Title: People v. Williams

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 85453-Agenda 4-January 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								JACQUELINE ANNETTE WILLIAMS, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 12, 2000.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	On November 16, 1995, Debra Evans was fatally shot and
stabbed in the Addison apartment where she lived with James
Edwards and her children, Samantha, Joshua, and Jordan. Debra
was nine months pregnant, and the baby she was carrying, Elijah
Evans, was cut from her womb. Samantha was killed in the
apartment with her mother. Joshua and Elijah were taken from the
apartment, and Jordan was left alone in the apartment with his
dead mother and sister. The day after Debra's and Samantha's
murders, police found Joshua's dead body in an alley in Maywood.
When police arrested defendant, Jacqueline Annette Williams, on
November 17, she was holding Elijah, who was still alive. In
connection with the murders and kidnappings of the members of
the Evans family, defendant, her cousin Laverne Ward, and her
boyfriend Fedell Caffey were jointly indicted on several counts of
first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping. They were tried
separately.
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Du Page County,
defendant was convicted of the first degree murders of Debra,
Samantha, and Joshua Evans. She was also convicted of the
aggravated kidnappings of Joshua and Elijah Evans. The same jury
found defendant eligible for the death penalty and found no
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death
penalty. The circuit court sentenced defendant to death for the first
degree murders of Debra, Samantha, and Joshua Evans. At a
separate sentencing proceeding, the circuit court sentenced
defendant to 15 years' imprisonment for the aggravated
kidnapping of Joshua Evans and imposed a consecutive 15-year
sentence for the aggravated kidnapping of Elijah Evans.
	Defendant directly appeals her murder convictions and death
sentence to this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d
R. 603. Her death sentence has been stayed pending our review.
134 Ill. 2d R. 609(a).


BACKGROUND 

	At defendant's trial, James Edwards testified that in
November 1995, he was living with Debra and her three children
in a two-bedroom apartment in Addison, Illinois. Samantha was
10 years old, Joshua was 7 years old, and Jordan was almost 2
years old. Debra was nine months pregnant and was scheduled to
enter the hospital on Sunday, November 19, to have labor induced.
	At about 5:30 p.m. on November 16, 1995, Edwards left for
his job. When he returned, after leaving work at 2:30 a.m., Jordan
met him in the kitchen. Jordan was alive. Edwards found Debra
lying on the living room floor between a coffee table and a love
seat. She was unresponsive, and Edwards observed a large wound
to her stomach. Samantha was lying on the floor in the children's
bedroom. Her neck had been slashed. Joshua was missing.
Edwards called 911.
	Edwards further testified that several items were missing from
the apartment, including a Grambling State University Tigers
jacket and a pair of poultry shears. In addition, on the bed that he
and Debra shared, there was an Ace bandage that Edwards had
never seen before.
	Patrice Scott testified that, shortly after midnight on
November 17, 1995, defendant, who was a friend of hers, came to
the Villa Park apartment Scott shared with Dwight Pruitt and
Scott's three daughters. Joshua was with defendant, and defendant
had blood on her sweater. Joshua was wearing a coat and boots but
no socks or pants.
	According to Scott, defendant asked if Joshua could spend the
night at Scott's apartment because his mother had been shot "out
west" during a drug deal, and defendant was going to visit her in
the hospital. Defendant also told Scott that she, defendant, had
given birth and would bring the new baby with her when she came
to retrieve Joshua in the morning.
	After defendant left, Scott asked Joshua what his name was.
He told her his name and said he needed to use the bathroom.
Joshua used the bathroom, and Scott put him to bed on her living
room couch. During the night, Scott heard Joshua whimpering and
crying in his sleep. Around 5 a.m., Scott arose to feed her
newborn, Alexis. Joshua was still whimpering and crying in his
sleep. When he awakened around 6 or 7 a.m., he was crying.
	Scott testified that she asked Joshua if he was worried about
his mother and told him that his mother would be okay. Joshua
replied, "No, no, she's not," and said that his mother and sister
were dead. He explained that four burglars had come through the
window and cut his mother and sister. He said that his little
brother had been left in the apartment and asked Scott to get
Jordan. Joshua told Scott that he had been hiding in the apartment
and that, when the burglars left, he ran out after defendant, who
brought him to Scott's apartment. Joshua repeated this story
several times.
	Scott asked Joshua if he knew who the burglars were. Joshua
identified the burglars as Annette, Fedell, Vern, and "Boo-Boo."
According to Scott, defendant is usually called Annette, and
defendant has a relative named Bo Wilson. Scott admitted that she
did not initially tell police that Joshua had named Fedell and
"Boo-Boo" as two of the burglars. She testified that she was afraid
of Fedell.
	Joshua continued crying after he told Scott what had
happened to his family. Scott's daughters entered the living room
and one of them read Joshua a book. Joshua listened to her read,
but his emotional state did not change significantly. When Scott's
daughters left for school, Joshua told Scott to chain the door
because the burglars might return.
	Scott further testified that, around 9 a.m., defendant returned
to the Villa Park apartment. Scott informed her that there was a
discrepancy between what defendant said had happened to
Joshua's mother and what Joshua said had happened. Scott also
told defendant that Joshua had named her, Vern, and Fedell as the
"burglars" who had entered his apartment. Defendant became
angry at Joshua, cursed at him, and accused him of lying. In
response, Joshua asserted repeatedly, "No, no, that's what
happened."
	According to Scott, defendant then told Joshua that his mother
had left him some medicine. Joshua replied, "What medicine, I
don't take any medication." Defendant brought him into the
kitchen and gave him something, after which he gagged and
vomited. Scott again asked defendant about what Joshua had told
her that morning. Defendant said that Joshua talked too much and
that Caffey had told her to take him south to the "projects."
	Scott testified that she then agreed to go to defendant's house
so that defendant could give Scott some baby outfits for Alexis.
Defendant drove Scott, Alexis, and Joshua in a gray four-door car
to her Schaumburg townhouse. At the townhouse, defendant first
brought Scott to a bedroom. Caffey and a white baby boy with
blond hair and tape on his stomach were on the bed in the
bedroom. Defendant then asked Scott to bring Joshua to the
laundry room in the townhouse.
	Scott testified that Caffey and an unidentified man were
already in the laundry room. Scott denied that this man was Ward
or Bo Wilson and denied that Wilson had threatened to kill her.
After the unidentified man left, defendant told Caffey, "[Joshua's]
got a big mouth. He knows - he knows our names. He said my
name, your name and Vern's name." Caffey asked defendant why
she had brought Scott to the house and why she had not taken
Joshua "out south" as he had instructed.
	Defendant told Joshua to sit on the day bed in the laundry
room and picked up a rope from the floor of the laundry room. She
wrapped it around Joshua's neck, and she and Caffey began
strangling Joshua with the rope. Joshua and Scott screamed, Scott
pushed defendant, and defendant dropped the rope.
	Defendant then left the laundry room and returned holding a
knife behind her back. According to Scott, Caffey did not instruct
defendant to get the knife. When Scott saw the knife, she screamed
and asked Caffey and defendant to take her home and to free
Joshua. Defendant threw the knife on the bed. Caffey instructed
defendant to take Scott home and informed Scott that, if she told
anyone what had happened, he would kill her and her whole
family. Scott grabbed Alexis and sat in the front seat of the gray
car, which was parked in the garage of the townhouse. Defendant
instructed Joshua to sit in the back seat, which he did. Scott looked
into the back seat and saw Caffey stabbing Joshua as defendant
appeared to be holding Joshua's arm. Scott felt Joshua kick the
seat and heard him gagging.
	Defendant then moved to the driver's seat of the car, and
Caffey told her, "You know where to go." Joshua was whimpering
in the back seat, and Scott was afraid for her life and her baby's
life. They drove to Maywood, where defendant and Caffey took
Joshua from the car and helped him walk to the back of a building.
Defendant and Caffey returned without Joshua. Defendant left
Caffey in Maywood and drove Scott to her apartment in Villa
Park.
	When Scott and defendant arrived at Scott's apartment,
defendant asked Scott for cleaning products to remove vomit from
her car. Scott gave her some cleaning supplies, and defendant
drove away.
	Pruitt's testimony about the events in Villa Park essentially
mirrored Scott's. He added that he was watching the midday news
around 11 a.m. on November 17 when he saw a television news
story about the homicides in Addison. He attempted to call the
police but could not find a working telephone until after defendant
left Scott at the Villa Park apartment, around 12 p.m. After the
police arrived, Pruitt and Scott accompanied them to Maywood,
and Scott showed police the location where defendant and Caffey
had left Joshua.
	Pruitt admitted that, at the time of trial, he was serving a
prison sentence for a weapons charge. He also testified that he was
a gang member and had previous convictions for armed robbery
and unlawful possession of a controlled substance.
	Defendant's sister, Tina Martin, testified that, at 3:30 a.m. on
November 17, 1995, she received a call from defendant.
Defendant stated that she had just given birth and was at a friend's
house. Martin and her mother went to the friend's house, where
they saw defendant, Caffey, and a baby with light coloring.
	Members of several different police departments and the Cook
and Du Page County state's attorneys' offices testified to the
circumstances of defendant's arrest and her statements to them.
They testified that, during the afternoon of November 17, Joshua's
partially clothed body was found in an alley in Maywood. That
night, police arrested defendant and Caffey at defendant's
Schaumburg townhouse. At the time of their arrest, defendant was
carrying Elijah in an infant carrier, and Caffey was wearing the
Grambling Tigers jacket taken from the Addison apartment. Police
examined Elijah, who was alive, and observed a bloody piece of
gauze taped over his navel.
	In her initial conversations with police and prosecutors,
defendant minimized her role in the murders and kidnappings. For
example, during some conversations, she stated that Elijah was her
son, and she had given birth at a friend's house on November 16.
Defendant also stated that Caffey was the baby's father and that
the baby's name was Fedell Caffey, Jr. In other conversations,
defendant told police that Caffey and Ward went to the Addison
apartment to speak to Debra about the unborn baby and to teach
Debra a lesson. Defendant knew there would be "trouble" when
they went to the apartment. At Caffey and Ward's request,
defendant met them in the apartment building parking lot at about
10 p.m. on November 16. Caffey exited the building and handed
a newborn baby to defendant.
	Similarly, defendant attributed much of the responsibility for
Joshua's kidnapping and murder to Scott and Caffey. For example,
she told police that Scott gave Joshua Visine and soda pop to
drink. Defendant also said that Caffey and Scott wanted her to
leave Joshua in the "projects," but she could not, so she brought
him to the Schaumburg townhouse. According to defendant,
Caffey was angry that she brought Joshua to the townhouse and
asked her to get a knife, which she did. Caffey then instructed
defendant and Scott to pull on the ends of a cord wrapped around
Joshua's neck. Caffey told defendant to drive to Maywood and
stabbed Joshua during the car ride. Defendant further stated that,
after they left Joshua in an alley in Maywood, Scott threw a sheet
in which Joshua had been wrapped out of the car window as they
drove by the Baldwin piano factory.
	In a written statement defendant signed on November 18,
however, defendant admitted to a greater role in the murders and
kidnappings of the members of the Evans family. She stated that
she and Caffey had been dating for two years. Throughout their
relationship, defendant and Caffey had attempted to conceive a
child. Caffey wanted a baby boy with light skin so that the baby
would resemble him. Defendant had become pregnant, but one
pregnancy had ended in an abortion and another had ended with a
miscarriage.
	According to defendant's statement, Ward was upset with
Debra during the four months that preceded the murders. On
November 16, 1995, Ward, Caffey, and defendant drove to
Debra's apartment in the gray Sable because Ward wanted to talk
to Debra about their son Jordan. Debra was pregnant and planned
to deliver her baby on Monday. Debra had chosen to name the
baby Elijah.
	Defendant further stated that she, Caffey, and Ward arrived at
the Evans apartment at about 9 p.m. Debra let them into the
building and apartment. Debra sat on a small couch, and she and
defendant had a conversation about their children. Subsequently,
while defendant was in the bathroom, she heard a loud ringing
noise. She exited the bathroom and saw Debra lying on her back.
Debra's eyes were blinking rapidly, and bubbles were coming
from her mouth. Caffey was holding a small silver automatic gun.
Ward was standing beside Debra and appeared to be stabbing her
in the neck.
	Caffey then made a cut "crossways" on Debra's abdomen
with the poultry shears. As he cut, defendant could see the head of
a baby. She and Caffey wanted the baby because it was a boy.
Caffey pulled the baby from Debra and cut the umbilical cord
while defendant stood next to him. Caffey did not want the baby
at that point because he thought he had killed the baby, but
defendant still wanted the baby. She blew into the baby's nose and
mouth, and he began breathing.
	Defendant further stated that, as she dressed the baby in a
sleeper, Caffey and Ward went into the children's bedroom.
Joshua ran from the bedroom crying that Caffey and Ward were
hurting his sister. Defendant covered Debra with a blanket, but
when Joshua saw his mother, he vomited and ran to the bathroom.
	Defendant began to leave the apartment with the baby. Joshua
grabbed her legs and said that he did not want to stay there
because Caffey and Ward were bad. Defendant and Joshua exited
the apartment through the back entrance. Caffey and Ward joined
them in the car and they all drove to a location on Roosevelt Road,
where Ward exited the car. Defendant and Caffey then drove to
Scott's, where they left Joshua. Defendant lied and told Scott that
Joshua's mother had been shot at a "drug spot."
	Defendant stated that she and Caffey then drove to the house
of a friend, where they placed a bandage on the baby's navel.
Defendant and Caffey spent the night at the Schaumburg
townhouse, where they washed some of the baby's blood from the
coat Caffey had stolen from the Addison apartment.
	On Friday morning, defendant returned to Scott's apartment
and learned that Joshua had told Scott about the murders.
Defendant knew at that point that they "were in deep trouble." She
took Joshua to the Schaumburg townhouse. Scott came with them
because she wanted to see defendant's baby.
	According to defendant's written statement, Caffey and Ward
were at the townhouse. They were all afraid that Joshua would
identify them. Caffey told defendant to tie a scarf around Joshua's
mouth, which she did. Ward left the townhouse at that point.
Defendant asked Joshua to sit on the bed and tried to poison him
by having him swallow "antiseptic." Caffey asked defendant to get
a knife. Defendant did so and gave Caffey the knife. Joshua was
screaming and frightened. Scott was also frightened because
Caffey was threatening her.
	Defendant further stated that they put Joshua in the car on the
floor behind the driver's seat. Defendant sat in the driver's seat,
and Caffey sat in the back seat. Caffey wrapped a cord around
Joshua's neck several times and ordered defendant and Scott to
pull on the ends of the cord. Joshua was screaming, crying, and
moaning. Defendant and Scott dropped the cord, and Caffey began
stabbing Joshua. Defendant drove to Maywood, where she pulled
into an alley. She removed the sheet that was wrapped around
Joshua and left him in the alley. Defendant dumped the sheet at a
piano company and drove Scott to her apartment. They killed
Joshua because he knew who committed the murders.
	In addition to evidence of defendant's statements to police,
the State presented police testimony describing the scene of
Debra's and Samantha's murders. On the sidewalk in front of the
apartment building, police found the poultry shears described by
Edwards and by defendant in her written statement. There was
blood on the shears, and one of the handles was broken. The
windows and doors of the apartment showed no signs of forced
entry. There was blood spattered in the living room, hallway, and
bathroom of the apartment. Police found an emissions test notice
addressed to Debra Evans on a hutch in the living room. The
State's fingerprint expert opined that a fingerprint on the
emissions test notice matched defendant's. In the master bedroom,
police discovered an Ace bandage soaked in blood next to a
bloodstain on the bed.
	In the dishwasher in defendant's Schaumburg townhouse,
police found the knife defendant had identified in her written
statement as the weapon used to kill Joshua. In a garbage bag in
the garage, police found a white coaxial cable. There was a bed
and scarf in the laundry area. There was what appeared to be a
pool of blood on the floor of the back seat of the gray car in the
garage.
	With respect to Joshua's kidnapping and murder, police
recovered an empty brown iodine bottle from the kitchen garbage
in Scott's apartment. On November 18, police discovered a
bloodstained bed sheet near the Baldwin Piano Company in
Bellwood, seven blocks from the alley where defendant left
Joshua's body. Police found a matching sheet and pillowcase in
defendant's townhouse.
	According to the State's serology expert, the samples from the
following items tested positive for human blood: the poultry
shears, the bathroom vanity in the Addison apartment, the Ace
bandage, the emissions test notice, the Grambling Tigers jacket,
the bed sheet found by the piano company, and the carpet from the
gray Sable. In addition, there was saliva on the scarf found in
defendant's townhouse, although it could not be determined
whether the saliva was human. The State's DNA experts opined
that blood on the white cord from defendant's garage belonged to
Joshua; blood from the Addison apartment vanity belonged to
Elijah; blood on the Grambling Tigers jacket belonged to both
Elijah and Jordan; blood on the poultry shears belonged to
Samantha; blood on the carpet of the gray Sable belonged to
Joshua; and blood on the sheet recovered near the piano company
belonged to Joshua. In addition, one of the State's DNA experts
testified that in his opinion Ward was the father of both Elijah and
Jordan.
	Dr. Shaku Teas testified concerning the autopsies she
performed on Debra's and Samantha's bodies. Samantha had
seven stab and incised wounds on her neck and some incised
wounds to her left arm. Dr. Teas explained that, generally, a stab
wound is deeper than it is long and an incised wound is longer
than it is deep. According to Dr. Teas, the cause of Samantha's
death was multiple stab wounds.
	With respect to Debra's autopsy, Dr. Teas testified that a
bullet had entered the back of her head and traveled through the
right side of her brain to the area behind her forehead. In addition,
Debra had four incised wounds to her neck. There was a 13-inch
gaping wound from one side to the other of Debra's abdomen. Her
uterus had been sliced open. The placenta and umbilical cord,
which had been cut with a sharp instrument, remained in the
uterus, but there was no fetus. Some intestines near the uterus had
also been cut. Dr. Teas testified that the temporal order of Debra's
wounds could not be determined from the autopsy alone. With
respect to the ability of a fetus to survive when its mother dies, Dr.
Teas testified that a fetus can survive as long as the mother's heart
is beating. After the mother's heart stops, however, the fetus can
survive for only three to five minutes. In Dr. Teas' opinion, the
main cause of Debra's death was the gunshot wound, and the
multiple stab and incised wounds were contributing causes. Dr.
Teas further opined that all of the stab and incised wounds to
Samantha and Debra could have been caused by the poultry shears.
	Dr. Christopher Olson, Debra's obstetrician and gynecologist,
testified that, when a Caesarean is performed in an appropriate
medical manner, three persons are required to deliver a child. If
there were no concern for the well-being of the mother and child,
fewer persons would be needed. Dr. Olson testified, however, that
more than two hands are needed to deliver a baby by Caesarean,
particularly if a horizontal incision, such as the one on Debra's
abdomen, is made. Dr. Olson further testified that the incision
used to remove the baby from Debra's uterus was at the back of
the uterus. Therefore, the uterus must have been pulled to the side
or lifted out of the abdomen to make this cut. According to Dr.
Olson, it was unlikely that this could have been accomplished by
one person.
	Dr. Olson also stated that, for a fetus to survive, it would have
to be removed from a nonbreathing mother within two to three
minutes. In Dr. Olson's opinion, Debra's heart was beating when
the baby was removed from her body because the baby survived
and because the blood spatters around her body suggested a certain
amount of blood pressure.
	Dr. Joseph Cogan testified that he performed an autopsy on
Joshua. Dr. Cogan stated that Joshua had injuries, such as ligature
marks, that indicated strangulation. The marks appeared to be from
some sort of cord wrapped around his neck two times. There were
several stab wounds to Joshua's neck. Joshua had no defensive
wounds. Dr. Cogan also found evidence of aspiration, that is,
evidence that Joshua had inhaled his own vomit.
	Dr. Cogan further testified that the stab wounds occurred
while Joshua was still alive. The strangulation preceded the stab
wounds, and the aspiration occurred after he was stabbed. Dr.
Cogan opined that, although he did not analyze Joshua's stomach
contents, the unusual damage to the tissue of Joshua's lungs from
the aspirated stomach contents was consistent with the ingestion
of iodine. Dr. Cogan also testified that the ligature marks were
consistent with the white cord found in defendant's garage, and the
stab wounds were consistent with the butcher knife found in
defendant's dishwasher. Dr. Cogan testified that Joshua would not
have died instantaneously from his injuries but would not have
lived for more than 30 minutes. In Dr. Cogan's opinion, Joshua
died from multiple injuries: the strangulation, the stab wounds,
and the aspiration of the stomach contents.
	In addition to this testimony describing the circumstances of
the murders and kidnappings of members of the Evans family, the
State presented evidence concerning defendant's and her
codefendant's activities in the months preceding the murders and
evidence of their relationships with the Evans family. Edwards
testified that he had been living with Debra since 1989. Between
1989 and 1995, Edwards and Debra separated several times.
During these separations, another defendant, Ward, lived with
Debra and fathered Jordan and Elijah. Edwards stated that, several
months prior to the murders, Debra had decided to name the baby
she was carrying Elijah. During the last few weeks before the
murders, Ward telephoned the Evans apartment several times, and
Edwards overheard Debra arguing with Ward.
	Edwards further testified that one week before the murders
defendant came to the Evans apartment unexpectedly. Defendant
and Edwards had a short conversation, during which defendant
asked Edwards what time he went to work and how he traveled to
work. Edwards told her that he worked from about 6 p.m. to 2:30
a.m.
	Scott testified that, in the fall of 1995, defendant asked her if
Pruitt knew where she could get a gun. Pruitt testified that
defendant had asked him on several occasions to obtain a gun for
her in the summer of 1995. Caffey was with her the last time.
	Defendant's cousin John Pettaway testified that he saw
defendant, Ward, and Caffey together during the afternoon of
November 16, 1995. As Pettaway and Ward were driving around
Wheaton that afternoon, they met defendant and Caffey twice. On
both occasions, defendant, Caffey, and Ward had a brief
conversation. Pettaway further testified that, the following day, he
saw defendant at a car wash vacuuming the back seat area of the
gray four-door car she was driving.
	Defendant's sister, Tina Martin, testified that, around 6:50
p.m. on November 16, 1995, Ward came to the house Tina shared
with her mother on Crescent Street in Wheaton. Ward made a
telephone call to Debra Evans. Tina overheard a portion of their
conversation, during which Ward asked, "Is the baby mine, or is
it his." Ward left the Martin house around 8:10 p.m.
	Cynthia Sawyer, a friend of Debra and defendant, testified
that Debra and defendant had lived together at one time. Sawyer
further testified that Ward and Debra had argued about the
paternity of Jordan for several years before the murders. A few
days before the murders, Sawyer observed defendant wearing an
Ace bandage on her right arm.
	According to the testimony of several State witnesses,
defendant was unable to have children in 1995, but, in the months
before the murders, pretended that she was pregnant. Defendant's
sister, Tina Martin, testified that defendant told her that she was
pregnant in April 1995. Defendant said that the baby was due in
August, and Tina held a baby shower for defendant. Defendant
later told her sister that the baby was due in October. She did not
have a baby in October but continued to claim that she was
pregnant. Darlene Bearden, defendant's probation officer, testified
that, on November 1, 1995, defendant told her over the telephone
that she had given birth. At an appointment on November 9,
defendant told Bearden that she had named the baby Elijah.
	Following the presentation of this evidence, the State rested
its case in chief. Defendant's case consisted primarily of testimony
intended to impeach Scott and Pruitt's testimony. One police
officer testified that she showed Scott a photo array on January 19,
1996. Scott selected a photo of Bo Wilson from this array and,
contrary to her trial testimony, stated that she was "fairly positive"
that he was the other man in the Schaumburg townhouse when
she, defendant, and Joshua arrived there. Scott told the officer that
Wilson appeared angry that Joshua was with her and defendant.
Scott also stated that Wilson was a gang member, terrified her, and
had threatened her.
	Another police officer testified that, when Scott spoke to him
on November 17, she said that Joshua had told her that four black
men had entered the Addison apartment and two of them had
come through the bedroom window. In addition, she stated that
Joshua had said that, after the "bad men" left, he ran out and found
defendant. Still another police officer testified that Scott had told
him on November 18 that she did not know who held Joshua as
Caffey stabbed him. Defendant also presented the testimony of a
police officer who stated that Pruitt had said that he first heard of
the murder on the 10 a.m. news, and Scott returned to the
apartment around 11 a.m.
	The only other witness for the defense was Kim Young,
another friend of defendant. She testified that defendant had made
false claims of pregnancy several times prior to 1994 as part of a
"female game" they played to keep the men they were dating. 	In addition, the defense presented two stipulations. According
to one, the time of Pruitt's 911 call was 12:44 p.m. According to
the other, during an interview on November 18, 1995, with
assistant State's Attorneys, Scott said that Caffey wanted
defendant to take Joshua to the projects on the south side, but
defendant had told Caffey that Joshua could be hurt there.
	In rebuttal, the State called a police officer, who testified that,
on November 18, 1995, Scott stated that defendant held Joshua
while Caffey stabbed him.
	The jury found defendant guilty of the first degree murders of
Debra, Samantha, and Joshua Evans. In addition, the jury found
her guilty of the aggravated kidnappings of Joshua and Elijah.
	At the first stage of defendant's sentencing hearing, the jury
considered the evidence presented at trial and defendant's
convictions for first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping. In
addition, the State presented evidence that defendant's date of
birth was December 22, 1966. The jury returned eight separate
eligibility verdicts. In connection with Debra Evans' murder, the
jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty under the
multiple-murder and felony-murder statutory aggravating factors.
See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3), (b)(6) (West 1994). In connection with
Samantha Evans' murder, the jury found defendant eligible for the
death penalty under the multiple-murder and brutal and heinous
murder of a child under 12 statutory aggravating factors. See 720
ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3), (b)(7) (West 1994). In connection with Joshua
Evans' murder, the jury found defendant eligible for the death
penalty under the multiple-murder, felony-murder, brutal and
heinous murder of a child under 12, and murder of a witness
statutory aggravating factors. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3), (b)(6),
(b)(7), (b)(8) (West 1994).
	At the second stage of sentencing, the State presented
evidence concerning defendant's criminal history. This history
included evidence that, in 1988, defendant had been sentenced to
court supervision for the offense of theft by deception and for the
offense of retail theft. In 1991 she was arrested for credit card
fraud. In addition, she was convicted of theft based on her 1991
possession of jewelry and checks that had been stolen during a
series of burglaries in the area around the Wheaton house she
shared with a male companion. In 1993, defendant and another
woman were arrested for cashing and attempting to cash forged
checks at local banks. The checks had been stolen from the office
of a Wheaton attorney whose office defendant's mother cleaned.
According to the woman arrested with defendant, they planned to
give the money from the forged checks to defendant's male
companion. Defendant was convicted of forgery.
	Defendant's probation officers testified that, in January 1992,
defendant was sentenced to 24 months of probation for felony
theft. Defendant was sentenced to additional terms of probation for
violating the terms of her probation and remained on probation in
November 1995.
	One of defendant's friends testified that, in January 1995, she
and defendant visited Caffey in the hospital. Defendant said that
she had accidentally stabbed Caffey, and Caffey's lung had been
punctured. A few months earlier, Caffey and his friends had
severely beaten defendant.
	Members of the Du Page County sheriff's office testified
concerning defendant's conduct in jail while awaiting trial in this
case. In July 1996, a comb that had been fashioned into a shank
was found hidden in defendant's cell. Later that year, defendant
grabbed the shoulder of a sheriff's deputy as he was escorting
another inmate past defendant's cell.
	Christie DeSmedt, the administrator for the general assistance
program for Milton Township in Wheaton, described a document
she found in defendant's general assistance file. This document
was an application in defendant's name for one of the holiday
baskets local organizations and individuals donated to needy
families through a township program. The application, which was
dated November 6, 1995, gave an address on Crescent in Wheaton
and provided defendant's mother's telephone number. It listed the
names and ages of defendant's three children, as well as a fourth
child, Fedell, age one month.
	In addition to this evidence in aggravation, the State presented
victim impact statements read by Debra's father and sister and
Samantha's father.
	In mitigation, defendant presented the testimony of an inmate
who met Ward in the Du Page County jail. The inmate testified
that, in February 1997, he and some other inmates were engaged
in horseplay. Ward told them to stop or he would "f-- [them] up
like [he] did that b-- in Addison."
	An Addison police detective testified for the defense that
another inmate contacted police concerning a conversation he had
had with Ward in jail. According to this inmate, Ward had said he
went to Debra's apartment with $2,000, some of which he planned
to give to Debra in exchange for the unborn baby. He and Debra
had an argument, however, and she would not take the money.
	Debra's sister Katy Evans testified that, in August 1995, Ward
had indicated that he wanted the baby Debra was carrying, but
Debra said that there was no way that he was going to get any of
her children. Two days before the murder, Debra told Katy that
Ward was harassing her and picking fights with her and that she
was worried. Debra said that she was scared something was going
to happen and asked Katy to take her children.
	An Addison police officer testified that she showed Patrice
Scott a photo array. Scott began to cry when she looked at one
photo and stated that she was scared to identify the individual in
the photo. Scott stated that this individual was Calvin "Bo"
Wilson and that Wilson was the other man at the Schaumburg
townhouse. He was surprised that Joshua was still alive and upset
that defendant had brought Scott to the townhouse. He threatened
to kill Scott and her daughters.
	The defense also presented the testimony of several police
officers who described incidents of domestic violence between
defendant and her boyfriends. According to these police officers,
in January 1990, defendant made a complaint that a boyfriend,
with whom she had just ended a relationship, entered her
apartment, punched her in the face, and choked her. The
boyfriend's niece had threatened defendant with a .25-caliber
semiautomatic pistol.
	In 1991 and 1993 police responded to four calls of domestic
violence involving defendant and another boyfriend. In connection
with these incidents, the boyfriend was charged with, inter alia,
battery, aggravated assault, and domestic battery. These charges
were based on conduct including choking defendant, threatening
her with a loaded gun, hitting her in the head with a crescent
wrench, and dragging her by her hair.
	In 1994, defendant made two complaints of domestic violence
against Caffey. She told police that Caffey had thrown bricks at
the car in which she was riding, had pushed her, and had struck her
in the face. Based on these allegations, Caffey was charged with
criminal damage to property and domestic battery.
	Tina Martin testified that she and defendant grew up in
Wheaton. Tina had witnessed one of defendant's boyfriends
physically abusing her, and defendant's children had told her that
another boyfriend beat defendant frequently. Tina had observed
defendant with bruises on her face. According to Tina Martin,
defendant is too trusting of people and has poor judgment in her
choice of friends.
	Defendant's mother, Martha Martin, testified that defendant
dropped out of high school during her sophomore year when she
became pregnant with her son. According to Martin, defendant did
not have trouble in school and had a normal relationship with her
and a good relationship with her father. Martin testified that
defendant could be influenced by other people, but she was a good
mother and loved children.
	Dr. Frank Cushing, a psychologist who evaluated defendant
in 1996, testified that defendant had a full scale IQ of 81, which is
below average or borderline mentally retarded. Dr. Cushing
diagnosed defendant with major depression and opined that she
suffered from this condition prior to the murders. In addition, Dr.
Cushing found that defendant had a generalized anxiety disorder
and a borderline personality disorder with dependent features.
Characteristics of a borderline personality disorder that defendant
possessed included volatile interpersonal relationships,
impulsivity, rapid mood swings, instances of poorly controlled
anger, and fear of abandonment and rejection.
	Dr. Cushing testified that, because of defendant's dependent
personality traits and her history of abuse, she was psychologically
vulnerable to predatory males. Dr. Cushing speculated that threats
from these men could cause defendant to act in ways she would
not normally act. He opined that there was a strong possibility that
defendant was coerced by Ward and Caffey into participating in
the murders and aggravated kidnappings of members of the Evans
family. Based on his evaluation, Dr. Cushing believed that
defendant was more susceptible to coercion than the average
person.
	Dr. Cushing also diagnosed defendant as having a paranoid
personality disorder with antisocial traits. Her inability to accept
blame for her actions was characteristic of the paranoid personality
disorder. Her repeated violation of the law, deceitfulness, and lack
of remorse were antisocial traits. Dr. Cushing testified that these
disorders may be treated through the administration of
psychotropic medications. In addition, individuals with antisocial
personality disorders adjust well to structured environments, such
as prison.
	Du Page County jail employees testified that, while defendant
was in the jail, she was disciplined for offenses such as having
extra linen, not wearing her uniform correctly, having an
unauthorized pen, possessing a plastic shank, and throwing water
on another inmate. The watch supervisor also testified that
defendant had requested to be placed in administrative segregation
in order to avoid confrontations with other inmates.
	The defense also presented testimony that, in 1993, defendant
completed a program to become a certified nursing assistant.
While she was in jail on the murder charges, defendant obtained
her general equivalency diploma (GED).
	The jury found no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the
imposition of the death penalty, and the circuit court sentenced
defendant to death based on her first degree murder convictions.
The circuit court held an additional sentencing hearing on
defendant's two aggravated kidnapping convictions. The circuit
court imposed a 15-year sentence for each conviction and ordered
these sentences to run consecutively. Defendant's death sentence
was stayed, pending direct review by this court.
ANALYSIS
I. Voir Dire
	We begin by addressing defendant's challenge to the selection
of the jury in her case. Prior to voir dire, defendant filed a motion
in which she asked the circuit court to prohibit the State from
exercising peremptory challenges against venirepersons who
indicated reservations against the death penalty. The circuit court
denied the motion. During voir dire, the defense objected,
consistent with its motion, to the State's exercise of peremptory
challenges against four prospective jurors and two prospective
alternate jurors. According to defendant, a new sentencing hearing
is required because the State's use of peremptory challenges to
exclude these jurors was unconstitutional under Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770 (1968).
	A prospective juror may be excused for cause based on his or
her views on the death penalty only if those views "prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and oath." People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 488 (1998), citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,
424, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 851-52, 105 S. Ct. 844, 852 (1985). In
Witherspoon, the United States Supreme Court held that a
prospective juror may not be removed for cause solely because he
or she expresses a general objection to the death penalty. People
v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 143 (1998), citing Witherspoon, 391 U.S.  at 522, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 784-85, 88 S. Ct.  at 1777. The Court
explained that, if the State were permitted to remove all such
jurors, it would not only produce a jury capable of imposing the
death penalty, it would create a jury "uncommonly willing to
condemn a man to die." Witherspoon, 391 U.S.  at 521, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 784, 88 S. Ct.  at 1776 (1968).
	Defendant contends that the concerns that motivated the
Witherspoon holding with respect to challenges for cause also
apply to the State's use of peremptory challenges. Thus, according
to defendant, the State should be prevented from using peremptory
challenges to accomplish what Witherspoon prevents it from doing
with its challenges for cause.
	As defendant acknowledges, however, this court has
previously rejected the argument she makes. See People v.
Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 549 (1995), citing People v. Williams,
161 Ill. 2d 1, 55-56 (1994); People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103,
136-38 (1991); People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 481-82 (1984).
Defendant offers us no persuasive reason to reconsider those
holdings, and we decline to do so.
II. Trial
	With respect to the guilt-innocence phase of proceedings in
defendant's case, defendant argues that her convictions for the
murders of Debra and Samantha Evans must be reversed based on
insufficient evidence. In addition, she contends that she is entitled
to a new trial as a result of two erroneous evidentiary rulings by
the circuit court. According to defendant, the circuit court erred
when it permitted Scott and Pruitt to testify concerning statements
Joshua made to them. In addition, defendant asserts that the circuit
court improperly limited the jury's consideration of testimony that
Scott identified Bo Wilson in a photo array. Defendant does not
challenge the circuit court's denial of her motion to suppress her
statements to police or the admission of these statements at trial.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
	According to defendant, her convictions for the murders of
Debra and Samantha Evans must be reversed because there was no
evidence that defendant inflicted any injuries to Debra or
Samantha. Defendant further contends that the State failed to
prove that she was accountable for Debra's and Samantha's
murders because there was no evidence that she knew that Ward,
Caffey, or the unidentified third man went to the Evans apartment
with the intent to commit a crime or that she joined this group with
knowledge that criminal acts were going to occur. Defendant does
not contend that there was insufficient evidence to support her
conviction for Joshua's murder or her convictions for the
aggravated kidnappings of Joshua and Elijah.
	When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting her conviction, a reviewing court must determine
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Heard,
187 Ill. 2d 36, 85 (1999). It is the responsibility of the trier of fact
to determine the credibility of witnesses, to weigh their testimony,
to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from the evidence. People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91, 132
(1999). A reviewing court will not overturn a defendant's
conviction based on insufficient evidence unless the proof is so
improbable or unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt exists as to
the defendant's guilt. People v. Taylor, 186 Ill. 2d 439, 445
(1999).
	Section 5-2(c) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides that a
person is legally accountable for the criminal conduct of another
if "[e]ither before or during the commission of an offense, and
with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he
solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in
the planning or commission of the offense." 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c)
(West 1994). To prove that the defendant possessed the intent to
promote or facilitate the crime, the State may present evidence
which establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant
shared the criminal intent of the principal or (2) there was a
common criminal design. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 337 (1995).
A defendant's intent may be inferred from the nature of her actions
and the circumstances accompanying the criminal conduct. People
v. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d 254, 266 (2000). Under the common-design
rule, if "two or more persons engage in a common criminal design
or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design
committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties
to the design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the
consequences of the further acts." In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d  at 337.
Words of agreement are not needed to establish a common design;
rather, like intent, a common design may be inferred from the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. People
v. Batchelor, 171 Ill. 2d 367, 376 (1996). Mere presence at a
crime, even when combined with knowledge that a crime is being
committed and flight from the scene, is insufficient to establish
guilt by accountability. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 323
(1998). However, "[e]vidence that a defendant voluntarily attached
himself to a group bent on illegal acts with knowledge of its
design supports an inference that he shared the common purpose
and will sustain his conviction for an offense committed by
another." In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d  at 338.
	Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was accountable for
Debra's and Samantha's murders. Evidence presented at trial
indicated that defendant aided and abetted Ward and Caffey in the
planning and commission of Debra's and Samantha's murders and
that these murders were committed in furtherance of a common
design to take Elijah from Debra by force.
	With respect to defendant's role in the planning and
commission of the murders, there was testimony that, during the
months that preceded the murders, defendant attempted to obtain
a gun from Pruitt. One week before the murders, defendant visited
the Evans apartment and asked Edwards when he left for work and
how he traveled to work. Hours before the murders, defendant was
seen having two conversations with Ward and Caffey. Defendant
admitted in her written statement that she stood next to Caffey as
he cut open Debra's abdomen, and there was medical testimony
that more than one person would have been required to make the
incision to her uterus and remove the baby. Further, a bloody Ace
bandage was discovered in a bedroom in the Evans apartment.
Edwards had not seen this bandage before, and defendant had been
seen wearing an Ace bandage on her arm a few days before the
murders.
	Evidence of defendant's participation in a common design to
take Elijah from Debra by force included testimony that Ward was
Elijah's father, that Ward and Debra had argued about the baby's
paternity, and that defendant knew that Ward and Caffey went to
the Evans apartment to talk to Debra about the unborn baby and to
"teach [her] a lesson." There was also evidence that defendant and
Caffey wanted Elijah and planned to pretend he was their son. In
her written statement, defendant admitted that she and Caffey
wanted a light-skinned baby boy but had been unable to have one.
Defendant knew that Debra had planned to enter the hospital to
give birth on Monday, November 20. During the months that
preceded the murders, defendant had made false claims that she
was pregnant and indicated that her due date was in October, a few
weeks before Debra was due to give birth. A few days before the
murders, defendant told her probation officer that she had given
birth to a baby named Elijah, the name that Debra had chosen for
the child she was carrying. After the murders, defendant told her
mother, sister, and police that Elijah was her son. Evidence of
defendant's presence in the Evans apartment during the murders,
her flight from the apartment with Ward and Caffey, her failure to
report the murders to police, and her continued close affiliation
with Caffey after the murders also supported a finding of common
design. See Batchelor, 171 Ill. 2d  at 376. Based on this evidence,
we believe a rational jury could have found defendant accountable
for Debra's and Samantha's murders, and we reject defendant's
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
B. Admission of Joshua's Statements
	Next, defendant argues that the admission of evidence
concerning Joshua's statements deprived her of a fair trial. Prior
to trial, the State filed a petition seeking the admission of Joshua's
statements under section 115-10 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 1994)). The State
also offered the statements under the excited utterance or
spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. Defendant
filed a motion in limine to exclude these statements.
	The circuit court held a hearing on the State's petition and
defendant's motion in limine. At the hearing, an Addison police
department detective summarized the evidence discovered by
police during their investigations of the murders and kidnappings
of members of the Evans family. Scott and Pruitt also testified.
Their testimony at the hearing was essentially the same as their
trial testimony, although they did provide some additional detail
concerning their communications with Joshua and his mental state.
Scott testified that, when Joshua first awakened on November 17,
he was very upset and said he was worried about his mother. Scott
offered Joshua something to eat or drink, but he declined.
According to Pruitt, Joshua was scared, crying, and talking in a
frantic voice as he told Scott the events leading up to his arrival at
her apartment. After Scott's daughters left for school, Joshua acted
hysterical and upset. He repeated his story about the burglars and
said that he had to go back to the apartment to get his little brother.
	The defense presented testimony by police officers and
detectives who had spoken to Scott and Pruitt. The police
testimony showed differences between what these individuals had
told police and their testimony at the hearing.
	At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court ruled that all
of Joshua's statements were admissible under section 115-10. In
addition, the circuit court held that, except for his denial that he
took medication, Joshua's statements were also admissible under
the common law spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay
rule.
	Defendant argues that Joshua's statements were inadmissible
hearsay and should not have been admitted under either the
statutory or the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay
rule. We begin with an examination of the circuit court's decision
to admit the statements under section 115-10 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Section 115-10 provides in relevant part:
			"(a) In a prosecution for a physical or sexual act
perpetrated upon or against a child under the age of 13
*** at the time the act was committed ***, the following
evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay
rule:
				***
				(2) testimony of an out of court statement made by
such child *** describing any complaint of such act or
matter or detail pertaining to any act which is an
element of an offense which is the subject of a
prosecution for a sexual or physical act perpetrated
upon or against a child ***.
			(b) Such testimony shall only be admitted if:
				(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside
the presence of the jury that the time, content, and
circumstances of the statement provide sufficient
safeguards of reliability; and
				(2) The child ***:
					***
					(B) is unavailable as a witness and there is
corroborative evidence of the act which is the
subject of the statement." 725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West
1994).
Under this statute, the State has the burden of proving that the
time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide
sufficient safeguards of reliability. People v. Zwart, 151 Ill. 2d 37,
43 (1992).
	With respect to the applicable standard of review, this court
has held that the circuit court's decision to admit evidence under
section 115-10 will not be reversed unless the record clearly
demonstrates that the circuit court abused its discretion. See
People v. Bowen, 183 Ill. 2d 103 (1998); Zwart, 151 Ill. 2d  at 44.
Defendant contends, however, that a de novo standard of review
should apply to the circuit court's evidentiary rulings under section
115-10. According to defendant, in People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366 (1998), this court "seemingly" overruled the standard of
review set forth in Bowen and Zwart. Defendant relies on a
statement in Coleman that "courts of review have traditionally
reserved the abuse of discretion standard for those decisions of the
lower court which deserve great deference on review, i.e.,
decisions made by the trial judge in overseeing his or her
courtroom or in maintaining the progress of a trial" (Coleman, 183
Ill. 2d at 387). Defendant asserts that determining the admissibility
of a statement under section 115-10 does not involve the progress
of the trial or the administration of the courtroom. Instead, she
argues, it is a legal decision and, therefore, should be reviewed de
novo. We disagree.
	Contrary to defendant's assertion, our decision in Coleman
did not affect holdings in Bowen and Zwart that the abuse of
discretion standard of review applies to admissibility
determinations under section 115-10. In Coleman, unlike Bowen
and Zwart, the admissibility of hearsay statements under section
115-10 was not at issue. In Coleman, we held that a de novo,
rather than an abuse of discretion or manifestly erroneous,
standard of review applies to a circuit court's decision to dismiss
a defendant's claims under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725
ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1994)) without an evidentiary hearing.
Also, the language in Coleman on which defendant relies does not
suggest that the application of an abuse of discretion standard is
inappropriate for decisions concerning the admissibility of
evidence. In Coleman, we explained that an abuse of discretion
standard should not apply at the dismissal stage of post-conviction
proceedings because there are no factual inquiries at that stage.
Admissibility determinations under section 115-10 involve factual
inquiries, as illustrated by the statutory requirement that a hearing
be conducted. See 725 ILCS 5/115-10(d)(1) (West 1994). Thus,
Coleman is inapplicable. Moreover, in decisions since Coleman,
this court has reiterated that an abuse of discretion standard of
review applies to evidentiary decisions by the circuit court. See,
e.g., People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 219 (1999); Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 
at 58; People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998). Accordingly, we will
not reverse the circuit court's decision to admit Joshua's
statements under section 115-10 absent an abuse of discretion.
	As to the merits of this evidentiary issue, defendant contends
that the circuit court erred in admitting Joshua's statements under
section 115-10 because (1) the statements did not relate to an
offense against Joshua, (2) the circuit court improperly relied on
a finding that Joshua had been concealed from his "stepfather,"
and (3) the statements could not satisfy the constitutional or
statutory requirements for reliability because the witnesses who
described them, Scott and Pruitt, were not credible.
	Defendant asserts that testimony concerning Joshua's
statements should not have been admitted under section 115-10
because the statements failed to satisfy the statutory requirement
that they "pertain[ ] to any act which is an element of an offense
which is the subject of a prosecution for a sexual or physical act
perpetrated upon or against a child." 725 ILCS 5/115-10(a)(2)
(West 1994). According to defendant, testimony concerning
Joshua's description of the events in the Evans apartment should
not have been admitted because it concerned offenses committed
against individuals other than Joshua. In addition, defendant
argues that Joshua's statements that he did not take medicine and
was not a liar did not pertain to the charge that defendant
committed an aggravated kidnapping of Joshua.
	We hold that the circuit court properly found that, in the
statements at issue, Joshua related an "act or matter or detail
pertaining to any act which is an element of an offense which is
the subject of a prosecution for a sexual or physical act against"
him. With respect to the events in the Evans apartment, Joshua
stated that burglars entered his apartment and cut his mother and
sister, that his mother and sister were dead, that his brother was
left in the apartment, that the burglars were Annette, Fedell, and
Vern, and that he hid and ran out after defendant. In addition,
when defendant accused him of lying, Joshua stated, "No, no,
that's what happened."
	These statements pertained to acts that were elements of the
aggravated kidnapping charge against defendant. Aggravated
kidnapping may be proved with evidence of secret confinement of
a child under the age of 13 without the consent of his parent or
guardian. See 720 ILCS 5/10-1(a)(1), 10-2(a)(2) (West 1994).
Joshua's statements explained how and why Joshua came to be
confined by defendant and established that the confinement was
without the consent of his mother.
	Similarly, Joshua's statement, "What medicine, I don't take
any medication," related to the acts that formed the basis of
defendant's charge for Joshua's murder. This statement was
relevant to determining the nature of the substance defendant had
given him, as well as her role in the acts that caused his death.
	In support of her argument that Joshua's statements describing
the events in the Evans apartment were inadmissible because they
pertained to offenses against individuals other than Joshua,
defendant cites People v. Peck, 285 Ill. App. 3d 14 (1996). In that
case, the court held that statements by one sexual abuse victim
about the defendant's sexual abuse of another victim were not
admissible under section 115-10 because the State failed to show
that the statements involved " 'components of the
contemporaneous and ongoing series of events constituting a
matter or detail pertaining to the offense perpetrated against [the
declarant] herself.' " (Emphasis in original.) Peck, 285 Ill. App. 3d
at 17, quoting People v. Embry, 249 Ill. App. 3d 750, 763 (1993).
For example, the Peck court held that one of the victims' statement
that, as she watched from a tree, she had seen the defendant
sexually abuse the other victim was inadmissible because it clearly
did not involve a matter or detail pertaining to an act committed
contemporaneously against the declarant. Peck, 285 Ill. App. 3d at
17-18.
	In the case before us, by contrast, the acts against Joshua's
mother and sister did pertain to offenses against Joshua. Joshua's
description of his mother's murder showed he was taken without
her consent, and his witnessing of his mother's and sister's
murders provided the reason for his kidnapping and murder.
Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that the admission of evidence concerning Joshua's
statements complied with subsection (a)(2) of section 115-10.
	Defendant also attacks the circuit court's decision to admit
Joshua's statements under section 115-10 on the basis that the
circuit court relied on a mistaken belief that Edwards was Joshua's
stepfather. In deciding that Joshua's statements related to elements
of the aggravated kidnapping charge, the circuit court found that
these statements showed Joshua's secret confinement from his
stepfather. According to defendant, Edwards was not Joshua's
stepfather, and the circuit court's mischaracterization of the
relationship between Edwards and Joshua requires reversal of its
decision that Joshua's statements were admissible under section
115-10. Defendant explains: "the court's ruling depended on a
finding that Joshua had been concealed from his parent or legal
guardian. [Citation.] As James Edwards was neither Joshua's
parent nor his legal guardian, that ruling is reversible error."
	At trial, defendant failed to object to the circuit court's
characterization of Edwards as Joshua's stepfather, and her post-trial motion makes no mention of the circuit court's conclusion
that Edwards was Joshua's stepfather. In her reply brief, defendant
asserts that she preserved her argument regarding Edwards by
generally objecting to the admissibility of Joshua's statements and
by arguing in her post-trial motion that the circuit court erred in
admitting these statements. Due to defendant's failure to
specifically raise this issue in the circuit court, however, we agree
with the State that it is waived. See, e.g., People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 293 (1995); People v. Towns, 157 Ill. 2d 90, 100 (1993);
People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988); see also 725 ILCS
5/116-1(c) (West 1994).
	Defendant argues that we may nevertheless recognize the
error as plain error. The State contends that we may not consider
defendant's plain error argument because defendant raised it for
the first time in her reply brief, and, under Supreme Court Rule
341(e)(7), "[p]oints not argued are waived and shall not be raised
in the reply brief." 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7). We disagree that
defendant's failure to include her plain error argument in her
opening brief precludes us from considering it.
	The rules of waiver are applicable to the State as well as the
defendant in criminal proceedings, and the State may waive an
argument that the defendant waived an issue by failing to argue
waiver in a timely manner. See, e.g., People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 283 (1990) (finding that the State waived its argument that
the defendant failed to make a timely Batson objection by failing
to make this argument in the trial court); People v. O'Neal, 104 Ill. 2d 399, 407 (1984) ("The principle of waiver applies to the State
as well as the defendant in a criminal case"). Under these
principles, in order to obtain review of an argument that a
defendant waived an issue for review, the State must raise this
argument in its appellee's brief. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7).
Accordingly, we believe it would be unfair to require a defendant
to assert plain error in his or her opening brief.
	Moreover, in applying the plain error doctrine to review
claims not preserved at the trial level, this court has stated that the
purpose of the plain error rule is to guard "against the 'possibility
that an innocent person may have been convicted due to some
error which is obvious from the record, but not properly
preserved' " (People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 294 (1992), quoting
People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576 (1980)) and to protect and
to preserve the integrity and the reputation of the judicial process
(People v. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1994)). These
considerations also justify our consideration of a defendant's plain
error argument despite his or her failure to include it in an opening
brief. Indeed, this court has previously considered a defendant's
plain error argument raised for the first time in a reply brief. See
People v. Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d 215, 235 (1997).
	Although we find it appropriate to consider defendant's plain
error argument, we conclude that no plain error resulted from the
circuit court's mistaken characterization of Edwards as Joshua's
stepfather. Under the plain error doctrine, a reviewing court may
consider a trial error not properly preserved when (1) the evidence
in a criminal case is closely balanced or (2) where the error is so
fundamental and of such magnitude that the accused was denied
a right to a fair trial. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d  at 293. Absent reversible
error, however, there can be no plain error. See People v. Keene,
169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1995). No reversible error occurred as a result of
the circuit court's characterization of Edwards as Joshua's
stepfather.
	The aggravated kidnapping statute requires that a child's
confinement be against the will of the child. Confinement of a
child is deemed against the child's will if it is without the consent
of a parent or legal guardian. 720 ILCS 5/10-1(b), 10-2(a)(2)
(West 1994). At the hearing, there was evidence that Edwards was
Debra's live-in boyfriend, had acted as a father figure to Joshua,
and that Joshua called him his "stepdad." There was no evidence
that Edwards had any legal status as Joshua's stepfather or
guardian.
	As the State argues, however, we may affirm the circuit
court's decision for any appropriate reason, regardless of whether
the circuit court relied on those grounds and regardless of whether
the circuit court's reasoning was correct. See, e.g., Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 205; People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 101 (1994). Even
assuming the circuit court erred in basing its admissibility
determination on a finding that Joshua was confined without the
consent of Edwards, who was not his parent or legal guardian, we
may affirm the circuit court based on evidence that defendant
confined Joshua without the consent of his mother. As stated,
Joshua's description of the events in the Evans apartment related
to this element by describing how his mother was killed and how
he was taken from the apartment. Thus, the circuit court properly
admitted these statements under section 115-10 regardless of its
error with respect to the relationship between Joshua and Edwards.
	Defendant further contends that the circuit court erred in
admitting Joshua's statements under section 115-10 "because
Patrice Scott and Dwight Pruitt, the 'conduits' for the hearsay
statement, were so unreliable themselves that the statements
satisfy neither constitutional nor statutory requirements for
reliability." In support of this argument, defendant relies on
evidence of inconsistencies in Scott's and Pruitt's testimonies and
their statements to police. For example, defendant recites evidence
that Scott failed to initially tell police that Joshua said Caffey was
involved in the crimes and that Joshua had been fatally stabbed;
first told police that she and defendant had stopped at a Wal-Mart
store, left Joshua in Maywood, and then traveled to defendant's
townhouse; and told police that Joshua had said four black males
rather than four burglars had entered the apartment. With respect
to Pruitt's reliability, defendant relies on evidence that Pruitt was
an incarcerated gang member and failed to initially tell police the
names of the perpetrators identified by Joshua. Further, Pruitt told
police that defendant brought Elijah to the Villa Park apartment
with her, that he had seen the story about Joshua on the 10 a.m.
news, that defendant and Scott had returned to the Villa Park
apartment at 11 a.m., and that defendant and Scott left Joshua in
Maywood before going to Schaumburg.
	To satisfy the requirements of the confrontation clause of the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, hearsay
statements of an unavailable child declarant admitted under an
exception to the hearsay rule must bear adequate "indicia of
reliability." Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638, 653, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3147 (1990). A hearsay statement
possesses sufficient "indicia of reliability" (1) if the hearsay
statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or (2) if
there is a showing of " 'particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.' " Wright, 497 U.S.  at 816, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 653,
110 S. Ct.  at 3147, quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 608, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 (1980). Section 115-10
does not contain a firmly rooted hearsay exception. See People v.
March, 250 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1073 (1993). However, under
section 115-10, a hearsay statement by a child declarant may not
be admitted unless the circuit court first finds "in a hearing
conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content,
and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards
of reliability." 725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 1994).
	In the instant case, the circuit court found that the time,
content, and circumstances of Joshua's statements provided
sufficient safeguards of reliability to permit their introduction
under section 115-10. In addition, the circuit court decided that
Joshua's statements possessed the "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness" required by Wright for admission under the
confrontation clause. In considering the time, content, and
circumstances of Joshua's statements, the circuit court expressly
stated that it considered and weighed the credibility of the
witnesses at the hearing.
	Many of the inconsistencies in Scott's and Pruitt's testimonies
and statements to police could be explained by the evidence that,
when police first spoke to Scott, she was hysterical and afraid of
Caffey, who had threatened to kill her and her family. Other
inconsistencies, such as the time of the news story Pruitt viewed
and defendant and Scott's travels to Maywood and Schaumburg,
did not relate to circumstances of Joshua's statements. The circuit
court was in the best position to assess the credibility of the
witnesses at the hearing, and, after reviewing the record, we
cannot conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion in
admitting Joshua's statements under section 115-10. See People
v. R.D., 155 Ill. 2d 122, 146 (1993) (deferring to the circuit court's
credibility determination).
	Having upheld the admission of Joshua's statements under
section 115-10, we also reject defendant's argument that the
circuit court erred in finding that certain statements by Joshua
were admissible under the common law spontaneous declaration
exception to the hearsay rule. After ruling that all of Joshua's
statements were admissible under section 115-10, the circuit court
concluded that his statements about the events in the Evans
apartment were also admissible under the spontaneous declaration
exception to the hearsay rule. The circuit court found, however,
that Joshua's denial that he took medicine was not admissible
under this common law exception because it did not relate to the
events in the apartment. Nevertheless, the circuit court admitted
this statement under section 115-10.
	For a hearsay statement to be admissible under the
spontaneous declaration exception, (1) there must be an
occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and
unreflecting statement, (2) there must be an absence of time for the
declarant to fabricate the statement, and (3) the statement must
relate to the circumstances of the occurrence. People v. Edwards,
144 Ill. 2d 108, 169 (1991). In determining whether a hearsay
statement is admissible under the spontaneous declaration
exception, courts employ a totality of the circumstances analysis.
People v. Georgakapoulos, 303 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1012 (1999); M.
Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence
§803.3, at 793 (7th ed. 1999). This analysis involves the
consideration of several factors, including time, "the nature of the
event, the mental and physical condition of the declarant, and the
presence or absence of self-interest." People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 382 (1990).
	In addition, the fact that a declarant's statement is made at the
first opportunity to speak supports a finding of spontaneity (see,
e.g., People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221, 241 (1988)), but a declarant
may make a spontaneous declaration to a person even after having
spoken previously to another (House, 141 Ill. 2d at 386). Although
a statement made in response to persistent interrogation might not
be admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception (see, e.g.,
People v. Sommerville, 193 Ill. App. 3d 161, 174-75 (1990)), the
fact that a statement was made in response to a question does not
necessarily destroy spontaneity (see, e.g., People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229, 260 (1992); see also M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's
Handbook of Illinois Evidence §803.3, at 795-96 (7th ed. 1999)).
That a statement is volunteered has also been found to support a
finding of admissibility under the spontaneous declaration
exception. See, e.g., People v. Merideth, 152 Ill. App. 3d 304, 315
(1987). No one factor is dispositive. Georgakapoulos, 303 Ill.
App. 3d at 1012.
	The time factor has been described as an "elusive" factor,
"whose significance will vary with the facts of each case." House,
141 Ill. 2d  at 382. Indeed, the period of time that may pass without
affecting the admissibility of a statement under the spontaneous
declaration exception varies greatly. See, e.g., People v. Gacho,
122 Ill. 2d 221 (1988) (statement made 6½ hours after the
occurrence was admissible); People v. Newell, 135 Ill. App. 3d
417 (1985) (statement made 20 minutes after the occurrence was
properly excluded). The critical inquiry is " 'whether the statement
was made while the excitement of the event predominated.' "
Smith, 152 Ill. 2d  at 260, quoting M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's
Handbook of Illinois Evidence §803.3, at 627 (5th ed. 1990).
	Defendant does not dispute that the murders of Joshua's sister
and mother qualify as a startling event sufficient to produce a
spontaneous and unreflecting statement. Defendant challenges,
however, the circuit court's finding that there was an absence of
time for Joshua to fabricate his statements. According to
defendant, by the time Joshua made his statements at 5 a.m. and
9 a.m. the day after the murders, the excitement of the murders had
dissipated.
	The evidence indicated that Joshua witnessed the murders of
his mother and sister sometime between 10 p.m. and midnight on
November 16. Scott's testimony indicated that Joshua's first
statements to her about the events occurred at about 6 a.m. or 7
a.m. on November 17 and his statements denying that he was lying
or took medication occurred shortly after defendant's return to the
Villa Park apartment around 9 a.m. Thus, 6 to 9 hours passed
between the murders and Joshua's first statements to Scott about
the events, and 9 to 11 hours passed between the murders and his
statements to defendant.
	In other cases involving child declarants, courts have found
that similar delays do not preclude the application of the
spontaneous declaration exception. See M. Graham, Cleary &
Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence §803.3, at 796 (7th ed.
1999) (noting that courts have been liberal in applying the
spontaneous declaration exception to children of tender years). For
example, in People v. Chatman, 110 Ill. App. 3d 19 (1982), the
appellate court held that the statement of a four-year-old made 18
hours after witnessing a shooting was admissible where the child
was emotionally distraught and was found in an uninhabited area.
Similarly, in People v. Phillips, 159 Ill. App. 3d 483, 491 (1987),
the appellate court held that a 15-hour delay between a sexual
assault and the statements of a 2½-year-old did not destroy the
statement's spontaneity because "[t]he stress caused by the
defendant's acts would have lingered long after the acts
themselves were committed." See also, e.g., Meredith, 152 Ill.
App. 3d at 316 (7½ hours). Based on this authority, we reject
defendant's argument that the passage of time between the
murders and Joshua's statements destroyed their spontaneity.
	Further, we find that the other circumstances surrounding
Joshua's statements support the circuit court's admission of these
statements under the spontaneous declaration exception. Caffey
and Ward entered the bedroom where Joshua and his sister were
sleeping and fatally stabbed Samantha as Joshua watched. Joshua
ran from the bedroom, only to see his mother, who had also been
brutally murdered, lying in a blood-spattered living room. Joshua
was then taken by his mother's and sister's killers to a strange
apartment in the middle of the night. Certainly exhausted from the
events, Joshua fell into a fitful sleep shortly after defendant left
him with Scott. He cried out during his sleep and awakened crying
early in the morning. After refusing Scott's offer of food, he
volunteered a description of the events at the Evans apartment. He
spoke in a frantic voice and appeared scared. Although he listened
to one of Scott's children read a book, he became hysterical and
upset again after the children left for school and expressed fear
that the "burglars" would return. Defendant arrived, swore at him,
and accused him of lying. Joshua, however, maintained that what
he had said was correct. There is no evidence that Joshua had any
motive to fabricate his version of events. Under these
circumstances, we agree with the circuit court that the excitement
of the murders predominated at the time Joshua made his
statements in Scott's apartment and that Joshua's statements were
a product of these events rather than reflection.
	Defendant argues that the fact Scott described Joshua as
"worried" proved that his statements were not spontaneous
because worry results from reflection. We believe, however, that
the evidence of Joshua's mental state demonstrates that Joshua's
"worry" was fear and anxiety about his mother's and sister's
murders and not reflection. We also cannot accept defendant's
argument that "[t]he fact that Joshua related a series of events,
rather than making a simple statement, also shows that he reflected
upon the events." According to defendant, reflection was required
for Joshua to organize the events in his mind. See People v. Smith,
127 Ill. App. 3d 622, 628 (1984) (the fact that declarant gave a
step-by-step description of his actions following the attack on his
aunt suggested reflection). We decline to find that the mere fact
that Joshua described a series of events demonstrates reflection.
He stated only that burglars had entered his apartment through a
window, that they had cut his mother and sister, and that he hid
and ran out of the apartment after defendant, who brought him to
Scott's apartment. This was a very simplified description of the
events in the Evans apartment, which Joshua could have related
without reflection. Moreover, as noted, the totality of the
circumstances surrounding his statements supports a conclusion
that they were spontaneous. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit
court correctly decided that, except for Joshua's denial that he took
medication, his statements were admissible under the spontaneous
declaration exception to the hearsay rule.
	In addition to challenging the admissibility of Joshua's
statements, defendant contends that the circuit court erred by
failing to instruct the jury as required by section 115-10(c).
Section 115-10(c) provides: "If a statement is admitted pursuant
to this Section, the court shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury
to determine the weight and credibility to be given the statement
and that, in making the determination, it shall consider the age and
maturity of the child, *** the nature of the statement, the
circumstances under which the statement was made, and any other
relevant factor." 725 ILCS 5/115-10(c) (West 1994). Illinois
Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 11.66 (3d ed. 1992)
(hereinafter IPI Criminal 3d) tracks this statutory language.
	The State argues that defendant may not now claim that the
circuit court erred by failing to instruct the jury according to IPI
Criminal 3d No. 11.66 because she did not tender this instruction
and did not object to the absence of this instruction in the trial
court. In addition, the State asserts that any error resulting from the
circuit court's failure to give the instruction was harmless.
Defendant does not dispute that she waived this issue for review.
Instead, she asserts that we may consider it as plain error under
Supreme Court Rules 451(c) (177 Ill. 2d R. 451(c)) and 615(a)
(134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)).
	Under an exception to the waiver rule, Rule 451(c) permits a
court to consider substantial defects in instructions despite a
defendant's failure to make a timely objection, if the interests of
justice require. People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 45-46 (1996).
Under Rule 615(a), a procedural default may be excused when the
evidence is closely balanced or when the error is of such
magnitude that it deprives the defendant of a fair trial. People v.
Alvine, 173 Ill. 2d 273, 297 (1996).
	Defendant argues that this court's decision in People v.
Mitchell, 155 Ill. 2d 344 (1993), requires a finding in this case that
the failure to instruct the jury according to IPI Criminal 3d No.
11.66 was plain error. In Mitchell, this court held that the circuit
court erred in admitting hearsay statements by a child alleging
sexual abuse because the circuit court failed to conduct a hearing,
as required by section 115-10, and because the record did not
support a conclusion that the statements were reliable. We further
held in Mitchell that it was error for the circuit court to fail to
provide the jury with IPI Criminal 3d No. 11.66. In light of the
prejudicial testimony concerning the child victim's statements,
which were improperly admitted without a hearing, and the
inconsistencies in the victim's testimony at trial, this court
concluded that the evidence was sufficiently close that the circuit
court's failure to instruct the jury was plain error. Mitchell, 155 Ill. 2d  at 354.
	Our decision in Mitchell does not support a finding of plain
error in this case. Unlike the circuit court in Mitchell, the circuit
court in the case before us conducted a thorough hearing, and the
record does not indicate that the circuit court's conclusion that
Joshua's statements were reliable was an abuse of discretion.
Moreover, all but one of Joshua's statements admitted at trial were
admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception to the
hearsay rule, as well as section 115-10. Section 115-10 provided
the exclusive basis for the admission of only Joshua's statement
that he did not take any medicine. IPI Criminal 3d No. 11.66 is not
required when statements are admitted under the spontaneous
declaration exception. See People v. Pitts, 299 Ill. App. 3d 469,
478-79 (1998). Accordingly, we find that the circuit court's failure
to give this instruction did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.
C. Limiting Instruction
	Defendant also claims that she was denied a fair trial by a
limiting instruction the circuit court gave to the jury regarding its
consideration of evidence of Scott's identification of Bo Wilson.
During her testimony at trial, Scott denied that the unidentified
man at the Schaumburg townhouse was Bo Wilson. The defense
presented the testimony of a police detective who had showed
Scott a photo array in January 1996. According to this detective,
a photograph of Bo Wilson was included in this array, and, upon
viewing Wilson's photograph, Scott became visibly upset. The
detective testified that Scott said that she was fairly positive
Wilson was the unidentified man in Schaumburg, that he had
appeared angry that Joshua was with her and defendant, that he
was a gang member, that he terrified her, and that he had made
threats that caused her to fear for the safety of her family.
	During closing argument, the defense argued that defendant
was afraid of Caffey and Wilson, and, in committing the crimes
against the Evans family, she was only following Caffey's orders.
As part of this argument, the defense stated:
			"I suggest to you, also, that when she went to the house
in Schaumburg and Bo Calvin Wilson was angry and
surprised she brought Joshua there -"
The State interrupted, objecting that it was improper to argue these
facts as substantive evidence. The circuit court instructed the jury
that "any evidence that was introduced in impeachment that is in
contradiction with the witness' testimony here, by means of a prior
inconsistent statement, is received for the purpose of your
consideration and believability of that witness, and I so instruct
you." Subsequently, the defense argued: "You heard testimony that
Bo Calvin Williams was in Schaumburg. Patrice Scott was afraid
of him. She was afraid of him. Why would that not apply to
Annette Williams and her children as well?"
	Defendant now argues that Scott's identification of Wilson
supported the theory that defendant was the "unwitting observer
of a crime committed by a group of violent men." She contends
that, by prohibiting the jury from considering Scott's identification
of Wilson as substantive evidence, the circuit court denied her a
fair trial. According to defendant, this evidence was admissible
substantively under section 115-12 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (725 ILCS 5/115-12 (West 1994)), which provides in
relevant part: "A statement is not rendered inadmissible by the
hearsay rule if (a) the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing, and
(b) the declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement, and (c) the statement is one of identification of a person
made after perceiving him." 725 ILCS 5/115-12 (West 1994).
Based on this statutory exception, defendant contends that she was
entitled to use Scott's identification of Wilson to argue that
Wilson was one of the men in the Evans apartment. In addition,
defendant asserts that "because Scott's fearful and agitated
reaction to his photograph established the accuracy of her
identification, the defense was entitled to argue that Patrice Scott
was afraid of Bo Wilson."
	The State responds that defendant waived this issue by failing
to include it in her post-trial motion and that she waived any claim
of plain error by failing to assert it in her opening brief. In her
reply brief, defendant argues that the issue may be considered as
plain error.
	As the State observes, defendant has waived this issue by
failing to include it in her post-trial motion. See Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 
at 186. Although defendant's failure to assert plain error in her
opening brief does not preclude us from considering her plain
error argument, we find that no plain error occurred as a result of
the circuit court's limiting instruction.
	We agree with defendant that Scott's identification could be
admitted as substantive evidence under section 115-12, and,
therefore, the circuit court erred in limiting the jury's consideration
of this evidence. This error, however, did not rise to the level of
plain error.
	As our discussion of defendant's sufficiency of the evidence
argument demonstrates, the evidence in this case was not closely
balanced. Defendant has also failed to establish that the asserted
error amounts to plain error under the second prong of the plain
error analysis. Under this prong, relief under the plain error rule is
proper only if "the error is of such magnitude that there is a
substantial risk that the accused was denied a fair and impartial
trial, and remedying the error is necessary to preserve the integrity
of the judicial process." People v. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d 271, 297
(1999). There was overwhelming evidence that defendant was
accountable for Caffey's and Ward's acts in killing Debra and
Samantha. Substantive admission of Scott's identification of
Wilson may have supported a conclusion that Wilson
accompanied defendant, Caffey, and Ward to the Evans apartment.
Such evidence would not, however, have changed defendant's
accountability for the events in the apartment, particularly since
there was no evidence that Wilson had a role in these events.
Further, even if the jury had considered Scott's fear of Wilson as
substantive evidence, there was no evidence that defendant was
afraid of Wilson or that her actions resulted from any such fear.
Thus, we find no plain error resulting from the circuit court's
limiting instruction.
III. Sentencing
	We now turn to defendant's assertions of error at the
sentencing proceedings. At the first stage of the sentencing
hearing, the jury returned eight separate eligibility verdicts. In
connection with Debra's murder, defendant was found eligible for
the death penalty under the multiple-murder aggravating factor
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1994)) and the felony-murder
aggravating factor (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)). With
respect to the first degree murder of Samantha Evans, the jury also
found the existence of two statutory aggravating factors: the
multiple-murder aggravating factor (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West
1994)) and the factor concerning the brutal and heinous murder of
a child under 12 years of age (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(7) (West 1994)).
In regards to Joshua's murder, the jury found defendant eligible
under four statutory aggravating factors: multiple murder (720
ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1994)), brutal and heinous murder of a
child under 12 years of age (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(7) (West 1994)),
felony murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)), and murder
of a witness (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(8) (West 1994)).
	Defendant challenges the validity of each of these eligibility
verdicts. In addition, she asserts that she is entitled to a new
second stage sentencing hearing because (1) the circuit court erred
in admitting evidence of the holiday basket application and (2) her
counsel were ineffective for failing to request an instruction on the
statutory aggravating factor of compulsion.
A. Validity of Statutory Aggravating Factors
	Defendant argues that all eight of the eligibility verdicts must
be reversed for the following reasons: (1) the verdict forms
relating to her eligibility under sections 9-1(b)(3) and 9-1(b)(6)
were defective because they omitted the mental state elements of
these statutory aggravating factors; (2) the nonpattern instructions
the jury received under sections 9-1(b)(3), 9-1(b)(7), and
9-1(b)(8) did not require the jury to find the elements of the
statutory aggravating factors but instead permitted the jury to base
eligibility on a finding that "defendant was a major participant
acting with a reckless indifference for human life while
committing an Aggravated Kidnaping"; (3) there was insufficient
evidence that defendant personally inflicted any injuries to Debra
and therefore insufficient evidence to support her eligibility under
section 9-1(b)(6); (4) there was insufficient evidence to establish
defendant's guilt for Debra's and Samantha's murders; (5) section
9-1(b)(7) is unconstitutional as applied to defendant because her
eligibility under this factor could have been based on her
accountability for Ward's and Caffey's actions in killing Joshua
and Samantha; and (6) section 9-1(b)(7) is unconstitutionally
vague on its face.
1. Eligibility Based on Section 9-1(b)(6) for Joshua's Murder
	We hold that defendant's eligibility may be upheld based on
the felony-murder statutory aggravating factor predicated on
Joshua's murder. " '[W]here a defendant is found eligible based
upon two or more statutory aggravating factors, the fact that one
of those factors may later be invalidated will not generally impair
the eligibility finding as long as a separate, valid aggravating
factor supported eligibility.' " People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 64
(1998), quoting People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 165 (1996). The
Illinois death penalty statute does not place special emphasis on
any single aggravating factor and gives no added significance to
multiple aggravating factors as opposed to a single factor. People
v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1 (1998). The purpose of finding a statutory
aggravating factor at the first stage of sentencing is to narrow the
class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death
penalty. People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 90-91 (1992). "[O]nce
one such factor is proved, the defendant is eligible for death
regardless of whether other factors exist as well." Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d  at 91.
	 The only challenge defendant makes to the finding of
eligibility based on defendant's murder of Joshua during an
aggravated kidnapping is that the verdict form was defective under
this court's decision in People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995),
because it omitted certain elements required for eligibility under
section 9-1(b)(6). Among the elements for eligibility under the
felony-murder statutory aggravating factor are requirements that
the "murdered individual *** received physical injuries personally
inflicted by the defendant substantially contemporaneously with
physical injuries caused by one or more persons for whose conduct
the defendant is legally accountable" and that the defendant "acted
with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the
knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another." 720
ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(a)(ii), (b)(6)(b) (West 1994).
	The felony-murder eligibility verdict form premised on
Joshua's murder provided:
			"We, the jury, unanimously find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant Jacqueline Annette Williams is
eligible for a death sentence under the law. We
unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that: the
defendant was 18 years old or older at the time of the
murder of Joshua Evans for which she was convicted in
this case; and the following statutory aggravating factor
exists: that Joshua Evans was killed in the course of an
Aggravated Kidnapping as set forth in paragraph [2] of
the second proposition concerning the First Degree
Murder of Joshua Evans."
According to defendant, this verdict form was defective because
it omitted the statutory requirements that the defendant actually
kill or inflict injuries to the murdered individual and did not
require a finding that defendant intended to kill or knew her acts
created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm.
Defendant contends that there was no "actual verdict" for
eligibility under section 9-1(b)(6) because the verdict form did not
contain a complete statement of the necessary elements for
eligibility under this aggravating factor.
	The State responds that defendant cannot raise this issue on
appeal because she failed to object to the verdict form, failed to
tender an alternative verdict form, and failed to include the issue
in her post-trial motion. Alternatively, the State argues that the
verdict form was not defective.
	We find that defendant has waived this issue for review for
the reasons advanced by the State. See People v. Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 41 (1996); Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186. Defendant asserts,
however, that the defective verdict form constituted plain error
under Rules 451(c) and 615(a). We hold that the challenged
verdict form did not omit the required elements for eligibility
under section 9-1(b)(6) and, therefore, find no plain error. See
generally Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 17.
	In People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995), this court reversed
the jury's finding of eligibility because of a defective verdict form.
As in the instant case, the defendant's eligibility in Mack was
based on section 9-1(b)(6). The verdict form at issue in Mack
provided: "We, the jury, unanimously find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the following aggravating factor exists in relation to this
Murder: Larry Mack killed Joseph Kolar in the course of an
Armed Robbery." See Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 529-30. The Mack court
found that this verdict form was improper. It explained, "where the
verdict purports to set out the elements of the offense as specific
findings, it must do so completely or be held insufficient." Mack,
167 Ill. 2d  at 538. The Mack court concluded that the verdict form
at issue was defective because it attempted to set forth a statutory
aggravating factor but did so incompletely by omitting the mental
state element under section 9-1(b)(6),
	In evaluating the effect of this omission, the Mack court noted
that "[t]he test of the sufficiency of a verdict is whether the jury's
intention can by ascertained with reasonable certainty from the
language used." Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 537. In addition, "all parts of
the record will be searched and interpreted together in determining
the meaning of a verdict." Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 537. The Mack
court rejected, however, the State's argument that the presence of
the mental state requirement in the jury instructions cured any
error resulting from the absence of this element from the verdict
form. The Mack court stated that it could not "lightly discount" the
possibility that the jury was confused as a result of the discrepancy
between the jury instructions and the verdict form. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 535. In addition, to conclude that the jury found the existence
of the mental state under section 9-1(b)(6), when this element was
missing from the verdict form, would be "a speculative attempt to
reconstruct the jury's deliberations and divine its unexpressed
conclusions." Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 536-37. For these reasons, the
Mack court reversed the eligibility verdict and remanded the cause
for resentencing. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d at 538-39; see also, e.g., Buss,
187 Ill. 2d  at 225 (finding the eligibility verdict forms legally
insufficient).
	We disagree with defendant's argument that the verdict form
relating to her eligibility for the death penalty under section
9-1(b)(6) for Joshua's murder is invalid under Mack. Instead, we
find that the verdict form is like those this court upheld in People
v. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d 335 (1997).
	In McNeal, this court rejected a defendant's Mack challenge
to the six jury verdicts finding him guilty of first degree murder.
The defendant had been charged under three different theories of
first degree murder for the murder of two victims. The verdict
forms described the different theories in parentheticals. For
example, one form stated, " 'We, the jury, find the defendant,
Aldwin McNeal, Guilty of the offense of first degree murder (was
committing the offense of robbery) of Corey Gerlach.' " McNeal,
175 Ill. 2d  at 359. Another stated, " 'We, the jury, find the
defendant, Aldwin McNeal, Guilty of the offense of first degree
murder (intended to kill) of Perry Austin.' " McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d  at
360. The defendant in McNeal argued that these verdict forms
were invalid under Mack because they failed to require a finding
that the defendant performed the acts that caused the victims'
deaths or a finding that the defendant possessed the mental state
when he performed these acts. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d  at 360.
	This court found no Mack violation. It observed that the jury
had been properly instructed as to the elements of the different
theories of first degree murder. In addition, unlike Mack, there was
no discrepancy between the jury instructions and the verdict forms.
The parenthetical material referred to theories of first degree
murder under which defendant was charged and conformed with
the description of these theories in the instructions. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d  at 362. Based on this reasoning, the McNeal court found
that the verdict forms were proper. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d  at 362.
	 As in McNeal, the verdict form and the record in this case
permit us to conclude with reasonable certainty that the jury found
the existence of the elements required for eligibility under section
9-1(b)(6). There is no discrepancy between the jury instructions
and the felony-murder verdict forms in defendant's case. Instead,
the felony-murder eligibility verdict form relating to Joshua's
murder contains an express reference to portions of the jury
instructions. These instructions contained a complete statement of
the necessary elements for eligibility under section 9-1(b)(6). The
jury instruction relating to defendant's eligibility for the death
penalty as a result of Joshua Evans' murder provided in relevant
part:
			"Before the defendant may be found eligible for a death
sentence under the law for the first degree murder of
Joshua Evans, the State must prove the following
propositions:
			First Proposition: That the defendant was 18 years old
or older at the time of the commission of the murder of
Joshua Evans of which she was found guilty at the trial of
this case; and
			Second Proposition: That one or more of the following
statutory aggravating factors exist
* * *
			[2] Joshua Evans was killed in the course of
Aggravated Kidnapping and Joshua Evans received
physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant
substantially contemporaneously with physical injuries
caused by one or more persons for whose conduct the
defendant was legally responsible and the physical
injuries inflicted by either the defendant or other persons
for whose conduct she is legally responsible caused the
death of Joshua Evans; and in performing the acts which
resulted in physical injuries personally inflicted by the
defendant on Joshua Evans substantially
contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by one
or more persons for whose conduct the defendant was
legally responsible, the defendant acted with the intent to
kill Joshua Evans or with the knowledge that her acts
created a strong probability of death to Joshua Evans."
By referring to "paragraph [2] of the second proposition
concerning the First Degree Murder of Joshua Evans," the felony-
murder eligibility verdict forms in defendant's case incorporated
the necessary elements under section 9-1(b)(6), including the
required mental state and defendant's infliction of injuries on the
decedent.
	As a result, unlike Mack, a conclusion in defendant's case that
the jury found the necessary elements under section 9-1(b)(6) need
not be based on speculation. When we consider the verdict forms
in the context of the record in defendant's case, we can conclude
with reasonable certainty that the jury found these elements.
Accordingly, we hold that defendant was properly found eligible
for the death penalty based on the felony-murder statutory
aggravating factor premised on Joshua's murder.
	As a consequence of this holding, we need not decide the
merits of defendant's challenge to the eligibility verdict under
section 9-1(b)(6) for Debra's murder or her challenges to the
eligibility verdicts based on section 9-1(b)(3), 9-1(b)(7), or
9-1(b)(8). Defendant was independently eligible for the death
penalty on the ground that she murdered Joshua during an
aggravated kidnapping. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 320-21 (1998); People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258, 268 (1993);
Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d  at 90; Thus, the jury's reliance on any other
aggravating factors did not affect its finding that defendant was
eligible for the death penalty. See People v. Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d 321, 345 (1989).
2. Consideration of Invalid Statutory Aggravating Factors at the
Second Stage Sentencing Hearing
	Defendant, however, argues that, under People v. Brownell,
79 Ill. 2d 508 (1980), and People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133 (1992),
the jury's consideration of invalid aggravating factors at the
second stage of sentencing requires that her death sentence be
vacated. In Brownell, this court held that the defendant was
entitled to a new second stage sentencing hearing because the jury
had considered an invalid aggravating factor at that stage. The
defendant was convicted of the murder, rape, and aggravated
kidnapping of Louise Betts. The circuit court found defendant
eligible for the death penalty under the felony-murder and murder
of a witness statutory aggravating factors. The circuit court had
determined that, because Betts was a witness to defendant's
crimes, her murder satisfied the requirements of the murder of a
witness statutory aggravating factor. This court reversed the circuit
court's eligibility finding, holding that the legislature intended the
murder of a witness eligibility factor to apply only when the
murder victim is a witness in a separate offense. Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d  at 525-26. Although the Brownell court upheld the circuit
court's eligibility finding based on the felony-murder factor, it
concluded that a new second stage sentencing hearing was
required because the circuit court had weighed an aggravating
factor that the Brownell court "concluded figured erroneously in
the court's sentencing decision." Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d  at 536.
	In cases decided after Brownell, this court has held that the
jury's consideration of invalid statutory aggravating factors at the
second stage of a capital sentencing hearing is subject to a
harmless error analysis. See, e.g., People v. Cole, 172 Ill. 2d 85,
103 (1996); People v. Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d 1, 69 (1995); see also
Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d  at 345 (applying a harmless error analysis to the
jury's consideration of evidence of a nonstatutory aggravating
factor). For example, in Pasch, this court held that the felony-murder statutory aggravating factor was invalid because the
evidence at trial did not support the predicate felony, but the jury's
consideration of this factor at the aggravation-mitigation stage was
harmless. In Pasch, defendant was found eligible for the death
penalty under the felony-murder, multiple-murder, and murder of
a police officer statutory aggravating factors. Aggravated
kidnapping was the underlying felony for the felony-murder
statutory aggravating factor. This court reversed defendant's
conviction for aggravated kidnapping, finding insufficient
evidence of the "secret confinement" element. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 
at 187-88. The court, therefore, held that the felony-murder
aggravating factor was invalid.
	The Pasch court rejected, however, defendant's claim that the
jury's consideration of this invalid factor at the second stage of
sentencing required resentencing under Brownell. The Pasch court
explained that, whereas in Brownell the sentencer had weighed a
factor that was "not warranted by the evidence," in the case before
it, the jury "did not rely on anything it should not have during the
second phase of the hearing." Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 190. According
to the Pasch court:
		"Once it had been determined that defendant was eligible
for the death penalty, by virtue of his actions falling
within one of the 10 aggravating factors detailed under
section 9-1(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 [citation],
the jury could consider any aggravating factors. It was not
limited to those set forth in subsection (b) in determining
whether to impose the death penalty. [Citation.] As a
result, even though the jury should not have considered
defendant's restraint of [the victim] in terms of its being
a felony, it was entirely proper to have considered
defendant's identical conduct as an aggravating factor in
determining whether to impose the death penalty.
			Therefore, the absence of a conviction for aggravated
kidnapping should not have affected the jury's decision
here, since the jury would have been able to consider the
same aggravating and mitigating factors that the
defendant claims it actually did consider." (Emphasis in
original.) Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 190.
The Pasch court, therefore, held that no new sentencing hearing
was required. See also, e.g., Williams, 181 Ill. 2d at 321-22; Cole,
172 Ill. 2d  at 103; Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d  at 69; Page, 156 Ill. 2d  at
270; Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 190; Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d  at 92;
Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d  at 347; but see Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d  at 345 (the
jury's consideration of evidence of a nonstatutory aggravating
factor required resentencing).
	In the case before us, we have held that defendant was
properly found eligible for the death penalty on the basis that she
murdered Joshua during an aggravated kidnapping. Even
assuming, arguendo, the invalidity of the remaining statutory
aggravating factors, we find that the jury's consideration of these
factors at the second stage of sentencing does not require
resentencing. See Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 321 (assuming the
invalidity of a statutory aggravating factor, finding that the jury's
consideration of this factor did not require resentencing); Page,
156 Ill. 2d  at 269 (same); Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d  at 345-46 (same).
	At the second stage of sentencing, the jury was instructed that
it could consider, as aggravation, the factors it had found at
eligibility. The State also briefly argued that aggravating factors
the jury could weigh included those that the jury had found at
eligibility. As in Pasch, however, even if the jury should not have
weighed the challenged statutory aggravating factors, it could have
properly considered the conduct underlying these allegedly invalid
factors. An examination of this underlying conduct, as well as the
other evidence presented at the aggravation-mitigation stage,
supports the conclusion that the jury's consideration of the
challenged factors, even if improper, was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
	Aggravating evidence at the second stage hearing included
evidence that defendant had planned to take the unborn child of
her friend Debra in order to satisfy her and her boyfriend's desire
for a light-skinned baby boy. She attempted to obtain a gun and
ascertained when Edwards would be absent from the apartment.
After Caffey shot Debra, defendant stood next to Caffey as he
ripped Elijah from Debra's womb. Defendant did nothing to help
Debra or Samantha, and concerned herself only with Elijah, the
baby she wanted. To conceal these crimes, defendant hid Joshua
at her friend's apartment. Upon learning that Joshua could identify
her, defendant swore at him and attempted to poison him by
forcing him to drink iodine, a substance that contributed to his
death. She participated further in the torture of this terrified little
boy, who tried in vain to get help for his little brother who had
been left alone in the apartment with his brutally murdered mother
and sister. She helped to strangle Joshua, retrieved a knife to stab
him, held him while Caffey stabbed him, and eventually left him
to die alone in an alley, half-dressed, in November.
	Other evidence presented at the aggravation-mitigation stage
showed that such violent conduct by defendant was not an isolated
incident. She had previously stabbed Caffey, puncturing a lung,
and an object fashioned into a shank was found in her jail cell as
she awaited trial in this case. Defendant had a criminal history,
including possession of stolen property and forgery, and was on
probation at the time of the murders in this case.
	The evidence in mitigation was that defendant had dropped
out of school when she became pregnant in her sophomore year of
high school, she was a good mother, she had a below-average IQ,
her boyfriends had physically abused her, and she was
psychologically vulnerable to predatory males and more
susceptible to coercion than the average person. The defense also
presented evidence that Ward wanted the baby Debra was
carrying, and Ward had admitted responsibility for Debra's
injuries to another inmate.
	This mitigating evidence did little to explain or excuse
defendant's involvement in the horrific crimes against the Evans
family. She was accountable for Ward's conduct and, although she
may have been abused in the past and was susceptible to coercion,
there was no evidence that coercion or physical threats caused her
acts on November 16. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that
defendant was motivated by her own desire for a baby and acted
apart from and contrary to Caffey's instructions at times.
	In light of the overwhelming aggravating evidence supporting
the imposition of the death penalty, we find that any error resulting
from the jury's consideration of allegedly invalid statutory
aggravating factors was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. Holiday Basket Application 
	Defendant also contends that she is entitled to a new second-stage sentencing hearing because the circuit court erred in
admitting evidence of the holiday basket application form from her
general assistance file. In a pretrial motion in limine, defendant
requested that evidence of the form be excluded because it was
disclosed in violation of section 11-9 of the Illinois Public Aid
Code (305 ILCS 5/11-9 (West 1996)), which prohibits disclosure
of public aid documents, except under certain circumstances. The
circuit court denied defendant's motion.
	We will not order a new sentencing hearing based on the
admission of this form. Admission of the holiday basket
application was cumulative in light of other evidence that
defendant wanted Debra Evans' baby and planned to pretend that
Elijah was her son. Any error in the admission of the holiday
basket application was, therefore, harmless. See Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d  at 74-75. Even assuming that the admission of this evidence
was improper, therefore, no new sentencing hearing is necessary.
C. Defense Counsel's Failure to Request a Compulsion
Instruction
	Defendant further argues that she was denied the effective
assistance of counsel at the second stage of her capital sentencing
hearing by her attorneys' failure to have the jury instructed that
compulsion is a statutory mitigating factor. The Illinois death
penalty statute includes compulsion among the statutory mitigating
factors a jury may consider:
			"The court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to
consider any aggravating and any mitigating factors which
are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty.
Aggravating factors may include but need not be limited
to those factors set forth in subsection (b). Mitigating
factors may include but need not be limited to the
following:
* * *
				(4) the defendant acted under the compulsion of
threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or
great bodily harm." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(c) (West 1994).
Although some statutory mitigating factors were included in the
jury instructions, compulsion was not one of them. The jury did
receive a general instruction that "[w]here there is evidence of a
mitigating factor, the fact that such mitigating factor is not a factor
specifically listed in these instructions does not preclude your
consideration of the evidence." Defendant contends, however, that
a specific instruction regarding compulsion was necessary.
According to defendant, such an instruction was warranted by
evidence that her boyfriends, including Caffey, had abused her,
and evidence that defendant had a dependent personality and
attached herself to predatory males who could make her do things
she would not normally do on her own.
	Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), to establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish (1) that defense
" 'counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness' " and (2) that " 'there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.' " People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 529-30 (1999), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 688,
694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064, 2068. There is
a "strong presumption that the challenged action or inaction of
counsel was the product of sound trial strategy and not of
incompetence." Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 397. A defendant's failure
to satisfy either prong of the Strickland analysis will result in the
rejection of his ineffective assistance claim. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d  at
332.
	We find that defendant in this case has failed to overcome the
presumption that her attorneys' performance was adequate. A
defendant is entitled to have the jury receive instructions on the
law that applies to her theory of the case, provided there is
evidence in the record to support that theory. People v. Gilliam,
172 Ill. 2d 484, 519 (1996). The evidence in this case did not
support an instruction on the statutory mitigating factor of
compulsion. Although there was evidence that defendant was
psychologically vulnerable to predatory males who could cause her
to do things she would not normally do by threatening her, there
was no evidence that Caffey or anyone else threatened defendant
or that her actions were the result of threats. To the contrary, there
was evidence that, against Caffey's wishes, defendant brought
Joshua to the Schaumburg townhouse. Also, whereas there was
evidence that Caffey had beaten defendant in 1994, there was no
evidence that he had threatened her with any "imminent" "death
or great bodily harm," as required by the compulsion statutory
mitigating factor. 	Given that the evidence did not support an
instruction on the statutory mitigating factor of compulsion,
defendant was not entitled to one, and we cannot say that defense
counsel were deficient for failing to request a compulsion
instruction. See Alvine, 173 Ill. 2d  at 297. Accordingly, we reject
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
IV. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty
	 Defendant makes several additional constitutional challenges
to the Illinois death penalty statute. This court has, however,
previously rejected the arguments that the death penalty statute is
unconstitutional because (1) it places a burden of proof on
defendants that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigation
(see, e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152
(1996)); and (2) it allows the jury to weigh the vague aggravating
factor "any other reason" a defendant should be sentenced to death
(see, e.g., Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d at 112-13; People v. Mulero, 176 Ill. 2d 444, 481 (1997); People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 48 (1995)).
In other cases, this court has also found no merit to the arguments
that the death penalty statute is unconstitutional because (1)
prosecutors have discretion to decide to seek the death penalty
(see, e.g., People v. Fair, 159 Ill. 2d 51, 96 (1994)); (2) the
prosecution need not give a defendant pretrial notice of its intent
to seek the death penalty (People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 161
(1998)); (3) there is limited comparative proportionality review of
death sentences (see, e.g., People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 173-74 (1997); People v. Harris, 164 Ill. 2d 322, 351 (1994)); (4) there
is no requirement that the sentencing body make written findings
(see, e.g., Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d at 173-74); (5) the sentencing body
may consider nonstatutory aggravating factors (see, e.g., Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 248; Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d at 112-13); (6) there is no
requirement for pretrial notice to defendants of evidence of
aggravating circumstances (see People v. Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d 1,
33 (1995)); (7) the State has no burden of proof (see, e.g.,
Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d at 173-74); (8) the language of the statute may
cause the jury to place the burden of proof on the defendant (see,
e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; Harris, 182 Ill. 2d  at 161;
Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d at 112); and (9) the jury is precluded from
considering the range of sentences that apply if the death penalty
is not imposed (see People v. Childress, 158 Ill. 2d 275, 318
(1994)). Defendant offers no persuasive reason for our
reconsideration of these holdings. We also decline to find that
these aspects of the death penalty statute combine to make it
unconstitutional. As this court stated in Childress, " '[i]f all of the
individual aspects are constitutional, we stand by the conclusion
that the whole is also constitutional.' " Childress, 158 Ill. 2d  at
318, quoting People v. Phillips, 127 Ill. 2d 499, 542-43 (1989); see
also, e.g., People v. Woolley, 178 Ill. 2d 175, 215 (1997); People
v. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201, 247 (1993).
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed. We direct the clerk of this court to enter an order setting
Wednesday, January 17, 2001, as the date on which the sentence
of death, entered by the circuit court of Du Page County, shall be
carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the manner provided
by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996). The clerk of this court
shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the
Director of Corrections, the warden of Tamms Correctional
Center, and the warden of the institution where defendant is
confined.
Affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
	I agree that Williams' convictions should not be disturbed. In
my view, however, her sentence of death cannot be allowed to
stand. For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and
partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois
death penalty law is void and unenforceable because it violates the
eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section
2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2).
Williams' sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and she
should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j)
(West 1994). Because Williams was found guilty of murdering
more than one victim, the term of her imprisonment must be
natural life. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1994).