Title: In re Allen

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 91-260


 In re Jacqueline C. Allen                    Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
                                              Employment Security Board

                                              April Term, 1992


 Lawrence Leland and Mary Anne Gucciardi, board members

 Jean Anne Kiewel of Hertz and Wesley, Brattleboro, for plaintiff-appellant

 J. Eric Anderson of Cantini, Anderson & Oakman, Manchester Center, for
   defendant-appellee Vermont Academy

 Brooke Pearson, Montpelier, for defendant-appellee Department of Employment
   & Training



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.),
           Specially Assigned



      MORSE, J.   The Employment Security Board denied plaintiff unemployment
 benefits because, before quitting her job, she did not give notice to her
 employer's business manager or someone in similar authority that she was
 being sexually harassed by her supervisor.  Plaintiff appealed.  We reverse
 and remand.
      Plaintiff worked at Vermont Academy as a secretary for the housekeeping
 and maintenance departments.  From December 1989 to April 1990, plaintiff
 alleged, and the Board expressly found, that one of plaintiff's two super-
 visors, the head of maintenance, made sexual advances toward her on at least
 three occasions.  The first incident occurred in December 1989, when the
 supervisor grabbed plaintiff and kissed her.  Plaintiff informed no one of
 the incident.  Several days later the supervisor apologized and stated that
 it would not happen again.  In January 1990, the supervisor asked plaintiff
 for a New Year's kiss, and plaintiff objected.  He later apologized and made
 another promise to stop the conduct.  In April 1990, however, the supervisor
 for a third time insisted that she kiss him.  Plaintiff refused, pushed the
 supervisor away, and left.  Finally, in August 1990, the supervisor
 requested that plaintiff accompany him to the gym basement to take
 inventory.   Although plaintiff agreed to perform the task, she refused to
 do so in the isolated basement.  No incidents occurred during the
 inventory; however, plaintiff, claiming she feared further unwanted sexual
 advances, shortly thereafter quit her job.
      Several days later plaintiff wrote a letter to the supervisor in which
 she demanded that the harassment stop and stated that she wanted to return
 to work.  He allowed her to return, but within a short period of time the
 supervisor became "very friendly" again, although no unwanted sexual contact
 or comments occurred.  Plaintiff, believing that the harassment would
 recommence, quit for good in October 1990.
      Except for one occasion, plaintiff never personally complained, by
 formal grievance or otherwise, to anyone other than the offending super-
 visor.  The Board found that plaintiff, after returning to work in September
 1990, informed the head of housekeeping that the head of maintenance had
 attempted to kiss her, to which she objected.  Vermont Academy's business
 manager, the offending supervisor's superior, had not been told by anyone of
 the offending behavior toward plaintiff.
      The Academy did not submit in evidence a personnel policy or grievance
 procedure at the hearing.  Instead, it presented the testimony of the head
 of housekeeping at the Academy.  She stated that she had been aware of a
 posted personnel policy but she was unsure whether it outlined a grievance
 procedure in general or one specifically addressing complaints of sexual
 harassment.  She believed that if a problem arose, the necessary procedure
 would be to file a complaint with the immediate supervisor.  Plaintiff also
 testified that she had never received a copy of the policy, nor did she know
 that a policy existed.
      The Board concluded that plaintiff had not met her burden in showing
 that she had good cause to quit which was attributable to her employer.
 Critical to its determination was the finding that the business manager had
 no knowledge of the harassment.  Because the business manager, and therefore
 Vermont Academy as the employing unit, was without notice or opportunity to
 remedy the problem, the Board denied plaintiff benefits.
      As the trier of fact, the Board's factual findings and conclusions will
 not be disturbed by this Court if they are supported by credible evidence.
 Favreau v. Department of Employment and Training, 156 Vt. 572, 577, 594 A.2d 440, 443 (1991).  If the findings of fact do not support the Board's
 determination under the applicable law, that judgment will not be upheld on
 review.  In this case, the Board's findings of fact do not support its
 determination that the plaintiff's reason for quitting was not "attri-
 butable to" the employer.  We conclude that actual notice to a person
 superior to the offending supervisor was not required.
      A person is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if she
 voluntarily terminates employment "without good cause attributable to [the]
 employing unit."  21 V.S.A. {1344(a)(2)(A).  This two-pronged standard
 requires a showing of a sufficient reason to justify the quit, Stryszko v.
 Department of Employment and Training, 144 Vt. 198, 199, 475 A.2d 230,