Title: State v. Sanders

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 60A14   
19 December 2014 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA  
 
 
v. 
RONDELL LUVELL SANDERS 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel 
of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 753 S.E.2d 713 (2014), affirming in part 
and  remanding for resentencing in part a judgment entered on 15 February 2013 
by Judge Wayland J. Sermons, Jr. in Superior Court, Beaufort County.  Heard in 
the Supreme Court on 18 November 2014. 
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Laura E. Parker, Assistant Attorney 
General, for the State-appellant. 
 
W. Michael Spivey for defendant-appellee. 
 
BEASLEY, Justice.  
 
On 19 November 2009, a jury found Rondell Luvell Sanders (“defendant”) 
guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon.  At sentencing, the trial court awarded 
sentencing points for defendant’s two prior Tennessee misdemeanor convictions, 
finding the Tennessee offenses of “theft of property” and “domestic assault” to be 
substantially similar to North Carolina offenses.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
remanded the case and instructed the trial court to consider the elements of the 
STATE V. SANDERS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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offenses, rather than their punishments, when determining substantial similarity.  
State v. Sanders, ___  N.C. App. ___, 736 S.E.2d 238 (2013).  On remand, the trial 
court considered the elements and determined the Tennessee offenses to be 
substantially similar to the North Carolina offenses of “larceny” and “assault on a 
female.”  It is from the trial court’s order on remand that defendant presently 
appeals.   
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and remanded in part 
the trial court’s judgment.  State v. Sanders, ___  N.C. App. ___, ___, 753 S.E.2d 713, 
717 (2014).  The court unanimously affirmed the trial court’s determination that the 
Tennessee offense of “theft of property” is substantially similar to the North 
Carolina offense of “larceny.”1   Id. at ___, 753 S.E.2d at 716.  The Court of Appeals 
majority held that the trial court erred in finding the Tennessee offense of “domestic 
assault” to be substantially similar to the North Carolina offense of “assault on a 
female.”  Id. at ___, 753 S.E.2d at 717.  The majority concluded that the elements of 
the Tennessee offense differed from the North Carolina offense to such an extent 
that the two offenses were not substantially similar.  Id. at ___, 743 S.E.2d at 717.  
The dissent disagreed, and would have held that, because the purposes of the two 
states’ offenses are similar and because additional evidence in the record would 
demonstrate that defendant’s conduct would satisfy the elements of the North 
                                            
1 This Court denied defendant’s petition for discretionary review of this 
unanimous holding on 11 June 2014.  ___ N.C. ___, 758 S.E.2d 861 (2014). 
STATE V. SANDERS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Carolina offense, the State met its burden of establishing the two offenses’ 
substantial similarity by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at ___, 753 S.E.2d at 
719-20 (Bryant, J., dissenting).  The State appeals the holding of the Court of 
Appeals on the basis of the dissent pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2).   
Subsection 15A-1340.14(e) governs the assignment of sentencing points for 
prior convictions in other jurisdictions and states, in pertinent part, that 
[i]f the State proves by the preponderance of the evidence 
that an offense classified as a misdemeanor in the other 
jurisdiction is substantially similar to an offense classified 
as a Class A1 or Class 1 misdemeanor in North Carolina, the 
conviction is treated as a Class A1 or Class 1 misdemeanor 
for assigning prior record level points. 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.14(e) (2013).  This Court has not addressed the comparison of 
out-of-state offenses with North Carolina offenses for purposes of determining 
substantial similarity under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.14(e).   
First, the State argues that the trial court did not err in determining the 
Tennessee offense of “domestic assault” and the North Carolina offense of “assault 
on a female” to be substantially similar without reviewing the Tennessee statute 
defining the offense of “assault.”   
The Court of Appeals has held that, for purposes of determining “substantial 
similarity” under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.14(e), a party may establish the elements of 
an out-of-state offense by providing “evidence of the statute law of such state.”  
STATE V. SANDERS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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State v. Rich, 130 N.C. App. 113, 117, 502 S.E.2d 49, 52 (citing N.C.G.S. § 8-3), disc. 
rev. denied, 349 N.C. 237, 516 S.E.2d 605 (1998).  Further, the Court of Appeals has 
consistently held that when evidence of the applicable law is not presented to the 
trial court, the party seeking a determination of substantial similarity has failed to 
meet its burden of establishing substantial similarity by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  See, e.g., State v. Burgess, 216 N.C. App. 54, 57-58, 715 S.E.2d 867, 870 
(2011) (holding that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of out-of-state 
convictions’ similarity to North Carolina offenses when, inter alia, the State provided 
copies of the 2008 version of the applicable out-of-state statutes, but did not present 
evidence that the statutes were unchanged from the 1993 and 1994 versions under 
which the defendant had been convicted); State v. Wright, 210 N.C. App. 52, 70-72, 708 
S.E.2d 112, 125-26 (holding that when the State did not provide evidence of the New 
York and Connecticut statutes under which the defendant had been convicted, did not 
submit copies of the applicable out-of-state statutes, and did not furnish a comparison 
of the statutes’ provisions with the laws of North Carolina, the State failed to 
demonstrate the substantial similarity of the out-of-state convictions to North Carolina 
crimes), disc. rev. denied, 365 N.C. 200, 710 S.E.2d 9 (2011); State v. Morgan, 164 N.C. 
App. 298, 309, 595 S.E.2d 804, 812 (2004) (holding that the State failed to meet its 
burden of showing that the defendant’s prior conviction was substantially similar to a 
North Carolina offense when it offered the 2002 version of the applicable New Jersey 
statute governing the defendant’s 1987 New Jersey conviction, but failed to present any 
evidence that the statute was unchanged from 1987 to 2002).  
STATE V. SANDERS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Section 39-13-111 of the Tennessee Code Annotated provides that “[a] person 
commits domestic assault who commits an assault as defined in § 39-13-101 against 
a domestic abuse victim.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111(b) (2009).  Section 39-13-
101 of the Tennessee Code Annotated, in turn, establishes that someone commits an 
“assault” when he or she: “(1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily 
injury to another; (2) Intentionally or knowingly causes another to reasonably fear 
imminent bodily injury; or (3) Intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact 
with another and a reasonable person would regard the contact as extremely 
offensive or provocative.”  Id. § 39-13-101(a)(1)-(3) (2009).  Here the State provided 
the trial court with a photocopy of the 2009 version2 of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111, 
but did not give the trial court a photocopy of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101.   
We agree with the Court of Appeals that for a party to meet its burden of 
establishing substantial similarity of an out-of-state offense to a North Carolina 
offense by the preponderance of the evidence, the party seeking the determination 
of substantial similarity must provide evidence of the applicable law.  We therefore 
hold that it was error for the trial court to determine that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-
111 was substantially similar to a North Carolina offense without reviewing Tenn. 
                                            
2 We note that the 2009 version was not, in fact, the version of the statute 
actually in force at the time of defendant’s Tennessee conviction.  After defendant 
was convicted on 6 January 2009, the statute was amended to add subsection (c)(3).  
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111 (2009) (showing the effective date of the 2009 
amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111 as 1 July 2009).   
STATE V. SANDERS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Code Ann. § 39-13-101, which is explicitly referenced by Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-
111 and defines Tennessee’s statutory elements of assault. 
 
Second, the State argues the trial court did not err in its determination that 
the Tennessee offense of “domestic assault” and the North Carolina offense of 
“assault on a female” were substantially similar.  The State urges this Court to look 
beyond the elements of the offenses and consider (1) the underlying facts of 
defendant’s out-of-state conviction, and (2) whether, considering the legislative 
purpose of the respective statutes defining the offenses, the North Carolina offense 
is “suitably equivalent” to the out-of-state offense.   
In North Carolina, “any person who commits [an] assault” is guilty of a class 
A1 misdemeanor “if, in the course of the assault, . . . he or she . . . [a]ssaults a 
female, he being a male person at least 18 years of age.”  N.C.G.S. § 14-33(c), (c)(2) 
(2013).  The offense “assault on a female” thus requires that (1) the assailant be 
male, (2) the assailant be at least eighteen years old, and (3) the victim of the 
assault be female.  Id., § 14-33(c)(2).  The offense does not require that any type of 
relationship exist between the assailant and the victim. 
In comparison, a person in Tennessee is guilty of the offense of domestic 
assault if that person “commits an assault as defined in § 39-13-101 against a 
domestic abuse victim.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111(b) (2009).  Subsection 39-13-
STATE V. SANDERS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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111(a) of the Tennessee statutes specifically defines a “domestic abuse victim” as 
“any person who falls within the following categories:” 
(1) Adults or minors who are current or former spouses; 
(2) Adults or minors who live together or who have lived 
together; 
(3) Adults or minors who are dating or who have dated or 
who have or had a sexual relationship, but does not 
include fraternization between two (2) individuals in a 
business or social context; 
(4) Adults or minors related by blood or adoption; 
(5) Adults or minors who are related or were formerly 
related by marriage; or 
(6) Adult or minor children of a person in a relationship 
that is described in subdivisions (a)(1)-(5). 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111(a) (2009).  The offense thus requires that the person 
being assaulted fall within at least one of these six enumerated categories of 
domestic relationships.  The offense does not require the victim to be female or the 
assailant to be male and of a certain age. 
The Court of Appeals has stated, and we agree, that “[d]etermination of 
whether the out-of-state conviction is substantially similar to a North Carolina 
offense is a question of law involving comparison of the elements of the out-of-state 
offense to those of the North Carolina offense.”  State v. Fortney, 201 N.C. App. 662, 
671, 687 S.E.2d 518, 525 (2010) (citing State v. Hanton, 175 N.C. App. 250, 255, 623 
S.E.2d 600, 604 (2006)).  The Court of Appeals has appropriately determined certain 
offenses to be insufficiently similar by comparing the elements of out-of-state and 
North Carolina offenses.  See, e.g., State v. Hogan, ___  N.C. App. ___, ___, 758 
STATE V. SANDERS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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S.E.2d 465, 474 (concluding that the New Jersey offense of third-degree theft is not 
substantially similar to the North Carolina offense of misdemeanor larceny “[g]iven 
the disparity in elements” between the definitions of the two offenses), appeal 
dismissed and disc. rev. denied, ___ N.C. ___, 762 S.E.2d 465 (2014); Hanton, 175 
N.C. App. at 258-59, 623 S.E.2d at 606 (determining that the New York offense of 
second-degree assault is not substantially similar to the North Carolina offense of 
assault inflicting serious injury because, unlike the North Carolina offense, the New 
York offense does not require that the defendant cause “serious” physical injury).  
After comparing the elements of the Tennessee offense of “domestic assault” and the 
North Carolina offense of “assault on a female,” we must conclude that the offenses 
are not substantially similar.  Indeed, a woman assaulting her child or her husband 
could be convicted of “domestic assault” in Tennessee, but could not be convicted of 
“assault on a female” in North Carolina.  A male stranger who assaults a woman on 
the street could be convicted of “assault on a female” in North Carolina, but could 
not be convicted of “domestic assault” in Tennessee.   
We therefore hold that the trial court erred in determining the two offenses to 
be substantially similar.  Accordingly, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals 
on this issue and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the 
trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
 
STATE V. SANDERS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.