Title: NORTHFORK CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT, DAVID JAMISON, an individual, and ROBERT HOSZWA, an individual V. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PARK COUNTY and WORTHINGTON GROUP of WYOMING, LLC; WORTHINGTON GROUP of WYOMING, LLC V. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PARK COUNTY and NORTHFORK CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT, DAVID JAMISON, an individual, and ROBERT HOSZWA, an individual

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

NORTHFORK CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT, DAVID JAMISON, an individual, and ROBERT HOSZWA, an individual V. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PARK COUNTY and WORTHINGTON GROUP of WYOMING, LLC; WORTHINGTON GROUP of WYOMING, LLC V. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PARK COUNTY and NORTHFORK CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT, DAVID JAMISON, an individual, and ROBERT HOSZWA, an individual2010 WY 41Case Number: S-09-0148, S-09-0149Decided: 04/08/2001NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
NORTHFORK 
CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT, DAVID JAMISON, an individual, and ROBERT 
HOSZWA, an 
individual,Appellants(Petitioners),v.BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF PARK COUNTY,AppelleeRespondent, andWORTHINGTON GROUP of 
WYOMING, LLC,Appellee(Respondent-Intervenor).

 
 
WORTHINGTON 
GROUP of WYOMING, 
LLC,Appellant(Respondent-Intervenor),v.BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PARK COUNTY,Appellee(Respondent),and 
NORTHFORK CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT, DAVID JAMISON, an 
individual, and ROBERT HOSZWA, an 
individual,Appellees(Petitioners).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Northfork Citizens for Responsible Development, David Jamison, and Robert 
Hoszwa:

Debra 
J. Wendtland and Anthony T. Wendtland of Wendtland & Wendtland, LLP, 
Sheridan, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Wendtland.

 
 
Representing 
Board of County Commissioners of Park County:

James 
F. Davis, Deputy Park County Attorney, Cody, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Worthington Group of Wyoming, LLC:

Laurence 
W. Stinson and Dawn R. Scott of Bonner Stinson, P.C., Cody, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Stinson.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Northfork 
Citizens for Responsible Development, David Jamison, and Robert Hoszwa 
(collectively Northfork) have appealed the district court's affirmance of the 
approval by the Board of County Commissioners of Park County (the Board) of a 
subdivision proposed by Worthington Group of Wyoming, LLC (Worthington).1  Northfork raises evidentiary and 
procedural issues.  In a 
cross-appeal, Worthington contends that Northfork's issues are moot because 
Worthington has built the subdivision.  
We find that the appeal is not moot.  We affirm in part and reverse in part, 
and remand to the district court for further remand to the Board for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.   Are Northfork's issues moot 
because, Northfork having sought neither a stay nor an injunction, Worthington 
built the subdivision while the appeal was pending?

 
 
            
2.   Did the Board 
violate county regulations and state law by allowing county officials to waive 
mandated collection of information at an early stage of development on the 
ground that such information would be collected at a later 
stage?

 
 
            
3.   Did the Board 
violate county regulations by approving a final plat that was not consistent 
with the sketch plan?

 
 
4.   Is the Board's finding that the 
subdivision has a dependable water source supported by substantial 
evidence?

 
 
            
5.   Did the Board's 
approval of the subdivision's open space plan violate county 
regulations?

 
 
6.   Was Northfork unlawfully denied 
intervention in the contested case hearing?

 
 
            
7.   Did the Board 
violate county regulations by allowing dedication of subdivision roads for only 
limited public use?

 
 
            
8.   Did the Board 
violate county regulations and state law by allowing gated access to the 
subdivision?

 
 
            
9.   Did the Board 
violate county regulations by allowing multi-family dwellings on a portion of 
the subdivision?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In Park County, 
the developer of a proposed subdivision must obtain sketch plan approval, final 
plat approval, and a special use permit.  
At issue in the instant case is the Board's application of that process 
and its eventual approval of the Copperleaf Subdivision (the subdivision), which 
is located on approximately 553 acres of land along the North Fork of the 
Shoshone River, west of Cody.  In Northfork Citizens for Responsible 
Development v. Park County Board of County Commissioners, 2008 WY 88, ¶ 16, 
189 P.3d 260, 264-65 (Wyo. 2008) (Northfork I), this Court determined that 
the Northfork group, who are neighboring or area landowners, had standing to 
petition for judicial review of the Board's approval of the subdivision.  Upon remand, the district court affirmed 
the Board.   These 
inter-related appeals followed.

 
 
[¶4]      In October 2004, 
Worthington submitted to the Park County Planning & Zoning Commission (the 
Commission) and the Board a sketch plan and special use permit application for 
development of the subdivision.  Northfork filed numerous written 
objections and appeared at all Commission hearings regarding the project.  The Commission held a public hearing on 
November 30, 2004, at which hearing Worthington agreed to change its proposed 
water source from individual wells to a centralized system.  On December 8, 2004, the Board denied 
Northfork's attempted appeal of various "determinations and/or interpretations" 
made by the planning coordinator in his review of the sketch plan and special 
use permit application.  In addition 
to finding, in effect, that the appeal was premature, the Board specifically 
stated the following:

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 

            
WHEREAS, 
evidence of adequate capacity for water and sewer is necessary between the 
sketch plan and final plat stage in the review process for approval or denial of 
a subdivision, but is not necessary at the sketch plan/special use permit stage 
during concurrent review; and

 
 

            
WHEREAS, 
the [Commission] and the [Board] will have the ability to review the adequacy of 
water and sewer capacity as is required by both the [zoning regulations] and 
[development standards and regulations], as well as the other items listed in 
the written letter of appeal during the normal process of the 
subdivision/special use permit review; and

 
 

            
WHEREAS, 
at the sketch plan/special use permit stage, under circumstances where the 
applicant has sought concurrent review of the sketch plan and special use permit 
application, the Planning Coordinator may waive items of information listed as 
required;

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
[¶5]      The Commission 
held a second public hearing on December 21, 2004, to continue discussing both 
the sketch plan and the special use permit application.  On the same date, the Commission 
approved the sketch plan and recommended approval of the special use permit, 
conditioned to ensure that "[a]dequate services and infrastructure are available 
to serve the use, or the applicant has agreed to provide services and 
infrastructure in sufficient time to serve the proposed 
use[.]"

 
 
[¶6]      On December 28, 
2004, Northfork appealed the Commission's resolution, raising many of the issues 
presently before the Court in this appeal, including procedural defects, 
insufficient information in the application, gated access, road dedication, open 
space requirements, multi-family dwellings, and water and sewer systems.  The Board denied the appeal as it applied 
to the special use permit, finding that no such appeal right existed, but agreed 
to hear the appeal as it applied to sketch plan issues.  The Board conducted a public hearing on 
January 25, 2005, and on February 8, 2005 issued a resolution in which it found 
against Northfork on some issues, found that some issues were not ripe for 
appeal because they were not sketch-plan issuesthis category including water 
and sewer servicesand remanded some issues to the Commission for further 
considerationthis category including open space requirements.  Of special significance to the present 
appeal is the Board's interpretation of its subdivision regulations as not 
requiring certain sketch plan information in the context of a major subdivision 
development, because such information is to be provided at the final plat 
stage.

 
 
[¶7]      The Commission 
held a public meeting on March 15, 2005, to consider the matters remanded to it 
by the Board.  As concerns this 
appeal, the Commission thereafter issued Resolution No. 2005-13, in which a 
"Revised Sketch Plan" with re-drawn open space boundaries was approved. The new 
open space plan consisted of connecting previously separate open space parcels 
with "corridors" dedicated as open space.  
Northfork's appeal of this resolution was denied by the Board on April 
19, 2005, on the ground that the resolution involved only ministerial acts that 
remained subject to Board review.

 
 
[¶8]      On March 31, 
2005, the Board held a public hearing on Worthington's special use permit 
application.  For the next couple of 
months Worthington and Northfork dueled over the water supply issue, eventually 
drawing both the State Engineer's Office and the Department of Environmental 
Quality (DEQ) into the fray.  The 
details of that conflict will be discussed in more detail in the section of this 
opinion dealing with substantial evidence as to the water source.  Suffice it to say for present purposes 
that, when the Board approved the special use permit via its Resolution No. 
2005-40 on June 21, 2005, it did so based upon Worthington's agreement to 
provide "service and infrastructure in time to serve the proposed 
use."

 
 
[¶9]      Not surprisingly, 
the water supply issue survived approval of the special use permit, with 
Worthington identifying and then abandoning various water sources.  On October 28, 2005, DEQ issued a "no 
adverse recommendations" letter based upon a proposed public water supply system 
using water taken from the North Fork of the Shoshone River, with a permit for 
200 gallons per minute.  Two months 
later, on December 28, 2005, Worthington filed the final plat for the 
subdivision.

 
 
[¶10]   The Board discussed and voted to 
approve the final plat at a regularly scheduled meeting on March 7, 2006.  Resolution No. 2006-16, carrying that 
vote into effect, was issued on March 14, 2006.  The Resolution contained the following 
lengthy finding in regard to the subdivision's water 
supply:

 
 

            
The 
Board finds 
that DEQ, in consultation with the Wyoming State Engineer has reviewed the 
Developer's plan for a central water distribution system drawing water from the 
Northfork of the Shoshone River under a water permit issued by the Wyoming State 
Engineer in May 2005 for year-round direct flow in the amount of 200 gallons per 
minute, and that the subdivision at full build-out (131 lots) will not require 
said amount of water according to calculations in the file and otherwise of 
record undisputed by any other calculations of record, and that the Developer 
has provided information in the file that, after checking with the State 
Engineer, there has been no recorded regulation or "call" on water rights on the 
Northfork of the Shoshone River, however, opponents to this subdivision have 
submitted pleadings from a separate proceeding indicating that in 1977 there was 
a "call" on the Northfork of the Shoshone River during a dry year, however, the 
Board herein takes notice that in 1993 the Bureau of Reclamation completed a 
project on the Buffalo Bill Dam and Reservoir which has allowed for 
significantly more water storage in Buffalo Bill Reservoir than existed in 1977 
and that such additional storage creates significantly different and more 
favorable circumstances relating to satisfaction of water rights than existed in 
1977, including the availability of water in a State of Wyoming storage account 
available for purchase and/or exchange; and that DEQ, after reviewing the 
Developer's water system plan as required by law and pursuant to their own rules 
and regulations has provided the Board with a letter with no adverse 
recommendations regarding the water supply system and that said review requires 
a demonstration of quantity, quality and dependability of the water supply 
system and that said review satisfactorily accomplishes the purposes of the Park 
County subdivision regulations, and that even so the Board has reviewed the 
information presented itself, and finds that, the water system as reviewed 
herein is dependent solely on the May 2005 water permit and that the Board is 
not in its review considering the availability of domestic water from any wells 
located on the subject property or from irrigation rights or other source, 
though the Board recognizes that the Developer does have potential access to 
additional water for domestic purposes should the Developer seek to follow 
whatever necessary local, state and/or federal procedures exist in supplementing 
its 2005 direct flow water permit; and that the system provides that all water 
mains are within the boundaries of the subdivision and that individual service 
lines are available to each lot line[.]

 
 
[¶11]   On March 30, 2006, Worthington 
requested a contested case hearing (the hearing) to challenge five conditions 
the Board had placed upon the subdivision:  
(1) dedication of subdivision roads to public use; (2) no multi-family 
dwellings; (3) no gated entrance; (4) no planting of fruit- or berry-producing 
trees; and (5) no stocking of fish in ponds.2  Alleging to be "aggrieved or adversely 
affected in fact" by the Board's decisions, Northfork reacted by moving the 
Board to be allowed to intervene in the hearing procedures, including discovery, 
as a matter of right.  The Board 
responded by requiring Northfork first to "demonstrate with specificity" the 
following:

 
 
i.      Their individual 
or collective ability to meaningfully contribute to the record in this matter in 
a manner which will [not] cause undue delay or prejudice to one or both current 
parties;

 
 
ii.     The nature and extent 
of harm they may collectively or individually suffer as it relates to each 
specific issue raised in the Worthington Group's contested case 
petition;

 
 
iii.    How the proposed interveners 
are collectively or individually so situated that the disposition of this 
contested case may, as a practical matter impair or impede the proposed 
interveners' collective or individual ability to protect their respective 
interests;

 
 
iv.    How the proposed interveners 
either collectively or individually allege their interests are not or will not 
adequately be represented by Park County and the Park County attorney; 
and

 
 
v.     That they have a 
significant interest in the present contested case proceeding, and not one that 
is merely contingent or similar to the interest of any member of the public at 
large.

 
 
vi.    The names or identities of 
the individual members of North Fork Citizens for Responsible Development; the 
ownership interest in any real properties or other assets that such members deem 
may be affected by the Copperleaf Subdivision Development; and a specific 
description of the existence of North Fork Citizens for Responsible Development 
as a legal entity, including its formation date.

 
 
[¶12]   While maintaining its objection to 
these special requirements, Northfork submitted responses, in which it 
emphasized the special harm to neighboring landowners and downstream water users 
that could result from approval of the subdivision.  In a lengthy and detailed order, the 
Board denied Northfork's motion to intervene, concluding that Northfork had 
failed to provide sufficient information showing that individual Northfork 
members would be harmed by the subdivision to any greater extent than would be 
the general public.

 
 
[¶13]   The contested case hearing was held 
on July 12, 2006, and the Board issued its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law on October 3, 2006.  In its 
order, the Board continued the prohibition against fruit- and berry-producing 
trees, and the prohibition against fish in the ponds, but reversed itself on the 
other issues:  allowing limited 
dedication of roads to public use, allowing a gated entrance, and allowing 
multi-family dwellings on a portion of the platted area.  Northfork filed a petition for review in 
the district court on November 1, 2006, challenging (1) Resolution No. 2005-40, 
which approved the special use permit; (2) Resolution No. 2005-53, which 
clarified the intention of Resolution No. 2005-40 in regard to the timing of 
water system and sewer system approvals; (3) Resolution No. 2006-16, which 
approved the subdivision permit and final plat; and (4) the Board's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law resulting from the hearing.  Worthington was allowed to intervene in 
the court action to protect its interests.

 
 
[¶14]   On May 18, 2007, Worthington moved 
to dismiss the petition for review on the ground that Northfork was not 
aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by the Board's action.  The district court issued a decision 
letter on July 23, 2007, and an order of dismissal on August 23, 2007, in which 
it concluded that the Northfork appellants lacked standing to challenge the 
Board's actions because they had not shown that they possessed any interest in 
the matter different from that of members of the general public.  As noted previously herein, Northfork 
appealed that ruling, and we reversed in Northfork I.  Upon remand, the district court 
eventually made the following determinations:  (1) Worthington's completion of the 
project did not render the matter moot because the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure did not require Northfork to obtain an injunction; (2) the Board's 
ratification in Resolution No. 2005-40 of the planning coordinator's waiver of 
water supply information at the special use permit stage did not violate county 
regulations; (3) the Board's decisions during the special use permit review 
process regarding water supply were supported by substantial evidence; (4) the 
Board's findings in regard to the open space requirements of a "grouped lot 
subdivision with density bonus" were supported by substantial evidence; (5) 
Resolution No. 2006-16 is not clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence in regard to water supply; (6) the Board's adoption of Resolution No. 
2006-16 as it relates to water supply was not arbitrary or capricious, and was 
in accordance with the law; (7) Resolution No. 2006-16 did not violate the 
county's open space regulations; (8) the Board did not err in denying 
Northfork's motion to intervene in the contested case hearing process because 
the Board, as a party, sufficiently represented Northfork's interests; (9) while 
there is a county regulation that subdivision roads be "offered" for public 
dedication, there is no county regulation that requires the Board to accept all 
offered roads as fully dedicated to public use; (10) inasmuch as subdivision 
roads need not be accepted for public use and maintenance, it follows that 
allowing a gated entrance to a subdivision that does not have roads fully 
dedicated to public use is not a violation of state law in the form of a county 
sub-delegating the regulation of traffic; and (11) the Board did not err in 
determining that an earlier variance allowing multi-family dwellings on a 
portion of the platted area had not expired.

 
 
[¶15]   The combined cases now before this 
Court consist of Worthington's appeal of the district court's rejection of its 
mootness argument, and Northfork's appeal from the rest of the district court's 
order and the underlying Board decisions.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶16]   A district court's decision on the 
question of mootness is an issue of law that we review de novo.  Cooper v. Town of Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 
1201 (Wyo. 2000).  The other issues 
brought to the Court in this appeal require application of our standard for 
reviewing the actions of an administrative agency.  That standard requires that we give no 
special deference to the decision of the district court, but consider the case 
as if it came directly from the agency.  
Dale v. S & S Builders, 
LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 9, 188 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 2008).  The statutory limits of our review are 
set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis  2009):

 
 
            
(c)     To the 
extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
(i)      Compel agency 
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

 
 
(ii)     Hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

 
 
(A)    Arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 
 
(B)    Contrary to constitutional 
right, power, privilege or immunity;

 
 
(C)    In excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

 
 
(D)    Without observance of 
procedure required by law; or

 
 
(E)    Unsupported by substantial 
evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 
 
[¶17]   In Dale, we noted that this statute 
actually contains several different standards of review, and that all are not 
applicable in any given instance.  
2008 WY 84, ¶¶ 8-26, 188 P.3d  at 557-62.  We will not repeat that detailed 
analysis here.  Rather, we will 
simply parse the statute and note that a reviewing court must set aside agency 
action where the agency:  (1) acted 
arbitrarily; (2) acted capriciously; (3) acted contrary to law; (4) abused its 
discretion; (5) violated a constitution; (6) acted beyond its statutory 
authority; (7) failed to observe legally required procedures; or (8) made 
findings or reached conclusions unsupported by substantial evidence.  We have defined "arbitrary and 
capricious" in the administrative agency review context as 
follows:

 
 
The 
arbitrary and capricious test requires the reviewing court to review the entire 
record to determine whether the agency reasonably could have made its finding 
and order based upon all the evidence before it.  The arbitrary and capricious standard is 
more lenient and deferential to the agency than the substantial evidence 
standard because it requires only that there be a rational basis for the 
agency's decision.

 
 

Id. 
at ¶ 12, at 559 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  In turn, we defined the substantial 
evidence test as follows:

 
 
"In 
reviewing findings of fact, we examine the entire record to determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support an agency's findings.  If the agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency and must uphold the findings on appeal.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions. . . ."

 
 

Id. 
at ¶ 11, at 558 (quoting Newman v. State 
ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 12, 49 P.3d 163, 168 (Wyo. 2002)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Are 
Northfork's issues moot because, Northfork having sought neither a stay nor an 
injunction, Worthington built the subdivision while the appeal was 
pending?

 
 
[¶18]   The doctrine of mootness has clear 
application in Wyoming:

 
 
            
We have examined the mootness doctrine on numerous occasions.  In Bard Ranch Co. v. Frederick, 950 P.2d 564, 566 (Wyo. 1997), we said:

 
 
Our 
general law on justiciability provides that courts should not consider issues 
which have become moot.  We do not 
decide cases when a decision will have no effect or pertains only to matters 
that might arise in the future.  A 
case is moot when the determination of an issue is sought which, if provided, 
will have no practical effect on the existing controversy.  Therefore, if events occur during the 
pendency of an appeal that cause a case to become moot or make determination of 
the issues unnecessary, we will dismiss it.

 
 

In 
re SNK, 
2005 WY 30, ¶ 6, 108 P.3d 836, 837-38 (Wyo. 2005) (most internal citations 
omitted).  Of particular import to 
the instant case is the idea that the interests supporting standing may not 
necessarily persist throughout litigation:

 
 
The 
doctrine of mootness encompasses those circumstances which destroy a previously 
justiciable controversy.  This 
doctrine represents the time element of standing by requiring that the interests 
of the parties which were originally sufficient to confer standing persist 
throughout the duration of the suit.  
Thus, the central question in a mootness case is "whether decision of a 
once living dispute continues to be justified by a sufficient prospect that the 
decision will have an impact on the parties."

 
 

Merchant 
v. State Dep't of Corrs., 
2007 WY 159, ¶ 15, 168 P.3d 856, 863 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting KO v. LDH (In re Guardianship of MEO), 
2006 WY 87, ¶ 27, 138 P.3d 1145, 1153 (Wyo. 2006) (internal citations 
omitted)).

 
 
[¶19]   Worthington's mootness argument is 
as follows:  when Northfork filed 
its petition for review in the district court in November 2006, it sought 
neither a stay, nor an injunction.3  Consequently, nothing prevented 
Worthington from completing the subdivision, which it did.  In its brief, Worthington describes the 
now-existing situation as follows:

 
 
            
In asking the Court to review and overturn or remand the permits issued 
by [the Board], [Northfork] asks the Court to "undo" all the building and 
infrastructure that has been completed.  
To honor their request would necessarily impose tremendous hardship on 
the developers, residents, and purchasers.  
The relief sought by [Northfork]no more [subdivision]can only be 
obtained at significant hardship to others.  At the time the lower court heard the 
appeal, [the subdivision] was (and remains) complete.  Thirty-two home sites have been sold and 
2 homes were currently under construction.  Mr. Kudelski, one of the owners of the 
development company, uncontestedly points out that:

 
 
In 
other words, the roads, potable water system, centralized sewer system, raw 
water system, electric and power infrastructure, and phone lines have all 
been installed and are currently being used.  The landscaping has been completed and 
is quite extensive, including on-site ponds, berms, fencing, and the like.  The gatehouse and gates have also been 
constructed, as has an entry way statue of elk in combat.

 
 
[¶20]   Worthington relies upon the legal 
and equitable principles set forth in Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. DeVilbiss, 
729 P.2d 353 (Colo. 1986).  The 
facts of that case are not complex.  
DeVilbiss, a neighboring landowner, contested a coal company's 
application for a special use permit to construct a coal-loading facility.  The special use permit was granted, 
contingent upon the company's obtaining a height variance.  The variance was also granted.  DeVilbiss filed suit, alleging arbitrary 
and capricious agency action.  
Eventually, the Colorado Supreme Court found the matter to be moot 
because the facility had been constructed during the pendency of the action, and 
DeVilbiss had not sought a stay or preliminary injunction.  Id. at 356-60.  The Colorado court reasoned that:  (1) a party who seeks to enjoin 
presumptively legal conduct, but who fails to seek a stay or a preliminary 
injunction, "must bear some responsibility for" the changed circumstances; (2) 
courts are more apt to find mootness from changed circumstances where the 
challenged conduct is legally permissible and done in good faith; and (3) the 
company had spent a large sum of money in completing the facility.  Id.; see also Richland Park Homeowners Ass'n v. 
Pierce, 671 F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1982).4

 
 
[¶21]   In response, Northfork contends 
that, in Ebzery v. City of Sheridan, 
982 P.2d 1251 (Wyo. 1999), this Court rejected the reasoning of DeVilbiss and also rejected application 
of the theory of "vested rights" in situations such as the one at hand.  Although Ebzery involved a variance rather than a 
special use permit, we observed that "[a]ctions taken in reliance on a variance 
or permit while the time for appeal is pending are inherently 
unreasonable."  Id. at 1257.  In holding that the developer's 
expenditures did not render the underlying issues moot, we described such 
expenditures as a "calculated risk."  
Id. at 1256-57.  Finally, we specifically recognized the 
vested rights doctrine described in Snake 
River Venture v. Board of County Commissioners, 616 P.2d 744 (Wyo. 1980), 
but we opined that "Snake River does 
not stand for the proposition that one who knows a variance is subject to appeal 
may render that appeal moot if only [he or she] act[s] quickly enough."  Ebzery, 982 P.2d  at 
1257.

 
 
[¶22]   We do not believe that the 
distinction between a variance and a special use permit negates the application 
of the principles enunciated in Ebzery to the present case.  Perhaps most importantly, those 
principles require parties to respect the judicial process and judicial 
resolution of disputes:

 
 
[W]e 
are not unmindful of Zoning Bd. of 
Adjustment v. DeVilbiss, 729 P.2d 353 (Colo. 1986), which holds that the 
failure of one challenging a zoning variance to obtain a temporary injunction 
pending the outcome of an appeal renders the cause moot.  The problem with this approach, however, 
is that it encourages the disregard of legal challenges and promotes 
construction which may subsequently be found to be in violation of an 
erroneously waived zoning regulation.  
In this regard, we consider the reasoning in Bat'tles v. Board of Adjustment and 
Appeals, 711 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. App. 1986), to be sounder.  The Bat'tles court rejected the notion that 
the failure to obtain a restraining order or to file a supersedeas bond renders 
the cause moot.  That court 
concluded that as the statute concerning the grant or denial of a variance was 
silent on whether a bond or restraining order was required, the general law of 
civil suits applied, and that law does not require a losing plaintiff to seek a 
bond or a restraining order.

 
 
            
We therefore reject the DeVilbiss approach and hold that just as 
a plaintiff who collects a judgment which is appealed but is not superseded 
takes the risk of having to make restitution, Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gantt, 256 Ala. 
262, 54 So. 2d 595 (1951), so, too, does one who builds in accordance with a 
zoning variance which is appealed take the risk that it will have to tear down 
what it has built.

 
 

Bowman 
v. City of York, 
240 Neb. 201, 482 N.W.2d 537, 546 (1992).  
Expenditures made with knowledge of a court challenge are not 
expenditures made in good faith reliance upon a variance or permit.  Id. at 547.  We continue to hold that, in Wyoming, 
completion of a project under a variance or permit during the pendency of an 
appeal does not render the appellate issues moot.

 
 
Did 
the Board violate county regulations and state law by allowing county officials 
to waive mandated collection of information at an early stage of development on 
the ground that such information would be collected at a later 
stage?

 
 
[¶23]   The gravamen of this allegation is 
that the Board violated state law by not complying strictly with its own zoning 
regulations, which failure requires reversal of the Board's actions.5  Specifically, Northfork contends that 
the Board allowed Park County's planning coordinator to violate his authority to 
waive certain information requirements under Zoning Regulation 4-510 by allowing 
Worthington to apply for a special use permit without providing the water system 
information mandated by Zoning Regulation 4-505 and 4-510.  Zoning Regulation 4-505 reads as 
follows:

 
 
Special 
use permit approval is required before commencing or establishing any use 
specified in Table 2-1, Schedule of Uses, as requiring a special use 
permit.  Special use permits are 
also required pursuant to Subsection 3-210-E, Nonconforming Uses, and 
Division 6-300, Airport Overlay District.

 
 
Subdivisions 
are specified in Table 2-1, and therefore require a special use permit.  In turn, Zoning Regulation 4-510 
provides in pertinent part as follows:

 
 
The 
following information shall be submitted to the Planning Department with any 
application for a special use permit unless the Planning Coordinator waives 
information requirements because the specified item(s) is not relevant to the 
project review.

 
 
A.    Written 
Material:

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
5.   Evidence that an adequate water 
supply in terms of quantity, quality, and dependability for the use is or will 
be available;

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
(Emphasis 
in original.)

 
 
[¶24]   Northfork posits that a general 
waiver provision that allows the planning coordinator to waive the production of 
information "not relevant to the project review" simply cannot be extended so 
far as to relieve a developer from the duty of producing before approval of a 
special use permit application, information concerning the water source and 
supply for a major subdivision.  
Consequently, Northfork argues, the Board violated its own zoning 
regulations when it adopted Resolution No. 2005-40 on June 21, 2005, approving 
the special use permit for the subdivision, while having in hand only 
Worthington's agreement "to provide service and infrastructure in time to serve 
the proposed use," as opposed to actual information showing "an adequate water 
supply in terms of quantity, quality, and dependability."

 
 
[¶25]   The Board's response to the 
accusation that it did not follow its own rules focuses upon the distinction 
between an application solely for a special use permit, and an application for a 
special use permit coupled with an application for a subdivision permit.  As an example of the former, the Board 
states that a person desiring to establish a commercial business on his or her 
property would be required only to apply for a special use permit.  All use impacts would be reviewed prior 
to approval of a special use permit in that situation because that would be the 
extent of county review.

 
 
[¶26]   In the subdivision context, 
however, the developer is required to proceed through a three-step process.  First, the subdivision is exposed to 
"sketch plan review" by the Commission.  Second, as noted above, subdivision 
approval also requires special use permit application and approval.  Finally, "final plat review" occurs prior 
to the Board's approval of a subdivision.  The Board's point is that the planning 
coordinator's waiver of the presentment of certain information at one stage of 
the proceedings is acceptable where the information must be presented at a 
different stage of the proceedings prior to final approval.  The Board further points out that, in 
addition to the waiver authority found in Zoning Regulation 4-510, set forth 
above (see supra ¶ 23), Park County's 
Development Standards and Regulations give the planning coordinator similar 
authority:

 
 
These 
standards and regulations specify information to be submitted with permits, 
certificates, and other applications.  
Situations may occur when not all of the items listed will be needed 
because of the nature of the applicant's request. . . .  The Planning Coordinator and/or County 
Engineer are hereby authorized to determine, based on the nature of the 
applicant's request, whether to waive the requirement to submit items of 
information or to require additional information.

 
 
[¶27]   "Administrative rules and 
regulations have the force and effect of law, and an administrative agency must 
follow its own rules and regulations or face reversal of its action."  RME Petroleum Co. v. Wyo. Dep't of 
Revenue, 2007 WY 16, ¶ 40, 150 P.3d 673, 688 (Wyo. 2007); see also In re Adoption of CF, 2005 WY 
118, ¶ 42, 120 P.3d 992, 1005 (Wyo. 2005).  
In assessing whether an agency has abided by its rules and regulations, 
we defer to the agency's construction of those rules and regulations, unless 
that construction is clearly erroneous or inconsistent with their plain 
meaning.  RME Petroleum, 2007 WY 16, ¶ 44, 150 P.3d  at 689; Swift v. Sublette County Bd. 
of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 32, ¶ 10, 40 P.3d 1235, 1238 (Wyo. 2002); Pinther v. State Dep't of Admin. & 
Info., 866 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Wyo. 1994).

 
 
[¶28]   In the instant case, the Board has 
concluded that its rules and regulations allow it to schedule over time the 
receipt from a developer of information required in the sketch plan-special use 
permit-final plat-subdivision plan approval process.  That conclusion, based upon the 
interrelatedness of the separate processes, is not clearly erroneous, nor is it 
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the rules and regulations, when all are 
read together.  The subdivision 
approval process is time-consuming and in-depth.  It involves numerous decisions, on many 
and various issues, and it involves continual and repeated status review by 
county staff members, the Commission, and the Board.  It is not unreasonable for the Board to 
determine that certain information, such as water source information, that might 
be required at an earlier stage in a simpler development, need not be provided 
until a later stage in a complex subdivision development.  This is not a case where the Board 
granted a subdivision permit without requiring mandatory submissions of 
information; rather, it is simply a case where the Board accepted submission of 
that information in a timely manner as the subdivision application 
progressed.

 
 
Did 
the Board violate county regulations by approving a final plat that was not 
consistent with the sketch plan?

 
 
[¶29]   Northfork contends that, in 
violation of Park County's Development Standards and Regulations, the 
subdivision's final plat was not consistent with its sketch plan.  Because Northfork's argument in this 
regard is brief, it is easier simply to quote it rather than to 
paraphrase:

 
 
            
One criteria [sic] for approval of a final plat is that the final plat 
"must" be "consistent with the approved sketch plan . . . ."  DSR Ch IV § 3. b. (3).  Resolution No. 2006-16 is not consistent 
with the approved sketch plan.  
Prior to and during the sketch plan phase, [Worthington] repeatedly 
changed it's [sic] water source for the subdivision.  Finally, after proposing to convert 
irrigation water to domestic use, the Park County Planning Coordinator 
proclaimed that [Worthington's] plan to convert irrigation water to domestic use 
was now "elemental" to the sketch plan.  
Completely contrary to that "elemental" plan, the final plat relies upon 
2005 surface water from the river.  
Again, completely contrary to the mandate of DSR IV § 3 b. (3) the court 
below allowed the [Board] to waive the consistency requirement as to 
water.

 
 

[¶30]   Resolution of this issue begins, as 
it should, with recognition that the cited development standard does, indeed, 
require that "the proposed subdivision is consistent with the approved sketch 
plan . . . ."  That statement must, 
however, be read within the context of the entire process of subdivision 
development in Park County.  Sketch 
plan review and approval are tasks assigned to the planning coordinator and the 
Commission.  Final plat and 
subdivision plan approval are, however, accomplished by the Board.  There are a host of requirements that the 
developer must meet between sketch plan and final plat; while the final plat is 
to be consistent 
with the sketch plan, it need not be identical 
to it, or the entire process could end after the sketch plan was approved.  Changes are anticipated.  For instance, the Development Standards 
and Regulations provide that, at the sketch plan phase, the planning coordinator 
is "to alert the applicant to . . . any issues which need to be addressed prior 
to final plat submittal."

 
 
[¶31]   Specifically in regard to water, 
the Development Standards and Regulations require that a sketch plan be referred 
to the State Engineer, that the planning coordinator forward any concerns raised 
by the State Engineer to the developer, and that the developer "shall address 
these concerns to the satisfaction of the [State Engineer] prior to approval of 
the final plat."  A completed sketch 
plan application is also subject to public review, including any comments as to 
how the proposed water system may negatively impact water quantity or quality, 
or may have inadequate water rights.  Such provisions obviously contemplate 
modifications to the sketch plan.

 
 

[¶32]   The Development Standards and 
Regulations governing final plat review and approval are somewhat more demanding 
in regard to a subdivision's water supply, but even then there is "breathing 
room."  What is required is 
"[a]dequate evidence that a water supply sufficient in terms of quality, 
quantity, and dependability will 
be available 
to ensure an adequate supply of water to the type of subdivision proposed." 
 (Emphasis added.)  Stated a second time, the requirement is 
that "[a]dequate provision has been made for water supply . . . in accordance 
with these regulations and Wyoming State Law."  Finally, underscoring the built-in 
recognition that there will be some change between the sketch plan and the final 
plat, the Development Standards and Regulations require that "[n]o change has 
occurred which would result in an inability to make the findings required for 
approval of sketch plats [sic]."

 
 
[¶33]   The Board defends against 
Northfork's contentions by pointing out the above-mentioned Development 
Standards and Regulations (see supra 
¶ 32), and by indicating that the change in Worthington's water supply planfrom 
water wells on individual lots to a centralized surface water source piped 
through a centralized water supply systemwas actually a vast improvement.  Further, Northfork's claim that an 
"irrigation use to domestic use" conversion was proclaimed by the planning 
coordinator to be an elemental part of the sketch plan is inaccurate.  What the planning coordinator actually 
reported to the Board in an internal memorandum was as 
follows:

 
 

2001 
Amendments  Water.  As noted above, the 2001 Amendments to 
the Subdivision Regulations established the Simple Subdivision Procedure.  Consequently, Attachment E (Sketch Plan 
Submittal Requirements) applied to Simple Subdivisions only.  It did not replace the Sketch Plan 
Submittal Requirements listed in the Subdivision Regulations since 
1994.

 
 
Accordingly, 
no information on water rights or water quality is required of any applicant as 
part of the Sketch Plan submittal for a subdivision.  The Wyoming Department of Environmental 
Quality has not delegated its review of domestic water or sewer systems to Park 
County, and there is no one on County staff to review such 
data.

 
 

[Northfork] 
refers to an "ever-changing water system" for this proposal.  So far, the only change has been for the 
applicants to commit to a central water system rather than individual 
wells.  This was in response to 
several concerns expressed by area residents prior to, and during , the November 
30th public hearing.  This proposed 
system must be approved by both Wyoming DEQ and the Wyoming State Engineer's 
Office, prior to the applicants' submitting a Final Plat for this 
subdivision.  This 
central water system is now an elemental part of the Sketch Plan for this 
project, 
and if there are substantial changes in the future the approved Sketch Plan will 
need to be amended.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  A sketch plan was tendered 
with individual water wells.  After 
staff input and public comment, a final plat was approved with a central water 
supply system.  The Board did not 
err in determining that this was not such an "inconsistency" as to require 
denial of the final plat of the subdivision.

 
 
Is 
the Board's finding that the subdivision has a dependable water source supported 
by substantial evidence?

 
 
[¶34]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-306 
(LexisNexis 2009) sets the minimum requirements that must be met before a 
subdivision permit may be granted.  
In regard to water supply, the statute provides in pertinent part as 
follows:

 
 
(a)    The board shall require . . . 
the following information to be submitted with each application for a 
subdivision permit . . . :

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
(vi)    A study evaluating the water 
supply system proposed for the subdivision and the adequacy and safety of the 
system.  The study shall, at a 
minimum, include the following:

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
(B)    For all water supply systems 
except individual on-lot wells, a report submitted by the subdivider 
demonstrating the adequacy and safety of the proposed water supply system.  The report shall address, at a minimum, 
the following issues:

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 

(VI)    Where a centralized water 
supply system is proposed containing a new source of water supply to be 
developed, the report shall also demonstrate that the water supply system is 
sufficient 
in terms of quality, quantity and dependability 
and will be available to ensure an adequate water supply system for the type of 
subdivision proposed. . . .

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Consistent with this 
statute, Park County's Development Standards and Regulations provide in Section 
3 of Chapter IV as follows:

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
b.      Final 
plat:

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
(2)    Submittal Requirements for 
Final Plats:  The following 
information shall be submitted with any application for final plat approval 
unless specific items are waived by the Planning Coordinator as unnecessary. . . 
.

 
 
(a)   Written 
Material:

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 

Adequate 
evidence that a water supply sufficient 
in terms of quality, quantity, and dependability will 
be available to ensure an  adequate 
supply of water to the type of subdivision proposed. . . .

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶35]   Northfork contends first that the 
conjunction "and" in both the statute and the regulation requires the 
subdivision developer to provide evidence not just of the quality and quantity 
of the water supply, but also of the dependability of that supply.  See Prickett v. Prickett, 2007 WY 153, ¶ 
11, 167 P.3d 661, 664 (Wyo. 2007).6  Next, Northfork notes the well-known 
principle that use of the word "shall" in both the statute and the regulation 
indicates that the requirements are mandatory.  See Stutzman v. Office of Wyo. State 
Engineer, 2006 WY 30, ¶ 17, 130 P.3d 470, 475 (Wyo. 2006).  Northfork then equates the concept of "adequate 
evidence" with the legal term "substantial evidence," which we have defined as 
"relevant evidence in the entire record which a reasonable mind might accept in 
support of the agency's conclusions."  
 See Dale, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d  at 
561.  Finally, Northfork argues that 
the record does not contain substantial evidence of the dependability of the 
subdivision's water supply, which is an "unperfected" 2005 surface right in the 
river.  In fact, Northfork contends 
that the record contains no 
evidence that 
the water supply is dependable.

 
 
[¶36]   Worthington first proposed as a 
water supply ground water wells on individual lots.  Public comment and opposition led 
Worthington to propose, instead, a centralized system based upon converted 
irrigation rights.  After additional 
public comment and opposition, Worthington again revised its water supply 
proposal, this time to surface water from the river along with an exchange of 
water from the downstream Buffalo Bill Reservoir.  The final proposal, accepted by the 
Board, was for a 200 gallons per minute surface water supply from the river, 
with a 2005 priority date.

 
 
[¶37]   Northfork concedes in its appellate 
brief that, given the subdivision's need for only 25 gallons per minute, the 
2005 water right is adequate evidence of "quantity."  Citing the dictionary definition of 
"dependable" as meaning "reliable," however, Northfork argues that Worthington's 
evidence fails that test.  See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary 310 (10th ed. 1999).  
Relying upon general concepts of Wyoming water law, Northfork argues 
that, in a dry year, a 2005 priority could be "shut off first" to satisfy 
earlier priorities.  In fact, just 
such a "call" on the river in 1977 shut down all water rights in the area back 
to 1900 priorities.

 
 
[¶38]   More specifically, Northfork argues 
that the Board unreasonably relied upon DEQ's "no adverse recommendation" report 
because the Board knew that the report was based upon inaccurate information as 
to the proposed water supply.  The 
final plat was approved on March 7, 2006.  About a week earlier, DEQ identified for 
a deputy Park County attorney "the key letter that I used to determine water was 
dependable (adequate)."  That 
letter, dated September 30, 2005, was sent to DEQ from the State Engineer's 
Office.  The substantive portion of 
the letter reads as follows:

 
 
            
As was the case with the first submittal for this subdivision proposal, 
existing water rights as outlined under Wyoming Statute 18-5-306(a)(xi) have yet 
to be addressed.  A tabulation of 
potentially subject rights was provided with the first State Engineer review 
comments.  With the exception of the 
newly filed permit to recognize the proposed domestic supply use, and the yet to 
be filed reservoir permit to recognize the newly proposed recycling of treated 
wastewater for irrigation; the originally identified subject water rights remain 
identical to those identified under the first submittal.

 
 
            
Additionally, it is my understanding that the subdivider continues to 
pursue plans to purchase stored water in Buffalo Bill Reservoir, has applied for 
permits to drill several miscellaneous use wells, and is investigating changing 
all or part of the existing senior irrigation water rights (either temporarily 
or permanently) to domestic use within the subdivision. . . 
.

 
 
[¶39]   As proof if its allegations, 
Northfork identifies portions of the agency record that show the following:  (1) by October of 2005, the Board knew 
that Worthington had admitted in a petition filed with the State Engineer that 
issues of the sufficiency and reliability of its 2005 surface water permit 
required it to seek an additional source of supply in the form of reservoir 
water exchange; (2) by October of 2005, the Board knew that there would be no 
such reservoir water exchange; (3) by January of 2006, the Board knew that the 
final plat application listed no well water source of supply; and (4) by January 
of 2006, the Board knew there would be no conversion of irrigation water to 
domestic use.  Finally, Northfork 
cites Rodgers v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety & Compensation Division, 2006 WY 65, ¶ 23, 135 P.3d 568, 
576 (Wyo. 2006), as requiring administrative agencies to consider and weigh all material evidence offered by the 
parties, and to resolve conflicts in that evidence.  To summarize, Northfork contends that it 
was unreasonable for the Board to conclude, from the record evidence, that a 
2005 priority surface water right was a dependable source of supply for the 
proposed subdivision.

 
 
[¶40]   The Board's response to these 
allegations is reflected in this sentence from its appellate brief:  "A surface water permit granted by the 
State of Wyoming for 200 gallons per minute to a subdivision with a need for 25 
gallons per minute from a riverway water source that has been flowing 
uninterrupted through geologic time amounts to an adequate and dependable water 
source."  More particularly, the 
Board refers to the following portion of Resolution No. 2006-16, wherein the 
final plat and subdivision permit were approved on March 7, 2006, as proof that 
the Board did not act in ignorance of the fact that the proposed water source 
was limited to the river permit:

 
 
[T]he 
Board has reviewed the information presented itself, and finds that, the water 
system as reviewed herein is dependent solely on the May 2005 water permit and 
that the Board is not in its review considering the availability of domestic 
water from any wells located on the subject property or from irrigation rights 
or other source, though the Board recognizes that [Worthington] does have 
potential access to additional water for domestic purposes should [Worthington] 
seek to follow whatever necessary local, state and/or federal procedures exist 
in supplementing its 2005 direct flow water permit . . . .

 
 
[¶41]   The Board also argues that 
Worthington's exploration of alternative water sources does not, ipso facto, mean that the surface water 
right is not dependable or is inadequate.  
Rather, the Board considers Worthington's efforts in that regard simply 
as evidence of Worthington's thoroughness in ensuring the dependability of its 
water supply.  Finally, the Board 
argues that it recognized and addressed the potential risk of a call or 
regulation of rights on the river, when it stated as follows in Resolution No. 
2006-16:

 
 
[O]pponents 
to this subdivision have submitted pleadings from a separate proceeding 
indicating that in 1977 there was  a 
"call" on the Northfork of the Shoshone River during a dry year, however, the 
Board herein takes notice that in 1993 the Bureau of Reclamation completed a 
project on the Buffalo Bill Dam and Reservoir which has allowed for 
significantly more water storage in Buffalo Bill Reservoir than existed in 1977 
and that such additional storage creates significantly different and more 
favorable circumstances relating to satisfaction of water right than existed in 
1977, including the availability of water in a State of Wyoming storage account 
available for purchase and/or exchange . . . .

 
 
[¶42]   In short, the Board found that the 
single incident of a call on the river in 1977, especially given a major change 
in circumstances after that date, was not such evidence of risk as to render the 
2005 priority "undependable" as the subdivision's water supply.  The findings of an administrative agency 
are given considerable deference during judicial review, meaning that the court 
does not disturb those findings unless they are clearly contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence.  
Dale, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 11, 188 
P.3d at 558-59; EOG Res., Inc. v. Dep't 
of Revenue, 2004 WY 35, ¶ 12, 86 P.3d 1280, 1284 (Wyo. 2004).  In this instance, we cannot say that the 
Board's determination was contrary to the great weight of the evidence.  Apparently, there has been one call on 
the river in recorded history.  
After that, reservoir storage was enhanced to alleviate area water 
shortage in the event of a similar dry year.  The Board found that to be sufficient 
evidence of the dependability of the subdivision's water supply, and we will not 
second-guess the Board or substitute our judgment for that of the Board, where 
sufficient evidence exists in the record supporting that determination.  Speculation that another dry year in the 
future potentially could cause a shortage does not overcome the record 
evidence.

 
 
Did 
the Board's approval of the subdivision's open space plan violate county 
regulations?

 
 
[¶43]   The subdivision is located on land 
that was zoned GR-5, which zone is described as follows in Park County Zoning 
Resolution Section 2-405 F:

 
 

F.  General Rural 5-Acre 
(GR-5).  The GR-5 district allows 
moderate-intensity land uses.  
Conventional subdivisions will average 5 acres per housing unit.  A variety of uses is permitted in this 
district in recognition of the varied land uses typical of rural areas.  This 
district is also intended to promote the retention of open space, agricultural 
land, wildlife habitat, riparian habitat and scenic areas 
and 
prevent development on unstable geologic features.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  The subdivision was 
actually developed, however, under Zoning Resolution 2-615 E, under the concept 
of "lot grouping:"

 
 

E.  Lot Grouping Requirements:  Grouped 
lot subdivisions shall meet all of the following 
requirements:

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 

3.  A 
minimum of 50 percent of the acreage of the parent parcel shall be open space 
configured as a separate parcel owned and managed by a homeowners' association 
or other entity 
or as a contiguous area comprised of portions of individual building lots 
restricted against development by a conservation easement.  Such areas shall meet the open space 
requirements of the subdivision regulations and shall be indicated on the plat 
or record of survey. . . .

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)7  The Zoning Resolution contains the 
following pertinent definitions in Division 7-200:

 
 

Open 
Space:  An area of land that is essentially 
unimproved and is set aside or reserved for agricultural purposes or to be 
maintained in a natural state.

 
 

Parcel:  A contiguous area of land owned and 
recorded as the property of the same person or a single 
entity.

 
 
[¶44]   Northfork contends that the Board 
violated these regulations by approving the subdivision's final plat where the 
open space provided for therein was not a single contiguous parcel, was not 
entirely undeveloped, and did not fulfill Park County's policy that open space 
promote wildlife habitat and migration.  A review of the final plat reveals that, 
indeed, the open space in the subdivision consists of one very large tract north 
of the housing lots, three separate tracts of relatively significant size within 
the subdivision, but largely surrounded by houses, a "beltway" surrounding the 
entire subdivision, and several narrow corridors connecting these various 
tracts.  There appears to be no 
dispute that, taken together, these tracts cover approximately 53% of the entire 
subdivision.

 
 
[¶45]   The Board defends its approval of 
the subdivision's open space configuration with several arguments.  First, it describes the subdivision as 
an "innovative design," apparently intending to mean that the open space 
configuration best fits the underlying subdivision design while meeting the 
purposes of the Zoning Resolution, because it allows open space to "pervade" the 
development.  Next, the Board notes 
that the prohibition of exterior lot line fencing actually creates a much larger 
open space area than the specifically reserved 53%.  The Board then notes that Northfork has 
incorrectly defined "open space" as specifically contemplating wildlife habitat 
and migration; neither of those terms being included in the definition of the 
term.  The Board also points out the 
numerous connective corridors, and argues that any roadways crossing open space 
areas should be considered de 
minimis.  Finally, the Board 
argues that it should be given broad discretion in interpreting and applying its 
own rule, and that its approval of the open space design is not clearly 
erroneous or contrary to the rule.

 
 

[¶46]   We will affirm the district court 
and the Board as to the open space requirements for the following reasons.  First, the final plat clearly shows the 
provision of open space that meets the definition contained in the Zoning 
Resolution.  It is land "reserved 
for agricultural purposes or to be maintained in a natural state."  In reaching this conclusion, we note 
that the GR-5 zone requirements list separately 
"open 
space, agricultural land, wildlife habitat, riparian habitat and scenic 
areas."  The term "open space" is 
not, as is argued by Northfork, defined by the equivalent terms that follow it 
in that list.  Rather, open space is 
defined as cited above from a separate section of the Zoning Resolution, which 
definition includes only "agricultural purposes" and "natural state."  See supra ¶ 43.  The Lot Grouping requirements make no 
mention of wildlife at all.  And 
even if we construed "open space" to include "wildlife habitat," Northfork has 
not shown that wildlife will be any more inhibited in utilizing the open space 
within this subdivision as designed than it would be open space in a 
single-parcel configuration.  In 
making that statement, we do not consider the migration patterns of any 
particular species of wildlife, there being nothing in the record suggesting a 
concern within the Zoning Resolution in that regard, and there being nothing in 
the record showing the disruption of the migration patterns of any particular 
species.

 
 
[¶47]   Having reached these conclusions 
ourselves from reviewing the record, we cannot very well determine that the 
Board acted unreasonably or against the great weight of the evidence in 
concluding that this subdivision design meets the purposes of the Zoning 
Resolution's open space requirements.  
While we are not convinced that the numerous corridors make the separate 
tracts "contiguous," we are at the same time not convinced that the Board's 
acceptance of this "flaw" is so significant as to represent a violation of its 
own regulations.

 
 
[¶48]   Our standard for reviewing agency 
determinations is well established.  
We give deference to an agency's findings of fact and we do not reverse 
them unless they are contrary to the great weight of the evidence, or not 
supported by substantial evidence.  
Buehner Block Co. v. Wyo. Dep't of 
Revenue, 2006 WY 90, ¶ 10, 139 P.3d 1150, 1153 (Wyo. 2006).  On the other hand, we review de novo the interpretation and 
application of law.  Id.  This dichotomous approach applies to 
mixed questions of fact and law.  Antelope Valley Improvement & Serv. 
Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 992 P.2d 563, 566 (Wyo. 1999).  We consider the reasonableness of the 
agency's exercise of judgment, and we defer to the agency's interpretation of 
the language it normally implements, unless clearly erroneous.  Buehner Block, 2006 WY 90, ¶ 11, 139 P.3d  at 1153; Davis v. City of 
Cheyenne, 2004 WY 43, ¶ 6, 88 P.3d 481, 484 (Wyo. 2004); Bryant v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of 
Transp. 2002 WY 140, ¶ 9, 55 P.3d 4, 8 (Wyo. 2002); Swift, 2002 WY 32, ¶ 10, 40 P.3d  at 
1238.

 
 
[¶49]   In the instant case, the Board 
considered the requirements of the GR-5 zone, the Board considered the 
requirements of Lot Grouping, the Board considered the definition of "open 
space," and the Board concluded that the subdivision's open space configuration 
met the purposes of the Board's Zoning Resolution.  The facts really are not at issuethe 
final plat is in the record.  And we 
cannot say that the Board committed an error of law in determiningthrough the 
exercise of its judgmentthat the open space tracts retained under the ownership 
of Worthington substantially complied with the open space requirements of the 
Zoning Resolution.

 
 
Was 
Northfork unlawfully denied intervention in the contested case 
hearing?

 
 
[¶50]   A brief review of some 
administrative law concepts may be helpful as we begin this discussion.  The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act 
(the WAPA) is found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-3-101 through 16-3-115 (LexisNexis 
2009).  By definition, a board of 
county commissioners is an "agency" subject to the WAPA.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(i); 
Holding's Little America v. Bd. of County 
Comm'rs of Laramie County, 670 P.2d 699, 701-02 (Wyo. 1983).  Certain lengthy and specific 
requirements for contested case hearings under the WAPA are found at Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-3-107.  A "contested case" 
is defined as "a proceeding including but not restricted to ratemaking, price 
fixing and licensing, in which legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are 
required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing . 
. .[.]"  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-101(b)(ii).  In turn, a "party" 
is "each person or agency named or admitted as a party or properly seeking and 
entitled as of right to be admitted as a party[.]"  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-101(b)(vi).

 
 
[¶51]   Significantly, we have repeatedly 
interpreted these statutes to mean that a proceeding is only a contested case if 
it is a trial type hearing that is required by law.  In re Bd. of County Comm'rs, Sublette 
Co., 2001 WY 91, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d 107, 112 (Wyo. 2001).  The "trial type hearing" requirement 
does not come from the WAPA, itself, but from whatever underlying statute is at 
issue in the proceeding.  See, e.g., Foster's Inc. v. City of 
Laramie, 718 P.2d 868, 874-75 (Wyo. 1986); Diefenderfer v. Budd, 563 P.2d 1355, 
1359 (Wyo. 1977).  In other words, 
if no statute or other law requires the "legal right, duties or privileges of a 
party" to be determined at a trial type hearing, no contested case proceeding is 
required.

 
 
[¶52]   We raise this issue because, 
although all involved, at the time, treated the hearing that took place on July 
12, 2006 as a contested case hearing, we have not been made aware of any 
underlying statute or administrative regulation that required Worthington's 
"appeal" of the five conditions placed upon the final plat and subdivision 
permit to be conducted as a trial type hearing.  In its brief, Northfork cites Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 16-3-101 and 102 for the proposition that the WAPA "governs all 
contested case proceedings."  While 
that is true to the extent that all contested case hearings held pursuant to 
WAPA must conform to the requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107, it does not 
answer the question of whether a trial type hearing was required in this 
instance.  Northfork also cites to 
Rules for Contested Case Practice and 
Procedure Before the Park County Board of County Commissioners, Ch. 1, § 1, 
but those Rules appear nowhere in the record.

 
 
[¶53]   Belatedly, in a footnote in its 
appellate brief, the Board suggests that, "[d]espite having held one in this 
case, the Board does not believe that contested case hearings are applicable or 
necessary when a board of county commissioners reviews whether to grant or deny 
a discretionary land use permit."  This is, of course, an important 
question, because the contested case definitions and regulations of WAPA would 
not apply to a hearing that was not a contested case.  We do not intend, at this late juncture, 
to say whether or not the reconsideration of permit conditions by a board of 
county commissioners is or should be a contested case proceeding.  The hearing in this case was assumed by 
all to be a contested case hearing, was held as a contested case hearing, and 
has previously been judicially reviewed as if it were a contested case 
hearing.  For the purposes of these 
related appeals, it was a contested case hearing.

 
 
[¶54]   The next question is how the 
determination as to whether Northfork should have been allowed to participate in 
the hearing should have been made.  
In that regard, we previously have applied the requirements of W.R.C.P. 
24(a) governing "intervention of right" in a civil action to the issue of who is 
"entitled as of right to be admitted as a party" in a WAPA contested case.  Amoco Prod. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 
2004 WY 89, ¶¶ 14-16, 94 P.3d 430, 437 (Wyo. 2004).  Neither party suggests an alternative 
approach.  W.R.C.P. 24(a) provides 
as follows:

 
 
(a)    Intervention of right.  Upon timely 
application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an 
action:

 
 
(1)    When a statute confers an 
unconditional right to intervene; or

 
 
(2)    When the applicant claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the 
action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may 
as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that 
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing 
parties.

 
 
[¶55]   In the instant case, we are 
concerned with the three requirements of W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2):  one, that the applicant claims an 
interest in the subject of the action; two, that the applicant is so situated 
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede 
the applicant's ability to protect that interest; and three, that the 
applicant's interest is not adequately represented by an existing party.  We have already found in favor of 
Northfork in regard to the first two considerations.  See Northfork I, 2008 WY 88, ¶¶ 12-16, 
189 P.3d  at 264-65.  Upon remand, 
the district court found against Northfork on the third 
consideration:

 
 
The 
Court finds that [Northfork has] failed to satisfy the third requirement . . . 
.  The [Board] was appropriately a 
party to the contested case hearing since it was acting in its regulatory 
capacity during the subdivision review process and not in its adjudicatory 
capacity.  As such, the [Board] had 
an interest in determining the ability of the developer to plan and construct a 
subdivision within the parameters as set forth by the Park County subdivision 
regulations.

 
 
            
This Court can discern no reason why [Northfork's] interests are not 
completely aligned with the [Board's] interest with regard to the contested case 
proceeding.  [Northfork] failed to 
identify any particular claims they  
would intend to make if allowed to intervene which show [Northfork's] 
interests are different than the [Board's] or that the [Board] would not 
adequately represent those interests.

 
 
(Internal 
citations omitted.)8

 
 
[¶56]   Having reviewed this extensive 
record in great detail, we simply cannot agree with the district court's 
conclusion that the Board adequately represented Northfork's interests during 
the contested case proceedings.  In 
fact, the record reveals the Board's unyielding opposition to any participation 
by Northfork throughout the entire process.  The Board's attitude toward Northfork 
could more readily be described as adversarial than as representative.  As we recognized in Northfork I, Northfork had 
particularized and protectable interests in the development, which interests do 
not appear from the record to have been shared by, no less championed by, the 
Board.

 
 
Remaining 
Issues

 
 
[¶57]   The remaining enumerated 
issuesroad dedication, gated access, and multi-family dwellingsare all issues 
that were heard and decided at the contested case hearing.  Because we conclude that Northfork was 
wrongfully deprived of its right to intervene in that hearing, those remaining 
issues will be remanded as well.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶58]   The 
fact that Worthington constructed the subdivision during the pendency of this 
appeal did not render moot the issues raised by Northfork.  The Board did not violate state law or 
its own regulations in allowing county officials to waive the collection of 
certain information regarding the subdivision at early stages of the 
development, because the subdivision process provided that such information 
would be made available and evaluated prior to approval of the final plat and 
prior to granting of the subdivision permit.  Changes in the water supply source 
during the development process did not render the final plat inconsistent with 
the sketch plan, inasmuch as the sketch plan process clearly contemplated 
such changes.  The Board's 
conclusion that the subdivision's water supply was dependable was based upon 
substantial record evidence, with any potential conclusion to the contrary being 
mere speculation.  The Board did not 
err as a matter of law in determining the open space configuration within the 
subdivision to be adequate under the Board's Zoning Resolution.  The Board did err, however, in denying 
Northfork the right to participate in the contested case 
hearing.

 
 
[¶59]   The district court and the Board 
are reversed to the extent set forth above, and the case is remanded to the 
district court for further remand to the Board for further proceedings 
consistent herewith. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Over 
time, the legal identities of the developer and the contestants have changed 
somewhat, but those changes are not relevant to the issues involved herein.  Consequently, we will refer to the 
former as "Worthington" and the latter as "Northfork" throughout this 
opinion.

 
 

2The 
last two listed conditions were imposed to discourage the entry of bears into 
the subdivision.

 
 

3See 
W.R.C.P. 62 and 65.

 
 

4The 
rationale of DeVilbissthat a change 
in circumstances may render an existing controversy mootwas reaffirmed in Grange Insurance Association v. Hoehne, 
56 P.3d 111, 114 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

 
 

5Northfork 
cites Ahearn v. Town of Wheatland, 
2002 WY 12, ¶ 14, 39 P.3d 409, 415 (Wyo. 2002), and Schoeller v. Board of County Commissioners 
of the County of Park, 568 P.2d 869, 876-77 (Wyo. 1977) in support of this 
proposition.  Those cases actually 
hold that the zoning authority of counties and municipalities is limited to that 
derived from state statute, and county actions inconsistent with the statutes 
may mandate reversal.  Similarly, 
two cases cited by Northfork as holding that "[c]ounty planning regulations must 
be strictly construed and followed" do not involve county planning or zoning 
regulations.  See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 
2004 WY 89, ¶¶ 19-21, 94 P.3d 430, 439 (Wyo. 2004); and U.S. West Commc'ns, Inc. v. Wyo. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 988 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Wyo. 1999).

 
 

6As 
part of this argument, Northfork also relies upon two well-known precepts of 
statutory construction:  The same 
analysis is used to determine the meaning of administrative regulations as is 
used to determine the meaning of statutes.  
See State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of 
Revenue v. UPRR Co., 2003 WY 54, ¶ 12, 67 P.3d 1176, 1183 (Wyo. 2003).  Each word of a statute must be given 
meaning.  See In re MN, 2007 WY 189, ¶ 4, 171 P.3d 1077, 1080 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 

7Although 
the Board makes the point that individual lots within the subdivision are to 
remain unfenced, which, in effect, adds what amounts to additional "open space," 
there is no suggestion in the record that the open space in the subdivision is 
made up of portions of individual building lots.  Rather, the open space in this 
subdivision falls under that portion of the zoning resolution highlighted 
above.

 
 

8The 
district court correctly points out that, technically, there are four 
requirements under W.R.C.P. 24(a), the fourth being timeliness of the filing of 
the application for intervention.  
See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Colley, 871 P.2d 191, 194 (Wyo. 1994).  The question of timeliness has not been 
raised in this case.