Title: The Florida Bar v. David Samuel Nicnick

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-290 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR,  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
DAVID SAMUEL NICNICK,  
Respondent. 
 
[July 12, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that David Samuel 
Nicnick be found guilty of professional misconduct and suspended from the 
practice of law for ninety-one days.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. 
Const.  We approve the referee’s findings and recommendations. 
FACTS 
 
The Florida Bar filed a complaint against David Samuel Nicnick alleging 
violations of Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 3-4.2 (violation of Rules of 
Professional Conduct is a cause for discipline); 3-4.3 (commission of any act that 
is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice may constitute a cause for 
discipline); 4-3.3(a)(1) (a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of 
material fact or law to a tribunal); 4-3.3(a)(2) (a lawyer shall not knowingly fail to 
disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting 
a criminal or fraudulent act by the client); 4-3.3(a)(4) (a lawyer shall not 
knowingly permit any witness to offer testimony or evidence that the lawyer 
knows to be false); 4-3.4(a) (obstructing another party’s access to evidence); 4-
8.4(a) (a lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of 
another); and 4-8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving 
misrepresentation).  After considering stipulated facts and conducting a hearing to 
determine disputed facts, the referee issued a report in which the following 
findings and recommendations were set forth: 
Nicnick represented a mother in a case involving child support arrearages.  
In that case, it was alleged that the child’s father had fraudulently transferred stock 
to his mother to avoid a child support obligation.  The mother-in-law retained 
counsel to provide representation for her in the litigation from June 1, 1999, 
through May 2, 2001, at which time counsel was allowed to withdraw.  Nicnick 
was aware that the mother-in-law was represented by counsel during those dates.   
The mother was approached by the mother-in-law’s personal assistant.  The 
personal assistant informed the mother that the mother-in-law wished to settle the 
 
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litigation.  The mother informed Nicnick of this development, and sought from him 
a written outline of a settlement agreement.  Nicnick drafted this and a revision 
requested by the mother.  Nicnick had no expectation that the documents he 
drafted would be returned to him executed. 
On or about February 17, 2001, the personal assistant delivered an executed 
settlement agreement to Nicnick with a signature purporting to be that of the 
mother-in-law.  At the same time, Nicnick and his law partner were meeting with 
the same personal assistant concerning legal representation; this personal assistant 
had been accused of stealing the mother-in-law’s automobile and was asking 
Nicnick and his partner to provide his legal representation.  Concerned about the 
personal assistant’s damaged relationship with the mother-in-law, Nicnick decided 
not to proceed with the settlement agreement until the criminal case was resolved.  
Nicnick did not inform opposing counsel of the signed settlement agreement 
because he did not want him involved.  Thus, opposing counsel had no knowledge 
of the agreement.  Further, the mother did not see the mother-in-law sign the 
document.  For the purposes of the disciplinary proceeding, the parties stipulated 
that an expert would have testified that the signature on the settlement agreement 
was not that of the mother-in-law. 
On August 28, 2001, the trial court held a hearing in the civil case.  At that 
hearing, Nicnick informed the court that the settlement agreement appeared to be 
 
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signed by the mother-in-law, but he had no independent confirmation of that fact.  
The mother-in-law denied signing the document, as well as a certified copy of a 
traffic citation which Nicnick used as a handwriting exemplar.  Subsequent to the 
hearing, the trial court entered a Partial Finding of Fact and a Final Judgment for 
the mother, finding she and the mother-in-law entered into a valid settlement 
agreement that settled all matters in the case.  Although the trial court’s ruling has 
been challenged many times, it still stands. 
The referee concluded that there were no violations of rules 4-3.3(a)(1), 4-
3.3(a)(2), 4-3.3(a)(4), and 4-8.4(c) with respect to the actual use of the settlement 
agreement in the civil litigation because Nicnick made the appropriate disclosures 
to the trial judge.  Also, the referee concluded that rules 3-4.2, 3-4.3, and 4-8.4(a) 
were inapplicable to the present case.  However, the referee concluded that once 
Nicnick gave the settlement agreement to his client, the mother, with the 
understanding that it would be delivered to the mother-in-law, he had an obligation 
to share the document with opposing counsel.  The referee found that, here, 
Nicnick failed to do so because he did not want opposing counsel to be involved at 
that time.  By failing to share the settlement agreement with opposing counsel 
 
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before presenting it to the mother-in-law, the referee concluded that Nicnick 
violated rules 4-3.4(a) and 4-8.4(c).1 
The referee found that the following aggravating factors were present:  (1) 
prior ten-day suspension for misconduct in Case No. SC01-274; and (2) substantial 
experience in the practice of law because Nicnick has been practicing since 1992.  
In mitigation, the referee found:  (1) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (2) 
full cooperation with the Bar; (3) good character and reputation; (4) remorse; and 
(5) remoteness of prior offense. 
The referee recommends that Nicnick:  (1) be suspended from the practice of 
law for a period of ninety-one days; (2) complete a minimum of ten hours in ethics 
Continuing Legal Education courses within six months of the date of this Court’s 
approval of the referee’s report; and (3) payment of the Bar’s costs in the amount 
of $3,711.56. 
Nicnick petitioned for review of the referee’s report, challenging the 
referee’s recommendations as to guilt and discipline.   
ANALYSIS 
                                          
 
1.  Although the referee was concerned with the possibility that Nicnick 
communicated with a party represented by counsel, the referee did not consider 
whether Nicnick violated rule 4-4.2 (Communication with a Represented Party) 
because the Bar did not charge him with such. 
 
 
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First, Nicnick challenges the referee’s recommendations as to guilt.  The 
party contending that the referee's findings of fact and conclusions as to guilt are 
erroneous carries the burden of demonstrating that there is no evidence in the 
record to support those findings or that the record evidence clearly contradicts the 
conclusions.  Fla. Bar v. Carlon, 820 So. 2d 891, 898 (Fla. 2002); Fla. Bar v. 
Vining, 761 So. 2d 1044, 1047 (Fla. 2000).  Nicnick challenges the referee’s 
conclusion that he violated rules 4-3.4(a) (Obstructing Another Party’s Access to 
Evidence) and 4-8.4(c) (Engaging in Conduct Involving Misrepresentation). 
 
Rule 4-3.4(a) provides that a lawyer shall not  
unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or otherwise 
unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other material that 
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is relevant to a pending 
or a reasonably foreseeable proceeding; nor counsel or assist another 
person to do any such act. 
Rule 4-8.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not “engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”   
Both parties agree that the settlement agreement is of the type that was 
relevant in the civil proceeding between the mother and the mother-in-law, and 
should not have been concealed.  Rather, Nicnick essentially argues that he did not 
share the executed draft settlement agreement with opposing counsel because he 
was unsure as to its authenticity, and states that had opposing counsel remained in 
the case, he would have disclosed the document to him before he actually relied 
upon it.  Further, Nicnick alleges that he felt compelled to investigate the 
 
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authenticity of the document before turning it over to opposing counsel, who 
withdrew from the case before the investigation could be completed.  Moreover, 
Nicnick claims he believed that opposing counsel was aware of the mother-in-
law’s actions regarding the settlement.  Based on these assertions, Nicnick states 
that there was no active concealment in the instant case.  We disagree. 
In Florida Bar v. Forrester, 818 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 2002), the respondent 
received a sixty-day suspension for concealing a contract during a deposition (rule 
4-3.4(a)) and lying as to its whereabouts (rule 4-8.4(c)).  Among other things, the 
respondent argued that multiple copies of the contract were available and the 
concealment lasted only for a short period of time because the contract was 
uncovered by the end of the deposition.  The Court rejected these arguments: 
The comment notes that one of the purposes of rule 4-3.4(a) is to 
secure fair competition in the adversary system. Fair competition is 
secured by ensuring that a party's right to obtain relevant evidence is 
not frustrated by the concealment of such evidence. We see no reason 
to distinguish the situation where multiple copies of a document are 
available or when the concealment lasts for only a short period of 
time. Thus, we conclude that in the interest of promoting fair 
competition both the availability of multiple copies and the duration 
of such concealment do not, under the circumstances of this case, 
negate the specifically prohibited conduct of concealing a relevant 
document. 
Id. at 482. 
Nicnick asserts that it was within ethical boundaries to conceal a potentially 
forged settlement agreement until he felt the time was right for it to be revealed.  
As set forth in Forrester, this is not a decision that Nicnick was entitled to make.  
 
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Whether opposing counsel or the mother-in-law knew that the settlement 
agreement existed or even had a copy of such is irrelevant in this case.  As the 
referee’s conclusion is supported by the record, we accept the referee’s conclusion 
that Nicnick is guilty of violating rule 4-3.4(a). 
Next, Nicnick further argues that he lacked the requisite intent to violate rule 
4-8.4(c) because he did not deliver the draft agreement to his client, the mother, 
with the intent to be dishonest.  “[I]n order to sustain a violation of rule 4-8.4(c), 
the Bar must prove intent.  The intent element can be satisfied, however, merely by 
showing that the conduct was deliberate or knowing.”  Fla. Bar v. Brown, 905 So. 
2d 76, 81 (Fla. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Fla. Bar v. Lanford, 691 So. 2d 
480, 481 (Fla. 1997).  A referee's finding with regard to intent is a factual finding 
which must be upheld if there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to 
support it.  Forrester, 818 So. 2d at 483.  Additionally, where a referee's factual 
findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence, “this Court is precluded 
from reweighing the evidence and substituting its judgment for that of the referee.”   
Fla. Bar v. MacMillan, 600 So. 2d 457, 459 (Fla. 1992). 
Here, the referee found, based on the testimony adduced at the disciplinary 
hearing, that Nicnick deliberately and knowingly concealed the agreement from 
opposing counsel because he did not want opposing counsel involved.  Thus, 
Nicnick’s misconduct was intentional because he knowingly concealed the 
 
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document.  See Forrester, 818 So. 2d at 483.  Further, the referee’s finding is based 
on competent, substantial evidence as revealed in the testimony.  See MacMillan, 
600 So. 2d at 459.  It is difficult to understand why Nicnick believes that his failure 
to share the purported settlement agreement with opposing counsel does not 
constitute a deceitful act.  By its very nature, the act of omission demonstrated in 
concealing a relevant document is deceptive.  Cf. Fla. Bar v. Miller, 863 So. 2d 
231, 234 (Fla. 2003).  By concealing the settlement agreement, Nicnick was 
effectively representing to opposing counsel that there was no settlement 
agreement and that issues remain in the case.  As the referee’s conclusion is 
supported by the record, we approve the referee’s conclusion that Nicnick should 
be found guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c). 
Nicnick also challenges the referee’s recommended discipline.  In reviewing 
a referee's recommended discipline, this Court's scope of review is broader than 
that afforded to the referee's findings of fact because, ultimately, it is the Court’s 
responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 
2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  However, this Court will 
generally not second-guess the referee's recommended discipline as long as it has a 
reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).     
 
 
 
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The facts in Florida Bar v. Myers, 581 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1991), are similar to 
the present case.  In Myers, the respondent failed to notify opposing counsel of a 
final hearing in a dissolution of marriage proceeding in which he represented the 
husband.  At the final hearing, the respondent submitted a disavowed settlement 
agreement and intentionally failed to inform the court that the wife was represented 
by counsel.  As a result, the husband was awarded custody of the minor child of 
the parties.  At a disciplinary hearing before a referee, the respondent was found 
guilty of violating rules 4-3.3(d) (a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material 
facts known, whether or not the facts are adverse), 4-8.4(a) (a lawyer shall not 
violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct), and rule 4-8.4(d) 
(a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice).  On review, the Court imposed a ninety-day suspension to be followed by 
two years’ probation.  However, unlike the respondent in Myers, where 
exceptionally substantial mitigating factors existed,2 Nicnick has previously been 
subject to a disciplinary suspension and has substantial experience in the practice 
of law.  Hence, despite those mitigating factors presented here, the record here 
supports a suspension greater than that imposed in Myers. 
                                          
 
 
2.  In Myers, we noted that the respondent’s misconduct was influenced by 
the abduction of his child by his former wife, which occurred during the same 
period as the representation. 
 
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Likewise, in Florida Bar v. Schultz, 712 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1998), we imposed 
a ninety-day suspension on a respondent for dishonesty unrelated to any 
representation or case pending at the time the misconduct occurred.  Also, as noted 
above, in Florida Bar v. Forrester, 818 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 2002), a respondent 
received a sixty-day suspension for concealing a contract during a deposition and 
then lying as to its whereabouts.  Additionally, in Forrester, opposing counsel 
knew of the existence of the contract and had copies of such, and the misconduct 
occurred in the course of a single deposition.  In the present case, Nicnick drafted 
the settlement agreement in the course of representation in a pending case and 
obtained a signature, now stipulated by the parties to be a forgery, to execute the 
agreement.  Further, Nicnick effectively worked through an intermediary to contact 
a represented party, and then withheld the settlement agreement from opposing 
counsel who had no knowledge of the agreement.   
Nicnick’s misconduct is more egregious than that involved in Myers, 
Schultz, and Forrester, and is the type of misconduct that often results in much 
harsher sanctions than was imposed in those cases.  In Florida Bar v. Hmielewski, 
702 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1997), and Florida Bar v. Rood, 569 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1990), 
respondents were found guilty of engaging in misconduct involving the 
concealment of documents.  In those cases, the respondents also abused the 
discovery process and made deliberate misrepresentations to the court that were 
 
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prejudicial to the administration of justice.  In Hmielewski, we imposed a three-
year suspension; in Rood, we imposed a one-year suspension.  Although Nicnick 
was not found to have committed misconduct relating to the actual use of the 
settlement agreement, the less onerous sanction recommended by the referee in this 
case reflects this distinction.  Accordingly, we approve the referee’s 
recommendation to impose a ninety-one-day suspension. 
CONCLUSION 
David Samuel Nicnick is hereby suspended for ninety-one days.   
The suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of this opinion so 
that Nicnick can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing clients.  
If he notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and does not need 
the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order making the 
suspension effective immediately.  
David Samuel Nicnick shall accept no new business from the date this 
opinion is filed until he is reinstated.   
Further, Nicnick shall complete a minimum of ten hours in ethics 
Continuing Legal Education courses within six months of the date of this opinion. 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from David Samuel 
Nicnick in the amount of $3,711.56, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
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It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar  
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director and Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Director 
of Lawyer Regulation, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and Juan Carlos 
Arias, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Kevin P. Tynan of Richardson and Tynan, PLC, Tamarac, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent