Title: BLAKE BRYAN LEAVITT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BLAKE BRYAN LEAVITT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 11Case Number: No. S-10-0116Decided: 01/24/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

BLAKE 
BRYAN LEAVITT,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Lincoln County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; and Tina N. Kerin, Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jessica Y. 
Frint, Student Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Matthew E. Riehl, 
Student Intern, Prosecution Assistance Program.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After being 
convicted of four misdemeanors and felony interference with a peace officer, 
Blake Brian Leavitt claims the evidence was insufficient to support his 
conviction for felony interference.  
We affirm.

            

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Leavitt's single 
issue before this Court is, as he phrases,

 
 
There 
was insufficient evidence to convict [Leavitt] of felony interference with a 
peace officer.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On September 4, 
2009, the Afton Police Department received a call that a vehicle was spinning 
tires in the gravel outside of a home.  
From the report given, Officer Aaron Jenkins of the Afton Police 
Department recognized the vehicle described as one owned by Blake 
Leavitt.

 
 
[¶4]      Shortly after 
receiving this report, Officer Jenkins began following the vehicle but initially 
did not turn on any lights or sirens.  
After Leavitt's vehicle increased speed on hospital property, Officer 
Jenkins activated both his lights and sirens, and the pursuit of Leavitt 
ensued.  Officer Jenkins called for 
backup to which Sheriff's Deputy Craig P. Thatcher responded.  Thatcher attempted to stop Leavitt at an 
intersection to no avail.

 
 
[¶5]      For the next 
several hours a high speed chase took place, taking the officers outside Afton, 
into Swift Creek Canyon, and into and back out of Idaho.  At one point, Deputy Thatcher 
"semi-blocked" the parking lot of Swift Creek Canyon in an attempt to make 
Leavitt stop.  Leavitt, however, did 
not stop and instead drove his vehicle directly at Deputy Thatcher.  His actions influenced Deputy Thatcher 
to run behind his vehicle.   
Leavitt was finally apprehended after two of his tires were flattened by 
"stop sticks" and his engine caught on fire near Auburn, Wyoming.  He was arrested after exiting his 
vehicle.

 
 
[¶6]      Following a jury 
trial on February 16-17, 2010, Leavitt was convicted of Count I, Felony 
Interference with a Peace Officer; Count II, Fleeing or Eluding a Peace Officer; 
Count III, Fleeing or Eluding a Peace Officer; Count V, Reckless Driving; and 
Count VI, Possession of Marijuana.  
Count IV, Reckless Endangering, was dismissed.  Leavitt was sentenced to the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary for not less than one and one-half years nor more than three 
years.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

 
[¶7]      In Gomez v. State, 2010 WY 108, ¶ 19; 237 P.3d 393, 398-99 (Wyo. 2010), we stated:

 
 

The 
benchmark for reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether the 
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is adequate to 
permit a reasonable trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We 
will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Instead, we will 
determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even 
could, have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Pryor v. State, 2009 WY 95, ¶ 7, 212 P.3d 635, 637 
(Wyo. 2009).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      Leavitt's only 
issue on appeal is whether the State presented sufficient evidence to the jury 
to find him guilty of interference with a peace officer in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b).  Leavitt 
takes issue with the charge that the State showed he had attempted to inflict 
bodily injury upon Deputy Thatcher when he drove his pickup directly at the 
deputy, causing him to run behind his patrol car to avoid being hit.  Leavitt argues that his "specific 
intent" was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  The State, on the other hand, argues 
that sufficient evidence existed to convict Leavitt.

 
 
[¶9]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-5-204(b) (LexisNexis 2009) states in pertinent part:

 
 
(b)  A 
person who intentionally and knowingly causes or attempts to cause bodily injury 
to a peace officer engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties is 
guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) 
years.

 
 
[¶10]   In Garcia v. State, 777 P.2d 1091, 1095 
(Wyo.1989), Garcia similarly appealed that the State's evidence was insufficient 
regarding his specific intent to cause bodily injury to a police officer.  We explained as 
follows:

 
 
In 
Fuller [v. State, 568 P.2d 900, 903-904 (Wyo. 
2007)], we explained that, although the law presumes an individual to generally 
intend the natural consequences of his actions, it will not presume that he 
specifically intended any particular consequence.  That is, a mere showing that certain 
conduct occurred which produced a particular result is legally sufficient to 
establish the actor's general intent.  
Thus, we explained that the bare fact of assaultive behavior will not 
give rise to a presumption that an assailant had 
the specific intent to cause any particular harm.  We also noted, however, that 
such specific intent may be properly proven by reasonable inferences from the character of 
such acts and their surrounding circumstances.  In particular, the specifics of a 
defendant's conduct and other circumstantial evidence may permit the jury to 
infer that he acted with the specific intent to cause bodily injury.  [Citations omitted; emphasis in 
original.]

 
 
[¶11]   The State may prove specific intent 
by the permissible means of inference from circumstantial evidence.  Garcia, 777 P.2d  at 1096.  Furthermore, in Walter v. State, 811 P.2d 716 (Wyo. 
1991), this Court specifically stated that "[o]ne who knowingly drives an 
automobile directly at another person can reasonably be found to have intended 
to do bodily injury to that person."  
Walter, 811 P.2d  at 721.

 
 
[¶12]   Both Deputy Thatcher and Officer 
Jenkins testified regarding the incident in Swift Creek Canyon.  In fact, the trial transcript clearly 
shows that ample evidence existed that circumstantially demonstrated Leavitt's 
mental state.  In addition to the 
Swift Creek Canyon incident, Deputy Thatcher testified that Leavitt almost hit 
his vehicle at the intersection of 5tth and Jefferson Streets in Afton, 
and again on County Road 238.  
Officer Jenkins also testified that his vehicle would have been hit by 
Leavitt in Swift Creek Canyon but for the officer's evasive driving action.  Highway Patrolman Andy Jackson also 
testified that there were several times throughout the pursuit when law 
enforcement officers were forced to take evasive action to avoid 
collision.

 
 

[¶13]   Taking these accounts into 
consideration, along with the actual Swift Creek Canyon incident, the testimony 
provides circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could draw an 
inference regarding Leavitt's general mental state during the night of his 
arrest.  The question is not whether 
other inferences would be possible.  
Garcia, 777 P.2d  at 1096.  Rather, the question is whether a 
rational jury could draw this particular inference without entertaining a 
reasonable doubt as to the truth of the inferred fact.  Id.  
 Viewing only the State's evidence, and in the light most 
favorable to the State, we find that a jury could reasonably infer from this 
evidence the existence of specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Leavitt intended to cause bodily injury.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶14]   The State presented sufficient 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Blake Leavitt attempted to inflict bodily injury on a peace officer.  Affirmed.