Title: Madrid v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Madrid v. State1996 WY 15910 P.2d 1340Case Number: 95-9Decided: 01/31/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

Victor MADRID, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, Dan 
Spangler, J.

Sylvia Hackl, State Public Defender; and Tim 
Newcomb (argued) of Grant & Newcomb, Cheyenne, for 
Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. 
Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, Assistant Attorney General (argued), 
for Appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, Justice.

[¶1]      Victor Madrid 
(Madrid) appeals the judgment and sentence of the district court convicting him 
of one count of felony murder in violation of W.S. 6-2-101 and sentencing him to 
a term of life imprisonment in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Madrid submits 
the following issues for our review:

I. Did forcing 
Victor [Madrid] to defend pro se against a seasoned prosecutor at his detention 
hearing violate his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments' right to counsel, as well 
as Article 1, § 6 and § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution, and Rule 44, 
W.R.Cr.P.?

II. Did denying 
Victor's [Madrid's] right to subpoena his only accuser as a relevant witness at 
his preliminary hearing violate his right to compulsory service under his Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, his right to confront adverse 
witnesses under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, Article 1, § 10 of the 
Wyoming Constitution, Rule 5.1(b), W.R.Cr.P., and Garcia v. State, 667 P.2d 1148 
(Wyo. 1983)?

III. Was the 
participation by the District Attorney in preventing the defense from 
interviewing the government's star witness a violation of the Wyoming 
Constitution's Article 1, § 6 Due Process by violating fundamental fairness and 
interfering with the administration of justice?

IV. Were the 
statements given to the police and admitted into evidence at trial, made 
voluntarily when viewed in the context of police testimony that they 
intentionally deceived Victor [Madrid] into making his 
statement?

V. Did the refusal 
by the trial court to allow the defense to introduce testimony of "False 
Confession Syndrome" or "False Memory Syndrome" violate Victor's [Madrid's] 
right to present a defense? 

VI. Did the trial 
court abuse its discretion when it allowed an unsequestered witness to testify 
on a critical issue?

VII. Did the court 
violate Victor's [Madrid's] due process and abuse its discretion when it refused 
Defense Instruction A?

VIII. Did the 
government violate Victor's [Madrid's] right against self-incrimination under 
the 5th Amendment and Wyoming Constitution's Article 1, § 11 when it held him 
incommunicado for three days of interrogation even though he had an attorney for 
an unrelated criminal charge?

[¶4]      The State 
rephrases the issues as:

I. Did the county 
court commit reversible error by conducting Appellant's detention hearing in the 
absence of counsel?

II. Did the State 
inhibit Appellant's access to a material witness?

III. Did the 
District Court err by not suppressing the statements Appellant made to law 
enforcement?

IV. Did the 
District Court abuse its discretion by permitting an unsequestered witness to 
testify, refusing Appellant's proffered jury instruction and disallowing expert 
testimony on "false confession syndrome" or "false memory 
syndrome."[?]

FACTS

[¶5]      On November 30, 
1993, Velma Filener was murdered during a burglary of the home belonging to a 
friend with whom she was staying. Ms. Filener died as the result of seventeen 
knife wounds. For several weeks the Casper Police Department conducted an 
investigation of the burglary and murder, but they were unable to identify any 
suspects.

[¶6]      One month later, 
on December 23, 1993, the police responded to a medical assist call involving an 
apparent drug overdose by Madrid. Upon arrival, the officer learned that Madrid 
had made statements relating to delusional dreams he had been having in which he 
saw himself killing an elderly lady, stabbing her with a knife seven times, with 
blood on his hands and being chased by a "red demon." The officer relayed this 
information to the detective involved in the Filener investigation. Detectives 
then interviewed Madrid at the hospital. Madrid recounted his "dreams," giving 
details about the burglary and the murder. Madrid was immediately placed under 
police hold at the hospital - based upon a failure to appear for sentencing on 
an earlier, unrelated burglary conviction - and upon his release from the 
hospital was transported to the Natrona County Detention 
Center.

[¶7]      For two days 
Madrid was again interviewed at the detention center and was more forthcoming 
with details about the burglary and murder. However on the third day, Madrid 
informed the detectives that he no longer wished to talk to them without an 
attorney. Madrid was officially charged with the murder of Ms. Filener on 
December 30, 1993, and, following a jury trial, was convicted of felony murder. 
Madrid timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Right to counsel at the detention 
hearing

[¶8]      Madrid argues 
that his constitutional right to counsel was violated when he was not afforded 
counsel at his initial detention hearing wherein the State requested that the 
court hold Madrid in custody, reasoning Madrid was a serious flight risk due to 
the fact that he had failed to appear for sentencing on an earlier burglary 
conviction; he was charged with first degree murder; he was unemployed; and he 
had no real or personal property of value in Wyoming. Madrid alleges violations 
of the Wyoming Constitution, the Federal Constitution pursuant to the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.

[¶9]      Madrid was 
represented by counsel at his district court arraignment. The court offered to 
reconsider the issue of bond, however, Madrid declined to be heard on the 
matter. "In order for a claimed error to be regarded as harmful, there must be a 
reasonable probability that, but for the error, the verdict would have been more 
favorable to the defendant." Talbott v. State, 902 P.2d 719, 721, (Wyo. 1995); 
see also Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 67 (Wyo. 1989); Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 362 (Wyo. 1988). Madrid has failed to establish that not having an 
appointed attorney at his detention hearing prejudiced the verdict against him. 
Accordingly, we can find no reasonable probability that the verdict would have 
been more favorable to him and thus find no reversible 
error.

II. Accused's right to have access to 
the State's witnesses

[¶10]   Madrid argues that the State 
inhibited his right to interview one of the State's key witnesses, a juvenile; 
that the State moved to quash his subpoena to call the witness at the 
preliminary hearing; that the State conspired with the Wyoming Girls' School to 
deny Madrid access to interview the witness; and that the State specifically 
requested the witness not to speak with Madrid's counsel.

[¶11]   Rule 5.1(b), W.R.Cr.P., provides an 
accused the right to subpoena and call witnesses during his preliminary hearing, 
but this right is not absolute. Garcia v. State, 667 P.2d 1148, 1154 (Wyo. 
1983). This right must be viewed in light of the true constitutional purpose of 
the preliminary hearing, which is to obtain a determination by a neutral, 
detached fact finder that there is probable cause to believe a crime has been 
committed and that the defendant committed it. Id. And although some discovery 
is the inevitable by-product of a preliminary hearing, discovery is not the 
purpose of the hearing. Id. Thus, discretion is left to the court to determine 
whether or not the purpose for which a defendant seeks to introduce testimony 
from a witness whom he has subpoenaed fits within the realm of discovery rather 
than the determination of probable cause. Id. To this end, we have stated that 
it is incumbent upon counsel to explain the relevance to the issue of probable 
cause of the testimony he seeks to introduce at the preliminary hearing, 
pursuant to a sufficient offer of proof. Id., at 1155.

[¶12]   After careful review of the record, 
we find no evidence that Madrid subpoenaed the witness for the preliminary 
hearing, nor that the State moved to quash such a subpoena. The preliminary 
hearing was held on January 11, 1994; and the record, pursuant to an affidavit, 
establishes that detectives of the Casper Police Department did not interview 
this witness until April 28, 1994. Madrid provides no record support to show 
that a subpoena was executed or quashed; likewise, Madrid provides no record 
citation establishing his offer of proof that sufficiently explains the 
relevance to the issue of probable cause of the testimony of the witness. In 
fact, in his brief on appeal, Madrid acknowledges that he wished to call the 
witness as a witness at the preliminary hearing because he believed she had 
given a variety of contradictory stories. This is not relevant to the issue of 
probable cause.

[¶13]   Madrid's additional allegations 
that the State interfered with his access to the witness are without merit. The 
record reveals that the State filed its Disclosure of Information on May 27, 
1994, listing the juvenile as a witness. The juvenile was represented by 
counsel; and when Madrid attempted to subpoena her at a motions hearing in June 
of 1994, it was the juvenile's attorney, not the State, who quashed that 
subpoena. Furthermore, Madrid scheduled an interview with the juvenile on five 
separate occasions. In each instance, it was the juvenile's attorney who 
canceled the interview. We will not presume allegations unsupported by the 
record. See Hayes v. American Nat'l Bank of Powell, 784 P.2d 599, 601 (Wyo. 
1989) (we cannot consider factual recitations in briefs unless they are 
supported by the record; contentions by the parties of what they believed 
occurred have no materiality unless they are demonstrated in the record 
considered by the district court); Mentock v. Mentock, 638 P.2d 156, 160 (Wyo. 
1981) (we will not consider any matter upon which the record is silent); see 
also Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351, 1354 (Wyo. 1978). We 
can only decide a case upon what appears in the record before us. Matter of 
Estate of Reed, 566 P.2d 587, 590 (Wyo. 1977); Gifford v. Casper Neon Sign Co., 
Inc. 618 P.2d 547, 552 (Wyo. 1980). Accordingly, we are unable to find a 
violation of Madrid's constitutional rights concerning any alleged State 
interference with witness access. Likewise, we can find no support for alleged 
interference by the State with the "administration of justice" or inhibiting the 
"fundamental fairness" of appellant's trial. 

III. Voluntariness of Madrid's 
confession

a. Standard of 
review

[¶14]   Madrid argues that the district 
court's denial of his motion to suppress statements made to detectives of the 
Casper Police Department was clearly erroneous. We review a district court's 
denial of a motion to suppress under an abuse of discretion standard, which has 
been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under the 
circumstances. Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994); Davis v. State, 
859 P.2d 89, 93 (Wyo. 1993).

Findings on factual 
issues made by the district court considering a motion to suppress are not 
disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Hyde v. State, 769 P.2d 376, 378 (Wyo. 1989); Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 487 (Wyo. 1988). * * * Since 
the district court conducts the hearing on the motion to suppress and has the 
opportunity to: assess the credibility of the witnesses; the weight given the 
evidence; and make the necessary inferences, deductions and conclusions, 
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the district court's 
determination. United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1406 (10th Cir. 
1990).

Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 218; see also Bravo v. 
State, 897 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶15]   Statements made by an accused to 
peace officers are voluntary if they are the product of a free and deliberate 
choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. Bravo, 897 P.2d  at 1305; 
Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 664 (Wyo. 1993); Burk v. State, 848 P.2d 225, 233 
(Wyo. 1993). It is well settled that we determine voluntariness by examining the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession. Bravo, at 1305; Vigil, 
at 664; Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 141 (Wyo. 1986). The burden is on the 
State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a confession is 
voluntary; however, the movant at a suppression hearing may be required to go 
forward with evidence on the issue of the involuntariness of his confession and 
the State may then rebut the issue. Bravo, at 1305; Garcia v. State, 777 P.2d 603, 605 (Wyo. 1989).

b. 
Discussion

[¶16]   Madrid argues that the statements 
made to the detectives at the Natrona Detention Center were induced by 
deception, rendering the statements involuntary. Madrid supports this allegation 
by citation to the trial transcript rather than the motion to suppress hearing. 
Because Madrid is alleging the district court erred in not suppressing his 
statements, the only relevant proceeding we need review is the hearing, not what 
transpired at trial. Responsibility for presenting a sufficient record lies with 
the appellant. See Edwards v. Edwards, 732 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Wyo. 1987). Here, 
the only thing developed on the record regarding this issue was that Madrid 
testified at the hearing that the detectives told him that biological samples 
taken from him connected him to the crime scene. Madrid's counsel did not 
cross-examine the detective as to whether he had lied to Madrid. Another 
detective was asked by Madrid's counsel whether any of Madrid's bodily fluids 
were found at the crime scene, but this question was objected to and sustained 
by the court. Under these circumstances, it became a matter of assessing the 
witness credibility. "[R]esolution of conflicting evidence is within the 
province of the [district] court, and its findings must be given great weight 
when considered in light of its opportunity to hear and observe the witnesses." 
Bravo, at 1305 (quoting Garcia, 777 P.2d at 606).

[¶17]   The district court considered the 
totality of the circumstances, assessed the credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight to be given to their testimony, and made the necessary inferences, 
deductions and conclusions. Madrid was continually read his constitutional 
rights pursuant to Miranda, and he intelligently acknowledged that he understood 
his rights. Throughout the interviews, he never asked to see an attorney, nor 
did he ever tell the detectives that he wished to no longer speak with them 
without an attorney present. As soon as Madrid invoked his constitutional 
rights, the interviewing stopped. Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the district court's determination, we hold that the district court 
did not err in finding that Madrid's statements were voluntary and admissible 
and that the motion to suppress should be denied.

IV. The right against 
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment

[¶18]   Madrid contends that his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated, as well as Article 1, § 
11 of the Wyoming Constitution, because he was previously represented by counsel 
on an unrelated charge and had invoked his constitutional rights. Thus he 
alleges that once questioning began, his rights were violated rendering the 
statements made inadmissible.

[¶19]   Initially we note that the State 
attempted to develop this issue at trial. Counsel for Madrid, however, objected 
based on grounds of relevancy, and the district court sustained the objection. 
When an issue is not raised at trial, appellant bears the burden of establishing 
plain error. Lauthern v. State, 769 P.2d 350, 357 (Wyo. 1989). Under a plain 
error analysis, the record must clearly show what occurred at trial without 
resort to speculation. McLaughlin v. State, 780 P.2d 964, 971 (Wyo. 1989); 
Scherling v. Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352 (Wyo. 1979) (appellant's burden to bring the 
court a complete record on which to base a decision); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. 
v. Emerson, 578 P.2d  at 1354 (we will not consider any matter upon which the 
record is silent); see also Mentock v. Mentock, 638 P.2d  at 160; Hayes v. 
American Nat'l Bank of Powell, 784 P.2d  at 601; and Matter of Estate of Reed, 
566 P.2d  at 590. We decline, therefore, to address this issue under a plain 
error analysis. See McLaughlin, at 971.

V. The Sequestration 
Order

[¶20]   Madrid asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion when it permitted an unsequestered witness to 
testify after the district court had entered a sequestration order. Wyoming Rule 
of Evidence 615 provides:

At the request of a 
party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the 
testimony of other witnesses, and it may enter the order on its own motion. This 
rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) 
an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as 
its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a 
party to be essential to the presentation of his cause.

Rule 615 contemplates sequestration of each 
witness during the testimony of the other witnesses. Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 439 (Wyo. 1995); Lauthern v. State, 769 P.2d  at 352. The purpose is to 
prevent the parties from tailoring their testimony to conform to prior testimony 
and to assist the fact finder in detecting falsehoods and testimony which is 
less than candid. Candelaria, at 439; Lauthern, at 352. We have stated before 
that, in the context of W.R.E. 615,

[a] party who 
contends that the presence of a witness is essential to the presentation of his 
cause must bear the burden of supporting that allegation and showing why the 
policy of Rule 615 in favor of sequestration is 
inapplicable.

Stone v. State, 745 P.2d 1344, 1350-51 (Wyo. 
1987).

[P]ermitting 
witnesses to testify who have been in the courtroom in violation of a 
sequestration order is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court 
and * * * we [will] reverse only for an abuse of that 
discretion.

Lauthern, 769 P.2d  at 
352.

[¶21]   In this case, the district court 
entered a sequestration order prior to the commencement of opening statements. 
In its case in chief, the prosecution called the owner of the residence in which 
Ms. Filener was murdered to establish whether her front door and patio door were 
locked on the night the murder occurred. It was Madrid's theory that the doors 
were locked and Ms. Filener opened the door for and was murdered by someone she 
knew. The owner, however, could not testify with certainty that the front door 
was locked when she left. To rebut appellant's theory, the prosecution argued to 
the court that it was essential that the owner's granddaughter, who had not been 
listed as a witness and who was present in the courtroom during the owner's 
testimony, be called as a witness. It was the granddaughter on the night of the 
murder who had picked up the owner and taken her to dinner. Madrid's counsel 
objected, but the court overruled the objection, allowing her testimony 
regarding the status of the door. She, however, did not know whether the doors 
were locked when they left.

[¶22]   We find that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in allowing the granddaughter to testify. The burden is 
on the appealing party to establish that an error is prejudicial. Candelaria, 
895 P.2d  at 440; Roderick v. State, 858 P.2d 538, 550 (Wyo. 1993). Madrid has 
failed in this regard.

VI. Refusal of Jury Instruction 
A

[¶23]   Madrid asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion by refusing Defense Instruction A. A defendant has 
the right to have instructions on his theory of the case presented to the jury 
if the proposed instructions sufficiently inform the jury of the theory or 
defense and if competent evidence exists supporting the law expressed in the 
instructions. Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 142 (Wyo. 1995); Amin v. State, 811 P.2d 255, 261 (Wyo. 1991). The district court may, however, refuse an 
instruction which is clearly erroneous, confusing, argumentative or unduly 
emphasizes one aspect of the case. Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544, 548 (Wyo. 
1990).

[¶24]   Defense Instruction A 
provided:

A statement made by 
a Defendant other than at his trial may be either an admission or a 
confession.

An admission is a 
statement by a Defendant, which by itself is not sufficient to warrant an 
inference of guilt, but which tends to prove guilt when considered with the rest 
of the evidence.

A confession is a 
statement by a Defendant which discloses his guilt of that 
crime.

You are the 
exclusive judges as to whether an admission or a confession was made by the 
Defendant and if the statement is true in whole or in part. If you should find 
that such statement is entirely untrue, you must reject it. If you find it is 
true in part, you may consider that part which you find to be 
true.

Evidence of an oral 
admission or an oral confession of the Defendant ought to be viewed with 
caution.

We find the instruction confusing and 
question the existence of authority for the proposition that oral admissions and 
confessions should be viewed with caution.

[¶25]   Additionally, Instruction A does 
not conform to Madrid's theory of the case. It was Madrid's contention at trial 
that his statements to the police were involuntary. It is within the district 
court's discretion to present its own instruction on the defendant's theory of 
the case or defense. Witt, 892 P.2d  at 142; Sanchez v. State, 694 P.2d 726, 729 
(Wyo. 1985). The district court gave the following instruction relating to the 
voluntariness of Madrid's statements:

YOU ARE INSTRUCTED 
that statements, if any, made by the Defendant charged with the crime, shall be 
considered by you only if you find that such statements were made voluntarily in 
whole or in part. If you find such statement is involuntary, then you must 
reject it. If you find it is voluntary in part, you must consider that part of 
the statement which you find to have been voluntary.

A voluntary 
statement is to be considered by you together with all other evidence in 
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused and you may give the statement 
such weight and credibility as you see fit.

If you find that 
the Defendant was coerced into making a statement, you may disregard the 
statement entirely.

We find this instruction to be a correct 
statement of the law, adequately covering Madrid's involuntariness claim. See 
Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1053 (Wyo. 1987) (reversible error will not be 
found where the instructions correctly state the law).

VII. False Confession 
Syndrome

[¶26]   Madrid alleges that he was entitled 
to present expert testimony at trial concerning "False Confession Syndrome" or 
"False Memory Syndrome." Madrid fails to address Wyoming law regarding 
admissibility of expert testimony as succinctly espoused in Sorensen v. State, 
895 P.2d 454 (Wyo. 1995) and Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741 (Wyo. 1993). 
Therefore, Madrid's position is unsupported by cogent argument or pertinent 
authority and, accordingly, we decline consideration. Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d  
at 219; Farbotnik v. State, 850 P.2d 594, 606 (Wyo. 1993).

CONCLUSION

[¶27]   Finding no prejudice accruing by 
the lack of appointed counsel at the detention hearing, no State interference 
with witness access, no abuse of discretion in allowing the unsequestered 
witness testimony, no error in refusal of Defense Instruction A, and finding 
that Madrid's statements were voluntarily made and admissible, the judgment and 
sentence is

[¶28]   
Affirmed.