Title: Eustice v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Eustice v. State1994 WY 37871 P.2d 682Case Number: 93-176Decided: 03/25/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Michael Thomas EUSTICE,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court, Sheridan County, John C. Brackley, 
J.

Representing 
Appellant:

Michael 
Thomas Eustice, pro se.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., D. Michael Pauling, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, Director of Prosecution Assistance 
Program, and Stephanie A. Materi, Student Intern for Prosecution Assistance 
Program, for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

MACY, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Michael 
Thomas Eustice appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to 
vacate or correct an illegal sentence.

[¶2.]     We reverse and 
remand.

[¶3.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues:

I. 
Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion, and violated 
appellant's right to due process, when it sentenced appellant to terms of 
incarceration of from one year and 114 days to three years and 114 days on 
charges of misdemeanor battery.

II. 
Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion when it failed to grant 
appellant credit against his sentences for all time already served by appellant 
prior to sentencing.

[¶4.]     Early in the morning on 
July 22, 1990, Appellant discovered his girlfriend with another man. Appellant 
violently beat the man, dislodging two of his teeth. Afterwards, he transported 
his girlfriend back to her apartment, forced her to bathe while he pounded her 
head against the bathroom wall, led her to his car, and drove with her from 
Sheridan, Wyoming, to South Dakota, continuing to beat her along the way. The 
next day, South Dakota officials located Appellant and his girlfriend, and they 
notified the Sheridan police.

[¶5.]     After initially 
pleading not guilty, Appellant entered into a plea bargain and pleaded guilty to 
two counts of misdemeanor battery in violation of WYO. STAT. § 6-2-501(b) 
(1988), one count for each of his victims, and to one count of kidnapping in 
violation of WYO. STAT. § 6-2-201(a)(ii), (b)(i), and (c) (1988). In accordance 
with the plea bargain, the district court sentenced Appellant to serve two 
consecutive terms of six months each in the Sheridan County jail for the battery 
counts. After awarding a credit for the presentence confinement, the district 
court suspended the remainder of the battery sentences pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 
7-13-302(a)(i) (1987). The district court deferred further proceedings on the 
kidnapping count and placed Appellant on probation for a period of five years 
pursuant to the terms of WYO. STAT. § 7-13-301(a) (1987).1

[¶6.]     On August 17, 1992, the 
State filed a motion to revoke Appellant's probation, alleging that Appellant 
had committed several violations of his probation conditions, including another 
battery against the woman who was a victim in this case. Appellant admitted that 
he had violated his probation conditions. The district court revoked Appellant's 
probation pursuant to the provisions of WYO. STAT. § 7-13-301(c)(i) (Supp. 1993) 
and ordered him to serve consecutive sentences in the Wyoming State Penitentiary 
on the kidnapping count and the two battery counts with each sentence to be for 
a period of not less than one year and 114 days nor more than three years and 
114 days on each count and with credits of 114 days each being given off both 
the minimum and maximum sentences for the presentence time served. The district 
court later amended Appellant's sentence to direct that the battery and 
kidnapping sentences run concurrent with each other.

[¶7.]     The State maintains 
that this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction because Appellant did not timely 
file his notice of appeal. The district court entered its order on July 16, 
1993, denying Appellant's motion to vacate or correct an illegal sentence. 
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on August 19, 1993, thirty-four days after 
the date on which the order was entered.

[¶8.]     Since Appellant filed 
his notice of appeal more than thirty days after the district court entered its 
order, the notice could not invoke our appellate jurisdiction. W.R.A.P. 2.01. In 
order to ensure that Appellant is afforded equal protection in his presentence 
confinement credit award, we will consider the merits of his untimely appeal. 
See Stice v. State, 799 P.2d 1204 (Wyo. 1990), habeas corpus 
denied, 838 F. Supp. 1548 (D.Wyo. 1993) (reaching the merits of an untimely 
criminal appeal in order to prevent a denial of due process and to ensure 
effective assistance of counsel).

[¶9.]     The State concedes that 
Appellant's battery sentences were illegal because, at the time of his 
post-revocation sentencing, Appellant had already been in presentence 
confinement and on probation for a period which totaled more than the length of 
the maximum sentences for the misdemeanor batteries. See Kahlsdorf v. 
State, 823 P.2d 1184 (Wyo. 1991) (citing the predecessor to WYO. STAT. § 
7-13-302 (1987)) (sentencing court may not impose probation greater in length 
than the maximum sentence available for the underlying offense). We agree and 
hold that the district court erred when it imposed Appellant's post-revocation 
battery sentences.

[¶10.]  Appellant contends that the district 
court abused its discretion by erroneously failing to award the correct amount 
of presentence confinement credit toward his kidnapping sentence. We 
agree.

[¶11.]  The following colloquy occurred at the 
sentencing hearing:

[THE 
COURT:] So, it's the judgment and sentence of this Court that the probation is 
not appropriate in your case, Mr. Eustice. I don't know how much time you have 
spent in jail awaiting this charge and in jail on the other two misdemeanors, 
and then you did some time for Johnson - or for Campbell County, I guess, on 
another charge that was the underlying basis, so what I'm going to do, since I 
don't have that information before me, I'm going to make your sentence a term of 
not less than one - I think that's a minimal sentence to the penitentiary, Mr. 
Eustice - nor more than three years. That will be - however, I want the one year 
plus whatever time that you've already spent in jail. I think I have to give you 
credit for the time served, but I don't know what that time is so what I'm doing 
is whatever time you have served plus one year for the minimum sentence for the 
time served plus three years for the maximum sentence.

Do 
you understand that, counsel?

[PROSECUTOR]: 
Yes, your Honor.

THE 
COURT: I'm not going to impose any fine. You know, obviously you don't have the 
funds to pay any fine with.

I'm 
not going to impose any Victim's Compensation because obviously you don't have 
the funds to pay that.

The 
written judgment and sentence fixed Appellant's presentence confinement credit 
at 114 days.

Our 
established rule is that, on appeal, we do not set aside a sentence if it is 
within the legislatively mandated minimum and maximum terms in the absence of a 
clear abuse of discretion.

Betzle 
v. State, 
847 P.2d 1010, 1024 (Wyo. 1993) (citing Carey v. State, 715 P.2d 244 
(Wyo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S. Ct. 270, 93 L. Ed. 2d 247 
(1986)). A defendant who has been confined prior to being sentenced because of 
his or her inability to post bail is entitled to receive a credit against the 
sentence for the amount of his or her presentence confinement. Renfro v. 
State, 785 P.2d 491, 498 (Wyo. 1990). When a sentencing court erroneously 
fails to award a presentence confinement credit, a later denial of a motion to 
correct the illegal sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion. Ramirez v. 
State 
, 800 P.2d 503    , 504 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶12.]  If a full credit were given for his 
presentence confinement, Appellant's maximum term would fall below the 
twenty-year maximum sentence which could be imposed for kidnapping, and his 
minimum term would be less than ninety percent of his maximum term. Van Duser 
v. State, 796 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Wyo. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 7-13-201 (1987); § 
6-2-201(a) and (c). While the precise amount of Appellant's presentence 
confinement cannot be determined from the record, the record does indicate that 
Appellant's confinement totalled more than 114 days.

[¶13.]  The State concedes that Appellant was in 
custody from August 9, 1990, until November 14, 1990 - ninety-eight days - 
awaiting his arraignment, competency evaluation, and sentencing for the battery 
and kidnapping charges. Apparently, though, the State claims that Appellant is 
not entitled to receive a credit toward his kidnapping sentence for this initial 
confinement. We disagree. Since Appellant was confined in part because of the 
kidnapping charge and since the district court ordered his kidnapping and 
battery sentences to run concurrent with each other, Appellant is entitled to 
receive a credit toward his subsequent kidnapping sentence for those 
ninety-eight days. Weedman v. State, 792 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Wyo. 
1990).

[¶14.]  The State also concedes that Appellant 
was in custody from August 24, 1992, until November 20, 1992 - eighty-nine days 
- awaiting his probation revocation hearing. Appellant was thus entitled to 
receive a credit for at least 187 days toward his kidnapping 
sentence.

[¶15.]  The record suggests that Appellant may 
have been confined for three additional periods before he was sentenced. First, 
according to the presentence investigation report, Appellant was "turned over to 
law enforcement authorities" in South Dakota on July 23, 1990, after being 
evaluated at a veterans' administration hospital. If Appellant were jailed in 
South Dakota because of the battery and kidnapping charges, he would be entitled 
to receive an additional credit toward his kidnapping sentence for that period 
of confinement. But see Green v. State, 776 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1989) (when 
confinement in Wyoming is caused by a sentence imposed in another jurisdiction, 
under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers the accused is not entitled to 
receive a credit toward the Wyoming sentence).

[¶16.]  Second, according to Appellant, he 
surrendered to Sheridan police on August 7, 1990. The prosecutor stated that 
Appellant was arrested on August 8th. The sheriff's return indicates that 
Appellant was arrested on August 9th, the day of his initial appearance. 
Appellant would be entitled to receive an additional credit toward his 
kidnapping sentence if he spent any time in jail awaiting his initial 
appearance.

[¶17.]  Third, the record shows that Appellant 
may have been confined at the detention center for some additional time prior to 
August 24, 1992, after he had finished serving his second battery term, awaiting 
his probation revocation hearing. Appellant would be entitled to receive a 
credit toward his kidnapping sentence for any additional time which he may have 
spent at the detention center.

[¶18.]  Because the record demonstrates that 
Appellant was confined for at least 187 days, we hold that the district court 
abused its discretion by awarding a credit of only 114 days toward Appellant's 
kidnapping sentence. We remand this case to the district court for a finding of 
the precise amount of the presentence confinement award, if any, which Appellant 
is entitled to receive beyond 187 days. Pursuant to § 7-13-201, the written 
order established Appellant's sentence at not less than one year and 114 days 
nor more than three years and 114 days. W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(B). Thus, on remand, 
the district court's modified award of the presentence confinement credit must 
be made against the written sentence.

[¶19.]  Under our current rules of criminal 
procedure, a sentence must contain both a finding of the amount of the 
presentence confinement and either an express award or an express denial of a 
credit for that presentence confinement. W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(E) & (F); 
accord W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C) (similar requirement for contested 
information contained in the presentence investigation report). Despite our 
rules, these issues continue to plague our docket; therefore, we deem it 
appropriate to refine our standard procedure for awarding a presentence 
confinement credit. See Renfro, 785 P.2d  at 497 n. 7.

[¶20.]  If a sentence fails to comply with 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(E) or (F), the accused would be entitled to have a limited 
remand for a new award of a credit unless we have been able to fashion a correct 
award from the record. Compare Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101 (Wyo. 
1993) (limited remand for written findings to correct violations of W.R.Cr.P. 
32(a)(3)(C)(ii)); and Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 1992) (remand 
not necessary when the Supreme Court can accomplish amendment to judgment and 
sentence). On remand and resentencing, "we assume appellants will not be 
punished for exercising their constitutional right to appeal." Griebel v. 
State, 763 P.2d 475, 478 (Wyo. 1988). For findings in future cases which 
involve a contested presentence confinement credit, we adopt the procedure 
recommended by the American Bar Association:

(c) 
In reaching its findings on all controverted issues (standard 18-6.6(a)(i)), the 
sentencing court should employ the preponderance of the evidence standard and 
may treat the contents of a verified presentence report as presumptively 
accurate, provided, however, that material factual allegations made in the 
presentence report and effectively challenged by the defendant should not be 
deemed to satisfy the government's burden of persuasion unless reasonable 
verification of such information can be shown to have been made (standard 
18-5.1(c)) or adequate factual corroboration otherwise exists in the sentencing 
or trial record.

III 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 18-6.4(c) at 448 (2d ed. Supp. 
1986). In future sentencing proceedings, if the accused has access to, and fails 
to contest, the information used by the sentencing court to fix the amount of 
the credit, we will presume, except in extraordinary cases, that the accused 
acknowledged the essential accuracy of that information. Id., commentary 
at 456; see Alexander v. State, 823 P.2d 1198 (Wyo. 1992) (under 
W.R.Cr.P. 33(c)(2), the accused must be afforded an opportunity to contest the 
information used by the sentencing court).

[¶21.]  We hope that in the future this simple 
procedure will eliminate unnecessary appeals, encourage accurate accounting, and 
ensure fair sentencing decisions. See Renfro, 785 P.2d  at 498 n. 8 
(clarity in the judgment and sentence is highly preferred); and ABA STANDARDS, 
supra, Standard 18-6.8 at 492 ("The court should assure that the record 
accurately reflects the facts upon which a credit for time served prior to 
sentencing will be computed").

[¶22.]  Reversed and remanded with directions 
that Appellant's post-revocation battery sentences be vacated, that a finding be 
made as to the amount of time Appellant spent in presentence confinement, and 
that an order be entered awarding a credit for that presentence confinement time 
against Appellant's minimum and maximum kidnapping sentences which were defined 
in the written order.

Footnotes

1 
Amended by 1991 WYO. SESS. LAWS ch. 77, § 1, effective July 1, 1991.