Title: Bogle v.Oregon

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

No. 45	
August 9, 2018	
455
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
TRACEY E. BOGLE,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review.
(SC S065280) (Control)
TRACEY E. BOGLE,
Respondent on Review,
v.
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review.
(SC S065247)
TRACEY BOGLE,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
Mark NOOTH,
Superintendent,
Snake River Correctional Institution,
Respondent on Review.
(SC S065085)
(CC 13C14935; 14C23348) (CA A160042; A159747)
(SC S065280 (Control); S065247; S065247)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 8, 2018.
Jedediah Peterson, O’Connor Weber LLC, Portland, 
argued the cause and filed the briefs for Tracey E. Bogle.
_____________
	
*  Appeals from Marion County Circuit Court: Linda L. Bergman, Judge. 284 
Or App 882, 395 P3d 643 (2017), and Thomas M. Hart, Judge. 284 Or App 879, 
395 P3d 644 (2017).
456	
Bogle v. State of Oregon
Tracey E. Bogle, Salem, filed the supplemental brief 

pro se.
Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, Salem, argued the 
cause and filed the brief for State of Oregon and Mark Nooth, 
Superintendent. Also on the brief was Ellen F. Rosenblum, 
Attorney General.
DUNCAN, J.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals and the judgments 
of the circuit court are affirmed.
_Case Summary: This appeal involves two post-conviction cases arising out of 
the same underlying criminal case, which were consolidated for review. In Bogle 
v. State, petitioner was represented by counsel but filed pro se motions pursu­
ant to Church v. Gladden, 244 Or 308, 417 P2d 993 (1966), including a motion 
asking the post-conviction court to instruct petitioner’s counsel to raise an addi­
tional ground for relief. The post-conviction court denied the pro se motions, and 
denied relief on the grounds raised by counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 
but, based on its understanding of Church, indicated that petitioner would not be 
barred from raising his pro se grounds for relief in a subsequent post-conviction 
case, despite ORS 138.550(3), a claim preclusion rule. While Bogle v. State was 
pending in the post-conviction court, petitioner initiated a second post-conviction 
case, Bogle v. Nooth. On the state’s motion, the post-conviction court dismissed 
that case on two alternative grounds, ORCP 21 A(3) and ORS 138.550(3), and the 
Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: (1) the purpose of a petitioner’s Church motion is 
to inform the post-conviction court that petitioner’s counsel has failed to assert a 
ground for relief and to ask the court either to replace counsel or to instruct coun­
sel to assert the ground for relief; (2) given that purpose, a petitioner must make 
a legitimate complaint regarding counsel; (3) a legitimate complaint includes a 
complaint that counsel is not exercising reasonable professional skill and judg­
ment; (4) if the petitioner makes that showing, the post-conviction court must 
exercise its discretion to replace or instruct counsel; (5) the post-conviction court 
did not err in its response to petitioner’s pro se motions, but the Court of Appeals 
did err in holding that, because petitioner filed the motions, he would not be 
barred by ORS 138.550(3) from later raising the claims that he had identified in 
the motions; (6) the post-conviction court did not plainly err in dismissing peti­
tioner’s second post-conviction case based on ORCP 21 A(3).
The decisions of the Court of Appeals and the judgments of the circuit court 
are affirmed.
Cite as 363 Or 455 (2018)	
457
	
DUNCAN, J.
	
This appeal involves two post-conviction relief cases, 
which arose out of the same underlying criminal case and 
have been consolidated for review: Bogle v. State of Oregon, 
284 Or App 882, 395 P3d 643 (2017), and Bogle v. Nooth, 284 
Or App 879, 395 P3d 644 (2017).
	
In Bogle v. State, petitioner, who was represented by 
counsel, filed pro se motions pursuant to Church v. Gladden, 
244 Or 308, 311, 417 P2d 993 (1966). The motions included a 
motion for the court to instruct petitioner’s counsel to raise 
an additional ground for relief. The post-conviction court 
denied the pro se motions, and, after a hearing on the merits 
of the grounds for relief that counsel had raised, the court 
denied relief. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the court 
had erred by failing to consider his pro se grounds for relief 
or, alternatively, by failing either to instruct counsel to raise 
them or to make a record of its reasons for not instructing 
counsel to do so. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding 
that the post-conviction court did not err in its response to 
petitioner’s pro se motions because petitioner could raise his
pro se grounds for relief in a subsequent post-conviction case.
	
Both petitioner and the state petitioned for review, 
and we allowed both petitions. On review, the parties dispute 
what actions a post-conviction court must take in response 
to a Church motion in which a petitioner asserts that court-
appointed counsel is failing to raise a ground for relief and 
asks the court either to replace counsel or to instruct coun­
sel to raise the ground for relief. The parties also dispute 
what effect the filing of such a motion has on whether the 
petitioner can raise the ground for relief in a subsequent 
post-conviction case, given that ORS 138.550(3) provides 
that any ground for relief that is not raised in a petitioner’s 
first post-conviction case is deemed waived, unless it could 
not reasonably have been raised in the first case.
	
For the reasons explained below, we hold that, when 
a petitioner files a motion asserting that court-appointed 
counsel is failing to raise a ground for relief and asking the 
court either to replace counsel or to instruct counsel to raise 
the ground for relief, the question for the post-conviction 
458	
Bogle v. State of Oregon
court is whether the petitioner has established that counsel’s 
failure to raise the ground for relief constitutes a failure to 
exercise reasonable professional skill and judgment. If so, 
then the court must exercise its discretion to either replace 
or instruct counsel. The purpose of such a motion is for peti­
tioner to seek to have counsel raise the ground for relief 
in the current post-conviction case; it is not to enable the 
petitioner to avoid claim preclusion under ORS 138.550(3) 
and raise the ground in a subsequent post-conviction case. 
Applying those holdings, we affirm the judgment of the post-
conviction court and the decision of the Court of Appeals in 
Bogle v. State, although our reasoning differs from that of 
the Court of Appeals.
	
While Bogle v. State was pending in the post-
conviction court, petitioner initiated a second post-
conviction case, Bogle v. Nooth. On the state’s motion, the 
post-conviction court dismissed that case, citing both ORCP 
21 A(3), which allows a court to dismiss an action when 
“there is another action pending between the same parties 
for the same cause,” and ORS 138.550(3), which bars suc­
cessive post-conviction cases. Petitioner appealed, and the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court’s dis­
missal under ORCP 21 A(3). Petitioner petitioned for review, 
asserting, among other things, that the post-conviction 
court plainly erred in relying on ORCP 21 A(3) in a post-
conviction case. As explained below, we conclude that the 
post-conviction court did not plainly err and, therefore, we 
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court and the 
decision of the Court of Appeals in Bogle v. Nooth.
I.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
	
The relevant facts are primarily procedural. 
Petitioner pleaded guilty to and was convicted of burglary 
and assault. Pursuant to a plea deal, the trial court imposed 
probation. Petitioner did not appeal his convictions or sen­
tences. Later, the state alleged that petitioner violated the 
conditions of his probation. The trial court revoked peti­
tioner’s probation and imposed the 72-month prison sentence 
that petitioner had agreed to as part of his plea deal. In con­
nection with the plea and probation violation proceedings, 
Cite as 363 Or 455 (2018)	
459
petitioner initiated the two post-conviction cases that are 
before us, Bogle v. State and Bogle v. Nooth.
A.  Bogle v. State
	
While his probation violation proceeding was pend­
ing, petitioner filed his post-conviction petition in Bogle v. 
State, alleging that his attorney in the plea proceeding had 
failed to adequately represent him. The post-conviction court 
appointed post-conviction counsel to represent petitioner, 
and counsel filed three amended petitions clarifying peti­
tioner’s claims. In the third amended petition, which was 
filed after petitioner’s probation was revoked, counsel added 
claims asserting that petitioner’s attorney in the probation 
violation proceeding had failed to adequately represent him. 
 
Because petitioner wanted to assert additional claims, coun­
sel also added a section entitled “PETITIONER’S PRO SE 
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF.” Counsel expressly refused to certify 
that any of the pro se claims were “well grounded in fact and 
warranted by existing law, or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law,” and he 
stated that he had included the pro se claims in the petition 
“to assist [petitioner] in preserving his claims.” See ORCP 
17.1 Counsel cited Church as authority for including the pro 
se claims. Although counsel had included petitioner’s pro se 
claims in the third amended petition, petitioner filed a series 
of pro se motions asserting the same claims. He cited Church 
as authority for filing the motions and asserting the claims.
	
As discussed in greater detail below, in Church this 
court rejected a petitioner’s argument that, in his second 
post-conviction case, he could raise grounds for relief that 
the attorney in his first post-conviction case had failed to 
raise. 244 Or at 310-11. This court held that the grounds 
for relief were barred by ORS 138.550(3), which gener­
ally bars successive post-conviction cases. In addition, this 
court stated that, if, during his first post-conviction case, 
	
1  ORCP 17 provides that an attorney who signs a filing certifies, among other 
things, “that the claims, defenses, and other legal positions taken * 
* 
* are war­
ranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modifi­
cation or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law” and “that the 
allegations and other factual assertions * 
* 
* are supported by evidence.” ORCP 17 
C(3) - (4).
460	
Bogle v. State of Oregon
the petitioner had believed that his attorney was failing to 
raise a ground for relief, the petitioner had to inform the 
post-conviction court of that fact and ask the court either 
to replace the attorney or instruct the attorney to raise the 
ground for relief. Id. at 311-12.
	
In response to the filings citing Church in this 
case, the post-conviction court held a hearing on petitioner’s
pro se claims. During that hearing, the court reviewed each 
claim and explained to petitioner why it could not be raised. 
Then the court struck all of petitioner’s pro se claims.
	
After that hearing, this court issued its decision 
in Johnson v. Premo, 355 Or 866, 877, 333 P3d 288 (2014), 
in which it clarified that Church does not authorize a rep­
resented petitioner to assert pro se grounds for relief. This 
court explained,
“[N]othing in [Church] sanctions the sort of hybrid repre­
sentation that permits a post-conviction petitioner to be 
represented by counsel and, at the same time, flood the 
court with pro se motions and with other requests for relief 
any time the petitioner disagrees with counsel’s prosecu­
tion of the case. Church says no more than this: If a post-
conviction petitioner’s attorney fails to assert a ground for 
relief, the petitioner must bring that fact to the attention of 
the court to avoid the effect of ORS 138.550(3).”
Id.
	
Despite Johnson, petitioner filed a second series of 
pro se motions. Each motion cited Church as authority for 
filing the motion. However, only two of the motions asserted 
pro se grounds for relief that had not been addressed in the 
first Church hearing, and only one of those motions also 
asked the court to order counsel to raise the new ground for 
relief.2
	
2  Petitioner’s second series of pro se motions included motions relating to 
grounds for relief he wanted to assert and motions relating to other matters. 
The motions relating to grounds for relief included a renewed Church motion, a 
motion to allow new pro se claims, and a motion to amend the petition to include a 
claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Of those, only the last motion asked the post-
conviction court to instruct petitioner’s counsel to raise a ground for relief. The 
motions relating to other matters included a motion to supplement the record, 
a motion to disqualify the judge, a motion to separate the consolidated post-
conviction cases, and a motion to compel petitioner’s attorney to “either question 
witnesses via investigator, or by and through depositions.”
Cite as 363 Or 455 (2018)	
461
	
In response to petitioner’s second series of pro se 
motions, the post-conviction court held another hearing. At 
that hearing, the court explained that it had received and 
reviewed the new pro se filings and that the purpose of the 
hearing was “to clarify the record concerning these new fil­
ings.” The court stated that it wished to begin by explain­
ing its view, then allow petitioner to state his concerns, and 
finally “move forward with how to clarify things.” The court 
acknowledged that petitioner had cited Church as the basis 
for his pro se filings, but explained that, in its view,
“Church simply says an inmate must raise his claims some 
way. He cannot simply sit silent through judicial proceed­
ings and not raise his claims and then try to utilize those 
claims at a later time. That’s all Church v. Gladden says. It 
doesn’t authorize hearings, it doesn’t authorize a separate 
kind of motion practice[.]”
The post-conviction court also stated that, under Johnson, 
“if a litigant appears by counsel, they cannot also have
pro se matters themselves.” The court then recounted what 
had happened at and after the prior hearing:
“[W]hen we had our hearing last fall on what we called the 
Church v. Gladden hearing, the purpose of that hearing 
was to allow you to educate me about the claims that you 
wished to have certified in your petition and claims that 
your attorney had not been able to certify. So I allowed you 
to file a memorandum and we had oral discussion on the 
record about all of those claims and when we concluded, I 
gave you my ruling that those claims that you were wish­
ing to add to your petition lacked a legal or factual basis 
and I would not allow amendment of the petition.
	
“* 
* 
* 
* 
*
	
“Since that time, I’ve gotten various different motions 
where you are complaining that, hey, I didn’t get to amend 
my petition, and so I want to remove [the judge] and I want 
to have my pro se claims renewed and I want to have them 
established and I want to do depositions and I want to do 
other things under those claims[.] * 
* 
* So my ruling is 
you’ve made the record. Those claims are not authorized 
and we need to move forward to your trial * 
* 
*.
	
“* 
* 
* 
* 
*
462	
Bogle v. State of Oregon
	
“Now, those are the concerns I have, and as I view the 
record, I would say that each of your motions have already 
been established and that they do not have a legal basis 
and I would deny them and I would move forward to the 
trial date.”
	
The post-conviction court then gave petitioner 
an opportunity to explain why he had authority to file 
the motions and have the court consider them. Petitioner 
responded by explaining all of his motions and the concerns 
underlying them. Eventually, petitioner expressed con­
cerns about counsel’s performance and asked the court to 
replace counsel or allow petitioner to represent himself. The 
court denied petitioner’s request for substitution of counsel, 
because it concluded that none of petitioner’s concerns pro­
vided a basis for substitution. The court then reminded peti­
tioner that he could not simultaneously be represented by 
counsel and represent himself:
	
“One of the issues in [Johnson] is * 
* 
* you can’t have 
hybrid representation which is what you’ve been trying to 
do for the last six months, where you have a lawyer, a law­
yer has done your petition, is preparing for your trial and 
then you have filed a number of independent pro se motions. 
I’ve tried to rule on those as I mentioned and so your record 
is clear and you have the ability if your trial is unsuccess­
ful, you have the right to file an appeal and certainly your 
record would be there * 
* 
* but my ruling is there that I 
ruled that they do not have a legal or factual basis and they 
cannot be certified and so they cannot be part of the peti­
tion. * 
* 
* But I can’t allow you to try to be the lawyer of the 
case when you have a lawyer and I can’t allow you to con­
tinually repeat that I have additional motion or additional 
claims and feel like there’s the right to a hearing under 
Church v. Gladden because there is no such right.”
The court then inquired whether petitioner wanted to rep­
resent himself. Petitioner asked whether the case would be 
continued if he did, and the court answered that it would 
not, given the length of time it had been pending. Based 
on that ruling, petitioner withdrew his request to represent 
himself.
	
The post-conviction court ultimately determined 
that petitioner had received adequate assistance of counsel 
Cite as 363 Or 455 (2018)	
463
in both the original plea proceeding and the probation viola­
tion proceeding, and the court denied petitioner relief.
	
Petitioner appealed, challenging the post-conviction 
court’s response to his second series of pro se motions. 
Petitioner argued that, under Church, if a petitioner’s coun­
sel refuses to allege a claim, the petitioner may inform the 
court of that fact and the court may instruct counsel to raise 
the claim, if the court determines that the claim is “legiti­
mate,” that is, if it has “a basis in fact and law.” Petitioner 
further argued that the post-conviction court had failed to 
determine whether the claims he had identified in his sec­
ond series of pro se motions were legitimate. According to 
petitioner, the court denied petitioner’s request to raise the 
claims “because petitioner had already brought the court’s 
attention to other claims in a prior Church v. Gladden hear­
ing.” Alternatively, petitioner argued, if the court had deter­
mined that his pro se claims were not legitimate, it had 
erred because it had failed to make a record of its reasons 
for doing so.
	
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s argu­
ments, stating that nothing in Church required the post-
conviction court to consider petitioner’s pro se claims and 
decide whether to order petitioner’s attorney to raise them. 
Bogle v. State, 284 Or App at 884. Relying on Johnson, the 
Court of Appeals concluded:
“Church means simply that, to the extent the post-conviction 
court refused to consider those claims because they were 
not asserted through counsel, ORS 138.550(3) will not 
bar petitioner from pursuing them in a subsequent peti­
tion because he has followed Church’s directive by bringing 
those claims to the attention of the post-conviction court 
below in this proceeding.”
Bogle v. State, 284 Or App at 883-84.
	
The state petitioned the Court of Appeals to recon­
sider that interpretation of Church, and the Court of Appeals 
denied that petition. Both parties petitioned for review.
	
In his petition for review, petitioner asserted that, 
although Church requires a petitioner to notify the post-
conviction court if his or her attorney has declined to raise 
464	
Bogle v. State of Oregon
requested claims, the Court of Appeals had held that “a 
post-conviction court has no duty to respond to or consider 
them.” According to petitioner, “If that is the proper proce­
dure, it leaves several open questions, such as whether such 
requests can be reviewed on appeal or what the preclusive 
effect would be in a possible successive petition for post-
conviction relief.”
	
In its petition for review, the state asserted that the 
Court of Appeals had erred in holding that ORS 138.550(3) 
would not bar petitioner’s pro se claims in a subsequent 
post-conviction case. The state contended that the Court of 
Appeals’ holding is not supported by Church or Johnson and 
is contrary to the policy underlying ORS 138.550(3), which 
bars successive post-conviction cases.
	
We allowed review to clarify what Church authorizes 
a petitioner to file, what a post-conviction court is required 
to do in response to a Church motion, and what effect a 
Church motion has on a subsequent post-conviction case.3 
We address those issues below, after pausing to describe the 
facts of the petitioner’s other post-conviction case, Bogle v. 
Nooth, which is before us on a different issue.
B.  Bogle v. Nooth
	
While Bogle v. State was pending in the post-
conviction court, petitioner initiated a second post-conviction 
case by filing a petition that raised claims of inadequate 
assistance of counsel in both the original plea proceeding 
and the probation-revocation proceeding. On the state’s 
motion, the post-conviction court dismissed petitioner’s sec­
ond petition, citing both ORCP 21 A(3), which allows a court 
to dismiss an action when “there is another action pending 
between the same parties for the same cause,” and ORS 
138.550(3), which limits successive post-conviction cases.
	
On appeal, petitioner challenged both grounds 
for dismissal. Regarding ORCP 21 A(3), petitioner argued 
that the rule does not apply in post-conviction proceedings. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner failed to 
	
3  Petitioner filed pro se supplemental petitions for review, which we allowed, 
and pro se supplemental briefs. We reject without further discussion petitioner’s 
arguments in those briefs.
Cite as 363 Or 455 (2018)	
465
preserve that argument and therefore did not reach it. Bogle 
v. Nooth, 284 Or App at 880-81. Instead, the court assumed 
that OCRP 21 A(3) applied and held that the post-conviction 
court correctly dismissed the petition pursuant to that rule. 
Id. Because ORCP 21 A(3) provided a sufficient basis for dis­
missal, the Court of Appeals declined to address whether 
ORS 138.550(3) also authorized dismissal. Id. at 881.
II.  ANALYSIS
	
We address the issues in these consolidated cases 
separately, turning first to those in Bogle v. State and then 
those in Bogle v. Nooth.
A.  Bogle v. State
	
We begin with an overview of the relevant post-
conviction statutes. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act 
(PCHA), ORS 138.510 to ORS 138.686, was enacted to 
establish an exclusive procedure through which a person 
convicted of a state crime can challenge his or her convic­
tion. ORS 138.510 (“[A]ny person convicted of a crime under 
the laws of this state may file a petition for post-conviction 
relief.”); see generally Jack G. Collins and Carl R. Neil, 
The Oregon Postconviction Hearing Act, 39 Or L Rev 337 
(1960) (describing origins and provisions of PCHA).4 Post-
conviction relief can be granted for several reasons, includ­
ing that the petitioner’s conviction resulted from a “substan­
tial denial” of the petitioner’s state or federal constitutional 
rights, which renders “the conviction void.” ORS 138.530
(1)(a). Thus, a petitioner may obtain post-conviction relief 
if, among other things, his or her conviction resulted from 
a substantial denial of the state or federal right to counsel. 
See Stevens v. State of Oregon, 322 Or 101, 107-08, 902 P2d 
1137 (1995) (stating principle). To establish a denial of the 
right to counsel, a petitioner must establish that his or her 
counsel in the underlying criminal case failed to provide 
adequate representation, under the state constitution, or 
effective representation, under the federal constitution, and 
	
4  Collins and Neil participated in the drafting of the PCHA and wrote their 
article on the act shortly after the act was adopted. This court has repeatedly 
looked to the article to understand the meaning of the act. Verduzco v. State of 
Oregon, 357 Or 553, 570, 355 P3d 903 (2015) (citing Johnson, 355 Or at 874-75, 
and Benson v. Gladden, 242 Or 132, 135, 407 P2d 634 (1965)).
466	
Bogle v. State of Oregon
that the petitioner was prejudiced by that failure. Montez v. 
Czerniak, 355 Or 1, 7-8, 322 P3d 487, adh’d to as modified 
on recons, 355 Or 598, 330 P3d 595 (2014); see also State 
v. Smith, 339 Or 515, 526, 123 P3d 261 (2005) (observing 
that under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, 
the defendant’s right to counsel includes the right “to a 
lawyer who provides adequate assistance”); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 US 668, 686, 104 S Ct 2025, 80 L Ed 2d 
674 (1984) (recognizing that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel “is the right to the effective assistance of counsel” 
(internal quotation omitted)); State v. Davis, 345 Or 551, 
579, 201 P3d 185 (2008) (recognizing that the standards 
for determining adequacy of counsel under the state consti­
tution are functionally equivalent to those for determining 
the effectiveness of counsel under the federal constitution). 
If the petitioner establishes a denial of his or her right to 
counsel, the post-conviction court may order a new trial or 
other appropriate relief. ORS 138.520 (providing that the 
post-conviction court may order “release, new trial, modi­
fication of sentence, and such other relief as may be proper 
and just”).
	
A post-conviction case begins with the filing of a 
petition. ORS 138.560(1). If a petitioner wants to be repre­
sented by counsel but is unable to retain counsel, the peti­
tioner must file a pro se petition, together with a request 
for counsel. ORS 138.590(2). If the petitioner is financially 
eligible, the post-conviction court shall appoint “suitable” 
counsel to represent the petitioner. ORS 138.590(4); see also 
ORS 138.590(1) (“Any petitioner who is unable * 
* 
* to employ 
suitable counsel possessing skills and experience commen­
surate with the nature of the conviction and complexity of 
the case * 
* 
* may proceed as a financially eligible person.”). 
Thus, a financially-eligible petitioner has a statutory right 
to court-appointed counsel.
	
One reason the legislature provided for the 
appointment of post-conviction counsel was to ensure that 
post-conviction proceedings run smoothly and efficiently. 
Johnson, 355 Or at 874. As Collins and Neil explain,
“[t]he lack of counsel in post-conviction proceedings leads to 
confusion, misunderstanding, and an increased burden on 
circuit-court judges.” 39 Or L Rev at 351. A second reason 
Cite as 363 Or 455 (2018)	
467
for providing for the appointment of counsel was to ensure 
that petitioners did not inadvertently waive any grounds 
for relief. According to Collins and Neil, the appointment 
of counsel was “highly desirable in view of the strict res 
judicata provisions” of the PCHA. Id.; see also id. at 358 
(observing that the res judicata provisions apply “only to 
the effect of prior post-conviction proceedings under the act, 
when appointed counsel will always have been available in 
the first proceeding” (emphasis in original)).
	
ORS 138.550(3) is one of the res judicata provisions 
of the PCHA. As mentioned, it provides that any ground for 
relief that is not raised in a petitioner’s first post-conviction 
case is deemed waived, unless it could not reasonably have 
been raised in the first case. Specifically, it provides:
	
“All grounds for relief claimed by petitioner in a peti­
tion pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be asserted 
in the original or amended petition, and any grounds not 
so asserted are deemed waived unless the court on hear­
ing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted 
therein which could not reasonably have been raised in the 
original or amended petition.”
	
The res judicata provisions were among “the most 
important [provisions of] the act.” 39 Or L Rev at 356. They 
were intended to “provide a clear and workable basis for 
reducing the tide of post-conviction litigation to manageable 
proportions, while maintaining standards of fairness.” Id.
	
The right to counsel established by ORS 138.590 
and the claim preclusion rule established by ORS 138.550(3) 
were both at issue in Church. Because the parties’ argu­
ments in this case are based on their different interpreta­
tions of Church and Johnson, which interpreted Church, we 
describe those cases in some detail.
	
In Church, the petitioner was convicted of murder 
and, after an unsuccessful direct appeal, he filed a petition 
for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied 
relief and dismissed the petition. The petitioner then filed 
a second petition for post-conviction relief. In response to 
that petition, the defendant asserted, among other things, 
that two of the petitioner’s grounds for relief were barred by 
ORS 138.550(3) because they reasonably could have been 
468	
Bogle v. State of Oregon
raised in the petitioner’s first post-conviction case. The peti­
tioner countered that the grounds were not barred by ORS 
138.550(3) because the attorney who had represented him 
in his first post-conviction case had refused to raise them, 
even though the petitioner had asked him to do so.
	
On review, this court held that the grounds for relief 
were barred. Church, 244 Or at 313. It observed that, if the 
petitioner’s assertion that his prior attorney had refused 
to raise requested grounds for relief was sufficient to avoid 
claim preclusion under ORS 138.550(3), then it would be 
“absolutely impossible that there be any finality to this type 
of litigation.” Id. at 311. All a petitioner would need to do 
would be to “allege that his attorneys in each of his previ­
ous proceedings were unfaithful to [his] trust, and the door 
[would be] opened wide to relitigate ad infinitum.” Id. That 
result, this court explained, would be inconsistent with the 
PCHA’s res judicata provisions. As this court had held in 
Delaney v. Gladden, 232 Or 306, 374 P2d 746 (1962), cert 
den, 372 US 945 (1963), with respect to ORS 138.550(2), 
another res judicata provision of the PCHA, “ 
‘[t]he state is 
not obliged to provide a forum to hear and rehear cases that 
have already reached a lawful termination.’ 
” Church, 244 
Or at 312 (quoting Delaney, 232 Or at 308).
	
This court reasoned that, although the petitioner 
had been represented by counsel in his first case, the peti­
tioner himself had a duty to act when his attorney had 
refused his requests to raise the grounds for relief. In lan­
guage that has been often quoted since, this court stated:
“If petitioner’s attorney in the first post-conviction proceed­
ing failed to follow any legitimate request, petitioner could 
not sit idly by and later complain. He must inform the court 
at first opportunity of his attorney’s failure and ask to have 
him replaced, or ask to have him instructed by the court to 
carry out petitioner’s request.”
Id. at 311-12 (emphasis added). Because the petitioner had 
not informed the post-conviction court of the grounds for 
relief that his attorney had refused to raise, this court con­
cluded that the petitioner had “acquiesced” in his attorney’s 
failure to raise them and, therefore, could not raise them in 
his second post-conviction case. Id. at 312.
Cite as 363 Or 455 (2018)	
469
	
The broad language in Church regarding a peti­
tioner’s obligation to inform the post-conviction court if 
counsel is failing to “follow any legitimate request,” could 
be read as authorizing a petitioner to seek court assistance 
whenever the petitioner disagrees with counsel regarding 
the litigation of his or her case. But, in Johnson, this court 
held that the Church holding is limited by its factual con­
text. It simply identifies steps a petitioner can take when 
counsel has failed to raise a ground for relief. 355 Or at 877.
	
In Johnson, the petitioner was convicted of aggra­
vated murder, and after an unsuccessful appeal, he filed a 
petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court 
granted the petition, and the defendant appealed. The peti­
tioner filed a pro se notice of cross-appeal and multiple pro se 
motions. After learning that the petitioner was represented 
by appellate counsel, the defendant moved to strike the peti­
tioner’s pro se motions. The Appellate Commissioner denied 
the motion in part, and the defendant petitioned for recon­
sideration by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals 
held that Church authorizes a represented petitioner to file 
pro se motions in some circumstances; specifically,
“ 
‘[a] petitioner who is represented by appointed counsel on 
appeal may file a motion in his or her own name based on a 
showing that the petitioner has a good faith and objectively 
reasonable belief that counsel lacks, or is failing to exercise 
the “skills and experience commensurate with the nature 
of the conviction and complexity of the case.”’ 
”
Johnson, 355 Or at 870 (quoting Court of Appeals’ Order 
on Reconsideration (quoting ORS 138.590)). Applying that 
holding, the Court of Appeals concluded that the petitioner 
had failed to make the requisite showing and struck the peti­
tioner’s pro se motions. The defendant petitioned for review, 
challenging the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Church.
	
On review, this court in Johnson began by noting 
that it was well-established that a represented party must 
appear through counsel. 355 Or at 871-72; see ORS 9.320 
(“Where a party appears by attorney, the written proceed­
ings must be in the name of the attorney who is the sole rep­
resentative of the client[.]”); ORCP 17 (requiring that a rep­
resented party’s court documents be signed by the party’s 
470	
Bogle v. State of Oregon
attorney); ORAP 1.40(4) (adopting ORCP 17 “as a rule of 
appellate procedure applicable to the Supreme Court and 
the Court of Appeals”). This court then considered whether 
Church created an exception to that rule, and concluded that 
it did not. As set forth above, it held:
“[N]othing in the opinion sanctions the sort of hybrid rep­
resentation that permits a post-conviction petitioner to be 
represented by counsel and, at the same time, flood the 
court with pro se motions and other requests for relief any 
time the petitioner disagrees with counsel’s prosecution of 
the case. Church says no more than this: If a post-conviction 
petitioner’s attorney fails to assert a ground for relief, the 
petitioner must bring that fact to the attention of the court to 
avoid the effect of ORS 138.550(3).”
Johnson, 355 Or at 877 (emphasis added). Thus, Church “did 
not sanction pro se filings to complain about the failure of 
counsel to agree with a post-conviction petitioner on every 
single issue of trial strategy.” Id. Properly understood in the 
context of the question presented in the case, Church “is lim­
ited to the matter of attempting to relitigate a ‘ground for 
relief’ within the meaning of ORS 138.550(3).” Id.
	
Applying that view of Church, this court affirmed 
the Court of Appeals’ disposition of the petitioner’s pro se 
motions. Id. at 878. This court held that, even assuming 
Church applies in appeals, as the petitioner had argued, the 
petitioner’s pro se motions did not come “within the ambit 
of Church” because none of them concerned “whether peti­
tioner’s appellate counsel had declined to advance a ground 
for post-conviction relief.” Id.
	
Thus, Johnson clarified two important limits of 
Church. First, Church does not authorize hybrid represen­
tation. It does not create an exception to the general rule 
that a represented party must appear through counsel. 
Consequently, if a represented petitioner files a motion that 
purports to be based on Church but actually is an attempt at 
hybrid representation, the post-conviction court may strike 
the motion. See ORS 9.320 (providing that, “where a party 
appears by attorney,” the attorney “is the sole representa­
tive of the client”); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 123-25, 806 
P2d 92 (1991) (holding that, in a criminal case, there is no 
Cite as 363 Or 455 (2018)	
471
state constitutional right to hybrid representation, but a 
trial court may allow such representation). For example, if 
a represented petitioner files a motion to personally litigate 
grounds for relief in addition to those being litigated by the 
petitioner’s attorney, the court may strike the motion.
	
Second, Church identified a means for petitioners to 
raise a concern about counsel, specifically, a concern about 
counsel’s failure to raise one or more grounds for relief. 
Church did not authorize petitioners to seek court interven­
tion to resolve every disagreement they may have with coun­
sel. Thus, a pro se motion that, for example, asks a court to 
instruct counsel to conduct certain depositions or call cer­
tain witnesses at trial is not a proper Church motion. As we 
understand Church, as clarified by Johnson, the purpose of 
a proper Church motion is to notify the post-conviction court 
that counsel has failed to raise certain grounds for relief 
and to ask the court to either replace counsel or instruct coun­
sel to raise those grounds for relief. Thus, a proper Church 
motion is, essentially, a motion for substitution of counsel or 
for the less drastic remedy of instruction of counsel.
	
Neither Church nor Johnson address what a peti­
tioner must show to secure substitution or instruction of 
counsel. But because both of those actions require court 
intervention into an attorney-client relationship, we con­
clude that, for a court to be required to substitute or instruct 
a petitioner’s attorney, the petitioner must have a “legit­
imate complaint” about counsel. See State v. Langley, 314 
Or 247, 257, 839 P2d 692 (1992), adh’d to on recons, 318 Or 
28, 861 P2d 1012 (1993) (stating that a criminal defendant 
has “no right to have another court-appointed lawyer in the 
absence of a legitimate complaint concerning the one already 
appointed for him” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
	
Although Church states that a petitioner may 
“ask to have [counsel] replaced, or ask to have [counsel] 
instructed by the court to carry out petitioner’s request,” 
244 Or at 311-12, we conclude that the showing a petitioner 
must make is the same regardless of which remedy the peti­
tioner seeks, because, although instruction of counsel may 
be a less drastic remedy, it requires the court to intervene in 
the attorney-client relationship in a directive way and such 
472	
Bogle v. State of Oregon
intervention is appropriate only when the petitioner has a 
legitimate complaint against his attorney. If a petitioner 
makes the required showing for substitution of counsel, the 
post-conviction court can replace counsel or take the lesser 
step of instructing counsel, if it determines that counsel will 
follow the instruction. See Smith, 339 Or at 525 (stating that 
“a trial court has an obligation to consider and grant or deny 
a motion for substitute counsel” and such a motion “should 
be granted if the defendant’s complaint is legitimate and 
denied if it is not”).
	
As with a motion for substitution of counsel in a 
criminal case, a petitioner who files a Church motion bears 
the burden of establishing that substitution of counsel is 
appropriate. Id. at 524 (observing that in State v. Davidson, 
252 Or 617, 619-20, 451 P2d 481 (1969), this court “placed 
the obligation of coming forward with ‘adequate reasons’ for 
the substitution of counsel or a ‘legitimate complaint’ about 
existing counsel squarely on the defendant”). In a criminal 
case, one way a defendant can establish that substitution of 
counsel is appropriate is by showing that counsel is failing 
to provide adequate representation. Langley, 314 Or at 258 
(observing that a “legitimate complaint” about appointed 
counsel “is one that is based on an abridgement of a criminal 
defendant’s constitutional right to counsel,” which “requires 
adequate performance of an appointed lawyer’s professional 
assistance”). Counsel in a criminal case fails to provide 
adequate representation if he or she fails “to exercise rea­
sonable professional skill and judgment.” Trujillo v. Maass, 
312 Or 431, 435, 822 P2d 703 (1991). Although the right to 
counsel in a post-conviction case is statutory, not constitu­
tional, appointed counsel—like all counsel—must exercise 
reasonable professional skill and judgment. Consequently, 
a petitioner can establish that replacement or instruction of 
counsel is appropriate if counsel is failing to exercise rea­
sonable professional skill and judgment.
	
To summarize, we conclude that (1) the purpose of 
a petitioner’s Church motion is to inform the post-conviction 
court that petitioner’s counsel has failed to assert a ground 
for relief and to ask the court either to replace counsel or 
to instruct counsel to assert the ground for relief; (2) given 
that purpose, a petitioner must make a legitimate complaint 
Cite as 363 Or 455 (2018)	
473
regarding counsel; (3) a legitimate complaint includes a 
complaint that counsel is not exercising reasonable profes­
sional skill and judgment. Based on those conclusions, we 
further conclude that, to prevail on a Church motion, a peti­
tioner must show that counsel has failed to raise a ground 
for relief and, in doing so, has failed to exercise reasonable 
professional skill and judgment.
	
Thus, the inquiry that a post-conviction court must 
make in response to a Church motion is whether the peti­
tioner’s complaint about counsel is legitimate. Contrary 
to petitioner’s argument in this case, it is not whether the 
grounds for relief that the petitioner wants to raise are 
legitimate. Counsel may make strategic choices about which 
grounds for relief to assert and may decline to assert a ground 
for relief, even if it is supported by fact and law, in order to 
focus on more promising grounds for relief. See Krummacher 
v. Gierloff, 290 Or 867, 875, 627 P2d 458 (1981) (stating that 
a lawyer is not required to “automatically do the defendant’s 
bidding in all respects or otherwise suspend the operation 
of professional ethics and judgment[,] * 
* 
* [or] expend time 
and energy uselessly or for negligible potential benefit under 
the circumstances of the case”). Thus, the question before a 
court ruling on a Church motion is whether the petitioner 
has established that, in choosing which grounds for relief to 
raise, counsel has failed to exercise reasonable professional 
skill and judgment.
	
As with motions for substitution of counsel in crim­
inal cases, the steps that a post-conviction court takes in 
response to a Church motion may vary. The post-conviction 
court has an obligation to consider and rule on the motion. 
See Smith, 339 Or at 525 (describing trial court’s duties 
regarding motions for substitution of counsel). But whether 
the court will need to hold a hearing, inquire of counsel, 
or take other steps will depend on the circumstances. See 
id. at 530 (“[A] trial court should exercise its discretion in 
ruling on a motion for appointment of new counsel, engag­
ing in such inquiry as the nature of defendant’s complaint 
requires.”). As in a criminal case,
“determining the legitimacy of any complaint about 
appointed counsel is case- and fact-specific, and it leaves 
474	
Bogle v. State of Oregon
to the trial court the task of weighing whatever the defen­
dant puts before that court in light of all the other known 
circumstances, such as the judge’s personal observations of 
the performance of counsel.”
Id. at 525.
	
When determining what steps to take in response 
to a Church motion and when ultimately ruling on the 
motion, a post-conviction court should consider the impor­
tance of post-conviction counsel, given the PCHA’s strict 
res judicata provisions, and the fact that a petitioner can­
not bring a subsequent post-conviction case to challenge the 
adequacy of post-conviction counsel. At the same time, the 
court should consider the potential problems that could arise 
if it intervenes too much in the attorney-client relationship. 
See Smith, 339 Or at 529 (noting that certain inquiries into 
complaints about counsel can raise issues about, among 
other things, “the disclosure of privileged communications, 
lawyer work product, and trial strategy”). Generally, a post-
conviction court presented with a proper Church motion 
should review the motion and give the petitioner a reason­
able opportunity to establish the basis for replacement or 
instruction of the petitioner’s current counsel. See, e.g., id. at 
531 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying a defendant’s motion for substitution of counsel 
when the court “heard and considered defendant’s concerns 
and concluded that defendant had not demonstrated a legit­
imate reason for the court to appoint substitute counsel”). 
In some cases, a court may be able to make its ruling based 
solely on the petitioner’s written motion; in other cases, a 
hearing may be required.
	
If a post-conviction court denies a petitioner’s 
Church motion, but the petitioner still wants to raise the 
grounds for relief that counsel has declined to raise, the 
petitioner can move to dismiss counsel and proceed pro se 
and, if that motion is granted, raise the grounds person­
ally. Alternatively, the petitioner can continue with current 
counsel and, if need be, challenge the denial of the Church 
motion on direct appeal, just as a defendant can challenge 
the denial of a motion for substitution of counsel in a crimi­
nal case.
Cite as 363 Or 455 (2018)	
475
	
The process established by Church for petitioners to 
seek court intervention to ensure claims are raised should 
not lead to serial pro se filings. Because the purpose of a 
proper Church motion is to enable a petitioner to raise con­
cerns about counsel’s failure to assert certain grounds for 
relief in a petition, a court could establish a rule requiring 
petitioners to raise all such concerns in a single filing and 
within a specific time period following counsel’s filing of the 
petition, with an exception for good cause. See, e.g., Malheur 
County Circuit Court Supplementary Local Rule 4.105(2) 
(requiring petitioners to file “any Church claims, together 
with supporting evidence” “[n]o later than sixty (60) days 
after receipt of the amended petition or notice of intent to 
proceed on the original petition”).
	
With that understanding of what constitutes a 
proper Church motion and what a post-conviction court is 
required to do in response to a Church motion, we return to 
the parties’ arguments in this case. As mentioned, petitioner 
argues that the post-conviction court erred in its response 
to his second series of pro se motions. Specifically, he argues 
that the post-conviction court erred by denying the motions, 
because it did not determine whether they were “ ‘legiti­
mate’, that is, supported by fact and law.” Petitioner further 
argues, in the alternative, that even if the post-conviction 
court made that determination, it erred because it did not 
make a record of its reasons for the determination.
	
We conclude that the post-conviction court did not 
err in its response to petitioner’s second series of pro se 
motions. Some of the motions were attempts at hybrid rep­
resentation and were properly rejected as such. Only three 
of the motions concerned grounds for relief that petitioner 
wanted to assert, and only one of those asked the court to 
instruct counsel to raise a ground for relief. Contrary to 
petitioner’s argument on review, the court was not required 
to determine whether each of the grounds for relief that peti­
tioner had identified was supported by fact and law. That is 
because, when deciding whether to replace or instruct coun­
sel pursuant to Church, the question for the post-conviction 
court is whether petitioner’s complaint about counsel is 
legitimate; that is, whether petitioner has established that 
476	
Bogle v. State of Oregon
counsel’s failure to raise a ground for relief constitutes a 
failure to exercise reasonable professional skill and judg­
ment. The record in this case shows that the court consid­
ered that question and resolved it against petitioner. The 
court reviewed petitioner’s filings, held a hearing on them, 
listened to petitioner’s arguments about the grounds for 
relief he wanted asserted, and concluded that petitioner had 
failed to establish that the grounds for relief had to be added 
to the petition. As evidenced by its denial of the request for 
replacement counsel petitioner made at the hearing, the 
court concluded that petitioner had failed to establish that 
counsel was failing to exercise reasonable professional skill 
and judgment.5  Therefore, the post-conviction court did not 
err as petitioner argues.
	
We turn finally to the state’s argument on review. 
As described above, the state argues that the Court of 
Appeals erred in holding that, because petitioner had “fol­
lowed Church’s directive by bringing [his pro se claims] to 
the attention of the post-conviction court below in this pro­
ceeding,” ORS 138.550(3) would not bar him from raising 
those claims in a subsequent post-conviction proceeding. 
The state argues that the Court of Appeals’ holding is incon­
sistent with ORS 138.550(3), is not supported by Church, 
and, is contrary to the limits on successive post-conviction 
proceedings and hybrid representation, which this court 
recognized in Church and Johnson.
	
We agree with the state. The Court of Appeals’ 
holding is inconsistent with ORS 138.550(3)’s limit on 
successive post-conviction proceedings. ORS 138.550(3) 
requires petitioners to raise all of their grounds for relief 
in their first post-conviction case, and provides that any 
ground that is not raised is waived, unless it could not rea­
sonably have been raised in the first case. In Church, this 
court held that, for the purposes of ORS 138.550(3), the fact 
that a petitioner’s attorney declined to raise a ground for 
relief does not mean that the ground could not reasonably 
	
5  As mentioned, the second series of pro se motions included three motions 
concerning claims petitioner wanted to assert. Two of those motions did not 
expressly ask the court either to replace or instruct counsel. To the extent that 
those motions were attempts at hybrid representation, they could be struck.
Cite as 363 Or 455 (2018)	
477
have been raised. But the Court of Appeals’ holding in this 
case would allow petitioners to raise grounds for relief, even 
though they could reasonably have been raised in an earlier 
post-conviction case, and that is contrary to the text of ORS 
138.550(3).
	
Church does not suggest that, if a petitioner 
informed the post-conviction court of grounds for relief that 
petitioner’s counsel was not raising, the petitioner could 
raise those grounds in a subsequent post-conviction case. To 
the contrary, Church stated that a petitioner could inform a 
post-conviction court of such grounds for relief and ask the 
court either to replace counsel or instruct counsel to raise 
the grounds for relief. The remedies that Church identifies—
replacement or instruction of counsel—would result in the 
grounds for relief being raised in the current post-conviction 
case, not preserved for a future case.
	
In Church, this court recognized that ORS 
138.550(3) was intended to limit serial litigation of post-
conviction cases arising out of a single criminal prosecu­
tion, and in Johnson this court held that post-conviction 
petitioners do not have a right to hybrid representation. The 
Court of Appeals’ holding in this case is at odds with both 
Church and Johnson, because it would allow serial litiga­
tion and enable petitioners to engage in hybrid represen­
tation. Under the Court of Appeals’ holding, if a petitioner 
informed the post-conviction court of grounds for relief that 
counsel was not raising, the petitioner could bring a second 
post-conviction case and ask counsel in that case to raise 
the claims. If petitioner’s second counsel also declined to 
raise the claims, the process could repeat and result in ad 
infinitum litigation, which this court warned against in 
Church. If the petitioner elected to represent himself or her­
self in the second post-conviction case, then the petitioner 
would be able to engage in hybrid representation by rais­
ing claims through counsel in the first case and then rais­
ing claims personally in the second. As the state correctly 
points out, that would simply be “hybrid representation in 
a different form—and one that is more inefficient, because 
the counseled and pro se litigation would proceed sequen­
tially rather than in parallel.”
478	
Bogle v. State of Oregon
	
In sum, we conclude that the post-conviction court 
did not err in its response to petitioner’s pro se motions, 
but the Court of Appeals did err in holding that, because 
petitioner filed the motions, ORS 138.550(3) would not bar 
him from later raising the claims he had identified in the 
motions.
B.  Bogle v. Nooth
	
We now turn to the issue presented in Bogle v. 
Nooth. As mentioned previously, the post-conviction court 
dismissed the petition in Bogle v. Nooth on two alternative 
grounds: (1) ORCP 21 A(3), which provides that a defendant 
may move to dismiss an action on the ground “that there 
is another action pending between the same parties for the 
same cause,” and (2) ORS 138.550(3), which provides that 
any “grounds for relief” that were not “asserted in the orig­
inal or amended petition” are “deemed waived” unless they 
“could not reasonably have been raised in the original or 
amended petition.”
	
On review, petitioner argues that neither ORCP 
21 A(3) nor ORS 138.550(3) authorized the post-conviction 
court to dismiss his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Regarding the dismissal under ORCP 21 A(3), petitioner 
asserts that the rule does not apply in post-conviction pro­
ceedings because it is inconsistent with ORS 138.550(3). In 
petitioner’s view, ORCP 21 A(3) would not allow simultane­
ous post-conviction cases arising out of the same underlying 
criminal conviction, but ORS 138.550(3) would, if the lat­
er-filed petition for post-conviction relief asserted “grounds 
for relief” that “could not reasonably have been raised” in an 
earlier petition. Therefore, petitioner reasons, the rule and 
statute are inconsistent and, because the statute is specific 
to post-conviction cases, it controls. See Mueller v. Benning, 
314 Or 615, 621 n 6, 841 P2d 640 (1992) (the Oregon Rules of 
Civil Procedure apply to post-conviction proceedings unless 
the post-conviction statutes provide otherwise); see also ORS 
174.020(2) (when statutes conflict, the more specific statute 
controls).
	
Petitioner also argues that the post-conviction court 
erred in concluding that ORS 138.550(3), which bars suc­
cessive claims, justified the dismissal because, according to 
Cite as 363 Or 455 (2018)	
479
petitioner, the court applied the wrong test for determin­
ing whether the claims were barred. Specifically, petitioner 
argues that the post-conviction court dismissed the claims 
under ORS 138.550(3) based on its determination that 
the action involved “the same body of operative facts, but 
that the appropriate standard, based on the text of ORS 
138.550(3), is whether the grounds “could not reasonably 
have been raised” in an earlier petition.
	
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner did not 
preserve his argument that ORCP 21 A(3) does not apply 
in post-conviction proceedings, and petitioner does not dis­
pute that holding. Instead, he asserts—for the first time 
in this case—that the post-conviction court’s application of 
ORCP 21 A(3) was “plain error.” However, petitioner makes 
no argument that the error is not reasonably in dispute and 
we conclude that the post-conviction court’s error, if any, is 
not so obvious that it is beyond reasonable dispute. State v. 
Serrano, 355 Or 172, 179, 324 P3d 1274 (2014) (to qualify 
as “plain error,” an asserted error must be one of law that 
is apparent on the face of the record and not reasonably in 
dispute). Because the post-conviction court dismissed peti­
tioner’s petition based on ORCP 21 A(3) and, in the alter­
native, ORS 138.550(3), and petitioner has failed to estab­
lish that the court erred by relying on the former, we need 
not determine whether the court erred by relying on the
latter.
III.  CONCLUSION
	
In sum, in Bogle v. State, we conclude that the post-
conviction court did not err in its response to petitioner’s
pro se motions. Contrary to petitioner’s argument, Church 
does not require a post-conviction court to determine 
whether each claim that a petitioner asserts counsel should 
raise is supported by facts and law. Instead, Church simply 
provides that, if counsel declines to raise a ground for relief 
that the petitioner wants to be raised, the petitioner can 
ask the court to replace counsel or instruct counsel to raise 
the ground for relief. To be entitled to such court action, the 
petitioner must establish that counsel’s failure to raise the 
claim constitutes a failure to exercise reasonable profes­
sional skill and judgment. In this case, the post-conviction 
480	
Bogle v. State of Oregon
court determined that petitioner failed to carry that burden. 
Therefore, the court did not err.
	
In Bogle v. Nooth, we conclude that petitioner has 
not established that the post-conviction plainly erred in dis­
missing that case based on ORCP 21 A(3).
	
The decisions of the Court of Appeals and the judg­
ments of the circuit court are affirmed.