Title: Theodore R. Steele v. State of Arkansas

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 05-237 NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION THEODORE R. STEELE Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered January 19, 2006 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SEBASTIAN COUNTY, CR 1998-939, HON. JAMES ROBERT MARSCHEWSKI, JUDGE AFFIRMED PER CURIAM Theordore R. Steele was charged by information with possession of drug paraphernalia and, on February 8, 1999, entered a negotiated plea of nolo contendere to the charge, receiving a suspended imposition of sentence for 60 months. On October 20, 2003, the State filed a petition to revoke the suspension, alleging the terms of the suspension had been violated in that certain payments had not been made and that the defendant, Mr. Steele, had committed drug-related offenses in Crawford County. A bench warrant was issued. Mr. Steele filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus or for a writ of mandamus, in which he requested the resolution of any warrants against him in Arkansas or any other state, and that any time or sentence be ordered to run concurrently with the sentence he was then serving in Oklahoma. The circuit court denied the petition by order entered December 21, 2004, and Mr. Steele, now represented by counsel, has lodged in this court his appeal of that order. Appellant Steele's counsel filed a brief asserting that any appeal of the denial of postconviction relief would be wholly without merit and asking that he be allowed to withdraw as counsel. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(j)(1) set requirements for the withdrawal of counsel for a defendant in a criminal case after a notice of appeal has been filed on the basis that an appeal is without merit. Under the rule, an attorney who wishes to withdraw from an appeal must abstract and brief all of the rulings that were adverse to his client. While a "no-merit" brief is typically filed in a direct appeal from a judgment, this court has allowed the filing of mo-merit briefs in postconviction appeals. See Hewitt v. State, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (May 12, 2005); Brady v. State, 346 Ark. 298, 57 S.W.3d 691 (2001). Based on our review of the issues presented, we conclude that the appeal is without merit, and accordingly, the circuit court's order is affirmed and we grant counsel's request to withdraw. Appellant's petition first sought relief through a writ of habeas corpus. Yet appellant's petition clearly alleges he was incarcerated in Oklahoma at the time the petition was filed. A circuit court does not have jurisdiction to release on a writ of habeas corpus a prisoner not in custody in that court's jurisdiction. Pardue v. State, 338 Ark. 606, 999 S.W.2d 198 (1999)(citing Mackey v. Lockhart, 307 Ark. 321, 819 S.W.2d 702 (1991)). In this case, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to release appellant as he was not in custody within the court's jurisdiction and the writ could not issue. As to mandamus relief, appellant's appeal is also without merit. The purpose of a writ of mandamus is to enforce an established right or to enforce the performance of a duty. Manila School Dist. No. 15 v. Wagner, 357 Ark.20, 159 S.W.3d 285 (2004). It is issued by this court only to compel an officer or judge to take some action. Arkansas Democrat-Gazette v. Zimmerman, 341 Ark. 771, 20 S.W.3d 301 (2000). Mandamus is an appropriate remedy when a public officer is called upon to do a plain and specific duty, which is required by law and which requires no exercise of discretion or official judgment. Axley v. Hardin, 353 Ark. 529, 110 S.W.3d 766 (2003). A writ of mandamus is appropriate if two factors are established: that the duty to be compelled is ministerial and not discretionary, and that the petitioner has shown a clear and certain right to the relief sought, and the absence of any other adequate remedy. Id. at 535-536, 110 S.W.3d at 770. This court will reverse a trial court's ruling on a petition for writ of mandamus only if there has been an abuse of discretion. Id. Here, the relief sought was resolution of the matter of any warrants and that any sentence run concurrently with appellant's sentence being served in Oklahoma. The circuit court did not have jurisdiction to resolve any warrants issued in Crawford County or otherwise outside of the judicial district. Circuit judges have authority to preside only over cases pending in the judicial district in which they serve. State v. Vaughn, 343 Ark. 293, 33 S.W.3d 512 (2000). While the circuit court did not include in its order that the warrant issued in Sebastian County was withdrawn, the State did indicate that it had dropped its detainer in a hearing on the petition, and the same indication is included in a notation on the court's docket. Although the petition was denied, it appears that appellant received the relief requested as to warrants within the court's jurisdiction. As for the issue of concurrent sentences, that relief is clearly not appropriate for a writ of mandamus. No action was taken on the petition to revoke. But, the duty appellant sought to compel, order of concurrent rather than consecutive sentences, is discretionary, not ministerial. The decision to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences lies solely within the province of the trial judge. Smith v. State, 354 Ark. 226, 118 S.W.3d 542 (2003). Because there was no merit to appellant's appeal, the order denying postconviction relief is affirmed and counsel is granted leave to withdraw. Affirmed.