Title: LESLIE G CRAWFORD V DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL SERVICE

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 4, 2002  
LESLIE G. CRAWFORD,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 114930  
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL SERVICE, 
MEMBERS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE  
COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS, and DIRECTOR OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
PER CURIAM  
The plaintiff claims that he was improperly denied a  
promotion and that minority applicants with lower test scores  
were promoted.  He brought this action under 42 USC 1983,  
Const 1963, art 11, § 5, and the Michigan Civil Rights Act.  
The circuit court granted summary disposition for the  
defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We conclude:  
(1) the “safe harbor” provision of MCL 37.2210 does not bar  
the plaintiff’s constitutional or federal law claims,  
(2) plaintiff has standing to pursue those claims, and (3)  
further factual development is needed on the merits, making  
summary disposition inappropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10).  We  
remand the case to the Saginaw Circuit Court for further  
proceedings.  
I  
The plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he has worked for  
the Department of Corrections since 1987.  He began at the  
Thumb Correctional Facility as a Corrections Officer.  In  
1989, 
the 
plaintiff 
took 
a 
written 
examination 
for  
supervisors, and received a score of 99 out of 100, which gave  
him a “band 1" (highly qualified) rating.  The other levels  
are band 2 (qualified) and band 3 (unqualified).  The  
plaintiff began working as a sergeant in 1989 at the Standish  
Maximum Correctional Facility.  He held that position for  
about two years, and then spent almost two more years there in  
a lower job classification following a voluntary demotion.  
The plaintiff resumed his status as a sergeant in 1993,  
serving as a “CSS IV sergeant” at the Gus Harrison  
Correctional Facility in Adrian, which required a 218-mile  
daily round trip from his Clio home.  
In 
1993, 
the 
Department of Corrections opened the Saginaw  
Correctional Facility near plaintiff’s home, and he sought a  
sergeant’s position there.  Although he already worked at that  
rank 
in 
Adrian, 
the 
Department of Corrections required persons  
seeking lateral transfers to proceed as though they were  
seeking promotion to that position. The plaintiff therefore  
2  
 
took a “structured interview” in the spring of 1994.  The  
interview process involved a group of applicants being asked  
identical questions. The responses were then scored and the  
applicants were ranked.  
The Department of Corrections hired eleven persons into  
the 
sergeant 
positions 
at 
Saginaw. 
Three 
were  
African-Americans who had scored in the top eleven.  Four were  
African-Americans who did not score in the top eleven.  The  
plaintiff and three other white applicants who scored in the  
top eleven were not given positions.  
Of 
the 
four 
African-Americans who were hired as sergeants  
despite not placing in the top eleven, three had received  
written scores that placed them in band 2 on the written exam.  
Under “augmented certification” procedures employed by the  
Department of Corrections, members of protected groups  
(African-Americans, Hispanics, American Indians, Asians,  
Pacific Islanders, women, and handicapped persons) in band 2  
were treated as though they had scored in band 1, under  
certain circumstances.  In this instance, those applicants  
were moved into the set of persons eligible for promotion even  
though nonhandicapped white males in band 2 were never moved  
into band 1.  
In June 1996, the plaintiff filed suit against the Civil  
Service Commission, the Department of Civil Service, and the  
Department of Corrections and its director.  In count I of his  
amended complaint, the plaintiff asked for “prospective  
3  
 
relief” under 42 USC 1983—declaratory and injunctive relief  
that would cancel the department’s affirmative action plans  
and processes.  Count II sought injunctive and declaratory  
relief under Const 1963, art 11, § 5 (the Civil Service  
provision that prohibits appointments and promotions on the  
basis of racial considerations). Count III was framed under  
the Michigan Civil Rights Act,1 and once again asked for  
declaratory and injunctive relief.  In each count, the  
plaintiff also specifically requested an order that would  
place him at the Saginaw Correctional Facility in the disputed  
sergeant position.  
II  
In response to the first amended complaint, the  
defendants filed a motion for summary disposition, which the  
circuit court granted on August 12, 1997.  
The department’s affirmative action plan had been  
submitted to and approved by the Civil Rights Commission under  
MCL 37.2210, which provides:  
A person subject to this article may adopt and 
carry out a plan to eliminate present effects of 
past discriminatory practices or assure equal 
opportunity with respect to religion, race, color, 
national origin, or sex if the plan is filed with 
the commission under rules of the commission and  
the commission approves the plan.  
The circuit court held that that approval insulated the  
department from an action under the Civil Rights Act, and  
dismissed count III of the complaint.  The court granted  
1 MCL 37.2101 et seq.  
4  
 
 
summary disposition on plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 and Const 1963,  
art 11, § 5 claims on the ground that the plaintiff lacked  
standing.  Alternatively, the court found that those claims  
were moot because the department had ceased using the  
augmented certification lists as part of the hiring process in  
1997.2  
The plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals  
affirmed, with Judge Markman dissenting.3  The majority agreed  
with the circuit court that the Civil Rights Commission’s  
approval of the affirmative action plan protected the  
department from suit under the Civil Rights Act.  It also  
affirmed the circuit court’s conclusion that the plaintiff  
2 The circuit court also added the following comment:  
The Court would note parenthetically that even  
if the Court’s analysis of Defendant’s race  
discrimination claims in counts I and II are  
erroneous, Plaintiff has advanced no documentary 
proof that Defendant’s affirmative action plan has 
accomplished its goal and despite same continues to 
be utilized, as the trial court found to be 
unconstitutional in Cremonte v State Police, 
Livingston 
Circuit 
Court/Court 
of 
Claims  
#94-13442-NO; 
#95-15727, 
which 
is 
cited 
by 
Plaintiff in its supplemental authorities.  Thus, 
Plaintiff has not constructed a documentary record 
to demonstrate that the goals of affirmative action 
have been met, or exceeded, and the continued use 
of the plan would “unnecessarily trammel the rights 
of nonminority employees.”  Victorson [v Dep’t of  
Treasury, 439 Mich 131, 140; 482 NW2d 685 (1992)]. 
See also Conlin [v Blanchard, 745 F Supp 413, 423 
(ED Mich, 1990)] and Johnson v Transportation  
Agency, 480 US 616, 638; 107 S Ct 1442; 94 L Ed 2d 
615 (1987).  
3 
  Unpublished opinion per curiam issued, June 1, 1999 
(Docket No. 205603).  
5  
 
 
lacked standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief  
under 42 USC 1983 and Const 1963, art 11, § 5.4  
The plaintiff has filed an application for leave to  
appeal to this Court.  We held the application in abeyance for  
Lewis v Michigan, Docket No. 114241, and Sharp v City of  
Lansing, Docket No. 116171, which have now been decided.5  
III  
The appeal involves a decision on a motion for summary  
disposition, which we review de novo.  Hazle v Ford Motor Co,  
464 Mich 456, 461; 628 NW2d 515 (2001).  The critical issue in  
the case—whether the plaintiff has standing—is a question of  
law, which we also review de novo.  Lee v Macomb Co Bd of  
Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726, 734; 629 NW2d 900 (2001).  
IV  
The Sharp and Lewis decisions are not entirely  
dispositive of this case.  In Lewis, we held that the judicial  
branch could not create a money damages remedy for violation  
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Michigan Constitution.  
Const 1963, art 1, § 2. The applicability of that principle  
to this case is limited, however, since the plaintiff is not  
seeking the benefit of such a judicially created damages  
remedy. Rather, he primarily seeks injunctive relief.  
4 
 The Court declined to reach the circuit court’s  
alternative or “parenthetical” basis for granting summary 
disposition.  
5  Lewis v Michigan, 464 Mich 781; 629 NW2d 868 (2001);  
Sharp v City of Lansing, 464 Mich 792; 629 NW2d 873 (2001).  
6  
 
 
 
Our decision in Sharp focused on the statutory safe­
harbor defense of § 210 of the Civil Rights Act.  Sharp makes  
clear that an employer, like the department in this case, is  
insulated from liability under the Civil Rights Act where the  
affirmative action plan in question has been approved by the  
Civil Rights Commission.  However, in Sharp we emphasized that  
that statute does not protect the defendant against other  
claims:  
But our inquiry does not end there.  A state  
actor is involved.  Consequently, the protections 
provided directly by the state Equal Protection 
Clause come into play.  When an aggrieved plaintiff 
alleges that a public employer denied his equal 
protection rights in violation of art 1, § 2, the 
employer’s acts are subject to review under that 
constitutional 
provision. 
Injunctive 
and  
declaratory relief are available to restrain any 
acts found to violate the state Equal Protection 
Clause.  Hence, the mere existence of an approved 
affirmative action plan does not insulate a state 
employer, or its plan, from all judicial scrutiny. 
[464 Mich 800.]  
V  
The principal basis on which the Court of Appeals upheld  
the summary disposition was its conclusion that the plaintiff  
lacked standing. It found that there was no indication that  
plaintiff would face adverse treatment in the future:  
Here, the substance of plaintiff’s complaint 
deals only with his past rejection.  There has been  
no showing that plaintiff will continue to apply 
for the sergeant’s position at the SCF in the near 
future or otherwise.  Nor does plaintiff indicate 
that a particular position exists for which he may 
apply in the future where the DOC’s affirmative 
action policy would also apply.  Plaintiff also  
does not claim to be excluded from any further 
applicant pool or selection process in applying for 
any given appointment for which he is qualified.  
7  
 
In addition, even if plaintiff had alleged  
that he was going to apply for a sergeant’s 
position in the immediate future at a desirable 
location, there is no evidence that the DOC will 
again use the affirmative action plan and augmented 
certification lists.  To the contrary, on April 25, 
1997, the DOC discontinued its use of augmented 
certification lists.  Thus, if plaintiff attempts 
to apply for another position, the selection  
process 
will 
not 
use 
certification 
lists.  
Therefore, it is conjectural whether plaintiff will 
suffer any future injury because of the DOC’s 
affirmative action plan.  Accordingly, we find that  
plaintiff 
failed 
to 
demonstrate 
a 
real 
and  
immediate threat that he would again suffer similar 
injury in the future and that the relief sought 
would redress the future injury.  
As we explained in Lee, supra, the doctrine of standing  
has its origin in the requirement that the judiciary address  
only actual controversies:  
This position followed from the even earlier 
iteration of the standing doctrine by Justice 
Campbell in 1859 when, speaking for this Court, he 
said:  
“By the judicial power of courts is generally 
understood 
the 
power 
to 
hear 
and 
determine  
controversies 
between 
adverse 
parties, 
and  
questions in litigation.  [Daniels v People, 6 Mich 
381, 388 (1859) (emphasis added).]”  
Later, in Risser v Hoyt, 53 Mich 185, 193; 18 NW 
611 (1884), this Court explained:  
“The judicial power referred to is the  
authority to hear and decide controversies, and to 
make binding orders and judgments respecting them. 
[Emphasis added.]” [464 Mich 738.]  
In Lee, we endorsed the test articulated by the  
United States Supreme Court in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife,  
504 US 555, 560-561; 112 S Ct 2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992), in  
which the Court said:  
Over the years, our cases have established  
8  
 
  
that the irreducible constitutional minimum of  
standing contains three elements. 
First, the 
plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is 
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or 
imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” 
Second, there must be a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury 
has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the 
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . 
th[e] result [of] the independent action of some 
third party not before the court.” Third, it must 
be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” 
that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable 
decision.”  
We concluded in Lee:  
In our view, the Lujan test has the virtues of  
articulating clear criteria and establishing the 
burden of demonstrating these elements. Moreover, 
its three elements appear to us to be fundamental 
to standing; the United States Supreme Court  
described them as establishing the “irreducible 
constitutional minimum” of standing.  We agree. 
Accordingly, we now join Justice Cavanagh’s view 
[in Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n v Detroit, 449 Mich 
629, 651-652; 537 NW2d 436 (1995)] and adopt the 
Lujan test . . . . [464 Mich at 740.]  
Judge Markman, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, found  
the facts of this case to clearly come within the standing  
requirements. As he explained:  
With respect to count I, plaintiff sues for 
declaratory relief under 42 USC 1983, namely, a 
declaration that “said affirmative action policy, 
the current availability standard, the ‘augmented 
certification’ rule and the DOC’s affirmative  
action plans in force in 1994 and thereafter are 
unconstitutional, null and void . . . .”  Here, 
there 
is 
undisputably 
a 
“case 
of 
actual  
controversy,” in which the parties have adverse 
interests. 
Detroit Base Coalition v Dep’t of  
Social Services, 431 Mich 172, 191-192; 428 NW2d 
335 (1988); MCR 2.605(A).  Plaintiff asserts that  
the government has acted in a manner inconsistent 
with the federal and state constitutions in  
carrying outs its affirmative action programs, 
while defendant denies this.  
9  
  
* * *  
With respect to count II, plaintiff sues for 
injunctive relief under Const 1963, art 11, § 5. 
Such provision, in addition to mandating civil 
service promotions “exclusively on the basis of 
merit” and prohibiting decisions undertaken for 
“religious, racial or partisan purposes,” also 
provides that “[v]iolation of any of the provisions 
hereof may be restrained or observance compelled by 
injunctive or mandamus proceedings brought by any 
citizen of the state.” 
However broadly this 
provision is to be construed with regard to the 
rights of “any citizen,” it is certainly broad 
enough to encompass a “citizen” who has been 
subject to the application of an affirmative action 
plan—involving at least arguably a departure from 
the 
constitutional 
“merit” 
standard—and 
who  
otherwise has standing to pursue a statutory 
damages claim.  Plaintiff asserts that, but for the 
dilution of the “merit” standard by defendant’s 
affirmative action policies, he would have obtained 
the promotion which he has currently been denied.  
It may be that changes in the defendants’ policies will  
mean that it is not appropriate to award injunctive relief  
regarding future conduct.  However, we agree with Judge  
Markman that on its face this is a case in which the plaintiff  
has standing. He alleges that he was denied a job for which  
he was qualified and that he would have received but for  
illegal racial discrimination. 
This would constitute a  
concrete, actual injury directly traceable to the challenged  
action by the defendants.  He requests an order placing him in  
that position. 
Such an order would redress the injury  
claimed. Lujan, supra, 504 US 561. Whether he is entitled to  
such relief is a question that must await further proceedings  
in the circuit court.  But, under the principles set forth in  
our decisions, he has standing to bring this action.  
10  
 
 
This is particularly true of the plaintiff’s claim under  
Const 1963, art 11, § 5. That section establishes the Civil  
Service Commission, and includes the following provisions  
relevant to this case:  
No person shall be appointed to or promoted in 
the classified service who has not been certified  
by the commission as qualified for such appointment 
or 
promotion. 
No 
appointments, 
promotions, 
demotions or removals in the classified service  
shall be made for religious, racial or partisan 
considerations.  
* * *  
Violation of any of the provisions hereof may 
be restrained or observance compelled by injunctive 
or mandamus proceedings brought by any citizen of 
the state.  
That provision explicitly gives standing to any Michigan  
citizen to challenge alleged violations of art 11, § 5.  
Michigan Coalition of State Employee Unions v Civil Service  
Comm, 465 Mich 212, 219; 634 NW2d 692 (2001).  Thus, plaintiff  
certainly has standing to seek injunctive or mandamus relief  
against defendants’ alleged violations of art 11, § 5.  
VI  
Because 
it 
upheld the summary disposition on the standing  
issue, the Court of Appeals did not reach the circuit court’s  
alternative mootness theory. The circuit court had said:  
Similarly, this Court alternatively finds that 
Plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claim is moot.  “An issue  
is moot where circumstances render it impossible 
for the reviewing court to grant any relief.”  In  
re Wayne Election Comm, 150 Mich App 427, 432; 388 
NW2d 707 (1986), lv den 425 Mich 882 (1986). 
However, where the issue is of public significance 
and is likely to recur in the future yet evade 
judicial review, this Court will entertain the  
11  
  
 
case. Id.; In re Forfeiture of $53, 178 Mich App 
480, 485; 444 NW2d 182 (1989).  
In the present case, Plaintiff requests an 
injunction 
to 
enjoin 
Defendants 
from 
using, 
implementing, or enforcing an affirmative action 
plan.  Since Defendants have ceased using augmented 
certification lists as part of their hiring 
process, it is unlikely that this issue will recur 
in the future.  If it does, Plaintiff and others  
similarly situated have immediate recourse to  
declaratory and injunctive relief, and thus are not 
prejudiced by the court’s disposition herein.[6]  
However, 
this 
ignores the fact that the plaintiff’s claim  
seeks redress for the 1994 decision not to promote him.  
Further factual development may establish that he is entitled  
to relief on the ground that that decision was the product of  
illegal race discrimination, or it may establish that he is  
not entitled to such relief.  However, the fact that the  
Department of Corrections has apparently discontinued use of  
the policies that allegedly led to that employment decision  
does 
not 
render 
moot 
the controversy regarding the plaintiff’s  
entitlement for redress for the 1994 decision.  
The importance of the circuit court’s “parenthetical”  
statement, which the Court of Appeals also did not address, is  
not clear.  It appears to be an at least tentative decision by  
the circuit court that the plaintiff had not come forward with  
enough evidence to show that the department’s affirmative  
action plan was not still justified. Given the vagueness of  
the circuit court’s statement in that regard, we cannot  
6 
 The circuit court later said that the same mootness  
analysis applied to the claim under Const 1963, art 11, § 5.  
12  
 
 
consider sustaining summary disposition for the defendants on  
that ground.  Certainly on the materials presented, it cannot  
be said that there was no genuine issue of material fact on  
that question.  
VII  
The safe-harbor provision of MCL 37.2210 does not  
insulate 
the 
defendants 
from 
potential 
liability 
under 
federal  
law or the Michigan Constitution, and plaintiff has standing  
to challenge the Department of Corrections’ 1994 decision not  
to promote him.  Whether he is entitled to relief requires  
further 
factual 
development 
in 
the 
circuit 
court.  
Accordingly, the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the  
Saginaw Circuit Court are reversed, and the case is remanded  
to the circuit court for further proceedings.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, TAYLOR, and YOUNG, JJ.,  
concurred.  
KELLY, J., concurred in the result only.  
13  
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
LESLIE G. CRAWFORD,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 114930  
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL SERVICE, 
MEMBERS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE  
COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS, and DIRECTOR OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,  
Defendant-Appellees.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring).  
I concur in the decision to reverse the judgment of the  
Court of Appeals and to remand to the circuit court for  
further proceedings.  
I write separately because I continue to disagree with  
this Court’s adoption in Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464  
Mich 726; 629 NW2d 900 (2001) of the federal standing  
requirements from Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555;  
112 S Ct 2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992).  As I stated in my  
concurrence in Lee, I would not supplement Michigan’s  
traditional rules of standing by adopting the federal test.  
In this case, plaintiff has standing under Michigan’s  
traditional rules.  This Court stated in House Speaker v State  
Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 554; 495 NW2d 539 (1993),  
that 
“[s]tanding 
requires 
a 
demonstration 
that 
the 
plaintiff’s  
substantial interest will be detrimentally affected in a  
manner different from the citizenry at large.” Plaintiff was  
denied a job for which he was qualified in violation of the  
prohibition of race-based hiring in Const 1963, art 11, § 5.  
Plaintiff has thus clearly demonstrated that he has a  
substantial interest that has been detrimentally affected in  
a manner different from the citizenry at large.  
MARKMAN, J., took no part in the decision of this case.  
2