Title: In the Matter of Correll

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13258 
 
IN THE MATTER OF KEVIN P. CORRELL. 
 
 
April 29, 2024. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Reciprocal discipline, Suspension.  
Constitutional Law, Freedom of speech and press, Freedom of 
association. 
 
 
 
 
On February 4, 2021, the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) suspended Kevin P. Correll from practice before 
the USPTO in patent, trademark, and other nonpatent matters for 
sixty months (five years) on the basis that Correll violated 
several of the USPTO's disciplinary rules.  The matter 
subsequently came before a single justice of this court on bar 
counsel's petition for reciprocal discipline.  The single 
justice suspended Correll from the practice of law in the 
Commonwealth for a period of three years, and Correll appeals.  
We affirm.1,2 
 
 
1.  Background.  In 2019, an administrative law judge 
determined that Correll had violated several sections of the 
 
 
1 We have reviewed the respondent's preliminary memorandum 
and appendix, as well as the record that was before the single 
justice.  Pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:23, 471 Mass. 1303 (2015), 
we dispense with further briefing and oral argument.  
 
 
2 After the respondent's appeal was filed in this court, we 
remanded the matter to the single justice for an explanation of 
his decision to impose a three-year suspension.  The single 
justice subsequently issued a detailed memorandum setting forth 
the bases for his decision. 
 
 
2 
USPTO Code of Professional Responsibility -- 37 C.F.R. 
§§ 10.23(a), 10.23(b)(4), 10.23(b)(5), 10.23(c)(20), 
and 10.40(b)(2) -- and the USPTO Rules of Professional 
Responsibility -- 37 C.F.R. §§ 11.111, 11.116(a)(1), 11.505, and 
11.804(d) -- by representing private parties before the USPTO 
while he was employed by the Federal government (as an 
electronics engineer for the United States Department of the 
Navy).3  The director of the USPTO subsequently affirmed the 
administrative law judge's decision in a final order issued in 
February 2021.4  Among other things, Correll, while a Federal 
government employee, "engage[d] . . . in conduct which is 
contrary to applicable Federal ethics law, including conflict of 
interest statutes and regulations of the department . . . 
currently employing said practitioner," in violation of 37 
C.F.R. § 11.111; engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by 
practicing law "in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation 
of the legal profession in that jurisdiction," in violation of 
37 C.F.R. § 11.505; and engaged in "conduct that is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice," in violation of 37 C.F.R. 
§ 11.804(d).  The detailed facts of Correll's misconduct -- of 
his representation of private parties before the USPTO while he 
was a Federal government employee -- are set forth in the final 
order from the USPTO, as well as in two Federal court decisions, 
see note 4, supra, and need not be reiterated here. 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  Under our bar disciplinary rules, a "final 
adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer has been 
guilty of misconduct . . . may be treated as establishing the 
 
 
3 Prior to May 3, 2013, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) Code of Professional Responsibility 
applied to persons practicing before that office.  Effective May 
3, 2013, the USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct apply to 
persons practicing before that office.  The respondent engaged 
in misconduct that violated both the code and the rules.  See 
Correll vs. Vidal, U.S. Ct. App., No. 2022-1420, slip op. at 2 
(Fed. Cir. July 8, 2022). 
 
 
4 Correll also filed, in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia, two motions in which he 
sought a preliminary injunction to postpone his suspension.  A 
judge in that court issued an order denying the motions, see 
Correll vs. Under Secretary of Commerce of Intellectual Prop., 
U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 21-898 (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2022), and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
subsequently affirmed the order, see Correll vs. Vidal, U.S. Ct. 
App., No. 2022-1420 (Fed. Cir. July 8, 2022). 
 
3 
misconduct for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in the 
Commonwealth."  S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 16 (5), as appearing in 
425 Mass. 1319 (1997).  Additionally, a judgment of suspension 
in another jurisdiction  
 
"shall be conclusive evidence of the misconduct unless the 
bar counsel or the respondent lawyer establishes, or the 
court concludes, that the procedure in the other 
jurisdiction did not provide reasonable notice or 
opportunity to be heard or there was significant infirmity 
of proof establishing the misconduct." 
 
S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 16 (3), as appearing in 425 Mass. 1319 
(1997).  See Matter of Mitrano, 453 Mass. 1026, 1027 (2009), and 
cases cited.  In considering reciprocal discipline, "[w]e 
generally give effect to the disciplinary decisions of another 
jurisdiction without undertaking the often difficult and 
protracted task of redoing the inquiry which has already been 
concluded there."  Id., quoting Matter of Lebbos, 423 Mass. 753, 
755 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1275 (1997).  Our inquiry, 
therefore, is "generally limited to determining whether the 
attorney received a fair hearing at which sufficient evidence 
was presented to justify our taking reciprocal disciplinary 
action."  Matter of Mitrano, supra, quoting Matter of Bailey, 
439 Mass. 134, 136 (2003). 
 
 
Correll does not specifically argue that he did not receive 
a fair hearing or that the evidence was not sufficient to 
support the USPTO's decision of a term suspension of his 
license.  And, in any event, there is no indication in the 
record before us that he did not "receive[] a fair hearing at 
which sufficient evidence was presented to justify our taking 
reciprocal disciplinary action."  Matter of Steinberg, 
448 Mass. 1024, 1025 (2007), quoting Matter of Bailey, 
439 Mass. at 136.  Indeed, Correll does not deny that he engaged 
in the actions that led to a finding of misconduct.  That is, he 
does not deny that while he was employed by the Federal 
government, he represented private parties before the USPTO.  
Instead, he argues, as he did before the USPTO and in the 
Federal courts, that the USPTO's suspension of his license 
violated his rights to freedom of speech and of association 
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; 
that the Federal conflict of interest statutes do not apply to 
his conduct; and that the USPTO violated his due process rights 
because it failed "to appreciate the differing statutes of 
limitations for trademark and patent matters."  Correll vs. 
Vidal, U.S. Ct. App., No. 2022-1420, slip op. at 6-10 (Fed. Cir. 
 
4 
July 8, 2022).  Each of these issues was squarely addressed by 
the USPTO, and by both the Federal district and circuit courts. 
 
 
As to Correll's primary argument, in particular, that his 
suspension violates his First Amendment rights to free speech 
and association, it is true, as he argues, that he did not 
altogether give up his First Amendment rights when he became a 
Federal employee.  It is equally true, however, that the 
government may impose certain regulations on the speech of its 
employees without violating the First Amendment.  See Pickering 
v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).  The challenge is 
to "arrive at a balance between the interests [of the employee] 
in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of 
the [government], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of 
the public services it performs through its employees."  Id.  In 
this case, Correll argues that the USPTO, and, in turn, the 
Federal courts, erred in engaging in that balancing test.  Our 
role is, again, not to redo that inquiry, and it suffices to say 
that Correll was not disciplined -- his license was not 
suspended -- on the basis of the content of his speech, but 
rather on the basis that in representing private parties before 
the USPTO, he violated certain of the USPTO's disciplinary 
rules.  Moreover, as the District Court noted, "the only 
prohibition on [Correll's] speech was the speech [he] exercised 
when representing private clients in front of the USPTO.  [He] 
was free to speak on patent and trademark matters otherwise."  
Correll vs. Under Secretary of Commerce of Intellectual Prop., 
U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 21-898 (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2022). 
 
 
We turn now to the issue of the sanction imposed by the 
single justice, and whether the three-year suspension of 
Correll's license to practice law in the Commonwealth is 
"markedly disparate from that imposed in comparable cases."  
Matter of Steinberg, 448 Mass. at 1025, citing Matter of Kersey, 
444 Mass. 65, 70 (2005).  "In reciprocal discipline cases . . . 
our task is not to replicate the sanction imposed in another 
jurisdiction but, rather, to mete out the sanction appropriate 
in this jurisdiction, 'even if that discipline exceeds, equals, 
or falls short of the discipline imposed in another 
jurisdiction.'"  Matter of Steinberg, supra, quoting Matter of 
Watt, 430 Mass. 232, 234 (1999).  Indeed, the three-year 
suspension imposed by the single justice "falls short" of the 
five-year suspension imposed by the USPTO. 
 
 
This case presents a fairly unique fact pattern, but we can  
look to cases involving the same underlying misconduct -- i.e., 
practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation 
 
5 
of the legal profession in that jurisdiction -- to assess the 
propriety of the three-year suspension.5  That is just what the 
single justice did in ordering the three-year suspension.  He 
"properly considered the facts establishing the respondent's" 
actions, see Matter of Steinberg, 448 Mass. at 1025, including 
the respondent's disregard for actual and potential conflicts of 
interest; his knowing and continuous failure to comply with the 
relevant rules; and the duration of his misconduct.  The single 
justice also properly took bar counsel's recommendation into 
consideration -- here, although the USPTO imposed a five-year 
suspension, bar counsel recommended only a three-year suspension 
–- and noted that a term suspension of five years, in 
Massachusetts, is quite rare.  Indeed, in matters resulting in 
an indefinite suspension, a respondent may seek reinstatement 
after five years.  See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (2) (b), as 
appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009).  With all of that in mind, 
the single justice reasonably imposed a sanction that was lesser 
than that imposed by the originating jurisdiction, here the 
USPTO.  The three-year suspension is warranted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the record, accompanied by a 
memorandum of law. 
 
Kevin P. Correll, pro se. 
 
 
5 We note, in doing so, that Correll does not argue that the 
three-year suspension is markedly disparate; rather he continues 
to argue that the underlying disciplinary order from the USPTO 
was improper and that the petition for reciprocal discipline 
should be dismissed.