Title: Aldrich v. Labor & Ind. Review Comm'n

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 53 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP1785   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Joyce Aldrich, 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission, 
          Respondent-Co-Appellant, 
Best Buy Stores, L.P., 
          Respondent-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2011 WI App 94 
Reported at: 334 Wis. 2d 495, 801 N.W.2d 457 
(Ct. App. 2011 – Published)     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 23, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 7, 2012   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire   
 
JUDGE: 
William M. Gabler, Sr.   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Peter M. Reinhardt, Bridget M. Finke and Bakke Norman, S.C., 
Menomonie and oral argument by Peter M. Reinhardt.   
 
For the respondent-appellant there was a brief by Amy 
Schmidt Jones, Steven A. Nigh and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Amy Schmidt Jones. 
 
For the respondent-co-appellant there was a brief by David 
C. Rice, assistant attorney general and J.B. Van Hollen, 
attorney 
general 
and 
oral 
argument 
by 
David 
C. 
Rice.  
 
 
2012 WI 53
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP1785 
(L.C. No. 
2009CV518) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Joyce Aldrich, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission, 
 
          Respondent-Co-Appellant, 
 
Best Buy Stores, L.P., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 23, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded with instructions. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is an employment 
discrimination case.  The state and federal antidiscrimination 
statutes are remedial; they are designed to remedy problems 
identified by the state legislature and Congress.   
¶2 
The Wisconsin legislature has declared that it is the 
legislative intent "to protect by law the rights of all 
individuals to obtain gainful employment and to enjoy privileges 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
2 
 
free from employment discrimination."1  The Wisconsin Fair 
Employment Act is designed to encourage and foster, to the 
extent practicable, the employment of all qualified individuals.    
¶3 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that all 
filings under the federal antidiscrimination statutes should be 
construed "to protect the employee's rights and statutory 
remedies;"2 
the 
federal 
procedures 
to 
claim 
employment 
discrimination "must be accessible to individuals who have no 
detailed knowledge of the relevant statutory mechanisms and 
agency processes."3   
¶4 
Joyce Aldrich, the petitioner, seeks review of a 
published court of appeals decision.4  The court of appeals 
affirmed an opinion of the Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review 
Commission (LIRC) dismissing Ms. Aldrich's state discrimination 
claims against her employer, Best Buy Stores, L.P.  Ms. Aldrich 
claims that Best Buy discriminated against her on the basis of 
her age and gender.   
¶5 
Ms. Aldrich filed her claims first with the federal 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  The claims 
                                                 
1 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.31(2) 
(2009-10). 
 
All 
subsequent 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-10 version 
unless otherwise indicated.  
2 Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 406 
(2008).  
3 Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 403.   
4 Aldrich v. LIRC (Aldrich II), 2011 WI App 94, 334 
Wis. 2d 495, 801 N.W.2d 457. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
3 
 
later went to the Equal Rights Division (ERD) of the Wisconsin 
Department of Workforce Development by a procedure known as 
deferral.  The claimed discriminatory conduct in the present 
case occurred nearly 10 years ago.  Neither Ms. Aldrich nor Best 
Buy has had the merits of the claims heard by any court or any 
federal or state administrative agency.  The decision today 
gives Ms. Aldrich and Best Buy an opportunity to be heard.    
¶6 
At this stage, the appeal raises the following two 
issues: 
¶7 
First, under the circumstances of the present case and 
the governing rules promulgated by the Department of Workforce 
Development, is Ms. Aldrich's complaint deemed filed with the 
ERD on the date that she filed documents with the EEOC that 
constituted a "charge" under federal law, or is it deemed filed 
with the ERD on the date that she filed documents with the EEOC 
that would have constituted a complaint under state law?  Best 
Buy, LIRC, and the court of appeals take the former approach.    
¶8 
Second, is Ms. Aldrich barred by the doctrine of issue 
preclusion from litigating before the ERD the timeliness of her 
filing of the federal "charge" in the EEOC?  In other words, may 
Ms. Aldrich argue before the ERD that her intake questionnaire 
was a timely filing of a federal "charge" under federal law such 
that the ERD must consider it a complaint timely filed under 
state law?  LIRC and the court of appeals applied issue 
preclusion and thus ruled that Ms. Aldrich's complaint was time-
barred under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act because the 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
4 
 
federal district court had determined that she did not file a 
timely "charge" with the EEOC under federal law.       
¶9 
For the reasons set forth, we do not definitively 
decide the first issue.  At this stage, we rest our decision on 
the second issue.  We conclude that Ms. Aldrich is not barred by 
the doctrine of issue preclusion from litigating before the ERD 
the timeliness of the filing of her federal discrimination 
"charge" with the EEOC.  In other words, Ms. Aldrich may 
litigate whether the intake questionnaire filed with the EEOC 
qualifies as a "charge" under federal law.  If it does, then 
under the approach taken by LIRC in this and prior cases, it was 
filed timely for federal and state purposes and Ms. Aldrich will 
be deemed to have filed a timely complaint with the ERD. 
¶10 We conclude that applying the doctrine of issue 
preclusion in the present case does not comport with principles 
of fundamental fairness.  We reach this decision based on the 
unique circumstances of Ms. Aldrich's case, the basis for the 
decision of the federal district court barring Ms. Aldrich's 
claim as untimely, the shift in the federal law relating to what 
documents constitute a valid federal "charge" (see Federal 
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 (2008)), and the 
Wisconsin legislative public policy of protecting the statutory 
rights of employees with discrimination claims.   
¶11 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the matter to LIRC with instructions to 
remand the matter to the ERD to determine whether the intake 
questionnaire filed with the federal EEOC in Ms. Aldrich's case 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
5 
 
satisfies the requirements of a charge under federal law so that 
the charge was filed timely within the 300-day federal statutory 
period. 
¶12 Our opinion is structured as follows.   
¶13 Part I provides background.  Subpart I.A. (¶¶17-27) 
sets forth the relationship between the state administrative 
agency enforcing the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act and the 
federal 
administrative 
agency 
enforcing 
the 
federal 
antidiscrimination statutes, to give context to the present 
case.  Subpart I.B. (¶¶28-64) provides the facts and procedural 
history of the present case.   
¶14 Part II discusses the first issue raised by the 
parties——the meaning of Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 218.03(5)——and 
explains that we do not definitively decide the issue at this 
time.  See ¶¶65-86. 
¶15 Part III is our analysis of issue preclusion.  Subpart 
III.A. (¶¶90-96) presents the standard of review; subpart III.B. 
(¶¶97-108) analyzes the legal elements of issue preclusion and 
concludes that they are satisfied in the present case; and 
subpart III.C. (¶¶109-149) analyzes whether applying issue 
preclusion comports with principles of fundamental fairness in 
the present case and concludes that it does not.   
I 
¶16 We first set forth the relationship between the state 
administrative agency enforcing the Wisconsin Fair Employment 
Act and the federal administrative agency enforcing the federal 
antidiscrimination statutes, to give context to the present 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
6 
 
case.  We then lay out the facts and procedural history of Joyce 
Aldrich's discrimination claims. 
A 
¶17 An employee who wishes to pursue a discrimination 
claim against an employer has the option of filing a claim under 
the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act with the Equal Rights Division 
(ERD) of the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development or 
filing a claim under analogous federal statutes with the federal 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  Because of the 
overlapping substance of the state and federal statutes, it is 
common for both the state and federal agencies to become 
involved at various points in investigating the same claim.   
¶18 So common, in fact, that the Wisconsin ERD and the 
Milwaukee District Office of the federal EEOC are parties to a 
detailed "worksharing agreement."  The stated purpose of the 
agreement is "to provide individuals with an efficient procedure 
for obtaining redress for their grievances under appropriate 
State and Federal laws."  
¶19 Under the worksharing agreement, the first agency to 
receive a discrimination claim ordinarily "defers" the claim to 
the other agency.      
¶20 The use of the word "defers" is somewhat strange.  It 
appears to mean that the administrative agency that first 
receives the claim notifies the other agency that a claim has 
been filed.  The worksharing agreement dictates that the first 
agency to receive a claim will process the claim and the "other" 
agency takes no action initially.  In other words, although the 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
7 
 
rules and the agreement refer to the first agency "deferring" a 
claim to the "other agency," it is actually the "other agency" 
(here the ERD) that "defers" to the agency in which the claim is 
first filed (here the EEOC).  
¶21 The Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development has 
promulgated a rule governing the timeliness of complaints before 
the ERD in deferral situations: 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 218.03(5). Date of filing of 
complaint deferred by another agency.  A complaint 
which is deferred to the [Department of Workforce 
Development] 
by 
a 
federal 
or 
local 
employment 
opportunity agency with which the department has a 
worksharing agreement complies with the requirements 
of sub. (3) and is considered filed when received by 
the federal or local agency.5 
¶22 The time limit for filing a claim under both the state 
and federal statutes is 300 days from the date of the alleged 
discrimination.  In the federal system, the document to be filed 
within the 300-day statutory period is referred to as a 
"charge."  In the state system, the document to be filed is 
referred to as a "complaint" in the statutes as well as in the 
Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development rules.6  A rule of 
the Department of Workforce Development sets forth the contents 
                                                 
5 All citations to the Wisconsin Administrative Code are 
current through Wisconsin Administrative Register No. 673 (eff. 
Jan. 15, 2012).  The language of the relevant rules has not 
changed since Ms. Aldrich's demotion. 
6 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 111.39(1); Wis. Stat. § 111.375; 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 218.03. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
8 
 
of a complaint, and by rule the Department agrees to provide 
"appropriate assistance in completing and filing complaints."7  
¶23 According to LIRC, under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
218.03(5), set forth above, in deferral situations the document 
that constitutes a federal "charge" automatically complies with 
the Department rules governing the form and content of a 
complaint for purposes of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act and 
is considered filed with the ERD when received by the federal 
EEOC. 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DWD 218.03 provides in part as 
follows: 
(3) Form and content of complaint. A complaint shall 
be written on a form which is available at any 
division office or on any form acceptable to the 
department. Each complaint shall be signed by the 
person filing the complaint or by the person's duly 
authorized representative. The signature constitutes 
an acknowledgment that the party or the representative 
has read the complaint; that to the best of that 
person's 
knowledge, 
information 
and 
belief 
the 
complaint is true and correct; and that the complaint 
is not being used for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass the party against whom the complaint is filed. 
Each complaint shall contain all of the following 
information:  
(a) The name and address of the complainant.  
(b) The name and address of the respondent.  
(c) A concise statement of the facts, including 
pertinent dates, constituting the alleged act of 
employment discrimination, unfair honesty testing or 
unfair genetic testing. 
(4) Assistance by the department. The department 
shall, upon request, provide appropriate assistance in 
completing and filing complaints. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
9 
 
¶24 The formal requirements for a federal "charge"8 and for 
a state complaint differ somewhat.  The requirements for both 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 Contents of charge; 
amendment of charge: 
(a) Each charge should contain the following: 
(1) The full name, address and telephone number of the 
person making the charge except as provided in 
§ 1601.7;  
(2) The full name and address of the person against 
whom the charge is made, if known (hereinafter 
referred to as the respondent);  
(3) A clear and concise statement of the facts, 
including pertinent dates, constituting the alleged 
unlawful employment practices:  See § 1601.15(b);  
(4) If known, the approximate number of employees of 
the respondent employer or the approximate number of 
members of the respondent labor organization, as the 
case may be; and  
(5) 
A 
statement 
disclosing 
whether 
proceedings 
involving the alleged unlawful employment practice 
have been commenced before a State or local agency 
charged with 
the enforcement of fair employment 
practice 
laws 
and, 
if 
so, 
the 
date 
of 
such 
commencement and the name of the agency. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of 
this 
section, 
a 
charge 
is 
sufficient 
when 
the 
Commission receives from the person making the charge 
a written statement sufficiently precise to identify 
the parties, and to describe generally the action or 
practices complained of. A charge may be amended to 
cure technical defects or omissions, including failure 
to verify the charge, or to clarify and amplify 
allegations 
made 
therein. 
Such 
amendments 
and 
amendments alleging additional acts which constitute 
unlawful employment practices related to or growing 
out of the subject matter of the original charge will 
relate back to the date the charge was first received. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
10 
 
are minimal, in recognition of the fact that many complainants 
proceed 
without 
attorneys 
and 
the 
fact 
that 
the 
antidiscrimination laws are remedial in nature. 
 
¶25 As noted above, in the state system, the Department of 
Workforce 
Development 
provides 
"appropriate 
assistance 
in 
completing and filing complaints."  In the federal system, the 
EEOC is involved in the filing as well, but rather than merely 
providing assistance when necessary, it appears that the EEOC 
investigators are responsible in all cases for converting the 
information from the intake questionnaire completed by the 
complainant into a "charge."     
¶26 The 
present 
case 
illustrates 
that 
although 
a 
complainant may provide information to the EEOC timely, the EEOC 
does not always file the "charge," which is drafted by an EEOC 
investigator and approved by the complainant, until after the 
300-day statutory time limit has passed.  LIRC advises that any 
delay by the investigator in preparing a "charge" for filing 
does not affect the timeliness of the "charge" when the intake 
questionnaire or other document filed with the EEOC and used by 
the EEOC investigator in preparing the "charge" may be deemed a 
"charge" under federal law.9    
 
¶27 With this description of the worksharing arrangement 
between the state and federal agencies and the Wisconsin 
                                                                                                                                                             
A charge that has been so amended shall not be 
required to be redeferred. 
9 Brief of Labor and Industry Review Commission at 30-31. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
11 
 
Department rules, we turn to explain what happened with Ms. 
Aldrich's discrimination claims against Best Buy.  
B 
¶28 The 
merits 
of 
Ms. 
Aldrich's 
age 
and 
gender 
discrimination claims are not before the court and have not yet 
been litigated before any agency or court.  We set forth a 
limited account of her allegations as background, and we set 
forth her attempts to have her claims heard on the merits by 
either the EEOC or the ERD. 
 
¶29 Ms. Aldrich began work at Best Buy in 1987 and earned 
a number of promotions over the years.  In March of 2003 she was 
demoted.  Ms. Aldrich alleged that several male managers were 
not demoted even though the reasons for her demotion applied 
equally to them.  She also alleged that younger, male employees 
received vacation that she had requested, took demotions without 
pay cuts, and made comments about her age. 
 
¶30 After her demotion, Ms. Aldrich communicated with the 
federal 
EEOC 
in 
Milwaukee 
to 
inquire 
about 
filing 
a 
discrimination 
claim 
against 
Best 
Buy. 
 
During 
a 
brief 
conversation, an EEOC employee told her that the EEOC would send 
paperwork to her and that when she completed the paperwork and 
sent it back to the EEOC, her claim would be filed.   
 
¶31 Ms. Aldrich received two documents from the federal 
EEOC 
in 
late 
March 
or 
early 
April 
of 
2003, 
a 
"Basic 
Questionnaire" and a "Charge Questionnaire."  We will refer to 
both these documents together as the intake questionnaire. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
12 
 
¶32 The Basic Questionnaire asked for information about 
Ms. Aldrich's employer and Ms. Aldrich's employment history, 
including the names of her supervisors, whether she had ever 
been promoted, and whether she had received any negative 
evaluations.  It also asked her to describe the discriminatory 
actions that were the basis of her claim and to provide the 
names of the persons involved and the dates.  Additionally, it 
asked Ms. Aldrich to provide information about how other 
employees in "very similar circumstances" were treated and to 
provide the names of any witnesses.   
¶33 The Charge Questionnaire asked for Joyce Aldrich's 
full name, address, telephone number, age, sex, and race.  It 
included a section entitled "Those actions that you wish to 
include 
in 
the 
charge," 
which 
asked 
for 
the 
dates 
of 
discrimination, the names and job titles of individuals who 
discriminated 
against 
Ms. 
Aldrich, 
a 
description 
of 
the 
discrimination, and a description of the reasons the employer 
gave for its actions against Ms. Aldrich.  
 
¶34 Ms. Aldrich completed the two questionnaires.  She 
signed both under penalty of perjury.  The EEOC received Ms. 
Aldrich's completed intake questionnaire on August 27, 2003, 
with approximately one-half of the 300-day time limit yet to 
expire.  Upon receipt of the intake questionnaire, the EEOC 
assigned a 2003 EEOC charge number to Ms. Aldrich's case and 
assigned the case to Wendy Martin, one of its investigators. 
 
¶35 On August 29, 2003, the EEOC investigator sent a 
letter to Ms. Aldrich explaining the need for additional 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
13 
 
information to draft the charge.  Upon receiving the letter, Ms. 
Aldrich called the EEOC investigator and provided the requested 
information.   
 
¶36 At least twice during the fall of 2003, Ms. Aldrich 
communicated with the federal EEOC investigator to check on the 
status of her case.  In December, the EEOC investigator informed 
Ms. Aldrich that the case had been transferred to Lili Llanas, 
another EEOC investigator. 
 
¶37 Ms. Aldrich spoke to this second EEOC investigator 
once and answered additional questions in late December or early 
January.  Sometime in January, Ms. Aldrich received a draft of a 
charge from the second investigator.  According to Ms. Aldrich, 
the draft contained several inaccuracies.  In response, Ms. 
Aldrich called the second investigator and also sent her a 
letter that included "Corrections to be made on Charge of 
Discrimination" and "More Charges of Discrimination."  
 
¶38 Ms. Aldrich's letter provided information on a variety 
of health problems she endured during the fall and winter of 
2003, including foot surgery, surgery to remove a mass from her 
colon, headaches, back pain, and a mild heart attack.  Ms. 
Aldrich explained that multiple doctors told her that stress was 
to blame for her health problems and that she should not return 
to Best Buy.  In her letter, Ms. Aldrich told the second 
investigator that she gave her written separation notice to Best 
Buy on January 26, 2004.  
 
¶39 In late January or early February 2004, Ms. Aldrich 
received a revised draft of the charge from the second EEOC 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
14 
 
investigator.  It incorporated Ms. Aldrich's corrections but did 
not include her claim of constructive discharge.   
¶40 Ms. Aldrich signed the charge on February 4, 2004, and 
the federal EEOC received the charge on February 10, 2004.  
Pursuant to its worksharing agreement with the ERD, the federal 
EEOC transmitted the charge to the ERD on February 17, 2004, and 
notified the ERD that the EEOC would initially process the case.  
The ERD received the "charge" and the EEOC's letter on February 
18, 2004.   
¶41 On March 11, 2004, the ERD notified the parties that 
it would take no action while the EEOC investigated because the 
worksharing agreement dictates that the claim is initially 
processed by the first agency to receive it. 
 
¶42 Ms. Aldrich was not represented by an attorney from 
March of 2003 through February of 2004. 
 
¶43 On January 14, 2005, the EEOC issued a "Dismissal and 
Notice of Rights," notifying Ms. Aldrich that the EEOC was 
closing its investigation of her case because it could not 
determine, based on her charge, that Best Buy had violated the 
applicable antidiscrimination statutes.  The notice indicated 
that Ms. Aldrich could bring a suit in federal court within 90 
days of receiving the dismissal notice to challenge the EEOC's 
dismissal of her claim.  
 
¶44 On March 3, 2005, the ERD sent Ms. Aldrich a letter 
advising her that it would conduct an independent investigation 
of her case if she submitted a written request by March 23, 
2005.  Ms. Aldrich requested an independent investigation by the 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
15 
 
ERD in a letter dated March 16, 2005,10 which was received by the 
ERD on March 21, 2005.  
 
¶45 In April 2005, Ms. Aldrich also exercised her right to 
file a civil action in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin, seeking review of the EEOC's 
dismissal of her discrimination claims.  As a result, the ERD 
held its investigation in abeyance.  
 
¶46 In her action before the federal district court, Ms. 
Aldrich alleged that her March 2003 demotion was discriminatory 
and that she was constructively discharged in January 2004.  
Best Buy moved for summary judgment, claiming that Ms. Aldrich's 
charge was time-barred because it was received by the EEOC on 
February 10, 2004, more than 300 days after her March 2003 
demotion.  Ms. Aldrich argued to the federal district court that 
the intake questionnaire she submitted on August 27, 2003 
constituted a valid charge under federal law and was within the 
300-day statutory time period. 
 
¶47 In a decision that predated the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 
U.S. 389 (2008), the federal district court granted Best Buy's 
motion for summary judgment and dismissed Ms. Aldrich's claims.11   
¶48 The federal district court rested its holding on 
Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1991).  In that 
                                                 
10 The letter was accidentally dated March 16, 2004 rather 
than 2005. 
11 Aldrich v. Best Buy, No. 05-C-226-S, slip op. (W.D. Wis. 
Sept. 21, 2005).  
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
16 
 
case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to treat an 
intake questionnaire as a federal charge because the EEOC 
investigator had informed the complainant that the intake 
questionnaire contained insufficient information and that no 
further 
action 
would 
be 
taken 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
the 
questionnaire.12 
 
¶49 Because the first EEOC investigator sent Ms. Aldrich a 
letter requesting further information in order to complete the 
charge, the federal district court concluded that Ms. Aldrich's 
case was indistinguishable from Perkins.  The federal district 
court was unmoved by the fact that Ms. Aldrich timely completed 
the intake questionnaire, promptly responded to the request for 
additional information, and called the EEOC on a number of 
occasions to check on the status of her case.  It was apparently 
irrelevant to the federal district court that Ms. Aldrich was 
dependent on the actions of the EEOC investigators to complete 
the filing of her charge, that months passed while Ms. Aldrich 
waited for the EEOC investigators to draft her charge, that her 
case was switched from one EEOC investigator to another, and 
that the final delay occurred because the first draft completed 
by the EEOC investigator was unsatisfactory.13 
                                                 
12 Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 
1991). 
13 The federal district court also granted summary judgment 
on Ms. Aldrich's constructive discharge claim because it was not 
included in the charge that the EEOC received on February 10, 
2004, and therefore Ms. Aldrich had failed to exhaust her 
administrative remedies with respect to that claim.  
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
17 
 
 
¶50 Rather than appeal the federal district court's 
decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Ms. Aldrich 
requested that the ERD recommence its independent investigation.  
On June 6, 2006, the ERD issued an initial determination, 
finding probable cause to believe that Best Buy violated the 
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act.  Thus, Ms. Aldrich's case was 
scheduled for a hearing on the merits before an administrative 
law judge (ALJ). 
 
¶51 Best Buy moved the ALJ to dismiss the proceeding on 
the basis of claim preclusion.  The ALJ granted Best Buy's 
motion, concluding that the federal district court action 
satisfied the elements of claim preclusion.  LIRC affirmed.  On 
certiorari review, the circuit court reversed LIRC's decision. 
 
¶52 In a published decision, Aldrich v. Labor & Industrial 
Review Commission (Aldrich I), 2009 WI App 63, 310 Wis. 2d 796, 
751 N.W.2d 866, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court's reversal of the LIRC decision dismissing Ms. Aldrich's 
WFEA claim against Best Buy.  The court of appeals concluded 
that claim preclusion could not bar Ms. Aldrich's state 
discrimination 
claims 
because 
"[t]he 
exclusive 
means 
of 
asserting a [Wisconsin Fair Employment Act] claim is through the 
Department of Workforce Development's Equal Rights Division" and 
Ms. Aldrich, therefore, could not have litigated her Wisconsin 
Fair Employment Act claims in the federal court action.14   
                                                 
14 Aldrich v. LIRC (Aldrich I), 2008 WI App 63, ¶9, 310 
Wis. 2d 796, 751 N.W.2d 866. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
18 
 
 
¶53 On remand, Best Buy again moved the ERD to dismiss Ms. 
Aldrich's claim before it.  Best Buy's second motion to dismiss 
asserted that Ms. Aldrich's claims were untimely under the 
applicable 
rules 
adopted 
by 
the 
Department 
of 
Workforce 
Development under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act.    
¶54 Best Buy contended that under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
218.03(5), quoted above, Ms. Aldrich's complaint was deemed 
filed with the ERD when Ms. Aldrich's "charge" was received by 
the EEOC.  Best Buy asserted that issue preclusion barred Ms. 
Aldrich 
from 
arguing 
before 
the 
ERD 
that 
her 
intake 
questionnaire constituted a "charge" under federal law because 
the federal district court had already decided that Ms. 
Aldrich's "charge" was a later document that was not received by 
the EEOC until February 10, 2004, more than 300 days after the 
alleged discrimination. 
 
¶55 The ALJ granted Best Buy's motion to dismiss Ms. 
Aldrich's claim.  The ALJ cited Wis. Stat. § 111.39(1), which 
provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he department may receive 
and investigate a complaint . . . if the complaint is filed with 
the department no more than 300 days after the alleged 
discrimination . . . occurred."  The ALJ then explained that 
"[w]hile the ERD generally considers the first written contact 
alleging discrimination to be the date of filing, . . . this 
situation involves deferral and not a case that was first filed 
with the ERD."  According to the ALJ, in a deferral situation, 
Wis. Admin. Code. § DWD 218.03(5) applies and "is construed to 
mean that the 'Charge of Discrimination' . . . that was received 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
19 
 
at the EEOC on February 10 of 2004 is deemed by the ERD to be a 
complaint that was filed on February 10 of 2004 even though it 
was not actually received at the ERD until February 18 of 2004."  
 
¶56 The ALJ stated that "the federal court determined that 
February 10 of 2004 was the date of filing [with the EEOC] and 
rejected [Ms. Aldrich's] argument that August 27 of 2003 should 
be 
considered 
the 
date 
of 
filing 
[with 
the 
EEOC]."  
Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Aldrich would be 
precluded from relitigating the issue of when her "charge" was 
filed with the EEOC.   
¶57 The ALJ did note that issue preclusion may be applied 
only if it comports with "fundamental fairness" and cited the 
five factors that are ordinarily considered to aid this 
determination.  Then the ALJ concluded, without reference to the 
fundamental fairness factors, that "[b]ased on the doctrine of 
issue preclusion, the determination of the U.S. District Court 
that the Complainant's 'Charge of Discrimination' was filed with 
the EEOC on February 10 of 2004 (and not on August 27 of 2003) 
must be accepted."  With respect to Ms. Aldrich's constructive 
discharge claim, the ALJ concluded that it was untimely because 
it was not included in the charge that the EEOC received on 
February 10, 2004.   
 
¶58 Ms. Aldrich petitioned LIRC for review of the ALJ's 
decision, and LIRC affirmed.15  As we explain below, it is LIRC's 
decision that we review in the present case. 
                                                 
15 Aldrich v. Best Buy, ERD No. CR200400999 (LIRC, May 21, 
2009).   
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
20 
 
¶59 LIRC affirmed the ALJ's interpretation of Wis. Admin. 
Code § DWD 218.03(5).  LIRC stressed that it has consistently 
concluded that a complaint deferred to the ERD from the EEOC 
(where it was first filed) is deemed filed with the ERD on the 
date the complainant satisfies the filing requirements of a 
"charge" under federal law.16  
 
¶60 LIRC then affirmed the ALJ's decision to apply issue 
preclusion and bar Ms. Aldrich from relitigating the issue of 
whether her intake questionnaire constituted a "charge" under 
federal law.  LIRC considered the five fundamental fairness 
factors in issue preclusion and concluded that none was 
implicated in the present case.  Accordingly, LIRC concluded 
that "Aldrich's demotion claim must be dismissed as untimely."  
 
¶61 Lastly, LIRC affirmed the ALJ's determination that Ms. 
Aldrich's constructive discharge claim was not timely filed 
because it was never filed directly with the ERD and the federal 
court determined that it was not included in a timely charge 
filed with the EEOC. 
 
¶62 On certiorari review for the second time, the circuit 
court reversed LIRC for a second time.17  The circuit court 
interpreted Aldrich I to "tacitly suggest[] issue preclusion is 
not available to LIRC and Best Buy, Inc. in this case."  The 
                                                 
16 LIRC cited Keup v. Mayville Products, ERD No. 9302193, 
(LIRC, June 22, 1995), and Mozden v. Brakebush Brothers, Inc., 
ERD No. CR200600005 (LIRC, Mar. 30, 2007).  
17 Aldrich v. LIRC, No. 09CV518, unpublished order (Eau 
Clair County Cir. Ct. June 9, 2010).  
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
21 
 
circuit court believed "it was the intention of the Court of 
Appeals that Joyce Aldrich's case would go back to the Equal 
Rights Division for an actual evidentiary hearing on her 
underlying substantive claim."  
 
¶63 In a published decision, the court of appeals reversed 
the circuit court and remanded with directions to reinstate 
LIRC's decision.18  First, the court of appeals affirmed LIRC's 
interpretation of Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 218.03(5), concluding 
that in a deferral situation like the present case, a complaint 
is deemed filed with the Wisconsin ERD on the date the EEOC 
receives a federal "charge" of discrimination.19  Second, the 
court of appeals affirmed LIRC's decision to apply issue 
preclusion and bar Ms. Aldrich from relitigating the issue of 
whether her intake questionnaire constituted a charge under 
federal law.  
 
¶64 This court accepted Ms. Aldrich's petition for review. 
II 
 
¶65 We turn to the first question the parties present:  In 
a deferral situation like the present case, under the applicable 
Department of Workforce Development rules, is a complaint deemed 
filed with the ERD on the date that the complainant filed 
documents with the EEOC that constituted a "charge" under 
federal law, or is it deemed filed on the date that the 
                                                 
18 Aldrich v. LIRC (Aldrich II), 2011 WI App 94, 334 
Wis. 2d 495, 801 N.W.2d 457. 
19 Aldrich II, 334 Wis. 2d 495, ¶¶14-16. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
22 
 
complainant filed documents with the EEOC that would have 
constituted a "complaint" under state law?  To put it another 
way, if the intake questionnaire Ms. Aldrich filed with the EEOC 
would have qualified as a complaint under state law, could Ms. 
Aldrich be deemed to have timely filed a complaint under the 
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act even if the ERD did not receive 
the documents from the EEOC until after the 300-day statutory 
period expired, or must Ms. Aldrich establish that the intake 
questionnaire constituted a "charge" under federal law? 
¶66 Much of the parties' dispute has centered around Wis. 
Admin. Code § DWD 218.03(5), discussed above, which governs the 
timeliness of a claim that was initiated with an agency with 
which the ERD has a worksharing agreement.  Wisconsin Admin. 
Code § DWD 218.03(5) is entitled "Date of filing of complaint 
deferred by another agency," and it reads as follows: 
A complaint which is deferred to the department by a 
federal or local employment opportunity agency with 
which the [Department of Workforce Development] has a 
worksharing agreement complies with the requirements 
of sub. (3) and is considered filed when received by 
the federal or local agency.  
¶67 Because Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 218.03(5) deems a 
complaint filed with the ERD when it is received by the federal 
agency (the EEOC) or a local agency, it creates an exception to 
the general rule that a complaint is deemed filed on the date it 
is physically received by the ERD.20   The parties dispute the 
                                                 
20 See Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 218.02(6) ("'Filing' means the 
physical receipt of a document."). 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
23 
 
meaning of the rule.  Neither party's interpretation fits 
comfortably with the text of the rule. 
¶68 Best Buy and LIRC argue that Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
218.03(5) uses the word "complaint" generically to refer both to 
federal "charges" and to any discrimination claims filed in 
local agencies; "complaint" as used in the rule refers to the 
pleading (whatever it is called) "which is deferred" by another 
agency to the ERD.   
¶69 Furthermore, 
Best 
Buy 
and 
LIRC 
read 
the 
word 
"deferred" to mean "sent."  In other words, Best Buy and the 
LIRC interpret the rule to mean that a pleading must actually be 
sent from the EEOC to the ERD to qualify as a "complaint which 
is deferred." 
¶70 Best Buy's and LIRC's interpretation of the words 
"complaint" and "deferred" in the rule is not a natural reading 
of these words.   
¶71 In the present case, Best Buy argues that the only 
document the ERD "received" was the "charge" that the EEOC 
received on February 10, 2004.  They acknowledge that Wis. 
Admin. Code § DWD 218.03(5) creates an exception to the physical 
receipt requirement, and thus argue that under the deferral 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
24 
 
provision, Ms. Aldrich's complaint should be deemed filed with 
the ERD on February 10, 2004.21 
¶72 In sum, according to Best Buy and LIRC, in a deferral 
situation like the instant case, only a "charge" filed timely 
with the EEOC according to federal law is deemed a complaint 
received timely by the ERD.    
¶73 This interpretation——that a state complaint is deemed 
filed when the federal agency receives documentation that 
constitutes a "charge" under federal law——is supported by LIRC 
case law. 
¶74 For example, in Keup v. Mayville Metal Products, ERD 
No. 9302193 (LIRC, June 22, 1995), the complainant sent a 
questionnaire to the federal EEOC well within the 300-day time 
limit, but it was not converted into a formal charge until after 
the 300-day time limit had expired.  The EEOC evidently was not 
concerned 
with, 
or 
was 
not 
alerted 
to, 
the 
potential 
untimeliness.  Nevertheless, the federal EEOC terminated its 
investigation after conciliation efforts failed.22   
¶75 The ERD picked up the investigation in Keup.  The ERD 
dismissed the Keup complaint on the ground that the complaint 
                                                 
21 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.39(1) provides that the ERD may 
process a complaint only if that complaint "is filed with the 
department [of workforce development, of which ERD is a 
division] 
no 
more 
than 
300 
days 
after 
the 
alleged 
discrimination . . . ."  The rules define "filing" to mean "the 
physical receipt of a document."  Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
218.02(6).   
22 According to Keup, this was the EEOC's standard procedure 
at the time. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
25 
 
had 
been 
received 
more 
than 
300 
days 
of 
the 
alleged 
discrimination.  On review, the LIRC reversed the ERD.  The LIRC 
analyzed federal law, including Steffen v. Meridian Life Ins. 
Co., 859 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1988), and determined that the 
complainant's intake questionnaire satisfied the charge-filing 
requirements 
under 
federal 
law. 
 
Because 
the 
initial 
questionnaire fulfilled the federal requirements of a charge and 
was timely, according to LIRC it would be deemed timely received 
as a complaint by the state agency.23  The case was remanded for 
further proceedings before the ERD.24   
¶76 Keup 
addressed 
the 
question 
whether 
an 
intake 
questionnaire can constitute a federal "charge" under federal 
law.  With respect to this point, LIRC's brief advises that any 
                                                 
23 In contrast to the present case, there had been no 
determination by the federal agency or a federal court regarding 
the timeliness of the complainant's federal charge.   
24 Keup's reasoning was followed in Mozden v. Brakebush 
Brothers Inc., ERD No. CR200600005 (LIRC, Mar. 30, 2007).  In 
Mozden, the LIRC stated that "because a charge received by the 
EEOC is also deemed to be received by the state agency with 
which the EEOC has a worksharing agreement, including the 
Wisconsin ERD, the date on which the charge was received by the 
EEOC will constitute the filing date for purposes of the 
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act." 
The Keup and Mozden cases were followed by LIRC in the 
Aldrich case:  "[I]f Aldrich's claim of discrimination was not 
timely received in the federal forum then it would not be 
considered timely received by the ERD.  Both Keup and Mozden 
thus stand for the proposition that, for an intake questionnaire 
to stop the statute of limitations under the WFEA, the 
complainant must show that the intake questionnaire constituted 
a charge under federal law."  Aldrich v. Best Buy, Inc., ERD No. 
CR200400999 (LIRC, May 21, 2009). 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
26 
 
delay by the investigator in preparing a "charge" for filing 
does not affect the timeliness of the "charge" under federal law 
when the intake questionnaire or other document filed with the 
EEOC and used by the EEOC investigator in preparing the "charge" 
may be deemed a "charge" under federal law.25 
¶77 Keup did not address the first issue presented in the 
instant case, namely whether an intake questionnaire that 
fulfills the requirements of a state complaint (but does not 
constitute a "charge" under federal law) and was filed within 
the 300-day statutory period constitutes a complaint under the 
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act that satisfies the 300-day 
requirement under state law.   
¶78 The 
interpretation 
and 
application 
of 
the 
rule 
proposed by Best Buy and LIRC is at odds with the text of the 
rule.  Under DWD § 218.03(5), complaints deferred from the EEOC 
to the Wisconsin ERD automatically comply with the form and 
content requirements of state law.  But under the worksharing 
arrangement, the EEOC charge, not a complaint, is deferred.  
Also, interpreting the word "deferred" to mean "sent" is 
contrary to ordinary usage. 
¶79 Ms. Aldrich also focuses on the words "complaint" and 
"deferred" in the statute and Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 218.03(5).  
She argues that Best Buy and LIRC discard the word "complaint" 
and replace it with the word "charge."  She asserts that any 
document received by the federal EEOC that satisfies the minimal 
                                                 
25 Brief of Labor and Industry Review Commission at 30-31. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
27 
 
form and content requirements for a complaint under state law 
should be deemed a "complaint" filed with the Wisconsin ERD when 
it is received by the federal EEOC.   
¶80 Ms. Aldrich argues that the word "deferred" in Wis. 
Admin. Code § DWD 218.03(5) does not require any particular 
pleading to actually be sent to the ERD by the other agency.  
Rather, Ms. Aldrich contends that any pleading received by the 
other agency that would qualify as a complaint under state law 
is deemed filed with the ERD when it is received by the other 
agency.  Nothing in the administrative rules, according to Ms. 
Aldrich, addresses when, or even if, a complaint initially filed 
with the EEOC must be physically received by the ERD in order to 
satisfy the 300-day statutory rule.  According to Ms. Aldrich, 
her 
intake 
questionnaire 
satisfies 
the 
state 
complaint 
requirements, should be deemed her complaint for purposes of her 
state claims, and should be deemed filed with the ERD on August 
27, 2003, well within the 300-day statutory period. 
¶81 Ms. 
Aldrich's 
argument 
resting 
on 
the 
intake 
questionnaire 
is 
difficult 
to 
square 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.39(1), which requires that a complaint be filed with the 
ERD——not the EEOC——to stop the running of the Wisconsin Fair 
Employment Act 300-day statutory period, and with Wis. Admin. 
Code § DWD 218.02(6), which defines "filing" to mean the 
physical receipt of a document.  Also, under Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 218.03(5), it is a "complaint which is deferred" that will 
automatically comply with the form and content requirements for 
a state complaint.   
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
28 
 
¶82 We have serious reservations about both Best Buy's and 
LIRC's proposed interpretation of Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
218.03(5) on the one hand and Ms. Aldrich's on the other hand.  
We are hesitant to adopt either interpretation when it is 
difficult to square either with the text of the rule.  We are 
also hesitant to upset, on this record, LIRC's interpretation of 
the rule in the context of the complex and longstanding 
worksharing agreement between the EEOC and the ERD.   
¶83 LIRC argued in its brief and at oral argument that it 
would cause practical and administrative difficulties if the 
court accepted Ms. Aldrich's interpretation of Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 218.03(5).  At a glance, it is not obvious why it would be 
more difficult for the ERD to scrutinize an EEOC file to 
determine whether documents filed earlier than the "charge" 
satisfy the complaint requirements under state law than it is 
for the ERD to scrutinize an EEOC file to determine whether 
documents filed earlier than the "charge" satisfy the "charge" 
requirements under federal law, as it did in Keup.   
¶84 Nonetheless, 
we 
take 
it 
seriously 
when 
an 
administrative agency with extensive experience in processing 
discrimination claims warns us that a particular interpretation 
of 
a 
rule 
or 
statute 
would 
have 
significant 
practical 
consequences that involve its longstanding relationships with a 
federal agency and local agencies. 
¶85 At this stage of the present litigation, we need not 
and do not address the question whether, under the deferral 
circumstances of the present case, a complaint is deemed filed 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
29 
 
with the ERD on the date that the complainant filed documents 
with the EEOC that constituted a "charge" under federal law, or 
whether it is deemed filed with the ERD on the date that the 
complainant filed documents with the EEOC that would have 
qualified as a complaint under state law.  That issue is left 
for decision on another day.    
¶86 Instead we turn to the second issue in the case, 
namely whether Ms. Aldrich may litigate before the ERD the 
timeliness (under federal law) of her filing of the federal 
"charge" in the EEOC.   
III 
 
¶87 We must determine whether issue preclusion bars Ms. 
Aldrich from arguing that her intake questionnaire constituted a 
federal "charge" that was timely filed as a matter of federal 
law.  In other words, does the determination of the federal 
district court that the intake questionnaire filed with the EEOC 
did not qualify as a "charge" under federal law preclude Ms. 
Aldrich (under the doctrine of issue preclusion) from litigating 
this question anew before the ERD?   
 
¶88 The doctrine of issue preclusion, formerly known as 
collateral estoppel, is designed to limit the relitigation of 
issues that have been actually litigated in a previous action.  
The burden is on the party asserting issue preclusion, here Best 
Buy, to establish that it should be applied.26    
                                                 
26 See Paige K.B. v. Steven G.B., 226 Wis. 2d 210, 219-25, 
594 N.W.2d 370 (1999). 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
30 
 
¶89 We first discuss the standard of review of LIRC's 
decision that issue preclusion applies.  We then apply a two-
step analysis: "(1) whether issue preclusion can, as a matter of 
law, be applied, and if so, (2) whether the application of issue 
preclusion would be fundamentally fair."27 
A 
 
¶90 When this court reviews a case that was initially 
decided by an administrative agency, it reviews the decision of 
the agency, not that of the court of appeals or circuit court.28  
We must determine the standard for reviewing LIRC's conclusion 
that the doctrine of issue preclusion applies in the present 
case.  
 
¶91 The application of issue preclusion involves questions 
of law, and the "fundamental fairness" analysis also involves 
questions of fact, policy, and discretion.29  The court has 
quoted with approval the idea that "[t]he availability of 
collateral estoppel [issue preclusion] is a mixed question of 
law and fact in which legal issues predominate."30  
                                                 
27 Estate of Rille v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2007 WI 36, 300 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶36, 728 N.W.2d 693. 
28 Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. State Div. of Hearings & 
Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶8 n.4, 292 Wis.2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184. 
29 Estate of Rille, 300 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶36-39; Paige K.B., 226 
Wis. 2d at 225. 
30 Paige K.B., 226 Wis. 2d at 225 (quoting Ayers v. City of 
Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th  Cir. 1990)). 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
31 
 
¶92 Questions of law are ordinarily determined by a court, 
rather than an administrative agency, although a court may 
accord deference to an agency's ruling on a question of law, 
such 
as 
statutory 
interpretation. 
 
It 
is 
a 
court's 
responsibility to decide questions of law and determine whether 
deference is due and what level of deference is due an 
administrative agency's determination of a question of law.31   
¶93 In considering whether to defer to an administrative 
agency's determination of a question of law, the court takes 
into account the comparative institutional qualifications and 
capabilities of the court and the administrative agency32 and 
looks to Wis. Stat. § 227.57 for instruction.  The legislature 
has provided in § 227.57(10) that upon court review of an 
agency's decision, "due weight shall be accorded the experience, 
technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency 
involved, as well as discretionary authority conferred upon it."  
Section 227.57(8) states that "the court shall not substitute 
its judgment for that of the agency on an issue of discretion." 
 
¶94 With regard to comparative institutional capability, 
courts probably have more experience with the doctrine of issue 
preclusion than administrative agencies.  The application of 
issue preclusion is a question of law with which courts have a 
great 
deal of familiarity and with which LIRC, in all 
                                                 
31 Racine Harley-Davidson, 292 Wis.2d 549, ¶8 n.4. 
32 Id., ¶14. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
32 
 
likelihood, has less familiarity.33  Unlike interpretation of a 
statute that LIRC administers, issue preclusion is not a 
doctrine 
peculiarly 
within 
LIRC's 
experience, 
technical 
competence, or specialized knowledge.   
 
¶95 With regard to the application of Wis. Stat. § 227.57, 
although LIRC may have discretionary authority delegated to it, 
determining whether the application of issue preclusion comports 
with notions of "fundamental fairness" is not within its 
delegated discretionary authority.  For this reason, we do not 
believe our independent review of LIRC's decision on issue 
preclusion runs afoul of § 227.57.  
¶96 We conclude, as did LIRC and the court of appeals,34 
that whether LIRC properly applied the doctrine of issue 
preclusion is subject to de novo review by the circuit court.35 
B 
¶97 The first step in the analysis of issue preclusion is 
to "determine whether the issue or fact was actually litigated 
and determined in the prior proceeding by a valid judgment in a 
                                                 
33 This is not to say the ERD and LIRC are completely 
unfamiliar with issue preclusion.  They do confront the doctrine 
on occasion.  See, e.g., Rogers v. Wis. Knife Works, ERD No. 
CR200002066 (LIRC, Dec. 22, 2005); Taylor v. St. Michael Hosp., 
ERD No. 199901329 (LIRC, May 31, 2001); Moore v. Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., ERD No. 8700321 (LIRC, Nov. 22, 1991) (aff'd sub nom. 
Moore v. LIRC, 175 Wis. 2d 561, 499 N.W.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1993)).  
34 Aldrich II, 334 Wis.2d 495, ¶10.  
35 The standard of review would be somewhat different if we 
were reviewing a circuit court's application of issue preclusion 
rather than an agency's.  See, e.g., Estate of Rille, 300 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶36-39, 82, 103. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
33 
 
previous action and whether the determination was essential to 
the judgment."36  In the present case, the issue in question is 
whether Ms. Aldrich filed a timely "charge" under federal law.  
¶98 The second step in the analysis of issue preclusion 
requires a circuit court to "determine whether applying issue 
preclusion comports with principles of fundamental fairness."37  
Several of the factors in determining fundamental fairness are 
premised on questions of law; others are based on fact, policy, 
and discretion. 
¶99 We conclude, as did LIRC, that the issue of whether 
Ms. Aldrich filed a timely "charge" under federal law was 
actually litigated in federal district court, was determined in 
a prior action by a valid judgment of the federal district 
court, and was essential to the prior judgment.        
¶100 The federal district court decided, on a motion for 
summary judgment, that Ms. Aldrich failed to timely file the 
"charge" with the EEOC.  An issue decided on summary judgment 
may satisfy the elements of issue preclusion.38  As LIRC noted, 
the federal court "specifically held that Aldrich's intake 
questionnaire did not constitute a charge."  The federal court 
decided that Ms. Aldrich's formal charge was not filed until 
February 10, 2004.  This decision was essential to the federal 
                                                 
36 Estate of Rille, 300 Wis. 2d 1, ¶37.  
37 Id., ¶38 (citing Paige K.B., 226 Wis. 2d at 225). 
38 Estate of Rille, 300 Wis. 2d 1, ¶48 (quoting DePratt v. 
West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 113 Wis. 2d 306, 310-11, 334 N.W.2d 883 
(1983)).  
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
34 
 
court's 
ultimate 
conclusion 
that 
Ms. 
Aldrich's 
federal 
discrimination claim was time-barred.39 
¶101 Ms. Aldrich argues, however, that issue preclusion 
cannot apply, as a matter of law, when the legal rules that 
formed the basis of the prior judgment have changed.  She 
contends that the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, which we previously discussed briefly 
and will discuss more fully below, came down after the federal 
district court decision in the present case and changed how 
federal courts determine what documents constitute a "charge."  
She further asserts that the decision would have compelled a 
different outcome in her case.  
¶102 Ms. Aldrich's argument is motivated by the Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments § 28(2)(b) (1982), which lists as an 
"exception[] to the general rule of issue preclusion" an 
"intervening change in the applicable legal context."40  The 
                                                 
39 Ms. Aldrich argues here and argued to LIRC that issue 
preclusion does not apply because the issue before the ERD is 
whether 
the 
intake 
questionnaire 
satisfied 
the 
complaint 
requirement of the WFEA, an issue the federal court did not 
decide.  LIRC concluded that Ms. Aldrich's argument rested on 
the flawed premise that the date of filing of a complaint can be 
determined independently of the federal law under the deferral 
circumstances of the present case.  As we stated previously, we 
do not address this issue in the present review, and we do not 
address it in discussing issue preclusion. 
40 Section 28 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments  
(1982) provides as follows: 
[R]elitigation of the issue in a subsequent action 
between the parties is not precluded in the following 
circumstances: 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
35 
 
court has consistently looked to this Restatement for guidance 
on issue preclusion.41  Contrary to Ms. Aldrich's argument, the 
comments in the Restatement and the cases on this aspect of 
issue preclusion recognize that not every intervening change in 
the law means that issue preclusion cannot, as a matter of law, 
apply.     
¶103 To determine whether an intervening change in the law 
is an exception to issue preclusion, we look at the goals of 
issue preclusion, which are to avoid repetitive litigation, 
conserve judicial resources, and foster reliance on judicial 
action 
by 
promoting 
finality 
of 
judgments 
and 
avoiding 
inconsistent decisions.42  These goals would be undermined if 
courts always opened their doors to relitigation of previously 
decided cases each time the law shifted or developed.  As a 
federal circuit court of appeals has explained, "[e]ven if there 
were a settled change in the law . . . we still would be unable 
to 
give 
the 
[plaintiffs] 
the 
benefit 
of 
the 
evolving 
                                                                                                                                                             
. . . . 
(2) The issue is one of law and . . . (b) a new 
determination is warranted in order to take account of 
an intervening change in the applicable legal context 
or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of 
the laws . . . .    
41 See Estate of Rille, 300 Wis. 2d 1, ¶48 n.24. 
42 See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 
(1979). 
Comment c. to § 28(2)(b) states: "[T]he choice must be made 
in 
terms 
of 
the 
importance 
of 
stability 
in 
the 
legal 
relationships between the immediate parties . . . ." 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
36 
 
jurisprudence 
by 
permitting 
them 
to 
relitigate 
the 
issue. . . . Such a broad exception would swallow the general 
rule . . . ."43   
¶104 A number of Wisconsin cases have stated that issue 
preclusion applies only when the "applicable legal rules remain 
unchanged."44  None of these cases supports the proposition that 
a categorical exception to issue preclusion applies in the 
present case.   
¶105 The origin of the assertion in the Wisconsin cases 
that issue preclusion may apply only when the applicable legal 
rules remain unchanged is Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. 
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948).  A comparison of the present case 
to Sunnen demonstrates that the categorical exception to issue 
preclusion urged by Ms. Aldrich is not compelled by precedent.  
¶106 Sunnen involved litigation between a taxpayer and the 
government.  The United States Supreme Court explained that 
issue preclusion could be used to "relieve the government and 
the taxpayer of redundant litigation" of questions that arise 
                                                 
43 O'Leary v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1062, 1069 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  See also United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242 
(1924) ("[A] fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the 
original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent action, even 
though the determination was reached upon an erroneous view or 
by an erroneous application of the law."). 
44 See, e.g., State ex rel. Flowers v. DHSS, 81 Wis. 2d 376, 
387, 260 N.W.2d 727 (1978); State ex rel. Staples v. Young, 142 
Wis. 2d 348, 352, 418 N.W.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1987); Crowall v. 
Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 120, 125-26, 346 N.W.2d 327 
(Ct. App. 1984); State ex rel. Lyons v. DHSS, 105 Wis. 2d 146, 
150, 312 N.W.2d 868 (Ct. App. 1981). 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
37 
 
identically each year.  Sunnen, 333 U.S. at 599.  The Sunnen 
Court noted, however, that if the relevant tax laws change, the 
prior year's determination would be "obsolete or erroneous" and 
applying collateral estoppel would lead to "inequalities in the 
administration of the revenue laws."  Id. 
¶107  The key distinction between Sunnen and the present 
case is that in the taxpayer context, there is a new claim 
arising from new (albeit identical) facts each year.45  In the 
present case, however, Ms. Aldrich is seeking to relitigate the 
exact same facts already litigated.46   
                                                 
45 One 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
cases 
cited 
above 
featured 
recurring, identical facts, like Sunnen.  See State ex rel. 
Staples v. Young, 142 Wis. 2d 348, 418 N.W.2d 333 (Ct. App. 
1987).  In Staples, the court of appeals did not apply issue 
preclusion and allowed a party to relitigate an issue in light 
of a change in the governing law with regard to the new (albeit 
identical) facts.  The party sought only to relitigate the new 
facts, however, and did not seek to relitigate the issue with 
regard to the previously decided facts.  
Comment c. to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
§ 28(2)(b) states:  
[T]he choice must be made in terms of the importance 
of stability in the legal relationships between the 
immediate parties, the actual likelihood that there 
are similarly situated persons who are subject to 
application 
of 
the 
rule 
in 
question, 
and 
the 
consequences to the latter if they are subject to 
different legal treatment. 
46 The other Wisconsin cases cited above are not analogous 
to the present case.  In Flowers and Lyons, the courts held that 
parties were not precluded at probation revocation proceedings 
from relitigating issues that were decided at prior criminal 
proceedings.  The rationale was that the governing procedural 
rules and burdens of proof were different in the two types of 
proceedings, not that there had been a change in the applicable 
law.  
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
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¶108 If a change in the applicable legal rules has 
relevance to issue preclusion in the present case, and we think 
it does, it is in the second step of the analysis of issue 
preclusion, to which we now turn.   
C 
¶109 The second step in the analysis of issue preclusion is 
to determine whether applying issue preclusion comports with 
principles of fundamental fairness.  The central goal is "to 
protect the rights of all parties to a full and fair 
adjudication of all issues involved in the action . . . ."47  The 
decision should be made with special attention to "'guarantees 
of due process which require that a person must have had a fair 
opportunity procedurally, substantively and evidentially to 
pursue 
the 
claim 
before 
a 
second 
litigation 
will 
be 
precluded.'"48  
¶110 Drawing on the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 
courts have set forth a list of five factors that may be 
considered to determine whether issue preclusion comports with 
fundamental fairness.  The five factors are as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                             
Crowall quoted the requirement from Sunnen that the 
"applicable legal rules remain unchanged," but it did not 
analyze or rely on that requirement.  Crowall, 118 Wis. 2d at 
126.    
47 Michelle T. v. Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681, 688-89, 495 
N.W.2d 327 (1993).   
48 Estate of Rille, 300 Wis. 2d 1, ¶60 (quoting Precision 
Erecting, Inc. v. M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 224 Wis. 2d 288, 
305, 592 N.W.2d 5 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
39 
 
(1) Could the party against whom preclusion is sought 
have obtained review of the judgment as a matter of 
law; 
(2) Is the question one of law that involves two 
distinct claims or intervening contextual shifts in 
the law; 
(3) Do significant differences in the quality or 
extensiveness 
of 
proceedings 
between 
two 
courts 
warrant relitigation of the issue; 
(4) Have the burdens of persuasion shifted such that 
the party seeking preclusion had a lower burden of 
persuasion in the first trial than in the second; and 
(5) Are matters of public policy and individual 
circumstances 
involved 
that 
would 
render 
the 
application of collateral estoppel to be fundamentally 
unfair, including inadequate opportunity or incentive 
to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial 
action?49  
¶111 No single factor is dispositive in the fundamental 
fairness analysis, and the final decision must rest on a "sense 
of justice and equity."50  The five traditional factors from our 
case law and the Restatement (from which our factors were 
derived) are not exhaustive or exclusive.  
¶112 The weight given to each factor is discretionary.  
Factors 1, 2, and 4 are questions of law.  Factors 3 and 5 
involve questions of fact and policy and require discretionary 
determinations.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that the overall 
question involves fundamental fairness, the "'most important 
factor to be considered is fairness to the party against whom 
                                                 
49 See, 
e.g., 
Estate 
of 
Rille, 
300 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶61; 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (1982).   
50 See Estate of Rille, 300 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶38, 82. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
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preclusion is asserted . . . .'"51  Best Buy has the burden of 
proving that issue preclusion comports with fundamental fairness 
in the present case.52 
¶113 Because factors 1, 3, and 4 do not warrant lengthy 
discussion in the present case, we address them quickly before 
moving on to factors 2 and 5.  
¶114 With regard to factor 1, as LIRC noted, Ms. Aldrich 
could have appealed the federal district court's judgment to the 
Seventh Circuit, but she chose not to.  Had appeal been 
unavailable to Ms. Aldrich, it would have cut strongly in favor 
of not applying issue preclusion. 
¶115 We agree with LIRC that factor 3 does not present a 
strong reason to refuse to apply issue preclusion in the instant 
case.  The parties were represented by counsel.  The quality and 
extensiveness of the proceedings in Ms. Aldrich's federal court 
action was at least equal to the quality and extensiveness of 
the proceedings that would unfold at the Wisconsin ERD. 
¶116 Factor 4 is inconsequential in the present case.  The 
burden was on Best Buy to establish that Ms. Aldrich's "charge" 
was untimely before the federal court, and the same burden is on 
Best Buy to establish that the complaint is untimely before the 
ERD.  
                                                 
51 Id., ¶63 (quoting Precision Erecting, 224 Wis. 2d at 
306).  
52 Paige K.B., 226 Wis. 2d at 219. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
41 
 
¶117 Factor 
2, 
in 
contrast, 
warrants 
more 
careful 
attention.  We are to consider whether the question is one of 
law that involves two distinct claims or intervening contextual 
shifts in the law. 
¶118 The 
issue 
of 
whether 
Ms. 
Aldrich's 
intake 
questionnaire constituted a charge under federal law is a mixed 
question of law and fact.  The discrimination claims Ms. Aldrich 
brought under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act are separate and 
distinct from her discrimination claims brought before the 
federal EEOC.53 
¶119 Crucially, as LIRC noted, there has been a contextual 
shift in the relevant law since the federal district court made 
its decision in September of 2005.  In 2008, the United States 
Supreme Court decided Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 
U.S. 389 (2008), and settled a conflict among the federal 
circuits regarding what documents constitute a "charge" under 
federal law.     
¶120 In Holowecki, the employer argued that an intake 
questionnaire could never constitute a "charge" and that a 
"charge" could not be deemed filed until the EEOC fulfilled its 
"mandatory duty to notify the charged party and initiate a 
conciliation process."  Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 403.  The Court 
quickly rejected this view, explaining that "[i]t would be 
                                                 
53 As noted above, Ms. Aldrich's situation is not analogous 
to that of the taxpayer in Sunnen.  Ms. Aldrich is not bringing 
a separate claim based on new (but identical, recurring) facts.  
Rather, she is bringing a separate claim in which the exact same 
set of facts is again relevant.  
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
42 
 
illogical and impractical to make the definition of charge 
dependent upon a condition subsequent over which the parties 
have no control."54  The Court also noted that "[t]he system must 
be accessible to individuals who have no detailed knowledge of 
the relevant statutory mechanisms and agency processes.  It thus 
is consistent with the purposes of the Act that a charge can be 
a form, easy to complete, or an informal document, easy to 
draft."55 
¶121 The United States Supreme Court also declined to treat 
all intake questionnaires as "charges."  "[T]he agency requires 
some mechanism to separate information requests from enforcement 
requests."  Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 401.  The Court explained 
that individuals should be able to ask the agency questions 
without necessarily triggering the agency's duty to notify the 
employer.  "If an individual knows that reporting this minimal 
information to the agency will mandate the agency to notify her 
employer, she may be discouraged from consulting the agency or 
wait until her employment situation has become so untenable that 
conciliation efforts would be futile."  Id. 
¶122 The Holowecki Court settled on the following objective 
standard to define when an intake questionnaire constitutes a 
charge: "In addition to the information required by the 
regulations, i.e., an allegation and the name of the charged 
party, if a filing is to be deemed a charge it must be 
                                                 
54 Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 404 (emphasis added). 
55 Id. at 403 (emphases added). 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
43 
 
reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take 
remedial action to protect the employee's rights or otherwise 
settle a dispute between the employer and the employee." 
Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 402.  Accordingly, under Holowecki, if an 
objective observer would construe the filing as a request for 
"the agency to activate its machinery and remedial processes," 
the filing constitutes a charge.  Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 402. 
¶123 Ms. 
Aldrich 
argues 
that 
Holowecki 
represents 
a 
substantial change in the relevant law and that her intake 
questionnaire 
would 
certainly constitute a "charge" under 
Holowecki.  Best Buy, on the other hand, argues that Holowecki 
actually adopted the approach that was already the law of the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and was applied to Ms. 
Aldrich's claims by the federal district court.  
¶124 Best Buy's argument is not persuasive in the present 
case.  The seminal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case on what 
constitutes a "charge" prior to Holowecki was Steffen v. 
Meridian Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1989).  In 
Steffen, the Seventh Circuit held that in order to constitute a 
charge, "notice to the EEOC must be of a kind that would 
convince a reasonable person that the grievant has manifested an 
intent to activate the Act's machinery."56  Best Buy is correct 
to assert that the Supreme Court cited Steffen in Holowecki and 
that Holowecki adopted the standard set forth in Steffen.57  
                                                 
56 Steffen, 859 F.2d at 542 (quoting Bihler v. Singer Co., 
710 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1983)).   
57 See Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 396, 402. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
44 
 
¶125 However, the federal district court in the present 
case did not apply the Steffen standard to Ms. Aldrich's intake 
questionnaire.  Rather, the federal district court relied on 
another Seventh Circuit case, Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 
463 (7th Cir. 1991), which is in tension with Steffen and is no 
longer good law after Holowecki.  
¶126 In Perkins, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that an intake questionnaire would constitute a charge only 
"where the information contained in the questionnaire was 
sufficient to constitute a charge, and both the claimant and 
EEOC indicated that they would treat the questionnaire as a 
charge."58  The complainant in Perkins "was informed by the EEOC 
at the time he completed the intake questionnaire that there was 
insufficient information to support his claim of retaliation and 
that no further action would be taken on the basis of the 
questionnaire."  Perkins, 939 F.2d at 470.  Thus, the federal 
court of appeals did not treat the questionnaire as a charge.  
¶127 The federal district court in the present case relied 
heavily on the Perkins holding.  It concluded that under 
Perkins, "an intake questionnaire [i]s not sufficient to 
constitute a charge where the EEOC informed the employee that 
his questionnaire contained insufficient information."  The 
federal district court explained that Ms. Aldrich received a 
letter requesting additional information from the first EEOC 
investigator assigned to her case.  Because of this letter, the 
                                                 
58 Perkins, 939 F.2d at 470 (emphasis added). 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
45 
 
federal 
district 
court 
held 
that 
Ms. 
Aldrich's 
intake 
questionnaire could not constitute a "charge." 
¶128 Perkins was in tension with Steffen when it was 
decided.  The federal district court might have considered the 
rule announced in Steffen along with the rule set forth in 
Perkins in its decision and tried to resolve the tension.  It 
did 
not. 
Regardless 
of 
whether 
Ms. 
Aldrich's 
intake 
questionnaire needed to be supplemented, the questionnaire 
should have been reviewed to determine whether the EEOC was 
given "notice that, by filing the Intake Questionnaire, [the 
complainant] intended to 'activate the Act's machinery.'"59  The 
bright-line rule from Perkins applied by the federal district 
court is hard to square with the objective standard set forth in 
Steffen. 
¶129 Additionally, it seems to us that whatever the status 
of Perkins was before Holowecki, it is no longer good law after 
Holowecki.  Again, Holowecki held that an intake questionnaire 
that contains a minimal allegation and the name of the charged 
party constitutes a charge if it is "reasonably construed as a 
request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the 
employee's rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the 
employer and the employee."  Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 402.  More 
importantly, the Supreme Court asserted that "[i]t would be 
illogical and impractical to make the definition of "charge" 
                                                 
59 Steffen, 859 F.2d at 544. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
46 
 
dependent upon a condition subsequent over which the parties 
have no control."  Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 404.  
¶130 While we leave the issue of whether Ms. Aldrich's 
intake questionnaire constitutes a valid federal "charge" under 
Holowecki to the ERD, we do note that the federal district 
court's resolution of Ms. Aldrich's case seems to run directly 
counter to the Supreme Court's exhortation that the timeliness 
of a complainant's charge cannot hinge on subsequent actions of 
the EEOC over which the complainant has no control.60  It also is 
in tension with the Supreme Court's reminder that "[d]ocuments 
filed by an employee with the EEOC should be construed, to the 
extent consistent with permissible rules of interpretation, to 
protect 
the 
employee's 
rights 
and 
statutory 
remedies."  
Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 406. 
                                                 
60 The complainant in Holowecki included an affidavit with 
the intake questionnaire that asked the agency to "[p]lease 
force 
Federal 
Express 
to 
end 
their 
age 
discrimination." 
Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 405.  While Ms. Aldrich's intake 
questionnaire was not accompanied by a similar affidavit, it 
still may well have (1) contained the required allegation and 
information; and (2) been reasonably construed as a request for 
"the agency to activate its machinery and remedial processes." 
Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 402.  Certainly once Ms. Aldrich provided 
her additional information and "more charges of discrimination," 
which was still within the 300-day time limit, it was clear that 
she was seeking enforcement, not merely information.  At that 
point, she had already quit her job with Best Buy, rendering 
irrelevant the Supreme Court's concern that too loose a 
definition 
of 
"charge" 
might 
discourage 
employees 
from 
consulting with the agency out of fear of triggering the 
agency's duty to report the complaint to the employer.  See 
Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 401.  
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
47 
 
¶131 Thus, we agree with Ms. Aldrich that there has been a 
contextual shift in the relevant law since the federal district 
court rendered its decision in her case.  The question we must 
address, though, is how this contextual shift factors into the 
fundamental fairness analysis. 
¶132 LIRC noted the Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Holowecki but did not analyze whether it constituted a shift 
from pre-existing Seventh Circuit law.  LIRC quoted a section of 
Best Buy's brief, which relied on Morgan v. Department of 
Energy, 424 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2005), and O'Leary v. Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Co., 923 F.2d 1062 (3d Cir. 1991), for the 
conclusion that a categorical exception to issue preclusion was 
not warranted.     
¶133 We agree with LIRC insofar as it concluded that the 
present case does not fit into a categorical, absolute exception 
to the application of issue preclusion.  However, LIRC did not 
go further and analyze whether there was anything about Ms. 
Aldrich's circumstances that warranted an exception to the 
application of issue preclusion in the present case.   
¶134 After briefly introducing factor 5 and summarizing 
LIRC's analysis of factor 5, we will consider factors 2 and 5 
together and explain why the contextual shift in the law and the 
individual circumstances involved would render the application 
of issue preclusion in the present case fundamentally unfair. 
¶135 Factor 5 directs us to consider whether there are 
matters of public policy and individual circumstances involved 
that 
would 
render 
the 
application 
of 
issue 
preclusion 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
48 
 
fundamentally 
unfair, 
including 
inadequate 
opportunity 
or 
incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial 
action.  
¶136 LIRC briefly summarized Ms. Aldrich's arguments (which 
we discuss in detail below), then quoted Best Buy's brief, which 
explained that Ms. Aldrich made the same arguments to the 
federal district court, which rejected them.  LIRC also quoted, 
in full, an "exception" to issue preclusion from the Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments, from which our factor 5 was derived.  The 
Restatement's fifth exception provides as follows: 
[R]elitigation of the issue in a subsequent action 
between the parties is not precluded in the following 
circumstances: . . . (5) 
There 
is 
a 
clear 
and 
convincing need for a new determination of the issue 
(a) because of the potential adverse impact of the 
determination on the public interest or the interests 
of persons not themselves parties in the initial 
action, 
(b) 
because 
it 
was 
not 
sufficiently 
foreseeable at the time of the initial action that the 
issue would arise in the context of a subsequent 
action, or (c) because the party sought to be 
precluded, as a result of the conduct of his adversary 
or other special circumstances, did not have an 
adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and 
fair adjudication in the initial action.61  
¶137 LIRC concluded that "(a)" did not apply because Ms. 
Aldrich was a party in the initial federal action; "(b)" did not 
apply because the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act has the same 
300-day time limit as the federal law; and "(c)" did not apply 
because Ms. Aldrich had an adequate opportunity and incentive to 
litigate her claim fully in the initial action.  Accordingly, 
                                                 
61 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (1982).  
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
49 
 
LIRC concluded, "Aldrich's demotion claim must be dismissed as 
untimely" (emphasis added).  To the extent that LIRC concluded 
it must apply issue preclusion because Ms. Aldrich failed to 
establish that one of the traditional factors was satisfied, 
LIRC was mistaken as a matter of law.  
¶138 Although 
LIRC 
did 
analyze 
the 
five 
traditional 
fundamental fairness factors, its decision suggests that it may 
have lost sight of the overarching task, which was to make a 
holistic, 
discretionary 
determination 
regarding 
fundamental 
fairness.62   
¶139 Our 
fundamental 
fairness 
analysis, 
which 
is 
particularly guided by factors 2 and 5, leads us to conclude 
that issue preclusion should not be applied in the present case.  
Our decision is influenced by unique circumstances that began 
after Ms. Aldrich first contacted the EEOC in March of 2003, 
after her demotion.    
¶140 Ms. Aldrich alleges that the EEOC employee to whom she 
initially spoke told her that all she needed to do was complete 
and return the paperwork the EEOC would send and her charge 
would be filed.  Ms. Aldrich completed the intake questionnaire 
thoroughly and returned it to the EEOC with approximately half 
of the 300-day time limit still remaining.  Ms. Aldrich also 
responded to requests for more information over the phone, made 
                                                 
62 See, e.g., Estate of Rille, 300 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶38, 82.  See 
also McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512 
(1971) ("[T]here must be evidence that discretion was in fact 
exercised.  Discretion is not synonymous with decision-making. 
Rather, the term contemplates a process of reasoning."). 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
50 
 
phone calls independently to check on the status of her case, 
and provided corrections and additional information when the 
federal EEOC's first draft of her charge contained inaccuracies.  
Ms. Aldrich appears to have been diligent and was at the mercy 
of the EEOC's delays and personnel changes.  The actions of EEOC 
barred Ms. Aldrich from having the merits of her claim 
considered under the law. 
¶141 The 
federal 
antidiscrimination 
statutes 
and 
the 
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act are both remedial, and it is 
common for complainants to file without the assistance of a 
lawyer, as Ms. Aldrich did.63  The United States Supreme Court 
noted in Holowecki that "[t]he system must be accessible to 
individuals who have no detailed knowledge of the relevant 
statutory mechanisms and agency processes."  Holowecki, 552 U.S. 
at 403.  In Ms. Aldrich's case, the system seems to have come up 
far short of the Supreme Court's vision.  It was not accessible 
to Ms. Aldrich. 
¶142 Although Ms. Aldrich had the opportunity to make these 
arguments in federal district court, her case was heard before 
the United States Supreme Court made its clear statements in 
Holowecki that "[i]t would be illogical and impractical to make 
the definition of charge dependent upon a condition subsequent 
over which the parties have no control" and that "[d]ocuments 
filed by an employee with the EEOC should be construed, to the 
                                                 
63 See Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 402 ("In the administrative 
context now before us it appears pro se filings may be the rule, 
not the exception.").  
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
51 
 
extent consistent with permissible rules of interpretation, to 
protect the employee's rights and statutory remedies."64  The 
federal district court in Ms. Aldrich's case relied heavily on 
Perkins, which does not share Holowecki's complainant-friendly 
stance on the procedures for filing a charge with the EEOC.  
¶143 As we explained above, a contextual shift in the law 
does not necessarily mean that issue preclusion, as a matter of 
law, cannot apply.  A categorical exception allowing parties to 
relitigate completed cases in light of future legal developments 
would weaken the goal of finality.  But Ms. Aldrich did not wait 
for a change in the law and then attempt to relitigate a 
completed lawsuit.  Rather, she brought her discrimination claim 
to the Wisconsin ERD immediately after the federal district 
court dismissed her federal EEOC claim as untimely.  Ms. Aldrich 
evidently believed that the state system would still investigate 
the merits of her claim, and when her state claim was again 
attacked on the grounds of timeliness, she put forth a plausible 
interpretation of the Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 218.03(5), which, 
if adopted, would have meant her state complaint was filed 
timely. 
¶144 Ms. Aldrich did not lie in wait for a change in the 
law and then rush to the Wisconsin ERD to have her case heard 
for a second time.  In Ms. Aldrich's mind, her case had never 
ended.  She was navigating the complexities of having two 
available forums, federal and state, and attempting to have her 
                                                 
64 Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 404, 406. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
52 
 
state claims heard on the merits.  Under these circumstances, we 
decline to allow a federal district court's interpretation of 
federal law, subsequently rejected by the United States Supreme 
Court, to deny a Wisconsin employee the right to pursue her 
claims under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act.      
¶145 Under factor 5, we are to consider matters of public 
policy and individual circumstances.  We conclude as a matter of 
public policy expressed by the Wisconsin legislature and the 
United States Supreme Court that complainants who diligently 
pursue their employment discrimination claims should be given 
leeway in an effort to preserve their rights to have their 
claims decided on the merits.  The individual circumstances of 
Ms. Aldrich's case suggest that she was diligent and the 
untimeliness lay at the door of the federal EEOC investigators.     
¶146 Additionally, while she was seeking redress the United 
States Supreme Court changed the law.  Ms. Aldrich should have 
the benefit of the analysis of the United States Supreme Court.  
In the context of a remedial statutory scheme, it seems 
problematic for her claims to be barred so that they would never 
be heard on their merits.65   
                                                 
65 Although it is not essential to our holding, we do take 
note that we disagree to some extent with LIRC's conclusion that 
it was foreseeable to Ms. Aldrich that the federal court's 
procedural judgment would have a preclusive effect on her claims 
before the state agency.  As we observed, Ms. Aldrich did not 
believe the timeliness of her state claims hinged on the 
question that was addressed by the federal district court.   
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
53 
 
¶147  We accept that Ms. Aldrich had a full opportunity to 
litigate her claim before the federal district court under then-
existing law and to appeal to the federal court of appeals, but 
given 
the 
unique 
circumstances 
of 
Ms. 
Aldrich's 
entire 
experience, we are not persuaded that she has received "a fair 
opportunity procedurally, substantively and evidentially to 
pursue the claim . . . ."66   
¶148 In sum, we conclude, based on a combination of facts 
and circumstances and our sense of justice and equity, that it 
would not comport with our notion of fundamental fairness if Ms. 
Aldrich were precluded from relitigating whether her intake 
questionnaire constituted a "charge" under federal law.     
¶149 Thus, we remand the cause to LIRC with instructions 
for LIRC to remand the cause to the ERD for further proceedings.  
Best Buy will no longer be able to rely on issue preclusion to 
prevent Ms. Aldrich from relitigating whether her intake 
questionnaire constituted a charge under federal law such that 
the charge was timely filed.  The Holowecki decision is relevant 
to this issue. The ERD may also need to determine whether Ms. 
Aldrich's letter containing "more charges of discrimination" 
should be considered an amendment to a "charge" under federal 
law that timely asserted a claim of constructive discharge.  
                                                 
66 Estate of Rille, 300 Wis. 2d 1, ¶60 (quoting Precision 
Erecting, 224 Wis. 2d at 305). 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
54 
 
Considering and applying federal law is not entirely unfamiliar 
to the state agency.67   
* * * * 
¶150 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that Ms. 
Aldrich is not barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion from 
litigating before the ERD the timeliness of the filing of her 
federal discrimination "charge" with the EEOC.  In other words, 
Ms. Aldrich may litigate whether the intake questionnaire filed 
with the EEOC qualifies as a "charge" under federal law.  If it 
does, then under the approach taken by LIRC in this and prior 
cases, the "charge" was filed timely for federal and state 
purposes and Ms. Aldrich will be deemed to have filed a timely 
complaint with the ERD. 
¶151 We conclude that applying the doctrine of issue 
preclusion in the present case does not comport with principles 
of fundamental fairness.  We reach this decision based on the 
unique circumstances of Ms. Aldrich's case, the basis for the 
decision of the federal district court barring Ms. Aldrich's 
claim as untimely, the shift in the federal law relating to what 
documents constitute a valid federal "charge" (see Federal 
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 (2008)), and the 
Wisconsin legislative public policy of protecting the statutory 
rights of employees with discrimination claims.   
                                                 
67 See, e.g., Keup v. Mayville Metal Products, (LIRC, ERD 
Case No. 9302193, EEOC Case No. 260930624, June 22, 1995) 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
55 
 
¶152 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the matter to LIRC with instructions to 
remand the matter to the ERD to determine whether the intake 
questionnaire filed with the federal EEOC in Ms. Aldrich's case 
satisfies the requirements of a charge under federal law such 
that the charge was filed timely within the 300-day federal 
statutory period. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the Labor and Industry 
Review Commission with instructions. 
No. 
2010AP1785   
 
 
 
1