Title: Richard Patrick Wilson and Billy Don Wilson v. Gene Isaacs, Sheriff of Cass County, and Brad Craven

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS  
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES  
ATTORNEYS FOR  
William E. Beck II 
 
 
Ian L. Stewart 
 
 
 
AMICUS CURIAE 
Kokomo, Indiana  
 
 
Michael R. Morow 
 
 
Office of the Attorney General 
                              
 
 
Stephenson Morow & Semler 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Whitney K. Beck  
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Student Legal Intern 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kokomo, Indiana  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thomas M. Fisher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Solicitor General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heather L. Hagan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ashley E. Tatman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 09S05-1003-CV-149 
 
RICHARD PATRICK WILSON AND 
BILLY DON WILSON,  
 
 
 
Appellants (Plaintiffs below), 
 
v. 
 
GENE ISAACS, SHERIFF OF CASS COUNTY, AND 
BRAD CRAVEN, 
 
 
 
 
Appellees (Defendants below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Cass Superior Court, No. 09D01-0708-CT-13  
The Honorable Thomas C. Perrone, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 09A05-0906-CV-344 
_________________________________ 
 
June 28, 2010 
 
Dickson, Justice. 
 
 
In this action for damages the plaintiffs allege that Deputy Brad Craven of the Cass 
County Sheriff's Department discharged his taser gun into Richard Patrick Wilson three times, 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jun 28 2010, 10:34 am
 
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two of which occurred after Wilson was laying immobile on the ground.  Seeking immunities 
under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, the defendants obtained summary judgment from the trial 
court.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment for the Deputy, but reversed sum-
mary judgment as to the Sheriff.  Wilson v. Isaacs, 917 N.E.2d 1251, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).  
Both defendants sought transfer, challenging the partial reversal of summary judgment.1  We 
hold that a law enforcement officer's use of force in excess of the reasonable force authorized by 
statute is not shielded from liability under the "enforcement of a law" immunity provided in In-
diana Code § 34-13-3-3(8) and that genuine issues of fact exist, precluding summary judgment.   
  
 
As to the claims against the Sheriff of Cass County for the actions of Deputy Craven, the 
defendants sought summary judgment in the trial court, asserting "Indiana's law enforcement 
immunity found at Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(8)."  Appellants' App'x at 200.  In its order granting 
summary judgment, the trial court did not specify the basis for its decision.  Id. at 10.  The de-
fendants argue that there is undisputed evidence showing the deputy was engaged in acts as a law 
enforcement officer enforcing the law when the events giving rise to the suit occurred.  They as-
sert: 
Both Plaintiffs have admitted that they knew that Deputy Craven was a police officer 
when he arrived . . . and when he tazered Richard Wilson.  Plaintiffs both saw that Depu-
ty Craven was in uniform and was in a marked patrol car.  Plaintiffs knew that there were 
a number of other police officers present who were in uniform and were driving marked 
police cars.  Moreover, Plaintiffs had just witnessed Deputy Craven arrest their younger 
brother. 
 
Appellees' Br. at 14 (internal citations omitted). 
     
 
In relevant part, the specific Indiana Tort Claims Act immunity provision at issue pro-
vides as follows:  
A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's em-
ployment is not liable if a loss results from the following: 
*   *   * 
(8) The . . . enforcement of . . . a law (including rules and regulations), unless the  
act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment.   
                                                 
 
1 The plaintiffs did not seek relief on transfer as to the portion of the Court of Appeals decision 
affirming summary judgment against the plaintiffs as to their claims against the deputy personally.  As to 
this issue, we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals.  Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).      
 
 
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Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3.  The defendants correctly point out that the plaintiffs are not asserting a 
claim for false arrest or false imprisonment.   
 
 
The plaintiffs contend on appeal that the government is not immune from liability for the 
deputy's conduct because disputed facts exist regarding whether the deputy used unreasonable 
and excessive force contrary to Indiana Code § 35-41-3-3(b), which provides in relevant part: "A 
law enforcement officer is justified in using reasonable force if the officer reasonably believes 
that the force is necessary to effect a lawful arrest."  Id.  The plaintiffs argue that at no time dur-
ing the incident did either of them pose any threat to Deputy Craven or others, that neither of the 
plaintiffs had a weapon, and that neither were sought by law enforcement nor had any prior crim-
inal record.  They assert that the deputy's actions were unreasonable and excessive when he 
"proceeded to taze the obedient plaintiff multiple times, shocking him repeatedly with 50,000 
volts of electrical current."  Appellants' Br. at 9.           
 
 
The parties do not dispute that there are contested issues of fact regarding whether the 
deputy's actions constituted or exceeded reasonable force.  The issue is instead whether the law 
enforcement immunity is available to shield the government from liability for such claims.  In 
reviewing an appeal from a summary judgment ruling, an appellate court applies the same stan-
dard as the trial court and thus affirms summary judgment only if "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Ind. 
Trial Rule 56(C); see Row v. Holt, 864 N.E.2d 1011, 1013 (Ind. 2007).  Where as here the dis-
pute is one of law rather than fact, a de novo standard of review applies.  Freidline v. Shelby Ins. 
Co., 774 N.E.2d 37, 39 (Ind. 2002). 
 
  
 
Whether a police officer's use of unreasonable or excessive force is immune from suit 
under the Indiana Tort Claims Act's law enforcement immunity is not a new legal question.  In 
Kemezy v. Peters we declared, "the use of excessive force is not conduct immunized" by the "en-
forcement of a law" immunity of the Indiana Tort Claims Act.  622 N.E.2d 1296, 1297 (Ind. 
1993).  As emphasized in Kemezy, Indiana law had long recognized that "law enforcement of-
ficers owe a private duty to refrain from using excessive force in the course of making arrests."  
Id.  Ten years later, in King v. Northeast Sec., Inc., we explained that this immunity is restricted 
 
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to the "enforcement of laws that are within the assignment of the governmental unit," and "the 
legislature intended that a governmental entity be immune only for failing to . . . enforce a law 
that falls within the scope of the entity's purpose or operational power."  790 N.E.2d 474, 482, 
483 (Ind. 2003). 
 
 
The defendants argue that the rule in Kemezy no longer applies because it was based on a 
public/private duty test for law enforcement immunity that was subsequently disavowed in Ben-
ton v. City of Oakland City, 721 N.E.2d 224, 230 (Ind. 1999).  This position is supported by City 
of Anderson v. Davis, 743 N.E.2d 359, 365 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied, but was re-
jected by the Court of Appeals in the present case.  Wilson, 917 N.E.2d at 1257.      
 
 
The resolution of this question is guided by our unanimous opinion in Patrick v. Miresso, 
848 N.E.2d 1083 (Ind. 2006).  Miresso did not involve a claim of excessive police force but the 
analogous claim of an officer's negligent operation of a police vehicle while pursuing a fleeing 
suspect.  Addressing the impact of Benton upon the availability of the law enforcement immuni-
ty, we noted its implicit modification of the public/private duty test but vigorously rejected the 
claim that Benton operated to expand the availability of the immunity.  Id. at 1085–87.  We con-
cluded by holding that the Indiana Tort Claims Act's law enforcement immunity "does not shield 
governmental entities and personnel from liability resulting from a breach of the statutory duty to 
operate emergency vehicles 'with due regard for the safety of all persons.'"  Id. at 1087 (quoting 
Ind. Code § 9-21-1-8(d)(1)).2 
 
 
In Miresso, the statutory immunity was construed in conjunction with the statutory re-
quirement that emergency vehicles be operated "with due regard for the safety of all persons."  
Ind. Code § 9-21-1-8(d)(1).  Noting that statutes in apparent conflict should be construed harmo-
niously if reasonably possible, we declined to extend the immunity to claims of government neg-
ligence in operating emergency vehicles.  Analogous to the statutory duty of due regard in the 
operation of emergency vehicles is the statutory provision authorizing a law enforcement offic-
er's use of reasonable force but only "if the officer reasonably believes that the force is necessary 
                                                 
 
2 Our holding in Miresso was unanimously reasserted in the companion case of City of Indian-
apolis v. Garman, 848 N.E.2d 1087 (Ind. 2006). 
 
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to effect a lawful arrest."  Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3(b).  If an officer uses unnecessary or excessive 
force, the officer may commit the torts of assault and battery.  Crawford v. City of Muncie, 655 
N.E.2d 614, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied; City of South Bend v. Fleming, 397 N.E.2d 
1075, 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979), trans. not sought.  As in Miresso, we find that the statutory 
provision restrains the statutory immunity from erecting a shield to liability for conduct contrary 
to the statute.3  Accordingly, the contrary view expressed in City of Anderson is disapproved. 
 
 
Although we conclude that the law enforcement immunity of the Indiana Tort Claims Act 
does not shield the government from liability for excessive force by police, there remain genuine 
issues of material fact regarding whether Deputy Craven's conduct was reasonable and whether 
he reasonably believed that the force he used was "necessary to effect a lawful arrest."  Ind. Code 
§ 35-41-3-3(b).  These factual issues remain for resolution at trial.    
  
Conclusion 
 
      
 
We reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' liability claims 
against the Sheriff of Cass County for the conduct of Deputy Craven.  As to the plaintiffs' claims 
against Deputy Craven personally, we summarily affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals 
affirming summary judgment.   
 
 
Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.  Shepard, C.J., dissents without opinion.  
                                                 
 
3 As Judge Hamilton insightfully observed, "[o]ne should not conclude too readily that the Indi-
ana legislature intended to leave Indiana citizens without a remedy under state law if police officers inflict 
unreasonable and excessive force upon them."  Fidler v. City of Indianapolis, 428 F. Supp. 2d 857, 867 
(S.D. Ind. 2006).