Title: State v. Johnson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2023 WI 39 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP664-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
T. A. J., 
          Appellant, 
     v. 
Alan S. Johnson, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 394 Wis. 2d 807, 951 N.W.2d 616 
PDC No: 2020 WI App 73 - Published  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 16, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 6, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waupaca   
 
JUDGE: 
Raymond S. Huber   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined with respect to ¶¶2-22 and 
25-29.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion.  
KAROFSKY, J., filed a concurring opinion.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Nathan J. Wojan and Petit & Dommershausen, S.C., 
Menasha. There was an oral argument by Nathan J. Wojan.  
 
 
 
2 
For the appellant, there were briefs filed by Andrea K. 
Rufo and Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc., Racine. There was an 
oral argument by Andrea K. Rufo.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there were briefs filed by 
Sarah L. Burgundy and Lisa E.F. Kumfer, assistant attorneys 
general, with whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney 
general. There was an oral argument by Sarah L. Burgundy, 
assistant attorney general.   
 
Amicus curiae briefs were filed by Katie R. York, appellate 
division director, with whom on the briefs was Kelli S. 
Thompson, state public defender, for the Wisconsin State Public 
Defender. There was an oral argument by Katie R. York, appellate 
division director.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Erika Jacobs Petty and 
Lotus 
Legal 
Clinic, 
Brookfield, 
for 
Lotus 
Legal 
Clinic, 
Wisconsin Coalition Against Sexual Assault, and the National 
Crime Victim Law Institute at Lewis & Clark Law School.  
 
Amicus curiae briefs were filed by Ellen Henak, Robert R. 
Henak, and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, for the Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.  
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 39 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP664-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2017CF0056) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
T. A. J., 
 
          Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Alan S. Johnson, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
May 16, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined with respect to ¶¶2-22 and 
25-29.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion.  
KAROFSKY, J., filed a concurring opinion.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined.   
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   Patients have a statutory 
privilege to prevent disclosure of confidential communications 
with their health care provider that are made for the purposes 
of diagnosis or treatment.  See Wis. Stat. § 905.04(2) (2019-
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
2 
 
20).1  In State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. 
App. 1993), however, the court of appeals created a process by 
which a criminal defendant could obtain a limited review by the 
court (in camera review) of a victim's privately held, otherwise 
privileged health records.2  The State and a victim in a pending 
criminal case, T.A.J., ask us to revisit Shiffra, arguing that 
it was wrongly decided, is unworkable, and its rationale has 
been undermined by subsequent developments in the law.  We 
agree, and therefore overrule Shiffra.3   
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Even though a Shiffra motion could in theory seek in 
camera review of any witness's records, as a practical matter, 
such motions almost always seek review of the victim's records.  
See Wis. Stat. § 950.02(4)(a) (defining "victim").  For that 
reason, and for simplicity, we refer to the privilege-holder as 
the "victim" throughout this opinion.   
3 Although many subsequent cases have applied Shiffra, we 
overrule those cases only to the extent they can be read to 
permit in camera review of privately held, privileged health 
records in a criminal case upon a showing of materiality.  See, 
e.g., State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 
N.W.2d 298; State v. Rizzo, 2002 WI 20, 250 Wis. 2d 407, 640 
N.W.2d 93; State v. Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d 372, 564 N.W.2d 775 
(1997); State v. Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d 43, 553 N.W.2d 265 (Ct. 
App. 1996); State v. S.H., 159 Wis. 2d 730, 465 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. 
App. 1990); Rock Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. DeLeu, 143 
Wis. 2d 508, 422 N.W.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1988).  As explained more 
fully below, we hold that Shiffra incorrectly concluded that the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 
480 
U.S. 
39 
(1987) 
applied 
to 
privately 
held, 
privileged health records.  Nevertheless, nothing in our opinion 
should be read as questioning Ritchie itself.   
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
3 
 
I 
¶2 
Johnson 
was 
charged 
with 
several 
felonies 
in 
connection with allegedly sexually assaulting his daughter, 
K.L.J., and his son, T.A.J.  He sought in camera review of 
T.A.J.'s mental health and counseling records,4 citing Shiffra 
and State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298.5  
Although the State did not take a position on the motion for in 
camera review, T.A.J. submitted a brief in opposition.  Johnson 
argued, and the circuit court6 agreed, that T.A.J. lacked 
standing to oppose the motion.7   
¶3 
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
decision in an interlocutory appeal, holding that a 2020 
amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution, Marsy's Law, gave crime 
victims like T.A.J. standing to oppose Shiffra motions.  See 
State v. Johnson, 2020 WI App 73, ¶¶26, 46-47, 394 Wis. 2d 807, 
951 N.W.2d 616; see also Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m.   
                                                 
4 Johnson also sought in camera review of K.L.J.'s privately 
held mental health treatment records.  Like T.A.J., the circuit 
court subsequently concluded that K.L.J. lacked standing to 
oppose Johnson's motion.  Because K.L.J. did not appeal the 
circuit court's decision on standing, only T.A.J.'s arguments 
are before us.   
5 As explained below, Green refined the standard for 
obtaining in camera review of privately held, privileged health 
records announced in Shiffra.   
6 The Honorable Raymond S. Huber of the Waupaca County 
Circuit Court presided. 
7 The circuit court has not yet ruled on Johnson's motion 
for in camera review of T.A.J.'s records, and this case remains 
in a pre-trial posture.   
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
4 
 
¶4 
After we granted Johnson's petition for review, the 
parties' briefs understandably focused on the issue of whether 
T.A.J. has standing to oppose Johnson's motion.  The State also 
asserted, however, that Shiffra was wrongly decided.  Following 
oral argument last term, we ordered the parties to file 
supplemental briefs in response to a single question:  "Should 
the court overrule State v. Shiffra . . . ?"   
II 
¶5 
Before tackling that question, we first provide some 
background on confidentiality and privilege, the statutes that 
apply to health records, and the way the statutory privilege in 
§ 905.04 interacts with Shiffra and Green.  We then discuss 
Shiffra and the cases on which it relied.   
A 
¶6 
Although confidentiality and privilege are related, 
they are nonetheless distinct concepts.  As we have previously 
explained, confidential information is "that which is 'meant to 
be kept secret.'"  In re John Doe Proceeding, 2004 WI 65, ¶15, 
272 Wis. 2d 208, 680 N.W.2d 792 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 
294 (7th ed. 1999)).  Privilege, meanwhile, "is a broader 
concept," which includes "the legal right not to provide certain 
data when faced with a valid subpoena."  Id.; see also Burnett 
v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 85, 589 N.W.2d 21 (1999).  "Privileges 
are the exception, not the rule."  Alt, 224 Wis. 2d at 85.  
Unless a privilege is provided by statute "or inherent or 
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
5 
 
implicit in statute or in rules adopted by the supreme court or 
required by the constitution of the United States or Wisconsin," 
no person may refuse to be a witness or disclose "any matter," 
"any object," or any "writing."  Wis. Stat. § 905.01(1)-(3); see 
also State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 505, 326 N.W.2d 744 
(1982) (explaining that privileges are the exception to the 
"fundamental tenet of our modern legal system . . . that the 
public has a right to every person's evidence").     
¶7 
Both of these concepts are implicated when health 
records are at issue.  With respect to confidentiality, Wis. 
Stat. § 146.82(1) provides that "[a]ll patient health care 
records shall remain confidential."  And as for privilege, Wis. 
Stat. § 905.04(2) states that patients have "a privilege to 
refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from 
disclosing 
confidential 
communications 
made 
or 
information 
obtained or disseminated for purposes of diagnosis or treatment 
of the patient's physical, mental or emotional condition."   
¶8 
There are exceptions to these confidentiality and 
privilege statutes.  For instance, § 146.82(2)(a)4. provides 
that otherwise confidential patient health records may be 
disclosed pursuant to "a lawful order of a court of record."  
There is no similar generally applicable exception to the 
privilege in § 905.04(2), however.  Instead, § 905.04 contains 
several narrow exceptions to the privilege, for example when 
records are created pursuant to a court-ordered examination "for 
purposes of guardianship, protective services or protective 
placement."  § 905.04(4)(b).  There is no such exception to the 
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
6 
 
privilege in § 905.04(2), however, for court-ordered in camera 
review of a victim's privately-held, privileged health records 
upon a criminal defendant's motion.   
¶9 
Nevertheless, the court of appeals created such an 
exception in Shiffra when it held that a defendant is "entitled 
to an in camera inspection" of a victim's privately-held, 
otherwise privileged health records "if [the defendant] meets 
the burden of making a preliminary showing of materiality."  
Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 607.  To meet that burden, the defendant 
must show "that the sought-after evidence is relevant and may be 
helpful to the defense or is necessary to a fair determination 
of guilt or innocence."  Id. at 608.   Although Shiffra said a 
defendant was "entitled" to in camera review upon meeting that 
burden, that was an overstatement.  See id. at 607.  As Shiffra 
explained, unlike with a subpoena or other court-ordered 
compulsory process, a victim could not be held in contempt for 
refusing to allow in camera review after the defendant made an 
initial showing of materiality because "[the victim] is not 
obligated to disclose her psychiatric records."8  See id. at 612.  
Instead, once the defendant makes a showing of materiality, 
victims are caught between a rock and hard place:  Either turn 
                                                 
8 Shiffra referred to "psychiatric" and "mental health 
treatment" records specifically, but the court of appeals 
subsequently held that Shiffra was not limited only to those 
types of records.  See State v. Navarro, 2001 WI App 225, ¶9, 
248 Wis. 2d 396, 636 N.W.2d 481.  For that reason, throughout 
this opinion we describe Shiffra as applying generally to 
"health records."   
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
7 
 
over the privileged health records for in camera review or be 
precluded from testifying at trial.  See id.  That remedy was, 
in the Shiffra court's view, "the only method of protecting [the 
defendant's] right to a fair trial . . . if [the victim] refused 
to disclose her records."  Id.   
¶10 We raised the threshold for materiality in Green, 
holding that the standard expressed in Shiffra——that the records 
"may 
be" 
necessary 
to 
determine 
guilt 
or 
innocence——was 
insufficient "[i]n light of the strong public policy favoring 
protection 
of . . . counseling 
records." 
 
See 
Green, 
253 
Wis. 2d 356, ¶32.  Accordingly, we held that defendants must 
show "a 'reasonable likelihood' that the records will be 
necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence" to obtain in 
camera review of privileged health records.  Id. (quoting 
Goldsmith 
v. 
State, 
651 
A.2d 
866, 
877 
(Md. 
1995)).  
Additionally, we explained that the evidence sought must not be 
"cumulative to other evidence available to the defendant," and 
that it is the defendant's duty "to reasonably investigate 
information related to the victim before setting forth an offer 
of proof and to clearly articulate how the information sought 
corresponds to his or her theory of defense."  Id., ¶¶34-35.   
¶11 The upshot of Shiffra and Green is that a defendant 
may obtain an in camera review of a victim's health records——
despite the statutory privilege against disclosure——if he shows 
a reasonable likelihood that the records are not cumulative and 
are "necessary" to a determination of guilt or innocence.  See 
id. ¶32.  And if the victim does not submit his or her records 
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
8 
 
for that in camera review, then he or she may not testify at 
trial.  See Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 612. 
B 
 
¶12 Shiffra created this framework based on its reading of 
a United States Supreme Court decision, Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 
480 U.S. 39 (1987), and two court of appeals decisions that 
discussed Ritchie, Rock County Department of Social Services v. 
DeLeu, 143 Wis. 2d 508, 422 N.W.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1988) and State 
v. S.H., 159 Wis. 2d 730, 465 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1990).   
 
¶13 Ritchie addressed whether a criminal defendant had a 
right to access confidential——not privileged——records from a 
state 
child 
protective 
services 
agency 
responsible 
for 
"investigating cases of suspected mistreatment and neglect."  
480 U.S. at 43.  After an investigation by that agency, Ritchie 
was charged with repeatedly assaulting his daughter.  Id.  
Before trial, he served the agency with a subpoena for its 
investigative records.  Id.  The agency refused to comply, 
however, noting that state law required that the records remain 
confidential unless a court ordered otherwise.  See id. at 43-
44.  The trial court denied Ritchie's motion for disclosure of 
the records and he was convicted at trial.  Id. at 44-45.   
 
¶14 Ritchie appealed, arguing that the failure to disclose 
the contents of the agency's file violated his Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.  See id. at 45.  The United States 
Supreme Court held that Ritchie's due process rights were 
violated, drawing heavily on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
9 
 
(1963), which requires that the prosecution turn over to the 
defendant evidence in its possession that is favorable to the 
accused and material to his defense.  See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 
56-58; see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.  The Ritchie Court 
seemingly assumed that the evidence satisfied Brady's possession 
requirement, perhaps because the agency that held the records 
was responsible for investigating child abuse cases.  See 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57; see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 
263, 281 (1999) (stating that evidence in the government's 
"possession" for Brady purposes includes "'favorable evidence 
known to others acting on the government's behalf in th[e] 
case'" (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995)).  It 
then 
explained 
that 
Brady's 
materiality 
requirement 
was 
difficult to evaluate because neither the parties nor the court 
had reviewed the files.  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57.  As a 
workaround, the Court held that in camera review was the 
appropriate way to assess the materiality of the confidential 
records, 
in 
part 
because 
state 
law 
did 
not 
guarantee 
confidentiality in all circumstances.  See id. 57-61.  Instead, 
state law "contemplated some use of [agency] records in judicial 
proceedings," namely after a court order.  Id. at 58.  Thus, 
Ritchie held that "[the defendant's] interest (as well as that 
of the Commonwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected 
fully by requiring that the [agency's] files be submitted only 
to the trial court for in camera review."  Id. at 60.   
 
¶15 Two court of appeals decisions discussed Ritchie 
before Shiffra was decided.  The first, DeLeu, dealt with the 
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
10 
 
statutory requirements for releasing a county department of 
social services' files for use in a criminal case.  See 143 
Wis. 2d at 509.  Like the records in Ritchie, the department's 
files 
were 
confidential——not 
privileged——and 
subject 
to 
disclosure "by order of the court."  Id. at 510 (quoting Wis. 
Stat. § 48.78(2)(a) (1987-88)); see also Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 
43-44.  The court of appeals concluded that the orders directing 
disclosure of the department's files were invalid because the 
statutory procedure for releasing them was not followed.  See 
DeLeu, 143 Wis. 2d at 510-11.  Additionally, the court of 
appeals noted that Ritchie was not implicated because the 
criminal defendant who sought release of the department's files 
"ha[d] not moved the trial court in his criminal cases to make 
an in camera review of the agency records."  Id. at 510.  
Nevertheless, DeLeu gave a broad description of Ritchie's 
holding, stating "that a criminal defendant is entitled to an in 
camera review by the trial court of confidential records if 
those records are material to the defendant's defense," and 
"that [the defendant] is entitled to such a review . . . 
provided he makes a preliminary showing that the files contain 
evidence material to his defense."  Id. (citing Ritchie, 480 
U.S. at 60-61).   
 
¶16 The court of appeals relied on that broad language in 
a subsequent case, S.H., suggesting for the first time that the 
reasoning of Ritchie and DeLeu also applied to health records 
that are privileged under § 905.04——not merely confidential——and 
not in the State's possession.  See S.H., 159 Wis. 2d at 737-38.  
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
11 
 
In S.H., the defendant was charged with sexually assaulting his 
three children.  Id. at 733.  Before trial, he signed medical 
release forms pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.30(5)(a) (1989-90)9 
seeking release of his children's records from a private 
counseling center.  The children's guardian ad litem invoked the 
privilege against the disclosure of health records contained in 
§ 905.04, and the trial court blocked the records' release.  See 
S.H., 159 Wis. 2d at 734; see also § 51.30(6) (stating that 
§ 905.04 "supersede[s] [§ 51.30] with respect to communications 
between physicians and patients").  Although the court of 
appeals agreed that the records were privileged and that the 
release form did not authorize disclosure, it nonetheless stated 
that Ritchie "controls [the defendant's] constitutional right to 
compel disclosure of confidential records," and that "if a 
defendant makes a preliminary showing that the records contain 
evidence material to his defense, he is entitled to an in camera 
review by the trial court of those records."  S.H., 159 
Wis. 2d at 737-38 (citing DeLeu, 143 Wis. 2d at 511).10     
 
¶17 That brings us back to Shiffra, which relied on 
Ritchie, DeLeu, and S.H. to conclude that a criminal defendant 
is entitled to an in camera review of a victim's privately held, 
                                                 
9 All statutory citations in this paragraph are to the 1989-
90 version.   
10 Because the defendant did not appeal a circuit court 
decision denying in camera review, however, S.H. did not address 
whether the defendant made the preliminary showing necessary to 
obtain in camera review of the counseling records.  See 159 
Wis. 2d at 738.   
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
12 
 
privileged health records if he or she "make[s] a preliminary 
showing that the sought-after evidence is material to his or her 
defense."  Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 605.  The court of appeals 
explained that "Wisconsin precedent . . . clearly makes Ritchie 
applicable to cases in which the information sought by the 
defense is protected by statute and is not in the possession of 
the state."  Id. at 606-07 (citing DeLeu, 143 Wis. 2d at 511; 
S.H., 159 Wis. 2d at 736).  For that reason, the court dismissed 
the State's argument that the victim's "psychiatric history 
[and] psychiatric records" differed from the records in Ritchie 
because they were privileged against disclosure under § 905.04, 
not merely confidential, and were not in the State's possession.  
See id. at 603, 606-07.  Additionally, the court held that 
suppression of the victim's testimony at trial was the only 
appropriate remedy for her refusal to release the records for in 
camera review since she was not "obligated to disclose her 
psychiatric records," and therefore could not be held in 
contempt.  Id. at 612.    
III 
¶18 The question is whether we should overrule Shiffra.  
To answer that question, we must first address the role of stare 
decisis in our analysis.    
A 
¶19  We have repeatedly recognized the importance of stare 
decisis to the rule of law.  See, e.g., State v. Denny, 2017 WI 
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
13 
 
17, ¶69, 373 Wis. 2d 390, 891 N.W.2d 144; State v. Luedtke, 2015 
WI 42, ¶40, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 592.  That is why we 
require a special justification in order to overturn our 
precedent.  See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of 
Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257 
(quoting Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 
653 N.W.2d 266).   
¶20 We have specifically identified five such special 
justifications.  See State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶51 n.16, 294 
Wis. 2d 1, 
717 
N.W.2d 729. 
 
A 
special 
justification 
for 
overruling precedent exists when:  (1) the law has changed in a 
way that undermines the prior decision's rationale; (2) there is 
a "need to make a decision correspond to newly ascertained 
facts;" (3) our precedent "has become detrimental to coherence 
and consistency in the law;" (4) the decision is "unsound in 
principle;" or (5) it is "unworkable in practice."  Id. (citing 
Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶¶98-99).  Any one of these 
special justifications is sufficient to justify overruling 
precedent.  See State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶50, 389 
Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813.  But we have never required a 
special justification to overturn a decision of the court of 
appeals.  See State v. Lira, 2021 WI 81, ¶45, 399 Wis. 2d 419, 
966 N.W.2d 605.  Since Shiffra is a court of appeals decision, 
we therefore do not need a special justification to overrule it.   
 
¶21 That being said, Shiffra is unlike most court of 
appeals decisions because on three prior occasions we signaled 
that we approved of it.  The first time was in State v. Solberg, 
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
14 
 
211 Wis. 2d 372, 564 N.W.2d 775 (1997), where we recited the 
materiality standard in Shiffra and said that "giving the 
defendant an opportunity to have the circuit court conduct an in 
camera review of the privileged records, while still allowing 
the patient to preclude that review, addresse[d] both the 
interests of the defendant and the patient."  Id. at 383, 387.  
The second was in State v. Rizzo, 2002 WI 20, 250 Wis. 2d 407, 
640 N.W.2d 93, where the defendant argued that he was entitled 
to access a victim's treatment records even after the circuit 
court did an in camera review because it was necessary to 
conduct 
an 
effective 
cross-examination 
of 
the 
victim's 
therapist, who testified at trial as a Jensen11 witness.  Id., 
¶48.  We rejected that claim because it would have upset the 
balance Shiffra struck between "the victim’s interest in 
confidentiality 
[and] 
the 
constitutional 
rights 
of 
the 
defendant."  Id., ¶53.  Neither Solberg nor Rizzo examined the 
basis for the court of appeals' holding in Shiffra, however, and 
instead took its framework as a given.  We went further though 
in a third case, Green, and rejected the State's argument that 
Shiffra was wrongly decided.  But we did so only because Solberg 
and Rizzo had "recognized the validity of Shiffra."  Green, 253 
Wis. 2d 356, ¶21 n.4.  Nevertheless, Green, Solberg, and Rizzo 
never did what the State and T.A.J. ask us to do in this case:  
                                                 
11 See State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 250, 432 N.W.2d 913 
(1988) (explaining that expert testimony that a sexual assault 
victim's behavior is consistent with the behavior of sexual 
assault victims generally may be admissible).   
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
15 
 
analyze whether Shiffra was wrongly decided.  See Green, 253 
Wis. 2d 356, ¶21 n.4; see also Rizzo, 250 Wis. 2d 407, ¶53; 
Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d at 386-87.   
¶22 We have on two prior occasions, however, been asked to 
perform that analysis.  In both State v. Johnson, 2014 WI 16, 
¶13, 353 Wis. 2d 119, 846 N.W.2d 1 (per curiam) and State v. 
Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶¶6-8 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (lead 
op.), the State argued that Shiffra was wrongly decided and 
should be overturned.  And each time, the court was too divided 
to reach a majority holding.  See Lynch, 371 Wis. 2d 1, ¶7 
(stating that three justices would have overruled Shiffra, one 
would have applied it as it was, and three would have modified 
it 
in 
various 
ways); 
Johnson, 
353 
Wis. 2d 119, 
¶¶7-11 
(explaining that, of the five participating justices, two would 
have modified Shiffra, two would have reaffirmed it, and one 
would have overruled it).  As Johnson and Lynch demonstrate, the 
validity of Shiffra remains an open question, and one on which 
there has been substantial disagreement.  Nevertheless, because 
we arguably applied Shiffra in several prior cases, we assume 
without deciding that the framework Shiffra articulated should 
be treated as precedent from this court, and that we may 
overrule it only if there is a "special justification" for doing 
so.  See Young, 294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶51.   
B 
 
¶23  We 
conclude 
that 
there 
are 
three 
special 
justifications for overruling Shiffra.  First, Shiffra is 
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
16 
 
unsound in principle because it incorrectly concluded that 
Ritchie applied to privileged (not just confidential) records 
not in the State's possession and because it undermines the 
therapist-patient relationship.  Second, the standard for 
obtaining in camera review articulated in Shiffra and Green is 
unworkable in practice.  And third, Shiffra has been undermined 
by the adoption of new statutory and constitutional provisions 
protecting the rights of victims, and is now detrimental to 
coherence in the law.  See, e.g., Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m; Wis. 
Stat. § 950.04.    
1 
 
¶24 Shiffra is unsound in principle because it incorrectly 
concluded that Ritchie applied to privately held and statutorily 
privileged health records.  See Roberson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶51 
("A decision is unsound in principle when it relies on an 
erroneous understanding of United States Supreme Court decisions 
. . . because the misunderstanding and faulty application risk 
perpetuating erroneous declarations of the law." (internal 
alterations and quotation marks omitted)).  Additionally, 
Shiffra's alternative, public-policy based rationale is unsound 
in 
principle 
because 
it 
undermines 
the 
therapist-patient 
relationship.  See Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 611-12.    
¶25 As explained previously, the records in Ritchie were 
in the state's possession because they were held by a state 
investigative agency.  See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 43.  By 
contrast, the health records at issue in Shiffra were held by a 
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
17 
 
private entity and thus were entirely outside the State's 
possession or control.  Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 607.  That is a 
meaningful distinction because the holding in Ritchie——that the 
defendant had a due process right to an in camera review of the 
agency's files——rested on Brady, which imposes a disclosure 
obligation only on exculpatory and material evidence in the 
state's possession.  See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 (citing Brady, 
373 U.S. at 87).  Shiffra brushed this difference aside, 
however, because it believed DeLeu and S.H. "ma[de] Ritchie 
applicable to cases in which the information sought by the 
defense is protected by statute and is not in the possession of 
the state."  Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 606-07.  But the portions 
of DeLeu and S.H. on which Shiffra relied gave no explanation 
for how the rule in Ritchie could apply to privately held 
records.  Indeed, as many other courts have said, Ritchie simply 
does not apply to privately held records.12  See, e.g., United 
States v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 947 (7th Cir. 1998); Vaughn v. 
State, 608 S.W.3d 569, 575 (Ark. 2020); Goldsmith, 651 A.2d at 
872; but see Burns v. State, 968 A.2d 1012, 1024-25 (Del. 2009).    
 
¶26  Additionally, Shiffra and the cases preceding it did 
not 
address 
the 
distinction 
between 
privilege 
and 
                                                 
12 For this reason, Ritchie also would not apply to requests 
for in camera review of privately-held records that are merely 
confidential, not privileged, under Wis. Stat. § 146.82(1).  
Even though such records may be released "[u]nder a lawful order 
of a court of record," see § 146.82(2)(a)4., Ritchie does not 
provide defendants with a due process right to in camera review 
of confidential records that are not in the State's possession.  
See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57.   
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
18 
 
confidentiality.  The records at issue in Shiffra and S.H. were 
privileged under § 905.04(2), which states that "[a] patient has 
a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other from 
disclosing 
confidential 
communications 
made 
or 
information 
obtained 
or 
disseminated 
for 
purposes 
of 
diagnosis 
or 
treatment." 
 
Shiffra 
dismissed 
this 
statutory 
privilege, 
claiming that under S.H. and DeLeu, "a statute allowing for 
confidentiality is not a barrier to in camera review."  Shiffra, 
175 Wis. 2d at 607.  But § 905.04 is not merely a "statute 
allowing for confidentiality"——it provides that certain records 
are privileged from disclosure.  As the text of § 905.04(2) 
demonstrates, and as discussed above, confidentiality and 
privilege are distinct concepts.  See § 905.04(2) (granting 
patients "a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any 
other from disclosing confidential communications." (emphasis 
added)).   
 
¶27 Shiffra overlooked this point, and in doing so, 
broadened the holding in Ritchie.  In Ritchie, the records at 
issue were confidential under a statute that specifically 
allowed for disclosure pursuant to a court order.  Ritchie, 480 
U.S. at 43-44.  Thus, Ritchie was "not a case where a state 
statute grant[ed] [the agency] the absolute authority to shield 
its files from all eyes."  Id. 57-58.  Section 905.04, in 
contrast, creates a privilege without a generally applicable 
exception for disclosure pursuant to a court order.  Instead, 
§ 905.04(4) contains a number of specific and narrow exceptions, 
none of which authorize disclosure for in camera review merely 
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
19 
 
because a criminal defendant makes a showing that the privileged 
records may contain information material to his defense.  In the 
absence of such an exception, § 905.04(2) means what it says:  
that patients "ha[ve] a privilege to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent any other person from disclosing" their health records.  
§ 905.04(2).  We do not create exceptions to other statutory 
privileges like the attorney-client privilege or the privilege 
for confidential communications to members of the clergy simply 
because the privileged communications may contain information 
material to a criminal defendant's defense.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 905.03, 905.06.  Shiffra offered no justification for its 
decision to do so in the case of the patient-health care 
provider privilege, and Ritchie does not provide one either.   
 
¶28 Shiffra's references to a criminal defendant's right 
to 
present 
a 
complete 
defense 
do 
not 
salvage 
its 
misinterpretation of Ritchie.  Shiffra correctly observed that 
defendants have a due process right to a "meaningful opportunity 
to present a complete defense."  See Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 605 
(citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984)).  But 
Ritchie never discussed or relied on cases involving that right.  
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has never held that 
the right to present a complete defense applies before trial.  
Instead, the Court has said the right applies when, for example, 
state evidentiary rules arbitrarily exclude a defendant from 
introducing evidence at trial without a legitimate purpose for 
doing so.  See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324-28 
(2006) ("This right is abridged by evidence rules that infringe 
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
20 
 
upon a weighty interest of the accused and are arbitrary or 
disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve." 
(internal alterations and quotation marks omitted)).  Shiffra 
did not explain how the right to present a complete defense 
could be implicated by a pretrial discovery motion seeking in 
camera review of a victim's privately held, privileged health 
records.   
 
¶29 Simply put, nothing in Ritchie supports Shiffra's 
conclusion that criminal defendants have a due process right to 
in camera review of a victim's privately held, privileged health 
records upon a showing of materiality.13  Accordingly, we hold 
that Shiffra is unsound in principle because it incorrectly 
concluded that Ritchie applied to privately held, privileged 
health records.  See Roberson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶51.   
¶30 Nevertheless, Shiffra rested on more than just its 
misreading of Ritchie.  It also relied on "[p]ublic policy and 
the history of our judicial system" as justifying its efforts to 
                                                 
13 The dissent concedes as much, admitting that "[t]here is 
no constitutional right to an in camera review."  Dissent, ¶37.  
Nevertheless, the dissent suggests that overruling Shiffra is 
unjustified because in camera review is "a means of fulfilling" 
the right to present a complete defense.  Id.  But that gets the 
analysis backwards.  Holding that criminal defendants have a 
general right to pretrial discovery, for example, might be a 
good way of "fulfilling" the defendant's right to present a 
complete defense.  Yet there is still "no general constitutional 
right to discovery in a criminal case."  See Weatherford v. 
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).  So too with in camera review 
of privately held, privileged health records upon a showing of 
materiality.  Because the Constitution does not guarantee a 
right to in camera review of privately held, privileged health 
records, Shiffra was wrong to hold otherwise.  
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
21 
 
balance "the sometimes competing goals of confidential privilege 
and the right to put on a defense."14  Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 
611-12.  We have described Shiffra in similar terms as well.  
See Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶23 (characterizing Shiffra as 
"balancing" the "competing rights and interests involved when a 
defendant seeks an in camera review of privileged records"); see 
also Rizzo, 250 Wis. 2d 407, ¶53.  But courts of course lack the 
power to rewrite statutes in the name of public policy.  And 
even if the court of appeals had that power, Shiffra would be 
unsound in this respect as well because the rule it adopted 
undermines the therapist-patient relationship.   
¶31 As the United States Supreme Court explained, "[l]ike 
the spousal and attorney-client privileges, the psychotherapist-
patient privilege is 'rooted in the imperative need for 
confidence and trust.'"  Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 
(1996) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 
(1980)).  That is because "[e]ffective psychotherapy . . . 
depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the 
patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of 
facts, emotions, memories, and fears," often about sensitive 
issues.  Id.  The statutory privilege in § 905.04(2) protects 
that atmosphere of confidence and trust by providing that 
                                                 
14 Although the Constitution, as interpreted in Ritchie, 
does not justify Shiffra's holding, nothing in the Constitution 
prohibits states from adopting a similar rule.  See, e.g., Iowa 
Code § 622.10(4) (2021) (authorizing criminal defendants to 
obtain in camera review of privately held, privileged health 
records upon a showing of materiality).   
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
22 
 
patients' confidential communications with their health care 
providers are privileged against disclosure.  See Steinberg v. 
Jensen, 194 Wis. 2d 439, 459, 534 N.W.2d 361 (1995).   
¶32 In camera review, even if it does not ultimately lead 
to the disclosure to the defense of any privileged health 
records, still undermines that statutory privilege.  A patient's 
willingness to discuss sensitive issues will be chilled if she 
knows that her most private thoughts and fears might be revealed 
to a circuit court judge in the context of a criminal case.  See 
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 ("[T]he mere possibility of disclosure 
may 
impede 
development 
of 
the 
confidential 
relationship 
necessary for successful treatment.").  And that is because 
"'[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain 
but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is 
little better than no privilege at all.'"  Id. at 18 (quoting 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).  As 
other courts have recognized, in camera review "'intrudes on the 
rights of the victim and dilutes the statutory privilege,'" even 
if that review does not lead to broader disclosure of privileged 
communications.  See State v. Pinder, 678 So. 2d 410, 415 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State v. J.G., 619 A.2d 232, 237 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)); see also In re Crisis 
Connection, Inc., 949 N.E.2d 789, 802 (Ind. 2011); Commonwealth 
v. Kennedy, 604 A.2d 1036, 1046 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) ("The 
compelling interest in allowing [a] rehabilitative process to 
occur in private is not to build a case for the prosecution, but 
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
23 
 
rather to deal with the trauma of the assault and begin the 
healing process.").   
¶33 Therefore, Shiffra was wrong to imply that in camera 
review is a minimal intrusion on a victim's privacy.  See 
Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 611-12.  Because Shiffra undermines the 
trust necessary to an effective patient-health care provider 
relationship 
and, 
with 
it, 
"[t]he 
mental 
health 
of 
our 
citizenry, . . . a public good of transcendent importance," we 
conclude it is unsound in principle in this respect as well.  
See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11.    
2 
 
¶34 Shiffra is also unworkable in practice because it 
cannot be applied consistently and is inherently speculative.     
 
¶35 As discussed previously, we said in Green that in 
camera review of a victim's privileged health records is 
available only if a defendant "set[s] forth, in good faith, a 
specific factual basis demonstrating a reasonable likelihood 
that the records contain relevant information necessary to a 
determination of guilt or innocence" that "is not merely 
cumulative to other evidence available to the defendant."  
Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶34.  In this context, information that 
is "necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence" is 
evidence that "'tends to create a reasonable doubt that might 
not otherwise exist.'"  Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Fuller, 667 
N.E.2d 847, 855 (Mass. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by 
Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400, 414 (Mass. 2006)).   
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
24 
 
 
¶36 Reading this language in isolation, one would think 
the standard for obtaining in camera review is high.  After all, 
unless a defendant already knows what is in a victim's records, 
how can he show a reasonable likelihood that the records contain 
relevant information "necessary to a determination of guilt or 
innocence?"  Id. (emphasis added).  Similarly, without knowing 
the contents of the victim's records, how can a defendant "show 
more than a mere possibility that the records will contain 
evidence that may be helpful or useful to the defense?"  Id., 
¶33; see also id. (stating that "[t]he mere contention that the 
victim has been involved in counseling related to prior sexual 
assaults or the current sexual assault is insufficient"). 
¶37 Yet at the same time, Green also said that the 
standard it adopted was "not intended . . . to be unduly high 
for the defendant."  Id., ¶35.  To that end, Green explained 
that because "[t]he defendant, of course, will most often be 
unable to determine the specific information in the records," 
"in cases where it is a close call, the circuit court should 
generally provide an in camera review."  Id.   
 
¶38 As these quotes demonstrate, Green is in tension with 
itself.  And given that tension, it should not be surprising 
that courts have struggled to apply Green.  Take, for example, 
two cases in which defendants made similar allegations:  that a 
victim was receiving counseling at the time the alleged crimes 
occurred, that the counseling was meant to address the victim's 
relationship with the defendant or events related to the crimes 
charged, and that in camera review of the records would reveal 
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
25 
 
information about those alleged offenses.  See State v. Johnson, 
No. 2011AP2864-CRAC, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 
18, 2012), aff'd as modified 2013 WI 59, 348 Wis. 2d 450, 832 
N.W.2d 609 (per curiam), reconsideration granted, 353 Wis. 2d 
119; State v. Keith, No. 2010AP1667-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 24, 2011).  In one of those cases, the court 
of appeals held that the defendant made a sufficient showing for 
in camera review.  See Johnson, No. 2011AP2864-CRAC, at ¶14.  In 
the other, however, the court of appeals held that the 
defendant's motion was "based on pure speculation."  See Keith, 
No. 2010AP1667-CR, at ¶13.   
¶39 As these court of appeals decisions illustrate, 
Shiffra (as modified by Green) is unworkable because it cannot 
be applied consistently.  But court of appeals decisions tell 
only part of the story.  Circuit courts also struggle to apply 
Shiffra consistently because it is inherently speculative.  When 
a Shiffra motion is filed, neither the defendant, the State, nor 
the circuit court have seen the victim's treatment records.  Yet 
the circuit court must decide, often based on vague allegations 
and an affidavit from the defendant, whether it is reasonably 
likely that records the judge has never seen contain information 
"necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence."  See 
Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶34.  Because "[t]he defendant, of 
course, will most often be unable to determine the specific 
information in the records," we explained that "the circuit 
court should generally provide an in camera review" in close 
cases.  Id., ¶35.  Despite that, the court of appeals has 
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
26 
 
criticized 
circuit 
courts 
for 
appearing 
to 
"consider 
possibilities of what the counseling records might contain 
rather than the higher 'reasonable likelihood' standard" we 
articulated in Green.  See State v. Lewis, 2009AP2531-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶14 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2010).  The 
problem, however, is not with circuit courts' application of 
Green but with the standard itself.  Shiffra and Green give 
circuit courts no choice but to guess at whether a victim's 
records contain material information and to resolve close 
questions in favor of in camera review.  And for that reason, we 
hold that it is unworkable in practice.   
3 
 
¶40 Finally, since it was decided, Shiffra has been 
undermined by two related developments in the law:  the removal 
of procedural and evidentiary barriers to prosecuting sexual 
assault cases and the passage of statutory and constitutional 
protections for crime victims.15  For these reasons, we also 
conclude that Shiffra is detrimental to coherence in the law.   
                                                 
15 We acknowledge, of course, that these changes in the law 
would not be material to our analysis if Shiffra was right that 
the Constitution grants criminal defendants a right to in camera 
review of privately held, privileged health records upon a 
showing of materiality.  But as we explained previously, the 
Constitution, as interpreted in Ritchie, does not create such a 
right.  Nevertheless, we discuss these changes in the law 
because they undermine Shiffra's alternative rationale, which it 
said was based on "[p]ublic policy" and balancing the competing 
interests of privilege holders and criminal defendants, rather 
than the Constitution.  See Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 611-12.     
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
27 
 
¶41 Historically, the law adopted a "stance of overt 
suspicion toward rape accusers."  See Deborah Tuerkheimer, 
Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount, 
166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 21 (2017).  As recently as the 1970s, this 
court addressed "policy considerations" that "proof of rape 
[should be] difficult to prevent 'after thought' rapes, i.e., 
the 
possibility 
of 
women 
experiencing 
an 
unpleasant 
sex 
experience being motivated to 'get even' and making a claim of 
being raped."  State v. Herfel, 49 Wis. 2d 513, 517, 182 
N.W.2d 232 (1971).  For that reason, Wisconsin law required the 
victim's "utmost physical resistance" in order to prove sexual 
assault.  See Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 206, 106 N.W. 536 
(1906).  Additionally, "[b]efore rape shield legislation, 
defendants in sexual assault cases would use a victim's sexual 
history to attack the credibility of the victim and the victim's 
story."  State v. Mulhern, 2022 WI 42, ¶60, 402 Wis. 2d 64, 975 
N.W.2d 209 (Ziegler, C.J., concurring).   
¶42 Over the last several decades, our law has evolved 
away from this distrust of sexual assault victims, and removed 
many of the procedural and evidentiary barriers to prosecuting 
those cases.  See Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b) (prohibiting 
introduction of "evidence concerning the complaining witness's 
prior sexual conduct" subject to narrow exceptions); State v. 
Clark, 87 Wis. 2d 804, 815, 275 N.W.2d 715 (1979) (explaining 
that, following amendments to the definition of consent in Wis. 
Stat. § 940.225(4) (1977-78) "failure to resist" sexual assault 
"is not consent; the statute requires 'words' or 'overt acts' 
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
28 
 
demonstrating 'freely given consent'"); see also Tuerkheimer, 
Incredible 
Women, 
supra 
at 
21-25 
(describing 
similar 
developments in other states).16  Moreover, Wisconsin has also 
acknowledged the admissibility of expert testimony to rebut 
common misconceptions about the connection between delayed 
reporting, which is common in both sexual assault and domestic 
violence cases, and a victim's credibility.  See State v. 
Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 250, 432 N.W.2d 913 (1988) ("Expert 
testimony on the post-assault behavior of a sexual assault 
victim is admissible in certain cases to help explain the 
meaning of that behavior."); State v. Bednarz, 179 Wis. 2d 460, 
467-68, 507 N.W.2d 168 (Ct. App. 1993) (permitting expert 
testimony about post-traumatic stress disorder as a possible 
explanation for a domestic violence victim's behavior).   
¶43 Despite these changes to our law, Shiffra continues to 
reflect outdated skepticism toward victims of sexual assault.  
Shiffra was, after all, a sexual assault case, and the rule it 
adopted rested on the concern that without in camera review of 
privileged health records, defendants would be convicted based 
on false reports.  See Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 612 (suggesting 
that in camera review was necessary because the victim's 
psychiatric records might reveal information bearing on her 
"ability to accurately perceive events and her ability to relate 
                                                 
16 Although some of these changes occurred before Shiffra 
was decided, Shiffra did not consider them, nor could it 
appreciate their importance within the broader context of the 
subsequently 
enacted 
statutory 
and 
constitutional 
victim's 
rights provisions discussed below.   
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
29 
 
the truth.").  But now we know that false reports of crimes are 
rare, and no more common in sexual assault cases than any other 
type of case.17  And yet, Shiffra motions are commonplace in 
sexual assault and domestic violence cases.18  By contrast, 
Shiffra motions are highly unusual in other types of cases, even 
though nothing about Shiffra's rule is limited to sexual assault 
                                                 
17 Several studies place the rate of false reports of sexual 
assault between 4.5 and 6.8 percent.  See, e.g., Tuerkheimer, 
supra, at 17-20 (summarizing studies that independently reviewed 
allegations of sexual assault to determine whether they were 
false).  That rate is no higher than in other types of cases.  
See Tyler J. Buller, Fighting Rape Culture with Noncorroboration 
Instructions, 
53 
Tulsa 
L. 
Rev. 
1, 
6 
& 
n.46 
(2017).  
Nevertheless, "studying the prevalence of false reports is 
difficult because of the methodological challenge of identifying 
ground truth——a difficulty that largely accounts for significant 
discrepancies in findings."  Tuerkheimer, supra, at 17.    
Although false reports and false convictions are serious, 
it is not clear why there would be fewer such reports or 
convictions if we upheld Shiffra.  For that to be the case we 
would have to make the dubious assumption that individuals who 
make false reports are frequently disclosing their falsity to 
health care providers but not to other individuals, or that 
cross-examination and the trial process is an ineffective tool 
for exposing those false reports without access to victims' 
privileged health records.   
18 Although data regarding circuit court filings are not in 
the record, all three of the court of appeals' non-summary 
decisions over the last two years mentioning Shiffra were 
domestic violence or sexual assault cases.  See, e.g., State v. 
Rausch, No. 2020AP197-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶4 (Wis. Ct. 
App. May 11, 2022) (per curiam); State v. Steinpreis, No. 
2020AP1893-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶6 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 
2022) 
(per 
curiam); 
State 
v. 
Hineman, 
No. 
2020AP226-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶1-2 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2021) (per 
curiam), rev'd 2023 WI 1, 405 Wis. 2d 233, 983 N.W.2d 652; State 
v. Doyle, No. 2019AP2162-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶2 (Wis. Ct. 
App. June 22, 2021) (per curiam).  
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
30 
 
cases.19   This difference is particularly striking considering 
that witness credibility is an issue in nearly every case, 
regardless of the type of crime being prosecuted.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that Shiffra has been undermined by developments in 
the law regarding sexual assault and domestic violence, and is 
therefore detrimental to coherence in the law.   
¶44 In addition to the changes in the law regarding sexual 
assault and domestic violence, the expansion of victim's rights 
laws also has undermined Shiffra.  A month after Shiffra was 
decided, the Wisconsin Constitution was amended to affirm that 
"[t]h[e] state shall treat crime victims, as defined by law, 
with fairness, dignity and respect for their privacy."  See Wis. 
Const. art. I § 9m (1994).  A few years later, the legislature 
passed a comprehensive crime victims' bill of rights, see 1997 
Wis. Act 181, which was subsequently amended to grant crime 
victims an enforceable right to "fairness and respect."  See 
Wis. Stat. § 950.04(1v)(ag).  And in 2020, voters ratified 
                                                 
19 Indeed, the State was able to locate just four appellate 
decisions in which a Shiffra motion was filed outside a sexual 
assault or domestic violence case, and we have been unable to 
locate any others.  See State v. Kletzien, 2008 WI App 182, 314 
Wis. 2d 750, 762 N.W.2d 788; State v. Ballos, 230 Wis. 2d 495, 
602 N.W.2d 117 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Kutska, No. 97-2962-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1998); State v. 
Napper, Nos. 94-3260-CR & 94-3261-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Sept. 12, 1996).   
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
31 
 
Marsy's Law,20 which amended the Wisconsin Constitution once 
again to guarantee crime victims the rights "[t]o be treated 
with dignity, respect, courtesy, sensitivity, and fairness," 
"[t]o privacy," and "[t]o reasonable protection from the accused 
throughout the criminal . . . justice process."  See Wis. Const. 
art. I § 9m(2)(a), (b), (f).  Additionally, Marsy's Law 
guarantees that these rights will be "protected by law in a 
manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded the 
accused."  Id. § 9m(2).    
 
¶45 Collectively, these changes reflect increased concern 
for the rights of crime victims, as well as a broader conception 
of what it means to be a crime victim.  See id. § 9m(1)(a)1.  
Yet Shiffra did not consider the rights of crime victims at all, 
let alone the impact its holding would have on victims' privacy 
or their right to be protected from the accused throughout the 
criminal 
justice 
process. 
 
Instead, 
Shiffra 
equated 
the 
government's 
interest 
in 
the 
confidentiality 
of 
its 
investigative files in Ritchie with a victim's interest in her 
privately held, privileged health records.  But those interests 
differ in important ways.  A victim has an individual interest 
in privacy guaranteed by Marsy's Law and in preserving the 
atmosphere of trust and confidence necessary to obtain effective 
medical treatment.  See Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m(2)(b); Jaffee, 
                                                 
20 In a case decided today, Wisconsin Justice Initiative, 
Inc. v. WEC, 2023 WI 38, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, we 
conclude that the process by which Marsy's Law was adopted and 
ratified complied with the requirements of the Wisconsin 
constitution.   
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
32 
 
518 U.S. at 10.  In contrast, the state's interest in 
maintaining the confidentiality of the files at issue in Ritchie 
related to investigating and prosecuting abuse cases.  See 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60.  Although these interests have some 
things in common, namely the shared interest in avoiding 
"general disclosure" of reports of assault or abuse, victims 
have their own unique interests in preserving the privacy of 
their confidential communications with health care providers to 
obtain effective treatment.  See id.; see also § 905.04(2).   
 
¶46 Shiffra did not consider the different interests of 
the State and victims, and it could not have considered the 
expansion of victims' rights laws after it was decided.  We 
therefore conclude that these subsequent developments in the law 
have undercut the rationale for Shiffra.  And because Shiffra is 
in tension with our victims' rights laws and the Wisconsin 
Constitution's protections for crime victims, we further hold 
that it is detrimental to coherence in the law.   
  IV 
 
¶47 In sum, we hold that Shiffra must be overturned.  It 
is unsound in principle because it rests on a misinterpretation 
of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ritchie and 
harms the therapist-patient relationship.  It is unworkable in 
practice because it is inherently speculative and cannot be 
applied 
consistently. 
 
And 
it 
has 
been 
undermined 
by 
developments in the law regarding sexual assault and domestic 
violence and by the adoption of new statutory and constitutional 
No. 
2019AP664-CR   
 
33 
 
provisions protecting the rights of victims, and is therefore 
detrimental to coherence in the law.  See, e.g., Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 9m; Wis. Stat. § 950.04.  These three reasons each 
provide a special justification for departing from stare 
decisis.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals' decision 
and remand to the circuit court with instructions to deny 
Johnson's motion for in camera review of T.A.J.'s privately 
held, privileged mental health treatment records.21    
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.       
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Because we hold that Shiffra must be overturned, we need 
not address the parties' other arguments about whether our 
constitution or victims' rights statutes grant crime victims 
standing in the context of a criminal case.    
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶48 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).   
We cannot mistake "the law" for "the opinion of the 
judge" because "the judge may mistake the law." 
Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n (Johnson II), 2022 WI 14, ¶259, 
400 Wis. 2d 626, 971 N.W.2d 402 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
dissenting) 
(quoting 
Introduction, 
William 
Blackstone, 
Commentaries *71), summarily rev'd sub. nom., Wis. Legislature 
v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 1245 (per 
curiam). 
¶49 This court has a duty to overrule precedential 
decisions that are objectively erroneous.  Friends of Frame 
Park, U.A. v. City of Waukesha, 2022 WI 57, ¶42, 403 Wis. 2d 1, 
976 N.W.2d 263 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) (citing 
Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶21, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 
N.W.2d 405).  "To err is human, and judges are nothing if not 
human[.]"  Bartlett v. Evers, 2020 WI 68, ¶202, 393 Wis. 2d 172, 
945 N.W.2d 685 (Kelly, J., concurring/dissenting).  "No man's 
error becomes his own Law; nor obliges him to persist in it.  
Neither (for the same reason) becomes it a Law to other Judges."  
Cobb v. King, 2022 WI 59, ¶50, 403 Wis. 2d 198, 976 N.W.2d 410 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (quoting Thomas Hobbes, 
Leviathan 192 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) 
(1651)).  "[B]y obstinately refusing to admit errors" this court 
does "more damage to the rule of law . . . than by overturning 
an erroneous decision."   State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶49, 
389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813 (quoting Johnson Controls, Inc. 
v. Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶100, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 
N.W.2d 257). 
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
¶50 In this case, the State argued the court of appeals in 
State v. Shiffra reached an objectively wrong holding based on 
unsound reasoning.  175 Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 
1993), modified, State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 
646 N.W.2d 298.  This court ordered further briefing addressing 
the issue.1  The court of appeals in Shiffra misapplied binding 
precedent regarding the constitutional right to due process, 
specifically, Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).  This 
error alone provides sufficient reason to overrule Shiffra.   
¶51 Although this court correctly overrules Shiffra, I do 
not 
join 
the 
majority 
opinion 
in 
full. 
 
The 
majority 
misinterprets Shiffra, and, while it acknowledges the separation 
of powers established under the Wisconsin Constitution, the 
majority does not respect it.   
                                                 
1 The dissent claims this court should not overrule a case 
unless the argument for doing so is clearly developed in the 
opening briefs, faulting this court for ordering further 
briefing on whether to overrule Shiffra.  Dissent, ¶¶113–14.  
The dissenting author, however, has voted to overrule precedent 
she does not like even when no party asked this court to do so.  
Compare Tavern League of Wis., Inc. v. Palm, 2021 WI 33, ¶72, 
396 
Wis. 2d 434, 
957 
N.W.2d 261 
(Ann 
Walsh 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting) (claiming one of this court's decisions should be 
overruled), with id., ¶38 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) (explaining 
this court was not "asked to reexamine" the decision and that 
"doing so" was unnecessary "to decide this case"). 
Additionally, the dissent faults this court for not 
addressing the standing issue.  E.g., Dissent, ¶¶13–14.  The 
dissent maintains this court's decision to leave that issue 
unaddressed somehow demonstrates outcome-oriented reasoning.  
Id.  Curiously, the dissent never addresses the standing issue 
either——and it would seemingly need to reach the issue, unlike 
the majority. 
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
¶52 The court of appeals in Shiffra grounded its decision 
in the constitutional right to due process, but the majority 
claims the court of appeals also adopted a non-constitutional 
"alternative rationale":  "[p]ublic policy[.]"  Majority op. ¶40 
n.15 
(quoting 
Shiffra, 
175 
Wis. 2d at 
611–12) 
(first 
modification in the original).  This interpretation of Shiffra 
is tenuous, but the majority claims it necessitates a lengthy 
discussion of public policy problems it perceives the court of 
appeals created.  See id., ¶¶24, 40 n.15.  For example, the 
majority reasons that "Shiffra's alternative, public-policy 
based rationale is unsound in principle because it undermines 
the therapist-patient relationship."  Id., ¶24 (citing Shiffra, 
175 Wis. 2d at 611–12).  If the majority's interpretation is 
correct, the alternative rationale in Shiffra is unsound 
primarily because the court of appeals lacks lawmaking power——
not because the law the court of appeals created represents poor 
public policy.  See In re Amending Wis. Stats. §§ 48.299 & 
938.299 Regulating the Use of Restraints on Child. in Juv. Ct. 
(Juv. Ct.), 2022 WI 26, ¶43 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
dissenting).  If a statutory privilege conflicts with the 
Constitution, the Constitution always prevails, but a court has 
no power to rewrite a statute it dislikes.  The majority 
acknowledges that "courts of course lack[] the power to rewrite 
statutes in the name of public policy."  Majority op., ¶30.  
Assuming any discussion of this supposed alternative rationale 
is necessary, it should end with this acknowledgment. 
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
¶53 Even if this court endorsed Shiffra as the majority 
supposes, it followed the now-defunct rule that court of appeals 
decisions bind this court in addition to lower courts.  This 
court discarded that misguided rule last term.  Compare 
Manitowoc County v. Samuel J.H., 2013 WI 68, ¶5 n.2, 349 
Wis. 2d 202, 833 N.W.2d 109 ("[T]he doctrine of stare decisis 
applies to published court of appeals opinions and requires this 
court 'to follow court of appeals precedent unless a compelling 
reason exists for overruling it.'"  (quoting Wenke, 274 
Wis. 2d 220, ¶21)), with State v. Yakich, 2022 WI 8, ¶31, 400 
Wis. 2d 549, 970 N.W.2d 12 ("[W]e are not bound by court of 
appeals decisions.  As the state's highest court, we interpret 
legal questions independently."  (citing State v. Lira, 2021 
WI 81, ¶45, 399 Wis. 2d 419, 966 N.W.2d 605)).  This development 
undermines the rationale of this court's decisions purportedly 
approving Shiffra but with no analysis of its reasoning.  See 
Roberson, 
389 
Wis. 2d 190, 
¶50 
(explaining 
"[c]hanges 
or 
developments in the law" may "undermine[] the rationale behind a 
decision," providing a reason to overrule the decision (citing 
Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund & Compcare Health Servs. 
Ins., 2006 WI 91, ¶33, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216)).  
Because I disagree with some of the reasons the majority 
advances for overturning Shiffra, I join only part of the 
majority opinion and respectfully concur. 
I.  BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS OBJECTIVELY WRONG IN 
SHIFFRA, THIS COURT MUST OVERRULE IT. 
¶54 The 
objective 
error 
in 
Shiffra 
stems 
from 
a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the Due Process Clause of the 
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution; 
specifically, the court of appeals in Shiffra did not reconcile 
its reasoning with the state action doctrine.  The clause 
embodying that doctrine provides:  "[N]or shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law[.]"  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis 
added).  The United States Supreme Court interpreted the text of 
that clause as follows:  "[T]he principle has become firmly 
embedded 
in 
our 
constitutional 
law 
that 
the 
action 
inhibited . . . is only such action as may fairly be said to be 
that of the States.  That Amendment erects no shield against 
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful."  
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (citing Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).  This court is bound to respect this 
principle because of the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution, 
which 
provides 
that 
"[t]his 
Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby[.]"  U.S. Const. 
art. VI, § 2.  See generally Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 
2021 WI 87, ¶21, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469 (citing State 
v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶18, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142). 
 
¶55 In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court 
conceptualized 
a 
prosecutor's 
withholding 
of 
exculpatory 
evidence as state action.  373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963).  As the 
Court 
explained, 
"prosecution 
that 
withholds 
evidence . . . which, 
if 
made 
available, 
would 
tend 
to 
exculpate . . . [the defendant] or reduce the penalty helps 
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant.  That casts 
the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that 
does not comport with standards of justice[.]"  Id.   
 
¶56 The Court later clarified that the rule articulated in 
Brady is narrow:  "There is no general constitutional right to 
discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one[.]"  
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).  Brady is 
grounded instead in a prosecutor's "special role[.]"  Strickler 
v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999).  A prosecutor is "the 
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of 
a sovereign[.]"  Id. (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 
U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).  Hence, Brady is consistent with both the 
state action doctrine and the longstanding rule that a criminal 
defendant has no general constitutional right to discovery. 
 
¶57 In Ritchie, the United States Supreme Court extended 
Brady in a limited way.  A criminal defendant sought access to 
confidential——but not privileged——records in the possession of a 
state 
agency 
with 
investigative 
duties 
but 
not 
in 
the 
prosecutor's possession.  480 U.S. at 42–44.  The Court began 
its analysis by noting, "[i]t is well settled that the 
government has the obligation to turn over evidence in its 
possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to 
guilt or punishment."  Id. at 57 (citing United States v. Agurs, 
427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87) (emphasis added).  It 
held that a court should review the records at a closed hearing 
to determine whether the law compels the State to share any of 
them with the accused.  Id. at 61.  The Court reiterated, 
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
7 
 
however, 
the 
lack 
of 
a 
general 
constitutional 
right 
to 
discovery.2  Id. at 59–60 (quoting Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 559). 
¶58 The Court in Ritchie never suggested the due process 
right it articulated covered records held by non-state actors.  
As one commentator has explained: 
Ritchie and other cases relying on Brady have no 
relevance to the issue of subpoenas to third parties.  
"Brady imposes a constitutional duty on prosecutors to 
turn over exculpatory evidence . . . ."  The rationale 
for such 
a 
rule 
is 
that 
the 
prosecutor, 
after 
initiating 
criminal 
charges, 
should 
not 
be 
the 
"architect" of an unfair proceeding.  Plainly, crime 
victims (and third parties holding records about crime 
victims) 
are 
not 
state 
actors. 
 
They 
are 
not 
architects of the criminal proceedings and therefore 
are not subject to these constitutional restrictions 
on state action. . . .  
[A] 
defendant 
has 
no 
constitutional 
right 
to 
discovery[.] 
Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly:  Integrating 
Victims into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 Utah 
L. Rev. 861, 914–15 (quoting Bolduc v. United States, 402 
F.3d 50, 56 n.6 (1st Cir. 2005)) (first ellipsis in the 
original).  As the court concludes in this case, the court of 
appeals in Shiffra erred by "equat[ing] the government's 
interest . . . with a victim's interest[.]"  Majority op., ¶45. 
                                                 
2 The dissent acknowledges "[t]here is no constitutional 
right to an in camera review" but claims the question before 
this court is whether "there is a constitutional right to 
present a complete defense[.]"  Dissent, ¶140.  The dissent does 
not cite any source to support its assertion, but more 
importantly, the assertion is inconsistent with the admonition 
in Brady and numerous other cases that a defendant is not 
entitled to discovery as a matter of constitutional right. 
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
8 
 
¶59 No decision of the United States Supreme Court——or any 
federal circuit——has suggested the existence of such a right.  
As the Seventh Circuit has explained, if the government does not 
possess the records, "there can be no 'state action' and 
consequently, no violation of [the] Fourteenth Amendment."  
United States v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 947 (7th Cir. 1998).  It 
went on to hold that "a failure to show that the records a 
defendant seeks are in the government's possession is fatal 
to . . . [a Ritchie claim]."  Id. (citing United States v. 
Skorniak, 59 F.3d 750, 755 (8th Cir. 1995)).  Other circuits are 
in accord.  For example, the Eighth Circuit similarly held, 
"While Brady requires the Government to tender to the defense 
all exculpatory evidence in its possession, it establishes no 
obligation on the Government to seek out such evidence."  United 
States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1386 (8th Cir. 1981) (quoting 
United States v. Walker, 559 F.2d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 1977)). 
 
¶60  Neither Shiffra nor decisions relying on Shiffra 
explain how a private party's withholding of records could 
possibly be characterized as state action.  Cassell, Treating 
Crime Victims Fairly, at 915 & n.319.  As a lead opinion of this 
court explained in 2016: 
To say the court of appeals took some liberties 
interpreting 
and 
applying 
Ritchie 
would 
be 
an 
understatement. . . .  [T]he court of appeals swept 
into Ritchie's reach privileged records held by 
entities completely removed from the investigative 
criminal 
process. 
 
Ritchie——a 
case 
concerning 
confidential records (subject to numerous exceptions) 
held by the very agency charged with investigating the 
offense and therefore soundly rooted in Brady——never 
should have been stretched to cover privileged records 
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
9 
 
held by agencies far removed from investigative and 
prosecutorial functions.   
State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶36, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 
(lead op.).  The court of appeals did "not offer a principled 
reason for extending Ritchie to private records[.]"  Cassell, 
Treating Crime Victims Fairly, at 915 n.319. 
 
¶61 The reasoning in Shiffra is demonstrably "unsound in 
principle" because it displays "an erroneous understanding" of 
binding precedent.  See Roberson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶51 (quoting 
Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Dep't of Rev., 2018 WI 75, ¶83, 382 
Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21 (lead op.)).  The United States 
Constitution does not require the pseudo-statutory scheme the 
court of appeals created, and the United States Supreme Court 
never 
suggested 
otherwise. 
 
"To 
avoid 
the 
injustice 
of 
subjecting parties in perpetuity to erroneous holdings, '[t]he 
primary and most important factor to weigh in considering 
whether to overrule an earlier decision is its correctness.'"  
Friends of Frame Park, 403 Wis. 2d 626, ¶65 (quoting Johnson II, 
400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶259) (modification in the original).  Because 
Shiffra was objectively wrong as a matter of law, this court 
correctly overrules it.     
II.  THE MAJORITY AND THE DISSENT MISREAD SHIFFRA AND 
MISUNDERSTAND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS BY INVOKING PUBLIC 
POLICY. 
 
¶62 The majority discusses public policy considerations at 
length even after holding that due process does not require the 
procedure created in Shiffra.  The majority acknowledges these 
discussions are relevant only for rebutting the supposed 
"alternative" basis for the reasoning in Shiffra:  "[p]ublic 
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
10 
 
policy[.]"  Majority op., ¶40 n.15 (quoting Shiffra, 175 
Wis. 2d at 
611–12) 
(first 
modification 
in 
the 
original).  
Specifically, the majority maintains the court of appeals in 
Shiffra grounded its holding not only in the United States 
Constitution but also in "'[p]ublic policy' and balancing the 
competing 
interests 
of 
privilege 
holders 
and 
criminal 
defendants[.]"  Id. (quoting Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 611–12) 
(first modification in the original).   
 
¶63 As a preliminary matter, the existence of this 
supposed alternative rationale is based on a suspect reading of 
Shiffra.  The phrase "public policy" appears once in Shiffra, 
toward the end of the opinion.  The court of appeals stated:  
"Public policy and the history of our judicial system require 
that Wisconsin's courts embrace Ritchie in the manner prescribed 
by . . . [the court of appeals] in . . . [two previous cases]."  
Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 612.  The court seemed to be suggesting 
that the creation of what it considered to be sound public 
policy justified reading Ritchie in a particular way.  The court 
did not, however, employ public policy as an independent basis 
for its holding.   
 
¶64 Even 
if 
the 
majority's 
interpretation 
plausibly 
reflects the reasoning of the court of appeals in Shiffra, the 
majority should not incorporate public policy considerations 
into its analysis because the judiciary lacks general lawmaking 
power.  "'The legislative power' is 'vested in a senate and 
assembly' 
under 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
1 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution."  Juv. Ct., 2022 WI 26, ¶43.  "This vesting is a 
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
11 
 
constitutional 
command, 
stated 
in 
'unambiguous' 
and 
'unqualified' 
language." 
 
Id. 
(quoting 
Bartlett, 
393 
Wis. 2d 172, ¶175).  "The legislative power includes the 
authority to:  (1) 'declare whether or not there shall be a 
law'; (2) 'determine the general purpose or policy to be 
achieved by the law'; and (3) 'fix the limits within which the 
law shall operate.'"  Id., ¶44 (quoting Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 
WI 76, ¶11, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600).  Beyond legal 
pleading, practice, and procedure,3 the judiciary lacks authority 
to exercise lawmaking power because the people vested that 
function in a different branch.  Id., ¶¶46–48.  Shiffra's rule 
impermissibly modified the legislature's work.  As the majority 
notes, 
"[t]here 
is 
no . . . exception 
to 
the 
[statutory] 
privilege . . . for court-ordered in camera review of a victim's 
privately-held, privileged health records upon a criminal 
defendant's motion"——the court of appeals simply "created" one.  
Majority op., ¶¶8–9. 
 
¶65 Perhaps the purported public policy basis for the 
holding in Shiffra is unsound on several grounds, but the court 
of appeals had no authority to ponder policy considerations——nor 
does this court.  Shiffra lacks any legitimacy because the court 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 751.12(1) (2021–22) provides in relevant 
part:   
The state supreme court shall, by rules promulgated by 
it from time to time, regulate pleading, practice, and 
procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts, for 
the purposes of simplifying the same and of promoting 
the speedy determination of litigation upon its 
merits.  The rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or 
modify the substantive rights of any litigant. 
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
12 
 
of appeals overrode a statute.  The majority acknowledges this 
obvious point, but nonetheless wades into a substantive public 
policy discussion, citing social science articles regarding the 
purported rate of false claims of sexual assault in an effort to 
prove Shiffra is outdated.  Id., ¶¶30, 43 n.17.  The judiciary 
is not well suited to sort through the conflicting social 
science literature cited by the majority, nor does it have any 
constitutional authority to determine the best public policy for 
the state.  "[T]he judiciary is not in a good position to judge 
social values or social science.  When social science is 
disputed, the institutional parameters of the judiciary are 
amplified.  It is the legislature that is structured to assess 
the merits of competing policies and ever-changing social 
science assertions."  Roberson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶38.  The 
majority also does not explain how social science research could 
possibly inform the analysis of whether the court of appeals 
properly 
interpreted 
the 
Due 
Process 
Clause 
in 
Shiffra.  
"[S]ocial science has no role to play in constitutional 
analysis[.]"  Id., ¶86 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring). 
 
¶66 The dissent would preserve Shiffra at the expense of 
the separation of powers that is central to the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The dissent and the majority agree that "nothing 
in the Constitution prohibits the adoption of the Shiffra 
procedure."  Dissent, ¶136 (citing majority op., ¶30 n.14).  
True, but the constitution assigns that choice to another branch 
of government.  As the majority acknowledges, the legislature 
could adopt a Shiffra-like procedure by statute, and other state 
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
13 
 
legislatures have done so.  Majority op., ¶30 n.14 (citing Iowa 
Code § 622.10(4)).  The issue is not whether a provision of the 
United States Constitution conflicts with the procedure created 
by 
the 
court 
of 
appeals; 
we 
examine 
only 
whether 
the 
Constitution requires that procedure.  No provision does; 
therefore, the proper "balance" between the "rights of both 
criminal defendants and victims" is for the legislature to 
decide.  See dissent, ¶104. 
 
¶67 The dissent does not recognize the threat Shiffra 
poses to the rule of law, noting it is a "decades-old procedure, 
relied upon by courts, litigants, and victims alike.  And what 
has the majority left in its place?  Nothing."  Id., ¶108.  On 
the contrary, the majority has restored a statutory privilege 
unaltered by the judicial pen.  The dissent also forgets that 
"[u]nlike a fine wine, precedent does not necessarily get better 
with age."  Johnson II, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶253 (citing Montejo v. 
Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2093 (2009) (Alito, 
J., concurring)).  Judges who rewrite a statute erode democratic 
rule.  Reversing such judicial overreach restores it.   
 
¶68 The dissent also invokes a rather vague reliance 
interest supposedly created by Shiffra.  The United States 
Supreme Court explained less than a year ago that "[t]raditional 
reliance interests arise 'where advance planning of great 
precision is most obviously a necessity.'"  Dobbs v. Jackson 
Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2276 (2022) 
(quoted source omitted).  Generally, such interests arise from 
cases deciding rules of "property and contract" law.  Id. 
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
14 
 
(quoted source omitted).  The Court has been skeptical of 
"intangible" interests.  Id. at 2277.  What specific decisions 
did people make in reliance on Shiffra?  Did criminals commit 
crimes thinking they could later find evidence to attack their 
victims' credibility?  Did victims decide not to seek mental 
health counseling?  Neither supports perpetuating the court of 
appeals' objective error in Shiffra, but what other interests 
the dissent has in mind is unclear. 
III.  SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW UNDERMINE DECISIONS OF 
THIS COURT SUPPOSEDLY ENDORSING SHIFFRA. 
 
¶69 While this court has sometimes demanded a special 
justification for overruling its prior decisions, it does not 
require a heightened reason to overrule court of appeals 
precedent.  Lira, 399 Wis. 2d 419, ¶45.  Just last term, this 
court noted its "repeated willingness to interpret and apply the 
law correctly, irrespective of a court of appeals decision that 
came to a different conclusion."  Id. (collecting cases).  While 
the court of appeals primarily serves to correct errors below, 
"[t]he people of Wisconsin established this court as the supreme 
judicial tribunal and in fulfilling our constitutional duty to 
declare the law in this state, we may overturn any incorrect 
court of appeals opinion with no consideration of the stare 
decisis doctrine."  Friends of Frame Park, 403 Wis. 2d 1, ¶68.  
Accordingly, "we are not bound by court of appeals decisions.  
As the state's highest court, we interpret legal questions 
independently."  Yakich, 400 Wis. 2d 549, ¶31 (citing Lira, 399 
Wis. 2d 419, ¶45).   
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
15 
 
 
¶70 Until last term, this court had recognized a peculiar 
form of stare decisis, which required it to treat court of 
appeals precedent as its own.  See, e.g., Samuel J.H., 349 
Wis. 2d 202, ¶5 n.2 (quoting Wenke, 274 Wis. 2d 220, ¶21).  This 
now-defunct rule caused many problems, as this case highlights. 
 
¶71 In State v. Green, this court erroneously treated 
Shiffra as binding.  253 Wis. 2d 356.  In Green, the State 
argued this court should overrule Shiffra.  This court relegated 
its analysis and ultimate rejection of that argument to a single 
footnote, declaring: 
The 
State 
contends 
that 
the 
holding 
in . . . Shiffra . . . was in error because it relied 
on . . . Ritchie . . . . 
 
The 
State 
argues 
that 
Ritchie was distinguishable and therefore inapplicable 
because it involved a situation, unlike here, where 
the records were in the government's possession.  The 
Shiffra court, however, specifically rejected this 
argument, concluding that it was bound by Wisconsin 
precedent, which clearly made Ritchie applicable in 
cases where the information sought by the defense is 
not in the possession of the state.  Shiffra, 175 
Wis. 2d at 606–07, 499 N.W.2d 719 (citing State v. 
S.H., 
159 
Wis. 
2d 
730, 
736, 
465 
N.W.2d 
238 
(Ct.App.1990), and In re K.K.C., 143 Wis. 2d 508, 511, 
422 N.W.2d 142 (Ct.App.1988)).  This court recognized 
the validity of Shiffra in State v. Solberg, 211 
Wis. 2d 372, 386–87, 564 N.W.2d 775 (1997), and in 
State v. Rizzo, 2002 WI 20, ¶53, 250 Wis. 2d 407, 640 
N.W.2d 93.  We will not depart from this precedent. 
Id., ¶21 n.4 (emphasis added). 
 
¶72 Although 
this 
court 
in 
Green 
claimed 
it 
had 
"recognized the validity of Shiffra" in Solberg and Rizzo, it 
did little more than cite Shiffra in those cases.  Neither case, 
as the majority notes, "examined the basis for the court of 
appeals' holding in Shiffra, . . . instead . . . [taking] its 
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
16 
 
framework as a given."  Majority op., ¶21.  For example, 
paragraph 53 of Rizzo, which Green indicates "recognized the 
validity of Shiffra" states, in full: 
Rizzo's position appears to be that he was entitled to 
cross-examine Dr. Pucci using the treatment records 
because if the records would have revealed the source 
of the quote as D.F.'s parents, this would have 
undermined Dr. Pucci's credibility.  We do not adopt 
Rizzo's position because it would eviscerate the 
procedure for in camera review set forth in Shiffra, 
which protects a victim's confidential records.  In 
effect, Rizzo's position would provide that the 
defendant must receive full access to the victim's 
treatment 
records 
in 
every 
case 
in 
order 
to 
effectively cross-examine an expert who treated the 
victim.  That is in stark contrast to the in camera 
procedure under Shiffra, which specifically balanced 
the victim's interest in confidentiality against the 
constitutional rights of the defendant.  See 175 
Wis. 2d at 609–10, 499 N.W.2d 719. 
Rizzo, 250 Wis. 2d 407, ¶53.  In Rizzo, this court did not 
endorse Shiffra but rather rejected an argument that would have 
left victims without protection the law provides——in contrast 
with Shiffra, which at least retained some statutory protection.  
The majority correctly notes that "Green, Solberg, and Rizzo 
never did what the State and T.A.J. ask us to do in this case:  
analyze whether Shiffra was wrongly decided."  Majority op., ¶21 
(citations omitted).  A few Shiffra citations in this court's 
decisions are insufficient to uphold Shiffra. 
 
¶73 This court's prior treatment of Shiffra relinquished 
this court's law-development function to the court of appeals, 
in violation of the supreme law, which makes this court 
"supreme."  The people of Wisconsin ratified a constitutional 
amendment in the 1970s creating the court of appeals with the 
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
17 
 
understanding that its establishment would allow this court to 
improve the quality of its legal analysis.  Friends of Frame 
Park, 403 Wis. 2d 1, ¶59 ("The court of appeals was created in 
1978 by constitutional amendment so that this court could focus 
on its law-developing function."  (citing Matthew E. Garbys, 
Comment, A Shift in the Bottleneck:  The Appellate Caseload 
Problem Twenty Years After the Creation of the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 1547, 1548).  A committee noted: 
In the rush to cope with its increasing calendar, the 
Supreme Court must invariably sacrifice quality for 
quantity.  Increasing appellate backlogs necessarily 
produce 
a 
dilution 
in 
craftsmanship. . . .  
The 
Supreme Court is cast in the role of a "case-deciding 
court"——one which merely reacts to individual cases 
and thus slights its law-stating function. 
. . . . 
The size of this caseload can only have a detrimental 
effect on the quality of the Supreme Court's work. 
Cases involving major questions of substantive law may 
be decided on the basis of superficial issues. 
. . . .  
The function of the Court of Appeals should be to 
provide a reasonably available appeal to correct trial 
court errors and to do justice expeditiously among the 
litigants.  The articulation of broad legal principles 
and 
the 
formulation 
of 
a 
coherent 
body 
of 
jurisprudence should remain primarily the function of 
the Supreme Court.  The Court of Appeals should follow 
the procedural and substantive law mandated through 
prior Supreme Court decisions, when such decisions are 
applicable. 
Citizens Study Comm. on Jud. Org., Report to Governor Patrick J. 
Lucey 78, 80 (1973) (on file at the David T. Prosser Jr. State 
Law Library).  With regard to 
Shiffra, this court has 
"slight[ed]" its "law-stating function," thereby perpetrating 
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
18 
 
"the precise problem the people of this state sought to prevent 
by creating the court of appeals."  Friends of Frame Park, 403 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶60 (quoting Citizens Study Comm. on Jud. Org., 
Report to Governor Patrick J. Lucey, at 78).  The court of 
appeals itself has recognized that this court "has been 
designated by the constitution and the legislature as a law-
declaring court. . . .  While the court of appeals also serves a 
law-declaring function, such pronouncements should not occur in 
cases of great moment."  State v. Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d 428, 432, 
367 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1985) (citation omitted). 
 
¶74 The court of appeals in Shiffra never addressed 
Ritchie directly, instead concluding court of appeals precedent, 
S.H. and K.K.C., already addressed Ritchie's reach.  Neither 
S.H. nor K.K.C., however, supplies any substantive analysis of 
Ritchie.  In S.H., the court held that any argument grounded in 
Ritchie 
had 
been 
forfeited: 
 
"S.H. . . . fails 
to 
mention . . . his Ritchie discovery motion . . . in his main 
brief.  Issues not briefed are deemed abandoned. . . .  [W]e 
will not address the [circuit] court's refusal to conduct an in 
camera review pursuant to Ritchie."  159 Wis. 2d at 738 
(citation omitted).  The court barely discussed Ritchie, and as 
the State now argues, "the only purpose of the S.H.'s court 
mention of Ritchie was to explain that . . . [the defendant] had 
abandoned any constitutional argument on appeal."  In K.K.C., 
the court limited its analysis of Ritchie to the following: 
[The defendant] contends that if the trial judge in 
his criminal cases does not review the agency's files, 
he will be denied his constitutional rights to 
confrontation, compulsory process and due process.  
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
19 
 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 . . . (1987).  
Ritchie holds that a criminal defendant is entitled to 
an in camera review by the trial court of confidential 
records 
if 
those 
records 
are 
material 
to 
the 
defendant's defense.  Id. at ––––, 107 S. Ct. at 
1003 . . . . 
DeLeu has not moved the trial court in his criminal 
cases to make an in camera review of the agency 
records.  If he does so, Ritchie, supra, establishes 
that he is entitled to such a review by the trial 
court, provided he makes a preliminary showing that 
the files contain evidence material to his defense. 
143 Wis. 2d at 511.  As noted in the majority opinion, K.K.C. 
dealt with records possessed by a government agency, not 
privately held records.  See majority op., ¶15.  Not only had 
this court never independently analyzed Ritchie's reach, no 
Wisconsin court had done so——until this case.   See generally 
Lynch, 371 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶21–39 (explaining the problematic 
origins of Shiffra and this court's problematic deference to 
it). 
 
¶75 The 
treatment 
of 
Ritchie 
by 
Wisconsin 
courts 
demonstrates the importance of careful reconsideration of prior 
judicial error: 
[T]he potential for mistakes is constantly at hand, 
because it is tempting for a creative court to reach a 
decision "by extorting from precedents something which 
they do not contain." Robert Rantoul, Oration in 
Scituate (July 4, 1836) in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of 
Interpretation 39 (1991).  Once embarked on this path, 
it is too easy for the court to "extend [its] 
precedents, which were themselves the extensions of 
others, till, by this accommodating principle, a whole 
system of law is built up without the authority or 
interference of the [people]."  Id. 
Bartlett, 393 Wis. 2d 172, ¶202 (modifications in the original).  
Brady created a narrow right, which Ritchie then extended.  Then 
No.  2019AP664-CR.rgb 
 
20 
 
Shiffra extended Ritchie, and so on in what has been dubbed "a 
series of wrong turns[.]"  Katharine Adler, Comment, In the Name 
of "Justice":  Shiffra-Green and Their Unintended Harms, 106 
Marq. L. Rev. 243, 257 (2022).  At no point in this series of 
extensions did this court ever step in and decide the meaning of 
the law.  See id.  This court now does its duty.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
¶76 The judiciary takes an oath to uphold the United 
States Constitution, not precedent.  Nothing compels this court 
to reflexively follow the decisions of a lower court.  See 
Bartlett, 393 Wis. 2d 172, ¶206.  The Wisconsin Constitution 
prohibits such deference.  Our oath obligates us to overturn 
"judge-made constitutional law," when "divorced" from the United 
States Constitution.  Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Law 
Without the Constitution:  The Supreme Court's Remaking of 
America, in "A Country I Do Not Recognize":  The Legal Assault 
on American Values 1–2 (Robert H. Bork ed., 2005).  I 
respectfully concur with the majority's decision to overturn 
Shiffra because the court of appeals in that case misinterpreted 
federal constitutional law.  The majority should have rested its 
analysis solely on that ground; developments in social science 
have no role to play in discerning the Constitution's meaning. 
 
 
No.  2019AP664-CR.jjk 
 
1 
 
¶77 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   (concurring).  "For most sexual 
assault victims, privacy is like oxygen; it is a pervasive, 
consistent need at every step of recovery.  Within the context 
of the legal system, if a victim is without privacy, all other 
remedies are moot."  Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second 
Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty Years of Rape Law Reform, 38 
Suffolk U.L. Rev. 467, 473 (2005). 
¶78 I agree with the majority opinion and join it in full.  
The majority opinion handily explains how Shiffra was unsound in 
principle, unworkable in practice, and detrimental to the 
coherence of the law.  I write this concurrence to illustrate 
the practical reality of how Shiffra was unworkable and to 
address the dissenting opinion's contention that the Shiffra 
framework provided a "reasonable balance" between a victim's 
right to privacy and a defendant's right to present a complete 
defense.  See Dissent, ¶124.  The on-the-ground reality of the 
Shiffra framework, which I will illustrate through three case 
examples, reveals anything but a reasonable balance. 
¶79 I begin by taking a step back and acknowledging the 
strength, courage, and resiliency necessary for a sexual assault 
victim to report in the first place.  Sexual assault is 
pervasive in our society.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
reports that a forcible rape occurs in the United States every 
3.8 minutes.  Alexa Sardina & Alissa R. Ackerman, Restorative 
Justice in Cases of Sexual Harm, 25 CUNY L. Rev. 1, 3 (2022).  
Additionally, it is estimated that almost 20 percent of women 
and eight percent of men are sexually abused before the age of 
No.  2019AP664-CR.jjk 
 
2 
 
18.  Id.  Despite these astronomical numbers, only approximately 
36 percent of sexual assaults and 34 percent of attempted sexual 
assaults are reported to police.  Id. at 4.  Furthermore, 
according to data from the U.S. Department of Justice, as much 
as 86 percent of child sexual abuse may go unreported 
altogether.  Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., U.S. Dep't Just., Youth 
Victimization: Prevalence and Implications, 6 (Apr. 2003).  The 
reasons victims are reluctant to report are numerous and include 
shame, fear of not being believed, and fear of retribution.  
Alexa Sardina & Alissa R. Ackerman, Restorative Justice in Cases 
of Sexual Harm, 25 CUNY L. Rev. 1, 6 (2022). 
¶80 Despite these barriers, some sexual assault victims 
still choose to report and engage with the criminal justice 
system.  However, in the past thirty years, because of Shiffra, 
countless 
sexual 
assault 
victims 
who 
reported 
their 
victimization have been on the horns of a dilemma, forced to 
choose between either disclosing their mental health records or 
not testifying in the trials of their perpetrators.  Neither 
option was tenable, leaving victims with no choice but to have 
their suffering compounded by the system meant to administer 
justice. 
¶81 Under Shiffra, once a court ordered a victim to 
disclose her mental health records, a victim's first purported 
option was to hand over those records for an in camera 
inspection which could then lead to disclosure to the defendant.  
This was hardly a workable option.  Disclosing a victim's most 
personal beliefs, thoughts, and feelings to a judge, and 
No.  2019AP664-CR.jjk 
 
3 
 
potentially to the person who has caused her unimaginable harm, 
destroys the sanctity of the relationship between the victim and 
her therapist.  "The psychotherapist-patient privilege is 
'rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust.'"  
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) (quoting Trammel v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).  That is because 
"[e]ffective psychotherapy . . . depends on an atmosphere of 
confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a 
frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and 
fears," often about sensitive issues.  Id.  Even "the mere 
possibility 
of 
disclosure 
may 
impede 
development 
of 
the 
confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment."  
Id.  Given that the disclosure of mental health records causes 
incredible and irreparable harm to victims by rending the veil 
of 
privacy 
required 
for 
therapeutic 
healing, 
it 
is 
not 
surprising that many victims chose the second purported option 
and refused disclosure. 
¶82 But the option to refuse disclosure was equally 
unworkable.  The court of appeals in Shiffra affirmed an 
astonishing remedy when it decided that a victim who failed to 
turn over mental health records should be sanctioned and her 
trial testimony suppressed.  The impact of this remedy has been 
undeniably negative for both victims and the State because in 
the vast majority of Shiffra cases, a victim's testimony was the 
only evidence against the accused.  Consequently, when a victim 
was barred from testifying, the perpetrator was often not held 
to account. 
No.  2019AP664-CR.jjk 
 
4 
 
¶83 I turn now to three cases——Shiffra, S.C. Johnson, and 
Lynch——where victims were caught on the horns of the Shiffra 
dilemma. 
 
These 
cases 
reveal 
how 
defendants 
have 
filed 
incredibly broad requests for victim mental health records that 
were fishing expeditions at best and deliberate attempts to 
harass and intimidate victims at worst.  These cases further 
reveal how judges have granted these broad requests, ordering 
victims to release mental health records despite the defendant's 
failure to point to any evidence which would bring the victim's 
credibility into question.  Judges have ordered victims to turn 
over years, even decades, of therapy records in order to look 
for the possible absence of communication to the therapist about 
the abuse——which may not have been relevant evidence to begin 
with.  See State v. Hineman, 2023 WI 1, ¶65, 405 Wis. 2d 233, 
983 N.W.2d 652 (Karofsky, J., concurring) ("The truth——as 
opposed to the myth——is that when it comes to child sexual 
assault cases, disclosure is the departure from the norm.").  
Finally, these cases exemplify how the Shiffra remedy led to 
catastrophic results as charge after charge was dropped or 
amended to far less serious charges, and justice was all but 
abandoned. 
I.  STATE V. SHIFFRA 
¶84 State v. Shiffra itself demonstrates the sheer breadth 
of privileged mental health information that some victims were 
ordered to turn over and the consequences that ensued when 
victims did not comply with the order to disclose their records.  
It also demonstrates how requests can be both highly speculative 
No.  2019AP664-CR.jjk 
 
5 
 
and cumulative of other evidence already available to the 
defendant.  Shiffra was charged with second-degree sexual 
assault for an incident involving a victim I will refer to as 
P.P.  See State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 602, 499 N.W.2d 719 
(Ct. App. 1993).  Shiffra was accused of sexually assaulting 
P.P., leaving her with bruises on her breasts and left elbow and 
a "hickey" on her left breast——bruises that were documented by 
the police when she reported the incident that same evening.  
Id.  The day before the jury trial was to start, Shiffra filed a 
motion seeking an adjournment because the State had turned over 
evidence that indicated that P.P. had "a history of psychiatric 
problems which may affect her ability to perceive and relate 
truthful information."  Id. at 603. 
¶85 After the circuit court granted the adjournment, 
Shiffra filed a motion seeking an order requiring P.P. "to 
reveal to the defendant her psychiatric history, psychiatric 
records and to execute an authorization to release medical 
information from any doctors, hospitals or counselors seen by 
[P.P.] with respect to her mental condition."  Id. at 603.  More 
specifically, the defense sought evidence that P.P. "may suffer 
from some type of psychiatric disorder which causes her an 
inability 
to 
truthfully 
relate 
facts 
as 
she 
perceives 
them . . . .  And that she may suffer from an inability or some 
disorder which causes her to have flashbacks to previous 
instances in her life and then they become sexual assaults of 
her because of her disorders."  Id.  The circuit court found 
that "there has been a sufficient basis shown . . . for the 
No.  2019AP664-CR.jjk 
 
6 
 
Court to at least believe an in camera inspection be ordered for 
the Court to determine whether or not there is anything in 
the . . . psychiatric or psychological reports which would be of 
materiality to the defendant."  Id. at 604.  According to the 
court, the defendant presented "an adequate showing to indicate 
that there may be psychological problems which do affect . . . 
the individual's ability to accurately perceive what is going on 
about [her]."  Id. 
¶86 The circuit court then ordered P.P to present all 
medical records related to her mental health history within 21 
days or be barred from testifying at trial.  Id. at 604-05.  
This order is particularly notable for its breadth and lack of 
limitation.  P.P. had told defense counsel that she had received 
mental health treatment from the time she was six years old, 
which meant that the court ordered P.P. to turn over twenty-
seven years of treatment records.  Id. at 610; Brief of 
Plaintiff-Appellant at 30, State v. Shiffra, 91-CF-451.  Twenty-
seven years of vulnerabilities, traumas, and personal struggles, 
all laid bare in front of the court.  When faced with this 
proposition, P.P. opted not to disclose, and the court issued an 
order barring her from testifying.  Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 605. 
¶87 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court.  Id. 
at 602.  It recognized that Shiffra needed to make a preliminary 
showing of materiality by showing that "[P.P.'s] records are 
relevant and may be necessary to a fair determination of guilt 
or innocence."  Id. at 610.  However, the court then seemingly 
ignored the fact that P.P.'s mental health records were 
No.  2019AP664-CR.jjk 
 
7 
 
cumulative of other evidence already available to Shiffra——
namely, extensive information about P.P.'s mental health history 
that defense counsel had already obtained from P.P. in an 
interview.  Id. at 610-11.  The court's justification also 
demonstrates the highly speculative nature of the demand for 
P.P.'s records: 
It may well be that the evidence contained in the 
psychiatric 
records 
will 
yield 
no 
information 
different from that available elsewhere.  However, the 
probability is equally as great that the records 
contain independently probative information.  It is 
also quite probable that the quality and probative 
value of the information in the reports may be better 
than anything that can be gleaned from other sources.  
Finally, the information might well serve as a 
confirmation of [P.P.'s] reality problems in sexual 
matters.  It is the duty of the trial court to 
determine whether the records have any independent 
probative value after an in camera inspection of the 
records. 
Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 611. 
¶88 Because P.P. refused to release twenty-seven years of 
privileged mental health records to the court for the purpose of 
confirming her "reality problems in sexual matters," she was not 
allowed to testify, and there was no trial.  Instead, the 
charges were significantly reduced to misdemeanors, and Shiffra 
pled to one count of battery, one count of fourth degree sexual 
assault, and one count of disorderly conduct.  Judgment of 
Conviction, State v. Shiffra, 91-CF-451.  He was sentenced to 
six months in jail, which was stayed, and was placed on 
probation for three years.  Id. 
No.  2019AP664-CR.jjk 
 
8 
 
II.  STATE V. S.C. JOHNSON 
 
¶89 State 
v. 
S.C. 
Johnson, 
No. 
2011AP1864-CRAC, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. app. Apr. 18, 2012), also 
demonstrates how Shiffra's materiality requirement did nothing 
to prevent some defendants' purely speculative requests.  The 
inherent speculation of requests for records under Shiffra was 
exacerbated in this case, as in many others, because the request 
was based on the possibility that the victim had not shared her 
experience of sexual abuse with a therapist. 
¶90 S.C. Johnson was charged with one count of repeated 
sexual assault and three counts of incest by a stepparent for 
incidents that took place when his stepdaughter, T.S., was 
between twelve and fifteen years old.  Id. at ¶3.  Based on 
these charges, his total exposure was 160 years in prison. 
¶91 Johnson sought an in camera inspection of T.S.'s 
therapy records.  The request was premised entirely on the 
unsupported possibility that the victim had "either denied or 
did not disclose any sexual assault by Johnson" to her 
therapist.  Id. at ¶4. 
¶92 Yet, the circuit court still ordered T.S. to turn over 
her records, and when she refused based on privilege, the State—
—not the defendant——sought an order compelling production of her 
records.  Id. at ¶¶6-8.  The circuit court decided that rather 
than suppressing T.S.'s testimony, it would "inform the jury 
that, as a result of the victim's refusal, a presumption exists 
that the contents of the records would have been helpful to the 
defense."  Id. at ¶1. 
No.  2019AP664-CR.jjk 
 
9 
 
¶93 The court of appeals upheld the circuit court's 
determination regarding the in camera inspection based on the 
mistaken idea that a lack of communication to a therapist about 
sexual abuse would be relevant to the case: 
We conclude that there is a "reasonable likelihood" 
that 
the 
records 
contain 
relevant 
information 
necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence 
such that in camera inspection is required.  The fact 
that the purpose of the therapy was to address 
interpersonal relationships between T.S. and Johnson 
and that the therapy occurred during the time period 
at issue makes it reasonably likely the records 
contain 
relevant 
information 
necessary 
to 
a 
determination of guilt or innocence. 
Id., ¶15 (internal citation omitted). 
¶94 Moreover, the court of appeals doubled down, reversing 
the circuit court's decision regarding remedy and ordering the 
suppression of T.S.'s testimony.1  Id. at ¶¶16-18.  The decisions 
of the circuit court and court of appeals were striking because 
they ordered the disclosure of years and years of therapy 
records in order to determine whether T.S. reported being 
sexually abused.  However, this premise is simply not relevant 
given the prevalence of delayed reporting in child sexual 
assault cases.  See Tonya Lippert, et al., Telling Interviewers 
About Sexual Abuse: Predictors of Child Disclosure at Forensic 
Interviews, 
14 
Child 
Maltreatment 
100, 
100 
(Feb. 
2009) 
("Research on children and adults indicates that children often 
significantly delay disclosure of sexual abuse or keep the abuse 
a secret into adulthood."). 
                                                 
1 On appeal, this court was divided and the court of appeals 
decision stood.  See State v. Johnson, 2014 WI 16, 353 
Wis. 2d 119, 846 N.W.2d 1. 
No.  2019AP664-CR.jjk 
 
10 
 
¶95 Unsurprisingly, without the testimony of T.S. there 
was no trial.  Instead, S.C. Johnson pled to amended misdemeanor 
charges of fourth degree sexual assault and disorderly conduct.  
Judgment of Conviction, State v. Johnson, 2011CF376.  He served 
four months in jail with Huber2 release privileges.  Id. 
III.  STATE V. LYNCH 
 
¶96 State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 
N.W.2d 89, demonstrates more of the same——a request for eighteen 
years of mental health records based on the possibility that: 
(1) the victim may have had a mental health diagnosis that could 
have compromised her credibility, or (2) that the victim had not 
communicated the abuse to her therapist. 
¶97 Former Fox Lake Police Chief Patrick Lynch was charged 
with three counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child and 
three counts of stalking for incidents that started in 1989 when 
the victim was seven years old.  Lynch, 371 Wis. 2d 1, ¶12.  He 
faced over 30 years in prison.  Prior to trial, Lynch filed a 
Shiffra motion, seeking to subpoena the victim's "psychiatric, 
psychological, counseling, therapy and clinical records" from 
1993-2011 for in camera review.  Id. at ¶13.  The court granted 
the motion based on two of the defendant's proposed rationales: 
(1) the victim exhibited ongoing symptoms of post traumatic 
stress 
disorder, 
an 
illness 
which 
sometimes 
affects 
the 
sufferer's memory; and (2) contrary to some of the victim's 
statements, the victim likely did not report Lynch to any 
                                                 
2 Huber release grants leave privileges to county jail 
prisoners for purposes such as employment, healthcare, attending 
to family needs, and more.  See Wis. Stat. § 303.08. 
No.  2019AP664-CR.jjk 
 
11 
 
treatment providers as a child because those treatment providers 
were mandatory reporters, but did not report the assault.  State 
v. Lynch, 2015 WI App 2, ¶¶13, 26, 359 Wis. 2d 482, 859 N.W.2d 
125. 
 
¶98 The circuit court found in favor of the defendant and 
ordered the victim to disclose "the names and addresses of all 
of her treatment providers since January 1, [1990]," and to 
authorize the court to obtain her records.  Lynch, 371 Wis. 2d 
1, ¶14.  It continued, "By treatment providers, the [c]ourt is 
talking about physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, and 
other forms of therapists engaged in any form of counseling with 
[the complainant] up to the present time."  (Emphasis removed)  
Id. 
 
¶99 The victim refused to turn over her mental health 
records "[u]nless and until" the circuit court's determination 
was reviewed by another court.  Id. at ¶15.  As a consequence, 
pursuant to Shiffra, the court barred her from testifying 
against Lynch at trial.  The State filed an appeal, and the 
court of appeals affirmed.  Lynch, 359 Wis. 2d 482.  The State 
then appealed to this court, but we were divided and so the 
court of appeals decision stood.  Lynch, 371 Wis. 2d 1. 
¶100 This case demonstrates how easily in camera review 
could be obtained despite no showing of any individualized link 
between the victim's records and the theory of the defense.  By 
the circuit court's logic, the therapy records of anyone who 
displays symptoms of PTSD could have been subject to in camera 
review.  Since symptoms of PTSD are common for victims of sexual 
No.  2019AP664-CR.jjk 
 
12 
 
assault (see Emily R. Dworkin, et. al., PTSD in the Year 
Following 
Sexual 
Assault: 
A 
Meta-Analysis 
of 
Prospective 
Studies, Trauma, Violence & Abuse (2021) (finding that about 75 
percent of sexual assault victims experience symptoms of PTSD a 
month after a sexual assault)), this and similar applications of 
Shiffra exposed a sweeping number of victims to in camera review 
of a wide swath, if not all, of their mental health records. 
¶101 Also, this case again shows how courts ignored when 
requested records were cumulative of other evidence.  Lynch 
already had statements from the victim's provider and a defense 
expert that indicated the victim exhibited PTSD symptoms.  It is 
unclear what further probative value the victim's records 
offered as Lynch had what he needed to make his case. 
¶102 Without the victim's testimony, the charges were 
amended and Lynch pled to four misdemeanor crimes: two counts of 
attempted stalking and two counts of attempted misconduct in 
office.  Judgment of Conviction, State v. Lynch, 2010CR365.  His 
only penalty was to pay court costs.  Id. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶103 These cases all demonstrate the untenable choice that 
Shiffra so often forced upon victims: (1) turn over years 
(sometimes decades) of highly personal records based on little 
more than speculation and incorrect assumptions about mental 
health and sexual abuse; or (2) opt not to disclose, be barred 
from testifying, and see their perpetrator walk away.  This 
approach was never "balanced."  Shiffra was a thumb on the 
scale.  By subjecting victims to the risk of vast invasions of 
No.  2019AP664-CR.jjk 
 
13 
 
their privacy and then sanctioning those victims who wished to 
guard their most private records, Shiffra allowed perpetrators 
to harass victims into silence. 
 
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶104 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Admittedly, 
this case raises a difficult issue.  Protecting the rights of 
both criminal defendants and victims often requires a delicate 
balance. 
¶105 Almost three decades ago, the court of appeals 
attempted to strike that balance in State v. Shiffra, 175 
Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993).  And in State v. 
Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298, this court 
embraced 
and 
refined 
the 
standard 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
established in Shiffra. 
¶106 These cases set forth a procedure by which, if a 
defendant believes there is relevant information located in a 
victim's1 health records, the defendant may seek an in camera 
review of those records.  In order to receive an in camera 
review, the defendant must meet an initial burden "to make a 
preliminary showing that the sought-after evidence is relevant 
and may be helpful to the defense or is necessary to a fair 
determination of guilt or innocence."  Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 
608.  "[T]he preliminary showing for an in camera review 
requires a defendant to set forth, in good faith, a specific 
factual basis demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that the 
records 
contain 
relevant 
information 
necessary 
to 
a 
determination of guilt or innocence and is not merely cumulative 
                                                 
1 As the majority opinion observes, a Shiffra/Green motion 
could be filed to seek in camera review of any witness's 
records.  Majority op., ¶1 n.2.  For the sake of consistency, I 
also use the word "victim" throughout this writing. 
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
to other evidence available to the defendant."  Green, 253 Wis. 
2d 356, ¶34. 
¶107 During this process, the victim has two opportunities 
to refuse to disclose the documents——at the time the defendant 
files a motion for in camera review or, if the circuit court 
determines that the defense is entitled to the records, after 
the in camera review but before the documents are disclosed.  If 
the victim does not disclose the records, then the victim cannot 
later testify.  See Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 612. 
¶108 The majority now discards this decades-old procedure, 
relied upon by courts, litigants, and victims alike.  And what 
has the majority left in its place?  Nothing.   
¶109 Shiffra may not provide a perfect procedure, yet such 
a goal is rarely achieved in our system of law.  However, the 
procedure is well-established, and has proven to be a workable 
means of balancing the important interests at stake.  Because 
the majority both discounts the principle of stare decisis and 
misapplies the stare decisis factors, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶110 This case has traveled a long and winding road to this 
point, and Johnson's trial has not yet even begun.  Johnson was 
charged with multiple offenses, including sexual assault of his 
son, T.A.J., and his daughter, K.L.J.  Majority op., ¶2.  
Pursuant to Shiffra and Green, Johnson filed a motion in the 
circuit court for the court to conduct an in camera review of 
counseling records of the two alleged victims.  Id. 
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶111 After the State took no position on the motion, T.A.J. 
submitted a brief in opposition.  Id.  The circuit court denied 
the motion, determining that "there is no legal standing for 
victims to file such motions."  Upon T.A.J.'s interlocutory 
appeal, the court of appeals reversed, determining that Article 
I, § 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution gave the alleged victim 
standing to oppose Johnson's Shiffra/Green motion.  Id., ¶3; 
State v. Johnson, 2020 WI App 73, ¶26, 394 Wis. 2d 807, 951 
N.W.2d 616.  Johnson petitioned for this court's review.       
¶112 Last term, in September of 2021, we held an initial 
oral argument, examining two issues raised by Johnson's petition 
for review:  (1) whether an alleged victim in a criminal case 
has standing under Article I, § 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution 
to lodge legal arguments in opposition to a defendant's motion 
for in camera review, and (2) whether recent amendments to that 
constitutional provision apply retroactively to an alleged 
victim's request for standing prior to the enactment of the 
amendment.2 
¶113 As the majority correctly states, the parties' briefs 
"understandably focused on the issue of [standing]."  Majority 
op., ¶4.  It further explains that "[t]he State also asserted, 
however, that Shiffra was wrongly decided."  Id.  What the 
                                                 
2 The parties also briefed the question of whether Wis. 
Stat. § 950.105, which provides in relevant part that, "[a] 
crime victim has a right to assert, in a court in the county in 
which the alleged violation occurred, his or her rights as a 
crime victim under the statutes or under article I, section 9m, 
of the Wisconsin Constitution," confers standing on the alleged 
crime victim in this matter. 
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
majority fails to explain is that this assertion was not raised 
until it appeared in the State's response brief, and then it was 
tucked away in a cryptic footnote:  "Shiffra is incorrect to the 
extent that it holds that Ritchie applies to records outside the 
State's possession."  With this oblique reference, the majority 
was able to tee up the issue, reaching out to transform the case 
to meet its desired quest——to overrule Shiffra. 
¶114 After another round of briefing and another round of 
oral argument, the majority now overrules Shiffra.  In doing so, 
it bases its determination on the assertions that Shiffra was 
wrongly decided, is unworkable, and has been undermined by 
developments in the law.  Id., ¶1.  Interestingly, in its final 
footnote the majority reveals its true hand, acknowledging the 
abandonment of the very issue for which we granted review:  
"Because we hold that Shiffra must be overturned, we need not 
address the parties' other arguments about [standing]."  Id., 
¶47 n.21. 
II 
¶115 The majority's legal analysis gets off on the wrong 
foot by giving short shrift to the principle of stare decisis. 
¶116 Stare decisis refers to the principle that requires 
courts to "stand by things decided" and is fundamental to the 
rule of law.  Hinrichs v. DOW Chem. Co., 2020 WI 2, ¶66 & n.12, 
389 Wis. 2d 669, 937 N.W.2d 37.  "This court follows the 
doctrine of stare decisis scrupulously because of our abiding 
respect for the rule of law."  Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emps. 
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, 
¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 
N.W.2d 257. 
¶117 "Fidelity to precedent ensures that existing law will 
not be abandoned lightly.  When existing law is open to revision 
in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of 
judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results."  
Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 
N.W.2d 266 
(internal 
quotations 
and 
footnotes 
omitted).  
Accordingly, any departure from stare decisis "demands special 
justification."  Id. 
¶118 Such "special justification" can be found where 
certain criteria articulated in our case law are present.  Those 
criteria include:  (1) where changes or developments in the law 
have undermined the rationale behind a decision; (2) where there 
is a need to make a decision correspond to newly ascertained 
facts; and (3) whether a precedent has become detrimental to 
coherence 
and 
consistency 
in 
the 
law. 
 
Hinrichs, 
389 
Wis. 2d 669, ¶68.  "We also consider 'whether the prior decision 
is unsound in principle, whether it is unworkable in practice, 
and whether reliance interests are implicated.'"  Id. (quoting 
Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶99). 
¶119 It is true that Shiffra is a court of appeals opinion, 
and not an opinion of this court.  See majority op., ¶20.  
However, this court has applied and signaled its approval of 
Shiffra time and time again.  The majority simply assumes 
without deciding that Shiffra "should be treated as precedent 
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
from this court" and moves on.  Id., ¶22.  But that isn't the 
whole story. 
¶120 In State v. Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d 372, 564 N.W.2d 775 
(1997), this court embraced Shiffra, explaining that the 
procedure it established "strikes an appropriate balance between 
the defendant's due process right to be given a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense and the policy 
interests underlying the Wis. Stat. § 904.05(2) privilege."  
Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d at 387 (footnote omitted).  Further, we 
stated that "giving the defendant an opportunity to have the 
circuit court conduct an in camera review of the privileged 
records, while still allowing the patient to preclude that 
review, addresses both the interests of the defendant and the 
patient."  Id.  
¶121 Five years after we decided Solberg, we again had an 
opportunity to consider the contours of Shiffra in Green, 253 
Wis. 2d 356.  There, we fine-tuned the standard set forth in 
Shiffra, concluding that "a defendant must set forth a fact-
specific 
evidentiary 
showing, 
describing 
as 
precisely 
as 
possible the information sought from the records and how it is 
relevant to and supports his or her particular defense."  Id., 
¶33.  Rather than even remotely calling Shiffra into question, 
the Green court refined the standard it presents, further 
entrenching Shiffra in the law.  See also Johnson v. Rogers 
Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 2005 WI 114, ¶¶72-74, 283 Wis. 2d 384, 700 
N.W.2d 27 (stating and relying on the Shiffra standard); State 
v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶31, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433 
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
(same); State v. Rizzo, 2002 WI 20, ¶¶48-54, 250 Wis. 2d 407, 
640 N.W.2d 93 (applying the Shiffra framework).  
¶122 But that's not all.  When explicitly given the 
opportunity to do so on multiple occasions, this court has 
declined to overrule Shiffra.  First, in State v. Johnson, 2013 
WI 59, ¶2, 348 Wis. 2d 450, 832 N.W.2d 609 (per curiam), the 
court observed in a per curiam opinion that "[a] majority of the 
court would not overrule Shiffra.  Chief Justice Abrahamson, 
Justice [Ann Walsh] Bradley, Justice Crooks, and Justice Ziegler 
conclude that Shiffra should not be overruled, observing that 
this court has reaffirmed or applied Shiffra in a number of 
cases."3   
¶123 Then in State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 
N.W.2d 89, the court again declined an opportunity to overrule 
Shiffra.  Lynch produced no majority opinion, but several 
justices, constituting a clear majority, wrote regarding the 
need to maintain Shiffra.  
¶124 Justices Abrahamson and Ann Walsh Bradley stated:  
"Contrary to Justice Gableman's opinion, we would not overrule 
Shiffra.  There are strong interests implicated when a defendant 
seeks a witness's mental health treatment records."  Id., ¶113 
(Abrahamson & Ann Walsh Bradley, JJ., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  In describing these implicated interests, 
these two justices observed that "[f]or defendants, it is the 
                                                 
3 The court later granted reconsideration in Johnson, but 
the essential point that Shiffra should be maintained did not 
change.  State v. Johnson, 2014 WI 16, ¶3, 353 Wis. 2d 119, 846 
N.W.2d 1 (per curiam) (granting reconsideration). 
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
interest in being able to present a complete defense," while 
"[a]t the same time, patients have an interest in keeping their 
mental health treatment records private."  Id., ¶113-14.  "The 
Shiffra procedure takes both of these interests into account and 
prescribes a reasonable balance" and "is consistent with the 
approach taken by a majority of state courts."  Id., ¶115-16. 
¶125 Likewise, Justice Prosser wrote that he would leave 
Shiffra intact.  He stated: 
Although the lead opinion by Justice Michael J. 
Gableman makes a number of compelling arguments about 
the foundation and lineage of Shiffra and Green, as 
well as their effect on Wisconsin law, I am ultimately 
persuaded that the better course for this court is to 
address the concerns arising from these opinions 
rather than to strike them down and start over.  In my 
view, overruling the opinions is more likely to 
intensify 
controversy 
than 
to 
resolve 
it, 
as 
overruling would seriously undermine a number of prior 
decisions and would invite a host of new theories to 
protect criminal defendants at trial. 
Id., ¶152 (Prosser, J., dissenting). 
¶126 Finally, then-Justice Ziegler indicated her support 
for maintaining the Shiffra framework:  "The Shiffra–Green line 
of cases, while not perfect, has provided a reasoned and 
reasonable approach to these difficult questions.  Under 
principles of stare decisis, I would not overthrow these well-
established cases without 'special justification,' and none has 
yet been provided."  Id., ¶192 (Ziegler, J., dissenting) 
(internal citation omitted). 
¶127 The majority here says that Lynch and Johnson indicate 
that the validity of Shiffra remains an open question.  Majority 
op., ¶22.  This is a tenuous assertion.  Just because the State 
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
doesn't like Shiffra and continually seeks to overturn it does 
not mean that the question was not given a definitive answer.4  
In both of the cited cases, the court was presented with a clear 
opportunity to overrule Shiffra and declined it.  The fact that 
Johnson was a per curiam opinion and Lynch resulted in no 
majority does not change this fact. 
¶128 This court has relied on and reaffirmed Shiffra to a 
significant extent.  Stare decisis weighs heavily in such a 
situation.  See Lynch, 371 Wis. 2d 1, ¶88 (Abrahamson & Ann 
Walsh Bradley, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  
¶129 The extent of the majority's destabilization is only 
partially revealed in footnote 3.  In addition to overruling 
Shiffra, it apparently is also overruling in part State v. 
Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, State v. Rizzo, 250 Wis. 2d 407, State 
v. Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d 372, State v. Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d 43, 
55-57, 553 N.W.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1996), State v. S.H., 159 
Wis. 2d 730, 465 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1990), and Rock Cnty. 
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. DeLeu, 143 Wis. 2d 508, 422 N.W.2d 142 
(Ct. App. 1988), and untold others, too numerous to mention.  
The majority provides the above list of cases as only a sampling 
of cases which it is overruling today.  
¶130 But instead of acknowledging the force with which this 
court has reaffirmed and maintained Shiffra, the majority 
minimizes such reliance.  See majority op., ¶¶21-22.  I would 
not do so.  Consistency and stability in the law demands that we 
                                                 
4 See State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶189, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 
N.W.2d 89 (Ziegler, J., dissenting). 
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
give greater consideration to stare decisis than does the 
majority.   
III 
¶131 Not only does the majority give short shrift to the 
principle of stare decisis, but it also mistakenly concludes 
that the relevant criteria weigh in favor of overruling Shiffra.    
¶132 The majority bases its conclusion on three assertions:  
(1) that "Shiffra is unsound in principle because it incorrectly 
concluded that Ritchie applied to privately held and statutorily 
privileged health records," majority op., ¶24; (2) that Shiffra 
is "unworkable in practice because it cannot be applied 
consistently and is inherently speculative," id., ¶34; and (3) 
that Shiffra has been undermined by both "the removal of 
procedural and evidentiary barriers to prosecuting sexual 
assault cases and the passage of statutory and constitutional 
protections for crime victims."  Id., ¶40.  All three assertions 
prove to be unavailing, and I will address each in turn. 
A 
¶133  As a first basis for overruling Shiffra, the majority 
asserts that it is unsound in principle.  It points to a 
purported misreading of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 
(1987).  In the majority's view, Shiffra erroneously concluded 
that Ritchie, which addressed records in the State's possession, 
applied to privately held records.  Majority op., ¶25. 
¶134 However, the Ritchie court merely dealt with the facts 
before it, which involved records in the State's possession.  
Nothing in that opinion forecloses its application outside of 
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
this narrow context.  Although its conclusion was derived in 
part from principles set forth in Brady,5 it went out of its way 
to "express no opinion on whether the result . . . would have 
been different if [a] statute had protected the [subject] files 
from 
disclosure 
to 
anyone, 
including 
law-enforcement 
and 
judicial personnel."  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 n.14; see also 
Lynch, 371 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶210-16 (Ziegler, J., dissenting).  
Wisconsin statutes do not go so far as to protect privileged 
records from everyone in all circumstances, see Wis. Stat. 
§§ 146.82(2), 905.04(4), but "even if the statute[s] did not 
allow such disclosure, the Ritchie court 'express[ed] no 
opinion' on the potential distinction."  Lynch, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶212 (Ziegler, J., dissenting). 
¶135 Indeed, "courts in many other states have extended 
Ritchie to cover records held by private health care providers."  
Id., ¶167 (Prosser, J., dissenting); see State v. Kelly, 545 
A.2d 1048, 1056 (Conn. 1988); Burns v. State, 968 A.2d 1012, 
1024 (Del. 2009); People v. Bean, 560 N.E.2d 258, 273 (Ill. 
1990); Cox v. State, 849 So.2d 1257, 1272 (Miss. 2003); State v. 
Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 703-04 (N.H. 1993); State v. Rehkop, 908 
A.2d 488, 495-96 (Vt. 2006); Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 581 
(Wyo. 1990).  Shiffra's analysis of Ritchie is thus not an 
outlier. 
¶136 A distinction between publicly and privately held 
records has thus been persuasively rejected not only by this 
court in Lynch, but also by courts around the country.  Notably, 
                                                 
5 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
the majority even recognizes that nothing in the Constitution 
prohibits the adoption of the Shiffra procedure.  Majority op., 
¶30 n.14.  It should likewise recognize that nothing in its 
opinion justifies this about-face.  Regardless, the majority 
soldiers on. 
B 
¶137 The majority contends next that Shiffra is unworkable.  
Again, this assertion is handily dismantled.  In asserting that 
Shiffra is unworkable in practice, the majority points to 
purported problems in the consistency of its application and the 
"inherently speculative" nature of its inquiry.  Majority op., 
¶34. 
¶138 But 
just 
because 
judges 
may 
reach 
different 
conclusions on similar facts does not mean that the standard 
itself is unworkable.  For example, judges reach differing 
determinations on similar facts regarding whether reasonable 
suspicion for a search exists all the time, but this does not 
mean that reasonable suspicion is an unworkable standard.  
Similarly, judges with similar facts in a criminal case, 
applying the same standards, may reach different conclusions as 
to what constitutes an appropriate sentence.  Again, this does 
not mean that the sentencing standards are unworkable. 
¶139 Contrary to the majority's assertion, Shiffra provides 
a clear standard and guiding principle on which all can rely.  
This court has seen fit to tweak that standard on only one 
occasion.  See Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶¶33-34.  
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
¶140 The root of the majority's error on this point appears 
to be in its refusal to recognize that the defendant's right to 
present a complete defense is even implicated in the present 
situation.  See majority op., ¶28.  This fundamental flaw 
permeates the majority's analysis, causing it to discount the 
defendant's interests and fail to grasp the true nature of the 
problem to which Shiffra provides a solution.  By sleight of 
hand, the majority in essence states that there is no "due 
process right to in camera review of a victim's privately held, 
privileged health records upon a showing of materiality."  Id., 
¶29.  That is not the question.  There is no constitutional 
right to an in camera review.  Rather, there is a constitutional 
right to present a complete defense and an in camera review is 
but a means of fulfilling that right.  
¶141 Certainly there are weighty interests on the victim's 
side as well, a premise that I do not dispute.  But those 
interests are protected both by the steep initial burden a 
defendant must meet to be entitled to an in camera review, much 
less access to records, and the absolute privilege to refuse to 
disclose the records (albeit with the consequence of not being 
able to testify).  See Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶34 (setting 
forth that "the preliminary showing for an in camera review 
requires a defendant to set forth, in good faith, a specific 
factual basis demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that the 
records 
contain 
relevant 
information 
necessary 
to 
a 
determination of guilt or innocence and is not merely cumulative 
to other evidence available to the defendant").  Under this 
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
standard, circuit courts do not take the decision to allow in 
camera review lightly.  Broad requests and fishing expeditions 
will be rejected, and decisions are subject to appellate review. 
¶142 As then-Justice Ziegler has aptly stated:   
The 
Shiffra–Green 
framework 
provides 
a 
workable 
solution to a difficult problem.  Perhaps suggesting 
its intrinsic equity, the framework forces every party 
involved——the defendant, the privilege-holder, the 
State——to shoulder a burden of some kind.  The 
defendant must meet the required evidentiary showings, 
is never allowed his own review of the records at 
issue prior to final disclosure, and may nevertheless 
lose access to the records if the privilege-holder 
does not consent to disclosure.  The privilege-holder 
must choose between limited disclosure of privileged 
evidence 
which 
is 
reasonably 
likely 
to 
contain 
relevant, non-cumulative information necessary to a 
determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence 
and preclusion of her testimony at trial.  Finally, 
the State faces the possibility that its prosecution 
will be "hampered by a witness who strives to maintain 
privacy." 
Lynch, 371 Wis. 2d 1, ¶201 (Ziegler, J., dissenting) (citing 
Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d at 55). 
¶143 While the majority's result is certainly protective of 
alleged crime victims, I question whether it impairs the truth-
seeking function of our courts.  Although the majority is 
correct that false reports are rare, see majority op., ¶43 n.17, 
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
15 
 
this is little comfort to the between 4.5 and 6.8 percent of 
defendants who are falsely accused.6   
¶144 For centuries, our jurisprudence has followed the 
admonition that it is better for ten guilty people to go free 
than one innocent languish in prison.  See 4 W. Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England (1769) c. 27, p. 352; Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 367 n.158 (1972) (Marshall, J., 
concurring); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring).  Benjamin Franklin voiced this same 
sentiment, albeit with a different mathematical formulation.  He 
stated it as:  "it is better 100 guilty Persons should escape 
than that one innocent Person should suffer."  9 Benjamin 
Franklin, Works 293 (1970), Letter from Benjamin Franklin to 
Benjamin Vaughan (14 March 1785).  Shiffra serves such an end, 
and the majority's departure takes us further away from this 
foundational principle. 
C 
¶145 The majority's contention that subsequent developments 
in the law have undermined the Shiffra procedure also falls 
flat.   
                                                 
6 I observe that the Shiffra procedure also may assist in 
shielding a defendant from an allegation that is the result of a 
false memory.  See Johnson v. Rogers Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 2005 WI 
114, 
¶¶1, 
4, 
283 
Wis. 2d 384, 
700 
N.W.2d 27; 
Sawyer 
v. 
Midelfort, 227 Wis. 2d 124, 132-33, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999).  In 
such a situation, access to counseling records may be of great 
import. 
 
See 
Elizabeth 
F. 
Loftus, 
et 
al., 
Patient-
Psychotherapist Privilege:  Access to Clinical Records in the 
Tangled Web of Repressed Memory Litigation, 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 
109, 111 (1996). 
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
16 
 
¶146 According to our methodology regarding stare decisis 
as cited above, "changes or developments in the law" may 
undermine the rationale behind a decision such that overruling 
it is appropriate.  Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶98.  The 
majority points to several purported "developments" that have so 
undermined Shiffra.  First, it cites the removal of "many of the 
procedural and evidentiary barriers" to prosecuting sexual 
assault cases and the law's evolution away from distrust of 
sexual assault victims.  Majority op., ¶42.  It also highlights 
the expansion of victims' rights laws of both the statutory and 
constitutional varieties.  Id., ¶44. 
¶147 The problem with the majority's invocation of alleged 
developments in the law is that many of the "developments" cited 
were in existence when Shiffra was decided in 1993.  For 
example, Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b), the rape shield statute, was 
enacted in 1975.  See § 12, ch. 184, Laws of 1975.  The 
majority's reliance on State v. Clark, 87 Wis. 2d 804, 815, 275 
N.W.2d 715 (1979), and State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 250-51, 
432 N.W.2d 913 (1988), suffers from a similar shortcoming.  See 
majority op., ¶42.  The majority does not fully explain how 
statutes and case law that were available to the Shiffra court 
could subsequently undermine that court's determination other 
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
17 
 
than to acknowledge that the Shiffra court did not consider 
them.  See id., ¶42 n.16.7 
¶148 Likewise, the recent amendments to Article I, § 9m of 
the Wisconsin Constitution do not compel the overruling of 
Shiffra.  Shiffra was grounded in the defendant's constitutional 
right to present a complete defense.  See Shiffra, 175 
Wis. 2d at 
605 
("Under 
the 
due 
process 
clause, 
criminal 
defendants must be given a meaningful opportunity to present a 
complete defense. . . . [A]n in camera review of evidence 
achieves the proper balance between the defendant's rights and 
the state's interests in protection of its citizens.").  The 
recent 
constitutional 
amendment 
cannot 
"undermine" 
this 
rationale because it explicitly protects a defendant's federal 
constitutional due process rights, including the right to 
present a complete defense.  See Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m(6) 
(setting forth that sec. 9m "may not be interpreted to supersede 
a defendant's federal constitutional rights"). 
¶149 The majority errs by overruling our longstanding 
precedent.  Pursuant to Shiffra, the bar defendants must clear 
to be entitled to an in camera review is a high one, to say 
                                                 
7 The majority also attempts to ascribe outsized importance 
to a recently amended constitutional victim's rights provision, 
arguing that the Shiffra court did not "appreciate [the] 
importance" of the statutory changes cited "within the broader 
context of the subsequently enacted statutory and constitutional 
victim's rights provisions . . . ."  See majority op., ¶42 n.16.  
But the constitutional changes did not mark the beginning of the 
trends the majority observes, which were well-established by the 
time the constitution was amended.  The relevant information was 
available and could have been considered by the Shiffra court if 
it deemed it relevant to its analysis.   
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
18 
 
nothing of actually being entitled to a victim's health records.  
Absent the Shiffra procedure, both defendants and the court 
system as a whole are put at a disadvantage in seeking the 
truth.   
¶150 Instead of recognizing the delicate balancing the 
Shiffra standard embodies, the majority upsets the balance.  In 
doing so, it replaces a "workable solution to a difficult 
problem," hewn over three decades, with no solution at all.  I 
would leave the Shiffra framework intact rather than cast it 
aside, leaving nothing in its place.  
¶151 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶152 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2019AP664-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1