Title: State ex rel. Omni Energy Group, LLC v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil & Gas Resources Management

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Omni Energy Group, L.L.C. v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, Div. of Oil & Gas 
Resources Mgt., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5581.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-5581 
THE STATE EX REL. OMNI ENERGY GROUP, L.L.C. v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES, DIVISION OF OIL AND GAS RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Omni Energy Group, L.L.C. v. Ohio Dept. of 
Natural Resources, Div. of Oil & Gas Resources Mgt., Slip Opinion No.  
2020-Ohio-5581.] 
Public utilities—Oil and gas—Salt-water-injection wells—Drilling permits—Ohio 
Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06—Mandamus—Division chief has clear legal duty 
to determine, forthwith, whether objections to applications are relevant 
and/or substantive. 
(No. 2020-0528—Submitted September 9, 2020—Decided December 9, 2020.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 1} In this original action, relator, Omni Energy Group, L.L.C., seeks a writ 
of mandamus against respondents, the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, 
Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management; department director Mary Mertz; 
and division chief Eric Vendel, to compel Vendel to render decisions on two 
saltwater-injection-well-permit applications.  We grant a writ of mandamus, but 
instead of ordering Vendel to immediately render a decision on the applications, we 
order him to rule upon the validity of the objections that have been submitted 
concerning Omni’s applications.  That ruling will determine whether Vendel must 
issue the permits or hold a hearing on the applications.  We deny the writ as to the 
division and as to Mertz. 
Background 
{¶ 2} In March 2019, Omni filed applications with the division to drill two 
saltwater-injection wells in Belmont County.  Under R.C. 1509.02, the division has 
exclusive authority to regulate the permitting and operation of saltwater-injection 
wells in Ohio.  Vendel, the chief of the division, is responsible for issuing or denying 
the permits.  See R.C. 1509.06 and 1509.22; Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06. 
{¶ 3} Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06(H) establishes four basic phases in the 
saltwater-injection-well-application process: first, the division verifies that the 
application is complete; second, the applicant gives public notice; third, the division 
receives comments and objections from the public; and fourth, the division chief 
issues or denies the permit.  The first three phases are not at issue here—Omni’s 
applications were complete as to form, Omni gave public notice, and the division 
received about 100 comments and objections opposing the applications. 
{¶ 4} As to the fourth phase, when an objection is timely received, before 
issuing or denying a permit, the division chief “shall rule upon the validity of the 
objection.”  Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06(H)(2)(c).  If the division chief finds that 
no objection is “relevant to the issues of public health or safety, or to good 
conservation practices, or is without substance, a permit shall be issued.”  Id.  But if 
January Term, 2020 
 
3
the division chief finds that an objection is relevant or presents a substantive issue, 
“a hearing shall be called within thirty days of receipt of the objection.”  Id.  After a 
hearing is held, the division chief may either issue or deny the permit.  Ohio 
Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06(H)(2)(d).  When no hearing is held, the division chief is 
required to issue the permit within 21 days after the applicant filed its proof of public 
notice.  Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06(H)(3).  When there is a hearing, the division 
chief is required to issue or deny the permit within 30 days after the completion of 
the hearing.  Id. 
{¶ 5} In this case, based on a public comment it had received, the division 
requested additional information from Omni because the proposed wells would be 
drilled through an abandoned underground coal mine.  By the end of January 2020, 
Omni had given the division the additional information it had requested—namely, a 
technical study of the issue certified by a professional engineer.  Respondents 
acknowledge that all issues concerning the abandoned coal mine have been resolved.  
The division has not asked Omni for any other additional information, nor has it 
scheduled a hearing on the applications or indicated that one will be necessary.  But 
the division does plan to hold a “public meeting” concerning the applications.  
Respondents concede that neither the Revised Code nor the Ohio Administrative 
Code requires a public meeting and that a “meeting” is not a “hearing” under Ohio 
Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06(H). 
{¶ 6} After the COVID-19 pandemic made an in-person public meeting 
impossible, the division announced that it would hold an online public meeting on 
April 10, 2020.  But on April 8, Robert Murray sued the Department of Natural 
Resources in the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas, seeking a temporary 
restraining order to prevent the online meeting.  Murray’s company, Murray Energy 
Corporation, had objected to Omni’s applications, and Murray wants the public 
meeting to be held in-person, not virtually.  The common pleas court issued a 
temporary restraining order enjoining the virtual meeting, and as of the submission 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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of the evidence in this case, an injunction remained in place.  In the course of the 
Belmont County case, the Department of Natural Resources has acknowledged that 
a public meeting is not a required part of the permitting process. 
{¶ 7} The division chief has not rendered a decision on Omni’s applications.  
On April 20, 2020, Omni filed a complaint against the division, Vendel, and Mertz, 
seeking a writ of mandamus compelling them to either issue or deny the permits.  In 
its complaint, Omni also requested an order staying the Belmont County case and an 
award of damages, costs, and attorney fees.  We granted an alternative writ on July 
10.  159 Ohio St.3d 1442, 2020-Ohio-3678, 149 N.E.3d 511. 
Analysis 
{¶ 8} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Omni must establish by clear and 
convincing evidence (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal 
duty on the part of respondents to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 
2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6, 13. 
Omni has a clear legal right to—and the division chief has a clear legal duty to 
provide—a ruling on the validity of the objections submitted against the 
applications 
{¶ 9} Respondents do not dispute that the division chief ultimately must 
decide whether or not to issue the permits.  They argue, however, that the division 
chief does not presently have a clear legal duty to make the decision, because he plans 
to first hold a public meeting. 
{¶ 10} Respondents contend that in seeking to compel an immediate decision 
without a public meeting, Omni really is trying to strictly enforce the timeframes 
established under Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06(H)—and to force the division chief 
to issue the permits simply because he did not timely deny them.  But respondents 
mischaracterize Omni’s argument.  Contrary to what respondents suggest, Omni does 
not question the division chief’s continuing discretionary authority over the 
January Term, 2020 
 
5
applications.  In fact, in its briefs, Omni repeatedly requests an order requiring the 
division chief to immediately render a decision either issuing or denying the permits.  
Respondents’ argument concerning strict enforcement of the statutory and regulatory 
deadlines, therefore, is irrelevant to the main issue we must decide. 
{¶ 11} The issue before us is whether Omni has a clear legal right to have the 
division chief immediately proceed to a decision on the applications and whether the 
division chief has a corresponding duty to do so.  Waters, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-
Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, at ¶ 6.  Respondents argue that the division chief is not 
required to make a decision at this time because it is reasonable, and within his 
discretion, to conduct a comprehensive review and hold a public meeting “to be fully 
transparent and to satisfy local public interests.” 
{¶ 12} There are two aspects to this argument.  Respondents first point to 
multiple technical issues unique to Omni’s proposed wells—e.g., their proximity to 
abandoned coal mines, wetlands, and Interstate 70—to emphasize the need for a 
thorough review.  But the evidence suggests that these issues have been addressed 
and resolved, and respondents do not argue otherwise.  So even if the division chief 
has needed additional time to thoroughly review Omni’s applications, respondents 
have not shown that he needs yet more time for additional review. 
{¶ 13} Respondents also argue that the division chief has discretion to hold a 
meeting before he makes his decision “to provide a final meaningful opportunity for 
the public to give their input on the applications.”  Although they concede that no 
statute or rule provides for such a meeting, respondents cite Redman v. Dept. of Indus. 
Relations, 75 Ohio St.3d 399, 662 N.E.2d 352 (1996), in support of their claim that 
the division chief may implement whatever review process he deems proper.  The 
issue in Redman was whether a statute that did not provide precise standards to guide 
regulatory decision-making was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
authority.  Id. at 403.  In rejecting the constitutional challenge, we applied an 
“impracticability exception” that allows an administrative decision-maker to exercise 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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discretion in applying certain police-power regulations that necessarily require 
flexibility in their application.  Id. at 405, 409-410. 
{¶ 14} Respondents’ invocation of the impracticability exception in this case 
is misplaced.  To begin, the exception arises when there is a question whether 
legislative authority has been unconstitutionally delegated.  Omni does not challenge 
the division chief’s discretionary authority; in fact, Omni seeks to compel the division 
chief to exercise his discretion.  Moreover, even if the exception were relevant, it 
does not support respondents’ claim that the division chief is free to add requirements 
to existing administrative procedures that the division itself established.  See R.C. 
1509.22(C) (requiring the division chief to “establish procedures and requirements 
in accordance with which a person shall apply for a permit or order for the storage, 
recycling, treatment, processing, or disposal of brine”). 
{¶ 15} Respondents argue that circumstances beyond their control—the 
pandemic and the temporary restraining order—have delayed the completion of the 
application process.  But in truth, their insistence on a public meeting is to blame.  
Because no legal authority calls for such a meeting, the division chief has a clear legal 
duty to immediately proceed with the application process.  See State ex rel. Athens 
Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Gallia, Jackson, Meigs, Vinton Joint Solid Waste Mgt. Dist. 
Bd. of Dirs., 75 Ohio St.3d 611, 614, 665 N.E.2d 202 (1996) (“although a writ of 
mandamus cannot issue to control a public body’s exercise of discretion, it can be 
issued to compel the public body to exercise such discretion when it has a clear legal 
duty to do so”); State ex rel. Pipoly v. State Teachers Retirement Sys., 95 Ohio St.3d 
327, 2002-Ohio-2219, 767 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 18 (recognizing that an administrative rule 
adopted pursuant to legislative authority may provide the basis for a clear legal duty 
and a clear legal right in a mandamus case). 
{¶ 16} But the specific relief Omni seeks—an order requiring the division 
chief to immediately render a decision either granting or denying the permits—is 
premature.  Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06(H)(2)(c) provides that when an objection 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
is submitted concerning an application, the division chief “shall rule upon the validity 
of the objection.”  Such a ruling involves a determination of whether the objection is 
“relevant to the issues of public health or safety, or to good conservation practices” 
or whether the objection “ha[s] substance.”  Id.  If an objection is relevant or 
substantive, the division chief must hold a hearing, but if an objection is not relevant 
or substantive, “a permit shall be issued.”  Id.  No evidence shows that the division 
chief has ruled upon the validity of the objections as required under Ohio Adm.Code 
1501:9-3-06(H)(2)(c).  The division chief’s only existing clear legal duty, therefore, 
is to make that threshold determination.  That ruling, in turn, will dictate whether he 
must issue the permits or schedule a hearing.  See Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-
06(H)(2)(c). 
{¶ 17} This raises the question whether the division chief can still hold a 
hearing now that the deadline for scheduling one has passed.  Ohio Adm.Code 
1501:9-3-06(H)(2)(c) provides that if the division chief considers an objection to be 
relevant or substantive, “a hearing shall be called within thirty days of receipt of 
the objection.”  The last day to object to Omni’s applications was July 30, 2019, so 
under this rule, any hearing should have been called no later than August 29, 2019. 
{¶ 18} Generally, when a provision “directs certain actions with [a] view to 
the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of public business,” it is construed as 
directory.  State ex rel. Jones v. Farrar, 146 Ohio St. 467, 472, 66 N.E.2d 531 
(1946).  This rule applies “unless the nature of the act to be performed or the 
phraseology of the [provision] is such that the designation of time must be 
considered a limitation upon the power of the officer.”  State ex rel. Smith v. 
Barnell, 109 Ohio St. 246, 255, 142 N.E. 611 (1924).  “The use of the word ‘shall’ 
to institute the deadline does not change this.”  In re Application of Columbus S. 
Power Co., 128 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-1788, 947 N.E.2d 655, ¶ 38. 
{¶ 19} Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06(H)(2)(c) does not express any intent to 
deprive the division chief of the authority to call a hearing after 30 days from the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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receipt of an objection.  Because the 30-day deadline is a time restriction on the 
performance of an official duty, it is directory.  Therefore, if the division chief finds 
that a timely submitted objection to Omni’s applications is relevant or substantive, 
the failure to comply with Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06(H)(2)(c)’s deadline for 
calling a hearing does not deprive the division chief of his authority to conduct a 
hearing, nor will it prevent him, after a hearing, from either issuing or denying the 
permits. 
Omni lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law 
{¶ 20} Omni seeks to compel the division chief to carry out his duties under 
Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06.  Because an action for a mandatory injunction to 
compel a public official to perform a duty is itself an extraordinary remedy, Omni 
does not have an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. 
Levin v. Schremp, 73 Ohio St.3d 733, 735, 654 N.E.2d 1258 (1995).  “[U]nderlying 
public duties having their basis in law may be compelled by a writ of mandamus.”  
Id. 
{¶ 21} Although respondents suggest that Omni has an adequate remedy at 
law, they do not identify an alternative legal remedy that Omni could have pursued.  
They instead seem to argue that Omni does not need to compel the division chief to 
act, because he intends to complete the application process once he is allowed to hold 
a public meeting, either in-person or online.  But as explained, the division chief lacks 
authority to delay the application process for a public meeting to be held.  
Respondents have not shown that Omni has an adequate remedy at law. 
{¶ 22} Amicus curiae, Residents to Protect Eastern Ohio, L.L.C.,1 also 
contends that Omni has an adequate remedy at law.  It first argues that Omni will 
                                                 
1. According to its brief, Residents to Protect Eastern Ohio “is a nonprofit limited liability company 
whose members include the Richland Township Trustees, Belmont County Commissioners, and 
citizens of Ohio who share a common interest in promoting and protecting the local community 
from any environmental and/or public health and safety matters, including ensuring good 
conservation practices are occurring.”  The company was formed by Robert Murray.   
January Term, 2020 
 
9
have the right to an administrative appeal if the division chief denies the permits.  But 
the possibility of an administrative appeal does not show that Omni has an adequate 
remedy—without a decision, there is nothing to appeal.  Residents to Protect Eastern 
Ohio next argues that Omni can obtain relief in the common pleas court now that it 
has intervened in the Belmont County case.  But as just explained, the relief that 
Omni could obtain in the common pleas court would be in the form of a mandatory 
injunction, which is not an ordinary remedy.  Finally, Residents to Protect Eastern 
Ohio argues that Omni “is merely seeking an injunction specifically prohibiting 
ODNR from holding a public meeting.”  This argument misconstrues what Omni is 
trying to accomplish; Omni clearly seeks to compel the division chief to carry out 
his duties.  Residents to Protect Eastern Ohio also has not shown that Omni has an 
adequate remedy at law. 
Omni has abandoned its requests for additional relief 
{¶ 23} In its complaint, Omni prayed for a stay of the Belmont County case 
and an award of damages, costs, and attorney fees.  But Omni failed to present any 
argument in its merit brief supporting these requests.  Omni therefore has abandoned 
its requests for additional relief.  See State ex rel. Cleveland Right to Life v. Ohio 
Controlling Bd., 138 Ohio St.3d 57, 2013-Ohio-5632, 3 N.E.3d 185, ¶ 1 (lead 
opinion). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 24} Because Omni has not suggested a basis for granting a writ of 
mandamus as to the division or to Mertz, we deny the writ as to those respondents.  
But we grant a writ of mandamus as to Vendel and order him to determine, forthwith, 
whether any objections submitted concerning Omni’s applications are relevant 
and/or substantive. 
Writ granted in part  
and denied in part. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., 
concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DEWINE, J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 25} Because respondent Eric Vendel, the chief of the Ohio Department 
of Natural Resources’ Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management, has failed 
to comply with his clear statutory duty to either grant or deny the drilling-permit 
applications submitted by relator, Omni Energy Group, L.L.C., within 30 days of 
the filing of those applications, I would grant a writ of mandamus to compel Vendel 
to issue an order granting or denying the applications.  The majority does not, and 
I therefore dissent. 
{¶ 26} R.C. 1509.02 grants the division exclusive authority to regulate the 
permitting and operation of saltwater-injection wells in Ohio.  R.C. 1509.05 
prohibits the drilling of a new saltwater-injection well without the owner first 
obtaining a permit from the division.  The permitting process for a new saltwater-
injection well is set forth in R.C. 1509.06.  R.C. 1509.06(C)(2) provides, “[T]he 
chief shall issue a permit for a well or proposed well within an urbanized area within 
thirty days of the filing of the application unless the chief denies the application by 
order.”  Nothing in R.C. 1509.06 gives the chief discretion to disregard the 30-day 
time limit, although R.C. 1509.06(F) guides the chief’s review of a permit 
application: 
 
The chief shall issue an order denying a permit if the chief finds that 
there is a substantial risk that the operation will result in violations 
of this chapter or rules adopted under it that will present an imminent 
danger to public health or safety or damage to the environment, 
provided that where the chief finds that terms or conditions to the 
January Term, 2020 
 
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permit can reasonably be expected to prevent such violations, the 
chief shall issue the permit subject to those terms or conditions, 
including, if applicable, terms and conditions regarding subjects 
identified in rules adopted under section 1509.03 of the Revised 
Code. 
 
{¶ 27} A separate statute regulates the operation of a saltwater-injection 
well.  R.C. 1509.22(D)(1) prohibits the injection of brine or waste from oil and gas 
drilling, exploration, or production without a permit issued by the chief (unless a 
rule of the chief expressly authorizes injection without a permit).  The permit 
required by R.C. 1509.22(D)(1) is “in addition to any permit required by section 
1509.05 of the Revised Code” for drilling a new well. 
{¶ 28} R.C. 1509.03(A) grants the chief general authority to promulgate 
“rules for the administration, implementation, and enforcement of this chapter.”  
But R.C. 1509.22(C) also specifically requires the chief to adopt rules that 
“establish procedures and requirements in accordance with which a person shall 
apply for a permit or order for the storage, recycling, treatment, processing, or 
disposal of brine and other waste substances that are not subject to a permit issued 
under section 1509.06 or 1509.21 of the Revised Code.” 
{¶ 29} Therefore, the General Assembly has created one permitting process 
for drilling a saltwater-injection well and another for operating it.  It has also 
provided a specific statutory procedure to be followed for the review of an 
application to drill a new well—including deadlines for granting or denying the 
application—while delegating to the chief the authority to establish the procedure 
for reviewing an application for operating a saltwater-injection well. 
{¶ 30} As a division of a state agency and a creature of statute, see R.C. 
1509.02, the division is limited to the powers conferred on it by statute, see State 
ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. v. State, 146 Ohio St.3d 315, 2016-Ohio-478, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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56 N.E.3d 913, ¶ 51.  Administrative agencies possess only the rule-making power 
that is delegated to them by the General Assembly, and any administrative rule that 
is contrary to a statute is invalid.  See MacDonald v. Cleveland Income Tax Bd. of 
Rev., 151 Ohio St.3d 114, 2017-Ohio-7798, 86 N.E.3d 314, ¶ 24; Athens Home Tel. 
Co. v. Peck, 158 Ohio St. 557, 562, 110 N.E.2d 571 (1953). 
{¶ 31} Under R.C. 1509.06(C)(2), the chief has 30 days to grant or deny the 
application for a permit to drill a saltwater-injection well.  An administrative rule 
extending that 30-day period to provide for additional notice, objections, and a 
hearing on a drilling-permit application would conflict with the statute and be 
invalid.  The issue, then, is whether Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06(H) impermissibly 
extends the 30-day time period. 
{¶ 32} The chief promulgated Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06 to establish a 
permit-application process for “[a]ny person who proposes to construct, convert to, 
or operate a brine injection well.”  It therefore purports to apply to both the drilling 
and the operation of a saltwater-injection well.  The rule provides for notice, public 
comment, and a hearing before the chief decides whether to grant or deny the 
application for a drilling permit. 
{¶ 33} The rule allows the chief 15 days to review and verify that the 
application is complete, and it requires the applicant to then provide proof of notice 
to the public and affected landowners within 30 days of verification of the 
application.  Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06(H)(1).  Objections to the application 
may be sent within 15 days from the filing of the proof of notice.  Id.  Ohio 
Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06(H)(2)(c) provides that if the division receives an objection 
to an application that the chief considers to be “relevant to the issues of public 
health or safety, or to good conservation practices, or to have substance, a hearing 
shall be called within thirty days of receipt of the objection.”  The chief then must 
review the objection, the evidence, and the application and either grant or deny the 
application within 30 days of the hearing.  Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06(H)(2)(c) 
January Term, 2020 
 
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and (3).  If no hearing is conducted, the chief must grant or deny the application 
within 21 days of the applicant filing proof of public notice.  Ohio Adm.Code 
1501:9-3-06(H)(3). 
{¶ 34} Although R.C. 1509.06(C)(2) requires the chief to approve or deny 
the application for a drilling permit within 30 days of its filing, Ohio Adm.Code 
1501:9-3-06(H) extends that time.  The chief has 15 days to review the application, 
the applicant then has 30 days to provide proof of public notice, and the public then 
has another 15 days to object to the application.  If no objection is filed, or if the 
objection does not require a hearing, the chief must grant or deny the application 
within 21 days, creating a processing time of up to 81 days.  If a valid objection is 
filed within the 15-day objection period, the chief has 30 days from receipt of the 
objection to call a hearing and then an additional 30 days from the date of the 
hearing to grant or deny the permit, allowing the chief up to 120 days to process 
the application. 
{¶ 35} “[W]here the language of [a statute] is plain and unambiguous it is 
the duty of the court to give it the effect required by the plain and ordinary 
signification of the words used.”  Marqua v. Martin, 109 Ohio St. 56, 62-63, 141 
N.E. 654 (1923).  R.C. 1509.06(C)(2)’s plain meaning creates a duty on the part of 
the chief to grant or deny a drilling-permit application within 30 days.  Because 
Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06(H) impermissibly extends the 30-day period 
mandated by the statute, it is invalid to that extent. 
{¶ 36} Omni filed its drilling-permit applications on March 22, 2019, and it 
brought this mandamus action more than a year later, on April 20, 2020.  Yet even 
now, more than a year and a half after the filing of the two applications, the chief 
has still not complied with the duty to either grant or deny them within 30 days. 
{¶ 37} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a relator must establish (1) a 
clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of a 
respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
14 
course of the law.  State ex rel. Maxcy v. Saferin, 155 Ohio St.3d 496, 2018-Ohio-
4035, 122 N.E.3d 1165, ¶ 24. 
{¶ 38} R.C. 1509.06(C)(2) creates a clear legal right for an applicant to 
receive a decision on its application for a drilling permit within 30 days of filing, 
and it imposes a clear legal duty on the part of the chief to either grant or deny that 
application within the 30-day time period.  And as the majority holds, there is no 
adequate remedy at law to compel the chief to comply with this duty.  Therefore, 
mandamus will lie to enforce the 30-day time period established by R.C. 
1509.06(C)(2). 
{¶ 39} Here, the chief has not issued an order either granting or denying 
those applications even though more than 30 days have passed.  No statute permits 
the chief to delay issuing that order until he or she has conducted a hearing or, as 
in this case, after a public meeting has been held.  Omni has a clear legal right to a 
decision on its drilling-permit applications, the chief had and continues to have a 
clear legal duty to issue an order granting or denying them, and Omni specifically 
requests that relief. 
{¶ 40} It is not the province of this court to second-guess the General 
Assembly’s public-policy decision to grant the chief only 30 days to decide whether 
to grant or deny a drilling-permit application.  If that time period is insufficient for 
the chief to review applications, then it is the prerogative of the General Assembly 
alone to grant additional time for review.  However, as the law of this state currently 
stands, an applicant has the right to a decision on its request for a drilling permit 
within 30 days, and that right may be enforced through an action in mandamus.  
Whether the applicant may agree to allow the chief more time to review the 
application is a question that does not require an answer today. 
{¶ 41} For these reasons, I would grant the requested writ of mandamus 
compelling the chief of the Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management to 
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
either grant or deny Omni’s applications for drilling permits.  Because the majority 
denies that relief, I dissent. 
 
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Gagin Legal Services, L.L.C., and Christopher J. Gagin, for relator. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Daniel J. Martin and William S. Myers, 
Assistant Attorneys General, for respondents. 
Shaheen Law Group, L.L.C., Michael J. Shaheen, and Kristina S. Herman, 
urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae, Residents to Protect Eastern Ohio, 
L.L.C. 
_________________