Title: Jose Betancourt v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC00-2134
____________
JOSE BETANCOURT,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[December 13, 2001]
ANSTEAD, J.
We have for review the decision in Betancourt v. State, 767 So. 2d 557 (Fla.
3d DCA 2000), which certified conflict with the decision in Eady v. State, 604 So.
2d 559 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla.
Const.  For the reasons set forth below, we approve the Third District’s decision in
Betancourt and disapprove of Eady.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Jose Betancourt was charged with and found guilty of four first-degree
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felonies in which the applicable statutes that codify them specifically provide that
they each constitute “a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a
term of years not exceeding life.”  §§ 782.04(2), 787.01(2), 810.02(2), 812.13(2)(a),
Fla. Stat. (1989).  Betancourt was charged in a four-count information with count 1:
second-degree murder, count 2: robbery with a firearm, count 3: burglary of a
structure with a firearm and assault or battery, and count 4: kidnapping.  At trial, the
jury returned verdicts of guilty for all of the crimes as charged.  The trial court
sentenced Betancourt to life imprisonment.  
Thereafter, Betancourt filed a motion to correct illegal sentence contending
that the kidnapping conviction was erroneously classified as a life felony for
purposes of sentencing under the statutory guidelines.  The State conceded that the
kidnapping count should be reclassified as a first-degree felony punishable by life,
rather than a life felony, and a new scoresheet was prepared to correct this error. 
The resentencing scoresheet reflected a total score of 317 points, which translated
into a recommended sentencing range of twenty-two to twenty-seven years
imprisonment and a permitted range of seventeen to forty years.  See Fla. R. Crim.
P. 3.988(a).  The trial court then resentenced Betancourt to four forty-year terms of
imprisonment, all terms to run concurrent.
Betancourt appealed his resentencing, arguing that a first-degree felony
1.  The Second District has explained the apparent distinction between a life
felony and a first-degree felony punishable by life when it stated: “[W]henever a
court sentencing a life felony opts for a term of years in lieu of a life sentence, that
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punishable by life must be treated as an ordinary first-degree felony for purposes of
the sentencing guidelines pursuant to the First District Court of Appeal’s decision
in Eady v. State, 604 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).  See Betancourt v. State,
767 So. 2d 557, 557 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).  The Third District Court of Appeal
rejected this claim, affirmed the forty-year sentences, and certified its holding as
being in direct conflict with the Eady decision. 
ANALYSIS
Section 775.081, Florida Statutes, titled “Classifications of felonies and
misdemeanors,” states that “[a] capital felony and a life felony must be so
designated by statute.”  § 775.081(1), Fla. Stat. (1989).  Section 775.082, Florida
Statutes, titled “Penalties,” states that for first-degree felonies, a defendant is
subject to “a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years or, when specifically
provided by statute, by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life
imprisonment.”  § 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989).  On the other hand, section
775.082(3)(a) states that a defendant is subject to a term of imprisonment for life or
by a term of imprisonment not exceeding forty years for a life felony committed on
or after October 1, 1983.1 
court is limited to a sentence no harsher than forty years.  Ironically, no such
limitation is posed with respect to first degree felonies punishable by life.  It has
been held elsewhere that 300 years is less than ‘life.’”  Greenhalgh v. State, 582 So.
2d 107, 108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (citations omitted).
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As noted, in seeking review Betancourt relies on Eady, where the First
District held:
[A]ppellant correctly asserted that assessment of 150 points under the
category of first degree felony punishable by life was improper.  “A
capital felony and a life felony must be so designated by statute.”  §
775.081(1), Fla. Stat. (1989).  Second-degree murder . . . is designated
by statute as “a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment
for a term of years not exceeding life . . .”  § 782.04(2) Fla. Stat.
(1989).  In view of the statutory designation, the second-degree
murder conviction should have been scored as a first-degree felony,
without the punishable by life designation.
604 So. 2d at 560.  Betancourt asserts that in accordance with Eady, his
resentencing scoresheet was improperly calculated because all four offenses were
scored under the sentencing guidelines as first-degree felonies, punishable by life. 
See Betancourt, 767 So. 2d at 558.  He claims that he is entitled as a matter of law
to have his scoresheet recalculated and his offenses scored only as first-degree
felonies.  He also asserts that his forty-year sentences exceeded the statutory
maximum for first-degree felonies.  See id. 
It appears the Eady court simply applied the Legislature’s overall
classification scheme for “life felonies” to trump the express provisions of the
2.  The Third District noted that the First District had rendered other
decisions inconsistent with its reasoning in Eady but had not expressly receded
from the Eady holding.  See Brown v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2753 (Fla. 1st
DCA Dec. 8, 1999) (affirming a life sentence for an armed burglary because it is a
first-degree felony punishable by life); Dues v. State, 716 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1st DCA
1998) (affirming a habitualized sentence for a first-degree felony punishable by life);
Knickerbocker v. State, 619 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (affirming a
habitualized life sentence for a first-degree felony punishable by life); see also
Patterson v. State, 693 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (affirming a fifty-year
sentence for a first-degree felony punishable by life); Roberts v. State, 685 So. 2d
88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (affirming a thirty-five year sentence for a first-degree
felony punishable by life).
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guidelines and to override the Legislature’s express penalty provision of life for a
second-degree murder conviction.  In doing so, the Eady court failed to give effect
to the express provisions of section 775.082, which allows for alternative penalties
for first-degree felonies including life imprisonment when expressly provided. 
Similarly, the Eady court overlooked the express provisions of the sentencing
guidelines that provide for separate scoring for first-degree felonies punishable by
life.  
While the Eady court did not address section 775.082, the Betancourt court
expressed the view that section 775.082 authorized the punishment of life
imprisonment for first-degree felonies when specifically provided by statute.  See
Betancourt, 767 So. 2d at 558.2  In its analysis, the Third District, in a majority
opinion authored by Judge Cope, explained:
3.  The Third District also remanded the case so that the life classification on
the judgment for the kidnapping offense could be changed.  See Betancourt, 767
So. 2d at 558.
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We respectfully disagree with Eady.  The Florida Statutes
authorize punishment for a first-degree felony as follows: “For a
felony of the first degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30
years or, when specifically provided by statute, by imprisonment for a
term of years not exceeding life imprisonment . . . .”  Id.  §
775.082(3)(b).  The fact that a first-degree felony can, where
authorized by law, carry a life penalty does not convert it into an
impermissible life felony.  The sentencing guidelines and scoresheets
are themselves statutory, see id. § 921.0015, and provide specific
scores for first-degree felonies punishable by life imprisonment.  See
Fla. R. Cr. P. 3.988 (1990).  The defendant’s first-degree felonies
punishable by life were all properly scored as such, and the forty-year
sentences are within the legal maximum.  See Burdick v. State, 594 So.
2d 267, 268-69 (Fla. 1992). 
Id. at 558 (footnote omitted).3  We concur in this analysis and agree that the
Legislature has expressed its clear intent both by providing for life imprisonment as
a penalty for some first-degree felonies, and by express provisions in the
sentencing guidelines for separate scoring for first-degree felonies punishable by
life.
In Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1992), this Court considered the
question of whether a first-degree felony punishable by life was subject to an
enhanced sentence pursuant to the provisions of the habitual felony offender
statute, which provided for sentence enhancement only for first-degree felonies
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rather than life felonies.  The defendant argued that a first-degree felony punishable
by life should be treated as the functional equivalent of a life felony and, hence, not
subject to the habitual felony offender statute.  See id. at 268.  This Court explained
the Legislature’s classification scheme for felonies, but concluded that regardless
of the fact that some first-degree felonies were punishable by life, they should still
be considered first-degree felonies for purposes of habitualization:
The legislature has created five categories of felonies: capital
felony; life felony; felony of the first-degree; felony of the second-
degree; and felony of the third-degree.  There is no separate
classification for first degree felonies punishable by life imprisonment. 
Thus, a first-degree felony, regardless of the sentence imposed by the
substantive law prohibiting the conduct, is still a first-degree felony
under both the statutory classification and under the habitual offender
statute.
Id. at 268-69 (citations omitted).  This Court rejected the appellant’s claim that only
those first-degree felonies not subject to life imprisonment should be subject to the
habitual offender statute, and we held that a contrary holding would violate the
policy behind the habitual offender statute to enhance punishments for habitual
offenders.  See id. at 269.  However, nowhere in Burdick did we suggest that the
Legislature’s express provision for a life sentence for some first-degree felonies
could be ignored.
Accordingly, we disapprove of the holding in Eady, and approve the Third
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District’s decision affirming Betancourt’s four forty-year concurrent sentences.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Third District - Case No. 3D99-3017
(Dade County)
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Rosa C. Figarola, Valerie Jonas, and Billie
Jan Goldstein, Assistant Public Defenders, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Michael J. Neimand, Bureau Chief, Criminal
Appeals, Assistant Attorney General, and Kristine Keaton, Assistant Attorney General,
Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Respondent