Title: Broderick W. Monlyn v. State Of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
____________ 
Nos. SC02-1729 & SC03-1757 
____________ 
BRODERICK W. MONLYN, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
_____________ 
BRODERICK W. MONLYN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAMES V. CROSBY, 
Respondent. 
 
[December 2, 2004] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Broderick Monlyn appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion 
for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and 
petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
 
 
- 2 - 
3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the lower 
court's order and deny Monlyn's habeas petition. 
I.  FACTS 
In October 1992 Monlyn escaped from prison and hid for two nights in his 
neighbor Alton Watson's barn.  On the morning of October 8, he confronted 
Watson, severely beat him, tied and gagged him, took his wallet, and escaped in 
his truck.  Monlyn hid Watson inside the barn, where he died of his wounds.  
Monlyn was convicted in November 1993 of first-degree murder, armed robbery, 
and armed kidnapping.  After a unanimous jury recommendation, he was sentenced 
to death.  The trial court found five aggravating factors, no statutory mitigation, 
and three nonstatutory mitigating factors.1  On appeal, this Court affirmed, denying 
relief on each of the thirteen issues raised.  Monlyn v. State, 705 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 
1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 957 (1998). 
Subsequently, Monlyn filed a timely motion and later an amended motion 
for postconviction relief.2  Following a Huff3 hearing, the trial court held an 
                                        
1.  The aggravating factors were as follows: (1) the murder was especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (2) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated; 
(3) Monlyn had a prior violent felony conviction; (4) the murder was committed in 
the course of an attempt to commit robbery or kidnapping; (5) the murder was 
committed for pecuniary gain.  The nonstatutory mitigating factors were Monlyn's 
affection for his family, his aid to others, and his good adjustment to prison life. 
2.  Monlyn raised twelve grounds, eight of  which asserted that counsel was 
ineffective for (1) failing to challenge a state witness's competency to testify, (2) 
 
 
- 3 - 
evidentiary hearing on selected issues.  The court then issued an order denying 
relief.  In this appeal from denial of his postconviction motion, Monlyn raises only 
the following issues:  (1) that counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to preserve for 
review the admissibility of habit testimony, (b) failing to elicit testimony regarding 
the robbery, (c) failing to advise appellant of his right to testify at the penalty 
phase, and (d) the cumulative effect of these errors; and (2) that the trial court erred 
by failing to rule on two of Monlyn's postconviction claims.  We address these 
issues in order and then address Monlyn's habeas petition. 
II.  INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court established a 
two-pronged standard for determining whether counsel provided legally ineffective 
assistance.  A defendant must point to specific acts or omissions of counsel that are 
                                                                                                                              
failing to object to habit testimony, (3) failing to elicit testimony regarding the 
victim's wallet, (4) failing to object to the admission of DNA evidence, (5) failing 
to call Monlyn's cellmate to testify, (6) failing to object to the prior violent felony 
aggravator, (7) failing to introduce Monlyn's remorse as mitigation in the penalty 
phase, and (8) failing to inform the defendant of his right to testify in the penalty 
phase.  He also claimed the following errors:  (9) denial of the right to adversarial 
testing regarding the pecuniary gain aggravator, (10) denial of the right to testify in 
the penalty phase, (11) unconstitutionality of the death sentence because jury 
instructions did not define aggravators with the requisite specificity, and (12) 
denial of the right to adversarial testing during the penalty phase. 
3.  See Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993) (holding that when a 
defendant sentenced to death files a postconviction motion, the judge must hold a 
hearing to determine whether any of the claims require an evidentiary hearing and 
to hear legal argument related to the motion). 
 
 
- 4 - 
"so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment."  Id. at 687.  Second, the defendant also must 
establish prejudice by "show[ing] that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different."  Id. at 694.  A reasonable probability is a "probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome."  Id.  Claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel present mixed questions of law and fact subject to plenary review.  
Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1045 (Fla. 2000).  Thus, this Court 
independently reviews the trial court's legal conclusions and defers to the trial 
court's findings of fact. 
A.  Monlyn's Claim Regarding Habit Testimony 
Monlyn first contends that counsel failed to object to inadmissible habit 
testimony and that but for this error he probably would not have been convicted of 
first-degree murder or robbery and would not have been sentenced to death.4  At 
trial, the victim's widow testified that although she did not know exactly how much 
money her husband had in his wallet on the day he was murdered, he probably had 
between two and three hundred dollars, including a one-hundred dollar bill he kept 
in a hidden compartment.  Monlyn claimed the wallet contained no cash.  We need 
                                        
4.  Monlyn raised the question of the admissibility of the habit testimony in 
his direct appeal, but because the claim was not preserved, we refused to address it.  
705 So. 2d at 4. 
 
 
- 5 - 
not determine whether the widow's testimony was erroneously admitted because 
we hold that Monlyn was not prejudiced by its admission. 
Even if the habit evidence were erroneously admitted, the trial court 
correctly found that the crime of robbery was established in this case.  Section 
812.13(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992), defines the crime of robbery as 
the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of 
larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either 
permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the 
money or other property when in the course of the taking there is the 
use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. 
The evidence at trial showed that after Monlyn beat the victim into submission, he 
took Watson's wallet with the intent to take any cash it might contain and then, 
after rifling through it, threw it away.  Thus, competent, substantial evidence 
supports the robbery conviction even if no cash was actually found in the victim's 
wallet.  Further, ample evidence other than the widow's testimony showed that the 
wallet did contain cash.  Witnesses testified that before the murder, including the 
evening before, Monlyn expressed a plan to rob Watson of his money and truck, 
and Monlyn testified that he took the wallet with the intent to rob Watson.  Monlyn 
only had a few dollars in quarters when he escaped from prison, but when he 
arrived in Lake City shortly after the murder, he admitted that he told his former 
girlfriend that he had bought the bicycle he was riding for $35 and had 
approximately $200.  When she asked him where he got the money, he responded 
 
 
- 6 - 
that "for times like this, you just improvise."  In addition, when he was arrested the 
day after the murder, he had more money on him than when he escaped from 
prison. 
Finally, Monlyn was charged with robbery in the alternative—currency or 
Watson's truck.  The evidence at trial showed his prior intent to steal the truck, and 
Monlyn admitted, and the evidence showed, that Monlyn took the truck and drove 
it from Madison to Lake City, where he abandoned it. 
B. Monlyn's Claim Regarding the Money in the Victim's Wallet 
Monlyn claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to elicit testimony at 
trial that after the victim's wallet was recovered from the crime scene, an FDLE 
analyst found a one-hundred dollar bill hidden inside it.  He also asserts error in 
counsel's failure to object to the argument that no money was found in the victim's 
wallet.  At the evidentiary hearing, Monlyn's trial counsel admitted that he knew 
about the hidden money but had overlooked it at trial.  He considered the amount 
of cash taken from the wallet to be of no significance in light of Monlyn's own 
testimony about the robbery.  We agree with the trial court that Monlyn failed to 
meet the Strickland requirements.  As we explained above, the robbery was 
complete in this case with Monlyn's taking of the victim's wallet.  In addition, 
ample evidence demonstrated that Monlyn did take cash from the victim.  
 
 
- 7 - 
Moreover, robbery was charged in the alternative, and the evidence shows that 
Monlyn robbed the victim of his truck. 
Monlyn next contends that the robbery conviction fails, along with the 
felony murder conviction, if it is based solely on his taking of the victim's truck.  
He relies on cases such as Knowles v. State, 632 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1993), where this 
Court struck the aggravator that the murder was committed in the course of a 
robbery because the taking of the vehicle in that case could have been an 
afterthought.  Unlike the situation in Knowles, however, Monlyn was charged with 
and convicted of robbery, and the evidence at trial showed that he planned to and 
did unlawfully rob the victim of his truck, abandoning it some fifty miles away.  
Therefore, Monlyn's robbery conviction, felony murder conviction, and the 
aggravating factor that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery are all 
supported by competent, substantial evidence. 
Finally, Monlyn claims that because a general verdict form was used, there 
is no way to determine on which theory the jury based its verdict, and that the 
robbery basis is invalid because there is insufficient evidence to support it.  This 
claim, too, fails.  First, as discussed above, the felony murder conviction rests 
firmly on either or both the robbery of the wallet or of the truck.  Second, his 
reliance on Fitzpatrick v. State, 859 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2003), is misplaced.  In 
Fitzpatrick we invoked the principle that "a general verdict is invalid when it rests 
 
 
- 8 - 
on multiple bases, one of which is legally inadequate" and reversed for new trial 
because the jury had been given an erroneous burglary instruction. Id. at 490 
(emphasis added) (citing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1957)).  
Thus, the verdict in the case could have been based on a legally unsupportable 
theory.  Monlyn's claim is different; he argues a factual or evidentiary 
insufficiency.  As we explained in Fitzpatrick, claims of legal and factual 
insufficiency are not synonymous, and reversal is not required in the latter 
instance.  859 So. 2d at 491 (citing Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 
(1991)).  Thus, even if competent, substantial evidence did not support robbery of 
the wallet, it does support robbery of the truck, and reversal is not required. And 
even if Monlyn's felony murder conviction were not supported by the robbery of 
the wallet or the truck, competent, substantial evidence supports the kidnapping 
conviction on which the felony murder charge was alternatively based.  See 
Morrison v. State, 818 So. 2d 432, 453-54 (Fla. 2002) (holding that even if 
evidence did not support premeditated murder and one of the felony murder bases, 
the conviction could be affirmed if one of the bases for felony murder was 
supported by competent, substantial evidence), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 957 (2002). 
C.  Monlyn's Claim Regarding His Right to Testify 
Monlyn claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that he 
could testify in his own behalf during the penalty phase.  At the evidentiary 
 
 
- 9 - 
hearing, Monlyn testified that although he testified in the guilt phase of trial, 
counsel did not inform him of this right to testify during the penalty phase.  He said 
that he would have testified that he was "sorry for what happened" and that he was 
just "in the wrong place at the wrong time."  Monlyn's trial counsel testified that he 
had no specific recollection of advising Monlyn.  At the time of the trial, however, 
counsel had practiced law for twenty years and had served as counsel to murder 
defendants in at least fifty cases, approximately ten of which were death penalty 
cases.  He said that his standard practice was to discuss the right with the client "in 
each and every case" and that the decision to testify was the client's.  Asked if he 
"probably" followed his practice in this case, counsel responded, "Not probably.  I 
did it."  The lower court found, as a matter of fact, that Monlyn was advised of his 
right to testify and that the proposed remorse testimony would not have resulted in 
a life recommendation. 
To establish this claim, Monlyn must meet both prongs of Strickland. 
Oisorio v. State, 676 So. 2d 1363, 1364-65 (Fla. 1996) (holding that to succeed in 
an ineffectiveness claim that trial counsel interfered with defendant's right to 
testify, defendant must meet both prongs of Strickland).  He has failed as to both.  
The trial court's finding, based on trial counsel's unswerving testimony, that 
counsel always advised clients of this right and that he did so in this case, is 
supported by competent, substantial evidence.  See Roberts v. State, 840 So. 2d 
 
 
- 10 - 
962, 973 (Fla. 2002) ("Findings on the credibility of evidence by a lower court are 
not overturned if supported by competent, substantial evidence."); accord 
Zakrzewski v. State, 866 So. 2d 688, 696 (Fla. 2003) (citing Roberts and, where 
defendant's and counsel's testimony conflicted, upholding the trial court finding 
that counsel was credible). 
Further, Monlyn has shown no prejudice.  Monlyn testified during the guilt 
phase that he did not intend to kill the victim and that he felt "bad" about it.  He 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was "just in the wrong place at the wrong 
time."  Such testimony does not reflect remorse and appears to be an attempt to 
minimize responsibility.  Further, Monlyn's testimony stands in direct 
contravention of the trial testimony presented to the jury that Monlyn planned to 
rob or kill the victim, or both, and Monlyn's own trial testimony that he chose to 
hide out in the victim's barn for two nights after he escaped from prison.  The 
evidence showed that he beat the victim with such severity—inflicting over thirty 
blunt injury wounds—that the victim died after Monlyn tied, gagged, and hid him.  
Monlyn left the victim to die without seeking any help.  The jury unanimously 
recommended death, and the trial court found five aggravating circumstances,  
including two of the most serious—that the crime was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel, and that it was cold, calculated, and premeditated.  See Larkins 
v. State, 739 So.2d 90, 95 (Fla.1999) (stating that "[HAC and CCP] are two of the 
 
 
- 11 - 
most serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme").  The trial 
court found no statutory mitigation and only three nonstatutory mitigating factors.  
Thus, no reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the penalty phase would 
have been different had Monlyn testified. 
D. Monlyn's Claim of Cumulative Error 
Because Monlyn has not satisfied the Strickland standard as to the foregoing 
claims, he has not demonstrated any cumulative error or prejudice.  See Griffin v. 
State, 866 So. 2d 1, 22 (Fla. 2003) ("[W]here individual claims of error alleged are 
either procedurally barred or without merit, the claim of cumulative error must 
fail."); Vining v. State, 827 So. 2d 201, 219 (Fla. 2002) ("Because the alleged 
individual errors are without merit, the contention of cumulative error is similarly 
without merit."). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO RULE 
Monlyn contends that because the trial court failed to rule on two of his 
claims, we must remand to the trial court for their consideration.  The record shows 
that the parties agreed that the issues could be decided without an evidentiary 
hearing and that the lower court failed to rule on them.  Remand, however, is not 
necessary in this case because both claims are procedurally barred. 
 
 
- 12 - 
In one claim Monlyn alleged that the jury was improperly instructed on the 
pecuniary gain aggravator.  This claim should have been raised on direct appeal.  
See State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. 1991) (explaining that jury 
instructions "are subject to the contemporaneous objection rule, and, absent an 
objection at trial, can be raised on appeal only if fundamental error occurred").   In 
his other claim, Monlyn raised the same issue regarding the instruction on the CCP 
aggravator and his requested instruction on the improper doubling of two 
aggravators that he raised in his direct appeal.  Thus, this Court already has 
expressly addressed the claims and denied relief.  705 So. 2d at 5-6.  Accordingly, 
because both claims are legally barred, we find no need to remand for the trial 
court to consider them. 
IV.  THE HABEAS PETITION 
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Monlyn argues that under Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Florida's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional 
and that the Ring decision applies retroactively to him.  In Ring, the Court held 
that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, the jury must find the facts that 
would render the defendant eligible for the death penalty.  Monlyn was convicted 
in 1993 of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and armed kidnapping, and the jury 
unanimously recommended the death penalty. 
 
 
- 13 - 
We have previously rejected each of the claims Monlyn raises in his petition.  
First, we have held that under Ring, the prior violent felony aggravator is exempt 
from Ring.  See, e.g., Belcher v. State, 851 So. 2d 678, 685 (Fla.) (holding the 
prior violent felony aggravator finding is exempt from Ring), cert. denied, 124 S. 
Ct. 816 (2003).  In addition, another aggravating factor in this case was that the 
murder was committed in the course of a robbery or kidnapping, and the jury 
convicted Monlyn of both robbery and kidnapping during the guilt phase.  See 
Fennie v. State, 855 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2003) (denying postconviction Ring claim 
and noting that jury unanimously recommended death and one aggravator was that 
murder was committed in course of a kidnapping where defendant was also 
convicted of kidnapping), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1877 (2004).  We also have held 
that the jury is not required unanimously to specify each aggravator found.  Duest 
v. State, 855 So. 2d 33, 48-49 (Fla. 2003) (rejecting a claim that the jury must 
unanimously specify each aggravator found), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2023 (2004).  
Finally, because the jury in Monlyn's case returned a unanimous recommendation 
of death, he lacks standing to assert any error regarding lack of jury unanimity.  
See Belcher, 851 So. 2d at 685 (rejecting the claim that the death penalty statute's 
failure to require that the jury render a unanimous, binding sentencing 
recommendation violates Ring). 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 
- 14 - 
In light of the foregoing analysis, we affirm the lower court's denial of 
postconviction relief and deny Monlyn's petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
It is so ordered. 
 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
CANTERO, J., concurs with an opinion, in which WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, C.J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which QUINCE, J., 
concurs. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
CANTERO, J., concurring. 
I concur in the majority opinion.  I would specifically address, however, 
Monlyn's contention that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), applies retroactively.  I would hold, for the reasons 
stated in my specially concurring opinion in Windom v. State, 29 Fla. L. Weekly 
S191 (Fla. May 6, 2004), that it does not.   
The United States Supreme Court  recently addressed the question of Ring's 
retroactivity in federal habeas proceedings.  In Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 
2519 (2004), the Court examined its holding in Ring under the federal retroactivity 
 
 
- 15 - 
analysis outlined in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).5  The Court held that the 
rule announced in Ring was procedural—not substantive—and was not a 
"watershed" rule implicating the fundamental fairness or accuracy of the criminal 
proceeding such that retroactive application to final cases was required.  
Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2526.  The Court emphasized that Ring is not about 
whether judges or juries are more accurate factfinders.  Rather, the issue in Ring 
was a simple question of what procedure is required by the Sixth Amendment—
i.e., who decides.  Summerlin, 124 S.Ct. at 2525.  The Court also compared its 
nonretroactivity decision regarding Ring with its decision in DeStefano v. Woods, 
392 U.S. 631 (1968), in the which the Court refused retroactively to apply Duncan 
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which held that the right to jury trial guaranteed 
in the Sixth Amendment applied to the States.  The Court concluded that "[i]f 
under DeStefano a trial held entirely without a jury was not impermissibly 
inaccurate, it is hard to see how a trial in which a judge finds only aggravating 
factors could be."  Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2526.  Thus, although the Supreme 
Court uses a different retroactivity analysis, its conclusion that the new rule 
announced in Ring does not call into question the fairness of penalty phase 
proceedings in death penalty cases is persuasive. 
                                        
5.  Although Teague was a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court adopted its 
approach to retroactivity in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 
 
- 16 - 
I recognize that this Court is not bound by the Supreme Court's 
nonretroactivity decision in Summerlin.  That decision is binding only on federal 
courts in applying the federal habeas corpus statute.  See, e.g., Cowell v. Leapley, 
458 N.W.2d 514, 517 (S.D. 1990) (stating that the federal government controls 
access to habeas corpus and each state controls how it provides access to 
postconviction relief); Daniels v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487, 489 (Ind. 1990) (holdi
ng 
that the new rule announced in a U.S. Supreme Court case did not apply 
retroactively in state postconviction cases).  Nevertheless, because the Supreme 
Court has plainly spoken on the issue of Ring's retroactivity and because Monlyn 
raises this issue, as a Court we should finally decide whether Ring applies 
retroactively in Florida. 
This case also provides us with the opportunity directly to address whether 
this Court should continue to use the retroactivity analysis it announced in Witt v. 
State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980), or whether we should instead adopt the 
Teague analysis employed by the federal courts.  In response to Monlyn's 
contention that Ring should be applied retroactively to final cases, the State not 
only argued against Ring's retroactivity, but also urged this Court to abandon the 
Witt retroactivity analysis in favor of Teague.  In my opinion in Windom, I 
analyzed the question under both Witt and Teague and concluded that under either 
standard Ring is not retroactive.  I also urged the Court to adopt the Teague 
 
 
- 17 - 
analysis with respect to the constitutional decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court.  In accordance with my Windom concurrence, therefore, I would hold both 
that Ring does not apply retroactively and that the Teague retroactivity analysis 
applies to United States Supreme Court cases adopting new constitutional rules. 
WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
 
 
PARIENTE, C.J., specially concurring. 
 
I concur in the majority opinion in all respects, including its discussion of 
Monlyn’s claim pursuant to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  Further, I 
conclude that in light of the United States Supreme Court decision in Schriro v. 
Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004), Ring’s holding that a jury rather than a judge 
must find a death-qualifying aggravating circumstance does not apply retroactively 
to cases on postconviction review under the test of Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 
(Fla. 1980).   
As a United States Supreme Court decision firmly grounded in the 
constitutional right of trial by jury, Ring meets the first two criteria for retroactive 
application under Witt.  On the remaining consideration, whether the decision has 
“fundamental significance,” this Court stated in Witt that “only major 
constitutional changes of law will be cognizable in [collateral proceedings].”  Id. at 
929.  The Court contrasted “jurisprudential upheavals” warranting retroactivity 
 
 
- 18 - 
with “evolutionary refinements in the criminal law [that afford] new or different 
standards for the admissibility of evidence, for procedural fairness, for 
proportionality review of capital cases, and for other like matters.  Emergent rights 
in these categories, or the retraction of former rights of this genre, do not compel 
an abridgement of the finality of judgments.”  Id.  
In determining whether Ring is retroactive under Witt, I would defer to the 
United States Supreme Court's characterization of Ring in Summerlin.  The Court 
in Summerlin held that Ring is not retroactive under the test of Teague v. Lane, 
489 U.S. 288 (1989).  In reaching that conclusion, the Court stated that Ring 
affects procedural rather than substantive rights, because it regulates the manner in 
which culpability is determined rather than alter the range of conduct or class of 
persons that the law punishes.  See Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2523.  The Court also 
determined that Ring does not change the elements of the offense of murder 
punishable by death, and does not greatly enhance the fairness or accuracy of death 
penalty proceedings.  See id. at 2524-26.  Regarding the latter concern, the Court 
noted that because the burden of proof in Arizona for aggravating factors found by 
the trial court was “beyond a reasonable doubt,” the  requirement of Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that facts authorizing an increased sentence be 
found beyond a reasonable doubt was not in issue in Ring.  See Summerlin, 124 S. 
Ct. at 2522 n.1.  Florida law also requires that aggravating factors in death penalty 
 
 
- 19 - 
cases be established beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Rogers v. State, 783 So. 2d 
980, 992-93 (Fla. 2001). 
Applying Witt’s retroactivity test to the United States Supreme Court's 
observations in Summerlin, I conclude that Ring is not among the “fundamental 
and constitutional law changes which cast serious doubt on the veracity or integrity 
of the original trial proceeding.”  Witt, 387 So. 2d at 929.  As a decision that bears 
only on the procedure in which eligibility for the death penalty is determined 
without altering the burden of proof or otherwise increasing the accuracy or 
fairness of the proceedings, Ring is an evolutionary refinement in capital 
jurisprudence. 
 
Because I reach this conclusion under Florida’s longstanding Witt test, I 
would not address whether this Court should instead adopt the Teague standard for 
determining the retroactivity of United States Supreme Court decisions, as Justice 
Cantero urges.   
QUINCE, J., concurs. 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Madison County,  
E. Vernon Douglas, Judge - Case No. 92-147-CF 
and an Original Proceedings – Habeas Corpus 
 
Baya Harrison, III, Monticello, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
 
- 20 - 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Charmaine M. Millsaps and Carolyn M. 
Snurkowski, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent