Title: Honan v. Honan

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Honan v. Honan1991 WY 52809 P.2d 783Case Number: 89-267Decided: 04/18/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
Lars Erik HONAN, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

June Jensen HONAN, Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal was taken from 
judgment of the District Court, Teton County, D. Terry Rogers, 
J.

Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, and remanded.

Urbigkit, C.J., dissented. 

William R. Fix, Jackson, for 
appellant.

Kenneth S. Cohen, 
Jackson, for 
appellee.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

OPINION

MACY, Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Lars Erik 
Honan (the husband) appeals from the disposition of his complaint for a divorce 
from Appellee June Jensen Honan (the wife) and from the district court's order 
holding him in contempt.

[¶2.]     We affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand.

[¶3.]     The husband raises the 
following issues:

     1. Did the trial 
judges act properly in finding the [husband] in contempt, incarcerating [the 
husband], and then setting bail at $100,000?

     2. Have the 
[husband's] rights of due process of law been violated?

     3. Did the trial judge 
err in not ordering a continuance of the trial date?

[¶4.]     The wife responds with 
the following issues:

     ISSUE NO. 1: Is there 
a final, appealable order with respect to [the husband's] contemptuous conduct 
and, if not, is [the husband's] appeal on this issue premature?

     ISSUE NO. 2: Should 
[the husband's] appeal be summarily dismissed pursuant to the bad faith/flagrant 
abuse rule announced in Connors v. Connors?

     ISSUE NO. 3: Should 
[the husband's] appeal be dismissed for failure to file a statement of the 
issues as required by W.R.A.P. Rule 4.02?

     ISSUE NO. 4: Did the 
district court treat [the husband's] conduct as a civil contempt or a criminal 
contempt and, in either event, did the district court act appropriately? 

     ISSUE NO. 5: Did the 
district court err in not granting a continuance of the trial date?

[¶5.]     The record of this case 
comprises a plethora of motions, orders, and hearings. An extrication of 
relevant facts from that quagmire reveals that on January 24, 1989, the husband 
filed a complaint, seeking a divorce from the wife. The wife answered the 
complaint, counterclaimed for a divorce, and filed a motion for temporary 
alimony, temporary child support, and attorney's fees. In response, the district 
court held a motion hearing and granted the wife's motion. The husband did not 
attend the hearing and failed to comply with the temporary alimony and support 
order. To enforce the order, the wife filed a motion requesting that the husband 
be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. In response to 
the motion, the district court issued an order requiring that the husband appear 
in person and show why he should not be held in contempt. On the day of the 
hearing, the husband's attorney appeared, but, once again, the husband failed to 
appear. The district court held the husband in contempt for his failure to 
appear and for his failure to comply with the temporary support order. The 
district court also directed the issuance of a bench warrant for the husband's 
arrest and set August 22, 1989, as the date for a trial on the merits of the 
divorce. The husband did not attend the trial, and his attorney asked for the 
district court's permission to withdraw from being the husband's counsel. The 
district court granted the attorney's request and proceeded to conduct a trial 
in the absence of the husband.

[¶6.]     On September 15, 1989, 
the husband was arrested pursuant to the bench warrant. Three days later, the 
district court held a bail hearing and orally set the husband's bail at 
$100,000. In the written bail order, the district court reduced the bail amount 
to $68,000 and conditioned the husband's release from jail upon his payment of 
the $12,000 arrearage which had accrued since the district court entered the 
temporary support order. In its order, the district court stated:

The Clerk of the District 
Court shall immediately pay the sum of $12,000.00 to [the wife], and she shall 
deposit the remaining $68[,]000.00 in an interest bearing account. It is the 
intention of the Court that this latter sum shall be subject to execution, 
attachment, or other similar or additional remedy available to [the wife] to 
enforce the terms of the Divorce Decree to be entered in this action, it being 
understood by all concerned that, if [the husband] fails to respond as 
previously ordered at the trial of this action, or fails to appear as ordered 
below, then the cash bail bond plus accrued interest in the account opened by 
the Clerk of the District Court shall be delivered to [the wife] in partial 
satisfaction of the property division awarded to her in the Divorce 
Decree.

Upon the deposit of 
$80,000 on September 21, 1989, Appellant signed a bail bond and order to secure 
his discharge from jail. The record, at the time bail was posted, does not 
indicate that anyone other than Appellant furnished the $80,000.

[¶7.]     On October 16, 1989, a 
divorce decree was filed. The decree was not finalized, however, because it 
stated that the issue of the division of the husband's retirement and investment 
funds with Eastern Airlines would be resolved in a subsequent qualified domestic 
relations order. The qualified domestic relations order was filed a week later, 
and it stated that it incorporated the divorce decree and that it was a final 
order.

[¶8.]     The husband filed an 
appeal from the qualified domestic relations order. After he filed the notice of 
appeal, both parties filed additional motions with the district court. 
Consequently, this Court issued an order of remand directing the district court 
to dispose of all pending matters. The district court ruled on the motions, and 
the appeal proceeded.

[¶9.]     The husband contends 
that the district court violated his due process rights when it held him in 
contempt and retained his bail for the benefit of the wife. We have recognized 
that courts of general jurisdiction have the inherent power to punish for 
contempt. Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1989); Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. 
District Court of Ninth Judicial District of Fremont County, 735 P.2d 709 (Wyo. 
1987); Horn v. District Court, Ninth Judicial District, 647 P.2d 1368 (Wyo. 
1982). Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not overturn a lower court's 
contempt citation. Horn, 647 P.2d 1368.

[¶10.]  Contempt orders are usually classified as 
criminal or civil in nature. Criminal contempt is a punitive punishment used by 
a court to punish a contemnor for disobedience and to vindicate the court's 
authority. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Company, 774 P.2d 1274 (Wyo. 1989). If a court imposes criminal 
contempt, it must comply with the due process requirements of W.R. Cr.P. 41. 
Civil contempt is a remedial punishment used to coerce the contemnor into 
performing an affirmative act. United Mine Workers of America, Local 
1972, 774 P.2d 1274. Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-112(a) (Supp. 1990) provides:

     (a) In a proceeding 
for divorce, the court may cause the attendance of either party and compel an 
answer under oath concerning his property, rights or interests, or money that he 
may have or money due or to become due to him from others, and make such order 
thereon as is just and equitable. To enforce its orders concerning alimony, 
temporary or permanent, or property or pecuniary interests, the court may 
require security for obedience thereto, or may enforce the orders by attachment, 
commitment, injunction or by other means.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶11.]  The record indicates that the district 
court's contempt order was civil in nature. The husband had failed to attend at 
least three hearings and to pay temporary support, temporary alimony, and 
attorney's fees as ordered by the district court. By issuing the bench warrant 
and holding him in contempt, the district court was simply trying to force the 
husband into complying with its orders. Once the husband was incarcerated, the 
district court gave him the opportunity to purge a portion of his contempt by 
conditioning his release upon payment of the arrearage from the temporary 
support order. The district court used the $68,000 bail to ensure that the 
husband would appear at subsequent hearings and to ensure that he would continue 
to comply with the district court's orders. Given the husband's history of 
ignoring the district court's directives, the district court's inherent contempt 
power, and § 20-2-112(a), the district court's actions concerning the husband's 
contempt were judicious. The orders which the district court entered in this 
instance were intended to enforce its earlier orders relating to alimony and 
support and to ensure Appellant's future appearance. The statutory authority is 
broad enough to justify the arrest, the commitment, the conditional release, and 
the sequestration of the funds posted as bond. We hold that, under the 
circumstances of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion, and 
we find no error in the district court's treatment of the requirement for a bail 
bond and its use of that money.

[¶12.]  The husband also argues that the district 
court abused its discretion when it failed to order a continuance for the trial 
date. In its order holding the husband in contempt, the district court stated 
that a trial on the merits of the divorce would begin on August 22, 1989. The 
husband did not seek to change the trial date by asking the district court for a 
continuance. Instead, he called the judge's administrative assistant and told 
her that he would not be able to attend the trial. On August 22, 1989, the wife, 
her attorney, and the husband's attorney appeared for the proceedings. The 
husband failed to attend, however, and his attorney asked the district court for 
permission to withdraw from being the husband's attorney. The district court 
granted the motion to withdraw and proceeded with the trial.

[¶13.]  The district court has the authority to 
control the course of a litigation. That power includes the discretion to grant 
continuances, either upon its own motion or upon a motion by one of the parties, 
and to grant an attorney's request to withdraw. Bromley v. Haberman, 583 P.2d 703 (Wyo. 1978); Wyo. Stat. § 1-9-102 (1988); Rules 102 and 201 of the 
Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming. The district 
court must exercise its discretion in a way which promotes justice. See Bromley, 
583 P.2d 703.

[¶14.]  In this case, the husband suffered an 
injustice when the district court, in the husband's absence, allowed the 
attorney to withdraw because no one was present to represent the husband's 
interests. Those interests included an opportunity to challenge the contempt 
order and to make a formal request for a continuance. Thus, we hold that the 
district court abused its discretion when it permitted the husband's attorney to 
withdraw and then immediately proceeded with the trial in the absence of the 
husband. The husband is entitled to have a new trial after being given 
reasonable notice of the trial setting so that he may appear and defend through 
his attorney or pro se.

[¶15.]  In response to the husband's brief, the 
wife argues that the district court's order holding the husband in contempt is 
not a final appealable order and that, therefore, we should dismiss the 
husband's appeal.1 We disagree. The husband's primary 
complaint pertains to the district court's bail order. The outcome of the trial 
determined whether the district court needed the husband's bail money to enforce 
his compliance with the divorce decree. If the husband had been represented at 
the trial, either by himself or by an attorney, the outcome could have been such 
that the district court's use of the husband's bail money would have been 
unnecessary. Hence, the issues emanating from the contempt order are 
inextricably intertwined with the issues arising from the trial and subject to 
our review at this time.

[¶16.]  The wife also argues that we should 
follow Connors and dismiss the husband's appeal because he acted in bad faith. 
In Connors, 769 P.2d  at 342-43, we stated:

[W]e will follow a bright 
line rule that where one who is charged with contempt makes no meaningful good 
faith effort to comply with the order, the violation of which resulted in the 
contempt order in the first place, such contemnor likely will be subjected to 
summary appeal dismissal. This rule will be applied to cases, as here, 
exhibiting bad faith on the part of the contemnor in ignoring the authority of 
the court while he attempts to appeal.

We recognize that the 
husband has not been entirely forthright with the district court, and we 
admonish him to follow the district court's orders. Because of the flaw in the 
trial on the merits of the divorce, however, we decline to dismiss the husband's 
appeal.

[¶17.]  Finally, the wife contends that we should 
dismiss the husband's appeal because he did not file a statement of the issues 
as is required by W.R.A.P. 4.02. That rule states in pertinent part:

     The appellant shall, 
within ten (10) days after filing the notice of appeal, file and serve on the 
appellee a description of the parts of the transcript which he intends to 
include in the record, and, unless the entire transcript is to be 
included, a statement of the issues he intends to present on the 
appeal.

(Emphasis added.) The 
husband satisfied the requirements of W.R.A.P. 4.02 by designating the entire 
record as the record on appeal.

[¶18.]  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded in accordance with this opinion.

URBIGKIT, C.J., dissented without 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 W.R.A.P. 1.05 
provides:

     A final order is: (1) 
an order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order in effect 
determines the action and prevents a judgment; (2) an order affecting a 
substantial right, made in a special proceeding, or upon a summary application 
in an action, after judgment; (3) an order, including a conditional order, 
granting a new trial on the grounds stated in Rule 59(a)(4) and (5), W.R.C.P.; 
if an appeal is taken from such an order, the judgment shall remain final and in 
effect for the purposes of appeal by another party.