Title: People v. Law

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 93389-Agenda 25-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								JASON A. LAW, Appellee.
								Opinion filed December 5, 2002.

	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	In June 2001 defendant, Jason A. Law, was charged with
violating section 6-16(c) of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 (the
Act) (235 ILCS 5/6-16(c) (West 2000)). Defendant filed a motion
to dismiss the case and have the statute declared unconstitutional.
Following a hearing, the circuit court of Whiteside County granted
the motion, declaring section 6-16(c) unconstitutionally vague and
dismissing the information. The State appealed directly to this
court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 603; 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). For the reasons
set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND
	The factual background of this case is limited. Defendant's
motion to dismiss raised only issues of law, not fact, and no
evidence was presented by either side during the hearing.
	In February 2001 the State filed a criminal complaint against
defendant charging him with the offense of "Resident Allowing
Person/s Under 21 to Leave Residence after Consuming Alcohol,"
in violation of section 6-16(c) of the Act. Section 6-16(c)
provides in pertinent part:
			"Any person shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor
where he or she knowingly permits a gathering at a
residence which he or she occupies of two or more
persons where any one or more of the persons is under 21
years of age and the following factors also apply:
				(1) the person occupying the residence knows that
any such person under the age of 21 is in possession of
or is consuming any alcoholic beverage; and
				(2) the possession or consumption of the alcohol by
the person under 21 is not otherwise permitted by this
Act; and
				(3) the person occupying the residence knows that
the person under the age of 21 leaves the residence in
an intoxicated condition." 235 ILCS 5/6-16(c) (West
2000).
	The complaint alleged that on or about January 30, 2001,
defendant "knowingly permitted" his residence "to be used for a
gathering and knew that an invitee, Brock L. Boss[,] was under the
age of 21 and the invitee was consuming alcohol while at his
residence." The complaint added: "[D]efendant then allowed
Brock Boss and others to leave the residence after consuming
alcohol."
	Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. In his motion, defendant
alleged, inter alia, that section 6-16(c) was unconstitutional
because it "purport[ed] to require the Defendant to commit the
offense of Unlawful Restraint in order to avoid criminal
responsibility for such violation of the Liquor Control Act."
	The State voluntarily dismissed the complaint and
subsequently filed an amended information. While the amended
information more closely tracked the language of section 6-16(c),
it did not address defendant's unlawful-restraint objection. The
information stated:
			"[O]n or about the 30th day of January, 2001,
[defendant] committed the offense of LIQUOR TO
MINOR/PRIV RESIDENCE in that said defendant
knowingly permitted his residence *** to be used as a
gathering of two or more persons with knowledge that an
invitee, Brock Boss, was under the age of 21, and that
said invitee was consuming alcohol not otherwise
permitted by [the Act], while at his residence. Said
Defendant knew that Brock Boss left the residence in an
intoxicated condition, in violation of [section 6-16(c) of
the Act]."
	Defendant moved to dismiss the information and declare the
statute unconstitutional. Following a hearing, the circuit court
granted the motion. In a written opinion and order, the court
stated:
			"Although this statute appears to be intended to prevent
a person from providing a place for underage drinking in
which the minor subsequently leaves the residence in an
intoxicated state, its language fails to give fair notice as to
what type of conduct is prohibited. Clearly, it is illegal for
a minor to possess or consume alcohol, but it is likewise
illegal to unlawfully restrain an individual. Yet, if a minor
consumes alcohol at the residence of a Defendant, this
statute requires the Defendant to commit a criminal
offense (Unlawful Restraint) in order not to violate this
statute. Therefore, the statute is vague."
	The circuit court declared section 6-16(c) unconstitutional
and dismissed the information. Because the statute was declared
unconstitutional, the State appealed directly to this court. 134 Ill.
2d R. 603.

ANALYSIS
	This court reviews de novo a circuit court's determination
regarding the constitutionality of a statute. Russell v. Department
of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 441 (1998). Statutes are
presumed constitutional, and a party challenging the
constitutionality of a statute has the burden of establishing its
invalidity. Russell, 183 Ill. 2d  at 441; People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2000).
	The question before us is whether section 6-16(c) is
unconstitutionally vague. A criminal law may be declared
unconstitutionally vague for either of two independent reasons.
First, the statute may fail to provide the kind of notice that would
enable a person of ordinary intelligence to understand what
conduct is prohibited. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41,
56, 144 L. Ed. 2d 67, 80, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (1999); see People
v. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d 109, 113 (2001); People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 356 (1996); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 227, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2298-99 (1972)
(due process requires that a statute "give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,
so that he may act accordingly"). Second, a statute may be
declared unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide explicit
standards for those who apply it, thus authorizing or even
encouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Morales,
527 U.S.  at 56, 144 L. Ed. 2d  at 80, 119 S. Ct.  at 1859; see
Grayned, 408 U.S.  at 108-09, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 227-28, 92 S. Ct.  at
2299; Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d  at 113; Warren, 173 Ill. 2d  at 356.
	In determining whether section 6-16(c) provides proper notice
of the conduct that is prohibited, we apply a somewhat modified
approach. In most criminal statutes, the actus reus, or wrongful
deed, refers to an affirmative act. See 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott,
Substantive Criminal Law §1.2, at 10; §3.3, at 282-83 (1986). The
emphasis in such statutes is on conduct that is prohibited, i.e., the
guilty act. However, where a criminal statute imposes an
affirmative duty upon an individual to take action, the actus reus
refers to a failure to act. See 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive
Criminal Law §1.2, at 10; §3.3, at 282-83 (1986). The focus in
such statutes is on conduct that is required of the individual, rather
than on conduct which is prohibited.
	In the case at bar, the State concedes that section 6-16(c)
"imposes a statutory duty to prevent an intoxicated minor from
leaving a social gathering." To avoid prosecution under section
6-16(c), the occupant must take affirmative steps to prevent an
intoxicated minor from departing. Thus, in determining whether
section 6-16(c) is unconstitutionally vague, the proper inquiry is
whether the statute gives fair warning as to what conduct is
required of the occupant to prevent an intoxicated minor from
departing.
	The difficulty with section 6-16(c) is that it provides no
guidance as to the steps that are to be taken to prevent an
intoxicated minor from leaving the gathering. Section 6-16(c)
attempts to impose an affirmative duty, but is silent as to the scope
of this duty. The result is that the residential occupant is left to
speculate as to what course he should take to avoid violating the
statute. For example, would it be sufficient if the occupant merely
called the police, or the minor's parents? If the parents were
called, could the occupant release the intoxicated minor to the
parents and still comply with section 6-16(c)? On the other hand,
might it be sufficient for the occupant to simply warn the minor
not to leave? If the minor left the premises despite the warning,
would the occupant then be in violation of section 6-16(c)?
	It might appear that the most obvious means of satisfying
section 6-16(c) would be simply to detain any intoxicated minor
who was about to leave the gathering. However, this option is
problematic. Section 10-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides:
"A person commits the offense of unlawful restraint when he
knowingly without legal authority detains another." 720 ILCS
5/10-3(a) (West 2000). Thus, as the circuit court below noted, a
residential occupant who physically detained an intoxicated minor
could be criminally culpable for unlawful restraint, which is a
Class 4 felony. This could pose a difficult choice for an occupant
attempting to avoid prosecution under section 6-16(c): either
comply with the statute and commit a felony, or do nothing and
commit a misdemeanor.
	The State argues that section 6-16(c) "does not force a person
to commit the offense of unlawful restraint." According to the
State, section 6-16(c) itself "effectively provides a grant of 'legal
authority' to detain an intoxicated minor." This argument lacks
merit. As noted, section 6-16(c) provides absolutely no guidance
as to the steps a residential occupant should take to prevent an
intoxicated minor from leaving a social gathering. In this situation,
we cannot conclude that this same statute provides "legal
authority" for one particular step that is itself criminalized by
another statute.
	We hold that section 6-16(c) fails to provide the kind of
notice that would enable an ordinary person to understand what he
must do to avoid prosecution under the statute. See Morales, 527 U.S.  at 56, 144 L. Ed. 2d  at 80, 119 S. Ct.  at 1859; Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d 
at 113; Warren, 173 Ill. 2d  at 356. Accordingly, section 6-16(c) is
unconstitutionally vague. 
	We note that, of necessity, section 6-16(c) is
unconstitutionally vague on its face and not simply as applied to
this case. In order to be facially invalid, a statute must be
impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Village of Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 371, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (1982); Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d 
at 112. We have determined that section 6-16(c) leaves the scope
of the action required of the occupant completely undefined. As
noted, it is uncertain whether the most obvious means of
complying with the statute-the detention of the minor-falls within
this scope. A residential occupant who detains an intoxicated
minor faces potential criminal liability for unlawful restraint. This
dilemma illustrates the broad uncertainty that exists with regard to
the scope of the duty in question. Any person of common
intelligence is forced to speculate as to the meaning of this statute.
See Morales, 527 U.S.  at 58, 144 L. Ed. 2d  at 81, 119 S. Ct.  at
1860. Accordingly, there is no set of circumstances under which
section 6-16(c) would be valid. See Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d  at 112.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons set forth above, we hold that section 6-16(c)
of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 (235 ILCS 5/6-16(c) (West
2000)) is unconstitutional on its face. The judgment of the circuit
court is affirmed.
	Circuit court judgment affirmed.