Title: Vigil v. Baltzley

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

448 P.2d 171 (1968) 79 N.M. 659 Martha D. VIGIL, Cleo Roybal, Carmen Varela, Eva Lucero, Delfina Velarde, Angelia Vigil, Luciano Vigil, Ramon I. Vigil, Patricio Vigil, Ernesto Vigil and John T. Watson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. C.A. BALTZLEY and Nola B. Baltzley, his wife, and Honey Boy Haven, Inc., a New Mexico Corporation, Defendants-Appellants. No. 8630. Supreme Court of New Mexico. December 9, 1968. *172 Leslie D. Ringer, Santa Fe, for appellants. David L. Lunt, Santa Fe, for appellees. MOISE, Justice. Defendants appeal from a judgment determining that plaintiffs have a prescriptive easement over certain property of defendants for the purpose of driving herded cattle and for hunting, fishing and recreation; enjoining defendants from obstructing the free use and travel of the roads over which plaintiffs have easements; directing defendants to remove their locks from the fences and gates crossing the roads, or deliver keys to plaintiffs; and enjoining a change of locks without prior delivery of keys to plaintiffs. Defendants' first point, about which there can be little dispute, is stated in the following language: Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497, 71 P.2d 646, 112 A.L.R. 536 (1937), is then cited as detailing the elements which must be proved by anyone claiming an easement by prescription. We quote the following from that case: Additionally, it is stated in Hester, supra, that, "A way claimed by prescription must be a definite, certain, and precise strip of land." Plaintiffs do not question that the elements are as stated. Neither do they take issue with the additional rule that a prescriptive right is not favored in the law. Zimmerman v. Newport, 416 P.2d 622 (Okl. 1966); Mood v. Banchero, 67 Wash. 2d 835, 410 P.2d 776 (1966). The parties do differ, however, as to the applicability of certain legal presumptions and the allocation of the burden of proof. Defendants cite cases from other jurisdictions discussing each element and the nature of the proof required to establish it. We do not think anything would be added by a review of each of these holdings. Rather, we quote from Castillo v. Tabet Lumber Co., 75 N.M. 492, 494, 406 P.2d 361 (1965), where we summarized the holdings of Hester, supra, in the following language: See, also, Maestas v. Maestas, 50 N.M. 276, 175 P.2d 1003 (1946), and Wilson v. Williams, 43 N.M. 173, 87 P.2d 683 (1939). The following, which we quote from Sanchez v. Dale Bellamah Homes of New Mexico, Inc., 76 N.M. 526, 528, 417 P.2d 25 (1966), is also instructive: The property which is traversed by the three roads in issue, although in high, rough country, is not open and unenclosed but, to the contrary is and has been enclosed by a fence during the entire period during which the prescriptive right is claimed to have accrued, and accordingly the rule to be applied is the general one wherein a conclusive grant is presumed, and not the exception where the use is presumptively permissive. See Castillo v. Tabet Lumber Co., supra; Hester v. Sawyers, supra. We here copy the trial court's findings 8 and 9, which are not challenged by defendants and which accordingly are facts in the case, Baca v. Gutierrez, 77 N.M. 428, 423 P.2d 617 (1967); Brown v. Arapahoe Drilling Co., 70 N.M. 99, 370 P.2d 816 (1962). The findings read: In addition, we copy finding 10 which, although challenged, should be considered at this point: As we view the defendants' Points II and III, the findings concerning each of the elements already noted as being required to establish a prescriptive easement are attacked as not supported by substantial evidence, and that this is particularly true because the only evidence is in the nature of conclusions as opposed to facts. We do not agree with the argument made. The testimony adduced at the trial has been read in its entirety and, although conflicts are to be found therein, we cannot say that it is not substantial to support the findings made by the court and attacked herein. This being true, they will not be disturbed. Ash v. H.G. Reiter Co., 78 N.M. 194, 429 P.2d 653 (1967); Brown v. Cory, 77 N.M. 295, 422 P.2d 33 (1967). We would add a word concerning defendants' claim in their Point II that the evidence introduced in support of each of the elements required to establish an easement by prescription was not substantial because in the nature of "blanket statements." By this it appears that defendants contend evidence that the use of the roads was "open" or was "uninterrupted" or "peaceable," and so on, concerning each element, is not substantial because in the nature of conclusions. However, even if we assume for the sake of argument that such proof would not be considered as substantial, our examination of the record discloses much more than mere proof in the nature of legal conclusions. To the contrary, we find much testimony concerning the particular uses made by plaintiffs, concerning defendants' knowledge, and everything necessary to establish the rights found to exist. As already noted, this proof is not without conflict, but it is substantial. We see nothing in the cases relied on by defendants which in any way supports their argument in this regard. Although not cited, we think the rule being urged is that stated in Romero v. Herrera, 30 N.M. 139, 228 P. 604 (1924), to the effect that a witness may only testify as to facts and not as to conclusions. To permit the latter would be an invasion of the province of the factfinder. As already noted, although *175 there may have been some conclusionary evidence, there was, in addition, a great deal of proof as to facts. The point is held to be without merit. By their Point VI, defendants claim that the present cause is barred by a previous action wherein John T. Watson, a plaintiff here, and Luis and Josefita Vigil, brought suit against C.A. Baltzley, one of the defendants here, seeking to restrain and enjoin the defendant from in any way interfering with or obstructing certain roads therein described. The proceeding was numbered 14619 on the docket of the San Miguel County District Court and was filed in 1949. Thereafter, in 1959, an order was entered dismissing the action with prejudice, under Rule 41(e) (§ 21-1-1(41) (e), N.M.S.A. 1953), because of failure to diligently prosecute. Concerning this case, the trial court found as follows: While description of Road No. 1 in Cause 14619 appears to be similar in some respects to the 5-8 road in this case, there is considerable question as to whether the two roads are identical, and there is testimony that they are different. There is substantial support for the quoted findings and they will not be disturbed. Additional points argued by defendants have been considered. Like the points just discussed they, too, are in the nature of attacks on findings. We do not believe that any useful purpose would be served by discussing them in detail. Suffice it to say we have examined the record and have determined that the findings attacked are substantially supported and, accordingly, we will not disturb them. There being no reversible error, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. It is so ordered. NOBLE and CARMODY, JJ., concur.