Title: RON BIXLER V. ORO MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., and BRAD HYDE, DANIEL R. ERD and ZANE PASMA

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RON BIXLER V. ORO MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., and BRAD HYDE, DANIEL R. ERD and ZANE PASMA2006 WY 140145 P.3d 1260Case Number: 05-272Decided: 11/01/2006Modified: 12/29/2006
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
RON 
BIXLER,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
ORO 
MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., and BRAD HYDE, DANIEL R. ERD and ZANE 
PASMA,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal from theDistrictCourtofFremontCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
S. Cohen of Cohen Law Office, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Richard 
Mathey of Green River, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Ron Bixler and 
Oro Management, L.L.C. ("Oro") owned 1700 acres of land near Atlantic City, Wyoming, 
("the Atlantic City property") as tenants in common.  After seeking a partition of the land 
and agreeing with Oro to a partition procedure that differs from the statutory 
procedure, Bixler failed to perform the agreed-upon steps to effectuate the 
division.  The district court, 
therefore, enforced the agreement and ordered the partition of the land.  Bixler now appeals, claiming that the 
district court erred in deviating from the statutory procedure.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.  Did the district court err in enforcing 
the partition of the Atlantic 
City property according to the parties' previous 
agreement instead of requiring that the property be partitioned according to the 
statutory procedure?

 
 
            
2.  Was Oro's motion for 
entry of an order of partition "deemed denied" ninety days after it was 
filed?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      This is the 
second time these parties have appeared before this Court.  For a detailed background of the claim 
underlying this appeal, see Bixler v. Oro 
Mgmt., L.L.C., 2004 WY 29, 86 P.3d 843 (Wyo. 2004).  The facts relevant to the instant appeal 
were summarized1 by the district court in its order 
of partition as follows:

 
 
            
1.   On August 20, 2004 a 
hearing was held on [Bixler's] Motion For Partition.  At the hearing the parties agreed on a 
procedure for division of their property.  
The parties agreed that Plaintiff Bixler would divide the property into 
two parcels and then Defendant ORO would select one of the parcels, thus 
completing the partition.[2]  [Bixler] was ordered to prepare an 
appropriate order.

 
 
            
2.   [Bixler] did not 
prepare an appropriate order.  
Therefore, on October 22, 2004 [Oro] filed a Rule 58 Notice,[3] together with an order on [Bixler's] Motion For 
Partition . . . .  Because [Bixler] 
had been provided with a copy of this order by mail on October 6, 2004 and 
because [Bixler] filed no objection to it, the Court entered the Order Regarding 
[Bixler's] Motion For Partition on October 28, 2004.

 
 
            
3.   . . . [Bixler] did 
not divide the property into separate parcels, as ordered in the Order Regarding 
[Bixler's] Motion For Partition.  
Further, [Bixler] made no response at all to [Oro's] Motion for Relief 
Under Rule 70.[4]  The Court, on February 2, 2005, 
therefore entered its Order Granting Relief Under Rule 70.[5]

 
 
            
4.   In said order Carl 
Anderson was appointed by the Court to divide the property in the same manner as 
. . . Bixler had previously been ordered to do.  Carl Anderson then proceeded to divide 
the property within the time allowed by the Court.  . . . Oro then made its election of 
parcels.

 
 
            
5.   . . . Bixler could 
have and indeed should have divided the property, as he agreed to do and as he 
was ordered to do following the August 20, 2004 hearing.  He chose not to do so.  He also chose not to file anything at 
all in this action since his April 28, 2004 Motion For Order Of Partition.  

 
 
            
6.   Now, after having 
failed to act, after observing [Oro] move forward with the case, after 
permitting both [Oro] and the Court to proceed without objection or comment, and 
after having been consulted by Carl Anderson during formulation of the Division 
Report, [Bixler] comes before the Court complaining about the 
result.

 
 
            
7.   [Bixler's] 
complaints about the Division Report inaccurately portray the Division 
Report.  Said complaints are 
unsupported by evidence and entirely disregard [Bixler's] ongoing nonfeasance 
herein.  Had [Bixler] done as he 
agreed to do and as he was ordered to do following the August 20, 2004 hearing 
the Court would not have had to enter its Order Granting Relief Under Rule 70 
and [Bixler] would not now be coming before the Court complaining of acts taken 
by Carl Anderson pursuant to said order.

 
 
[¶4]      After reciting 
these facts, the district court partitioned the Atlantic 
City property in accordance with the 
report filed by Carl Anderson and granted Oro title to the area it had 
previously elected and granted Bixler the remainder of the property.  Bixler now appeals that 
order.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      We review the 
interpretation and construction of statutes de novo.  Brown v. Arp & Hammond Hardware Co., 
2006 WY 107, ¶ 11, 141 P.3d 673, 678 (Wyo. 2006).  Likewise, the application of our rules 
of procedure, including the W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2) "deemed denied" rule, is a question 
of law that we review de novo.  Rawlinson v. Wallerich, 2006 WY 52, ¶ 6, 
132 P.3d 204, 206 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      At the outset, it 
is useful to note that, while the parties' briefs often digress from the issues 
on appeal, the only questions presented to us are: (1) whether the district 
court erred in enforcing the partition agreement as created during the August 
20, 2004, hearing; and (2) whether Oro's motion for entry of an order of 
partition was deemed denied prior to the district court granting that motion and 
subsequently entering an order of partition.

 
 
[¶7]      That the 
Atlantic City 
property must be partitioned is not an issue in this case.  Instead, the first question with which we 
are faced is whether, with the consent of both parties, such partition can be 
accomplished in a manner other than that provided by our statutes.  In Wyoming, 

 
 
[i]f the 
court finds that the plaintiff has a legal right to any part of the estate, it 
shall order partition in favor of the plaintiff or all parties in interest, 
appoint three (3) disinterested persons of the vicinity to be commissioners to 
make the partition and order a writ of execution to issue.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-32-104 (LexisNexis 2005).  
Bixler contends that it was error for the district court not to appoint 
commissioners to partition the property, though he makes no mention of the fact 
that he agreed to an alternate procedure.  
As recited in the district court's order, "[t]he parties agreed that . . 
. Bixler would divide the property into two parcels and then . . . ORO would 
select one of the parcels, thus completing the partition."  Bixler has not refuted that such an 
agreement was reached and has also failed to discuss the applicability of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-32-108 (LexisNexis 2005), which states that

 
 
[b]efore 
a writ of partition is issued, the person of whom partition is demanded may 
appear in court in person or by attorney and consent to a partition of the 
estate according to the facts and prayer set forth in the petition.  This amicable partition, when made and 
recorded, is valid and binding between the parties 
thereto.

 
 
[¶8]      Because Bixler 
omitted mention of the agreement he reached with Oro and because he failed to 
discuss the applicability of § 1-32-108, we have no reason to disagree with 
Oro's contention that § 1-32-108 should apply and, therefore, the district court 
was not bound to appoint commissioners under § 1-32-104.  Further, because § 1-32-108 
applies, the district court did not err in applying W.R.C.P. 70 and appointing 
Carl Anderson to partition the Atlantic City property when Bixler neglected to 
do so.

 
 
[¶9]      We need not 
discuss this claim further because the remainder of Bixler's argument on this 
issue, which argument includes assertions that Carl Anderson was not impartial 
and that the division report was inaccurate and "unintelligible," alleges facts 
not contained in the record and is not supported by cogent argument or citation 
to pertinent authority.  Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, ¶ 20, 88 P.3d 1050, 1060 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶10]   Bixler next argues that, under our 
holding in Paxton Res., L.L.C. v. 
Brannaman, 2004 WY 93, 95 P.3d 796 (Wyo. 2004), the district court was 
divested of subject matter jurisdiction because more than ninety days passed 
between Oro's Motion for Entry of Order 
of Partition on May 13, 2005, and the district court's grant of that motion 
on September 30, 2005.  W.R.C.P. 
6(c)(2) states that a "motion not determined within 90 days after filing shall 
be deemed denied."  After first 
noting that more than 90 days passed between the motion and the order granting 
it and then identifying the language of W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2), the balance of 
Bixler's argument on this issue is as follows:

 
 
            
Although there seems to be confusion among Wyoming lawyers as to how 
and when the "deemed denied" rule applies, based on the Hodges opinion it seems clear that the 
district court was without authority to enter the Partition Order on September 
30, 2005.  As this Court stated in 
Hodges [v. Lewis & Lewis, Inc., 2005 WY 134, 
¶ 18, 121 P.3d 138, 144 (Wyo. 2005)], 

 
 
Ms. 
Hodges argues that, because the district court did not rule on Lewis' January 
12, 2004 motion for extension of time within 90 days after it was filed, it was 
deemed denied.  We have no quarrel 
with that reasoning and agree that the motion was deemed denied after the 90 day 
period expired.'

 
 
[¶11]   Bixler's argument must fail.  First, he ignores the actual discussion 
of the "deemed denied" rule in Hodges.  The remainder of the above-quoted 
paragraph notes that whether the January 12, 2004 motion in Hodges was deemed denied was not the 
real issue in that case.  Hodges v. Lewis & Lewis, Inc., 2005 
WY 134, ¶ 18, 121 P.3d 138, 144 (Wyo. 2005).  Instead, the question was whether the 
district court retained jurisdiction such that it could rule on a renewed motion 
filed after the original motion was deemed denied.  Id. 
at ¶ 19, 121 P.3d  at 144.  We held 
that, because the motion at issue was interlocutory and not a post-trial motion 
that affected the finality of the judgment, the district court retained subject 
matter jurisdiction over the case and was able to enter an order after the 
original motion was deemed denied.  
Id. at ¶ 21, 121 P.3d  at 145.  In the instant case, 
Bixler has ignored that discussion and makes no argument that Oro's motion is 
distinguishable from the motion in Hodges and more closely resembles the 
situation we faced in Paxton.6  We also note that, even if Oro's motion 
was deemed denied, Bixler has made no argument regarding the impact such a 
denial would have on the district court's ability ultimately to issue its 
October 21, 2005 Order of Partition, 
or if, as in Paxton, the denial would 
deprive the district court of jurisdiction.  Because Bixler bears the burden of 
showing that error occurred in the proceedings below, and he failed to provide 
us with any other analysis or citation to pertinent authority to support his 
"deemed denied" claim, his argument must fail.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶12]   The district court did not err in 
enforcing the partition agreement reached by Bixler and Oro, even though such 
agreement differed from the default statutory partition scheme.  Further, Bixler has failed to prove that 
the district court did not have the authority to grant Oro's Motion for Entry of Order of 
Partitionor the subsequent order of partitionwhen the order granting Oro's 
motion was issued more than 90 days after the motion was 
filed.

 
 
[¶13]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Since 
there are no transcripts of any hearings that the district court held in this 
matter, we must assume the district court's findings of fact are supported by 
the evidence presented by the parties at those hearings.  Carroll v. Law, 2005 WY 44, ¶ 9, 109 P.3d 544, 547 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

2It 
appears from the record that the parties chose this method to avoid "the costly 
statutory procedure."

 
 

3This 
notice simply provided Bixler with an opportunity to object to the form of the 
order within ten days.

 
 

4That 
motion was filed on January 5, 2005.

 
 

5W.R.C.P. 
70 provides, in pertinent part:

 
 
If a 
judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land . . . or to perform any 
other specific act and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the 
court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some 
other person appointed by the court and the act when so done has like effect as 
if done by the party.

 
 
Bixler 
does not object to the application of Rule 70 in this manner. 

 
 

6In Paxton, 

 
 
we 
considered the interplay of several court rules in determining when a notice of 
appeal must be filed under the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure in order to 
confer jurisdiction upon this Court.  
Paxton, ¶ 4.  Paxton filed several post-trial motions, 
including a motion for a new trial, after a jury awarded Brannaman compensatory 
damages for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing.  Id., ¶ 1.  The day after the post-trial motions 
were filed, the district court entered a judgment on the jury verdict.  Id., ¶ 3.  The court subsequently set a hearing for 
Paxton's post-trial motions on a date more than 90 days after they were 
filed.  Id.  Following the hearing, the district 
court denied the post-trial motions and Paxton appealed.  Id.  The notice of appeal was filed more than 
30 days after the post trial motions were deemed denied and, accordingly, we 
ruled that the notice of appeal was untimely.

 
 

Hodges, ¶ 20, 
121 P.3d  at 144-45.