Title: State v. Patrick R. Patterson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 130 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP1968-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Patrick R. Patterson, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 161 
Reported at: 321 Wis. 2d 752, 776 N.W.2d 602 
(Ct. App. 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 17, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
 
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 14, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Juneau   
 
JUDGE: 
Charles A. Pollex   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by David R. Karpe. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Michael 
C. Sanders, assistant attorney general with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  The cause was argued by 
Michael C. Sanders. 
 
 
 
 
                    2010 WI 130 
 
          NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2008AP1968-CR    
(L.C. No. 
2004CF31) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Patrick R. Patterson,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
NOV 17, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals1 in a case arising from the 
death of seventeen-year-old Tanya S. (Tanya) from a drug 
overdose.  Patrick R. Patterson (Patterson) challenges his 
convictions in connection with her death for first-degree 
reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled substance contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 940.02(2)(a) (2007-08)2 and contributing to the 
delinquency of a child with death as a consequence contrary to 
                                                 
1 State v. Patterson, 2009 WI App 161, 321 Wis. 2d 752, 776 N.W.2d 602. 
 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 
version unless otherwise indicated. 
 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1), (4)(a).3  After a jury convicted him of 
both offenses, Patterson moved the Juneau County Circuit Court, 
the Honorable Charles A. Pollex presiding, for postconviction 
relief, which the circuit court denied as to these offenses.  
The court of appeals affirmed the jury verdict and the circuit 
court's denial of postconviction relief.   
¶2 
We address four issues in our review:   
-  First, whether the punishments for first-degree reckless 
homicide by delivery of a controlled substance and contributing 
to the delinquency of a child with death as a consequence are 
multiplicitous when both convictions arise from the same death.   
-  Second, whether a defendant may be convicted of 
contributing to the delinquency of a seventeen-year-old when the 
relevant statute's definition of "child" provides an exception 
for purposes of prosecuting a person who is over seventeen.4   
-  Third, whether a jury instruction for first-degree 
reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled substance was 
erroneous because the way the instruction was worded allegedly 
allowed the jury to find guilt based on a mere allegation rather 
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.   
                                                 
3 Patterson was also charged with four counts of delivery of a controlled 
substance, Oxycodone, to Tanya and three others.  These charges are not at 
issue in this appeal. 
4 See Wis. Stat. §§ 948.01(1), 948.40(1).  Section 948.01(1) provides:  
"'Child' means a person who has not attained the age of 18 years, except that 
for purposes of prosecuting a person who is alleged to have violated a state 
or federal criminal law, 'child' does not include a person who has attained 
the age of 17 years."  Section 948.40(1) provides:  "No person may 
intentionally encourage or contribute to the delinquency of a child." 
 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
3 
 
-  Fourth, whether Patterson is entitled to a new trial 
because of claimed prosecutorial misconduct stemming from the 
prosecutor's use of other witnesses' statements and testimony in 
a manner prohibited by Haseltine.5 
 
¶3 
We affirm the court of appeals for the reasons stated 
below.  In response to Patterson's first claim, we hold that 
convictions for both first-degree reckless homicide by delivery 
of a controlled substance and contributing to the delinquency of 
a child with death as a consequence are not multiplicitous 
because, in light of the four-part analysis outlined in State v. 
Davison, 2003 WI 89, ¶50, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 666 N.W.2d 1, we 
conclude that the legislature intended to permit multiple 
punishments for these offenses.  On this issue, we affirm the 
court of appeals, but on different grounds.6  We conclude that 
the convictions are not multiplicitous because contributing to 
the delinquency of a child with death as a consequence is not a 
"type 
of 
criminal 
homicide" 
for 
purposes 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.66(2), and further conclude that the legislature intended 
to permit cumulative punishments for that offense and first-
degree reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled substance.    
                                                 
5 In Haseltine, the court of appeals held that "[n]o witness, expert or 
otherwise, should be permitted to give an opinion that another mentally and 
physically competent witness is telling the truth."  State v. Haseltine, 120 
Wis. 2d 92, 96, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1984).  
 
6 The court of appeals held that the charges are not multiplicitous, but its 
holding was based on an improper reading of Davison.  Patterson, 321 
Wis. 2d 752, ¶12 (citing Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶¶65-67).  In its 
decision, the court of appeals reasoned that, based on Davison, Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.66 does not prohibit conviction of both the charged crime and a lesser-
included offense when both offenses are charged.  Patterson, 321 Wis. 2d 752, 
¶12.  We disagree for the reasons set forth below. 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
4 
 
¶4 
Regarding the second issue, we hold that Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.40(1) proscribes contributing to the delinquency of any 
child under the age of eighteen, and thus Patterson's conviction 
was proper.  Our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1) is 
informed by the plain language and legislative history of the 
definition of "child" in Wis. Stat. § 948.01(1), which excludes 
those over seventeen only for the "purposes of prosecuting" such 
person.   
¶5 
Third, we conclude that the jury instruction for 
first-degree reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled 
substance was not erroneous because the jury was properly 
advised that the burden of proving all elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt rested on the State.  Patterson's 
claim that the wording of the fourth element of that crime 
allowed the jury to convict him based on allegations alone is 
not 
reasonable, 
especially 
when 
one 
looks 
at 
the 
jury 
instructions as a whole.   
¶6 
Fourth, 
there 
was 
no 
prosecutorial 
misconduct 
warranting a new trial because the single Haseltine violation in 
the seven-day trial in this case did not "so infect[] the trial 
with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of 
due process."  State v. Neuser, 191 Wis. 2d 131, 136, 528 
N.W.2d 49 (Ct. App. 1995).  We therefore affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals.  
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶7 
For the purposes of this appeal, the facts of this 
case are undisputed.  At the heart of this case is the death of 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
5 
 
Tanya, at the age of seventeen, from an overdose of Oxycodone, a 
prescription pain medication.  Tanya spent the night of May 2, 
2003, with her boyfriend, Patterson.  Over the course of that 
evening, Patterson and Tanya both used Oxycodone.  Several 
people who visited Patterson at his home that night testified 
that Patterson gave Tanya Oxycodone pills, which she ingested.  
The next morning, Patterson and his mother, with whom Patterson 
lived, awoke to find Tanya unconscious.  Emergency medical 
personnel were unable to revive Tanya, and she was taken to the 
hospital, where she was pronounced dead.  After an autopsy and a 
toxicological analysis, the coroner determined that the cause of 
death was drug ingestion, specifically, Oxycodone.   
¶8 
On February 13, 2004, Patterson was charged with two 
counts of delivery of a schedule II controlled substance, namely 
Oxycodone, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(a), first-
degree reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled substance 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.02(2)(a), and encouraging or 
contributing to the delinquency of a child resulting in death in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1), (4)(a).  In an amended 
criminal 
complaint, 
Patterson 
was 
also 
charged 
with 
two 
additional counts of delivery of a controlled substance in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(a), for delivering Oxycodone 
to two others on the night of May 2, 2003.   
¶9 
After a seven-day jury trial in Juneau County Circuit 
Court, the Honorable Charles A. Pollex presiding, the jury 
acquitted Patterson of one count of delivery of a controlled 
substance and found Patterson guilty of all other charges.  
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
6 
 
Patterson moved the circuit court for postconviction relief.  
First, Patterson argued that count four, contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor resulting in death, should be dismissed 
due to insufficient evidence.  Specifically, Patterson alleged 
that the State failed to prove the first element of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.40 because Tanya was seventeen at the time and thus not a 
"child" as that term is used in the statute.7  Second, Patterson 
sought dismissal of the contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor 
and 
delivery 
of 
a 
controlled 
substance 
counts 
as 
multiplicitous, arguing that both are lesser included offenses 
of first-degree reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled 
substance.  Third, Patterson argued that count three, first-
degree reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled substance, 
must be dismissed because a jury instruction was erroneous.  The 
circuit court granted Patterson's motion to dismiss count two 
for delivery of Oxycodone to Tanya because it is a lesser 
included offense of count three, reckless homicide by delivery 
of Oxycodone, and denied all of Patterson's other claims for 
relief.  
¶10 Patterson appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court's judgment of conviction and order denying 
Patterson's motions for postconviction relief.  Patterson, 321 
Wis. 2d 752, ¶1.  Regarding Patterson's multiplicity claim, the 
court of appeals held that the punishments for both first-degree 
                                                 
7 In that claim, Patterson also argued (1) ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel for failing to raise the issue during trial, and (2) that his 
conviction was based on insufficient evidence because, even viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, Tanya never "possessed" 
Oxycodone.  Patterson does not raise these issues on appeal. 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
7 
 
reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled substance and 
contributing to the delinquency of a child with death as a 
consequence are not multiplicitous because an analysis of the 
relevant 
factors 
reveals 
a 
legislative 
intent 
to 
permit 
convictions for both offenses.  Id.  In part the court of 
appeals relied on Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, and interpreted that 
case to provide that Wis. Stat. § 939.66 does not show a clear 
legislative intent to bar multiple convictions for lesser 
included offenses when both offenses are charged.  Patterson, 
321 Wis. 2d 752, ¶¶10-12.  In addressing Patterson's claim that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.40(1) 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
children 
over 
seventeen, the court of appeals examined the relevant statutory 
definitions and concluded that seventeen-year-olds are excepted 
from the definition of "juvenile" only for the "purpose[] of 
investigating or prosecuting" such person.  Patterson, 321 
Wis. 2d 752, ¶29.  In response to Patterson's jury instruction 
claim, the court of appeals held that, viewing the instructions 
as a whole, the use of the word "alleged" in the fourth element 
of the charge of first-degree reckless homicide by delivery of a 
controlled substance only refers back to the first element and 
thus does not improperly relieve the State of its burden of 
proof.  Id., ¶32.  On Patterson's prosecutorial misconduct 
claim, the court of appeals held that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Patterson's 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
8 
 
motion for a mistrial because the prosecutor's single improper 
question did not result in an unfair trial.8  Id., ¶37.   
II. ANALYSIS 
¶11 Patterson challenges several aspects of his trial and 
conviction.  We agree with the court of appeals' decision to 
affirm the circuit court's judgment of conviction and denial of 
postconviction relief, though in part on different grounds.  We 
will address each of Patterson's claims in the order decided by 
the court of appeals and as outlined above.   
A. 
Patterson's Multiplicity Claim 
¶12 A multiplicity claim presents a question of law that 
is "subject to independent appellate review."  State v. 
Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶52, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 643 N.W.2d 437.  
Multiplicity claims are analyzed under a two-part test.  First, 
pursuant to the Blockburger elements-only test, this court 
examines whether the offenses are identical in law and fact.  
Id.  Second, this court turns to whether the legislature 
intended multiple punishments for the conduct and offenses at 
issue.  Id.  
¶13 Patterson argues that the legislature did not intend 
to permit multiple convictions for reckless homicide by delivery 
of a controlled substance and contributing to the delinquency of 
a child with death as a consequence for the same act.  See Wis. 
                                                 
8 The court of appeals also addressed the claim raised in Patterson's 
postconviction motion that the State failed to prove that Tanya "possessed" 
Oxycodone and held that there was sufficient evidence.  Patterson, 321 
Wis. 2d 752, ¶26.  Patterson did not raise that issue in his petition for 
review to this court. 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
9 
 
Stat. §§ 940.02(2)(a), 948.40(1), (4)(a).9  While Patterson 
concedes that the statutes are not identical in law or fact, he 
argues that the legislature intended to prohibit multiple 
convictions, and thus multiple convictions violate due process.  
In support he contends that the plain language and legislative 
history of Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2) shows a clear legislative 
intent to prohibit conviction of a homicide offense and a lesser 
included type of homicide.  Further, Patterson asserts that 
§ 948.40(1), (4)(a) is a less serious type of homicide than 
§ 940.02(2)(a) because they require proof that the defendant 
caused a death and impose a lesser penalty than first-degree 
reckless homicide.  Patterson contends that homicide statutes 
are located throughout the statutes and that Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.40(1), (4)(a) is one such example.  In response to the 
court of appeals' holding, Patterson argues that Davison does 
not control because this court limited its interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.66 to subsection (2m) which applies to battery 
offenses.      
                                                 
9 Contributing to the delinquency of a child.  (1) No 
person may intentionally encourage or contribute to 
the delinquency of a child. This subsection includes 
intentionally encouraging or contributing to an act by 
a child under the age of 10 which would be a 
delinquent act if committed by a child 10 years of age 
or older. . . .  
(4) A person who violates this section is guilty of a 
Class A misdemeanor, except: (a) If death is a 
consequence, the person is guilty of a Class D 
felony . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1), (4)(a). 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
10 
 
¶14 The State's argument is twofold.  First, the State 
argues that, based on this court's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.66 in Davison, the lesser included offenses provision does 
not prohibit multiple convictions when both offenses are 
charged.  Additionally, the State argues that in any event Wis. 
Stat. § 939.66(2) does not prohibit the convictions here because 
Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1), (4)(a) is not a "type of criminal 
homicide."   
¶15 Before delving into the substance of Patterson's 
multiplicity claim, we will address the appropriate framework 
for analyzing such claims.  Under the Wisconsin Constitution, 
multiple punishments may not be imposed for charges that are 
identical in law and fact unless the legislature intended to 
impose such punishments.  Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶¶30-32; 
State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 401-02, 576 N.W.2d 912 
(1998).  Therefore, the "elements-only" test, to determine 
whether charges are identical in law and fact, is the first 
prong of a multiplicity analysis.  Multaler, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 
¶52.  The elements-only test determines the presumption under 
which the analysis of the second prong is to be conducted.  
Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶¶43-45.  Offenses with elements 
identical in law and fact establish a presumption that the 
legislature did not intend to permit multiple punishments.  Id., 
¶43.  Offenses with elements that differ in law or fact 
establish a presumption that the legislature did intend to 
permit multiple punishments.  Id., ¶44.    
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
11 
 
¶16 Regardless of the outcome of the elements-only test, 
the court proceeds to the second prong to discern legislative 
intent.  Id., ¶¶43-45.  Operating under the presumption 
established under the first prong, the court then proceeds in a 
four-factor analysis to determine whether the legislature 
intended to permit multiple punishments for the offenses in 
question.  Id., ¶50.  This court examines (1) all relevant 
statutory language, (2) the legislative history and context of 
the statutes, (3) the nature of the proscribed conduct, and (4) 
the appropriateness of multiple punishments for the defendant's 
conduct.  Id.  Even if the plain language of the relevant 
statutes is unambiguous, in addressing a multiplicity claim we 
proceed through all four factors.  State v. Grayson, 172 
Wis. 2d 156, 161, 493 N.W.2d 23 (1992). 
¶17 We now turn to the statutes at issue in this case.  
First, under the elements-only test, first-degree reckless 
homicide by delivery of a controlled substance and contributing 
to the delinquency of a child with death as a consequence are 
not identical in law and fact.10  Both parties acknowledge that 
the offenses are not identical in law or fact.  To provide just 
                                                 
10 The elements of first-degree reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled 
substance are that the defendant delivered a controlled substance to the 
victim; that the victim used the substance that the defendant delivered; and 
that the defendant knew or believed that the substance was the controlled 
substance that was delivered.  Wis. Stat. § 940.02(2)(a); see Wis JI——
Criminal 1021.   
The elements of contributing to the delinquency of a child where death is a 
consequence are that the child was under the age of 18 years; that the 
defendant intentionally encouraged or contributed to the delinquency of that 
child; and that death was a consequence of encouraging or contributing to the 
delinquency of that child.  Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1), (4)(a); see Wis JI——
Criminal 2170A.  
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
12 
 
one difference, contributing to the delinquency of a child with 
death as a consequence requires that a child be involved, 
whereas reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled substance 
applies to both children and adults.  Compare Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.02(2)(a), with Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1), (4)(a).  Thus, we 
proceed presuming that the legislature intended to permit 
punishment under Wis. Stat. §§ 940.02(2)(a), 948.40(1), (4)(a) 
for the same conduct.  Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶44.  The 
offenses are multiplicitous only if this presumption is rebutted 
by clear evidence of contrary legislative intent.  Id. 
1. 
Relevant Statutory Language 
 
¶18 The plain language of the three relevant statutes does 
not rebut the presumption that the legislature intended to 
permit 
punishment 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 940.02(2)(a), 
and 
948.40(1), (4)(a).  In addition to the two statutes under which 
Patterson was convicted, Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2) is relevant to 
this analysis because it prohibits conviction of both a homicide 
offense and a lesser included type of criminal homicide.  
Patterson's multiplicity claim is based in part on his argument 
that Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1), (4)(a) is a type of criminal 
homicide.  Under this factor we conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.40(1), (4)(a) is not a type of criminal homicide because  
it lacks the characteristics of a traditional homicide statute. 
 
¶19 As we have noted, Wis. Stat. § 939.66 permits 
conviction of either the charged offense or a lesser-included 
offense, but precludes conviction of both.  Contrary to the 
State's assertion and the court of appeals' reasoning, this 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
13 
 
statute prohibits convictions under multiple statutes where one 
is an included offense of the other, whether or not one or both 
are charged.  Wis. Stat. § 939.66.  The court of appeals based 
its holding in part on this charging distinction.  Patterson, 
321 Wis. 2d 752, ¶12.  Relying on this court's decision in 
Davison, the court of appeals held that Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2) 
does not show a clear legislative intent to prohibit "punishment 
for both a charged criminal homicide and a charged less serious 
type of criminal homicide."  Id. (emphasis added).  Based on 
this language the State argues that this court should affirm the 
court of appeals on the ground that Wis. Stat. § 939.66 does not 
prohibit conviction of multiple types of homicide when both 
offenses are charged.  We reject this reading of Davison and 
decline to affirm the court of appeals on this basis.   
¶20 We disagree with the court of appeals for two reasons.  
First, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
reliance 
on 
Davison 
is 
inappropriate because Davison involved the battery statutes.  
Our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 939.66 in Davison turned on 
an analysis of subsection (2m), which prohibits conviction of 
both a battery offense and "a less serious or equally serious 
type of battery."  263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶109.  Second, the court of 
appeals misinterpreted our holding in Davison.  While we noted 
that a literal reading of Wis. Stat. § 939.66 could suggest that 
it permits multiple convictions for two types of battery where 
both are charged, we rejected this reading, calling it a 
"curious result[]," in favor of a more reasonable interpretation 
of the statute based on the legislative history of subsection 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
14 
 
(2m).  Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶¶74-75, 109 ("The disturbing 
inconsistency 
within 
§ 939.66 
if 
Davison's 
literal 
interpretation of subsection (2m) were adopted, the compelling 
legislative history of subsection (2m), the legislative motive 
for the proscribed conduct under the ordinary and special 
circumstances battery statutes, and the appropriateness of 
punishing more than one offense lead us to conclude that the 
legislature has not clearly intended to prohibit multiple 
punishments on these facts.").  As we did in Davison, we decline 
to hold that Wis. Stat. § 939.66 permits conviction for an 
offense and an included offense where both are charged, and 
instead affirm the court of appeals on the basis that Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.40(1), (4)(a) is not a type of criminal homicide. 
¶21 In 
subsection 
(2) 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.66, 
the 
provision explains that an included crime may be "[a] crime 
which is a less serious type of criminal homicide than the one 
charged."  Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2).  While Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2) 
prohibits conviction of a homicide offense and a lesser included 
type of homicide, see Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d at 408, to resolve 
whether § 939.66(2) informs the present legislative intent 
analysis, we must determine whether Patterson was convicted of 
multiple "type[s] of criminal homicide."   
 
¶22 The statute is silent regarding what offenses are 
categorized as "a type of criminal homicide."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.66(2).  In fact "homicide" is not defined anywhere in the 
statutes.  Thus, Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2) is ambiguous regarding 
what offenses are included as a "type of criminal homicide."  
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
15 
 
 
¶23 However, the fact that § 948.40(1), (4)(a) is so 
different than the homicide statutes, in its elements and 
location in the statutes, is instructive.  The homicide statutes 
are collected in chapter 940 entitled "Crimes Against Life and 
Bodily 
Security." 
 
The 
offense 
for 
contributing 
to 
the 
delinquency of a child with death as a consequence is located in 
chapter 948, which contains the "Crimes Against Children."   
 
¶24 Rather than being a homicide statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.40(1), (4)(a) is more akin to other offenses spread 
throughout the statutes that proscribe certain conduct and 
impose a more serious punishment where death results.  Patterson 
argues 
that 
these 
other 
statutes, 
citing 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.74(5)(d) as an example, are simply homicide statutes 
located outside of chapter 940.  Wisconsin Stat. § 346.74(5)(d), 
which provides the penalty when a driver fails to comply with 
the requirements in Wis. Stat. § 346.67(1) after an accident 
that results in a death, is similar to § 948.40(1), (4)(a).  
Both provide a more serious punishment where "death is a 
consequence."  Wis. Stat. §§ 346.74(5)(d), 948.40(1), (4)(a).  
In contrast, the homicide statutes target those who "cause[] the 
death" of another.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01-.03.  
Further, the fact that § 346.74(5)(d) is not a type of criminal 
homicide is evident from the fact that defendants are often 
convicted under both that statute and a homicide statute when 
their conduct is proscribed by both.11  Like Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
11 See State v. Harmon, 2006 WI App 214, 296 Wis. 2d 861, 723 N.W.2d 732 
(defendant convicted of § 940.10 – homicide by negligent operation of a 
vehicle – and § 348.74 – hit-and-run resulting in death); State v. Lohmeier, 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
16 
 
§ 346.74(5)(d), § 948.40(1), (4)(a) is not a type of criminal 
homicide.12      
¶25 The language of the relevant statutes suggests that 
the legislature did not intend contributing to the delinquency 
of a child with death as a consequence to be a type of criminal 
homicide.  The legislative history of these statutes further 
supports this conclusion. 
2. 
Legislative History 
 
¶26 Continuing with our multiplicity analysis, we examine 
the legislative history of the relevant statutes, specifically 
Wis. Stat. §§ 939.66, 948.40(1), (4)(a).  Based on this history, 
we conclude that the legislature did not intend for Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.66(2)'s prohibition against conviction of multiple types 
of criminal homicide to include contributing to the delinquency 
of a child with death as a consequence.  First, the history of 
the lesser included offenses provision suggests that the 
legislature intended "type[s] of criminal homicide" to include 
                                                                                                                                                             
205 Wis. 2d 183, 556 N.W.2d 90 (1996) (defendant convicted of both §§ 940.09 
and 346.74(5)); State v. Carter, 229 Wis. 2d 200, 598 N.W.2d 619 (Ct. App. 
1999) (defendant charged with both §§ 940.02(1) and 346.74(5)(d)); State v. 
Urbanec, No. 1998AP402-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jun. 8, 1999) 
(defendant convicted of both §§ 940.09 and 346.74(5)(d) for same death). 
12 Contributing to the delinquency of a child with death as a consequence is 
also distinct from the homicide statutes because the child or a third person 
could be the immediate cause of the death.  Because Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1), 
(4)(a) utilizes broad language penalizing those who contribute to the 
delinquency of a child if death is a consequence, a defendant could be 
convicted where the child, as a result of the delinquency to which the 
defendant contributed, causes a death.  In contrast, most homicide statutes 
require that the defendant actually cause the death of another.  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.01-.03, 940.05-.06, 940.08-.10.  We recognize that a defendant may 
also be convicted for felony murder where another person is the immediate 
cause of the death; however, we noted in Oimen that holding the felon 
responsible for the homicide was acceptable because the legislature limited 
felony murder to "inherently dangerous felonies."  State v. Oimen, 184 Wis. 
2d 423, 435-42, 516 N.W.2d 399 (1994).    
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
17 
 
only the traditional homicide offenses.  Second, the history of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1), (4)(a) shows that it was created to 
protect children from dangerous conduct that can result in a 
death, and it was not created as another type of criminal 
homicide.   
 
¶27 The legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 939.66 is 
largely silent on what offenses were meant to be included as a 
"type of criminal homicide," but its origin and development 
suggest that it is limited to the traditional homicide statutes 
now located in chapter 940.  Before the legislature added 
specific examples of offenses that were considered included 
crimes, the general lesser included offenses provision was 
located in Wis. Stat. § 357.09, entitled "Conviction of included 
crime."13  In 1951 the Senate proposed the creation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 339.45,14 which is substantially similar to the current lesser 
included offenses provision in Wis. Stat. § 939.66.  1951 S.B. 
784.  A comment in that bill notes that the new provision was 
"substantially a restatement of the old section 357.09 with the 
concept of 'included crime' being spelled out in greater 
detail."  Id.  This change explained that a lesser type of 
                                                 
13 This statute provided that "[w]hen a defendant is tried for a crime and is 
acquitted of part of the crime charged and is convicted of the residue 
thereof, the verdict may be received and thereupon he shall be adjudged 
guilty of the crime which appears to the court to be substantially charged by 
such residue of the indictment or information and shall be sentenced 
accordingly."  Wis. Stat. § 357.09 (1951).   
14 Section 339.45 provided that "[u]pon prosecution for a crime, the actor may 
be convicted of either the crime charged or an included crime, but not both.  
An included crime may be any of the following: . . . (2) A crime which is a 
less serious type of criminal homicide than the one charged."  1951 S.B. 784. 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
18 
 
criminal homicide was an included crime, but the legislature did 
not specify what it meant by a type of criminal homicide. 
¶28 This bill was never passed by the Assembly, but in 
1953 an identical provision was passed by both the Assembly and 
the Senate as part of a major revision and reorganization of the 
criminal code.  Ch. 623, Laws of 1953; 1953 A.B. 100.  A comment 
explains that "[s]ubsection (2) of the new section is a 
restatement of old law."  1953 A.B. 100.  As further explanation 
of this new law, the comment provides that "[a]n example of an 
included crime under subsection (2) is homicide by reckless 
conduct when the crime charged is first-degree murder."  1953 
A.B. 100.  In this law, both of the offenses in the example were 
located in the newly created chapter 340, entitled "Crimes 
against life and bodily security."15  Ch. 623, Laws of 1953.  
While this Act was printed in the 1953 Statutes, it was not to 
become effective until it was reenacted by the 1955 legislature.  
See § 282, ch. 623, Laws of 1953; William A. Platz, The Criminal 
Code, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 350, 351-52. 
¶29 The legislature did not reenact this law but instead 
replaced it entirely with Chapter 696, Laws of 1955.  Platz, 
supra, at 352.  In reorganizing the code, the legislature moved 
the lesser included offenses provision and the homicide statutes 
to Wis. Stat. § 939.66 and chapter 940 respectively.  Ch. 696, 
Laws of 1955.  Other than renumbering the statutes, the 
legislature did not further modify the lesser included offenses 
                                                 
15 The current versions of these offenses are located in chapter 940. 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
19 
 
or homicide provisions.  No additional comments were provided to 
elaborate on what offenses were included as types of criminal 
homicide.   
¶30 Through this major overhaul of the criminal code, the 
legislature grouped all of the homicide statutes together in 
chapter 940, while at the same time developing the language in 
the lesser included offenses provision referring to types of 
criminal homicide.  By so doing in the same Act, the 
legislature, it appears, intended to refer to those core 
criminal homicide statutes in what is now chapter 940.  As noted 
above, the comments in the legislative history further support 
this conclusion. Further, the legislative history of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.40(1), (4)(a) leads to the same result. 
¶31 The legislative history confirms what the language of 
the statute suggests; Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1), (4)(a) is not a 
type of criminal homicide, but rather a law for the protection 
of children from egregious conduct with, obviously, very serious 
consequences when that conduct results in a death.  The fact 
that this statute provides a more serious punishment for 
contributing to a child's delinquency when a death occurs does 
not make it a homicide statute.   
¶32 In 1961, the language at issue was added to the 
statute proscribing contributing to the delinquency of a child.16  
                                                 
16 Prior to the revision, Wis. Stat. § 947.15 provided: "Contributing to the 
delinquency or neglect of children.  (1) The following persons may be fined 
not more than $500 or imprisoned more than one year in county jail or both: 
(a) Any person 18 or older who intentionally encourages or contributes to the 
delinquency or neglect of any child . . . "  Wis. Stat. § 947.15(1)(a) 
(1959).  After this change Wis. Stat. § 947.15 provided "Contributing to the 
delinquency of children; neglect; neglect contributing to death.  (1) The 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
20 
 
Ch. 485, Laws of 1961.  Little explanation accompanied this 
revision.  The bill simply stated that it was a law to "amend 
947.15(1) relating to increasing the penalty for neglect of 
children when death results."  Drafting File, ch. 485, Laws of 
1961, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.   
¶33 While 
the 
intention behind its creation remains 
somewhat unclear, later revisions provide more insight into the 
legislature's intent regarding this statute.  In 1987, a special 
committee of the legislative council on crimes against children 
developed chapter 948 to "[r]eorganize[] those crimes against 
children currently located in the criminal code [chs. 939 to 
948] into a separate chapter of the criminal code, new ch. 948, 
relating solely to crimes against children."  Drafting file for 
1987 Wis. Act 332, Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau 
of 1987 S.B. 203, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.  
This move to chapter 948, as opposed to chapter 940 which 
contains the homicide statutes, indicates that the underlying 
conduct targeted by this statute is contributing to the 
delinquency of a child, not homicide.  We are further convinced 
by comments to this Act, which explain: 
In s. 948.40, which applies only to contributing to 
the delinquency of a child: 
4. 
Subsection 
(4) 
revises 
the 
penalties 
for 
contributing to the delinquency of a child by: 
                                                                                                                                                             
following persons may be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than 
one year in county jail or both, and if death is a consequence may be fined 
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years: (a) Any person 18 or older who 
intentionally encourages or contributes to the delinquency or neglect of any 
child . . . "  Wis. Stat. § 947.15(1)(a) (1961). 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
21 
 
a. 
Increasing 
the 
penalty 
where 
death 
is 
a 
consequence 
of 
the 
act 
which 
is 
encouraged 
or 
contributed to from a Class D felony to a Class C 
felony. 
1987 Wis. Act 332. 
 
¶34 These 
comments clarify that Wis. Stat. § 948.40 
proscribes contributing to the delinquency of a child, which 
offense 
is 
considered 
more 
serious 
"where 
death 
is 
a 
consequence."   
 
¶35 Nothing in the legislative history of either Wis. 
Stat. § 939.66 or § 948.40(1), (4)(a) overcomes the presumption 
that the legislature intended to permit multiple punishments 
under these offenses.  In fact, quite the opposite.  We conclude 
that the statutory language and legislative history of these 
provisions indicate that § 948.40(1), (4)(a) is not a type of 
criminal 
homicide 
and 
thus 
not 
covered 
by 
§ 939.66(2).  
Nevertheless, continuing with the multiplicity analysis, we turn 
to the third factor. 
3. 
The Nature of the Proscribed Conduct 
 
¶36 The third factor in the multiplicity analysis requires 
us to consider the policies underlying each of the statutes and 
the objectives they seek to achieve.  See Davison, 263 
Wis. 2d 145, ¶¶91, 94.  The statutes prohibiting the offenses at 
issue here are aimed at very different targets. 
 
¶37 First-degree reckless homicide by delivery of a 
controlled substance was created as a specific type of criminal 
homicide to prosecute anyone who provides a fatal dose of a 
controlled 
substance. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.02(2)(a). 
 
The 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
22 
 
legislature developed this law, often referred to as the Len 
Bias law, in the wake of the tragic death of a University of 
Maryland basketball star by the same name from a cocaine 
overdose.  See Wis JI——Criminal 1021 n.1; Walter Dickey, David 
Schultz & James L. Fullin, Jr., The Importance of Clarity in the 
Law of Homicide: The Wisconsin Revision, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 1323, 
1351 n.97.   
 
¶38 As discussed above in greater detail, § 948.40(1), 
(4)(a) is meant to protect children from those who would 
encourage them to become delinquent.  See 1987 Wis. Act 332.  
The overarching goal of this statute is to protect children from 
harm by shielding them from the dangers of breaking the law. 
 
¶39 Patterson argues that the nature of the proscribed 
conduct is the same for both offenses because the physical act, 
"administering Oxycodone to the victim, causing her to die," is 
the same for both offenses.  However, under this factor we are 
not concerned with whether the underlying act is the same for 
both offenses as that inquiry was done in the elements-only 
test.  Rather, this factor focuses on the policies underlying 
these offenses.   
¶40 The court of appeals aptly dismissed Patterson's 
argument under this factor as follows.  "That Patterson's 
particular conduct happens to fall within a relatively limited 
area covered by both statues does not show that the legislature 
intended only one punishment."  Patterson, 321 Wis. 2d 752, ¶19.   
¶41 The State argues that the legislature intended to 
permit multiple punishments for these offenses because each 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
23 
 
statute proscribes different conduct.  According to the State 
and as we noted above, Wis. Stat. § 940.02(2)(a) addresses 
homicide involving the delivery, manufacture or distribution of 
drugs and, in contrast, Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1), (4)(a) addresses 
contributing to the delinquency of a child.  We agree with the 
State, and thus turn to the final factor in this analysis. 
4. 
The Appropriateness of Multiple Punishments 
 
¶42 Our analysis under this factor is closely related to 
that under the previous factor, and thus we need not repeat that 
discussion here in great detail.  See Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 
¶98.  We conclude that each statute addresses separate harms for 
which society has a significant interest in preventing.   
 
¶43 The aim of the reckless homicide by delivery of a 
controlled substance statute is preventing drug-related deaths 
by prosecuting those who distribute fatal doses of drugs.  Wis. 
Stat. § 940.02(2)(a).  The contributing to the delinquency of a 
child offense is meant to protect children from a number of 
different harms and provides increased deterrence through a more 
serious 
punishment 
when 
a 
death 
results. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.40(1), (4)(a).  When a defendant's conduct implicates both 
of these offenses, as Patterson's conduct has, it is an 
especially grievous offense because he has not only caused a 
death by providing a controlled substance, but he has involved a 
child in that offense.  In Patterson's case, it was the child's 
death that resulted.  We conclude that multiple punishments are 
appropriate to deter such behavior. 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
24 
 
 
¶44 For the reasons stated above, we hold that Patterson 
failed to overcome the presumption that the legislature intended 
to allow multiple punishments for this offense, and therefore, 
his convictions are not multiplicitous.    
B. 
Patterson's claim regarding the definition  
of "child" for the purposes of § 948.40(1) 
 
¶45 This issue concerns the proper interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 948.40(1), specifically the definition of "child" for 
the purposes of that statute.17  As this is a question of 
statutory interpretation, our review is de novo.  McNeil v. 
Hansen, 2007 WI 56, ¶6, 300 Wis. 2d 358, 731 N.W.2d 273.  
Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the 
statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We interpret 
a statute "where possible to give reasonable effect to every 
word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Id., ¶46.  Only if we 
conclude that the plain language of the statute is ambiguous 
will we look to the legislative history for clarification.  Id. 
 
¶46 Patterson argues that his conviction under Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.40(1), (4)(a) was error because Tanya was seventeen at the 
time of her death and the statute does not apply to seventeen-
year-olds.  He bases this argument on an exception in the 
                                                 
17 The court of appeals reviewed this claim as one challenging the sufficiency 
of the evidence.  Patterson, 321 Wis. 2d 752, ¶27.  Before the court of 
appeals Patterson argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
guilty verdict for contributing to the delinquency of a child with death as a 
consequence based on his interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1).  However, 
Patterson's argument before this court does not present this issue as one 
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, but rather as one of statutory 
interpretation.  Because we conclude that this claim turns on the appropriate 
interpretation of § 948.40(1), our analysis will address it as such. 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
25 
 
definition of "juvenile" for those over seventeen.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.02(10m).  The State argues that this exception applies 
only for the purposes of prosecuting children and therefore does 
not apply to prosecutions under Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1).  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 938.02(10m), 948.01(1).  We agree with the State.  
We conclude that this exception applies only to the prosecution 
of children based on the plain language and legislative history 
of Wis. Stat. §§ 948.01(1) and 948.40(1).  
 
¶47 We first examine the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.40(1).  It provides that "[n]o person may intentionally 
encourage or contribute to the delinquency of a child."  Wis. 
Stat. § 948.40(1).  "Child" is defined in chapter 948 as "a 
person who has not attained the age of 18 years, except that for 
purposes of prosecuting a person who is alleged to have violated 
a state or federal criminal law, 'child' does not include a 
person who has attained the age of 17 years."18  Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.01(1).  Based on the plain language of the definition of 
"child," it excludes children over the age of seventeen from its 
definition only "for the purposes of prosecuting" such a person.  
Id.  Since under Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1) it is the person 
contributing to the child's delinquency being prosecuted and not 
the child, the exception does not apply to the victim here.  
                                                 
18 The relevant exception to the definition of "juvenile" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.02(10m) is substantially similar to the exception in the definition of 
"child" in Wis. Stat. § 948.01(1).  Because the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.40(1) refers to "child" rather than "juvenile," and  because the 
relevant legislative history addresses the definition of "child" in chapter 
948, we will continue the analysis by referring to the definition of "child" 
even though the parties and the court of appeals framed their analyses around 
the definition of "juvenile."  As the court of appeals noted, Patterson, 321 
Wis. 2d 752, ¶29 n.12, the analysis would be the same under either term. 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
26 
 
 
¶48 Patterson argues that this reading of § 948.40(1) 
strips the word "delinquency" of any meaning.  He asserts that 
the reference to a child's delinquency implicates the over-
seventeen exception as children must be prosecuted to become 
delinquent.  This argument fails for two reasons.  First, this 
court has expressly held that a conviction under § 948.40(1) for 
contributing to a child's delinquency is not predicated on the 
child actually being adjudicated delinquent.  Riger v. State, 
249 Wis. 201, 204, 23 N.W.2d 456 (1946).  Second, the pattern 
jury instruction explains that for the purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.40(1), 
"delinquency" 
means 
"any 
violation 
of 
state 
criminal law by a child."  Wis JI——Criminal 2170A.  This 
clarifies that the term "delinquency" in Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1) 
requires proof only that the child violated a criminal law, and 
not that the child was prosecuted for that violation.       
 
¶49 While the language is reasonably clear, there is 
claimed ambiguity regarding the interplay between the exception 
in the definition of "child" for prosecution purposes and the 
reference in Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1) to delinquency.  To resolve 
that ambiguity, and in support of our interpretation, we will 
examine the legislative history for further guidance.   
  
 
¶50 The exception in the definition of "child" for the 
purpose of prosecuting children over seventeen was added in 1995 
as part of a revision to juvenile court jurisdiction.  Drafting 
File for 1995 Wis. Act 27, Analysis by the Legislative Reference 
Bureau of 1995 A.B. 150, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, 
Wis.  The Legislative Reference Bureau clarified that the 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
27 
 
purpose of the bill was to "lower[] from 18 to 17 the age at 
which a person who violates a criminal law is subject to the 
jurisdiction 
and 
procedures 
of 
the 
adult 
court 
and, 
on 
conviction, to an adult sentence."  Id.  As jurisdiction over 
the child at issue in § 948.40(1) is not a concern in 
prosecuting 
the 
person 
that 
contributed 
to 
that 
child's 
delinquency, the exception for children over seventeen does not 
apply.  The legislative history supports the plain meaning of 
the language in Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1).  
 
¶51 Therefore, we hold that Patterson's conviction for 
contributing to the delinquency of Tanya was not error on the 
basis claimed by Patterson. 
C. 
Patterson's Jury Instruction Claim 
 
¶52 We now turn to Patterson's claims regarding errors 
during his trial.  We first address Patterson's jury instruction 
claim and then turn to his claim regarding prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
¶53 A jury instruction is erroneous if it fails to clearly 
place the burden of proving all elements of the offense on the 
State.  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).  To ensure 
compliance with the Winship standard, we must "examine the jury 
instruction as a whole [] to determine whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions 
to allow conviction based on" insufficient proof.  State v. 
Avila, 192 Wis. 2d 870, 889, 532 N.W.2d 423 (1995).  The jury 
was instructed as follows regarding the requirements of Wis. 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
28 
 
Stat. 
§ 940.02(2)(a), 
which 
closely 
follows 
the 
pattern 
instruction: 
Before you may find the defendant guilty of this 
offense, the State must prove by evidence which 
satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
following four elements were present: First, that the 
defendant delivered a substance; second, that the 
substance was Oxycodone; third, that the defendant 
thought or believed that the substance was Oxycodone, 
a controlled substance; and fourth, that Tanya [S.] 
used the substance alleged to have been delivered by 
the defendant and died as a result of that use. 
(Emphasis added). 
 
¶54 Patterson asserts that this instruction allowed the 
jury to find him guilty of first-degree reckless homicide by 
delivery of a controlled substance based on mere allegations.  
Specifically, Patterson takes issue with the fourth element in 
the instruction, which he contends permitted the jury to find 
him guilty "on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt."  In 
response, the State points out that, when viewed as a whole, the 
jury instruction is not erroneous because the reference to "the 
substance alleged to have been delivered by the defendant" only 
directs the jury back to the first element of the instruction.  
The court of appeals agreed, explaining that "[t]he 'alleged' 
language in element four is plainly a reference to the substance 
Patterson was alleged to have delivered to Tanya S. in elements 
one and two of the crime.  Those elements, in turn, require 
proof 
that 
Patterson 
actually 
delivered 
the 
Oxycodone."  
Patterson, 321 Wis. 2d 752, ¶32.   
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
29 
 
 
¶55 We agree that, considering the jury instruction as a 
whole, it is not reasonably likely that the jury misunderstood 
the burden of proof.  Under this instruction, even to reach the 
challenged element, the jury must find that the State proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant delivered Oxycodone 
to Tanya.  Once the members of a jury reach the fourth element, 
we are satisfied that they will understand that the language 
refers them back to their previous finding, not that the burden 
has been lowered.19  Therefore, the jury instruction does not 
erroneously relieve the State of its burden of proving all of 
the elements of Wis. Stat. § 940.02(2)(a) beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
D. 
Patterson's Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim 
¶56 We now turn to Patterson's final claim regarding 
alleged 
prosecutorial 
misconduct, 
which 
Patterson 
argues 
entitles him to a new trial.  The circuit court denied 
Patterson's motion for a mistrial, and the court of appeals 
affirmed.  It is well established that a motion for a mistrial 
based on prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed under an erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
standard. 
 
Hoppe 
v. 
State, 
74 
Wis. 2d 107, 119, 246 N.W.2d 122 (1976); State v. Lettice, 205 
Wis. 2d 347, 352, 556 N.W.2d 376 (Ct. App. 1996).  Such a motion 
"is addressed to the sound discretion of the [circuit] court and 
                                                 
19 We also note that these instructions are not only sufficient, but necessary 
to ensure that the defendant is not prejudiced by the instruction.  Any 
alternative to the phrase used in the jury instruction "alleged to have been 
delivered by the defendant" – such as referring to a "substance delivered by 
the defendant" - would have the effect of suggesting that the defendant is 
guilty of the first element before the jury has an opportunity to make that 
determination. 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
30 
 
will not be reversed by this court unless there is evidence of 
[an erroneous exercise] of discretion and prejudice to the 
defendant."  Hoppe, 74 Wis. 2d at 119. 
¶57 Patterson argues that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial because 
the prosecutor's misconduct denied him due process. The alleged 
misconduct is based on four questions in which the prosecutor 
referred 
to 
another 
witness's 
statements 
or 
testimony.  
Patterson contends that in three instances, the prosecutor 
improperly impeached or refreshed the recollection of a witness 
with another witness's statements or testimony.20  Patterson 
agrees with the court of appeals that in a fourth instance, the 
prosecutor violated Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d at 95-96, by asking a 
witness to opine on the truthfulness of another witness's 
statements.  The State responds that the court of appeals 
correctly concluded that only one of the prosecutor's questions 
even arguably violated Haseltine and that any error did not 
prejudice Patterson.   
¶58 We agree with the State that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion.  Under Haseltine, an 
attorney may not ask a witness to testify about the truthfulness 
of another witness' testimony.  Id.  While such questions are 
                                                 
20 Patterson concedes that these three questions were not Haseltine violations 
but nevertheless asserts that they were improper questions.  Generally, 
Patterson asserts that the prosecutor continuously "attempted to shift the 
burden to the defendant" and improperly used another witness's statements or 
testimony to impeach witnesses or refresh their recollection.  Patterson does 
not elaborate on how these questions would shift the burden to the defendant 
or why the use of other witnesses' statements or testimony in the manner is 
improper if it is not a violation of Haseltine.   
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
31 
 
improper, Haseltine violations do not result in reversible error 
unless the opinion testimony "creates too great a possibility 
that the jury abdicated its fact-finding role" to the witness 
and did not independently find the defendant's guilt.  Id. at 
96.  In response to claims of prosecutorial misconduct, a new 
trial is appropriate only when improper questions "so infected 
the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a 
denial of due process."  Neuser, 191 Wis. 2d at 136.  Under 
these guidelines, we examine the allegedly improper questions. 
¶59 In the first instance, the prosecutor referred to 
another 
witness's 
testimony 
to 
refresh 
Janice 
Tappa's 
recollection when cross-examining her.  The prosecutor asked 
Tappa, "[W]hat if Calvin had said that [Tanya] told him that she 
took two pills, would that help to refresh your recollection?"   
¶60 In 
the 
second 
instance, 
during 
the 
redirect 
examination of Patterson's brother, Daniel Perez, the prosecutor 
attempted to impeach his testimony by asking, "So if all other 
witnesses 
said 
that 
at 
11:00 
your 
mom 
was 
already 
home . . . that would be wrong?" 
¶61 In the third instance, the prosecutor referred to an 
exhibit outlining Patterson's statements to police and asked 
Investigator Strompolis about his recollection of Patterson's 
statements.  Contrasting Patterson's statements to police with 
his mother's testimony, the prosecutor asked, "So if Loretta 
Patterson had testified that he kept his most recent Oxycontin 
40-milligram prescription in his pants pocket, would this be the 
first time you heard this?"  Before Investigator Strompolis 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
32 
 
could respond, Patterson's counsel objected, and the prosecutor 
rephrased the question.   
¶62 The fourth instance Patterson asserts was a Haseltine 
violation 
also 
occurred 
during 
the 
prosecutor's 
cross-
examination 
of 
Investigator 
Strompolis. 
 
While 
eliciting 
information about the investigator's interrogation of Misty 
Hale, the prosecutor asked, "Do you believe she was being 
truthful when she gave that information to you or did you stop 
the tape again?"   
 
¶63 We conclude that the first three questions are not 
improper because the other witnesses' statements or testimony 
were used for impeachment purposes or to refresh the witness's 
recollection.  We also agree with the court of appeals that 
these questions were not Haseltine violations because the 
prosecutor was not seeking to elicit the witness's opinion on 
whether those other witnesses' statements were true.   
¶64 Regarding the fourth question, we agree with the court 
of appeals that while it may violate Haseltine because the 
prosecutor asked whether the witness believed another witness's 
statements were true, it did not result in an unfair trial.  See 
Patterson, 321 Wis. 2d 752, ¶36.  In her cross-examination of 
Investigator Strompolis, the prosecutor was responding to 
Patterson's counsel's suggestion that the police did not conduct 
an adequate investigation.  Given this context, it becomes clear 
that 
the 
question 
was 
used 
to 
explain 
why 
Investigator 
Strompolis did not continue with his interrogation of Misty 
Hale, rather than to establish the truth or falsity of Hale's 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
33 
 
statements.  We note that, under these circumstances, any error 
by the prosecutor in asking this question was harmless.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2); State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶69, 245 
Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223 (applying the harmless error statute 
to criminal proceedings).  This particular question in this 
context did not "create[] too great a possibility that the jury 
abdicated its fact-finding role" to the witness or failed 
independently to find the defendant's guilt.  Haseltine, 120 
Wis. 2d at 96.  Nor did this question or any of the other 
allegedly improper questions raised by Patterson "so infect[] 
the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a 
denial of due process." Neuser, 191 Wis. 2d at 136.  The circuit 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying 
Patterson's motion for a mistrial. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶65 We affirm the court of appeals for the reasons stated 
above.  In response to Patterson's first claim, we hold that 
convictions for both first-degree reckless homicide by delivery 
of a controlled substance and contributing to the delinquency of 
a child with death as a consequence are not multiplicitous 
because, in light of the four-part analysis outlined in Davison, 
263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶50, we conclude that the legislature intended 
to permit multiple punishments for these offenses.  On this 
issue, we affirm the court of appeals, but on different grounds.  
We conclude that the convictions are not multiplicitous because 
contributing to the delinquency of a child with death as a 
consequence is not a "type of criminal homicide" for the 
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
34 
 
purposes of Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2), and further that the 
legislature intended to permit cumulative punishments for that 
offense and first-degree reckless homicide by delivery of a 
controlled substance.    
¶66 Regarding the second issue, we hold that Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.40(1) proscribes contributing to the delinquency of any 
child under the age of eighteen, and thus Patterson's conviction 
was proper.  Our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 948.40(1) is 
informed by the plain language and legislative history of the 
definition of "child" in Wis. Stat. § 948.01(1), which excludes 
those over seventeen only for the "purposes of prosecuting" such 
person.   
¶67 Third, we conclude that the jury instruction for 
first-degree reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled 
substance was not erroneous because the jury was properly 
advised that the burden of proving all elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt rested on the State.  Patterson's 
claim that the wording of the fourth element of that crime 
allowed the jury to convict him based on allegations alone is 
not 
reasonable, 
especially 
when 
one 
looks 
at 
the 
jury 
instructions as a whole.   
¶68 Fourth, 
there 
was 
no 
prosecutorial 
misconduct 
warranting a new trial because the single Haseltine violation in 
the seven-day trial in this case did not "so infect[] the trial 
with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of 
due process."  Neuser, 191 Wis. 2d at 136.  We therefore affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals.  
No. 2008AP1968-CR 
 
35 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
   
 
      
 
 
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