Title: DSG Evergreen Family Limited Partnership v. Town of Perry

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2020 WI 23 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP2352 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
DSG Evergreen Family Limited Partnership, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Town of Perry, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 385 Wis. 2d 514,925 N.W.2d 782 
(2019 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 27, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 4, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit Court   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard G. Niess   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KELLY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Matthew J. Fleming and Murphy Desmond S.C., Madison. There 
was an oral argument by Matthew J. Fleming. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there were briefs filed by Mark 
J. Steichen and Boardman & Clark LLP, Madison. There was an oral 
argument by Mark J. Steichen. 
 
 
2020 WI 23 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2017AP2352 
(L.C. No. 
2015CV65) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
DSG Evergreen Family Limited Partnership, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Town of Perry, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
FEB 27, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KELLY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
  
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   The Town of Perry (the "Town") 
acquired a portion of property belonging to DSG Evergreen Family 
Limited Partnership ("DSG") through its power of eminent domain.  
In exercising that power, the Town committed itself to building a 
replacement road over part of the acquired property.  DSG says the 
Town failed to build the road to the standards required by either 
the condemnation petition or Wis. Stat. § 82.50(1) (2017-18),1 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
2 
 
which applies to the construction of town roads.  It seeks a 
declaratory 
judgment 
establishing 
the 
Town's 
road-building 
obligations or, in the alternative, damages sufficient to allow it 
to build the promised road.  The Town says the claim preclusion 
doctrine bars DSG from raising its claims in this case.  It also 
says that, in any event, DSG lacks a cognizable claim because the 
statutes on which it relies do not create a private cause of 
action. 
¶2 
We conclude that claim preclusion does not bar DSG's 
claim that the Town did not build the replacement road to the 
standards required by the condemnation petition.  However, we also 
conclude that Wis. Stat. § 82.50(1) does not impose obligations on 
the Town that are susceptible to a declaration of rights, nor does 
it create a private cause of action by which DSG can recover 
damages for the alleged failure to construct a proper road.  
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings on this claim.2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
DSG used to own approximately 92 acres of land in the 
Town of Perry.  Now it owns just over 80 acres because the Town 
used its condemnation power to take the difference (12.13 acres) 
to create what came to be known as the Hauge Log Church Historic 
District Park (the "Park").  Prior to the condemnation, County 
                                                 
2 This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals, DSG Evergreen Family Ltd. P'Ship v. Town of Perry, No. 
2017AP2352, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2018), 
which affirmed the judgment of the Dane County Circuit Court, the 
Honorable Richard G. Niess presided.    
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
3 
 
Highway Z ran along the eastern edge of DSG's property.  DSG had 
built a field road off of Highway Z to access its land for 
agricultural purposes and, eventually, to reach a residence and 
farm building it anticipated building.3  This was the only means 
of accessing the property.  Now, after the condemnation, the Park 
runs along the eastern edge of DSG's property instead of County 
Highway Z.  To prevent DSG's property from being landlocked, the 
Town's condemnation petition promised to grant DSG a permanent 
access easement over a new field road it committed itself to 
building over the northern-most part of the Park.  Specifically, 
the condemnation petition said: 
The Town will replace the existing field road on the 
12.13 acre parcel to be acquired with a new field road 
from [the county highway] along the northern boundary of 
the Hauge Church Park boundary to the western boundary 
of the proposed Park in order to provide access to the 
Owner's other lands in the Town of Perry and for park-
related purposes subject to the Hauge Church Park 
Regulations.  This field road will be built to the same 
construction standards as the existing field road.  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶4 
The Town's efforts to obtain DSG's property spawned a 
significant amount of litigation.  To identify the issues already 
litigated and——by process of elimination——the issues still 
potentially subject to litigation, we must survey each of the cases 
                                                 
3 Several years before the present proceedings, DSG obtained 
an "Agricultural Non-Controlled Access" permit which allowed it to 
access the parcel for agricultural purposes.  Shortly afterwards 
it applied for and obtained a "Residential (single-family) Non-
controlled Access" permit, allowing DSG to access the parcel from 
the county highway for residential purposes.  At the time of the 
condemnation, DSG used the road only for agricultural purposes.  
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
4 
 
between the Town and DSG related to the acquisition of this 
property. 
A.  The Right-to-Take Case 
¶5 
The Town attempted to negotiate a voluntary sale of DSG's 
property, as required by statute, but was unsuccessful.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 32.06(2a).  So the Town took the next step in the exercise 
of its eminent domain power——it served on DSG a "jurisdictional 
offer."  § 32.06(3).  A jurisdictional offer describes, amongst 
other subjects, the property the authority intends to acquire, the 
amount of compensation the authority is offering for the 
acquisition, and the owner's right to challenge both the exercise 
of eminent domain and the amount of compensation.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 32.06(3) and 32.05(3). 
¶6 
After receiving a jurisdictional offer, the owner may 
bring suit in circuit court challenging the condemnor's right to 
acquire his property.  Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5).  DSG exercised this 
right, claiming a discrepancy between the legal description in the 
jurisdictional offer and the statutorily-required appraisal upon 
which the offer must be based (the "Right-to-Take Case").4  
§ 32.06(2)(b).  The circuit court dismissed DSG's claim, and the 
court of appeals affirmed.  See Town of Perry v. DSG Evergreen 
Family Ltd. P'Ship, No. 2008AP163, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. Apr. 23, 2008).  
                                                 
4 The jurisdictional offer DSG challenged was actually the 
"Fourth Amended Jurisdictional Offer," but because the prior 
offers are immaterial to this case, we will make no distinction 
between them. 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
5 
 
¶7 
The Town and DSG were still at loggerheads after 
resolution of the Right-to-Take Case with respect to the amount to 
be paid for the property.  Because DSG would not accept the amount 
indicated in the jurisdictional offer, the Town commenced suit to 
authoritatively establish the amount due to DSG for acquisition of 
the property, an amount known as "just compensation" (the "Just 
Compensation Case").  Wis. Const. art. I, § 13 ("The property of 
no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation 
therefor.").  The matter proceeded to a jury trial.  In the present 
case, the parties stipulated that the only issue presented to the 
jury in the Just Compensation Case was the amount owed to DSG for 
the property rights the Town was acquiring:  
The essential issue tried in the just compensation 
trial was the determination of the fair market value of 
the entirety of DSG's property before the Taking and the 
fair market value of DSG's property after the Taking 
assuming completion of the project for which the Taking 
occurred, including the construction of the new field 
road under the terms of the Petition.[5]  
¶8 
In establishing the just compensation due to DSG, the 
jury had to assume, as a practical matter, that the Town would 
                                                 
5 This is the calculation prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6):   
In the case of a partial taking of property other than 
an easement, the compensation to be paid by the condemnor 
shall be the greater of either the fair market value of 
the property taken as of the date of evaluation or the 
sum determined by deducting from the fair market value 
of the whole property immediately before the date of 
evaluation, the fair market value of the remainder 
immediately after the date of evaluation, assuming the 
completion of the public improvement[.] 
 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
6 
 
complete the new field road as described in the condemnation 
petition because the Town could not start its construction until 
after the trial was over and the required compensation paid.6  
Nevertheless, DSG expressed doubt about the Town's ability to build 
the new field road as indicated in the condemnation petition.  It 
introduced an engineering report to that effect, which said: 
Neither a public road nor a private driveway meeting all 
applicable Town, County, State and Federal requirements 
can be constructed entirely within the easement.  In 
addition, a private driveway constructed within the 
easement is not equivalent to the existing farm road 
because of inferior intersection sight distance and 
maximum slope characteristics.  
DSG did not, however, offer any testimony with respect to the 
report's contents, nor did the report go to the jury. 
¶9 
The jury returned a verdict favorable to DSG, awarding 
it compensation greater than the Town's jurisdictional offer.7 The 
Town then obtained title to the property by paying DSG the required 
amount and recording the award with the register of deeds. 
B.  The Present Case 
¶10 The Town started work on the promised road after 
obtaining title to the property.  Almost immediately after it was 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.06(9)(b) (The condemnor "shall within 
70 days after the date of filing of the commission's award, pay 
the amount of the award . . . to the owner and take and file the 
owner's 
receipt 
therefor 
with 
the 
clerk 
of 
the 
circuit 
court . . . .  Title to the property taken shall vest in the 
condemnor upon the filing of such receipt or the making of such 
payment."). 
7 The court of appeals affirmed the jury's verdict.  See DSG 
Evergreen Family Ltd. P'Ship v. Town of Perry, No. 2011AP492, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2012). 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
7 
 
done, DSG notified the Town that it was not suitable for heavy 
farm machinery.  So the Town performed some remedial work on the 
road and brought it into compliance with the standards described 
in the Town's Driveway Ordinance.  See Perry, Wisconsin, Driveway 
Ordinance (2000).  The Town subsequently adopted a resolution 
establishing the road as the Hauge Parkway (the "Parkway") and 
declaring the road open for the "the benefit of the public, 
adjacent property owners and for park related purposes" (the 
"Resolution"). 
¶11 But DSG claims the road still does not meet the standards 
to which the Town committed itself.  The condemnation petition 
says the new field road would be "built to the same construction 
standards as the existing field road."  DSG says it built its field 
road to meet town road standards (as described in Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.50), standards it says the new road doesn't meet because it 
is too narrow, too steeply sloped, lacks an emergency turn-out, 
lacks a storm-water retention pond, and lacks a place to turn 
around.  
¶12 Because of the road's perceived inadequacies, DSG took 
the Town back to the circuit court.  Its complaint sought a 
judgment declaring that the Town "is obligated to improve and 
maintain [the new field road] to County and Town standards for a 
Town road."  Alternatively, it requested over $288,000 so that it 
could improve the new field road to the standards it claims the 
Town promised to satisfy. 
¶13 DSG asked for summary judgment, arguing (in part) that 
by adopting the Resolution, the Town became subject to Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
8 
 
§ 82.03,8 thereby imposing on it an obligation to improve the 
Parkway to the town road standards described by Wis. Stat. § 82.50.  
The Town responded with a summary judgment motion of its own in 
which it sought a ruling that, regardless of what §§ 82.03 or 82.50 
might require, they do not create a private cause of action 
enforceable by DSG.  The circuit court agreed with the Town, and 
so granted judgment against DSG on that issue. 
¶14 The case continued with respect to the scope of the 
Town's road-building obligations imposed by the jurisdictional 
offer.  It ended when the circuit court concluded that claim 
preclusion barred DSG's claim.  It said "the before-and-after just 
compensation analysis necessarily placed the issue of construction 
standards for the new field road front and center in the prior 
action."  Therefore, it concluded that "DSG could have vigorously 
contested the replacement road promised by the Town" in the Just 
Compensation Case, but didn't.  The court of appeals affirmed.  It 
reasoned that "DSG knew before and at the time of the condemnation 
trial that the Town could not comply with the interpretation of 
the condemnation petition that DSG advocates in this lawsuit."  
DSG Evergreen Family Ltd. P'Ship v. Town of Perry, No. 2017AP2352, 
unpublished slip op., ¶42 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2018).  
Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that "[u]nder claim 
preclusion principles, DSG cannot now request relief that the Town 
is not complying with the condemnation petition when DSG failed to 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 82.03(1)(a) provides, in relevant part, 
that:  "[t]he town board shall have the care and supervision of 
all highways under the town's jurisdiction[.]" 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
9 
 
raise that issue in the previous lawsuit."  Id.  We granted DSG's 
petition for review. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 We review the circuit court's grant of partial summary 
judgment de novo.  Leicht Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pallet Cent. 
Enterprises, Inc., 2019 WI 61, ¶8, 387 Wis. 2d 95, 928 N.W.2d 534 
("We review the disposition of a motion for summary judgment de 
novo, applying the same methodology the circuit courts apply." 
(cited source omitted)).  While our review is independent from the 
circuit court and court of appeals, we benefit from their analyses.  
See Preisler v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 135, ¶16, 360 
Wis. 2d 129, 857 N.W.2d 136.  Summary judgment is appropriate only 
"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08(2); see also Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wis. Gas 
Co., 2003 WI 38, ¶11, 261 Wis. 2d 70, 661 N.W.2d 776 (quoting and 
applying Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2001-02)). 
¶16 We also review the circuit court's decision with respect 
to claim preclusion de novo.  "Whether claim preclusion applies 
under a given factual scenario is a question of law we review 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit court 
and court of appeals."  Teske v. Wilson Mut. Ins. Co., 2019 WI 62, 
¶20, 387 Wis. 2d 213, 928 N.W.2d 555 (cited source omitted). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
10 
 
¶17 DSG asks us to send this case back to the circuit court 
so that it may continue litigating the three claims described in 
its Complaint.  The claims include two requests for a declaration 
of rights and one alternative claim for damages.  The first 
declaration DSG seeks is that the condemnation petition requires 
the Town to upgrade the Parkway to meet the standards to which DSG 
had built its original field road (the "Petition Standard Claim").  
DSG also requests a declaration that Wis. Stat. § 82.50 requires 
the Town of Perry to upgrade the Parkway to the standards of a 
town road (the "Town Road Claim").  As an alternative to 
declaratory relief, DSG asks for damages sufficient to allow it to 
satisfy the Town's obligation to improve the Parkway (the "Damages 
Claim").  The Town says the doctrine of claim preclusion bars us 
from entertaining DSG's case at all.9  It also denies that § 82.50 
creates a private cause of action enforceable against the Town.  
We conclude that claim preclusion does not bar any of DSG's claims.  
However, we also hold that DSG is not entitled to declaratory 
relief with respect to the Town Road Claim, and that § 82.50 does 
not create a private cause of action capable of supporting the 
Damages Claim.  Therefore, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the matter to the circuit court for further 
proceedings on DSG's Petition Standards Claim.  We will address 
                                                 
9 Some of our older decisions refer to the doctrine of claim 
preclusion as res judicata.  The concepts are the same, but "[t]he 
term claim preclusion replaces res judicata" in our more recent 
decisions.  N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 550, 
525 N.W.2d 723 (1995). 
 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
11 
 
claim preclusion first, and then the Town's argument that § 82.50 
cannot support DSG's Town Road Claim or its Damages Claim. 
A.  Claim Preclusion 
¶18 The claim preclusion doctrine ensures that parties do 
not continue litigating claims that a court has already 
authoritatively resolved.  Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43, ¶19, 
279 Wis. 2d 520, 694 N.W.2d 879 ("The doctrine of claim preclusion 
provides that a final judgment on the merits in one action bars 
parties from relitigating any claim that arises out of the same 
relevant facts, transactions, or occurrences." (cited sources 
omitted)).  This doctrine applies upon satisfaction of the 
following elements:   
(1) identity between the parties or their privies in the 
prior 
and 
present 
suits; 
(2) 
prior 
litigation 
result[ing] in a final judgment on the merits by a court 
with jurisdiction; and (3) identity of the causes of 
action in the two suits. 
Id., ¶21 (quoted source omitted).  The rule applies even if the 
claim was not actually litigated, so long as the party could have 
raised it.  Teske, 387 Wis. 2d 213, ¶43 (The preclusive effect 
applies to matters "which might have been litigated in the former 
proceedings." (quoted source omitted)).  The doctrine developed 
because we recognize that "endless litigation leads to chaos; that 
certainty in legal relations must be maintained; that after a party 
has had his day in court, justice, expediency, and the preservation 
of the public tranquility requires that the matter be at an end."  
Kruckenberg, 279 Wis. 2d 520, ¶20 (quoted source omitted). 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
12 
 
¶19 DSG agrees that its circumstances satisfy the first two 
elements of the claim preclusion test,10 so the only issue here is 
whether the third element of the claim preclusion test is 
satisfied——to wit, whether there is an "identity of the causes of 
action" between this case and a prior case.  See Kruckenberg, 279 
Wis. 2d 520, ¶24.  Therefore, our analysis must compare DSG's road-
related claims in this case against those it either actually 
litigated, or could have litigated, during the Right-to-Take Case 
or the Just Compensation Case.  We conclude that there is no 
"identity of the causes of action" between the claims in this case 
and those that were, or could have been, litigated in either of 
the prior cases. 
¶20 We 
analyze 
claim 
preclusion 
issues 
using 
the 
transactional approach, which "reflects the expectation that 
parties who are given the capacity to present their entire 
controversies shall in fact do so."  Teske, 387 Wis. 2d 213, ¶31.  
This requires that "all claims arising out of one transaction or 
factual situation are treated as being part of a single cause of 
action and they are required to be litigated together."  Id. 
(quoting A.B.C.G. Enters., Inc. v. First Bank Se., N.A., 184 
Wis. 2d 465, 480-81, 515 N.W.2d 904 (1994)); see also N. States 
Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 555, 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995) 
(The "number of substantive theories that may be available to the 
                                                 
10 That is, DSG agrees there is an identity of parties between 
this case and both the Right-To-Take Case and the Just Compensation 
Case, and it agrees the two prior cases concluded with judgments 
on the merits. 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
13 
 
plaintiff is immaterial——if they all arise from the same factual 
underpinnings they must all be brought in the same action or be 
barred from future consideration.").  The operative question, 
therefore, is whether the Town's compliance with the road-building 
obligations imposed by the condemnation petition or state statutes 
was part of the same "transaction or factual situation" presented 
in the Just Compensation Trial. 
¶21 Because we look at the "transaction or factual 
situation" of the prior cases, our analysis is necessarily context 
specific.  When the allegedly claim-precluding case was part of a 
municipality's acquisition of property through its power of 
eminent domain, context becomes especially important.  Typically, 
we expect parties to raise all claims arising out of the same 
"transaction or factual situation" in the same lawsuit because 
they are masters of their own pleadings and are free to draft an 
all-encompassing 
pleading. 
 
But 
parties 
to 
condemnation 
proceedings do not have the same degree of freedom, and that 
affects the types of claims a condemnation case may subsequently 
preclude.  So we must examine the types of issues a property owner 
may raise in eminent domain-related litigation.  Discerning the 
scope of those issues will inform our analysis of the preclusive 
effect of the Right-to-Take Case and the Just Compensation Case.  
We will address each case in turn. 
1.  The Right-to-Take Case 
¶22 A right-to-take case is a limited purpose action.  As 
its name implies, such a case addresses issues related to the 
condemnor's right to acquire the property:   
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
14 
 
When an owner desires to contest the right of the 
condemnor to condemn the property described in the 
jurisdictional offer for any reason other than that the 
amount of compensation offered is inadequate, such owner 
may . . . commence an action in the circuit court of the 
county wherein the property is located, naming the 
condemnor as defendant. 
Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5).  This type of action does not reach the 
amount of compensation owed to the property owner if the condemning 
authority is successful.  But it is the only opportunity to raise 
an objection to the authority's right to acquire the property.  
Id. ("Such action shall be the only manner in which any issue other 
than the amount of just compensation or other than proceedings to 
perfect title under ss. 32.11 and 32.12 may be raised pertaining 
to the condemnation of the property described in the jurisdictional 
offer."). 
¶23 The Town argues that DSG could have asserted its claim 
regarding the sufficiency of the new field road in the Right-to-
Take case.  Specifically, it says: 
If at the time of the condemnation proceedings DSG had 
truly believed the promise [to build the new field road 
to the standards of the old field road] to be the vague, 
nebulous formulation . . . that DSG now contends, then 
DSG could have sought to have the Fourth Amended 
Jurisdictional Offer on which the petition is based 
declared void in part or in whole.  
But DSG does not claim the Town's road-building obligation is vague 
or nebulous.  To the contrary, it says the obligation "is 
unambiguous in that the 'standard' by which the new field road was 
to be measured is expressly identified as being the 'existing field 
road.'"  Even if the Town had correctly characterized DSG's 
argument, it has provided no argument and cited no authority to 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
15 
 
suggest that this is the type of issue a property owner must raise 
in a right-to-take case.  And as the party advancing the claim 
preclusion argument, it is the Town's burden to prove its 
applicability.  State ex rel. Barksdale v. Litscher, 2004 
WI App 130, ¶13, 275 Wis. 2d 493, 685 N.W.2d 801 ("The burden of 
proving claim preclusion is upon the party asserting its 
applicability." (citing Alexopoulos v. Dakouras, 48 Wis. 2d 32, 
37, 179 N.W.2d 836 (1970))). 
¶24 The court of appeals' opinion provides no guidance on 
this question either.  In fact, it did not substantively analyze 
the question at all because, it says, it accepted the Town's 
argument that DSG had conceded that it should have litigated the 
Town's road-building obligations in the Right-to-Take Case.  But 
that is not actually what the Town argued, either in the court of 
appeals or here.  The Town's argument is that DSG conceded that 
"if it was going to challenge the validity of the promise, a right-
to-take challenge would have been the proper remedy."  The 
statement of law lying at the heart of this alleged concession may 
or may not be correct, but it has nothing to do with this case.  
DSG is not challenging the validity of the Town's promise as 
contained in the jurisdictional offer.  To the contrary, DSG 
affirmatively asserts its validity.  Indeed, the whole point of 
this case is to compel the Town to make good on what DSG says is 
a valid and unambiguous promise——the construction of a replacement 
road in accordance with the standards identified in the petition 
(or, alternatively, to pay for the privilege of not doing so).   
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
16 
 
¶25 So the court of appeals' conclusion that DSG conceded it 
could have litigated its current issues in the Right-To-Take Case 
is incorrect.  DSG conceded only that, if it were to have 
challenged the validity of the promise, it could have done so in 
the Right-To-Take case——an issue not raised in this case.  And 
neither the Town nor the court of appeals has provided any 
authority or reasoning to suggest DSG could have litigated its 
current issues in the Right-to-Take Case (a necessary potentiality 
if the litigation is to have claim-preclusive effects).  We will 
not develop the argument on the Town's behalf.  State ex rel. Flynn 
v. Kemper Ctr., Inc., 2019 WI App 6 ¶30 n.12, 385 Wis. 2d 811, 924 
N.W.2d 218 ("We will not abandon our neutrality to develop 
arguments for a party.").  Consequently, the Town has failed to 
establish that the Right-to-Take Case bars DSG's current claim 
that the Town has not honored its road-building obligations. 
2.  The Just Compensation Case 
¶26 The Town offers the Just Compensation Case as the second 
candidate for a bar against DSG's current claims.  The issues a 
party may present in this type of case are even more constricted 
than that available in a right-to-take case.  Consequently, so is 
its potential preclusive power.  The condemnor pursues such a case 
when the owner does not accept the amount specified in the 
jurisdictional offer.  It commences when the condemnor files a 
verified condemnation petition in the circuit court.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.06(7).  The circuit court then assigns the matter to the 
chairperson of the county condemnation commissioners (the 
"Chairperson").  Id.  The Chairperson selects three commissioners 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
17 
 
whose task it is to "serve as a commission to ascertain the 
compensation to be made for the taking of the property or rights 
in property sought to be condemned . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 32.08(5).  
The statutes do not confer on the Commission authority to address 
any issue other than compensation.  Upon the conclusion of its 
proceedings, the Commission "file[s] its award with the clerk of 
the circuit court, specifying therein the property or interests 
therein taken and the compensation allowed the owner . . . ."  
§ 32.06(8).  If either party is dissatisfied with the award, it 
may appeal the Commission's decision to the circuit court.  
§ 32.06(10). 
¶27 As with a right-to-take case (described above), the 
scope of this litigation is limited by statute.  The case 
"proceed[s] as an action in said court subject to all the 
provisions of law relating to actions brought therein, but the 
only issues to be tried shall be questions of title, if any, as 
provided by ss. 32.11 and 32.12 and the amount of just compensation 
to be paid by condemnor . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 32.06(10).  
According to the statutes, therefore, the only issues the parties 
may litigate in a just compensation case are matters of title and 
the amount of money to be paid to the property owner. 
¶28 But within that already narrow litigative universe, the 
statutes narrow the available issues even further by defining how 
the court (and the Commission) calculates the compensation due to 
the owner when, as here, there is a partial taking of property: 
In the case of a partial taking of property other 
than an easement, the compensation to be paid by the 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
18 
 
condemnor shall be the greater of either the fair market 
value of the property taken as of the date of evaluation 
or the sum determined by deducting from the fair market 
value of the whole property immediately before the date 
of evaluation, the fair market value of the remainder 
immediately after the date of evaluation, assuming the 
completion of the public improvement . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6) (emphasis added).  So not only must the 
circuit 
court 
follow 
a 
statutorily-prescribed 
method 
of 
calculating just compensation, it must also assume the completion 
of the public improvement when doing so. 
¶29 Here, part of the public improvement was a new field 
road built to the same construction standards as the old field 
road.  The condemnation petition says: 
The Town will replace the existing field road on the 
12.13 acre parcel to be acquired with a new field road 
from Highway Z along the northern boundary of the Hauge 
Church Park boundary to the western boundary of the 
proposed Park in order to provide access to the Owner's 
other lands in the Town of Perry and for park-related 
purposes subject to the Hauge Church Park Regulations. 
This field road will be built to the same construction 
standards as the existing field road.[11] 
The purpose of the road was not just to provide DSG access to its 
remaining land.  It was also to serve the Park, as provided by the 
Hauge Church Park Regulations.  This had been the plan from the 
beginning of the project, as the Town made clear when it adopted 
the Resolution dedicating the new field road as the "Hauge 
Parkway."  The Resolution recites that "the Town has acquired real 
estate necessary for the Park, and the Plan provides for the 
establishment of a Town Park Road . . . ."  It goes on to say that 
                                                 
11 This language is identical to the jurisdictional offer the 
Town presented to DSG before commencing the Just Compensation Case. 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
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it constructed the Parkway "to provide access to the Park from 
County Highway Z for the benefit of the public, adjacent property 
owners and for park related purposes . . . ."  The recitals 
conclude with the observation that "the final task is to formally 
dedicate the Parkway to establish a permanent right of way as 
contemplated by the Plan . . . ."  The operative part of the 
Resolution said "Hauge Parkway shall hereby be dedicated to the 
public as a public Parkway and Town Park Road, with all rights of 
use to the public and the owners of the real estate contiguous to 
the Park, subject to the Town's regulation of establishment of 
driveways." 
¶30 Based on this record, there can be no doubt that 
construction of the new field road——now known as the Hauge Parkway—
—was part of the public improvements anticipated by the 
condemnation petition.  The parties' stipulation also bears 
witness to this conclusion.  They agreed that "[t]he essential 
issue tried in the just compensation trial . . . assum[ed] 
completion of the project for which the Taking occurred, including 
the construction of the new field road under the terms of the 
Petition."  (Emphasis added.)  Therefore, Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6) 
required the circuit court to assume the new road would be 
constructed as provided by the condemnation petition.  That is to 
say, even if DSG were convinced the Town would renege on its road-
building obligation, or perform it inadequately or short of the 
required standards, it could not have litigated that issue in the 
Just Compensation Case, even had it so desired.  As a matter of 
law, the court must assume that after completion of the public 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
20 
 
improvements, DSG would have access to its property over a field 
road "built to the same construction standards as the existing 
field road." 
¶31 That statutorily required assumption draws a sharp 
divide between claims DSG could and could not present in the Just 
Compensation Case.  If DSG were to claim that the new field road—
—constructed to the same standards as the old field road——would 
diminish the value of its remaining property, it would have to 
pursue that claim in the Just Compensation Case.  Calculating 
compensation for the diminished value of the owner's remaining 
property is the core purpose of such cases.  The Just Compensation 
Case, therefore, would bar a claim based on the diminished value 
of the remaining property here. 
¶32 But that is not DSG's claim.  In this case, DSG does not 
claim that a road built to the standards required by the 
condemnation petition would diminish the value of its remaining 
property.  Instead, it assumes the Just Compensation Case properly 
calculated the value of the property rights it lost——assuming the 
Town builds the required road.12  Its claim here is that the Town 
                                                 
12 In the Just Compensation Case, the Town argued on appeal 
that DSG's claim for increased compensation "was premised on its 
loss of reasonable access from County Highway Z to its remaining 
property after the partial taking . . . ."  DSG Evergreen Family 
Ltd. P'ship, No. 2011AP492, unpublished slip op., ¶9.  The court 
of appeals, however, said the Town "does not have a meritorious 
argument to present."  Id., ¶14.  The court of appeals recognized 
that DSG's actual argument was that its loss of frontage on a town 
road eliminated its ability to develop residential lots on the 
remainder of its property.  Specifically, the court of appeals 
said: 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
21 
 
failed to build the required road.  The purpose of this case is to 
compel the Town to fulfill the obligations that the circuit court, 
as a matter of law, had to assume the Town would honor when it 
calculated its award of just compensation. 
¶33 With that understanding, the Town's argument that DSG 
already litigated the Town's faithfulness to its road-building 
obligation, or at least attempted to do so, in the Just 
Compensation Case does not follow either as a matter of logic or 
of law.  The Town's argument in this regard depends on the 
significance of the engineering report DSG introduced in the Just 
Compensation Case.  The Town paid particular attention to the 
report's introduction, which describes the scope of the ensuing 
analysis.  In relevant part it says: 
                                                 
DSG responds on this issue that at trial it was 
DSG's theory, which DSG asserts appears to have been 
accepted by the jury, that through the partial taking 
the Town took title to all of DSG's frontage property 
along public roads, thereby depriving DSG of the 
valuable opportunity to create up to six residential 
lots on its property, due to Dane County zoning 
requirements for public road frontage to support 
residential lots.  DSG points to testimony from its 
engineer "that a town road meeting the required [county 
zoning] standards  would  not fit within  the footprint 
of the easement given by the Petition."  Thus, DSG 
argues, authority cited by the Town regarding the 
quality and nature of changed access in eminent domain 
cases is irrelevant to this case, because DSG rested its 
claim on its alleged loss of the ability to use the 
remainder parcel for residential, as opposed to 
agricultural, purposes due to the alleged loss of road 
frontage as a result of the partial taking. 
Id., ¶15. 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
22 
 
The Town of Perry has proposed that the existing 
farm road be abandoned and a new access be constructed 
within the limits of a proposed 66' wide easement as 
located by the Town of Perry. Per the Town, the new 
access could consist of either a public road or a private 
driveway. 
A public road was preliminarily designed to meet 
the applicable minimum standards. A private driveway was 
also 
preliminarily 
designed 
to 
meet 
applicable 
standards. The public road and private driveway designs 
were compared to the applicable Town, County, State and 
Federal standards. The private driveway was also 
compared to the existing farm road to see if it would 
provide an equivalent access. 
The intent of this report is to provide details of 
the analyses performed and to show how the designs either 
met or failed to meet the required standards. 
The report concludes that: 
Neither a public road nor a private driveway 
meeting all applicable Town, County, State and Federal 
requirements can be constructed entirely within the 
easement. In addition, a private driveway constructed 
within the easement is not equivalent to the existing 
farm road because of inferior intersection sight 
distance and maximum slope characteristics. 
The Town concludes that, because the report took issue with the 
Town's ability to build the road described in the condemnation 
petition, DSG actually litigated, or at least attempted to 
litigate, that issue. 
¶34 What the engineering report actually did was opine on an 
issue the circuit court could not entertain.  The report called 
into question whether the Town could build either a public road or 
a private driveway on the easement described in the condemnation 
petition that would conform to all applicable rules and 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
23 
 
regulations.13  But that question, as a matter of law, was beyond 
the circuit court's authority to hear.  Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(6) 
says the circuit court had to assume, contrary to the report's 
conclusion, that the Town could and would provide the road as 
described.  That is to say, § 32.09(6) precluded DSG from 
litigating the question raised by the engineering report in the 
Just Compensation Case.14  Even if submission of the report 
represents an attempt to do so, the claim preclusion doctrine does 
not recognize attempts at litigation.  Instead, it asks only 
whether the final judgment in the Just Compensation Case actually 
adjudicated the claim, or could have adjudicated it had it been 
raised.  See Teske, 387 Wis. 2d 213, ¶23.  The Town does not argue 
the former, and the circuit court could not have done the latter 
without going beyond the boundaries set by § 32.09(6).  Therefore, 
DSG's attempt to litigate an issue the circuit court was forbidden 
from entertaining (if that is what submission of the engineering 
report represents) cannot engage the claim preclusion doctrine. 
                                                 
13 The report said the required road could not meet all of the 
applicable public road standards without "impacting area outside 
of the easement."  That was problematic, the report reasoned, 
because "the area outside of the easement is not within the control 
of [DSG] and [DSG] does not have permission to use lands beyond 
the easement."  The report concluded that building a private 
driveway was problematic for the same reasons. 
14 This is not to say that the circuit court could not have 
considered the engineering report as part of the Just Compensation 
Case.  The report could have provided, for example, evidence 
bearing on the decreased value of DSG's remaining property——a 
proper consideration for a just compensation trial. 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
24 
 
¶35 We conclude that neither the Right-to-Take Case nor the 
Just Compensation Case bars DSG's Petition Standards Claim, its 
Town Road Claim, or its Damages Claim.15  But that is all we decide 
in this portion of our opinion.  We note that the Town dedicated 
a significant amount of its brief to the construction standards 
required by the condemnation petition and how the new field road 
satisfies them.  But that was the subject of the litigation the 
circuit court prematurely ended with its ruling on claim 
preclusion.  Therefore, we express no opinion on the construction 
standards required by the condemnation petition, nor the current 
field road's compliance with them.  We are simply concluding that 
claim preclusion does not serve as a bar to DSG's complaint.16 
B.  Declaration/Private Cause of Action 
¶36 As an alternative to its claim that the Town failed to 
construct the new field road to the standards required by the 
condemnation petition (the Petition Standards Claim), DSG says the 
Town took on a statutorily-imposed obligation to improve the field 
road to town road standards when it dedicated it as the "Hauge 
Parkway" (the Town Road Claim).  Specifically, it says this 
                                                 
15 Because we hold that claim preclusion does not apply here, 
we need not reach DSG's alternative argument that we should create 
an exception to the claim preclusion doctrine for use in eminent 
domain cases. 
16 The Town says we can affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals on the basis that it satisfied its obligation to construct 
the new field road, arguing that this leaves nothing further to 
litigate.  We disagree.  To be sure, the Town did build a new field 
road, but whether that road satisfies the standards required by 
the condemnation petition is another question entirely. 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
25 
 
obligation arises when a town "formally declares that a town road 
exists 
and 
improves 
that 
road, 
opening 
it 
for 
public 
travel . . . ."  So it asked for a declaration that the Town must 
comply with its statutory obligation or, in the alternative, an 
award of damages sufficient to allow DSG to perform the 
construction the Town has refused to do.  The Town says DSG is 
entitled to neither form of relief because it dedicated the Hauge 
Parkway as a "town parkway," not a "town road," so the standards 
applicable to town roads have no applicability.  In any event, it 
says, the statute on which DSG relies creates no private cause of 
action against the Town. 
¶37 As a preliminary matter, we must address some lack of 
precision in the way the parties have addressed this issue.  The 
parties both bundled together DSG's alternative claims for relief 
and analyzed the resulting package according to a single rubric.  
They each used a different rubric, but neither of them accounted 
for the essential differences between the two types of claims.  
DSG, for example, says it may pursue declaratory judgment as well 
as its alternative demand for damages pursuant to the long-
recognized right to compel a municipal entity or officer to perform 
its mandatory duties.  Typically, such relief is available through 
a writ of mandamus.  See Voces De La Frontera, Inc. v. Clarke, 
2017 WI 16, ¶11, 373 Wis. 2d 348, 891 N.W.2d 803 ("Mandamus is a 
remedy that can be used 'to compel a public officer to perform a 
duty of his office presently due to be performed.'" State ex rel. 
Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶27, 262 Wis. 2d 720, 665 
N.W.2d 155."); Beres v. City of New Berlin, 34 Wis. 2d 229, 232, 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
26 
 
148 N.W.2d 653 (1967) ("However, this court has taken the position 
that a writ of mandamus will issue to enforce the performance of 
plain imperative duties of a ministerial character imposed on a 
public body such as a city council."); State v. City of Madison, 
170 Wis. 133, 136, 174 N.W. 471 (1919) ("Where there is a plain 
duty, as here involved, it is a well-recognized and long-
established doctrine that compliance therewith may be enforced by 
mandamus.").  The Town on the other hand, says DSG is not entitled 
to either a declaration of rights or damages because the statutes 
on which it relies do not create a private cause of action.  Neither 
of these analytical rubrics is capable of properly addressing both 
of DSG's claims. 
¶38 So we must analyze DSG's declaratory judgment claim 
separately from its claim for damages.  After identifying the 
claimed deficiencies in the new field road, DSG's complaint 
"demands judgment against the [Town] declaring that the [Town] is 
obligated to improve and maintain all portions of the park road 
declared to exist by the Town of Perry Resolution, dated October 
17, 2011, to County and Town standards for a Town road."  DSG's 
request for damages, on the other hand, has nothing to do with 
declaring rights, but concentrates entirely on whether the 
municipality's failure to comply with a statutory obligation 
imposes civil liability in favor of a specific party.  Therefore, 
we will address DSG's Town Road Claim as a request for a 
declaration of rights, and the alternative demand for damages as 
an assertion of a "private cause of action" against the Town. 
1.  Declaratory Judgment 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
27 
 
¶39 A plaintiff may demand a declaration of rights pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 806.04(2), which says:  
Any person . . . whose rights, status or other legal 
relations are affected by a statute . . . may have 
determined any question of construction or validity 
arising under the . . . statute . . . and obtain a 
declaration of rights, status or other legal relations 
thereunder. 
We said in Tooley v. O'Connell that a declaration of rights is 
available only if the plaintiff satisfies the following four 
conditions: 
(1)  There must exist a justiciable controversy that is 
to say, a controversy in which a claim of right is 
asserted against one who has an interest in contesting 
it. 
(2)  The controversy must be between persons whose 
interests are adverse. 
(3)  The party seeking declaratory relief must have a 
legal interest in the controversy that is to say, a 
legally protectible interest. 
(4)  The issue involved in the controversy must be ripe 
for judicial determination . . . . 
77 Wis. 2d 422, 433-34, 253 N.W.2d 335 (quoted source omitted; 
ellipses in original). 
¶40 DSG says we must declare that the Town has a duty to 
improve the Parkway to town road standards because of the 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 82.50(1).  This statutory subsection 
says that "[t]he following minimum geometric design standards are 
established for improvements on town roads . . . ."  The balance 
of the subsection describes the design standards applicable to 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
28 
 
roads of varying traffic loads.  Id.17  DSG argues that this must 
assuredly impose on the Town an affirmative obligation with respect 
to the Parkway because the identified standards are "minimums."  
If the road falls below this standard, DSG says, it must 
necessarily violate the statute.  And if there is no affirmative 
obligation to comply with the statute, DSG concludes, there would 
have been no point in enacting it in the first place. 
¶41 We conclude that DSG's Town Road Claim does not satisfy 
Tooley's first or fourth requirements.  That is, DSG does not have 
a "claim of right" in how the Town chooses to exercise its 
discretion under the terms of Wis. Stat. § 82.50.  And although 
the Town's exercise of discretion may eventually resolve to a 
particular course of action, that undecided course of action cannot 
be ripe for adjudication at this time. 
¶42 The same statute establishing the minimum standards for 
town roads vests in the Town a certain degree of discretion with 
respect to complying with them.  Specifically, it provides that 
"[t]he department [of transportation] may approve deviations from 
the minimum standards in special cases where the strict application 
of the standards is impractical and where such deviation is not 
contrary to the public interest and safety and the intent of this 
section."  Wis. Stat. § 82.50(2).  Before the department can 
                                                 
17 The statute provides different standards for local service 
roads, roads with intermittent traffic, roads with less than 100 
daily cars, roads with 100-250 daily cars, roads with 251-400 daily 
cars, roads with 401-1000 daily cars, roads with 1001-2400 daily 
cars, and roads with over 2400 daily cars.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.50(1). 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
29 
 
approve a deviation, of course, there must be a request to deviate.  
Nothing in the statutes controls the circumstances in which the 
Town may apply for such a deviation, which indicates the 
application is left to its discretion.  This is consistent with 
the broader statutory framework relating to town roads, in which 
the legislature has decreed that "[t]he town board shall have the 
care 
and 
supervision 
of 
all 
highways 
under 
the 
town's 
jurisdiction . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 82.03(1)(a); see also 
§ 82.03(4) ("The town board shall direct when and where all highway 
funds shall be expended.").  So if the Town can apply to the 
department of administration for relief from the standards imposed 
by § 82.50, then compliance with those standards is subject to at 
least some cognizable amount of discretion.  And in the presence 
of such discretion, declaratory relief is inappropriate because 
the rights are not yet fixed:  "Courts will not declare rights 
until they have become fixed under an existing state of 
facts . . . ." Voight v. Walters, 262 Wis. 356, 359, 55 N.W.2d 399 
(1952); see also Olson v. Town of Cottage Grove, 2008 WI 51, ¶43, 
309 Wis. 2d 365, 749 N.W.2d 211 ("The facts on which the court is 
asked 
to 
make 
a 
judgment 
should 
not 
be 
contingent 
or 
uncertain . . . ."); Wis. Stat. § 806.04(6) ("The court may refuse 
to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such 
judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate 
the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding."). 
¶43 Notwithstanding these principles, DSG says, we have 
previously 
enforced 
a 
town's 
road-related 
obligations.  
Specifically, it refers us to State ex rel. Cabott, Inc. v. Wojcik, 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
30 
 
47 Wis. 2d 759, 177 N.W.2d 828 (1970), and State ex rel. Wollner 
v. Schloemer, 200 Wis. 350, 228 N.W. 487 (1930).  It says this 
brace of cases establishes that "Wisconsin law has long recognized 
that a private cause of action for mandamus may be stated when a 
town violates clear duties imposed upon it by law with regard to 
highways and other plain statutory duties." 
¶44 But neither Cabott nor Wollner suggests there is a 
cognizable claim in the way a town exercises its discretionary 
road-related responsibilities.  In Cabott, we addressed a statute 
that required towns to "keep [highways] passable at all times," 
and further required that "[w]hen any highway under [the town's] 
charge becomes impassable [it] shall put the same in passable 
condition as soon as practicable."  Wis. Stat. § 81.03 (1969-70).  
We said the statutory command to keep the highways passable was 
"mandatory and unequivocal," even if the manner of making it 
passable was subject to the town's discretion.  Cabott, 47 
Wis. 2d at 768.  There is no comparable duty under Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.50.  The Town's ability to apply for a deviation from the 
standards contained in that statute mean we cannot consider them 
"mandatory and unequivocal."  Similarly, in Wollner we considered 
a statute that said "no town board shall discontinue . . . any 
highway when such discontinuance would deprive the owner of lands 
of access therefrom to the public highway." 200 Wis. at 352 
(quoting Wis. Stat. § 80.02 (1929-30)).  The duty not to 
discontinue in such circumstances was mandatory and unequivocal.  
The ensuing writ of mandamus commanded the town to reopen the 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
31 
 
highway, but did not specify the manner of doing so inasmuch as 
that was left to the town's discretion.  Wollner, 200 Wis. at 352. 
¶45 Our opinion in State ex rel. Wisniewski v. Rossier, 205 
Wis. 634, 238 N.W. 825 (1931), reinforces the lesson that we lack 
the authority to direct the Town's exercise of its discretionary 
authority.  There, we said the "crucial question . . . [was] 
whether a town, or its officers, may be compelled by mandamus to 
repair and maintain a highway in a safe condition."  Id. at 635.  
Referring to our decision in Wollner, we said we "never intended 
to hold that mandamus may be invoked in this state to compel a 
town board to repair or to maintain a highway."  Id. at 637. 
¶46 Although Wisniewski, Cabott, and Wollner addressed the 
significance of a town's discretion in the context of a writ of 
mandamus,18 we think the lesson is no less important in determining 
whether a person has a "claim of right" in how a town exercises 
its discretion (the first Tooley prerequisite to a declaration of 
rights).  Although we may review a town's exercise of discretion 
to ensure it stays within proper parameters, it is not for the 
judiciary to tell the town how to exercise its discretion in the 
                                                 
18 State ex rel. Althouse v. City of Madison, 79 Wis. 2d 97, 
106, 255 N.W.2d 449 (1977) ("[W]hen the action sought to be 
compelled is discretionary, mandamus will not lie."); State ex 
rel. Thomas v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 343, 349, 198 N.W.2d 675 (1972) 
("[M]andamus will not lie to control the manner in which a 
governmental body or officer exercises his statutorily-conferred 
discretion."). 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
32 
 
first instance.19  Because Wis. Stat. § 82.50 does not impose on 
the Town a mandatory and non-discretionary obligation to improve 
the Parkway to town road standards, DSG can have no cognizable 
claim of right until, at the earliest, the town's discretionary 
authority resolves to a particular course of action.  And because 
that has not yet occurred, DSG's Town Road Claim is also not ripe 
for review. 
2.  Damages 
¶47 There are instances in which private parties may sue 
public officers for damages based on their failure to comply with 
statutory obligations.  But as the Town observes, "a private right 
of action is created only when (1) the language or the form of the 
statute evinces the legislature's intent to create a private right 
of action, and (2) the statute establishes private civil liability 
rather than merely providing for protection of the public."  Grube 
v. Daun, 210 Wis. 2d 681, 689, 563 N.W.2d 523 (1997).  The first 
element of the analysis focuses on the legislature's intent, which 
we find in the statute's language.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 ("We assume that the legislature's intent is expressed 
in the statutory language.").  The second element reflects the 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Nowell v. City of Wausau, 2013 WI 88, ¶24, 351 
Wis. 2d 1, 838 N.W.2d 852 ("Thus, the scope of certiorari review 
is limited to:  (1) whether the [municipality] kept within its 
jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; (3) whether 
its action was arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable and 
represented its will and not its judgment; and (4) whether the 
evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order or 
determination in question." (alteration in original)). 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
33 
 
general rule "'that a statute which does not purport to establish 
a civil liability, but merely makes provision to secure the safety 
or welfare of the public as an entity, is not subject to a 
construction establishing a civil liability.'"  McNeill v. 
Jacobson, 55 Wis. 2d 254, 259, 198 N.W.2d 611 (1972).  Nor will a 
cause of action "be implied to protect an interest other than the 
one specifically protected by the statute."  Id. 
¶48 DSG says "Wisconsin law, has long recognized that a 
private cause of action . . . may be stated when a town violates 
clear duties imposed upon it by law with regard to highways[.]"  
But the balance of its argument makes it clear that it was 
addressing not a right to seek damages, but its ability to seek 
relief in the form of a declaration of rights or writ of mandamus 
(which we addressed above).  Nothing in its briefs describes how 
we could understand Wis. Stat. §§ 82.03 or 82.50 as making the 
Town answerable to DSG in damages for failure to improve the 
Parkway to town road standards. 
¶49 Our review of these statutes confirms that it contains 
no language evidencing a "clear expression of intent to create a 
private right of action" for a town's failure to comply with its 
standards.  Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 
81, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981).  Nor does any provision in the statutes 
suggest its terms exist to protect a private interest rather than 
"providing for protection of the public."  Grube, 210 Wis. 2d at 
689.  We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 82.50(1) does not create a 
private cause of action. 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
34 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶50 We hold that neither the Right-to-Take Case nor the Just 
Compensation Case bars DSG's claims in this case.  However, we 
also hold that Wis. Stat. § 82.50(1) does not impose road-building 
obligations on the Town that are susceptible to a declaration of 
rights, nor does it create a private cause of action by which DSG 
can recover damages for the failure to improve the Parkway to town 
road standards.  Therefore, we reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings 
on the Petition Standards Claim. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is reversed 
and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
  
 
No. 
2017AP2352   
 
 
 
1