Title: Pruitt v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Lacy, S.J.1 
 
JOSEPH CLIFTON PRUITT 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 061701 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
September 14, 2007 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
In this appeal, the sole issue we consider is whether the 
evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of violating 
Code § 18.2-308(A) for concealing a weapon “about his person” 
as a second offense. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Although the principal facts are not in dispute, under 
the well-established standard for analyzing a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, we review 
those facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
drawing all reasonable inferences in the Commonwealth’s favor 
as the prevailing party at trial.  Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 
Va. 296, 299, 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005).  The judgment of the 
trial court will be reversed only upon a showing that it “is 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”  Code 
§ 8.01-680; Viney, 269 Va. at 299, 609 S.E.2d at 28. 
                     
1 Justice Lacy participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of her retirement on 
August 16, 2007. 
 
2
 
On the morning of October 6, 2004, Joseph Clifton Pruitt 
was involved in an automobile accident at the intersection of 
South Main Street and the Danville Expressway in the City of 
Danville.  Pruitt was driving a 1995 Ford Thunderbird and was 
on his way to work in Greensboro, North Carolina when another 
vehicle pulled out in front of his vehicle, causing a 
collision.  Prior to the collision, Pruitt was in possession 
of a .357 caliber Sig-Sauer pistol that he had placed on the 
front passenger seat of his vehicle as he was leaving for 
work.  Pruitt carried the pistol for personal protection 
because he traveled early in the morning and late at night. 
 
As a result of the collision, which caused the airbags in 
Pruitt’s vehicle to deploy, the pistol fell off the passenger 
seat onto the floor of the vehicle.  There, the pistol 
remained in full view.  Pruitt had been “thrown around” in his 
vehicle, had suffered injuries to his knee and wrist, and his 
head was bleeding.  Believing that his vehicle was damaged to 
the extent that it would have to be towed from the accident 
scene, Pruitt retrieved the pistol, placed it in the console 
compartment between the vehicle’s front seats, and immediately 
exited the vehicle.  When Officer Clark C. Gagnon of the 
Danville City Police, responding to a report of the accident, 
arrived on the scene, Pruitt was outside his vehicle with the 
doors closed and the windows up. 
 
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After advising Pruitt that his vehicle would have to be 
towed, Officer Gagnon performed an inventory search of the 
vehicle pursuant to a written police department policy.  
During that search, Gagnon opened the console compartment and 
found the pistol Pruitt had placed there.  Officer Gagnon then 
went to a nearby ambulance where Pruitt was being treated for 
his injuries and informed him that he would be charged with 
possession of a concealed weapon in violation of Code § 18.2-
308(A). 
 
At a subsequent bench trial held in the Circuit Court of 
the City of Danville on March 17, 2005, the Commonwealth 
presented evidence to support the charge of a violation of 
Code § 18.2-308(A), principally through the testimony of 
Officer Gagnon.  Without objection from Pruitt, the 
Commonwealth also introduced a copy of Pruitt’s 1997 
conviction for carrying a concealed weapon.  Pruitt testified 
on his own behalf and, during cross-examination by the 
Commonwealth, he conceded that his prior conviction for 
carrying a concealed weapon resulted from his having carried a 
pistol in a console compartment of a vehicle. 
 
In arguing to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence and 
again in closing argument, Pruitt contended that the evidence 
was insufficient to show that he had concealed the pistol 
“about his person” as required by Code § 18.2-308(A) because 
 
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he had exited the vehicle immediately upon placing the pistol 
in the console compartment.  Pruitt contended that his intent 
was to secure the weapon so that it would not be in plain view 
because he believed that this was the prudent course of 
action.  The Commonwealth contended that so long as Pruitt 
remained in the vicinity of the vehicle, the pistol was 
concealed about his person for purposes of Code § 18.2-308(A). 
 
In its summation, the circuit court stated that it 
accepted Pruitt’s testimony that the pistol had not been 
concealed prior to the accident and his explanation as to why 
he had placed the pistol in the console compartment.  
Nonetheless, the court found the evidence was sufficient to 
convict Pruitt of carrying a concealed weapon.  The court 
indicated, however, that it would be willing to reconsider the 
issue prior to sentencing after receiving a presentence report 
and reviewing the applicable case law. 
 
At a sentencing hearing held April 29, 2005, the parties 
again briefly addressed the issue whether the evidence showed 
that Pruitt had concealed the pistol “about his person.”  The 
circuit court reiterated that while there were “mitigating 
circumstances,” it remained of opinion that the evidence was 
sufficient to convict Pruitt of concealing the pistol in 
violation of Code § 18.2-308(A).  The court sentenced Pruitt 
to three years in prison, suspending the entire sentence. 
 
5
 
Pruitt noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia, which refused his petition for appeal by an 
unpublished order.  Pruitt v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1135-
05-3 (May 24, 2006).  Citing Leith v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. 
App. 620, 621-23, 440 S.E.2d 152, 153-54 (1994) and Watson v. 
Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 124, 127, 435 S.E.2d 428, 430 
(1993), the Court of Appeals found that “[f]rom his position 
next to the driver’s door, [Pruitt] could have easily obtained 
his gun from the console.  This evidence supported the trial 
judge’s finding that the weapon was concealed ‘about the 
person’ within the meaning of Code § 18.2-308.”  Id.  
Following Pruitt’s application for a review by a three-judge 
panel of the Court of Appeals, the petition was again refused 
for the reasons stated in the Court’s prior order.  Pruitt v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 1135-05-3 (August 11, 2006).  We 
awarded Pruitt this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
 
In relevant part, Code § 18.2-308(A) provides that: 
 
If any person carries about his person, hidden 
from common observation . . . any pistol . . . he 
shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.  A second 
violation of this section . . . shall be punishable 
as a Class 6 felony. 
 
 
Pruitt contends that the circuit court and the Court of 
Appeals both erred in concluding that he had concealed his 
pistol in violation of Code § 18.2-308(A) because, by 
 
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immediately exiting his vehicle after placing his pistol in 
the console compartment, that weapon was never “about his 
person” as required by the statute.  This is so, he maintains, 
because this Court has held in prior cases interpreting the 
phrase “about his person” that a weapon must be “so connected 
with the person as to be readily accessible for use or 
surprise, if desired.”  Sutherland v. Commonwealth, 109 Va. 
834, 835, 65 S.E. 15, 15 (1909); accord Schaaf v. 
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 429, 430, 258 S.E.2d 574, 574-75 (1979).  
Pruitt further asserts that the particular facts in this case 
support his contention that the pistol was not readily 
accessible to him and, thus, distinguish the present case from 
the cases cited by the Court of Appeals where weapons also 
were concealed within vehicles.  See, e.g., Leith, 17 Va. App. 
at 621, 440 S.E.2d at 153 (during traffic stop, driver 
voluntarily advised officer that a pistol was in the locked 
console compartment); Watson 17 Va. App. at 125, 435 S.E.2d at 
429 (pistol discovered concealed under floormat after driver 
was arrested following a traffic stop). 
 
The Commonwealth maintains that, subject to certain 
exceptions not applicable on these facts, see Code § 18.2-
308(B) and Code § 18.2-308(C), a violation of Code § 18.2-
308(A) is an inchoate offense committed upon concealment of a 
weapon.  Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177, 182, 639 
 
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S.E.2d. 227, 230 (2007).  Therefore, the Commonwealth contends 
that the instant Pruitt closed the console compartment in 
which he placed the pistol, Pruitt was guilty of violating 
Code § 18.2-308(A).  Additionally, even after Pruitt exited 
his vehicle, the Commonwealth contends that the pistol 
remained about Pruitt’s person because he “had only to open 
the car door, lean in and open the console to secure the 
weapon in mere seconds.”  We disagree with the Commonwealth. 
 
First, the Commonwealth’s reliance on Farrakhan is 
misplaced.  While we did state in Farrakhan that “[b]ecause an 
offense under Code § 18.2-308(A) is ‘possessory’ in nature, it 
is committed upon concealment,” id., we were not concerned in 
that case with whether the defendant concealed a weapon “about 
his person,” but whether the item he had concealed within a 
pocket of his clothing was a “weapon of like kind” within the 
meaning of Code § 18.2-308(A).  There was simply no issue in 
Farrakhan as to whether the item was concealed “about his 
person.” 
 
By contrast, in this case, the issue is whether a weapon 
is concealed “about [the] person” of the defendant as 
contemplated by Code § 18.2-308(A) when he places it into a 
closed compartment inside a vehicle as he is exiting the 
vehicle.  In all previous cases decided by this Court and the 
Court of Appeals construing the term “about his person” where 
 
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the weapon was not concealed by or in the defendant’s 
clothing, the issue was whether the weapon remained “so 
accessible as to afford prompt and immediate use” by the 
defendant while it was concealed.  Sutherland, 109 Va. at 835, 
65 S.E. at 15. 
 
In Sutherland, for example, the defendant placed a 
holstered pistol in a saddlebag that he carried in his hands, 
id., while in Schaaf the pistol was in a handbag carried by 
the defendant.  Schaaf, 220 Va. at 430, 258 S.E.2d at 574.  In 
Sutherland, we held that a holstered pistol within a saddlebag 
was not “so connected with the person as to be readily 
accessible for use or surprise if desired” and, thus, though 
“hid[den] from common observation,” as the relevant statute 
required, it was not within the intendment of the statute’s 
further requirement that the weapon be “about his person.”  
Sutherland, 109 Va. at 835-36, 65 S.E. at 15-16.  However, 
distinguishing and narrowing the holding in Sutherland by 
noting that a handbag was usually carried closer to the 
defendant’s person than was a saddlebag and was of a character 
that its contents were more readily accessible, in Schaaf we 
held that a pistol loose in a zippered handbag was about the 
 
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defendant’s person.2  Schaaf, 220 Va. at 431, 258 S.E.2d at 
575. 
 
Although the principle underlying Sutherland and Schaaf –
that the harm to be interdicted by Code § 18.2-308(A) is the 
accessibility of a concealed weapon for prompt and immediate 
use – is applicable in this case, those cases do not resolve 
our analysis.  It is self-evident that when a person conceals 
a weapon in an enclosed console of a vehicle and then exits 
that vehicle, the weapon is not as readily accessible as a 
weapon concealed in a carried bag or satchel.  Similarly, the 
Court of Appeals’ decisions in Leith and Watson are inapposite 
here because in both of those cases it is readily apparent 
that the defendants remained inside the vehicles in close 
proximity to where the weapons were concealed until directed 
to exit the vehicles by the police.  Thus, in each of those 
cases, there was no doubt that the weapons remained so 
accessible to the defendants as to afford prompt and immediate 
use. 
 
The undisputed facts in the instant case are clearly 
distinguishable from those in Schaaf, Leith, and Watson.  
There simply is no evidence demonstrating that Pruitt remained 
                     
2 In Schaaf, we also held that “[w]hile Sutherland can be 
distinguished from this case on the facts, to the extent that 
there may be a conflict Sutherland is overruled.”  Id. at 432, 
258 S.E.2d at 575. 
 
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in the vehicle for any appreciable length of time beyond that 
necessary to place his pistol in the console compartment.  
Granting all reasonable inferences to the Commonwealth, the 
evidence established that Pruitt placed the pistol inside the 
console compartment as he was exiting his vehicle.  Once he 
exited the vehicle and closed the door, the pistol was no 
longer accessible to him so as to afford “prompt and immediate 
use.”  Thus, we hold that at no time while the pistol was 
concealed inside the console compartment was it “about 
[Pruitt’s] person” as required by the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we hold that the Court of Appeals 
erred in holding that the evidence was sufficient to find 
Pruitt guilty of concealing a weapon in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-308(A) and in upholding the judgment of the circuit 
court in that regard.  Because the evidence was not sufficient 
to show that Pruitt concealed the pistol about his person, we 
will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate 
Pruitt’s conviction, and dismiss the indictment against him. 
Reversed and dismissed.