Title: Hofto v. Blumer

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

74 Wn.2d 321 (1968) 444 P.2d 657 MARGARET E. HOFTO, as Administratrix, Appellant, v. LARRY BLUMER et al., Respondents.[*] No. 39543. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. August 22, 1968. Sterbick, Manza, Moceri, Gustafson & Narigi, by Michael S. Manza, for appellant. Lycette, Diamond & Sylvester and Ralph M. Bremer, for respondents. *322 DONWORTH, J.[] This is an action to recover damages for wrongful death instituted by the administratrix of the estate of Joseph L. Hofto, deceased, for the benefit of herself (his surviving wife) and two minor children. In her original complaint the administratrix (herein referred to as appellant) named as defendants Larry Blumer and his wife, doing business as Gay Construction, who owned a certain flatbed truck, which collided with the pickup truck which was being operated by the deceased at the time of his death. Also named as defendants were Robert G. Kaiser (and his wife) who was an employee of defendants Blumer and was driving their flatbed truck at the time of the collision. These defendants, in answering the complaint, admitted ownership of the flatbed truck and that at the time of the collision it was being operated by their employee in the course of his duties. They denied all allegations of negligence on the part of the employee and affirmatively pleaded two defenses: (1) that the collision was caused by the negligence of an unknown person and (2) that it was caused by the contributory negligence of the deceased. As a result of the first affirmative defense discovery proceedings were had and an amended complaint was filed in which Joseph Stafford and his wife (herein called respondents) were named as additional defendants. As briefly stated in appellant's brief, the substance of the allegations in the amended complaint relating to respondents activities is as follows: Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the action as to them on the ground that appellant had failed to state a claim in the amended complaint upon which relief could be granted. Respondents' motion was orally argued in the trial court and also briefs were submitted. The court then rendered its oral opinion dismissing respondents from the action as follows: Thereafter the trial court entered an order in accordance with the foregoing opinion and appellant has appealed therefrom to this court. In order to determine whether or not the trial court was in error in entering its order of dismissal we must consider the pertinent allocations of the amended complaint: IV V VI VII The prayer of the amended complaint was for judgment for $300,000 general damages, plus funeral and burial expenses and $100 for loss of the pickup truck. Appellant's assignments of error are directed to the reasons stated by the trial court in rendering its oral decision (quoted above) and in entering its order dismissing respondents from the action. Appellant in her brief in her endeavor to show that the order of the trial court was erroneous cites CR 8(a) and 12(b) (6), RCW vol. 0.[1] She states that the only two decisions *326 of this court involving dismissal of claims thereunder are Sherwood v. Moxee School Dist. No. 90, 58 Wn.2d 351, 363 P.2d 138 (1961) and Higgins v. State, 70 Wn.2d 323, 422 P.2d 836 (1967). [1] In the latter case, in reversing the trial court's dismissal of a third party complaint we said: This court in the Moxee case pointed out that under the rules above referred to it is no longer necessary for a plaintiff to plead facts "constituting a cause of action." We there quoted from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 Sup. Ct. 99 (1957) in which the United States Supreme Court stated the test to be applied in passing upon such a motion as follows: We have recently had occasion to consider these rules in Barnum v. State, 72 Wn.2d 928, 435 P.2d 678 (1967) in *327 which an inmate of the state penitentiary sued the state and two state officials for personal injuries sustained in an assault committed upon him by another inmate, who was also named as a defendant. The defendants moved for a dismissal under CR 12(b) (6), RCW vol. 0. The trial court granted the motion. On appeal from the order of dismissal we held that the trial court's action in granting the motion was premature. Concerning the application of the above rule we said: In the case before us we are unable to agree with the reasons stated by the trial court for holding that under the allegations of the amended complaint no set of facts could be proven which would entitle appellant to recover against respondents. We think it would be improper for us to discuss at this time the merits of the contentions of the parties which are fully stated in the briefs. To do so might have the effect of prejudging this case when it comes on for trial. As yet respondents have not had occasion to file an answer so that the factual issues have not been framed at this time. Our conclusion is that we cannot say that it appears beyond doubt from the allegations of the amended complaint that appellant can prove no set of facts in support of *328 her claim which would entitle her to the relief sought against respondents. The order appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. FINLEY, C.J., HILL, HAMILTON, and NEILL, JJ., concur. [*] Reported in 444 P.2d 657. [] Judge Donworth is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution. [1] Rule 8 (a): "Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded." Rule 12 (b) "Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading ... shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: ... (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,...."