Title: Axelrod v. Reid Limited Partnership

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 49628 
 
DAVID W. AXELROD, as Trustee of the 
DAVID W. AXELROD FAMILY TRUST 
dated June 13, 2017, as restated on September 
28, 2018, 
 
     Plaintiff-Counterdefendant- 
     Respondent-Cross Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
REID LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho 
limited partnership; and MICHAEL REID, an 
individual, 
 
     Defendants-Counterclaimants- 
     Appellants-Cross Respondents. 
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Boise, January 2024 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: July 1, 2024  
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
SUBSTITUTE OPINION. THE 
COURT’S 
PRIOR 
OPINION 
DATED APRIL 25, 2024 IS 
HEREBY WITHDRAWN. 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Teton County.  Steven W. Boyce, District Judge.  
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and vacated in part. 
 
Law Offices of Jonathan S. Willett, Boulder, CO, for Appellant/Cross-Respondent, 
Reid Limited Partnership. Jonathan S. Willett argued.  
 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney, PA, Idaho Falls, for Respondent/Cross-Appellant, David 
W. Axelrod, Trustee. Jeffrey D. Brunson argued.  
 
Michael Reid, Appellant/Cross-Respondent pro se.  
_____________________ 
_________________________ 
 
MEYER, Justice. 
This case is a consolidated appeal of issues arising out of a settlement agreement 
concerning the real property and easement rights of two neighboring landowners. For the reasons 
set forth below, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
David W. Axelrod as Trustee of the David W. Axelrod Family Trust (“Axelrod”) purchased 
property in Teton County in 2003. Michael Reid owned and operated an organic dairy farm nearby 
on land owned by the Reid Limited Partnership (“RLP”). Reid also leased land for his farming 
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operations adjacent to the parcel purchased by Axelrod.  
At the time of its purchase, the Axelrod parcel was not accessible by road. There were two 
options for building an access road: (1) build along the two easements provided for in the Axelrod 
deed (referred to collectively to as the “Miller Easement”), which together would connect to a 
main highway, or (2) build onto an existing dirt road that came through the RLP property. Reid 
told Axelrod that he would prefer Axelrod to build onto the existing dirt road because the Miller 
Easement cut across a pasture he was leasing for grazing. In 2004, Axelrod built onto the existing 
dirt road, referred to hereinafter as the “RLP Easement.” 
In 2006, Axelrod built a house on the Axelrod parcel. At first, Axelrod and Reid got along. 
But in 2011, the relationship between Axelrod and Reid began to sour. At that time, landscape 
contractors hired by Axelrod sprayed herbicide on and around the RLP Easement, including on 
some of the RLP land. Reid’s dairy farm, certified as “organic and biodynamic,” was subject to 
certain requirements and inspections to maintain its certification, and because of the herbicide 
being applied, Reid lost organic certification for three years on three or four acres of RLP land 
around the RLP Easement.  
Later, Teton County placed a road sign on the RLP Easement road. Reid observed traffic 
on the RLP Easement road and was concerned that it would be mistaken for a public road. Reid 
contacted Axelrod to ask for his help in getting the road sign removed. During this conversation, 
Reid referred to Axelrod’s usage of the RLP Easement as a “handshake agreement,” which alarmed 
Axelrod. Axelrod declined to help Reid and stated that he had a “firm, written easement.” 
After this conversation, Reid received a letter from Axelrod’s attorney demanding that he 
“either sign a document that confirmed that [Axelrod] had an express written easement or [he] 
would be sued.” Reid refused to sign the document and in early 2017, began blocking off the RLP 
Easement road.  
This led to Axelrod’s filing suit seeking clarification about the nature of his easement 
rights. During the litigation, both Reid and Axelrod filed motions for summary judgment. On April 
18, 2018, the district court issued a memorandum decision on the cross-motions for summary 
judgment. The court concluded that Axelrod did not have an express easement for use of the RLP 
Easement, but he did have an easement by estoppel. Shortly after this decision, on the day trial 
was to commence, the parties executed a settlement agreement and stipulated to dismiss the suit. 
Chief among the obligations undertaken by the parties as part of the settlement agreement was 
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that, within two years, Axelrod would build a new road along the Miller Easement and thereafter 
renounce any easement rights in the RLP Easement, and that Reid would be “solely” responsible 
for the cost and installation of an “up to sixteen-foot (16’) wide cattle guard” to be installed “on 
the Axelrod [p]roperty substantially in the vicinity of the Red Gate . . . .” 
In September 2018, Axelrod built the Miller Easement road. Because winter was 
approaching, Axelrod and Reid discussed when the cattle guard was to be installed and, 
specifically, whether it should wait until spring. There was initial difficulty in finding a cattle guard 
that would serve the need and meet the specifications in the Settlement Agreement. Ultimately, 
the road contractor working for Axelrod found a sixteen-foot cattle guard and was directed by 
Axelrod to install it “exactly where the red gate” was. Before the end of October 2018, the cattle 
guard was purchased, installed, and the red gate was removed. Although Reid was involved in 
discussions with Axelrod about when to put the cattle guard in and in discussions with the 
contractor about placement, he was not involved in the final selection or ultimate placement of the 
cattle guard. Reid disagreed with the ultimate placement of the cattle guard because he believed 
the cattle guard selected was unnecessarily expensive; he was required to pay for it; it was installed 
almost entirely on Axelrod’s property; and he felt it did not serve as an effective barrier for the 
cows between his organic farm and Axelrod’s herbicide-treated property. Reid then put up a blue 
gate across the Miller Easement road, in a place where the Axelrod, Miller, and RLP property met, 
so his cows could not access any of Axelrod’s property.  
As a result of the new barrier across his new road and a breakdown in communication 
between the parties, Axelrod filed suit on January 6, 2020, alleging that Reid and RLP had failed 
to abide by a term of the Settlement Agreement that required Reid and RLP to pay “all costs 
associated with the acquisition and installation of” a cattle guard and had “failed to deal fairly with 
and act in good faith toward Axelrod . . . .”  
On January 31, 2020, Reid, acting pro se, responded in a pleading titled “Response and 
Cross Complaint” in which he denied all allegations against him and RLP, and asserted myriad 
claims against Axelrod, including trespass and illegal removal and destruction of his fence. 
On February 21, 2020, Axelrod moved to dismiss Reid’s cross-complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted; for entry of default regarding RLP, who was not 
represented by counsel; and for the court to take judicial notice of certain facts relating to RLP. 
On March 6, 2020, Axelrod filed a motion for summary judgment. On March 9, 2020, Reid 
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filed the “Affidavit of Michael Reid in Support of Response and Counter Complaint” with 
voluminous attachments. 
On March 13, 2020, Axelrod filed a motion to strike Reid’s affidavit and a motion to 
shorten time so his motions could be heard together. Due to court scheduling issues and 
circumstances incident to the COVID-19 pandemic, the hearing on these motions was continued 
for two months to May 19, 2020.  
In the intervening time, Reid filed several responsive papers: on March 27, 2020, he filed 
a response to Axelrod’s motion for summary judgment; on May 13, 2020, he filed an “Affidavit 
of Michael Reid in Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment”; and on May 15, 2020, 
he filed a response to Axelrod’s motion to strike. 
On May 19, 2020, the district court heard Axelrod’s motions during a remote hearing. On 
the motion for entry of default, the court concluded that RLP was required by law to have counsel. 
Finding that no prejudice would result from allowing RLP time to obtain counsel, the court ordered 
that RLP had 30 days for a licensed attorney to enter an appearance and file a responsive pleading 
on its behalf. On the motion to strike, the court went through Reid’s filing paragraph by paragraph, 
denying the motion as to some paragraphs and granting it as to others. The district court determined 
that Reid’s response to Axelrod’s motion to strike was not filed seven days prior to hearing as 
required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7 and would not be considered by the court.  
Next, the court took up Axelrod’s motion for summary judgment. There were several issues 
with Reid’s response to Axelrod’s filing: (1) it was only an affidavit—it was not connected to a 
memorandum; (2) it was not filed 14 days in advance of the hearing as required by Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56; and (3) it was never served on Axelrod’s counsel. Ultimately, the court 
concluded, pursuant to Rule 56(e), that Reid, as the nonmoving party, had failed to properly 
support any assertion of fact or address the assertions of fact in Axelrod’s motion for summary 
judgment. Accordingly, the court granted Axelrod’s motion for summary judgment. 
On May 29, 2020, Reid filed a motion for reconsideration, citing Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60, seeking relief from the court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of Axelrod. 
Shortly thereafter, Axelrod filed a memorandum of costs and attorney fees, requesting that his fees 
be paid by Reid pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, Idaho Code sections 12-120 and 12-
121, and Section 3.05 of the Settlement Agreement. While a hearing on the reconsideration motion 
was pending, counsel for RLP filed an appearance, an answer, and on the morning of the 
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reconsideration hearing, a request to correct a clerical error in the judgment, regarding the inclusion 
of RLP in the order granting summary judgment. 
On July 21, 2020, at the hearing on the motion for reconsideration, the court took up the 
issue of whether judgment had been entered in error against RLP. After hearing arguments on the 
issue, the court determined that judgment had indeed been entered in error as to RLP and ordered 
that judgment against RLP be vacated. The district court then heard arguments related to Reid’s 
motion for reconsideration, ultimately concluding that there were no grounds under Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60 that would require reconsideration.  
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court agreed to consider Axelrod’s memorandum for 
attorney fees but advised counsel for Axelrod to go through his records and parse out any work 
with respect to RLP. Ten days later, on July 31, 2020, Axelrod submitted a revised memorandum 
of attorney fees and affidavit of counsel, showing reductions for work related to RLP.   
On August 13, 2020, Reid filed a memorandum in opposition. On September 9, 2020, Reid 
filed a notice of appeal. On October 9, 2020, the district court issued its written decision on 
Axelrod’s request for attorney fees. The court granted Axelrod’s claim for fees and costs associated 
with litigating against Reid until summary judgment but denied Axelrod’s request for additional 
fees incurred in defending Reid’s motion for reconsideration. 
On December 22, 2020, Axelrod filed a motion to certify the partial judgment against Reid 
as final. On December 29, 2020, Reid and RLP filed a joint objection to that motion. The parties 
were heard on the motion at a status conference on January 5, 2021, during which the court denied 
the motion. 
The remaining issues between RLP and Axelrod were litigated in a four-day trial held 
August 18, 19, 20, and September 15, 2021. On the third day of the bench trial, Axelrod moved 
for directed verdict on RLP’s trespass counterclaim. The court granted the motion.  
At the conclusion of the trial, Axelrod moved for directed verdict on all remaining claims, 
which included Axelrod’s claim for breach of contract and RLP’s two remaining counterclaims: 
violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and conversion. On October 1, 2021, in a 
written decision, the district court granted Axelrod’s motion for directed verdict on all remaining 
claims. 
On December 10, 2021, Axelrod moved for entry of final judgment and submitted a 
memorandum of attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, Idaho Code 
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sections 12-120 and 12-121, and Section 3.05 of the parties’ Settlement Agreement. On December 
25, 2021, RLP filed a “Memorandum in Opposition to Attorney’s Fees and Costs Motion.” On 
January 19, 2022, the court heard the parties on the motions for entry of judgment and for attorney 
fees. On February 2, 2022, the court issued an order on the request for attorney fees and costs, 
awarding Axelrod $52,725.20 in attorney fees and $1,043.23 in costs. On February 4, 2022, 
judgment was entered against RLP and Reid individually. Reid and RLP appeal.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“An appeal from summary judgment is reviewed under the same standard a district court 
uses when granting a motion for summary judgment.” Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. 
Investor, LLC, 157 Idaho 732, 737, 339 P.3d 1136, 1141 (2014). “[S]ummary judgment is proper 
if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.” Id. at 737–38, 339 P.3d at 1141–42 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). “If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment 
should be granted.” Id. at 738, 339 P.3d at 1142. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. This Court declines to consider Reid’s issues on appeal related to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 2.2.  
The first two issues Reid asserts on appeal concern the timeliness of his filings in 
opposition to Axelrod’s motion for summary judgment. He asserts that, because of circumstances 
attendant to the COVID-19 pandemic, his filings should not be considered late. Specifically, Reid 
asserts that the court clerk’s office was locked and inaccessible when he needed to access it to 
notarize his filings, and the court’s refusal to consider them on timeliness grounds violates Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 2.2. Reid contends that the Teton County clerk’s office was inaccessible 
from March 27, 2020, to May 4, 2020, and the deadlines for his filings should have been extended. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 2.2 is entitled “Computing and Extending Time,” and 
subsection (a)(2) is entitled “Inaccessibility of the Clerk’s Office.” It reads, “[u]nless the court 
orders otherwise, if the clerk’s office is inaccessible, then the time for filing is extended to the first 
accessible day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.” I.R.C.P. 2.2(a)(2).  
“‘This Court exercises free review over questions regarding the interpretation of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure.’” Ward v. State, 166 Idaho 330, 332, 458 P.3d 199, 201 (2020) (quoting 
Haight v. Idaho Dep’t of Transp., 163 Idaho 383, 387, 414 P.3d 205, 209 (2018)). “When it comes 
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to motion practice, ‘pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those represented 
by an attorney.’” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Kootenai Cnty. v. Harriman-Sayler, 154 Idaho 
13, 17, 293 P.3d 637, 641 (2012)).  
At the May 19, 2020, hearing, Reid mentioned his difficulty accessing the court and getting 
his documents notarized but did not cite Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 2.2 or make an argument 
for its application or an extension of time at the hearing. “This Court has long held that substantive 
issues will not be considered for the first time on appeal.” Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 57, 
244 P.3d 197, 201 (2010) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). “[A] party’s 
failure to object to action by the trial court precludes a party from challenging that action on 
appeal.” Mackowiak v. Harris, 146 Idaho 864, 866, 204 P.3d 504, 506 (2009). Because Reid failed 
to raise his objection based on application of Rule 2.2 and an extension of time at the hearing 
below, this Court declines to review the ruling of the district court regarding the timeliness of 
Reid’s filings.  
B. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment against Reid.  
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider Reid’s materials 
prepared in response to Axelrod’s motion for summary judgment.  
At the summary judgment hearing, Axelrod argued that Reid’s response to the summary 
judgment motion was untimely. He claimed that it did not comply with Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56 because Reid had filed a response styled “Affidavit of Michael Reid in Response to 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment” on May 13, only six days before the hearing. When 
the court asked Reid whether he had filed anything responding to the motion prior to May 13, Reid 
replied that he thought he had, but did not have specifics in front of him. The court then said that 
it found a filing, entitled “Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment,” filed by Reid 
on March 27. The court asked Axelrod if he had received the filing. Axelrod replied that he had 
not. The court noted that the filing had a certification of service to Axelrod, but asked Reid if he 
had confirmation of service to Axelrod, and Reid replied that he did not.  
Reid argues that his failure to serve Axelrod his response to the summary judgment motion 
was “excusable neglect” because of the pandemic and that Axelrod’s frequent viewing of the court 
repository alleviated any prejudice.  
Axelrod argues that Reid’s procedural arguments and his reasons for not filing a timely 
response are unavailing because of the feasibility of filing under the rules, even under the 
circumstances of the pandemic. Specifically, Axelrod points to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 4 
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and 5, which allow for electronic filing and the ability to file via facsimile, respectively. Axelrod 
also points to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 2.7 and Idaho Code section 9-1406, both of which 
allow a litigant to file a supporting declaration in lieu of notarized filings.  
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b)(2) states that “[t]he answering brief and any opposing 
documents must be served at least 14 days before the date of the hearing.” This Court “review[s] 
a district court’s decision on whether to accept an untimely filed affidavit in connection with 
summary judgment for an abuse of discretion.” Ciccarello v. Davies, 166 Idaho 153, 162, 456 P.3d 
519, 528 (2019). In discretionary review, this Court uses the four-prong standard, that is, “whether 
the trial judge: (1) [c]orrectly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg 
v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 867, 421 P.3d 187, 198 (2018).  
The date set for hearing Axelrod’s motion for summary judgment was May 19, 2020, so 
the affidavit filed by Reid on May 13 in support of his response was clearly not timely under the 
rules. But Reid’s March 27 filing was well within the 14-day requirement for filing a response. 
However, the testimony of Reid at the hearing was that he could not “find anything that would 
prove” he served the March 27 filing on Axelrod. This admission, coupled with representations by 
Axelrod’s counsel that he had never received the document, rendered the district court’s decision 
declining to consider Reid’s responsive filings within the bounds of its discretion. In its oral ruling 
that followed, the court indicated that it perceived the issue to be within its discretion; then it acted 
within the outer boundaries of that discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards to the 
choices before it by granting the motion for summary judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(e)(3). The district court’s decision was reached by an exercise of reason. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider 
Reid’s responsive materials. 
2. The district court did not err in granting Axelrod’s motion for summary judgment 
because Reid’s pleadings and supporting affidavit did not raise genuine issues of 
material fact.  
Reid argues that there was sufficient evidence in the record to prevent the court from 
granting Axelrod’s motion for summary judgment. Reid contends that there was enough factual 
evidence that Axelrod’s claims were disputed in his “Response to Complaint and Cross 
Complaint” and his “Affidavit of Michael Reid in Support of Response and Counter Complaint,” 
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together with the record of disputed facts, even if his response to Axelrod’s summary judgment 
motion is not considered. In response, Axelrod argues that Reid’s brief on appeal is written 
contrary to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6)—scattered and with very few citations to authority—so 
Reid’s arguments should be dismissed. Axelrod also argues that Reid has failed to establish that 
the district court erred in granting Axelrod’s motion for summary judgment.  
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) requires “appellants to specify the issues they are raising 
and provide legal and factual support for those arguments.” Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 
230, 220 P.3d 580, 586 (2009). Reid’s brief is not lengthy, but it sets forth many arguments, with 
several citations to authority. On the issue of summary judgment, we find adequate argument in 
Reid’s brief to support our review.     
In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we recognize that 
“[t]he burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact” rests with the moving 
party and “[w]e construe the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion[.]” 
Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896, 155 P.3d 695, 697 (2007). “However, the nonmoving party 
must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to withstand 
summary judgment.” Id. at 896–97, 155 P.3d at 697–98. “A mere scintilla of evidence or only 
slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes 
of summary judgment.” Id.  
Axelrod’s claims against Reid, as well as his motion for summary judgment, were narrowly 
crafted. They were limited to the contention that Reid had breached the parties’ Settlement 
Agreement by failing to pay for the cattle guard, and that by this inaction, Reid also violated the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It is undisputed that Reid refused to pay for the cattle 
guard. Indeed, Reid openly admitted this fact at trial. His arguments on appeal essentially amount 
to assertions that he was excused from performing under the parties’ agreement because Axelrod 
breached the agreement first. But Reid’s assertions are unpersuasive and do not raise genuine 
issues of material fact.   
In Reid’s response to the initial complaint, he asserted that Axelrod had not “acted in a 
manner consistent with the purpose of the Settlement Agreement.” Reid alleged that Axelrod 
breached the agreement by directing the contractor to install the cattle guard in the fall of 2018 
when Axelrod had communicated that he may wait until spring.  Reid also claimed the cattle guard 
was more expensive than anticipated and that it was installed in the wrong location. But none of 
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these actions complained of by Reid contravened the express terms of the parties’ agreement. The 
parties’ agreement required that, within two years, Axelrod was to construct a new road along the 
Miller Easement, the contractor was to select a cattle guard and install it, and Reid was to pay for 
the cattle guard. The cattle guard was to be placed on the Axelrod property in the vicinity of the 
red gate. The undisputed facts are that six months after this agreement was entered, Axelrod caused 
a road to be constructed along the Miller Easement, Axelrod’s contractor selected and installed a 
cattle guard on the Axelrod property at the location of the red gate, and Reid failed to pay for it. 
There is nothing in the record that casts any more than a slight doubt as to the veracity of these 
facts. The district court recognized this, and in its ruling declared: the “nonmoving party here, 
which is Mr. Reid, has failed to properly support any assertion of fact or address the assertions of 
fact that were set forth in the Motion for Summary Judgment.” We agree. Accordingly, we 
conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Axelrod as 
against Reid.  
C. Pro se litigants are not entitled to leniency.  
Reid argues that he was entitled to “wide leeway” in his filings with the trial court because 
of the difficulty of being a pro se litigant, especially during the pandemic. Axelrod responds that 
Reid’s status as a pro se litigant does not entitle him to greater leeway from the district court and 
that this argument must fail on appeal.  
Axelrod is correct. “Pro se litigants are not accorded any special consideration simply 
because they are representing themselves and are not excused from adhering to procedural rules.” 
Michalk, 148 Idaho at 229, 220 P.3d at 585 (quoting Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 718, 170 
P.3d 375, 383 (2007)). Reid’s status as a pro se litigant does not grant him any privileges not 
accorded to other litigants; he is held to the same standard as a represented party. Accordingly, we 
decline to grant him special treatment or additional consideration solely on this basis.  
D. The district court erred when it dismissed RLP’s claim for trespass.  
When counsel for RLP entered an appearance and filed its responsive pleading, it included 
the trespass counterclaim at issue. The claim reads:  
36.  In directing and supervising construction of a road for which the 
grading, gravel and other buttressing falls upon RLP property, Plaintiff has 
committed a trespass.  
37.  Moreover, in maintaining the road, Plaintiff has destroyed the fence 
line by causing gravel and snow to repeatedly exceed the scope of the easement 
resulting in excessive debris on RLP property.  
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38.  As a result, RLP has suffered damages, including but not limited to, an 
inability to construct a fence at the edge of its property to protect its livestock and 
property interests, and re-grading and re-constructing the road to conform with the 
property boundaries between the RLP and DLMFT [Miller Family] properties.  
At trial, Reid testified that RLP transferred the RLP land to him personally in “August or 
September” of 2019, and that shortly thereafter RLP was dissolved. In December 2020, Reid 
attempted to re-instate RLP but was notified by the Secretary of State’s office that, in the interim, 
another entity had taken on a name too similar to RLP for it to be re-instated in that name. Reid 
testified that for this reason, in December 2020, Reid added the word “family,” to form the Reid 
Family Limited Partnership (“RFLP”) and transferred the RLP land (then owned by him 
personally) to RFLP. This last transfer to RFLP was not known to counsel for either party before 
it was disclosed on the third day of a four-day trial. Accordingly, Axelrod made a motion to dismiss 
the trespass counterclaim, alleging that RLP was not the owner of the land at the time of the 
trespass. Shortly thereafter, the court, in a ruling from the bench, declared:  
In considering the record before the [c]ourt, it’s clear that, at the time of the 
alleged trespass, the real property was owned by Michael Reid, an individual, who 
is -- or was a named party in this case.  
And judgment was entered against that individual by the [c]ourt on May 
22nd on all claims, including, expressly, the dismissal of those claims. So Mr. Reid 
owned the property at this point.  
Then the Reid Limited Partnership did not own the real property at the time 
the alleged trespass was committed or it was alleged to have been committed.  
And it’s axiomatic to the [c]ourt that a material element of any claim for 
trespass is that one must own property in order for there to be a trespass upon the 
property.  
Without ownership of the property, there can be no claim for trespass as 
against Reid Limited Partnership. They didn’t own the property.  
For those reasons, then, the [c]ourt finds that, as a matter of law, the third 
claim for relief, trespass, in the counterclaim is dismissed.  
RLP then moved for reconsideration of the ruling, which the court denied, stating:  
The fact that Michael Reid is a named party to the case and judgment was already 
entered, he was the titled owner of the property.  
So it’s not a matter of getting the right party in. It’s a matter of the [c]ourt’s 
already made a previous ruling that determines the issue.  
And that was on May 22nd of 2020, when Mr. Reid had a summary 
judgment order entered against him that included dismissal of the trespass claim. 
He was the owner of the property at the time.  
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RLP argues that the district court erred in dismissing its trespass claim because the claim 
contained no dates of the alleged trespassory acts, and the trespass is a “continuing tort” because 
the manner of construction of the Miller Easement road causes continual debris, gravel, and snow 
to fall outside the easement boundaries. RLP further argues that its trespass counterclaim included 
the destruction of the northern boundary fence, and asserts that destruction of the fence is “a 
continuing assault” on the property that was “pled at the early stages of the litigation.”  
Axelrod argues that the trial court correctly determined that RLP did not own the land in 
question at the time of the alleged trespass, that RLP mischaracterizes the ruling of the district 
court in its brief, and that RLP does not provide any authority in support of its contention.  
 “A reviewing court will uphold factual findings made by the trial court in granting a 
motion for involuntary dismissal so long as those findings are not clearly erroneous, meaning they 
are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence.” Day v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 172 Idaho 
431, 441, 533 P.3d 1227, 1237 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Spirit Ridge 
Min. Springs, LLC v. Frankling Cnty., 157 Idaho 424, 426, 337 P.3d 583, 585 (2014)). “Under the 
clearly erroneous standard, the district court’s findings of fact will be liberally construed in favor 
of the judgment entered.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “However, this Court 
exercises free review over the district judge’s conclusions of law.” Id. (quoting Frost v. Gilbert, 
169 Idaho 250, 263, 494 P.3d 798, 811 (2021)).  
“An action for trespass is, at its core, a tort action.” Bliss v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 167 
Idaho 141, 150, 468 P.3d 271, 280 (2020). Idaho law related to trespass prohibits impermissible 
entry upon or damage to land owned or possessed by another. I.C. § 6-202; Mueller v. Hill, 158 
Idaho 208, 212–13, 345 P.3d 998, 1002–03 (2015). A party has standing to bring a trespass claim 
if that party owns or has actual or constructive possession of the real property at the time of 
trespass. Mueller, 158 Idaho at 212–13, 345 P.3d at 1002–03. Trespass claims can also be assigned 
to another party, thus conferring standing on the assignee, but otherwise trespass claims are 
personal to the owner or possessor of the land. Id.; Radford v. Van Orden, 168 Idaho 287, 299–
300, 483 P.3d 344, 356–57 (2021); I.C. § 55-402.  
 Ownership of the land and timing of the alleged trespass are key inquiries here. According 
to the record before the court, RLP was the owner of the RLP land from 2014 until it was 
transferred by quit claim deed to Reid in September 2019. However, RLP does not limit its claims 
to a specific period of time. Instead, RLP asserts that acts beginning with the Miller Easement road 
13 
construction and subsequent maintenance, including grading and snow removal, have resulted in 
“continuous” trespass upon surrounding RLP land of unwanted gravel, snow, and debris.  
While Idaho courts have recognized a continuing tort doctrine,1 RLP has standing to assert 
trespass, continuing or otherwise, only during its period of ownership. The district court’s ruling 
relied on the fact that RLP did not own the land at the time of the alleged trespass. But RLP did 
own the land in 2018, when the Miller Easement road was constructed, and therefore has standing 
to assert a claim for alleged damage incurred to the surrounding RLP land incident to construction 
of the road and for maintenance, grading, and snow removal until transfer of the land was 
completed in 2019. While RLP does not have standing to bring trespass claims related to events 
occurring after RLP transferred the property to Reid in 2019, it was erroneous for the district court 
to conclude that RLP had not pleaded any claims under which it could proceed. Brown v. City of 
Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 807, 229 P.3d 1164, 1169 (2010) (“Under notice pleading, a party is no 
longer slavishly bound to stating particular theories in its pleadings . . . [a] complaint must merely 
state claims upon which relief may be granted, and pleadings should be liberally construed . . . .” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). For this reason, we conclude that the district court 
erred in dismissing RLP’s counterclaim for trespass.   
Though RLP was dissolved in September 2019, it brought this claim, and may pursue it 
after remand pursuant to Idaho Code section 30-23-802(a). Idaho Code section 30-23-802(a) 
provides that “[a] dissolved partnership shall wind up its business and, except as otherwise 
provided in [statutes related to rescinding dissolution], the partnership continues after dissolution 
only for the purposes of winding up.” (Emphasis added.) Idaho Code section 30-23-802(b)(2)(C) 
provides that “[i]n winding up its business, the partnership . . . [m]ay . . . [p]rosecute and defend 
actions and proceedings, whether civil, criminal or administrative . . . .” Further, this Court has 
stated that “[a] partnership does not terminate upon dissolution, but continues until after its affairs 
have been completely wound up.” Guenther v. Ryerson, 166 Idaho 315, 327, 458 P.3d 184, 196 
 
1 Woodland v. Lyon, 78 Idaho 79, 83, 298 P.2d 380, 381 (1956); Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 (1981); 
Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 850 P.2d 749 (1993); Beavertail, Inc. v. United States, No. 4:12-cv-610-BLW, 2017 
WL 3749446, at *10 (D. Idaho Aug. 20, 2017); Crescent Mine, LLC v. Bunker Hill Mining Corp., No. 2:21-cv-00310-
DCN, 2022 WL 612394, at *7 (D. Idaho Mar. 2, 2022). In Woodward, this Court explained that a landowner could 
recover for injury to pasture, alfalfa, and grain crops due to a neighboring landowner’s filling in the stream bed because 
“[t]he tort herein alleged [was] not a single wrong, but a continuing one . . . .” 78 Idaho at 83, 298 P.2d at 381. In 
another context, this Court has defined a continuing tort as “one inflicted over a period of time; it involves a wrongful 
conduct that is repeated until desisted, and each day creates a separate cause of action.” Glaze v. Deffenbaugh, 144 
Idaho 829, 833, 172 P.3d 1104, 1108 (2007) (quoting Curtis, 123 Idaho at 603, 850 P.2d at 754). 
14 
(2020). “Explained another way, before a partnership legally ends, three steps must be completed, 
(1) dissolution, (2) winding-up of the partnership’s business or liquidation, and (3) termination of 
the partnership.” Id. (citing Ramseyer v. Ramseyer, 98 Idaho 47, 51, 558 P.2d 76, 80 (1976)). 
While RLP is dissolved, it is not yet legally terminated. It continues only for the purpose of 
winding up its affairs, which, for RLP, includes prosecution of its trespass claim against Axelrod.  
E. The district court did not err when it denied the motion to amend the pleadings to add 
RFLP as a party.  
During Reid’s testimony at trial, it was discovered that Reid had transferred the RLP land 
to RFLP. Thereafter, RLP’s counsel orally moved to amend the pleadings to add RFLP as a party 
to the action to pursue trespass claims. Axelrod objected, arguing that he would be greatly 
prejudiced by the addition of a new party “in the middle of trial.” Thereafter, the court denied the 
motion, stating:  
I do find the prejudice would outweigh the discretion I would have to do that at this 
time, noticing, as you said, [counsel for RLP], that doesn’t preclude a prior claim—
or another claim in the future, if that’s where the matter goes.  
But, in terms of this trial, this is the time we had scheduled for trial. We’re 
on the third day. And I’m not going to allow amendment of another party here that, 
quite frankly, as a practical matter, I don’t even know how I’d be able to do that at 
this point and who would represent that -- that -- that interested party as an entity.  
So, with that in mind, the motion is denied.  
On appeal, RLP argues that the district court erred in denying its motion to amend the 
pleadings to add RFLP as a party pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15 because RFLP is a 
successor-in-interest to RLP and that Idaho law permits “an amendment to cure a defective 
pleading . . . unless the noticed party would be unduly prejudiced.” RLP also argues that the district 
court should have allowed the addition of RFLP as a real party in interest pursuant to Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 17. RLP asserts that Axelrod was not prejudiced because he was on notice from 
the time of the original counterclaim that destruction of fences that served as a border between the 
two properties was at issue. In response, Axelrod argues that RLP does not articulate how the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying the motion.  
“A court’s decision to allow the amendment of the pleadings is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.” Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 345, 33 P.3d 816, 819 (2001). 
Similarly, decisions to grant or deny a Rule 17 motion for joinder are reviewed under the abuse of 
discretion standard. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 92, 867 P.2d 960, 966 (1994). Abuse of 
15 
discretion is determined using a four-prong standard. “That is, whether the trial judge: (1) 
[c]orrectly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 
867, 421 P.3d at 198. 
In Hayward v. Vista Valley Corp, this Court set forth circumstances under which Rules 15 
and 17 could be jointly applied to amend pleadings to add a party plaintiff. 136 Idaho at 347–48, 
33 P.3d at 821–22. Hayward concerned a personal representative who filed a wrongful death action 
in federal court two days before the expiration of the statute of limitations. Id. at 346, 33 P.3d at 
820. The personal representative filed another case in state court the same day, with identical facts, 
asserting contractual claims against the same party. Id. at 344, 33 P.3d at 818. When the federal 
case was dismissed, the personal representative sought to amend his state court claims to include 
the wrongful death claim, which was now time-barred. Id. The district court denied this request, 
declaring that the personal representative was not a real party in interest because he did not bring 
the claim as an heir or on behalf of the heirs. Id. at 348, 33 P.3 at 822. The district court further 
concluded that, to pursue the claim, not only would the claim have to be added, but the personal 
representative would have to add a party or change the party listed on the pleading. Id. On review, 
this Court declared that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the personal 
representative leave to amend his pleadings because of the minimal substantive difference in the 
case if leave had been granted, noting that amendment would “merely be changing the 
representative capacity in which the suit is being brought.” Id. at 349, 33 P.3d at 823. The Court 
also quoted a Second Circuit decision declaring that “[a] Rule 17(a) substitution of plaintiffs 
should be liberally allowed when the change is merely formal and in no way alters the original 
complaint’s factual allegation as to the events or participants.” Id. (quoting Advanced Magnetics, 
Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d 11, 20 (2nd Cir. 1997)).  
Here, in contrast to Hayward, the claims brought by RLP and those likely to be brought by 
RFLP are closely connected, but there are substantive differences between them. RLP, when it 
entered its appearance and filed its pleadings, set forth specific claims against Axelrod for trespass. 
They principally concerned: (1) trespass to RLP land alleged to have occurred due to the 
construction of the Miller Easement road from which “grading, gravel and other buttressing fall[] 
upon RLP property” and (2) destruction of the fence line by snow and gravel maintenance of the 
16 
road exceeding the scope of the easement. The claims likely to be brought by RFLP differ from 
those asserted by RLP because they center around fence destruction alleged to have occurred 
incident to Axelrod’s placement of the new fence along the border of the Miller Easement road in 
May 2021. RLP has stated, both to this Court and below, that it seeks to join RFLP to pursue 
claims against Axelrod related to the new fence. Further, in denying the trial motion to join RFLP 
at trial, the district court noted that its ruling did not “preclude a prior claim -- or another claim in 
the future . . . .” During the pendency of this case, a new case was filed by RFLP against Axelrod 
asserting trespass by (1) the “discharge of rocks and other debris” from an “unnecessarily wide 
roadbed” and (2) the removal of the old fence and the erection of the new fence in 2021.  
The instant case also differs from Hayward because Hayward concerned a son who filed 
as personal representative instead of as heir and was therefore blocked from pursuing his claims 
under identical facts. This case concerns two separate legal entities: RLP and RFLP, whose claims 
arise from different facts. Though RLP and RFLP have similar membership and interests, these 
similarities do not convert the partnerships into a single entity. See Costa v. Borges, 145 Idaho 
353, 357, 179 P.3d 316, 320 (2008) (“[A] partnership is . . . an entity distinct from its partners[.]”); 
Jayo Development, Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 158 Idaho 148, 153, 345 P.3d 207, 212 
(2015) (holding that common control by a husband and wife of an LLC and corporation did not 
convert the LLC and corporation into a single entity). Further, more than a year had elapsed 
between the time RLP was dissolved and RFLP was formed. RLP’s arguments that RLP and RFLP 
are the same entity are unavailing.  
Finally, the analysis in Hayward was conducted against a backdrop of the statute of 
limitations: if the Court did not allow amendment of the pleadings in that case, the claims were 
time-barred and could not be brought elsewhere. Hayward, 136 Idaho at 346–47, 33 P.3d at 820–
21. The relation back doctrine of Rule 15(c) was vitally important in Hayward. Such is not the 
case here. Claims related to the construction of the Miller Easement road were asserted within the 
time set by the statute of limitations in the instant case and RFLP’s claims regarding the 
construction of the new fence in May 2021 have been preserved by its new filing in district court. 
See I.C. § 5-218(2). 
Due to these many distinctions, Hayward does not inform the result in this case. “Rule 
17(a) is designed to prevent a forfeiture when determination of the proper party is difficult or when 
an understandable mistake has been made in selecting the party plaintiff.” Conda P’ship, Inc. v. 
17 
M.D. Constr. Co., 115 Idaho 902, 904, 771 P.2d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 1989). Reid was a general 
partner of RLP and is a general partner of RFLP. He had knowledge of the transfers of the RLP 
land, as he demonstrated at trial. From his perspective, determination of the proper party to assert 
claims against Axelrod should not have been difficult. “In determining a reasonable time [in which 
a party should be joined or substituted], trial courts should consider the good faith of the plaintiff 
and the prejudice, if any, experienced by the defendant.” Id.  Because RLP sought to add RFLP on 
the third day of a four-day trial, the district court held that prejudice to Axelrod was sufficient to 
deny amendment to add a new party during trial. That decision was within the boundaries of the 
district court’s discretion.     
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
declining RLP’s request to add RFLP. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision 
declining to allow the amendment of RLP’s pleadings to add RFLP as a party. 
F. The trial court did not err in granting Axelrod’s motion for involuntary dismissal.  
On September 15, 2021, at the conclusion of the trial, Axelrod made an oral motion for 
directed verdict regarding Count I, Breach of Contract, in his own complaint as well as to RLP’s 
remaining counterclaims, which were violation of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
and conversion. On November 29, 2021, the district court issued its “Memorandum Decision on 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Directed Verdict,” granting the motion.  
At the outset, we note that, procedurally with respect to RLP’s counterclaims, Axelrod’s 
motion should have been a motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41(b). Spirit Ridge Min. Springs, LLC v. Franklin Cnty., 157 Idaho 424, 426, 337 P.3d 
583, 585 (2014).  
[A] judge does not render a verdict in a bench trial. Therefore, a directed verdict 
[motion] at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence in a bench trial is inappropriate. A 
directed verdict is defined as “[a] ruling by a trial judge taking a case from the jury 
because the evidence will permit only one reasonable verdict.” Black’s Law 
Dictionary, at 1791 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).  
 Id.    
Accordingly, we review the district court’s dismissal of RLP’s counterclaims under the 
standard for reviewing a dismissal pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). “When a 
defendant moves for an involuntary dismissal at the close of the plaintiff’s presentation in a non-
jury case, the court sits as a trier of fact and is not required to construe all evidence and inferences 
to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Keenan v. Brooks, 
18 
100 Idaho 823, 825, 606 P.2d 473, 475 (1980)). “The trial court is to weigh the evidence, resolve 
any conflicts in it, and decide for itself where the preponderance lies.” Cummings v. Stephens, 157 
Idaho 348, 355, 336 P.3d 281, 288 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A trial 
court’s findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. “When 
deciding whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this Court does not substitute its view of 
the facts for that of the trial court. It is the province of the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence 
and to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id. (quoting Miller v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 
Inc., 139 Idaho 825, 832, 87 P.3d 934, 941 (2004)). “Although there may be conflicting evidence, 
substantial and competent evidence exists if there is evidence in the record that a reasonable trier 
of fact could accept and rely upon in making the factual finding challenged on appeal.” Hood v. 
Poorman, 171 Idaho 176, 186–87, 519 P.3d 769, 779–80 (2002) (alterations, internal quotation 
marks, and citation omitted).  
1. Violation of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Regarding RLP’s claim that Axelrod violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, the court, in its written decision, declared that Axelrod had fulfilled every obligation 
contemplated under the contract, including constructing the Miller Easement road within six 
months of the agreement when the terms of the Settlement Agreement required that it be 
constructed within two years. The court also declared that Axelrod’s approval for installation of 
an expensive cattle guard “instead of a cheaper one” was not a violation of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing because Section 1.06 of the Settlement Agreement granted Axelrod’s 
contractor, Matkin, “sole discretion” in installing the cattle guard, which included selection of the 
guard. The court also pointed to language in Section 1.06 of the agreement that stated, “Contractor 
will invoice Reid directly and may communicate with Reid regarding installation of the cattle 
guard,” to show that the parties’ agreement did not require communication with Reid or RLP. 
(Emphasis added.)   
The court discussed the evidence regarding the cost of the cattle guard, noting that Matkin’s 
company had done research on the type of cattle guard and believed the one they found was of 
good quality; Reid searched for another, less expensive cattle guard in the area from various sellers 
and was unable to find one; and there was no evidence in the record that Axelrod had influenced 
the selection of the cattle guard. For these reasons, the court held that Axelrod had not “nullified 
or significantly impaired any obligation required by the Settlement Agreement by approving the 
19 
installation of an expensive cattle guard as opposed to a cheaper or used cattle guard.”  
Regarding whether the cattle guard served as an effective barrier, Reid testified at trial that 
he was the sole proprietor of the entity that owns and operates the cattle business. The court 
concluded that RLP did not have any legal interest in the dairy cattle. Accordingly, the court 
granted a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on RLP’s counterclaim for violation of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
On appeal, RLP argues that Axelrod used the 2017 case (leading to the Settlement 
Agreement) “as a ruse to facilitate the actual construction of a separate road . . . .” It argues that 
the timing of the signing of the Settlement Agreement—the night before trial was to begin—was 
suspect and that the litigation was an attempt to “beat down” Reid. RLP also argues that Axelrod 
acted in bad faith when he “unilaterally” directed Matkin to install the cattle guard in the fall of 
2018 because he had communicated to Reid that it may not happen until Spring, and because the 
cattle guard selected was an expensive one. RLP also alleges bad faith in Axelrod’s guaranteeing 
payment for the more expensive cattle guard because Reid had expressed discomfort with the price 
and Reid was responsible under the Settlement Agreement for paying for it.   
Axelrod asserts in response that Reid’s perspective is irrelevant to this proceeding, that 
RLP was represented by counsel in entering into the Settlement Agreement, that RLP agreed that 
the Settlement Agreement would be binding on all the parties, and that RLP entered into the 
Settlement Agreement for “valuable consideration.” Axelrod further argues that the cattle guard 
was selected and installed as agreed by the parties in Section 1.06 of the Settlement Agreement.  
“In every contract there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which 
requires the parties to perform, in good faith, the obligations required by their agreement.” Drug 
Testing Compliance Grp., LLC v. DOT Compliance Serv., 161 Idaho 93, 102–03, 383 P.3d 1263, 
1272–73 (2016) (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “A violation of the 
covenant occurs when either party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the 
contract.” Id. “The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not create independent 
obligations, it merely applies to contractual obligations.” Id.  
The court’s conclusion that Axelrod did not violate the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Section 1.06 of the Settlement 
Agreement provides:  
Axelrod will contract with Matkin Brothers Excavation, Inc. or another contractor 
20 
at Axelrod’s sole discretion (“Contractor”) to install the Miller Easement Road. 
Contractor will install an up-to sixteen-foot (16’) wide cattle guard on the Axelrod 
Property substantially in the vicinity of the Red Gate as identified on Exhibit C., 
which gate will be removed. Reid shall be solely responsible for the cost of the 
cattle guard and all labor and materials associated with its installation, including 
but not limited to additional grading and/or fill required for its proper installation 
and incorporation into the Miller Easement Road. Contractor will select the cattle 
guard and related materials and will determine the construction specifications 
consistent with the build out for the Miller Easement Road and subject to Axelrod’s 
approval, which will not be unreasonably withheld. Contractor will invoice Reid 
directly and may communicate with Reid regarding the installation of the cattle 
guard. Reid will fully cooperate with Contractor and will take no action that will 
interfere with or impede the construction of the Miller Easement Road or the work 
of the Contractor, surveyors or others participating in the construction. Once the 
cattle guard is completely and properly installed Axelrod shall be responsible for 
its maintenance.  
The record supports the conclusion that Axelrod fulfilled the terms of the Settlement 
Agreement in good faith. He contracted to have the Miller Easement road built within the time 
specified, and he directed the installation of a 16-foot cattle guard on his property. Pursuant to the 
terms of the Settlement Agreement, Matkin selected the cattle guard and sought Axelrod’s 
approval. Axelrod provided approval and the cattle guard was installed. Axelrod acted within the 
terms of the Settlement Agreement. The district court did not err in dismissing this claim.  
RLP’s argument that the 2017 litigation was a “ruse” so that Axelrod could build a new 
road is unpersuasive. There is no evidence in the record supporting this claim. By contrast, 
evidence in the record tends to show that Axelrod spent more than $50,000 developing the RLP 
Easement road, which he abandoned as soon as the Miller Easement road was built as part of the 
Settlement Agreement.  
RLP’s argument that the timing of the Settlement Agreement was coercive is also 
unpersuasive. As Axelrod points out, both parties were represented by counsel when the Settlement 
Agreement was signed, each was bound by the terms, and both parties certified that they received 
valuable consideration for the agreement.  
2. Conversion  
The court granted Axelrod’s motion for directed verdict on RLP’s conversion counterclaim 
related to the location and placement of the cattle guard. The court determined that the Settlement 
Agreement was unambiguous and precluded a finding of conversion because testimony at trial 
established that it was installed “substantially in the vicinity of the red gate” as required by the 
21 
agreement. 
Three elements must be present for a valid conversion claim. They are: “‘(1) that the 
charged party wrongfully gained dominion of property; (2) that property is owned or possessed by 
plaintiff at the time of possession; and (3) the property in question is personal property.’” Med. 
Recovery Servs., LLC v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 157 Idaho 395, 400, 336 P.3d 802, 
807 (2014) (quoting Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 846, 243 P.3d 642, 662 (2010)).  
The court’s conclusion on this claim is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
RLP did not have a valid conversion claim against Axelrod relating to placement of the cattle 
guard. The Settlement Agreement clearly states that the cattle guard was to be installed “on the 
Axelrod property.” It was always intended by the parties that the cattle guard be installed on the 
Axelrod property—and it was. Axelrod did not “wrongfully gain dominion” of it. As the elements 
of conversion could not be met under the facts of this case, the district court did not err in 
dismissing this claim. See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 689, 183 P.3d 771, 777 (2008) 
(affirming the trial court’s dismissal of a claim when an essential element had not been 
established).  
3. Breach of Contract  
Axelrod’s procedurally inappropriate motion for directed verdict on RLP’s counterclaims 
contained a motion for directed verdict on its own claim against RLP—breach of contract. 
Requesting a motion for directed verdict in a bench trial for success on one’s own claims is highly 
unusual. Because the district court took the motion under advisement and issued a written decision 
on the motion—with all its subparts—we treat the district court’s decision on Axelrod’s breach of 
contract claim as an adjudication on the merits of the claim. We take this stance because the 
issuance of the district court’s decision served to dismiss the counterclaims and issue judgment in 
favor of Axelrod on his breach of contract claim. Thereafter, Axelrod moved for entry of final 
judgment in the case and submitted a memorandum of attorney fees and costs, but there was no 
more discussion about the merits of the parties’ claims, nor was there a further ruling from the 
court regarding these claims. Thus, we review the district court’s decision on appeal for “whether 
the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions 
of law.” Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Constr. & Trucking, Inc., 151 Idaho 761, 768, 264 P.3d 400, 
407 (2011) (quoting Independence Lead Mines v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 26, 137 P.3d 
409, 413 (2006)). “This Court will set aside findings of facts only when clearly erroneous. We will 
22 
not disturb findings supported by substantial and competent evidence, even if the evidence is 
conflicting.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).   
On appeal, RLP argues that Axelrod breached the agreement by “unilaterally” selecting a 
cattle guard and guaranteeing its payment, thereby “tak[ing] Mr. Reid out of the discussions” about 
where to place the cattle guard and which cattle guard to purchase, causing him damages. Because 
of Axelrod’s breach, RLP argues, RLP was excused from performing under the contract. 
The trial court determined that there was no ambiguity in the Settlement Agreement, and 
as such, the parties’ duties and responsibilities were clear, declaring that the language in the 
agreement was “bargained for and agreed to.” Regarding the placement of the cattle guard, the 
court found that testimony from Axelrod and the contractor at trial established that the cattle guard 
was installed at the same location where the Red Gate was previously located, that Reid “was 
unable to give a definitive answer as to the location of the Cattle Guard,” and that no evidence was 
given to refute the claim that the cattle guard was installed at the location of the Red Gate. Thus, 
the trial court concluded that the cattle guard was installed “substantially in the vicinity of the Red 
Gate” as required by the Settlement Agreement.  
The court concluded that the only question left to be decided in ruling on Axelrod’s breach 
of contract claim was whether Reid had breached the agreement. Because it was undisputed that 
Reid had failed to pay for the cattle guard as agreed in the Settlement Agreement, the court ruled 
in favor of Axelrod. Our review confirms that the trial court’s decision is supported by substantial 
and competent evidence.   
By contrast, there is no evidence that Axelrod “unilaterally” selected the cattle guard in 
contravention of the agreement as RLP alleges. The evidence presented at trial showed that the 
Contractor conducted research regarding cattle guards available in the area that would work for 
the intended purpose and selected the one ultimately installed, after approval was given by Axelrod 
consistent with the requirements of Section 1.06 of the Settlement Agreement. The evidence also 
showed that Axelrod directed the Contractor to install it “exactly” where the Red Gate was located. 
Certainly, this was “substantially in the vicinity of the Red Gate,” as the district court concluded. 
Also important to this discussion is the language in Section 1.06 of the Settlement Agreement 
regarding the inclusion of Reid in the selection and installation of the cattle guard. As set forth 
above, it stated that “Contractor will invoice Reid directly and may communicate with Reid 
regarding the installation of the cattle guard.” (Emphasis added.) This clearly states that 
23 
communication with Reid was not a prerequisite to selection and installation of the cattle guard in 
accordance with the contract terms. See Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 160 Idaho 251, 
256, 371 P.3d 305, 310 (2016), abrogated on other grounds by 3G AG LLC v. Idaho Dep’t of 
Water Res., 170 Idaho 251, 509 P.3d 1180 (2022) (stating that “the word ‘may’ is permissive rather 
than the imperative or mandatory meaning of ‘must’ or ‘shall’”).  
The district court concluded that Axelrod did not breach the Settlement Agreement, and 
therefore, RLP was not excused from performance. Because we find that the district court’s 
decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence, we affirm the judgment of the 
district court ruling in favor of Axelrod on his contract claim.     
G. Attorney Fees  
1. As against Reid 
On May 19, 2020, the trial court granted Axelrod’s motion for summary judgment. On 
May 22, 2020, the court entered judgment against Reid and RLP and dismissed with prejudice all 
their claims. On May 29, 2020, Reid filed a motion for reconsideration and an affidavit in support 
of that motion. Before the court heard Reid’s motion for reconsideration, on June 2, 2020, Axelrod 
filed a memorandum of costs and fees requesting $28,215.05. Reid failed to timely respond to the 
memorandum.   
Reid’s reconsideration motion, as well as a motion by RLP to correct a clerical error, was 
heard by the court on July 21, 2020. At the hearing, the court denied Reid’s motion to reconsider. 
It also concluded that RLP was included in the judgment in error. As litigation regarding RLP and 
Axelrod would continue, the court requested that Axelrod submit another memorandum of attorney 
fees and costs, with reductions related to RLP. As instructed, Axelrod reviewed time entries and 
reduced his overall submission by $5,675. His new memorandum requested $22,540.05 in fees 
and costs.   
On July 29, 2021, the court issued an order vacating judgment as to RLP and denying 
Reid’s motion for reconsideration. Shortly thereafter, on July 31, 2021, Axelrod submitted another 
memorandum for attorney fees and affidavit of counsel for work related to defending the 
reconsideration motion. The amount sought by Axelrod for defense of this motion was $4,577.50. 
Reid timely responded to this memorandum and objected to the reasonableness of the fee request.   
A hearing on Axelrod’s attorney fees motion was conducted on September 15, 2020. On 
October 9, 2020, the court issued a written decision declining to award fees to Axelrod for 
24 
defending the motion to reconsider but awarding Axelrod the entire $22,540.05 requested for fees 
and costs related to litigating the motion for summary judgment. The court, in describing why it 
was declining to award attorney fees on the motion for reconsideration, stated: 
What constitutes a “reasonable fee” is a discretionary determination for the 
trial court, to be guided by the criteria of [Rule] 54(e)(3). Kelly v. Hodges, 119 
Idaho 872, 876, 811 P.2d 48, 52 (Ct. App. 1991)[;] Action Collection Servs., Inc., 
v. Bigham, 146 Idaho 286, 290, 192 P.3d 1110, 1114 (Ct. App. 2008). Among the 
factors listed in [Rule 53(e)(3)] is: (L) any other factor which the court deems 
appropriate in the particular case. The [c]ourt also notes that “[t]he amount of 
attorney’s fees to be awarded is a decision committed to the discretion of the trial 
court.” H2O Envtl. Inc. v. Farm Supply Distributors, Inc., 164 Idaho 295, 297–98, 
429 P.3d 183, 185–86 (2018).   
In considering the procedural history of this case, and in consideration of 
Reid’s objection to the reasonableness of the fees requested as articulated in his 
response and argument at hearing, the [c]ourt determines that the fees requested for 
defending against Reid’s Motion to Reconsider are not appropriate, when 
considering the totality of fees to be awarded in this case as further discussed below. 
As such the [c]ourt declines to award Axelrod’s costs that were incurred in 
defending against Reid’s motion to reconsider. 
 
On appeal, Axelrod argues that the district court erred in not referencing Section 3.05 of the 
parties’ Settlement Agreement in its decision on reconsideration. This was error, Axelrod asserts, 
because Idaho law requires that, when a party’s claim for attorney fees is based on a contract, the 
criteria in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) do not apply. For this proposition Axelrod cites 
Bank of Idaho v. Colley, 103 Idaho 320, 322, 647 P.2d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 1982); Chittenden & 
Eastman Co. v. Leasure, 116 Idaho 981, 982, 783 P.2d 320, 321 (Ct. App. 1989); and Farm Credit 
Bank of Spokane v. Wissel, 122 Idaho 565, 568, 836 P.2d 511, 514 (1992), overruled by Miller v. 
Rocking Ranch No. 3 Property Owners’ Association, Inc., 173 Idaho 285, ___, 541 P.3d 127, 
1293–94 (2024). Thus, Axelrod concludes, the district court erred in basing its denial of fees on 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3)(L). We agree.  
 
In Bank of Idaho, the Idaho Court of Appeals declared that “we cannot sustain the district court 
in treating the obligation to pay attorney fees differently from the obligation to pay the debt” 
required under the parties’ agreement. 103 Idaho at 326, 647 P.2d at 782.  
 
In Chittenden, this Court held that a prevailing party’s general entitlement to attorney fees 
under section 12-120 did not override a valid agreement between the parties limiting the dollar 
amount that could be claimed or awarded. 116 Idaho at 982, 783 P.2d at 321.   
In Farm Credit Bank, the Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that there was no 
25 
“prevailing party” for purposes of awarding costs under Rule 54(d)(1) but vacated the trial court’s 
order because it did not take into consideration the terms of the parties’ contract in determining 
the attorney fee and cost award. In its analysis, the Court declared, “where there is a valid contract 
between the parties which contains a provision for an award of attorney fees and costs, the terms 
of that contractual provision establish a right to an award of attorney fees and costs.” 122 Idaho at 
568–69, 836 P.2d at 514–15. 
Recently, Farm Credit Bank was overruled by this Court to the extent that it stood for the 
proposition that non-prevailing parties could be awarded attorney fees and costs pursuant to the 
terms of a contract between the parties:  
[G]oing forward, to be awarded attorney fees pursuant to a contractual provision, 
the party seeking fees must be both entitled to attorney fees under the contract and 
have prevailed on the discrete claim under the contract. . . . It will only be eligible 
for an award of attorney fees arising from claims on which it prevailed. 
Miller, 173 Idaho at ___, 541 P.3d at 1292. Farm Credit Bank, however, still stands for the 
proposition that when there is a choice between a statute-based entitlement to attorney fees and a 
contract-based entitlement to attorney fees, the contractual standard applies. 122 Idaho at 568–69, 
836 P.2d at 514–15. This standard was not overruled in Miller.  
Section 3.05 of the parties’ Settlement Agreement concerned the payment of attorney fees. 
It reads:  
In the event a Party is required to employ an attorney for the enforcement of any 
right under this Agreement or for the resolution of any dispute arising from this 
Agreement, with or without suit, the defaulting or non-prevailing Party agrees to 
pay the non-defaulting or prevailing Party’s reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
 
We agree that this mutually-agreed-upon contract term should have been the basis for the 
attorney fee awards, including those requested by Axelrod for defending against Reid’s motion for 
reconsideration. Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 186, 75 P.3d 743, 747 (2003) (“Where 
a valid contract between the parties contains a provision for an award of attorney fees, the terms 
of the contract establish a right to attorney fees.”). For this reason, we vacate the district court’s 
refusal to award attorney fees to Axelrod for his defense of Reid’s motion for reconsideration. On 
remand, determination of fees associated with the reconsideration motion should be based on 
Section 3.05 of the parties’ Settlement Agreement. The decision to award attorney fees is at the 
trial court’s discretion and will be reviewed for abuse of that discretion. Tricore Invs., LLC v. 
Estate of Warren ex rel. Warren, 168 Idaho 596, 627, 485 P.3d 92, 123 (2021).    
26 
2. As against RLP 
At the conclusion of a four-day trial on Axelrod’s and RLP’s claims, Axelrod submitted a 
“Memorandum of Costs and Fees” that requested an award of $12,860.23 in costs and $70,336.25 
in attorney fees. The court determined that Axelrod was the prevailing party in the matter and, as 
such, was entitled to an award of costs pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. The court 
then went through many of the items on Axelrod’s list, declining to pay the full amount requested. 
The result was that Axelrod’s request for costs as of right was reduced from $3,043.23 to 
$1,043.23. After analysis of each of the factors in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(e)(3), the 
trial court reduced Axelrod’s request for attorney fees by 25%, awarding him $52,725.50.   
Axelrod argues that the district court erred in reducing his attorney fees incurred in 
prevailing over RLP. As the district court’s judgment regarding the dismissal of RLP’s trespass 
claim is vacated with this opinion, litigation between the parties to resolve this claim will continue. 
Accordingly, we vacate the award of attorney fees to Axelrod as against RLP for determination of 
an appropriate fee award at the conclusion of the proceedings.   
3. On appeal.  
Axelrod requests attorney fees and costs on appeal against both RLP and Reid. Axelrod 
makes this request under Section 3.05 of the parties’ Settlement Agreement and Idaho Code section 
12-121. This Court may award attorney fees on appeal pursuant to a contractual provision. Off-
Spec Sols., LLC v. Transp. Invs., LLC, 168 Idaho 734, 740, 487 P.3d 326, 332 (2021) (citing 
O’Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 912, 188 P.3d 846, 854 (2008)). If attorney fees 
are not awarded to a prevailing party on appeal under a contractual provision for attorney fees, 
“the amount of . . . recovery on the defendant’s contractual obligation would be reduced, contrary 
to the purpose of the contractual provision for payment of attorneys’ fees in the event of suit 
brought” to enforce the contract. Vaughn v. Vaughn, 91 Idaho 544, 548, 428 P.2d 50, 54 (1967) 
(citations omitted).  
The litigation between Axelrod and RLP will continue; therefore, there is not yet a 
prevailing party. If Axelrod is ultimately the prevailing party, then the district court may award 
him attorney fees against RLP for this appeal pursuant to Section 3.05 of the Settlement 
Agreement.  Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC. v. MacDonald, 162 Idaho 228, 236, 395 P.3d 1261, 
1269 (2017). Costs on appeal are awarded to RLP pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40. 
27 
Axelrod has prevailed on all claims brought against Reid and all claims asserted by Reid 
against Axelrod. Axelrod is awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal against Reid under Section 
3.05 of the parties’ Settlement Agreement. Because we award attorney fees on appeal under 
Section 3.05 of the Settlement Agreement, we do not address attorney fees under Idaho Code 
section 12-121. Axelrod is entitled to costs on appeal against Reid pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule 40. 
Because we award attorney fees on appeal under Section 3.05 of the Settlement Agreement, 
we do not address attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the grant of summary judgment as against Reid 
individually and affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing RLP’s counterclaims for 
conversion and violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. We also affirm 
the judgment of the district court on Axelrod’s breach of contract claim and the judgment of the 
district court refusing to allow amendment of the pleadings to add RFLP as a party. We vacate the 
judgment of the district court dismissing RLP’s trespass claim. We affirm the award of attorney 
fees to Axelrod as against Reid for costs incurred in prosecuting summary judgment claims but 
vacate the judgment of the district court declining to award attorney fees for defense of the motion 
for reconsideration. We vacate the attorney fee award as against RLP and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Axelrod is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal 
for all claims involving Reid. The district court may award Axelrod attorney fees on appeal for all 
claims involving RLP if he is the prevailing party on remand. RLP is entitled to costs on appeal 
from Axelrod. 
Chief Justice BEVAN and Justices BRODY, ZAHN, and YEE-WALLACE, J. Pro Tem, 
CONCUR.