Title: Mark D. Winkler v. Michael W. Moore

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
Nos.  SC93294, SC94507, SC00-614
____________
MARK D. WINKLER, 
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, etc., et al.,
Respondents,
CHRISTOPHER HALL,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, etc., et al.,
Respondents,
JAMES CROSS,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, etc., et al.,
Respondents,
[April 25, 2002]
1.   We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(8)-(9), Fla. Const.
2.   For our purposes today, we will use the term “overcrowding credits” and
“overcrowding gain time” interchangeably.
3.   For each group the Department provided criteria for membership as well
as a specific number of days it planned to award each member for each month in
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PER CURIAM.
Mark D. Winkler and Christopher Hall petition this Court for writs of habeas
corpus.  James Cross petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus.1  This Court has
consolidated their cases and hereby denies Winkler’s and Hall’s petitions in full,
and denies Cross’s petition in part and grants it in part as further set forth below.
BACKGROUND
 In Gomez v. Singletary, 733 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1998), this Court addressed
gain time in the context of prisoners who were never awarded certain types of
overcrowding credits2 but should have been awarded such credits.  This Court held
that the subsequent revisions in the prison overcrowding statutes which effectively
made the petitioners ineligible to receive any credits constituted an ex post facto
violation.  In that case, the Florida Department of Corrections (hereinafter the
Department) provided proposed relief charts for six "Offender Groups" which were
groups of inmates categorized by offense type, program eligibility, and offense
date.3  Only three groups (Groups 3, 4 and 5) were actually represented by a
which overcrowding surpassed the relevant triggering percentage threshold under
each version of each statute.  While this Court only specifically discussed and
approved the proposed criteria and awards for Offender Groups 3, 4, and 5, the
Department classified and placed inmates in all six Offender Groups and awarded
them credits according to what it believed to be the underlying reasoning of
Gomez—that inmates are entitled to receive overcrowding credits according to the
program and version of that program in effect at the time of their offenses.  
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petitioner in Gomez, and therefore this Court declined to address the other groups
(1, 2, and 6).  Now that petitioners representing the remaining groups are before this
Court, we hereby set forth the overcrowding gain time awards for the three
remaining groups as well.  Further, as a means of finalizing and setting forth the
proper Gomez awards for all groups, the appendices to this opinion (A and B)
contain charts for determining the proper overcrowding awards for all six groups.
PETITIONER WINKLER:  OFFENDER GROUP 1 
Petitioner Winkler was convicted of three counts of DUI manslaughter and
one count of leaving the scene of an accident involving death.  The offenses were
committed on April 9, 1985.  At the time of his offenses, Winkler was eligible for
emergency gain time.  The Department never awarded any emergency gain time to
any inmates prior to Gomez.  Instead, and as set forth in Gomez, it utilized a series
of new overcrowding gain time statutes.  Each new statute essentially superseded
the previous one.  Winkler was awarded credits under all the programs enacted after
emergency gain time.  Thus, he received 720 days of administrative gain time and
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1,860 days of provisional credits and when the Department stopped awarding
provisional credits in 1991, the Florida Parole Commission began awarding him
control release credits.  In 1993, the Legislature canceled all administrative gain
time and provisional credits but Winkler retained his control release eligibility. 
Eventually, however, due to the reduction in prison overcrowding, all of Winkler’s
control release credits were canceled.   In 1997, the United States Supreme Court
ruled in Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997), that the State had violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause when it retroactively canceled overcrowding gain time because
such credits, like regular gain time, were subject to ex post facto analysis.  The
decision essentially overruled this Court’s previous decisions holding that
overcrowding gain time was not subject to ex post facto analysis.  See, e.g.,
Blankenship v. Dugger, 521 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1988); Dugger v. Rodrick, 584 So.
2d 2 (Fla. 1991); Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1994). 
In December of 1998, this Court concluded in Thomas v. Singletary, 729 So.
2d 369 (Fla. 1998), that while the cancellation of control release credits did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, inmates were entitled to receive credits under the
other overcrowding statutes in effect at the time of their offenses (emergency gain
time, administrative gain time or provisional credits).  See Gomez v. Singletary, 733
So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1998). 
4.   The triggering threshold is the point in time at which the percentage of
prison overcrowding exceeds a certain point.  That certain point was first called
“lawful capacity,” and then later “total capacity.”  For each overcrowding program
the Legislature provided for a different triggering threshold.  Further, it changed the
definition of “lawful capacity” and “total capacity” a number of times. All these
variables have made the determination of inmate gain time awards very complicated.
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Nevertheless, the Department determined that Winkler would not have
received any credits because he was a Group 1 Offender.  The Department
contended that Group 1 Offenders were not entitled to the restoration of any credits
because, at the time of these inmates’ offenses, the emergency gain time statute was
the only overcrowding statute in effect, and it authorized the award of credits only
when the inmate population exceeded 98% of “lawful capacity.”  Under the
definition of “lawful capacity” in effect at the time of these prisoners’ offenses, that
threshold was not met.4  Winkler contested this determination, asserting that the
retroactive cancellation of Winkler’s already awarded early release credits violated
Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses of both the United States Constitution and
the Florida Constitution.
We conclude that even if some members of Offender Group 1 actually
received overcrowding credits, they had no real entitlement to such credits under the
Ex Post Facto Clause based on the underlying reasoning of this Court’s decisions in
Gomez and Meola v. Department of Corrections, 732 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1998).  This
5.   We refer to such offenders as Group 0 (zero) Offenders.
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Court, relying on and interpreting the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Lynce, explained in Gomez that one must look to the statute in effect on the date of
the inmate’s offense to see what ex post facto entitlement each inmate might have. 
Inmates who were awarded credits under the provisional credits statute but whose
offenses occurred prior to the effective date of any of the prison overcrowding
statutes (i.e., prior to June 15, 1983) actually had no ex post facto entitlement to the
credits they received.  Petitioner Jones in Meola was an example of such an
offender, and this Court ruled that the Department did not have to restore his
credits.5  Similarly, this Court also found that inmates who offended when the
emergency gain time statute had a triggering threshold of 99% of “lawful capacity”
(June 2, 1986-February 4, 1987), were not entitled to restoration of their
administrative gain time or provisional credits under Lynce because the prison
population did not reach that threshold when credits were being awarded.  See
Meola, 732 So. 2d at 1033-34.  
Similarly, Group 1 Offenders were not and are not entitled to credits because
the prison population did not exceed the relevant prison overcrowding percentile
threshold.  That threshold is determined based on the emergency gain time statute as
it existed from its effective date in 1983.  See § 944.598, Fla. Stat. (1983).  While
6.   As described by the court approving the settlement agreement, the terms
of the agreement included the following provision:
The terms of the settlement agreement provide
generally that .  .  .  the total number of inmates housed in
the institutions under the control of the Department of
Corrections will not exceed “design capacity” plus one-
third.  .  .  Although no interim timetable is specified, the
settlement proposal provides that these conditions will be
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the definition of “lawful capacity” was 133% of design capacity for the Offender
Groups (3-5) discussed in Gomez, see Gomez, 733 So. 2d at 507-508, for Group 1
Offenders, the definition was different.  “Lawful capacity” was defined as “the total
capacity of all institutions and facilities in the prison system as determined either by
the Legislature or by the courts.”  See § 944.598(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (1983) (emphasis
added).  The Legislature did not determine what was meant by the term until 1992. 
Any earlier effective date could only have been determined by a court.  The court
made such a determination in the settlement agreement executed in the landmark
prison overcrowding case of Costello v. Wainwright, 489 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Fla.
1980).  Under that agreement, the Department was given until July 1, 1985, to
attempt to reduce prison overcrowding before the Legislature’s definition of “lawful
capacity” as 133% of design capacity would go into effect.  The definition of lawful
capacity was not set until July 1, 1985.  Therefore, no definitive and unlawful
overcrowding could occur prior to that date.6  Prior to July 1, 1985, the 1983
met no later than July 1, 1985.
Costello, 489 F. Supp. at 1102 (emphasis added).
7.   The Department asserts that the proper definition of “lawful capacity” for
this Offender Group is “maximum capacity.”  It then provides voluminous charts
setting forth, in great detail, exactly how many inmates per month could be housed
in its facilities based on 98% of this “maximum capacity.”  Although the
Department may have limited itself during this time-frame, neither the Legislature
nor any court had done so, and therefore we decline to accept that definition.  The
Department’s definition was apparently accepted by two district courts, however,
see e.g., Leggett v. Moore 765 So. 2d 258, 259 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Black v.
Moore, 768 So. 2d 1236, 1236-38 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Grant v. Singletary, 730
So. 2d 805, 805-06 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), and, therefore, to the extent those district
court decisions conflict with this opinion, they are disapproved.
-8-
emergency gain time statute became effective and provided for the award of credits
when prison overcrowding exceeded 98% of “lawful capacity.” No such credits,
however, could be awarded because there was no judicial or legislative definition of
“lawful capacity”; prison overcrowding could not be determined based on an
undefined level.  In other words, while there might have been some overcrowding,
there could be no unlawful overcrowding until at least July 1, 1985.  Before this
date, the Department was not restricted under ex post facto principles in determining
how many inmates it could house regardless of how the Department chose to define
“lawful capacity.” 7  
Winkler also claims his ex post facto rights have been violated because his
credits were “retrospectively” canceled.  In so arguing he attempts to redefine the
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term “retrospective.”  He asserts that, since he received overcrowding credits but
they were later taken away, the taking was an unlawful “retrospective” application
of the law which violated ex post facto principles.  The problem with this argument
is that for ex post facto purposes the term “retrospective” has not been defined in
the manner he suggests.
In Lynce, the United States Supreme Court explained that two critical
elements must be present for a criminal or penal law to violate ex post facto
principles: (1) it must be retrospective, that is, “it must apply to events occurring
before its enactment;” and (2) it must “disadvantage the offender affected by it." 
Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981))
(emphasis added). 
 While there is no disagreement that gain time forfeitures result in a
disadvantage to inmates by increasing the time they have to spend in prison, the
question that is left to answer is what is the operative “event” under the first Lynce
criterion.  In order for Winkler to prevail on his ex post facto claim, this Court
would have to accept Winkler’s assertion of what “event” is used to trigger a
retroactivity determination.  Winkler argues the “event” is the act of giving Winkler
overcrowding credits.  Thus, he opines the law taking away his credits was applied
retrospectively to or after the “event” of receiving the credits.  However, as we have
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previously indicated, the appropriate “event” for ex post facto purposes is the
commission of the offense and the rights the offender had on the date he or she
committed the offense.  That means, for example, that if at the time of the criminal
offense, inmate A had a right to receive 20 days per month of gain time and then
later the Legislature changed the gain time to five days per month and applied that
change retrospectively to inmate A’s earlier occurring offense (the relevant
“event”), then there would be an ex post facto violation.  That did not occur here. 
At the time of Winkler’s offense, he was entitled to receive overcrowding credits if
prison overcrowding exceeded 98% of “lawful capacity,” which, as discussed
above, did not occur.  Winkler actually received credits under a more advantageous
statute because he would not have received any credits under the statute in effect at
the time of his offense.  Therefore, even though he lost credits after receiving them,
there is no constitutional violation because he lost something he had no right to
receive at the time of his offense—and that is the relevant time-frame for ex post
facto purposes.  Accordingly, neither Winkler nor any of the members of Offender
Group 1 are entitled to any credits under ex post facto principles.  
Winkler’s due process claim is controlled by this Court’s decision in Meola
v. Singletary, 732 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1998).  There this Court found that, since none
of the early overcrowding statutes provided for the cancellation of credits other than
8.  This Court stated in Meola:
[T]his Court has already determined that across-the-board
legislative cancellations eliminate any question of
arbitrariness or any need for individual proceedings. See
Langley v. Singletary, 645 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1994); Griffin
v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1994). While we
acknowledge that Lynce has essentially overruled our
previous decisions in this area as concerns the Ex Post
Facto Clause, we find no indication in Lynce that we must
now also recede from our earlier conclusions regarding
due process.  In Langley, we discussed the reasons for the
across-the-board cancellations taken pursuant to section
944.278 and found those reasons to be adequate. We
stated:
[A]dministrative gain time and provisional
credits were temporary devices for achieving
federally mandated reduction in prison
overcrowding. The legislature now has
determined that the problem has lessened and
that other devices are available that render
administrative gain time and provisional
credits redundant or unnecessary. These
devices include increased building of prisons,
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for certain specified misconduct, the petitioners had a reasonable expectation that
they could keep the credits they had been awarded.  That being the case, the State
could not take the credits without providing due process.  While balancing the
expectations of the petitioners and the State’s public security concerns, this Court
determined that the legislative process had provided sufficient due process.  Id. at
1036-37.8  We conclude that the same analysis should apply 
front-end diversionary programs, and certain
other early release programs.
Langley, 645 So.2d at 961. In Griffin v. Singletary, 638
So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1994), we determined that there was no
violation of due process when the legislature canceled
credits for inmates (such as Meola and Jones) convicted
of especially serious crimes in order to protect society.
We reaffirm our previous decisions in Langley and Griffin
as to our discussion of due process. We believe that the
State has a legitimate interest in seeing that prisoners
serve their sentences and that only the least dangerous
inmates are released early when prison overcrowding
reaches crisis proportions. Accordingly, while we agree
that prisoners did have a legitimate liberty interest in
Provisional Credits after having been awarded such
credits, since the "taking" was not done only against one
individual, but rather, against all similarly situated
prisoners, the legislative process provided sufficient due
process of law.  While inmates who had received these
credits may legitimately complain that they believed they
could keep the credits, these expectations must be
balanced against the legitimate security expectations of
the public and its legislators. We conclude that the
legislature's determination that public security concerns
outweighed inmate expectations was reasonable. Since the
"rational basis" test is really just another way of saying
that the State had a legitimate reason for acting and that
its actions were a reasonable means to achieve the desired
result, we conclude that the State has met that test.
Id. at 1036-37 (footnotes omitted).
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here.  Thus, Group 1 Offenders are not entitled to any overcrowding credits under
due process principles.  
9.   Offender Group 1 includes offenders whose offenses were committed on
or after June 15, 1983, but before July 1, 1985, and who are eligible for emergency
gain time at 98% of “lawful capacity,” with “lawful capacity” being undefined
during that period, and who are not eligible for, or lost the benefit of administrative
gain time, provisional credits, or control release.
10.   Offender Group 2 includes offenders whose offenses were committed on
or after July 1, 1985, but before June 2, 1986, and who are eligible for emergency
gain time, at 98% of lawful capacity, with lawful capacity defined as 133% of
design capacity, but who are not eligible for administrative gain time, provisional
credits, or control release, or who lost the benefit of administrative gain time,
provisional credits, or control release.
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Winkler’s petition for writ of
habeas corpus should be denied in full. 9 
PETITIONER HALL:   OFFENDER GROUP 2
Petitioner Hall is serving a 40-year sentence for two sexual batteries, several
burglaries, and a robbery with a firearm, all occurring in the period from March 14,
1986, to March 30, 1986.  When Hall entered prison he was not awarded any kind
of overcrowding credits prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Lynce and this Court’s decision in Gomez.  After Gomez was issued, however, the
Department reexamined his case and awarded him 330 days of emergency gain time
as a Group 2 Offender.10  Hall argues that he should be entitled to many more days
of credits.  We disagree.
Hall was eligible for emergency gain time credit when prison overcrowding
11.   The inmate had to be eligible for “regular” gain time.  That meant that 
inmates with sentences of  life imprisonment or death and those serving  mandatory
minimum sentences were not eligible for overcrowding credits.
12. Phase II eligibility (section 944.598(3)) required that the offender be
serving a sentence of three years or less (except those imposed under section
775.087 or section 893.135, Florida Statutes (1983)) and be within 60 days of
release by parole, gain time or expiration of sentence.
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exceeded 98% of “lawful capacity” with “lawful capacity” being defined as 133%
of design capacity.  As this Court explained in Gomez, the emergency gain time
statute is different from the administrative gain time and provisional credits statutes
because the number of emergency gain time awards is limited to a certain period of
time.  Hall was eligible for credits under the first version of the emergency gain time
statute.  That statute had two parts.  The first part (phase I) provided for the award
of credits “across-the-board” to all inmates,11 and the second part (phase II)
provided for the award of credits to a different group of inmates if the limited
awards available to the first group did not work to sufficiently reduce the level of
prison overcrowding.12  Under the statute, the first group could only receive a
certain number of credits per overcrowding occurrence (phase I).  If the inmate did
not qualify for credits under phase II, the inmate was limited to the phase I awards. 
The Department’s prison population records show that inmates eligible for awards
under only phase I were entitled to 30-day awards eleven times between 1987 and
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1995.  This totals 330 days.  Based on the length of Hall’s sentence, he did not
qualify for phase II awards; thus, he can only receive the 330 credits due under
phase I.  Therefore, phase I members (like Hall) who are Group 2 Offenders are
entitled to only up to 330 days of emergency gain time (depending upon their
disciplinary records) and since Hall was awarded 330 days, he has received all he is
entitled to.
Hall also claims that he should be entitled to receive more than 330 days
because the Department should not have been permitted to utilize later-enacted
overcrowding statutes in order to let a different, less politically repugnant group of
inmates out early.  Essentially, he argues that the Legislature and the Department
worked to keep sexual offenders, murderers, and other unpopular inmate groups
from being released early by enacting and utilizing later-enacted statutes to release
the less dangerous (less unpopular) inmates when prison overcrowding reached
crisis proportions.  
By making this argument, Hall overlooks the fact that this Court said in
Gomez that the Legislature could take action to prevent overcrowding from reaching
such high levels that the offenders thought to be more dangerous would have to be
released under the earlier statute.  As explained in Gomez, the Legislature
succeeded for a number of years in keeping the 98% of “lawful capacity” threshold
13.   Group 5 includes offenders whose offenses were committed on or after
July 1, 1988, but before September 1, 1990, and who are eligible for provisional
credits at the 97.5% threshold, but who are not eligible for control release.
14.   Group 6 includes offenders whose offenses were committed on or after
September 1, 1990, but before June 17, 1993, and who are eligible for provisional
credits at 98% of “lawful capacity,” with “lawful capacity” defined as 133% of
design capacity, but who are not eligible for or lost the benefit of control release.
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from being exceeded by releasing the less dangerous inmates through new
programs.  It was not until the Legislature failed to keep the thresholds from being
triggered and then ignored the fact of overcrowding that any ex post facto violation
occurred.  The emergency gain time statute did not provide that if anyone was ever
to be released early it had to be Hall and all those eligible under the original, less
restrictive statute.  That was not the contingency.  The award of credits was based
on the contingency of prison overcrowding surpassing the 98% threshold.  The
Legislature kept that contingency from occurring for a good number of years and
even when it failed, it kept it from occurring as often as it might have occurred. 
This Court said in Gomez that there was nothing wrong with that action and we
reaffirm that statement here today.  Accordingly, we deny Hall’s petition in full.
PETITIONER CROSS:   OFFENDER GROUP 6  
Petitioner Cross is serving a number of sentences that qualify for Offender
Group 513 awards and a number of offenses that qualify for Offender Group 614
15.   Cross’s cumulative 17-year prison term for  burglary and dealing in
stolen property is his controlling sentence.
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awards.  The offenses with the longest prison terms are considered the controlling
offenses (since, of course, the inmate cannot be released before they end).  Cross’s
controlling sentence qualifies for Offender Group 6 designation, and thus the award
Cross receives as a Group 6 offender controls his release date.15 
When Cross was sent to prison in 1993, he was statutorily eligible for control
release consideration and when the Parole Commission first evaluated him for the
program, it considered him a good candidate for possible early release.  Thus, the
Parole Commission placed him in the “advanceable pool,” see Fla. Admin. Code R.
23-22.006(10)(b)-(c), and began awarding him control release credits.  A few
months after arriving in prison, however, Cross was returned to the circuit court for
probation revocation proceedings regarding 1989 and 1990 cases for which he had
been on probation prior to his 1993 return to prison.  At those proceedings, the court
revoked his probation (effective the date of the violation) and resentenced him in
those cases.  Upon his return from resentencing, the Parole Commission reassessed
Cross’s fitness for early release and determined that he was no longer a good
release risk.  See § 947.146(7)(a)1.e., Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1992).  Accordingly, it
established Cross’s control release date as “Maximum Sentence Length-Non-
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Advanceable B.”  See Fla. Admin. Code R. 23-22.006(10)(a)2.  This meant that his
previously awarded control release credits were canceled and when subsequent
credits were awarded, his release date was not reduced (i.e., it was not “advanced”)
because Cross was no longer in the “advanceable pool.”  
In early 1999, after this Court’s decision in Gomez became final, the
Department began auditing inmates’ sentences to determine whether any Gomez
credits were to be awarded.  The Department determined that based on the time-
frames in which he was in custody, Cross was entitled to 548 days of the 822 total
possible days of provisional credits as to his Group 6 offenses.  Cross was entitled
to 357 days of the 1830 days total possible days of provisional credits as to his
Group 5 offenses.  Cross objected, arguing, inter alia, that the Department
improperly made him ineligible to receive overcrowding credits for two months for
each month in which he received a disciplinary report. 
Cross admits he committed disciplinary infractions during four separate
months and admits that for those months, he is not entitled to overcrowding credits. 
He is not entitled to these credits because under both the provisional credits statute
and the administrative gain time statute, an inmate is not eligible for credits unless
he is “earning incentive gain-time.”  See § 944.277(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988) (the
provisional credits statute); § 944.276, Fla. Stat. (1987) (the administrative gain
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time statute).  The Department’s rules (in effect when provisional credits were in
effect) indicated that:
An inmate is not eligible to receive incentive gain time for the month in
which there is an infraction of the rules of the Department or the laws
of the State for which he is found guilty.
See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-11.0065(5)(a) (emphasis added) (now renumbered as
rule 33-601.101(6)(a)).  Rule 33-11.0065(3)(c) further clarifies the matter and
provides:
As evaluations are based on activities for the month, no inmate shall be
considered as earning incentive gain time until the month is complete,
the evaluations have been submitted, and the award has been
determined.
See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-11.0065(3)(c) (now renumbered as rule 33-
601.101(3)(c)). 
We conclude, based on these rules, that the Department is justified in denying
an inmate overcrowding credits when a disciplinary infraction is committed and it
may wait until the month is over to award gain time.  However, according to the
Department’s policy, it has taken the matter one step further:  for each month in
which a disciplinary infraction was committed, the Department has denied Cross
(and apparently all inmates entitled to Gomez credits) overcrowding gain time
eligibility for two months—both the month in which the disciplinary infraction was
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committed and the following month.  While rule 33-11.0065(5)(a) (now renumbered
as 33-601.101(6)(a)) has been amended to provide for subsequent ineligibility for up
to six months following the month in which a disciplinary infraction occurs, the
amended rule specifically provides that it only applies to inmates who are found
guilty of committing a disciplinary infraction on or after April 21, 1996, and who are
serving sentences imposed for offenses committed on or after October 1, 1995. 
Therefore, the amended rule would not apply to the disciplinary infractions at issue
in this case.  
While we completely understand that the Department might want to wait until
the month is complete to award gain time, whether the penalty is taken in the first
month or the subsequent month, under the rules pertinent to this case, if there is one
month of misbehavior, there should be only one month of gain time ineligibility. 
That being the case, Cross is entitled to 405 days credits on his Group 5 offenses
and 612 days credits on his Group 6 offenses.
Lastly, the Department and the petitioners assert that the first overcrowding
statute should be considered to have gone into effect on June 15, 1983, despite the
fact that this Court’s charts in Gomez showed it as going into effect on June 16,
1983.  They assert that they have essentially disregarded that part of the opinion
because they believed it was a mistake and that it would cause too much upheaval,
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both to the Department and to the parties.  The Department brought this issue to the
Court’s attention on rehearing in Gomez and, while we did not specifically address
the matter in the opinion, we considered the issue and concluded that the
Department’s reliance upon an attorney general opinion was not correct.  For that
reason, the chart was published showing the first overcrowding statute going into
effect on June 16, 1983.  
 We reiterate the determination made in Gomez that the statute became
effective on June 16, 1983, when the bill was filed in the Office of the Secretary of
State, not on June 15, 1983, when the Governor signed it.  See State ex rel.
Schwartz v. Bledsoe, 31 So. 2d 457, 460 (Fla. 1947) (holding that a bill becomes a
law when “approved and signed by the Governor and by him filed in the office of
the Secretary of State”).  However, the parties agree on this issue and assert that a
change would disadvantage numerous inmates as well as disrupt the entire system of
calculating gain time since other gain time statutes were also enacted as a part of the
same act.  We see no reason to disrupt this already established procedure of
applying the statute retroactively by one day as the Department has done for nearly
twenty years, so long as this application benefits the inmate population and
decreases the upheaval already caused by Lynce.  Therefore, we have changed the
chart to indicate that we will treat the statute as if it had gone into effect on June 15,
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1983.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing we hereby deny Mark D. Winkler’s and Christopher
Hall’s petitions for writ of habeas corpus.  We hereby grant mandamus relief to
James Cross to the extent that he is entitled to additional credits on his Group 5
offenses and his Group 6 offenses because the Department erroneously withheld
overcrowding gain time credits for two months instead of one month.
It is so ordered.  
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
Three Cases Consolidated:
Two Original Proceedings - Habeas Corpus
One Original Proceeding - Mandamus
Baya Harrison, III, Monticello, Florida, for Petitioners Winkler and Cross; 
Christopher Hall, pro se, Daytona Beach, Florida, and John C. Schaible, Florida
Institutional Legal Services, Inc., Gainesville, Florida, for Petitioner Hall,
Petitioners  
Susan A. Maher, Deputy General Counsel, and Judy Bone, Assistant General
Counsel,  Sheron L. Wells, Assistant General Counsel, and Kim M. Fluharty,
Assistant General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, Florida; and
-23-
William L. Camper, General Counsel, and Bradley R. Bischoff, Assistant General
Counsel, Florida Parole Commission, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondents
16. LC means “lawful capacity.”
17. Most Group 2 Offenders, including petitioner Hall, will be eligible for only up to 330 days of credits
under Phase I.  A Group 2 Offender is not eligible for additional awards under Phase II unless he/she is eligible
under subsection (3) of the Emergency Gain Time Statute.  See § 944.598(3), Fla. Stat. (1983-Supp. 1992).
-24-
Winkler Appendix A:  Overcrowding relief programs - Dates - Thresholds
Group 0*
Group 1**
Group 2**
Group 3***
Group 4***
Group 5***
Group 6**
Petitioner Jones
Petitioner Winkler
Petitioner Hall
Petitioner Gomez
Petitioner Kivett
Petitioner Hock
Petitioner Cross
Pre-6/15/83
Offenders
No statute
6/15/83-6/30/85
Offenders
EGT at 98% of LC16 
7/1/85-6/1/86
Offenders
EGT at 98% of LC
(Defin. 133% of
Design Cap.)
6/2/86-6/16/93 
Offenders
EGT at 99% of LC
(defin. 133% of
Design Cap.)
2/5/87-6/30/88
Offenders
AGT at 98% of LC
(defin. 133% of Design
Cap.)
7/1/88-8/31/90
Offenders
PC at 97.5% of LC
(defin. 133% of Design
Cap.)
9/1/90-6/16/93
Offenders
PC at 98% of LC
(defin. 133% of
Design Cap.)
Total Possible
Relief: 0 Days
Total Possible
Relief: 0 Days:
Total Possible Relief:
720 days
Phase I:  330 Days
Phase II17: 390 Days
Total Possible Relief:
120 days
Total Possible Relief:
2,592 Days
Total Possible Relief:
1,830 Days
Total Possible Relief:
822 days
Full Definitions of Offender Groups provided on last page of Chart. 
*Group 0 was represented by Jones in
Meola v. Singletary, 732 So. 2d 1029
(Fla. 1998).
** Groups 3, 4 & 5 were  represented
in Gomez v. Singletary, 733 So. 2d
499 (Fla. 1998).
*** Groups 1, 2, & 6 are represented
in current pending case - Winkler,
Hall, Cross v. Moore, SC93294,
SC94507, SC00-614.
-25-
Winkler Appendix A (continued):  
Offender Group Definitions
Offender Group 0 (zero) includes offenders whose offenses were committed before the first overcrowding credits statute (the Emergency
Gain Time statute) became effective on June 15, 1983, and were not eligible for Emergency Gain Time, Administrative Gain Time,
Provisional Credits, or Control Release, or who lost the benefit of any or all of the above-referenced programs.
Offender Group 1 includes offenders whose offenses were committed on or after June 15, 1983, but before July 1, 1985, and who are
eligible for Emergency Gain Time at 98% of “lawful capacity,” with “lawful capacity” being undefined during such period, but who are not
eligible for, or lost the benefit of Administrative Gain Time and/or Provisional Credits and/or Control Release.
Offender Group 2 includes offenders whose offenses were committed on or after July 1, 1985, but before June 2, 1986, and who are
eligible for Emergency Gain Time, at 98% of “lawful capacity,” with “lawful capacity” defined as 133% of design capacity, but who are
not eligible for Administrative Gain time, Provisional Credits, or Control Release, or who lost the benefit of Administrative Gain time
and/or Provisional Credits, and/or Control Release.
Offender Group 3 includes offenders whose offenses were committed on or after June 2, 1986 but before June 17, 1993, and who are
eligible for Emergency Gain Time at  99% of “lawful capacity” with “lawful capacity” defined as 133% of design capacity, but who are not
eligible for Administrative Gain time, Provisional Credits, or Control Release, or who lost the benefit of Administrative Gain Time and/or
Provisional Credits, and/or Control Release. 
Offender Group 4 includes offenders whose offenses were committed on or after February 5, 1987, but before July 1, 1988, and who are
eligible for Administrative Gain Time at 98% of “lawful capacity,” with “lawful capacity” defined as 133% of design capacity, but who are
not eligible for, or lost benefit of Provisional Credits and/or Control Release.
Offender Group 5 includes offenders whose offenses were committed on or after July 1, 1988 but before September 1, 1990 (7/1/88-
8/31/90) and who are eligible for Provisional Credits at the 97.5% threshold), but who are not eligible for Control Release.
Offender Group 6 includes offenders whose offenses were committed on or after September 1, 1990, but before June 17, 1993, and who are
eligible for Provisional Credits at 98% of “lawful capacity,” with “lawful capacity” defined as 133% of design capacity, but who are not
eligible for, or lost the benefit of Control Release.
-26-
Winkler Appendix B:  Overcrowding Awards Per Group
(I)
Represents awards made under section 944.598(2) [Phase I]
(II)
Represents awards made under section 944.598(3) [Phase II]
Effective
Date
Group 1
(Emerg. GT)
98%
6/15/83-6/30/85
Group 2
(Emerg. GT)
98%
7/1/85-6/1/86
Group 3
(Emerg. GT)
99%
6/2/86-6/16/93
Group 4
(Admin. GT)
98%
2/05/87-6/30/88
Group 5
(Prov. Credits)
97.5%
7/1/88-8/31/90
Group 6
(Prov. Credits)
98%
9/1/90-6/16/93
02/16/1987
10 (II)
10 (I)
02/26/1987
20 (II)
20 (II)
03/17/1987
15 (II)
03/26/1987
15 (II)
04/16/1987
04/24/1987
05/15/1987
05/26/1987
06/17/1987
06/26/1987
07/16/1987
07/28/1987
08/17/1987
08/27/1987
09/14/1987
09/22/1987
Effective
Date
Group 1
(Emerg. GT)
98%
6/15/83-6/30/85
Group 2
(Emerg. GT)
98%
7/1/85-6/1/86
Group 3
(Emerg. GT)
99%
6/2/86-6/16/93
Group 4
(Admin. GT)
98%
2/05/87-6/30/88
Group 5
(Prov. Credits)
97.5%
7/1/88-8/31/90
Group 6
(Prov. Credits)
98%
9/1/90-6/16/93
-27-
09/29/1987
10/13/1987
10/22/1987
10/29/1987
11/12/1987
11/19/1987
12/09/1987
12/17/1987
12/28/1987
01/19/1988
01/28/1988
02/04/1988
02/17/1988 
03/08/1988
03/14/1988
03/24/1988
04/12/1988
04/20/1988
04/27/1988
05/12/1988
Effective
Date
Group 1
(Emerg. GT)
98%
6/15/83-6/30/85
Group 2
(Emerg. GT)
98%
7/1/85-6/1/86
Group 3
(Emerg. GT)
99%
6/2/86-6/16/93
Group 4
(Admin. GT)
98%
2/05/87-6/30/88
Group 5
(Prov. Credits)
97.5%
7/1/88-8/31/90
Group 6
(Prov. Credits)
98%
9/1/90-6/16/93
-28-
05/19/1988
05/26/1988
06/08/1988
06/23/1988
06/30/1988
07/14/1988
20
07/21/1988
20
08/09/1988
20
08/15/1988
20
08/23/1988
20
09/09/1988
20
09/21/1988
20
09/28/1988
20
10/12/1988
20
10/20/1988
20
10/27/1988
20
11/10/1988
20
11/18/1988
20
11/29/1988
20
12/14/1988
20
Effective
Date
Group 1
(Emerg. GT)
98%
6/15/83-6/30/85
Group 2
(Emerg. GT)
98%
7/1/85-6/1/86
Group 3
(Emerg. GT)
99%
6/2/86-6/16/93
Group 4
(Admin. GT)
98%
2/05/87-6/30/88
Group 5
(Prov. Credits)
97.5%
7/1/88-8/31/90
Group 6
(Prov. Credits)
98%
9/1/90-6/16/93
-29-
12/20/1988
20
12/22/1988
20
12/29/1988
20
01/19/1989
20
01/26/1989
20
02/06/1989
20
02/16/1989
20
02/24/1989
20
03/10/1989
20
03/16/1989
20
03/22/1989
20
03/30/1989
20
04/18/1989
20
04/25/1989
20
04/28/1989
20
05/12/1989
20
05/18/1989
20
05/25/1989
20
06/07/1989
20
06/15/1989
20
Effective
Date
Group 1
(Emerg. GT)
98%
6/15/83-6/30/85
Group 2
(Emerg. GT)
98%
7/1/85-6/1/86
Group 3
(Emerg. GT)
99%
6/2/86-6/16/93
Group 4
(Admin. GT)
98%
2/05/87-6/30/88
Group 5
(Prov. Credits)
97.5%
7/1/88-8/31/90
Group 6
(Prov. Credits)
98%
9/1/90-6/16/93
-30-
06/21/1989
20
06/28/1989
20
07/07/1989
20
07/17/1989
20
07/25/1989
20
07/31/1989
20
08/08/1989
20
08/22/1989
20
08/28/1989
20
09/07/1989
20
09/15/1989
30
09/25/1989
30
10/05/1989
30
10/18/1989
30
10/27/1989
30
11/16/1989
30 (I)
30
12/07/1989
30 (I)
30
12/14/1989
30 (II)
30
12/26/1989
30 (II)
30
01/10/1990
30
Effective
Date
Group 1
(Emerg. GT)
98%
6/15/83-6/30/85
Group 2
(Emerg. GT)
98%
7/1/85-6/1/86
Group 3
(Emerg. GT)
99%
6/2/86-6/16/93
Group 4
(Admin. GT)
98%
2/05/87-6/30/88
Group 5
(Prov. Credits)
97.5%
7/1/88-8/31/90
Group 6
(Prov. Credits)
98%
9/1/90-6/16/93
-31-
01/26/1990
30 (I)
30
02/08/1990
30
02/19/1990
30 (II)
30
02/28/1990
30 (II)
30
03/16/1990
30
03/28/1990
30
04/13/1990
30
04/26/1990
30 (I)
30
05/11/1990
30 (II)
30
05/24/1990
30 (I)
30
06/14/1990
30 (I)
30
06/27/1990
30 (II)
30
07/09/1990
30 (II)
30
07/26/1990
08/16/1990
30 (I)
30
08/31/1990
30 (II)
30
09/13/1990
10/05/1990
30 (I)
30
10/19/1990
30 (I)
30
11/08/1990
30 (II)
30
Effective
Date
Group 1
(Emerg. GT)
98%
6/15/83-6/30/85
Group 2
(Emerg. GT)
98%
7/1/85-6/1/86
Group 3
(Emerg. GT)
99%
6/2/86-6/16/93
Group 4
(Admin. GT)
98%
2/05/87-6/30/88
Group 5
(Prov. Credits)
97.5%
7/1/88-8/31/90
Group 6
(Prov. Credits)
98%
9/1/90-6/16/93
-32-
11/28/1990
30 (I)
30
01/18/1991
06/30/1991
76
07/31/1991
109
10/31/1991
180
11/30/1991
172
04/30/1992
184
05/31/1993
220
06/30/1993
30 (I)
40
40
40
07/31/1993
25 (II)
16
16
16
08/31/1993
35 (II)
51
51
51
09/30/1993
32
32
32
10/31/1993
36
36
36
11/30/1993
51
51
51
12/31/1993
56
56
56
01/31/1994
36
36
36
02/28/1994
46
46
46
03/31/1994
32
32
32
04/28/1994
30 (I)
04/30/1994
34
34
34
Effective
Date
Group 1
(Emerg. GT)
98%
6/15/83-6/30/85
Group 2
(Emerg. GT)
98%
7/1/85-6/1/86
Group 3
(Emerg. GT)
99%
6/2/86-6/16/93
Group 4
(Admin. GT)
98%
2/05/87-6/30/88
Group 5
(Prov. Credits)
97.5%
7/1/88-8/31/90
Group 6
(Prov. Credits)
98%
9/1/90-6/16/93
-33-
05/31/1994
30 (II)
26
26
26
06/30/1994
30 (II)
33
33
33
07/31/1994
28
28
28
08/31/1994
48
48
48
09/30/1994
30
30
30
10/31/1994
37
37
37
11/30/1994
42
42
42
12/31/1994
37
37
37
01/31/1995
37
37
37
02/28/1995
37
37
37
03/31/1995
37
37
37
06/30/1995
1
08/31/1995
20
09/30/1995
25
10/31/1995
20
11/30/1995
1
Total
Gomez
  Phase I -  0
  Phase II - 0
Gomez
  Phase I -  330
  Phase II - 390
Gomez
  Phase I -  40
  Phase II - 80
Gomez
2,592
Gomez
1,830
Gomez
822
Effective
Date
Group 1
(Emerg. GT)
98%
6/15/83-6/30/85
Group 2
(Emerg. GT)
98%
7/1/85-6/1/86
Group 3
(Emerg. GT)
99%
6/2/86-6/16/93
Group 4
(Admin. GT)
98%
2/05/87-6/30/88
Group 5
(Prov. Credits)
97.5%
7/1/88-8/31/90
Group 6
(Prov. Credits)
98%
9/1/90-6/16/93
18. Most Group 2 Offenders will be eligible for only up to 330 days of credits under Phase I.  A Group 2
Offender is not eligible for additional awards under Phase II unless he/she is eligible under subsection (3) of the
Emergency Gain Time Statute.  See § 944.598(3), Fla. Stat. (1983-Supp. 1992).
-34-
TOTAL
  POTENTIAL
AWARDS
0
72018
120
2,592
1,830
822