Title: Norfolk and Western Rwy. Co. v. Puryear

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, 
Koontz, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY 
                                             OPINION BY  
v.  Record No. 950210 
SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
                                           November 3, 1995 
ROBERT E. PURYEAR 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 
 
Clifford R. Weckstein, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether a litigant's 
written summary of those parts of the testimony favorable to his 
case is admissible into evidence as an exhibit.  We are also 
asked to determine whether the trial court improperly ruled that 
a proper foundation was laid for the admission of certain tests 
relied upon by an expert witness. 
 
Robert E. Puryear worked for the Norfolk and Western Railway 
Company (N & W) for 32 years, first as a fireman and an engineer, 
and then, starting in 1975, as a foreman.  While he was a fireman 
and an engineer, Puryear rode on N & W's locomotives every 
working day, and while a foreman, he rode on N & W's locomotives 
three days a week.  Less than a year before his retirement from N 
& W in September 1987, Puryear was advised that he suffered from 
hearing loss. 
 
Two years after retiring, Puryear filed this damage action 
against N & W under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 
45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq.  In this action, Puryear alleged that N & 
W violated a duty of care imposed upon it by FELA in exposing him 
to excessive noise from its locomotives, equipment, and horns, 
thereby causing his hearing loss.  During a jury trial, the trial 
court admitted certain exhibits and expert testimony over N & W's 
 
 
 
 
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objection.  The jury returned a verdict of $150,000 in favor of 
Puryear upon which final judgment was entered.  N & W appeals, 
assigning, among other things, the admission of this evidence as 
error. 
 
Puryear testified that, between 1961 and 1975, he spent 50% 
of his working time riding on General Motors EMD GP-9 
locomotives; another 10% of his working time during this period 
was spent on locomotives he described as "Alcos."   From 1972 to 
1975, Puryear also made approximately 60 trips on General Motors 
EMD-F-7 locomotives.  While a foreman, Puryear also rode on 
General Electric Company C-36-7 locomotives at least one day out 
of the three days each week that he rode on N & W locomotives.  
Puryear testified about the loud noise created by the engines and 
equipment on the GP-9, F-7 and Alco locomotives and the horns of 
the C-36-7 locomotives. 
 
Dr. Angelo Campanella, one of Puryear's expert witnesses on 
the measurement of sound, testified about the noise levels on N & 
W's F-7, GP-9, and C-36-7 locomotives.  According to Dr. 
Campanella, tests which he and other experts had performed 
indicated that the horn on the C-36-7 locomotive and the engines 
and equipment of the F-7 and GP-9 locomotives produced noise in 
excess of sound levels fixed by Federal Railroad Administration 
(FRA) regulations at the time FELA employees were exposed to such 
noise.
*
 
     
*The court ruled that the FRA noise standards fixed N & W's 
 
 
 
 
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(..continued) 
 
Except for Puryear's testimony that the Alco locomotives 
made more noise than the F-7 locomotives, there was no evidence 
that any of the other types of locomotives and equipment on which 
Puryear rode during the balance of his employment exceeded FRA 
noise standards.  In fact, Campanella testified that an SD-40 
locomotive of the same model on which Puryear rode 40% of the 
time from 1961 to 1975 had been tested and found not to exceed 
those standards. 
 
Puryear and his experts on the cause and effect of hearing 
loss testified that his hearing loss developed during his 
employment with N & W.  However, N & W's expert in the same 
field, who examined Puryear after this controversy arose and had 
also reviewed hearing tests performed upon Puryear in 1987, 1989, 
and 1994, opined that Puryear's significant hearing loss occurred 
after he retired, due to an aging phenomenon known as 
presbycusis.  Thus, the evidence conflicted on the issues of the 
amount of Puryear's exposure to the allegedly excessive noise of 
some of N & W's locomotives and equipment and whether that 
exposure caused his hearing loss. 
 
Against this background, we consider whether the trial court 
erred in admitting into evidence two exhibits relevant to these 
conflicts.  The first exhibit was Puryear's written summary of 
duty of care and no error has been assigned to that ruling.  
Therefore, it became the law of the case. 
 
 
 
 
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his testimony on the amount of time he spent on locomotives that 
he and Dr. Campanella regarded as excessively noisy.  The second 
exhibit was a chart prepared by Dr. Campanella, based on the 
information in Puryear's summary.  This chart summarized Dr. 
Campanella's testimony on his calculations of Puryear's periods 
of exposure to the excessive noise of these locomotives. 
 
N & W contends that these exhibits should not have been 
admitted into evidence because they summarized only those parts 
of Puryear's oral testimony favorable to his contentions and 
because, during its deliberations, the jury might have placed 
more weight on these written summaries than on their collective 
recollection of the actual testimony.  Puryear responds by 
claiming that "[t]his Court has routinely approved the admission 
of summary exhibits into evidence." 
 
None of the cases relied upon by Puryear deals with the 
issue of the admissibility of summaries or charts of favorable 
parts of oral testimony upon a contested issue.  In Peterson v. 
Neme, 222 Va. 477, 281 S.E.2d 869 (1981), we specifically stated 
that "the only question presented by this assignment of error is 
whether the plaintiff's lay opinion [of her injuries and 
disabilities] and the supporting exhibit [summarizing part of the 
plaintiff's oral testimony] were admissible to prove causal 
connection between her injuries and her capacity to work."  Id. 
at 483, 281 S.E.2d at 872.  Thus, we were not deciding whether 
the plaintiff's summary of her testimony was admissible as an 
 
 
 
 
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exhibit.  In Marefield Meadows, Inc. v. Lorenz, 245 Va. 255, 264, 
427 S.E.2d 363, 368 (1993), and Avocet Development Corp. v. 
McLean Bank, 234 Va. 658, 667, 364 S.E.2d 757, 762 (1988), we 
approved the introduction of exhibits that summarized voluminous 
documentary evidence that was not in dispute. 
 
And, contrary to Puryear's reading of Scott v. Greater 
Richmond Transit Co., 241 Va. 300, 305, 402 S.E.2d 214, 218 
(1991), and Horne v. Milgrim, 226 Va. 133, 138, 306 S.E.2d 893, 
895 (1983), we indicated in those cases that written exhibits 
repeating oral testimony given at trial, either by a witness or 
by the reading of depositions, should not be introduced into 
evidence as exhibits because of the danger that the summarized 
oral testimony may receive more emphasis than other oral 
testimony.  Indeed, we further indicated in Scott that the reason 
a written version of the oral testimony in that case should not 
be made an exhibit was because a jury can take exhibits into the 
jury room pursuant to Code § 8.01-381.  241 Va. at 305, 402 
S.E.2d at 218. 
 
Puryear claims that these exhibits were not argumentive, but 
were merely illustrative aids.  However, his counsel's argument 
belies this claim.  His counsel argued that Puryear had no duty 
to make N & W's case for it and agreed that if Puryear could 
introduce these written summaries into evidence as exhibits, N & 
W could likewise introduce an exhibit emphasizing the periods of 
time that Puryear rode on locomotives which did not exceed the 
 
 
 
 
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FRA noise standards.  Thus, if we adopted Puryear's contention, 
jury trials could become a battle of charts and summaries of oral 
testimony, shifting the jury's attention away from traditional 
considerations of each witness's credibility and the jury's 
obligation to decide the case based upon its collective 
recollection of all the evidence. 
 
Although these summaries of Puryear's oral testimony might 
have been used as aids in the presentation of his case, we 
conclude that they were clearly inadmissible into evidence as 
exhibits.  This is because, when admitted into evidence and taken 
into the jury room, the summaries of this testimony could have 
been reviewed during the jury deliberations and thus would have  
impermissibly emphasized Puryear's version of the facts to the 
prejudice of N & W. 
 
And, contrary to Puryear's contention, the admissibility of 
such summaries is not subject to the discretion of the trial 
court.  A "trial court has no discretion to admit clearly 
inadmissible evidence because 'admissibility of evidence depends 
not upon the discretion of the court but upon sound legal 
principles.'"  Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 
820, 823 (1986)(quoting Crowson v. Swan, 164 Va. 82, 92, 178 S.E. 
898, 903 (1935)).  Thus, we hold that the trial court erred in 
admitting the written summaries into evidence. 
 
Because of the error in admitting the written summaries of 
testimony, we will reverse the trial court's judgment and remand 
 
 
 
 
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the case for a new trial.  Since the evidence may not be the same 
at the new trial, we will not decide whether a proper foundation 
was laid for the admission of some of the tests relied upon by 
Dr. Campanella in forming his opinion of the excessive noise 
levels to which Puryear was exposed. 
 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, dissenting. 
 
I concur with the majority's decision that the written 
summaries of those parts of the testimony favorable to Puryear's 
case were erroneously admitted into evidence as exhibits.  
Specifically, I agree that the adoption of the practice of 
admitting summaries of oral testimony would result in a battle of 
charts and summaries of oral testimony, shifting the jury's 
attention away from traditional considerations of each witness's 
credibility and the jury's obligation to decide a case based upon 
its collective recollection of all the evidence.  In my view, 
however, the error in this case was harmless.  See Code 
§ 8.01-678.  
 
N & W contends that "the admission of [Puryear's] exhibits, 
and their use in the jury room, prejudiced [N & W] and unfairly 
elevated the credibility and persuasiveness of oral testimony 
offered by [Puryear's] witnesses."  The sole question of fact 
relevant to this evidence was whether Puryear's hearing loss and 
tinnitus were attributable to his exposure to excessive noise on 
his job at N & W.  While the exhibits erroneously admitted may 
 
 
 
 
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have emphasized the evidence showing this to be the case, the 
record as a whole nonetheless supports the jury's verdict 
attributing Puryear's hearing loss and tinnitus to conditions of 
his employment.  Accordingly, I do not see that N & W was 
prejudiced by the erroneous admission of the exhibits and would 
hold that error to be harmless, substantial justice for the 
parties having been achieved. 
 
Furthermore, because I find no error in the second issue 
raised by N & W, I would affirm the jury's verdict and award.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.