Title: BERNARD G. WALSTON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BERNARD G. WALSTON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 106704 P.2d 696Case Number: 84-261Decided: 08/08/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
BERNARD G. WALSTON, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LincolnCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming 
Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, Jim Dinneen, Student Intern, Defender 
Aid Program, for 
appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Michael A. Blonigen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In this appeal we are 
asked to decide whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find and 
the trial court to enter judgment finding the appellant guilty of driving a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation of 
§ 31-5-233(a), W.S. 1977, which, as amended by Ch. 52, § 1, S.L. of Wyoming 
1982, provides:

"It is unlawful for any 
person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, to a degree which 
renders him incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle, to drive * * * any 
vehicle within this state."

[¶2.]     Therefore, the elements 
of the offense are: (1) that the person charged (2) be driving a vehicle (3) 
within the State of Wyoming, and (4) such a person be under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor (5) to a degree which renders him incapable of safely 
driving a motor vehicle.

[¶3.]     This court has held 
that each of the aforesaid elements must be proved in order that a prima facie 
case be established under the statute. Crum v. City of Rock Springs, 
Wyo., 652 P.2d 27, 28 
(1982).

FACTS

[¶4.]     The facts most 
favorable to the appellee are these:

[¶5.]     At approximately 7:00 
p.m. on June 23, 1984, a deputy of the Lincoln County Sheriff's Department 
entered the Triangle Bar in Kemmerer in order to serve some civil papers on the 
appellant, Bernard Walston. He served the papers, and noticed that appellant had 
a drink in front of him. After the deputy returned to his patrol car, he 
observed the appellant leave the Triangle Bar, enter his pick-up truck, and 
drive away. He followed the appellant because he believed, from his previous 
observation, that he was too drunk to drive.

[¶6.]     The officer followed 
Walston for approximately one mile, during which time the appellant was driving 
in what was described as a "zigzag" motion. On two occasions he crossed the 
center line by a minimum of two feet, and was observed making turns and then 
over-correcting when he completed them. After observing the appellant for a 
distance of a mile or more, the deputy stopped Mr. Walston because he believed 
him to be operating his vehicle in an unsafe manner.

[¶7.]     Having stopped the 
vehicle, the deputy asked Walston to perform some field sobriety tests, which he 
was unable to do correctly or adequately. In a conversation with the officer, 
Mr. Walston offered to do some tests of his own, and he asked the deputy sheriff 
if he was going to be arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor. During this conversation, appellant's speech was slow and slurred. The 
officer testified that there was an odor of alcohol about Walston's breath and 
person, and that his eyes were bloodshot and watered. The deputy reported that 
Mr. Walston leaned on the tailgate to keep his balance. After observing these 
things, the officer arrested appellant and inquired if appellant would be 
willing to take a breathalyzer or other chemical test, and he refused. When 
Walston was booked into the LincolnCounty jail, the jailer noted that he had 
a difficult time answering simple questions and that his speech was 
slurred.

The Sufficiency of the 
Evidence

[¶8.]     The standard against 
which this court tests sufficiency-of-the-evidence questions was set out in Simmons v. State, Wyo., 687 P.2d 255, 
257 (1984), when we said:

"* * * We test the 
sufficiency of the evidence on appeal by examining and accepting as true the 
evidence of the prosecution, leaving out of consideration entirely the evidence 
of the defendant in conflict therewith; we give every favorable inference which 
may reasonably and fairly be drawn to the evidence of the prosecution. In other 
words, it is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt for us, but whether it is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable 
inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the jury when the 
evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the state. 
[Citations.]"

[¶9.]     In order to establish a 
violation under § 31-5-233(a), it is not required that a blood test be given, 
but there must be evidence that the defendant consumed alcohol. Hammer v. Town of Jackson, Wyo., 524 P.2d 884 
(1974).

[¶10.]  The evidence in this case is sufficient 
to support a finding that appellant was intoxicated to a degree which rendered 
him incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle, and all of the elements of 
the crime are supported by substantial evidence. The deputy observed Mr. Walston 
in a bar where he appeared to have a drink in front of him, and he followed the 
appellant because he felt that he was too drunk to drive. When Walston was 
stopped, the deputy smelled alcohol, and Mr. Walston himself admitted that he 
had been drinking. Furthermore, there is ample evidence that alcohol had been 
ingested by Walston. In fact, there is evidence that appellant was drinking just 
before he left the bar, and he admits he had been drinking that afternoon. Once 
such evidence is introduced, there is a reasonable inference that the driving 
behavior of appellant was affected by alcohol. The rational relationship between 
the bloodshot eyes, poor balance and difficulty communicating with police and 
the ingestion of alcohol is clearly established. Appellant offered no 
alternative explanation for his condition and appearance.

[¶11.]  Similarly, there is more than ample 
evidence that Walston was incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle. The 
police officer testified that appellant crossed the center line twice by more 
than two feet, he overcorrected on turns, and his inability to maintain his 
proper place on the road presented a clear and present danger to the driving 
public. Mr. Walston's performance when given the field sobriety tests, his 
demeanor at the time of arrest and his poor balance indicate a definite 
impairment of his ability to react properly and safely to possible traffic 
hazards. The only rational explanation for this behavior is that he was 
intoxicated.

[¶12.]  There can be no question but that the 
record contained sufficient evidence to support the 
charge.

[¶13.]  Affirmed.