Title: Honorable William M. Gabler, Sr. v. Crime Victims Rights Board

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2017 WI 67 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP275 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
The Honorable William M. Gabler, Sr., 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Crime Victims Rights Board, 
          Respondent-Appellant, 
Wisconsin Department of Justice, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 27, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 17, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire 
 
JUDGE: 
James J. Duvall 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs and dissents (opinion 
filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. did not participate. 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs (in court of 
appeals) by Thomas C. Bellavia, assistant attorney general, and 
Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and oral argument by Misha 
Tseytlin. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief (in court 
of appeals) by Thimothy M. Barber and Axley Brynelson, LLP, 
Madison, with whom on the brief was Patrick J. Fielder and 
Hurley, Burish & Stanton, SC, Madison.  Oral argument by Patrick 
J. Fiedler. 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 67
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP275 
(L.C. No. 
2013CV473) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
The Honorable William M. Gabler, Sr., 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Crime Victims Rights Board, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant, 
 
Wisconsin Department of Justice, 
 
          Respondent. 
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Eau Claire 
County, James J. Duvall, Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   In creating an executive 
branch entity with authority to pass judgment and impose 
discipline on a judge's exercise of core judicial powers, the 
Wisconsin legislature violates the Wisconsin Constitution's 
structural separation of powers and invades a domain recognized 
for over two hundred years as the exclusive province of the 
judiciary.  Neither the executive branch nor the legislature may 
reprimand or otherwise discipline a Wisconsin judge.  The 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
2 
 
Wisconsin Constitution reserves such disciplinary powers for the 
supreme court alone.  Nor may the legislature empower the 
executive 
branch 
to 
threaten 
any 
judicial 
officer 
with 
repercussions 
for 
exercising 
constitutional 
power 
vested 
exclusively in the judiciary. 
¶2 
Encroachment on judicial power degrades the judicial 
independence that serves as a bulwark protecting the people 
against tyranny.  By statutorily authorizing executive action 
against 
the 
judiciary, 
the 
legislature 
unconstitutionally 
conferred power on an executive board to impair, improperly 
influence, 
and 
regulate 
the 
judiciary's 
exercise 
of 
its 
constitutional 
duties. 
Specifically, 
the 
legislature 
transgressed the constitutional boundaries of its powers by 
authorizing the Crime Victims Rights Board (the "Board") to 
investigate and adjudicate complaints against judges, issue 
reprimands against judges, and seek equitable relief and 
forfeitures through civil actions against judges.  We therefore 
affirm the decision of the circuit court and hold that Wis. 
Stat. §§ 950.09(2)(a), (2)(c)-(d) and (3) and 950.11 (2015-16)1 
are unconstitutional with respect to judges; accordingly, the 
Board's actions against Judge William M. Gabler are void. 
I.  AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY 
¶3 
Any student of American government can recite the 
fundamental principle that both our state and the federal 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
3 
 
Republic 
separate 
governmental 
powers 
between 
independent 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches.  In a 1796 speech 
to his colleagues in the Fourth Congress, then-Representative 
James Madison deftly summarized the dispersal of power he helped 
to engineer: 
The powers given up by the people for the purposes of 
Government, had been divided into two great classes.  
One of these formed the State Governments; the other, 
the Federal Government.  The powers of the Government 
had been further divided into three great departments; 
and the Legislative department again subdivided into 
two independent branches.  Around each of these 
portions of power were seen also exceptions and 
qualifications, 
as 
additional 
guards 
against 
the 
abuses to which power is liable. 
5 Annals of Cong. 493 (1796).  Joseph Story later "deemed [it] a 
maxim of vital importance" that "the three great powers of 
government . . . should for ever be kept separate and distinct."  
2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States § 519, at 2-3 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co., 1833).  
After more than two hundred years of constitutional governance, 
that tripartite separation of independent governmental power 
remains the bedrock of the structure by which we secure liberty 
in both Wisconsin and the United States. 
¶4 
To the Framers of the United States Constitution, the 
concentration of governmental power presented an extraordinary 
threat to individual liberty:  "The accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, 
whether of one, a few, or many, . . . may justly be pronounced 
the very definition of tyranny."  The Federalist No. 47, at 298 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
4 
 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) [hereinafter 
Federalist].  As Madison explained when advocating for the 
Constitution's 
adoption, 
neither 
the 
legislature 
nor 
the 
executive nor the judiciary "ought to possess, directly or 
indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the 
administration of their respective powers."  Federalist No. 48 
(James Madison), id. at 305. 
¶5 
The Framers' fear of concentrated power reflected the 
thinking 
of 
seventeenth 
and 
eighteenth 
century 
political 
philosophers, who warned of the ramifications of unchecked 
governmental power.  John Locke, for example, observed that "it 
may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at 
power, for the same persons who have the power of making laws to 
have also in their hands the power to execute them."  John 
Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government § 143 (1764), 
reprinted in Two Treatises of Government 119, 194 (Thomas I. 
Cook ed., 1947).  Absent separation, those who make the laws 
"may exempt themselves from obedience," or they might "suit the 
law, both in its making and execution, to their own private 
advantage."  Id.  Montesquieu2 shared Locke's concern about the 
threat 
to 
liberty 
from 
accumulated 
power, 
expressing 
apprehension that a government with shared legislative and 
executive power could first "enact tyrannical laws" then 
"execute them in a tyrannical manner."  1 Montesquieu, The 
                                                 
2 The philosopher Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de 
Montesquieu, is generally known simply by his title. 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
5 
 
Spirit of the Laws 151-52 (Oskar Piest et al. eds., Thomas 
Nugent 
trans., 
1949) 
(1748). 
 
Similar 
concern 
marked 
Montesquieu's assessment of the judicial power, which could 
impinge on liberty through "arbitrary control," if fused with 
the legislature, or by "violence and oppression," if mixed with 
the executive.  Id. at 152.3 
¶6 
"[T]he Constitution of the United States divides all 
power conferred upon the Federal Government into 'legislative 
Powers,' Art. I, § 1, '[t]he executive Power,' Art. II, § 1, and 
'[t]he judicial Power,' Art. III, § 1 . . . ."  Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992) (second and 
third 
alterations 
in 
original). 
 
Unlike 
some 
state 
constitutions, however, the federal Constitution does not 
include a clause expressly adopting the separation of powers.  
Instead, because "[t]he Constitution enumerates and separates 
the powers of the three branches of Government in Articles I, 
II, 
and 
III, . . . it 
is 
this 
'very 
structure' 
of 
the 
Constitution that exemplifies the concept of separation of 
powers."  Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (quoting 
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983)); see also Humphrey's 
Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935) ("So much is 
                                                 
3 For additional discussion of the philosophical bases for 
the separation of powers, as well as the doctrine's utility for 
achieving "the interconnected goals of preventing tyranny and 
protecting liberty," see generally Rebecca L. Brown, Separated 
Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1513, 1531-40 
(1991). 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
6 
 
implied in the very fact of the separation the powers of these 
departments by the Constitution . . . .").4 
¶7 
The 
Constitution's 
structure 
advances 
separation 
through deliberate calibration of incentives and control between 
the branches.  To attain a lasting separation, the Framers did 
not place their trust in mere "parchment barriers against the 
encroaching spirit of power."  Federalist No. 48, supra, at 305.  
Rather, 
they 
"built 
into 
the 
tripartite 
Federal 
Government . . . a 
self-executing 
safeguard 
against 
the 
encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of 
the other."  Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699 (1997) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
122 (1976)).5  Specifically, the Constitution gives "to those who 
administer each department the necessary constitutional means 
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others," 
therefore guaranteeing "security against a gradual concentration 
                                                 
4 "Obviously, then, the Constitution's central mechanism of 
separation of powers depends largely upon common understanding 
of 
what 
activities 
are 
appropriate 
to 
legislatures, 
to 
executives, and to courts."  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992). 
5 See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 
(1872) ("It is the intention of the Constitution that each of 
the 
great 
co-ordinate 
departments 
of 
the 
government——the 
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial——shall be, in its 
sphere, independent of the others."); see also Loving v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) ("Even when a branch does not 
arrogate power to itself, moreover, the separation-of-powers 
doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the 
performance of its constitutional duties." (citing Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 397-408 (1989)). 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
7 
 
of the several powers in the same department."  Federalist 
No. 51 (James Madison), supra, at 318-19.6 
¶8 
When structuring the federal judiciary, the Framers 
knew from experience the perils of adopting a separation of 
powers in name without paying appropriate attention to the 
incentives affecting individual judges.  By the time of the 
Constitutional Convention, "[t]he Framers of our Constitution 
lived among the ruins of a system of intermingled legislative 
and judicial powers, which had been prevalent in the colonies 
long before the Revolution."  Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 
514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995).  Several colonial legislative bodies 
not only reviewed judicial decisions but also "correct[ed] the 
judicial 
process 
through 
special 
bills 
or 
other 
enacted 
legislation."  Id.7  Some early state legislatures——Virginia, for 
example——possessed 
and 
employed 
substantial 
control 
over 
judicial salaries and tenure, rivaling the British government's 
                                                 
6 See also Victoria Nourse, Toward a "Due Foundation" for 
the Separation of Powers: The Federalist Papers as Political 
Narrative, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 447, 473-74 (1996) ("[T]o protect the 
institution, 
one 
must 
protect 
the 
persons 
within 
the 
institution.  Private interest must not dictate public interest.  
Thus, individual officers should be as independent as possible 
from influence by other branches when it comes to matters in 
which their personal interest may obscure their public duties.  
And that means security for persons——the security from fear that 
one's livelihood will be at risk if one pursues the obligations 
of office." (footnote omitted)). 
7 For additional discussion of special legislation in 
colonial America, see generally Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving 
Legislative Generality, 98 Marq. L. Rev. 625, 660-79 (2014). 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
8 
 
absolute authority that helped spark the Revolution.  Federalist 
No. 48, supra, at 307-08 (citing Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the 
State 
of 
Virginia 
(1781)); 
see 
also 
The 
Declaration 
of 
Independence (U.S. 1776) ("[The King of Great Britain] has made 
Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their 
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries."). 
¶9 
As a reaction to the Framers' experiences with 
compromised judicial independence, Article III of the federal 
Constitution "protects liberty" and "implement[s] the separation 
of powers" in part "by specifying the defining characteristics 
of Article III judges."  Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483 
(2011).  Article III provides that federal judges "shall hold 
their Offices during good Behaviour" and, "at stated Times, 
receive . . . Compensation, which shall not be diminished during 
their Continuance in Office."  U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.  Both 
provisions evince a recognition that "a power over a man's 
subsistence amounts to a power over his will."  Federalist 
No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra, at 471 (emphasis omitted); 
see United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 568 (2001) (observing 
that the Constitution "help[s] to secure an independence of mind 
and spirit necessary if judges are 'to maintain that nice 
adjustment between individual rights and governmental powers 
which constitutes political liberty" (quoting Woodrow Wilson, 
Constitutional Government in the United States 143 (1911))); 
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980); cf. Bradley v. 
Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872) ("[I]t is a general 
principle of the highest importance to the proper administration 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
9 
 
of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority 
vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, 
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.").  By 
insulating individual federal judges from manipulation by 
Congress or the Executive, the Framers assured that the 
Judiciary as a whole could exercise genuinely independent 
judgment. 
¶10 Over time, the Supreme Court has both defended the 
independence of judges and protected the judicial power from 
encroachment.  Thus, the Court has held that even marginal 
changes 
in 
judicial 
salaries 
violate 
the 
constitutional 
prohibition on diminishment of compensation.  See Hatter, 532 
U.S. at 578 (imposition of Social Security taxes on sitting 
judges); Will, 449 U.S. at 230 (revocation of scheduled pay 
increase).  The Court has also held that the other branches may 
not "confer the Government's 'judicial Power' on entities 
outside Article III."  Stern, 564 U.S. at 484.  Accordingly, 
"Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III 
courts in officials of the Executive Branch."  Plaut, 514 U.S. 
at 218 (citing Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792)).  
Neither may Congress "prescribe rules of decision to the 
Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before 
it."  Id. (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1872)).  Such 
decisions show clear adherence to the precept that "[a] 
Judiciary free from control by the Executive and Legislature is 
essential if there is a right to have claims decided by judges 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
10 
 
who are free from potential domination by other branches of 
government."  N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 
458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982) (plurality) (quoting Will, 449 U.S. at 
217-18).8 
¶11 These separation of powers principles, established at 
the founding of our nation and enshrined in the structure of the 
United States Constitution, inform our understanding of the 
separation of powers under the Wisconsin Constitution.  Like its 
federal counterpart, "[o]ur state constitution . . . created 
three branches of government, each with distinct functions and 
powers," and "[t]he separation of powers doctrine is implicit in 
this tripartite division."  Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, ¶48, 
271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666, overruled on other grounds by 
Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, 295 
Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408.  Three clauses of the Wisconsin 
Constitution embody this separation:  Article IV, Section 1 
("[t]he legislative power shall be vested in a senate and 
assembly"); Article V, Section 1 ("[t]he executive power shall 
be vested in a governor"); and Article VII, Section 2 ("[t]he 
                                                 
8 See also 
The Federalist No. 78, at 465 (Alexander 
Hamilton) 
(Clinton 
Rossiter 
ed., 
1961) 
("The 
complete 
independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in 
a 
limited 
Constitution."); 
cf. 
1 
William 
Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England 269 (Philadelphia 1771) 
(noting that, if the legislature subsumes the judiciary, "the 
life, liberty, and property of the subject would be in the hands 
of arbitrary judges, whose decisions would be then regulated 
only by their own opinions, and not by any fundamental 
principles of law; which though legislators may depart from, yet 
judges are bound to observe"). 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
11 
 
judicial 
power . . . shall 
be 
vested 
in 
a 
unified 
court 
system").  See State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 816, 266 
N.W.2d 597 
(1978). 
 
Before 
discussing 
in 
greater 
detail 
Wisconsin's law of separated powers and judicial independence, 
we will first describe the collision between branches in the 
present case:  the Board's disciplinary review of Judge Gabler's 
decision to postpone a criminal defendant's sentencing. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
¶12 At the outset, it is important to understand the 
context in which Judge Gabler made the challenged January 2012 
decision.  The Eau Claire District Attorney's office filed a 
criminal complaint in late July 2011 alleging that Leigh M. 
Beebe sexually assaulted K.L., a minor.  An amended complaint 
filed in early August added charges against Beebe for allegedly 
sexually assaulting K.H., also a minor.  Initially, Judge Gabler 
set a January 2012 trial for all charges in the amended 
complaint, but in December 2014 he granted Beebe's severance 
motion and ordered separate trials for the charges involving 
each victim.  At the January trial, a jury convicted Beebe of 
sexually assaulting K.L. 
¶13 At a subsequent scheduling conference on January 18, 
2012, Judge Gabler scheduled Beebe's trial on the charges 
involving K.H. for August 7-8, 2012.  The State then asked Judge 
Gabler to sentence Beebe immediately for the January conviction.  
Invoking the victims rights statute to argue that K.L. was 
"entitled to some finality," the assistant district attorney 
suggested that the court should not "delay [sentencing Beebe] 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
12 
 
for seven, eight or longer months to resolve . . . other 
matters." 
¶14 After considering the State's arguments, Judge Gabler 
exercised his discretion and denied the State's request to 
sentence Beebe for the January conviction before the August 
trial.  He began by considering K.L.'s rights as a victim.  
Referring to Wis. Stat. § 950.04(1v)(k), which assures victims a 
"speedy disposition" of cases to "minimize the length of time 
they must endure the stress of their responsibilities" in a 
criminal matter, Judge Gabler observed that because K.L. had 
already testified at trial "her active participation in the 
matter, other than giving a . . . victim statement at the 
sentencing, [was] concluded."  He also noted that the terms of 
Beebe's bond would continue to keep K.L. safe from her 
assailant.  Turning to Beebe's rights as a defendant, Judge 
Gabler acknowledged that sentencing him to prison could leave 
him with inadequate access to his attorney as they prepared for 
a complicated second trial.  Finally, Judge Gabler considered 
the efficient administration of justice.  Allowing time for the 
Department of Corrections (DOC) to prepare a presentence 
investigation report would delay sentencing on the January 
conviction until at least early April, and sentencing Beebe to 
prison would "impose[] a huge burden on the court and on the 
county to retrieve him" for an August trial. 
¶15 K.L. contacted the Department of Justice's Office of 
Crime Victim Services (CVS) in April 2012 to express concern 
about Judge Gabler's decision to postpone Beebe's sentencing.  
No. 
2016AP275   
 
13 
 
The Victim Resource Center Coordinator brought this concern to 
Judge Gabler's attention in a June 2012 letter, explaining that 
K.L "want[ed] closure in her case as soon as possible" and that 
"[t]he long delay between the jury trial and sentencing [was] 
causing [K.L.] extreme stress and anxiety."  Citing Article I, 
Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution and Wis. Stat. 
§ 950.04(1v)(k), 
the 
letter 
requested 
that 
Judge 
Gabler 
"consider sentencing Mr. Beebe as soon as possible." 
¶16 In a responsive letter to CVS two weeks later, Judge 
Gabler expanded on the reasoning articulated at the January 
scheduling 
conference. 
 
The 
letter 
began 
and 
ended 
by 
recognizing K.L's rights as a victim and placing those rights in 
the context of his entire decision: 
[K.L.'s] stress and anxiety and her rights as a victim 
are but one aspect of a variety of factors that I must 
consider in resolving this entire case. 
. . . . 
. . . I understand and acknowledge the stress and 
anxiety 
that 
[K.L.] 
feels. 
 
I 
understand 
and 
acknowledge that the long delay between Mr. Beebe's 
January 11, 2012 conviction and his sentencing is not 
ideal.  In my 13 years as a circuit court judge I have 
never had a case such as this where sentencing takes 
place more than two or three months after the 
conviction, but . . . this is an unusual case with 
unusual circumstances that are beyond my control.  I 
have, 
to 
the 
best 
of 
my 
ability, 
taken 
into 
consideration all relevant factors based upon the 
timing of sentencing. 
After describing the discretion that circuit courts possess to 
manage their busy dockets, Judge Gabler offered five detailed 
reasons for postponing sentencing:  (1) if sentenced to prison, 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
14 
 
Beebe's "absence from the community would have a significant 
deleterious effect upon his attorney's ability to adequately 
prepare 
for 
trial"; 
(2) 
the 
DOC 
could 
not 
complete 
a 
sufficiently comprehensive presentence investigation until after 
the August trial because "Beebe . . . constitutionally [could 
not] be compelled to discuss any facts or circumstances relating 
to the alleged sexual assault of [K.H.]" before the trial; (3) 
whether a jury convicted Beebe at the August trial would affect 
the appropriate sentence for the January conviction; (4) 
conducting two sentencings would "cause other governmental 
agencies or departments to spend money unnecessarily" because it 
"would require the Sheriff to [retrieve] him [for the August 
trial] and would require the [DOC] to conduct two separate 
presentence investigations"; and (5) Beebe's likely appeal from 
the sentence would seriously hamper proceedings in the second 
trial "because the entire court file [would be] physically 
shipped . . . to the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals." 
¶17 Judge Gabler therefore declined to accelerate Beebe's 
sentencing in response to the letter.9  Beebe pled no contest to 
                                                 
9 Testifying before the circuit court in the present case, 
Judge Gabler provided additional facts about his response to the 
letter, which he immediately thought might be an "impermissible 
ex parte communication involving a pending case."  After 
considering the rules governing ex parte communications and 
consulting with a member of the judicial commission, Judge 
Gabler remained resolute in his decision not to adjust Beebe's 
sentencing date in response to the letter.  He determined that 
any change might be the product of improper influence, and he 
observed that, if he notified the parties' attorneys that he was 
acting in response to the letter, he would violate the Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 950.095 
requirement 
that 
he 
keep 
the 
letter 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
15 
 
all remaining charges against him on August 6, 2012, and on 
October 18, 2012, Judge Gabler imposed sentence with respect to 
both the January and August convictions. 
¶18 K.L. submitted a formal complaint to the Board on 
August 2, 2012.  The complaint alleged that Judge Gabler's 
decision to postpone sentencing abridged her speedy disposition 
right under Wis. Stat. § 950.04(1v)(k) and her rights to timely 
disposition and protection from the accused under Article I, 
Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Judge Gabler received 
notice of the complaint on October 23, 2012, and he and his 
attorney submitted responses the following month. 
¶19 The Board issued a probable cause determination in 
February 2013.  Under the heading "Conclusions of Law," the 
Board asserted——without analysis——its authority to review Judge 
Gabler's decision: 
Respondent Gabler is a "public employee" and a "public 
official" 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 950.09(2)(a) . . . .  Gabler is also a "judge" 
within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(b).  
Gabler is therefore subject to the Board's statutory 
authority to determine whether there is probable cause 
to believe that he violated any of the crime victim 
rights alleged by K.L. 
                                                                                                                                                             
confidential.  As the circuit court observed in its review of 
the Board's Decision, "the type of communication involved here 
was specifically directed to gain a procedural advantage, that 
is one party's desire to change the sentencing date without 
notice to any other parties to the criminal case." 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
16 
 
Based on the evidence in its possession,10 the Board did not find 
probable cause to conclude that Judge Gabler violated K.L's 
right to protection from Beebe during the criminal proceedings.  
It did, however, find probable cause to conclude that Judge 
Gabler violated K.L's statutory and constitutional rights to a 
timely disposition of the criminal matter by postponing Beebe's 
sentencing 
on 
the 
January 
2012 
conviction. 
 
An 
order 
accompanying the probable cause determination offered both K.L. 
and Judge Gabler the opportunity to request an evidentiary 
hearing and challenge any of the Board's preliminary findings of 
fact. 
¶20 Judge Gabler responded in early March 2013 with a 
motion seeking dismissal of both the complaint and the probable 
cause determination.  Among other bases for dismissal, he 
insisted that "the Board's review of [his] decisions intrude[d] 
upon the judiciary's core constitutional powers and violate[d] 
the separation of powers doctrine."  As alternative relief in 
the event the Board denied his motion to dismiss, he also 
requested an evidentiary hearing to develop the factual record 
underlying his discretionary decisions. 
                                                 
10 The propriety of the means by which the Board obtained 
the records underlying its probable cause determination, as well 
as 
its 
eventual 
Decision, 
was 
the 
subject 
of 
extensive 
discussion in the parties' briefs.  Because we do not reach the 
due 
process, 
procedural 
irregularity, 
jurisdictional, 
or 
substantial evidence issues argued by the parties, we have not 
included a lengthy recitation of the facts related to those 
claims. 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
17 
 
¶21 The Board denied his motion on July 24, 2013, and, two 
days later, issued its Final Decision and Order (the "Decision") 
on K.L.'s complaint.  Once again, the Board determined, without 
analysis, that Judge Gabler met the definition of "public 
employee" and "public official" in Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(a) and 
was "therefore subject to the Board's statutory authority to 
determine whether he violated the rights of a crime victim under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 950, Wis. Stat. ch. 938, or [A]rticle I, 
[S]ection 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution, and to impose a 
remedy for any rights violation found."11  Following a discussion 
that mirrored its probable cause analysis, the Board stated its 
conclusion regarding K.L.'s speedy disposition right: 
[T]he four factors identified at the January 18, 2012, 
scheduling conference as the basis for delaying 
Beebe's sentencing until after the August 7-8, 2012, 
trial, singly or in combination, lacked a factual 
basis, a legal basis, or both; unreasonably delayed 
Beebe's sentencing; and therefore violated K.L.'s 
crime victim right under Wis. Stat. § 950.04(1v)(k) to 
a speedy disposition of the case in which K.L. was 
involved. 
Based on this conclusion, "the Board also determine[d] that 
Gabler 
violated 
K.L.'s 
constitutional 
right 
to 
timely 
disposition of the case as to which K.L. was a crime victim."  
The Board identified no difference between the statutory and 
                                                 
11 Unlike in its probable cause determination, the Board 
apparently declined to exercise authority over Judge Gabler as a 
"judge" under Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(b), which permits the Board 
to refer judges to the judicial commission for alleged ethical 
violations. 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
18 
 
constitutional rights:  "Although a crime victim's right to 
timely 
or 
speedy 
disposition 
of 
the 
case 
has 
both 
a 
constitutional 
and 
a 
statutory 
foundation, 
the 
different 
foundations have no practical effect on the proceedings in this 
case." 
¶22 As a remedy for Judge Gabler's actions that the Board 
determined violated K.L.'s statutory and constitutional rights, 
the Board chose to "issue a Report and Recommendation directed 
to Gabler consistent with [its] Final Decision and Order."12  
Attached to its Decision, the Board included a formal notice of 
each party's right to file an appeal in the circuit court. 
¶23 Judge Gabler initiated this review of the Board's 
Decision under Chapter 227 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  In a 
thorough opinion, the Eau Claire County Circuit Court reversed 
the Board's Decision and remanded the matter to the Board with 
instructions to dismiss with prejudice the complaint against 
Judge Gabler.  The Board appealed, and we granted Judge Gabler's 
petition to bypass the court of appeals. 
                                                 
12 The Board's Report and Recommendation, which remains 
publicly 
available 
on 
its 
website, 
includes 
the 
Board's 
conclusion that "the court violated [K.L.'s] statutory right to 
a speedy disposition and constitutional right to a timely 
disposition."  Because we now hold that the Board's Decision is 
void, so is the Board's remedy.  We adopt the circuit court's 
judgment setting aside the Report and Recommendation in its 
entirety. 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
19 
 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A.  Chapter 227 Review 
¶24 "When a party appeals to the court of appeals or seeks 
review in this court 'from a circuit court order reviewing an 
agency decision,' the appellate court reviews the decision of 
the agency, not the decision of the circuit court."  Rock-
Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. DNR, 2013 WI 74, ¶53, 350 Wis. 2d 45, 
833 N.W.2d 800 (quoting Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. DNR, 2011 WI 
54, ¶25, 335 Wis. 2d 47, 799 N.W.2d 73).  Accordingly, we review 
the Board's Decision rather than the circuit court's reversal of 
that Decision, although we benefit from the circuit court's 
analysis.  Adams v. State Livestock Facilities Siting Review 
Bd., 2012 WI 85, ¶24, 342 Wis. 2d 444, 820 N.W.2d 404. 
¶25 "Administrative decisions which adversely affect the 
substantial interests of any person, whether by action or 
inaction, whether affirmative or negative in form, are subject 
to review as provided in" Chapter 227.  Wis. Stat. § 227.52.  A 
court conducting a Chapter 227 review "shall set aside or modify 
the agency action if it finds that the agency has erroneously 
interpreted a provision of law and a correct interpretation 
compels a particular action."  Wis. Stat. § 227.57(5).  The 
reviewing court shall, however, accord "due weight" to the 
"experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of 
the 
agency 
involved, 
as 
well 
as 
discretionary 
authority 
conferred upon it."  Wis. Stat. § 227.57(10). 
¶26 Emphasizing 
its 
experience 
exercising 
its 
legislatively delegated authority to review crime victim rights 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
20 
 
complaints, the Board argues that this court should give "great 
weight" deference to its Decision.  Wisconsin's case law states 
that, "[w]hile statutory interpretation is normally a question 
of law determined independently by a court, a court may give an 
agency's interpretation of a statute great weight deference, or 
due weight deference, or no deference."  Rock-Koshkonong, 350 
Wis. 2d 45, ¶59 (footnotes omitted).  The deference framework, 
however, is inapposite in this case because we must determine 
whether an executive agency's review of a circuit court's 
decision comports with the separation of powers under the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
We 
review 
that 
question 
of 
constitutional law de novo.  Schilling v. CVRB, 2005 WI 17, ¶12, 
278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623; see also Coulee Catholic Sch. 
v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, ¶31, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868. 
B.  The Constitutionality of a Statute 
¶27 The parties also dispute the appropriate scope of this 
court's constitutional review of the Board's actions.  Judge 
Gabler 
explains 
that 
"[h]e 
is 
arguing 
that 
ch. 950 
is 
unconstitutional as applied by the [Board] in this case to a 
judge."  But the Board counters that, because Judge Gabler 
challenges Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(a), (2)(c)-(d), and (3) to the 
extent those portions of the statute affect judges, his claim, 
to 
succeed, 
must 
satisfy 
the 
requirements 
for 
a 
facial 
challenge. 
¶28 The Board directs our attention to Doe v. Reed, 561 
U.S. 186 (2010), in which the Supreme Court considered whether, 
under a state public records law, disclosure of petitions in 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
21 
 
support of a statewide referendum would violate the First 
Amendment rights of people who signed the petitions.  Although 
the parties disagreed whether to treat the claim as a facial or 
an as-applied challenge, the Court observed that "[i]t obviously 
ha[d] characteristics of both": 
The claim is "as applied" in the sense that it does 
not seek to strike the [public records law] in all its 
applications, but only to the extent it covers 
referendum petitions.  The claim is "facial" in that 
it is not limited to plaintiffs' particular case, but 
challenges application of the law more broadly to all 
referendum petitions. 
Id. at 194.  Explaining that "[t]he label is not what matters,"13 
the Court identified an essential attribute of the hybrid 
challenge: 
"plaintiffs' 
claim 
and 
the 
relief 
that 
would 
follow . . . reach beyond the particular circumstances of these 
plaintiffs."  Id.  Consequently, the Court determined that the 
plaintiffs could prevail only if they met the standards for a 
facial challenge.  Id. 
¶29 We agree with the Board that Judge Gabler's challenge 
parallels the Supreme Court's characterization of the challenge 
in Reed: 
Gabler's claim is as-applied in that it does not seek 
to invalidate Wis. Stat. § 950.09[2](a), (c)-(d), and 
(3) in all applications, but only to the extent they 
cover the activities of judges.  Gabler's claim is 
                                                 
13 See also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010) 
("[T]he distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is 
not so well defined that it has some automatic effect or that it 
must always control the pleadings and disposition in every case 
involving a constitutional challenge."). 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
22 
 
nonetheless facial in that it is not limited to 
Gabler's specific circumstances, but more broadly 
challenges all applications of those provisions to 
judges. 
Judge Gabler by no means seeks to invalidate the entirety of 
Chapter 950 as contrary to the Wisconsin Constitution.  But he 
does contend that the Board can never constitutionally take 
action against a judge under Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(a), (2)(c)-
(d), or (3).  To prevail, Judge Gabler therefore must meet the 
standard for a facial challenge and demonstrate that the 
disputed 
portions 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 950.09 
"cannot 
be 
constitutionally enforced" by the Board against judges "under 
any circumstances."  Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶46, 
333 Wis. 2d 273, 797 N.W.2d 854 (quoting Soc'y Ins. v. LIRC, 
2010 WI 68, ¶26, 326 Wis. 2d 444, 786 N.W.2d 385). 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
¶30 When delineating the Wisconsin Constitution's lines of 
demarcation separating governmental powers, this court has 
observed that "[t]he constitutional powers of each branch of 
government fall into two categories:  exclusive powers and 
shared powers.  Each branch has exclusive core constitutional 
powers into which other branches may not intrude."  State v. 
Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 643, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999) (citing State 
ex rel. Friedrich v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 192 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 
531 N.W.2d 32 (1995)).  "This court is highly mindful of the 
separation 
of 
powers. 
 
It 
does 
not 
engage 
in 
direct 
confrontation with another branch of government unless the 
confrontation is necessary and unavoidable."  State v. Moore, 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
23 
 
2015 WI 54, ¶91, 363 Wis. 2d 376, 864 N.W.2d 827; see also 
Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 48, 11 N.W.2d 604 (1943) 
("The state suffers essentially by every . . . assault of one 
branch of the government upon another; and it is the duty of all 
the co-ordinate branches scrupulously to avoid even all seeming 
of such." (quoting In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 240 (1875)). 
¶31 Confronting this attack on judicial independence is 
both necessary and unavoidable.  "[P]ower is of an encroaching 
nature and . . . it ought to be effectually restrained from 
passing the limits assigned to it."  Federalist No. 48, supra, 
at 305.  The preservation of liberty in Wisconsin turns in part 
upon the assurance that each branch will defend itself from 
encroachments by the others.  "[C]ore zones of authority are to 
be 'jealously guarded' by each branch of government," Barland v. 
Eau Claire Cty., 216 Wis. 2d 560, 573, 575 N.W.2d 691 (1998) 
(citing Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14), meaning "[t]he co-
ordinate branches of the government . . . should not abdicate or 
permit others to infringe upon such powers as are exclusively 
committed to them by the constitution," Rules of Court Case, 204 
Wis. 501, 514, 236 N.W. 717 (1931).  Each branch's core powers 
reflect "zones of authority constitutionally established for 
each branch of government upon which any other branch of 
government is prohibited from intruding.  As to these areas of 
authority, . . . any exercise of authority by another branch of 
government is unconstitutional."  State ex rel. Fiedler v. Wis. 
Senate, 155 Wis. 2d 94, 100, 454 N.W.2d 770 (1990) (citing In re 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
24 
 
Complaint Against Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 776, 348 N.W.2d 559 
(1984)).14   
¶32 Consequently, "one branch of the government has no 
authority to compel a co-ordinate branch to perform functions of 
judgment and discretion that are lawfully delegated to it by the 
constitution."  Outagamie Cty. v. Smith, 38 Wis. 2d 24, 39-40, 
155 N.W.2d 639 (1968).  To ensure that each branch will act on 
its own behalf and free from improper influence by the others, 
the Wisconsin Constitution parallels Article III of the federal 
Constitution and insulates individual governmental actors from 
personal manipulation.  See Wis. Const. art. IV, § 26(2) 
("Except as provided in this subsection, the compensation of a 
public officer may not be increased or diminished during the 
term of office . . . ."). 
¶33 The Board contends this case does not implicate 
exclusive judicial power.  Because Article I, Section 9m of the 
Wisconsin Constitution states that "[t]he legislature shall 
provide remedies for the violation of this section," the Board 
insists that the power to remedy violations of crime victim 
rights is, at most, shared between the judiciary and the 
legislature, which delegated its authority to an executive 
                                                 
14 See also In re. Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 382, 240 N.W. 441 
(1932) ("Under our constitution the judicial and legislative 
departments are distinct, independent, and co-ordinate branches 
of the government.  Neither branch enjoys all the powers of 
sovereignty, but each is supreme in that branch of sovereignty 
which properly belongs to its department."). 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
25 
 
entity.  The Board therefore contends that its review of Judge 
Gabler's decision neither unduly burdened nor substantially 
interfered with the judiciary's constitutional authority. 
¶34 "Shared powers lie at the intersections of the[] 
exclusive core constitutional powers."  Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 
643.  The separation of powers doctrine "envisions a system of 
separate branches sharing many powers while jealously guarding 
certain others, a system of 'separateness but interdependence, 
autonomy but reciprocity.'"  Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14 
(quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).  Like the federal 
Constitution,15 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
enumerates 
a 
calibrated structure of powers shared between the branches.  
See, e.g., Wis. Const. art. V, § 10(1)(a)-(b) (providing that 
"[e]very bill which shall have passed the legislature shall, 
before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor" and, 
"[i]f the governor approves and signs the bill, the bill shall 
become law").  For the Wisconsin judiciary, this means that the 
legislature retains the power to remove justices and judges 
through impeachment or address.  See Wis. Const. art. VII, §§ 1, 
11, 13. 
                                                 
15 Cf. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 426 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
("The Constitution . . . is a prescribed structure, a framework, 
for the conduct of government.  In designing that structure, the 
Framers themselves considered how much commingling was, in the 
generality 
of 
things, 
acceptable, 
and 
set 
forth 
their 
conclusions in the document."). 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
26 
 
¶35 In its shared powers decisions, this court has 
acknowledged that some legislative actions affecting the courts 
do not contravene the separation of powers.16  But "the 
legislature is prohibited from unduly burdening or substantially 
interfering with the judicial branch."  State v. Holmes, 106 
Wis. 2d 31, 68, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982).  Thus, "[w]hen 'the 
exercise of administrative and legislative power ha[s] so far 
invaded the judicial field as to embarrass the court and impair 
its proper functioning,' the court will be 'compelled to 
maintain its integrity as a constitutional institution.'"  Id. 
at 69 (second alteration in original) (quoting Integration of 
Bar, 244 Wis. at 49). 
¶36 We disagree with the Board's characterization of this 
case as presenting a question of shared powers.  Regardless of 
any responsibility shared between the legislature and judiciary 
for remedying violations of victims' rights, this case raises a 
more fundamental constitutional question:  May an executive 
agency, 
acting 
pursuant 
to 
authority 
delegated 
by 
the 
legislature, review a Wisconsin court's exercise of discretion, 
declare its application of the law to be in error, and then 
sanction the judge for making a decision the agency disfavors?  
                                                 
16 See John F. Jelke Co. v. Beck, 208 Wis. 650, 660, 242 
N.W. 576 (1932) ("In Wisconsin the jurisdiction and power of the 
courts is conferred not by act of the legislature but by the 
constitution itself.  While the legislature may regulate in the 
public interest the exercise of the judicial power, it cannot, 
under the guise of regulation, withdraw that power or so limit 
and circumscribe it as to defeat the constitutional purpose."). 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
27 
 
Applying separation of powers principles, we conclude that the 
answer to this question is unequivocally no.  Any other response 
would 
unconstitutionally 
permit 
an 
executive 
entity 
to 
substitute its judgment for that of the judge——effectively 
imposing an executive veto over discretionary judicial decision-
making and incentivizing judges to make decisions not in 
accordance with the law but in accordance with the demands of 
the executive branch in order to avoid a public rebuke 
reinforced with the imprimatur of a quasi-judicial board. 
A.  Invasion of Core Judicial Powers 
¶37 No aspect of the judicial power is more fundamental 
than the judiciary's exclusive responsibility to exercise 
judgment in cases and controversies arising under the law.  "It 
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is."  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 177 (1803).  As Alexander Hamilton famously explained, 
"[t]he judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or 
the purse; . . . [i]t may truly be said to have neither force 
nor will but merely judgment."  Federalist No. 78 (Alexander 
Hamilton), 
supra, 
at 
464 
(emphasis 
added; 
capitalization 
omitted).  By vesting the judicial power in a unified court 
system, the Wisconsin Constitution entrusts the judiciary with 
the duty of interpreting and applying laws made and enforced by 
coordinate branches of state government.  The constitution's 
grant of judicial power therefore encompasses "the ultimate 
adjudicative authority of courts to finally decide rights and 
responsibilities as between individuals."  State v. Williams, 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
28 
 
2012 WI 59, ¶36, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460 (citing State 
v. Van Brocklin, 194 Wis. 441, 443, 217 N.W. 277 (1927)). 
¶38 "For more than a century, this court has been called 
upon to resist attempts by other branches of government to 
exercise authority in an exclusively judicial area." Grady, 118 
Wis. 2d at 778.17  When navigating inter-branch disputes, this 
court preserves a place of paramount importance for the 
principle that "a truly independent judiciary must be free from 
control by the other branches of government."  Grady, 118 
Wis. 2d at 782 (citing Will, 449 U.S. at 217-19).  To protect 
that independence, this court has consistently rejected any 
attempt "to coerce judges in their exercise of the essential 
case-deciding function of the judiciary."  Id.  Permitting an 
executive 
agency 
to 
review 
judges' 
official 
actions 
for 
compliance with the victims' rights laws would upend the 
constitutional structure of separated powers, which allocates 
independent judicial power to the courts. 
                                                 
17 See Barland v. Eau Claire Cty., 216 Wis. 2d 560, 575 
N.W.2d 691 (1998) (circuit court's authority to remove judicial 
assistant despite collective bargaining agreement); 
In re 
Complaint Against Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984) 
(time limits for judges to resolve cases); Integration of Bar 
Case, 
244 
Wis. 8, 
11 
N.W.2d 604 
(1943) 
(regulation 
of 
attorneys); Cannon, 206 Wis. 374 (admission to the bar); Rules 
of Court Case, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N.W. 717 (1931) (statute 
requiring court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure); 
Thoe v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 181 Wis. 456, 195 
N.W. 407 (1923) (legislation defining the legal sufficiency of 
evidence); In re Court Room, 148 Wis. 109, 134 N.W. 490 (1912) 
(county regulation of courtroom facilities); In re Janitor of 
the Supreme Court, 35 Wis. 410 (1874) (interference with 
appointment of supreme court employee). 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
29 
 
¶39 Resolute 
resistance 
to 
intrusions 
across 
the 
constitutionally 
constructed 
judicial 
perimeter 
does 
not 
represent a power play by one branch vis-à-vis another.  "The 
purpose of the separation and equilibration of powers in 
general . . . was not merely to assure effective government but 
to preserve individual freedom."  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  If the judiciary 
passively permits another branch to arrogate judicial power unto 
itself, however estimable the professed purpose for asserting 
this prerogative, the people inevitably suffer.  If the power to 
perform judicial duties is subject to formal penalties imposed 
under color of law by another branch of government, the people 
lose their independent arbiters of the law, the balance of 
powers tips, and the republican form of government is lost. 
¶40 Decades ago, this court recognized the peril presented 
by seemingly sensible legislative acts designed to compel proper 
performance of judicial duties.  In re Complaint Against Grady, 
118 
Wis. 2d 762, 
348 
N.W.2d 559 
(1984), 
considered 
the 
constitutionality of a "statute requiring the withholding [of] a 
judge's salary for failure to decide cases within a specified 
time."  Id. at 782.  Checking legislative drift into the 
judicial domain, this court held that "[t]he setting and 
enforcement of time periods for judges to decide cases lies 
within an area of authority exclusively reposed in the judicial 
branch of government."  Id. at 783.  The court recognized that 
allowing the legislature to mandate deadlines for judges to 
resolve cases would threaten the judiciary's "independen[ce] in 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
30 
 
the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities."  Id. at 
782. 
¶41 By issuing a Decision concluding that Judge Gabler 
violated a victim's constitutional and statutory rights to 
prompt disposition of cases, the Board encroached on the 
exclusive judicial authority identified in Grady.  The Grady 
court rebuffed the legislature's imposition of time limits not 
because the court opposed the timely administration of justice 
but because the legislature mandated particular judicial action.  
In the present case, the Board claims that the executive now 
possesses authority to influence the timeline for judicial 
decision-making in matters involving victims' rights.  Like the 
Grady court rejecting legislative control of judicial dockets, 
we refuse to countenance executive interference with matters 
pending before the courts.  The judicial power vested in 
Wisconsin's unified court system presumes that courts balance 
the legal rights of all interested parties when exercising 
discretion in pending matters, and our constitution and statutes 
make clear that courts must consider victims as part of that 
evaluation.  But important legal protections for victims do not 
vest the executive branch with newfound authority to contravene 
bedrock principles of judicial independence. 
¶42 Indeed, the Board's Decision, as well as its Report 
and Recommendation directed at Judge Gabler under Wis. Stat. 
§ 950.09(3), seem mild in comparison to other means by which the 
Board asserts authority to influence judicial decision-making.  
Most significantly, the Board could financially penalize a judge 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
31 
 
for exercising legal judgment by pursuing a civil action to 
assess a forfeiture under Wis. Stat. §§ 950.09(2)(d) and 
§ 950.11.  As the United States Supreme Court has observed in 
the judicial immunity context, personal "[l]iability to answer 
to every one who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of 
the judge . . . would destroy that independence without which no 
judiciary can be either respectable or useful."  Bradley, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347.  A possible financial penalty levied on 
a judge if an executive board disagrees with the judge's 
decision conjures thoughts of the ruinous commingling of 
governmental powers that preceded adoption of the federal 
Constitution. 
¶43 In observing that the Board stopped short of imposing 
the full panoply of statutorily available penalties against 
Judge Gabler, we do not mean to imply that the remedies elected 
by the Board are inconsequential.  It is one thing for citizens, 
politicians, or the media to criticize or second-guess judges, a 
cherished right that our constitutions, and this court, shield 
from infringement. It is a different matter entirely for the 
legislature to usurp constitutionally vested judicial power, 
adorn an executive department with all the trappings of a court, 
and empower that body to declare a judge's decisions in 
violation of a victim's constitutional and statutory rights.  
The disciplinary sting of the Board's actions was no less 
deleterious to Judge Gabler than if imposed by this court——the 
only body constitutionally permitted to prescribe it. 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
32 
 
¶44 Availability of Chapter 227 review of the Board's 
decisions does not, as the Board suggests, cure a separation of 
powers 
violation 
because 
judicial 
review 
of 
the 
Board's 
decisions does not eliminate the external interference with 
official judicial action.  If a judge must account for the 
possibility that an executive body will administer sanctions in 
response to the judge's discretionary decision in an official 
capacity, eventual Chapter 227 review does not abate the 
executive branch's encroachment on judicial independence.  A 
judge cannot fulfill the constitutional duty to interpret the 
law in a truly neutral and impartial manner if the threat of 
personal legal consequences lurks in the background of every 
case.  As Judge Gabler observes in his brief, an appellate court 
might affirm a judge's legal determination, but the Board could 
nevertheless sanction that judge for the same decision——creating 
an incentive for judges to decide cases in a manner inconsistent 
with prevailing law.  Regardless of whether a court ultimately 
reviews the Board's decisions, allowing a coordinate branch of 
government to exert influence over judicial decision-making 
would contravene the Wisconsin Constitution's careful allocation 
of governmental powers, which prevents competition between a 
judge's personal interests and constitutional responsibilities. 
¶45 An 
exchange 
during 
oral 
argument 
in 
this 
case 
highlights the untenable scenarios that could arise if we accept 
the Board's characterization of the scope of its authority.  The 
Solicitor General conceded that the Board's broad understanding 
of its own authority under Wis. Stat. § 950.09 could allow it to 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
33 
 
take action on a complaint against the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  
If the Board determined that the justices of this court violated 
a victim's right to prompt disposition of a case, for example, 
it might publicly reprimand the members of this court under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 950.09(2)(a) 
or 
even 
pursue 
a 
forfeiture 
under 
§ 950.09(2)(d).  To challenge the Board's determination, the 
members of this court would need to initiate a Chapter 227 
action.  But that Chapter 227 action would place a circuit 
court——and perhaps the intermediate court of appeals——in the 
absurd, not to mention unconstitutional, position of reviewing 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's interpretation of the law.  
Subjecting this court's decisions to review by a circuit court 
would obviously interfere with our duties and responsibilities 
as Wisconsin's court of last resort.  See Wis. Const. art. VII, 
§ 3(2) ("The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction over all 
courts . . . ."); see also Williams, 341 Wis. 2d 191, ¶36 & n.13 
(citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177). 
¶46 The Board ultimately fails to recognize that its 
Decision constituted quasi-judicial review of a judge's legal 
judgment.  In essence, the Board asserts the power to 
authoritatively decide whether a judge's official act comported 
with Wisconsin law, including the Wisconsin Constitution.  This 
assertion 
of 
power 
contravenes 
the 
principle, 
judicially 
acknowledged in Marbury and respected for over two hundred 
years, that it is the province of the judiciary, not the 
executive, to say what the law is.  Consistent with this 
venerable principle, our constitution vests the judicial power 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
34 
 
in Wisconsin's unified court system, and that judicial power 
confers on judges an exclusive responsibility to exercise 
independent judgment in cases over which they preside.  Because 
an 
executive 
board 
cannot 
interfere 
with 
the 
legal 
determinations judges make in an official capacity——much less 
declare them in violation of the constitution——the Board's 
claimed authority violates Wisconsin's structural separation of 
governmental powers. 
B.  Infringement on This Court's Disciplinary Authority 
¶47 Accepting the Board's expansive conception of its own 
power would also infringe on this court's exclusive authority to 
discipline judges.  Article VII, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides that "[e]ach justice or judge shall be 
subject to reprimand, censure, suspension, removal for cause or 
for disability, by the supreme court pursuant to procedures 
established by the legislature."  (Emphasis added.)18  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 757.83(1)(a) establishes the judicial commission, which 
investigates and prosecutes allegations of judicial misconduct.  
See Wis. Stat. §§ 757.85, 757.89.  Importantly, if the judicial 
commission's prosecution of alleged misconduct results in a 
recommendation 
that 
a 
judge 
be 
disciplined, 
this 
court 
"review[s] the findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
recommendations . . . and determine[s] appropriate discipline in 
                                                 
18 As noted above, this court shares the removal power with 
the legislature.  See Wis. Const. art. VII, §§ 1, 11, 13.  The 
people of Wisconsin also retain a portion of removal power 
through the recall process.  See Wis. Const. art. XIII, § 12. 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
35 
 
cases of misconduct."  Wis. Stat. § 757.91.  By assigning 
exclusive responsibility for judicial discipline to this court, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
precludes 
the 
legislative 
and 
executive branches from compromising independent adjudication in 
Wisconsin courts. 
¶48 Allowing the Board to take disciplinary action against 
judges under Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(a), (c), and (d) would 
clearly 
contradict 
the 
constitution. 
 
"The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
provides 
four 
disciplinary 
alternatives 
for 
judicial 
misconduct: 
 
reprimand, 
censure, 
suspension 
and 
removal."  In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Aulik, 146 Wis. 2d 57, 77, 429 N.W.2d 759 (1988) (citing Wis. 
Const. art. VII, § 11).  By its plain text, a "reprimand" of a 
judge under § 950.09(2)(a) would usurp this court's authority to 
"reprimand" under the Wisconsin Constitution by declaring a 
judge's conduct improper through a formal adjudicatory process.  
Cf. Reprimand, Black's Law Dictionary 1495 (10th ed. 2014) ("In 
professional legal responsibility, a form of disciplinary action 
that is imposed after trial or formal charges and declares the 
lawyer's conduct to be improper but does not limit his or her 
right to practice law . . . .").  And while this court's 
constitutional judicial discipline power does not expressly 
include the authority to assess a forfeiture or impose an 
equitable remedy, as § 950.09(2)(c) and (d) permit, allowing the 
legislature to create an executive board with the power to 
penalize or enjoin official judicial action would be anathema to 
the judicial independence preserved by the separation of 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
36 
 
governmental powers under the Wisconsin Constitution.  We cannot 
sustain an arrangement that sabotages the judiciary's structural 
independence. 
¶49 Nor will we permit an executive board to arrogate 
reprimand authority to itself by cloaking its action in other 
terms.  Cf. Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 
19, ¶19, 373 Wis. 2d 543, 892 N.W.2d 233 ("We are not merely 
arbiters of word choice.").  Here, the Board gave Judge Gabler 
notice 
of 
K.L.'s 
complaint, 
issued 
a 
probable 
cause 
determination, provided an opportunity to object, offered (but 
declined to hold) an evidentiary hearing, and issued its formal 
Decision.  The Board determined that Judge Gabler violated 
K.L.'s statutory and constitutional rights, indicated that it 
would issue a public Report and Recommendation confidentially 
"directed to" Judge Gabler, and notified him of his right to 
appeal.  These procedures resemble the judicial commission's 
procedures 
for 
investigating 
and 
prosecuting 
a 
judicial 
misconduct complaint.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 757.85, 757.89.  By 
subjecting Judge Gabler to these quasi-judicial proceedings, 
issuing a Decision that bore the imprimatur of disciplinary 
authority, and concluding that Judge Gabler violated a victim's 
statutory and constitutional rights as a matter of law, the 
Board intruded on this court's exclusive authority to reprimand 
judges, regardless of the label affixed to its action. 
¶50 We therefore conclude that Wis. Stat. §§ 950.09(2)(a), 
(2)(c)-(d), and (3) and 950.11 cannot constitutionally apply to 
judges because they invade two exclusive aspects of judicial 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
37 
 
authority:  the judicial power vested in the unified court 
system and the disciplinary function vested in this court.19  
This 
strict 
conservation 
of 
the 
judiciary's 
structural 
independence blocks the other branches from interfering with 
individual rights by manipulating judicial outcomes. 
V.  ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A.  Constitutional Avoidance 
¶51 Alongside the separation of powers issue, the Board 
argues that we should reverse the circuit court's decision 
because the Board did not violate Judge Gabler's right to 
procedural 
due 
process, 
any 
procedural 
errors 
the 
Board 
committed did not impair the fairness of its actions, the Board 
had jurisdiction over K.L.'s complaint, and substantial evidence 
supported the Board's Decision.  "This court does not normally 
decide constitutional questions if the case can be resolved on 
other grounds."  Adams Outdoor Advertising, Ltd. v. City of 
Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶91, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803 
(quoting Labor & Farm Party v. Elections Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 351, 
354, 344 N.W.2d 177 (1984)).  This case is incapable of 
                                                 
19 Under Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(b), the Board may, however, 
refer a complaint alleging ethical violations against a judge to 
the judicial commission for proceedings, potentially culminating 
in review and disposition by this court.  In this capacity, the 
Board has no greater authority than any other complainant filing 
a claim with the judicial commission.  Interpretations of the 
law with which the Board may disagree do not belong before the 
judicial commission and are subject solely to appellate review. 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
38 
 
resolution 
without 
deciding 
the 
constitutional 
conflict 
presented by the Board's exercise of its statutory powers. 
¶52 Constitutional avoidance is "a matter of judicial 
prudence" and does not apply where the constitutionality of a 
statute is "essential to the determination of the case."  
Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 Wis. 2d 552, 561, 313 N.W.2d 47 (1981); 
see Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 223-24 (1960) 
(Black, 
J., 
dissenting) 
("[T]here 
is 
a 
judicial 
practice . . . under which courts do not ordinarily decide 
constitutional questions unless essential to a decision of the 
case. . . .  But even the greatest of our judges have not always 
followed it as a rigid rule.  Perhaps had they done so the great 
opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison would 
never have been written."); Fleeman v. Case, 342 So. 2d 815, 818 
(Fla. 1976); Hammond v. Bingham, 362 P.2d 1078, 1079 (Idaho 
1961).  Courts in other jurisdictions have also recognized that 
the principle of constitutional avoidance gives way where the 
constitutional question is of great public importance.  See, 
e.g., State ex rel. Bland v. St. John, 13 So. 2d 161, 170 (Ala. 
1943); Buckingham v. State ex rel. Killoran, 35 A.2d 903, 904-05 
(Del. 1944). 
¶53 Even if we agreed with the Board's non-constitutional 
arguments, we would nevertheless need to decide the essential 
question of whether the Wisconsin Constitution permits the Board 
to pursue disciplinary action against Judge Gabler, a separation 
of powers issue of great public importance.  Neither party 
suggests any pertinent portion of Chapter 950 is ambiguous, and 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
39 
 
there is no saving construction of the statute that would cure 
its constitutional infirmity.20  Since Chapter 950 is clear, the 
fundamental question presented is whether application of Chapter 
950 to judges violates the structural separation of powers.21  
Because we affirm the circuit court's decision on that essential 
constitutional question, we need not address the Board's other 
arguments. 
                                                 
20 The dissent would interpret the term "public officials" 
in Wis. Stat. §§ 950.08-.09 to exclude judges.  See, e.g., 
dissent, ¶133.  But the statutes' plain language does not 
support this reading, nor did either party advance such a 
baseless argument.  The search for a saving construction of a 
patently unconstitutional statute does not compel a court to 
adopt an absurd one.  Although Chapter 950 does not define the 
term "public officials," the term's ordinary meaning undoubtedly 
encompasses judges.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for 
Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
("Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning . . . .").  In Black's Law Dictionary, the definition of 
"public 
official" 
redirects 
to 
the 
first 
definition 
of 
"official," which means "[s]omeone who holds or is invested with 
a public office; a person elected or appointed to carry out some 
portion of a government's sovereign powers."  Official, Black's 
Law Dictionary 
1259 (10th ed. 2014).  We have already 
established that Article VII, § 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
vests the judicial power in the unified court system, and there 
is no dispute that all Wisconsin judges are either appointed or 
elected to exercise that portion of the sovereign power.  See 
Wis. Const. art. VII, §§ 4(1), 5(2), 7, 9.  Nothing in the text 
of Chapter 950 supports a deviation from this plain meaning, 
thus setting up the inevitable constitutional conflict at issue 
in this case. 
21 See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2098 (2014) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Since the Act is 
clear, the real question this case presents is whether the Act 
is 
constitutional 
as 
applied 
to 
petitioner." 
(emphasis 
omitted)). 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
40 
 
B.  First Amendment Right to Criticize Courts 
¶54 Nothing in this opinion should be read as abridging 
political speech protected by the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  For all of the weight we assign to 
preserving the judiciary's independence from interference by the 
legislative and executive branches, we also recognize that 
public 
speech 
criticizing 
judges 
implicates 
different 
constitutional interests.  The United States Supreme Court has 
held the "essential right of the courts to be free of 
intimidation 
and 
coercion . . . to 
be 
consonant 
with 
a 
recognition that freedom of the press must be allowed in the 
broadest 
scope 
compatible 
with 
the 
supremacy 
of 
order."  
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 334 (1946) (citing Bridges 
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263, 265-66 (1941)).  Although 
judges, particularly elected judges, must always guard against 
allowing popular pressures to influence their judgment, public 
speech 
criticizing 
judges 
does 
not 
endanger 
judicial 
independence in the same manner as legislative or executive 
action seeking to exert control over judges. 
¶55 This court has long recognized the value of open 
public discussion regarding the judiciary: 
[C]ourts will not seek immunity from criticism by 
restraining the citizen or threatening the exercise of 
the right of free speech.  In a democracy the best 
interest of society is promoted by according to the 
citizen 
the 
greatest 
freedom 
in 
the 
matter 
of 
discussing the relative qualifications of candidates 
for public office and of freely criticising any 
governmental department.  He has a right to express 
his 
views 
upon 
the 
question 
of 
whether 
any 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
41 
 
governmental department is functioning in a manner to 
promote 
the 
general 
welfare. 
 
This 
freedom 
of 
discussion is important in order that the citizen may 
be advised concerning the affairs of his government 
and placed in the possession of facts which will 
enable him, with such discrimination as he may 
possess, to form intelligent conclusions. 
In re. Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 406, 240 N.W. 441 (1932). 
¶56 Consistent 
with 
this 
longstanding 
reverence 
for 
political speech, we emphasize that our holding does not 
constrain individuals or groups from criticizing judges.   As 
the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, the First Amendment 
protects 
not 
only 
individual 
speech 
but 
also 
speech 
by 
individuals acting in concert through a collective body.  See 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 
(2014); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010).  This 
opinion prohibits the legislature and the executive branch from 
transgressing the separation of powers by formally disciplining 
judges for exercising judgment, but the people may of course, 
individually or collectively, express opinions about judicial 
matters.  Ultimately, because the people elect their judges in 
Wisconsin, they retain the strongest voice of all to approve or 
disapprove of judges and their decisions. 
¶57 We caution, however, that reckless criticism of the 
courts risks undermining their role as a check on the 
legislative and executive branches.   
The members of society have become content to accept 
the decisions of courts in their controversies with 
their fellows, and they will remain content so long as 
they have confidence in their courts.  Restlessness, 
discontent, and anarchy, however, will result with the 
passing of confidence in the integrity of the courts, 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
42 
 
and 
stable 
government 
will 
totter 
upon 
its 
foundations.  It is for this reason that high-minded 
citizens 
refrain 
from 
impetuous 
and 
ill-founded 
criticism of the courts. 
Cannon, 206 Wis. at 406-07.  We by no means implore silence from 
our fellow citizens;22 rather, we caution those who impugn the 
integrity of judicial decision-making that while the courts 
remain fervent guardians of speech, particularly political 
expression, the right to speak, when exercised irresponsibly, is 
not without cost to the stability of our republican form of 
government. 
C.  Respect for Victims' Rights 
¶58 We close by reaffirming this court's commitment to 
upholding the crime victims' rights enshrined in our statutes 
and constitution.  No less than we did a decade ago, "we believe 
that justice requires that all who are engaged in the 
prosecution of crimes make every effort to minimize further 
suffering by crime victims."  Schilling, 278 Wis. 2d 216, ¶26.  
Earlier this term, a concern about possible re-traumatization of 
victims influenced our decision permitting the Department of 
Justice to withhold requested public records——notwithstanding 
                                                 
22 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941) ("The 
assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by 
shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the 
character of American public opinion.  For it is a prized 
American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with 
prefect good taste, on all public institutions.  And an enforced 
silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the 
dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment, 
suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance 
respect." (footnote omitted)). 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
43 
 
the strong public policy otherwise favoring disclosure.  See 
Dem. Party of Wis. v. DOJ, 2016 WI 100, ¶¶14, 28-33, 372 
Wis. 2d 460, 888 N.W.2d 584.  Our decision today does not signal 
a departure from our consistent protection of victims' rights. 
¶59 Although we prohibit the Board from disciplining 
judges because executive review of judicial decisions violates 
fundamental separation of powers principles, crime victims 
nonetheless have recourse for their grievances against judges.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 950.105 assures victims a mechanism for 
directly asserting their own rights in court.  We reserve for 
future cases more comprehensive discussion of the interplay 
between 
victims' 
rights 
and 
procedural 
tools, 
such 
as 
intervention, writs of mandamus, and supervisory writs.  Because 
victims may assert their rights in court, these procedural 
mechanisms could offer alternative remedies for victims seeking 
to vindicate their rights.  And because these procedural means 
could offer recourse for victims within the unified court 
system, they would not pose a threat to the judiciary's 
independence.23 
                                                 
23 Availability of standing for victims under Wis. Stat. 
§ 950.105 also undermines the Board's argument that referral to 
the judicial commission under Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(b) leaves 
victims 
without 
an 
adequate 
remedy. 
 
Specifically, 
§ 950.09(2)(b) permits the Board to "[r]efer to the judicial 
commission a violation or alleged violation by a judge of the 
rights of crime victims."  The Board expresses concern that a 
judge's alleged violations of a victim's rights might not 
satisfy 
the 
definition 
of 
misconduct 
necessary 
for 
the 
imposition 
of 
judicial 
discipline. 
 
Under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 757.81(4), an allegation of "misconduct" charges a judge with 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
44 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
¶60 The people bestowed much power on the legislature, 
comprised of their representatives whom the people elect to make 
the laws.  However, ever vigilant in averting the accumulation 
of power by one body——a grave threat to liberty——the people 
devised a diffusion of governmental powers, placing judicial 
power, along with the authority to discipline judges, within the 
exclusive province of the independent judiciary.  These powers 
may not be claimed by another branch.  Just as the people of the 
United States at the founding of the Republic vested all federal 
judicial power in the Judiciary, the people of Wisconsin vested 
the Wisconsin judiciary with the power to exclude the coordinate 
branches of government from the judicial domain in order to 
safeguard judicial independence.  The significance of preserving 
clear boundaries between the branches has been understood since 
the founding of our nation, with the role of the judiciary 
                                                                                                                                                             
committing a "[w]illful violation of a rule of the code of 
judicial ethics"——a serious ethical allegation. 
We agree with the Board that Wis. Stat. § 757.81(4)(a) sets 
a high bar for proof of judicial misconduct, but we disagree 
that 
it 
leaves 
victims 
without 
a 
remedy. 
 
The 
Board 
misapprehends the proper role of the judicial commission, which 
does not exist to review judges' discretionary decisions.  In 
Wisconsin, crime victims' rights are a matter of constitutional 
and statutory law, and Wis. Stat. § 950.105 confirms that 
victims may assert those rights in court.  Accordingly, a victim 
who disagrees with a judge's legal determination may challenge 
that decision through existing procedural means within the court 
system.  Contested discretionary decisions are not ethical 
transgressions and therefore do not belong before the judicial 
commission. 
No. 
2016AP275   
 
45 
 
plainly recognized:  "This independence of the judges is equally 
requisite 
to 
guard 
the 
Constitution 
and 
the 
rights 
of 
individuals . . . ."  Federalist No. 78, supra, at 468.  By 
conferring on an executive board the power to review and 
discipline judges, the legislature contradicts the Wisconsin 
Constitution, violates the structural separation of powers, and 
threatens judicial independence.  We therefore hold that Wis. 
Stat. §§ 950.09(2)(a), (2)(c)-(d), and (3) and 950.11 are 
unconstitutional as applied to judges and declare the Board's 
Decision against Judge Gabler void. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
¶61 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶62 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  I cannot join the majority opinion, which 
casts aside the cardinal principle of statutory interpretation: 
Save.  Do not destroy.1  
¶63 This 
court 
ordinarily 
follows 
the 
principle 
of 
constitutional avoidance.  This court generally does not "decide 
constitutional questions if the case can be resolved on other 
grounds."2      
¶64 Nevertheless, in the instant case, the majority 
opinion rushes headlong into determining the constitutionality 
of the statutes at issue without interpreting the statutes.   
¶65 Disregard of bedrock, well-established principles of 
statutory interpretation in the instant case leads, in my 
opinion, to a lack of appropriate respect and constitutional 
concern for crime victims and the legislative and executive 
branches of government.    
¶66 In its constitutional analysis, the majority opinion 
overzealously 
and 
unnecessarily 
forces 
head-on 
collisions 
between: 
• Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution, a 
1993 constitutional amendment (hereinafter sometimes 
referred to as the Crime Victims Amendment) ensuring 
                                                 
1 "The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to 
save and not to destroy."  N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937). 
2 Labor & Farm Party of Wis. v. Elections Bd., 117 
Wis. 2d 351, 354, 344 N.W.2d 177 (1984).   
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
2 
 
crime victims' rights3 (including "timely disposition 
of the case") and vesting the legislature with the 
responsibility to "provide remedies for the violation 
of this section,"4 and Article VII, Section 2 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution vesting judicial power in the 
unified 
court 
system.5 
 
When 
interpreting 
a 
                                                 
3 The history of the Crime Victims Amendment demonstrates 
that the amendment uses the phrase "privileges and protections" 
rather than the word "rights" but that this phrase was viewed as 
synonymous with the word "rights."  Memorandum from Racine 
County District Attorney Lennie Weber to Senator Barbara 
Ulichny, Feb. 24, 1992 (available in the drafting file for 1991 
S.J.R. 41).  
4 Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  
Victims of crime. SECTION 9m. [As created April 1993] 
This state shall treat crime victims, as defined by 
law, with fairness, dignity and respect for their 
privacy. This state shall ensure that crime victims 
have all of the following privileges and protections 
as provided by law: timely disposition of the case; 
the opportunity to attend court proceedings unless the 
trial court finds sequestration is necessary to a fair 
trial for the defendant; reasonable protection from 
the accused throughout the criminal justice process; 
notification of court proceedings; the opportunity to 
confer with the prosecution; the opportunity to make a 
statement to the court at disposition; restitution; 
compensation; and information about the outcome of the 
case and the release of the accused. The legislature 
shall provide remedies for the violation of this 
section.  Nothing in this section, or in any statute 
enacted pursuant to this section, shall limit any 
right of the accused which may be provided by law. 
(Emphasis added.) 
5 Article VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  
(continued) 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
3 
 
constitutional provision, a court seeks "to give 
effect to the intent of the framers and of the people 
who adopted it."6   
• Article VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
vesting judicial power in the unified court system and 
Wis. Stat. ch. 950 (2015-16)7 entitled Rights of 
Victims and Witnesses of Crime, especially §§ 950.09 
and 950.11,8 and the powers and duties of the 
Department of Justice and the Crime Victims Rights 
Board.9   
• Victims and judges. 
• The judicial branch and the legislative branch.  The 
Wisconsin Constitution vests the legislative power in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Court system. SECTION 2. [As amended April 1966 and 
April 1977] The judicial power of this state shall be 
vested in a unified court system consisting of one 
supreme court, a court of appeals, a circuit court, 
such 
trial 
courts 
of 
general 
uniform 
statewide 
jurisdiction as the legislature may create by law, and 
a municipal court if authorized by the legislature 
under section 14.  
6 Schilling v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2005 WI 17, ¶13, 
278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623 (citation omitted). 
7 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
8 For the text and discussion of relevant provisions of Wis. 
Stat. ch. 950, see ¶¶136-185, infra. 
9 The statute creating the Crime Victims Rights Board is 
quoted at ¶118 n.42, infra.  
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
4 
 
a senate and assembly,10 and Article I, Section 9m of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
(the 
Crime 
Victims 
Amendment) states that "the legislature shall provide 
remedies for the violation of the section."11 (Emphasis 
added.)  
• The judicial branch and the executive branch.  The 
Crime 
Victims 
Rights 
Board, 
created 
by 
the 
legislature, is an executive branch agency attached to 
the Department of Justice. 
¶67 The majority opinion declares judges and the judicial 
branch the "hands down" winner of these confrontations.  The 
majority 
opinion's 
failure 
to 
analyze 
the 
Crime 
Victims 
Amendment and Chapter 950; its declaration that Wis. Stat. 
§ 950.09(2)(a), § 950.09(2)(c)-(d), § 950.09(3), and § 950.11 
are unconstitutional with respect to judges on the basis of the 
separation of powers doctrine; and its voiding the actions of 
the Crime Victims Rights Board relating to Judge Gabler 
unnecessarily aggrandize judicial powers at the expense of 
victims and the legislative and executive branches.  See 
                                                 
10 Article III, Section 1 provides:  "The legislative power 
is vested in a senate and assembly."  
11 The drafting record explains that advocates supported the 
constitutional amendment because it provided victims with a 
mechanism for enforcement.  See Schilling, 278 Wis. 2d 216, ¶22.  
See also Gary Watchke, Wis. Legis. Reference Bureau Brief 93-4, 
Constitutional 
Amendments 
and 
Advisory 
Referenda 
to 
be 
Considered by Wisconsin Voters April 6, 1993 at 4 (Mar. 1993) 
(available on the Legislative Reference Bureau's 
website, 
http://lrbdigital.legis.wisconsin.gov/digital/collection/p16831c
oll2/id/592/rec/5).  
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
5 
 
majority op., ¶¶2, 46, 53, 56, 60.  Moreover, the majority 
opinion 
dismally 
fails 
to 
provide 
any 
guidance 
on 
the 
interpretation of the constitutional and statutory provisions 
relating to crime victims. 
¶68 Accordingly, I write separately.   
¶69 Before I further discuss the majority opinion's veneer 
of constitutional analysis, it is important to discuss Eau 
Claire County Circuit Court Judge William M. Gabler, Sr.'s role 
as the sentencing judge in the instant case.   
¶70 When the crime victim asserted a claim against him, 
Judge Gabler had been considering a sentence in the pending 
criminal case.  His task was to adhere to the statutes and 
federal and state constitutions in deciding the sentence.  He 
had to consider the victim.  He also had to consider the 
criminal defendant's constitutional and statutory rights to a 
fair trial and a fair sentencing.  Notably, the Crime Victims 
Amendment unequivocally protects the rights of the accused.  It 
states that nothing in the Crime Victims Amendment, "or in any 
statute enacted pursuant to this section, shall limit any right 
of the accused which may be provided by law."            
¶71 Judge Gabler exercised his discretion in scheduling 
sentencing on the basis of his analysis of the facts and law.  
While the sentencing proceeding was pending, the Office of Crime 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
6 
 
Victim Services in the Department of Justice communicated with 
the Judge about scheduling the sentencing.12     
¶72 While being questioned by this executive branch agency 
during the pending judicial proceedings, Judge Gabler displayed 
a steadfast commitment——as all judges and justices should——to 
being neutral, fair, impartial, and nonpartisan in performing 
judicial duties.  The Judge was careful, however, to avoid ex 
parte communications (which raise serious issues of judicial 
ethics).13  The Judge made it clear that he would listen to and 
address the concerns presented, but that he would not be a 
slender reed easily buffeted by winds of pressure about 
sentencing.   
¶73 Not all victims, circuit court or appellate judges or 
justices, lawyers, court observers, legislators, members of the 
executive branch, or the public would necessarily agree with 
Judge Gabler's discretionary decision regarding sentencing.  
Neither the majority nor I need decide whether we agree with the 
Judge's decision on the timing of the sentencing.  That's not 
the issue before this court.  Court procedures exist for 
                                                 
12 See majority op., ¶16 (quoting Judge Gabler's response to 
the initial letter from the Crime Victims Services explaining 
his reasons for the date he chose for sentencing).  
13 See majority op., ¶¶12-17.  The provision in the 
Wisconsin 
Code 
of 
Judicial 
Conduct 
regarding 
ex 
parte 
communications is SCR 60.04(1)(g):  "A judge may not initiate, 
permit, engage in or consider ex parte communications concerning 
a pending or impending action or proceeding . . . . "  (The 
exceptions stated are not relevant in the instant case.) 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
7 
 
deciding the validity of a circuit court judge's sentencing 
decisions in a criminal case.     
¶74 Judge Gabler raises substantive legal issues before 
this court, namely the constitutionality of the challenged 
statutory provisions in Chapter 950 of the statutes.  I address 
them.   
¶75 In Part I, I set forth the applicable rules of 
statutory interpretation, a task the majority opinion never 
performs.    
¶76 In 
Part 
II, 
I 
apply 
the 
rules 
applicable 
to 
interpreting 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
I 
analyze 
the 
historical background and text of the Crime Victims Amendment, a 
task the majority opinion never performs.  The constitutional 
debates and the general history of the adoption of the Amendment 
are also informative in interpreting the challenged statutory 
provisions.  
¶77 In Part III, with the Crime Victims Amendment in mind, 
I apply the applicable statutory interpretive rules to the 
challenged statutory provisions.  I conclude that the majority 
opinion's declaration of statutory unconstitutionality on the 
basis of the doctrine of separation of powers is not tethered to 
the constitutional or statutory texts.  The texts of the 
challenged 
statutory 
provisions 
have 
a 
constitutional 
interpretation that this court should adopt.  I do so.        
¶78 In Part IV, I assess the conduct of the Department of 
Justice and the Crime Victims Rights Board in the instant case 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
8 
 
to determine whether each has kept within or exceeded its 
statutory powers or violated the constitution.   
¶79 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that the correct 
interpretation of the applicability of the challenged statutory 
provisions to judges depends on the text of the Crime Victims 
Amendment, the interpretation of the challenged statutory 
provisions, and the effect of other statutory provisions and the 
common law.   
¶80 As properly interpreted, the challenged provisions of 
Chapter 950 are constitutional with respect to judges.   
• Wisconsin Stat. § 950.08(3) does not authorize the 
Department of Justice to mediate a complaint against a 
judge.       
• Wisconsin Stat. § 950.09(2) does not authorize the 
Crime Victims Rights Board to determine probable cause 
or investigate a crime victim's complaint against a 
judge.       
• Wisconsin Stat. § 950.09(2)(a) does not authorize the 
Crime Victims Rights Board to "reprimand" a judge.   
• Wisconsin Stat. § 950.09(2)(b) authorizes the Crime 
Victims Rights Board to refer a complaint about a 
judge to the Judicial Commission.  
• Wisconsin Stat. § 950.09(2)(c) does not authorize the 
Crime Victims Rights Board to seek equitable relief 
against a judge.   
• Wisconsin Stat. § 950.09(2)(d) does not authorize the 
Crime Victims Rights Board to impose a forfeiture on a 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
9 
 
judge: A judge enjoys absolute immunity for actions 
taken in his or her official capacity.         
• Wis. Stat. § 950.09(3) authorizes the Crime Victims 
Rights Board to issue a non-binding Report and 
Recommendation concerning crime victims rights and 
services.  This court should not silence critiques of 
the judicial system authorized by the legislature.    
• The Department of Justice and the Crime Victims Rights 
Board 
did 
not, 
in 
several 
instances, 
correctly 
interpret and apply the challenged statutes.  
I 
¶81 I first consider the rules of statutory interpretation 
to be applied when a challenge is made to the constitutionality 
of a statute.  The majority opinion jumps right over this basic 
first step.   
¶82 When 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
a 
statute 
is 
in 
question, "[t]he rule oft stated in our cases is that statutes 
are presumed to be constitutional . . . ."14  In its haste to 
reach its declaration of unconstitutionality, the majority 
opinion does not even pay lip service to this rule. 
¶83 "Because of the strong presumption in favor of 
constitutionality, a party bringing a constitutional challenge 
to a statute bears a 'heavy burden'" to prove that the statute 
                                                 
14 Demmith v. Wis. Judicial Conference, 166 Wis. 2d 649, 662 
n.9, 480 N.W.2d 502 (1992) (citing State v. Holmes, 106 
Wis. 2d 31, 41, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982)).   
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
10 
 
is unconstitutional.15  The challenger has to prove, and the 
court has to be persuaded, that the statute is unconstitutional 
"beyond a reasonable doubt."16   
¶84 In 
its 
haste 
to 
reach 
its 
declaration 
of 
unconstitutionality, the majority opinion does not even pay lip 
service to this rule either. 
¶85 Because "courts have a duty to uphold statutes when 
they reasonably can," State v. Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 142, 589 
N.W.2d 370 (1999) (Prosser, J., dissenting); see also Zarnke, 
224 Wis. 2d at 142-43 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (collecting 
cases), this court has an obligation to "search [] for a means 
of sustaining the act, not for reasons which might require its 
condemnation."  State ex rel. Harvey v. Morgan, 30 Wis. 2d 1, 
13, 139 N.W.2d 585 (1966).   
¶86 The presumption of constitutionality of a statute and 
a court's obligation to search for reasons to sustain a statute 
necessarily inform this court's interpretation of a statute. 
¶87 The parties' briefs address statutory interpretation, 
including legislative history, in their focus on issues of 
constitutionality.  Clearly the parties followed a litigation 
strategy:  Both Judge Gabler and the Crime Victims Rights Board 
have sought a ruling on the constitutionality of the statutory 
                                                 
15 Wis. Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Morgan, 2010 WI 94, ¶37, 328 
Wis. 2d 469, 787 N.W.2d 22 (quoting State v. Carpenter, 197 
Wis. 2d 252, 276, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995)).   
16 State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, ¶13, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 
N.W.2d 786; State v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶8, 323 Wis. 2d 377, 780 
N.W.2d 90. 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
11 
 
provisions at issue.  Judge Gabler wants the statutes declared 
unconstitutional as to judges.  The Crime Victims Rights Board, 
by its counsel the Wisconsin Department of Justice, wants the 
statutes declared constitutional as to judges. 
 
¶88 Adopting the parties' litigation strategy "hook, line 
and sinker," the majority opinion centers on the parties' 
constitutional arguments.     
¶89 I would have preferred to ask the parties to brief 
selected statutory interpretation issues.  As I have written 
numerous times, this court benefits from briefs.  Briefing and 
the adversarial process are more apt to lead a court to the 
right conclusion and are a fairer process for the litigants.17  
Fortunately, in the instant case, no further facts need to be 
developed to write on the issue of statutory interpretation. 
¶90 In any event, principles governing constitutional 
avoidance and a court's decision making function do not rest on 
the parties' litigation strategy.  "The parties may prefer a 
decision on constitutional grounds; but we, of course, are not 
                                                 
17 "The rule of law is generally best developed when issues 
are raised by the parties and then tested by the fire of 
adversarial briefs and oral arguments."  State v. Howes, 2017 WI 
18, ¶104 n.7, 373 Wis. 2d 468, 893 N.W.2d 812 (Abrahamson, J., 
dissenting) (quoting City of Janesville v. CC Midwest, Inc., 
2007 WI 93, ¶68, 302 Wis. 2d 599, 734 N.W.2d 428 (Ann Walsh 
Bradley, J., dissenting)). 
See also Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., v. Doyle, 2006 WI 
107, ¶335, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408 (Roggensack, J., 
concurring in part & dissenting in part) ("As various members of 
this court have said, we should not 'reach out and decide 
issues' that were not presented to the court by the parties.").    
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
12 
 
bound by their litigation strategies."  Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 
309, 345 n.7 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
¶91 The constitutionally protected rights of crime victims 
and the independence and interdependence of the three branches of 
government give the issue of statutory interpretation added 
significance.   
¶92 Accordingly, I address the interpretation of the 
challenged statutes.   
¶93 The presumption of constitutionality underlies three 
prevailing rules of statutory interpretation, sometimes referred 
to collectively as the canon of constitutional avoidance.18  
These rules govern the instant case and were not systematically 
applied by the majority opinion:   
                                                 
18 The canon of constitutional avoidance was most famously 
restated in Justice Brandeis's concurrence in Ashwander v. 
Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936), in which he 
extolled a "series of rules under which [the Court] has avoided 
passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions 
pressed upon it for decision."  Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346 
(Brandeis, J., concurring).   
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
13 
 
(1) 
A court should resolve a case on non-constitutional 
grounds if possible.19  
(2) 
A court should interpret a statutory provision at 
issue 
in 
a 
manner 
that 
renders 
the 
statute 
constitutional by construing the statute to avoid a 
                                                 
19 Ordinarily a court "will not decide a constitutional 
question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of 
the case."  Escambia Cty. v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) 
per curiam ).  Accord  Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 Wis. 2d 552, 561, 
313 N.W.2d 47, 51 (1981) ("As a matter of judicial prudence, a 
court should not decide the constitutionality of a statute 
unless it is essential to the determination of the case before 
it."); Labor & Farm Party of Wis. v. Elections Bd., 117 
Wis. 2d 351, 354, 344 N.W.2d 177 (1984) ("We need not reach 
these various constitutional issues because we conclude the case 
can be resolved on statutory construction grounds alone.  This 
court does not normally decide constitutional questions if the 
case can be resolved on other grounds"); DeBruin v. St. Patrick 
Congregation, 2012 WI 94, ¶42, 343 Wis. 2d 83, 816 N.W.2d 878 
(Crooks, 
J., 
concurring) 
("[W]e 
do 
not 
normally 
reach 
constitutional issues in cases that are resolvable on other 
grounds . . . .").   
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
14 
 
constitutional problem,20 
or, when facing equally 
plausible interpretations of a statute, choosing the 
constitutional one.21  
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Kenosha Cty. DHS v. Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, ¶20, 
293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845 ("Where the constitutionality of 
a statute is at issue, courts [should] attempt to avoid an 
interpretation that creates constitutional infirmities."); Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. v. DOR, 222 Wis. 2d 650, 667, 586 N.W.2d 872 
(1998) ("A court should avoid interpreting a statute in such a 
way that would render it unconstitutional when a reasonable 
interpretation 
exists 
that 
would 
render 
the 
legislation 
constitutional."); Norquist v. Zeuske, 211 Wis. 2d 241, 250, 564 
N.W.2d 748, 752 (1997) (A court "must not construe a statute to 
violate the constitution if it can possibly be construed 
consistent with the constitution.") (emphasis added); Demmith v. 
Wis. Judicial Conference, 166 Wis. 2d 649, 664 n.13, 480 
N.W.2d 502 (1992) (A court applies a saving interpretation "if 
at all possible, in a manner that will preserve the statute as a 
constitutional enactment."); Baird v. La Follette, 72 Wis. 2d 1, 
5, 239 N.W.2d 536, 538 (1976) ("Where there is serious doubt of 
constitutionality, we must look to see whether there is a 
construction of the statute which is reasonably possible which 
will avoid the constitutional question."); Ashwander, 297 U.S. 
at 348 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("When the validity of an act 
of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious 
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle 
that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of 
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be 
avoided."). 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
15 
 
(3) 
If a saving interpretation is not possible, a court 
should sever unavoidably unconstitutional provisions 
or applications of the statute and leave the remainder 
intact.22  It "is axiomatic that a 'statute may be 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 See, e.g., Adams v. Northland Equip. Co., Inc., 2014 WI 
79, 
¶46, 
356 
Wis. 2d 529, 
850 
N.W.2d 272 
("[W]hen 
given 
alternative statutory interpretations, we will select the 
interpretation that results in a constitutionally sufficient 
statute."); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 
526, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978) ("Given a choice of reasonable 
interpretations of a statute, this court must select the 
construction which results in constitutionality."); Clark v. 
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (If there are multiple 
"competing plausible interpretations" of a statute, the canon of 
constitutional avoidance instructs a court to choose the 
constitutional application based on the "reasonable presumption 
that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises 
serious doubts."); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast 
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) 
("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute 
would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will 
construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such 
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.").  
22 See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 990.001(11), 
which 
provides 
for 
severability as follows: 
SEVERABILTIY.  The provisions of the statutes are 
severable. The provisions of any session law are 
severable.  If any provision of the statutes or of a 
session law is invalid, or if the application of 
either to any person or circumstance is invalid, such 
invalidity shall not affect other provisions or 
applications which can be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 
See also Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 Geo L.J. 
1945, 1950-51 (1997) ("[A]ll forms of severability are triggered 
only 
by 
a 
ruling 
on 
the 
merits 
of 
a 
constitutional 
question . . . . "); 
Kevin 
C. 
Walsh, 
Partial 
Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 738, 746–47 (2010) ("[I]f 
the 
statute 
has 
unconstitutional 
applications, 
they 
are 
severable from the constitutional applications.") (citations 
omitted). 
(continued) 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
16 
 
invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet valid 
as applied to another.'"23   
¶94 In sum, my analysis of the issues presented follows 
these established rules of statutory interpretation. 
 
¶95 The majority opinion does not.  Its defense:  "This 
case 
is 
incapable 
of 
resolution 
without 
deciding 
the 
constitutional conflict presented by the Board's exercise of its 
statutory powers."  Majority op., ¶51.  I disagree.  The court 
should examine the statutes to decide the Board's powers before 
deciding the constitutionality of the statutes. 
II 
¶96 Before I analyze the applicability of the challenged 
(and presumably constitutional) statutory provisions to judges, 
I consider the state constitution Crime Victims Amendment.  The 
challenged 
statutory 
provisions 
were 
created 
or 
amended 
subsequent to the adoption of the constitution's Crime Victims 
Amendment and are to be interpreted in light of the Amendment.         
                                                                                                                                                             
Severability is not without limits.  Thus, "[a]scertaining 
the severability of an unconstitutional provision from the 
remainder of a statute requires a determination of legislative 
intent" and "the viability of the severed portion standing 
alone."  
Burlington N., Inc. v. City of Superior, 131 
Wis. 2d 564, 580-81, 388 N.W.2d 916 (1986); Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 
330 ("[T]he touchstone for any decision about [a severability] 
remedy is legislative intent, for a court cannot 'use its 
remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.'") 
(quoting Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 94 (1979) (Powell, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).   
23 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 
320, 329 (2006) (quoting Dahnke–Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 
257 U.S. 282, 289 (1921)). 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶97 The Amendment, Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, provides as follows: 
Victims of crime. SECTION 9m. [As created April 1993] 
This state shall treat crime victims, as defined by 
law, with fairness, dignity and respect for their 
privacy.  This state shall ensure that crime victims 
have all of the following privileges and protections 
as provided by law:  timely disposition of the case; 
the opportunity to attend court proceedings unless the 
trial court finds sequestration is necessary to a fair 
trial for the defendant; reasonable protection from 
the accused throughout the criminal justice process; 
notification of court proceedings; the opportunity to 
confer with the prosecution; the opportunity to make a 
statement to the court at disposition; restitution; 
compensation; and information about the outcome of the 
case and the release of the accused.  The legislature 
shall provide remedies for the violation of this 
section.  Nothing in this section, or in any statute 
enacted pursuant to this section, shall limit any 
right of the accused which may be provided by law. 
(Emphasis added.)   
¶98 The court has set forth the method for interpreting a 
Wisconsin constitutional provision and has used this method in 
interpreting the Crime Victims Amendment.  See Schilling v. 
Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2005 WI 17, ¶16, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 
N.W.2d 623)(citations omitted).24 
¶99 The court examines the constitutional debates and 
practices at the time of the drafting of the provision 
(including the general history relating to the constitutional 
amendment and the legislative history of the amendment), the 
text 
of 
the 
constitutional 
provision, 
and 
the 
earliest 
                                                 
24 See also Polk Cty. v. State Public Defender, 188 
Wis. 2d 665, 674, 524 N.W.2d 389 (1994); State v. Beno, 116 
Wis. 2d 122, 136-37, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984). 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
18 
 
interpretation of the provision by the legislature as manifested 
in the first law enacted after the ratification of the 
constitutional 
provision. 
 
Naturally, 
judicial 
precedent 
interpreting the Amendment also matters.       
¶100 The Amendment was obviously designed with crime 
victims 
in 
mind. 
 
Following 
a 
national 
trend 
of 
"constitutionalizing" victims' rights,25 Wisconsin citizens voted 
to adopt the Crime Victims Amendment in 1993.26  Although crime 
victims were already protected by statute in Wisconsin,27 the 
proponents 
of 
the 
Crime 
Victims 
Amendment 
sought 
to 
"constitutionalize" victims' rights.  Proponents contended that 
                                                 
25 When the Crime Victims Amendment was adopted, 12 other 
states' constitutions recognized victims rights.  Currently, 32 
states have amended their constitutions to include a provision 
relating to crime victims.  The remaining 18 states, the Federal 
government, and the District of Columbia have statutes that 
recognize victims' rights.  
For a compendium containing each jurisdiction's laws 
relating 
to 
the 
rights 
of 
crime 
victims, 
see 
https://law.lclark.edu/live/news/23544-victims-rights-law-by-
state?.  
For a discussion of the victims' rights movement and the 
issues presented, see Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles:  
The Victims' Rights Movement, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 517.   
26 The 
Crime 
Victims 
Amendment 
was 
adopted 
by 
two 
consecutive Wisconsin legislatures.  See 1991 S.J.R. 41, 1993 
S.J.R. 3.  Not all legislators favored it.      
27 See Chapter 219, Laws of 1979 (creating Chapter 950 of 
the Wisconsin Statutes, which established a statutory bill of 
rights for victims and witnesses of crimes).  Chapter 950, 
including the bill of rights, was substantially amended by 1997 
Act 181 after the ratification of the state constitution Crime 
Victims Amendment.     
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
19 
 
a constitutional guarantee was "necessary to give weight to the 
statutory language and to ensure that all crime victims have 
access to the same services."28   
¶101 The drafting record of the Crime Victims Amendment 
explains that advocates supported the Amendment because it 
provided victims with a mechanism for enforcement.29  See 
Schilling, 278 Wis. 2d 216, ¶22; Gary Watchke, Wis. Legis. 
Reference Bureau Brief 93-4, Constitutional Amendments and 
Advisory Referenda to be Considered by Wisconsin Voters April 6, 
1993, at 4 (Mar. 1993) (available on the Legislative Reference 
Bureau's website, http://lrbdigital.legis.wisconsin.gov/digital/ 
collection/p16831coll2/id/592/rec/5). 
¶102 Three observations should be made regarding the Crime 
Victims Amendment.  First, the constitution's Amendment is 
written in terms of the "privileges and protections" of crime 
victims, not "rights."  Second, and relatedly, the Amendment 
unequivocally protects the rights of the accused.  Third, the 
Amendment declares that the legislature "shall provide remedies 
for the violation of this section."  
¶103 First, the text of the Crime Victims Amendment is 
framed in terms of the "privileges and protections" of crime 
                                                 
28 Gary Watchke, Wis. Legis. Reference Bureau Brief 93-4, 
Constitutional 
Amendments 
and 
Advisory 
Referenda 
to 
be 
Considered by Wisconsin Voters April 6, 1993, at 3 (Mar. 1993) 
(available on the Legislative Reference Bureau's website, 
http://lrbdigital.legis.wisconsin.gov/digital/collection/p16831c
oll2/id/592/rec/5). 
29 See Brief of Respondent-Appellant Crime Victims Rights 
Board at 20-21.   
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
20 
 
victims, not "rights."  A letter in the drafting file explains 
the genesis of the terminology "privileges and protections" and 
suggests that it is due little weight as an interpretive matter:  
Sen. Adelman objected to the use of the term "right" 
in SJR 41.  It became apparent that his objection was 
based more on the symbolism attached to the notion of 
"crime victims rights" than to any genuine legal or 
substantive meaning of the "rights" afforded....  We 
have, therefore, agreed to substitute the phrase 
"privileges and protections" for "rights" in the 
introduction to the enumerated provisions.30  
¶104 Second, and relatedly, it appears that a central theme 
threading through the passage of the Crime Victims Amendment was 
to protect the rights of an accused.  State Senator Lynn Adelman 
persuaded the Joint Resolution's principal author, Senator 
Barbara Ulichny, to add the following language to the Amendment: 
"Nothing in this section, or in any statute enacted pursuant to 
this section, shall limit any right of the accused which may be 
provided by law."  This language reflects the understanding of 
the drafters and leaders in the State Senate that "enactment of 
the amendment will not lead to a balancing of a defendant's 
                                                 
30 Memorandum from Racine County District Attorney Lennie 
Weber to Senator Barbara Ulichny, Feb. 24, 1992 (available in 
the drafting file for 1991 S.J.R. 41).  Senator Ulichny was the 
Joint Resolution's principal author and requested District 
Attorney Lennie Weber to negotiate certain terms of the bill 
with the State Public Defender's Office and Senator Lynn 
Adelman.  
A proposed constitutional amendment, 
2017 A.J.R. 47, 
currently pending before the Wisconsin State Assembly, would 
replace the phrase "privileges and protections" with the word 
"rights." 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
21 
 
legal rights against those of a crime victim"31 and that a 
defendant's rights "would in no way be limited" by the 
privileges and protections granted crime victims.32 
¶105 In fact, the importance placed on the Amendment's 
protection of the rights of the accused is demonstrated in the 
ballot question asking voters whether they wished to adopt the 
Amendment.  The voters were asked:  
"Rights of victims of crime." Shall section 9m of 
article I of the constitution be created requiring 
fair and dignified treatment of crime victims with 
respect for their privacy and to ensuring that the 
guaranteed privileges and protections of crime victims 
                                                 
31 Gary Watchke, Wis. Legis. Reference Bureau Brief 93-4, 
Constitutional 
Amendments 
and 
Advisory 
Referenda 
to 
be 
Considered by Wisconsin Voters April 6, 1993, at 4 (Mar. 1993) 
(available on the Legislative Reference Bureau's website, 
http://lrbdigital.legis.wisconsin.gov/digital/collection/p16831c
oll2/id/592/rec/5).  See Letter from Senator Adelman to Dr. 
Rupert Theobold, head of the Legislative Reference Bureau, Mar. 
12, 1992 (available in the drafting file for 1991 S.J.R. 41); 
Memorandum from Racine County District Attorney Lennie Weber to 
Senator Barbara Ulichny, Feb. 24, 1992 (available in the 
drafting file to 1991 S.J.R. 41); Ken Eikenberry, Victims of 
Crime/Victims of Justice, 34 Wayne L. Rev. 29, 46 (1987-1988) 
(this law review article is part of the drafting file and was 
apparently influential in the drafting of the Amendment:  "A 
victims' rights amendment could not, without expressly doing so, 
curtail any rights granted to defendants."). 
32 See Letter from Senator Adelman to Dr. Rupert Theobold, 
head of the Legislative Reference Bureau, Mar. 12, 1992 
(available in the drafting file for 1991 S.J.R. 41). 
Some other states' constitutional provisions guaranteeing 
certain rights to crime victims also expressly dispel the notion 
that protection of a victim's rights would diminish the 
constitutional rights of the accused.  See, e.g., Ind. Const. 
Art. 1, § 13(b) (grants rights to victims "to the extent that 
exercising 
these 
rights 
does 
not 
infringe 
upon 
the 
constitutional rights of the accused").  
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
22 
 
are protected by appropriate remedies in law without 
limiting any legal rights of the accused?"33  (Emphasis 
added.)       
¶106 Third, 
the 
Crime 
Victims 
Amendment 
tasks 
the 
legislature with effectuating the Amendment.34  The second 
sentence of the Amendment provides that the State "shall ensure 
that crime victims have all of the following privileges and 
protections as provided by law . . . . "  (Emphasis added.)  The 
phrase "as provided by law" was used "in order to ensure[ ] that 
the legislature has great flexibility in devising a reasonable 
and workable means to implement the specific provisions of the 
amendment."35  Furthermore, the second-to-last sentence of the 
Amendment states that the legislature "shall provide remedies 
for violation of this section."36   
                                                 
33 Gary Watchke, Wis. Legis. Reference Bureau Brief 93-4, 
Constitutional 
Amendments 
and 
Advisory 
Referenda 
to 
be 
Considered by Wisconsin Voters April 6, 1993, at 2 (Mar. 1993) 
(available on the Legislative Reference Bureau's website, 
http://lrbdigital.legis.wisconsin.gov/digital/collection/p16831c
oll2/id/592/rec/5). 
34 See Brief of Respondent-Appellant Crime Victims Rights 
Board at 18 ("[T]he people of Wisconsin have amended the 
Wisconsin Constitution in a way that restricted how judges may 
treat crime victims in court proceedings and that expressly 
empowered the Legislature to provide remedies for violations of 
victims' rights."). 
35 Memorandum from Racine County District Attorney Lennie 
Weber to Senator Barbara Ulichny, Feb. 24, 1992 (available in 
the drafting file for 1991 S.J.R. 41). 
36 See Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis to 1993 S.J.R. 
3 ("The legislature must provide remedies for the violation of 
the new section."). 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
23 
 
 
¶107 Previous judicial interpretations of a constitutional 
provision are also informative in interpreting and applying the 
Amendment.  This court has had only one occasion to interpret 
the Crime Victims Amendment.       
¶108 The court interpreted the first sentence of the Crime 
Victims Amendment (stating that "this state shall treat crime 
victims . . . with fairness, dignity and respect for their 
privacy") in Schilling v. Crime Victims Rights Board, 2005 WI 
17, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623.  The Schilling court 
declared that this first sentence is a statement of purpose that 
does not provide enforceable, self-executing crime victims' 
rights.  It merely guides interpretation of the remaining 
sentences of the constitutional provision and the statutory 
provisions 
enacted 
relating 
to 
crime 
victims' 
rights.37 
Accordingly, the court determined that a district attorney could 
not be privately reprimanded by the Crime Victims Rights Board 
under that provision.38 
                                                 
37 Schilling v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2005 WI 17, ¶¶1, 
27, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623.   
38 The legislature responded to the Schilling decision by 
enacting 
2011 
Wis. 
Act 
283, 
§ 2, 
creating 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 950.04(1v)(ag) and statutorily recognizing a victim's right to 
be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect for privacy by 
public officials.  See drafting file for 2001 A.B. 232, 2011 
Wis. Act 283.  Section 2 of the Act provides as follows: 
Section 2.  950.04(1v)(ag) of the statutes is created 
to read: 
950.04(1v)(ag) To be treated with fairness, dignity, 
and 
respect 
for 
his 
or 
her 
privacy 
by 
public 
officials, employees, or agencies.  This paragraph 
does not impair the right or duty of a public official 
(continued) 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
24 
 
¶109 The constitution's Crime Victims Amendment has not 
otherwise been judicially interpreted.39 
¶110 In sum, the text and history of the Crime Victims 
Amendment reflects the legislature's and the voters' concern for 
both crime victims and accuseds.  
III 
¶111 The first legislative enactment interpreting Article 
I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution after ratification 
was 1997 Wis. Act 181.  Among other matters, it repealed and 
recreated Wis. Stat. § 950.04, the crime victims bill of rights, 
and created the Crime Victims Rights Board.  The challenge in 
the instant case is to provisions of the 1997 Act as amended 
through the 2015-16 biennium.  I proceed to examine the 
statutory provisions.     
¶112 The majority opinion's dissertation and reliance on 
the separation of powers doctrine to strike down challenged 
statutory provisions in Chapter 950 as applicable to judges is 
untethered to the text of the Crime Victims Amendment and the 
challenged statutes.  Indeed, textual analysis is conspicuously 
absent from the majority opinion.     
¶113 The 
majority 
opinion 
defends 
its 
rush 
to 
constitutional decision without textual analysis by asserting 
                                                                                                                                                             
or employee to conduct his or her official duties 
reasonably and in good faith. 
39 For a discussion of the Crime Victims Amendment and the 
open records law, see Democratic Party of Wis. v. DOJ, 2016 WI 
100, ¶¶4, 14, 29, 372 Wis. 2d 460, 888 N.W.2d 584.   
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
25 
 
that resolution of the constitutional separation of powers issue 
is "essential."  Majority op., ¶¶52-53 (citing Kollasch v. 
Adamany, 104 Wis. 2d 552, 561, 313 N.W.2d 47, 51 (1981)).   
¶114 Putting the cart before the horse, so to speak, the 
majority opinion makes the separation of powers issue seem 
"essential" by framing the issue presented as follows:  
May an executive agency, acting pursuant to authority 
delegated by the legislature, review a Wisconsin 
court's 
exercise 
of 
discretion, 
declare 
its 
application of the law to be in error, and then 
sanction the judge for making a decision the agency 
disfavors?   
Majority op., ¶36.   
¶115 The majority opinion frames the issue to engender the 
response that a statute enabling an executive branch agency to 
so act is unconstitutional.  The majority opinion asserts, 
without analysis of the text of the statutes, that the Board has 
authority "to investigate and adjudicate complaints against 
judges, issue reprimands against judges, and seek equitable 
relief and forfeitures through civil actions against judges." 
Majority op., ¶2.  The majority opinion should, in my opinion, 
frame the issues in a more neutral fashion.  The issues to be 
considered are what authority did the legislature grant an 
executive agency relative to crime victim complaints against 
judges and is this grant of authority constitutional?40  
                                                 
40 The Crime Victims Rights Board offers four main arguments 
supporting the constitutionality of the challenged statutes:  
(continued) 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
26 
 
¶116 A careful analysis of the Crime Victims Amendment 
(Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution), and 
Chapter 950 (the statutes relating to victims and witnesses of 
crime), demonstrates that the legislature did not confer 
"unconstitutional" powers on an executive agency relating to a 
crime victim's complaint against a judge.  A court must presume 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) The Board does not review the correctness of a judge's 
exercise of discretion in scheduling when a complaint is filed. 
Rather the Board determines whether the judge's exercise of 
scheduling discretion was consistent with the constitutional 
rights of a crime victim and the limitations on judicial 
discretion created by the Crime Victims Amendment and Chapter 
950. 
(2) Because the Board's report and recommendations are 
reviewable by a court under Wis. Stat. Chapter 227, the 
legislative and executive branches do not exercise unfettered 
power over a member of the judiciary. 
(3) A court's restricting the Board's power to provide a 
remedy for a judge's violation of a crime victim's rights beyond 
referral to the Judicial Commission is contrary to the Crime 
Victims Amendment.  Such a restriction deprives crime victims of 
any remedy in a case in which violation of a crime victim's 
right does not rise to the level of a violation in the 
jurisdiction of the Judicial Commission.  Supreme Court Rule 
60.04(1)(h) requires a judge to "dispose of all judicial matters 
promptly and efficiently."  The Board acknowledges that delay 
that violates the right of a crime victim under the Constitution 
and Wis. Stat. § 950.04(1v) may not violate the Code of Judicial 
Conduct, which requires willful violation.  The Board asserts 
that § 950.04(1v) provides broader protections for victims than 
the Code of Judicial Conduct.   
(4) The Board's issuance of a Report and Recommendation 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 950.09(3) setting forth best practices 
for protecting a victim's right to speedy disposition in the 
instant case is a remedy the legislature is authorized to adopt 
under the Crime Victims Amendment.  This remedy does not deprive 
the judge of any right or alter his or her legal status or 
interfere with his or her functioning as a judge.   
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
27 
 
that the legislature intended a statute to comply with the 
legislature's constitutional powers and duties.  A court must 
follow the cardinal principle of saving rather than destroying a 
statute's constitutionality.   
A 
¶117 I begin with the legislature's first enactment after 
voters adopted the Crime Victims Amendment, namely 1997 Wis. Act 
181, as amended through the 2015-16 biennium.  The Act was 
apparently enacted in response to the directive in the Crime 
Victims Amendment that "[t]he legislature shall provide remedies 
for the violation of this section."41  The Act created a Crime 
Victims Rights Board and delegated functions relating to crime 
victims to the Department of Justice.   
¶118 Act 181 created a five-member Crime Victims Rights 
Board.  Wis. Stat. § 15.255(2).42  The Board is an executive 
                                                 
41 See Brief of Respondent-Appellant Crime Victims Rights 
Board at 20-22. 
42 Wisconsin Stat. § 15.255(2)(a)-(c) creating the Crime 
Victims Rights Board provides, inter alia, as follows:  
(2) Crime victims rights board. (a) There is created a 
crime victims rights board which is attached to the 
department of justice under s. 15.03. 
    (b) The crime victims rights board shall be 
composed of 5 members as follows: 
 
1. One district attorney holding office in this 
state. 
 
2. One representative of local law enforcement in 
this state. 
(continued) 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
28 
 
agency that is "attached" to the Wisconsin Department of Justice 
for limited administrative purposes.43  The Act provides that the 
Board "shall promulgate rules establishing procedures for the 
exercise of its powers under this section."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 950.09(5).44   
                                                                                                                                                             
 
3. One person who is employed or contracted by a 
county board of supervisors under s. 950.06 to provide 
services for victims and witnesses of crimes. 
 
4. Two members, not employed in law enforcement, 
by a district attorney or as specified in subd. 3., 
who are citizens of this state. 
(c) The members of the crime victims rights board 
specified in par. (b)2. and 3. shall be appointed by 
the attorney general.  One of the members specified in 
par. (b)4. shall be appointed by the crime victims 
council and the other member shall be appointed by the 
governor.  The member specified in par. (b)1. shall be 
appointed 
by 
the 
Wisconsin 
District 
Attorneys 
Association. 
43 Wisconsin Stat. § 15.03 describes the Board's limited 
attachment to the Department of Justice as follows: 
Any . . . board 
attached . . . to 
a 
department . . . shall be a distinct unit of that 
department . . . [and] 
shall 
exercise 
its 
powers, 
duties 
and 
functions 
prescribed 
by 
law . . . . independently 
of 
the 
head 
of 
the 
department . . .  , but budgeting, program coordination 
and related management functions shall be performed 
under the direction and supervision of the head of the 
department . . . . 
"Actions of the board are not subject to approval or review 
by the attorney general."  Wis. Stat. § 950.09(4). 
44 For the rules promulgated by the Board, see Wis. Admin. 
Code § CVRB Ch. 1 (June 2000). 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
29 
 
¶119 Despite the creation of the Board as a distinct 
agency, the Department of Justice retains statutory authority 
and duties regarding crime victims under the Act.  The 
Department's authority and duties are intertwined with the 
functioning of the Board.  The Board may act on a victim's 
complaint after the Department has completed its actions with 
regard to a victim's complaint.45     
¶120 Most importantly for purposes of the instant case is 
the Department of Justice's mediation function regarding crime 
victim complaints.  The Department's mediation function is set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 950.08(3) as follows: 
The department may receive complaints, seek to mediate 
complaints and, with the consent of the involved 
parties, actually mediate complaints regarding the 
treatment of crime victims and witnesses by public 
officials[46]. . . . The 
department 
may 
act 
as 
a 
liaison between crime victims or witnesses and others 
when seeking to mediate these complaints and may 
request a written response regarding the complaint 
from the subject of a complaint.  If asked by the 
department to provide a written response regarding a 
complaint, the subject of a complaint shall respond to 
the department's request within a reasonable time. 
(Emphasis added.)  
                                                 
45 See Wis. Stat. 950.09(2) ("A party may not request the 
board to review a complaint under this subsection until the 
department has completed its action on the complaint under s. 
950.08(3)."); Wis. Adm. Code § CVRB 1.04(2) ("All complaints [to 
the Board] shall be prepared on a complaint form obtained from 
the mediator." 
46 The statute uses the phrase "public officials, employees, 
or agencies."  Because I conclude that judges are not 
"employees" or "agencies," I consider only whether judges are 
"public officials" under the statute.      
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
30 
 
¶121 The phrase "public officials" is not defined in Wis. 
Stat. § 950.08(3) or elsewhere in Chapter 950, although it is 
used several times in the chapter.47    
¶122 In giving meaning to the phrase "public officials" in 
Wis. Stat. § 950.08(3), I must consider the context in which the 
phrase is used.  A phrase that ordinarily has a particular 
meaning may not have that meaning in certain circumstances as it 
interacts "with and relate[s] to other provisions in the statute 
and to other statutes."48  Ordinarily the phrase would include 
judges.  A question arises, however, whether the phrase in 
§ 950.08(3) includes judges. 
¶123 Participation in mediation is not required under Wis. 
Stat. § 950.08(3).  I conclude, however, that the phrase "public 
officials" in § 950.08(3) relating to the Department's mediation 
function does not include judges for four interrelated reasons: 
the Crime Victims Amendment, the nature of the mediation 
                                                 
47 I could find no definition of "public officials" that 
applies in all statutes.  For definitions of "state public 
office" and "state public official" for purposes of the Code of 
Ethics for Public Officials and Employees, see Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.42(13) and (14).   
48 Dep't of Corrections v. Schwarz, 2005 WI 34, ¶14, 279 
Wis. 2d 223, 693 N.W.2d 703 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); see also Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. 
Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶74, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258 (Prosser, 
J., concurring) ("Ambiguity in an insurance policy may arise in 
different ways. First, the language of the disputed provision 
may be ambiguous because the import of the words is uncertain or 
the impact of the words is uncertain with respect to unusual 
facts.  Second, a provision that is unambiguous when viewed in 
isolation may become ambiguous when considered in the context of 
the entire policy.") (Emphasis added.) 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
31 
 
process, the prohibition on questioning a judge outside a 
judicial 
proceeding 
about 
the 
judge's 
thought 
processes 
regarding an act taken in the judge's official capacity, and the 
many conflicting roles that the Department plays in the 
administration of the criminal justice system. 
¶124 The Crime Victims Amendment unequivocally provides 
that neither it nor the legislature limits the rights of the 
accused.  An accused has the right to a judge's exercise of 
discretion 
regarding 
sentencing. 
 
"[S]entencing 
is 
a 
discretionary judicial act . . . ."  McCleary v. State, 49 
Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).  See also State v. 
Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶68, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197 ("The 
circuit court possesses wide discretion in determining what 
factors are relevant to its sentencing decision.").   
¶125 In the instant case, the victim complained to the 
Department of Justice while the sentencing proceeding was 
pending before Judge Gabler.  The Department never mediated the 
matter.  Had it attempted to do so (either before or after the 
completion of sentencing), the mediation would have interfered 
with the defendant's rights. 
¶126 The nature of the mediation process also points to the 
conclusion that the Department does not have statutory authority 
to mediate a crime victim's complaint against a judge under Wis. 
Stat. § 950.08(3).  Mediation is a form of dispute resolution in 
which people in conflict are assisted by a neutral third person 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
32 
 
to reach a voluntary agreement.49  Mediation between the victim 
and the judge would have taken place outside the presence of the 
parties in the criminal case——namely, the defendant and the 
State as prosecutor——and thus would have constituted ex parte 
communications.50  
¶127 Another problem with classifying judges as "public 
officials" subject to mediation by the Department of Justice is 
that mediation appears to bear the imprimatur of revealing a 
judge's 
thought 
processes 
outside 
a 
judicial 
proceeding 
regarding an act taken in the judge's official capacity.  Such a 
process is problematic.  "The overwhelming authority concludes 
that a judge may not be compelled to testify concerning mental 
                                                 
49 American Bar Association, How Courts Work:  What is 
Mediation?, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law
_related_education_network/how_courts_work/mediation_whatis.html  
50 See Brief of Respondent-Appellant Crime Victims Rights 
Board at 38 (Noting that the circuit court identified as an 
issue requiring an evidentiary hearing the "impact on Judge 
Gabler's communications with [the Department] and the [Crime 
Victims Rights board] of the Code of Judicial Conduct's 
restrictions on ex parte communications."). 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
33 
 
processes used in formulating official judgments or the reasons 
that motivated him in the performance of his official duties."51  
¶128 Furthermore, when the Department acts as mediator, it 
is wearing only one of many hats it wears in the criminal 
justice system.  For example, the Department consults with and 
advises district attorneys in all matters pertaining to their 
duties;52 appears for the State and prosecutes or defends all 
actions and proceedings, civil or criminal, in this court and in 
                                                 
51 United States v. Roebuck, 271 F. Supp. 2d 712, 718 (D. 
V.I. 2003) (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 
(1941); Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276, 306–07  (1904)); 
see also State ex rel. Kaufman v. Zakaib, 535 S.E.2d 727, 734-
737 (W. Va. 2000); 
In re Enforcement of Subpoena, 972 
N.E.2d 1022, 1027-34 (Mass. 2012) (recognizing a judicial 
deliberative privilege to refuse to be a witness based on 
concerns for finality, quality and integrity of decision-making, 
and the independence and impartiality of the judiciary); United 
States v. Cross, 516 F. Supp. 700, 707 (M.D. Ga. 1981) , aff'd, 
742 F.2d 1279 (11th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds for 
further consideration, 468 U.S. 1212 (1984) (because "judges are 
under no obligation to divulge the reasons that motivated them 
in their official acts[,] the mental processes employed in 
formulating the decision may not be probed"). 
Allowing such probing could undermine the integrity of the 
judicial system.  Roebuck, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 722 (citing 
Terrazas v. Slagle, 142 F.R.D. 136, 139 (W.D. Tex. 1992); accord 
United States v. Dowdy, 440 F. Supp. 894,  896 (W. Va. 1977) 
("Should a judge be vulnerable to subpoena as to the basis of 
every action taken by him, the judiciary would be open to 
frivolous 
attacks 
upon 
its 
dignity 
and 
integrity, 
and 
interruption of its ordinary and proper functioning.") (internal 
quotation marks & quoted source omitted). 
52 Wisconsin Stat. § 165.25(3) provides that the Department 
of Justice shall "[c]onsult and advise with the district 
attorneys when requested by them in all matters pertaining to 
the duties of their office." 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
34 
 
the court of appeals;53 and appears for judges in any civil 
action or other matter brought before a court or administrative 
agency growing out of the judge's duties.54  The Department's 
multiple roles raise a Gordian knot of conflict-of-interest 
questions.   
¶129 Interpreting 
"public 
officials" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 950.08(3) to include a judge for purposes of mediation by the 
Department of Justice would entangle judges in this web of 
conflicts.   
¶130 These 
considerations 
cast 
significant 
doubt 
on 
interpreting the phrase "public officials" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 950.08(3) to include a judge and to enable the Department of 
Justice to mediate a crime victim's complaint against a judge.  
¶131 In sum, mediation would have interfered with an 
accused's 
rights 
guaranteed 
by 
the 
federal 
and 
state 
constitutions to a fair, impartial, neutral, nonpartisan judge 
exercising his or her discretion in sentencing; interfered with 
ongoing proceedings in the circuit court; involved ex parte 
communications; involved the judge in explaining his or her 
thought processes; and entangled the judge in a web of the 
Department's conflicts.   
                                                 
53 See Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1). 
54 See Wis. Stat. § 165.25(6).  In the instant case, 
however, the Department represents the Crime Victims Rights 
Board before this court against a judge in a lawsuit involving a 
crime victim's complaint against the judge; the Department does 
not represent the judge.   
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
35 
 
¶132 When 
there 
are 
multiple 
"competing 
plausible 
interpretations" of a statute, the canon of constitutional 
avoidance instructs a court to choose the constitutional 
interpretation based on the "reasonable presumption that [the 
legislature] did not intend the alternative which raises serious 
constitutional doubts."  Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 
(2005).55 
¶133 Accordingly, 
applying 
the 
rules 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, I conclude that the phrase "public officials" in 
Wis. Stat. § 950.08(3) for purposes of mediation by the 
Department of Justice does not include judges.  Judges are not 
subject to the Department's mediation of a crime victim's 
complaint under § 950.08(3).   
B 
¶134 Having decided that Wis. Stat. § 950.08(3) does not 
grant the Department of Justice authority to mediate a crime 
victim's complaint against a judge, I turn to the power of the 
Crime Victims Rights Board over a crime victim's complaint 
                                                 
55 See also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005) 
("The canon of constitutional avoidance comes into play only 
when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the 
statute 
is 
found 
to 
be 
susceptible 
of 
more 
than 
one 
construction; and the canon functions as a means of choosing 
between them.  See, e.g., Almendarez–Torres v. United States, 
523 U.S. 224, 237–238 (1998); United States ex rel. Attorney 
General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909).").  
See also Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 43 
Wis. 2d 570, 577–78, 169 N.W.2d 65, 68 (1969) ("[I]f a statute 
is 
open 
to 
more 
than 
one 
reasonable 
construction, 
the 
construction which will accomplish the legislative purpose and 
avoid unconstitutionality must be adopted."). 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
36 
 
against a judge.  The Board takes the position in the instant 
case that it has authority over a crime victim's complaint 
against a judge even though no mediation takes place.  According 
to the Board, the Department of Justice need not mediate a 
matter for the Board to attain power over a crime victim's 
complaint against a judge; for the Board to act on a complaint, 
the Department need confirm only that it has completed its 
action under Wis. Stat. § 950.08(3).56  
¶135 Although the statutes and Board rules might be 
interpreted to require mediation by the Department of Justice as 
a prerequisite to the Board's functioning,57 I agree that 
mediation is discretionary with a party and is not a necessary 
prerequisite for the Board to function.   
¶136 The 
Crime 
Victims 
Rights 
Board's 
functions 
are 
described in Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(a)-(d).   
Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2) 
¶137 The 
introductory 
language 
in 
§ 950.09(2) 
(quoted 
below) requires the Board to determine, before it begins any 
investigation or takes any action, that there is probable cause 
to believe that the subject of the complaint violated the rights 
of a crime victim.     
Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2) At the request of one of the 
involved parties, the board may review a complaint 
                                                 
56 See Brief of Respondent-Appellant Crime Victims Rights 
Board at 41-42. 
57 Judge Gabler takes this position as a matter of statutory 
interpretation. 
 
See 
Brief 
of 
Petitioner-Respondent 
The 
Honorable William M. Gabler, Sr. at 22-24.    
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
37 
 
made to the department under s. 950.08(3) regarding a 
violation of the rights of a crime victim.  A party 
may not request the board to review a complaint under 
this subsection until the department has completed its 
action on the complaint under s. 950.08(3).  In 
reviewing a complaint under this subsection, the board 
may not begin any investigation or take any action 
specified in pars. (a) to (d) until the board first 
determines that there is probable cause to believe 
that the subject of the complaint violated the rights 
of a crime victim. . . .  
¶138 To determine whether there is probable cause, the 
Board requests the subject of the complaint to submit an answer.  
Wis. Admin. Code § CVRB 1.05(4), (5) (June 2000).  The Board 
determines probable cause based on the complaint, answer, and 
any information provided by the mediator.  Wis. Admin. Code 
§ CVRB 1.05(6), (7) (June 2000).  If the Board finds probable 
cause, it may commence an investigation.  Wis. Admin. Code 
§ CVRB 1.05(8) (June 2000).58  
¶139 The 
Board's 
rules 
provide 
that 
it 
may, 
as 
an 
investigatory body, "request responses [from the subject of a 
complaint] to written questions, participation in a personal or 
telephone interview with the Board, and written documentation." 
Wis. Admin. Code § CVRB 1.06 (June 2000).  A hearing may be 
held.  Wis. Admin. Code § CVRB 1.07 (June 2000).   
                                                 
58 Judge Gabler interprets Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2) and Wis. 
Admin. Code § CVRB 1.06(1) as prohibiting the Board from 
investigating a crime victim complaint until after there has 
been a finding of probable cause and argues that the Board 
violated the confidentiality of Judge Gabler's file contrary to 
§ 950.095(1)(a). 
 
See 
Brief 
of 
Petitioner-Respondent 
The 
Honorable William M. Gabler, Sr. at 30-32. 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
38 
 
¶140 A party's participation in the Board's finding of 
probable cause, investigation, and hearing is not required.  For 
substantially similar reasons for my conclusion that the 
statute, properly interpreted, does not authorize the Department 
of Justice to mediate a crime victim's complaint against a 
judge, I conclude that the Board is not authorized to determine 
probable cause or investigate a crime victim's complaint against 
a judge.   
¶141 The 
Board's 
probable 
cause 
determination 
and 
investigation of a crime victim's complaint would, in violation 
of the Crime Victims Amendment, limit the judge's decision-
making ability and the rights of the accused, would require the 
judge to engage in ex parte communications, and would require 
the judge to explain, outside the judicial proceeding, the 
judge's thought processes regarding an act taken in the judge's 
official capacity.  See ¶126 & n.50, supra.    
¶142 Accordingly I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2) 
does not authorize the Crime Victims Rights Board to determine 
probable cause or investigate a crime victim's complaint against 
a judge. 
Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(a),(c), & (d) 
¶143 After 
a 
determination 
of 
probable 
cause 
and 
investigation under Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2), the Board "may do 
any of the following":  
(a) Issue private and public reprimands of public 
officials, employees or agencies that violate the 
rights of crime victims provided under this chapter, 
ch. 938 and article I, section 9m, of the Wisconsin 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
39 
 
constitution.  [DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL by MAJORITY 
OPINION as to JUDGES.] 
(b) Refer to the judicial commission a violation or 
alleged violation by a judge of the rights of crime 
victims provided under this chapter, ch. 938[59] and 
article I, section 9m, of the Wisconsin constitution.  
[NOT CHALLENGED.] 
(c) Seek appropriate equitable relief on behalf of a 
victim if such relief is necessary to protect the 
rights of the victim.  The board may not seek to 
appeal, reverse or modify a judgment of conviction or 
a 
sentence 
in 
a 
criminal 
case. 
 
[DECLARED 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL by MAJORITY OPINION as to JUDGES.] 
(d) Bring civil actions to assess a forfeiture under 
s. 950.11. Notwithstanding s. 778.06, an action or 
proposed action authorized under this paragraph may be 
settled for such sum as may be agreed upon between the 
parties.  In settling actions or proposed actions, the 
board 
shall 
treat 
comparable 
situations 
in 
a 
comparable manner and shall assure that any settlement 
bears a reasonable relationship to the severity of the 
offense or alleged offense.  Forfeiture actions 
brought by the board shall be brought in the circuit 
court for the county in which the violation is alleged 
to 
have 
occurred. 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
[DECLARED 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL by MAJORITY OPINION as to JUDGES.] 
¶144 Although the Board cannot determine probable cause or 
investigate a crime victim's complaint against a judge, I 
address Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(a), (c), and (d) to determine 
their applicability to judges.   
¶145 I approach each challenged paragraph (that is, (a), 
(c), and (d)) of Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2) in turn with the rules 
of statutory interpretation in mind.  I conclude that these 
                                                 
59 Chapter 938 of the Wisconsin Statutes is entitled the 
Juvenile Justice Code.  Section 938.01(2)(g) explains that the 
victim of a criminal act perpetrated by a juvenile is afforded 
the same rights as if the actor were an adult.  
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
40 
 
three paragraphs do not empower the Board to act on a crime 
victim's complaint against a judge.  
¶146 Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(a).  Paragraph (a) of Wis. 
Stat. § 950.09(2) refers to "public officials."  As in Wis. 
Stat. § 950.08(3), the phrase "public officials" is undefined.  
The majority opinion assumes, without analysis, that the phrase 
includes judges.  I do not.  This assumption is unreasonable for 
several reasons.   
¶147 First, as I explained above, the phrase "public 
officials" used in Wis. Stat. § 950.08(3) cannot be interpreted 
as referring to judges.  See ¶¶121-131, supra.  If the phrase in 
§ 950.08(3) does not include judges, the phrase in § 950.09(2) 
probably does not refer to judges.  Why?  Because § 950.08(3) 
and § 950.09(2) are tied together, and it is only logical that 
the phrase would have the same meaning in both places.60     
¶148 Second, Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(a)'s use of the word 
"reprimand" along with the phrase "public officials" leads a 
reader to conclude that the phrase "public officials" does not 
include a judge.  The word "reprimand" is a word used in the 
Wisconsin Constitution and statutes referring to discipline of 
judges.  Discipline of judges is governed by Article VII, 
                                                 
60 See State ex rel. Gebarski v. Circuit Court, 80 
Wis. 2d 489, 495, 259 N.W.2d 531 (1977) (citing Atl. Cleaners & 
Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (a 
natural presumption exists that an identical term used multiple 
times in different parts of a legislative act is intended to 
have the same meaning, but the presumption is not rigid). 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
41 
 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution,61 Wis. Stat. §§ 757.71-
.99, and Supreme Court Rules Chapter 60.62  To interpret the 
phrase "public official" in § 950.09(2)(a) to mean that the 
Board 
may 
reprimand 
a 
judge 
renders 
this 
provision 
constitutionally problematic because other constitutional and 
statutory provisions explicitly govern judicial discipline, 
including reprimand.   
¶149 Interpreting the phrase "public official" in Wis. 
Stat. § 950.09(2)(a) as not including a judge or justice renders 
the phrase "public official" used in § 950.09(2)(a) consistent 
with the use of the phrase in § 950.08(3) and avoids a 
constitutional challenge to § 950.09(2)(a).   
¶150 Third, the statutes state that the Board has authority 
to refer a violation or alleged violation by a judge of the 
rights of a crime victim to the Judicial Commission.  This 
statement appears not once but twice in Chapter 950.  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 950.09(2)(b), 950.095(2)(b).   
                                                 
61 Article VII, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  
Each justice or judge shall be subject to reprimand, 
censure, 
suspension, 
removal 
for 
cause 
or 
for 
disability, 
by 
the 
supreme 
court 
pursuant 
to 
procedures established by the legislature by law.  No 
justice or judge removed for cause shall be eligible 
for reappointment or temporary service.  This section 
is alternative to, and cumulative with, the methods of 
removal provided in sections 1 and 13 of this article 
and section 12 of article XIII.  (Emphasis added.) 
62 Supreme Court Rules are printed in volume 6 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes. 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
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¶151 These provisions specifically referring to a judge and 
the Judicial Commission imply that the legislature excluded 
judges from the phrase "public officials"; the legislature chose 
to single out judges and not treat judges as "public officials."     
¶152 There is no constitutional or statutory problem with 
the Board's forwarding complaints against a judge to the 
Judicial Commission. 
¶153 Fourth, Wis. Stat. § 950.105 gives a crime victim the 
right to assert, in the circuit court in which the alleged 
violation has occurred, his or her rights as a crime victim 
under the statutes or under Article I, Section 9m of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  The inference to be drawn is that the 
crime victim has a remedy for a complaint against a judge and 
need not rely on the Board to resolve the complaint. 
¶154 Fifth, during enactment of Wis. Stat. § 950.09 the 
legislature rejected an amendment to the bill that would have 
prevented the Board from reviewing a complaint made against a 
judge.63  The Crime Victims Rights Board argues in this court 
that the rejected amendment means the legislature intended the 
Board to oversee a crime victim's complaint against a judge 
under § 950.09.64  Another more plausible interpretation is that 
the amendment was not necessary in light of the other provisions 
                                                 
63 Compare S. Amend. 1 to 1997 A.B. 342 with 1997 Wis. Act 
181.   
64 See Brief of Respondent-Appellant Crime Victims Rights 
Board at 22. 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
43 
 
in subsection 950.09(2) expressing the legislative intent that 
certain provisions in § 950.09(2) do not govern judges. 
¶155 Sixth, Wis. Stat. § 950.04(1v)(ag), a provision in the 
crime victims bill of rights, includes the phrase "public 
officials":  A crime victim has the right "to be treated with 
fairness, dignity and respect for his or her privacy by public 
officials, 
employees 
or 
agencies."65 
 
The 
phrase 
"public 
officials" is not defined here either.     
¶156 Even if the phrase includes judges, the next sentence 
provides:  "This paragraph does not impair the right or duty of 
a public official or employee to conduct his or official duties 
reasonably and in good faith."  These two sentences read 
together demonstrate that the legislature was careful not to 
allow this provision referring to public officials to include 
judges and interfere with a judge's core function of deciding 
cases. 
                                                 
65 The phrase "public official" also appears in Wis. Stat. 
§ 950.04(1v)(dr), the crime victims bill of rights, relating to 
a public official's duty to protect a victim's personal 
identity.  A victim's personal identity is protected in judicial 
records.   
This court has adopted rules under Wis. Stat. § 751.12 
governing the protection of the personal identity of crime 
victims.  In appellate procedure, the protection of personal 
identity is governed by Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.86.  In the 
circuit courts, attorneys may file a motion to seal information, 
including crime victim information.  See Wis. Stat. § 801.21; 
Gerald P. Ptacek & Marcia Vandercook, Court Filings:  New Rules 
to Protect Confidential Information in Court Records, Wis. 
Lawyer, May 2016, at 12.    
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
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¶157 Seventh and last (and perhaps most importantly), Wis. 
Stat. § 950.09(2)(c) explicitly and significantly limits the 
Board's powers over a judge or a judge's decision in a criminal 
case, stating:  "The board may not seek to appeal, reverse or 
modify a judgment of conviction or a sentence in a criminal 
case."66     
¶158 A similar limitation on a crime victim's sway over a 
circuit court's decision-making powers appears in Wis. Stat. 
§ 950.10(2).  This subsection provides that a court's failure to 
comply with Chapter 950 or Article I, Section 9m of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, the Crime Victims Amendment, is not 
grounds for an appeal of a judgment of conviction and is not 
grounds to reverse or modify a judgment of conviction or a 
sentence.67  
¶159 Applying the rules of statutory interpretation to Wis. 
Stat. § 950.09(2)(a), I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(a) 
                                                 
66 See Brief of Respondent-Appellant Crime Victims Rights 
Board at 22. 
67 Wisconsin Stat. § 950.10(2) provides as follows:   
A failure to provide a right, service or notice to a 
victim under this chapter or ch. 938 or under Article 
I, section 9m, of the Wisconsin constitution is not 
ground for an appeal of a judgment of a conviction and 
is not grounds for any court to reverse or modify a 
judgment of conviction or sentence. 
See State v. Grindemann, 2002 WI App 106, ¶19 n.5, 255 
Wis. 2d 632, 648 N.W.2d 507 (State conceded that failure to 
conform to statutory provisions governing crime victim rights is 
not grounds for an appeal of a sentence, citing Wis. Stat. 
§ 950.10(2)).  
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
45 
 
does not apply to judges.  If the Board has no statutory power 
to reprimand judges, no constitutional issue arises by virtue of 
§ 950.09(2)(a). 
¶160 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 950.09(2)(c). 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 950.09(2)(c) empowers the Crime Victims Rights Board to seek 
appropriate equitable relief as follows:  
Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(c)  Seek appropriate equitable 
relief on behalf of a victim if such relief is 
necessary to protect the rights of the victim.  The 
board may not seek to appeal, reverse or modify a 
judgment of conviction or a sentence in a criminal 
case.   
¶161 This provision does not explicitly allow the Board to 
seek equitable judicial relief against a court or judge. 
Interpreting the provision to allow such equitable relief would 
negate the second sentence, which significantly limits the 
Board's power over courts and judges.   
¶162 Furthermore, the Crime Victims Amendment explicitly 
states that neither the Amendment nor any statute enacted 
pursuant thereto shall limit any right of the accused which may 
be provided by law.  An accused has the right to a fair, 
neutral, 
impartial, 
and 
nonpartisan 
judicial 
proceeding 
conducted according to law, including a judge's exercise of 
discretion. 
¶163 If the Board were able to seek equitable relief to 
enjoin a court or judge from scheduling sentencing, for example, 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
46 
 
that action would limit the accused's rights in contravention of 
the Crime Victims Amendment.68 
¶164 In sum, as a matter of statutory interpretation I 
conclude that Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(c) does not confer power on 
the Board to seek equitable relief against a judge or court.  
¶165 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 950.09(2)(d). 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 950.09(2)(d) provides that the Crime Victims Rights Board may  
[b]ring civil actions to assess a forfeiture under s. 
950.11. . . . Forfeiture actions brought by the board 
shall be brought in the circuit court for the county 
in which the violation is alleged to have occurred.  
¶166 Section 950.09(2)(d) does not explicitly grant the 
Board the authority to bring a forfeiture action against a 
judge. 
¶167 Another provision, Wis. Stat. § 950.11, to which 
§ 950.09(2)(d) refers, explains that a civil action to assess a 
forfeiture under § 950.09(2)(d) may be brought against "public 
official."  Wisconsin Stat. § 950.11 provides:  
Penalties.  A public official, employee or agency that 
intentionally fails to provide a right specified under 
s. 950.04(1v) to a victim of a crime may be subject to 
a forfeiture of not more than $1,000.  
Again the phrase "public official" is not defined. 
¶168 The 
majority 
opinion 
declares 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 950.09(2)(d) is unconstitutional as applied to judges on the 
ground that it allows the Board to "financially penalize" a 
judge.  Majority op., ¶42.  The majority opinion errs. 
                                                 
68 See Reply Brief of Respondent-Appellant Crime Victims 
Rights Board at 9. 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
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¶169 As a matter of statutory interpretation, the phrase 
"public official" used in Wis. Stat. § 950.11 and applicable to 
§ 950.09(2)(d) does not include judges.  The phrase "public 
officials" is used in the same way in § 950.11 as it is used in 
§§ 950.08(3), 950.09(2)(a), 950.04(1v)(ag), and 950.04(1v)(dr), 
and does not include a judge.   
¶170 Even if judges were "public officials" under Wis. 
Stat. § 950.09(11), a forfeiture action cannot be brought 
against a judge under § 950.09(2)(d).  Judges have absolute 
judicial immunity as a matter of statutory and common law in 
Wisconsin.69  Although this absolute immunity is limited to acts 
taken within the jurisdiction of the court, a judge's decision 
on scheduling sentencing, for example, is without a doubt an act 
taken within the jurisdiction of the court.  
¶171 I 
thus 
conclude 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
statutory 
interpretation and the doctrine of judicial immunity that Wis. 
Stat. § 950.09(2)(d) does not authorize the imposition of a 
forfeiture on judges as a matter of statutory and common law.70 
                                                 
69 See, e.g., Ford v. Kenosha Cty, 160 Wis. 2d 485, 498, 466 
N.W.2d 646 (1991); Scarpaci v. Milwaukee Cty., 96 Wis. 2d 663, 
694-95, 292 N.W.2d 816 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 
(1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4).  
70 The Capital Times explained that prior to the adoption of 
the Crime Victims Amendment, then-Assembly Minority Leader David 
Prosser worried that "[i]f crime victims who are given specific 
constitutional rights believe the system has failed to protect 
them adequately, district attorneys, judges and other criminal 
justice officers could be sued . . . ."  Victim Rights on 
Crowded Ballot, The Capital Times, Mar. 8, 1993. 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
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Wis. Stat. § 950.09(3) 
¶172 I turn now to Wis. Stat. § 950.09(3) authorizing the 
Crime Victims Rights Board to issue Reports and Recommendations 
"concerning the securing and provision of crime victims rights 
and services."  The text of § 950.09(3) applies to judges and 
judicial proceedings, inter alia, and provides as follows: 
Wis. Stat. § 950.09(3) In addition to its powers under 
sub. 
(2), 
the 
board 
may 
issue 
reports 
and 
recommendations concerning the securing and provision 
of crime victims rights and services. (Emphasis 
added.) 
¶173 The Crime Victims Amendment entrusts the legislature, 
as I have stated previously, with the responsibility to "provide 
remedies for the violation of this section."  The Report and 
Recommendation is one remedy the legislature has provided under 
the Crime Victims Amendment.71 
¶174 The majority opinion declares Wis. Stat. § 950.09(3) 
unconstitutional as applied to judges under the separation of 
powers doctrine on the ground that "the Board encroached on 
exclusive judicial authority . . . ."  Majority op., ¶41.  The 
majority 
opinion 
feigns 
that 
the 
Board's 
Report 
and 
Recommendation invades judicial decision-making in the instant 
case by recommending the timing for scheduling a sentencing 
proceeding.  Majority op., ¶41.  The Report and Recommendation 
relating to the instant case does no such thing.   
                                                 
71 See Brief of Respondent-Appellant Crime Victims Rights 
Board at 22. 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
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¶175 The majority opinion ignores the statutory language 
and the Board's interpretation and application thereof.   
¶176 The Board's Reports and Recommendations recommend best 
practices for "securing . . . crime victims rights." 
 The 
Reports often begin with a statement that "the Board has become 
aware of a situation that provides the Board with an opportunity 
to" comment on the situation and recommend best practices for 
assisting victims.  The Report describes the factual background 
of the situation, as the Board understands it.  After stating 
the facts, often taken from a transcript of the court 
proceedings, the Report generally sets forth the applicable 
statutes, the issues, and the recommendations.  None of the 
Reports reveals names, the county in which the situation arose, 
or other identifying indicators.  No report reprimands a judge 
or interferes with any of the judiciary's core powers.   
¶177 The Board has issued at least six Reports and 
Recommendations relating to a crime victim in a judicial 
proceeding.  Each of the Reports and Recommendations is public 
and 
can 
be 
found 
on 
the 
Board's 
website. 
 
See 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/ocvs/cvrb-documents.72 
¶178 Neither the statute nor the Report and Recommendation 
itself provides a means for enforcing the Board's Report and 
Recommendation.  In other words, the Report and Recommendation 
does not bind anyone.   The Report and Recommendation is just 
what its title denotes——no more, no less. 
                                                 
72 See Brief of Respondent-Appellant Crime Victims Rights 
Board at 14-15. 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
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¶179 The majority opinion recognizes it should not use its 
judicial power to stifle criticism of judicial decisions, 
judicial practices, judges, or the judicial system.  But stifle 
it does.  The majority opinion declares that the Board's Report 
and Recommendation generally describing a situation involving a 
crime victim and proposing best practices for judges is 
unconstitutional.  Majority op., ¶¶54-57.  
¶180 Section § 950.09(3) does not present even a close call 
for me:  The court should not silence legislatively authorized 
evaluations of the judicial system by an executive agency 
composed of criminal justice professionals and public members.  
The 
institutions 
composing 
the 
criminal 
justice 
system, 
including the courts, should welcome all the help we can get.        
¶181 I conclude that the Board's authority to issue a 
Report and Recommendation set forth in Wis. Stat. § 950.09(3) is 
a legislative remedy authorized by the Crime Victims Amendment 
that helps secure crime victims rights and services and does not 
limit the rights of an accused or violate any constitutional 
provision. 
 
The 
Board's 
power 
to 
issue 
Reports 
and 
Recommendations pursuant to § 950.09(3) is constitutional as 
applied to judges.   
Wis. Stat. § 950.11 
¶182 Finally, I address Wis. Stat. 
§ 950.11 imposing 
penalties on public officials.  Section 950.11 states that a 
public official who intentionally fails to provide a right 
specified under the crime victims bill of rights may be subject 
to forfeiture as follows: 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
51 
 
Wis. Stat. § 950.11. Penalties A public official, 
employee or agency that intentionally fails to provide 
a right specified under s. 950.04 (1v) to a victim of 
a crime may be subject to a forfeiture of not more 
than $1,000. [DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL by MAJORITY 
OPINION as to JUDGES] 
¶183 Again, this statute does not define the phrase "public 
official." 
The 
majority 
opinion 
declares 
this 
provision 
unconstitutional as applied to judges on the ground that the 
Board "could financially penalize a judge for exercising legal 
judgment . . . ."  Majority op., ¶42.  
¶184 I conclude this provision does not apply to judges.  
The phrase "public official" does not include a judge, as I have 
explained previously.   
¶185 Moreover, a judge has absolute judicial immunity from 
personal liability under statute and common law if the judge 
acts within the jurisdiction of the court.  See ¶170 & n.69, 
supra.      
IV 
¶186 I now turn from the statutory provisions to assess the 
conduct of the Department of Justice and the Crime Victims 
Rights Board in the instant case.  I must determine whether 
either or both exceeded their statutory powers or violated the 
federal or state constitution in the instant case.   
¶187 The Department of Justice does not have the statutory 
power to mediate a complaint by a crime victim against a judge; 
it did not attempt to perform mediation in the instant case.   
¶188 The Crime Victim Rights Board, however, sought to 
determine probable cause and to investigate the crime victim's 
complaint against Judge Gabler under Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2).  
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
52 
 
The statute, properly interpreted, does not authorize the Board 
to undertake these pursuits in relation to a crime victim's 
complaint against a judge.  To the extent that the Board did so, 
the Board exceeded its statutory powers.   
¶189 The Board does not have the authority to reprimand 
Judge Gabler or to interfere with the Judge's discretion in 
scheduling sentencing.  To the extent that the Board undertook 
to reprimand the judge or interfere with the judge's discretion, 
it exceeded its statutory authority. 
¶190 The statutes do not authorize the Board to seek 
equitable relief or to bring a civil action against a judge to 
assess a forfeiture.  The Board did not do so in the instant 
case.   
¶191 The Board issued a Report and Recommendation based on 
the facts of the instant case.  The Report did not identify the 
Judge, the crime victim, or the county and did not include any 
identifying factors.  The legislature has the responsibility to 
"provide remedies for the violation" of the Crime Victims 
Amendment.  One of a crime victim's privileges and protections 
under the Crime Victims Amendment and the crime victims bill of 
rights is the "timely disposition of the case."  One remedy the 
legislature has provided is the Board's issuance of Reports and 
Recommendations.  Wis. Stat. § 950.09(3).  
¶192 I conclude that the Board's power to issue Reports and 
Recommendations is constitutional when applied to a judge and 
does not interfere with the judiciary's core powers.      
* * * * 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
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¶193 As properly interpreted, the challenged sections of 
Chapter 950 are constitutional with respect to judges.   
• Wisconsin Stat. § 950.08(3) does not authorize the 
Department of Justice to mediate a complaint against a 
judge.       
• Wisconsin Stat. § 950.09(2) does not authorize the 
Crime Victims Rights Board to determine probable cause 
or investigate a crime victim's complaint against a 
judge.       
• Wisconsin Stat. § 950.09(2)(a) does not authorize the 
Crime Victims Rights Board to "reprimand" a judge.   
• Wisconsin Stat. § 950.09(2)(b) authorizes the Crime 
Victims Rights Board to refer a complaint about a 
judge to the Judicial Commission.  
• Wisconsin Stat. § 950.09(2)(c) does not authorize the 
Crime Victims Rights Board to seek equitable relief 
against a judge.   
• Wisconsin Stat. § 950.09(2)(d) does not authorize the 
Crime Victims Rights Board to impose a forfeiture on a 
judge:  A judge enjoys absolute immunity for actions 
taken in his or her official capacity.         
• Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 950.09(3) 
authorizes 
the 
Crime 
Victims Rights Board to issue a non-binding Report and 
Recommendation 
concerning 
the 
securing 
of 
crime 
victims' rights and services.  This court should not 
silence critiques of the judicial system as authorized 
by the legislature.    
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
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• The Department of Justice and the Crime Victims Rights 
Board, however, did not correctly interpret and apply 
the challenged statutes.  
¶194 The majority opinion contravenes basic principles of 
statutory and constitutional interpretation.  Applying the canon 
of constitutional avoidance, I conclude that the challenged 
statutory provisions are easily amenable to a constitutional 
interpretation.  The majority opinion's lengthy foray into the 
separation of powers analysis is unnecessary and inappropriate. 
¶195 When a court addresses the scope of the judicial 
branch's power and the powers of the other branches of 
government, it must avoid an overzealous defense of the 
judiciary's power and must avoid appropriation of unchecked 
power in the judiciary.  
¶196 The 
Crime 
Victims 
Amendment 
and 
the 
statutes 
demonstrate the legislature's attempt at a thoughtful, even-
handed approach to crime victims, accuseds, and judicial and 
executive branch functions.  Is the drafting perfect?  No.  But 
perfect drafting is rarely the hallmark of any state or federal 
statute (or opinion of a court).       
¶197 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
No.  2016AP275.ssa 
 
 
 
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