Title: Jefferson Clinic, PC v. Roberson

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

626 So. 2d 1243 (1993)
JEFFERSON CLINIC, P.C.
v.
Cora ROBERSON.
1910845.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 26, 1993.
Rehearing Denied August 27, 1993.
W. Michael Atchison, Robert P. MacKenzie III, and P. Perry Finney of Starnes & Atchison, Birmingham, for appellant.
James D. Forstman, Birmingham, for appellee.
ADAMS, Justice.
Jefferson Clinic, P.C., a professional corporation of physicians practicing medicine at Cooper Green Hospital in Birmingham, Alabama, appeals a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of Cora Roberson in the amount of $250,000. We reverse and remand.
Roberson was injured in an automobile accident and was taken to Cooper Green *1244 Hospital, where she was diagnosed as having five broken ribs and a pneumothorax, which is a partially collapsed lung. When Roberson was admitted to Cooper Green, several X-rays were done of her spine, including her neck. The X-rays of Roberson's neck did not indicate a fracture and, therefore, she was treated for a strain to her neck. Physical therapy was attempted on Roberson for the neck strain; however, it was abandoned because she could not endure the pain. Although Roberson contends that she continued to be in intense pain, no further tests were run on her neck to determine if, in fact, there was a fracture to the spine that had not shown up on the original X-rays taken of her neck. She was released from the hospital and was sent to a nursing home, where she stayed until she returned for two check-ups at Jefferson Clinic; her condition was found to be improving. Thereafter, she sought the opinion of Dr. Gaylon Rogers. Dr. Rogers examined her and placed her back in the hospital. He ordered further X-rays of her neck and later ordered a CT scan; the CT scan indicated that there was, indeed, a fracture to the vertebrae of her neck.
Roberson thereafter sued Jefferson Clinic, Cooper Green Hospital, and her attending physicians, alleging that she had received negligent medical care. Cooper Green and three of the physicians were dismissed prior to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the other physician; therefore, Jefferson Clinic is the sole party appealing.
Following the trial, the judge charged the jury as follows:
First, Jefferson Clinic contends that the trial judge erred in charging the jury that
Jefferson Clinic argues that this charge, which is just the reverse of the "honest error charge" found to be error in Shumaker v. Johnson, 571 So. 2d 991 (Ala.1990), is equally confusing and misleading to the jury and, therefore, should not have been allowed. In Shumaker v. Johnson, 571 So. 2d 991 (Ala. 1990), this Court reviewed the propriety of the following "honest error" jury charge given in a medical malpractice case:
Shumaker, at 993.
Chief Justice Hornsby, speaking for a majority of the Court, stated:
"Sasser v. Connery, 565 So. 2d 50, 53 (Ala. 1990) (Hornsby, C.J., concurring specially).
Shumaker, at 993-94.
The purpose of eliminating the "honest error" charge in Shumaker was to prevent the confusion of the jury. As stated in Shumaker, the issue in a medical malpractice case is whether the doctor has breached the standard of care, and the issue of good faith on the part of the physician has no place in this type of case. We need look no further than Shumaker for the proposition that the injection of subjective standards rather than objective standards into the jury's deliberative process clearly causes confusion. Despite the fact that in this case the judge gave the opposite of the "honest error charge," we hold that the resulting confusion of the jury is the same. Therefore, on the basis of the rationale of Shumaker, the judgment in this case is hereby reversed.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, STEAGALL and INGRAM, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, SHORES and HOUSTON, JJ., dissent.
HOUSTON, Justice (dissenting).
If it is error to give the "honest error" jury charge one way, and I do not think it was (Shumaker v. Johnson, 571 So. 2d 991, 995-97 (Ala.1990) (Houston, J., dissenting)), it should be error to give it the way it was given in this case. The majority is being consistent in reversing and remanding this case. I do not believe in this case, as I did not believe in Shumaker v. Johnson, that the trial court's charge, taken as a whole, could have prejudiced the rights of the appellant. I would allow both the "honest error" jury charge and the mirror image of it that was given in this case; in my opinion, it is not error to give either. It should not be reversible error to give the charge given in this case or the charge given in Shumaker. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court, and I dissent.
MADDOX, J., concurs.