P.P., 2005 WI 32, ¶¶29, 34, 279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 344.  A 
significant difference between the present case and P.P. is 
that, here, Jodie asserted that the conditions of return in her 
original 
CHIPS 
order 
were 
impossible 
for 
her 
to 
meet, 
effectively contesting the circuit court's determination that 
grounds for parental unfitness had been proven.   
12 In cases where the petition to terminate parental rights 
is not contested, Wisconsin law requires the circuit court to 
"hear testimony in support of the allegations in the petition."  
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(3).   
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
8 
 
of unfitness at the urging of the Kenosha County District 
Attorney.   
¶13 The district attorney established that Jodie had not 
satisfied the condition of return that required her to obtain 
suitable housing for Max.  Max's caseworker for the Kenosha 
County Division of Children and Family Services similarly 
testified that because Jodie's first parole eligibility date was 
in March 2006, Jodie would not meet the conditions of return 
within the 12 months following the dispositional hearing.  She 
also testified that Max was adjudged to be in need of protection 
and services, that termination of parental rights warnings were 
provided to Jodie, that conditions of return were imposed, and 
that Jodie failed to meet the conditions of return.  Max's 
social worker further testified that Jodie had attempted to meet 
other conditions of return: Jodie had cooperated with the 
Division of Children and Family Services, participated in case 
planning to meet the conditions of return, was on a waiting list 
for other programming, and had provided regular correspondence 
to Max and called and visited with him whenever she was able and 
he was made available to her. 
¶14 Jodie's trial counsel attempted to raise the issue 
that it was impossible for Jodie to have met the condition of 
return that she obtain a suitable residence, and that there was 
no possibility that Jodie could meet that condition of return 
within the following 12 months because Jodie was incarcerated.  
The circuit court judge stated that because the parties had 
already stipulated to the grounds for parental unfitness, she 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
9 
 
would not entertain the argument that it was impossible for 
Jodie to meet the conditions of return imposed as part of the 
CHIPS order.  
¶15 At the end of the testimony on the grounds phase, the 
circuit court again determined that sufficient grounds had been 
established and found Jodie an "unfit" parent.  During the 
second phase of the termination proceedings, the dispositional 
phase, the court determined that the Department had met its 
statutory 
requirement 
of 
assisting 
Jodie 
in 
meeting 
her 
conditions of return.  The court recognized the impossibility of 
Jodie meeting the condition of return that required Jodie to 
supply appropriate housing while Jodie remained incarcerated, 
but found that this impossibility was the result of Jodie's own 
actions.  In addition, the court found that when the Department 
began working with Max, he had "a mouth full of cavities" and 
had "significant anger and extensive temper tantrums upon the 
beginning of the transfer" of Max to his foster home.  The court 
noted that Max had greatly improved while in foster care. 
¶16 Upon 
completion 
of 
the 
dispositional 
phase, the 
circuit court determined that it was in Max's best interest to 
terminate Jodie's parental rights.13   
¶17 Jodie was appointed counsel to appeal the termination 
of her parental rights.  Jodie's appellate counsel filed a no-
merit report, asserting that the plea colloquy satisfied the 
                                                 
13 The court also entered a default judgment against the 
parental rights of the named father, as well as any unknown 
fathers. 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
10 
 
requirements 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(7), 
and 
the 
plea 
was 
therefore knowing and voluntary. The no merit report also 
asserted that the court appropriately considered Max's best 
interest in determining that Jodie's parental rights should be 
terminated. Jodie filed a response to the no-merit report, 
contending, among other things, that it was impossible for her 
to complete the conditions for return within 12 months, as 
required, because she was given a sentence that exceeded 12 
months.   
¶18 In a one-judge unpublished decision, the court of 
appeals summarily affirmed the circuit court's termination of 
Jodie's parental rights. Jodie filed a pro se petition for 
review with this court, and we accepted review. Jodie was 
appointed counsel for this review. 
II 
¶19 This case requires us to examine whether a court may 
find a parent unfit under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a) based solely 
on the parent's failure to meet an impossible condition of 
return.  In order to determine whether § 48.415(2)(a) is 
constitutional as applied to Jodie, we must interpret and apply 
both 
the 
state 
and 
federal 
constitutions 
and 
statutory 
provisions. 
These 
present 
questions 
of 
law 
subject 
to 
independent appellate review.  State v. Fisher, 2006 WI 44, ¶4, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (citing State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 
113, ¶19, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785); State v. Cole, 2003 
WI 59, ¶10, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700.   
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
11 
 
¶20 The 
purpose 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
is 
to 
determine what a statute means so that it may be given its full, 
proper, and intended effect.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110. 
This 
court 
has 
consistently 
concluded 
that 
"[s]tatutes are presumed to be constitutional; therefore, 'every 
presumption must be indulged to uphold the law if at all 
possible.'" 
State 
v. 
Hezzie, 
219 
Wis. 2d 848, 
862, 
580 
N.W.2d 660 (1998) (quoting Norquist v. Zeuske, 211 Wis. 2d 241, 
250, 564 N.W.2d 748 (1997)).  " Where the constitutionality of a 
statute is at issue, courts attempt to avoid an interpretation 
that creates constitutional infirmities."  Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 
WI 52, 65, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666.    
 ¶21 As a threshold issue, we examine whether Jodie waived 
her right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute when 
she entered a plea of no contest.  Whether a party has waived 
his or her right to assert that a statute violates the party's 
substantive due process rights is a question of constitutional 
fact.  Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, ¶51 n.18, 233 
Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607 (citing State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 283-84, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986)).  Although "[w]e 
review constitutional questions independently of the conclusion 
of the lower courts[,]" we uphold a circuit court's findings of 
evidentiary facts unless the findings are "contrary to the great 
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence."  Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 283-84 (citations omitted). 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
12 
 
¶22 Whether Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2), as applied to Jodie, 
violates her constitutional right to substantive due process, 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
constitutional 
law, 
subject 
to 
independent appellate review.  Monroe County D.H.S. v. Kelli B., 
2004 WI 48, ¶16, 271 Wis. 2d 51, 678 N.W.2d 831.   
III 
¶23 This case requires us to examine whether the circuit 
court's 
finding 
of 
parental 
unfitness 
violated 
Jodie's 
constitutional right to substantive due process because one or 
more of the court-ordered conditions of return were impossible 
for Jodie to meet at the time they were imposed.   
¶24 Because 
an 
"as 
applied" 
challenge 
to 
the 
constitutionality of a statute is a non-jurisdictional defect, a 
party's right to challenge the constitutionality of a statute 
can be waived by entering a plea of no contest.  State v. Cole, 
2003 WI 112, ¶46, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328; P.P., 279 
Wis. 2d 169, 
¶25. 
However, 
the 
constitution 
requires 
an 
affirmative showing that the plea was entered knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently.  See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 257 
(citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)).14  We therefore 
begin our constitutional analysis by determining whether Jodie's 
no contest plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 
entered.   
                                                 
14 A parent challenging the circuit court's acceptance of a 
plea is subject to the analysis recognized by this court in 
State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  
Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, ¶42 n.18, 233 
Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607. 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
13 
 
A 
¶25 The mandatory procedures used to properly accept a 
plea are established by statute.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 260-
61. In termination of parental rights proceedings, Wisconsin law 
requires the circuit court to undertake a personal colloquy with 
the 
defendant 
in 
accordance 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(7).  
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(3) ("If the petition is not contested the 
court shall hear testimony in support of the allegations in the 
petition, including testimony as required in sub. (7).").  Prior 
to accepting an admission or a plea of no contest, subsection 
(7) requires the court to: 
(a) address the parties present and determine that the 
admission is made voluntarily and understandingly;  
(b) establish whether any promises or threats were 
made to elicit an admission;  
(c) establish whether a proposed adoptive parent of 
the child has been identified; and  
(d) make such inquiries as satisfactorily establish a 
factual basis for the admission. 
Steven 
H., 
233 
Wis. 2d 344, 
¶39 
(citing 
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(7)).15  In addition, the person entering the 
                                                 
15 The statute reads, in full: 
Before accepting an admission of the alleged facts in 
a petition, the court shall: 
(a) Address the parties present and determine that the 
admission is made voluntarily with understanding of 
the nature of the acts alleged in the petition and the 
potential dispositions. 
(b) Establish whether any promises or threats were 
made 
to 
elicit 
an 
admission 
and 
alert 
all 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
14 
 
no contest plea must have knowledge of the constitutional rights 
he or she is giving up by making the plea.  Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 265-66.  
¶26 In any challenge to a no contest plea, the party must 
make a prima facie showing that the circuit court violated its 
                                                                                                                                                             
unrepresented parties to the possibility that a lawyer 
may discover defenses or mitigating circumstances 
which would not be apparent to them. 
(bm) Establish whether a proposed adoptive parent of 
the child has been identified.  If a proposed adoptive 
parent of the child has been identified and the 
proposed adoptive parent is not a relative of the 
child, the court shall order the petitioner to submit 
a report to the court containing the information 
specified in s. 48.913(7).  The court shall review the 
report to determine whether any payments or agreement 
to make payments set forth in the report are coercive 
to the birth parent of the child or to an alleged to 
presumed father of the child or are impermissible 
under s. 48.913(4).  Making any payment to or on 
behalf of the birth parent of the child, an alleged or 
presumed father of the child or the child conditional 
in any part upon transfer or surrender of the child or 
the termination of parental rights or the finalization 
of the adoption creates a rebuttable presumption of 
coercion.  Upon a finding of coercion, the court shall 
dismiss the petition or amend the agreement to delete 
any coercive conditions, if the parties agree to the 
amendment.  Upon a finding that payments which are 
impermissible under s. 48.913(4) have been made, the 
court may dismiss the petition and may refer the 
matter to the district attorney for prosecution under 
s. 948.24(1).  This paragraph does not apply if the 
petition was filed with a petition for adoptive 
placement under s. 48.837(2). 
(c) Make such inquiries as satisfactorily establish 
that there is a factual basis for the admission. 
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(7). 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
15 
 
mandatory duties of informing the party of his or her rights, 
and the party must allege that the party, in fact, did not know 
or understand the rights that he or she was waiving.  Steven H., 
233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶42.  If the party successfully makes a prima 
facie showing, the burden shifts to the county to establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that the parent "knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived the right to contest the 
allegations in the petition."  Id. 
¶27 The 
question 
regarding 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Jodie's no contest plea arrives under a unique procedural 
posture because Jodie has not filed a motion to withdraw her 
plea of no contest.  Instead, appellate counsel filed a no merit 
report, which Jodie contested, in which Jodie alleged in 
response to the report, among other things, that it was 
impossible for her to complete the conditions for return within 
12 months, as required, because she was given a sentence that 
exceeded 12 months.  Jodie clearly asserts that she did not 
understand what she was giving up by pleading no contest.  Jodie 
further contends that the record reveals that the circuit court 
failed to meet its duty to determine that Jodie's waiver was 
entered knowingly because the no contest plea was entered 
through an internally 
inconsistent 
plea questionnaire and 
colloquy.   
¶28 This court has previously evaluated whether a parent's 
no contest plea was knowingly made, even though he had not filed 
a post-judgment motion to withdraw the plea. Steven H., 233 
Wis. 2d 344, ¶43.  In light of Jodie’s response to the no merit 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
16 
 
report filed in this case, we similarly examine the record to 
determine whether her no contest plea was entered knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently.  In evaluating the voluntariness 
of Jodie's plea, we examine all pertinent portions of the record 
relating to the modified plea questionnaire and colloquy 
regarding 
Jodie's 
modifications to 
the 
questionnaire. See 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  We will uphold the circuit court's 
findings of evidentiary or historical facts unless the findings 
are "contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence."  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 283-84 (citations omitted).   
¶29 Although Jodie entered a plea of no contest to the 
grounds phase, she was given a standardized plea questionnaire 
designed for persons pleading no contest to both grounds and 
disposition.  Jodie made numerous alterations16 to, and notations 
on, the standard plea questionnaire.  Jodie altered the first 
line of the plea form to read: "I, Jodie, mother, hereby enter a 
no contest plea to the facts as contained in the Termination of 
Parental Rights petition as to the grounds phase."  (underlined 
portion added by Jodie). 
¶30 Statement 11 of the plea form reads as follows:  
I am aware that there are other alternatives available 
to me other than termination of parental rights, 
specifically:  
                                                 
16 We note that Jodie made numerous changes to the form, 
although the record does not clearly reflect whether she 
personally made the changes or whether the changes were made 
through her counsel.  In any event, Jodie signed the form as 
altered by the changes.  It is immaterial whether Jodie or her 
counsel actually made the changes. 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
17 
 
a. 
Continued foster care with services provided 
toward eventual return; 
b. 
Placement with relatives; 
c. 
Return of the child with after care services 
provided (if appropriate); 
d. 
AFDC, food stamps, Title XIX; 
e. 
Paternity/child support order; 
f. 
Parenting classes as well as other services. 
¶31 Jodie initialed the space provided next to each of the 
six alternatives listed, but wrote in the margin next to 
statement 11: "Disagree that these are available due to filing 
of TPR petition" and wrote next to the listed alternatives (a) 
through (f): "Disagree with this because TPR petition filed."   
¶32 Statement 12 of the plea form reads: "Being aware of 
the alternatives listed in number 11, I still wish to enter this 
no contest plea and terminate my parental rights."  Jodie wrote 
in the margin next to this statement: "Still disagree that these 
alternatives are available w/ filing of TPR petition." 
¶33 Statement 13 of the plea form originally read: "I 
agree that there are enough facts in the petition for the 
jury/court to find that there are grounds to terminate my 
parental rights to the above named child, and I do not object to 
the judge doing so."  Jodie struck the last phrase "object to 
the judge doing so" and substituted "contest the matter."   
¶34 In statement 15 of the plea form, Jodie changed the 
word "will" to "could," and added the phrase "after holding a 
dispositional hearing" at the end of the statement.  Statement 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
18 
 
15, as altered by Jodie, reads: "I understand that, if the court 
accepts the no contest pleas of all parties, my parental rights 
to the above-named child could [deleted "will"] be terminated 
pursuant to Section 48.__, Stats., and the court can enter a 
dispositional order after holding a dispositional hearing."  
(underlined portions added by Jodie).  In addition, Jodie added 
a notation next to this statement that she was "still contesting 
disposition."   
¶35 During the plea hearing, the court recognized that 
Jodie had "several caveats, apparently, on almost every question 
that is on the plea form," and that it "better go through them."  
The court questioned Jodie about some of Jodie's modifications 
to the plea form: 
THE COURT: 
You are aware that there are other 
alternatives that you could ask the Court to consider 
at the time of the disposition, which is not yet, 
which is next week——or not next week——but within the 
next several weeks.  Do you understand that? 
JODIE: 
Yes. 
THE COURT: 
And that would be continued foster 
care, return of the child with aftercare services, 
AFDC, food stamps, or Title 19, our W-2 it should have 
in there, paternity, child support order, or parenting 
classes, as well as other services.  Do you understand 
that? 
JODIE: 
Yes. 
THE COURT: 
Okay, You're saying——Written in the 
margin on that question is that the——you disagree that 
these are available to you due to the filing of a TPR 
petition.  Many of them are not available to you 
because you're in prison, isn't that correct? 
JODIE: 
Yes. 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
19 
 
THE COURT: 
I mean, we understand that there's some 
things ——We can't return the child to you; you're in 
prison. 
JODIE: 
Yes. 
THE COURT: 
And so some of these things are——even 
though those options are available and you could ask 
for them, they're not likely to happen because of your 
location. 
JODIE'S COUNSEL: 
Your Honor, I wrote in——Because of 
the way the question's worded that it makes it sound 
like she's got a choice, and we're——we obviously don't 
believe she's got a choice.  We can argue for them and 
we can—— 
THE COURT: 
Well, this petition really applies to 
an entire termination of parental rights action, not 
just the grounds portion. 
JODIE'S COUNSEL: 
And that's why it's difficult—— 
THE COURT: 
Right. 
JODIE'S COUNSEL: 
——and things need to be changed.  
But that's the reason for the notations that are made. 
THE COURT: 
It's 
appropriate 
and 
thorough, 
Ms. 
Meyer [Attorney for Jodie] . . . .   
¶36 In this colloquy, the court failed to address Jodie's 
modifications to the questionnaire that demonstrated Jodie's 
belief that termination of her parental rights was not a 
foregone conclusion due to her no contest plea.  During the plea 
colloquy, the court asked Jodie if she understood that "upon the 
receipt of finishing this petition or this plea the Court is 
going to find you to be an unfit parent?"  (emphasis added).  
Although Jodie answered in the affirmative during the colloquy, 
the alterations Jodie made to the standard plea form directly 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
20 
 
contradict this position.  The court failed to address this 
discrepancy.   
¶37 Moreover, the circuit court refused to take testimony 
regarding Jodie's allegation that it was impossible for her to 
meet the conditions of return imposed as part of the CHIPS 
order.  At the October 22, 2004, dispositional hearing, although 
the court had already made a finding of parental unfitness, the 
court 
took 
testimony 
regarding 
the 
grounds 
for 
parental 
unfitness at the urging of the Kenosha County District Attorney.  
During this testimony, Jodie's trial counsel attempted to raise 
the issue that it was impossible for Jodie to have met the 
condition of return that she obtain a suitable residence, and 
that there was no possibility that Jodie could meet that 
condition of return within the following 12 months because Jodie 
was incarcerated.  The circuit court judge stated that because 
the parties had already stipulated to the grounds for parental 
unfitness, she would not entertain the argument that it was 
impossible for Jodie to meet the conditions of return imposed as 
part of the CHIPS order.  Had the circuit court taken testimony, 
the court would have discovered Jodie's confusion and could have 
taken steps to ensure that Jodie understood what she was 
pleading to, or, in the alternative, the court could have 
rejected Jodie's no contest plea. 
¶38 Our review of the record reveals that there is 
insufficient evidence to support a determination that Jodie 
entered her plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.  The 
plea form and modifications contained inconsistencies, the 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
21 
 
circuit court's colloquy was incomplete with regard to these 
inconsistencies, and the court refused to allow testimony 
regarding Jodie's reasons for entering a plea of no contest.  We 
conclude that the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence fails to establish that Jodie's plea of no contest was 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.  We therefore 
conclude that Jodie has not waived her substantive due process 
challenge to Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) as applied in this case. 
B 
¶39 We 
next 
examine 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court's 
application of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) to Jodie violated her 
substantive due process rights.   Substantive due process rights 
are rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, and Article I, Sections 1 and 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.17  "The right of substantive due process protects 
against a state act that is arbitrary, wrong or oppressive, 
regardless of whether the procedures applied to implement the 
action were fair."  P.P., 279 Wis. 2d 169, ¶19 (citing Kelli B., 
271 Wis. 2d 51, ¶19).  Substantive due process requires that 
when a statute adversely affects fundamental liberty interests, 
the statute must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling 
interest that justifies interference with fundamental liberty 
interests.  Kelli B., 271 Wis. 2d 51, ¶17 (citation omitted).  
                                                 
17 Monroe County v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 48, ¶19 n.7, 271 
Wis. 2d 51, 678 N.W.2d 831 ("The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from depriving 'any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law[.]'  See also Wis. Const. art. §§ 1 and 8."). 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
22 
 
¶40 This case requires us to examine how a parent's 
incarceration relates to the decision to terminate parental 
rights. The United States Supreme Court has recognized a 
parent's fundamental right to the care and custody of his or her 
child, and concluded that a state may not terminate this right 
without an individualized determination that the parent is 
unfit.  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).  Absent a 
finding of unfitness, it is presumed that children are best 
served by remaining with their natural parents.  Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982). This court has similarly 
recognized that "[a] parent's desire for and right to 'the 
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her 
children' is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants 
deference 
and, absent 
a 
powerful 
countervailing 
interest, 
protection.'"  Sheboygan County D.H.H.S. v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 
95, ¶22, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402 (citing Lassiter v. 
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (other citations 
and quotations omitted)).   
¶41 Because Jodie has a fundamental liberty interest in 
parenting Max, any statute that infringes upon this interest is 
subject to strict scrutiny review. See Kelli B., 271 Wis. 2d 51, 
¶17. See also Julie A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶22 (concluding that 
any attempt by the state to terminate parental rights must 
involve fundamentally fair procedures) (citations omitted).  
This court has already determined that the State's compelling 
interest underlying the 11 grounds for termination of parental 
rights under Wis. Stat. § 48.415 is to protect children from 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
23 
 
unfit parents. P.P., 279 Wis. 2d 169, ¶20; Kelli B., 271 
Wis. 2d 51, ¶25. The threshold issue, therefore, is whether 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2), 
as 
applied 
to 
Jodie, 
is 
narrowly 
tailored to meet the State's compelling interest of protecting 
Max from an unfit parent. 
¶42 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415 establishes 11 grounds for 
termination of parental rights. Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1)-(10).  
Under subsection (2)(a) of this statute, grounds for termination 
of parental rights exist when a child is in continuing need of 
protection or services, if the following is established: 
[1] That the child has been adjudged to be a child or 
an unborn child in need of protection or services and 
placed, or continued in a placement, outside his or 
her home pursuant to one or more court orders under s. 
48.345, 
48.347, 
48.357, 
48.363, 
48.365, 
938.345, 
938.357, 938.363 or 938.365 containing the notice 
required by s. 48.356(2) or 938.356(2).18 
[2] That the agency responsible for the care of the 
child and the family or of the unborn child and 
expectant mother has made a reasonable effort to 
provide the services ordered by the court.19 
[3] That the child has been outside the home for a 
cumulative total period of 6 months or longer pursuant 
to such orders not including time spent outside the 
home as an unborn child; and that the parent has 
failed to meet the conditions established for the safe 
return of the child to the home and there is a 
substantial likelihood that the parent will not meet 
these conditions within the 12-month period following 
the fact-finding hearing under s. 48.424.20 
                                                 
18 Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)1. 
19 Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)2.b.   
20 Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3. 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
24 
 
¶43 The legislature defined "reasonable effort" to mean 
that 
the 
responsible 
agency 
has 
made 
"an 
earnest 
and 
conscientious effort to take good faith steps to provide the 
services 
ordered" 
and 
to 
take 
into 
consideration 
"the 
characteristics of the parent or child . . . the level of 
cooperation of the parent . . . and other relevant circumstances 
of the case."  § 48.415(2)(a)2.a.21   
¶44 In addition, the legislature included a temporal 
component in termination of parental rights proceedings.  P.P., 
279 Wis. 2d 169, ¶21.  The legislature provided that  
The courts and agencies responsible for child welfare 
should 
also 
recognize 
that 
instability 
and 
impermanence in family relationships are contrary to 
the welfare of children and should therefore recognize 
the importance of eliminating the need for children to 
wait unreasonable periods of time for their parents to 
correct the conditions that prevent their safe return 
to the family. 
Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(a). 
¶45 The language of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) requires a 
finding by the circuit court that the relevant agency made 
reasonable efforts. P.P., 279 Wis. 2d 169, ¶30. The text 
                                                 
21 This subsection states, in full: 
"reasonable effort" means an earnest and conscientious 
effort to take good faith steps to provide the 
services ordered by the court which takes into 
consideration the characteristics of the parent or 
child or of the expectant mother or child, the level 
of cooperation of the parent or expectant mother and 
other relevant circumstances of the case. 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)2.a. 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
25 
 
obligates the responsible agency to make "an earnest and 
conscientious effort to take good faith steps to provide the 
services ordered by the court."  Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)2.a.  
The statute does not allow the responsible agency to determine 
which conditions it must, in good faith, assist the parent in 
meeting.   
¶46 This subsection of the statute also necessitates that 
the courts evaluate the particular facts and circumstances 
relevant to the parent and child involved in the proceeding.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)2.a.  In light of the legislature's 
emphasis 
on 
"eliminating 
the 
need 
for 
children 
to 
wait 
unreasonable periods of time for their parents to correct the 
conditions that prevent their safe return to the family,"22 the 
amount of time a parent is unable to provide for his or her 
child due to the parent's incarceration can and should be 
considered by the circuit court as part of the court's 
evaluation of the relevant facts and circumstances.   
¶47 In this case, we must determine whether the circuit 
court's 
application 
of 
the 
statute 
was 
constitutionally 
permissible when the court determined that Jodie was an unfit 
parent because she failed to meet conditions of return that were 
impossible for her to meet because she was incarcerated.  We 
find, J.L.N. v. Nevada, 55 P.3d 955 (Nev. 2002), a recent 
decision by the Nevada Supreme Court, to be helpful in our 
analysis.  In J.L.N., the Nevada court evaluated state statutes 
                                                 
22 Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(a). 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
26 
 
similar 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) 
in 
the 
context 
of 
an 
incarcerated parent.  The mother, Diana, was incarcerated for 
violating conditions of her parole on a forgery conviction, and 
her children were placed in foster care.  J.L.N., 55 P.3d at 
957.  The Nevada statutes in question establish a rebuttable 
presumption that the best interests of the child are served by 
termination of parental rights if the child has been placed 
outside the home for 14 of any 20 consecutive months.  Id. at 
958 (citing NRS 128.109(2) and NRS 432B.553(2)). Under Nevada 
law, when a parent is unable or unwilling to correct the 
circumstances, conduct, or conditions that led to the placement 
of the child outside the home, there is a failure to adjust.  
Id. at 959 (citing NRS 128.0126). In addition, if a parent fails 
to comply substantially with the case plan that includes 
conditions necessary for the return of the child within six 
months, there is a presumption of failure to adjust.  Id.  
Although Diana completed every condition of return to every 
extent possible, given her incarceration, the circuit court 
found that the best interest of the child prong had been 
satisfied based on the length of time her child, J.L.N., had 
been placed outside Diana's home.  Id. at 957-58.   
¶48 The Nevada Supreme Court recognized that the majority 
of other jurisdictions that have considered this issue have 
determined that while the parent's incarceration is relevant, 
termination should not be based on the parent’s incarceration 
alone.  Other factors must also be considered.  Id. at 959 
(citing Johnson v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Serv., 82 S.W.3d 183 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
27 
 
(2002); In re Dependency of J.W., 953 P.2d 104 (1998); In the 
Matter of R.P., 498 N.W.2d 364 (S.D. 1993)).  The Nevada court 
similarly concluded that "while a parent's incarceration must be 
considered 
in 
determining 
whether 
termination 
is 
proper, 
incarceration alone is insufficient to satisfy the statutory 
requirement of parental fault as it relates to failure of 
parental adjustment."  Id. at 959-60.  The circuit court must 
also consider "the nature of the crime, the sentence imposed, 
who the crime was committed upon, the parent's conduct toward 
the child before and during incarceration, and the child's 
specific needs."  Id. at 960.  Having recognized that Diana and 
J.L.N. had established a strong, loving bond and that Diana's 
felony conviction did not involve conduct related to the abuse 
or neglect of her children, id. at 958, the Nevada court 
concluded that a parent "must be shown to be at fault in some 
manner and cannot be judged unsuitable by reason of failure to 
comply with requirements and plans that are impossible to abide 
by."  Id. at 959 (citation omitted). 
¶49 Like the Nevada Supreme Court, we similarly conclude 
that a parent's incarceration does not, in itself, demonstrate 
that the individual is an unfit parent.  See J.L.N., 55 P.3d at 
956.  We further conclude that a parent's failure to fulfill a 
condition of return due to his or her incarceration, standing 
alone, is not a constitutional ground for finding a parent 
unfit.  Id.  These conclusions are required by the Wisconsin and 
United States Constitutions, which preclude a state from 
terminating 
a 
parent's 
fundamental 
right 
without 
an 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
28 
 
individualized determination of unfitness.  Stanley, 405 U.S. at 
649.   
¶50 Because we interpret statutes to be constitutional if 
possible, Hezzie, 219 Wis. 2d 848 at 862 (citation omitted), we 
also conclude that Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) requires the court to 
evaluate the particular facts and circumstances relevant to the 
parent and child involved in the proceeding.  Our conclusions do 
not render a parent's incarceration irrelevant.  We simply 
conclude 
that 
a 
parent's 
incarceration 
is 
not 
itself 
a 
sufficient basis to terminate parental rights.  Other factors 
must also be considered, such as the parent's relationship with 
the child and any other child both prior to and while the parent 
is incarcerated, the nature of the crime committed by the 
parent, the length and type of sentence imposed, the parent's 
level of cooperation with the responsible agency and the 
Department of Corrections, and the best interests of the child.  
See P.P., 279 Wis. 2d 169, ¶30 (recognizing that the termination 
of parental rights of the incarcerated parent was "grounded in a 
lack of fitness on the part of [the parent]. . . . [T]he finding 
was based on [the parent’s] sexual assault and extreme abuse of 
his own children.").  See also J.L.N., 655 P.3d at 960. 
¶51 We therefore conclude that in cases where a parent is 
incarcerated and the only ground for parental termination is 
that the child continues to be in need of protection or services 
solely 
because 
of 
the 
parent’s 
incarceration, 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) 
requires 
that 
the 
court-ordered 
conditions of return are tailored to the particular needs of the 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
29 
 
parent and child.  A contrary interpretation would render the 
statute unconstitutional.  Compare Hezzie, 219 Wis. 2d at 862 
(citation omitted). 
¶52 In the present case, the circuit court found Jodie an 
unfit parent without regard for her actual parenting activities.  
Contrast P.P., 279 Wis. 2d 169, ¶30.  There is no evidence that 
the conditions of return were created or modified for Jodie 
specifically.  Although the circuit court properly considered 
the fact that Jodie would be incarcerated until at least March 
2006, the court did not consider other relevant facts and 
circumstances particular to Jodie until the dispositional phase, 
where the parent's rights are no longer paramount and the best 
interest of the child controls.   
¶53 Jodie established a substantial relationship with Max 
during the first two years of his life when she was the sole 
caregiver for Max.  There is no indication that Jodie had 
problems 
maintaining 
a 
home 
or 
exhibited 
any 
parental 
deficiencies prior to her incarceration.  The only factual 
findings by the circuit court regarding Jodie's parental 
deficiencies pre-incarceration were that Max had "a mouth full 
of cavities" and that Max had "significant anger and extensive 
temper tantrums upon the beginning of the transfer" of Max to 
his foster home.  Moreover, Jodie was incarcerated for non-
violent offenses and given a sentence of less than four years.   
¶54 We also note that Jodie made significant progress 
toward meeting many of the other conditions of return.  Jodie 
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
30 
 
took advantage of counseling opportunities while incarcerated.23  
Moreover, Jodie engaged in concerted efforts to maintain contact 
with Max and clearly demonstrated that she wanted to retain her 
parental rights over Max. 
¶55 Substantive due process requires that the State's 
action to terminate Jodie's parental rights be narrowly tailored 
to meet the State's compelling interest of protecting Max from 
an unfit parent.  Both the court-ordered conditions of return 
and the circuit court's evaluation of Jodie's failure to meet 
these conditions were not narrowly tailored to meet that 
interest.  We conclude that the circuit court improperly deemed 
Jodie unfit solely by virtue of her status as an incarcerated 
person without regard for her actual parenting activities or the 
condition of her child, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2), 
and Jodie's substantive due process rights.    
IV 
¶56 We conclude that the circuit court's finding of 
parental unfitness was based on an impossible condition of 
return, without consideration of any other relevant facts and 
circumstances 
particular 
to 
the 
parent, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a).  We also conclude that Jodie did not 
waive 
her 
right 
to 
challenge 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) because the record fails to clearly and 
                                                 
23 According to certificates filed with the circuit court on 
May 21, 2004, Jodie completed the parenting classes offered at 
the Robert E. Ellsworth Correctional Center on November 13, 
2003.  Jodie also completed domestic violence education offered 
by the Women's Resource Center of Racine on March 15, 2004.   
No. 
2005AP2-NM   
 
31 
 
affirmatively demonstrate that Jodie entered her no contest plea 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.  We further determine 
that 48.415(2), as applied to Jodie, is not narrowly tailored to 
advance a compelling state interest, and therefore conclude that 
Jodie's constitutional right to substantive due process was 
violated.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals. 
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
¶57 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J., did not participate. 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP2-NM.jpw 
 
1 
 
 
¶58 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  The termination of 
parental rights based on Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) (2003-04)1 is 
part of a narrowly tailored step-by-step statutory process.  The 
statutory process ensures an individualized determination of a 
parent's fitness.  A parent's valid plea of no contest does not 
negate the individualized determination.   
¶59 In this case, the step-by-step process provided Jodie 
an individualized determination of her fitness as a parent.  The 
majority concluded otherwise, and now children of incarcerated 
parents will be serving a concurrent sentence in limbo.   
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶60 Jodie entered a plea of no contest during the grounds 
step of the termination procedure.  The majority deemed this 
plea invalid.  I disagree. 
¶61 A valid no contest plea must be entered knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently.  Waukesha County v. Steven H., 
2000 WI 28, ¶42, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607.  A plea is 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered when a court 
determines, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the 
defendant was aware of his or her constitutional rights.  State 
v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 254, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
¶62 The record reveals that Jodie knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently entered her plea.  First, she signed a form 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2005AP2-NM.jpw 
 
2 
 
that 
she 
and 
her 
attorney 
tailored 
to 
represent 
her 
understanding of the plea. Jodie initialed next to line 14 of 
the form, which stated, "I understand that, if the court accepts 
the [] no contest plea of all parties, the court will find me to 
be an unfit parent."2  
¶63 Jodie also initialed next to line 15 of the form, 
which stated, "I understand that, if the court accepts the [] no 
contest plea of all parties, my parental rights to the above-
named child could be terminated pursuant to Section 48.__, 
Stats., and the court can enter a dispositional order after 
holding a dispositional hearing.  (§ 48.427 Stats.)  Still 
contesting disposition." (Emphasis for Jodie's additions to the 
form.)3 
 
Jodie 
tailored 
the 
form 
so 
it 
clarified 
her 
understanding that her no contest plea related to the grounds 
phase only, not the dispositional phase.   
¶64 In addition to Jodie tailoring the form to reflect her 
understanding of her plea, the court extensively discussed the 
plea form with her during the subsequent colloquy.  The 
following excerpt illustrates that the court thoroughly examined 
Jodie's understanding of her plea: 
The court: 
You're giving up your opportunity to 
present evidence on your own behalf and to make 
witnesses come to court and testify for you even if 
they didn't want to come to court? 
                                                 
2 Jodie redacted the word "admission" between the phrases 
"the court accepts the" and "no contest plea." 
3 Again, Jodie redacted the word "admission" between the 
phrases "the court accepts the" and "no contest plea." 
 
No.  2005AP2-NM.jpw 
 
3 
 
[Jodie]:  
Yes. 
The court: 
Do you understand you're giving up your 
opportunity to make the state prove each element of 
the 
statute 
contained 
within 
this 
petition 
to 
establish grounds? 
[Jodie]:  
Yes. 
The court: 
You are 
giving 
up 
your 
chance to 
require the state to prove allegations of the petition 
by 
evidence 
that 
is 
clear, 
satisfactory 
and 
convincing, and that 10 of the 12 jurors would have to 
agree on that verdict before it could be accepted? 
[Jodie]:  
Yes. 
The court: 
Do you understand by entering this plea 
that grounds will be determined to have been met by 
the 
state, 
that 
they'll 
have 
proved 
by 
clear, 
satisfactory and convincing evidence that grounds 
exist to terminate your parental rights? 
[Jodie]:  
Yes. 
The court: 
And you understand that as a result of 
that we'll move to phase two of the termination of 
parental rights? 
[Jodie]:  
Yes.  
The court: 
As a result of that, you understand 
that if termination of parental rights is granted it 
could end your relationship between yourself and Max? 
[Jodie]:  
Yes. 
The court also asked, "Do you understand that upon the receipt 
of finishing this petition or this plea the Court is going to 
find you to be an unfit parent? Do you understand that?"  Jodie 
replied, "Yes."       
¶65 The tailored plea form, coupled with the colloquy, 
make clear that Jodie possessed the requisite awareness to enter 
her plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 
No.  2005AP2-NM.jpw 
 
4 
 
¶66 Notwithstanding this evidence in the record, the 
majority concludes that Jodie did not enter a valid no contest 
plea.  Majority op., ¶38.  The majority finds the plea defective 
because of perceived inconsistencies in the form, an inadequate 
colloquy, and a refusal by the court to take testimony.  Id.  A 
consideration of these supposed defects in Jodie's plea reveals 
that they are unpersuasive.    
¶67 Finding the supposed defects in Jodie's plea requires 
the majority to launch into second-guessing that is beyond the 
scope of our Bangert analysis.  Bangert analysis does not ask 
whether or not the individual has made the best strategic 
decision at that point of the proceeding. See Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 254.  Yet, the majority's analysis seems to revolve 
around the feeling that termination of parental rights is a 
"foregone conclusion" after the grounds stage.  Majority op., 
¶36.  An examination of our case law and Wis. Stat. § 48.427 
reveals otherwise.   
¶68 In Sheboygan County DHHS v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, 
¶24, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d  402, this court laid out the 
nuances of the two-step procedure for contested termination 
proceedings.  The first step determines whether grounds exist to 
terminate parental rights. Wis. Stat. § 48.424(1).  During the 
first step, the parent's rights are paramount.  Id.  The second 
step is the disposition.  Wis. Stat. § 48.427.  During the 
second step, the best interests of the child are the polestar.  
Julie A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶37. 
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¶69 Based solely on the prevailing factors for the 
respective steps, parents seemingly have the best chance of 
prevailing at the grounds stage.  In this context, the majority 
draws the conclusion that Jodie must have not understood her 
rights.  Majority op., ¶37.  The majority goes so far as to 
state, "the court failed to address Jodie's modifications to the 
questionnaire that demonstrated Jodie's belief that termination 
of her parental rights was not a foregone conclusion due to her 
no contest plea."  Majority op., ¶36 (emphasis added).  The 
majority presumes that termination is a foregone conclusion.  
The majority views it as a defect that the court did not take 
testimony and explore the wisdom of Jodie's strategy.  Id.         
¶70 This might be persuasive if the legislature had made 
the policy decision to require termination of parental rights 
upon the finding of grounds to terminate.  However, it did not.  
The legislature created an additional step where the court "may 
enter an order terminating the parental rights of one or both 
parents."  Wis. Stat. 48.427(3) (emphasis added).  Although the 
child's best interest becomes the polestar of the disposition 
step, 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
is 
not 
a 
"forgone 
conclusion."     
¶71 The majority's discovery of the "defects" opens the 
door to the creation of a new rule: a parent's otherwise valid 
plea of no contest at the grounds step will be deemed invalid if 
he or she challenges the disposition.  Although the majority may 
view this to be the only advisable approach to the two-step 
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termination procedure, it 
warps this 
court's 
longstanding 
Bangert analysis to reach its desired result.  
¶72 A valid plea of no contest waives an individual's 
right to challenge the constitutionality of a statute.  Dane 
County DHS v. P.P., 2005 WI 32, ¶25, 279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 
N.W.2d 344.  Therefore, the majority's conclusion that Jodie 
failed to enter a valid no contest plea also opens the door to 
its launching into substantive due process analysis.   
II 
¶73 Jodie did not have her parental rights terminated 
because of her status as an inmate.  She had her parental rights 
terminated because of the step-by-step statutory process that 
underlies Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2).  Jodie failed to maintain a 
residence, financially support Max, complete alcohol and drug 
treatment, demonstrate appropriate parenting skill, or complete 
counseling.  Contrary to the majority's conclusion, Jodie did 
not have her substantive due process rights violated.   
¶74 In P.P., this court found that "the statutory step-by-
step process that underlies § 48.415(4) is sufficient to show 
that subsection (4) is narrowly tailored to advance the State’s 
compelling 
interest 
of 
protecting 
children 
against 
unfit 
parents[.]"  Id., ¶26.  A similar step-by-step statutory process 
underlies § 48.415(2).  See Julie A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶23.  
Accordingly, the full statutory scheme should be analyzed in 
this case.   
¶75 Jodie's 
individualized 
determination 
of 
unfitness 
began when Kenosha County filed a CHIPS petition.  Jodie was 
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given notice of the petition.  A hearing was held within 30 
days.  Jodie had the right to a jury trial at the fact-finding 
hearing.  The circuit court found jurisdiction over Max, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.13(8).  The matter proceeded to a 
dispositional hearing.  At the dispositional hearing, the court 
made findings to maintain and protect the well-being of the 
child that were the least restrictive to the parent and the 
child.  Jodie never contested any of these proceedings.   
¶76 After the court entered the CHIPS order, the state 
filed the TPR petition nearly 17 months after the disposition 
hearing.  On the grounds phase, Jodie pled no contest.  If she 
had not entered a plea of no contest, a fact-finding hearing 
would have occurred.  She would have been entitled to a further 
individualized determination related to her fitness as a parent.  
The state would have had the burden of proving that reasonable 
efforts had been made to provide the services ordered by the 
court.  Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)2.b. Satisfying the reasonable 
efforts element would have required the state to prove that the 
services ordered by the court took into consideration the 
characteristics 
of 
the 
parent 
and 
the 
child.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)2.a.  The grounds stage presented Jodie 
with the opportunity to challenge the conditions imposed for the 
safe return of Max.  However, Jodie pled no contest. 
¶77 After Jodie pled no contest, the court held a  
dispositional hearing, at which time the court considered the 
factors pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3).  The factors 
include, but are not limited to, the likelihood the child will 
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be adopted, the child's age and health, the relationship between 
the parent and the child, the child's wishes, the duration of 
the child's separation from the parent, and whether a more 
stable family relationship will result from the termination.   
¶78 Regardless of the step-by-step statutory process that 
underlies § 48.415(2), the majority concludes that "the circuit 
court improperly deemed Jodie unfit solely by virtue of her 
status as an incarcerated person without regard for her actual 
parenting activities or the condition of her child."  Majority 
op., ¶55 (emphasis added).  Rather than recognizing that Jodie's 
no contest plea affected the process for deeming Jodie unfit, 
the majority uses this set of circumstances to conclude that the 
conditions imposed on Jodie and the circuit court's evaluation 
during the grounds stage violated Jodie's substantive due 
process rights.   
¶79 However, the state did not act arbitrarily, wrongly, 
or oppressively.  "[T]he court did not consider other relevant 
facts 
and 
circumstances 
particular 
to 
Jodie 
until 
the 
dispositional phase," majority op., ¶52, because the court had 
concluded a valid no contest plea had been entered.   
¶80 The inconsistency between the majority's conclusion 
that Jodie had her parental rights terminated "solely by virtue 
of her status as an incarcerated person" and the reality of this 
case has a simple explanation: In the face of this court's case 
law and the statutes, the majority looked to a Nevada Supreme 
Court case, J.L.N. v. Nevada, 55 P.3d 955 (2002).     
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¶81 In J.L.N., the Nevada Supreme Court applied a statute 
unlike Wisconsin's.  An examination of the underlying Nevada 
statutes related to the termination of parental rights exposes 
that Nevada's legislature made very different policy judgments 
than Wisconsin's legislature.  In Nevada, "[t]he primary 
consideration in any proceeding to terminate parental rights 
must be whether the best interests of the child will be served 
by the termination."  Nev. Rev. Stat. § 128.105 (2004).  There 
is not a two-step termination procedure.  There is not a step 
where the parent's rights are paramount.   
¶82 Conversely, in Wisconsin, the rights of the parent are 
paramount during the grounds step of the termination proceeding.  
Julie A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶24.  Based on P.P., 279 Wis. 2d 
169, ¶26 and Julie A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶23, the Wisconsin 
Legislature crafted a statutory step-by-step process so that it 
provides an individualized determination of unfitness.     
¶83 The 
Wisconsin 
Legislature 
also 
expressly 
granted 
courts the necessary exclusive jurisdiction 
over children 
alleged to be in need of protection or services as a result of 
their parent being incarcerated.  Wis. Stat. § 48.13(8).  Rather 
than creating a safe harbor for incarcerated parents, as the 
majority attempts to do in this case, the legislature ensured 
that 
a 
child 
receiving 
inadequate 
care as 
a 
result of 
incarceration was grounds for the statutory step-by-step process 
to proceed.      
¶84 Nevertheless, the majority cavalierly finds that the 
statutory process inadequately provided Jodie an individualized 
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determination.  Not only must courts now seemingly advise a 
parent that pleading no contest at the grounds step is 
inadvisable, but court-ordered conditions must be more tailored 
for incarcerated parents.  The majority fails to share its 
vision of how exactly the state is going to be able to come up 
with such conditions, and also protect the interests of a child.   
¶85 The majority creates a special class of children who 
will be left to linger while their parents serve time for their 
volitional acts.  In its effort to protect incarcerated parents, 
the 
majority 
inadvertently 
imposes 
on 
the 
children 
of 
incarcerated parents a sentence in limbo.  This contradicts the 
stated purpose of the Children's Code, which "recognize[s] the 
importance of eliminating the need for children to wait 
unreasonable periods of time for their parents to correct the 
conditions that prevent their safe return to the family."  
Wis. Stat. § 48.01(a).   
¶86 The majority also fails to share how its new scheme 
will work when the incarcerated parent has been sentenced to a 
longer term than Jodie's.  Will a two-year-old whose parent has 
been sentenced to 14 years need to wait until she is 16 to get a 
stable family relationship?  What happens when a parent will be 
incarcerated for longer than the remainder of his or her child's 
adolescence?  The majority opinion leaves these questions 
unanswered.   
¶87 I cannot support such a distortion of the step-by-step 
process underlying Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2), especially when it 
leads to this setback in the care the state provides children 
No.  2005AP2-NM.jpw 
 
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neglected by their incarcerated parents.  The distortion is all 
the more perplexing given that Jodie waived her constitutional 
challenge upon the entry of her valid no contest plea.    
¶88 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
¶89 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
joins this opinion.  
 
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