Title: Sellers v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Sellers v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.1999 WY 63979 P.2d 959Case Number: 97-199Decided: 05/21/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: KAREN SELLERS, Appellant 
(Petitioner/Employee-Claimant),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, ex 
rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee 
(Respondent/Objector-Defendant).

Appeal from the W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certification from the District Court of Sweetwater County, The 
Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge.

Michael D. 
Newman of Honaker, Hampton & Newman, Rock Springs, WY. Argument by Mr. 
Newman, Representing Appellant.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and 
Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Haggerty, 
Representing Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired November 2, 1998.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Karen 
Sellers injured her lumbar spine while exiting her work vehicle. Worker's 
Compensation Division (Division) denied Sellers' request for benefits, stating 
that exiting a vehicle is an activity of day-to-day living and, therefore, not 
compensable under § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) of the Worker's Compensation Act (Act). 
The hearing examiner agreed and denied benefits. Because we hold that an 
activity that is under the employer's control and direction does not constitute 
an activity of day-to-day living, we reverse the decision of the hearing 
examiner.

[¶2]      
ISSUES

Sellers presents 
the following issues for our review:

Was the Office 
of Administrative Hearings' decision denying benefits arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law?

Was the Office 
of Administrative Hearings' decision denying benefits supported by substantial 
evidence?

The Division 
states the issue:

The Employee 
injured her back while exiting a pickup truck while working. The Hearing 
Examiner found that exiting the truck was a normal activity of day-to-day living 
excluded from the definition of "injury."

A. Was the 
Hearing Examiner's decision supported by substantial evidence and in accordance 
with law?

FACTS

[¶3]      Sellers, an 
animal control officer for the City of Rock Springs, injured her lumbar spine 
while exiting her work truck on October 1, 1995. The next day, Sellers sought 
medical treatment. When Sellers requested medical and temporary total disability 
benefits, the Division denied her claim pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1994), stating that A[t] here was no injury 
or accident indicated on the accident report. "Upon Sellers' request, the 
Division referred her contested case to the Office of Administrative Hearings 
(OAH), which held a hearing on July 23, 1996. At the hearing, Sellers' treating 
chiropractic expert testified with a reasonable degree of probability that the 
immediate cause of [Sellers'] condition was, in fact, stepping out of the truck 
and jarring, twisting and jarring her back." The OAH denied benefits, finding 
that "`[i]njury' does not include . . . [a] ny injury resulting primarily . . . 
from the normal activities of day-to-day living," and that the acts of entering 
and exiting a motor vehicle are normal activities of day-to-day living and, 
hence, any injuries arising therefrom are not compensable . . . ." 

[¶4]      Relying upon the 
recent decision in Cabral v. Caspar Bldg. Systems, Inc., 920 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 
1996), Sellers sought reconsideration. On December 18, 1996, the OAH held a 
hearing on Sellers' reconsideration motion and again denied her request for 
benefits, stating "[n]o medical evidence or other evidence was presented that 
showed some unique work related circumstance or event occurred when the Claimant 
was exiting the vehicle which could take the Claimant's injury out of an act of 
everyday living." Sellers appealed, and the district court certified the case to 
this court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶5]      W.R.A.P. 12.09(a) 
limits judicial review of an agency's decision to those matters specified in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (Michie 1997). Everheart v. S & L Industrial, 
957 P.2d 847, 851 (Wyo. 1998). Section 16-3-114(c) states, in relevant 
part:

[T] he court 
shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due 
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:

. . . 
.

(ii) Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law[.]

[¶6]      When reviewing an 
administrative decision, we will not defer to the agency's conclusions of law. 
Nelson v. Sheridan Manor, 939 P.2d 252, 255 (Wyo. 1997). Conversely, we will 
defer to an agency's findings of fact as long as the agency's findings of fact 
comport with the evidence. Pederson v. State, ex rel. Workers' Compensation 
Div., 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997). We review a case under the arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse-of-discretion, or otherwise-not-in-accordance-with-law 
standard when an agency decides that the party charged with the burden of proof 
has failed to meet that burden. Id.; City of Casper v. Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 452 
(Wyo. 1995). The party with the burden of proof has the duty to prove a fact in 
dispute among the parties. Utech, 895 P.2d  at 450. "We will reverse a 
determination that a claimant has failed to meet its burden of proof only if it 
is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or not in accordance with law." 
Stuckey v. State, ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 890 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wyo. 
1995).

[¶7]      Under the Act, 
the burden to prove all the essential elements of the claim rests on the 
claimant. Martinez v. State, ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 917 P.2d 619, 
621 (Wyo. 1996). Once the claimant has satisfied this burden, the burden shifts, 
requiring the Division to produce evidence that the injury is excluded from the 
Act's coverage by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G). To satisfy its burden, 
the Division is required to submit evidence showing that the claimant was 
injured while engaging in an activity of day-to-day living. Cabral, 920 P.2d  at 
270.

DISCUSSION

Defining A 
Anormal activities of day-to-day living

[¶8]      The legislature 
amended § 27-14-102(a)(xi) in 1994 to exclude normal activities of daily living 
from the definition of injury and from coverage:

"Injury" means 
any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and includes 
damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in 
the course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used 
or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the 
employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the 
employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business. "Injury" does not 
include:

. . . 
.

(G) Any injury 
resulting primarily from the natural aging process or from the normal activities 
of day-to-day living, as established by medical evidence supported by objective 
findings.

[¶9]      The Division 
asserts the above language is unambiguous. However, the more reasonable 
conclusion is that the statute is unclear inasmuch as it excludes "normal 
activities of day-to-day living" from coverage without defining what that phrase 
encompasses or including standards for its application. In defining the phrase 
"the normal activities of day-today living," we recently held the 
right-of-control test was the appropriate standard to determine whether the 
activity in question was a normal activity of day-to-day living. State, ex rel. 
Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. v. Sparks, 973 P.2d 507, 511 (Wyo. 
1999). If the employer has the right to control the employee's work environment, 
the details of the activity the employee was engaged in when injured, and the 
injury arises out of the employee's course of employment, then the "normal 
activities of day-to-day living" exception does not apply. Id.  To hold otherwise would cause the Act to 
be devoid of any real coverage for workers injured on the 
job.

Application of 
Cabral

[¶10]   Contrary to the hearing examiner's 
conclusion, Sellers was not required to show that "some unique work related 
circumstance or event occurred when [Sellers] was exiting the vehicle which 
could take [her] injury out of an act of everyday living." The burden to prove 
that Sellers' injury came within the normal daily activity exception of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) rested upon the Division. "The plain language 
of this statute requires that medical evidence, which is supported by objective 
findings, be presented to establish that the claimant's injury resulted 
primarily from the normal activities of day-to-day living." Cabral, 920 P.2d  at 
270.

[¶11]   It is uncontested that Sellers was 
engaged in job-related duties when she injured her back while exiting her 
vehicle. Sellers satisfied her burden by providing evidence that she was injured 
while fulfilling her employment duties. The Division, however, offered no 
medical evidence to establish that Sellers' injury resulted primarily from the 
normal activities of daily living or to discount Dr. Arguello's testimony. The 
Division, therefore, failed to meet its burden to show that the injury was not 
work related. Merely stating that exiting a vehicle is an act of daily living is 
insufficient to satisfy the Division's burden of proof. The Division, in 
accordance with the right-of-control test, must present evidence to show that 
the activity in question is a normal activity of day-to-day living. Accordingly, 
we are bound to set aside the hearing examiner's decision since it misapplies 
and contradicts Cabral and is, therefore, not in accordance with law. Stuckey v. 
State, ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 890 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wyo. 
1995).

CONCLUSION

[¶12]   The hearing examiner erred in 
concluding that Sellers' injury was a normal activity of day-to-day living and, 
thus, excluded from coverage by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G). Since 
Sellers' employer had the right to control the details of her work environment 
and direct her activities, the daily living exception is not applicable. Sellers 
satisfied her burden by proving her injury was compensable; the Division failed 
to meet its burden of producing evidence demonstrating that Sellers' injury 
resulted primarily from the normal activities of day-to-day living. Hence, 
Sellers' injury is covered by the Act, and the hearing examiner's decision was 
arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law.

[¶13]   Reversed.