Title: HUNNEWELL v HUNNEWELL

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

N o . 12043 IN THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE OF MONTANA 1971 CAROLYN MARIE HUNNEWELL, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs - ARCHIE RAY HUNNEWELL, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, Honorable LeRoy L . McKinnon, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Dockery and Parrish, Lewistown, Montana. Loble, Picotte and Loble, Helena, Montana. Lester He Loble, I1 argued, Helena, Montana. For Respondent : ,argued Robert L . Johnson, Lewistown, Montana. William E . Berger argued, Lewistown, Montana. DEC - 9 1971 Lx.p-i Filed : AUG 3 11972 Submitted: October 27, 1971 ~ecided : OEC - 9 1 9 7 9 ".(;[ AUG 3 1 1972 M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s is an appeal by Archie Ray Hunnewell, t h e defend- a n t , from a judgment e n t e r e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t o f Fergus County following t r i a l to t h e c o u r t , s i t t i n g without a jury. From t h e record it appears t h a t p l a i n t i f f and defendant were married i n 1953. The defendant husband is 4 8 y e a r s of age and t h e p l a i n t i f f w i f e 36 y e a r s o f age. Three c h i l d r e n were born to t h e couple, a g i r l now 1 5 , and t w o sons now 1 3 and 8 y e a r s o f age. The couple moved o n t o t h e ranch owned by d e f e n d a n t ' s f a t h e r n e a r Danvers, Montana and l i v e d t h e r e t h e whole o f t h e i r married l i f e up u n t i l t h e t i m e of t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n p r i o r t o t h e d i v o r c e . The defendant h a s been a rancher a l l h i s l i f e . H e is 35 to 40 p e r c e n t permanently d i s a b l e d o f t h e body as a whole a s t h e r e s u l t o f an a c c i d e n t a l i n j u r y t o h i s s p i n e s u s t a i n e d i n 1965. Since t h e i n j u r y t o h i s s p i n e t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a b i l i t y t o work h i s ranch has been impaired and it is apparent from t h e r e c o r d h e w i l l always r e q u i r e a s s i s t a n c e t o do so. The record f u r t h e r r e v e a l s t h a t f o r some y e a r s t h e r e has been a degree o f controversy i n t h e household concerning t h e common f a c e t s of domestic l i f e , t h e d i s c i p l i n i n g and needs o f t h e c h i l d r e n , t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h e household budget and t h e degree of s o c i a l i z i n g and o u t s i d e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e p a r t i e s . The record a l s o r e v e a l s t h a t t h e defendant h a s been r e f u s e d t h e e x e r c i s e of h i s m a r i t a l p r e r o g a t i v e f o r o v e r a y e a r and a h a l f , t h e p l a i n t i f f r e f u s i n g t o s h a r e t h e same bedroom with defendant during t h a t period. Further, it appears t h a t p l a i n t i f f subjected defendant t o r i d i c u l e i n t h e presence of t h e children; took extended summer vacations t o v i s i t her mother i n S e a t t l e and thus absent- ing h e r s e l f from t h e defendant and t h e ranch operation during the most a c t i v e season of t h e year. The circumstances of these complaints about each o t h e r r e s u l t e d i n p l a i n t i f f f i l i n g f o r a divorce and defendant t o counterclaim f o r t h e same r e l i e f . Upon the t r i a l p l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d t o incidents which happened years before while defendant's testimony was of recent incidents. The c o u r t granted p l a i n t i f f a divorce, ordered t h e property divided, provided f o r custody of t h e children and allow- ance f o r t h e i r support. Defendant c o n t e s t s a l l of these r u l i n g s on t h i s appeal. W e have examined t h e record here with g r e a t c a r e i n our endeavor t o find t h e evidence which supports the c o u r t ' s find- ing t h a t defendant was g u i l t y of extreme c r u e l t y . W e cannot f i n d it and must thereforehold t h a t t h e c o u r t abused its d i s c r e t i o n i n t h i s regard s i n c e t h e r e is a c l e a r preponderance of t h e evi- dence a g a i n s t such finding. Conway v, Fabian, 108 Mont. 287, 89 P.2d 1022. The evidence i n t h i s cause does support defendant's counterclaim f o r a divorce and t h e c o u r t was i n e r r o r i n not s o finding and granting a divorce t o defendant. The defendant next r a i s e s t h e i s s u e of the v a l i d i t y of t h e property settlement ordered by t h e court. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n its findings of f a c t found t h a t a t t h e t i m e of t h e i r marriage t h e p a r t i e s had brought t o t h e marriage about equal amounts of property and t h a t t h e property s i n c e acquired had been acquired through t h e j o i n t e f f o r t s of t h e p a r t i e s . While t h e record supports t h e finding of equal i n i t i a l contribution it f a i l s t o support the finding t h a t t h e a f t e r acquired property r e s u l t e d from e i t h e r t h a t o r the p a r t i e s j o i n t e f f o r t s . H e r e t h e bulk of t h e ranch property w a s t h e land which was i n p a r t paid f o r by crop share but f o r t h e most p a r t i n t h e following manner: When t h e p l a i n t i f f and defendant were married they moved onto t h e Hunnewell ranch under an informal crop shar- ing agreement with defendant's f a t h e r . Subsequently a t h r e e year l e a s e was signed. Upon the expiration of the l e a s e defen6- a n t ' s f a t h e r and stepmother entered i n t o a c o n t r a c t f o r deed with t h e p a r t i e s f o r the sale of t h e ranch. While the c o n t r a c t f o r deed was signed by both t h e plain- t i f f and defendant, t h e deed i t s e l f , which was executed contem- poraneously, named t h e defendant as t h e s o l e grantee. The purchase p r i c e of t h e ranch was $50,000 f o r 1,760 acres, o r approximately $29 per acre. The contract f u r t h e r pro- vided t h a t payment would be made on a crop share b a s i s . M r . Hunnewell died two years l a t e r and included among the a s s e t s of the e s t a t e w a s the balance outstanding on t h e con- t r a c t of approximately $43,000. During t h e probate of t h e e s t a t e , t h e defendant agreed t o relinquish h i s share i n a l l o t h e r a s s e t s of h i s f a t h e r ' s e s t a t e , which amounted t o $35,404.89, and agreed t o pay $4,000 t o each of h i s two sisters i n exchange f o r t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n t h e c o n t r a c t . I t was i n t h i s manner t h a t t h e ranch was acquired by defendant. It is a w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e of law i n t h i s s t a t e t h a t i n determining a property settlement pursuant t o t h e grant- ing of a divorce, t h e c o u r t w i l l consider t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s made by t h e p a r t i e s i n acquiring t h e property i n question. Libra v. Libra, Mont . , 484 P.2d 748, 28 St.Rep. 4 6 0 ; and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . I t w a s , then, e r r o r f o r t h e c o u r t t o f i n d t h a t t h e plain- t i f f had and was e n t i t l e d t o a one-half undivided i n t e r e s t i n t h e ranch. P l a i n t i f f ' s i n t e r e s t based upon j o i n t e f f o r t o r con- t r i b u t i o n was s o f r a c t i o n a l t h a t t h e award of t h e e q u i t y i n t h e town house i n Lewistown as ordered by t h e c o u r t was amply s u f f i - c i e n t t o compensate h e r f o r her i n t e r e s t i n t h e farm. Defendants contention t h a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n ordering c h i l d support payments u n t i l t h e c h i l d r e n are through c o l l e g e on t h e b a s i s t h a t it is openended and imposes an o b l i g a t i o n g r e a t e r than defendant's duty a t l a w has m e r i t . While t h e c o u r t expressly provided t h a t such payments were contingent upon t h e i r emancipation o r f u r t h e r o r d e r of t h e c o u r t t h e c h i l d r e n are s t i l l q u i t e young and t h e i r educational f u t u r e s most uncertain; and no n e c e s s i t y e x i s t s now t o make support payments f o r a longer period than t h e law provides. The c o u r t should await a l a t e r appropriate t i m e because defendant's o b l i g a t i o n t o support h i s c h i l d r e n through c o l l e g e w i l l depend i n a l a r g e degree upon f a c t o r s n o t y e t known; t h e d e s i r e and a b i l i t y of t h e c h i l d r e n themselves a s w e l l a s t h e a b i l i t y of t h e defendant t o make such provisions a t t h a t t i m e . The e q u i t y of t h i s provision is then, a t t h i s t i m e , premature. The f i n a l assignment of e r r o r i s t o t h e d e n i a l of de- f e n d a n t ' s r e q u e s t f o r t h e custody of t h e c h i l d r e n d u r i n g t h e summer months, t h e c o u r t g r a n t i n g him i n s t e a d reasonable v i s i - t a t i o n r i g h t s . The record c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t a l l t h e c h i l d r e n still have a c t i v e i n t e r e s t s i n r i d i n g h o r s e s , c a r i n g f o r animals, and o t h e r ranch l i f e a c t i v i t i e s . The p l a i n t i f f ' s d e n i a l t h a t t h e defendant w a s a f i t and proper person t o have custody of t h e c h i l d r e n a s s t a t e d i n h e r answer t o p e r t i n e n t i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s was t h a t she d i d n o t f a v o r j o i n t custody. The c h i l d r e n then- s e l v e s had mixed emotions regarding t h e same, which is c o n s i s t e n t with t h e trauma o f t h e i r s i t u a t i o n . W e understand e v e n t s have t r a n s p i r e d i n t h i s r e s p e c t s i n c e t h e o r i g i n a l t r i a l l a n d t h e defendant f a t h e r n o t having been found u n f i t , t h e c o u r t should f u r t h e r consider t h e c h i l d r e n ' s custody. The cause should be remanded t o t h e district c o u r t f o r modification of its f i n d i n g s and judgment i n conformity with t h i s opinion. I t i s W e concur: Associate H t i c e s s i t t i n g i n place o f M r . J u s t i c e John C. Harrison. Supplemental Opinion on Rehearing This cause was first submitted on October 27, 1971, on appeal from the district court of Fergus County. The district court had granted a decree of divorce in favor of plaintiff Carolyn Hunnewell, and further ordered that the property ac- quired during the marriage be divided evenly between plaintiff and defendant. Defendant Archie Hunnewell appealed and on Dec- ember 9, 1971, this Court reversed the district court ordering the decree of divorce be entered for defendant. In that same opinion we ordered that the property should not be divided even- ly between the parties as the evidence in the record did not support the conclusion that each party had contributed equally to the marriage. A petition for rehearing was filed on December 23, 1971, and rehearing was held on June 14, 1972. From the showing made at the rehearing it became apparent that some changes needed to be made in our original opinion. That portion of the original opinion relating to the decree of divorce and the remanding of the custody of the children to the district court will stand. The statement of facts in the original opinion with the foregoing statement will be sufficient for the purposes of this supplemental opinion. The necessary change to be made in the original opinion relates to determination of how the property of the marriage is to be apportioned. Originally we held that an award of the equity in the "town house" would be sufficient to compensate Mrs. Hunne- well for her contribution to the marriage. On rehearing it was shown that this equity amounted to approximately $2,000, which is about the amount of money Mrs. Hunnewell contributed to the marriage in the beginning. While the record does support the conclusion that the bulk of the marital property was obtained by Archie's inheri- tance from his father and the arrangement made between his sisters, the record also shows that Carolyn Hunnewell did make a contribution to the marriage for which she should be compen- sated in a greater amount than her original contribution, It may be true that she did absent herself from the ranch during the peak period of activity, but it is also true that she was present during the remaining time when she carried out the duties and responsibilities expected of a "ranch wife". Archie Hunnewell testified that Carolyn had helped with the calving on the ranch. Carolyn's testimony showed that during her presence at the ranch she did all the cooking, including the canning of garden vegetables and cleaning for the family. She also testi- fied she took part in the children's activities. To compensate for her contribution we order that Carolyn Hunnewell is to receive the town house in Lewistown outright. The present encumbrance to be assumed by Archie Hunnewell who may either satisfy the mortgage and deliver the property to Carolyn or he may continue to pay the mortgage payments until such mort- gage is satisfied. Carolyn Hunnewell is to have immediate posses- sion. This, plus the other property divisions ordered, will fully satisfyany further claims Carolyn Hunnewell may have on the ranch property. She will have no claim to any of the property Archie Hunnewell inherited from his father or any of the machinery or equipment necessary to carry on the ranching operation. The marital property also includes property, both real and personal, held in joint tenancy. These joint tenancies shall be terminated and the various items of property divided equally be- tween the parties with the exception that Archie is to retain all interest in the REA stock originally acquired by his father. Carolyn Hunnewell shall be required to execute a crop share lease to Archie on her interest in the real property, formerly held in joint tenancy, annually so long as Archie complies with the conditions of said lease, any renewal and extension thereof. This lease shall be made on the usual terms of such leases in the area, and if there be dispute between the parties as to such "usual terms" the district judge shall make such determination. Should Carolyn Hunnewell choose to sell her interests Archie Hunnewell shall have the option to meet any and all bids and terms of such contemplated sale, and in any such sale the down payment shall not be more than 25% of the sale price, the balance to be paid in five equal installments, one installment due each year for a period of 5 years. The purpose of this pro- vision is to permit Archie to continue to ranch and farm the premises without being met with a sudden emergency to raise money, the Court being aware that all the property is presently mort- gaged and such an emergency demand might cause a hardship. As to the grazing land which would not be included in a crop share lease, the same general conditions as heretofore out- lined shall be contained in such lease and the compensation for the annual use for grazing purposes shall be the "usual terms" of grazing leases in the area, and if there be dispute between the parties the district judge shall set such compensation. The record reveals a dispute exists over the distribution of the remaining personal property held by the parties. So that an equitable solution may be made we are referring this matter back to the district court to determine the amount of such personal property in the marriage and which of the parties has possession, and then make an equitable division. In making this division that portion of the personal property which consists of antiques and heirlooms should be distributed to the party whose family originally owned the article. The property interests of the children should also be considered in making such distribution. As to the cattle, Carolyn should be given 10 head of sound cows, free and clear of any encumbrance. They shall be picked by the parties, Carolyn having the first pick, then Archie, and so on until 10 head have been selected, and they shall be rebranded by Carolyn, unless she desires to sell in which event Archie shall have the right to meet the bid of any commercial cattle buyer agreed upon by the parties and thereby retain ownership thereof. Should the district judge desire that these settlement provisions be handled otherwise than here set forth but in the same vein, he is privileged to appoint a Master who shall see that they are carried out. We find no merit in the contention that the petition for rehearing was not filed within time, extensions of time are often granted by the Court to counsel in person, or by phone, without the necessity of a formal order. The cause is remanded to the district court for further proceedings in conformity with what has been said here and in the original opinion heretofore issued.