Title: Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming v. Bryant

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming v. Bryant1985 WY 116704 P.2d 1311Case Number: 84-208, 84-209Decided: 08/21/1985EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF WYOMING, APPELLANT (RESPONDENT), 

v. 

IN THE MATTER OF PETITION OF PAUL KRUGER BRYANT, III, FOR REVIEW OF THE APPEAL DECISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF WYOMING CONCERNING THE CLAIM OF PAUL KRUGER BRYANT, III, CLAIMANT, AND CATHEDRAL HOME FOR CHILDREN, EMPLOYER, APPELLEE (PETITIONER). 

CATHEDRAL HOME FOR CHILDREN, APPELLANT (EMPLOYER), 

v. 

IN THE MATTER OF PETITION OF PAUL KRUGER BRYANT, III, FOR REVIEW OF THE APPEAL DECISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF WYOMING CONCERNING THE CLAIM OF PAUL KRUGER BRYANT, III, CLAIMANT, AND CATHEDRAL HOME FOR CHILDREN, EMPLOYER, APPELLEE (PETITIONER), 

v. 

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF WYOMING (RESPONDENT).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
COMMISSION OF WYOMING, APPELLANT (RESPONDENT), 

v. 

IN THE MATTER OF PETITION 
OF PAUL KRUGER BRYANT, III, FOR REVIEW OF THE APPEAL DECISION OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY COMMISSION OF WYOMING CONCERNING THE CLAIM OF PAUL KRUGER BRYANT, III, 
CLAIMANT, AND CATHEDRAL HOME FOR CHILDREN, EMPLOYER, APPELLEE (PETITIONER). 

CATHEDRAL HOME FOR 
CHILDREN, APPELLANT (EMPLOYER), 

v. 

IN THE MATTER OF PETITION 
OF PAUL KRUGER BRYANT, III, FOR REVIEW OF THE APPEAL DECISION OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY COMMISSION OF WYOMING CONCERNING THE CLAIM OF PAUL KRUGER BRYANT, III, 
CLAIMANT, AND CATHEDRAL HOME FOR CHILDREN, EMPLOYER, APPELLEE (PETITIONER), 

v. 

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
COMMISSION OF WYOMING (RESPONDENT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

 
 
Philip Nicholas 
of Corthell and King, Laramie, for appellant Cathedral Home for 
Children.

Joe Scott, Sp. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Casper, for appellant Employment Security 
Commission of Wyoming.

Caroline A. 
Papa, Laramie, 
for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The Employment Security 
Commission of Wyoming (ESC) disqualified appellee Paul Kruger Bryant from 
certain benefits. The district court reversed the decision of the ESC, restoring 
appellee to benefits. Both the ESC and the employer, Cathedral Home for Children 
(Cathedral Home) appeal the decision of the district 
court.

[¶2.]     We will 
reverse.

[¶3.]     According to the ESC 
the issues are:

"A. Whether the 
Employment Security Commission of Wyoming erred by basing its decision solely on 
the evidence introduced at the examiner hearing on this matter and not 
considering as evidence certain written statements of the parties that are part 
of the record in this matter, but not introduced into evidence at the examiner 
hearing, and not considering as evidence the fact that there was a lower level 
determination in favor of claimant Paul Kruger Bryant, 
III?

"B. Whether the 
Employment Security Commission of Wyoming's decision is supported by substantial 
evidence in light of the whole record and is in conformity with 
law?"

[¶4.]     According to the 
Cathedral Home the single issue is:

"Is the decision of the 
Employment Security Division supported by substantial 
evidence?"

[¶5.]     The only issue we need 
address is the substantial evidence issue.1

[¶6.]     Appellee Bryant was 
employed by appellant Cathedral Home from February, 1982 until July, 1982. On or 
about July 1, 1982, Bryant and a fellow employee, Bill Waines, were involved in 
an altercation. According to the "incident reports" prepared by Cathedral Home 
personnel, Waines lost his temper and "grabbed" Bryant. Bryant characterizes the 
encounter as an assault, while an appeals examiner's characterization was 
"physical confrontation."

[¶7.]     After Waines regained 
that which he had previously lost, to-wit, his temper, he apologized to Bryant 
for his behavior. Bryant filed a criminal complaint against Waines and the 
latter either pled guilty to, or was found guilty of, an assault and fined 
$5.

[¶8.]     Immediately after the 
incident with Waines, Bryant left the work site. He returned in about 90 minutes 
with a handwritten letter of resignation. Bryant filed a claim for unemployment 
benefits following his separation from the Cathedral Home. On March 10, 1983, a 
deputy from ESC issued a determination which disqualified Bryant from benefits 
for eight weeks (July 4 through August 28, 1982) on the ground that he 
voluntarily quit his work with the Cathedral Home without good cause. On March 
14, 1983, Bryant appealed, and the deputy issued a redetermination which held 
Bryant entitled to benefits without disqualification. At this point the 
Cathedral Home appealed.

[¶9.]     The matter was referred 
to the ESC's appeals examiner who conducted a hearing on August 2, 1983. Bryant 
did not attend the hearing. The examiner issued a decision reversing the 
deputy's redetermination, disqualifying Bryant for eight weeks of benefits for 
voluntarily quitting without good cause. Bryant appealed this decision to the 
ESC, which affirmed the examiner's action.

[¶10.]  On November 16, 1983, Bryant filed a 
petition for judicial review of the ESC's final decision with the District Court 
for AlbanyCounty. The district court 
found Bryant had good cause to quit, reversed the ESC's decision disqualifying 
Bryant for benefits, and awarded benefits to Bryant without 
disqualification.

[¶11.]  On July 20, 1984, the ESC filed a notice 
of appeal of the district court's decision to the Wyoming Supreme Court. On the 
same day, the Cathedral Home filed a similar notice of 
appeal.

I

[¶12.]  Both appellants, the Cathedral Home and 
the ESC, speculate that the district court may have been influenced by Bryant's 
written statements and/or letters appearing in the record, but not introduced 
into evidence nor noticed by the appeals examiner or the ESC. Appellee contends 
that the decisions of the appeals examiner and the ESC were based on incompetent 
evidence.2

[¶13.]  This is a poor case to discuss the rules 
of evidence before an administrative agency or the mechanics of noticing 
materials in the files or otherwise as part of the basis for a decision. 
Furthermore, this is not the case for this court to attempt to reconcile the 
mandate in § 16-3-107(r), W.S. 1977 ("Findings of fact shall be based 
exclusively on the evidence and matter officially noticed"), with the mandate in 
§ 16-3-109 ("The agency shall consider the whole record or any portion 
stipulated to by the parties"). We say that this case does not lend itself to a 
meaningful discussion of those matters because:

1. The hearing before the 
appeals examiner was informal and so far as we can tell, only one lawyer was 
involved.

2. The transcript of 
evidence is taken from a tape recording and is not 
letter-perfect.

3. Appellee did not 
testify nor introduce evidence.

4. We do not know whether 
the hearing examiner, the ESC or the district court considered matters other 
than the evidence produced at the administrative hearing.

[¶14.]  More significantly, however, we need not 
discuss some legal matters suggested by counsel because they are unnecessary to 
our determination. Under the standard of review set out hereinafter, it does not 
make any difference if the trial court considered materials not offered or 
admitted into evidence or considered facts not noticed by the administrative 
agency. We therefore need not address the first issue raised by the 
ESC.

II

[¶15.]  We believe that our review of this case 
should be limited to a determination of whether the ESC's decision disqualifying 
Bryant for benefits is supported by substantial evidence and is in conformity 
with law.

[¶16.]  Review of this matter is governed by § 
16-3-114(c), W.S. 1977 (October 1982 Replacement), which 
reads:

"(c) To the extent 
necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole 
record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of 
the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

"(i) Compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

"(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

"(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

"(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

"(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

"(D) Without observance 
of procedure required by law; or

"(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute."

[¶17.]  In an appeal from a decision of an 
administrative agency, we are obliged to review the appeal as though it came 
directly to this court from the agency. We are not bound to accept any of the 
conclusions reached in the district court. Wyoming State Department of Education v. 
Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681 
(1982).

[¶18.]  In Matter of North Laramie Land Company, 
Wyo., 605 P.2d 367, 373 (1980), we said:

"* * * [T]he district 
court is sitting in a role similar to that of an intermediate court of appeals. 
On a subsequent appeal to this court, we give no special deference to the 
decision of the district court but rather independently review the matter using 
the same materials and the same standards used by the district court. 
[Citations.] * * * The questions posed to the district court in this 
intermediate appellate setting are purely questions of law. All fact questions 
have been decided and resolved by the hearing body. As a matter of appellate 
practice, an appellate court accords no special deference and is not bound by a 
district court's decision on a question of law. * * *"

[¶19.]  In Board of Trustees of School District No. 4, 
Big Horn County v. Colwell, Wyo., 611 P.2d 427, 428 (1980), we 
said:

"For the purpose of 
reviewing the propriety of the district court's action, we will review the 
agency action as though the appeal were directly to this court from the agency. 
We are governed by the same rules of review as was the district court. 
[Citations.]

"Therefore, we will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the agency. * *"

[¶20.]  In McCulloch Gas Transmission Company v. Public 
Service Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 627 P.2d 173, 178 (1981), this court 
reviewed some basic rules about appeal from a decision of an administrative 
agency, and said

"[a]s an appellate court 
considering an appeal from an administrative agency, we must accept the agency's 
findings of fact when supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Substantial 
evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as supporting 
the agency's conclusion. [Citation.] * * *"

In an appeal 
from an administrative tribunal, we said:

"* * * [T]he rule adopted 
and followed by appellate courts here and elsewhere of deferring their opinions 
to the weight and credibility of the evidence to that of the trier of the facts 
in the first instance should be adhered to in land lease cases. * * *" Howard v. 
Lindmier, 67 Wyo. 78, 86, 214 P.2d 737, 739 
(1950).

This standard 
was also followed in Board of Trustees of 
School District No. 4, Big Horn County v. Colwell, supra; and Board of Trustees, Laramie County School 
District No. 1 v. Spiegel, Wyo., 549 P.2d 1161 (1976).

[¶21.]  In Howard v. Lindmier, supra, 214 P.2d  at 
740, we further stated:

"* * * [T]he term 
`substantial evidence' does not include the idea of weight of evidence, although 
it is more than a mere scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [Citations.] * 
* *"

[¶22.]  Section 9-4-114(c), now 16-3-114(c), W.S. 
1977, was amended in 1979. The amendment required agency action, findings and 
conclusions to be supported by substantial evidence. Additionally, the amendment 
provided for a review of the whole record.

[¶23.]  We said in Board of Trustees of School District No. 4, 
BigHornCounty v. Colwell, supra, at 
429:

"* * * Under this 
standard [§ 9-4-114(c), W.S. 1977, as amended], we do not examine the record 
only to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the Board's 
decision, but we must also examine the conflicting evidence to determine if the 
Board could reasonably have made its findings and order upon all of the evidence 
before it. * * *"

[¶24.]  In Universal Camera Corporation v. National 
Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S. Ct. 456, 465, 95 L. Ed. 456, 467-468 (1951), it was stated:

"* * * [A] court may 
[not] displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views, even 
though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter 
been before it de novo. * * *"

[¶25.]  The above holding was quoted with 
approval in National Labor Relations 
Board v. Walton Manufacturing Company, 369 U.S. 404, 82 S. Ct. 853, 7 L. Ed. 2d 829 (1962); and Board of Trustees of 
School District No. 4, Big Horn County v. Colwell, 
supra.

[¶26.]  Section 26-3-106(a), W.S. 1977, provides 
an individual shall be disqualified for eight weeks of benefits if he has "left 
his most recent work voluntarily without good cause."3 Good cause was defined by this 
court in Sage Club, Inc. v. Employment 
Security Commission, Wyo., 601 P.2d 1306, 1310 (1979):

"`* * * [S]uch a cause as 
justifies an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and 
joining the ranks of the unemployed; the quitting must be for such a cause as 
would reasonably motivate in a similar situation the average able-bodied and 
qualified worker to give up his or her employment with its certain wage rewards 
in order to enter the ranks of the compensated unemployed. The terms "good 
cause" and "personal reasons" connote, as minimum requirements, real 
circumstances, substantial reasons, objective conditions, palpable forces that 
operate to produce correlative results; adequate excuses that will bear the test 
of reason; just grounds for action. * * *'"

[¶27.]  In applying the standards of review 
developed by this court we are satisfied that the decision reached by the ESC to 
disqualify appellee for benefits from July 4, through August 28, 1982, for 
voluntarily leaving his employment without good cause is supported by 
substantial evidence.

[¶28.]  Evidence showed that appellee was 
involved in an altercation and quit his job; there was no evidence that he was 
injured, and the inference is that the assault was minor. There was also 
evidence that the assault on appellee was an isolated incident and that the 
assaulter apologized to appellee and assured an investigator that such an 
incident would not happen again. Appellee was asked if there was anything that 
could be done to get him to stay and he said, "No," and that he was not 
interested in a meeting with his assaulter because he was going to quit anyway. 
Waines was reprimanded for his assault on appellee. Bryant was encouraged to 
stay on the job and let the employer deal with Waines, but Bryant did not want 
to stay.

[¶29.]  Letters and statements by appellee in the 
file, but not in evidence contradict a portion of the evidence produced by the 
Cathedral Home. However, the appeals examiner and the ESC were not required to 
believe these statements or could give them such weight as they desired. We may 
not properly substitute our opinion as to the weight and credibility of the 
evidence for that of the ESC, nor could the district court. Spivey v. Lucky McUranium Corporation, 
Wyo., 636 P.2d 518 (1981).

[¶30.]  An employee is not justified in quitting 
his job because of a minor, isolated confrontation with a fellow employee. This 
is particularly true if the abused employee does not have reason to believe that 
further abuse will result if he stays on the job. An aggrieved employee has a 
duty to report the abuse to his employer and cooperate in some common-sense 
action to eliminate the problem. Larson 
v. Department of Economic Security, Minn., 281 N.W.2d 667 (1979); Colduvell v. Commonwealth, Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review, 48 Pa.Cmwlth. 185, 408 A.2d 1207 (1979); Stacy v. Commonwealth, Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review, 43 Pa.Cmwlth. 355, 402 A.2d 330 (1979); Denby v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 567 P.2d 626 
(1977).

[¶31.]  The general rule indicated above would 
not apply if an employee were seriously injured, had a genuine fear of assault 
if he returned to work, had good reason to believe that attempts to work out the 
problem would be futile, or attempt to stop the abuse had failed. None of these 
exceptions to the general rule apply here, however.

[¶32.]  Cases cited by appellee in support of his 
contention that he had good cause to quit his job are generally cases in which 
the abuse of the employee was of a serious nature. For example, in Coleman v. Employment Security Department of 
Washington, 25 Wn. App. 405, 607 P.2d 1231, 1232 (1980), Ms. Coleman worked 
the night shift. A strong, male co-worker, while in a blind rage, threatened to 
"punch your cheek right down your throat," and appeared ready to do so. She 
complained to management and asked to be transferred to the day shift. Instead, 
the male co-worker was rewarded with a transfer to the more desirable day shift. 
She also had a genuine fear for her safety.

[¶33.]  In Boogay v. Commonwealth, Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review, 46 Pa.Cmwlth. 51, 405 A.2d 1112 (1979), the 
claimant was an instructor and clerk at a bowling alley frequented by members of 
youth gangs. As a result of her frequent requests that they leave the premises, 
she incurred their anger and threats of physical violence. This caused stress 
which aggravated an existing medical and nervous condition. She had a genuine 
and reasonable fear for her safety.

[¶34.]  In Break N Eat Corporation v. Commonwealth, 
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 60 Pa.Cmwlth. 13, 426 A.2d 1262 
(1981), the claimant quit after he was severely beaten by a management official 
and suffered three broken ribs, loose teeth, and other injuries. He also did not 
return to work because he feared for his health and 
safety.

[¶35.]  In Southern Hardware and Lumber Company v. 
Vesich, La. App., 250 So. 2d 780 (1971), the claimant quit after he was 
punched in the mouth by an angry customer, and because of the incident, he lost 
a tooth and had a split lip. Claimant reported this to his employer, whose 
cavalier response was "the customer is always right."

[¶36.]  Furthermore, appellee did not meet his 
burden of proof before the administrative agency. A claimant who has voluntarily 
left his employment has the burden of proving that he had good cause for doing 
so, and such good cause must meet the test of ordinary common sense and 
prudence. Mere dissatisfaction with working conditions does not constitute good 
cause for quitting one's employment. Denby v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission, supra.

"Where the statute denies 
compensation to one who leaves his employment voluntarily without good cause, a 
claimant who has voluntarily abandoned his employment has the burden of proving 
a good cause. More particularly, a claimant who has terminated his employment 
voluntarily must prove that the reason for such termination was of a necessitous 
and compelling nature; that is, he must show that the forces behind such 
voluntary termination are real, substantial, and reasonable, and that his 
conduct meets the standards of ordinary common sense and prudence, and that he 
acted in good faith." 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare, § 275, pp. 
559-560 (1977).

"* * * A claimant who has 
voluntariy left his employment has the burden of proving that he had good cause 
for doing so, and such cause must meet the test of ordinary common sense and 
prudence." 76 Am.Jur.2d, Unemployment Compensation, § 59, p. 956 
(1975).

[¶37.]  Appellee did not appear before the 
hearing examiner or the ESC to give testimony. He did not ask that matters in 
the files be noticed. Unless the letters and statements in the file are 
considered, which is questionable, there was not a shred of evidence to support 
appellee's position. In summary, appellee has not met his burden of proof. 
Additionally, under our standard of review we cannot substitute our opinion as 
to the weight and credibility for that of the ESC, unless as a matter of law the 
decision of the administrative agency cannot be sustained under the evidence of 
this case.

[¶38.]  We reverse the district court and 
reinstate the decision of the ESC.

1 In his brief appellee 
attempts to inject into the Cathedral Home appeal the following 
issue:

"Does the Supreme Court 
have jurisdiction over a matter where the Appellant never exhausted the appeal 
rights because it failed to petition to the District Court for review of the 
decision against it, and was never added as a party to the appeal of Appellee 
herein?"

We do not see 
the significance of this objection. Both the ESC and Cathedral Home appeal the 
decision of the district court and address the same matters in their briefs. 
Appellee contends that the Cathedral Home did not appeal the ESC decision to the 
district court. Perhaps it was satisfied with the ESC decision. In any event, 
the Cathedral Home participated in the review in the district court and defended 
the ESC decision. If appellee is correct, which we doubt, dismissal of the 
Cathedral Home appeal would only eliminate one appellant. So far as we can tell, 
it would not change the issue nor be of any advantage to 
appellee.

2 Appellee objected to the 
evidence considered by the appeals examiner asserting that it was hearsay, 
lacked foundation and otherwise incompetent. On the other hand, appellee 
proffered evidence of a lesser quality, contending:

"Petitioner asserts, that 
`under the substantive evidence rule, as applied in administrative proceedings, 
all evidence is competent and may be 
considered, regardless of its source and 
nature . . . In other words, the competency of evidence for purposes of 
administrative agency adjudicatory proceedings is made to rest upon the logical 
persuasiveness of such evidence to the reasonable mind in using it to support a 
conclusion.' Black's Law Dictionary, 5th 
Edition, p. 1281. (Emphasis added)."

3 Section 26-3-106(a), 
W.S. 1977, was the statute in effect at the time appellee quit his job and filed 
his claim. The controlling statute now is § 27-3-311(a)(i), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 
1985). The latter statute retains the language, "Left his most recent work 
voluntarily without good cause * * *." The length of disqualification was 
increased. Other changes in the statutes are not material to this 
appeal.

ROSE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶39.]  The majority resolve this appeal on the 
ground that substantial evidence in the record supports the final action taken 
by the Employment Security Commission (ESC or Commission). The threshold 
question - whether the ESC based its action on all of the evidence in the record 
- is not addressed. The majority reason that the extent to which the district 
court considered documents submitted outside the administrative hearing makes no 
difference since this court is not bound to accept any of the district court's 
conclusions. The propriety of the evidence before the district court is not at 
issue, however. The issue is whether the ESC erred in failing to consider as 
evidence written statements submitted by appellee Bryant outside the appeals 
hearing but in connection with his application for unemployment 
benefits.

[¶40.]  In my judgment, these statements 
constitute evidence and the laws of this state require the ESC to consider their 
probative value in determining Bryant's eligibility for benefits. Because the 
agency is the finder of fact in this case, Employment Security Commission of Wyoming v. 
Laramie Cabs, Inc., Wyo., 700 P.2d 399 (1985), the appellate issue of 
substantial evidence addressed by the majority does not arise until and unless 
we determine that the ESC considered all of the evidence in the record in the 
first place. 

[¶41.]  The ESC admits in its brief that it did 
not consider Bryant's statements as evidence in reaching its 
decision:

"ESC's decision is based 
on the evidence that was introduced in the evidentiary hearing on this matter 
and is proper. ESC did not err by failing to consider as evidence written 
statements made by Bryant outside the evidentiary hearing * * 
*."

These statements 
consist of two fact-finding reports, the first submitted to the agency's deputy 
in support of Bryant's initial claim for benefits and the second in support of 
his request for a redetermination of the deputy's original decision. These 
statements are signed by Bryant and provide that the reported facts are true to 
the best of his knowledge and belief. The record also contains a letter 
submitted by Bryant to the ESC in response to notification from the Commission 
of the impending hearing to consider the appeal examiner's 
decision.

[¶42.]  The ESC concedes that these statements 
are part of the record in this case. The Commission contends, however, that 
since the documents were not introduced into evidence at the hearing before the 
appeal examiner, they are not evidence and were not a proper basis for the 
agency's decision. The Wyoming Employment Security Law, §§ 27-3-101 through 
27-3-704, W.S. 1977, and the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, §§ 16-3-101 
through 16-3-115, W.S. 1977, refute this contention.

[¶43.]  Under § 27-3-402(a)1 of the Wyoming Employment Security 
Law, a deputy designated by the ESC determines a claimant's eligibility for 
unemployment benefits based in part on the claimant's statement of the facts. 
The deputy's decision is final unless a party appeals or seeks a 
redetermination. Since the deputy is the initial finder of fact on behalf of the 
ESC and since the claimant's statement forms a partial basis for the deputy's 
decision, such statement constitutes evidence in support of the claim for 
benefits. For the same reasons, the claimant's statement made in connection with 
the deputy's redetermination of eligibility pursuant to § 27-3-402(c), W.S. 
1977,2 is evidence bearing on a right to 
benefits.

[¶44.]  Section 27-3-404(b) sets out the proper 
basis for a decision by the ESC upon review:

"(b) Upon review or 
appeal and based on evidence previously submitted or upon additional evidence it 
may direct be taken, the commission may affirm, modify or reverse the findings 
and conclusions of the appeal tribunal."

The Commission 
must base its action on all of the 
evidence previously submitted, including the applicant's factual statements 
given to the deputy, or on additional evidence that it directs be taken, which 
could include Bryant's letter to the ESC.

[¶45.]  Section 27-3-405(a) provides that the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act governs hearings or appeals before the 
Commission. Section 16-3-1093 of the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act directs the agency to consider the whole record in reaching a 
decision. Section 16-3-107(r)4 of the Act requires the agency to 
base findings of fact exclusively on the evidence in the record and on matters 
officially noticed. Evidence in the administrative record may derive from 
sources other than an evidentiary hearing. Holding's Little America v. Board of 
CountyCommissioners of Laramie County, Wyo., 670 P.2d 699 
(1983).

[¶46.]  The weight to be given the statements at 
issue in the case at bar depends in part on the extent to which they were 
impeached at the hearing before the appeal examiner. They are, however, proper 
evidentiary items which the ESC was not entitled to ignore in deciding Bryant's 
eligibility for unemployment benefits. These statements are not materials 
submitted by an outsider to the proceedings such as tainted the agency's 
decision-making process in Fallon v. 
Wyoming State Board of Medical Examiners, Wyo., 441 P.2d 322 (1968). Nor are 
they matters to which opposing parties had no opportunity to respond. Clay v. Everett, 4 Ark. App. 122, 628 S.W.2d 339 (1982). Rather, they are signed statements made by the claimant to the 
Commission in order to prove his right to benefits pursuant to the employment 
security law. The Commission had an obligation to consider these statements in 
deciding Bryant's claim.

[¶47.]  I would note further that ample legal 
authority exists for the proposition that a physical attack or threat of attack 
by a co-employee constitutes good cause for terminating one's employment. Escamilla v. Industrial Commission of the 
State of Colorado, Colo. App., 670 P.2d 815 (1983); Hussa v. Employment Security Department of 
the State of Washington, 34 Wn. App. 857, 664 P.2d 1286 (1983); Coleman v. Employment Security 
Department, 25 Wn. App. 405, 607 P.2d 1231 (1980). Whether the incident in 
the case at bar amounts to good cause for appellee's voluntarily leaving the job 
is a question of fact which must be determined on the basis of all of the 
evidence properly in the record. I would have remanded this case with directions 
for the ESC to consider appellee's eligibility for benefits in light of his 
signed, written statements to the Commission.

1 Section 27-3-402(a), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"(a) Determination of a 
claim filed pursuant to W.S. 27-3-401(a) shall be made promptly by a deputy 
designated by the commission. The determination shall state the weekly benefit 
amount entitlement for that week for the claimant and if a claim is denied, the 
reasons for denial. * * * Except as provided by subsection (c) of this section, 
a determination is final unless a party entitled to notice applies for 
redetermination or appeals the determination within ten (10) days after notice 
is mailed or delivered."

2 Section 27-3-402(c), 
W.S. 1977, provides in part:

"(c) The deputy may 
reconsider a determination if he finds an error in computation or identity, 
discovers wages of the claimant relevant to but not considered in the 
determination or finds benefits are allowed, denied or determined on a 
misrepresentation of facts. * * * A redetermination is final unless a party 
entitled to notice files an appeal within ten (10) days after notice is mailed 
or delivered."

3 Section 16-3-109, W.S. 
1977, provides in part:

"The agency shall 
consider the whole record or any portion stipulated to by the 
parties."

4 Section 16-3-107(r), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"(r) Findings of fact 
shall be based exclusively on the evidence and matters officially 
noticed."