Title: WILLIE EARL SUTTON, III V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WILLIE EARL SUTTON, III V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 148220 P.3d 784Case Number: S-09-0072Decided: 12/09/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 

WILLIE 
EARL SUTTON, III,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      After 
conditionally pleading guilty to a controlled substance offense, Mr. Sutton 
challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence 
discovered during a search of the vehicle he was driving.  He maintains that he was 
unconstitutionally detained for a canine drug sniff.  We conclude that the trooper had 
reasonable suspicion to detain him and affirm.            

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Sutton states 
a single issue on appeal:

 
 
            
Was the continued detention of Mr. Sutton after he refused to consent to 
a search supported by reasonable suspicion?

 
 
The 
State phrases the issue as:

 
 
            
Were Appellant's constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution violated, and did the district court err in denying 
his motion to suppress?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On March 15, 
2007, Mr. Sutton was driving a blue Pontiac car with California license plates 
eastbound on I-80.  Wyoming Highway 
Patrol Trooper Jeremy Mrsny stopped the vehicle for traveling 80 miles per hour 
in a 75 miles per hour zone.  The 
stop was video recorded by Trooper Mrsny.  
Trooper Mrsny approached the car and greeted Mr. Sutton.  He noticed some items on the front 
passenger seat of the car, including large cooking bags and a bottle of No-Doz; 
two cell phones were located on the center console.  Mr. Sutton stated that he was traveling 
to Denver, Colorado to see his girlfriend who was due to have a baby on March 
14, 2007, (the day before the stop).  
Trooper Mrsny informed him that he had missed the I-25 exit to 
Denver.  Mr. Sutton provided the 
trooper with a rental agreement for the car and an Illinois driver's 
license.   

 
 
[¶4]      Trooper Mrsny 
asked Mr. Sutton to accompany him to the patrol car.  Reviewing the rental agreement, the 
trooper noticed that Mr. Sutton had rented the car in San Francisco, California 
for one day.  The rental agreement 
stated that he had rented the car on March 13, 2007, and the car was due to have 
been returned to the rental company the day before, March 14, 2007.  When asked about the terms of the rental 
agreement, Mr. Sutton explained that, when he rented the car, he did not know 
how long he was going to need it so he just rented it for one day but the term 
could be extended.     

 
 
[¶5]      Trooper Mrsny 
issued a warning to Mr. Sutton and told him he was free to leave.  After Mr. Sutton exited the patrol car, 
the trooper followed him and asked for permission to ask some more 
questions.  Mr. Sutton acquiesced to 
the additional questioning.  Trooper 
Mrsny asked again about the one-day rental.  Mr. Sutton stated that he had originally 
rented the car just to drive around San Francisco, but had decided at the last 
minute to travel to Denver and he had called the rental company to make 
arrangements to extend the rental period.  
The trooper inquired whether there were illegal drugs in the car, asking 
about several controlled substances individually, and Mr. Sutton denied having 
any such contraband.  Trooper Mrsny 
then asked for permission to search the car and Mr. Sutton refused.    

 
 
[¶6]      Trooper Mrsny 
informed Mr. Sutton that he was detaining him for a canine drug sniff.  The canine unit arrived approximately 
twelve minutes later and the dog immediately alerted.  The officers searched the trunk, 
recovering approximately five pounds of marijuana, some packaged in oven cooking 
bags.      

 
 
[¶7]      Mr. Sutton was 
arrested and charged with one count of possession with intent to deliver 
marijuana, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (LexisNexis2009), 
and one count of felony possession of marijuana in violation of § 
35-7-1031(c)(iii) (LexisNexis 2009).1  Mr. Sutton filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence recovered as a result of the search, asserting several different 
arguments that his detention and the search violated the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  The 
district court held a hearing and denied the suppression motion.  Mr. Sutton then entered into a plea 
agreement with the State.  He pled 
guilty to possession with intent to deliver marijuana, reserving his right to 
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.  The district court entered a Judgment and 
Sentence, but the order did not state that Mr. Sutton's plea was 
conditional.  Mr. Sutton 
appealed.  

 
 
[¶8]      After the appeal 
was already docketed in this Court, Mr. Sutton filed a motion for a nunc pro tunc order to correct the 
Judgment and Sentence because it did not state that his plea was 
conditional.  The district court 
entered the corrected order, and we granted Mr. Sutton's motion to supplement 
the record with the Judgment Nunc Pro 
Tunc.2  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      We apply the 
following standard in reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress 
evidence:

            
Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion 
of the trial court.   Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, ¶ 39, 67 P.3d 1207, ¶ 39 (Wyo. 2003).  We 
will not disturb such rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion.   Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when 
it is shown the trial court reasonably could not have concluded as it did.   Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 320, ¶ 13 (Wyo. 2004).  Factual 
findings made by a trial court considering a motion to suppress will not be 
disturbed unless the findings are clearly erroneous.   Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶ 8, 37 P.3d 1279, ¶ 8 (Wyo. 2002).  Because the 
trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence, assess witness 
credibility, and draw the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, we 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination.  Id. Whether an unreasonable search or 
seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights presents a question of 
law and is reviewed de novo.  Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 480 
(Wyo. 1999).

 
 

O'Boyle 
v. State, 2005 
WY 83, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d 401, 407 (Wyo. 2005).  See also, Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 10, 169 P.3d 538, 542 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶10]   The Fourth Amendment 
states:

 
 
            
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.  

 
 
We 
recognize three tiers of interaction between police and citizens under the 
Fourth Amendmentconsensual encounter, investigatory detention and arrest.  Custer v. State, 2006 WY 72, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d 620, 624-25 (Wyo. 2006).  See also, Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 691-92 
(Wyo. 1993).  A traffic stop is 
analogous to a second tier investigatory detention and is sometimes termed a Terry stop.3   Barch v. State, 2004 WY 79, ¶ 7, 92 P.3d 828, 831 (Wyo. 2004).  "[A]n 
investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop . . . " O'Boyle, ¶ 47, 117 P.3d  at 414.  The officer may expand the investigative 
detention beyond the scope of the initial stop only if the traveler consents to 
the expanded detention or if "there exists an objectively reasonable suspicion 
that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring."  Id., citing Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 13, 64 P.3d 700, 706 (Wyo. 2003).   

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Sutton claims that Trooper 
Mrsny did not have an objectively reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in 
criminal activity to justify detaining him for the canine sniff.  In determining whether an officer had a 
reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment, we look to the totality of the 
circumstances and how those circumstances developed during the officer's 
encounter with the occupant of the vehicle.  See, Flood, ¶ 23, 169 P.3d  at 545.     

 
 
The 
Supreme Court has instructed that we not examine each factor adding up to 
reasonable suspicion individually, but that we evaluate how convincingly they 
fit together into a cohesive, convincing picture of illegal conduct. In 
[United States v.] Arvizu, [534 U.S. 266, 122 S. Ct. 744, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 
(2002)], the Court rejected what is called a "divide-and-conquer analysis," 
noting that reasonable suspicion may exist even if "each observation" is 
"susceptible to an innocent explanation." Arvizu, 534 U.S.  at 274, 122 S. Ct. 744.

 
 

Garvin 
v. State, 2007 
WY 190, ¶ 16, 172 P.3d 725, 729-30 (Wyo. 2007), quoting United States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d 784, 
787 (10th Cir. 2007).   
In considering the totality of the circumstances, "[c]ommon sense and 
ordinary human experience are to be employed, and deference is to be accorded a 
law enforcement officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious 
actions."  Damato, ¶ 16, 64 P.3d  at 707, quoting 
United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 
946 (10th Cir. 1997).   

 
 
[¶12]   The district court ruled that the 
trooper had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Sutton:

 
 
In 
this case, as in many, if each item [of evidence] is viewed in isolation, as a 
sort of "snapshot" without reference to those before and after, they each in 
turn seem insignificant.  (Though 
one exception to this may be the presence of the large cooking bags in the front 
seat of the car, as no ordinary reason for their presence springs to mind.  Defendant's brief suggests none.)  

 
 
A 
different image emerges, however, when the trooper's observations and the 
defendant's answers and comments each are considered in light of the one before 
and how they lead to the next question and response.  That Mr. Sutton said he missed the exit 
from I-80 to I-25 leading to Denver, for example, is not remarkable, though the 
exit would be conspicuously indicated on the Interstate highway and something 
for which, presumably, the defendant would be looking.  But, by the time the trooper heard of 
the missed exit, he had already seen the cooking bags and knew that such bags 
are commonly used by drug couriers to package high-grade marijuana to suppress 
the odor and prevent crushing of the product.  In very short order he learned that the 
car driven by Mr. Sutton was a car rented in San Francisco for one day, that Mr. 
Sutton ha[d] an Illinois driver's license and that the purpose for the rental of 
the car was for a trip from San Francisco to Denver and 
back.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
The 
trooper could reasonably, as he did, infer from the observations and information 
that Mr. Sutton might be transporting marijuana, [using] the cooking bags to 
package it and suppress its odor, pass[ed] the I-25 turnoff because his 
destination was not Denver, may have used a rental car with a one-day agreement 
because he did not intend to return it, and had an Illinois driver's license 
because he lived in Chicago not California, and started in San Francisco because 
that was the source of the cargo.  
Given the trooper's training, experience and observations, these were 
inferences that he could reasonably draw and they amount to reasonable 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity such that detention beyond the reason 
for the stop was justified.

 
 
[¶13]   Mr. Sutton claims that the district 
court's finding that the car was rented for only one day was clearly 
erroneous.  He maintains that the 
rental agreement provided for a minimum one day rental "but was otherwise an 
open rental agreement with a daily and weekly rate."  The rental agreement actually had two 
parts.  The original agreement was 
for a white Taurus; however, Mr. Sutton exchanged it for the blue Pontiac.  The agreement was apparently a standard 
form and although it contained hourly, daily and weekly rates, it specifically 
stated that Mr. Sutton was renting the car for one day.  The inclusion of weekly rates on the 
standard form rental agreement does not support Mr. Sutton's claim that the 
agreement was open ended.  

 
 
[¶14]   Mr. Sutton also claims a notation 
on the agreement, which indicated that he was allowed to return the car to an 
alternate location with a rate change, confirmed the rental was open-ended.  The notation in the second part of the 
agreement4 stated:  "REMARKS: RET TO ORD/ADJ RTE IC/B."  The trooper testified that he did not 
know what the notation meant and neither Mr. Sutton nor a representative from 
the rental agency testified at the suppression hearing to explain the meaning of 
the notation.  Even if we assume, as 
Mr. Sutton advocates, that the notation allowed him to return the car to another 
location with a corresponding rate adjustment, that does not change the fact 
that the agreement specified a one-day rental. 

 
 
[¶15]   Mr. Sutton also asserts that he 
invited the trooper to call the rental company to verify that he had extended 
the rental agreement and the trooper had an obligation to do so.  Initially, we note that it is not 
entirely clear from the video that Mr. Sutton invited Trooper Mrsny to call the 
rental company.  We have, however, 
reviewed cases where officers have called rental companies to confirm a 
traveler's assertions about his travel plans, see, e.g., Feeney v. State, 2009 WY 67, ¶ 5, 208 P.3d 50, 52 (Wyo. 2009), but those cases did not state that the trooper was 
required to undertake such an investigation.  Mr. Sutton claims that Damato, ¶ 24, 64 P.3d  at 709-10, is 
authority for the proposition that the trooper was required to call the rental 
company.  In Damato, we criticized the trooper for 
failing to ask the defendant about discrepancies between his statements 
concerning where he had rented the car and where he was to return the car and 
the information contained in the rental agreement.  Here, the trooper did ask Mr. Sutton 
about the discrepancies.  Damato does not, therefore, support Mr. 
Sutton's assertion that the trooper was required to call the rental company 
before considering the fact that the car should have been returned the day 
before as a basis for reasonable suspicion to detain him.  

 
 
[¶16]   In Garvin, the rental agreement stated that 
the car should have been returned six days before the day of the stop.  When the trooper asked her about the 
past due rental agreement, Ms. Garvin explained that she had left on her trip 
later than expected and she had contacted the rental agency to extend the return 
date on the vehicle.  Garvin, ¶ 5, 172 P.3d  at 727.  We ruled that, even with Ms. Garvin's 
explanation, the trooper properly relied on the past due rental agreement as a 
factor that supported a finding of reasonable suspicion.  Id., ¶¶ 15-17, 172 P.3d  at 729-30.  That decision does not indicate that the 
trooper was required to further investigate Ms. Garvin's explanation by calling 
the rental company before he could use the late return as a factor in his 
analysis.  

 
 
[¶17]   Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the district court's determination, we conclude its factual 
finding that the rental agreement showed a one day rental was not clearly 
erroneous.  Mr. Sutton does not 
dispute any of the district court's other factual findings but argues that the 
factors were insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish reasonable suspicion 
to detain him for a canine drug sniff.   

 
 
[¶18]   Turning then to the factors cited 
by the trooper and district court as establishing reasonable suspicion, we start 
with the aforementioned rental agreement.  
We have stated that a rental agreement that contradicts or is somehow 
inconsistent with the traveler's plans is an appropriate consideration in a 
reasonable suspicion analysis.  See, e.g., Feeney, ¶ 21, 208 P.3d at  56-57; Garvin, ¶¶ 15-17, 172 P.3d  at 
729-30.  The fact that the rental 
agreement indicated that Mr. Sutton had only rented the car for one day and it 
should have been returned the day before the stop was a legitimate factor in the 
reasonable suspicion analysis.   

 
 
[¶19]   We have recognized that "unusual or 
inconsistent travel plans are a proper consideration in a reasonable suspicion 
analysis."  Feeney, ¶ 20, 208 P.3d  at 56.  See also, Flood, ¶¶ 30, 33, 169 P.3d  at 
547-48.  Mr. Sutton told the trooper 
that he had begun his trip in San Francisco, where he had been staying for 
approximately one month, and he was traveling to Denver.  He had, however, passed the exit to 
Denver by several miles.  Mr. Sutton 
stated that his girlfriend was living and attending school in Denver and he had 
made a last minute decision to travel to Denver to attend the birth of his 
child, although he was already one day past the due date.  He also stated that he did not know how 
long he would stay in Denver.  Mr. 
Sutton's explanation of his trip was, to say the least, strange.  

 
 
[¶20]   The trooper attempted to clarify 
whether Mr. Sutton's Illinois driver's license correctly stated a Chicago 
address since he had come from California.  
Mr. Sutton explained that the Illinois address was correct and he had 
been in California for about a month because he was "taking a break" from 
Chicago and wanted to see if he would like to live there.  Later in the stop, Mr. Sutton stated 
that he had just started a new job in Illinois before he left to go to 
California, but he was allowed to take a month off because business was 
slow.    

 
 
[¶21]   All in all, the situation described 
by Mr. Sutton was certainly odd, if not implausible.  He lived and worked in Illinois, yet he 
had been in California for nearly a month; his pregnant girlfriend lived in 
Denver, where he was traveling to at the last minute in order to attend the 
birth of his baby; he did not know how long he would stay in Denver even though 
he was driving a rental car which would amount to a considerable expense.  The trooper was certainly entitled to 
rely on the unusual nature of this story in making his reasonable suspicion 
determination.    

 
 
[¶22]   The presence of the cooking bags on 
the front passenger seat was also suspicious.  Trooper Mrsny, who was specially trained 
in drug interdiction, testified that he was aware that such bags are used by 
drug couriers to package marijuana because they mask the smell and do not crush 
the controlled substance.  As the 
district court noted, no plausible explanation for the presence of the bags 
readily comes to mind and Mr. Sutton did not suggest any such explanation to the 
district court or on appeal.  We 
have stated that the presence of a potential odor masking agent is an 
appropriate factor for consideration in the reasonable suspicion analysis.  See, Feeney, ¶ 16, 208 P.3d  at 55; Flood, ¶ 24, 169 P.3d  at 546.  While those cases dealt with a masking 
odordryer sheets and cologne, the presence of a product or device used to 
suppress odor like the cooking bags would also be a proper consideration.  

 
 
[¶23]   Although not mentioned by the 
district court in its ruling denying the motion to suppress, the trooper also 
testified that he considered Mr. Sutton's unusual level of nervousness as a 
factor in his reasonable suspicion analysis.  Mr. Sutton claims the trooper's 
statements that he seemed unduly nervous are not borne out by the record.  The trooper testified that Mr. Sutton 
was fidgeting in the patrol car and was sweating even though he complained it 
was cold outside.  He further stated 
that, when they shook hands after the trooper gave him the warning, he noticed 
Mr. Sutton's hand was shaking and very sweaty.  The trooper testified that Mr. Sutton 
seemed even more nervous and broke eye contact when specifically asked whether 
he was transporting marijuana, as opposed to other illegal drugs.    

 
 
[¶24]   Generic nervousness has little 
weight in establishing reasonable suspicion because a citizen may be expected to 
be somewhat nervous when stopped by law enforcement for a traffic 
violation.  Flood, ¶ 27, 169 P.3d  at 546.  However, extreme and continued 
nervousness is entitled to more weight.  
Id.  Moreover, factors such as acting 
evasive or breaking eye contact when asked certain questions can also form the 
basis for reasonable suspicion.  See, e.g., Garvin, ¶ 17, 172 P.3d  at 730 (noting 
that defendant flushed, was evasive and looked away from the officer when 
answering certain questions but did not exhibit those reactions when answering 
others).  There is nothing in the 
record to contradict the trooper's testimony that Mr. Sutton was unusually 
nervous throughout their encounter and reacted suspiciously when asked whether 
he was transporting marijuana.   
Consequently, we conclude Mr. Sutton's nervousness is a factor that may 
be given some weight in the reasonable suspicion analysis.  

 
 
[¶25]   These factors, the past due rental 
agreement, the unusual travel plans, the oven cooking bags and the unusual 
nervousness, when viewed individually could be seen as innocuous.  Nevertheless, when they are all 
considered together and in relation to one another, they justify the trooper's 
suspicion that Mr. Sutton was engaging in illegal activities.  Mr. Sutton's constitutional rights were 
not violated when the trooper detained him for the canine drug sniff.  

 
 
[¶26]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Section 35-7-1031 states in relevant part:

 
 

(a)   Except 
as authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, 
deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled 
substance. Any person who violates this subsection with respect 
to:

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
(ii) 
Any other controlled substance classified in Schedule I, II or III, is guilty of 
a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, 
fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or 
both;

 
 
. . . .

 

(c)   It 
is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled 
substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to a 
valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this act. Any person 
who violates this subsection:

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
(iii) 
And has in his possession any other controlled substance classified in Schedule 
I, II or III in an amount greater than set forth in paragraph (c)(i) of this 
section, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five 
(5) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or 
both[.]

 
 

2The record contains a written plea agreement but it did not state that 
Mr. Sutton was reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression 
motion.  Defense counsel did state 
at the rearraignment hearing that Mr. Sutton was reserving the right to appeal 
the denial of his motion to suppress and the district court acknowledged the 
conditional nature of the plea.  
Interestingly, the transcript does not indicate that the prosecutor 
uttered a single word during Mr. Sutton's change of plea hearing, so there was 
no express State consent to the conditional plea.  The parties did not mention the 
conditional nature of the plea at the sentencing hearing and the original 
Judgment and Sentence did not properly reflect the conditional plea.  However, that error was corrected in the 
Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc.    

 
 
The procedure employed in this case for entering a conditional plea did 
not conform with W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) or our decision in Walters v. State, 2008 WY 159, 197 P.3d 1273 (Wyo. 2008), in that the right to appeal was not initially reserved in 
writing and the State did not expressly consent to the conditional plea.  However, given that the precise issue 
preserved for appellate review is clear in the record; neither party raised a 
specific issue challenging the conditional nature of the plea; the purpose of 
the conditional plea proceduresto ensure that the ruling appealed is 
dispositive, Id., ¶ 15, 197 P.3d at 
1277-78was unquestionably served here; and the record was corrected to reflect 
that the plea was conditional, we will exercise our discretion to consider the 
substantive issue.  Tucker v. State, 2009 WY 107, ¶ 19, 214 P.3d 236, 242 (Wyo. 
2009).

 
 

3Named after the seminal case Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 
(1968).

 
 

4A similar handwritten note was included in the first part of the 
agreement.