Title: Roy v. Palmateer

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  December 1, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
RAYMOND FRANCIS ROY,
Respondent on Review,
v.
JOAN PALMATEER,
Superintendent,
Oregon State Penitentiary,
Petitioner on Review.
STATE ex rel RAYMOND FRANCIS ROY,
Respondent on Review,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 00C20058, 01C19972; CA A116149 (Control),
CA A117045;  SC S51941)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 7, 2005.
Erika L. Hadlock, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for petitioners on review.  With
her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Bear Wilner-Nugent, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
response and brief for respondent on review. 
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
cases are remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Joseph C. Guimond, Judge. 194 Or App 330, 95 P3d 1124 (2004).
BALMER, J.
This case requires us to determine whether plaintiff,
an inmate, is entitled to immediate release on habeas corpus
because the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (board)
has determined that he is "likely to be rehabilitated within a
reasonable period of time."  ORS 163.105(3) (1983).  The Court of
Appeals agreed with plaintiff that he is entitled to immediate
release.  We conclude, however, that the Court of Appeals erred
in its reading of this court's prior cases and the applicable
statutes.  We therefore reverse and remand the case to the Court
of Appeals for further proceedings.
Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
naming as defendant the superintendent of the Oregon State
Penitentiary, where he is confined.  He argued that, because the
board had found that he was likely to be rehabilitated within a
reasonable time, the superintendent should release him
immediately.  As we describe in greater detail below, plaintiff
later filed a petition for an alternative writ of mandamus
against the board, making the same argument that he made in his
habeas corpus petition.  The trial court ruled against plaintiff
on both petitions.  Plaintiff appealed those separate judgments. 
The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals for argument and
decision and reversed the judgment in the habeas corpus case. 
Roy v. Palmateer, 194 Or App 330, 95 P3d 1124 (2004).  We allowed
the state's petition for review and, as noted, now reverse. (1)
The facts that give rise to the present case are
undisputed.  In 1984, plaintiff was convicted of aggravated
murder, a crime that he had committed earlier that year.  See ORS
163.095 (1983) (describing aggravated murder).  The trial court
sentenced plaintiff to life in prison.  Under ORS 163.105(2)
(1983), plaintiff had to serve 20 years of that sentence without
the possibility of parole or work release.  In December 1999,
plaintiff asked the board to hold a hearing pursuant to ORS
163.105(3) (1983) to determine whether he was "likely to be
rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time."  On
February 15, 2000, the board made that finding.  The board then
converted plaintiff's term of confinement to life imprisonment
with the possibility of parole, as ORS 163.105(4) (1983)
required, and set a projected parole release date of May 18,
2004. (2)
In November 2000, plaintiff filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.  He argued that, under this court's decision in
Norris v. Board of Parole, 331 Or 194, 13 P3d 104 (2000), he was
entitled to release as of February 15, 2000, the date on which
the board found him capable of rehabilitation.  The state moved
to dismiss on the grounds that a writ of habeas corpus was an
inappropriate procedure to challenge the board's failure to order
immediate release, and the trial court dismissed the petition. 
In December 2001, plaintiff petitioned for an alternative writ of
mandamus, again asserting his claim that Norris required his
release as of the date that the board determined he was capable
of rehabilitation. (3)  The trial court denied the petition for
a writ of mandamus.  Plaintiff appealed the adverse judgments in
both the habeas corpus and mandamus actions to the Court of
Appeals.
On appeal, the state conceded that the trial court had
erred in concluding that habeas corpus relief was not the proper
remedy for plaintiff's claimed deprivation but, on the merits,
argued that plaintiff was not entitled to immediate release.  The
Court of Appeals, however, accepted plaintiff's argument that
Norris, when applied to the facts of plaintiff's case, required
his immediate release on parole. (4)  Roy, 194 Or App at 342-43.  Judge Armstrong dissented as to the majority's treatment of
Norris, arguing that the majority had misread that opinion.  Id.
at 344-48 (Armstrong, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).  As noted, we granted review and now reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
In Norris, this court construed the 1977 version of ORS
163.105, which is not materially different from the 1983 version
of that statute that is at issue here. (5)  Norris involved an
inmate (Norris) who had been convicted of two counts of
aggravated murder and sentenced to two consecutive life terms. 
Norris's minimum term of incarceration under each sentence was 20
years.  In response to Norris's petition under ORS 163.105(3)
(1977), the board found that Norris was likely to be
rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time.  The board,
however, did not convert Norris's first life sentence to life
with the possibility of parole.  The Court of Appeals reversed,
and the board sought review in this court.  Before this court,
the board argued that ORS 163.105(4) (1977) required it to make
two independent findings before it could change the terms of an
inmate's confinement:  first, that an inmate was capable of
rehabilitation and, second, that the inmate's sentence should be
converted to life with the possibility of parole.  331 Or at 200,
202-03.  Because the board had not made the second finding, it
argued, it neither was required nor permitted to modify Norris's
sentence.  Alternatively, the board argued that, if it was
required to convert an inmate's life sentence to life with the
possibility of parole, the inmate nevertheless would remain
subject to his minimum sentences.  Id. at 203.  The board then
would have the authority to override those sentences after a
parole consideration hearing, pursuant to ORS 144.120 (1977),
which would allow the board to consider a variety of factors to
determine if the inmate should be paroled.  Id. 
After examining the text and context of ORS 163.105
(1977), this court held, among other things, that the only
finding that the parole board must make in a rehabilitation
hearing is whether the inmate is capable of rehabilitation.  The
court concluded that "the legislature intended that * * * the
[b]oard must find only whether the prisoner is capable of
rehabilitation" and, once having made that finding, "the [b]oard
must change the first of petitioner's life sentences to life with
the possibility of parole or work release."  Norris, 331 Or at
207-08.  The court then ruled that Norris began serving his
second life sentence on the date that the board had made its
finding that he was capable of rehabilitation as to his first
sentence.  This court stated:
"[T]he [b]oard must change the first of
petitioner's life sentences to life with the
possibility of parole or work release.  Petitioner is
entitled to have that change occur retroactively to
January 26, 1994, the date that the [b]oard found him
to be capable of rehabilitation.  On that date,
petitioner began serving his second life sentence with
a 20-year minimum term of confinement for his second
conviction of aggravated murder.  In 2009, 15 years
from the date that he began serving that 20-year
minimum term, petitioner may petition for a
rehabilitation hearing and that hearing also will be
governed by ORS 163.105(3), (4), and (5) (1977).  Only
if the [b]oard again finds that petitioner is capable
of rehabilitation within a reasonable period of time,
must the [b]oard change petitioner's second aggravated
murder sentence to life with the possibility of parole
and work release.  Only at that point would petitioner
become eligible for parole."
Norris, 331 Or at 207-08 (emphasis added).  We turn to the Court
of Appeals' analysis in this case, which relied heavily on the
foregoing passage from Norris. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that Norris stands for
the proposition that "an offender subject to ORS 163.105(3) and
(4) [(1983)] must automatically be released on parole in
connection with the relevant sentence on the date on which the
board finds that the offender is capable of rehabilitation and,
concomitantly, converts the offender's sentence."  Roy, 194 Or
App at 339.  The Court of Appeals also concluded that "the timing
of the offender's parole release is not subject to criteria set
out in otherwise generally applicable statutes and rules relating
to parole release * * *."  194 Or App at 342-43 (emphasis in
original). 
The Court of Appeals majority ascribed significance to
the fact that, in Norris, this court expressly declined to decide
two questions that would arise if the board later found the
inmate in that case to be capable of rehabilitation in connection
with his second life sentence:  (1) whether the parole matrix
criteria would then be applicable, and (2) whether the board had
erred in its previous findings regarding relevant factors under
that matrix.  Roy, 194 Or App at 339-40.  Those are questions
that would not arise if a capable-of-rehabilitation finding
resulted in automatic parole release.  Finally, the Court of
Appeals perceived "some tension" between this court's conclusion
that Norris was entitled to automatic parole release on
conversion of his first sentence and the legislature's use of the
phrase "possibility of parole" in ORS 163.105(4).  Id. at 340. 
In light of the foregoing considerations, the Court of Appeals
concluded:
"We are left, then, with the Norris court's
pronouncement that, on the date that the board made its
finding that the offender was capable of
rehabilitation, the offender began serving his
consecutive sentence.  Whether at odds with other
portions of the opinion or not, the statement is part
of the court's disposition of the case.  We therefore
are constrained not to regard it as mere dictum; to the
contrary, we are bound to follow it."
Roy, 194 Or App at 342. 
In his separate opinion, Judge Armstrong asserted that
the majority had focused on one aspect of Norris that arguably
conflicts with other aspects of the decision without making any
effort to reconcile the conflict and that the majority had failed
to recognize the significance of the fact that Norris was serving
consecutive sentences.  Id. at 344-47 (Armstrong, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).  Judge Armstrong pointed out
that, in Norris, a rehabilitation finding on the second
aggravated murder sentence would have made Norris merely
"eligible" for parole, not entitled to immediate parole.  Id. at
347.  He argued that the seemingly conflicting provisions of
Norris may be harmonized by recognizing that this court had to
pick some date as the starting date for Norris to begin serving
his second sentence.  According to Judge Armstrong, this court in
Norris simply chose the date on which the board had issued its
rehabilitation order as the appropriate date.  Id. at 348.  As a
result, Judge Armstrong reasoned, Norris was not authority for
the majority's conclusion that plaintiff was entitled to be
released on parole.  He articulated what he viewed as the better
approach to applying Norris in the context of this case: 
"I believe that we should apply Norris in a way that is
most consistent with the relevant statutes.  That
application is one that makes people serving aggravated
murder sentences that are subject to ORS 163.105
eligible for parole when the board issues a
rehabilitation order but does not require them to be
paroled when the board issues the order."
Id. at 349 (footnotes omitted).
On review, the state argues that the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that plaintiff is entitled to immediate release
on parole because neither the statute nor the case law compels
that conclusion.  The state points out that, under ORS 163.105(2)
(1983), inmates convicted of aggravated murder must be confined
for a minimum of 20 years without the possibility of parole. 
Although an inmate may seek a hearing regarding likelihood of
rehabilitation after 15 years of confinement, no statute requires
that the minimum period of 20 years be shortened if the board
concludes that the inmate is "likely to be rehabilitated within a
reasonable period of time."  Instead, the state contends that
such a finding converts the inmate's sentence to a life sentence
with a minimum of 20 years and the possibility of parole after
the minimum period of years has been served.  See ORS 163.105(4)
(1983) ("the order shall convert the terms of the prisoner's
confinement to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole
or work release"). (6)  According to the state, the pertinent
statute provides only for the possibility of parole, not for
immediate release, once the board finds that an inmate is capable
of rehabilitation.
Second, the state argues, Norris does not require
plaintiff's immediate release once the board has made its
finding.  The state maintains that the issue in Norris was
whether the board needed to make any findings, in addition to a
finding of likely rehabilitation, before ordering the conversion
of the inmate's sentence to life with the possibility of parole
under ORS 163.105(4) (1977).  In the state's view, Norris held
that no additional findings were necessary, and once the board
determined that the inmate was capable of rehabilitation, the
board was obligated to convert his sentence to a life sentence
with the possibility of parole.  The court's opinion in Norris,
according to the state, did not indicate that Norris
automatically was required to be released on parole as soon as
the board made a finding of likely rehabilitation.  Instead, the
state argues, plaintiff and the Court of Appeals seized on this
court's observation in Norris that Norris was entitled to have
his first aggravated-murder sentence retroactively changed -– to
life with the possibility of parole –- as of the date on which
the board concluded that Norris was likely to be rehabilitated. 
This court deemed that date to have been the date on which Norris
"began serving his second life sentence with a 20-year minimum
term of confinement for his second conviction of aggravated
murder."  Norris, 331 Or at 208.  That statement, the state
asserts, is the source of the idea that Norris stands for the
otherwise inexplicable proposition that any inmate convicted of
aggravated murder is entitled to immediate release when the board
has determined only that he is likely to be rehabilitated within
a reasonable time.  In the state's view, this court's decision to
hold that Norris's second sentence started on the date of the
board's finding arose from the complexities inherent in
untangling the effects of multiple convictions, not from any
statutory command that the inmate was entitled to immediate
release based on a finding that he was capable of rehabilitation.
Plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals correctly
understood the implications of Norris.  He observes that, after
reviewing the text and context of ORS 163.105 (1977), this court
decided that the sole issue in a rehabilitation hearing before
the board is whether the inmate is likely to be rehabilitated in
a reasonable period of time.  In Norris, the day that the board
entered its likely-to-be-rehabilitated finding was deemed to be
the day that the first sentence ended and the second sentence
began.  According to plaintiff, the Court of Appeals correctly
viewed Norris as holding that an inmate "must automatically be
released on parole in connection with the relevant sentence on
the date on which the board finds that the offender is capable of
rehabilitation and, concomitantly, converts the offender's
sentence."  Roy, 194 Or App at 339.  Further, ORS 163.105 (1983)
contains no provision changing its effect when two life sentences
are imposed (as in Norris), rather than a single life sentence
(as in this case).  Plaintiff argues that, in effect, ORS 163.105
(1983) offers a lesser alternative sentence of 15 years,
available to inmates who can demonstrate to the board's
satisfaction that they are "likely to be rehabilitated within a
reasonable period of time."  See ORS 163.105(3) (1983) ("[A]t any
time after 15 years from the date of imposition of a minimum
period of confinement pursuant to subsection (2) of this section,
the State Board of Parole, upon the petition of a prisoner so
confined, shall hold a hearing to determine if the prisoner is
likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time."). 
After 15 years, plaintiff argues, if the board determines that
the inmate is likely to be rehabilitated, then he must be
released. (7)
We agree with the state that the Court of Appeals erred
when it relied more heavily on a peculiar facet of the procedural
posture in Norris than on the plain directive of the applicable
statute.  Under ORS 163.105(4) (1983), if the board finds that
the inmate is capable of rehabilitation, then the board must
enter an order converting "the terms of the prisoner's
confinement to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole,
or work release."  The issue for the board is "only whether the
prisoner is capable of rehabilitation."  Norris, 331 Or at 207. 
This court further observed in Norris that the sentence would be
converted to one of life imprisonment with merely the possibility
of parole or work release.  Id.  Nothing in the statute or the
opinion in Norris supports the view that the "possibility" of
release is the same as a requirement of "immediate" release.
The court in Norris did not determine Norris's release
date or hold that he was eligible for parole.  Instead, his
release date would depend on a finding of likely rehabilitation
with respect to his second sentence.  See Norris, 331 Or at 208
(allowing petitioner to "petition for a second rehabilitation
hearing after he serves 15 years of his second aggravated-murder
sentence" but noting that he would not be "eligible for parole
unless the [b]oard [found] him capable of rehabilitation at that
second hearing").  More importantly, Norris did not purport to
establish any rule that a finding of likely rehabilitation
required immediate release.
We therefore conclude that the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that plaintiff was entitled to immediate release on
parole after the board found that he was "likely to be
rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time."  As noted
previously, the Court of Appeals did not reach plaintiff's
constitutional arguments.  We therefore remand to the Court of
Appeals so that it may consider those arguments.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the cases are remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
1. For convenience, like the Court of Appeals, we refer to the superintendent and the board
collectively as the state.
2. For reasons unrelated to the issues discussed here, the board later postponed plaintiff's
parole release date to May 18, 2006.
3. Plaintiff also asserted federal and state constitutional claims in both the habeas corpus
and mandamus petitions.
4. In light of that conclusion, the Court of Appeals did not reach plaintiff's constitutional
challenges to the board's action, nor did it address his contention that the trial court had erred in
dismissing his petition for writ of mandamus.  
5. ORS 163.105 (1983) provided, in part:
"(2) When a defendant is convicted of murder defined as aggravated
murder pursuant to ORS 163.095(2), the court shall order that the defendant shall
be confined for a minimum of 20 years without possibility of parole, release on
work release or any form of temporary leave or employment at a forest or work
camp.
"(3) * * * [A]t any time after 15 years from the date of imposition of a
minimum period of confinement pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the
State Board of Parole, upon the petition of a prisoner so confined, shall hold a
hearing to determine if the prisoner is likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable
period of time.  The sole issue shall be whether or not the prisoner is likely to be
rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time. * * *
" * * * * * 
"(4) If, upon hearing all the evidence, the board finds that the prisoner is
capable of rehabilitation and that the terms of the prisoner's confinement should
be changed to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, or work release, it
shall enter an order to that effect and the order shall convert the terms of the
prisoner's confinement to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole or work
release.  Otherwise, the board shall deny the relief sought in the petition."
Since 1983, the legislature has modified ORS 163.105 on numerous occasions.
6. The state asks us to hold that, notwithstanding a board finding that an inmate is likely to
be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time, the board never can reduce the inmate's
sentence below the 20-year minimum.  Conversely, plaintiff asks us to hold that a board
"rehabilitation finding shortens the twenty-year minimum term that initially applies to life
sentences in such cases to fifteen years[.]"  We do not find it necessary to reach that issue in this
case because plaintiff already has served more than the 20-year minimum sentence.
7. As noted previously, we do not reach the issue of whether a board finding under ORS
163.105 (1983) can, in effect, reduce an inmate's sentence below the otherwise applicable 20-year minimum.  See ___ Or ___, n 6, (slip op at 10, n 6).