Title: RITA ANN HUMPHREY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RITA ANN HUMPHREY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 67185 P.3d 1236Case Number: 06-249Decided: 06/16/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
RITA ANN 
HUMPHREY,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Tina N. 
Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Donna D. Domonkos, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; 
David Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. Domonkos and Mr. 
Westling.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Pojman.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In March 2006, a 
jury convicted Appellant Rita Ann Humphrey of second degree murder in the 1977 
death of her husband, Jack Humphrey.  
On appeal, Appellant challenges her conviction on grounds of speedy trial 
and due process violations and evidentiary errors.  We find no reversible error in the 
issues presented and affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Appellant 
presents the following issues for our consideration:

 
 
I.          
Whether Appellant was denied her right to a speedy trial under W.R.Cr.P. 
48, with a delay of 270 days, and under the United States Constitution, with a 
delay of 561 days.

 
 
II.         
Whether Appellant was denied her Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process when the State delayed charging her for over 26 years.  Appellant was substantially prejudiced 
by the delay.

 
 
III.        
Whether the district court committed reversible error when it admitted 
Jack Humphrey's hearsay statements under the state of mind exception to the 
hearsay rule.  Jack Humphrey's state 
of mind was not an issue at trial and the statements did not help the trier of 
fact determine Appellant's state of mind.

 
 
IV.       Whether the 
district court committed an abuse of discretion by improperly admitting hearsay 
evidence contrary to W.R.E. 803(6) and contrary to the completeness requirements 
of W.R.E. 106.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

Trial 
Evidence

 
 
[¶3]      Appellant and 
Jack were married in 1967.  For many 
years, it was a happy marriage.  
However, in 1977, the marital relationship deteriorated.  Appellant became increasingly and openly 
hostile toward Jack. They were no longer intimate, and Appellant developed a 
relationship with another man, Ron Akers.  
Financial problems also arose in the relationship.  Household bills were not being paid, 
including the mortgage on the family home, checks were bouncing, and a large sum 
of money, approximately $3,700.00, was missing out of their joint bank account 
at Hilltop National Bank (Hilltop Bank).  
Jack eventually spoke with personnel at Hilltop Bank on November 22, 
1977, about the missing money and discovered Appellant had not deposited several 
of his paychecks, which explained the account shortage and the resulting bounced 
checks.  That discovery caused 
further tension between Jack and Appellant.  That night, Jack was noticeably upset 
and angry at Appellant as he discussed the financial mess with his sister, 
Bonnie Humphrey.  

 
 
[¶4]      Around 4:30 a.m. 
the next morning, November 23, Appellant telephoned her sister, Donna 
Baldwin.  Appellant informed Baldwin 
something was wrong with Jack, and she needed Baldwin's assistance immediately.  Baldwin and her boyfriend at the time, 
Frank Finch, arrived at Appellant's home within minutes, entering through the 
back door into the kitchen where Appellant was situated.  After speaking with Appellant, 
Baldwin and Finch went to the couple's 
bedroom.  Upon entering the room, 
they immediately smelled the odor of gun powder and noticed Jack had been 
shot.  

 
 
[¶5]      Baldwin and Finch 
then returned to the kitchen, and Baldwin 
contacted the police and Jack's brother, Larry Humphrey, who lived nearby.  Finch noticed a rifle laying on the 
kitchen counter, wrapped in what appeared to be an infant's blanket.  Finch grabbed the rifle and carried it 
out the back door, where he put the rifle down and pushed the barrel into the 
snow.  Upon returning to the 
kitchen, Appellant handed him an empty bullet casing, which he tossed out the 
back door. 

 
 
[¶6]      Around 5:00 a.m., 
Officer Jeff Lord of the Evansville Police Department arrived at the Humphrey 
residence.  Finch escorted Officer 
Lord to the master bedroom, where the officer observed Jack lying face down on a 
bed, covered by a blanket, with a gunshot wound to the back of his head.  Forensic analysis of the crime scene 
indicated the blanket was placed over Jack after he was shot.  Officer Lord did not find a firearm in 
the vicinity of the body. 

 
 
[¶7]      Officer Lord 
asked Appellant what she knew about her husband's death.  Appellant stated she had fallen asleep 
in the basement while watching TV and she was awakened by a sound which she 
believed to be a gunshot.  She then 
went upstairs and attempted to rouse her husband.  When Jack did not respond, she 
telephoned her sister. 

 
 
[¶8]      After speaking 
with Appellant, Officer Lord conducted a protective sweep of the home.  He found no evidence of forced entry or 
other signs of an intruder, even though the doors to the Humphrey residence were 
kept locked at night.  Upon the 
arrival of other officers at the scene, Officer Lord conducted a perimeter 
search of the premises and found a .243 caliber Ruger M77 rifle and an empty 
shell casing lying in the snow by the back door of the residence.  The rifle was later identified as 
Appellant's custom made rifle, which she proficiently used for hunting.  Appellant's rifle, as well as the 
couple's other firearms, was always kept unloaded in the closet of the master 
bedroom.  The ammunition for the 
firearms was stored separately in a cupboard by the kitchen.  The rifle was subsequently identified as 
the murder weapon.  

 
 
[¶9]      Appellant was 
interviewed that morning at the Natrona County Sheriff's Office.  While there, she also spoke with Bonnie 
Humphrey, who pressed her for information about Jack's death.  During that conversation, Appellant put 
her hands over her face and stated: "God, what have I done?"  A gunshot residue kit was also collected 
from Appellant that morning. Analysis of the residue taken from the back of 
Appellant's left hand disclosed three fragments of partially burned 
gunpowder.  

 
 
[¶10]   Within a week of the murder, 
Appellant and Akers were seen together at the Sage Club in Casper.  By January, Akers was living at 
Appellant's house, driving Jack's truck and wearing his clothes.  Approximately one week after Jack's 
death, Appellant began pursuing the proceeds of his life insurance policies, 
which she ultimately received in the amount of $30,285.46.  Seven months later, Appellant received 
the proceeds from the sale of the couple's home and other real property.  

 
 

Procedural 
Facts

 
 
[¶11]   Appellant's legal woes began on 
April 11, 1980, when a grand jury indicted her for the first degree murder of 
her husband.  The district court 
later granted Appellant's April 14, 1980, request for a preliminary hearing and, 
on May 7, it remanded the case to county court.1  Also on May 7, Appellant waived her 
right to a speedy preliminary hearing, and stipulated to a June 23, 1980, 
preliminary hearing date.  The 
preliminary hearing failed to produce sufficient probable cause to support the 
murder charge, and the county court issued an order dismissing the case on July 
2, 1980.  The district court 
formally dismissed the indictment on August 22, 1980.  

 
 
[¶12]   In 1999, the Evansville Police 
Department reopened the investigation into Jack Humphrey's death.  That investigation led to the refiling 
of the first degree murder charge against Appellant on March 5, 2004.  Following a preliminary hearing on May 
26, 2004, Appellant was bound over to district court.  The district court initially set 
Appellant's trial for September 27, 2004, stacked behind a number of other 
trials which were also set for that day.  On July 8, Appellant filed a "Motion for 
Date Certain for Trial" wherein she requested that her trial be continued to a 
later date on a more reasonable schedule.  
On July 19, 2004, the district court moved the trial to the October 18 
trial stack because of the court's crowded docket.  At Appellant's arraignment on August 10, 
and in response to defense counsel's concerns about the trial setting, the 
district court vacated the October 18 trial date. During a scheduling conference 
held on August 25, the parties agreed to a January 3, 2005, trial date.  

 
 
[¶13]   Two days later, on August 27, 2004, 
Appellant moved to dismiss the murder charge, arguing that her constitutional 
right to a speedy trial under both the United States and Wyoming 
Constitutions had been violated by the excessive delay in bringing her to 
trial.  Appellant based her speedy 
trial claim on the lapse in time between the filing of the initial indictment in 
1980 and the filing of the instant information in 2004.  On September 10, Appellant filed another 
motion to dismiss the murder charge, this time alleging that the 24-year delay 
in recharging her for the 1977 murder of her husband transgressed her 
constitutional right to due process.  
Appellant contended that her right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the 
delay due to the death of several witnesses and the loss of potential 
evidence.  In addition to these 
motions, Appellant filed numerous motions pertaining to evidentiary matters, 
including multiple suppression motions.

 
 
[¶14]   The district court heard testimony 
and argument on Appellant's motions to dismiss on October 28, 2004, and took the 
matters under advisement.  The 
district court ultimately determined that Appellant's constitutional speedy 
trial right had been violated and, on December 20, 2004, the court entered an 
order dismissing the case.  In 
finding a speedy trial violation, the district court considered the entire time 
period between the initial April 11, 1980, indictment and the January 3, 2005, 
trial setting.  The district court 
did not rule on Appellant's due process claim.  

 
 
[¶15]   This Court subsequently granted the 
State's petition for review and reversed the district court's order of 
dismissal.  State v. Humphrey, 2005 WY 131, 120 P.3d 1027 (Wyo. 2005) (Humphrey I), cert. denied, Humphrey v. Wyoming, 546 U.S. 1139 (2006).  We held that the district court erred in 
considering the period of time during which no charges were pending against 
Appellant  August 22, 1980, to March 5, 2004  in holding that Appellant's 
constitutional right to a speedy trial had been abridged.  Id., ¶¶ 12, 18, 
120 P.3d  at 1030-31.

 
 
[¶16]   On remand, the district court, with 
the parties' concurrence, set Appellant's trial for March 13, 2006.  Thereafter, Appellant renewed her speedy 
trial and due process motions to dismiss.  
On January 30-31, 2006, the district court, once again, heard testimony 
and argument on Appellant's motions to dismiss, as well as the parties' other 
outstanding motions.  After 
reexamining the length of delay in the criminal proceedings and the reasons for 
the delay, the district court declined to find a constitutional speedy trial 
violation.  In addition, the 
district court found no evidence of improper prosecutorial motive underlying the 
24-year charging, as required under Fortner v. State, 843 P.2d 1139, 1142 
(Wyo. 1992), and denied Appellant's due process claim.  

 
 
[¶17]   Appellant's trial commenced as 
scheduled on March 13 and concluded on March 24, 2006.  The jury found Appellant guilty on the 
lesser offense of second degree murder.  
The district court sentenced Appellant on June 15, 2006, to a term of 
imprisonment of 25 to 40 years.  
This appeal followed. 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
A.        
Speedy Trial

 
 

Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶18]   We review a speedy trial claim to 
ensure the mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) and constitutional guarantees have been 
met.  Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1032 
(Wyo. 
1995).  We examine de novo the 
constitutional question of whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 
10 of the Wyoming Constitution.  We review the district court's factual 
findings for clear error.  Sisneros v. State, 2005 WY 139, ¶ 16, 
121 P.3d 790, 796-97 (Wyo. 2005); Humphrey I, ¶ 8, 120 P.3d  at 
1029.

 
 

Analysis

 
 
[¶19]   We first consider Appellant's 
contention that her speedy trial right under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)2 was violated when she was not tried 
within 180 days of her arraignment.  
The record reveals Appellant expressly waived the time limitations of the 
rule when she sought, via her motion for a date certain, a continuance of the 
initial trial date.  The record also 
shows that, upon remand from this Court's reversal of the district court's order 
of dismissal, Appellant agreed to a trial setting beyond the rule's 180-day 
requirement.  We hold Appellant 
waived the speedy trial requirements of Rule 48(b), and thus this claim, by her 
actions in the district court.

 
 
[¶20]   We now turn to the question of 
whether Appellant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was infringed.  The Sixth Amendment guarantees every 
criminal defendant a speedy and public trial.  Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), set forth the benchmark test that applies to 
constitutional speedy trial claims. The Barker test requires consideration of 
four factors in determining whether a speedy trial violation has occurred:  the length of delay; the reason for the 
delay; the defendant's assertion of her right; and the prejudice to the 
defendant.  Barker, 407 U.S.  at 530, 92 S. Ct.  at 2192; Strandlien v. State, 2007 WY 66, ¶ 6, 
156 P.3d 986, 990 (Wyo. 2007); Humphrey 
I, ¶ 9, 120 P.3d  at 1029; Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 31, 93 P.3d 222, 230-31 (Wyo. 2004).  None of 
these factors alone are dispositive.  
Rather, the factors must be considered together and balanced in relation 
to all of the relevant circumstances of the delay in bringing the defendant to 
trial.  Barker, 407 U.S.  at 533, 92 S. Ct.  at 2193; Strandlien, ¶ 6, 156 P.3d  at 990; Walters v. State, 2004 
WY 37, ¶ 10, 87 P.3d 793, 795 (Wyo. 2004).  
The ultimate question is "whether the delay in bringing the accused to 
trial was unreasonable, that is, whether it substantially impaired the right of 
the accused to a fair trial."  Walters, ¶ 10, 87 P.3d  at 795 (quoting 
Warner v. State, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 10, 28 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo. 2001)).  When a 
speedy trial violation is found to have occurred, the charges must be 
dismissed.  Walters, ¶ 10, 87 P.3d  at 795; see also Barker, 407 U.S.  at 522, 92 S. Ct.  at 2188.

 
 
[¶21]   We begin our analysis with the 
first factor of the Barker test  the 
length of delay.  The law is 
well-settled that the speedy trial right attaches upon the filing of a criminal 
complaint or the arrest of the defendant, whichever occurs first.  Strandlien, ¶ 8, 156 P.3d  at 990; Jennings v. State, 4 P.3d 915, 921 (Wyo. 
2000); see also United States v. 
MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-7, 102 S. Ct. 1497, 1501, 71 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1982); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 
313, 92 S. Ct. 455, 459, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971).  We recently reiterated that the speedy 
trial guarantee does not apply to the period of time between the dismissal of a 
charge and the subsequent refiling of the charge, provided the defendant is not 
held in continuous custody.  That 
is, "the Speedy Trial Clause has no application to the period of time in which a 
defendant is neither under arrest nor formally charged."  Humphrey I, ¶¶ 11-13, 17, 120 P.3d at 
1030-31; see also United 
States v. Loud 
Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 106 S. Ct. 648, 88 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1986); MacDonald, 456 U.S.  at 6-10, 
102 S. Ct.  at 1501-03.  We have also 
recognized that when a dismissed charge is supplanted by another charge, "the 
periods of formal charge by a single sovereign for the same criminal act are 
tacked together even if the charges are different."  Strandlien, ¶ 8, 156 P.3d  at 990 
(quoting Caton v. State, 709 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Wyo. 1985)).

 
 
[¶22]   On the basis of these principles, 
we find that the speedy trial clock in this case initially began on April 11, 
1980, when the indictment was filed and Appellant was arrested, and continued to 
run until the indictment was formally dismissed by the district court on August 
22, 1980.  The clock resumed on 
March 5, 2004, when the murder charge was re-filed against Appellant.  It stopped again when the district court 
dismissed the case on December 20, 2004.  
The speedy trial clock restarted on October 26, 2005, upon the filing in 
the district court of this Court's mandate reversing the December 20 order of 
dismissal, and continued to run until Appellant's trial began on March 13, 
2006.  See Sodergren v. State, 715 P.2d 170, 178 
(Wyo. 1986); Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663, 670 
(Wyo. 1982), 
overruled on other grounds by Vlahos v. 
State, 2003 WY 103, 75 P.3d 628 (Wyo. 2003).  The total elapsed time to trial, 
excluding the time when no charge was pending against Appellant, was 561 days.3  Consistent with prior cases, we conclude 
that the length of delay in bringing Appellant to trial warrants examination of 
the remaining speedy trial factors.  
See Strandlien, ¶ 9, 156 P.3d  
at 990 (762 days); Sisneros, ¶ 19, 
121 P.3d  at 797 (349 days); Berry, ¶ 34, 93 P.3d  at 232 (720 days); Warner, ¶ 12, 
28 P.3d  at 26 (658 days).

 
 
[¶23]   We therefore turn to the reasons 
for the delay.  In conducting this 
analysis we examine which party was responsible for the delay.  On this factor, we have 
stated:

 
 
"A 
deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be 
weighted heavily against the government.  
A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be 
weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate 
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than 
with the defendant.  Finally, a 
valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate 
delay."

 
 

Wehr v. 
State, 841 
P.2d [104,] 112-13 [(Wyo. 1992)] (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531, 
92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972)).  
Official bad faith in causing delay is weighed heavily against the 
government.  Barker, 407 U.S.  at 531, 92 S. Ct. 2182.  "Delays attributable to 
the defendant are deducted from the equation."  Jennings v. State, 4 P.3d 915, 921 (Wyo. 
2000).  "We weigh any delay properly 
attributable to the defendant against the delay chargeable to the State.  We have frequently acknowledged a 
defendant may defeat his claim to a speedy trial by his own dilatory 
practices."  Wehr, 841 P.2d  at 
113.

 
 

Whitney 
v. State, 2004 
WY 118, ¶ 42, 99 P.3d 457, 471-72 (Wyo. 2004); see also Strandlien, ¶ 10, 156 P.3d  at 
991.

 
 
[¶24]   An examination of the record in 
this case discloses that a total of 133 days elapsed in the 1980 criminal 
action.  In that case, Appellant 
sought and obtained a preliminary hearing, resulting in a 56-day delay in the 
criminal proceedings.4  After the preliminary hearing failed to 
produce sufficient probable cause to support the murder charge and the county 
court dismissed the case, an additional 51 days passed before the district court 
formally dismissed the indictment against Appellant.

 
 
[¶25]   In the instant criminal action, 
excluding the time when no charge was pending against Appellant, a total of 428 
days passed between the date Appellant was recharged with the murder of her 
husband, March 5, 2004, and the date of Appellant's trial, March 13, 2006.  The record reflects that Appellant 
promptly waived her right to a speedy preliminary hearing and requested that the 
preliminary hearing be held in May on a date convenient to the circuit court and 
counsel.  In accordance with 
Appellant's request, the preliminary hearing was continued to May 26, thereby 
resulting in a 56-day delay in the proceedings beyond the requisite 20-day 
preliminary hearing period.5  After the case was bound over to 
district court, there was a 29-day delay in Appellant's arraignment caused by a 
scheduling misunderstanding between defense counsel and the district court.  Appellant then obtained a continuance of 
the October 18 trial, resulting in a 63-day delay in the proceedings leading up 
to the district court's dismissal of the case on December 20, 2004.  Thereafter, following this Court's 
reversal of that order of dismissal and accompanying remand of the case to the 
district court for trial, the parties agreed to a trial date of March 13, 2006, 
amounting to an additional delay of 138 days.

 
 
[¶26]   From our review of the record, we 
find that, of the 561 days at issue in this case, delays amounting to 80 days 
were occasioned by neutral factors not directly attributable to Appellant or the 
State.  We also find the delays 
surrounding the preliminary hearings in both criminal actions and the 
continuance of the October 18 trial date in the present action, totaling 175 
days, are directly attributable to Appellant, and that the 138-day delay 
following this Court's remand is attributable to both Appellant and the 
State.  We conclude, on the whole, 
that the reasons for the delay in this case weigh evenly in favor of and against 
each party.

 
 
[¶27]   Turning to the third factor, there 
is no question Appellant asserted her constitutional right to a speedy 
trial.  During the 1980 criminal 
proceedings, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial and 
filed a separate demand for a speedy trial.  After the refiling of the criminal 
charge, Appellant filed two additional motions to dismiss for failure to afford 
her a speedy trial, as well as other pleadings in support of her speedy trial 
claim. Appellant's assertions of the speedy trial right, however, were 
intertwined with waivers of speedy preliminary hearings in both criminal 
actions, a request for a continuance of the trial date in the instant criminal 
action, continued acquiescence to the timetables set by the district court, 
numerous pretrial motions that required evidentiary hearings, and a request for 
a five-month stay in the proceedings while Appellant pursued her speedy trial 
complaint in the United States Supreme Court.  Accordingly, we find that this factor 
weighs only slightly in Appellant's favor.

 
 
[¶28]   The final factor we consider is the 
degree of prejudice to Appellant caused by the delay.  We assess prejudice in light of the 
interests the particular evils the speedy trial right is intended to 
prevent:  (1) lengthy pretrial 
incarceration; (2) pretrial anxiety; and (3) impairment of the defense.  Barker, 407 U.S.  at 532, 92 S. Ct.  at 2193; Strandlien, ¶ 14, 156 P.3d  at 991; Whitney, ¶ 54, 99 P.3d  
at 475.  Impairment of the defense 
is the most serious element "because the inability of a defendant adequately to 
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system."  Id.  

 
 
[¶29]   Appellant initially contends that 
the delay in her case was so lengthy as to give rise to a presumption of 
prejudice.  We have held that "until 
delay exceeds a point where there is a probability of substantial prejudice,' 
the burden of proving prejudice should remain with the accused."  Strandlien, ¶ 15, 156 P.3d  at 991 
(quoting Caton, 709 P.2d at 1266); Whitney, ¶ 55, 99 P.3d  at 475.  We disagree with Appellant's conclusion 
that the length of delay occasioned in this case, standing alone, raises a 
presumption of prejudice.  
Consequently, we decline to relieve Appellant of her burden of 
establishing actual prejudice.

 
 
[¶30]   On the prejudice prong, Appellant 
only argues that the delay impaired her defense of the charge.  In support of this contention, Appellant 
points to the unavailability of certain witnesses and evidence resulting from 
the passage of time between the dismissal of the 1980 criminal action and the 
refiling of the murder charge in 2004.6  The obvious flaw in Appellant's 
argument, as noted above, is that the protection of the Speedy Trial Clause has 
no application to the period of time in which she was neither under arrest nor 
formally charged for the murder of her husband.  Any prejudice flowing from the loss of 
witnesses and evidence during the 24-year gap between the criminal prosecutions 
must be scrutinized under the tenets of the Due Process Clause, not the Speedy 
Trial Clause.  MacDonald, 456 U.S.  at 7-9, 102 S. Ct.  at 1501-02.  Appellant does 
not offer any evidence or argument of prejudice resulting from the 561-day delay 
at issue here.  Consequently, this 
factor weighs heavily against Appellant.

 
 
[¶31]   In balancing the four Barker factors, we hold that Appellant 
was not denied her constitutional right to a speedy trial.  Although a delay occurred in bringing 
Appellant to trial and Appellant asserted her right to a speedy trial, the 
length of the delay was not unreasonable in light of the facts in this 
case.  Furthermore, and most 
importantly, Appellant has not demonstrated actual prejudice arising from the 
delay in the criminal proceedings.  
Under the circumstances, dismissal of the criminal charge against 
Appellant is not warranted.

 
 

B.        Due 
Process

 
 
[¶32]   Appellant contends her right to due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution7 was violated by the 24-year delay 
in re-charging her for the 1977 murder of her husband, and she faults the 
district court for denying her motion to dismiss the criminal charge.  Appellant claims she was substantially 
prejudiced by the delay due to the death of several potential witnesses and the 
loss of certain evidence essential to her defense.  Whether Appellant's constitutional right 
to due process was violated is a question of law that we review de novo.  Wilkie v. State, 2002 WY 164, ¶ 4, 56 P.3d 1023, 1024 (Wyo. 2002) (constitutional issues are questions of law and are 
reviewed de novo); see also Pope v. State, 2002 WY 9, ¶ 14, 38 P.3d 1069, 1072 (Wyo. 2002); Taylor v. 
State, 7 P.3d 15, 19 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 
[¶33]   Wyoming does not have a statute of limitations 
for the prosecution of criminal offenses.  
Addressing the issue previously, this Court has 
said:

 
 
There is 
no question the legislature would have the authority to enact a statute of 
limitation, and the failure to adopt one does not appear to be oversight.  Instead, it represents a conscious 
decision to refrain from extending grace through a statute of limitation in 
criminal cases.  Consistently with 
our statement in Story [v. State], 721 P.2d [1020,] 1026 
[(Wyo. 1986)], 
"whether statutes of limitations governing prosecution of criminal offenses 
should be adopted at all is a matter solely for the 
legislature."

 
 

Vernier 
v. State, 909 P.2d 1344, 1348 (Wyo. 1996) (emphasis 
omitted).

 
 
[¶34]   In the absence of a statute of 
limitations, which is the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale 
criminal charges, the prosecution for a criminal offense may be commenced at any 
time during the life of the offender unless the delay in charging denied the 
accused her constitutional right to due process.  Fortner v. State, 843 P.2d 1139, 1142 
(Wyo. 
1992).  Adopting the rule 
articulated in United States v. 
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 323-26, 92 S. Ct. 455, 465-66, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971), 
we have held that precharging delay is not a violation of due process absent a 
showing of both an intentional delay by the state to gain a tactical advantage 
over the accused and actual prejudice resulting from the delay.  Vernier, 909 P.2d at 1348-50; Fortner, 843 P.2d at 1142-44; Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062, 
1169-70 (Wyo. 1992); Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1027-29 
(Wyo. 
1986).  The burden of proving the 
required two-part showing lies with the appellant.  Id.

 
 
 [¶35]  We find that Appellant has not carried 
her burden on either prong.  First, 
Appellant has not demonstrated that the State purposely delayed filing the 
criminal charge in order to gain a tactical advantage over her or that the delay 
was the product of an improper prosecutorial motive.  Appellant acknowledges as much, but 
claims the requirement of proving an improper prosecutorial motive places an 
unfair burden on her when the State has exclusive access to the information 
concerning the reasons for the delay in filing the criminal charge.  She argues the State should bear the 
burden of justifying the charging delay, and urges this Court to absolve her of 
the responsibility of proving prosecutorial bad faith.  

 
 
[¶36]   In Fortner, 843 P.2d  at 1143, this Court 
acknowledged that, "[i]t seems unjust to leave the burden of proving improper 
prosecutorial motive entirely with Appellant when the prosecution has nearly 
exclusive access to information on the reasons it failed to promptly bring 
charges."  It was this concern that 
led the Court to adopt a test requiring the accused to make a prima facie 
showing of improper motive and then requiring the State to come forward with its 
reasons for the delay.  This test, 
we said, takes into account the State's access to information while still 
placing the burden of proving both improper motive and prejudice on the 
accused.  Id. at 1143-44.  The Appellant's argument in this case 
does not persuade us to alter existing law on this issue.

 
 
[¶37]   To show improper motive, Appellant 
alleged the prosecutor improperly used the criminal prosecution to settle family 
differences.  She claimed the case 
was reopened after Jack Humhrey's sister, Bonnie Humphrey, was elected mayor in 
Evansville in 
1998 and, as mayor, used her position to hire a police chief who would pursue 
criminal charges against Appellant.  
The difficulty with Appellant's argument is that regardless of Bonnie 
Humphrey's motive, the prosecutor who reopened the case produced substantial 
evidence from which a jury found Appellant guilty of second degree murder.  Bonnie Humphrey's motive 
notwithstanding, Appellant produced no evidence that previous prosecutors had 
delayed bringing charges based upon an improper motive.

 
 
[¶38]   Appellant likewise has not 
demonstrated actual prejudice to her case resulting from the delay.  In the district court, she claimed that 
because of the delay the following evidence was no longer 
available:

 
 

·         
The 
testimony of her mother, Lois Ferris, who was 53 years old when Jack Humphrey 
was found dead from a gun shot wound and 80 years old at the time the State 
filed new charges against Appellant.  
Mrs. Ferris was the first person Appellant called on the morning of Mr. 
Humphrey's death.  According to 
Appellant, the State claimed Mrs. Ferris helped hide evidence.  Appellant claimed Mrs. Ferris' age and 
poor health made her unable to remember the events that occurred after Mr. 
Humphrey's death.

 
 

·         
The 
testimony of Helen Johnston, Appellant's aunt, who was deceased by the time the 
State refiled the charges.  
According to Appellant, the State claimed Mrs. Johnston reported that 
Appellant or Mrs. Ferris called her at 3:00 a.m. on November 23, 1977.  Appellant alleged that Mrs. Johnston 
would have denied the State's claim.

 
 

·         
The 
testimony of Art Terry and Ron Ketchum, the detectives who investigated Jack 
Humphrey's death and who were deceased by the time new charges were filed.  Appellant claimed they would have cast 
doubt on Bonnie Humphrey's testimony that she heard Appellant say, "God, what 
have I done?" and "Who will take care of my children now?" at the sheriff's 
office the morning of Jack Humphrey's death.  She asserted the detectives would have 
testified that Bonnie Humphrey was not in the same room and could not have heard 
Appellant.

 
 

·         
The 
rifle the State alleged was used to shoot Jack Humphrey, which the prosecutor 
returned to Appellant in 1986 and was no longer in her possession when the 
charges were refiled.  Appellant 
alleged "that the rifle is important evidence, and that improved technology 
would help show it was not [her] who fired it, and that it may not even be the 
instrument of Jack Humphrey's death."

 
 

·         
The 
files of Appellant's defense attorney and his investigator from 1977 to 1980, 
which no longer existed.  Appellant 
alleged it was their investigation that led the circuit court to find 
insufficient probable cause and dismiss the charges in 1980.  She alleged they did not remember what 
happened and "all of the evidence, information and material collected by them, 
including the identities of important witnesses are gone."

 
 

·         
The 
audiotape and complete transcript of the 1980 preliminary hearing, which no 
longer existed.  She alleged "if we 
could hear [the tape], we could determine the good reasons [the county court 
judge] dismissed the case."

 
 

·         
The tape 
and transcript of the grand jury proceedings.  She alleged "[t]hose records are 
probably important, at least because stories of the State's chief witnesses in 
providing an alleged motive" have changed over time.

 
 

·         
The 
X-ray of Jack Humphrey's head taken on the morning of his death.  Appellant alleged the X-ray is "probably 
the best evidence of the bullet angle and, if available, would be examined by a 
qualified expert.  That X-ray, if 
available, would likely show the track of the bullet and therefore the 
angle."

 
 

·         
Taped 
statements of Frank Finch and Larry Humphrey taken by investigators on November 
23, 1977.

 
 

·         
The 
testimony of Gary Koschene who the State alleged was "involved" with 
Appellant.  Appellant alleged that 
if he were available to testify, he would deny any involvement with her and 
dispute any involvement between her and Ron Akers.

 
 

·         
Jack 
Humphrey and Appellant's complete financial records for 1977 which Appellant 
alleged would show that they were not having financial difficulties by October 
and November of 1977, refuting the State's claim that her motive for killing her 
husband was financial difficulties.   

 
 
[¶39]   The State argues that Appellant's 
assertions of prejudice were speculative, vague, and unfounded because the 
missing evidence involved undisputed facts, matters established by other 
available evidence or matters not at issue.  The State also asserts Appellant did not 
show the presentation of any of the unavailable evidence would have changed the 
outcome of her case.  We 
agree.

 
 
[¶40]   Appellant did not indicate what 
testimony Lois Ferris would have provided that she was unable to provide because 
of her age.  Mrs. Johnston's 
testimony would not have been helpful because the State did not present evidence 
concerning a 3:00 a.m. phone call for her to refute.  The testimony Appellant asserted 
detectives Terry and Ketchum allegedly would have given is speculative and, even 
if their testimony had been as she believed, would not likely have changed the 
outcome given the other evidence the State presented.

 
 
[¶41]   Appellant made no effort to show 
what new technology existed by 2006 that could have determined who fired the 
rifle or whether it was the weapon used.  
She identified no specific evidence from her attorney's files or the 
county court and grand jury tapes or transcripts that would have helped her 
defense.  She did not indicate what 
she believed the X-ray would have shown about the path of the bullet nor did she 
suggest how having the X-ray would have been helpful in light of the 1977 
autopsy report which indicated the bullet's path could not be conclusively 
identified because of the condition of Jack Humphrey's skull and the State's 
2004 reconstruction of the skull which allowed experts to identify the entry 
point and approximate trajectory of the bullet.

 
 
[¶42]   Appellant also made no showing as 
to how tapes of November 23, 1977, witness interviews would have been useful or 
how their unavailability actually prejudiced her defense.  The testimony Appellant believes Mr. 
Koschene would have given was unlikely to have changed the outcome in light of 
the other evidence the State presented; therefore, Appellant has not shown 
actual prejudice from the absence of his testimony.  What the absent financial records may 
have shown is speculation and, in any event, defense counsel had the opportunity 
to fully cross-examine the State's witnesses concerning the Humphreys' financial 
situation.  Appellant has not shown 
actual prejudice from the incompleteness of those records.

 
 
[¶43]   In sum, Appellant's argument is 
deficient in both aspects necessary to establish a due process violation based 
on the precharging delay.  Our 
independent review of the record reveals no evidence indicating bad faith or 
improper motive on the part of the State, and we are not convinced Appellant was 
substantially prejudiced by the delay given the facts of this case.  Both improper motive and actual prejudice 
must be shown in order to establish a due process violation.  Vernier, 909 P.2d  at 1345.  Even if we were to conclude some 
prejudice resulted from the delay because evidence was unavailable, Appellant 
has not presented any evidence that the prosecutors delayed refiling the charges 
in order to gain a tactical advantage or due to some other improper motive.  By itself, the fact 24 years elapsed 
between the dismissal of the original criminal case and the filing of the new 
murder charge does not establish a due process violation.  See Marion, 404 U.S.  at 325-26, 
92 S. Ct.  at 466.  We therefore 
reject Appellant's claim.

 
 
C.        
Evidentiary errors

 
 

Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶44]   Appellant claims the district court 
erred in admitting hearsay statements of the victim and certain financial 
records.  Generally, decisions 
regarding the admissibility of evidence are entrusted to the sound discretion of 
the district court.  Law v. State, 2004 WY 111, ¶ 14, 98 P.3d 181, 187 (Wyo. 2004).  We afford 
considerable deference to the district court's decision and, as long as a 
legitimate basis exists for the district court's ruling, it will not be reversed 
on appeal.  Id.  Under the abuse of discretion standard, 
our primary consideration is the reasonableness of the district court's 
decision.  Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 20, 157 P.3d 923, 928 (Wyo. 2007); Wilde v. 
State, 2003 WY 93, ¶ 13, 74 P.3d 699, 707 (Wyo. 2003).  The burden of establishing an abuse of 
discretion rests with the appellant.  
Martin, ¶ 20, 157 P.3d  at 
928.

 
 
[¶45]   If we find that the district court 
erred in admitting the evidence, we must then determine whether or not the error 
affected Appellant's substantial rights, providing grounds for reversal, or 
whether the error was harmless.  See Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 766-67 (Wyo. 2001); W.R.A.P. 9.04; W.R.Cr.P. 52.  The error is harmful if there is a 
reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to 
Appellant if the error had never occurred.  
Skinner, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d  at 
767.  To demonstrate harmful error, 
Appellant must prove prejudice under "circumstances which manifest inherent 
unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair 
play."  Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 
(Wyo. 
1990)).

 
 
[¶46]   To the extent no objection is made 
at trial to the evidence challenged on appeal, our review is limited to 
determining whether plain error occurred.  
We will not find plain error unless:  (1) the record clearly reflects the 
error; (2) the party claiming the error demonstrates that a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely 
arguable, way; and (3) the party proves that the violation adversely affected a 
substantial right resulting in material prejudice.  Lessard v. State, 2007 WY 89, ¶ 14, 158 P.3d 698, 702 (Wyo.2007); Cazier v. 
State, 2006 WY 153, ¶ 10, 148 P.3d 23, 28 (Wyo. 2006); Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 9, 34 P.3d 271, 274 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 

Victim's 
statements  

 
 
[¶47]   At trial, Bonnie Humphrey testified 
about a conversation she had with Jack the night of November 22.  She testified that, during this 
conversation, Jack stated he had spent the day at Hilltop Bank trying to 
determine why checks were bouncing and why money was missing out of their 
account.  Jack told her that he was 
going back to the bank on Monday and, if he found out Appellant, in fact, took 
the money and was responsible for their financial problems, he was going to 
throw her "ass out in the street," and keep the girls with him.  Bonnie Humphrey testified that Jack was 
extremely upset and angry about the bank problems and Appellant's possible 
involvement in those problems. 

 
 
[¶48]   Appellant asserts this testimony 
constituted inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."  W.R.E. 801(c).  Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls 
within one of the exceptions contained in W.R.E. 803 or 804.  W.R.E. 802.

 
 
[¶49]   The State argues the statements 
were admissible under W.R.E. 803(3), which provides the following exception to 
the hearsay rule:

 
 

Then-existing 
mental, emotional, or physical condition.  A 
statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or 
physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, 
and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove 
the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, 
identification, or terms of declarant's will.

 
 
In 
support of admission of the statement under Rule 803(3), the State offers,8 among other citations, the 
following quotation from a recognized legal authority:

 
 
The 
exception is available when a nonparty's state of mind is significant.  In many criminal trials, the state of 
mind of the alleged victim is important. What the victim said is often 
admissible to show his purpose, knowledge or mental state.

 
 
4 
Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 8:71, at 601-02 (3d 
ed. 2007).  The State contends the 
testimony to which Appellant objects showed the victim's then-existing state of 
mind  he was angry with Appellant about the problems at the bank and, if he 
learned that she was responsible for the missing money and checks, he intended 
to kick her out of the house and keep the children with 
him.

 
 
[¶50]   We agree with the State.  The testimony showed Jack Humphrey's 
then-existing state of mind and emotion (his intent, plan, design, and mental 
feeling).  His state of mind was 
relevant because testimony from bank employees and others indicated Appellant 
knew he was upset about the missing money and believed she was responsible, and 
her knowledge of his state of mind may have affected her actions later that 
night.  The fact that Appellant knew 
her husband was upset and believed she was responsible for the missing money 
distinguishes this case from Schmunk v. 
State, 714 P.2d 724, 740 (Wyo. 1986), in which this Court concluded hearsay 
testimony that the victim intended to leave her husband was not admissible 
because there was no evidence that he knew about her intent.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting Bonnie Humphrey's testimony concerning the statements 
Jack Humphrey made to her on the night before he was 
killed.

 
 

Financial 
Records

 
 
[¶51]   During the trial, various and 
numerous copies of records from Old Faithful Life Insurance Company (Old 
Faithful), Hilltop Bank, and Guaranty Federal Savings and Loan Association 
(Guaranty Federal), consisting of, among other things, documents pertaining to 
Jack's life insurance policies, bank statements, loan records, and mortgage 
records, including delinquency notices, were received as evidence. The evidence 
apparently was admitted pursuant to W.R.E. 803(6),9 the hearsay exception for "business 
records."  Appellant contends it was 
error to admit this evidence because the evidence does not satisfy the 
requirements for admissibility under W.R.E. 803(6).  Appellant also complains that the 
records are incomplete and, as such, their admission violated the "completeness" 
requirement of W.R.E. 106.10  We note Appellant never objected at 
trial to the admission of the Hilltop Bank and Guaranty Federal records on these 
grounds.  Accordingly, review of 
Appellant's complaints is a mix of plain error and abuse of 
discretion.

 

[¶52]   Our review of this issue is 
inhibited by the global scope of Appellant's argument.  Appellant muddles categories of 
documents together, failing to present any cogent argument regarding specific 
challenges to individual documents.  
Because of the overreaching nature of Appellant's argument, we are at a 
loss to find any basis in Appellant's argument for overturning the district 
court's determination of admissibility.  

 
 
[¶53]   Appellant's argument that the 
challenged documents should not have been admitted seems to revolve, in part, 
around her speculation that further documents existed that had not been 
discovered.  Other aspects of her 
argument concern documents that were destroyed over time after the homicide and 
were no longer available at the time of trial.  Appellant complains that the speculative 
and unavailable documents could have changed the entire context of the admitted 
documents.  Thus, it simply is not 
fair to have allowed admission of what she contends to be incomplete files.  We disagree.

 
 
[¶54]   Appellant's challenge mistakes 
admissibility with credibility.  We 
know of no legal principle, nor has Appellant directed us to any, that would bar 
admissibility of standard business records based on the unavailability of 
related documents, particularly those whose very existence is purely a matter of 
conjecture.  Indeed, this Court has 
determined just the opposite to be true:

 
 
Without 
question, the complete records, unmarred by torn pages and missing segments, 
would have been more useful to the trial court than those records actually 
admitted.  However, such 
discrepancies go to the weight rather than to the admissibility of the 
evidence.  So long as the available 
records satisfied all of the safeguards set out in Rule 803(6), we cannot say 
that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting them into 
evidence.

 
 

Matter 
of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 999 (Wyo. 1984).

 
 
[¶55]   We need not further attempt to 
divine the nature of Appellant's remaining arguments on this issue since she has 
not argued, within the context of the facts of this case, that admission of the 
challenged records prejudiced her, even under a harmless error standard.  Under the circumstances, we have no 
basis to conclude "there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have 
been more favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred."  Skinner, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d  at 
767.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶56]   We have found no reversible error 
in our review of the record in this case in light of the applicable rules of 
law.  The judgment and sentence of 
the district court is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In 2000, 
legislation was enacted reforming the county court system into the present 
circuit court system.  2000 
Wyo. Sess. 
Laws, ch. 24.

 
 

2W.R.Cr.P. 
48(b) requires that a defendant's trial be held within 180 days of arraignment 
unless certain exceptions apply.

 
 

3The district 
court adopted Appellant's calculation on this factor and concluded that the 
total elapsed time was 557 days.  
However, our review of the record discloses that the total delay was 561 
days.

 
 

4Appellant 
was not legally entitled to a preliminary hearing following the grand jury 
indictment and, therefore, it was not a matter of due course in the criminal 
proceedings.  W.R.Cr.P. 5.1(a) 
(formerly W.R.Cr.P. 7).

 
 

5W.R.Cr.P. 
5(c) mandates that a preliminary hearing be held within 20 days of the 
defendant's initial court appearance if the defendant is not in custody.  Appellant was not in custody and, 
accordingly, the preliminary hearing was required to be held within 20 days of 
her March 11 initial appearance. 

 
 

6The 
unavailability of the witnesses and evidence formed the basis for the district 
court's dismissal of the case on speedy trial grounds in December 2004. 

 
 

7The 
Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant part: "nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."  U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV, § 1.

 
 

8The State 
quoted from the second edition of this authority.  We have elected to quote this passage 
from the most current version.  
There are only minor differences. 

 
 

9W.R.E. 
803(6) states:

 
 

Records 
of regularly conducted activity.  A 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, 
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from 
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of 
that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data 
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified 
witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances or 
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.  The term "business" as used in this 
paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, 
and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for 
profit[.]

 
 

10W.R.E. 106 
states:

 
 
When a 
writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an 
adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part or any 
other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered 
contemporaneously with it.