Title: Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Hoffman

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:  12/23/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
_________________________
1141273
_________________________
Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., d/b/a Victoryland
v.
Marie Hoffman
Appeal from Macon Circuit Court
(CV-08-13)
_________________________
1141277
_________________________
Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., d/b/a Victoryland
v.
Sandra R. Howard
Appeal from Macon Circuit Court
(CV-09-900113)
_________________________
1141278
_________________________
Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., d/b/a Victoryland
v.
Dianne Slayton
Appeal from Macon Circuit Court
(CV-09-900124)
WISE, Justice.
Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., d/b/a Victoryland
("MCGP"),  appeals from the trial court's orders denying its
1
motions to compel arbitration in the actions filed against it
by Marie Hoffman, Sandra R. Howard, and Dianne Slayton
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "the plaintiffs").
Facts and Procedural History
Case No. 1141273
In case no. 1141273 and case no. 1141278, the complaints
1
refer to "Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc. and Macon County
Greyhound 
Park, 
Inc. 
d/b/a 
Victoryland, 
an 
Alabama
corporation."  We have treated the two named entities as a
single corporation.
2
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
On January 29, 2008, Hoffman sued MCGP based on events
occurring on January 21, 2008.  In her complaint, Hoffman
alleged that, on January 21, 2008, she was playing on an
electronic-bingo machine at Victoryland, a greyhound pari-
mutuel racecourse that is owned and operated by MCGP.  Hoffman
alleged that she hit a $110,000 jackpot while playing the
machine; that MCGP employees and a technician came over; and
that the technician cleared the machine and told her that the
jackpot had been caused by a malfunction of the machine. 
Hoffman also alleged that she continued to play that machine;
that she hit another $110,000 jackpot; that MCGP employees and
a technician came over again; that the technician again
cleared the machine and told her that the second jackpot was
also the result of a malfunction; and that she was no longer
allowed to play that machine.  In her complaint, Hoffman
asserted a breach-of-contract claim; an unjust-enrichment
claim; a claim of recklessness and wantonness; and a
negligent-training-and-supervision claim. 
Case No. 1141277
On September 22, 2009, Howard sued MCGP.  In her
complaint, she alleged that she had played 
an 
electronic-bingo
3
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
machine at Quincy's 777 Casino, which is owned and operated by
MCGP, on numerous occasions.  Howard also alleged that, on
August 28, 2009, she played an electronic-bingo machine at
Quincy's 777, but she did not win any jackpots on that date;
that Larry P. Langford, who was the mayor of the City of
Birmingham at that time, was also a patron at Quincy's 777 on
that date; that MCGP employees escorted Langford to specific
electronic-bingo machines; that, while playing on those
machines, Langford won jackpots; and that Langford won in
excess of $50,000 while playing those machines.  She also
alleged that, on prior occasions when Langford had played the
electronic-bingo machines at MCGP, he had won substantial
jackpots and that, "upon information and belief," MCGP
employees had escorted Langford to specific electronic-bingo
machines on those other occasions as well.
In her complaint, Howard alleged a breach-of-contract
claim; a claim that MCGP negligently, recklessly, and/or
wantonly operated bingo games at Quincy's 777 Casino on August
28, 2009; claims of fraud and fraudulent suppression; and a
claim of unconscionable, false, misleading, and deceptive
trade practices.  She subsequently amended her complaint to
4
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
add Milton E. McGregor, an owner of MCGP, and Monte Russell,
who she alleged was "a high-ranking employee of MCGP," as
defendants and to assert a conspiracy claim.
Case No. 1141278
On October 29, 2009, Slayton sued MCGP.  She also sued
Multimedia Games, Inc., which she alleged was the owner and
operator of the electronic-bingo machine she had played on the
premises of Victoryland.  In her complaint, she alleged that,
on August 26, 2009, she was playing on an electronic-bingo
machine at Victoryland; that she played the maximum bet
possible on the machine and hit the play button; that a
winning bingo card appeared; and that the machine froze,
stopped, and indicated that she had won a jackpot of $50,000. 
Slayton alleged that MCGP employees then approached her and 
informed her that she had won a jackpot; that the MCGP
employees requested a copy of her identification and Social
Security card so they could process the payment of her
jackpot; and that an MCGP employee subsequently told her that
they would not pay the jackpot because the machine had
malfunctioned, resulting in the jackpot.  Based on the events
of August 26, 2009, Slayton asserted a breach-of-contract
5
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
claim; a fraud claim; claims that the defendants had
negligently, recklessly, or wantonly voided her jackpot win;
a claim that the defendants had negligently, recklessly, and
wantonly maintained and serviced the electronic-bingo machine
she had been playing; an unjust-enrichment claim; a claim of
spoliation of evidence; a negligent-training-and-supervision
claim; and a claim of fraudulent concealment and suppression.
In each of these three cases, MCGP filed motions to
compel binding arbitration and to dismiss the proceedings,
arguing that each case involved a contract involving
interstate commerce that included a written arbitration
agreement.   MCGP presented evidence indicating that in March
2
2007 it had adopted the "Macon County Greyhound Park Official
Bingo Rules" ("the official bingo rules") and that it amended
those rules on August 10, 2008.  The official bingo rules
provide, in pertinent part:
"Participation in any bingo game constitutes a
Patron's 
understanding 
of, 
and 
full 
and
unconditional agreement to and acceptance of these
Official Rules."  
In case no. 1141277, MCGP, McGregor, and Russell filed
2
a joint motion to compel binding arbitration and to dismiss.
McGregor and Russell are not parties to these appeals.
6
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
The official bingo rules include the following arbitration
provision:
"Arbitration and Disputes.  As a condition of
participating in any bingo game, Patron agrees that
any and all disputes which cannot be resolved
between the parties, claims and causes of action
arising out of or connected with any bingo game, or
any prizes awarded, or the determination of winners
shall be resolved individually, without resort to
any form of class action and exclusively by
arbitration pursuant to the commercial arbitration
rules of the American Arbitration Association, then
effective.  Further, in any such dispute, under no
circumstances will Patron be permitted to obtain
awards for, and Patron hereby waives all rights to
claim punitive, incidental or consequential damages,
or any other damages, including attorneys' fees,
out-of-pocket expenses and/or any other damages, and
Patron further waives all rights to have damages
multiplied or increased.  All issues and questions
concerning 
the 
construction, 
validity,
interpretation and enforceability of these Official
Rules, or the rights and obligations of Patron and
Operator in connection with these bingo games, shall
be governed by, and construed in accordance with,
the laws of the State of Alabama, without giving
effect to the conflict of laws rules thereof, and
all proceedings shall take place in that State in
the City of Tuskegee, County of Macon."
MCGP also presented evidence indicating that the plaintiffs
were  members of its QClub Advantage program, which is "a
voluntary customer loyalty program which rewards customers
with points for their electronic bingo play."  As a member,
7
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
each plaintiff had received an orange QClub card.  The
following was printed on the back of the card:
"Your participation in this program is your
acceptance of and agreement with the MCGP, Inc.
Official Bingo Rules." 
MCGP also attached to the motions to compel arbitration
copies of what it asserted was an electronic signature of each
plaintiff.  It also attached affidavits from Lewis Benefield,
the chief operating officer for MCGP.  In his affidavit,
Benefield stated that the attached signature in case no.
1141273 was an electronic copy of Hoffman's signature
authorizing the transfer of her points from a previous rewards
program to the QClub Advantage program and that the electronic
signatures in case no. 1141277 and case no. 1141278 were
electronic signatures of Howard's and Slayton's agreeing to
the terms of the official bingo rules.  MCGP argued that each
of the plaintiffs had demonstrated her agreement to be bound
by the official bingo rules, which included the arbitration
agreement, by playing the electronic-bingo machines at MCGP's
facilities; by  participating in the QClub Advantage program;
and by their electronic signatures. 
8
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
 
MCGP also asserted that the contracts that contained the
arbitration 
provision 
involved 
interstate 
commerce. 
Specifically, it presented evidence indicating that all the
electronic-bingo 
machines 
on 
MCGP's 
premises 
were 
manufactured
outside Alabama.  It also presented evidence indicating that
the electronic-bingo machine at issue in case no. 1141273 was
owned by a Nevada corporation with its principal place of
business in Reno, Nevada.  Finally, it presented evidence
indicating that 48-52% of the participants in its QClub
Advantage program were from states other than Alabama.
Each of the plaintiffs objected to the motions to compel
arbitration.  Each argued that there was no agreement to
arbitrate; 
that 
the 
arbitration 
provisions 
were 
unconscionable
and therefore void; that the official bingo rules were outside
the rules promulgated by the sheriff of Macon County pursuant
to Ala. Const. 1901, Amend. No. 744 (Local Amendments, Macon
County, § 1, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.)) ("the sheriff's
rules"); that they were fraudulently induced into entering the
contract containing the arbitration provision; and that the
arbitration provision is void because the contracts in
question were illegal gambling contracts.
9
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
On July 20, 2015, the trial court entered a separate
order in each case denying the motion to compel arbitration. 
MCGP appealed those denials to this Court.  We consolidated
those cases for the purpose of writing one opinion.
Standard of Review
"This Court's standard of review on an appeal
from a trial court's order granting or denying a
motion to compel arbitration is well settled.  Bowen
v. Security Pest Control, Inc., 879 So. 2d 1139,
1141 (Ala. 2003).  A direct appeal is the proper
procedure by which to seek review of such an order,
Rule 4(d), Ala. R. App. P., and this Court will
review de novo the trial court's grant or denial of
a motion to compel arbitration.  Bowen, 879 So. 2d
at 1141.  The party seeking to compel arbitration
has the initial burden of proving the existence of
a contract calling for arbitration and proving that
the contract evidences a transaction involving
interstate commerce.  Polaris Sales, Inc. v.
Heritage Imports, Inc., 879 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (Ala.
2003).  The party seeking to compel arbitration must
present some evidence tending to establish its
claim.  Wolff Motor Co. v. White, 869 So. 2d 1129,
1131 (Ala. 2003).  Once the moving party meets that
initial burden, the party opposing arbitration has
the burden of presenting evidence tending to show
that the arbitration agreement is invalid or that it
does not apply to the dispute in question.  Bowen,
879 So. 2d at 1141.  See also Title Max of
Birmingham, Inc. v. Edwards, 973 So. 2d 1050,
1052–53 (Ala. 2007)."
Alabama Title Loans, Inc. v. White, 80 So. 3d 887, 891-92
(Ala. 2011).
Discussion
10
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
MCGP argues that the trial court erred when it denied the
motions to compel arbitration.  
"In Green Tree Financial Corp. of Alabama v.
Vintson, 753 So. 2d 497, 501–02 (Ala. 1999), this
Court held:
"'Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA") provides that "[a] written
provision in any ... contract evidencing a
transaction 
involving 
[interstate] 
commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction 
... 
shall 
be 
valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable."  9 U.S.C. §
2.  Moreover, the Supreme Court of the
United States has stated that the FAA
establishes 
a 
strong 
federal 
policy
favoring arbitration.  Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24–25, 103 S. Ct. 927, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765
(1983) (the FAA "establishes that, as a
matter 
of 
federal 
law, 
any 
doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should 
be 
resolved 
in 
favor 
of
arbitration").  Accordingly, trial courts
are required to stay or dismiss proceedings
and to compel arbitration when the parties
have 
entered 
into 
a 
valid 
contract
containing an arbitration agreement, and a
trial court's denial of a motion to compel
arbitration is subject to appeal.  See,
e.g., Patrick Home Center, Inc. v. Karr,
730 So. 2d 1171, 1172 (Ala. 1999).  This
Court will apply the de novo standard of
review to a trial court's order denying a
motion to compel arbitration.  Id.'"
American Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus v. Parker, 92
So. 3d 58, 64 (Ala. 2012) (emphasis added).  
11
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
First, this Court must address whether there is a valid
contract containing an arbitration agreement.  It is
undisputed that the alleged contracts that included the
arbitration 
provisions 
were 
gambling 
contracts, 
i.e., 
contracts to play electronic bingo.  Section 8-1-150(a), Ala.
Code 1975, specifically provides: "All contracts founded in
whole or in part on a gambling consideration are void."  
In Johnson v. Jefferson County Racing Ass'n, Inc., 1 So.
3d 960 (Ala. 2008), Debra Johnson, on her own behalf and on
behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, sued the
Jefferson 
County Racing 
Association, 
Inc., d/b/a The
Birmingham Race Course ("JCRA"), seeking to recover money she
and others had paid to participate in an activity advertised
as "Quincy's MegaSweeps" ("MegaSweeps") after this Court held
in Barber v. Jefferson County Racing Ass'n, Inc., 960 So. 2d
599, 604 (Ala. 2006), that MegaSweeps "involve[d] the use of
slot machines,' a gambling device that is illegal in Alabama." 
Johnson, 1 So. 3d at 961.  JCRA filed a motion to compel
Johnson to arbitrate her claims and to dismiss Johnson's
action.  Johnson argued that JCRA could not establish a valid
contract calling for arbitration because MegaSweeps amounted
12
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
to a contract founded on gambling and the contract was thus
void and unenforceable pursuant to § 8-1-150, Ala. Code 1975. 
The trial court determined that, because  Johnson's arguments
amounted to a challenge to the MegaSweeps contract as a whole
rather 
than 
a 
challenge 
to 
the 
arbitration 
clause
specifically, the issue of the validity of the contract was to
be determined by the arbitrator, and not the court. 
Therefore, it dismissed Johnson's action and ordered that she
arbitrate her claims.  Johnson appealed to this Court, arguing
that the trial court's order compelling her to arbitrate her
claims was  erroneous because, she said, the MegaSweeps
contract was void ab initio and the arbitration clause itself
was therefore void.
In addressing Johnson's argument that there was no valid
contract calling for arbitration, this Court stated:
"Johnson argues that JCRA cannot meet its
initial burden of demonstrating the existence of a
contract calling for arbitration because, she
argues, 'under this Court's unanimous decision in
Barber [v. Jefferson County Racing Ass'n, Inc., 960
So. 2d 599 (Ala. 2006)], the MegaSweeps contracts
relied on by the JCRA are void ab initio.' 
Johnson's brief at 15 (emphasis in the original).
"Section 8-1-150(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides:
13
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
"'All contracts founded in whole or in part
on a gambling consideration are void.  Any
person who has paid any money or delivered
any thing of value lost upon any game or
wager may recover such money, thing, or its
value by an action commenced within six
months from the time of such payment or
delivery.'5
"Johnson contends that the MegaSweeps contract is
void under § 8-1-150 because, she says, this Court
in Barber 'held that, as a matter of Alabama law,
playing the MegaSweeps involved the payment of
consideration to gamble.'  Johnson's brief at 17.
Johnson thus concludes that the arbitration clause
in the MegaSweeps contract is unenforceable because,
she argues, under Alabama law '"when a contract is
utterly void, it does not have any existence even
for the protection of one who relied and acted upon
it without notice of its infirmity."'  Johnson's
brief at 15 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Bramlett, 224 Ala. 473, 475, 140 So. 752, 753
(1932)). JCRA, however, argues that Johnson cannot
avoid arbitration by challenging the validity or
legality of the MegaSweeps contract as a whole,
rather than the arbitration clause itself.  JCRA is
correct.  
"Recently, in Paragon Ltd., Inc. v. Boles, 987
So. 2d 561, 567 (Ala. 2007), this Court rejected an
argument similar to the one Johnson now makes.  In
6
that case Emily Boles sued Paragon alleging that
Paragon had breached a construction contract by
failing to complete the construction of a house and
overcharging Boles for the work it had completed.
Paragon responded by arguing 'that the construction
contract 
contained 
a 
valid 
and 
enforceable
arbitration clause, which required that any dispute
related to the contract be settled by arbitration.'
987 So. 2d at 562.  Boles argued in response that,
'under § 34-14A-14, Ala. Code 1975, Paragon [could]
not maintain an action to enforce any provision of
14
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
the contract, including the arbitration clause,
because ... Paragon admitted [to the Alabama Home
Builders Licensure Board] that it had engaged in the
construction of Boles's residence without holding a
required license.'  Paragon, 987 So. 2d at 567.
"This Court first noted in Paragon that Boles's
argument, like Johnson's argument in the case now
before us, 'clearly attacks Paragon's ability to
enforce the contract as a whole and does not
specifically attack the arbitration clause within
the contract.' 987 So. 2d at 567.  This Court also
stated 
that 
'[i]t 
is 
well 
established 
that
challenges to the validity of the contract as a
whole and not specifically to the arbitration clause
within the contract must go to the arbitrator, not
a court.'  Paragon, 987 So. 2d at 567; see also
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 403-04, 87 S. Ct. 1801, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1270
(1967) ('Accordingly, if the claim is fraud in the
inducement of the arbitration clause itself -- an
issue which goes to the "making" of the agreement to
arbitrate -- the federal court may proceed to
adjudicate it.  But the statutory language does not
permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud
in the inducement of the contract generally.'
(footnotes omitted)).  Relying on the United States
Supreme Court decision in Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. v. Cardegna, the same decision relied on by the
trial court here, this Court in Paragon concluded
that 'the arbitration clause in the contract between
Paragon and Boles is enforceable, and it is
irrelevant whether Paragon's actions render the
contract as a whole void.  That question is for the
arbitrator to decide, not this Court.'  Paragon, 987
So. 2d at 568; see also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.
v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. at 445-46, 126 S. Ct. 1204
('Prima Paint and Southland [Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1 (1984)] ... establish[ed] three propositions.
First, 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
substantive 
federal
arbitration 
law, 
an 
arbitration 
provision 
is
severable from the remainder of the contract.
15
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
Second, unless the challenge is to the arbitration
clause itself, the issue of the contract's validity
is considered by the arbitrator in the first
instance. Third, this arbitration law applies in
state as well as federal courts.').   We concluded
8
Paragon by stating that 'the arbitration clause is
enforceable even if the contract as a whole is later
found to be void.'• Paragon, 987 So. 2d at 568-69.
"The case before us is closely analogous to
Paragon.  Johnson emphasizes that in this case
'there is no relevant determination to be made as to
the validity of the MegaSweeps contracts under § 8-
1-150(a) 
that 
has 
not 
already 
been 
finally
established as a matter of Alabama law in Barber [v.
Jefferson County Racing Ass'n, Inc., 960 So. 2d 599
(Ala. 2006) ].'• Johnson's brief at 19.  She further
contends that 
"'[this] Court examined the MegaSweeps
itself and determined that, as a matter of
Alabama law, the MegaSweeps itself was
illegal gambling and, more specifically,
that it involved gambling consideration. 
And under § 8-1-150(a), the existence of
gambling consideration is the only issue in
the 
determination 
of 
whether 
the 
MegaSweeps
contracts were void ab initio.'  
"Johnson's brief at 19 (emphasis in the original).
Similarly, however, at the time Paragon asserted
arbitration as a defense to litigation, it had
'entered into a consent agreement with the Alabama
Home Builders Licensure Board in which Paragon
admitted that it had engaged in the construction of
Boles's 
residence 
without 
holding 
a 
required
license.'  Paragon, 987 So. 2d at 567.  Thus, the
sole question under § 34-14A-14 as to whether
Paragon could 'bring or maintain any action to
enforce 
the 
provisions 
of 
any 
contract 
for
residential home building which he or she entered
into' was already answered -- Paragon did not have
16
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
the 'license required.'  Nevertheless, we held in
Paragon that arbitration was required.  Applying our
decision in Paragon to the facts of this case, we
conclude that, like the construction contract in
Paragon, 'the arbitration clause in the [MegaSweeps]
contract 
between 
[JCRA] 
and 
[Johnson] 
is
enforceable, and it is irrelevant whether [JCRA]'s
actions render the contract as a whole void. That
question is for the arbitrator to decide, not this
Court.'   Paragon, 987 So. 2d at 568.  Therefore the
9
trial court did not err in determining that a
contract calling for arbitration exists.
"______________
" The dissent argues that '[h]ad the Legislature
5
intended that some provisions of those [gambling]
contracts [addressed in § 8–1–150] not be void, it
could have said so in clear terms, but its language
is all-encompassing and unmistakable.' 1 So. 3d at
971–72. 
The 
dissent 
continues 
that 
'[t]he
Legislature has clearly provided that the customer's
remedy for losses in an illegal gambling activity is
an action in court, not arbitration provided by a
clause in a contract that is void ab initio.' 1 So.
3d at 972.  However, whether the arbitration clause
in the MegaSweeps contract is severable is not a
question of state law, but one of federal law.
"In 
Buckeye 
Check 
Cashing, 
Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546
U.S. 440, 445, 126 S. Ct. 1204, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1038
(2006), the Supreme Court of the United States said
that 'the [Federal Arbitration Act] "create[d] a
body of federal substantive law," which [is]
"applicable in state and federal courts."' (quoting
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12, 104 S.
Ct. 852, 79 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1984)).  The Supreme Court
noted that it had previously 'rejected the view that
the question of "severability" was one of state law,
so that if state law held the arbitration provision
not to be severable a challenge to the contract as
a whole would be decided by the court.'   546 U.S.
17
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
at 445, 126 S. Ct. 1204.  This Court is bound by
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
See Ex parte Procom Servs., Inc., 884 So. 2d 827,
834 (Ala. 2003) ('"'This Court may rely on a
decision of any federal court, but it is bound by
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.'"'
(quoting Weems v. Jefferson–Pilot Life Ins. Co., 663
So. 2d 905, 913 (Ala. 1995), quoting in turn Ex
parte Gurganus, 603 So. 2d 903, 908 (Ala. 1992)));
Ingram v. American Chambers Life Ins. Co., 643 So.
2d 575, 577 (Ala. 1994) ('Under Article VI of the
United States Constitution, we are bound by the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court.').
" The Paragon decision was released after the
6
parties to this appeal submitted their briefs.
"....
" The dissent argues that Buckeye Check Cashing
8
is distinguishable from this case because in Buckeye
Check Cashing a decision had not yet been made as to
whether the contract at issue was, in fact, void.
See Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So.
2d 860, 863 (Fla. 2005) ('In the case before us
today, however, the underlying contract at issue
would be rendered void from the outset if it were
determined 
that 
the 
contract 
indeed 
violated
Florida's usury laws.'), rev'd, Buckeye Check
Cashing, 546 U.S. at 445–46, 126 S. Ct. 1204.
"Justice 
Parker 
asserts 
that in 
this case '[t]he
illegality of the MegaSweeps scheme is ... not an
issue on the table for either an arbitrator or a
trial court to decide' because 'in Barber ... this
Court clearly and unanimously held that the
MegaSweeps scheme constitutes illegal gambling.' 1
So. 3d at 971.  This Court in Barber did address
'the MegaSweeps scheme' and declared it to be a
gambling operation; however, neither this Court, nor
the trial court, addressed in that decision what
effect the decision would have on the MegaSweeps
18
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
contract in this case.  This case, therefore, is
legally 
indistinguishable 
from 
Buckeye 
Check
Cashing.  Whether this particular contract is void
is a decision for the arbitrator, and not for this
Court or for the trial court (or, as suggested by
the 
dissent, 
for 
the 
legislature, 
whose
constitutional mandate is to pass general laws and
which is prohibited by the separation-of-powers
doctrine from deciding the effect of a statute on
particular parties in particular cases).  No matter
how obvious we might consider the answer to a
question, we cannot answer that question with legal
effect absent the jurisdiction to do so.  Moreover,
the question whether the MegaSweeps contract may
later be deemed void or merely voidable under state
law is not of consequence when deciding whether the
arbitration clause in that contract is severable and
enforceable.  See Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at
446, 126 S. Ct. 1204 ('In declining to apply Prima
Paint [Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395 (1967)]'s rule of severability, the Florida
Supreme Court relied on the distinction between void
and voidable contracts. ... Prima Paint makes this
conclusion 
irrelevant. 
That 
case 
rejected
application of state severability rules to the
arbitration agreement without discussing 
whether the
challenge at issue would have rendered the contract
void or voidable.').  See also Paragon, 987 So. 2d
at 56 ('Therefore, the arbitration clause in the
contract between Paragon and Boles is enforceable,
and it is irrelevant whether Paragon's actions
render the contract as a whole void.  That question
is for the arbitrator to decide, not this Court.').
" The dissent argues that the MegaSweeps
9
contract is void as a whole under § 8–1–150(a), Ala.
Code 1975, because it is founded on gambling
consideration and, thus, that 'the arbitration
clause is just as void as the rest of the contract.'
1 So. 3d at 971.  However, as noted above, no court
has made a determination as to the status of the
MegaSweeps contract; thus, as the United States
19
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
Supreme Court noted in Buckeye Check Cashing:
'[U]nless the challenge is to the arbitration clause
itself, the issue of the contract's validity is
considered by the arbitrator in the first instance.'
546 U.S. at 445–46, 126 S. Ct. 1204."
Johnson, 1 So. 3d at 963-66 (some footnotes omitted).
Justice Parker concurred in part and dissented in part,
stating, in relevant part:
"In 
§ 
8-1-150(a), 
Ala. 
Code 
1975, 
the
Legislature has clearly articulated the position of
the State of Alabama on gambling:  'All contracts
founded in whole or in part on a gambling
consideration are void.'  The language could hardly
be more explicit.  The statute declares that '[a]ll
contracts,' not just some, are 'void,' not voidable,
if those contracts are founded 'in whole or in part
on a gambling consideration.' 
"....
"Even if a contract is formed between JCRA and
the customer, and even if that contract does include
the posted rules -- including the arbitration clause
-- that contract is, according to § 8-1-150(a),
'void.'  If, as JCRA insists, the arbitration clause
is 
part 
of 
that 
(void) 
contract, 
then 
the
arbitration clause is just as void as the rest of
the contract.  As distinguished from a voidable
contract, a void contract is the same as a
nonexistent contract.  Mason v. Acceptance Loan Co.,
850 So. 2d 289, 295 (Ala. 2002).  JCRA insists that
the arbitration clause in the contract confers upon
the arbitrator the authority to decide this dispute.
But a void or nonexistent contract cannot confer any
authority upon anyone.
"JCRA 
relies 
upon Buckeye 
Check 
Cashing, 
Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 126 S. Ct. 1204, 163 L. Ed.
20
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
2d 1038 (2006), for the proposition that an
arbitrator, not a court, must decide a challenge to
the 
validity 
and 
enforcement 
of 
a 
contract
containing an arbitration clause.  Buckeye Check
Cashing involved an allegedly illegal payday loan,
but the illegality of the loan, including the rate
of interest actually charged, was the disputed
issue.  There is no dispute in this case as to the
illegality of the MegaSweeps scheme.  Only two years
ago, 
in 
Barber 
v. 
Jefferson 
County 
Racing
Association, Inc., 960 So. 2d 599 (Ala. 2006), this
Court clearly and unanimously held that the
MegaSweeps scheme constitutes illegal gambling.  The
illegality of the MegaSweeps scheme is therefore not
an issue on the table for either an arbitrator or a
trial court to decide.  
"The main opinion contends that, although the
Court in Barber held that the MegaSweeps scheme is
an illegal gambling operation, it did not address
the effect of that determination upon the legality
or voidness of a MegaSweeps contract. This is a
distinction with no significance.  The Court need
not specifically declare a gambling contract void,
because the Legislature has already done so. 
Section 8-1-150(a) is clear: 'All contracts founded
in whole or in part on a gambling consideration are
void.'  The logic is simple and unmistakable:  All
gambling contracts are void; MegaSweeps contracts
are 
gambling 
contracts; 
therefore, 
MegaSweeps
contracts are void.
"JCRA contends that even if the contract to
purchase a MegaSweeps card is a void contract, the
arbitration clause is nonetheless severable from the
rest of the contract.  JCRA's position is internally
inconsistent: It has strenuously argued that the
posted rules are part of the MegaSweeps contract,
but it now wants this Court to hold that some of the
rules, but not all of the rules, are part of the
contract.  But § 8-1-150(a) is explicit on this
point.  It declares that '[a]ll contracts founded in
21
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
whole or in part on a gambling consideration are
void.' 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
Had 
the 
Legislature
intended that some provisions of those contracts not
be void, it  could have said so in clear terms, but
its language is all-encompassing and unmistakable.
And subsection (a) continues:  
"'Any person who has paid any money or
delivered any thing of value lost upon any
game or wager may recover such money,
thing, or its value by an action commenced
within six months from the time of such
payment or delivery.'
"§ 8-1-150(a) (emphasis added).  The Legislature has
clearly provided that the customer's remedy for
losses in an illegal gambling activity is an action
in court, not arbitration provided by a clause in a
contract that is void ab initio.  
"Nevertheless, 
the 
main 
opinion 
insists 
that 
the
United States Supreme Court noted in Buckeye Check
Cashing that 'unless the challenge is to the
arbitration clause itself, the issue of the
contract's validity is considered by the arbitrator
in the first instance.'  546 U.S. at 445-46, 126 S.
Ct. 1204.  However, Buckeye Check Cashing did not
extend to a fact situation like the one here.  In
determining what kinds of contracts must be
submitted to arbitration, the Supreme Court stated
that '[t]here can be no doubt that "contract" as
used this last time [referring to its use in Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395, 412-13 (1967),] must include contracts that
later prove to be void.'  Buckeye Check Cashing, 546
U.S. at 448, 126 S. Ct. 1204. In this case, the
MegaSweeps contract has already been proven void by
the legislative declaration followed by the judicial
determination.  I therefore believe that this case
can be distinguished from Buckeye Check Cashing. 
Finally, I note that the posted Quincy's MegaSweeps
Official Sweepstakes Rules declare themselves to be
22
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
'[v]oid where prohibited by law.'  This declaration
is found at the beginning of the rules in Paragraph
1 and appears to apply to the entire rules.
Paragraph 2 provides that '[t]he Sweepstakes is
subject to all federal, state and local laws and
regulations, including without limitation Ala. Code
§ 8-19D-1 et seq. and Ala. Atty. Gen. Ops. 1999-28
and 2005-173.'  The rules contain no severability
clause or any other language that would suggest that
the void-where-prohibited-by-law provision applies
to anything less than the entire set of rules. If,
as JCRA insists, the rules are part of the contract,
then by operation of the rules themselves, the
arbitration clause is void.  
"Because I believe that a void and illegal
contract cannot confer authority upon an arbitrator,
and because I believe that the facts of this case --
a 'contract' consisting of a card the customer
receives only after paying for it, a contract that
allegedly incorporates rules 
that declare themselves
'[v]oid where prohibited by law,' and a statute that
not only declares such contracts void but also
provides that an action in court is the customer's
remedy -- present a situation not contemplated in
Buckeye Check Cashing, I dissent as to that holding
of the majority."
1 So. 3d at 970-72 (Parker, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
The "contracts" that include the arbitration clauses at
issue in these cases are "contracts" arising from Hoffman's,
Howard's, and Slayton's playing electronic bingo at premises
that are owned and operated by MCGP.  At first blush, it
appears that, based on this Court's previous decision in
23
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
Johnson, any question regarding the legality of the
"contracts" would be a challenge to the validity of the
contracts as a whole, which would be a question to be resolved
by the arbitrator rather than the court.  However, for the
following reasons, we determine that the "contracts" are
undisputably contracts based on criminal conduct that are 
thus
unenforceable and invalid.  MCGP, therefore, cannot establish
that any of these three cases involve a valid contract calling
for arbitration.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err
when it denied the motions to compel arbitration and to
dismiss.
The facts in Johnson are distinguishable from the facts
in these cases.  The contracts at issue in Johnson involved a
game known as "MegaSweeps."  Approximately one and one-half
years before its decision in the Johnson case, this Court
issued its decision in Barber v. Jefferson County Racing
Ass'n, Inc., 960 So. 2d 599 (Ala. 2006), in which it held that
the MegaSweeps scheme constituted illegal gambling.  The
majority opinion in Johnson rejected Justice Parker's
assertion that the facts in Johnson were distinguishable from
the facts in Buckeye Check Cashing because the illegality of
24
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
the MegaSweeps scheme had previously been decided, stating:
"[N]either this court, nor the trial court, addressed in that
decision what effect the decision would have on the MegaSweeps
contract in this case."  1 So. 3d 965 n.8. 
However, these cases do not involve contracts based on
participation in the MegaSweeps scheme.  Rather, these cases
involve 
alleged 
contracts 
that 
arose 
from 
Hoffman's, 
Howard's,
and Slayton's playing electronic bingo.  At the time of our
decision in Johnson, this Court had not yet addressed the
legality of electronic bingo in Alabama.  Now, more than eight
years since this Court released it decision in Johnson, this
Court has been called upon to address the legality of
electronic-bingo games on numerous occasions.  
Most recently, in State v. $223,405.86, [Ms. 1141044,
March 31, 2016] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2016), this Court
addressed the legality of electronic-bingo machines that had
been seized from Victoryland.  In holding that the seized
electronic-bingo 
machines 
were 
illegal 
gambling 
machines, 
this
Court stated: 
"Section 65 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901
prohibits 'lotteries,' 'gift enterprises,' and 'any
scheme in the nature of a lottery.'  The elements of
a lottery that violate § 65 of the Constitution of
25
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
Alabama are '(1) a prize, (2) awarded by chance, and
(3) for a consideration.'  Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.
of Luverne, Inc. v. Coca–Cola Bottling Co.,
Andalusia, 534 So. 2d 295, 296 (Ala. 1988). It is
this so-called 'anti-lottery provision' that stands
as the constitutional bar not just to what is known
in contemporary parlance as a 'lottery,' but to slot
machines and all other forms of gambling in Alabama.
In 1981, the Justices of this Court, quoting
Yellow–Stone Kit v. State, 88 Ala. 196, 7 So. 338
(1889), explained that '"[t]he courts have shown a
general disposition to bring within the term
'lottery' every species of gaming, involving a
disposition of prizes by lot or chance ...."'
Opinion of the Justices No. 277, 397 So. 2d 546, 547
(Ala. 1981).
"The efforts to circumvent § 65 have taken on a
seemingly endless variety of imaginative forms over
a long period.  For over 100 years, the appellate
courts of this State have addressed cases involving
efforts by gambling interests to evade this
prohibition in an endless variety of new and
inventive ways.  See, e.g., Grimes v. State, 235
Ala. 192, 193, 178 So. 73, 73 (1937) (noting that
the language of § 65 was adopted from the Alabama
Constitution of 1875 and that '[t]he lust for profit
by catering to and commercializing the gambling
spirit has given rise to many ingenious devices'). 
As this Court explained in 2006 in responding to yet
another of those attempts:
"'The 
owners 
[of 
the 
gambling
establishment] propose that they have
found, and exploited, a "loophole" in the
law. ...  Alabama's gambling law, however,
is not so easily evaded.  It is "'the
policy of the constitution and laws of
Alabama [to prohibit] the vicious system of
lottery schemes and the evil practice of
gaming, in all their protean shapes.'"' 
26
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
"Barber v. Jefferson Cty. Racing Ass'n, Inc., 960
So. 2d 599, 614 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Opinion of the
Justices No. 83, 249 Ala. 516, 517, 31 So. 2d 753,
754 (1947), quoting in turn Johnson v. State, 83
Ala. 65, 67, 3 So. 790, 791 (1887) (emphasis added
in Barber)).
"The latest 'protean shape' conceived by those
who would own or operate casinos in Alabama has been
electronic machines claimed to constitute the game
of 'bingo' within the meaning of various local
constitutional amendments that allow bingo in
certain counties for charitable or similar purposes.
Before directly examining this recent conception, it
is helpful to consider our courts' response to
earlier 'protean shapes' conceived in an effort to
circumvent § 65.
"One of the earliest rejections by our courts of
attempts to misuse local bingo amendments occurred
a little over 20 years ago.  In City of Piedmont v.
Evans, 642 So. 2d 435 (Ala. 1994), this Court held
that 'instant bingo' was a form of lottery
prohibited by § 65.  The Court narrowly construed
the term 'bingo' as found in Amendment No. 508, Ala.
Const. 1901 (now Local Amendments, Calhoun County,
§ 1, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.)), while citing
with approval the definition of that term employed
by a related municipal ordinance:
"'"'That 
specific 
kind 
of 
game, 
or
enterprise, commonly known as "bingo" in
which prizes are awarded on the basis of
designated numbers, or symbols, which are
drawn, at random, by the operator of said
game and which are placed by the persons
playing, or participating in said game, on
cards, or sheets of paper, which contain,
or set out, numbered spaces, upon which
said designated numbers or symbols, may be
placed 
by 
the 
persons 
playing 
or
participating in said game.'"'
27
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
"City of Piedmont, 642 So. 2d at 437 (emphasis
added).
"Three years later, in Foster v. State, 705 So.
2d 534 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), a unanimous Court of
Criminal Appeals held in an opinion authored by then
Judge Cobb that, where 'bingo' is authorized but not
otherwise defined by local 
constitutional amendment,
that term means nothing '"other than the ordinary
game of bingo."' 705 So. 2d at 538 (quoting Barrett
v. State, 705 So. 2d 529, 532 (Ala. Crim. App.
1996)).  The Foster court upheld the appellant's
conviction 
and 
12–month 
prison 
sentence 
for
promoting gambling and possession of a gambling
device where the appellant had contended that the
gambling activity he operated was 'bingo' within the
meaning of the local bingo amendment and of a city
ordinance adopted pursuant to that amendment.  The
court acknowledged '"this state's strong public
policy against lotteries as expressed in § 65 of the
Alabama Constitution,"' declared that bingo is a
'narrow exception to the prohibition of lotteries in
the Alabama Constitution,' and, accordingly, held
that "no expression in [an] ordinance [governing the
operation of bingo] can be construed to include
anything other than the ordinary game of bingo,'
lest the ordinance be 'inconsistent with the
Constitution of Alabama.' 705 So. 2d at 537–38
(emphasis added); see also Barrett v. State, 705 So.
2d 529 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (to similar effect). 
"In more recent years, the strategy of misusing
local bingo amendments has been renewed with
additional vigor and creativity.  Indeed, as noted
in Part III.A., above, in just the past six years,
the appellate courts of this State have rendered at
least a dozen decisions engendered by the advent of
so-called 'electronic bingo.'  No less than six of
those cases addressed the meaning of the simple term
'bingo' 
found 
in 
those 
amendments, 
including
Amendment No. 744, which we addressed in one of
those cases.  The local bingo amendments at issue in
28
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
those cases were proposed and adopted following, and
thus with an actual or imputed knowledge of, the
holdings in Evans, Foster, and Barrett. See, e.g.,
Ex parte Fontaine Trailer Co., 854 So. 2d 71, 83
(Ala. 2003) ('It is an ingrained principle of
statutory construction that "[t]he Legislature is
presumed to be aware of existing law and judicial
interpretation when it adopts [an act]. Ex parte
Louisville & N.R.R., 398 So. 2d 291, 296 (Ala.
1981)."' (quoting Carson v. City of Prichard, 709
So. 2d 1199, 1206 (Ala. 1998))).  Consistent with
the holdings in those earlier cases, we repeatedly
have made clear in our more recent cases that
references to 'bingo' in local bingo amendments are
references to the ordinary game of bingo, and not to
the electronic machines at issue in those cases. 
"....
"Based on the foregoing, there is no room for
any conclusion other than that which we reached in
Ex parte State:  The term 'bingo' as used in
Amendment No. 744 means the traditional game of
bingo as has been described by this Court.  The
[Barber v. ]Cornerstone[, 42 So. 3d 65 (Ala. 2009),]
elements, as since expounded upon in Houston County
[Economic Development Authority v. State, 168 So. 3d
4 (Ala. 2014)], are yet again reaffirmed.  They are
applicable to the term 'bingo' in Amendment No. 744,
just as they are applicable to the use of that term
in Alabama's other local bingo amendments.
"In our opinion in Cornerstone, published over
six years ago, we noted certain arguments made by
the State at that time.  It is surprising, given our
opinion 
in 
Cornerstone 
and 
our 
opinions 
in
subsequent cases during the ensuing six years, that
the following arguments remain germane today:
"'"First, there is no question
that this case 'involve[s] a
matter of public importance.'
29
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
Chapman[ v. Gooden], 974 So. 2d
[972,] 989 [(Ala. 2007)]. ...
"'"The issue is before the
Court because [the State has]
shown that there is no reasonable
chance that the machines at issue
could be found to be anything
other than slot machines, and no
reasonable 
chance 
that 
the
computer program used to run them
qualifies as the game commonly
known as bingo within the meaning
of Amendment 674.  A ruling by
this Court to that effect would
surely put a practical end to
this latest effort by gambling
interests around the State to
make a mockery of this State's
gambling laws ....  They prefer
to delay, continue to rake in
millions during the delay with
procedural 
maneuvers 
such 
as
those they have engaged in here
and in other appeals before this
Court, and ultimately pin their
hopes on 
the 
possibility of
political 
changes 
which 
they
believe may come with delay."
"'....
"'"...  Despite this Court's
clear, emphatic, and repeated
disapproval 
of 
every 
artful
attempt to circumvent Alabama's
anti-gambling law, see, e.g.,
Barber v. Jefferson County Racing
Assoc., 960 So. 2d 599, 614 (Ala.
2006), gambling interests, as
demonstrated 
by 
this 
case,
continue to flout those laws."'
30
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
"Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 76 (quoting arguments
made on behalf of the State of Alabama).
"Today's decision is the latest, and hopefully
the last, chapter in the more than six years' worth
of attempts to defy the Alabama Constitution's ban
on 'lotteries.' It is the latest, and hopefully the
last, chapter in the ongoing saga of attempts to
defy the clear and repeated holdings of this Court
beginning in 2009 that electronic machines like
those at issue here are not the 'bingo' referenced
in local bingo amendments.  It is the latest, and
hopefully the last, chapter in the failure of some
local law-enforcement officials in this State to
enforce the anti-gambling laws of this State they
are sworn to uphold, thereby necessitating the
exercise and performance by the attorney general of
the authority and duty vested in him by law, as the
chief law-enforcement officer of this State, to
enforce the criminal laws of this State.  And
finally, it is the latest, and hopefully last,
instance in which it is necessary to expend public
funds to seek appellate review of the meaning of the
simple term 'bingo,' which, as reviewed above, has
been declared over and over and over again by this
Court. There is no longer any room for uncertainty,
nor justification for continuing dispute, as to the
meaning of that term. And certainly the need for any
further expenditure of judicial resources, including
the resources of this Court, to examine this issue
is at an end. All that is left is for the law of
this State to be enforced."
___ So. 3d at ___ (footnotes omitted)(some emphasis added).
Thus, the state of the law regarding the illegality of
electronic bingo in Alabama is well established.  
Additionally, further consideration leads us to believe
that we should revisit the decision in Johnson.
31
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
The main point of the decisions relied upon in Johnson --
Paragon Ltd., Inc. v. Boles, 987 So. 2d 561, 567 (Ala. 2007),
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
403-04 (1967), and Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
546 U.S. 440 (2006) -- is that a challenge to a contract as a
whole on the basis that the contract is void because it is
based on illegal conduct by one of the parties is an issue
that should be decided by the arbitrator; that arbitration
provisions are severable from the remainder of the contract;
and that the courts can decide only challenges to the validity
of the arbitration provisions themselves.  Even if the
arbitration provision is severable from the rest of the
contract, the trial court would still determine the validity
of the arbitration clause.  The arbitration clause in the
official bingo rules states, in pertinent part:
"As a condition of participating in any bingo game,
Patron agrees that any and all disputes which cannot
be resolved between the parties, claims and causes
of action arising out of or connected with any bingo
game, or any prizes awarded, or the determination of
winners shall be resolved individually, without
resort to any form of class action and exclusively
by 
arbitration 
pursuant 
to 
the 
commercial
arbitration rules of the American Arbitration
Association, then effective.  Further, in any such
dispute, under no circumstances will Patron be
permitted to obtain awards for, and Patron hereby
32
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
waives all rights to claim punitive, incidental, or
consequential 
damages, 
or 
any 
other 
damages,
including attorneys' fees, out-of-pocket expenses
and/or any other damages, and Patron further waives
all rights to have damages multiplied or increased."
Thus, the consideration for any agreement to arbitrate is the
ability to participate in an electronic-bingo game.  This
Court has repeatedly held that electronic-bingo games, 
such as
those at issue in these cases, constitute illegal gambling in
Alabama.  Accordingly, the arbitration provision itself would
constitute a void contract because it is, at least in part,
based on illegal gambling consideration.  Accordingly, 
even if
the arbitration provision is severed from the rest of any
"contract," the arbitration provision itself is void as a
matter of law pursuant to § 8-1-150.  
Moreover, Johnson was based on this Court's previous
decision in Paragon and the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Prima Paint and Buckeye Check Cashing.  However,
this case is distinguishable from Paragon, Prima Paint, and
Buckeye Check Cashing because the nature of the "contracts"
that include the arbitration provisions in the cases now
before us are inherently different from the nature of the
contracts that were involved in those cases.  
33
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
In Paragon, Emily Boles and Paragon had entered into a
contract pursuant to which Paragon was to construct a house
for Boles.  Boles subsequently sued Paragon, alleging breach
of contract, and Paragon filed a motion to compel arbitration,
which the trial court denied.  Paragon appealed to this Court. 
On appeal, Boles argued that Paragon could not maintain any
action to enforce the provisions of the 
construction 
contract. 
Specifically, 
she 
asserted 
that, 
during 
a 
separate
administrative proceeding, "Paragon entered into a consent
agreement with the Alabama Home Builders Licensure Board in
which Paragon admitted that it had undertaken to construct 
Boles's residence without holding a required license and,
thus, under § 34-14A-14, Ala. Code 1975, Paragon cannot
maintain any action to enforce the provisions of the
residential-home-building-contract."  987 So. 2d at 564.
Prima Paint involved a consulting agreement between Prima
Paint Corporation and Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Company
that included an arbitration clause.  In Prima Paint, the
plaintiffs did not challenge the legality of the contract or
specifically challenge the arbitration clause.  Rather, the
plaintiffs sought rescission of the contract because 
they said
34
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
they had been fraudulently induced to enter into the entire
agreement.  
In Buckeye Check Cashing, the plaintiffs had "entered
into various deferred-payment transactions with petitioner
Buckeye Check Cashing (Buckeye), in which they received cash
in exchange for a personal check in the amount of the cash
plus a finance charge."  546 U.S. at 442.  The plaintiffs
brought a class-action suit "alleging that Buckeye charged
usurious interest rates and that the Agreement violated
various 
Florida 
lending 
and 
consumer-protection 
laws,
rendering it criminal on its face."  546 U.S. at 443.
Thus, the subject matter of the contracts involved in
Paragon, Prima Paint, and Buckeye Check Cashing was an
inherently legal activity -- a contract to build a house, a
consulting agreement, and a contract to lend money.  However,
in each of those cases, there were factual questions to be
decided that would determine whether the conduct of the
parties had rendered those contracts void or voidable.  In
those cases, this Court and the United States Supreme Court
held that the questions as to whether those contracts, as a
whole, were void or voidable were to be decided by
35
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
arbitrators.  However, this case does not involve contracts
for an inherently legal activity that might be rendered void
or voidable by the actions of a party to the contract. 
Rather, the entire subject matter of the "contracts" at issue
in these cases is patently illegal conduct -- illegal
gambling.  As we noted earlier, this Court has repeatedly held
that the electronic-bingo games, such as the ones in question,
constitute illegal gambling.   Further, § 
8-1-150 
specifically
provides that contracts that are based in whole or in part on
gambling consideration are void.  In Buckeye Check Cashing,
the United States Supreme Court stated, in pertinent part:
"Challenges 
to 
the 
validity 
of 
arbitration
agreements 'upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract' can be
divided into two types. One type challenges
specifically the validity of the agreement to
arbitrate.  See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1984) (challenging the agreement to
arbitrate as void under California law insofar as it
purported to cover claims brought under the state
Franchise Investment Law).  The other challenges the
contract as a whole, either on a ground that
directly affects the entire agreement (e.g., the
agreement was fraudulently induced), or on the
ground that the illegality of one of the contract's
provisions renders the whole contract invalid.
Respondents' claim is of this second type. The crux
of the complaint is that the contract as a whole
(including its arbitration provision) is rendered
invalid by the usurious finance charge."
36
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
546 U.S. at 444-45 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
Additionally, in Buckeye Check Cashing, the United States
Supreme Court also stated:
"It is true, as respondents assert, that the Prima
Paint rule permits a court to enforce an arbitration
agreement in a contract that the arbitrator later
finds to be void.  But it is equally true that
respondents' approach permits a court to deny effect
to an arbitration provision in a contract that  the
court later finds to be perfectly enforceable. 
Prima Paint resolved this conundrum -- and resolved
it in favor of the separate enforceability of
arbitration provisions."
546 U.S. at 448-49 (emphasis added).  However, this is not a
case in which the illegality of one provision of the contract
renders the whole contract invalid.  Additionally, this case
does not involve a situation where a court or an arbitrator
could subsequently find the "contracts" in question to be
perfectly enforceable.  Rather, the entire subject matter of
these contracts is illegal conduct.  Thus, there are no
factual questions to be resolved by an arbitrator or a court
before a determination can be made as to whether the contracts
in question are void or voidable.  Rather, it is clear that
the "contracts" are void as a matter of law.  To suggest that
a court should enforce any provision in a contract that is
based on illegal conduct and that is void as a matter of law,
37
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
particularly when the agreement to arbitrate is itself based
on gambling consideration, is unconscionable.  What if the
contract was for different illegal conduct, for example, the
sale of an illegal controlled substance such as cocaine or a
murder for hire?  Surely, no court would enforce any part of
such a contract by requiring an arbitrator to determine
whether such contracts were illegal and void. 
Based on the legal developments regarding the illegality
of electronic bingo that have occurred during the years since
we originally released our decision in Johnson, 
the 
procedural
posture of this case is sufficiently distinguishable so that
our holding in Johnson does not govern in this case. 
Additionally, to the extent Johnson suggests that the 
validity
of a contract that is based solely on criminal conduct is a
matter that should be submitted to an arbitrator, such holding
is incorrect and is hereby overruled.  
"We previously have observed that stare decisis '"is
a golden rule, not an iron rule."'  Goldome Credit
Corp. v. Burke, 923 So. 2d 282, 292 (Ala. 2005)
(quoting Ex parte Nice, 407 So. 2d 874, 883 (Ala.
1981) (Jones, J., dissenting)).  In those rare cases
where, in retrospect, a rule announced in a previous
case is not plausible, the doctrine of stare decisis
does not prevent this Court's reexamination of it.
38
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
"'Although we have a healthy respect for
the principle of stare decisis, we should
not blindly continue to apply a rule of law
that does not accord with what is right and
just.  In other words, while we accord "due
regard to the principle of stare decisis,"
it is also this Court's duty "to overrule
prior decisions when we are convinced
beyond ... doubt that such decisions were
wrong when decided or that time has
[effected] such change as to require a
change in the law."  Beasley v. Bozeman,
294 Ala. 288, 291, 315 So. 2d 570, 572
(1975) (Jones, J., concurring specially).'
"Ex parte State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 764 So. 2d
543, 545–46 (Ala. 2000) (footnote omitted).  'As
strongly as we believe in the stability of the law,
we also recognize that there is merit, if not honor,
in admitting prior mistakes and correcting them.'
Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 598, 320
So. 2d 68, 73 (1975)."
Ex parte Vanderwall, 201 So. 3d 525, 536 (Ala. 2015).  
Conclusion
Because the "contracts" containing the arbitration
provisions 
in 
these 
cases 
were 
based 
on 
gambling
consideration, they were based 
solely on criminal conduct, and
are therefore void.  Consequently, the provisions of those
"contracts," including the arbitration provisions, are void
and unenforceable. Therefore, the trial court properly denied
the motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss these cases. 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgments.
39
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
1141273 -- AFFIRMED.
1141277 -- AFFIRMED.
1141278 -- AFFIRMED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.
Bryan, J., concurs in the result.
Shaw, J., dissents.
Main, J., recuses himself.
40
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
SHAW, Justice (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent.  Our caselaw holds that the issue
whether the contracts in these cases are void is an issue to
be decided by an arbitrator.
The main opinion appears to hold that precedent should
not be followed because those cases involved certain facts
that needed to be determined by an arbitrator; in the instant
case, however, the Court holds that no determination by an
arbitrator is required.  As discussed below, the holding of
the main opinion fails to follow controlling federal law that
this Court has recognized.  
In Barber v. Jefferson County Racing Ass'n, Inc., 960 So.
2d 599 (Ala. 2006), this Court determined that a gaming
activity called "MegaSweeps," which was operated by the
Jefferson 
County Racing Association, 
Inc., d/b/a The
Birmingham Race Course ("JCRA"), involved the use of illegal
slot machines.  In Johnson v. Jefferson County Racing Ass'n,
Inc., 1 So. 3d 960 (Ala. 2008), Johnson sued JCRA seeking to
recover money she had paid to participate in the illegal
MegaSweeps game.  See Ala. Code 1975, § 8-1-150(a).  The
"official rules" for participating in MegaSweeps contained an
41
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
arbitration provision, and JCRA sought to compel Johnson to
arbitrate her claims.  Johnson argued, however, that JCRA
could not establish a "valid contract calling 
for 
arbitration"
because, she argued, the MegaSweeps contract, which was
founded on gambling consideration, was void under Ala. Code
1975, § 8–1–150(a).  1 So. 3d at 962.  The trial court,
relying on Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S.
440 (2006), held that because Johnson's challenge was to the
MegaSweeps contract as a whole, rather than to the arbitration
clause in the contract, the issue of the validity of the
contract was to be decided by the arbitrator.  1 So. 3d at
962-63.  
On appeal, Johnson again argued that JCRA could not
demonstrate the existence of a contract calling for
arbitration because, under Barber, supra, all MegaSweeps
contracts were void ab initio.  Johnson, 1 So. 3d at 963. 
Specifically, she argued that Barber held, as a matter of law,
that MegaSweeps constituted illegal gambling under § 8-1-
150(a). 1 So. 3d at 964.  This Court held that Johnson could
not avoid arbitration by challenging the validity of the
MegaSweeps contract as a whole instead of the arbitration
42
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
clause itself.  Id.  In support of this holding, this Court
cited Paragon Ltd., Inc. v. Boles, 987 So. 2d 561 (Ala. 2007). 
In that case, the Court noted:
"It is well established that challenges to the
validity of the contract as a whole and not
specifically to the arbitration clause within the
contract must go to the arbitrator, not a court. In
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S.
440, 126 S. Ct. 1204, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1038 (2006), the
United States Supreme Court held:
"'Prima Paint [Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967),] and
Southland [Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1
(1984),] 
answer 
the 
question 
presented 
here
by establishing three propositions. First,
as 
a 
matter 
of 
substantive 
federal
arbitration law, an arbitration provision
is severable from the remainder of the
contract. Second, unless the challenge is
to the arbitration clause itself, the issue
of the contract's validity is considered by
the arbitrator in the first instance.
Third, this arbitration law applies in
state as well as federal courts. The
parties have not requested, and we do not
undertake, 
reconsideration 
of 
those
holdings. Applying them to this case, we
conclude 
that 
because 
respondents 
challenge
the Agreement, but not specifically its
arbitration provisions, those provisions
are enforceable apart from the remainder of
the 
contract. 
The 
challenge 
should
therefore be considered by an arbitrator,
not a court.'"
987 So. 2d at 567-68 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S.
at 445–46) (emphasis added).
43
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
Johnson argued, however, that there was nothing for the
arbitrator to decide as to the validity of the MegaSweeps
contract under § 8-1-150(a) that had not already been decided
in Barber, which held that MegaSweeps involved illegal
gambling consideration.  1 So. 3d at 966.  This Court noted,
however, that the same had been true in Paragon: The defendant
in that case had entered into a consent judgment admitting
that it had constructed a house without the required license. 
1 So. 3d at 966.  That meant that the defendant could not
enforce the contract in that case.  1 So. 3d at 964-65. 
Nevertheless, pursuant to an arbitration clause in the 
contract, the actual determination whether the contract was
void was held to be for the arbitrator to decide, and the
arbitration clause was held to be enforceable, even if the
contract was later found void.  1 So. 3d at 965-66.  The same
was held to be true for Johnson: 
"'[T]he arbitration clause in the [MegaSweeps]
contract 
between 
[JCRA] 
and 
[Johnson] 
is
enforceable, and it is irrelevant whether [JCRA]'s
actions render the contract as a whole void. That
question is for the arbitrator to decide, not this
Court.'"
44
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
Johnson, 1 So. 3d at 966 (quoting Paragon, 987 So. 2d at 568). 
As to the argument that, under § 8-1-150(a), the MegaSweeps
contract was as a whole void, and the arbitration clause was
thus similarly void, this Court stated: 
"[N]o court has made a determination as to the
status of the MegaSweeps contract; thus, as the
United States Supreme Court noted in Buckeye Check
Cashing: 
'[U]nless 
the 
challenge 
is 
to 
the
arbitration clause itself, the issue of the
contract's validity is considered by the arbitrator
in the first instance.'"
Johnson, 1 So. 3d at 966 n.9 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing,
546 U.S. at 445–46).
In the instant cases, the plaintiffs' arguments that § 8-
1-150(a) voids the contracts appear to be aimed at the
contracts as a whole.   Their challenges to the arbitration
3
The 
arguments 
found 
in 
the 
plaintiffs' 
oppositions 
to 
the
3
motions to compel arbitration filed by Macon County Greyhound
Park, 
Inc., 
attacked 
the 
arbitration 
provisions 
as
unconscionable.  But as to whether they are void based on
illegal gambling consideration, the plaintiffs' arguments
appear to be premised on the notion that the entire contracts
are void as unenforceable gambling contracts.  Under the
heading "THE ARBITRATION PROVISION IS VOID BECAUSE THE
CONTRACT IS BASED ON AN ILLEGAL GAMBLING CONTRACT UNDER ALA.
CODE § 8-1-150," the plaintiffs argued:
"Macon County Greyhound Park cannot enforce the
arbitration provision because electronic bingo
contracts 
are 
illegal 
contracts 
for 
gambling
activity and are void ab initio. See Ala. Code, §
8-1-[1]50 (providing that all contracts founded in
45
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
provisions themselves are not premised on § 8-1-150(a) but on
arguments relating to unconscionability.  If Johnson and
Paragon are followed, the challenges to the contracts as a
whole must be decided by an arbitrator.   
The main opinion in the instant case states:   
whole or part on a gambling consideration are void).
Macon County Greyhound Park admits these contracts,
by which it bases its demands for arbitration, are
the same contracts through which Macon County
Greyhound 
Park 
allowed 
its 
members 
to 
play
electronic bingo.  Macon County Greyhound Park
cannot enforce the arbitration provision because
electronic bingo are [sic] illegal contracts for
gambling activity and are void ab initio.  Ala. Code
[1975, § 8-1-150].  Macon County Greyhound Park
admits these contracts by which it bases its demands
for arbitration are the same contracts through which
Macon County Greyhound Park allowed its members to
play electronic bingo."
(Emphasis added.)  They further argued: 
"[Macon County Greyhound Park] attempts to compel
arbitration on a contract which is founded on
illegal gambling consideration.  The Plaintiff took
part in an illegal gambling game in which money was
to be paid on the happening of an uncertain even[t].
[Macon County Greyhound Park's] electronic bingo
games constitute an illegal gambling operation under
the Alabama Supreme Court decision of Barber v.
Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc., [42 So. 3d 65
(Ala. 2009),] and thus any contract made on the
basis of this game is void."
(Emphasis added.)  
46
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
"[T]his case does not involve a situation where a
court or an arbitrator could subsequently find the
'contracts' in question to be perfectly enforceable. 
Rather, the entire subject matter of these contracts
is illegal conduct.  Thus, there are no factual
questions to be resolved by an arbitrator or a court
before a determination can be made as to whether the
contracts in question are void or voidable."
___ So. 3d at ___.
But as recounted above, the same was true in Paragon and
Johnson. 
The 
party 
resisting 
arbitration 
in 
Johnson
specifically 
claimed 
that, 
in 
Barber, 
all 
MegaSweeps 
contracts
had been determined to be void ab initio.  We stated that
"Johnson brought the present action" seeking to recover money
she had paid to participate in the MegaSweeps "following this
Court's decision in Barber, ... in which we determined that"
MegaSweeps involved the use of illegal slot machines.  1 So.
3d at 961.  The decisions--Barber and Johnson--were issued 18
months apart.  There seems to be no dispute that the gambling
activity declared illegal in Barber was the exact activity
challenged in Johnson.  It was deemed irrelevant that all
MegaSweeps contracts were assumed to be void: The actual
question as to the validity of the contract in Johnson was for
the arbitrator to decide.  1 So. 3d at 966.  The same had been
true in Paragon: "[T]he sole question" whether the contract
47
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
could be enforced "was already answered--Paragon did not have
the 'license required.'"  1 So. 3d at 966.  There were no
factual disputes about the legality of the contracts in either
Paragon or Johnson. ___ So. 3d at ___.  Under the rationale of
the main opinion, it would have been "unconscionable" for a
court to enforce those contracts and require an arbitrator to
determine whether the contracts were illegal and void. 
Nevertheless, 
Paragon 
and 
Johnson 
followed 
controlling 
federal
caselaw requiring such a result.  The posture of the instant
case is indistinguishable from the posture of Paragon and
Johnson; yet this Court, contrary to controlling federal
precedent, undertakes a new analysis and reaches a different
result.  
The main opinion assumes that the contracts at issue in
the instant cases are illegal and that an arbitrator can make
no other conclusion: "[T]here are no factual questions to be
resolved by an arbitrator or a court before a determination
can be made as to whether the contracts in question are void
or voidable." __ So. 3d at ___.  Perhaps these contracts are
illegal, but it is unnecessary for this Court, or any court
for that matter, to reach such a conclusion.  No determination
48
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
has been made as to whether the electronic-bingo machines used
in 2008 and 2009--which are the machines at issue in this
case--fail to meet the test for legal bingo found in Barber v.
Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc., 42 So. 3d 65 (Ala.
2009), a case released after the underlying events in the
instant case.  It is true that, seven to eight years after the
events leading to the instant lawsuits, electronic-bingo
operations at Victoryland were declared illegal in State v.
$223,405.86, [Ms. 1141044, March 31, 2016] ___ So. 3d ___
(Ala. 2016).  But the electronic-bingo devices in State v.
$223,405.86 were seized in an investigation that began on
December 20, 2012, "two days after the Casino announced its
opening."  Ex parte State of Alabama, 121 So. 3d 337, 342
(Ala. 2013).  Victoryland had apparently been closed between
the activity underlying the complaints in the instant cases
and the investigation leading to State v. $223,405.86, which
investigation started three to nearly four years later.  In my
mind, this Court is putting the cart before the horse by
holding ex mero motu that illegal activity that started in
2012 necessitates a finding that activity that occurred years
earlier was also illegal, thus rendering those 
prior 
contracts
49
1141273; 1141277; 1141278
void.  Again, that may be the case here; however, Johnson and
Paragon, both of which, as noted, are based on controlling
federal-court precedent, stand for one simple proposition: 
Whether the contracts in these cases are void is for an
arbitrator to determine. I would follow our precedent;
therefore, I respectfully dissent.  
50