Title: Girot v. Keith

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 96963-Agenda 14-May 2004.
RICHARD GIROT, Appellant, v. KENNETH KEITH, Objector
(Municipal Officers Electoral Board of the City of Braidwood et al., 							Appellees).
Opinion filed October 21, 2004. 
	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	The issues in this case are whether due process was violated
when the petitioner-appellant, Richard Girot, was denied the right to
be listed as a candidate for mayor on the ballot in the February 25,
2003, primary election in the City of Braidwood (Braidwood) and, if
so, whether such violation can be considered harmless error.
Following Girot's filing of his statement of candidacy and nominating
petitions for mayor of Braidwood, Kenneth Keith filed several
objections alleging Girot's failure to comply with certain requirements
of Illinois' Election Code (Code) (10 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West
2002)). The Municipal Officers Electoral Board of the City of
Braidwood (Electoral Board or Board) scheduled a hearing on these
objections. Girot moved to have the city clerk, Sue Grygiel, replaced
on the Board due to her alleged bias, but this motion was denied.
Following the hearing, the Board sustained Keith's objections and
held that Girot's name would not be placed on the ballot. Girot sought
judicial review, and the circuit court of Will County affirmed the
Electoral Board's decision. Girot appealed and the appellate court
found that Girot's due process rights had been violated, but affirmed
the circuit court, finding the error to be harmless. 341 Ill. App. 3d
902. We granted Girot's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a). Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 345 (155 Ill. 2d R. 345), we
have permitted the Independent Voters of Illinois, et al., to file an 
amicus curiae brief in support of Girot.
	Our examination of the record in the case at bar shows that on
December 9, 2002, Girot filed, inter alia, a statement of candidacy
and petitions with city clerk Grygiel, seeking Girot's placement on the
ballot for a mayoral election in Braidwood. Two weeks after Girot
submitted his documents, Keith filed objections asserting that, inter
alia, Girot failed to properly bind his petition sheets and statement of
candidacy, in violation of sections 7-10 and 10-4 of the Code (10
ILCS 5/7-10, 10-4 (West 2002)). As city clerk of Braidwood,
Grygiel normally sat on the Board to hear and decide objections to
election petitions. See 10 ILCS 5/10-9(3) (West 2002). However,
when it became apparent that Grygiel was to participate in the hearing
on Keith's objections as both a witness and a member of the Board,
Girot moved for Grygiel to be replaced.
	At the hearing on Girot's motion, he asked to have a member of
the Electoral Board notify the chief judge of the circuit court to
appoint Grygiel's replacement. See 10 ILCS 5/10-9(6)(d) (West
2002). Girot argued that because Grygiel, as city clerk, had personally
received his petitions and would be testifying regarding whether they
had been bound, Grygiel's position on the Electoral Board would
violate Girot's fourteenth amendment right to due process. The
Board, after discussing the matter in executive session, voted to deny
Girot's motion for substitution.
	At the hearing on Keith's objections, the following testimony,
inter alia, was adduced. Grygiel testified on behalf of the objector that
she had personally received Girot's nominating papers. She further
stated that when she received those documents, they were loose and
not stapled, bound, or clipped in any way. Grygiel testified that she
put Girot's documents in a paper clip. Following the denial of his
motion for a directed verdict, Girot testified that his nominating
documents were paper-clipped together when he filed them with
Grygiel. He further testified that Grygiel separated them and looked
through them, "which it appeared to me at that time that she stapled
them." On cross-examination, Girot admitted that while it seemed that
Grygiel had stapled his papers, there were no staple marks on the
documents, which he believed could mean that Grygiel "stapled
something else." Girot then called Grygiel, who testified that when she
accepted his documents, she put them in a paper clip. She did not
believe that they were paper-clipped when Girot gave them to her.
However, on redirect, Grygiel admitted that she "would honestly say
I'm not a [sic] hundred percent [certain]" that the papers were not
clipped together when she received them.
	Following closing arguments, the Board, including Grygiel, went
into executive session to deliberate. When the hearing was again
called to order, Electoral Board Chairperson Heberer moved to grant
the objector's petition that the name of Richard Girot be struck from
the ballot for the election. The motion was granted by a vote of 2 to
1, with Grygiel being the deciding vote. The Board noted that it found
Grygiel's testimony credible, but also stated that it would find that,
even if Girot had paper-clipped the nominating petitions together, he
had not complied with the Code. The Board also held that Keith's
other objections were substantiated by failures in Girot's documents,
which independently supported its decision.
	Initially, we note that, under the Code, as well as under notions
of procedural due process, it was clearly error for the Electoral Board
to deny Girot's motion to substitute Grygiel. The Board's written
decision states that it "denies Girot's Motion for Substitution seeking
the removal of City Clerk, Sue Grygiel, from the Board. There is no
statutory provision authorizing Ms. Grygiel's removal. Moreover,
judicial review, if pursued, will ensure that Girot received a fair
hearing before the Board. See [In re] Objection of Cook [to
Referendum Petition of Pierce], 122 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 462 N.E.2d 557, 560 (1984)." However, in Kaemmerer v. St. Clair County
Electoral Board, 333 Ill. App. 3d 956, 959 (2002), the Fifth District
of the Appellate Court held, contrary to its prior holding in In re
Objection of Cook: "The Code provides a means to substitute a
statutorily designated person to replace an 'interested' board member.
*** [S]ection 10-9(6) establishes a process for the substitution of a
member of the Electoral Board in the event of a conflict."
Kaemmerer, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 959-60.
	Indeed, subsection (d) of section10-9(6) states, inter alia: "Any
vacancies on an electoral board not otherwise filled pursuant to this
Section shall be filled by public members appointed by the Chief Judge
of the Circuit Court for the county wherein the electoral board hearing
is being held upon notification to the Chief Judge of such vacancies."
10 ILCS 5/10-9(6)(d) (West 2002). Thus, contrary to the Board's
decision, we agree with Kaemmerer, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 960, that
section 10-9(6) of the Code covers the instant situation, allowing for
a substitution of a board member "in the event of a conflict." See also
Anderson v. McHenry Township, 289 Ill. App. 3d 830, 833-34 (1997)
(appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and
remanded for a new hearing de novo before an electoral board
composed of impartial replacements appointed by the chief judge of
the circuit court pursuant to section 10-9(6) of the Code).
	The Board also erred in denying Girot's motion to substitute
based on its finding that judicial review would "ensure that Girot
received a fair hearing before the Board." (Emphasis added.) This
reasoning, apparently originating in In re Objection of Cook, has since
been used by several Illinois courts to reject claims of procedural due
process violations where an objector or candidate argued he could not
receive a fair hearing before an electoral board. See Ryan v. Landek,
159 Ill. App. 3d 10, 13 (1987) (judicial review in the circuit court
under section 10-10.1 of the Code, inter alia, precludes finding an
implied right to substitute board members " 'whenever an objector
feels a conflict is present' "), quoting In re Objection of Cook, 122 Ill.
App. 3d at 1072); see also Ayers v. Martin, 223 Ill. App. 3d 397, 399
(1991) (statutory protections, together with the remedy of judicial
review, adequately ensure a fair hearing).
	In the instant case, however, the circuit court, on judicial review,
affirmed the Electoral Board's ruling, holding that its decision "on the
issue of binding" was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
While it is true that judicial review of electoral board questions of fact
will be disturbed only if they are against the manifest weight of the
evidence, the review of a question of law is independent and not
deferential. See Reyes v. Bloomingdale Township Electoral Board,
265 Ill. App. 3d 69, 72 (1994). As this court recently stated:
		"An administrative agency's findings of fact are not reversed
unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence,
and questions of law are reviewed de novo. [Citation.] We
review the issue of whether [plaintiff's] procedural due
process rights were violated under the de novo standard
because it is a legal question. [Citation.]" Lyon v.
Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264,
271 (2004).
Therefore, here, where the preliminary question raised on judicial
review was one of law, the circuit court's error in using a standard of
review other than de novo once again deprived Girot of a fair hearing.
See Comito v. Police Board of the City of Chicago, 317 Ill. App. 3d
677, 686 (2000) (on judicial review, the manifest weight of the
evidence standard is not controlling where the board is prejudiced or
biased against the claimant and incapable of giving him a fair hearing);
County of Lake v. Pollution Control Board, 120 Ill. App. 3d 89, 98
(1983) (where Pollution Control Board, on administrative review of
county board's decision, incorrectly applied the wrong standard of
review, its finding was invalid).
	On appeal, the appellate court did not address this standard of
review error by the circuit court, but agreed with Girot that his due
process rights were adversely affected by Grygiel's simultaneous
status as witness and fact finder. The appellate court relied on the
"well-settled principle of law that due process requires that a party
appearing before an administrative tribunal be judged by an unbiased
decisionmaker. [Citation.]" 341 Ill. App. 3d at 903. As the appellate
court further stated:
		"[Girot] was placed in the unenviable position of presenting
testimony contradictory to that of a witness who would then
retire with the other two Board members to determine the
credibility of the witnesses. Suggesting that Grygiel was
unbiased, when she was required to weigh her own credibility
against another witness's, stretches our credulity." 341 Ill.
App. 3d at 903-04.
We concur with this reasoning, where it is indeed a well-settled
principle of law that concepts of due process apply to administrative
hearings, and the parties are guaranteed the right to a fair and
impartial tribunal. See Anderson, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 832; Sindermann
v. Civil Service Comm'n, 275 Ill. App. 3d 917, 923 (1995); see also
Collura v. Board of Police Commissioners, 113 Ill. 2d 361, 369
(1986).
	However, the appellate court went on to hold that while the
Electoral Board erred in failing to grant Girot's motion for
substitution: "Because Girot claims that Grygiel's dual role at the
hearing violated [Girot's] fourteenth amendment due process rights,
we further assess the error under the harmless error standard. See
People v. Jefferson, 227 Ill. App. 3d 491, 496 (1992). If the error did
not affect the outcome of the hearing, then it is not reversible error.
See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967)." 341 Ill. App. 3d at 904. It is here that we must part
company with the appellate court's opinion.
	Contrary to the appellate court, we believe that a due process
violation of this nature can never be found harmless. We find the Third
District's reasoning in Huff v. Rock Island County Sheriff's Merit
Comm'n, 294 Ill. App. 3d 477 (1998), to be particularly cogent:
		"A fundamental principle of due process, applicable to
administrative agencies and commissions, is that no person
who has a personal interest in the subject matter of a suit may
sit in judgment on that case. In re Heirich, 10 Ill. 2d 357, 140 N.E.2d 825 (1956). A personal interest or bias can be
pecuniary or any other interest that may have an effect on
the impartiality of the decisionmaker. City of Naperville v.
Wehrle, 340 Ill. 579, 173 N.E. 165 (1930). To prove bias,
the plaintiff must overcome a presumption of honesty by
showing in the record that the administrative proceedings
were either tainted by dishonesty or contained an
unacceptable risk of bias. Caliendo v. Martin, 250 Ill. App.
3d 409, 620 N.E.2d 1318 (1993)." (Emphasis added.) Huff,
294 Ill. App. 3d at 481.
	In this case, Girot has shown, via the record, that he was biased
by the due process violation of an electoral board determination in
which one of the decisionmakers ultimately adjudicated contested
issues of fact regarding her own credibility. We find that such a
process flagrantly violates due process notions of fairness and
impartiality. Put simply, there is an inevitable bias when a fact finder
is evaluating her own credibility. As the United States Supreme Court
stated in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 99 L. Ed. 942, 946, 75 S. Ct. 623, 625 (1955): "[O]ur system of law has always endeavored
to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no man can
be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where
he has an interest in the outcome."
	Further, we find this case distinguishable from those cases where
an administrative decisionmaker is merely familiar with the facts of a
matter. See Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville
Education Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 493, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1, 9, 96 S. Ct. 2308, 2314 (1976) (mere familiarity with the facts of a case gained by
an agency in the performance of its statutory role does not disqualify
a decisionmaker). Here, Grygiel cast the deciding vote to strike
Girot's name from the ballot, and the Electoral Board adopted
findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding her own credibility.
Thus, where a fair hearing before an administrative agency must
include, inter alia, impartial rulings on the evidence (Abrahamson v.
Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 95
(1992)), and Girot has shown that he was prejudiced because the
proceeding "contained an unacceptable risk of bias" (Huff, 294 Ill.
App. 3d at 481), we find the appellate court erred in holding this due
process violation to be harmless.
	Contrary to the appellate court's belief, Jefferson and Chapman
do not require a harmless error analysis to be applied in every case
where a fourteenth amendment right to due process is violated.
Jefferson, 227 Ill. App. 3d at 496, merely states that when a certain
type of federal due process violation has occurred, e.g., the giving of
an improper instruction, the reviewing court must assess the error
under the harmless error standard enunciated in Chapman. Indeed,
Chapman does hold: "[T]here may be some constitutional errors
which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and
insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution,
be deemed harmless ***." (Emphasis added.) Chapman, 386 U.S.  at
22, 17 L. Ed. 2d  at 709, 87 S. Ct.  at 827. However, Chapman
endorses a procedure which "emphasizes an intention not to treat as
harmless those constitutional errors that 'affect substantial rights' of
a party." Chapman, 386 U.S.  at 23, 17 L. Ed. 2d  at 710, 87 S. Ct.  at
828. Finally, Chapman makes clear "that there are some constitutional
rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated
as harmless error," and cites, as an example, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 71 L. Ed. 749, 47 S. Ct. 437 (1927), which involved the lack of
impartiality of a judge. Chapman, 386 U.S.  at 23 & n.8, 17 L. Ed. 2d 
at 710 & n.8, 87 S. Ct.  at 827-28 & n.8; see also Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302, 331, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991) (the bias of the judge is a "structural defect[ ] in
the constitution of the trial mechanism, which def[ies] analysis by
'harmless-error' standards").   
	As a final matter, Keith and the Board argue that because
Braidwood's February 25, 2003, primary and April 1, 2003, mayoral
election have come and gone, this court should declare Girot's appeal
to be moot. However, the questions that we have addressed here
clearly fall within the public interest exception to the mootness
doctrine. The criteria for the application of the public interest
exception are: (1) the public nature of the question; (2) the desirability
of an authoritative determination for the purpose of guiding public
officers; and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur. Bonaguro
v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 395 (1994). It is
true that Braidwood's mayoral election is long since over and Girot,
as appellant, can receive no actual relief, i.e., a timely hearing before
an unbiased decisionmaker. Nevertheless, we feel that each of the
criteria for the application of the exception has been met, and that it
is of substantial public interest to establish that a clear due process
violation, not susceptible to harmless-error analysis, occurs where a
member of an election board acts as both a witness and an adjudicator.
	Given this holding, we need not address whether Girot's filings
contained Code violations, including whether a paper clip constitutes
"fastening [the documents] together at one edge in a secure and
suitable manner," under sections 7-10 and 10-4. A determination of
the legitimacy of Keith's objections would serve no purpose under the
circumstances presented here. As the United States Supreme Court
stated so concisely some 77 years ago: "No matter what the evidence
was against [defendant], he had the right to have an impartial judge."
Tumey, 273 U.S.  at 535, 71 L. Ed.  at 759, 47 S. Ct.  at 445. Thus, in
sum, because Girot seasonably raised an objection to Grygiel's
participation on the Electoral Board, he was entitled to halt the
hearing and request that the chief judge appoint a substitute for
Grygiel, where she presented an "unacceptable risk of bias." Huff, 294
Ill. App. 3d at 481; see also Tumey, 273 U.S.  at 535, 71 L. Ed.  at 759,
47 S. Ct.  at 445; 10 ILCS 5/10-9(6)(d) (West 2002). As this
procedure was not followed, a due process violation occurred which
requires reversal of the Electoral Board's decision.
	Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the
circuit and appellate courts affirming the Board's decision are
reversed.
Reversed.
	 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:
	The majority asserts that a violation of the due process right to
a hearing before an unbiased decisionmaker can never be deemed
harmless error. Slip op. at 5. I disagree because the majority should
not have addressed the constitutional issue and, further, because the
majority's pronouncements on the questions addressed are, in my
view, erroneous. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
	First, it is a well-established rule that this court will not address
a constitutional issue when the case can be decided on other grounds.
Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 396
(1994). This appeal clearly could have been, and should have been,
decided on other grounds. Furthermore, the majority asserts, without
analysis, that each of the criteria for application of the public interest
exception to the mootness doctrine has been met. Slip op. at 7-8. I see
nothing in the record to justify the conclusion that any of the criteria
have been met. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal as moot.
	Second, the issue in this case concerns whether Girot failed to
comply, as a matter of law, with the secure-binding requirement of the
Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-4 (West 2002)). Where, as here, the
issue is a question of law concerning only compliance with the
Election Code, due process is satisfied. See, e.g., Ayers v. Martin, 223
Ill. App. 3d 397, 400 (1991) (holding that where "the issues are
basically questions of law and the trial court has reviewed them de
novo, due process is provided"). Consequently, even if this case meets
the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, the majority
should uphold the Electoral Board's decision on the basis that Gerot
failed to comply with the Election Code.
	Third, the alleged bias in this case did not violate Girot's due
process rights. The alleged bias of Grygiel is that, in her capacity as a
fact finder, she was required to assess the credibility of Girot, who
testified contrary to her own testimony. According to the majority,
because Grygiel testified regarding the filing of the nominating
petitions in question, she was required to assess her own credibility
and Girot's credibility. If the case turned on the credibility of
witnesses, a risk of bias could be present that may violate Girot's due
process rights. This case, however, was not decided adversely to Girot
because of conflicting testimony. Instead, the Electoral Board's
decision was based on its determination that Girot failed to comply,
as a matter of law, with the secure-binding requirement of the Election
Code.
	In its recitation of the facts, the majority notes that Girot
admitted that the nominating petitions were secured only by a paper
clip when he tendered them to Grygiel. He further conceded, on cross-examination, that no staple marks appeared on the documents and that
Grygiel could have stapled something else. Grygiel denied stapling the
documents, but admitted that she was not certain whether they were
attached by a paper clip when delivered to her, or whether she affixed
the paper clip. Thus, there was no material difference in the testimony
of the witnesses on this dispositive point. Both agreed that the
documents were attached by paper clip and not stapled or otherwise
secured in a suitable manner.
	Accordingly, the Electoral Board was not required to assess
witness credibility in determining that attaching documents by paper
clip was not compliant with the Election Code requirement that the
documents be fastened together in a secure and suitable manner. The
Electoral Board expressly found that "affixing the petition sheets and
Statement of Candidacy by a paper clip does not comply with the
mandate of being 'bound' as required by Section 10-4." Therefore, I
would hold that Grygiel's dual capacity as witness and fact finder did
not affect the outcome of the hearing and, under these circumstances,
did not violate Girot's due process rights. Even if due process was
implicated, I would hold that any violation in this case was "so
unimportant and insignificant that [it] may, consistent with the Federal
Constitution, be deemed harmless." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 709, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827 (1967).
	Moreover, the majority's reliance on Huff v. Rock Island County
Sheriff's Merit Comm'n, 294 Ill. App. 3d 477 (1998), is misplaced.
That case correctly held that, "[t]o prove bias, the plaintiff must
overcome a presumption of honesty by showing in the record that the
administrative proceedings were either tainted by dishonesty or
contained an unacceptable risk of bias." Huff, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 481.
The Huff court determined, however, that no taint or risk was
demonstrated, despite the fact that one of the commissioners had
served as the sheriff's political campaign chairman and that another
commissioner may have made a disparaging remark about the plaintiff
at an earlier disciplinary hearing.
	In the case before us, the only possible risk of bias demonstrated
by the record is a credibility assessment by Grygiel. The majority
asserts that she adjudicated contested issues of fact regarding her own
credibility. Slip op. at 6. As noted earlier, there was no contested issue
of fact regarding the means used to secure the petitions. The Electoral
Board was simply not required to assess credibility in determining
whether using a paper clip satisfied Election Code requirements.
	Furthermore, "[n]ot all allegations of bias *** rise to the level of
a due process violation" (Ryan v. Landek, 159 Ill. App. 3d 10, 12
(1987)) and simply being a witness to this transaction as a result of a
statutory duty is insufficient to establish bias. I am aware of no
authority requiring a disqualification of an electoral board member
whenever a party alleges bias. In fact, " '[t]he case law, both federal
and state, generally rejects the idea that the combination [of] judging
[and] investigating functions is a denial of due process ... .' " Withrow
v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 52, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712, 726, 95 S. Ct. 1456,
1467 (1975), quoting 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
§13.02, at 175 (1958). Therefore, I am persuaded that, under the
specific facts of this case, the error was harmless.
	Additionally, the majority holds that under the Election Code, as
well as due process considerations, it was error for the Electoral
Board to deny Girot's motion to substitute Grygiel, because section
10-9(6) of the Election Code allows the substitution of an Electoral
Board member in the event of a conflict. Slip op. at 3. This conclusion
is based on the majority's reliance on the holding in Kaemmerer v. St.
Clair County Electoral Board, 333 Ill. App. 3d 956 (2002).
Kaemmerer is clearly distinguishable on its facts.
		Kaemmerer involved the Election Code's provision for
substitution of an Electoral Board member. Section 10-9(6) of the
Election Code provides a method of filling a vacancy on the Electoral
Board created by a single specific circumstance-a board member
being a candidate for the office that is the subject of the objector's
challenge. The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
			"In the event that any member of the appropriate board is
a candidate for the office with relation to which the
objector's petition is filed, he shall not be eligible to serve on
that board ***." 10 ILCS 5/10-9(6) (West 2002).
	In Kaemmerer, an objector filed challenges to a Republican slate
of candidates, including the candidates for county clerk and county
treasurer. The first challenge to be heard was that of the objector to
the petitions of the candidate for county clerk. The Republican
candidate for that office objected to the Democratic county clerk, who
was a candidate for reelection, serving as a member of the Electoral
Board. The incumbent recused himself, and the incumbent Democratic
county treasurer was substituted. The Republican candidate again
objected, noting that the basis of the challenge to the county
treasurer's opponent's candidacy was the same as the challenge to the
county clerk's opponent's candidacy, and the treasurer would, in
effect, be deciding the issues raised in the challenge to his opponent.
The objection was denied, the hearing proceeded, and the challenge
was unsuccessful. The circuit court affirmed and the appellate court
reversed. The appellate court applied section 10-9(6) of the Election
Code, holding that "each member of the Electoral Board whose
opponent was being challenged should have recused himself," noting
that the conflict the statute was intended to resolve remained, despite
literal compliance, in the first instance, with the statutory language.
Kaemmerer, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 960.
	In the case at bar, the conflict created by Grygiel's dual capacity
is neither directly nor indirectly addressed by section 10-9(6), because
the express language of that statute only applies to vacancies caused
by an office holder's disqualification in cases when the election
opponent's petitions are the object of a challenge. The statute was
clearly not designed to resolve conflicts of the kind presented in this
case. The majority's application of the statute is a forced
interpretation, not justified by the clear, unambiguous language of
section 10-9(6). As we have often explained, legislative intent is
determined primarily from the language used in the statute, and courts
should not depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into
it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with express
legislative intent. Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 56
(1998); Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 389 (1996). I
believe the majority's application of section 10-9(6) violates this
principle, by enlarging its scope beyond the specific conflict addressed
by the legislature, and is thus erroneous. Therefore, I respectfully,
dissent.