Title: P. v. Koontz

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 5/9/02
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
)
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
)
)
S036450
v.
)
)
HERBERT HARRIS KOONTZ,
)
Sacramento County
)
Super. Ct. No. 92F11330
Defendant and Appellant.
)
__________________________________ )
Defendant was convicted of the first degree murder of George Martinez
with jury findings that he had used a firearm in the commission of the crime and
that the murder was committed while he was engaged in the commission or
attempted commission of a robbery.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 12022.5, subd. (a),
190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A); unless otherwise specified, all further statutory references
are to the Penal Code.)  Defendant was also convicted of second degree robbery,
kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, and vehicle taking, all with the finding he
had used a firearm in the commission of the crimes (§§ 211, 209, subd. (b),
12022.5, subd. (a); Veh. Code, § 10851), and petty theft with a prior (§ 666).
Defendant admitted having suffered two prior serious felony convictions and
having served four prior prison terms.  (§§ 667, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (b).)
Following the jury’s return of a death verdict and the trial court’s denial of
defendant’s automatic motion to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), defendant
was sentenced to death for the murder conviction, imprisonment for life for the
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kidnapping for robbery conviction, and an aggregate determinate term of 21 years’
imprisonment; both the indeterminate and the determinate terms were to be served
consecutively to the sentence for murder.  This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd.
(b).)
The judgment is affirmed.
I.  FACTS
A.  Guilt phase
1.  Petty theft at F. W. Woolworth
About 3:00 p.m. on November 19, 1992, Donald Gallagher was working as
the assistant manager of the F. W. Woolworth store at 1000 K Street in downtown
Sacramento.  While conversing with the store manager near the front of the store,
Gallagher heard the security alarm sound, signifying that someone had attempted
to leave the store with an inventory item still retaining the magnetized tag that is
normally demagnetized at the time of purchase.  Gallagher approached defendant,
who, after having set off the security device, had stepped back inside the store, and
asked him if he had purchased anything that might have set off the alarm.
Defendant denied having done so.  Gallagher asked to look inside the plastic
Payless bag defendant was carrying; defendant consented.  Inside the bag
Gallagher saw several items bearing Woolworth’s tags, including a jar of coffee, a
hair trimmer set and an umbrella, along with some items not from Woolworth.
The store manager asked defendant if he had a receipt for the Woolworth’s
items in his bag.  Defendant replied in the negative, but said he had purchased
them earlier in the day and had just returned to the store.  Defendant claimed he
had paid for the items at register number 9.  Store personnel checked the day’s
detail tapes for that register, as well as the previous day’s tapes, but found no entry
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corresponding to the $12.99 hair trimmer set in defendant’s bag.  Police were
summoned, and defendant was cited and released on his promise to appear.
2.  Crimes at Volunteers of America apartments
a.  Prosecution evidence
On December 23, 1992, McLean Currie worked the graveyard shift as a
security monitor at the Volunteers of America Independent Living and Readiness
Pilot Project (the Project) at 254 Cleveland Avenue in Sacramento.  The aim of the
Project was to take persons, many of them drug addicts and alcoholics, from
nonfunctional environments and prepare them for life in mainstream society.
Participants resided in two-bedroom apartments; defendant and the victim, George
Martinez, shared apartment 9.
Between 5:00 and 5:15 a.m. on that date, Currie, who worked from an
office located in apartment 5, saw Martinez enter the office and noted his entrance
in the logbook.  Soon thereafter, defendant followed Martinez into the office.
Currie, who was not acquainted with defendant, asked who he was.  Defendant
replied, “My name’s Herb.”  Currie noted his entrance in the logbook.  Defendant
and Martinez went into the kitchen of apartment 5, which served as a common
area for Project participants, and Currie heard “low talking.”  Martinez came out
of the kitchen and walked back down the hall toward Currie’s office with
defendant following him.  Defendant said, “Let’s go back to the apartment, we can
figure this out.”  Martinez said, “No, I don’t want to go.”
Martinez and defendant walked back and forth in the hallway several times.
Finally, Martinez entered the office; defendant stood in the doorway.  Currie
realized there was some problem between the two men:  Martinez appeared
scared, and defendant looked irritated.  Currie asked what was going on.  Martinez
said, “I don’t have to put up with this shit this early in the morning.”  Currie asked
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what he was talking about.  Defendant said, “I got a little gas.”  Currie asked the
two men to sit down.  When neither moved after 30 seconds to a minute, Currie
took out a red incident folder and told them that if they did not help him resolve
the problem, he would have to write an incident report.  Defendant said, “All right,
I’ll settle it.”  Defendant entered the office, locked the door, pulled a handgun
from the waistband of his pants and demanded Martinez’s car keys.  Martinez
shook his head.  Defendant then shot Martinez in the abdomen and said,
“Goddamn Mexican’s been bugging me ever since I have lived here.”  Martinez
fell backward into a chair in the office.  Defendant again asked Martinez for his
car keys; Martinez said he did not have them.
Currie wanted to call an ambulance for Martinez.  Still holding the gun in
his hand, defendant answered:  “Shut the fuck up.  We are doing things my way
now.”  He drew another gun from the waistband of his pants, saying he had five
more rounds in the gun he had used to shoot Martinez, and the other was loaded.
As Currie was about to call an ambulance, defendant told him to pull the phone
out.  Currie pulled the phone to the edge of the desk.  Defendant grabbed it by the
cord, ripped it out of the wall, and threw it onto Martinez, saying, “Let him call.”
Defendant asked if Currie had a car in the parking lot.  Currie said he did,
to which defendant responded, “Give me your keys.”  Currie retrieved his keys
from his jacket pocket and placed them on the desk.  Defendant asked which keys
unlocked the car and started it; Currie gave him the information and told him it
was necessary to push a button underneath the steering column.  Defendant said,
“That’s not going to work.”  He told Currie they were going to get Martinez’s keys
and directed him to get up from the desk and walk to defendant’s apartment.
Defendant and Currie walked the 25 to 35 yards down the sidewalk from
the office to apartment 9.  Still brandishing a gun, defendant directed Currie to
enter, and Currie complied.  Defendant told him to wait in a corner of one of the
5
bedrooms.  Defendant pulled out a knapsack and laid it on the bed.  He began to
pull clothes from the closet; Currie packed them into the knapsack.  When Currie
finished packing, defendant told him they were going to look for George’s keys.
They then went into the other bedroom.  While Currie stood in the corner of the
room, defendant searched for the keys.  Not finding them anywhere, defendant
said, “George must have the keys on him.”
Still holding a gun, defendant walked behind Currie back to apartment 5.
There, Martinez was lying prone in the same position as when they had left.
Defendant instructed Currie to search Martinez’s pockets for the keys.  Currie
found them in a pocket of Martinez’s coat.  Currie found no weapons on Martinez,
who by this time was silent.  Currie handed the keys to defendant, who said, “No,
you’re going to come out and start the car.”  Defendant and Currie then walked out
to the parking lot.
Currie got into Martinez’s car and eventually succeeded in starting it.  He
backed the car out of the parking space and, at defendant’s direction, turned the
headlights on.  After Currie scraped some ice off the windshield, defendant got
into the car and drove away.
Meanwhile, Robert Edwards was coming out of apartment 6 on his way to
work, when he heard someone calling for help.  As he approached apartment 5, he
realized the person calling out was inside.  Edwards entered and found Martinez
lying on his back at the entrance to the family room with a Christmas tree pulled
over on top of him.  Martinez asked Edwards to call 911; Edwards did so and
reported that Martinez, who was holding his chest, may have suffered a heart
attack.
After ending the phone call, Edwards returned to Martinez, who had passed
out.  Edwards administered cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).  He smelled no
alcohol on Martinez’s breath.  When Martinez regained consciousness, Edwards
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asked him what had happened.  Martinez said he had been shot by his roommate.
Opening Martinez’s shirt, Edwards saw a bullet hole in his abdomen.  Edwards
went outside to seek help and saw Currie returning to the office from the parking
lot.  A car, which Edwards recognized as Martinez’s, was driving out of the lot.
Currie told Edwards to get back inside, as the man in the car had a gun.
Currie and Edwards returned to apartment 5.  Martinez asked Currie for a
glass of water; Currie and Edwards helped him sit up.  After Currie left to get the
water, Martinez fell over.  Edwards again administered CPR.  A few minutes later,
fire department emergency personnel arrived and began to treat Martinez.  They
found no weapons in the area.  Ultimately, Martinez was transported by
ambulance to a hospital, where he later died.
Sacramento Police Officers Frank Reyes and Currina Pendleton arrived at
the crime scene around 6:00 a.m.  Officer Reyes obtained a brief statement from
Currie, who was quite upset, and then broadcast information regarding defendant
and Martinez’s vehicle.  Reyes searched Martinez’s clothing, finding no weapons.
Officer Pendleton secured the scene, accompanied Martinez to the hospital in the
ambulance, and collected his effects after he was declared dead; she found no
weapons in Martinez’s clothing, but did retrieve Martinez’s uncashed Blue
Diamond Growers paycheck.
An autopsy established that Martinez had died as a result of a gunshot
wound to the abdomen, which severed the aorta, resulting in extensive internal
hemorrhaging.  Analysis of Martinez’s blood was negative for cocaine,
methamphetamine, morphine, PCP and alcohol; his blood was not tested for
marijuana.
A subsequent search of apartment 9 by Sacramento Police detectives
yielded a live .38-caliber round in defendant’s nightstand.  No weapons, bullets,
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alcohol, drugs or paraphernalia were found in Martinez’s room.  An expended slug
was retrieved from apartment 5.
Between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. the same day, California Highway Patrol
Officer William Sullivan, working out of the Buttonwillow Office in Kern County,
received two citizens’ calls about a driver on Interstate 5.  A dispatcher who
checked the license number given by one of the callers informed Sullivan that the
car had been involved in a homicide.  Officer Sullivan observed the suspect
vehicle, a silver Buick, driving southbound at 70 miles per hour and weaving from
side to side in the lane.  The car abruptly pulled into the Buttonwillow rest area
and stopped.  Officer Sullivan and fellow California Highway Patrol Officer Bill
Waterhouse ordered the driver to exit the car, toss the keys out of the car and raise
his arms.  Defendant slowly got out of the car and eventually extended his arms
after reaching several times toward his waist.  As Officer Sullivan trained his rifle
on defendant, Officer Waterhouse ordered defendant to kneel on the ground.  After
being ordered several times to kneel down, defendant finally complied.
Defendant appeared intoxicated; his breath smelled of an alcoholic
beverage, his speech was slurred, and he was unsteady on his feet.  After
defendant had been handcuffed, the officers searched him.  Inside a pocket of his
jacket was a loaded .32-caliber derringer pistol.  In the rear passenger
compartment of the Buick was a knapsack containing a blue steel Smith and
Wesson .38-caliber revolver with four live rounds and one expended round in it.
Ballistics testing established that the revolver had fired the expended slug found in
apartment 5.
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b.  Defense evidence
Testifying at trial in his own behalf, defendant denied stealing anything
from the Woolworth store and sought to establish that he shot Martinez in self-
defense after Martinez assaulted him with a knife.
Defendant began his testimony by recounting how he had arrived in
Sacramento a few months after being released from prison on parole.  According
to defendant, he was hit on the head at the Greyhound bus terminal in downtown
Sacramento and robbed of his “paperwork,” job leads, auto mechanic course
certificates and other belongings.  He then went to a halfway house for recovering
drug abusers and alcoholics on Bannon Street in Sacramento, but he felt he did not
belong in that environment.  Thereafter, defendant went to various social services
agencies and volunteered his services.  He also worked odd jobs on the weekends.
Defendant eventually moved into the Volunteers of America apartments, with
George Martinez assigned to be his roommate.
Defendant testified he and Martinez got along well in the beginning, but
over time they began quarrelling.  When Martinez drank, he became a “mean
drunk.”  Defendant purchased meat and cheese at a local flea market and stored it
in the refrigerator in the apartment he shared with Martinez.  Later, he noticed
some of it was missing and confronted Martinez.  Martinez threatened him with a
knife and said, “Don’t make me use this on you.”  Defendant claimed he had
forced Martinez to back down with a pan of boiling water he was using to prepare
oatmeal.  He did not report the incident because he was not a “snitch.”  A second
similar incident occurred a few days later, when defendant again noticed meat
missing from the refrigerator; defendant confronted Martinez, who, smelling of
alcohol, again threatened him with a knife.  Defendant testified he picked up a
kitchen knife and Martinez left the apartment.
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A few days before December 23, 1992, defendant testified, he bought two
handguns from a woman at the flea market; defendant claimed he did not want the
weapons, but the woman was insistent because she needed money.  Defendant
planned to resell the weapons at the flea market the following weekend at a price
double what he had paid for them.  Defendant kept the guns in an old shoulder bag
and often carried them with him because he walked through very tough
neighborhoods at night, where he would encounter gang members.
Late on the night of December 22, 1992, defendant went to visit some
friends, intending soon to sell the two guns and move out of the Volunteers of
America apartments.  At his friends’ house the lights were out, so he turned
around and walked back downtown.  At the Greyhound bus station, he took a taxi
to a nearby restaurant.1  About an hour later, he took another cab ride back to his
apartment.2
Entering the apartment, defendant testified he tossed his backpack onto his
bed and went to turn on the wall heater.  Martinez, who smelled of alcohol, came
out of his bedroom and said, “I am tired of this shit, you always turn on the gas.”
Martinez was holding a knife in his hand.  When defendant pulled a gun, Martinez
backed away and put his knife back in his jacket pocket; defendant likewise put
his gun back.  As Martinez was about to leave the apartment, he threatened
defendant, saying, “I am going to get you, I am going to cut you in half.”
                                                
1 
Frances Simpson testified she was working as a waitress at the Denny’s
restaurant at Third and J Streets in Sacramento early in the morning of December
23, 1992, when defendant came in and sat at the counter.  She testified he escorted
a drunken man, who had been “hustling people for money,” outside the restaurant,
then returned and ordered a meal.  Simpson did not smell alcohol on defendant’s
breath.
2 
The cabdriver, Igor Golovko, testified he did not notice any signs that
defendant was intoxicated.
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Martinez walked out the front door of the apartment.  Defendant followed
him to the office where Currie was sitting at a desk writing in a log book.
Defendant testified that when he entered the office, Martinez was looking at a
bulletin board.  Suddenly, defendant claimed, Martinez “rushed” him.  Defendant
grabbed and hit Martinez in self-defense, causing Martinez to fall into a Christmas
tree, knocking it over.  Defendant backed away, knowing that, with a gun, he held
an advantage in the fight.
Currie asked defendant who he was, and defendant identified himself.
Martinez picked up the fallen Christmas tree and again threatened defendant.
Martinez then walked into the office; defendant followed, trying to calm him
down.  Martinez continued to repeat his threats.  Currie said he smelled alcohol
and would have to separate the two men.  Defendant testified that when he took
his eyes off Martinez to tell Currie he did not drink, Martinez suddenly rushed
defendant with a knife, and defendant shot him.  Martinez stopped, but said
nothing and did not look like he was hurt.  He put his knife back in his pocket and
sat on a nearby chair, still looking red and angry.
According to defendant, Currie said:  “I am a white man.  You are not
going to shoot me, too, are you?”  Defendant replied that he had put the gun back
in his waist, that he had another in his pocket, and the guns were going to stay
there, as he had no fight with Currie.
Defendant asked Currie for the keys to his car.  According to defendant,
Currie said all he had was a little truck, but he offered to get Martinez’s keys.
Defendant denied pointing any guns at Currie and claimed he followed Currie to
the apartment he shared with Martinez.  They did not find any keys there and, after
putting some clothes in defendant’s pack, returned to the office.  Martinez had
moved to the floor and was holding his wound.  He appeared to be in pain,
although defendant still did not think he had been badly hurt.  Defendant admitted
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throwing a telephone on the floor, but denied throwing it on Martinez.  Defendant
testified that Currie reached into Martinez’s coat pocket and removed his car keys.
Defendant told Currie to start the car.  Defendant asserted he was not guilty of
stealing any car because Currie had taken the keys and started the car.  Defendant
had not wanted Martinez’s car because, as a certified mechanic, he knew it was
worthless.
When defendant drove away, he did not call the police because he was
preoccupied with thoughts of getting a lawyer.  He was heading to Riverside for
that purpose; he knew an attorney there.
Defendant soon encountered problems with Martinez’s car.  Although the
digital fuel gauge showed three gallons, the car ran out of gas and stalled on the
freeway.  Defendant claimed a California Highway Patrol officer stopped and
asked him, “What’s the trouble, Sarge?”  The officer asked him if he had any
money, and defendant showed him three $100 bills.  The officer then called a tow
truck operator, who sold defendant three gallons of gas for $20.  Later, just outside
Bakersfield, the electrical system failed when defendant tried to start the car.
Another highway patrol officer came along, and a second tow truck driver was
able to start the car.  Defendant paid him with a $100 bill.  After getting back on
the freeway, defendant saw a sign for a rest area.  It was cold, and he pulled in to
get some coffee.  It was there he was arrested.  Defendant explained that he had
initially refused to kneel on the ground when ordered to do so by highway patrol
officers because it was cold.  Defendant denied reaching toward the pocket
containing the derringer.
On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged his prior felony
convictions for burglary in 1963, assault with a firearm in 1967, receiving stolen
property in 1978, a “felony involving dishonesty” in 1982, and robbery in 1983.
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Patrick O’Farrell testified for the defense that Martinez had stabbed him on
August 16, 1992.  O’Farrell, who admitted having been convicted of various
felonies, testified he was sitting on Del Paso Boulevard drinking with two friends
on that date; one of the men, named Steve, asked Martinez about repaying some
money he owed him.  Martinez became embroiled in a verbal argument over the
money.  O’Farrell stood up and struck Martinez in the face with a whiskey bottle.
Martinez then stabbed O’Farrell in the abdomen, turned and walked away.
c.  Rebuttal
Craig Wire, the safety coordinator for the Volunteers of America, opined
that Martinez did not have a reputation for violence, but rather was generally soft-
spoken and timid.  Defendant, according to Wire, had a reputation for aggressive
behavior.  Anthony Kotko, Martinez’s supervisor at Blue Diamond Growers,
testified he had never observed any type of aggressive or violent behavior by
Martinez.
B.  Penalty phase
1.  Prosecution evidence
It was stipulated that defendant was in custody in prison during the
following periods:  July 19, 1957, to April 17, 1959; November 5, 1959, to
November 5, 1962; June 11, 1963, to June 13, 1966; April 26, 1968, to May 18,
1977; October 23, 1978, to September 18, 1980; November 20, 1980, to March 30,
1981; and October 28, 1983, to April 30, 1992.  Selected pages from the court
records of the underlying convictions, including a 1968 conviction for assault with
intent to commit murder and a 1983 conviction for armed robbery, were admitted
into evidence.
The prosecution presented evidence that defendant had committed various
sexual offenses in an incident that occurred in 1983.  In February of that year,
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Wanda B. was living in an apartment complex on what was then called
Sacramento Boulevard in Sacramento; defendant was the apartment manager.
Late in the evening of February 19, 1983, Ms. B., who did not have a telephone in
her apartment, went to defendant’s apartment to use his.  There she encountered
two heavyset White males, Elvis Wakefield and his cousin, Allen Wade
Wakefield, who told her defendant was not at home.  Ms. B. then left.  Later, she
returned to defendant’s apartment; when she knocked and asked to use the
telephone, defendant invited her in.  Once she was inside, defendant grabbed her
by the arm and pulled her into his bedroom.  The Wakefields remained in the
living room, and once Ms. B. was in defendant’s bedroom, the volume of the
television set went up.  In the bedroom, defendant ripped open his shirt, causing
buttons to fall off.  Defendant proceeded to rip open Ms. B.’s jeans and threw her
to the floor.  She noticed a handgun stuck in the front of his pants.  He put his
penis in her mouth and held the gun to her head.  After pulling off her jeans,
defendant inserted his penis into her vagina.  He attempted to sodomize her and
said he was “going to let his friends do it” when he was through.
Ms. B. managed to escape when defendant dozed off.  She returned to her
own apartment and related what had happened to her boyfriend, Jose, who called
the police.  A search of defendant’s bedroom yielded a shirt missing several
buttons, along with the corresponding buttons; in a drawer to the right of the
kitchen sink, police found a loaded blue steel .22-caliber handgun.
Ms. B. admitted having been convicted of possessing cocaine for sale but
denied having been arrested for drug use.  She acknowledged her boyfriend had
previously stabbed her out of jealousy.  She denied ever having spent the night
with defendant in his apartment and denied telling another witness, Harold
Newman, she had done so.
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2.  Defense evidence
Allen Wade Wakefield, who admitted having been convicted of robbery
and receiving stolen property, testified that Ms. B. had come to defendant’s
apartment several times during the day on February 20, 1983, to see defendant
about getting some “crank” (methamphetamine).  He also testified that Ms. B. had
voluntarily accompanied defendant to his bedroom.  Elvis Wakefield testified he
heard “a lot of giggling” coming from the bedroom while defendant and Ms. B.
were there together.
Defendant testified that Ms. B. “came on” to him because she wanted him
to talk some people into giving her drugs on credit.  He testified that he and Ms. B.
had consensual sex in his apartment and that when her boyfriend looked in
defendant’s bedroom window and saw them engaged in intercourse, the boyfriend
began screaming and Ms. B. ran from the room.  Defendant denied seeing a gun in
his apartment that evening, but testified he had had many houseguests and had
previously seen guns there.
II.  ANALYSIS
A.  Competency and self-representation issues3
1.  Defendant’s asserted incompetency to stand trial; trial court’s
failure to hold hearing on competency
Defendant contends his conviction was obtained in violation of his right to
due process (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15) because he
was incompetent to stand trial and the trial court nevertheless failed to hold a
hearing, pursuant to section 1368, on the question of his competency.  Trying him
                                                
3 
Defendant was represented by appointed counsel, Vincent O’Brien, through
the preliminary examination.  At the conclusion of that proceeding, defendant
successfully moved for self-representation under the rule of Faretta v. California
(1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).
15
while he was incompetent, he further contends, deprived him of numerous other
state and federal constitutional rights, including the rights to a fair trial, trial by
jury, confrontation and cross-examination, presentation of a defense, effective
assistance of counsel, equal protection, and reliable guilt and penalty phase
verdicts as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, and their California counterparts, article I, sections
7, 15 and 17.
To restate general principles applicable to this issue:  “A person cannot be
tried or adjudged to punishment while mentally incompetent.  (§ 1367, subd. (a).)
A defendant is mentally incompetent if, as a result of a mental disorder or
developmental disability, he or she is unable to understand the nature of the
criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational
manner.  (Ibid.)  When the accused presents substantial evidence of incompetence,
due process requires that the trial court conduct a full competency hearing.
(People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 804; Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S.
375, 377.)  ‘Evidence is “substantial” if it raises a reasonable doubt about the
defendant’s competence to stand trial.’  (People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th
691, 726, overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th
1046, 1069, fn. 13.)”  (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131.)
When there exists substantial evidence of the accused’s incompetency, a
trial court must declare a doubt and hold a hearing pursuant to section 1368 even
absent a request by either party.  (See People v. Aparicio (1952) 38 Cal.2d 565,
568; § 1368, subd. (a).)  Claiming that that condition is met here, defendant asserts
he was unable to cooperate with and assist his original appointed counsel in his
defense and that after becoming his own counsel, he was unable to competently
prepare and present his own defense.  Prior to trial, defendant fired several
investigators, being unable—he now contends—to interact with them in a rational
16
manner.  Defendant characterizes his trial as a travesty, punctuated with fits of his
incoherent rambling and nonsensical statements, an irrational defense based on
self-defense against a nonexistent knife and a delusional belief that the shot he
fired into the victim’s abdomen did not really hurt him, as well as an untenable
suggestion that the paramedics actually killed the victim by negligent treatment.
Defendant further asserts that he presented a number of witnesses in his defense
who were either not helpful or damaging to the defense.
Examination of the record fails to support defendant’s claim of
incompetency to stand trial.  Even supposing defendant is correct that the various
examples of his rambling, marginally relevant speeches cited in his briefing may
constitute evidence of some form of mental illness, the record simply does not
show that he lacked an understanding of the nature of the proceedings or the
ability to assist in his defense.  To the contrary, defendant (who, it will be recalled,
had had extensive prior experience with the criminal justice system) put on
evidence, conducted cross-examination and testified on his own behalf.  Despite
his early difficulties in working with former appointed counsel and investigators,
by the time of trial he apparently enjoyed a good working relationship with his
investigators.  That his witness list expanded as his investigation progressed is
hardly proof that his defense was based on delusion.  And, although the jury
ultimately credited the prosecution’s evidence over defendant’s version of the
shooting, his story contained no bizarre content, as opposed to mere exaggeration
or lies.
Defendant’s case thus is distinguishable from Howard v. State (Miss. 1997)
697 So.2d 415, on which he relies.  In Howard, the Mississippi Supreme Court
reversed a murder conviction and death sentence on the basis, inter alia, that the
trial court had erred in failing to declare a doubt as to the defendant’s competency
and, without ordering proceedings to determine his competency, in permitting him
17
to act as his own attorney at trial.  When, after some two years of pretrial delay,
Howard insisted his appointed counsel be granted no further continuances, the trial
court informed him he would have to cooperate with his attorneys and accept their
judgment as to the timing of the trial, or else he could represent himself.  Howard
elected the latter course.  He proceeded immediately to trial without filing any
pretrial motions or exercising any challenges during voir dire, even as he objected
to the prosecutor’s offer to excuse prospective jurors who clearly were biased
against Howard.  Although the prosecution’s case rested almost entirely on
forensic bite-mark evidence, Howard made no attempt to challenge or counter that
evidence.  His questioning of witnesses rarely had any relevance to the issues in
the case.  (Id. at pp. 419-420.)  “For example, Howard questioned the firemen who
discovered the victim’s body on the subject of the fire department’s hiring
practices.  While apparently hoping to elicit information about an imagined
conspiracy so complicated that it never took shape even in his own mind, he
questioned a witness as to whether it was unusual for an elderly person such as the
victim to have a driver’s license.”  (Id. at p. 420.)  Howard’s theory was that
Howard’s own family members had killed the victim and were framing him; he
even suggested one of the jurors might have committed the crime.  (Ibid.)  During
the one-hour sentencing phase, Howard refused to say anything to the jury.  The
trial judge never ordered a competency hearing, although prior to trial he did enter
an order requiring that Howard undergo a mental examination, with which
Howard refused to cooperate.  On various occasions each of the four attorneys
appointed to represent or assist Howard articulated to the court their concern that
he was incompetent to stand trial.  The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the
trial judge was thus apprised of information that should have raised a doubt about
Howard’s competency and that the court erred in permitting Howard to represent
himself without first determining his competency.  (Id. at pp. 421-425.)
18
In the present case, prior to defendant’s exercise of his right to self-
representation, his appointed counsel never raised any question concerning
defendant’s competency.  Unlike Howard, defendant took an active role in pretrial
proceedings and voir dire.  Moreover, he questioned witnesses concerning the
facts of the case and the character of the victim, although his shaky grasp of the
concept of legal relevancy did not well serve his cause.  Defendant testified and
presented argument on his own behalf, although he did not, as a competent
attorney would, attempt to develop a persuasive case in mitigation.  These
deficiencies in his self-representation suggest not incompetency to stand trial but,
rather, the lack of legal training common to most pro se defendants.
Defendant’s appellate briefing makes much of his oral references, at trial, to
“unfairness” in the proceedings and his accusations of misconduct against the
prosecutor; defendant labels this behavior paranoid and insists it demonstrates
incompetency to stand trial.  The briefing, however, overlooks the context of the
cited remarks:  When he complained of unfairness, defendant was undergoing
cross-examination by the prosecutor and the course of trial evidently was not
proceeding entirely to his liking.  The record before us lacks substantial evidence
demonstrating defendant was incompetent to stand trial.
Defendant contends Magistrate Goff, who heard and decided his motion to
waive the assistance of counsel and to represent himself pursuant to Faretta,
supra, 422 U.S. 806, unequivocally expressed a doubt regarding defendant’s
competency, yet erroneously failed to suspend proceedings to have him evaluated
pursuant to section 1368.  Contrary to defendant’s claim, we do not read the record
as showing the magistrate doubted defendant’s competency to stand trial; rather,
although the magistrate used the term “competency,” he seems only to have been
expressing his reservations about defendant’s intellectual capacity to provide
adequate self-representation.
19
The question arose in the following context:  As noted (see ante, fn. 3), at
the preliminary hearing on the homicide charge, defendant was represented by
Attorney Vincent O’Brien.  After the prosecution presented its case, Magistrate
Goff held defendant to answer and, in his capacity as cross-designated judge in the
county’s superior and municipal courts, deemed the complaint on file to be an
information.  Attorney O’Brien waived arraignment on the information, and
defendant entered not guilty pleas and denied the enhancement allegations.  The
magistrate then asked defendant whether he was able to hire a private attorney, to
which defendant replied:  “Oh, I’d like to go pro per, your Honor.  And I’d like to
make another motion at this time.”  Defendant stated, “I make a motion for
representing myself.”  On inquiry by the court, the prosecutor commented:  “As
foolish as it may be, it is my understanding he has a right to do that.  If I had any
say in it, I’d oppose it.”  The court responded:  “I don’t know how you can oppose.
You may have some information I don’t have.”  The court inquired into the
possibility of appointing Attorney O’Brien as advisory counsel, but O’Brien noted
(and defendant confirmed) he wished to represent himself without the benefit of
advisory counsel.  The court proceeded to advise defendant of his right to the
appointment of counsel and the perils of self-representation, and permitted
defendant to discuss his legal training.  Defendant stated:  “I was a member of
National Lawyers Guild at Folsom Prison.  We have a charter there.  I specialized
in appeals.  Helped some men get out.  And my exact specialty was motions, over
twenty motion[s] to the court.  I only had one denied.  And lot of times I was
harassed by the guards.  So I had to use a paper and pencil.  Was able to make
trips from Folsom Prison to the courts on just a piece of paper and pencil.  Quoted
as having unusually legible handwriting.  I have a two years—on average, I’m
literate; not a dummy.  And my reason for this is I’m not getting, huh, the kind of
defense that I need.  And I need the freedom to give my side more than yes or no
20
answers.”  Defendant apologized to the court for earlier having made a “slight
outburst” and sought to elaborate on why he wished to represent himself.  The
court discouraged him, saying:  “I would suggest that you say as little as possible.
[¶] You have a very able lawyer over there.  [¶] Mr. Maguire [the prosecutor],
obviously you have seen him operate.  He’s a pro.  Knows exactly what he’s
doing.  And it’s his job to prosecute you for this.  And he will ask for the death
penalty.  I would suggest, if you really are competent to represent yourself, you
wouldn’t say anything about the case.”  Defendant persisted in commenting on the
evidence just presented in the preliminary hearing.  The court warned:  “Before
you go any further, if you are competent to represent yourself, you would know
that the matter of your preliminary hearing, probable cause, has been decided.  It’s
submitted.”  The court told defendant there was no use continuing to discuss the
preliminary hearing evidence:  “So what, now, if you are demonstrating your
knowledge of the law, what you are doing right now is telling me you really don’t
know anything, where you are not competent to represent yourself.  That’s what
you are telling me at this point.”  (Italics added.)  Defendant retorted, “It requires
very little competency in this particular case.”
Thus, up to this point in the hearing on defendant’s Faretta motion, the
context establishes that, in using the term “competent,” the court clearly was
referring to defendant’s legal knowledge or ability, rather than to any mental
disability or disorder.
The court then inquired further into defendant’s legal training,
understanding of the current charges and criminal history.  This exchange
concluded in the following manner:  “The [court]:  In 1983, said you were
sentenced to sixteen months—or sixteen years in state prison for 211.  And—you
had done your sixteen years, Mr. Martinez would still be alive, wouldn’t he?
[¶] The Defendant:  Mr. Martinez shouldn’t attack me with a knife, your Honor.
21
For the third time, it was justifiable.  And that’s my defense.”  The court then
commented:  “Mr. O’Brien, I have serious questions about the—the defendant’s
mental capacity.  Looking at this rap sheet, I don’t think there is any question that,
well, no question has entered my mind about the insanity defense.  I don’t think
there is a—appears to be one here.  However, I think there is—obviously appears
to be a pretty severe mental problem because he’s certainly unable to function
socially.”  Evidently anticipating an adverse ruling, defendant stated he would
appeal the court’s decision.
After some further discussion of defendant’s educational history, the court
said:  “Well, I’m prepared at this point to grant the motion of self-representation
for the sole reason I don’t think I have any choice.  [¶] Mr. Maguire, do you think
I have any choice?”  The prosecutor answered in the negative and asked that
defendant be admonished he would not be allowed to delay the case by seeking an
attorney on the eve of trial.  The court accordingly advised defendant he was
entitled to counsel, but that no judge would delay the trial to allow an attorney to
represent him.  Defendant interjected:  “I waive that.  [¶] Every time, I have
waived no time.”  The court replied:  “I’m not talking about that.  I’m—”
Defendant interrupted, “I [want] to get this over.”  The court finished:  “I’m
talking about something entirely different.  [¶] Now I have serious reservations
about Mr. Koontz’ mental capacity to represent himself.  And I feel a moral
responsibility to point that out on the record.  Although, as I say, there’s no
indication that he has a defense of insanity, that being the legal, medical, term.
I’m certain that I would feel more comfortable in making a ruling if I could be
assured he’d be examined by a competent analist [sic] to determine whether he’s
in fact competent.  I think the test would be far different for a legal test of insanity.
I understand the law doesn’t provide for that.  So we are—in any event, I have to
grant the motion.  Do so with reservations I put on the record.”
22
Defendant contends the court’s “serious questions” about his “mental
capacity to represent himself” constituted the expression of a doubt as to his
competency to stand trial, requiring the institution of proceedings under section
1368.  We disagree.  Each instance in which the court questioned defendant’s
“competency” or “mental capacity” occurred immediately after some exchange in
which the court highlighted deficiencies in defendant’s legal abilities that cast
doubt on the wisdom of his motion for self-representation.  The court observed
that nothing suggested defendant had a claim of legal insanity, and the sole
reference to defendant’s “mental problems” occurred in relation to a survey of
defendant’s extensive criminal history and apparent inability to “function
socially.”  While we find it unclear how an order for defendant’s examination by
an analyst might have caused the court to feel more “comfortable” in granting
defendant’s Faretta motion, we are unwilling to assume—as defendant would
have us do—that, in so ruling, the court used the term “competency” in a sense
different from every other instance in which it had used the same word, and
without acknowledging the statutory obligation to suspend proceedings, of which
it may be presumed the court was aware.  Indeed, in repeatedly inviting the
prosecutor to articulate some legal basis for denial of the Faretta motion, the court
seems implicitly to have been asking him to put on the record any information he
possessed, such as mental health history, that might obviate the need to permit
defendant to represent himself.  And, as the Attorney General observes, as of the
date of the hearing on defendant’s Faretta motion, defense counsel had reported
no particular conflicts or difficulties in dealing with defendant that might have
been the product of a mental illness.  Consequently, on this record we find no error
in Magistrate Goff’s failure to institute competency proceedings under section
1368.
23
2.  Defendant’s asserted incompetency to waive his right to the
assistance of counsel and to represent himself
Defendant contends his conviction and sentence are constitutionally infirm
because the trial court improperly allowed him to waive the assistance of counsel
and to represent himself at trial despite his asserted incompetency to do so.  As we
have observed:
“A defendant in a criminal case possesses two constitutional rights with
respect to representation that are mutually exclusive.  A defendant has the right to
be represented by counsel at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution.  (United
States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 223-227 [87 S.Ct. 1926, 1930-1932, 18
L.Ed.2d 1149]; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 339-345 [83 S.Ct.
792, 793-797, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733]; Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287
U.S. 45, 71 [53 S.Ct. 55, 65, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527].)  At the same time, the
United States Supreme Court has held that because the Sixth Amendment grants to
the accused personally the right to present a defense, a defendant possesses the
right to represent himself or herself.  (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806,
819 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533] . . . .)
“The United States Supreme Court has concluded in numerous cases and a
variety of contexts that the federal Constitution requires assiduous protection of
the right to counsel.  The right to counsel is self-executing; the defendant need
make no request for counsel in order to be entitled to legal representation.
(Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 513 [82 S.Ct. 884, 888-889, 8 L.Ed.2d
70].)  The right to counsel persists unless the defendant affirmatively waives that
right.  (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464-465 [58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82
L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357].)  Courts must indulge every reasonable inference
against waiver of the right to counsel.  (Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387,
24
404 [97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424].)”  (People v. Marshall (1997) 15
Cal.4th 1, 20.)
The requirements for a valid waiver of the right to counsel are (1) a
determination that the accused is competent to waive the right, i.e., he or she has
the mental capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against
him or her; and (2) a finding that the waiver is knowing and voluntary, i.e., the
accused understands the significance and consequences of the decision and makes
it without coercion.  (Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 400-401 & fn. 12;
People v. Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 139.)  The trial court may not determine
a defendant’s competency to waive counsel by evaluating his ability to present a
defense.  (Godinez v. Moran, supra, at pp. 399-400; U.S. v. Arlt (9th Cir. 1994) 41
F.3d 516, 518.)
On appeal, we examine de novo the whole record—not merely the
transcript of the hearing on the Faretta motion itself—to determine the validity of
the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel.  (People v. Marshall, supra, 15
Cal.4th at p. 24.)
Defendant essentially contends that mental illness rendered him unable to
make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel because he could not
appreciate how an attorney might be of assistance in his defense.  Contrary to
defendant’s claim, however, we fail to perceive in this record evidence,
“overwhelming” or otherwise, undermining his stated assent to self-representation
after due admonition.  That defendant later took missteps in his self-representation
or occasionally expressed some perplexity at courtroom procedure appears to
reflect his lack of legal knowledge, not necessarily mental illness or
incompetency.
25
3.  Asserted inadequacy of admonitions regarding risks of self-
representation
In order to make a valid waiver of the right to counsel, a defendant “should
be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the
record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with
eyes open.’  [Citation.]”  (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835.)  No particular form
of words is required in admonishing a defendant who seeks to waive counsel and
elect self-representation; the test is whether the record as a whole demonstrates
that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including
the risks and complexities of the particular case.  (People v. Stansbury (1993) 4
Cal.4th 1017, 1048, revd. on another point in Stansbury v. California (1994) 511
U.S. 318.)
In People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568 (Lopez), the court
enumerated a set of suggested advisements and inquiries designed to ensure a clear
record of a defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.  First, the court
recommended the defendant be cautioned (a) that self-representation is “almost
always unwise,” and the defendant may conduct a defense “ ‘ultimately to his own
detriment’ ” (id. at p. 572); (b) that the defendant will receive no special
indulgence by the court and is required to follow all the technical rules of
substantive law, criminal procedure and evidence in making motions and
objections, presenting evidence and argument, and conducting voir dire; (c) that
the prosecution will be represented by a trained professional who will give the
defendant no quarter on account of his lack of skill and experience; and (d) that
the defendant will receive no more library privileges than those available to any
other self-represented defendant, or any additional time to prepare.  Second, the
Lopez court recommended that trial judges inquire into the defendant’s education
and familiarity with legal procedures, suggesting a psychiatric examination in
26
questionable cases.  The Lopez court further suggested probing the defendant’s
understanding of the alternative to self-representation, i.e., the right to counsel,
including court-appointed counsel at no cost to the defendant, and exploring the
nature of the proceedings, potential defenses and potential punishments.  The
Lopez court advised warning the defendant that, in the event of misbehavior or
disruption, his or her self-representation may be terminated.  Finally, the court
noted, the defendant should be made aware that in spite of his or her best (or
worst) efforts, the defendant cannot afterwards claim inadequacy of
representation.  (Id. at pp. 572-574.)  As indicated above, the purpose of the
suggested Lopez admonitions is to ensure a clear record of a knowing and
voluntary waiver of counsel, not to create a threshold of competency to waive
counsel.  (See People v. Stansbury, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1048; Godinez v. Moran,
supra, 509 U.S. at pp. 399-400.)
In the present case, defendant asserted his right of self-representation at the
conclusion of the preliminary examination.  The trial court then warned defendant
in the following terms:  “If the jury believes what [McLean Currie] just testified
to—if there was ever a just case for imposing the death penalty, this is the case.
And I would be very careful, sir, because you are dealing in a highly technical
area, and you need all the help you can get.  [¶] Now, I don’t know whether you
are guilty or not.  I haven’t heard all the case.  But I’m telling you, you are in
serious trouble, serious trouble.”  The trial court went on to advise defendant:
“First, you have the right to be represented by a lawyer at all stages of this case.
In any case which you are a defendant in, if you cannot afford your own lawyer
I’ll appoint one to represent you.  That’s already been done.  [¶] Second, it is
generally not a wise choice to represent yourself in a criminal matter.  I think I just
said that as strongly as I could say it.  [¶] The penalty for the offense of violating
[section] 187 of the Penal Code, that is, murder, in this case of Mr. Martinez, is
27
[the] death penalty. . . .  [T]he district attorney is telling you right now, that if the
jury finds you guilty of murdering Mr. Martinez, that he will ask that jury to
impose a death penalty.  [¶] And, fourth, I cannot help you present your case.  No
judge can help you present your case or grant you any special treatment because
you are representing yourself.  You must know that.  [¶] . . . [Y]ou will be opposed
by a trained prosecutor.  There is no question about that.  Mr. Maguire has already,
I’m sure, convinced you of that.  [¶] You must comply with all the rules of
criminal procedure and evidence just as an attorney must.  And I will tell you that
very few judges and attorneys know all of those.  And, I mean, unless you have
been practicing law for some time, you wouldn’t know many of them.  [¶] . . .
[F]urther, if you are convicted, you cannot appeal based on the claim that you
were not competent to represent yourself.  You must know that I have serious
questions about that.”  The court also warned defendant that if he was disruptive,
he would be removed from the courtroom and an attorney would be appointed to
finish the case.  Defendant explained he had assisted a number of inmates in
preparing pro se motions while at Folsom Prison, and that he was literate and able
to write legibly.  When the court inquired whether he knew what the charges were,
defendant initially stated “a self-defense case” and “[t]he charges are irrelevant,”
but, on being pressed, correctly responded:  “Murder in the first degree.  Murder,
robbery, kidnapping.”  Defendant indicated his defense would be that the
homicide was justifiable because the victim had attacked him with a knife.
Defendant complains the warnings he received fell short of the Lopez
recommendations in various respects.  (See Lopez, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at pp.
572-574.)  Defendant notes that, although the court cautioned that self-
representation is generally not a wise choice, it did not warn him that he might
conduct a defense “ultimately to his own detriment.”  The latter warning, however,
clearly was implicit in the former.  Defendant acknowledges that the court
28
cautioned he would have to comply with all the rules of criminal procedure and
evidence, but he complains that the court said nothing about having to follow
substantive rules of law and did not specify that this requirement applied to
motions and objections, the presentation of evidence, voir dire and argument.  We
conclude, however, that the warning given sufficed to put defendant on notice of
what would be expected of him.  Defendant acknowledges that the court
mentioned he would be opposed by a trained prosecutor, but complains the court
did not sufficiently elaborate on the unfairness of such a mismatch.  Again,
however, we find the admonition sufficient and the failure to comment further on
the prosecutor’s superior training and experience to be inconsequential.  Next,
defendant observes the court gave no warning at all that he would be entitled to no
more library privileges than any other self-represented defendant and that he
would not have a staff of investigators, in the words of the Lopez court, “at his
beck and call.”  (Id. at p. 573.)  Of course, defendant did have a staff of
investigators and repeatedly expressed satisfaction with the two investigators
under appointment at the time of trial.  Moreover, while defendant complained to
the trial court on a number of occasions that he was not getting sufficient time in
the law library to prepare his case, the court did attempt to address his
dissatisfaction, and defendant cites nothing in the record suggesting either that his
decision to waive counsel was predicated on a misunderstanding about the extent
of his in propria persona library privileges or that he was somehow prejudiced by
lack of access to the law library.
Defendant’s central argument with respect to the asserted inadequacy of the
admonitions seems to be that his asserted mental illness rendered him unfit to
comprehend the risks of self-representation.  He points to the court’s statement
that it had “serious questions about [defendant’s] mental capacity” and that
defendant “appear[ed] to [have] a pretty severe mental problem because he’s
29
certainly unable to function socially,” evidently referring to defendant’s lengthy
criminal history.  Alluding to various occasions during the trial when he gave
disorganized speeches in open court, defendant contends he was not in fact
“literate,” contrary to his own representation to the court.  Defendant further
asserts that he made “delusional” claims, such as an assertion that he possessed an
Associate of Arts degree and had attended the University of California at Davis,
that the trial court—aware that defendant had spent most of his adult life in
prison—should have realized indicated he was mentally unfit to stand trial.  But a
proclivity to boast or exaggerate, a tendency to digress in argument, a shaky grasp
of the legal concept of relevancy, even a certain tangentiality in speech patterns
does not necessarily mean that a defendant lacks a rational and factual
understanding of the proceedings, the basic criterion for competency.  (See Dusky
v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 402.)  Finally, defendant notes that, at one
point, he asserted self-representation had been “forced upon [him].”  The
assertion, however, flies in the face of the trial court’s careful admonitions, as
quoted above, and seems to have been born of midtrial disappointment at the
course the proceedings had taken.  Defendant fails to show that mental illness
rendered him unable to validly elect self-representation.
4.  Asserted unreliability of death judgment due to self-representation
Defendant contends his sentence of death is invalid because his self-
representation at trial renders the judgment unreliable by the standards of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Arguing
that the absence of counsel detrimentally affected his exercise of all other
constitutional rights (see Menefield v. Borg (9th Cir. 1989) 881 F.2d 696, 698),
defendant asks this court to hold the Sixth Amendment right of self-representation
guaranteed by Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, inapplicable to capital trials.  We
30
have previously declined the invitation.  “ ‘Notwithstanding the state’s significant
interest in a reliable penalty determination, a determination best made by a fully
informed sentencer, a defendant’s fundamental constitutional right to control his
defense governs.  [Citation.]  The defendant has the right to present no defense and
to take the stand and both confess guilt and request imposition of the death
penalty.  [Citations.]  It follows that the state’s interest in ensuring a reliable
penalty determination may not be urged as a basis for denying a capital defendant
his fundamental right to control his defense by representing himself at all stages of
the trial.’ ”  (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1364-1365, quoting
People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 617-618, fn. omitted.)  Other states
considering the question have answered it similarly.  (E.g., People v. Coleman
(1995) 168 Ill.2d 509 [214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919, 937-938]; Bridges v.
State (Nev. 2000) 6 P.3d 1000, 1012; State v. Reed (1998) 332 S.C. 35 [503
S.E.2d 747, 750].)
B.  Guilt phase issues
1.  Consolidation of petty theft with homicide and related charges
Defendant contends the trial court erred in granting the prosecution’s
motion to consolidate the charge of petty theft from Woolworth with those for the
murder, robbery and vehicle taking committed at the Volunteers of America
apartments.  The error, he asserts, deprived him of his rights to due process of law,
a fair trial, trial by jury, confrontation and cross-examination, presentation of a
defense, assistance of counsel, equal protection, and reliable guilt and penalty
phase verdicts in a capital case, guaranteed under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, and article I, sections 7, 15
and 17 of the California Constitution.
31
An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses
connected together in their commission, or two or more different offenses of the
same class of crimes.  (§ 954.)  Offenses falling within this description, but
charged in separate pleadings, may be consolidated for trial in order to promote
judicial efficiency (see People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 935), and a trial
court’s rulings on joinder are reviewed for abuse of discretion (People v.
Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1283-1284).
Defendant complains the requirements of section 954 were not met in his
case because petty theft and murder are offenses of different classes, and the
Woolworth’s theft and the Martinez homicide were not connected in their
commission.  Further, he argues, evidence of the two offenses was not cross-
admissible, and the theft charge served only to prejudice him in the jury’s eyes by
casting doubt on his veracity.  He contends that had the trial court denied joinder,
it is reasonably probable he would have achieved a more favorable result at trial.
Defendant was charged, inter alia, with robbery and vehicle-taking in the
Volunteers of America incident, and petty theft in the Woolworth matter.
Although no case directly so holds, we may reasonably conclude these offenses
fall within the same class, in that they share the common characteristic of the
wrongful taking of another’s property.  (See People v. Leney (1989) 213
Cal.App.3d 265, 269 [interpreting § 954 to permit joinder of offenses possessing
common characteristics or attributes]; cf. People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th
1005, 1055 [theft as lesser included offense of robbery].)  As such, their joinder
was proper.
Defendant, therefore, can establish error only on a clear showing of
prejudice.  (People v. Mason, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 933.)  This he fails to do.
Although the evidence of the two sets of offenses was not cross-admissible, the
petty theft was of relatively minor seriousness, and nothing about the incident
32
suggested defendant readily engaged in criminal violence.  The trial court,
moreover, instructed the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 17.02 to decide each
count separately.  Although defendant complains the petty theft charge served only
to cast doubt on his veracity with respect to the murder charge, in light of the
extensive criminal history defendant acknowledged on cross-examination, the
petty theft could not have affected significantly the jury’s assessment of his
credibility.
Defendant complains the robbery charge was only “secondary” to the
murder charge, but he fails to cite authority for his implicit proposition that joinder
is proper only when the charge to be consolidated is of the same class as the
“principal” charge, here the murder.
We thus conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
prosecution’s consolidation motion, and defendant’s derivative claims of
constitutional error lack merit.4
                                                
4 
This conclusion is not undermined by the fact that the prosecution did not,
at trial, expressly make the argument that petty theft was an offense of the same
class as robbery, apparently relying instead on the theory that the offenses were
connected in their commission, inasmuch as defendant killed George Martinez and
stole his car on December 23, 1992, in order to flee the area and thus avoid his
scheduled court appearance that day on the petty theft charge.  Although a party
generally may not change his or her theory of the case on appeal, when a claim
presents only a question of law a reviewing court may permit a change in theory.
(Panopulos v. Maderis (1956) 47 Cal.2d 337, 340-341; People v. Borland (1996)
50 Cal.App.4th 124, 129.)  This is such an instance.  To the extent the trial court
may have relied on that theory in making its ruling, we review the correctness of
the trial court’s ruling, not the reasons underlying it.  (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure
(4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 340, p. 382; People v. Ross (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1151,
1157.)
33
2.  Evidentiary issues
a.  Poverty as motive for robbery
Under the well-established rule, a defendant’s poverty generally may not be
admitted to prove a motive to commit a robbery or theft; reliance on such evidence
is deemed unfair to the defendant, and its probative value is outweighed by the
risk of prejudice.  (E.g., People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 939.)  In some
circumstances, however, evidence of a defendant’s poverty is admissible for the
limited purpose of refuting a claim that he did not commit the offense because he
did not need the money, or to eliminate other possible explanations for sudden
wealth after the occurrence of a theft offense.  (People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d
815, 854, disapproved on another ground in People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d
771, 836; People v. Gorgol (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 281, 303-304.)
In the present case, the prosecutor elicited, on cross-examination,
defendant’s testimony pertaining to his earnings in the months prior to the offenses
and the extent of the money and property he had accumulated.  This line of
questioning, defendant contends, violated the state law evidentiary principles cited
above and deprived him of his rights to due process of law, a fair trial, trial by
jury, confrontation and cross-examination, presentation of a defense, effective
assistance of counsel, equal protection, and reliable guilt and penalty phase
verdicts as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the federal Constitution, and their state constitutional counterparts, article I,
sections 7, 15 and 17.  Defendant acknowledges he failed to object on these
grounds, but argues the evidence thus elicited tended so strongly to lead to an
unreliable death judgment that we nevertheless may and should reach the merits of
his argument.
Defendant’s failure to object at trial renders the contention forfeited, and  it
lacks merit in any event.  In an effort to show he lacked a motive to steal
34
Martinez’s car, defendant testified that he more than adequately met his needs for
food, shelter and other material goods by a combination  of food stamps, welfare,
the shared housing arrangement at the Volunteers of America apartments, odd
jobs, and part-time work at a flea market.  Defendant also contrasted Martinez’s
alleged impecuniousness with his own relatively ample resources, claiming he had
lent Martinez money on occasion.  Defendant testified that when Martinez’s car
ran out of gas shortly after the shooting, a California Highway Patrol officer
stopped to offer help, and defendant proclaimed he had “plenty of money,”
showing the officer $320 in cash that he kept in a money clip.  The prosecutor was
entitled to explore, on cross-examination, the basis for defendant’s testimony; he
did not improperly introduce defendant’s poverty as a motive for robbery.
b.  Auto mechanic course certificates excluded as hearsay
Defendant sought to introduce into evidence certain certificates he claimed
to have received upon his completion of several courses in auto mechanics.  The
trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection on grounds of hearsay.  Defendant
contends this ruling constituted error under state evidentiary law, as well as a
denial of his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, trial
by jury, confrontation and cross-examination, presentation of a defense, effective
assistance of counsel, equal protection, and reliable guilt and penalty phase
verdicts.  (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15,
17.)
Defendant first argues the certificates were relevant for a nonhearsay
purpose.  That is, he asserts their admission would have been proper not to prove
he actually had completed the courses, but as circumstantial evidence of his state
of mind (familiarity with automotive systems and repair) and that he acted in
conformity with it (i.e., that defendant disdained Martinez’s car because of his
35
understanding of its mechanical problems, and thus did not intend to steal it).  The
Attorney General contends defendant failed to preserve the claim of error by not
advancing this nonhearsay basis for the certificates’ admission before the trial
court, and that the certificates were in fact hearsay not qualifying for the business
records exception.  (See Evid. Code, §§ 354, 1271 [exception to hearsay rule for
written records created in the regular course of business at or near the time of the
relevant act, condition, or event, when the custodian or other qualified witness
testifies to the record’s identity and the mode of its preparation, and the sources of
information and method and time of its preparation were such as to indicate its
trustworthiness].)  Finally, assuming the exclusion of the certificates was error, the
Attorney General argues, defendant was not prejudiced thereby because he
testified, without contradiction, that he had taken several auto mechanics courses
at Soledad State Prison.  Thus, had the trial court admitted the certificates, a
different outcome was not reasonably probable.  (People v. Watson (1956) 46
Cal.2d 818, 836.)
In our review, defendant sufficiently preserved the argument he now
advances by urging that the certificates should be admitted to prove his
“expertise.”  Nevertheless, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in excluding the certificates.  Even insofar as they were relevant to prove
defendant was familiar with auto mechanics, the certificates were hearsay:  They
tended, in essence, to demonstrate that he had acquired such familiarity by
completing the courses in question.  Moreover, defendant made no effort at trial to
authenticate the documents or otherwise meet the foundational requirements for
their admission as business records.  (See Evid. Code, § 1271.)  In any event, in
view of the minimal probative value of the certificates and the absence of any
conceivable prejudice resulting from their exclusion, any possible error would
have been harmless under the circumstances.
36
c.  Sufficiency of evidence
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions
of murder and robbery and the jury’s finding on the robbery-murder special-
circumstance allegation.  The error, he contends, deprived him of his rights to due
process of law, a fair trial, trial by jury, confrontation and cross-examination,
presentation of a defense, effective assistance of counsel, equal protection, and
reliable guilt and penalty phase verdicts in a capital case, as guaranteed by the
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and California Constitution article I, sections 7, 15 and 17.  The standard of review
is well settled:  On appeal, we review the whole record in the light most favorable
to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that
is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317-320; People v. Johnson (1980) 26
Cal.3d 557, 578.)  If the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must
accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a
witness’s credibility for that of the fact finder.  (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th
1199, 1206.)  We consider separately defendant’s contentions regarding the two
theories of murder that the prosecution advanced in this case:  felony murder, and
premeditated and deliberate first degree murder.
i.  Robbery, felony murder, robbery-murder special
circumstance
Defendant contends the evi dence is insufficient to support the jury’s
verdicts of guilt on the robbery and felony-murder counts and its true finding on
the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation.  Only speculation, he argues,
suggests the shooting in this case was committed as a part of a robbery.  Rather,
according to defendant, his dispute with the victim concerned the heat in their
37
shared apartment, and the taking occurred only after the shooting (and thus, he
contends, fails to support an inference that he entertained an intent to steal at the
time he shot the victim, as required for robbery, felony murder, and the robbery-
murder special circumstance).  (See People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1 (Morris),
disapproved on another ground in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-544,
fn. 5; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1090, overruled on other
grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823 [mental state required for
felony-murder special circumstance is intent to commit underlying felony].)
Defendant argues the evidence shows the taking was merely incidental to the
killing and thus is insufficient to support a felony-murder verdict under the rule of
People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 59-62, disapproved on another point in
People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, fn. 3.
In Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d 1, this court reversed a robbery conviction and
a robbery-murder special-circumstance finding for insufficient evidence.  In
Morris, the victim’s unclothed body was found, shot to death, in a gay bathhouse.
The record contained no evidence that any personal property was in the victim’s
possession at the time of the murder.  No property belonging to the victim was
ever recovered, with the possible exception of a credit card, lent to the victim by a
third person; the defendant, or someone looking like him, was seen presenting the
card three days after the murder.  A witness testified the defendant had made the
comment that “ ‘. . . he go out there and make money, you know, with these
homosexuals, you know, dates—he had to kill one.’ ”  (Id. at p. 20.)  We held the
evidence insufficient to show that any property was taken from the victim by force
or fear, as necessary for robbery:  That the defendant surreptitiously stole a credit
card from the victim’s clothes before shooting him, or even that the victim offered
the card as a form of consideration for sexual services, was each a plausible
scenario given the state of the evidence.  (Id. at pp. 20-22.)
38
In People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, on which defendant also relies, the
defendant husband killed his wife, apparently out of jealousy or for revenge.  The
defendant and an accomplice then took her purse, clothing, and rings, apparently
to hinder identification of the victim.  Setting aside the robbery-murder special-
circumstance finding, this court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to
establish the murder had been committed during the commission of a robbery; the
taking was merely incidental to the murder.  (Id. at pp. 59-62.)
In contrast, in the present case, McLean Currie testified that defendant
demanded Martinez’s car keys at gunpoint, Martinez refused, and defendant then
shot him, after which he again demanded the keys and proceeded to search for
them.  Defendant asserts the shooting grew out of a dispute between the two men
concerning the heat in their apartment and that any theft was incidental to the
shooting, but the jury was not required to credit defendant’s version of the event.
From the evidence presented, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the
dispute between defendant and Martinez concerned defendant’s insistence that
Martinez surrender his car, and that defendant shot Martinez in order to compel
him to accede to his demands.  In other words, the evidence supports an inference
that defendant entertained the intent to steal before he committed an act of force.
That defendant did not actually succeed in finding the keys until after the shooting
does not dictate a contrary result.  The jury’s verdicts on the robbery and murder
charges and its true finding on the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation
find ample support in the evidence.
ii.  Premeditated murder
Defendant also contends insufficient evidence supports his conviction of
first degree murder on a premeditation theory.  To review applicable principles:  A
verdict of deliberate and premeditated first degree murder requires more than a
39
showing of intent to kill.  (§ 189 [“willful, deliberate and premeditated killing” as
first degree murder].)  “Deliberation” refers to careful weighing of considerations
in forming a course of action; “premeditation” means thought over in advance.
(People v. Bender (1945) 27 Cal.2d 164, 183; People v. Thomas (1945) 25 Cal.2d
880, 900; see People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1123-1124; CALJIC No.
8.20 (6th ed. 1996).)  “The process of premeditation and deliberation does not
require any extended period of time.  ‘The true test is not the duration of time as
much as it is the extent of the reflection.  Thoughts may follow each other with
great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly. . . .’
[Citations.]”  (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767.)
Defendant argues the record in this case shows the shooting of George
Martinez to have been not a premeditated and deliberate crime, but rather the
culmination of an argument over the temperature in their apartment, a rash and
impulsive act to which defendant’s asserted mental illness contributed.  According
to defendant, the evidence shows only that he was carrying a loaded gun and shot
the victim impulsively, as a witness looked on, during the course of an argument.
He further contends the analysis this court employed in People v. Anderson (1968)
70 Cal.2d 15 (Anderson) supports reversal of his murder conviction.  Anderson
identified three factors commonly present in cases of premeditated murder:
“(1) [F]acts about how and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which
show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as
intended to result in, the killing—what may be characterized as ‘planning’
activity; (2) facts about the defendant’s prior relationship and/or conduct with the
victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a ‘motive’ to kill the victim,
which inference of motive, together with facts of type (1) or (3), would in turn
support an inference that the killing was the result of ‘a pre-existing reflection’
and ‘careful thought and weighing of considerations’ rather than ‘mere
40
unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed’ [citation]; (3) facts about the
nature of the killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was
so particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed
according to a ‘preconceived design’ to take his victim’s life in a particular way
for a ‘reason’ which the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2).”
(Id. at pp. 26-27.)  Defendant argues the Anderson factors are lacking in the
present case.
As we have cautioned, however, “[u]nreflective reliance on Anderson for a
definition of premeditation is inappropriate.  The Anderson analysis was intended
as a framework to assist reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence
supports an inference that the killing resulted from preexisting reflection and
weighing of considerations.  It did not refashion the elements of first degree
murder or alter the substantive law of murder in any way.”  (People v. Thomas
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 517.)  In other words, the Anderson guidelines are
descriptive, not normative.  “The Anderson factors, while helpful for purposes of
review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor are
they exclusive.”  (People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1125.)
The facts in this record showing the killing to have been deliberate and
premeditated may be summarized as follows.  Defendant, having armed himself in
the early  morning hours with two concealed and loaded handguns, argued with
the victim in the apartment they shared.  When the victim sought refuge in the
Project’s offices, located in a different apartment in the complex, defendant
pursued him and persisted in the argument as the victim walked back and forth in
the hallway.  After McLean Currie unsuccessfully exhorted the two men to resolve
their differences, and indicated by gesture that he intended to write up a
disciplinary report based on their failure to do so, defendant said, “All right, I’ll
settle it.”  Defendant then entered the office, locked the door and pulled a handgun
41
from the waistband of his pants.  After the victim refused defendant’s demand for
his car keys, defendant fired a shot at the victim’s abdomen.  He then took active
steps to prevent Currie from summoning medical care, without which the victim
was certain to die.
Applying the Anderson guidelines, we easily find evidence of planning
(defendant’s arming himself and following the victim to the Project’s office),
motive (to effectuate a robbery), and a manner of killing indicative of a deliberate
intent to kill (firing a shot at a vital area of the body at close range, then preventing
the witness from calling an ambulance).  These facts suffice to support a verdict of
premeditated and deliberate first degree murder.
d.  Prosecutorial misconduct
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing
argument by citing defendant’s 1983 armed robbery conviction as evidence of a
character for violence, contrary to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a),
which renders inadmissible evidence of a person’s character when offered to prove
his or her conduct on a specified occasion.  The prosecutor’s asserted
misstatement of law, defendant contends, amounted to the improper use of a
deceptive or reprehensible method to persuade the jury (see People v. Hill, supra,
17 Cal.4th at p. 819) and, according to defendant, so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of his federal constitutional
right to due process of law and a reliable judgment.  As the Attorney General
points out, however, defendant forfeited this contention by failing to object or to
seek a curative admonition below.  (See People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153,
1212.)  Even were the claim preserved for appeal, for the reasons that follow we
would find no misconduct.
42
It will be recalled that defendant testified Martinez had twice assaulted him
with a knife before their fatal confrontation in the office at the Volunteers of
America apartments.  Defendant also testified Martinez was drinking that morning
and, when he was drinking, was “a mean drunk.”  In context, the challenged
argument went as follows:  “Now, let’s talk about Mr. Koontz’ character, or
credibility.  [¶] He was convicted of armed robbery; I believe it was 1983.  Now,
armed robbery is a crime of moral turpitude.  That’s why it’s allowed to be
introduced.  Moral turpitude is a readiness to do evil, and it has to do with
character and honesty—Or it would not be allowed to be introduced.  All right.
[¶] Not only was he convicted of that, he was convicted of receiving stolen
property in Yolo County, and I believe that was in 1978.  Doesn’t matter exactly
when it was, but he was convicted of receiving stolen property.  [¶] That was
allowed to be introduced to attack his credibility, because that’s also a crime of
moral turpitude.  In other words, people who take stolen property in are not really
the honest kind of people, and people who do armed robberies are not the honest
kind of people.  [¶] Also he was convicted of burglary, and that’s a crime of moral
turpitude.  And that was allowed to be introduced to attack his credibility.  So it’s
not like he had one; it’s not like he had two.  He’s got three crimes of moral
turpitude.  [¶] And, also, the armed robbery was allowed to be introduced to show
a character for violence.  It was the same thing; the armed robbery was introduced
for two purposes.  And I’m not suggesting that there were two crimes.  It was one
crime.  It was initially called, for the purpose of credibility, I think called—Theft.
Theft involving dishonesty.  And then it was later called an armed robbery.  But
it’s a 1983 conviction, one and the same.  But the armed robbery also shows a
character for violence.  And it was also allowed to be introduced that he’s been
convicted of an assaultive crime involving a gun.  So that goes to his character for
violence.  [¶] So he’s got a character based on his past, and the past is a good
43
prediction of the future.  Not always, but it’s definitely something that can be used
to predict the future.  He’s got two crimes of violence, and one of them crosses
over.  But three crimes for credibility—that affect his credibility, and he’s saying
that his story of what happened is preposterous when we—And for instance, when
he says that McLean Currie is the one who actually stole the car—That’s
laughable.  If McLean Currie stole the car, he’s not guilty of auto theft, because
McLean Currie stole the car for him.”
Defendant correctly points out that Evidence Code section 1101,
subdivision (a) reflects the general rule that evidence of other crimes is
inadmissible when offered solely to prove criminal disposition or a propensity on
the part of the accused to commit the crime charged.  The general rule recognizes
that the probative value of such evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
(People v. Kelley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 232, 238-239.)  Defendant, however, ignores
Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (b), which provides:  “In a criminal
action, evidence of the defendant’s character for violence or trait of character for
violence (in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific
instances of conduct) is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is
offered by the prosecution to prove conduct of the defendant in conformity with
the character or trait of character and is offered after evidence that the victim had a
character for violence or a trait of character tending to show violence has been
adduced by the defendant under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a).”  Here, after
defendant had testified regarding Martinez’s character for violence, the trial court
ruled that the prosecutor could present, in rebuttal, as evidence of defendant’s
character for violence, proof of defendant’s 1983 armed robbery conviction.
Defendant did not object to that ruling at trial and does not now assert it was
erroneous.  Consequently, the prosecutor’s argument found support in the
evidence and the trial court’s ruling, and does not constitute misconduct.
44
e.  Instructional issues
i.  CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02
Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury with
CALJIC Nos. 2.015 and 2.026 because those instructions invite the jury to base a
finding of guilt on a degree of proof below that required by the due process clause
and because they establish an impermissible mandatory and conclusive
                                                
5 
CALJIC No. 2.01 states:  “[A] finding of guilt as to the crime may not be
based on . . . circumstantial evidence unless the proved circumstances are not only,
one, consistent with the theory that the defendant is guilty of the crime, but, two,
cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion.  [¶] Further, each fact
which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish the
defendant’s guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  In other words,
before an inference essential to establish guilt may be found to have been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance upon which such inference
necessarily rests must first be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  [¶] Also, if the
circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of
which points to the defendant’s guilt and the other to his innocence, you must
adopt that interpretation which points to the defendant’s innocence, and reject that
interpretation which points to his guilt.  [¶] If, on the other hand, one interpretation
of such evidence appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be
unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the
unreasonable.”
6 
CALJIC No. 2.02 states:  “The specific intent with which an act is done
may be shown by the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act.
However, you may not find the defendant guilty of any of the charges in Counts 1
through 5, nor may you find to be true the special circumstance alleged in Count 1,
unless the proved circumstances are not only, one, consistent with the theory that
the defendant had the required specific intent but, two, cannot be reconciled with
any other rational conclusion.  Also, if the evidence as to any such specific intent
is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the
existence of the specific intent and the other to the absence of the specific intent,
you must adopt that interpretation which points to the absence of the specific
intent.  [¶] If, on the other hand, one interpretation of the evidence as to such
specific intent appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be
unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the
unreasonable.”
45
presumption.  The error, he contends, violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, and the corollary
provisions of the state Constitution, article I, sections 7, 15 and 17.
As defendant acknowledges, we have previously held that “these
instructions properly direct the jury to accept an interpretation of the evidence
favorable to the prosecution and unfavorable to the defense only if no other
‘reasonable’ interpretation can be drawn.  Particularly when viewed in conjunction
with other instructions correctly stating the prosecution’s burden to prove
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, these circumstantial evidence
instructions do not reduce or weaken the prosecution’s constitutionally mandated
burden of proof or amount to an improper mandatory presumption of guilt.
[Citations.]”  (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 375.)  Defendant asks us to
revisit this conclusion, but he advances no persuasive reason to do so.
ii.  Failure to instruct on manslaughter as lesser included
offense of murder
Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct, sua sponte, on
voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder on the theory that
the killing was committed either in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion or in
unreasonable self-defense.  The omission of such instructions, he argues, deprived
him of his rights to due process, a fair trial, trial by jury, confrontation and cross-
examination, presentation of a defense, effective assistance of counsel, equal
protection, and reliable guilt and penalty phase verdicts in a capital case,
guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal
Constitution and article I, sections 7, 15 and 17 of the California Constitution.  We
conclude any error in the trial court’s failure so to instruct the jury was harmless.
In criminal cases, even absent a request, the trial court must instruct on
general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence.  (People v.
46
Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154.)  This obligation includes giving
instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question
whether all the elements of the charged offense were present, but not when there is
no evidence the offense was less than that charged.  (Ibid.)  The trial court must so
instruct even when, as a matter of trial tactics, a defendant not only fails to request
the instruction, but expressly objects to its being given.  (Ibid.; see also People v.
Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 196, 199-203 [trial court must instruct on heat-of-
passion and unreasonable self-defense theories of manslaughter, if supported by
evidence, even when defendant objects on the basis that such instructions would
conflict with his defense].) 7  Error in failing to instruct the jury on a lesser
included offense is harmless when the jury necessarily decides the factual
questions posed by the omitted instructions adversely to defendant under other
properly given instructions.  (People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721,
overruled on another ground in People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142.)
Manslaughter, an unlawful killing without malice, is a lesser included
offense of murder.  (§ 192; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 422.)  Malice
is presumptively absent when a defendant kills “upon a sudden quarrel or heat of
passion” (§ 192, subd. (a)), provided that provocation is sufficient to cause an
ordinarily reasonable person to act rashly and without deliberation, and from
passion rather than judgment.  (People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515.)
Additionally, when a defendant kills in the actual but unreasonable belief that he
or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, the doctrine of
                                                
7 
Thus, that defendant objected to the giving of instructions on voluntary
manslaughter would not preclude a finding of error in the trial court’s failure to do
so (although in some circumstances an objection might invite any error).  (People
v. Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 196, 198.)
47
“imperfect self-defense” applies to reduce the killing from murder to voluntary
manslaughter.  (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 771, 773; see People v.
Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 645.)
Without specifying precisely how he was provoked, defendant argues that
the killing occurred during the course of a conflict with the victim.  As the
Attorney General observes, however, the evidence shows the victim tried to
distance himself from defendant just before the shooting, and Currie, in his role as
security monitor, attempted to resolve the tension between the two men.  Any
provocation arising out of defendant’s prior arguments with the victim was no
longer immediately present by the time of the shooting, such that a reasonable
person in defendant’s position would have reacted with homicidal rage.  Hence,
we cannot say the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter based on heat of passion.
Citing his testimony that he shot Martinez in response to the latter’s
assaulting him with a knife, defendant argues further that the trial court erred in
failing to instruct the jury on the doctrine of unreasonable self-defense.  The
Attorney General appears to concede that the evidence supported the giving of the
instruction, but he argues its omission was harmless under the rule of People v.
Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at page 721, because the jury necessarily rejected the
unreasonable self-defense theory in returning a true finding on the robbery special-
circumstance allegation.  This finding signified the jury’s unanimous conclusion
that the killing occurred during the commission of a robbery and that defendant
committed the murder in order to carry out or advance the commission of the
crime of robbery.  We agree that any error in failing to instruct the jury on the
definition of manslaughter and the doctrine of unreasonable self-defense was
harmless.
48
C.  Penalty phase issues
1.  Evidentiary issues
a.  Admission of evidence of sexual assault
Defendant challenges, on due process and double jeopardy grounds, the
admission of evidence that he sexually assaulted Wanda B. in 1983 (ante, at pp.
12-13; U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15).  He further contends that
principles of collateral estoppel and laches, as well as the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment’s requirement of heightened reliability in capital cases, dictated
exclusion of the evidence.  Observing that the trial court ultimately concluded, in
ruling on the automatic motion to modify the death verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)),
that the evidence was insufficient to prove the sexual acts were done without Ms.
B.’s consent, defendant argues the assertedly erroneous admission of the evidence
compels reversal of his sentence.  We conclude defendant’s claims lack merit.
Defendant predicates his double jeopardy argument on the fact that the
charges against him stemming from the Wanda B. incident were dismissed on the
prosecutor’s motion for insufficient evidence.  The dismissal, he contends, was
tantamount to an acquittal, and evidence of prior charges of which a defendant was
acquitted may not be presented to the jury as part of the prosecutor’s case-in-
aggravation.  (§ 190.3; People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935, 951.)  We
disagree, however, with defendant’s premise:  Dismissal of the charges, whether
bargained for or otherwise, does not constitute an acquittal and thus does not
dictate exclusion of the evidence of the underlying incident.  (People v. Bradford,
supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1375.)  Defendant was not previously placed in jeopardy on
the dismissed Wanda B. charges, and the lack of any findings on the charges
renders the collateral estoppel doctrine inapplicable on these facts.
Defendant argues that “laches,” i.e., the “sheer lapse of time” following the
prosecution’s dismissal of the Wanda B. incident, bars, on grounds of fundamental
49
fairness, admission of the underlying evidence on the question of penalty in the
present trial.  More correctly stated, laches is an equitable defense to the
enforcement of a stale claim and requires a showing of unreasonable delay plus
either the plaintiff’s acquiescence in the act complained of or prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the delay.  (Conti v. Board of Civil Service
Commissioners (1969) 1 Cal.3d 351, 359.)  The doctrine of laches may be asserted
only in a suit in equity.  (People v. Harvest (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641, 652
[laches inapplicable to resentencing proceeding].)  Accordingly, defendant may
not raise the defense of laches in the present proceeding.  Defendant’s broader
claim of unfairness in the admission of the evidence lacks merit, as he fails to
show he was disadvantaged in defending against the Wanda B. evidence.  Despite
the passage of 10 years, defendant called witnesses to the incident, and he himself
testified to his version of the event.  As the Attorney General observes, neither
remoteness nor the expiration of the statutory limitations period bars admission of
a defendant’s prior unadjudicated criminal conduct for purposes of section 190.3,
factor (b).  (People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 772.)
Defendant further contends there was insufficient evidence of Wanda B.’s
lack of consent to the sexual acts to permit their admission in the prosecutor’s
case-in-aggravation.  We disagree.  Before the evidence was admitted, the trial
court held a hearing, out of the presence of the jury, to assess Ms. B.’s credibility.
Both she and defendant testified at this hearing.  In thereafter ruling on the
admissibility of the evidence, the trial court demonstrated its awareness of the
correct standard:  “[T]he judge should not permit evidence to go to the jury in a
penalty phase as to other crimes which [have] not resulted in a conviction unless
there’s sufficient evidence that could satisfy the reasonable doubt standard.
Unless a juror could reasonably come to a finding that there’s enough evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt, the [d]efendant’s guilty of the crime.  [Sic.]  Judge is
50
not supposed to allow the evidence to go to the jury.”  The court found that Ms.
B.’s felony convictions (drug possession for sale and drunk driving) detracted
somewhat from her credibility, but also noted, “a lot of what she says has a ring of
truth.  Had she been eager to lie about the case, [she] could have made things
worse against [defendant].  Instead, she was reluctant to give certain information
like the specificity of the rape charge not wanting to be embarrassed by that . . . .
[¶] It appears to me that she—that if she were testifying alone, no other
corroborating circumstances, that it would be difficult to say that a juror could
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that she’s accurate and truthful about her
testimony.  But in view of the offer of proof that Officer Gault would testify, she
mentioned a gun prior to the time she could have seen the gun, that Officer
Santiago will testify he found a gun, and that Sergeant Humphrey will testify he
saw the torn zipper in the jeans.  All those are corroborating circumstances that
could cause a juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the act occurred.”
We conclude the trial court correctly admitted the evidence.  The
correctness of this ruling was in no way undermined by the court’s later
determination, when deciding the verdict modification application, not to consider
the Wanda B. incident in aggravation of penalty.  That the trial court, in exercising
its independent judgment under section 190.4, concluded the evidence did not
prove the conduct beyond a reasonable doubt did not mean that the jury could not
reasonably come to the opposite conclusion.  In the analogous context of an
appellate claim of insufficiency of evidence, we have said that “ ‘Although it is the
duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is
susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other
innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be
convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  If the
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the
51
reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.  [Citations.]’
[Citation.]”  (People v. Thomas, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 514.)  The jury was
instructed not to consider the Wanda B. evidence unless it found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that defendant had committed the alleged offenses.  In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, we presume the jury made no
inappropriate use of the Wanda B. evidence.  (See People v. Cunningham (2001)
25 Cal.4th 926, 1014.)
b.  Exclusion of evidence of lie detector test
Defendant contends the trial court denied him due process by ruling, on the
prosecutor’s motion in limine, that he could not mention he had taken, or was
willing to take, a lie detector test.8  Although defendant acknowledges that the
results of such tests are inadmissible to prove or disprove a charge of murder or to
attack or bolster a witness’s credibility (Evid. Code, § 351.1, subd. (a)
[“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph
examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to
take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted
into evidence in any criminal proceeding, . . . unless all parties stipulate to the
admission of such results”]; People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 763-764,
overruled on other grounds in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 232-238;
People v. Adams (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 109, 115-118), he contends these
principles have no application here.
                                                
8 
The record contains no evidence that defendant ever took a polygraph test;
defendant asserts his offer to do so was met with the prosecution’s advance refusal
to stipulate to admission of the results, so no test was administered.
52
Defendant first argues that Evidence Code section 351.1 is inapplicable
here, but he cites no authority for the proposition that the penalty phase of a capital
trial is not a criminal proceeding within the meaning of the statute.  Defendant
essentially contends that the penalty phase involves only normative
decisionmaking, not the determination of the truth or falsity of evidence, and that
the policies dictating exclusion of polygraph results have no application here.  We
disagree.  The truth or falsity of the Wanda B. incident was hotly disputed during
defendant’s penalty trial, and even with respect to character and background
evidence commonly admitted in penalty trials, assessments of credibility are an
inescapable part of the trier of fact’s duty.  Thus, contrary to defendant’s
argument, the rationale behind the statute—ensuring the continuation of the long-
standing rule of exclusion for evidence not established as scientifically reliable
(see Review of Selected 1983 Cal. Legislation (1984) 15 Pacific L.J. 588, 589)—
appears fully applicable to the sentencing phase of his trial.
Alternatively, assuming the applicability of Evidence Code section 351.1,
defendant contends due process nevertheless requires the admission of polygraph
results as mitigating evidence under the rule of Skipper v. South Carolina (1986)
476 U.S. 1.  He urges such evidence would be relevant not to determining his guilt
or credibility, but to demonstrating his reduced moral culpability, i.e., that he is
mentally ill and delusional.  We note, preliminarily, that in the trial court
defendant made no offer of proof that polygraph tests would be relevant to
establish his reduced moral culpability or that he was mentally ill or delusional.
(See Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a) [no reversal of judgment for erroneous exclusion
of evidence unless error resulted in a miscarriage of justice and “[t]he substance,
purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence was made known to the court by
the questions asked, an offer of proof, or by any other means”].)  Assuming, for
argument’s sake, that defendant’s omission should not result in a waiver of his
53
claim, in the absence of any showing in the record that polygraph tests do provide
reliable evidence bearing on moral culpability, we must in any event reject it.  As
defendant has provided only unsupported assertions in this regard, he fails to
demonstrate that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous or denied him due process.
2.  Trial court’s ruling on automatic motion to modify verdict, section
190.4, subdivision (e)
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his automatic motion to
modify the jury’s death verdict, thereby violating both section 190.4, subdivision
(e), and his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, to
present a defense, to a penalty determination based on all available mitigating
evidence, effective assistance of counsel, and a reliable determination of penalty.
(U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15, 17.)
In ruling on a verdict-modification motion, the trial court must make an
independent determination whether imposition of the death penalty on the
defendant is proper in light of the relevant evidence and the applicable law.  The
court is required to determine whether the verdict is adequately supported, in
accordance with the weight it believes the evidence deserves.  (People v.
Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1105.)  In so doing, the trial court must specify
reasons sufficient to assure effective appellate review.  (Id. at p. 1106.)
“ ‘On appeal, we subject a ruling on a verdict-modification application to
independent review.’  [Citation.]  ‘Of course, when we conduct such scrutiny, we
simply review the trial court’s determination after independently considering the
record; we do not make a de novo determination of penalty.’  [Citation.]”  (People
v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1106.)
The trial court issued an extensive memorandum of decision.  The
memorandum reflects the court’s correct understanding of its obligation under
section 190.4, subdivision (e) and its careful consideration of statutory aggravating
54
and mitigating factors as they bore on the evidence presented at the trial.  Thus,
our independent review discloses no reason to overturn the court’s ruling.
With respect to section 190.3, factor (a), the trial court stated:  “In this case
there are several circumstances of the crime that are aggravated.  The shooting was
completely unprovoked and cold-blooded.  The conflict between the defendant
and the victim did not arise spontaneously.  The defendant had to seek out the
victim by apparently arming himself with two guns and following him from his
apartment to an office in a different building where he repeatedly tried to talk the
victim into cooperating.  When his verbal efforts proved fruitless, the defendant
intentionally raised the level of danger.  After the victim refused to give his keys
to the defendant, the defendant turned, closed the door and pulled out a handgun.
He once again demanded the car keys while pointing the gun at the victim.  The
victim shook his head negatively and, without any further warning or provocation,
the defendant shot the victim once in the stomach from point-blank range.
[¶] After the victim was shot, the defendant expressed no emotion and committed
aggravating acts against the victim . . . .  [¶] The proof shows that the victim . . .
suffered greatly by crawling from the office to the living room area of the unit
. . . .  Medical help probably could not have arrived in time to save the victim’s life
even if a call had been placed immediately after the shooting.  However, the
defendant was not aware that medical aid would be unsuccessful and he
intentionally prevented the victim from receiving emergency treatment.  Such an
act is callous and without conscience.  [¶] The above conduct demonstrates
considerable aggravating circumstances were present during the commission of
the homicide.”  The court also noted, however, that the victim was not particularly
vulnerable and the killing was not done in a particularly heinous or atrocious
manner, circumstances it found mitigating.
55
With respect to section 190.3, factor (b), the trial court reviewed the three
incidents of prior violent criminal conduct adduced in aggravation.  The court
found defendant’s version of the circumstances of his 1968 conviction for assault
with intent to commit murder to be unworthy of any credibility, and the conviction
itself to be a substantial factor in aggravation.  The court assigned some
aggravating weight to defendant’s 1983 conviction for armed robbery, but less
than that accorded to defendant’s 1968 assault conviction, in light of the absence
of proof of the specific circumstances of the 1983 case.  Finally, the court
reviewed the evidence of the Wanda B. incident, concluding “[t]here was . . .
insufficient evidence presented to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual
acts were without consent.  [¶] . . .  [¶] This . . . act cannot be considered an
aggravating factor.”
With respect to section 190.3, factor (c), the trial court reviewed
defendant’s nine prior felony convictions.9  Finding it notable that all of
defendant’s convictions in the previous 25 years involved weapons, the court
stated:  “Therefore, not only are defendant’s felony convictions quite numerous,
but most of them involve a danger of harm to others because of the presence of
deadly weapons.  His criminal record is a substantially aggravating factor.”
With respect to potentially mitigating factors, the trial court noted that, at
the time of the offense, defendant was apparently annoyed at the victim for unclear
reasons; the court, however, found nothing rising to the level of an extreme mental
or emotional disturbance as required by section 190.3, factor (d).  The court found
                                                
9 
I.e., second degree burglary convictions in 1957, 1959, and 1963; the 1968
assault with intent to commit murder (two counts); a 1971 conviction for
possession of a weapon in prison; a 1978 conviction for receiving stolen property
and being a felon in possession of a firearm; and a 1983 armed robbery.
56
defendant’s claim that he killed in self-defense to be incredible, thus concluding
section 190.3, factor (f), pertaining to circumstances a defendant reasonably
believed to be a moral justification or extenuation of his conduct, did not mitigate
the offense.  With respect to section 190.3, factor (h), requiring consideration of
any mental disease or defect or the effects of intoxication that might have impaired
the defendant’s appreciation of his actions or ability to conform to the law, the
court noted:  “There was no evidence presented by either side to suggest that the
defendant was mentally deficient or impaired at the time of the murder.  The
defendant at the time of trial, while representing himself, demonstrated no obvious
sign of mental disease.  While his decision to represent himself in a capital case
might cause others to question his mental status, the defendant had been through
criminal proceedings and trials on numerous prior occasions and handled himself
with a fair degree of proficiency.  He did not demonstrate during the trial that he
had any mental defect or disease.  [¶] . . .  [¶] . . . The defendant’s state of sobriety
many hours later when arrested is not very probative on the issue of his sobriety at
the time of the murder.  From the totality of the evidence, it is clearly indicated
that the defendant could appreciate the seriousness of his actions and conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law.”  The court found defendant’s age (59 at
the time of the hearing) to be a mitigating factor.  (§ 190.3, factor (i).)  With
respect to section 190.3, factor (k), “any other circumstance which extenuates the
gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime,” the court
noted, “the only arguable extenuation of the crime was the possible feeling of
desperation the defendant felt to avoid going back to prison on a parole violation
in view of his recent petty theft arrest at Woolworth’s. . . .  [¶] . . .  [¶] The
defendant, however, says he did not fear going back to prison. . . .  [¶] . . .  [¶] The
eyewitness’s testimony about the defendant’s actions just before and after the
murder described a calm, but persistent, man who set out to have his way and
57
made sure he achieved that goal.  There was no indication in the testimony that the
defendant was emotional or desperate in his actions or his words.  His actions
were calculated and consistent with the ‘tunnel vision’ that at least one witness
testified typified the defendant’s usual conduct.  [¶] Viewed as a whole, there is no
support for the contention that the possibility of a prison sentence for petty theft so
disturbed the defendant as to cause an understandable feeling of desperation that
constituted an extenuating circumstance.”  The court found section 190.3, factors
(e) and (g) not to be present in the case.
Finally, the trial court independently reviewed the evidence of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  It acknowledged that the aggravating
circumstances about the commission of the crime itself did not substantially
outweigh the mitigating circumstances, but relied largely on defendant’s
“staggering” record of felonies and acts of violence to uphold the jury’s verdict.
Defendant complains the trial court should have accorded greater impact, in
its ruling, to the subtraction of the Wanda B. incident from the aggravating
evidence, but we find the court’s assessment of the relative weight of that evidence
to be reasonable.  Defendant also complains that the trial court wrongly found
inapplicable section 190.3, factor (h) (pertaining to mental disease or defect or
intoxication), but we see nothing in the record to undermine the court’s finding.
What defendant now characterizes as “significant and pervasive evidence of [his]
mental illness and concomitant paranoia and delusional beliefs” seems simply to
have been his unsuccessful effort to persuade the court and jury of a state of facts
(a need to defend against a knife attack by the victim) that did not exist.
Significantly, he introduced no evidence suggesting he was mentally ill.  On this
record, his decision to represent himself seems more a product of his imprudence
or hubris than of mental illness or delusion.
58
3.  Cumulative error
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of errors in the guilt and penalty
phases of his trial so undermines confidence in the judgment as to require its
reversal.  We disagree.  With respect to the guilt phase, we have concluded the
trial court erred nonprejudicially in failing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter
on the theory of unreasonable self-defense.  We have found no merit to
defendant’s remaining guilt phase claims.  Considering together the effect of these
errors in the guilt phase, we find no cumulative prejudice to defendant.  With
respect to the penalty phase, we have found no error to cumulate.  We therefore
reject defendant’s claim that cumulative error in his trial denied him a fair trial and
due process of law.
4.  Unreliability of sentence
Citing the federal constitutional requirement of heightened reliability for
death judgments (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Herrera v. Collins
(1993) 506 U.S. 390, 405), defendant contends his sentence cannot stand because
his trial was a “travesty” as a result of the trial court’s decision to allow him, an
assertedly mentally ill person, to defend himself.  Defendant contends his failure,
due to mental illness, to present adequate information about the circumstances of
the crime or sufficient evidence in mitigation of penalty deprived the jury of a
reliable basis for its sentencing decision.
As we have concluded (see ante, at p. 24), defendant’s exercise of the right
to self-representation at trial did not render the judgment constitutionally
unreliable.
5.  Constitutionality of certain features of California’s death penalty
law
Defendant asserts that several features of this state’s capital sentencing
scheme violate the federal Constitution, but we have repeatedly rejected similar
59
contentions.  Thus, contrary to defendant’s argument, section 190.2 does not fail to
perform the constitutionally required narrowing function by virtue of the number
of special circumstances it provides (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044,
1179) or because of the breadth of the felony-murder special circumstance (People
v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1265-1266).  Nor is defendant’s death
sentence invalid because of prosecutorial discretion in determining whether to
seek the death penalty.  (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1078.)  The death
penalty law is not unconstitutional for failing to require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of aggravating factors, factors in support of a finding that aggravation
outweighs mitigation, or that death is the appropriate penalty.  (Ibid.)  Nor is the
law constitutionally infirm because it does not require intercase proportionality
review.  (Ibid.)10  Section 190.3, factor (a) is not unconstitutionally vague.
(Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976.)  Written findings concerning
aggravating factors the jury has found to be true are not constitutionally required.
(People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1078.)  The jury’s use during the penalty
phase of unadjudicated criminal activity, as permitted by section 190.3, factor (b),
does not render a sentence unreliable (Kraft, supra, at p. 1078); consistent with
that general rule and our previous decisions, the presentation of evidence of the
Wanda B. incident did not violate collateral estoppel principles or the double
jeopardy provisions of the federal and state Constitutions, because dismissal of a
charge, whether by plea bargain or otherwise, is not the equivalent of an acquittal
within the meaning of section 190.3.  (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at
                                                
10 
Defendant also makes an intracase proportionality claim, arguing his
sentence is grossly disproportionate to his offense, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, due to his asserted mental illness.
Although a death sentence is subject to such review (People v. Bradford, supra, 15
Cal.4th at p. 1384), the record fails to support the factual premise of his argument.
60
p. 1375.)  Nor did the doctrine of laches, the applicability of which to a capital
sentencing determination defendant fails to establish, preclude the prosecution
from presenting that evidence.  (See People v. Harvest, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at
p. 652; People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 772 [neither remoteness nor
expiration of the limitations period is a bar to presentation of unadjudicated
criminal activity pursuant to § 190.3, factor (b)].)  The inclusion in the section
190.3 list of potential mitigating factors of such adjectives as “extreme” (§ 190.3,
factor (d)) neither acts as a barrier to the jury’s consideration of mitigating
evidence (People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 479), nor renders the factor
unconstitutionally vague, arbitrary, or incapable of principled application (People
v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1138).  Finally, section 190.3 and related jury
instructions are not unconstitutional because they do not inform the jury that
certain sentencing factors are relevant only in mitigation of penalty.  (People v.
Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 564.)
6.  Effect of delay between sentence and execution
Defendant contends that execution serves no legitimate penological purpose
after many years’ confinement on death row, and that the mental anguish produced
by such lengthy incarceration violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment as incorporated to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The authorities on which defendant
relies include no decisions of any court, state or federal, in this country, however,
and this court has previously rejected the identical claim.  (People v. Ochoa (2001)
26 Cal.4th 398, 462-463.)  We do so again here.
7.  Constitutionality of lethal injection
Defendant argues that execution by lethal injection as provided by section
3604 would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
61
Constitution because of the method’s great risk of inflicting unnecessary pain.  He
cites no decisions, state or federal, holding lethal injection unconstitutional.  In
any event, the claim bears solely on the legality of the execution of the sentence,
not on the validity of the sentence itself.  (People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at
p. 1110.)
III.  DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WERDEGAR, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.
62
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Koontz
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal XXX
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S036450
Date Filed: May 9, 2002
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Sacramento
Judge: Kenneth G. Peterson
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Richard Power, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for  Respondent:
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson,
Assistant Attorney General, Stephen G. Herndon, John G. McLean and Harry Joseph Colombo, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
63
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Richard Power
P.O. Box 476
Shingle Springs, CA  95682-0476
(530) 677-6344
Harry Joseph Colombo
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street, Suite 125
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550
(916) 324-5170