Title: KEATS v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KEATS v. STATE2003 WY 1964 P.3d 104Case Number: 01-231Decided: 02/13/2002
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 

 

 

 

WADE 
TRAVIS KEATS,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Carol Seeger of Carter Law Office, Gillette, 
Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. 
Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Patrick J. LeBrun (Student 
Intern).

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      In July 2001, a 
Campbell County jury convicted appellant, Wade Travis Keats, of first-degree 
arson in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101 (LexisNexis 2001).  The district court sentenced him to a 
three- to seven-year prison term.  
On appeal, appellant argues that the district court failed adequately to 
instruct the jury on the specific intent element of first-degree arson, 
improperly excluded evidence that appellant was taken into custody pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-10-101 through 25-10-127 (LexisNexis 2001), improperly 
precluded the jury from considering appellant's ownership of the occupied 
structure at issue, and failed adequately to instruct the jury regarding the 
definition of "maliciously," an element of first-degree arson.  We affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant raises 
the following issues:

 

Whether 
the trial court erred in refusing to give a specific intent jury instruction in 
the trial of first degree arson which is a specific intent 
crime.

 

Whether 
the trial court erred in limiting evidence of the appellant's mental condition 
during the trial of the specific intent crime of first degree 
arson.

 

Whether 
the trial court erred in refusing appellant's proposed jury instruction No. G 
which acknowledges ownership or title to an occupied structure is not a defense 
to first degree arson, however, ownership or title may be considered in 
determining appellant's intent or state of mind.

 

Whether 
the trial court erred in refusing appellant's proposed jury instruction No. H 
defining the term "maliciously" to include that ill will, hatred or hostility be 
directed to another.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On the evening of 
December 30, 2000, appellant angrily left some friends, stating to one friend 
"if [you don't] want to go to jail, get out of the car . . .."  The friend complied.  Appellant then returned to his mobile 
home in the early morning hours of December 31, 2000, and, appearing angry and 
intoxicated, asked his roommate to "get [her] stuff and leave, get out of his 
house."  After gathering some of her 
property, and her son, in order to leave the residence, the roommate observed 
appellant break a window and then saw a small fire in the hallway.  She extinguished the fire, and as she 
left, appellant "was talking about burning the house down with himself in it and 
he was tired of everybody using him."  
The roommate reported the incident to an emergency 
dispatcher.

 

[¶4]      Campbell County 
sheriff's deputies responded to appellant's residence just after 1:00 a.m. on 
December 31, 2000.  As they stood 
outside the mobile home, they observed appellant periodically inside the 
residence, but he did not initially respond to their requests to exit the 
residence or talk to them.  
Eventually, the officers entered the residence and located appellant in 
the bathroom.  A lengthy period of 
interaction and attempted negotiation between appellant, the officers, and, at 
appellant's request, another individual ensued.  During this period, appellant's unstable 
demeanor vacillated rapidly between suicidal, threatening, anger, laughter, and 
depression.  For example, appellant 
frequently exited and retreated to the bathroom, told the officers to get out of 
his house, threatened to kill himself if they did not do so, displayed three 
different knives, at times held a knife to his abdomen and throat, stabbed 
knives into the bathroom wall, door, and floor while yelling at the officers to 
"come and get some of this," laughed at the officers, and stated that if the 
officers came through the bathroom door, a knife was positioned such that it 
would harm appellant.

 

[¶5]      Appellant 
ultimately proceeded to light several fires at different times and at different 
locations within the residence.  The 
officers, and firemen, were able to extinguish and control these fires until at 
least one fire began to spread, filling the mobile home with smoke.  At one point, appellant broke a window, 
but upon seeing an officer outside the window pointing a flashlight and firearm 
at him, appellant took two deep breaths of fresh air and returned to the 
smoke-filled residence.  Eventually, 
amidst the smoke, flames and steam, the officers subdued appellant, who was 
proceeding through the mobile home with a knife in his hand, and placed him into 
custody.  The mobile home was 
"damaged probably beyond replacement fixing."

 

[¶6]      The State charged 
appellant with first-degree arson and possession of a deadly weapon with 
unlawful intent, both felonies.  A jury found appellant guilty of first-degree 
arson, but acquitted him of the possession of a deadly weapon charge.  The district court 
sentenced appellant to a three- to seven-year prison term.  He appeals from 
that judgment and sentence.

 

DISCUSSION

 

            
Specific Intent Jury Instructions

 

[¶7]      Appellant first 
argues that the district court did not adequately instruct the jury regarding 
the specific intent element of first-degree arson.  At trial, appellant 
entered a timely objection, stating that "it is reversible error not to instruct 
the jury as to the definition of specific intent" and that "the State must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant maliciously set a fire specifically 
intending to destroy or damage an occupied structure."  See W.R.Cr.P. 30(a).  Appellant contends that two jury instructions 
he offered at trial, which instructions the district court refused, would have 
adequately instructed the jury on this specific intent element.

 

[¶8]      We have stated that 
the

 

"trial judge is afforded latitude to tailor the 
instructions to the facts of the case, and reversible error will not be found as 
long as the instructions when viewed as a whole and in the context of the entire 
trial fairly and adequately cover the issues."

 

Streitmatter v. State, 981 P.2d 921, 925 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Scadden v. 
State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1053 (Wyo. 1987)).  Jury instructions are "designed to inform the 
jury about the applicable law so that the jury may apply that law to its own 
findings with respect to the material facts."  Brown v. State, 
817 P.2d 429, 439 (Wyo. 1991).

 

"Given this purpose, the test whether the jury has been 
instructed on the necessary elements of the crime charged is whether the 
instruction leaves no doubt as to under what circumstances the crime can be 
found to have been committed.'  Graham v. United 
States, 187 F.2d 87, 90 (D.C. Cir.1950), cert. 
denied, 341 U.S. 920, 71 S. Ct. 741, 95 L. Ed. 1353 (1951); United States v. Salliey, 360 F.2d 699, 702 (4th Cir.1966).  A failure to give any instruction on an essential element of a 
criminal offense is fundamental error, as is a confusing or misleading 
instruction, requiring reversal of the defendant's conviction[.]  Vigil [v. State], 859 P.2d [659] at 662 [(Wyo.1993)], 
quoting Cole v. Young, 817 F.2d 412, 423 (7th Cir.1987) (emphasis added); Phillips v. State, 760 P.2d 388, 390 (Wyo.1988); Redland v. State, 766 P.2d 1173, 1174 (Wyo.1989)."

 

Reilly v. State, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d 1259, 1265 (Wyo. 
2002) (quoting Miller v. 
State, 904 P.2d 344, 348 (Wyo. 1995)) (emphasis in original).

 

[¶9]      According to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101(a), a "person is guilty of first-degree arson if he 
maliciously starts a fire or causes an explosion with intent to destroy or 
damage an occupied structure."  The district court instructed the jury as 
follows regarding the elements of first-degree arson:

 

INSTRUCTION NO. 7

 

The necessary elements of the offense of First Degree Arson 
as contained in Count I are:

 

1.         On 
or about December 31, 2000;

 

2.         In 
Campbell County, Wyoming;

 

3.         The 
Defendant, Wade Travis Keats;

 

4.         
Maliciously started a fire(s);

 

5.         
With intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure.

 

[¶10]   We recently stated:

 

In the past, crimes have commonly been categorized by 
whether they require a "specific intent" or a "general intent."  For many years, 
Wyoming had several pattern jury instructions defining and explaining the two 
terms, and yet, the differences between the concepts were not always readily 
discernible.

 

            
"Realizing that the distinction between a specific intent crime and a 
general intent crime is apparently troublesome, we can perhaps clarify it by 
stating it in a somewhat different way.  When the statute sets out the offense with 
only a description of the particular unlawful act, without reference to intent 
to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, the trial judge asks the 
jury whether the defendant intended to do the outlawed act.  Such intention is 
general intent.  
When the statutory definition of the crime refers to an intent to do some 
further act or attain some additional consequence, the offense is considered to 
be a specific intent crime and then that question must be asked of the 
jury."

 

Reilly, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d at 1262 (quoting Dorador v. 
State, 573 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo. 1978)).  Following that logic, first-degree arson can 
be categorized as a "specific intent" crime in that the statute requires that 
one act "with intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-101(a).

 

[¶11]   Appellant offered this additional 
instruction on the specific intent element of first-degree arson, which 
instruction the district court refused:

 

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. K

 

            
The crime charged in this case is a serious crime which requires proof of 
specific intent before the Defendant can be convicted.  Specific intent, as 
the term implies, means more than the general intent to commit the act.  To establish 
specific intent the State must prove that the Defendant knowingly did an act 
which the law forbids, [knowingly failed to do an act which the law requires,] 
specifically intending a result prohibited by law.  Such intent may be 
determined from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

 

            
An act or a failure to act is "knowingly" done, if done voluntarily and 
intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent 
reason.

 

(Bracketed material in original.)  The proposed jury 
instruction's language mirrors that contained in former W.Cr.P.J.I. 3.504 
(1978).  Reilly, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 9 n.1, 55 P.3d  at 1262 
n.1.

 

[¶12]   We conclude that the district court did 
not err in refusing this proposed jury instruction.  The district 
court's jury instruction on the substantive elements of first-degree arson 
adequately instructed the jury regarding the specific intent element of 
first-degree arson, leaving "no doubt as to under what circumstances the crime 
can be found to have been committed.'"  Reilly, 2002 WY 
156, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d at 1265 (quoting Miller, 
904 P.2d at 348).  "Wyoming does not require particular words be 
used to properly instruct on the specific intent element of the crime of 
[first-degree arson]."  Compton v. State, 
931 P.2d 936, 940 (Wyo. 1997).  On appeal, Compton argued that the district 
court erred by not separately (beyond the substantive elements of the crime 
charged) instructing "the jury on the definition of specific intent" contained 
in the very jury instruction appellant proposed in the instant case.  Id. at 940-41.  We held that, instead, "it is more important 
that the jury understand what exactly they had to determine," and the district 
court's "elements" instruction in that case "specifically and precisely and in 
an understandable manner properly" instructed the jury on the specific intent 
element of the crime charged.  Id. at 941.

 

[¶13]   We further note that W.Cr.P.J.I. 3.504 
is no longer contained within the pattern criminal jury instructions.  Indeed, we have

 

acknowledged a trend in the law to dispense with the 
pattern jury instructions defining and explaining intent due to their "vagueness 
and general failure to enlighten juries."  Compton v. State, 
931 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo.1997).  Instead, juries should be instructed as to 
the appropriate intent that is an element of the particular crime; "it is more 
important that the jury understand what exactly they [are required] to 
determine."  Id.  This is consonant with our recent holding 
that "the test of whether a jury has been properly instructed on the necessary 
elements of a crime is whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the 
circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed."  Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 
(Wyo.2001).  
The point is that attempting formally to distinguish between specific 
intent and general intent, beyond the substantive elements of the crime, may not 
be the surest way to define the nature of the intent that must be proven.

 

Reilly, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 9, 55 P.3d at 1262-63 (footnote omitted).

 

[¶14]   Appellant also offered this additional 
instruction, which instruction the district court refused:

 

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. L

 

            
You are instructed that First Degree Arson is a specific intent 
crime.  To find 
the Defendant guilty, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant maliciously set a fire specifically intending to destroy or damage an 
occupied structure.  
Such intent may be determined from all the facts and circumstances 
presented by the evidence.

 

[¶15]   The district court did not err in 
refusing this proposed jury instruction.  We are unable to discern precisely how the 
proposed instruction would have assisted the jury in rendering its verdict.  Regarding the 
proposed instruction's first sentence, we find that the "facts and charges of 
this case did not require the court to identify [the requisite] intent as 
specific' or restate the name of the crime, but required the court to 
adequately instruct the jury that it should determine whether [appellant] was 
guilty of . . ." first-degree arson.  Compton, 931 P.2d  
at 940.  We previously established that the district 
court's "elements" instruction in the instant case met this requirement.  Juxtaposition of 
the proposed instruction's second sentence ("that the Defendant maliciously set 
a fire specifically intending to destroy or damage an occupied structure") with 
the elements instruction actually given by the district court (the "Defendant, 
Wade Travis Keats . . . [m]aliciously started a fire(s) . . . [w]ith intent to 
destroy or damage an occupied structure") reveals no meaningful distinction 
between the language contained in the proposed instruction and that contained in 
the elements instruction the district court actually gave the jury.  Id.  Finally, as to the proposed instruction's 
third sentence, the district court did instruct the jury that:

 

            
The intent with which an act was done is [a] condition of the mind, that 
is seldom if ever, capable of direct or positive proof.  Because we have no 
power to directly oversee the condition of a person's mind, the best we can do 
is infer it from the evidence introduced.

 

            
The Jury may consider the circumstances surrounding the act, the doing of 
the act itself, the manner in which it was done, and the means used.

 

            
Jury Instruction Defining "Maliciously"

 

[¶16]   As was mentioned above, one of the 
elements of first-degree arson that must be proved by the State is that the 
defendant "maliciously started a fire."  One of the trial battles in the instant case 
was over the correct definition of the word "maliciously."  The district court 
gave the following instruction to the jury:

 

INSTRUCTION NO. 15

 

            
"Maliciously" means acting in the state of mind in which an intentional 
act is done without legal justification or excuse.  The term 
"maliciously" conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility and implies 
a wicked state of mind.

 

[¶17]   The appellant objected to Instruction 
No. 15 and offered the following instruction in its place:

 

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. H

 

            
"Maliciously" means acting in the state of mind in which an intentional 
act is done without legal justification or excuse.  The term 
"maliciously" conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility toward another.

 

(Emphasis added.)  The wording of this proposed jury instruction 
is identical to the wording of a suggested definition contained in the Use Note 
to W.Cr.P.J.I. 31.01A (1996), which is the elements instruction for first-degree 
arson.  That 
suggested definition borrowed and modified the definition of malice found in 
W.Cr.P.J.I. 21.01D (1996), which is one of the homicide instructions.

 

[¶18]   There are two interrelated issues 
raised by these conflicting definitions.  First, does the malice or the malicious act 
have to be directed toward another?  And second, does the State have to prove either (1) that the act was 
done with no legal justification or excuse, or (2) that it was done with hatred, 
ill will or hostility, or does it have to prove both (1) and (2)?1

 

[¶19]   The words "malice," "malicious," and 
"maliciously" have appeared as elements in several crimes and causes of action, 
including murder, arson, malicious mischief, and malicious prosecution.  Because the terms 
are not statutorily defined, this Court has at times been called upon to 
determine their meanings in their different contexts.  A review of some of 
that case law may help to put our issues into perspective.  For instance, in 
malicious prosecution, the term means that the prosecution was instituted from 
an "improper motive," which is "any motive other than one to further the ends 
of justice or to punish an offender against the criminal law.'"  Huber v. Thomas, 45 Wyo. 440, 19 P.2d 1042, 1045 (1933) 
(quoting Henning v. Miller, 44 Wyo. 114, 8 P.2d 825, 
831 (1932)).

 

[¶20]   In Wiggin v. 
State, 28 Wyo. 480, 206 P. 373, 374 (1922), the defendant was convicted of violating a statute 
against "willfully and maliciously kill[ing] any . . . neat cattle . . . the 
same being the property of another . . .."  In reversing the conviction, Justice Blume 
delivered the following analysis of the word "maliciously" as used in that 
statute:

 

            
The defendant asked an instruction to the effect that the jury must find 
that the killing of the animal was done through malice, hatred, or ill will 
toward George and Henry Frederick, or that the killing was so cruel that malice 
could be inferred therefrom.  . . .  The court gave, on this subject, over the 
objection of the defendant, the following instruction:

 

            
"You are instructed that malice includes not only anger, hatred, and 
revenge, but every other unlawful and unjustifiable motive.  Malice is not 
confined to ill will toward an individual, but is intended to denote an action 
flowing from any wicked and corrupt motive, a thing done with a wicked mind, 
where the fact has been attended with such circumstances as evince plain 
indications of a heart regardless of social duty, and fatally bent on mischief; 
hence malice may be implied or inferred from any deliberate and cruel act 
against another, or his property, which shows an abandoned and malignant 
heart."

 

            
The case of State v. Johnson, 7 Wyo. 512, 54 
Pac. 502, is a case involving malicious mischief, and the court, in speaking of 
the malice essential to be shown in such cases, although the act there involved 
was only a misdemeanor, said in part:

 

            
"The authorities are nevertheless substantially agreed that the malice 
necessary to constitute the offense is something more than the malice which is 
ordinarily inferred from the willful doing of an unlawful act without 
excuse.  The 
statutes were not intended to make every willful and wrongful act punishable as 
a crime, but they are devised to reach that class of cases where the act is done 
with a deliberate intention to injure.  * * *  And it seems to be generally held that in 
order to bring an offense under the head of malicious mischief it must appear 
that the mischief was itself the object of the act, and not that it was 
incidental to some other act lawful or unlawful."

 

            
The principle laid down in that case that the malice in such cases is 
something more than what is ordinarily understood as legal malice, but is that 
malice as it is more ordinarily understood in common speech, has been the 
settled rule of law in this state since 1898, and we see no reason for departing 
therefrom.  . . 
.

 

". . .  Maliciously, in this sentence, is still more 
significant and controlling.  It means, with ill will, malevolence, grudge, 
spite, wicked intention, enmity.  And this ill will cannot exist without an 
object.  It 
must be aimed at some one; and assimilating this offense to malicious mischief, 
which it very much resembles, we hold the malice the culprit entertains must be 
directed to the owner of the premises."

 

Wiggin, 206 P.  at 374 (quoting Johnson v. 
State, 61 Ala. 9 (Ala. 1878)).

 

[¶21]   Clearly, at least in 1922, and at least 
as applied to malicious mischief, the concept of malice included not only an 
element of ill will, but it required that such ill will be directed toward a 
particular person.  
Less than two years later, however, in penning the opinion that became 
the source for the pattern jury instruction definition of malice in murder 
cases, and indirectly, in arson cases, Justice Blume reached a noticeably 
different conclusion:

 

As to what constitutes malice is not easily defined.  . . .  In its popular 
sense, the term malice conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility 
toward another.  
. . .  
That is not its legal meaning, but the term nevertheless implies a wicked 
condition of mind while the homicide is committed; a mind, we may say, 
committing the very act willfully.  . . .  In Bennett v. 
State, 15 Ariz. 58, 136 Pac. 276, it was said:

 

            
"The legal import of the term malice' extends beyond and is more 
comprehensive than ill will, hatred, or revenge.  It includes all states of the mind under 
which the killing of a human being by another takes place without any cause 
which will, in law, justify or excuse it or mitigate the homicide to 
manslaughter."

 

. . . [I]t is said that the term includes all those states 
and conditions of mind which accompany a homicide that is committed without 
legal excuse or extenuation.

 

State v. Sorrentino, 31 Wyo. 129, 224 P. 420, 423 (1924).

 

[¶22]   In the definition of malice in Wiggin, emphasis was placed upon the concept of ill 
will toward another person.  In the definition of malice in Sorrentino, emphasis was placed upon the concept of an 
act committed without legal justification or excuse.  The "old" pattern 
jury instruction, W.Cr.P.J.I. 7.106 (1978), and the new pattern jury 
instruction, W.Cr.P.J.I. 21.01D (1996), contain both concepts.2  The problem is that 
the concepts are not identical, leaving considerable doubt as to exactly what it 
is the State has to prove in a given case.3  Perhaps recognizing 
this difficulty, the source note to the new pattern instruction directs 
attention to Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1069 
(Wyo. 1987), where this Court, in a homicide case, said simply that 
"[m]alice has been defined as intentional killing without legal justification or 
excuse and under circumstances which are insufficient to reduce the crime to 
manslaughter."  
See also Nunez v. State, 383 P.2d 726, 729 
(Wyo. 1963).  In Armstrong v. 
State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1113-14 (Wyo. 1992), we noted the confusion that can arise because of 
differing legal and common definitions of malice, yet we also cited Sorrentino with approval and noted that the passage of 
six decades had "failed to endow our language with suitable synonyms."

 

[¶23]   In Dean v. 
State, 668 P.2d 639, 642-43 (Wyo. 1983), we considered the meaning of the word "maliciously" 
specifically within the context of the first-degree arson statute.  The value of Dean as precedent, however, is diminished by the fact 
that the crime in that case was charged under a statute, now repealed, that did 
not much resemble the present statute.  For ease of comparison, we will set out both 
statutes in full.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-121 (1957) states:

 

Any person who willfully and maliciously sets fire to or 
burns or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of 
any dwelling house, whether occupied, unoccupied or vacant, or any kitchen, 
shop, stable or other outhouse that is parcel thereof, or belonging to or 
adjoining thereto or any standing timber on public or privately owned land, 
whether the property of himself or of another, shall be guilty of arson in the 
first degree . . ..

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101(a) states:

 

A person is guilty of first-degree arson if he maliciously 
starts a fire or causes an explosion with intent to destroy or damage an 
occupied structure.

 

[¶24]   In Dean, in 
a discussion focused mainly on the fact that the old statute defined a general 
intent crime, while the new statute defined a specific intent crime, we quoted 
with approval the following definition of the word "maliciously" as used in the 
old statute:

 

". . .  "[M]alicious" when used in defining the crime 
of arson is quite different from its literal meaning.  * * *  "The malice 
* * * need not be express, but may be implied; it need not take the 
form of malevolence or ill will, but it is sufficient if one deliberately and 
without justification or excuse sets out to burn the dwelling house of 
another."'  . . 
.

 

. . .  To be a willful and malicious burning in the 
law of arson, the burning must simply be done voluntarily and without excuse or 
justification and without any bona fide claim of right.  . . .  [M]aliciously' 
means that state of mind which actuates conduct injurious to others without 
lawful reason, cause or excuse."

 

Dean, 668 P.2d at 642-43 (quoting State v. 
Scott, 118 Ariz. 383, 576 P.2d 1383, 1385 (1978)).  See also 5 
Am.Jur.2d Arson and Related Offenses § 7 
(1995).

 

[¶25]   The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982, of 
which the new arson statute is a part, abolished common law crimes.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-1-102 (LexisNexis 2001).  Consequently, the important question is not 
what "maliciously" may have meant as part of common law arson, or even as part 
of the earlier statute, but what it means in the current statute.  See 5 Am.Jur.2d, supra, at 
§§ 1, 2.  In making that determination, however, we may 
resort to prior case law as an interpretive aid.  Id.  The ordinary rules 
of statutory construction, however, are our primary guide.

 

[¶26]   We have often stated our principles of 
statutory construction, and we will not repeat them here at length.  Suffice it to say 
that, if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we simply abide by 
its plain meaning.  
If the statute is ambiguous, which means that its meaning is uncertain 
and it is susceptible to more than one interpretation, we may construe it.  Our primary goal is 
to determine legislative intent.  Statutes are to be given a reasonable 
interpretation with reference to their purpose.  Ambiguities in criminal statutes should be 
resolved in favor of lenity.  Union Pacific R.R. v. 
Trona Valley Federal Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, ¶ 7, 57 P.3d 1203, 1205-06 
(Wyo. 2002); DeLoge v. State, 2002 WY 155, 
¶ 8, 55 P.3d 1233, 1237 (Wyo. 2002); State v. Nelson, 2002 WY 99, 
¶ 6, 49 P.3d 185, 188 (Wyo. 2002); Jones v. State, 2002 WY 35, ¶ 
10, 41 P.3d 1247, 1252 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶27]   In applying the Sorrentino definition of malice, it becomes obvious 
that different evidence is required to prove the hatred or ill will that 
characterizes malice in its common meaning than the evidence that is required to 
prove the absence of a legal justification or excuse.  In applying its 
murder statutes, the Supreme Court of North Carolina declared that

 

the element of malice may be established by at least three 
different types of proof:  (1) "express hatred, ill-will or spite"; (2) 
commission of inherently dangerous acts in such a reckless and wanton manner as 
to "manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty and 
deliberately bent on mischief"; or (3) a "condition of mind which prompts a 
person to [act] intentionally without just cause, excuse or justification."  [State v.] Reynolds, 307 
N.C. at 191, 297 S.E.2d [532], 536 [(1982)].

 

State v. Coble, 351 N.C. 448, 527 S.E.2d 45, 47 (2000).  This approach relieves the dichotomy between 
the concept of "ill will" and the concept of "no legal excuse or justification" 
left by Sorrentino, in that it suggests that the 
varying definitions are alternatives.  We must then ask whether the legislature 
intended for either or both of those alternatives to apply under the 
first-degree arson statute.4

 

[¶28]   In his analysis of the revised criminal 
code that included the new arson statute, Professor Theodore E. Lauer concluded 
that the word "maliciously" may well be surplusage in the statute:

 

The word "maliciously" in first-degree arson is probably 
unnecessary.  
While traditionally arson has required that a fire be "willfully and 
maliciously" started, the term "maliciously" has meant something less than 
intentionally.  
See R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 
856-61 (3d ed.1982), where a malicious state of mind is said to be one wherein 
there is an absence of justification, excuse or mitigation, and either an intent 
to cause a particular harm or the "wanton and wilful doing of an act with 
awareness of a plain and strong likelihood that such harm may result."  Id. at 860.  But where, as in first degree arson, the act 
of starting the fire must be done "with intent to destroy or damage an occupied 
structure," it is clear that only an intent to cause the harm will suffice, and 
a knowing or reckless state of mind is not enough.

 

Theodore E. Lauer, Goodbye 3-Card 
Monte:  The 
Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982, XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 509, 511 n.12 
(1984).  We are not, however, free to ignore any word 
that the legislature has chosen to place in a statute, and every word is 
presumed to have a meaning.  Basin Elec. Power 
Co-op. v. Bowen, 979 P.2d 503, 509 (Wyo. 1999).  Furthermore, "maliciously" is a word that 
gives the statute a mens rea element, without which 
it would reach innocent conduct.5  State v. Stern, 
526 P.2d 344, 347 (Wyo. 1974); Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 27 at 164-65 
(15th ed. 1993).  See also Dean, 
668 P.2d at 642 and State v. 
Laude, 654 P.2d 1223, 1229 (Wyo. 1982).

 

[¶29]   Wyoming is far from alone in having 
attempted to modernize its arson laws.  The commentaries to the Model Penal Code 
describe a "vast legislative development of the offense" of arson in the United 
States.  Model 
Penal Code, § 220.1 at 4 (1980).  Three patterns existed in this 
legislation:  
(1) offenses classified in relation to the types of property involved, 
but with criteria discriminating according to the likelihood of endangering 
life; (2) offenses classified specifically with reference to danger to persons; 
and (3) offenses classified solely on the basis of the type of property 
burned.  Id. at 5-9.  In most legislation, the concept of danger to 
others was incorporated through use of the term "maliciously" or by denoting 
that the property burned had to be the property "of another."  Id. at 18-25.

 

[¶30]   Arizona's experience with the mens rea element of its first-degree arson statute is 
enlightening as we study our own statute.6  Prior to 1978, 
first-degree arson in Arizona required that a person "willfully and maliciously" 
set fire to a structure.  That phrase was judicially construed to mean 
"voluntarily and without excuse or justification and without any bona fide claim 
of right."  Matter of Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. 
J-37390-1, 116 Ariz. 519, 570 P.2d 206, 209 (1977).  After a full revision of Arizona's criminal 
code, and a couple of subsequent amendments, the mens 
rea element of the first-degree arson statute now is "knowingly and 
unlawfully damaging an occupied structure . . .."  Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 13-1704 (West 2001).  In construing the word "unlawfully" and its 
statutory definition"contrary to law or, where the context so requires, not 
permitted by law"the Arizona Court of Appeals emphasized the dangers of 
fire:

 

"A fire poses unique hazards.  As a means of 
destruction, it is difficult to control and may quickly spread to nearby 
buildings or fields.  
Firemen and policemen are endangered.  Neighbors and passers-by, fearing that a 
structure is occupied, may attempt hazardous rescue efforts."

 

State v. Newfield, 161 Ariz. 470, 778 P.2d 1366, 1369 (1989) (quoting State v. 
Durant, 674 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1983)).

 

[¶31]   The point of this detour into Arizona 
law has been to show that there is little difference between the concept of 
"unlawfully" (contrary to law or not permitted by law) and "maliciously" 
(without legal justification or excuse).  Beyond that, the use of these terms in 
conjunction with the burning of an occupied structure, rather than the burning 
of the property of another, suggests that the goal of the first-degree arson 
statutes in both cases is to protect all members of the public who might be 
harmed, not just the owner of the property or some other identified 
individual.  In 
turn, this suggests that in a prosecution for first-degree arson, the State does 
not have to prove that the malice or the malicious act was directed toward 
another.7

 

[¶32]   Earlier in this opinion, we noted that 
we do not construe statutes that we have not first found to be ambiguous.  If a statute is not 
ambiguous, we simply "abide by its plain meaning."  Union Pacific R.R., 2002 WY 165, ¶ 7, 57 P.3d at 
1205-06; DeLoge, 2002 WY 155, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d  at 1237; 
Nelson, 2002 WY 99, ¶ 6, 49 P.3d  at 188; Jones, 2002 WY 35, ¶ 10, 41 P.3d  at 1252.  In that regard, we 
must ask whether the word "maliciously" is ambiguous as it appears in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-3-101(a).  
Despite the lengthy analysis through which we have just gone, we conclude 
that the answer is "no."  In enacting statutes, the legislature is 
presumed to have acted with full knowledge of the existing law.  In re Estate of Fosler, 13 P.3d 686, 688 (Wyo. 
2000); Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 306 (Wyo. 1999).  In the present context, that means that in 
1982 when the legislature adopted Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101(a) as part of the 
new criminal code, it was aware of the definition of malice that this Court has 
been applying since at least 1924.  That definition has always contained the 
alternative theories of actual hostility or ill will and the doing of an act 
without legal justification or excuse, the latter alternative not requiring the 
direction of ill will toward any particular person.  The legislature's 
use of the word "maliciously" in a statute designed to protect any person who 
may be endangered as a result of an arson comports with that definition.  The fact that the 
pattern jury instructions, in not distinguishing between the alternate theories, 
may have created questions for juries, does not make the statute ambiguous.

 

[¶33]   We conclude that the district court did 
not err in refusing the appellant's proposed jury instruction defining the term 
"maliciously."  
In fact, the jury instruction as given may have been prejudicial to the 
State in that it appears to require the State to prove both that the appellant 
acted with ill will and hostility and that he acted without legal justification 
or excuse.  The 
jury instruction does not distinguish between actual malice and implied 
malice.  The 
facts of the instant case bear out the need for such distinction.  The appellant may 
not have felt actual hostility or ill will toward his roommate or toward the 
police officers who responded to the 911 call.  His actions, nevertheless, placed them all in 
great danger.  
That is exactly the type of conduct that can be characterized as being 
"without legal justification or excuse."

 

            
Other Issues

 

[¶34]   Appellant asserts that because 
first-degree arson contains an element of specific intent and appellant argued 
at trial that he ultimately intended to commit suicide, the district court 
improperly excluded evidence that law enforcement took appellant into custody 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-10-101 through 25-10-127, the statutory 
procedures utilized to place a mentally ill person in emergency detention.  Appellant's 
contention is that his specific intent being the intent to kill himself, he did 
not have the specific intent to commit first-degree arson.  Aside from citing 
summarily to the referenced statutes, appellant does not otherwise cite to any 
legal authority in advancing this argument.  Appellant further contends that the district 
court's jury instruction that "ownership or title to an occupied structure is 
not a defense to First Degree Arson" improperly precluded the jury from 
considering appellant's ownership of the occupied structure for other proper 
purposes.  This 
argument consists of two paragraphs, neither of which cite to any supporting 
legal authority.

 

[¶35]   "We have repeatedly stated that 
arguments that are not . . . supported by pertinent citations to authority will 
not be considered."  
Eustice v. State, 11 P.3d 897, 904 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶36]   The district court did not err in 
refusing to give the appellant's proposed jury instructions regarding specific 
intent and malice.  
The appellant's other arguments have not been supported by cogent 
reasoning or pertinent authority.  The judgment and sentence of the district 
court is affirmed.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

  
1During deliberations, the jury in the instant 
case sent a note to the judge asking, "Does maliciously when it says hatred, ill 
will, or hostility have to be towards someone else or can it be towards yourself 
or an object?"  
The district court judge did not answer that question, other than to tell 
the jury that the law was contained in the instructions they had been given.

  
2W.Cr.P.J.I. 7.106 (1978) states:

 

"With malice" means the commission of a wrongful act done 
intentionally without legal justification or excuse.  The term "malice" 
conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility toward another and implies 
a wicked condition of mind.

 

W.Cr.P.J.I. 21.01D (1996) states:

 

"Malice" means the state of mind in which an intentional 
act is done without legal justification or excuse.  The term "malice" 
conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility toward another.

 

  
3In the case of a contract killing, for instance, 
should the State have to prove that the hired killer had actual, personal ill 
will or hatred for the victim?  That does not seem likely.

  
4Because first-degree arson is now a specific 
intent crime, the third alternative identified in Coblethe commission of inherently dangerous acts in a 
reckless and wanton mannerwould not suffice to prove the crime.

  
5The intentional burning of an "occupied 
structure" could certainly be done without any criminal intent, especially since 
"occupied structure" is defined by statute to include situations where no one is 
actually present in the structure.  See Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2001).  For instance, fire departments often perform 
training exercises by burning old structures with the owner's permission.  The fire is set 
with the specific intent to destroy or damage the structure, but there is no 
unlawful intent.

  
6In addition to the cases cited herein, see State v. Vickers, 138 Ariz. 450, 675 P.2d 710, 711 
(1983), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1033 
(1990); Rudolph J. Gerber, Arizona 
Criminal Code Revision:  Twenty Years Later, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 143, 
145 (1998); and Rudy J. Gerber and John F. Foreman, Commentary, Arizona's Criminal Law:  The Critical Need for Comprehensive 
Revision, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 63, 65, 95 (1976).

  
7Of course, that does not foreclose the State, in 
an appropriate case, from pursuing and proving the alternate definition of 
malice based on actual hostility or ill will toward someone.