Title: PEOPLE OF MI V KIMBERLY STARKS

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 19,2005 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 126756 
KIMBERLY STARKS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
_______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
WEAVER, J.   
The 
issue 
presented 
is 
whether 
the 
prosecution 
presented sufficient evidence in this case to establish 
criminal assault and thus bind defendant over on the charge 
of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct 
involving 
sexual 
penetration, 
MCL 
750.520g(1). 
The 
district court dismissed the charge against defendant, and 
the circuit court affirmed. 
On remand from this Court for 
consideration as on leave granted, the Court of Appeals 
also affirmed. 
We reverse the dismissal of the charge 
against 
defendant, 
concluding 
that 
the 
prosecution 
 
 
 
presented sufficient evidence to bind defendant over on the 
charge of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual 
conduct involving sexual penetration. 
An assault may be established by showing that one has 
attempted an intentional, unconsented, and harmful or 
offensive touching of a person. 
The evidence presented at 
the preliminary examination suggests that after defendant 
sent another person out of the room and closed the 
automatically locking door to that room, she asked the 
complainant whether he wanted her to perform fellatio on 
him, instructed the complainant to remove his pants, and 
was observed bending over in front of the complainant, who 
had unzipped and unbuttoned his pants at the defendant’s 
request, less than two feet from him. 
The complainant 
testified that defendant was about to commit fellatio when 
another employee entered the room and that when that 
employee entered the room, defendant pretended to put 
clothes in the washing machine. 
Thus, the evidence 
presented suggests more than mere preparation to commit the 
act; 
it suggests a great degree of proximity to the 
completed act. 
Further, we reject the argument that the complainant 
could consent to the act and overrule the incorrect 
conclusion in People v Worrell, 417 Mich 617; 340 NW2d 612 
2  
 
 
(1983), that consent is always a defense to the crime of 
assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct 
involving sexual penetration. 
The complainant, who was 
thirteen years old at the time of the incident, could not 
consent to an act of fellatio. Because a thirteen-year-old 
child cannot consent to sexual penetration, consent by such 
a victim is not a defense to the crime of assault with 
intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving sexual 
penetration. 
Therefore, there was probable cause to believe that 
defendant committed assault with intent to commit criminal 
sexual conduct involving sexual penetration and defendant 
should have been bound over on the charge. 
We remand this 
case to the circuit court with the instruction that the 
circuit court remand this case to the district court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I 
Defendant was charged with assault with intent to 
commit 
criminal 
sexual 
conduct 
involving 
sexual 
penetration, MCL 750.520g(1), following an incident at the 
Pause Program at Herman Kiefer Hospital, a detention 
facility for delinquent boys. Defendant was an employee of 
3  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
the program. The complainant was a resident of the program 
and was thirteen years old at the time of the incident.1 
At 
the 
preliminary 
examination, 
the 
complainant 
testified that he and another boy were in the laundry room 
with defendant doing laundry. Donavonne Manigault, another 
employee of the program, testified that the laundry room 
door locked automatically when it was shut. 
Manigault 
further explained that the door to the laundry room was 
kept open if laundry was “being done, or something like 
that,” and was kept closed at any other times so that 
residents would not have access to the room. 
The complainant testified that defendant asked the 
other boy to leave the laundry room and then closed the 
door behind him. She then asked the complainant whether he 
would like her to perform fellatio on him like she had on 
another resident in the program2 and told him to pull down 
his pants. 
The complainant complied, unbuckling his belt 
and undoing his pants. 
The complainant stated that as 
defendant was about to perform fellatio, Manigault opened 
1 The incident occurred on June 30, 2001. 
The 
complainant was born on February 19, 1988. 
2 The complainant testified that he had observed 
defendant perform fellatio on another resident of the 
program in that resident’s room. 
4  
 
 
 
the door and interrupted them. 
Defendant then began 
yelling at the complainant, acting as if the complainant 
had done something to her, and tried to look as though she 
were putting clothes in the washing machine. 
Manigault testified that after taking a break from the 
floor, he returned and noticed that defendant was not on 
the floor, so he began looking for her. When he approached 
the laundry room door, it was shut and locked. 
Manigault 
used his key to open the door and, when he entered the 
laundry room, he saw defendant bending over in front of the 
washing machine and the complainant standing behind her 
less than two feet away. 
He stated that the complainant’s 
belt was unbuckled, his pants were unbuttoned and unzipped, 
and the complainant was holding his pants up so that they 
would not fall down. 
After hearing the testimony offered by the complainant 
and Manigault, the district court refused to bind defendant 
over on the charge, finding that there was not probable 
cause to believe a crime was committed. The district court 
explained that there was not evidence that the complainant 
had been placed in fear of any battery and therefore 
dismissed the charge. 
The 
prosecutor 
appealed, 
and 
the 
circuit 
court 
affirmed the dismissal of the charge. 
The circuit court 
5  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
reasoned that there was no evidence that defendant touched 
the complainant or threatened him with violence or force 
and that there was no overt act done in perpetration of the 
alleged crime. 
Therefore, there was not probable cause 
concerning the assault element. 
The prosecutor appealed to the Court of Appeals, which 
initially denied leave to appeal. 
But this Court remanded 
the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on 
leave granted.3
 On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the dismissal of the charge.4
 In determining whether 
defendant committed an assault, the Court of Appeals 
stated: 
The evidence showed that after arranging to
be alone with a thirteen-year-old boy, defendant
offered to perform fellatio on him and told him
to pull down his pants, which he started to do.
Defendant did not expressly threaten to harm the
boy; 
there is no evidence that she made any
threatening gestures; the boy gave no indication
that he was apprehensive of being injured or
harmed in any way or that he was complying with
defendant’s plan against his will. Although this
evidence may have established probable cause to
believe defendant attempted to commit criminal
sexual conduct, MCL 750.92; Worrell, supra, that
was not the charge the prosecutor sought to bind
over to circuit court for trial. 
The evidence 
3 467 Mich 889 (2002). 
4 People v Starks, unpublished opinion per curiam of
the Court of Appeals, issued June 22, 2004 (Docket No.
244478). 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
presented at the preliminary examination failed
to establish probable cause to believe that 
defendant committed an assault. 
Therefore, the
district court did not err in dismissing that
charge, and the circuit court properly affirmed
that ruling. 
But despite its ruling, the Court of Appeals urged this 
Court to reexamine and overrule the Worrell decision 
because it believed that Justice Boyle’s dissent in Worrell 
offered the better analysis. 
The Court of Appeals agreed 
with Justice Boyle that “the complainant’s consent, or lack 
of consent, is not germane in a prosecution for assault 
with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving 
penetration with a child under the age of sixteen.” 
The prosecutor sought leave to appeal, and this Court 
granted leave to appeal, instructing the parties to include 
among the issues briefed 
whether People v Worrell, 417 Mich 617 (1983),
was properly decided, and whether the prosecution
presented sufficient evidence in this case to
establish a criminal assault and to bind over 
defendant on the charge of assault with intent to
commit 
criminal 
sexual 
conduct 
involving
penetration, MCL 750.520g(1). 
[471 Mich 904 
(2004).] 
II 
A trial court’s decision whether to bind a defendant 
over for trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 561; 621 NW2d 702 (2001). “A 
magistrate has a duty to bind over a defendant for trial if 
7  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
it appears that a felony has been committed and there is 
probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the 
felony.” Id., citing MCL 766.13.5 
MCL 750.520g(1) provides that “[a]ssault with intent 
to 
commit 
criminal 
sexual 
conduct 
involving 
sexual 
penetration shall be a felony punishable by imprisonment 
for not more than 10 years.” The elements of the crime are 
“(1) an assault, and (2) an intent to commit [criminal 
sexual conduct] involving sexual penetration.” 
People v 
Nickens, 470 Mich 622, 627; 685 NW2d 657 (2004). It is the 
first element that is disputed in the present case. 
An assault may be established by showing either an 
attempt to commit a battery or an unlawful act that places 
another 
in 
reasonable 
apprehension 
of 
receiving 
an 
immediate battery. 
Id. at 628. 
The first type of assault 
is characterized as “attempted-battery assault”; the second 
is characterized as “apprehension-type assault.” 
Id. 
Battery has been defined as “‘an intentional, unconsented 
5 In this case, the magistrate was bound by this
Court’s decision in People v Worrell. 
Under Worrell, the
magistrate may not have abused his discretion in refusing
to bind defendant over. 
But as will be explained, Worrell 
was wrongly decided. Because we overrule that decision, it
does not bar binding defendant over on the charge of
assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct 
involving sexual penetration. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
and harmful or offensive touching of the person of another, 
or of something closely connected with the person.’” 
Id., 
quoting People v Reeves, 458 Mich 236, 240 n 4; 580 NW2d 
433 (1998). 
The use of force against a person is not 
considered a battery if the recipient consents to what is 
done. 
Nickens, supra at 630. 
But the consent cannot be 
coerced or fraudulently obtained, must be given by one who 
is legally capable of consenting to such a deed, and cannot 
“‘relate to a matter as to which consent will not be 
recognized as a matter of law.’” 
Id., quoting Perkins & 
Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed), p 154. 
Thus, when one 
attempts an intentional, unconsented, and harmful or 
offensive touching of a person, one has committed an 
assault. 
In Worrell, supra at 622, this Court concluded that 
consent is always a defense to assault with intent to 
commit criminal sexual conduct, reasoning that “[i]f the 
other person is a willing partner to the physical act, 
there can be no assault because there is no reasonable 
apprehension of immediate injury.” We disagree. 
As explained in Nickens, one is guilty of an assault 
when one attempts an intentional, unconsented, and harmful 
or offensive touching. 
Moreover, consent must be given by 
one who is legally capable of giving consent to the act. 
9  
 
 
 
                                                 
Nickens, supra at 630. 
MCL 750.520d(1)(a) states that a 
person is guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct if 
the person engages in sexual penetration with another 
person and that person is at least thirteen but younger 
than sixteen years old.6
 Accordingly, a thirteen-year-old 
child cannot legally consent to sexual penetration with 
another person because sexual penetration of a thirteen­
year-old 
child 
is 
automatically 
third-degree 
criminal 
sexual conduct.7  Therefore, the complainant in this case, 
who was thirteen years old, could not consent to the 
attempted touching in this case—fellatio—and defendant’s 
attempt to commit fellatio, if proven, would amount to an 
attempt to commit an intentional, unconsented, and harmful 
or offensive touching, which, by definition, is an assault. 
As noted by Justice Boyle in her dissent in Worrell: 
[I]n the case of a victim under 16 years of
age and [at least] 13 years of age[,] the 
elements of assault with intent to commit third­
degree criminal sexual conduct may be made out by 
6 MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(iii) states that a person is
guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct if he or she
engages in sexual penetration with another person, that
person is at least thirteen but younger than sixteen years
old, and the actor is in a position of authority over the
victim and uses this authority to coerce the victim to
submit. 
7 And it could be first-degree criminal sexual conduct
if other factors are present. 
10  
 
 
   
                                                 
 
evidence sufficient to permit the factfinder to
conclude that the defendant had the specific
intent to commit sexual penetration, and that a 
showing of force or coercion is not required in
the case of an underage victim. 
If force or 
coercion were necessary elements of the offense
in the case of an underage victim, then the young
victim would have no greater protection from 
sexual assaults than an adult victim. We believe 
this result to be inconsistent with the criminal 
sexual conduct act’s provisions which provide
greater 
protection 
from 
sexual 
conduct 
for 
persons under 16 years of age. 
[Worrell, supra
at 633.] 
Therefore, Worrell’s incorrect conclusion that consent is 
always a defense to the crime of assault with intent to 
commit criminal sexual conduct involving sexual penetration 
is overruled.8 
8 See also People v McDonald, 9 Mich 150, 152-153
(1861)(consent does not negate assault with intent to 
commit rape), and People v Goulette, 82 Mich 36, 39; 45 NW
1124 
(1890) 
(the 
victim’s 
own 
acts 
would 
form 
no 
justification for the defendant to assault her with intent
to violate her person because the victim was under the age
of consent). 
As recently noted, the doctrine of stare decisis is
not applied mechanically to prevent this Court from 
overruling previous decisions that are erroneous. Although
we overrule precedent with caution, we may overrule a prior
decision when we are certain that it was wrongly decided
and “‘“less injury will result from overruling it than from
following it.”’” 
People v Davis, 472 Mich 156, 168 n 19;
695 NW2d 45 (2005), quoting People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 69
n 17; 679 NW2d 41 (2004), quoting McEvoy v Sault Ste Marie,
136 Mich 172, 178; 98 NW 1006 (1904). 
Additionally, there
are 
no 
relevant 
“reliance” 
interests 
involved 
and 
overruling Worrell will not produce any “practical real­
world dislocations.” See Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439,
466; 613 NW2d 307 (2000). 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant asserts that even if Worrell is overruled, 
the district court properly dismissed the charge against 
her because the evidence at most shows some preparation to 
commit a crime, but does not demonstrate an “overt act” 
with the intent to achieve sexual penetration. 
We 
disagree. 
As noted by Justice Boyle in her dissent, 
assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct 
involving sexual penetration can be distinguished from 
attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct “by the 
proximity of the defendant to the completed act.” 
Id. at 
634-635. 
“[A]ssault with intent to commit criminal sexual 
conduct involving penetration is an attempt to commit 
third-degree criminal sexual conduct plus a greater degree 
of proximity.” Id. at 635. 
The evidence presented at the preliminary examination 
suggests that defendant, an employee of the facility, asked 
the complainant, a resident, whether he wanted her to 
perform fellatio on him after defendant sent another 
resident out of the room and closed the automatically 
locking door. Defendant then instructed the complainant to 
remove 
his 
pants, 
and 
the 
complainant 
unzipped 
and 
unbuttoned his pants at defendant’s request. Defendant was 
observed by another employee bending over in front of the 
complainant 
less 
than 
two 
feet 
from 
him 
while 
the 
12  
 
 
complainant held up his unzipped, unbuttoned pants. 
The 
complainant testified that defendant was about to commit 
fellatio when the other employee walked into the room and 
that when the other employee entered the room, defendant 
pretended to put clothes in the washing machine. 
The 
evidence suggests that, but for the other employee entering 
the room, defendant would have completed the act. Further, 
the complainant was thirteen years old and could not 
legally consent to an act of fellatio. 
Thus, the evidence 
presented suggests more than mere preparation; it suggests 
a greater degree of proximity to the completed act. 
Therefore, there was probable cause to believe that 
defendant committed assault with intent to commit criminal 
sexual conduct involving sexual penetration, and the Court 
of Appeals affirmance of the dismissal of the charge is 
reversed. 
This case is remanded to the circuit court with 
the instruction that the circuit court remand this case to 
the district court for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 126756 
KIMBERLY STARKS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring). 
I agree with the majority that the prosecution 
presented sufficient evidence to bind defendant over on the 
charge of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual 
conduct 
(CSC) 
involving 
sexual 
penetration, 
MCL 
750.520g(1). 
In my view, however, it is unnecessary to 
reach the issue whether the thirteen-year-old complainant 
could consent to the underlying act as a matter of law for 
purposes of MCL 750.520g(1), and therefore whether People v 
Worrell, 417 Mich 617; 340 NW2d 612 (1983), must now be 
overruled. 
Here, the prosecutor presented sufficient 
evidence demonstrating that the complainant did not consent 
to the underlying act. 
Therefore, the evidence was 
sufficient to bind defendant over on the charge of assault 
with intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by 
not binding defendant over for trial. 
A district court has a duty to bind a defendant over 
for trial if, at the conclusion of the preliminary 
examination, there is probable cause to believe that the 
defendant committed a felony. 
MCL 766.13. 
A district 
court’s decision whether to bind a defendant over for trial 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
People v Stone, 
463 Mich 558, 561; 621 NW2d 702 (2001). 
Here, the evidence introduced at the preliminary 
examination 
showed 
that 
defendant 
was 
one 
of 
the 
complainant’s supervisors in a youth detention program. 
Defendant was monitoring the complainant and another boy 
while the boys did their laundry. 
Using her position of 
authority, defendant ordered the other boy out of the room 
and arranged to be alone with the thirteen-year-old 
complainant in the locked laundry room.1
 Once alone, 
defendant asked the complainant if he wanted her to perform 
1 Defendant’s coworker testified that the door to the 
laundry room was usually kept open while laundry was being
done. But when the coworker later confronted defendant and 
the complainant in the laundry room, the door was closed. 
2  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
fellatio on him. 
The complainant did not respond.2 
Defendant then ordered the complainant to pull his pants 
down. 
The complainant did as he was told. 
As defendant 
was 
about 
to 
perform 
fellatio, 
defendant’s 
coworker 
unlocked and opened the door, interrupting defendant. 
The 
complainant testified that defendant then began cursing at 
him, pretending as if the complainant had done something to 
her, and also pretending that she was doing laundry. 
After considering this evidence, the district court 
concluded there was not probable cause to believe that an 
assualt was committed, noting: 
Now, the question that is before this Court
is was the complainant in fear, and there is no
testimony on the record that he was placed in
fear of any battery. He pulled down his pants. 
* * * 
2  [The prosecutor]: Okay. 
Now when you say
that she said do you want your private part
sucked, is that the words that she used, or did
she call it something else? 
[The complainant]: She called it something
else. 
[The prosecutor]: What did she call it? 
[The complainant]: She used the word private
part as dick. 
[The prosecutor]: Okay. Did you answer her? 
[The complainant]: No. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
The Court in this particular -- If this was
a criminal sexual conduct first degree, the 
authority of the defendant would have been an
element or a factor to take a CSC three to a CSC 
one. 
However, there is nothing on this record
that he was placed in fear. 
A battery is a forceful violent touching of
a person. 
The Court does not believe that the proofs
have been established to show that there is 
probable cause that a crime was committed. There 
is no -- There is no evidence of the defendant 
[sic, the complainant] being placed in fear. 
On the basis of the evidence presented, I would conclude 
that the district court abused its discretion by not 
binding defendant over for trial because there was probable 
cause to believe that defendant committed the crime of 
assault 
with 
intent 
to 
commit 
CSC 
involving 
sexual 
penetration. 
The elements of assault with intent to commit CSC 
involving sexual penetration are (1) an assault and (2) an 
intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration. 
People 
v Nickens, 470 Mich 622, 627; 685 NW2d 657 (2004).  The 
first element, an assault, can occur in one of two ways. 
First, an assault can occur from an unlawful act that 
places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an 
immediate 
battery 
(apprehension-type 
assault). 
Alternatively, an assault can occur from an attempt to 
commit a battery (attempted-battery assault). 
Id. at 628. 
4  
 
 
 
A “‘battery is an intentional, unconsented and harmful or 
offensive touching of the person of another, or of 
something closely connected with the person.’” 
Id. 
(citation omitted; emphasis added). 
Generally, a battery 
does not occur when the recipient validly consents to the 
touching. Id. at 630. 
Here, the prosecutor presented sufficient evidence 
that the complainant was placed in reasonable apprehension 
of receiving an immediate battery, i.e., an unconsented 
offensive touching, and, thus, there was probable cause to 
believe 
that 
defendant 
committed 
an 
apprehension-type 
assault. Moreover, even if the district court’s conclusion 
that the complainant was not placed in fear is accorded 
great weight, there was still sufficient evidence that an 
attempted-battery assault nonetheless occurred. 
On the 
basis of the prosecutor’s proffered evidence, there was 
probable cause to believe that the complainant did not 
consent and, thus, there was probable cause to believe that 
defendant 
committed 
an 
attempted-battery 
assault. 
Defendant used her position of authority to isolate the 
complainant and subsequently ordered him to remove his 
pants so that she could perform fellatio. 
In other words, 
there was probable cause to believe that the complainant’s 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
compliance 
with 
his 
supervisor’s 
order 
was 
not 
a 
manifestation of his consent. 
Thus, I agree with the majority that the prosecution 
presented sufficient evidence to bind defendant over on the 
charge of assault with intent to commit CSC involving 
sexual penetration. 
However, I would not reach the issue 
whether the complainant could consent to the underlying act 
because, at the very least, there is probable cause to 
believe that the complainant did not consent to the act. 
Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by not 
binding defendant over for trial on the charge of assault 
with intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly
Stephen J. Markman 
6