Title: ROBERT E. HINCKS V. WALTON RANCH COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROBERT E. HINCKS V. WALTON RANCH COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation2007 WY 12150 P.3d 669Case Number: 06-111Decided: 01/23/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
ROBERT 
E. HINCKS,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
WALTON 
RANCH COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy Guthrie, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Richard J. Mulligan of Mulligan & Owens, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming; Heather 
Noble, Jackson, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Noble.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Bradford S. Mead of Mead & Mead, Jackson, Wyoming. 

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Robert E. Hincks was injured when the 
vehicle in which he was riding struck a cow. He filed negligence claims against 
the driver of the vehicle, David E. Carpenter, and the owner of the cow, Walton 
Ranch Company (Walton).  He settled 
his claims against Mr. Carpenter.  
Mr. Hincks and Walton proceeded with discovery and Walton filed a motion 
for summary judgment.  After a 
hearing, the district court granted the motion, holding there was no evidence of 
negligence on Walton's part.  Mr. 
Hincks appeals the order granting summary judgment.  We conclude genuine issues of material 
fact existed precluding summary judgment and reverse.

            

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The issue for our 
consideration is whether a genuine issue of material fact existed on Mr. Hincks' 
claim that Walton was negligent in permitting a cow to get out of its pasture 
onto a public highway. 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  On May 14, 2004, at approximately 11:00 
p.m., Mr. Hincks was riding in a vehicle driven by Mr. Carpenter on Highway 22 
near Jackson, Wyoming.  
The vehicle struck a cow that had wandered onto the highway.  The cow was owned by Walton and had been 
pastured on Walton land located along the north side of the highway.  

 
 
[¶4]  At the scene of the accident, a private 
gravel driveway intersects Highway 22 from the north side.  The driveway, called Iron Rock Road, runs 
along the west side of the Walton property and is separated from it by a post 
and wire fence with a gate leading to the pasture.  

 
 
[¶5]  Mr. Hincks claimed Walton was negligent 
in permitting livestock to roam at large onto a public highway in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-24-108 (LexisNexis 2005) which provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 

(a)   No owner 
or person having custody or charge of livestock shall permit the livestock to 
run at large in any fenced public highways in Wyoming as defined in W.S.§ 
31-1-101. 

 
 
The 
parties conducted discovery and Walton filed a motion for summary judgment, 
claiming the only facts presented were:  
Walton owned the cow; it was on the road; it got out of the pasture; the 
vehicle hit the cow; Mr. Hincks was injured.  Walton claimed these facts were 
insufficient to establish negligence under Wyoming law.

 
 
[¶6]  After a hearing, the district court 
granted Walton's motion for summary judgment.  The district court concluded evidence 
that the cow was on the road did not establish a violation of § 11-24-108.  Citing Nylen v. Dayton, 770 P.2d 1112, 1115 
(Wyo. 1989), the district court concluded the statute required proof of 
knowledge, consent, willfulness or equivalent negligence on the livestock 
owner's part.  Finding no evidence 
of knowledge, consent, willfulness or equivalent negligence on Walton's part, 
the district court concluded no statutory violation occurred and summary 
judgment was proper.  Mr. Hincks 
appeals from the district court's order granting summary judgment.    

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]  When reviewing an order granting a 
summary judgment motion, we consider the record de novo.  Knapp v. Landex Corp., 2006 WY 36, ¶ 7, 
130 P.3d 924, 926 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]  Mr. Hincks claims genuine issues of 
material fact existed precluding summary judgment on his claim that Walton was 
negligent.  Our review of orders 
granting summary judgment is governed by W.R.C.P. 56(c), which provides in 
pertinent part:  

 
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
When 
reviewing a summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of all 
favorable inferences which may be fairly drawn from the record.   Cathcart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 2005 WY 154, ¶ 11, 123 P.3d 579, 586 (Wyo. 2005).  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if proven, would have the effect of establishing or 
refuting an essential element of an asserted cause of action or defense.  Wyo. Downs 
Rodeo Events, LLC v. State, 2006 WY 55, ¶ 11, 134 P.3d 1223, 1228 (Wyo. 
2006).

 
 
[¶9]  Viewed in the light most favorable to 
Mr. Hincks, the evidence presented during the summary judgment phase of this 
case showed the cow that Mr. Carpenter's vehicle struck belonged to Walton and 
was pastured on Walton property on the northeast side of the intersection of 
Highway 22 and Iron Rock 
Road.  
Walton maintained the fence between Iron Rock Road and the pasture.  Mr. Carpenter testified he inspected the 
gate after the accident and the wire loop that goes over the top of the gate 
post to hold it closed was not connected, leaving an opening of approximately 
two feet.  He testified it "looked 
like a cow had been rubbing on it and it probably broke loose from the cow's 
weight."    

 
 
[¶10]  William Cawley, a Walton employee, 
testified that when he arrived at the scene shortly after the accident, he 
inspected the fence and found the stay was out of the bottom rung on the south 
end of the gate, leaving the bottom of the gate unfastened.  He testified he thought maybe the cow 
got out of the pasture through the opening at the bottom of the gate.  Trooper Shannon Basaraba of the Wyoming 
Highway Patrol testified the fence was damaged.  He testified it looked like something 
had pushed or scraped at the fence and opened it up.  Deputy Curt Drumheller of the Teton 
County Sheriff's Office testified that on one of the sections of the fence along 
the driveway all of the strands of wire between two of the posts were down on 
the ground, allowing access in and out of the pasture.       

 
 
[¶11]  As the above testimony reflects, there 
was a conflict in the testimony as to the nature of the opening in the 
fence.  However, all of the 
witnesses testified that they observed an opening in the fence between the 
Walton pasture and Iron Rock 
Road, either because the fence was damaged or because 
the gate was not secured.  Despite 
this testimony, the district court concluded the evidence was not sufficient to 
establish negligence on Walton's part because, while it showed the cow was on 
the highway, it did not show Walton's knowledge, consent, willfulness or 
equivalent negligence.  In reaching 
this result, the district court relied on Nylen.

 
 
[¶12]  We disagree with the result reached by 
the district court and its interpretation of Nylen.   In Nylen, a truck driver was injured when 
his truck collided with a horse owned by Dayton Ranches that had wandered onto 
the highway.  Prior to the accident, 
the horse had been kept in pastures owned by Dayton Ranches adjacent to the 
highway.  No evidence was presented 
showing how the horse got out of the pasture.  Evidence was presented that the pasture 
gate was closed at the end of the work day on the date of the 
accident.

 
 
[¶13]  The injured truck driver filed a 
complaint alleging Dayton Ranches was negligent per se or alternatively that § 
11-24-108 created a rebuttable presumption of negligence.  The district court granted summary 
judgment for Dayton Ranches concluding no evidence of negligence was presented 
and Wyoming 
law does not subject livestock owners to strict liability, negligence per se or 
presumptions of negligence.  We 
affirmed, stating:

 
 
[I]n the 
instant case, where appellant has admittedly failed to present any evidence of 
appellees' negligence, the mere presence of the horse on the highway fails to 
establish a violation of the statute and, in the absence of a statutory 
violation, there can be no question of negligence per se or a rebuttable 
presumption of negligence.

 
 

Nylen, 770 P.2d  at 1116-1117. 

 
 
[¶14]  The present case is easily distinguished 
from Nylen where the only evidence was a closed gate and 
a horse on the road and no evidence from which an inference could be made as to 
how the horse got out of the pasture and onto the road.  In contrast, the evidence in Mr. Hincks' 
case suggested the cow got out of the pasture onto the highway through a damaged 
section of the fence or an unsecured gate.  
Additionally, unlike the injured party in Nylen, Mr. Hincks did not claim § 
11-24-108 created negligence per se or a rebuttable presumption of 
negligence.  Rather, he claimed the 
evidence of the damaged fence established a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether Walton was negligent.  
Stated another way, Mr. Hincks asserted a genuine issue of material fact 
existed as to whether Walton, by failing to exercise reasonable care to properly 
secure the gate or maintain the fence, permitted the cow to escape and run at 
large on Highway 22 in violation of the statute.        
          

 
 
[¶15]  Given the evidence and Mr. Hincks' 
assertions, the instant case is more akin to Roitz v. Kidman, 913 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 
1996) than it is to Nylen.  In Roitz, a passenger was killed when the 
vehicle in which he was riding struck some cattle on a county road.  The deceased passenger's parents filed a 
complaint against the ranchers who owned the cattle claiming they were negligent 
in failing to keep their livestock off the road. 

 
 
[¶16]  Evidence was presented that the cattle 
had to travel through two gates to reach the spot where the accident 
happened.  The upper gate was open 
on the night of the accident. Conflicting testimony was presented as to whether 
the ranchers' practice was to keep it open or closed.  The lower gate was also open on the 
night of the accident, giving the cattle access to the highway.  Ranch employees testified they checked 
the lower gate and found it closed on the afternoon of the accident but did not 
check it that evening as was customary.  

 
 
[¶17]  The district court held the ranchers 
were not negligent and granted their motion for summary judgment.  This Court reversed, holding that 
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the ranchers were 
negligent.  We 
said:

 
 
A jury 
should determine what type of precautions the ranchers, as reasonable persons 
under all the circumstances, should have taken to keep their cattle off the 
roadway.  For example, should the 
ranchers have kept the gates closed and, if so, what actions should they have 
taken to ensure that the gates remained closed?  A jury must also determine from the 
conflicting evidence what precautions were actually taken by the ranchers to 
ensure that their cattle were not running at large on the roadway. 

 
 

Roitz, 913 P.2d  at 435.

 
 
[¶18]  As in Roitz, we hold Mr. Hincks raised genuine 
issues of material fact as to whether Walton was negligent.  The witnesses agreed an opening existed 
in Walton's fence through which the cow could have escaped.  A jury must determine from the 
conflicting evidence how the cow escaped and whether Walton took reasonable 
precautions to keep the cow from escaping.  
We made it clear in Nylen, 
where no evidence was presented to show how the horse got through the fence, that the mere escape of livestock onto 
the road is not evidence of the livestock owner's negligence.  However, unlike Nylen, some evidence was presented here 
to show the cow could have gotten through the fence and onto the road through an 
unsecured gate or damaged section of fence.  This evidence was sufficient to raise a 
jury question concerning whether Walton permitted the cow to escape by failing 
to exercise reasonable care in constructing, maintaining or inspecting the gate 
or fence or whether, instead, Walton exercised reasonable care and the cow 
simply rubbed the gate down during the night.  

 
 
[¶19]   Reversed.