Title: State v. Lemoine

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 5 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP2597-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Dennis D. Lemoine, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 337 Wis. 2d 558, 806 N.W.2d 269 
(Ct. App. 2011 - Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 8, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 4, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sauk 
 
JUDGE: 
Guy D. Reynolds 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
Abrahamson, C.J. dissent. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Katie R. York, assistant state public defenders, and 
oral argument by Katie R. York. 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Sally 
L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
        2013 WI 5 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP2597-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2007CF153) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Dennis D. Lemoine, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 8, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 that affirmed the 
judgment of the circuit court.  This case involves statements 
made during what was undisputedly a non-custodial interrogation 
of defendant Dennis D. Lemoine.  The issue before this court is 
whether the statements were involuntary.  If the statements were 
involuntary, the next appropriate step is to determine whether 
the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
                                                 
1 State v. Lemoine, No. 2010AP2597, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2011).   
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
2 
 
admission of the unconstitutionally obtained statements did not 
impel Lemoine to testify in order to overcome their impact at 
trial.2  
¶2 
Lemoine challenged the statements prior to trial on 
the grounds that they were involuntary.  The circuit court for 
Sauk County, the Honorable Guy Reynolds presiding, reviewed a 
video recording of the interrogation, found that Lemoine's 
statements 
were 
voluntary 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, and allowed admission of the statements at trial.  
Lemoine then testified at trial and was convicted.  He appealed 
on the grounds that the statements were involuntary and were 
thus improperly admitted. 
 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
assumed 
without deciding that the statements were involuntary but held 
that in light of the other evidence produced at trial, including 
the defendant's testimony, the admission of the statements was 
harmless error. The court of appeals denied Lemoine's motion for 
reconsideration.  
¶3 
We hold that the admission of Lemoine's statements at 
trial was not error because, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the statements were voluntary.  The well-
established 
test 
for 
voluntariness 
balances 
the 
personal 
characteristics of the defendant against pressures imposed by 
law enforcement officers to determine if the pressures exceeded 
                                                 
2 That determination is made under the standards set forth 
in Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), and State v. 
Anson, 2005 WI 96, 282 Wis. 2d 629, 698 N.W.2d 776; a discussion 
of these cases is contained in ¶35-36, infra. 
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
3 
 
the defendant's ability to resist.  State v. Clappes, 136 
Wis. 2d 222, 236, 401 N.W.2d 759 (1987).  Nothing about Lemoine 
made him particularly vulnerable; he was 22 years old, had 
earned a high school equivalency diploma (HSED), held a job as a 
truck driver, was familiar with one of the interviewing 
officers, and was assertive enough to voice his discomfort with 
a female officer's presence, a concern the police accommodated.  
The interrogator overstated the evidence against Lemoine and 
provided Lemoine with incentives to give information, including 
a promise that Lemoine would not be jailed for the night if he 
told the "true story."  When balanced, however, against the 
characteristics of Lemoine, the tactics used by the police in 
the 75 to 80 minute interrogation did not rise to the level of 
being coercive.  Therefore, it was not error for the circuit 
court to admit the voluntary statements at trial.  Accordingly, 
though our analysis differs from that of the court of appeals, 
we affirm its decision.  
I. 
BACKGROUND3 
¶4 
On the morning of April 23, 2007, Lemoine visited a 
friend at his friend's house.  Lemoine's friend's five-year-old 
daughter, Caitlin B., returned home from Head Start and wanted 
to jump on the trampoline in the backyard.  Lemoine offered to 
go with her and watch her, and he sat on the steps on the back 
                                                 
3 The following facts are taken from trial testimony and 
exhibits. 
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
4 
 
porch while watching Caitlin.  At some point, Caitlin came to 
Lemoine and sat on his lap.   
¶5 
Four days later, Caitlin told her parents that while 
she was sitting on Lemoine's lap on April 23 he "pulled her 
dress up and pulled down her underwear and put his finger in her 
pee-pee."  Caitlin's mother reported the incident to the Sauk 
County Sheriff's Department, and on April 29, Caitlin underwent 
a sexual assault exam at Meriter Hospital in Madison.  The next 
day, Detective Stacy McClure interviewed Caitlin.  McClure asked 
Caitlin repeatedly if she had been given a "bad touch," and 
initially, Caitlin did not implicate Lemoine.  After a ten-
minute break during which Caitlin had contact with her mother, 
Caitlin told McClure that Lemoine pulled down her underwear and 
touched her "pee-pee."  
¶6 
Later that day, McClure called Lemoine and requested 
that he come to the sheriff's department.  Lemoine arrived about 
an hour later.  Initially, McClure interviewed Lemoine alone; 
she was later joined by Lieutenant Michael Stoddard.  The 
interview, which lasted 75 to 80 minutes, took place in a small, 
windowless office at the sheriff's department and was recorded.  
No one advised Lemoine of his Miranda4 rights or told him he was 
free to leave.  At one point, when Lemoine's phone made a sound, 
Stoddard told Lemoine he could answer it.  
¶7 
No one argues that coercive conduct took place during 
the first 45 minutes of the interview.  During that time, 
                                                 
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
5 
 
Lemoine stated that he had stopped by Caitlin's parents' house 
on the day in question and that he watched Caitlin bounce on her 
trampoline briefly until he walked away "because it was boring."  
Lemoine repeatedly denied that Caitlin sat on his lap or was 
alone with him.  When told that Caitlin claimed to have sat on 
his lap, Lemoine said that Caitlin "doesn't tell the truth" and 
was a troubled child so he "avoid[s] her at all costs."  He 
further said that Caitlin had hit him in the back of the head 
with a chair once and had "smacked" him with wrenches. 
¶8 
After a break during which McClure briefly left the 
room, Stoddard joined the interview.  Stoddard told Lemoine that 
he did not believe his story and that, if he would "come clean," 
the officers could help him out "by not making a big production 
in the [newspaper]." 
Stoddard also told Lemoine that Caitlin 
had just "gone through some very lengthy medical procedures" and 
that they were awaiting the results.  Stoddard said, "I don't 
think it's going to look good for you when" the test results 
come in.  Lemoine asked how many years of incarceration he would 
face if he admitted to the allegations, to which Stoddard 
replied that he did not know, but that the crime was a felony.  
Lemoine expressed concern that he would be unable to continue 
working as a truck driver with a felony conviction, but Stoddard 
assured him that a felony conviction would not prevent him from 
driving a truck. 
¶9 
Stoddard described three different scenarios: "We can 
arrest you and put you in jail, and you will go to court 
tomorrow.  We give you a citation and send you down the road.  
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
6 
 
Or we can do nothing and wait until we've got everything."  
Lemoine requested a citation to which Stoddard replied, "No.  
I'm not going to give you the choice."  At that time, Lemoine 
voiced his discomfort with having McClure present, and she left 
the room.  Lemoine stated, "I'm comfortable with you."  Later, 
Lemoine asked what a felony and citation were, and Stoddard 
explained that with a citation, Lemoine could ask for time to 
get his affairs in order and come back to make an initial court 
appearance at a later date, whereupon he would enter a plea and 
say "I'm not guilty of this."    
¶10 Stoddard also promised Lemoine that if Lemoine gave 
the "true story . . . today" he would not "spend the night in 
jail" 
and 
that 
this 
would 
"give 
you 
time 
to 
call 
an 
attorney . . . [o]therwise, you know, we can lock you up, if we 
choose to do so."  Stoddard explained that in jail Lemoine would 
not "be able to make any phone calls or anything."  Stoddard 
then encouraged Lemoine to talk to the district attorney so that 
"it doesn't end up in court" or "in the public forum."  Lemoine 
said that he would admit to the allegations if Stoddard would 
promise in writing that he would not be taken to jail.   
¶11 Lemoine then explained that when he was sitting on the 
back porch, Caitlin jumped onto his lap and that as he picked 
her up from his lap he placed his hand on her private area and 
rubbed the area over the underwear for "10, 15 seconds."  After 
repeatedly denying to Stoddard that there was skin-to-skin 
contact, he eventually admitted that there was.  Lemoine 
characterized the incident as "the stupidest thing I've ever 
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
7 
 
done" and said that he "almost wrecked" his motorcycle on the 
way to the police station because he knew why he was being 
called in.  Later, during a break in which he was alone in the 
interview room, he said to himself, "I can't believe I did 
this."  Lemoine was issued a citation and released. He was 
subsequently charged with first degree sexual assault of a child 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e).5  
¶12 Prior 
to 
trial, 
Lemoine 
moved 
to 
suppress 
the 
statements as coerced and therefore inadmissible.6  The circuit 
court reviewed the video and the transcript of the interview, 
received briefing and decided at a hearing that the statements 
were voluntary.7  Portions of the video were admitted at trial, 
and Lemoine testified.  A jury found Lemoine guilty after a 
four-day trial.   
                                                 
5 The court of appeals noted an error in the judgment of 
conviction; the judgment of conviction stated that “Lemoine was 
found guilty of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(b), sexual intercourse 
with a person who has not attained the age of twelve years, 
when, in fact, he was found guilty of violating § 948.02(1)(e), 
sexual contact with a person who has not attained the age of 
thirteen years.”  State v. Lemoine, No. 2010AP2597, n. 1, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2011).  The court 
of appeals, consistent with Roberts v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 537, 
547, 164 N.W.2d 525 (1969), modified the judgment to reflect the 
correct statutory violation.  Id. 
6 Lemoine concedes that he was not in custody and therefore 
acknowledges that the statement was not obtained in violation of 
Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, which requires police to give certain 
warnings prior to custodial interrogations. 
7 The circuit court made its determination after having the 
benefit of watching a video of the interrogation.   
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
8 
 
¶13 Lemoine appealed the conviction on the grounds that 
his 
statements 
were 
involuntary 
and 
therefore 
wrongfully 
admitted at trial.  The court of appeals affirmed the conviction 
by 
assuming 
without 
deciding 
that 
the 
statements 
were 
involuntary and then finding the admission of the statements to 
be harmless error.  Lemoine moved for reconsideration for 
failure to conduct a Harrison/Anson analysis, and the court of 
appeals denied it, stating, "we have already addressed and 
rejected Lemoine's Harrison argument by holding that an error 
was harmless.  Nothing in the materials submitted causes us to 
reconsider our decision."  State v. Lemoine, No. 2010AP2597, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2011).  Lemoine 
petitioned this court for review, which we granted.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 This case presents an opportunity to apply our case 
law on voluntary statements and determine whether, under the 
totality of the circumstances, a statement was made voluntarily 
and is admissible against a defendant.  The due process test of 
voluntariness "takes into consideration the totality of all the 
surrounding circumstances – both the characteristics of the 
accused and the details of the interrogation."  Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (citations omitted).  A 
statement is voluntary if the pressures exerted by the police do 
not exceed the defendant's ability to resist.  State v. Clappes, 
136 Wis. 2d at 236.  The State must show voluntariness by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Lego v. Twomney, 404 U.S. 477, 
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
9 
 
489 (1972); State v. Jerrell, C.J., 2005 WI 105, ¶17, 283 Wis. 
2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110.   
¶15 Motions to suppress evidence on constitutionality 
grounds are reviewed by this court with a two-prong analysis.  
State v. Felix, 2012 WI 36, ¶22, 339 Wis. 2d 670, 811 N.W.2d 
775.  "First, we review the circuit court's findings of 
historical fact, and will uphold them unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Second, we review the application of constitutional 
principles to those facts de novo." Id.  See also State v. 
Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, ¶34, 261 Wis. 2d 294, 661 N.W.2d 407.   
III. ANALYSIS 
¶16 No one disputes the findings of historical fact made 
by the circuit court, so we turn to the determination of whether 
Lemoine's statements were voluntary.   
A. Voluntariness of Lemoine's Statements 
¶17 Where a defendant raises a voluntariness challenge, 
the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
statements made by the defendant were voluntary.  Jerrell C.J., 
283 Wis. 2d 145, ¶17.  If involuntary statements were admitted 
at trial, the admission could violate due process rights. Rogers 
v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540 (1961), see State v. McManus, 152 
Wis. 2d 113, 130, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989).  
"A 
defendant's 
statements are voluntary if they are the product of a free and 
unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice, as 
opposed to the result of a conspicuously unequal confrontation 
in which the pressures brought to bear on the defendant by 
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
10 
 
representatives of the State exceeded the defendant's ability to 
resist." Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶36 (citations omitted).  
¶18 We make the determination in light of all of the facts 
surrounding the interview and decided under the totality of the 
circumstances, 
balancing 
the 
defendant's 
relevant 
personal 
characteristics with the pressures imposed by the police.  Id., 
¶38.  This Court described the test in detail in Hoppe.   
The relevant personal characteristics of the defendant 
include 
the 
defendant's 
age, 
education 
and 
intelligence, physical and emotional condition, and 
prior experience with law enforcement. The personal 
characteristics 
are 
balanced 
against 
the 
police 
pressures and tactics which were used to induce the 
statements, such as: the length of the questioning, 
any delay in arraignment, the general conditions under 
which 
the 
statements 
took 
place, 
any 
excessive 
physical or psychological pressure brought to bear on 
the defendant, any inducements, threats, methods or 
strategies used by the police to compel a response, 
and whether the defendant was informed of the right to 
counsel and right against self-incrimination. 
Id., ¶39 (citations omitted).   
¶19 The parties disagree on the application of the facts 
to that test.  Lemoine asserts that his personal characteristics 
make him susceptible to police pressure because he was young, 
inexperienced with police, and desperate to keep his job and to 
stay out of jail.  He also asserts that the interrogation 
tactics 
amounted 
to 
coercive 
police 
conduct. 
 
Lemoine 
specifically points to five things: (1) the promise not to put 
Lemoine in jail in exchange for the "true story," (2) the 
statement that Stoddard can help Lemoine out by keeping the case 
out of the papers and the "public forum," (3) the statement that 
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
11 
 
Lemoine cannot make phone calls in jail, implying a restriction 
on contacting an attorney, (4) the exaggeration of the evidence 
against Lemoine, and (5) the failure to advise Lemoine of his 
Miranda rights.  Lemoine argues that the totality of the 
circumstances 
test 
is 
not 
a 
checklist 
of 
factors 
taken 
individually; instead, certain things, like the characteristics 
of the defendant, may increase the coercive influence of other 
tactics.  Here, Lemoine argues that under the totality of the 
circumstances, the police tactics overcame Lemoine's ability to 
resist and made it impossible for Lemoine to make statements 
representing his free and unconstrained will. 
¶20 The 
State 
argues that Lemoine's statements were 
voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.  It argues 
that the relevant personal characteristics of Lemoine show that 
at 
the time 
of 
the interview, he was not particularly 
vulnerable.  He was an adult, he held a good job, and despite 
dropping out of high school, he was intelligent enough to have 
earned an 
HSED. During the interview he was alert and 
appreciated the significance of the questioning, and he had 
previous encounters with police.  The State argues that the 
officer's promise of not spending the night in jail was kept, 
Miranda warnings were not required because Lemoine was not in 
custody, the comment about limited phone access was not patently 
untrue, and using deception in an interrogation is common and 
generally 
acceptable; 
balanced 
against 
Lemoine's 
characteristics, Stoddard's conduct was not so coercive that it 
overcame Lemoine's ability to resist.   
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
12 
 
¶21 Applying the standard as laid out in Hoppe, we look 
first to the characteristics of the defendant and then to the 
tactics used by the police.  As we have noted previously, the 
circuit court's findings indicate that Lemoine was not a 
vulnerable person.  He was nearly 23 years old at the time of 
the interview.  He did not graduate from high school, but the 
year he dropped out of high school he earned a high school 
equivalency diploma (HSED).  Lemoine had a job as a truck 
driver.  During the interview, Lemoine asked relevant questions 
that revealed that he was tracking the interview.  Lemoine did 
not have any limitations physically or emotionally.  He stated 
during the interview that he had not slept since the previous 
day, but the circuit court judge, who watched a videotape of the 
interview, found him to be alert at all times during the 
questioning with no signs of impairment.  Lemoine asserts that 
he was very afraid of jail and losing his job, which impacted 
his emotional state, but the circuit court found that "if 
Lemoine had some internal coercion or pressures going on they 
were not made known to the detectives," and that he "appeared 
basically at ease and filled with energy."   
¶22 Lemoine's previous experience with law enforcement is 
another 
relevant 
characteristic 
in 
the 
determination 
of 
voluntariness.  See Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶39.  The circuit 
court found that Lemoine had no prior "experience with law 
enforcement in the criminal justice system, but he had some 
passing, at least, acquaintance with court proceedings insofar 
as 
a 
friend's 
court 
appearance 
or 
acquaintance's 
court 
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
13 
 
appearances."  During the questioning, Lemoine made repeated 
references to being a "felon" and also talked about a person he 
knows who went to jail for molesting kids who is now "on that 
list that they have," presumably referring to Wisconsin's sex 
offender registry, showing some familiarity with the criminal 
justice system.  
¶23 Lemoine's personal characteristics did not make him 
vulnerable to police pressures.  While he did not have extensive 
interaction with the criminal justice system, he certainly had 
some familiarity with the system.  He was educated and held a 
good job, and he remained actively engaged throughout the 
interview.  We have held that certain characteristics make 
defendants particularly vulnerable like minors (Jerrell C.J., 
283 Wis. 2d 145, ¶6, finding involuntary a written confession of 
a 14-years-old in eighth grade) and those in the hospital 
receiving treatment (State v. Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶27, 
finding involuntary statements made by a defendant described as 
dehydrated, vomiting, suffering from tremors and hallucinations, 
lethargic, with slurred speech, difficulty tracking questions 
and low blood sugar).  See also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 
321-22 
(1959) 
(finding 
involuntary 
statements 
made 
by 
a 
defendant who had only one-half year of high school and had a 
history of emotional instability).  Lemoine had none of the 
characteristics of a defendant who was as vulnerable as those 
persons. 
¶24 The characteristics of the defendant must be balanced 
against tactics used by police.  Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 236.  
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
14 
 
Lemoine was subjected to a non-custodial interrogation that 
lasted about 75 to 80 minutes.  The police officers took two 
breaks, leaving Lemoine alone during those breaks.  The 
interview took place in the sheriff's department in a small 
room.  At times, two detectives questioned Lemoine.  Neither of 
them told Lemoine he was free to leave.  The door was closed, 
but Lemoine was seated closest to the door.  Both Lemoine and 
Stoddard had their phones turned on during the interrogation.  
Stoddard answered his phone at least once, and when Lemoine's 
phone made a noise, Stoddard told him he could answer it.  At 
one point, Lemoine said he was uncomfortable with the female 
detective, McClure; she promptly left.  Lemoine then stated that 
he was comfortable with Stoddard with whom he had had some prior 
contact.  There was no indication of physical or significant 
psychological pressure placed on Lemoine.  Those interviewing 
Lemoine spoke in normal tones of voice.  These facts do not 
demonstrate inappropriate police pressure or tactics. 
¶25 We turn next to the inducements, threats, and lack of 
information given to the defendant about his rights.  The police 
made some promises or at least provided incentives for telling 
them what they wanted to hear, including agreeing to keep 
Lemoine out of jail for the night.8  The police also indicated 
that if Lemoine was put in jail, he would be cut off from 
communication, including, by implication, communication with a 
                                                 
8 The circuit court found unreasonable Lemoine’s belief that 
he would not be jailed at all but found that a promise of not 
being jailed that particular night was made by Stoddard. 
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
15 
 
lawyer.  It is true that Lemoine was not informed of his right 
to counsel or his right against self-incrimination.  As the 
circuit court found, this case would have been much easier if 
the interviewers had given Lemoine such warnings; however, 
Lemoine concedes that such Miranda warnings apply to custodial 
interrogations, and he makes no argument that he was in custody 
or that they were required here.   
¶26 Lemoine 
was 
not 
particularly 
vulnerable, 
and 
therefore, the conduct of the officers was insufficient to 
overcome Lemoine's ability to resist.  The tactics complained of 
were not anywhere near as harmful as Lemoine asserts. 
¶27 First, the inducements offered by the police were not 
sufficient to make the statements involuntary.  This court 
examined promises made during interviews in State v. Owens, 148 
Wis. 2d 922, 436 N.W.2d 869 (1989).  In Owens, the police 
promised a defendant they would consolidate charges in multiple 
counties to one county in exchange for cooperation.9  Id. at 925.  
This Court found, "[a]lthough a promise was made to the 
defendant, it was fulfilled. Therefore, it was not part of an 
impermissible, coercive police tactic which could have rendered 
the confession involuntary."  Id. at 931.   
¶28 Here, the circuit court made a finding that the 
promise made was a promise not to spend that night in jail.  
                                                 
9 The defendant also argued that the police promised to 
consolidate all charges into a single charge, but the circuit 
court found that no such promise was made.  State v. Owens, 148 
Wis. 2d 922, 925, 436 N.W.2d 869 (1989). 
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
16 
 
Stoddard stated, "If we get the true story on you today, I'll 
see to it that you don't spend the night in jail, okay?"  This 
promise was kept, and Lemoine did not go to jail that night.  
Consistent with Owens, this kept promise was not coercive.10  The 
State cites several cases from other jurisdictions in which 
similar promises were made and subsequent statements were found 
to be voluntary.11  It is not automatically unduly coercive to 
promise a benefit to a suspect in exchange for cooperation. See 
State v. Cydzik, 60 Wis. 2d 683, 692, 211 N.W.2d 421 (1973). 
Stoddard's promise to Lemoine is not the type of promise that 
would reasonably overcome the ability of a suspect like Lemoine 
to resist.   
¶29 Second, 
Lemoine 
exaggerates 
the 
consequences 
of 
Stoddard's offer to keep the case out of the public forum and 
the papers in exchange for cooperation.  Stoddard stated that 
                                                 
10 This is not to say that there could never be a situation 
in which a promise that was kept would, in the totality of the 
circumstances, be coercive enough to overcome a defendant’s 
ability to resist, but in this situation, the promise was not.  
The State recognized that keeping a promise is not always 
dispositive when it stated, “[w]hile keeping such a promise may 
not necessarily conclude the voluntariness inquiry, it is an 
important 
factor 
that 
supports 
a 
determination 
of 
voluntariness.” Resp. Br. at 11. 
11 State v. Silva, 674 P.2d 443, 447, 450 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1983), State v. Jungbauer, 348 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Minn. 1984),  
State v. J.G., 619 A.2d 232, 239-40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1993), 
People v. Van Kuren, 767 N.Y.S.2d 323, 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2003), Commonwealth v. Templin, 795 A.2d 959, 966-67 (Pa. 2002), 
United States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 42 (2d Cir. 1997), 
United States v. Ferrara, 377 F.2d 16, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1967);  
Resp. Br. at 10-11.   
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
17 
 
they would not make a "big production" in the papers if Lemoine 
cooperated.  There is no evidence that Stoddard did anything to 
get media involved in this case.  Even if Stoddard's statement 
was a conditional promise, Stoddard kept his promise so the 
statement does not weigh against voluntariness here.  See Owen, 
148 Wis. 2d at 931.  Also, Stoddard suggested that cooperating 
with the district attorney would keep this case out of court and 
out of the public forum – which is true to an extent.  Agreeing 
to a plea limits the number of court appearances in a case, 
essentially keeping the case out of the public forum much more 
than otherwise might occur.   
¶30 Third, Lemoine complains of Stoddard's implication 
that if Lemoine went to jail he would be cut off from 
communication, including communication with a lawyer.  Stoddard 
implied that not going to jail that day would "give you time to 
call an attorney . . . [o]therwise, you know, we can lock you 
up, if we choose to do so."  Stoddard explained that in jail 
Lemoine would not "be able to make any phone calls or anything."  
Lemoine cites State v. Ward, 2009 WI 60, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 
N.W.2d 236, for the proposition that holding someone without 
allowing them to contact an attorney is constitutionally 
forbidden.  In Ward, an officer told the suspect that she could 
not make any phone calls while in custody.  Id., ¶6.  After an 
hour and forty minutes, police told her that this prohibition 
did not apply to attorney phone calls.  Id.  The majority of the 
court 
held 
that 
the 
circumstances 
did 
not 
destroy 
the 
voluntariness of the confession because the violation did not 
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
18 
 
last long enough to warrant suppression.12 Id., ¶54. The court 
stated that it is constitutionally impermissible to hold an 
individual in custody without allowing him or her to contact an 
attorney.  Id., ¶52. However, misrepresentations by police "do 
not necessarily make a confession involuntary"; rather, they are 
a relevant factor in the totality of the circumstances. Id., 
¶27.  Lemoine argues that Ward forbids Stoddard from saying 
phone calls were limited in jail, especially because unlike in 
Ward, Lemoine was never told that attorney phone calls are 
allowed from jail.  The State distinguishes Ward because Ward 
was actually in custody whereas Lemoine was not in custody.   
¶31 In light of the majority holding in Ward, the 
statements made by Stoddard were not themselves a constitutional 
violation in this case because Lemoine was not in custody.  This 
is not a situation like Ward.  The entire time that officers 
questioned Lemoine, he had access to his cell phone, and he was 
explicitly informed that he could use it.  Stoddard made a 
misstatement when he did not clarify that attorney phone calls 
were allowed in jail, but in general, it is reasonable to view 
Stoddard's comments as an explanation that taking care of things 
outside of jail is easier.  Because the comments were 
                                                 
12 Justice 
Crooks 
dissented, 
joined 
by 
Chief 
Justice 
Abrahamson and Justice Bradley, on the grounds that, despite 
Ward’s 
characteristics 
weighing 
toward 
voluntariness, 
the 
tactics used by police including holding Ward incommunicado for 
over 
24 
hours 
made 
Ward’s 
statements 
and 
reenactments 
involuntary.  State v. Ward, 2009 WI 60, ¶75, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 
767 N.W.2d 236 (Crooks, J., dissenting).  
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
19 
 
technically a misrepresentation, they weigh toward a finding of 
involuntariness, but in the context of the whole interview, they 
do not suffice to make Lemoine's statements involuntary.  
¶32 Fourth, exaggerations of evidence against a defendant 
are the least coercive police deceptions because they can be 
countered with the knowledge of the person being questioned.  
State v. Triggs, 2003 WI App 91, 264 Wis. 2d 861, 663 N.W.2d 
396, stated:  
Of the numerous varieties of policy trickery . . . a 
lie that relates to a suspect's connection to the 
crime is the least likely to render a confession 
involuntary . . . Inflating 
evidence 
of 
[the 
defendant's] guilt interfered little, if at all, with 
his "free and deliberate choice" of whether to 
confess, for it did not lead him to consider anything 
beyond his own beliefs regarding his actual guilt or 
innocence, his moral sense of right and wrong, and his 
judgment regarding the likelihood that the police had 
garnered enough valid evidence linking him to the 
crime. In other words, the deception did not interject 
the 
type 
of 
extrinsic considerations that would 
overcome [the defendant's] will by distorting an 
otherwise rational choice of whether to confess or 
remain silent. 
Id., ¶19 (citations omitted).  Here, the detectives stated that 
extensive tests had been done and that it probably would not 
look good for Lemoine when the results came in.  This 
information would not have caused Lemoine to make an involuntary 
statement because Lemoine could check any exaggerations with his 
own memory of the event and determine whether the interviewer 
was lying.   
¶33 Finally, no one in this case disputes that Miranda 
warnings were not given to Lemoine.  Lemoine argues that the 
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
20 
 
lack of Miranda warnings exacerbate the other tactics used by 
the police under the totality of the circumstances.  It is true 
that in this case, Miranda warnings were not required, but the 
lack of warnings is still relevant.  Hoppe clearly holds that 
one of the relevant factors in the analysis of the totality of 
the circumstances is "whether the defendant was informed of the 
right to counsel and right against self-incrimination."  Hoppe, 
261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶39.  The lack of these warnings, even when not 
required by the relevant case law, is a relevant piece of the 
equation.  The circuit court stated in its oral decision, "[I]t 
is clear no Miranda warnings were given, which would make this 
an easier case by a lot."  While relevant, the lack of warnings 
is not dispositive, and in this case, it does not tip the scales 
to make Lemoine's statements involuntary.   
¶34 For these reasons, we agree with the circuit court's 
determination that Lemoine's statements were voluntary and thus 
admissible.  Considering all relevant factors, the tactics of 
the police in this case did not overcome Lemoine's will or his 
ability to resist.  The State met its burden of showing 
voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. 
B. Harrison/Anson Analysis 
¶35 We briefly address the analysis that would follow if 
we had found Lemoine's statements involuntary.  The State and 
Lemoine agree that if the statements are found to be involuntary 
on appeal, after Lemoine testified at trial, then the next 
proper step is to conduct a Harrison/Anson analysis.  We note 
that Lemoine moved for reconsideration at the court of appeals 
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
21 
 
for failure to conduct a Harrison/Anson analysis, and the court 
of appeals denied it, stating, "we have already addressed and 
rejected Lemoine's Harrison argument by holding that the error 
was harmless.  Nothing in the materials submitted causes us to 
reconsider our decision."  State v. Lemoine, No. 2010AP2597, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2011).   
¶36 In Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), the 
United States Supreme Court found that when statements later 
determined to be inadmissible are used at trial and the 
defendant takes the stand and testifies, there must be a 
determination of whether the defendant's testimony at trial was 
impelled by the admission of the illegally obtained statements 
in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 224-25.  In State 
v. Anson, 2005 WI 96, 282 Wis. 2d 629, 698 N.W.2d 776, this 
court held that the review required by Harrison is a paper 
review where the circuit court makes historical findings of fact 
based on the entire record.  Id., ¶13.  The test laid out in 
Anson requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
following:   
First, the circuit court must consider whether the 
defendant testified "in order to overcome the impact 
of 
[statements] 
illegally 
obtained 
and 
hence 
improperly introduced [.]" Harrison, 392 U.S. at 223, 
88 S.Ct. 2008. Second, even if the court concludes 
that the defendant would have taken the stand, it must 
determine whether the defendant would have repeated 
the damaging testimonial admissions "if the prosecutor 
had not already spread the petitioner's confessions 
before the jury." Id. at 225–26, 88 S.Ct. 2008.   
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
22 
 
Id., ¶14.  Only after a Harrison/Anson analysis does the court 
proceed to a harmless error analysis.  See id., ¶¶15-16.  In 
this case, we decide that Lemoine's statements are voluntary.  
Therefore, there is no need to proceed to a Harrison/Anson or a 
harmless error analysis. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶37 We hold that the admission of Lemoine's statements at 
trial was not error because, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the statements were voluntary.  The well-
established 
test 
for 
voluntariness 
balances 
the 
personal 
characteristics of the defendant against pressures imposed by 
law enforcement officers to determine if the pressures exceeded 
the defendant's ability to resist.  Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 236.  
Nothing about Lemoine made him particularly vulnerable; he was 
22 years old, had earned a high school equivalency diploma 
(HSED), held a job as a truck driver, was familiar with one of 
the interviewing officers, and was assertive enough to voice his 
discomfort with a female officer's presence, a concern the 
police accommodated.  The interrogator overstated the evidence 
against Lemoine and provided Lemoine with incentives to give 
information, including a promise that Lemoine would not be 
jailed for the night if he told the "true story."  When 
balanced, however, against the characteristics of Lemoine, the 
tactics used by the police in the 75 to 80 minute interrogation 
did not rise to the level of being coercive.  Therefore, it was 
not error for the circuit court to admit the voluntary 
No. 
2010AP2597-CR   
 
23 
 
statements at trial.  Accordingly, though our analysis differs 
from that of the court of appeals, we affirm its decision.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
No.  2010AP2597-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶38 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  This case 
calls upon the court to address two issues: (1) whether the 
defendant's confession was voluntary; and (2) whether the court 
of appeals erred by not conducting a Harrison/Anson analysis.  I 
write separately to address both issues. 
I 
¶39 The majority has correctly stated the legal principles 
governing the determination of the voluntariness of confessions.  
Voluntariness is evaluated on a case-by-case basis by analyzing 
the totality of the circumstances.  Both the circuit court and 
court of appeals concluded that this case presents a close call 
on the issue of voluntariness.  I agree it is close but, in my 
opinion, this defendant's confession was involuntary. 
¶40 I watched the video of the interrogation.  This is a 
close case because the video is, on its surface, reassuring that 
the interrogation was conducted in a polite, solicitous and non-
threatening manner.  Yet, the interrogation techniques using 
deception and promises came right out of the guidebooks on how 
to 
interrogate 
a 
suspect to induce a confession.  The 
interrogation techniques used here have not been condemned out 
of hand by the United States Supreme Court, but they have to be 
carefully examined in each case.  Tipping the scale for me here 
is that in addition to the deceptive interrogation techniques 
and 
the 
defendant's 
personal 
vulnerabilities, 
the 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
misinformed 
the 
defendant 
of 
his 
constitutional right to call an attorney.  In considering the 
totality 
of 
circumstances, 
the 
misinformation 
about 
the 
No.  2010AP2597-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
defendant's constitutional rights pushes this case over the line 
for me.1    
¶41 I 
recognize 
that 
"no 
confession 
following 
interrogation is completely voluntary in the psychological sense 
of the word."2  In determining voluntariness, a court applies 
legal principles, not psychological or philosophical principles.  
¶42 Under the law, a confession is not voluntary when the 
pressures imposed by law enforcement exceed the suspect's 
ability to resist.3   
¶43 Confessions 
are 
the 
product 
of 
the 
situational 
pressures inherent in the conditions of interrogation, including 
excessively 
long 
questioning, 
the 
presentation 
of 
false 
incriminating evidence, and the use of themes that imply 
                                                 
1 No one claims that the law enforcement officers were 
required to give the defendant Miranda warnings.  The court has, 
however, emphasized the importance of the Miranda warnings and 
the constitutional rights the Miranda decision protects.   
I conclude that law enforcement officers who do not have to 
give the Miranda warnings err in giving a suspect misinformation 
about his or her constitutional rights regarding counsel.  See 
State v. Knapp, 2003 WI 121, ¶¶46, 73, 265 Wis. 2d 278, 666 
N.W.2d 881 
(an 
officer's 
intentional 
omission 
of 
Miranda 
warnings to get information from a suspect entitled the suspect 
to have physical evidence against him suppressed at trial when 
he gave incriminating statements before being advised of his 
Miranda rights). 
2 Fred 
E. 
Inbau 
et 
al., 
Criminal 
Interrogation 
and 
Confessions 417 (4th ed. 2004). 
3 See majority op., ¶3; Knapp, 265 Wis. 2d 278, ¶89 (citing 
State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 235-36, 401 N.W.2d 759 
(1987)).  
No.  2010AP2597-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
leniency.4  The interrogation techniques aim to break down the 
suspect's will until he provides the police with the information 
they are looking for.   
¶44 Confessions are also the product of the personal 
vulnerabilities of the suspect.  The court must therefore 
consider 
such 
factors 
as 
the 
suspect's 
age; 
education; 
intelligence; 
physical, 
mental 
and 
emotional 
condition; 
personality 
traits; 
and 
previous 
experience 
with 
law 
enforcement.5   
¶45 The 
single-minded 
purpose 
of 
interrogating 
the 
defendant in the present case was to elicit an incriminating 
statement and perhaps a full confession to assist the district 
attorney in securing a conviction.  The Sauk County Sheriff's 
Department was not investigating a crime for which it did not 
have a suspect or a viable lead.  Detective McClure had received 
a report from the victim's mother and a statement from the 
victim that the defendant had committed a sexual assault.  The 
only thing left to do was to get a confession from the 
defendant. 
¶46 The interrogation was conducted in a subtle, quiet, 
and non-threatening way.  During the entire interrogation, law 
enforcement 
officers 
were 
polite 
and 
solicitous 
of 
the 
defendant.  They posed as the defendant's friends, there to help 
                                                 
4 Jennifer 
T. 
Perillo 
& 
Saul 
M. 
Kassin, 
Inside 
Interrogation:  The Lie, The Bluff, and False Confessions, 35 
Law & Hum. Behav. 327 (2011). 
5 State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 235-37, 401 N.W.2d 759 
(1987); see also Inbau et al., supra note 2, at 417. 
No.  2010AP2597-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
the defendant.  The techniques used were right out of the books 
on how to interrogate a suspect to induce a confession.  They 
were interrogation techniques recommended to break down a 
suspect's natural inclination to deny wrongdoing.   
¶47 The defendant here was interviewed in a small, 
windowless room, with no distractions, designed to induce stress 
and structured to promote a sense of isolation and create a 
sense of anxiety, despair, and a desire to escape.6 
¶48 For the first half of the interrogation, which went on 
for 
nearly 
an 
hour 
and 
a 
half, 
the 
defendant 
denied 
inappropriately touching the victim.  Only after the Lieutenant 
offered deceptive misinformation about evidence against the 
defendant, made promises to the defendant, and misinformed the 
defendant of his constitutional right to counsel, did the 
defendant confess to the crime. 
¶49 The Lieutenant used the false evidence ploy, by which 
interrogators bolster an accusation by presenting the suspect 
with supposedly incontrovertible evidence of his guilt.7     
¶50 The Lieutenant made multiple assertions regarding the 
victim's physical exam; no assertions were based in fact.  The 
Lieutenant told the defendant that the victim went through "very 
lengthy medical procedures" and that they had some "pretty solid 
evidence."  The Lieutenant asked the defendant for a DNA swab, 
                                                 
6 Inbau et al., supra note 2, ch. 5; Saul M. Kassin et al., 
Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 
Law & Hum. Behav. 3, 6-7 (2010). 
7 Perillo & Kassin, supra note 4. 
No.  2010AP2597-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
implying there was some sort of DNA evidence.  When that did not 
work, the Lieutenant stated that the victim was getting 
"specialized testing," and that they had enough with the "tests 
and testimonies" for probable cause and he and the district 
attorney were confident the allegations were true. 
¶51 In reality, the physical exam performed on the victim 
found no evidence of a sexual assault. 
¶52 The Lieutenant told the defendant that the only way he 
could be helped was to "come clean."  The Lieutenant explained 
that the harder police have to work, the less sympathy they 
would have for the defendant.  The Lieutenant told the defendant 
that he did not believe his story and that, if the defendant 
would "come clean," the officers could help him out "by not 
making a big production in the [newspaper]."  Majority op., ¶8.  
¶53 Making threats or promises during an interrogation 
that address the consequences about which the suspect is 
concerned is very influential in breaking a suspect's will and 
straddles the line of permissibility.8   
¶54 The defendant was very concerned about losing his job; 
about spending a night in jail; about ending up in court; and 
about having his conduct publicized in the community.  
¶55 The Lieutenant played to all of the defendant's 
concerns.   
¶56 The Lieutenant assured the defendant that if he 
admitted to the allegations, which were a felony, the felony 
                                                 
8 Inbau et al., supra note 2, at 418. 
No.  2010AP2597-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
conviction would not prevent him from keeping his job driving a 
truck.  Majority op., ¶8.   
¶57 The 
Lieutenant described three scenarios to the 
defendant: "We can arrest you and put you in jail, and you will 
go to court tomorrow.  We can give you a citation and send you 
down the road.  Or we can do nothing and wait until we get 
everything."  The defendant requested the citation.  The 
Lieutenant replied:  "No, I'm not going to give you the choice." 
Majority op., ¶9. 
¶58 The Lieutenant told the defendant:  "If we get the 
true story on you today, I'll see to it that you don't spend the 
night in jail, okay?"  The defendant's response to the 
Lieutenant was:  "Just don't take me to jail, and I'll admit to 
it."  
¶59 The Lieutenant kept his promise to keep the defendant 
out of jail for the night.  He also encouraged the defendant to 
talk with the district attorney so that "it doesn't end up in 
court" or "in the public forum."  Majority op., ¶10. 
¶60 The Lieutenant advised the defendant that if he 
confessed, he would be able to consult with an attorney as 
follows:  
And it will give you time to call an attorney and get 
your ducks in a row; all right?  Otherwise, you know, 
we can lock you up, if we choose to do so.  Which kind 
of limits your ability of what you can get. 
¶61 When the defendant asked what he meant, the Lieutenant 
replied:  "Well, you're not going to be able to make any phone 
calls or anything." 
No.  2010AP2597-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶62 The Lieutenant was not fully truthful in advising the 
defendant about his inability to call or speak to an attorney 
unless the defendant confessed.  Indeed the Lieutenant's advice 
contravened the Miranda warnings: an accused has the right to 
remain silent and the right to have a lawyer present. 
¶63 The defendant was 22 years of age with limited 
experience with law enforcement.  He was at an age susceptible 
to police coercion.9  The defendant appeared very naïve in the 
video and not at all aware of or suspicious of the law 
enforcement officer's motives or tactics.   
¶64 The court summarized the factors a court should 
consider in determining whether a confession was voluntary in 
State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 235-37, 401 N.W.2d 759 
(1987), as follows:  
In determining whether a confession was voluntarily 
made, the essential inquiry is whether the confession 
was procured via coercive means or whether it was the 
product of improper pressures exercised by the police.  
The presence or absence of actual coercion or improper 
                                                 
9 There is no claim in the present case that the defendant 
made a false confession.  Still, false confessions can occur in 
both voluntary and involuntary confessions.   
Nearly one quarter of those exonerated through DNA in the 
United States were wrongfully convicted after giving what turned 
out to be a false confession.  See Perillo & Kassin, supra note 
4. 
Young suspects are more likely to give a false confession. 
In a recent study analyzing 125 false confessions in the United 
States between 1971 and 2002, the largest sample ever studied, 
63% of false confessions were made by suspects under the age of 
25.  Thirty-two percent of the suspects were under 18, meaning 
that 31% of the total persons falsely confessing were between 18 
and 25.  See Kassin et al., supra note 6, at 5. 
No.  2010AP2597-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
police practices is the focus of the inquiry because 
it is determinative on the issue of whether the 
inculpatory statement was the product of a "free and 
unconstrained 
will, 
reflecting 
deliberateness 
of 
choice." 
In examining whether a confession was rationally and 
deliberately made, it is important to determine that 
the defendant was not the "victim of a conspicuously 
unequal confrontation in which the pressures brought 
to bear on him by representatives of the state 
exceed[ed] the defendant's ability to resist."  This 
determination is made, in turn, by examining the 
totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the confession.  The ultimate determination of whether 
a confession is voluntary under the totality of the 
circumstances standard requires the court to balance 
the personal characteristics of the defendant against 
the pressures imposed upon him by police in order to 
induce him to respond to the questioning. 
The relevant personal characteristics of the confessor 
include his age, his education and intelligence, his 
physical 
and 
emotional condition, and his prior 
experience with the police.  These factors must be 
balanced against the police pressures and tactics 
which have been used to induce the admission, such as 
the 
length 
of 
the 
interrogation, 
any 
delay 
in 
arraignment, the general conditions under which the 
confessions took place, any excessive physical or 
psychological 
pressure 
brought 
to 
bear 
on 
the 
declarant, 
any 
inducements, 
threats, 
methods 
or 
strategies 
utilized 
by 
the 
police 
to 
compel 
a 
response, and whether the individual was informed of 
his 
right 
to 
counsel 
and 
right 
against 
self-
incrimination. (Emphasis added; internal citations 
omitted.) 
¶65 I have considered the factors set forth in Clappes.  
The combination of the defendant's personal characteristics, the 
deceptive tactics, and the misinformation about the defendant's 
constitutional right to an attorney crosses the line between a 
voluntary and an involuntary confession for me.  In my opinion, 
the pressures exceeded the defendant's ability to resist.  It's 
No.  2010AP2597-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
a close case, but in my opinion, this defendant's confession was 
involuntary. 
II 
¶66 I also write separately here to call attention to the 
second issue raised by the parties.  This second issue is, in my 
opinion, the reason the court granted the petition for review of 
the case, namely the Harrison10/Anson11 analysis.  The court of 
appeals failed to discuss these cases.  It assumed the 
confession was involuntary and went directly to a discussion of 
harmless error.  When the defendant moved the court of appeals 
to 
reconsider 
its 
decision 
for 
failure 
to 
conduct 
a 
Harrison/Anson analysis, the court of appeals denied the motion.  
The court of appeals responded: 
[W]e have already addressed and rejected Lemoine's 
Harrison argument by holding that any error was 
harmless. 
¶67 The parties dispute various issues arising in a 
Harrison/Anson analysis, including: 
   Does an appellate court have the authority to make a 
Harrison determination? 
   How does a Harrison/Anson analysis comport with a 
harmless error analysis?  
   May a reviewing court avoid determining whether the 
defendant's testimony was impelled by the admission of 
                                                 
10 Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968). 
11 State v. Anson, 2005 WI 96, 282 Wis. 2d 629, 698 
N.W.2d 776. 
No.  2010AP2597-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
his police statement at trial and just determine 
whether the error was harmless? 
   After a reviewing court has determined that the 
defendant's statements were not made voluntarily, may 
the court rely on the defendant's trial testimony to 
determine that any error admitting the confession was 
harmless? 
   Is a Harrison determination based on a paper review of 
the record or is an evidentiary hearing in the circuit 
court required or allowed? 
   If a Harrison determination is made by the circuit 
court, does the circuit court make findings about the 
credibility or plausibility of a witness's testimony 
at trial? 
   If a Harrison determination is made by the circuit 
court, does the circuit court have to address the 
importance of the erroneously admitted evidence, along 
with the properly admitted evidence?  
   Has the State carried its burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant's testimony at 
trial in the present case was not impelled by the 
admission at trial of his statement to police?   
No.  2010AP2597-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
   If the defendant's testimony was impelled, is the 
error prejudicial per se?12       
¶68 Because the majority concludes that the confession was 
voluntary, it decides that it need not and does not address any 
Harrison/Anson issues.13  Nevertheless, this court has often 
decided an important issue that is not determinative but is 
fully briefed and argued and is likely to arise again in other 
cases.14  Unfortunately, these Harrison/Anson issues await 
another case. 
                                                 
12 Compare Harrison, 392 U.S. at 226 ("It has not been 
demonstrated, therefore, that the petitioner's testimony was 
obtained 
'by 
means 
sufficiently distinguishable' from the 
underlying illegality 'to be purged of the primary taint.'  
Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed.") (internal citation 
omitted); and Anson, 282 Wis. 2d 629, ¶56 ("We hold that the 
State has not demonstrated that 'the petitioner's testimony was 
obtained 
'by 
means 
sufficiently distinguishable' from the 
underlying illegality 'to be purged of the primary taint.'  As 
such, we hold that Anson's testimony was impelled by the State's 
underlying constitutional violation.  Thus, we hold that the 
circuit court's error in failing to suppress Anson's tape-
recorded statement, which violated his Sixth Amendment rights, 
was not harmless.  Therefore, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals and remand for a new trial.") (internal 
citations omitted). 
The United States Supreme Court has directed a reviewing 
court to use extreme caution before determining that admission 
of 
an 
involuntary 
confession 
was 
harmless. 
 
Arizona 
v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991). 
13 For a discussion of Harrison, see 3 Wayne R. LaFave et 
al., Criminal Procedure §§ 9.5(d), 10.2(c) (3d ed. 2007). 
14 See, e.g., Les Moise, Inc. v. Rossignol Ski Co., Inc., 
122 Wis. 2d 51, 54 361 N.W.2d 653 (1985) (We chose to decide the 
issues presented for review because the issue was likely to 
recur and we disagreed with the decision of the court of 
appeals, even though our opinion would not affect the parties 
directly.); State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court, 
115 Wis. 2d 220, 229-230, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983):  
No.  2010AP2597-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶69 For the reasons set forth, I write separately in 
dissent.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
[T]his court has held that it will retain a matter for 
determination although that determination can have no 
practical effect on the immediate parties:  Where the 
issues are of great public importance; . . . where the 
precise 
situation 
under 
consideration 
arises 
so 
frequently that a definitive decision is essential to 
guide the trial courts; where the issue is likely to 
arise again and should be resolved by the court to 
avoid uncertainty . . . . 
This court has a law-declaring function, that is, 
determining on common-law principles what the law 
should be in view of the statutory and decisional law 
of the state and in view of the general trend of the 
law. . . . It is not inappropriate for this court, 
where a problem is likely to recur, to declare the law 
for the guidance of other courts, even though the 
particular controversy is moot (internal citations 
omitted). 
No.  2010AP2597-CR.ssa 
 
1