Title: State v. Johnson

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

State of Maryland v. Donnell Johnson,   No. 50, September Term, 2001.
[Criminal Law – Applicability of the Rule of Consistency in Separate Conspiracy Trials: Held:
The rule of consistency is inapplicable to verdicts issued in separate trials;  thus, despite the
acquittal of all of the respondent’s named co-conspirators in a prior trial, the respondent’s
conviction for conspiracy is legally valid.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 50
September Term, 2001
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
DONNELL JOHNSON
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:   January 9, 2002
We are tasked to determine whether the rule of consistency bars the respondent’s
conviction of conspiracy to commit murder when all of the named co-conspirators were
acquitted of conspiracy in a prior and separate trial.  Consistent with our decision in Gardner
v. State, 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d 1317 (1979), we hold that the rule of consistency is
inapplicable to verdicts issued in separate trials.  Thus, despite the acquittal of all of the
respondent’s named co-conspirators in a prior trial, the respondent’s conviction for conspiracy
is legally valid. 
I.   Background
A.
Facts
On June 14, 1998, Keisha Robinson, a.k.a. Alicia Miller, was grabbed and assaulted near
Ridgehill Avenue in Baltimore City by five men, including the respondent, Donnell Johnson.
During the assault, Robinson heard one of the men exclaim, “Let’s go around the corner and
get her boyfriend.” The men then left to pursue Robinson’s boyfriend, Jerome Tyler, a.k.a.
Herman Ridley.  Robinson went home immediately after the assault but returned to the
Ridgehill Avenue area approximately twenty minutes later in search of her boyfriend.
Robinson found Tyler, who had a cut on his face, and saw another man, whom she only knew
as “Timmy,” lying in the alley.  “Timmy,” later identified as Gary Hawkins, was unconscious
and unresponsive.
Witnesses told the police that Hawkins was surrounded by several men; one of the men
struck Hawkins, causing him to fall to the ground.  The men then dragged Hawkins into an alley
where the beating and kicking continued until Hawkins was unconscious.   An ambulance
transported Hawkins to the Shock Trauma Center at the University Hospital in Baltimore, but
1
An autopsy report indicated that he died of blunt force head injuries which caused
internal bleeding of the brain.  
2
Bolger, Duncan, Johnson, and Richardson were indicted together.  Christian was
indicted separately.  All five defendants were present together at the commencement of the
proceedings on October 13, 1999 at which time the respondent’s counsel moved to strike her
appearance due to a personal conflict of interest.
The respondent argues that where a separate trial is forced on the defendant due to
circumstances beyond his control (i.e. his counsel’s conflict of interest), fundamental fairness
requires that the rule of consistency be applied as if the defendant had been jointly tried with
his conspirators.  Notwithstanding the absolute lack of authority for this proposition, and
notwithstanding that the court’s objective was to secure fundamental fairness for respondent
by ensuring that he was not represented by an attorney who acknowledged a personal conflict
of interest, the question of whether the rule of consistency applies should never be dependent
upon the defendant’s subjective desires concerning the determination  to separate the trials.
To require courts to enforce different standards with respect to inconsistent verdicts
depending on whether the severance was voluntary or involuntary, wanted or unwanted, is
unworkable.
2
Hawkins did not survive his injuries.1 
Robinson and other witnesses eventually  identified the primary suspects to the murder
of Gary Hawkins as Thomas Bolger, Andre Christian, Harold Duncan, Ronald Richardson, and
the respondent.
B.
Legal Proceedings
Bolger, Christian, Duncan, Richardson, and the respondent, as well as other unnamed,
unknown co-conspirators, ultimately were charged with the first degree murder of Gary
Hawkins and conspiracy to commit first degree murder.2  Prior to trial, the respondent’s case
was severed from that of the other named co-conspirators because of a conflict of interest on
the part of the respondent’s counsel.  The co-conspirators were tried jointly prior to the
respondent’s trial; Bolger, Christian, and Richardson were convicted of second degree murder
3
The respondent also argued a second evidentiary issue, claiming that the circuit court
erroneously admitted hearsay testimony during the trial.  The Court of Special Appeals agreed
that testimony was hearsay, and thus improperly admitted, but held that the error was harmless.
This evidentiary issue was not raised in the petition for writ of certiorari before this Court. 
3
and second degree assault, while Duncan was convicted only of second degree murder.  All
were acquitted of conspiracy to commit murder.
Subsequently, the respondent was tried before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and
on May 8, 2000, was convicted of second degree assault and conspiracy to commit murder.
Prior to sentencing, the respondent filed a Motion for New Trial / Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal Notwithstanding the Verdict arguing that pursuant to the rule of consistency, the prior
acquittal of a co-conspirator mandates the acquittal of a subsequently tried conspirator.  The
circuit court denied the motions on dual grounds.  First, the court ruled that the rule of
consistency did not apply because the respondent’s indictment, while specifically naming the
four other separately tried co-conspirators, included unknown and unnamed co-conspirators.
Second, the circuit court ruled that evidence at trial supported the theory that persons other
than the separately tried co-conspirators may have conspired with the respondent to commit
murder.  
The respondent appealed to the Court of Special Appeals claiming, again, that a
conspiracy conviction cannot stand when all other co-conspirators were acquitted previously
in a separate trial.3  In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the
judgment of the circuit court with respect to the conspiracy conviction.  Relying on its holding
in Rosenberg v. State, 54 Md. App. 673, 460 A.2d 617 (1983), the intermediate appellate
4
Because the Court of Special Appeals found that the rule of consistency rendered  the
respondent’s conspiracy conviction legally invalid (pursuant to the prior acquittal of the named
co-conspirators), the court was required to consider whether the conviction may still be valid
based upon the unknown, unnamed co-conspirator language in the indictment.  According to
the Court of Special Appeals, the respondent’s conspiracy conviction could not be based solely
upon the unknown unnamed co-conspirator language in the indictment because the evidence
procured at trial would not support such a conviction.  The State’s primary witnesses never
testified that persons other than the named co-conspirators participated in the crime.
Robinson identified all five men, and Sultan Pasha, the State’s other primary witness, was able
only to identify four of the five men.  
We do not agree, however, with the initial holding by the Court of Special Appeals, i.e.
that the rule of consistency applies to separate trials of co-conspirators.  Because the rule of
consistency is inapplicable to separate trials, the respondent’s conviction for conspiracy
(with the named co-conspirators) is legally valid.  As such, we do not need to consider, as the
Court of Special Appeals did, whether the respondent’s conviction could be based solely upon
the unknown, unnamed co-conspirator theory.  Nevertheless, the Court of Special Appeals’s
conclusion regarding unknown, unnamed co-conspirators fails to consider the differences in
the quantum of proof that may exist at a subsequent trial of a presently unknown co-
conspirator.  As we discuss, infra, for reasons completely unrelated to the guilt or innocence
of the defendant, the evidence admitted before a jury against one co-conspirator may differ
from the evidence admitted against another.
4
court held that “a conviction of a conspirator will stand even though the co-conspirator is
subsequently acquitted, but the prior acquittal of a co-conspirator mandates the acquittal of a
subsequently tried conspirator.” Id. at 679-80, 460 A.2d at 620 (emphasis of original omitted).
The Court of Special Appeals further held that there was insufficient evidence to support the
conviction of conspiracy based on the theory that unknown, unnamed persons may have
conspired with the respondent.4
The State petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted, to consider
whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that under the rule of consistency, the
prior acquittal in a separate trial of all named co-conspirators barred the respondent’s
5
conviction of conspiracy to commit murder.  See 365 Md. 65, 775 A.2d 1216 (2001).  We
hold that the rule of consistency is inapplicable to verdicts issued in separate trials.  Thus,
despite the acquittal of all of the respondent’s co-conspirators in a prior trial, the respondent’s
conviction for conspiracy is legally valid.
II.   Standard of Review 
We are asked to review the legality of a conviction, i.e., whether the respondent’s
conviction of conspiracy to commit murder is legally valid upon the prior acquittal of his co-
conspirators.  As with all questions of law, we review this matter de novo.  See Williams v.
State, 364 Md. 160, 169, 771 A.2d 1082, 1087 (2001); Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282,
753 A.2d 519, 525 (2000)(stating that “[i]ssues of law and mixed questions of law and fact are
reviewed de novo”]; Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999).
III.    Discussion
This Court consistently has defined conspiracy as the agreement between two or more
people to achieve some unlawful purpose or to employ unlawful means in achieving a lawful
purpose.  See McMillian v. State, 325 Md. 272, 290-91, 600 A.2d 430, 439 (1992)(quoting
Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 221, 582 A.2d 525, 528 (1990)); Apostoledes v. State, 323
Md. 456, 461-62, 593 A.2d 1117, 1120 (1991)(quoting Townes v. State, 314 Md. 71, 75, 548
A.2d 832, 834 (1988)); Mason v. State, 302 Md. 434, 444, 488 A.2d 955, 960 (1985).   We
have further explained that, 
The essence of a criminal conspiracy is an unlawful agreement.
The agreement need not be formal or spoken, provided there is a
meeting of the minds reflecting a unity of purpose and design.  In
6
Maryland, the crime is complete when the unlawful agreement is
reached, and no overt act in furtherance of the agreement need be
shown.
Townes, 314 Md. at 75, 548 A.2d at 834.  At the core of the crime of conspiracy is the
agreement; thus, conspiracy requires two or more participants.  See Mason, 302 Md. at 444,
488 A.2d at 960 (stating that “[t]he agreement is the crime, and the crime is complete without
any overt act”);  Gardner v. State, 286 Md. at 524, 408 A.2d at 1319 (noting that “conspiracy
necessarily requires the participation of at least two people”).  The legal tenet known as the
“rule of consistency” embodies the postulate that where the participation of only one person
is established, the crime of conspiracy cannot exist and a conviction thereunder is void.   See
Gardner, 286 Md. at 524, 408 A.2d 1319.   It is pursuant to this doctrine that the respondent
argues, and the Court of Special Appeals held, that a conspiracy conviction cannot stand when
separately tried co-conspirators were acquitted at a prior trial.  The resolution of this issue
requires our Court to define the scope of the rule of consistency and its proper application.
While this specific issue – whether a prior acquittal of co-conspirators bars the
conviction of a subsequently tried conspirator – has not been considered by this Court, a
similar dispute arose more than twenty years ago in Gardner v. State, supra.  The Gardner
Court considered whether one conspirator’s conviction may stand where the sole co-
conspirator is acquitted at a subsequent trial.  Id. at 521, 408 A.2d at 1318.   In holding that
the rule of consistency does not apply to separate trials of co-conspirators, see id. at 528, 408
A.2d at 1322, we explained that: 
The rule developed many years ago when the practice was to try
5
We note that, contrary to the law in our State, both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and
the California Supreme Court recently went a step further and stated that consistency in
verdicts resulting from joint trials was no longer required, so long as the verdicts were
7
all persons charged with the crime of conspiracy together. Under
such circumstances, common sense dictated that verdicts based
on the same evidence and circumstances should be consistent.
Accordingly the rule has developed primarily regarding joint
trials. 
Id. at 524, 408 A.2d at 1319-20 (emphasis added).  Contrary to inconsistent verdicts in joint
trials, inconsistent verdicts in separate trials may result from a variety of differences between
the trials in question: the strength of the evidence presented to the jurors, the manner in which
the evidence is presented, the availability of witnesses, the quality of the evidence,  the ability
to establish plausible defenses, and the composition of the jury, to name a few.  
O t h e r
courts, as we noted in Gardner, see 286 Md. at 526-28, 408 A.2d at 1321, similarly have held
the rule of consistency to be inapplicable to separate trials of co-conspirators.  The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, for example, stated that the rule of consistency loses much of its force
in the case of separate trials because “different verdicts may well . . . [be] due solely to the
different composition of the two juries, . . . [or] a variety of other circumstances, including a
difference in the proof offered at trial.” Commonwealth v. Byrd, 417 A.2d 173, 177 (Pa.
1980); see Commonwealth v. Phillips, 601 A.2d 816, 820 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1992) aff’d 633 A.2d
604 (Pa. 1993)(per curiam)(holding that “the prior acquittal of a sole co-conspirator in a
separate trial does not preclude finding the subsequently tried co-conspirator guilty of
conspiracy”).  California courts also have recognized that the rule of consistency is a logical
imperative only where all conspirators are tried together.5  See e.g. People v. Nunez, 228 Cal.
supported by the evidence.  See People v. Palmer, 15 P.3d 234, 235 (Cal. 2001);
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 651 A.2d 1096, 1099 (Pa. 1994).  Thus, if five co-conspirators
are tried together, it is a possible and legally valid outcome in these jurisdictions to have only
one of the co-conspirators convicted of conspiracy.
8
Rptr. 64, 65 (1986); People v. Holzer 102 Cal. Rptr. 11, 12 (1972).  
In fact, this postulate is well-accepted in most state jurisdictions, see e.g. Yedrysek v.
State, 739 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Ark. 1987); People v. Palmer, 15 P.3d 234, 239 (Cal. 2001);
Marquiz v. People, 726 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Colo. 1986); State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 733
(Fla. 1996); Smith v. State, 297 S.E.2d 273, 274 (Ga. 1982); Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 439
N.E.2d 754, 757 (Mass. 1982); People v. Anderson, 340 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Mich. 1983);
Platt v. State, 8 N.W.2d 849, 856 (Neb. 1943); State v. Hawkins, 428 A.2d 1322, 1323-24
(N.J. 1981)(applying the rule of consistency only to verdicts rendered at joint trials);  State
v. Valladares, 664 P.2d 508, 513 (Wash. 1983); and in most federal jurisdictions, see e.g.
United States v. Bucuvalas, 909 F.2d 593, 597 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Thomas, 900
F.2d 37, 40 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d 328, 332-33 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Sachs, 801 F.2d 839, 845 (6th Cir. 1986); Cortis v. Kenney, 995 F.2d
838, 840 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Valles-Valencia, 811 F.2d 1232, 1238-39  (9th Cir.
1987); United States v. Andrews, 850 F.2d 1557, 1561 (11th Cir.) (en banc) cert. denied, 488
U.S. 1032, 109 S. Ct. 842, 102 L. Ed. 2d 974 (1989); United States v. Dakins, 872 F.2d 1061
1065-66 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 966, 110 S. Ct. 410, 107 L. Ed. 2d 375
(1989).
Several of these jurisdictions, to some degree, have based their respective decisions
6
  In Standefer, the Supreme Court considered whether an alleged principal’s acquittal
barred the conviction of the accessory at a subsequent trial.  See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 11,
100 S. Ct. at 2002, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 692-93.  The crime for which the principal and accessory
were charged was accepting unlawful compensation in violation of 26 U. S. C. A. § 7214 (a)(2)
(West 1989) and 18 U. S. C. A. § 2 (West 2000). Refusing to apply the doctrine of non-mutual
collateral estoppel to a jury verdict in a criminal case, the Court held that the prior acquittal
was irrelevant to the prosecution of the accessory; thus, a person could be convicted as an
accessory even though the principal was acquitted in a prior proceeding.  See Standefer, 447
U.S. at 21-26, 100 S. Ct. at 2006-09, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 698-701.  
This Court’s stance on the prosecution of accessories and principals historically had
differed from federal law.  While we did, in Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 404 A.2d 1073
(1979), abolish our common law rule that a final conviction of the principal is necessary
before the accessory can be tried, see 285 Md. at 716, 404 A.2d at 1079 (stating that “the
trials of accessories before or after the fact will not be precluded because the principals have
not been sentenced or even have not been tried”), we had not completely abrogated the related
common law rule, that an accessory cannot be convicted of a higher crime than the principal.
See State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189, 201-02, 396 A.2d 1041, 1049 (1978).  Granted, we  limited
procedural aspects of the doctrine of accessoryship.  See Jones v. State, 302 Md. 153, 160-61
9
to forego applying the rule of consistency on two Supreme Court decisions, Standefer v.
United States, 447 U.S. 10, 100 S. Ct. 1999, 64 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1980) and United States v.
Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S. Ct. 471, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461 (1984), which have undermined the rule
of consistency.  Significantly, in both cases, the Supreme Court relied on the fact that
inconsistent jury verdicts are often a product of jury lenity to support its determination to
uphold facially inconsistent verdicts.  See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 22, 100 S. Ct. at 2007, 64
L. Ed. 2d at 699; Powell, 469 U.S. at 65, 105 S. Ct. at 477, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 469.  The Standefer
Court acknowledged that juries in criminal cases often “acquit out of compassion or
compromise or because of their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise,
but to which they were disposed through lenity.” Standefer, 447 U.S. at 22, 100 S. Ct. at 2007,
64 L. Ed. 2d at 699 (internal quotations and citations omitted).6 Similarly, the Powell Court
486 A.2d 184, 188 (1985)(holding that an accessory before the fact may be convicted of a
greater crime than the principal and stating that “[m]erely because the evidence in the
principal's trial may have been different, or the principal may have agreed to a favorable plea
bargain arrangement, or the jury in the principal's trial may have arrived at a compromise
verdict, is not a good reason for allowing the accessory to escape the consequences of having
committed a particular offense”).  We stated, however, that a complete abrogation of  the
common law doctrine of accessoryship would require action by the State Legislature.  See
State v. Sowell, 353 Md. 713, 726, 728 A.2d 712, 719 (1999).  The Legislature recently
abrogated the distinction between principals and accessories in Maryland Code (2001), §4-
204(b) of the Criminal Procedure Article. 
7
The Supreme Court in Powell, upon considering whether an acquittal on the predicate
felony (possession with intent to distribute cocaine) necessarily indicated that there was
insufficient evidence to support the telephone facilitation conviction and mandated acquittal
on that count as well, held that inconsistent verdicts with respect to a single defendant in a
criminal trial are not reviewable as a matter of course.  See Powell, 469 U.S. at 62-69, 105 S.
Ct. at 475-79, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 466-71.  
10
stated, “[t]he fact that the inconsistency may be the result of lenity, coupled with the
Government's inability to invoke review, suggests that inconsistent verdicts should not be
reviewable.” Powell, 469 U.S. at 66, 105 S. Ct. at 477, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 469.7  
While not ruling on the specific issue before us, the Supreme Court affirmatively
recognized that different trials commonly lead to different results.  We necessarily consent
to these consequences by our common acceptance of the jury system.  See Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 101, 94 S. Ct. 2887, 2899, 41 L. Ed. 2d 590, 611 (1974)(citing United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279, 64 S. Ct. 134, 135, 88 L. Ed. 48, 51 (1943)); Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492, n. 30, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1313 n.30, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498, 1511
n.30 (1957)(stating “that different juries may reach different results. . . is one of the
consequences we accept”); Ferrell v. State, 318 Md. 235, 254, 567 A.2d 937, 946-47, cert.
denied, 497 U.S. 1038, 110 S. Ct. 3301, 111 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1990)(quoting United States v.
11
Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329, 336-37 (2nd Cir. 1979)).
A symmetry of results, while ideal, is not necessary to ensure the attainment of justice.
Asymmetrical or inconsistent verdicts may be the result of the failure of the government to
produce evidence at trial satisfying the jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to some of
the named co-conspirators. See Gardner, 286 Md. at 527-28, 408 A.2d at 1321 (noting that
the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Platt v. State, 8 N.W.2d 849, 855 (Neb. 1943), provided
the “most persuasive reasons for not applying the rule [of consistency] to separate trials,”
namely that “[t]he acquittal of the second conspirator could well result from the death or
absence of an important state witness, the incompetency of a confession of the convicted
conspirator in the second trial, the incompetency of a plea of guilty entered by the convicted
conspirator at his trial, or for any other reason that would amount to a failure of
proof”)(emphasis added)).  Whether the evidence itself differs from one trial to another or
whether two juries reasonably might have taken different views of the same evidence,  an
acquittal is not tantamount to a determination of innocence.  See United States v
Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d at 332; People v Berkowitz, 406 N.E.2d 783, 790 (N.Y. 1980). 
We digress, momentarily, to mention that the respondent raises a second argument in
his brief before this Court, namely that the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel prevents
the State from prosecuting the respondent for conspiracy because the State failed to prove that
a conspiracy existed at the prior trial.  That argument, however, has not been raised previously,
and thus, according to Maryland Rule 8-131(a), is not properly preserved for appellate review.
Regardless, we have stated that the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel is inappropriate
12
in criminal cases, primarily because of the nonmutuality of the parties in the two cases.  See
Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323, 329-330, 449 A.2d 1153, 1156-57 (1982)(holding that the
disposition of State's case against one defendant will not collaterally estop relitigation of a
common factual issue in a subsequent prosecution of a different defendant because of the
nonmutuality of the parties in the two cases).  The State would otherwise be deprived of its
opportunity to litigate whether a specific defendant violated the laws in question, thus
undermining the government’s important interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws.  See
Gillis v. State, 333 Md. 69, 79, 81 n.5, 633 A.2d 888, 893, 894 n.5 (1993) cert. denied, 511
U.S. 1039, 114 S. Ct. 1558, 128 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1994)(citing Standefer v. United States, 447
U.S. at 25, 100 S. Ct. at 2007, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 701; Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. at 329-30, 449
A.2d at 1156-57). See also, Welsh v. Gerber Products, Inc., 315 Md. 510, 518, 555 A.2d 486,
490 (1989)(referring to the Supreme Court’s Standefer decision and noting that the doctrine
of non-mutual collateral estoppel cannot be applied in criminal cases); People v. Berkowitz,
406 N.E.2d at 789-90 (holding that a conspiracy defendant whose sole alleged co-conspirator
had been previously acquitted of the conspiracy charge could not utilize the doctrine of
collateral estoppel as a bar to his own prosecution because that there will often be significant
disparities in the proof available against each of two separately tried defendants and a verdict
of acquittal is not necessarily a determination of innocence). 
For the foregoing reasons, and consistent with our previous decision in Gardner, we
hold that the rule of consistency is inapplicable to verdicts issued in separate trials; thus,
despite the acquittal of all of the respondent’s co-conspirators in a prior trial, the respondent’s
13
conviction for conspiracy must stand.  The Court of Special Appeals erred in reversing the
respondent’s conviction, and the decision on which it relies, Rosenberg v. State, 54 Md. App.
673, 460 A.2d 617 (1983), is incorrect with respect to its discussion of the rule of
consistency.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY.  COSTS IN
THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE
RESPONDENT.