Title: Alston v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 121
September Term, 2009
_________________________________________
CURTIS WINDELL ALSTON
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
__________________________________________
Bell, C. J.
        Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned)
Rodowsky, Lawrence F. (Retired,
Specially Assigned),
                  JJ.
__________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
_________________________________________
Filed:   March 23, 2012
The petitioner, Curtis Windell Alston, was convicted of first degree murder and
related offenses.  He was sentenced to life in prison without parole for first degree
murder and lesser terms for the other offenses.  In an action under the Postconviction
Procedure Act, the postconviction trial court vacated Alston’s convictions and
sentences and granted him a new trial.  The State filed no application for leave to
appeal the postconviction trial court’s judgment.  Forty-four days after the entry of the
final judgment in the postconviction case, the State filed in that case a “Motion to
Reconsider [the] Court’s Order and Opinion Granting Post Conviction Relief.”
Subsequently, the court did reconsider its earlier judgment and denied Alston’s petition
for postconviction relief, thereby re-imposing Alston’s original convictions and
sentences.
The present case is a proceeding under Maryland Rule 4-345(a) which states:
“The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.”  The issue before us is whether
the postconviction trial court’s re-imposition of Alston’s original sentences, after
having vacated those sentences and ordered a new trial, constituted the imposition of
illegal sentences within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a) and our cases.  
I.
The issue and pertinent facts in this case relate to procedural matters;
consequently, we shall not set forth the facts concerning the substantive offenses which
Alston was charged with committing.
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In January 1999, Alston was indicted, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s
County, for one count of first degree murder, two counts of using a handgun in a felony
or crime of violence, one count of attempted murder, one count of first degree assault,
one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and one count of conspiracy to
commit attempted murder.  Alston’s jury trial took place in July 1999, and he was
found guilty on all counts except attempted murder and conspiracy to commit
attempted murder.  The next month, Alston was sentenced to the following terms of
imprisonment:  life without parole for first degree murder; twenty years consecutive on
each of the handgun counts; twenty-five years consecutive for first degree assault; and
a concurrent life sentence for conspiracy to commit murder.  The Court of Special
Appeals affirmed the judgments in an unreported opinion, and this Court denied
Alston’s petition for a writ of certiorari.  Alston v. State, 360 Md. 273, 757 A.2d 809
(2000).
In August 2003, Alston filed, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County,
an action under the Maryland Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, presently
codified in Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 7-101 et seq. of the Criminal
Procedure Article.  The petition raised numerous issues, several of which concerned
Alston’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at his July 1999
criminal trial.  Alston’s petition requested that the “court vacate Petitioner’s
convictions and sentences and grant him a new trial.”  At the hearing on the petition,
both Alston’s counsel at his 1999 criminal trial and Alston himself testified.
The Circuit Court on March 28, 2005, filed a detailed opinion holding that
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1
Maryland Rule 4-212(f).
2
Section 7-109(a) of the Postconviction Procedure Act provides as follows:
“§ 7-109.  Appeal of final order.
(a) Application. – Within 30 days after the court passes an
order in accordance with this subtitle, a person aggrieved by the
order, including the Attorney General and a State’s Attorney, may
apply to the Court of Special Appeals for leave to appeal the order.”
3
Neither the Postconviction Procedure Act nor the Maryland Rules governing postconviction
proceedings (Rules 4-401 through 4-408) contain any provisions authorizing motions for
reconsideration in the postconviction trial court.
Alston was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at his criminal trial.
The basis for this holding was that Alston had not been presented to a District Court
Commissioner for about 48 hours from the time of his arrest, that he was held for 23
hours before he gave the police incriminating statements, and that counsel failed to
argue that this delay in presenting Alston to a Commissioner, and this violation of the
prompt presentment rule1 should be given “very heavy weight” in the court’s
determination of whether the incriminating statements were voluntary.  
The Circuit Court ordered “that Petitioner’s Motion for Post Conviction Relief
is Granted,” thereby vacating Alston’s convictions and sentences and awarding him a
new trial.  The opinion and order were duly entered on the docket, and they constituted
a final judgment under Maryland Rule 4-407(d).  As earlier pointed out, the State did
not file an application for leave to appeal the postconviction trial court’s judgment.2 
On May 11, 2005, forty-four days after the entry of final judgment in the
postconviction case, the State filed in that case a “Motion to Reconsider Court’s Order
and Opinion Granting Post Conviction Relief.”3  A hearing on the State’s motion was
-4-
4
Section 7-104 states:
“§ 7-104.  Reopening postconviction proceeding.
The court may reopen a postconviction proceeding that was
previously concluded if the court determines that the action is in the
interests of justice.”
held on September 8, 2005, and on September 20, 2005, the Circuit Court filed an
opinion and an order stating that “Petitioner’s Motion for Post Conviction relief is
Denied.”  In its opinion, the Circuit Court treated the State’s motion for reconsideration
as a motion to “reopen” the postconviction proceeding.  The court held that, under § 7-
104 of the Postconviction Procedure Act, “this Court has authority to reopen the
petition for post conviction relief,” if “the action is in the interests of justice,” and that,
in Alston’s case, “justice so requires.”4  As to the merits, the postconviction court
reversed its earlier position because it found that the voluntariness of Alston’s
confession, based in part on “the delayed presentment of the petitioner to a
Commissioner,” had been “finally litigated” in Alston’s direct appeal from the
judgments at his 1999 criminal trial.
Alston filed an application for leave to appeal the Circuit Court’s judgment
reopening the postconviction proceeding and denying Alston’s petition for
postconviction relief, and the Court of Special Appeals granted leave to appeal.  Alston
argued, inter alia, that the State was not authorized to file a motion to reopen a
postconviction action and that only the convicted person could file such a motion under
§ 7-104 of the Postconviction Procedure Act.  The Court of Special Appeals, in an
unreported opinion, did not decide the issues raised by Alston.  Instead, the
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intermediate appellate court stated that “we are unable to determine the basis for the
court’s conclusion that justice required the reopening of [Alston’s] previously
concluded post conviction proceeding.”  The Court of Special Appeals remanded the
“case to the post conviction court so that it can provide, on the record, an explanation
for its determination that reopening [Alston’s] post conviction proceeding was ‘in the
interests of justice.’”
Following the remand by the Court of Special Appeals, the postconviction trial
court filed a brief opinion reiterating what it had previously written.  The court stated
that, in its view, § 7-104 of the Postconviction Procedure Act authorizes “either party
to move for reconsideration of a ruling in a post conviction case.”  The postconviction
trial court repeated that it “became aware that the issue of delay of presentment was
litigated” on Alston’s direct appeal from his original convictions.  The Court of Special
Appeals denied Alston’s application for leave to appeal the postconviction trial court’s
ruling after the remand.
On April 18, 2008, Alston commenced the present case by filing in the Circuit
Court for Prince George’s County a motion to correct illegal sentences.  Alston argued
in the motion that the postconviction trial court’s revocation of the order vacating his
convictions and sentences, and re-imposing the sentences, constituted the imposition
of illegal sentences.  He claimed that he was entitled to relief under Rule 4-345(a)
which authorizes a court to “correct an illegal sentence at any time.”  The Circuit Court,
without a hearing and in a one line order, denied Alston’s motion to correct illegal
sentences.  
-6-
Alston appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported
opinion.  Alston filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari which this Court
initially denied.  Alston v. State, 410 Md 560, 979 A.2d 707 (2009).  Upon Alston’s
motion to reconsider, this Court did reconsider and granted the petition for a writ of
certiorari.  Alston v. State, 411 Md. 355, 983 A.2d 431 (2009).
II.
The issue of whether Alston was entitled to relief in this proceeding under Rule
4-345(a) involves two subsidiary questions:  1.  was the postconviction trial court’s re-
imposition of Alston’s original sentences, after having vacated those sentences and
having ordered a new trial, unlawful?  2.  if unlawful, was the re-imposition of the
sentences cognizable under Rule 4-345(a)?  We shall answer both questions in the
affirmative.
A.
When the postconviction trial court on March 28, 2005, filed, and the clerk
entered, an opinion and order that Alston’s postconviction petition be granted, thereby
vacating Alston’s original convictions and sentences and ordering a new trial, the
court’s order constituted a final judgment.  See Maryland Rule 4-407(d) which
provides:  “(d) Finality.  The statement and order [of the postconviction trial court]
constitute a final judgment when entered by the clerk.”  Like most other final
judgments, the judgment entered on March 28, 2005, was subject to appellate review.
When a final judgment in a postconviction case is adverse to the State, the only
remedy granted to the State in the Postconviction Procedure Act is to “apply to the
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Court of Special Appeals for leave to appeal the order.”  See § 7-109(a), supra n.2.  To
reiterate, the State did not file an application for leave to appeal the final judgment of
the postconviction trial court vacating Alston’s convictions and sentences and
ordering a new trial.  Instead, forty-four days after the final judgment, the State filed
in the postconviction trial court a motion for reconsideration.
In holding that it could reopen the postconviction case upon the State’s motion
for reconsideration, the postconviction trial court relied upon § 7-104 of the
Postconviction Procedure Act, with the court stating “that its revisory power under
Section 7-104 . . . permits either party to move for reconsideration of a ruling in a post
conviction case.”  Similarly, § 7-104 is the only ground relied upon by the State in
support of the postconviction trial court’s decision to reconsider its prior judgment. 
Section 7-104 provides: 
“The court may reopen a postconviction proceeding
that was previously concluded if the court determines that
the action is in the interests of justice.”  
Although § 7-104 itself does not contain language specifying who may file an
application  to reopen  a  previously  concluded  postconvction proceeding, the statute
as a whole and the legislative history of § 7-104 make it clear that only a “convicted
person” may bring either a postconviction proceeding or a petition to reopen a
postconviction proceeding.
Section 7-104 of the Postconviction Procedure Act, authorizing the reopening
of postconviction proceedings, was not enacted in isolation.  Instead, it was enacted
along with § 7-103 of the Act, and particularly § 7-103(a) which allows the filing of
-8-
5
Section 7-103 provides as follows:
“§ 7-103. Number and time of filing of petitions.
(a) Only one petition allowed. – For each trial or sentence, a
person may file only one petition for relief under this title.
(b) 10-year filing period. – (1) Unless extraordinary cause is
shown, in a case in which a sentence of death has not been imposed,
a petition under this subtitle may not be filed more than 10 years after
the sentence was imposed.
(2) In a case in which a sentence of death has been
imposed, Subtitle 2 of this title governs the time of filing a petition.”
only one petition for “relief under this title.”5  
Prior to 1986, the Postconviction Procedure Act placed no limit upon the number
of petitions for postconviction relief that a convicted person could file.  Ch. 647 of the
Acts of 1986, however, provided that a “person may not file more than two petitions,
arising out of each trial, for relief” under the Postconviction Procedure Act.  The two-
petition limit remained in effect until 1995.  In addition, before 1995 there was no
provision in the statute for “reopening” a postconviction proceeding.
The General Assembly, by Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995, enacted several changes
in the Postconviction Procedure Act. With regard to the number of petitions a convicted
person could file, this Court in Grayson v. State, 354 Md. 1, 4, 728 A.2d 1280, 1281
(1999), summarized one change as follows:
“The General Assembly in 1995 once again addressed
the number of petitions under the Post Conviction Procedure
Act which could be filed to challenge a particular
conviction.  By Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995, which was
captioned ‘Death Penalty Reform’ and which primarily
amended statutory provisions relating to capital punishment,
the General Assembly also amended subsection (a)(2) of the
Post Conviction Procedure Act to provide as follows:
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6
By Ch. 10 of the Acts of 2001, the Postconviction Procedure Act was re-codified as §§ 7-101
through 7-109, §§ 7-201 through 7-204, and § 7-301 of the Criminal Procedure Article.
‘(2)(I) A person may file only one
petition, arising out of each trial, for relief
under this subtitle.
‘(II) The court may in its discretion
reopen a postconviction proceeding that was
previously concluded if the court determines
that such action is in the interests of justice.’
The first of the above-quoted paragraphs was subsequently
codified as Art. 27, § 645(A)(a)(2)(i) and the second as
Art. 27, § 645A(a)(2)(iii).”6
See also State v. Williamson, 408 Md. 269, 274-276, 969 A.2d 300, 303-304 (2009). At
the same 1995 legislative session, Ch. 258 of the Acts of 1995 was enacted, and it also
amended former Art. 27, § 645A(a)(2), by providing:
“II. Unless extraordinary cause is shown, in a case in
which a sentence of death has not been imposed, a petition
under this subtitle may not be filed later than 10 years from
the imposition of sentence.”
Consequently, in 1995, two different provisions were enacted to be in the same
place in the code, with each one being a second paragraph to the newly amended
subsection limiting a person to one postconviction petition.  The codifiers initially
codified the three provisions as paragraphs (i), (ii), and (iii) of then § 645A(a)(2).  In
2001, the codifiers made the reopening provision a separate § 7-104.  The Revisor’s
Note immediately after the reopening provision stated that the recodification was
“without substantive change from former Art. 27, § 645A(a)(2)(iii).”
-10-
In addition, Senate Bill 340, which became Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995, provided
in its title, inter alia, that the Act was “FOR the purpose of...altering the number of
petitions for postconviction relief, arising out of each trial, that a person is permitted
to file; permitting a circuit court to reopen a postconviction proceeding under certain
circumstances . . . .”
It seems clear that the reopening provision was tied to the provision limiting the
number of petitions a person could file, and reopening was for the purpose of providing
a safeguard for the occasional meritorious case where the convicted person had already
filed one postconviction petition.  The reopening paragraph was not to authorize a
second postconviction petition with all of the requirements applicable to postconviction
petitions; rather it was for the case where a circuit court, in its discretion, believed that,
in the interests of justice, a convicted person’s conviction or sentence should be
examined.  See Evans v. State, 396 Md. 256, 277-278, 914 A.2d 25, 37-38 (2006), cert.
denied, 552 U.S. 835, 128 S.Ct. 65, 169 L.Ed.2d 53 (2007); Gray v. State, 388 Md. 366,
382-384, 879 A.2d 1064, 1073-1074 (2005).
The legislative history of Ch.110 of the Acts of 1995 confirms that the
reopening provision was tied to the single petition provision, and was a safeguard for
criminal “defendants.”  Nothing in the legislative history suggests that the reopening
clause was for either side to file a motion for reconsideration.  Thus, during the 1995
session of the General Assembly, the Governor’s Chief Legislative Officer testified
before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee on Senate Bill 340, which became
Ch. 110, as follows (emphasis added):
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“In [1986], the General Assembly capped the number of
postconviction petitions to two.  However, there is no
apparent rationale for not limiting the defendant to one
petition.  Common sense dictates that the defendant should
include all grounds for relief in one petition.  The right to
file a second postconviction petition simply affords the . . .
defendant an unwarranted opportunity for delay.  Senate Bill
340 limits the defendant to one postconviction petition
unless the court determines that reopening the case is
necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.”
The Chairperson of the Governor’s Commission on the Death Penalty, which
drafted Senate Bill 340, also testified on the Bill before the Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee.  He stated:
“This amendment would reduce the number of post
conviction petitions from two to one, but would permit a
court to reopen a previously concluded proceeding if
necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice.  This balances
the need for procedural safeguards with the need for
stemming cost and delay.  There simply is no need for
routine second petitions – counsel can and should put all
claims into a first petition.  At the federal level, a defendant
gets only one habeas corpus petition; he should not get more
than one post conviction petition.”
The “Floor Report” of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee on Senate Bill
340 of the 1995 session stated:
“The bill eliminates the right of a defendant to file a second
postconviction petition.  However, the bill permits a court to
reopen a proceeding if a reopening is necessary to avoid a
‘miscarriage of justice.’”
-12-
The “Bill Analysis” Report of the House Judiciary Committee on Senate Bill 340
contained similar language.
The history of the reopening provision, § 7-104 of the Postconviction Procedure
Act, demonstrates that the provision was simply to provide a limited exception, for the
benefit of criminal “defendants,” to the restriction upon the number of postconviction
petitions which they could file.
Other sections of the Postconviction Procedure Act also confirm that only a
convicted person, who is imprisoned or on parole or probation, may file a petition for
postconviction relief or a petition to reopen under the Act.  Thus, the first section of the
Act clearly delineates the applicability of the entire statute, which would include § 7-
104:
“§ 7-101.  Scope of title.
This title applies to a person convicted in any court in the
State who is:
(1) confined under sentence of death or imprisonment;
or
(2) on parole or probation.”
The next section specifies who may institute a “proceeding” under the statute
(emphasis added):
“§ 7-102.  Right to begin proceeding.
(a) In general. – Subject to subsection (b) of this section
§§ 7-103 and 7-104 of this subtitle and Subtitle 2 of this
title, a convicted person may begin a proceeding under this
title in the circuit court for the county in which the
conviction took place at any time if the person claims that:
(1) the sentence or judgment was imposed in violation
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of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution
or laws of the State;
(2) the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the
sentence;
(3) the sentence exceeds the maximum allowed by
law; or
(4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral
attack on a ground of alleged error that would otherwise be
available under a writ of habeas corpus, writ of coram nobis,
or other common law or statutory remedy.
(b) Requirements to begin proceeding. – A person may
begin a proceeding under this title if:
(1) the person seeks to set aside or correct the
judgment or sentence; and 
(2) the alleged error has not been previously and
finally litigated or waived in the proceeding resulting in the
conviction or in any other proceeding that the person has
taken to secure relief from the person’s conviction.”
A “proceeding” under the Act covers both a “petition” under § 7-103 and a reopening
proceeding under § 7-104.  In fact, it is noteworthy that § 7-104 uses the word
“proceeding” whereas § 7-103 does not.  See also Thanos v. State, 332 Md. 511, 520,
632 A.2d 768, 772 (1993) (A particular “hearing was not a post conviction proceeding
. . . . [because the] hearing was initiated by a motion filed by the State, not the
defendant, and did not involve a request for relief by the defendant”).
There is no support in the language of the Postconviction Procedure Act, in the
history of the Act, or in any of this Court’s opinions, for the State’s and the Circuit
Court’s position that the State could reopen a proceeding under § 7-104.  It is clear that
the reopening provision is solely for the benefit of a “convicted person.”  Consequently,
the postconviction trial court’s reopening of Alston’s postconviction proceeding and
its re-imposition of Alston’s convictions and sentences was unauthorized and unlawful.
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B.
The remaining question is whether the postconviction trial court’s unlawful re-
imposition of Alston’s original convictions and sentences is cognizable in an action to
correct illegal sentences under Maryland Rule 4-345(a).
There are many opinions of this Court delineating the scope of Rule 4-345(a) or
its predecessor rules.  Several recent ones include, e.g., Matthews v. State, ___ Md.
___, ___ A.3d ___ (2012); Tshiwala v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2012);
Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568, 575 n.1, 7 A.3d 557, 561 n.1 (2010); Taylor v. State, 407
Md. 137, 141 n.4, 963 A.2d 197, 199 n.4 (2009); Montgomery v. State, 405 Md. 67, 74,
950 A.2d 77, 81-82 (2008); Hoile v. State, 404 Md. 591, 620-623, 948 A.2d 30, 47-50,
cert. denied sub nom. Palmer v. Maryland, 555 U.S. 884, 129 S.Ct. 257, 172 L.Ed.2d
146  (2008); Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 466, 918 A.2d 506, 509-510 (2007); State
v. Wilkins, 393 Md. 269, 273-276, 900 A.2d 765, 767-770 (2006); Evans v. State, 382
Md. 248, 278-280, 855 A.2d 291, 309 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1150, 125 S.Ct.
1325, 161 L.Ed.2d 113 (2005).
In determining the applicability of Rule 4-345(a), the most important principle
is “that, as a general rule, a Rule 4-345(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence is not
appropriate where the alleged illegality ‘did not inhere in [the defendant’s] sentence.’”
Evans v. State, supra, 382 Md. at 278, 855 A.2d at 309, quoting State v. Kanaras, 357
Md. 170, 185, 742 A.2d 508, 517 (1999).  See, e.g., Chaney v. State, supra, 397 Md.
at 466, 918 A.2d at 509-510 (A Rule 4-345(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence is
“limited to those situations in which the illegality inheres in the sentence itself”); State
-15-
v. Wilkins, supra, 393 Md. at 275, 900 A.2d at 769 (“An error committed by the trial
court during the sentencing proceeding is not ordinarily cognizable under Rule 4-345(a)
where the resulting sentence or sanction is itself lawful”).
There is one type of illegal sentence which this Court has consistently held
should be corrected under Rule 4-345(a).  Where the trial court imposes a sentence or
other sanction upon a criminal defendant, and where no sentence or sanction should
have been imposed, the criminal defendant is entitled to relief under Rule 4-345(a).
See, e.g., Matthews v. State, supra, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.3d at ___, quoting
Montgomery v. State, supra, 405 Md. at 74-75, 950 A.2d at 82 (“A motion to correct
an illegal sentence ordinarily can be granted only where there is some illegality in the
sentence itself or where no sentence should have been imposed,” emphasis added);
Taylor v. State, supra, 407 Md. at 141 n.4, 963 A.2d at 199 n.4, quoting Baker v. State,
389 Md. 127, 133, 883 A.2d 916, 919 (2005)  (“[A] motion to correct an illegal
sentence” is “‘entertained . . . where . . . the sentence never should have been
imposed’”); State v. Wilkins, supra, 393 Md. at 273-274, 900 A.2d at 768 (“[A] motion
to correct an illegal sentence can be granted . . . where no sentence should have been
imposed”).
Several cases in this Court have involved situations where no sentence or
sanction should have been imposed, and this Court has held that relief under Rule 4-
345(a) was appropriate.  Judge Harrell for the Court in Hoile v. State, supra, 404 Md.
at 621, 948 A.2d at 48, described three of these cases as follows:
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7
Prior to Walczak, opinions of Maryland ’s appellate courts were in substantial conflict regarding
the Rule authorizing the correction of illegal sentences.  See Walczak, 302 Md. 422, 425-427, 488
A.2d 949, 950-951 (1985).  The Walczak opinion resolved the conflicts among the appellate
opinions.
“See Ridgeway v. State, 369 Md. 165, 171, 797 A.2d 1287,
1290 (2002) (no sentence should have been imposed on the
defendant for certain assault charges because the defendant
was acquitted of those charges); Holmes v. State, 362 Md.
190, 195-96, 763 A.2d 737, 740 (2000) (sentence of
probation with home detention as a condition of probation
was illegal because the trial court lacked statutory authority
to impose such a condition); Moosavi v. State, 355 Md. 651,
662, 736 A.2d 285, 291 (1999) (sentence was illegal because
the defendant was convicted under an inapplicable statute).”
 
A seminal case with regard to Rule 4-345(a) is Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422,
488 A.2d 949 (1985).7  In that case, the trial court ordered the defendant Walczak, as
a condition of probation, to pay restitution to a victim of a crime (armed robbery) of
which Walczak had not been convicted.  Walczak failed to object in the trial court to
the restitution, and the Court of Special Appeals held that Walczak had waived the
issue.  This Court, however, held that the restitution order was not authorized by statute
and that it should not have been imposed.  The Court further held that it was an illegal
sentence, and, under Rule 4-345(a), it should be corrected despite the failure to object
in the trial court.  See also Jones v. State, 384 Md. 669, 866 A.2d 151 (2005) (holding
that, when the jury’s verdict of guilty on a count was not orally announced in open
court, and the jury was not polled and harkened to the verdict on that count, no sentence
should have been imposed on that count, and the sentence on the count was illegal
within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a)).  
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8
Even if the postconviction trial court had only granted a new trial to Alston, the effect would
have been the same.  See, e.g., Cottman v. State, 395 Md. 729, 734, 912 A.2d 620, 622 (2006) (“The
effect of granting a new trial was to vacate the original judgment and conviction”); Cook v. Toney,
245 Md. 42, 50, 224 A.2d 857, 861 (1966) (An earlier “verdict . . . was completely eliminated by
the [later] granting of the new trial”); Snyder v. Cearfoss, 186 Md. 360, 367, 46 A.2d 607, 610
(1946) (“It is generally recognized that the effect of granting a motion for a new trial is to leave the
cause in the same condition as if no previous trial had been held”), and cases there cited.
Turning to the case at bar, as previously discussed, Alston’s petition under the
Postconviction Procedure Act requested that the postconviction trial court “vacate
Petitioner’s convictions and sentences and grant him a new trial.”  The postconviction
trial court on March 28, 2005, rendered, and entered on the docket, an opinion and an
order “that Petitioner’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is Granted.”  By granting the
petition, the court granted the relief requested; thus, the order vacated the convictions
and sentences and awarded Alston a new trial.8  This was a final judgment under Rule
4-407(d), subject only to the State’s right, within 30 days, to apply to the Court of
Special Appeals for leave to appeal.
When the State decided not to seek leave to appeal, the postconviction trial
court’s order became fully effective.  Alston at that time had no convictions and no
sentences under the January 1999 indictment; he faced a trial of the charges in that
indictment if the State decided to re-try him.  When the postconviction trial court in
September 2005 unlawfully reopened the postconviction proceeding that had terminated
on March 28, 2005, and unlawfully denied Alston any “Postconviction Relief,” the
effect of the court’s action was to impose, illegally, convictions and sentences upon a
person whose convictions and sentences had been vacated.  The action by the
postconviction trial court in Alston’s postconviction case was essentially similar to the
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imposition of convictions and sentences on charges of which the defendant had been
acquitted, which was involved in Ridgeway v. State, supra, 369 Md. at 171-172, 797
A.2d at 1290.  Although Alston had not been acquitted of the charges when the
convictions and sentences were re-imposed in September 2005, his convictions and
sentences had been vacated.  Legally, he was in the position of one who was awaiting
trial on those charges.
Under our decisions, the postconviction trial court’s illegal action is cognizable
under Rule 4-345(a).  Upon remand, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
should correct the imposition of the illegal convictions and sentences by granting relief
in accordance with the order of March 28, 2005.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED, AND CASE
REMANDED TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS WITH DIRECTIONS TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S
COUNTY AND REMAND THE CASE TO
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID BY PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY.