Title: State v. Harrison

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2020 WI 35 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP2440-CR and 2017AP2441-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Richard H. Harrison, Jr., 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 386 Wis. 2d 629,927 N.W.2d 923 
(2019 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 17, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 15, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Clark   
 
JUDGE: 
Nicholas J. Brazeau, Jr.   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, 
in which ZIEGLER, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, KELLY, and HAGEDORN, 
JJ., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Jennifer R. Remington, assistant attorney general and 
Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general.  There was an oral argument by 
Jennifer R. Remington. 
 
For the defendant-respondent-cross-petitioner, there was a 
brief filed by Jeremy A. Newman, assistant state public defender. 
There was an oral argument by Jeremy A. Newman. 
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 35
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.   2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2007CF115) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Richard H. Harrison, Jr., 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Cross 
Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 17, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, KELLY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined.  DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion in which ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY, J. joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J.   We 
review 
an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 reversing an order 
of the circuit court2 that granted sentence credit to Richard H. 
                                                 
1 State v. Harrison, Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2019). 
2 The Honorable Nicholas J. Brazeau, Jr. of Clark County 
presided. 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
2 
 
Harrison, Jr. pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) (2017–18)3 
and remanded with directions to advance the commencement of 
concurrent terms of extended supervision for Harrison's 2007 and 
2008 cases to the date they would have begun but for Harrison's 
confinement for unrelated convictions that later were set aside. 
¶2 
We agree with the court of appeals that Harrison is not 
entitled 
to 
sentence 
credit 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a).  Harrison is not entitled sentence credit under 
§ 973.155(1)(a) because the days he spent in custody for which he 
seeks sentence credit were not in connection with the courses of 
conduct for which those sentences were imposed.  He also is not 
entitled to sentence credit pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.04 because 
sentences for the 2007 and 2008 crimes were not vacated and re-
imposed for the same crimes and the requested credit did not arise 
from vacated sentences for those crimes.  Furthermore, we conclude 
that the court of appeals erred by advancing the commencement of 
Harrison's terms of extended supervision for the 2007 and 2008 
cases.  Whether to employ advancement is a public policy decision 
that is better left to the legislature.  Accordingly, we reverse 
the court of appeals decision in regard to advancement.   
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
3 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Harrison's Criminal History 
¶3 
Harrison has four relevant criminal cases.  We shall 
refer to the individual cases by the year they were charged:  2007, 
2008, 2010 and 2011.  Importantly, these cases involve unrelated 
conduct.   
1.  The 2007 and 2008 Cases 
¶4 
In March 2009, Harrison and Clark County reached a global 
plea agreement for his 2007 and 2008 cases.  For the 2007 case, he 
pled no contest to theft-business setting.  The circuit court 
withheld sentence and placed Harrison on probation for six years.  
For the 2008 case, he pled no contest to fraud/rendering income 
tax return.  The circuit court again withheld sentence and placed 
Harrison on probation for three years.  The terms of probation 
were to run concurrently. 
¶5 
Less than three years later, the Department of 
Corrections revoked Harrison's probation.  In December 2011, the 
circuit court sentenced Harrison, in each case, to six years of 
imprisonment, consisting of three years of confinement and three 
years of extended supervision.  The sentences were to run 
concurrently and sentence credit was awarded. 
2.  The 2010 Case 
¶6 
In July 2010, Harrison was charged with burglary of a 
building or dwelling, resisting or obstructing an officer and theft 
of movable property, all as a repeater.  A jury found Harrison 
guilty on all three counts.  In January 2012, the circuit court 
sentenced Harrison to a total of twenty years of imprisonment, 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
4 
 
consisting of thirteen years of confinement and seven years of 
extended supervision.  Notably, his sentences were to run 
consecutively to each other and to all other sentences already 
imposed.  Therefore, Harrison had to finish serving his terms of 
confinement for his 2007 and 2008 cases before the terms of 
confinement for the 2010 case commenced.4   
¶7 
The State concedes that Harrison's terms of confinement 
imposed for his 2007 and 2008 cases ended in February 2014.  At 
that time, Harrison could have been released to extended 
supervision but for the sentences imposed for his 2010 case, as 
well as the 2011 case discussed below. 
¶8 
In January 2015, we set aside Harrison's convictions in 
the 2010 case because we concluded that his statutory right to 
judicial substitution had been violated.5  We remanded for a new 
trial but the case was dismissed on the prosecutor's motion. 
3.  The 2011 Case 
¶9 
In September 2011, Harrison was charged with repeated 
sexual assault of a child.  A jury found Harrison guilty, and, in 
March 2013, the circuit court sentenced Harrison to forty years of 
imprisonment, consisting of thirty years of confinement and ten 
years of extended supervision.  The sentence was to run 
consecutively to all other sentences already imposed. 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 302.113(4) states in relevant part:  "All 
consecutive sentences . . . shall be computed as one continuous 
sentence.  The person shall serve any term of extended supervision 
after serving all terms of confinement in prison." 
5 State v. Harrison, 2015 WI 5, 360 Wis. 2d 246, 858 
N.W.2d 372.   
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
5 
 
¶10 Harrison petitioned the Western District of Wisconsin 
for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing his conviction must be set 
aside because he had been denied effective assistance of counsel 
in violation of his Sixth Amendment right.  The district court 
granted 
his 
petition 
in 
October 
2016.6 
 
In 
January 
2017, 
the 
circuit 
court vacated the conviction.  At that point, the State had to 
release or retry Harrison.7 
¶11 In January 2019, the State and Harrison reached a plea 
agreement under which Harrison pled no contest to causing mental 
harm to a child.  In August 2019, the circuit court imposed a 
sentence of eight years imprisonment, consisting of six years of 
confinement and two years of extended supervision.  The sentence 
was to run consecutively to all other sentences already imposed. 
B.  Procedural History 
¶12 In August 2017, after the circuit court vacated his 
conviction in the 2011 case but before he was resentenced, Harrison 
moved for sentence credit pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).  
Specifically, he argued that from February 2014, when he would 
have begun extended supervision on the sentences for the 2007 and 
2008 cases but for confinement on the sentences for the 2010 and 
2011 cases which later were set aside, to January 2017, when his 
sentence for repeated sexual assault of a child was vacated 
pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus, he was not confined under 
                                                 
6 Harrison v. Tegels, 216 F. Supp. 3d 956 (W.D. Wis. 2016). 
7 The record shows that he was not released due to failure to 
meet the terms of the bond that had been set. 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
6 
 
a valid sentence.  He moved to credit this period (February 2014 
to January 2017) against the time he was to serve on extended 
supervision for the 2007 and 2008 cases. 
¶13 The circuit court granted Harrison's motion, explaining 
it would be "silly to view the incarceration as simply wasted, 
dead time."  The circuit court viewed its decision as 
"fundamentally fair." 
¶14 The court of appeals took a different approach but 
reached a similar result.  State v. Harrison, Nos. 2017AP2440-CR 
& 2017AP2441-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 
2019).  It first concluded Harrison was not entitled sentence 
credit 
because 
the 
sentence 
credit 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a), does not authorize credit for time spent in 
custody for a course of conduct unrelated to the course of conduct 
for which the sentence was imposed.  Id., ¶2.  As the court of 
appeals noted, "the courses of conduct were different between the 
cases . . . ."  Id.  However, the court of appeals concluded the 
circuit court reached "the correct practical result."  Id., ¶3.   
¶15 To so conclude, the court of appeals adopted what it 
called the "advance-the-commencement-of-valid-sentences concept."  
Id.  "Under this approach, invalid sentence time is ignored, which 
has the effect of advancing to an earlier point on the timeline 
the commencement of all valid sentences."  Id.  Applying that 
approach, the court of appeals reasoned, "Harrison's periods of 
extended supervision in the two cases in which the convictions 
were not vacated should be deemed to have begun as soon as Harrison 
finished serving the initial confinement portion of his sentences 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
7 
 
in his only valid cases: the two in which his convictions were not 
vacated."  Id.  The court of appeals, accordingly, reversed the 
circuit court order granting sentence credit but remanded with 
directions to advance the commencement of the terms of extended 
supervision for the 2007 and 2008 cases.  Id., ¶4.  Importantly, 
the court of appeals noted that Harrison had not been resentenced 
in the 2011 case.  Id., ¶10 n.2.   
¶16 The State petitioned for review, arguing the court of 
appeals effectively granted Harrison sentence credit even though 
it was not authorized by Wis. Stat. § 973.04.  In other words, the 
State asserted that employing advancement contravened the 
provisions of § 973.04. 
¶17 Harrison filed a cross-petition for review, arguing the 
circuit court's decision was correct:  he could be granted 
sentence credit under Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).  Harrison was 
concerned that were he not awarded sentence credit and his extended 
supervision was revoked, he could be "reconfined for all of the 
available time on the 2007 and 2008 sentences that Harrison was 
not 'in custody in connection with' those sentences."  To explain 
further, he contended that if we were to imply that he was on 
extended supervision when he actually was confined, revocation 
would, arguably, permit the State to confine him for a longer 
period than if he received credit that was applied to extended 
supervision for his 2007 and 2008 cases.  We granted both petitions 
before Harrison was resentenced in the 2011 case.   
¶18 Following his resentencing in the 2011 case, Harrison 
moved us to summarily reverse the court of appeals and remand to 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
8 
 
the circuit court with directions to deny application of sentence 
credit to his extended supervision for his 2007 and 2008 cases.  
He conceded that he is not entitled sentence credit or advancement 
in those cases.  Although the State maintained that Harrison was 
entitled to neither, it opposed his motion because the State asks 
us to reach the merits in the matter now before us.  The State 
argued in its response to the motion, "Harrison wants to concede 
the issues so he can receive sentence credit on his new period of 
confinement for causing mental harm to a child . . . instead of 
his old periods of extended supervision."  The State also argued 
that the issues presented are not moot.   
¶19 We denied Harrison's motion; however, we ordered the 
parties to address two additional 
issues:8  first, whether Harrison 
is judicially estopped from arguing for reversal, and second, 
whether we should summarily reverse or vacate the court of appeals' 
decision given that both parties now take similar legal positions.   
¶20 We reach the merits and reverse the court of appeals for 
the reasons explained below. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶21 We address issues with differing standards of review.  
First, we decide whether Harrison is judicially estopped from 
arguing for reversal.  We independently determine whether the 
elements of judicial estoppel are satisfied.  State v. Ryan, 2012 
WI 16, ¶30, 338 Wis. 2d 695, 809 N.W.2d 37 (citing State v. White, 
                                                 
8 Supreme Court Order, October 15, 2019. 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
9 
 
2008 WI App 96, ¶15, 312 Wis. 2d 799, 754 N.W.2d 214).  If the 
elements are satisfied, the decision to estop a party is a 
discretionary decision for the first court addressing the matter.  
See Ryan, 338 Wis. 2d 695, ¶30 (citing Salveson v. Douglas Cty., 
2001 WI 100, ¶38, 245 Wis. 2d 497, 630 N.W.2d 182).  We are the 
first court to address judicial estoppel in this matter. 
¶22 We also consider whether the issues raised with regard 
to Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) and Wis. Stat. § 973.04 are moot.  
We decide as a matter of law whether a controversy is moot when it 
is based on undisputed facts.  Winnebago Cty. v. Christopher S., 
2016 WI 1, ¶31, 366 Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 109.   
¶23 Whether to summarily dispose of a petition or to address 
the merits when a party changes positions from that initially 
presented is a decision committed to our discretion.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.21(1) ("The court upon its own motion or upon the motion of 
a party may dispose of an appeal summarily.").   
¶24 Here, we choose to reach the merits.  Therefore, we 
decide whether Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) authorizes sentence 
credit for extended supervision for the 2007 and 2008 cases and to 
some extent, § 973.155(1)(a)'s interaction with Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.04.  To do so, we independently interpret and apply Wisconsin 
statutes under known facts as questions of law.  Daniel v. 
Armslist, LLC, 2019 WI 47, ¶13, 386 Wis. 2d 449, 926 N.W.2d 710; 
State v. Friedlander, 2019 WI 22, ¶17, 385 Wis. 2d 633, 923 
N.W.2d 849. 
¶25 The court of appeals applied a concept similar to that 
found in federal common law wherein commencement of a subsequent, 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
10 
 
consecutive sentence that follows an earlier sentence later 
determined to be invalid is advanced to the date on which the 
second sentence was imposed.  Tucker v. Peyton, 357 F.2d 115, 118 
(4th Cir. 1966).  We have not discussed advancement as a Wisconsin 
common law concept relating to sentencing.  The nature and 
applicability of a common law doctrine are questions of law that 
we independently review.  State v. Hobson, 218 Wis. 2d 350, 358, 
577 N.W.2d 825 (1998).  
B.  Judicial Estoppel  
¶26 "Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked at 
the court's discretion to preclude a party from abusing the court 
system."  State v. Steinhardt, 2017 WI 62, ¶18 n.14, 375 
Wis. 2d 712, 896 N.W.2d 700; see also State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 
337, 347, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996) (explaining that judicial estoppel 
is intended "to protect against a litigant playing 'fast and loose 
with the courts' by asserting inconsistent positions").   
¶27 To invoke judicial estoppel requires:  "(1) the later 
position must be clearly inconsistent with the earlier position; 
(2) the facts at issue should be the same in both cases; and 
(3) the party to be estopped must have convinced the first court 
to adopt its position."  Ryan, 338 Wis. 2d 695, ¶33.   
¶28 With respect to sentence credit, Harrison contends his 
"original position, that he was entitled to sentence credit, was 
wholly contingent on the fact that he had not been resentenced in 
either the 2010 or 2011 case."  The State responds that both 
parties were aware of the likelihood of resentencing. 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
11 
 
¶29 The State also contends that Harrison's change in 
position is an attempt at "manipulating the court system."  
However, the State has not asked us to estop Harrison because it 
also seeks reversal, which makes this case different than most 
cases where we considered judicial estoppel.  Harrison also 
responds: "[I]t is unclear how or why this [c]ourt would estop 
Harrison from conceding that he is not entitled to sentence credit 
in this appeal." 
¶30 We agree with Harrison.  We should not estop a party 
from making a necessary concession.  Attorneys, particularly those 
who participate in appeals where the court's decision will 
establish precedent for non-parties, are expected to make 
concessions.  See Michael R. Dreeben, The Role of the Solicitor 
General in the Department of Justice's Appellate Process, United 
States Attorneys' Bulletin, January 2013, at 5, 10 ("Members of 
the [United States] Supreme Court expect prosecutors to confess 
error in appropriate cases.  Indeed, Justices have expressed 
incomprehension 
when 
prosecutors 
have 
failed 
to 
confess 
error . . . .").  Furthermore, SCR 20:3.3 obligates attorneys to 
be candid with tribunals. 
¶31 We conclude Harrison has not taken a position as to 
advancement that is clearly inconsistent with an earlier position.  
Also, whether to employ advancement in a sentencing context is a 
question we have not directly addressed.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that Harrison is not estopped from making sentence credit or 
advancement concessions.   
C.  The Merits 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
12 
 
¶32 As we explained above, we do not apply the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel to Harrison; furthermore, we conclude that 
Harrison's change in position is an insufficient basis for 
summarily reversing or vacating an opinion that was the result of 
an adversarial proceeding.  While we have summarily disposed of 
cases following a concession of a party, the reversible errors in 
such cases have been obvious.  See e.g., State v. Lord, 2006 WI 
122, ¶5, 297 Wis. 2d 592, 723 N.W.2d 425 (per curiam) (explaining 
that the "State's concession that the legal principle adopted by 
the court of appeals is an incorrect statement of law effectively 
eliminates the issue upon which the petition for review was 
granted.").  This case, unlike Lord, presents difficult and novel 
questions of law for which our opinion will be helpful.  
Accordingly, we decline to summarily dispose of the petition for 
review. 
¶33 We also conclude that the court of appeals' employment 
of advancement in regard to the 2007 and 2008 cases likely 
precludes mooting the issues raised in this review.  Christopher 
S., 366 Wis. 2d 1, ¶31.  However, even if the issues were moot, we 
would decide them because the application of advancement and 
sentence credit under Wis. Stat. § 973.155 or Wis. Stat. § 973.04 
when a sentence has been vacated are issues likely to arise again 
and our decision will alleviate uncertainty.  Outagamie Cty. v. 
Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶80, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607.  
Accordingly, we address the merits.  
D.  Wisconsin's Sentence Credit Statutes 
1.  General Principles of Statutory Interpretation 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
13 
 
¶34 We interpret Wis. Stat. § 973.155 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.04 to decide whether Harrison is entitled sentence credit 
for the 2007 and 2008 cases.  "The purpose of statutory 
interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it 
may be properly applied."  Westmas v. Creekside Tree Serv. Inc., 
2018 WI 12, ¶18, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 N.W.2d 68 (citing State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).  We, therefore, begin with the 
language of the statute.  Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶18 (citing 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45).  "If the words chosen for the statute 
exhibit a 'plain, clear statutory meaning,' without ambiguity, the 
statute is applied according to the plain meaning of the statutory 
terms."  Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶18 (quoting State v. Grunke, 
2008 WI 82, ¶22, 311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 769). 
¶35 In construing the plain meaning of a particular statute, 
we may consider related statutes.  Winebow, Inc. v. Capitol-Husting 
Co., Inc., 2018 WI 60, ¶30, 381 Wis. 2d 732, 914 N.W.2d 631 
(quoting State v. Clausen, 105 Wis. 2d 231, 244, 313 N.W.2d 819 
(1982)).  "Context is important to meaning."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 
633, ¶46.  Statutes are interpreted "in relation to the language 
of surrounding or closely-related statutes."  Id.; see also Antonin 
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts 252 (2012) ("Statutes in pari materia are to be interpreted 
together, as though they were one law.").   
2.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155 
¶36 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) states in relevant 
part:  "A convicted offender shall be given credit toward the 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
14 
 
service of his or her sentence for all days spent in custody in 
connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed." 
 
Therefore, 
two 
statutory 
issues 
are 
presented:  (1) whether Harrison was in custody from February 2014 
to January 2015, when his convictions for the 2010 case were 
vacated, in connection with the courses of conduct that gave rise 
to the 2007 and 2008 cases; and (2) whether Harrison was in custody 
from January 2015 to January 2017, when his conviction for the 
2011 case was vacated, in connection with the courses of conduct 
that gave rise to the 2007 and 2008 cases.   
3.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.04 
¶37 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.04 states:  "When a sentence is 
vacated and a new sentence is imposed upon the defendant for the 
same crime, the department shall credit the defendant with 
confinement previously served."  In order to receive sentence 
credit pursuant to § 973.04 the following requirements must be 
met:  (1) an imposed sentence must be vacated; (2) the vacated 
sentence was re-imposed for the same crime; (3) the time the 
defendant requested as sentence credit was served in satisfaction 
of the sentence that was vacated.  State v. Lamar, 2011 WI 50, ¶4, 
334 Wis. 2d 536, 799 N.W.2d 758.    
a.  Harrison's Positions 
¶38 Harrison argued at the court of appeals that he must 
have been confined until January 2017 "based on the course[s] of 
conduct for which sentences were imposed in the 2007 and 2008 cases 
[because] [t]here was no other legal basis for [his] confinement."  
Therefore, Harrison argued, his sentences from the 2007 and 2008 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
15 
 
cases must have "continued running 'as if there had been no 
judgment' from the date of sentencing through Harrison's release 
from prison [in January 2017]."  Under different circumstances, we 
have stated that a vacated judgment of conviction "lacks force or 
effect" and the act of vacating "places the parties in the position 
they occupied before entry of the judgment."  Id., ¶39 n.10 
(quoting 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 714).   
¶39 As support for his contention, Harrison cited Wis. Stat. 
§ 302.113(4), which states in relevant part: 
All consecutive sentences . . . shall be computed as one 
continuous sentence.  The person shall serve any term of 
extended supervision after serving all terms of 
confinement in prison.   
Harrison did not explain why this statute, which directs that 
consecutive sentences be computed as one continuous sentence, has 
any impact on whether he should receive credit toward concurrent 
sentences in the 2007 and 2008 cases. 
¶40 Lastly, he claimed case law: 
[R]ecognize[s] the distinction between a rule, on the 
one hand, that would allow a defendant to "bank" time 
served on vacated or voided sentences to be used like a 
"line of credit" against unrelated later sentences and 
a rule, on the other hand, that requires credit be 
granted when the service of a defendant's lawfully 
imposed sentence is delayed based on the service of a 
subsequently vacated sentence. 
Notably, the primary case Harrison cited for this contention, 
Tucker v. Peyton, granted advancement and not sentence credit.   
¶41 And finally, before us, Harrison concedes that he has no 
basis for sentence credit on the 2007 and 2008 cases because he 
has been resentenced for the 2011 case.  Rather, he implies that 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
16 
 
he is entitled to sentence credit on the resentencing for the 2011 
case from February 2014 when Harrison's confinement for the 2007 
and 2008 cases ended until January 2017 when the sentence in the 
2011 case was vacated.  However, he does not ask us to employ Wis. 
Stat. § 973.04 to that purpose.9  
b.  State's Position 
¶42 The State has maintained a consistent position.  It 
argued in the court of appeals and continues to argue here that 
the course of conduct for which a prisoner was confined must be 
"factually connected" to the course of conduct for which the 
"sentence was imposed" in order to receive credit.  From February 
2014, when the confinement for the 2007 and 2008 cases concluded 
until January 2015 when the conviction for the 2010 was vacated, 
the 2010 case was the factual basis for his incarceration.  From 
January 2015 to January 2017, the 2011 case was the factual basis 
for Harrison's confinement.  The State cites State v. Johnson, 
2009 WI 57, ¶3, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207, to support its 
position.    
¶43 Johnson explains that to give sentencing credit, a court 
must determine:  "(1) whether the offender was 'in custody' within 
the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a); and (2) whether all or 
part of the 'custody' for which sentence credit is sought was 'in 
connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed.'"  Id., ¶27.  Johnson also instructs that "[n]either the 
statute nor the case law . . . justifies crediting a defendant's 
                                                 
9 The 2011 case is not before us on this review. 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
17 
 
sentence for time spent in presentence custody that is not related 
to the matter for which sentence is imposed."  Id., ¶32.  
Furthermore, "a mere procedural connection will not suffice" for 
the requisite factual connection.  Id., ¶33.   
c.  Harrison's Sentence Credit 
¶44 We are persuaded by the State's arguments.  The language 
of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) that is relevant to Harrison's claim 
is plain.10  Our decision in Johnson clearly explained that a 
factual connection between the sentence imposed and the custody 
that preceded it is required for sentence credit.  We said, a 
"factual connection fulfills the statutory requirement for 
sentence credit, and . . . a procedural or other tangential 
connection will not suffice."  Id., ¶33 (quoting State v. Floyd, 
2000 WI 14, ¶17, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155). 
¶45 Furthermore, 
when 
a 
sentence 
is 
vacated 
and 
a 
resentencing occurs, Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) must operate in 
concert with Wis. Stat. § 973.04.  At times, both statutes must be 
considered for a particular period of custody.  Lamar, 334 Wis. 2d 
536, ¶32, n.7.  Harrison's earlier interpretation that requested 
sentence credit for 2007 and 2008 cases would have precluded 
application of § 973.04 to the resentencing that occurred in the 
2011 case.  However, there is no reason to believe that the 
                                                 
10 We 
interpreted 
the 
term, 
"custody" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a) where conflicting meanings were proposed for 
various types of pretrial restrictions.  State v. Magnuson, 2000 
WI 19, ¶11, 233 Wis. 2d 40, 606 N.W.2d 536.  Magnuson concluded 
that "custody" occurs, "whenever the offender is subject to an 
escape charge for leaving that status."  Id., ¶25.    
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
18 
 
legislature would have written § 973.155(1)(a) so broadly that it 
would have a preclusive effect on the credit that § 973.04 directs.  
As we explained in Lamar, "[t]he operative language of § 973.04——
that the defendant shall be credited 'with confinement previously 
served'——must be interpreted in light of the nature of the 
particular 
sentences 
imposed." 
 
Id., 
¶35. 
 
Therefore, 
§ 973.155(1)(a) and § 973.04 must be separately analyzed based on 
the specific sentences imposed and the conduct that underlies them.  
Id.  Here, only § 973.155(1)(a) is before us because no sentence 
that was vacated and re-imposed for the same crime is at issue, 
which § 973.04 requires.   
¶46 In addition, Harrison's arguments were not grounded in 
the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a), as the State's 
arguments were.  Instead, Harrison argued that fairness and equity 
required stepping outside of the plain meaning of § 973.155(1)(a).  
In a previous case, we rejected the contention that sentence credit 
statutes could be read contrary to their plain meaning.  
Friedlander, 385 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44 (citing Black v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, ¶30, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333) 
("Courts, however, should be most hesitant to adopt judicially 
created remedies when the legislature, the primary policymaker, 
has statutorily addressed the topic.  Here, we defer to those 
policy choices."). 
¶47 Furthermore, determining when a result is fair is 
subject to debate.  In State v. Allison, 99 Wis. 2d 391, 299 
N.W.2d 284 (Ct. App. 1980), the court of appeals rejected the sort 
of equitable approach Harrison had proposed.  The court of appeals 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
19 
 
"[r]ecogniz[ed] Allison's claim for credit would have the 
anomalous effect of rewarding the habitual criminal with credit 
while the person who does not commit a later crime is not similarly 
compensated.  Rewarding habitual criminality is clearly against 
public policy."  Id. at 394.   
¶48 Reasonable minds can disagree with regard to Harrison's 
position below.  However, sentence credit historically has been 
the purview of the legislature.  See generally Richard A. 
Karbarker, Comment, Right to Credit for Time Served and to 
Preservation of Original Sentence, 1967 U. Ill. L.F. 180.  Sentence 
credit is not a concept known to the common law.  Indeed, 
Karbarker's comment from 1967 provides a telling illustration: 
In the typical case, because of a constitutional (or 
other) error in the first trial, the defendant wins a 
new trial, usually by means of a writ of habeas corpus, 
after having served a part of his sentence under the 
reversed conviction.  Let us assume that defendant's 
original sentence was for 10 years and that he has 
already served 5.  After the second trial, defendant is 
sentenced to seven years.  In effect, defendant's 
sentence has been increased upon his second trial for he 
will now have to remain in prison for 12 years instead 
of only 10 years.  Defendant asks to be given credit on 
his new sentence for the five years already served.  In 
over two-thirds of the states, this request will 
probably be denied. . . .  Only recently have courts and 
legislatures begun to realize the seriousness of this 
problem and to formulate rational solutions. 
Id. at 180–81. 
¶49 And finally, applying credit for time confined to 
unrelated terms of extended supervision also ignores that 
confinement and extended supervision serve different penological 
goals.  Extended supervision is to assist convicted defendants' 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
20 
 
rehabilitation as they re-enter society, as well as to protect the 
community into which they transition.  See State v. Miller, 2005 
WI App 114, ¶11, 283 Wis. 2d 465, 701 N.W.2d 47 (concluding that 
requiring payment of child support is appropriate in serving "the 
dual goals of supervision:  rehabilitation of the defendant and 
the protection of a state or community interest").   
¶50 We conclude Harrison is not entitled sentence credit 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) on his extended supervision 
for the 2007 and 2008 cases.   
E.  Advancement 
¶51 Having rejected the contention that Harrison is entitled 
sentence credit, which is statutorily defined, we now consider the 
concept of advancement, which the court of appeals employed.  Some 
jurisdictions, as a matter of common law, might deem Harrison to 
have started serving his terms of extended supervision when he 
would have but for sentences that were later set aside.  We have 
not previously addressed this issue. 
¶52 The basis for advancement, in most jurisdictions, is the 
common law.  Tucker, 357 F.2d at 118; Jamison v. Cupp, 555 P.2d 
475, 476–77 (Or. App. 1976) ("Although the issue has not generally 
been viewed as being of constitutional dimension, the courts have 
consistently resolved it on the basis of traditional notions of 
fair play which underlie the due process concept and the absence 
of any but technical reasons to the contrary.").  Contra Gentry v. 
State, 464 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1971) (suggesting 
advancement is grounded in constitutional law). 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
21 
 
¶53 The Maine Supreme Court said that advancement was 
necessary to comply with the "spirit" of Maine's "statutory 
requirement that a convict to State Prison serve the full term for 
which he was sentenced . . . .  Without credit for the time [] 
served since the imposition of the second sentence although 
originally applicable to the erroneous sentence, the convict is 
then made to serve more than the full term of the only valid 
sentence upon which his incarceration in State Prison may be 
legally predicated."  Green v. State, 245 A.2d 147, 149–50 (Me. 
1968), opinion supplemented by, Green v. State, 247 A.2d 117 (Me. 
1968). 
1.  The History of Advancement 
¶54 Placed in historical context, the concept of advancement 
seems to be an outgrowth of a concept that existed before 
consecutive sentencing:  that a judgment not stated in certain 
terms is void.  In Ex parte Roberts, 9 Nev. 44, 45 (1873), "[u]nder 
a judgment of conviction for prison-breaking, the petitioner was 
on the 11th day of March, 1872, sentenced to confinement in the 
State prison for the period of one year, to commence upon the 
expiration of a term of imprisonment which he was then undergoing 
for robbery."  The robbery conviction was vacated.  Id. at 45-46.  
The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing "the 
judgment of the 11th of March, 1872, is void for uncertainty, since 
it depends upon an impossible condition, or that the sentence 
thereunder commenced running upon its rendition, and has now 
expired by limitation."  Id. at 46.  The State argued that the 
sentence for prison-breaking commenced once the judgment in the 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
22 
 
robbery case was vacated.  Id.  Without citing any authority, the 
Nevada Supreme Court concluded that "[e]ither the judgment of the 
11th of March commenced to run upon its rendition, or it is void 
for uncertainty, and in neither case is the warden of the State 
prison entitled to the custody of the prisoner."  Id.   
¶55 A lower court in Ohio reasoned similarly in 1885.  Ex 
parte Jordan, 5 Ohio Dec. 397 (Probate Ct. 1885).  Counsel for a 
prisoner argued that the prisoner must have started serving his 
second sentence at the moment the act criminalizing his conduct 
for his first sentence was declared unconstitutional.  The court 
explained: 
I cannot agree with the counsel for the prisoner that 
the second sentence took effect at the time the act was 
declared unconstitutional, namely, in May, 1885. 
I am of the opinion that the act under which the prisoner 
was tried, convicted and sentenced for having burglar's 
tools 
in 
his 
possession 
having 
been 
declared 
unconstitutional, affected the proceedings from the 
beginning. 
An unconstitutional law is void, and is no law.  An 
offense created by it is not a crime.  A conviction under 
it is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and absolutely 
void, and can not be a legal cause of imprisonment. 
If there was no law, and no conviction could have been 
had under it, it must follow that the conviction and 
sentence were illegal and void on the [date the first 
sentence was imposed].  If that be true, it must follow 
that he was not serving his term on the first sentence 
at any time, since there was no law, no trial, no 
sentence, no term to serve.  The second sentence began, 
then, [on that day], if it began at all, and under the 
rules he has worked out his fine and costs under such 
sentence. 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
23 
 
But were I mistaken in this conclusion, I would further 
hold that the second sentence, which provides that the 
same shall take effect after the expiration of a previous 
sentence, is void for uncertainty. 
Id. at 398.  
¶56 In the mid-1800s, there was still debate about the 
propriety of consecutive sentences.  Particularly, some argued 
that, because the commencement date of the second or subsequent 
sentence was uncertain at the time the sentence was imposed, such 
sentences should be void for uncertainty.   
¶57 As courts started to reject this argument, some also 
started to reject advancement.  See Kite v. Commonwealth, 52 Mass. 
581, 585 (1846), overruled by Brown v. Comm'r of Corrs., 147 N.E.2d 
782 (Mass. 1958) ("Though uncertain at the time, depending upon a 
possible contingency that the imprisonment on the former sentence 
will be remitted or shortened, it will be made certain by the 
event.  If the previous sentence is shortened by a reversal of the 
judgment, or a pardon, it then expires; and then, by its terms, 
the sentence in question takes effect, as if the previous one had 
expired by lapse of time.").  Today, no one would argue that 
consecutive sentences are void merely because the first sentence 
could be shortened and, therefore, the commencement date of the 
second is uncertain.   
¶58 Nevertheless, advancement, once seemingly tied to this 
uncertainty, became untethered and developed into an independent 
concept.  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court utilized 
advancement in 1894.  Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308, 318 
(1894) (concluding that upon reversal of the first count, the 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
24 
 
sentence on the remaining count commenced on the date fixed for 
imprisonment on the first count).  Its decision has served as the 
primary authority for advancement in the federal courts.  See 
United States v. Tuffanelli, 138 F.2d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 1943). 
2.  Approaches Toward Advancement 
¶59 Other jurisdictions' starting point when deciding 
whether to adopt advancement has been to determine whether a 
reversed judgment of conviction is "void" from its inception or 
"voidable": 
[T]he question [of] whether the invalidated earlier 
sentence was void or merely voidable may be important to 
the determination of the effect of the invalidation upon 
a later, consecutive sentence.  Some courts have 
manifested an unwillingness to permit time served under 
an invalidated sentence which was merely voidable to be 
credited against the term of a valid consecutive 
sentence.  The underlying idea seems to be that a 
voidable sentence is, until invalidated, valid in all 
respects, and time served in prison under such a sentence 
cannot, in logic, be held to be referable to any other 
sentence.  Conversely, some courts, in holding that upon 
invalidation 
of 
an 
earlier 
separately 
imposed 
consecutive sentence the later sentence runs from the 
date that it was imposed, have taken pains to point out 
that the earlier sentence was absolutely void . . . . 
Effect of Invalidation of Sentence Upon Separate Sentence Which 
Runs Consecutively, 68 A.L.R.2d 712 (1959).11  When courts have 
concluded that a first sentence is voidable, they have disallowed 
                                                 
11 The American Law Reports has been a commonly cited 
authority by those courts that have authorized advancement.  E.g., 
State v. Berumen II, slip op. No. A-10596, 2011 WL 3631134 (Alaska 
App.); Jackson v. Jones, 327 S.E.2d 206 (Ga. 1985); State v. Owen, 
410 P.2d 698 (Ariz. App. 1966). 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
25 
 
advancement.  See Kite, 52 Mass. at 585; see also Smith v. Lovell, 
77 A.2d 575 (Me. 1950), overruled by Green, 245 A.2d 147. 
¶60 When they have concluded a first sentence is void, the 
next question has been whether fairness requires advancing the 
commencement date of a second or subsequent sentence.  Burton C. 
Agata, Time Served Under a Reversed Sentence or Conviction — A 
Proposal and a Basis for Decision, 25 Mont. L. Rev. 1, 50 (1963) 
(explaining courts "rely[] on a sense of fairness, [to] allow[] 
credit for the time served under the reversed sentence by reckoning 
the commencement of the second sentence from the time it was 
imposed").  At least one court has skipped the traditional first 
step of deciding whether a judgment is void or voidable and decided 
to adopt advancement based on fairness.  Green, 245 A.2d at 149 
("Fair play requires that where a prior sentence is set aside for 
error, whether the sentence be void or voidable, the second 
sentence which would otherwise commence at the termination of the 
previous sentence must be moved forward and made to run as of the 
first day of actual incarceration of the prisoner after its 
imposition."). 
¶61 The argument for why advancement is fair seems to be 
that "[t]he defendant will serve a period with respect to the 
second offense, commencing and terminating at the same time as if 
there had been no erroneous sentence in existence when it was 
imposed."  Agata, Time Served Under a Reversed Sentence or 
Conviction, at 48–49; see also State ex rel. Willis v. Brantley, 
285 N.E.2d 571, 573 (Ill. App. 1972) ("Where, as here, appellant's 
prior conviction was reversed and the state has declined to retry 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
26 
 
the case, and where appellant could have been serving a validly 
imposed second sentence but for the service of the invalid 
sentence, justice requires that the second sentence be deemed to 
run from the date of its imposition.").  Some courts have said 
advancement is the "humane" approach.  E.g., Potter v. State, 139 
S.E.2d 4, 5 (N.C. 1964); Brown, 147 N.E.2d at 784; see also Stidham 
v. Sowers, 255 So. 2d 740, 744 (La. 1971) ("We agree with the trial 
judge that the principles of justice and fairness demand that 
Stidham's sentence for Simple Escape commence on the date of its 
imposition . . . and not on the date his sentence for Armed Robbery 
was declared invalid."). 
3.  A Policy Choice 
¶62 We do not adopt advancement for several reasons.  
Primarily, we conclude that adopting advancement is a public policy 
decision better left to the legislature.  As explained above, we 
have previously stated that we are bound by the plain meaning of 
sentence credit statutes and to some degree applying advancement 
would conflict with the statutory choices of the legislature.12 
¶63 Second, and relatedly, we again note that what is "fair" 
is the subject of much debate.  In Allison, the court of appeals 
concluded that advancement would reward habitual offenders.  
Allison, 99 Wis. 2d at 394.  Others have been wrongfully imprisoned 
                                                 
12 To some extent, it could be argued that the legislature has 
already decided what to do with the advancement concept by its 
enactment of Wis. Stat. § 973.04.  Section 973.04 directs how and 
when sentence credit is allocated for confinement previously 
served on a sentence that is later vacated and a new sentence 
imposed for the same crime.   
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
27 
 
but only those who were repeat offenders and sentenced to 
consecutive sentences are able to benefit from advancement.  Those 
wrongfully imprisoned for a single offense have no similar 
recourse.  
¶64 Furthermore, those serving a single sentence are not 
going to be placed "in the position they occupied before entry of 
the judgment" merely because a court declares the judgment void.  
Lamar, 334 Wis. 2d 536, ¶39 n.10.  These people will have lost 
months, maybe years, of their lives and nothing the court does 
will fix that.  Other courts seem to agree that it would be 
"inauspicious social policy" to give those serving a single 
sentence a "line of credit" against sentences for future crimes.  
See State v. Berumen II, slip op. No. A-10596, 2011 WL 3631134 *2 
(Alaska App.) (Mannheimer, J., dissenting) (citing Marker v. 
State, 829 P.2d 1191, 1195 (Alaska App. 1992)).  "[I]f we allowed 
defendants to 'bank' the time they served in prison on any sentence 
that was subsequently overturned, we would give these defendants 
'a sense of immunity' and a perverse incentive to engage in future 
criminal conduct."  Berumen II, 2011 WL *2 (Mannheimer, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Marker, 829 P.2d at 1195); see also Bryant v. 
Warden, Metro. Corr. Ctr. of N.Y.C., 776 F.2d 394, 396 (2d Cir. 
1985) (explaining that time served on criminal sentences should 
not be banked thereby giving defendants a "line of credit" to be 
applied against future sentences).   
¶65 Accordingly, if Wisconsin is to adopt advancement as a 
sentencing adjunct, it is a task better left to the legislature. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR   
 
28 
 
¶66 We agree with the court of appeals that Harrison is not 
entitled sentence credit.  Sentence credit is governed by statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).  Harrison is not entitled to sentence 
credit under § 973.155(1)(a) because the days he spent in custody 
were not in connection with the course of conduct for which 
sentence was imposed.  He also is not entitled to sentence credit 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.04 because sentences for the 2007 and 
2008 crimes were not vacated and re-imposed for the same crimes 
and the requested credit did not arise from vacated sentences for 
those crimes.  Furthermore, we conclude that the court of appeals 
erred by advancing the commencement of Harrison's terms of extended 
supervision for the 2007 and 2008 cases.  Whether to employ 
advancement is a public policy decision better left to the 
legislature.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals in 
regard to advancement.  
 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
Nos.  2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶67 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.  (concurring).  In the period 
of time between this court granting review and hearing oral 
argument, the factual and legal support for Richard H. Harrison 
Jr.'s claim disappeared.  Accordingly, Harrison asks us to 
summarily dispose of this appeal, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.21(1) (2017-18).1  The majority rejects his request and 
instead issues an advisory opinion concerning what are now 
hypothetical facts.  The majority erroneously delves into, and 
rejects, the concept of advancement, despite the fact that no party 
is asking this court to adopt that concept.  For the following 
reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶68 The procedural history of this appeal and the interplay 
between Harrison's 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2011 criminal convictions 
illustrates why this case should be summarily reversed.  Harrison 
was sentenced in his 2007 and 2008 cases to three years of initial 
confinement and three years of extended supervision to be served 
concurrently.  Shortly thereafter, in his 2010 case, Harrison was 
sentenced to 13 years of initial confinement followed by seven 
years of extended supervision, to run consecutively to any other 
sentence.  Finally, in his 2011 case, Harrison was sentenced to 30 
years of initial confinement, followed by ten years of extended 
supervision, to run consecutively to any other sentence. 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 809.21(1) provides:  "The court upon its 
own motion or upon the motion of a party may dispose of an appeal 
summarily." 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Nos.  2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
¶69 Harrison finished serving the initial confinement 
portions of his 2007 and 2008 sentences in February 2014.  Harrison 
then began serving the initial confinement portion of his 2010 
sentence, as he was required to serve that time before he could 
begin serving the extended supervision portion of his 2007 and 
2008 sentences. 
¶70 In January of 2015, this court set aside Harrison's 2010 
conviction because his statutory right to judicial substitution 
had been violated.  State v. Harrison, 2015 WI 5, 360 Wis. 2d 246, 
858 N.W.2d 372.  On June 23, 2015, the circuit court dismissed the 
case.  Upon dismissal, Harrison began serving the initial 
confinement portion of his 2011 sentence. 
 
¶71 In October 2016 the Federal District Court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin granted Harrison's writ of habeas 
corpus challenging his 2011 conviction on the grounds of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  In early 2017 the circuit court 
entered an order vacating Harrison's conviction and sentence in 
the 2011 case and subsequently set a new trial date. 
¶72 In August 2017 Harrison moved the circuit court for 
sentence credit against the extended supervision portion of his 
2007 and 2008 cases under Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).2  Harrison 
asserted that he was entitled to credit for the time period from 
February 2014 until January 2017 because his confinement during 
that period was not pursuant to a valid sentence.  In November 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) provides:  "A convicted 
offender shall be given credit toward the service of his or her 
sentence for all days spent in custody in connection with the 
course of conduct for which sentence was imposed." 
Nos.  2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
2017 the circuit court awarded Harrison sentence credit of roughly 
three years against the extended supervision portion of his 2007 
and 2008 sentences. 
¶73 In March 2019 the court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court order, determining that sentence credit was improper under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) because the "courses of conduct were 
different 
between 
the 
cases 
with 
the 
ultimately 
vacated 
convictions and the cases with the never vacated convictions."  
State v. Harrison, Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR, unpublished 
slip op., ¶2 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2019).  However, the court of 
appeals remanded the case with direction that the Department of 
Corrections (DOC) "advance the commencement of Harrison's extended 
supervision periods in the 2007 and 2008 cases, so that these 
extended supervision periods commence on the dates on which 
Harrison completed serving the initial confinement portions of his 
sentences in the 2007 and 2008 cases."  Id., ¶26. 
¶74 The State filed a petition for review on April 22, 2019, 
challenging the court of appeals' adoption of the advancement 
concept.  Harrison filed a cross-petition for review on May 22, 
2019, asserting that he was entitled to sentence credit against 
the 2007 and 2008 cases.  On August 14, 2019, we accepted both 
petitions for review. 
¶75 At the time this court accepted the petitions for review, 
Harrison had already pled no contest in the 2011 case, but had not 
yet been resentenced.  Just five days later, on August 19, 2019, 
the circuit court resentenced Harrison to six years of initial 
confinement followed by two years of extended supervision and 
Nos.  2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
ordered the DOC to calculate Harrison's sentence credit pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 973.04.3 
¶76 In September 2019 the State moved the court to supplement 
the record with eight documents, including the transcript from 
Harrison's August 19, 2019 resentencing hearing.  In response, 
Harrison filed a motion asking the court to summarily reverse the 
court of appeals' decision and to remand this case to the circuit 
court to enter an order denying Harrison's motion for sentence 
credit.  In his motion, Harrison conceded that the underlying basis 
for his sentence credit claim no longer existed because a new 
sentence had been imposed in his 2011 case.  We granted the motion 
to supplement the record, denied the motion for summary reversal, 
and asked the parties to brief the following relevant issue: 
Whether this court may or should summarily reverse or 
vacate a court of appeals' decision due to a change in 
position by one party or due to the fact that both 
parties now appear to have a similar position as to a 
legal issue addressed in the court of appeals' decision.4 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.04 provides:  "When a sentence is 
vacated and a new sentence is imposed upon the defendant for the 
same crime, the department shall credit the defendant with 
confinement previously served." 
4 We also asked the parties to brief a second issue: 
Whether the defendant-respondent is judicially estopped 
from now taking the position that the court of appeals' 
decision should be reversed and the cases should be 
remanded to the circuit court with directions to deny 
his motion for sentence credit, including whether the 
fact of the intervening sentencing in Ashland County 
Case No. 2011CF82 renders the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel inapplicable. 
Nos.  2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
Supreme Court Order, October 15, 2019.  Through briefing, and at 
oral argument, Harrison effectively explained why this court 
should summarily reverse the court of appeals' decision. 
¶77 The undisputed bottom line is this:  everyone agrees 
that Harrison is not entitled to the sentence credit he received 
from the circuit court or the relief ordered by the court of 
appeals.  Harrison admits that since he was resentenced in the 
2011 case, he can no longer meritoriously assert that the roughly 
three years he spent in prison from February 2014-January 2017 was 
not connected to a lawfully imposed sentence.  In other words, now 
that the time was clearly connected to his 2011 case, in which he 
was resentenced, there is no basis to argue for credit against his 
2007 and 2008 cases.  The majority chooses to overlook the 2011 
resentencing and the fact that, upon resentencing, the entire 
foundational basis for the court of appeals' decision regarding 
the concept of advancement has disappeared. 
¶78 Since the advancement remedy ordered by the court of 
appeals was based on the then-existing fact that no new sentence 
had been imposed in the 2011 case,5 any decision from this court 
                                                 
Supreme Court Order, October 15, 2019.  I agree with the majority 
that Harrison is not estopped from making sentence credit or 
advancement concessions.  See majority op., ¶31. 
5 The court of appeals observed in its decision: 
First, in the event that Harrison is sentenced in a 
revived 2011 case, the normal rules regarding the 
service of confinement time before the service of 
extended supervision time should apply.  Second, 
Harrison should be credited with all sentence credit in 
the 2011 case to which he is entitled under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155. 
Nos.  2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
regarding advancement is merely advisory.  Tammi v. Porsche Cars 
N. Am., Inc., 2009 WI 83, ¶3, 320 Wis. 2d 45, 768 N.W.2d 783 
("Courts will not render merely advisory opinions.") (quoted 
source omitted).  Rather than render an advisory opinion, I would 
summarily reverse the court of appeals and remand the case to the 
circuit court to enter an order denying Harrison's motion for 
sentence credit.  It is this court's "job to adjudicate the dispute 
in front of us."  State v. Steffes, 2013 WI 53, ¶27, 347 
Wis. 2d 683, 832 N.W.2d 101; see State v. Grandberry, 2018 WI 29, 
¶31 n.20, 380 Wis. 2d 541, 910 N.W.2d 214 (rejecting the party's 
invitation to "make broad pronouncements based on hypothetical 
facts").  There is no longer a dispute in front of us to adjudicate. 
¶79 For the foregoing reasons, I would summarily reverse the 
court of appeals and remand the case to the circuit court to enter 
an order denying Harrison's motion for sentence credit. 
¶80 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
State v. Harrison, Nos. 2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR, unpublished 
slip op., ¶10 n.2, (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2019). 
Nos.  2017AP2440-CR & 2017AP2441-CR.rfd 
 
1