Title: Drummond v. Delaware

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
DALLAS DRUMMOND, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 247, 2011 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  File No. IK10-02-0412 through 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  IK10-02-0415 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  July 11, 2012 
Decided:  September 6, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED 
 
 
Adam D. Windett, Donovan Hopkins & Windett, LLC, Dover, Delaware for 
appellant. 
 
 
John Williams, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
2 
 
 
 
After a first trial, at which a jury convicted the defendant of three crimes, 
this Court remanded for a new trial because the Superior Court judge failed to 
thoroughly inform the defendant about the significance of his decision to waive 
counsel.  During retrial, the trial judge allowed the State to present a record of the 
testimony given at the first trial.  Later, a prosecution witness referenced the 
defendant’s criminal history while responding to a question on cross examination.  
After being convicted again, the defendant appeals, claiming that both the incidents 
described above warrant a new trial.  Finding no merit to either argument, we 
affirm. 
FACTS 
 
Dallas Drummond was married to Kia Peterson, who lived with the couple’s 
children in an apartment complex.  Drummond could not live with Peterson, for 
two reasons.  First, the apartment complex’s rules banned convicted felons from 
living on the property, and Drummond was one.  Second, management placed 
Drummond on a list of people banned from even visiting the property.  
Consequently, if Drummond entered Peterson’s apartment, or even the apartment 
grounds, he would be trespassing. 
 
On January 19, 2010, Peterson’s neighbor Brandi George saw Drummond in 
the apartment complex.  When Peterson returned from work later that day, 
3 
 
Peterson discovered that her computer was missing.  She called the Smyrna Police 
Department to report the missing computer.   
 
Drummond eventually admitted to Peterson that he had stolen her computer, 
and that he could retrieve it for her, although someone else had it.  George 
overheard this confession.  James Westley had purchased a computer from 
Drummond to give to his grandson.  Peterson gave Westley’s name to the police, 
and Westley voluntarily returned the computer to the police when they asked for it.   
 
On January 26, 2010, Detective Brandon Dunning spoke to Drummond.  
During the conversation, Drummond admitted that he took Peterson’s computer, 
and said that he knew he was not allowed on the grounds of the apartment 
complex. 
 
The State charged Drummond with burglary second degree, theft, theft by 
false pretenses, and criminal trespass third degree.  In the first trial, after the State 
presented its case, and against the advice of his attorney, Drummond chose to 
testify.  The trial judge told Drummond his testimony would be limited to 
answering questions asked by his attorney and the prosecutor.  The judge clarified 
for Drummond that he could not, as he desired, “speak and let the Courts know 
what the truth is and what [he] fe[lt] about [him]self and what [he has] been 
through and what [he has] done wrong in society.”  Drummond responded: 
 
4 
 
Okay.  Basically, I just wanted to ask is that it’s my life that’s on the 
line here, and I don’t feel as though that it’s, like, properly correct to 
not let me speak to the Courts and to the jurors, so I would really like 
to fire counsel at this moment.   
 
After initially denying Drummond’s request, the trial judge ultimately granted it.  
Drummond then testified in narrative form, and gave a closing argument.  The jury 
found him guilty on all charges, and the judge sentenced Drummond to life 
imprisonment because the burglary conviction rendered him a habitual offender.    
 
This Court reversed the conviction, finding that the trial judge should have 
engaged in a more thorough process before permitting Drummond to proceed pro 
se.1  The first trial therefore violated Drummond’s Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, so the Court ordered a new trial.    
   
 
Before Drummond’s second trial, concerning the same charges, Drummond 
filed a motion to exclude his prior trial testimony.  The trial judge denied the 
motion, finding that under Harrison v. United States,2 Drummond did not offer the 
testimony for the purpose of rebutting unconstitutionally admitted evidence.   
 
Also during Drummond’s second trial, Peterson testified, and several 
portions of her testimony led to issues on appeal, although defense counsel failed 
to object to them during trial.  First, the State asked Peterson why she asked the 
apartment’s managers to place Drummond’s name on the banned list.  She 
                                                           
1 Drummond v. State, 15 A.3d 216, at *1 (Del. Mar. 3, 2011) (TABLE). 
2 Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008 (1968). 
5 
 
responded, “We kept having several issues into where I had to call the police and 
pretty much, they could not help me because he would vanish before they got 
there.  So they suggested to me that the only thing that I can do was to put him on 
this list.”  Second, the State asked Peterson if Drummond knew about problems she 
had locking her window.  She responded, “[Y]es, he was aware because he had 
been in my home when he wasn’t supposed to be several times . . . .”  Third, 
Peterson testified about a previous occasion on which she found 20 dollars 
missing, Drummond denied taking it, and then later admitted he had taken the 
money from her.  Drummond’s counsel did not object to any of these statements.     
 
In response to two other statements Peterson made while testifying, 
Drummond’s counsel moved for a mistrial.  First, Peterson stated during direct 
examination that she went to management regarding Drummond “because he was 
stealing several items from me and my neighbor.”  Second, in response to a 
question on cross-examination regarding when Drummond had the car, Peterson 
stated “August – August, he got out of jail.”  The trial judge denied both motions 
for a mistrial, although he did instruct the jury to disregard the statement that in 
August Drummond had emerged from jail.      
 
 
At the conclusion of Drummond’s second trial, the jury acquitted him of 
burglary second degree, but convicted him of the remaining charges.  This appeal 
followed.   
6 
 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
This Court reviews a trial judge’s decision to deny a defendant’s motion for 
mistrial to determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion.3  Where defense 
counsel failed to object, we will only require a new trial if the failure to order a 
new trial constituted plain error.4  We review de novo Drummond’s claim that the 
use of his testimony from the first trial violated his constitutional rights.5 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. 
The Admission of Drummond’s Testimony from the First Trial was, at 
Worst, Harmless Error 
 
 
The United States Supreme Court sorts violations of the right to counsel into 
two groups.  The most serious violations, those that led to “structural defects in the 
constitution of the trial mechanism itself,” can never be subject to harmless error 
analysis.6  In contrast, “An appellate court may quantitatively assess ‘trial errors’ in 
the admission of evidence . . . against the other evidence in the case to determine 
whether the admission of a confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”7   
                                                           
3 Michaels v. State, 970 A.2d 223, 229 (Del. 2009); Allen v. State, 970 A.2d 203, 215 (Del. 
2009).   
4 Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
5 Swan v. State, 28 A.3d 362, 382 (Del. 2011). 
6 Deputy v. State, 602 A.2d 1081, at *1 (Del. Sept. 3, 1991) (TABLE) (citing Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)).  See also Reid v. U.S., 2012 
WL 2541904 at *11 (D.Del. Jun. 27, 2012) (discussing the distinction between structural errors 
and errors in the trial process). 
7 Id.   
7 
 
 
The admission of Drummond’s testimony counts, at most, as a “trial error.”  
The testimony from the first trial was but one piece of evidence, and as such did 
not affect the trial mechanism.  More broadly, evidence admitted in violation of a 
defendant’s right counts as a “trial error,” not a structural error.  In Deputy, this 
Court examined the admission of a confession obtained in violation of the 
defendant’s right to counsel, and the Court found the error harmless.8   
 
The admission of Drummond’s earlier testimony, if an error at all, plainly 
constituted harmless error.  Drummond faced a mountain of convincing evidence.  
First, he confessed to Peterson that he took the computer, and George overheard 
the confession.  Second, Whitely testified he bought the computer from 
Drummond.  Third, Drummond admitted his crimes to the police detective.   
 
Some language in Cooke v. State suggests that this Court will never use 
harmless error analysis for violations of the right to counsel.  In Cooke, the Court 
said that “The assistance of counsel is among those constitutional rights so basic to 
a fair trial that their denial can never be treated as harmless error.”9  Despite this 
broad language, Cooke presented a much different factual setting.  In Cooke, the 
                                                           
8 Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581, 592 (Del. 1985) (“We, therefore, rule that the second taped 
confession of defendant was improperly admitted in violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.  However, our decision in this matter does not mandate complete reversal under 
the facts of this case.  Despite the fact that the defendant’s second confession was erroneously 
admitted into evidence, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to 
the felony murder convictions.”).   
 
9 Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 850 (Del. 2009) (quoting State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1148 
(Kan. 2000)). 
8 
 
Court considered a trial that included defense counsel who “failed to function in 
any meaningful sense as the [prosecution’s] adversary.”10  That failing had broad 
effects and justified a new trial, just as we granted to Drummond on his first appeal 
to this Court.  On appeal from the second criminal trial he faced, Drummond 
presents an error premised on the admission of evidence, not the denial of counsel.  
Errors concerning the admission of evidence, like the admission of this testimony, 
qualify for harmless error review.   
B. 
The Trial Judge did not Err by Refusing to Grant a Mistrial 
 
On appeal, Drummond argues that two groups of statements should have 
triggered a mistrial.  First, he argues the trial judge committed clear error by failing 
to grant a mistrial sua sponte in response to some statements made by Peterson, 
namely those listed above as having triggered no objection or motion from 
Drummond’s counsel.  Second, Drummond argues that the trial judge abused his 
discretion by denying the motions for a mistrial.  We find no merit to either 
suggestion. 
 
To constitute clear error, “the alleged error must affect substantial rights, 
generally meaning that it must have affected the outcome of [the] trial.”11  The 
defendant bears the burden of persuasion to demonstrate prejudice.12 
                                                           
10 Id. at 850 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 666, 104 S.Ct. 2039 (1984)).    
11 McNally v. State, 980 A.2d 364, 367 (Del. 2009); Castura v. State, 977 A.2d 898, at *3 (Del. 
Jul. 16, 2009) (TABLE); Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006).   
9 
 
 
Drummond has not carried his burden to demonstrate that any of the 
statements to which his attorney did not object affected the outcome of the trial.  
Three persons, one a police officer, testified that they heard Drummond confess to 
stealing the computer.  Another person testified that he purchased the computer 
from Drummond.  Nevertheless, the jury found Drummond not guilty on the felony 
burglary charge.  In light of the other overwhelming evidence, Drummond has 
failed to prove that any of these statements mattered enough to constitute 
prejudice. 
 
Moreover, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying a motion 
for a mistrial in response to the statements to which Drummond’s counsel objected.  
The parties brief these extra comments as if they were an outburst, as occurred in 
Taylor v. State.13  But Taylor focused on the effect of a dramatic outburst, during 
which a witness had an emotional breakdown while testifying, and was unable to 
continue.14  This case, in contrast, concerns extra information supplied by a witness 
in response to questions asked by attorneys.     
 
When deciding whether a witness that gives an answer that goes beyond 
what was asked and provides prejudicial information requires a mistrial, a trial 
judge should consider four factors: “the nature and frequency of the conduct or 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
12 Id.   
13 690 A.2d 933 (Del. 1997).   
14 Id. at 934.   
10 
 
comments, the likelihood of resulting prejudice, the closeness of the case and the 
sufficiency of the trial judge’s efforts to mitigate any prejudice in determining 
whether a witness’s conduct was so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial.”15  This 
Court grants deference to a trial judge: “A trial judge sits in the best position to 
determine the prejudicial effect of an unsolicited response by a witness on the 
jury.”16 
 
It would be fair to say that Peterson made multiple statements indicating that 
she had trouble with Drummond and that he had trouble with the law.  The jury 
could surmise as much from the necessary evidence.  Drummond, after all, was 
barred from living with his own wife and children, hardly a normal circumstance.  
And Drummond’s wife served as the complaining witness in a case about the theft 
of a computer.  These comments, then, had a negligible chance of causing 
prejudice and, as discussed above, the case was not close.  Moreover, on one of the 
occasions the judge instructed the jury to focus on only that portion of Peterson’s 
testimony that directly responded to the question.  Given the significance of these 
statements in light of the weight of the evidence against Drummond, the trial judge 
did not abuse his discretion by refusing to grant a mistrial.   
                                                           
15 Pena v. State, 856 A.2d 548, 550 (Del. 2004); see also Dickens v. State, 2 A.3d 73, at *4 (Del. 
Jul. 23, 2010) (TABLE).   
16 Pena, 856 A.2d at 550.   
11 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgments.