Title: BELDEN v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BELDEN v. STATE2003 WY 8973 P.3d 1041Case Number: 01-57Decided: 07/31/2003
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

                                                                                                            

GARY 
LEE BELDEN,

Appellant(Defendant) ,

 
 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff) .

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Lincoln County

The Honorable John D. Troughton, Judge 
(Retired)

 
 
     

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, Public Defender, and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument presented by Ms. Domonkos.

 
    

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, 
Prosecution Assistance Program; and Charles L. Peters and Kerry Gaines, Student 
Interns.  Argument presented by Ms. Gaines.

 
    

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

*Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

 

HILL, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which VOIGT, J., joins; VOIGT, 
J., also filed a dissenting opinion.

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Gary Lee Belden 
(Belden) appeals convictions for first-degree sexual assault in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(i) and first-degree murder in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a).  Belden asserts multiple errors in his trial 
including claims of judicial and prosecutorial misconduct, admission of 
prejudicial uncharged misconduct evidence, exclusion from an in camera hearing that was a critical stage of the 
trial proceedings, and a violation of the Wyoming Constitution through the 
appointment of an Assistant United States Attorney as a special prosecutor.  We find no 
prejudicial error and affirm the convictions.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Belden presents five 
issues for review:

 

                        
Issue I

Whether the trial court committed judicial misconduct when 
he repeatedly interfered with the proceedings and usurped the roles of both 
trial counsel and the jury?

                        
Issue II

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 
admitted evidence of two incidents of sexual assault allegedly committed by 
Belden?

                        
Issue III

Whether the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct 
when he solicited opinion testimony of Belden's guilt, argued propensity on 
prior bad acts, misstated the facts and shifted the burden of proof in closing 
argument and asked the jury to convict for reasons other than the evidence?

                        
Issue IV

Whether Belden was deprived of his right to be present at a 
critical stage of the proceedings by not being present during a hearing 
concerning prosecutorial misconduct?

                        
Issue V

Whether the district court violated the Wyoming 
Constitution by allowing an Assistant United States Attorney to function as 
special prosecutor?

 

The State's statement of the issues parallels Belden's but 
with slightly different language:

 

I.                     
Did the district court commit judicial misconduct by 
repeatedly and unnecessarily interfering with the proceedings, and usurp the 
role of trial counsel and the jury?

II.                   
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it 
admitted evidence of two prior charges of sexual assault against [Belden]?

III.                  
Did the prosecutor commit prosecutorial misconduct when a 
witness gave unsolicited opinion testimony on [Belden's] guilt; or did the 
prosecutor in closing improperly argue propensity from [Belden's] prior acts of 
misconduct, misstate the facts, ask the jury to convict for reasons other than 
the evidence, or improperly shift the burden of proof to [Belden]?

IV.               
Did [Belden] have a constitutional right to be present at 
the hearing in camera on the objection to the State's closing argument, and does 
the record show that [Belden's] absence was other than knowing and 
voluntary?

V.                 
Did the district court violate the Wyoming Constitution by 
allowing an Assistant United States Attorney to act as special 
prosecutor?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      In August of 1985, 
Belden was employed as a baker at the ARA facility at the Shute Creek Exxon 
Plant near Diamondville, Wyoming.  On August 29, 1985, Belden, using the 
pseudonym Richard Price, was scheduled to begin his shift at 9:30 p.m.  Instead of punching 
in for work, however, Belden quit his job without notice.  Various co-workers 
described Belden's appearance as "suspicious," "impatient and nervous," "real 
anxious," "real jittery," and "nasty, aggravated, upset."  One co-worker noted 
Belden's nervousness as well as scratches on his chest, neck, and face.  Belden proceeded to 
dispose of several personal items before leaving the facility in a co-worker's 
truck, which he did not have permission to use.  Belden also left various items behind that he 
never attempted to recover, including a motorcycle and his final 
paycheck.

 

[¶4]      Belden's co-worker in 
the bakery, Terrie Smith, returned to the mobile home she shared with her 
friend, Nancy Lane, after completing her shift early the next morning on August 
30, 1985.  
Smith discovered the naked, battered body of Nancy Lane on the living 
room floor of the trailer.  Lane had been brutally beaten and then 
strangled to death.  
Her body bore injuries indicating that she had been the victim of a 
sexual assault prior to death.  Investigators were able to collect a semen 
sample along with scrapings from under Lane's fingernails and a hair found on 
her body.1

 

[¶5]      Belden was not 
located until December of 1987 when he was arrested in Utah.  Investigators went 
to Utah to question him.  Belden claimed he had permission to use the 
truck that he had taken on the night of August 29, 1985.  He also stated that 
he knew the victim through her roommate, who was also his co-worker at the 
bakery.  Belden 
voluntarily provided the investigators with blood and hair samples.  DNA analysis 
revealed that Belden was the source of the semen found in the victim's 
body.  DNA 
tests of the fingernail scrapings were generally inconclusive but tended to 
exclude Belden as the source.2

 

[¶6]      For reasons that 
remain unclear in the record, the investigation into the victim's death remained 
dormant until sometime in 1998.  The re-opened investigation ultimately led to 
charges of sexual assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(i)3 and first-degree murder in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a)4 against Belden.  A jury trial was held from October 9, through 
October 17, 2000.  
Belden's defense was that he had consensual intercourse with the victim 
on the night of August 29 but that she was alive when he left her trailer.  Belden suggested 
that either the victim's ex-boyfriend or her roommate's estranged husband might 
have been involved in her death.  Nevertheless, the jury returned a guilty 
verdict on both charges.  Additional facts will be set out in our 
discussion below, as necessary.

 

DISCUSSION

 

A.     Standard of Review

 

[¶7]      We have never 
explicitly established a standard for the appellate review of claims alleging 
judicial misconduct during a jury trial.  Belden urges us to utilize the standard 
enunciated by the Supreme Court of Kansas:

 

Allegations of judicial misconduct during trial must be 
decided on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding such alleged 
misconduct; and in order to warrant or require the granting of a new trial it 
must affirmatively appear that the conduct was of such a nature that it 
prejudiced the substantial rights of the complaining party.

 

State v. Hamilton, 731 P.2d 863, 869 (Kan. 1987).  In addition to the standard set forth above 
and cited by Belden, the Kansas Supreme Court has further stated:

A mere possibility of prejudice from a remark of the judge 
is not sufficient to overturn a verdict or judgment. If a proper and reasonable 
construction will render the remark unobjectionable, the remark is not 
prejudicial.

 

State v. Kleypas, 40 P.3d 139, 220 (Kan. 2001) (quoting State v. Nguyen, 
883 P.2d 937, 939 (Kan. 1992)).

 

[¶8]      The State, on the 
other hand, suggests that we have hinted in previous opinions that an abuse of 
discretion standard is appropriate:

 

It occasionally happens that some occurrence upon a trial 
will warrant and may require comment by the court upon the conduct of a witness 
by way of caution, admonition, or censure, and, when such comment is within due 
bounds, and appropriate to the character of the occurrence, it will not be 
subject to a valid exception.

 

Kendrick v. Healy, 192 P. 601, 612 (Wyo. 1920).  See also Kennedy v. 
State, 422 P.2d 88, 93-94 (Wyo. 
1967) (remark by trial court not in violation of the standard set forth in Kendrick "nor an abuse of discretion").

 

[¶9]      In Jansen v. State, 892 P.2d 1131 (Wyo. 1995), 
we confronted a claim that the trial court prejudiced the defendant when it 
rebuked his counsel for improperly marking an exhibit during closing 
argument:

 

The trial court acts as a referee of the contest between 
the parties. It should be fair and impartial as between the parties and their 
attorneys and allow them considerable freedom in the presentation of their 
respective cases in their own way.

. . . .

Although we have said that the court must assiduously avoid 
any appearance of partiality, we recognize also that the court must be firm, 
maintain control of the proceeding and assure that what 
occurs is within the rules of law and procedure to the end that the jury 
receives and considers only lawful evidence conducive to its arriving at a just 
result. * * * [A]lthough where circumstances reasonably 
necessitate, it is within the province of the trial court to admonish or rebuke 
counsel. * * * Maintaining a semblance of order in those trials is left largely 
to the trial court and is not a basis for reversal absent a clear showing of 
prejudice.  McCabe v. R.A. Manning Construction Co., Inc. 674 P.2d 699, 708-09 (Wyo. 
1983).

The test for the clear showing of prejudice does not relate 
to the number of rulings in favor of each counsel, but rather assurance "that 
what occurs is within the rules of law and procedure to the end that the jury 
receives and considers only lawful evidence conducive to its arriving at a just 
result."

 

Jansen, 892 P.2d  at 1142 (emphasis in original).  In practical terms, 
there is no difference between the two standards proffered by Belden and the 
State.  The 
trial court has a certain amount of discretion to control the proceedings before 
it.  The court 
is constrained, however, by the requirement that all criminal defendants are 
entitled to a fair trial.  If the actions of the trial court prejudice a 
defendant's right to a fair trial, then, obviously, an abuse of discretion is 
present.  The 
concept of an abuse of discretion is subsumed within the specific standard set 
forth by the Kansas Supreme Court.  Accordingly, for purposes of reviewing claims 
of judicial misconduct, we will apply that standard.  In applying that 
standard, however, we think it is appropriate to do so within the context set 
forth by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals:

 

Reviewing Pisani's claim is difficult because, of course, 
we are unable to observe directly the interaction of personalities during trial; 
our review is necessarily limited to "the cold black and white of a printed 
record.'" United States v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062, 1067 (2d Cir. 1970)(quoting United States 
v. Ah Kee Eng, 241 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1957)). For this reason, we have no handy tool with which 
to gauge automatically whether the trial judge's conduct has improperly tipped 
the balance of the trial against the defendant. United 
States v. Nazzaro, 472 F.2d 302, 304 (2d Cir. 1973). Our disposition of the claim must flow from careful 
deliberation after close scrutiny of the record. Our role, however, is not to 
determine whether the trial judge's conduct left something to be desired, or 
even whether some comments would have been better left unsaid. Rather, we must 
determine whether the judge's behavior was so prejudicial that it denied Pisani 
a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial. United States v. 
Robinson, 635 F.2d 981, 984 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 992, 101 S. Ct. 2333, 68 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1981). If we conclude that the conduct 
of the trial had so impressed the jury with the trial judge's partiality to the 
prosecution that this became a factor in determining the defendant's guilt, then 
the convictions should be reversed. United States v. 
Guglielmini, 384 F.2d 602, 604 (2d Cir. 1967).

 

United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 402 (2nd Cir. 1985).  In other 
words:

 

The test to determine if a judicial comment in the jury's 
presence constitutes reversible error is whether the remark was such that it was 
reasonably calculated to benefit the state or to prejudice the defendant's 
rights. For comments by the trial judge to constitute reversible error the 
defendant must show that the remarks were prejudicial and that he or she was 
harmed thereby.

 

75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 309 (1991 
and 2001 Supp.).  
With these general standards in mind, we turn to Belden's complaints 
about the trial court's conduct.

 

B.                 
Discussion

 

[¶10]   Belden's multiple claims of judicial 
misconduct are based upon comments by the district court judge during the course 
of the trial.  
We will quote extensively from the transcript during our discussion of 
those claims.  
This will necessarily increase the length of our discussion 
substantially; however, it is essential to our analysis and resolution of 
Belden's claims.  
Our quotations from the transcript will include the allegedly improper 
comments and, when necessary, additional portions of the proceedings in order to 
place the comments in context.

 

[¶11]   In his initial claim, Belden asserts 
that the following exchange between the judge, the defendant, and defense 
counsel during the testimony of the victim's roommate interfered with his 
attorney-client relationship.  The State had called the victim's roommate to 
the witness stand.  
Part of the defense theory of the case was that there were viable 
suspects beyond Belden who had a motive and opportunity to commit this 
crime.  One of 
the suspects to whom the defense pointed was the estranged husband of the 
roommate.  To 
establish his viability as a potential suspect, the defense sought to establish 
through the roommate's testimony that her estranged husband had been involved in 
a three-way sexual relationship with her and the victim, and that he had wanted 
to continue the relationship but the victim was reticent.  The defense also 
sought to inquire into the roommate's husband's history of sexual assault and 
violence towards women.  The prosecution objected to that line of 
questioning.  
In response, the court sent the jury out, and the following took place in camera:

 

THE COURT:  Please sit down. Answer the question, if you 
will.  Do you 
remember the question?

THE WITNESS:  Pardon? If my ex-husband had a  a desire for 
[the victim], as well?

THE COURT:  Now, what do you mean by a desire for [the 
victim] as well?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  A sexual desire for [the victim]?

THE COURT:  What's the next question?

Q:  Is that correct, he had a sexual desire for 
[the victim]?

A:  He did.

THE COURT:  What's the next question?

Q:  In fact, he tried to go to bed with [the 
victim] on many occasions and plotted with you for help?

A:  He had got us into bed at least one time that 
I remember.

Q:  And it upset him that she would not go to bed 
with him?

A:  More than likely.

Q:  In fact, as you said, at one time, he did get 
the two of you into bed together?

A.      Correct.

Q:  And when you had taken Terrie back  or 
Brandy [roommate's daughter], excuse me.  Taken Brandy back to live with him, he wanted 
you to come back and live with him again, didn't he?

A.     He  I  as I remember, he did.

Q:  That's  oh, and then I did also, your Honor, 
want to ask questions about during their marriage, him beating and strangling 
her.

[PROSECUTION]:  What purpose?

THE COURT:  Wait. The testimony about [roommate's 
ex-husband] wanting to have a sexual relationship with [the victim] is being 
offered for the purposes of demonstrating that he might have had a motivation to 
sexually assault [the victim].  Now, that's what that's being offered for, is 
that correct?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  Well, the 

THE COURT:  Am I getting the picture?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  Sexual assault and murder, 
yes. I'm mainly looking at the murder.

THE COURT:  That's the next question I have. How 
does this show that he might have  Just explain it to me, [Defense 
counsel].

* * * *

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  The underlying sex goes 
towards the murder, your Honor.  [The roommate's ex-husband] had a motive to 
kill because  two reasons, one, he wanted [roommate] back; also, he wanted [the 
victim] and maybe she wouldn't have him. . . .  And if he did sexually assaulted [sic] her, he certainly could have sexually assaulted 
her without any emission.

THE COURT:  Oh, [Defense counsel].

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  This is a muddy case, your 
Honor.  There's 
a very viable suspect and we need him out here.

THE COURT:  Well, you are being vague with 
me.  You are 
not being direct with me.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  Okay.

THE COURT:  And you've got to tell me what 
inferences and conclusions can be logically drawn from the testimony that you 
are asking to be admitted.  Now, you know, there's no indication that 
[roommate's ex-husband], in spite of any desire to have sexual relations with 
[the victim], in fact, had sexual relations with [the victim]; and I don't know 
how having a desire to have sexual relations with [the victim] equates to a 
reason for killing her.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  He had sex 

THE COURT:  And you're going to have to show that 
to me because I'm just too dumb to understand it.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  He has had sex with her, 
your Honor, in the past.  He wanted sex with her again.  He has had a prior 
sexual assault conviction in which he committed sexual assault, but there was no 
emission.  He 
did not ejaculate.  
So the fact that there's not any physical evidence  or any biological 
evidence of him raping her, that doesn't preclude that he did.  A hair of his was 
found near the body, on that  on that blanket.  It puts him there, or conceivably there.  And as you know, 
we've described  we're just trying to point to other people who had equal 
opportunity, motive and capability of committing such a crime.  And I think it's 
relevant.  I'm 
not trying to be vague. I think that's 

THE COURT:  And I'm not trying to [be] 
disingenuous with you, [defense counsel].  But, you know, if it comes across to me as 
being totally nonsense and illogical and I can't understand it

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  Well, I guess I see it as 
logical, your Honor.  
His wife had left him.

THE COURT:  You're not listening to me.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  Okay.

THE COURT:  You know, the big problem lawyers have is 
they listen to themselves and they don't listen to anybody else.  I'll hit you right 
straight between the eyes with it.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  Okay.

THE COURT:  If it has the effect on me that it 
has on me, what do you think is going to happen with the Jury?  Now, what's the 
objection of the Defense  or of the Prosecution?

[PROSECUTION]:  Your Honor, first of all, he's 
not laid proper foundation for any of this.  He just starts asking questions.

. . .

[PROSECUTION]:  Your Honor, it's a 404 (b) 
problem.  He's 
trying to show [roommate's ex-husband], who is not even here, has a propensity 
for this kind of crime and, therefore, he's a suspect in this.  It's not relevant 
to what we're doing here at all and it gets into the love triangle that we 
talked about yesterday, Judge. [the victim's] character 

THE COURT:  You know, I don't know what you guys 
are talking about.  
You mystify me, too.

[PROSECUTION]:  Well, I can 

THE COURT:  I see this as more damaging to the 
defense than it is helpful.  And, you know, I want you two defense lawyers 
to hear that from me.  
You know why I want you to hear that from me?  You know, I want 
you and your client to insist  particularly your client, to insist that this 
kind of testimony be received.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL # 2]:  I'm trying not to 
intercede in this, your Honor.  If you want my comment, I will.

THE COURT:  Now, I don't want to block the 
Defense, but I don't want in my record any allegations of ineffective assistance 
of Counsel [sic].  And I'll put it right out in the open.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL # 2]:  I appreciate 

THE COURT:  And I don't  I'm not trying to 
intimidate you guys.  
I know I can't intimidate you, [defense counsel #2].  I know that I 
can't.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL # 2]:  Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT:  Because you're just not that kind of 
a guy. But I can make you think about things.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  Your Honor, --

THE COURT:  And that's all I'm trying to do.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  Your Honor, if I may?

THE COURT:  Yes.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  The only thing he's 
getting into is to ask this Witness, which he's already  the questions that 
she's testified to.  
We will hook this all up with our witness at the end of the case.  This is all 
foundational to our laying what we believe is our defense, which is that 
[roommate's husband] is a viable candidate for the person who committed this 
crime.  She 
testified that [her husband]  we don't want to go into his record.  We don't want to go 
into a lot about the threesome, just the simple questions that we asked and she 
answered and then we're going on with it.

THE COURT:  You want to  you want to establish, 
number one, that [roommate's ex-husband] had a sexual interest in the 
decedent?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  That's correct.

THE COURT:  Number two, there was at least some 
sexual activity between [roommate's ex-husband] and the decedent?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  Well, I don't know if we 
wanted to go there but we felt 

THE COURT:  Well, she has already testified to 
some kind of sexual conduct.  Three people in bed 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  I think we have to go 
there.

THE COURT:  Pardon?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  I think we have to go 
there just to some extent because, as we said, we don't want to try to demean 
anybody here, but just those points that you've talked about.  And then she's 
already testified that she couldn't contact him for quite some period of 
time.  And that 
he had at least  you know, he had been very abusive towards her and tried to 
strangle her.

THE COURT:  You want to show he has the 
propensity for violence?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  Well, he does, yeah. But 
we're not getting into any convictions.  We've done that with  with [the victim's 
ex-boyfriend], of course. I think  you know, if you don't want us to do it here 
 you know, she's given statements to this.  We're going to have an investigator  our 
expert is going to say they had a Mr. [roommate's ex-husband's name] and he'd 
done this.  
Their reports show that he had done this; their reports show that he'd 
done that; and he's a person that needed to be looked at very closely.  And as [a sheriff's 
investigator] testified, they didn't even check it.  She even told them 
at one time that she suspected her own husband of being the  the man who killed 
[the victim].  
And I'm not  you know, she said that.  I think that is very relevant to our 
case.

THE COURT:  Mr. Belden, do you agree with your 
attorneys; and do you want them to do all of those things that they have just 
described to me?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  You can answer the 
question.

[BELDEN]:  I'll go with the advice of my 
attorneys, sir.

THE COURT:  Pardon?

[BELDEN]:  I'll go with the advice of my 
attorneys.

(An off-the-record discussion was held between [the defense 
attorneys] and Mr. Belden.)

THE COURT:  Now, Mr. Belden, tactical decisions 
have to be made in every case of how to proceed.  And, you know, your attorneys do the best 
they can.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  He's just said  he's told 
us what to do.  
We will stop.

THE COURT:  You'll what?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  He doesn't want us to go 
any further.

THE COURT:  Now, Mr. Belden, I don't want to talk 
you out of something.

[BELDEN]:  You didn't, sir.

THE COURT:  Okay.

[BELDEN]:  You had no 

THE COURT:  I don't want to talk your lawyers out 
of something.  
I just want to make sure that you are  all of you are doing what you 
think is best.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  We're not going to  we 
want to go into this, that there was a sexual interest.  We are going to not 
inquire into whether or not he had any propensities of violence towards her.

THE COURT:  See, I think that's a wise decision.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT:  See, I think that is a wise, wise 
decision.  I 
don't think the Defense ought to be making suggestions about propensity in this 
case.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  And we are not going into 
that area.  But 
the rest of it, you know, the fact that they  that he had a sexual attraction 
and had sex and wanted to have sex, I think that is essential.

THE COURT:  Now, Mr. Belden, I'm not on your 
side.

[BELDEN]:  I understand, sir.

THE COURT:  But I'm not on their side, either.

[BELDEN]:  I understand that, also, sir.

THE COURT:  I'm on the side of doing my damnedest 
to make sure that you get a fair trial.  And I'm on the side of doing my damnedest to 
make sure that the people of the State of Wyoming get a fair trial.

[BELDEN]:  Understood.

THE COURT:  That's my only interest, Mr. Belden; 
and I can only ask you to believe me.  You may or may not believe me.

[BELDEN]:  I do, sir. I do believe you.

THE COURT:  But that's my only interest.  Now, Mr. Belden, 
I'll tell you why I think the decision that you and your Counsel have just made 
is a wise one.  
There is a 99% probability that I am going to allow information about 
your past conduct  contact with [a woman Belden allegedly sexually assaulted 
previously] and what's the 

[PROSECUTION]:  [another alleged sexual assault victim]

THE COURT:  And [the second alleged victim] to be 
placed before the Jury.  And I'm going to give the Jury a cautionary 
instruction about not considering that information with regard to the charge of 
sexual assault.  
And I'm giving that instruction to the Jury if I give that information 
about [the two victims] to the Jury because I don't want them thinking you have 
a propensity to get involved in rapes.

[BELDEN]:  Yes, sir.

THE COURT:  And if you and your Counsel begin 
talking about propensity, the Jury is liable to say, "Well, hell, let's talk 
about the Defendant's propensity."  Do you follow me, Mr. Belden?

[BELDEN]:  Yes, sir, I do.

THE COURT:  And do you understand me?

[BELDEN]:  Yes, sir.

THE COURT:  That's why I say to you and your 
Counsel that I think your decision not to talk about the propensity of other 
people is a wise decision.  And that's why I am incredulous that the  
that the State wants to block propensity evidence.

[PROSECUTION]:  Well, your Honor, the only thing 

THE COURT:  I don't need any comment from you, 
[prosecutor].

[PROSECUTION]:  I had a good one.

THE COURT:  What was your comment?

[PROSECUTION]:  I'll withdraw it, Judge.

THE COURT:  Okay.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  I would ask you to take 
this into consideration with regard to whether you put in anything about the 
other charges with regard to the Defendant because, your Honor, whether we limit 
them to one charge or the other, it goes to everything.

THE COURT:  I know, [defense counsel #2].  You're going to 
argue that every chance you get to me, but I haven't made the final ruling.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  And that's the only reason 
that I'm still arguing.  If you had ruled, your Honor, I would not 
raise the subject.

THE COURT:  Let's not get into it now, is what I 
was trying to say to you.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  Thank you. I just wanted 
to bring it up.

THE COURT:  I know.  I know what you are 
doing.  You're 
a bulldog and you will just hammer and hammer and hammer every chance you get to 
prevail on your side of the argument.  And you've just done that, but let's not get 
into it now.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  Thank you.

THE COURT:  All right. Now, Prosecution, there is 
already testimony of sexual interest.  There's also testimony concerning some kind 
of sexual conduct between [roommate's husband] and the decedent.  It's already been 
testified to by this Witness and I will allow that testimony to stand.  And I guess that  
that then puts you at this point into another line of questioning, [defense 
counsel #1]?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  It does.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  Did we get this before the Jury?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  I think that was 

THE COURT: Mrs.  and I can't 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  Nordell.

THE COURT:  I was going to call you [husband's 
last name] and I can't do that.  [The roommate] testified that she and [the 
victim] and [roommate's husband] had been in bed together.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  Okay. I think that's enough.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  Wasn't that out of the 
presence of the 

THE COURT:  I didn't write it down specifically 
and that's not exactly how she said it.  "He got us in bed together," I think is the 
way she said it.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  Wasn't that out of the 
presence of the Jury?

[PROSECUTION]:  No, she said it.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  Did she say it? I'm a 
little lost.

THE COURT:  Just wait.  I didn't right [sic] down the page and the line, [court reporter], and 
I'll try to look it up.  I don't know if you can help me.  (Pause.)  What I heard was 
while the Jury was gone.  Here are the questions and answers while the 
jury was gone. 

. . . [Court reads back exchange at the beginning of this 
citation]

And then away we went.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  We would be happy, your 
Honor, if I could ask her if [her ex-husband] had a sexual desire for [the 
victim], the thing about trying to get them into bed together and did he want 
her back 

THE COURT:  Okay. You may put your objection on 
the record.  I 
intend to permit it.  
[Prosecutor], make your 

[PROSECUTION]:  Okay. Your Honor, --

THE COURT:  -- objection if you want to put an objection 
on the record.

[PROSECUTION]:  We do.

THE COURT:  Well, do it.

[PROSECUTION]:  Your Honor, we would object to 
that as far as relevance to this.  I don't see where that is relevant to what 
we're here for today.  
The issue at question is 6-2-312, the same thing we talked about 
yesterday with [the victim's] character.

THE COURT:  The objection will be overruled.  The  The objection 
is overruled.  
Bring the jury back in.

 

Belden contends that the district court judge 
inappropriately interposed himself into his attorney-client relationship by 
encouraging him not to pursue a particular tactical strategy: i.e., pursuing the line of questioning designed to 
establish the victim's roommate's husband as a viable suspect because of his 
desire for the victim within the context of his past history of physical and 
sexual violence towards women.  Belden insists that the court's interference 
was not harmless because it infringed on his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
counsel and prevented the jury from hearing evidence relevant to the defense's 
theory of the case.  
The State, on the other hand, contends that the decision to refrain from 
pursuing that line of questioning was an independent decision made after Belden 
and his counsel had conferred and the district court did nothing but praise them 
after that decision had been taken.

 

[¶12]   Both parties cite United States v. Goodwin, 770 F.2d 631 (7th Cir. 1985).  In that case, the 
defendant's counsel informed the trial judge that his client did not intend to 
take the stand.  
770 F.2d  at 635-36.  After a hesitant reply from the defendant 
that she did not intend to testify, the trial judge advised her of the pros and 
cons of her decision and then recessed the proceedings so that she could consult 
her family and counsel.  770 F.2d  at 636.  Thereafter, defense 
counsel informed the court that his client would take the stand because she had 
been left with the impression that the judge was advising her to do so.  Id. The trial judge informed her that he was merely 
advising her of the options available to her and not trying to influence her 
decision.  Id.  The defendant elected to testify anyway.  On appeal, the 
defendant claimed that the trial judge had essentially coerced her to take the 
stand.  After 
reviewing the comments made by the trial judge, the Seventh Circuit expressed 
serious concerns about them:

 

We find this colloquy disturbing. While we appreciate the 
trial judge's extreme care and solicitude in attempting to ensure that Goodwin's 
initial decision not to testify was voluntary, we believe that the judge went 
too far in this case. A trial judge must take great care not to assume the 
functions of trial counsel. The trial judge in this case went beyond his limited 
function of ensuring that Goodwin's decision not to testify was voluntary when 
he expressed surprise at her decision, explained some of the pros and cons of 
her taking the stand, and strongly implied that her only chance for acquittal 
was to testify. Although his observations may have been correct, they were not 
appropriate. A trial judge's role in this situation is limited to making sure 
that the defendant understands his or her rights and ensuring that the 
defendant's final decision is made voluntarily, with no coercion or undue 
influence. It is primarily the responsibility of the defendant's counsel, not 
the trial judge, to advise the defendant on whether or not to testify and to 
explain the tactical advantages and disadvantages of doing so. If a judge deems 
it necessary to comment on what he or she views as an inadvisable decision in 
this critical area, then the court should discuss the matter with the 
defendant's counsel. Discussing the issue directly with the defendant may 
inappropriately involve the judge in the unique attorney-client relationship, 
raising possible Sixth Amendment concerns as well as, in this case, the more 
obvious Fifth Amendment problems.

 

Goodwin, 770 F.2d  at 637.  Nevertheless, the appellate court rejected 
the defendant's claim because it was not convinced that the trial judge's 
comments had overborne her will or, even if they had, that it was prejudicial 
error.  Id. 

 

[¶13]   While Goodwin involved judicial comments on the defendant's 
constitutional right to testify or not, and this case involves the tactical 
question of the defense's case theory, the general principals identified by the 
Seventh Circuit Court are equally applicable here.  The district 
court's concern about the potential effects of the line of questioning being 
pursued by Belden's counsel and the possibility of a later claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is commendable.  However, the court's actions in this case 
went too far.  
Like the court in Goodwin, even though the 
district court's observations on the perils of defense counsel's tactical 
choices in pursuing the question of the husband's history of sexual assault and 
physical violence towards women may have been correct, they were not 
appropriate.  
If the court had a concern about counsel's approach and felt it necessary 
to comment on the issue, then it should have raised the matter directly with 
counsel.  
"Discussing the issue directly with the defendant may inappropriately 
involve the judge in the unique attorney-client relationship."  770 F.2d  at 
637.

 

[¶14]   Despite our concerns over the court's 
comments, we are confident that there was no prejudice to Belden.  The decision to 
abandon the line of questioning was made by Belden and his counsel after 
consultation.  
After that decision was made, the court stressed that it did not want to 
talk Belden or his counsel out of anything.  Belden and his counsel stated that the judge 
had not done so.  
A careful reading of the colloquy reveals that prior to that point, the 
court made no comments indicating whether or not it believed the line of 
questioning was appropriate.  The court's inquiry up to that point had been 
an attempt to determine exactly where the defense was going with its questioning 
of the witness.  
After learning the substance of the defense strategy, the court asked 
Belden if he agreed with it.  Belden's counsel told him that he could 
answer that question.  
The court did not express an opinion on the appropriateness of the 
defense strategy until after defense counsel and Belden had clearly indicated 
that they did not intend to pursue that strategy.  Accordingly, we find that the court's 
comments did not prejudice Belden or otherwise interfere with the 
attorney-client relationship.  To the extent that the court's comments 
constituted error, it was harmless.

 

[¶15]   As part of its case, the State sought 
to introduce evidence relating to two prior charges of sexual assault against 
Belden.  In 
Belden's next claim, he contends that the trial court effectively became an 
adversary when it told the State under what theory it would allow the admission 
of that uncharged misconduct evidence.  Belden points to the following soliloquy, 
which took place outside the presence of the jury (emphasis supplied by 
Belden):

 

THE COURT:  . . .  Now, I want to caution 
the Prosecution on this issue.  I have real concern about the clerks in the 
Wyoming Supreme Court.  You know, when I try to look at the State's 
case in the light that the State sees it, what I see is that two and two adds up 
to four.  And I 
see that in several fashions.  One is [sic] the 
pictures and the semen and the DNA.  You know, the pictures and the testimony says 
"Here's a body that's brutally beaten, that has been involved in sexual 
intercourse, and semen is leaking from the body," according to your opening 
statement, and two and two adds up to four.

And the other kind of two and two thing is is [sic] that you're saying, "You know, look, even if you 
assume, [defense counsel], that there was consensual sex in the past, when this 
man had consensual sex, he ended up being accused of rape and charged criminally 
and, therefore, two plus two equals four.  He has a motive for silencing this person who 
he had consensual sex with, that he wasn't  didn't have a long-standing 
relationship with."

Now, that is just, it seems to me, a common sense analysis 
of what you folks think happened in this case.  But, you know, if we begin to set aside 
common sense and we begin to start to apply technical rules of law, the first 
technical rule of law that rejects common sense is the technical rule of law 
that says "If you have a propensity to rape someone, it's nonadmissible [sic] in evidence."  Now, right?

[PROSECUTION]:  Yes.

THE COURT:  And, you know, if I extend that kind 
of technical analysis further, there's a problem in the State's case concerning 
uncharged misconduct.  
This man is not charged with premeditated murder.  This man is charged 
with sexual assault felony murder.  And it's one thing for motive to be 
introduced for purposes of showing a reason for premeditated murder and another 
thing to introduce motive in a sexual assault felony murder case.  And it's an issue 
that the Defense has not raised.

            
It is an issue that the Defense has not raised.  They have not yet 
said to me that the motive ought to be a motive for sexual assault, not a motive 
to premeditate and intentionally kill someone.  And you folks want to push this business of 
the prior alleged misconduct of this guy too far.  And you're not only  you're going to push 
those clerks and those members of the Supreme Court over the edge and they are 
not going to do what you want everyone to do and that is to use common 
sense.  It's 
built in for them to do that because of the uncharged misconduct.

            
In this case, it's built in.  All they have to do is say "This is just 
overly prejudicial."  
They don't  and, you know, they can hang it up by saying I abused my 
discretion.  
And, furthermore, they can say "It was not relevant to the issue of 
sexual assault and it certainly wasn't relevant to the issue of sexual assault 
felony murder."  
Now, they can say that.  But to say that, it seems to me, flies in the 
face of common sense because a person can have a motive to cover up sexual 
assault.  And that's what I think is the key to this testimony.  He has a motive to 
cover up the intercourse.  Don't call it sexual assault, call it 
intercourse.  
Because he wants to avoid accusations.

            
Now, that's your theory.  And I'm willing to 
let you have that theory without endorsing it, without rejecting it, just saying 
that it's something that I think the State is entitled to introduce in this 
case.

 

Based on those comments, Belden contends that the trial 
court supplied the State with the theory for admission of the uncharged 
misconduct evidence.  
Implied in Belden's argument is that this evidence would not otherwise 
have been admitted because the State had not offered any appropriate grounds for 
its admission.

 

[¶16]   When the record is examined, Belden's 
claim that the court was supplying the State with a basis for admitting that 
testimony is utterly without merit.  The comments noted above were made by the 
trial court in chambers during a conference between the parties on the morning 
of the third day of the trial on October 11, 2000.  The question before 
the court was whether or not to admit testimony from two witnesses who alleged 
that Belden had sexually assaulted them.  The question had also been raised whether or 
not to allow testimony or to simply present the jury with a written history 
relating the accusations that were made against Belden and their 
disposition.  
The portion of the transcript cited above is taken verbatim from what 
appeared in Belden's brief.  Belden neglected to include the remark made 
by the prosecution less than a page before the cited material wherein motive is 
specifically referenced as the basis for the admission of the evidence.  Belden also 
neglects to mention that there was a hearing on the admissibility of uncharged 
misconduct evidence on August 28, 2000.  The State argued motive for the admission of 
this evidence at that time.  In addition, the State filed a brief on 
September 11, 2000, in which it again argued motive as a basis for 
admission.  In 
fact, Belden's own brief in response to the State's argument to admit this 
evidence specifically affirms that the State was urging admission based upon a 
contention that it showed a "motive to silence" the victim.  Reading the cited 
portion of the transcript above, it is clear that the trial court is not giving 
the prosecution the basis for admitting the proposed evidence; rather, it is 
merely discussing how, at that time, it was considering the prosecution's 
arguments in favor of the evidence.  In other words, the court is merely 
reiterating the argument made to it by the prosecution--nothing else.  Belden's argument 
that the court committed misconduct by supplying the State with the basis for 
the admission of this evidence is contrary to the record and without 
merit.

 

[¶17]   At the end of his argument on this 
claim in his brief, Belden makes a cursory allegation of additional misconduct 
by the trial court in favoring the State in its rulings on evidence before the 
jury:

 

There are other minor examples of the trial court helping 
the state in front of the jury. After a defense objection, the trial court told 
the state to ask the witness if he agreed with those statements. * * * After 
another defense objection, the trial court told the state: "As long as you talk 
about motive and as long as you talk about the homicide, you may talk about it 
with this witness."

 

A review of the relevant portions of the transcript dispels 
any question of misconduct on the court's part.  The first incident occurred during the 
prosecution's cross-examination of a defense expert who had testified on what 
sort of injuries and physical evidence would typically be found in a sexual 
assault situation.

 

[PROSECUTION]: Now, the Department of Justice document that 
 that we  we looked up on the Internet and we printed off in all of its 190 
some pages  I guess 199 pages, has a lot of information about sexual assault. 
And one of the statements out of this big, thick document that I see here is it 
says that genital trauma evidence  genital trauma is useful  useful  to show 
both recent sexual contact and force. Would you agree with that?

[WITNESS]: I would agree.

Q: And it goes on in that same paragraph to say that while 
the examiner will usually not find genital injuries, this should not influence 
their testimony regarding the validity of the rape since most rape victims do 
not experience genital injury as a result of a rape. And they site [sic] as a source for that Bower and Dalton [sic], 1997. They go on to say in one study vaginal 
injury 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I 

[PROSECUTION]: -- that I want to 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I'm going to object at this 
time. I think it's an improper way to present evidence and to question the 
Witness. If they want to show a document to him, ask him if he's familiar with 
it, they can. If they want to present the document, I think they have to do that 
through their own witness. I object to the form of the question.

[PROSECUTION]: The Witness testified that he expected to 
find more bruising on this  on this victim.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That's not what that reference is even 
to.

[PROSECUTION]: Well, I'm going to get to that reference in 
just a few minutes.

THE COURT: You may ask him if he agrees with those 
statements.

 

In response to the defense's objection, the court told the 
prosecution it could ask this witness if he agreed with statements made in the 
document relating to injuries characteristic of sexual assaults.  We are at a loss to 
understand how the judge's ruling constituted a comment helping the 
prosecution.  
The court essentially overruled the defense objection.  In that sense it 
was, of course, helpful to the State.  That is the nature of objections  one side 
or the other is "favored" when one is sustained or overruled.  There is no 
reasonable interpretation here, however, that could support any claim of bias on 
the part of the judge in making this ruling.  The judge simply made a ruling on a question 
of evidence that is an inherent part of a trial court's function.  Belden's claim of 
misconduct or bias is meritless.

 

[¶18]   The second incident cited by Belden 
occurred during re-cross of the same witness:

 

[PROSECUTION]: [Belden] had motive, did he not?

A: I'm not sure what it was.

Q: In 1976, he met [one of the uncharged misconduct 
victims], you're aware of that, aren't you?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I'm going to object at this 
time because it's a limiting instruction on how that can be used and I think he 
should be very careful.

[PROSECUTION]: I'll try to be as careful as I can, 
Judge.

THE COURT: As long as you talk about motive and as long as 
you talk about the homicide, you may talk about it with this Witness.

 

The court had ruled that uncharged misconduct evidence 
related to other alleged sexual assaults by Belden was admissible for the 
purpose of demonstrating motive for him to kill the victim.  This witness, a 
Nebraska law enforcement officer, had been called by the defense to testify 
about the investigation and to support the defense claim that other suspects had 
a motive kill the victim.  The court's comment merely told the 
prosecutor that he could continue his line of inquiry but only so long as he 
stayed within the parameters under which the uncharged misconduct evidence was 
admitted.  The 
comment was not in any way indicative of misconduct or bias on the part of the 
trial court.  
Belden's claim is not cogent and is without merit.

 

[¶19]   Next, Belden asserts that the trial 
judge improperly intruded into the trial process by commenting on evidence, 
denigrating counsel for both parties, and repeatedly making comments that 
reduced the seriousness of the proceedings.  The main instance cited by Belden occurred 
when the prosecution attempted to introduce a photograph of a motorcycle, which 
Belden had left behind in 1985.  The picture was taken shortly before trial 
and defense counsel objected because the photograph did not portray the 
motorcycle as it existed in 1985.  The trial court sustained the objection and 
the following colloquy transpired:

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Excuse me, Counsel.  I'm going to object 
to any further questions by Counsel concerning these photographs because it's 
been ruled that they are nonadmissible [sic].

[PROSECUTION]:  That's fine.  I wasn't going to 
ask you about the photographs.

Q:  Did that motorcycle look like it was in 
pretty good shape for being out in the weather for fifteen years?

A:  Yes.

Q:  Did it look rideable [sic]?

 A:  Yes.

Q:  Did the handlebars look like they'd been in a 
crash or were inoperable?

A:  No, sir.

THE COURT:  Give me the photograph.

(The Witness handed the photograph to the Court.)

THE COURT:  Thank you. (Pause.)

[PROSECUTION]:  I'll still move for its 
admission, Judge. We'll try it a little later. (Pause.) I'll move for its 
admission.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, if they get a 
picture of the  of the motorcycle when it was taken  I would assume, if they 
had done an investigation about this, that they have a picture of it when they 
took it into custody.  
That's what's relevant.  I object to this photograph because it 
doesn't depict the motorcycle at the time it was taken into custody.  I will say that 
they can have that photograph.  That's what it looks like today.  Whether it looked 
like that fifteen years ago or not, I guess we have to say it looked like that 
fifteen years ago.

[PROSECUTION]:  I think [defense counsel's] 
objection goes to the weight rather than the admissibility.  Move for it's [sic] admission.

THE COURT:  Well, I don't know.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I don't think it 

THE COURT:  You've puzzled me and the Jury, guys, 
because I don't know what the significance of it is.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I don't either, 
but 

[PROSECUTION]:  Let me ask one more question.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  -- they're putting it in, so 
I figure they've got some significance to it.  And if there is some significance, I want to 
see the photograph of the vehicle at the time of the events that took place, not 
now.

[PROSECUTION]:  Judge, let me ask one more 
question and maybe I can tie up the significance and relevance.

THE COURT:  I think I glean what it is, but I'm 
not certain, so you may ask the question.

Q:  If you owned that motorcycle, sir, would you 
just have left it out at the man camp?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT:  Sustained.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Jesus.

THE COURT:  I think that what you're trying to do 
is to have this Witness comment upon the value of that motorcycle.

[PROSECUTION]:  I am.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I object to even 
this discussion going on before the Jury.  And I  and I think what Counsel has done is 
highly prejudicial, highly improper, and I think he should be strongly 
admonished.  
And I feel like I almost should ask for a mistrial.

THE COURT:  Well, if you're going to ask for a 
mistrial, ask for one.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  For the record, I will, 
because of the comments that this man has made.

THE COURT:  [Prosecutor], do you want to 
respond?

[PROSECUTION]:  I would like to you, your Honor.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  May we do this outside the 
hearing of the Jury?

THE COURT:  No, you did it in front of the 
Jury.  We're 
going to do it all in front of the Jury.

[PROSECUTION]:  Thank you, your Honor.  Judge, that 
photograph depicts  the witness has identified the photograph of a motorcycle 
that he has stated for the record was the property of the Defendant.  Now, the photograph 
depicts the motorcycle at the impound lot here at the Lincoln County Sheriff's 
Office.  Now, I 
thought that the victim  the Witness was aware of the circumstances surrounding 
the taking of the photograph.  That's my mistake.  But other than 
that, your Honor, he says that the photograph is an accurate depiction of the 
motorcycle as he observed it on Sunday evening, no changes or alterations.  And, certainly, the 
property of  a piece of property that belongs and has been connected to this 
particular Defendant, abandoned by this particular Defendant according to the 
testimony of the officer, it appears is relevant for certain purposes.  Now, would the 
Court  

THE COURT:  The motion before the Court is not 
the admissibility of the picture or the relevance of the motorcycle. The issue 
before the Court is a motion for mistrial and a request for me to reprimand you 
for your comments about the motorcycle in front of the damn Jury.  That's what [sic] before the Court.  Now, if you want to address that, you 
can.

[PROSECUTION]:  I did not mis- --

THE COURT:  Don't talk to me about the motorcycle.

[PROSECUTION]:  Judge, in talking in front of 
this Jury, I did not misrepresent the condition of the motorcycle.  I have not tried to 
put before this Jury any sort of unfairly prejudicial evidence in any way.  I'm just trying to 
do my job.  And 
I would ask that the motion for mistrial be denied.

THE COURT:  [Defense counsel], is there anything 
more you would like to say for the record?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I need to voire dire the 
Witness so I can do that.

THE COURT:  Go ahead. Voir dire.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Did you try to start that 
motorcycle?

[WITNESS]:  No, sir.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Do you know anything about 
the electrical system of this motorcycle?

[WITNESS]:  No, sir.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  You don't know  were you 
aware in your investigation that the motorcycle had been damaged by somebody who 
had borrowed it from [Belden], and had wrecked it and that it was 
inoperable?  Do 
you know that?  
It's in all of your reports.

[WITNESS]:  Yes.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  So you  but the motorcycle, 
so far as you know, you're trying to say it was operable or it was not 
operable?

[WITNESS]:  It appears to be not operable.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  But you never checked it?

[WITNESS]:  No, sir.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Okay. Your Honor, that's why 
I object.

[PROSECUTOR]:  Judge, that goes to weight.

THE COURT:  Fellows, enough's enough. Enough's 
enough from both of you.  You're treating the Jury and me like we're a 
bunch of dummies.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I'm not trying to, your 
Honor.

THE COURT:  Ladies and Gentlemen, you know what 
this is all about, don't you?  Is there anybody confused about what's going 
on about the motorcycle?  If so, raise your hands[.]  No hands have been 
raised.  Now, 
the motion for mistrial is denied.  [Prosecutor], I won't reprimand you for 
anything other than wasting our time over this issue of the motorcycle.  Now, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, it's time for the noon recess and we'll take it now. . . .

* * * *

(Jury left the courtroom.)

* * * *

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, for the record, I 
have to at this time make a further and second motion for a mistrial on the 
basis and for the reasons  and I do this with a great deal of trepidation and  
well, I do this because I have to.  I feel that the Court has commented upon a 
very important part of the evidence to the Jury in its remarks and, as such, I 
think that the  the Defendant has been severely prejudiced; and I ask for a 
mistrial.

THE COURT:  State with particularity what the 
comment is to which you object so that 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  The comment 

THE COURT:  -- so that if I have, in fact, commented on 
the evidence, I will have an opportunity to cure the problem that you 
perceive.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Yes, your Honor.  And I appreciate 
and I think it's only fair that I do that.  The comments were to the  to the Jury and 
the way you said it was the Jury knows what this is all about with this 
motorcycle.  
And the  the implication, at least that I took, was that it was  it's a 
minor thing.  
As a matter of fact, this motorcycle is a major issue.  They're trying to 
say he left a perfectly good motorcycle and that shows flight.  The fact of the 
matter is if we'd ever gotten into it, the motorcycle was  was destroyed by 
somebody else.  
There was a  he  he couldn't get it fixed.  We now have before 
this Jury the comments that the Court thinks that this thing is all a big bunch 
of hog wash.  I 
don't think I can cure it.  I don't think any comments by the Court can 
cure it.  I 
just think it's been a comment upon the evidence.  I think we should have stopped.

THE COURT:  All right. [Defense counsel], you 
opened it up and I'm going to tell the Jury that my comments were directed at 
lawyers, not at evidence, and that I am tired of the nonsense between you two 
lawyers in front of this Jury.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  And I  as I said in my 
motion 

THE COURT:  And I will tell them that in no 
uncertain terms, [defense counsel].

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  As I said in my motion, I 
think that making any further comments will be more harmful and, your Honor, 
--

THE COURT:  Now, let me tell you something else, 
[defense counsel].  
Both sides of this case better start looking at the Jury. Both attorneys 
better start looking at the Jury and they better be measuring their conduct as 
reflected in the demeanor of the Jury.  Both of you.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I've only made one objection, 
your Honor.

THE COURT:  You both better look at how your 
behavior is affecting the Jury.  You're both not aware of that.  I think that other 
people in this courtroom are observing what the Jury  how the Jury is reacting 
to your conduct in this case, Counsel.  And I just think that both of you need to 
look at it because you're wearing my patience thin and you are wearing, both of 
you, the Jury's patience thin.  Now, you have something more, another 
objection, [defense counsel][?]  State it.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  No, your Honor, I  I have stated that  you 
know, I  I just think I need to make my  I simply got up and objected because 
of the  the picture was not a recent depiction.  It was sustained.  And then we went  
continued it from Counsel.  I had to do something, Judge.  He can't continue 
to talk about an objection that's sustained by the Court.  I  I don't want to 
 to do this.  
This is the last thing  and I have every  I have most adamant respect 
that I could ever have for this Court and I know that you know that.  And I don't wish to 
pursue this and I don't wish to make a scene out of it, but [the prosecutor] 
continued to talk about something when you had sustained it.

THE COURT:  Now, [defense counsel], you are 
seeing this case in your own eyes and you are seeing it in the  with the 
viewpoint of having your way.  You forget what it's like to be a judge.  You forget that 
when an objection is lodged to a piece of evidence or testimony and the 
objection is sustained, that does not preclude Counsel from trying again and 
again and again.  
And each time the efforts are made, an objection is sustained, they can 
try again and again and again until the patience of the Court wears out.

            
Now, my patience wore out with both of you on the photograph over a 
motorcycle because it was absolutely obvious to the Jury, as it was to me, that 
what you're really talking about is whether or not a piece of junk was abandoned 
or whether a valuable piece of property was left behind.  And you guys were 
going to go on and on and on about when a photograph was taken and I had enough 
of that from both of you.  Because you, [prosecutor], never asked the 
Witness whether it was operable, whether it was inoperable, whether it was junk, 
whether it had any value at all.  [Defense counsel] finally gets up and asks 
some questions along those lines.  But you didn't, [defense counsel].  And the argument 
becomes about when is a damn photograph taken?  And I had enough of both of you.  And that's what I 
commented on, the conduct of Counsel.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Again, your Honor, I'm going 
to ask that  I would withdraw my motion for mistrial, but I would ask 

THE COURT:  No, don't withdraw it.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  But I would ask the Court not 
to comment further to the jury.

THE COURT:  I won't let you withdraw it, [defense 
counsel].  I 
won't let you.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I would, in all due 
respect.  And 
I'm not going to say anything more about the situation.  I understand 
completely what the Court is saying.  I think I understand completely what I did, 
but I do believe that we are compounding the matter if we say anything more.

THE COURT:  Now, you guys just better pay 
attention to me. You have been in a pissing match, the two of you, from the 
moment you walked into my courtroom.  And it's going to be  it's a contest of who 
is going to be the big stud duck in this case.  Both of you have been bumping heads to win 
the argument between the two of you.  You've been paying more attention to who's 
going to be the top dog than you have to what in the world are you trying to do 
in this case[.]

            
This isn't a contest between you being right, [defense counsel], and him 
being wrong; and you being right, [prosecutor], and him being wrong.  This is a case  
the whole issue in this case is is [sic] what 
testimony is admissible, what evidence is admissible and what conclusions and 
inferences can be drawn from that testimony and the evidence.  And if it is 
objectionable evidence, then you should fight on the admissibility, not on who's 
right, not on who's stud duck, not on a damn photograph, but the significance of 
what was left behind.

            
Now, I'm telling you guys this because I'm not sure that you're aware 
that you're doing it.  
I'm just not sure that the two of you are aware that you're doing 
it.  You're 
both fine, fine attorneys.  You're both skilled trial attorneys.  But you've got to 
lay aside the business of winning the quarrel between yourselves.  The issues are "Can 
I win the argument with the Judge?  Can I win the argument of admissibility or 
inadmissibility."

            
You know, you've been going on and on and and [sic] leaving me out.  I want to be left out. You know, I don't want 
to have to rule but, boy, when you  but you're leaving me out because you're 
quarreling back and forth with each other.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  With all due respect, your 
Honor, I made the objection and I stated it to you.  And I didn't think 
it was badgering with Counsel, but I will attempt to not do so.

THE COURT:  You're  [defense counsel], you're 
the worst. You've been making comments throughout the trial: "If he knew what to 
do."  "That's 
not the right objection."  "He still hasn't figured it out."

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Well, that was three days 
ago, your Honor.

THE COURT:  Well, you know, this morning, you 
make comments about how you wish we could get on with getting some relevant 
evidence in here.  
"Don't know why we're doing all of this."  "Maybe somewhere along the line we'll get to 
the point where we get to the material things in this case."  Now, I may share 
that view with you, [defense counsel], but, you know, where do you get off in 
the middle of the examination of witnesses, during the course of the trial, 
making those kind of comments?  Those are comments to show [the prosecutor] 
up in front of the Jury.  Those are comments to build yourself up and 
put him down.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I'm sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT:  And what does that do to [the 
prosecutor]?  
He just bristles up like the young banty [sic] rooster that he is.  And, you know, the hackles on his neck come 
up and he's going to show you and he's not going to put up with that.  That's the kind of 
stuff that's going on in this case.

            
Now, I want to have some fun with you guys.  I don't mind some 
humorous interjections in this case because it tends to cause us  cause all of 
us not to take ourselves too seriously.  And I generally poke fun at myself first and 
the lawyers second as an antidote to this business of us taking ourselves too 
seriously.  But 
I'm tired of it, guys, and it  it's only taken two and half days.

            
* * * *

And so, [defense counsel], I understand  [defense 
counsel], I understand what you're talking to me about and why you feel 
frustration about wanting to get on with the case 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  But I feel it's more than 
that.

THE COURT:  -- because you see him anticipating 
the defense in his case in chief.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  But, your Honor, I feel it's 
a deliberate attempt at more than that.  And that's all I'm trying to combat.  I really think it's 
a deliberate attempt to  you know, to say something else to the Jury.  I think that's what 
this photograph is about.  He even asked that witness "Would somebody 
leave a valuable motorcycle like that?"  That was his whole intent in putting that in, 
your Honor.

THE COURT:  Certainly.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Well, that's incorrect. I 
think you have to agree with me that that's incorrect.  That was the basis 
of my objection.  
I knew that that's what he was going to do.  And I'm sorry that 
I didn't just sit down after I made the objection, but I didn't know how to keep 
that from going on.  
I mean, he was obvious about what he was doing and that's what upset me 
so much, Judge, because I do think that is totally improper.

THE COURT:  But the issue is whether a piece of 
junk was abandoned or whether a valuable piece of evidence was left behind 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  That's true.

THE COURT:  -- while somebody fled. And, you know, the 
resolution of that issue is for the Jury.  The fact that needs to be established is was 
it junk or wasn't it junk?  And [the witness] 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Doesn't know.

THE COURT:  The photograph doesn't establish 
that.  
Somebody's knowledge of the motorcycle establishes whether it's junk or 
whether it's not junk.  I can't tell whether it's junk by looking at 
a photograph and neither can you and neither can the Jury.  They can see that 
there's a motorcycle that looks like it's in good shape except for the seat.

            
And so, you know, the question really was to [the witness], "Do you know 
the value of that motorcycle?"  Was it operable?"  So, you know, let's 
just forget it.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Thank you, your Honor.

            
* * * *

THE COURT:  Now, [defense counsel], I am going to 
tell the Jury that the Defense thought I was commenting upon the motorcycle and 
the evidence; and I'm going to tell this Jury "I don't want you to think that my 
comments had anything to do with the motorcycle or the evidence."

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I understand that.

THE COURT:  "My comments were intended by me to 
be comments on the lawyers."

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  And I understand that, your 
Honor,  and I 

THE COURT:  And I'm going to tell them that, 
[defense counsel].

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I think it's going to cause 
more problems.

THE COURT:  This Jury knows that I like you 
guys.  They 
know that.  I 
told them that right off the bat in the beginning of the case.  And I have told 
this Jury that I'm like you two guys.  I've put myself in the same category with 
you.  Now, just 
quit the belly bumping.

            
* * * *

(The Jury returns after the recess.)

THE COURT:  Ladies and Gentlemen, -- I've got to 
plug myself in here.

            
This is a portion of an instruction that I will give you later on in the 
trial but I want you to hear it now, at least this portion of it.

            
I'll read you the entire instruction: These instructions have been given 
you because it is my duty to instruct you as to all the law that you must 
consider and I have not, in giving them or by any ruling made or by anything I 
have said or done during the trial, intended or attempted to give any intimation 
or opinion as to what the facts and proof were or as to which witnesses are 
worthy of belief or what your verdict should be.  If, during the trial, you have formed an 
impression that the Court has a feeling one way or another about the case, you 
shall disregard any such impression because you jurors are the sole judges of 
the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. The feelings of the Court, if 
any, are irrelevant.

            
I read that instruction to you because I do not want you to think that 
any of the comments that I made to you at the end of the morning session were a 
comment on any of the evidence.  Anything that I said at the end of the 
morning recess was not a comment on the evidence.  It was a comment on the actions of the 
attorneys and that's what I intended it to be.  I did not intend it to be a comment on any 
evidence.  I 
intended my comments to be comments about the attorneys.

 

It is within the trial court's discretion to comment upon 
the conduct of a witness or counsel through a caution, admonition, or censure as 
the circumstances may warrant.  Kendrick, 27 Wyo. 
at 154; see also 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 309 (1991).  However, determining the weight of the 
evidence and assessing the credibility of the witnesses is within the exclusive 
province of the jury.  
Wilkening v. State, 922 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Wyo. 
1996).  When 
making comments in front of the jury, the trial judge should take great care to 
ensure that he does not intrude into the jury's province.

 

[¶20]   Belden contends that the court's 
comments prejudiced him when it refused to hear the motion for a mistrial 
outside the presence of the jury because the State was allowed to present its 
theory behind the evidence and its importance.  Second, he complains that the court's 
comments constituted derogatory remarks about counsel for both parties.  He also insists 
that the court's statement that the motorcycle evidence was "a waste of time" 
was a direct comment on the evidence and, consequently, the court usurped the 
jury's function to determine the facts and credibility.

 

[¶21]   While we find the district court's 
comments unsettling, we are unable to conclude that they were prejudicial to 
Belden for several reasons.  First, the particular statement cited by 
Belden was specifically addressed towards the prosecutor:  "[Prosecutor], I 
won't reprimand you for anything other than wasting our time over this issue of 
the motorcycle."  
From the context in which it appears, the statement is not a comment on 
the evidence; rather, it is an expression of frustration on the part of the 
trial court over what it has perceived as unnecessary, dilatory tactics by the 
prosecution.  
However, it would not be unreasonable for one to construe the court's 
comments to constitute a statement relating to the court's opinion of the value 
of that evidence.  
Even if we accept that interpretation, the fact remains that the comment 
was directed at the prosecution and its attempt to lay a foundation for the 
admission of the photograph of the motorcycle.  It takes a rather large leap in logic to 
conclude that these comments  directed towards the prosecution  so "impressed 
the jury with the trial judge's partiality to the prosecution that this became a 
factor in determining the defendant's guilt."  Pisani, 773 F.2d  
at 402.  Along 
these lines, we would note that evidence relating to the motorcycle was, at 
most, peripheral to the ultimate question of Belden's guilt.  Each party gave the 
motorcycle a single, fleeting mention during their lengthy closing 
arguments.  
Accordingly, we find that the comments by the trial court did not 
prejudice Belden to the point where he was denied a fair trial.

 

[¶22]   Furthermore, any prejudicial effects of 
the court's comments were mitigated by the timely instruction given to the 
jury.  The 
instruction, noted above, was given to the jury immediately upon their return 
from their noon recess before the trial resumed.  The instruction explicitly stated that the 
jury was to give no consideration to the court's comments and that they were the 
sole determiners of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.  This instruction 
was given again to the jury just prior to deliberations.  The court took 
appropriate and immediate remedial action to correct any implication that his 
comments may have suggested an opinion on the value of the evidence or that he 
favored a particular party.  We assume that juries follow a court's 
curative instructions.  Metzger v. State, 
4 P.3d 901, 908 (Wyo. 
2000); see also Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852, 857 
(Wyo. 1987).

 

[¶23]   In his final claim of judicial 
misconduct, Belden contends that there were numerous examples of improper 
comments that denigrated counsel for both parties and reduced the seriousness of 
the proceedings.  
He acknowledges that most of the incidents are minor but argues that in 
total they showed a pattern of "impugning counsel and the proceedings." Again, 
in order for us to set the proper perspective for Belden's claims, we will quote 
extensively from the record.  We will not discuss each citation 
separately.  
Instead, we will discuss and analyze the merits of Belden's claims after 
setting out the relevant portions of the transcripts.  In several 
instances, we have expanded the portion of the transcript cited by Belden in 
order to provide a context for the comments made therein.  Belden added the 
underlining in the transcript citations below in the appendix to his 
brief:

 

THE COURT:  Each side is entitled to another 
peremptory challenge relative to the alternate. Exercise your eighth challenge, 
Mr. Prosecutor.  
(Pause.)

            
You get two more peremptory challenges, [defense counsel], number eight 
and number nine.  
And the Prosecution gets two more, number eight and number nine.  (Pause.)

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I think we've got to do some 

(The State exercised its eighth peremptory challenge.)

THE COURT:  You gave me two, Counsel.  Do you want one 
back?

([Prosecutor] retrieved the paper.) (Pause.)

(The Defense exercised their eighth peremptory 
challenge.)

THE COURT:  You know, I 
take the plug out my ear so I don't hear you whispering.  (Laughter.)

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  You know I wouldn't say 
anything.

THE COURT:  And then when 
you talk to me, I can't hear you.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Who is the  in your system 
who  as the jury sits now, would the alternate be?

THE COURT:  [Names alternate].  (Pause.)

            
I don't know if the loss of hearing is a blessing 
or a curse, Ladies and Gentlemen.  I do know it's real handy when you don't want 
to listen to your wife.  (Laughter.)  You just pretend you 
don't hear.

[PROSECUTOR #1]:  You don't need a 
hearing loss.

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  That's 
exactly right, Judge.  
You don't need the hearing aids for that.

THE COURT:  My daughter 
calls it male selective hearing loss.  (Laughter.)

                                    
* * * *

[PROSECUTOR #1]:  Thank you, Judge.

[Witness], I'm going to hand you a series of photographs 
that were taken during the course of the autopsy and we'll go through them.  I'll  we'll 
introduce them and then we'll talk about them.  I'll bring them up on the LCD, if we 
can.  And if, 
folks, you can't hear, may I  if this gets too loud, the Doctor's kind of soft 
spoken, so if somebody can't hear, your Honor, Counsel, Members of the Jury, 
just somebody speak up and we'll try to go as loud as we can.  And I'm going to 
ask [Prosecutor #2] to make sure I've turned this thing on.  I hit one button 
and I don't know if I did it right.

[Prosecutor #2]:  You 
spent the weekend with it, I thought.

THE COURT:  He loses his 
confidence when he's in front of a group.  (Laughter.)

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  Can you shut the lights 
off?

[PROSECUTOR #1]:  I'll 
remember that, Judge.  
I'll practice.

THE COURT:  He doesn't 
want to be embarrassed by a machine.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  You have to turn on the 
computer.

[PROSECUTOR #1]:  We've got the computer on.  We're just waiting 
for the light bulb to come on.

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  Okay.  It warms up for a second.

* * * *

THE COURT:  No objection?  You're excused, 
Doctor.  Thank 
you for coming.

            
Ladies and Gentlemen, it is time for you to take the noon recess.  We'll do what we're 
going to do  and let me give you some explanation about it.  There is a witness 
that is only available today because of other commitments and we are trying to 
preserve the testimony of that witness for presentation to you at a later 
time.  We're 
going to do that by videotaping that testimony while you are gone and that 
videotape will be presented to you later on in the trial.  That's the most 
that I'll tell you at this point.

            
I think that to accomplish what we want to accomplish, we'll probably 
take close to an hour and a half.  I would  I was told 
by the attorneys that it would be about an hour, but I was also told by the 
attorneys that this Witness would be about an hour.  And so, you know, I 
come awful close to buying stock in the Brooklyn Bridge from time to time.  It seems like I 
would probably buy some if the salesman was a lawyer. (Laughter.)

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I doubt it, 
Judge.

* * * *

[PROSECUTOR #1]:  Let me hand you an item  have 
we marked this?  
I don't believe we have.  I think it's  I'm looking for a specific 
item.

            
Our  It's our Exhibit No. 61, which is a rape kit taken on 1/7/88.  This is it.  I don't see it on 
there.

            
Oh, we haven't tagged it.  Okay.  Thank you.  (Pause.)

THE COURT:  How are you doing,  Pat?

THE REPORTER:  I'm fine.

THE COURT:  I'm talking to 
Pat.

[PROSECUTOR #1]:  I knew 
you weren't asking me.

THE COURT:  Yeah, I'm not 
going to ask you if you need a break.

* * * *

(The jury re-enters the courtroom after a conference in 
chambers.)

THE COURT:  Good morning, folks.  How are you 
all?  Did you 
have trouble getting down from Afton?  Snowing up there?

[Juror]:  No.

THE COURT:  Boy, it was snowing buckets in 
Evanston when we left.  Lord, I thought it was going to be a major 
snowstorm, but when we got on this side of the First Sister and got out on the 
Cumberland Flats, it kind of quit.  It was foggy, cloudy, wet, but no snow.

[Juror]:  It is now.

THE COURT:  It is now, snowing on the flats?

[Juror]:  Yes.

THE COURT:  I was 
laughing before I came into court.  You know, I was kidding [prosecutor] and 
[defense counsel].  
I tell them that they're  the only essential difference between the two 
of them is their size and their weight.  That they basically both have the same kind 
of character and personality when it comes to the job of trying cases.

            
I was joking with Pat and Ken that the best way 
to keep these two guys under control is to keep myself under control because 
what I don't tell them is is [sic] that maybe there 
are three of a kind in this courtroom.  And Ken said to me, "Yeah, if you get 
involved in it, it's going to look  it's going to make WWF look like a church 
social."  
(Laughter.)

            
So I say that because, you know, I've been 
dinging at them and I want you folks to hear it and to say it in their presence 
because they're good men and they fight hard for their cause.

            
Okay,  
[prosecutor].

(Witness sworn in.)

[PROSECUTOR]:  Good 
morning, folks.  
As the littlest of the three, I'm going to keep myself under 
control.

* * * *

[PROSECUTOR]:  And do you recall reading the 
[victim's] diary about the events of this week, that is, August 25, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th?

[WITNESS]:  Yes, sir.

Q:  Does [the victim] talk about [her 
ex-boyfriend] in this diary?

A:  Yes, she does.

Q:  Does she talk about her terrible fear for 
[the ex-boyfriend]?  
Did she 

A:  No.

Q:  Would you say that, in fact, it appears that 
she's very  she was glad to see him, wasn't she, one week 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I'm going to object to the 
form of the question.  
It [sic] leading and suggestive.

[PROSECUTOR]:  Well, we'll read the 
diary.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Why don't you just ask the 
question, Counsel, without leading the Witness?  And I object to his 
reading the document.  If he wants to show him a document and 
refresh his memory, he may do so.

[PROSECUTOR]:  I'm not 
going to read the diary.  I'm trying to read the diary so I can point 
out the passage so I can refresh the Witness's recollection.

THE COURT:  You guys are 
doing what you are doing and you're not involving me.  As far as I'm 
concerned, you have withdrawn the question, [prosecutor].

[PROSECUTOR]:  I have, your Honor.

THE COURT:  So ask another one.

            
And, [defense counsel], if you have an objection, 
I know what you will do.  You will object.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I was just anticipating.  He got the diary 
and walked back there and said, "Let me read it" and that's what I was concerned 
about your Honor.  
I'm sorry.  
I didn't mean to disrupt the Court.

* * * *

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Were you able to see any kind 
of lesion?

[Witness]:  Yes, I did.

Q:  That's interesting, because the pathologist 
yesterday who took the photographs wasn't able to show them to us.

A:  Well, the photograph I saw 

[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, I would raise an 
objection. That's not what the pathologist said.  He said, "I would rather not identify them 
from the photograph because they are not the best quality.  I'd rather testify 
from my reports."

THE COURT:  We're not 
going to have an argument between Counsel.

[PROSECUTOR]:  We're not going to, you Honor.

THE COURT:  I've had 
enough of that kind of stuff from the lawyers.

[PROSECUTION]:  We don't 
want to start, your Honor. I'll withdraw it.  We can take care of it.

* * * *

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Okay. I expect we'll see him 
again, so I'll ask him.  One last thing.  [The prosecutor] 
showed you a  I guess it was a lab report.  I lost track of all the exhibit numbers.  And asked you if 
there was anything in there that indicated the presence of a spermicide and you 
said no?

[WITNESS]:  That's correct.

Q: Okay.  If I may, I'll show you another lab 
report.

(An off-the-record discussion was held between [defense 
counsel] and [the prosecution].) (Pause.)

Q:  And if you would mainly read the bottom 
paragraph now  not out loud, or I guess you can if you like.  You can read it out 
loud.  If that 
would indicate there was a spermicide present 

[PROSECUTION]:  Your Honor, wait a minute.  May I look at 
that?  Is that 
an exhibit?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  No.

[PROSECUTION]:  Oh, may I look at it?  I thought you were 
pulling 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  It's your lab report, May 16. 
(Pause.)

(An off-the-record discussion was held between [defense 
counsel], and [the prosecution].)

[PROSECUTOR]:  There's no foundation and we would 
object to that because it's earlier than the lab report.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I got it from you folks.

THE COURT:  Well, mark it.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  Mark it.

THE COURT:  Mark it and 
offer it.  
Let's not sit here and discuss it between the lawyers.  You know, you 
either talk to the Judge, you talk to the Jury or you talk to no one.

[PROSECUTOR]:  Your 
Honor, we're not going to raise an objection to the introduction.

THE COURT:  Then why are 
you wasting my time, Counsel?

[PROSECUTOR]:  I didn't 
know what it was, your Honor.

THE COURT:  You are.  You are 
now.

* * * *

[PROSECUTOR]:  Okay.  Where was  did you find out any information 
where that blue pickup was last seen?

[WITNESS]:  The last I heard was Deputy 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I'm going to 
object.  I 
don't know what he heard or how he heard or  so I think I'm going to 
object.

THE COURT:  It's hearsay.

[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, not getting into the 
truth of the matter, just to show what he did next.

THE COURT:  I would 
anticipate it's going to put the vehicle in a location that's going to cause 
some palpitations 

[PROSECUTOR]:  Okay.

THE COURT: -- for Defense Counsel, 
which means it's being offered for the truth of the matter stated.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I 
don't know what it's being offered for.

THE COURT:  Sounds to me like 
hearsay.

* * * *

THE COURT:  And I will permit Counsel to go 
ahead; and I'll see if he's going to do what I expect him to do.

[PROSECUTOR]:  (Con't [sic] Redirect Examination by [the prosecutor] of [the 
witness]:) Roger, will you look at your report again, what I've put in 
parentheses, and read that?

[THE WITNESS]:  "We turned around and went to" 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Wait, --

[PROSECUTOR]:  To yourself.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: -- that's what I objected 

THE COURT:  Just to yourself.

[PROSECUTOR]:  Yes, read it to yourself, sir. (Pause.)

THE COURT:  I am 
beginning to lose patience in this case, Gentlemen, and I'm giving you some 
warning.

[PROSECUTOR]:  Roger, does that report indicate 
you made an extensive search for that vehicle?

A:  It appears so, yes.

THE COURT:  Now, that is 
an improper question.  
There is  the objection is sustained.  The answer is disallowed. 

(Pause.)

That is a hearsay document and the document is not allowed 
to talk.

[PROSECUTOR]:  Understood, your Honor.

Q:  Roger, after looking at your report, do you 
remember where you went to look for this vehicle?

A:  We went into the Diamondville area.

Q:  Anywhere specific?

A:  After looking at the report, we must have 
been to all of the areas of Diamondville, on the main roads.

THE COURT:  Away we go.

[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, I have nothing further.

* * * *

[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, we did a trial 
deposition in this case with a [witness] and would ask permission to show 
that.

THE COURT:  Is it a video or is it a written?

[PROSECUTOR]:  It's a video.

THE COURT:  All right.  How long is it?

[PROSECUTOR]:  Fifteen, thirty minutes?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Not that long, I don't 
think.  
Twenty?

[PROSECUTOR]:  It wasn't that long, fifteen to 
thirty minutes, your Honor.  (Pause.)

THE COURT:  Was there a 
judge presiding when you did this?

[PROSECUTOR]:  No.  Neither one of us raised any objections.

THE COURT:  All right.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  We get along 
better.

[PROSECUTOR]:  We get along good, 
your Honor.

(Laughter.)

THE COURT:  It's the tag 
team matches that are driving me nuts.  (Pause while the television was set up.)

A JUROR:  We need some 
popcorn.

ANOTHER JUROR:  Yeah, that sounds 
good.

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  You can lay a little 
foundation, if you might ask the Judge, to tell the Jury why this is 
videotaped.

* * * *

[PROSECUTOR]:  Is it  was it a burden on you to 
have somebody just quit without notice?

[WITNESS]:  Oh, bakers were unusual people.  Like myself, why, I 
had everything planned out the day before, the night before we went to 
work.  If 
somebody upset that schedule that I had in my mind, they might as well send me 
back home.  And 
this is the way I worked because I had everything planned out.  And they're kind of 
unusual people because of the variance of baking is a very complicated thing 
with a noncontrolled shop.  An uncontrolled shop.  You don't have a 
chemist.  You 
don't have anybody to analyze your water, your salt or anything like that and  
and the temperature, the specific gravity and everything comes into this to make 
a good product.  
And so it's a [sic] very complicated with an 
uncontrolled shop and it's hard to get a good product.  We was at  at an 
elevation where everything dryed [sic] out too 
fast.  Your 
cakes had to have your custard in them to keep them more moist, more oil and 
stuff  (The video continued but the Reporter reported 
the following colloquy:)

[PROSECUTOR #1]:  I don't think there was much 
more.  We 
didn't have a heart to stop him.

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  We can stop it here, Judge.

THE COURT:  Pull the 
plug.

THE VIDEO WITNESS:  And [Belden] was a very, very 
 done his job  (The video continued but the Reporter 
reported the following colloquy:)

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  Oh, maybe we ought to hear that.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  Yeah, let's hear 
that.

THE COURT:  Now, fellows, 
you took the deposition.  You know what this Witness said; and if there 
is nothing that's material or relevant to this case, then just pull the 
plug.

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  Okay. Sorry. Just 

THE COURT:  Just because 
you guys did it doesn't mean we have to hear it.  (Pause.)

            
I really have hit a slump at the end of the week, 
folks.  Do you 
want to hear how to make biscuits?

[JUROR]:  No.  I'm hungry.

[JUROR #2]:  I want to eat 
them.

THE COURT:  I'm pretty good at 
dutch oven biscuits.

[JUROR #3]:  That sounds pretty 
good right now.

[Court takes noon recess]

* * * *

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I don't have anything further.

[PROSECUTOR #1]:  Got about five questions, 
pretty short.  
I don't know, your Honor, if 

THE COURT:  Then let's do it, do the questions 
before the recess.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I'll keep track.  (Pause.)

(An off-the-record discussion was held between [the 
prosecutors].)

THE COURT:  Do you know 
what the hardest thing for a lawyer to say is, Ladies and Gentlemen?

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  Just a few 
questions?

THE COURT:  That's the 
easiest thing to say.  
The hardest thing to say is no questions.  (Laughter.)

 [PROSECUTOR #1]:  [Prosecutor #1] 
narrowed me down, your Honor, so it will go quicker.

THE COURT:  And when they 
say "I only have about five questions," that means "I only have about five 
subjects."  
(Laughter.)

* * * *

[PROSECUTOR]:  Okay.  Thank you.  No further 
questions, your Honor.  [Defense counsel] would like to talk to you 
for just a bit.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  And 
if I could have the original exhibit?

[PROSECUTOR]:  Yes. I might need to look at 
those, if you could make sure I've got the right ones.  I'll get them back 
to you, though, because I'm more afraid of you than I am 
the Judge.

THE COURT:  And justifiably so. 
 (Laughter.)

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I know, Judge.

* * * *

[PROSECUTOR #1]:  No further questions. Thank you.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I guess  (Pause.)  No, I don't have 
any questions.

THE COURT:  Thank you, [witness].  You may step down; 
and you're excused.

THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

[PROSECUTOR #1]:  Your 
Honor, now we would like to take up an issue with the Court out of the presence 
of the Jury, if we may.  (Pause.)

THE COURT:  I was 
thinking about going back to Maryland and having a boo law base [sic].  (Laughter.)

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  What?

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  How about a stone crab in 
Annapolis? That would be good.

THE COURT:  How long will it take, the rest of 
the afternoon?  
You see the clock.

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  I don't think it will take long, Judge.

THE COURT:  I have one juror that needs to go Farson. [sic]

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  They can go.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  It's about those other two  
that other little piece.  I think they're done.

THE COURT:  The last two witnesses?

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  Yes, sir.

THE COURT:  Then I will send the Jury home 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Okay.

THE COURT: -- because I think  
we're not going to do that in forty minutes, I don't think.  You've been 
fighting about it now for 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I thought it had been 
settled.  I 
don't know.

THE COURT:  Well, we will 
see.  I'm going 
to send them home because depending on what the ruling is, the State is going to 
rest.

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  Well, 
it depends on what the ruling is, but, yes, sir.

THE COURT:  Yeah.  This will be the 
end of the State's case.  I will end  I will determine when the case  
blah, blah, blah.

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  Yes, sir.

THE COURT:  My ruling will determine whether two 
more  the information from two more individuals is provided.

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT:  Okay.  And then the State will rest?

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  That's right.

* * * *

[PROSECUTOR]:  In light of the matters that we've discussed 
this morning, we're going to ask the Clerk to read something into the record and 
to you folks [the Jury].

THE COURT:  [Clerk]?

[CLERK]:  I'll need the podium.  I'll read very 
slow.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  See how you like it.

THE COURT:  They're going 
to try to make you nervous and embarrass you, [clerk].  Don't let these 
ladies get away with it.  (Laughter.)

* * * *

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Well, let me ask you 
this.  Did you 
 you reviewed the material?

[WITNESS]:  Yes, sir, I did.

Q:  And is it fair to say that based  and these 
were all of the police reports and all of that information that  that had been 
provided to us?

A:  That's correct.

Q:  And based upon that, did you  did you find 
leads that do not appear to have been followed up on and a number of different 
suspects that that information pointed to?

[PROSECUTOR]:  Same objection, your Honor.  That's a matter for 
the  that can be brought out and has been brought out by other witnesses.  And it is not 
subject  it is not the proper subject of expert testimony.  In fact, I don't 
think this is expert testimony.

THE COURT:  What do you think it is?

[PROSECUTOR]:  I think  well, I would rather  I 
have heard nothing that would qualify this particular Witness as an expert, to 
begin with.  I 
think it's lay testimony.  I don't think that it's going to be any more 
helpful to the Jury.  
I don't think it's proper opinion testimony.  (Pause.)

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, they have 
presented the testimony of [another witness] and this is just  (Pause.)

[PROSECUTOR]:  Well, Judge, --

THE COURT:  If you're 
going to stand up and say "He didn't object and I did," sit down.

[PROSECUTOR]:  No. I'm  I was going to advance a 
couple more arguments, but I think the Court probably knows what I'm going to 
say and I will  I feel I'm kind of on thin ice on 
making too  making an argument in front of the 
Jury concerning this material, other than to advance the objections as 
argued, your Honor.  
(Long pause.)

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  701, Judge.  (Pause.)  Your Honor, I 
believe it comes under 702.  701 and 702, both.  (Pause.)

THE COURT:  I'll reserve a ruling.  Ask a question.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Yes, your Honor.

Q:  Did you in your materials review the 
investigation as it relates to [the victim's ex-boyfriend]?

A:  Yes, I did.

Q:  Did you review it as it relates to [the 
roommate's ex-husband] and [the roommate's brother]? 

A:  Yes, I did.

Q:  And also [the victim's roommate]?

A:  Yes.

Q:  And as it relates to, I believe, people that 
 to any other unknown, possible people?

A:  Yes, I did.

Q:  And your  you reviewed this material as you 
would if you had been a  the investigator reviewing all of these reports as 
they came into you; is that correct?

A:  Yes, that is correct.

Q:  And you are prepared now to offer testimony 
as to what you found from the records that were supplied to you from the police, 
including the  the records of [a police investigator] and the other 
investigators?

A:  Yes.

Q:  Okay.  Let's talk about some of these individuals 
then. Let's first talk about [Belden].  What  what did your review and your 
investigation reveal with regard to [Belden]?

[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, --

THE COURT:  Sustained.

[PROSECUTOR]: -- same objection.

THE COURT:  Now, I'm not 
going to let him open it up  let you open it up to a narrative, [defense 
counsel].  And 
I am not going to allow either side to come in and offer expert opinion on the 
ultimate issue 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I'm not going to ask him that.

THE COURT: -- to be decided by the Jury in this case.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, we are not 
offering that.

[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  We're not offering that.

[PROSECUTOR]:  I have to make the following 
objection outside the hearing of the Jury.  Based on that last question of [defense 
counsel], I have to talk to the Court either at side bar 
or in chambers.

THE COURT:  We'll have to 
send them out because I can't do side bars.  I have a hard enough time hearing you people 
when you're yelling at me.  (Laughter.)  All right, folks, 
step out.

* * * *

THE COURT:  I'm going to see what kind of 
donnybrook we have.  
Because, you know, [the defense witness] is going to tell this Jury about 
[the victim's roommate's ex-husband] having committed assaults and violence in 
other jurisdictions and there is not one scintilla of evidence before the Jury 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Because you denied us the 
opportunity to try to present that when we had the witness who could have done 
it, your Honor.  
I am sorry.

THE COURT:  Mr.  [defense counsel] 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  You told me I couldn't go 
into that, your Honor.

THE COURT:  [Defense counsel], I have not seen 
any offers of proof concerning charges against [the roommate's estranged 
husband] nor convictions of [his].  Now, you know, I am trying to avoid this 
being an argument between two judges, [defense counsel].  I let you drag me 
into that before noon. And when I realized that I had walked into a quagmire, I 
shut up and I backed off because I said to myself, "Hey, Judge, you just let 
yourself get into what you said you weren't going to let yourself get into in 
this case."  
And I said, "Judge, you just let yourself get drug into the same thing 
that you've been saying [a prosecutor] got himself drug into."

            
And so, [defense counsel] I am not going to get 
into another argument where it is an ex judge [sic] 
arguing with sitting judge.  You do your job as a lawyer and I'll do my 
job as a judge.  
And you either make offers of proof, you either submit testimony and 
evidence or you don't.  And if you do, there will either be 
objections to it or there will not be objections to it.  If there is [sic] objections, I'll rule on them the best I can.  But I don't intend to bump heads with you any more, 
[defense counsel].

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I'm 
not trying to bump heads with you and I've never asked for any  any quarter and 

THE COURT:  We spent a 
whole morning because I let myself get drug into this business of two judges 
arguing.  And 
I'm ashamed of myself.  I'm ashamed of myself for letting that 
happen.

            
Now, come back to the stand, [witness].  (Pause.)

([Witness] retook the stand.)

THE COURT:  Bring in the Jury.

* * * *

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  What about a motive for [the 
victim's roommate's ex-husband]?

[WITNESS]:  My review of the reports would 
indicate that there is a motive, in my opinion, that [the roommate's ex-husband] 
would have for committing the murder.

Q:  What would that motive be?

[PROSECUTOR]:  Objection, improper opinion 
testimony, your Honor, from a lay witness.

THE COURT:  Sustained.

Q:  [The roommate's ex-husband] had  never 
mind.

THE COURT:  You got it, [defense 
counsel].

Q:  Let's go on.

THE COURT:  I think you've got it.  That's why I 
sustained the objection, because I think you're in the position to do what you 
want to do, [defense counsel].

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Thank you, your Honor.

* * * *

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Without specifically going to 
why, you apparently have come to a conclusion that [the victim's roommate's 
brother] is a possible suspect?

[WITNESS]:  Yes.

Q:  What kind  let me ask you this.  You had described 
this crime to me based upon what you'd seen as what kind of a crime?  You had a term for 
it?

A:  I'm sorry, I'm 

Q:  Okay.  Maybe I can't go that way then.  [The brother] was 
in the area, so he had opportunity?

THE COURT:  Motive, [defense 
counsel].

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Yeah.

Q:  Well, he had opportunity.  Yeah, now was there 
 do you  based upon your review of everything, do you think he had anything 
that would give him motive?

A:  Yes.

* * * *

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  In reviewing that report, in 
connection with the day that that took place, September 1, does that report 
indicate when [an alibi witness] said [the victim's ex-boyfriend] was at his 
trailer at South Pass City?

[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, --

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  You can just answer yes or no.

[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, objection.

THE COURT:  Yes or 
no.  [Defense 
counsel], you're  you know, I think it's obvious to me and the Jury that you 
want this Witness to tell us what [the alibi witness] said about the 
date.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Yes.

THE COURT:  And I don't intend to 
let you do that.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Okay.  We'll go someplace else.

Q:  But based upon that information, I take it 
you believe that 

THE COURT:  However  
however, [defense counsel], I will allow you to have him testify that he 
encountered information that caused him to conclude that there was a discrepancy 
between what [the alibi witness] might say and what [the ex-boyfriend] has told 
us.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Okay.  That's what I was 
just going to ask.

THE COURT:  I'll let him 
go that far, but I will not let him purport to tell this Jury what [the alibi 
witness] would testify.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Okay.

Q:  Now, based upon that information, do you have 
an opinion  apparently, you have an opinion.  Did you hear the 
Judge's statement?  
(Laughter.)

A:  Yes.

THE COURT:  Just ask him 
did the Judge summarize it correctly?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Did the Judge summarize it 
correctly?

A:  Sort of. I'm not aware of what the testimony 
was in the courtroom for the testimony of [the ex-boyfriend], that he, in fact, 
testified from the report.

Q:  All right.

A:  I find an inconsistency between what [the 
ex-boyfriend] said and what [the alibi witness] said.

* * * *

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Now, is  does [the 
ex-boyfriend] have further opportunity between 9:00 and midnight, in your 
opinion?

[WITNESS]:  Yes.

Q:  Please explain that to me.

A:  The vehicle was observed at [the 
ex-boyfriend's] trailer at approximately between 11:30 and 12:00, 12:01.  [The ex-boyfriend] 
was not.  He 
was not observed or  until the following morning.  I believe it was 
approximately 9:00 in the morning.

Q:  Okay.

A:  So there is a time period of nine hours that 
no one saw him.

Q:  But if his car is there, how is he going to 
get back and forth?  
How is he going to do it?

A:  I would be speculating 

Q:  Well, you think there is 

[PROSECUTOR]:  The Witness just said he was 
speculating which we've heard a lot of this afternoon from this Witness.  I'm glad he's 
finally identified what he's doing; and I would object to his speculation.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Judge, I object to the objection, the form of the 
objection.

THE COURT:  Well, the 
objection is sustained; and your objection to the manner in which the objection 
was given is sustained.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Thank you.

THE COURT:  You're 
reminding me of myself, [defense counsel].

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  All right.

THE COURT:  Blowing off 
steam.

[PROSECUTOR]:  I was.  And it was 
fun.

THE COURT:  All right.  (Laughter.)

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  So we've talked about [the 
ex-boyfriend].  
Now, let's assume that he was in his car and he's home at midnight.  Now, do you have 
any opinion as to whether or not he still had any opportunity to commit this 
crime, at least the crime of murder?

A:  Yes.

Q:  And is there any indication  well, what is 
that?  Tell me 
that.

A:  An analysis of the reports would indicate 
that there were two parties that placed a red pickup truck at [the 
ex-boyfriend's] trailer prior to midnight.  It was not there after midnight.

Q:  Okay.  Now, what about  is [the ex-boyfriend's] 
whereabouts accounted for between midnight, if he had driven home, and the next 
morning?

A:  No independent corroboration, just his 
statement that he went home and went to sleep.

Q:  Now, there was some DNA tests taken of the 
fingernails of the decedent and I believe you were not shown those tests until 
just recently?

A:  That's correct.

Q:  Do you attach any significance to that?

A:  I do.

Q:  What is that significant of?

A:  The result indicated that under  or in the 
scrapings of the right fingernails of the victim, there's DNA comparison that 
matches to [the ex-boyfriend].

Q:  Or they said they couldn't rule him out?

A:  That is correct.

Q:  Now, you are aware that there is no DNA  or 
they did the same DNA analysis of those fingernails to include [Belden] but he 
was excluded?

A:  That's 

Q:  Are you aware of that?

A:  That's what the report stated, yes.

Q:  Now, as an investigator, with your kind of 
experience, if you had a witness who was telling the truth when they say 
somebody was scratched, would you expect that you might find any evidence as a 
result of that scratching 

A:  Yes.

Q:  -- based upon what you've learned in this 
case?  I mean, 
the DNA was found?

A:  Okay.

Q:  Okay.  Excuse me.

A:  I'm not sure I 
understand the question or whether there were two questions there.

Q:  Yeah.

THE COURT:  Well, answer them 
both.

THE WITNESS:  Okay. Thank you, your Honor.  (Laughter.)  My experience would 
indicate to me that 

THE COURT:  I'm sorry.  I couldn't 
resist.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I 
deserved it, every bit of it.  That was a terrible question.

[PROSECUTOR]:  And I want to object 
to both of them.

THE COURT:  Okay.  The objection to 
both is sustained.  
Now, let's start over again.

* * * *

[PROSECUTOR]:  All right. It looks to me like 
before you left the Lincoln Police Department, you were what we refer to in my 
office as a sharp pencil.  Have you ever heard that phrase?

[WITNESS]:  In reference to a trooper, I have, 
but not to an attorney.

Q:  A supervisor.  You were a supervisor, correct?

A:  I was.

Q:  And your job was basically to make sure that 
people stayed within budget.  You were to liaison with the press.  You were to serve 
as a guest speaker at various things.  Oh, you were to make sure that those 
University of Nebraska athletes knew if they really got out of line, they might 
end up in jail, and that sort of thing; is that correct?

A:  Yes, sir  no, sir.

Q:  Oh, then let's read your vitae. We'll go on. 
Perhaps you misrepresent it 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, -- your Honor, I 
would offer his curriculum vitae as an exhibit.

[PROSECUTOR]:  And also 
ask, your Honor, the Witness wanted to get in a little crack and that's fine, 
but we'll get along  he and I will get along a lot better if we can keep that 
to a minimum.

THE COURT:  Both of you 

[PROSECUTOR]:  I'll 
promise not to yell if you promise not to put in the cracks.

THE COURT:  And you'll 
all get along better with me if neither one of you do either one of those 
things. All right?

THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

THE COURT:  I have lost 
my control once today and I don't want to do it again.

[PROSECUTOR]:  That's fine, Judge.

THE COURT:  Okay.

* * * *

[PROSECUTOR]:  Okay.  Now, you said you 
look for two things when you're solving a crime, motive and opportunity; is that 
correct?

[WITNESS]:  I believe I said that those are two 
of the things that I'm looking for.  There are other things.

Q:  Sure.  Like means  means, motive, opportunity, 
isn't that what they always teach you fellows? Or maybe not you, but law 
enforcement, in general, in looking at a criminal 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I object. That's 
a snide underhanded, you know, editorial comment that is improper.

[PROSECUTOR]:  And I object to the objection, 
your Honor. It 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  It's an improper question.

[PROSECUTOR]:  Up to this point, your Honor, I've 
tried to keep in check how  any comments about [defense counsel] and his 
editorializing but at this point, I object to the objection and leave it at 
that.

THE COURT:  Well, it 
wasn't underhanded, but it was snide. It was right out front. So the objection 
to the form of your question and the manner of your question is sustained. 
 And I 
won't sustain your objection to [defense counsel's] objection.

            
Okay. Now, let's take a recess.  It's time for a 
recess for all of us because, you know, between [defense counsel], me and you, 
[prosecutor], it becomes the pot and kettle and  I don't know what I am.  I'm maybe in the 
thunder mode.  
I don't know.  
But the pot, the kettle and  and the tea pot.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, --

THE COURT:  And it's time for us to just take a 
break.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, the only thing I 
would say is this Witness has been delayed two extra days from what he 
anticipated and I need to get him going as quickly as I can.

THE COURT:  [Defense 
counsel], look behind you at the clock.  We've been here since 1:00 and it's almost 
3:00.  And 
I think you would like a break, too, wouldn't you, [witness]?

THE WITNESS:  That's fine, your Honor.

THE COURT:  Fifteen minutes, Ladies and Gentlemen.

* * * *

[PROSECUTOR]:  Good.  You and I are both 
tongue-tied.  
We are both like George Bush.  We massacre those syllables.

            
What does that mean?

[WITNESS]:  She had a bruise on her head.

Q:  You're aware that Dr. Allen testified that 
that wound was sufficient to have debilitated her?

A:  I was not here.  I 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I'm going to 
object to that question because it mistakes [sic] 
the testimony.  
He said it might, not that it did.  It could.

THE COURT:  I will not 
settle the dispute about what the pathologist said.  The jury will 
resolve that.  
If your objection is the form of the question, --

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Misstates the evidence is my objection, your Honor.

THE COURT:  Then I will not rule 
on it.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  That's fine, your Honor, but 
that's my objection.

* * * *

[PROSECUTOR]:  How about [the roommate's 
brother]? Is he mentioned in [the victim's] diary, ever?

[WITNESS]:  Oh, I don't recall that, [the 
brother] being mentioned in the diary.

Q:  Is there any indication that  you made some 
 some insinuation concerning illegal activities, that [the roommate] would have 
 or [the roommate] would have a motive based upon some sort of illegal 
activities that were going on?

THE COURT:  Now, --

A:  Yes, --

THE COURT:  Now, Counsel, 
--

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  He 
asked the question. I think we're entitled to an answer.

THE COURT:  Just wait. I 
don't need your help, [defense counsel].  I don't need your help.  When I need your 
help, I'll ask for it.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Yes, sir, but I don't think that 

THE COURT:  I don't need 
your help, [defense counsel].  You sit there and I'll hear you at the proper 
time.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Okay, your Honor, just as 
long as I get to say my piece.

THE COURT:  Now, I don't know which [the roommate 
or her brother] you are talking about.

[PROSECUTOR]:  I misspoke and I tried to correct 
myself.  [The 
roommate].

Q:  Okay. The 

THE COURT:  Now, [defense counsel]?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I think he can 
answer the question that's been asked.

THE COURT:  Well, he can answer the question as 
soon as I can identify who [the prosecutor] is talking about, --

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Okay. I'm sorry that you were 

THE COURT: -- in fairness to the witness. [Defense 
counsel], you just be a lawyer.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I'm sorry, your Honor. I 

THE COURT:  And you don't try to do my job any 
more, [defense counsel].

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I'm trying to do my job.

THE COURT: You're trying to tell me what to do and I've had 
enough of it.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I'm sorry you perceive it 
that way, your Honor.  
That's not what I'm trying to do.

THE COURT:  Now, clean up your question, 
[Prosecutor].

* * * *

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Just one question  two 
questions following that up.  And I think you tried to answer this.  Is there any 
evidence that indicates that  I mean, you said there had to be an encounter 
because at least we know that [Belden] and [the victim] had sex?

[WITNESS]:  Correct.

Q:  Correct.  There's no evidence as to when that sex took 
place, is there?

A:  Not that I found, no.

Q:  And it is possible, I guess, that they could 
have had sex before 8:00 o'clock?

A:  Yes.

Q:  It is possible that they could have had sex 
after 8:00 o'clock?

A:  Yes.

Q:  It is possible they could have had sex any 
time on the 28th or 29th  up until they found her dead body, correct?  I mean, to be 
fair?

A:  Yes, sir.

Q:  And it's also possible and it's  there's 
nothing in the records that indicate that the sex took place at the time that 
the murder took place, is there?

A:  No, sir.

[PROSECUTOR]:  Objection, your Honor.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Thank you.

THE COURT:  Enough, 
enough, enough, enough.  The Jury knows.  It's been gone over 
and over and the Jury has heard it.  It's now in the hands of the Jury to 
decide.

* * * *

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  What other kinds of things 
do you see that cause that type of injury?

[WITNESS]:  Well, we've discussed, unfortunately, 
physicians cause that.  For anybody who has ever had an initial pap 
smear, you have to have  use the speculum and we, from time to time, will cause 
injury to the  to the vaginal side walls, to the perineal body.  Consensual sex, 
vigorous sex, is very  very consistent with trauma, abrasions, 
lacerations.  
And probably the thing that I see the most is infections.

([Prosecutor #1] began coughing and left the 
courtroom.)

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  Do we need to hold up a 
second?

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  Could we hold up just a moment 
while [prosecutor #1] goes and recovers from whatever happened to him?  It wasn't as 
serious as it might be. It should be brief.

([Prosecutor #1] entered the courtroom.)

[PROSECUTOR #1]:  Now, 
I'm embarrassed, your Honor.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  It's all this sex 
talk.

[PROSECUTOR #1]:  It's 
that alkaline water.

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  He's 
got six kids.  
I don't think it's the subject.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  That's what scares 
him.

THE COURT:  Talk about 
vigorous sex and [prosecutor #1] fled the courtroom.  (Laughter.)

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  Well, now I'm lost.  (Laughter.)  Let's see.

THE COURT:  We've got to 
stop and be serious, folks.  I'm sorry I did that.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  No, you're not.  (Laughter.)

THE COURT:  All 
right.  Now, 
let's get back.  
This is serious business.

* * * *

THE COURT:  Okay.  Do you want to try to do a witness in twenty 
minutes or do you want to go home?  This is going to send the case into Tuesday, 
Ladies and Gentlemen.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I have to go all 
the way back to Cheyenne.  And if I can leave now, I  you know, but I 
don't want to take up any more time with this Jury and I'll stay here.  You know, Judge, I 
never  when I started practicing law, we tried these cases until midnight and 
we started out the next morning at 6:00 o'clock, so I'm ready to go.

THE COURT:  If that's the Jury's pleasure and 
yours, I'll do it, otherwise I would like to go 
home.  And I 
think these jurors ought to hang me if I did that to them.  (Laughter.)

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Well, 
I wanted to hang that judge, too.

THE COURT:  I think it's 
time for us to go home.  We've had really a tough day, Gentlemen.  At least I 
have.  It's 
time for us to quit and it's time for us to send these good folks home to 
their families.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT:  Because we're 
going to impose upon them next week as well.  And, folks, I'm sorry about that.  But this is an 
important case and it's a serious case.  It's one that deserves all the attention that 
 that it requires.  
And you shouldn't be trying to take short cuts with it.  And, you know, the most admirable thing about this whole case has been you 
folks.  You 
know, my behavior isn't anything which you can  you would want to throw a stick 
at.  Maybe you 
would want 

[JUROR]:  We've heard 
about you before.  
We came prepared.  (Laughter.)

THE COURT:  Yeah.  It's been a little 
bit touch and go here. And so has [the prosecutor] and so has [the defense 
counsel].  And 
we've been the three principal culprits in the case.  But, you know, you 
folks have just been superb.  Your attention has never wavered.  You are bright and 
you have been interested and you know what?  You've been good natured.  You really 
have.  I sure 
as hell haven't.  
(Laughter.)

* * * *

THE COURT:  Yeah, I do.  (Laughter.)  You can  you can 
talk to  you can talk to other judges if they happen to be available, but, you 
know, I'm the only district judge.  And, you know, I don't talk to very many 
judges, so it's one of those things that you do alone.  And you folks can 
only do it with the other folks that are on the jury.

            
Anything I should take up with them that I haven't talked about, 
Counsel?  [Prosecutor #2], you're the only one paying attention to 
me.

[PROSECUTOR #2]:  No, we were all  
(Laughter.)

[PROSECUTOR #1]:  We were 
rapt with attention.  And, no, there's nothing else that we need to 
talk about.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Bullshit.

THE COURT:  [Defense 
counsel's] packing his bag for a fast retreat.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I'm 
honest, Judge. I was  I was not listening to you, but then that's the 
difference between me and [Prosecutor #1].

[PROSECUTOR #1]:  Oh, --

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I 
finally got back at him.  Sorry. That's  that's just a little 

THE COURT:  We can yell 
and scream at each other as lawyers and be madder than hell at each other and 
say harsh and mean things to each other, but that's just only for the 
minute.  That 
doesn't mean anything.  That's just kind of the heat of the battle 
sort of things.

            
Old Ed Herschler and I would go round and round 
and round and when it was all done, he would say, "Come on, kid. I'll buy you a 
drink."  Oh, 
hell.

            
All right.  
We'll see you 9:00 o'clock tomorrow morning.

* * * *

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  That's what you wrote?

[PROSECUTOR]:  Asked and answered.

THE COURT:  You sit.  You sit.  I've had enough of 
this.  Next 
question.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT:  We're not 
going to have two lawyers arguing.  I've had an ex-judge and me arguing and that 
wasn't any good.

* * * *

THE COURT:  Thank you, [prosecutor].

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  May I have that report?

[PROSECUTOR]:  You've got it.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  No. I don't have a copy.

[PROSECUTOR]:  Well, you  you have may it. [sic]

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I can't find it.

THE COURT:  You may step 
down, [witness], while they're arguing with each other.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Well, I don't have this one 
because it was 10/2.  
Can we just make a copy of that?  (Pause.)  Your Honor, at this time, what I would like 
to do is to set up and play the videotape deposition and then we have one other 
witness, but we'll do him last.

THE COURT:  All right.  Fine.  Set it up.  We'll just sit here 
and wait.

* * * *

[PROSECUTOR]:  Okay. Now, in regards to the 
injuries that  or the absence of injuries that you describe around the genital 
area of [the victim], it's true, isn't it, Doctor, that if [the victim] had been 
rendered either unconscious or debilitated in a serious  substantial fashion, 
she would not be able to struggle and it's quite likely that injuries to that 
area might not have occurred?

[WITNESS]:  I disagree with that.

Q:  So every rape that you've always seen, 
there's always significant bruising to the inner thighs and the vaginal 
area?

A:  Typically, commonly, --

Q:  No, that's  the question was every 
rape.  Now, Doctor, you like to go on and I know you want to earn 
your $1,200, but, please, Doctor 

A:  Sir, I'm  I'm really 
offended by that.

Q:  Just, please, answer 
my questions.

A:  I'm really offended 
by that.

Q:  Well, that's irrelevant 

A:  I'm here to answer 

[PROSECUTOR]:  I ask that 
the Witness be instructed to answer the questions that I'm asking.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #1]:  Objection, your 
Honor.  He's 
just arguing.  
Just ask the question.

THE COURT:  It's time to 
stop.  If you 
two want to get acquainted and begin to learn how to talk to each other in a 
proper fashion in the courtroom, I know a place I can put you so you can get 
acquainted.

            
Now, Doctor, you are a witness, not an 
advocate.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL #2]:  I'm going to object, your Honor.

THE COURT:  You will 
answer the questions.  
If he calls for a yes or no question  answer from you, you will answer 
yes; you will answer no; or you will give us some version of "I cannot answer 
that question yes or no," but you will not volunteer.

            
Now, [prosecutor] you know the difference between 
asking questions and arguing with the witness.  The two of you are engaged in argument.  You are not engaged 
in questions and answers.  I won't permit it from you, 
[prosecutor].

[PROSECUTOR]:  Yes, sir.

THE COURT:  You know 
better.

[PROSECUTOR]:  Yes, sir.

THE COURT:  And I think, 
Doctor, that you've testified before and you know the rules and so I'm going to 
hold you to those rules.  Do you understand, sir?

THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

THE COURT:  Now, proceed.

* * * *

[PROSECUTOR]:  So, Doctor, let me get this right. 
In your opinion  well, let me put it this way.  Since you're an expert, I'll give you a 
hypothetical.  
You come upon a young woman thirty years of age in a trailer.  We're down in  
what county is San Antonio in?

[WITNESS]:  Bexar County.

Q:  Bexar County.  So down in Bexar County, San Antonio, you 
come across a young woman in a trailer.  She's got fabric around her neck.  Fluid seeping out 
of her nose and her mouth.  She's sustained a blow to the top of her 
head.  She's 
got a cheek that's all swollen up on the left side.  She's spread out on 
the living room of her  of her trailer with her legs spread.  She's got semen at 
the entrance to her vagina and deep within her vagina.  And I take it from 
your testimony today, Doctor, that you would tell the good deputy sheriffs of 
Bexar County, "Thank God, boys, we don't have a rape here?"

A:  No, I wouldn't tell them that without having 
all of the information processed and without finding out more about the 
circumstances around the death, including people that are being considered as 
suspects.  This 
is nothing that you rush into and make a judgment after three or four weeks and 
 and say that there's a sexual assault based on one small injury that can occur 
after other kinds of trauma.

Q:  Doctor, that wasn't 
the hypothetical I gave you; and I didn't ask you to focus in on one small piece 
of evidence, did I?

A:  No, but you 

Q:  You have to take the whole  the whole scene 
into consideration?

A:  And then you have to do all the other things 
that I've said.

Q:  And that's what Dr. Allen did in this case, 
isn't it?

A:  That's  that's true. That's 

[PROSECUTOR]:  Thank you very much.  I have no further 
questions of this Witness.  (Pause.)

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I'm not asking the questions.

THE COURT:  Dr. Bux, I 
think they're through dinging at you.

THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT:  Thank you for 
coming.  I hope 
you enjoyed your trip up here.

* * * *

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  And he told you that he'd 
been driving around there, trying to wait for her to get there, correct?

[WITNESS]:  Yes, sir.

Q:  And he told you at that time  I wanted to 
try to put this in order but you're  you know, since you have some question 
about when he was there, I've had to kind of go around here.

[PROSECUTOR]:  Objection, your Honor, to the 
argumentative 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I'm trying 

[PROSECUTOR]:  If he could just stick to a 
question and  answer format rather than having [defense counsel] give 
argument, I guess, for lack of a better phrase.

THE COURT:  Ask a 
question.  The 
whole commentary is a waste of the Jury's and my time.

* * * *

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  And then you ask him  
(Pause.) "And, anyway, you drove around until"  and what was his answer?

[WITNESS]:  I don't recall.

Q:  Well, here it is, right there.

A:  "At least until sun up."

Q:  And then what was the next statement?

A:  I asked him "Which would have probably"  and 
he said, "About 5:00 or 6:00."

Q:  So he'd been out, driving around, going by, 
trying to find his sister who was living at [the victim's] trailer and we know 
he's driving around from at least 2:00 o'clock 

THE COURT:  Ask a 
question, [defense counsel], or you're going to get an objection.

Q:  Okay.

* * * *

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  You would tell me that you 
think the investigation that you did and the follow-ups that you did with regard 
to [the victim's ex-boyfriend], [the roommate's ex-husband] and everybody else 
was a good, thorough investigation?

[WITNESS]:  Yes, sir, as a whole.

Q:  As a whole. Although you can't give us any 
specific reasons why you excluded these people, you just did it because your 
investigative sense told you to, is that what you're telling me?

A:  No, sir.  I could give you several reasons.

Q:  Start.

A:  Pardon?

Q:  Start.

[PROSECUTOR]:  Objection 
to the tone of [defense counsel's] voice.  He's becoming argumentative.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I 
apologize  
-- I apologize to you, [witness].  I really do.  I really apologize to you.

THE COURT:  Look at the 
clock, [defense counsel].  (Pause.)  I would like to finish the Witness before we 
take the noon recess.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I will.  (Pause.)  I think all of it's 
argument, so I will  I have no further questions.

THE COURT:  [Prosecutor], do you have anything more?

[PROSECUTOR]:  Yes, your Honor. In regards to 

THE COURT:  I roll my 
eyes at you, [prosecutor].  Did you see me?

[PROSECUTOR]:  I looked 
at you, Judge; and I am going to risk incurring your wrath by asking a few 
questions, but just a few.

 

While we certainly wish that the trial court could have 
been more circumspect, we discern no error that would support a reversal of the 
jury's judgment.  
The foregoing comments do not evince any bias on the part of the trial 
court in favor of one side or the other.  The court's attempt to relieve tension 
through humor was, at worst, ill advised, but it either was not prejudicial at 
all, or not so prejudicial as to impair Belden's right to a fair trial.  The court's 
comments were directed either at itself or towards counsel of both parties.  It must be stressed 
that counsel for Belden and the State actively engaged in banter with the trial 
court without ever questioning the propriety of the attempts at humor.  Attempts at humor 
or levity that were directed at or referenced a criminal defendant would 
certainly raise serious concerns implicating the fairness of a trial.  However, none of 
the comments made by the judge or counsel in this case were of that 
nature.

 

[¶24]   While one could characterize the 
court's comments admonishing counsel as intemperate or unwise, we do not find 
them to have been necessarily prejudicial, or so prejudicial to defendant, as to 
deprive him of a fair trial.  The court directed its comments equally at 
counsel for both sides.  It is difficult to discern the atmosphere of 
a trial or how the jury perceived the proceedings from the sterile, black and 
white transcript.  
It is telling, however, that the party in the best position  Belden's 
defense counsel  never gave indication that they believed the court's comments 
were motivated by bias or had the effect of prejudicing Belden.  There was no 
objection, request for an in camera hearing, or 
motion for a new trial based upon the court's comments.  In short, there is 
no evidence in the transcript or in the record that the court's comments 
admonishing counsel for their conduct caused prejudice and deprived Belden of a 
fair trial.

 

[¶25]   This case spanned seven days of trial 
from October 9 through October 17, 2000, generated 1,390 pages of transcript, 
and almost 1,000 pages of record.  Belden and the State were represented by 
highly competent counsel who zealously advocated on behalf their clients.  Both sides 
vigorously presented their positions to the jury.  The various quotations taken from the record 
transcript in this case appear lengthy in this format but in the context of the 
proceedings below they are but a miniscule portion.  After a careful 
review of the entire record, we are convinced that there was no prejudice to 
Belden from the comments made by the district court to the extent that he was 
deprived of his right to a fair trial.

 

The following information is admitted for a limited purpose 
and relevant to the charge of first degree murder:  The purpose is to 
show that [Belden] may have a had a motive or reason for killing [the 
victim].  You 
shall not consider this information for any other purpose or purposes.

            
In August, 1976, the Defendant met [woman #1] . . . Approximately, one 
week after they became roommates, Defendant and [woman #1] engaged in sexual 
intercourse.  
[Woman #1] accused the Defendant of rape.  [Belden] was charged with the commission of a 
crime, but he was not convicted of sexual assault.

            
In June 1984, the Defendant met [woman #2] and they agreed to have a 
dinner date.  
On the night of the date, the Defendant and [woman #2] engaged in sexual 
intercourse.  
[Woman #2] accused the Defendant of rape.  [Belden] was charged with the commission of a 
crime, but he was not convicted of sexual assault.

 

At the conclusion of the case, the district court included 
the following instruction to the jury:

 

The information relative to [woman #1] and [woman #2] was 
admitted for a limited purpose relevant to the charge of first degree murder: 
The purpose was to show that [Belden] may have had a motive or reason for 
killing [the victim].  
You shall not consider this testimony for any other purpose, or 
purposes.

            
In addition, by allowing the information to be admitted, the Court does 
not pass on the weight to be afforded the information, if any, or whether the 
information proves or fails to prove the purpose for which the information was 
received; those are matters for you to decide.

 

The evidence was admitted over the objection of 
Belden.  On 
appeal, Belden contends that the district court abused its discretion because 
the evidence was irrelevant, overly prejudicial, and denied him his 
Constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses.

 

A.                 
Standard of Review

 

[¶27]                           
Our review of rulings by a trial court, admitting or excluding evidence, 
is premised upon deference to the trial court, and we do not reverse a case 
because of evidentiary rulings unless an abuse of discretion is 
demonstrated.  
Horton v. State, 764 P.2d 674, 676-77 (Wyo. 
1988).  
"Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously."  Vaughn v. State, 
962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998).

 

O'Brien v. State, 2002 WY 
63, ¶ 27, 45 P.3d 225, 234 (Wyo. 
2002).

 

B.                 
Discussion

 

[¶28]   The State's theory of the case was that 
Belden had a motive to kill the victim because he had been accused in the past 
of rape after engaging in sexual intercourse with other women.  The motive to kill 
was his desire to prevent another accusation of rape.  The district court 
admitted the evidence, as noted above, but specifically limited it to the 
question of Belden's motive to kill the victim.

 

[¶29]   Belden attacks the admission of this 
evidence by claiming that motive is irrelevant to a charge of felony murder, 
which is predicated on the first-degree sexual assault charge.  Belden insists that 
the use of the evidence to show motive "was a sham of an excuse to introduce 
prejudicial propensity evidence."  In support of this claim, Belden contends 
that the prosecution made a propensity argument during its closing:

 

And, finally, two and a half years later when they finally 
track him down, what does he say?  He denies any involvement with [the 
victim].  He 
says, "Oh, I was at that house once or twice.  Once  I didn't go inside the house.  No, I wasn't 
involved with those people.  I wasn't involved with those people."  That's what he 
says.  
Subsequently, blood is obtained from him and we discover that the chances 
are one in 700 billion that that semen is somebody else's.

            
There's evidence from the victim in this case that shows she knew the 
Defendant briefly and in passing, but the evidence shows they're not involved in 
any way, shape or form.  They have no relationship whatsoever.  And, finally, the evidence shows that in the past, the Defendant 
had had sexual intercourse with women and been accused of rape.  It is our 
contention, Ladies and Gentlemen, that these facts point out one inescapable 
conclusion, that the Defendant sexually assaulted 
and murdered [the victim].  [Emphasis supplied by Belden.]

 

Belden insists that this is a blatant propensity argument 
especially in light of the fact that the State did not link the evidence to a 
motive to kill until later in the closing.  In his final attack, Belden contends that the 
court erred by introducing the evidence through the written statement read to 
the jury.  If 
the trial court believed that the evidence was too prejudicial to allow the 
women to testify, then Belden argues it was too prejudicial to be admitted in 
any form.  
Belden also claims that the admission of the evidence through the 
statement read to the jury deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation.5

 

[¶30]   Procedurally, the possibility that the 
State might offer evidence related to previous accusations of sexual assault 
against Belden was disclosed through a court filing by the State detailing the 
evidence it would offer in a trial.  A hearing was scheduled, and the State filed 
a memorandum in support of its position.  A hearing was held on August 28, 2000.  It is very 
important to note that the two women who brought the accusations against Belden 
appeared at that hearing and gave testimony under oath regarding the specifics 
of the alleged incidents at that hearing.  The State followed up the hearing with a 
detailed brief defending admission of the evidence.  Belden responded 
with a brief opposing the State's evidence.

 

[¶31]   The district court considered the issue 
up until the conclusion of the State's presentation of its trial case.  At that time, the 
district court reviewed the parties' arguments and very carefully considered 
whether or not to admit this evidence balancing its probative value against the 
potential for prejudice within the context of the factors we set out in Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351 (Wyo. 
1996).  In 
making its ruling, the court set out in detail its reasoning:

 

Now, the testimony of [the two women] that was given to 
this Court, clearly in its  in the allegations of prior rapes, direct attention 
to and reflect upon the character of [Belden]. And by Rule 404(b), that 
testimony is rendered inadmissible unless those prior allegations of rape are 
relevant for some other purpose than reflecting or showing the character of 
[Belden].

            
Now, the State has claimed many purposes or reasons why it should be 
relevant, but all of those reasons have been rejected by the Court except one 
and that is motive.  
The State claims that the allegations [by the two women] are relevant 
and, therefore, admissible for the purpose of showing that the Defendant had a 
motive for killing [the victim].  It is not whether he committed the act of 
rape of these two ladies, or not, which the State believes is important.  Instead, it is the 
accusation and the subsequent prose  unsuccessful prosecution for sexual 
assault which the State believes is important.  It is the accusation and the prosecution, the 
unsuccessful prosecution which the State believes supplies the motive.  It is not whether 
the rape occurred or whether it didn't occur.  (Pause.)

            
In short, the State wants to argue to the Jury that once having 
consensual sexual intercourse with [one of the women] and then being accused of 
rape and tried and unsuccessfully  not tried unsuccessfully for that crime, 
that gave [Belden] a reason or motive for silencing [the victim] after 
consensual sex by killing her.

            
Now, I raised and the Defense now argues to the Court that motive to kill 
is not relevant not relevant.  It is not relevant to either first degree 
sexual assault or first degree sexual assault felony murder.  The idea advanced 
by the Defense is that motive to kill or motive for killing is an explanation of 
why someone might have intended to kill another person, but it is not an 
explanation of why someone might have intended to sexually assault someone.  In short, the 
Defense argues that the motive alleged by the State goes to intent, the intent 
to kill.  The 
State  the Defense argues that intent to kill is not an element of first degree 
sexual assault felony murder and, therefore, intent to kill is not a part of 
this case.  In 
other words, the alleged motive is irrelevant in this case.

            
Now, [defense counsel], I have to disagree and I do disagree.  And, [Belden], I 
take no joy in it. The State of Wyoming, through its legislature, has defined 
what constitutes first degree murder and it has given us a whole list of acts 
that constitute first degree murder.  Among the kinds of conduct that the 
legislature has said constitutes first degree murder are the crime of sexual 
assault felony murder and first degree premeditated murder.  In the case of 
first degree premeditated murder, the State of Wyoming has said that there must 
be premeditation and intent and that it must be proved by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt by the State if the charge is first degree premeditated 
murder.

            
But, on the other hand, the legislature has said "We will relieve the 
State of the burden of proving intent or premeditation if it's sexual assault 
felony murder."  
In short, the State  the Wyoming Legislature has said that killings that 
occur in the perpetration of sexual assaults are so destructive to the fabric of 
our society that we will just make it the most severe crime on our books.  And we will 
legislate and decree that all that the State needs to prove in sexual assault 
felony murder is that the sexual assault occurred and the victim was killed in 
the perpetration of that assault. In other words, your burden of proof is 
different, Mr. Prosecutors.  But just because the burden and elements of 
proof are different for sexual assault felony murder does not mean that intent 
to kill is not a part of the crime alleged.  It does not mean that intent to kill is not a 
part of the incident that occurred.  It just means that the State doesn't have to 
prove it.  When 
a person is killed in the perpetration of a sexual assault, the killing is 
either accidental or it is intentional.

            
What's an example of an accidental killing?  The victim 
momentarily fights off her attacker and attempts to flee, trips and falls, 
strikes her head and dies.

            
First degree murder, if the killing is accidental, motive relative to the 
intent to kill would not be relevant.  On the other hand, if the killing was 
intentional and, in other words, not accidental, rather, it was intentional, 
motive or reason to kill is relevant.  It flat is relevant.  It is part of the 
picture.  It 
may not have to be proved intent or motive, but it is part of the picture.  It is part of the 
story.  At 
least from the standpoint of the State, it is.

[The court goes on to review the evidence, which shows that 
this was not an accidental death.]

In summation, the Court concludes that the motive of 
[Belden] to kill is a relevant issue to be placed before the Jury, with the Jury 
to determine whether or not the alleged motive makes sense or whether it makes 
no sense at all; and for the Jury to determine whether or not it will accept or 
reject the motive and the arguments of the State.

 

The district court correctly concluded that motive, while 
not an element of felony murder, could still be relevant.

 

Although . . . proof of motive is ordinarily not essential, 
evidence tending to show motive is always relevant and admissible, particularly 
in cases of circumstantial evidence, or where the intent of accused is at issue, 
or accused denies the commission of the crime, unless its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice from its admission.

            
Evidence tending to show the absence of motive is likewise relevant and 
admissible. . . .

            
The admission of evidence with respect to motive is within the discretion 
of the court.  
Wide latitude in the admission of evidence of motive is permissible, 
particularly in cases where a corrupt motive or fraudulent intent is an 
important element of the crime charged.

 

22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 726 
(1989 and 2001 Supp.) (citations omitted).  Motive is especially relevant in this case 
because Belden admitted to being present at the victim's 
residence during the timeframe wherein the crime occurred but denied 
perpetrating the crime.  Other jurisdictions have allowed evidence of 
motive in felony murder cases.  See People v. Wells, 302 N.W.2d 196, 200 (Mich.App. 1980); 
Jackson v. State, 590 A.2d 177, 183 (Md.App. 1991); 
Williamson v. State, 590 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Ark. 
1979); and Fry v. State, 748 N.E.2d 369, 372 (Ind. 
2001).  As one 
court has framed it:

 

Ordinarily, evidence tending to support a theory of the 
case being tried is admissible.  See State v. 
McElrath, 322 N.C. 1, 366 S.E.2d 442 (1988).  In the present case, the State was not 
required to prove a motive for the murder of the victim.  "The existence of a 
motive is, however, a circumstance tending to make it more probable that the 
person in question did the act, hence evidence of motive is always admissible 
where the doing of the act is in dispute." 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence 
§ 83 (3d ed. 1988).

 

State v. Coffey, 389 S.E.2d 48, 55 (N.C. 1990).  Belden denied 
killing the victim. Accordingly, evidence relating to a motive for Belden to 
kill the victim was certainly relevant.

 

[¶32]   Belden also claims that the evidence 
should not have been admitted because it was too prejudicial.  The trial court 
analyzed the proposed evidence in light of the Vigil 
factors, which include the balancing test set out in W.R.E. 403.  Obviously, evidence 
probative to the State's case will have a prejudicial effect on Belden.  After its analysis, 
the court concluded that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial 
effect.  The 
court determined that the State's need to show motive for a crime that Belden 
denied committing outweighed the prejudicial effect of that evidence on 
him.  We 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

 

[¶33]   Belden complained that the State used 
the evidence not to show motive but to establish a propensity on his part to 
commit sexual assault crimes.  We evaluate claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct for plain error if there was no objection.  Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 51, ¶4, 44 P.3d 22, ¶4 (Wyo. 
2002).  There 
was no objection to the prosecutor's statements during closing noted above.  To show plain 
error, Belden needs to demonstrate "the violation of a clear and unequivocal 
rule of law, clearly reflected in the record, resulting in the abridgment of a 
substantial right of the party to his material prejudice."  Id. (citing Arevalo v. 
State, 939 P.2d 228, 232 (Wyo. 
1997)).

 

[¶34]   At the commencement of his closing 
argument, the prosecutor quickly summarized the evidence produced during 
trial.  At the 
conclusion of that summary, the prosecutor made the statement with which Belden 
finds fault: "It is our contention, Ladies and Gentlemen, that these facts point 
out one inescapable conclusion, that the Defendant sexually assaulted and 
murdered [the victim]."  Belden highlights the phrase "sexually 
assaulted" and contends that the prosecutor was using the prior allegations of 
sexual misconduct to support an argument that he had a propensity to sexually 
assault women.  
This is a mischaracterization of the prosecutor's statement.  Read in context, 
the prosecutor is referring not to the prior sexual assault accusations but to 
all of the other facts he had listed.  It is reasonable to interpret the statement 
so that the reference to the prior sexual assault accusations refers to the 
phrase "and murdered [the victim]."  While not worded elegantly, the prosecutor's 
statement is not an argument based on propensity.  Belden has failed to show plain 
error.

 

[¶35]   Finally, Belden has claimed that the 
admission of the evidence of the prior sexual assault accusations through a 
written statement read by the clerk of court violated his Sixth Amendment right 
to confrontation.  
Again, Belden did not object, so a plain error analysis applies.  A defendant may 
waive his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation:

 

We recognize that examination of the circumstances of each 
case is essential when considering any waiver of constitutional rights because 
"[v]ariations in the factual context giving rise to the issue of waiver of any 
one right of the accused are infinite." . . .  (citation 
omitted).  We 
also recognize that we must accord proper weight to the role of defense counsel 
in fashioning an overall trial strategy, including one involving waiver of the 
right to confrontation, for the defendant's best advantage. . . . (citation 
omitted).  A 
well developed body of case law protects defendants from constitutionally 
defective actions of their attorneys.  See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  Given these safeguards, we reject Plitman's 
argument that a defendant in every instance personally must waive the right to 
confront the witnesses against him.  We therefore join the majority of circuit 
courts of appeals and hold that defense counsel may waive a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation where the decision is one of trial tactics or 
strategy that might be considered sound.

 

United States v. Plitman, 194 F.3d 59, 64 (2nd Cir. 1999).

 

[¶36]   During the trial, the court indicated 
in a conference in chambers that it would give the defense a choice to allow 
admission of the evidence of the prior sexual assault accusations through 
witness testimony or through a written sanitized version read to the jury.  While maintaining 
their objection to the admission of this evidence at all, defense counsel 
specified a preference for the written statement.  Prior to having the statement read to the 
jury, the court presented the statement to both parties and incorporated their 
suggestions into the final product.  Under these circumstances, it is clear that 
defense counsel made a tactical decision to support the written statement over 
having Belden's accusers testify.  It is important to remember that defense 
counsel had cross-examined both accusers during the motions hearing in 
August.  Thus, 
Belden's counsel had an opportunity to observe the accusers, hear their 
testimony, and test them through cross-examination.  Once the trial 
court ruled that the evidence was admissible, defense counsel had to determine 
how to proceed while defending the best interests of their client.  Apparently, defense 
counsel concluded that it would be best to avoid having the accusers take the 
stand.  
Accordingly, defense counsel supported the admission of the evidence 
through the written statement even though that would mean waiving Belden's Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation.  That was a tactical decision we will not 
question with hindsight.  Belden has failed to demonstrate that the 
decision constituted plain error and his claim must fail.

 

III.                  
Prosecutorial Misconduct

 

[¶37]   Belden alleges several instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct including soliciting testimony from a witness on the 
question of guilt, arguing propensity based upon uncharged misconduct evidence, 
misstating evidence, shifting the burden of proof during closing argument, and 
asking for a conviction for reasons other than on the basis of the 
evidence.

 

A.                 
Standard of Review

 

[¶38]   Belden did not interpose an objection 
at trial to any of the prosecutor's statements, which he now alleges were 
improper.  We 
review claims of misconduct by a prosecutor during closing argument under the 
following principles:

 

The general rule in Wyoming is that a failure to interpose 
a timely objection to improper argument is treated as a waiver, unless the 
prosecutor's misconduct is so flagrant as to constitute plain error, requiring 
reversal.  Montoya v. State, 971 P.2d 134, 136 (Wyo. 
1998); Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Wyo. 
1992).  A plain 
error analysis requires the appellant to demonstrate the violation of a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law, clearly reflected in the record, resulting in the 
abridgment of a substantial right of the party to his material prejudice.  Arevalo v. State, 939 P.2d 228, 232 (Wyo. 
1997).  We are 
reluctant to find plain error in closing arguments "lest the trial court becomes 
required to control argument because opposing counsel does not object."  James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 207 (Wyo. 
1994) (quoting Taul v. State, 862 P.2d 649, 659 (Wyo. 
1993)).

 

Trujillo, ¶4. 

 

B.                 
Discussion

 

[¶39]   One of the alleged instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct cited by Belden was the portion of the prosecutor's 
closing argument set out in the previous issue, which Belden claimed improperly 
argued propensity.  
We addressed that issue in the previous section and stand by our analysis 
set out there.

[¶40]   Belden claims the prosecutor elicited 
opinion testimony that he was guilty of sexual assault:

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  And part of what led you to 
believe that you knew who perpetrated this crime was DNA evidence; is that not 
correct?

[WITNESS]:  Yes.

Q:  Can you relate to the jury what DNA evidence 
you had at that time?

A:  DNA indicated that [Belden] had sexually 
assaulted her and had left semen within her body at that time.

 

Belden argues that the prejudicial effect of this statement 
is "obvious," and that the State was complicit in eliciting it because it wanted 
to convey to the jury that the DNA evidence proved his guilt. 

 

[¶41]   It is error per 
se for the prosecutor to directly solicit an opinion from a witness on the 
guilt of the defendant.  If, however, the witness expressed an opinion 
through a non-responsive answer, we review for prejudice.  In this case, we do 
so under our plain error standard since Belden did not object.  See Dudley v. State, 951 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Wyo. 
1998).  The 
first two elements are established since the witness' statement is clearly 
reflected in the record and expresses an opinion on Belden's guilt (i.e., that he "had sexually assaulted her.")  After carefully 
reviewing the entire record, however, we conclude that the remark did not 
materially prejudice Belden.  The witness' response was clearly not 
responsive to the prosecutor's question.  The witness was a sheriff's department 
investigator who was not testifying as an expert on DNA or sexual assaults.  The witness only 
testified about the investigation and his role in it.  Furthermore, there 
was no dispute that the semen found in the victim was from Belden, so identity 
was not an issue.  
After the witness made the remark, the prosecutor moved on with his 
questioning.  
Thus, the remark was an isolated statement that was not referred to again 
either by this witness or the prosecution.  In order for us to find prejudicial plain 
error, we would have to make a finding that there was "a reasonable possibility 
that, had the jury not heard the [witness'] statement, the verdict would have 
been different."  
Dudley, 951 P.2d  at 1180.  Given the 
voluminous nature of the record including the other evidence produced at trial 
and the other factors noted above, we cannot conclude that but for the statement 
the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant.  Accordingly, we 
find no material prejudice.

 

[¶42]   Belden contends that the prosecutor 
"asked the jury to convict for reasons other than the evidence" when he 
concluded his closing argument with:

 

And based on all of that evidence, the direct and 
circumstantial evidence that's been presented to you, I ask you, please, do your 
duty.  Review 
all of the evidence and return with a just and proper verdict; that is, that the 
Defendant is guilty of the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree and 
murder in the first degree.

 

According to Belden, the prosecutor was telling the jury it 
was their duty to convict.  Belden states that the jury's duty was to 
"review the evidence and make a just determination of the facts" and return a 
verdict based solely on that determination.  He contends that the prosecutor's argument 
was improper and "highly prejudicial."

 

[¶43]   While we do not quibble with Belden's 
description of a jury's duty, we think he has misconstrued the prosecutor's 
argument.  We 
do not understand the prosecutor to be arguing that the jury had a duty to 
convict Belden.  
The portion of the argument cited by Belden is merely the second half of 
the final paragraph in the prosecutor's argument.  Immediately preceding the statement quoted 
above, the prosecutor stated:

 

Now, folks, rape and murder are secretive crimes, often 
times incapable of proof by direct evidence.  Here, we have direct evidence.  A one in 700 
billion chance that somebody other than this man perpetrated these heinous 
crimes.  That's 
direct evidence.

 

The prosecutor was noting that it was the jury's duty to 
review the evidence and reach a verdict.  The prosecutor closed his argument by 
advocating his position that the evidence supported a verdict of guilty.  See Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1116 (Wyo. 
1992).

 

[¶44]   Even if we accepted Belden's 
interpretation, we would not find prejudice.  The jury was instructed that it constituted 
the exclusive province to weigh and consider all the evidence and determine the 
credibility of the witnesses.  Immediately after the prosecutor's closing, 
the court noted that the defense had objected6 to certain 
portions of the closing and reiterated the substance of its instruction to the 
jury.  Given 
the curative instructions by the court and the fleeting nature of the comment, 
we do not find any material prejudice. 

 

[¶45]   Next, Belden contends that the 
prosecutor misrepresented the facts in the case.  The victim kept a diary in which she wrote 
about the daily events of her life and the people in it.  Belden wanted to 
"dispel the implication that because, [the victim's] diary contained no 
reference to any romantic or sexual relationship with him, that none had 
existed."  
Belden insisted that in order to prove its point it would have to put 
before the jury evidence of a number of sexual encounters of the victim to show 
that she had relationships that were not noted in her diary.  To avoid the 
potential complications of offering such evidence, the prosecution and defense 
entered into a stipulation that "[c]ertain events occurred in the life of [the 
victim], which she did not write about in her diary."  During his closing 
argument, the prosecutor made the following argument:

 

Please, Ladies and Gentlemen, take the time during your 
deliberations to examine this document [the diary] closely.  Read the passages 
of June and July and August of 1985.  It will take you a long time.  It will take you a 
long time to go through this but at the end that reading [sic], you will know [the victim].  You will know that 
[the victim] was  at the time of her death, she was involved with one 
fellow.  She'd 
had a sexual interlude with that fellow earlier in the week of her death.  That she was kind 
of flirting with another fellow, a guy by the name of [the man's name].  You'll find that 
she no more had a relationship with this man [Belden] than she had a 
relationship with the man in the moon because she was 
the type of person to put those things down.  And she did.  Please read this 
document. [Emphasis added by Belden.]

 

Belden claims that this was a misstatement of the facts and 
in flagrant violation of the stipulation.

 

[¶46]   We cannot agree with Belden's 
characterization.  
The stipulation stated that the parties agreed that the victim did not 
write about every event in her diary.  There is nothing in the stipulation that 
would prevent the prosecutor from arguing that if the victim had an intimate 
relationship with Belden, that it would have been mentioned in the diary.  The prosecutor is 
not arguing "because she wrote everything in her diary the absence of any 
reference to a relationship with Belden must mean there wasn't one."  We do not think it 
is inconsistent for the prosecutor to agree that the victim did not write 
everything in her diary while contending an intimate relationship would be one 
of the things that she would write about in the diary.  The prosecutor did 
not contradict the substance of the stipulation and merely made an argument 
through an inference based upon the evidence adduced at trial.  There was no 
misconduct.

 

[¶47]   Finally, Belden contends that the 
prosecutor shifted the burden of proof to him during his closing 
argument:

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  The Defendant's semen is found in 
and around her and there is no evidence that she ever, 
ever, ever consented to have sex with the Defendant.  [Emphasis 
supplied by Belden.]

 

Belden claims that the prosecutor's argument creates an 
implication that the burden of proof was on him to demonstrate that the sexual 
conduct between him and the victim was consensual.

 

[¶48]   Belden's claim has no merit.  "In presenting 
closing argument, the prosecutor is entitled to reflect upon the evidence and to 
draw reasonable inferences from that evidence in order to assist the jury in its 
function."  Armstrong, 826 P.2d  at 1116.  The prosecutor was 
making an argument based upon the trial evidence.  It is not error for the prosecutor to argue 
that its evidence is uncontradicted or that the evidence does not support the 
defendant's theory of the case.  Vigil, 926 P.2d  
at 358-59 ("It is not improper for the government to draw attention to the 
failure or lack of evidence on a point, if it is not intended to call attention 
to the failure of the defendant to testify.") (quoting Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 169 (10th Cir. 1955)).  The prosecutor certainly did not comment on 
the defendant's failure to testify.  The prosecutor's argument was proper advocacy 
on behalf of his client.

 

IV.               
Belden's Absence From in camera 
Conference

 

[¶49]   During the prosecutor's closing 
argument, defense counsel objected to his characterization of a witness' 
testimony.  The 
trial court excused the jury and directed the court reporter to read the 
witness' testimony.  
The transcript indicates that Belden left the room and was not present 
during the conference on the objection.  On appeal, Belden claims that his absence 
from the hearing meant he was deprived of his constitutional right to be present 
at all critical stages of the trial.

 

A.                 
Standard of Review

 

[¶50]   An accused has the right to be present 
during every stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to the outcome if 
his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.  The Sixth Amendment 
and the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution guarantee this right.  Seeley v. State, 
959 P.2d 170, 177 (Wyo. 
1998).  The 
right of the accused to be present at the critical stages of a trial is also 
explicitly guaranteed by Wyoming law.  Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-202 and W.R.Cr.P. 43(a).  "The question of whether a defendant had the 
right to be present at a specific phase of his trial is an issue of law and, as 
such, is subject to de novo review."  Seeley, 959 P.2d  at 175.  A deprivation of the right to be present at 
all critical stages of a trial is subject to harmless error analysis.  Seeley, 959 P.2d  at 178; Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-10, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1263-65, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991); United 
States v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1528 (10th Cir. 1995); Luu v. People, 841 P.2d 271, 273-75 
(Colo. 1992).

 

B.                 
Discussion

 

[¶51]   The record is silent as to why Belden 
was absent during the conference on the objection to the prosecutor's closing 
argument.  The 
transcript simply notes that Belden left the room.  Belden contends 
that the conference was an important part of the trial proceedings and his 
exclusion prejudiced him and deprived him of a right to a fair trial. Belden 
suggests that had he been present, he could have:  offered suggestions on other times the 
disputed testimony may have arisen during trial; asked for an explanation of the 
proceedings and its significance; and conferred with his counsel on the 
appropriate course of action. 

 

[¶52]   A defendant's right to be present 
during trial proceedings is not absolute.  People v. Starks, 
679 N.E.2d 764, 768-69 (Ill.App. 3 Dist. 1997).  A "defendant's presence is not required when 
it would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.'"  Seeley, 959 P.2d  at 177 (quoting Snyder v. Com. of Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 106-07, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332-33, 78 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1934)).  We have held that a defendant's presence is 
not required "at a conference or argument upon a question of law."  Lobatos v. State, 875 P.2d 716, 724 (Wyo. 
1994).  In 
addition, the defendant's absence can be harmless if "the issue is not one on 
which counsel would be likely to consult the defendant, or it is not one for 
which the defendant, if consulted, would be likely to have an answer that would 
sway the judge."  
United States v. Rodriguez, 67 F.3d 1312, 1316 (7th Cir. 1995).  A short absence can 
be insignificant, especially if the defendant's counsel is present throughout 
the proceedings.  
United States v. Harris, 908 F.2d 728, 739-40 (11th Cir. 1990).

 

[¶53]   Assuming for purposes of our review 
that Belden's absence deprived him of his constitutional right to be present, we 
do not find any prejudice.  While the record is silent as to why Belden 
was absent from the conference, there is no indication that the absence was 
anything but voluntary.  Furthermore, the absence was for a brief 
period of time.  
The conference was concerned with the propriety of the prosecutor's 
closing argument.  
Belden fails to convince us that his presence during this conference 
could have had any appreciable effect on the outcome of his trial.  There is nothing to 
indicate that Belden possessed any special information on the question before 
the trial court that his counsel did not or that his presence could have altered 
the judge's decision on the objection in any way.  If we assume Belden's absence constituted a 
deprivation of a constitutional right, the error was harmless.

 

V.                 
Appointment of Special Prosecutor

 

[¶54]   Belden contends that the appointment of 
an Assistant United States Attorney as a special prosecutor violated art. 6, § 
19 of the Wyoming Constitution, which provides:

 

No member of congress from this state, nor any person 
holding or exercising any office or appointment of trust or profit under the 
United States, shall at the same time hold or exercise any office in this state 
to which a salary, fees or perquisites shall be attached.  The legislature may 
by law declare what offices are incompatible.

 

A.                 
Standard of Review

 

[¶55]   Belden suggests that the applicable 
standard of review is the standard de novo one this 
Court applies to questions of law and constitutional issues.  However, the State 
correctly points out that this claim was never put before the trial court and is 
being raised for the first time in this appeal.  This Court generally does not consider issues 
raised for the first time on appeal.  Yetter v. State, 
987 P.2d 666, 670 (Wyo. 1999).  We have, however, considered claims of error 
despite the defendant's failure to object at trial.  "Our rule is that 
in the absence of fundamental error affecting a substantial right of the 
appellant an issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be 
considered."  
Davis v. State, 859 P.2d 89, 94 (Wyo. 
1993).  We 
review those claims not objected to at trial and raised for the first time on 
appeal for plain error.  Britton v. State, 
976 P.2d 669, 671 (Wyo. 1999).  The burden of establishing plain error is 
assigned to the appellant even when the claimed error would constitute a 
violation of a constitutional right.  Id.  As we noted earlier, 
plain error is found when:  The violation of a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law, clearly reflected in the record, resulting in the abridgment of a 
substantial right of the party to his material prejudice is demonstrated.  Arevalo v. State, 939 P.2d 228, 232 (Wyo. 
1997).

 

B.                 
Discussion

 

[¶56]   We need only address the material 
prejudice prong of the plain error standard in order to resolve Belden's 
claim.  Belden 
claims that he was materially prejudiced by the appointment of an Assistant 
United States Attorney as special prosecutor because it was a "structural 
error."  
According to Belden, the special prosecutor's "presence, in blatant 
violation of the Wyoming Constitution, affected the framework of [his] trial by 
challenging the sovereignty of the state court proceedings, manifesting a 
situation ripe for conflicts of interest, and affording the state an unfair 
advantage in the form of a prosecutorial overmatch."

 

[¶57]   The constitutions of the United States 
of America and the State of Wyoming, in conjunction with Wyoming's criminal 
statutes, rules of procedure and evidence, operate in criminal cases to achieve 
a single purpose:  
to ensure that an accused receives a fair trial.  Belden claims that 
the mere appointment of an Assistant United States Attorney as a special 
prosecutor was an affront to the sovereignty of Wyoming and permeated the entire 
proceedings with prejudice.  We strongly disagree with Belden's 
contentions.  
Belden does not claim any actual prejudice on account of the appointment 
of the special prosecutor amounting to a denial of his due process right to a 
fair trial.  
Belden received what he is constitutionally guaranteed.  There is nothing in 
the record to suggest that the presence of an Assistant United States Attorney 
acting as a prosecutor affected the trial proceedings in any manner so as to 
impede Belden's right to a fair trial.  The only thing Belden offers us is 
unsupported allegations.  Belden cannot sit silently while the special 
prosecutor is appointed and the entire trial process is completed and then 
complain on appeal when the result is adverse to him.  Since there was no 
material prejudice to Belden's right to a fair trial through the appointment of 
the special prosecutor, we decline to address his claim any further.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶58]   We have reviewed the entire record and 
transcript of the trial and carefully considered the issues raised by 
Belden.  Our 
review did not disclose any prejudicial error and, accordingly, Belden's 
sentence and conviction are affirmed.
  

GOLDEN, Justice, dissenting, with whom 
VOIGT, Justice, joins.

[¶59]       Because I believe that Belden was denied his right to a 
fair trial by the improper admission of prejudicial uncharged misconduct 
evidence and judicial and prosecutorial misconduct, I must respectfully 
dissent.

 

[¶60]       The fundamental issue in this case was the identity of the 
victim's attacker and killer.   Proof of a motive could assist in 
identifying the killer; however, motive that is too general, universal or 
applicable to a large number of persons is not helpful for identification.  In this case, the 
motive accepted by the trial court was too general under the specific facts of 
this case to have been admissible without violating W.R.E. 404 and 403.  The trial court's 
instruction to the jury that Belden may have had a motive to kill the victim 
followed by statements that he had been accused of a crime, charged, but not 
convicted left the jury to guess as to what connection these statements had to 
the evidence in this case.  

 

[¶61]       No evidence showed that Belden was worried about another 
rape accusation or had felt compelled to kill other women that he had sexual 
intercourse with to avoid accusations, and to assign him that potential motive 
would have required jury speculation.  The jury might have guessed that his motive 
was to eliminate the victim as a witness to his sexual assault upon her; 
however, that motive applied to whomever killed the victim and is too general to 
have been admissible as peculiar to Belden.  Nor was there any evidence that Belden had 
increased incentive to kill this victim for fear of severe punishment.  Contrary evidence 
not revealed to the jury indicated that his experience with accusations led to 
very little punishment because he was previously acquitted of one charge and the 
other was dismissed after he pled guilty to a misdemeanor.  

 

[¶62]       Furthermore, these statements were too unfairly prejudicial 
to be admitted. Belden was charged with sexual assault felony murder, meaning 
evidence of an intent to commit a murder was not required and the jury must 
first convict of sexual assault before it could convict for felony murder.  Admitting evidence 
that Belden had previously been accused of sexual assault was plainly too 
prejudicial because this evidence only proved that he had been accused of other 
sexual assaults.  
In other words, it was propensity evidence and was 
inadmissible.

 

[¶63]       Uncharged misconduct that demonstrates evidence of a motive 
to commit the charged crime is admissible in a felony murder trial; however, the 
circumstances that allow its admission are limited.  Evidence of a 
potential motive, such as the one presented in this case, is rarely 
admissible.  
Proof of a motive that is "peculiar to the defendant" or arises from an 
emotion that is "directed at the victim or class of victims" are examples of 
admissible evidence of motive.  The evidence is admitted because it reliably 
identifies the perpetrator while eliminating the risk that the accused will be 
convicted for his bad character.  1 Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, § 3:15 to 3:18 (Rev. ed. 
1999).   
For example, had the trial court in this case found that proof existed 
that Belden had made statements indicating that he would kill to avoid another 
rape accusation then it is probable that the evidence would have been admissible 
as evidence of motive.  Because the ultimate fact for the jury to 
decide from this type of uncharged misconduct evidence is identity, if the 
previous misconduct was so similar to this case's facts because in those 
previous cases, Belden had left work and arrived at their residences, brutally 
beaten and sexually assaulted them and then had strangled them and it was only 
fortuitous that each had lived, then it is again probable that the evidence 
would have been admissible.  Without this type of proof, the trial court 
could not admit previous sexual assault accusations without running afoul of 
Rules 404 and 403.  
The lack of motive evidence as well as the dissimilarity to this crime's 
facts resulted in an admission of evidence that simply proved that he had 
committed this crime because he had committed other crimes.  My conclusion is 
borne out by the prosecutor's own words in his closing argument that 
stated:

 

And, finally, the evidence shows that in the past, the 
Defendant had had sexual intercourse with women and been accused of rape.  It is our 
contention, Ladies and Gentlemen, that these facts point out one inescapable 
conclusion, that the Defendant sexually assaulted and murdered [the 
victim.]

 

Such a statement by the prosecutor used the uncharged 
misconduct to prove the sexual assault and was in violation of the court's 
limiting instructions.  

 

[¶64]       The prosecutor also committed misconduct when he elicited 
an answer from an investigator that DNA indicated that Belden had "sexually 
assaulted" her and had left semen in her body.  Eliciting an opinion of the accused's guilt 
in this manner is reversible error.  Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1338 (Wyo. 
1992); Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 881 (Wyo. 
1990); Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 68 (Wyo. 
1989).  
Finally, in his closing argument, the prosecutor admonished the jury to 
"do your duty.  
Review all of the evidence and return with a just and proper verdict; 
that is, that the Defendant is guilty of the crimes of sexual assault in the 
first degree and murder in the first degree."  This statement can only be read as an 
exhortation that implied this jury could only do its duty if it reached a 
certain verdict.  
Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶¶27, 28, 49 P.3d 975, 987 (Wyo. 
2002).  

 

[¶65]       Finally, I must disagree with the majority's conclusion 
after thorough examination of the judicial conduct in this case, that such 
conduct did not deprive Belden of a fair trial. Had Belden complained of a few 
individual statements, I would agree with the majority's conclusion; however, we 
cannot consider all of these many statements in isolation from one another.  Both the majority 
and Justice Voigt's dissenting opinion find that the judge engaged in numerous 
incidents of improper conduct and it is this sheer number that requires that I 
depart with the view that the conduct was not prejudicial.

 

[¶66]       I would reverse and remand this case for new trial.  

            
VOIGT, Justice, dissenting.

[¶67]   I agree with the reasoning and 
conclusions contained in Justice Golden's dissenting opinion.  I write separately 
to emphasize that I would reverse primarily due to judicial misconduct.  The record reveals 
that this was not a situation where a remark or two by the trial judge raised a 
question of potential bias.  Instead, the record reveals judicial 
harassment and intimidation of counsel, and gross and continuing interference by 
the trial judge in counsels' attempts to try their respective cases.  Beyond that, the 
trial judge's inappropriate attempts at levity endangered the sense of 
seriousness and dignity due a murder trial.  The trial judge berated counsel for engaging 
in a "big stud duck" contest, but it is clear that he was the one most caught up 
in the contest for the jury's attention and approbation.

 

[¶68]   The trial judge in this case violated 
several specific rules:

 

            
(1)       Trial judges 
must be mindful of the influence they wield, and that their words may mold the 
opinion of the jurors to the extent that a party may be prejudiced.  Randolph v. State, 117 Nev. 970, 36 P.3d 424, 433 (2001), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 183 
(2002).  The 
trial judge should be conscious of the fact that all concerned, including 
parties, witnesses and jurors, look to him for justice and that comments he 
makes and the attitude he conveys toward counsel and the trial may have an 
important effect thereon.  State v. Sanchez, 
611 P.2d 721, 722 (Utah 
1980).  The 
trial judge must exercise restraint over his conduct and utterances, must 
suppress his personal predilections, and must control his temper and emotions, 
and when it becomes necessary during trial for the judge to comment upon the 
conduct of witnesses, spectators, counsel, or others, he should do so in a firm, 
dignified and restrained manner.  State v. Walker, 
252 Kan. 279, 845 P.2d 1, 11 (1993).  
The trial judge should be the exemplar of dignity and impartiality, 
should avoid repartee, should avoid any conduct that tends to demean the 
proceedings, and should not permit any person in the courtroom to embroil him in 
conflict.  State v. Gadelkarim, 256 Kan. 671, 887 P.2d 88, 95 (1994).

            
(2)       It is not the 
job of the trial judge to represent the defendant or to second-guess strategy 
employed by defense counsel.  Kailukiak v. State, 
959 P.2d 771, 776 (Alaska App. 1998), abrogated on other 
grounds by Harmon v. State, 11 P.3d 393 (Alaska App. 2000).  The trial judge 
must not interject himself into the attorney-client relationship between the 
defendant and counsel.  Rhyne v. State, 
38 P.3d 163, 167 (Nev. 2002).  The trial judge must allow counsel freedom to 
present their respective cases, regardless of whether the trial judge may feel 
the case is proceeding on the wrong theory or that the trial judge would try the 
case differently.  
McCabe v. R.A. Manning Const. Co., Inc., 674 P.2d 699, 708 (Wyo. 
1983).

            
(3)       Critical 
decisions in a criminal case should not rest, in whole or in part, on an attempt 
to teach an attorney a lesson.  State v. Bible, 
175 Ariz. 549, 858 P.2d 1152, 1198 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1046 (1994).  
The concept of judicial independence does not equate to unbridled 
discretion on the part of the judge to bully and threaten.  In re Hammermaster, 139 Wash. 2d 211, 985 P.2d 924, 936 
(1999).

            
(4)       Well-conceived 
judicial humor may be a welcome relief in a long, tense trial.  People v. Riel, 22 Cal. 4th 1153, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 998 P.2d 969, 985 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1087 (2001) (quoting People v. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d 713, 753-54, 244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 934 (1988)).  
Injecting levity into a trial may, however, create a scintillating and 
relaxed atmosphere that may adversely influence the jury's perception of the 
significance of the trial.1  Parodi v. Washoe 
Medical Center, Inc., 111 Nev. 365, 892 P.2d 588, 589-90 (1995).  Further, counsel may fear interjecting 
disapproval of such atmosphere.  Id.

 

[¶69]   When read as a whole, the record 
compels the conclusion that the appellant did not receive a fair trial.  The multiple 
incidents of judicial misconduct colored the entire proceeding to such an extent 
that we cannot be assured that the verdict would have been the same in the 
absence of such misconduct.  I would reverse and remand for a new 
trial.

 

FOOTNOTES

1Upon discovering the 
victim's body, Terry Smith had placed a blanket over her.  Investigators were 
unable to determine if the hair had come from the blanket or had been deposited 
during the course of the assault.  DNA testing would later identify the hair as 
belonging to Smith's then estranged husband.

2The DNA analysis of the 
fingernail scrapings could not identify any one specific person as the 
source.  
However, while Belden was excluded as the probable source, the victim's 
former boyfriend could not be excluded.

3At the time of the 
murder, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(i) (Michie 1977 Republished ed. and Supp. 
1983) provided:

Sec. 6-2-302.  Sexual assault in the first 
degree.

(a)  Any actor 
who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first 
degree if:

(i)  The actor 
causes submission of the victim through the actual application, reasonably 
calculated to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible 
confinement[.]

4  At the time of the 
murder, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a) (Michie 1977 Republished ed. and Supp. 
1983) provided:

Sec. 6-2-101.  Murder in the first 
degree[.]

(a)  Whoever 
purposely and with premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to 
perpetrate, any sexual assault, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, resisting 
arrest or kidnapping, or by administering poison or causing the same to be done, 
kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first degree.

5Belden also cites the 
Wyoming Constitution, art. 1, § 10 but does not provide any analysis under that 
provision.  
Accordingly, we only consider his argument under the federal 
constitution.

6The defense objections 
were to portions of the prosecutor's closing that are not the subject of any 
claim of error in this appeal.

 
                                        
Footnotes for the Dissent

1The jurors asking for 
popcorn to watch a videotaped exhibit comes to mind.