Title: Com. v. Jerry

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

323 Pa. Superior Ct. 299 (1983) 470 A.2d 601 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Bernard JERRY, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted September 30, 1983. Filed December 23, 1983. Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 13, 1984. *302 Michael James Healey, Pittsburgh, for appellant. Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellee. Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and POPOVICH, JJ. POPOVICH, Judge: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County denying Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA)[1] relief to appellant, Bernard Jerry. On March 16, 1977, appellant was convicted by a judge, sitting without a jury, of possession of a controlled substance[2] and theft by receiving stolen property.[3] Appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than nine months nor more than eighteen months. No post-verdict motion was filed, and no direct appeal was taken. We must remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. On September 2, 1977, appellant filed his first PCHA petition pro se. A hearing was held on June 1, 1978, and the court denied appellant's petition. On November 29, 1978, appellant filed his second PCHA petition pro se. The court denied appellant's petition without a hearing. Appellant's third pro se PCHA petition was filed in May of 1981. This petition also was dismissed because "all issues raised therein have been previously disposed of by this Court." Order of Court dated June 23, 1981, at No. 4. There is no transcript of this evidentiary hearing; however, counsel for the appellant and the prosecution entered into a "STIPULATION OF FACTS" which *303 stated that an evidentiary hearing was conducted on September 15, 1981. Appellant was permitted to amend his PCHA petition to include an allegation of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The court concluded that appellant did not waive his right to appeal and entered an order allowing appellant the right to appeal nunc pro tunc from the order of court dated June 1, 1978. The court also appointed private counsel to represent appellant on appeal. Appellant raises three issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's application to suppress illegally seized evidence because warrants were required; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a statement made by appellant as a result of police interrogation; and (3) whether the trial court erred in ruling that there was sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction for theft by receiving stolen property. The prosecution contends that the issues that appellant raises either have been finally litigated or waived because "appellant's failure to file post trial motions precludes consideration of those allegations of error raised in his first PCHA petition concerning the admission of certain evidence." Brief for the Prosecution at 7. We cannot agree with the prosecution's contention. To begin with, the PCHA court determined that appellant's appellate rights were violated. Even the prosecution conceded as much in its "STIPULATION OF FACT" when it stated: Although the prosecution in its stipulation admitted that appellant's appellate rights were violated at the PCHA stage, this Court concludes that appellant's failure to file *304 post-trial motions does not constitute a waiver because our examination of the record reveals that appellant was not advised properly of his post-trial rights. The Court stated the following: At the time of appellant's trial, March 17, 1977, appellant should have been informed of his "rights with respect to the filing of post-trial motions [e.g., the right to the assistance of counsel in the filing of the motion and on appeal of any issues raised therein], the time for filing and the waiver consequences of not filing as required by Rule 1123". Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 268 Pa.Super. 295, 298 n. 4, 408 A.2d 154, 156 n. 4 (1979)[4]. Although appellant was advised of the time limit for filing post-trial motions, he was not advised of his right with respect to the filing of post-trial motions nor was he advised of the waiver consequences of not filing a motion in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123. Thus, on this record we are unable to agree with the prosecution that "appellant's failure to file post trial motions precludes consideration of those allegations of error raised in his first PCHA *305 petition concerning the admission of certain evidence." Brief for the Prosecution, supra at 7. It is well-established that: In any event, the issue of whether appellant was deprived of his appellate rights either at the post-trial stage or at the PCHA stage is intertwined in the instant case because the PCHA court concluded that appellant's appellate rights were violated at the PCHA stage, and our examination of the record also establishes that appellant's appellate rights were violated at an additional stage, the post-trial stage.[6] This is significant because we must analyze the issues appellant has raised in connection with the PCHA Hearing Act which provides in relevant part: The presumption in the instant case has been rebutted because appellant was deprived of his appellate rights at the post-trial stage. See Commonwealth v. Miranda, supra. In this nunc pro tunc appeal, we are presented with an additional procedural twist. That is, appellant raised at the PCHA level and before this Court other issues. In his brief filed before this Court, appellant contended that (1) the suppression court erred in denying his application to suppress because the police officer conducted an illegal, warrantless search and seizure and an illegal warrantless arrest; *307 (2) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a statement obtained as the result of police interrogation; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction of receiving stolen property. Because the other issues which appellant raises can be addressed on the present record, there is no need to remand on these issues. See Commonwealth v. Miranda, Id., 296 Pa.Superior Ct. at 456, 442 A.2d at 1141 ("Moreover, we have a complete record and can address each of the specific allegations raised by appellant.") In reviewing the determination made by the suppression court, we must remember the following guidelines: *308 Additionally, in making this determination, we must consider only the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses and so much of the evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 280-1, 361 A.2d 282, 290 (1976). The prosecution's evidence at the suppression hearing established that the police received a telephone call at approximately 3:59 P.M. on October 29, 1976, stating that appellant at 58 Roberts Street was seen with a machine gun. (Notes of Suppression Testimony, N.S. 4) The police also knew from information received seventeen or eighteen months previously that a "man was renting guns out to suspected hold-up people." (N.S. 5) The police also stated that at that time appellant was not there. Id. The police officer proceeded to 58 Roberts Street with other officers and surrounded the house. (N.S. 6) The police officer approached the front door, knocked on the door and was admitted by an unknown adult. (N.S. 6-7) The officer, who was not in uniform at the time, asked the individual where Bernard, the appellant, was, and the individual "made a motion with her hand, pointing up." (N.S. 7) The police officer then climbed the stairs until he went to the second floor. Id. Because the police officer had recovered a gun previously on the third floor, he opened the door to the third floor. Id. He heard footsteps and saw appellant either exiting or coming in the doorway. (N.S. 8) By this time, the other officers had arrived. The police then found a .38 pistol on the dresser at the top of the steps. Id. Upon being asked whose guns they were, no one answered. Id. Then appellant answered that the other guns were in the corner when the police questioned, "Where are your other guns?". (N.S. 8) A rifle was located in the corner, which had a clip of eight live rounds. (N.S. 17) At that time, appellant was placed under arrest. The police also seized a white envelope in plain view which tested to be cocaine and lidocaine. (N.S. 18) *309 After the police officers testified on behalf of the prosecution, the appellant presented no additional testimony. The suppression court then stated the following: In our view, the suppression court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are supported by the record. In a similar case, we found that the officer's entry onto the premises and subsequent arrest was valid notwithstanding the fact that no warrants were obtained and stated the following: Additionally, we note that once the police were lawfully on the premises, they had a right to seize anything that was in plain view. Commonwealth v. Harris, 479 Pa. 131, 387 A.2d 869 (1978).[7] Appellant attacks the validity of his arrest because it was made without a warrant. He cites Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A.2d 1177 (1978) for support of the proposition that a warrantless arrest in one's home, absent exigent circumstances, violates the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. We need not examine whether Williams is controlling because our Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457, 417 A.2d 128 (1980), that Williams is not retroactive and applies only to "arrests made subsequent to the date of the Williams decision, November 18, 1978." Commonwealth v. Norris, 305 Pa.Super. 206, 211, 451 A.2d 494, 496 (1982). In the instant case, appellant was arrested on October 29, 1976, more than two years before Williams was decided. Accordingly, we need not examine the applicability of that decision. The second issue appellant raises concerns whether the trial court erred in allowing the police to testify at trial *313 that appellant had told the police that he had resided on the third floor of 58 Roberts Street, the scene of the crime. Appellant claims that this statement was the product of improper police interrogation. However, this issue was not raised at the pretrial stage nor was there this objection interposed at trial. Hence, a waiver has occurred. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 306 and Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974). Appellant argues next that the evidence is insufficient to establish his conviction of receiving stolen property. More specifically, appellant contends that even if the prosecution established that the "gun was stolen, it has failed to show the necessary criminal intent on the part of Defendant." Brief for Appellant at 15. We agree. When analyzing the sufficiency of evidence, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict winner, in this case, the prosecution, and accept as true all of the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which the fact finder, the trial court, could have based its verdict. Commonwealth v. Harrison, 289 Pa.Super. 126, 131, 432 A.2d 1083, 1086 (1981).[8] Additionally, in order to establish the crime of receiving stolen property, the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "(1) the property had been stolen, (2) the accused received the property and (3) the accused knew or had reasonable cause to know that it had been stolen." Commonwealth v. Worrell, 277 Pa.Super. 386, 390, 419 A.2d 1199, 1201 (1980). When viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the record contains the following uncontradicted testimony: Between September 21st and 23rd of 1975, a .38 caliber pistol, a "Smith and Wesson Chief Special", had been stolen *314 from Frank Dampf, a police officer with Duquesne University's Department of Public Safety. (N.T. 63) While the officer did know that the pistol was stolen from his locker, he did not know who had stolen the pistol. On October 29, 1976, approximately one year and four weeks later, the police seized the pistol from the top of appellant's dresser, which was located on the 3rd floor of 58 Roberts Street.[9] No fingerprints were taken from the gun and the appellant presented no testimony on his behalf at trial. In the past, we have said that the facts in receiving stolen property cases must be examined in light of the following considerations: Commonwealth v. Harrison, 289 Pa.Super. at 130, 432 A.2d at 1086 (quoting Commonwealth v. Henderson, 415 Pa. 452, 455, 304 A.2d 154, 156 (1973)). Based on the above standard, we find that appellant offered no license or other explanation of how he came into possession of the pistol. Parenthetically, we note that it is not a crime in Pennsylvania to carry an unlicensed firearm in your home. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106 ("No person shall carry a firearm in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a license therefor as provided in this subchapter.) (Emphasis added). Additionally, the fact that appellant's possession of the pistol was "unexplained" is not dispositive of the issue of appellant's guilty knowledge. See Commonwealth v. *315 Stover, 291 Pa.Super. 509, 436 A.2d 232 (1981) (plurality opinion). On this aspect of the case, we have said the following: Thus, without additional evidence, appellant's unexplained possession is not sufficient to support his conviction for the crime of receiving stolen property in this case. We note that at the time of appellant's arrest, appellant did not flee nor did he indicate that the pistol on the dresser was stolen. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 317 Pa.Super. 135, 138, 463 A.2d 1121, 1123 (1983) (the accused's conduct at the time of arrest is indicative of guilty knowledge); Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 310 Pa.Super. 331, 336, 456 A.2d 637, 640 (1983) ("Both Appellant's flight and his collection of car keys are supportive of Appellant's knowledge that the car was stolen.") Second, the prosecution presented no testimony regarding the appellant's relationship with the victim. However, it was stipulated at trial that the "gun was stolen by some unknown person in September, 1975". (N.T. 63). Third, with respect to the elapsed time period of approximately one year and three weeks, we have said that the term "recent possession" "correspond[s] to a period of time within which a thief could not have had the opportunity to *316 divest himself of possession." Commonwealth v. Brosko, 243 Pa.Super. 312, 318, 365 A.2d 867, 870 (1976). As applied to the instant case, we conclude that appellant's possession was not recent. See Commonwealth v. Stover, 291 Pa.Super. at 512, 436 A.2d at 233 (possession of an automobile 37 days after the car was stolen is "not very recent".) In this connection, our Supreme Court has even said that "substantial numbers of used guns are transferred in seemingly innocent circumstances." Commonwealth v. Owens, 441 Pa. at 325, 271 A.2d at 233. Fourth, although the record states that the victim's pistol was stolen from his locker, there was no indication where the locker was located. Fifth, even if appellant's possession of the stolen gun could be considered recent, we have said that possession of the kind of property involved in the instant case, a recently stolen gun, does not rise to an inference that "a possessor of a recently stolen pistol more likely than not knew or had reason to know that the weapon had been stolen". Id., 441 Pa. at 325, 271 A.2d at 234. Sixth, the rifle which was seized at the same time as the pistol did not prove to be stolen nor were any other stolen items seized by the police at the time of appellant's arrest. Seventh, the prosecution failed to establish whether there were any distinguishing characteristics of the property. Thus, in the absence of any other evidence, appellant's mere possession of the stolen pistol and his unexplained possession of the pistol are insufficient to support a conviction for receiving stolen property. Hence, we must vacate that conviction. The record indicates that appellant was sentenced to not less than nine months nor more than eighteen months in prison for his convictions of possession of a controlled substance and receiving stolen property. However, because we are unable to determine the process by which the sentencing court arrived at the sentence because the sentencing transcript has not been forwarded to this Court, and because we are unable to glean such information from the *317 record, we must remand the matter for resentencing. Commonwealth v. Welch, 291 Pa.Super. 1, 3, 435 A.2d 189, 190 (1981). Remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is not retained. ROWLEY, J., filed a concurring and dissenting statement. ROWLEY, Judge, concurring and dissenting: I join in the opinion of the Court. However, I respectfully dissent from the decision to remand this case for resentencing. Appellant has not raised, in his statement of questions involved, an issue concerning his sentence or the sentence proceeding. Pa.R.A.P. 2116 is "in the highest degree mandatory," and we should not consider issues that have not been raised by the appellant in his statement of questions involved. Moreover, even if the issue was properly before us, rather than remand for resentencing I would direct that a supplemental record consisting of the sentencing transcript be certified and transmitted to this Court pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1926. However, since the issue has not been raised, I would affirm the judgment of sentence. [1] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq. [2] 35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-113(16). [3] 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925. [4] In a similar case, we said: "At the time of appellant's trial [June, 1977], a seven (7) day period was in effect under then Rule 1123. The ten (10) day period did not become effective until July 1, 1977. However, the amending of the rule has no bearing on the issues raised by this appeal." Id., 268 Pa.Superior Ct. at 298 n. 3, 408 A.2d at 155 n. 3. [5] The notes of testimony from the sentencing proceeding have not been forwarded to this Court with the rest of the transcript. However, even if we assume that appellant was advised properly of his appellate rights at sentencing, any appeal he would have launched would have been futile because a defendant "waives for purposes of appeal any issues which could have been included in the post-trial motions." Commonwealth v. Olsen, 247 Pa.Super. 513, 519, 372 A.2d 1207, 1210 (1977). [6] In Commonwealth v. Miranda, 296 Pa.Super. 441, 448 n. 6, 442 A.2d 1133, 1136 n. 6 (1982), this Court commented on this problem: Thus, it is evident that denial of appellate rights may result for varied reasons, including, inter alia, the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, as was the case in Commonwealth v. Webster, 466 Pa. 314, 353 A.2d 372, 373 (1976), or a procedural error committed by the lower court, such as the failure of the court to inform defendant of his appeal rights. Because most of the cases developing the law in the area of nunc pro tunc appeals arise within the context of ineffective appellate counsel claims, our opinion appears to deal with this subject almost exclusively; however, the impact and scope of this opinion is intended to be broader and more general, explaining the proper procedure to be utilized by a PCHA court faced with a claim asserting denial of appellate rights, for whatever reason, together with other claims properly raised. [7] The firearms violations were dropped by the prosecution because the prosecution had misindicted appellant because the barrel length of the rifle was sixteen inches long. Under 18 C.P.S.A. § 6102, a rifle must have a barrel of less than 15 inches in order to fall within the Uniform Firearms Act, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1 et seq., as amended. See Commonwealth v. Rapp, 253 Pa.Super. 31, 384 A.2d 961 (1978). [8] The prosecution did not address the merits of this issue because it contends that this issue also is waived because it was "not raised in appellant's first post conviction petition and [has] been finally litigated." Brief for the Prosecution at 10 n. 4. However, a deprivation of appellate rights does not operate as a waiver in this case, as previously discussed. See Commonwealth v. Miranda, supra. [9] It appears that appellant's father rents rooms on the 2nd floor to boarders, and that appellant's father resides on the first floor of the building. Additionally, the record states that an individual also was arrested in appellant's room on October 29, 1976; however, this individual was released when the police discovered that he was a visitor.