Title: Greene Cty. Agricultural Soc. v. Liming

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Greene Cty. Agricultural Soc. v. Liming, 89 Ohio St.3d 551, 2000-Ohio-486.] 
 
 
 
 
 
GREENE COUNTY AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY, APPELLEE, v. LIMING ET AL., 
APPELLANTS; MANGAN, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Greene Cty. Agricultural Soc. v. Liming (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 551.] 
Torts — Political subdivision tort liability — County agricultural society is a 
political subdivision pursuant to R.C. 2744.01(F) — Conducting livestock 
competition at county fair by county agricultural society is a proprietary 
function pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744. 
1.  A county agricultural society is a political subdivision pursuant to R.C. 
2744.01(F). 
2.  The conducting of a livestock competition at a county fair by a county 
agricultural society is a proprietary function pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744. 
(No. 99-1755 — Submitted May 23, 2000 — Decided September 6, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Greene County, No. 98-CA-119. 
 
This case centers on the showing of a hog, named “Big Fat,” by then 
seventeen-year-old Laura Liming at the 1996 Greene County Fair.  Laura Liming 
entered Big Fat in the hog show at the July 1996 fair as part of a 4-H Club project.  
Big Fat was named “Reserve Grand Champion,” the second highest award for a 
hog at the show. 
 
 
2
 
After the conclusion of the fair, appellee Larry Mangan, the president of 
appellee Greene County Agricultural Society (“the Society”), began an 
investigation based on information he received indicating that Big Fat may not 
have been eligible to compete in the hog show.  Specifically, Mangan investigated 
whether Laura Liming had violated an exhibition rule that required that all hogs 
exhibited at the fair be purchased prior to May 15, 1996. 
 
Mangan’s investigation raised suspicions that Big Fat may have been the 
same hog that was shown under a different name by a different person at the 
Clinton County Fair earlier in that summer of 1996, and that Laura Liming may 
have purchased the hog after its showing at the Clinton County Fair.  Mangan’s 
investigation revealed that according to the rules of the Clinton County Fair, hogs 
were required to be slaughtered after that fair’s hog show.  Mangan became 
convinced that the hog in question, after its showing at the Clinton County Fair, 
was sold to Laura Liming rather than being slaughtered.  Subsequently, it appears 
that the Society adopted the report of its Livestock Committee, concluding at a 
meeting on February 24, 1997, that Laura Liming had violated the fair’s rules by 
purchasing Big Fat after the May 15 purchase deadline and showing the hog at the 
fair.1 
 
The Society imposed sanctions against appellants Laura Liming and her 
parents James and Diane Liming for their alleged roles in the incident.  The 
 
 
3
Society also sanctioned appellant Kenneth Smith, who allegedly had facilitated the 
sale of Big Fat to Laura Liming and to whom hogs at the Clinton County Fair were 
consigned for slaughter.  The sanctions included ordering Laura Liming to return 
all ribbons, trophies, and money received above the consignment price resulting 
from her exhibition of Big Fat; barring the immediate family of James Liming 
from participating in the 1997, 1998, and 1999 Greene County Fairs; barring the 
immediate family of Kenneth Smith from participating in the 1997, 1998, and 1999 
Greene County Fairs; and declaring that no individual or group associated with 
Kenneth Smith would be awarded consignment of 4-H animals shown at the 
Greene County Fair. 
 
On April 30, 1997, the Society filed suit against the Limings and Smith in 
the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County in an apparent attempt to enforce 
the sanctions.  The Society also sought compensatory and punitive damages. 
 
On July 17, 1997, the Limings and Smith filed an answer, a counterclaim 
against the Society, and a third-party complaint against Mangan and others, 
asserting that no violation of the fair’s rules had taken place and that the Society 
and Mangan had violated their due-process rights and had defamed them in articles 
about the incident published in the Xenia Daily Gazette.  The Limings and Smith 
sought compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. 
 
 
4
 
The Limings and Smith moved for summary judgment on July 31, 1998, as 
to the claims in the Society’s complaint, arguing that the sanctions could not be 
enforced because the Society had allegedly not followed its internal procedures in 
considering the matter.  On August 30, 1998, the Society and Mangan moved for 
summary judgment on the claims raised against them in the counterclaim and 
third-party complaint, arguing that pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
set forth in R.C. Chapter 2744, the Limings and Smith could not recover on any of 
their claims. 
 
On September 30, 1998, in two separate decisions, the trial court ruled on 
the summary judgment motions that had been filed by each side.  In one decision, 
the trial court ruled that the Society was a political subdivision that had engaged in 
a governmental function, and so found the Society immune pursuant to R.C. 
Chapter 2744 from all of the counterclaims put forth by the Limings and Smith, 
and therefore entitled to summary judgment on those claims.  Also in that decision, 
the trial court granted summary judgment to Mangan on the claims raised against 
him in the third-party complaint, finding that Mangan was entitled to immunity for 
the claims raised against him individually.  The trial court certified its decision 
pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B). 
 
In its other decision, the trial court overruled the motion for summary 
judgment filed by the Limings and Smith, determining that genuine issues of 
 
 
5
material fact existed as to the propriety of the Society’s investigation and 
sanctions.  The trial court set a date for trial on the claims raised in the Society’s 
complaint. 
 
The Limings and Smith appealed to the Court of Appeals for Greene County 
from both decisions of the trial court.  The court of appeals determined that only 
the trial court’s summary judgment finding the Society and Mangan to be immune 
was a final appealable order, and that the other decision denying summary 
judgment to the Limings and Smith was not.2  Therefore, in its opinion, the court of 
appeals addressed only the issues relating to the immunity of the Society and 
Mangan.  The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court on those 
issues. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Freund, Freeze & Arnold, Neil F. Freund and Lynnette Pisone Ballato, for 
appellees Greene County Agricultural Society and Larry T. Mangan. 
 
David M. Deutsch Co., L.P.A., and David M. Deutsch, for appellants. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Barbara A. Servé and Peter M. 
Thomas, Assistant Attorneys General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio 
Department of Agriculture. 
 
 
6
 
King & Blair and James F. Blair, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio 
Fair Managers Association. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  The sole issue presented for review is whether 
the Society is entitled to immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744, so that summary 
judgment was appropriate as a matter of law.3  In the circumstances of this case, 
this issue has two components:  (1) Is the Society a political subdivision for 
purposes of R.C. Chapter 2744? and (2) If the answer to the first question is yes, 
was the Society engaged in a governmental function in performing the actions at 
issue?  For the reasons that follow, we find that the Society is not immune from 
suit, and accordingly reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
I 
 
Since R.C. Chapter 2744 deals with Political Subdivision Tort Liability, the 
first question we must answer is whether the Society, as a county agricultural 
society, is a “political subdivision.”  If, as appellants contend, the Society is not a 
political subdivision, then R.C. Chapter 2744 does not apply to it, it is not immune 
from suit for that reason, and our inquiry is at an end.  If, on the other hand, the 
Society is a political subdivision, then we must further consider, as the second 
component of our inquiry, how other provisions of R.C. Chapter 2744 apply to this 
case. 
 
 
7
 
R.C. 2744.01(F) defines a “political subdivision” as “a municipal 
corporation, township, county, school district, or other body corporate and politic 
responsible for governmental activities in a geographic area smaller than that of the 
state.”  R.C. 2744.01(F) then goes on to set forth a nonexhaustive list of particular 
bodies that fall within the above definition.  County agricultural societies are not 
specifically mentioned in the statute. 
 
Since the Society does not fall within any of the other groups listed in R.C. 
2744.01(F), for it to be a political subdivision it must be a “body corporate and 
politic responsible for governmental activities.”  It is clear that a county 
agricultural society exists “in a geographic area smaller than that of the state,” so 
that statutory requirement is easily met. 
 
R.C. Chapter 1711 provides for the establishment, organization, and 
functioning of county agricultural societies.  R.C. 1711.13 explicitly provides that 
“[c]ounty agricultural societies are hereby declared bodies corporate and politic.”  
Therefore, if county agricultural societies are “responsible for governmental 
activities,” then all requirements of R.C. 2744.01(F) are met to qualify the Society 
for status as a political subdivision. 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary (7 Ed.1999) 167, defines “body politic” as “[a] 
group of people regarded in a political (rather than private) sense and organized 
under a single governmental authority.” 
 
 
8
 
This exact issue of whether a county agricultural society is a political 
subdivision as contemplated in R.C. 2744.01(F) was considered by the Attorney 
General of Ohio in 1988 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 88-034.  The issue arose in the 
context of considering whether a county agricultural society was a political 
subdivision that could establish and maintain a self-insurance program under R.C. 
2744.08(A)(2)(a) to cover tort liability claims against it and whether a county 
agricultural society was a political subdivision that could join with other political 
subdivisions in establishing and maintaining a joint self-insurance pool under R.C. 
2744.081(A) to pay tort judgments, settlements, and the like relating to acts or 
omissions of the political subdivision or its employees.  In order to undertake those 
actions, a county agricultural society first had to qualify as a political subdivision 
pursuant to R.C. 2744.01(F). 
 
In that opinion, the Attorney General determined that a county agricultural 
society is a political subdivision and so could undertake the insurance actions at 
issue relating to tort claims against it.  Similarly to the framework of the discussion 
we have set out above, the Attorney General stated that the only requirement of 
R.C. 2744.01(F) that required a “detailed analysis” was whether a county 
agricultural society is responsible for governmental activities. 
 
The Attorney General acknowledged that “[c]ertainly, county agricultural 
societies possess some characteristics that suggest that their activities are not 
 
 
9
governmental.”  However, the Attorney General nevertheless concluded that 
county agricultural societies are responsible for governmental activities, and 
therefore are political subdivisions under R.C. 2744.01(F). 
 
The Attorney General reasoned that “the primary purpose of county 
agricultural societies has repeatedly been identified as education.”  The Attorney 
General quoted from State ex rel. Leaverton v. Kerns (1922), 104 Ohio St. 550, 
554-555, 136 N.E. 217, 218:  “[A]n agricultural fair is * * * a public institution 
designed for public instruction, the advancement of learning and the dissemination 
of useful knowledge.”  The Attorney General also pointed out that under R.C. 
1711.10, the Director of Agriculture may withhold funds for a particular county 
agricultural society if it is shown that the fair put on by that agricultural society 
was not of sufficient educational value to justify the expenditure of those funds.  
The Attorney General further pointed out that “the promotion of educational goals 
traditionally has been regarded as an appropriate governmental activity,” citing as 
support for that statement Tilton v. Richardson (1971), 403 U.S. 672, 91 S.Ct. 
2091, 29 L.Ed.2d 790; Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Kansas City (1970), 397 
U.S. 50, 90 S.Ct. 791, 25 L.Ed.2d 45; Green v. Thomas (1930), 37 Ohio App. 489, 
175 N.E. 226; and Meyer v. Cleveland (1930), 35 Ohio App. 20, 171 N.E. 606. 
 
We are in agreement with the court of appeals that appellants’ arguments 
based on Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities v. 
 
 
10
Professionals Guild of Ohio (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 147, 545 N.E.2d 1260, are not 
on point.  The issue in that case was whether the county board was a “person” for 
purposes of R.C. 119.01(F) who could appeal a decision of the State Employment 
Relations Board.  The issue was not whether the county board was a political 
subdivision. 
 
We see no reason to disagree with the conclusion reached by the Attorney 
General in 1988 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 88-034 on this point, the first component 
of our inquiry.4  We hold that a county agricultural society is a political subdivision 
pursuant to R.C. 2744.01(F).  We thus agree with the decision of the court of 
appeals upholding the ruling of the trial court on this question. 
II 
 
Having found that the Society is a political subdivision, we must ask, as the 
next component of our inquiry, whether the Society is entitled to immunity under 
the provisions of R.C. Chapter 2744. 
 
R.C. Chapter 2744 sets out the method of analysis, which can be viewed as 
involving three tiers, for determining a political subdivision’s immunity from 
liability.  First, R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) sets out a general rule that political 
subdivisions are not liable in damages.  In setting out this rule, R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) 
classifies the functions of political subdivisions into governmental and proprietary 
functions and states that the general rule of immunity is not absolute, but is limited 
 
 
11
by the provisions of R.C. 2744.02(B), which details when a political subdivision is 
not immune.  Thus, the relevant point of analysis (the second tier) then becomes 
whether any of the exceptions in R.C. 2744.02(B) apply.  Furthermore, if any of 
R.C. 2744.02(B)’s exceptions are found to apply, a consideration of the application 
of R.C. 2744.03 becomes relevant, as the third tier of analysis.5  See Cater v. 
Cleveland (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 24, 28, 697 N.E.2d 610, 614-615.  See, also, Harp 
v. Cleveland Hts. (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 506, 509, 721 N.E.2d 1020, 1023; Hill v. 
Urbana (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 130, 133, 679 N.E.2d 1109, 1112. 
 
The exception in R.C. 2744.02(B) implicated by this case that potentially 
defeats the Society’s immunity under the analysis discussed above is R.C. 
2744.02(B)(2), which provides that political subdivisions are liable for “negligent 
performance of acts by their employees with respect to proprietary functions.”  
Appellants claim that the Society was engaged in proprietary functions when it 
conducted the hog show and the investigation of the alleged Big Fat incident at 
issue, so that the Society is not immune, and the judgment of the court of appeals 
should be reversed.  Appellees, on the other hand, claim that the Society engaged 
in governmental functions.  If appellees are correct, then R.C. 2744.02(B)(2)’s 
exception to immunity does not apply, R.C. 2744.02(A)(1)’s general rule of 
immunity is not defeated, and we must affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
 
12
 
The mutually exclusive definitions of “governmental function” and 
“proprietary function” are set out in R.C. 2744.01.  R.C. 2744.01(C)(2) lists 
specific functions expressly designated as governmental functions, and R.C. 
2744.01(G)(2) lists specific functions that are expressly designated as proprietary 
functions.  The activities of the Society at issue in the present case do not fall 
within either R.C. 2744.01(C)(2) or 2744.01(G)(2).  Therefore, to classify the 
Society’s activities, we look to R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)’s definition of “governmental 
function,” which we set out below.  See, also, R.C. 2744.01(G)(1)(b), which for 
our inquiry here defines a “proprietary function” as a function that “promotes or 
preserves the public peace, health, safety, or welfare and that involves activities 
that are customarily engaged in by nongovernmental persons.” 
 
R.C. 2744.01(C)(1) provides that a governmental function is one that 
satisfies any of the following tests: 
 
“(a) A function that is imposed upon the state as an obligation of sovereignty 
and that is performed by a political subdivision voluntarily or pursuant to 
legislative requirement; 
 
“(b) A function that is for the common good of all citizens of the state; 
 
“(c) A function that promotes or preserves the public peace, health, safety or 
welfare [and] that involves activities that are not engaged in or not customarily 
engaged in by nongovernmental persons * * *.” 
 
 
13
 
R.C. Chapter 2744 was the General Assembly’s response to judicial 
abolishment of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  See Franks v. Lopez (1994), 
69 Ohio St.3d 345, 347, 632 N.E.2d 502, 504.  In making the distinction between 
governmental functions and proprietary functions a key component of R.C. 
Chapter 2744 when it was enacted in 1985, the General Assembly has chosen to 
embrace a concept that was developed through the case law of this court prior to 
the adoption of that chapter, even though the concept has been criticized by 
numerous judges and commentators.6  See Comment, The Ohio Political 
Subdivision Tort Liability Act:  A Legislative Response to the Judicial 
Abolishment of Sovereign Immunity (1986), 55 U.Cin.L.Rev. 501, 505-507, 510-
521.  Those earlier cases can be instructive in illustrating the rationale behind the 
distinction. 
 
For example, in Wooster v. Arbenz (1927), 116 Ohio St. 281, 284-285, 156 
N.E. 210, 211-212, a case considering the immunity of a municipality, this court 
stated: 
 
“In performing those duties which are imposed upon the state as obligations 
of sovereignty, such as protection from crime, or fires, or contagion, or preserving 
the peace and health of citizens and protecting their property, * * * the function is 
governmental, and if the municipality undertakes the performance of those 
functions, whether voluntarily or by legislative imposition, the municipality 
 
 
14
becomes an arm of sovereignty and a governmental agency and is entitled to * * * 
immunity * * *.  If, on the other hand, there is no obligation on the part of the 
municipality to perform them, but it does in fact do so for the comfort and 
convenience of its citizens * * * and the city has an election whether to do or omit 
to do those acts, the function is private and proprietary. 
 
“Another familiar test is whether the act is for the common good of all the 
people of the state, or whether it relates to special corporate benefit or profit.” 
 
The Wooster court expounded that “[i]f the function being exercised is 
proprietary and in pursuit of private and corporate duties, for the particular benefit 
of the [municipal] corporation and its inhabitants, as distinguished from those 
things in which the whole state has an interest, the city is liable.”  116 Ohio St. at 
284, 156 N.E. at 211. 
 
When a political subdivision’s acts go beyond governmental functions (and 
when it acts in a proprietary nature) there is little justification for affording 
immunity to that political subdivision.  “Having entered into activities ordinarily 
reserved to the field of private enterprise, a [political subdivision] should be held to 
the same responsibilities and liabilities as are private citizens.”  Schenkolewski v. 
Cleveland Metroparks Sys. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 31, 37, 21 O.O.3d 19, 24, 426 
N.E.2d 784, 788. 
 
 
15
 
With the above considerations in mind, we consider the application of R.C. 
2744.01(C)(1). 
 
We summarily agree with the court of appeals’ determination that the 
Society’s activities implicated in this case do not fall within R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(a).  
The functions at issue clearly are not ones “imposed upon the state as an obligation 
of sovereignty.” 
 
As to R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(b), the trial court based its decision finding the 
Society immune on this provision, determining that the Society’s activities at issue 
here were “for the common good of all citizens of the state.”  The court of appeals 
expressed reservations about the trial court’s conclusion in this regard, but declined 
to definitively rule on the propriety of the trial court’s determination, because the 
court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling on other grounds. 
 
We specifically find that the Society’s activities do not fall within R.C. 
2744.01(C)(1)(b).  We agree with the concern voiced by the court of appeals that 
the trial court’s definition of what is for the common good of all citizens of the 
state is too broad because it would subsume the definition of a governmental 
function found in R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(c).  As aptly stated by the court of appeals, 
“Any activity that promotes or preserves the public peace, health, safety, and 
welfare would also fall within a broad definition of what is for the common good 
of all citizens of the state, thus obscuring the legislature’s purpose in crafting a 
 
 
16
distinction between activities engaged in or customarily engaged in by 
nongovernment persons and those that are not.  See R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(c) and 
(G)(1)(b).”  When an appropriately narrow definition of “for the common good of 
all citizens” is applied, the Society’s activities do not fall within R.C. 
2744.01(C)(1)(b).  The activities at issue benefit only some of the citizens of the 
state, not all citizens. 
 
The pivotal provision to construe in determining whether the Society 
engaged in governmental or proprietary functions is R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(c).  The 
court of appeals concluded that the Society’s activities at issue fall within R.C. 
2744.01(C)(1)(c)’s definition of a “governmental function.”  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court of appeals reasoned that a county fair promotes the public 
welfare by educating the public about agriculture and other matters, and further 
reasoned that a livestock competition is an activity not engaged in or not 
customarily engaged in by nongovernmental persons. 
 
As we acknowledged above in considering whether the Society is a political 
subdivision, there is an educational component to the Society’s activities.  See 
Leaverton, 104 Ohio St. at 554-555, 136 N.E. at 218.  This educational component 
may perhaps be sufficient to support a finding that the activities at issue promote 
the public welfare.  However, R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(c) is phrased in the conjunctive, 
so that the obvious question that must be decided is whether the Society’s activities 
 
 
17
at issue can be classified as governmental functions because they involve 
“activities that are not engaged in or not customarily engaged in by 
nongovernmental persons.”  R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(c).  See, also, R.C. 
2744.01(G)(1)(b) (proprietary function involves “activities that are customarily 
engaged in by nongovernmental persons”). 
 
In resolving this question, we must first recognize that a central 
consideration within the structure of R.C. Chapter 2744 is the premise that some 
activities of a political subdivision may be governmental functions, while some 
other activities are not.  Thus, the issue here is not whether holding a county fair is 
a governmental function; rather, it is the more specific question of whether 
conducting the hog show at the county fair and conducting the investigation into 
the allegations of irregularity surrounding the entry of Big Fat in that hog show are 
governmental functions. 
 
It is apparent to us that even though conducting a county fair may be an 
activity not customarily engaged in by nongovernmental persons, conducting a 
livestock competition is an activity customarily engaged in by nongovernmental 
persons.  Any organization, whether private or public, can hold a competition of 
this type.  The consideration that many such competitions are conducted within 
county fairs cannot change the fact that there is nothing inherently governmental 
about them.  In this situation, educational value alone is not enough to convert 
 
 
18
what otherwise would not be a governmental function into something that is a 
governmental function.  We see no reason to distinguish a livestock competition at 
a county fair from any other similar competition, such as a livestock competition 
held elsewhere than at a county fair, or a dog or cat show, or an art show, or a chili 
cook-off, or a beauty pageant, or a car show. 
 
In a situation such as the present case, when the political subdivision at issue 
is not one of the bodies specifically mentioned within R.C. 2744.01(F), the 
exceptions to immunity of R.C. 2744.02(B) should be construed in a way that leads 
to a finding of immunity for only the central core functions of the political 
subdivision.  If the exceptions in R.C. 2744.02(B) are interpreted too expansively 
in this situation, the balance of competing interests reflected in the structure of 
R.C. Chapter 2744 is undermined. 
 
Unlike the court of appeals, we determine that the Society’s activities at 
issue do not constitute governmental functions, but instead are proprietary 
functions.  We hold that the conducting of a livestock competition at a county fair 
by a county agricultural society is a proprietary function pursuant to R.C. Chapter 
2744.  We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals on this issue and remand 
this cause to the trial court for further proceedings. 
 
Since we have determined that an R.C. 2744.02(B) exception to immunity 
applies to the circumstances at issue, our analysis has progressed to the point 
 
 
19
where the “third tier” of consideration set forth in Cater now becomes relevant.  As 
to R.C. 2744.03’s application to the Society’s immunity, we find that none of the 
defenses of R.C. 2744.03 applies to this case.  The nonliability provisions of that 
statute must be read more narrowly than the liability provisions of R.C. 
2744.02(B), or the structure of R.C. Chapter 2744 makes no sense at all.  See Hall 
v. Ft. Frye Loc. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 690, 699, 676 
N.E.2d 1241, 1247; Hallett v. Stow Bd. of Edn. (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 309, 313, 
624 N.E.2d 272, 274; Stuckey v. Lawrence Twp. Bd. of Trustees (Aug. 24, 1992), 
Stark App. No. 8806, unreported, 1992 WL 214485 (Milligan, J., dissenting). 
 
However, the question of Mangan’s personal liability, and how R.C. 2744.03 
applies to that, requires a different analysis than we employ with regard to R.C. 
2744.03’s application to the Society.  Of course, if we had found that the Society is 
not a political subdivision, then Mangan could not qualify as an employee of a 
political subdivision for R.C. Chapter 2744 purposes, and the trial court’s finding 
that he is immune from suit under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) on the claims raised against 
him individually could not stand.  However, since we have found that the Society 
is a political subdivision pursuant to R.C. 2744.01(F), R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) is 
relevant to the question of Mangan’s personal liability. 
 
R.C. 2744.03(A) specifies that the defenses and immunities contained within 
that section may be asserted “in connection with a governmental or proprietary 
 
 
20
function.”  Therefore, regardless of whether the Society engaged in governmental 
or proprietary functions in conducting the activities at issue, Mangan will be 
immune in his individual capacity unless his acts satisfy the standards of R.C. 
2744.03(A)(6) exposing him to personal liability.  See Fabrey v. McDonald 
Village Police Dept. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 356, 639 N.E.2d 31, 35. 
 
The trial court granted summary judgment to Mangan on the issue of his 
personal immunity, finding that none of the requirements for imposing personal 
liability on an employee under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) was met.  The trial court 
specifically found that summary judgment was appropriate because, even if 
Mangan’s conduct may have been negligent, “reasonable minds cannot differ that 
[his conduct] did not rise to the level of and constitute malice, bad faith, or reckless 
conduct.” 
 
Appellants, as part of their appeal to the court of appeals, challenged the trial 
court’s finding that Mangan was entitled to personal immunity under R.C. 
2744.03(A)(6).  The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court on 
this issue, finding that there was no evidence that Mangan acted with ill will, 
malice, or bad faith in conducting his investigation, that reasonable minds could 
not differ on whether Mangan acted recklessly in his investigation, and that there 
was no genuine issue of material fact that any comments Mangan made were 
outside the scope of his employment or made with ill will or malice. 
 
 
21
 
Because we have found that the Society is not immune, and because this 
matter is being remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, further facts 
may emerge regarding the propriety and details of Mangan’s actions.  Given this 
scenario, we vacate at this time the trial court’s determination (and the court of 
appeals’ subsequent affirmance) that Mangan is individually immune.  We view 
the lower courts’ decisions on this issue as premature.  We stress that, upon 
remand, Mangan’s personal immunity is an open question, at this time neither 
established nor foreclosed.  We additionally emphasize that our holding that the 
Society is not immune is solely on that question of law, and should not be read as 
having any bearing on the resolution of the merits of the claims of any party. 
 
In conclusion, the judgment of the court of appeals that the Society is 
immune from suit is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for 
further proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs. 
 
DOUGLAS and PFEIFER, JJ., concur in the syllabus and judgment. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
 
22
 
1. 
The parties seem to agree that in this suspected scenario, the act of 
showing a hog that had previously been shown at another county’s fair did not 
itself specifically violate the rules of the Greene County Fair. 
 
2. 
Even though the trial court included Civ.R. 54(B) language in both of 
its decisions, only the one involving issues of immunity was deemed to be a final 
appealable order by the court of appeals. 
 
3. 
We note that appellants do not challenge the constitutionality of any 
aspect of R.C. Chapter 2744.  Therefore, our inquiry is confined solely to 
interpreting the provisions of the relevant statutes.  Furthermore, the decision in 
Dunn v. Brown Cty. Agricultural Soc. (1888), 46 Ohio St. 93, 18 N.E. 496, relied 
upon by appellants, predates R.C. Chapter 2744 by nearly one hundred years, and 
it appears that a county agricultural society was not designated both “a body 
corporate and politic” by the statutes in effect at the time governing such societies.  
(Emphasis added.)  See 46 Ohio St. at 97-98, 18 N.E. at 498.  That the General 
Assembly has chosen to designate a county agricultural society as a “body politic” 
in R.C. 1711.13 is an important factor in our decision. 
 
4. 
As further support for the Society’s status as a political subdivision, 
appellees point out that in 1992 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 92-078, the Attorney 
General determined that a county agricultural society’s board of directors is a 
“public body” pursuant to R.C. 121.22 and is subject to the open meeting 
 
 
23
requirements of that statute.  Although we recognize that a “public body” for 
purposes of R.C. 121.22 is definitely not coextensive with a “political subdivision” 
pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744, and we further note that this opinion of the 
Attorney General relied on the earlier Attorney General opinion in 1988 Ohio 
Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 88-034 (which appellants argue was wrongly decided), we 
agree with appellees that the decision in 1992 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 92-078 
does provide some additional support for the proposition that the Society is a 
political subdivision. 
 
5. 
At some point, R.C. 2744.05 may also become relevant, as R.C. 
2744.02(B) is expressly made subject to that section as well. 
 
6. 
See, e.g., Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc. (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 26, 
29, 2 OBR 572, 574, 442 N.E.2d 749, 752 (“Attempts to classify municipal 
functions into these two categories have caused confusion and unpredictability in 
the law.”); Hack v. Salem (1963), 174 Ohio St. 383, 394, 23 O.O.2d 34, 40, 189 
N.E.2d 857, 864 (Gibson, J., concurring in judgment) (attempted distinction 
between governmental and proprietary functions is a “morass of conflict and 
confusion,” “has been difficult and frequently leads to absurd and unjust 
consequences,” and is a “ ‘bramble bush’ * * * which is both faulty and unsuited to 
modern * * * life”). 
__________________ 
 
 
24
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring.  I concur with the syllabus and judgment of the 
majority.  While I do so, I continue to adhere to my dissent in Gladon v. Greater 
Cleveland Regional Transit Auth. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 312, 323, 662 N.E.2d 287, 
296. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the 
Agricultural Society is a political subdivision, but I dissent from the holding that 
the Society activities pertinent to this case are proprietary rather than 
governmental. 
 
The majority states that the important question here is not whether the 
holding of the county fair is a governmental function, but whether the holding of a 
hog show at the county fair and the subsequent investigation into allegations of 
wrongdoing associated with that hog show were governmental functions.  First, I 
see no basis for distinguishing the county fair from a hog show held as a part of the 
fair.  The majority approvingly reviews a 1988 Attorney General opinion in which 
the Attorney General determined that a county agricultural society is a political 
subdivision because its main purpose is education.  1988 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 
88-034.  If the promotion of educational goals of a county fair is a governmental 
function and renders a county agricultural society a political subdivision, how can 
 
 
25
a livestock competition held as part of the fair, serving the same kinds of 
educational purposes as does the fair and conducted by the same entity that holds 
the fair, be distinguished from the fair as a whole for purposes of governmental 
immunity?  What happens at a county agricultural fair that makes it educational, if 
not agricultural exhibits, demonstrations, events, and contests?  It seems to me that 
a livestock competition is an important part of what makes the holding of the fair 
itself a governmental function.  For our purposes here, then, we must view the hog 
competition as part and parcel of the fair itself.  I would hold, therefore, that the 
hog show is a governmental function. 
 
The majority attempts to support its holding that the hog show is a 
proprietary function by asserting that “[a]ny organization, whether private or 
public, can hold a competition of this type.”  The test, however, is not whether a 
nongovernmental person (or entity) can conduct the activity in question.  Rather, it 
is whether the activity is, in fact, “customarily engaged in by nongovernmental 
persons.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(c).  The majority concedes that 
“many such competitions are conducted within county fairs.”  County agricultural 
fairs could conceivably be held by private, nongovernmental organizations.  The 
fact appears to be, though, that they are not, and that is a critical difference under 
the statute. 
 
 
26
 
The majority goes on to state that “[t]he consideration that many such 
competitions are conducted within county fairs cannot change the fact that there is 
nothing inherently governmental about them.”  While it is true that the fact that an 
event takes place within a county fair does not automatically render it a 
governmental function, the evidence here is that “such competitions” are 
customarily conducted by county fairs.  And whether an activity is “inherently 
governmental” is not the test. 
 
Finally, the majority concludes that there is “no reason to distinguish a 
livestock competition at a county fair from any other similar competition, such as a 
livestock competition held elsewhere than at a county fair, or a dog or cat show, or 
an art show, or a chili cook-off, or a beauty pageant, or a car show.”  But a 
livestock competition held elsewhere might still be a governmental function, or it 
might not, depending on who was conducting it and what the purposes of the show 
were.  And dog or cat shows, chili cook-offs, beauty pageants, and car shows, aside 
from the fact that their primary purposes are less likely to be educational and more 
likely to be commercial, entertainment-oriented, or otherwise private, are 
customarily held by nongovernmental persons.  There is good reason to distinguish 
between the hog show at issue here and the other kinds of shows and contests 
mentioned by the majority. 
 
 
27
 
Because I would hold the county fair livestock competition to be a 
governmental function, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals that the 
Society is immune from liability in this case.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing 
dissenting opinion.