Title: Alex Pagan v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-378 
____________ 
 
ALEX PAGAN,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-1327 
____________ 
 
ALEX PAGAN,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
WALTER A. MCNEIL, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[October 1, 2009] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Alex Pagan appeals an order of the trial court denying his motion to vacate 
his convictions of first-degree murder and sentences of death filed under Florida 
 
 
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Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas 
corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the 
reasons expressed below, we affirm the trial court‘s denial of postconviction relief 
and deny the petition for habeas relief. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Alex Pagan was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder in the 1993 
deaths of six-year-old Michael Lynn and his father Freddy Jones, two counts of 
attempted murder of the child‘s mother Latasha Jones and the Joneses‘ eighteen-
month-old son Lafayette Jones.  Pagan was also convicted of armed robbery and 
armed burglary for breaking into the Joneses= Broward County home and taking 
their Jeep Cherokee.  Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2002).  
 
Latasha Jones testified that two men1 entered the master bedroom of the 
Joneses‘ home in the early morning hours by crashing through the sliding glass 
doors.  The two men demanded money from the couple.  One of the intruders 
stated that he had messed up the ―first time‖ and now wanted a large amount of 
cash that he believed was in the house.  The intruders were wearing ski masks, but 
at one point Latasha was able to see one of the men whose mask was partially off.  
Latasha described him as ―very bright skinned, looked like he was white‖ and as 
                                          
 
 
1.  Co-perpetrator Willie Graham was convicted of the same charges in a 
separate trial and sentenced to life in prison.  
 
 
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being ―the calm one‖ of the two perpetrators.  She described the other man as 
being hyper.  Latasha also testified that ―the calm one‖ tied up the couple and shot 
the victims. 
 
Latasha testified that that the couple‘s house had been burglarized 
approximately one month earlier.  Clothes, jewelry, and cash had been taken.  
Latasha identified some items of jewelry that were recovered from Pagan‘s 
residence after he was arrested for the murders.  Other items of the Joneses‘ 
jewelry had been taken to two pawn shops by Graham. 
 
Antonio Quezada and Keith Jackson, friends of the defendants Pagan and 
Graham, testified that they saw both men wearing the jewelry identified by Latasha 
as having been stolen in the first burglary.  Quezada testified that Pagan told him 
―the next time they would do it right.‖  Quezada also testified that he drove the 
defendants to the Joneses‘ home on the night of the murders and that Pagan stated 
that they would kill everybody.  Pagan arrived at Quezada‘s apartment later that 
night and stated that he had killed everyone, including the children.  He also 
admitted that he had stolen the Joneses‘ car and abandoned it at a supermarket. 
 
Keith Jackson testified that Pagan admitted that he had committed the home 
invasion murders.  Pagan also told Jackson that he had targeted the Joneses‘ home 
because Freddy Jones was a drug dealer and was reputed to have money in his 
home.  Pagan admitted his participation in the first burglary and showed Jackson 
 
 
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the gold jewelry he had taken.  Pagan showed him the house he had burglarized 
and stated his intention to go back because he had not gotten all of the money that 
was supposed to be in the house.  After the murders, Pagan admitted to Jackson 
that he had shot everyone in the house, had dismantled the gun and scattered it 
over Miami, and had shot the victims because he thought they had seen his face. 
 
During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence of Pagan‘s prior 
criminal record, which included a sexual assault and two aggravated batteries.  
Pagan‘s mitigation witnesses included family members and friends who testified 
about his childhood and upbringing, a records supervisor with the Broward County 
Sheriff‘s Office who testified about his exemplary prison record, and an attorney 
who testified about his cooperation in his defense.  The jury recommended a death 
sentence by a vote of seven to five. 
 
At the Spencer hearing,2 a forensic psychologist testified that Pagan has a 
borderline personality disorder and suffered from attention deficit disorder as a 
child.  The State presented another forensic psychologist who disputed both 
findings.  The defense also presented testimony from other family members and 
friends about Pagan‘s family relationships. 
 
The trial court followed the jury‘s recommendation and imposed death 
sentences for each murder.  The trial court found three aggravating circumstances:  
                                          
 
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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Pagan had a prior violent felony conviction; the murders were committed during 
the course of a felony; and the murders were committed in a cold, calculated, and 
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.  The 
court found as a statutory mitigating circumstance, under the catch-all provision of 
―any other factors,‖ that Pagan had a deprived childhood based on his father‘s 
abandonment of the family when he was two years old and his mother‘s having to 
raise two small children on her own.  The trial court also found several 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, including that Pagan suffered from 
attention deficit disorder, had a borderline personality disorder, was a loving 
brother, was a loving grandson and great-grandson, was a loving friend, and 
displayed good conduct while in custody. 
 
On appeal, Pagan raised seventeen claims.3  This Court found all but one of 
Pagan‘s claims of error to be meritless, not properly preserved for appeal, or not 
                                          
 
 
3.  Pagan asserted that (1) there was insufficient evidence presented at trial 
to sustain his conviction and to support the trial court‘s denial of his motion for 
judgment of acquittal; (2) the trial court improperly admitted collateral crime 
evidence under Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959); (3) the trial court 
erred in denying Pagan‘s motion to suppress physical evidence; (4) the trial court 
erred in refusing to grant a new trial or to declare a mistrial when the prosecutor 
improperly bolstered the credibility of a state witness; (5) the trial court erred in 
admitting recorded hearsay; (6) the trial court erred in denying Pagan‘s motion for 
a new trial and in upholding the State‘s challenge to a juror; (7) the trial court 
abused its discretion in reviewing Pagan‘s motion for mistrial and therefore erred 
in refusing to order a new trial; (8) the trial court erred in refusing to grant one or 
more of Pagan‘s motions for a mistrial; (9) the trial court erred in permitting the 
showing of photographs of the deceased; (10) the trial court erred in denying 
 
 
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argued with specificity.  The only error found by this Court (the prosecutor‘s 
reference to ―Desert Storm‖ without a factual basis in the evidence) was deemed 
harmless.   Pagan, 830 So. 2d at 813.  We affirmed Pagan‘s convictions and 
sentences.  Id. at 817.  The United States Supreme Court subsequently denied 
Pagan‘s petition for writ of certiorari. See Pagan v. State, 539 U.S. 919 (2003). 
Pagan filed a postconviction motion in June 2004, raising twenty-one 
claims.  In January 2005, the trial court issued an order granting Pagan an 
evidentiary hearing on four of his claims.4  The trial court denied all relief in 
February 2006. 
                                                                                                                                        
Pagan‘s motion for a new trial based on a discovery violation when testimony 
concerning a voice lineup was permitted; (11) the trial court erred in denying 
Pagan‘s motion for mistrial when the prosecutor made an improper golden rule 
argument in closing argument; (12) the trial court erred in denying Pagan‘s motion 
for mistrial when the prosecutor in closing argument referred to a camouflage 
jacket from the Desert Storm military campaign which was not in evidence and 
which was highly prejudicial; (13) the trial court erred in permitting Keith Jackson 
to testify about the death of the six-year-old child victim; (14) the trial court erred 
in overruling objections and permitting the medical examiner to express expert 
opinions on the properties of glass; (15) the trial court erred in granting the State‘s 
motion for a voice lineup and in allowing testimony relating to the voice lineup to 
be admitted at trial; (16) these cumulative errors required reversal and remand; and 
(17) Pagan‘s death sentence was not proportionate.  Pagan, 830 So. 2d at 802-03. 
 
4.  The evidentiary hearing concerned Pagan‘s claims that the State 
committed a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by suppressing 
evidence about the identity of an alternate suspect purportedly contained in a 
police report;  that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to 
ensure that Pagan received a proper mental health examination, by failing to 
conduct a proper investigation of mitigation, by failing to present mitigation 
evidence properly, and by failing to call witnesses who could mitigate the facts of 
 
 
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Pagan has appealed the denial of postconviction relief to this Court, raising 
nine issues.  Pagan asserts that (1) the State committed a Brady5 violation by 
suppressing evidence in a police report about the identity of an alternate suspect; 
(2) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to ensure that Pagan 
received a proper mental health examination, to conduct a proper investigation of 
mitigation, and to present mitigation evidence properly; (3) defense counsel 
provided ineffective assistance by failing to call witnesses who could mitigate the 
facts underlying the prior violent felony aggravator; (4) the trial court erred in 
summarily denying a Brady claim relating to Keith Jackson‘s plea in a different 
case; (5) the trial court erred in summarily denying a Giglio6 claim relating to 
Keith Jackson‘s testimony about charges against him in Dade County; (6) the trial 
court erred in summarily denying a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
relating to Wanda Jackson‘s testimony; (7) the trial court erred in summarily 
denying claims of confrontation violations and prosecutorial misconduct relating to 
the testimony of Keith Jackson and Wanda Jackson; (8) the trial court erred in 
summarily denying a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the cross-
                                                                                                                                        
the prior violent felony aggravator; and that Pagan was denied his rights under Ake 
v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), because counsel failed to ensure a proper mental 
health examination and failed to provide necessary information to the mental 
health expert. 
 
5.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
6.  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 
 
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examination of Detective Ron Peluso; and (9) the trial court erred in summarily 
denying a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the cross-
examination of Keith Jackson.  Pagan has also filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, raising two issues.  He claims that (1) he was denied equal protection when 
prospective jurors were struck from his jury because English was not their primary 
language; and (2) he was denied a reliable sentence and verdict because the jury‘s 
role was diminished in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi.7  We address Pagan‘s 
claims in turn below. 
POSTCONVICTION APPEAL 
The first three claims that Pagan raises in his postconviction appeal were the 
subject of a three-day evidentiary hearing by the trial court in February 2005.8  At 
the hearing, Pagan presented testimony from his guilt phase attorney Dennis 
Colleran, his penalty-phase attorney Kenneth Malnik, his friend Philip Howard 
regarding the facts underlying the prior felony conviction aggravator, his 
grandmother Viola Miranda and his father Miguel Pagan about his childhood and 
family relationships, and clinical psychologists Henry Dee and Mark Cunningham.  
Brady Violation 
                                          
 
 
7.  Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). 
 
8.  The court granted an evidentiary hearing on four of Pagan‘s 
postconviction issues.  Pagan only raises three of those issues in this appeal. 
 
 
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Pagan claims that the State committed a Brady violation by suppressing the 
identity of an alternate suspect referred to in a police report.  The trial court denied 
relief on this claim, finding that this alleged Brady evidence was available to Pagan 
prior to and at the time of trial.  The court noted that defense counsel had used the 
identity ‖mix up‖ in a motion to suppress, in a motion for new trial, and in 
argument to the jury.  Thus, the court concluded, there was no Brady violation.  
The trial court further concluded that even if this was Brady material, it would not 
have undermined confidence in the outcome of Pagan‘s trial proceedings. 
 
Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the State is required to 
disclose material information within its possession or control that is favorable to 
the defense.  See Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 2d 161, 168 (Fla. 2004).  To establish 
a Brady violation, the defendant has the burden to show (1) that favorable 
evidence—either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently 
suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant 
was prejudiced.  See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); see also 
Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000).  To meet the materiality prong, the 
defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that had the suppressed 
evidence been disclosed the jury would have reached a different verdict.  See 
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.  See Way, 760 So. 2d at 913; see also 
 
 
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Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290.  The remedy of retrial for the State‘s suppression of 
evidence favorable to the defense is available when ―the favorable evidence could 
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine 
confidence in the verdict.‖  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 
514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)).  Giving deference to the trial court on questions of fact, 
this Court reviews de novo the application of the law and independently reviews 
the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence.  See Mordenti, 894 So. 2d at 169; 
Way, 760 So. 2d at 913. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Pagan‘s guilt phase counsel Dennis Colleran 
testified that the theory of defense was that Pagan had not been involved in the 
crimes and that Keith Jackson had implicated Pagan to remove suspicion from 
himself and his associates.  The record shows that Colleran filed a number of 
pretrial motions, including motions to suppress the physical evidence found in 
Pagan‘s house and to suppress various witness statements.  Colleran testified that 
he never received the Miramar Police Department Information Sheet, dated April 
2, 1993.  This information sheet involved Pagan‘s codefendant Willie Graham and 
Graham‘s attempts to hire someone to kill the police detective investigating the 
instant case.  Included on the information sheet was a statement that ―Graham has 
[a] known associate Alex Ramirez who resides in Turtle Bay.‖ 
 
 
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In his statements to the police about the instant crime, Keith Jackson related 
that Willie Graham and his friend ―Alex‖ had admitted their involvement in the 
house invasion and murders.  Jackson did not know Alex‘s last name, but was able 
to give accurate information about where Alex lived, which was Pagan‘s residence, 
and he identified Alex as having been released from prison recently, which Pagan 
had been.  Jackson stated that Alex‘s last name could be Ramirez.  Thus, this was 
the name listed on the search and arrest warrants relating to Pagan. 
Colleran testified that had he received the Miramar information sheet 
mentioning an Alex Ramirez who lived at Turtle Bay, he could have more 
thoroughly investigated Ramirez and his connection to Jackson and Graham.  
Colleran also testified that he could have used the information sheet to attack the 
credibility of the police investigation and to impeach Jackson.   Colleran testified 
that had he received this information sheet, it would have ―put [him] on a much 
heavier harder trail against Ramirez‖ and he would have been able to argue his 
motions ―more strongly‖ with this information. 
However, Colleran admitted that long before trial he realized that Ramirez 
was a real person and not an alias for Pagan or misleading information provided by 
Jackson.  Included in the discovery materials received by Colleran in July 1993 
were employment records listing Alex Ramirez as working with Willie Graham.  
Colleran had also hired an investigator to investigate Alex Ramirez and his 
 
 
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connection to Jackson or Graham in July 1993.  In August 1995, Colleran hired 
another investigator to speak to Alex Ramirez.  Colleran admitted that he had 
previously obtained a report showing that Alex Ramirez had no criminal record 
and he considered Ramirez as a possible witness against Jackson‘s alibi.  Colleran 
described Ramirez as a ―straight shooter who wouldn‘t be somebody under [Keith] 
Jackson‘s control.‖ 
On cross-examination, Colleran admitted that he had used the name mix-up 
to his strategic advantage in the motions to suppress, arguing that the warrants 
were defective because they did not have Pagan‘s actual name but instead referred 
to Alex Ramirez.   In a motion for a new trial in August 1997, Colleran continued 
to argue that there was no Alex Ramirez and that Jackson had lied to the police, 
even though Colleran knew at the time that Alex Ramirez was an actual person 
who was acquainted with codefendant Graham. 
Thus, the fact that there was a real person named Alex Ramirez who was 
associated with Willie Graham and Keith Jackson was not suppressed by the State, 
because the defense had this information as early as July 1993, used this 
information to argue various motions to the court, and even investigated this 
individual.  If the evidence in question was known to the defense, it cannot 
constitute Brady material.  Thus, a Brady claim cannot stand if a defendant knew 
of the evidence allegedly withheld or had possession of it; the evidence simply 
 
 
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cannot then be found to have been withheld from the defendant.  See Occhicone v. 
State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (Fla. 2000).  Pagan has not established a Brady 
violation. 
Ineffective Assistance Claim Regarding Mitigation Evidence 
In his second issue on appeal, Pagan asserts that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance in regard to mitigation evidence in three respects.  First, 
Pagan claims that penalty-phase counsel Kenneth Malnik failed to ensure that he 
received a proper mental health evaluation because defense mental health expert 
Dr. Martha Jacobson did not explore possible organic brain damage and because 
Malnik did not present Dr. Jacobson‘s testimony to the jury but only to the court 
during the Spencer hearing.  Second, Pagan claims that Malnik failed to conduct a 
proper investigation of potential mitigation to uncover many mitigating factors that 
could have been presented to the jury.  Third, Pagan claims that Malnik failed to 
present the mitigation evidence in a proper way because both parties and the court 
referred to criminal responsibility rather than moral culpability in evaluating the 
mitigating evidence. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, Pagan presented testimony from penalty-phase 
counsel Malnik about his preparation, investigation, and presentation of mitigating 
evidence, from Pagan‘s father Miguel Pagan about the family history of substance 
abuse, from Pagan‘s grandmother Viola Miranda that no psychologist or lawyer 
 
 
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ever interviewed her prior to the penalty phase, from neuropsychologist Dr. Henry 
Dee about the results of his postconviction evaluation and testing of Pagan, and 
from psychologist Dr. Mark Cunningham about extensive mitigating evidence 
from Pagan‘s childhood, family, and background.  
 
After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief on this claim, 
finding that Pagan had not shown deficient performance.  The court further 
concluded that even if the evidence that Pagan referenced in the evidentiary 
hearing had been presented, it would not have changed the outcome of the 
proceedings because Pagan did not challenge the aggravating factors, which the 
court had found ―standing alone‖ to be ―sufficient to outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances.‖  The trial court summarized Malnik‘s investigation and 
preparation for the penalty phase and discussed his strategic reason for not 
presenting Dr. Jacobson‘s testimony to the jury.  The court also noted that although 
the postconviction mental health experts expressed different opinions about 
Pagan‘s mental condition and a new approach for presenting his family history to 
the jury, this did not show deficient performance by counsel.  
Following the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has held that for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
 
 
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competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a 
specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is 
clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. 
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted).  
Where this Court previously has rejected a substantive claim on the merits, counsel 
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a meritless argument.  See Heath 
v. State, 3 So. 3d 1017, 1033 (Fla. 2009). 
Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law 
and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the trial 
court‘s factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but 
reviewing the trial court‘s legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 
2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).   
 
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel‘s performance was not 
ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  ―A fair assessment of attorney 
performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel‘s challenged conduct, and to 
evaluate the conduct from counsel‘s perspective at the time.‖  Id. at 689.  The 
defendant carries the burden to ―overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action ‗might be considered sound trial strategy.‘‖  
 
 
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Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  ―Judicial scrutiny of 
counsel‘s performance must be highly deferential.‖  Id.  In Occhicone v. State, 768 
So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000), this Court held that ―strategic decisions do not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been 
considered and rejected and counsel‘s decision was reasonable under the norms of 
professional conduct.‖ 
With respect to the investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence, the 
Supreme Court observed in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003),  that 
―Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of 
mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the 
defendant at sentencing.  Nor does Strickland require defense counsel to present 
mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case.‖  Id. at 533.  Rather, in deciding 
whether trial counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment with regard to 
the investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence, a reviewing court must 
focus on whether the investigation resulting in counsel‘s decision not to introduce 
certain mitigation evidence was itself reasonable.  Id. at 523; Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 690-91.  When making this assessment, ―a court must consider not only the 
quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known 
evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.‖  Wiggins, 539 
U.S. at 527. 
 
 
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An attorney can almost always be second-guessed for not doing more.  
However, this is not the standard by which counsel‘s performance is to be 
evaluated under Strickland.   Deficient performance involves ―particular acts or 
omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.‖  Maxwell, 490 
So. 2d at 932.  Here, Malnik reviewed the records and evaluations that he inherited 
from Pagan‘s previous counsel, consulted with previous counsel and the previous 
mental health expert who had evaluated Pagan, conducted his own investigation by 
obtaining school records and jail records, interviewed Pagan, interviewed Pagan‘s 
family and friends, obtained the appointment of Dr. Jacobson to conduct a mental 
health evaluation of Pagan, consulted with Dr. Jacobson, and reviewed Pagan‘s 
criminal records.  Malnik made a strategic decision not to present Dr. Jacobson‘s 
testimony to the jury and only to the judge at the Spencer hearing based on factors 
learned during the course of his investigation.  Malnik explained that Dr. 
Jacobson's diagnosis of Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) was not consistent with 
the nature of the crime and would not ―necessarily explain the crime to a jury‖ as it 
might to a scientist or psychologist.  Additionally, Malnik learned during 
depositions that the State mental health expert would contradict the diagnoses of 
ADD and borderline personality disorder and would present damaging evidence 
that Pagan had an antisocial personality disorder and had been involved with gangs 
 
 
- 18 - 
and guns.  He knew that the school records and anecdotal information from friends 
and family did not support the ADD diagnosis.  Furthermore, Malnik knew that Dr. 
Jacobson did not find any statutory mental health mitigators.  ―Strategic decisions 
do not constitute ineffective assistance if alternative courses of action have been 
considered and rejected.‖  White v. State, 964 So. 2d 1278, 1288 (Fla. 2007) 
(quoting Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 223 (Fla. 1998)). 
Based on the mitigating evidence that Malnik presented at the penalty phase 
and the Spencer hearing, the sentencing court found both ADD and borderline 
personality disorder as nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and childhood 
deprivation as a statutory mitigating circumstance under the catch-all provision of 
section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1997).9  Moreover, much of the family 
information that Dr. Cunningham presented in his postconviction testimony was 
actually presented to the jury during Pagan‘s penalty phase.  Finally, any claim that 
the court applied an incorrect standard in evaluating the mitigating evidence is 
procedurally barred because it was not raised on direct appeal.  See Harvey v. 
Dugger, 656 So. 2d 1253, 1256 (Fla. 1995) (―[I]ssues that could have been, but 
were not, raised on direct appeal are not cognizable through collateral attack.‖).  
                                          
 
 
9.  The statute provides, in pertinent part, that mitigating circumstances shall 
include ―[t]he existence of any other factors in the defendant‘s background that 
would mitigate against the imposition of the death penalty.‖  § 921.141(6)(h), Fla. 
Stat. (1997). 
 
 
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Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‘s denial of this ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. 
Prior Violent Felony Aggravator 
Pagan next asserts counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to call 
witnesses who could mitigate the facts underlying the prior violent felony 
aggravator.   The sentencing order found the prior violent felony aggravator based 
on Pagan‘s convictions for five violent felonies—indecent assault, two counts of 
aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, and the attempted murders of Latasha 
Jones and her infant son—and the contemporaneous capital felony convictions for 
the murders of Freddy Jones and Michael Lynn.  The indecent assault conviction is 
the basis of Pagan‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel here. 
The indecent assault occurred when Pagan was nineteen years old and 
involved the thirteen-year-old sister of a friend, who reportedly had a ―crush‖ on 
Pagan and was always hanging around him.  When a group of Pagan‘s friends went 
to a festival in Miami, the young girl went over to Pagan‘s house.  Pagan could not 
accompany his friends to the festival because he was on house arrest.  Pagan and 
the girl began kissing.  The girl stated that it went too far and Pagan would not stop 
when she said no.  Pagan stated that it was a consensual sexual encounter.  Pagan 
was convicted of indecent assault. 
 
 
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The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on this claim.   Penalty-
phase counsel Malnik was questioned about his handling of this prior conviction 
aggravator and one of Pagan‘s high school friends testified about his recollection 
of the matter.  Malnik testified that he reviewed the files for all of Pagan‘s prior 
convictions and was familiar with the facts of the indecent assault conviction and 
the statements made in the case.  Malnik testified that he did not want to bring in 
witnesses regarding this incident because he did not want to highlight the assault or 
make it a focus of the case.  However, after the State brought out the details of the 
incident, Malnik was able to admit Pagan‘s complete statement to the police 
asserting that this was a consensual sexual contact, which was somewhat 
exculpatory to Pagan.  Malnik was also able to keep the jury from learning that the 
victim had been a virgin and that Pagan had pled guilty to the assault.  
At the evidentiary hearing, Pagan‘s high school friend Philip Howard 
testified about his recollection of the events surrounding the indecent assault 
conviction.  Howard testified that the victim had a crush on Pagan and considered 
him her ―boyfriend.‖  Howard also testified that the victim became angry and 
jealous when Pagan dated a girl his own age and threatened to get even with Pagan 
and that she made inconsistent statements about what had occurred on the evening 
in question.  However, Howard also testified that the victim was upset and crying 
the day after the incident.  Psychologist Dr. Mark Cunningham testified that the 
 
 
- 21 - 
indecent assault conviction could have been mitigated with information that Pagan 
had been repeatedly sexually abused by older women beginning when he was ten 
years old and continuing throughout his childhood.  
The trial court denied relief on this claim, finding that counsel made a 
strategic decision and was not deficient in his performance.  Based on the 
testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, we agree.  Further, even if counsel 
had presented Howard‘s testimony at the penalty phase and been able to mitigate 
the circumstances of the indecent assault conviction, Pagan cannot prove prejudice 
by counsel‘s failure to do so.  The prior violent felony aggravator did not rest 
solely on this conviction for indecent assault.  It was supported by several other 
more violent convictions.  Thus, we affirm the trial court‘s denial of relief on this 
claim because Pagan has failed to demonstrate deficient performance and 
prejudice. 
The remainder of Pagan‘s claims on appeal assert that the trial court erred by 
summarily denying a number of his postconviction claims.  As a general 
proposition, a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction 
relief motion unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show 
that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is 
legally insufficient.  See, e.g., Maharaj v. State, 684 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1996); 
Anderson v. State, 627 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1993); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850.  The 
 
 
- 22 - 
defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally 
valid claim.  Mere conclusory allegations are not sufficient to meet this burden.  
See Kennedy v. State, 547 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1989).  However, in cases where there 
has been no evidentiary hearing, the reviewing court must accept the factual 
allegations made by the defendant to the extent that they are not refuted by the 
record.  See Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1999); Valle v. State, 705 So. 2d 
1331 (Fla. 1997).  This Court must examine the claim to determine if it is legally 
sufficient, and, if so, determine whether or not the claim is refuted by the record.  
We review Pagan‘s claims that were summarily denied in this context. 
Claims Relating to State Witness Keith Jackson  
Pagan asserts that the trial court should have granted him an evidentiary 
hearing on several claims relating to State witness Keith Jackson, including an 
alleged Brady violation regarding Jackson‘s plea in an unrelated Dade County 
case, an alleged Giglio10 violation relating to Jackson‘s trial testimony about the 
Dade County case, and a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the cross-
examination of Jackson.  For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the 
trial court‘s summary denial of each of these claims was proper.  
Pagan claims that the State committed a Brady violation by withholding 
information about the terms of Jackson‘s plea agreement in the Dade case, 
                                          
 
 
10.  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972). 
 
 
- 23 - 
documentation of Jackson‘s performance of the terms of that agreement, and 
violations of the agreement that had not led to any charges being brought or 
sanctions imposed against Jackson.  Pagan also claims that this evidence was 
material to his effective impeachment of Jackson‘s testimony.  The trial court 
found that Pagan did not establish a Brady violation because the evidence of 
Jackson‘s murder charge in Dade County was not suppressed.  The court‘s order 
cites extensive pretrial and trial record references to Jackson‘s Dade case.  The 
court also concluded that the claim was legally insufficient because Pagan did not 
plead what ―favorable evidence‖ was allegedly withheld. 
We agree with the trial court.  The State did not suppress the fact that 
Jackson had entered into a plea agreement in the Dade case and the nature of that 
agreement, i.e., Jackson was promised a reduced sentence in return for his 
testimony against the other codefendants in that case.  The record of Pagan‘s trial 
is replete with motions, evidence, testimony, and argument regarding Jackson‘s 
Dade case.  Thus, the real thrust of Pagan‘s claim is that there is some undisclosed 
documentation of Jackson‘s performance of that agreement which may indicate 
that he violated the terms of the agreement.   
Although the ―due diligence‖ requirement is absent from the Supreme 
Court's most recent formulation of the Brady test, it continues to 
follow that a Brady claim cannot stand if a defendant knew of the 
evidence allegedly withheld or had possession of it, simply because 
the evidence cannot then be found to have been withheld from the 
defendant. 
 
 
- 24 - 
Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (Fla. 2000).  Here, the State disclosed 
that Jackson had entered into a plea agreement in the Dade case, outlined the 
parameters of the agreement, stated the sentencing range that Jackson faced, and 
disclosed the name of the judge who was presiding over Jackson‘s case.  In fact, 
Pagan‘s counsel filed a notice of reciprocal discovery with a number of attached 
documents that he had obtained from the Dade County file of Jackson‘s case.   Cf. 
Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 911-12 (Fla. 2000) (noting that evidence is not 
―suppressed‖ where the defendant was aware of the exculpatory information).  
Thus, we question whether any information was actually suppressed and, thus, 
whether Pagan stated a legally sufficient claim as to the second prong of Brady. 
However, even if information relating to the terms of Jackson‘s plea 
agreement could be considered suppressed, Pagan cannot meet the third prong of a 
Brady violation on this claim, i.e., the defendant was prejudiced because the 
evidence was material.  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); see also 
Way, 760 So. 2d at 910.  To meet this prong, the defendant must demonstrate a 
reasonable probability, that is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome, that had the suppressed evidence been disclosed the jury would have 
reached a different verdict.  See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289-90.  Pagan was able to 
present significant impeachment of Jackson‘s character and credibility by eliciting 
that Jackson had been charged with attempted first-degree murder in an unrelated 
 
 
- 25 - 
case and had agreed to testify against his codefendants in exchange for a more 
lenient sentence.  Any additional information about Jackson‘s performance of the 
plea requirements would only be more impeachment and our confidence in the 
outcome of the trial is not undermined.  See Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 508 
(Fla. 2003) (rejecting Brady claim on the materiality prong in light of the 
significant impeachment of the witness without the disclosure of payment of a 
reward). 
Pagan also asserts that the State presented false and misleading information 
regarding the status of Jackson‘s Dade case in violation of Giglio.  Specifically, 
Pagan asserts that the State knew that the charges had been reinstated against 
Jackson in the Dade case a year before Jackson‘s testimony in Pagan‘s trial, yet 
Jackson testified that the charges had only recently been reinstated.  Pagan asserts 
that the State did not want the jury to know that Jackson had entered a plea 
agreement in that case in exchange for his testimony in that case.  Pagan also 
contends that the State did not want the jury to know the specifics of that case:  that 
Jackson had been charged with attempted murder in an incident in which drugs had 
been stolen; had kidnapped and attempted to execute the victim in the case with a 
firearm; had been arrested with two other codefendants; and had entered into a plea 
agreement in exchange for his testimony against the codefendants.  Pagan 
acknowledges that the State gave notice of Jackson‘s deal through supplemental 
 
 
- 26 - 
discovery, but contends that the full extent of the deal was not revealed.  The trial 
court found this claim to be legally insufficient as pled because Pagan‘s claim was 
conclusory and he presented no argument or analysis regarding the materiality of 
the testimony presented.  The court also noted that Jackson‘s plea deal and the 
underlying charges were thoroughly discussed during the trial. 
A Giglio claim requires proof that (1) the prosecutor presented or failed to 
correct false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) 
the false evidence was material.  See Guzman v. State, 941 So. 2d 1045, 1050 (Fla. 
2006).  Once the first two prongs are established, the false evidence is deemed 
material if there is any reasonable possibility that it could have affected the jury‘s 
verdict.  Id.   Under this standard, the State has the burden to prove that the false 
testimony was not material by demonstrating it was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Id. at 1050-51; see also Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 2d 161, 175 (Fla. 2004).   
Giglio claims present mixed questions of law and fact.  Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 
766, 785 (Fla. 2004).  A reviewing court defers to those factual findings supported 
by competent, substantial evidence, but reviews de novo the application of the law 
to the facts.  Id. 
In June 1994, Pagan filed a motion in limine to introduce evidence of the 
Dade charges as reverse Williams11 rule evidence against Jackson and to use this 
                                          
 
 
11.  Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959). 
 
 
- 27 - 
information to impeach him.  However, because the Dade charges had been 
dropped against Jackson at that time, the court ruled that Pagan could not present 
this evidence.  In May 1996, the State gave notice to Pagan through supplemental 
discovery that Jackson had been rearrested on the Dade charges, that Jackson had 
entered a plea agreement in exchange for cooperating with the State, that Jackson 
faced a sentence ranging from five years‘ probation to ten years in prison, and 
identified the judge who would preside over this case.  In November 1996, Pagan 
filed another motion in limine to cross-examine Jackson about his rearrest on the 
Dade charges, the nature of that crime, and the sentence that Jackson could receive.  
At the hearing on the motion, the State acknowledged that Jackson had been 
rearrested and had made a deal with the State and that Pagan had a right to 
question Jackson about these matters.  Pagan‘s counsel also discussed the 
particulars of the Dade case against Jackson, including that Jackson and Willie 
Graham shot a drug dealer in the head, inflicting a nonfatal wound, in order to steal 
his money, that this crime had led the police to Jackson as a possible suspect in the 
instant case, and that Jackson had given the police information about who 
committed the instant crimes. 
During Jackson‘s trial testimony, the prosecutor asked him about his arrest 
in the Dade case and the status of the charges against him.  Jackson testified that he 
had been arrested in February 1992 with Graham and another individual for a 
 
 
- 28 - 
crime in Dade County and that the charges had been dropped after eight months, 
but had been reinstated in 1996.12  Jackson admitted that he had entered a plea 
agreement in exchange for his testimony in the Dade case and was awaiting 
sentencing, which could range from five years‘ probation to ten years in prison.  
During cross-examination of Jackson, Pagan‘s counsel elicited that Jackson and 
Graham had been arrested for attempted first-degree murder in the Dade case, that 
Jackson had been aware that the dropped charges were going to be reinstated 
against him at the time of his initial questioning in this case, and that Jackson had 
been incarcerated for eight months on those charges. 
Essentially, Pagan contends that a Giglio violation occurred when Jackson 
testified on direct examination that he had been rearrested in 1996 on the Dade 
charges and the State did not clarify or correct that he had actually been rearrested 
in 1995.  False evidence is deemed material under Giglio if there is any reasonable 
possibility that it could have affected the jury‘s verdict.  Guzman, 941 So. 2d at 
1050.  In other words, false testimony is not material if it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id. at 1051.   We conclude that this error as to the date charges 
were reinstated against Jackson was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The jury 
was fully aware of the charges against Jackson, the nature of the crime involved, 
that Graham was Jackson‘s codefendant in that case, that Jackson had entered into 
                                          
 
 
12.  Jackson was actually rearrested on these charges in 1995.  
 
 
- 29 - 
a plea agreement requiring him to testify against his codefendants in another case, 
and the range of possible sentences he faced.  Further, Pagan was not prevented 
from fully discussing or exploring this issue at trial.  
Pagan also asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance relating 
to his cross-examination of Jackson.  Pagan‘s argument to this Court on this point 
is very brief, and consists almost entirely of a direct quote of his postconviction 
motion below.  In that motion he argued that trial counsel was ineffective in failing 
to argue that Keith Jackson had actually committed this offense and in failing to 
question Jackson about his attack on another individual, his drug dealing activities, 
and his relationship with four individuals (Eric Miller, Anthony Graham, Daryl 
Featherstone, and Dee Dee Mosley).  Pagan‘s only explanation of the significance 
of these alleged omissions is a one-sentence argument that he was prejudiced by 
the failure to impeach Jackson, the State‘s main witness, and by the failure to show 
that Jackson had motive and ability to commit the offenses that were the basis of 
Pagan‘s convictions. 
In its order denying relief, the trial court found this claim to be legally 
insufficient because Pagan did not explain how linking Jackson to these four 
individuals would further his defense.  Further, the trial court stated that the record 
shows that counsel did what Pagan alleges he failed to do, i.e., he brought out the 
facts of Jackson‘s Dade county case, pointing out that Jackson had motive and 
 
 
- 30 - 
ability to commit these crimes, and pointing out Jackson‘s relationship with Miller, 
Graham and Mosley.  The court acknowledged that defense counsel did not 
address Jackson‘s relationship with Featherstone, but noted that Pagan did not 
show how a discussion of Featherstone was important to his defense or how he was 
prejudiced by this omission. 
This Court encourages trial courts to hold evidentiary hearings on 
postconviction motions.  However, when a motion lacks sufficient factual 
allegations or the alleged facts do not render the judgment vulnerable to collateral 
attack, a motion may be summarily denied.  See Ragsdale v. State, 720 So. 2d 203, 
207 (Fla. 1998).  A hearing is warranted on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim only where a defendant alleges specific facts, not conclusively rebutted by 
the record, which demonstrate a deficiency in counsel‘s performance that 
prejudiced the defendant.  Id.; Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1995).  A 
summary or conclusory allegation is insufficient to require the trial court to 
examine the specific allegations against the record. 
Pagan offers no explanation of the significance of linking Jackson to the four 
individuals listed or what Jackson‘s attack on the other individual involved.  Thus, 
the trial court properly concluded that this part of Pagan‘s claim was legally 
insufficient and no hearing was required.  The legal sufficiency of the remainder of 
this claim is also tenuous.   However, Pagan at least hits the high points of why the 
 
 
- 31 - 
cross-examination and impeachment of Jackson was important; he alleges Jackson 
was one of the State‘s main witnesses against Pagan and that he had motive and 
opportunity to commit this offense.  However, as the trial court concluded and the 
State points out in its brief to this Court, Pagan‘s counsel actually performed the 
tasks that Pagan claims were omitted.  Counsel pointed out that Jackson had been 
charged with attempted first-degree murder in Dade County along with Graham 
and had been offered a plea deal, that Jackson feared he would be charged in the 
instant case, that Jackson had a motive to lie about Pagan‘s involvement in the 
instant crimes, that Jackson fit the physical description of one of the assailants 
given by the surviving victim, Latasha Jones, that Jackson‘s alibi was not solid and 
that there were inconsistencies in Jackson‘s statements.  Counsel also elicited 
information about the personal connections between Jackson and Miller,13 
Mosley,14 and Graham.15  Because the record refutes Pagan‘s claims that counsel 
failed to question or impeach Jackson, counsel‘s performance was not deficient 
and no evidentiary hearing was required on this claim. 
                                          
 
 
13.  Counsel elicited that Miller was Jackson‘s cousin and gave Jackson 
information that the victim Freddy Jones was a drug dealer who purportedly kept 
lots of money in his house. 
 
14.  Mosley was dating Jackson‘s cousin Miller and had a personal grudge 
against surviving victim Latasha Jones. 
 
15.  Graham and Jackson were close friends and had been charged as 
codefendants in an attempted murder in Dade County. 
 
 
- 32 - 
Accordingly, we conclude that Pagan is not entitled to relief on any of these 
claims relating to Keith Jackson, and we affirm the trial court‘s summary denial of 
the claims. 
Summary Denial of Other Claims  
Pagan claims that the trial court erred in summarily denying two other 
claims of ineffective assistance, both of which involve Wanda Jackson‘s deposition 
in which she related statements made to her by her husband Keith Jackson about 
the crimes committed in this case.  Pagan also alleges confrontation and 
prosecutorial misconduct claims based on Wanda‘s deposition testimony.  Pagan 
contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce Wanda‘s deposition 
at trial because the jury was prevented from hearing the statements attributable to 
Keith and because Wanda‘s testimony could have been used to contradict the 
testimony of Detective Ron Peluso.  Pagan also claims that he was denied his right 
to confront witnesses when defense counsel failed to cross-examine Keith or 
Wanda about these statements and that the State committed prosecutorial 
misconduct by directing Keith to invoke the marital privilege regarding these 
statements.   For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the trial court‘s 
summary denial of these claims was proper. 
The State filed a motion in limine to exclude Wanda Jackson‘s testimony 
about statements that Keith Jackson had made to her.  The State argued that the 
 
 
- 33 - 
testimony was inadmissible hearsay and was covered by the marital privilege in 
section 90.504, Florida Statutes.16  Keith had invoked the marital privilege to 
exclude Wanda‘s testimony during Willie Graham‘s earlier trial for the same 
crimes at issue here.  When the State sought a ruling on its motion prior to voir dire 
questioning in Pagan‘s trial, the court stated that it would not rule on the motion or 
conduct a hearing on the issue until Keith invoked the marital privilege to exclude 
Wanda‘s testimony.  The State brought up the motion in limine again prior to 
opening statements, but the court reiterated that it would not discuss the issue until 
the witness was being called to testify.  Pagan ultimately decided not to put on a 
defense case and thus never called Wanda as a witness.  In response to the judge‘s 
questioning, Pagan stated that he was in agreement with the decision not to put on 
a defense case. 
Pagan claims that counsel was ineffective in failing to present Wanda‘s 
testimony about the statements made by Keith.  The trial court concluded that 
Pagan had not established that counsel‘s performance was deficient because he did 
not show that Wanda‘s deposition was taken pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
                                          
 
 
16.  The statute provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) A spouse has a privilege during and after the marital 
relationship to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from 
disclosing, communications which were intended to be made in 
confidence between the spouses while they were husband and wife. 
§ 90.504(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). 
 
 
- 34 - 
Procedure 3.190(j), which is the only way that the deposition would have been 
admissible as substantive evidence.  The court explained that if Wanda‘s 
deposition was not admissible, counsel could not be deemed deficient for failing to 
seek its admission.  The court also concluded that Pagan had not proven the 
prejudice prong required for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
Based on the record cited above, it is clear that the trial court never ruled on 
the State‘s motion in limine regarding marital privilege or the admissibility of 
Wanda‘s deposition testimony.  Pagan cannot now complain about counsel‘s 
failure to present this evidence when he specifically agreed at trial with the 
decision not to put on a defense case.  Moreover, Pagan has not asserted how he 
was prejudiced by this decision.  Thus, we affirm the trial court‘s summary denial 
of this claim. 
Pagan also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in his cross-examination 
of Detective Ron Peluso because counsel did not impeach the detective with 
allegedly contradictory statements in Wanda‘s deposition testimony.  In his brief to 
this Court, Pagan cites his motion to vacate below without elaborating on this 
claim.   As we explained in Duest v. Dugger, 555 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1990),  
The purpose of an appellate brief is to present arguments in support of 
the points on appeal.  Merely making reference to arguments below 
without further elucidation does not suffice to preserve issues, and 
these claims are deemed to have been waived. 
Thus, we find the claim waived and do not address it. 
 
 
- 35 - 
Finally, Pagan asserts that he was denied his confrontation rights when his 
counsel failed to cross-examine Keith or question Wanda about the statements 
made by Keith.  He also claims that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct 
by directing Keith Jackson to invoke the marital privilege regarding these 
statements.  Pagan does not elaborate on how his confrontation rights were violated 
or why the State‘s motion in limine constituted misconduct.  He asserts that the 
marital privilege did not apply to Keith Jackson‘s statements because the couple 
was estranged at the time the statements were made. 
The trial court denied the confrontation claim as legally insufficient, 
conclusory, and involving alleged trial error that should have been raised on direct 
appeal.  The court also noted that Pagan had not demonstrated how the statements 
could have been admitted through a hearsay exception.  The trial court denied the 
misconduct claim as moot because there was no record evidence that the State had 
successfully invoked the marital privilege at trial and the issue was never fully 
addressed because Wanda Jackson was never offered as a witness. 
We conclude that neither aspect of this claim involves an actual issue.  Had 
Pagan attempted to introduce Wanda Jackson‘s testimony or deposition and been 
prevented from doing so, he could argue that he was prevented from presenting a 
witness, albeit such a claim is properly raised on direct appeal.  However, Pagan 
never met the threshold of putting it at issue because he never offered Wanda as a 
 
 
- 36 - 
witness or attempted to introduce her deposition testimony, a strategic decision that 
Pagan specifically agreed with.  
As to the claim of prosecutorial misconduct, Pagan seems to be claiming that 
marital privilege did not apply to these statements and the prosecutor‘s filing of the 
motion in limine invoking the privilege was tantamount to misconduct.  However, 
as noted above, there is a marital privilege for confidential communications made 
between spouses while they are husband and wife.  See § 90.504, Fla. Stat. (2007).  
The privilege continues after the marital relationship ends as long as the 
communications were made during the marital relationship.  Either party can 
invoke the privilege and refuse to disclose or prevent another from disclosing those 
communications.  This privilege does not apply where the spouses are involved in 
proceedings against each other or one spouse is charged with a crime committed 
against the other spouse‘s person or property or that of a child of either.  Whether 
the communication occurred while the two were husband and wife would be a 
determination for the court.  In the instant case, the State filed a motion in limine 
claiming that the privilege applied.  The court never ruled on the motion because 
the statements in question were never sought to be admitted.  In his motion to 
vacate, Pagan asserted that the privilege did not apply because the marriage 
between Wanda and Keith was ―defunct‖ at the time the statements were made.  It 
appears that this legal argument is the basis upon which Pagan asserts prosecutorial 
 
 
- 37 - 
misconduct.  However, prosecutorial misconduct cannot be based on a good faith 
argument that a statutorily recognized privilege applies.  Further, as the trial court 
found below, there is no record evidence that the marital privilege was successfully 
invoked at trial here.  Thus, we affirm the trial court‘s summary denial of this 
claim. 
HABEAS PETITION 
Pagan has also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court, 
raising two issues.  Pagan claims that (1) he was denied equal protection when 
prospective jurors were struck from his jury because English was not their primary 
language; and (2) he was denied a reliable sentence and verdict because the jury‘s 
role was diminished in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). 
Pagan does not claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising 
the juror claim on direct appeal.  Instead, he raises the merits of the claim for the 
first time in this habeas petition.  However, habeas corpus is not a second appeal 
and cannot be used to litigate issues which could have been or were raised on 
direct appeal.  See, e.g., Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1992).  
Thus, this substantive claim on the jurors‘ excusal is procedurally barred because it 
should have been raised on direct appeal.  White v. State, 964 So. 2d 1278, 1290 
(Fla. 2007).  
 
 
- 38 - 
Additionally, the juror claim is without merit.  Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.300(c) gives the court authority to excuse a juror for cause if, after 
examination of the juror, ―the court is of the opinion that the juror is not qualified 
to serve as a trial juror.‖  While a juror cannot be excluded on the basis of not 
speaking English well, the juror can be excluded based on his or her inability to 
understand English.   See Cook v. State, 542 So. 2d 964, 970 (Fla. 1989) (―[I]t is 
the ability to understand English rather than to speak it perfectly which is 
important.‖).  As we stated in Cook, 
There is hardly any area of the law in which the trial judge is 
given more discretion than in ruling on challenges of jurors for cause. 
Appellate courts consistently recognize that the trial judge who is 
present during voir dire is in a far superior position to properly 
evaluate the responses to the questions propounded to the jurors. 
Id. at 969. 
As reflected in the transcript of voir dire questioning at Pagan‘s trial, the 
judge explained to the parties that he would question those individuals who 
required individual questioning.  If he intended to excuse them, the judge would 
ask the parties if they had any objections to the excusal.  If he did not intend to 
excuse them, he would ask the parties if they had any questions.  In two instances, 
prospective jurors stated that they did not speak English well.  The judge explained 
to each of the men that she was not concerned with how well they could speak 
English, but how well they understood it.  Each man responded that he had 
 
 
- 39 - 
difficulty understanding what the judge was saying.  Neither the State nor defense 
counsel voiced objections to excusing the two men.  This record reflects no abuse 
in the trial court‘s handling of this matter. 
Finally, Pagan claims that in light of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), 
the jury instructions violated the principles of Caldwell v. Mississippi because they 
diminished the jury‘s true role in his death sentence.  We have held that Ring does 
not apply retroactively to defendants whose convictions were final when the 
decision was rendered.  See Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2005).  Further, 
we have repeatedly rejected objections based on Caldwell to Florida‘s standard 
jury instructions.  See Mansfield v. State, 911 So. 2d 1160, 1180 (Fla. 2005) 
(denying habeas relief on claim that death sentence was unconstitutional under 
Ring and Caldwell); Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 285, 291 (Fla. 1993); Turner v. 
Dugger, 614 So. 2d 1075, 1079 (Fla. 1992).  Thus, Pagan is not entitled to habeas 
relief on this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons expressed above, we affirm the trial court‘s denial of 
postconviction relief and we deny Pagan‘s petition for habeas relief. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA and PERRY, JJ., did not participate. 
 
 
 
- 40 - 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,  
Susan Lebow, Judge – Case No. 93-3648-CF-10B 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Robert T. Strain and Peter J. 
Cannon, Assistant CCR Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Leslie T. Campbell, and 
Lisa-Marie Lerner, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent