Title: In re T.T., Juvenile

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re T.T., Juvenile (2004-465); 178 Vt. 496; 872 A.2d 334

2005 VT 30

[Filed 22-Feb-2005]
                                                                        
                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2005 VT 30

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2004-465

                             FEBRUARY TERM, 2005

  In re T.T., Juvenile	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       	                               }	Rutland Family Court
                                       }	
  	                               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 158-9-01 RdJv

                                                Trial Judge: Paul F. Hudson

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Mother appeals the family court's order terminating her
  parental rights with respect to her son T.T. and denying the motion for
  custody filed by T.T.'s paternal grandparent.  We affirm.

       ¶  2.  T.T. was born on September 7, 2001 and taken into custody a
  week later by the Department of Children and Families (DCF).  Mother was
  incarcerated at the time of T.T.'s birth.  The father denied paternity
  until genetic testing confirmed it in December 2001.  In February 2002, the
  family court declared T.T. to be a child in need of care or supervision
  (CHINS) based on the admissions of the father and mother, both of whom had
  histories of chronic substance abuse and incarceration.  At the initial
  disposition hearing in March 2002, the court adopted the Department's
  recommendation that DCF continue to have custody of T.T. while it pursued
  reunification with mother.  In August 2002, the Department changed its case
  plan goal to termination of parental rights (TPR) because mother was unable
  to overcome her substance abuse problems.  The Department filed its
  termination petition in January 2003, and in June of that year, the court
  granted the paternal grandfather's motion for party status.  The
  termination hearing was held May 10-12, 2004.  On the first day of hearing,
  the grandfather, who had been involved in the proceeding with respect to
  visitation issues, filed a motion for custody of T.T.  He had already been
  given custody of T.T.'s two siblings in 1999 and 2000 before he and his
  wife of twenty-six years divorced.
   
       ¶  3.  Following three days of testimony, the court terminated
  mother's parental rights and denied the grandfather's motion for custody. 
  With respect to the termination petition, the court examined the four
  criteria contained in 33 V.S.A. § 5540 and concluded, among other things,
  that (1) neither the father nor mother would be able to resume their
  parental duties within a reasonable time; and (2) both parents essentially
  conceded that they could not, and would not be able to, care for T.T.  As
  for the grandfather's motion, the court examined the options in 33 V.S.A. §
  5528(3) and concluded that he was not qualified to assume custody of T.T.
  because he delayed in seeking to be the foster care provider for T.T. at a
  time when the infant was bonding with his current foster family, and
  because he failed to appreciate T.T.'s needs concerning any proposed
  transfer of custody from the foster family to him.  According to the court,
  T.T.'s best interests required that he remain with the family who had
  provided him with security, stability, and care for most of his life.

       ¶  4.  Only mother has appealed the family court's order.  She first
  argues that the court's decision to terminate her parental rights does not
  comport with its objective of providing stability to T.T. while allowing
  him to continue a relationship with his siblings, who have already been
  placed in the grandfather's custody.  According to mother, the court's
  statement that the foster family had promised to continue T.T.'s
  relationship with his grandfather and siblings demonstrates the court's
  misunderstanding of the legal import of a termination order, which cuts off
  all legal ties between T.T. and his siblings.  In mother's view, given the
  court's acknowledgment that T.T. has benefitted from having a relationship
  with his grandfather and siblings, guardianship of some kind makes more
  sense than termination, which leaves T.T. exposed to the uncertainties of
  the foster care system.

       ¶  5.  We find these arguments unavailing.  When the family court is
  presented with a petition by DCF for custody of a child without limitation
  as to adoption, and the court finds changed circumstances, it is required
  by statute to weigh the best-interest-of-the-child factors contained in 33
  V.S.A. § 5540 to determine whether termination of parental rights is
  warranted.  Here, the court examined each of the statutory factors,
  including the most significant one-whether the parents would be able to
  resume their parental duties within a reasonable period of time, see In re
  M.M., 159 Vt. 517, 523, 621 A.2d 1276, 1280 (1993)-and determined that
  termination of parental rights was in T.T.'s best interests.  The evidence
  overwhelmingly supports the court's determination that the parents had
  failed to play a constructive role in T.T.'s life and that they would be
  unable to resume parental duties within a reasonable time.  See 33 V.S.A. §
  5540(3), (4).  Indeed, the father and mother conceded that they could not
  care for T.T. and would not be able to do so in the foreseeable future.

       ¶  6.  Further, the evidence with respect to § 5540's first two
  criteria-the child's relationship with his foster parents, siblings, and
  others and his adjustment to his home, school, and community-also supports
  the family court's termination decision.  As the court emphasized, the
  foster parents had cared for T.T. for most of his young life, nursing him
  through needed physical therapy and becoming his psychological parents in
  the process.  See In re J.M., 160 Vt. 146, 150,