Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3824.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-3824 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. FREEMAN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3824.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Continuing to practice law after suspension — 
Failure to notify court of suspension — Indefinite suspension. 
(No. 2010-0346 — Submitted April 20, 2010 — Decided August 24, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-008. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Henry Roosevelt Freeman of Tallmadge, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0022713, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1981.  On August 13, 2008, this court imposed a one-year suspension with six 
months stayed on conditions based upon respondent’s failure to maintain proper 
accounting of client funds and his improper use of trust accounts as personal 
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checking accounts.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman, 119 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008-
Ohio-3836, 894 N.E.2d 31. 
{¶ 2} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline now 
recommends that we indefinitely suspend respondent from the practice of law 
based upon his (1) continued representation of two clients during his suspension 
and (2) failure to notify opposing counsel or the court of his suspension.  Neither 
party has objected to the board’s report.  For the reasons that follow, we agree that 
respondent’s actions violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and that an 
indefinite suspension, with reinstatement conditioned upon his compliance with 
the conditions set forth in his prior disciplinary action, is appropriate. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 3} As part of respondent’s suspension order in his prior disciplinary 
case, this court ordered respondent to immediately cease the practice of law in any 
form; forbade him to appear on behalf of another before any court, judge, 
commission, board, administrative agency, or any other public authority; ordered 
him to notify all opposing counsel and unrepresented parties of his suspension 
within 30 days; and ordered him to file a notice of disqualification with each court 
in which he had a matter pending. 
{¶ 4} While the board made no finding in this regard, respondent 
admitted that he had received actual notice of his suspension from the practice of 
law and that he had read this court’s opinion in that case.  Although he denied 
having received or read a copy of the court’s order of suspension, and no evidence 
in this record establishes that respondent was served with that order, respondent 
conceded that he had received several certified mailings from this court but that 
he “probably did not open it up.”  In any event, the duties of a suspended attorney 
are stated in Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E), of which respondent is charged with notice. 
{¶ 5} In a two-count complaint, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged 
respondent with continuing to represent clients after this court suspended his 
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license to practice law and failing to notify either opposing counsel or the courts 
of his suspension.  A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline conducted a hearing and issued a report containing findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a recommendation. 
{¶ 6} With respect to count one, the panel and board found that 
respondent represented a client at a September 11, 2008 contested custody hearing 
without informing his client, opposing counsel, or the court that his license had 
been suspended approximately one month earlier.  On September 19, 2008, 
respondent went to inform the court that he would be late for the continued 
hearing due to his participation in another proceeding.  The court, however, had 
independently learned of his suspension and informed him that he could not 
appear on behalf of his client.  Respondent admitted that the allegations in count 
one are true. 
{¶ 7} With regard to count two, the panel and board found that 
respondent had appeared at a September 19, 2008 final pretrial hearing on behalf 
of a client.  Without informing opposing counsel or the court’s staff attorney of 
his suspension, respondent discussed possible settlement of the case.  At the 
conclusion of that hearing, citing a disagreement with his client rather than his 
suspension from the practice of law, he orally moved the court for leave to 
withdraw as counsel.  Both the panel and the board rejected respondent’s self-
serving claims that he was not representing his client as “simply not credible.” 
{¶ 8} Based upon these findings, the board concluded, and we agree, that 
clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that respondent’s conduct in each of 
the two counts violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging 
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in “conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice” ), 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law), and 5.5(a) 
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(prohibiting a lawyer from practicing law in violation of the regulation of the 
legal profession in the jurisdiction) and Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E) (setting forth the 
duties of a disbarred or suspended attorney). 
Sanction 
{¶ 9} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 10} In aggravation, the panel and board found that respondent had a 
prior disciplinary offense, had engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving 
multiple offenses, had failed to fully acknowledge the wrongfulness of his 
conduct, by claiming that his actions with respect to count two did not constitute 
the practice of law, and had failed to comply with this court’s August 13, 2008 
suspension order requiring him to file an affidavit of compliance and pay the costs 
of that disciplinary action.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a), (c), (d), and (g). 
{¶ 11} While the board acknowledged respondent’s testimony that he 
remained involved with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) and 
was dealing with depression, the board noted that respondent offered no 
independent evidence of his current involvement with that program.  The board 
therefore did not explicitly consider it as a factor in mitigation, and the board 
found no other mitigating factors.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) through (h). 
{¶ 12} Having weighed respondent’s conduct, the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, and the sanctions imposed in similar cases, the board 
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recommended that we indefinitely suspend respondent from the practice of law.  
Further, as a condition to his reinstatement, the board recommended that 
respondent be required to comply with all of the conditions set forth in his prior 
disciplinary action. 
{¶ 13} We have stated, “The normal penalty for continuing to practice law 
while under suspension is disbarment.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Koury (1997), 77 
Ohio St.3d 433, 436, 674 N.E.2d 1371.  Relator, however, has not advocated 
disbarment and instead argues that we should indefinitely suspend respondent 
from the practice of law.  In support of this lesser sanction, relator notes that in 
respondent’s earlier disciplinary case, there was evidence that he had been 
diagnosed with anxiety and depression and that it was his doctor’s opinion that he 
was not yet capable of providing legal services because his recovery was 
incomplete. 
{¶ 14} As the board observed, we have routinely imposed indefinite 
suspensions for attorneys who continued to practice law after we have suspended 
their licenses for CLE and registration violations.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Higgins, 117 Ohio St.3d 473, 2008-Ohio-1509, 884 N.E.2d 1070; Toledo Bar 
Assn. v. Crandall, 98 Ohio St.3d 444, 2003-Ohio-1637, 786 N.E.2d 872; Akron 
Bar Assn. v. Barron (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 167, 707 N.E.2d 850.  We have also 
imposed indefinite suspensions when attorneys have continued to practice law 
during license suspensions imposed for other forms of misconduct.  See, e.g., 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Winkfield, 107 Ohio St.3d 360, 2006-Ohio-6, 839 N.E.2d 
924 (imposing an indefinite suspension on an attorney who practiced law during 
the suspension imposed in Columbus Bar Assn. v. Winkfield (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 
364, 745 N.E.2d 411, for multiple violations including neglect of client matters 
and failure to promptly pay funds to a client); and Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Jackson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 104, 712 N.E.2d 122 (imposing an indefinite 
suspension on an attorney who practiced law during a reciprocal suspension 
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imposed following his suspension in Hawaii for misconduct requiring payment of 
restitution to clients). 
{¶ 15} Having weighed respondent’s conduct and the aggravating and 
mitigating factors and considered the sanctions imposed for comparable conduct, 
we agree that the proper sanction for respondent’s misconduct is an indefinite 
suspension from the practice of law.  Accordingly, Henry Roosevelt Freeman is 
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in the state of Ohio.  Before he 
may petition for reinstatement, respondent must comply with the following 
conditions:  (1) extend his OLAP contract for at least two years from the date of 
our order in this case, (2) abide by the obligations imposed on him by his OLAP 
contract, (3) continue his treatment for anxiety and depression and provide proof 
of his treatment and any other medical information that may be requested by his 
OLAP-contract monitor, (4) refrain from any disciplinary violations.  Costs are 
taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Robert R. Berger, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Henry Roosevelt Freeman, pro se. 
______________________