Title: P. v. Alvarez

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 5/23/02
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
)
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
)
)
S089554
v.
)
)
Ct.App. 4/1 D031387
JOSE M. ALVAREZ,
)
)
San Diego County
Defendant and Appellant.
)
Super. Ct. No. SCD131556
__________________________________ )
To convict an accused of a criminal offense, the prosecution must prove that
(1) a crime actually occurred, and (2) the accused was the perpetrator.  Though no
statute or constitutional principle requires it, California, like most American
jurisdictions, has historically adhered to the rule that the first of these components –
the corpus delicti or body of the crime – cannot be proved by exclusive reliance on
the defendant’s extrajudicial statements.
In practice, the corpus delicti rule operates in several ways.  The defendant
may object to the admission of his extrajudicial statements on grounds that
independent proof of the corpus delicti is lacking.  Whenever such statements form
part of the prosecution’s case, the jury must be instructed that conviction requires
some additional proof the crime occurred.  On appeal, a defendant may make a direct
claim that there was insufficient evidence, aside from his statements, of the corpus
delicti.
In June 1982 the voters, by adopting Proposition 8, added section 28,
subdivision (d) (section 28(d)), the “Right to Truth-in-Evidence” provision, to
2
article I of the California Constitution.  This section provides that except under
certain statutes already in effect, or thereafter enacted by two-thirds vote of each
house of the Legislature, “relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal
proceeding.”
The issue presented by this case is narrow.  We granted review to consider,
for the first time since the adoption of Proposition 8, whether section 28(d)
abrogated the corpus delicti rule in California.  We will conclude that section 28(d)
did abrogate any corpus delicti basis for excluding the defendant’s extrajudicial
statements from evidence.  On the other hand, in our view, section 28(d) did not
abrogate the corpus delicti rule insofar as it provides that every conviction must be
supported by some proof of the corpus delicti aside from or in addition to such
statements, and that the jury must be so instructed.
Here, defendant was convicted on multiple charges after he invaded the home
of a 13-year-old female acquaintance at night and attacked her in her sleep.  The
Court of Appeal sustained convictions for burglary and aggravated assault, but it
reversed the conviction for a forcible lewd act on an underage child.  As to the latter
charge, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court had erred by failing to instruct,
sua sponte, on the need for independent proof of the corpus delicti.  The People
contended that no error had occurred because section 28(d) had abrogated the
independent-proof rule, but the Court of Appeal dismissed this argument.  Moreover,
the Court of Appeal reasoned, the error was prejudicial, because aside from
defendant’s preoffense statements introduced at trial, there was no evidence of his
lewd intent in touching the victim.
For reasons indicted above, we believe the Court of Appeal properly rejected
the People’s argument that section 28(d) had abrogated the need for a corpus delicti
instruction.  However, unlike the Court of Appeal, we deem any instructional error
harmless, because the independent evidence of lewd intent was present.
3
Accordingly, insofar as the Court of Appeal overturned the forcible lewd act
conviction, its judgment must be reversed.
FACTS
A jury convicted defendant of residential burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460,
subd. (a))1 (count 1), a forcible lewd act upon a child under 14 (§ 288, subd. (b))
(count 2), and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1)) (count 4).2  Under the “One Strike” law, the jury found that the forcible
lewd act occurred during a residential burglary perpetrated with the intent to commit
such an act (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (d)(4)).  Defendant was sentenced to an
indeterminate term of 25 years to life on the forcible lewd act conviction;
determinate sentences on the burglary and assault convictions were stayed under
section 654.
The trial evidence, essentially undisputed, indicated the following:
In September 1997, the victim, 13-year-old Monique G., lived in an apartment
with her mother Margaret and her three younger siblings.  Defendant knew Monique
                                                
1 
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2 
The jury acquitted defendant on count 3, which charged an attempted
forcible lewd act upon a child.  When the trial court first received the jury’s verdicts,
the court noted the apparent inconsistency between the conviction on count 2 and the
acquittal on count 3.  The court sent the jury back with instructions that if it
convicted on count 2, it should simply reach no verdict on count 3.  However, as
returned, the verdict form for count 3, through various handwritten and hand-initialed
notations, again indicated an acquittal on that count, and the entire verdict was
accepted.  In a modification of its original opinion on appeal, the Court of Appeal
rejected defendant’s argument that the acquittal on count 3, a lesser included offense
of count 2, required an acquittal on count 2 as well.  Defendant has not raised the
issue in this court, either by a petition for review, or in an answer to the People’s
petition (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 28(d)), and it is not before us.
4
and her family, and the location of their apartment, because he had been the
boyfriend of Angela Plum, a friend of Margaret’s.  Monique and defendant had
exchanged greetings on several occasions.
On the night of September 6 and 7, 1997, Monique, her 13-year old friend
Jessica, and her 10-year old friend Kyra were sleeping downstairs while Margaret
and her younger children slept in upstairs bedrooms.  Monique, asleep on a loveseat
in the living room, was wearing a T-shirt and boxer shorts and was covered with a
“furry” blanket.  The family’s routine was to lock the windows and doors and turn off
the lights before retiring, but, because it was a warm evening, the kitchen window
might have been left open a crack.
Sometime in the early morning hours of September 7, Monique felt a
sensation like an insect crawling on her stomach underneath her shirt, but it did not
awaken her.  Moments later, she did awake when she felt something strangling her.
Defendant was standing over her, his hands covering her nose and mouth.  Jessica
heard Monique’s muffled scream, whereupon she also awoke and, by illumination
from the kitchen light, saw someone choking Monique.  As Monique sought to
wrench free and called for help, defendant kept one hand over her nose and mouth,
and with the other, pressed down on her throat.
Jessica ran upstairs to get Margaret.  Jessica and Margaret came back
downstairs, and defendant ran out the front door.  As he did so, Jessica recognized
him.  Before calling the police, Margaret noticed that the kitchen light was on and
the kitchen window was open wide.
Two or three nights later, Monique, Jessica, and Margaret were inside the
apartment when they heard the front door handle jiggle; Margaret looked outside and
saw defendant.  Margaret called 911, and the police responded, but by then defendant
was gone.
5
An evening or so after that, defendant came by the apartment and asked if he
could use the bathroom and have a glass of water.  Margaret let him in, and while he
was in another room, she called the police and her boyfriend, Mark Armstrong.
Armstrong responded and attempted to detain defendant until the police arrived.
Armstrong asked defendant what he was doing there after the earlier break-in.  A
friend of defendant’s arrived at the front door, whereupon defendant slipped past
Armstrong and fled.
The evidence indicated that on two occasions before the attack, defendant had
expressed a sexual interest in Monique.  Angela Plum testified that in April 1997,
approximately five months before the assault, defendant told her he would like to
have sexual relationships with both Plum and Monique at the same time.  Monique
herself testified that a couple of months before the attack, she was at Jessica’s house
and called home to check on her family.  Plum answered the phone and said to
Monique that defendant would like to talk to her.  Defendant then came on the line
and told Monique he had had a dream “where we were kissing and having sex or
something like that.”
Defendant was convicted as indicated above.  On appeal, he urged, among
other things, that the trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte on the corpus
delicti rule, as set forth in CALJIC No. 2.72.  This instruction would have told the
jury that “[n]o person may be convicted of a criminal offense unless there is some
proof of each element of the crime independent of any . . . [admission] made by
[him] . . . outside this trial.”  Defendant argued the error was prejudicial as to count
2, the forcible lewd act conviction, because that offense requires a touching with
lewd intent (§ 288, subds. (a), (b); see People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434),
and his extrajudicial expressions of sexual interest in Monique were the only
evidence of such intent.
6
In an unpublished opinion, as modified, the Court of Appeal for the Fourth
Appellate District, Division One, reversed defendant’s forcible lewd act conviction
and otherwise affirmed the judgment.  With respect to the forcible lewd act count,
the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that the trial court erred in failing to
instruct sua sponte on the corpus delicti rule.  The error was prejudicial, the Court of
Appeal reasoned, because the sole evidence of defendant’s lewd intent in touching
Monique was his preoffense expressions of sexual interest in her.
The Court of Appeal rejected the People’s claim, inspired by a concurring
opinion in People v. Culton (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 363 (Culton), that Proposition 8
had abrogated the corpus delicti rule.  The instant Court of Appeal’s majority
opinion, written by Justice McDonald, observed that no decision had so held, and
that numerous cases since 1982 had applied the rule, thus assuming its continued
existence.  The majority also noted Justice Mosk’s concurring opinion in People v.
Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 319, concluding that the rule had not been abrogated.
Justice Benke concurred separately in the majority’s conclusion that a prejudicial
violation of the corpus delicti rule had occurred.  She suggested she did so only
because there was no dispositive authority that Proposition 8 had abrogated the
corpus delicti rule, and she observed that this issue “remains unaddressed.”
Defendant did not seek review.  We granted the People’s petition for review,
which was limited to the Proposition 8 issue.
DISCUSSION
In every criminal trial, the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti, or the
body of the crime itself – i.e., the fact of injury, loss, or harm, and the existence of a
criminal agency as its cause.  In California, it has traditionally been held, the
prosecution cannot satisfy this burden by relying exclusively upon the extrajudicial
statements, confessions, or admissions of the defendant.  (E.g., People v. Ochoa
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 404 (Ochoa); People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th 279, 301;
7
People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 364 (Jennings); People v. Wright
(1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 403 (Wright); People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 455
(Beagle); People v. Cobb (1955) 45 Cal.2d 158, 161; People v. Amaya (1952)
40 Cal.2d 70, 75-76; People v. Simonsen (1895) 107 Cal. 345, 347; 1 Witkin &
Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Elements, § 45, p. 250.)  Though mandated
by no statute, and never deemed a constitutional guaranty, the rule requiring some
independent proof of the corpus delicti has roots in the common law.  (Crisera,
Reevaluation of the California Corpus Delicti Rule: A Response to the Invitation
of Proposition 8 (1990) 78 Cal. L.Rev. 1571, 1571-1573 (Crisera).)  California
decisions have applied it at least since the 1860s.  (Comment, California’s Corpus
Delicti Rule: The Case for Review and Clarification (1973) 20 UCLA L.Rev. 1055
(Comment).)
Virtually all American jurisdictions have some form of rule against
convictions for criminal conduct not proven except by the uncorroborated
extrajudicial statements of the accused.  (E.g., 1 McCormick on Evidence (5th
ed. 1999) Confessions, § 145, pp. 521-522 (McCormick); Crisera, supra,
78 Cal. L.Rev. 1571, 1572-1573.)3  This rule is intended to ensure that one will not
                                                
3 
A majority of jurisdictions, like California, require some independent proof
of the corpus delicti itself, i.e., injury , damage, or loss by a criminal agency.  (1
McCormick, supra, Confessions, § 146, pp. 525-527, 528, fn. 4.)  In federal
prosecutions, and in a minority of states, the rule is simply that the accused’s
incriminating statement cannot be proof the crime occurred unless there is some
independent evidence that the statement is trustworthy.  (Opper v. United States
(1954) 348 U.S. 84, 93; see Armstrong v. State (Alaska 1972) 502 P.2d 440, 447;
People v. Yoshida (Hawaii 1960) 354 P.2d 986, 991; State v. Zysk (N.H. 1983)
465 A.2d 480, 483; State v. Lucas (N.J. 1959) 152 A.2d 50, 57-61; Fontenot v.
State (Okla.Crim.App. 1994) 881 P.2d 69, 77-78; State v. Ervin (Tenn.Crim.App.
1986) 731 S.W.2d 70, 72; see also State v. Parker (N.C. 1985) 337 S.E.2d 487,
495; Holt v. State (Wis. 1962) 117 N.W.2d 626, 633.)
8
be falsely convicted, by his or her untested words alone, of a crime that never
happened.  (Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, 405; People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th
279, 301; Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d 334, 368.)
The California decisions have addressed the independent-proof requirement
in various contexts.  It has been held that the defendant may not be held to answer if
no independent evidence of the corpus delicti is produced at the preliminary
examination.  (Jones v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 390, 393; see
People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th 279, 300-301.)4  At trial, the defendant’s
extrajudicial statements have been deemed inadmissible over a corpus delicti
objection absent some independent evidence of the crime to which the statements
relate (see, e.g., Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, 404-405; Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d
367, 404; People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867, 885-886 (Robbins)), and we
have said that the corpus delicti rule is one governing the admissibility of evidence
(People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 529; see also People v. Rogers (1943)
                                                
4 
In People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th 279, the magistrate bound the
defendant over for trial on capital murder charges, but found insufficient
independent evidence, aside from the defendant’s extrajudicial statements, to
establish the corpus delicti of an associated charge that the defendant orally
copulated the victim by force.  Despite the magistrate’s refusal to hold the defendant
to answer on this charge, the prosecutor included it in the information.  The superior
court denied the defendant’s motion, under section 995, to set the oral copulation
count aside.  The defendant asserted on appeal that this ruling was error.  In response,
we first insisted that the holding of Jones v. Superior Court, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d
390, to the effect that independent proof of the corpus delicti must be presented at
the preliminary examination, was “not under review.”  (People v. Jones, supra,
17 Cal.4th at p. 300.)  Nonetheless, we analyzed the claim under standards generally
applied to the denial of section 995 motions.  We concluded the superior court had
not erred because, contrary to the magistrate’s determination, the preliminary
examination did include sufficient independent evidence that a forcible oral
copulation had occurred.  (People v. Jones, supra, at pp. 301-304.)
9
22 Cal.2d 787, 806).  Whenever an accused’s extrajudicial statements form part of
the prosecution’s evidence, the cases have additionally required the trial court to
instruct sua sponte that a finding of guilt cannot be predicated on the statements
alone.  (E.g., Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d 441, 455; People v. Howk (1961) 56 Cal.2d
687, 706-707; People v. Holbrook (1955) 45 Cal.2d 228, 234; People v. Frey
(1913) 165 Cal. 140, 147; CALJIC No. 2.72; see People v. Carpenter (1997)
15 Cal.4th 312, 393-394 (Carpenter) [distinguishing statement made as part of
crime]; but see Rogers, supra, 22 Cal.2d at p. 806.)5  Finally, appellate courts have
entertained direct claims that a conviction cannot stand because the trial record lacks
independent evidence of the corpus delicti.  (E.g., Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d 367,
403-405; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 552-553; People v. Alcala
(1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 624-625 (Alcala) [addressing the issue sua sponte]; People v.
Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 115 (Towler).)
In requiring independent evidence of the corpus delicti, California has not
distinguished between actual confessions or admissions on the one hand, and pre-
offense statements of intent on the other.  Thus, the rule in California has been that
one cannot be convicted when there is no proof a crime occurred other than his or
her own earlier utterances indicating a predisposition or purpose to commit it.
(Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d 441, 455, fn. 5; see People v. Bispham (1938)
                                                
5 
CALJIC No. 2.72 instructs in pertinent part that “[n]o person may be
convicted of a criminal offense unless there is some proof of each element of the
crime independent of any [confession] [or] [admission] made by [him] [her] outside
of this trial.”
10
26 Cal.App.2d 216, 217-218; see also Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th 312, 393-394
[distinguishing statement of present intent made as part of crime itself].)6
The independent proof may be circumstantial and need not be beyond a
reasonable doubt, but is sufficient if it permits an inference of criminal conduct,
even if a noncriminal explanation is also plausible.  (Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d
334, 364; People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 610-611; Towler, supra, 31 Cal.3d
105, 117.)  There is no requirement of independent evidence “of every physical act
constituting an element of an offense,” so long as there is some slight or prima facie
showing of injury, loss, or harm by a criminal agency.  (People v. Jones, supra,
17 Cal.4th 279, 303.)  In every case, once the necessary quantum of independent
evidence is present, the defendant’s extrajudicial statements may then be considered
for their full value to strengthen the case on all issues.  (Robbins, supra, 45 Cal.3d
867, 885-886; Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d 604, 624-625.)
Here, the People have never challenged defendant’s assumption that the
corpus delicti of a forcible lewd act upon a child under 14 necessarily includes the
                                                
6 
The concurring opinion acknowledges the established California doctrine that
the defendant’s incriminating preoffense statements are not admissible absent
independent proof of the corpus delicti.  However, the concurrence urges that the
“preoffense statement” aspect of the California corpus delicti rule may have been
abrogated by Proposition 8, and should be reexamined and rejected in any event.  For
two reasons, no independent discussion of this issue is appropriate.  The People have
not separately challenged the “preoffense statement” corollary of the California
corpus delicti rule at any stage.  Thus, we have no occasion here to reconsider its
rationale.  Moreover, the effect of Proposition 8 on this corollary is necessarily
determined by the effect of Proposition 8 on the corpus delicti rule in its entirety.
As we elsewhere hold, to the extent the corpus delicti rule limits the admission of
relevant evidence, Proposition 8 does entirely abrogate the rule, including any
limitation on the admission of preoffense statements.  On the other hand, because
Proposition 8 speaks only to the admissibility of relevant evidence, it can have no
other limiting effect on the corpus delicti rule.
11
statutory elements that such an underage child was physically touched, by means of
force, violence, duress, or menace, for the present and immediate purpose of
sexually arousing or gratifying the toucher or the victim.  (§ 288, subds. (a), (b);
People v. Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th 434, 444-452.)7  Further, the People have not
disputed that defendant’s extrajudicial statements of preoffense sexual interest in
Monique were introduced as evidence of the requisite lewd intent.  Nor have the
People ever suggested that defendant waived or forfeited the corpus delicti issue by
failing to raise it during the trial.8
                                                
7 
The concurring opinion takes issue with this premise as well, arguing that on
the facts of this case, the corpus delicti rule only required independent proof of a
forcible, and thus necessarily criminal, touching, and did not further require
independent proof of the sexual intent necessary to establish, as an element of the
specific charge, that the touching was lewd.  However, a contrary assumption was
apparently shared by the parties and all lower courts.  In response to questions raised
at oral argument, counsel for the People conceded that they have not raised, either
below or in this court, the issue discussed by the concurring opinion.  Accordingly,
as with other issues not raised, we decline to address it.
8 
In Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d 367, we held the defendant could not complain
his extrajudicial statements were improperly admitted without independent proof of
the corpus delicti, because he had not objected on that ground at the time the
statements were proffered.  (Id., at p. 404, citing People v. Mitchell (1966)
239 Cal.App.2d 318, 323.)  We noted that the prosecution might have withheld
available independent proof because no corpus delicti objection was raised, and that
the defense’s silence might signal a wish to forestall the presentation of such
additional damaging evidence.  (Wright, supra, at pp. 404-405, citing Mitchell,
supra, at p. 323.)  No decision of this court, including Wright, has suggested that an
evidentiary objection at trial is a prerequisite to raising instructional and sufficiency
claims on appeal.  However, post-Wright Court of Appeal decisions have split on
whether, by virtue of Wright’s reasoning, the defendant must either give the
prosecution trial notice of his insistence on independent proof or forfeit the benefit
of the independent-proof rule entirely.  (People v. Lara (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 658,
675 [failure to raise corpus delicti objection to admission of extrajudicial
statements does not waive claim that corpus delicti instruction was improperly
omitted]; People v. Martinez (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1103-1104 [failure to
(Footnote continued on next page)
12
Instead, to rebut defendant’s argument that the corpus delicti rule was
violated by failure to instruct the jury there must be some proof, aside from his
extrajudicial statements, of each element of the charged offense (CALJIC No. 2.72),
the People have argued only (1) that the statements were part of the crime itself, and
thus need not be independently corroborated;9 (2) that any instructional error was
harmless, because there was independent proof of lewd intent;10 and (3) most
significantly, that Proposition 8, by deeming all relevant evidence admissible,
entirely abrogated the rule barring admission and consideration of the defendant’s
extrajudicial statements absent independent proof of the corpus delicti.  Only the
last contention is renewed in this court.  We proceed to consider it.
Proposition 8 was adopted by the voters at the June 8, 1982 General Election.
Among other things, it added section 28(d), entitled Right to Truth-in-Evidence, to
article I of the California Constitution.  This provision declares that “[e]xcept as
provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each
house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal
proceeding.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  Section 28(d) further states that it does not
                                                                                                                                                
raise corpus delicti objection to admission of extrajudicial statements waives
appellate claim that independent proof of corpus delicti was insufficient]; People v.
Sally (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1621, 1628 [same].)
9 
In the Court of Appeal, the People cited Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th 312
for this premise.  In Carpenter, we held that a sua sponte corpus delicti instruction
is not required where the defendant’s extrajudicial statements were not expressions
of an intent to commit a crime at a later time, but were made at the time of the
offense, and were thus part of the offense itself.  (Id., at pp. 393-394.)  The Court of
Appeal rejected the People’s contention, noting the months-long time gap between
defendant’s expressions of sexual interest in Monique and the September 1997
attack.  The People have not renewed their Carpenter argument in this court.
10 
We discuss this issue below.
13
abrogate “existing statutory rule[s] of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or
Evidence Code, [s]ections 352, 782[,] or 1103.”
“We and the Courts of Appeal have consistently held that in criminal
proceedings, section 28(d) supersedes all California [as opposed to federal]
restrictions on the admission of relevant evidence except those preserved or
permitted by the express words of section 28(d) itself.  (People v. Mickle (1991)
54 Cal.3d 140, 168; People v. Harris [(1989)] 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1080-1082
[(Harris)]; People v. Taylor (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 622; see In re Lance W. (1985)
37 Cal.3d 873 [(Lance W.)].)  The appellate decisions reject arguments that section
28(d) was intended only to prevent courts from excluding evidence because its
seizure violated the California Constitution (cf. . . . Lance W., supra, at p. 890).
Were that the sole purpose, the cases reason, there was no need to preserve some,
but not all, existing statutory limitations on the admission of relevant evidence.  Nor
was it necessary to restrict the Legislature’s power to enact new exclusionary rules.
Indeed, both the plain language of section 28(d) and the ballot materials for
Proposition 8 indicate an intent to make all relevant evidence admissible, subject
only to [the] specified exceptions.  (Harris, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1082, & fn. 16;
see also . . . Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 888.)”  (People v. Wheeler (1992)
4 Cal.4th 284, 291 (Wheeler).)
It is undisputed that the corpus delicti rule is not a requirement of federal law,
and it has no basis in California statutory law.  (Cf., e.g., Ramona R. v. Superior
Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 808-811 [rule that minor’s statements to juvenile
probation officer cannot be used as part of prosecution’s case-in-chief is part of
state privilege against self-incrimination statutorily preserved by Evidence Code
section 940, and thus by section 28(d)]; but see People v. Macias (1997) 16 Cal.4th
739, 753 (Macias) [privilege against self-incrimination preserved by Evidence Code
did not extend to use for impeachment of minor’s statements to juvenile probation
14
officer]; People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 318-319 (May) [reaching similar
result with respect to use for impeachment of defendant’s voluntary statement
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436].)  Thus, to the
extent the corpus delicti rule limits the admissibility of relevant evidence, it was
abrogated by section 28(d).
There is no doubt that an incriminatory statement by the accused himself is
relevant evidence, i.e., evidence having a “tendency in reason” to prove the disputed
facts, bearing on his guilt, to which the statement relates.  (Evid. Code, § 210; see
People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th 279, 326 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.); see also
Culton, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th 363, 374 (conc. opn. of Timlin, J.).)  Indeed, the
accused’s own disclosure of his criminal acts, purposes, or motives is so inherently
and logically persuasive on those issues that erroneous admission of such evidence
in violation of the accused’s constitutional rights requires careful evaluation of
prejudicial effect.  (See, e.g., People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 500-510
(Cahill).)  Accordingly, insofar as the corpus delicti rule restricts the admissibility
of incriminatory extrajudicial statements by the accused, section 28(d) abrogates
it.11
                                                
11 
We have held that section 28(d) did not eliminate certain preexisting
nonstatutory rules restricting the admission of scientific or technical evidence.
(People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 598 (Leahy) [“Kelly rule” requiring
foundational showing of general acceptance of new scientific technique]; Harris,
supra, 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1094 [rule barring admission of polygraph evidence absent
new showing of scientific acceptance].)  Our reasoning rested on the premise that
section 28(d) “ ‘did not . . . abrogate generally accepted rules by which the
reliability and thus the relevance of scientific evidence is determined.
[Citation.]’ ”  (Leahy, supra, at p. 598, quoting Harris, supra, at p. 1094, italics
added.)  The corpus delicti rule, including its restriction on the admission of the
accused’s extrajudicial statements, may demonstrate distrust of such statements as
the sole proof that a crime occurred, but this is not the sort of reliability concern,
going to relevance itself, that supports the rules barring evidence of questionable
(Footnote continued on next page)
15
Defendant raises several arguments against the notion that section 28(d)
affected the corpus delicti rule.  He notes that section 28(d) contains no express
reference to the corpus delicti requirement.  He claims the electorate’s primary
purpose was simply to overturn California judicial decisions that exceeded federal
constitutional requirements in excluding evidence as a remedy for police
misconduct (see, e.g., Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th 739, 751; May, supra, 44 Cal.3d
309, 318-319; Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887; see also Ballot Pamp.,
Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) arguments in favor of Prop. 8, p. 34; id., rebuttal to
argument against Prop. 8, p. 35), not to abrogate a substantive rule of law affecting
the sufficiency of proof (see People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th 279, 327-328
(conc. opn. of Mosk, J.); Comment, supra, 20 UCLA L.Rev. 1055, 1078-1079).
Defendant suggests the numerous appellate decisions which have applied the
rule since June 1982 (see authorities cited ante) reflect a universal assumption that
it remains in effect.  He stresses, as Justice Mosk recently did, that in the wake of
Proposition 8, both the electorate and the Legislature have adopted statutes
abrogating or modifying the rule in particular situations.  For example, Penal Code
section 190.41, added by Proposition 115 (approved by the voters at the Primary
Election of June 5, 1990), provides that in a capital case, the corpus delicti of a
felony-based special circumstance need not be proved independently of the
defendant’s extrajudicial statement.  Evidence Code section 1228 (Stats. 1984, ch.
1421, § 1, pp. 4492-4493) provides that in prosecutions for specified offenses, the
                                                                                                                                                
scientific merit.  When deductions based on a questionable scientific technique are
offered in evidence, the issue is whether the technique, by its inherent nature,
actually has a “tendency in reason” (Evid. Code, § 210) to prove what it purports to
prove, i.e., to produce a scientifically valid result.  Evidence produced by
scientifically invalid techniques simply is not probative evidence, and is thus not
“relevant” evidence the admissibility of which is governed by section 28(d).
16
extrajudicial statements of complaining witnesses under 12 years old are, in certain
circumstances, not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule for the purpose of
establishing the corpus delicti as a necessary antecedent to introduction of the
defendant’s confession.12  Defendant insists these measures are further proof that
section 28(d) did not abrogate the corpus delicti rule, for if it had done so, the later
statutes would be unnecessary.
In light of these considerations, defendant maintains, the effect of section
28(d) on the corpus delicti rule is at least ambiguous.  That being so, he concludes,
we must resolve the ambiguity in the accused’s favor.  (Citing People v. Woodhead
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1011 [Proposition 8’s directive that “no person convicted
of” a serious felony is eligible for commitment to the Youth Authority could apply
if either the current, or any prior, felony conviction was serious; narrower
construction, confining the rule to the current felony, is therefore required].)
We are not persuaded.  The language of section 28(d) is not ambiguous, but
plain, and we must follow it.  As we have explained, this language is not confined to
                                                
12 
Like Justice Mosk, defendant also cites a third statute, section 868.5,
subdivision (c) (Stats. 1983, ch. 347, § 1, pp. 1545-1546), dealing with the order of
testimony when persons chosen by a prosecuting witness as courtroom supporters
(id., subd. (a)) are themselves prosecuting witnesses.  Subdivision (c) of section
868.5 provides that generally the testimony of the supporters must precede the
testimony of the person they are supporting, but if “the evidence given by [a
supporter] would be subject to exclusion because it has been given before the corpus
delicti has been established, the evidence shall be admitted subject to the court’s or
the defendant’s motion to strike that evidence from the record if the corpus delicti
is not later established by the testimony of the prosecuting witness.”  The purpose
and effect of this statute are unclear, since the corpus delicti rule would not bar
testimony by one prosecuting witness before the corpus delicti was established by
the testimony of another.  As explained above, the rule only prevents the accused’s
own extrajudicial statements from being introduced until some independent
evidence of the corpus delicti is presented.
17
police misconduct issues, but removes all obstacles to the admissibility of relevant
evidence save those expressly preserved by the section.  That cases after the
adoption of Proposition 8 have continued to address corpus delicti claims is not
dispositive of the effect of section 28(d) on the rule.  No prior decision has
confronted this precise issue,13 and it is axiomatic that cases are not authority for
propositions not considered.  (People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966, 978, fn. 7;
People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 482, fn. 7; see also Amwest Surety Ins.
Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1268; Johnson v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.4th
389, 415 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
For similar reasons, subsequent statutes addressing the corpus delicti rule,
even when adopted by the voters themselves, are not proof that section 28(d) itself
had left the rule undisturbed.  Because no court had decided the issue, these laws
may simply spring from a prudent determination that if the rule still existed, it
should at least be modified in the specified ways.14  The statutes cited by defendant
                                                
13 
In Culton, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th 363, the majority, in an opinion by Justice
Timlin, addressed defendant’s claim of a corpus delicti violation by holding that
there was sufficient independent evidence of the corpus delicti.  (Id., at pp. 366-
373.)  In a concurrence to his own majority opinion, Justice Timlin unilaterally
raised the issue whether section 28(d) abrogated the corpus delicti rule, concluding
that it had done so.  (Culton, supra, at pp. 373-376 (conc. opn. of Timlin, J.).)
However, this conclusion did not garner majority support.
14 
Such concerns seem certain to have motivated the voters when, through
Proposition 115, they added section 190.41 to the Penal Code.  As indicated above,
this statute provides that the corpus delicti of a felony-based special circumstance
need not be proven independently of the defendant’s statements.  This portion of
Proposition 115 was not specifically discussed in the ballot materials, but the
proponents stated that one purpose of the initiative was to “overturn decisions by
Rose Bird and her allies which made [our death penalty law] nearly inoperative.”
(Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) argument in favor of Prop. 115, p. 36.)
The decision clearly targeted by section 190.41 was People v. Mattson (1984)
37 Cal.3d 85, a post-Proposition 8 case which, without any reference to section
(Footnote continued on next page)
18
were not direct efforts to interpret or implement section 28(d), and are thus not
subject to the maxim that when a constitutional provision is capable of various
interpretations, the one adopted by the Legislature has persuasive significance.  (Cf.
California Housing Finance Agency v. Patitucci (1978) 22 Cal.3d 171, 175;
Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor (1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 693.)  Nothing in
these legislative actions contravenes a conclusion that Proposition 8 abrogated the
corpus delicti rule to the extent indicated by its plain terms.
Of course, our decisions have already rejected defendant’s suggestion that
the effect of section 28(d) should be confined to court-made rules excluding
evidence as a remedy for police misconduct.  On several occasions, we have
concluded that its terms abrogated statutory and nonstatutory grounds of
inadmissibility unrelated to the so-called exclusionary rule.  (E.g., People v.
Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 465 [section 28(d) abrogated, to extent
inconsistent with federal law, California rule barring admission of nontestifying
defendant’s unredacted extrajudicial statement which implicates codefendant];
Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th 284, 288-295 [section 28(d) abrogated Evidence Code
sections 787 and 788, making prior felony convictions the only admissible evidence
of prior conduct for impeachment]; Harris, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1080-1083
[same].)15
                                                                                                                                                
28(d), precisely held that the corpus delicti of a felony-based special circumstance
did have to be established aside from the defendant’s extrajudicial statements.
(Mattson, supra, at pp. 93-94.)  By confronting a court decision that applied the
corpus delicti rule in a manner they deemed unacceptable, the voters did not
evidence their understanding that, in adopting Proposition 8, they had otherwise
retained the rule intact.
15 
In People v. Starr (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 574, though the People did not raise
the point, the majority observed “[i]t has been suggested” (id., at p. 580) that
adoption of the Evidence Code in 1965 had abrogated the corpus delicti rule.  The
(Footnote continued on next page)
19
We are therefore persuaded that insofar as the corpus delicti rule has directly
barred or restricted the admissibility in evidence of otherwise relevant and
admissible extrajudicial statements of the accused, on grounds that independent
proof of the crime is lacking, the rule has been abrogated by section 28(d).  Under
this constitutional provision, a corpus delicti objection to the introduction of
defendant’s statements is no longer valid as such.16
                                                                                                                                                
suggestion arose in Justice Gustafson’s dissenting opinion (Starr, supra, at pp. 583-
586), and, as the dissent disclosed, the particular Evidence Code provision at issue
was section 351.  In language similar to the words of section 28(d), Evidence Code
section 351 provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant
evidence is admissible.”  The Starr majority rejected the view that this statute had
abolished the corpus delicti requirement.  Primarily discussing the rule as one of
sufficiency of evidence, long settled in criminal procedure, the majority observed
only:  “We do not believe that such a firmly established and fundamental rule of the
criminal law of years’ standing was overruled by any vague and indecisive provision
in the Evidence Codenor do we believe that the Legislature so intended.”  (Starr,
supra, at p. 583.)  We do not find the Starr majority’s analysis persuasive under
section 28(d).  First, the majority in Starr failed to acknowledge that the corpus
delicti rule includes a restriction on the admissibility of relevant evidence, a topic
directly addressed by both Evidence Code section 351 and section 28(d).  Moreover,
Evidence Code section 351 merely sought to codify, in the context of a
comprehensive statement of evidentiary principles, the general maxim that relevant
evidence is admissible.  By contrast, section 28(d) represents a focused effort by the
electorate to overturn remaining nonstatutory limitations on the admission of such
evidence.  In at least one other context, we have held that while a rule of
nonadmissibility (the “vicarious exclusionary rule” in search and seizure cases) was
not abrogated by Evidence Code section 351 (Kaplan v. Superior Court (1971)
6 Cal.3d 150, 160-161), it was later abrogated by the facially similar language of
section 28(d) (Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d 873, 889-890).
16 
As we have noted on several occasions, section 28(d) expressly preserves a
trial court’s sound discretion, under Evidence Code section 352, to exclude
evidence which, though technically relevant, is more prejudicial than probative under
the particular circumstances.  (E.g., Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th 284, 294-295; see
Leahy, supra, 8 Cal.4th 587, 598.)  Nothing we say here is intended to affect that
discretion.
20
We have already explained, however, that the independent-proof rule
historically has been more than a limitation on the admissibility of relevant
evidence.  As indicated above, the rule has not simply barred the introduction of the
defendant’s out-of-court statement over his valid objection that independent proof
of the corpus delicti is lacking.  Instead, the California decisions have additionally
required a jury instruction against exclusive reliance on such a statement, and have
made insufficient independent proof of the corpus delicti a discrete ground for
reversal on appeal.  As we have seen, courts traditionally consider claims of
instructional error, and of insufficient proof, on their own merits, without reference
to whether the defendant affirmatively sought, on corpus delicti grounds, to prevent
the admission of his out-of-court statements, or whether those statements were
properly allowed in evidence.  (But see fn. 6, ante.)
We have said that the independent-proof rule “essentially precludes
conviction based solely on a defendant’s out-of-court statements.”  (People v. Ray
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 341, italics added; see People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th
279, 301.)  In other words, as historically applied, the rule requires corroboration
of the defendant’s extrajudicial utterances insofar as they indicate a crime was
committed, and forces the People to supply, as part of their burden of proof in
every criminal prosecution, some evidence of the corpus delicti aside from, or in
addition to, such statements.  (See People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th 279, 327-328
(conc. opn. of Mosk, J.); Ballard v. State (Md. 1994) 636 A.2d 474, 476, fn. 1; but
see ante, fn. 6.)
However, the language of section 28(d) does not address issues of
corroboration, burden of proof, or sufficiency of proof.  Though section 28(d)
broadly eliminates rules that exclude relevant evidence from a criminal trial, the
words of the constitutional provision do not speak beyond that subject.  “By its
terms, the Truth-in-Evidence provision affects only the admissibility of evidence
21
. . . .”  (Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th 478, 500, fn. omitted.)  The words of section 28(d)
do not mention the corpus delicti rule by name, nor do they purport to affect any rule
by which evidence, otherwise admissible, must be independently corroborated.
Moreover, nothing in the ballot materials for Proposition 8 suggests the
voters intended section 28(d) to have such an effect beyond its express provisions.
On the subject of evidentiary rules, the Attorney General’s summary of the initiative
advised only that Proposition 8 included “provisions regarding . . . exclusion of
relevant evidence.”  (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) official summary
of Prop. 8, p. 32, italics added.)  The Legislative Analyst’s analysis explained that
“[u]nder current law, certain evidence is not permitted to be presented in a
criminal trial,” including “evidence obtained through unlawful eavesdropping or
wiretapping, or through unlawful searches of persons or property,” but that
Proposition 8 “generally would allow most relevant evidence to be presented in
criminal cases.”  (Id., analysis of Prop. 8 by Legis. Analyst, p. 32, italics added.)
A proponent of the initiative, Lieutenant Governor Mike Curb, did argue that
Proposition 8 would “restore balance to the rules governing the use of evidence
against criminals.”  (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) arguments in favor
of Prop. 8, p. 34, italics added.)  One might contend that the corpus delicti rule
limits the use of an accused’s extrajudicial statements insofar as it prevents such
statements from constituting the sole proof a crime was committed.  However,
Lieutenant Governor Curb’s brief and vague reference to “use of evidence,” read in
context with the express words of section 28(d) and the official explanations
thereof, is not susceptible to such a broad construction.  The cited argument is no
evidence of the voters’ understanding that they were abolishing a venerable rule, not
named or mentioned in the initiative or associated materials, which required
corroboration of a particular kind of criminal evidence.
22
As we have recounted, when the Evidence Code, as drafted by the Law
Revision Commission, was adopted in 1965, similar debate arose whether the rule
requiring independent proof of the corpus delicti had been abolished.  The focus of
such contentions was new Evidence Code section 351, which, like section 28(d),
states that all relevant evidence is admissible.  One commentator succinctly noted
the strongest argument against a conclusion that the rule was entirely abrogated:  “It
is simply not clear that the corpus delicti rule is always identified and classified as a
procedural rule of evidence rather than a rule of the substantive criminal law.
Assuming the latter, the Law Revision Commission members may never have
contemplated that it was their task to deal with the rule in the Code or that their work
product would affect its continued viability. . . .  If the corpus delicti rule is viewed
as a procedural rule, going to admissibility of the accused’s confession, then it
would have been within the possible scope of the Evidence Code.  On the other hand,
the substantive requirement that the corpus delicti be established sufficiently could
not have been altered by mere revision of evidence law.”  (Comment, supra,
20 UCLA L.Rev. 1055, 1078-1079, fn. omitted.)
We find such reasoning persuasive in the context of section 28(d).  The
literal language of this provision abolishes, with specified exceptions, all state law
restrictions on the admissibility of relevant evidence, necessarily including the
prong of the corpus delicti rule that bars introduction of an accused’s out-of-court
statements absent independent proof a crime was committed.  But section 28(d)
does not address, expressly or implicitly, any substantive rule that a conviction
requires some proof, aside from the accused’s statements, of the corpus delicti, and
that the jury must be so instructed.  Such issues are beyond the scope of section
28(d), both by its literal words and as it reasonably must have been understood by the
23
electors.  Insofar as the corpus delicti rule includes this latter requirement, it was
not abrogated by Proposition 8.17
The result of our conclusions is as follows:  Because of the adoption of
section 28(d) through Proposition 8, there no longer exists a trial objection to the
admission in evidence of the defendant’s out-of-court statements on grounds that
independent proof of the corpus delicti is lacking.  If otherwise admissible, the
defendant’s extrajudicial utterances may be introduced in his or her trial without
regard to whether the prosecution has already provided, or promises to provide,
independent prima facie proof that a criminal act was committed.
                                                
17 
For a contrary result, the People rely heavily, as in the Court of Appeal, on
Justice Timlin’s concurring opinion in Culton, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th 363.  There,
the defendant was convicted of 10 counts of lewd and lascivious conduct upon the
same four-year-old girl.  On appeal, he urged his police statement, essentially
admitting all the charged acts, should not have been admitted over his corpus
delicti objection, because there was no other evidence of a criminal act against the
minor, or of multiple such acts.  The majority rejected the claim, finding sufficient
independent evidence in expert testimony concerning the condition of the victim’s
vaginal area.  (Id., at pp. 366-373.)  Justice Timlin concurred in the result,
concluding that section 28(d) had abrogated the rule requiring proof, aside from the
defendant’s extrajudicial statements, of the corpus delicti.  In his opinion, Justice
Timlin focused on the independent-proof rule as one concerning the admission and
exclusion of relevant evidence, the issue presented in the case before the court, and
a subject on which section 28(d) speaks directly.  He reasoned that the rule
forbidding introduction of the defendant’s statements absent independent proof of
the corpus delicti was among those merely “prophylactic” court-made exclusionary
rules which Proposition 8 was intended to eliminate.  (Culton, supra, at pp. 375-
377 (conc. opn. of Timlin, J.).)  As indicated above, we have concluded the literal
words of section 28(d) compel the result reached by Justice Timlin with respect to
the exclusionary prong of the independent-proof rule.  However, Justice Timlin did
not clearly consider the effect of section 28(d) on the instructional and sufficiency
prongs of the rule, which California decisions have separately applied.  As we have
seen, section 28(d) neither expressly nor implicitly addresses rules requiring
corroboration of otherwise admissible evidence.
24
However, section 28(d) did not eliminate the independent-proof rule insofar
as that rule prohibits conviction where the only evidence that the crime was
committed is the defendant’s own statements outside of court.  Thus, section 28(d)
did not affect the rule to the extent it (1) requires an instruction to the jury that no
person may be convicted absent evidence of the crime independent of his or her out-
of-court statements or (2) allows the defendant, on appeal, directly to attack the
sufficiency of the prosecution’s independent showing.
We apply these principles to the instant case.  As will be recalled, defendant’s
claim on appeal is that the trial court erred, with respect to the forcible lewd act
charge, by failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the requirements of the rule
requiring independent proof of the corpus delicti.  The Court of Appeal properly
rejected the People’s responsive argument (the only one urged in this court) that,
because Proposition 8 had abrogated the independent-proof rule, there was no
instructional error.  We find the Court of Appeal’s result correct in this regard.  As
we have explained, section 28(d), as adopted by Proposition 8, abolished the rule
only insofar as it barred or limited the admissibility in evidence of defendant’s out-
of-court utterances.  Section 28(d) did not affect any obligation to instruct the jury
that such statements cannot be the sole proof the crime occurred.
However, we do not agree with the Court of Appeal’s further conclusion that
any instructional error was prejudicial.  Error in omitting a corpus delicti instruction
is considered harmless, and thus no basis for reversal, if there appears no reasonable
probability the jury would have reached a result more favorable to the defendant had
the instruction been given.  (Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d 441, 455; People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
Of course, as we have seen, the modicum of necessary independent evidence
of the corpus delicti, and thus the jury’s duty to find such independent proof, is not
great.  The independent evidence may be circumstantial, and need only be “a slight or
25
prima facie showing” permitting an inference of injury, loss, or harm from a
criminal agency, after which the defendant’s statements may be considered to
strengthen the case on all issues.  (E.g., Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th 279, 303;
Jennings,  supra, 53 Cal.3d 334, 364; Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d 604, 624-625.)  If,
as a matter of law, this “slight or prima facie” showing was made, a rational jury,
properly instructed, could not have found otherwise, and the omission of an
independent-proof instruction is necessarily harmless.
Contrary to the Court of Appeal, we find sufficient independent evidence that
defendant forcibly touched Monique for the specific purpose of sexual gratification.
At the outset, the jury could reasonably infer from all the circumstances that
defendant entered Monique’s residence for the purpose of molesting her.  Though he
knew Monique’s family, and had seen Monique on several ocasions, he did not enter
as an invited guest during waking hours, but after bedtime, when the house was dark,
and surreptitiously, most likely through a kitchen window he forced open.
Moreover, it appears that, once inside, he proceeded immediately to where Monique
was sleeping; there is no evidence that anything in the apartment, other than the
window, had been disturbed, or that any property was taken.
Significantly, Monique testified that, brief moments before she was fully
awake, she felt a light touch on the bare skin of her stomach, under both the T-shirt
she was wearing and the thick blanket which also covered her.  The Court of Appeal
discounted this evidence, stating it was “implausible that [defendant] could have
touched the skin of Monique’s stomach while she was covered by clothing and a
heavy blanket.”  On the contrary, we think the jury was entitled to infer that
defendant had indeed touched Monique in this manner, and, under the circumstances,
that the motivation for physical contact of this intimate nature was sexual
gratification.  (People v. Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th 434, 452.)
26
These circumstances permit the further inference that, by then placing his
hands upon the sleeping Monique’s mouth and throat, and keeping them there to
restrain and silence her when she awoke and resisted, defendant committed a “lewd
or lascivious act” (§ 288, subd. (a)) “by use of force” (id., subd. (b)(1)), i.e., a
touching for purposes of immediate sexual gratification “undertaken . . . by means of
‘physical force substantially different from or substantially greater than that
necessary to accomplish the lewd act itself.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Neel (1993)
19 Cal.App.4th 1784, 1790; People v. Cicero (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474-475,
477-484.)
Defendant’s postattack behavior is also circumstantial evidence of his lewd
intent at the time he assaulted Monique.  The jury could infer that his return to
Monique’s home on two later occasions indicated his obsessive, and likely sexual,
interest in the victim.
As a matter of law, therefore, the record contains the requisite prima facie
showing, independent of defendant’s extrajudicial statements, that defendant forcibly
touched Monique with the specific intent to achieve sexual gratification.
Accordingly, insofar as the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the
requirement of independent evidence, the error was harmless.  We will therefore
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal to the extent it overturned defendant’s
conviction on this charge.18
                                                
18        We stress the narrow nature of our proposed holding.  The matter before us is
limited to the direct effect of Proposition 8 on the California rule requiring
independent proof of the corpus delicti.  We do not otherwise consider the
parameters of the independent-proof rule, for such broader issues are not presented.
We are aware of various policy criticisms of the rule (see, e.g., Crisera, supra,
78 Cal.L.Rev. 1571, 1580-1584; Comment, supra, 20 UCLA L.Rev. 1055, 1087-
1090; but see People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th 279, 321-325 (conc. opn. of
(Footnote continued on next page)
27
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed insofar as it vacated
defendant’s conviction for a forcible lewd act upon a child under 14.  In all other
respects, the Court of Appeal’s judgment is affirmed.
BAXTER, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
                                                                                                                                                
Mosk, J.)), but we express no view on that subject, for it is beyond the scope of the
questions framed by this appeal.
1
CONCURRING OPINION BY BROWN, J.
The corpus delicti rule exists to ensure a defendant does not admit to a crime
that never happened.  (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 301.)  To achieve this
limited purpose, the rule requires only that the People provide prima facie evidence
independent of the defendant’s extrajudicial statements—i.e., corroborate—that a
crime was committed.  (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 405.)  The parties’
assumption that the corpus delicti rule requires corroboration of defendant’s intent
in committing the offense, if correct, would signal a radical expansion of the rule,
which has hitherto required corroboration of only the actus reus and not the mens
rea of a crime, except in unusual circumstances not present here.  Furthermore,
defendant made the statements before the offense, and it is not clear that the judge-
made rule requiring corroboration of preoffense statements remains good law after
the enactment of Proposition 8.  Accordingly, I concur in the disposition only.
I.
Notwithstanding the assumption of the parties and the lower courts that the
corpus delicti rule required corroboration of not only a criminal injury but also the
mental element of lewd intent (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 11), we have long held
otherwise.  “All that need be shown by independent evidence . . . is that a crime has
been committed by someone.”  (People v. Cobb (1955) 45 Cal.2d 158, 161.)
Because the showing of a criminal act satisfies the rule, there is generally no
need to corroborate the defendant’s mental state.  (1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.
2
Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Elements, § 45.)  Thus, the People must corroborate the
act of an unlawful killing (People v. Simonsen (1895) 107 Cal. 345, 347), but the
defendant’s extrajudicial admissions alone may establish his mental state, and thus
the extent of his liability.  Therefore, a defendant’s statements may alone establish
the malice element of murder (Ureta v. Superior Court (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d
672, 676), the specific intent to kill element of attempted murder (People v.
McGlothen (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1014; see also People v. Daly (1992) 8
Cal.App.4th 47, 59), or the premeditation and deliberation element of first degree
murder (People v. Cooper (1960) 53 Cal.2d 755, 765).  Although this exclusion of
intent from the corpus delicti rule has received its fullest explanation in homicide
case law, it applies in other contexts as well.  (See People v. Key (1984) 153
Cal.App.3d 888, 895 (Key).)
Nevertheless, some Penal Code section 2881 prosecutions fall outside this
basic rule.  An individual violates section 288 through “ ‘any touching’ ” with a
sexual intent.  (People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 442, 444-445
(Martinez).)  The individual’s subjective motivation alone may thus distinguish an
innocent touching from a felonious touching manifesting lewdness.  (Id. at p. 450.)
Thus, the People need to corroborate the actus reus and the mens rea because the
two are so intertwined that the former might not exist absent the latter.
Corroboration of criminal intent is necessary if, without that intent, there is no
showing of a criminal act (see § 288, subd. (a)); in all other cases, the corpus delicti
rule does not require corroboration of a defendant’s intent.
The instant case clearly falls within the basic rule because defendant’s acts
were not otherwise innocent.  Defendant violated section 288, subdivision (b), which
                                                
1
Hereafter, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
proscribes lewd or lascivious acts “by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or
fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury . . . .”  Force or violence is inherently
unlawful, and thus the corpus delicti rule does not require corroboration of intent in
prosecutions for forcible sex offenses like rape or oral copulation.  (Key, supra,
153 Cal.App.3d at p. 895.)  The testimony of the People’s witnesses, which
established “someone chok[ed] Monique” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 4) obviated the need
to “refer[] to the actor’s intent” “to determine whether [the] touching [was]
permitted or prohibited.”  (Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 450.)  Without
reference to defendant’s intent, the People corroborated the commission of a
criminal act, and thus had no further corroboration burden.
II.
There is also reason to question whether the functional equivalence we have
drawn between preoffense statements and postoffense admissions (maj. opn., ante,
at pp. 9-10) for corpus delicti purposes (People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441,
455, fn. 5) remains intact in light of Proposition 8.  The Beagle court observed
federal law did not require corroboration of preoffense statements, but we rejected
this standard in a single sentence of analysis, placed at the end of a footnote.
“Although we agree that the risk of conviction on a false pre-offense statement
alone is less than the risk of such a conviction upon a false confession or admission,
we find the risk of an unjust result sufficient to justify our broader rule.”  (Beagle, at
p. 455, fn. 5.)
We imposed a similarly stringent standard of proof for determining the
admissibility of confessions.  (People v. Jiminez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595.)  Although
federal law permitted use of a confession if voluntariness could be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence, we excluded confessions that were not proven
voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt “as a judicially declared rule of criminal
procedure.”  (Id. at p. 605.)  After the passage of Proposition 8, we held the
4
initiative precluded us from insisting on a standard of proof that exceeded the
federal requirement and adopted the preponderance standard.  (People v. Markham
(1989) 49 Cal.3d 63, 71.)  Arguably, Proposition 8 impels a comparable congruence
between California and federal law regarding corroboration of preoffense
statements.  Indeed, after Proposition 8, we held the corpus delicti rule did not apply
to a defendant’s statement—apparently made moments before the offense—that he
wanted to rape the victim.  (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 394.)
The rationale underlying the corpus delicti rule also supports reexamination
of our Beagle footnote.  The distinction articulated by the federal courts remains
persuasive.  “The rule requiring corroboration of confessions protects . . . against
errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions alone.  Where the . . . statement
was made prior to the crime this danger does not exist.  Therefore we are of the view
that such admissions do not need to be corroborated.”
(Warszower v. United States (1941) 312 U.S. 342, 347, fn. omitted.)  Other states
likewise follow the modern rule that “[p]re-offense statements do not require
corroboration because they contain none of the inherent weaknesses of admissions
made after the fact.”  (29A Am.Jur.2d (1994) Evidence, § 764, p. 130; see also State
v. Johnson (Utah 1991) 821 P.2d 1150, 1162, and cases cited therein.)  The same
rationale, and thus the same rule, applies to statements made during the offense.
(Government of Virgin Islands v. Hoheb (3d Cir. 1985) 777 F.2d 138, 142;
Johnson, at p. 1162.)  Under this rule, statements indicating a sexual desire toward
minor victims, made prior to the charged offenses, do not require corroboration.
(State v. Atwood (Ariz. 1992) 832 P.2d 593, 615.)
CONCLUSION
The majority opinion properly “stress[es] the narrow nature” of today’s
decision (maj. opn., ante, at p. 27, fn. 18), which assumes—but does not hold—
defendant’s statements required corroboration.  The majority thus decides a limited
5
question, and its analysis does not alter our traditional understanding that the corpus
delicti rule requires corroboration of only a criminal act and not a criminal mind.
BROWN, J.
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Alvarez
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion NP opn. filed 5/24/00 – 4th Dist., Div. 1
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S089554
Date Filed: May 23,. 2002
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: San Diego
Judge: Henry Wien*
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Carl Fabian, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for  Respondent:
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons,
Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood, Garrett Beaumont and Carl H. Horst, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
*Judge of the Imperial Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
2
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Carl Fabian
3232 Fourth Avenue
San Diego, CA  92103
(619) 692-0440
Carl H. Horst
Deputy Attorney General
110 West A Street, Suite 1100
San Diego, CA  92101
(619) 645-2280