Title: John Marder v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 159 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2755 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
John Marder,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Board of Regents of the University of  
Wisconsin System,  
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 177 
Reported at:  276 Wis. 2d 186, 687 N.W.2d 832 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 29, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 27, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Douglas 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert E. Eaton   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BRADLEY, J., did not 
participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent-petitioner 
there were briefs by Aaron N. Halstead and Shneidman, Hawks & 
Ehlke, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Aaron N. Halstead. 
 
For the defendant-respondent-cross-appellant the cause was 
argued by Jennifer Sloan Lattis, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney 
general. 
 
 
 
2005 WI 159
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2003AP2755  
(L.C. No. 
2001CV222) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John Marder, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin 
System, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 29, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is the review of 
a decision from the court of appeals reversing the order of the 
circuit court for Douglas County, Robert E. Eaton, Judge, that 
reversed the decision of the Board of Regents of the University 
of Wisconsin System (Board) to terminate John Marder, a tenured 
faculty member at the University of Wisconsin-Superior (UW-
Superior).  
¶2 
Marder does not assert that there was insufficient 
evidence presented to the Board to terminate him for just cause.  
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
2 
 
Instead, he argues that:  (1) the Board failed to accord him a 
fair hearing under the contested case procedures of ch. 227, 
which prohibits ex parte communications with the decision-maker 
on the merits of the case and provides specific remedies when 
such communication occurs; and (2) the Board was a biased 
decision-maker, thereby denying him due process of law, because 
of three alleged ex parte communications:  (a) between the 
chancellor of UW-Superior and Regent Toby Marcovich; (b) between 
counsel advising the chancellor and counsel advising the Board; 
and (c) between the chancellor and the Board just before the 
Board voted to terminate him.   
¶3 
We conclude that the proper pre-termination procedure 
for a tenured faculty member of the University of Wisconsin 
System is set out in Wis. Stat. § 36.13(5) (2003-04)1 and Wis. 
Admin. Code § UWS 4 (Apr., 2001),2 which the Board correctly 
employed, and that there has been no showing that Marder's 
rights were compromised by alleged ex parte communications 
between the chancellor and Regent Marcovich or between the 
University 
of 
Wisconsin 
System 
counsel 
who 
advised 
the 
chancellor and the Board.  However, based on the record before 
us, we cannot determine whether in the communication between the 
chancellor and the Board, which occurred immediately before the 
Board voted to terminate Marder, the chancellor presented new 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated.   
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code are to the April, 2001 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
3 
 
facts to the Board upon which its decision to terminate Marder 
was based.  Therefore, we remand to the circuit court for the 
limited purpose of making that determination.  We leave to the 
circuit court's discretion the decision of whether discovery is 
needed to determine whether the chancellor presented any new 
facts upon which Marder's termination was based.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
Marder was first employed by the UW-Superior in 1987; 
he was a tenured professor in the Department of Communicating 
Arts.  In 1999, UW-Superior Chancellor Julius Erlenbach served 
Marder with a Statement of Charges that included 18 separate 
charges against him that the chancellor said "evince a pattern 
of behavior that is inconsistent with the expectations this 
university has of tenured faculty members and which further 
violate standards of professional conduct, thus constituting 
just cause to dismiss you from your tenured faculty position at 
UW-Superior."  The chancellor advised Marder that he had the 
right to request a hearing on the chancellor's decision to 
terminate his employment.   
¶5 
The Statement of Charges that led to the chancellor's 
decision to dismiss Marder included the following:  (1) Marder 
shared a hotel room with a particular female UW-Superior student 
and drank too much alcohol which caused him to "black-out" so 
that he was unable to remember if he had engaged in sexual 
misconduct; (2) Marder shared hotel rooms and traveled with a 
different female UW-Superior student, who complained to the 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
4 
 
Affirmative 
Action 
Committee 
that 
Marder 
engaged 
in 
inappropriate sexual conduct, causing the Committee to find that 
he had engaged in improper behavior with the student; (3) Marder 
manipulated student evaluations by playing a tape recording 
relating to his removal as advisor to the student newspaper for 
his editing class during the final five or six minutes of class 
in the middle of the semester, and then distributed course 
evaluations, 
for 
the 
students 
to 
complete, 
even 
though 
evaluations were not to be done until the end of the semester; 
(4) Marder continued to complain because one of his colleagues 
had married a departmental secretary, causing considerable 
conflict with her and requiring corrective action by the 
Provost; 
(5) 
Marder 
repeatedly 
engaged 
in 
harassing 
and 
disruptive 
behavior 
toward 
his 
faculty 
colleagues 
and 
departmental staff, which became so unpleasant that the Provost 
moved Marder's office out of the Communicating Arts building and 
adjusted his workload; (6) Marder was the custodian of the 
accounts for the student newspaper when various irregularities 
in its accounts occurred; (7) Marder sent a letter to the 
Wisconsin Attorney General containing misrepresentations of fact 
about his departmental chair; and (8) Marder sent a letter to 
the 
UW-Superior 
auditor 
that 
contained 
confidential 
and 
inaccurate information about a colleague, in an effort to draw 
the auditor into an intra-departmental conflict. 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
5 
 
¶6 
Marder 
requested 
a 
hearing 
on 
his 
termination, 
pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code § UWS 4.04.3  In January of 2000, 
pursuant to § UWS 4.03,4 a Committee of Faculty Terminations 
(CFT), comprised of four tenured faculty members at UW-Superior, 
held two days of hearings and rejected the chancellor's 
recommendation to terminate Marder.  However, the CFT found that 
there had been "a near total breakdown in collegiality in the 
Department of Communicating Arts," and that Marder "engaged in a 
course of conduct that is simply unacceptable on this or any 
other university campus."  The committee did not recommend that 
Marder be dismissed, but did recommend that he be transferred to 
another department and that he be forced to undergo professional 
counseling. 
¶7 
During the CFT hearing, attorneys from the Office of 
the General Counsel of the University of Wisconsin System 
(General Counsel's Office), including Patricia Brady (Brady) and 
Anne Bilder (Bilder), served as legal counsel to the chancellor.  
They were under the supervision of Attorney Elizabeth Rindskopf 
Parker, who was at the same time acting as legal counsel to the 
Board. 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Admin. Code § UWS 4.04 reads, in pertinent part: 
"Hearing.  If the faculty member requests a hearing . . . such a 
hearing shall be held.  . . .  The request for a hearing shall 
be addressed in writing to the chairperson of the standing 
faculty committee created under s. UWS 4.03." 
4 Wisconsin Admin. Code § UWS 4.03 reads, in pertinent part: 
"Standing faculty committee.  The faculty of each institution 
shall 
provide 
a 
standing 
committee 
charged 
with 
hearing 
dismissal cases and making recommendations under this chapter." 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
6 
 
¶8 
After the CFT issued its decision, the chancellor 
persisted in his intention to terminate Marder, and pursuant to 
Wis. Admin. Code § UWS 4.07(1),5 he recommended to Katherine 
Lyall, President of the University of Wisconsin System, that 
Marder be dismissed.  In that recommendation, the chancellor 
reported that Marder had been the subject of a number of formal 
and informal complaints by students, faculty, staff and the 
chair of his department at UW-Superior, involving matters of 
alleged sexual misconduct with students, alleged inappropriate 
conduct as an instructor and troubled relationships with fellow 
faculty members.  In the same recommendation, the chancellor 
also noted that, in accordance with § UWS 4.07(1), he had 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Admin. Code § UWS 4.07 reads, in pertinent part: 
Recommendations: to the chancellor: to the regents.  
(1) The faculty hearing committee shall send to the 
chancellor and to the faculty member concerned, as 
soon as practicable after conclusion of the hearing, a 
verbatim record of the testimony and a copy of its 
report, findings, and recommendations.  The committee 
may determine that while adequate cause for discipline 
exists, some sanction less severe than dismissal is 
more appropriate.  . . .  If the chancellor's proposed 
recommendations differ substantially from those of the 
faculty 
hearing 
committee, 
the 
chancellor 
shall 
promptly consult the faculty hearing committee and 
provide the committee with a reasonable opportunity 
for a written response prior to forwarding his/her 
recommendation. 
 
If 
the 
recommendation 
is 
for 
dismissal, 
the 
recommendation 
shall 
be 
submitted 
through the president of the system to the board.  A 
copy of the faculty hearing committee's report and 
recommendations 
shall 
be 
forwarded 
through 
the 
president of the system to the board along with the 
chancellor's recommendation. 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
7 
 
reviewed the record of the CFT hearing and the CFT report 
rejecting his recommendation to terminate Marder, that the CFT's 
report contained errors of law and fact, that the CFT's 
recommendations were unrealistic6 and that Marder should be 
dismissed.   
¶9 
The chancellor explained that the record of the 
hearing disclosed serious instances of misconduct, and that 
after hearing these facts, he could not accept the CFT's 
conclusion that termination should not occur.  He asserted that 
Marder's dismissal was necessary to maintain faculty morale and 
the integrity of the University, and he requested that President 
Lyall forward his recommendation to the Board for further 
consideration.   
¶10 President Lyall referred the chancellor's request to 
the Personnel Matters Review Committee (PMRC) of the Board for 
review.  Attorneys Brady and Bilder continued to provide counsel 
to the chancellor during the proceedings before the PMRC.   
¶11 On March 8, 2001, the PMRC recommended to the Board 
that the dismissal proceedings against Marder be discontinued, 
but that Marder be placed on notice that his past behavior could 
be used against him if he were involved in a subsequent 
disciplinary proceeding.  The Board did not accept this 
recommendation and returned the matter to the PMRC for hearing.  
                                                 
6 For example, the committee recommended that Marder be 
moved to another department based on his conflicts with other 
faculty in his own department.  The chancellor pointed out that 
this was an unrealistic recommendation since Marder was not 
qualified to teach in any other department. 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
8 
 
¶12 The PMRC held a hearing at which it invited argument 
from Marder and the chancellor.  It again recommended that 
Marder not be terminated, but it failed to include within its 
recommendation proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
Therefore, the Board returned the case to the PMRC for 
preparations of proposed findings and conclusions.  
¶13 On June 8, 2001, the Board held a meeting in Milwaukee 
at which Marder's termination was discussed.  The chancellor 
flew from Superior to Milwaukee for that meeting with Regent 
Marcovich.  At the meeting, the chancellor addressed the Board 
in closed session about his decision to terminate Marder.  
Attorneys from the General Counsel's Office, including those who 
advised the chancellor and those who advised the Board, were 
present.  Marder and his attorney were not allowed to be 
present.  Directly following the closed session, the Board voted 
11 
to 
3 
in 
open 
session 
to 
accept 
the 
chancellor's 
recommendation to terminate Marder.   
¶14 The Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of 
the 
Board 
from 
the 
termination 
proceedings 
included 
the 
following:   
(2) A 
female 
UW-Superior 
student 
accused 
Professor Marder of inappropriate conduct during a 
school-related trip to New York City in March 1995.  
He admitted sharing a hotel room with the student, and 
admitted that he had consumed so much alcohol that he 
experienced a "black out" and could not recall whether 
or not he had, as she alleged, masturbated in front of 
her . . . . 
(4) Professor 
Marder 
pursued 
a 
personal 
relationship 
with 
a 
foreign 
(French) 
student 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
9 
 
commencing in 1994 while she was seeking advice on 
possible admission and later studying at UW-Superior.  
. . .  The foreign student filed a formal complaint of 
sexual harassment against Professor Marder . . . which 
included allegations that he masturbated in front of 
her in shared hotel rooms . . . . 
(8) In 
late 
December 
1996, 
shortly 
after 
Professor Marder was made custodian of the [student 
newspaper's] financial accounts, UW-Superior conducted 
an audit of those accounts.  Professor Marder provided 
information . . . to the campus auditor . . . [that] 
included confidential matters related to Professor 
Marder's treatment of the department secretary . . . 
and inaccurate information about [another professor's] 
activities in connection with the [newspaper] . . . .  
Marder 
indicated 
in 
his 
transmittal 
of 
the 
confidential information to [the auditor] that he had 
provided students with copies of the information 
. . . . 
(12) Professor 
Marder 
sent 
a 
letter 
dated 
February 5, 1997, to the Attorney General complaining 
of an open meetings law violation which gives the 
impression that [another professor] or [the department 
administrative 
assistant] 
had 
influenced 
[the 
auditor's] decision not to permit tape recording of a 
meeting.  The letter seeks to have the Attorney 
General bring charges for an open meetings violation 
against [the 
auditor, 
another professor 
and the 
department administrative assistant]. The accusation 
against [the 
other 
professor and 
the 
department 
administrative assistant] was untrue and the letter's 
recounting of the events was misleading . . . . 
(20) After Professor Marder concluded that [the 
department administrative assistant] had befriended 
the French student with whom [Marder] was pursuing a 
personal relationship, he responded by making a series 
of 
unfounded 
accusations 
against 
[the 
department 
administrative assistant]. 
(25) There 
was 
no 
evidence 
introduced 
to 
establish that anyone other than Professor Marder had 
contributed to the breakdown of collegiality within 
his department.  
. . . . 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
10 
 
(2) There is just cause for the dismissal of 
John Marder from his tenured faculty position at the 
UW-Superior under the applicable standard for such 
matters . . . . 
¶15 Marder petitioned the Douglas County Circuit Court for 
review of his termination pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1).  
He sought reversal of the Board's decision, or, in the 
alternative, leave to take discovery regarding three alleged 
ex parte communications that he argued violated his due process 
right to an unbiased decision-maker.  The circuit court reviewed 
the case and concluded that the prohibition of ex parte 
communications for contested cases set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.50 required that Marder be present when the Board and the 
chancellor met.  It declined to grant discovery or to reverse 
the Board's decision based on Marder's contention that the Board 
was too biased to hear the case.  Instead, it remanded the case 
to the Board for further action on "a correct interpretation of 
the law."  
¶16 Marder appealed the decision, arguing that the Board 
was too tainted to render a fair decision in a remand of the 
matter.  Alternatively, Marder disputed the circuit court's 
denial of his request to allow discovery.  The Board cross-
appealed the circuit court's determination that contested case 
provisions of ch. 227 applied to Marder's case.   
¶17 The court of appeals concluded that ch. 227 contested 
case provisions did not apply to Marder's case.  However, it 
held that the applicable administrative code provisions, § UWS 
4, and Marder's constitutional due process rights required 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
11 
 
Marder's presence at any hearing in which new facts were 
presented on which his discharge was based.  The court of 
appeals remanded the matter to the circuit court to determine 
whether such facts were presented when the chancellor met with 
the Board immediately before the Board voted to terminate 
Marder.  Marder petitioned for review, which we granted. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶18 This case requires us to interpret related statutes, 
to review an agency's application of its own rules and to 
determine 
whether 
the 
agency's 
pre-termination 
procedures 
accorded Marder due process of law.   
¶19 Statutory interpretation and the application of a 
statute to a given set of facts are questions of law that we 
review independently, but benefiting from the analyses of the 
court of appeals and the circuit court.  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 
59, ¶12, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700.  An administrative 
agency's interpretation of its own rules is controlling unless 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the language of the rule.  
State v. Busch, 217 Wis. 2d 429, 441, 576 N.W.2d 904 (1998).  We 
review whether due process has been provided as a question of 
law.  State v. Sorenson, 2002 WI 78, ¶25, 254 Wis. 2d 54, 646 
N.W.2d 354.  
B. 
Wisconsin Statutes 
¶20 Marder contends that the court of appeals erred 
because he was entitled to the procedures applicable to 
contested cases under the criteria set out in Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
12 
 
§ 227.42(1).7  The Board disagrees, and contends that the 
legislature created Wis. Stat. § 36.13,8 which gave the Board 
authority to create attendant administrative rules to serve as 
the specific procedure the University is to follow when 
considering the termination of a tenured faculty member.  The 
Board explains that according to § 36.13(5) it promulgated Wis. 
Admin. Code § UWS 4 to accord notice and hearing prior to 
termination, which it applied here.   
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.42(1) provides:  
(1) In addition to any other right provided by 
law, any person filing a written request with an 
agency for hearing shall have the right to a hearing 
which shall be treated as a contested case if: 
(a) A substantial interest of the person is 
injured in fact or threatened with injury by agency 
action or inaction; 
(b) There is no evidence of legislative intent 
that the interest is not to be protected; 
(c) The 
injury 
to 
the 
person requesting 
a 
hearing is different in kind or degree from injury to 
the general public caused by the agency action or 
inaction; and 
(d) There is a dispute of material fact. 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 36.13(5) is the provision that is 
relevant here.  It provides: 
Procedural guarantees.  Any person having tenure may 
be dismissed only for just cause and only after due 
notice and hearing.  . . .  The action and decision of 
the board in such matters shall be final, subject to 
judicial review under ch. 227.  The board and its 
several faculties shall develop procedures for the 
notice and hearing which shall be promulgated by rule 
under ch. 227. 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
13 
 
¶21 To interpret whether the contested case provisions of 
ch. 227 apply, we begin by examining the plain meaning of the 
statutory language, in context, as is required by State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 
Wis. 2d 
633, 
681 
N.W.2d 
110. 
 
"[S]tatutory 
language 
is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole . . . and reasonably, to avoid absurd or 
unreasonable results."  Id.   Here, we must interpret several 
statutes that it is argued may relate to pre-termination 
procedures for a tenured faculty member.  We do so to avoid 
inconsistencies.  See City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee County, 27 
Wis. 2d 53, 56, 133 N.W.2d 393 (1965).  The context in which we 
interpret Wis. Stat. § 227.42 includes Wis. Stat. § 36.13(5) 
because § 36.13(5) addresses termination of tenured faculty 
members.  
¶22 It is not disputed that Wis. Stat. § 36.13(5) requires 
the Board to develop procedures for notice and hearing to employ 
when it is recommended that a tenured faculty member be 
dismissed.  Additionally, Marder does not dispute that Wis. 
Admin. Code § UWS 4 was promulgated in accord with § 36.13(5).  
Rather, it is his position that the general contested case 
provisions of ch. 227 must be applied to the procedures set out 
in § UWS 4, even though Wis. Stat. § 227.42 does not specify the 
agency actions to which it applies.  The Board asserts that if 
the legislature had intended the contested case provisions of 
ch. 227 to apply, there would have been no need for § 36.13(5).   
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
14 
 
¶23 We agree with the Board.  We note that generally where 
a specific statutory provision leads in one direction and a 
general statutory provision in another, the specific statutory 
provision controls.  See State v. Smith, 106 Wis. 2d 151, 159, 
316 N.W.2d 124 (Ct. App. 1982).  Here, the Board has promulgated 
through its rule-making power a complete procedure to be 
employed before a tenured faculty member can be terminated.  In 
addition, in Wis. Stat. § 227.42(3) the legislature explained 
that there would be occasions when it would choose to create 
notice and hearing procedures for particular agency actions and 
when it did so, the provisions of § 227.42 would not apply.  
Section 227.42(3) provides: 
This section does not apply to rule-making proceedings 
or rehearings, or to actions where hearings at the 
discretion of the agency are expressly authorized by 
law.   
¶24 In Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc. v. DNR, 149 
Wis. 2d 
817, 
440 
N.W.2d 
337 
(1989), 
we 
interpreted 
the 
relationship between the contested case provisions of ch. 227 
and Wis. Stat. § 227.42(3).  We concluded that the legislative 
history behind § 227.42 showed it was intended to fill gaps 
where hearing rights were needed, but had not been provided in a 
specific statute.  Id. at 828.  We also concluded that 
subsection (3) excluded "from the scope of the provision actions 
for which hearing rights are provided elsewhere."  Id.  The 
reasoning of Waste Management is applicable here because there 
is no gap in the statutes or administrative code regarding the 
hearing rights afforded to tenured faculty undergoing pre-
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
15 
 
termination procedures.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
provisions of § 36.13(5) and the rules the Board promulgated 
under Wis. Admin. Code § UWS 4, which are expressly authorized 
by law, set out the pre-termination procedures to which Marder 
was due.9  The contested case provisions of ch. 227 do not apply.  
This includes Wis. Stat. § 227.50(1), which comes into play only 
if the contested case provisions of § 227.42(1) apply. 
C. 
Administrative Rules 
¶25 Wisconsin 
Admin. 
Code 
§ UWS 
4, 
Procedures 
for 
Dismissal, provides a standard, "just cause," that must be met 
before a tenured faculty member can be dismissed.  § UWS 4.01.  
It also provides the right to notice and hearing on the charges 
against the faculty member, § UWS 4.02-4.05, with ultimate 
review of whether termination should occur resting with the 
Board, § UWS 4.08.  Nothing in § UWS 4 explicitly prohibits 
ex parte communications as Wis. Stat. § 227.50(1) does in a 
contested case proceeding.  However, because Marder has a due 
process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard on the 
charges against him, Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 
470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985), a consultation outside of Marder's 
presence may cause constitutional problems if during the 
consultation the chancellor provided the Board with new facts on 
                                                 
9 Marder contends that in order to be outside of ch. 227's 
contested 
case 
provisions, 
pre-termination 
proceedings 
for 
tenured 
faculty 
should 
have 
been 
listed 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.03(4).  We conclude such a listing would have been 
redundant, given the plain statement the legislature set out in 
Wis. Stat. § 227.42(3) and Wis. Stat. § 36.13(5). 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
16 
 
which the Board based Marder's termination, even if such 
consultation 
does 
not 
conflict 
with 
the 
terms 
of 
the 
administrative rule.  See id. at 545-46.    
D. 
Ex Parte Communications 
¶26 Marder contends that three ex parte communications 
violated his statutory rights and the due process guaranty to an 
unbiased decision-maker.  The contacts are:  (1) between the 
chancellor of UW-Superior and Regent Marcovich; (2) between 
counsel advising the chancellor and counsel advising the Board; 
and (3) between the chancellor and the Board just before the 
Board voted to terminate Marder.  We have already addressed 
Marder's statutory argument; we now proceed to address his due 
process concerns.   
¶27 We begin by noting that it is uncontested that Marder 
has a due process right in his continued employment at UW-
Superior.  See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538; Patterson v. Bd. of 
Regents, 119 Wis. 2d 570, 581, 350 N.W.2d 612 (1984).  A basic 
element of constitutional due process, to which Marder is 
entitled, is a fair hearing conducted before a fair tribunal.  
See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).  "It is . . . 
undisputable that a minimal rudiment of due process is a fair 
and impartial decisionmaker."  Guthrie v. WERC, 111 Wis. 2d 447, 
454, 331 N.W.2d 331 (1983).  The United States Supreme Court and 
Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
held 
that 
an 
adjudicator 
in 
an 
administrative hearing comes within the ambit of the due process 
requirement of an unbiased decision-maker.  See Withrow v. 
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975); see also State ex rel. DeLuca v. 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
17 
 
Common Council, 72 Wis. 2d 672, 684, 242 N.W.2d 689 (1976).  
Furthermore, violations of due process are not limited to bias 
or unfairness in fact, but in very limited circumstances may 
occur "when the risk of bias is impermissibly high."  Guthrie, 
111 Wis. 2d at 454 (concluding that the risk of bias is 
impermissibly high when one who acted as counsel for one of the 
parties becomes the decision-maker).    
¶28 If the risk of bias does not fall within one of the 
few circumstances where the risk of bias is impermissibly high, 
an ex parte communication merits further consideration as a 
potential violation of due process rights only if the decision-
maker is provided new and material information in the course of 
the communication.  Stone v. FDIC, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999).  As was carefully explained in Stone: 
The introduction of new and material information 
by means of ex parte communications to the deciding 
official 
undermines 
the 
public 
employee's 
constitutional due process guarantee of notice (both 
of the charges and of the employer's evidence) and the 
opportunity to respond . . . .   However, not every 
ex parte communication is a procedural defect so 
substantial and so likely to cause prejudice that it 
undermines the due process guarantee and entitles the 
claimant to an entirely new administrative proceeding.  
Only ex parte communications that introduce new and 
material information to the deciding official will 
violate the due process guarantee of notice. 
Id. at 1376-77. 
¶29 In explaining when the risk of actual bias is 
impermissibly 
high, 
Withrow 
held 
that 
administrative 
adjudicators retain a presumption of honesty and integrity and 
that, absent "a showing to the contrary, state administrators 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
18 
 
'are 
assumed 
to 
be 
men 
of 
conscience 
and 
intellectual 
discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly 
on the basis of its own circumstances.'"  Withrow, 421 U.S. at 
55 (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941)).  
In Withrow, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that because an 
adjudicating body had participated in the initiation and 
investigation of the administrative charges to suspend a 
physician's license, the physician's right to a fair and 
impartial decision-maker had been violated.  See Withrow, 421 
U.S. at 57.   
¶30 In concluding that there had been no showing of a 
biased 
decision-maker, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
contrasted 
the 
circumstances of that case with cases "in which the adjudicator 
[had] a pecuniary interest in the outcome [or] in which he has 
been the target of abuse or criticism from the party before 
him."  Id. at 47 (citations omitted).  The court reasoned that 
mere exposure to the evidence presented in non-adversary 
investigative procedures was insufficient to impugn the fairness 
of the board members who later sat as adjudicators in an 
adversary hearing.  Id. at 57.  The court based that conclusion 
on the reasoning that under those circumstances the risk of bias 
or 
prejudice 
was 
not 
"intolerably 
high 
or 
to 
raise 
a 
sufficiently great possibility that the adjudicators would be so 
psychologically wedded to their complaints that they would 
consciously or unconsciously avoid the appearance of having 
erred or changed position."  Id.  Finally, in Withrow the 
Supreme Court placed the burden of making such a showing on the 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
19 
 
party challenging the impartiality of the adjudicator.  Id. at 
47. 
¶31 In DeLuca, we interpreted and applied Withrow in order 
to ascertain that in a city council dismissal hearing, the 
initiation of removal proceedings by aldermen who subsequently 
decided the matter as adjudicators did not necessarily create 
circumstances that violated any constitutional right to a fair 
and impartial adjudicator.  DeLuca, 72 Wis. 2d at 684.  We 
relied 
on 
the 
Withrow 
presumption 
that 
administrative 
adjudicators act with honesty and integrity, and imposed the 
burden established in that case:  "even where the investigative 
and adjudicative functions are combined, the objector must 
assume the heavy burden of showing that this combination of 
functions creates an unconstitutional risk of unfairness."  Id. 
¶32 Wisconsin appellate courts have applied this rule in 
cases of administrative adjudication in which professional 
relationships and dual roles linked adversary counsel and 
adjudicators and required a strong showing to rebut the 
presumption that administrative agents act with integrity.  See 
Nu-Roc Nursing Home, Inc. v. DHSS, 200 Wis. 2d 405, 416, 546 
N.W.2d 562 (Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that "[c]riticism of an 
adjudicator's performance of his official duties does not spur 
the type of animosity created by personal insults and threats"); 
see also Bracegirdle v. Dep't of Regulation & Licensing, 159 
Wis. 2d 402, 464 N.W.2d 111 (Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that 
Bracegirdle's right to an impartial decision-maker was not 
contravened when the chairman of the board advised the attorney 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
20 
 
who prepared the charges against Bracegirdle).  Those cases 
apply the high Withrow burden to challenges to an agency's 
adjudication based on an alleged lack of impartiality in 
violation of due process.  
¶33 Accordingly, we must determine whether Marder has 
carried the burden to show that the three alleged ex parte 
communications created an impermissibly high probability of 
actual bias or introduced new information on which the Board 
based its decision to terminate Marder.  The first improper 
communication is alleged to have occurred during the plane ride 
to the Board's June 8, 2001 meeting, between the chancellor and 
Regent Marcovich.  Marder does not allege that the plane ride 
created an impermissibly high probability of actual bias.  
Instead, it is his theory that the time that the chancellor and 
Regent Marcovich spent together on the plane was suspicious 
because it occurred on the same day as the Board voted to 
terminate him and it was Marcovich who moved for Marder's 
termination.  He speculates that the chancellor and Marcovich 
must have discussed the case in an inappropriate way.   
¶34 However, Marder has not presented any facts that would 
overcome the presumption that the chancellor and Marcovich acted 
appropriately when they traveled together.  They were not 
prohibited from talking to one another and the legal presumption 
that administrative adjudicators are able to maintain their 
professional and ethical responsibility to remain impartial and 
to conduct themselves 
appropriately 
applies 
to 
Marcovich.  
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
21 
 
Marder's general complaints do not meet the high burden set 
forth in Withrow and adopted by us in DeLuca.   
¶35 The second contact Marder challenges occurred between 
attorneys in the General Counsel's Office, one of whom advised 
the chancellor and the other of whom advised the Board during 
Marder's dismissal proceedings.  Marder argues that these 
circumstances created partiality in the Board and that there may 
have been inappropriate strategizing between the attorneys that 
tainted his right to a fair hearing before an impartial 
adjudicator.  Marder argues that the principles set forth by 
this court in Guthrie, in which an administrative decision-maker 
was disqualified because he had previously acted as counsel for 
one of the parties in the same matter, should apply to his case.     
¶36 We 
disagree. 
 
In 
Guthrie, 
we 
held 
that 
an 
administrative decision-maker is disqualified when he or she has 
previously acted as counsel for one of the parties because "the 
possibility 
of 
partiality 
or 
bias 
is 
too 
high 
to 
be 
constitutionally tolerable."  Guthrie, 111 Wis. 2d at 460.  
Here, none of the attorneys in a previous proceeding involving 
Marder sat on the Board as a decision-maker.  Rather, they 
provided counsel for a University of Wisconsin employee, the 
chancellor, and a University of Wisconsin board, the Board of 
Regents. 
¶37 We conclude that the facts of this case more closely 
parallel Bracegirdle, in which the court of appeals concluded 
that there was not an intolerable risk of unfairness when the 
chairperson of a board advised the prosecuting attorney and also 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
22 
 
prepared the board's decision.  See Bracegirdle, 159 Wis. 2d at 
414-15; see also Nu-Roc, 200 Wis. 2d at 420-21, in which the 
court of appeals applied the reasoning of Bracegirdle.  In Nu-
Roc, a deputy to adversary counsel representing the agency in an 
adjudicated administrative matter participated in the final 
decision of the case.  The court of appeals held that the 
deputy's professional relationship with counsel did not overcome 
the presumption of honesty and integrity of the decision-makers. 
¶38 Here, Marder's argument regarding the shared office of 
counsel does not overcome the high burden we have established to 
overcome the presumption that the Board acted with honesty and 
integrity.  Further, he did not argue that the risk of 
unfairness was intolerably high under the circumstances.  He 
simply alleged that because the chancellor and the Board 
received legal consultation from attorneys who work for the same 
office, there was a possibility that the attorneys strategized 
inappropriately.  He did not show that through this indirect 
relationship the adjudicator had become "psychologically wedded" 
to a predetermined disposition in the case. 
¶39 The final communication that Marder alleges violated 
his rights is the Board's consultation with the chancellor 
during the closed meeting immediately prior to the Board's vote 
to terminate him.  The Board concluded that it was required to 
consult with the chancellor under Wis. Admin. Code § UWS 
4.08(2), which states: 
If, after the hearing, the board decides to take 
action different from 
the recommendation 
of the 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
23 
 
faculty hearing committee and/or the chancellor, then 
before taking final action the board shall consult 
with 
the 
faculty 
hearing 
committee 
and/or 
the 
chancellor, as appropriate. 
Because the chancellor continued to recommend dismissal when 
both the PMRC and the CFT had not, the Board relied on § UWS 
4.08(2) for its procedure.  Section UWS 4.08(2) does not require 
that this consultation occur in the presence of the faculty 
member; and as an initial matter, the Board's interpretation of 
its own rules is controlling unless that interpretation is 
inconsistent with the language of the rule.  Hillhaven Corp. v. 
DHFS, 2000 WI App 20, 232 Wis. 2d 400, 606 N.W.2d 572.  There is 
nothing about this consultation that creates an impermissible 
risk of actual bias, nor does Marder allege that there was.  
However, even though we know the Board and the chancellor 
consulted about whether to terminate Marder, we do not have 
enough information about what occurred in that meeting to 
determine if Marder's rights were violated by the presentation 
of new facts on which his termination was based.    
¶40 Therefore, as the United States Supreme Court has 
explained, because due process requires that deprivation of 
property must be preceded by notice and an opportunity for 
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case, Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950), 
Marder's right to notice of the charges against him was violated 
if the Board was presented with new facts on which Marder's 
termination was based.  Therefore, we agree with the court of 
No. 
2003AP2755   
 
24 
 
appeals that a remand to the circuit court is necessary to 
answer whether such facts were presented. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶41 We conclude that the proper pre-termination procedure 
for a tenured faculty member of the University of Wisconsin 
System is set out in Wis. Stat. § 36.13 and Wis. Admin. Code 
§ UWS 4, which the Board correctly employed, and that there has 
been no showing that Marder's rights were compromised by alleged 
ex parte 
communications between the 
chancellor 
and 
Regent 
Marcovich or between the University of Wisconsin System counsel 
who advised the chancellor and the Board.  However, based on the 
record 
before 
us, 
we 
cannot 
determine 
whether 
in 
the 
communication between the chancellor and the Board, which 
occurred immediately before the Board voted to terminate Marder, 
the chancellor presented new facts to the Board upon which its 
decision to terminate Marder was based.  Therefore, we remand to 
the circuit court for the limited purpose of making that 
determination.  We leave to the circuit court's discretion the 
decision of whether discovery is needed to determine whether the 
chancellor 
presented 
any 
new 
facts 
upon 
which 
Marder's 
termination was based.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶42 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and ANN WALSH BRADLEY, 
J., did not participate. 
 
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2003AP2755   
 
 
 
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