Title: Mountain Cement Co. v. The South of Laramie Water & Sewer Dist.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MOUNTAIN CEMENT COMPANY, a Nevada corporation v. THE SOUTH OF LARAMIE WATER & SEWER DISTRICT; IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF MOUNTAIN CEMENT COMPANY FOR THE EXCLUSION FROM THE SOUTH OF LARAMIE WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT: MOUNTAIN CEMENT COMPANY v. THE SOUTH OF LARAMIE WATER & SEWER DISTRICT.2011 WY 81Case Number: S-10-0199, S-10-0238Decided: 05/13/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 

MOUNTAIN 
CEMENT COMPANY, a Nevada corporation,Appellant 
(Plaintiff),v.THE SOUTH OF LARAMIE WATER & SEWER 
DISTRICT,Appellee (Defendant).IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF 
MOUNTAIN CEMENT COMPANY FOR THE EXCLUSION FROM THE SOUTH OF LARAMIE WATER AND 
SEWER DISTRICT:MOUNTAIN CEMENT COMPANY,Appellant 
(Petitioner),v.THE SOUTH OF LARAMIE WATER & SEWER 
DISTRICT,Appellee (Respondent).

 
 
Docket 
No. S-10-0199

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Docket 
No. S-10-0238

W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certified Question from the District Court of Albany 
County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Philip 
A. Nicholas & Mitchell H. Edwards of Nicholas & Tangeman, LLC, Laramie, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Nicholas.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Kermit 
C. Brown and Elisa M. Butler of Brown & Hiser LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Brown.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In these 
consolidated appeals, Mountain Cement Company, a Nevada corporation (Mountain 
Cement), challenges the district court's conclusions that Mountain Cement's 
property was properly included in the South of Laramie Water and Sewer District 
(the District) and that the District lawfully issued certain general obligation 
bonds, and also challenges the refusal of the Board of County Commissioners of 
Albany County (the Board) to exclude Mountain Cement's property from the 
District.  Finding that Mountain 
Cement is barred from challenging the inclusion of its property in the District, 
and finding that the District's proposed general obligation bond issue was not 
unlawful, we affirm the district court in S-10-0199.  In S-10-0238, we answer the certified 
questions as set forth below.1

 
 
ISSUES 
IN S-10-0199

 
 
[¶2]      1.   Whether the District had the 
authority to include Mountain Cement's property within the District's boundaries 
without Mountain Cement's written consent?

 
 
            
2.   Whether the 
District's proposed general obligation bond issue for the purpose of improving 
and expanding the District's existing water system is in violation of 
law?

 
 
            
3.   Whether the 
District's proposed general obligation bond issue for the purpose of improving 
and expanding the District's existing water system violates the District's 
statutory indebtedness limitation?

 
 
ISSUES 
IN S-10-0238

 
 
[¶3]      We have agreed to 
answer the following questions certified to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b):

 
 
            
1.   Does a Wyoming board 
of county commissioners have the power and authority to remove real property 
from a water and sewer district?

 
 
            
2.   If the answer to the 
first question is "yes," under what circumstances may a board of county 
commissioners remove property from a water and sewer 
district?

 
 
            
3.   Does the Petition 
for Exclusion of Mountain Cement Company from the South of Laramie Water and 
Sewer District (the Petition), taking the facts alleged in the Petition as true 
and the allegations viewed in the light most favorable to Mountain Cement, state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      The District was 
established by the Board in 1992.2  The persons attempting to organize the 
District represented that the District would not levy property taxes, but would 
fund itself solely through user fees.  Both the Petition submitted to the Board 
and the District's Amended Rules and Regulations provided that the District 
intended to fund its systems with user fees, and not to levy taxes.  Since its inception, the District has 
obtained water pursuant to an Agreement for the City of Laramie to Furnish 
Municipal Water to the South of Laramie Water and Sewer 
District.

 
 
[¶5]      Mountain Cement 
owns land south of the City of Laramie, with a portion of said land exceeding 20 
acres in size lying within the District.3  It is undisputed that, in 1992, Mountain 
Cement's plant manager signed a petition favoring organization of the District, 
but that no one with actual authority ever consented in writing to Mountain 
Cement's inclusion in the District.  It is also undisputed that Mountain 
Cement obtains no water or other services from the District.4

 
 
[¶6]      In October 2008, 
Mountain Cement learned from the Albany County Assessor that the District 
intended to levy a tax for the 2009 tax year against property lying within the 
District.  On January 29, 2009, 
Mountain Cement filed in the district court the Complaint that underlies this 
Court's case no. S-10-0199.  The 
Complaint alleged eight claims or causes of action, some being in the 
alternative:

 
 
Claim 
I:         
Declaratory Judgment & Affirmative Relief

                       
(MCC's Property Not Properly Included w/in 
District)

 
 
Claim 
II:        
Estoppel

                       
(Tax Assessment & General Obligation Bonds)

 
 
Claim 
III:       
Declaratory Judgment & Affirmative Relief

                       
(Signatures Invalid for Fraud in the Inducement)

 
 
Claim 
IV:      
Declaratory Judgment & Affirmative Relief

                       
(Tax Resolution Invalid)

 
 
Claim 
V:       
Declaratory Judgment & Affirmative Relief

                       
(Bond Issue Invalid)

 
 
Claim 
VI:      
Declaratory Judgment & Affirmative Relief

(Tax 
Assessment & General Obligation Bond Violation of Equal 
Protection)

 
 
Claim 
VII:     Declaratory 
Judgment & Affirmative Relief

(Tax 
Assessment & General Obligation Bond Violation of Due 
Process)

 
 
Claim 
VIII:    Declaratory 
Judgment & Affirmative Relief

                       
(Tax Assessment Unconstitutional Taking of Private 
Property)

 
 
[¶7]      A day after the 
above-described Complaint was filed in the district court, Mountain Cement filed 
with the Board the Petition mentioned above.  This Petition, which underlies this 
Court's case no. S-10-0238, contained the same allegations found in the 
Complaint, but sought relief under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-10-120 (LexisNexis 2007) 
and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-29-307 (LexisNexis 2007), as will be discussed more 
fully below.

 
 
DISPOSITION 
BELOW

 
 
[¶8]      On March 26, 
2009, the District filed in the district court a motion to dismiss Mountain 
Cement's Complaint, citing W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).  The gravamen of a "12(b)(6) motion" is 
that there has been a "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted[.]"  Both parties filed 
memoranda of law, after which the motion was heard on August 5, 2009.  The district court issued a Decision 
Letter on September 8, 2009, and an order on September 22, 2009, dismissing all 
but Claim IV (Tax Resolution Invalid) and Claim V (Bond Issue Invalid), leaving 
those claims for further development.

 
 
[¶9]      On November 9, 
2009, the District filed a motion seeking summary judgment under W.R.C.P. 56 on 
Claims IV and V.  Mountain Cement 
filed its response on January 7, 2010, and the matter was heard on April 2, 
2010.  In separate decision letters 
issued April 20, 2010, and July 8, 2010, the district court granted the 
District's motion on both counts.  A 
final order disposing of all eight claims in the District's favor was entered on 
August 3, 2010.  The appeal from 
that order was docketed in this Court as S-10-0199.

 
 
[¶10]   While the district court action 
proceeded as described above, the Petition Mountain Cement had filed with the 
Board was also being considered.  In 
the Petition, the factual allegations of which generally tracked those set forth 
in the district court Complaint, Mountain Cement sought to have its property 
"excluded," meaning "removed," from the District.  After certifying three questions of law 
to the district court and receiving the district court's responses thereto, the 
Board dismissed the Petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted.  Mountain Cement then 
filed in the district court a petition for review of the Board's order.  Upon the parties' stipulated motion, the 
district court certified to this Court the same three questions that the Board 
had certified to it.  Those 
questions have been listed hereinabove.  See supra ¶ 3.  In their briefs to this Court, the 
parties have focused primarily upon the question of whether Mountain Cement's 
Petition was time barred by the provisions of § 41-10-120 and § 
22-29-307.

 
 
STANDARDS 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]   Review of a dismissal under 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
is de novo, with this court applying 
the same standards and examining the same materials as the district court.  Swinney v. Jones, 2008 WY 150, ¶ 6, 199 P.3d 512, 515 (Wyo. 2008).  "We accept the facts alleged in the 
complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party.  Dismissal is appropriate 
only if it is certain on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot 
assert any facts that create entitlement to relief."  Id.  Dismissal is granted sparingly because 
it is a drastic remedy, but dismissal is proper where, for instance, the 
complaint clearly shows that the action is barred by a statute of 
limitations.  Id.; Simon v. Teton Bd. of Realtors, 4 P.3d 197, 200 (Wyo. 2000); Gillis v. F & A Enters., 934 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Wyo. 
1997).

 
 
[¶12]   Review of a grant of summary 
judgment under W.R.C.P. 56(c) is similar to review of a dismissal under W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6):

 
 
            
On appeal, this Court evaluates the propriety of a district court's 
summary judgment ruling by examining the same materials and following the same 
standards as the district court.  We 
examine the record de novo in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be 
fairly drawn from the record.  If 
upon review of the record, doubt exists about the presence of genuine issues of 
material fact, we resolve that doubt against the party seeking summary 
judgment.  We review questions of 
law de novo without giving any deference to the district court's 
determinations.  If we can uphold 
summary judgment on any proper legal basis appearing in the record, we 
will.

 
 

Heimer 
v. Antelope Valley Improvement & Serv. Dist., 
2010 WY 29, ¶ 14, 226 P.3d 860, 863 (Wyo. 2010) 
(quoting Wagner v. Reuter, 2009 WY 75, ¶ 11, 208 P.3d 1317, 1321-22 (Wyo. 2009) 
(internal citations omitted)).  
"Summary judgment may be the appropriate resolution in a declaratory 
judgment action."  Coffinberry v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of the 
County of Hot Springs, 2008 WY 
110, ¶ 3, 192 P.3d 978, 979 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶13]   These appeals largely involve 
statutory interpretation, for which the following standards 
apply:

 
 
In 
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 
legislature's intent.  All statutes 
must be construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining the 
meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the 
same general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony.  Statutory construction is a question of 
law, so our standard of review is de novo.  
We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's 
intent.  We begin by making an 
inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of 
the statute in pari materia.  When a statute is sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and 
do not resort to the rules of statutory construction.  Wyoming Board of Outfitters and Professional 
Guides v. Clark, 2001 WY 78, 
¶ 12, 30 P.3d 36, [41] (Wyo. 
2001); Murphy v. State Canvassing 
Board, 12 P.3d 677, 679 
(Wyo. 2000).  Moreover, we must not 
give a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of 
another interpretation.  Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 413 (Wyo. 1990) 
(citing McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1283 (Wyo. 
1980)).

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 

Loberg 
v. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 
2004 WY 48, ¶ 5, 88 P.3d 1045, [1048] (Wyo. 2004) 
(quoting Board of County Comm'rs of Teton 
County v. Crow, 2003 WY 40, 
¶¶ 40-41, 65 P.3d 720, 
[733-34] (Wyo. 2003)).  Only if we 
determine the language of a statute is ambiguous will we proceed to the next 
step, which involves applying general principles of statutory construction to 
the language of the statute in order to construe any ambiguous language to 
accurately reflect the intent of the legislature.  If this Court determines that the 
language of the statute is not ambiguous, there is no room for further 
construction.  We will apply the 
language of the statute using its ordinary and obvious 
meaning.

 
 

BP 
Am. Prod. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 
2005 WY 60, ¶ 15, 112 P.3d 596, 604 (Wyo. 2005).5

DISCUSSION

 
 
Whether 
the District had the authority to include Mountain Cement's property within the 
District's boundaries without Mountain Cement's written 
consent?

 
 
[¶14]   This issue was the subject of Claim 
I of the Complaint, in which Mountain Cement sought a declaration from the 
district court that neither Mountain Cement nor its predecessors in interest to 
the lands included within the District had consented to that inclusion, and 
that, therefore, those lands are not included in the District.  The district court dismissed this claim 
under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, so we will review that decision using the appropriate standard set 
forth above.

 
 
[¶15]   Mountain Cement contends that the 
Board's inclusion of Mountain Cement's property within the district was void ab initio because it violated the 
provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-10-102(c) (LexisNexis 2009), which provisions 
are the same as when originally enacted in 1959 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 188, § 2 at 
261, and which read as follows:

 
 
            
(c)     No 
tract of twenty (20) acres or more shall be included in any district without the 
written consent of each person having legal (as distinguished from equitable) 
title to the tract.

 
 
[¶16]   As mentioned above, no corporate 
officer or director or other representative with actual authority to do so ever 
gave written consent to inclusion of Mountain Cement's property in the 
District.  See supra ¶ 5.  Mountain Cement also avers that written 
consent similarly was not obtained from the legal owners of the "Dodge property" 
and the "Silva property" now owned by Mountain Cement and included in the 
District.

 
 
[¶17]   The district court dismissed Claim 
I on two grounds raised by the District.  
First, the district court found that Mountain Cement's Complaint violated 
the provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-10-107(g) (LexisNexis 2009), which was in 
effect at the time the District was organized in 1992.  That statutory section provides as 
follows:

 
 
            
(g)   A resolution of the 
board of county commissioners establishing the district shall be considered 
final and no petition in error nor other appeal shall lie therefrom.  The resolution of the board of county 
commissioners shall finally and conclusively establish the regular organization 
of the district against all persons except the state of Wyoming, in an action in 
the nature of a writ of quo warranto, commenced by the attorney general within 
thirty (30) days after the resolution declaring the district as organized and 
not otherwise.  The organization of 
the district shall not be directly or collaterally questioned in any suit, 
action or proceeding except as expressly authorized in this 
subsection.

 
 
[¶18]   In reaching its conclusion, the 
district court reasoned as follows:

 
 
At 
the end of the day, however, this Court is persuaded that the statute that 
prohibits direct or collateral attacks against the organization of a district in 
"any suit, action or proceeding" reflects the Wyoming Legislature's intent to 
shield a district from suit on the grounds that said districts must have the 
ability to pursue financing, incur indebtedness, and construct projects without 
fear of persons having the later ability to "opt out" of the District whenever 
they are unhappy with the District's decisions.  The formation of water and sewer 
districts is very much a front-loaded procedure geared toward establishing 
conclusive finality to the proceedings once a district is 
formed.

 
 
            
And, frankly, the "organization" of a district very much includes the 
membership of that district and the consequent boundaries of the 
district.  The ability to challenge 
the district's boundaries or membership many years in the future, as is the case 
here, would greatly hinder a district's ability to secure financing.  That is exactly what Mountain Cement is 
attempting to do in the case at bar and exactly what the statute prohibits.  For that reason, the Court concludes 
that Mountain Cement is estopped from challenging the formation of The District, 
including its inclusion therein.

 
 
[¶19]   The District's "fall back" position 
on this issue, in the event the district court did not accept its argument based 
upon § 41-10-107(g) was that the Complaint was barred by the ten-year statute of 
limitations found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-109 (LexisNexis 2009).  That statute provides that "[a]n action 
for relief, not hereinbefore provided for, can only be brought within ten (10) 
years after the cause of action accrues."  
The district court agreed with the District, opining that Mountain Cement 
had imputed knowledge of its inclusion in the District by July 1992, at the 
latest, when notices were published including Mountain Cement's property in the 
District, and more likely had actual knowledge of such when Mountain Cement's 
plant manager signed the Petition on April 23, 1992.

 
 
[¶20]   We will affirm the district court's 
dismissal of Claim I under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), for several reasons.  First, a motion to dismiss under 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is an appropriate vehicle in which to raise the issue of the 
passage of a period of limitations.  
See, e.g., Corkill v. Knowles, 955 P.2d 438, 440-41 (Wyo. 1998); 
Gillis, 934 P.2d at 1254-55; and Boller v. Western Law Assocs., P.C., 828 P.2d 1184, 1186 (Wyo. 
1992).  Second, § 41-10-107(g) 
unambiguously forbids any "petition in error [or] other appeal" from a board's 
resolution establishing a water district, and unambiguously states that the 
"organization of the district shall not be directly or collaterally questioned 
in any suit, action or proceeding" except "an action in the nature of a writ of 
quo warranto, commenced by the attorney general within thirty (30) days after 
the resolution . . . ."  Third, 
there is no inherent right to appeal from administrative action; rather, any 
such right is limited as described in the statute.  Holding's Little Am. v. Bd. of County 
Comm'rs of Laramie County, 670 P.2d 699, 702 (Wyo. 1983) (and cases cited therein); United States Steel Corp. v. Wyo. Envtl. 
Quality Council, 575 P.2d 749, 750 (Wyo. 1978); 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law §§ 405, 409 
(2004).