Title: Cincinnati City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Cincinnati City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio St.3d 557, 
2009-Ohio-3628.] 
 
 
 
CINCINNATI CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLEE, v. 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Cincinnati City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio 
St.3d 557, 2009-Ohio-3628.] 
Attorney fees — R.C. 2335.39(A)(2)(d) — “Organization” construed to include 
school board. 
(No. 2008-1480 — Submitted June 3, 2009 — Decided July 30, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County,  
No. C-070494, 176 Ohio App.3d 678, 2008-Ohio-2845. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellants, the State Board of Education of Ohio and the Ohio 
Department of Education, advance the following proposition of law:  “A school 
district with more than 500 employees is an ‘organization’ barred from recovering 
attorney fees by R.C. 2335.39(A)(2)(d).” 
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we hold that a school district board of 
education is subsumed within the meaning of “organization” in R.C. 
2335.39(A)(2)(d).  Because the Cincinnati City School District Board of 
Education, appellee, is an organization with more than 500 employees, it is not an 
eligible party for purposes of recovering attorney fees under R.C. 2335.39.  We 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial 
court. 
{¶ 3} The Cincinnati school board filed an action against the appellants 
disputing the state’s method of calculating certain funding to public school 
districts.  The trial court granted relief to Cincinnati, and the Hamilton County 
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.  Cincinnati City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 
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v. State Bd. of Edn., 176 Ohio App.3d 157, 2008-Ohio-1434, 891 N.E.2d 352.  
After this court agreed to review the case, the parties settled and the case was 
dismissed on the appellants’ motion.  119 Ohio St.3d 1443, 2008-Ohio-4487, 893 
N.E.2d 515, 119 Ohio St.3d 1498, 2008-Ohio-5500, 895 N.E.2d 562. 
{¶ 4} Thereafter, the Cincinnati school board moved the trial court for an 
award of attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 2335.39 as a prevailing eligible party.  
The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the board was not an “eligible 
party” for a fee award, because a school board is an “organization” for purposes 
of R.C. 2335.39(A)(2).  The court of appeals reversed and remanded.  Cincinnati 
City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn. of Ohio, 176 Ohio App.3d 678, 
2008-Ohio-2845, 893 N.E.2d 530.  The appellate court concluded that the term 
“organization” in R.C. 2335.39(A)(2)(d) was not intended to encompass entities 
such as a school board.  Thus, the Cincinnati school board was not excluded from 
eligibility under R.C. 2335.39(A)(2).  Id. at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 5} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal.  120 Ohio St.3d 1416, 2008-Ohio-6166, 897 N.E.2d 651. 
{¶ 6} The school board’s motion for attorney fees was based upon R.C. 
2335.39(B)(1), which provides: 
{¶ 7} “Except as provided in divisions (B)(2) and (F) of this section, in a 
civil action, or appeal of a judgment in a civil action, to which the state is a party, 
or in an appeal of an adjudication order of an agency pursuant to section 119.12 of 
the Revised Code, the prevailing eligible party is entitled, upon filing a motion in 
accordance with this division, to compensation for fees incurred by that party in 
connection with the action or appeal. Compensation, when payable to a prevailing 
eligible party under this section, is in addition to any other costs and expenses that 
may be awarded to that party by the court pursuant to law or rule.”  (Emphasis 
added.)   
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3 
{¶ 8} To be entitled to an award of fees, a party must be a “prevailing 
eligible party,” which is defined as “an eligible party that prevails in an action or 
appeal involving the state.”  R.C. 2335.39(A)(5).  An “eligible party” is defined in 
terms of exclusions: 
{¶ 9} “(2) ‘Eligible party’ means a party to an action or appeal involving 
the state, other than the following: 
{¶ 10} “(a) The state; 
{¶ 11} “(b) An individual whose net worth exceeded one million dollars at 
the time the action or appeal was filed; 
{¶ 12} “(c) A sole owner of an unincorporated business that had, or a 
partnership, corporation, association, or organization that had, a net worth 
exceeding five million dollars at the time the action or appeal was filed, except 
that an organization that is described in subsection 501(c)(3) and is tax exempt 
under subsection 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code shall not be excluded as an 
eligible party under this division because of its net worth; 
{¶ 13} “(d) A sole owner of an unincorporated business that employed, or 
a partnership, corporation, association, or organization that employed, more than 
five hundred persons at the time the action or appeal was filed.”  R.C. 
2335.39(A)(2). 
{¶ 14} The state opposed the school board’s motion for attorney fees on 
the basis that it was not an eligible party because it is an “organization that 
employed, more than five hundred persons at the time the action or appeal was 
filed.”  R.C. 2335.39(A)(2)(d).  The narrow issue before us is whether the word 
“organization” in R.C. 2335.39(A)(2)(d) encompasses a school district board of 
education. 
{¶ 15} R.C. 2335.39 does not define “organization.”  When a word is not 
defined, we use its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning unless it is contrary 
to clear legislative intent.  Hughes v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 114 Ohio St.3d 47, 
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2007-Ohio-2877, 868 N.E.2d 246, ¶ 14.  We also read the word in context using 
rules of grammar and common usage.  R.C. 1.42. 
{¶ 16} Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) 1590 defines 
organization as “a group of people that has a more or less constant membership, a 
body of officers, a purpose and usu. a set of regulations.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 
(8th Ed.2004) 1133 defines “organization” as “[a] body of persons (such as a 
union or corporation) formed for a common purpose.”  See also American 
Heritage Dictionary (4th Ed.2000) 1239 (“A group of persons organized for a 
particular purpose;  an association”).  Thus, the common meaning of the term 
“organization” requires a group of members having a common purpose. 
{¶ 17} A school district board of education is a statutorily created entity 
composed of individual members responsible for governing a school district or 
educational service center.  R.C. 3311.055.  It is described as “a body politic and 
corporate.”  R.C. 3313.17.  Thus, the common, ordinary meaning of the word 
“organization” encompasses a school board. 
{¶ 18} However, the Cincinnati school board contends that we must 
construe “organization” in the context of other entities listed in R.C. 
2335.39(A)(2)(d).  According to the board, because the words “organization” and 
“association” are expansive terms that follow more specifically named entities of 
unincorporated business, partnership, and corporation – entities that the board 
contends are nongovernmental – “organization” in this context also refers only to 
nongovernmental entities.  Similarly, the appellate court relied on the doctrine of 
ejusdem generis to conclude that a school board does not share similar 
characteristics with other entities listed in R.C. 2335.39(A)(2)(d), i.e., 
unincorporated business, partnership, corporation, association, so it is not an 
organization.  176 Ohio App.3d 678, 2008-Ohio-2845, 893 N.E.2d 530, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 19} We disagree.  R.C. 2335.39(A)(2)(d) excludes five broad 
categories or groups that may exist in various forms or for various purposes.  
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These entities may be private or government groups.  The statute includes no 
limitations, and we are constrained from adding or subtracting terms when 
construing statutory language.  In re Adoption of Holcomb (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 
361, 366, 18 OBR 419, 481 N.E.2d 613.  The only applicable similarity that is 
required for purposes of R.C. 2335.39(A)(2)(d) is the number of employees, i.e., 
more than 500 at the time the action or appeal was filed. 
{¶ 20} Furthermore, the doctrine of ejusdem generis does not operate to 
exclude a school board from being an organization for purposes of R.C. 
2335.39(A)(2)(d).  Under the doctrine, “whenever words of general meaning 
follow the enumeration of a particular class, then the general words are to be 
construed as limited to those things which pertain to the particularly enumerated 
class.”  Akron Home Med. Servs., Inc. v. Lindley (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 107, 109, 
25 OBR 155, 495 N.E.2d 417.  See also Moulton Gas Serv., Inc. v. Zaino, 97 
Ohio St.3d 48, 2002-Ohio-5309, 776 N.E.2d 72, ¶ 14.  However, the terms 
“partnership,” “corporation,” and “association” are general terms just as 
“organization” is.  Each is a general category having multiple subcategories.  
Thus, we do not agree with the appellate court’s application of ejusdem generis to 
construe the word “organization” in the statute. 
{¶ 21} The school board also contends that R.C. 2335.39(A)(2)(a) 
expressly excludes the state from being an eligible party, and “state” as defined in 
R.C. 2743.01 (incorporated by reference in subsection (A)(6)) expressly excludes 
political subdivisions.  Thus, according to the board, political subdivisions are not 
excluded from being eligible parties. 
{¶ 22} In general, we agree that political subdivisions are not excluded 
under R.C. 2335.39(A)(2)(a); however, we do not read this exclusion as broadly 
as the Cincinnati school board suggests to include all political subdivisions as 
eligible parties.  That a political subdivision is not excluded under R.C. 
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2335.39(A)(2)(a) does not determine eligibility if other statutory provisions apply 
to exclude a political subdivision. 
{¶ 23} R.C. 2335.39(A)(2) excludes from eligibility those who most 
likely have the ability to pay litigation costs:  entities with a certain number of 
employees or net worth, wealthy individuals, and the state.  The Cincinnati school 
board is an organization with more than 500 employees; thus, it is excluded from 
being an eligible party.  This exclusion comports with the underlying purpose of 
this fee-shifting statute:  to assist economically disadvantaged parties who have 
prevailed in proceedings in which the state is a party.  See Haghighi v. Moody, 
152 Ohio App.3d 600, 2003-Ohio-2203, 789 N.E.2d 673, ¶ 10, quoting Spencer v. 
Natl. Labor Relations Bd. (C.A.D.C.1983), 712 F.2d 539, 549 (“R.C. 2335.39 is 
Ohio's version of the Federal Equal Access to Justice Act.  It was passed to 
censure frivolous government action that coerces a party to resort to the courts to 
protect his or her rights.  It serves to ‘ “encourage relatively impecunious private 
parties to challenge unreasonable or oppressive governmental behavior by 
relieving such parties of the fear of incurring large litigation expenses.” ’ ” 
[Citations omitted]). 
{¶ 24} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 25} I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.  Yes, 
“organization” is a rather general term, but it appears in R.C. 2335.39(A)(2)(d) 
among a list of words describing voluntarily created business enterprises.  In 
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contrast, a local board of education is a statutorily created political subdivision.  
In regard to governmental entities, R.C. 2335.39(A)(2)(a) excludes only “[t]he 
state.”  R.C. 2335.39(A)(2)(a) would have been the logical place to list other 
political subdivisions that were also excluded from an award of fees.  Moreover, 
R.C. 2335.39(A)(2)(c) also refers to an “organization” but speaks in terms of net 
worth and possible tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code.  It’s not 
talking about school boards. 
{¶ 26} A board of education simply does not fit as an R.C. 
2335.39(A)(2)(d) exclusion.  And if it doesn’t fit, we must omit. 
__________________ 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Nicholas A. Pittner, James J. Hughes III, 
Jennifer A. Flint, and Allen Shaffer, for appellee. 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
Alexandra T. Schimmer, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Stephen P. Carney, 
Deputy Solicitor, and Todd R. Marti and Jason Patrick Small, Assistant Solicitors, 
for appellants. 
______________________