Title: CORDOVA v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CORDOVA v. STATE2001 WY 9633 P.3d 142Case Number: 00-43Decided: 10/16/2001

October 
Term, A.D. 2001

RICHARD 
D. CORDOVA, 

Appellant(Defendant),

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

The 
Honorable Jere Ryckman, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and 
Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender.  Argument by Ms. Yoder. 

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and Ken DeCock, Student Intern for the Prosecution 
Assistance Program.  Argument by Mr. 
DeCock. 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

  
            
LEHMAN, Chief Justice.

 [¶1]      Appellant Richard 
D. Cordova entered two nolo contendere pleas to charges of deliv­ery 
of marijuana in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2001) and possession of methamphetamine in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001).1  Under W.R.Cr.P. 11, Mr. Cordova reserved 
his right to appeal the dis­trict court's denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant.  On appeal, Mr. Cordova contends that the 
affidavit supporting the issuance of the search warrant was not adequate to 
establish probable cause and thus violated his constitutional rights as 
guaranteed by the United States and Wyoming Constitutions.  Giving deference to the judicial issuing 
officer and concluding that the district court did not err in denying Mr. 
Cordova's motion to suppress, we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Mr. Cordova 
presents this statement of the issues:

ISSUE 
I

Was the 
affidavit executed in support of the search war­rant adequate to establish 
probable cause?

ISSUE 
II

Has the 
Wyoming Supreme Court elected to adopt a "good faith" exception to the 
exclusionary rule and, if so, does that exception conflict with Article 1, § 4 
of the Wyoming Con­stitution?

Appellee 
State of Wyoming restates the issue:

Did the 
district court err in concluding that probable cause existed to support the 
issuance of the warrant to search Appellant's residence and refusing to suppress 
the evidence seized by law enforcement during the execution of that 
warrant?

FACTS2

[¶3]      On May 6, 1999, 
Mr. Cordova sold for $160 approximately one and one-half ounces of marijuana to 
a confidential informant working with the Southwest Wyoming Drug Enforcement 
Team.  This controlled buy took 
place at Mr. Cordova's residence in Rock Springs under the direction of Officer 
Russell Schmitt of the Green River Police Department. On July 20, 1999, Mr. 
Cordova was charged for this act with delivery of marijuana in viola­tion of 
§ 35-7-1031(a)(ii).  On that same 
date, a warrant was issued for his arrest.  
On July 21, 1999, based on his own affidavit, Officer Schmitt sought and 
obtained a search warrant for Mr. Cordova's residence from the Sweetwater County 
Court Commissioner.  The warrant was 
executed the same day.  In the 
course of the search, officers discovered two plastic bags filled with a white 
powdery substance weighing in excess of three grams.  The powder later tested as 
methamphetamine.  On July 27, 1999, 
Mr. Cordova was charged with felony pos­session of methamphetamine in 
violation of § 35-7-1031(c)(i) and (c)(ii). 

[¶4]      Mr. Cordova 
entered a plea of not guilty to both charges on August 11, 1999.  On Sep­tember 10, 1999, he filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of his residence, 
citing a lack of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant as a violation 
of his constitutional rights under the United States and Wyoming 
Constitutions.  The suppres­sion 
motion was heard on October 20, 1999.  
After testimony from Officer Schmitt and arguments of counsel, the 
district court denied Mr. Cordova's motion to exclude the search evidence.  Subsequently, Mr. Cordova, pursuant to a 
plea agreement with the State, entered a conditional plea of nolo 
contendere to both charges properly reserving his right to appeal the 
district court's denial of his motion to suppress under W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2).  On December 7, 1999, Judgment and 
Sentence was entered against Mr. Cordova sentencing him to serve two concurrent 
terms of two to four years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary.  This timely appeal 
followed.

DISCUSSION

[¶5]      Mr. Cordova 
contends that the affidavit executed by Officer Schmitt in support of the 
issuance of the search warrant for his residence was inadequate to establish 
probable cause as required by Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution 
and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Analyzing this issue under the Wyoming 
Constitution, we agree that the affidavit in question comes uncomfortably close 
to violating the protections guaranteed Wyoming citizens by art. 1, § 4.  However, viewing the document in its 
totality and giving deference to the judicial issuing officer, we conclude that 
the affidavit was ade­quate to support a finding of probable cause 
sufficient for the issuance of the warrant.

[¶6]      This court in 
Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1999), recently articulated our 
posi­tion on the subject of independent state constitutional analysis, 
vis- -vis art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  We explained:

[J]ust 
as we have done with other state constitutional provisions which have no federal 
counterpart, we think that Article 1, § 4 deserves and requires the development 
of sound principles upon which to decide the search and seizure issues arising 
from state law enforcement action despite its federal counterpart and the 
activity it generates for the United States Supreme Court.  Development of sound constitutional 
principles on which to decide these issues may lead to decisions which parallel 
the United States Supreme Court; may provide greater protection than that Court; 
or may provide less, in which case the federal law would prevail; but whatever 
the result, a state constitutional analysis is required unless a party desires 
to have an issue decided solely under the Federal Constitution. 

990 P.2d  
at 485.  Vasquez further 
established that, in order to best "develop our own consti­tutional 
principles under the state provision by consideration of constitutional theory 
appro­priate to this state," our art. 1, § 4 analysis must take place prior 
to any federal constitutional analysis.  
Id. at 486.3

[¶7]      Article 1, § 4 of 
the Wyoming Constitution provides: 

The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be 
seized.

Over 
eighty years ago, this court addressed the section's 
purpose:

This 
provision against unreasonable search and seizure has been considered one of the 
fundamental props of English and American liberty of the individual citizen and 
to be most sacredly observed, giving rise to the expression that a "man's house 
is his castle," designed to prevent violation of his private security in 
property, or the unlawful invasion of the home of the citizen by the officers of 
the law acting under legislative or judi­cial sanction, and to give remedy 
against such usurpations.

State v. 
Peterson, 27 Wyo. 
185, 194 P. 342, 345 (1920).

[¶8]      It has been long 
settled that our state constitution's requirement that probable cause be 
supported by affidavit rather than the more general "oath or affirmation" of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution somewhat strengthened the 
state provision because it creates a permanent written record.  Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 483 
(citing Peterson, 194 P. at 346); see also Davis v. State, 859 P.2d 89, 93 (Wyo. 1993); Smith v. State, 557 P.2d 130, 132 (Wyo. 
1976).  It is important to note that 
W.R.Cr.P. 41(c) allows  judicial 
issuing officers to consider additional sworn testimony in making their 
determination of probable cause provided that the testimony 
is recorded and becomes part of the written affidavit.  This prerequisite saves the rule from 
impermissibly conflicting with the affidavit requirement of art. 1, § 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution.

[¶9]      In deciding the 
case before us, we will first examine the standards by which we review a 
judicial issuing officer's determination of probable cause and issuance of a 
search warrant under the Wyoming Constitution.  It is established law that Wyoming's 
affidavit requirement limits our review in that we are confined to and can only 
consider what the record reflects was before the issuing magistrate at the time 
of the issuance of the warrant.  
Supplemental testimony taken at a hearing on a motion to suppress cannot 
be considered in determining whether adequate probable cause existed at the time 
the warrant was issued.  Guerra 
v. State, 897 P.2d 447, 453 (Wyo. 1995); Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 478 (Wyo. 1983); Smith, 557 P.2d  at 132.4

[¶10]   Traditionally, this court has 
applied a de novo review when reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit 
to support the issuance of a search warrant under art. 1, § 4.  Indeed, de novo review is 
particularly appropriate under these circumstances.  The reasons which normally underlie 
deferring to the district court's denial of a motion to suppressits ability to 
assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the 
necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions at the hearing on the 
motionare absent when reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit to support a 
determination of probable cause.  
Because art. 1, § 4 requires that all information the issuing officer 
relied upon to make the determination be included within the affidavit, this 
court is in essentially the same position as the issuing magistrate.  Further, we have always held that 
ultimately whether an unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation of 
constitutional rights presents a question of law and is reviewed de 
novo.  Bailey v. State, 
12 P.3d 173, 176 (Wyo. 2000); Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 480; Gronski v. 
State, 910 P.2d 561, 563 (Wyo. 1996).

[¶11]   Despite our long-standing de 
novo review standard, we also have cited federal author­ity 
stating that the issuing magistrate's determination of probable cause should be 
paid great deference.  Bonsness 
v. State, 672 P.2d 1291, 1292 (Wyo. 1983).  The rationale for giving deference to 
the magistrate's determination is consistent with the strong preference in art. 
1, § 4 for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.  "This reflects both a desire to 
encourage the use of the warrant process by police officers and a recognition 
that once a warrant has been obtained, intrusion upon interests protected . . . 
is less severe than otherwise may be the case."  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
237 n.10, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331 n.10, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983).  Accordingly, a reviewing court, in order 
to effectuate our state constitution's strong preference for the issuance of a 
warrant, should give deference to the judicial issuing offi­cer's 
determination of probable cause.  
This deference places the burden of establishing a constitutional 
violation by a preponderance of the evidence on parties claiming that their 
rights were violated.  However, it 
is

not to 
be employed to blindly sustain the actions of the magis­trate or to place 
any reviewing court in a position that it may refuse to examine the factual 
basis for such issuance.  To refuse 
or to fail to do so could result in serious erosion of one of our most valuable 
constitutional rights, and unless there is factual basis for determination of 
probable cause this court would be evading its responsibility by failing to 
declare this to be the case.

Smith, 
557 P.2d  
at 133.

[¶12]   We now turn to the substantive law 
governing the case before us.  In 
Smith, this court addressed the test for probable cause necessary to 
support the issuance of a search warrant under the Wyoming Constitution.  We held that judicial issuing officers 
must have a sub­stantial basis for concluding that probable cause 
exists.  In essence, they must make 
a two-fold finding to justify the issuance of a search warrant.  First, the factual situation must be 
sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious or prudent man to believe that a 
crime was being committed or that one had been committed.  Second, there must be a showing that the 
fruits of the crime or the evidence thereof are in the area or structure sought 
to be searched.  Smith, 557 P.2d  at 132-33.  This test requires 
that the issuing officer weigh and consider all of the circumstances surrounding 
the issuance of the warrant.  
Bonsness, 672 P.2d  at 1293.

[¶13]   Support for the judicial officer's 
factual finding of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant must be found 
in the affidavit.  Ostrowski, 
665 P.2d  at 478.  This document 
must supply the issuing officer with sufficient information to make an 
independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant.  To that end, the affidavit must include 
more than bare conclusions of the affiant.  
Id.

[¶14]   The necessity that affiants 
adequately articulate the factual basis for their request for a warrant is 
absolute and long established in this court's jurisprudence interpreting art. 1, 
§ 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  
The requirement arises as a consequence of our constitutional framework 
because

[i]t is 
the judge or magistrate before whom the complaint is filed who determines the 
question of existence of "probable cause" for the issuance of a search warrant, 
and not the person who files and verifies the complaint and asks for the 
warrant.

Peterson, 
194 P. 
at 348 (quoting 24 R.C.L. 707).  
Peterson, in addition to holding individual warrants 
unconstitutional as lacking probable cause, struck down legislation that allowed 
warrants to be issued based on the affiant's mere "information and belief."  The court articu­lated its rationale 
for doing so:

  

This 
necessarily makes the issuance of a warrant . . . a judicial act, to be 
exercised by the officer who is clothed by law with the power and authority to 
determine as to whether or not the warrant should be issued, and this discretion 
must rest upon facts verified by oath or affirmation.  The questions of probable cause and of 
rea­sonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed are 
addressed alone to the judgment of such officer, and their determination cannot, 
by statute, be vested in the person who verifies the facts from which these 
opinions, conclusions, or deductions are drawn.  Any other construction would reduce this 
constitutional guaranty to an absurdity, and would violate its letter and spirit 
and defeat its purpose.

194 P. 
at 348-49 (quoting De Graff v. State, 103 P. 538, 541 (Okla.Crim.App. 
1909)).

[¶15]   In the context of an affidavit 
containing hearsay from "informants," sufficient facts must be presented such 
that the judicial issuing officer or magistrate can make an independ­ent 
judgment as to the third party's credibility, veracity, reliability, and basis 
of knowledge in reaching the ultimate determination of the existence of probable 
cause.  We do not herein adopt a 
rigid test for the level of factual support or corroboration necessary to make a 
deter­mination of adequate probable cause but simply remind all judges, 
judicial officers, and magistrates that art. 1, § 4 does not allow the issuance 
of search warrants for the homes of Wyoming citizens on the basis of mere 
"information and belief" whether it be held by law enforcement officers or their 
informants.  Wiggin v. State, 
28 Wyo. 480, 206 P. 373, 376 (1922); State v. Boulter, 5 Wyo. 236, 39 P. 883, 884 (1895).

[¶16]   Turning now to the affidavit before 
us, we find that it is composed of nineteen para­graphs.  Paragraphs one through five list Officer 
Schmitt's years of experience, specialized training, and expertise in drug 
enforcement activities.  Although, 
this court has said that a law enforcement officer's experience and expertise 
are factors that can be considered in the context of a warrantless arrest or a 
warrantless search, Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512, 518 (Wyo. 1989); 
Lee v. State, 2 P.3d 517, 522 (Wyo. 2000), these factors have less 
validity in determining the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a 
search warrant.  Again, under art. 
1, § 4 it is the judicial officer who is charged with making the ultimate 
determina­tion of probable cause.  
He cannot rely simply on the extensive expertise of a trained 
narcot­ics officer as a substitute for the requirement of a sufficient 
factual basis with which to form his own objectively reasonable determination 
for the issuance of a search warrant.  
Nor can we in reviewing his determination.

[¶17]   Paragraphs six through eleven 
detail the controlled buy of marijuana between the confi­dential informant 
and Mr. Cordova that took place on May 6, 1999.  The search warrant was not sought until 
July 21, 1999, a span of over two and one-half months.  Mr. Cordova argues that, because a 
finding of probable cause requires a determination that certain objects can 
currently be found at a particular place, the controlled buy was too 
remote in time to the request for the search warrant.  Consequently, he contends, any 
information it may have pro­vided was "stale" and cannot provide the basis 
for a determination of probable cause.  
The State does not directly address this temporal point, arguing simply 
that the affidavit taken as a whole indicated that Mr. Cordova's drug dealings 
were continuous in nature. 

[¶18]   This court has never addressed 
exactly this issue on the basis of art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  In State v. Scott, 41 Wyo. 438, 
286 P. 390 (1930), a case applying the state constitution, the court reversed 
the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress search evidence of an illegal 
moonshine operation.  It stated in 
dicta: 

The 
affidavit was sworn to and filed with the justice of the peace, and the search 
warrant issued, on January 31, 1929.  
It will be noticed that the affidavit seems to allege knowledge of a 
state of affairs on December 31, 1928.  
While the defendant makes no mention of this point, we may say in passing 
that a search warrant is issued to seize a thing alleged to be at that time in 
the place to be searched, and it would be at least doubtful whether an affidavit 
of conditions one month before would be a sufficient showing of probable 
cause.

286 P. 
at 392 (citation omitted) (citing State v. Gardner, 240 P. 984 (Mont. 
1925); Dandrea v. United States , 7 F.2d 861 (C.C.A.8 
1925)).

[¶19]   The court next addressed temporal 
proximity as a factor supporting a probable cause determination, apparently on 
the basis of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Con­stitution, in 
Guerra, 897 P.2d 447 (Golden, J., specially concurring; Lehman, J., 
dissenting).  We rejected a 
bright-line test, holding that, rather than being determined by the days or 
months between the facts relied upon and the issuance of the warrant, timeliness 
depends on the "nature of the criminal activity, the length of the activity, and 
the nature of the property to be seized."  
897 P.2d  at 454 (quoting United States v. Snow, 919 F.2d 1458, 
1460 (10th Cir. 1990)). 

[¶20]   In the case before us, the nature 
of the criminal activity is the illegal possession and sale of marijuana.  Mr. Cordova cites to cases in which 
courts have held that, precisely because of its illegality, a drug trafficking 
scheme has an attenuated existence.  
"To point out the obvious, the goal of selling drugs is to dispose of 
them."  United States v. Huggins, 
733 F. Supp. 445, 449 (D.D.C. 1990).  
Our research indicates that this view of the nature of this particular 
criminal activity comprises the greater weight of authority, and we find its 
reason­ing persuasive.  See 
generally Annotation, Search Warrant: sufficiency of showing as to time 
of occurrence of facts relied on, 100 A.L.R.2d 525 Later Case Service, § 
7.  As a general conclusion, because 
of its distinctive nature, the illegal sale of controlled substances cannot be 
compared facilely to a white-collar criminal scheme or a legitimate business for 
purposes of concluding whether factual information contained within an affidavit 
is "stale" and thus inadequate to support a probable cause determination under 
art. 1, § 4.5 

[¶21]   The second factor that a court may 
consider in determining timeliness is "the length of the activity."  We stated in Guerra that, "when 
the activity is of a protracted and continu­ous nature, the passage of time 
diminishes in significance."  897 P.2d  at 455 (quoting United States v. Sherman, 576 F.2d 292, 296 
(10th Cir. 1978)).  The 
district court, in denying Cordova's motion to suppress, held that the drug 
sales in question were a continuing activity.  The general rule is that the facts and 
circumstances set forth in an affidavit submitted in sup­port of the 
issuance of a search warrant should be current and timely so as to indicate that 
the premises, person, place, or thing to be searched presently contains the 
fruits or evidence of the crime.  
United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285, 286 (10th Cir. 1972).  An exception to this rule is where the 
court finds facts indicating the likelihood that there is a continuing criminal 
activity.  Id. "Time and 
staleness assuredly are elements of probable cause.  How­ever, when an affidavit 
indicates the existence of an ongoing scheme to sell drugs, the passage of time 
becomes less significant than is the case of a single, isolated 
transaction."  Whitten v. State, 
331 S.E.2d 912, 914 (Ga.App. 1985) (citation omitted).

[¶22]   The affidavit avers in paragraphs 
twelve through fifteen:

12.       That the 
Confidential Informant stated that he has bought marijuana from Cordova on at 
least 30 separate occasions within the last 12 months.  He has stated on one of those occasions 
he has observed as much as 10 pounds of marijuana in Cordova's residence at one 
time.

13.       That the 
Confidential Informant stated that he believes Cordova buys most of his 
marijuana from an unknown source in Ft. Collins, Colorado.  Your affiant has checked Cordova's drug 
history and has found that he has prior drug activity in the state of 
Colorado.

14.       That the 
Confidential Informant has provided informa­tion in the past on more than 
five occasions and that information provided regarding Cordova has been reliable 
and is found to be truthful during the agents [sic] follow up 
investigations.

15.       Your 
affiant has confirmed that Cordova is still living in the above described 
resident [sic]. Your affiant has received information from the Confidential 
Informant that Cordova is still involved in trafficking of marijuana.  Your affiant believes because of the 
Confidential Informants' statements Cordova is still involved in marijuana 
trafficking. 

[¶23]   In paragraph twelve, the affidavit 
avers that "the Confidential Informant [has] stated that he has bought marijuana 
from Cordova on at least 30 separate occasions within the last 12 months."  Generally when an affidavit states that 
"within some given time period" an event has occurred, without giving specific 
dates, the reviewing court must assume that the events occurred during the 
earliest time averred for purposes of a timeliness analysis.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Novak, 
335 A.2d 773, 774 (Pa.Super. 1975); State v. Birkestrand, 239 N.W.2d 353, 
358 (Iowa 1976).

The 
reason for this policy is obvious. If this were not the con­struction given 
to this phrase, stale information could be made to appear current by the mere 
use of "within" language. For example, if a dozen drug purchases were made in 
the first week of January and one wished to obtain a search warrant in the first 
week of March based solely on this information he would need only say that 
within the last two months a dozen purchases were made,' rather than "a dozen 
purchases were made in the first week of January."

Novak, 335 A.2d  at 774.  Wyoming law 
enforcement officers can easily avoid this judicial construction by simply 
including dates of transactions within their affidavits.

[¶24]   Notwithstanding our construction as 
to when the transactions averred to within para­graph twelve took 
place, the informant describes firsthand observations of large quantities of 
marijuana in Mr. Cordova's home.  An 
informant's description of criminal activity along with firsthand knowledge of 
the events entitles his information to carry greater weight than it might 
otherwise.  Lee, 2 P.3d  at 
523 (citing Bonsness, 672 P.2d at 1293).  The quantity of marijuana possessed by 
Mr. Cordova standing alone allows the inference that he possessed it with intent 
beyond that of personal consumption.  
In addition, the informant's statement that he had purchased marijuana 
from Mr. Cordova "on at least 30 separate occasions within the last 12 months" 
is "against his own penal interest."  
This court has held that an admission against penal interest carries its 
"own indicia of credibility."  
Id.  Likewise, Officer 
Schmitt's corroboration of the confidential informant's statements regarding 
where Mr. Cordova gets his marijuana, the controlled buy that took place on the 
basis of the confidential informant's information, and Officer Schmitt's general 
statement that on five occasions, when he was "following up" the confidential 
informant's information, he found the confidential informant to be reliable and 
truthful (though vaguely conclusory) provide a basis for the judicial issuing 
officer to conclude that the confidential informant was a reliable and credible 
source of information as to Mr. Cordova's activities.  We think that thirty separate 
transactions with the same confidential informant occurring over a period of 
time, a subsequent controlled buy on May 6, 1999, and averments by a credible 
and reliable source sufficiently establish that Mr. Cordova's trafficking 
activity was lengthy and continuous.

[¶25]   The third factor that should be 
considered in determining whether the information con­tained within an 
affidavit is timely and thus sufficient to support the issuance of a search 
warrant is the "nature of the property to be seized."  This was the deciding factor in 
Guerra.  There the court said 
that, because the items to be seized were notations of fronted contra­band, 
as business records of debts owed the record keeper, they were of "enduring 
utility" to the defendant and likely to remain intact until such time as the 
debts were satisfied.  The unpaid 
debts owed to the defendant also established evidence of the continuing nature 
of her crimes.  In Guerra, 
the court stated that the two sales of marijuana over six months old may 
have been sufficiently remote in time as to render a warrant void, 
particularizing additional marijuana as the thing to be seized, but 
distinguished the case, again, because the objective of the search was "not 
additional product, but business records based upon prior transactions for which 
Guerra had yet to be paid."  
Guerra, 897 P.2d  at 456.

[¶26]   Paragraph sixteen of the affidavit 
in question avers in three parts:

Your 
affiant has worked as an undercover officer and has developed contacts with 
narcotic users, narcotic sellers, narcotic informers and narcotic experts.  Your affiant has been involved in 
discussions and in interviews with individuals who are involved in the aspects 
of sales, packaging, transferring and the use of narcotics to include 
methamphetamine.  Your affiant is 
familiar with the manner and means in which methamphetamine is processed and 
packaged for sale. 

Example 
#1.  Based upon my experience, 
training and participation in other investigations I know that very often it is 
vital to analyze individuals' records in order to locate and iden­tify a 
target's assets.  Even though their 
assets may be in other persons' or entities' names, the individuals continue to 
maintain dominion and control over their assets and their assets or 
evi­dence of asset ownership are normally retained at a location under their 
control or ownership, such as their residence or their business location.  In my experience, documents and 
paperwork evidencing their business and personal financial transactions are 
often maintained and preserved for periods of time well beyond the occurrence of 
actual financial transactions.

Example 
#2.  Based on my experience, 
training and par­ticipation in other investigations, I know that individuals 
who attempt to hide assets very often place or attempt to place their assets in 
names other than their own to avoid detection.  These individuals do this by giving cash 
to "third party nominees" and

have 
this third party purchase assets in their name.  By doing this, they hope to lessen the 
likelihood that the third party's activities will be traced back to 
themselves.  This serves to insulate 
the indi­viduals engaged in the illegal activity from the purchase of the 
asset.  

[¶27]   The affidavit fails to indicate how 
these very general statements relate to Mr. Cordova.  This court has decried the use of 
general statements such as these in an affidavit before:

We need 
not attempt a grammatical analysis of the alle­gations of the 
affidavit.  It was evidently 
intended to state a set of facts that would cause the issuance of a warrant in 
every case where it was desired to search for whisky or articles used in its 
manufacture.  The use of such a 
form, without any effort to make it fit the particular case, shows an intention 
to treat too lightly the constitutional provisions designed to prevent 
unrea­sonable searches and seizures, and forbidding the issuance of a 
warrant except upon probable cause supported by affidavit par­ticularly 
describing the place to be searched and the thing to be seized.  

Scott, 
286 P. 390 at 392 (citing Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4).

[¶28]   The final three paragraphs of the 
affidavit state:

17.       Based upon 
your affiant's training and experience, your affiant knows that persons involved 
in narcotic trafficking or the use of narcotics and dangerous drugs often 
maintain receipts, currency, notes, ledgers, address books, telephone numbers 
and computers with information regarding other persons who may be involved in 
narcotic trafficking.

18.       Your 
affiant prays for authorization from this Court to serve this warrant at any 
time, day or night for fear that the evi­dence listed will be destroyed, 
altered, concealed, or otherwise disposed of.

19.       As a result 
of the above information, the affiant has prob­able cause to believe that 
evidence of Richard Cordova [sic] drug distribution and use is being concealed 
at [the address of the residence].  
Evidence including but not limited to usable amounts of controlled 
substances, monies, receipts, address books, scales, ledgers and use 
paraphernalia will exist in the areas to be searched. Your affiant prays that a 
warrant for search and seizure be issued as requested.  

We find 
the facts before us distinguishable from those in Guerra.  Unlike Guerra, there 
is no averment that Cordova "fronted" contraband or would have any reason to 
keep notations of unpaid debt.  The 
factual information contained within an affidavit cannot be considered less 
"stale" for art. 1, § 4 purposes merely because the affidavit alleges that the 
warrant is sought to search for records, rather than drugs, without more than a 
bare allegation that "persons involved in narcotic trafficking or the use of 
narcotics and dangerous drugs" often maintain records.  To allow this would render the third 
factor in a timeliness analysis meaningless because law enforcement officers 
could simply allege their search is one for records and thus automatically 
extend the shelf life of the facts supporting their request for the 
warrant.  How­ever, in this 
case, because we think the affidavit before us adequately establishes a 
continu­ing scheme of drug sales, it was sufficient to establish probable 
cause to support a search for and seizure of narcotics on the date the warrant 
was issued.  Likewise, we find that 
the lan­guage within the affidavit referencing records, receipts, and 
ledgers, etc. is sufficient to justify a seizure of such items should 
they be found by law enforcement officers in the course of an otherwise lawful 
search.

[¶29]   In conclusion, after weighing the 
factors that guide our timeliness analysis and inter­preting the affidavit 
before us in its totality in a "commonsense and realistic fashion,"6 we find that it sufficiently 
established a continuous, lengthy, and ongoing scheme of drug traf­ficking 
by Mr. Cordova such as to allow a reasonably cautious and prudent judicial 
officer to issue a search warrant for Mr. Cordova's residence on July 21, 
1999.7  Having herein deter­mined that that 
the affidavit requirement of art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution "somewhat 
strengthened" our state provision, and after analyzing the issue on that basis, 
we conclude there is no need to analyze the warrant under the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.  
In addition, because we have found adequate probable cause for the 
issuance of the search warrant in question, we need not address whether this 
court should recognize a "good faith" exception to art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  The district court's 
denial of Mr. Cordova's motion to suppress search evidence is affirmed.8

FOOTNOTES

1Section 35-7-1031(a)(ii) and (c)(ii) 
provides:

35-7-1031.  Unlawful manufacture or delivery; 
counterfeit substance; unlawful possession.  

(a)  Except as authorized by 
this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with 
intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.  Any person who violates this subsection 
with respect to:

                        
. . .

(ii) Any other controlled substance 
classified in Schedule I, II or III, is guilty of a crime and upon conviction 
may be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, fined not more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000), or both;

            
. . .

(c)  It is unlawful for any 
person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless the 
substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to a valid prescription or 
order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, 
or except as otherwise authorized by this act.  Any person who violates this 
subsection:

            
. . .

(ii) And has in his possession 
methamphetamine or a controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II which 
is a narcotic drug in an amount greater than those set forth in paragraph (c)(i) 
of this section, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more 
than seven (7) years, a fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars 
($15,000.00), or both[.]

2Because Cordova entered a conditional 
guilty plea, there was no jury trial.  
The facts presented were found in charging documents, motions, the 
arraignment, change of plea hearing, sentencing hearing, and court orders.  Generally, the facts are not in dispute. 

3Our analysis herein attempts to include 
only those Wyoming cases in which it is clear that an independent analysis of 
the Wyoming Constitution has taken place.  
We are purposely excluding those cases in which the primary analysis 
falls under the federal constitution with the Wyoming Constitution cited 
secondarily as mere additional authority for a given 
proposition.

4The exception to this rule applies when 
defendants meet their burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the affiant gave deliberately false statements or recklessly disregarded 
the truth in creating the affidavit. Then the affiant's false material is set to 
one side.  If the remaining content 
is still sufficient to establish probable cause for the issuance of the search 
warrant, it is proper to deny the defendant's motion to suppress; but, if the 
remaining content is insufficient, the warrant is invalid, and the exclusionary 
rule prohibits admission of the evidence just as if probable cause was lacking 
on the face of the affidavit.  
Davis, 859 P.2d 89,  
93 (Wyo. 1993).

5Our finding is limited to the illegal 
sale of controlled substances.  
Cultivation of illegal crops or the creation of clandestine drug labs, 
because of the differing nature of the criminal activities involved, may warrant 
a different finding as to how quickly given information may become "stale" for 
purposes of an art. 1, § 4 analysis.  

6

[A]ffidavits for search warrants . . . 
must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and 
realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and 
haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate 
specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this 
area.  A grudging or negative 
attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police 
officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before 
acting.

United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S. Ct. 741, 746, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1965).

7Examining the actual warrant before us, 
we take this opportunity to remind judges, issuing magistrates, judicial 
officers, and law enforcement personnel of the items that constitutionally can 
be seized under art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  An issued warrant can properly authorize 
a government officer to seize contraband, fruits of crimes, and evidence of 
crimes. W.R.Cr.P. 41(b).  However, 
the warrant at issue authorizes seizure of "United States Currency, precious 
metals and jewelry which could be used to purchase controlled 
substances.'"  
(Emphasis added.)  Article 1, 
§ 4 requires a showing that currency is the fruit of a crime or evidence of a 
crime before it may be constitutionally seized.

8The district court's Judgment and 
Sentence entered on December 7, 1999, incorrectly lists the crime charged and 
pleaded as Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i) (misdemeanor possession of a 
controlled substance) for which, unless a subsequent offense, the maximum 
sentence is twelve months.  It is 
clear in the record that Mr. Cordova in fact pleaded nolo contendere to § 
35-7-1031(c)(ii) (felony possession of methamphetamine).  Mr. Cordova's brief does not mention 
this error.  However, because the 
entered sentence exceeds the maximum allowable under § 35-7-1031(c)(i), pursuant 
to W.R.Cr.P. 36 we hereby order the district court to enter a corrective 
Judgment and Sentence Nunc Pro Tunc listing the appropriate 
subsection.