Title: State v. Phipps

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

418 S.E.2d 178 (1992) 331 N.C. 427 STATE of North Carolina v. Mickey Alton PHIPPS. No. 565A90. Supreme Court of North Carolina. June 25, 1992. *179 Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen., by Valerie B. Spalding, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State. D. Thomas Lambeth, Jr., June K. Allison, and Julie A. Risher, Burlington, for defendant-appellant. WHICHARD, Justice. Defendant appeals his convictions for first-degree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon. In a capital trial, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder on the basis of both premeditation and deliberation and the felony murder rule. The jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment for the murder. The trial court imposed that sentence in addition to a forty-year sentence for the robbery conviction. We conclude that the trial court erred in failing to submit the charge of second-degree murder, but we hold the error to be nonprejudicial in light of the felony murder verdict. Because the first-degree murder conviction may be upheld only by virtue of the felony murder rule, however, we arrest judgment on the underlying felony, robbery with a dangerous weapon. The State presented evidence tending to prove the following facts and circumstances: *180 On 7 May 1989, Janice Sheets was working as the manager of the Adams Seafood restaurant in North Wilkesboro. As manager, one of her duties was to make the night deposit at First Union Bank. Sheets left the restaurant at about 11:00 p.m. and drove her car to make the deposit. A night watchman in the vicinity of the bank saw Sheets' car in the parking lot at 11:40 p.m. and again at 12:40 a.m. A depositor discovered Sheets' car in the bank parking lot at approximately 1:20 a.m. and reported it to the authorities. Officers Burns and Bailey of the North Wilkesboro Police Department investigated the report and found the dead body of Janice Sheets. The autopsy revealed both blunt and sharp force injuries to the victim's head and a defensive injury to one finger on the victim's right hand. The victim received as many as eighteen blows to the head, but the cause of death was an incised wound or a sharp force wound to the neck. This wound was approximately four inches long, one and one-half inches wide, and it involved a complete transection, or cutting, of the right jugular vein. The murder investigation revealed that two bank deposit bags containing cash, checks, and credit card receipts totalling $9,556.65 were taken from Janice Sheets. Nineteen identifiable fingerprints were found in the victim's car, fifteen of which matched the victim's. The four remaining identifiable fingerprints did not match the victim's or defendant's, but were otherwise unidentified. Investigators found several other latent prints with insufficient ridge detail for proper identification. Forensic tests of blood and hair samples failed to identify a suspect. Two witnesses testified that they saw an individual matching defendant's general description in the vicinity of the murder scene near the time of the crime. One identified defendant as the individual she saw that night. As part of the murder investigation, SBI Special Agent Steve Cabe spoke with employees of the restaurant, including defendant, who worked as a cook and busboy. Agent Cabe first spoke with defendant on 8 May 1989. Defendant told Cabe he had left the restaurant at about 10:00 p.m. and gone to the Run-In, a nearby convenience store, and talked with Mark McNeill. In a second conversation with Agent Cabe, on 10 May 1989, defendant said he had bought a six-pack of beer and some gasoline at the Run-In. Defendant said he spoke with McNeill and then went straight home. After learning that investigators had interviewed his wife, defendant admitted that he had not gone straight home but instead had been with his cousin, Lois Bailey, until midnight. Defendant told Cabe that he had been seeing Lois for approximately four years, and that they parked his car in an alley that evening. Lola Simpson, whose maiden name was Bailey,[1] testified that she had known defendant for about seven years and that they had had an affair for about four years. Simpson testified that defendant called her on 12 May 1989 and told her he had given the police her name and that he needed an alibi for the time of Janice Sheets' murder. Defendant responded negatively when Simpson asked him if he had killed Sheets. He said that he needed the alibi because he had been out drinking with Tracy Dowell, who was underaged, and did not want to get Tracy in trouble. Simpson indicated to defendant that she needed to think about whether to provide him with an alibi. Tracy Dowell testified at trial that he was not with defendant on the evening of the murder. Defendant called Simpson again on 18 May 1989 to ask whether the police had spoken with her. He again said he wanted her to tell the police that he was with her between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. on the evening of the murder. Police officers spoke with Simpson the next day, and she told them she had been at her mother's house on the evening of 7 May and defendant had not been with her. *181 Defendant spoke with SBI Special Agent William Foster at the police department on 19 May 1989. According to Foster, defendant said he had "told some fabrications" because he did not have an alibi for the night of Janice Sheets' murder. In this interview, defendant told Foster that Sheets had asked him to put a cardboard box in her car just before he left work. Defendant complied with that request and then told Sheets he was leaving. Defendant went to the Run-In and then waited in the alley for Lola Simpson. Defendant drank a couple of beers, drove around for a while, and then went home. Less than a month later, defendant admitted his responsibility for the death of Janice Sheets. SBI Special Agent Jonathan Jones testified that defendant made the following inculpatory statement to him on 8-9 June 1989: The State also presented evidence that defendant was in dire financial straits. Shortly before the murder, defendant unsuccessfully sought loans of more than one thousand dollars from two financial institutions, and he faced foreclosure on his residence. Yet, within a week after the murder and robbery, defendant made up two delinquent house payments with $2,137.75 in cash. He also made up delinquencies on two other loan accounts and a Duke Power Company account. Further, he made retribution in cash of almost $100 worth of bad checks he had written. Defendant presented no evidence at the guilt stage of the trial. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder, based on both the felony murder rule and a finding of premeditation and deliberation, and robbery with a dangerous weapon. The jury recommended that defendant receive a sentence of life imprisonment for the murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and to a consecutive forty-year term for the robbery conviction. In his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain inculpatory statements. During the investigation, law enforcement officials questioned defendant at least ten times. The questioning culminated in the 8-9 June confession described above. Defendant argues that his motion to suppress the inculpatory statements should have been granted because the statements were obtained prior to his having been advised of his constitutional rights and under such circumstances that the statements were made unknowingly, unintelligently, and involuntarily. We disagree. *182 Judge Rousseau denied defendant's motion to suppress on the grounds that These legal conclusions were based on the following extensive findings of fact: Our review of the record reveals that these findings of facts are supported by plenary competent evidence. They thus are binding on this Court on appeal. State v. Jenkins, 292 N.C. 179, 184, 232 S.E.2d 648, 652 (1977). Defendant argues first that Judge Rousseau erred in concluding that he was not entitled to Miranda warnings until 2:00 a.m. on 9 June 1989, and second, that Judge Rousseau erred in concluding that his confession was free, voluntary, and made with knowledge that it could be used *185 against him. With respect to the first question, defendant specifically argues that he was deprived of his right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments during all questioning prior to his confession on 9 June. He argues that the law enforcement officers postponed arresting him so they could interrogate him repeatedly without affording him the constitutional protections, such as the right to counsel, that would arise during custodial interrogation or the commencement of formal adversarial proceedings. We note first that defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments "attaches only at such time as adversary judicial proceedings have been instituted `whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment.'" State v. Franklin, 308 N.C. 682, 688, 304 S.E.2d 579, 583 (1983) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1882, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 417 (1972)), overruled on other grounds by State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 337 S.E.2d 487 (1985). In State v. Nations, 319 N.C. 318, 324, 354 S.E.2d 510, 514 (1987), this Court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach at the time of his interrogation or arrest; instead, it attached at his first appearance before a judge of the district court. In this case, defendant had not even been arrested at the time he gave his confession; thus, we cannot conclude that there was a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. With respect to defendant's claim that he was interrogated without first being advised of his constitutional rights, particularly his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment, the crucial question is whether defendant underwent custodial interrogation. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held: Id. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1611, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 706 (footnote omitted). "[T]he Supreme Court of the United States has specifically rejected arguments that the principles of Miranda should be extended to cover interrogation in noncustodial circumstances after a police investigation has focused on the suspect...." State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 408, 290 S.E.2d 574, 580 (1982). Thus, defendant's claim of a Miranda violation is without merit unless there was custodial interrogation. In resolving the question of whether there was custodial interrogation, Id. at 410, 290 S.E.2d at 581; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1876, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509 (1980). We hold that Judge Rousseau correctly concluded that defendant was not in custody, and thus was not entitled to Miranda warnings, prior to his 2:00 a.m. confession. Defendant had cooperated with the investigation of this murder from the outset. Several times, upon request, he had come to the police station on his own. On these occasions, he had answered questions and had even been fingerprinted once. On no occasion was defendant placed under arrest; to the contrary, each time he was permitted to return home. During the investigation defendant also cooperated by returning investigators' phone calls and agreeing to meet with them to discuss his alibi for the evening of the murder. Defendant agreed to take a polygraph test and accompanied law enforcement officers to Hickory on 18 May 1989 for that purpose. *186 Upon being advised by SBI Agent Jones that he did not have to take the polygraph test, that he had the right to remain silent, and that anything he said could be used against him, defendant chose to exercise those rights and declined to take the test. The officers acceded to defendant's choice and drove him back to North Wilkesboro. Defendant later spoke in casual circumstances with a local attorney who advised defendant that he did not have to take the polygraph test. On the evening of 8 June 1989, law enforcement officers sought to speak again with defendant regarding the murder. Because he had no operable telephone, the officers were constrained to go to defendant's residence. Defendant agreed to go with the officers to the police station to "clear up" some matters. After about an hour at the police station, defendant agreed to go with the officers to Hickory to take the polygraph test. Defendant requested that the officers take him by his house first to inform his wife. The officers granted this request and offered to make sure defendant got something to eat on the way to Hickory. While at defendant's house, Chief Miller heard defendant's wife tell him not to take the test and to call his attorney. Defendant's response was that he wanted to clear up the matter that evening. Instead of stopping for food on the way to Hickory, the officers complied with defendant's preference that he take the polygraph first and eat later. Once at the SBI office, defendant waited by himself in a lobby with unlocked external doors for over thirty minutes. He was allowed to use the rest room unaccompanied several times. He was again informed by Agent Jones of his rights prior to taking the polygraph test, and he signed a form indicating that he wished to waive his rights. Defendant took the polygraph test and waited alone while the results were compiled. After Agent Jones analyzed the results, he again informed defendant that he was not under arrest and was free to leave. Agent Jones then confronted defendant with the negative results and asked him to tell the truth. Defendant then asked for and received permission to call his mother. Following this phone call, defendant made and repeated his confession in which he admitted responsibility for the death of Janice Sheets. The facts of this case are similar to those in Davis, where: Davis, 305 N.C. at 415-17, 290 S.E.2d at 584-85. As in Davis, we conclude that there was no custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda prior to the time defendant gave his confession. Further, defendant gave his confession after having been advised of his constitutional rights and after having waived those rights in writing prior to taking the polygraph examination. Thus, there was likewise no violation of Miranda at the time of the confession. Defendant's final argument under this assignment of error is that his waiver of rights and confession were not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Defendant essentially contends that the multiple interrogations, including law enforcement visits to his home, the long duration of the 8-9 June session, including the lack of sleep and food, and the confrontation with his earlier inconsistent and untruthful statements, caused both the confession and the waiver of his constitutional rights to be involuntary. For all the reasons described above relating to the question of custodial interrogation, we conclude that defendant's confession was voluntarily made, and that defendant made the confession after being advised fully of his constitutional rights and having voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently relinquished those rights. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motions for (1) authorization of a private investigator and (2) an ex parte hearing at which to apply for funds to employ expert assistance. These contentions are without merit. In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held: Id. at 83, 105 S. Ct. at 1096, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 66. This Court has followed Ake and required, upon a threshold showing that a particular matter subject to expert testimony is likely to be a significant factor in a defendant's defense, the provision of psychiatric and fingerprint experts. State v. Moore, 321 N.C. 327, 364 S.E.2d 648 (1988). Further, an indigent defendant has a statutory right to "counsel and the other necessary expenses of representation." N.C.G.S. § 7A-450(b) (1989); see also N.C.G.S. § 7A-454 (1989) (in its discretion the court may approve expert witness fee for an indigent defendant). "[T]o establish a specific need for the assistance of an expert, the defendant must show that: (1) he will be deprived of a fair trial without the expert assistance, or (2) there is a reasonable likelihood that the expert assistance will materially assist him in the preparation of his case." State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 284, 389 S.E.2d 48, 58 (1990). Undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance would be "beneficial" or "essential" to preparing an adequate defense are insufficient to meet the threshold showing required by Ake. State v. Tucker, 329 N.C. 709, 719, 407 S.E.2d 805, 811 (1991) (citing State v. Hickey, 317 N.C. *188 457, 469, 346 S.E.2d 646, 654 (1986) (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n. 1, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2637 n. 1, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231, 236 n. 1 (1985))). We have also held that Id., 329 N.C. at 719-20, 407 S.E.2d at 811-12. Defendant sought the appointment of an investigator because his attorney did not have Defendant's motion for the appointment of an investigator referred to no particular evidence or issue that would be significant to the case, and simply was an insufficient showing of particularized need for expert assistance under Ake. See State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 355, 368 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1988). The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion. Defendant also filed a motion for an ex parte hearing for additional expert assistance. The trial court denied this motion. Defendant notes that four identifiable fingerprints were located inside the victim's automobile, none of which matched the victim's or defendant's. Defendant says that at the requested ex parte hearing he would have sought funds to hire an expert in fingerprint identification. Defendant contends that the trial court's ruling violated his right to due process of law, to the effective assistance of counsel, and to be reliably sentenced in a capital trial. Defendant says that specific language in Ake guarantees his right to an ex parte hearing on his motion for expert assistance: "When the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent." Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83, 105 S. Ct. at 1096, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 66. We note that although the Court referred to an "ex parte threshold showing," it also stated in the paragraph denominating its express holding: "Our concern is that the indigent defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist for the purpose we have discussed, and as in the case of the provision of counsel we leave to the States the decision on how to implement this right." Id. at 83, 105 S. Ct. at 1096, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 66. Defendant and the State agree that the issue of defendant's entitlement to an ex parte hearing is a question of first impression in this jurisdiction. Our opinions have often quoted the "ex parte" language from Ake, but the issue has never arisen squarely, as it does here. See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 329 N.C. at 718, 407 S.E.2d at 811; State v. McLaughlin, 323 N.C. 68, 83, 372 S.E.2d 49, 60 (1988), vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1021, 110 S. Ct. 1463, 108 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1990), on remand, 330 N.C. 66, 408 S.E.2d 732 (1991); State v. Moore, 321 N.C. at 344, 364 S.E.2d at 656; State v. Smith, 320 N.C. 404, 420, 358 S.E.2d 329, 338 (1987); State v. Hickey, 317 N.C. at 468, 346 S.E.2d at 654. Our research also reveals that no federal court has passed on the question of whether an ex parte hearing on a motion for expert assistance is constitutionally required.[2]*189 At the time Ake was decided, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) stated: 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (1988); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(b).[3] The then-existing federal practice may shed light on the origin of the "ex parte " language in the Ake opinion. The federal practice under the statute has persisted, and several federal courts have enforced the statutory right of an indigent defendant to an ex parte hearing when seeking expert assistance. See United States v. Dolack, 484 F.2d 528 (10th Cir.1973); United States v. Sutton, 464 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.1972); United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.1971); Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir.1970). Three states have addressed the question of whether Ake demands, rather than presumes, that the request for expert assistance be heard ex parte. In Brooks v. State, 259 Ga. 562, 385 S.E.2d 81 (1989), the Supreme Court of Georgia stated: Id. at 564-65, 385 S.E.2d at 83-84. The court went on to prescribe a procedure by which an indigent defendant would seek funds for expert assistance: 14-207(b) (1990). Id. at 566, 385 S.E.2d at 84. In McGregor v. State, 733 P.2d 416 (Okla.Crim.App.1987), the court granted a writ of mandamus requiring a previously ordered evidentiary hearing to be held ex parte. The hearing was on the defendant's motion for a court-appointed psychiatrist. The court summarily concluded that "[t]he intention of the majority of the Ake Court that such hearings be held ex parte is manifest." Id. at 416. The court based its conclusion on the same passage in Ake as does this defendant. To the contrary, the Supreme Court of South Dakota has held that a state statute requiring that "appointment of expert witnesses by the court shall *190 be made only after reasonable notice to the parties to the proceeding of the names and addresses of the experts proposed for appointment" does not violate a defendant's rights to due process or equal protection of the law. State v. Floody, 481 N.W.2d 242, 254-56 (S.D.1992). We conclude that the decision to grant an ex parte hearing is within the trial court's discretion. Though such a hearing may in fact be the better practice, it is not always constitutionally required under Ake. In Ake the right to expert psychiatric assistance on behalf of indigent defendants was rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Ake, 470 U.S. at 76-77, 105 S. Ct. at 1092-93, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 61-62 (citation omitted). Whereas an indigent defendant's access to the "basic tools of an adequate defense" is a core requirement of a fundamentally fair trial, the need for an ex parte hearing on a motion for expert assistance is not. Defendant may participate meaningfully in the preparation of his defense even though the prosecutor is present for and contests his motion for expert assistance. The primary justification for an ex parte hearing is that it allows an indigent defendant to make a detailed showing, sufficient to meet the Ake threshold, of his need for expert assistance without alerting the prosecution to vital trial strategy and theories of defense. Though this is a desirable advantage, and one available to both the State and nonindigent defendants, we conclude that its absence does not necessarily render the trial of an indigent defendant fundamentally unfair. Apart from its holding that the states would be responsible for implementing the right recognized in Ake, that decision included several other references suggesting that an ex parte hearing is not necessarily constitutionally required. First, in conducting its due process balancing test, the Court implicitly recognized that the State's interest in its economy is a valid consideration. The Court stated that "it is difficult to identify any interest of the State, other than that in its own economy, that weighs against recognition of this right," Ake, 470 U.S. at 79, 105 S. Ct. at 1094, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 63, and noted that "[m]any States, as well as the Federal Government, currently make psychiatric assistance available to indigent defendants, and they have not found the financial burden so great as to prejudice this assistance," id. at 78, 105 S. Ct. at 1094, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 63. Through such language the Court recognized the need to balance the importance of the protection sought with the associated cost to the State. Because the "assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal his defense," id. at 80, 105 S. Ct. at 1095, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 64, the Court concluded that cost considerations failed to tip the balance in favor of the State. Although the Court tipped the scales in favor of the accused when considering the importance of obtaining expert assistance to aid in building a defense, it did not address the *191 importance of the procedures by which expert assistance is sought. Further, the Court realized that although indigent defendants must be afforded the basic tools for an effective defense, it would not be possible to require that indigent defendants have all the advantages and privileges that result from greater wealth. The Court held that a psychiatrist must be appointed upon a threshold showing that a defendant's sanity would be a significant issue at trial, but it was careful to note: "This is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own." Id. at 83, 105 S. Ct. at 1096, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 66. For the reasons described above, we conclude that Ake did not mandate that motions for expert assistance be heard ex parte. We also conclude that an ex parte hearing is not constitutionally required in every case. There are strong reasons for conducting the hearing ex parte, and the court may, in its discretion, do so. Defendant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the denial of his motion here. We thus find no abuse of discretion and overrule this assignment of error. Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to put into evidence certain testimony and numerous exhibits. He says first that an excessive number of graphic and repetitious photographs of the crime scene and victim were erroneously admitted over his objection. Second, defendant contends that an excessive volume of physical evidence and expert or investigative testimony was presented, despite its failure to link the defendant to the crime, so as to confuse and unduly prejudice the defendant. Defendant objected to the evidence based on Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence: N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (1988). In State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 372 S.E.2d 523 (1988), we described the proper framework for analyzing a defendant's contention that the trial court admitted unduly prejudicial and inflammatory photographs. Id., 323 N.C. at 283-85, 372 S.E.2d at 526-27. In Hennis, the Court found reversible error where the State introduced thirty-five eight-by-ten-inch glossy photographs and duplicate slides. The circumstances under which the photographs and slides were introduced, however, were important to the determination that error occurred. The State constructed a screen upon which the slides were projected in images three feet ten inches by five feet six inches, and in such a manner that the images were projected immediately above the defendant's head. Nine of the slides illustrated the testimony of the deputy sheriff who discovered the bodies of the three victims, and twenty-six slides illustrated the testimony of the pathologists who conducted the autopsies. The photographs, most of which were in color, were distributed to the jury in silence, one at a time, for a full hour. In the present case, the State introduced fifty-two color photographs of the crime scene and the victim's body. Of these, thirty-eight illustrated testimony regarding the scene of the crime and, though some revealed the presence of blood, none showed more of the victim's body than her foot protruding from an open car door. Of the fourteen remaining photos, six related to the testimony concerning the autopsy report. These six photos depicted isolated areas of injury to the scalp and the neck, and the injuries as they appeared to the upper torso as a whole. Three photographs showed the victim's body slumped over in the car, but none of her injuries were apparent. Three photos of the victim's body in the car, and one photo taken at the morgue, were particularly gruesome, but without undue repetition they illustrated Agent Melton's testimony regarding his investigation of the crime. The remaining photograph depicted what was described as a defensive, sharp force injury to the victim's finger. The circumstances surrounding the presentation of these photographs, and the photographs themselves, are not such that we can say their admission into evidence for illustrative purposes was not the result of a reasoned decision. The number of photographs alone is an insufficient measure of their capacity to prejudice and inflame the jury; instead, the court looks to their probative value and the circumstances of their introduction into evidence. See State v. Robinson, 327 N.C. 346, 358, 395 S.E.2d 402, 409 (1990). The trial court carefully considered the photographs prior to admitting them into evidence, and we cannot conclude that it abused its discretion in admitting them. This assignment of error is overruled. Further, we reject defendant's argument that the cumulative effect of the prodigious volume of physical evidence and expert or investigative testimony was confusion and undue prejudice. Defendant argues that the State, in an improper attempt to prejudice the jury, presented physical evidence such as bloodstained objects from the victim's car (for example, the victim's purse, soft drink can, telephone book, and key chain, in addition to car door panels, windows, and steering wheel), scientific evidence *193 (such as fingerprint, serology, and hair identification tests which failed to link defendant to the crime scene), and investigative testimony relating to the above. According to defendant, prejudice occurred because the State was sending a subtle message to the jury that it had conducted an exhaustive investigation of the murder and had isolated only one possible perpetratordefendant. Given that message, defendant fears the jury was inclined to convict him regardless of the fact that despite the comprehensive investigation there was little direct evidence linking him to the crime. In remarking on the propriety of a prosecutor's closing argument, we have said: State v. Westbrook, 279 N.C. 18, 37, 181 S.E.2d 572, 583 (1971) (emphasis added), judgment vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 939, 92 S. Ct. 2873, 33 L. Ed. 2d 761 (1972). Under the circumstances of this case, we find no error in the manner in which the prosecutor sought to fulfill his duty through the presentation of evidence. Further, defendant's suggestion that the jury was convinced to convict him for any improper purpose is belied by the import of defendant's own admission of his responsibility for the death of Janice Sheets. Defendant next contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused his request for a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication as a defense to premeditated and deliberated murder. Defendant says the failure to instruct on the legal significance of his voluntary intoxication evidence unconstitutionally lightened the State's burden of proving premeditation and deliberation. The controlling precedent on this question is State v. Mash, 323 N.C. 339, 372 S.E.2d 532 (1988). In Mash, the Court stated: Id. at 346, 372 S.E.2d at 536 (quoting State v. Strickland, 321 N.C. 31, 41, 361 S.E.2d 882, 888 (1987) (quoting State v. Medley, 295 N.C. 75, 79, 243 S.E.2d 374, 377 (1978))) (citations omitted). "When determining whether the evidence is sufficient to entitle a defendant to jury instructions on a defense or mitigating factor, courts must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant." Id., 323 N.C. at 348, 372 S.E.2d at 537. Defendant presented no evidence relating to his degree of intoxication. Instead, defendant relies on evidence presented by the State. This evidence is twofold. First, Agents Jones and Foster testified regarding defendant's inculpatory statement in which he said he got off work at either 10:00 or 10:30 p.m. and then went to the Run-In to buy a six-pack of beer. Defendant rode around for a while, drinking beer and smoking marijuana, until shortly before 11:00 p.m. According to his statement *194 to the agents, defendant was "pretty buzzed on beer and pot." Second, Mark McNeill, who worked at the Run-In on the night of the murder, corroborated defendant's statement that he purchased beer that evening. Defendant makes no reference to additional evidence in the record relating to his state of intoxication at any relevant time. We hold that the trial court was correct to deny defendant's requested instruction on voluntary intoxication, as the evidence was insufficient to warrant such an instruction. The evidence falls far short of that found to be sufficient in Mash, where the defendant had been seen drinking from 4:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m., where witnesses described him as "definitely drunk" and "pretty high" by 9:30 p.m., and where the defendant's actions became "drunker, wilder and out of control." Mash, 323 N.C. at 348, 372 S.E.2d at 538; see also State v. Baldwin, 330 N.C. 446, 463, 412 S.E.2d 31, 41 (1992) (insufficient evidence of intoxication where defendant drank five or six beers and consumed an indeterminate amount of marijuana and cocaine). Defendant also argues that the high evidentiary standard of proof required as a prerequisite to a voluntary intoxication instruction unconstitutionally prevents a defendant from presenting evidence in his defense. We see no merit to this contention, as the presence of a burden of production on an issue cannot reasonably be said to preclude introduction of evidence thereon. Accordingly, we overrule this assignment of error. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his request to submit to the jury the possible verdict of second-degree murder. Such an instruction is required under the following circumstances: State v. Thomas, 325 N.C. 583, 594, 386 S.E.2d 555, 561 (1989) (citations omitted). Defendant does not contend there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation, making submission of the first-degree murder charge error. Instead, he contends, and we agree, that the State's evidence would have permitted a rational jury to convict him of second-degree murder. Second-degree murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice but without premeditation and deliberation. State v. Young, 324 N.C. 489, 493, 380 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1989). In its case-in-chief, the State presented testimony of Agents Jones and Foster regarding defendant's inculpatory statements. According to their testimony, defendant stated that he got off work between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. the night of the murder. At the victim's request, defendant *195 used her keys to open her car door and put a box on the front seat. He then returned the keys and told the victim he was going to make a phone call. The victim, who had known defendant since they had worked together at Kentucky Fried Chicken several years previously, and who had hired defendant to work at Adams Seafood, then said, "Well, if you're going to be around a while, why don't you ride to the bank with me?" Defendant agreed to do so, and he telephoned his mother from the pay phone inside the restaurant. While waiting to go to the bank, defendant went to buy beer at the Run-In and then came back to the restaurant and waited for about thirty minutes. The victim came outside eventually and asked defendant if he was ready to go. When defendant replied "Yes," she asked if he wanted to follow her in his car or to ride with her. Defendant said that he would ride with her. Defendant got in the front seat next to the victim and they rode together towards the bank. On the way, defendant asked how much money was made that night. He then said that he needed the money because he was about to lose his home. He asked if she could give the money to him. The victim replied, "Hell, no!" When they arrived at the bank, defendant said again, "Janice, I need that money." The victim made a response that defendant could not remember, then he tried to snatch the money bag. The victim, who was five feet nine inches tall and weighed 230 pounds, "smacked the hell out of [defendant]." She then tried to get out of the car and defendant grabbed her by the hair and pulled her back into the car. According to the testimony relating his confession, defendant then said the victim grabbed a chrome bar that looked like a ratchet and tried to hit him with it. Defendant stopped the blow, took the bar, and hit her with it several times. He tried again to get the money bag, but the victim produced a large pocketknife and tried to cut him. Defendant wrestled the knife from her and stabbed her in the neck. Defendant then grabbed the money bag, the knife, and the bar, and left. "`Whenever there is any evidence or when any inference can be fairly deduced therefrom tending to show a lower grade of murder, it is the duty of the trial judge, under appropriate instructions, to submit that view to the jury.'" State v. Strickland, 307 N.C. at 285, 298 S.E.2d at 653 (quoting State v. Perry, 209 N.C. 604, 606, 184 S.E. 545, 546 (1936)). From the evidence described above, a rational jury could have concluded that defendant killed Janice Sheets with malice but without premeditation and deliberation. The jury could have concluded that defendant carried no weapons with him when he went to the bank with the victim, and that he merely tried to take the money bags from her with permission or with the force of his own hands. If the jury believed his statement, it could have concluded that defendant only killed the victim as a result of the struggle that ensued after defendant pulled the victim back into the car and after the victim escalated the struggle by using deadly weapons to defend herself. Thus, the jury could have concluded that defendant killed the victim with malice but without the premeditation and deliberation necessary for first-degree murder. It therefore was error for the trial court to refuse to instruct on second-degree murder. Defendant is not entitled to a new trial, however, because the jury based its verdict on both premeditation and deliberation and the felony murder rule. Defendant's first-degree murder conviction under the felony murder rule is without error and is therefore upheld. See State v. Wall, 304 N.C. 609, 286 S.E.2d 68 (1982). As a result, however, we must arrest judgment on the conviction for the underlying felony, robbery with a dangerous weapon. FIRST-DEGREE MURDER (89 CrS 3312)NO ERROR. ROBBERY WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON (89 CrS 331)JUDGMENT ARRESTED. MEYER, Justice, dissenting. I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that defendant's "first-degree murder conviction may be upheld only by virtue of *196 the felony murder rule" and that the Court must therefore "arrest judgment on the underlying felony, robbery with a dangerous weapon." I believe that the trial court properly refused to submit second-degree murder as a lesser offense of the charge of first-degree murder committed with premeditation and deliberation and that it committed no error requiring the reversal of defendant's convictions or the sentences imposed thereon. It is not every case in which first-degree premeditated and deliberated murder is charged that an instruction on second-degree murder must be given. State v. Strickland, 307 N.C. 274, 284-85, 298 S.E.2d 645, 653 (1983). Such an instruction must be given as a lesser offense of first-degree premeditated and deliberated murder only where the evidence presented at trial raises a genuine issue as to whether the defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation in the killing. In making this determination, the question is not whether the jury could convict defendant of second-degree murder but whether "the evidence, reasonably construed, tend[s] to show lack of premeditation and deliberation." Id. at 287, 298 S.E.2d at 654. Relying on a portion of defendant's confession, wherein defendant stated that the victim "smacked the hell out of [defendant]," tried to hit defendant with a chrome bar resembling a ratchet, and pulled a pocketknife on defendant, the majority states: I disagree. The evidence presented at defendant's trial showed a ruthless killing committed by a man who had devised a plan to rob his employer and who had committed himself to using whatever force was necessary to carry out his plan. The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to defendant, showed that the victim had refused to hand over the money to defendant and had "started out of the car" when defendant "grabbed her by the hair and pulled her into the car." When the victim sought to defend herself, first with a ratchet and then with a pocketknife, defendant overcame the victim and responded by inflicting multiple blows to the victim's head. The uncontradicted evidence presented at trial showed that defendant inflicted eighteen blows to the victim's head, all while she was alive. Many of the blows were inflicted with such force as to expose the victim's skull. Not content with the fact that the victim was only stunned by the blows, defendant then proceeded to slash the victim's throat, inflicting the four inch long, one and one-half inch wide fatal wound that completely severed the victim's right jugular vein, partially severed the victim's right common carotid artery, and cut the victim's thyroid cartilage deeply enough to expose the victim's windpipe. Having accomplished this, defendant then grabbed the deposit bags containing his employer's money and fled the scene. In my opinion, the statement by defendant raises no question as to the premeditation and deliberation on the part of defendant. Even assuming that defendant had not formed an intent to kill the victim before he dealt the first blow to her head, I fail to see how any rational juror could have reasonably found that defendant, having dealt eighteen blows to the victim's head, did not act with premeditation and deliberation when he subsequently slashed the victim's throat and left her helpless, to bleed to death. Based on the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, the jury returned the only reasonable verdict, finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder based upon the theories of premeditation and deliberation and of felony murder. I find it beyond all reason and logic to conclude, as does the majority, that the jury may have found that defendant did not act with premeditation *197 and deliberation had it been instructed on second-degree murder. I therefore dissent from the portion of the majority opinion that concludes that the trial court erred in failing to submit the charge of second-degree murder. MITCHELL and LAKE, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion. [1] It appears from the transcript, though with less than complete clarity, that Lois Bailey and Lola Simpson are one and the same. [2] In Thor v. United States, 574 F.2d 215, 219 (5th Cir.1978), the court said "the right to an ex parte hearing pursuant to [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 17(b) does not appear to rise to a constitutional level." The federal rule considered in Thor provides for issuance of subpoenas and the payment of witness fees for indigent defendants. We note, however, that Thor was decided prior to Ake. [3] Several states have codified procedures for providing expert assistance to indigent defendants following an ex parte showing of need. See Kan.Stat.Ann. § 22-4508 (1988); S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-26(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp.1991); Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-14-207(b) (1990).