Title: Means v. Industrial Commission

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

110 Ariz. 72 (1973) 515 P.2d 29 Ruth MEANS, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent, Phelps Dodge Corporation, Respondent Employer, State Compensation Fund, Respondent Carrier. No. 11242-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. October 24, 1973. Rehearing Denied November 27, 1973. *73 Whitehill, Berger & Karp, P.C., by David D. West, Tucson, for petitioner. William C. Wahl, Jr., Chief Counsel The Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix, for respondent. Evans, Kitchel & Jenckes, P.C., by Stephen W. Pogson and Richard L. Levin, Phoenix, for respondent employer. Robert K. Park, Chief Counsel State Compensation Fund, Phoenix, for respondent carrier. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is a petition for review of a decision and opinion of the Court of Appeals, 19 Ariz. App. 484, 508 P.2d 371 (1973), which affirmed an award of the Industrial Commission of Arizona denying compensation to the petitioner Ruth Means. We consider only one question and that is: May an annulment be obtained on grounds which constitute an impediment rendering the marriage void or voidable if the same grounds are available by statute as the basis for obtaining a divorce? The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. Prior to April 1965 the petitioner and Lyle Lloyd Means were husband and wife. Mr. Means died as the result of an industrial accident and petitioner was awarded an Industrial Commission award pursuant to statute: On 26 December 1969 petitioner participated in a marriage ceremony and she thereafter applied for and was awarded two years' compensation in one lump sum pursuant to the above quoted statute. Petitioner later secured an annulment of this marriage based upon the impotency of her new "husband." There is no doubt that the ground alleged, as the findings of the hearing officer suggest, constituted an impediment to the marriage which would normally render it void. The statutory grounds for annulment are: And our divorce statute in force at the time of the decree of annulment stated: In an early case of this court we held: And: In the instant case, after the decree of annulment, the petitioner tendered back the lump sum settlement and asked that her benefits be reinstated. Hallford v. Industrial Commission, 63 Ariz. 40, 159 P.2d 305 (1945); State Compensation Fund v. Reed, 12 Ariz. App. 317, 470 P.2d 465 (1970); State Compensation Fund v. Foughty, supra. The Industrial Commission in denying the reinstatement, relied on Southern Pac. Co. v. Industrial Com., supra, that impotency could not be used as a ground for annulment. A marriage may be annulled when the false representation or concealment is such that the fundamental purpose of the injured party in entering into the marriage is defeated. The majority view is that courts under general equity powers have inherent jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate actions for annulment of marriage, irrespective of statute. Our search has revealed only one other jurisdiction, the State of Georgia, which follows our rather restrictive rule that statutory grounds for divorce may not be used to annul a marriage, even though the grounds "constitute an impediment rendering the marriage void." Mackey v. Mackey, 198 Ga. 707, 32 S.E.2d 764 (1945). We believe that the view of the majority is the better view and that any grounds rendering the marriage void or voidable should be available to grant an annulment of marriage. In reaching this decision, we are persuaded primarily by what we believe to be the logical import of the annulment statute, that an annulment may be granted when the grounds show "an impediment rendering the marriage void" with no restriction on this statutory ground indicated by either the annulment statute or the divorce statute. Divorce and annulment may both affect the validity of a marriage, especially in the case of a marriage that is only voidable as opposed to being void, but the actions for annulment and divorce are two different and distinct actions, one based upon a valid marriage, and the other based upon a marriage that may be void or voidable. Even with the present "no fault" divorce statute, § 25-311 et seq., A.R.S. (1973), enacted after the decree of annulment in this case, there are situations wherein justice demands that an annulment be granted and the fact that a dissolution could be granted under our new statute, should not preclude the granting of a valid decree of annulment. The contrary holding of this court in Southern Pac. Co. v. Industrial Com., supra, is by this opinion overruled. The decision and opinion of the Court of Appeals, 19 Ariz. App. 484, 508 P.2d 371 (1973), is vacated and the award of the Industrial Commission is set aside. The decision by the majority overrules this Court's holding in Southern Pacific Co. v. Industrial Commission, 54 Ariz. 1, 91 P.2d 700 (1939) which has been the law in this State for over 30 years. During that entire period the Legislature has never seen fit to change the law as announced in the cited case until the current year with the passage of the so-called "no fault" divorce statute. In substance the Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra, held that physical incompetency at the time of marriage is not a ground for annulment but of divorce only. While the majority take the position that the better view is that any grounds rendering the marriage void or voidable should be available to grant an annulment of marriage even if such ground is also a statutory ground for divorce, this view appears contrary to the *76 public policy of this State as set forth in the statutes. As this Court pointed out over 30 years ago, it was the evident intention of the Legislature that physical incompetency at the time of marriage be a ground for divorce and not annulment. The legislative history of inaction to change in any way the decision of the Court reinforces our belief that this Court's construction of the legislative intent was correct. If there was to be a change in the law, it should be by legislative enactment and not by judicial construction. The award of the Industrial Commission of Arizona denying compensation to the petitioner should be affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, J., concurs in the foregoing dissent of Justice HOLOHAN. [1] But see dissent in Black v. Industrial Commission, 83 Ariz. 121, 317 P.2d 553 (1957) and State Compensation Fund v. Foughty, 13 Ariz. App. 381, 476 P.2d 902 (1970).