Title: Seguin v. Northrup Grumman Systems Corp.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
CRISELL SEGUIN 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 080217 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
February 27, 2009 
NORTHROP GRUMMAN  
SYSTEMS CORPORATION, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Dennis J. Smith, Judge 
 
 
This appeal arises from the circuit court’s order 
compelling arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the 
Virginia Uniform Arbitration Act, Code § 8.01-581.01 et seq.  
The dispositive issue in this case is whether the Act provides 
a right to appeal from an order that compels arbitration. 
BACKGROUND 
 
During the course of Crisell Seguin’s employment, 
Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation sent unilateral e-mails 
and memoranda advising its employees that continued employment 
signified agreement to the new arbitration requirements of the 
company’s Dispute Resolution Process.  After receiving these 
emails and memoranda, Seguin continued in her employment at 
Northrop Grumman, but never signed an arbitration agreement.  
Seguin subsequently filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County alleging that Northrop Grumman, and her 
supervisor, John C. Gage, (collectively, “Northrop Grumman”) 
had defamed her by making false statements in her work 
performance evaluation.  Northrop Grumman filed a motion to 
compel arbitration, contending that Seguin’s claim was covered 
by the company’s dispute resolution procedure requiring 
binding arbitration.  In support of its motion, Northrop 
Grumman asserted that by continuing her employment with the 
company after notice of the new dispute resolution procedure, 
Seguin effectively agreed to forfeit her right to a trial by a 
court and jury and to rely exclusively on arbitration to 
settle her claim. 
 
On October 26, 2007, the circuit court held a brief 
hearing on Northrop Grumman’s motion to compel arbitration.1 
Following that hearing and on the same day, the circuit court 
entered an order granting Northrop Grumman’s motion to compel 
arbitration.  Subsequently, Seguin filed this appeal seeking 
this Court’s review of the circuit court’s order to compel 
arbitration. 
                     
1 Code § 8.01-581.02(A) provides that “if the opposing 
party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the 
court shall proceed summarily to the determination of the 
issue of the existence of an agreement and shall order 
arbitration only if found for the moving party.”  In this 
case, the record is clear that the circuit court was mindful 
of this statutory mandate and upon consideration of the 
exhibits filed and the oral arguments of the parties 
determined that an agreement to arbitrate existed.  The 
sufficiency of that hearing as contemplated by the statutory 
mandate is not challenged in this appeal and, accordingly, we 
express no opinion on that issue.  
 
 
2
 
On appeal, mirroring the assertions made in the circuit 
court, Seguin maintains that Northrop Grumman cannot create an 
agreement by unilaterally declaring that her continued 
employment constituted acceptance of an arbitration agreement.  
The thrust of her assertion is that, while she continued her 
employment with Northrop Grumman after receiving the company’s 
communication of its new dispute resolution procedure, more 
was required to bind her to that procedure.  According to 
Seguin, her silence did not constitute an acceptance so as to 
form an arbitration agreement between her and her employer.  
Northrop Grumman disputes the validity of Seguin’s 
contentions. 
DISCUSSION 
 
It is self-evident that before this Court can consider 
the merits of the parties’ contentions concerning the 
existence of the arbitration agreement in question, we must 
initially resolve the issue whether the circuit court’s 
October 26, 2007 order compelling arbitration between the 
parties in this case is an appealable order. 
 
In this regard, Northrop Grumman asserts that this Court 
lacks jurisdiction to consider Seguin’s appeal because Code 
§ 8.01-581.016, contained in the Virginia Uniform Arbitration 
Act, does not confer any right to appeal from an order 
compelling arbitration.  Northrop Grumman further asserts that 
 
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such an order is not a final order in a civil case as 
contemplated by Code § 8.01-670(A)(3) and, thus, the circuit 
court’s October 26, 2007 order is not subject to appeal. 
 
In response, Seguin maintains that an order compelling 
arbitration is a final order because it “ ‘determines the 
rights of the parties, and leaves nothing further to be done 
by the court in the cause, though it may still enter such 
. . . orders as may be necessary to carry the [order] into 
execution.’ ”  Leggett v. Caudill, 247 Va. 130, 133, 439 
S.E.2d 350, 351 (1994) (quoting Lee v. Lee, 142 Va. 244, 250, 
128 S.E. 524, 526 (1925)).  In further support of her 
contention that the order in question is appealable, Seguin 
cites Amchem Products v. Asbestos Cases Plaintiffs, 264 Va. 
89, 96, 563 S.E.2d 739, 742-43 (2002), in which this Court 
stated that “Code § 8.01-581.016 confers upon this Court 
jurisdiction to review a circuit court’s order that denies or 
compels arbitration.”  (Emphasis added.)2 
 
Pursuant to Code § 8.01-581.016:  
                     
2 The emphasized language, “or compels,” does not appear 
in the bound volume of the Virginia Reports.  Nevertheless, 
the quoted language is accurate and was confirmed by this 
Court as part of the Amchem opinion after the bound volume of 
the Virginia Reports was published, and has been available on 
this Court’s web site for the past six years with a notation 
of the November 2002 amendment, as well as being available in 
the correct form on various commercial electronic databases 
since that time. 
 
 
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An appeal may be taken from: (1) An order denying 
an application to compel arbitration . . . (2) An 
order granting an application to stay arbitration 
. . . (3) An order confirming or denying an 
award; (4) An order modifying or correcting an 
award; (5) An order vacating an award without 
directing a rehearing; or (6) A judgment or 
decree entered pursuant to the provisions of this 
article. 
 
 
Code § 8.01-581.016 does not grant a right to appeal an 
order granting an application to compel arbitration.  The 
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous.  It is 
axiomatic that when the language of a statute is unambiguous, 
we are bound by that language and will not add words to the 
statute that would expand the scope of the statute.  Jackson 
v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 269 Va. 303, 313, 608 
S.E.2d 901, 906 (2005); Burlile v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 501, 
511, 544 S.E.2d 360, 365 (2001). 
 
Seguin’s reliance on Amchem to support her contention 
that there is a right to appeal from an order that compels 
arbitration is misplaced.  That case involved an appeal from a 
circuit court’s order denying an application to compel 
arbitration.  Under Code § 8.01-581.016, the General Assembly 
expressly created a right to appeal from such an order.  The 
Court’s statement in Amchem that “Code § 8.01-581.016 confers 
upon this Court jurisdiction to review a circuit court’s order 
that denies or compels arbitration” is dictum in so far as the 
statement includes the phrase “or compels.”  Id. at 96, 563 
 
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S.E.2d at 742-43.  In no way does the Court’s prior decision 
in Amchem circumvent the lack of an express right under Code 
§ 8.01-581.016 to an appeal from an order compelling 
arbitration. 
 
Finally, we turn to Seguin’s contention that the order 
compelling arbitration in this case was a final judgment order 
contemplated by Code § 8.01-670(A)(3) which permits an appeal 
from “a final judgment in any other civil case.”  There is no 
merit to this contention.  An order that compels arbitration 
pursuant to the Virginia Uniform Arbitration Act is not a 
final judgment order.3  Pursuant to Code § 8.01-581.010, the 
circuit court retains jurisdiction to vacate an arbitration 
award; pursuant to Code § 8.01-581.011, the circuit court 
retains jurisdiction to modify or correct an arbitration 
award. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court’s 
October 26, 2007 order that compelled the parties to arbitrate 
their dispute was not an appealable order and, thus, this 
Court does not have jurisdiction to review the merits of 
                     
3 For further detailed discussion regarding what may 
constitute a final order as contemplated by Code § 8.01-
670(A)(3), see Comcast of Chesterfield County, Inc. v. Board 
of Supervisors of Chesterfield County, 277 Va. ___, ___, 
S.E.2d ___, ___(2009) (this day decided). 
 
 
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Seguin’s contentions regarding the existence or enforceability 
of the arbitration agreement in question.  Accordingly, this 
appeal will be dismissed without prejudice. 
Dismissed. 
 
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