Title: Valentine v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

688 So. 2d 313 (1996)
Terance VALENTINE, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 84472.

Supreme Court of Florida.
December 19, 1996.
Rehearing Denied February 19, 1997.
*314 James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Douglas S. Connor, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Carol M. Dittmar, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
SHAW, Justice.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the death penalty on Terance Valentine. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We affirm the first-degree murder conviction and sentence of death.
The underlying facts of the crime are set out in this Court's initial opinion on direct appeal:
Valentine v. State, 616 So. 2d 971, 972 (Fla. 1993).
Valentine was convicted on all counts, the jury recommended death on the first-degree murder charge by a ten-to-two vote, and the judge imposed a sentence of death, finding three aggravating circumstances[1] and three mitigating circumstance.[2] This Court reversed the conviction and vacated the sentence due to a jury selection error under State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla.1984). On retrial, Valentine was again convicted on all counts but this time he waived the jury advisory sentence and presented mitigating evidence directly to the judge. The trial court described the brutality of the crime:
The court sentenced Valentine to consecutive terms of imprisonment on the non-capital offenses[3] and imposed a sentence of death on the first-degree murder conviction based on four aggravating circumstances[4] and four mitigating circumstances.[5] Valentine raises nine issues.[6]
Valentine first claims that he and Romero were never legally divorced and that the husband-wife evidentiary privilege thus barred portions of Romero's testimony. We disagree. The privilege provides:
§ 90.504, Fla. Stat. (1993). An exception to the privilege permits testimony in certain cases of inter-spousal crime:
§ 90.504(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (1993). Valentine contends that although Romero's testimony concerning the attempted murder of her is embraced within the above exception to the privilege, her testimony concerning Porche's murder is not and thus is shielded by the privilege.
We find this claim to be without merit. The plain language of the above exception encompasses precisely the situation claimed by Valentine to exist in the present case: This is a proceeding (a criminal trial) in which one alleged spouse (Valentine) is charged with committing a crime (attempted first-degree murder) against the person of the other spouse (Romero). This reading of the exception comports with the basic policy underlying the privilege, which is to promote marital harmony. The construction urged by Valentine, on the other hand, would make a mockery of that policy, for howor why would the state possibly seek to promote marital harmony between a killer and his would-be victim?[7] We find no error.
*317 Valentine next points out that when he was apprehended by the FBI near New Orleans, officers were acting on a warrant later determined to be flawed, resulting in his illegal arrest. He claims that his statement to Detective Fernandez of the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office was tainted by his unlawful arrest. We disagree. The United States Supreme Court has addressed this issue:
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975)(footnotes and citation omitted).
In the present case, the record supports the trial court's finding that Valentine's statement was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest to purge it of any possible taint. The statement was made nearly two days after the arrest; Valentine had been advised of his rights repeatedly; he had been taken before two federal magistrates; and the nature of the illegality itself was inadvertent and nonflagrant, which Valentine concedes.[8] We find no error.
Evidence was introduced showing that footprints made by an athletic-type shoe were found on the ground outside Romero's home, on the sliding glass door that had been kicked in, and on the ground in the open field a few feet from the abandoned Blazer. Valentine claims that this evidence should not have been admitted because it was insufficiently linked to him. We disagree. Romero testified that Valentine was wearing tennis shoes at the time of the crime. She gave a description of the perpetrator, including his shoes, to the officer at the scene. Further, the footprints show the perpetrator's path of access into the house and presence in the immediate area of the killing, thus substantiating Romero's version of events. We find no error.
Valentine next argues that his conviction for attempted first-degree murder is error. We agree. The jury was instructed on two possible theories on this count, attempted first-degree felony murder and attempted first degree premeditated murder, and the verdict fails to state on which ground the jury relied. After Valentine was sentenced, this Court held that the crime of attempted first-degree felony murder does not exist in Florida. See State v. Gray, 654 So. 2d 552 (Fla.1995). Because the jury may have relied on this legally unsupportable theory, the conviction for attempted first-degree murder must be reversed. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 112 S. Ct. 466, 116 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1991).
This error, we conclude, has no effect on the sentence of death since Valentine was convicted of three other violent felonies (i.e., armed burglary and two counts of kidnapping) arising from the same episode; any one of these other crimes would support the "prior violent felony" aggravating circumstance. Further, even if this aggravating circumstance were not present, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court still would have imposed the death penalty given the nature and extent of the *318 remaining aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986). As the trial court pointed out, this was an extraordinarily brutal crime.
The remainder of Valentine's claims either were not preserved[9] or are without merit.[10] Accordingly, we reverse the conviction for attempted first-degree murder and vacate the sentence on that count. We affirm the remaining convictions and sentences, including the first-degree murder conviction and sentence of death.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
GRIMES, J., concurs with an opinion, in which OVERTON and WELLS, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., concurs in result only as to the conviction and concurs as to the sentence.
GRIMES, Justice, concurring.
If Valentine's comments and letters to Romero fell within the scope of section 90.504, Florida Statute (1993), I believe Valentine would have been at least entitled to a jury instruction that such communications could not be considered with respect to the charge that he murdered Porche. However, the threats to maim and kill Porche came at a time when Valentine and Romero had been separated for over a year, and Valentine thought Romero had now married Porche. A communication made under these circumstances is not one which section 90.504 was designed to keep confidential. When it is clear, as in this case, that the husband and wife are permanently separated, the policy which underlies the marital privilege no longer exists, and there is no reason why communications between them should not be admissible as any other evidence. See United States v. Treff, 924 F.2d 975 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 958, 111 S. Ct. 2272, 114 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1991); United States v. Frank, 869 F.2d 1177 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 839, 110 S. Ct. 121, 107 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1989); United States v. Fulk, 816 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir.1987); In re Witness Before Grand Jury, 791 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.1986); People v. Mohammed, 122 Misc.2d 504, 470 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1984).
OVERTON and WELLS, JJ., concur.
[1]  The trial court found the following: Valentine had been convicted of a violent felony, i.e., the contemporaneous attempted murder; the murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping; the murder was both cold, calculated and premeditated, and heinous, atrocious or cruel.
[2]  The court found the following: Valentine had no significant history of prior criminal activity; Valentine's age was forty-one; Valentine had supported his family, was a good father, had not mistreated his wife before, was a well-known basketball player and coach who took an interest in children, and was known to be a nonviolent and close family man.
[3]  The court sentenced Valentine to life imprisonment on the armed burglary count; life imprisonment for the kidnapping of Romero; life imprisonment for the kidnapping of Porche; five years' imprisonment on the grand theft count; and thirty years' imprisonment on the attempted murder charge.
[4]  The court found the following: Valentine had been convicted of a prior violent felony; the murder was committed during the course of a burglary and kidnapping; the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner.
[5]  The court gave slight weight to each of the following: The crime was out of character for the defendant and indicated a single period of aberrant behavior; the defendant is a skilled worker who can be expected to make a contribution to the prison system; the defendant has a large family that will provide love and support for him while he is in prison; the defendant offered no resistance when arrested, has adapted well to incarceration, is likely to function well in prison, has been a model inmate with no disciplinary problems, and has exhibited appropriate behavior in jail and court.
[6]  Valentine claims the trial court erred in addressing the following matters: 1) in ruling that the husband/wife privilege was inapplicable to bar Romero's testimony on Porche's murder; 2) in denying his motion to suppress his statements to Detective Fernandez; 3) in denying his motion to strike the expert's footprint testimony as too speculative; 4) in declining his motion to appoint a jury selection expert; 5) in denying his motion to grant him the concluding argument to the jury in spite of his presentation of alibi witnesses; 6) in giving the standard reasonable doubt instruction; 7) in convicting him of attempted first-degree murder because it may rest on attempted felony murder, a nonexistent crime; 8) in finding that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner; 9) in failing to find several mitigating circumstances.
[7]  Valentine's contention that Romero's testimony is protected because it falls within an exception that was deliberately eliminated by the legislature in 1978 is specious. The earlier exception provided:

(3) There is no privilege under this section:
. . . .
(b) In a criminal proceeding in which one spouse is charged with:
. . . .
2. A crime committed at any time against the person or property of a third person, which crime was committed in the course of committing a crime against the person or property of the other spouse.
§ 90.504, Fla. Stat. (1977). The policy underlying the privilege dictates that this exception was applicable in those cases where one spouse committed a crime against both a third person and the other spouse but was charged in the pending proceeding only with the crime against the third person. That is not the case in the present proceeding.
[8]  The arresting officers relied on a federal warrant that was later determined by the trial court to be supported by inadequate evidence.
[9]  Issue 4) was not preserved.
[10]  Issues 5), 6), 8) and 9) are without merit.