Title: 1000 Fleet v. Guerriero

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

One Thousand Fleet Limited Partnership v. John Guerriero, et al,
No. 54, September Term, 1996 
TORTS--MALICIOUS USE OF PROCESS--An action for malicious use of
process cannot be maintained when the underlying lawsuits had not
been terminated in plaintiff's favor because the judgment
dismissing the lawsuits was pending on appeal.
TORTS--MALICIOUS USE OF PROCESS--Malicious use of process requires
damages consisting of seizure of property, arrest or other special
injury.  
TORTS--ABUSE OF PROCESS--Abuse of process requires damages
consisting of an arrest or seizure of property.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 54 
September Term, 1996
___________________________________
ONE THOUSAND FLEET LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP
v.
JOHN GUERRIERO et al.
___________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker
Wilner,
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
___________________________________
   Filed:  June 12, 1997
This appeal involves the torts of malicious use of process and
abuse of process.  We must decide whether Appellant One Thousand
Fleet Limited Partnership may maintain suit for malicious use of
process and abuse of process against Appellees John Guerriero,
Richard Ingrao, and the Little Italy Community Organization based
on lawsuits filed by Ingrao and the Little Italy Community
Organization challenging the zoning modification and issuance of
building permits for a real estate development project undertaken
by Appellant in Baltimore's Little Italy neighborhood.  The Circuit
Court for Baltimore City dismissed Appellant's two-count complaint
against Appellees.  We shall affirm.
The Parties
Appellant One Thousand Fleet Limited Partnership ("Fleet") is
a Maryland limited partnership engaged in real estate development
in Baltimore City.  Appellee John Guerriero is a property owner in
Baltimore's Little Italy neighborhood.  Appellee Richard Ingrao is
also a property owner in Little Italy and, at the time of most of
the events in question here, was president of the Little Italy
Community Organization ("Community Organization").  The Community
Organization, also an appellee, is a non-profit corporation formed
to further the interests of the residents and businesses of the
Little Italy neighborhood.
The Project
In the summer of 1992, Fleet began negotiations to purchase an
abandoned furniture warehouse, the Bagby Furniture building,
2
       Fleet's predecessor was Henrietta Corporation.  The letter
1
from the Community Organization, dated March 15, 1993, is addressed
to "Patrick Turner, Henrietta Corporation."  One Thousand Fleet
Limited Partnership was formed sometime between March, 1993, and
when Fleet applied to the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals for
the necessary zoning modifications.  One Thousand Fleet and
Henrietta Corporation have the same address and Patrick Turner's
name appears on all of One Thousand Fleet's zoning and conditional
use applications. 
Many of the contentions of the Community Organization and
Ingrao in the four underlying lawsuits and in their counterclaim in
this case concern the propriety of the Board issuing zoning
modifications and permits given the change in the entity seeking to
purchase the property.  This issue is not before us on this appeal
and we express no opinion on it.       
       Notwithstanding the reference to fifty-six apartment units
2
in the letter from the Community Organization, the record and the
briefs of both Appellant and Appellees refer to the construction of
fifty-seven apartment units.
located at 509-521 South Exeter Street in Baltimore City.  Fleet
intended to convert the building to an apartment building
containing fifty-seven apartments.  The Community Organization
initially supported the project.  In a letter dated March 15, 1993,
Ingrao, on behalf of the Community Organization, wrote a letter to
Fleet's predecessor  informing Fleet that "[t]he community
1
overwhelmingly approved the conversion of the building into 56
apartment units."   The letter contained certain Community
2
Organization demands concerning parking, the height of the
building, the management of the property, and the zoning
modifications that Fleet would be required to obtain.  
On April 1, 1993, Fleet reached an agreement of sale with the
owners of the Bagby Furniture building to purchase the building for
one million dollars.  In order to develop the property as an
3
apartment building, it was necessary to obtain a rezoning of the
property from heavy industrial to a residential classification.
The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore approved the zoning change
on July 2, 1993.  Fleet also applied for conditional use authority
from the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals ("the Board") of the
City of Baltimore.  Conditional use authority from the Board was
necessary in order to use the building as apartments.  The Board
approved the conditional use authority on November 30, 1993.  
After it cleared the zoning hurdles, Fleet sought and received
financial commitments for the project from various federal, state,
and local entities.  As a condition of state and local funding,
Fleet was required to reserve ten apartment units in the planned
residential facility for persons of moderate income.  Fleet alleges
that at this point the Community Organization's support for the
project evaporated.  According to Fleet, the public financing was
discussed at several public meetings and opposition to the project
became intense.  Fleet alleges in its complaint that racism
motivated the opposition and that at one of the meetings, Guerriero
stated that he opposed the project because "it would attract
residents of African-American descent" to the neighborhood;
Guerriero suggested that a lawsuit should be filed to prevent
further development of the project.  Fleet further alleges that at
this meeting, Guerriero also offered to fund a lawsuit to stop the
project, although he did not wish to have his name associated with
the lawsuit.
4
       Ingrao and the Community Organization filed two lawsuits
3
against the City of Baltimore seeking a determination that the
zoning authority for the property was no longer valid and
challenging the issuance of building permits for the project.  They
filed two additional lawsuits, seeking judicial review of the
actions taken by the Baltimore City Board of Municipal and Zoning
Appeals.  The four cases, all captioned "LICO et al. v. Mayor &
City Council et al.," were filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City and numbered as follows:  95094003/CL194931; 95124005/CL
196386; 95139066/CL194323; 95082023/CL197154.  
On April 5, 1995, counsel for Guerriero sent a letter to Glenn
Charlow of the Manekin Corporation, the Bagby Furniture Company's
realtor.  In the letter, Guerriero offered to purchase the property
for $300,000 cash.  The record does not reflect whether Mr. Charlow
responded, but Guerriero's offer apparently was not accepted as
Fleet ultimately succeeded in purchasing the building for the
agreed upon one million dollars.  
The Underlying Law Suits
The Community Organization and Ingrao filed four lawsuits
against the Board and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.3
The lawsuits challenged the Board's extension of the conditional
use authority, the City's issuance of the building permit, and the
City's rezoning of the Bagby Furniture building.  Fleet was not
named as a defendant in any of the four lawsuits filed by Gerald R.
Walsh, counsel for the Community Organization and Ingrao.  Fleet
sought to intervene in these four actions and to consolidate the
cases.  The circuit court (Rombro, J.) granted Fleet's motion to
intervene and ordered the cases consolidated.  The court also
agreed to shorten the time to file pleadings and motions, finding
5
that the lawsuits could jeopardize Fleet's financing if allowed to
run their normal course.
 On June 8, 1995, the circuit court dismissed all four
lawsuits, concluding that the Community Organization and Ingrao
lacked standing to assert the claims contained in the four actions.
The Community Organization and Ingrao appealed to the Court of
Special Appeals.  Ultimately, on December 5, 1995, the appeals were
dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals for lack of prosecution.
      
The Present Lawsuit
On April 24, 1995, Fleet filed a one-count complaint against
Guerriero, Ingrao, and the Community Organization alleging abuse of
process.  On June 26, 1995, Fleet filed an amended complaint,
adding a count of malicious use of process.  The complaint alleged
that the Community Organization and Ingrao, at the direction of
Guerriero and with his financial backing, filed suits in order to
prevent Fleet from completing its project and that the lawsuits
were misused to facilitate Guerriero's purchase of the property at
a reduced price.    
The Community Organization and Ingrao filed a two-count
counterclaim.  In the first count, the Community Organization and
Ingrao challenged the Board's issuance of a building permit because
they contended that the conditional use permit, on which the
building permit was premised, was invalid.  The second count
alleged defamation based on a letter Fleet sent to Administrative
6
Judge Joseph H.H. Kaplan dated May 10, 1995, that allegedly accused
Appellees of racism.  
All parties moved to dismiss.  The circuit court (Steinberg,
J.) granted the motions of Guerriero, the Community Organization
and Ingrao "for the reasons set forth in that motion, which this
Court hereby adopts, and the additional fact that the underlying
litigation which serves as the predicate for the malicious use of
process cause of action is currently on appeal before the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland."  Judge Steinberg entered final
judgment in favor of Guerriero, the Community Organization, and
Ingrao.  See Maryland Rule 2-602.
Fleet appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  This Court
granted certiorari before consideration by that court.
I.  
Despite the similarity in language, "[a]buse of process,
malicious use of process, and malicious prosecution are essentially
different and independent torts."  R. GILBERT & P. GILBERT, MARYLAND TORT
LAW HANDBOOK § 5.3, at 54 (1992).  In Maryland, the term "malicious
use of process" means malicious prosecution of a civil claim.
"Malicious prosecution" in Maryland applies to criminal charges,
but otherwise shares the same elements as malicious use of process.
S. SPEISER, ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 28:20, at 114 (1991, 1996
Supp.).  "Abuse of process," on the other hand, is a distinct tort.
7
Abuse of process in Maryland can apply to either civil or criminal
charges.  With these basic concepts in mind, we turn to the
elements of malicious use of process and abuse of process under
Maryland law.
A.  Malicious Use of Process
This Court in Walker v. American Security Co., 237 Md. 80, 87,
205 A.2d 302, 307 (1964), described the tort of malicious use of
process:
[A]ctions for malicious prosecution and malicious use of
process are concerned with maliciously causing criminal
or civil process to issue for its ostensible purpose, but
without probable cause. . . . Actions for malicious
prosecution and malicious use of process have the same
essential elements and are often referred to as being
essentially synonymous, with most of the cases referring
to malicious prosecution as arising out of a criminal
proceeding and malicious use of process as arising out of
a civil proceeding.  
This Court has long recognized that "[s]uits for malicious
prosecution are viewed with disfavor in law and are to be carefully
guarded against."  North Pt. Constr. Co. v. Sagner, 185 Md. 200,
206, 44 A.2d 441, 444 (1945).  Public policy requires that citizens
be free to resort to the courts to resolve grievances without fear
that their opponent will retaliate with a malicious use of process
lawsuit against them.  See Owens v. Graetzel, 149 Md. 689, 694-95,
132 A. 265, 267 (1926).  
The cause of action for malicious use of process has five
elements and all must co-exist to maintain the action.  Keys v.
Chrysler Credit Corp., 303 Md. 397, 407, 494 A.2d 200, 205 (1985).
8
First, a prior civil proceeding must have been instituted by the
defendant.  Second, the proceeding must have been instituted
without probable cause.  Sagner, 185 Md. at 208, 44 A.2d at 445.
Probable cause for purposes of malicious use of process means "a
reasonable ground for belief in the existence of such state of
facts as would warrant institution of the suit or proceeding
complained of."  Id. at 208-09, 44 A.2d at 445.  Third, the prior
civil proceeding must have been instituted by the defendant with
malice.  Malice in the context of malicious use of process means
that the party instituting proceedings was actuated by an improper
motive.  Keys, 303 Md. at 408 n.7, 494 A.2d at 205 n.7.  As a
matter of proof, malice may be inferred from a lack of probable
cause.  See Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 717, 664 A.2d
916, 924 (1995).  Fourth, the proceedings must have terminated in
favor of the plaintiff.  See Berman v. Karvounis, 308 Md. 259, 266,
518 A.2d 726, 729 (1987).  Finally, the plaintiff must establish
that damages were inflicted upon the plaintiff by arrest or
imprisonment, by seizure of property, or other special injury which
would not necessarily result in all suits prosecuted to recover for
a like cause of action.  Keys, 303 Md. at 407, 494 A.2d at 205;
Owens, 149 Md. at 695, 132 A. at 267.     
B.  Abuse of Process
In his treatise, Professor Keeton notes that an action for
malicious use of process does not provide a remedy for those cases
9
"in which legal procedure has been set in motion in proper form,
with probable cause, and even with ultimate success, but
nevertheless has been perverted to accomplish an ulterior purpose
for which it was not designed.  In such cases a tort action has
been developed for what is called abuse of process."  W. KEETON,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 121, at 897 (5th ed. 1984).  In
Krashes v. White, 275 Md. 549, 555, 341 A.2d 798, 802 (1975), Judge
Eldridge, writing for the Court, described the tort of abuse of
process:
The tort of abuse of process occurs when a party has
wilfully misused criminal or civil process after it has
issued in order to obtain a result not contemplated by
law.  (citations omitted.)
 
To sustain a cause of action for abuse of process, the
plaintiff must prove:  first, that the defendant wilfully used
process after it has issued in a manner not contemplated by law,
Keys, 303 Md. at 411, 494 A.2d at 207;  second, that the defendant
acted to satisfy an ulterior motive; and third, that damages
resulted from the defendant's perverted use of process, Berman, 308
Md. at 262, 518 A.2d at 727.  A bad motive alone is not sufficient
to establish an abuse of process.  "Some definite act or threat not
authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate
in the use of the process is required . . . ."  KEETON, supra, §
121, at 898; see also Berman, 308 Md. at 265, 518 A.2d at 729;
Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 230-31, 14 A. 518, 522 (1888);
10
Wells v. Orthwein, 670 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) ("[N]o
liability is incurred where the defendant has done nothing more
than pursue the lawsuit to its authorized conclusion regardless of
how evil his motive may be.").       
In summary, the two torts at issue in this case are separate
and distinct.  This Court, in Walker v. American Security Co., 237
Md. 80, 87, 205 A.2d 302, 306-07 (1964), outlined the differences
between the two as follows:  
A tort action for abuse of process, on the one hand,
and the tort actions for malicious prosecution and
malicious use of process, on the other hand, are
essentially different and independent actions.  An action
for abuse of process differs from actions for malicious
prosecution and malicious use of process in that abuse of
process is concerned with the improper use of criminal or
civil process in a manner not contemplated by law after
it has been issued, without the necessity of showing lack
of probable cause or termination of the proceeding in
favor of the plaintiff, while actions for malicious
prosecution and malicious use of process are concerned
with maliciously causing criminal or civil process to
issue for its ostensible purpose, but without probable
cause.  (emphasis in original).
See also Bidna v. Rosen, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 251, 259 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993), rev. denied, No. G012357, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 6936 (Cal. Dec.
30, 1993) (describing malicious use of process as concerning a
meritless lawsuit and abuse of process as concerning "misuse of the
tools the law affords litigants once they are in a lawsuit"
(emphasis in original)).   
The case of Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corporation, 303 Md. 397,
494 A.2d 200 (1985), illustrates the differences between malicious
11
use of process and abuse of process.  In Keys, Anna Keys's wages
were attached by a writ of garnishment issued to enforce a judgment
that Keys had fully satisfied more than four years earlier.  Id. at
400, 494 A.2d at 201.  After Keys's attorney brought the matter to
the attention of Chrysler Credit Corporation, Chrysler Credit
checked its records and found that Keys had indeed satisfied the
judgment four years earlier.  Chrysler Credit reimbursed her wages.
Keys sued Chrysler Credit for, inter alia, malicious use of process
and abuse of process.  Id. at 402, 494 A.2d at 202.  Judge
McAuliffe, writing for the Court, concluded that the trial court
improperly dismissed Keys's malicious use of process claim because
a prior civil proceeding had been instituted by Chrysler Credit
against Keys, that the proceeding was instituted without probable
cause inasmuch as Chrysler admitted that Keys had fully paid the
judgment, that malice may be inferred from a want of probable
cause, that the proceeding was terminated in Keys's favor, and that
Keys suffered a seizure of her property, i.e., the garnished wages.
Id. at 408-10, 494 A.2d at 205-07.  The Court held, however, that
Keys could not maintain an action for abuse of process because
there was no evidence of any improper use or perversion of the
process after it issued.  The Court noted that Keys's "proper
complaint in this case is with the issuance of the process, . . .
and she has no proper proof of an abuse of process."  Id. at 412,
494 A.2d at 207 (emphasis added).  Thus, an action for abuse of
12
process could not survive.      
With the elements of the two torts in mind, we turn now to
examine whether Fleet alleged facts sufficient to support causes of
action for malicious use of process and abuse of process.
II.
Fleet appeals the judgment of dismissal, with prejudice, of
its 
two-count 
complaint 
against 
Guerriero, 
the 
Community
Organization, and Ingrao.  Accordingly, this Court must "assume the
truth of all relevant and material facts well pleaded and all
inferences which can be reasonably drawn from those facts."  Stone
v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 330 Md. 329, 333, 624 A.2d 496, 498
(1993).  In considering the allegations, however, we consider
allegations of fact and inferences deducible from them; we do not
consider merely conclusory charges.  Berman v. Karvounis, 308 Md.
259, 265, 518 A.2d 726, 728-29 (1987).    
A.  Malicious Use of Process
Fleet alleges that the Community Organization, Ingrao, and
Guerriero committed the tort of malicious use of process on the
grounds that the four lawsuits challenging the zoning of the
disputed property were instituted without probable cause and with
malice, in that the lawsuits were intended to interfere with
Fleet's ability to finance the purchase and to facilitate
Guerriero's purchase of the property at a reduced price.  Fleet
13
further alleges that the dismissal of all four zoning lawsuits by
Judge Rombro constituted termination in its favor.  Finally, Fleet
claims damages based on the inability to obtain financing, delays,
and loss of rental income.  The Community Organization, Guerriero,
and Ingrao contend that Fleet lacks standing because the Community
Organization and Ingrao did not name Fleet as a party in any of the
underlying lawsuits.  Fleet maintains that the fact that it was not
named as a defendant in any of the suits is of no moment, because
it was clearly the target of each action and the object of the four
cases was to seek a revocation or withdrawal of valuable
governmental permits that it held.  Fleet argues that in order to
protect its rights, intervention was inevitable.  
As discussed above, see supra part I.A., a cause of action for
malicious use of process consists of five elements, all of which
must co-exist in order to maintain the action.  The plaintiff's
failure to satisfy even one element mandates dismissal.  We shall
hold that because Fleet failed to allege facts to support a cause
of action for malicious use of process, the circuit court properly
granted Appellees' motions to dismiss.  
We shall first address the element of malicious use of process
that requires the proceeding be terminated in favor of the
plaintiff.  The judgment dismissing the Community Organization and
Ingrao's four zoning lawsuits was pending on appeal when Fleet
filed its amended complaint in this case.  The question of whether
14
       We leave for another day the question of whether a party
4
who was not an original party in the underlying lawsuit but rather
participated as an intervenor may maintain a cause of action for
malicious use of process.  Of the few states that have addressed
the issue, most hold that the malicious use of process plaintiff
must have been an original party to the underlying action.  See,
e.g, H. Eilerman & Sons v. Nestley, 148 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1941); Duncan v. Griswold, 18 S.W. 354, 355 (Ky. Ct. App.
1892); Cuddy v. Sweeney, 386 N.E.2d 805, 806 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979);
McGranahan v. Dahar, 408 A.2d 121, 130 (N.H. 1979);  Rosen v.
American Bank of Rolla, 627 A.2d 190, 193 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
Pennsylvania seems to recognize an exception to the general rule
for intervenors who are indispensable parties to the underlying
proceedings but were not joined by the plaintiff as parties.  The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that intervenors who were
indispensable parties to the underlying action may maintain a cause
of action for malicious use of process because the failure of the
plaintiff in the underlying action to join them as indispensable
parties should not bar a cause of action.  Hart v. O'Malley, 676
A.2d 222, 225 (Pa. 1996). 
a proceeding has been "terminated" for purposes of a malicious use
of process action when the judgment "terminating" the proceeding
was pending on appeal at the time the plaintiff initiated the
malicious use of process action is a question of first impression
in this State.
Section 674(b) of the Second Restatement of Torts specifies
that a cause of action for malicious use of process shall lie only
when "the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person
against whom they are brought."   The comments to this section
4
address the issue of appeal:  
A favorable adjudication may be by a judgment rendered by
a court after trial, or upon demurrer or its equivalent.
In either case the adjudication is a sufficient
termination of the proceedings, unless an appeal is
taken.  If an appeal is taken, the proceedings are not
terminated until the final disposition of the appeal and
15
of any further proceedings that it may entail.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 cmt. j.  The Restatement position
represents the majority view.  SPEISER, supra, § 28:23 & n.10, at
144; see also M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Pending Appeal in Civil
Action as Precluding Malicious Prosecution Action Based on
Successful Termination in Trial Court, 41 A.L.R.2d 863, 863 (1955)
(describing as the "better view" and that which "may be
legitimately termed the weight of authority" the rule that "the
pendency of an appeal . . . precludes maintenance of a suit for
malicious prosecution").  The majority rule furthers an important
judicial policy--the conservation of judicial resources.  We agree
with the assessment of the intermediate appellate court of Arizona:
The majority rule prevents repetitive and unnecessary
litigation.  It would be a waste of judicial resources to
allow the plaintiff in the malicious prosecution action
to prosecute his claim only to have it rendered
meaningless if later the appeal of the underlying action
is decided against him.
Klatzke v. Moran, 682 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
We adopt the view expressed in the Restatement and hold that
Fleet could not maintain an action for malicious use of process
when it filed the amended complaint on June 26, 1995.  The judgment
dismissing the underlying lawsuits was pending on appeal until
December 5, 1995, when the appeal was dismissed.  Fleet's cause of
action for malicious use of process fails because the underlying
proceedings were not terminated when the complaint alleging
malicious use of process was filed.  This holding is in accord with
16
several of our sister states that have addressed this issue.  See,
e.g., Barrett Mobile Home Transport v. McGugin, 530 So.2d 730, 732
(Ala. 1988); Klatzke, 682 P.2d at 1158-59; Cazares v. Church of
Scientology of Cal., 444 So.2d 442, 446-47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Mattingly v. Whelden, 435 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Ind. Ct. App.
1982); Breen v. Shatz, 267 S.W.2d 942, 943 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954);
Parisi v. Michigan Townships Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that malicious prosecution cause of action for
purposes of statute of limitations does not accrue until final
resolution on appeal).  
As we previously discussed, all five elements of malicious use
of process must co-exist to maintain a cause of action.  Normally,
the plaintiff's failure to allege facts sufficient to satisfy any
one element would end our analysis.  In this case, however, the
underlying action was terminated December 5, 1995, when the Court
of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution,
and if the termination element were the only element Fleet failed
to satisfy, Fleet would be entitled to re-file the action.
Accordingly, we shall also address Fleet's alleged damages.  
 Fleet fails to allege legally cognizable damages.  To
maintain a cause of action for malicious use of process, the
plaintiff must establish that wrongful proceedings caused an
arrest, a seizure of property, or other "special injury."  Owens v.
Graetzel, 149 Md. 689, 697, 132 A. 265, 267 (1926).  This Court has
17
described the damages required by Maryland law as follows:
Maryland has steadfastly adhered to the so-called
"English" rule that no action will lie for the malicious
prosecution of a civil suit when there has been no arrest
of the person, no seizure of the property of the
defendant, and no special injury sustained which would
not ordinarily result in all suits prosecuted for like
causes of action.
Sagner, 185 Md. at 207, 44 A.2d at 444; see also Shamberger v.
Dessel, 236 Md. 318, 321, 204 A.2d 68, 70 (1964) (finding no cause
of action for malicious use of process because "there was no
special injury sustained by the appellant which would not
ordinarily result in all caveats to wills involving devises of real
property"); GILBERT & GILBERT, supra, § 5.1, at 50.  "The mere expense
and annoyance of defending a civil action is not a sufficient
special damage or injury to sustain an action for malicious
prosecution."  Sagner, 185 Md. at 207, 44 A.2d at 445.
Fleet's malicious use of process count alleges that "Plaintiff
has sustained actual damages as a consequence of the actions of the
Defendants in that it has been unable to obtain final financing for
the Project, has suffered delays which have increased costs and has
sustained a loss of rental revenue among other damages."  These
damages are inadequate to maintain a cause of action for malicious
use of process.  Fleet alleges neither an arrest nor seizure of its
property.  Nor does Fleet allege a "special injury" for purposes of
malicious use of process.  To qualify as a "special injury," the
damages must be different than those that ordinarily result from
18
all suits for like causes of action.  Fleet's alleged damages do
not qualify as a special injury because any real estate developer
facing a legal challenge to the zoning of its property would have
suffered the same damages regardless of whether the zoning
challenge was rightfully or wrongfully instituted.  The Community
Organization's and Ingrao's zoning challenges would likely have
impeded financing, caused delays, and decreased rental revenue
under any circumstances.  The damages Fleet suffered as a result of
the four lawsuits are those that would ordinarily result from
proceedings for similar causes of action.  Id., 44 A.2d at 444.
B.  Abuse of Process
Fleet also alleges that the Community Organization, Ingrao,
and Guerriero committed the tort of abuse of process.  Fleet
identified the process "abused" as the first two zoning challenges
filed by the Community Organization and Ingrao.  According to
Fleet's complaint, the misuse of the process consisted of
Guerriero's discussions with Fleet's lenders and Guerriero's
attempt to purchase the property at a drastically reduced price.
Fleet describes its damages as "loss of certain deposit money,
delay of the Project, lost rents, increased construction, legal and
financing costs and other damages."  Guerriero, Ingrao and the
Community Organization contend that Guerriero's letter offering to
buy the Bagby Furniture building does not qualify as an abuse of
the process of the underlying lawsuits and that Fleet failed to
19
allege damages consisting of arrest or seizure of property as
required for abuse of process. 
We need not consider whether Fleet properly alleged abuse of
process after the lawsuits were filed because we hold that Fleet
did not allege legally cognizable damages.  Consequently, the
circuit court properly dismissed Appellees' motion to dismiss.  
A cause of action for civil abuse of process in Maryland
requires that the plaintiff establish that an arrest of the person
or a seizure of property of the plaintiff resulted from the abuse
of process.  Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 231, 14 A. 518,
522 (1888).  Judge McSherry, writing for the Court in Bartlett,
described the scope of abuse of process:
All the cases upon this subject depend either upon
the arrest of the person or the seizure of his property;
and we have been referred to none where this action was
sustained for an injury to the plaintiff's business or
good name.  Any unfounded suit may result in such injury;
but it will hardly be seriously contended that where
there has been no wrongful deprivation of liberty or no
illegal seizure of property, that each unfounded suit is
to be treated as such an abuse of the process of the law
as will sustain action against the one who instituted it.
Id. at 231, 14 A. at 522.  The law of several sister states is in
accord.  See, e.g, Hopper v. Drysdale, 524 F. Supp. 1039, 1041 (D.
Mont. 1981) (applying Montana law); Withall v. Capitol Federal
Savings of America, 508 N.E.2d 363, 368 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987);
Reynolds v. Givens, 695 P.2d 946, 951 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); cf.
Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895, 902 (Ky. 1981) (holding that
"injury to the person or his property" required for abuse of
20
process); Hertz Corp. v. Paloni, 619 P.2d 1256, 1259 (N.M. Ct. App.
1980) (holding that "unlawful interference with the plaintiff's
person or property" required for abuse of process).
The intermediate appellate court in Illinois decided a case
factually similar to the case before us and concluded, as we do,
that delays in financing and delays in the development of a real
estate project do not constitute damages cognizable under abuse of
process.  Commerce Bank N.A. v. Plotkin, 627 N.E.2d 746 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994).  In Commerce Bank, the Plotkins, the defendants in the
abuse of process action, had filed suit against both the City of
Peoria and the plaintiff, Commerce Bank, challenging the
plaintiff's legal right to develop a shopping center.  Id. at 747.
In its suit for abuse of process, Commerce Bank alleged that the
Plotkins and the other plaintiffs in the underlying action did not
file the lawsuit for the purpose of obtaining the relief sought,
but rather to prevent the plaintiffs from obtaining financing to
develop the shopping center.  Commerce Bank also alleged that the
Plotkins had challenged the development in order to extort large
sums of money from Commerce Bank in exchange for terminating the
proceedings.  Commerce Bank allegedly suffered losses from the
delay in financing and, as a result, was forced to sell a portion
of the shopping center.  Id. at 748.  The Illinois court wrote:
"While we are not unsympathetic to the plaintiffs' predicament, we
do not believe that the facts of this case support an action for
21
abuse of process."  Id. at 749.    
In this case, Fleet alleges only that it suffered injury to
its business and to the Bagby Furniture building project;
specifically, Fleet lost money, suffered a delay of its project,
and faced increased construction, legal and financing costs.  Fleet
alleges no seizure of its property.  Nor does Fleet allege an
interference with its property lesser than actual seizure, such as
a lis pendens.  See DeLeo v. Nunes, 546 A.2d 1344, 1347 (R.I.
1988).  
Fleet contends that this Court's decision in Krashes v. White,
275 Md. 549, 341 A.2d 798 (1975), stands for the proposition that
neither arrest nor seizure of property is required to sustain a
cause of action for abuse of process in Maryland.  Fleet
misconstrues Krashes, and reads our opinion too broadly.  In
Krashes, this Court addressed, as a certified question from the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, whether
arrest is an essential element of the torts of malicious
prosecution and abuse of process.  Krashes involved abuse of
criminal process--the defendant caused an arrest warrant to be
issued against the plaintiff and then proceeded to extract a
confessed judgment.  Id. at 552, 341 A.2d at 800.  This Court
concluded:
While the issuance by a court of some sort of criminal
process against a party is necessary before that party
can properly bring an action for abuse of criminal
process, there is no requirement that the party be
22
arrested or that an arrest warrant against him be issued.
Id. at 556, 341 A.2d at 802 (emphasis added).  
Our holding in Krashes is limited to abuse of criminal
process.  We also held in Krashes that a plaintiff in a criminal
malicious prosecution action need not prove any special damages,
such as arrest or seizure of property, but we noted that malicious
use of civil process requires seizure of the property or other
special injury.  Id. at 554-55, 341 A.2d at 801.  This Court did
not address the requirements for abuse of civil process in Krashes,
and we reject Appellant's argument that the Court intended to
depart from the long-standing elements of abuse of civil process
requiring arrest or seizure of property.  See Bartlett, 69 Md. 219,
14 A. 518 (holding that arrest or seizure of property required for
abuse of civil process).
The Circuit Court for Baltimore City properly dismissed
Fleet's abuse of process count.  Fleet failed to plead facts
establishing legally cognizable damages.  In cases of abuse of
civil process, Maryland law requires an arrest or a seizure of the
property.  Fleet alleged neither.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY
AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE
PAID BY APPELLANT.