Title: STEVEN A. DELOGE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STEVEN A. DELOGE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 152123 P.3d 573Case Number: 04-85, 04-129Decided: 11/29/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
STEVEN 
A. DELOGE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
STEVEN 
A. DeLOGE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeals 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
Pro 
se

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and Lucas E. Buckley, Student 
Intern.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and SKAVDAHL, D.J (Case No. 
04-85).

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ. (Case No. 
04-129).

 
 

HILL, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In these appeals, 
the Appellant, Steven A. DeLoge (DeLoge), seeks review of the district court's 
order denying his Motion for Preservation and Return of Property, as well as his 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  
We will dismiss the appeal in Case No. 04-85 and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
We affirm in Case No. 04-129.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      In Case No. 
04-85, DeLoge raises these issues:

 
 
I.          
Whether the district court erred when it declined to rule upon [DeLoge's] 
motion for the preservation and return of seized property?

II.          
Whether [DeLoge's] state and federal constitutional rights to property 
and due process were violated when the district court denied the motion for 
return of seized property?

III.         
Was [DeLoge's] appointed trial counsel ineffective for failing to timely 
motion the district court to preserve and return the seized 
property?

IV.        Was 
[DeLoge's] appointed counsel on direct appeal of the criminal conviction 
ineffective for failing to timely motion the district court to preserve and 
return the seized property or to raise the issue of trial counsel's failure to 
the supreme court?

V.        Are 
[DeLoge's] due process rights to relevant exculpatory evidence being violated by 
the State's failure to preserve evidence that is in the possession of the 
police?

 
 
The 
State abbreviates the issues to these:

 
 
I.          
The district court did not abuse its discretion in relation to [DeLoge's] 
motion for preservation and return of property.

II.          
Neither [DeLoge's] trial nor appellate counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective in failing to file a motion for return of seized 
property.

 
 
[¶3]      In Case No. 
04-129, DeLoge raises these issues:

 
 
I.          
Whether [DeLoge's] motion to withdraw guilty pleas was improperly 
dismissed by the district court violating his constitutional rights to due 
process under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.

II.          
Whether the Nixon decision of 
the Wyoming Supreme Court violates due process by changing the plain meaning of 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(d).

III.         
Whether the district court denied [DeLoge's] constitutional right to due 
process by denying him a previously granted evidentiary 
hearing.

IV.        
Whether district court violated and denied [DeLoge's] Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel at a critical stage of the criminal 
proceedings.

V.        
Whether [DeLoge's] Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel was violated by counsel's performance in defense of 
[DeLoge].

VI.        
Whether the district attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct by 
misrepresenting the facts to the trial court when responding to [DeLoge's] 
motion for in camera review and [DeLoge's] motion to withdraw guilty 
pleas.

VII.       Whether the 
district court has violated [DeLoge's] constitutional right to a full and fair 
proceeding through bias, prejudice and abuse of 
discretion.

 
 
The 
State abbreviates these issues as follows:

 
 
I.          
Did the district court properly deny [DeLoge's] motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas without affording him an evidentiary hearing?

II.          
Was [DeLoge] denied his constitutional right to counsel by the district 
court?

III.         
Is [DeLoge] entitled to relief from his convictions due to alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel?

IV.        Is 
[DeLoge] entitled to relief because of alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct?

V.        Is 
[DeLoge] entitled to relief from the order denying his motion to withdraw guilty 
pleas because of alleged judicial bias?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶4]      DeLoge was 
originally charged with eleven counts of second degree sexual assault.  The sexual assaults occurred between 
August 22, 1999, and October 31, 1999.  
DeLoge entered pleas of guilty to six counts of second degree sexual 
assault, and six life sentences were imposed upon him by the judgment and 
sentence entered on December 1, 2000.  
On March 20, 2002, DeLoge filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas.  On October 16, 2002, the 
judgment and sentence of the district court was affirmed by this Court.  DeLoge v. State, 2002 WY 155, 55 P.3d 1233 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
[¶5]      On December 9, 
2003, DeLoge filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief in the district 
court.  On April 22, 2004, DeLoge 
filed a Petition for Writ of Review in this Court contending:  (1) That the district court had abused 
its discretion in denying him appointed counsel in those then on-going 
proceedings; (2) that the district court had acted prejudicially against him in 
the post conviction proceedings; and (3) that the district court refused to act 
on his properly filed motions.  By 
order entered on May 10, 2004, this Court denied that Petition for Writ of 
Review.  By order entered on August 
24, 2004, the district court dismissed DeLoge's Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief.  On September 7, 2004, 
DeLoge filed another Petition for Writ of Review in this Court challenging the 
district court's dismissal of his Petition for Post Conviction Relief.  By order entered on October 12, 2004, 
this Court denied that Petition for Writ of Review.

 
 
[¶6]      On October 6, 
2003, DeLoge filed a Motion for Preservation and Return of Seized Property.  The district court did not rule on that 
motion, and it is DeLoge's contention that it was deemed denied after 90 days 
under W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2), i.e., on January 4, 2004.  DeLoge filed his notice of appeal with 
respect to the denial of that motion on February 3, 2004.  This is the appeal in Case No. 
04-85.  By order entered on May 18, 
2004, the district court denied DeLoge's motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas.  DeLoge filed a notice of 
appeal challenging that decision on May 25, 2004.  This is the appeal denominated in Case 
No. 04-129.

 
 
Case No. 
04-85

 
 
[¶7]      This appeal 
arises out of the seizure of certain items of property that belonged to 
DeLoge.  The property at issue was 
obtained by the State, pursuant to search warrants issued by the district court, 
shortly after his arrest on November 3, 1999.  The search warrants are not in the 
record designated for these appeals, nor are the returns of those warrants.  What appears to be at least a partial 
listing of the property in question can be found in the record.  Appended to DeLoge's motion for return 
of his property was an itemized list of dozens of items that he contends have no 
evidentiary value to police agencies in Wyoming, or police agencies in other 
states.

 
 
[¶8]      W.R.Cr.P. 41(e) 
provides:

 
 
            
(e)  Motion for Return 
of Property. -- A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure or by 
the deprivation of property may move the court in which charges are pending or 
if charges have not been filed the court from which the warrant issued for the 
return of the property on the ground that such person is entitled to lawful 
possession of the property.  The court shall receive evidence on any 
issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion.  If the motion is granted, the property 
shall be returned to the movant, although reasonable conditions may be imposed 
to protect access and use of the property in subsequent proceedings.  If a motion for return of property is 
made or comes on for hearing after criminal charges have been filed, it shall be 
treated also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
The 
rules of criminal procedure also provide a suggested form for use by a defendant 
in seeking return of seized property:

 
 
FORM 11. 
Motion for return of seized property and suppression of 
evidence.

 
 
IN 
THE DISTRICT COURT

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING            
)

)  ss:

COUNTY 
OF _______________   )           
______ JUDICIAL DISTRICT

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,           
)

Plaintiff,                      
)           
MOTION FOR RETURN

)           
OF SEIZED PROPERTY AND

      vs.                         
)           
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE

)

JOHN 
DOE,                                       
)

Defendant.                 
)           
  Criminal Action No. 
____

 
 
John Doe 
hereby moves this court to direct that certain property of which he is the 
owner, a schedule of which is annexed hereto, and which on the ____ day of 
_______, (year), at the premises known as _______ Street, in the City of 
_______, in the County of _______, State of Wyoming, was unlawfully seized and 
taken from him by a Deputy Sheriff of the County of _______, State of Wyoming, 
(Give name of deputy, if known, and if unknown, so state) be returned to him and 
that it be suppressed as evidence against him in any criminal 
proceeding.

The 
petitioner further states that the property was seized against his will and 
without a search warrant.

Defendant 
further moves that any and all testimony in regard to said property, and 
testimony or evidence based upon said unlawful search and seizure be likewise 
suppressed as evidence against him.

Dated 
this ____ day of _______, (year).

 
 
 
 
__________________

Attorney 
for Petitioner

 
 
DeLoge's 
motion was substantially in that form, although it clearly was not a motion to 
suppress, but rather a motion for the return of property that was his own 
personal property and arguably of no evidentiary value to any police 
agency.

 
 
[¶9]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-2-105 (LexisNexis 2005) provides:

 
 
§ 
7-2-105. Disposition and appraisal of property seized or held; notice and order 
to show cause; judgment.

            
(a)  When personal property not subject to be summarily 
destroyed is seized or held by any peace officer pursuant to any law of this 
state, or when property seized by any peace officer is delivered to the 
appropriate law enforcement agency under provisions other than W.S. 35-7-1049, 
or property is taken into custody as lost, mislaid or abandoned, the head of the 
law enforcement agency shall forthwith ascertain as closely as 
practicable:

                        
(i)  The approximate value of the 
property;

            
(ii)  The facts giving rise to the seizure or 
custody;

(iii)  The 
name and position of the person making the seizure or taking the property into 
custody;

(iv)  The 
name and address of the owners of the property or those persons who were in 
possession of the property at the time of the seizure;

(v)The 
names and addresses of all persons known to have an interest in the property 
seized.

            
(b)  Any property seized by a peace officer shall be delivered 
immediately to the appropriate law enforcement agency.  The head of the law enforcement agency 
shall maintain custody of the property pending an order of disposal by the court 
pursuant to this section unless the property is otherwise released according to 
this section.

            
(c)  If the property is lost, mislaid, abandoned or unclaimed 
or if possession of the property is unlawful, the law enforcement agency shall 
seek in circuit court or district court an order to show cause why the property 
should not be sold or forfeited and sold at public auction or transferred to the 
use of the law enforcement agency.  
If the lawful owner of the property can reasonably be ascertained, the 
property shall be delivered to him without judicial action unless the property 
constitutes evidence of a crime, the possession of the property would be 
unlawful or ownership and interest are in dispute.

            
(d)  Notice and proceedings on the order to show cause shall be 
according to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, provided notice by 
publication shall be once each week for two (2) consecutive weeks.  The trial of the issues shall be by the 
court.

            
(e)  On final hearing the order to show cause shall be taken as 
prima facie evidence that the property is abandoned or unclaimed and is 
sufficient for a judgment of forfeiture in the absence of other 
proof.

            
(f)  In disputed ownership cases the burden shall be upon the 
claimants to show that they are the lawful owners or have a legally recognizable 
interest in the property.

            
(g)  When the property is encumbered, the court shall, after 
deducting costs, direct the payment of the encumbrance from the proceeds of any 
sale of the property or distribute the property equitably between those persons 
having a legal interest.

            
(h)  The proceedings and judgment of forfeiture shall be in rem 
and shall be primarily against the property itself.

            
(j)  Upon the entry of a judgment of forfeiture the court shall 
determine the disposition to be made of the property, which may include the 
destruction or sale of the property or the allocation of the property to some 
other governmental function or use or otherwise, as the court may 
determine.

            
(k)  Sale of the property shall be at public auction 
to the highest bidder for cash after two (2) weeks public notice as the court 
may direct.

            
(m)  Upon the application of any claimant, the court may fix 
the value of a forfeitable interest in the seized property and permit the 
claimant to redeem the property upon the payment of a sum equal to the value, 
which sum shall be disposed of as would the proceeds of the sale of the property 
under a judgment of forfeiture.

            
(n)  The balance of the proceeds, if any, shall be deposited in 
the general operating account of the state, county or municipal entity that has 
fiscal authority over the law enforcement agency confiscating the 
property.

            
(o)  This section does not apply to property which is subject 
to the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, W.S. 34-24-101 through 
34-24-140.

 
 
[¶10]   We conclude that both the rule and 
the statute make it plain that DeLoge may seek to have his property restored to 
him, absent some justification provided by the State for its continued retention 
of that property.  DeLoge has 
availed himself of a remedy provided to him by law.  See City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 119 S. Ct. 678, 142 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1999) ("It follows that when law 
enforcement agents seize property pursuant to warrant, due process requires them 
to take reasonable steps to give notice that the property has been taken so the owner can pursue available remedies 
for its return." [Emphasis added.]).  
As in the West Covina case, 
here there is no contest that the State had the right to seize the property in 
the first instance nor has the State at this point denied its ultimate 
obligation to return that property, absent some justification for its continued 
retention.  Id. at 119 S. Ct. 681.

 
 
[¶11]   DeLoge filed a notice of appeal 
before the district court had an opportunity to decide the motion on its 
merits.  Whether the district court 
intended to simply ignore the motion, or to rule on it eventually, is not 
revealed by the record.  It is clear 
that DeLoge's multiplicity of motions and petitions garbled the proceedings in 
this case and made the district court's task quite difficult.  DeLoge's appeal was premised on the 
notion that his motion had been deemed denied by operation of W.R.C.P. 
6(c):

 
 
(c)  Motions and Motion Practice. 
-

(1)  Unless 
these rules or an order of the court establish time limitations other than those 
contained herein, all motions, except (A) motions for enlargement of time, (B) 
motions made during hearing or trial, (C) motions which may be heard ex parte, 
and (D) motions described in subdivisions (3) and (4) below, together with 
supporting affidavits, if any, shall be served at least 10 days before the 
hearing on the motion.  Except as 
otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), or unless the court by order permits service 
at some other time, a party affected by the motion shall serve a response, if 
any, together with affidavits, if any, at least three days prior to the hearing 
on the motion or within 20 days after service of the motion, whichever is 
earlier.  Unless the court by order 
permits service at some other time, the moving party shall serve a reply, if 
any, at least one day prior to the hearing on the motion or within 15 days after 
service of the response, whichever is earlier.  Unless the court otherwise orders, any 
party may serve supplemental memoranda or rebuttal affidavits at least one day 
prior to the hearing on the motion.

            
(2)  A request for hearing may be served by the moving party or 
any party affected by the motion within 30 days after service of the 
motion.  Absent a timely request for 
hearing the court may, in its discretion, determine the motion without a 
hearing.  A motion not determined within 90 days 
after filing shall be deemed denied.  
A party whose motion has been deemed denied shall have 10 days after the 
effective date of such denial to serve such pleadings or other papers, if any, 
as may be required or permitted.

            
(3)  A party moving for a protective order under Rule 26(c) or 
to compel discovery under Rule 37(a) may request an immediate hearing 
thereon.  An immediate hearing may 
be held if the court finds that a delay in determining the motion will cause 
undue prejudice, expense or inconvenience.

            
(4)  A motion relating to the exclusion of evidence may be 
filed at any time.  Absent a request 
for hearing by a moving party or any party affected by the motion, the court 
may, in its discretion, determine the motion without a hearing.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶12]   W.R.Cr.P. 1(a) provides that:  "In the event that a procedure is not 
established by these rules, the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure shall 
govern."  However, we decline to 
import the "deemed denied" rule into criminal proceedings where a district court 
is required either by the tenor of the governing rules, or the precepts of due 
process, to timely dispose of motions filed by criminal defendants.  See Patrick v. State, 2005 WY 32, ¶8, 
108 P.3d 838, 841 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶13]   For this reason, we dismiss this 
appeal and remand the matter to the district court with directions that it rule 
in a timely manner on the merits of DeLoge's motion for the return of his 
property.  Because of this 
disposition, we will not address the other issues raised by DeLoge at this 
time.

 
 
Case No. 
04-129

 
 
[¶14]   The district court denied DeLoge's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the motion because of the application of Nixon v. State, 2002 WY 118, 51 P.3d 851 
(Wyo. 2002).  DeLoge filed his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea before his appeal was resolved and, hence, Nixon does not apply to the 
circumstances of his case.

 
 
[¶15]   DeLoge styled his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea very much along the lines of a similar motion filed in 
the case of Brock v. State, 981 P.2d 465 (Wyo. 1999).  There we held that 
the district court was required to conduct a hearing on Brock's motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas under the circumstances of Brock's case (his claims 
were facially substantive claims of ineffective assistance of counsel).  However, Brock filed his motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas prior to sentencing, whereas DeLoge's motion was filed 
after sentencing and well after his appeal was in process.

 
 
[¶16]   W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) provides that such 
a plea may only be set aside to correct a manifest injustice.  Reading DeLoge's pleadings as generously 
as they can be read, we do not find in them circumstances arising to the level 
of "manifest injustice."  We have 
characterized the concept of "manifest injustice" in these 
terms:

 
 
W.R.Cr.P. 
32(d) provides that if a motion to withdraw a plea is made after sentencing, a 
plea "may be set aside only to correct manifest injustice."  "Manifest injustice" contemplates a 
"situation that is unmistakable or indisputable, was not foreseeable, and 
affects the substantial rights of a party."  McCarthy v. State, 945 P.2d 775, 776 
(Wyo.1997).  It is, in part, 
intended to address " ' "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a 
complete miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary 
demands of fair procedure." ' "  United States v. Blackwell, 127 F.3d 947, 956 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting United 
States v. Todaro, 982 F.2d 1025, 1028 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 943, 113 S. Ct. 2424, 124 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1993) and F.R.Cr.P. 32(d)).  The party seeking to withdraw his pleas 
bears the burden of demonstrating manifest injustice.  State v. McDermott, 962 P.2d 136, 139 
(Wyo.1998).  Justification for this 
heightened standard for withdrawal of a plea after sentencing is based in 
the

"practical 
considerations important to the proper administration of justice.  Before sentencing, the inconvenience to 
court and prosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as 
compared with the public interest in protecting the right of the accused to 
trial by jury.  But if a plea of 
guilty could be retracted with ease after sentence, the accused might be 
encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential punishment, and 
withdraw the plea if the sentence were unexpectedly severe.  The result would be to undermine respect 
for the courts and fritter away the time and painstaking effort devoted to the 
sentencing process."

 
 

Id. at 138 
(quoting Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743, 749 (Wyo.1975) and Kadwell v. United 
States, 315 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir.1963)) (emphasis in 
original).

A 
district court has discretion in determining whether a party has proved manifest 
injustice.  Absent an abuse of that 
discretion, we will not disturb the district court's determination.  McDermott, 962 P.2d  at 138.  A district court's decision to deny a 
motion to withdraw a plea "will not be reversed for an abuse of discretion so 
long as the district court reasonably could conclude as it did."  Nixon v. State, 4 P.3d 864, 869 
(Wyo.2000).

Browning 
v. State, 2001 
WY 93, ¶¶27-28, 32 P.3d 1061, 1069-70 (Wyo.2001).

 
 

Ingersoll 
v. State, 2004 
WY 102, ¶19, 96 P.3d 1046, 1051-52 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Reyna v. State, 2001 WY 105, ¶27, 33 P.3d 1129, 1137-38 (Wyo. 2001)).

 
 
[¶17]   DeLoge's motion did not set out 
facts or circumstances that constituted a manifest injustice.  It is well settled that we may affirm 
the district court's decision on any legal ground appearing in the record.  Lacey v. State, 2003 WY 148, ¶10, 79 P.3d 493, 495 (Wyo. 2003).  Therefore, we affirm the district court's 
denial of the motion on the basis that the district court's only proper course 
of action was to deny the motion as failing the "manifest injustice" 
test.

 
 
EXHAUSTION 
OF STATE REMEDIES

 
 
[¶18]   Although not explicitly raised as 
an issue in these appeals, we are compelled to take note that DeLoge has 
exhausted his state remedies in this criminal matter by means of his direct 
appeal and two petitions for post conviction relief.  As noted above, the district court is 
required to consider DeLoge's motion for the return of his property, but may 
decline to consider any additional matters relating to this criminal case.  Any further pleadings filed by DeLoge in 
the district court relating to this criminal matter may be summarily dismissed 
or denied by the district court.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶19]   The appeal in Case No. 04-85 is 
dismissed, and that matter is remanded to district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  The 
appeal in Case No. 04-129 is affirmed, although on a basis different from that 
articulated by the district court.