Title: Green Mountain Insurance Co. v. Wakelin

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12760 
 
GREEN MOUNTAIN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.  vs.  MARK J. WAKELIN & 
others.1 
 
 
 
Norfolk.      December 6, 2019. - March 3, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher,  
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Insurance, Homeowner's insurance, Owned property exclusion.  
Declaratory Relief.  Practice, Civil, Declaratory 
proceeding, Summary judgment.  Contract, Insurance, 
Construction of contract.  Words, "Arising out of." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 18, 2015. 
 
 
The case was heard by Mark A. Hallal, J., on motions for 
summary judgment, and a motion for entry of judgment was 
considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Brian P. Harris for the plaintiff. 
 
J. Michael Conley for Charmaine Norris. 
 
William J. Doyle for Robert Powers. 
                                                 
 
1 Charmaine Norris, as personal representative of the estate 
of Keith Norris; and Robert Powers, as administrator of the 
estate of Deana Lee Powers. 
2 
 
 
 
Peter E. Heppner, for Mark J. Wakelin, was present but did 
not argue. 
 
Kathy Jo Cook, Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin J. Powers, Paul R. 
Johnson, & Lawrence A. Wind, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial 
Attorneys, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  This is a declaratory judgment action requiring 
us to interpret an exclusion in a homeowner's insurance policy.  
The plaintiff, Green Mountain Insurance Company, Inc. (insurer), 
sold a homeowner's policy to Mark Wakelin for property that he 
owned in Braintree.  As is typically the case, the homeowner's 
policy provided him protection against personal liability as 
well as property damage.  The policy also contained an exclusion 
for bodily injury "arising out of a premises" owned by the 
insured but not insured under the policy.  In the instant case, 
Wakelin owned an uninsured property, a cabin without electrical 
power in Maine.  Tragically, four people -- two of Wakelin's 
children and two of their friends -- died from carbon monoxide 
poisoning when a portable generator Wakelin left at the cabin 
was improperly used inside the cabin to power a small 
refrigerator.  The issue is whether the deaths caused by the 
improper use of the portable generator arose out of the 
uninsured premises as defined by the exclusion.  We conclude 
that the portable generator does not constitute a condition of 
Wakelin's uninsured property and that, as a result, the victims' 
claims here do not arise out of that premises.  For these 
3 
 
 
reasons, the policy exclusion does not apply under the facts of 
this case, and the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.2 
 
1.  Background.  Wakelin is the named insured on a 
homeowner's insurance policy issued by the plaintiff insurer.  
In addition to coverage for loss of property under the policy, 
the policy also insures Wakelin against personal liability.  The 
property insured under Wakelin's policy is in Braintree. 
 
Coverage E of Wakelin's policy insures him if "a claim is 
made . . . against [him] for damages because of 'bodily injury' 
or 'property damage' caused by an 'occurrence' to which [the 
policy] applies."  The policy excludes the following from 
coverage: 
"4.  'Insured's' Premises Not An 'Insured Location' 
 
"'Bodily injury' or 'property damage' arising out of a 
premises: 
 
"a.  Owned by an 'insured'; 
 
"b.  Rented to an 'insured'; or 
 
"c.  Rented to others by an 'insured'; 
 
"that is not an "insured location." 
 
 
Wakelin also owned a cabin and property in Byron, Maine 
(the camp).  The parties do not dispute that the camp in Maine 
                                                 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys. 
4 
 
 
is not an "insured location" within the meaning of the policy.  
It is also not covered by another homeowner's insurance policy. 
 
The tragic accident underlying this case took place at the 
cabin on or around July 14, 2015.  The facts regarding the cabin 
are as follows:  Wakelin obtained a building permit in 2009 to 
construct the cabin on the property, but never obtained a 
certificate of occupancy.  The camp was "off the grid," meaning 
it was not supplied with town electricity.  Wakelin had hoped 
that someday in the future either the town would supply 
electricity, or he would be able to install solar panels.  The 
cabin had a wood stove, and Wakelin used solar-powered or 
battery-operated lights when at the camp.  Although the cabin 
had rough wiring strung through parts of its ceiling, that 
wiring was not functional as of the summer of 2015.  The cabin 
was seasonal and was not used in the winter. 
 
Wakelin purchased a gasoline-powered generator in Weymouth 
around 2012.  When buying the generator, Wakelin viewed its 
portability as an important consideration.3  He took advantage of 
the option to buy a generator with wheels and a handle for $250 
more.  After he purchased the generator, he brought it from 
Massachusetts to the camp in Maine.  He only used the generator 
                                                 
 
3 Although Wakelin considered someday installing a permanent 
generator to keep outside the cabin, at the time he purchased 
the generator in question, the option of purchasing a permanent 
generator was too expensive. 
5 
 
 
at the camp and never used it anywhere else.  Whenever Wakelin 
left the property, he would chain the generator to the garage 
door so it could not be stolen.  He similarly chained his two 
all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to the door whenever he left the 
property. 
 
Wakelin did not use the generator every time he went to the 
camp.  He did use the generator when he or someone else who was 
working on the property needed it to charge power tools.  The 
generator was used strictly for working on the property.  When 
he or someone else working on the property used the generator, 
Wakelin would always ensure the generator was outside.  The 
generator was not hard wired into the camp's electrical system, 
and Wakelin did not have any plans to hard wire the generator to 
the cabin. 
 
Wakelin testified without contradiction that, if the 
generator was already started to power the tools, he might plug 
the microwave that was in the camp kitchen into the generator to 
heat something up.  However, he testified that he rarely did so 
and would not start the generator just to use the microwave. 
 
Wakelin had other items at the camp that required 
electricity, including a small, college-sized refrigerator, and 
several slot machines.  He brought the slot machines to the camp 
so they would not be stolen from his home in Braintree.   
Wakelin testified that he had not plugged in either the 
6 
 
 
refrigerator or the slot machines since bringing them to the 
camp. 
 
On or around July 14, 2015, Wakelin's daughter, Brooke 
(twenty-one years old), and son, Matthew (eighteen years old), 
went to the camp with two friends, Keith Norris (twenty-three 
years old) and Deana Lee Powers (twenty-two years old), to 
celebrate Brooke's upcoming twenty-second birthday.  Shortly 
after arriving at the camp, all four individuals died from 
carbon monoxide poisoning.  Upon inspection, it was discovered 
that the victims had plugged the small refrigerator into the 
generator using an extension cord, and ran the generator inside 
the cabin without opening any windows or doors.  The generator 
was not running when it was found, but its switch was in the 
"on" position, and it contained little to no gasoline. 
 
After the accident, counsel for the estate of Norris 
notified the insurer in a letter dated October 7, 2015, of the 
estate's wrongful death claim against its insured, Wakelin.  
Among other things, counsel claimed that Wakelin failed to 
instruct his children and their friends on the proper and safe 
use of the generator and also failed to warn them of the dangers 
of running the generator in an enclosed area. 
 
After receiving this letter, the insurer initiated a 
declaratory judgment action against Wakelin, the estate of 
Norris, and the estate of Powers in December 2015.  In its 
7 
 
 
complaint, the insurer anticipated that the respective estates 
of Norris and Powers would make claims that its insured, 
Wakelin, was negligent and caused the death of both victims.  
The insurer sought a judgment from the Superior Court declaring 
that coverage for these claims was barred under the policy's 
exclusion for claims arising out of a premises owned by the 
insured but not an insured location under the policy.  At the 
inception of the lawsuit, the insurer entered into a subsidiary 
agreement with the defendants that insulated Wakelin from any 
liability beyond the policy limits if coverage was not excluded.  
Because he would not incur any defense costs or be personally 
liable for any damages under the agreement, Wakelin is a party 
to the lawsuit in name only. 
 
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.  As a 
part of its motion, the insurer relied on an electrical 
engineer's conclusions that the deaths arose out of a 
combination of using the generator inside the cabin and the 
cabin's inadequate ventilation to disperse the carbon monoxide.4 
 
The Superior Court judge denied the insurer's motion for 
summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of the 
                                                 
 
4 The defendants moved to strike from the insurer's motion 
for summary judgment any reference to the engineer's 
conclusions, and argued that the engineer failed to satisfy the 
requisite standard of reliability established in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  The Superior 
Court judge denied the defendants' motion to strike. 
8 
 
 
defendants.  The insurer filed a timely notice of appeal, and we 
transferred the insurer's appeal to this court on our own 
motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "Summary judgment 
is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law."  Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346, 350 (2012).   
"In a case like this one where both parties have moved for 
summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom judgment [has entered]" 
(citation omitted).  Id.  The interpretation of an insurance 
policy is a question of law subject to de novo review.  Id.  
"[I]f the language of an insurance policy is unambiguous, then 
we construe the words in their usual and ordinary sense" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id.  However, if the policy 
language is ambiguous, "doubts as to the intended meaning of the 
words must be resolved against the insurance company that 
employed them and in favor of the insured.  This rule of 
construction applies with particular force to exclusionary 
provisions" (quotations and citations omitted).  Id. at 350-351. 
 
No material facts are in dispute in this case.  The sole 
question whether the policy exclusion applies is a question of 
law ripe for summary judgment, as it requires interpreting the 
9 
 
 
policy language and applying that language to the undisputed 
facts of this case. 
b.  Homeowner's insurance and the exclusionary language at 
issue.  "As is characteristic of a standard homeowner's policy," 
the policy at issue "has two categories of coverage:  insurance 
against loss to property, including its use, and insurance 
against [personal] liability."  Callahan v. Quincy Mut. Fire 
Ins. Co., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 262 (2000).  See J.F. Comerford 
& M.S. Coven, Insurance Law § 3:2 (2013).  Thus, homeowner's 
insurance provides protection against "two distinct perils":  
"(1) liability resulting from the condition of the insured 
premises, and (2) liability stemming from the insured's tortious 
personal conduct which may occur at any place on or off the 
insured premises."  Tacker v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 530 
N.W.2d 674, 677 (Iowa 1995), citing Lititz Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Branch, 561 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Mo. App. 1977).  See 9 Couch on 
Insurance 3d § 126:8 (rev. ed. 2015). 
However, the policy does exclude from coverage bodily 
injury or property damage arising out of a premises owned by an 
insured that is not an insured location under the policy.  It is 
not appropriate to impose liability for this distinct third 
"peril" -- injury arising out of the premises of uninsured 
property -- because the insurer has not been given the 
opportunity to inspect and assess the uninsured property and 
10 
 
 
been compensated to assume this additional risk.  If an insured 
wishes to be insured against liability arising out of another 
premises, he or she must allow inspection and assessment of that 
risk and pay for that additional coverage, as an additional 
premises results in additional exposure for the insurance 
company.  See Callahan, 50 Mass. App. Ct. at 263 ("the many 
personal risks incident to ownership of property . . . are 
distinctly greater when an insured owns additional real estate 
that the insurer has not inspected and assessed from the point 
of view of risk").  The insurer cannot agree to insure a 
property for its "falling roof slate" or other defects if it has 
not had the opportunity to understand the risk it would be 
insuring against on that premises and, in most cases, 
subsequently require an insured to make certain repairs before 
offering protection against liability for the conditions of that 
premises.  See id.  See also Commerce Ins. Co. v. Theodore, 65 
Mass. App. Ct. 471, 475 (2006) (Theodore).  It is for this 
reason that the uninsured premises exclusion exists in most if 
not all homeowner's insurance policies providing personal 
liability coverage.  See id.; Callahan, supra. 
As it is undisputed that the deaths here were caused by the 
improper use of a portable generator inside the cabin, and the 
cabin was not an insured premises, we are clearly not concerned 
with the first peril discussed supra.  The only issue is whether 
11 
 
 
the bodily injury arose from the uninsured premises or from 
tortious personal conduct.  This requires a more precise 
understanding of what it means for bodily injury to arise from 
the uninsured premises. 
Although this court has not yet interpreted the specific 
exclusionary language at issue, the Appeals Court and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit have interpreted 
the words "arising out of a premises" to mean "arising out of a 
condition of a premises."  Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Zamsky, 732 
F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 2013) (Zamsky).  See Theodore, 65 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 475; Callahan, 50 Mass. App. Ct. at 262-263, 264 
n.5.  Many other courts around the country have similarly 
interpreted this language.  See, e.g., id. at 264 n.5 
(collecting cases); Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 561 S.W.2d at 373.  
This language "differentiates what arises out of [the premises] 
from what occurs on" an uninsured premises.  Callahan, supra at 
262.  The relevant exclusionary language does not exclude, for 
example, coverage for the second peril described supra -- 
namely, "liability stemming from the insured's tortious personal 
conduct which may occur at any place on or off the insured 
premises."  Tacker, 530 N.W.2d at 677.  See Westfield Ins. Co. 
v. Hunter, 128 Ohio St. 3d 540, 541-542 (2011) (negligent 
entrustment of minor with ATV did not arise out of uninsured 
premises). 
12 
 
 
 
To better illustrate this distinction, we turn first to the 
decision of the Appeals Court in Callahan.  In that case, the 
insured had a homeowner's insurance policy for property he owned 
in New Hampshire.  Callahan, 50 Mass. App. Ct. at 261.  The 
claim arose, however, when the insured's dog attacked a business 
invitee on property the insured owned in Massachusetts.  Id. at 
260.  The homeowner's policy insured against personal liability, 
but excluded coverage for "bodily injury or property 
damage . . . arising out of a premises []owned by an 
insured . . . that is not an insured location."  Id. at 261.  
The Massachusetts property was owned by the insured but not an 
insured location under the policy.  Id.  The question before the 
court on the insurer's claim for declaratory judgment was 
whether the dog bite -- for which the insured was personally 
liable -- arose out of the Massachusetts property.  Id.  Stated 
differently, "[t]he question [was] whether the exclusion ought 
to be read as pertaining to anything that occurs on the off-
policy premises or whether the exclusion is limited to accidents 
that occur because of a condition of the off-policy premises, 
such as a hole in a walkway, a loose step, defective plumbing, 
or faulty electric wiring."  Id. 
 
The Appeals Court held that the exclusion in the policy did 
not apply to a dog bite that occurred on the uninsured premises.  
Id. at 264-265.  In its analysis, the court relied on Lititz 
13 
 
 
Mut. Ins. Co., a parallel Missouri case involving an off-policy 
premises dog bite.  Callahan, supra at 263-264, citing Lititz 
Mut. Ins. Co., 561 S.W.2d at 373-374.  The court concluded:  
"That an accident happened on a premises did not make it 'in 
connection with' those premises."  Callahan, supra at 263.  The 
court contrasted tortious personal conduct -- which "was not 
greatly expanded by an insured's ownership of other real 
property" -- with "personal risks incident to ownership of 
property," such as "the loose board, the falling roof slate, the 
defect in the walkway, [and] the failure of outdoor lighting."  
Id. 
 
Applying the same analysis it used in Callahan, the Appeals 
Court reached a different result six years later in Theodore, 65 
Mass. App. Ct. at 476.  In that case, the insured homeowner 
owned a property in the Dorchester section of Boston that was 
not covered under the insured's homeowner's policy for property 
in Framingham.  Id. at 472.  A man helping the insured cut down 
a dying tree at the Dorchester property fell from a ladder while 
attempting to remove his chainsaw from the tree.  Id.  The 
insurer commenced a civil action seeking a judgment declaring 
that it had no obligation to defend or indemnify its insured for 
his personal liability in the man's fall.  Id.  The insurer 
invoked an exclusion that pretermitted coverage for personal 
14 
 
 
liability "[a]rising out of a premises . . . [o]wned by an 
'insured' . . . that is not an 'insured location."  Id. at 471. 
 
The court compared the facts of Theodore to the facts of 
Callahan:  "That an accident happens on the uninsured premises 
does not by itself trigger the exclusion.  The dog bite [in 
Callahan] did not stem from any condition of the uninsured 
premises and in our view did not arise from the premises."  Id.  
at 475.  However, the court concluded that "where . . . a third 
person is on the property to repair a condition of the property 
-- the dying tree -- and in the course of such repair an injury 
results, such injury is one 'arising out of a premises.'"  Id. 
at 476.  Thus, the tree -- unlike the dog in Callahan -- was a 
condition of the premises, and falling from the ladder was 
sufficiently related to the condition of the premises to trigger 
the exclusion.  Id. 
 
The First Circuit used the two "bookend cases" discussed 
supra to frame its inquiry in Zamsky, 732 F.3d at 42.  In that 
case, three people suffered severe burns when an insured's guest 
poured gasoline on a portable fire pit.  Id. at 40.  The 
injuries occurred at the insureds' property in Falmouth, which 
was not an insured location under the policy at issue.  Id. at 
39-40.  Similar to the policies in Callahan and Theodore, the 
policy in Zamsky excluded from coverage injuries "[a]rising out 
of a premises" owned by an insured but not itself an "insured 
15 
 
 
location."  Id. at 40 n.2.  In comparing Callahan and Theodore 
to the case before it, the First Circuit reasoned: 
"In both [Callahan and Theodore], the Appeals Court 
interpreted the . . . exclusion's ambiguous 'arising out of 
a premises' language to mean arising out of a condition of 
a premises.  Read together, the cases establish a 
dichotomy:  if the covered occurrence arises out of a 
condition of the premises and the exclusion's other 
requirements are satisfied, the exclusion applies; 
otherwise, it does not.  This dichotomy is faithful to an 
interpretive principle long hallowed by the [Supreme 
Judicial Court]:  ambiguities in insurance policies are to 
be construed in favor of affording coverage to the insured.  
This venerable principle underpins, and is fully consistent 
with, the [Supreme Judicial Court's] unwavering insistence 
that exclusions from coverage should be strictly 
construed."  (Citations omitted.) 
 
Id. at 42-43.  Thus, the First Circuit concluded that "arising 
out of a premises" was ambiguous policy language and that, as 
such, it must be construed in favor of the insured.  Id.  The 
court went on to conclude that the portable fire pit at issue in 
the case was not a condition of the premises that fell under the 
exclusion: 
"Although we leave for another day the exact contours of 
the phrase 'a condition of the premises,' it is nose-on-
the-face plain that this portable fire pit -- stored on the 
property for a matter of months and used just once prior to 
the occurrence (in a different location) -- was not a 
condition of the Falmouth premises.  The fact that the fire 
pit was easily movable is a significant consideration.  See 
9 Steven Plitt et al., Couch on Insurance 3d § 126:8 
(2008).  See also Callahan, [50 Mass. App. Ct. at 263].  
Unlike the tree in Theodore, [65 Mass. App. Ct. at 475-
476], the fire pit was not a part of the premises.  Unlike 
the electric fence that the Callahan court hypothesized 
would be considered a condition of the premises, [Callahan, 
supra], the fire pit was not erected on the property.  Nor 
did the fire pit constitute a defect in some part of the 
16 
 
 
premises, such as 'the loose board, the falling roof slate, 
the defect in the walkway, [or] the failure of outdoor 
lighting' mentioned by both the Theodore and Callahan 
courts.  [See Theodore, supra at 475, quoting Callahan, 
supra].  Rather, the fire pit was a portable item of 
personal property that happened to be stored in a building 
on the Falmouth premises." 
 
Id. at 44-45.  In reaching this conclusion, the court in Zamsky 
emphasized that, if the insurer had "wanted to exclude from 
coverage all injuries occurring at an owned premises that it did 
not insure, it would have been child's play to say so."  Id. at 
44.  See, e.g., California Cas. Ins. Co. v. American Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 208 Ariz. 416, 420 (2004) (barring coverage for off-
policy premises dog bite when policy excluded from coverage 
damages "arising out of any act or omission occurring on or in 
connection with any premises owned . . . by any insured other 
than an insured premises" [emphasis added]).  Instead, it used 
the standard "arising out of" language. 
 
In the three cases discussed supra, as well as in the great 
weight of authority on this subject, there is a distinction 
drawn between cases of tortious conduct that occur on an 
uninsured premises and personal liability that arises out of a 
condition of a premises.  For example, the dog bite in Callahan 
"was no more connected to [the insured's] real estate than had 
[the insured] spilled hot coffee on a guest on those premises.  
It happened there, but it did not 'arise out of,' as the phrase 
is understood."  Callahan, 50 Mass. App. Ct. at 263.  "Had [the 
17 
 
 
dog] bitten someone in front of the municipal building" or most 
anywhere else in town, the insured would have been protected by 
the personal liability portion of the policy.  Id. at 262. 
 
Whether the personal liability in the instant case arises 
out of the uninsured premises presents a close question.  We 
conclude that the generator does not constitute a condition of 
the uninsured premises, and the accident caused by the generator 
therefore cannot trigger the uninsured premises exclusion.  The 
generator was portable, and Wakelin even spent more money on the 
generator so that it would be portable.  It was also not hard 
wired into the cabin's rough electrical system to make it a part 
of the cabin.  It was only "attached" to the cabin by means of a 
chain so it would not be stolen -- just like the ATVs, which are 
also Wakelin's personal property.  Nor was it regularly used to 
provide electricity in the cabin.  The generator was brought to 
the cabin to charge power tools used to complete the cabin's 
construction, and was not continuously run to power everyday 
appliances inside the camp.  Although it was always kept at the 
Maine cabin, it was portable like the fire pit in Zamsky.  
Zamsky, 732 F.3d at 45. 
 
The generator here did not resemble any property condition 
that typically gives rise to personal liability, such as "the 
loose board, the falling roof slate, the defect in the walkway, 
[or] the failure of outdoor lighting."  Callahan, 50 Mass. App. 
18 
 
 
Ct. at 263.  Inspection of the property would not have revealed 
a correctable defect, as it would have had the generator been 
hard wired inside the house.  Nor was the generator a permanent 
fixture of the cabin.5  Compare In re Ryerson, 519 B.R. 275, 287 
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2014) (generator not fixture where it could be 
removed without damage to realty and wiring was amenable to 
reconnecting to generator with appropriate cabling and lugs), 
with Fifth Third Mtge. Corp. v. Johnson, 2011-Ohio-6778, ¶¶23, 
28 (Ct. App. 2011) (nonportable generator was fixture where it 
was attached to home by electric and gasoline lines that could 
only be used with specific generator, and where generator was 
listed in advertising when defendants attempted to sell home). 
 
Further, it was Wakelin's failure to instruct his children 
on how to properly use the generator rather than any condition 
or defect on the property that is the basis for his potential 
liability here.  See Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 561 S.W.2d at 374 
                                                 
 
5 Although the law of fixtures does not control the analysis 
in the present case, we find it a helpful analogy in determining 
whether an item of personal property can form the basis for 
liability arising out of a premises for purposes of the policy 
exclusion, particularly since the word "premises" "contemplates 
the land and more or less permanently affixed structures 
contained thereon."  Westfield Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 128 Ohio St. 
3d 540, 545 (2011), quoting Lititz Mut. Ins. Co. v. Branch, 561 
S.W.2d 371, 373 (Mo. App. 1977).  See, e.g., Bay State York Co. 
v. Marvix, Inc., 331 Mass. 407, 411 (1954) ("Where the chattel 
is so affixed to the realty that its identity is lost, or where 
it cannot be removed without material injury to the realty or to 
itself, the intent to make it a part of the realty may be 
established as matter of law"). 
19 
 
 
("Liability for injuries caused by an animal owned by an insured 
arises from the insured's personal tortious conduct in harboring 
a vicious animal, not from any condition of the premises upon 
which the animal may be located"); Westfield Ins. Co., 128 Ohio 
St. 3d at 546 ("our inquiry must focus on the insureds' alleged 
negligence in permitting [the minor] to operate the ATV in a 
negligent or reckless manner, which has no causal link to the 
quality or condition of the premises").  See also Zamsky, 732 
F.3d at 40 (burns caused by negligence of pouring gasoline on 
fire and not condition of premises).  Wakelin could have been 
responsible for the very same omission elsewhere and still would 
have been covered by the policy.  See Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 
supra.  By way of example, Wakelin could have lent the portable 
generator to a neighbor and failed to instruct him or her on how 
to properly use it, and had any harm resulted, he would have 
been covered under his policy for the same alleged tortious 
conduct that underlies the present case. 
 
In a similar vein, we reject the insurer's argument that 
the cabin's "inadequate ventilation" was a condition of the 
premises out of which the accident arose.  The generator's 
danger and warning labels explicitly warned that using a 
generator anywhere indoors can be lethal.  The labels specified 
that the generator should only be used outside, and never in any 
enclosed or even partly enclosed area.  Nothing from our review 
20 
 
 
of the record makes this particular cabin any more susceptible 
to an accident involving carbon monoxide poisoning than any 
other enclosed area, as no enclosed area is a safe place to run 
a generator.  This further supports our conclusion that this 
accident -- however tragic -- could have happened anywhere, and 
did not arise out of a condition of the uninsured premises. 
 
In reaching this decision, we also conclude that the 
relevant language of the policy is ambiguous enough to require 
that it be read against the insurer, particularly since the 
policy language at issue is an exclusion from coverage.  See 
Boazova, 462 Mass. at 350-351; Zamsky, 732 F.3d at 42-43.  In so 
doing, we acknowledge Massachusetts case law requiring the 
phrase "arising out of" in insurance policies to "be read 
expansively, incorporating a greater range of causation than 
that encompassed by proximate cause under tort law."  Bagley v. 
Monticello Ins. Co., 430 Mass. 454, 457 (1999).  However, we 
reject the insurer's argument that an expansive reading of 
"arising out of" also requires an expansive reading of "arising 
out of a premises."  An expansive reading of "arising out of" 
comes only after establishing that the object in question -- 
here, a generator -- is a condition of the premises.  See, e.g., 
Theodore, 65 Mass. App. Ct. at 472-473 (applying expansive 
interpretation of "arising out of" only after establishing tree 
was condition of property); Zamsky, supra at 43 ("the 'arising 
21 
 
 
out of' language only comes into play if there is some causal 
link between the covered occurrence and a condition of the 
premises").  Accepting the insurer's argument to broadly expand 
what arises out of a premises would defeat our long-standing 
principle of strictly construing exclusions from coverage 
against the insurer.  See Holyoke Mut. Ins. Co. in Salem v. 
Vibram USA, Inc., 480 Mass. 480, 485 (2018). 
 
In sum, we cannot "countenance the insurer's revisionist 
attempt to make a policy exclusion sweep more broadly than its 
language dictates," particularly where the insurer had the 
ability to include different exclusionary language in its policy 
and failed to do so.6  Zamsky, 732 F.3d at 44. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The generator that caused the tragic 
accident in this case when it was improperly used inside the 
cabin was not a condition of the uninsured premises.  The 
accident therefore did not arise out of the uninsured premises, 
                                                 
 
6 For example, the insurer chose to use broader language in 
a separate exclusion for property damage arising out of "[a]ny 
act or omission in connection with a premises owned, rented or 
controlled by an 'insured', other than the 'insured location,'" 
(emphasis added).  This exclusion, which does not apply to the 
present case, references an act or omission on the premises 
rather than liability arising from the premises itself.  
Further, the phrase "'[i]n connection with' is ordinarily held 
to have even a broader meaning than 'arising out of.'"  
Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fitchburg Mut. Ins. Co., 
58 Mass. App. Ct. 818, 821 (2003).  The insurer could have, but 
did not, use similar language in the exclusion that is the 
subject of this appeal. 
22 
 
 
and the coverage exclusion at issue does not apply.  The 
judgment of the Superior Court is therefore affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.