Title: Young v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-12809 
 
DALE YOUNG  vs.  CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD & another.1 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     February 11, 2020. - October 9, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ.2 
 
 
Retirement.  Public Employment, Retirement.  State Board of 
Retirement.  Contributory Retirement Appeal Board.  
Contract, Employment.  Words, "Employee," "Regular 
compensation." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
April 30, 2018. 
 
 
The case was heard by Susan E. Sullivan, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Dale Young, pro se. 
Stefan L. Jouret for Michael McHugh & others. 
Melinda E. Troy for State Board of Retirement. 
 
                     
1 State Board of Retirement. 
 
 
2 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  Dale Young served as the coordinator, and then 
the director, of the State's natural resource damages program.  
During her first ten years at the program, she worked as a 
contract employee.  After becoming a regular State employee and 
a member of the State retirement system, she purchased 
retirement credit for four years of her contract service, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 32, § 4 (1) (s).  She later retired and 
requested that her benefit amount be based on her compensation 
during the purchased years of creditable contract employment, 
instead of her lower-paid years as a regular State employee.  
The Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB) concluded that 
compensation received during service for which credit is 
purchased pursuant to G. L. c. 32, § 4 (1) (s), cannot be used 
to calculate retirement benefits because it is not "regular 
compensation"; CRAB therefore ruled against Young's request.  A 
Superior Court judge affirmed CRAB's decision, and Young 
appealed; we transferred the matter to this court on our own 
motion.  We conclude that Young did not meet the statutory 
definition of "employee" for purposes of the retirement system 
in the years that she worked as a contract employee.  Thus, 
there was no abuse of discretion in the Superior Court judge's 
decision, affirming CRAB, that Young was not entitled to 
3 
 
retirement benefits calculated based on her salary for those 
years.3 
 
Because an understanding of the factual background requires 
some knowledge of the statutory definitions, we first present a 
statutory overview before discussing the facts of this case. 
 
1.  Statutory structure.  The pension scheme is a 
"contributory retirement system."  Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. 
Contributory Retirement Appeals Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 601 (2019), 
quoting Retirement Bd. of Stoneham v. Contributory Retirement 
Appeal Bd., 476 Mass. 130, 132 (2016).  Employees of the 
Commonwealth generally are eligible for membership, and are 
required to contribute to the system via payroll deductions.  
See G. L. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (a) (x), 22 (1) (b); Massachusetts 
Teachers' Retirement Sys. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 
466 Mass. 292, 294 (2013).  "Creditable service ordinarily is 
based on the duration of a member's employment in public service 
in the Commonwealth while a member of a public retirement 
system."  Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement Sys., supra, citing 
G. L. c. 32, § 4 (1) (a). 
 
Upon retirement, if a member has accrued sufficient 
creditable service, the member will receive a monthly retirement 
allowance.  See G. L. c. 32, §§ 5, 10.  This allowance often is 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Michael 
McHugh, Mark Stinson, Alice Smith, and James O. Brown, Jr. 
4 
 
based in part on the highest rates of regular compensation 
received by the member during his or her career of public 
service.  See id.  Regular compensation is "the salary, wages or 
other compensation in whatever form, lawfully determined for the 
individual service of the employee by the employing authority."  
G. L. c. 32, § 1.  Therefore, one may receive regular 
compensation only during service as an employee.  An employee, 
in relevant part, is "any person whether employed or appointed 
for a stated term or otherwise, who is engaged in duties which 
require that his [or her] time be devoted to the service of [the 
Commonwealth] in each year during the ordinary working hours of 
regular and permanent employees, and who is regularly and 
permanently employed in such service, . . . excluding any person 
whose compensation for service rendered to the [C]ommonwealth is 
derived from the subsidiary account 03."  Id. 
 
The Commonwealth also hires some workers, not as regular 
State employees, but, rather, as contract employees.  These 
workers enter into time-limited contracts to work for the 
Commonwealth.  See Office of the Comptroller, Expenditure 
Classification Handbook 27 (Nov. 2014) (2014 Expenditure 
Handbook).  Unlike regular State employees, they are not 
appointed to legislatively authorized positions, and do not 
receive retirement benefits, insurance, sick time, vacation, or 
personal leave.  See id.  Contract employees do, however, have 
5 
 
an employment relationship with the State, making them 
distinguishable from independent contractors and consultants.  
See id.  See also G. L. c. 149, § 148B (setting forth test for 
independent contractor status). 
 
In certain circumstances, an individual who was a contract 
employee and subsequently became a regular State employee may 
purchase credit for up to four years of that prior contract 
employment.  See G. L. c. 32, § 4 (1) (s).  To do so, the member 
must pay, with interest, the amounts that would have been 
withheld as payroll contributions had the service been rendered 
as a State employee.  See id.  "Upon completion of the payments, 
the member shall receive the same credit for the period of 
previous service as a contract employee as would have been 
allowed if the service had been rendered by the member as a 
[S]tate employee."  Id. 
 
2.  Factual background.  Young worked for the Department of 
Health from 1979 to 1982, and for the Department of 
Environmental Protection from 1986 to 1998.  During those years, 
she was a State employee and a member of the State retirement 
system.  From 1998 until 2008, she was a contract employee for 
the Department of Environmental Protection, the Executive Office 
of Environmental Affairs, and the Executive Office of Energy and 
Environmental Affairs.  Working under one-year contracts, she 
served as the coordinator, and then the director, of the natural 
6 
 
resource damages program.  She was not a member of the 
retirement system, but she was required to contribute a portion 
of her income to an alternative retirement plan.  As a contract 
employee, she did not receive health insurance, life insurance, 
vacation time, sick time, or any other paid time off.  She was 
entitled to receive unemployment insurance coverage, coverage 
under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, and a year-end W-2 tax 
form. 
 
In 2008, Young's position was converted to regular 
employment, and she once again became an active member of the 
State retirement system.  She subsequently purchased credit for 
four of her previous years of contract employment, paying over 
$40,000 to the annuity savings fund of the retirement system.  
Her position was eliminated in 2010.  Because she had more than 
twenty years of creditable service, Young received a termination 
retirement allowance.  See G. L. c. 32, § 10 (2).  This type of 
allowance is based in part on the highest rates of regular 
compensation received during the member's years of service.  See 
id.  The State Board of Retirement (board) based her pension 
benefit on her final two years of regular employment, from 2008 
to 2010, and her last year of regular employment prior to 
becoming a contract employee, from 1997 to 1998. 
 
3.  Prior proceedings.  Young appealed from the board's 
determination to the Division of Administrative Law Appeals 
7 
 
(DALA).  She argued that her retirement benefit should have been 
based on her salary during the purchased years of contract 
employment, which was higher than her salary during her time as 
a regular State employee.  An administrative magistrate in DALA 
held an evidentiary hearing and ruled in Young's favor, and the 
board appealed to CRAB.  CRAB concluded that Young was not an 
employee during the years in question, so her salary during 
those years was not regular compensation and could not be the 
basis for her retirement allowance.  Accordingly, CRAB reversed 
the DALA administrative magistrate's determination. 
 
Young then challenged CRAB's decision in the Superior Court 
under G. L. c. 30A.  A Superior Court judge denied Young's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings and allowed CRAB's cross 
motion.  Young appealed, and we transferred the case from the 
Appeals Court on our own motion. 
 
4.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  While we review 
questions of law de novo, we nonetheless "typically defer[] to 
CRAB's expertise and accord[] great weight to its interpretation 
and application of the statutory provisions it administers" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Plymouth Retirement Bd., 483 
Mass. at 604.  We will reverse or amend CRAB's decision only if 
it is arbitrary or capricious, based upon an error of law or 
unlawful procedure, unwarranted by the facts found by the agency 
8 
 
or the Superior Court, or unsupported by substantial evidence.  
See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). 
 
b.  Statutory interpretation.  The sole question in this 
case is whether compensation earned during periods of contract 
employment, for which creditable service subsequently is 
purchased, is "regular" compensation for purposes of calculating 
the retirement allowance.  Regulation compensation is the 
"salary, wages or other compensation in whatever form, lawfully 
determined for the individual service of the employee by the 
employing authority."  G. L. c. 32, § 1.  Based on this 
language, compensation can be regular compensation only if 
received by an "employee."  Contract employees are treated as 
employees, as opposed to independent contractors, for the 
purposes of relevant labor laws.  See 2014 Expenditure Handbook, 
supra at 27.  See also Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, 
Inc., 465 Mass. 607, 620 (2013) (discussing purposes of 
independent contractor statute, G. L. c. 149, § 148B).  Our 
inquiry, however, is whether contract employees are "employees" 
within the meaning of the retirement scheme, which contains a 
separate and explicit statutory definition. 
 
To be deemed an employee under G. L. c. 32, § 1, an 
individual must meet three requirements.  First, the individual 
must be "engaged in duties which require that his [or her] time 
be devoted to the service of [the Commonwealth] in each year 
9 
 
during the ordinary working hours of regular and permanent 
employees."  G. L. c. 32, § 1.  Second, an employee must be 
"regularly and permanently employed."  G. L. c. 32, § 1.  Third, 
the individual's compensation cannot be "derived from the 
subsidiary account 03."  G. L. c. 32, § 1. 
 
Young's work clearly met the first two of these 
requirements.  She worked full time for the Commonwealth during 
the years in question.  The board argued before DALA and CRAB 
that Young's contract employment was not permanent because she 
was hired for one-year terms.4  As Young correctly noted at these 
administrative proceedings, however, this argument disregards 
the language in G. L. c. 32, § 1, that an employee can be "any 
person whether employed or appointed for a stated term or 
otherwise."  Young, like other contract employees, served for a 
stated term; indeed, she completed ten consecutive one-year 
terms.  Therefore, the mere fact that her contract employment 
throughout this ten-year period had multiple end dates did not 
preclude her from being an employee within the meaning of the 
statue.  We conclude that her contract employment was regular 
and permanent.  See Retirement Bd. of Concord v. Colleran, 34 
Mass. App. Ct. 486, 489 (1993). 
                     
 
4 The State board of retirement did not pursue this argument 
in its brief, but did again argue the point at oral argument 
before us. 
10 
 
 
The third requirement, which is the focus of the parties' 
briefs, presents a different question.  As stated, this 
requirement precludes any individual whose compensation was 
"derived from the subsidiary account 03."  See G. L. c. 32, § 1. 
Thus, if Young had been paid directly out of the 03 account, she 
would not have been an employee under the plain language of the 
statute.  See Commonwealth v. Wassilie, 482 Mass. 562, 573 
(2019) ("plain and unambiguous" statutory language "is 
conclusive" [citation omitted]).  The record indicates, however, 
that the 03 account was eliminated prior to the time of Young's 
contract employment. 
 
Young argues that she is not excluded from the definition 
of "employee" because she was paid from an account labeled "CC," 
which is used for contract employees, and not from the 
"03 account."  See 2014 Expenditure Handbook, supra at 27.  CRAB 
concluded that the CC account was derived from the 03 account 
and should be considered to be equivalent.  See Haskell vs. 
State Bd. of Retirement, CR-99-528 (DALA June 23, 2000; CRAB 
Mar. 13, 2001) ("03 subsidiary account was broken down into four 
separate subsidiary accounts":  "CC, HH, JJ and NN").  CRAB 
found that there was insufficient evidence to establish that 
Young was paid specifically from the CC account, but that the 
evidence established that Young had been paid from one of the 
CC, HH, JJ, or NN accounts, discussed infra.  CRAB determined 
11 
 
that it was not relevant for the purposes of this case which 
account was the source of Young's salary, as all of them were 
derivative of the 03 account.  CRAB therefore determined that 
Young did not meet the statutory definition of an employee. 
 
CRAB's conclusion implicitly contains the factual finding 
that the executive branch intended the CC account to be a 
derivative of the 03 account, as well as the legal conclusion 
that the statutory scheme allows the executive branch to 
establish such derivative accounts.  For the reasons to be 
discussed, we agree that the identity of the specific derivative 
account is not relevant, as all of them fall under the 03 
account designation, and that the Legislature intended the 
executive branch to have the authority to create such derivative 
accounts.  For simplicity, we will assume that Young was paid 
from the CC account. 
 
In 1947, the Legislature decreed that "[a]ppropriations by 
the general court, and any allotments by the governor, shall be 
expended only in the amounts prescribed in the subsidiary 
accounts . . . established by . . . the joint committee on ways 
and means."  See St. 1947, c. 636, § 2 (amending G. L. c. 29, 
§ 27).  The joint committee subsequently promulgated an 
expenditure code handbook establishing the accounts titled 01, 
02 and 03.  See Object Code Numbers and Subsidiary Accounts for 
Budgetary Control, approved by the House Committee on Ways and 
12 
 
Means 3 (rev. June 1, 1949) (Object Code Numbers).  The 
03 account was delineated as the proper source of payment for 
"[a]ll services . . . rendered by non-employees except 
contractual services classified under other subsidiary 
accounts."  Id. 
 
In 1990, the comptroller issued a new expenditure 
classification handbook.  See Office of the Comptroller, 
Expenditure Classification Handbook (Feb. 1990) (1990 
Expenditure Handbook).  Instead of the previous numerical 
accounts, the new handbook used a series of subsidiary accounts 
designated by letters.  Compare id. at 1, with Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, Subsidiary Accounts and Expenditure Code Numbers 
for Budgetary Control (1978).  The board argues that the 
comptroller considered four of these new categories -- CC, HH, 
JJ, and NN -- to be part of the old 03 account.  The board 
supports this contention by pointing to a 1990 memorandum from 
the comptroller that indicates that workers who previously had 
been paid from the 03 account were being divided into those four 
new groups.  In addition, the comptroller's publications 
consistently have stated that contract employees are not 
eligible for membership in the retirement system.  See 2014 
Expenditure Handbook, supra at 27; 1990 Expenditure Handbook, 
supra at 4 ("individuals who are employed on a temporary basis 
through contracts . . . are not eligible for benefits"). 
13 
 
 
The board's argument is bolstered by Young's "Salary 
Request and Release" form, which was completed by the Department 
of Environmental Protection.  The form contained a notation 
describing her as a "03 contractor" during the period in 
question.  We conclude that there is substantial evidence to 
support CRAB's factual finding that the executive branch derived 
the CC account from the 03 account and intended the newer 
CC account to be treated equivalently.  See Retirement Bd. of 
Stoneham, 476 Mass. at 134. 
 
This conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry.  The 
legal question remains:  did the Legislature intend to give the 
executive branch the discretion to treat contract employees as 
03 workers, and thereby exclude them from the definition of 
"employee" in G. L. c. 32, § 1?  To answer this question, we 
examine the process of enacting the statutory exclusion for 
those paid from the 03 account. 
 
In 1973, a legislative committee reported that "the intent 
and purpose of the '03' subsidiary account, as set forth in the 
Code Manual, has been violated.  It is no longer just the 
account out of which true consultants are compensated, but . . . 
has become another subsidiary account to be used for hiring 
[S]tate employees."  See Joint Committee on Post Audit and 
Oversight, Report Relative to Use of Consultants by State 
Agencies 43 (Jan. 15, 1973) (1973 Report).  The report noted 
14 
 
that many workers had been hired in contravention of the 
requirement in the expenditure classification handbook that any 
services paid for under the 03 account "be for a limited 
specified period of time"; these workers included those who had 
been paid from the 03 account for more than three years.  See 
id. at 18.  Hiring agencies also had flouted the requirement in 
the classification handbook that 03 account funds be used only 
for services that State employees generally do not or are not 
available to provide.  See id.5 
 
To rectify these problems, the Legislature enacted 
St. 1973, c. 1230, § 8, which mandates a number of procedures to 
be followed prior to hiring consultants and prohibits 
consultants from supervising others.  See 1973 report, supra at 
52 (Appendix C) (recommending legislation which subsequently was 
enacted).  In essence, the new legislation delineated which 
workers could be considered consultants and which could not.  
See St. 1973, c. 1230, § 8.  It did not dictate how those hired 
as consultants should be treated.  See id. 
 
If Young had brought a claim of misclassification based on 
the contention that she should have been considered a regular 
                     
 
5 These issues have been discussed repeatedly by the State 
Auditor.  See Auditor of the Commonwealth, Report on the Use of 
Contract Employees by Certain State Agencies (Feb. 12, 2010); 
Auditor of the Commonwealth, Report on the Use of "03" 
Consultants in the Departments of Mental Health, Public Welfare, 
and Social Services (July 8, 1987). 
15 
 
State employee instead of a contract employee, and therefore her 
service during those years was regular membership service, the 
enactment might have been relevant.  See, e.g., Rotondi v. 
Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 463 Mass. 644, 646 (2012) 
(plaintiff challenged CRAB's determination that previous service 
was not membership service).  But Young did not claim that her 
previous service was regular membership service.  Rather, she 
purchased credit for her contract service and then sought to 
base her retirement benefit on compensation received during that 
contract service.  We thus must decide the narrow question 
whether compensation received during periods of contract 
employment, for which credit has been purchased pursuant to 
G. L. c. 32, § 4 (1) (s), is regular compensation. 
 
The 1973 report also identified another issue with respect 
to the 03 accounts; the report indicated that some workers who 
were being paid out of the 03 account had been given membership 
in the retirement system.  See 1973 report, supra at 38.  To 
prevent this practice, the report recommended adding the 
following language to the definition of "employee" in G. L. 
c. 32, § 1:  "no consultant, as defined in [G. L. c. 29, § 29A,] 
shall be deemed to be an employee for the purposes of this 
chapter unless his [or her] agreement for employment as a 
consultant specifically provides therefor."  See 1973 report, 
supra at 53 (Appendix D). 
16 
 
 
Rather than excluding consultants, as the report 
recommended, the Legislature instead amended the definition of 
"employee" to "exclud[e] any person whose compensation for 
service rendered to the [C]ommonwealth is derived from the 
subsidiary account 03."  See St. 1973, c. 324, § 1.  Therefore, 
the question becomes whether the Legislature intended this 
exclusion to apply only to consultants, or if the exclusion was 
intended to give the executive branch the discretion to include 
some or all contract employees in the excluded class of workers.  
See G. L. c. 29, § 29A (giving Secretary of Administration and 
Finance discretion regarding use of 03 account). 
 
On the one hand, the language that the Legislature chose 
gives the executive branch more latitude than would have been 
afforded by the language suggested in the 1973 report.  On the 
other hand, the act was entitled "An Act providing that certain 
consultants shall not be considered employees of the 
[C]ommonwealth for the purposes of retirement under the 
contributory retirement system for public employees" (emphasis 
added); this would seem to indicate that the exclusion was 
intended to encompass only consultants.  See St. 1973, c. 324, 
§ 1; Olmstead v. Department of Telecomm. & Cable, 466 Mass. 582, 
589 & n.12 (2013) (title of act is relevant to statutory 
interpretation). 
17 
 
 
This ambiguity likely arises because the term "contract 
employee" was not in common use in 1973.  At that time, the 
expenditure classification handbook provided the 01 account for 
regular State employees and the 03 account for nonemployees.  
See Object Code Numbers, supra at 3.  There was no category for 
contract employees, who seem to occupy a hybrid category.  The 
first Massachusetts statute containing either the term "contract 
employee" or "contracted employee" was enacted in 1997.  See 
St. 1997, c. 163, § 3.  Similarly, neither term appeared in a 
published decision of this court or the Appeals Court until 
2005.  See Scott v. Boston Hous. Auth., 64 Mass. App. Ct. 693, 
694 (2005). 
 
Without a clear answer as to whether the Legislature 
intended to allow contract workers to be excluded from the 
definition of "employee," we look to G. L. c. 32, § 4 (1) (s), 
the provision under which Young purchased credit for her 
contract employment.  That statute provides that purchasers of 
creditable service for contract work "shall receive the same 
credit for the period of previous service as a contract employee 
as would have been allowed if the service had been rendered by 
the member as a [S]tate employee."  Id.  The statute does not 
state explicitly whether compensation received during purchased 
contract employment is regular compensation.  See Leary v. 
Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 421 Mass. 344, 347 (1995) 
18 
 
(compensation received for out-of-State service for which credit 
was purchased was not regular compensation). 
 
General Laws c. 32, § 4 (1) (s), is not the only provision 
to allow the purchase of credit for past service.  General Laws 
c. 32, § 20 (5) (c) (2), permits the purchase of previous 
service if the individual was not a member of the State 
retirement system due to an error in the records.  See Worcester 
Regional Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 
92 Mass. App. Ct. 497, 500 (2017).  General Laws c. 32, § 3 (3), 
allows makeup payments in cases of late entry into membership. 
 
"[W]here two or more statutes relate to the same subject 
matter, they should be construed together so as to constitute a 
harmonious whole consistent with the legislative purpose."  
Sebago v. Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc., 471 Mass. 321, 339 (2015), 
quoting Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 
513-514 (1975).  "[W]e do not interpret a statute so as to 
render it or any portion of it meaningless."  City Elec. Supply 
Co. v. Arch Ins. Co., 481 Mass. 784, 790 (2019), quoting Volin 
v. Board of Pub. Accountancy, 422 Mass. 175, 179 (1996).  See A. 
Scalia & B.A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts 174-179 (2012). 
 
The interactions between the provisions permitting the 
purchase of credit for previous service resolves our inquiry.  
"[I]ndividuals who are 'employees[]' . . . are generally 
19 
 
eligible for membership."  Retirement Bd. of Stoneham, 476 Mass. 
at 132 & n.5, citing G. L. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (a) (x).  
Therefore, if contract employees met the definition of 
"employee," as Young argues, all of their contract service would 
qualify as membership service.  Young would have been able to 
purchase credit for her previous contract service under one of 
the provisions permitting the purchase of previous membership 
service.  See Worcester Regional Retirement Bd., 92 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 500, citing G. L. c. 32, §§ 3 (3), 20 (5) (c) (2).  There 
would be no need for a special provision only for contract 
employees, and G. L. c. 32, § 4 (1) (s), would be mere 
surplusage. 
 
The Legislature could not have intended such a result.  See 
Plymouth Retirement Bd., 483 Mass. at 607, quoting City Elec. 
Supply Co., 481 Mass. at 790 ("The canon against surplusage is 
strongest when an interpretation would render superfluous 
another part of the same statutory scheme").  We therefore 
conclude that the Legislature necessarily implicitly granted the 
executive branch the authority to pay at least some contract 
employees from the 03 account or its derivatives, and thereby to 
exclude those contract employees from the definition of 
"employee" under G. L. c. 32, § 1. 
 
This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that Young's 
salary during her final years of contract employment was higher 
20 
 
than during her subsequent years as a regular State employee.  
The Superior Court judge found that Young's contract salary 
"included an additional amount to compensate her for lack 
of . . . benefits," such as paid time off, a finding that Young 
does not dispute.  With this type of arrangement in mind, the 
Legislature reasonably could have intended to authorize the 
executive branch to exclude contract workers from the definition 
of "employee" within the meaning of the retirement scheme.  See 
Commonwealth v. Morgan, 476 Mass. 768, 777 (2017), quoting 
Seideman v. Newton, 452 Mass. 472, 477 (2008) (we "must 
interpret the statute so as to render the legislation effective, 
consonant with sound reason and common sense"). 
 
The motion judge properly affirmed CRAB's determination 
that compensation received during years for which credit in the 
State retirement system is purchased pursuant to G. L. c. 32, 
§ 4 (1) (s), is not regular compensation, and may not be used to 
calculate a member's pension benefit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.