Title: Kitt v. Crosby

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
PRESTON W. KITT, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 081064 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
HOWARD KEITH CROSBY, ET AL. 
 
    February 27, 2009 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALLEGHANY COUNTY 
Malfourd W. Trumbo, Judge 
 
Preston W. Kitt and other heirs of Henry Kitt (collectively 
“Kitt”) appeal from an adverse judgment in an ejectment action 
instituted against Howard K. Crosby.  Kitt first asserts that 
the trial court should have ruled, as a matter of law, that Kitt 
owned the disputed property based on a 1944 deed of conveyance 
and should not have submitted the issue to the jury.  Kitt also 
assigns error to two evidentiary rulings made by the trial 
court.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the 
judgment of the trial court.  
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS  
J.L. Blizzard and his wife, Martha F. Blizzard, purchased a 
large parcel of land in Alleghany County in 1931.  In 1944, 
after J.L.’s death, Martha executed a deed of conveyance to 
Henry Kitt.  In 1995, the Blizzard heirs deeded legal title to 
the remaining “unsold and unconveyed” portion of the Blizzard 
property to James B. Mead and Virginia L. Brooks, trustees of 
the Lipsey-Mead Virginia Land Trust (Mead trustees).  The Mead 
trustees sold some of the property to Howard Crosby.  Crosby 
also expressed interest in acquiring property he believed the 
Mead trustees owned which was located between the Kitt property 
transferred in 1944 and National Forest land.  The Mead trustees 
agreed to sell the land to Crosby if he established that such a 
parcel existed and was owned by the Mead trustees.  To support 
the Mead trustees’ ownership, Crosby hired a surveyor, Gregory 
E. Vess, to prepare a plat depicting the land conveyed to Henry 
Kitt in 1944 and the remainder of the Blizzard parcel.  In 2001, 
Crosby filed suit against the Kitt heirs to establish the 
boundary based on the Vess plat.  That suit was dismissed 
without prejudice. 
In 2003 Vess prepared another plat for Crosby which showed 
a line dividing a 26.14-acre tract owned by the Kitts from a 
71.74-acre tract “represent[ing] an area of uncertain title, 
possibly the residue of that property conveyed to [the Mead 
trustees]” by the Blizzard heirs.  In 2004, the Mead trustees 
conveyed the 71.74-acre tract shown on the 2003 Vess plat to 
Crosby by quitclaim deed.  Crosby subsequently built roads on 
the 71.74-acre tract and began cutting timber on the tract in 
2005. 
 
Preston Kitt, Henry Kitt’s grandson and heir, filed a 
complaint against Crosby alleging that the 71.74-acre tract (the 
disputed property) shown on the 2003 Vess plat was part of the 
property conveyed to Henry Kitt in the 1944 deed.  In an amended 
 
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complaint, Kitt sought to recover possession of the land, 
$221,390 in compensatory damages and $664,170 in punitive 
damages.1 
 
At trial, there was no dispute that the 1944 deed conveyed 
a parcel of approximately 25 acres to Henry Kitt (the undisputed 
property).  Kitt presented the following evidence to establish 
his ownership of the disputed property.  
The 1944 deed described the property conveyed as follows: 
A certain piece or parcel of land of triangular 
shape, and containing approximately twenty five (25) 
acres, more or less, and bounded as follows: 
Beginning at a point at the intersection of the Old 
Rich Patch Railroad Bed (railroad now abandoned) with 
the boundary line of a tract of land owned by the 
United States Government, thence running with said 
boundary line of the United States Government, in a 
Southerly direction to a point at the intersection of 
the said Government line with the intersection of a 
boundary (Northerly) line of a tract of land owned by 
W.L. McElwee, thence running in a Northwesterly 
direction along the Northeasterly boundary line of 
the said McElwee tract of land to a point where the 
said McElwee tract of land to a point where the said 
McElwee tract of land boundary line intersects with 
the said Old Rich Patch Railroad bed, thence from 
said point, running Easterly along the Southern edge 
of the said Railroad bed to the point of beginning 
. . . . 
 
Kitt’s surveyor, David Ingram, testified that he located 
the property conveyed in the 1944 deed by the deeds and plats of 
the adjacent boundaries of the two properties and railroad bed 
                                                 
1 In addition to Preston Kitt, known heirs of Henry Kitt who 
wished to participate in the litigation were included as 
plaintiffs.  Known Kitt heirs who did not wish to participate 
were named as defendants along with unknown heirs.  
 
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identified in the deed.  Ingram agreed that there were 
inconsistencies in the directional calls of the deed and noted 
that the adjoining boundary identified in the 1944 deed as the 
McElwee property, had been conveyed to the United States Forest 
Service five years prior to the 1944 deed.  Ingram further 
acknowledged that the deed failed to describe a significant 
directional change in the government property boundary line.  
Ingram testified that he found remnants of a fence but no fence 
posts and that the fence did not extend in a straight line.  
Ingram stated that the boundary line depicted on the 2003 Vess 
plat did not reconcile with the deed.  
Kitt also presented testimony that Henry Kitt, a long-time 
employee of Martha Blizzard, lived in a house on the undisputed 
property, prior to and after the 1944 conveyance.  Grandsons of 
Henry Kitt testified that the Kitt family had used the property, 
including the disputed property, for hunting, hiking, cutting 
logs, picking mushrooms, and digging ginseng.  Preston Kitt 
claimed his father told him that “if [property is] on this 
mountain, it belongs to Henry Kitt or the government.”  Preston 
Kitt testified that the only fence on the property was built to 
enclose four to six acres near the house to keep livestock, and 
John Kitt testified that the fence was not built until after 
Henry Kitt died.  Testimony presented by Kitt also showed that 
at one time a barn existed on the undisputed property and 
 
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another home and saw mill existed somewhere on the property.  
There was conflicting evidence as to whether the home and saw 
mill were on the undisputed property, along the fence line, or 
on the disputed property.  Preston Kitt claimed that there were 
“drag roads,” used to drag logs out of the woods, on both the 
disputed and undisputed property.  Preston Kitt testified that 
he and his family continued to use the disputed property until 
they learned that Crosby was claiming ownership of it. 
Crosby’s expert surveyor, Steve P. Douty, testified that 
he, like Ingram, was able to find the three adjoining property 
lines identified in the 1944 deed.  Douty also testified that 
the directional calls did not reconcile with the boundaries in 
the 1944 deed.  Douty, over Kitt’s objections, testified 
regarding drawings he made reflecting the calls, courses, and 
acreage recited in the 1944 deed and that he drew the line 
marking the boundary now claimed by Crosby in an effort “to find 
some combination that adheres more closely with the deed.”  
Douty testified that this line was based in part on a fence that 
he found that ran the length of most of Crosby’s claimed 
boundary line.  According to Douty, when the fence reached the 
perpendicular boundary of the McElwee land purchased by the 
Forest Service the fence turned and continued along the 
undisputed property.  No remnants of a fence were found 
 
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following the boundary between the disputed property and the 
Forest Service property. 
Crosby also presented evidence that the Kitts never posted 
any of the property, the Blizzards only posted that portion of 
the property containing a quarry, and other people from the 
community went on the land to hunt and collect mushrooms.  
Crosby testified that he found an old fence on three sides of 
the undisputed property, including along the old railroad bed.  
Crosby agreed that there was evidence of a “skid road” on the 
disputed property. 
 
Kitt moved to strike Crosby’s evidence, arguing that, 
pursuant to the order of preference rule adopted in Providence 
Properties, Inc. v. United Virginia Bank/Seaboard National, 219 
Va. 735, 744-45, 251 S.E.2d 474, 479-80 (1979), the trial court 
should rule, as a matter of law, that Kitt had established 
ownership of the disputed property because both experts could 
locate the boundary lines of adjoining properties.  The trial 
court, finding questions of fact remained as to the intent of 
the grantor, denied Kitt’s motion and submitted the case to the 
jury. 
 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Crosby.  The trial 
court denied Kitt’s motion to set aside the verdict, stating 
that there were “sufficient concerns” with the description of 
the property in the 1944 deed and that the jury had properly 
 
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determined “the intentions of the parties at the time of the 
conveyance.”  We awarded Kitt an appeal on four assignments of 
error. 
DISCUSSION 
1. Ownership of disputed property 
 
To prevail in an action for ejectment, the plaintiff must 
prove that he has good title and the right to possession of the 
property, and he must recover upon the strength of his own title 
rather than upon the weakness of the defendant's title.  See 
White v. Lee, 144 Va. 523, 529, 132 S.E. 307, 309 (1926).  The 
primary consideration when construing a deed is “to determine 
the intention of the parties executing the instrument.”  Camp v. 
Camp, 220 Va. 595, 597, 260 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1979).  If the 
descriptions in a deed are ambiguous, parol evidence can be used 
to ascertain the intention of the parties at the time of the 
conveyance.  Chesapeake Corp. v. McCreery, 216 Va. 33, 37-38, 
216 S.E.2d 22, 25 (1975). 
In this case, the evidence showed that the 1944 deed 
contained a number of inconsistencies or ambiguities including: 
(1) the property referred to as the McElwee tract had been 
conveyed to the federal government prior to 1944; (2) the 
directional calls in the deed were inconsistent with and could 
not be reconciled with the location of the adjoining properties; 
and (3) while the deed recited a conveyance of 25 acres “more or 
 
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less,” the adjoining property boundaries encompassed 
approximately 97 acres.  Nevertheless, the experts for both Kitt 
and Crosby were able to locate on the ground the boundaries of 
the properties identified in the deed as adjacent to the 
conveyed parcel. 
 
Kitt, relying on Providence, argues that the rule of 
preference requires that the deed be construed according to the 
“adjacent boundaries or lines of adjoining tracts” because, as 
the Court held in that case, descriptions of course or distance 
must “give way” to “known boundaries” and that quantity is “the 
least reliable method of describing land.”  219 Va. at 744-45, 
251 S.E.2d at 479.  Thus, Kitt concludes, the trial court should 
have applied the rule of preference and held that, as a matter 
of law, the adjacent boundaries and lines of adjoining tracts in 
this case established that the 1944 deed of conveyance included 
conveyance of the disputed property to Henry Kitt.  We disagree. 
In adopting the rule of preference, we specifically stated 
that the rule “is not inflexible and will not be applied if to 
do so would frustrate the intent of the parties to the deed.  
Indeed, the rule is designed to effectuate the presumed intent 
of the parties.”  Id. at 745, 251 S.E.2d at 480.  The rule of 
preference is applied to determine the grantor’s intent when 
there is no evidence to the contrary.  Id. at 747, 251 S.E.2d at 
481.  When the trial court in Providence applied the rule of 
 
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preference to determine the grantor’s presumed intent, there was 
no other credible evidence showing an intent contrary to that 
reflected by the application of the rule of preference.  See id. 
at 743, 251 S.E.2d at 478.  In the instant case, in addition to 
the surveyors’ evidence directed to locating the property on the 
ground as described in the deed, both parties presented 
additional parol evidence of intent. 
Kitt’s evidence was that a fence was built to keep 
livestock on the 25-acre parcel and that members of the Kitt 
family hunted and cut logs and firewood from both the disputed 
property and undisputed property.  This evidence conflicted with 
Crosby’s evidence that the portions of the fence that were found 
supported the proposition that the fence was a boundary fence 
for the undisputed property conveyed in 1944. 
The evidence also showed that the Kitt house was located on 
the undisputed property but the evidence regarding the location 
of other structures constructed on the property was in conflict. 
Testimony located these buildings on the disputed property, the 
undisputed property or “right on the line or beyond the line” 
shown as separating the two parcels on the Vess survey. 
Testimony also showed that, in addition to the Kitt family, 
members of the general public had used the disputed property for 
hunting and gathering over the years.  With the exception of a 
 
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quarry property, the Blizzard land had never been posted and no 
one did or would object to people hunting on the property. 
 
Unlike the record in Providence that contained no evidence 
of an intent contrary to the presumed intent established by 
application of the rule of preference, this record contains 
conflicting evidence of the grantor’s intent.  Furthermore, the 
evidence of the fence and use of the disputed property was 
contrary to the presumption of intent that would prevail if the 
rule of preference alone was applied to the 1944 deed.  Because 
evidence of intent was presented, the trial court did not err in 
refusing to resolve the issue of ownership as a matter of law by 
applying the rule of preference, and, because that evidence was 
in conflict, the trial court properly submitted the issue to the 
jury.  Accordingly, we reject Kitt’s first assignment of error.2 
2. Admission of surveyor Steve Douty’s testimony 
 
In his second assignment of error, Kitt challenges the 
trial court’s admission of certain testimony by Douty.  Kitt, 
citing Edwards v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., 163 Va. 851, 857-58, 
177 S.E. 841, 843 (1935), asserts that whether the disputed land 
was within the boundaries contained in the 1944 deed is a 
question of fact and expert surveyors may testify as to the 
facts pertaining to the location, but may not express an opinion 
                                                 
2 Kitt does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the jury’s verdict. 
 
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as to the location.3  According to Kitt, Douty’s testimony 
regarding the location of the property by reference to the 
boundary lines of adjoining property was proper but that part of 
Douty’s testimony discussing the location of the property based 
on monuments or other factors not recited in the 1944 deed, such 
as the old fence, amounted to opinion testimony regarding the 
location of the boundaries.  According to Kitt, because the 
boundaries of adjoining properties identified in the 1944 deed 
could be established, Douty should have been restricted to 
testifying only about those boundaries. 
 
As we have already discussed, admission of parol evidence 
to determine the intent of the grantor was appropriate due to 
inconsistencies in the 1944 deed, and the conflicting evidence 
of intent precludes the application of the rule of preference as 
a matter of law in this case.  Therefore, Douty’s testimony 
based on admissible evidence of intent such as the location of 
the old fence was proper.  Douty’s discussion of diagrams he 
prepared to depict a parcel based on factors recited in the deed 
other than adjoining property boundaries involved facts 
pertaining to the location of the disputed property but did not 
amount to an opinion regarding the location of the property.  
                                                 
3 But see Code § 8.01-401.3(B)(opinion testimony on ultimate 
issues).  
 
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Accordingly, we reject Kitt’s challenge to the admissibility of 
Douty’s testimony.  
3. Testimony of Gregory E. Vess 
Kitt called Gregory Vess as a witness to testify regarding 
his 2003 plat.  The trial court, however, disqualified Vess from 
giving expert opinion testimony based on the “side switching” 
doctrine adopted in Turner v. Thiel, 262 Va. 597, 553 S.E.2d 765 
(2001).  Kitt asserts that this ruling was error because that 
doctrine did not apply to Vess’ testimony and, if the doctrine 
applied, Crosby failed to satisfy the two-part test established 
in Turner to support expert disqualification. 
In Turner we adopted the following test to be used when a 
party seeks to disqualify the expert of an opposing party 
because the expert had previously been retained by the party 
seeking disqualification: 
Was it objectively reasonable for the first party who 
claims to have retained the expert witness to conclude 
that a confidential relationship existed between that 
party and the expert; and did the first party disclose 
any confidential or privileged information to the 
expert witness? 
 
Id. at 601, 553 S.E.2d at 768.  The person seeking 
disqualification has the burden of proving both prongs of 
this test.  Id. at 602, 553 S.E.2d at 768. 
The record shows that Crosby hired Vess in 1999 to prepare 
plats reflecting ownership of the disputed property.  The plat 
 
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Vess created in 2003 was filed with the 2004 quitclaim deed from 
the Mead trustees to Crosby.  Vess, called by Kitt as a witness, 
testified regarding a number of factual matters involving the 
2003 plat, but Kitt was not allowed to introduce a prior plat 
made by Vess.  At that point, Kitt’s counsel made the following 
statement: 
I believe I need at this point to be allowed to ask 
Mr. Vess something that might carry over from the 
area of fact into opinion.  And, therefore, I submit 
that because the Defendant is the one claiming the 
privilege, it’s up to him at this point to prove the 
privilege attaches and ask for a ruling of the Court 
on that. 
 
Following further discussion, the trial court ruled that Crosby 
met his burden under Turner to have Vess disqualified as an 
expert witness for Kitt. 
 
Kitt first argues that the “side switching” doctrine 
addressed in Turner was not applicable here because Kitt did not 
seek to offer Vess as an expert witness on their behalf.  The 
statement of Kitt’s counsel recited above clearly demonstrates 
that Kitt intended to seek opinion testimony from Vess.  Since 
the sought-after testimony involved an opinion based on 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, and such 
opinion testimony can only be given by an expert, see Code 
§ 8.01-401.3, the trial court, notwithstanding Kitt’s 
protestations, correctly concluded that Kitt was treating Vess 
 
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as an expert witness, thus implicating the disqualification 
issue discussed in Turner.  
 
Kitt next asserts that the doctrine does not apply because 
once the 2003 plat was recorded any expectation of 
confidentiality or privilege was waived.  Again we disagree. 
While the plat itself is public record, confidential or 
privileged information obtained during the period of engagement 
remains protected by the disqualification rule of Turner. 
 
We now turn to Kitt’s assertion that Crosby did not meet 
his burden to disqualify Vess under the two-part test set out in 
Turner.  First, the record reflects that counsel for Crosby 
proffered to the trial court that Vess was hired originally in 
1999 in contemplation of litigation and, although the litigation 
filed in 2001 was dismissed without prejudice, the relationship 
remained ongoing on the assumption that Crosby would be a 
defendant in a later lawsuit.  Whether a confidential 
relationship exists, such as a relationship in contemplation of 
litigation, is a function of Crosby’s objectively reasonable 
perceptions, not those of Vess.  Turner, 262 Va. at 601-02, 553 
S.E.2d at 768.  Therefore, regardless of Vess’ perceptions of 
the relationship, the proffer of the nature of the relationship 
between Crosby and Vess supported the trial court’s conclusion 
that Crosby met his burden of establishing a confidential 
relationship as required by the first prong of the Turner test. 
 
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The second prong of the Turner test requires a showing that 
confidential information was disclosed to the expert witness. 
Confidential information includes 
discussion of: a party’s strategies in litigation, the 
kinds of experts that the retaining party expected to 
employ, a party’s views of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each side’s case, the role of each of 
the litigant’s expert witnesses to be hired, 
anticipated defenses, counsel’s theory of the case, 
and counsel’s mental impressions. 
 
Id. at 602-03, 553 S.E.2d at 768.  At trial Vess testified that 
he had conversations with Crosby and Crosby’s counsel about 
Vess’ findings and opinions as they related to Crosby’s ability 
to show ownership of the disputed parcel before and during the 
filing of the instant lawsuit.  In light of this record 
evidence, we cannot say the trial court erred in holding that 
Crosby satisfied his proof burden under the second prong of the 
Turner test.  Accordingly, we reject Kitt’s third assignment of 
error.  
CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
submitting the issue of ownership of the disputed property to 
the jury, did not err in allowing certain testimony by Douty, 
and did not err in disqualifying Vess as an expert offered by 
 
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Kitt based on the expert disqualification doctrine adopted in 
Turner.4  
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
                                                 
4 In light of these holdings, we need not address Kitt’s 
fourth assignment of error regarding his punitive damage claim. 
 
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