Title: Dodge v. Randolph-Macon Woman's College

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
JENNA DODGE, ET AL. 
 
 
      OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 070843  
 June 6, 2008 
 
TRUSTEES OF RANDOLPH-MACON WOMAN'S COLLEGE, 
D/B/A RANDOLPH-MACON WOMAN'S COLLEGE 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG 
J. Leyburn Mosby, Jr., Judge 
 
 
The narrow issue that we consider in this appeal is 
whether the plaintiffs pled a cause of action for breach of a 
contract that purportedly entitled them to receive a college 
education in a predominantly female academic environment for 
four years. 
 
The plaintiffs, Jenna Dodge, Sarah Hassmer, Hayley J. 
Maxwell, Laura McKean-Peraza, Kelsey McCune, Jennifer C. 
Mullins, Rebekah Lynn Pauli, Jessica Whittle, and Mary 
Elizabeth Yardley, filed their complaint against the Trustees 
of Randolph-Macon Woman's College, a Virginia nonstock 
corporation.  The plaintiffs are students at the Randolph-
Macon Woman's College, a predominantly female liberal arts 
college for approximately 115 years. 
 
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that when they 
"accepted [the College's] offers of admission, paid tuition 
and other fees, and registered for classes, a contract was 
formed between them and the [College], which . . . included 
the promise, both express and implied, that if [the 
plaintiffs] paid the tuition and fees and enrolled at [the 
College], they would receive a four-year liberal arts 
education at a woman's college."  The plaintiffs allege that 
they reasonably expected that the College would continue to 
offer "the curriculum plan as advertised in the college 
catalog and other promotional materials upon which Plaintiffs 
relied when choosing" to attend the College.  Continuing, the 
plaintiffs state that "[a]dditional terms of the contracts are 
within the various official [College] publications, including 
promotional materials, the [H]onor [C]ode, the student 
handbook, the academic catalog, correspondence between [the 
College] and the students, and the [C]ollege's policies and 
regulations." 
 
The plaintiffs allege in the complaint that they chose to 
attend the College "specifically in order to obtain a four-
year liberal arts college degree . . . in a single-sex 
environment."  The plaintiffs allege that the College's 2005-
07 Academic Catalog states:  "Last, and most important, 
Randolph-Macon Woman's College offers an education fully and 
completely directed toward women.  In a time of increasing 
opportunities for women, it is essential that the 
undergraduate years help the student build confidence, 
 
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establish identity, and explore opportunities for careers and 
for service to the society that awaits her." 
 
According to the plaintiffs' allegations, the College 
announced in August 2006 that its Trustees would approve a 
strategic plan that included, among other things, a transition 
from a predominantly female educational institution to a 
coeducational college that would offer a new curriculum 
identified as "global honors." 
 
The plaintiffs allege that when the Trustees approved the 
strategic plan, the College anticipatorily breached its 
contracts with them.  The plaintiffs asked that the circuit 
court enter a declaration that the College breached its 
contracts, and the plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring 
the College to remain a predominantly women's college until 
the fall of 2010, when all the plaintiffs would have 
graduated. 
 
The College filed a motion for a "bill of particulars and 
craving oyer."  The litigants agreed upon an order requiring 
the plaintiffs to file a bill of particulars and the documents 
that the plaintiffs claim comprise their contracts with the 
College.   
The plaintiffs filed a bill of particulars and they 
alleged the following: "There is only one contract between 
each one of the [p]laintiffs and Randolph-Macon Woman's 
 
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College" and that a contract was established when they 
"accepted their respective offers and matriculated according 
to [the College's] schedule for their respective initial 
academic years to begin their promised four-year education at 
[Randolph-Macon Woman's College]."  The plaintiffs attached 
numerous documents to their bill of particulars that 
purportedly contain the contract, including:  letters of 
offers of admission from the College's Admissions Committee; 
correspondence, including e-mail, among the College's 
representatives and the students; and the College's 2005-07 
Academic Catalog. 
 
The College filed a demurrer and asserted that the 
plaintiffs failed to identify or plead the existence of a 
contract between the plaintiffs and the College in the bill of 
particulars and attached documents.  The circuit court 
considered the pleadings, documents, and legal memoranda and 
entered an order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the 
complaint.  The plaintiffs appeal. 
 
The plaintiffs contend that they pled a cause of action 
for breach of contract.  The plaintiffs assert that the 
relevant terms of their contracts with the College are 
contained in the standardized acceptance letters that the 
plaintiffs received from the College and other documents.  
Continuing, the plaintiffs argue that the following paragraph 
 
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in their complaint contains facts sufficient to establish the 
existence of a contract: 
"When [the plaintiffs] accepted [the College's] 
offers of admission, paid tuition and other fees, 
and registered for classes, a contract was formed 
between them and the school, which, inter alia, 
included the promise, both express and implied, that 
if [the plaintiffs] paid the tuition and fees and 
enrolled at [the College], they would receive a 
four-year liberal arts education at a woman's 
college." 
 
We disagree with the plaintiffs' contentions. 
 
The principles governing our review of a circuit court's 
consideration of a demurrer are well established.  A demurrer 
admits the truth of all properly pleaded material facts.  "All 
reasonable factual inferences fairly and justly drawn from the 
facts alleged must be considered in aid of the pleading.  
However, a demurrer does not admit the correctness of the 
pleader's conclusions of law."  Fox v. Custis, 236 Va. 69, 71, 
372 S.E.2d 373, 374 (1988); accord Tronfeld v. Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co., 272 Va. 709, 713, 636 S.E.2d 447, 449 (2006); Fuste 
v. Riverside Healthcare Ass'n, 265 Va. 127, 131-32, 575 S.E.2d 
858, 861 (2003). 
When, as in this case, the circuit court grants a 
demurrant's motion craving oyer, the circuit court in ruling 
on the demurrer may properly consider the facts alleged as 
amplified by any written documents added to the record as a 
result of the motion.  Ward's Equipment, Inc. v. New Holland 
 
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N. Am., Inc., 254 Va. 379, 382, 493 S.E.2d 516, 518 (1997); 
Hechler Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 230 Va. 396, 
398, 337 S.E.2d 744, 746 (1985).  A circuit court "considering 
a demurrer may ignore a party's factual allegations 
contradicted by the terms of authentic, unambiguous documents 
that properly are a part of the pleadings."  Ward's Equipment, 
Inc., 254 Va. at 382, 493 S.E.2d at 518.   
 
Additionally, "[i]t is fundamental that no person may be 
subjected by law to a contractual obligation, unless the 
character of the obligation is definitely fixed by an express 
or implied agreement of the parties.  In order to be binding, 
an agreement must be definite and certain as to its terms and 
requirements; it must identify the subject matter and spell 
out the essential commitments and agreements with respect 
thereto."  Progressive Constr. Co. v. Thumm, 209 Va. 24, 30-
31, 161 S.E.2d 687, 691 (1968) (citation omitted).  The terms 
of the contract must be clear, definite, and explicit.  See 
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission of Va. v. Elliott, 272 
Va. 97, 119, 630 S.E.2d 485, 496 (2006); Chang v. First 
Colonial Savings Bank, 242 Va. 388, 391, 410 S.E.2d 928, 930 
(1991).  A contract must be sufficiently definite to enable a 
court to give the contract an exact meaning, and the contract 
must obligate the contracting parties to matters that are 
definitely ascertained or ascertainable.  Smith v. Farrell, 
 
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199 Va. 121, 128, 98 S.E.2d 3, 7 (1957).  A contract is not 
valid and it is unenforceable if the terms of the contract are 
not established with reasonable certainty.  Id. 
 
Applying the aforementioned principles, we hold that the 
plaintiffs failed to plead facts, which if established at 
trial, would demonstrate the existence of a contract that 
required the College to operate an academic institution 
predominantly for women during the four years that the 
plaintiffs expected to attend the College.  Even though the 
plaintiffs referenced numerous documents, this Court, just as 
the circuit court, has reviewed the documents and can find no 
such promise.  There is no language in any of these documents 
in which the College made a clear, definite, and specific 
promise to operate a college predominantly for women during 
the duration of the plaintiffs' academic studies at the 
College.  Thus, we hold that the plaintiffs failed to plead 
the existence of a contract between the parties. 
 
Contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, the College's 
articles of incorporation do not form the basis of a contract 
between the students and the College.  By its very nature, the 
articles of incorporation do not contain a clear, definite, 
and explicit agreement among the parties to the alleged 
contract. 
 
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In conclusion, our narrow holding in this appeal is that 
the plaintiffs failed to plead the existence of a clear, 
definite, and explicit contract between the plaintiffs and the 
College that required the College to provide a four-year 
education for the plaintiffs in an academic environment 
predominantly for women.  In view of this holding, we need not 
consider the litigants' remaining arguments.  Accordingly, we 
will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE LEMONS, with whom SENIOR JUSTICE RUSSELL joins, 
dissenting. 
 
 
I do not fundamentally disagree with the principles of 
law cited by the majority.  I simply disagree with their 
application in this case. 
 
We have often warned our trial courts about granting 
motions that “short circuit” the legal process and deprive 
litigants of their “day in court and depriv[e] this Court of 
an opportunity to review a thoroughly developed record on 
appeal.”  Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson v. Lake 
Fairfax Seven Ltd. P’ship, 253 Va. 93, 95, 480 S.E.2d 471, 472 
(1997).  Unfortunately, that principle is not followed in this 
case.  When we consider an appeal based upon grant of a 
demurrer, we do not decide the merits of the case.  We only 
decide the adequacy of pleadings.  Fuste v. Riverside 
 
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Healthcare Ass’n, Inc., 265 Va. 127, 131-32, 575 S.E.2d 858, 
861 (2003).  Additionally, we must “consider as true the facts 
alleged [in the complaint], the facts impliedly alleged, and 
the reasonable inferences of fact that can be drawn from the 
facts alleged.”  Almy v. Grisham, 273 Va. 68, 77, 639 S.E.2d 
182, 186 (2007). 
 
Among the facts properly pled that should be sufficient 
to survive demurrer are: 
1. 
When “[Students] accepted [the College’s] offers of 
admission, paid tuition and other fees, and 
registered for classes, a contract was formed 
between them and the school, which, inter alia, 
included the promise, both express and implied, that 
if [Students] paid the tuition and fees and enrolled 
at [the College] they would receive a four-year 
liberal arts education at a women’s college.”  
 
2. 
“[The College] routinely used oral and written 
communications, as well as the College’s 115-year 
reputation, to promote the institution and its 
mission: providing a liberal arts education to women 
only.”  
 
3. 
“The College attracted Students in large part due to 
[the College’s] oral and written representations 
regarding these unique aspects of [the College]. 
Students relied on such statements in accepting the 
College’s offers of admission.”  
 
4. 
Additional terms of the contract, to the extent 
relevant, are found “within the various official 
[College] publications, including promotional 
materials, the honor code, the student handbook, the 
academic catalog, correspondence between [the 
College] and the [S]tudents, and the [C]ollege’s 
policies and regulations.”  
 
 
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5. 
The acceptance letters to the Students contained 
reference to the specific date of their expected 
graduation four years hence. 
 
6. 
The acceptance letters to the Students referred to 
“The Macon Plan, ‘which will serve as a guide 
through your four years at Randolph-Macon Woman’s 
College.’ ”  
 
7. 
Promotional material used in the admissions process 
and sent to prospective students included a speech 
by a former President of the College entitled “Why a 
Women’s College?” and answered the question in part 
by observing:  
 
[w]omen’s colleges address a need that 
can be addressed in no other way.  In 
classrooms of women only, it is a given 
that women’s comments will be taken 
seriously.  In classrooms of female 
students, there are no male students to 
find you stupid, or, worse yet, to find 
you unattractive or even unfeminine if 
you speak up and know the answers.  In 
women’s classrooms it’s OK to be both 
smart and good-looking, and there is no 
tacit pressure to conceal intelligence 
or convictions.  Moreover, in 
classrooms of women, the culture of 
academic competition can also be a 
culture of collaboration (which often 
yields superior results). 
 
8. 
The Students relied on these and other written and 
oral promises that their education would be for four 
years in a primarily women’s college. 
 
While the majority cites Smith v. Farrell, 199 Va. 121, 98 
S.E.2d 3 (1957), it does not include the following observation 
in that case: 
Another essential element of a valid 
contract is certainty and completeness. 
The element of completeness denotes that 
the contract embraces all the material 
 
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terms; that of certainty denotes that each 
one of those terms is expressed in a 
sufficiently exact and definite manner. An 
incomplete contract, therefore, is one 
from which one or more material terms have 
been entirely omitted. An uncertain 
contract is one which may, indeed, embrace 
all the material terms, but one of them is 
expressed in so inexact, indefinite or 
obscure language that the intent of the 
parties cannot be sufficiently ascertained 
to enable the court to carry it into 
effect. 
 
Id. at 127-28, 98 S.E.2d at 7.  I do not find the pleadings in 
this case to be either uncertain or incomplete.  Especially 
troubling is the grant of a demurrer in the face of 
allegations of oral promises from the College to the Students 
which can only be tested at trial.  The Students may or may 
not prevail at trial, but that question is not properly before 
us.  The proper question is whether they alleged sufficient 
facts to survive demurrer.  The record reveals that they did; 
consequently, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion 
and judgment of this Court.