Title: Thomann v. Board of Registration of Real Estate Brokers & Salesmen

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12360 
 
MICHAEL THOMANN  vs.  BOARD OF REGISTRATION OF REAL ESTATE 
BROKERS AND SALESMEN.1 
 
 
 
December 10, 2018. 
 
 
Real Property, License to sell.  License.  Administrative Law, 
Judicial review.  Due Process of Law, Administrative 
hearing. 
 
 
 
Michael Thomann, a licensed real estate broker, appeals 
from the judgment of a single justice of this court affirming a 
decision of the Board of Registration of Real Estate Brokers and 
Salesmen (board) suspending Thomann's license for ten days.  We 
affirm. 
 
 
1.  Proceedings before the board of registration.  In 
October 2014, the board initiated adjudicatory proceedings 
against Thomann, alleging that he had engaged in the business of 
real estate brokering through an unlicensed limited liability 
company, in violation of 254 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.00(11) (2013) 
and 254 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.00(14)(e) (2005); and had failed to 
provide a certain notice of agency disclosure to the seller of 
real property, in violation of 254 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 3.00(13)(a) (2005).2  The board asserted, on the basis of those 
                     
 
1 The board, so named, is established by G. L. c. 13, § 54.  
The board refers to itself as the "Board of Registration of Real 
Estate Brokers and Salespersons." 
 
 
2 The board additionally alleged that Thomann assumed duties 
and responsibilities of a business entity engaged in the real 
estate brokering business without adequate preparation or 
competency, in violation of 254 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.00(14)(e), 
2 
 
 
violations, that discipline was warranted pursuant to G. L. 
c. 112, § 61.  Thomann denied the allegations against him; 
asserted that he had conducted his real estate brokering 
activities through a properly registered business or trade name; 
and alleged that it was his routine business practice to provide 
his clients with a specific form of agency disclosure.  Over 
Thomann's opposition, an administrative hearing officer 
eventually granted the board's motion for a summary decision, 
concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact in 
dispute and that the alleged violations had been established.  
See 801 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.01(7)(h) (1998).  The parties, 
through counsel, then submitted memoranda in lieu of a sanctions 
hearing. 
 
 
The hearing officer's tentative decision, which referenced 
her summary ruling, determined that the violations had been 
proved and concluded that a sanction against the respondent's 
license was therefore warranted.3  See 801 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.01(11)(c) (1998).  Thomann, both individually and through 
his attorney, filed written objections.  The board's final 
decision, dated September 15, 2016, considered Thomann's 
objections and adopted the tentative decision with certain 
modifications.  It ordered suspension of Thomann's license for 
ten days, beginning on October 3, 2016, with reinstatement 
conditioned on his written certification that he did not 
practice during the period of suspension; payment of a $1,200 
civil administrative penalty; and submission of an application 
for an appropriate license for Thomann's limited liability 
company or a certification that the company had been dissolved.  
See G. L. c. 112, §§ 61, 65A.  The board's decision notified 
Thomann that he could appeal from the decision either by filing 
a petition for judicial review in the Superior Court within 
twenty days of his receipt of the decision, pursuant to G. L. 
                     
by failing to comply with certain liability insurance 
requirements.  See 254 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.00(12) (2013).  
Although the hearing officer determined that the violation had 
been established, the board did not consider it a separate 
violation for purposes of sanction.  The violation was not 
challenged on appeal, and we do not address it further. 
 
 
3 The tentative decision did not repeat all of the facts and 
conclusions of law on which the summary ruling was based.  It 
did, however, expressly provide that "the Ruling on Summary 
Decision established liability in this forum." 
3 
 
 
c. 112, § 87BBB, or by filing a petition for review in the 
county court within thirty days, pursuant to G. L. c. 112, § 64. 
 
On October 19, 2016, Thomann filed a motion in the county 
court seeking an extension of time to file a petition there, and 
representing that he received the board's final order on 
September 30, 2016.  The clerk of the county court treated this 
motion as a petition for review under G. L. c. 112, § 64, and 
docketed it as such.  After the board filed the administrative 
record and both parties filed their briefs, the single justice 
affirmed the board's final decision and denied all other 
requests for relief.  This appeal followed. 
 
 
2.  Procedure for judicial review.  Judicial review of the 
final decisions of many boards of registration is properly 
sought by filing a petition in the county court within thirty 
days of the receipt of notice of the decision.  This procedure 
is established by G. L. c. 112, § 64, and by G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 14 (7).  See, e.g., Hamel v. Board of Registration of Funeral 
Directors & Embalmers, 449 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2007); Friedman v. 
Board of Registration in Med., 414 Mass. 663, 664 & n.1 (1993).  
The board in this case, at the end of its written decision, 
informed Thomann that he could proceed in that fashion, and that 
is essentially what he did.  The single justice also decided the 
matter under those statutes. 
 
 
In the case of this particular board, however, another 
statute applies.  General Laws c. 112, § 87BBB (C), states, with 
respect to decisions of this board, that any person aggrieved by 
the decision "may appeal to the superior court sitting in equity 
for the county wherein he resides or has his principal place of 
business, or to said court sitting in equity for the county of 
Suffolk" (emphasis added).  The statute requires the appeal to 
be filed in the Superior Court within twenty days of receipt of 
notification of the board's decision; authorizes the Superior 
Court to hear all the pertinent evidence and to determine the 
facts; and authorizes the Superior Court to annul the board's 
decision if it exceeded the board's authority or to grant other 
relief as justice and equity may require.  Id.  Significantly, 
§ 87BBB (C) then also states that "[t]he foregoing remedy shall 
be exclusive," and further provides that, from the decision of 
the Superior Court, "the parties shall have all rights of appeal 
and exception as in other equity cases" (emphasis added).  Id.  
Thus, the statute specific to this particular board, § 87BBB, 
unlike the more generic statute applicable to boards of 
registration generally, G. L. c. 112, § 64, identifies the 
4 
 
 
Superior Court, not this court, as the forum for judicial 
review, and states that this remedy "shall be exclusive."4 
 
 
The notice given by the board at the end of its written 
decision in this case appeared to give the parties two options 
for obtaining judicial review of the decision.  It informed them 
that they could proceed either in the county court, pursuant to 
§ 64, or in the Superior Court, pursuant to § 87BBB.  That 
appears to us to be at odds with the plain language of 
§ 87BBB (C), which states that the remedy provided therein shall 
be exclusive.  We encourage parties in future cases to pursue 
their appeals from this particular board in the Superior Court, 
pursuant to § 87BBB (C) (see, e.g., Rao v. Board of Registration 
of Real Estate Brokers & Salesmen, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 922, 922 
[1982]), and we invite the board to consider clarifying its 
notice so that it is consistent with the language of § 87BBB 
(C), namely that the remedy provided therein "shall be 
exclusive."5 
 
 
Even though we believe that Thomann should have sought 
judicial review in the Superior Court under § 87BBB, and not in 
the county court directly under § 64, we shall proceed to 
consider his appeal.  The single justice clearly had the 
authority to transfer the matter that was commenced in this 
                     
 
4 Contrast G. L. c. 112, § 84A, which governs decisions of 
the Board of Registration in Embalming and Funeral Directing.  
That statute, like § 87BBB, also identifies a procedure other 
than a petition in the county court under G. L. c. 112, § 64, as 
a means of obtaining judicial review.  It states that judicial 
review may be obtained by filing a petition in the District 
Court within ten days of the board's decision.  Unlike § 87BBB, 
however, § 84A states that the District Court procedure provided 
therein "is in the alternative to that provided by [§ 64], and a 
decision of the court upon a petition brought under [§ 84A] 
shall be final and conclusive" (emphasis added).  A party 
aggrieved by a decision of the Board of Registration in 
Embalming and Funeral Directing thus can proceed in one of two 
ways:  either in the county court pursuant to § 64, or in the 
District Court pursuant to § 84A.  See Hamel v. Board of 
Registration of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 449 Mass. 1008, 
1009 n.1 (2007). 
 
 
5 If the Legislature believes that we have misconstrued what 
appears to us to be the plain language and purpose of 
§ 87BBB (C), it is, of course, free to clarify the statute 
accordingly. 
5 
 
 
court to the Superior Court; and, vice versa, had it been 
commenced in the Superior Court, as we believe it should have 
been, she clearly would have had the authority to transfer it 
here.  See G. L. c. 211, § 4A.  See also Beres v. Board of 
Registration of Chiropractors, 459 Mass. 1012, 1013 (2011).6 
 
 
3.  Correctness of the board's decision and sanction.  The 
single justice reviewed the record before her, including the 
pleadings and the administrative record filed by the board, and 
affirmed the board's final decision and order.  We agree with 
the single justice that there was no error in the board's 
decision.  See Weinberg v. Board of Registration in Med., 443 
Mass. 679, 685 (2005) (under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 [7], court 
"reviews the decision of the board directly, despite this matter 
being brought as an appeal of a decision of the single 
justice"). 
 
 
a.  Facts.  We summarize the facts stated by the hearing 
officer, as modified and adopted by the board, reserving other 
facts for later discussion.7  We conclude that the findings were 
supported by substantial evidence.  See Weinberg, 443 Mass. at 
685. 
 
 
Thomann is the sole manager of Boston International Group, 
LLC (LLC), a Massachusetts limited liability company.  Its 
certificate of organization represented publicly that it would 
engage in business including "commercial real estate."  It does 
not have its own real estate broker's license.  See G. L. 
c. 112, § 87UU; 254 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.00(11) (2013).  The 
board found that, "[o]n or about January 3, 2013, Boston 
                     
 
6 As stated, actions commenced in the Superior Court in 
accordance with § 87BBB (C) must be brought within twenty days 
of receipt of notice of the board's decision in order to be 
timely, whereas actions commenced in the county court pursuant 
to § 64 must be brought within thirty days.  Thomann represents 
that he received the final decision on September 30, 2016, and 
there is nothing to suggest he received any earlier notice. 
 
 
7 Like the single justice, we decline to consider evidence 
that was not before the board.  See G. L. c. 112, § 64 
(incorporating standards of review provided in G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 14 [3]-[7]); G. L. c. 112, § 87BBB (C) (on appeal, reviewing 
court shall hear all "pertinent evidence").  See also Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
459 Mass. 603, 630 (2011) (judicial review of administrative 
agency decision confined to administrative record). 
6 
 
 
International Group, LLC, [doing business as] Boston 
International Group, entered into a Marketing Agreement for 
Exclusive Right to Sell (the 'Marketing Agreement') real 
property located at 167 Revere Beach Parkway in Chelsea, 
Massachusetts (the 'Property')."  Although the marketing 
agreement identified only "Boston International Group" and not 
"Boston International Group, LLC," as the "Broker," substantial 
evidence supports the board's finding that the LLC was both a 
party to the agreement and the entity that was actively engaged 
in the real estate brokering activities for the property.  See 
Duggan v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 456 Mass. 666, 674 
(2010).  In addition, in August 2013, the LLC (identifying 
itself in its complaint as "Boston International Group, LLC[, 
doing business as] The Boston International Group, Ltd") 
commenced an action in the Superior Court against the other 
parties to the marketing agreement, alleging breach of the 
agreement and seeking payment of a brokerage commission to the 
LLC.  The complaint averred: 
 
 
"5.  On January 3, 2013, the Defendants, Nobrega's 
Inc. and Robert J. Nobrega, individually and as agent of 
the [Nobrega Nominee] Trust, and the Plaintiff, entered 
into an Exclusive Right to Sell Agreement (hereinafter 'the 
Agreement'), regarding the sale of the Property owned by 
the Trustee Defendants located at 167 Revere Beach Parkway, 
Chelsea, Massachusetts. 
 
 
" . . . 
 
 
"10.  Under the Exclusive Right to Sell Agreement, the 
Defendants, Nobrega's, Inc. and Robert J. Nobrega, 
individually and as Trustee of the Nobrega Nominee Trust 
are obligated to pay the Plaintiff a brokerage commission 
([six percent]) upon the sale of Defendant's property 
during the term of the agreement." 
 
In its answer to a counterclaim filed by the defendants, the LLC 
also expressly admitted the allegation that "Boston 
International Group, Boston International Group, Ltd., and 
Boston International Group, LLC, are not duly licensed as . . . 
real estate brokers."8 
                     
 
8 The LLC subsequently amended its complaint to substitute 
"Michael Thomann [doing business as] The Boston International 
Group" for the LLC as the plaintiff in the action.  Nonetheless, 
the board was entitled to find, and did so find, based on all 
the evidence in the record, including the representations made 
7 
 
 
 
b.  Conducting brokering activities through unlicensed 
entity.  The gravamen of Thomann's argument is that he performed 
all of the brokering activity under his individual real estate 
broker's license using his business name, "Boston International 
Group," and not through the LLC.9  On the evidence before it, 
however, the board was warranted in concluding, as it did, that 
Thomann had actually engaged in the business of real estate 
brokering through the LLC (which had no license) without first 
obtaining a separate license for the LLC, in violation of 254 
Code Mass. Regs. §§ 2.00(11) and 3.00(14)(e).  That conclusion 
was supported by substantial evidence. 
 
 
The LLC's certificate of organization indicates that 
Thomann is its sole manager.  The LLC's business was described 
in this public filing to include services related to "commercial 
real estate" and "any activities directly or indirectly related 
thereto."10  Additionally, in a draft fee agreement for the 
transaction in this case, Thomann had presented the LLC and 
himself to the client as the "Seller's Agent," and outlined the 
fee for services due on the sale of property.  A notation on the 
agreement indicates that it was provided to the client.  
Further, when the dispute later arose, the lawsuit was commenced 
against the client in the LLC's name demanding payment of a real 
estate brokerage fee; in the same action, the LLC acknowledged 
that it was not licensed to engage in the real estate business.  
The board did not err in concluding that Thomann's conduct -- 
acting through the unlicensed LLC to broker the sale of the 
property -- violated 254 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 2.00(11) and 
3.00(14)(e). 
 
                     
in the original complaint, that the LLC was both a party to the 
marketing agreement and the entity that served as the broker. 
 
 
9 A real estate broker may "operat[e] under a business or 
trade name (doing business as)," provided notice is given to the 
board.  254 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.00(3) (1998).  Thomann had in 
fact earlier provided notice to the board that he was doing 
business as "Boston International Group."  The board apparently 
never was told, however, and would have had no reason to know, 
that Thomann was actually operating through a limited liability 
company. 
 
 
10 In addition, Thomann stated to the board's investigator 
that "Boston International Group LLC is registered with MA RE 
Board." 
8 
 
 
 
c.  Notice of agency disclosure.11  On appeal, Thomann also 
challenges the determination that he violated the agency 
disclosure requirements of 254 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.00(13)(a).  
That regulation requires real estate brokers to provide 
prospective purchasers and sellers of real estate with "a notice 
developed and approved by the board which clearly discloses the 
relationship of the broker or salesperson with the prospective 
purchaser or seller of the real estate . . . at the time of the 
first personal meeting between the prospective purchaser or 
seller and the broker or salesperson for the purpose of 
discussing a specific property" (emphasis added).  Id. 
 
 
In the summary decision ruling, the hearing officer 
determined that there was no evidence that Thomann gave the 
board-approved agency disclosure notice to the seller of the 
property that was the subject of the marketing agreement.  
Although Thomann asserted -- without a supporting affidavit or 
other evidence -- that he had in fact provided notice, the 
sample agency disclosure form he claimed to have provided to his 
real estate clients differed in material respects from the form 
approved by the board.  The hearing officer also found that 
Thomann failed to provide the form to the client at the 
appropriate time, i.e., in 2013, at the time the LLC entered 
into the marketing agreement and undertook to provide broker 
services, and that he failed to retain a copy of the form for 
the time period required by the regulations.  See 254 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 3.00(13)(a)(1) (three years from date of notice).  There 
was substantial evidence in the record to support the finding of 
a violation in this respect.12 
 
 
 
d.  Other claims of error.  On appeal, Thomann also raises 
assorted other claims.  He contends that the board failed to 
                     
 
11 On appeal from the single justice's judgment, Thomann 
asserts for the first time that he used the board-approved 
disclosure form, and appended a blank copy of the form to his 
brief.  We decline to reach claims and assertions like this that 
were not raised during the administrative proceedings or before 
the single justice.  See Weinberg v. Board of Registration in 
Med., 443 Mass. 679, 688 (2005). 
 
 
12 Although the board's final decision and order does not 
contain express findings concerning the hearing officer's 
summary ruling, it references the summary ruling, and it adopts 
the tentative decision (with certain modifications), which in 
turn referenced both the regulatory violations and the 
supporting summary ruling. 
9 
 
 
reasonably accommodate his alleged disability, and otherwise 
violated his right to due process.  He also claims that he was 
denied the assistance of legal counsel.  While we do not address 
each of his claims specifically, we have reviewed each of them 
and find them without merit.  With respect to the right to 
counsel, the record indicates that Thomann was in fact 
represented by multiple attorneys during the course of the 
administrative proceedings, and that he discharged his attorney 
after objections to the tentative decision had been filed.  The 
record also demonstrates that Thomann was given multiple 
extensions of time to file materials at various stages of the 
proceedings.  With respect to his claim of disability, there is 
nothing in the administrative record to suggest that Thomann 
requested or was denied any reasonable accommodation by the 
board, or that he substantiated any such claim.  In sum, the 
record amply supports the conclusion that the proceedings before 
the board comported with due process requirements.  See, e.g., 
Langlitz v. Board of Registration of Chiropractors, 396 Mass. 
374, 377 (1985). 
 
 
4.  Sanction.  Once statutory or regulatory violations have 
been established, the administrative agency has discretion in 
determining the appropriate sanction.  See G. L. c. 112, §§ 61, 
65A.  On appeal, we consider only whether the sanction imposed 
was a reasonable exercise of that discretion.  See Sugarman v. 
Board of Registration in Med., 422 Mass. 338, 347-348 (1996).  
See also Vaspourakan, Ltd. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control 
Comm'n, 401 Mass. 347, 355 (1987).  A reviewing court will not 
interfere with the agency's imposition of a penalty except in 
the most extraordinary circumstances.  Id.  No such 
circumstances are present here. 
 
 
In this case, we conclude that the board reasonably 
exercised its discretion when it sanctioned Thomann.  The $1,200 
civil administrative penalty was within the range permitted by 
statute.  See G. L. c. 112, § 61; G. L. c. 112, § 65A.  "Given 
that the range of penalties is for the agency, the fact that the 
[board] imposed more lenient penalties for similar violations in 
the past does not render the sanctions against [Thomann] 
arbitrary or capricious."  BAA Mass., Inc. v. Alcoholic 
Beverages Control Comm'n, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 839, 849 (2000).  
The ten-day suspension given to Thomann is actually less than 
the period imposed by the board for similar violations in other 
cases, and is reasonable in the circumstances of this case.  
With respect to the requirement that Thomann either obtain a 
real estate brokering license for the LLC or certify that the 
LLC has been dissolved, we conclude that that requirement is 
10 
 
 
also reasonable, particularly in light of the business purposes 
articulated in the LLC's certificate of organization. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion.  For all of these reasons, we agree with 
the single justice that the board's decision suspending 
Thomann's license for ten days, imposing a $1,200 civil penalty, 
and imposing certain conditions on the reinstatement of his 
license was supported by substantial evidence and free from any 
errors of law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Michael Thomann, pro se. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Kimberly A. Parr, 
Assistant Attorney General, for Board of Registration of Real 
Estate Brokers and Salesmen.