Title: Manosh v. First Mountain Vermont, L.P.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Manosh v. First Mountain Vermont, L.P.  (2003-426); 177 Vt. 616; 869 A.2d 79

2004 VT 122

[Filed 14-Dec-2004]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2004 VT 122

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2003-426

                             NOVEMBER TERM, 2004

  Howard A. Manosh               }     APPEALED FROM:
                                 }
                                 }
       v.                        }     Lamoille Superior Court
                                 }     
  First Mountain Vermont, L.P.   }
                                 }     DOCKET NO. 181-8-02 Lecv

                                       Trial Judge:  Edward J. Cashman

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.     Defendant First Mountain Vermont, L.P. (FMV) appeals from a
  default judgment entered by the Lamoille Superior Court to sanction FMV for
  not complying with an order compelling discovery.  While FMV's failure to
  respond to proper discovery requests may warrant a severe sanction, we
  reverse and remand because it is impossible for this Court to ascertain the
  trial court's reasons for imposing the ultimate sanction of a default
  judgment, or whether the trial court considered less drastic alternatives. 

       ¶  2.     In August 2002, plaintiff Howard A. Manosh filed the present
  action, seeking a declaratory judgment as to the ownership of certain
  development rights on real property located in Morrisville, Vermont. 
  Plaintiff contends that through a series of transactions involving him,
  FMV, and the Grand Union Company, FMV became the owner of the real
  property, and plaintiff retained the rights to develop it.  The underlying
  transactions are not at issue in this appeal because the court entered
  judgment for plaintiff before the parties had completed discovery.

       ¶  3.     Plaintiff began discovery in early October 2002 by serving
  defendant with a series of interrogatories and requests to produce. 
  Defendant did not respond to the requests within the thirty-day time limit
  provided by V.R.C.P. 33 and 34, and plaintiff's counsel inquired about the
  failure to respond by letters dated November 18 and December 2, 2002.  In
  the December letter, plaintiff's counsel advised defendant's counsel that
  plaintiff would move to compel responses and seek sanctions if defendant
  did not answer plaintiff's interrogatories and document requests by
  December 10, 2002.  Plaintiff asserts that his counsel was informed by
  defendant's attorney on December 19, 2002 that defendant would provide
  answers to discovery by January 10, 2003.

       ¶  4.     Defendant failed to provide any discovery responses by
  January 10, 2003.  On January 31, 2003, plaintiff moved to compel and
  requested sanctions, including striking defendant's answer and entering a
  default judgment for plaintiff, under V.R.C.P. 37.  Defendant did not
  respond to plaintiff's motion to compel.  The court granted the motion by
  entry order dated February 18, 2003.  The entry order also explained that a
  status conference would be scheduled.  Meanwhile, on February 12, 2003,
  defense counsel filed a certificate of service with the court indicating
  that defendant had sent its discovery responses to plaintiff's attorney on
  February 10, 2003, by regular mail.  

        
       ¶  5.     At the status conference on March 26, 2003, it was
  determined that defendant still owed plaintiff a response to document
  request number twelve.  FMV had neither produced any responsive information
  nor objected or otherwise responded to that particular request.  FMV's
  counsel indicated, however, that he felt the request was too broad and that
  he would file a written motion for protection if he had to.  After some
  discussion with counsel for both sides, the court narrowed the scope of the
  request, and ordered defendant to respond to it by April 15, 2003.  The
  date passed with no response from defendant as ordered.  

       ¶  6.     At the next status conference on May 27, 2003, the court
  inquired about the progress the parties had made in the case.  Plaintiff
  complained that defendant still had not complied with the court's orders
  compelling discovery, including not responding to document request twelve. 
  Defense counsel said little during the hearing, but explained that he had
  not received a response to the request from his client despite having asked
  FMV to provide one.  The court took a short recess, and when the hearing
  resumed, it ordered defendant's answer stricken and entered a default
  judgment for plaintiff.  The court issued a judgment reflecting that
  decision on June 5, 2003.  FMV then moved, without requesting a hearing, to
  reinstate its answer and to set aside the default judgment.  By entry
  orders dated August 22, 2003, the court denied those motions without
  further explanation, and this appeal followed.

       ¶  7.     As a preliminary matter, we reject Manosh's argument that
  the judgment striking the answer and entering the default is not properly
  before us.  See V.R.A.P. 3(a) ("An appeal from a judgement preserves for
  review any claim of error in the record . . . ."); see also Town of Lyndon
  v. Burnett's Contracting Co., 138 Vt. 102, 108,