Title: City of South Burlington v. Dept. of Corrections

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

City of South Burlington v. Dept. of Corrections (99-308); 171 Vt. 587; 
762 A.2d 1229

[File 19-Jul-2000]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 23-Oct-2000]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 99-308

                              MARCH TERM, 2000

City of South Burlington	       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	Chittenden Superior Court
                                       }	
                                       }
Vermont Department of Corrections      }	DOCKET NO. S0033-99 CnC

Trial Judge: Matthew I. Katz

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       The City of South Burlington appeals from a dismissal of their action
  for failure to state a  claim for an injunction enforcing the terms of a
  zoning permit granted to the Department of  Corrections.  The City argues
  that the trial court erred in: (1) holding that the Department was not 
  bound by the exclusivity-of-remedy provision for zoning disputes under  24
  V.S.A. § 4472; and (2)  holding that the Department is, as an agency of the
  sovereign, immune from local zoning regulations.  We agree with the first
  claim of error and reverse.

       The State of Vermont, through the Department of Corrections (the
  Department),  operates a  prison on property located in the City of South
  Burlington (the City).  In 1992, the Department  applied to the City
  Planning Commission for site plan approval to add 5,000 square feet of 
  administrative space to the Chittenden Regional Correctional Facility.  In
  its application, the  Department represented that the expansion would not
  result in an increase in either inmates or  employees.  The Planning
  Commission therefore made specific findings of fact that the facility 
  would not increase its number of employees nor its number of inmates.   The
  Commission went on to  note that no additional parking spaces were needed,
  nor would any additional sewer demand be  generated because there would not
  be any additional inmates or employees.  The Commission also  observed that
  although the prison was a prior nonconforming use, the degree of
  nonconformity  would not increase due to the administrative expansion.  The
  Commission concluded, "[t]his  approval is conditional on a maximum of 197
  permanent or semi-permanent beds.  Any increase in  permanent or
  semi-permanent beds shall require Planning Commission approval."  The
  Department  did not appeal this decision.  Seven years passed.

       In January 1999, the City sought to enjoin the Department from using
  the facility to house  more than 197 inmates.  The City alleges that since
  1997 the Department has regularly housed more  than 197 inmates at the
  facility.  The Department moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming 
  sovereign immunity from suit, and the court granted the motion.  The City
  appeals.   

 

       Below, the City argued that 24 V.S.A. § 4472 barred the Department
  from challenging the  validity of the 197-inmate limitation because the
  Department did not appeal the 1992 decision.   Section 4472(a) provides:

    Except as provided in subsection (b) and (c) hereof, the exclusive
    remedy  of an interested person with respect to any decision or
    act taken, or any  failure to act, [in a matter of municipal
    planning and zoning] shall be the  appeal to the board of
    adjustment or the development review board under  section 4464 of
    this title.
    
  We have "strictly enforced the exclusivity-of-remedy provision consistent
  with the evident legislative  intent to require all zoning contests to go
  through the administrative review process in a timely  fashion."  Town of
  Sandgate v Colehamer, 156 Vt. 77, 84, 589 A.2d 1205, 1209 (1990)
  (collecting  cases).   We have recognized that the policy underlying the
  statute is to assure parties of finality.  See  Levy v. Town of St. Albans,
  152 Vt. 139, 142, 564 A.2d 1361, 1363 (1989).  Thus,  subsection (d) 
  declares:

    Upon failure of any interested person to appeal to a board of
    adjustment  under section 4464 of this title, or to appeal to a
    superior court under  section 4471 of this title, all interested
    persons affected shall be bound by  such decision or act . . . and
    shall not thereafter contest, either directly or  indirectly, such
    decision or act . . . in any proceedings, including, without 
    limitation, any proceeding brought to enforce this chapter.  

  24 V.S.A. § 4472(d) (emphasis added).  The broad and unmistakable language
  of this provision is  designed to prevent any kind of collateral attack on
  a zoning decision that has not been properly  appealed through the
  mechanisms provided by the municipal planning and development statutes.  

       We have enforced these sections of § 4472, which are two sides of the
  same coin, uniformly in  cases stretching back several decades.   In
  Colehamer, 156 Vt. at 85, 589 A.2d  at 1210, we held that  the plain
  language of § 4472 "clearly applies to defenses raised in enforcement
  proceedings and  clearly applies to attacks on the validity of zoning
  provisions unless they raise constitutional issues."  We therefore held
  that the defendant who had received a citation for violating a zoning
  ordinance  was required to appeal the citation to challenge the ordinance's
  validity.  See id.at 85-86, 589 A.2d  at  1210.  We reviewed the cases
  enforcing the exclusivity-of-remedy provision and concluded that the  broad
  right of appeal, coupled with the plain language of the statute, barred the
  defendant from  collaterally attacking the zoning ordinance.  See id.  In
  Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354,  357, 609 A.2d 638, 639-40
  (1992), we held that Colehamer applied to affirmative defenses and 
  therefore the defendants' affirmative defense of a permitted nonconforming
  use was barred by failure  to properly appeal a zoning decision under §
  4472.  

 

       In perhaps the most closely analogous case, we held that where the
  zoning board issued a  building permit to a dog-racing facility and the
  superior court later found the approval to have been  void as beyond the
  board's authority to grant, plaintiff-neighbors were barred from attacking
  that  board decision by § 4472.  See Levy, 152 Vt. at 142, 564 A.2d  at
  1364. We observed that § 4472  "implements a policy of repose . . . . [to
  ensure] the orderly governance of development."  Id. at 143,  564 A.2d  at
  1364.   As the plaintiffs had not appealed the original decision of the
  zoning board but  were attempting to collaterally attack it in Levy, we
  concluded that § 4472 "forecloses such a  contest" and deprives the court
  of jurisdiction to hear such claims.  Id. at 142, 564 A.2d  at 1363.   As 
  does the Department in this case, the Levy plaintiffs argued that § 4472
  does not apply where the  zoning decision was void at the time it was made. 
  We rejected that argument, noting that the  Legislature chose to provide
  finality and repose in zoning disputes, and concluded that this policy 
  prevailed "even where the board's ruling is ultra vires."  Id. at 143, 564 A.2d  at 1364. 

       Levy relied in part on Graves v. Town of Waitsfield, 130 Vt. 292, 295,