Title: In re Children of Danielle M.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 174 
Docket: 
Cum-19-248 
Submitted 
   On Briefs: November 21, 2019 
Decided: 
December 30, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILDREN OF DANIELLE M. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Danielle M. appeals from a judgment entered by the District Court 
(Portland, Eggert, J.) terminating her parental rights to her three children, and 
the father appeals from a judgment entered by the court terminating his 
parental rights to the child they have in common, who is the youngest of the 
children.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i), (ii), (iv) (2018).  Each 
parent argues that there was insufficient evidence to support an order 
terminating his or her parental rights, and the father also argues that the 
Department of Health and Human Services did not provide appropriate and 
necessary reunification services.  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  In December 2017, the Department filed a petition for a child 
protection order and preliminary protection order for each of the three 
children, who at that time were eight, four, and two years old.  The petitions 
 
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alleged, and the accompanying affidavits from the Department averred, that 
the mother was abusing illicit drugs and alcohol and that the children were 
present during three different violent altercations involving the mother.  With 
respect to the father of the youngest child, the petition and affidavit further 
cited as bases for a preliminary protection order a domestic violence incident 
during which the father pushed the mother down the stairs and strangled her 
with the children present, and a physical altercation between him, the mother, 
and the father of the oldest child involving a crowbar, during which the 
children were nearby.   
[¶3]  The court (Powers, J.) entered orders of preliminary protection 
placing the children in the Department’s custody.1  After the parents of each 
child waived the opportunity for a summary preliminary hearing, the court 
entered an order maintaining the Department’s custody of each child. 
[¶4]  In March 2018, the court (Eggert, J.) entered a jeopardy order, with 
the parents’ agreement, as to each of the three children.  Jeopardy was based 
                                               
 
1  Originally, two separate petitions were filed because of the different parentage of the children: 
one petition was for the oldest child, and the other was for the two younger children.  The court 
(Lawrence, J.) issued preliminary protection orders regarding the three children on December 11, 
2017.  However, the second petition was subsequently amended to remove the middle child, and a 
third petition was filed naming only the middle child and listing that child’s father as unknown.  The 
court (Powers, J.) issued preliminary protection orders regarding the youngest child and the middle 
child on December 13, 2017, based on the amended second petition and the third petition, and the 
Department retained custody of all three children.  
 
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on alcohol and substance abuse, mental health issues, exposure of the children 
to violence, and the family’s prior child protective history.  The court ordered 
the parents to participate in mental health evaluations and follow 
recommendations, undergo substance abuse evaluations to determine 
appropriate treatment, and submit to random drug testing.  The permanency 
plan was for reunification of the children with their parents.   
[¶5]  In February 2019, the Department petitioned to terminate the 
mother’s parental rights to all three children, and the father’s parental rights 
to the youngest child,2 based on their lack of consistent progress toward any 
of the rehabilitation and reunification goals.   
[¶6]  A hearing was held on the petitions to terminate the parents’ 
parental rights on May 13 and 14, 2019.  After hearing testimony and 
accepting documents in evidence, the court entered two judgments, which, in 
combination, terminated the parental rights of both parents to their 
respective children on May 23, 2019.  In each judgment, the court made the 
following findings by clear and convincing evidence, and its findings are 
                                               
 
2  The Department also petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the father of the eldest 
child.  However, that father later consented to the termination of his parental rights, and the 
termination of his parental rights is not at issue in this appeal. 
 
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supported by competent evidence in the record.  See In re Daniel H., 2017 ME 
89, ¶ 2, 160 A.3d 1182. 
On December 7, 2017, Mother and the children were involved in 
an automobile accident as passengers and Mother had a physical 
altercation with the driver of the other car while the children 
were present.  The police responded and were concerned that 
Mother was under the influence of alcohol.  The next day [the 
mother and both fathers] were involved in a serious altercation . . . 
with a crowbar in front of the children.  Again it was believed that 
Mother was under the influence of alcohol.  [The mother and one 
of the fathers] were arrested and [the other father] was 
hospitalized.  The children were safety planned and placed with a 
former foster parent.  Criminal charges against Mother were later 
dismissed.  Mother was ordered to participate in a substance 
abuse evaluation to determine appropriate treatment, and, also to 
participate 
in 
a 
mental 
health 
evaluation 
and 
follow 
recommendations.   
Mother’s Rehabilitation Plan focused upon Mental Health 
treatment and Substance Abuse Treatment.  There was concern 
about her drug and alcohol use while she was caring for the 
children.  The goal of the substance abuse treatment was to help 
Mother get to a place where she could be a safe and sober 
caretaker for her children.  Mother was to submit to drug testing 
upon request.  Mother was also to have regular visitation with the 
children.  Throughout this case those visits have been regularly 
attended and have been fully supervised.  Mother’s progress on 
her reunification plan has been irregular and other than visitation 
none of the steps have been completed.   
In her earlier case Mother was able to complete her 
reunification program and be successfully reunited with the 
children in about seventeen months.  She knows how to do it.  In 
this case she is now seventeen months from the date of the 
granting of the PPO, and little progress has been made.  She has 
done no mental health counseling which she acknowledges she 
 
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needs for her panic anxiety and depression, but has not engaged 
in the counseling that would help her.  She has participated in 
some substance abuse counseling, but not consistently with any 
one program to make any significant progress.  She has taken only 
three drug screens and all were positive for a substance she 
should not have been using.  The initial petition included concerns 
about her alcohol intoxication, and complaints of her alcohol use 
has dogged her throughout the case including as recently as April 
17, 2019 when she was intoxicated at the METRO substation and 
creating a scene when she couldn’t produce a picture i.d. for a bus 
pass.  Again she acknowledges her need for help with her 
addictions, but has not completed any of the programs which may 
have helped her.   
The Guardian ad litem has smelled the odor of alcohol on 
Mother’s breath the last three times they had been in court 
together including on the first day of this hearing.  Mother 
appears to be using alcohol to cope with her anxiety and that 
usage is continuing to the present.  In addition the GAL has also 
learned that Mother has lost her apartment and has been 
homeless.  She does not presently have the ability to provide safe 
and stable housing for [the children].   
[The children] w[ere] out of her care for much of the 
seventeen months of the duration of her first child protection 
petition.  [They] ha[ve] now been out of her care for another 
seventeen months during this petition.  Contrary to the first time 
when she successfully went from supervised visits through the 
process leading up to trial placement and dismissal of the petition 
in seventeen months, in this petition seventeen months have 
elapsed and she has not progressed beyond supervised visits.  
Because of her behavior and reactivity to reports from the 
children during visits no plans have been made to progress to 
check in visits, never mind in home or unsupervised visits.  
Allowing more time to participate in the programming she should 
have been doing all along is not in the children’s best interests.  
 
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[¶7]  In addition to his involvement in the violent incidents described 
above, the court made the following specific findings pertaining to the father: 
 
In addition to the evaluations ordered in the Jeopardy Order 
[the father] was required by his reunification plan to participate 
in education about violence, and to participate in a mental health 
evaluation.  He did obtain a psychosocial screening, but that is not 
a substitute for a mental health evaluation which would be more 
comprehensive and be based upon input from others.  When 
asked about performing the reunification requirements, he 
responded that the assessment was enough and that he was really 
only a support for Mother and not interested in reunification for 
himself.  He did attend supervised visits up until October 31, 2018 
when he was arrested and charged with attempted murder and 
other lesser charges by indictment based upon an allegation of an 
attack . . . with his automobile.  He remains incarcerated and his 
case is set for jury trial . . . .  No evidence was presented during the 
hearing to allow the Court to make findings on the strength of the 
charges, but he will be incarcerated at least until after the jury 
trial.  He has in any event expressed no interest in being involved 
in the reunification process.   
[¶8]  With respect to the two younger children, the court found,  
[They] now have a stable placement with the same family 
. . . .  [The youngest child] has had some . . . issues being dealt with 
in counseling. . . .  [The youngest child] is doing well and is happy 
and comfortable with [the] foster family.  [The middle child] is . . . 
engaging and talkative . . . with great energy.  [The child] is very 
bright and has superior reading skills . . . [and] is happy and 
comfortable in [the] foster home . . . .  The foster family makes 
sure that both children have contact with [the oldest child].   
 
[¶9]  With respect to the oldest child, the court found, 
[The child] now has a stable placement with a family. . . .  [The 
child] has [established a] place in the foster family with three 
 
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other [children], and has adjusted well.  [The child] is doing well 
in school and teachers say [the child] is a pleasure to have in class.  
[The child] is participating in counseling.  [The child] says that all 
is well in [the] foster home.   
 
[¶10]  Based on these findings, the court found that the Department had 
made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and reunify the family, including 
through placement and monitoring in licensed foster homes, supervised 
visitation, referrals for mental health and substance abuse treatment services, 
family team meetings, and case worker assistance.  The court found that, 
despite these efforts, the parents were unable to protect the children from 
jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time 
reasonably calculated to meet the needs of the children; that the parents were 
unable to take responsibility for the children within a time reasonably 
calculated to meet the needs of the children; that the parents had failed to 
make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the children; and that 
termination of the parents’ parental rights is in the children’s best interests.  
See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i), (ii), (iv).  The court also found that all 
three children have good prospects to be adopted.   
 
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[¶11]  The parents timely appealed from the court’s judgment.3  
See 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2018); M.R. App. P. 2A, 2B.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Termination of the Mother’s and Father’s Parental Rights 
 
[¶12]  Both parents argue that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the court’s judgment terminating their parental rights.  We review the 
court’s factual findings supporting the unfitness and best interest 
determinations for clear error, and we review the court’s ultimate conclusion 
that termination was in the child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion, 
“viewing the facts, and the weight to be given them, through the trial court’s 
lens, giving the court’s judgment substantial deference.”  In re Gabriel W., 2017 
ME 133, ¶ 2, 166 A.3d 982 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶13]  Before a court orders the termination of parental rights, it must 
first find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the following 
circumstances exists: 
(i) The parent is unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy 
and these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time which is 
reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs;  
 
                                               
 
3  On June 5, 2019, prior to filing a notice of appeal, the father moved for reconsideration and for 
the court to amend its findings and issue additional findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The 
father’s motion was denied on July 1, 2019. 
 
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(ii) The parent has been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for 
the child within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the 
child’s needs;  
 
(iii) The child has been abandoned; or  
 
(iv) The parent has failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate 
and reunify with the child pursuant to section 4041. 
 
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b) (2018).  Then, the court must determine 
whether there is clear and convincing evidence to support a finding that 
termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.  Id. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).   
 
[¶14]  We have reviewed the record in its entirety to determine 
whether the evidence of parental unfitness and the children’s best interests 
are sufficient, and we conclude that (1) competent evidence in the record 
supports the court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, of one or more 
grounds of parental unfitness as to each parent, see id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b), 
and (2) the court did not commit clear error or abuse its discretion in 
determining that termination of each parent’s parental rights is in each child’s 
best interest, see id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).  See In re Daniel H., 2017 ME 89, ¶ 17, 
160 A.3d 1182.  
 
[¶15]  To the extent the father argues that the Department failed to 
provide appropriate and necessary reunification services, we note that “[t]he 
 
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Department’s compliance with its rehabilitation and reunification duties . . . 
does not constitute a discrete element requiring proof in termination 
proceedings, nor does the failure of the Department to comply with [its 
duties] preclude findings of parental unfitness.”  Id. ¶ 15 (quotation marks 
omitted).  Any lack of reunification efforts is considered as “one of many 
factors in evaluating the parent’s fitness.”  Id. 
[¶16]  Although the father contends that the Department failed to 
perform its duties, the Department developed a rehabilitation and 
reunification plan for him.  Cf. In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶¶ 41-42, 854 
A.2d 195.  There is competent evidence in the record to support the court’s 
finding that the father was not interested in reunification for himself and was 
merely supporting the mother.  Therefore, we cannot conclude that the 
Department failed to “[m]ake good faith efforts to cooperate with the parent 
in pursuit of the plan.”  22 M.R.S. § 4041(1-A)(A)(3) (2018).   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Seth Berner, Esq., Portland, for appellant mother 
 
Matthew Govan, Esq., Govan Law Office, P.A., Portland, for appellant father 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and 
Human Services 
 
 
Portland District Court docket numbers PC-2017-84, PC-2017-85, and PC-2017-86 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY