Title: Titchenal v. Dexter

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Titchenal v. Dexter  (96-188); 166 Vt. 373; 693 A.2d 682

[Filed 28-Feb-1997]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 23-Apr-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                     No. 96-188

Chris Titchenal                                  Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.                                          Washington Superior Court

Diane Dexter                                     November Term, 1996

John P. Meaker, J.

       Julie A. Frame and Jennifer E. Nelson of Hoff Curtis Pacht Cassidy &
  Frame, P.C., Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant

       John R. Durrance, Jr. of Gaston, Durrance & Fairbanks, Montpelier, for
  defendant-appellee

       Mary L. Bonauto, Boston, Massachusetts, for amicus curiae Gay &
  Lesbian Advocates & Defenders

PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

       ALLEN, C.J.   The issue in this case is whether the superior court may
  apply its equitable powers to adjudicate a visitation dispute that cannot
  be brought in statutory proceedings within the family court's jurisdiction. 
  We affirm the superior court's decision that it does not possess the
  authority to adjudicate such matters.

       The dispute arose after the breakup of a relationship between two
  women who had both participated in raising a child adopted by only one of
  them.  Plaintiff alleges the following facts, which are disputed but
  accepted as true for purposes of reviewing the trial court's dismissal of
  the case.  See Sabia v. State, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 669 A.2d 1187, 1190
  (1995).  In 1985, plaintiff Chris Titchenal and defendant Diane Dexter
  began an intimate relationship.  They purchased a

 

  home together, held joint bank accounts, and jointly owned their
  automobiles.  They both contributed financially to their household, and
  each regarded the other as a life partner.

       At some point, the parties decided to have a child.  When their
  attempts to conceive via a sperm donor failed, they decided to adopt a
  child.  In July 1991, defendant adopted a newborn baby girl, who was named
  Sarah Ruth Dexter-Titchenal.  The parties held themselves out to Sarah and
  all others as her parents.  The child called one parent "Mama Chris" and
  the other parent "Mama Di."  For the first three and one-half years of
  Sarah's life, until the parties' separation, plaintiff cared for the child
  approximately 65% of the time.  Plaintiff did not seek to adopt Sarah
  because the parties believed that the then-current adoption statute would
  not allow both of them to do so.

       Eventually, the parties' relationship faltered, and by November 1994
  defendant had moved out of the couple's home, taking Sarah with her.  For
  the first five months following the parties' separation, Sarah stayed with
  plaintiff between Wednesday afternoons and Friday evenings.  By the spring
  of 1995, however, defendant had severely curtailed plaintiff's contact with
  Sarah and had refused plaintiff's offer of financial assistance.

       In October 1995, plaintiff filed a complaint requesting that the
  superior court exercise its equitable jurisdiction to establish and enforce
  regular, unsupervised parent-child contact between her and Sarah.  The
  court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, refusing to recognize a cause
  of action for parent-child contact absent a common-law or statutory basis
  for the claim.  On appeal, plaintiff argues that the superior court has
  equitable jurisdiction under the state's parens patriae authority to
  consider her complaint, and that both public policy and the doctrines of in
  loco parentis and de facto parenthood allow the court to exercise its
  equitable authority in cases such as this.  An organization called the Gay
  & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) makes essentially the same arguments
  in its amicus curiae brief.

       Plaintiff urges us to grant "nontraditional" family members access to
  the courts by

 

  recognizing the legal rights of de facto parents.(FN1)  According to
  plaintiff, the state's parens patriae power to protect the best interests
  of children permits the superior court to adjudicate disputes over
  parent-child contact (FN2) outside the context of a statutory proceeding. 
  Thus, under the scheme advocated by plaintiff and amicus curiae, the family
  court would adjudicate disputes concerning parental rights and
  responsibilities and parent-child contact within the parameters and
  criteria set forth in statutory divorce, parentage, dependency and neglect,
  nonsupport and separation, relief-from-abuse, and at times guardianship
  and adoption proceedings, see 4 V.S.A. §§ 454-455 (establishing
  jurisdiction of family court), while the superior court would exert its
  equitable powers to consider such disputes arising outside these statutory
  proceedings.

       We find no legal basis for plaintiff's proposal.  Courts cannot exert
  equitable powers unless they first have jurisdiction over the subject
  matter and parties.  In re Marriage of Ryall,