Title: Reagan v. Brown

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

285 P.2d 789 (1955) 59 N.M. 423 Sally REAGAN; John H. Reagan; Albert Leon Reagan; A.A. Reagan, Jr.; C.A. Reagan; Louise R. McCall; George A. May; Alvin R. Morrison; Charley Thomas Morrison; Sue M. Brown; Thomas D. Reagan; Timothy L. Reagan; Lee A. Reagan; Frank S. Reagan; and Abilene Christian College, a corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. J.B. BROWN, Jr.; James Brit Brown, Jr.; J. B. BROWN; A.E. Whitehead; Vallie Whitehead; Thos. E. Boyd; William Stevens; Ruth C. Stevens; Magnolia Petroleum Co., a corporation; Magnolia Petroleum Company, a corporation; United States Smelting, Refining and Mining Co., a corporation; United States Smelting, Refining and Mining Company, a corporation; Tide Water Associated Oil Company, a corporation; Tide Water Associated Oil Company, a corporation; Odessa Natural Gasoline Co., a corporation; Trebol Oil Co., a corporation; Warren Oil Corporation, a corporation; The Following Named Defendants by Name, if Living; if Deceased, Their Unknown Heirs: Susie L. Cheney; Rebecca M. King; Bettie C. Dickinson; B.C. Dickinson; Bernice Dickinson; Grant Corbin; Paul L. Davis; Stephen H. Orendorff; Mary A. Orendorff; J.E. Simmons; Beulah H. Simmons; Bruce K. Matlock; Bonnie H. Matlock; E.J. Swanson; R.H. Reed; Hugh W. Ferguson, Jr.; E.G. Rodman; W.E. McLaughlin; Lydia McLaughlin; Reese Cleveland; Rozelle B. Cleveland; W.F. Martin; Lillah Martin; Wm. D. Austin; Mildred M. Austin; H.L. Neeb; Marion C. Neeb; J. Hugh Liedtke; and William O. Liedtke; Unknown Heirs of the Following Named Deceased Persons: James Brit Brown; J.B. Brown; Dollie R. Brown; and Dollie Reagan Brown; and All Unknown Persons Claiming Any Lien, Interest or Title in the Premises Adverse to Plaintiffs. No. 5923. Supreme Court of New Mexico. July 7, 1955. Lynell G. Skarda, Clovis, Fred M. Standley, Santa Fe, for appellants. T.E. Mears, Sr., Portales, James T. Jennings, Hervey, Dow & Hinkle, W.E. Bondurant, Jr., Roswell, for appellees. McGHEE, Justice. The plaintiffs-appellants are collateral heirs of Dollie B. Brown, a widow who *790 was killed by her only child, James B. Brown, Jr., and who at the time of her death was the owner of an undivided five-eighths interest in the real property involved in this action, the son having inherited the remaining interest from his father who died on August 20, 1940. The defendants-appellees, other than Brown, claim various mineral interests in the realty arising from conveyances by James B. Brown, Jr., and his successors in interest between the year 1947 and the filing of this action in 1951. Judgment was rendered for the defendants below and as grounds for reversal the plaintiffs here urge: 1. An only son who murders his widowed mother may not inherit her estate, notwithstanding the fact our laws of descent do not by their terms prohibit it, and they are her lawful heirs. 2. If he must be held to be her heir because of the wording of our statute on descent, then a court of equity should decree him to be a constructive trustee, holding the legal title for their benefit. The crime was committed by the defendant, James B. Brown, Jr., on June 5, 1942. On August 1, 1942, he entered a plea of guilty to murder in the second degree and received a sentence therefor of not less than forty years nor more than fifty-five years in the penitentiary. His mother died intestate, her estate was regularly probated in the Probate Court of Roosevelt County, New Mexico, and on May 22, 1943, a final decree was there entered adjudging James B. Brown, Jr., to be the son and the sole heir at law of Dollie R. Brown and the owner of all her real and personal property. The position that one who feloniously kills his ancestor is not precluded, absent a prohibitory statute, from inheriting the estate of his victim is adopted in the following cases, as compiled in Annotation entitled "Felonious killing of ancestor as affecting intestate succession", appearing in 39 A.L.R.2d 477: It is stated at page 483, of said annotation: Similarly compiled in the above annotation are the following cases holding that one who feloniously kills his ancestor is not entitled to intestate succession in the estate of his victim: At page 488, 39 A.L.R.2d, the reasoning of the latter courts in support of their opinions is succinctly summarized as follows: The annotation to which we have referred includes all cases on the subject and is preceded by report of In re Duncan's Estates, Washington, 1952, cited supra, where the cases are also summarized. Our statutes on descent and distribution are plain and unambiguous. They provide that subject to marriage contracts and the payment of debts of the decedent the property goes to designated persons. § 29-1-10, 1953 Compilation. To adopt the contention of the plaintiffs on this point we must read an amendment into the statute and say, "Provided, however, one may not inherit the estate of one he has murdered." This we regard as a legislative matter and the legislature which has only recently adjourned has passed an act now in effect providing a murderer may not inherit the estate of his victim. Ch. 61, Laws of 1955. *792 We will follow the line of reasoning of the cases which refuse to amend or set aside the unambiguous statutes of descent and distribution, and hold the property of the mother descended to the son, James B. Brown, Jr. It is abhorrent to us that a murderer can profit by his crime and the assertion of the plaintiffs that Brown should be held to take the legal title as a constructive trustee has our sympathy. It is so held in some opinions cited in the plaintiffs' brief and ably discussed at the oral argument. However, before deciding that question, we must dispose of the plea of limitations interposed by the defendants to such claim. Sections 23-1-4 and 23-1-18, 1953 Compilation, read, respectively, as follows: It was admitted by the plaintiffs that there or no facts tolling, postponing or suspending such statutes if they apply to the facts of this case and are valid and constitutional under all of the laws of New Mexico. Although these two sections have been in effect since their adoption in 1880, we appear to have but one case where the question whether they applied to trusts was decided, that of Patterson v. Hewitt, 1901, 11 N.M. 1, 66 P. 552, 55 L.R.A. 658, affirmed, 1904, 195 U.S. 309, 25 S. Ct. 35, 49 L. Ed. 214. This Court said, at pages 39, 40, of 11 N.M., at page 564 of 66 P.: We reluctantly hold the plaintiffs' cause of action seeking to have Brown declared to be a constructive trustee is barred by our four-year statute of limitations quoted above. *793 What we have said makes it unnecessary to decide the remaining point in the case. The judgment is affirmed. It is so ordered. LUJAN, SADLER, and KIKER, JJ., and ROBERT W. REIDY, D.J., concur. COMPTON, C.J., not participating.