Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Sharon A. Riek

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 81 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1049-D   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Sharon A. Riek, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
     v. 
Sharon A. Riek, 
          Respondent-Respondent.   
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST RIEK    
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 23, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 26, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
complainant-appellant, 
there 
were 
briefs 
by 
Jonathan E. Hendrix and the Office of Lawyer Regulation, and 
oral argument by Jonathan E. Hendrix.   
 
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief by Martin 
E. Kohler and Geoffrey R. Misfeldt and Kohler and Hart, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Geoffrey R. Misfeldt. 
  
 
 
2013 WI 81
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP1049-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Sharon A. Riek, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Sharon A. Riek, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 23, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.   Complaint dismissed.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
appeals a referee's decision recommending the court dismiss a 
disciplinary complaint alleging that Attorney Sharon A. Riek 
violated SCR 20:3.8(f)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(h) (2007-
08),1 made actionable via SCR 20:8.4(f).  We agree with the 
referee's conclusion that Attorney Riek did not violate the 
aforementioned rules.  Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2011AP1049-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Attorney Riek is an assistant district attorney in 
Racine County.  She was licensed to practice law in Wisconsin in 
1986.  In 1999 Attorney Riek accepted a consensual private 
reprimand for failing to correct a false statement made to a 
court by her witness.  Private Reprimand, No. 1999-25.   
¶3 
This disciplinary matter stems from Attorney Riek's 
allegedly belated disclosure of certain information obtained 
during the prosecution of Tyrone Smith (Smith).   
¶4 
On August 18, 2008, Smith was arrested for possession 
of marijuana discovered in his vehicle during a traffic stop.  
At the time, Smith was on extended supervision for possession 
with intent to deliver cocaine.  Isaiah Simpson (Simpson) was a 
passenger in the vehicle during the stop.   
¶5 
On August 19, 2008, the Racine County district 
attorney's office charged Smith with possession of marijuana as 
a repeat offender.  Attorney Riek was assigned to prosecute 
Smith's case.  Smith's supervising agent, Agent Leah Zeni, began 
proceedings to revoke Smith's extended supervision.  Attorney 
Mark Lukoff was appointed to represent Smith in both the 
revocation proceeding and the marijuana possession case.   
¶6 
On August 22, 2008, Simpson, the passenger in the 
vehicle, informed Agent Zeni that the marijuana found in the 
vehicle belonged to him, not to Smith.  Agent Zeni told Simpson 
to report this information to the Racine County district 
attorney's office and advised Attorney Lukoff of Simpson's 
confession.  
No. 
2011AP1049-D   
 
3 
 
¶7 
Meanwhile, on September 4, 2008, the circuit court 
held a preliminary hearing in Smith's marijuana possession case.  
After that hearing, Smith's attorney filed a demand for 
discovery and inspection with the court and served it upon 
Attorney Riek.  The discovery demand included a routine demand 
that 
the 
State 
"[d]isclose 
to 
defendant 
any 
exculpatory 
evidence."  See Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(h).  
¶8 
Attorney Lukoff received a copy of Simpson's statement 
to Agent Zeni before Smith's revocation proceeding.  At Smith's 
revocation hearing on October 15, 2008, Agent Zeni entered 
Simpson's confession into evidence.  Smith based his defense at 
the revocation hearing on Simpson's confession.   
¶9 
On October 27, 2008, the administrative law judge 
(ALJ) declined to revoke Smith's extended supervision, stating, 
"Based on Mr. Simpson's statement, I find insufficient credible 
evidence to attribute the marijuana to Mr. Smith."   
¶10 Agent Zeni appealed the ALJ's decision, stating, inter 
alia:  
[A]fter providing his statement, [Isaiah] Simpson was 
instructed by this agent to go to the Racine District 
Attorney's office and provide a signed affidavit 
admitting the marijuana in the vehicle was his.  At 
the time of the Final Revocation hearing, Mr. Simpson 
failed to go to the Racine District Attorney's 
office . . . . 
The Division of Hearing and Appeals sustained the ALJ's decision 
on November 13, 2008, noting that "[i]t is also clear that 
Smith's friend, [Isaiah] Simpson, brought the marijuana into 
Smith's car."   
No. 
2011AP1049-D   
 
4 
 
¶11 In early November 2008, Simpson did go to the Racine 
County district attorney's Office where he met with District 
Attorney Michael E. Nieskes (D.A. Nieskes) and informed D.A. 
Nieskes that the marijuana found in Smith's vehicle belonged to 
him, not to Smith.  As a result of that November meeting, D.A. 
Nieskes wrote a note (the Simpson Note) that stated, "[Isaiah] 
Simpson 1010 Park Ave 637-9029 states that the dope is his not 
Tyrone [Smith's]." 
¶12 The Simpson Note was not a sworn statement.  It was 
unsigned and undated.  Later that morning, D.A. Nieskes told 
Attorney Riek about his meeting with Simpson and gave her the 
Simpson Note.  Attorney Riek recalls being advised of Simpson's 
statement to D.A. Nieskes but she does not recall receiving the 
Simpson Note.   
¶13 On November 7, 2008, Attorney Riek asked the Racine 
County sheriff's department to investigate Simpson's statement 
that the marijuana belonged to him.  The Racine County sheriff's 
department had difficulty contacting Simpson.  
¶14 Meanwhile, Attorney Lukoff's own investigator was also 
trying to contact Simpson.  In January 2009 Attorney Lukoff's 
investigator spoke with Simpson.  Simpson told Attorney Lukoff's 
investigator that the marijuana was his, not Smith's. 
¶15 On February 5, 2009, Attorney Lukoff sent Attorney 
Riek a witness list that included Simpson.  Attorney Lukoff 
enclosed Simpson's written statement to Agent Zeni and the 
defense investigator's summary of the January meeting with 
Simpson.   
No. 
2011AP1049-D   
 
5 
 
¶16 On March 26, 2009, Attorney Lukoff personally met with 
Simpson in preparation for Smith's trial.  During this meeting, 
Attorney Lukoff learned, for the first time, that Simpson had 
met with D.A. Nieskes.  Attorney Lukoff promptly sent a letter 
to Attorney Riek, by facsimile, asking for a copy of any 
information Simpson provided to D.A. Nieskes.  
¶17 The next day, March 27, 2009, now four days before 
Smith's trial, Attorney Riek sent Attorney Lukoff a copy of the 
Simpson Note.  Her cover letter included the statement that, 
"[a]s I indicated to you earlier today, based upon this note, I 
sent a request to the Racine County Sheriff's Department to have 
them follow up on this information and Isaiah Simpson declined 
to cooperate and provide a statement."  Attorney Riek later told 
the OLR that she found the Simpson Note among unrelated papers 
on her desk on or about March 26, 2009.   
¶18 Smith's trial was scheduled to commence on March 31, 
2009.  When Simpson arrived for the trial that day, Attorney 
Riek directed a law enforcement officer to interview him.  
Simpson again admitted the marijuana was his, not Smith's.  
¶19 Attorney Riek then moved to dismiss Smith's case.  The 
criminal charges against Smith were dismissed on March 31, 2009, 
prior to the commencement of trial. 
¶20 On May 9, 2011, the OLR filed a disciplinary complaint 
against Attorney Riek alleging that by failing to promptly 
provide the defense with exculpatory information concerning a 
third party's admission of possessing marijuana that Smith was 
charged with possessing, Attorney Riek violated SCR 20:3.8(f)(1) 
No. 
2011AP1049-D   
 
6 
 
and Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(h), enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(f).  
The OLR sought a public reprimand and imposition of costs.  
¶21 Referee Michael Dubis was appointed and discovery 
ensued.  Both parties moved for summary judgment.   
¶22 On August 6, 2012, Referee Dubis issued a report 
recommending summary judgment in favor of Attorney Riek.  The 
referee found that the exculpatory information at issue was 
already in possession of the defense at least as early as 
October 15, 2008, the date of Smith's revocation hearing, some 
five months prior to trial.  Notably, the referee determined 
that a prosecutor's ethical duty under SCR 20:3.8(f) is 
consistent with the constitutional requirements imposed pursuant 
to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  The referee stated 
that SCR 20:3.8 "must include Brady's materiality standard.  To 
hold otherwise would be to require disclosure of favorable 
evidence without regard to that evidence's significance and no 
matter how many times the defense has already heard/received the 
same."  The referee concluded that Attorney Riek did not violate 
either 
SCR 20:3.8(f)(1) 
or 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23(1)(h) 
and 
recommended this court dismiss the disciplinary complaint.   
¶23 The OLR appeals.  The OLR maintains that Attorney Riek 
violated two separate legal standards, SCR 20:3.8(f)(1) and Wis. 
Stat. § 971.23(1)(h).  The OLR challenges, on appeal, the 
No. 
2011AP1049-D   
 
7 
 
referee's interpretation of SCR 20:3.8(f)(1).  Oral argument was 
conducted on February 26, 2013.2 
¶24 We will affirm a referee's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 
747.  We review a referee's conclusions of law de novo.  Id. 
¶25 We first consider whether Attorney Riek violated 
SCR 20:3.8(f)(1).  This inquiry requires us to consider the 
nature and scope of prosecutors' disclosure obligations under 
both constitutional and ethical standards.   
¶26 Federal court decisions and decisions of this court 
establish constitutional minimums related to a prosecutor's pre-
trial disclosure obligations.  In Brady the U.S. Supreme Court 
held "that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the 
evidence 
is 
material 
either 
to 
guilt 
or 
to 
punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."  
373 U.S. at 87.  Subsequent decisions clarify that evidence is 
"material . . . if there is a reasonable probability that, had 
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different."  United States v. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).  Thus, simply "showing that the 
prosecution knew of an item of favorable evidence unknown to the 
                                                 
2 After oral argument the Wisconsin District Attorneys 
Association filed a motion seeking permission to file an amicus 
brief supporting Attorney Riek.  The OLR opposed the motion 
because it was untimely.  By order dated March 12, 2013, this 
court denied the motion. 
No. 
2011AP1049-D   
 
8 
 
defense does not amount to a Brady violation, without more."  
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995); see also Bagley, 473 
U.S. at 675 n.7 ("[A] rule that the prosecutor commits error by 
any failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, no 
matter how insignificant, would impose an impossible burden on 
the prosecutor and would undermine the interest in the finality 
of judgments.").  
¶27 Attorney 
Riek 
is 
accused 
of 
violating 
SCR 20:3.8(f)(1), an ethics rule, which provides:   
 
A prosecutor, other than a municipal prosecutor, 
in a criminal case or a proceeding that could result 
in the deprivation of liberty shall: 
 
(1) make timely disclosure to the defense of all 
evidence or information known to the prosecutor that 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates 
the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, 
disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all 
unprivileged 
mitigating 
information 
known 
to 
the 
prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of 
this responsibility by a protective order of the 
tribunal; . . . . 
The parties agree that because SCR 20:3.8(f)(1) includes 
evidence and information, disclosure under SCR 20:3.8(f)(1) does 
not depend on the admissibility of the exculpatory information. 
¶28 The OLR contends that a prosecutor's ethical duty of 
disclosure 
under 
SCR 
20:3.8(f)(1) 
is 
broader 
than 
the 
constitutional requirements identified in Brady.  The OLR 
contends SCR 20:3.8(f)(1) requires disclosure of favorable 
evidence or information without regard to its "materiality" or 
to whether the State had exclusive possession or control of the 
evidence or information.   
No. 
2011AP1049-D   
 
9 
 
¶29 We reject the OLR's proffered interpretation of 
SCR 20:3.8(f)(1).  This court adopted the current version of 
SCR 20:3.8(f) in 2006 as part of a comprehensive review of the 
Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys.  See Sup. 
Ct. Order No. 04-07, 2007 WI 4 (issued Jan. 5, 2007, eff. 
July 1, 2007).3  We discussed proposed changes to SCR 20:3.8 at 
several public hearings and open conferences prior to our 2006 
rules revision.  The ABA adopted numerous changes to the Model 
Rules as a result of Ethics 2000; however, it made no 
substantive changes to the text of the Model Rule implicated 
here, Model Rule 3.8(d), that correlates with our SCR 20:3.8(f).  
Indeed, during Ethics 2000 the ABA expressly "decided against 
attempting to explicate the relationship between [Model Rule 
3.8(d)] . . . and the prosecutor's constitutional obligations 
under Brady and its progeny."  See Kirsten M. Schimpff, Rule 
3.8, The Jencks Act, and How the ABA Created a Conflict Between 
Ethics and The Law on Prosecutorial Disclosure, 61 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 1729, 1756 (August, 2012) (citing Margaret Colgate Love, 
The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of 
the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 441, 469 
(2002)).   
                                                 
3 The proposal to revise Wisconsin's Rules of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys had its origins in the American Bar 
Association's (ABA) Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, which undertook a comprehensive study and 
evaluation of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
commonly referred to as "Ethics 2000." Subsequently, most 
states, including Wisconsin, undertook a review of their own 
rules of professional conduct to determine whether similar 
revisions should be made.   
No. 
2011AP1049-D   
 
10 
 
¶30 In 2009 the ABA's Standing Committee on Legal Ethics 
and Professional Responsibility rendered Formal Opinion 09-454 
(hereinafter "ABA Opinion").  This ABA Opinion, issued after we 
adopted SCR 20:3.8, asserts that a prosecutor's ethical duty 
under 
Model 
Rule 
3.8(d) 
is 
broader 
in 
scope 
than 
the 
constitutional requirements under Brady.  ABA Comm. on Legal 
Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009) at 1.  
The ABA Opinion contends that the ethical obligation imposed by 
Rule 3.8 is more demanding than constitutional obligations 
because it requires disclosure of evidence or information 
favorable to the defense without regard to the anticipated 
impact of the evidence or information on a trial's outcome.   
¶31 As to materiality, the ABA Opinion notes: 
A prosecutor's constitutional obligation extends only 
to favorable information that is "material," i.e., 
evidence 
and 
information 
likely 
to 
lead 
to 
an 
acquittal.  . . .  Rule 3.8(d) does not implicitly 
include the materiality limitation recognized in the 
constitutional 
case 
law. 
 
The 
rule 
requires 
prosecutors to disclose favorable evidence so that the 
defense can decide on its utility.   
Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).  The ABA Opinion also declares that 
disclosure must be made "as soon as reasonably practical" once 
the information is known to the prosecutor.  Id. at 6. 
¶32 The OLR urges us to follow this reasoning and to 
explicitly 
construe 
SCR 
20:3.8(f)(1) 
to 
impose 
ethical 
obligations on prosecutors that transcend the requirements of 
Brady.  The OLR notes that the North Dakota Supreme Court has 
No. 
2011AP1049-D   
 
11 
 
adopted this reasoning.  See Disciplinary Board v. Feland, 820 
N.W.2d 672 (N.D. 2012). 
¶33 The ABA Opinion, however, has not been universally 
adopted; indeed, it has received some pointed criticism.  See, 
e.g., Schimpff, supra at 1767.  Some jurisdictions explicitly 
align their ethics rules on prosecutorial disclosure with 
federal constitutional standards.  See, e.g., D.C. Rules Prof'l 
Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2012) (clarifying that their comparable 
ethics rule "is not intended either to restrict or to expand the 
obligations of prosecutors derived from the United States 
Constitution, federal or District of Columbia statutes, and 
court rules of procedure."); see also N.C. Rules Prof'l Conduct 
3.8(d) (2012) (requiring timely disclosure of "all evidence or 
information required to be disclosed by applicable law, rules of 
procedure, or court opinions."). 
¶34 After the issuance of the ABA Opinion, several 
jurisdictions rendered decisions construing their equivalent of 
SCR 20:3.8(f) consistent with the requirements of Brady and its 
progeny.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin, 923 
N.E.2d 125 (Ohio 2010); see also In re Jordan, 913 So. 2d 775 
(La. 2005); In re Attorney C., 47 P.3d 1167 (Colo. 2002).   
¶35 We 
do 
the 
same 
here. 
 
Adopting 
the 
OLR's 
interpretation would impose inconsistent disclosure obligations 
on prosecutors.  Indeed, the ABA Opinion describes several 
hypothetical scenarios where a prosecutor could fully comply 
with the constitutional obligations the Court has outlined under 
No. 
2011AP1049-D   
 
12 
 
Brady, but still be in violation of the Model Rule.4  Disparate 
standards are likely to generate confusion and could too easily 
devolve into a trap for the unwary. 
¶36 Under conflicting standards, prosecutors would face 
uncertainty as to how to proceed and could face professional 
discipline for failing to disclose evidence even when applicable 
constitutional law does not require disclosure of the same 
evidence.  The practical effect——disclosing evidence to avoid 
disciplinary sanctions——could effectively expand the scope of 
discovery currently required of prosecutors in criminal cases. 
See, e.g., Kellogg-Martin, 923 N.E.2d at 130.  A broader 
interpretation also invites the use of the ethics rule as a 
tactical weapon in litigation, contrary to our stated intent in 
SCR Chapter 20 (Preamble, cmt. 20).  What better way to 
interfere with law enforcement efforts than to threaten a 
prosecutor with a bar complaint?  See, e.g., Brief for National 
District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae at 14, Smith v. 
Cain, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012) (No. 10-8145).  
Prosecutors should not be subjected to disciplinary proceedings 
for complying with legal disclosure obligations.  We thus 
construe the ethical mandate of SCR 20:3.8(f)(1) in a manner 
                                                 
4 For example, the ABA Opinion declares that disclosure must 
be made "as soon as reasonably practical" once the information 
is known to the prosecutor.  Supreme court rule 20:3.8(f)(1) 
requires counsel to "make timely disclosure," which has been 
interpreted to mean the disclosure must be made within a 
reasonable time before trial.  State v. Harris, 2004 WI 64, 272 
Wis. 2d 80, 680 N.W.2d 737. 
No. 
2011AP1049-D   
 
13 
 
consistent with the scope of disclosure required by the United 
States Constitution, federal or Wisconsin statutes, and court 
rules of procedure. 
¶37 We turn to the OLR's alternative claim that Attorney 
Riek's conduct nonetheless violates SCR 20:3.8(f)(1) because the 
information at issue here was material.  The referee stated: 
By the time the [Simpson] Note was created in early 
November of 2008, the information found in this note 
was cumulative and immaterial as the note contained 
information that was already in possession of the 
defense at least as early as October 15th, 2008, about 
5 months prior to trial.  
The OLR objects to this determination, stating:  
First, the plain language of the ethical rule does not 
contain an exception for cumulative evidence.  Second, 
it overlooks an additional piece of information at 
issue: that Simpson had made a confession to the 
District Attorney himself.  It was this piece of 
information which made District Attorney Nieskes a 
potential witness in the criminal case against Smith, 
and needed to be disclosed.  (Emphasis in original.) 
¶38 The OLR is correct that SCR 20:3.8(f)(1) does not 
contain an explicit exception for cumulative evidence.  However, 
the referee's determination that Simpson's statement to D.A. 
Nieskes was cumulative is relevant to assessing its materiality.  
Simpson repeated his confession to at least five different 
people during the course of the Smith criminal proceeding.  The 
referee thus determined that the statement to D.A. Nieskes was 
not material to the outcome of Smith's proceeding.  We agree.   
¶39 Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  
No. 
2011AP1049-D   
 
14 
 
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.  A "reasonable probability" is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  
Id.  We have stated:   
[With this test,] the reviewing court may consider 
directly any adverse effect that the prosecutor's 
failure to respond might have had on the preparation 
or 
presentation 
of 
the 
defendant's 
case. 
 
The 
reviewing court should assess the possibility that 
such effect might have occurred in light of the 
totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of 
the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial 
proceeding the course that the defense and the trial 
would have taken had the defense not been misled by 
the prosecutor's incomplete response.   
State v. Harris, 2004 WI 64, ¶14, 272 Wis. 2d 80, 680 N.W.2d 737 
(quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683).  
¶40 The OLR emphasizes the fact that the confession at 
issue was made to a district attorney.  Under the facts 
presented, we deem this a distinction without a difference.  The 
defense was already well aware that Simpson claimed the 
marijuana as his own.  Some five months previously, in October 
2008, an ALJ had declined to revoke Smith's extended supervision 
based in large part on Simpson's confession.  We perceive no 
material significance in the fact that he included a district 
attorney among the various persons to whom he freely admitted 
ownership of the marijuana. 
¶41 Nor do we perceive any adverse impact on the defense.  
The OLR also offers a rather tortured scenario in which it 
posits that if Attorney Riek had failed to disclose to the 
defense the fact of Simpson's confession to D.A. Nieskes there 
might have been an adverse result for Smith if Simpson or other 
No. 
2011AP1049-D   
 
15 
 
defense witnesses to whom Simpson confessed failed to appear for 
trial.  The reality, however, is that before trial, Attorney 
Riek did disclose to the defense the Simpson Note and confession 
to D.A. Nieskes.  Simpson did appear at trial, whereupon 
Attorney Riek directed her investigator to question him.  Upon 
receiving 
confirmation 
that 
Simpson 
still 
accepted 
responsibility for the marijuana, Attorney Riek moved for 
dismissal of the charges against Smith.  On these facts, there 
is no evidence of record that Smith was adversely affected by 
any arguable delay in disclosing one of several substantively 
identical confessions to the defense four days in advance of 
trial.  We therefore accept the referee's conclusion that 
Attorney Riek did not violate SCR 20:3.8(f)(1). 
¶42 The OLR also accuses Attorney Riek of violating a rule 
of criminal procedure that imposes disclosure obligations on 
prosecutors.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23(1)(h) is entitled, "What 
A District Attorney Must Disclose To A Defendant" and provides:   
 
Upon demand, the district attorney shall, within 
a reasonable time before trial, disclose to the 
defendant or his or her attorney and permit the 
defendant or his or her attorney to inspect and copy 
or photograph all of the following materials and 
information, if it is within the possession, custody 
or control of the state: 
 
. . .  
 
(h) Any exculpatory evidence.   
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate a statute 
regulating the conduct of lawyers.  SCR 20:8.4(f).     
No. 
2011AP1049-D   
 
16 
 
¶43 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23(1)(h) requires prosecutors to 
disclose information within the State's possession "within a 
reasonable time before trial."  This is defined to mean that a 
prosecutor 
must 
disclose 
exculpatory 
evidence 
"within 
a 
sufficient time for its effective use."  See Harris, 272 
Wis. 2d 80, ¶37.  The question is not whether it would have been 
prudent or preferable for Attorney Riek to have disclosed the 
statement to D.A. Nieskes sooner.  The question is whether she 
violated the statute by disclosing the information to the 
defense four days before a trial that never occurred. 
¶44 The record is devoid of evidence that Attorney Riek's 
alleged delay in producing the Simpson Note and disclosing the 
fact of Simpson's discussion with D.A. Nieskes was intentional 
or done for any strategic purpose.  Mindful of the voluminous 
caseloads managed by most prosecutors, we are unwilling to rule 
that Attorney Riek's disclosure of essentially duplicative 
information four days in advance of an apparently routine 
marijuana 
possession 
case 
ran 
afoul 
of 
her 
ethical 
and 
procedural obligations as a prosecutor.   
¶45 We note, moreover, that even where a prosecutor does 
fail to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady, a 
single inadvertent failure does not necessarily constitute an 
ethical violation.  Negligence and ethical misconduct are not 
necessarily synonymous.  Most courts and official ABA policy 
agree that a single instance of "ordinary negligence" may 
trigger other adverse consequences and possible sanctions but 
does not usually constitute a disciplinary violation warranting 
No. 
2011AP1049-D   
 
17 
 
public discipline.  See, e.g., In re Conduct of Gygi, 541 P.2d 
1392, 1396 (Or. 1975) (stating "we are not prepared to hold that 
isolated instances of ordinary negligence are alone sufficient 
to warrant disciplinary action."); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of 
Maryland v. Kemp, 641 A.2d 510, 518 (1994) ("While we do not 
condone, and certainly do not encourage, attorney negligence or 
carelessness in the handling of client affairs, neither do we 
routinely treat negligence or carelessness as a violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.").  Prosecutors should certainly 
be mindful of their disclosure obligations, but the possibility 
of a grievance proceeding should not permeate every discovery 
dispute in criminal cases.  See Attorney C., 47 P.3d at 1173-74. 
¶46 We accept the referee's conclusion that Attorney 
Riek's conduct did not violate SCR 20:3.8(f)(1) or Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.23(1)(h), made actionable via SCR 20:8.4(f), and we 
dismiss the complaint. 
¶47 IT IS ORDERED that the disciplinary complaint filed 
against Attorney Sharon A. Riek is dismissed.  No costs. 
 
No. 
2011AP1049-D   
 
 
 
1