Title: Vigna v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

John Vigna v. State of Maryland, No. 55, September Term, 2019. Opinion by Biran, J. 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – CHARACTER EVIDENCE – CHARACTER OF THE 
ACCUSED FOR APPROPRIATENESS WITH CHILDREN – The Court of Appeals 
held that, in a prosecution of a defendant for a sex crime against a minor, the defendant’s 
character for appropriateness with children in his custody or care may be a pertinent trait 
of character for purposes of admissibility of character evidence under Maryland Rule 5-
404(a)(2)(A). When the State objects to a defendant’s proffer of opinion or reputation 
evidence under Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A) to establish his or her character for a particular trait, 
the trial court must determine whether: (1) the particular quality identified by the defendant 
is a “trait of character” within the meaning of Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A); and (2) evidence of 
such a trait of character is “pertinent,” i.e., relevant to the trier of fact’s consideration of 
the charged offenses. If the trial court answers both of these questions in the affirmative, 
then the court (if requested by the State) should (3) analyze the proffered evidence under 
Maryland Rule 5-403 to determine whether its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice or another circumstance listed in that Rule.   
 
CRIMINAL LAW – CHARACTER EVIDENCE – HARMLESS ERROR – The Court 
of Appeals held that any error in excluding evidence of Petitioner’s character for 
appropriateness with children in his custody or care was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Testimony from parents who stated that, based on their experiences in seeing 
Petitioner interact with children in his custody or care, they would entrust the lives of their 
children and other children to him, was functionally the equivalent of an opinion that 
Petitioner was the type of person who was appropriate with children in his custody or care. 
In addition, opinion testimony of multiple defense witnesses that Petitioner was law-
abiding, although broader than the excluded opinion evidence Petitioner sought to elicit, 
ultimately served the same purpose.  
 
APPELLATE PRACTICE – ABANDONMENT AND PRESERVATION OF 
ARGUMENTS – The Court of Appeals held that, where Petitioner included no substantive 
argument in his briefs on the constitutional question for which the Court granted review, 
Petitioner abandoned the argument. In addition, Petitioner failed to preserve his new 
constitutional argument for appellate review, where he raised it for the first time in his 
briefs to the Court. 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL – DUE 
PROCESS – The Court of Appeals held that, because any evidentiary error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, Petitioner received a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment. In 
addition, the trial court’s adverse evidentiary ruling did not prevent Petitioner from 
presenting a meaningful defense. Thus, the exclusion of the proffered character evidence 
did not deprive Petitioner of due process.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 55 
 
                    September Term, 2019  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
    JOHN VIGNA 
 
   v. 
 
     STATE OF MARYLAND 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
McDonald 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Biran, 
 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Biran, J. 
Watts and Hotten, JJ., concur. 
 
 
Filed: August 18, 2020
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case Nos. 130781C & 129932C 
Argued: March 9, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case No. 419686V 
Argued 1/7/19 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
Suzanne Johnson
2020-08-20 14:51-04:00
For many years, John Vigna was a popular elementary school teacher in Silver 
Spring, Maryland. But, as our nation has learned all too well, it is possible for a person to 
be a popular teacher (or coach or trainer or member of the clergy, etc.) and, at the same 
time, to sexually abuse children entrusted to his care. According to the evidence the jury 
heard in this case, Vigna sexually abused several female students while he was their 
teacher. The evidence showed that Vigna would have these young girls sit in his lap, and 
then would rub their buttocks and touch their genital areas over their clothes, or otherwise 
touch the girls for his sexual gratification. 
At his trial, Vigna sought to elicit evidence from parents of students and from 
professional colleagues that, in their opinion, Vigna is the type of person who behaves 
appropriately with children in his custody or care. The trial judge ruled this evidence 
inadmissible, reasoning that appropriateness with children in one’s custody or care is not a 
“trait of character” within the meaning of the applicable rule of evidence. However, the 
trial judge allowed Vigna’s character witnesses to testify that Vigna is law-abiding and 
truthful.  
The jury convicted Vigna on nine counts, and the trial judge sentenced Vigna to 80 
years of imprisonment, suspending all but 48 years. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed 
the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and upheld Vigna’s convictions.  
We have not previously considered whether the type of character evidence Vigna 
sought to introduce at his trial is proper under the Maryland Rules. For the reasons 
discussed below, we conclude that character evidence of appropriateness with children in 
one’s custody or care (or of similar character traits, such as trustworthiness with children 
2 
 
or sexual morality with respect to children) may be admissible in a criminal case where a 
defendant is accused of sexually abusing a child. However, we hold that any error by the 
trial court in excluding such character evidence in Vigna’s case was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. We also reject Vigna’s constitutional arguments based on the trial court’s 
evidentiary rulings. Accordingly, we affirm Vigna’s convictions.  
I 
 
Background 
A. Vigna’s Career as a Teacher 
Vigna was a teacher in the Montgomery County Public Schools (“MCPS”) system 
from 1992 until his dismissal in 2016 following the emergence of the allegations that led 
to this criminal case. During his tenure with MCPS, Vigna taught grades three through five 
at Cloverly Elementary School (“Cloverly”) in Silver Spring. He also coached baseball and 
unified bocce at nearby Paint Branch High School, handling the three roles simultaneously 
before the end of his employment with MCPS. 
Vigna was very popular with students and other teachers. Vigna’s students adored 
his affectionate teaching style, and many of them maintained close relationships with Vigna 
after they left his classroom. Vigna’s fellow teachers respected his abilities as a teacher, 
and several entrusted him with their students when they had to attend to other matters.  
According to Vigna, he treated his students like family, which for Vigna included 
physical displays of affection. He often hugged, kissed, and consoled students during the 
school day. These interactions with students did not go unnoticed by colleagues and others. 
Occasionally, other teachers and staff saw Vigna with students on his lap as he sat behind 
3 
 
his desk. On several occasions, these physical contacts prompted concerned observers 
either to speak with Vigna directly or to alert school officials about his conduct.  
Jennifer Grey, a fifth-grade teacher at Cloverly, took the former approach. More 
than once, Ms. Grey cautioned Vigna that, “especially as a male teacher,” he should not 
“be alone with female students one-on-one,” and that he should “keep [his] distance.” 
Another teacher at Cloverly and a close friend of Vigna, David Cline, also cautioned Vigna 
about engaging students too closely. Ms. Grey and Mr. Cline were not concerned about the 
possibility of any sexual contact with students; rather, Vigna’s colleagues were “looking 
out for his well-being” by reminding him of professional guidelines and what they “felt 
was appropriate.” In response to Ms. Grey, Vigna on at least one occasion asserted that he 
was “not doing anything wrong.” 
On two occasions in 2008, while Vigna was a fifth-grade teacher, Cloverly principal 
Melissa Brunson1 became aware of students sitting in Vigna’s lap. First, on February 28, 
2008, a fire marshal reported to Dr. Brunson that, during a routine inspection, he saw a 
student sitting on Vigna’s lap. Dr. Brunson gave Vigna a verbal warning and counseled 
him not to have students sit in his lap. Vigna indicated to Dr. Brunson that he understood 
the problem.  
                                              
1 MCPS documents dating from 2013 and earlier, which were introduced as exhibits 
at Vigna’s trial, refer to Cloverly’s principal as “Ms.” Brunson. At trial, the parties referred 
to her as “Dr.” Brunson. The record does not reflect when Dr. Brunson obtained her 
doctoral degree. We will use Dr. Brunson’s current title in this opinion.  
 
4 
 
Second, on or about May 29, 2008, a building service worker became upset after he 
saw a student sitting in Vigna’s lap. Vigna pursued the staff member down the hall. 
According to Vigna, he tried to “explain that the child was upset and that [he] was trying 
to meet the child’s needs at that moment.” The loud exchange between Vigna and the 
building service worker received the attention of nearby staff, including Mr. Cline, who 
helped to deescalate the situation and took Vigna to Dr. Brunson’s office. On June 2, 2008, 
having received two reports of lap-sitting over a three-month span, Dr. Brunson issued a 
letter of reprimand to Vigna (the “2008 reprimand”), stating that his “handling of this 
situation was improper, unprofessional, and must not be repeated.” The letter informed 
Vigna that further incidents could lead to his termination. Vigna signed the 2008 reprimand 
on June 2, 2008. 
To monitor Vigna more easily, Dr. Brunson moved him from a classroom located 
outside the building to one next to her office. Thereafter, Vigna taught the third grade 
instead of the fifth grade, although fourth- and fifth-grade students often visited his 
classroom after dismissal, while they were waiting for their buses to be called. According 
to Vigna, he remained committed to his “family” style of teaching despite Dr. Brunson’s 
warnings.  
During the 2012-13 school year, prompted by a parent complaint, Dr. Brunson 
requested that MCPS’s Office of Human Resources and Development investigate 
allegations that Vigna “had invited female students to sit on [his] lap, lift[ed] them in the 
air, and danc[ed] with them during class.” During the investigation, Vigna was placed on 
administrative leave for approximately three weeks. In a statement that Vigna provided in 
5 
 
relation to that investigation, Vigna wrote: “I am going to restrict my activities in the 
classroom to strictly teaching, counseling and advising students and will make every effort 
to not have any physical contact at all with my students.” The result of the 2012-13 
investigation was that Vigna received another letter of reprimand, this time from Larry A. 
Bowers, the Chief Operating Officer of MCPS (the “2013 reprimand”). Referencing 
Vigna’s two lap-sitting incidents in 2008 and Dr. Brunson’s admonition to Vigna at that 
time, Mr. Bowers wrote, “It is difficult to believe that any teacher, especially a veteran 
teacher, would not understand what is respectful and professional behavior, even after 
receiving a reprimand.” Mr. Bowers warned Vigna that he needed to “alter [his] 
interactions with students immediately,” and that “[a]ny further instances of such 
unprofessional behavior may be grounds for more severe disciplinary action up to and 
including dismissal.”  
B. The Criminal Investigation and Charges 
The criminal charges against Vigna involved four girls and a young woman who all 
accused him of touching them in a sexual manner while they attended Cloverly.2 The first 
of Vigna’s former students to identify incidents of sexual abuse was A.C., who had been 
Vigna’s student in third grade during the 2013-14 school year. Teachers knew A.C. as an 
engaging and attentive student. In February 2016, A.C. was in Ms. Grey’s fifth-grade 
classroom when, during a pilot class on body safety taught by school counselor Heather 
                                              
2 We will refer to the victims by their initials to protect their privacy. The five former 
Cloverly students who testified that Vigna abused them were: friends A.C. and G.G.; L.D., 
who was an adult at the time of trial; and sisters A.S. and J.S. 
6 
 
Sobieralski, her demeanor changed. For the fifth-grade version of the body safety class, 
Ms. Sobieralski taught lessons on different types of abuse, starting with physical abuse. 
Later, she discussed sexual abuse. The PowerPoint slide she showed the class defined 
sexual abuse as follows: “When someone touches you or asks you to touch them on the 
private parts of the body (those parts covered by a bathing suit), other than to keep you 
clean and/or healthy.” The following slide identified different types of touches, including 
“Unsafe/unwanted touch,” which “feels uncomfortable, embarrassing or scary.” 
At about this point in the presentation, Ms. Sobieralski noticed that A.C. was 
“slumped down in her chair and staring out the window. And eventually she put her head 
down.” Observing the near-30 student class from her desk at the front of the room, Ms. 
Grey saw the same thing. They both considered this behavior unusual for A.C. During a 
break in instruction, Ms. Grey pulled Ms. Sobieralski aside to express her concern, and Ms. 
Sobieralski advised Ms. Grey to check on A.C. after class. When Ms. Grey first approached 
her, A.C. told Ms. Grey that she was okay, but at the end of the school day about an hour 
later, A.C. spoke to Ms. Grey again. This time, A.C. brought up Vigna: “You know how 
we all love Mr. Vigna? Well, he touches us in ways that make[] us feel uncomfortable.” 
Ms. Grey then took A.C. to Ms. Sobieralski’s office. After Ms. Sobieralski asked A.C. to 
explain how Mr. Vigna makes her feel comfortable, A.C. responded, “when he hugs me he 
touches my butt. And he makes me sit on his lap, and when I try to get up he doesn’t let 
me.” A.C. said this activity occurred when she was in Vigna’s third-grade class and 
continued when she regularly went to say goodbye to him in the fourth and fifth grades.   
7 
 
A.C. then met with a forensic social worker, Sara Kulow-Malave, at the Tree House 
Child Advocacy Center of Montgomery County. There, A.C. described how Vigna made 
girls feel uncomfortable. She told Ms. Kulow-Malave that Vigna touched her buttocks and 
made her sit on his lap. A.C. said that Vigna would rub her thighs with his hands and 
breathed steadily more and more heavily as she sat on his lap. She also stated that when 
she was on Vigna’s lap, she could feel a “hard” part of his body “under her butt.” When 
Ms. Kulow-Malave asked A.C. to show on an anatomical drawing where the hard part of 
Vigna’s body was, she circled the waistline. A.C. told Ms. Kulow-Malave that the first 
time Vigna made A.C. feel uncomfortable was during her second-grade year, and that the 
most recent time was just a few days before the body safety class with Ms. Sobieralski.  
During her discussion with Ms. Sobieralski and again with Ms. Kulow-Malave, 
A.C. also claimed that she saw Vigna touch her friend, G.G., inappropriately. G.G. never 
had Vigna as her primary teacher but would accompany A.C. when she visited his 
classroom after the final bell of the day. A.C. said that Vigna moved his hand over G.G.’s 
buttocks while giving her a hug.  
On February 12, 2016, the day after her interview with A.C., Ms. Kulow-Malave 
interviewed G.G. In addition to describing her own encounter with Vigna, G.G. 
corroborated A.C.’s account of repeated uncomfortable touches. G.G. explained how Mr. 
Vigna touched them differently during their hugs, and described how Vigna “squeezed” 
A.C.’s buttocks.   
 
Vigna was removed as a teacher at Cloverly immediately after these allegations of 
sexual abuse surfaced. A criminal investigation ensued. On June 23, 2016, Vigna was 
8 
 
charged in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Montgomery County with various sex 
offenses relating to his alleged abuse of A.C. and G.G. In July 2016, the charges were 
forwarded to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.  
The investigation continued, and three more victims came forward. L.D., a young 
adult, learned about the charges against Vigna through a Facebook group of Cloverly 
alumni. She then contacted police and reported incidents of sexual abuse by Vigna between 
August 2001 and June 2002, when Vigna was her fourth-grade teacher. According to L.D., 
she and Vigna interacted frequently during her time at Cloverly. L.D. alleged that Vigna 
would sit her and her friend on his lap, and touch her on her crotch. L.D. described one 
particular instance of abuse while she was sitting on Vigna’s lap:  
[H]e was talking to some boys across the desk, and every time he talked, I 
felt his finger on my crotch. And I remember this so well, even though it was 
so many years ago, because I felt sexually aroused when that happened. I felt 
like that tingly sensation, and that’s when I knew something wasn’t right. 
 
According to L.D., Vigna would engage in this touching activity when there was a lot of 
commotion in the room, as children waited for their buses. L.D. said that other children 
could not see Vigna touch her because their view was blocked by his desk. Vigna had L.D. 
kiss him on his cheek during her visits prior to leaving for the school bus. She also 
described one instance when she had to change her clothes, and Vigna said she could use 
the closet in his classroom. They were the only two people in the room at the time, and 
L.D. remembered feeling uncomfortable as the closet door was left ajar.  
Two more of Vigna’s former students came forward with similar accounts. A.S., a 
sixth-grader at the time of the trial, reported that when Vigna was her third-grade teacher, 
9 
 
he touched her weekly, or perhaps even more often, in ways that made her uncomfortable. 
In particular, A.S. said that Vigna had her sit on his lap at his desk while the rest of the 
class faced away to watch a video. On multiple occasions, he then touched her genitals, 
buttocks, and chest area over her clothes. Sometimes he kissed the top of her head and 
asked her for a kiss on the cheek. According to A.S., Vigna told her that he loved her and 
that she was beautiful while he held her on his lap. 
J.S., who is A.S.’s sister and one year younger, claimed that, when Vigna was her 
third-grade reading teacher, he would “call me over to the back table, just me and him, and 
then he would make sure I sat right next to him, and then he would start hugging me. He 
would start touching my butt.” 
In a superseding indictment filed on December 1, 2016, the State added charges 
related to the alleged sex abuse of L.D., A.S., and J.S. Ultimately, the State proceeded on 
two counts from the first indictment, which were consolidated with 12 counts contained in 
the second indictment. The charges included multiple counts of sexual abuse of a minor3 
and third-degree sex offense.4  
 
                                              
3 “A … person who has … temporary care or custody or responsibility for the 
supervision of a minor may not cause sexual abuse to the minor.” Md. Code Ann., Crim. 
Law (“CR”) § 3-602(b)(1) (2012). With respect to L.D., the indictment charged a violation 
of Article 27, § 35(C)(b)(1), of the Maryland Code, the predecessor statute to CR § 3-
602(b), which was in effect at the time that Vigna allegedly abused L.D.   
 
4 “A person may not: … engage in sexual contact with another if the victim is under 
the age of 14 years, and the person performing the sexual contact is at least 4 years older 
than the victim.” CR § 3-307(a)(3). At the time of Vigna’s alleged abuse of L.D., this 
offense was codified at Article 27, § 464(A) of the Maryland Code. 
10 
 
C. Pretrial Hearing on Character Evidence 
Prior to trial, Vigna filed a motion in limine seeking a ruling allowing him to 
introduce pertinent character evidence under Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A), which 
provides: “An accused may offer evidence of the accused’s pertinent trait of character. If 
the evidence is admitted, the prosecution may offer evidence to rebut it.” At a pretrial 
hearing on this motion on June 5, 2017, Vigna’s counsel argued that Vigna should be 
allowed to introduce character evidence of three pertinent traits: truthfulness, law-
abidingness, and appropriate interaction with children in his custody or care. The State did 
not challenge Vigna’s ability to introduce evidence as to his character for truthfulness and 
law-abidingness. However, the State objected to the admission of character evidence of 
Vigna’s appropriateness with children in his custody or care. While Vigna acknowledged 
that it would be improper to have former students specifically testify that Vigna did not 
abuse them, he argued that he should be allowed to introduce “classic reputation” and/or 
“classic opinion” evidence concerning his “character for interacting appropriately” with 
children in his custody or care.  
The trial court ruled that evidence concerning Vigna’s character for the traits of 
truthfulness and being law-abiding would be admissible. As for Vigna’s character for 
appropriateness with children in his custody or care, the court commented that, unlike the 
traits of honesty, peacefulness, and law-abidingness, which “span across all walks of life 
and all categories of interaction with people,” the trait proffered by Vigna seemed too 
“unique and specific and limited … to be considered a character trait.” The court reserved 
ruling with respect to the admissibility of this third category of character evidence. 
11 
 
D. The Trial and Appeal 
Vigna’s jury trial began on June 6, 2017, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, and concluded on June 9, 2017. The five victims discussed above all testified in 
the State’s case-in-chief. Each victim described how Vigna touched her buttocks and/or 
genital area. The State called the social workers who interviewed A.C., G.G., A.S., and 
J.S., and played for the jury the videos of those interviews. Ms. Grey testified about having 
seen Vigna with students in his lap a “handful of times.” In addition, over Vigna’s 
objection, Dr. Brunson testified about the circumstances that led to Vigna’s prior discipline, 
and the court admitted both the 2008 reprimand and the 2013 reprimand as exhibits. The 
court admitted this testimony and the letters of reprimand under Maryland Rule 5-404(b).5 
The court found that this evidence was admissible to demonstrate Vigna’s intent, 
knowledge, and absence of mistake. 
 
 
Vigna testified in his own defense, and denied that he ever touched any of his 
students for sexual gratification. He claimed that touching a student inappropriately was 
“simply against the fiber of [him].” He acknowledged that he had often hugged students, 
had them sit on his lap, and told them that he loved them. He claimed that his teaching 
style, which included these types of displays of affection, was the result of having grown 
up in a large Italian family that emphasized physical affection. He explained that his 
                                              
5 “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts … is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. Such evidence, 
however, may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.” Md. Rule 5-404(b). 
12 
 
teaching philosophy included treating a class like a family and the students as if they were 
his own children. Vigna testified that he made an effort to change his teaching style after 
he was reprimanded in 2013, but that the students continued to “hop on [his] knee” and 
initiate hugs with him, and that he was not going to push them away. Vigna attributed any 
contact that a student could have interpreted as sexual to be the result of an accidental 
touching. 
 
In addition to testifying himself, Vigna called nine witnesses in his defense case. 
Seven of these were character witnesses. They included Dr. Brunson’s predecessor as the 
Cloverly principal; fellow Cloverly teachers; parents of former female students in Vigna’s 
classes; a fellow coach and the athletic director at Paint Branch High School; and Vigna’s 
12-year-old niece.6 Prior to these character witnesses testifying, the trial judge took up the 
question on which he had reserved ruling, i.e., whether appropriate interaction with 
children is a proper character trait. The court concluded that it is not: 
I think that the proper character category would be character for … 
lawfulness or law[-]abiding citizen, something like that. Because the other 
one seemed so specific and so – it doesn’t seem like a character trait to me. 
It seems more like – it seems like it’s too narrow and too specific to be a 
character trait. So, but I think the more general notion of that request is that 
Mr. Vigna is generally a law-abiding person or I think that’s more consistent 
with a character trait, which is what the rule permits. So to that extent, I’ll 
grant the defendant’s motion to permit character evidence on that character 
trait. 
 
                                              
6 The other two defense witnesses, who were teachers at Cloverly, testified as fact 
witnesses to circumstances that called into question the accuracy of some of the victims’ 
testimony. 
13 
 
The court also confirmed that the character witnesses would be permitted to testify as to 
Vigna’s character for truthfulness.  
 
Six of the seven character witnesses testified to their opinion that Vigna possessed 
a character for being law-abiding. Those character witnesses provided extensive testimony 
concerning Vigna’s interactions with children in his custody or care in the course of 
opining as to his law-abidingness. For example, Janet Lopez, the principal of Cloverly from 
2004 to 2007, testified that she made unannounced classroom visits and “saw [Vigna] with 
children every day.” Based on her observations, Ms. Lopez opined that Vigna was law-
abiding.  
Kristen Delikat, a former colleague of Vigna’s at Cloverly for eight years, testified 
that she worked closely with Vigna when she was a reading specialist. Ms. Delikat often 
observed Vigna in his classroom. Ms. Delikat testified that she never saw Vigna touch or 
put a student in his lap. She, too, opined that Vigna was a law-abiding person.  
The Paint Branch athletic director, Heather Podesek, testified that she knew Vigna 
from his work as a bocce coach and his volunteering as a baseball coach, as well as Vigna’s 
service as the Vice President of the Paint Branch Athletic Association. Ms. Podesek 
testified that she would often watch Vigna’s interaction with his players and the student 
coaches, and saw Vigna’s “positive interactions . . . with his student athletes.” Based on 
her years of knowledge of, and experience with, Vigna, Ms. Podesek also opined that he 
was a law-abiding person.  
 
Jill Doll, the parent of two girls who had been in Vigna’s fifth-grade classes in the 
2006-07 and 2009-10 school years, testified about her interactions with Vigna as a parent 
14 
 
volunteer and a substitute teacher. She told the jury that she had seen Vigna interacting 
with students and trusted him with them, noting that this included trusting him “with the 
lives of [her] children.”  
Irena Nalls, whose daughter was in Vigna’s third-grade class in 2014-15, testified 
that, as a room parent, she often visited Vigna’s classroom. She assisted with and observed 
various parties in Vigna’s classroom, including parties for Halloween, Valentine’s Day, 
and the end of the school year. Ms. Nalls explained that she would stay in the room after 
these parties to help clean up while the children were still in the classroom before dismissal. 
Based on her experiences and observations, Ms. Nalls also opined that Vigna was law-
abiding.  
Terry Conrad, a parent whose daughter had been in Vigna’s class and who coached 
youth sports and high school baseball with Vigna, testified that Vigna was law-abiding and 
that he trusted Vigna “with [his] life.” 
 
Vigna’s 12-year-old niece testified that, after her father died when she was in the 
third grade, Vigna was like a father to her. She spent time with Vigna and trusted him. She 
further testified that she saw Vigna with other children when he was a parent chaperone on 
her field trips. She provided her opinion that Vigna obeyed the law.  
 
The character witnesses also testified to their opinion that Vigna was truthful.7 
                                              
7 In its rebuttal case, the State called Mr. Cline and recalled Ms. Grey and elicited 
evidence concerning specific instances of alleged untruthfulness by Vigna, as permitted 
under Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A). In addition, in an effort to rebut the character 
evidence concerning Vigna being law-abiding, the State elicited testimony that Vigna had 
smoked marijuana several times. 
15 
 
 
The jury found Vigna guilty on nine of the 14 counts with which he was charged. 
The circuit court subsequently sentenced Vigna to 80 years in prison, with all but 48 years 
suspended.  
 
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed Vigna’s convictions. Vigna v. State, 241 Md. 
App. 704 (2019). As pertinent here, the intermediate appellate court held that: (1) in 
resolving a question of first impression in Maryland, “appropriate interaction with 
children” is not a pertinent character trait under Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A); and (2) the circuit 
court’s evidentiary rulings did not deprive Vigna of his right to a fair trial under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
On September 24, 2019, Vigna filed a petition for certiorari. On November 6, 2019, 
we granted Vigna’s petition. 466 Md. 311 (2019). We agreed to review the following 
questions (which we paraphrase here slightly): 
I. 
Did the Court of Special Appeals err by contradicting the majority of other 
jurisdictions in holding that appropriate interaction with children is not a 
pertinent character trait under Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A)?  
II. 
Did the Court of Special Appeals err when it failed to recognize that denying 
Vigna the ability to introduce relevant character evidence, while at the same 
time allowing the State to introduce non-criminal “bad acts” character 
evidence, denied Vigna the right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution? 
 
 
16 
 
II 
Standard of Review 
Although an evidentiary ruling, including the decision to admit or exclude character 
evidence, is typically reviewed for abuse of discretion, see, e.g., Devincentz v. State, 460 
Md. 518, 539 (2018), in this case the circuit court excluded Vigna’s proffered character 
evidence based on its determination that appropriate interaction with children in one’s 
custody or care is “too narrow and too specific to be a character trait” under Rule 5-
404(a)(2)(A). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court, framing the question 
as whether the proffered character evidence was relevant to the specific crimes with which 
Vigna was charged. See Vigna, 241 Md. App. at 718. The Court of Special Appeals 
considered that to be a question of statutory interpretation requiring de novo review. Id. at 
717. We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that de novo review is appropriate for this 
question. See Williams v. State, 457 Md. 551, 563 (2018) (contrasting the decision whether 
a piece of evidence is relevant, which is a legal conclusion reviewed de novo, with the 
decision to admit relevant evidence, which is reviewed for abuse of discretion). We also 
review constitutional claims de novo. See, e.g., State v. Cates, 417 Md. 678, 691 (2011); 
Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535 (2006). 
III 
 
Discussion 
Vigna contends before us that the circuit court improperly excluded the proffered 
evidence concerning his character for appropriate interaction with children in his custody 
or care, and that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, Vigna 
17 
 
asserts that the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings violated his constitutional rights to due 
process and a fair trial.8  
We hold that appropriateness with children in one’s custody or care may be a 
“pertinent trait of character” within the meaning of Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A). However, we 
conclude that any error in the circuit court’s exclusion of such evidence in Vigna’s case 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As for Vigna’s constitutional arguments, Vigna 
abandoned his Sixth Amendment claim and failed to preserve a due process claim for 
appellate review. In any event, both constitutional claims lack merit.      
A. Appropriateness with Children in One’s Custody or Care May Be a Pertinent 
Character Trait for Purposes of Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A). 
 
1. Character Evidence under Maryland Rule 5-404(a) 
 
Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(1) provides that “evidence of a person’s character or 
character trait is not admissible to prove that the person acted in accordance with the 
character or trait on a particular occasion.” However, there are exceptions to this rule. As 
pertinent here, a defendant in a criminal case “may offer evidence of [his or her] pertinent 
trait of character. If the evidence is admitted, the prosecution may offer evidence to rebut 
it.” Id. § 5-404(a)(2)(A).9 
                                              
8 In the Court of Special Appeals, Vigna also asserted claims of evidentiary error 
relating to the admission of the 2008 and 2013 reprimands under Maryland Rule 5-404(b), 
as well as the admission of A.C.’s statements to Ms. Sobieralski under Maryland Rule 5-
802.1(d), which is a hearsay exception for a “prompt complaint of sexually assaultive 
behavior to which the declarant was subjected.” The intermediate appellate court rejected 
these contentions, and Vigna did not seek further review of those questions in this Court. 
    
9 The Rule also contains exceptions that allow: (1) a criminal defendant, in certain 
circumstances, to offer evidence of an alleged crime victim’s pertinent trait of character, 
18 
 
Maryland Rule 5-404 derives from its similarly numbered federal counterpart, 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404. The original Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404(a) explained that 
[c]haracter questions arise in two fundamentally different ways. (1) 
Character may itself be an element of a crime, claim, or defense. A situation 
of this kind is commonly referred to as “character in issue.” Illustrations 
[include] … the competency of the driver in an action for negligently 
entrusting a motor vehicle to an incompetent driver. No problem of the 
general relevancy of character evidence is involved, and the present rule 
therefore has no provision on the subject. The only question relates to 
allowable methods of proof, as to which see Rule 405,[10] immediately 
following. (2) Character evidence is susceptible of being used for the purpose 
of suggesting an inference that the person acted on the occasion in question 
consistently with his character. This use of character is often described as 
“circumstantial.” Illustrations are: evidence of a violent disposition to prove 
that the person was the aggressor in an affray, or evidence of honesty in 
disproof of a charge of theft. This circumstantial use of character evidence 
raises questions of relevancy as well as questions of allowable methods of 
proof. 
 
We are concerned here with a defendant’s effort to elicit “circumstantial” character 
evidence. Specifically, Vigna argues that a defendant, who has been accused of sexually 
abusing a child in his custody or care, should be permitted to introduce evidence of his 
                                              
subject to rebuttal evidence being introduced by the prosecutor, id. § 5-404(a)(2)(B); (2) a 
prosecutor to offer evidence in a homicide case of an alleged victim’s trait of peacefulness 
to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor, id. § 5-404(a)(2)(C); and (3) a 
party in any type of case to offer evidence, under certain circumstances, “of the character 
of a witness with regard to credibility,” id. § 5-404(a)(3). 
 
10 The Maryland Rules also include a counterpart to Federal Rule of Evidence 405, 
which governs the methods of proof a proponent of character evidence may use. As 
pertinent here, Maryland Rule 5-405 provides: “In all cases in which evidence of character 
or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to 
reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is 
allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.” 
19 
 
character for being appropriate in interactions with children in his custody or care, so that 
he may then ask the jury to infer from such evidence that it is less likely he committed the 
charged offense.  
This Court has not previously considered whether evidence concerning the character 
of a defendant for appropriateness with children (or similar traits) may be admissible in a 
criminal case where the defendant is charged with a sex crime against a child. To help 
inform our resolution of this question, we examine similar cases from other jurisdictions.  
2. Case Law Concerning Character Evidence in Child Sex Abuse Prosecutions 
 
The majority of the out-of-state courts that have considered this issue have held that 
appropriate interaction with children, sexual morality, and other similar formulations of 
traits relating to sexual disposition, may be pertinent character traits in child sex abuse 
cases. See State v. Rothwell, 294 P.3d 1137, 1143 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013) (holding that 
“character traits relating to a defendant’s sexual morality with children are pertinent”); 
State v. Enakiev, 29 P.3d 1160, 1163 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (“Evidence of a person’s character 
with respect to sexual propriety evinces that person’s propensity to act in a sexually proper 
manner,” and therefore may be admissible as a pertinent trait in a prosecution for a sex 
crime); State v. Rhodes, 200 P.3d 973, 976 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that defendant’s 
“sexual normalcy, or appropriateness in interacting with children, is a character trait, and 
one that pertains to charges of sexual conduct with a child”); State v. Hughes, 841 So. 2d 
718, 723 (La. 2003) (per curiam) (in case where defendant was charged with aggravated 
rape and other offenses involving child molestation, holding that “a defendant may present 
evidence of his or her reputation in the community as a moral person and for safe and 
20 
 
proper treatment of young children”); People v. McAlpin, 812 P.2d 563, 575-76 (Cal. 1991) 
(holding that character witnesses should have been permitted to testify to opinion that 
defendant was not “a person given to lewd conduct with children” and that he had a 
reputation for “normalcy in his sexual tastes,” which included not having “a reputation for 
being sexually attracted to young girls”); State v. Benoit, 697 A.2d 329, 331 (R.I. 1997) 
(where defendant was convicted of child molestation sexual assault charges, remanding 
case to trial court to consider whether proffered character witness had sufficient basis to 
provide an opinion concerning defendant’s “trustworthiness with children or other 
pertinent character traits”); State v. Hallman, 379 S.E.2d 115, 117 (S.C. 1989) (trial court 
erred by excluding character evidence of defendant’s “morality” in prosecution for sexual 
offenses against a minor); see also Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d 879, 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2002) (noting that defendant “was entitled to proffer evidence of his good character (or 
propensity) for moral and safe relations with small children or young girls”); State v. 
Griswold, 991 P.2d 657, 663 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (in case where defendant was charged 
with third degree child molestation, stating that “sexual morality is a pertinent character 
trait”); State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 350, 353-54 (Utah 1985) (where defendant was accused of 
sexually abusing a child, noting that defendant was permitted to introduce “reputation or 
opinion testimony to prove good moral character”); McMullin v. State, 486 S.W.3d 818, 
820-21 & n.1 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Rothwell for the proposition that “a relevant trait 
of good character could be proved by reputation or opinion evidence,” which the trial court 
had allowed the defendant to do; but affirming the trial court’s exclusion of evidence of 
21 
 
specific instances of conduct to prove the trait of “sexual morality with respect to minors”) 
(cleaned up). 
A minority of courts, on the other hand, have reasoned that character traits similar 
to the trait at issue here are not “pertinent” in child sex abuse prosecutions, because sex 
crimes generally occur in private. Thus, according to these courts, evidence of a 
defendant’s reputation in the community for appropriate interaction with children, based 
on public observation, does not make it more likely that the defendant is innocent of a sex 
crime he is alleged to have committed in private. See State v. Jackson, 730 P.2d 1361, 1364 
(Wash. App. Ct. 1986) (“The crimes of indecent liberties and incest concern sexual activity, 
which is normally an intimate, private affair not known to the community. One’s reputation 
for sexual activity, or lack thereof, may have no correlation to one’s actual sexual 
conduct.”)11; Hendricks v. State, 34 So. 3d 819, 822, 825-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (in 
child molestation case, affirming exclusion of evidence that defendant had an “excellent” 
reputation for sexual morality; because “a person’s tendency, or lack thereof, to commit 
acts of child molestation is not something that a community tends to have knowledge of, 
testimony concerning a person’s reputation for having such a trait is inherently unreliable 
and distinguishable from traditionally admissible reputation evidence”); State v. Graf, 726 
                                              
11 In State v. Griswold, cited above, a different Washington intermediate appellate 
division court disagreed with Jackson. See Griswold, 991 P.2d at 663. The Griswold Court 
suggested that the Washington Supreme Court’s holding concerning a character evidence 
jury instruction in the post-Jackson case of State v. Thomas, 757 P.2d 512 (1988), indicated 
that the state’s highest court approved of the type of character evidence Jackson had not 
allowed. To date, the Washington Supreme Court has not resolved this split in 
Washington’s intermediate appellate courts. 
22 
 
A.2d 1270, 1274-75 (N.H. 1999) (in sexual assault case involving a minor victim, relying 
on Jackson to hold that proffered evidence that defendant was “not the type of person to 
sexually assault or to take advantage of children” was irrelevant and, therefore, properly 
excluded at trial).  
In Rothwell, the case upon which Vigna most relies, the Court of Appeals of Idaho 
considered the majority and minority lines of cases on this question and adopted the 
majority position, rejecting the argument that the secretive nature of child sexual abuse 
renders character evidence of sexual morality inadmissible:  
We conclude the majority rule is correct. Because character traits relating to 
a defendant’s sexual morality with children are pertinent, or relevant, in this 
type of case, such evidence is admissible under I.R.E. 404(a)(1). We 
recognize that sexual abuse is usually secret behavior that would not be 
observed by others, and therefore the opinion or reputation evidence about a 
defendant’s 
trustworthiness 
with 
children 
may 
be 
of 
marginal 
persuasiveness. The same can be said, however, of many types of criminal 
activity. It appears that Rule 404(a)(1) was nevertheless intended to allow an 
accused the opportunity to present evidence of good character that is 
pertinent to the nature of the charged offense. The unlikelihood that the 
character witnesses would have been in a position to witness criminal 
conduct of the defendant goes to the weight of character evidence, not its 
admissibility. 
 
294 P.3d at 1143. The Rothwell Court confirmed that a defendant who seeks to introduce 
such evidence through a witness first must establish that the witness has a sufficient 
foundation of knowledge to opine or provide reputation evidence about the defendant’s 
sexual morality with children. Id. at 1143-44. In addition, the Court noted that a trial court 
retains the authority to exclude such character evidence under Idaho’s equivalent to 
23 
 
Maryland Rule 5-403,12 if the trial court finds that the probative value of the character 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of, among other things, unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. Id. at 1144. 
3. A Blanket Rule of Exclusion of Character Evidence of Appropriateness with 
Children in One’s Custody or Care Is Erroneous. 
 
Like the Rothwell Court, we adopt the majority position among the courts around 
the country that have considered this question, and hold that evidence of a defendant’s 
character for appropriateness with children in his or her custody or care (or a similarly 
worded trait) may be admissible in a case where the defendant is charged with sexual abuse 
of a minor or a similar crime against a child. 
 
The Court of Special Appeals opted for the minority position, based on its view that 
such character evidence can never be relevant in a child sex abuse case. See Vigna, 241 
Md. App. at 719-24. The intermediate appellate court reached this conclusion for two 
reasons. First, the court accepted the reasoning of Jackson and Hendricks that, due to the 
“secretive nature of sexual crimes, and sexual activity in general, a defendant’s reputation 
for sexual activity, or the lack thereof, [bears] no correlation to the likelihood that they 
committed the crimes charged.” Id. at 720. In this regard, the court observed that, “[u]nlike 
one’s reputation for honesty or peacefulness, traits that might be noticed by the community, 
                                              
12 “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.” Md. Rule 5-403. 
24 
 
whether one secretly molests children or does not would not be openly exhibited.” Id. at 
721.  
Second, the Court of Special Appeals observed that sexual predators often gain 
special access to children for the very reason that they are able to appear “appropriate” (and 
trustworthy, moral, etc.) in their interactions with children:  
Sexual predators are “not instantly recognizable as the ‘dirty old man 
in the raincoat.’” Anne-Marie McAlinden, Setting ‘Em Up: Personal, 
Familial, and Institutional Grooming in the Sexual Abuse of Children, 15 
SOC. AND LEGAL STUD. 339, 348 (2006). They blend into the community 
and often stand in trust relationships—coaches, clergy, teachers, physicians, 
or family members—with their victims. Id. Offenders “groom” victims 
through these relationships and “skillfully manipulate a child into a situation 
where he or she can be more readily sexually abused and is simultaneously 
less likely to disclose.” Id. at 346. Recent news accounts demonstrate how 
offenders exploit trust relationships, not only with children but also their 
parents and the community at large, to gain access to victims. Before these 
allegations became public, there undoubtedly were colleagues, parents, and 
other children who could have testified honestly that they believed those 
abusers were appropriate with children and much beloved by the community 
for the strong relationships they formed with them. 
 
To admit a community member’s opinion about a defendant’s 
reputation for propriety with children would fail to “consider that sex 
offenders may [ ] groom not just the child but also their family or the wider 
community as a necessary prerequisite to gaining access” to child victims. 
Id. at 341. In this way, they “ingratiate themselves with children and infiltrate 
themselves into unsuspecting ... communities.... To do this successfully, they 
must pass themselves off as being very nice, usually, men who simply like 
children.” Id. at 348. This is not to suggest that teachers, clergy, or other 
adults with close relationships with children should inherently be regarded 
with suspicion, or that their close relationships with children suggest 
impropriety with children. But an adult’s public interaction with children 
under his care doesn’t make it any more or less likely that the alleged victims 
were abused by him privately. And because it’s not relevant, it’s not 
admissible under Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A). 
 
Vigna, 241 Md. App. at 722-23 (footnotes omitted). 
 
25 
 
 
We disagree with the Court of Special Appeals’ reliance on Jackson and Hendricks. 
Rather, we agree with the Rothwell Court that “[t]he unlikelihood that the character 
witnesses would have been in a position to witness criminal conduct of the defendant goes 
to the weight of character evidence, not its admissibility.” 294 P.3d at 1143. To be sure, 
child sexual abusers do not usually commit their crimes in the view of others in the 
community from whom character witnesses are drawn.13 But, as the Court observed in 
Rothwell, the same can be said of other cases in which character evidence is routinely 
admitted. Id. For example, it is common for a defendant accused of a fraud offense to offer 
opinion and reputation testimony about the defendant’s character for honesty. See, e.g., 
Grant v. State, 55 Md. App. 1, 39 (1983) (noting that a defendant’s “reputation for truth 
and veracity would be relevant upon the trial of a charge such as perjury, false pretenses, 
or embezzlement”); In re Sealed Case, 352 F.3d 409, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (evidence of a 
defendant’s character for truthfulness and honesty is admissible in cases involving fraud or 
false statements). In such cases, prosecutors frequently elicit on cross-examination that the 
character witness did not work in the defendant’s allegedly fraudulent company or 
otherwise have any knowledge about the transactions at issue in the indictment. Such cross-
examination often is powerful, resulting in the proffered character evidence having 
                                              
13 However, as Vigna points out, there have been well publicized incidents in which 
colleagues of sexual predators allegedly became aware of the conduct at the time it was 
happening. See, e.g., Tom Winter, Hannah Rappleye & Tracy Conner, Sandusky Case 
Bombshell: Did 6 Penn State Coaches Witness Abuse?, NBC News (May 6, 2016), 
available at https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/sandusky-case-bombshell-did-6-
penn-state-coaches-witness-abuse-n569526 (accessed on Aug. 3, 2020), archived at 
https://perma.cc/7GGZ-9JSY.  
26 
 
“marginal persuasiveness” to the jury. Rothwell, 294 P.3d at 1143. However, we certainly 
cannot say that such challenged character evidence – or the character evidence that Vigna 
wanted to elicit in this case – will never have any relevance to a properly instructed jury.    
 
In addition, although we understand that child sex abusers frequently engage in 
“grooming” activity – with respect to child victims, as well as to their parents and other 
adults in the community – it does not follow that evidence that an alleged abuser has the 
character of appropriately interacting with children is categorically irrelevant. As the Court 
of Special Appeals correctly observed, not all close relationships between children and 
“teachers, clergy, or other adults … suggest impropriety.” Vigna, 241 Md. App. at 723 
(emphasis in original). Indeed, most adults in positions of trust with children undoubtedly 
choose to occupy those positions because they want to help children, not abuse them. For 
this reason, we believe that the Court of Special Appeals’ reliance on the grooming activity 
of convicted child sexual abusers to prevent an accused child sexual abuser from 
introducing character evidence of his appropriateness with children encroaches on the 
latter’s presumption of innocence. This we cannot allow. See, e.g., Montgomery v. State, 
292 Md. 84, 91 (1981) (listing the presumption of innocence among the “bedrock 
characteristics” that “are indispensable to the integrity of every criminal trial”), overruled 
on other grounds by Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383 (2012); see also Rinat Kitai, Presuming 
Innocence, 55 Okla. L. Rev. 257, 265 (2002) (“This presumption [of innocence prior to 
conviction] is a general one, granted equally to every person even before the onset of the 
investigation and trial, and independent of prior conditions such as her status, the amount 
of incriminating evidence, or her criminal history.”). 
27 
 
However, the State is not powerless when it comes to challenging the probative 
value of character evidence of appropriateness with children (as well as other positive traits 
such as law-abidingness and truthfulness) where there is evidence that the defendant 
engaged in grooming conduct not just toward children, but also toward the community as 
a whole. To the extent the State possesses such evidence, the State may seek to introduce 
expert testimony on such grooming to assist the jury in understanding its significance. See 
Coates v. State, 175 Md. App. 588, 607 (2007) (expert witness “described the process of 
‘grooming,’ in which an abuser gains a child’s trust through special attentiveness”); see 
also United States v. Romero, 189 F.3d 576, 585 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming admission of 
expert testimony on the “modus operandi of modern child molesters”).14 This, in turn, may 
provide the jury with insight as to how someone accused of a horrible crime against a child 
may nevertheless have a stellar reputation in the community for appropriate interaction 
with children and other positive traits of character. In addition, the prosecutor may cross-
examine the character witness concerning specific uncharged acts of inappropriateness. See 
Md. Rule 5-405(a). And, as discussed above, the prosecutor often will score points on 
cross-examination of such a character witness, even without going into specific acts of 
inappropriateness. 
                                              
14 This observation should not be taken to suggest that expert testimony is always 
necessary before the State (or the defense) may refer in closing arguments to evidence of a 
defendant’s conduct as “grooming” or the lack thereof. See Dandass v. State, 233 So. 3d 
856, 868-69 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that prosecutor’s reference in closing argument 
to defendant’s “grooming” of victim, without supporting expert testimony, was not 
improper in light of the victim’s testimony). We express no opinion on the factors that 
would permit (or require) expert testimony on “grooming” in any particular case. 
 
28 
 
Although the juries in many child sex abuse cases probably will not find reasonable 
doubt of guilt after hearing character evidence of the defendant’s appropriateness with 
children, it does not follow that there is no relevance to such character evidence. While not 
all people who have reputations for appropriate interaction with children in their custody 
or care refrain from sexually abusing some of those children, we expect that almost all 
people in positions of trust toward children who do refrain from sexually abusing those 
children, over time, will have built reputations in their community for appropriateness with 
children. Although research suggests that false allegations of child sexual abuse are very 
rare,15 they have occurred.16 For an innocent teacher, coach, or other person occupying a 
position of trust who has been falsely accused of child sexual abuse, the ability to introduce 
opinion or reputation evidence from respected members of the community about the 
defendant’s appropriateness with children in his custody or care may not only be relevant, 
but also crucial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. We have confidence that juries will be 
able to appropriately weigh such character evidence in conjunction with all the other 
relevant evidence they receive in child sexual abuse cases.  
                                              
15 See, e.g., The Leadership Council on Child Abuse & Interpersonal Violence, How 
Often Do Children’s Reports of Abuse Turn Out to Be False, available at 
http://www.leadershipcouncil.org/1/res/csa-acc.html (summarizing several studies that all 
concluded such false allegations occurred in single-digit percentage ranges) (accessed on 
Aug. 4, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/T3KP-GJJT. 
 
16 See Caroline Hendrie, Living Through a Teacher’s Nightmare: False Accusation, 
Education Week, https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1998/12/09/15false.h18.html, Dec. 
9, 1998 (accessed on Aug. 4, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/6A7K-6SQH. 
29 
 
In sum, we decline to adopt a per se rule that character evidence of appropriateness 
with children in one’s custody or care (or similar traits) is never relevant in a criminal case 
where the defendant is charged with a sex crime against a child. Rather, as we discuss in 
the next section, the trial court must conduct an individualized, three-part analysis to 
determine whether such evidence is admissible. 
4. The Test for Admissibility of Character Evidence Under Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A) 
 
When the State objects to a defendant’s proffer of opinion or reputation evidence 
under Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A) to establish his or her character for a particular trait, the trial 
court must determine whether: (1) the particular quality identified by the defendant is a 
“trait of character” within the meaning of Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A); and (2) evidence of such a 
trait of character is “pertinent,” i.e., relevant to the trier of fact’s consideration of the 
charged offenses. If the court answers both of these questions in the affirmative, then the 
court (if requested by the State) should (3) analyze the proffered evidence under Rule 5-
403 to determine whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice or another circumstance listed in that Rule.17 
a. Whether a Quality Is a “Trait of Character” 
Rules 5-404 and 5-405 do not define what constitutes “character” or a “trait of 
character”; neither do their counterparts in the Federal Rules of Evidence, in what one 
                                              
17 A pretrial motion in limine is typically the best way to address the admissibility 
of character evidence. That is the approach the parties took in this case. However, if neither 
party requests a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of character evidence, if the State 
objects to (or requests an offer of proof regarding) character evidence the defendant seeks 
to admit under Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A), the trial court should conduct this analysis outside the 
presence of the jury. 
30 
 
commentator has said “is perhaps a nod to the impracticality of defining [character].” 
Barrett J. Anderson, Recognizing Character: A New Perspective on Character Evidence, 
121 Yale L.J. 1912, 1923 (2012). The Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 405 at the time of its adoption “are just as imprecise, listing several examples of 
character traits, such as honesty, peacefulness, and violence, and then stating generally that 
‘character is defined as the kind of person one is.’” Id. There is scant additional guidance 
as to what constitutes a “trait of character” for purposes of admitting character evidence in 
a criminal trial. However, a proffered character trait cannot be “so diffuse as to be merely 
synonymous with good character generally, which is not admissible.” United States v. 
Angelini, 678 F.2d 380, 381 (1st Cir. 1982). As the Court in Angelini explained, Federal 
Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)(A), from which Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A) is derived,  
permits evidence of traits only; an earlier draft was modified, deleting 
language that would have allowed the introduction of evidence of a 
defendant’s character generally. See Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 
404; Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 4-04(a)(1), 46 F.R.D. 161, 227 
(1969). Under the common law, there was a similar distinction made between 
general good character and particular traits of character. See McCormick, 
Evidence § 191, at 455 (2d ed. 1972); 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 59, at 458; 22 
Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5236, at 382.   
 
 Angelini, 678 F.2d at 382. Rule 404 “was intended to restate the common law rule.” Id. 
(citing 2 Weinstein & Berger, Evidence ¶ 404(05) (1981)). 
We determine that, at the outset of a hearing regarding the admissibility of character 
evidence under Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A), the defendant must identify with particularity the 
quality that the defendant contends is a “trait of character,” and must articulate how the 
proffered trait sheds light on the “kind of person” he or she is. Generally, this should not 
31 
 
be a difficult burden to meet. As long as the defendant’s proffered character trait is 
sufficiently specific to distinguish it from “good character generally,” the defendant will 
pass this first part of the test.  
We have no difficulty concluding that the quality of being appropriate with children 
(or similar formulations, such as trustworthiness with children, or sexual morality with 
respect to children) can shed light on the type of person one is. See Enakiev, 29 P.3d at 
1163 (“Evidence of a person’s character with respect to sexual propriety evinces that 
person’s propensity to act in a sexually proper manner in all the varying situations of 
life. In that sense, sexual propriety is materially indistinguishable from … other examples 
of character traits,” such as truthfulness, honesty, temperance, carefulness, or peacefulness, 
“and is properly deemed a character trait.”) (citation omitted); Hughes, 841 So. 2d at 722 
(evidence of a defendant’s lack of sexual deviancy, or lack of interest in children as the 
occasion of sexual desire, “constitutes evidence of character because it reveals the ‘actual 
moral or psychical disposition’ of the person”) (quoting 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 52, at 448 
(3d ed. 1940) (emphasis in original)). Thus, when a defendant seeks to offer evidence of 
his character for appropriateness with children in his custody or care, or a similar trait 
involving a disposition toward children, the trial court should proceed to the pertinence, 
i.e., relevance, inquiry. 
b. Whether a Defendant’s Character for Appropriateness with 
Children Is a “Pertinent” Trait in a Particular Criminal Case  
 
As discussed above, a court may not exclude per se proffered character evidence of 
appropriateness with children as irrelevant to the determination of charges in a criminal 
32 
 
case. However, such evidence is not automatically relevant in every criminal case in which 
a defendant is charged with a crime against a child. A court should consider in each instance 
whether the proffered testimony is evidence of a “pertinent” trait of character, given the 
specific charges in the case. That is, the court should consider whether such evidence, if 
believed by the jury, makes it less likely that the defendant committed the charged offense. 
See Sahin v. State, 337 Md. 304, 311 (1995) (“To be relevant, it is necessary that the 
character be confined to an attribute or trait the existence or nonexistence of which would 
be involved in the noncommission or commission of the particular crime charged.”) 
(cleaned up). Thus, while a particular character trait may be relevant in one kind of criminal 
case, that same trait will not be relevant in others. In Braxton v. State, 11 Md. App. 435 
(1971), the Court of Special Appeals listed several examples of irrelevant character traits 
for specific crimes: 
It is irrelevant to show the defendant’s reputation for honesty and integrity 
in a prosecution for adultery; for truth and veracity, or peace and quietude, 
in a prosecution for statutory rape; for good military conduct in a rape 
prosecution; for truth and veracity in a robbery prosecution; or for honesty 
and integrity, in a murder prosecution; for morality and sobriety in a 
prosecution for a false bank report entry; or for reliability in business in a 
prosecution for the malicious destruction of property. 
 
Id. at 440 n.3 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
Where the State alleges that a defendant sexually abused a child who was in his 
custody or care at the time of the alleged offense, the relevance of character evidence 
concerning the defendant’s appropriateness with children in his custody or care is clear to 
us. To be sure, a jury may ultimately give such evidence little weight. However, for the 
reasons discussed above, we believe such character evidence has probative value, 
33 
 
especially in a case where (as here) temporary custody or care of the allegedly abused child 
is an element of at least one of the charged offenses.  
An arguably more difficult case in which to establish relevance may be where the 
defendant is charged with, for example, kidnapping and sexually assaulting a child with 
whom he has no prior relationship. In such a case, the probative value of character evidence 
of appropriateness with children (in one’s custody or otherwise) may depend on additional 
factors, including the theory of the defense and the particulars of the character evidence the 
defendant seeks to introduce. We leave such determinations of relevance for trial judges to 
assess on a case-by-case basis.  
c. Application of the Rule 5-403 Balancing Test 
If a trial judge determines that the proffered evidence goes to a “trait of character” 
and that such evidence has probative value to the jury’s consideration of the charges against 
the defendant, then the trial court should conduct a Rule 5-403 analysis (if the State requests 
that the court do so). If the court concludes that the probative value of the character 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, etc., then the trial court may exclude the proffered evidence.18  
 
 
                                              
18 If the result of the trial court’s analysis under the three-part test we have 
articulated is that the category of proposed character evidence is ruled admissible, the 
defendant still must establish that the proffered witness has a sufficient basis of knowledge 
upon which to provide opinion or reputation testimony regarding the character of the 
defendant. See Devincentz, 460 Md. at 543-44. And, if the defense seeks to admit character 
evidence through improper methods, e.g., proof of specific instances of conduct, as 
opposed to opinion and/or reputation evidence, then the court may sustain an objection by 
the State on that basis as well. Md. Rule 5-405(a). 
34 
 
B. Any Error in Excluding Vigna’s Proffered Character Evidence Was Harmless 
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. 
 
A trial court’s error does not necessarily require reversal of a conviction and a new 
trial. If an appellate court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error had no influence 
on the verdict, then the error is deemed harmless, and the conviction stands. See, e.g., 
Morris v. State, 418 Md. 194, 221-22 (2011). The exclusion of evidence is harmless if it is 
“unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as 
revealed by the record.” Dionas v. State, 436 Md. 97, 117 (2013).  
In this case, the circuit court ended its admissibility analysis after concluding that 
appropriateness in interactions with children is not a character trait. The circuit court was 
troubled by the “specific” and “unique” nature of the quality that Vigna articulated as a 
character trait. However, as discussed above, at the first step in the analysis we outlined 
above, we are concerned with traits that suffer from the opposite problem, i.e., traits that 
are so broad they are synonymous with good character generally. Appropriateness with 
children in one’s custody or care does not suffer from this infirmity. The circuit court 
should have considered that trait’s relevance to the jury’s consideration of the charges 
Vigna faced. 
 
The Court of Special Appeals considered the relevance question, but as discussed 
above, erred in adopting a per se rule that such character evidence has no relevance in a 
case where a defendant is charged with a sex offense against a child. We conclude that 
evidence of Vigna’s character for appropriateness with children in his custody or care had 
35 
 
at least some probative value in determining whether he abused the five children in his 
temporary custody or care, as alleged in the indictments.  
 
If we assume for the sake of argument that the State had no valid basis upon which 
to argue for exclusion of the proffered character evidence under Rule 5-403, we 
nevertheless conclude that the circuit court’s error in excluding the evidence was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. As the Court of Special Appeals aptly observed: 
Ultimately, very little of the testimony that Mr. Vigna offered did not find its 
way to the jury. He called nine defense witnesses who testified that he was 
law-abiding and truthful. Four were former colleagues, and two worked in 
Mr. Vigna’s classroom alongside him. One character witness, who was both 
a former colleague and the parent of a former student, testified that she 
trusted Mr. Vigna “obviously, with the lives of [her] children” and that “as a 
coworker, I trust him helping me out of some very difficult situations with 
other children. So [ ] he’s very trustworthy and ... very calming to the children 
that I needed help with.” Another stated that he would trust Mr. Vigna with 
his life. Mr. Vigna’s twelve-year-old niece testified that she trusted her uncle. 
And despite excluding testimony about Mr. Vigna’s reputation for 
interacting appropriately with children, the court allowed multiple parents to 
testify about the positive experience of having Mr. Vigna teach their children. 
He was not permitted to elicit testimony that he had the reputation for 
conducting himself appropriately with children, but the extensive testimony 
he did elicit supports the “trait” that Mr. Vigna sought to establish. 
 
241 Md. App. at 679-80. 
 
We agree with the Court of Special Appeals’ assessment of the record. The 
testimony from parents who stated that, based on their experiences in seeing Vigna interact 
with children, they would entrust the lives of their children and other children to him, was 
functionally the equivalent of an opinion that Vigna was the type of person who was 
appropriate with children. See McDowell v. State, 318 P.3d 352, 359-60 (Wyo. 2014) 
(witness who testified that her brother (the defendant) was an attentive, “fun uncle” and 
36 
 
that she never “ha[d] any problems” with him while her children were growing up, 
colloquially provided an opinion as to the defendant’s trustworthiness with children).  
Moreover, the opinion testimony of multiple defense witnesses that Vigna was law-
abiding, although broader than the excluded opinion evidence Vigna sought to elicit, 
ultimately served the same purpose. That is, if the jurors credited the character evidence 
that Vigna was law-abiding, they logically would have inferred that Vigna was not the type 
of person who would commit the specific violations of law with which he was charged.  
Finally, Vigna testified in his own defense and denied that he ever improperly 
touched any of his students. Indeed, he claimed that touching a student inappropriately was 
“simply against the fiber of [him].” The defense witnesses who followed Vigna on the 
witness stand testified to his character for truthfulness. The character evidence that Vigna 
was a truthful person, if believed, supported Vigna’s argument that the jurors should 
believe his denial of the charges.  
For these reasons, we conclude that any error in precluding the defense witnesses 
from opining that Vigna was not just law-abiding and truthful, but also was the type of 
person who is appropriate with children, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
Rothwell, 294 P.3d at 1150 (improper exclusion of character evidence that defendant was 
trustworthy with children was harmless, given its marginal probative value); McAlpin, 812 
P.2d at 577-78 (erroneous exclusion of opinion evidence that defendant was not a person 
given to lewd conduct was harmless under a reasonable probability standard); Hallman, 
379 S.E.2d at 117 (erroneous exclusion of evidence of defendant’s reputation for 
“morality” was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, where the character witnesses 
37 
 
testified that defendant had a good reputation for truth and veracity, which supported 
defendant’s own testimony that he did not commit the alleged abuse).19  
C. Vigna’s Constitutional Arguments Are Not Preserved for Appellate Review or 
Abandoned, and Lack Merit in Any Event.  
 
In the Court of Special Appeals, Vigna argued that the circuit court’s decisions to 
exclude his proffered character evidence and admit the 2008 and 2013 reprimands violated 
his right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Vigna’s theory was that the circuit court’s admission of his prior reprimands, combined 
with the exclusion of the defense witnesses’ proffered opinion and/or reputation testimony 
concerning Vigna’s character for appropriateness with children, was so prejudicial that it 
                                              
19 Vigna’s reliance on Pierce v. State, 62 Md. App. 453 (1985), is unavailing. In 
Pierce, the evidence showed that the victim began arguing with the defendant at a party 
when the defendant applied first aid to the victim’s teenage son. The victim, who was 
intoxicated at the time, started grappling with the defendant, who was carrying a handgun 
for protection. During the struggle, the firearm discharged, killing the victim. Id. at 455-
56. The trial judge precluded the defendant from eliciting character evidence of her 
peaceable nature, but two defense witnesses were allowed to testify to the defendant’s 
general good character and law-abiding nature. The jury acquitted the defendant of murder, 
but convicted her of voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held 
that the erroneous exclusion of character evidence of peacefulness was not harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 461-62.  
Assuming we would reach the same conclusion in Pierce as the Court of Special 
Appeals did, Pierce is distinguishable from this case. Evidence that a defendant is generally 
law-abiding may be much less significant than evidence that the defendant is peaceful, 
where the defendant is charged with murder as a result of a homicide that is not alleged to 
have been premeditated, but rather occurred during a struggle in a matter of seconds. In 
contrast, when a defendant is charged with committing sex crimes against multiple children 
spanning more than a decade, a jury may be able more readily to infer from character 
evidence about the defendant’s law-abidingness that the defendant is not the type of person 
who would commit the crimes with which he is charged.  
38 
 
denied him a fair trial. The Court of Special Appeals rejected this argument. Vigna, 241 
Md. App. at 732-33. 
In his petition for certiorari, the second question Vigna asked us to review was: 
“Did the Court of Special Appeals err when it failed to recognize that denying Mr. Vigna 
the ability to introduce relevant character evidence, while at the same time allowing the 
state to introduce non-criminal 404(b) ‘bad acts’ character evidence, denied him the right 
to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution?”  
We agreed to consider this question when we granted Vigna’s petition for certiorari. 
However, in his briefs to this Court, Vigna did not include any substantive argument about 
how the purported imbalance of the two evidentiary rulings rendered his trial unfair under 
the Sixth Amendment. Thus, Vigna abandoned the constitutional argument underlying the 
second question for which we granted review. See Md. Rules 8-504(a)(6) & (c). 
In place of his abandoned Sixth Amendment argument, Vigna made a different 
constitutional argument, claiming for the first time that the exclusion of his proffered 
character evidence violated his right to due process.20 Vigna seemingly accepts that 
exclusion of the type of character evidence he sought to admit would not have posed a due 
process problem when “our court system [was] male-centered.” However, according to 
                                              
20 Vigna did not specify in his briefs whether his due process claim arises under the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, or under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, or 
both. 
 
39 
 
Vigna, in the advent of statutory protections that now exist for victims,21 “this Court should 
be mindful of the pendulum swinging too far,” and should hold that, as a matter of due 
process, a court must allow a defendant to introduce relevant character evidence of the sort 
Vigna proffered in his trial. 
Vigna failed to preserve this due process argument for appellate review. See Md. 
Rule 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it 
plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court.”). 
Regardless, both Vigna’s original Sixth Amendment argument and his new due process 
argument lack merit. As discussed above, any error in the exclusion of character evidence 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. By definition, then, Vigna received a fair trial. It 
may not have been a perfect trial, given the limitation on Vigna’s ability to elicit the more 
specific character evidence he proffered, but fairness, not perfection, is the constitutional 
standard. See Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 647 (1976) (“[I]t is firmly established that an 
accused has a constitutional right to a fair trial but not necessarily to that seldom 
experienced rarity, a perfect trial.”) (cleaned up). 
Moreover, we disagree with Vigna that due process requires the admission of 
character evidence of the sort he sought to elicit in this case, either as applied to him or as 
to all defendants. The logical conclusion of Vigna’s argument is that a trial judge lacks all 
                                              
21 Vigna observes that “[i]n Maryland we have seen the advent of rape-shield laws, 
expansion of 404(b)-character evidence applied to sexual assault cases; child hearsay 
evidentiary rules (See Md. Rule 5-802.1), amendments to criminal procedure rules 
specifically to protect child sexual assault victims (See Md. Crim. Pro. 11-304), and also 
the establishment of Maryland’s victim’s rights laws that are so robust and progressive that 
they are now explicitly listed in the Maryland Declaration of Rights.”  
40 
 
discretion when it comes to relevant character evidence. To accept that contention would 
be to render such evidence immune to exclusion or limitation under Rule 5-403. We reject 
that assertion. We trust trial judges to exercise their discretion wisely in such 
circumstances, giving due consideration to a defendant’s right to put on a meaningful 
defense. See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). As for the contention 
that the circuit court’s ruling, as applied to Vigna, violated due process, we again disagree. 
The ruling did not prevent Vigna from putting on any kind of character evidence, let alone 
a meaningful defense. The record reflects that Vigna was ably represented by experienced 
trial counsel who, indeed, did present a meaningful defense on behalf of his client. The 
jury seems to have deliberated with care, acquitting Vigna of five of the 14 charges. We 
are confident that Vigna received due process, regardless of any harmless error that resulted 
from the exclusion of the character evidence Vigna sought to introduce.  
IV 
Conclusion 
As discussed above, character evidence of a defendant’s appropriateness with 
children in his custody or care (or a similar character trait) may be admissible in a case 
where a defendant is charged with a sex crime against a child. However, any error in the 
exclusion of such character evidence in Vigna’s case was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, given the extensive character evidence that the jury heard about Vigna’s character 
41 
 
for being law-abiding and truthful. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Special Appeals. 
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED; COSTS 
TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER. 
 
 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case Nos. 130781C & 129932C 
Argued: March 9, 2020 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 55 
 
September Term, 2019 
 
__________________________________ 
 
JOHN VIGNA  
v. 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
__________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Concurring Opinion by Hotten, J., which 
Watts, J. joins. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed: August 18, 2020 
 
Respectfully, I join the Majority in affirming the judgment of the Court of Special 
Appeals.  However, I write separately to express my views regarding the Majority’s 
conclusion that appropriateness with children in the care of Mr. Vigna is a pertinent 
character trait.   
Before trial, Mr. Vigna attempted to introduce, as character evidence, testimony that 
he had a reputation in the community for “appropriate interaction with students,” which he 
later broadened to include “any situation in which he has supervisory responsibility for 
children in his custody[.]”  Under Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A): “An accused [in a 
criminal case] may offer evidence of the accused’s pertinent trait of character.  If the 
evidence is admitted, the prosecution may offer evidence to rebut it.”  But fundamentally, 
what constitutes a “character trait”?  
The plain-language of the Rule outlines two elements that must be satisfied before 
the accused may offer character evidence: (1) the evidence must pertain to a trait of 
character and (2) that trait must be pertinent, or relevant, to the crime charged.  
Appropriateness with children in his care or custody is not a trait of character.  I am 
unconvinced that “reputation” for appropriate interaction with children in his care is a 
character trait, nor am I convinced that this testimony would be relevant in a child sex 
abuse trial.  I explain my reasoning more fully herein.  
A. Appropriate Interactions with Children in His Care is Not a Trait of Character. 
 
As a general rule, “evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not 
admissible to prove that the person acted in accordance with the character or trait on a 
particular occasion.”  Md. Rule 5-404(a)(1).  Stated differently, such evidence is 
 
2 
 
inadmissible to prove propensity.  Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A) is an exception to the 
general prohibition against propensity evidence.   
 
Character under the evidentiary rules, “is a generalized description of a person’s 
disposition, or of the[ir] disposition [with] respect to a general trait, such as honesty, 
temperance or peacefulness, that usually is regarded as meriting approval or disapproval.” 
1 McCormick on Evid. § 195 (8th ed. 2020).   While the text of the relevant rules does not 
explicitly define what constitutes a “character trait,” Black’s Law Dictionary similarly 
defines “character” as “[t]he qualities that combine to make an individual human being 
distinctive from others, esp[ecially] as regards morality and behavior; the disposition, 
reputation, or collective traits of a person as they might be gathered from close observation 
of that person’s pattern of behavior.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  A 
“trait” is generally understood to be an “[e]lement of a person’s [makeup] serving as an 
explanation 
of 
personal 
characteristics.” 
 
Trait, 
THE 
LAW 
DICTIONARY, 
https://thelawdictionary.org/trait/ (last visited on August 11, 2020), archived at 
https://perma.cc/DE6Y-PMTF; 
Trait, 
Merriam-Webster’s 
Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trait (last visited August 11, 2020), archived 
at https://perma.cc/XA8F-P3HY (defining “trait” as “a distinguishing quality (as of 
personal character)”).  
 
These definitions prove useful here.  As the trial judge articulated at the motions 
hearing, “usually character traits . . . span across all walks of life and all categories of 
interaction with people.”  However, Mr. Vigna attempted to elicit testimony that he was 
appropriate with children when they were under his supervision.  Unlike a general character 
 
3 
 
for being a peaceful person in an assault prosecution, for example, evidence that Mr. Vigna 
acted appropriately with children in his care or custody is evidence of conduct under 
specific circumstances.  It is not the kind of evidence contemplated by the exceptions to 
Rule 5-404(a)(1), because the evidence is situational and does not transcend all 
circumstances and interactions with all people.  Although a defendant is permitted to 
introduce evidence of a character trait on direct examination, such evidence is limited to 
testimony regarding the reputation of the accused for a particular character trait, and the 
witness’s personal opinion concerning that trait.  Md. Rule 5-405.  A defendant is not 
permitted to introduce evidence of specific instances of conduct on direct examination, 
unless evidence of the character trait is an “essential element of a charge, claim, or 
defense[.]”  Md. Rule 5-405(b).  Mr. Vigna framed this witness testimony as concerning 
his reputation in the community, but in actuality, this testimony constitutes past instances 
of behavior or conduct, which is prohibited under the relevant evidentiary rules.  Mr. 
Vigna’s attempt to reframe testimony of past conduct as “reputation” evidence falls just 
short of describing his conduct with children on a particular date and time.  As such, the 
proffered evidence was not evidence of a character attribute or trait.  
B. Appropriate Interactions with Children in His Care is Not “Pertinent” to 
Allegations of Child Sex Abuse.  
 
Assuming that the proffered evidence does qualify as a character trait, it was not 
pertinent.  As so well expressed by the Court of Special Appeals, “[t]he scope of what 
constitutes a ‘pertinent character trait’ under Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A) is defined by the nature 
of the crimes alleged.”  Vigna v. State, 241 Md. App. 704, 717–18, 213 A.3d 668, 676 
 
4 
 
(2019).  It is one that is relevant to the alleged crimes of the accused.  Braxton v. State, 11 
Md. App. 435, 440, 274 A.2d 647, 650 (1971).  To surpass the relevance bar, the character 
trait must be “confined to an attribute or trait the existence or nonexistence of which would 
be involved in the noncommission or commission of the particular crime[.]”  Id.  In other 
words, to be admissible as a pertinent trait of character, the particular evidence offered 
must bear some nexus to the charged crimes.  See State v. Bogle, 324 N.C. 190, 201, 376 
S.E.2d 745, 751 (1989) (stating that a “pertinent” character trait is that which “bear[s] a 
special relationship to . . . the crime charged”) (emphasis in original).  In the case at bar, 
we are concerned with whether “Mr. Vigna’s reputation in the community for appropriately 
interacting with children bears on whether he sexually abused them.”  Vigna, 241 Md. App. 
at 718, 213 A.3d at 676.  I agree with the Court of Special Appeals and the trial court, that 
such evidence has no bearing in this type of case.     
Evidence of appropriate behavior or conduct with children, unlike character for 
truthfulness or peacefulness in a fraud or assault investigation, adds nothing to a child sex 
abuse prosecution, because of the nature of the allegations.  As I believe the Court of 
Special Appeals correctly pointed out, child sexual predators are particularly insidious.  
These types of sexual predators often hide in plain sight.  They “blend into the community 
and often stand in trust relationships—coaches, clergy, teachers, physicians, or family 
members—with their victims.”  Vigna, 241 Md. App. at 722, 213 A.3d at 678 (citing Anne-
Marie McAlinden, Setting ‘Em Up: Personal, Familial, and Institutional Grooming in the 
Sexual Abuse of Children, 15 SOC. AND LEGAL STUD. 339, 348 (2006)).  They “groom 
victims through these relationships and skillfully manipulate a child into a situation where 
 
5 
 
he or she can be more readily sexually abused and is simultaneously less likely to disclose.”  
Id. (internal quotations omitted).  Mr. Vigna was an elementary school teacher with more 
than twenty years in the same school system.  Considering the covert nature of child sexual 
abuse under the circumstances presented, testimony regarding Mr. Vigna’s appropriate 
behavior with children in his care would prove irrelevant and tend to confuse or mislead 
the triers of fact. 
 
A minority of jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions in that regard.  For 
example, in State v. Jackson, “the Court of Appeals of Washington held that[,] because of 
the secretive nature of sexual crimes, and sexual activity in general, [] reputation for sexual 
activity, or lack thereof, bore no correlation to the likelihood that [the defendant] 
committed the crimes charged[.]”  Vigna, 241 Md. App. at 720, 213 A.3d at 677 (citing 
Jackson, 46 Wash. App. 360, 365, 730 P.2d 1361, 1364 (1986)).  In that case, the defendant 
was convicted of statutory rape, after the trial court excluded witness testimony that the 
defendant had a good reputation in the community for “not spend[ing] an inordinate 
amount of time with children in the community who are less than the age of ten” and 
generally for “not molesting children[.]”  Jackson, 46 Wash. App. at 365, 730 P.2d at 1364.  
The appellate court rejected the argument that this evidence was relevant because crimes 
of a sexual nature are “normally [] intimate, private affair[s] not known to the community.”  
Vigna, 241 Md. App at 720, 213 A.3d at 677 (footnote omitted).  As the Court of Special 
Appeals aptly acknowledged:   
Unlike honesty or peacefulness, traits [that] a person might exhibit visibly 
day-to-day, sexual interests, predilections, or deviancy are not readily 
discernable to a casual observer, or even a close colleague.  For that reason, 
 
6 
 
courts in other states have disagreed with the majority view and have found 
reputation evidence relating to sexual behavior irrelevant to a defendant’s 
guilt for sexual crimes involving children.  Put another way, the fact that a 
defendant might have behaved appropriately with children in some instances 
does not make it more or less likely that the defendant sexually abused a 
child. 
 
Id.  In conclusion, for the reasons previously expressed, I respectfully concur.    
Judge Watts has authorized me to state that she joins in this opinion.  
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here:  
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/coa/55a19cn.pdf