Title: Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Findlay

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Ohio 
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. Findlay, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-2804.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-2804 
OHIO PATROLMEN’S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. THE 
CITY OF FINDLAY, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. Findlay, Slip Opinion 
No. 2017-Ohio-2804.] 
Arbitration—Any limitation on an arbitrator’s authority to modify a disciplinary 
action pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) provision 
requiring that discipline be imposed only for just cause must be specifically 
bargained for by the parties and incorporated into the CBA—CBA placed 
no limitation on arbitrator’s authority to review disciplinary action 
imposed and fashion a remedy—Arbitrator’s award draws its essence from 
CBA, and arbitrator acted within his authority—Court of appeals’ judgment 
reversed, award reinstated, and cause remanded. 
(No. 2015-1581—Submitted February 7, 2017—Decided May 17, 2017.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 102282, 2015-Ohio-3234. 
_______________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (“OPBA”) and 
Sergeant David Hill of the Findlay Police Department appeal from a judgment of 
the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirming a common pleas court decision that 
vacated an arbitration award that changed the disciplinary sanction recommended 
by the chief of police against Hill from termination to a lengthy suspension.  The 
issue presented on this appeal is whether the collective bargaining agreement 
between the city of Findlay and the OPBA requiring that discipline be imposed only 
for just cause authorized the arbitrator to change the sanction recommended by the 
chief of police in accordance with the department’s matrix of discipline. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} The Findlay police department hired David Hill in 1992 as an 
auxiliary police officer; in 1999 he became a patrolman, and in 2005 he was 
promoted to sergeant.  The department’s disciplinary procedures include a 
“discipline matrix” setting forth progressive levels of discipline based on the 
seriousness of the offense and the number of prior violations and providing that 
“[i]f more than one discipline level is indicated, the Chief of Police has sole 
discretion in determining which of the two levels is appropriate, based on the facts 
of the case and history of the involved employee.” 
{¶ 3} Hill is a member of the OPBA, and that organization is a party to a 
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the city containing a provision that 
discipline shall be imposed only for just cause and establishing a grievance 
procedure which includes binding arbitration. 
The July 2012 Incidents 
{¶ 4} On July 6, 2012, Hill helped to create a video of him using a taser 
against the son of a fellow officer which violated the department’s social media 
policy, resulting in a written reprimand for his conduct.  On July 27, 2012, Hill 
made disparaging comments about another fellow officer’s mental health and 
January Term, 2017 
 
3
placed the barrel of his service weapon into his own mouth.  As a result of that 
incident, Chief of Police Gregory Horne recommended that Hill be suspended for 
30 days with 15 days stayed for conduct unbecoming an officer.  Hill then filed a 
grievance, but the city’s safety director agreed with the recommendation and denied 
it, and as a result, the matter was scheduled for arbitration on November 28, 2012. 
The November 2012 Incident 
{¶ 5} On November 13, 2012, after the midnight shift roll call, Hill referred 
to Officer Morgan Greeno as “Whoregan” in response to a question about the 
committee coordinating an upcoming Fraternal Order of Police Christmas party.  
Greeno filed a complaint because she thought the comment could have been related 
to her scheduled testimony against Hill at the arbitration hearing.  She also claimed 
that Hill had made and condoned comments based on the running joke that she was 
pregnant with the baby of a municipal building custodian. 
The First Arbitration 
{¶ 6} Jonathan Klein arbitrated the July 27 incident, found the city had just 
cause to discipline Hill for that incident but that Chief Horne’s recommendation of 
a 30 day suspension with 15 days stayed “exceeded the disciplinary matrix without 
justification,” and therefore reduced the disciplinary action to a ten day suspension 
in accordance with the matrix.  Noting Chief Horne’s testimony that the city is not 
required to and does not always follow the matrix, the arbitrator determined that 
“under the principles of just cause, the City cannot simply pick and choose when it 
will apply the Discipline Matrix to a particular infraction warranting discipline.”  
The arbitrator declined to address the OPBA’s contention that it had never agreed 
to the matrix because the record on that issue was not “sufficiently developed.” 
The Second Arbitration 
{¶ 7} Following an investigation of the November 13 incident, Chief Horne 
concluded Hill had violated several department rules and regulations, “the most 
serious” being the department’s sexual harassment policy, and he applied the matrix 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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to recommend Hill’s termination.  Hill filed a grievance asserting no just cause for 
his termination and that the chief’s application of the matrix violated the CBA.  The 
safety director agreed with the chief’s recommended termination and denied Hill’s 
grievance. 
{¶ 8} James Mancini arbitrated this matter and granted in part and denied 
in part the grievance.  Mancini found the evidence did not clearly demonstrate Hill 
had violated the department’s sexual harassment policy and therefore set aside the 
discharge penalty; however, he concluded that the city had “just cause to impose 
severe discipline” because Hill had engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer and 
had failed to properly carry out his supervisory duties.  Mancini noted Klein’s 
decision “concerning the department’s Discipline Matrix Guidelines” and 
concluded that the matrix “should be applied in this case” and that it indicated two 
levels of discipline, i.e., “the discipline could range from a 3-10 day suspension up 
to termination.”  He determined a “lengthy disciplinary suspension is warranted” 
and ordered that Hill be reinstated with full seniority but no back pay. 
{¶ 9} Hill and the OPBA filed an application in the common pleas court to 
enforce the arbitration award, claiming that the city refused to reinstate him and 
seeking lost wages, benefits, and seniority and interest, attorney fees, and court 
costs.  The city filed an application to vacate and/or modify the award.  The 
common pleas court consolidated the appeals and vacated the award pursuant to 
R.C. 2711.10(D), concluding that after Mancini had determined that the matrix 
should have been applied, he “exceeded and imperfectly executed his power” by 
departing from the matrix’s plain language, which gives sole discretion to the chief 
of police to choose between a three to ten day suspension or termination. 
{¶ 10} In a split decision, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
common pleas court, concluding the arbitration award did not draw its essence from 
the CBA and was arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful.  The majority explained the 
arbitrator “interpreted the CBA (and its just cause standard for disciplinary action) 
January Term, 2017 
 
5
as requiring the application of the discipline matrix to determine the 
appropriateness of the discipline imposed.”  2015-Ohio-3234, 40 N.E.3d 610, ¶ 41.  
The majority held that after determining the matrix applied and indicated two levels 
of discipline, the arbitrator lacked “arbitral authority to modify the disciplinary 
action imposed, which under the discipline matrix and the CBA was within the ‘sole 
discretion’ of Chief Horne.”  Id. at ¶ 43.  The dissenting judge opined that the 
disciplinary procedures and matrix were not part of the CBA, that the arbitrator had 
full authority to fashion a remedy, and that even if the procedures and matrix were 
part of the CBA, the choice of discipline was still subject to the just cause standard 
in the CBA. 
{¶ 11} The OPBA and Hill appealed, and we accepted the following 
proposition of law for review:  “Any limitation on an arbitrator’s ability to review 
and modify disciplinary action under the ‘just cause’ standard must be specifically 
bargained for by the parties and contained within the four corners of the collective 
bargaining agreement.” 
Positions of the Parties 
{¶ 12} The OPBA and Hill contend that any limitation on an arbitrator’s 
authority to modify discipline pursuant to a CBA that requires discipline to be 
imposed for just cause must be specifically bargained for and incorporated into the 
CBA and in this case, the disciplinary procedures and the matrix were unilaterally 
adopted by the city and therefore do not meet this standard.  They also claim that 
Articles 4.01 and 10 of the CBA, which permit the department to develop work 
rules and require OPBA members to comply with them, do not incorporate the 
matrix into the CBA, and they analogize this case to Southwest Ohio Regional 
Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 627, 91 Ohio St.3d 108, 742 
N.E.2d 630 (2001) (“SORTA”).  The OPBA and Hill thus maintain that Mancini 
had authority to modify the discipline in this matter, properly used the matrix for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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guidance, and fashioned an appropriate remedy in light of the city’s failure to prove 
its most serious allegation against Hill. 
{¶ 13} The city contends that an arbitrator’s authority to modify a 
disciplinary action if he finds that there is not just cause to impose it is limited by 
the predetermined penalties in the matrix which the city had authority to establish 
pursuant to Articles 4.01 and 10 of the CBA.  The city asserts that it did not 
unilaterally adopt the matrix because the OPBA agreed its members would abide 
by department rules and participated in the creation of the matrix.  Thus, the city 
claims Mancini was required to apply the matrix in this matter, including its 
language granting the chief sole discretion to choose between two levels of 
discipline.  And the city claims that Klein determined the city could not impose 
discipline contrary to the matrix and that these parties are bound by that decision. 
Issue 
{¶ 14} The issue presented here is whether the just cause for discipline 
provision of the CBA authorized Mancini to change the disciplinary action 
recommended by the chief of police pursuant to the matrix. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 15} “The public policy favoring arbitration requires that courts have only 
limited authority to vacate an arbitrator’s award.”  Assn. of Cleveland Fire Fighters, 
Local 93 of the Internatl. Assn. of Fire Fighters v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 476, 
2003-Ohio-4278, 793 N.E.2d 484, ¶ 13.  R.C. 2711.10(D) provides that the court 
of common pleas “shall make an order vacating the award upon the application of 
any party to the arbitration if * * * [t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so 
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made,” and R.C. 2711.15 authorizes an appeal from such 
an order. 
{¶ 16} “An arbitrator derives his authority from the express terms of the 
collective-bargaining agreement between the parties.”  Fostoria v. Ohio 
January Term, 2017 
 
7
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn., 106 Ohio St.3d 194, 2005-Ohio-4558, 833 N.E.2d 
720, ¶ 11.  “Arbitrators act within their authority to craft an award so long as the 
award ‘draws its essence’ from the contract—that is, ‘when there is a rational nexus 
between the agreement and the award, and where the award is not arbitrary, 
capricious or unlawful.’ ”  Cedar Fair, L.P. v. Falfas, 140 Ohio St.3d 447, 2014-
Ohio-3943, 19 N.E.3d 893, ¶ 7, quoting Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation 
& Dev. Disabilities v. Mahoning Cty. TMR Edn. Assn., 22 Ohio St.3d 80, 488 
N.E.2d 872 (1986), paragraph one of the syllabus.  “[A]n award ‘departs from the 
essence of a [contract] when: (1) the award conflicts with the express terms of the 
agreement, and/or (2) the award is without rational support or cannot be rationally 
derived from the terms of the agreement.’ ”  (Brackets sic.)  Id., quoting Ohio Office 
of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn., Local 11, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO, 59 Ohio St.3d 177, 572 N.E.2d 71 (1991), syllabus. 
{¶ 17} “Where an arbitrator’s decision draws its essence from the collective 
bargaining agreement, and in the absence of language in the agreement that would 
restrict such review, the arbitrator, after determining that there was just cause to 
discipline an employee, has the authority to review the appropriateness of the type 
of discipline imposed.”  Bd. of Trustees of Miami Twp. v. Fraternal Order of Police, 
Ohio Labor Council, Inc., 81 Ohio St.3d 269, 690 N.E.2d 1262 (1998), syllabus.  
“An arbitrator has broad authority to fashion a remedy, even if the remedy 
contemplated is not explicitly mentioned in the labor agreement.”  Queen City 
Lodge No. 69, Fraternal Order of Police, Hamilton Cty., Ohio, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 
63 Ohio St.3d 403, 407, 588 N.E.2d 802 (1992). 
{¶ 18} Article 41.03 of the CBA1 provides:  “The arbitrator shall have no 
power or authority to add to, subtract from, or in any other manner alter the specific 
                                                          
 
1 The court of appeals recognized the parties’ apparent disagreement as to whether the version of 
the CBA effective January 1, 2011, to December 31, 2012, or January 1, 2013, to December 31, 
2015, governs this matter.  The court noted that it was unclear from the record which version 
Mancini had used and determined that it did not need to resolve the issue, because the relevant 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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terms of this Agreement * * * nor to make any award that * * * violates any of the 
terms and conditions of this Agreement.”  Article 39.07 states:  “Discipline shall be 
imposed only for just cause.”  And Article 4.01(5) similarly reserves the city’s right 
to “suspend, discipline, demote, or discharge for just cause.” 
{¶ 19} Here, Mancini stated the matrix “should be applied in this case,” but 
he did not find that a specific provision in the CBA mandated application of the 
matrix, nor could such a finding be rationally derived from the terms of the 
agreement.  The CBA does not mention the police department’s disciplinary 
procedures or the matrix, and no language in the CBA restricts an arbitrator’s 
authority to review the appropriateness of the type of discipline imposed after the 
arbitrator has determined that there is just cause to discipline an employee for the 
type of misconduct at issue in this matter. 
{¶ 20} The city’s reliance on Articles 4.01 and 10 of the CBA is misplaced.  
Article 4.01 states: 
 
Unless expressly provided to the contrary by a specific provision of 
this Agreement, the Employer reserves and retains, solely and 
exclusively, all of its statutory and common law rights to manage 
the operation of its Department of Police.  Employer[’]s rights shall 
include, but are not limited to, the following: the right to * * * (10) 
develop, revise, or eliminate work practices, procedures and rules in 
the operation of the Department of Police and to maintain discipline 
* * *. 
 
{¶ 21} Article 10.01 of the CBA states: 
                                                          
 
provisions in both versions were “substantively similar, if not identical.”  2015-Ohio-3234, 40 
N.E.3d 610, at ¶ 11, fn. 1.  Because the exhibits from the arbitration include only a copy of the 
version of the CBA effective January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2015, we quote from that version in 
this opinion. 
January Term, 2017 
 
9
 
The Union agrees that its membership shall comply with Police 
Department and City of Findlay Rules and Regulations, including 
those relating to working conditions, conduct, and performance.  
The Employer agrees that Police Department and City of Findlay 
Rules and Regulations, which affect working conditions, conduct, 
and performance shall be subject to the grievance procedure if they 
violate this Agreement. 
 
Article 10.02 requires the parties to add any proposed changes to the rules and 
regulations “to the discussion agenda of the next Labor-Management Committee 
meeting,” and Article 10.03 generally requires the city to notify the OPBA of 
changes in writing at least 14 days prior to their proposed effective date. 
{¶ 22} In SORTA, 91 Ohio St.3d 108, 742 N.E.2d 630, the employer 
terminated a union employee for violating a drug policy which called for automatic 
termination of an employee who tested positive for marijuana.  An arbitration panel 
found the policy facially valid but determined that the automatic discharge sanction 
conflicted with, and thus violated, a provision of the CBA requiring sufficient cause 
for discharge.  The arbitration panel reinstated the employee, finding no sufficient 
cause for discharge under the circumstances.  A common pleas court affirmed the 
arbitration award, but the court of appeals reversed it and remanded with 
instructions to vacate the award. 
{¶ 23} We reversed the court of appeals and ordered reinstatement of the 
arbitration award, explaining that the employer had adopted the drug policy 
pursuant to a section of the CBA but that “any sanction for a violation of a rule 
adopted” pursuant to that section “was subject to the ‘sufficient cause’ standard” 
contained in a separate section of the CBA.  Id. at 110.  We noted that the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that although a CBA gave an employer  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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“the right * * * to make necessary reasonable rules and regulations 
for the conduct of business, providing that said rules and regulations 
are not in conflict with the terms of [the CBA] in any way,” * * *, 
the right to make such rules is not the right to equate the violation 
of such rules with “good and sufficient cause” for termination.  To 
hold otherwise would be to allow [the employer] to unilaterally 
define the meaning of “good and sufficient cause,” a right which 
was not contemplated by the CBA and for which [the employer] 
must negotiate with the Union. 
 
(Ellipses and first brackets sic and emphasis deleted.)  Id. at 111, quoting Local No. 
7 United Food & Commercial Workers Internatl. Union v. King Soopers, Inc., 222 
F.3d 1223, 1227 (10th Cir.2000). 
{¶ 24} We agreed with and applied this reasoning to conclude: 
 
SORTA did not have the right to unilaterally adopt automatic 
termination * * * as a sanction for testing positive, because such a 
sanction conflicts with the “sufficient cause” requirement for 
dismissal found in * * * the CBA.  Just as the court noted in King 
Soopers, allowing SORTA to enforce automatic termination would 
allow an employer to unilaterally adopt a sanction that conflicts with 
the sufficient-cause requirement for dismissal that was negotiated 
into the CBA, thereby undermining the integrity of the entire 
collective bargaining process.  The proper avenue for SORTA to 
adopt such a sanction would be through the collective bargaining 
process, not through a unilateral decision. 
 
January Term, 2017 
 
11 
(Emphasis sic.)  Id. 
{¶ 25} Similarly, in this case, although the CBA reserves the city’s right to 
develop work rules and obligates OPBA members to comply with those rules, the 
city’s right to develop rules is not a right to determine what particular form of 
discipline it has just cause to impose for a violation of those rules.  Stated 
differently, the city’s right to develop rules is not the right to unilaterally define the 
meaning of the phrase “just cause” for purposes of the CBA—a right that is not 
contemplated by the agreement.  Moreover, the discipline matrix is not subject to 
the grievance procedure pursuant to Article 10.01, because it is not a rule affecting 
“working conditions, conduct, and performance,” but even if it were and the OPBA 
had the rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard pursuant to Articles 10.02 
and 10.03 with respect to adoption of the matrix, such rights would not operate to 
incorporate the matrix into the CBA.  Pursuant to Article 46.01 of the CBA, to 
qualify as an appendix or amendment to the CBA, the matrix had to be signed by 
both the city and the OPBA.  It was not. 
{¶ 26} Finally, the city’s reliance on Klein’s decision is misplaced because 
he did not reach the issue whether the OPBA had agreed to the matrix but instead 
took issue with the city’s arbitrary application of the matrix and the city’s decision 
to depart from it without justification. 
{¶ 27} Although nothing in the CBA precludes the city from using the 
matrix as a guide in imposing discipline, treating the matrix as binding on the 
arbitrator would conflict with the just cause requirement for discipline that the city 
and the OPBA negotiated into the CBA and as in SORTA, would undermine the 
integrity of the entire collective bargaining process. 
{¶ 28} Because the parties did not specifically bargain for the matrix and 
incorporate it into the CBA, Mancini had authority to review the appropriateness 
of the disciplinary action imposed in this matter and broad authority to fashion a 
remedy.  His choice of remedy does not conflict with the express terms of the CBA, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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is rationally derived from the terms of the agreement, and is not arbitrary, 
capricious, or unlawful.  Therefore, the arbitration award draws its essence from 
the CBA. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 29} Any limitation on an arbitrator’s authority to modify a disciplinary 
action pursuant to a CBA provision requiring that discipline be imposed only for 
just cause must be specifically bargained for by the parties and incorporated into 
the CBA.  Here, the CBA placed no limitation on the arbitrator’s authority to review 
the disciplinary action imposed and fashion a remedy.  Because Mancini’s award 
draws its essence from the CBA and because he acted within his authority, we 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, reinstate the award, and remand this 
matter to the common pleas court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Judgment reversed,  
arbitration award reinstated,  
and cause remanded. 
KENNEDY, FRENCH, O’NEILL, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 30} I dissent.  I would hold that this court improvidently accepted the 
discretionary appeal and would dismiss the cause. 
{¶ 31} We accepted the following proposition of law: “Any limitation on 
an arbitrator’s ability to review and modify disciplinary action under the ‘just 
cause’ standard must be specifically bargained for by the parties and contained 
within the four corners of the collective bargaining agreement.”  See 144 Ohio St.3d 
1475, 2016-Ohio-467, 45 N.E.3d 243.  I dissented from the decision to accept 
jurisdiction.  And after consideration of the parties’ briefs and oral argument, it is 
January Term, 2017 
 
13 
even more clear that we accepted the appeal in error.  Appellants, David Hill and 
the Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (“OPBA”), ask us only to interpret a 
contract based on well-settled contract law.  Moreover, appellants ask us to do so 
on a record that contains very little evidence. 
{¶ 32} In their merit brief, appellants admit that “the Eighth District 
correctly recited the applicable law and properly framed the issue in dispute 
between the parties,” before asking us to correct an error they perceive in the court 
of appeals’ application of that law: the finding that the arbitrator exceeded his 
authority under the collective-bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the OPBA 
and the city by fashioning a remedy outside of the city’s discipline matrix.  The 
crux of appellants’ argument is that the discipline matrix had not been incorporated 
into the CBA and thus did not limit the arbitrator’s authority to fashion a remedy. 
{¶ 33} Appellants are correct that the law is already clear on the issues 
inherently raised in their proposition.  The Ohio Constitution charges us to exercise 
our discretionary jurisdiction in “cases of public or great general interest,” Article 
IV, Section 2(B)(2)(e), and this case presents neither.  As a court of last resort, it is 
not our role to consider allegations that a lower court has erred in applying 
established law but, rather, to set forth legal interpretations to guide the lower 
courts.  See State v. Noling, 136 Ohio St.3d 163, 2013-Ohio-1764, 992 N.E.2d 
1095, ¶ 63 (O’Donnell, J., dissenting) (“[W]e are not an error-correcting court; 
rather, our role as the court of last resort is to clarify confusing constitutional 
questions, resolve uncertainties in the law, and address issues of public or great 
general interest * * *.  Significantly, appellate courts consider assignments of error, 
while this court considers propositions of law.  The two are materially and 
substantively different”). 
{¶ 34} We have previously interpreted the law at issue in this case and have 
held that “ ‘[t]he arbitrator is confined to the interpretation and application of the 
collective bargaining agreement, and although he may construe ambiguous contract 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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language, he is without authority to disregard or modify plain and unambiguous 
provisions.’ ”  Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civil Serv. Emps. Assn., 
Local 11, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 59 Ohio St.3d 177, 180, 572 N.E.2d 71 (1991), 
quoting Detroit Coil Co. v. Internatl. Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 
Lodge No. 82, 594 F.2d 575, 579 (6th Cir.1979).  It is also well settled that “[w]here 
an arbitrator’s decision draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, 
and in the absence of language in the agreement that would restrict such review, the 
arbitrator, after determining that there was just cause to discipline an employee, has 
the authority to review the appropriateness of the type of discipline imposed.”  Bd. 
of Trustees of Miami Twp. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc., 
81 Ohio St.3d 269, 690 N.E.2d 1262 (1998), syllabus.  Any further legal 
pronouncements are unnecessary, and we should not entertain the invitation to 
consider whether a lower court incorrectly applied settled law. 
{¶ 35} But even if the law were unsettled, this case is not a proper vehicle 
to address the proposition.  The record lacks sufficient evidence to enable this court 
to determine whether the discipline matrix was incorporated into the CBA.  
Although counsel for appellants argued in her opening statement at the arbitration 
hearing that “this so-called matrix * * * is not a part of any collective bargaining 
agreement,” appellants offered no testimony to support that assertion.  However, 
one of the city’s witnesses testified that the union had used the matrix to negotiate 
a reduction in the disciplinary action imposed in another officer’s case and that Hill 
actually had helped negotiate the matrix, a fact that he did not dispute. 
{¶ 36} Moreover, Hill previously used the discipline matrix to his 
advantage.  In an earlier arbitration involving Hill, the arbitrator reduced Hill’s 
discipline from a 30-day suspension to a 10-day suspension, finding that the matrix 
permitted only a 10-day suspension.  The arbitrator in the prior case noted that 
“[a]lthough the Union asserted at the hearing that it never agreed to the City’s 
Discipline Matrix, * * * the record in this case is not sufficiently developed as it 
January Term, 2017 
 
15 
concerns a challenge to the reasonableness of the matrix itself, as opposed to its 
application in this case.”  The arbitrator of the present grievance assumed that the 
matrix was applicable but reduced the recommended disciplinary action because he 
found that the city failed to prove all its allegations against Hill and had failed to 
establish that it was justified in terminating him. 
{¶ 37} Although the record lacks any testimony that the discipline matrix 
had been incorporated into the CBA, it is also devoid of testimony that it had not 
been.  The majority nevertheless bases its decision on this issue that was not 
litigated below. 
{¶ 38} Finally, the majority’s conclusion that “[a]ny limitation on an 
arbitrator’s authority to modify a disciplinary action pursuant to a CBA provision 
requiring that discipline be imposed only for just cause must be specifically 
bargained for by the parties and incorporated into the CBA,” majority opinion at  
¶ 29, is overbroad and may have unintended consequences.  This conclusion 
violates at least one longstanding tenet of labor law—that “[t]he labor arbitrator’s 
source of law is not confined to the express provisions of the contract, as the 
industrial common law—the practices of the industry and the shop—is equally a 
part of the collective bargaining agreement although not expressed in it,” United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-582, 80 
S.Ct 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); see also Assn. of Cleveland Fire Fighters, Local 
93 of the Intl. Assn. of Fire Fighters v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 476, 2003-Ohio-
4278, 793 N.E.2d 484, ¶ 16, 19 (recognizing that past practice may be binding on 
parties to a CBA in certain circumstances, even when the practice is not set forth in 
the CBA).  By acceding to appellants’ proposition that “[a]ny limitation on an 
arbitrator’s ability to review and modify disciplinary action under the ‘just cause’ 
standard must be specifically bargained for by the parties and contained within the 
four corners of the collective bargaining agreement,” the majority opinion may 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
prevent an employer from relying on past practice as the basis for a disciplinary 
action. 
{¶ 39} Past practice may be binding, even if it is not set forth in a CBA, and 
could limit an arbitrator’s ability to modify a disciplinary action.  For instance, an 
employer may claim that it disciplined an employee according to its uncontested 
practice of imposing the same disciplinary action for a similar violation over a 
period of years.  Under the majority opinion, even if the employer establishes a past 
practice, the arbitrator could modify the discipline if the employee shows that the 
practice had not been specifically bargained for and incorporated into the CBA, 
upending labor law that has been settled for decades.  Without the development of 
facts regarding the full extent of the terms of the CBA here, the majority creates an 
unnecessary rule to reach a particular result. 
{¶ 40} For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would hold that the 
discretionary appeal was improvidently accepted. 
_________________ 
Joseph M. Hegedus and Daniel J. Leffler, for appellants. 
Allain Legal, Ltd., William F. Schmitz, and Eric M. Allain, for appellee. 
Paul L. Cox, urging reversal for amicus curiae Fraternal Order of Police of 
Ohio, Inc. 
R. Brian Moriarty and Marisa L. Serrat, urging reversal for amici curiae 
Cleveland Police Patrolmen’s Association, Toledo Police Patrolman’s Association, 
and Dayton Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 44. 
Greg Gordillo, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Employment 
Lawyers Association. 
_________________