Title: Dorr, Keller, Bentley & Pecha v. Dorr, Bentley & Pecha

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Dorr, Keller, Bentley & Pecha v. Dorr, Bentley & Pecha1992 WY 96841 P.2d 811Case Number: 91-32Decided: 08/14/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
DORR, KELLER, BENTLEY 
& PECHA; Smith, Keller & Associates; and G. Kevin Keller, 

Appellants, 
(Plaintiffs/Defendants),

v.

DORR, BENTLEY & 
PECHA; Mark Dorr; and Thomas J. Hogan, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court, Campbell County, Terrence O'Brien.

 

Don W. Riske, of 
Riske & Arnold, Cheyenne, for appellants.

Greg L. Goddard 
of Goddard, Perry & Vogel, Buffalo, and Cherie Shelton Norman of Skiles, 
Hageman & Butler, Laramie, for appellees.

Before 
THOMAS, CARDINE and GOLDEN, JJ., and ROONEY and BROWN, JJ. 
(Retired).

BROWN, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1]      This case 
involves dissolution of an accounting partnership and the submission of disputes 
to binding arbitration.

[¶2]      Appellants 
suggest seven issue for our review:

1. Whether the December 
14, 1990 dismissal order is void.

2. Whether the district 
court had jurisdiction to determine that the partnership was terminated when the 
partners had previously stipulated that all matters arising out of the 
partnership agreement be submitted to arbitration.

3. Whether the action 
below could continue after the district court realigned the parties so that both 
partners of the partnership were defendants.

4. Whether the district 
court committed reversible error by terminating a partnership that was still a 
party in litigation, had unpaid creditors, unsettled capital accounts and had 
uncompleted, unfiled federal tax returns.

5. Whether the district 
court committed reversible error by finding that the issuance of the arbitration 
award resulted in the appellant SK & A becoming a creditor of the other 
partner and not a creditor of the partnership. 

6. Whether the district 
court committed reversible error in prohibiting appellant SK & A from 
bringing an action in the name of the partnership as the liquidating 
partner.

7. Whether the district 
court committed reversible error in finding that the subject partnership was 
dissolved and terminated on August 24, 1989, the date on which the findings, 
conclusions and award were entered by the arbitration panel.

[¶3]      Appellees state 
that the only issue is whether:

     The trial court 
correctly determined that the partnership of Dorr, Keller, Bentley & Pecha 
(DKBP) terminated upon the entry of the arbitration panel's "Findings, 
Conclusion and Award" on August 24, 1989.

[¶4]      We will remand 
with instructions.

[¶5]      On January 1, 
1988, Dorr and Associates (D & A), a CPA firm operating in Gillette, Wyoming 
and consisting of individual partners Mark A. Dorr, Barbara E. Dorr, Steven K. 
Bentley and Stephen H. Pecha, joined with Smith, Keller & Associates (SK 
& A), a CPA firm operating in Cheyenne, Wyoming and consisting of general 
partners G. Kevin Keller and Robert Smith, to form the accounting firm of Dorr, 
Keller, Bentley & Pecha (DKBP). The partners in the DKBP partnership were D 
& A and SK & A. During the course of the partnership, disputes arose 
and, on April 3, 1989, SK & A gave notice of its intention to dissolve the 
partnership as of May 4, 1989. The notice effectively ended the participation of 
SK & A in the business operation of DKBP.

[¶6]      Subsequently, 
appellant SK & A brought suit in Laramie County District Court seeking, 
among other things, recovery of the accounting practice and damages. The 
Honorable Gary Hartman, sitting in Laramie County District Court, dismissed this 
lawsuit and ruled that the arbitration provisions of the partnership agreement 
applied and that the parties must submit their differences to 
arbitration.

[¶7]      On August 7 and 
8, 1989, an arbitration panel was convened and heard testimony and evidence 
regarding disputed matters. On August 24, 1989, in a two-to-one decision, the 
arbitration panel announced its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Award."1 On August 29, 1989, SK & A 
filed an action to confirm the arbitration award, in Civil Docket No. 121-106 in 
the First Judicial District Court, Laramie County, Wyoming. On January 29, 1990, 
the court issued an opinion letter stating it would confirm the arbitration 
award and directed counsel to prepare the appropriate judgment.

[¶8]      On February 1, 
1990, D & A filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. On March 27, 1990, D & A 
converted from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and on March 
29, 1990, an independent trustee, Thomas Hogan, was appointed by the court to be 
the legal representative of the estate.

[¶9]      On March 23, 
1990, Barbara Elizabeth Dorr and Stephen Harold Pecha, two of the three general 
partners of D & A, filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 7 of 
the Bankruptcy Code.

[¶10]   In an ostensible effort to 
determine the legal status of the partnership following the arbitration award, D 
& A filed a declaratory judgment action on April 30, 1990, in the Sixth 
Judicial District Court, No. 17330. On May 11, 1991, SK & A filed an action 
in Laramie County District Court, Civil Docket 123 No. 445, seeking, among other 
things, damages and an accounting. Those two actions were then consolidated 
before the Honorable Terrence O'Brien in the Sixth Judicial District. Neither 
party obtained relief from the automatic stay before filing their actions in the 
Sixth Judicial District Court and the First Judicial District Court. Mr. Hogan, 
the Chapter 7 trustee for D & A, did not authorize the filing of Case No. 
17330 in Campbell County. Furthermore, he did not authorize appellees' attorney 
to represent the trustee, the estate, or any interest in the estate. The 
automatic stay was not lifted until June 25, 1990.

[¶11]   Judge O'Brien ruled that the 
parties had agreed to arbitration to settle all of their differences in the 
dissolution of the partnership of DKBP; that the arbitration panel considered 
testimony and evidence, conducted an accounting and entered an award; that the 
arbitration award settled all disputes between the parties; and that those 
issues could not be re-litigated. If the court had stopped at this point, its 
ruling would have been correct if we disregard the fact that neither action 
should have been before the court in the first instance. However, it ruled 
further that the partnership of DKBP was dissolved and terminated on August 24, 
1989, the date the Findings, Conclusions and Award was entered by the 
arbitration panel; and that SK & A was not the liquidating partner of 
DKBP.2

[¶12]   On August 31, 1990, SK & A and 
Mr. Hogan, acting in his capacity as Chapter 7 trustee of the estate of D & 
A filed a "Joint Motion for Order Confirming Arbitration Award and Granting 
Judgment" in Doc. 121 No. 106 in the District Court, First Judicial District, 
Laramie County, Wyoming (apparently this matter had been in limbo since the 
petition to confirm was filed in August 1989).3 This joint motion cited the June 
26, 1990 order granting relief from stay and asked that the district court judge 
proceed to confirm the judgment. On December 5, 1990, the district court filed 
an order confirming arbitration in civil case No. 121-106.

[¶13]   On December 13, 1990, the attorney 
for appellees here filed a document styled "Motion to Set Aside Order Confirming 
Arbitration Order" in the Laramie County District Court suit. (Civil No. 
121-106). Mr. Goddard, attorney for D & A, purported to file this document 
on behalf of several entities, including "Dorr & Associates, a 
partnership."

[¶14]   Apparently in a letter dated April 
3, 1991, the court informed the parties that it would set aside the December 5, 
1990 order confirming the arbitration award and transfer the case to be 
consolidated with the action still pending in Campbell County.

[¶15]   We have had considerable difficulty 
in this case reconciling the record with what is represented in the briefs. It 
appears that counsel cleaned out their files and put random documents in the 
record, without regard to relevancy or sequence. Some materials are in the 
record three times; other materials referred to in the briefs are not in the 
record. Some documents are attached to other documents and are therefore not 
indexed. We permitted the original record to be supplemented by adding the 
United States Bankruptcy Court's order dated September 6, 1991. The recitations 
in this order filled in some of the holes in the original record.

I

[¶16]   A determination of the proper 
representative of D & A when in Chapter 7 bankruptcy will effectively 
dispose of this appeal.4

[¶17]   The filing of the petition in the 
bankruptcy court on February 1, 1990, created an estate. That estate consisted 
of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor [D & A] in property" 
wherever located and by whomever held. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988) (emphasis added). 
This includes any and all causes of action existing on the petition date. 
Delgado Oil, Inc. v. Torres, 785 F.2d 857 (10th Cir. 1986).

[¶18]   Property of the estate includes all 
of the debtor's inchoate and unliquidated interests. United States v. Whiting 
Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-05 n. 8, 103 S. Ct. 2309, 76 L. Ed. 2d 515 (1983) 
(Estate succeeds to no more or greater causes of action against third parties 
than those held by the debtor.) Property of the estate includes "[a]ny interest 
in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case. 11 
U.S.C. § 541(a)(7). Property of the estate in a Chapter 7 case of a 
non-individual includes all property, income, receivables, causes of action, 
etc., generated or acquired during a preceding Chapter 11 case. Id.

[¶19]   As a partner in DKBP, D & A had 
an interest in managing that partnership. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. § 17-13-501(iii) 
(1989). That management interest passed to the estate when D & A filed for 
bankruptcy. In re Cardinal Industries, Inc., 105 B.R. 834, supplemented 109 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.Ohio 1989).

[¶20]   When a cause of action accrues 
before the bankruptcy petition, that claim is property of the estate, regardless 
of whether or not a lawsuit based upon that cause of action had been commenced. 
In re James, 120 B.R. 802 (E.D.Pa. 1990); In re E.F. Hutton Southwest 
Properties, II, Ltd., 103 B.R. 808 (N.D.Tex. 1989); In re Johns-Manville 
Corporation, 57 B.R. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

[¶21]   When an interest in property 
becomes property of the estate, the "debtor" no longer has an independent 
interest in the property. There are a few narrow exceptions to this general 
rule, none of which are applicable to this case. All that a Chapter 7 debtor [D 
& A] has is the right to receive distribution from the net proceeds of the 
liquidation of its estate, if all claims are paid in full.

[¶22]   The "trustee * * * is the 
representative of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (1988) (emphasis added). It is 
the trustee who may "sue and be sued" on behalf of the estate. § 323(b). "After 
the estate is created, although title does not vest in the trustee himself (it 
vests in the estate), the trustee is authorized as the individual through whom 
the estate acts, i.e., as its representative under section 323(a)." 2 Collier on 
Bankruptcy, 323.01 at 323-2 (15th ed. 1987).

[¶23]   Therefore, after the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition, D & A held no independent interest in the DKBP 
partnership or the arbitration award. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). The effect of the 
conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 was that the entity entitled to assert, 
manage, represent, and/or sell those interests, changed from the former debtor 
[D & A] in possession to the Chapter 7 trustee. 

[¶24]   In Cain v. Hyatt, 101 B.R. 440, 442 
(E.D.Pa. 1989) (citations omitted), the court stated:

     The trustee in a case 
under Chapter 7 is the sole representative of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 323(a). As 
such, it is the trustee who "has the capacity to sue and be sued." 11 U.S.C. § 
323(b). Thus, courts have consistently held that a "trustee succeeds to all 
causes of action held by a debtor at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed." 
As the court held in Jefferson v. Mississippi Gulf Coast YMCA[. 73 B.R. 179 
(S.D.Miss. 1986)]:

It is well settled that 
the right to pursue causes of action formerly belonging to the debtor - a form 
of property under the Bankruptcy Code - vests in the trustee for the benefit of 
the estate.

[¶25]   The trustee is empowered to conduct 
all litigation and arbitration matters on behalf of the estate without giving 
notice to any party and without seeking authority from a court or from any 
party.

With or without court 
approval, the trustee * * * may 
prosecute or may enter an appearance and defend any pending action 
or proceeding by or against the debtor, or commence and prosecute any action or 
proceeding in behalf of the estate before any tribunal.

Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure R6009 (1991) (emphasis added).

[¶26]   Because the trustee is the 
representative of the estate, others, including the debtor, may not prosecute 
causes of action that are property of the estate. Lambert v. Fuller Co., Inc., 
122 B.R. 243 (E.D.Pa. 1990); Vreugdenhil v. Hoekstra, 773 F.2d 213 (8th Cir. 
1985). See also Jones v. Harrell, 858 F.2d 667 (11th Cir. 1988).

[¶27]   There is no requirement in Fed. 
R.Bankr.P. R6009 that the trustee notify the debtor, or any of its principals, 
of the conduct of litigation on behalf of the estate. Where the trustee is 
managing an asset that is a cause of action, the only notice required to 
be given to the debtor is set forth in Fed.R.Bankr.P. R2002(a)(3) and R9019. 
This notice only relates to a hearing on the final approval of the settlement by 
the bankruptcy court. There is no requirement that the debtor consent to, 
or approve, the conduct of litigation or settlement of controversy.

[¶28]   Relief from the automatic stay does 
not affect ownership of property or change the party with standing to represent 
the interest of an entity (in this case the estate's) in property. All that 
relief from stay does is change the forum in which interests may be adjudicated 
and allow liquidation to go forward. In other words, although the June 26, 1990 
order granted relief from stay and allowed the parties to proceed in the pending 
Laramie County District Court action, it did not change the fact that Mr. Hogan 
is the exclusive representative of this estate.

[¶29]   All causes of action that could 
have been brought by this debtor, on behalf of the debtor, or for the benefit of 
the debtor, may only be brought by the trustee after the petition in bankruptcy 
is filed. Delgado Oil, Inc., 785 F.2d  at 861.

[¶30]   The commencement of the Campbell 
County District Court action seeking a declaration of the nature and extent, or 
even the existence, of D & A's interest in either the partnership of DKBP, 
or in the arbitration award, was an unauthorized representation. Even if the 
action had been commenced after the June 25, 1990 order granting relief from 
stay, it would have still been void as an unauthorized representation. See 
Pueblo of Santa Rosa v. Fall, 273 U.S. 315, 47 S. Ct. 361, 71 L. Ed. 658 (1927). A 
suit instituted without authority from the party named as plaintiff is a 
nullity, and any judgment obtained in such a suit is void. Meredith v. The 
Ionian Trader, 279 F.2d 471 (2nd Cir. 1960).

[¶31]   As noted above, after this 
bankruptcy case was commenced, the partnership debtor, D & A, had no 
interest in DKBP, in the arbitration decision or award, or in the claims of Mr. 
Keller, or Smith-Keller against it, because they now belong to the estate. No 
action should have been taken regarding those interests without the express 
authority and consent of the trustee. Even the determination as to the continued 
existence or termination of DKBP may materially affect this estate.

[¶32]   Recent Tenth Circuit decisions hold 
that regardless of notice of the existence of the stay, violations of the 
automatic stay are void and not merely voidable. Ellis v. Consolidated Diesel 
Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Calder, 907 F.2d 953 (10th 
Cir. 1990); Valley Transit Mix of Ruidosa, Inc. v. Miller, 928 F.2d 354 (10th 
Cir. 1991). Further, the voidness is not cured by a subsequent lifting of the 
automatic stay. Ellis, 894 F.2d 371.

[¶33]   An erroneous notion advanced by 
counsel who have represented D & A is that the Chapter 7 partnership debtor 
is entitled to "notice" of the trustee's conduct of the causes of action 
belonging to this estate or notice of the trustee's entry into a case. This is 
not an accurate statement of the law. As noted above, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 
323 and Fed.R.Bankr.P. R6009, the trustee's authority to conduct litigation is 
limited only by the requirement that he obtain bankruptcy court approval of an 
actual and final settlement.

II

[¶34]   In the multitudinous proceedings 
below, the arbitration award has not been given effect. Generally, rights and 
duties flow from arbitration awards. It seems in this case that the parties have 
engaged in mostly unauthorized and futile litigation, have made the case 
unnecessarily complicated, and have ignored controlling principles.

[¶35]   In Strickland v. Seiple, 680 P.2d 533, 534-35 (Hawaii.App. 1984) (citations and footnotes omitted), the court 
said:

     Judicial review of an 
arbitration case is severely limited in our jurisdiction. Since the "primary 
purpose of arbitration is to avoid litigation," Mars Constructors, Inc. v. 
Tropical Enterprises, Ltd., 51 Haw. 332, 334, 460 P.2d 317, 319 (1969), our 
supreme court has "decided to confine judicial review to the strictest possible 
limits." Both the circuit court's review of an arbitration award and an 
appellate court's review of a judgment entered by the circuit court confirming 
the arbitration award are restricted by HRS §§ 658-9 and 658-10 (1976). Thus, an 
arbitration award may be vacated only on one of the four grounds specified in 
HRS § 658-9 and modified or corrected only on one of the three grounds set forth 
in HRS § 658-10.

* * * * * *

     An arbitration award 
is considered to be final when consideration of the submitted issues has been 
concluded and a resolution reached. Although there is no requirement that the 
award be self-executing, and although "it is not faulty because litigation may 
ensue in enforcing it," 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 111(b) (1975), it should be 
"sufficiently definite that only ministerial acts of the parties are needed to 
carry it into effect," Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers International 
Union, 187 F.2d 980, 982 (10th Cir. 1951); see also 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 115 
(1975), and "clear enough to indicate unequivocally what each party is required 
to do."

[¶36]   An arbitration award may be vacated 
by the court on one of five grounds stated in Wyo. Stat. § 1-36-114 (1988)5 and modified or corrected by the 
court on one of three grounds set forth in Wyo. Stat. § 1-36-115 (1988).6 Wyo. Stat. § 1-36-111 (1988) 
provides for modification of the award by the arbitrators.7 Wyo. Stat. § 1-36-113 (1988) 
provides for confirmation of the award by the court.

[¶37]   The parties have not invoked the 
statutory procedure to request the arbitrators to modify the arbitration awards 
nor have they requested that the court vacate, modify or correct the awards. The 
time specified in the statutes for correcting, modifying or vacating the awards 
has long since passed.

[¶38]   The attempted confirmation of the 
arbitration awards is poorly documented in the record. There is no order in the 
record confirming the August 24, 1989 award. However, a court order dated 
December 5, 1990 recites that the August 24, 1989 award was confirmed September 
10, 1990. This same order confirms the July 30, 1990 award. In its brief, 
appellees state that this order was overturned by a district judge. The original 
record submitted to us by the parties does not reflect this action. However, the 
United States Bankruptcy Court's order dated September 16, 1991, stated that the 
trial court in the arbitration confirmation proceedings stated that "it would 
set aside the December 5, 1990 Order Confirming Arbitration Award." Apparently 
the district court judge determined that D & A was not notified of the 
second arbitration proceedings. As indicated earlier in this opinion, a debtor 
(D & A) is not entitled to notice of the trustee's actions regarding conduct 
of litigation involving the bankruptcy estate.

[¶39]   We determine that the proceedings 
in the District Court, Sixth Judicial District8 were improper in that arbitration 
proceedings had not been completed and that the consolidated matters before the 
Sixth Judicial District were substantially the same as issues in arbitration. 
"When parties create a contractual relationship which includes a broad 
arbitration agreement, they intend to include within the scope of arbitration 
any dispute arising from the termination of that contractual relationship unless 
they clearly evidence a purpose to exclude such disputes." Waddell v. Shriber, 
465 Pa. 20, 348 A.2d 96, 101 (1975). In the case before us, the partnership 
agreement contained broad arbitration provisions.9

[¶40]   Courts generally hold that when a 
partnership agreement provides for arbitration, as in this case, collateral or 
parallel court proceedings with regard to the disputed property or issues being 
arbitrated are improper and such proceeding must be dismissed or stayed until 
arbitration is completed. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Hanover Development 
Corp., 73 Ill. App.3d 326, 29 Ill.Dec. 299, 391, 391 N.E.2d 562 (1979); Seidman 
and Seidman v. Wolfson, 50 Cal. App. 3d 826, 123 Cal. Rptr. 873 
(1975).

SUMMARY

[¶41]   After D & A went into Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, it no longer had standing to file and pursue its complaint dated 
April 30, 1990. The trustee in bankruptcy is the proper entity to represent the 
bankruptcy estate in any court or arbitration proceeding. D & A's April 30th 
complaint is a nullity for the further reason that it was filed in violation of 
an automatic stay which occurred when D & A went into Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 
A third reason to dismiss the proceeding tried in the Sixth Judicial District 
and now on appeal is that the parties generally ignored the arbitration award 
and attempted to litigate matters involving arbitration before arbitration had 
been completed.

[¶42]   The only viable district court 
action that we are aware of is a petition to confirm the arbitration award, 
Civil Docket No. 121-106, originally filed in the First Judicial District Court. 
This file apparently was transferred to the Sixth Judicial District. The status 
of an "Order Confirming Arbitration Award" is unclear and cannot be determined 
by reference to the record. The parties must now back up and pursue the petition 
for confirming the arbitration award. When the district court has finally acted 
upon that petition, a party may petition the district court to enforce the award 
if necessary, or take other appropriate action.

[¶43]   Remanded with instructions to 
dismiss the consolidated case here on appeal.

THOMAS, J., and ROONEY, 
Retired J., file dissenting opinions.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

 [¶44]  While I agree with much of what is said 
in the opinion of the court, I cannot agree with the ultimate resolution. I have 
struggled to find common ground with the majority opinion or with Justice 
Rooney, but I am persuaded that the correct disposition is that this appeal must 
be dismissed. That persuasion leaves me with the conclusion that I must 
separately dissent.

[¶45]   I am satisfied that the opinion of 
the court is correct in its conclusion that the civil action filed by Dorr & 
Associates in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District failed to invoke 
the jurisdiction of that court because of the stay in bankruptcy. The same 
rationale is applicable to the action purportedly filed by Dorr, Keller, Bentley 
& Pecha in the District Court of the First Judicial District that was 
ordered to be consolidated with the action pending in the Sixth Judicial 
District. In neither instance did the district court acquire jurisdiction over 
the case, and I am satisfied that the defect was not cured by the lifting of 
that stay at a later time.

[¶46]   Our rule is quite clear to the 
effect that this court has no greater subject matter jurisdiction than that 
vested in the trial court and, in instances in which the trial court has no 
jurisdiction, the appropriate disposition is dismissal of the appeal for want of 
jurisdiction in this court. Matter of Estate of Fulmer, 761 P.2d 658 (Wyo. 
1988); Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042 (Wyo. 1975); Pritchard v. State, Division 
of Vocational Rehabilitation, Dept. of Health and Social Services, 540 P.2d 523 
(Wyo. 1975); Ginn v. Parrish, 362 P.2d 824 (Wyo. 1961). The proper disposition 
for this court to make in this case is to dismiss the appeal.

[¶47]   Certainly, the court should not be 
offering advice concerning the action that apparently was instituted to confirm 
the award of the arbitrators. That case is not before this court in any 
way.

[¶48]   I would dismiss this appeal after 
noting the reasons for the absence of any jurisdiction in the trial 
court.

ROONEY, Justice, Retired, 
dissenting.

[¶49]   The arbitration proceeding was 
valid and disposed of this matter. The decision in arbitration was announced on 
August 24, 1989. The District Court indicated confirmation of the award on 
January 29, 1990, in an opinion letter. Although ineffective proceedings 
concerning this matter were had in the district court after institution of the 
bankruptcy proceedings on February 1, 1990 and March 3, 1990, such proceedings 
and subsequent proceedings concerning this matter were made effective when the 
automatic stay relative to them was lifted on June 25, 1990. In effect, the 
bankruptcy court turned disposition of the entire matter over to the state 
courts and the bankruptcy court concerned itself with the other claims, debts 
and assets of the bankrupts.

[¶50]   I would affirm.

 

 FOOTNOTES

1 The award 
provided:

The Arbitration Panel, by 
a majority, hereby award the following damages to Keller:

Unpaid compensation for 
calendar year 1988                              
$ 5,840.87

Unpaid 
compensation for the period 

January 1, 1989 through 
May 4, 1989                                            
  7,926.64

Damages for 
violation of dissolution provisions                            
91,396.27                      
___________

 Total               
                       
$105,163.78

     In addition to and 
exclusive of the foregoing, Dorr is directed to deliver to Keller all sums in 
Wyoming National Bank - Cheyenne Savings Account No. 1200831263, which by the 
last account statement had a balance of $1,565.35.

     Dorr is further 
directed to deliver to Keller all accounts receivable existing as of May 4, 
1989, and to pay to Keller any sums paid for said accounts receivable 
hereafter.

     Dorr is further 
directed to return to Keller all computer software in Dorr's possession which 
was brought into the partnership and/or owned by Keller as of May 4, 
1989.

2 The court's order 
stated:

IT 
IS THEREFORE HEREBY ORDERED:

1. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the First Judicial District Docket 123 Case No. 
445 (consolidated with Case No. 17330 in Campbell County, Wyoming) is hereby 
granted and said case is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

2. 
Plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief in Case No. 17330 is granted to the 
extent that the Court rules that as between Smith, Keller & Associates and 
Dorr & Associates and the partnership of Dorr, Keller, Bentley & Pecha, 
the partnership was terminated on the 24th day of August, 1989 and no longer 
exists.

3. 
That the arbitration award accomplished an accounting and dissolved and 
terminated the partnership as of August 24, 1989.

4. 
Dorr, Keller, Bentley & Pecha has no right of action and Smith, Keller and 
Associates cannot pursue any action in the name of Dorr, Keller, Bentley & 
Pecha.

3 Sometime before July 30, 
1990, Mr. Hogan, on behalf of the estate of D & A, agreed to additional 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and order to be submitted to the 
arbitration panel.

4 The discussion in this 
Part I of the opinion is substantially the same as that employed by Judge Harold 
Mai, Bankruptcy Judge, in his order dated September 6, 1991 with respect to the 
status of D & A, appellee here, in Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

5 The five grounds 
specified in Wyo. Stat. § 1-36-114 are:

     (i) The award was 
procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;

     (ii) There was evident 
partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption of any of the 
arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;

     (iii) The arbitrators 
exceeded their powers;

     (iv) The arbitrators 
refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown, refused to 
hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise conducted the hearing as 
to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or

     (v) There was no 
arbitration agreement, the issue was not adversely determined by a court as 
provided by law and the applicant did not participate in the arbitration hearing 
without raising the objection. The fact that the relief was such that it could 
not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not a ground for 
vacating or refusing to confirm the award.

6 The three grounds 
specified in Wyo. Stat. § 1-36-115 are:

     (i) There was an 
evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the description of 
any person or property referred to in the award;

     (ii) The arbitrators 
awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and the award may be corrected 
without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues submitted; 
or

(iii) The award is 
imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the 
controversy.

7 Wyo. Stat. § 1-36-111 
reads in pertinent part:

     (a) On application of 
a party or an order of the court, the arbitrators may modify the 
award:

(i) When there was an 
evident miscalculation of figures or description of a person or property  referred to in the award;

(ii) When the award is 
imperfect as to form not affecting the merits of the controversy; or

(iii) For the purpose of 
clarifying the award.

8 D & A's complaint 
for declaratory judgment was consolidated with SK & A's complaint originally 
filed in the First Judicial District.

9 The partnership 
agreement stated in part:

ARTICLE XII. 
ARBITRATION

Any controversy arising 
out of or relating to this partnership agreement shall be settled by arbitration 
by three members of the state knowledgeable in business affairs. The first two 
arbitrators selected, one by each of part to the controversy, and the third 
arbitrator mutually agreed upon and selected by the first two arbitrators. 
Majority decision of the arbitrators will constitute arbitrated settlement, and 
judgment on the award rendered may be entered by any court having jurisdiction. 
The arbitrated settlement shall be made by arbitrators within 60 days of 
selection of the third arbitrator. Arbitration shall be the exclusive remedy of 
controversy.