Title: Marine Bank v. Taz's Trucking Incorporated

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 65 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2827 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re Modern Building Materials Inc. Chapter 128 
Receivership: 
 
Marine Bank and Robert K. Steuer, Receiver,  
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Taz's Trucking Incorporated,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 164 
Reported at:  275 Wis. 2d 711, 688 N.W.2d 730 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 2, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 31, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Fisher   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Mark S. Schmitt and Maier McIlnay Schmitt & Button, Ltd., 
Grafton, and oral argument by Mark S. Schmitt. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief by Daryl 
L. Diesing, Barbara J. Janaszek and Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek 
S.C., Milwaukee, and Robert K. Steuer and Robert K Steuer Law 
Office, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Robert K. Steuer and 
Barbara J. Janaszek. 
 
 
2005 WI 65
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2827  
(L.C. No. 
03 CV 122) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re Modern Building Materials Inc. Chapter 
128 Receivership: 
 
 
 
Marine Bank and Robert K. Steuer, Receiver, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Taz's Trucking Incorporated, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
 JUN 2, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
Remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Petitioner Taz's Trucking 
Incorporated (Taz's) petitions for review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, Marine Bank v. Taz's Trucking 
Inc., 2004 WI App 164, 275 Wis. 2d 711, 688 N.W.2d 730, 
affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Marine Bank and Robert K. Steuer, Receiver (Marine Bank).  
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
2 
 
Marine Bank seeks to enjoin Taz's from collecting unpaid freight 
charges from the consignees of Modern Building Materials Inc. 
(MBM).  On review, we address the following questions: (1) 
whether there are genuine issues of material fact, or reasonable 
alternative inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, so 
that summary judgment should not have been granted; and (2) what 
are the applicable legal principles when determining whether 
Taz's may collect freight charges from the consignees-customers 
of MBM?     
¶2 
We conclude that summary judgment was improperly 
granted to Marine Bank.  Genuine issues of material fact, and 
reasonable alternative inferences drawn from undisputed facts, 
exist as to whether an agreement was made between Taz's and MBM, 
to the effect that Taz's could not seek payment from a 
consignee-customer of MBM.  We further conclude that Taz's 
liability for payment of freight charges is governed by contract 
law, and that there exist common law presumptions that a 
consignee and a consignor may be liable for the payment of those 
freight charges.  See Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Rudolph 
Express Co., 855 F. Supp. 270, 273 (E.D. Wis. 1994).  These 
presumptions may be rebutted, however, by evidence that the 
carrier and the consignor agreed that the consignor would be 
liable, exclusively, for such charges.  Absent an express 
contract to that effect, such an agreement may be determined to 
exist through analysis of the conduct of the parties.  Id.  
Here, however, the record is insufficient for a determination as 
to whether there was such an agreement.  For these reasons, we 
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
3 
 
reverse the court of appeals' decision affirming the summary 
judgment granted by the circuit court and remand this case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I 
¶3 
In the spring of 2002, MBM entered into a business 
relationship with Taz's to ship its precast concrete building 
products to MBM's customers.  The parties entered into a written 
agreement regarding the rates charged for shipping, but that 
agreement did not cover whether the consignor (MBM) or the 
consignee (MBM's customer) would be liable for those charges.  
¶4 
A typical transaction, pursuant to this agreement, 
consisted of MBM contacting Taz's to pick up the shipment and 
deliver the goods to an MBM customer.  Taz's would subsequently 
calculate the trucking charge based upon prespecified rate 
sheets.  For each shipment, MBM prepared a bill of lading to 
accompany the goods.  This bill of lading served as the key 
transmittal document for each shipment to an MBM customer.  The 
document did not contain any terms assigning liability for the 
freight 
charges; 
it 
simply 
provided 
the 
basic 
delivery 
information, such as time, place, manner, and the identity of 
the consignee.   
¶5 
Taz's billed MBM each week for the previous week's 
deliveries, until Taz's factored the account with a financing 
company in July 2002.  Taz's informed MBM of this arrangement 
and indicated that MBM could wait up to 90 days before making 
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
4 
 
its payments to the factor.1  However, in September 2002, MBM 
stopped making payments.  When the factor informed Taz's of 
MBM's delinquency in November 2002, Taz's immediately contacted 
MBM and threatened to seek the past-due freight charges from the 
consignees.  MBM promised to pay, and Taz's agreed not to seek 
payment from MBM's customers-consignees.   
¶6 
By January 2003, MBM was insolvent.  Marine Bank, 
which made loans to MBM in 2001-02 totaling over $9 million, 
filed a complaint and a motion for appointment of a receiver and 
for a preliminary injunction.  On January 24, 2003, the Kenosha 
County Circuit Court, Michael S. Fisher, Judge, granted Marine 
Bank's motion and appointed Robert K. Steuer (Steuer) as 
receiver of MBM, pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 128 (2001-02).2     
¶7 
MBM then informed Taz's that it was forced into 
receivership and that it would not pay for freight charges that 
accrued prior to the receivership on January 24, 2003.  Taz's 
then demanded payment from the consignees.  Several of the 
consignees informed the receiver, Steuer, that Taz's demanded 
                                                 
1 A factor is defined as "[o]ne who buys accounts receivable 
at a discount. . . ."  Black's Law Dictionary 612 (7th ed. 
1999).     
2 Unless otherwise indicated all references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2001-02 edition.    
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
5 
 
payment from them for the freight charges.3  Marine Bank filed a 
complaint on February 13, 2003, seeking an injunction and a 
declaratory judgment preventing Taz's from collecting freight 
charges from the consignees.  The circuit court issued a 
temporary restraining order against Taz's to that effect.   
¶8 
Both sides then filed motions for summary judgment.   
The circuit court granted Marine Bank's motion and permanently 
enjoined Taz's from collecting from the consignees.  The court 
concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact.  
The court acknowledged the presumption of consignee liability 
upon receipt of the goods, but held that the presumption was 
overcome here with evidence that MBM and Taz's had impliedly 
agreed that MBM would be liable for all freight charges.  Taz's 
timely appealed.  
¶9 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment.  It agreed with the circuit court 
that the law creates a presumption that both the consignor and 
consignee are liable to the carrier for freight charges.  The 
court held:  
[There is a] common-law presumption that a consignee, 
the party entitled to delivery under a bill of lading, 
                                                 
3 The parties entered into a stipulation pending the 
disposition of the case.  The stipulation provided that Marine 
Bank was free to collect from MBM's customers-consignees any and 
all of MBM's accounts receivable.  For each account receivable 
recovered, Marine would hold in trust in an interest-bearing 
business account the lesser of the dollar amount claimed by 
Taz's with respect to the account receivable or the amount 
actually collected on the account receivable from the identified 
MBM customer-consignee.   
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
6 
 
becomes liable for 
paying the 
carrier's 
freight 
charges upon delivery of the goods consigned.  The 
same liability is presumed to attach to the consignor, 
the party from whom the carrier receives the goods for 
delivery.  But liability for paying freight charges is 
ultimately a matter of contract, so either presumption 
may be rebutted by evidence that the parties to the 
bill of lading had something else in mind. 
Marine Bank, 275 Wis. 2d 711, ¶7 (quoting Schneider National, 
855 F. Supp. at 273).  Relying on Schneider National, the court 
of appeals determined that the common law presumption in regard 
to consignee liability had been rebutted here by undisputed 
evidence that MBM and Taz's had agreed that MBM would be solely 
liable for freight charges.4   
¶10 Taz's filed a petition for review with this court.  We 
granted its petition on November 17, 2004.   
II 
¶11 The first issue that we address is whether the circuit 
court 
properly 
granted 
Marine 
Bank's 
motion 
for 
summary 
judgment.  We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court and the court 
of appeals, and benefiting from the analyses of those courts.  
Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, ¶11, 277 
Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334 (citing Yahnke v. Carson, 2000 WI 
74, ¶10, 236 Wis. 2d 257, 613 N.W.2d 102).  Wisconsin Stat. 
                                                 
4 The court also looked at E.W. Wylie Corporation v. Menard, 
Inc., 523 N.W.2d 395 (N.D. 1994), and LTV Steel Co. v. David 
Graham Co., 78 B.R. 713 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987), in addition to 
Schneider National Carriers, Inc. v. Rudolph Express Co., 855 F. 
Supp. 270, 273 (E.D. Wis. 1994), and determined that all three 
cases are correct statements of law and should be applied to the 
facts in this case.  See Marine Bank v. Taz's Trucking, Inc., 
2004 WI App 164, ¶¶19-22, 275 Wis. 2d 711, 688 N.W.2d 730.   
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
7 
 
§ 802.08(2) directs that summary judgment is appropriate "if the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, 
and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."   
¶12 Our methodology begins by determining if a claim for 
relief is set forth.  If so, and the moving party has 
established a prima facie case for summary judgment, "we examine 
the record to determine whether there 'exist[s] disputed 
material 
facts, 
or 
undisputed 
material 
facts 
from 
which 
reasonable alternative inferences may be drawn, sufficient to 
entitle the opposing party to a trial.'"  Trinity Evangelical v. 
Tower Ins. Co., 2003 WI 46, ¶32, 261 Wis. 2d 333, 661 N.W.2d 789 
(quoting Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338, 294 N.W.2d 473 
(1980)).  "The burden is on the moving party to prove that there 
are no genuine issues of material fact.  An issue of fact is 
genuine if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.  
A material fact is such fact that would influence the outcome of 
the controversy."  Central Corp. v. Research Prods. Corp., 2004 
WI 76, ¶19, 272 Wis. 2d 561, 681 N.W.2d 178 (citations omitted).   
¶13 We conclude, based on our review of the record, that 
there are disputed material facts, and reasonable inferences to 
be drawn from undisputed facts, to preclude summary judgment.5  
                                                 
5 Although both parties argued in their briefs that the 
facts were undisputed, they asserted otherwise at oral argument.  
Taz's responded during questioning that there was no agreement 
on the facts, and Marine Bank's counsel stated that the parties 
were "two ships passing in the night with respect to what the 
facts are."   
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
8 
 
The primary issue in this case is whether there was an agreement 
between MBM and Taz's regarding the assignment of liability for 
freight charges, so that Taz's could not seek payment from a 
consignee.  Although there is no evidence of an express written 
agreement on this question, the circuit court and court of 
appeals held that the parties' course of conduct established an 
agreement that MBM would be exclusively liable for the freight 
charges.  It must be noted that while the course of dealing 
between MBM and Taz's supports the conclusion that Taz's or its 
factor generally received payment from MBM, there is nothing in 
the record that leads us to the conclusion directly, or by 
implication, that there was an agreement that MBM would be 
liable, exclusively, for such charges, and that Taz's could not 
seek payment from a consignee-customer of MBM.  Under these 
circumstances, summary judgment should not have been granted.     
¶14 Although there may be other genuine issues of material 
fact or reasonable alternative inferences drawn from undisputed 
facts, the lack of clear, undisputed evidence in the record 
concerning exclusivity justifies the reversal of the grant of 
summary judgment.   
III 
¶15 We next address the legal principles applicable in 
determining whether Taz's may collect from the consignees-
customers of MBM.   According to Taz's, the court of appeals 
erred by relying on Schneider National, E.W. Wylie Corporation 
v. Menard Inc., 523 N.W.2d 395 (N.D. 1994), and LTV Steel Co. v. 
David Graham Co., 78 B.R. 713 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987), to set 
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
9 
 
forth the general rule of liability for such charges.6  Taz's 
asks us to rely instead on cases decided by this court, which it 
claims adhere to the rule that, unless there is an express 
agreement otherwise, the consignee will become liable to the 
carrier for freight charges upon the acceptance of delivery.  
See Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Krohn Cartage Co., 79 
Wis. 2d 39, 255 N.W.2d 310 (1977); Werner Transp. Co. v. Shimon, 
249 Wis. 87, 23 N.W.2d 519 (1946); Waters v. Pfister & Vogel 
Leather Co., 176 Wis. 16, 186 N.W. 173 (1922).   
¶16 For guidance, we review many of the cases and the 
rationale discussed by the parties, the circuit court, and by 
the court of appeals.  The first case on consignee liability is 
Waters.  There, a carrier delivered goods to a consignee, and 
the bill of lading7 used by the parties was marked "prepaid."  
Although the document did not contain the freight charges or 
amount collected, the court determined that the carrier may look 
to recover the freight charges from the consignee, to whom the 
goods were actually delivered.  Relying on the Interstate 
                                                 
6 Although the court of appeals acknowledged that "[t]he 
parties agree that the general rule of liability for freight 
charges is correctly set forth in Schneider," Marine Bank, 275 
Wis. 2d 711, ¶7 (citation omitted), Taz's apparently withdrew 
its endorsement of that rule before this court.   
7 When a carrier signs a bill of lading upon receiving goods 
for delivery, the bill of lading may serve as a contract as well 
as a receipt.  See Schneider Nat'l, 855 F. Supp at 273-74.  
Therefore, its provisions are to be reviewed in order to 
determine whether it was intended to be a contract of carriage 
and, if so, what was the agreement of the parties.   
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
10 
 
Commerce Act (ICA),8 the court held that "[i]t is the acceptance 
of the goods . . . that makes the consignee a party to the 
contract.  Having accepted the goods, and it being undisputed 
that only a part of the lawful charge has been paid, the 
defendant thereby became liable for the remainder."  Waters, 176 
Wis. at 20.   
¶17 In Werner, a carrier filed suit against a consignee to 
recover freight charges for the delivery of three loads of eggs.  
The bill of lading attached to the shipment bore the notation 
"collect."  This court held that "[a]lthough no contractual 
relation arises between carrier and consignee by the mere 
designation of the latter as consignee, the consignee is the 
presumptive owner of the goods transported[,] and if he accepts 
the goods in the capacity of owner the law implies a promise on 
                                                 
8 The Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), passed by Congress in 
1887, created the Interstate Commerce Commission, the first 
regulatory agency.  Congress enacted the ICA in order to 
regulate the railroad industry, and to solve the problems of 
widespread 
discrimination 
that 
existed 
in 
pricing. 
 
The 
historical purpose of the ICA was "to achieve uniformity in 
freight transportation charges, and thereby to eliminate the 
discrimination and favoritism that had plagued the railroad 
industry in the late 19th century."  S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. 
Commercial Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336, 344 (1982). The ICA 
required common carriers to publish their rates in tariffs filed 
with the ICC, and prohibited carriers from charging or receiving 
different 
compensation 
for 
transportation 
than 
the 
rate 
specified in the tariff. 
Although the ICA was repealed by the ICC Termination Act of 
1995, Pub. L. No. 194-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995), the new 
statutory framework has retained some of the provisions.  See 49 
U.S.C. § 13707.   
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
11 
 
his part to pay the charges."  Werner, 249 Wis. at 89 (citation 
omitted). 
¶18 Finally, in Krohn, this court gave its most recent 
interpretation on consignee liability for freight charges.  Like 
the cases listed above, a carrier brought an action against a 
consignee 
to 
recover 
freight 
charges 
for 
two 
different 
shipments.  Krohn Cartage was named as the consignee in both 
shipments, and the record indicated that only a small portion of 
the order was delivered to it.  The court held:  
"The mere designation in the bill of lading of 
the consignee as the one liable for the freight 
charges does not create a contractual relationship 
between the carrier and the consignee, rendering the 
latter liable therefor, but rather, the consignee 
becomes liable therefor when an obligation arises on 
his part from presumptive ownership, acceptance of 
goods and the services rendered, and the benefits 
conferred by the carrier for such charges."  
Krohn, 79 Wis. 2d at 45 (quoting Arizona Feeds v. S. Pacific 
Transp. Co., 519 P.2d 199, 206 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974).   
 
¶19 We recognize that these cases were based, to some 
extent, on strict interpretations of the ICA.  See New York 
Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. York & Whitney Co., 256 U.S. 
496 (1921); Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. 
v. Fink, 250 U.S. 577 (1919).  These cases appear to present a 
rule that, at least under the ICA, a consignee/beneficial owner 
of shipped goods will always be jointly and severally liable for 
a carrier's freight charges upon acceptance of those goods.  In 
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
12 
 
re Penn-Dixie Steel Corp., 6 B.R. 817, 820 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1980).   
¶20 The court of appeals cites a line of cases that rely 
on contract principles to determine the liability for freight 
charges, but which also recognize the presumptions concerning a 
determination as to whether the consignor and consignee both may 
be liable for such charges.  In Schneider National, a carrier 
sought to recover freight charges from consignees.  Pursuant to 
its agreement with the consignor, Schneider's drivers would pick 
up the shipments from one of the consignor's terminals and sign 
a document entitled "Sunpath Bill of Lading," "which listed the 
location of the [consignor's] terminal, the name and location of 
one of the instant defendants--identified as 'consignee'--
various reference numbers, and the date and time of the driver's 
departure."  Schneider Nat'l, 855 F. Supp. at 272.  Upon 
delivery, the consignee would inspect the trailer, indicate on 
the document whether the shipment was "intact," and sign the 
document on the line marked "consignee."  Schneider would then 
submit this document, along with an invoice, to the consignor.  
The consignor regularly paid Schneider's invoices, and Schneider 
never requested payment of freight charges from any consignee.  
This was consistent with the agreement between the consignor and 
the consignee, making the consignor responsible for transporting 
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
13 
 
the shipments.9  Id.  After the consignor stopped paying the 
freight charges and filed for bankruptcy, Schneider attempted 
collection from the consignees.  
¶21 Schneider's claim was based on the "presumption that a 
consignee, the party entitled to delivery under a bill of 
lading, becomes liable for paying the carrier's freight charges 
upon delivery of the goods consigned."  Id. at 273.  However, 
the court in Schneider National made clear that the same 
liability is presumed to attach to the consignor.  As a result, 
the court concluded that "liability for paying freight charges 
is ultimately a matter of contract, so either presumption may be 
rebutted by evidence that the parties to the bill of lading had 
something else in mind."  Id. (citing S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. 
Commercial Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336, 343 (1982); Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Cent. Iron & Coal Co., 265 U.S. 59, 67 
(1924); Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Admiral Corp., 442 
F.2d 56, 62 (7th Cir. 1971)).  
¶22 When the court in Schneider National looked for other 
evidence of the parties' intent, it focused on the Sunpath Bill 
of Lading.  It held that the omission of terms from that bill of 
lading, such as the rate or charge for transportation, the 
                                                 
9 Taz's 
argues 
that 
the 
Schneider 
National 
case 
is 
distinguishable, because in that case there existed a contract 
between the consignor and the trucking company regarding payment 
of freight charges.  Taz's also points out that the course of 
dealing in Schneider National went on for six years, where here 
the practice between MBM and Taz's lasted for months, not years.  
That difference is an appropriate factor for consideration.     
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
14 
 
agreement and stipulations with respect to the carrier's common 
law liability in the case of loss or injury to the goods, and 
other obligations assumed by the parties, suggested that these 
bills of lading were not intended to function as contracts of 
carriage.10  Id. at 274.  Thus, the court held that "[t]he 
obvious implication is that freight charges were to be assessed 
not on the basis of the bill itself, but on the basis of an 
invoice sent separately from Schneider to [the consignor], 
pursuant (necessarily) to a contract between the two."  Id.   
¶23 The court also looked to the way in which the bills of 
lading were used to indicate the intent of the parties.  In that 
case, the Sunpath Bills of Lading were not forwarded to the 
consignees separately from the shipments.  Id.  Instead, the 
bill of lading was given to a consignee upon delivery of the 
shipment.  The court specifically held that the "Sunpath bills 
                                                 
10 The court contrasted the Sunpath Bill of Lading from the 
Uniform Bill of Lading, 49 C.F.R. § 1051.1.  The court found, 
among other things, that because the Sunpath Bill of Lading did 
not contain the terms required by the Uniform Bill of Lading, 
the parties did not intend to convey liability for payment of 
freight charges in that document.   
While we recognize that 49 C.F.R. § 1051.1 has been 
redesignated as 49 C.F.R. §  373.101, the analysis listed above 
is still relevant.  The fact that the regulatory provision has 
been redesignated does not change the fact that the Sunpath Bill 
of Lading was not a contract of carriage and did not contain any 
language that might indicate a right of the carrier to collect 
payment of freight charges from the consignee.  Without such 
language, it was merely an invoice.  We see no reason for a 
court not to use such a document as a factor in analyzing the 
parties' course of conduct, in order to determine whether there 
was any agreement that the consignor would be exclusively liable 
for the freight charges.      
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
15 
 
thus cannot have served as 'documents of title' establishing 
defendants' 
right 
to 
receive 
the 
shipments. . . ." 
 
Id. 
(citation omitted). "[B]ecause [the consignees] did not receive 
the bills prior to arrival of Schneider's deliveries, [the 
consignees] were deprived of any meaningful opportunity to 
decide whether to reject them, as is the consignee's right when 
the bill fails to conform to the underlying contract of sale or 
shipment."  Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, based on the 
terms of the Sunpath Bill of Lading, and the contents and use of 
those bills, the court held that the bills "expressed an 
intention on the part of Schneider and the other parties that 
Schneider would look exclusively to [the consignor] for payment 
of freight charges."  Id. at 275.   
 
¶24 The court of appeals also relied on two decisions 
which "apply the common-law presumption on consignee liability 
for freight charges in the traditional arrangement of consignor, 
trucking company and consignee."  Marine Bank, 275 Wis. 2d 711, 
¶19.  In Wylie, an interstate motor carrier brought an action 
against the consignee to collect unpaid freight charges.  In 
that case, there was a preexisting contract between the 
consignor and the consignee, designating the consignor liable 
for payment of the freight charges.  However, the bills of 
lading did not indicate the amount of freight charges or who was 
liable for them.  After the carrier was unsuccessful in 
recovering payments from the consignor, it brought an action 
demanding payment from the consignees.  The Supreme Court of 
North Dakota held that "contract law ordinarily determines who 
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
16 
 
is liable for payment of freight charges under the common law."  
Wylie, 523 N.W.2d at 399 (citing Cent. Iron & Coal Co., 265 U.S. 
59).  Consequently, the court concluded that any common law 
presumption about responsibility for freight costs may be 
rebutted by evidence that the parties intended something else.11  
Id.   Thus, the court concluded that the circumstances presented 
evidenced an arrangement for exclusive consignor liability for 
the freight charges.  The court held:  
Although Wylie was not a party to [the consignee's] 
agreement 
with 
[the 
consignor], 
[the 
consignor] 
directed Wylie to bill it for transportation costs in 
a manner that conformed to the agreement between the 
[consignor] and [consignee].  During their entire 
business relationship, Wylie looked solely to [the 
consignor] for payment and billed it for freight 
charges after each delivery. . . .  The bills of 
lading were silent as to the liability for and the 
amount of freight charges, and they thus confirmed 
[the 
consignee's] 
understanding 
that 
payment 
of 
freight charges was not a matter for its concern, but 
was a matter of contract between [the consignor] and 
Wylie.        
Id. at 405-06 (citations omitted).   
 
¶25 In LTV Steel, a carrier attempted to collect unpaid 
freight charges from a bankruptcy debtor's consignees.  The 
                                                 
11 To support this proposition, the court in Wylie cited the 
following authority: In re Roll Form Prod., Inc., 662 F.2d 150, 
154 (2d Cir. 1981); Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Admiral 
Corp., 442 F.2d 56, 61-62 (7th Cir. 1971); New York Cent. R. Co. 
v. Trans Am. Petroleum Corp., 108 F.2d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 1939); 
Schneider Nat'l, 855 F. Supp. at 273; LTV Steel, 78 B.R. at 722-
723; In re Penn-Dixie Steel Corp., 6 B.R. 817, 820 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1980); Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Peacock 
Eng'g Co., 628 N.E.2d 300, 304 (Ill. App 1993); Consol. Rail 
Corp. v. Hallamore Motor Transp., Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1137, 1138 
(Mass. 1985); see also 13 Am. Jur. 2d Carriers § 473 (1964). 
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
17 
 
debtor, as consignor, billed the consignees a net amount for the 
delivered materials, incorporating the freight charges.  The 
consignor then paid the carrier for the freight charges until it 
became bankrupt.  The bills of lading, which were marked 
"prepaid," were prepared by the debtors, signed by the carrier's 
agents, and billed directly to the consignor.  The bankruptcy 
court determined that the carrier has a common law right to 
collect the freight charges from the consignee, unless the 
parties contractually alter the liability.  Although the bill of 
lading was marked "prepaid," the court held that this notation 
was one factor to consider in determining whether the parties 
had agreed that the consignor alone would be liable for the 
freight charges.  LTV Steel, 78 B.R. at 724.   
¶26 The bankruptcy court also listed other factors for a 
court 
to 
consider, 
including: 
(1) 
whether 
the 
carrier 
historically looked solely to the consignor for payment; (2) 
whether this was the understanding of the parties as evidenced 
by every facet of their business relationship; (3) whether the 
consignor alone contracted with the carrier for shipping 
services; (4) whether direct billing was effected from carrier 
to consignor, and direct billing took place after delivery; (5) 
whether the consignor paid freight charges from its general 
funds; (6) whether customer-consignees were billed by the 
consignors on a unitary basis (i.e. one net amount for delivered 
materials inclusive of freight); (7) whether the consignor 
deposited the sum received from the customer-consignees into its 
general accounts; (8) whether there was no request by, or 
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
18 
 
agreement with, the carrier to segregate any portion of the 
funds received from customer-consignees, and none took place; 
(9) whether the two billing processes were not synchronized so 
as to give an impression that the consignor was the mere conduit 
between carrier and consignee; and (10) whether bills of lading 
and delivery tickets were marked prepaid to indicate consignor's 
liability and were signed by the carrier's agents without 
objection.  Id. at 723-24.   After weighing these factors, the 
court found that conduct of the parties evidenced an enforceable 
agreement and that the exclusive liability for the freight 
charges was that of the consignor.   
¶27 While we agree with the court of appeals that the 
holdings in Schneider National, Wylie, and LTV Steel provide a 
helpful framework for the analysis of this case,12 we conclude 
that the genuine issues of material fact here, as well as the 
conflicting and inconsistent presumptions, do not, without a 
more complete record, lead to a clear answer concerning whether 
there is exclusive liability for either the consignor or the 
consignee.  Liability for payment of freight charges is 
ultimately a matter of contract, see Schneider Nat'l, 855 F. 
Supp. at 273, and, therefore, the presumptions concerning 
consignor and consignee liability for freight charges may be 
rebutted by evidence that the parties agreed to something else.  
See id.; Wylie, 523 N.W.2d at 399.   
                                                 
12 While we recognize that these cases were decided before 
the ICC was repealed in 1995, each was based on common law 
contract principles, rather than the guidelines of the ICA.    
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
19 
 
¶28 In 
Wisconsin, 
presumptions 
in 
civil 
cases 
are 
considered in accord with Wis. Stat. § 903.01, which states in 
relevant part:  
[A] presumption recognized at common law or created by 
statute, including statutory provisions that certain 
basic facts are prima facie evidence of other facts, 
imposes on the party relying on the presumption the 
burden of proving the basic facts, but once the basic 
facts are found to exist the presumption imposes on 
the party against whom it is directed the burden of 
proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is 
more probable than its existence.     
In 
a 
case 
involving 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights, 
in 
discussing 
a 
rebuttable 
presumption 
of 
abandonment, 
we 
explained:  
The operation of sec. 903.01, Stats., works as 
follows.  The party relying on the presumption "has 
the burden of proving the basic facts."  7 Daniel D. 
Blinka, Wisconsin Practice sec. 301.4 at 52 (1991).  
The term "burden" referred to in the statute refers to 
both the burdens of production and persuasion.  Once 
the basic facts are found to exist, i.e., the 
petitioner has both produced evidence of those facts 
and convinced the jury of their existence, the burdens 
of persuasion and production shift to the party 
opposing the presumption.  That party then bears the 
burden of proving "that the nonexistence of the 
presumed facts is more probable than its existence."  
Id.                                                    
 
As applied to this case then, sec. 903.01, 
Stats., 
requires 
that 
once 
[the 
petitioner] 
establishes the basic facts of abandonment by clear 
and convincing evidence, i.e., meets both the burden 
of production and persuasion, the burden shifts to 
[the respondent]. 
Odd S.-G v. Carolyn S.-G., 194 Wis. 2d 365, 374, 533 N.W.2d 794 
(1995).   
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
20 
 
¶29 In that same case, in her dissenting opinion, then 
Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson recognized the difficulties that 
presumptions present:  
The concept of presumptions has plagued courts and 
scholars for years primarily because the law uses the 
word "presumption" in many different ways.  As a 
leading text explains, "one ventures the assertion 
that 'presumption' is the slipperiest member of the 
family of legal terms, except its first cousin, 
'burden of proof.'"  McCormick on Evidence, sec. 342 
at 449 (4th ed. 1992).  Professor Lansing has written 
in a similar vein that "the domain of presumptions has 
been called 'a place fraught with danger,' 'an 
impenetrable jungle,' 'a mist laden morass'——where 
more than one academician has been known to lose his 
way and, once returned, is never quite the same." 
Id. at 384-85 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
¶30 In this case, we are faced with conflicting and 
inconsistent presumptions.  Professor Daniel D. Blinka, in his 
treatise on Wisconsin evidence, has offered the following 
observation on such presumptions: "Conflicting presumptions 
should rarely present a problem.  Under § 903.01 it is 
impossible for opposing parties to both have the burden of 
persuasion on the same issue."  7 Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: 
Wisconsin Evidence § 301.4 at 73 (2d ed. 2001) (footnote 
omitted).  For support of this proposition, Blinka cites both 
Weinstein's Evidence, par. 301[04] and the Judicial Council 
Committee's Note to Wis. Stat. § 903.01: "('Should inconsistent 
presumptions be established in a case, the weight of the 
evidence establishing the facts upon which the presumption[s] 
are premised [the basic facts] is for the trier of fact and not 
to be dealt with by the judge in the discharge of his function 
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
21 
 
with respect to the law.')"  7 Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: 
Wisconsin Evidence § 301.4 at 73, n.10.   
¶31 On remand, the circuit court, or the trier of fact if 
not the circuit court, must weigh the evidence establishing the 
facts upon which the presumptions relating to consignor and 
consignee liability are premised.13  See Schneider National, 855 
F. Supp. at 273.  All of the factors discussed herein should be 
weighed in reaching a decision on the issue of exclusive 
liability.       
IV 
¶32 In 
sum, 
we 
conclude 
that 
summary 
judgment 
was 
improperly granted to Marine Bank.  Genuine issues of material 
fact, 
and 
reasonable 
alternative 
inferences 
drawn 
from 
undisputed facts, exist as to whether an agreement was made 
between Taz's and MBM, to the effect that Taz's could not seek 
payment from a consignee-customer of MBM.  We further conclude 
that Taz's liability for payment of freight charges is governed 
by contract law, and that there exist common law presumptions 
that a consignee and a consignor may be liable for the payment 
of those freight charges.  See id. at 273.  Such presumptions 
                                                 
13 While we recognize that the Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.) governs the sale of goods, it may nonetheless be 
instructive here.  LTV Steel, 78 B.R. at 723 n.12.  Section 2-
208(1) of the U.C.C. states: "Where the contract for sale 
involves repeated occasions for performance by either party with 
knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for 
objection to it by the other, any course of performance  
accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to 
determine the meaning of the agreement."   
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
22 
 
may be rebutted, however, by evidence that the carrier and the 
consignor 
agreed 
that 
the 
consignor 
would 
be 
liable, 
exclusively, for such charges.  Absent  an express contract to 
that effect, such an agreement may be determined to exist 
through analysis of the conduct of the parties.  Id.  Here, 
however, the record is insufficient for a determination as to 
whether there was such an agreement.  For these reasons, we 
reverse the court of appeals' decision affirming the summary 
judgment granted by the circuit court and remand this case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.      
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and remanded.   
    
 
 
No. 
2003AP2827   
 
 
 
1