Title: State v. Sutherland

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  October 7, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

	Plaintiff-Relator,

	v.

MYRON ROBERT SUTHERLAND, JR.,

	Defendant-Adverse Party.

(CC 983427CR; SC S46458)

	En Banc

	Original proceeding in mandamus.*

	Argued and submitted September 8, 1999.

	Kaye E. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for plaintiff-relator.  With her on the briefs were
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.

	Peter J. Richard, of Aspell, Della-Rose & Richard, Klamath
Falls, argued the cause and filed the brief for defendant-adverse
party.

	Emily Simon, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief
for amici curiae Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association and
State Public Defender.  With her on the brief was David Groom,
State Public Defender.

	GILLETTE, J.

	Peremptory writ to issue.  Pursuant to ORAP 1.20(4), 11.17,
and 14.05(2)(c), and notwithstanding ORAP 9.25, a combined
peremptory writ and appellate judgment shall issue on October 11,
1999, unless a petition for reconsideration is both filed and
physically received by the Office of the State Court
Administrator by October 8, 1999.  Any timely petition for
reconsideration will stay issuance of the peremptory writ and
appellate judgment until the court acts on such petition.

	*On petition for a writ of mandamus from an order of the
Klamath County Circuit Court.

		GILLETTE, J.

		This is an original mandamus proceeding brought under
ORS 34.250 and Article VII (Amended), section 2, of the Oregon
Constitution.  Petitioner, the State of Oregon (the state), asks
this court to overturn an order of the circuit court entered
before trial in the underlying criminal case, which presently is
set for trial beginning on October 13, 1999, in the Klamath
County Circuit Court.  Defendant is charged with assault in the
second degree, ORS 163.175.  In its order, the trial court
released defendant on conditions not relevant here, after
refusing to impose a pretrial security release amount of not less
than $50,000 under ORS 135.240(5), set out post.

		The state sought an alternative writ of mandamus from
this court directing the trial court to enter an order requiring
that defendant be taken into custody pending his posting a
security release deposit in an amount not less than $50,000 or to
show cause why it had not done so.  This court issued an
alternative writ.  The trial court declined to issue the order
contemplated by the writ, the matter was briefed and argued, and
the case now is before this court for decision.  For the reasons
that follow, a peremptory writ shall issue.

		The right to pretrial release of persons who, like
defendant, are accused of "Measure 11" offenses(1) is addressed in
two subsections of ORS 135.240.(2)  Subsection (4) of that statute
provides, in part: 

		"(4) Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(5) of this section, when the defendant is charged with
a crime listed in ORS 137.700 * * *: 

		"(a) Release shall be denied unless the court
determines by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant will not commit new criminal offenses while
on release.

		"(b) If the defendant wants to have a hearing on
the issue of release, the defendant must request the
hearing at the time of arraignment in circuit court. 
If the defendant requests a release hearing, the court
must hold the hearing within five days of the request.

		"(c) At the release hearing, unless the state
stipulates to the setting of security or release, the
court shall determine whether probable cause exists to
believe the defendant has committed an offense listed
in ORS 137.700 * * * and, if so, whether the defendant
would commit new crimes while on release.  The state
has the burden of producing evidence at the release
hearing subject to ORS 40.015(4) [relating to
proceedings not subject to the Oregon Evidence Code].   

		"(d) The defendant may be represented by counsel
and may present evidence on any relevant issue 

	* * *.

		"(e) If the court determines that the defendant
will not commit new crimes while on release, the court
shall set security or other appropriate conditions of
release.  If the court does not determine that the
defendant will not commit new crimes while on release,
the court shall deny release."

	Subsection (5) of ORS 135.240 provides, in part:

		"If the United States Constitution or the Oregon
Constitution prohibits application of subsection (4) of
this section, then notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the court shall set a security amount of not
less than $50,000 for a defendant charged with an
offense listed in ORS 137.700 * * * and may not release
the defendant on any form of release other than a
security release.  In addition to the security amount,
the court may impose any supervisory conditions deemed
necessary for the protection of the victim and the
community."

	Thus, ORS 135.240(4) requires a trial court to deny
release to a defendant accused of committing a Measure 11
offense, unless the court determines by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant will not commit any new crime while
on release.  ORS 135.240(5) then sets out an alternative scheme
to be applied if ORS 135.240(4) is found to be unconstitutional. 
Defendant, the trial court, and the state all agree that
subsection (4) of ORS 135.240 is unconstitutional.  As explained
below, we conclude that that agreement is well founded.

	Article I, section 14, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides:

		"Offences (sic), except murder, and treason, shall
be bailable by sufficient sureties.  Murder or treason,
shall not be bailable, when the proof is evident, or
the presumption strong." 

The question is whether ORS 135.240(4) is valid in light of that
constitutional provision.  To answer that question, we examine
the text, case law, and history surrounding Article I, section
14.  See Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16, 840 P2d 65 (1992)
(setting out that methodology).

	We observe, at the outset, that, by using the mandatory
"shall," the text of Article I, section 14, requires courts to
set bail for defendants accused of crimes other than murder or
treason.  As this court has explained, under that provision,
"with certain exceptions the defendant in a criminal case * * *
is entitled to be admitted to bail."  Hanson v. Gladden, 246 Or
494, 495, 426 P2d 465 (1967); see also Priest, 314 Or at 417
(implying that Article I, section 14, grants most defendants
accused of crimes a constitutional right to bail).  The
exceptions to that requirement are those set out in Article I,
section 14, viz., murder or treason.  Hanson, 246 Or at 495-96. 

	ORS 135.240(4), by contrast, requires a court to deny
release and, it follows, to deny bail, if the court concludes
that the defendant might commit crimes while on release.  See
generally Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 279-80, 959 P2d 49
(1998) (stating that a voter-approved constitutional amendment
setting out the same requirements for release contained in ORS
135.240(4) would change the standard for bail set out in Article
I, section 14).  Nothing of which we are aware permits a
conclusion different from the one mandated by the text of Article
I, section 14, and this court's interpretations of that text. 
See Priest, 314 Or at 418 (noting the lack of history surrounding
the Oregon framers' intent with regard to Article I, section 14). 
Accordingly, we conclude that ORS 135.240(4) is unconstitutional
under Article I, section 14, of the Oregon Constitution.  We turn
to the issue that the parties have joined here, viz., the
constitutionality of ORS 135.240(5).

	At the pretrial hearing in this case, defendant
asserted that ORS 135.240(5) is unconstitutional on various
grounds.  After a brief colloquy, the trial court adhered to its
ruling in previous cases that the statute is facially
unconstitutional under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon
Constitution,(3) as well as under various provisions of the United
States Constitution.(4)  As noted, the court then ordered
defendant's release under conditions not at issue here.  

	For a statute to be facially unconstitutional, it must
be unconstitutional in all circumstances, i.e., there can be no
reasonably likely circumstances in which application of the
statute would pass constitutional muster.  See, e.g., State v.
Chakerian, 325 Or 370, 381, 938 P2d 756 (1997) (for a statute to
be deemed to be impermissibly vague, it must be shown to be
"vague in all of its possible applications" (quoting State v.
Robertson, 293 Or 402, 411 n 8, 649 P2d 569 (1982)); United
States v. Salerno, 481 US 739, 745, 107 S Ct 2095, 2100, 95 L Ed
2d 697 (1987) (so holding under the United States Constitution in
connection with an examination of the constitutionality of the
federal Bail Reform Act).  Defendant and amici do not argue that
the $50,000 amount itself makes the statute facially
unconstitutional.  Both acknowledge (and we agree) that there
will be circumstances in which imposing a security release
requirement in that amount would be reasonable.  

	Defendant and amici do advance three other arguments as
to why ORS 135.240(5) is unconstitutional, however.  First, they
argue that the effect of the statute is to set bail for all
Measure 11 defendants without a hearing, contrary to due process. 
Second, they argue that the statute sets a mandatory minimum
security amount of $50,000 for all Measure 11 defendants, which
violates due process and deprives defendants of the presumption
of innocence.  Third, they argue that a $50,000 security amount
is excessive for indigent defendants and arbitrarily divides
Measure 11 defendants into two classes, those who can pay the
security amount and those who cannot. 

	The premise underlying defendant's and amici's
arguments is that, under ORS 135.240(5), a Measure 11 defendant
is not entitled to a hearing or individualized consideration of
his or her circumstances before the trial court imposes and
enforces the minimum $50,000 security release requirement.  That
premise itself raises at least two questions of statutory
construction.  The first is whether a right to a hearing exists
under the statute.  The second is whether, absent a provision
granting such a right in the statute, the right nonetheless
exists because of a separate source of law, either statutory or
constitutional.  We begin by examining the text and context of
ORS 135.240(5).  See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317
Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (setting out methodology for
interpreting statutes).  

	As to the question whether there is a right to a
hearing under ORS 135.240(5), defendant and amici correctly note
that the statute does not expressly provide for a hearing.  That
much is clear.  It is equally clear, however, that the statute
does not expressly deny a Measure 11 defendant the right to a
hearing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on an
as-applied basis, if the defendant requests such a hearing.  
From text (and context) it is clear that the statute does not
grant defendant a hearing.   

	We turn to the question whether some other source of
law aids defendant.  We know of no statute that would do so.
However, the state acknowledged at oral argument that, if ORS
135.240(5) withstands a facial challenge based on the amount of
security specified in the subsection (and we agree with all the
parties that it does), then Measure 11 defendants still may
challenge the imposition of the statutory amount on an as-applied
basis.  The ability to do so, the state asserted, presupposes a
right to a hearing at which the trial court may consider the
individual circumstances of a particular defendant.  

	In making that concession, the state did not identify
any particular source of law for its view, but we think that the
source of law is (as the trial court held) Article I, section 16,
of the Oregon Constitution.  The injunction that "excessive bail
shall not be required" necessarily presupposes a factual inquiry
into the issue of "excessiveness."  Only a hearing could provide
that factual inquiry.  We hold that any defendant who wishes to
make an "as applied" challenge to the propriety of imposing the
specified security release amount of $50,000 or higher under ORS
135.240(5) has a constitutional right to a hearing to address
that question.  See Delaney v. Shobe, 218 Or 626, 628, 346 P2d
126 (1959) (holding, under "excessive bail" provision of Article
I, section 16, of Oregon Constitution, criminal defendant bears
burden of establishing at hearing that amount of bail imposed is
excessive). 

	It follows from the foregoing that, as the state
suggested at oral argument, there is a source of law outside ORS
135.240(5) that entitles a Measure 11 defendant to a hearing or
individualized consideration on the amount, if any, that must be
posted as security.  Because that source of law is a
constitutional one, ORS 135.240(5) is subordinate.  Therefore,
the $50,000 specified by that statute as the minimum amount that
"shall" be imposed must be read as the minimum amount that is to
be imposed initially, on arrest.  Thereafter, defendant may
request a hearing for the purposes of establishing that, as to
him or her, requiring that or a higher amount as security is
constitutionally impermissible.  If defendant requests such a
hearing, he or she must be given the opportunity to demonstrate
that, as to that defendant, the statutory amount is "excessive"
and, if that demonstration is made, to have the court set some
lesser amount that is not excessive.  See Delaney, 218 Or at 628
(illustrating process).

	The foregoing discussion disposes of defendant's and
amici's arguments that ORS 135.240(5) allows no hearing with
respect to security release and that the statute imposes a
mandatory minimum security release amount in all cases.  
Defendant and amici's final argument, that the statutory amount
divides defendants into two classes based on wealth, is not well
taken.  Any amount set for security release classifies defendants
in that manner.  Thus, unless the whole concept of bail is
constitutionally impermissible -- and defendant and amici do not
argue that it is -- that argument does not assist them.

	We hold that ORS 135.240(4) violates Article I, section
14, of the Oregon Constitution.  We also hold that ORS 135.240(5)
is not facially unconstitutional under either the Oregon or
United States Constitutions, because circumstances exist in which
applying that statute would not violate either constitution.  The
trial court's ruling to the contrary was error.  However, we hold
that Measure 11 defendants may challenge the constitutionality of
the minimum security release amount of $50,000 in ORS 135.240(5)
on an as-applied basis and may request a hearing before the trial
court for the purpose of challenging the propriety of imposing
that or a higher amount. 

	Peremptory writ to issue.  Pursuant to ORAP 1.20(4),
11.17, and 14.05(2)(c), and notwithstanding ORAP 9.25, a combined
peremptory writ and appellate judgment shall issue on October 11,
1999, unless a petition for reconsideration is both filed and
physically received by the Office of the State Court
Administrator by October 8, 1999.  Any timely petition for
reconsideration will stay issuance of the peremptory writ and
appellate judgment until the court acts on such petition.

1. 	Assault in the second degree, ORS 163.175, is one of a
group of offenses that are listed in ORS 137.700(2)(a) and that
often are referred to as "Measure 11" offenses after a ballot
measure adopted by the people as a constitutional amendment that
contained the same list.  See ORS 137.700(2)(a)(G) (listing
second degree assault).  Thus, assault in the second degree is an
offense to which ORS 135.240 is applicable.  Pretrial release of
persons accused of offenses other than Measure 11 offenses is
governed by ORS 135.245.

2. 	The legislature enacted the statutory provisions at
issue as part of more comprehensive legislation, Senate Bill 936,
dealing with the Oregon criminal justice system.  1997 Or Laws,
ch 313.  The parties have not asked us to address the
constitutionality of that enactment as a whole, a question that
the Court of Appeals addressed in State v. Fugate, 154 Or App
643, 963 P2d 686, on recons 156 Or App 609, 969 P2d 395 (1998),
rev allowed 328 Or 275, 928 P2d 1173 (1999).  We limit our
analysis accordingly.

3. 	Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required."

4. 	We read the trial court transcript as establishing that
the trial court's ruling was that the statute is facially
unconstitutional.