Title: Mulier v. Johnson

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  August 9, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

VINCENT MULIER,
		Petitioner on Review,
	v.					
MARK JOHNSON,
LORRAINE DAVIS, LINDA KING,
and UNIVERSITY OF OREGON,
	Respondents on Review.
(CC 16-96-09570; CA A100065; SC S47132)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted January 10, 2001.
	David C. Force, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for petitioner on review.
	Richard D. Wasserman, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondents on review. 
With him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**  
	LEESON, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part. 
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed in part, and the
case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Lane County Circuit Court, Kip Leonard, Judge. 163 Or App 42, 986 P2d 742 (1999).
	**Kulongoski, J., resigned June 14, 2001, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.  De Muniz, J., did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
		LEESON, J.
		The sole issue on review in this civil action is
whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to
defendant University of Oregon (University) after it had granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment on all plaintiff's
claims. (1)  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment, but vacated and remanded the trial court's
award of attorney fees. (2)  Mulier v. Johnson, 163 Or App 42, 986
P2d 742 (1999).  We now reverse in part the decision of the Court
of Appeals, reverse in part the judgment of the circuit court,
and remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
		The relevant facts are undisputed.  In 1995, plaintiff
was a graduate teaching fellow in the Department of Philosophy at
the University of Oregon.  His salary and benefits were
calculated on the basis of his employment as .4 of the equivalent
of a full-time teaching fellow.  Johnson, the department chair,
reduced plaintiff's appointment to .2 of the equivalent of a
full-time teaching fellow and placed plaintiff on probation for
violating the department's "fraternization policy" by allegedly
sexually harassing a female student.  In 1997, plaintiff filed an
amended complaint under 42 United States Code (USC), section
1983, against the University employees Johnson, Davis, and King,
alleging two claims of deprivation of liberty and property
without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and a third claim
against the University for "violation of statutory duty." 
Plaintiff sought damages and "reasonable costs and disbursements"
on his third claim for relief.
		Defendants did not answer.  Instead, they moved for
summary judgment on all plaintiff's claims.  Defendants' motion
for summary judgment did not allege a right to attorney fees. 
See ORCP 68 C(2)(b) ("If a party does not file a pleading and
seeks judgment * * * by motion, a right to attorney fees shall be
alleged in such motion, in similar form to the allegations
required in a pleading.").  In a memorandum of law supporting the
motion for summary judgment, however, the University alleged a
right to recover attorney fees on plaintiff's claim against the
University for violation of statutory duty, arguing that
plaintiff's third claim for relief lacked an "objectively
reasonable basis."  As noted, the trial court granted the motion
for summary judgment on all three claims.
		Thereafter, defendants filed a motion for attorney
fees, costs, and disbursements under 42 USC section 1988, ORS
20.105, ORS 20.140, ORS 20.190, and ORCP 68 for prevailing
against all plaintiff's claims.  The motion also sought enhanced
prevailing party fees of $5,000 under ORS 20.190(3) if the trial
court denied the award of attorney fees.
		Under ORCP 68 C(4)(b), plaintiff had 14 days from the
date that defendants' served him with their motion for attorney
fees to object to the motion. (3)  However, before the expiration of
the 14 days, and before plaintiff had filed an objection, the
trial court granted defendants' motion and awarded the full
amount they had requested in costs, disbursements, and attorney
fees. 
		On appeal, plaintiff assigned error to the order
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and to its award
of attorney fees.  The Court of Appeals affirmed without
discussion the trial court's grant of defendants' motion for
summary judgment.  Mulier, 163 Or App at 44.  The court then held
that the University's failure to allege its right to attorney
fees in the motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's third
claim for relief, as required by ORCP 68 C(2)(b), was immaterial. 
The court reasoned:
	"[G]iven the concurrent filing of [the memorandum in
support of summary judgment] with the motion [for
summary judgment] and the lack of any possible
prejudice to plaintiff, the noncompliance with ORCP 68
(C)(2) did not affect plaintiff's substantial rights,
ORCP 12 B, and, thus, did not preclude defendant
University from recovering fees incurred in defending
the 'statutory duty' claim."
Id. at 47.  However, the Court of Appeals accepted the
University's concession that, because the trial court had entered
its money judgment fewer than 14 days after defendants had served
the motion for attorney fees on plaintiff, the money judgment
must be vacated and the case remanded to allow plaintiff an
opportunity to oppose the motion for attorney fees on the third
claim for relief.  Id. at 50.  This court allowed review to
address whether the trial court and Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the University was entitled to an award of attorney
fees on plaintiff's claim for "violation of statutory duty"
although the University did not allege that it was entitled to
attorney fees in defendants' motion for summary judgment, as
required by ORCP 68 C(2)(b).
		Plaintiff contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
relying on ORCP 12 B to excuse the University's failure to comply
with ORCP 68 C(2)(b) because, under that court's holding, ORCP 12
B effectively "swallows" the requirement in ORCP 68 C that the
right to attorney fees be alleged in a pleading or in a motion
seeking judgment or dismissal.  The University replies that its
failure to comply with ORCP 68 C(2)(b) did not substantially
prejudice plaintiff because the memorandum of law, which
accompanied defendants' motion for summary judgment, put
plaintiff on notice that the University sought attorney fees on
plaintiff's third claim for relief. (4)  
		To resolve the issue in this case, which is whether
ORCP 12 B requires a trial court to disregard a party's
noncompliance with ORCP 68 C(2)(b), we must construe ORCP 12 B. 
This court follows its template for statutory construction when
construing the rules of civil procedure, see McCarthy v. Oregon
Freeze Dry, Inc., 327 Or 84, 88, 957 P2d 1200, adhered to on
recons 327 Or 185 (1998) (so stating), beginning with an
examination of the text and context of the rule, see PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143
(1993) (so stating and describing statutory construction
methodology). 
		ORCP 12 B provides: 
		"The court shall, in every stage of an action,
disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or
proceedings which does not affect the substantial
rights of the adverse party."
That rule directs the court to disregard any error or defect in
the pleadings or proceedings, so long as the error or defect does
not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party.  The
dispositive question in this case is whether the University's
failure to allege its entitlement to attorney fees in the motion
for summary judgment was an "error" or "defect" as those terms
are used in ORCP 12 B. 
		ORCP 12 B does not define the terms "error" or
"defect."  Accordingly, we give those words their plain, ordinary
meanings.  See PGE, 317 Or at 611 (so stating).  An "error," in
part, is 
	"an act involving an unintentional deviation from truth
or accuracy:  a mistake in perception, reasoning,
recollection, or expression * * * :  an act that
through ignorance, deficiency, or accident departs from
or fails to achieve what should be done[.]" 
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 772 (unabridged ed 1993). 
A "defect" is defined, in part, as the "want or absence of
something necessary for completeness, perfection, or adequacy in
form or function[.]"  Id. at 591.  Both terms describe acts that
fail to achieve or complete something that a person has attempted
to do.  Under ORCP 12 B, then, an error or defect is a failure to
achieve or complete an attempt to comply with the requirements of
the rules of civil procedure.  The next question is whether the 
failure to allege an entitlement to attorney fees in a motion for
summary judgment is an "error" or "defect" as those terms are
used in ORCP 12 B. 
		ORCP 68 C(2)(a) provides: 
		"A party seeking attorney fees shall allege the
facts, statute, or rule which provides a basis for the
award of such fees in a pleading filed by that party."  
(Emphasis added.)  If a party chooses not to file a pleading and
seeks judgment or dismissal by motion, then "a right to attorney
fees shall be alleged in such motion, in similar form to the
allegations required in a pleading."  ORCP 68 C(2)(b) (emphasis
added).  The requirement that a party allege the right to
attorney fees in a pleading or in a motion is stated in mandatory
terms.  See Preble v. Department of Revenue, 331 Or 320, 324, 14
P3d 613 (2000) ("shall" is a command). 
		As we have explained, the words "error" and "defect" in
ORCP 12 B reflect the legislature's intent that a party must
attempt to comply with the mandatory requirements of the rules of
civil procedure if that party is to benefit from the provisions
of ORCP 12 B.  A complete failure to allege the right to attorney
fees in a motion under ORCP 68 C(2)(b) does not demonstrate an
attempt to comply with the requirements of that rule.  See
Hawkins v. City of La Grande, 315 Or 57, 63-4, 843 P2d 400 (1992)
(ORCP 12 B not a basis for disregarding complete failure to plead
affirmative defense as required by rules of civil procedure).
		In this case, it is uncontested that the University did
not allege its right to attorney fees in its motion for summary
judgment against plaintiff's claims or in a pleading.  The Court
of Appeals noted, and the University does not disagree, that the
University's concurrent filing of a memorandum in support of its
motion for summary judgment asserting the right to attorney fees
did not satisfy the requirements of ORCP 68 C(2)(b), because a
memorandum is not a motion.  Mulier, 163 Or App at 48.  The
function of a memorandum in support of a motion is to explain the
legal basis on which the moving party is entitled to prevail on
its motion.  Just as a memorandum claiming an entitlement to
attorney fees does not cure a failure to allege the right to
attorney fees in a motion under ORCP 68 C(2)(b), such a
memorandum does not transform that failure into an attempt to
comply with the rules of civil procedure for purposes of ORCP 12
B.  In this case, the University's failure to allege, or attempt
to allege, any right to attorney fees in the motion for summary
judgment means that there was no "error" or "defect" in that
motion that the trial court was entitled to disregard under ORCP
12 B.  It follows that the trial court erred in awarding the
University attorney fees on plaintiff's third claim for relief,
and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming that award.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in
part.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed in part, and
the case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.



1. 	Plaintiff's complaint named defendants the University
of Oregon and its employees, Johnson, Chair of the Department of
Philosophy, Davis, Vice Provost for Academic Affairs, and King,
Director of Human Resources.  The sole issue on review is the
University's entitlement to attorney fees on plaintiff's third
claim for relief.  We use the term "University" in this opinion
to refer only to defendant University of Oregon and the term
"defendants" to refer to all defendants named in plaintiff's
complaint.

2. 	The Court of Appeals held that Johnson, Davis, and
King, who were named as defendants for plaintiff's first and
second claims for relief, were not entitled to attorney fees. 
Mulier v. Johnson, 163 Or App 42, 50, 986 P2d 742 (1999).  That
portion of the Court of Appeals' decision is not before this
court.  The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's money
judgment and remanded the case to allow plaintiff an opportunity
to contest the University's motion for attorney fees.  Id. 
Neither the University nor plaintiff challenges that portion of
the court's decision.  Finally, in his petition for review,
plaintiff did not seek review of the portion of the Court of
Appeals' decision that affirmed the trial court's grant of
defendants' motion for summary judgment.  Accordingly, that
portion of the Court of Appeals' decision also is not before this
court.

3. 	ORCP 68 C(4)(b) provides, in part:  
		"A party may object to a statement seeking
attorney fees or costs and disbursements or any part
thereof by written objections to the statement.  The
objections shall be served within 14 days after service
on the objecting party of a copy of the statement."  

4. 	At oral argument before this court, the University also
argued that plaintiff had waived his right to challenge the form
or specificity of the University's alleged right to attorney
fees.  See ORCP 68 C(2)(d) ("Any objections to the form or
specificity of allegation of the facts, statute, or rule which
provides a basis for the award of fees shall be waived if not
alleged prior to trial or hearing.").  We decline to address that
argument because the University makes it for the first time on
review in this court.  ORAP 5.45(2).