Title: State v. Caffrey

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

70 Wn.2d 120 (1966) 422 P.2d 307 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. BRADFORD A. CAFFREY, Appellant.[*] No. 38668. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. December 29, 1966. Bradford A. Caffrey, pro se. Richard A. Nelle and William A. Gardiner, for respondent. JAMES, J.[] Appellant, a member of the bar, was found guilty of contempt of court. The trial court's oral ruling was formalized by an order entitled "Order Punishing Contempt in Presence of Court," reading as follows: Dated this 8th day of November, 1965. The incident which provoked the court's ruling is fairly summarized in the order. Appellant fails to make proper assignments of error, but contends: (1) That his conduct was not contumacious, and (2) that the punishment imposed was, in any event, excessive. [1] Three types of contempt proceedings are recognized in this jurisdiction. A criminal contempt statute defines certain acts related to the administration of justice as misdemeanors. RCW 9.23.010. A general contempt statute, RCW 7.20.010 enumerates 12 acts or omissions which may constitute *122 contempt of court which can result in either punishment or coercive relief. Independent of, but pervading the statutory specifics is the inherent power to punish for contempt derived from the constitutional origin of the court. State v. Estill, 55 Wn.2d 576, 349 P.2d 210 (1960); Keller v. Keller, 52 Wn.2d 84, 323 P.2d 231 (1958). Both statutes define as contempt of court, "disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior" in the presence of the court. Both the common law and the general statute authorize summary punishment if contempt is committed in the presence of the court. Keller v. Keller, supra. In his brief appellant characterizes as the "fatal" words his expression "if you can call it a court." He states that he uttered them with his back to the court as a "Shakespearean aside"; that they were spoken softly and that he did not intend the court to hear them. He avers that "it is most unfortunate that the judge's ears are so acute." He justifies his conduct as a "slip of the tongue" which took place in the "heat and excitement" of the occasion. [2] The trial court's order recites that appellant addressed the court in a "loud, angry, insulting and contemptuous manner." In State v. Zioncheck, 171 Wash. 388, 394, 18 P.2d 35, (1933), it is stated: [3] It is our view that appellant's version of the incident evidences an even more contemptuous attitude than that recited by the court. A "Shakespearean aside" intended only for the ears of those present in what appellant himself describes in his brief as a "court room crowded with attorneys" implies deliberate, not spontaneous malediction. [4] Punishment for contempt of court is within the sound discretion of the judge so ruling. Unless there is abuse of a trial court's exercise of discretion, it will not be *123 disturbed on appeal. Keyes v. United States, 314 F.2d 123 (9th Cir.1963); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 2 L. Ed. 2d 672, 78 Sup. Ct. 632 (1958). In considering appellant's plea that the punishment imposed was excessive, it must be borne in mind that his conduct was deliberate. A similar situation was considered in In re Willis, 94 Wash. 180, 186, 162 Pac. 38 (1917), where it was said: Before imposing sentence the trial court permitted appellant to make a statement. His statement was: This "apology" to the "profession" and to "any court in the state that I practice at" was hardly calculated to impress the trial court with appellant's contrition. The record further discloses that the trial judge was asked to and did consider suspension of the balance of the sentence after appellant had spent one night in the county jail. In declining the request the judge observed that not *124 only the immediate incident but prior performances of appellant persuaded him that appellant's conduct was deliberate. The record indicates no abuse of discretion. The judgment is affirmed. HILL, OTT, HUNTER, and HAMILTON, JJ., concur. [*] Reported in 422 P.2d 307. [] Judge James is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution.