Title: Duran v. Board of County Com'rs of Sweetwater County

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Duran v. Board of County Com'rs of Sweetwater County1990 WY 22787 P.2d 971Case Number: 89-174Decided: 02/27/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
PATRICIA G. DURAN, 

APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF SWEETWATER COUNTY, A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY; AND ROBERT W. VAN 
VALKENBERG, INDIVIDUALLY,

 APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Sweetwater County, John D. Troughton, J.

Michael D. 
Newman (argued), Rock Springs, and Gary K. Wood, Aurora, Colo., for 
appellant.

John D. Rossetti 
(argued), of Greenhalgh, Bussart, West & Rossetti, Rock Springs, for 
appellees.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      The central issue 
to be decided in this appeal is whether the claim of appellant, Patricia G. 
Duran (Duran), against appellees, Board of County Commissioners of Sweetwater 
County (County) and Robert W. Van Valkenberg (Van Valkenberg), is barred because 
it was not filed within two years of the alleged act giving rise to the claim. A 
secondary issue is whether the acts of the County's insurer in negotiating with 
Duran about the claim should estop the County from defending on the basis of the 
claims statute. Several other issues are raised by Duran. Because we hold, 
however, that the failure to timely file the claim is dispositive of this 
action, we affirm and find it unnecessary to address these other 
issues.

[¶2]      On November 16, 
1988, Duran filed a complaint in the district court alleging that on May 13, 
1986, Van Valkenberg, an employee of the County, while operating a road grader 
to improve the surface of Patrick Draw Road in Sweetwater County, was negligent 
in striking a school bus being driven by Duran. Ms. Duran suffered physical 
injuries in the accident and sought to recover damages for those injuries from 
the County. She claimed that Van Valkenberg was negligent in his operation of 
the grader; that the County was negligent in failing to appropriately warn 
motorists of the maintenance activities being conducted on the roadway and 
failing to train and supervise its employees to conduct maintenance activities 
in a safe and lawful manner; and that Van Valkenberg was working within the 
course and scope of his employment and, therefore, his negligence should be 
imputed to his employer, the County. 

[¶3]      On December 6, 
1988, the County filed a motion to dismiss asserting that Duran's complaint had 
not been filed within two years of the date of the alleged act as required by 
W.S. 1-39-113(a) (June 1988 Repl.); that pursuant to W.S. 1-39-120 (June 1988 
Repl.) the County was immune from suit for claims of damages arising out of the 
maintenance of a roadway; and that the claim could not be made under W.S. 
1-39-105 (June 1988 Repl.) for damages caused by a public employee operating a 
motor vehicle because the road grader was not a "motor vehicle" or "vehicle" as 
defined by W.S. 31-1-101(a)(xv) and (xxvi) (Cum.Supp. 1986). In April of 1989, 
Duran filed a brief in opposition to the County's motion to dismiss. Attached to 
the brief were numerous documents including an affidavit from one of her 
attorneys identifying a witness to the accident who was an employee of the 
County; Duran's medical records; numerous pieces of correspondence with GAB, the 
insurer for the County; a notice of claim addressed to the County and dated 
September 19, 1988; a resolution of the County denying the claim as barred by 
the statute of limitations under the Governmental Claims Act; and a letter dated 
September 21, 1988, from the state auditor acknowledging receipt of a claim 
filed with the State of Wyoming.

[¶4]      The district 
court entered an order on June 16, 1989, which stated only that, "Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted." The district court did not issue a 
decision letter or further enlighten the parties or this court as to the basis 
for the order dismissing the complaint.

[¶5]      Appellant's brief 
contains this statement of the issues:

"I. When matters outside 
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the trial court, must a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., be treated as a motion for 
summary judgment?

"II. Whether the 
Appellant substantially complied with W.S. 1-39-113(a) in filing her notice of 
claim later than two (2) years after the accident when Appellees had actual and 
constructive notice of the accident within the two year period following the 
accident.

"III. Whether the 
Appellees are immune from liability under W.S. 1-39-120(a)(iii).

"IV. Whether the 
Appellees are subject to liability under W.S. 1-39-105.

"V. Whether W.S. 
1-39-113[120]1 is unconstitutional in that it 
violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution of the 
United States and the Constitution of the State of Wyoming.

"VI. Whether Appellees 
are estopped or have waived their rights to challenge Appellant's failure to 
file a notice of claim within the two-year notice period pursuant to the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act."

[¶6]      The County, in 
turn, proposes this statement of the issues:

I. "Must appellees' 
motion to dismiss in the lower court be treated as a motion for summary 
judgment?

II. "Must appellant 
strictly comply with § 1-39-113 W.S. in order to confer jurisdiction on the 
district court?"

III. "Under the 
circumstances of this case, are appellees immune from liability under § 1-39-120 
W.S.?"

IV. "Under the 
circumstances of this case, are appellees subject to liability under § 1-39-105 
W.S.?"

V. "Is § 1-39-113 [§ 
1-39-120] W.S. unconstitutional in that it violates the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Constitution of the United States and the State of 
Wyoming?"

VI. "Are appellees 
estopped through the acts of GAB to assert appellant's failure to timely file a 
notice of claim pursuant to § 1-39-113 W.S.?"

[¶7]      Wyoming precedent 
is unequivocal in holding that failure to file a claim with the governmental 
entity within the two-year period provided in W.S. 1-39-113(a) (June 1988 Repl.) 
is an absolute bar to suit. Davis v. City of Casper, 710 P.2d 827, 829 (Wyo. 
1985); Lafferty v. Nickel, 663 P.2d 168, 172 (Wyo. 1983); see Board of Trustees 
of Univ. of Wyoming v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 413-14 (Wyo. 1983). Duran asks us to 
reverse these longstanding precedents, or at least to modify them, in light of 
authorities which appear to hold that as long as the governmental entity has 
received some sort of notice of the claim, that is sufficient to fulfill the 
statutory itemized written presentation requirement established in W.S. 
1-39-113(a). These authorities do not support the proposition put forward by 
Duran and will be discussed infra.

[¶8]      Courts have 
generally adhered to the well-established rule that there must be compliance 
with a notice-of-claim statute and that actual notice to the governmental entity 
is not a substitute for filing a claim. Annotation, Actual Notice or Knowledge 
by Governmental Body or Officer of Injury or Incident Resulting in Injury as 
Constituting Required Claim or Notice of Claim for Injury - Modern Status, 7 
A.L.R.4th 1063, 1065 (1981). In reaching these decisions, the courts have relied 
on two basic principles: (1) In the absence of a notice of claim, the 
governmental entity does not have reason to conduct an investigation or attempt 
to reach settlement with an injured party; and (2) the notice-of-claim 
requirement embodies a legislative policy that the right to sue a governmental 
entity requires compliance with the statutory conditions. Id., p. 
1066.

[¶9]      Wyoming's statute 
is clear in this regard:

"(a) No action shall be 
brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the claim 
upon which the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized 
statement in writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, 
error or omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than 
two (2) years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the 
claimant can establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

"(i) Not reasonably 
discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

"(ii) The claimant failed 
to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period 
despite the exercise of due diligence." (emphasis added) W.S. 1-39-113 (June, 
1988 Repl.).

[¶10]   Duran cites numerous cases which 
simply do not support her position. For instance, in Lee v. South Broward Hosp. 
Dist., 473 So. 2d 1322, 1323-24 (Fla.App. 1985), the court recognized that 
established law in Florida made compliance with Florida's notice-of-claim 
statute a condition precedent to maintaining a suit (Commercial Carrier Corp. v. 
Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979)). However, in Lee the 
intermediate appellate court did reverse a summary judgment which dismissed a 
complaint with prejudice where the claim was filed within Florida's three-year 
claim period, though suit had been instituted prior to the filing of the claim. 
In Diemert v. City of Mobile, 474 So. 2d 663, 665-66 (Ala. 1985), the Supreme 
Court of Alabama, while more liberally interpreting the state's notice-of-claim 
statute, nevertheless recognized the necessity of satisfying Alabama's six-month 
filing requirement by holding that actual filing of suit within six months of 
the date of injury was sufficient. In Besette v. Enderlin School Dist. No. 22, 
288 N.W.2d 67, 70-71, 7 A.L.R.4th 1047 (N.D. 1980) the North Dakota Supreme 
Court recognized the overwhelming majority view that actual notice is not a 
substitute for filing a claim and adopted that position. The North Dakota court 
noted that only two jurisdictions have held to the contrary. One of these is New 
York, and that exception is easily explained by that state's statute which 
permits a court to extend the time for filing a claim in circumstances where the 
public body "acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the 
claim * * *." Matey v. Bethlehem Central School Dist., Delmar, 89 Misc.2d 390, 
391 N.Y.S.2d 357, 359 (1977) (citing Gen.Mun. Law § 50-e, subd. 5). New York 
does enforce its requirement that suit must be filed within one year of the 
events giving rise to the claim. Id. In this case, Duran relies on several New 
York precedents which, as noted, are distinguishable. Minnesota, in Kelly v. 
City of Rochester, 304 Minn. 328, 231 N.W.2d 275 (1975) (a case heavily relied 
upon by Duran) adopted a rule at odds with the position taken by Wyoming and a 
majority of other jurisdictions. However, we agree with the North Dakota Supreme 
Court and decline to adopt this minority position.

[¶11]   We will also take note of other 
jurisdictions whose cases have been cited by Duran. In a decision, the exact 
limits of which are not entirely clear, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that 
a statute, which deprived a physically and mentally incapacitated minor who did 
not nominate a guardian or file a claim within a sixty-day filing period, 
deprived the minor of due process of law. Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, 384 
Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970). The reasoning of that case is not relevant to 
our statute which clearly provides exceptions that cover such contingencies as 
disabilities or other circumstances which prevent a claimant from filing a 
timely claim. W.S. 1-39-113(a)(i), (ii) and 1-39-114 (June 1988 
Repl.).

[¶12]   The Tennessee cases relied upon by 
Duran are not applicable because Tennessee has a statute like that of New York. 
Tennessee's statute provides that their notice-of-claim statute "shall not be 
strictly construed where the municipality should have reasonably apprised itself 
of the occurrence of the incident or could have done so with the exercise of 
proper diligence." Johnson v. City of Memphis, 699 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Tenn. App. 
1985) (citing T.C.A. § 29-20-302(c)). Likewise, the Texas cases are not in point 
because Texas law provides that a notice must be filed within six months, except 
where there is actual notice to the governmental entity that the claimant has 
received some injury. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Ray, 712 S.W.2d 271, 274 
(Tex. App. 1986) (citing § 16 of the Texas Tort Claims Act). New Mexico's 
statute makes failure to file the claim a bar to suit unless the statutorily 
required notice has been given "or unless the governmental entity had actual 
notice of the occurrence." Emery v. University of New Mexico Medical Center, 96 
N.M. 144, 628 P.2d 1140, 1143 (1981) (citing N.M.S.A. 1978 § 41-4-16(B)). A 
Wisconsin statute requires the filing of a claim, providing, however, that 
failure to give the notice does not bar the action if the governmental entity 
had actual notice of the damage or injury and the injured party shows to the 
satisfaction of the court that failure to give notice was not prejudicial to the 
governmental entity. Weiss v. City of Milwaukee, 79 Wis.2d 213, 255 N.W.2d 496, 
499 (1977) (citing W.S.A. 895.43(1)).

[¶13]   Finally, Oklahoma has joined 
Minnesota in holding that actual notice is sufficient although its statute does 
not contain provision therefor. Duesterhaus v. City of Edmond, 634 P.2d 720 
(Okla. 1981).

[¶14]   In summary, we adhere to our 
established rule that failure to timely file a claim, as required by W.S. 
1-39-113(a) (June 1988 Repl.), is a bar to the filing of a lawsuit against a 
governmental entity, and the order of the district court is affirmed. If a 
change in the rule is to be made, it should be made by the legislature and not 
this court.

[¶15]   We shall briefly respond to Duran's 
contention that the County should be estopped from defending on the basis of her 
failure to file a claim because the insurer for the County was actively involved 
in negotiations during the period when the time to file a claim was running. 
Duran relies upon the mere pendency of negotiations as the basis for employing 
the doctrine of estoppel, both in her brief in this court and in her defense to 
the motion to dismiss in the district court. Such an assertion is not of itself 
sufficient to establish an estoppel. Turner v. Turner, 582 P.2d 600, 603 (Wyo. 
1978). While in many cases assertions of estoppel, which would prevent resort to 
a statute of limitations, involve questions to be resolved by a fact finder, 
there are certain cases where this determination will be a matter for the 
courts. Id. at 602; Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 719 P.2d 234 (Wyo. 1986). In the 
instant case, the decision was clearly one to be decided by the district court 
as a matter of law. In opposition to the County's motion to dismiss, appellant 
only asserted ongoing negotiations as grounds for the application of estoppel. 
There was no assertion of representation by the insurer relied upon by 
appellant. As a matter of law, what is asserted is insufficient to require that 
the issue be presented to a fact finder.

[¶16]   We note for purposes of clarity 
that whether this case should be viewed in the light of a motion to dismiss, or 
in the light of a summary judgment because matters outside the pleadings were 
presented to and not excluded by the trial court, is of no consequence. Whether 
the trial court's action is viewed as a summary judgment or as an order to 
dismiss under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), we are nonetheless compelled to affirm the 
district court's order on the basis that Duran's suit was barred by the 
notice-of-claim statute.

[¶17]   It is unnecessary for us to resolve 
the other issues raised by Duran, in view of our holding that the claim is 
barred by the notice-of-claim statute.

[¶18]   The order of the district court 
dismissing the complaint is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Duran identifies the 
statute challenged as W.S. 1-39-113 in her statement of the issues and in the 
caption of her argument. It is clear from the text of the argument, however, 
that her challenge is to W.S. 1-39-120 and not W.S. 1-39-113.