Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: REGINA A. BLOMMEL V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, DIVISION OF WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: REGINA A. BLOMMEL V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, DIVISION OF WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION2005 WY 128120 P.3d 1013Case Number: 04-240Decided: 10/04/2005
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S

COMPENSATION 
CLAIM OF:

 
 

REGINA A. 
BLOMMEL,

 
 
Appellant

(Employee/Claimant),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

DEPARTMENT 
OF EMPLOYMENT, DIVISION

OF 
WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION,

 
 
Appellee

(Objector/Defendant).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
 Newton "Rusty" S. Ludwig, Sheridan, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kristi M. 
Radosevich, Assistant Attorney General.  

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
J., delivered the opinion of the Court; BURKE, J., filed a dissent in which 
VOIGT, J., joined.

 
 
 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      While working as 
a laborer for Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. (Wyoming Sawmills), Regina A. Blommel 
experienced pain in her right shoulder. She saw a physician's assistant who 
referred her to an orthopedic surgeon. The following day, she told her 
supervisor about the pain, but did not report it as work related. Nearly three 
weeks later, before she saw the orthopedic surgeon, Ms. Blommel quit her job 
with Wyoming Sawmills because of the pain. Thereafter, the orthopedic surgeon 
diagnosed a rotator cuff tear and recommended surgery. Ms. Blommel then filed a 
report of injury with the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division 
(Division), claiming her injury was work related. The Office of Administrative 
Hearings (OAH) denied her claim on the ground that it was untimely and the 
district court affirmed. We reverse. 

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Ms. Blommel 
presents the following issue:

 
 
Was the 
hearing examiner's findings that the Claimant did not timely notify her employer 
of her injury nor timely report her injury to the Division supported by 
substantial evidence?  (Wyoming 
Statute Section 16-3-114 (1982))

 
 
The 
Division restates the issues as follows:

 
 
Issue 
I.            
Whether substantial evidence supports the hearing examiner's decision 
that Blommel failed to timely report her alleged injury?

 
 
Issue 
II.            
Whether substantial evidence supports the hearing examiner's decision 
that Blommel failed to prove a compensable injury?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In August of 
2001, Ms. Blommel injured her right shoulder while helping a friend move a 
refrigerator. She was treated by an orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed rotator 
cuff tendonitis. According to Ms. Blommel, the injury was resolved through 
conservative treatment before she began work for Wyoming 
Sawmills.

 
 
[¶4]      From July of 2000 
to June of 2002, Ms. Blommel worked for Wal-Mart as a cashier, maintenance 
worker, unloading trucks, and stocking shelves. She was hired by Wyoming 
Sawmills as a laborer in June of 2002. Her job involved stacking lumber. 

 
 
[¶5]      On July 9, 2002, 
Ms. Blommel saw a physician's assistant for shoulder pain and was referred to an 
orthopedic surgeon. She made an appointment to see the surgeon on August 23, 
2002. On July 10, 2002, she told her supervisor that she was experiencing pain 
in her right shoulder. According to the supervisor, Ms. Blommel said she hurt 
her shoulder while working for Wal-Mart. 

 
 
[¶6]      On July 29, 2002, 
Ms. Blommel informed Wyoming Sawmills' human resources manager that she was 
quitting her job due to shoulder pain. Again, according to the manager, Ms. 
Blommel did not report that the injury was related to her work at Wyoming 
Sawmills. On August 23, 2002, Ms. Blommel went to her appointment with the 
orthopedic surgeon who diagnosed a rotator cuff tear. Three days later, she 
reported the injury to Wyoming Sawmills' human resources manager. On August 27, 
2002, Ms. Blommel filed a report of injury with the Division, listing the date 
of injury as July 9, 2002.

 
 
[¶7]      On October 1, 
2002, the Division issued a final determination denying benefits on the ground 
that the injury pre-existed Ms. Blommel's employment at Wyoming Sawmills. Ms. 
Blommel objected, and the case was referred to OAH. In a pre-hearing disclosure 
statement, the Division asserted Ms. Blommel did not make a timely report of her 
injury. 

 
 
[¶8]      In February of 
2003, Ms. Blommel underwent rotator cuff surgery. A hearing was held on her 
claim for benefits in September of 2003. The hearing examiner denied benefits, 
finding that her report of injury was untimely because "it was reasonably 
apparent to [Ms. Blommel] at the time she quit her job at Wyoming Sawmills, 
Inc., on or about July [29], 2002, that she was suffering from a shoulder 
condition which she attributed to a work place injury." The hearing examiner 
also found Ms. Blommel failed to rebut the presumption that her claim be denied 
by presenting clear and convincing evidence that Wyoming Sawmills and the 
Division were not prejudiced by the late filing as required under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-502(c) (LexisNexis 2005). Ms. Blommel appealed the hearing 
examiner's decision to the district court, which affirmed the denial of 
benefits.    

 
 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      In reviewing 
assertions of untimeliness in workers' compensation cases, we have said: 

 
 
 
 
Our 
judicial review [of agency decisions] is limited to those considerations 
specified in Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 
16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 1999) which provides in pertinent part:

 
 
(c) To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall: 

. . 
.

 
 
(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:     (A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;     . . 
.

    (E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

 

The 
interpretation and correct application of the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act are a question of law over which our review authority is 
plenary.  Conclusions of law made by 
an administrative agency are affirmed only if they are in accord with the law. 
We do not afford any deference to the agency's determination, and we will 
correct any error made by the agency in either interpreting or applying the 
law.  

 
 

Collicott 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2001 
WY 35, ¶4, 20 P.3d 1077, 1079 (Wyo. 2001) (citations omitted). 

 
 
[¶10]   The finder of fact in workers' 
compensation proceedings is charged with determining the time and cause of a 
compensable injury; however, whether an employee's claim is to be barred for 
failure to timely file a report of injury is a mixed question of fact and law. 
Iverson v. Frost Constr., 2003 WY 
162, ¶16, 81 P.3d 190, 195 (Wyo. 2003). This Court will affirm the hearing 
examiner's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. 
Id., ¶11. Where 
the hearing examiner makes no findings of fact, and concludes as a matter of law 
that an injury became apparent to a claimant on a particular date, we review the 
legal conclusion de novo. Wesaw v. 
Quality Maintenance, 2001 WY 17, ¶12, 19 P.3d 500, 505 (Wyo. 2001). 

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 

1.                              
Timeliness 
of the Report of Injury

 
 
[¶11]   The only specific factual finding 
the hearing examiner made concerning the time or cause of Ms. Blommel's injury 
was "that the injury is one occurring over a period of time; the Claimant's 
testimony indicated no triggering event or sudden occurrence." The hearing 
examiner concluded as a matter of law, however, that "it was reasonably 
apparent" to Ms. Blommel at the time she quit her job at Wyoming Sawmills on 
July 29, 2002, "that she was suffering from a shoulder condition which she 
attributed to a work place injury."   

 
 
[¶12]   Section 27-14-502(a), the provision 
governing the time for filing a report of injury, provides in pertinent part as 
follows:

 
 
(a)  As soon as is practical but not later 
than seventy-two (72) hours after the general nature of the injury became 
apparent, an injured employee shall, in writing or by other means approved by 
the department, report the occurrence and general nature of the accident or 
injury to the employer. In addition, the injured employee shall within ten (10) 
days after the injury became apparent, file an injury report with the employer 
and the division in a manner and containing information prescribed by division 
rule and regulation. . . .

 
 
[¶13]   Ms. Blommel makes no claim that she 
reported the injury in writing to her employer within 72 hours after July 9, 
2002, nor does she claim she filed an injury report with her employer and the 
Division within ten days after July 9. Rather, Ms. Blommel concedes that she 
filed her report of injury with Wyoming Sawmills and the Division on August 27, 
2002, 48 days after the July 9, 2002, injury date she identified on the injury 
report. Ms. Blommel asserts that her report of injury was timely despite the 
fact that it was not filed within ten days of the date of injury. She contends a 
reasonable person would not have known the nature and extent of her injury until 
Dr. Ferries diagnosed a torn rotator cuff on August 23, 2002. Prior to Dr. 
Ferries' diagnosis, she asserts, she did not know whether she sustained a new 
injury, whether her injury was a continuation of her prior injury, or otherwise. 
Using August 23 as the date of injury, Ms. Blommel contends she reported her 
injury in a timely fashion under § 27-14-502(a).

 
 
[¶14]   The Division argues that the 
hearing examiner's conclusion that the report of injury was not timely filed was 
supported by substantial evidence. The Division asserts the evidence 
demonstrated Ms. Blommel knew the pain she experienced on July 9, 2002, was 
work-related and this knowledge was confirmed on July 29, 2002, when she quit 
her job because the pain made it impossible for her to continue working. At the 
very least, the Division contends, Ms. Blommel was required to report her injury 
within 72 hours and ten days of July 29, 2002.        
     

 
 
[¶15]   In cases requiring us to determine 
the date of compensable injury, we have said:

 
 
The 
statutory reporting requirements do not begin to run until the employee becomes 
aware that an accident has caused an injury; and the term "injury" as used in 
the compensation statutes means compensable injury.

 
 
Our law 
on determining the date of a compensable injury is well-established. We have consistently held that when a correct diagnosis or prognosis 
of present or likely future disability is communicated to the claimant, the 
injury is discovered, it is compensable, and the statute of limitations begins 
to run. "When determining the time a particular injury became compensable, 
it should be asked:  When would a reasonable person, under 
the circumstances, have understood the full extent and nature of the injury 
and that the injury was related to his or her employment?" This question 
necessarily requires a careful evaluation of all facts to determine when an 
employee reasonably understood the nature and seriousness of his condition and 
that it was work-related.

 
 

Iverson, 
¶¶14-15 (emphasis added, citations omitted).  We review the entire record to determine 
when a claimant knew the nature and full extent of her injury. Id., ¶15.

 
 
[¶16]   There is no question Ms. Blommel 
understood the pain she began experiencing on July 9, 2002, was "related to her 
employment." She testified unequivocally that there was a correlation between 
her work and the pain. What is not so clear is when she understood, or a 
reasonable person under the circumstances would have understood, the "full 
extent and nature of the injury." She contends a reasonable person under the 
circumstances would not have understood the full extent and nature of her injury 
until August 23, 2002, when she saw Dr. Ferries and he told her she appeared to 
have a torn rotator cuff. In contrast, the Division argues and the hearing 
examiner found, that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have 
understood the full extent and nature of her injury by July 29, 2002, when she 
quit her job with Wyoming Sawmills because she "could not take the pain [any] 
more." In essence, Ms. Blommel's argument focuses on the date a diagnosis was 
rendered, while the Division focuses on other factors preceding the diagnosis. 
To resolve this issue, we consider our prior case law. 

   

[¶17]   In Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div., 2005 WY 7, ¶17, 105 P.3d 101, 110 (Wyo. 2005) (citations 
omitted), we said:

 

Our law 
on determining the date of a compensable injury is well-established.  We have consistently held that when a 
correct diagnosis or prognosis of present or likely future disability is 
communicated to the claimant, the injury is discovered, it is compensable, and 
the statute of limitations begins to run. . . .

 
 
            
Our previous decisions have never burdened an employee with filing claims 
for trivial injuries to avoid timeliness issues.  The employee, however, may not ignore 
these requirements for compensable injuries because notice requirements and the 
statute of limitations exist to allow employers to investigate claims, monitor 
medical care, and avoid stale claims.  

 

[¶18]   Applying these principles in Torres, we affirmed the hearing 
examiner's conclusion that the report was untimely because the record clearly 
showed the employee did not report her injury to her employer within 72 hours of 
the date she received a correct diagnosis and did not file a report with the 
Division within ten days of that date. 

 
 
[¶19]   In Iverson, the claimant was injured at 
work on two separate occasions. After the first injury, the claimant did not 
mention the injury and continued to work his shifts and overtime. After the 
second injury, however, the pain was significant enough to cause the claimant to 
discontinue working, seek medical treatment and obtain a diagnosis. We concluded 
the weight of the evidence showed that the employee injured himself on the first 
date, but did not know the nature and extent of his injury until the second date 
when he notified his employer, discontinued working and sought medical 
treatment. We said:

 
 
We 
accept the hearing examiner's conclusion that Iverson suffered a work-related 
injury in the first incident; however, our law is well established that 
statutory reporting requirements are not triggered when an employee sustains an 
apparent trivial injury which does not result in present disability and which 
would not reasonably be expected to cause future disability.  An employee is charged with knowing the full 
extent and nature of the injury no later than when a correct diagnosis and 
prognosis of present or likely future disability is communicated to the 
claimant.  At that point, the 
injury is discovered, it is compensable, and the statute of limitations begins 
to run.  

 
 

Iverson, ¶3 
(emphasis added).

 
 
[¶20]   In Wesaw, ¶15, the claimant was injured on 
October 15, 1998, sought medical treatment and received a diagnosis on October 
22, 1998, and filed his report of injury on November 3, 1998, more than ten days 
after the injury occurred. Although we concluded that the claimant may have 
recognized the causal relationship earlier, we concluded he did not understand 
the nature and seriousness of his injury until he received the doctor's 
diagnosis and, therefore, his report was timely. 

 
 
[¶21]   In each of these cases, we held the 
claimant understood the full extent and nature of his injury upon receiving a 
doctor's diagnosis. In Ms. Blommel's case, she had a prior diagnosis of rotator 
cuff tendonitis. When she experienced pain in the same shoulder and sought 
treatment on July 9, 2002, she was treated for shoulder pain and told to see an 
orthopedic surgeon if there was not improvement in the next few weeks. By July 
29, 2002, the pain had become so severe Ms. Blommel quit her job. Although she 
believed the pain was related to her work stacking lumber for Wyoming Sawmills, 
Ms. Blommel did not know, and there is no evidence she even suspected, her 
rotator cuff was torn and would require surgery until she received a physician's 
diagnosis on August 23, 2002. 

 
 
[¶22]   We hold that the hearing examiner 
misapplied the law when he concluded Ms. Blommel's claim should be denied 
because the general nature of her injury was apparent to her by July 29, 2002. 
The test for determining the time for filing a report of injury under § 
27-14-502 is when a reasonable person under the circumstances would have 
understood the full extent and nature of the injury and that the injury was 
related to his or her employment. Applying this test to the factual findings 
made by the hearing examiner, we hold as a matter of law that the general nature 
of the injury became apparent when Ms. Blommel learned on August 23, 2002, that 
she likely had a torn rotator cuff. 

 
 
[¶23]   Reversed.   

  

BURKE, 
Justice, dissenting, with whom VOIGT, Justice, 
joins.

 
 
[¶24]   I respectfully dissent.  I would affirm the decision of the 
hearing examiner that Ms. Blommel failed to file a timely claim of injury.  The majority, by employing a de novo standard of review, fails to 
accord proper deference to the decision of the hearing examiner.  

 
 
[¶25]   We articulated the proper standard 
of review in Beitel v. Workers' 
Compensation Division, 991 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Wyo. 1999):1

 
 
Under § 
27-14-502(a), an employee's duty to report a work-related injury commences when 
the general nature of his injury becomes apparent.  We have stated that an injury is 
apparent when the employee knows "that he has suffered an injury which can 
result in, or is likely to cause, a compensable disability."  Zielinske v. Johnson County School District 
No. 1, 959 P.2d 706, 709 (Wyo. 1998) 
(quoting Curnow v. State ex rel. 
   Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 899 P.2d 875, 878 (Wyo. 1995)).  The determination of when an injury 
became apparent is a question of fact.  
Id.  We, therefore, defer to the hearing 
examiner's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence.  DeWall [v. State], 960 P.2d [502], 503 
[Wyo. 
1998].

 
 
[¶26]   The hearing examiner found that "it 
was reasonably apparent to the Employee/Claimant, at the time she quit her job 
at Wyoming Sawmills, Inc., on or about July 26, 2002, that she was suffering 
from a shoulder condition which she attributed to a work place injury."  There is substantial evidence in the 
record to support the finding of the hearing examiner.

 
 
[¶27]   Ms. Blommel began her employment 
with Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. on June 12, 2002.  She was hired as a laborer and her 
duties included stacking rough-cut lumber.  
On July 9, 2002, Ms. Blommel was evaluated by Dawn Peters, a physician's 
assistant, for complaints of right shoulder pain.  According to Ms. Blommel's testimony, 
her shoulder had ached for a couple of weeks.  Ms. Blommel initially thought it was her 
"tendonitis coming back . . . but then it got worse and worse to the point it 
didn't feel the same.  It felt quite 
different."  Ms. Peters referred Ms. 
Blommel to an orthopedic surgeon for an evaluation.  Ms. Blommel returned to work and was 
placed on light duty by her supervisor for a period of time.  She failed to report to work on July 26, 
2002.  On July 29, 2002, Ms. Blommel 
advised her employer that she was terminating her employment because she could 
no longer tolerate the pain in her right shoulder.  Ms. Blommel was evaluated by an 
orthopedic surgeon on August 23, 2002.  
He diagnosed a rotator cuff injury.

 
 
[¶28]   The majority finds the August 23, 
2002, diagnosis of rotator cuff injury determinative of the timeliness 
issue.  However, the hearing 
examiner specifically rejected claimant's contention that the nature of the 
injury became apparent on the date of the torn rotator cuff diagnosis.  He stated, "[t]he [c]laimant argues that 
she was not formally diagnosed until August 23, 2002.  That may be, in that a formal medical 
diagnosis was rendered at that time; however, the general nature of the injury 
had been apparent to the claimant for quite some time."  Although the date of diagnosis of the 
injury is a factor to be considered in determining when the general nature of 
the injury was apparent to the employee, it is not the sole determining 
factor.  Logue v. State Workers' Safety and Comp. 
Div., 2002 WY 62, ¶¶ 13-18, 44 P.3d 90, 94-95 (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 
[¶29]   Under the interpretation reached by 
the majority, Ms. Blommel was not obligated to file a claim and notify her 
employer until she received a definitive rotator cuff diagnosis.  The diagnosis could have occurred months 
or years after Ms. Blommel quit work.  
Such a result undermines our previous recognition that "[t]he employee . 
. .  may not ignore these 
requirements for compensable injuries because notice requirements and the 
statute of limitations exist to allow employers to investigate claims, monitor 
medical care, and avoid stale claims."  
Torres, ¶ 
17.

 
 
[¶30]   The majority relies upon our 
decisions in Torres, Iverson and Wesaw to support its conclusion.  All are factually distinguishable from 
this case.  When placed in proper 
perspective, they do not compel, or support, the result reached by the 
majority.  In Torres, there was no question that the 
employee's notice of claim was untimely.  
It was filed two months after the employee had left work and had been 
diagnosed with a hernia which the employee claimed was work related.  At hearing, the employee attempted to 
prevail on the timeliness issue on the basis that it had not been raised by the 
Division.  In Torres, we reaffirmed the significance 
of compliance with the statutorily mandated reporting requirements, "[o]f 
course, the statutory limitations periods are of pivotal importance in 
circumstances like this because failure to comply with those limitation periods 
may be fatal to even a very meritorious claim."  Torres, ¶ 15.   

 
 
[¶31]   In Iverson and Wesaw the employee's original injury was 
deemed "trivial" because the employee continued to work for a period of time 
after sustaining the injury.  
However, in both cases, the employee filed his report of injury within 
ten days of the date he first missed work because of the injury and within ten 
days of the date he first sought medical attention.  Additionally, in Wesaw, the definitive diagnosis of 
pulmonary injury caused by chemical exposure was not made until January 1999, 
nevertheless, we determined that the time for reporting the injury began to run 
in October 1998.  Wesaw, ¶ 15.  

 
 
[¶32]   Admittedly, reasonable minds could 
differ as to when the general nature of the injury became apparent to Ms. 
Blommel.  In such situations, 
however, we must defer to the conclusion reached by the hearing examiner.  As we noted in Brees v. Gulley Enterprises, Inc., 6 P.3d 128, 132 (Wyo. 2000) (internal citations omitted):

 
 
"The 
agency is charged with determining the ultimate weight to be given th[e] 
evidence.'   In addition, the 
agency is charged with determining the credibility of the witnesses.  If the agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, this Court cannot substitute [its] judgment for that of 
the agency, but this Court is required to uphold its findings upon 
appeal.'"

 
 
[¶33]   Ms. Blommel's injury was not 
trivial.  She sought medical 
attention, was placed on light duty and eventually quit work because of the 
shoulder pain.  Ms. Blommel's report 
of injury was not filed within ten days of the date she first sought medical 
attention or within ten days of the date she quit work.    

 
 
[¶34]   It is important to recognize that a 
statutory safety net exists to protect employees from the seemingly harsh 
consequences resulting from strict application of the claim notice 
requirement.  An employee who 
submits an untimely claim may still be entitled to benefits if the employee 
establishes that the employer was not prejudiced by the late notice.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(c) (LexisNexis 
2001).  Because the majority has 
determined that Ms. Blommel's claim is timely, it is not necessary to determine 
whether substantial evidence exists to support the hearing examiner's 
determination that Ms. Blommel failed to prove that the untimely notice did not 
prejudice the employer.2 

 
 
[¶35]   The hearing examiner's decision 
that Ms. Blommel's claim was untimely is supported by substantial evidence and 
should be affirmed. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1There 
appears to be conflict in our jurisprudence as to the appropriate standard of 
review to be applied in these circumstances.  In Wesaw, we held that "the date the 
general nature of the injury became apparent to the [e]mployee" is a legal 
conclusion which we review de 
novo.  Id., ¶ 12.  The majority apparently adopts the Wesaw de novo standard of review.  Regardless of which standard is applied, 
I would affirm the OAH.

 
 

2The 
shorter the time gap between injury and notice, the easier it should be for the 
employee to establish lack of prejudice.  
In this case, the record reflects that less than one month passed between 
the date Ms. Blommel left work and the date she filed her report of injury.  The employer was aware of Ms. Blommel's 
shoulder problem in early July and placed her on light duty.  The employer knew that Ms. Blommel was 
leaving her employment because of shoulder problems and that she was scheduled 
to see a doctor in August for an evaluation.  During her testimony, the employer's 
office manager admitted that the reporting delay did not prejudice the 
employer's ability to monitor Ms. Blommel's medical treatment.  There does not appear to be any evidence 
in the record that the employer was prejudiced by the late filing.