Title: Wisconsin Ass’n of State Prosecutors v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 17 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP2224 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Wisconsin Association of State Prosecutors, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, James 
R. Scott and Rodney G. Pasch, 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
Service Employees International Union, Local 
150, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin, Office of State Employment 
Relations, 
          Intervenor-Appellant, 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, James 
R. Scott and Rodney G. Pasch, 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
Wisconsin Association of State Prosecutors, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
Service Employees International Union, Local 
150, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
Service Employees International Union, Local 
150, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
State of Wisconsin, Office of State Employment 
Relations, 
          Intervenor-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 372 Wis. 2d 347, 888 N.W.2d 237 
PDC No:  2016 WI App 85 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 28, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 5, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
John J. DiMotto 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
defendants-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Misha Tseytlin, solicitor general, with whom on 
the briefs were Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and Amy C. 
Miller, assistant solicitor general.  There was an oral argument 
by Luke Berg, deputy solicitor general. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents, there was a brief filed by 
Nathan D. Eisenberg, Erin F. Medeiros, and The Previant Law 
Firm, S.C., Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by Nathan D. 
Eisenberg. 
 
 
2018 WI 17
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP2224 
(L.C. Nos. 
2014CV9307, 2014CV9658, 2015CV328, 2015CV329, 2015CV501) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wisconsin Association of State Prosecutors, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 
James R. Scott and Rodney G. Pasch, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
Service Employees International Union, Local 
150, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin, Office of State Employment 
Relations, 
 
          Intervenor-Appellant, 
 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 
James R. Scott and Rodney G. Pasch, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 28, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
2 
 
Wisconsin Association of State Prosecutors, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
Service Employees International Union, Local 
150, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
Service Employees International Union, Local 
150, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
State of Wisconsin, Office of State Employment 
Relations, 
 
          Intervenor-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
3 
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, Wis. Ass'n of State 
Prosecutors v. Wis. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 2016 WI App 85, 372 
Wis. 2d 347, 888 N.W.2d 237, [hereinafter "WASP"], affirming the 
Milwaukee County circuit court's1 declaration that the Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Commission ("WERC") exceeded its authority 
under Wis. Stat. ch. 111 (2013-14)2 in promulgating Wis. Admin. 
Code chs. ERC 70 and 80, and the circuit court's subsequent 
order that WERC hold certification elections for the Wisconsin 
Association of State Prosecutors ("WASP") and the Service 
Employees International Union, Local 150 ("SEIU"). 
¶2 
The cause before us consists of five consolidated 
cases: two petitions for declaratory judgment and writ of 
prohibition under Wis. Stat. § 227.40 and three petitions for 
judicial review of an agency decision under Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 
and 227.53.  In their petitions for declaratory judgment, SEIU 
and WASP (collectively "the Unions") sought a declaration that 
Wis. Admin. Code chs. ERC 70 and 80 were invalid because the 
requirement that labor organizations file a petition for 
election as a condition precedent to holding a certification 
election irreconcilably conflicts with the statutory mandate 
that WERC hold annual certification elections; consequently, 
they sought writs of prohibition preventing WERC from enforcing 
                                                 
1 The Honorable John J. DiMotto presided. 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2013-
14 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
4 
 
those rules and refusing to conduct certification elections.  
The petitions for judicial review of an agency decision then 
sought orders overturning WERC's decisions to deny certification 
elections for the Unions on the basis that their petitions for 
election were not timely filed. 
¶3 
The circuit court declared Wis. Admin. Code chs. ERC 
70 and 80 invalid and issued orders overturning WERC's decisions 
not to hold certification elections for the Unions.  It reasoned 
that the use of "shall" in Wis. Stat. §§ 111.70(4)(d)3.b. and 
111.83(3)(b) imposes a mandatory duty to hold an annual 
certification election; that WERC had neither express nor 
implied power to impose a condition precedent to its statutorily 
mandated duty; and that such a requirement was unnecessary 
because an incumbent labor organization has "a real, de facto 
and legal interest in continued representation."  WERC appealed. 
¶4 
On appeal, WERC argued that the requirement was 
necessary because, without a petition, it could not otherwise 
know 
which 
labor 
organizations 
have 
an 
interest 
in 
representation, that is, which labor organizations should be 
included on the ballot.  The court of appeals rejected this 
argument and held that a current representative has a continuing 
interest in representation.  See WASP, 372 Wis. 2d 347, ¶21.  
The court of appeals then held that "shall" is mandatory in Wis. 
Stat. §§ 111.70(4)(d)3.b. and 111.83(3)(b), and that, therefore, 
making annual elections contingent on the filing of a petition 
for election is in direct conflict with the legislative mandate.  
Id., ¶¶19, 23.  WERC petitioned for review. 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
5 
 
¶5 
There are two issues on this appeal.  First, we 
consider whether WERC exceeded its statutory authority under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 111 when it promulgated Wis. Admin Code chs. ERC 
70 and 80.  We conclude that WERC did not exceed its authority 
because it has express authority under Wis. Stat. ch. 111 to 
promulgate rules that require a demonstration of interest from 
labor 
organizations 
interested 
in 
representing 
collective 
bargaining units; consequently, we reinstate WERC's orders 
dismissing the Unions' petitions for election as untimely. 
¶6 
Second, we consider the subsidiary issue of whether 
WERC may decertify a current representative labor organization 
on September 15 where there are no timely petitions for election 
filed.  We conclude that WERC may decertify a current 
representative labor organization on September 15, or at the 
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, whichever 
occurs later, where there are no timely petitions for election 
filed because the plain language of the statute requires WERC to 
conduct elections on or before December 1. 
¶7 
Thus, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and reinstate WERC's orders dismissing the Unions' petitions for 
election. 
 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶8 
This case arises from Act 103 amendments to two 
subchapters of the Wisconsin Statutes.  The first subchapter at 
                                                 
3 See 2011 Wis. Act 10. 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
6 
 
issue governs municipal employment relations and applies to 
SEIU.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 111.70-111.77 [hereinafter "MERA"].  
The second subchapter governs state employment labor relations 
and 
applies 
to 
WASP. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 111.81-111.94 
[hereinafter "SELRA"].  In particular, we are asked to interpret 
Wis. Stat. §§ 111.70(4)(d)3.b. and 111.83(3)(b) to determine 
whether WERC exceeded its authority under MERA or SELRA when it 
promulgated Wis. Admin. Code chs. ERC 70 and 80, respectively.  
Section 111.70(4)(d)3. states in relevant part as follows: 
b.  Annually, the commission shall conduct an 
election 
to 
certify 
the 
representative 
of 
the 
collective bargaining unit that contains a general 
municipal employee.  The election shall occur no later 
than December 1 for a collective bargaining unit 
containing school district employees and no later than 
May 1 for a collective bargaining unit containing 
general 
municipal 
employees 
who 
are 
not 
school 
district employees.  The commission shall certify any 
representative that receives at least 51 percent of 
the votes of all of the general municipal employees in 
the collective bargaining unit.  If no representative 
receives at least 51 percent of the votes of all of 
the general municipal employees in the collective 
bargaining unit, at the expiration of the collective 
bargaining agreement, the commission shall decertify 
the current representative and the general municipal 
employees shall be nonrepresented.  Notwithstanding 
sub. (2), if a representative is decertified under 
this subd. 
3.b., the affected general municipal 
employees may not be included in a substantially 
similar collective bargaining unit for 12 months from 
the date of decertification.  The commission shall 
assess and collect a certification fee for each 
election conducted under this subd. 3.b.  Fees 
collected under this subd. 3.b. shall be credited to 
the appropriation account under s. 20.425(1)(i). 
c.  Any 
ballot 
used 
in 
a 
representation 
proceeding under this subdivision shall include the 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
7 
 
names 
of 
all 
persons 
having 
an 
interest 
in 
representing or the results. 
§ 111.70(4)(d)3.b., c.  Section 111.83(3)(b) states as follows: 
Annually, 
no 
later 
than 
December 
1, 
the 
commission shall conduct an election to certify the 
representative of a collective bargaining unit that 
contains a general employee.  There shall be included 
on the ballot the names of all labor organizations 
having 
an 
interest 
in 
representing 
the 
general 
employees 
participating 
in 
the 
election. 
 
The 
commission may exclude from the ballot one who, at the 
time of the election, stands deprived of his or her 
rights under this subchapter by reason of a prior 
adjudication of his or her having engaged in an unfair 
labor practice.  The commission shall certify any 
representative that receives at least 51 percent of 
the votes of all of the general employees in the 
collective bargaining unit.  If no representative 
receives at least 51 percent of the votes of all of 
the general employees in the collective bargaining 
unit, at the expiration of the collective bargaining 
agreement, the commission shall decertify the current 
representative and the general employees shall be 
nonrepresented.  Notwithstanding s. 111.82, if a 
representative is decertified under this paragraph, 
the affected general employees may not be included in 
a substantially similar collective bargaining unit for 
12 months from the date of decertification.  The 
commission's certification of the results of any 
election is conclusive unless reviewed as provided by 
s. 111.07(8).  The commission shall assess and collect 
a certification fee for each election conducted under 
this paragraph.  Fees collected under this paragraph 
shall be credited to the appropriation account under 
s. 20.425(1)(i). 
§ 111.83(3)(b).4   
¶9 
Under these statutes, WERC is directed to "conduct an 
election[5] to certify the representative of a collective 
                                                 
4 For the purposes of our review, there are no significant 
differences in the language of the provisions.  See infra ¶41. 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
8 
 
bargaining 
unit." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 111.70(4)(d)3.b. 
and 
111.83(3)(b) (footnote added).  These statutory provisions 
address WERC's responsibilities in conducting the election, 
including 
its 
responsibility 
to 
certify 
and 
decertify 
a 
representative.6  The language of the statutes also requires WERC 
to include on the ballot "the names of all [labor organizations] 
having an interest" in representation.  §§ 111.70(4)(d)3.c. and 
111.83(3)(b).7  To this end, WERC is authorized to "adopt 
reasonable [] rules relative to the exercise of its powers and 
authority and proper rules to govern its proceedings and to 
regulate the conduct of all elections and hearings."  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 111.71(1), 111.94(1).  Under these enabling statutes, WERC 
promulgated rules to govern the election process, one of which 
requires that labor organizations interested in representing a 
bargaining unit file a "petition for election."  See Wis. Admin. 
Code §§ ERC 70.03 and 80.03. 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 "'Election' means a proceeding conducted by the commission 
in which the employees in a collective bargaining unit cast a 
secret ballot for collective bargaining representatives, or for 
any other purpose specified in this subchapter."  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 111.70(1)(e) and 111.81(6). 
6 "'Commission' means the employment relations commission."  
Wis. Stat. §§ 111.70(1)(c) and 111.81(3). 
7 We further note that Wis. Stat. § 111.83(3)(b) permits 
WERC to exclude from the ballot any labor organization that "at 
the time of the election, stands deprived of his or her 
rights . . . by reason of a prior adjudication of his or her 
having engaged in an unfair labor practice."  § 111.83(3)(b).  
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
9 
 
¶10 The petition for election at issue here8 is a two-page 
form that requires that a labor organization interested in 
representing a particular bargaining unit (1) provide the 
contact information of the employer; (2) describe the bargaining 
unit (i.e., the name and number of employees); (3) provide the 
termination date and status of the most recent collective 
bargaining agreement; (4) provide the contact information of 
anyone who may claim to currently represent the employees; (5) 
indicate whether the petitioner is the current representative; 
(6) indicate when the petitioner served a copy of the petition 
on the employer; (7) provide any additional relevant facts; and 
(8) provide the contact information for the petitioner.  See 
also Wis. Admin. Code §§ ERC 70.03(6) and 80.03(6).   
¶11 The petition also instructs the interested labor 
organization to submit the petition to WERC, along with the 
applicable certification fee, and notes that "[p]etition filing 
is 
not 
complete 
until 
[WERC] 
has 
received 
both 
the 
petition . . . and the required fee."  The form itself does not 
provide a deadline, but the rules do:  Wis. Admin. Code §§ ERC 
70.03(7)(a) and 80.03(7)(a) state that "[t]o be timely, a 
petition must be filed on or before September 15"; sections ERC 
70.03(2) and 80.03(2) state that "[a] petition is not filed 
unless 
it 
is 
accompanied 
by 
the 
applicable 
filing 
fee 
                                                 
8 The form has changed since 2014.  The current version is 
available 
at 
http://werc.wi.gov/doaroot/annual_certification_ 
election_information_sheet.pdf. 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
10 
 
established by sub. (4), contains the required signature or 
signature facsimile, and has been received by [WERC] at its 
Madison office during normal business hours specified in s. ERC 
10.06(1)"; and, Wis. Admin. Code § ERC 10.06(1) provides that 
"[WERC's] normal business hours at all work locations are 7:45 
AM to 4:30 PM, Monday through Friday, excluding legal holidays." 
¶12 The rules also prescribe the consequences of a failure 
to timely file: the existing representative labor organization 
is decertified either as of September 15 or, if there is a 
collective bargaining agreement in effect, at the expiration of 
that bargaining agreement; and the employees in the bargaining 
unit may not be included in a substantially similar collective 
bargaining unit for a minimum of one year.  See Wis. Admin. Code 
§§ ERC 70.03(7)(b) and 80.03(7)(b).  These rules mirror the 
consequences in the statute, which apply when a current 
representative labor organization does not receive at least 51 
percent of the votes in an election.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 111.70(4)(d)3.b. and 111.83(3)(b). 
¶13 As noted above, the cause before us consists of five 
consolidated cases.  These five cases deal with four petitions 
for election.  Three of the cases were filed by SEIU regarding 
three 
petitions 
for 
election; 
specifically, 
SEIU 
sought 
certification as the representative labor organization for 
Milwaukee Public Schools ("MPS") Building Service Helpers and 
Food Service Workers, and for St. Francis School District 
("SFSD") Custodians.  Two of the cases were filed by WASP 
regarding one petition for election; specifically, WASP sought 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
11 
 
certification as the representative labor organization for 
assistant district attorneys in the state of Wisconsin. 
 
A.  SEIU 
¶14 SEIU is a "labor organization."9  As of September 14, 
2014, SEIU was the exclusive certified bargaining unit for MPS 
Building Service Helpers and Food Service Workers.  As of 
September 14, 2014, SEIU was also the exclusive certified 
bargaining unit for SFSD Custodians.  MPS Building Service 
Helpers and Food Service Workers and SFSD Custodians are 
"general municipal employees"10; SEIU is, therefore, subject to 
MERA.  Additionally, as of September 15, 2014, the MPS Building 
Service Helpers and Food Service Workers and SFSD Custodians 
were school district employees,11 represented by an exclusive 
representative 
(SEIU), 
and 
not 
subject 
to 
a 
collective 
bargaining agreement; SEIU is, therefore, subject to Wis. Admin. 
Code ch. ERC 70.  Wis. Admin. Code § ERC 70.02. 
                                                 
9 "'Labor organization' means any employee organization in 
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in 
whole or in part, of engaging in collective bargaining with 
municipal 
employers 
concerning 
grievances, 
labor 
disputes, 
wages, 
hours 
or 
conditions 
of 
employment." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.70(1)(h). 
10 "'General municipal employee' means a municipal employee 
who is not a public safety employee or a transit employee," Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.70(1)(fm); 
"'Municipal 
employee' 
means 
any 
individual employed by a municipal employer other than an 
independent contractor, supervisor, or confidential, managerial 
or executive employee,"  § 111.70(1)(i).   
11 "'School district employee' means a municipal employee 
who is employed to perform services for a school district."  
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(ne). 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
12 
 
¶15 On September 15, 2014, SEIU filed petitions for 
election for all three bargaining units, but it did so after 
WERC's 4:30 p.m. close-of-business deadline, at 5:25 p.m. 
(Building Service Helpers), 5:27 p.m. (Food Service Workers), 
and 6:19 p.m. (Custodians).  SEIU's certification fees were 
submitted and received the following day, on September 16, 2014.  
On October 14, 2014, WERC voted 2—0 not to accept SEIU's 
petitions for election on the basis that they were not timely 
filed, and notified SEIU of its vote.   
¶16 On November 13, 2014, SEIU filed a petition for 
declaratory judgment and a petition for writ of prohibition 
(Case No. 14CV9658)12 pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.40 seeking a 
declaration that Wis. Admin. Code ch. ERC 70 was invalid because 
it exceeded WERC's statutory authority, and requesting a writ 
requiring WERC to conduct certification elections.  The petition 
also sought an order tolling the December 1 statutory deadline 
for holding certification elections until such elections could 
be held, and an order that WERC pay SEIU's attorney fees and 
costs. 
¶17 On 
November 
14, 
2014, 
WERC 
issued 
Commission's 
Decision No. 35447, Order Dismissing Petitions for Annual 
Certification Election (regarding MPS Building Service Helpers 
and Food Service Workers), and Commission's Decision No. 35446, 
                                                 
12 These petitions were filed against WERC as well as 
against James R. Scott and Rodney Pasch——the commissioners of 
WERC at the time——in their individual and official capacities. 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
13 
 
Order Dismissing Petition for Annual Certification Election 
(regarding SFSD Custodians).13  SEIU filed a petition with WERC 
for rehearing regarding these dismissals pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.49, but WERC denied rehearing.   
¶18 As of December 1, 2014, WERC had not conducted a 
certification election for MPS Building Service Helpers, MPS 
Food Service Workers, or SFSD Custodians because no union had 
expressed interest in representing them by the September 15 
deadline.  As a result, SEIU was treated as decertified by WERC, 
MPS, and SFSD as of September 15, 2014. 
¶19 On January 15, 2015, SEIU filed two petitions for 
judicial review (Case Nos. 15CV328 and 15CV329) pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53 seeking an order setting aside WERC's 
decisions 
to 
deny 
SEIU 
certification 
elections. 
 
SEIU's 
petitions also sought orders tolling the December 1 statutory 
                                                 
13 The parties briefly acknowledge that the Unions may have 
had a justiciability issue.  There are four prerequisites a 
party must satisfy to seek declaratory relief: (1) a justiciable 
controversy must exist; (2) the controversy must be between 
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the plaintiff must have 
a legally protectable interest in the controversy; and (4) the 
issue must be ripe for determination.  See Loy v. Bunderson, 107 
Wis. 2d 400, 410, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).  The justiciability 
issue here is with respect to the fourth prerequisite because 
the Unions filed their petitions before WERC issued its official 
decision and order.  For declaratory judgment and injunctive 
relief, however, the standard for ripeness is lower: harm may be 
anticipatory, if imminence and practical certainty of act or 
event exist.  See Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., Ltd., 
2002 WI 108, ¶¶43-46, 255 Wis. 2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626.  Given 
that WERC advised the Unions of its October 14 vote, this 
standard is met and the issue was justiciable. 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
14 
 
deadline 
for 
holding 
certification 
elections 
until 
such 
elections could be held, and that WERC pay SEIU's attorney fees 
and costs. 
 
B.  WASP 
¶20 WASP is a "labor organization."14 As of September 14, 
2014, WASP was the exclusive certified bargaining representative 
for all assistant district attorneys in Wisconsin.  Assistant 
district attorneys in Wisconsin are state "employees"15; WASP is, 
therefore, subject to SELRA.  Additionally, as of September 15, 
2014, the bargaining unit for state assistant district attorneys 
was a general state employee bargaining unit, as defined in Wis. 
Stat. § 111.825,16 represented by an exclusive representative; 
                                                 
14 "'Labor organization' means any employee organization 
whose purpose is to represent employees in collective bargaining 
with the employer, or its agents, on matters that are subject to 
collective bargaining under s. 111.91(1) or (3), whichever is 
applicable . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 111.81(12). 
15 "'Employee' 
includes: . . . [a]ssistant 
district 
attorneys, 
except 
supervisors, 
management 
employees 
and 
individuals who are privy to confidential matters affecting the 
employer-employee relationship."  Wis. Stat. § 111.81(7)(c). 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.825 states in relevant part as 
follows: 
 
(2)  Collective bargaining units for employees in 
the unclassified service of the state shall be 
structured with one collective bargaining unit for 
each of the following groups: . . .  
 
(d)  Assistant district attorneys. 
Wis. Stat. § 111.825(2)(d). 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
15 
 
WASP is, therefore, subject to Wis. Admin. Code ch. ERC 80.  
Wis. Admin. Code § ERC 80.02(1). 
¶21 On September 15, 2014, WASP filed a petition for 
election for certification for this bargaining unit, but it did 
so after WERC's 4:30 p.m. close-of-business deadline, at 5:46 
p.m.  WASP's certification fee was submitted and received the 
following day, on September 16, 2014.  On October 14, 2014, WERC 
voted 2—0 not to accept WASP's petition for election on the 
basis that it was not timely filed, and notified WASP of its 
vote.   
¶22 On November 11, 2014, WASP filed a petition for 
declaratory judgment and a petition for writ of prohibition 
(Case No. 14CV9307)17 pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.40 seeking a 
declaration that Wis. Admin. Code ch. ERC 80 was invalid because 
it exceeded WERC's statutory authority, and requesting a writ 
requiring WERC to conduct certification elections.  The petition 
also sought an order tolling the December 1 statutory deadline 
for holding certification elections until such elections could 
be held, and an order that WERC pay WASP's attorneys fees and 
costs. 
¶23 On 
November 
14, 
2014, 
WERC 
issued 
Commission's 
Decision No. 35445, Order Dismissing Petition for Annual 
Certification Election.18  WASP filed a petition with WERC for 
                                                 
17 These petitions were filed against WERC as well as 
against James R. Scott and Rodney Pasch——the commissioners of 
WERC at the time——in their individual and official capacities. 
18 See supra note 13. 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
16 
 
rehearing regarding this dismissal pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.49, but WERC denied rehearing.  
¶24 As of December 1, 2014, WERC had not conducted a 
certification election for the assistant district attorneys 
because no union had expressed interest in representing them by 
the September 15 deadline.  As a result, WASP was treated as 
decertified by WERC and the Office of State Employee Relations 
as of September 15, 2014. 
¶25 On January 15, 2015, WASP filed a petition for 
judicial review (Case No. 15CV501) pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 227.52 and 227.53 seeking an order setting aside WERC's 
decision to deny WASP a certification election.19  WASP's 
petition also sought an order tolling the December 1 statutory 
deadline 
for 
holding 
certification 
elections 
until 
such 
elections could be held, and an order that WERC pay WASP's 
attorney fees and costs. 
 
C.  Consolidation and Appeal 
¶26 On 
February 
25, 
2015, 
these 
five 
cases 
were 
consolidated.  Shortly thereafter, the parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment.  The Unions argued that Wis. 
Admin. Code chs. ERC 70 and 80 were invalid because they 
                                                 
19 The State of Wisconsin and the Office of State Employee 
Relations, by and through the Wisconsin Department of Justice, 
filed a notice of appearance as of right under Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.53(1)(d), requesting that they be permitted to participate 
as a party or interested person.  It does not appear from the 
record that that request was ever granted. 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
17 
 
irreconcilably conflict with the statutory mandate.  First, the 
use 
of 
"shall" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 111.70(4)(d)3.b. 
and 
111.83(3)(b) mandates annual certification elections; therefore, 
WERC cannot make certification elections contingent on the 
filing of a petition for election because it would contravene 
the statutory mandate.  Second, the legislature does require 
elsewhere that unions file petitions of interest under certain 
circumstances; therefore, the absence of a statutory requirement 
for such a petition here means that the legislature did not 
intend for there to be any requirement.  The Unions also argued 
that immediate decertification on September 15 contravenes the 
statute because it results in a certification period of less 
than one year. 
¶27 WERC argued that its rules were reasonable given the 
requirements of the statute and the realities of conducting 
elections.  First, "shall" can and should be construed in this 
context as directory, particularly in light of the fact that it 
would be absurd to compel an election where there are no names 
on the ballot.  In this regard, requiring a petition for 
election is reasonable given the statutory requirement that the 
ballot contain the names of labor organizations having an 
interest and the fact that there is no presumption of interest 
for incumbents.  Second, it is reasonable to require that the 
petition 
be 
filed 
by 
September 
15 
given 
the 
logistical 
difficulties of conducting elections on or before December 1.  
WERC also argued that decertifying the incumbent union on 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
18 
 
September 15 was at least equally as reasonable as decertifying 
on December 1.  
¶28 On July 31, 2015, the circuit court issued its 
decision and order.  It declared invalid "those provisions in 
[Wis. Admin. Code chs.] ERC 70 and 80 requiring an existing 
exclusive representative to file a [petition for election] in 
order to qualify for a recertification election."  Consequently, 
it reversed WERC's decisions denying the Unions certification 
elections; issued a writ of prohibition restraining WERC from 
enforcing invalid provisions; and ordered that WERC conduct 
certification 
elections 
for 
the 
Unions, 
to 
be 
held 
simultaneously with the December 1, 2015 elections.  The circuit 
court 
also 
ordered 
that, 
if 
the 
Unions 
win, 
their 
representational status shall be treated as uninterrupted.20  
Specifically, the circuit court found that "shall" is used 
mandatorily in Wis. Stat. §§ 111.70(4)(d)3.b. and 111.83(3)(b); 
that WERC had neither express nor implied power to impose a 
condition precedent to its statutorily mandated duty; and that 
such a requirement was unnecessary because an incumbent labor 
organization has "a real, de facto and legal interest in 
continued representation." 
¶29 WERC appealed.  On October 12, 2016, the court of 
appeals affirmed.  See WASP, 372 Wis. 2d 347.  The court of 
appeals 
held 
that 
"shall" 
is 
mandatory 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                                                 
20 The circuit court's order did not address the Unions' 
request for attorney fees and costs. 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
19 
 
§§ 111.70(4)(d)3.b. 
and 
111.83(3)(b), 
and 
that, 
therefore, 
making annual elections contingent on the filing of a petition 
for election is in direct conflict with the legislative mandate.  
Id., ¶¶19, 23.  It further held that a current representative 
labor organization has a continuing interest in representation, 
countering WERC's claim that, without a petition, WERC could not 
otherwise know which labor organizations have an interest in 
representation, that is, which labor organizations should be 
included on the ballot.  Id., ¶21.  
¶30 WERC petitioned for review.  On February 13, 2017, we 
granted the petition and now reverse. 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶31 "'Resolving an alleged conflict between a statute and 
an interpretive rule requires statutory interpretation,' which 
is a question of law that we review de novo . . . ."  Mallo v. 
DOR, 2002 WI 70, ¶14, 253 Wis. 2d 391, 645 N.W.2d 853 (quoting 
Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶26, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 
N.W.2d 659); see also Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves 
v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶6, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612 ("The 
nature and scope of an agency's powers are issues of statutory 
interpretation."). 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶32 There are two issues on this appeal.  First, we 
consider whether WERC exceeded its statutory authority under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 111 when it promulgated Wis. Admin Code chs. ERC 
70 and 80.  We conclude that WERC did not exceed its authority 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
20 
 
because it has express authority under Wis. Stat. ch. 111 to 
promulgate rules that require a demonstration of interest from 
labor 
organizations 
interested 
in 
representing 
collective 
bargaining units; consequently, we reinstate WERC's orders 
dismissing the Unions' petitions for election as untimely. 
¶33 Second, we consider the subsidiary issue of whether 
WERC may decertify a current representative labor organization 
on September 15 where there are no timely petitions for election 
filed.  We conclude 
that WERC may decertify a current 
representative labor organization on September 15, or at the 
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, whichever 
occurs later, where there are no timely petitions for election 
filed because the plain language of the statute requires WERC to 
conduct elections on or before December 1. 
 
A.  Whether WERC Exceeded Its Statutory Authority 
¶34 We consider first whether WERC exceeded its statutory 
authority under Wis. Stat. ch. 111 when it promulgated Wis. 
Admin. Code chs. ERC 70 and 80.  In short, WERC argued that 
these rules are lawful because they were promulgated pursuant to 
WERC's broad authority under Wis. Stat. §§ 111.71(1) and 
111.94(1) 
to 
create 
reasonable 
and 
proper 
rules 
for 
administering elections, and because the rules are consistent 
with the statutory text and legislative intent.  In short, the 
Unions argued that the statutes mandate that WERC hold an annual 
certification election, and that, therefore, WERC cannot make 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
21 
 
holding that annual election contingent on the filing of a 
petition for election. 
¶35 We conclude that WERC did not exceed its statutory 
authority because it has express authority under Wis. Stat. 
ch. 111 to promulgate rules that require a demonstration of 
interest from labor organizations interested in representing 
collective bargaining units; consequently, we reinstate WERC's 
orders 
dismissing 
the 
Unions' 
petitions 
for 
election 
as 
untimely. 
 
1.  General principles 
¶36 "[T]he court shall declare [a] rule invalid if it 
finds that it violates constitutional provisions or exceeds the 
statutory authority of the agency or was promulgated without 
compliance with statutory rule-making procedures."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.40(4)(a); see also Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2) ("No agency may 
promulgate a rule which conflicts with state law."); Cranes & 
Doves, 270 Wis. 2d 318, ¶14 ("[I]f an administrative rule 
conflicts with an unambiguous statute or a clear expression of 
legislative intent, the rule is invalid.").   
¶37 Here, the Unions have challenged Wis. Admin. Code 
chs. ERC 70 and 80 as exceeding WERC's statutory authority.  "In 
determining whether an administrative agency exceeded the scope 
of its authority in promulgating a rule, we must examine the 
enabling statute to ascertain whether the statute grants express 
or implied authorization for the rule."  Cranes & Doves, 270 
Wis. 2d 318, ¶14.  In this regard, "an agency's enabling statute 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
22 
 
is to be strictly construed" because "agencies have 'only those 
powers which are expressly conferred or which are necessarily 
implied by the statutes under which it operates.'"  Id. (quoting 
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. PSC, 110 Wis. 2d 455, 461-62, 329 
N.W.2d 143 (1983)).   
¶38 "Rule-making authority is expressly conferred on an 
agency [to] promulgate rules interpreting the provisions of any 
statute enforced or administered by the agency, if the agency 
considers it necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
statute . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a); see also Wis. Hosp. 
Ass'n v. Nat. Res. Bd., 156 Wis. 2d 688, 705-06, 457 N.W.2d 879 
(Ct. App. 1990) ("To expressly authorize a rule, the enabling 
statute need not spell out every detail of the rule.  If it did, 
no rule would be necessary.  Accordingly, whether the exact 
words used in an administrative rule appear in the statute is 
not the question.").   
¶39 This principle has been characterized in the case law 
as the "elemental approach."  
See Cranes & Doves, 270 
Wis. 2d 318, ¶14 (citing Wis. Hosp. Ass'n, 156 Wis. 2d at 
705-06) ("Wisconsin has adopted the 'elemental' approach to 
determining the validity of an administrative rule, comparing 
the elements of the rule to the elements of the enabling 
statute, such that the statute need not supply every detail of 
the rule.")  Under the elemental approach, "the reviewing court 
should identify the elements of the enabling statute and match 
the rule against those elements.  If the rule matches the 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
23 
 
statutory elements, then the statute expressly authorizes the 
rule."  Wis. Hosp. Ass'n, 156 Wis. 2d at 706. 
 
2.  WERC did not exceed its statutory authority  
in promulgating Wis. Admin. Code chs. ERC 70 and 80. 
¶40 The first statute at issue is MERA, see Wis. Stat. 
§§ 111.70-111.77, which applies to SEIU.  The second statute at 
issue is SELRA, see Wis. Stat. §§ 111.81-111.94, which applies 
to WASP.  The question is whether WERC exceeded its authority 
under MERA or SELRA when it promulgated Wis. Admin. Code 
chs. ERC 70 and 80, respectively.  Specifically, the Unions 
challenge 
the 
requirement 
that 
any 
labor 
organizations 
interested in representing collective bargaining units timely 
submit a completed petition for election.  See Wis. Admin. Code 
§§ ERC 70.03 and 80.03. 
¶41 The statutes mandate that WERC do five things:  
 
1. 
Conduct 
an 
annual 
election 
to 
certify 
the 
representative of a collective bargaining unit that 
contains an employee no later than December 1; 
2. 
Include 
on 
the 
ballot 
the 
names 
of 
all 
labor 
organizations having an interest in representing the 
employees participating in the election; 
3. 
Certify any representative that receives at least 51 
percent of the votes of all the employees in the 
collective bargaining unit; 
4. 
Decertify 
the 
current 
representative 
if 
no 
representative receives at least 51 percent of the 
votes 
of 
all 
the 
employees 
in 
the 
collective 
bargaining unit; and 
5. 
Assess and collect a certification fee for each 
election conducted. 
See Wis. Stat. §§ 111.70(4)(d)3.b., c. and 111.83(3)(b). 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
24 
 
¶42 A mandate is a command, and "'[c]ommand includes 
permission.  To mean to command any act to be done, and not to 
mean to permit it to be done, is impossible.'"  See Antonin 
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts 193-94 (2012) (quoting Jeremy Bentham, "Nomography," 
in 3 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 231, 262 (John Bowring ed., 
1843)).  Therefore, the statutory mandates are also statutory 
authorizations, and "[a]uthorization of an act also authorizes a 
necessary predicate act."  Id. at 192 (explaining the Predicate-
Act Canon); see also Estate of Miller v. Storey, 2017 WI 99, ¶52 
n.21, 378 Wis. 2d 358, 903 N.W.2d 759.  Therefore, WERC is 
expressly authorized under the statute to execute any predicate 
acts which are necessary to carrying out its mandated duties.   
¶43 One of WERC's mandated duties is to include on the 
ballot only those labor organizations having an interest in 
representation.  In order to include on the ballot only those 
labor organizations "having an interest," WERC must necessarily 
determine which labor organizations have such an interest.21  
Thus, it is expressly authorized to do so; that is, it is within 
WERC's express statutory authority to determine which labor 
organizations have an interest in being on a certification 
election ballot. 
                                                 
21 We briefly note here that there is no statutory 
indication that past representation triggers a presumption of 
interest in future representation.  As will be discussed below, 
the legislature knows full well how to indicate when such a 
presumption applies.  See infra ¶45. 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
25 
 
¶44 WERC is also expressly authorized to "adopt reasonable 
[] rules relative to the exercise of its powers and authority 
and proper rules to govern its proceedings and to regulate the 
conduct of all elections and hearings."  Wis. Stat. §§ 111.71(1) 
and 111.94(1).  "When an administrative agency promulgates 
regulations pursuant to a power delegated by the legislature, we 
construe those regulations together with the statute to make, if 
possible, an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with 
common sense and sound reason."  DOR v. Menasha Corp., 2008 WI 
88, ¶45, 311 Wis. 2d 579, 754 N.W.2d 95.  Here, the requirement 
that labor organizations file a brief form indicating their 
interest in representing the employees is a reasonable means by 
which to determine which unions have that interest because it 
effectuates the statute and is "in harmony with common sense and 
sound reason."22  Id.   
¶45 In this regard, we reject the argument that the rules 
were not necessary because a current representative has a 
continuing interest in representing the bargaining unit.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a) ("[A] rule is not valid if the rule 
exceeds 
the 
bounds 
of 
correct 
interpretation."). 
 
This 
conclusion is actually an assumption, but it has no basis in the 
text of Wis. Stat. § 111.83(3)(b) and is refuted by the context 
of surrounding provisions, specifically § 111.83(3)(a).  See 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 
                                                 
22 See infra note 31. 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
26 
 
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 
("[S]tatutory language is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding 
or 
closely-related 
statutes."). 
 
Section 
111.83(3)(a), which addresses the situation where questions 
regarding representation arise at times other than certification 
elections, states in relevant part as follows: 
Whenever 
a 
question 
arises 
concerning 
the 
representation of employees in a collective bargaining 
unit . . . [t]here shall be included on any ballot for 
the election of representatives the names of all labor 
organizations having an interest in representing the 
employees participating in the election as indicated 
in petitions filed with the commission.  The name of 
any existing representative shall be included on the 
ballot without the necessity of filing a petition. 
(Emphasis added.)  Although not applicable to the facts here,23 
this provision demonstrates that the legislature is fully 
capable of specifying where an assumption of continuing interest 
applies; thus, we should not read in that assumption where it is 
not specified.  See Scalia & Garner, supra ¶42 at 93 ("Nothing 
is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies 
(casus omissus pro omisso habendus est).  That is, a matter not 
covered is to be treated as not covered."); see also Heritage 
                                                 
23 Similarly, other provisions of Wis. ch. 111 that mention 
"petitions" are not relevant to the facts here: Wis. Stat. 
§§ 111.70(3)(a)4., 
111.70(4)(d)5., 
111.825(4) 
and 
(5), 
and 
111.84(1)(d).  These provisions address either a situation where 
there is no current representative or a situation where an 
employer is challenging a current representative's status. 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
27 
 
Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶14, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 
762 N.W.2d 652; id., ¶14 n.9.24 
¶46 We 
also 
reject 
the 
argument 
that 
there 
is 
an 
irreconcilable conflict between the enabling statute and the 
rule.  See Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2) ("No agency may promulgate a 
rule which conflicts with state law.").  This conclusion rests 
on the premise that the statute mandates an annual certification 
election 
without 
regard 
to 
whether 
there 
is 
any 
labor 
organization to elect.  Taken to its logical end, however, this 
premise would compel the absurd result that WERC is required to 
conduct an election where there is nothing and no one for whom 
to vote.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("[S]tatutory language 
is interpreted . . . to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.").  
Not only is it factually absurd to conduct an election where 
there are no participants, but the statutory definition of 
"election" 
presumes 
that 
there 
is 
at 
least 
one 
labor 
organization on the ballot for which employees can vote, see 
supra note 5, and neither MERA nor SELRA provide guidance for a 
write-in election.  Moreover, the statutes do not provide any 
procedure for how a current representative would remove itself 
                                                 
24 We note further that there is no textual basis to treat 
incumbents and non-incumbents differently under Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.83(3)(b), and that doing so may raise an equal protection 
problem.  Thus, this interpretation should be avoided.  See 
Blake v. Jossart, 2016 WI 57, ¶27, 370 Wis. 2d 1, 884 
N.W.2d 484; Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 247 (2012) ("A statute should be 
interpreted in a way that avoids placing its constitutionality 
in doubt."). 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
28 
 
from the ballot if it no longer wished to represent the 
employees; thus, if we were to read in a presumption of 
continuing interest, it is unclear how that presumption could be 
defeated where a current representative wants to disclaim 
interest. 
¶47 In sum, we conclude that WERC did not exceed its 
statutory authorization when it promulgated Wis. Admin. Code 
chs. ERC 70 and 80 because its power to require a petition for 
election 
as 
a 
demonstration 
of 
interest 
is 
necessarily 
authorized by the statutory mandate that the ballot "shall" 
include only the names of labor organizations "having an 
interest" in representation. 
 
3.  Consequently, WERC's orders dismissing the Unions'  
petitions for certification elections are reinstated. 
¶48 Below, because it concluded that the rules requiring a 
petition for election were invalid, the circuit court ordered 
that 
WERC's 
decisions 
and 
orders 
dismissing 
the 
Unions' 
petitions for certification be reversed.  The court of appeals 
affirmed.  See WASP, 372 Wis. 2d 347, ¶25.  Here, because we 
hold that the rules requiring a petition for election are valid, 
we reverse the court of appeals and consequently order that 
WERC's decisions and orders dismissing the Unions' petitions for 
election be reinstated. 
 
B.  Whether WERC May Decertify On September 15 
¶49 We consider second the subsidiary issue of whether 
WERC may decertify a current representative labor organization 
on September 15 where there are no timely petitions for election 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
29 
 
filed.25  In short, WERC argues that, because its rules requiring 
a petition for election are valid, it follows that WERC may 
decertify a current representative labor organization at the 
deadline for filing because that incumbent is treated as if it 
had failed to obtain the required 51 percent of the vote.  In 
short, the Unions argue that the statutes permit decertification 
only where there has been an annual certification vote. 
¶50 We 
conclude 
that 
WERC 
may 
decertify 
a 
current 
representative labor organization on September 15, or at the 
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, whichever 
occurs later, where there are no timely petitions for election 
filed because the plain language of the statute requires WERC to 
conduct elections on or before December 1. 
¶51 "[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language 
of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  The 
statutes state in relevant part as follows:  
If no representative receives at least 51 percent of 
the votes of all of the [employees] in the collective 
bargaining unit, at the expiration of the collective 
                                                 
25 Below, because it concluded that the rules requiring a 
petition for election were invalid, the circuit court did not 
reach 
the 
issue 
of 
when 
WERC 
may 
decertify 
a 
current 
representative labor organization if no petitions for election——
or only untimely petitions for election——are filed.  The court 
of appeals also declined to reach this issue.  See WASP, 2016 WI 
App 85, ¶24, 372 Wis. 2d 347, 888 N.W.2d 237.  We note, however, 
that the parties argued this issue in their briefing here, and 
in the circuit court and court of appeals below; thus, this 
issue was not forfeited. 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
30 
 
bargaining agreement, the commission shall decertify 
the current representative and the [employees] shall 
be nonrepresented. 
Wis. Stat. §§ 111.70(4)(d)3.b. and 111.83(3)(b).  Each statute 
also requires that WERC conduct the certification election "no 
later than December 1."26  Id.   
¶52 The phrase "no later than December 1" is inclusive of 
dates on or before December 1.  See Bryan A. Garner, Legal Usage 
606 (3rd ed. 2011) ("no later than (= on or before)"); see also 
Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1) ("All words and phrases shall be 
construed according to common and approved usage . . . ."); 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 ("Statutory language is given its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning . . . ."); Scalia & 
Garner, supra ¶42 at 69 ("Words are to be understood in their 
ordinary, everyday meanings——unless the context indicates that 
they bear a technical sense.").  Therefore, the statute 
authorizes27 WERC to hold elections at any time on or before 
December 1; and in fact, WERC did hold certification elections 
for different labor organizations between November 1—21 in the 
fall of 2014.  Where a certification election is held prior to 
December 1, it is possible that the results of that election 
will become available prior to December 1; when the results of 
                                                 
26 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.70(4)(d)3.b. actually provides two 
election dates: December 1 for school district employees and 
May 1 for general municipal employees who are not school 
district employees.  As noted above, see supra ¶14 note 11, the 
employees 
SEIU 
sought 
to 
represent 
are 
school 
district 
employees; thus, the December 1 date applies. 
27 See supra ¶42. 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
31 
 
the 
election 
become 
available, 
WERC 
"shall 
certify 
any 
representative that receives at least 51 percent of the votes" 
and, "[i]f no representative receives at least 51 percent of the 
votes . . . shall decertify the current representative and the 
[employees] 
shall 
be 
nonrepresented." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 111.70(4)(d)3.b., 111.83(3)(b).  Therefore, decertification 
before December 1 is consistent with the plain meaning of the 
statutory language, so long as WERC has established that the 
representative will not receive the requisite number of votes 
and there is no collective bargaining agreement in place that 
would otherwise dictate when decertification occurs. 
¶53 In this regard, failure to timely file and failure to 
be elected are logically and legally equivalent: where no 
petition for election demonstrating interest in representing a 
particular collective bargaining unit is timely filed, there are 
no labor organizations to put on the ballot;28 where there are no 
labor organizations to put on the ballot, there is no need to 
conduct 
a 
certification 
election;29 
where 
there 
is 
no 
certification 
election, 
the 
current 
representative 
labor 
organization will receive zero votes;30 and zero votes is less 
                                                 
28 See supra ¶¶40-47. 
29 See supra ¶46. 
30 To hold that, where there is no certification election, a 
current 
representative 
labor 
organization 
could 
avoid 
decertification would be an atextual and absurd result because, 
then, a labor organization could avoid decertification by not 
filing a petition for election (assuming, of course, that no 
other labor organization files one either). 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
32 
 
than "at least 51 percent of the votes of all of the [employees] 
in the collective bargaining unit."  Therefore, a current 
representative labor organization's failure to timely file is 
logically 
equivalent 
to 
an 
election 
in 
which 
a 
current 
representative labor organization does not receive at least 51 
percent of the votes of all employees in the collective 
bargaining unit, and we can identify no statutory or other legal 
basis on which they should be distinguished.   
¶54 Thus, WERC may decertify a current representative 
labor organization on September 15, or at the expiration of the 
collective bargaining agreement, whichever occurs later, when no 
timely petition for election is filed because September 15 is 
within the inclusive range of dates on which WERC may conduct 
elections 
and 
subsequently 
certify 
or 
decertify 
labor 
organizations, and decertification by failure to be elected and 
decertification by failure to timely file a petition for 
election are not logically or legally distinguishable.31  
                                                 
31 The reasonableness of September 15 as a deadline for 
petitions for election was not raised as an issue here, but we 
would note that September 15 seems a reasonable date on which to 
set 
the 
deadline 
for 
petitions 
for 
election, 
given 
the 
logistical requirements of conducting an election: where a 
petition for election is timely filed and an election is then to 
be conducted, WERC must (1) obtain and coordinate information 
from the employer and the interested labor organization to 
determine which employees are eligible to vote; (2) set a date 
for the election and determine how best to conduct the election, 
with time enough to notify employees of when and how they should 
vote; and (3) conduct the election.  And it must do all of those 
things for hundreds of labor organizations, representing tens of 
thousands of employees; for example, in the fall of 2014, WERC 
conducted 
305 
certification 
elections, 
involving 
54,662 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
33 
 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶55 There are two issues on this appeal.  First, we 
consider whether WERC exceeded its statutory authority under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 111 when it promulgated Wis. Admin Code chs. ERC 
70 and 80.  We conclude that WERC did not exceed its authority 
because it has express authority under Wis. Stat. ch. 111 to 
promulgate rules that require a demonstration of interest from 
labor 
organizations 
interested 
in 
representing 
collective 
bargaining units; consequently, we reinstate WERC's orders 
dismissing the Unions' petitions for election as untimely. 
¶56 Second, we consider the subsidiary issue of whether 
WERC may decertify a current representative labor organization 
on September 15 where there are no timely petitions for election 
filed.  We conclude that WERC may decertify a current 
representative labor organization on September 15, or at the 
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, whichever 
occurs later, where there are no timely petitions for election 
filed because the plain language of the statute requires WERC to 
conduct elections on or before December 1. 
¶57 Thus, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and reinstate WERC's orders dismissing the Unions' petitions for 
election. 
                                                                                                                                                             
employees.  Given that these responsibilities must be fulfilled 
such that all elections are completed on or before December 1, 
September 15 would seem a reasonable deadline for petitions for 
election. 
No. 
2015AP2224   
 
34 
 
 
 
By the Court.-The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No. 
2015AP2224.awb 
 
1 
 
¶58 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  This case 
represents 
yet 
another 
decision 
of 
this 
court 
that 
disenfranchises voters.1 
¶59 Although the texts of the applicable statutes mandate 
that annual recertification elections be held so that union 
members can vote for a representative, the majority concludes to 
the contrary.  It instead embraces conflicting administrative 
code provisions that allow the Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Commission (WERC) to cancel elections. 
¶60 To justify this conclusion the majority engages in 
analytical gymnastics, contorting its discussion to:  (1) dodge 
the main issue in the case, relegating its analysis of the 
dispositive question to a single conclusory paragraph; (2) 
implicitly determine that "shall" does not mean "shall"; and (3) 
rewrite the statute by including a requirement that does not 
exist in the text and which defeats the statute's purpose. 
¶61 Because I conclude, as did the circuit court and a 
unanimous court of appeals, that "shall" in fact does mean 
"shall" and that the statutes and administrative code provisions 
are in irreconcilable conflict, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶62 Taking its cue from WERC, the majority leads the 
reader astray by focusing its analysis on WERC's authority to 
                                                 
1 See League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. 
Walker, 2014 WI 97, 357 Wis. 2d 360, 851 N.W.2d 302; Milwaukee 
Branch of NAACP v. Walker, 2014 WI 98, 357 Wis. 2d 469, 851 
N.W.2d 262. 
No. 
2015AP2224.awb 
 
2 
 
regulate recertification elections pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. 
§§ 111.71(1) 
and 
111.94(1). 
 
See 
majority 
op., 
¶¶34-45.  
Consequently, the issue as presented and decided by both the 
circuit court and court of appeals is obscured. 
¶63 As the court of appeals aptly stated:  "The Commission 
spends 
a 
considerable 
amount 
of 
time 
discussing 
its 
legislatively delegated authority to promulgate reasonable rules 
related to the annual election statutes . . . [T]his is not the 
issue on appeal."  Wis. Ass'n of State Prosecutors v. Wis. Emp't 
Relations Comm'n, 2016 WI App 85, ¶22, 372 Wis. 2d 347, 888 
N.W.2d 237.  Yet the majority continues down this path, spending 
the bulk of its analysis on an ancillary issue. 
¶64 Contrary to the majority's framing of the issue, this 
case presents a rather straightforward question of statutory 
interpretation.  The issue is whether there is a conflict 
between 
the 
relevant 
statutes 
and 
administrative 
code 
provisions. 
¶65 The majority relegates its analysis of this issue to a 
single, conclusory paragraph.  See majority op., ¶46.  In its 
cursory analysis of the conflict, the majority ascribes great 
import to an assertion that the unions' preferred statutory 
construction "would compel the absurd result that WERC is 
required to conduct an election where there is nothing and no 
one for whom to vote."  Majority op., ¶46.  According to the 
majority, this absurdity would result because "the statutes do 
not provide any procedure for how a current representative would 
remove itself from the ballot if it no longer wished to 
No. 
2015AP2224.awb 
 
3 
 
represent the employees" and it is thus "unclear" what is to 
happen if a current representative wants to disclaim an interest 
in representing a bargaining unit.  Id. 
¶66 This assertion ignores the larger context of labor law 
in which this case arises.  A union can avoid its duty to 
bargain or remove itself from a ballot by unequivocally 
disclaiming further interest in representing a bargaining unit.2  
The majority's "absurd" consequence is thus easily avoidable 
through a simple disclaimer process that is available at any 
time and is already in use in both federal and state labor law.  
See Dycus v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 615 F.2d 820, 826 (9th 
Cir. 1980); see also 1 Emp. and Union Member Guide to Labor Law 
§ 3:12 (2017). 
II 
¶67 Administrative agencies do not have powers superior to 
those of the legislature.  Debeck v. Wis. Dep't of Nat. Res., 
172 Wis. 2d 382, 387-88, 493 N.W.2d 234 (Ct. App. 1992).  Thus, 
even if the majority were correct in focusing its analysis and 
conclusions on WERC's authority to promulgate rules regarding 
                                                 
2 Baraboo Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, WERC Dec. No. 14885-B at 8 
(Mar. 
10, 
1977) 
("The 
commission 
has 
allowed 
a 
labor 
organization to withdraw from an election if it indicates to the 
commission that it does not desire to appear on the ballot and 
does not desire to represent the employe[e]s."); see also Wis. 
Law Enf't Ass'n v. AFSCME Council 24, WERC Dec. No. 31397-B at 
32 (Aug. 1, 2006) (citing Bake-Line Prods., Inc., 329 NLRB 247, 
249 (1999) (explaining that "an exclusive bargaining agent may 
avoid its statutory duty to bargain on behalf of the unit it 
represents by unequivocally and in good faith disclaiming 
further interest in representing the unit . . . .")). 
No. 
2015AP2224.awb 
 
4 
 
recertification elections, it is to no avail.  An administrative 
agency may not promulgate a rule that conflicts with state law.  
Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶21, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 
N.W.2d 659; Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2).  "When a conflict occurs 
between a statute and a rule, the statute prevails."  Debeck, 
172 Wis. 2d at 388 (citation omitted). 
¶68 The dispositive question is whether SELRA3 and MERA4 
conflict with the petition requirement in Wis. Admin. Code chs. 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.83(3)(b) provides in relevant part: 
Annually, no later than December 1, the commission 
shall 
conduct 
an 
election 
to 
certify 
the 
representative of a collective bargaining unit that 
contains a general employee.  There shall be included 
on the ballot the names of all labor organizations 
having 
an 
interest 
in 
representing 
the 
general 
employees participating in the election  . . . The 
commission 
shall 
certify 
any 
representative 
that 
receives at least 51 percent of the votes of all of 
the general employees in the collective bargaining 
unit.  If no representative receives at least 51 
percent of the votes of all of the general employees 
in the collective bargaining unit, at the expiration 
of the collective bargaining agreement, the commission 
shall decertify the current representative and the 
general employees shall be nonrepresented. . . .   
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.70(4)(d)3.b. sets forth in relevant 
part: 
Annually, the commission shall conduct an election to 
certify 
the 
representative 
of 
the 
collective 
bargaining unit that contains a general municipal 
employee.  The election shall occur no later than 
December 1 for a collective bargaining unit containing 
school district employees and no later than May 1 for 
a 
collective 
bargaining 
unit 
containing 
general 
municipal employees who are not school district 
employees. 
 
The 
commission 
shall 
certify 
any 
representative that receives at least 51 percent of 
the votes of all of the general municipal employees in 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP2224.awb 
 
5 
 
ERC 70 and 80.5  In order to answer this question, I must examine 
first whether "shall" does indeed mean "shall."  Is it mandatory 
or merely directory? 
¶69 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we need not inquire further.  
Id. 
¶70 The language of both SELRA and MERA is plain.  Each 
statute provides that annually, "the commission shall conduct an 
election 
to 
certify 
the 
representative 
of 
a 
collective 
bargaining unit that contains a general . . . employee."  Wis. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the collective bargaining unit.  If no representative 
receives at least 51 percent of the votes of all of 
the general municipal employees in the collective 
bargaining unit, at the expiration of the collective 
bargaining agreement, the commission shall decertify 
the current representative and the general municipal 
employees shall be nonrepresented. . . .  
5 Wis. Admin. Code §§ ERC 70.01 and 80.01 state in relevant 
part: 
 . . . The existing exclusive representative of such 
employees that wishes to continue said representation, 
or 
any 
other 
labor 
organization 
interested 
in 
representing such employees, must file a petition on 
or before September 15 requesting the commission to 
conduct a secret ballot election to determine whether 
a minimum of 51 percent of the bargaining unit 
employees eligible to vote favor collective bargaining 
representation 
by 
the 
petitioner 
or 
another 
petitioning labor organization.  If no timely petition 
is filed, the result is the same as if only the 
existing representative filed a timely petition and 
the election resulted in decertification of the 
existing representative. . . .  
No. 
2015AP2224.awb 
 
6 
 
Stat. §§ 111.83(3)(b), 111.70(4)(d)3.b. (emphasis added).  In 
other words, each requires that an election be held annually.  
Full stop.  No conditions. 
¶71 Wisconsin Admin. Code §§ ERC 70.01 and 80.01 allow 
WERC to cancel an election.  See also Wis. Admin. Code §§ ERC 
70.03(7)(b) and 80.03(7)(b) (explaining the consequences of 
failure to timely file a petition).  Ignoring a line of analysis 
both the circuit court and court of appeals deemed dispositive, 
the majority implicitly determines that "shall" does not mean 
"shall" and that there is therefore no conflict between the 
statutes and WERC's administrative rules. 
¶72 The 
word 
"shall" 
is 
ordinarily 
presumed 
to 
be 
mandatory when it appears in a statute.  Vill. of Elm Grove v. 
Brefka, 2013 WI 54, ¶23, 348 Wis. 2d 282, 832 N.W.2d 121.  
However, "shall" may be construed as directory if necessary to 
carry out the legislature's clear purpose.  Id. 
¶73 In 
determining 
whether 
"shall" 
is 
mandatory 
or 
directory, I focus on two dispositive factors:  the consequences 
resulting from each construction and the general object sought 
to be accomplished by the legislature.6  See Karow v. Milwaukee 
Cty. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 572, 263 N.W.2d 214 
                                                 
6 In Karow v. Milwaukee Cty. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 82 
Wis. 2d 565, 572, 263 N.W.2d 214 (1978), we set forth five 
factors to consider in determining whether "shall" as used in a 
statute is mandatory or directory:  the inclusion or omission of 
a prohibition or a penalty in the statute, the consequences 
resulting from one construction or the other, the nature of the 
statute, the evil to be remedied, and the general object sought 
to be accomplished by the legislature. 
No. 
2015AP2224.awb 
 
7 
 
(1978).  Application of these factors here indicates that 
"shall" 
as 
used 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 111.83(3)(b) 
and 
111.70(4)(d)3.b. is mandatory. 
¶74 First, the majority's construction has significant and 
drastic consequences for employees.  It denies blameless 
employees the right to vote for union representation if their 
union narrowly misses a deadline.  As a result, employees not 
only lose their ability to vote on whether they are represented 
by a union, but also are stripped of their voice in negotiations 
with their employer, all because their union was less than an 
hour 
late 
filing 
a 
petition.7 
 
Conversely, 
the 
unions' 
interpretation protects against this harsh outcome. 
¶75 Second, a directory construction would run afoul of 
the general object sought to be accomplished by the legislature.  
Counsel for WERC asserted at oral argument that a purpose of Act 
10 is to enfranchise employees.  Accepting WERC's assertion, 
annual recertification elections provide employees with greater 
opportunity 
to 
decide 
whether 
they 
will 
continue 
to 
be 
represented by their union. 
¶76 Despite WERC's assertion that a purpose of Act 10 is 
the enfranchisement of voters, the majority's construction of 
the statute accomplishes the opposite.  Instead of expanding 
employees' ability to vote on whether they are represented by a 
union, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
takes 
all 
choice 
away 
from 
                                                 
7 See majority op., ¶15. 
No. 
2015AP2224.awb 
 
8 
 
employees, leaving them without union representation regardless 
of their actual wishes. 
¶77 I therefore conclude that "shall" as used in SELRA and 
MERA is mandatory.  The majority does not engage in even a 
modicum of analysis on this point and thus provides no 
persuasive reason to depart from a mandatory construction of 
"shall." 
¶78 Applying a mandatory construction of "shall" in Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 111.83(3)(b) 
and 
111.70(4)(d)3.b. 
leads 
to 
the 
conclusion that there is an irreconcilable conflict between 
these statutes and Wis. Admin. Code ERC §§ 70.01 and 80.01.  
Simply stated, the statutes mandate that there "shall" be an 
election, while the administrative code provisions allow an 
election to be cancelled. 
III 
¶79 The majority exacerbates this conflict by writing into 
the statute a requirement that does not exist in the text and 
which defeats the statute's purpose. 
¶80 WERC's rules add an additional requirement to the 
conduct of an election——the filing of a petition.  By creating a 
barrier that does not exist in the statutes, the WERC rules are 
necessarily in conflict with state law.  See State ex rel. 
Castaneda v. Welch, 2007 WI 103, ¶59, 303 Wis. 2d 570, 735 
N.W.2d 131.  As previously discussed, when a statute and an 
administrative rule conflict, the statute prevails.  Debeck, 172 
Wis. 2d at 388.  To avoid the conflict, the majority in essence 
writes a petition requirement into the statutes. 
No. 
2015AP2224.awb 
 
9 
 
¶81 A reading of the surrounding context of the statutes 
at issue reveals that the legislature chose not to include a 
petition requirement.  Chapter 111 is replete with statutory 
means by which an election may be triggered by the filing of a 
petition. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 111.70(3)(a)4., 
111.70(4)(d)5., 
111.825(4), 
111.825(5), 
111.83(3)(a), 
111.84(1)(d). 
¶82 The legislature thus knows full well how to write a 
petition requirement into a labor relations statute.  In the 
case of Wis. Stat. §§ 111.83(3)(b) and 111.70(4)(d)3.b., it 
chose not to include one.  The language of these statutes is 
clear.  An election "shall" take place. 
¶83 Additionally, the majority rewrites the statutes, 
inserting words to allow decertification of a bargaining 
representative in a manner the statutes do not contemplate.  The 
statutes provide but one path to union decertification——the 
failure to gain 51% of the votes in an election.  The WERC rules 
provide another——failure to file a petition by the stated 
deadline. 
¶84 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 111.83(3)(b) and 111.70(4)(d)3.b. 
prescribe only one manner in which WERC may decertify a 
bargaining unit:  "if no representative receives at least 51 
percent of the votes of all of the general employees in the 
collective bargaining unit, at the expiration of the collective 
bargaining agreement, the commission shall decertify the current 
representative 
and 
the 
general 
employees 
shall 
be 
nonrepresented."  In other words, an election is required as a 
No. 
2015AP2224.awb 
 
10 
 
precondition for decertification.  The statutes do not provide 
an additional manner in which a bargaining representative may be 
decertified. 
¶85 Conversely, Wis. Admin. Code §§ ERC 70.03(7)(b) and 
80.03(7)(b) provide that decertification is to occur "[i]f no 
timely petition is filed by any labor organization."  This 
conflicts with the statute because it provides an additional 
avenue to decertification the statute does not contemplate.  
Again, "[w]hen a conflict occurs between a statute and a rule, 
the statute prevails."  Debeck, 172 Wis. 2d at 388. 
¶86 Instead of acknowledging this conflict, the majority 
adds words to the statute.  It concludes that "failure to timely 
file and failure to be elected are logically and legally 
equivalent[.]"  Majority op., ¶53.  The majority's analytical 
gymnastics are unpersuasive, given that "failure to be elected" 
is the sole statutorily authorized manner for decertification.  
"Failure to timely file" can only be the "logical and legal" 
equivalent if the majority reads a petition requirement into the 
statute that simply is not there. 
¶87 The majority's conclusion further runs afoul of Act 
10's purported purpose to enfranchise employees.  Instead of 
expanding 
employees' 
choice 
in 
whether 
they 
wish 
to 
be 
represented by a union, the majority's decision decertifies an 
elected representative without allowing employees to say a word 
about it. 
¶88 Unlike the majority, I would uphold the purpose WERC 
asserts is behind Act 10——to enfranchise voters——and affirm the 
No. 
2015AP2224.awb 
 
11 
 
court of appeals.  I conclude that both SELRA and MERA are in 
irreconcilable conflict with the petition requirement in Wis. 
Admin. Code chs. ERC 70 and 80, and that "shall" means "shall." 
¶89 Finally, I observe that in determining that "shall" 
does not mean "shall," the majority circumvents this court's 
recent interpretative trajectory.  Indeed, when this court has 
been faced with a question of whether "shall" is mandatory or 
directory, it has overwhelmingly ruled on the side of a 
mandatory construction.  Over the last ten years, in most 
contexts this court has repeatedly arrived at the conclusion 
that "shall" means "shall," i.e. it is of a mandatory nature.8  
During the same time period, this court has declined to apply 
"shall" as mandatory in only a few contexts, including those 
involving a sexually violent person committed pursuant to ch. 
                                                 
8 See State v. Villamil, 2017 WI 74, ¶60, 377 Wis. 2d 1, 898 
N.W.2d 482 ("[W]e conclude that the State has failed to rebut 
the presumption that 'shall' is mandatory" in operating after 
revocation penalty statutes); City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 
WI 65, ¶23, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738 ("The legislature's 
use 
of 
'shall' 
in 
Wisconsin's 
OWI 
escalating 
penalty 
scheme . . . is mandatory . . . ."); Bank of New York Mellon v. 
Carson, 2015 WI 15, ¶23, 361 Wis. 2d 23, 859 N.W.2d 422 ("The 
context in which 'shall' is used in Wis. Stat. § 846.102(1) 
indicates that the legislature intended it to be mandatory."); 
State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, ¶27, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811 
("[W]e interpret 'shall' to be mandatory" in the context of 
expunction statutes); Vill. of Elm Grove v. Brefka, 2013 WI 54, 
¶26, 348 Wis. 2d 282, 832 N.W.2d 121 (determining that "shall" 
is mandatory in statute providing for revocation of drivers 
license for refusal to take a test for intoxication); State v. 
Thompson, 2012 WI 90, ¶62, 342 Wis. 2d 674, 818 N.W.2d 904 
(explaining that Wis. Stat. § 970.02(1)(a) imposes several 
mandatory duties on the circuit court); Watton v. Hegerty, 2008 
WI 74, ¶19 n.13, 311 Wis. 2d 52, 751 N.W.2d 369 ("[W]e conclude 
that 'shall' has a mandatory meaning within § 51.30(4)(a)."). 
No. 
2015AP2224.awb 
 
12 
 
980, an undocumented immigrant, and now in this case, a voter in 
a union recertification election.9 
¶90 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶91 I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON 
joins this dissent.    
 
 
 
                                                 
9 See State v. Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, ¶55, 378 
Wis. 2d 504, 904 N.W.2d 773 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (by 
applying the harmless error rule, the majority essentially 
renders the word "shall" meaningless); State v. Romero-Georgana, 
2014 WI 83, ¶114, 360 Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.2d 668 (Ann Walsh 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting) 
(explaining 
that 
the 
majority 
disregards 
the 
plain 
meaning 
of 
"shall" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(2)); In re Commitment of Gilbert, 2012 WI 72, ¶¶87-89, 
342 
Wis. 2d 82, 
816 
N.W.2d 215 
(Ann 
Walsh 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting) (observing that the majority finds ambiguity in a 
statute containing "shall" by ignoring the surrounding context). 
No. 
2015AP2224.awb 
 
 
 
1