Title: Longstaff v. Mills

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Longstaff v. Mills1989 WY 101773 P.2d 149Case Number: 88-117Decided: 05/09/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
ALAN LONGSTAFF D/B/A ALAN 
LONGSTAFF MASONRY CO., APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
JACK W. MILLS D/B/A 
DUNMAR BEST WESTERN INNS AND BRENT STEEPLES D/B/A INVESTCO CONSTRUCTION CO., 
INC., A FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofUintaCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

 
 
Alan Longstaff, pro se.

 
 
Richard L. Lavery of 
Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery and Rose, P.C., Evanston, for appellees.

 
 
Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and 
RAPER, Retired J. 

 
 

RAPER, Justice, 
Retired.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant's complaint 
appears to allege an oral contract. The trial judge sustained a Motion to 
Dismiss on the ground that the statute of limitations had run against the 
claim.1

 
 

[¶2.]     Appellant presents the 
issues to be:

 
 
1. Does Plaintiff's 
complaint state a claim upon which relief can be granted on grounds sufficient 
to withstand a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss?

 
 
2. Was Defendant Mills['] 
motion to dismiss under WRCP 12(b)(6) converted to a motion for summary 
judgment?

 
 
3. Did the Court err in 
granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's 
complaint?

 
 
4. Did the Court abuse 
it[]s discretion when it granted Plaintiff's late filed motion for a new 
Trial?

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellee states 
that:

 
 
The question presented is 
whether or not the district court erred in concluding, that the eight year 
period of limitation was applicable to the agreement between Appellant and 
Appellee, that the period of limitations had run and that no material facts were in 
dispute.

 
 

[¶4.]     We will reverse and 
remand for further proceedings.

 
 

[¶5.]     The appellant, pro se, 
filed a complaint against appellee on May 12, 1987, in which he alleged that 
"[o]n or about March of 1978 the Plaintiff was orally contracted by the 
Defendants in the amount of $84,500 to provide the labor and materials for the 
masonry work on a forty unit addition to the Best Western DunMar Inn of 
Evanston, Wyoming." It was further alleged that additional masonry work in the 
amount of $4,093 for a total of $88,593 was agreed upon between the parties. The 
complaint also stated that "[a]s of August 2nd 1978 Plaintiff had received a 
total of $80,093 from the Defendants leaving a balance owing to Plaintiff of 
$8,500 which balance was due and payable to Plaintiff upon completion of `minor 
masonry touchups'" which it is alleged were completed on or about October 5, 
1978. According to the complaint, requests for settlement went unheeded, so the 
prayer claimed $8,500, court costs, attorney fees, interest and punitive damages 
"for breach of contract."

 
 

[¶6.]     In a handwritten 
affidavit to the complaint, affiant stated that "eight years have not elapsed 
since the cause of action has [accrued]."

 
 

[¶7.]     Appellee filed a Motion 
to Dismiss or in the Alternative for a Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
claiming W.S. 1-3-105(a)(ii)2 barred the action on October 4, 
1986, eight years having elapsed.

 
 

[¶8.]     Appellant responded 
with a claim that a written agreement and/or promise in writing was signed by 
plaintiff and defendant on August 2, 1978, supported by his affidavit to which 
was attached a document he claimed constituted the written agreement. The 
attachment was handwritten on a printed statement form stamped "Alan Longstaff 
Masonry Co., 2627 East 10,000 South, Sandy, Utah84070." It bore a date of 
August 2, 1978, and listed various items as follows:

 
 
Basic contract 
      price

 
 
83,500 
      

Extra block 
      basement ht: 196 x 2 =

392 
      

 
 
Jos outs 15 x 8-33 
      fade out =

87 
      

 
 
Mech room 
      basement

392 
      

 
 
Outside stairs 
      wall

138 
      

 
 
Retaining wall 
      extra block

48 
      

 
 
Total extra block @ 
      $3.50 per unit

 
 
3,699

203 switchbox cuts 
      @ $1.50 per cut

 
 
304

10 hours forklift 
      use @ $45 with operator

 
 
450

 
 
 
 
 
 
Total with 
      extras

 
 
87,593 
      

 
 
 
 
 
 
Paid to 
      date

 
 
35,000 
      

Full balance to be 
      paid upon comp of minor masonry touchups terms accepted 
      

 
 
 
 
 
 

[¶9.]     In the upper part of 
the document appear some initials which conceivably could be those of Jack W. 
Mills, appellee. Appellant, in his affidavit, stated that two of the documents 
were made. One was initialed by him and delivered to Mills and the other 
initialed by Mills and delivered to appellant, the one attached to his 
affidavit. Appellee claimed the attachment kept by appellant has been altered to 
include language on the bottom: "[B]alance to be paid upon comp of minor masonry 
touchups[.] [T]erms accepted."

 
 

[¶10.]  Also attached to appellant's affidavit 
was a copy of a letter from appellee's attorney to appellant's attorney dated 
November 26, 1979. The letter stated that "[t]he initials appearing on the 
statement simply related to the payment of the 
$44,556.73."

 
 

[¶11.]  Upon the basis of briefs filed and other 
material, the court sustained appellee's Motion to 
Dismiss.

 
 

[¶12.]  A letter dated August 24, 1979, addressed 
to the then attorney for appellee, sent by him to appellant's then attorney, and 
signed by appellee Mills, stated in part that:

 
 
As per your request for 
details in reference to work done on addition to Dunmar Motel by Alan Longstaff 
Masonry Co. This job was to have been completed for a sum of $83,500.00 with 
extras, as per statement from Alan Longstaff Masonry Co., August 2, 1978. Total 
bill with extras $87,593.00, less payments of:

 
 
$25,000.00

June 16, 
      1978

Check # 
      20A 

10,000.00

July 13, 
      1978

Check # 
      028 

44,556.73

August 2, 
      1978

Check # 
      057

 
 
$79,556.73 Total 
      amount paid, resulting in an unpaid balance of $8,036.27. Subtract from 
      this amount * * * Use Tax of $536.27, leaving a balance of $7,500.00. (See 
      # 1 Copy)

 
 
The letter closes with 
the following statement:

 
 
It is hoped Mr. Longstaff 
doesn't object to the charges listed, as we never questioned his extra charges 
in the amount of $4,093.00 on August 2, 1978, and paid him in full on the 
extras

 
 
$ 
      7,500.00

-

Balance Owing, less 
      charges listed

 - 905.38

-

Windows

 - 104.00

-

Weatherstripping 
      windows 

- 
      795.00

-

Plaster (Berger 
      Lath & Plaster Co.) 

- 
      1,875.31

-

Carpenter (Mel 
      Teeples Co.) 

- 
      2,028.00

-

Rooms used by Mr. 
      Longstaff & Crew 

- 
      105.00

-

Clean-up

 
 
 
 
 
 
$ 
      5,812.69

-

Leaving a remaining 
      balance of $1,687.31.

 
 

[¶13.]  Since the letter dated August 24, 1979, 
acknowledged an account dated August 2, 1978, it would appear that there is a 
period of less than eight years between the date of acknowledgement and the date 
of the filing of the appellant's complaint.

 
 
Date of 
      acknowledgement

August 24, 1979 
      

Period of 
      limitation years

8 
      

Last day to 
      file

August 24, 1987 
      

Date of 
      complaint

May 12, 
      1987

 
 

[¶14.]  W.S. 1-3-119 
provides:

 
 
When payment has been 
made upon any demand founded on contract or a written acknowledgement thereof, 
or promise to pay the same has been made and signed by the party to be charged, 
the time for commencing an action runs from the date of such payment, 
acknowledgement or promise.

 
 
This injects a new 
question: Was the period of the limitation extended/tolled by appellee's letter 
of August 24, 1979?

 
 

[¶15.]  In response to the district court's 
dismissal of his complaint, appellant filed a motion for a new trial. The 
district judge treated the motion as if it was a motion for reconsideration and 
granted it. At the same time, the trial judge set the matter for an evidentiary 
hearing, limiting the question:

 
 
The sole issue upon which 
evidence shall be received is whether the Statute of Limitations respecting oral 
agreements or the Statute of Limitations respecting written instruments applies 
in this case.

 
 

[¶16.]  At the hearing, the letter of appellee 
dated August 24, 1979, was offered into evidence and received by the district 
judge. The appellee, Mr. Mills, was asked by the trial court whether he had 
authorized his attorney to send the letter to appellant's attorney. His answer 
was, "I never did." 

 
 

[¶17.]  Appellant, in his argument to the court, 
asserted that if the agreement was oral, it was tolled by W.S. 1-3-119. Appellee 
did not argue the point. The trial judge did not mention or dispose of the 
matter in his decision at the close of the hearing, though during the proceeding 
some colloquy concerning the letter came up:

 
 
THE COURT: You would then 
argue with respect to Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 that Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 becomes 
an additional written acknowledgement of a debt to you?

 
 
(Mr. Longstaff 
nodded.)

 
 
THE COURT: It becomes a 
written agreement signed by Mr. Mills agreeing to pay you at least 
$1,687.31?

 
 
MR. LONGSTAFF: 
Yes.

 
 

[¶18.]  We are convinced that the statute had 
been tolled by appellee's letter of August 24, 1979, which acknowledged a debt 
clearly identifiable in appellant's claim as set out in his complaint. As set 
out above, the basic contract price of $83,500 plus extras came to $87,593. 
After crediting payments, $8,036.27 remained unpaid, from which a use tax of 
$536.27 was to be deducted, leaving a balance of $7,500. There are errors in 
arithmetic in appellant's claim as he developed it, but he indicated in a brief 
he needed "a crash course in elementary math." Those are minor problems and can 
be straightened out by trial.

 
 

[¶19.]  The appellee further stated in his letter 
that "[i]t has not been our intent to ignore this unpaid amount." He also 
claimed poor workmanship and listed the corrective measures taken as the basis 
of a set-off against appellant's claim. This, of course, will have to be 
developed by further pleading and trial. The important thing is that a clear 
written acknowledgement of appellant's claim exists.3

 
 

[¶20.]  While appellee, by the letter, appears to 
claim set-offs, they are not yet an issue in this case. No answer has yet been 
filed. As said in Investment & Security Co. v. Bunten, 56 Wyo. 77, 103 P.2d 414 (1940), letters which make excuses for nonpayment of a note and do not deny 
the obligation nor regard the indebtedness as nonexistent are sufficient 
acknowledgment to revive the debt as a claim otherwise barred by 
limitations.

 
 

[¶21.]  In citing and quoting from a Kansas case, this court in Investment & Security Co., 
103 P.2d  at 418, emphasized the following Kansas language:

 
 
No set phrase or 
particular form of language is required; anything that will indicate that the party 
making the acknowledgment admits that he is still liable on the claim, that he 
is still bound for its satisfaction, that he is still held for its liquidation 
and payment, is sufficient to revive the debt or claim; and there is no 
necessity that there should also be a promise to pay the same, either express or 
implied. [Emphasis in original.]

 
 
This is also true in 
Wyoming.

 
 

[¶22.]  We are satisfied that the statute of 
limitations was tolled and that appellant's complaint was timely filed within an 
eight-year period as extended. This makes it unnecessary to determine whether 
the contract was oral or written.

 
 

[¶23.]  Reversed and remanded for further 
pleading and trial.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Although served, Brent Steeples 
d/b/a Investco Construction Co., Inc., did not answer or otherwise plead in the 
district court and is not a party to this appeal.

 
 

2 W.S. 1-3-105(a) provides in 
pertinent part:

 
 
(a) Civil actions other than for the 
recovery of real property can only be brought within the following periods after 
the cause of action accrues:

 
 
(i) Within ten (10) years, an action 
upon a specialty or any contract, agreement or promise in 
writing;

 
 
(ii) Within eight (8) years, an 
action:

 
 
(A) Upon a contract not in writing, 
either express or implied[.]

 
 

3 Appellee's counsel did not object 
to the letter except as to various notes which had been written on it by 
appellant. There was no objection on the ground of privilege. That the 
acknowledgement was sent to appellee's attorney and by him sent to appellant's 
attorney does not make it any less a written acknowledgement, signed by 
appellee. His attorney had apparent authority to transmit it as he did within 
less than a year after the work was completed and no one at that time was 
thinking about the limitations statute.