Title: McDermott v. Reynolds

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
GLENN MCDERMOTT, M.D. 
 
v.  Record No. 992028   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
June 9, 2000 
WILLIAM REYNOLDS 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
Thomas S. Shadrick, Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether Code § 8.01-220 bars a 
plaintiff's action against his former wife's paramour for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, when the conduct 
alleged would support an action for alienation of affection, a 
cause of action specifically prohibited by the statute. 
 
Glenn R. McDermott filed a motion for judgment against 
William Reynolds for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress based on Reynolds' alleged conduct in maintaining an 
adulterous relationship with McDermott's wife.  Reynolds 
demurred to the motion for judgment, asserting that McDermott's 
action was "essentially one for alienation of affection" and, 
thus, was barred by Code § 8.01-220. 
 
After hearing oral argument, the trial court concluded that 
McDermott's action was "clearly a case of alienation of 
affection" that was barred by Code § 8.01-220.  The trial court 
entered final judgment sustaining the demurrer and dismissing 
the motion for judgment. 
 
On appeal, McDermott argues that his action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress is separate and distinct from 
an action for alienation of affection.  He contends that Code 
§ 8.01-220 does not prohibit his action simply because the 
conduct on which his action is based has "overtones" of 
alienation of affection.  McDermott also asserts that his 
damages arose from Reynolds' intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, not from Reynolds' alienation of the affection of 
McDermott's wife.  We disagree with McDermott's arguments. 
 
A demurrer will be sustained if the motion for judgment, 
considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, fails 
to state a valid cause of action.  W.S. Carnes, Inc. v. Board of 
Supervisors, 252 Va. 377, 384, 478 S.E.2d 295, 300 (1996); see 
Dray v. New Market Poultry Products, Inc., 258 Va. 187, 189-90, 
518 S.E.2d 312, 312-13 (1999); Mortarino v. Consultant Eng'g 
Serv., Inc., 251 Va. 289, 295, 467 S.E.2d 778, 782 (1996); 
Luckett v. Jennings, 246 Va. 303, 307, 435 S.E.2d 400, 402 
(1993).  In reviewing a trial court's judgment sustaining a 
demurrer, we will consider as true the facts alleged in the 
motion for judgment, the facts impliedly alleged therein, and 
the reasonable factual inferences that can be drawn from the 
facts alleged.  See Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 259 
Va. 125, 129, 523 S.E.2d 826, 829 (2000); Breeding v. Hensley, 
 
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258 Va. 207, 211-12, 519 S.E.2d 369, 371 (1999); Moore v. 
Maroney, 258 Va. 21, 23, 516 S.E.2d 9, 10 (1999). 
 
As alleged in the motion for judgment, in December 1994, 
McDermott received a telephone call from Reynolds' wife 
informing him that she had just followed Reynolds and Flordeliza 
McDermott to a motel.  McDermott had been married to Flordeliza 
for 18 years and they had three children.  McDermott confronted 
Reynolds about his relationship with Flordeliza and demanded 
that Reynolds cease the adulterous relationship.  Instead of 
ending the relationship, Reynolds "flaunted it outwardly." 
 
Reynolds' conduct caused severe embarrassment and 
humiliation to McDermott and his three children.  McDermott also 
alleged that by refusing his requests and continuing to "flaunt" 
the relationship, Reynolds acted maliciously and with the intent 
to cause McDermott severe emotional distress.  As a result of 
his emotional distress, McDermott experienced sleeplessness, 
loss of weight, and interference with the performance of his 
duties as a physician.  Further, Reynolds' conduct caused the 
"break up" of McDermott's family and required McDermott and his 
three children to seek counseling, resulting in financial losses 
to McDermott. 
 
We first recognized the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress in Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 
S.E.2d 145 (1974).  We held that a plaintiff may recover damages 
 
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for emotional distress resulting from a non-tactile tort if he 
alleges and proves by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) 
the wrongdoer's conduct is intentional or reckless; (2) the 
conduct is outrageous and intolerable; (3) the wrongful conduct 
and the emotional distress are causally connected; and (4) the 
resulting distress is severe.  215 Va. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 
148; accord Delk, 259 Va. at 136, 523 S.E.2d at 833; Jordan v. 
Shands, 255 Va. 492, 498-99, 500 S.E.2d 215, 218-19 (1998); 
Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23, 26, 400 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1991). 
 
The statute at issue in this appeal, Code § 8.01-220, 
provides: 
A.  Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the 
contrary, no civil action shall lie or be maintained 
in this Commonwealth for alienation of affection, 
breach of promise to marry, or criminal conversion 
upon which a cause of action arose or occurred on or 
after June 28, 1968. 
 
B.  No civil action for seduction shall lie or be 
maintained where the cause of action arose or accrued 
on or after July 1, 1974. 
 
 
The fact that Code § 8.01-220 does not contain a reference 
to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress does 
not affect our analysis, because that tort encompasses many 
types of conduct unrelated to the causes of action specified in 
the statute.  We conclude that when the General Assembly enacted 
Code § 8.01-220, it manifested its intent to abolish common law 
actions seeking damages for a particular type of conduct, 
 
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regardless of the name that a plaintiff assigns to that conduct.  
Therefore, in determining whether an action is barred by Code 
§ 8.01-220, we consider the conduct alleged in the plaintiff's 
motion for judgment. 
 
The essential basis of McDermott's claim is that the 
defendant had an adulterous relationship with McDermott's wife, 
which he continued in an open and notorious manner after being 
confronted by McDermott.  This alleged conduct is precisely the 
type of conduct that the General Assembly intended to exclude 
from civil liability when it enacted Code § 8.01-220.  Thus, the 
fact that McDermott labels his claim as intentional infliction 
of emotional distress and recites the elements of that tort in 
support of his action does not shield the action from the 
statutory bar.  We must consider the nature of the cause of 
action pleaded, not merely its form, in determining whether a 
plaintiff has stated a cause of action that will permit recovery 
of damages for the conduct alleged.  See Philip Morris Inc. v. 
Emerson, 235 Va. 380, 407, 368 S.E.2d 268, 282-83 (1988). 
 
We note that our conclusion is in accord with the decisions 
of a majority of jurisdictions that have considered claims for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress with reference to 
statutes substantially similar to Code § 8.01-220.  The 
rationale underlying these decisions of our sister states, like 
our decision here, is based on the legislative intent manifested 
 
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in these statutes to remove conduct of this nature from civil 
liability.  See, e.g., Speer v. Dealy, 495 N.W.2d 911, 914-15 
(Neb. 1993); Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242 (Ohio 
1988); Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla. 1991); Koestler 
v. Pollard, 471 N.W.2d 7, 9-10 (Wis. 1991). 
 
Our decision today reflects a disagreement with the 
analysis and result reached in Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335 
(4th Cir. 1985).  There, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit considered an action in which a divorced 
spouse alleged that his former wife intentionally inflicted 
emotional distress on him by attempting to destroy his 
relationship with his son.  The former wife sought dismissal of 
the action, contending that it essentially alleged that she 
caused an alienation of the child's affection for his father, 
and that such actions are barred by Code § 8.01-220.  Id. at 
338. 
 
The Court of Appeals held that the facts of the case 
independently supported a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, although the conduct alleged had "overtones 
of affection alienation."  756 F.2d at 339.  The Court stated 
that the two torts have different characteristics and require 
different proof, citing as an example the requirement for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress that the infliction 
be intentional and something more than a simple aggravation.  
 
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756 F.2d at 340.  Thus, the Court of Appeals focused its 
analysis on the elements of the two torts, rather than on the 
conduct asserted by the plaintiff. 
 
In contrast, we have based our analysis on a defendant's 
alleged conduct because that methodology allows us to consider 
the legislative intent manifested in Code § 8.01-220.  By using 
this analysis, we effectuate that intent and foreclose a revival 
of the abolished tort of alienation of affection asserted in the 
guise of an action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court's 
judgment. 
Affirmed.
 
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