Title: Commonwealth v. Rodriguez

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12093 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  BRANDON RODRIGUEZ. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     October 5, 2016. - February 1, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Receiving Stolen Goods.  Larceny.  Constitutional Law, Double 
jeopardy.  Practice, Criminal, Dismissal, Double jeopardy, 
Collateral estoppel.  Due Process of Law, Collateral 
estoppel, Prosecutorial vindictiveness.  Estoppel.  
Collateral Estoppel.  Judicial Estoppel. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the New Bedford Division 
of the District Court Department on July 24, 2013. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Lisa F. Edmonds, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Roger L. Michel, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Timothy St. Lawrence for the defendant. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  In this case we consider whether an acquittal on 
a charge of receipt of stolen property bars a subsequent 
prosecution for larceny of the same property.  We conclude that 
2 
 
principles of double jeopardy are not a bar to such action and 
that the successive prosecutions here do not violate the 
equitable principles that must be considered in such cases. 
 
Background and procedure.  1.  The Commonwealth's 
allegations.1  In 2012, the defendant went to his friend's house.  
While the friend searched for his cellular telephone, he 
discovered the defendant in his mother's bedroom, standing in 
front of her jewelry box.  A drawer in the jewelry box was open.  
The defendant claimed he had been petting the friend's dog, who 
was in the bedroom.  The defendant asked his friend if he wanted 
the defendant "to shake [his] pockets out," but the friend 
declined.  The next day, the friend's mother discovered that a 
family ring was missing.  Later, her daughter saw a photograph 
online of the defendant in which he was wearing the ring on a 
chain around his neck. 
 
2.  The receipt of stolen property charge.  The 
Commonwealth initially sought a complaint in the New Bedford 
Division of the District Court Department against the defendant 
on the charges of both larceny in excess of $250 and receipt of 
stolen property, pursuant to G. L. c. 266, §§ 30 (1) and 60, 
respectively.  Apparently, because the friend was unavailable at 
 
1 This background section is based on the prosecutor's 
opening statement at trial, as the judge directed a verdict of 
not guilty before any evidence was introduced.  The defendant 
maintains he is innocent.  That the facts are disputed has no 
bearing on our decision in this appeal. 
                     
3 
 
the time, the Commonwealth was unable to present the factual 
evidence necessary to establish probable cause of larceny by the 
defendant.  As a result, the clerk-magistrate issued a complaint 
only for receipt of stolen property.  On the morning of trial, 
the friend, who could supply the evidence supporting the larceny 
charge, became available as a witness.  After jury empanelment, 
the trial judge learned that the testimony of the new witness 
related to larceny rather than receipt of stolen property. 
 
The judge told the parties that he would instruct the jury 
that if they found that the defendant was the thief, then they 
could not convict him of receiving stolen property.2  The judge 
denied the prosecutor's motion to amend the complaint to include 
larceny but stated that the Commonwealth was free to bring a new 
complaint for larceny at a later date.  Following the 
Commonwealth's opening statement, the judge invited and allowed 
the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty. 
 
3.  The larceny charge.  Weeks later, the Commonwealth 
filed a complaint against the defendant for larceny over $250.  
The defendant was arraigned on October 11, 2013.  He moved to 
dismiss the complaint on the ground of double jeopardy, arguing 
that he previously had been acquitted of receipt of stolen 
property, and the object of both prosecutions was the same 
 
2 As discussed infra, this was an erroneous statement of the 
law. 
                     
4 
 
allegedly stolen ring.  A different judge denied the motion to 
dismiss, as well as a motion for reconsideration.  A third 
judge, however, allowed the defendant's motion to dismiss, 
finding that larceny and receipt of stolen property were very 
closely related and based on the same facts.3  The Commonwealth 
appealed from the dismissal of the larceny charge.  We allowed 
the defendant's application for direct appellate review. 
 
  We reverse the allowance of the motion to dismiss, as 
larceny and receipt of stolen property are not the same offense 
for double jeopardy purposes.  Further, other equitable 
doctrines -- due process, collateral estoppel, and judicial 
estoppel -- do not weigh in this defendant's favor. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Double jeopardy.  Both parties agree that 
the trial judge erred in directing a verdict of not guilty on 
the charge of receipt.  Under our common law, it has long been 
the rule that a defendant may be charged with both larceny and 
receipt of stolen property, although, for reasons unrelated to 
double jeopardy, he may be convicted of only one of these 
offenses.  See Commonwealth v. Haskins, 128 Mass. 60, 61 (1880).  
This bar against convictions of both crimes does not mean that 
the Commonwealth cannot prove receipt using evidence showing 
 
3 It is not apparent from the record why this judge heard 
this motion, as it had already been decided.  The judge denied 
the prosecutor's request for an opportunity to brief the matter 
despite his protest that a different prosecutor had briefed and 
argued the issue previously. 
                     
5 
 
that the defendant was the thief.  Commonwealth v. Corcoran, 69 
Mass. App. Ct. 123, 127 (2007). 
 
The defendant argues that the subsequent larceny complaint 
was properly dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy.  We 
disagree. 
 
Because it involves a question of law, we review the motion 
judge's decision de novo.  See Commonwealth v. Carlino, 449 
Mass. 71, 72 n.7 (2007).  Double jeopardy protection stems from 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and from 
Massachusetts common and statutory law.4  Commonwealth v. Woods, 
414 Mass. 343, 346, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 815 (1993).  
Traditional double jeopardy principles bar a second prosecution 
for the same offense after either an acquittal or a conviction, 
as well as multiple punishments for the same offense.  Mahoney 
v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 278, 283 (1993).  As the defendant 
argues that his acquittal on the receipt of stolen property 
charge bars a subsequent larceny prosecution, he must show that 
receipt and larceny of the same property constitute the "same 
offense" for double jeopardy purposes.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gonzalez, 437 Mass. 276, 281 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 962 
(2003). 
 
4 General Laws c. 263, § 7, provides:  "A person shall not 
be held to answer on a second indictment or complaint for a 
crime of which he has been acquitted upon the facts and merits 
. . . ." 
                     
6 
 
 
a.  Appropriate test.  The parties disagree as to the 
appropriate test for determining whether two charges constitute 
the same offense in the case of successive prosecutions.5  The 
Commonwealth asserts that we should apply the same elements 
test, which normally governs our double jeopardy analysis.  The 
defendant argues that, in addition to the same elements test, we 
should also use the same conduct test, which, he maintains, 
would address concerns unique to successive prosecutions.6  We 
 
5 In a case of successive prosecutions, the defendant has 
already been "put in jeopardy" for the first charge.  The 
pertinent double jeopardy question that arises prior to the 
second trial is whether the defendant is being prosecuted again 
for an offense of which he was previously acquitted or 
convicted.  See Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871) 
(prior acquittal or conviction is bar to subsequent prosecution 
for same offense).  In a single prosecution, the question of 
double jeopardy arises at the sentencing stage.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Valliere, 437 Mass. 366, 371-372 (2002) ("The 
appropriate remedy for duplicative convictions, so as to prevent 
multiple punishments, is to vacate both the conviction and 
sentence on the lesser included offense, and to affirm on the 
more serious offense" [emphasis added]). 
 
 
6 We and the United States Supreme Court have already 
rejected two other tests that have emerged over the years. 
 
 
The same transaction test would require a prosecutor to 
bring "all charges arising out of the same incident or 
transaction" in a single prosecution.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gallarelli, 372 Mass. 573, 578-579 (1977) (discussing and 
rejecting same transaction test).  It would bar separate 
prosecutions for multiple crimes committed during the course of 
a crime spree, or for conspiracy and the substantive act.  See, 
e.g., Glawson v. Commonwealth, 445 Mass. 1019, 1020 (2005), 
cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1118 (2006).  Although the Model Penal 
Code and at least one Justice of the Supreme Court have 
advocated for adoption of this test, see Model Penal Code 
§ 1.07(2) (1962); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 452-456 (1970) 
                     
7 
 
conclude that the same elements test, firmly rooted in our 
history and our case law, is the only appropriate test to apply 
in both single and successive prosecution scenarios. 
 
i.  Same elements test.  The same elements test has a long 
history in both Massachusetts and Federal double jeopardy 
jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 
434-435 (1871), citing Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick. 496 
(1832).  See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 
(1932) (adopting same elements test from Morey as applicable to 
double jeopardy clause of Fifth Amendment).  See also Grady v. 
Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 535-536 (1990)7 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
("We have applied the Roby-Morey-Gavieres-Blockburger 
(Brennan, J., concurring), we and the Supreme Court have 
consistently rejected it.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (a), 378 
Mass. 859 (1979) (permitting but not requiring joinder by 
prosecutor of offenses based on same criminal conduct or 
episode); United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 709 n.14 (1993); 
Glawson, supra ("no double jeopardy violation merely because a 
defendant is tried separately for different offenses arising 
from a single transaction or series of events"). 
 
 
The same evidence test "would prevent the government from 
introducing in a subsequent prosecution any evidence that was 
introduced in a preceding prosecution."  Grady v. Corbin, 495 
U.S. 508, 521 n.12 (1990), overruled by Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704.  
Here, for example, the Commonwealth could not introduce the 
allegedly stolen ring in a trial on the larceny complaint if the 
ring had been used in the prosecution of the receipt charge.  
This test has been soundly rejected.  See Dixon, supra; 
Commonwealth v. Woods, 414 Mass. 343, 351, cert. denied, 510 
U.S. 815 (1993). 
 
 
7 As we discuss infra, the Grady case was expressly 
overruled insofar as it required any test except the same 
elements test.  See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704. 
                                                                  
8 
 
formulation in virtually every case defining the 'same offense' 
decided since Blockburger").  Under this test, a defendant may 
face successive prosecutions "for two crimes arising out of the 
same course of conduct provided that each crime requires proof 
of an element that the other does not."  Commonwealth v. 
Valliere, 437 Mass. 366, 371 (2002), citing Morey, 108 Mass. at 
434.  This means that a defendant facing successive prosecutions 
must show either that the new charge has the same elements as 
the first charge, or that one of the charged crimes is a lesser 
included offense of the other.  The defendant argues that, in 
applying the same elements test, we have historically examined 
whether the acts underlying both offenses "are so closely 
related [in fact] as to constitute in substance [but] a single 
crime."  Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. 418, 433 (2009).  We 
have done so, however, only where one of the crimes was a lesser 
included offense of the other, or where multiple counts of the 
same charge were brought together.  See id. at 435, and cases 
cited.  If a defendant cannot meet his burden under the same 
elements test, the underlying facts are irrelevant. 
 
ii.  Same conduct test.  The same conduct test considers 
what conduct the government would prove at trial, and would 
"bar[] a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential 
element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the 
government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for 
9 
 
which the defendant has already been prosecuted."  Grady, 495 
U.S. at 510.  The defendant argues that we should apply the same 
conduct test to mitigate the uncertainty and expense that 
defendants experience when facing successive prosecutions. 
 
Although the United States Supreme Court briefly adopted 
the same conduct test in successive prosecutions in Grady, the 
Court quickly reversed course, expressly overruling Grady three 
years later in United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 697, 704 
(1993).  There, the Court held that the Federal Constitution 
requires application only of the same elements test in both 
single and successive prosecutions.  Id. at 710-712.  By arguing 
that we should apply the same conduct test in the case of 
successive prosecutions, the defendant asks us to provide a 
higher level of protection than is required by the United States 
Constitution.  Although State common law and statutory law may 
provide greater protection against double jeopardy, Commonwealth 
v. Carlino, 449 Mass. at 79 n.20, as a general matter, "we have 
long recognized a protection against double jeopardy that is 
coextensive with Federal protection."  MacLean v. State Bd. of 
Retirement, 432 Mass. 339, 350 n.14 (2000). 
 
We decline to go further here.  Since the early Nineteenth 
Century, we have held that a prior acquittal does not bar a 
subsequent prosecution unless the two charges are legally the 
same offense.  Roby, 12 Pick. at 504 (no double jeopardy where 
10 
 
offenses are "perfectly distinct in point of law, however nearly 
they may be connected in fact").  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
406 Mass. 533, 536 (1990) (adhering to same elements test months 
before Grady was decided).  We deviated from this tradition in 
deference to Grady, which was subsequently overruled.8  See 
Woods, 414 Mass. at 346 (applying Grady test before Dixon was 
decided).  Since Dixon, we have again rejected the same conduct 
test in the context of a single prosecution.  See Vick, 454 
Mass. at 433-434.  By urging us to differentiate between single 
and successive prosecutions, the defendant would have us 
overturn long-standing precedent:  Morey, the seminal case 
articulating the same elements test, involved successive 
prosecutions (albeit prosecutions in the same term of the 
court).  See Morey, 108 Mass. at 434.  See also Commonwealth v. 
Gallant, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 409, 414-415 (2006) ("it is difficult 
to see how . . . a conduct-based test could ever possibly mesh 
with the Morey standard"). 
 
8 The cases to which the defendant cites do not change this 
tradition, as those cases did not decide to apply any test other 
than the same elements test, but only noted that defendants in 
successive prosecutions may require additional protection.  We 
discuss this in more detail in part 3, infra, in the section on 
equitable protections.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Crocker, 384 
Mass. 353, 359 n.7 (1981) ("Determining whether such cases 
involve reprosecution for the 'same offense' may require 
consideration of the actual facts developed at trial in support 
of the charge tried first" [emphasis added]). 
                     
11 
 
 
We are also guided by the historical adherence to the same 
elements test, which best balances protection of the defendant 
with other considerations:  due process and fairness, 
prosecutorial discretion, a desire to allow for severance of 
defendants and offenses into separate trials, and respect for 
the dignity of multiple victims of criminal behavior.  See Ashe 
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 468-469 (1970) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting on other grounds); Commonwealth v. Gallarelli, 372 
Mass. 573, 578 (1977).  Thus, the same elements test remains the 
only appropriate analysis, in both single and successive 
prosecutions. 
 
b.  Application of the same elements test.  To prove 
larceny, the Commonwealth must show that (1) the defendant took 
and carried away property; (2) the property was owned or 
possessed by someone other than the defendant; and (3) the 
defendant did so with the intent to deprive that person of the 
property permanently.  G. L. c. 266, § 30 (1) ("Whoever steals 
. . . the property of another . . . shall be guilty of larceny 
. . .").  See Commonwealth v. Donovan, 395 Mass. 20, 25-26 
(1985).  Receipt of stolen property requires that (1) the 
property in question was stolen; (2) the defendant knew that the 
property had been stolen; and (3) the defendant received or 
aided in the concealment of the stolen property.  G. L. c. 266, 
§ 60 ("Whoever buys, receives or aids in the concealment of 
12 
 
stolen . . . property, knowing it to have been stolen . . . 
shall be punished . . .").  See Commonwealth v. Donahue, 369 
Mass. 943, 949, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976).  Larceny thus 
requires that the defendant be the thief, whereas receipt 
"requires that the property already be stolen at the time of 
receipt."  Corcoran, 69 Mass. App. Ct. at 127 n.6.  As a result, 
the offenses are not identical, and neither is a lesser included 
offense of the other.  Instead, any intuitive connection between 
larceny and receipt arises because they have a principal-
accessory relationship.  See Commonwealth v. Finn, 108 Mass. 
466, 468 (1871) ("The offence of receiving stolen goods is 
accessory, only, to the principal offence of larceny.  The 
receiver is an accessory after the fact").  See also 
Commonwealth v. Berryman, 359 Mass. 127, 129 (1971) ("under our 
law one cannot be both a principal in a crime and an accessory 
after the fact to the same crime"); Commonwealth v. DiStasio, 
297 Mass. 347, 357, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 683 and 302 U.S. 759 
(1937) (principal and accessory offenses are distinct for double 
jeopardy purposes), citing Roby, 12 Pick. at 504.  See generally 
Commonwealth v. Nascimento, 421 Mass. 677, 683 (1996) (defendant 
may be charged with both larceny and receipt, but logically may 
not be convicted of both offenses).  Because larceny and receipt 
are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, dismissal 
13 
 
of the larceny complaint on double jeopardy grounds is not 
warranted. 
 
3.  Equitable protections.  Successive prosecutions raise 
concerns not present in single prosecutions.  See Dixon, 509 
U.S. at 724 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) ("To subject an individual to repeated prosecutions 
exposes him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal, . . . violates 
principles of finality, . . . and increases the risk of a 
mistaken conviction" [citations omitted]).  Despite these 
concerns, "[i]t is quite central to a prosecutor's necessary 
discretion that he retain the prerogative, after obtaining a 
first set of indictments, to initiate additional prosecutions 
for separate and distinct crimes."  Johnson, 406 Mass. at 538-
539.  See E.B. Cypher, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 25:56 
(4th ed. 2014) ("there is no statutory or constitutional right 
on the part of any person to be charged simultaneously, either 
by complaint or indictment, with all the offenses of which the 
police or prosecution might then be aware and which might have 
been committed in the course of a single act"). 
 
Defendants facing successive prosecutions have three 
additional sources of protection aside from the bar against 
double jeopardy:  due process protection (against prosecutorial 
overreach), collateral estoppel, and judicial estoppel.  Given 
14 
 
the procedural background that preceded the larceny complaint, 
these factors are not present here. 
 
a.  Due process.  Due process concerns would arise when a 
defendant could show prosecutorial vindictiveness or 
retaliation.  See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 388 Mass. 865, 870 
n.9 (1983) (same elements test is constitutionally sufficient 
"unless successive prosecutions are used to harass the 
defendant").  A defendant has a heavy burden to demonstrate that 
there was prosecutorial vindictiveness:  there must be a high 
likelihood of actual vindictiveness, and application of the 
doctrine must not "unduly undermine normal prosecutorial 
discretion" to bring charges in multiple prosecutions.  Johnson, 
406 Mass. at 537.  Here, the Commonwealth brought the new charge 
after the trial judge (erroneously) dismissed the pending charge 
of receipt of stolen property.  The Commonwealth initially 
applied for a single complaint charging both offenses, but 
failed because a key witness was unavailable to the police until 
the day of the trial.  See Glawson v. Commonwealth, 445 Mass. 
1019, 1021 (2005, cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1118 (2006) (noting 
that Commonwealth sought to consolidate issues).  As the second 
complaint was not the result of prosecutorial vindictiveness, 
due process concerns are inapplicable here. 
 
b.  Collateral estoppel.  Collateral estoppel, also known 
as issue preclusion, is another possible form of protection for 
15 
 
defendants who face successive prosecutions.  See generally 
Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 119 n.4 (2009).  The 
doctrine bars relitigation of an issue where the defendant can 
show that "there is (1) a common factual issue; (2) a prior 
determination of that issue in litigation between the same 
parties; and (3) a showing that the determination was in favor 
of the party seeking to raise the estoppel bar" (footnotes 
omitted).  Krochta v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 711, 715-716 
(1999).  See Kimbroughtillery v. Commonwealth, 471 Mass. 507, 
510–512 (2015) (principles of collateral estoppel barred 
successive probation revocation proceedings). 
 
In applying the doctrine, courts recognize that even where 
the offenses charged in successive prosecutions do not rise to 
the level of double jeopardy, relitigation of issues that are 
common to both cases may harm the defendant.  See Brown v. Ohio, 
432 U.S. 161, 166 n.6 (1977); Commonwealth v. Scala, 380 Mass. 
500, 505 (1980).  In this case, when the trial judge directed 
the verdict of acquittal, he made a determination (erroneously) 
only on the issue of receipt -- which is not an element of 
larceny and thus not a common factual issue.  Collateral 
estoppel does not apply. 
 
c.  Judicial estoppel.  The final doctrine potentially 
available to a defendant in the case of successive prosecutions 
is judicial estoppel, which "prevent[s] the manipulation of the 
16 
 
judicial process by litigants" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. DiBenedetto, 458 Mass. 657, 671 (2011), S.C., 475 Mass. 429 
(2016).  As an equitable doctrine, judicial estoppel may be 
appropriate where "a party has adopted one position, secured a 
favorable decision, and then taken a contradictory position in 
search of legal advantage."  Otis v. Arbella Mut. Ins. Co., 443 
Mass. 634, 641 (2005), quoting InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 
134, 144 (1st Cir. 2003).  For example, where the Commonwealth 
has already secured a conviction against a defendant, it may not 
bring a new charge positing a different theory of the same 
underlying act.  Commonwealth v. Gardner, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 
747-748 (2006) (conviction constituted favorable decision for 
Commonwealth).  In the instant case, however, the defendant was 
effectively acquitted of the charge of receipt.  As the trial 
judge expressly rejected the Commonwealth's position with 
respect to receipt, judicial estoppel does not preclude the 
complaint for larceny. 
 
Conclusion.  Because the charges alleged in the two 
complaints were not the same offense and other equitable 
concerns do not weigh in favor of dismissal, we reverse the 
allowance of the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground of 
double jeopardy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.