Title: Young v. Honeycutt

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

James H. YOUNG v. Tammy Lynn HONEYCUTT

95-1209                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 15, 1996


1.   New trial -- appellant's argument without merit -- present
     rules of civil procedure do not require judge to state with
     particularity reasons for granting a new trial. -- Appellant's
     contention that the trial judge's order granting the new trial
     was deficient because it did not include a "finding" that
     stated with particularity the reasons for the judge's decision
     to grant a new trial or that the jury's verdict was clearly
     contrary to the preponderance of the evidence was without
     merit; there is no such requirement in the Arkansas Rules of
     Civil Procedure.

2.   New trial -- when a new trial may be granted -- trial court's
     discretion is limited. -- Rule 59(a)(6) of the Arkansas Rules
     of Civil Procedure provides that a new trial may be granted to
     all or any of the parties on all or part of the issues on the
     application of the party aggrieved when the verdict or
     decision is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence;
     the trial court has limited discretion in the matter; it may
     not substitute its view of the evidence for the jury's except
     when the verdict is clearly against the preponderance of the
     evidence; however, the trial court may grant a new trial when
     a miscarriage of justice has occurred. 

3.   New trial -- review of trial court's granting of new trial --
     standard on review. -- In reviewing the trial court's granting
     of a motion for new trial, the test is whether the judge
     abused his or her discretion; this standard requires a showing
     of "clear" abuse or "manifest" abuse by acting improvidently
     or thoughtlessly without due consideration; a showing of abuse
     of discretion is more difficult when a new trial has been
     granted because the party opposing the motion will have
     another opportunity to prevail.

4.   New trial -- new trial ordered -- no abuse of discretion
     found. -- Where appellant admitted that he never slowed down
     or applied his brakes before he hit the white car, even though
     he couldn't see anything but water, and where there was a
     distance of approximately 500 feet from the crest of bridge to
     accident site and nothing obstructing appellant's view from
     the crest of the bridge to the stopped vehicles, the evidence
     demonstrated a course of conduct contrary to that which an
     ordinary person would have undertaken when confronted with
     such an emergency; AMI 901, which was read by the trial court
     to the jury, describes a driver's duty to lookout for other
     vehicles, to keep his vehicle under control and to drive at a
     speed that is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances;
     as it was uncontroverted that appellant did not decrease his
     speed when water splashed on his windshield, the trial court
     did not err in concluding that a new trial was warranted on
     the basis that the negligence of the first driver, if any, was
     exceeded by the negligence of appellant;  the trial court did
     not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial.
           

     Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court, Greenwood Division; John
Holland, Judge; affirmed.
     Pryor, Barry, Smith, Karber & Alford, by:  Ben T. Barry, for
appellant. 
     Jones, Jackson & Moll PLC, by:  Kendall B. Jones and J. Scott
Hardin, for appellee.

     Bradley D. Jesson, Chief Justice.April 15, 1996  *ADVREP1*






JAMES H. YOUNG,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

TAMMY LYNN HONEYCUTT,
                    APPELLEE,





95-1209


APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, GREENWOOD
DIVISION (CV94-140-G II)


HONORABLE JOHN HOLLAND
CIRCUIT JUDGE




AFFIRMED.


                  CHIEF JUSTICE BRADLEY JESSON


     The jury returned a defendant's verdict in this case involving
an automobile accident on a highway bridge.  The trial court
granted the plaintiff's motion for new trial, from which the
defendant appeals.  We affirm.  
     Shortly before 5:00 p.m. on June 3, 1994, appellee Tammy Lynn
Honeycutt was driving westbound on the Midland Avenue bridge from
Van Buren to Fort Smith.  Due to rainy conditions, she was
traveling under the 40 m.p.h. speed limit.  She could see with the
use of her windshield wipers, which were operating at normal speed. 
Honeycutt was in the right-hand lane when her car hydroplaned, slid
into the left lane, hit the concrete divider on the bridge, and
came to a stop.  She looked in her rear view mirror and saw a white
car pull up behind her and turn on its flashers.  Honeycutt then
activated her flashers so that the person behind her would know she
wanted to exit her car.  She had turned her car off and pulled up
the emergency brake when the white car behind her was rear-ended by
appellant James H. Young's truck, forcing the white car into hers. 
It was Honeycutt's testimony that Young apologized to her after the
accident, told her that he had not seen her, had not touched the
brake, and never slowed down.  Young explained to her that he was
trying to clear some water off his windshield that had splashed
over from the opposite side of the bridge.
     Officer David Thomas of the Fort Smith Police Department
investigated the accident.  Though it was raining on his way to the
scene, he stated he had no problem seeing while driving with the
aid of his windshield wipers.  He testified that the accident
occurred 500 feet from the crest of the bridge.  According to
Thomas, there was nothing obstructing Young's view from the crest
of the bridge to the stopped vehicles.  Young told Thomas that he
had been traveling in the left lane and that water had splashed
over the concrete barrier from the other lanes onto his windshield,
preventing him from seeing the vehicles stopped in front of him
until the collision occurred.  However, he told Thomas that he
continued at a steady speed and did not see any reason to slow
down.  While Thomas saw flashers on Honeycutt's vehicle, he did not
recall seeing flashers on the white car.  Because the rear end of
the white car was smashed, Thomas opined that the damage could have
caused the flashers not to operate.   
     Regarding damages, Honeycutt stated that while she was not
hurt in any manner from the initial contact she made with the
bridge, her head hit the seat-belt latch after the white car was
knocked into hers, causing her car to turn completely around.  She
described an "egg-size" knot on the back of her head, and stated
that her neck, back, and left collarbone were also hurting.  The
same evening of the accident, she went to the hospital, where she
underwent x-rays and was given muscle relaxers and pain pills. 
Three days later, Honeycutt was experiencing pain in both legs,
headaches, and soreness.  She was referred an orthopedic surgeon,
who diagnosed cervical and thoracic strain.  Honeycutt completed
approximately three weeks of physical therapy.  In her negligence
claim against Young, she sought damages for personal injuries, past
and future medical expenses, past and future mental anguish, and
lost income.  She prayed for $30,000, including $5,203.57 in
medical expenses and $208.84 for 23 hours of lost wages.  
     After the trial court denied Young's motion for directed
verdict, Young testified that it was raining very hard at the time
of the accident, and that he caught the hardest part of the rain on
the bridge.  He estimated his speed at 30 m.p.h. or slower because
of the weather.  It was Young's testimony that he got caught in the
inside lane because of traffic and could not change lanes. 
According to Young, he did not see anything or slow down before he
hit the white car, and he did not see any emergency flashers on the
white car or on Honeycutt's vehicle.
     At the close of all the evidence, various AMI instructions
were submitted to the jury, including the burden of proof for
damages based on negligence, proximate cause, the common law rules
of the road, and comparative negligence.  The jury returned a
unanimous verdict for Young, who appeals from the trial court's
granting of Honeycutt's motion for new trial.
     Young first contends that the trial judge's order granting the
new trial is deficient because it does not include a "finding" that
the jury's verdict was clearly contrary to the preponderance of the
evidence.  Before the Uniform Rules for Circuit and Chancery Court
were abolished in 1988, see In Re: Abolishment of the Uniform Rules
of Circuit and Chancery Courts, 294 Ark. 664, 742 S.W.2d 551
(1987), Rule 16 required judges to state, with particularity, the
specific reasons for their decision in their order granting the new
trial.  If they failed to do so, there was a presumption on appeal
that the jury's verdict was correct. See e.g., Stephens v,
Saunders, 293 Ark. 279, 737 S.W.2d 626 (1987); Brant v. Sorrels,
293 Ark. 276, 737 S.W.2d 450 (1987).  There is no such requirement
present in Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure; thus, Young's
argument is without merit.   
     Young next contends that the trial court abused its discretion
in granting a new trial because the jury's verdict was not clearly
against the preponderance of the evidence.  Rule 59(a)(6) of the
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties on all or part of the issues
on the application of the party aggrieved when the verdict or
decision is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.  The
trial court has limited discretion in the matter, as it may not
substitute its view of the evidence for the jury's except when the
verdict is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.
Bristow v. Flurry, 320 Ark. 51, 894 S.W.2d 894 (1995); Richardson
v. Flanery, 316 Ark. 310, 871 S.W.2d 589 (1994).  However, the
trial court may grant a new trial when a miscarriage of justice has
occurred.  Brant v. Sorrells, supra.  In reviewing the trial
court's granting of a motion for new trial, the test is whether the
judge abused his or her discretion. Bristow v. Flurry, supra;
Richardson v. Flanery, supra.   We have further described this
standard as requiring a showing of "clear" abuse, see Brant v.
Sorrells, supra; Saber Mfg. Co. v. Thompson, 286 Ark. 150, 689 S.W.2d 567 (1985), or "manifest" abuse by acting improvidently or
thoughtlessly without due consideration. See Dedman v. Porch, 293
Ark. 571,