Title: In re Clontz

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
No. 65A20 
 
Filed 18 December 2020 
 
IN RE INQURIY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NO. 18-193 
 
EDWIN D. CLONTZ, Respondent 
 
 
This matter is before the Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-376 and -377 upon 
a recommendation by the Judicial Standards Commission entered on 23 January 
2020 that respondent Edwin D. Clontz, a Judge of the General Court of Justice, 
District Court Division, Judicial District Twenty-Eight, be publicly reprimanded for 
conduct in violation of Canons 2A and 3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial 
Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the 
judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376. Heard in the Supreme 
Court on 12 October 2020.  
 
Jameson M. Marks, Counsel for the Judicial Standards Commission  
 
Devereux & Banzhoff PLLC, by Andrew B. Banzhoff for respondent.   
 
 
ORDER 
 
The issue before this Court is whether Judge Edwin D. Clontz, respondent, 
should be publicly reprimanded, as recommended by the North Carolina Judicial 
Standards Commission, for violations of Canons 2A and 3A(4) of the North Carolina 
Code of Judicial Conduct amounting to conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-
IN RE CLONTZ 
 
Order of the Court 
 
 
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376(b). For the reasons stated below, we agree with and adopt the recommendations 
from the Commission.  
 
On 4 February 2019 the Commission filed a Statement of Charges against 
respondent alleging respondent violated Canons 1, 2A, 3A(3), and 3A(4) when he held 
a probable-cause hearing without a defendant’s court-appointed counsel present on 
or about 18 July 2018. Respondent waived personal service and filed an answer to 
the Factual Allegations in the Statement of Charges on 28 February 2019. 
Respondent’s hearing before the Commission was originally scheduled for 11 October 
2019 but was continued until 13 December 2019. Prior to this hearing, counsel for the 
Commission and respondent filed a Stipulation of Facts on 19 November 2019.  
On 13 December 2019 a disciplinary hearing was held before the Commission 
Chair Judge Wanda G. Bryant and Commission members Judge Jeffrey B. Foster, 
Judge Sherri Elliot, Mr. William H. Jones Jr., Ms. Allison Mullins, Mr. Cresswell D. 
Elmore, and Mr. Grady H. Hawkins. Based on the Stipulation of Facts and its 
exhibits, the Commission found the following facts by clear, cogent and convincing 
evidence:  
1. On or about July 18, 2018, Respondent was presiding 
over probable cause hearings in criminal district court 
when Assistant District Attorney (ADA) Kristin 
Terwey, representing the State, made a motion to 
continue State v. Jermaine Logan, Buncombe County 
File Nos. 18CR86478–84.  
 
2. In response to ADA Terwey’s motion to continue, Mr. 
Logan’s court-appointed attorney Roger Smith objected 
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to the State’s motion and demanded a probable cause 
hearing on behalf of his client. Respondent then held 
the matter open for the parties to confer and instructed 
them both to return to court at 2:00 pm.  
 
3. Respondent did not realize that Mr. Smith was court-
appointed, but was obviously aware that Mr. Logan was 
represented by counsel in his felony criminal matter.  
 
4. At or about 2:00 pm, Respondent resumed court. ADA 
Terwey was present for the State and had secured the 
necessary witnesses to proceed with Mr. Logan’s 
probable cause hearing. Mr. Logan, who had remained 
in custody since his arrest, was brought from the jail to 
a holding cell adjacent to the courtroom with a barred 
window looking into Respondent’s courtroom as 
indicated in the photographs attached as Exhibits 1 and 
2 to the Stipulation of Facts.  
 
5. Mr. Smith failed to return to the courtroom at 2:00 pm 
as Respondent had instructed. Respondent knew Mr. 
Smith from other criminal cases and had previously 
experienced situations when Mr. Smith was not present 
in a timely manner for court appearances. Respondent 
then directed the courtroom bailiff to communicate with 
the other courtrooms in an effort to determine if Mr. 
Smith was elsewhere in the courthouse. The bailiff 
could not locate Mr. Smith in any other courtroom.  
 
6. At or around 2:50 pm, Respondent had concluded the 
day’s calendar with the exception of Mr. Logan’s case 
and one other matter and Mr. Smith still had not 
returned to the courtroom.  
 
7. Without Mr. Smith present, and knowing that Mr. 
Logan was represented by counsel in the felony criminal 
matter before him, Respondent then instructed ADA 
Terwey to call Mr. Logan’s case for hearing. Specifically, 
at the start of the probable cause hearing, Respondent 
stated on the record as follows: “Defense attorney has 
asked for a probable cause hearing. He was told to be 
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here at 2 p.m. It is now 2:50 p.m., and the attorney is 
not present. State is prepared to proceed on probable 
cause. They will call their first witness.”  
 
8. Upon receiving Respondent’s instruction to proceed 
without Mr. Logan’s counsel present, ADA Terwey 
hesitated but then called her first witness as directed 
by Respondent.  
 
9. During the probable cause hearing, Mr. Logan 
remained in the holding cell adjacent to the courtroom. 
Mr. Logan cross-examined the State’s two witnesses 
through the barred window of the prisoner holding area 
while he remained handcuffed and without access to 
pen or paper. It is routine in Buncombe County for in 
custody defendants to remain in the prisoner holding 
cell during court proceedings unless a specific request 
is made by a party to bring the defendant into the 
courtroom and no such request was made in this case 
.  
10. 
After the State concluded its evidence, ADA Terwey 
approached the bench to express to Respondent her 
discomfort with the hearing and her concern that Mr. 
Logan, if he testified without his attorney present, may 
incriminate himself. In response to ADA Terwey’s 
concerns, Respondent then advised Mr. Logan that he 
would not be permitted to testify because he may 
incriminate himself. Specifically, Respondent informed 
Mr. Logan that he would not be allowed to speak to 
avoid accidentally incriminating himself and stated to 
Mr. Logan as follows: “I’m not going to allow you to 
make any statements, because this is a probable cause 
hearing. The State has presented their case. The 
standard of proof is so low – or it’s lower than what 
would be beyond a reasonable doubt. I will let them 
make their argument.”  
 
11. 
Following Respondent’s instructions to the State to 
make its argument, ADA Terwey proffered no closing 
argument and stated “I would simply ask that probable 
cause be found.” Without giving Mr. Logan any 
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opportunity to be heard or make any arguments in his 
behalf, Respondent immediately ruled in the State’s 
favor and announced his finding that there was 
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for each 
of Mr. Logan’s charges and bound Mr. Logan’s matters 
over to superior court.  
 
12. 
Shortly after Mr. Logan’s probable cause hearing 
concluded, Mr. Smith returned to Respondent’s 
courtroom to find that his client’s case had been 
adjudicated in his absence. Mr. Smith, along with ADA 
Terwey and two other ADAs who were present during 
the probable cause hearing then went into a meeting 
with Respondent in his chambers.  
 
13. 
While in Respondent’s chambers, Mr. Smith explained 
that he was in the District Attorney’s office discussing 
Mr. Logan’s case. Just as he had made a point to put on 
the record at the start of the probable cause hearing 
that Mr. Smith was told to be in court at 2:00 pm and 
was not present by 2:50 p.m., Respondent again 
indicated to the parties that he proceeded with Mr. 
Logan’s case without Mr. Smith to “make a point” 
because Mr. Smith was not present at 2:00 pm when he 
had been told to return to court and Mr. Smith did not 
otherwise communicate his location to the Court or 
courtroom personnel.  
 
14. 
Respondent also acknowledged in the chambers 
meeting that he would not have proceeded with Mr. 
Logan’s case had he known that the Superior Court 
ADA prosecuting Mr. Logan’s case communicated that 
no plea bargain would be offered if Mr. Logan insisted 
on a probable cause hearing that day.  
 
15. 
Respondent also told Mr. Smith that because his 
findings had already been entered by the clerk, Mr. 
Smith could appeal the finding of probable cause.  
 
16. 
At the conclusion of the meeting in Respondent’s 
chambers, Mr. Smith requested to be heard on Mr. 
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Logan’s bond. Respondent informed the parties that he 
would entertain such a motion. After the parties 
reentered the courtroom, Mr. Smith advocated for a 
lower bond, which was opposed by the State. 
Respondent then lowered Mr. Logan’s bond from 
$100,000 secured to $25,000 secured.   
 
(citations to pages of the Stipulation and Record omitted). Based on these findings of 
fact, the Commission concluded as a matter of law that:  
1. The Statement of Charges alleges Respondent violated 
Canon 1, Canon 2A, Canon 3A(3), and Canon 3A(4) of 
the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Commission 
concludes that the findings of fact support the 
conclusion that Respondent violated Canon 2A and 
Canon 3A(4).  
 
2. Canon 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that 
“[a] judge should conduct himself/herself at all times in 
a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” Based on 
the findings of fact, the Commission concludes that on 
July 18, 2018, Respondent failed to conduct himself in 
a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary in violation of 
Canon 2A of the North Carolina Code of Judicial 
Conduct.  
 
3. Specifically with respect to Canon 2A, the Commission’s 
findings of fact concerning Respondent’s conduct show 
that Respondent knowingly proceeded with defendant’s 
probable cause hearing without the defendant’s counsel 
present to “make a point” about the lawyer’s failure to 
appear in court at the time Respondent had directed. 
Respondent noted this point on the record at the outset 
of the hearing and reiterated it in the chambers 
conference thereafter. At the hearing itself, Respondent 
made no effort to ascertain if Mr. Logan wished to 
continue the hearing or waive his right to counsel and 
proceed. Respondent’s conduct not only forced Mr. 
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Logan to proceed without his court-appointed counsel, 
but also required Mr. Logan to cross-examine witnesses 
from behind bars while handcuffed without access to 
pen and paper. Respondent’s conduct also threatened 
Mr. Logan’s 5th Amendment right against self-
incrimination, a point that ADA Terwey had to raise to 
Respondent. Finally, Respondent’s conduct sent a clear 
message that a criminal defendant will be held 
accountable for the tardiness of his court-appointed 
lawyer. This is a point that Respondent himself stated 
was not directed just at Mr. Smith, but at the entire 
Buncombe County Bar. Such conduct undoubtedly 
undermines public confidence in the fairness of criminal 
proceedings in violation of Canon 2A.  
 
4. The Commission further finds that Canon 2A is 
violated, and conduct prejudicial to the administration 
of justice occurs, when a judge employs improper means 
to discipline an attorney for conduct the judge 
considered to be unprofessional or frustrating. See, e.g., 
In re Bullock, 328 N.C. 712, 717–718, 403 S.E.2d 264, 
267 (1991) (censuring Respondent for violation of Canon 
2A and conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice upon a finding that Respondent improperly 
ordered an attorney into custody and further demanded 
information subject to the attorney-client privilege); In 
re Scarlett, Inquiry No. 10-209, Judicial Standards 
Commission, June 15, 2011)[sic] (publicly reprimanding 
Respondent for violation of Canon 2A among other 
violations and conduct prejudicial to the administration 
of justice for holding a disciplinary hearing against an 
attorney for unprofessional conduct without basic due 
process afforded to the attorney and dictating that the 
proceeding be closed to the public). 
  
5. Canon 3A(4) requires a judge to “accord every person 
who is legally interested in a proceeding, or the person’s 
lawyer, full right to be heard according to law . . . .” 
Based on the findings of fact, the Commission further 
concludes that Respondent failed to afford Mr. Logan 
and Mr. Smith a full right to be heard according to the 
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law in violation of Canon 3A(4) of the North Carolina 
Code of Judicial Conduct.  
 
6. Specifically 
with 
respect 
to 
Canon 
3A(4), 
the 
Commission’s findings of fact concerning Respondent’s 
conduct on July 18, 2018, and as supported by the 
transcript and audio proceeding with the hearing, show 
that Respondent stated at the outset of the hearing that 
he was proceeding with the hearing regardless of Mr. 
Smith’s absence and directed the State to proceed. 
Respondent did so without giving Mr. Logan any 
opportunity to be heard regarding the absence of his 
court-appointed counsel, whether he wished to continue 
the matter, or whether he wished to waive his right to 
counsel and proceed. In addition to denying Mr. Logan 
the opportunity to be heard on these critical issues, 
Respondent also interfered with the attorney-client 
relationship by denying Mr. Logan the right to consult 
with 
his 
court-appointed 
attorney 
and 
have 
representation at the hearing. Moreover, Respondent 
also intentionally denied Mr. Logan the right to be 
heard following the close of the State’s evidence, at 
which time Respondent directly and unequivocally 
informed Mr. Logan that he would not have the 
opportunity to be heard: “I’m not going to allow you to 
make any statements, because this is a probable cause 
hearing. The State has presented their case. The 
standard of proof is so low—or it’s lower than what 
would be beyond a reasonable doubt. I will let them 
make their argument.” Although Respondent’s denial of 
Mr. Logan’s right to be heard was rooted in the concerns 
ADA Terwey rightfully raised to Respondent about 
whether Mr. Logan if allowed to testify could 
incriminate himself in violation of his 5th Amendment 
rights, this was a situation caused by Respondent’s 
conduct in forcing Mr. Logan to proceed without his 
court-appointed counsel. Based on the totality of these 
circumstances, Respondent’s conduct denied Mr. Logan 
a full right to be heard as required under Canon 3A(4). 
See also Charles Gardner Geyh et al., Judicial Conduct 
and Ethics § 2.05 at 2-33 (5th Edition 2013) (“A judge 
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violates the duty under the Code to accord litigants 
their full right to be heard when the judge interferes 
with the litigant’s relationship with counsel. The most 
overt interference with the attorney-client relationship 
occurs if court proceedings are conducted with counsel 
absent when the judge knows the party has 
representation.”)  
 
7. Although the Statement of Charges alleges that 
Respondent’s conduct constituted willful misconduct in 
office in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A- 376(b), the 
Commission concludes that the clear and convincing 
evidence does not support a conclusion of willful 
misconduct in office. The Commission does conclude, 
however, 
that 
Respondent 
engaged 
in 
conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings 
the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 7A- 376(b). See also Code of Judicial Conduct, 
Preamble (“[a] violation of this Code of Judicial Conduct 
may 
be 
deemed 
conduct 
prejudicial 
to 
the 
administration of justice that brings the judicial office 
into disrepute.”) 
 
8. The Supreme Court first defined conduct prejudicial to 
the administration of justice in In re Edens, 290 N.C. 
299, 226 S.E.2d 5 (1976) as “conduct which a judge 
undertakes in good faith but which nevertheless would 
appear to an objective observer to be not only unjudicial 
conduct but conduct prejudicial to the public esteem for 
the judicial office.” Id. at 305, 226 S.E.2d at 9. Unlike 
willful misconduct in office, therefore, the motives or 
potential bad faith of the judge are not in issue. Instead, 
as the Supreme Court explained in Edens, conduct 
prejudicial to the administration “depends not so much 
upon the judge’s motives, but more on the conduct itself, 
the results thereof, and the impact such conduct might 
reasonably have upon knowledgeable observers.” Id. at 
305–306 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
 
9. Based upon the Commission’s conclusions that 
Respondent’s conduct violated Canon 2A and Canon 
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3A(4) as set forth in Paragraphs 2 through 6 above, the 
Commission further concludes that Respondent’s 
conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice 
and brings the judicial office into disrepute.  
 
10. 
As noted above, the subjective motives or good faith of 
the Respondent are not the focus of an inquiry into 
whether 
his 
conduct 
was 
prejudicial 
to 
the 
administration of justice. The focus is on the impact 
Respondent’s 
conduct 
might 
have 
on 
objective 
observers. Eden, 290 N.C. at 305, 226 S.E.2d at 9. 
Nevertheless, the Commission does address the 
assertions of Respondent’s Counsel at the hearing of 
this matter that Respondent’s conduct was the result of 
a good faith legal error and thus he cannot be subject to 
discipline. 
Respondent’s 
Counsel 
asserted 
that 
Respondent forced Mr. Logan to proceed without his 
counsel at the probable cause hearing because he felt he 
was obligated to do so after consulting the statutes, 
specifically N.C.G.S. § 15A-606(e) & (f), which govern 
probable cause hearings, and § 15A-611(c), which 
governs the procedures in probable cause hearings if a 
defendant appears without counsel.  
 
a. As a factual matter, Respondent’s defense of good faith 
legal error is not supported in the record. The 
Stipulation of Facts entered into by Respondent 
specifically 
addresses 
the 
agreed 
facts 
as 
to 
Respondent’s motives and statements regarding his 
decision to proceed without Mr. Logan’s court-
appointed counsel present. It is undisputed that he did 
so to “make a point” to Mr. Smith and other lawyers 
about being on time to court. Nowhere in the 
Stipulation of Facts is there any reference to 
Respondent’s alleged belief that he was required under 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-606(e) to proceed with a probable cause 
hearing involving a represented criminal defendant 
without counsel present. The audio and transcript of the 
probable 
cause 
hearing 
further 
establish 
that 
Respondent at no time indicated to the parties that he 
was proceeding with the hearing as he allegedly 
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believed was required under § 15A-606(e). Instead, as 
the audio and transcripts make clear, he informed the 
parties he was proceeding because defense counsel 
asked for the hearing and then had failed to appear on 
time. For these reasons, there is no factual support in 
the record that Respondent proceeded with the hearing 
for any other reason than to “make a point” about 
attorney tardiness to court.  
 
b. As a procedural matter, the Commission further finds 
that any alleged good faith legal error in interpreting 
§ 606(e) does not preclude a finding that Respondent 
violated Canon 2A or 3A(4) or that his objective conduct 
and statements were prejudicial to the administration 
of justice and public esteem for the judicial office. 
Specifically, the Commission does not need to consider 
or decide whether Respondent’s interpretation of 
§ 606(e) was correct as a matter of law to determine that 
Respondent denied Mr. Logan an opportunity to be 
heard at the probable cause hearing or engaged in 
conduct that undermines public confidence in the 
impartiality 
and 
integrity 
of 
the 
judiciary 
as 
established in Paragraphs 2 through 6 above.  
 
11. 
In reaching these conclusions of law, the Commission 
also recognizes that judges have a duty under Canon 
3B(3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct to take 
disciplinary action against attorneys for unprofessional 
conduct, and further, that there is a possibility that 
disciplinary action may have been warranted in the 
case of Mr. Smith’s apparent chronic tardiness to court 
and failure to appear at 2:00 p.m. as Respondent 
directed. This is without question a problem that vexes 
many good judges across the state. But there are many 
tools available to judges to discipline attorneys for 
failure to appear on time. That being said, forcing a 
criminal defendant known to be represented by counsel 
to proceed to represent himself in a probable cause 
hearing to which he was entitled and requiring him to 
cross-examine witnesses while handcuffed and confined 
in a small holding cell is not a disciplinary measure 
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against the defendant’s attorney that comports with the 
Code of Judicial Conduct or promotes public confidence 
in the administration of justice.  
 
12. 
Finally, the Commission recognizes that it is not 
empowered to determine matters of law and does not 
pass upon the legal question of whether Respondent’s 
findings of probable cause was supported in fact or law. 
That matter, as Respondent acknowledged and 
informed Mr. Smith, was an appealable issue to be 
addressed by the appellate courts. As noted above, the 
Commission also does not decide the appropriate 
interpretation on N.C.G.S. § 611(c) or § 606(e) or their 
application to the facts of this matter. The Commission 
instead must evaluate Respondent’s conduct at the 
probable cause hearing and “the impact such conduct 
might reasonably have upon knowledgeable observers.” 
Edens, 290 N.C. at 305–306, 226 S.E.2d at 9. Based on 
the findings of fact and for all the foregoing reasons, the 
Commission concludes as a matter of law that 
Respondent’s conduct not only violated Canon 2A and 
Canon 3A(4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, but was 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that 
brings the judicial office into disrepute.  
 
(citations to pages of the Stipulation and Record omitted). Based on these findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, the Commission recommended that this Court publicly 
reprimand respondent. In support of this recommendation, the Commission offered 
the following information:  
1. The Supreme Court in In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 
223 S.E.2d 822 (1985) first addressed sanctions under 
the Judicial Standards Act and stated that the purpose 
of judicial discipline proceedings “is not primarily to 
punish any individual but to maintain due and proper 
administration of justice in our State’s courts, public 
confidence in its judicial system, and the honor and 
integrity of its judges.” Id. at 602, 223 S.E.2d at 825.  
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2. Under the statutes governing the Commission, a public 
reprimand is appropriate where “a judge has violated 
the Code of Judicial Conduct and has engaged in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, but 
that misconduct is minor.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-374.2(7). The 
Commission considers Respondent’s misconduct to be 
“minor” because of the lack of prejudice to Mr. Logan in 
his criminal proceeding given the low bar for the State 
to establish probable cause and his ability to appeal the 
probable cause determination. The Commission also 
considers Respondent’s conduct in reducing Mr. Logan’s 
bond following the finding of probable cause and the 
isolated nature of the incident.  
 
3. Finally, in recommending reprimand as opposed to a 
more severe sanction, the Commission considers as 
mitigating factors Respondent’s willingness to enter 
into the Stipulation of Facts and the character 
affidavits submitted by Respondent that attest to 
Respondent’s 
professionalism, 
reputation 
for 
impartiality in criminal cases, and courteous demeanor 
as a jurist.  
 
(citations to pages of the Stipulation and Record omitted). 
In proceedings brought pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-376, this Court acts as a 
court of original jurisdiction rather than an appellate court. In re Hill, 357 N.C. 559, 
564 (2003) (citing In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147 (1978)). The Commission’s 
recommendations are not binding on this Court, and this Court makes its own 
independent judgment when considering the evidence. In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 
244 (1977). This Court may “adopt the Commission’s findings of fact if they are 
supported by clear and convincing evidence, or [we] may make [our] own findings.” 
In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. 418, 428 (2012) (quoting In re Badgett, 362 N.C. 202, 206 
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(2008)). If this Court finds that the Commission’s findings of fact are supported by 
clear and convincing evidence and chooses to adopt them, we must determine whether 
those findings support the Commission’s conclusions of law. In re Stone, 373 N.C. 368, 
379 (2020) (citing In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. at 429)  
 
The Commission based its findings of fact on the stipulated facts and exhibits, 
and respondent does not contest these findings. After careful review, we agree that 
the Commission’s findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidence, and we adopt them as our own.  
 
Respondent does not contest the fact that he held a probable-cause hearing 
without defendant’s counsel present but instead argues that an objectively reasonable 
reading of our statutes allows a district court to conduct a probable-cause hearing 
without a defendant’s counsel present. As an initial matter, this Court need not find 
a violation of our statutes in order to find a violation of our Code of Judicial Conduct. 
See In re Tucker, 350 N.C. 649, 651 (1999) (finding that respondent violated our Code 
of Judicial Conduct by rejecting a guilty plea and entering a verdict of not guilty 
without determining whether the judge’s conduct also violated our General Statutes). 
Instead, this Court must determine whether respondent’s statements, actions, and 
inactions constitute “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings 
the judicial office into disrepute.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b) (2019).   
 
Although our analysis hinges on respondent’s conduct rather than his 
compliance with our General Statutes, we reject respondent’s argument that his 
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conduct was the result of an objectively reasonable interpretation of our statutes 
governing probable-cause proceedings. Respondent argues that N.C.G.S. § 15A-606(e) 
allows probable-cause hearings to proceed without defense counsel present and 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-606(f) barred him from continuing the matter. A thorough 
examination of these statutes shows why this argument fails. These two sub-sections 
provide that:  
(e) If an unrepresented defendant is not indigent and has 
indicated his desire to be represented by counsel, the 
district court judge must inform him that he has a choice 
of appearing without counsel at the probable-cause hearing 
or of securing the attendance of counsel to represent him 
at the hearing. The judge must further inform him that the 
judge presiding at the hearing will not continue the 
hearing because of the absence of counsel except for 
extraordinary cause.  
 
(f) Upon a showing of good cause, a scheduled probable-
cause hearing may be continued by the district court upon 
timely motion of the defendant or the State. Except for 
extraordinary cause, a motion is not timely unless made at 
least 48 hours prior to the time set for the probable-cause 
hearing.  
 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-606(e)–(f) (2019). Although § 15A-606(e) allows for a probable-cause 
hearing to proceed without counsel present, it only applies to defendants who are not 
indigent, and it also requires that the trial court inform the defendant that they have 
a choice of appearing without counsel or securing the attendance of counsel and that 
the hearing will not be continued due to counsel’s absence except for extraordinary 
cause. Respondent’s conduct does not objectively comply with this statute because 
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there is no evidence that he ascertained whether defendant was indigent, as a 
threshold matter, and there is no evidence that he informed defendant of his choice 
between appearing without counsel or securing the attendance of counsel.  
 
Sub-section 15A-606(f) does not justify respondent’s conduct either because it 
explicitly only applies to motions made by the defendant or the State, not the trial 
court. Respondent’s admission that he would not have conducted the hearing if he 
had known that the ADA threatened to withhold a plea offer if defendant challenged 
probable cause further negates his original argument that § 15A-606(f) barred him 
from continuing the matter. 
Additionally, if respondent attempted to objectively follow all relevant statutes 
he would have followed N.C.G.S. § 15A-611, which is titled “Probable-cause hearings.” 
Subsection (c) provides that:  
If a defendant appears at a probable-cause hearing without 
counsel, the judge must determine whether counsel has 
been waived. If he determines that counsel has been 
waived, he may proceed without counsel. If he determines 
that counsel has not been waived, except in a situation 
covered by G.S. 15A-606(e) he must take appropriate action 
to secure the defendant’s right to counsel.  
 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-611(c). The plain language of this subsection requires the trial court 
to inquire whether a defendant has waived counsel if they appear without counsel 
and further requires “appropriate action” if counsel has not been waived and the 
defendant is indigent. There is no evidence that the trial court ascertained whether 
defendant waived counsel, and respondent failed to take any “appropriate action to 
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secure the defendant’s right to counsel.” Id.  Therefore, respondent’s conduct failed to 
reflect an objectively reasonable reading and interpretation of our General Statutes 
governing probable-cause proceedings.   
 
Respondent further argues that subjecting him to punishment for a legal error 
would create a slippery slope and “extend the disciplinary provisions in the Code of 
Judicial Conduct to cover legal errors committed by trial judges[.]” He cites to our 
recent decision in State v. Simpkins, 373 N.C. 530 (2020), in which we held that the 
trial court erred by determining the defendant had waived his right to counsel and 
remanded the matter for a new trial. Id. at 541. This analogy is inapposite. Unlike 
respondent here, the trial court in Simpkins made multiple attempts to determine 
whether the defendant wished to waive counsel and appointed standby counsel. Id. 
at 532. These additional actions by the trial court in Simpkins would foster public 
faith and confidence in the judiciary, even though the trial court was ultimately 
wrong in its determination that defendant waived counsel. Unlike the trial court in 
Simpkins, respondent rushed to hold a hearing without counsel present, he failed to 
explore other options regarding counsel prior to commencing the proceeding, and he 
made comments about “making a point” after the proceeding. This conduct 
demonstrated a disregard for the defendant’s statutory and constitutional rights, and 
that disregard undermines public faith and confidence in the judiciary.  
 
For the reasons articulated above, we agree with and adopt as our own the 
Commission’s conclusions that respondent’s conduct violates Canons 2A and 3A(4) of 
IN RE CLONTZ 
 
Order of the Court 
 
 
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the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and is prejudicial to the administration 
of justice, thus bringing the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-
376(b).  
 
The Commission recommended that respondent be publicly reprimanded. This 
Court is not bound by the recommended sanction of the Commission. Hartsfield, 365 
N.C. at 429. “[W]e may exercise our own judgment in arriving at a disciplinary 
decision in light of respondent’s violations of the North Carolina Code of Judicial 
Conduct.” In re Stone, 373 N.C. 368, 379 (2020) (citing Hartsfield, 365 N.C. at 429). 
Therefore, “[w]e may adopt the Commission’s recommendation, or we may impose a 
lesser or more severe sanction.” Id. This Court does not have established guidelines 
for determining the appropriate sanction and “each case should be decided upon its 
own facts.” In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 305 (1978).  
 
We recognize the multiple affidavits submitted on respondent’s behalf from 
attorneys in the Buncombe County Bar that attest to his fairness and further 
recognize that respondent has never been the subject of discipline from this Court. In 
light of this mitigating evidence and the fact that respondent voluntarily entered into 
a Stipulation of Facts, we conclude that the Commission’s additional findings and 
recommendation of public reprimand are appropriate, and we adopt them as our own. 
 
Therefore, the Supreme Court of North Carolina orders that respondent Edwin 
D. Clontz be publicly reprimanded for conduct in violation of Canon 2A and Canon 
3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, and for conduct prejudicial to 
IN RE CLONTZ 
 
Order of the Court 
 
 
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the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation 
of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376. 
By order of the Court in Conference, this the 15th day of December, 2020.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s/Davis, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the Court  
 
 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, this 
the 15th day of December, 2020.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
AMY L. FUNDERBURK 
 
 
 
 
 
Clerk of the Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s/M.C. Hackney 
 
 
 
 
 
Assistant Clerk  
 
 
 
 
Justice EARLS dissenting from Order. 
 
A public reprimand is appropriate where the Supreme Court finds that “a 
judge has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and has engaged in conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice, but that misconduct is minor.” 
N.C.G.S. § 7A-374.2(7) (2019). Because it is not clear to me that respondent’s conduct, 
while misguided, was so egregious as to be prejudicial to the administration of justice, 
I would have remanded to the Judicial Standards Commission for the issuance of a 
private letter of caution rather than issue a public reprimand from this Court. As a 
result, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s Order in this matter. 
This Judicial Standards Commission case proceeded on stipulated facts, and 
the Commission entered findings of fact based on the record before it. Respondent 
was presiding over probable cause hearings in criminal district court when the case 
of defendant Jermaine Logan was called. The assistant district attorney, Ms. Terwey, 
requested a continuance. Defense counsel, Mr. Smith, objected and demanded a 
probable cause hearing. The respondent held the matter open and instructed the 
parties to return at two o’clock that afternoon.  
At two o’clock, ADA Terwey was present with the necessary witnesses and the 
defendant, Mr. Logan, had been brought from jail to a holding cell adjacent to the 
courtroom that had a barred window looking into the room. However, defense counsel, 
Mr. Smith, was not there. 
IN RE CLONTZ 
 
Earls, J., dissenting from Order 
 
 
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After dealing with other matters on the calendar and having the bailiff check 
the other courtrooms to try to find Mr. Smith, respondent proceeded with the probable 
cause hearing without defense counsel present. Mr. Logan was allowed to cross-
examine the State’s witnesses “through the barred window of the prisoner holding 
area while he remained handcuffed and without access to pen or paper, which is 
routine in Buncombe County for in custody defendants, unless a specific request is 
made by a party to bring the defendant into the courtroom.”  
At the conclusion of the State’s evidence, ADA Terwey indicated that she was 
uncomfortable with the proceedings. She stated that Mr. Logan might incriminate 
himself if he testified. Respondent advised Mr. Logan that he wouldn’t be allowed to 
testify. ADA Terwey did not give a closing argument and respondent found that there 
was probable cause for the charges.  
After the hearing concluded, Mr. Smith returned and the parties met in 
respondent’s chambers. Mr. Smith reported that he had been in the district attorney’s 
office discussing Mr. Logan’s case, where a Superior Court assistant district attorney 
threatened to withhold a plea deal if Mr. Smith pressed for a probable cause hearing. 
Respondent stated that if he had known about the threat he would not have proceeded 
with the hearing. He stated at this point “that he proceeded with Mr. Logan’s case 
without Mr. Smith to ‘make a point’ because Mr. Smith was not present at 2:00 pm 
when he had been told to return to court and Mr. Smith did not otherwise 
communicate his location to the Court or courtroom personnel.” In a bond hearing 
IN RE CLONTZ 
 
Earls, J., dissenting from Order 
 
 
-3- 
after the meeting in chambers, respondent lowered Mr. Logan’s bond from $100,000 
secured to $25,000 secured. 
Respondent entered into evidence character affidavits from four witnesses who 
attest that he is generally well-regarded in the community, generally sensitive to the 
interests of defendants who appear before him, and that his conduct on this occasion 
was not part of a pattern of repeated misbehavior.  
As the majority notes, respondent argues without merit that in these 
circumstances he was legally prohibited by statute from continuing the probable 
cause hearing and was permitted to proceed in the absence of defense counsel. 
However, this legal mistake, even combined with respondent’s admitted improper 
motive, does not rise to the level of conduct which has warranted public reprimand in 
other cases. In the last five years, this Court has issued four public reprimands, the 
sum of which suggest that the instant case is inappropriate for public reprimand. 
For example, in another case adjudicated on stipulated facts, a district judge, 
perceiving unfair treatment from her Chief District Court Judge, began complaining 
about the Chief Judge “to other judges in her district, retired judges, court staff, and 
local attorneys” and “also suggested to her case manager and a courtroom clerk that 
the Chief Judge’s decisions regarding her schedule were based in part on racial 
prejudice.” In re Smith, 372 N.C. 123, 126, 827 S.E.2d 516, 518 (2019). In addition to 
consistent complaints about the Chief Judge, which we concluded on the evidence 
were unwarranted, id. at 127, 827 S.E.2d at 518–19, the respondent in that case 
IN RE CLONTZ 
 
Earls, J., dissenting from Order 
 
 
-4- 
sometimes openly “announce[d] that she was adjourning court early for personal 
appointments, such as for hair and nail salon visits or to spend time with her child,” 
which “created a perception that her judicial duties did not take precedence over her 
personal commitments and work schedule preferences.” Id. at 127–28, 827 S.E.2d at 
519. As a result of the respondent’s conduct, “several members of the domestic bar” 
requested that the respondent be removed from their cases, and “several judicial and 
court colleagues” brought concerns to the Chief Judge about the respondent’s 
behavior. Id. at 128, 827 S.E.2d at 519. We concluded that a public reprimand was 
appropriate. Id. at 135, 827 S.E.2d at 523. 
Similarly, we considered the case of a trial judge who “(1) failed to issue a 
ruling for more than two (2) years on a motion for attorney’s fees and expenses . . .; 
(2) failed to respond or delayed responding to party and attorney inquiries as to the 
status of the pending ruling; and (3) failed to respond in a timely manner to numerous 
communications from the Commission’s investigator regarding the status of the 
ruling during the Commission’s investigation into this matter.” In re Henderson, 371 
N.C. 45, 46, 812 S.E.2d 826, 827 (2018). The respondent in that case admitted “that 
he had no excuses for the delay other than his ‘dread’ of the case.” Id. at 47, 812 S.E.2d 
at 828. We concluded that the respondent should be publicly reprimanded. Id. at 52, 
812 S.E.2d at 830. 
We also considered the case of a Deputy Commissioner of the North Carolina 
Industrial Commission, where it was charged that the respondent had “wrecked his 
IN RE CLONTZ 
 
Earls, J., dissenting from Order 
 
 
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vehicle while driving under the influence of an impairing substance, putting at risk 
his own life and the lives of others.” In re Shipley, 370 N.C. 595, 596, 811 S.E.2d 556, 
557 (2018). The Judicial Standards Commission’s factual findings, unchallenged by 
the respondent, stated that the respondent was involved in an accident with another 
vehicle at around nine o’clock in the evening, after which two breath alcohol tests 
produced results indicating that the respondent had been driving while impaired. Id. 
at 596–97, 811 S.E.2d at 557–58. We issued a public reprimand. Id. at 600, 811 S.E.2d 
at 560. 
In another case, we considered a recommendation by the Commission 
concerning a district judge who was charged with failing to report extrajudicial 
income and “presiding over a criminal case that he had initiated and agreeing to the 
dismissal of the case after receiving restitution in chambers.” In re Mack, 369 N.C. 
236, 237, 794 S.E.2d 266, 267–68 (2016). The Commission’s factual findings, 
unchallenged by the respondent, indicated that the respondent received rental 
income from two residential properties, but failed to report that income for a number 
of years. Id. at 238–42, 794 S.E.2d at 268–70. Moreover, the respondent presided over 
a criminal case, calendared in his courtroom by the Assistant District Attorney, in 
which he was the complainant against a former tenant who had damaged the 
respondent’s rental home. Id. After acknowledging the judge’s remedial efforts and 
strong dedication to the community, we determined that a public reprimand was 
appropriate. Id. at 247–49, 794 S.E.2d at 273–74. 
IN RE CLONTZ 
 
Earls, J., dissenting from Order 
 
 
-6- 
In contrast to our prior cases issuing public reprimands, here respondent’s 
conduct occurred in one proceeding over the course of one afternoon. In Smith, 
Henderson, and Mack, on the other hand, the respondent’s conduct persisted over a 
significant period of time. See In re Smith, 372 N.C. at 126–28, 827 S.E.2d at 518–19; 
In re Henderson, 371 N.C. at 46, 812 S.E.2d at 827; In re Mack, 369 N.C. at 238–42, 
794 S.E.2d at 268–70. Respondent’s conduct in the present case involved no allegation 
of criminal conduct. However, the respondent in Shipley was accused of driving while 
under the influence of an impairing substance in violation of N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1. In 
re Shipley, 370 N.C. at 596, 811 S.E.2d at 557. Here, respondent’s conduct was not 
part of a pattern of unprofessional or unbecoming behavior. The respondent in Smith, 
however, received a public reprimand after “attorneys that frequently appeared” 
before her reported that she “regularly rushed to conclude cases” so that they were 
concerned about having a full and fair opportunity to be heard, and after several 
complaints were lodged regarding this and other behavior. In re Smith, 372 N.C. at 
125–29, 827 S.E.2d at 517–20. Moreover, none of the other cases in which the Court 
has issued a public reprimand in the last five years included an arguable claim of 
legal authority for the respondent’s conduct. Upon review of the similar cases 
considered recently by this Court, I am convinced that the present case does not 
demonstrate the level of conduct warranting a public reprimand. 
It is well-established that “[t]he Supreme Court ‘acts as a court of original 
jurisdiction, rather than in its typical capacity as an appellate court’ when reviewing 
IN RE CLONTZ 
 
Earls, J., dissenting from Order 
 
 
-7- 
a recommendation from the Commission.” In re Smith, 372 N.C. at 134, 827 S.E.2d 
at 522. In Smith we observed that: 
This Court is not bound by the recommendations of the 
Commission. Rather, we may exercise our own judgment in 
arriving at a disciplinary decision in light of Respondent's 
violations of several canons of the North Carolina Code of 
Judicial Conduct. Accordingly, ‘[w]e may adopt the 
Commission's recommendation, or we may impose a lesser 
or more severe sanction.” 
 
In re Smith, 372 N.C. at 135, 827 S.E.2d at 523 (citations omitted) (quoting In re 
Hartsfield, 365 N.C. 418, 429, 722 S.E.2d 496, 503 (2012)). Indeed, “[i]n arriving at a 
disciplinary decision, this Court employs its own judgment and ‘is unfettered by the 
Commission's recommendations.’ ”  In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. at 429, 722 S.E.2d at 
503 (quoting In re Badgett, 362 N.C. 202, 207, 657 S.E.2d 346, 349 (2008)).   
In making that independent judgment, it is important to remember that a 
judicial standards inquiry “is merely an inquiry into the conduct of one exercising 
judicial power.” In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 241, 237 S.E.2d 246, 250 (1977). “Its aim 
is not to punish the individual but to maintain the honor and dignity of the judiciary 
and the proper administration of justice.” Id.   On the facts of this case, accurately 
described by the Court’s order, a public reprimand is not required to ensure the honor 
of the judiciary and the proper administration of justice. Rather, a letter of caution is 
sufficient. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s order of public 
reprimand. 
IN RE CLONTZ 
 
Earls, J., dissenting from Order 
 
 
-8- 
 
EARLS, J. dissenting from order; Justices NEWBY and DAVIS join in this 
dissent.