Title: MacIel v. People

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

469 P.2d 135 (1970) Benjamin MACIEL, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. No. 24432. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. May 18, 1970. Benjamin Maciel, pro se. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., Robert L. Hoecker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error. KELLEY, Justice. The defendant is here, pro se, on a writ of error to the District Court of Pueblo County, questioning the constitutionality of the trial court's denial of his motion under Crim.P. 35(a). Rule 35(a) authorizes the court to "correct an illegal sentence at any time." The sole question to be decided on this review, as stated in defendant's brief, is: The defendant was arrested on November 16, 1968, on a charge of burglary. He was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. Unable to furnish a bond in the amount of $2000 to gain his freedom pending trial, Maciel remained in jail until he was sentenced on April 14, 1969, following his conviction on a plea of guilty. The defendant was sentenced to serve a term in the penitentiary of not less than five years nor more than eight years. He could have been sentenced to "confinement in the penitentiary for a term not less than one year nor more than ten years." C.R.S.1963, 40-3-5. The defendant, in his motion, alleged In other words, argues the defendant, he is required to serve a sentence four months and twenty-eight days longer than would another individual in like circumstances, except for the ability of the other individual to meet the requirements for bail. In ruling upon the motion for correction of sentence, the trial judge noted that The defendant, by way of rejoinder, contends The only authority cited by defendant in support of his position is Wilson v. Town of Handsboro, 99 Miss. 252, 54 So. 845. This decision is authority for the proposition that courts have inherent power to correct clerical errors at any time, and to make the judgment entry correspond with the judgment rendered. The case is not in point. The trial court here, in disposing of the 35(a) motion, reaffirmed the correctness of the original judgment. Three United States Courts of Appeal have considered the problem presented by the defendant. Ballard v. United States, 388 F.2d 607 (5th Cir.); Dunn v. United States, 376 F.2d 191 (4th Cir.); Stapf v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 100, 367 F.2d 326. The reasoning of the earliest case, Stapf v. United States, was adopted by the two subsequent ones. To the extent that it bears directly upon the problem before us, we adopt this language from Stapf: This means that where, as here, the actual sentence imposed plus the time spent in jail prior to sentence do not exceed the maximum sentence which could be imposed, it will be conclusively presumed that the sentencing court gave the defendant credit for the presentence time spent in confinement. The court, in Stapf, justified the conclusive presumption rule with this reasoning: The court here stated specifically that it took the presentence confinement *137 time into consideration, together with other factors, in determining the sentence; hence, it is not necessary to rely on the presumption. The judgment is affirmed.