Title: The Florida Bar v. Mark Evan Frederick

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________________
Nos. SC90007 & SC90387
____________________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
MARK EVAN FREDERICK,
Respondent.
[May 4, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
Mark Evan Frederick petitions this Court to review a referee’s report
recommending that he be found guilty of violating several of the Rules Regulating
the Florida Bar and suspended from the practice of law for ninety-one days.  We
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
I.  FACTS
The Florida Bar filed two unrelated complaints against Frederick:
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Case No. 90,007
Case number 90,007 arose from a dispute between Frederick and members of
a class action suit he had represented.  According to the Bar’s complaint, fourteen
people were originally expected to participate in the class action suit at $2000 each,
for a grand total of $28,000 to be paid to Frederick.  The Bar alleged that Frederick
originally advised members of the class that $5000 of the $28,000 was to be placed
in trust and used to pay costs, and that a written contingency fee contract later
entered into on behalf of the class provided that $20,000 was a nonrefundable
retainer; $8000 was a cost deposit; $13,100 had been paid to Frederick; and
$14,900 was owed.
The Bar further alleged that only nine people ultimately participated in the
class action suit, and those nine people paid Frederick an additional $4900 which, in
addition to the $13,100 already paid, amounted to a total of $18,000 (i.e., $2000
each).  The Bar alleged that members of the class at all times believed that the
$2000 each had paid included all costs of the litigation, but that Frederick did not
place any portion of the $18,000 into his trust account for payment of costs.  The
Bar alleged that instead, upon later withdrawing from representation, Frederick
asserted that the $18,000 represented only his fees, and that he had paid costs of
$5500 out of his own operating account.  According to the Bar’s complaint,
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Frederick accordingly refunded $12,500 to the class and had each of the nine
members of the class sign the following release:
    This release will acknowledge receipt of my file from
MARK EVAN FREDERICK, P.A., Attorney at Law.  We
further release said attorney from any further liability in
this matter and request that he not perform any more work
in my file.  We have expressed dissatisfaction with
Attorney Mark Evan Frederick regarding his fees and he
has offered to meet with us, he has written to us once, and
talked to us twice, and we accept his voluntary offer of
$12,500.00, to be paid to us within 2 days of his receipt of
this release, as complete satisfaction of my fee dispute. 
Further, we agree to not write the Florida Bar and if we
have already, we agree to voluntarily withdraw it.  If the
undersigned violates this Release agreement, the
undersigned has been made aware that we can be sued for
the recollection of these funds voluntarily paid to us.  
(Emphasis added.)  By reason of the foregoing, the Bar charged Frederick with
violating Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.15(a) (“Clients’ and Third Party
Funds to be Held in Trust”); 4-8.4(d) (“A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct in
connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice”); and 5-1.1(a) (“Nature of Money or Property Entrusted to Others”).
Case No. 90,387
Case number 90,387 arose from Frederick’s employment of a disciplinarily
resigned attorney, William D. Barrow.  According to the Bar’s complaint, Barrow
had direct contact with one of Frederick’s clients, and Frederick was aware of,
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directed, and acquiesced to such contact.  By reason of the foregoing, the Bar
charged Frederick with violating Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 3-6.1(c) (1990) 
(“No suspended, resigned, or disbarred attorney shall have direct contact with any
client”), and 4-5.3(a), (b), (c)(1), and (c)(2) (“Responsibilities Regarding
Nonlawyer Assistants”).
The Referee’s Report
The two cases were consolidated, a referee was appointed, and a disciplinary
hearing was held.  As to case  number 90,007, the referee ultimately found at length:
    1. Respondent met with a group of men who were
anticipating bringing a class action suit against the U.S.
Navy.  At this meeting in Panama City, Respondent
discussed with the group their claims against the Navy
and also discussed with them his fees and costs.  Initially
it was believed that fourteen people would be named as
plaintiffs.  The financial arrangements were that each
person would pay $2,000 and that $5,000 of this would go
as a cost retainer.
    2. Respondent memorialized this meeting and
agreement by letter dated August 18, 1994.
    3. On August 31, 1994, Respondent again met with the
group, this meeting being held in Destin.  At this meeting,
Respondent had two of the group, Robert Jones and
Sammy Barnes, acting on behalf of the entire group,
execute a written agreement for representation.
    4. The written agreement, which was a standard form
for a contingency fee arrangement, was modified by
Respondent who wrote the following terms on the form:
"$20,000 nonrefundable retainer; $8,000 cost deposit. 
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$13,100 received today; balance of $14,900 due by
September 22, 1994."  It was still assumed at this time
that the plaintiffs would equal fourteen in number when
their suit was filed.
    5. At this meeting, Respondent told Robert Jones, one
of the two signers for the group, that this contract
provided the terms they had discussed at their Panama
City meeting.
    6. Ultimately, nine people, instead of the anticipated
fourteen, participated in the litigation.  Respondent was
paid $18,000, in keeping with the $2,000 per person. 
None of this money was deposited into the Respondent's
trust account to cover costs.
    7. In a later meeting with the group at the Bay County
Courthouse, Respondent agreed to proceed with the case
as set forth in paragraph numbered six above, in spite of
his earlier desire to have at least ten plaintiffs.
    8. According to the testimony of the members of the
group, which the referee finds convincing, Respondent
never told them of his intentions to use the entire $18,000
as his attorney's fees.  They still had the understanding
that some of this money was to pay costs and expenses,
and that this amount would be placed in, as they termed it,
an escrow account.
    9. On January 25, 1995, Respondent sent his paralegal,
Tammy Tikell to a meeting with the nine group members,
again in Panama City.  At this meeting, Ms. Tikell had
each of the group's members sign a straight contingency
fee contract to meet what she understood to be a
requirement for individual contracts in federal class action
law suits.
    10. At the time the clients signed the contract, no
handwritten language was contained thereon.
    11. Ms. Tikell later added language that indicated that
the members acknowledged that their individual $2,000
payments made on September 24, 1994, were non-
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refundable retainers.  All of the members of the group
who testified at the hearing in this matter vehemently
denied the presence of the handwritten notation when they
signed the contract.  The referee finds their testimony to
be more credible than Ms. Tikell's.
    12. It was always represented to the group by
Respondent that a certain sum of their money would go to
pay costs.  This was clearly represented in Complainant's
exhibits numbered A [Respondent’s August 18, 1994
letter] and B [the written contingency fee contract], as
well as in his conversations with the clients.  At no time
was their fee arrangement renegotiated.
    13. Respondent failed to maintain any records by which
he could establish specific costs incurred in this litigation.
    14. In spite of testimony offered by Tammy Tikell that
she mailed letters to the clients concerning their
delinquent standing on the issue of cost money,
Respondent is unable to produce any documentation
showing that the clients were billed for any outstanding
fees, this in spite of an order to produce.
    15. Due to health concerns, Respondent was preparing
to withdraw from representation of certain federal
litigation matters.  In doing so, Respondent prepared
letters to be sent to certain clients informing them of this
decision.
    16. Tammy Tikell, who at the time was in a salary
dispute with Respondent, discovered a draft of a
withdrawal from representation letter Respondent had
prepared for this group of clients.
    17. Tammy Tikell informed the group of Respondent's
intentions to withdraw from representing them.  She
eventually showed them a copy of the draft.
    18. As a result of seeing the draft, the group sent
Respondent a letter demanding $15,000 of their money
back or they would "file a Florida bar complaint and sue .
. . for legal malpractice."
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    19. Upon receiving the group's letter, Respondent
replied by mail offering to refund $7,500.
    20. After other negotiations, it was agreed that
Respondent would refund the group $12,500.
    21. Sammy Barnes, one of the spokespersons for the
group[,] was informed by Respondent's secretary that
before she could give them the $12,500 check, they would
each have to sign a release.
    22. The release prepared by Respondent stated the
financial terms of their agreement and then provided that
". . . we agree to not write the Florida Bar and if we have
already, we agree to voluntarily withdraw it."
    23. The clients thought that they had to sign the release
as it was prepared in order to get their money back.
    24. The wording of the release and the accompanying
wording on the check eventually picked up by the clients
clearly show that the provision that the clients not contact
The Florida Bar was a condition precedent to the money
being refunded to the clients.
    25. The clients had at this time made arrangements to
retain another attorney to represent them in this matter,
and the fee they were to pay her was to come from the
money they received from Respondent.
(Record citations omitted.)  As to case number 90,387, the referee ultimately found:
    1. In late March 1996, Respondent employed William
D. Barrow, a disciplinarily resigned attorney, to work in
his office.
    2. Despite knowing of Mr. Barrow's status with The
Florida Bar, Respondent made no efforts to determine the
permitted parameters of Mr. Barrow's services.
    3. Respondent relied exclusively upon Mr. Barrow's
representations to him of his conversations with Florida
Bar representatives concerning what law office activities
he was allowed to conduct.
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    4. Respondent allowed, and in fact directed William D.
Barrow, a disciplinarily resigned attorney, to have direct
contact with Mr. Simp McCorvey, a client.
    5. The Florida Bar's exhibit numbered 1, which consists
of a number of memoranda to the file of the client in
question, documents in excess of ten times that Mr.
Barrow had contact with the client without respondent
being present.  For the most part, these were telephone
conversations, several being noted as having been taken at
respondent's request.
    6. William D. Barrow considered these conversations
to be direct contact, as set forth in a memorandum dated
April 30, 1996, wherein Mr. Barrow noted to Respondent
that he "would prefer, if at all possible, not to have any
more person to person dealings with the man."
    7. Respondent has contended from the beginning of this
complaint being filed that direct contact means face to
face meetings with clients and does not encompass
telephone conversations such as Mr. Barrow had with the
client.  The referee agrees with the position of the Florida
Bar that direct contact encompasses any unsupervised
client contact whether such contact is in person or by use
of telephone.
(Record citations omitted.)  Based on these findings, the referee ultimately
recommended that Frederick be found guilty as charged in case number 90,007, and
guilty of violating rules 3-6.1 and 4-5.3(a) and (b) (but not guilty of violating  rules
4-5.3(c)(1) and (c)(2)) in case number 90,387. 
As to discipline, the referee found no mitigation, but in aggravation found that
1Specifically, the referee found that Frederick had been privately reprimanded twice in
1990, admonished in 1993, and publicly reprimanded in 1996.  See Florida Bar v. Frederick, 678
So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1996).  
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Frederick had been previously disciplined several times;1 a pattern of misconduct;
multiple cases; submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive
practices during the disciplinary process; refusal to acknowledge the wrongful
nature of his conduct; and substantial experience in the practice of law.  The referee
ultimately recommended that Frederick be suspended from the practice of law for
ninety-one days and thereafter until he proved rehabilitation (including the
requirement that he attend at least one continuing legal education course on law
office management that includes instruction on the keeping of time records, trust
accounts, and payment of costs); be placed on probation thereafter for three years
under the supervision of a member of the Bar (including the requirement that he
provide periodic reports of his caseload and proof that he has established an
acceptable method of keeping time records by entering into a contractual
arrangement with Law Partners or a similarly acceptable organization approved by
the Bar); pay into the Clients’ Security Fund $5500 (the sum he retained from the
class action); and pay the Bar’s costs in the disciplinary proceeding ($8,282.86).
II.  ANALYSIS
Frederick challenges both the guilt and the discipline recommended by the
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referee.
A.  GUILT
As to guilt, Frederick challenges the referee’s recommendations in both case
number 90,007 and case number 90,387.
Case No. 90,007
In recommending that Frederick be found guilty of violating rules 4-1.15(a)
(“Clients’ and Third Party Funds to be Held in Trust”) and 5-1.1(a) (“Nature of
Money or Property Entrusted to Others”), the referee here found that Frederick had 
“failed to hold in trust, separate from his own property, funds paid him by clients for
costs and expenses,” and “used money entrusted to him by his clients for the
purpose of covering costs and expenses, for other purposes, specifically for his fees,
in spite of his employment agreement with his clients.”  In so finding, the referee
relied in part upon negotiations preceding the written contingency fee contract
between Frederick and his clients.  Frederick argues that, in so doing, the referee
fundamentally erred in violation of the parol evidence rule.  We disagree.
As this Court recognized long ago, “[t]he general rule is familiar that parol
evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary the terms of a valid written instrument,
but this rule applies only to the parties to the contract or their privies.   . . . [T]he
rule applies only to controversies between the parties themselves and those claiming
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under them, and between one of the parties and a stranger the rule does not apply.” 
Roof v. Chattanooga Wood Split Pulley Co., 36 Fla. 284, 295, 18 So. 597, 599
(1895) (emphasis added); accord Palmer v. R.S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So. 2d
635, 637 (Fla. 1955); Quarterman v. City of Jacksonville, 347 So. 2d 1036, 1038
(Fla. 1st DCA 1977); see generally 24 Fla. Jur. 2d Evidence and Witnesses § 446
(1995).  As explained by one noted commentator:
    The theory of the [parol evidence] rule is that the
parties have determined that a particular document shall
be made the sole embodiment of their legal act for certain
legal purposes.  Hence, so far as that effect and those
purposes are concerned, they must be found in that
writing and nowhere else, no matter who may desire to
avail himself of it.  But so far as other effects and
purposes are concerned, the writing has not superseded
their other conduct, nor other persons’ conduct, and it
may still be resorted to for any other purpose for which it
is material, either by other persons or by themselves.
9 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2446 (James H.
Chadbourn rev. 1981) (citation omitted).  As applied in the present case, the Bar
was not a party to the written contract between Frederick and his clients, nor did it
seek to alter the effects and purposes of that contract; rather, as a “stranger” to the
contract, the Bar resorted to, among other things, conduct preceding the contract
(i.e., parol evidence) for a separate effect and purpose for which that conduct was
material–to wit: as evidence of Frederick’s alleged professional misconduct.  The
2 In holding that the parol evidence rule does not apply to the disciplinary action brought
by the Bar seeking disciplinary measures against Frederick, we recognize that it would ordinarily
apply in a civil action between Frederick and his clients seeking enforcement of the fee contract. 
Insofar as both types of actions can involve monetary sanctions or awards, we perceive a potential
for abuse of the disciplinary process.  Specifically, aggrieved clients in contractual fee disputes
with their attorneys could “get around” the parol evidence rule simply by seeking restitution
through a disciplinary action, as opposed to monetary relief through a civil action.  The same
would not be true for aggrieved attorneys–the only recourse they would have in a contractual fee
dispute with their clients would be through a civil action, where the parol evidence rule would
ordinarily apply.  Such unequal footing between attorneys and clients in contractual fee disputes
appears to be at least unfair and at most unconscionable, especially considering that attorney-
client fee contracts in Florida are preferred, if not required, to be in writing.  See, e.g., R.
Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5(e)-(f).  Moreover, that the parol evidence rule could be so easily
avoided by aggrieved clients as described above is at odds with the principle that the parol
evidence rule is not simply a rule of evidence but, to the contrary, a fundamental rule of
substantive law.  See Schwartz v. Zaconik, 68 So. 2d 173, 175 (Fla. 1953); Knabb v.
Reconstruction Finance Corp., 144 Fla. 110, 130-31, 197 So. 707, 715 (1940).
We stress that, in making the above observations, we are by no means suggesting that the
clients in the present case intentionally attempted to avoid the parol evidence rule by pursuing  a
disciplinary, as opposed to civil, action against Frederick.  However, we do recognize the
potential for abuse in this context, and therefore direct the Bar to craft and submit to this Court a
proposed rule addressing these concerns.                       
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parol evidence rule simply does not apply under these circumstances.2
Frederick also argues that the referee fundamentally erred by “ignoring the
probative effect of a later oral agreement [at the Bay County Courthouse] which
modified and eliminated the cost advance requirement of the written agreement and
[Frederick] acted in reliance thereon.”  Significantly, however, the referee did not
“ignore” the evidence on this issue, but merely rejected Frederick’s testimony
regarding same in favor of the clients’ testimony.  Specifically, as already quoted
above, the referee found:
    In a later meeting with the group at the Bay County
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Courthouse, Respondent agreed to proceed with the case .
. . in spite of his earlier desire to have at least ten
plaintiffs. . . . According to the testimony of the members
of the group, which the referee finds convincing,
Respondent never told them of his intentions to use the
entire $18,000 as his attorney's fees.  They still had the
understanding that some of this money was to pay costs
and expenses, and that this amount would be placed in, as
they termed it, an escrow account.  
These findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, and
we are therefore “precluded from reweighing the evidence and substituting [our]
judgment for that of the referee.”  Florida Bar v. Lange, 711 So. 2d 518, 520 n.5
(Fla. 1998) (quoting Florida Bar v. MacMillan, 600 So. 2d 457, 459 (Fla. 1992)). 
“The party contending that the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions as to guilt
are erroneous carries the burden of demonstrating that there is no evidence in the
record to support those findings or that the record evidence clearly contradicts the
conclusions.”  Lange, 711 So. 2d at 520 n.5.  Such is not the case here, and
Frederick has not met this burden by simply repeating testimony and arguments
thereon that the referee heard and rejected below.  As this Court has held, “a party
does not meet the burden of showing that a referee’s findings are erroneous simply
by pointing to contradictory evidence where there is also competent, substantial
evidence in the record that supports the referee’s findings.”  Florida Bar v. Glick,
693 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla. 1997).  
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Next, in recommending that Frederick be found guilty of violating rule 4-
8.4(d) (“A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct in connection with the practice of
law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice”), the referee here found that
Frederick had “requir[ed] as a condition precedent to his clients receiving the funds
agreed to in their release . . . that they agree to either not contact the Florida Bar
with any complaints concerning him, or if they had already done so, that they would
withdraw the same.”  This Court has cautioned that “any such agreement is not
enforceable,” Florida Bar v. Fitzgerald, 541 So. 2d 602, 605 (Fla. 1989), and 
Frederick concedes that including such a requirement in the release was “ill-
advised.”  He nevertheless asserts that
to be guilty of a violation [of rule 4-8.4(d)], Frederick
must have [had] knowledge that he was guilty of
improperly using his clients’ trust money and was
attempting to cover up this misconduct to avoid the
consequences. [Frederick has] established, however, that
no misconduct or trust violation occurred, because the
$18,000 was a fee earned as a matter of law . . . .
This assertion directly contradicts the referee’s factual finding already quoted above
that “[i]t was always represented to the group by Respondent that a certain sum of
their money would go to pay costs.  This was clearly represented in Complainant's
exhibits numbered A [Respondent’s August 18, 1994 letter] and B [the written
contingency fee contract], as well as in his conversations with the clients.  At no
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time was their fee arrangement renegotiated.”  Once again, this finding is supported
by competent, substantial evidence in the record, and Frederick has neither met his
burden on review nor  established to the contrary “that no misconduct or trust
violation occurred” by simply pointing to contradictory evidence and repeating
testimony and arguments thereon that the referee heard and rejected below.  See
Lange, 711 So. 2d at 520 n.5; Glick, 693 So. 2d at 552.
Frederick alternatively argues that rule 4-8.4(d) does not apply here, asserting
that it was “designed to prohibit lawyers from engaging in racial, sexual or other
discriminatory conduct against any other participant in a judicial proceeding
administering justice.”  We reject such a narrow reading of rule 4-8.4(d), which
provides in full:
  A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct in connection
with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice, including to knowingly, or
through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or
discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court
personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including, but
not limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender,
religion, national origin, disability, marital status, sexual
orientation, age, socioeconomic status, employment, or 
physical characteristic.
In amending rule 4-8.4(d) to add the language underlined above, this Court  was
responding to “a number of problems faced by minorities and women in the legal
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profession . . . [and] the need for specific rules prohibiting discriminatory practices
by members of the Bar.”  Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules Regulating The
Florida Bar, 624 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 1993).  Significantly, however, the
amendment did not constrict the rule to address only these concerns; rather, it
broadened the rule to include them.  Indeed, in adopting the amendment, this Court
emphasized that “the amendment should preclude any conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice.”  Id. 
Furthermore, contrary to Frederick’s suggestion that rule 4-8.4(d) applies
only to conduct “in a judicial proceeding,” the rule itself more broadly provides that
it applies to “conduct in connection with the practice of law.”  This Court has
recognized that “[w]hile conduct that actually affects a given proceeding may be
prejudicial to the administration of justice, conduct that prejudices our system of
justice as a whole also is encompassed by rule 4-8.4(d).”  Florida Bar v. Machin,
635 So. 2d 938, 939-40 (Fla. 1994).  This certainly includes Frederick’s coercive
dealings with his clients in an effort to preemptively thwart the Bar’s disciplinary
involvement in this case.  See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Black, 602 So. 2d 1298, 1298
(Fla. 1992) (disciplining attorney for violating rule 4-8.4(d) and other disciplinary
rules in self-serving loan transaction with client); Florida Bar v. Perlmutter, 582 So.
2d 616, 617 (Fla. 1991) (disciplining attorney for violating rule 4-8.4(d) and other
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disciplinary rules by, among other things, “threatening to retaliate against citizens
who file complaints with The Florida Bar”).  We accordingly reject Frederick’s
argument in this regard and hold that his conduct in discouraging the Bar’s
involvement as a condition of the release falls within the “conduct in connection
with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice” broadly
prohibited by rule 4-8.4(d).      
Case No. 90,387
In recommending that Frederick be found guilty of violating former rule 3-
6.1(c) (“No suspended, resigned, or disbarred attorney shall have direct contact with
any client”), the referee here found that Frederick had “allowed and in fact directed
William D. Barrow, a disciplinarily resigned attorney, to have direct contact [i.e.,
telephone conversations] with a client.”  In so finding, the referee explicitly rejected
Frederick’s argument that “direct contact means face to face meetings with clients
and does not encompass telephone conversations such as Mr. Barrow had with the
client,” agreeing with the Bar’s position that “direct contact encompasses any
unsupervised client contact whether such contact is in person or by use of
telephone.”  
Frederick now argues that rule 3-6.1(c) is overly broad and vague insofar as it
does not define what “direct contact” is, urging that such “direct contact” does not
3Rather, Hunt involved predecessor Disciplinary Rule 3-101(A), which was applicable at
the time and provided that “[a] lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of
law.”  See Florida Bar v. Hunt, 429 So. 2d 1201, 1204 (Fla. 1983). 
4We note that this treatment of the term “direct contact” is consistent with our treatment
of that term elsewhere in the rules.  Specifically, in addressing solicitation of prospective clients
through “direct contact,” Rule of Professional Conduct 4-7.4(a) explicitly provides that “[t]he
term ‘solicit’ includes contact in person, by telephone, telegraph, or facsimile, or by other
communication directed to a specific recipient and includes any written form of communication
directed to a specific recipient.”
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include telephone conversations like those at issue here.  We again disagree. 
At the time of the conduct in question, rule 3-6.1(c) provided in full that “[n]o
suspended, resigned, or disbarred attorney shall have direct contact with any client
or receive, disburse, or otherwise handle trust funds or property.”  Frederick cites no
authority for his proposition that “direct contact” in the rule encompasses only face-
to-face meetings.  To the contrary, in Florida Bar v. Hunt, 429 So. 2d 1201, 1203-
04 (Fla. 1983), this Court adopted an uncontested referee’s report recommending
that an attorney be disciplined for, among other things, permitting a disbarred
attorney to prepare pleadings and have “direct contact” with clients, where such
“direct contact” consisted of written correspondence with clients in several cases. 
While Hunt did not involve rule 3-6.1(c),3 it does stand for the proposition that
written correspondence  amounts to “direct contact” in this context; a fortiori,
telephone conversations amount to “direct contact” as well.4  We accordingly reject
5Rule 3-6.1(c) has recently been amended and renumbered as rule 3-6.1(d), which
provides in full that “[n]o employee shall have direct contact with any client.  Direct client contact
does not include the participation of the employee as an observer in any meeting, hearing, or
interaction between a supervising attorney and a client.”  This amended rule was not in effect at
the time of Frederick’s conduct at issue in the present case.  Even assuming otherwise, the
amended rule does not change our analysis.  
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Frederick’s challenge to rule 3-6.1(c).5  Frederick does not contest the referee’s
related recommendation that he be found guilty of violating rules 4-5.3(a) and (b)
(“Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants”).  
We accordingly reject all of Frederick’s arguments regarding guilt, and
approve all of the referee’s recommendations of guilt in this case.        
B.  DISCIPLINE
In keeping with his argument that virtually all of the referee’s
recommendations of guilt should be rejected, Frederick generally argues that “the
recommended discipline also should be entirely rejected.”  However, as discussed at
length above, we approve all of the referee’s recommendations of guilt in this case. 
Thus, Frederick’s general argument against the recommended discipline, which
completely depends on a contrary result as to guilt, must accordingly fail.  
Frederick more specifically argues that this Court should reject that portion of
the referee’s recommendation as to discipline that he “should pay into the Florida
6Through the Clients’ Security Fund, “[t]he board of governors may provide monetary
relief to persons who suffer reimbursable losses as a result of misappropriation, embezzlement, or
other wrongful taking or conversion by a member of The Florida Bar of money or other property
that comes into the member's possession or control, all in accordance with chapter 7.”  R.
Regulating Fla. Bar 1-8.4; see also ch. 7, Rules Regulating Fla. Bar (setting forth the rules and
regulations of the Clients’ Security Fund).    
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Bar’s Client Security Fund [“the Fund”6] $5,500.00, which is the sum he retained
from the representation of the class action lawsuit [i.e., $18,000 minus the $12,500
he refunded] that resulted in the majority of the Bar’s allegations against him.” 
Frederick argues that this portion of the recommended discipline is “grossly unjust .
. . [and] constitutes a forfeiture and unjust enrichment” because he “had advanced
substantial costs and expenses” on behalf of his clients.  Frederick’s point is well
taken.    
In the disciplinary proceedings below, Bar counsel urged in closing argument:
[W]e are seeking restitution of fifty-five hundred dollars
to the clients or if the court finds that there have been
costs expended on behalf of these clients even though the
Respondent has been unable to show a dime of cost, we
would ask that you pay the cost to the client security fund
if the court feels that it would be unjust enrichment to give
the money back to the clients. . . . [W]e would ask that
either the money be refunded to the clients or paid to the
client’s security fund, to the general fund.
(Emphasis added.)  Given this option, that the referee here ultimately recommended
payment into the Fund (as opposed to restitution) implicitly suggests that the referee
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found the Bar’s stated alternative that “it would be unjust enrichment to give the
money back to the clients” and “there have been costs expended on behalf of these
clients,” despite the referee’s explicit finding here that Frederick “failed to maintain
any records by which he could establish specific costs incurred in this litigation . . .
[and] is unable to produce any documentation showing that the clients were billed
for any outstanding fees, this in spite of an order to produce.”  (Record citation
omitted.)  In other words, the referee here was aware that restitution was an urged
option; that he instead recommended payment into the Fund suggests that he
intended the payment not as restitution, but as something more akin to a fine. 
Significantly, however, “there is no authority to impose a fine as a condition
of discipline.”  Florida Bar v. Greene, 589 So. 2d 281, 282 (Fla. 1991); see also R.
Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.1 (types of discipline authorized do not include imposition
of fine).  Furthermore, in Florida Bar v. Rogowski, 399 So. 2d 1390, 1391 (Fla.
1981), this Court rejected a referee’s recommendation that the subject attorney pay
money into the Fund because, as here, “no funds were paid out of the [F]und,”
holding that “[t]here is no authority for this Court in a disciplinary proceeding to
require a payment that is not for restitution or the payment of costs.”  As neither of
these two ends are fulfilled by the proposed discipline at issue, we reject the
referee’s recommendation that Frederick pay $5500 into the Fund.  
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However, given the number and nature of Frederick’s offenses, his
disciplinary history, and the extensive aggravation at issue, we approve all
remaining aspects of the referee’s recommended discipline as being reasonably
supported by existing case law.  See Florida Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249,
1254 (Fla. 1999).  As cited by the Bar, similar cases involving trust account
violations or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice or both have
resulted in suspensions of ninety-one days or more.  See Florida Bar v. Adler, 589
So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1991) (eighteen-month suspension for trust account violations);
Florida Bar v. Burke, 578 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1991) (ninety-one day suspension for
trust account violations and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice and conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law); see also Florida
Bar v. Penn, 421 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1982) (six-month suspension for improperly
retaining legal fee and improperly requiring client to sign release).  Moreover, as
generally relevant in the present case, “[t]his Court has consistently held that misuse
of trust account funds is among the most serious infractions a lawyer can commit,”
Florida Bar v. Dubow, 636 So. 2d 1287, 1289 (Fla. 1994), and “[t]he Court deals
more harshly with cumulative misconduct than it does with isolated misconduct.” 
Florida Bar v. Bern, 425 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 1982). 
III.  CONCLUSION
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Based on the foregoing analysis, Mark Evan Frederick is hereby suspended
from the practice of law for ninety-one days and thereafter until he proves
rehabilitation (including the requirement that he attend at least one continuing legal
education course on law office management that includes instruction on the keeping
of time records, trust accounts, and payment of costs).  Following his suspension,
Frederick shall be placed on probation under the supervision of a member of the Bar
for three years (including the requirement that he provide periodic reports of his
caseload and proof that he has established an acceptable method of keeping time
records by entering into a contractual arrangement with Law Partners or a similarly
acceptable organization approved by the Bar).  The suspension will be effective
thirty days from the filing of this opinion so that Frederick can close out his practice
and protect the interests of existing clients.  If Frederick notifies this Court in
writing that he is no longer practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect
existing clients, this Court will enter an order making the suspension effective
immediately.  Frederick shall accept no new business from the date this opinion is
filed until the suspension is completed.  Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar,
650 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, for recovery of costs from
Mark Evan Frederick in the amount of  $8,282.86, for which sum let execution
issue.
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It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, John Anthony Boggs, Staff Counsel, and
Olivia Paiva Klein, Bar Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida,
       for Complainant
W.H.F. Wiltshire, Pensacola, Florida,
       for Respondent