Title: PRENTICE CLARK HOUSE, AN EMPLOYEE OF MERIT SERVICES v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PRENTICE CLARK HOUSE, AN EMPLOYEE OF MERIT SERVICES  v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION1985 WY 85701 P.2d 1162Case Number: 84-275Decided: 07/10/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
PRENTICE CLARK HOUSE, AN EMPLOYEE OF MERIT SERVICES, APPELLANT 
(EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLEE (OBJECTOR-DEFENDANT).

Rehearing Denied August 
26, 1985.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

 
 
R. Douglas 
Dumbrill, Hughes & Dumbrill, Sundance, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant appeals from 
an order of the district court denying appellant's application for additional 
benefits under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, § 27-12-101 et seq., W.S. 
1977. The application alleged "increased incapacity due solely to the injury," 
and that the court's order of May 17, 1982 modifying an award of permanent total 
disability "was based on mistakes of fact and mistakes of 
law."

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant was awarded a 
permanent total disability on July 7, 1979, without a hearing, for injuries 
suffered in an accident on October 10, 1977. Pursuant to a hearing on August 27, 
1981, an order of the court dated May 17, 1982 modified the July 7, 1979 order 
such that no further disability sums be paid to appellant inasmuch as he no 
longer suffered incapacity resulting from the October 10, 1977 accident. An 
application for additional benefits was filed December 22, 1983. It resulted in 
the order of September 28, 1984, from which this appeal is 
taken.

[¶4.]     Appellant words the 
issues on appeal:

"1. Did Judge O'Brien 
exceed his jurisdiction in taking away Prentice House's Worker's Compensation 
benefits [in the May 17, 1982 order], thereby committing a mistake which 
justifies reopening of the case?

"2. Has Prentice House, 
as a matter of law, experienced a change in condition which justifies 
reopening?

"3. Should the Supreme 
Court exercise the power of the writ of certiorari to correct the abuses of this 
case?"

[¶5.]     In arguing the first 
and third of these issues, appellant generally contends that errors of law 
occurred in connection with the August 27, 1981 hearing and resulting order of 
May 17, 1982. Not only does the notice of appeal reflect the appeal to be from 
the September 28, 1984 order, but the final nature of the May 17, 1982 order can 
be attacked only by normal appellate procedure or as otherwise authorized by 
statute. Appellant attempted to appeal the May 17, 1982 order, but failed to 
perfect it properly, and the appeal was dismissed. That appeal cannot be 
reinstated at this time to examine issues of law which may have been, and should 
have been, presented at that time.

[¶6.]     As pointed out by the 
district court, the finality of awards made under the Worker's Compensation 
Act1 is relaxed only to the extent 
provided by § 27-12-606, W.S. 1977:

"Where an award of 
compensation has been made in favor of or on behalf of an employee for any 
benefits under this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804], an application may be 
made to the clerk of district court by any party within four (4) years from the 
date of the last award, or at any time during which monthly payments under an 
award are being made, for additional benefits of any type or nature or for a 
modification of the amount of the award on the ground of increase or decrease of 
incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or 
fraud."

Under this 
statute, appellant must meet the burden of establishing (1) a mistake in 
determination of a material fact, (2) 
fraud2, or (3) increase in incapacity due 
solely to the injury. Conn v. Ed Wederski Construction Company, 
Wyo., 668 P.2d 649, 652 (1983).

[¶7.]     Appellant's argument on 
the first issue presented on appeal does not pertain to an issue of fact but 
pertains to an alleged mistake of law which properly should have been presented 
to us in a direct appeal from the May 17, 1982 order and not pursuant to § 
27-12-606, W.S. 1977. To hold otherwise would negate our rules relative to 
timely appeal and allow all worker's compensation appeals for legal error to be 
made within a four-year period - by either party, and for a decrease as well as 
an increase of the award. Uncertainty as to the status of an award for such a 
prolonged period would disrupt the administration of worker's 
compensation.

[¶8.]     Appellant's third issue 
on appeal, a request for review through certiorari, is directed at alleged 
errors in the proceedings which resulted in the May 17, 1982 order. Such 
proceedings were subject to direct appeal. Certiorari is not available to review 
matters on which there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy by direct appeal. 
Call v. Town of Afton, 73 Wyo. 271, 
278 P.2d 270, 273 (1954); City of 
Sheridan v. Cadle, 24 Wyo. 293, 157 P. 892, 895 
(1916). 

[¶9.]     In wording his second 
issue on appeal, appellant contends that the court erred in not finding a change 
in appellant's condition "as a matter of law." Actually, the court's findings in 
this respect were findings of fact. The court's conclusion that appellant 
"failed to show any increase in incapacity since the August 27, 1981 hearing, 
much less that any such claimed increase in incapacity is due solely to the 
October 10, 1977 accident/injury," was based upon the finding of fact that 
appellant "is not presently disabled as a result of the October 10, 1977 
accident," and that his "present condition has not materially changed from his 
condition which apparently existed at the time of the August 27, 1981 hearing." 
Appellant contends that such findings were mistaken and that the mistake 
warranted modification of the award pursuant to § 27-12-606, W.S. 
1977.

[¶10.]  In ascertaining whether or not the court 
did make a mistake, i.e. whether or not there was sufficient evidence to support 
the findings of fact, we

"`* * * assume that 
evidence in favor of the successful party is true, disregarding entirely the 
evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give to the 
evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which may be 
reasonably and fairly drawn from it. * * *'" Anderson v. Bauer, Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316, 1319 (1984), quoting from Richardson v. Green, Wyo., 644 P.2d 778, 779 
(1982).

"* * * Fact questions 
must be decided by the trier of fact, [citations]. We will not substitute our 
judgment for that of the trier of fact, findings of fact will be presumed to be 
correct and we will set them aside on appeal only where such findings are 
`clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of evidence.' [Citations.] * 
* *" Yost v. Harpel Oil Company, 
Wyo., 674 P.2d 712, 716 (1983).

[¶11.]  Medical testimony was received from four 
witnesses. The court found:

"That all of the doctors 
testified to an inability to attribute the onset of the schizophrenic condition 
to any specific event in Claimant's life."

[¶12.]  Dr. William R. Patterson, a psychiatrist, 
diagnosed appellant as a chronic paranoid schizophrenic, and that the condition 
"had been going on at least for several years," and probably pre-existed the 
accident. Dr. Stephen H. Martin testified that, in his opinion, the present 
physical complaints (pain or swelling) were due to simple disuse by appellant. 
Dr. William G. Walter-Ryan testified that if appellant's condition had changed 
at all since the May 17, 1982 order, it had improved. Not only did appellant 
fail to carry the burden of establishing a mistake of fact, but there was 
sufficient evidence to support findings contrary to that which appellant had to 
establish in order to prevail. The evidence was sufficient to support the 
findings of fact made by the trial court, and the only legal conclusion relative 
to increase or decrease in incapacity, if any, and the cause therefor was that 
made by the court.

[¶13.]  Affirmed.

1 Section 27-12-607, W.S. 
1977, provides in part:

"Every award within the 
meaning of this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] is a judicial determination 
of the rights of the employer, the employee and the disposition of money within 
the various accounts provided under this act as to all matters involved. * * *" 
(Emphasis added.)

2 Appellant does not 
contend for the existence of fraud. Fraud is subject to inquiry by a party or by 
the court itself other than by virtue of § 27-12-606. See Restatement of 
Judgments (Second) § 70 (1982).