Title: O'Brien v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co./Connelly v. Keystone Insurance Company/Hocutt v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
RANDY and EILEEN O’BRIEN
)
Individually and as
)  No. 58, 2001
Representatives of all persons
)
similarly situated
)  Court Below – Superior Court
)  of the State of Delaware
Plaintiffs Below,
)  in and for New Castle County
Appellants,
)
)  C.A. No. 99C-05-033
v.
)
)
PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN 
)
INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)
Defendant Below,
)
Appellee.
X
-------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN D. CONNELLY,
)
Individually and as representative of all
)  No. 22, 2001
persons similarly situated,
)
)  Court Below:  Superior Court
Plaintiffs Below,
)  of the State of Delaware
Appellants,
)  in and for New Castle County
)
v.
)  C.A. No. 99C-07-325
)
KEYSTONE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)
Defendant Below,
)
Appellee.
X
-------------------------------------------------------
JOHN E. HOCUTT, JR., Individually and
)
on behalf of all others similarly situated,
)  No. 134, 2001
)
Plaintiff Below,
)  Court Below:  Superior Court
Appellant,
)  of the State of Delaware
)  in and for New Castle County
v.
)
)  C.A. No. 00C-01-215
2
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE )
INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)
Defendant Below,
)
Appellee.
X
Submitted:  September 26, 2001
Decided:  November 9, 2001
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.
Robert Jacobs and J. X. Hedrick, II of Jacobs & Crumplar, Wilmington,
Delaware.  OF COUNSEL:  Richard L. Akel of Weitz & Luxenberg, New York,
New York; Debra Brewer Hayes (Argued) of Reich & Binstock, Houston, Texas.
Attorneys for Randy and Eileen O’Brien and Steven D. Connelly.
James W. Semple (Argued) of Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams,
Wilmington, Delaware.  Attorneys for Progressive Northern Insurance Company.
Michael L. Vild and Christopher A. Ward of The Bayard Firm, Wilmington,
Delaware.  OF COUNSEL:  Jeffrey A. Less (Argued) and Paul B. Bech of Bazelon
Less & Feldman, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  Attorneys for Keystone Insurance
Company.
William R. Peltz of Kimmel, Carter, Roman & Peltz, Wilmington,
Delaware.  OF COUNSEL:  Lawrence E. Feldman, Mark C. Rifkin (Argued), and
Roseann E. Weisblatt of Feldman & Rifkin, Jenkintown, Pennsylvania; Jonathan
Shub of Sheller, Ludwig & Badey, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  Attorneys for John
E. Hocutt, Jr.
Allen M. Terrell, Jr., (Argued) Frederick L. Cottrell, III, and Chad M.
Shandler of Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, Delaware.  Attorneys for
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company.
STEELE, Justice:
3
Steven D. Connelly, Plaintiff-below, appeals the December 18, 2000 joint
order of the Superior Court granting Defendant-below Keystone Insurance
Company’s Motion to Dismiss.  Plaintiffs-below Randy and Eileen O’Brien appeal
the Superior Court’s February 5, 2001 order granting Defendant-below Progressive
Northern Insurance Company’s Motion to Dismiss the O’Briens’ suit.  John E.
Hocutt, also Plaintiff-below, appeals the March 9, 2001 order of the Superior Court
granting Defendant-below State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s
Motion to Dismiss.1  Because of the nearly identical nature of the issues in these
cases, we have consolidated them for the purpose of this appeal.2
The question before this Court is whether or not the limits on liability found
in the automobile insurance policies issued by the Appellee insurance companies to
the Appellants preclude recovery for what is commonly known as the “diminished
value” of a vehicle that has been repaired after an accident.  Appellants argue that
the trial judge erred in determining that the “repair or replace” provisions of the
disputed policies cap the insurer’s liability at the cost of returning the vehicle to
substantially the same physical, operational, and mechanical condition as before
                                                
1 The plaintiffs in all three cases purport to represent not only themselves, but also all others
similarly situated.  Because the Superior Court dismissed the actions as a matter of law, it made
no decision on the certification of the proposed class.
2 The Superior Court articulated its findings only in its Order granting Defendant Keystone’s
Motion to Dismiss and denying the O’Briens’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.  See
O’Brien v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., Del. Super., 2000 WL 33113833 (2000) (Order).
However, the trial judge cited this decision as the basis for his dismissal of the O’Brien and
4
the accident.  They contend that, as a matter of law, 1) the policies specifically
provide for the coverage of diminished value; and, 2) in the alternative, the
language is ambiguous and should thus be interpreted broadly in favor of the
insureds.  We find that the language of the policy does not expressly covers loss
from “diminished value,” and that the “repair or replace” language crafted to limit
the insurers’ liability is clear and, therefore, not susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation.  Therefore, we AFFIRM the decisions of the Superior
Court.
I.
The facts of these cases are as follows:
O’Brien:  In December 1997, someone stole a 1995 Honda Accord owned
by Randy and Eileen O’Brien from a Wilmington parking lot.  The car was
discovered later that month with substantial damage to the front-end, passenger
side, and the interior.  The O’Briens filed a claim with Progressive under the
comprehensive coverage provision of their policy.  The comprehensive section of
the policy provided, in part, that if the policy-holder paid a premium for
comprehensive coverage, Progressive would pay for loss to a covered vehicle,
“subject to the Limit of Liability.”  The Limit of Liability section of the policy
provided as follows:
                                                                                                                                                            
Hocutt claims.  The record supports our assumption that the Superior Court’s findings in its
5
1. The Limit of Liability for loss to a covered vehicle or non-owned vehicle
will be the lowest of:
a. the actual cash value of the stolen or damaged property at the time
of loss, reduced by the applicable deductible shown on the
Declarations Page, and by its salvage value if you retain the
salvage;
b. the amount necessary to repair or replace the stolen or damaged
property with other property of like kind and quality, reduced by
the applicable Deductible as shown on the Declarations Page; or
c. any applicable Limit of Liability or Stated Amount Vehicle
Coverage shown on the Declarations Page, reduced by the salvage
value if you retain the salvage.  (Emphasis in original).
Progressive chose to repair the O’Briens’ Honda, as was its option.  The O’Briens
contend that damage to the vehicle which remained after these repairs resulted in a
loss in their vehicle’s value.  They claim that Progressive should indemnify them
for that loss.
Connelly:  In June 1998, Steven D. Connelly damaged his 1997 KIA
Sportage Sport Utility Vehicle (“S.U.V.”) in a collision in Chester County,
Pennsylvania.  Connelly’s vehicle sustained substantial damage to the front and
hood.  He filed a claim with his insurance provider, Keystone, under the collision
provision of the policy.  The Limit of Liability section of the Keystone policy
closely parallels the language in subsections (a) and (b) of the comprehensive
section of the Progressive policy, supra.  Like Progressive, Keystone limited
                                                                                                                                                            
Keystone decision are equally applicable to the other two policies.
6
recovery to the lesser of the actual cash value or the cost to repair or replace.  The
Keystone policy did not contain the “like kind and quality” language that appeared
in the Progressive policy.  After assessing the damage to Connelly’s S.U.V.,
Keystone opted to repair the vehicle.  The damage required replacement of major
panels, refinishing and repainting of the vehicle.  Appellant Connelly admits that
the vehicle was properly repaired, but maintains that he should be indemnified for
the diminished value resulting from residual physical damage.
Hocutt:  In August 1999, John E. Hocutt, Jr. was involved in a collision that
resulted in damage to his 1996 Isuzu Rodeo S.U.V.  The vehicle suffered extensive
structural damage and Hocutt submitted a claim to his insurer, State Farm, under
the collision coverage section of the State Farm policy.  The language in the State
Farm policy closely resembles that of both the Progressive and Keystone policies.
As in Keystone, the Limit of Liability for loss to property is the lower of actual
cash value of the vehicle or the cost of repair and replacement.  There is no
language concerning “like kind and quality.”  Hocutt stated that the repairs were
performed in a “workmanlike manner” at State Farm’s expense.  Nevertheless, he
maintains that the vehicle was not restored to its pre-loss condition because, after
the completion of the repairs, the vehicle was worth less than it was before the
collision.
7
In granting the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, the Superior Court made
assumptions of fact consistent with Plaintiffs’ allegations.  The trial judge assumed
that, even after all of the repairs had been made to plaintiffs’ vehicles, physical
damage, including evidence of repair, remained.3  He concluded that this type of
damage resulted in a loss of value known as “diminished value.”4  Moreover, the
judge assumed that diminished value is both real and non-speculative and, that if
given the opportunity, Plaintiffs could prove real damages.5
II.
Under Delaware law, the interpretation of contractual language, including
that of insurance policies, is a question of law.6  This Court reviews questions of
law de novo.7
The Delaware Code neither mandates nor regulates the carrying of
comprehensive or collision coverage in the automobile insurance policies for
vehicles registered in this State.  Instead, insurers make comprehensive and
collision coverage available for purchase as supplements to the insurance required
by the State.  Parties to an insurance contract are free to agree upon any terms so
long as that agreement is not inconsistent with a statutory prohibition or public
                                                
3 O’Brien, 2000 WL 33113833 at *1.
4 Id.
5 Id. at *4.
6 Emmons v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., Del. Supr., 697 A.2d 742, 744-45 (1997); Rhone-
Poulenc Basic Chems. Co .v. American Motorists Ins. Co., Del. Supr., 616 A.2d 1192, 1195
(1992).
8
policy.8  Because the State of Delaware has no policy interest in the coverage at
issue in this case, the role of the Court is to determine from the contract documents
the terms agreed upon by the parties.
The Court noted supra that minor differences exist in the language of the
three policies at issue in this litigation.  The most notable among these is the
absence of the term “like kind and quality” from both the Allstate and State Farm
policies.  The Superior Court correctly determined that the presence or absence of
these terms was not dispositive in this case.9  While these differences may govern
the standards of workmanship to which the claimants may hold their insurers, that
question is not before us today.  Therefore, the “like kind and quality” language
does not affect whether the policies provide coverage for diminution of value and
is irrelevant to our decision in these cases.
III.
Appellants contend that the policies in question explicitly provide for
coverage of diminished value, despite the lack of any clear statement to that effect
in the policies.  They argue that the plain and ordinary meanings of the terms
“loss,” “repair,” and “damage” favor coverage.  Under their theory, these words
                                                                                                                                                            
7 Rohner v. Niemann, Del. Supr., 380 A.2d 549, 552 (1977).
8 Grissom v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Del. Ch., 599 A.2d 1086, 1088 (1991); see also Whalen
v. On-Deck, Inc., Del. Supr., 514 A.2d 1072 (1986) (the Court will not void an insurance policy
provision absent “clear indicia” of a contrary public policy “in light of the importance of the
right of parties to contract as they wish”).
9 O’Brien, 2000 WL 33113833 at *2.
9
taken together require that, in the context of an insurance contract, an insurer
opting to repair a damaged vehicle must restore that vehicle to substantially the
same condition that it was in before the damage occurred.  We find this to be an
accurate statement of the insurers’ duties under the language of the policies.
However, Appellants cite the Superior Court’s interpretation of similar policy
language in Delledonne v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. to support their further
claim that “restoration to such condition can not be said to have been effected if the
repairs fail to render the vehicle as valuable as before.”10  The language of the
insurance contract reviewed in Delledonne11 simply does not support the Superior
Court’s holding in that case.
We have stated that a court’s interpretation of an insurance contact must rely
on a reading of all of the pertinent provisions of the policy as a whole, and not on
any single passage in isolation.12  Appellants contend that the term “loss” is
defined as a financial detriment suffered as a result of damage to property.
Therefore, they reason that any “repair” must restore this “loss.”  Whether or not
this Court accepts Appellants’ definition of loss, the claimed loss cannot be
interpreted without an accompanying examination of all of the policies’ limits on
                                                
10 Del. Super., 621 A.2d 350, 352 (1992).
11 The facts of the Delledonne case strongly suggest that the severity of the flood damage in that
instance made it impossible for repairs to restore the car to substantially the same condition as
before the damage.  If this was the case, the Superior Court should have determined whether the
standards of repair as provided by the contract were met or could be met, not that the term repair
required a full restoration of value.
10
liability, which were contracted to by all of the involved parties.  With minor, and
again irrelevant, differences in language, the policies in question give the insurer
the option of either reimbursing the claimant for the entire value of the damaged
automobile or of repairing or replacing its parts, depending on which will cost the
insurer less.  A reading of the policy language as Appellants suggest would render
this “choice” meaningless because it would require the insurer in every case to
reimburse the claimant for the full value of the auto in question.
Delaware courts have consistently held that an interpretation that gives
effect to each term of an agreement is preferable to any interpretation that would
result in a conclusion that some terms are uselessly repetitive.13  Contracts are to be
interpreted in a way that does not render any provisions “illusory or
meaningless.”14  Appellants’ argument would render the policy’s stated choice
between the lowest of actual cash value of the property and the amount necessary
to repair or replace damaged property both illusory and meaningless.  In every
instance, the amount of recovery would be the cash value of the car before the
incident that caused damage.  This Court may not accept Appellants’ argument and
still give meaningful effect to those policy terms that give the insurers a coverage
                                                                                                                                                            
12 Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Kenner, Del. Supr., 570 A.2d 1172, 1174 (1990).
13 Warner Communications Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., Del. Ch., 583 A.2d 962, 971
(1989), aff’d Del. Supr., 567 A.2d 419 (1989) (TABLE).
14 Sonitrol Holding Co. v. Marceau Investissements, Del. Supr., 607 A.2d 1177, 1183 (1992);
Seabreak Homeowners Ass’n v. Gresser, Del. Ch., 517 A.2d 263, 269 (1986), aff’d, Del. Supr.,
538 A.2d 1113 (1988) (TABLE).
11
option based on the lesser of the available costs.  Therefore, this Court cannot find
that the plain and ordinary meaning of the policy terms requires the insurers to
indemnify the policy holders for diminution of value.
IV.
In the alternative, Appellants argue that the policy language relating to the
terms “loss” and “repair and replace”15 in their respective policies is ambiguous.
We have held that where an ambiguity does exist, the doctrine of contra
proferentem requires that the language of an insurance policy be construed most
strongly against the insurance company that drafted it.16   It is “the obligation of the
insurer to state clearly the terms of the policy.”17  Appellants contend that the
contract language is ambiguous because it is susceptible to more than one
interpretation.  Therefore, they argue, the terms of the policies in question must be
construed to provide coverage for diminished value when the insurer has chosen to
repair a damaged vehicle.
However, where the language of a policy is clear and unequivocal, the
parties are to be bound by its plain meaning.18  Clear and unambiguous language in
an insurance contract should be given “its ordinary and usual meaning.”19  The
                                                
15 Or, as in the O’Brien policy, “repair or replace…with like kind and quality.”
16 Rhone-Poulenc, 616 A.2d at 1196; Steigler v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., Del. Supr., 384 A.2d
398, 400 (1978).
17 Emmons v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., Del. Supr., 697 A.2d 742, 745 (1997).
18 Id.
19 Rhone-Poulenc, 616 A.2d at 1195.
12
Delaware courts should not “destroy or twist policy language under the guise of
construing it.”20  “[C]reating an ambiguity where none exists could, in effect,
create a new contract with rights, liabilities and duties to which the parties had not
assented.”21  In construing insurance contracts, we have held that an ambiguity
does not exist where the court can determine the meaning of a contract “without
any other guide than a knowledge of the simple facts on which, from the nature of
language in general, its meaning depends.”22  Indeed, we will not torture policy
terms to create an ambiguity where an ordinary reading leaves no room for
uncertainty.23
This Court has further stated that an insurance contract is not ambiguous
simply because the parties do not agree on the proper construction.24  Instead, a
contract is only ambiguous when the provisions in controversy are reasonably or
fairly susceptible to different interpretations or may have two or more different
meanings.25  Appellants, citing the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
                                                
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1196 (quoting Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Del. Supr., 443 A.2d 925,
926 (1982)).
22 Rhone-Poulenc, 616 A.2d at 1196 (quoting Holland v. Hannan, D.C. App., 456 A.2d 807,
815 (1983)).
23 Rhone-Poulenc, 616 A.2d at 1197.
24 Id. at 1196.
25 Id.
13
Circuit in Inter Medical Supplies, Ltd. v. EBI Medical Sys, Inc.,26 argue that in
deciding whether a contract is ambiguous
[a court does] not simply determine whether, from [the court’s point] of
view the language is clear…. Before making a finding concerning the
existence or absence of ambiguity, [the court] consider[s] the contract
language, the meanings suggested by counsel, and the extrinsic evidence
offered in support of each interpretation.
This view is not Delaware law.  We have held unequivocally that “[e]xtrinsic
evidence is not to be used to interpret contract language where that language is
‘plain and clear on its face.”27  Therefore, the only question for this Court is
whether or not the plain language of the contract suggests more than one
interpretation.
Appellants argue that the mere fact that a number of courts nationwide have
reached different and contradictory conclusions about the meaning of policy terms
nearly identical to those before us in this case creates an ambiguity.  This
contention, while seductive, is without merit.  The Delledonne Court, cited by
Appellant, incorrectly stated Delaware law by finding that the existence of two
separate and distinct lines of authority in the interpretation of similar policy
language is evidence of ambiguity.28  The duty of the courts is to examine solely
                                                
26 181 F.3d 446, 457 (1999).
27 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 693 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1997).
28 621 A.2d at 352-53.  Appellant Hocutt also cites our decision in Jones v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., Del. Supr., 610 A.2d 1352, 1353 n.2 (1992).  While we noted in that instance that
evidence of a split in several courts’ interpretation of policy language buttressed our finding that
the generic term “damages” was ambiguous to the extent that it was unclear whether punitive
14
the language of the contractual provisions in question to determine whether the
disputed terms are capable of two or more reasonable interpretations.29  In so
doing, Delaware courts are obligated to confine themselves to the language of the
document and not to look to extrinsic evidence to find ambiguity.30  A mere split in
the case law concerning the meaning of a term does not render that meaning
ambiguous in the Delaware courts.31
This Court would place itself in an untenable position if it were to recognize
every split in judicial authority as prima facie evidence of ambiguity.  In the
context of interpreting insurance agreements, an adoption of this policy would
unduly restrict the power of the Delaware courts to render decisions independent of
our sister courts.  As discussed supra, absent exceptional circumstances,
ambiguous terms in insurance contracts are interpreted in favor of the insured
under the principle of contra proferentem.  If this Court were to allow an insured to
demonstrate ambiguity by providing evidence of a split in authority, contra
proferentem would preclude us from even addressing the contract language or the
merits of the case.
                                                                                                                                                            
damages were covered, the decision was based on our plain reading of the policy language.  We
have never held, as is argued here, that a split in authority alone establishes an ambiguity.
29 Rhone-Poulenc, 616 A.2d at 1196.
30 Hallowell, 443 A.2d at 926.
31 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., Del. Super., 711 A.2d 45, 59 (1995)
aff’d, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., Del. Supr., 693 A.2d 1059 (1997).
15
Appellants also contend that the internal documents of at least one insurer,
Progressive, support the claimed ambiguity.  Again, extrinsic evidence will not be
used where the clear language of the policy does not support an ambiguous
reading.  Appellants’ are quick to note that Progressive altered its policy explicitly
to exclude coverage for diminished value after this litigation began.  They suggest
that this alteration is tantamount to an admission by Progressive that it either
accepted Appellants’ interpretation of the insurance contract to include diminished
value or that they, at the very least, acknowledged the existence of an ambiguity
that needed to be corrected.  The fact that Progressive chose to make a clear policy
provision more clear as a remedial measure to this litigation may not be used as
evidence of an admission of either ambiguity or acceptance of Appellants’
interpretation of the policy.  The application of Appellants’ argument would
discourage remedial action and thus be contrary to the public policy of this State.32
We have made clear this State’s preference for as much clarity as possible in
contract language.  The adoption of Appellants’ argument would penalize those
parties who choose to alter their contracts in an attempt to avoid exactly the type of
costly litigation before us in this case.  Moreover, it would discourage insurers
from clarifying language in their policies, whether ambiguous or not, for fear of
negative inferences being drawn about the altered terms.  Our courts should
                                                
32 See Tzung v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 9th Cir., 873 F.2d 1338, 1341 (1989).
16
encourage insurers to reexamine even their most unambiguous policies in an
attempt to stem costly litigation and improve consumer understanding of their
policies.  Their actions clarifying insurance policy terms will reduce the likelihood
that policyholders will be tempted to debate terms of an insurance contract in order
to obtain indemnification for which they have neither bargained nor paid.  Not only
will this help the insurers lower litigation costs, but it should also benefit insureds
in the form of lower premiums.
Because this Court will not consider extrinsic evidence in determining the
ambiguity of an insurance provision, we must decide whether or not the language
of the contract is ambiguous on its face.  Appellants’ contend that “repair or
replace” provisions of the policy are ambiguous because the terms may create the
impression that the insurer will cover not only the costs of physical repair, but also
those costs associated with the restoration of value.
We conclude that the language “repair and replace” is not ambiguous and
that this language does not contemplate payment for diminution of value.  In the
common usage, the word “repair” means to fix by replacing or putting together
what is broken, or, as the court in Carlton v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. stated, “to
bring back to good or useable condition.”33  This definition of repair does not
require the insurer to restore the vehicle to factory condition or even to the
                                                
33 Tex. App., 32 S.W.3d 454, 464 (2000).
17
condition of the vehicle before the accident.  Therefore, a claimant is precluded
from recovering the amount of any reduction in the market value of the automobile
due to factors that are not subject to either repair or replacement.  Under the “repair
or replace” limitations on the policy, the insurer’s liability to a claimant is “capped
at the cost of returning the damaged vehicle to substantially the same physical,
operating, and mechanical condition as existed before the loss.34  This obligation
includes neither diminution in value resulting from a “market psychology” nor that
resulting from the minute physical imperfections that are inherent to any repair, so
long as repairs have been completed in a workmanlike manner and the vehicle has
been returned to substantially the same form as before the accident.
Ascribing to the phrase “repair or replace” an obligation to compensate the
insured for things that cannot reasonably be repaired or replaced violates the most
fundamental rule of contract construction.35  Our courts must give effect to the
intent of the parties as it is expressed in the language of the written policy.36  Thus,
the Delledonne Court erred in finding that the purpose of an auto insurance policy
is to “compensate the insured in full for any loss or damage to his automobile less
any deduction specified.”37  The actual purpose of an insurance policy is to
                                                
34 Id. at 465.
35 Id.
36 See Hercules, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., Del. Supr., ___ A.2d ___, 2001 WL 965080 at *4 (2001)
(The goal of the Court is to “ascertain the intent of the contracting parties based on the contract
terms.”); see also Carlton, 32 S.W.3d at 464-65.
37 621 A.2d at 353.
18
compensate the insured to the extent of the agreed upon policy terms.  In the case
of the policies before this Court, those agreed upon terms give the insurer the
option of paying the lesser of the cost of the vehicle before the accident or the cost
of repairing the vehicle to substantially the same physical, operating, and
mechanical condition as existed before the accident.  Thus we find that the terms
“repair or replace,” in the context of these insurance contracts, are not reasonably
or fairly susceptible to different interpretations or that they may have two or more
different meanings, and are therefore unambiguous.
In conclusion, the terms of an insurance contract are to be read as a whole
and given their plain and ordinary meaning.  A plain reading of the limits on
liability in the policies in question unambiguously give the insurers the option to
choose between the cost of repair or the full value of the vehicle before the covered
damage occurred.  To give full effect to this option, this Court can only assign one
meaning to the terms “repair or replace.”  Under this provision the insurer is
obligated to repair or replace vehicle parts only to the extent necessary to return the
automobile to substantially the same physical, operating, and mechanical condition
as before the covered incident.  Therefore we AFFIRM the rulings of the Superior
Court.