Title: State ex rel. Baja Marine Corp. v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Baja Marine Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 114 Ohio St.3d 70, 2007-Ohio-2881.] 
 
 
[THE STATE EX REL.] BAJA MARINE CORPORATION, APPELLANT, v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Baja Marine Corp. v. Indus. Comm.,  
114 Ohio St.3d 70, 2007-Ohio-2881.] 
Workers' compensation — Industrial Commission — Confusion among expert 
reports — Judgment reversed. 
(No. 2006-0974 – Submitted April 3, 2007 – Decided June 27, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 05AP-555, 2006-Ohio-1646. 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this direct appeal, appellant-employer Baja Marine Corporation 
(“BMC”) challenges the evidence underlying the appellee Industrial Commission 
of Ohio’s award of wage-loss compensation to Cynthia S. Eggelston.  Eggelston 
was injured at work in 1999, and a workers’ compensation claim was allowed for 
“cervical 
strain/sprain; 
thoracic 
strain/sprain; 
lumbosacral 
strain/sprain; 
aggravation degenerative discs L-4, L-5.”  The Industrial Commission of Ohio 
awarded Eggelston temporary total disability benefits.  In 2004, she moved for an 
additional allowance for aggravation of pre-existing disc degeneration, additional 
temporary total disability compensation, and wage-loss compensation. 
{¶ 2} In response to these motions, reports were submitted by Dr. Sushil 
M. Sethi, an independent medical examiner, and Dr. Michael R. Viau, 
Eggelston’s personal physician.  Dr. Sethi examined Eggelston on May 24, 2004.  
He opined that Eggelston had reached maximum medical improvement.  He 
acknowledged the presence of degenerative changes, but attributed them to the 
aging process and did not believe that they were aggravated by the industrial 
injury.  Dr. Sethi concluded that overall, Eggelston’s physical findings did not 
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substantiate her subjective complaints and that any back symptoms that might 
exist were unrelated to her industrial injury. 
{¶ 3} Dr. Viau submitted three reports on commission forms.  On April 
30, 2004, Dr. Viau attributed all of Eggelston’s symptoms to an “[a]ggravation of 
pre-existing disc degeneration L-3,4 and L-2,3,” a diagnosis that had nothing to 
do with Eggelston’s workers’ compensation claim.  The report did not mention 
any of Eggelston’s allowed conditions as causative or contributing factors.  In a 
June 28, 2004 report, however, Dr. Viau attributed Eggelston’s problems 
exclusively to “lumbosacral sprain/strain,” with no mention of the degenerative 
condition discussed so prominently two months before. 
{¶ 4} The third report from Dr. Viau, on June 18, 2004, released 
Eggelston to part-time light-duty work.  Curiously, the June 28 report — which 
was generated by the same examination — said that Eggelston could do no work 
whatsoever. 
{¶ 5} On July 12, 2004, commission hearing officers issued two orders.  
One specifically disallowed Eggelston’s claim for “aggravation of pre-existing 
disc degeneration at L2, 3, [and] aggravation of pre-existing disc degeneration at 
L3-4.”  In that order, the commission relied on Dr. Sethi and concluded that “the 
present symptomatology is not related to the 11/22/99 injury by way of either 
causation, aggravation, or flow through.”  The other order denied further 
temporary total disability compensation based on a finding of maximum medical 
improvement.  Those orders became final. 
{¶ 6} On December 20, 2004, the commission granted Eggelston’s 
wage- loss application, based in part on Dr. Viau’s June 18, 2004 report.  BMC 
unsuccessfully objected administratively and then turned to the Court of Appeals 
for Franklin County. 
{¶ 7} BMC objected to the commission’s reliance on Dr. Viau, claiming 
that inconsistencies among the three Viau reports disqualified all three from 
January Term, 2007 
3 
evidentiary consideration.  The court of appeals disagreed and denied a writ of 
mandamus, prompting BMC’s appeal to this court as of right. 
{¶ 8} Our review of the medical evidence reveals a confusing series of 
reports that are alternately complementary and contradictory.  The commission’s 
December 20, 2004 order suggests that the hearing officer may have been equally 
perplexed by the evidence, and, for this reason, we vacate the order and order the 
commission to consider the claim further and issue an amended order. 
{¶ 9} Dr. Viau’s June 18, 2004 examination generated the conclusions 
that Eggelston could do no work (June 28) and could do part-time work (June 18).  
Dr. Viau also attributed Eggelston’s symptoms exclusively to nonallowed 
conditions on April 30 and exclusively to allowed conditions on June 28.  Into 
this mix is added Dr. Sethi’s May 24, 2004 report, which  concludes that 
Eggelston’s symptoms are unrelated to her workplace injury – a report and 
conclusion that the commission expressly adopted in one of its July 12, 2004 
orders. 
{¶ 10} The December 20, 2004 commission order currently at issue relied 
on Dr. Viau’s report that permitted part-time work.  The order does not indicate 
whether the hearing officer was aware that the same examination that generated 
the conclusion that Eggelston could work also generated the conclusion that she 
could not. 
{¶ 11} The hearing officer also claims that the July 12, 2004 order did not 
state “that the 1999 injury had resolved.”  While the July order did not use those 
exact words, it did say that Eggelston’s “present symptomatology is not related to 
the 11/22/1999 injury by way of either causation, aggravation, or flow-through.”  
This certainly suggests that residuals from the allowed conditions no longer exist. 
{¶ 12} We therefore find a sufficient lack of clarity to warrant an order to 
the commission to consider the claim further and issue an amended order.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
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Judgment reversed 
and limited writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL 
and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs separately. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 13} In this direct appeal, appellant-employer, Baja Marine Corporation 
(“Baja”), seeks a writ of mandamus ordering appellee Industrial Commission of 
Ohio to vacate a December 20, 2004 order granting nonworking wage-loss 
compensation to Cynthia S. Eggelston. 
Case Procedure 
{¶ 14} Eggelston, employed as an inspector for Baja, lost her footing and 
twisted her back while stepping out of a boat on November 22, 1999. Her 
workers’ compensation claim was initially allowed for “cervical strain/sprain; 
thoracic strain/sprain; lumbosacral strain/sprain.”  An additional condition of 
“aggravation of pre-existing degenerative discs L-4,-5” was recognized, and 
Eggelston was awarded temporary total disability benefits for her allowed 
conditions from the day after her injury. 
{¶ 15} On April 1, 2004, Eggelston filed a motion seeking an additional 
allowance for aggravation of pre-existing disc degeneration at L2-3 and L3-4.  
Even though her personal doctor, Dr. Michael R. Viau, had given his opinion that 
the work injury directly and proximately caused the alleged aggravation, this 
opinion was not recognized. Instead, the commission relied on the May 24, 2004 
medical report of Dr. Sushil M. Sethi, an independent examiner, who reviewed 
Eggelston’s medical file and examined her.  Dr. Sethi concluded that Eggelston’s 
work injuries had resolved and that any work restrictions were due to a pre-
January Term, 2007 
5 
existing degenerative disc disease.  The appeal from the commission’s order 
disallowing the aggravation was denied, and the order became final. 
{¶ 16} Based on Dr. Sethi’s conclusions that Eggelston had reached 
maximum medical improvement, Baja filed a motion to terminate temporary total 
disability.  On June 18, 2004, while Baja’s motion was pending, Dr. Viau 
examined Eggelston.  He filled out a C-140 medical report, which stated that 
Eggelston was capable of working four hours per day, five days per week with 
specific permanent restrictions. Ten days later, Dr. Viau completed a C-84 report 
based upon the same June 18 physical examination, giving the contrary opinion 
that Eggelston could not return to any “light duty, alternative work, modified 
work, or transitional work.” 
{¶ 17} Dr. Sethi also submitted a June 28 supplemental report after further 
reviewing the medical records.  He reaffirmed that Eggelston’s 1999 work injury 
had resolved itself and that her ongoing symptoms were caused by pre-existing 
degenerative disease. He concluded, “There is no causal relationship with the 
present symptomatology or alleged diagnoses as mentioned to the 11-22-1999 
injury by way of causation, aggravation or flow through.” 
{¶ 18} Eggelston’s wage-loss application, the subject of this appeal, was 
approved on December 20, 2004. Baja unsuccessfully objected administratively 
and was unsuccessful in its appeal to the Court of Appeals for Franklin County. 
The court of appeals, not agreeing with Baja that the inconsistencies within Dr. 
Viau’s reports disqualified them from evidentiary consideration, denied a writ of 
mandamus, prompting Baja’s appeal to this court as of right. 
Legal Argument 
{¶ 19} Baja strenuously argues that the commission erred in relying on 
Dr. Viau’s opinions to award Eggelston nonworking wage loss and relies on State 
ex rel. Eberhardt v. Flxible Corp. (1994), 70 Ohio St3d 649, 640 N.E.2d 815, and 
State ex rel. M. Weingold & Co. v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-
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5353, 776 N.E.2d 69.  Both cases stand for the proposition that contrary medical 
opinions by a physician are not evidence and cannot support an award of workers’ 
compensation. 
{¶ 20} In Eberhardt, we held that the commission abused its discretion in 
denying temporary total disability based on a physician’s report that stated that 
the claimant had reached maximum medical improvement while also suggesting 
that the condition could improve with therapy .  We held also that the commission 
abused its discretion in relying on this doctor’s opinion.  Eberhardt, 70 Ohio St.3d 
at 657, 640 N.E.2d 815, and at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 21} In Weingold, we concluded specifically that inconsistent 
evaluations  based on the same examination could not be “some evidence” on 
which an award could be based. “We have held that internally inconsistent 
doctor’s reports cannot be ‘some evidence’ supporting a commission decision.  
State ex. rel. Lopez v. Indus. Comm. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 445, 633 N.E.2d 528.  
By extension, substantial inconsistencies between two C84s generated by the 
same examination compel the same result.”  Weingold, 97 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-
Ohio-5353, 776 N.E.2d 69, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 22} Here, the court of appeals recognized that the commission’s award 
of nonworking wage loss rested on the opinions of Dr. Viau.  Baja, 2006-Ohio-
1646, ¶ 3-4, 6.  Dr. Viau’s single examination of Eggelston on June 18, 2004, 
generated contrary conclusions.  The June 18 C-140 report states that Eggelston 
can do part-time work four hours a day, five days a week, and can stand for two 
hours during an eight-hour day; can occasionally bend and squat, frequently reach 
and lift up to ten pounds; and can occasionally lift up to 20 pounds. Yet based on 
the same examination, Dr. Viau later checked a box on the C-84 report that 
Eggelston is not “able to return to other employment including light duty, 
alternative work, modified work or transitional work.” 
January Term, 2007 
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{¶ 23} Dr. Viau also contradicted himself in attributing Eggelston’s 
symptoms exclusively to nonallowed conditions on April 30 but exclusively to 
allowed conditions in his June 28 report. On the C-30 questionnaire Dr. Viau 
indicated that Eggelston’s diagnosis was “[a]ggravation of pre-existing disc 
degeneration L-3,4 and L-2,3.” This diagnosis did not mention any of Eggelston’s 
allowed conditions as causing or contributing to her symptoms. However,  in his 
June 28 report, Dr. Viau attributed Eggelston’s problems exclusively to 
“Lumbosacral Sprain/Strain,” an allowed condition, without referring to the 
degenerative condition he discussed on April 30. 
{¶ 24} The December 20, 2004 commission order indicates that the staff 
hearing officer “relies on the C-140 report of Dr. Viau, dated 6/18/2004, which 
limits the injured worker to part-time (four to five hours per day) light duty work, 
on a permanent basis.”  The order does not mention Dr. Viau’s contradictory 
opinion, based upon the same physical examination, that Eggelston was not able 
to work at all.  Dr. Sethi’s June 28, 2004 amended report, offered by Baja, was 
discounted on the grounds that it related only to the issue of the termination of 
temporary total disability. 
{¶ 25} In summary, the commission based its order on one opinion of 
Eggelston’s treating physician, without considering his contradictory findings 
made on the same examination.  In Eberhardt, we explained: 
{¶ 26}  “[E]quivocal medical opinions are not evidence.* * * Such 
opinions are of no probative value.  Further, equivocation occurs when a doctor 
repudiates an earlier opinion, renders contradictory or uncertain opinions, or fails 
to clarify an ambiguous statement. 
{¶ 27} “* * *  
{¶ 28} “Repudiated, contradictory or uncertain statements reveal that the 
doctor is not sure what he means and, therefore, they are inherently unreliable.”  
Eberhardt, 70 Ohio St 3d at 657, 640 N.E.2d 815. 
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{¶ 29} In the case at bar, Dr. Viau’s opinions were contradictory on the 
issue of whether Eggelston was able or unable to work at light or modified duty. I 
concur in the reversal of the judgment of the court of appeals, but would hold that 
the commission abused its discretion by awarding nonworking wage-loss 
compensation based on insufficient evidence.  I would grant the writ requested 
and vacate the December 20, 2004 order. 
 
O’CONNOR, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
___________________ 
Moscarino & Treu, L.L.P., Michael J. Bertsch, Edward S. Jerse, and 
Kathleen E. Gee, for appellant. 
Marc Dann, Attorney General, and Dennis H. Behm, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
______________________