Title: Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 1/19/17 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
BERTHE FELICITE KABRAN, 
) 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S227393 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D064133 
SHARP MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, 
) 
 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 37-2010- 
 
 
) 
00083678-CU-PO-CTL 
 
____________________________________) 
 
A jury returned a special verdict finding that Sharp Memorial Hospital (the 
Hospital) was negligent in its treatment of Eke Wokocha but that this negligence 
did not cause his quadriplegia.  Shortly thereafter, Wokocha died.  An autopsy 
revealed evidence that, according to Wokocha‘s widow, Berthe Kabran, called 
into question the jury‘s causation determination.  Kabran moved for a new trial on 
the basis of this evidence.  In submitting expert affidavits explaining the 
significance of this evidence, Kabran did not timely pay the necessary filing fee.  
The Hospital did not object to the timeliness of the affidavits, and the trial court 
granted Kabran‘s motion for a new trial.  The Hospital, relying on Erikson v. 
Weiner (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1663 (Erikson), argued on appeal that because the 
affidavits were not timely filed, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rely on them 
in hearing the new trial motion.  The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did 
not lack fundamental jurisdiction and that the Hospital forfeited its challenge to 
the timeliness of the affidavits by failing to object in the trial court.   
 
2 
We conclude that Code of Civil Procedure section 659a does not deprive a 
court of fundamental jurisdiction to consider affidavits submitted after the 30-day 
deadline set forth in the statute.  Because the Hospital did not object to the 
timeliness of the affidavits in the trial court, it may not raise this issue for the first 
time on appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
I. 
 
Wokocha sued the Hospital in October 2012, alleging he was mishandled 
by an occupational therapist during a postoperative stay at the Hospital in January 
2009.  The Hospital‘s negligence, Wokocha alleged, caused spinal shock and 
bleeding, which in turn caused Wokocha‘s deterioration into quadriplegia.  The 
suit proceeded to trial.  In February 2013, the jury returned a special verdict 
finding that the Hospital was negligent in the care of Wokocha but that this 
negligence was not a substantial factor causing Wokocha‘s quadriplegia.  (All 
dates in the following two paragraphs are in the year 2013.) 
 
Shortly after the verdict, Wokocha died, and the court substituted Kabran as 
plaintiff.  On March 1, Kabran filed a notice of intent to move for a new trial, 
alleging newly discovered material evidence as a ground for the motion.  On 
March 6, the parties stipulated to a 20-day extension under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 659a for Kabran to file moving papers and affidavits in support 
of her motion for a new trial.  (All undesignated statutory references are to the 
Code of Civil Procedure.)  The trial court‘s order granting the extension identified 
Monday, April 1, as the deadline for filing.  Because the César Chávez Day 
holiday fell on Sunday, March 31, that year, April 1 was a court holiday.  On April 
2, Kabran served the Hospital and attempted to file with the court a memorandum 
of points and authorities along with two declarations — one by Dr. Guerad Grice, 
the other by Dr. Jeffrey Gross — in support of her motion for a new trial.  
Kabran‘s memorandum and supporting affidavits argued for a new trial on the 
 
3 
basis of autopsy findings tending to show that the mass on Wokocha‘s spine 
causing his deterioration into quadriplegia was not a tumor, as the Hospital had 
argued, but a ―traumatic neuroma‖ consistent with the injury Wokocha allegedly 
suffered during his postoperative stay in January 2009. 
 
The series of events that gave rise to the issue before us began when 
Kabran, in filing the memorandum and supporting affidavits on April 2, failed to 
pay the requisite filing fee.  On April 4, the clerk of court canceled the original 
April 2 time stamp and did not process the submissions.  Before the time stamp 
was canceled, however, Kabran obtained via an ex parte hearing on April 3 an 
order setting a new trial motion hearing for April 12 with a deadline for the 
Hospital‘s opposition papers of April 10.  Kabran‘s memorandum was stamped as 
received, with filing fees, on April 5; the Gross and Grice affidavits were filed on 
April 9.  In opposition, the Hospital submitted numerous evidentiary objections to 
the content of the affidavits and argued that the allegedly new evidence was 
cumulative, could have been discovered through reasonable diligence before trial, 
and would not have changed the outcome of the trial.  The Hospital did not object 
to the admission of the memorandum or supporting affidavits on the ground that 
they were untimely filed.  On April 12, the trial court granted Kabran‘s motion for 
a new trial on the grounds that ―[t]here is a probability that this new evidence [the 
autopsy findings] may render a different result in a new trial‖ and that the 
evidence ―could not, with reasonable diligence, [have] been discovered and 
produced at trial.‖  The order quoted Grice‘s affidavit in support of this 
conclusion. 
 
The Hospital appealed.  In addition to disputing the new trial order on its 
merits, the Hospital argued for the first time that the Grice and Gross affidavits 
were not timely filed under section 659a, that the 30-day aggregate period set forth 
in section 659a is jurisdictional, and that the trial court‘s order relying on the 
 
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belated filings was therefore void.  The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, 
explaining that the trial court‘s reliance on the Grice and Gross affidavits was ―in 
excess of its jurisdiction, but nevertheless within its fundamental jurisdiction.‖  
―Because [the Hospital] did not challenge the timeliness‖ of Kabran‘s affidavits 
and instead opposed the motion on the merits, the Court of Appeal held any 
objection waived and went on to affirm the trial court‘s new trial order on the 
merits.  In so holding, the Court of Appeal disagreed with Erikson, supra, 48 
Cal.App.4th 1663, which had held that the 20-day extension in section 659a is the 
exclusive remedy for a failure to file within the initial 10-day period and so trial 
courts lack jurisdiction to consider affidavits filed after the 30-day aggregate 
period.  We granted review. 
II. 
 
Sections 656 through 662 set forth when and how a party may move for a 
―re-examination of an issue of fact in the same court after a trial and decision by a 
jury, court, or referee.‖  (§ 656.)  Sections 659, 659a, and 660 set forth the 
procedures and deadlines associated with litigating a new trial motion.  A party 
must file a notice of its intent to move for a new trial either between the rendering 
of a decision and the judgment being entered; or within 15 days after the clerk 
mailed, or the opposing party received service of, written notice of the judgment; 
or within 180 days after the judgment was entered, ―whichever is earliest.‖  
(§ 659.)  Once jurisdiction is established by motion, the trial court has to rule on 
the motion within 60 days from the mailing or service of notice of judgment or, if 
no notice was given, within 60 days after the notice of intention to move for a new 
trial.  (§ 660.) 
 
Section 657 sets forth the possible grounds on which a trial court may grant 
a new trial motion.  Section 658 provides that although such a motion generally 
may rely solely on the minutes of the court, a motion that relies on newly 
 
5 
discovered evidence, juror misconduct, accident or surprise, or an irregularity in 
the proceedings ―must be made upon affidavits.‖  Section 659a establishes 
deadlines for submission of the required affidavits.  At the time Kabran submitted 
the Grice affidavit, section 659a read as follows:  ―Within 10 days of filing the 
notice, the moving party shall serve upon all other parties and file any affidavits 
intended to be used upon such motion.  Such other parties shall have ten days after 
such service within which to serve upon the moving party and file counter-
affidavits.  The time herein specified may, for good cause shown by affidavit or by 
written stipulation of the parties, be extended by any judge for an additional period 
of not exceeding 20 days.‖  (Former § 659a, as amended by Stats. 1989, ch. 1416, 
§ 20, p. 6232.)   
 
―A motion for a new trial is ‗a new statutory proceeding, collateral to the 
original proceeding‘ and constitutes a new action brought to set aside the 
judgment.‖  (Spruce v. Wellman (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 158, 161.)  Both the ―right 
to move for a new trial‖ and the court‘s jurisdiction to hear it are creatures of 
statute.  (Wagner v. Singleton (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 69, 72; 8 Witkin, Cal. 
Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 19, p. 601 [―there is 
no inherent power in the trial court to grant a new trial‖].)  A trial court gains 
jurisdiction to hear such a motion only after a party files a timely notice of intent 
and judgment has been entered.  (Tabor v. Superior Court (1946) 28 Cal.2d 505, 
508 [court had no jurisdiction to hear new trial motion filed before court signed 
and filed findings of fact and conclusion of law, and parties cannot overcome this 
jurisdictional defect by stipulation or waiver].)  Thus, a ―trial court does not have 
the jurisdiction to make an order granting a new trial on its own motion.‖  (Ehrler 
v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 147, 151.)  Nor is it ―within the power of the 
litigants to invest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the motion for a 
 
6 
new trial by consent, waiver, agreement or acquiescence.‖  (City of Santa Barbara 
v. Superior Court (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 612, 614.)   
 
Because the trial court‘s jurisdiction to hear a new trial motion is contingent 
upon the moving party‘s timely filing of notice, this court and the Courts of 
Appeal have repeatedly held that failure to adhere to the statutory provisions 
described above will make a subsequently granted new trial order reversible on 
appeal.  ―[I]t has uniformly been held that an order granting a new trial is in excess 
of jurisdiction and void if, for example, it is made . . . on a ground not prescribed 
by statute (Laumann v. Conner (1936) 12 Cal.App.2d 631; cf. Fomco, Inc. v. Joe 
Maggio, Inc. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 162, 166), or upon a notice of intention that is filed 
prematurely (Fong Chuck v. Chin Po Foon (1947) 29 Cal.2d 552; see also Auto 
Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 458–462) or too late 
(Smith v. Ibos (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 551) or is not served on an adverse party 
(Cox v. Certified Grocers of Cal. Ltd. (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 26, 31), or if the 
court purports to grant the motion after expiration of the statutory time for ruling 
(Hinrichs v. Maloney (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 544).‖  (Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 
Cal.2d 104, 118.) 
 
In particular, the trial court loses jurisdiction to hear a new trial motion if 
no notice of intent is filed within 15 days of the mailing or service of notice of 
entry of judgment, or within 180 days of the entry of the judgment.  (§ 659, 
subd. (b) [―The times specified . . . shall not be extended by order or stipulation‖]; 
see Neff v. Ernst (1957) 48 Cal.2d 628, 634 [―The time limit prescribed by law . . . 
is jurisdictional‖]; Tri-County Elevator Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 135 
Cal.App.3d 271, 274.)  If notice is filed, the court loses power to rule on the 
motion after 60 days.  (Siegal v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 97, 101.)   
 
By contrast, the Courts of Appeal have consistently held that the 10-day 
deadline for the filing of affidavits is not jurisdictional.  A court may retroactively 
 
7 
extend the deadline for filing to the full 30-day period even if the party did not 
seek an extension in advance.  (See Fredrics v. Paige (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1642, 
1648; Boynton v. McKales (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 777, 782.)  In Wiley v. Southern 
Pacific Transportation Co. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 177, 187, the party opposing a 
new trial order argued for the first time on appeal that the moving party had failed 
to file a statutorily required declaration in support of his new trial motion.  Wiley 
held that the moving party‘s failure to file the declaration did not make the new 
trial order void where the opposing party did not object on that ground in the trial 
court and the motion was granted before the 30-day period expired.  (Id. at p. 188.)  
If the opposing party had raised the issue during that period, Wiley reasoned, there 
would still have been time for the moving party to cure the error.  (Ibid.) 
 
Here, the Hospital failed to challenge an affidavit filed after the 30-day 
aggregate period had expired.  Did the trial court have power to grant a new trial 
on the basis of that affidavit, or is such a new trial order void for lack of 
jurisdiction?  In Clemens v. Regents of University of California (1970) 8 
Cal.App.3d 1, the Court of Appeal concluded that the 30-day aggregate period is 
not jurisdictional, at least under the ―narrow and peculiar circumstances‖ 
presented by that case.  (Id. at pp. 21–22.)  By contrast, several decisions have 
held that a trial court must disregard affidavits filed after section 659a‘s deadlines; 
these decisions, according to the Hospital, suggest that the 30-day aggregate 
period is jurisdictional.  (See Maple v. Cincinnati, Inc. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 
387, 391–392; Sitkei v. Frimel (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 335, 339.)  But none of these 
cases addressed the jurisdictional question.  In Hicks v. Ocean Shore Railroad, 
Inc. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 773, we affirmed the denial of a new trial, explaining that an 
affidavit filed after the statutory period did ―not properly constitute a part of the 
record‖ and need not have been considered by the trial court.  (Id. at p. 790.)  
Hicks made no mention of whether the untimeliness was raised in the trial court, 
 
8 
but the point was not relevant.  We merely concluded that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying a new trial on the basis of affidavits that on their 
face were submitted after the statutory deadline.  (Id. at pp. 789–790.) 
 
In Erikson, the Court of Appeal squarely addressed this question and held 
that the 30-day deadline for filing affidavits is jurisdictional.  Plaintiff Erikson had 
been awarded significant damages in a medical malpractice suit, and defendant 
Weiner moved for a new trial due to juror misconduct.  Weiner filed four 
affidavits in succession:  one on October 24, the final day of an extension granted 
by the trial court; two on November 8; and a supplemental affidavit at the hearing 
on November 14.  Three of the four affidavits were by the same juror.  (Erikson, 
supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1667–1668.)  Over Erikson‘s objection, the trial court 
accepted a declaration filed after the 30-day aggregate period had ended.  (Id. at 
p. 1669.)  The trial court denied Weiner‘s motion for a new trial.  On appeal, the 
court held that it would not consider the belatedly filed affidavit in determining 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the new trial motion.  (Id. 
at p. 1671.) 
 
Treating the terms ―mandatory‖ and ―jurisdictional‖ as synonyms, Erikson 
concluded that the aggregate 30-day period for filing affidavits is mandatory.  
(Erikson, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1671.)  The court focused on section 659a‘s 
requirement that the moving party ―shall file his affidavits within 10 days‖ and 
construed the 20-day extension as ―a precise and expressly limited remedy for 
failure to comply.‖  (Erikson, at p. 1672.)  Observing that the limitation of a 20-
day extension ―is hedged by other mandatory time frames for initiating and 
resolving a new trial motion,‖ Erikson reasoned that ―the extension of time to file 
affidavits beyond the aggregate 30-day period provided in section 659a will 
almost always encroach upon the interests of the opposing party to her allotted 
time for response.‖  (Ibid.) 
 
9 
 
The Court of Appeal below found Erikson‘s reasoning unpersuasive.  First, 
the court concluded that the use of ―shall‖ in section 659a does not automatically 
mean the time limits are jurisdictional.  (See Nichols v. Hast (1965) 62 Cal.2d 598, 
600–601 [use of ―shall‖ in section 659 did not preclude trial court from granting 
new trial on basis of insufficiency of the evidence notwithstanding moving party‘s 
failure to state that the motion was on the minutes of the court].)  Second, rather 
than construe the 20-day extension as a remedy for a party‘s failure to abide by the 
initial 10-day limit, the Court of Appeal viewed this provision as ―merely giv[ing] 
the party the option to obtain an extension.‖  So construed, the statute did not 
specify any penalties for noncompliance, as a jurisdictional statute would.  Third, 
the court said Erikson erred in failing to distinguish between ―mandatory‖ and 
―jurisdictional‖ procedural provisions.  ―[I]n light of the general rule and the 
absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary . . . the period in which to file 
opposing papers . . . is not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense. . . .‖  The trial 
court may have erred in accepting the affidavit, the Court of Appeal reasoned, but 
the Hospital forfeited any objection ― ‗by failing to preserve it in the trial court.‘ ‖  
III. 
 
― ‗When courts use the phrase ―lack of jurisdiction,‖ they are usually 
referring to one of two different concepts, although . . . the distinction between 
them is ―hazy.‖ ‘  [Citation.]‖  (People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216, 224 (Lara).)  
A lack of fundamental jurisdiction is ― ‗ ―an entire absence of power to hear or 
determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties.  
[Citation.] . . .‖ [¶] . . . [F]undamental jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver, 
estoppel, or consent.  Rather, an act beyond a court‘s jurisdiction in the 
fundamental sense is null and void‘ ab initio.  [Citation.]  ‗Therefore, a claim 
based on a lack of . . . fundamental jurisdiction[] may be raised for the first time 
on appeal.  [Citation.]‘ ‖  (Id. at pp. 224–225, italics added.)  Likewise, ―a 
 
10 
collateral attack on a final judgment may be made at any time when the judgment 
under challenge is void because of an absence of ‗fundamental jurisdiction.‘ ‖  
(People v. Allegheny Casualty Co. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 704, 716, fn. 7.)  Here, when 
we refer to a court‘s ―lack of jurisdiction‖ or the ―jurisdictional‖ nature of a 
statute, we are referring to the court‘s fundamental jurisdiction. 
―Even when a court has fundamental jurisdiction, however, the 
Constitution, a statute, or relevant case law may constrain the court to act only in a 
particular manner, or subject to certain limitations.‖  (People v. Ford (2015) 61 
Cal.4th 282, 286–287.)   We have described courts that violate procedural 
requirements, order relief that is unauthorized by statute or common law, or 
otherwise ―fail to conduct [themselves] in the manner prescribed‖ by law as acting 
―in excess of jurisdiction.‖  (Lara, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 224–225.)  Because a 
court that acts in excess of jurisdiction still has ―jurisdiction over the subject 
matter and the parties in the fundamental sense‖ (Abelleira v. District Court of 
Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288 (Abelleira)), any such act is ―valid until set 
aside, and parties may be precluded from setting it aside by such things as waiver, 
estoppel, or the passage of time‖ (People v. Ruiz (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 574, 
584).  In contrast to errors concerning a court‘s fundamental jurisdiction, ―[e]rrors 
which are merely in excess of jurisdiction should be challenged directly . . . and 
are generally not subject to collateral attack once the judgment is final . . . . ‖  
(People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 661.) 
 
In interpreting statutory requirements, courts have also used the terms 
―mandatory‖ and ―directory.‖  Whether a requirement is mandatory or directory is 
determined largely by its effect:  ―If the failure to comply with a particular 
procedural step does not invalidate the action ultimately taken . . . the procedural 
requirement is referred to as ‗directory.‘  If, on the other hand, it is concluded that 
noncompliance does invalidate subsequent action, the requirement is deemed 
 
11 
‗mandatory.‘  [Citation.]‖  (Edwards v. Steele (1979) 25 Cal.3d 406, 410 
(Edwards); see People v. Gray (2014) 58 Cal.4th 901, 909 (Gray).)  The 
mandatory-directory distinction is not to be confused with the distinction between 
―obligatory‖ and ―permissive‖ statutory provisions.  (People v. McGee (1977) 19 
Cal.3d 948, 959 (McGee).)  The latter distinction concerns whether a 
governmental entity or party is required to conform to a certain procedure (i.e., 
obligatory) or whether it ―may or may not comply as it chooses‖ (i.e., permissive).  
(Id. at p.  959; see B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 182.)  
By contrast, ― ‗the ―directory-mandatory‖ distinction is concerned only with 
whether a particular remedy — invalidation of the ultimate governmental action 
— is appropriate when a procedural requirement is violated.‘ ‖  (People v. Allen 
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 91, 101, italics added (Allen); see ibid. [noncompliance with a 
directory rule does not invalidate the underlying action, but the rule may be 
enforced by other means, ― ‗such as injunctive relief, mandamus, or monetary 
damages‘ ‖].) 
 
Erikson understood ―mandatory‖ as a synonym for ―jurisdictional.‖  
(Erikson, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1671.)  This court also has suggested on 
occasion that the ―mandatory‖ and ―jurisdictional‖ labels refer to the same 
concept.  (See Edwards, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 410; California Correctional Peace 
Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1148 (Correctional 
Peace Officers).)  Where the statutory provision at issue governs a decisionmaking 
entity‘s exercise of authority — like that of an administrative agency — a 
―mandatory‖ statute may be ―jurisdictional‖ in the sense that the entity lacks the 
power to take the action at issue if it does not comply with the statute.  (See 
Edwards, at p. 410 [hearing deadlines for board of permit appeals]; Gray, supra, 
58 Cal.4th 901 [30-day warning period before issuing citations using a newly 
 
12 
installed automated traffic enforcement device]; City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 905 [notice to landlord before appointment of a receiver].)   
 
But a party‘s failure to comply with a mandatory requirement ―does not 
necessarily mean a court loses fundamental jurisdiction resulting in ‗an entire 
absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the 
subject matter or the parties.‘ ‖  (Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 101, fn. 5, quoting 
Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 288.)  It is a ―misuse of the term ‗jurisdictional‘ 
. . . to treat it as synonymous with ‗mandatory‘ ‖ as a general matter.  (2 Witkin, 
Cal. Procedure, supra, Jurisdiction, § 4, p. 578.)  ―There are many time provisions, 
e.g., in procedural rules, that are not directory but mandatory; these are binding, 
and parties must comply with them to avoid a default or other penalty.  But failure 
to comply does not render the proceeding void‖ in a fundamental sense.  (Ibid.; see 
Poster v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit District (1990) 52 Cal.3d 266, 274–275; 
City of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 545, 551, fn. 2 (Santa 
Clara) [Courts of Appeal ―erred in reasoning that the limitation, because 
mandatory, was necessarily jurisdictional.‖].)  The high court has similarly 
recognized, as a matter of federal law, that ―mandatory‖ rules should not always 
―be given the jurisdictional brand.‖  (Henderson v. Shinseki (2011) 562 U.S. 428, 
435; see Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. (2006) 546 U.S. 500, 510; Eberhart v. United 
States (2005) 546 U.S. 12, 17–18; see also Bowles v. Russell (2007) 551 U.S. 205, 
216–217 (dis. opn. of Souter, J.).) 
For example, a statute of limitations may be ―mandatory in the sense that 
the court may not excuse a late complaint on grounds of mistake, neglect, or the 
like,‖ but ―it is not ‗jurisdictional.‘ ‖  (Santa Clara, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 551, 
fn. 2.)  A properly raised objection to an untimely complaint may require that the 
court dismiss it, and the court‘s failure to dismiss is reversible on appeal.  But a 
party cannot raise the untimeliness for the first time on appeal or in a collateral 
 
13 
attack.  If an untimely complaint results in a judgment, the judgment will not be 
disturbed on timeliness grounds if the defendant did not properly preserve a statute 
of limitations defense.  (See Samuels v. Mix (1999) 22 Cal.4th 1, 8; cf. Gonzalez v. 
Thaler (2012) 565 U.S. __, __ [132 S.Ct. 641, 651] [―calling a rule 
nonjurisdictional does not mean that it is not mandatory or that a timely objection 
can be ignored‖].) 
In sum, jurisdictional rules are mandatory, but mandatory rules are not 
necessarily jurisdictional.  Noncompliance with a mandatory rule can result in 
invalidation of the action so long as the noncompliance is properly raised; a party 
can forfeit its challenge to the noncompliance by failing to object.  Noncompliance 
with a jurisdictional rule cannot be excused or forfeited; a party may assert such 
noncompliance for the first time on appeal or in a collateral attack as a ground for 
invalidating the action.  In addition, a court may decide on its own motion that it 
lacks authority over the action because of noncompliance with a jurisdictional 
rule.  (See Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at pp. 302–303.) 
 
Sections 657, 659, and 660, which govern on what ground and in what time 
period a litigant may seek a new trial, fall into the jurisdictional category.  Not 
only is a party‘s attempt to file a notice of intent after the relevant deadline invalid, 
but the court has no power to issue a ruling on the basis of an untimely filed notice 
or on a ground not set forth in the statute.  (See § 660 [―the power of the court to 
rule on a motion for a new trial shall expire 60 days from‖ the mailing, service, or 
relevant filing]; Watkins v. Nutting (1941) 17 Cal.2d 490, 499 [―A notice of 
intention to move for a new trial upon one or more of the grounds specified in the 
Code of Civil Procedure is essential to the court‘s jurisdiction.‖]; Wagner v. 
Singleton, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 72 [trial court lacks jurisdiction to grant 
new trial on grounds not specified in the notice of intent]; In re Marriage of 
Beilock (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 713, 721 [―It is well settled that a timely filing of 
 
14 
the notice of intention to move for a new trial [under section 659] is jurisdictional, 
and the time cannot be extended or waived by the parties.‖].)  Thus, a party‘s 
failure to comply with any of these sections ― ‗may be raised for the first time on 
appeal.‘ ‖  (Lara, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 225.) 
The question here is whether section 659a‘s deadlines are similarly 
jurisdictional.  We hold that they are not.  As explained below, the Court of 
Appeal correctly concluded that the Hospital cannot challenge Kabran‘s alleged 
noncompliance for the first time on appeal. 
IV. 
 
There are two presumptions, one general and one specific, against 
concluding that a trial court has no power to consider affidavits filed outside the 
30-day aggregate period specified in section 659a.  First, we generally presume 
courts have jurisdiction unless specifically curtailed by the Legislature.  Our case 
law reflects a preference for the resolution of litigation and the underlying 
conflicts on their merits by the judiciary.  ―While the courts are subject to 
reasonable statutory regulation of procedure and other matters, they will maintain 
their constitutional powers in order effectively to function as a separate 
department of government.  [Citations.]  Consequently an intent to defeat the 
exercise of the court's jurisdiction will not be supplied by implication.‖  (Garrison 
v. Rourke (1948) 32 Cal.2d 430, 436.)  Second, and more specifically, ―[u]nless 
the Legislature clearly expresses a contrary intent, time limits are typically deemed 
directory.‖  (Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 102; see Correctional Peace Officers, 
supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1145 [requirement that board issue disciplinary decision is 
directory].) 
 
These presumptions are rebuttable.  We find time limits to have 
jurisdictional significance where the Legislature clearly so intends.  ―Courts have 
. . .  adopted various tests to determine the Legislature‘s ‗probable intent‘ ‖ in such 
 
15 
instances.  (Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 102, fn. 6.)  Some courts have held that 
the presumption may only be overcome where ― ‗a consequence or penalty is 
provided for failure to do the act within the time commanded.‘ ‖  (Edwards, supra, 
25 Cal.3d at p. 410; accord, Correctional Peace Officers, supra, 10 Cal.4th at 
p. 1143.)  Other courts have looked to whether the consequences of holding a time 
limitation mandatory or jurisdictional ―would defeat or promote the purpose of the 
enactment.‖  (Edwards, at p. 410, citing Morris v. County of Marin (1977) 18 
Cal.3d 901, 909–910.)  ―There is no ‗ ―simple, mechanical test‖ ‘ for making this 
determination.‖  (City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 924.)  
The question is ultimately one of legislative intent.  (McGee, supra, 19 Cal.3d at 
p. 962.)  
 
 In construing section 659a, we begin ―with the language of the statute, 
‗giv[ing] the words their usual and ordinary meaning [citation], while construing 
them in light of the statute as a whole and the statute‘s purpose [citation].‘ ‖  
(Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.)  The text of section 
659a does not reveal a clear legislative intent to deprive courts of the power to 
consider untimely filed affidavits.  As the Court of Appeal below observed, 
section 659a‘s instruction that either party ―shall‖ serve and file affidavits within 
10 days does not necessarily imply the deadline is jurisdictional.  ―The context of 
the language, as well as other indicia of legislative intent, must be considered‖ 
along with the choice of ―may‖ or ―shall.‖  (Lara, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 227.)   
Legislative intent that a time limit be jurisdictional may be signaled where the 
statute sets forth time limits in ―unusually emphatic form,‖ by ―reiterat[ing] its 
limitations several times in several different ways,‖ or, for example, by asserting 
that ― ‗no [relief] shall be allowed or made after the expiration of the period of 
limitation prescribed . . . unless a claim . . . is filed . . . within such period.‘ ‖  
(United States v. Brockamp (1997) 519 U.S. 347, 350–351.)   
 
16 
 
Sections 659 and 660 include such clear markers of legislative intent that 
their respective deadlines are jurisdictional.  Section 660 mentions jurisdiction 
expressly:  ―[T]he power of the court to rule on a motion for a new trial shall 
expire 60 days from‖ the filing of the notice of intent or service of notice of entry 
of judgment.  ―If such motion is not determined within said period of 60 days, . . . 
the effect shall be a denial of the motion without further order of the court.‖  
(Ibid.)  And section 659, subdivision (b) provides that ―[t]he times specified . . . 
shall not be extended by order or stipulation . . . .‖  Section 659a, by contrast, has 
no such language or clear limits on jurisdiction.  It is significant that the 
Legislature, while using language to identify closely related time limitations in this 
set of statutes as jurisdictional, did not use similar language with regard to the 
affidavit deadlines.  (In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610, 638 [―When language 
is included in one portion of a statute, its omission from a different portion 
addressing a similar subject suggests that the omission was purposeful.‖].) 
Further, unlike sections 659 and 660, section 659a contains no 
― ‗consequence or penalty‘ ‖ for noncompliance with the affidavit filing deadlines.  
(Edwards, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 410.)  As the Court of Appeal below observed, 
section 659a ―merely gives the party the option to obtain an extension of that 
time.‖  Our precedent disfavors inferring a penalty for noncompliance, as the court 
in Erikson did (see Erikson, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1672); such penalties or 
consequences should ―clearly reflect[] legislative intent to deprive the [court or 
agency] of further jurisdiction.‖  (Correctional Peace Officers, 10 Cal.4th at 
p. 1148, italics added.)   
  
The fact that the deadlines of sections 659 and 660 are jurisdictional may 
still suggest that the 30-day aggregate period in section 659a is jurisdictional if all 
of the deadlines form an intricately balanced or interconnected timing scheme.  
Erikson reasoned that because the affidavit deadlines are ―hedged by other 
 
17 
mandatory time frames for initiating and resolving a motion for new trial,‖ they 
must be similarly jurisdictional.  (Erikson, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1672.) 
 
The statutory scheme here provides that submission of affidavits must come 
within the 60-day jurisdictional period set forth by section 660.  But the deadlines 
specified in section 659a are not strictly tied to the timeline set forth in sections 
659 and 660.  Where the start of the 60-day jurisdictional period is triggered by the 
clerk mailing or the nonmoving party serving written notice of the entry of 
judgment, it is impossible for both parties to benefit from the full periods for filing 
affidavits set forth in section 659a.  If the moving party takes the full 15 days to 
file its notice of intent to move for a new trial after being served notice of entry of 
judgment, and if both parties receive the full extensions authorized by section 
659a, then the final affidavits would not be due until 75 days after notice of entry 
of judgment was sent or served — at which point the trial court would have 
already lost jurisdiction over the new trial motion.  Thus, although the Hospital is 
correct that a moving party‘s failure to adhere to the deadlines necessarily comes 
at the expense of the nonmoving party, the Legislature did not enact a scheme 
designed to ensure symmetry between the moving and nonmoving parties with 
respect to the time allowed for filing affidavits, as even strict adherence to the 
deadlines does not ensure such symmetry.  The section 659a deadlines may be 
―hedged‖ by jurisdictional time limits (Erikson, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1672), 
but those jurisdictional time limits in sections 659 and 660 are in no way 
dependent on or affected by the timing of affidavit submissions under section 
659a.  (Section 659a was recently amended as part of a legislative effort to 
reconcile the deadlines and procedures for motions for a new trial, motions for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and motions to vacate the judgment in an 
effort to reduce confusion among parties filing one or more of these related 
posttrial motions.  (Stats. 2014, ch. 93, § 2.).) 
 
18 
Moreover, whereas the Legislature enacted section 660 ―to do away with all 
uncertainty as to the power and jurisdiction of trial courts in the premises‖ 
(Strehlow v. Mothorn (1925) 197 Cal. 112, 116), the history of section 659a 
reveals nothing that suggests a legislative intent to deprive courts of jurisdiction to 
consider affidavits filed outside of the specified time limits.  Section 659a was 
enacted in 1929 (Stats. 1929, ch. 479, § 4, p. 84) and, between then and the time of 
Kabran‘s new trial motion, has undergone only minor revisions not relevant to the 
question before us.  Before the adoption of section 659a, provisions for the 
submission of affidavits in support of a new trial motion were part of section 659.  
The addition of section 659a was part of Senate Bill No. 73, an omnibus bill 
introduced at the behest of the Judicial Council in order to (among other things) 
―reduce the volume of frivolous and unnecessary appeals brought to correct errors 
which easily might be remedied by the trial courts‖ by affording ―litigants every 
reasonable opportunity‖ to attempt to redress errors through a new trial motion in 
the lower court before proceeding on appeal.  (Judicial Council of Cal., 2d. Rep. to 
Governor and Legislature (1929) Synopsis of Bills Introduced in Legislature, p. 81 
(Judicial Council Rep.) [discussing Sen. Bill No. 73 (1929 Reg. Sess.)]; id. at p. 83 
[findings regarding § 662].)   
The most significant changes initially proposed were eliminated before the 
passage of section 659a.  The Judicial Council Report identified two provisions 
from the proposed section 659a as providing ―for a complete and fair disclosure in 
the trial court, both to the judge and the litigants, of all alleged errors committed 
therein‖:  first, that along with affidavits, parties must submit ―points and 
authorities‖; and second, that failure to submit any supporting points or affidavits 
―may be construed as an abandonment of the motion, or as an admission that the 
same should be granted.‖  (Judicial Council Rep., supra, at p. 82 [findings 
regarding § 659a].)  But both of these provisions were removed by committee 
 
19 
amendments prior to the passage of Senate Bill No. 73.  (Sen. Bill No. 73 (1929 
Reg. Sess.), as amended Apr. 12, 1929.)  Thus, section 659a, as eventually passed, 
simply ―incorporate[d] the existing provisions in section 659, relating to the 
affidavits to be used in support of the motion for a new trial.  The only change 
made is the insertion of a phrase permitting the parties to extend, by stipulation, 
the time for the filing of such affidavits.‖  (Hollzer, Synopsis of Legislation, 
Enacted in 1929, Upon Recommendation of Judicial Council (1929) 4 State Bar J. 
38, 41.) 
 
―Invariably, ‗courts look to the procedure‘s purpose or function‘ ‖ in 
assessing whether ― ‗noncompliance has an invalidating effect.‘ ‖  (City of Santa 
Monica v. Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 924.)  The Hospital argues that the 
purpose of section 659a is to protect nonmoving parties; any delay in filing 
affidavits by the moving party necessarily subtracts from the time available to the 
opposing party to submit its own materials because the court must rule on the 
motion within a 60-day period.  The Hospital‘s rule would effectively impose 
upon trial courts a sua sponte duty to ensure that affidavits are timely filed within 
the 30-day aggregate period.  But that burden should instead fall on the 
nonmoving party, which is in the best position to assert its interests in the fairness 
and efficiency of the litigation process. 
The Hospital could have objected to the allegedly untimely affidavits at the 
April 3, 2013 ex parte hearing or in the opposition it filed on April 10, 2013.  But 
the Hospital did not register any such objection on the record.  The Hospital 
argues that because the clerk did not cancel the affidavits‘ time stamp until April 
4, it ―could not have possibly known that Plaintiff‘s papers were not timely filed‖ 
at the time of the April 3 ex parte hearing.  But the Hospital had been timely and 
personally served with the affidavits on April 2 and thus could not have been 
prejudiced by their inclusion at the ex parte hearing.  In any event, the Hospital 
 
20 
was or should have been aware of the issue by April 10, yet the Hospital did not 
raise the issue in the opposition it filed that day. 
Because sections 659 and 660 dictate when litigation over a new trial 
motion may begin and when it must end, those deadlines are strictly enforced as 
jurisdictional.  Section 659a, by contrast, governs the dynamic period of litigation 
itself.  Section 659a‘s deadlines aim to provide adequate time and flexibility for 
the parties to submit materials and respond to each other‘s submissions, but the 
parties may reach stipulations or other arrangements in order to further what they 
mutually regard as a fair and efficient litigation process.  Trial courts have no sua 
sponte duty to monitor compliance with the deadlines for submitting affidavits; 
noncompliance, without objection by any party, does not deprive the court of 
jurisdiction to consider the affidavits. 
 
Section 659a is distinguishable from the time limits set forth in section 657, 
which requires the trial court to file a statement of reasons within 10 days of the 
order determining the motion.  We held this time limit to be jurisdictional because 
the objective of this provision was to provide ―a precise record for appellate 
review‖ (La Manna v. Stewart (1975) 13 Cal.3d 413, 420) and because ―final 
responsibility for compliance‖ with that section rested with the trial judge (id. at 
p. 425).  Section 657‘s deadlines ensure appropriate review of a trial court‘s 
decision by an appellate court and thus require enforcement outside the bounds of 
the trial court itself, which might otherwise enlarge its own role at the expense of 
appellate decision makers.  (Cf. Mercer v. Perez, supra, 68 Cal.2d at pp. 123–124 
[permitting nunc pro tunc revision of inadequate statement of grounds eliminates 
any incentive for court‘s timeliness, and permitting courts to state no grounds 
undermines goal of effective appellate review].)  Whereas ― ‗the public, . . . the 
bar, . . . [and] the courts‘ ‖ (La Manna, at p. 424) are burdened by additional 
appellate filings when a trial court‘s statement of reasons is untimely or 
 
21 
nonexistent, only a particular ―case-specific interest in timeliness‖ (John R. Sand 
& Gravel Co. v. United States (2008) 552 U.S. 130, 133) is implicated by an 
untimely filed affidavit. 
 
In light of section 659a‘s purposes as well as the presumption against 
depriving courts of jurisdiction and the absence of explicit language in section 
659a doing so, we conclude that the 30-day aggregate period for the submission of 
affidavits is not jurisdictional.  We disapprove Erikson v. Weiner, supra, 48 
Cal.App.4th 1663, to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion.  But we note 
that despite its repeated descriptions of section 659a as ―jurisdictional,‖ Erikson is 
distinguishable because the nonmoving party there actually objected to the trial 
court‘s consideration of the untimely filed affidavit.  (Erikson, at p. 1669.)  
Erikson addressed only whether the trial court was required to sustain the 
nonmoving party‘s timeliness objection when it was properly raised in the trial 
court; it did not address whether such a timeliness objection can be raised for the 
first time on appeal.  Here, the Hospital failed to assert a timeliness objection in 
the trial court.  The alleged untimeliness of Kabran‘s affidavits cannot be raised 
for the first time on appeal and did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to 
consider them.
 
22 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We hold that the trial court had fundamental jurisdiction to consider 
Kabran‘s allegedly untimely filed affidavits in support of her motion for a new 
trial.  The Hospital, having failed to object to the affidavits‘ timeliness in the trial 
court, may not challenge the trial court‘s reliance on those affidavits for the first 
time on appeal.  We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 236 Cal.App.4th 1294 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S227393 
Date Filed: January 19, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: John Meyer 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Lotz, Doggett & Rawers, Jeffrey S. Doggett, Evan J. Topol and Patrick F. Higle for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Berman & Riedel, William Michael Berman; Kenneth M. Sigelman & Associates, Kenneth M. Sigelman, 
Penelope A. Phillips; Williams Iagmin and Jon R. Williams for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jeffrey S. Doggett 
Lotz, Doggett & Rawers 
101 West Broadway, Suite 1110 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 233-5565 
 
Jon R. Williams 
Williams Iagmin 
666 State Street 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 238-0370