Title: Pearson v. Sheriff of Bristol County

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-13110 
 
KELLIE PEARSON1 & others2  vs.  SHERIFF OF BRISTOL COUNTY & 
another.3 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 1, 2021. – May 17, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Sheriff.  Telephone.  Imprisonment, Inmate telephone calls. 
 
 
 
Certification of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial 
Court by the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts. 
 
 
Ian D. Roffman, Special Assistant Attorney General, for 
Sheriff of Bristol County. 
Jason D. Frank for Securus Technologies, Inc. 
James R. Pingeon for the plaintiffs. 
Daniel Greenfield, of Illinois, Kathrina Szymborski, of New 
York, & Maggie Filler, for American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
1 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
 
2 Roger Burrell, Brian Givens, and the Law Offices of Mark 
Booker, individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
 
 
3 Securus Technologies, Inc. 
2 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  The office of the sheriff of Bristol County 
(sheriff's office) contracted with a third-party vendor, Securus 
Technologies, Inc. (Securus), to provide inmate calling services 
in its correctional facilities.  Pursuant to this contract, 
Securus paid to the sheriff's office a percentage of its monthly 
revenues and annual lump-sum amounts.  The plaintiffs brought 
suit against the sheriff of Bristol County, Thomas M. Hodgson 
(sheriff), and Securus, alleging that the sheriff lacks 
authority to raise revenues for his office in this manner.  The 
sheriff, joined by Securus, argued that the necessary authority 
may be found in St. 2009, c. 61, An Act transferring county 
sheriffs to the Commonwealth (2009 act).4 
The United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts has asked this court by way of certified question 
the following: 
"Did the Massachusetts Legislature, through the provisions 
of [St. 2009, c. 61, §§ 12 (a), 12 (c), 15, or G. L. 
c.] 127, § 3, taken separately or together, authorize the 
Bristol County Sheriff's Office to raise revenues for the 
Office of the Sheriff through inmate calling service 
contracts?" 
 
For the reasons explained infra, we answer the question "yes." 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, MediaJustice, and Worth 
Rises. 
3 
 
Background.  1.  A brief history of county politics and the 
2009 act.  Historically, the offices of each of the 
Commonwealth's fourteen sheriffs were part of their respective 
county governments.5  Beginning in 1997, certain of those  
offices were transferred to the Commonwealth when the 
Legislature abolished their respective county governments 
(abolished counties).6  See G. L. c. 34B, §§ 1, 2; St. 1998, 
 
5 Counties are "territorial subdivisions of the Commonwealth 
bounded and organized by the General Court for the convenient 
administration of some parts of government."  County of 
Middlesex v. Waltham, 278 Mass. 514, 516 (1932).  First created 
in 1643, county governments historically were responsible for 
the maintenance of county courts, registries of deed, jails and 
houses of correction, and county roads.  1961 Senate Doc. No. 
580, at 54-55.  In counties whose governments have not been 
formally abolished -- Barnstable, Bristol, Dukes County, 
Nantucket, Norfolk, Plymouth, and Suffolk -- general executive 
authority is vested in a panel of county commissioners who are 
elected or serve ex officio.  See G. L. c. 34, § 4; G. L. c. 54, 
§ 158.  Among other responsibilities, county commissioners are 
charged with the care of county property and general management 
of the county's business and affairs.  G. L. c. 34, § 14. 
 
6 The county government system had long come under attack by 
those claiming that it was antiquated, plagued by financial 
crises, and riddled with debt.  See, e.g., Letter to Senate and 
House Representatives from Governor William F. Weld and 
Lieutenant Governor Argeo Paul Cellucci, dated January 7, 1997, 
enclosing legislative proposal entitled "An Act abolishing 
county government," 1997 House Doc. No. 1256; Governor's Budget 
Recommendations for Fiscal Year 1998, 1997 House Doc. No. 1, at 
8 (Governor's Message).  Following a push by Governor Weld and 
his successor, Governor Cellucci, the Legislature abolished 
Middlesex County government in 1997.  See St. 1997, c. 48, § 1; 
1997 House Doc. No. 4736.  The county governments of Berkshire, 
Essex, Franklin, Hampden, Hampshire, and Worcester soon met the 
same fate.  See G. L. c. 34B, § 1; St. 1997, c. 48, § 1; St. 
1998, c. 300, § 11. 
4 
 
c. 300, § 11.  Pursuant to this new scheme, the Commonwealth is 
responsible for the "operation and management of the county jail 
and house of correction"; however, the sheriffs of the abolished 
counties retain "administrative and operational control over the 
office of the sheriff, the jail, and the house of correction," 
including "the procurement of supplies, services and equipment."  
G. L. c. 34B, §§ 4, 12.  The offices of sheriffs in the 
remaining counties, including the Bristol County sheriff's 
office, continued to operate as part of their respective county 
governments.7 
In 2008, when the collapsing national economy resulted in 
shortfalls in revenues from the deeds excise taxes8 that 
 
7 Subsequent efforts to abolish the remaining county 
governments of Barnstable, Bristol, Dukes County, Nantucket, 
Norfolk, Plymouth, and Suffolk (remaining counties) did not gain 
sufficient traction against those who argued that they were 
efficient and provided important services.  See Still Intact, 
For Now Counties Left Alone by Governor's Cuts, Boston Globe, 
Mar. 2, 2003. 
 
8 Massachusetts imposes an excise tax on the transfer of any 
deed, instrument, or other writing whereby realty is conveyed to 
a purchaser.  G. L. c. 64D, § 1.  Prior to the passage of the 
2009 act, a statutorily mandated percentage of the revenues 
derived from the collection of this tax in each of the remaining 
counties was allocated to a deeds excise fund for each remaining 
county.  A percentage of each deeds excise fund was further 
allocated to a county correction fund for each remaining county, 
which was used to fund the operations of the offices of the 
sheriffs in the remaining counties.  G. L. c. 64D, §§ 11, 13 
(2000).  The 2009 act abolished the county correction fund and 
reallocated the deeds excise fund to satisfy unfunded county 
pension and other benefit liabilities of retired employees in 
5 
 
comprised a primary source of funding for the offices of these 
remaining sheriffs, Governor Deval Patrick introduced 
legislation proposing that they too be transferred to the 
Commonwealth, rendering them agencies of the Commonwealth, 
without abolishing their county governments, in order to 
"promote more efficient government" and "provide more stable and 
predictable budgeting for the transferred sheriffs' offices."  
2008 House Doc. No 4498 (2008 bill).  Among other things, the 
2008 bill proposed that "all revenues received with respect to 
programs, functions or activities of the office of the sheriff 
shall be paid to the state treasurer."  Id. at § 5.  This bill 
was not adopted. 
The next year, after "extensive discussion with the seven 
county sheriffs and others," Governor Patrick introduced a 
revised bill, again proposing the transfer of the seven 
remaining sheriffs' offices to the Commonwealth.  2009 Senate 
Doc. No. 7 (2009 bill).  Unlike the 2008 bill, the 2009 bill 
provided specific guidance regarding the posttransfer status of 
various administrative functions, duties, and obligations of the 
offices of the remaining sheriffs; clarified the status of the 
employees in those offices; and allocated responsibility for 
funding unfunded county pension liabilities and management of 
 
the office of a sheriff.  See St. 2009, c. 61, § 2 (repealing 
G. L. c. 64D, § 13, which established county correction fund). 
6 
 
employee insurance and retirement benefits.  See, e.g., id. at 
§§ 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 18-21.  The final version, "An Act 
transferring county sheriffs to the Commonwealth," enacted in 
August 2009, transferred "all functions, duties and 
responsibilities" of the offices of the sheriffs in the 
remaining counties, including in Bristol County, along with all 
assets, valid liabilities and debts, property, leases, and 
contracts, from their respective counties to the Commonwealth.9  
St. 2009, c. 61, §§ 4, 6, 7 (a), 9.  The transferred offices 
retained "administrative and operational control over the office 
of the sheriff, the jail, the house of correction and any other 
occupied buildings controlled by a transferred sheriff upon the 
effective date of [the] act."  Id. at § 15.  Revenues for "civil 
process, inmate telephone and commissary funds" would remain 
with each transferred office, and any sheriff who had "developed 
a revenue source derived apart from the state treasury" was 
permitted to retain that funding.  Id. at § 12 (a), (c). 
 
9 The 2009 act is a special act, meaning it has not been 
codified in the General Laws.  A special act typically refers to 
"legislation addressed to a particular situation, that does not 
establish a rule of future conduct with any substantial degree 
of generality, and may provide ad hoc benefits of some kind for 
an individual or a number of them."  Concord v. Water Dep't of 
Littleton, 487 Mass. 56, 59 n.3 (2021), quoting Commissioner of 
Pub. Health v. Bessie M. Burke Memorial Hosp., 366 Mass. 734, 
740 (1975).  A special act has the "same force and effect as a 
General Law."  Desrosiers v. Governor, 486 Mass. 369, 381 n.21 
(2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 83 (2021). 
7 
 
2.  The contract with Securus.  The facts relevant to the 
certified question are undisputed.  In May 2011, pursuant to its 
procurement policy and 801 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 21.00 (2003),10 
the sheriff's office issued a request for response (RFR) 
soliciting bids for an inmate and public calling system at its 
correctional facilities.  The RFR required bidders to meet 
technical and system management specifications and provided that 
the sheriff's office would not bear the cost of installing or 
maintaining the telephone system.  It further required bidders 
to propose site commissions11 payable to the sheriff's office 
 
10 The Commonwealth's "Policy Governing the Procurement of 
Commodities and/or Services" provides, to the office of each 
sheriff that adopts the policy, uniform rules and standards 
governing the procurement of commodities and services.  This 
policy aims to ensure that any procurements are in the best 
interest of, or best value to, the office of a sheriff.  The 
sheriff's procurement policy is consistent with the 
Commonwealth's regulations for the procurement of commodities or 
services, 801 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 21.00. 
 
11 "Site commissions" are "any form of monetary payment, in-
kind payment, gift, exchange of services or goods, fee, 
technology allowance, or product that a Provider of Inmate 
Calling Services or affiliate of a[] Provider of Inmate Calling 
Services may pay, give, donate, or otherwise provide to an 
entity that operates a correctional institution, an entity with 
which the Provider of Inmate Calling Services enters into an 
agreement to provide [Inmate Calling Services], a governmental 
agency that oversees a correctional facility, the city, county, 
or state where a facility is located, or an agent of any such 
facility."  47 C.F.R. § 64.6000(t).  The sheriff's office is not 
alone in requiring its inmate calling services provider to pay 
"site commissions" in the form of monetary payments or 
allowances.  See Global Tel*Link v. Federal Communications 
Comm'n, 866 F.3d 397, 404, 413 (D.D.C. 2017) ("In awarding 
contracts to [inmate calling services] providers, correctional 
8 
 
based on a percentage of the revenue the bidder would receive 
from operating the telephone system and encouraged them to 
include and pay the salary of two on-site administrators.  Three 
companies submitted bids. 
In August 2011, the sheriff's office awarded Securus a 
contract for the provision of a coinless inmate and public 
telephone system in its correctional facilities.  The contract 
provided, among other things, that Securus would pay the 
sheriff's office site commissions.12  The parties represent that 
the cost of inmate telephone calls is borne exclusively by call 
recipients, who either may receive (and pay for) collect calls 
from inmates or establish an account with Securus from which the 
cost of calls received will be deducted. 
 
facilities usually give considerable weight to which provider 
offers the highest site commission, which is typically a portion 
of the provider's revenue or profits. . . .  [S]ite commissions 
obviously are costs of doing business incurred by [inmate 
calling services] providers"). 
 
12 Under the original contract, the site commissions were 
comprised of a percentage of Securus's monthly revenues from the 
inmate calling services as a commission, annual funding for two 
on-site administrators, and annual funding for technology 
expenditures.  Of the three bidders, Securus proposed the lowest 
commission percentage and was the only bidder that agreed to 
provide funding for technology expenditures or specified funding 
for the on-site administrator positions.  In 2015, Securus 
ceased paying commissions as percentage of revenue entirely but 
continued to provide the sheriff's office with annual funding 
for the on-site administrator positions and the technology 
budget. 
9 
 
3.  Procedural posture.  In May 2018, the plaintiffs 
commenced a putative class action in the Superior Court against 
the sheriff and Securus, alleging that the agreement with 
Securus was an illegal kickback scheme resulting in inflated 
rates for inmate telephone calls and impeding inmates' ability 
to communicate with loved ones and counsel.  The plaintiffs 
assert in relevant part that the sheriff lacked statutory 
authority to collect revenues through contracts for inmate 
calling services.  They further contend that Securus is engaging 
in unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of G. L. 
c. 93A, § 2, by, among other things, paying the site commissions 
to the sheriff's office and charging correspondingly higher 
telephone call rates. 
Securus removed the case to the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts under the Federal Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005.  Following a June 2020 hearing, a 
judge in the District Court granted the defendants' motions for 
judgment on the pleadings and denied the plaintiffs' motions for 
partial summary judgment and class certification.  Central to 
the judge's decision was the conclusion that the 2009 act 
together with G. L. c. 127, § 3, authorized the sheriff's office 
to generate revenues from its contract with Securus to provide 
inmate calling services.  The plaintiffs moved to alter or amend 
the judgment and to certify a question of law to this court.  
10 
 
The judge thereafter vacated the judgment and certified the 
question now before us, pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 1:03, as 
appearing in 382 Mass. 700 (1981): 
"Did the Massachusetts Legislature, through the provisions 
of [St. 2009, c. 61, §§ 12 (a), 12 (c), 15, or G. L. 
c.] 127, § 3, taken separately or together, authorize the 
Bristol County Sheriff's Office to raise revenues for the 
Office of the Sheriff through inmate calling service 
contracts?" 
We answer the question "yes," as we conclude that § 12 (a) of 
the 2009 act, independently and buttressed by §§ 12 (c) and 15, 
authorizes the sheriff's office to collect and retain revenues 
through inmate calling services contracts. 
Discussion.  In Souza v. Sheriff of Bristol County, 455 
Mass. 573, 574-575 (2010), inmates in Bristol County 
correctional facilities challenged the sheriff's imposition of 
inmate fees to cover the cost of their care, including medical 
care, haircut services, and general education development (GED) 
testing.  Rejecting the sheriff's contention that he derived 
authority to impose the challenged fees from his common-law 
duties to operate and administer the county's correctional 
facilities, this court concluded that, "in the absence of 
specific legislative authority," the sheriff lacked authority to 
11 
 
impose such fees on inmates to defray the cost of their 
incarceration.13  Id. at 586. 
The plaintiffs contend that, as was the case in Souza, here 
too, the sheriff lacks the statutory authority to enter into 
inmate calling services contracts that generate revenue for the 
office.  As the defendants counter that such authority may be 
found in the 2009 act, we turn our attention there, beginning 
with § 12 (a).  See Dental Serv. of Mass., Inc. v. Commissioner 
of Revenue, 479 Mass. 304, 306 (2018) ("[O]ur analysis begins 
with the statutory language, the principal source of insight 
into [l]egislative purpose" [quotation and citation omitted]). 
1.  Section 12 (a).  Section 12 (a) of the 2009 act states 
in pertinent part:  "Notwithstanding any general or special law 
to the contrary . . . , revenues of the office of sheriff in 
[Bristol County] for civil process, inmate telephone and 
commissary funds shall remain with the office of sheriff."  St. 
2009, c. 61, § 12 (a).  The plaintiffs contend that the 
reference to inmate telephone funds in § 12 (a) is ambiguous and 
 
13 This court further concluded that imposition of the 
challenged fees was inconsistent with statutory provisions 
addressing the same subject matter.  Souza, 455 Mass. at 583, 
586-588, citing G. L. c. 124, § 1 (r) (Commissioner of 
Correction may establish haircut fees for State and county 
inmates), 1 (t) (county inmates' health insurance plans to be 
billed for medical services); G. L. c. 127, §§  86F (deductions 
from inmate work-release program earnings), 92A (Department of 
Education may not charge fee for GED testing). 
12 
 
that interpreting the section as allowing the sheriff to collect 
revenues from Securus would be tantamount to conferring 
unfettered authority to adopt new methods of generating income 
regardless of the source.14  We disagree. 
 
As the 2009 act does not describe what comprises inmate 
telephone revenues, "we look to external sources, including the 
legislative history of the statute, its development, its 
progression through the Legislature, prior legislation on the 
same subject, and the history of the times."  Worcester v. 
College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 139 (2013), quoting 81 
Spooner Rd. LLC v. Brookline, 452 Mass. 109, 115 (2008). 
Notably, prior to the passage of the 2009 act, the 
Legislature long had known that the sheriff collected revenues 
from inmate calling services providers.  At least as early as 
fiscal year 2001, the Legislature specifically accounted for 
revenues from county correctional inmate telephone services in 
annual budgets, providing that, "notwithstanding the provisions 
of any special law to the contrary, no county treasurer shall 
retain revenues derived by the sheriffs from commissions on 
telephone service provided to inmates or detainees" and that 
such revenues "shall be retained by the sheriffs not subject to 
 
14 For example, the plaintiffs argue, such an interpretation 
theoretically would authorize the sheriff to require inmates to 
pay a fee for the privilege of using the telephone. 
13 
 
further appropriation for use in a canteen fund."  St. 2000, 
c. 159, § 2, line item 8910-0000.  See St. 2001, c. 177, § 2, 
line item 8910-0000; St. 2002, c. 184, § 2, line item 8910-0000; 
St. 2003, c. 26, § 2, line item 8910-0000; St. 2004, c. 149, 
§ 2, line item 8910-0000; St. 2005, c. 45, § 2, line item 8910-
0000; St. 2006, c. 139, § 2, line item 8910-0000; St. 2007, 
c. 61, § 2, line item 8910-0000; St. 2008, c. 182, § 2, line 
item 8910-0000.  Additionally, in 2013, a special commission15 
noted that "[p]rior audits disclosed that [s]heriffs' 
[o]ffice[s] received commissions on inmate telephone services 
and that these funds were deposited into commissary, canteen, or 
inmates benefit accounts."  2013 Senate Doc. No. 1865, at 42. 
Thus, we conclude that § 12 (a)'s reference to revenues 
from inmate telephone funds refers to site commissions paid by 
inmate calling services providers, such as those at issue here.  
Given the Legislature's actual knowledge of the sheriff's long-
standing practice of collecting inmate telephones revenue from 
inmate calling services providers, the "absence of any 
 
15 Section 22 of the 2009 act required the formation of a 
special commission charged with "making an investigation and 
study relative to the reorganization or consolidation of 
sheriffs' offices, to make formal recommendations regarding such 
reorganization or consolidation and to recommend legislation, if 
any, to effectuate such recommendations relating to the 
reorganization, consolidation, operation, administration, 
regulation, governance and finances of sheriffs' offices."  St. 
2009, c. 61, § 22. 
14 
 
legislative objection whatsoever [in the 2009 act] is telling."  
Pavian, Inc. v. Hickey, 452 Mass. 490, 494 (2008), quoting 
Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 447 Mass. 814, 820 n.8 (2006) 
(Legislature presumed to be aware of commission's long-standing 
interpretation of statute).  See McCarty's Case, 445 Mass. 361, 
368-369 (2005) (Sosman, J., concurring).  Had the Legislature 
intended to put an end to the sheriff's practice of collecting 
inmate telephone revenues, it could have done so.  Instead, 
§ 12 (a) expressly provides that the sheriff may continue to 
retain inmate telephone revenues even after the transfer of the 
sheriff's office to the Commonwealth.16 
 
The plaintiffs also propose that because § 12 (a) states 
only that the revenues from the listed sources "shall remain 
with the office of sheriff," the section gives authorization not 
to collect revenues, but only to retain them (rather than 
depositing them into the Commonwealth's General Fund).17  If we 
 
16 We additionally note that the 2008 bill, which contained 
no reference to inmate telephone revenues and would not have 
permitted the sheriff to retain any revenues, was rejected by 
the Legislature.  See 2008 House Doc. No. 4498, § 5. 
 
17 At a hearing on a motion for partial summary judgment in 
the Federal District Court, the plaintiffs argued that § 12 (a) 
"merely says that any funds previously collected should 'remain' 
with the sheriff during the one-time transfer" (emphases added).  
In briefing before this court, the plaintiffs appeared to echo 
this reasoning, arguing that § 12 (a) "dealt only with what 
should happen to any telephone funds that might exist, as 
opposed to making any kind of statement about the lawfulness of 
their collection."  At oral argument, however, the plaintiffs 
15 
 
were to adopt this interpretation, it would mean that the 
sheriff would be authorized to retain revenues that he is not 
authorized to collect in the first place.18  Such an illogical 
and unreasonable result cannot be what the Legislature intended.  
See Meshna v. Scrivanos, 471 Mass. 169, 173 (2015) ("our respect 
for the Legislature's considered judgment dictates that we 
interpret the statute to be sensible, rejecting unreasonable 
interpretations unless the clear meaning of the language 
requires such an interpretation" [citation omitted]).  See also 
Ciani v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 178 (2019). 
Indeed, the sensible interpretation of the phrase "shall 
remain with the office of sheriff" is that it confers authority 
to the sheriff to both collect and retain inmate telephone 
revenue.  See Ciampi v. Commissioner of Correction, 452 Mass. 
162, 168-169 (2008) ("[a]n express grant carries with it by 
implication all incidental authority required for the full and 
efficient exercise of the power conferred" [citation omitted]).  
See also Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Department 
of Pub. Utils. (No.1), 461 Mass. 166, 187 (2011) ("[p]owers 
 
took the position that § 12 (a) contemplates, and applies to, 
ongoing revenue streams from sources enumerated in that section 
after the transfer date. 
 
18 Moreover, if, as the plaintiffs allege, the sheriff is 
not authorized to collect inmate telephone revenue, there would 
be no reason for the Legislature to provide for the retention of 
such revenue. 
16 
 
granted include those necessarily or reasonably implied" 
[citation omitted]). 
 
2.  Sections 12 (c) and 15.  Sections 12 (c) and 15 of the 
2009 act reinforce our conclusion.  Section 12 (c) provides that 
"[a]ny sheriff who has developed a revenue source derived apart 
from the state treasury may retain that funding to address the 
needs of the citizens within that county."  St. 2009, c. 61, 
§ 12 (c).  The plaintiffs argue that this language does not 
permit the sheriff to develop new sources of revenue that 
otherwise may be unlawful.  We agree.  However, as we have 
discussed, sheriffs have been collecting revenue from inmate 
calling services for decades.  Section 12 (c) confirms that the 
sheriff may retain this statutorily authorized source of 
revenue. 
Additionally, § 15 works in tandem with § 12 (a).  It 
provides in relevant part that the "sheriff shall retain 
administrative and operational control over the office of the 
sheriff, the jail, [and] the house of correction."19  St. 2009, 
c. 61, § 15.  As sheriffs are required by regulation to provide 
inmates with "[r]easonable access to public telephones," 103 
 
19 This "administrative and operational control" includes 
the authority over "the procurement of supplies, services and 
equipment."  G. L. c. 34B, § 12 (sheriffs of abolished counties 
retain "administrative and operational control" over their 
offices and county correctional facilities, which includes "the 
procurement of supplies, services and equipment"). 
17 
 
Code Mass. Regs. § 948.10 (2009), § 15 confirms a sheriff's 
continuing authority to enter into contracts for the provision 
of inmate calling services. 
3.  Plaintiffs' remaining arguments.  The plaintiffs 
present a number of additional arguments; we briefly address two 
of them.20  The plaintiffs assert that it would be "illogical" 
and "entirely arbitrary" to conclude that the 2009 act 
authorized the transferred sheriffs to collect inmate telephone 
revenue because it would have the effect of permitting only some 
sheriffs to contract for commissions with inmate telephone 
service providers.  However, the legality of a legislative 
scheme that treats different offices of sheriffs differently is 
not before us.  Further, the plaintiffs' contention that the 
Legislature would not have formalized the sheriff's authority to 
collect revenue from inmate calling services contracts in an 
uncodified special act is unpersuasive.  As noted, see note 9, 
supra, a special act has the "same force and effect as a General 
Law."  Desrosiers v. Governor, 486 Mass. 369, 381 n.21 (2020), 
cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 83 (2021). 
Conclusion.  We answer the certified question as follows:  
"Yes," § 12 (a) of the 2009 act, independently and buttressed by 
§§ 12 (c) and 15, authorizes the Bristol County sheriff's office 
 
20 The other points raised by the plaintiffs are without 
merit.  See Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954). 
18 
 
to collect and retain revenues through inmate calling services 
contracts.21 
The Reporter of Decisions is to furnish attested copies of 
this opinion to the clerk of this court.  The clerk in turn will 
transmit one copy, under the seal of the court, to the clerk of 
the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, as the answer to the question certified, and also 
will transmit a copy to each party. 
 
21 Because we find that the 2009 act alone affirms the 
sheriff's authority to collect and retain revenues from inmate 
calling services contracts, we need not consider whether G. L. 
c. 127, § 3, either independently or together with sections of 
the 2009 act, provides an additional source of authority.  We 
note, however, that G. L. c. 127, § 3, permits the keepers of 
State and county correctional facilities to retain "revenues 
generated by the sale or purchase of goods or services to 
persons in correctional facilities (emphasis added)."  Because 
telephone calls are not sold "to persons in correctional 
facilities," id., but rather are sold to and paid for by the 
call recipients outside the correctional facilities, the statute 
would not be applicable to revenue generated through inmate 
calling services contracts.