Title: Dept. of Safety v. Cole

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services v. Gregory
Cole - No. 59, 1995 Term
EVIDENCE -- Videotape admissible in administrative hearing either
under "silent witness" theory of admissibility or as a business
record when testimony showed that it was made and kept in the
ordinary course of business even though no witness testified that
what was depicted on the tape was a fair and accurate
representation.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 59
  September Term, 1995
___________________________________
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
v.
GREGORY COLE
___________________________________
Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Chasanow, J.
Bell, J., dissents
___________________________________
      Filed:  March 12, 1996       
         
We are called upon in the instant case to determine whether a
videotape may be admissible in evidence in an administrative
hearing even though no witness testifies that what is depicted on
the videotape is a fair and accurate representation of what it
purports to show.  For the following reasons, we answer in the
affirmative and hold that the videotape was properly admitted into
evidence.  We therefore reverse the Court of Special Appeals and
affirm the decision of the administrative law judge admitting the
videotape into evidence and terminating Respondent's employment
based on Respondent's conduct depicted in the videotape.
I.
This appeal arises out of an administrative proceeding
initiated by Petitioner, the Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services (Department), for the removal of Respondent,
Gregory Cole, from his employment as a Correctional Officer
Lieutenant at the Roxbury Correctional Institution in Hagerstown.
Cole was part of an "extraction team" assembled to remove a
disruptive inmate from his prison cell and move him to another
area.  This process was videotaped in accordance with routine
procedures of the correctional institution.  According to the
findings of the administrative law judge (ALJ) who presided over
the hearing, the videotape showed that gas was initially used by
the extraction team to subdue the inmate in his cell.  The ALJ
found that after the inmate was incapacitated and lying on the
-2-
     When asked "[w]hat is the normal procedure to be followed in
1
a cell extraction," Galley testified:
"Officers are trained to extract the inmate
from the cell.  When a[n] extraction occurs, a
team of officers is to go in.  The team
usually consists of one officer using a shield
for purposes of taming an inmate.  And four
officers behind that person following the
shield man into the cell for purposes of one
officer to be assigned to grab each extremity
of the body, two arms, two legs.  A sixth
officer is behind that group using a video
camera.  A seventh officer is in command of
the entire unit and situation as it occurs."
floor, Cole opened the cell door and kicked the inmate in the head,
shoulder and rib area, stepped on the inmate, lifted the inmate's
legs four or five feet from the floor by his leg irons and dropped
him several times.  The inmate was then removed from the cell.
Cole's actions were brought to the attention of the warden several
months later when the videotape was viewed by staff members of the
prison reviewing extraction tapes to be used for training purposes.
Charges for Cole's removal were then filed.
At the hearing held before the ALJ at the Maryland
Correctional Training Center in Hagerstown, the Department offered
the testimony of Warden John P. Galley.  Galley testified that it
is the regular practice of the institution to videotape cell
extractions.   Once made, Galley explained, the tapes are marked
1
with the date and time of the extraction, the names of the inmate
and the extraction team members, and are maintained in a vault in
the security office.  Galley was asked if he knew whether there was
-3-
a cell extraction in which Cole was involved on the date in
question and whether he knew if it was videotaped.  After answering
affirmatively to both questions, Galley identified the videotape
and stated that he had personally reviewed it.  Galley acknowledged
that he was not present at the extraction itself and viewed the
tape only after it was brought to his attention several months
later.  
The Department sought to introduce, through Galley, the
videotape along with the envelope that contained the tape and a
document stapled to the envelope showing the chain of custody of
the videotape.  Cole timely objected to admission of the videotape.
The ALJ overruled the objection and admitted the videotape,
envelope and attached chain of custody form into evidence.  While
the tape was played before the ALJ, Galley identified Cole as the
officer in the video entering the cell and kicking the inmate.
Cole testified and admitted that he was shown on the videotape, but
denied using excessive force against the inmate.  After viewing the
tape, the ALJ found that Cole committed a third category infraction
by use of unnecessary force upon the inmate and terminated Cole's
employment in accordance with the Department's mandatory sanction
for that type of violation.
Cole filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision with the Secretary
of Personnel.  After a hearing, a designee of the Secretary issued
an order adopting the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law of the ALJ and sustained Cole's removal from state service.
-4-
Cole then appealed to the Circuit Court for Washington County,
arguing that the videotape was improperly admitted into evidence
"[s]ince there was nobody there to authenticate the tape and nobody
there to say, in fact, if the tape reflected what had happened was
accurate."  The circuit court judge, agreeing with Cole, reversed
the decision of the ALJ and the Secretary of Personnel and
reinstated Cole to his position of Correctional Lieutenant.  The
judge held that the videotape was not properly authenticated
because it was "admitted in evidence without any foundation being
laid whatsoever."
The Department filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of
Special Appeals.  The intermediate court held, inter alia, that the
circuit court was correct in ruling that the videotape was
inadmissible for lack of authentication and affirmed that part of
the circuit court's decision.  Dept. of Public Safety v. Cole, 103
Md. App. 126, 652 A.2d 1159 (1995).  We granted certiorari to
consider whether the videotape was properly authenticated and thus
admissible.
 
II.
Cole 
contends 
that 
the 
videotape 
was 
not 
properly
authenticated because the Department did not produce a witness who
was present at the extraction to testify to the videotape's
-5-
accuracy.  Cole argues that a videotape, much like a photograph,
must be authenticated by a witness with first-hand knowledge who
can testify that what is depicted is a correct and accurate
representation of what it purports to show.  Although we agree that
this is one method of authenticating a videotape, it is not the
sole method.
Videotapes are generally admissible in evidence on the same
basis as motion picture films and subject to the same general rules
applicable to photographic evidence.  Tobias v. State, 37 Md. App.
605, 615, 378 A.2d 698, 704 (1977); 3 CHARLES C. SCOTT, PHOTOGRAPHIC
EVIDENCE § 1294, at Supp. 106-23 (2d ed. 1969 & 1994 Supp.)(citing
numerous cases).  Photographs can be admissible under one of two
distinct rules.  Typically, photographs are admissible to
illustrate the testimony of a witness when that witness testifies
from first-hand knowledge that the photograph fairly and accurately
represents the scene or object it purports to depict as it existed
at the relevant time.  See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 214, at 13 (John
W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); 6 LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 901.2,
at 491 (1987).  Since the Department did not produce a witness who,
based on personal observation, could verify that the videotape
accurately represents the cell extraction, the videotape could not
have been admitted into evidence under this first rule.  See
Wimpling v. State, 171 Md. 362, 373-74, 189 A. 248, 254 (1937).
There is also, however, a second, alternative method of
-6-
authenticating photographs that does not require the testimony of
a witness with first-hand knowledge.  The "silent witness" theory
of admissibility authenticates a photograph as a "mute" or "silent"
independent photographic witness because the photograph speaks with
its own probative effect.  See Sisk v. State, 236 Md. 589, 591-92,
204 A.2d 684, 685 (1964) and citations therein; 3 PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
§ 1294, at Supp. 106.  A majority of jurisdictions and authorities
recognize the viability of the "silent witness" theory of
admissibility.  See, e.g., Fisher v. State, 643 S.W.2d 571, 575-76
(Ark. Ct. App. 1982) and cases cited therein; Bergner v. State, 397
N.E.2d 1012, 1015-16 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) and cases cited therein;
2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 214, at 15.  Professor Wigmore, explaining
the rationale behind this theory, states:   
"With later advancements in the art of
photography ... and with increasing awareness
of the manifold evidentiary uses of the
products of the art, it has become clear that
an additional theory of admissibility of
photographs is entitled to recognition.  Thus,
even though no human is capable of swearing
that he personally perceived what a photograph
purports to portray (so that it is not
possible to satisfy the requirements of the
`pictorial testimony' rationale) there may
nevertheless be good warrant for receiving the
photograph in evidence.  Given an adequate
foundation assuring the accuracy of the
process producing it, the photograph should
then be received as a so-called silent witness
or as a witness which `speaks for itself.'"
(Footnote omitted).
3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 790, at 219-220 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
Wigmore then quotes at length what he considers a "forceful
-7-
opinion" from California detailing the need for the "independent
silent witness" theory.  3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 790, at 220-221.  As
stated in People v. Bowley, 382 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1963),
"photographs 
are 
useful 
for 
different
purposes.  When admitted merely to aid a
witness in explaining his testimony they are,
as Wigmore states, nothing more than the
illustrated testimony of that witness.  But
they may also be used as probative evidence of
what they depict.  Used in this manner they
take on the status of independent `silent'
witnesses.
* * *
X-ray photographs are admitted into evidence
although there is no one who can testify from
direct observation inside the body that they
accurately represent what they purport to
show.
There is no reason why a photograph or
film, like an X-ray, may not, in a proper
case, be probative in itself.  To hold
otherwise would illogically limit the use of a
device whose memory is without question more
accurate and reliable than that of a human
witness."  (Citations and footnote omitted).
Bowley, 382 P.2d at 594-95.
McCormick explains that:
"Under this doctrine, commonly referred to as
the `silent witness' theory of admission,
photographic 
evidence 
may 
draw 
its
verification, not from any witness who has
actually viewed the scene portrayed on film,
but from other evidence which supports the
reliability of the photographic product. ...
Today the `silent witness' doctrine affords an
alternative route to the introduction of
photographic 
evidence 
in 
virtually 
all
jurisdictions."  (Footnotes omitted).
-8-
     A Regiscope camera simultaneously photographs a person
2
cashing a check, the identification used by that person and the
check itself, by means of a two-lens camera.  Sisk v. State, 236
Md. 589, 594, 204 A.2d 684, 686 (1964).
     We note that although this Court has never expressly so
3
stated, X-ray photographs are ordinarily admitted into evidence
under the "silent witness" theory.  The reason is that since an X-
ray photographs objects that the human eye cannot see, no witness
is able to testify that the X-ray fairly and accurately reflects
what it purports to show.  See Fisher v. State, 643 S.W.2d 571, 574
(Ark. Ct. App. 1982); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 214, at 14-15 (John W.
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 214, at 15.  See generally James McNeal,
Silent Witness Evidence in Relation to the Illustrative Evidence
Foundation, 37 Okla. L. Rev. 219 (1984).
This Court, in Sisk, supra, relied upon the "silent witness"
theory to uphold the admission of a Regiscope photograph  without
2
a witness to verify its accuracy.  In considering for the first
time this method of authenticating photographs,  we noted that
3
there are circumstances where photographs may be admitted into
evidence as probative, substantive evidence because they act as
"`silent witnesses who speak for themselves,'" rather than solely
to add to or illustrate the testimony of a human witness.  Sisk,
236 Md. at 592, 204 A.2d at 685 (citation omitted).  Of course, the
photograph must still be a "reasonably accurate and honest
representation ... of the facts it purports to represent,"  Sisk,
236 Md. at 592-93, 204 A.2d at 685, but a witness with personal
knowledge is not required to lay that foundation.
We held in Sisk that because the "possibility of the
-9-
photograph not representing the transaction it purport[ed] to [wa]s
extremely remote," 236 Md. at 596, 204 A.2d at 687, and the
"possibility of error in the photograph ... almost nil, in the
absence of some intentional trickery to `fake' the photograph," the
evidence was admissible under the "silent witness" doctrine.  236
Md. at 596-97, 204 A.2d at 688.  Extrinsic evidence proved when,
where, and under what circumstances the photograph was taken and
showed that it accurately represented its subject.  Furthermore,
the trial judge found the evidence helpful and relevant.
If videotape evidence is generally admissible under the same
rules as photographic evidence, the issue then becomes whether we
may admit the videotape under the "silent witness" theory of
admissibility.  Other courts have adopted the "silent witness"
theory to admit videotape evidence.  In Fisher, supra, for example,
the appellant was convicted of theft of property from a grocery
store based in part on a videotape derived from a surveillance
camera installed in the store by the owner.  The owner testified
that, prior to the time Fisher entered the store, he had adjusted
the camera, began recording, checked that it was working properly,
and then left the premises.  The unattended camera captured video
of Fisher and her daughters "sacking groceries, and removing them"
from the store.  Fisher, 643 S.W.2d at 573.  The trial court
admitted the videotape into evidence, finding that a proper
foundation established that the tape fairly represented the events
-10-
occurring at the store.  The Court of Appeals of Arkansas,
recognizing that types of photographic evidence may be admitted
under two different theories, the "pictorial testimony" theory and
the "silent witness" theory, held that the videotape was properly
admitted under the latter theory.  Fisher, 643 S.W.2d at 573-575.
The court explained:
"Photographic 
evidence 
is 
the 
best
available means of preserving the appearance
of a scene at a given time.  It is superior to
eyewitness testimony in certain respects.
Eyewitness testimony is subject to errors in
perception, memory lapse, and a witness'
problem of adequately expressing what he
observed in language so that the trier of fact
can understand.  Photographic evidence can
observe a scene in detail without interpreting
it, preserve the scene in a permanent manner,
and transmit its message more clearly than the
spoken word.
We hold that photographic evidence is
admissible where its authenticity can be
sufficiently established in view of the
context in which it is sought to be admitted.
Obviously, the foundational requirements for
the admissibility of photographic evidence
under 
the 
`silent 
witness' 
theory 
are
fundamentally different from the foundational
requirements under the `pictorial testimony'
theory.  It is neither possible nor wise to
establish specific foundational requirements
for the admissibility of photographic evidence
under the `silent witness' theory, since the
context in which the photographic evidence was
obtained and its intended use at trial will be
different in virtually every case.  It is
enough to say, that adequate foundational
facts must be presented to the trial court, so
that ... the trier of fact can reasonably
infer that the subject matter is what its
proponent claims."
-11-
Fisher, 643 S.W.2d at 574-575.
The Court of Appeals of Virginia also held that "[v]ideotapes,
like photographs, when properly authenticated, may be admitted
under either of two theories: `(1) to illustrate the testimony of
a witness, and (2) as "mute," "silent," or "dumb" independent
photographic witnesses.'"  Brooks v. Com., 424 S.E.2d 566, 569 (Va.
App. 1992)(citation omitted).  Brooks involved a videotaped drug
transaction between Brooks and a police informant.  The State
authenticated the videotape by showing that tabs allowing
alteration of the tape were removed and that the videotape
contained an on-screen display of the seconds that had passed.  In
addition, three police officers verified that the voice on the tape
was that of Brooks even though "none of the officers testifying
actually observed [the drug transaction] taking place."  Brooks,
424 S.E.2d at 568.   The court found this evidence to constitute
"more than adequate grounds for determining that the tape was an
accurate representation of what it purported to depict."  Brooks,
424 S.E.2d at 569.  Hence, the videotape evidence was held
admissible under the "silent witness" theory.  See also United
States v. Pageau, 526 F.Supp. 1221, 1224 (N.D.N.Y. 1981)(testimony
as to installation, activation, operation and chain of possession
of videotape depicting correctional officers beating inmate was
sufficient foundation); Bowley, 382 P.2d at 595 (holding motion
picture film to be probative evidence in itself under the silent
-12-
witness theory); State v. Young, 303 A.2d 113, 116 (Me.
1973)(testimony as to installation, testing and custody of film
from bank's automatic camera justified admission of film as
independent evidence).
Most leading authorities also agree that videotape evidence
should be admissible under the silent witness theory.  McCormick
believes that since "[t]he `silent witness' theory of admissibility
is as fully applicable to the motion picture as to the still
photograph," the doctrine is "equally applicable" to videotape
evidence.  2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 214, at 17-18.  Accord 3
PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 1294, at Supp. 106 (commenting that videotapes
may be admitted either to illustrate testimony or as an independent
silent witness).
In view of the aforegoing, we agree that a videotape can be
admissible under the "silent witness" theory if properly
authenticated.  Authenticating videotape evidence under this theory
obviously requires a different foundation than necessary to
authenticate photographic evidence to illustrate the testimony of
a witness.  Most authorities and jurisdictions agree that in order
to authenticate photographic evidence under the "silent witness"
doctrine, the proponent must lay an adequate foundation assuring
the accuracy of the process that produced the photo.  See 3 WIGMORE
ON EVIDENCE § 790, at 220; see also Bergner, 397 N.E.2d at 1017
(requiring proof that photograph was not altered and suggesting
-13-
other non-mandatory guidelines for admission of photographs under
silent witness theory).  
We decline to adopt any rigid, fixed foundational requirements
necessary to authenticate photographic evidence under the "silent
witness" theory.  The facts and circumstances surrounding the
making of the photographic evidence and its intended use at trial
will vary greatly from case to case, and the trial judge must be
given some discretion in determining what is an adequate
foundation.  See Fisher, 643 S.W.2d at 575; Bergner, 397 N.E.2d at
1017.  We do note that a foundation is adequate, at least for an
administrative hearing, if there are sufficient indicia of
reliability so that the trier of fact can "reasonably infer that
the subject matter is what its proponent claims." Fisher, 643
S.W.2d at 575.   
Since the "silent witness" theory applies to videotape
evidence, we must now determine whether the videotape in the case
sub judice was sufficiently authenticated.  As warden, Galley was
competent to testify to the routine practices of the prison.  Rule
5-406 states that "[e]vidence of the ... routine practice of an
organization is relevant to prove that the conduct of the ...
organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the
... routine practice."  Galley testified at the hearing that cell
extractions are ordinarily videotaped at the institution.  In
addition, Galley verified that each videotape is routinely labelled
-14-
with the date and time of the extraction and the names of the
inmate and officers involved.  Galley explained that the videotapes
are kept in an individual envelope and are stored in a security
vault at the institution where they may be viewed only by signing
in and out on a chain of custody form.  It is also not disputed
that Officer Cole was depicted in the videotape.  We believe this
evidence is sufficient to prove in an administrative hearing that
the videotape was properly made in conformity with the routine
practice of the prison and thus, supports the trustworthiness and
reliability of the videotape.
It is evident that the possibility of tampering with or
distortion of the videotape was extremely remote.  No issue was
raised concerning the accuracy of the video process, and there was
no suggestion that the video camera was working improperly or that
the tape was altered.  In addition, the ALJ found the videotape to
be relevant and useful.  Based on the totality of the
circumstances, we hold that the videotape at issue was sufficiently
authenticated as a "silent witness" and was therefore properly
admitted into evidence by the ALJ. 
III.
A.
Alternatively, the videotape could have been admitted as part
of an official record made and kept in the ordinary course of the
correctional institution's business activity.  Maryland Rule 5-
-15-
     It is well-settled that hospital records, made in the
4
hospital's regular course of business, fall within the business
records exception to the rule against hearsay.  State v. Garlick,
313 Md. 209, 216, 545 A.2d 27, 30 (1988).
803(b)(6) sets out the well-established exception to the rule
against hearsay for records of regularly conducted business
activity.  There are times when items made part of and included
within an official record can be admitted into evidence as part of
a business record admitted under this exception.  See, e.g., Queen
v. State, 26 Md. App. 222, 229-31, 337 A.2d 199, 204
(1975)(indicating that photograph contained in base file would have
been included as part of business record had the entire record been
introduced).  For example, X-ray pictures included within a
hospital record have sometimes been admitted under the business
records exception.    See 3 PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 1267, at 118-19;
4
Coleman 
v. 
State, 
423 
So.2d 
276, 
280 
(Ala. 
Crim. 
App.
1982)(admitting X-ray into evidence under business records
exception to hearsay rule); State v. Torres, 589 P.2d 83, 86 (Haw.
1978)(noting that X-rays are included as hospital records admitted
under business record statute); Allen v. St. Louis Public Service
Company, 285 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Mo. 1956)(noting that X-rays are
generally admissible as part of a duly authenticated hospital
record).  According to at least one authority, if a witness
identifies the hospital record as that of a particular patient and
explains how records are ordinarily made and kept, the X-rays taken
-16-
at the hospital and contained within the hospital record may
qualify under the business records exception and be admissible in
evidence along with that hospital record.  3 PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE §
1267, at 118-19.  It should be noted, however, that "compliance
with the provisions of the [business record exception is]
sufficient identification only if there [is] no dispute concerning
the identity or reliability of the X-ray films in question."  3
PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 1267, at 119.  
In the instant case, the correctional institution's official
record consisted of the videotape, the envelope in which it was
stored and the chain of custody form attached thereto.  As part of
the official record, the videotape could have been admitted under
the business records exception if the Department properly
authenticated that record.
In order to authenticate a business record, the proponent of
the record must establish through testimony that the record was
made at or near the time of the act, that it was made by a person
with knowledge or from information transmitted by a person with
knowledge, that it was made and kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and that it is the regular practice of
that business to make and keep records.  Md. Rule 5-803 (b)(6).
This testimony must be given by a witness who possesses the
necessary knowledge to establish these facts, but there is no
requirement that the witness have first-hand knowledge of the
matter reported or that the witness actually have prepared or
-17-
observed the preparation of the report.  2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 292,
at 277.
We believe that the videotape was properly authenticated as
part of the correctional institution's business records.  The
Department established, through the testimony of Warden Galley,
that it was the regular practice of the correctional institution to
make and retain videotaped cell extractions, presumably as a
protection for both the inmates and the institution.  He also
testified that the videotapes are made during  cell extractions by
a member of the extraction team, and that the videotapes, once
made, are marked with the date and time of the extraction, the name
of the inmate and the correctional officers involved, and are
maintained in a vault in the security office of the institution.
Galley, as warden of the correctional institution and presumably
supervisor of the custodian of records, possessed the requisite
knowledge to establish the foundation for the business records
exception.  In addition, a chain of custody form attached to the
envelope in which the videotape was stored was introduced by the
Department.  The form listed the names of individuals who "signed
out" the videotape from the time it was made to the date of the
hearing.  Galley also identified Cole as a member of the extraction
team in the videotape as it was viewed at the hearing.  Moreover,
the videotape, once admitted as part of a business record and
played before the ALJ, possessed self-authenticating evidence.  The
beginning of the videotape shows a member of the extraction team
-18-
     Although it was not argued, it is conceivable that the
5
videotape may also have been admissible as a public record under
Maryland Rule 5-803 (b)(8).
identifying the date, time and location of the extraction as well
as a statement concerning what the extraction team will be doing.
The same officer makes another statement at the conclusion of the
tape explaining that the extraction was completed.  Finally, Cole
did not challenge the identity or reliability of the videotape and
concedes that it portrays him.  Taking all of these factors into
consideration, we find that there was enough evidence elicited at
the administrative hearing to conclude that a record was made and
kept in the course of the correctional institution's regularly
conducted business and that the videotape was made and kept as a
valuable part of that record.  Accordingly, we hold that the
videotape was sufficiently authenticated to be admitted into
evidence under the business records exception.5
B.
The Court of Special Appeals was concerned with the
possibility of manipulation or tampering with a videotape if a
witness with first-hand knowledge does not testify that what the
videotape depicts is an accurate representation of what occurred.
See Cole, 103 Md. App. at 134, 652 A.2d at 1162-63.  Authenticating
the videotape under the business records exception, however, should
alleviate concern over reliability and accuracy.  The rationale
-19-
underlying the business records exception is that because the
business relies on the accuracy of its records to conduct its daily
operations, the court may accept those records as reliable and
trustworthy.  See Chapman v. State, 331 Md. 448, 459, 628 A.2d 676,
681 (1993); JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 804, at 418
(2d ed. 1993).  Moreover, the recorder, who has no motive to
falsify or record inaccurately, is under a business duty to make an
honest and truthful report that can be relied upon by the business.
See State v. Garlick, 313 Md. 209, 217, 545 A.2d 27, 30-31 (1988);
Aetna Casualty & Surety v. Kuhl, 296 Md. 446, 454, 463 A.2d 822,
827 (1983).  It is therefore unnecessary to call witnesses to
testify to the truth of the entries.  The business records
exception incorporated into Md. Rule 5-803 (b)(6), as well as the
public records exception incorporated into Md. Rule 5-803 (b)(8),
contain a statement that a record, otherwise qualified for
admissibility under those sections, "may be excluded if the source
of information or the method or circumstances of the preparation of
the record indicate" that the record lacks trustworthiness.  While
the videotape meets all of the requirements of a business record,
Cole did not meet his burden of proving that it lacked
trustworthiness.
Cole never alleged that the Department tampered with or
altered the videotape.  In addition, although Warden Galley was not
present at the extraction, he testified that he had no reason to
-20-
doubt the accuracy of the videotape.  We have held that there is a
presumption that public officials properly perform their duties.
Beane v. McMullen, 265 Md. 585, 602, 291 A.2d 37, 46 (1972); Lerch
v. Md. Port Authority, 240 Md. 438, 457, 214 A.2d 761, 771 (1965).
The reliability associated with the business records exception in
addition to the lack of any motive to fabricate, alter or tamper
with the videotape provided the record with sufficient guarantees
of trustworthiness without the testimony of a witness with personal
knowledge.  Accordingly, authenticating the videotape of the cell
extraction as part of the prison's business records was sufficient
to warrant admission into evidence.
    
IV.
This Court has recognized that administrative agencies
generally are not bound by the technical common law rules of
evidence.  Dal Maso v. Bd. of Co. Comm'rs, 238 Md. 333, 337, 209
A.2d 62, 64 (1965).  We have also made clear that evidence "`which
is inadmissible in a judicial proceeding is not per se inadmissible
in an administrative proceeding.'"  Powell v. Maryland Aviation
Admin., 336 Md. 210, 220, 647 A.2d 437, 442 (1994)(citation
omitted).  We mandate only that administrative agencies observe the
basic rules of fairness as to parties appearing before them, Dal
Maso, 238 Md. at 337, 209 A.2d at 64, and that they admit evidence
that has sufficient reliability and probative value to satisfy
-21-
     Chapter 59, § 1 of the Acts of 1993 revised and renumbered
6
several sections of the Administrative Procedures Act.  Pursuant to
that revision, Maryland Code (1984, 1995 Repl. Vol.), State
Government Article, § 10-213 replaced what was formerly § 10-208,
effective June 1, 1993.  Since the administrative hearing on Cole's
termination of employment was heard and decided by the ALJ in 1992,
and the order of the Secretary of Personnel was dated January 18,
1993, we refer to § 10-208.
procedural due process.  Powell, 336 Md. at 220, 647 A.2d at 442.
The Administrative Procedures Act, Maryland Code (1984, 1993
Repl. Vol.), State Government Article (SG), § 10-208,  governing
6
the admission of evidence in a contested case in administrative
hearings provides in pertinent part:
"(b) Probative evidence. -- The agency
may admit probative evidence that reasonable
and prudent individuals commonly accept in the
conduct of their affairs and give probative
effect to that evidence.
(c) Exclusions. -- The agency may exclude
evidence that is:
(1) incompetent;
(2) irrelevant;
(3) immaterial; or
(4) unduly repetitious."
 
Clearly, the Department produced enough evidence to assure
that the videotape had sufficient probative value and indicia of
reliability and accuracy at least for an administrative hearing.
Notwithstanding the relaxed evidentiary requirements in the
administrative context, we believe that the videotape may have been
properly authenticated even under the more stringent rules of
evidence required for judicial proceedings.  
-1-
We hold that an adequate foundation was established to admit
the videotape into evidence, at least in an administrative hearing,
in either of two ways: (1) under the "independent silent witness"
theory of admissibility as probative, substantive evidence in
itself; or (2) under the business records exception to the rule
against hearsay, as part of an official record of the institution
made and kept in the ordinary course of business.  Hence, we uphold
Cole's termination of employment by the ALJ and reverse the Court
of Special Appeals.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
REMAND THIS CASE TO THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY WITH
DIRECTIONS TO REINSTATE THE DECISION
OF THE SECRETARY OF PERSONNEL.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY
RESPONDENT.
Dissenting Opinion follows next page:
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, J.:
In a well-reasoned opinion by Judge Marvin H. Smith, a former
judge of this Court, the Court of Special Appeals held that the
-2-
authentication of a video tape required "that a person with first-
hand knowledge of the subject of the movie or video tape testify
that it is a fair and accurate portrayal of the subject."
Department of Public Safety v. Cole, 103 Md. App. 126, 134, 652
A.2d 1159, 1162 (1995) (quoting 5 Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence §
403.6 at  322 (1987)).  To like effect, McLain and the intermediate
appellate court cited Tobias v. State, 37 Md. App. 605, 378 A.2d
698 (1977); 2 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence, § 214 (4th ed.
1992); 3 Charles C. Scott, Photographic Evidence, § 1294 (2nd ed.
1969); Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., Maryland Evidence Handbook § 1102
(2nd ed. 1993).  Noting that, in the instant case, the video tape
was admitted over the petitioner's objection, without any effort at
authentication, not to mention compliance with the "modern trend,"
McLain at 322, the court concluded that admission of the video tape
was error.  It thereupon affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court
for Washington County, which had reversed the ruling of the
Administrative Law Judge in that regard.  The Court of Special
Appeals ordered the case remanded for further proceedings,
including an attempt to authenticate the video tape.
The majority does not disagree with the authentication method
addressed by the intermediate appellate court.  Nor does it suggest
that the video tape was authenticated in compliance with this
method.  The majority relies, instead, on an alternative method of
authentication, the "silent witness" approach, to reverse the Court
of Special Appeals and affirm the decision of the Administrative
Law Judge.  
Under the "silent witness" approach,
photographic 
evidence 
may 
draw 
its
verification, not from any witness who has
actually viewed the scene portrayed on film,
but from other evidence which supports the
reliability of the photographic product.
2 McCormick on Evidence § 214 at 15.  That " other evidence" is the
required "adequate foundation assuring the accuracy of the  process
producing [the video tape]."  3 Wigmore on Evidence § 790 at 219-20
(Chadbourn rev. 1970).  The "silent witness" evidence must, of
course, be a "reasonably accurate and honest representation ... of
the facts it purports to represent," whether or not it is of the
-3-
     An x-ray picture is an example of "silent witness" evidence
1
that is not susceptible to eyewitness verification.  2 McCormick on
Evidence § 214 at 14-15 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).  See
also People v. Bowley, 382 P.2d 591, 594-95 (Cal. 1963).  Where
that is true, the foundation must address the accuracy of the
process producing it, as we have seen.  See 2 McCormick on
Evidence, § 214 at 15; 3 Wigmore On Evidence, § 790, at 219-20
(Chadbourn rev. 1970); People v. Doggett, 188 P.2d 792, 795 (Cal.
App. 1948) (photographs not testimonially authenticated admitted on
basis of expert photographer's testimony that they were not
composites or otherwise altered).
kind that is susceptible to eyewitness verification.   See Sisk v.
1
State, 236 Md. 589, 592-93, 204 A.2d 684, 685 (1964).  Therefore,
the foundational predicate must also satisfy this prong of the
test. 
In the instant case, the petitioner denied that he committed
the acts of excessive force with which he was charged, although he
did acknowledge that he was depicted on the video tape.
Nevertheless, no such foundational predicate for the introduction
of the video tape was even attempted to be laid.  No testimony was
offered as to how the video tape process works, see 2 McCormick on
Evidence, § 214 at 15 (authentication based on reliability of the
process will require a foundation that "resemble[s] that required
for the admission of the products of other scientific processes",
i.e., that the application of the present instance was a valid
one); 3 Wigmore on Evidence § 790 at 220 (Adequate foundation
assuring the accuracy of the process that produced the video tape
must be established), that the camcorder used was operating
properly, see Fisher v. State, 643 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Ark. App. 1982)
-4-
(noting that the owner testified to adjusting the unattended
camera, checking to see that it was working properly and turning it
on prior to the incident being recorded), or that the finished
product had not been tampered with.  See People v. Doggett, 188
P.2d 792, 795 (Cal. App. 1948).       
Acknowledging that a foundation must be laid, the majority
holds that the testimony of Warden Galley was sufficient to support
the introduction of the video tape.  According to the majority, his
competence to testify concerning the routine practices of the
prison and, in particular, about cell extractions, including the
fact that they are ordinarily video taped, sufficed.  More
particularly, the warden testified that the practice included
labeling the video tape with the date, time, and the names of the
inmates and officers involved, and storing the video tape in a
separate envelope in a security vault, access to which is subject
to a chain of custody form.  This testimony, the majority says,
satisfied the "silent witness" test.
I cannot agree.  The warden laid the foundation for deciding
that the extraction in this case was video taped.  Whether the
process which produced that video tape was accurate, or not, was in
no way addressed.  Indeed, the record is devoid of any evidence or
testimony that the camcorder used to record the extraction was
working properly.  Nor is there is any indication that the video
tape was not tampered with.  The majority's bald statement that
"the possibility of tampering with or distortion of the videotape
-5-
     The majority states that "there was no suggestion that the
2
video camera was working improperly or that the tape was altered."
___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (1996) [slip op. at 13].  It is
true that no explicit argument was made to that effect; however,
implicit in the petitioner's denial of wrongdoing is that the video
tape is inaccurate.  That, it seems to me, places on the proponent
of the evidence the obligation of establishing its accuracy.  No
attempt was made to do so.  Warden Galley was in no position to do
so.
     I  also reject the alternative ground for decision advanced
3
by the majority.  In my view, characterizing a video tape as a
"business record" does not relieve the proponent of the evidence of
the obligation of authenticating that video tape.  As I read the
majority opinion, that is precisely what it intends.  It thus
assumes the point in issue - the accuracy of the process and the
reliability of the depiction.  That is not, however, the appellate
or review function.
was extremely remote," ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at
13], does not make it so.  This is particularly so when the subject
of the video tape denies engaging in the conduct depicted.2
The majority points out that this is an administrative
proceeding.  That fact does not relieve the State of its obligation
of laying a proper foundation.    In this administrative hearing,
3
no evidence whatsoever was presented tending to support the
trustworthiness and reliability of the critical video tape.
Indeed, no attempt was made to present such evidence.
In my view, the Court of Special Appeals appropriately
resolved the issue.  Accordingly, I dissent.