Title: People v. Correa

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 6/21/12 (S163273 & S179552, both filed 6/21/12, are companion cases;  S163273 is the lead case) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S163273 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C054365 
VICTOR CORREA, 
) 
 
) 
Sacramento County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 06F1135 
 
____________________________________) 
 
After police found defendant hiding in a closet with a cache of guns, he was 
convicted of seven counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm.  (Former 
Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1).) 1  We initially limited review to the question 
whether imposing sentence on more than one of these counts violated section 
654‟s prohibition against multiple punishment for the same criminal act.  We 
requested supplemental briefing on the question whether section 654 applies to 
multiple violations of the same criminal statute.   
                                              
1  
Former Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (a), is now section 29800, 
subdivision (a), which became effective January 1, 2012.  (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, 
§ 6.)  The Law Revision Commission Comments to section 29800 make clear that 
the provision was carried over “without substantive change.”  (Nonsubstantive 
Reorganization of Deadly Weapon Statutes (June 2009) 38 Cal. Law Revision 
Com. Rep. (2009) p. 758.)  We will refer to the provision by its former 
designation.   
 
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
2 
We hold as follows.  By its plain language section 654 does not bar 
multiple punishment for multiple violations of the same criminal statute.  Contrary 
dictum in a footnote to Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 18, 
footnote 1 (Neal), is disapproved.  We do not apply this interpretation to defendant 
because the law has been unsettled in this area.  Even so, defendant‟s sentence did 
not violate section 654 because specific statutory authority makes possession of 
each weapon a separate offense.  (Former § 12001, subd. (k).)2   
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3 
In response to a report that someone was taking firearms into a house, 
Officer Kevin Howland went to the residence of defendant‟s parents.  Howland 
saw defendant get out of a car and walk into the garage.  The car had been 
reported stolen.  Other people left the house and were detained, but defendant 
barricaded himself inside.  After firing tear gas into the house, a SWAT team 
entered.  Defendant had hidden in a closet under some stairs and was stuck.  
Officers had to break open the back wall of the closet to extricate him.   Seven 
rifles and shotguns of varying calibers and gauges were found in the closet with 
him.  Ammunition fitting the weapons was found in the closet, an upstairs 
                                              
2  
Former section 12001, subdivision (k), is now section 23510.  Again, the 
Law Revision Commission Comments make clear that the provision was carried 
over “without substantive change.”  (Nonsubstantive Reorganization of Deadly 
Weapon Statutes (June 2009) 38 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., supra, at p. 479.)  
We will refer to the provision by its former designation.   
 
3  
Because of the narrow legal question under review, we have condensed the 
factual background in the Court of Appeal‟s opinion.  We accept the Court of 
Appeal‟s statement of facts unless a party calls the Court of Appeal‟s attention to 
any alleged omission or misstatement, in a petition for rehearing.  (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 8.500(c)(2).)  Neither party here sought rehearing. 
 
3 
bedroom, and the garage.  A neighbor testified that she had seen defendant with a 
shotgun or rifle, and that she had also seen a handgun in his bedroom.    
A jury convicted defendant of seven counts of being a felon in possession 
of a firearm4 and one count of receiving a stolen vehicle.5  Defendant waived his 
right to a jury trial on allegations of prior convictions.  The court found that he had 
two felony convictions for forcible sodomy,6 which qualified him for life 
sentencing under the three strikes law.7  It sentenced him to eight consecutive 
terms of 25 years to life, one for each firearm possession and one for receiving a 
stolen vehicle.   
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment.  We affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
Section 654, subdivision (a), provides:  “An act or omission that is 
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under 
the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in 
no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.  An 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same 
act or omission under any other.” 
 
  In Neal, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, the court added a “gloss” to section 654 that 
has been a subject of continuing controversy and given rise to much confusion.  
Neal threw gasoline into a couple‟s bedroom and ignited it, intending to kill the 
                                              
4  
Former section 12021, subdivision (a)(1).  The jury did not convict 
defendant of possessing two other guns found elsewhere in the house.   
5  
Section 496d, subdivision (a).  
6  
Section 286, subdivision (d).   
7  
Section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(A)(ii). 
 
4 
occupants.  The victims were severely burned, but survived.  Convicted of arson 
and two counts of attempted murder, Neal contended he could not be punished for 
the arson.  (Neal, at p. 15.)  
Even though section 654 refers to an “act or omission,” the Neal court 
opined that “[f]ew if any crimes . . . are the result of a single physical act.”  (Neal, 
supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 19.)  Accordingly, the relevant question is typically whether 
a defendant‟s “ „course of conduct . . . comprised a divisible transaction which 
could be punished under more than one statute within the meaning of section 
654.‟ ”  (Ibid., quoting People v. Brown (1958) 49 Cal.2d 577, 591.)  To resolve 
this question, the Neal court announced the following test:  “Whether a course of 
criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within 
the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor.  If all 
of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for 
any one of such offenses but not for more than one.”  (Neal, at p. 19.) 
In People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203 (Latimer), this court criticized 
Neal‟s analysis, but declined the Attorney General‟s invitation to reconsider the 
Neal “gloss.”  “While sympathetic with some of the Attorney General‟s 
arguments, we conclude that we may not now overrule Neal, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 
and its progeny.  For three decades, the Legislature has enacted new sentencing 
statutes in light of those cases.  Although the Legislature has not expressly ratified 
the Neal rule, it has impliedly accepted it.  In some respects, the sentencing 
structure we have today would be different but for the Neal line of cases.  To 
overrule them now would result in a sentencing scheme intended by no one.  
Principles of stare decisis compel us to adhere to the Neal test.  Any changes must 
be made by the Legislature, not this court.”  (Latimer, at pp. 1205-1206.)   
 
5 
 
The court stressed, however, that “nothing we say in this opinion is 
intended to cast doubt on any of the later judicial limitations of the Neal rule.”  
(Latimer, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1216.) 
 
In order to parse out the applicable precedent and to identify the flaw in the 
Neal footnote, it is important to distinguish among three related but distinct 
concepts:  multiple prosecution, multiple conviction, and multiple punishment. 
 
Section 654, subdivision (a), addresses multiple punishment and multiple 
prosecution.  The multiple prosecution bar, set out in the last sentence of 
subdivision (a), is a “ „procedural safeguard against harassment and is not 
necessarily related to the punishment to be imposed . . . .‟ ”  (People v. Britt 
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 944, 950 (Britt), quoting Neal, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 21.)  This 
case involves only the multiple punishment aspect of section 654. 
 
It is also important to recognize that section 654 concerns only multiple 
punishment, not multiple convictions.  “It is well settled that section 654 protects 
against multiple punishment, not multiple conviction.[8]  (People v. McFarland 
(1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 762.)”  (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335 
(Harrison).)  As we explained in People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1226-
1227, “In general, a person may be convicted of, although not punished for, more 
than one crime arising out of the same act or course of conduct.  „In California, a 
single act or course of conduct by a defendant can lead to convictions “of any 
number of the offenses charged.”  (§ 954, italics added; People v. Ortega (1998) 
19 Cal.4th 686, 692.)‟  (People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034.)  
                                              
8 
As we explain in footnote 9, post, at the time that Neal, supra, 55 Cal.2d 
11, was decided, courts that found section 654 applicable generally set aside the 
conviction, and not merely the punishment.  (See People v. McFarland (1962) 58 
Cal.2d 748, 763 (McFarland).) 
 
6 
Section 954 generally permits multiple conviction.  Section 654 is its counterpart 
concerning punishment.  It prohibits multiple punishment for the same „act or 
omission.‟  When section 954 permits multiple conviction, but section 654 
prohibits multiple punishment, the trial court must stay execution of sentence on 
the convictions for which multiple punishment is prohibited.  (People v. Ortega, 
supra, at p. 692; People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 359–360.)  . . .  [¶]  A 
judicially created exception to the general rule permitting multiple conviction 
„prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.‟  (People v. 
Montoya, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1034.)  „[I]f a crime cannot be committed without 
also necessarily committing a lesser offense, the latter is a lesser included offense 
within the former.‟  (People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 288.)”   
 
This case involves multiple violations of the same statute, while the express 
language of section 654 applies to an act that is punishable in different ways by 
different provisions of law.  That language notwithstanding, in the Neal footnote 
the majority remarked:  “Although section 654 does not expressly preclude double 
punishment when an act gives rise to more than one violation of the same Penal 
Code section or to multiple violations of the criminal provisions of other codes, it 
is settled that the basic principle it enunciates precludes double punishment in 
such cases also.  (People v. Brown, 49 Cal.2d 577, 591; see People v. Roberts, 40 
Cal.2d 483, 491; People v. Clemett, 208 Cal. 142, 144; People v. Nor Woods, 37 
Cal.2d 584, 586.)”  (Neal, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 18, fn. 1, italics added.) 
We asked the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the following 
questions regarding this dictum. 
(1)  Does the authority cited in this footnote support the italicized 
language? 
 
7 
 (2)  In light of the language and purpose of section 654, is it reasonable to 
apply it to bar multiple punishment for multiple violations of the same provision 
of law? 
 (3)  Should this court reconsider footnote 1 from Neal, supra, 55 Cal.2d at 
page 18, and instead conclude that Penal Code section 654 does not govern 
multiple punishment for violations of the same provision of law? 
 
In his supplemental letter brief, defendant raised two related issues.  As 
explained below, although the Neal footnote was dictum, subsequent decisions of 
the Court of Appeal have applied section 654 to multiple punishment for 
violations of the same provision of law.  The question arises whether stare decisis 
and legislative acceptance compel us to continue to follow the Neal footnote, just 
as they required us to follow the Neal gloss in Latimer, supra, 5 Cal.4th 1203.  
Further, may a contrary rule be applied to defendant without violating the due 
process and ex post facto clauses of the United States Constitution? 
 
A.  Reconsideration of the Neal Footnote 
(1) 
 
We conclude that, in addition to being dictum, the Neal footnote is an 
incorrect statement of law, unsupported by the authority it cites.  The cases relied 
upon do not stand for the proposition that the “basic principle” enunciated in 
section 654 “preclude[s] double punishment when an act gives rise to more than 
one violation of the same Penal Code section . . . .”  (Neal, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 
18, fn 1.)  Three of the four cases cited in the Neal footnote involved multiple 
convictions that were held to be improper without any reliance on section 654. 9  
                                              
9  
As we have noted, at the time that Neal, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, was decided, 
courts that found section 654 applicable generally set aside the conviction, and not 
merely the punishment.  (McFarland, supra, 58 Cal.2d 748, 763.)  The now-
familiar procedure of staying the punishment while preserving the conviction did 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
8 
Those three cases, discussed below, are People v. Clemett (1929) 208 Cal. 142 
(Clemett); People v. Nor Woods (1951) 37 Cal.2d 584 (Nor Woods); and People v. 
Roberts (1953) 40 Cal.2d 483 (Roberts).  By contrast, there is no suggestion here 
that multiple convictions were improper.  Defendant was found hiding under the 
stairs with seven guns.  He was convicted of seven counts of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm.  (Former § 12021, subd. (a)(1).)  Former section 12001, 
subdivision (k), provided that the possession of “each firearm . . . shall constitute a 
distinct and separate offense” under, among other provisions, section 12021. 
Clemett, supra, 208 Cal. 142, involved a prosecution under a statute that 
prohibited possession or operation of a still; the defendant was convicted of one 
count of possessing and one count of operating the same still, on the same day.  
This court granted review “solely for the reason that we entertained grave doubt as 
to whether two separate crimes had been committed . . . .”  (Id. at p. 143.)  “As 
early as People v. Shotwell, 27 Cal. 394, and People v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507, it was 
held that co-operative acts constituting but one offense when committed by the 
same person at the same time, when combined, charge but one crime and but one 
punishment can be inflicted as one offense.  „Where a statute makes two or more 
distinct acts connected with the same transaction indictable, each one of which 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
not develop until later.  (This historical development is reviewed in People v. 
Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 38-40 (dis. opn. of Chin, J.).)  Indeed, after it found 
that section 654 prohibited multiple punishment for arson in addition to two 
attempted murders, the Neal court set aside the arson conviction; it did not merely 
prohibit separate punishment.  (Neal, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 21.)  Thus, at that 
time, the question whether multiple conviction was permitted was essentially the 
same as the question whether section 654 prohibited multiple punishment.  
Accordingly, it is somewhat understandable that the Neal footnote relied on cases 
involving the question of multiple conviction. 
 
9 
may be considered as representing a stage in the same offense, it has in many 
cases been ruled they may be coupled in one count.  Thus, setting up a gaming 
table, it has been said, may be an entire offense; keeping a gaming table and 
inducing others to bet upon it, may also constitute a distinct offense; for either, 
unconnected with the other, an indictment will lie.  Yet when both are perpetrated 
by the same person, at the same time, they constitute but one offense, for which 
one count is sufficient, and for which but one penalty can be inflicted.‟ (Wharton 
on Criminal Law, approved in People v. Shotwell, 27 Cal. 394.)  Again, in People 
v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507, it was said:  [¶]  „The indictment is good whether it be 
regarded as containing two counts or but one.  Where, in defining an offense, a 
statute enumerates a series of acts, either of which separately, or all together, may 
constitute the offense, all such acts may be charged in a single count, for the 
reason that notwithstanding each act may by itself constitute the offense, all of 
them together do no more, and likewise constitute but one and the same offense.‟ ”  
(Clemett, at pp. 144-145.) 
Applying this line of authority, the Clemett court reversed the possession 
conviction, reasoning that “the legislature prescribed but one punishment for a 
violation of said act . . . .”  (Clemett, supra, 208 Cal. at p. 147.)  “Clearly the 
possession and control period is covered by the period during which the defendant 
operated said still.  The defendant may have had a still in his possession or under 
his control without operating the same, but he could not have operated it without 
having it under his control and in his constructive possession.”  (Id. at p. 146.) 
In Nor Woods, supra, 37 Cal.2d 584, a used car dealer was convicted of 
two counts of grand theft for taking both a 1946 Ford and some cash in exchange 
for a 1949 Ford, then failing to deliver the newer car or to return the trade-in and 
money.  This court reversed one of the convictions.  “It is unnecessary to 
determine under what circumstances the taking of different property from the 
 
10 
same person at different times may constitute one or more thefts.  [Citation.]  In 
the present case both the car and the money were taken at the same time as part of 
a single transaction whereby defendant defrauded [the victim] of the purchase 
price of the 1949 Ford.  There was, accordingly, only one theft, and the fact that 
the sentences were ordered to run concurrently does not cure the error.  
[Citations.]”  (Id. at pp. 586-587.) 
Roberts, supra, 40 Cal.2d 483, was a prosecution under Health and Safety 
Code section 11500, which read:  “ „Except as otherwise provided in this division, 
no person shall possess, transport, sell, furnish, administer or give away, or offer 
to transport, sell, furnish, administer, or give away, or attempt to transport a 
narcotic except upon the written prescription of a physician . . . .‟ ”  (Roberts, at p. 
486.)  The defendant and a confederate were convicted of conspiracy to violate the 
statute.  They were also convicted of violating the statute in three different ways 
on the same occasion by illegally transporting, selling, and possessing heroin.  The 
court reversed the transportation and possession convictions.  “The three acts are 
charged and adjudged as separate crimes.  However, „cooperative acts constituting 
but one offense when committed by the same person at the same time, when 
combined, charge but one crime and but one punishment can be inflicted.‟  
(People v. Clemett (1929), 208 Cal. 142, 144; see, also, People v. Knowles (1950), 
35 Cal.2d 175, 187.)  The present case [Roberts] resembles the Clemett case in 
that the only possession and transportation of heroin shown were those necessarily 
incident to its sale.  And as in the Clemett case (p. 150 of 208 Cal.) the error can 
be corrected by this court.”  (Roberts, at p. 491.) 
While these cases all tangentially refer to punishment, they do so because 
each held that the defendants were wrongfully convicted of multiple offenses 
when only a single crime was committed.  Naturally, because the convictions 
failed, any punishment based on them would also be set aside. 
 
11 
The fourth case cited in the Neal footnote is People v. Brown (1958) 49 
Cal.2d 577.  There the court considered the application of section 654 to one act 
that violated two different Penal Code provisions.  The defendant killed Lucy 
Sanchez in the course of an unlawful abortion and was convicted of both second 
degree murder and abortion.  Relying on section 654, this court reversed the 
abortion conviction.  “It is manifest from the evidence that defendant committed 
against Lucy only one criminal act, that is, the insertion of a blunt instrument in 
combination with the injection of a solution.”  (Brown, at p. 590.)  People v. 
Coltrin (1936) 5 Cal.2d 649, another abortion/murder case, was overruled insofar 
as it held, contrary to section 654, that a person could be “twice punished for one 
act.”  (Brown, at p. 593.)  Thus, Brown was a straightforward application of 
section 654‟s language and presaged the holding in Neal. 
(2) 
Both the language and purpose of section 654 counsel against applying it to 
bar multiple punishment for violations of the same provision of law.  Certainly the 
language of section 654 does not support such an application.  By its terms section 
654 applies only to “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways by 
different provisions of law . . . .”  (Italics added.) 
Nor does the purpose of section 654 support a bar to multiple punishment 
for multiple violations of the same provision of law.  As we have said frequently, 
the purpose of section 654 is to ensure that a defendant‟s punishment will be 
commensurate with his culpability.  (See, e.g., People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 
1048, 1063 (Oates); Latimer, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1211; People v. Perez (1979) 
23 Cal.3d 545, 550-551 (Perez); Neal, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 20.)  We have also 
observed that “[t]he Neal test does not, however, so ensure.  A person who 
commits separate, factually distinct, crimes, even with only one ultimate intent and 
objective, is more culpable than the person who commits only one crime in pursuit 
 
12 
of the same intent and objective.”  (Latimer, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1211.)  For the 
reasons we gave in Latimer, discussed above, we have not repudiated the long-
standing holding of Neal.  However, we here limit, rather than expand, its 
incongruity by applying section 654 according to its terms, that is, to “[a]n act or 
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law.” 
In other contexts, we have declined to extend section 654‟s reach and bar 
multiple punishment under the same provision of law.  For example, section 654 
does not apply to crimes of violence against multiple victims.  (E.g., Oates, supra, 
32 Cal.4th at p. 1063.)10  The reason is that “[a] defendant who commits an act of 
violence with intent to harm more than one person or by means likely to cause 
harm to several persons is more culpable than a defendant who harms only one 
person.”  (Oates, at p. 1063.)   
Similarly, we have declined to apply section 654 where the defendant has 
committed multiple violations of the same provision of law prohibiting sexual 
assaults.  In Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d 321, the defendant broke into the victim‟s 
home and committed three separate acts of digital penetration.  After each 
penetration the victim was able to pull away.  Twice the defendant was able to 
overpower her and penetrate her again.  After the third assault she was able to 
retreat to a bathroom and lock the door.  The entire episode lasted seven to 10 
minutes.  (Id. at pp. 325-326.) 
First, the Harrison court found that the defendant was properly convicted of 
three separate counts of sexual penetration by a foreign object.  (Harrison, supra, 
48 Cal.3d 321, 327-334.)  It then considered the trial court‟s imposition of separate 
                                              
10  
Section 654 is not applicable where “ „one act has two results each of which 
is an act of violence against the person of a separate individual.‟ ”  (Neal, supra, 
55 Cal.2d at pp. 20-21.) 
 
13 
consecutive sentences for each sexual offense.  It held that section 654 did not bar 
separate penalties for each assault, even though they involved violations of the 
same code section and occurred during a brief period.  It relied on the holding of 
Perez, supra, 23 Cal.3d at page 553, that a “ „defendant who attempts to achieve 
sexual gratification by committing a number of base criminal acts on his victim is 
substantially more culpable than a defendant who commits only one such act.‟ ”  
(Harrison, supra, at p. 336.)   
The Harrison court rejected the defendant‟s argument that under section 
654 he could not receive multiple punishments because his crimes involved 
identical offenses.  The court explained that to apply section 654 in that way 
“would mean that „once a [defendant] has committed one particular sexual crime 
against a victim he may thereafter with impunity repeat his offense,‟ so long as he 
does not direct attention to another place on the victim's body, or significantly 
delay in between each offense.  [Citation.]  However, it is defendant‟s intent to 
commit a number of separate base criminal acts upon his victim, and not the 
precise code section under which he is thereafter convicted, which renders section 
654 inapplicable.”  (Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 337-338.) 
 
Similarly, a felon who possesses several firearms is more culpable than one 
who possesses a single weapon.  The purpose of The Dangerous Weapons Control 
Law,11 of which former section 12021 was a part, is to protect the public by 
denying firearms to felons, who are considered more likely to commit crimes with 
them.  (People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 544 (Bell).)  The Legislature has 
made it clear that the magnitude of a felon‟s culpability depends on the number of 
                                              
11  
Former section 12000 et seq.  (Enacted by Stats. 1953, ch. 36, § 1, p. 653; 
repealed by Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 4, operative Jan. 1, 2012.)   
 
14 
weapons possessed.  As noted, former section 12001, subdivision (k) specified that 
the possession of “each firearm . . . shall constitute a distinct and separate offense” 
under, among other provisions, former section 12021.12  An analogy to our 
observation in Harrison is apt.  To apply the section 654 bar to punishment for 
multiple violations of the weapons possession statute here would mean that once a 
felon had acquired one firearm “ „he may thereafter with impunity‟ ”13 acquire as 
many guns as he wishes, at least as long as he keeps his arsenal in one place and is 
arrested while possessing all of its contents.  As we explain below, such a result 
clearly contravenes express legislative intent. 
(3) 
Reconsidering the Neal footnote is a departure.   Some Court of Appeal 
decisions have expressly relied on it in applying section 654 to multiple 
punishment for violations of the same provision of law.  (See People v. Davey 
(2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 384 (Davey); People v. Hall (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1084 
(Hall).) 
In Davey, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th 384, the Court of Appeal held that under 
section 654, “a single act of indecent exposure constitutes only one crime for the 
purpose of sentencing, regardless of the number of people who witness it.”  
(Davey, at p. 387.)  The court further held that “indecent exposure is not a violent 
                                              
12  
Former section 12001, subdivision (k), provided:  “For purposes of 
Sections 12021 [and other enumerated sections of the Pen. Code and Welf. & Inst. 
Code], notwithstanding the fact that the term „any firearm‟ may be used in those 
sections, each firearm . . . shall constitute a distinct and separate offense under 
those sections.”   
 
New section 23510 provides “notwithstanding the fact that the term „any 
firearm‟ may be used in [the specified] sections, each firearm . . . constitutes a 
distinct and separate offense under those sections.”   
13  
Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at page 337. 
 
15 
crime for the purpose of the multiple-victim exception under section 654.”  (Id. at 
p. 392.)  Citing the Neal footnote, the court said, “Although section 654 by its 
terms bars only multiple punishment for a single act violating more than one 
statute, it has long been interpreted also to preclude multiple punishment for more 
than one violation of a single Penal Code section, if the violations all arise out of a 
single criminal act.”  (Davey, at p. 389.) 
In Hall, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 1084, the issue was “whether a single act of 
exhibiting a firearm in a threatening manner in the immediate presence of several 
peace officers in violation of section 417, subdivision (c), is punishable for as 
many times as there are peace officers present pursuant to the multiple-victim 
exception to section 654.  We conclude that the plain language of section 654, its 
purpose, and the case law construing it compel a single punishment for a single act 
of exhibiting a firearm in violation of section 417, subdivision (c), regardless of 
the number of peace officers present.  The crime of exhibiting a firearm „in the 
immediate presence of a peace officer‟ in violation of section 417, subdivision (c), 
is, by its very definition, not committed upon a peace officer, but only in the 
presence of a peace officer.  The multiple-victim exception to section 654 requires 
multiple victims, not multiple observers.  Only once the exhibition of the firearm 
becomes an assault may the observers become victims, and may a single act 
warrant multiple punishment.”  (Id. at pp. 1086-1087.)  Relying on the Neal 
footnote, the Court of Appeal stayed sentences on two of the three brandishing 
convictions.  (Id. at pp. 1088, 1096-1097.)14 
                                              
14  
In Britt, supra, 32 Cal.4th 944, this court did not rely upon or cite the Neal 
footnote.  However, the court did hold that section 654 barred punishing the 
defendant for both of his violations of the same statute.  The defendant, a 
registered sex offender, was convicted in Sacramento County for failing to notify 
authorities there that he had moved to El Dorado County.  (§ 290, subd.(f)(1).)  
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
16 
However, having reconsidered the Neal footnote, we conclude that section 
654 does not bar multiple punishment for violations of the same provision of law.  
In doing so we reject dictum, correct a legally unsupported principle, are more 
consistent with our later jurisprudence, and conform to the plain language of the 
statute.  The stare decisis considerations that led to our policy decision in Latimer, 
not to repudiate the Neal holding, do not weigh as heavily with regard to the Neal 
footnote, particularly in light of its inconsistency with the text of the statute.  The 
Neal footnote has caused great confusion since its penning and is plainly obiter 
dictum.  In these circumstances, it is for this court, not the Legislature, to clarify 
our own jurisprudence.   
(4) 
Defendant contends that if we hold section 654 does not govern multiple 
punishment for violations of the same provision of law, we may apply the new 
rule prospectively only.  We agree. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
Later, he was also convicted in El Dorado County for failing to notify authorities 
in that county of the move.  We held that prosecuting the El Dorado County action 
after the defendant had been convicted in Sacramento County violated section 
654‟s bar on multiple prosecutions.  We also held that section 654‟s ban on 
multiple punishment was violated because the defendant had a single objective:  
avoiding police surveillance.  “Accordingly, we conclude that a person subject to 
section 290‟s reporting requirements who changes residence a single time within 
California without reporting to any law enforcement agency, and who thus violates 
both subdivisions (a) and (f) of section 290, may be punished for one of those 
crimes, but not both.”  (Britt, at pp. 953-954.)  The court noted that “[t]his case 
involves a single move directly from one jurisdiction to another.  We express no 
opinion on how section 654 would apply to other facts, such as multiple moves or 
the maintenance of multiple residences.”  (Id. at p. 951, fn. 4.) 
     
 
17 
The due process clause is a limitation on the powers of the legislature and 
does not of its own force apply to the judicial branch of government.  However, 
the principle on which the clause is based, that a person has a right to fair warning 
of the conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties, is fundamental to our 
concept of constitutional liberty.  As such, that right is protected against judicial 
action by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  (Marks v. United States (1977) 430 U.S. 188, 191-192; 
People v. Superior Court (Sparks) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 1, 21; People v. Morante 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 431.) 
Our case most nearly on point is People v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 59, where 
the court overruled In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330.  The Culbreth court had 
held that even if there were multiple counts involving multiple victims of violent 
crime, a firearm use enhancement under section 12022.5 could be imposed only 
once if all the charged offenses were incident to one objective and effectively 
comprised an indivisible transaction.  (Culbreth, at p. 333.)  The King court 
concluded that its holding overruling Culbreth could not be applied retroactively.  
(King, at p. 80.)  “The Culbreth rule has been the law of this state since 1976.  It 
was the law when defendant committed his crimes.  Refusing to apply it here 
would make the punishment for his crimes more burdensome after he committed 
them.  Defendant is therefore constitutionally entitled to its benefit.”  (Ibid.) 
While the ex post facto clause bars applying this new rule to defendant, the 
enactment history of former section 12021, subdivision (a) makes it clear that the 
Legislature intended that a felon found in possession of several firearms be liable 
to conviction of and punishment for each of the firearms.   
B.  Legislative History     
Former section 12021, subdivision (a)(1), made it a felony for a convicted 
felon to possess “any firearm.”  As we have explained, the purpose of The 
 
18 
Dangerous Weapons Control Law, of which section former 12021, subdivision (a) 
was a part, is to protect the public by denying firearms to felons, who are 
considered more likely to commit crimes with them.  (Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at 
p. 544.)  
The Legislature, in enacting former section 12001, subdivision (k) in 1994, 
made it clear that the magnitude of a felon‟s culpability depends on the number of 
weapons he or she possesses.  It provided that the possession of “each firearm . . . 
shall constitute a distinct and separate offense” under, among other provisions, 
section 12021. 
Section 12001, subdivision (k), was enacted in response to People v. Kirk 
(1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 58.  Kirk construed former section 12020, subdivision (a), 
which made it a felony to possess “any instrument or weapon of the kind 
commonly known as a . . . sawed-off shotgun.”  (Stats 1984, ch. 1562, § 1.1, 
p. 5499, italics added.)  The question was whether Kirk could be convicted of two 
violations of former section 12020, subdivision (a) “where he possessed two 
sawed-off shotguns at the same time and place.”  (Kirk, at p. 61.)  Finding federal 
authority persuasive on the question whether the term “any” was ambiguous, the 
Court of Appeal concluded that:  (1) the term “any” in former section 12020, 
subdivision (a), ambiguously indicated the singular or the plural; and (2) the 
ambiguity should be construed in favor of a defendant.  (Id. at pp. 62-66.)  The 
statute, the court held, “fail[ed] to provide any warning that separate convictions 
will result for each weapon simultaneously possessed.”  (Id. at p. 65.)  The court 
acknowledged, however, that the Legislature could amend the statute to permit 
multiple conviction and punishment, if it wished:  “We have no doubt the 
Legislature could, it if wanted to, make criminal and subject to separate 
punishment the possession of each and every sawed-off shotgun found at the same 
time and place.  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 62, italics added.)  In response, the 
 
19 
Legislature amended the statute to do just that.  The legislative history of section 
12001, subdivision (k), is replete with statements that it was intended to overrule 
Kirk and to make it clear that possession of each weapon constitutes a separate 
offense under the enumerated statutes.  (See, e.g., Legis. Counsel‟s Dig., Sen. Bill 
No. 37, 5 Stats. 1994 (1993-1994 1st Ex. Sess.) Summary Dig., pp. 583-584.) 
The Legislature, in repudiating Kirk and specifically providing that 
possession of each firearm is a separate offense, effectively adopted the rule we 
announce today.  It expressed its clear intention that a felon may be punished 
separately for each firearm possession count of which he is convicted.   
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR:   
 
KENNARD, ACTING C. J.  
BAXTER, J.  
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J.  
SEPULVEDA, J.    * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
* 
Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, 
assigned by the Acting Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution.  
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
In February 2006, police found defendant, a felon, in simultaneous 
possession of seven firearms.  At that time, as now, it was illegal for a felon to 
possess a firearm.  (Pen. Code,1 former § 12021, subd. (a)(1); now see § 29800, 
subd. (a)(1), added by Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6.)  Defendant was convicted of 
seven separate counts of violating former section 12021, one conviction for each 
prohibited weapon.  That he could be convicted of seven separate crimes on these 
facts is clear from the statutory scheme.  (Former § 12001, subd. (k); now see 
§ 23510.)  Whether he could be separately punished for each conviction is the 
question before us.   
As I explain, I agree with the majority that defendant may be separately 
punished for seven separate crimes.  Like the majority, I reach that conclusion 
because the Legislature specifically amended the Penal Code to provide that each 
weapon could be the basis of a separate conviction, and it could have had no 
reason or purpose to make that change had it not intended that defendant could 
also be punished for each of those separate convictions.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 18-19.)  Because there is no need to proceed further and disapprove dictum in 
Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, which found section 654 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
stated. 
 
2 
applicable to preclude multiple punishment for multiple violations of the same 
statute, I do not join that part of the majority opinion. 
Former section 12021 includes no express language referencing section 
654, nor does it provide that it applies “notwithstanding any other provision of 
law” or contain some equivalent language to suggest an exception to section 654‟s 
prohibition on multiple punishment.  But a legislative reaction to an appellate 
decision involving a different but related weapons law suggests the Legislature 
intended that felons be separately punished for each weapon they illicitly possess.  
In People v. Kirk (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 58, the defendant was convicted 
of possessing a sawed-off shotgun and a sawed-off rifle in violation of former 
section 12020, subdivision (a).2  The facts indicated his possession of the two 
weapons was simultaneous:  police entered the defendant‟s home in response to a 
report of a fight involving gunshots “and found a sawed-off shotgun on the living 
room couch and a sawed-off rifle in a closet in the bedroom.”  (Kirk, at p. 60.)  
The Kirk court explained that “[t]he principal question is whether defendant can be 
convicted of two violations of former section 12020 where he possessed two 
sawed-off shotguns at the same time and place.”  (Id. at p. 61.)  Finding it 
irrelevant that the weapons were of different types and observing that no evidence 
showed they were possessed at different places or different times (ibid.), the Kirk 
court focused on the word “any” in the statute to conclude the defendant was 
                                              
2  
At the time the defendant in Kirk committed his crime, former section 
12020, subdivision (a) made it a felony for “[a]ny person in this state” to possess 
“any short-barreled shotgun” or “any short-barreled rifle.”  (Stats. 1984, ch. 1562, 
§ 1.1, p. 5499.)   A substantially identical law now appears as section 33215.  
(Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6.) 
 
3 
“entitled to the benefit of the statutory ambiguity”3 (Kirk, at p. 65), that the 
possession of two illegal firearms constituted but one punishable act, and that 
section 654 barred punishing the defendant more than once for the simultaneous 
possession of two firearms (Kirk, at p. 65). 
In response to People v. Kirk, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d 58, the Legislature 
amended former section 12001 to clarify that each illegal firearm was the basis of 
a separate crime.  “In 1994, specifically in response to Kirk, the Legislature 
amended section 12001 by adding new subdivision[] (k) . . . .  (Stats. 1994, First 
Ex. Sess. 1993–1994, ch. 32, § 1.)  The new section[] provided as follows:  
[¶] „(k) For purposes of Section[] 12021 . . . , of this code, . . . notwithstanding the 
fact that the term “any firearm” may be used in [that] section[], each firearm . . . 
shall constitute a distinct and separate offense under [that] section[]. . . .‟  
[¶] [This new subdivision was] added with the express intent of overruling the 
holding in People v. Kirk „insofar as that decision held that the use of the term 
“any” in a weapons statute means that multiple weapons possessed at the same 
time constitutes the same violation.‟  (Stats. 1994, First Ex. Sess. 1993–1994, ch. 
                                              
3  
“We have no doubt the Legislature could, if it wanted to, make criminal 
and subject to separate punishment the possession of each and every sawed-off 
shotgun found at the same time and place.  [Citation.]  The question is whether it 
did so by outlawing the possession of „any instrument or weapon of the kind 
commonly known as a . . . sawed-off shotgun, . . .‟  (Former § 12020, subd. (a), 
[second] italics added.)”  (People v. Kirk, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 62, first 
italics added.)  After reviewing analogous federal law, the Kirk court concluded 
that “former section 12020, subdivision (a) is facially ambiguous.  As noted, the 
statute is directed at „Any person . . . who . . . possesses . . . any instrument or 
weapon . . . .‟  (Italics added.) By its use of the term „any‟ rather than „a,‟ the 
statute does not necessarily define the unit of possession in singular terms” (Kirk, 
at p. 65), and that “[i]n the circumstances, defendant is entitled to the benefit of the 
statutory ambiguity” (ibid.). 
 
4 
32, § 5.)”  (People v. Rowland (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 61, 65; People v. DeGuzman 
(2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 538, 544 [quoting Rowland].) 
At the time defendant was arrested in 2006, former section 12021, 
subdivision (a)(1) provided:  “Any person who has been convicted of a felony . . . 
who owns, purchases, receives, or has in his or her possession or under his or her 
custody or control any firearm is guilty of a felony.”  (Stats. 2004, ch. 593, § 6, 
p. 4665; § 29800, subd. (a)(1) now provides the same thing.)  Also at that time, 
former section 12001, subdivision (k), as amended in response to People v. Kirk, 
supra, 211 Cal.App.3d 58, provided that “For purposes of Section[] 12021 . . . 
each firearm . . . shall constitute a distinct and separate offense . . . .”  (Stats. 2005, 
ch. 715, § 4, p. 5733.)  Clearly the statutory scheme authorized the jury to convict 
defendant of seven separate counts of weapon possession, one for each firearm.  
But does it also compel an inference that the Legislature intended an implied 
exception to section 654 to permit multiple punishment as well? 
I agree with the majority that it does.  By adding subdivision (k) to former 
section 12001 specifically to overrule People v. Kirk, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d 58, 
the Legislature not only made clear that multiple convictions were permissible, it 
also necessarily implied that multiple sentences were also authorized.  This is so 
because no plausible reason exists to allow for multiple convictions if the 
offender‟s aggregate sentence were to remain the same.  “[W]e cannot assume our 
Legislature engaged in an idle act or enacted a superfluous statutory provision.”  
(California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 
14 Cal.4th 627, 635.)   
 
5 
 
Inferring an exception to section 654 from the addition of subdivision (k) to 
former section 12001 suffices to resolve the case before us.  It is thus unnecessary 
to address the continued vitality of the Neal dictum, which found section 654 
applicable to violations of the same statute.  (Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 
Cal.2d at p. 18, fn. 1.)  Although I do not join the majority‟s discussion concerning 
Neal, I concur in the balance of the majority opinion finding section 654 
inapplicable here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Correa 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 161 Cal.App.4th 980 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S163273 
Date Filed: June 21, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Patricia C. Esgro 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Conrad Petermann, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Charles A. French, Robert C. Nash and 
Jennevee H. De Guzman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Conrad Petermann 
Law Office of Conrad Petermann 
323 East Matilijia Street, Suite 110 
Ojai, CA  93023 
(805) 646-9022 
 
Jennevee H. De Guzman 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-255 
(916) 323-5809