Title: Commonwealth v. Villalobos

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12185 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANTHONY VILLALOBOS. 
 
 
October 26, 2017. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, Conduct of juror, Voir 
dire. 
 
 
 
Anthony Villalobos appeals from his convictions of 
involuntary manslaughter, as a lesser included offense of murder 
in the second degree, and assault and battery and from the 
denial of his motion for a new trial.  The Appeals Court 
affirmed his convictions in a divided opinion.  Commonwealth v. 
Villalobos, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 432 (2016).  See id. at 444-447 
(Rubin, J., dissenting).  We granted Villalobos's application 
for further appellate review, 475 Mass. 1102 (2016), and now 
reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial. 
 
 
1.  Sleeping jurors.  The issue that divided the Appeals 
Court was the trial judge's failure to conduct a voir dire after 
the prosecutor reported that some jurors fell asleep during the 
trial.  "[A] judicial observation that a juror is asleep, or a 
judge's receipt of reliable information to that effect, requires 
prompt judicial intervention."  Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 
Mass. 638, 643-644 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 
Mass. 61, 78 (2010).  "[I]f a judge receives a complaint or 
other information suggesting that a juror was asleep or 
otherwise inattentive, the judge must first determine whether 
that information is 'reliable.'"  McGhee, supra at 644.  If the 
judge determines that the information is not reliable, no 
intervention is necessary.  See Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 471 
Mass. 398, 412-413 (2015) (where counsel's assertions that juror 
was sleeping during charge were not found reliable, judge did 
not abuse discretion by taking no further action).  If, however, 
the judge does find the information reliable, he or she "must 
take further steps to determine the appropriate intervention."  
2 
 
McGhee, supra.  "Typically, the next step is to conduct a voir 
dire of the potentially inattentive juror, in an attempt to 
investigate whether that juror 'remains capable of fulfilling 
his or her obligation to render a verdict based on all of the 
evidence.'"1  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Dancy, 75 Mass. App. 
Ct. 175, 181 (2009).  The judge has "substantial discretion in 
this area," and on appeal, "[t]he burden is on the defendant to 
show that the judge's response to information about a sleeping 
juror was 'arbitrary or unreasonable.'"  McGhee, supra, quoting 
Beneche, supra. 
 
 
Villalobos has met his burden.  Indeed, this case is much 
like McGhee, in which we determined that the judge's failure to 
intervene gave rise to "serious doubt that the defendant 
received the fair trial to which he [was] constitutionally 
entitled."  McGhee, 470 Mass. at 645, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Braun, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 904, 906 (2009).  As the Appeals Court 
explained, during Villalobos's trial, the prosecutor reported 
one day that one juror "had fallen asleep 'several times' during 
the testimony," and the next day, that a different juror "was 
sound asleep during the cross-examinations."  Villalobos, 89 
Mass. App. Ct. 435-436.  The judge, who did not have the benefit 
of McGhee, did not give any indication that he doubted the 
reliability of the prosecutor's reports, yet he did not question 
the jurors to determine whether they had in fact fallen asleep 
and, if so, what portions of the evidence they might have 
missed.  Instead, the judge simply observed each juror for the 
rest of the day.  Id.  Similarly, in McGhee, supra at 642-645, 
one juror reported that another juror had fallen "sound asleep" 
and was even snoring, but the trial judge declined to take 
action. 
 
 
Moreover, like in McGhee, the trial judge appears to have 
been under the mistaken impression that he could not intervene 
unless he personally observed a juror sleeping.  See Villalobos, 
89 Mass. App. Ct. at 436 ("The prosecutor [stated], 'I think 
that both sides deserve to have jurors that are able to stay 
awake," and the judge stated, 'Obviously, but I have to notice 
it'" [emphasis added]).  Cf. McGhee, 470 Mass. at 645 ("The 
judge's reason for taking no further action . . . was 
essentially that he had not himself seen the juror sleeping").  
On the contrary, the receipt of reliable information from any 
                     
 
1 This is not to say that a voir dire is always necessary; 
there may be circumstances where a judge received reliable 
information that a juror is sleeping and properly exercises his 
or her discretion to intervene without conducting a voir dire. 
3 
 
source, not just the judge's own observation, that a juror is 
sleeping requires prompt judicial intervention.  The judge's 
apparent belief that he lacked discretion to do anything other 
than observe the jurors was itself an error of law.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Ramos, 402 Mass. 209, 216 (1988), and cases 
cited ("A ruling that the court has no power to direct an act, 
when in fact the act is discretionary, is an error of law"). 
 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the sleeping jurors missed 
minimal and relatively inconsequential portions of the 
testimony.  Based on only the record before us, however, we 
cannot be sure that this is true.  The purpose of a voir dire is 
to investigate the report that one or more jurors were sleeping 
and to determine what, if anything, the sleeping jurors missed.  
Because the judge did not conduct a voir dire, we do not have 
these essential findings.2 
 
 
In the circumstances of this case, the judge's response to 
the prosecutor's reports leaves us with "serious doubt that the 
defendant received the fair trial to which he is 
constitutionally entitled."  McGhee, 470 Mass. at 645, quoting 
Braun, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 906.  "The serious possibility that 
a juror was asleep for a significant portion of the trial" is a 
structural error and can never be considered harmless.  McGhee, 
supra at 645-646.  The convictions must be vacated. 
 
 
2.  Remaining issues.  Villalobos also argues that the 
evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.  For the 
reasons explained by the Appeals Court, Villalobos, 89 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 433-435, we disagree.  Accordingly, Villalobos may 
be retried for the offenses of which he was convicted.  Because 
of our disposition, we need not reach the other issues decided 
by the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments reversed. 
 
 
Elda S. James (Mathew B. Zindroski also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Amanda Teo, Assistant District Attorney (David J. Fredette, 
Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. 
                     
 
2 At oral argument, a question arose as to whether the 
reportedly sleeping jurors deliberated or were alternates.  The 
Commonwealth has since acknowledged that at least one of the 
jurors in question did in fact deliberate.  We therefore need 
not address in this case whether a trial judge can cure the 
failure to intervene by making the sleeping juror an alternate.