Title: V-1 Oil Co. v. City of Rock Springs

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

V-1 Oil Co. v. City of Rock Springs1991 WY 160823 P.2d 1176Case Number: 90-195Decided: 12/12/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
V-1 OIL COMPANY, 
Appellant (Complainant),

v.

 CITY OF 
ROCK SPRINGS, Wyoming, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee 
(Respondent).

 Appeal from District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Jere Ryckman, 
J.

 F.M. Andrews, Jr. and 
Robert O. Anderson of Andrews and Anderson, P.C., Riverton, for 
appellant.

 Vincent E. Crow, City 
Atty., Rock 
Springs, for appellee.

 Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

 URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

 [¶1.]     This case involves an 
official written order of the Rock Springs, Wyoming Fire Chief requiring 
immediate (sixty days) removal by appellant, V-1 Oil Company (V-1 Oil), of a 
long-standing 18,000 gallon liquefied petroleum gas (LPG or propane) storage 
tank from its service station premises within the city limits of the City of 
Rock Springs, Wyoming (City), appellee. The storage tank had been anathematized 
by the Fire Chief for contended violation of the City's Uniform Fire Code. V-1 
Oil appealed the Fire Chief's order and sought a variance from the Wyoming 
Council on Fire Prevention, Electrical Safety, and Energy Efficiency in 
Buildings (State Council). The State Council upheld the order of the Fire Chief 
and refused to consider V-1 Oil's request for a variance. The district court 
affirmed the State Council decision.

 [¶2.]     We reverse and 
remand.

 I. FACTS

 [¶3.]     V-1 Oil owns and 
operates a service station and convenience store in Rock Springs, Wyoming. As part of its business, V-1 Oil 
sells and dispenses propane from a 500 gallon tank. Also located on the premises 
is an 18,000 gallon propane storage tank. The 18,000 gallon above-ground tank 
was placed in its present location in either the late 1970's or early 1980's to 
replace a 12,000 gallon tank which had been in use at the same location since 
1964.

 [¶4.]     The City is a 
municipality organized under the laws of the State of Wyoming pertaining to 
first class cities. See W.S. 15-3-101 through 15-3-104. In 1985, the City 
adopted by ordinance the 1985 version of the Uniform Fire Code (UFC).1 Approximately a year or so after 
adoption, Rock Springs Fire Department Inspector Dennis Washam inspected the V-1 
Oil facility and determined that the large propane storage tank violated the 
tank capacity limitation in UFC § 82.105(a). UFC § 82.105(a) states:

 Within the limits 
established by law restricting the storage of liquefied petroleum gas for the 
protection of heavily populated or congested commercial areas, the aggregate 
capacity of any one installation shall not exceed 2,000 gallons water capacity, 
except that in particular installations this capacity limit may be altered at 
the discretion of the Chief after consideration of special features such 
as topographical conditions, nature of occupancy and proximity to buildings, 
capacity of proposed tanks, degree of private fire protection to be provided and 
facilities of the local fire department. The storage of liquefied petroleum gas 
shall conform to the provisions of the local zoning ordinance.

 (Emphasis 
added.)

 [¶5.]     Following Fire 
Inspector Washam's initial inspection, Rock Springs Fire Chief Harvey Cozad 
accompanied Inspector Washam to the V-1 Oil facility and together they made a 
visual inspection of the premises and surrounding area. Their investigation of 
the area was neither elaborate, systematic nor formalized. Without the benefit 
of having conducted a hearing and simply on the basis of his visit to the 
premises, Chief Cozad concluded that the long-existent LPG tank violated UFC § 
82.105(a). After applying what he called a "common sense" interpretation to such 
terms as "heavily populated or congested commercial area," the Fire Chief 
determined that none of the UFC § 82.105(a) "special features" were present 
which would compel him to make an exception to the 2,000 gallon capacity 
limitation. Consequently, on January 27, 1987, Fire Inspector Washam - acting at 
the direction of Fire Chief Cozad - issued a Notice of Violation to V-1 Oil by 
finding the 18,000 gallon capacity tank violated UFC § 82.105(a). Removal was 
ordered.

 [¶6.]     In response, V-1 Oil 
objected to the removal order and informed the City that its Notice of Violation 
did not contain a provision for an appeal. Since it had not previously 
considered an appeal from a Fire Code violation, the City discovered that it had 
failed to establish a local board of appeals pursuant to UFC § 2.302 (1985). UFC 
§ 2.302 states:

 In order to determine the 
suitability of alternate materials and type of construction and to provide for 
reasonable interpretations of the provisions of this code, there shall be and 
hereby is created a Board of Appeals consisting of five members who are 
qualified by experience and training to pass upon pertinent matters. The fire 
chief shall be an ex officio member and shall act as secretary of the board. The 
Board of Appeals shall be appointed by the executive body and shall hold 
office at their pleasure. The board shall adopt reasonable rules and regulations 
for conducting its investigations and shall render all decisions and findings in 
writing to the fire chief, with a duplicate copy to the appellant, and may 
recommend to the executive body such new legislation as is consistent 
therewith.[2]

 (Emphasis 
added.)

 [¶7.]     Lacking the local 
appeal board which should have been established pursuant to UFC § 2.302, the 
City determined that the State Council would be the proper body to hear an 
appeal. Thus, a second Notice of Violation giving V-1 Oil sixty days to remove 
its tank was issued on July 6, 1988. The second notice informed V-1 Oil that the 
adverse decision of the Fire Chief could be appealed to the State Council. 
Following issuance of the second notice, the Fire Chief contacted a private fire 
protection consulting engineer for independent verification that the violation 
determination was correct.

 [¶8.]     On July 22, 1988, V-1 
Oil filed a notice of appeal with the State Council requesting a hearing. Six 
days later, V-1 Oil filed a supplemental request with the State Council for a 
variance to allow V-1 Oil to continue operating its facility with the 18,000 
gallon propane tank in place. Though the record of correspondence between the 
parties in this case is incomplete (i.e., V-1 Oil's August 4, 1988 letter to the 
Attorney General's office as referenced in the record at is not contained in the 
record), it appears that there was considerable uncertainty and much debate as 
to what jurisdiction, if any, the State Council would have to consider V-1 Oil's 
variance request.

 [¶9.]     V-1 Oil argued that 
since the City had failed to create a local board of appeals pursuant to UFC § 
2.302, then W.S. 35-9-106(c) (1988) established a right for V-1 Oil to have the 
State Council consider its variance request. W.S. 35-9-106(c) 
states:

 Except as provided under 
W.S. 35-9-124(a)(ii) [dealing with the right of the Electrical Board to hear 
appeals and grant variances from Council rules and regulations], the council 
shall hear appeals to determine the suitability of alternate materials and type 
of construction and to interpret and grant variances from rules and regulations 
of the council.

 [¶10.]  On the other hand, the assistant attorney 
general responsible for advising the State Council felt that all the State 
Council could do in this case was to decide the merits of V-1 Oil's appeal 
without considering the variance request. The assistant attorney general relied 
on W.S. 35-9-121(c) (1988) which states:

 A municipality or county 
which has enforcement authority under this section may create its own appeals 
boards to determine the suitability of alternate materials and types of 
construction. The boards shall be appointed and removed by the governing body of 
the municipality or county. The council on fire prevention, electrical safety 
and energy efficiency in buildings and the electrical board shall serve as 
appeals boards for a municipality or county that has not created an appeals 
board under this subsection.[3]

 In an August 10, 1988 
letter to V-1 Oil's counsel, the assistant attorney general indicated that W.S. 
35-9-106(c) only allows the State Council to grant variances from its own rules 
and regulations - not from local enforcement district rules and regulations. 
Thus, it was the assistant attorney general's opinion that the State Council did 
not have jurisdiction to grant a variance in this case.

 [¶11.]  However, when the State Council began the 
hearing on V-1 Oil's appeal on December 1, 1988, it appears the assistant 
attorney general had changed her mind as to the applicability of W.S. 
35-9-106(c). During the hearing, she advised the State Council as 
follows:

 As [counsel for the City 
and V-1 Oil] have told you[,] this matter has been deliberated for quite some 
time over the jurisdictional authority and who does have authority and 
jurisdiction over this type of situation and it is clear to me in Wyoming 
Statute 35-9-121(c) * * * that this Body does have authority over the questions 
at hand.

 * * * * * *

 [¶12.]  It is my opinion that your authority 
arises under statute and also under 35-9-106 which specifically authorizes this 
Council to grant variances from the Code.

 [¶13.]  Although the State Council began its 
appeal hearing on December 1, 1988, the hearing was continued until January 17, 
1989 because an expert witness was unable to attend the December hearing. When 
the hearing was resumed in January, the State Council stated at the outset that 
it was meeting to determine "whether the 18,000 gallon liqu[e]fied petroleum 
tank is or is not in violation of the [UFC] and whether or not it meets the 
intent of the Code." In effect, the State Council reversed its December 1, 1988 
position on jurisdiction and refused to consider V-1 Oil's variance request. 
Instead, the State Council conducted the hearing for the sole purpose of 
determining whether the Fire Chief abused his discretion or acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously in finding that the 18,000 gallon tank violated the 
UFC.

 [¶14.]  On March 27, 1989, the State Council 
entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order. The State 
Council affirmed the Fire Chief's tank removal order by the unsurprising 
analysis that the tank was larger (18,000 gallons) than provided in the code 
criteria (2,000 gallons). Everyone recognized this fact from the onset and no 
hearing for authentication was actually required. V-1 Oil filed a Petition for 
Review and Request for Trial De Novo in the District Court, Third Judicial 
District, SweetwaterCounty on April 28, 1989. The district 
court affirmed the State Council's decision on June 22, 1990 and V-1 Oil then 
filed this appeal. The district court granted V-1 Oil's motions for stay of 
execution pending the outcome of all appellate proceedings in this 
matter.

 II. ISSUES

 [¶15.]  V-1 Oil states the issues for review as 
follows: 

 I. The actions of the 
Council, in refusing to accept and rule on V-1's request for a variance, was 
arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law.

 II. The Council's 
findings of fact, conclusions and decision was arbitrary, capricious and not 
based on the facts.

 III. The refusal of the 
Fire Chief to grant a variance was arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by 
the facts.[4]

 [¶16.]  Because we find V-1 Oil's first issue 
dispositive, we need not decide whether the State Council's findings and 
conclusions and the Fire Chief's refusal to grant a variance were supported by 
substantial evidence.

 III. ANALYSIS

 [¶17.]  It is apparent from the record, the 
appellate briefs and the oral argument that the parties were and remain confused 
about the State Council's jurisdiction to consider V-1 Oil's variance request in 
this case. The State Council conducted what amounted to a full-blown contested 
case-type hearing as to the merits of V-1 Oil's appeal of the Fire Chief's 
decision. However, although the State Council heard expert testimony and 
examined the evidence submitted by V-1 Oil and the City as to tank safety and 
other environmental conditions surrounding tank placement, the State Council had 
already decided as a matter of law that it did not have jurisdiction to consider 
the variance request.5

 [¶18.]  In reviewing an administrative agency 
action of this sort, we are guided by the standard set forth in W.S. 
16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) (1990). As a reviewing court, we are required to "[h]old 
unlawful and set aside agency action * * * found to be * * * not in accordance 
with law[.]" Id.

 [¶19.]  It is not clear from the record what 
statutory basis the State Council finally used to decide that it did not have 
jurisdiction to consider V-1 Oil's variance request. Without identifying a 
specific statutory basis for refusing the request, the State Council simply 
stated in its findings and conclusions that it was considering "an appeal from a 
decision of a local fire chief under W.S. 35-9-121(c)" and that Fire Chief Cozad 
and Fire Inspector Washam "were not arbitrary[,] capricious, nor [had they] 
abused their discretion" in the performance of their duties. All that was really 
determined was the admitted fact - the tank was 18,000 gallons.

 [¶20.]  In affirming the State Council's 
decision, the district court identified and relied on UFC § 82.105(a) to decide 
that only the Fire Chief has authority to consider a variance. While UFC § 
82.105(a) states that the Fire Chief may exercise his discretion in altering the 
tank capacity limitation at any particular installation in a heavily populated 
or congested area, the provision does not preempt variance consideration by 
either a local board of appeals or by the State Council pursuant to W.S. 
35-9-106(c).

 [¶21.]  The district court's narrow 
interpretation of UFC § 82.105 also fails to take into account the legislative 
intent inherent in W.S. §§ 35-9-106(c), 35-9-121(c) and UFC § 2.302, the UFC 
section authorizing local appellate boards "to provide for reasonable 
interpretations of the provisions of this code." Although UFC § 2.302 does not 
explicitly vest a local appeal board with authority to consider variance 
requests, the "reasonable interpretation" language reflects a clear intent that 
the Fire Chief's discretion under UFC § 82.105(a) is not unfettered. The 
legislature resolved potential conflict in this regard when it enacted W.S. 
35-9-121(b): "If local [fire] code provisions conflict with adopted state codes, 
the state code prevails." Thus, state statutes prevail over conflicting 
provisions in the Rock 
Springs version of the UFC. Regardless of the 
jurisdictional limitations arguably contained in UFC §§ 2.302 and 82.105(a), a 
careful reading of W.S. 35-9-106(c) in conjunction with W.S. 35-9-121(c) 
dictates that the legislature intended the State Council to have jurisdiction in 
variance requests when, as here, a municipality has failed to create a local 
board of appeals.

 [¶22.]  When read separately, the Wyoming statutory and UFC 
provisions at issue in this case are not ambiguous. However, none of the 
provisions speak directly and independently to the particular factual situation 
present in this case. Thus, our primary concern is to make sense of the 
legislative product by reading all of the provisions in pari materia to 
ascertain legislative intent. Mauler v. Titus, 697 P.2d 303 (Wyo. 1985). We have said 
we will "construe together statutes relating to the same subject" to avoid 
conflicting and confusing results. Department of Revenue and Taxation v. 
Irvine, 589 P.2d 1295, 1298 (Wyo. 1979); see also Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083 (Wyo. 1989).

 [¶23.]  It would be incongruous to find that the 
State Council would have the right to consider a variance request brought 
by a nonfirst class city Wyoming resident but that the State Council would 
not have similar jurisdiction if the variance request was brought by a 
resident of a first class city - especially when the City itself had failed to 
create a local board of appeals as mandated by City ordinance. If we were to 
accept the argument advanced by the City in this case, we would penalize a 
resident of Rock Springs by denying that person 
or business the full measure of due process and statutory protection to seek a 
variance accorded other Wyoming residents.

 [¶24.]  In holding that the State Council had 
jurisdiction to consider V-1 Oil's variance request, we rely on the following 
language in W.S. 35-9-106(c): "the council shall hear appeals * * * to 
interpret and grant variances from rules and regulations of the council." 
(Emphasis added.) We recognize that the mandatory language requiring the State 
Council to consider variances is ostensibly limited to variances "from rules and 
regulations of the council." The City argues that W.S. 35-9-106(c) should not 
apply here since the UFC provision in this case is a City ordinance and not a 
rule or regulation of the State Council. The problem with this reasoning is that 
it fails to take into account the role the State Council must assume when it 
substitutes as an appellate board in the absence of a local board of appeals 
pursuant to W.S. 35-9-121(c). If the State Council is to function in the 
capacity of a local board of appeals, it must be vested with the same authority 
and jurisdiction to interpret local ordinance rules and regulations. Otherwise, 
simply assigning the title without the corresponding mantle of authority would 
render meaningless the statutory appeal process. This court has often said that 
we will assume that the legislature does not intend futile or meaningless 
things. Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139 (Wyo. 1985). Thus, we find the legislature must 
have intended under the circumstances presented here that the State Council 
should consider variance requests where the City, for whatever reason, did not 
establish its own appeal procedure by naming an appeal board.

 [¶25.]  Since V-1 Oil would have had the right to 
seek a variance from a local board of appeals if the City had established 
such a board as mandated by UFC § 2.302, then V-1 Oil cannot be found to have 
sacrificed that same right to seek a variance from the State Council simply 
because the City ignored the mandatory requirement and failed or refused to 
establish a local board pursuant to UFC § 2.302 of its own ordinance. While the 
State Council may have acted in good faith and with the benefit of advice from 
the state attorney general's office, it erred in concluding as a matter of law 
that it could not consider V-1 Oil's variance request. Similarly, though perhaps 
for different reasons, the district court erred in reaching the same result. 
W.S. 35-9-106(c), when read in conjunction with W.S. 35-9-121(c) leads to the 
conclusion that the State Council in this case had jurisdiction to consider V-1 
Oil's request for a variance since the State Council was acting in the absence 
of and in the same capacity as a local board of appeals.

 [¶26.]  Thus, since the Fire Chief never 
conducted a variance hearing and the State Council refused to do so upon 
request, V-1 Oil has been denied a basic and fundamental due process right to 
have its variance request heard and decided by an impartial tribunal. While V-1 
Oil does not enjoy an absolute right to obtain a variance for its propane 
storage tank which preexisted enactment of the Rock Springs fire code, at the very least V-1 
Oil does have a due process right to have its variance request heard and 
considered. See n. 1, supra and UFC § 1.103(b) relating to conditions existent 
when the ordinance was adopted. We hold as a matter of law and under the 
particular circumstances of this case that the State Council erred in deciding 
that it did not have jurisdiction to consider V-1 Oil's variance request. W.S. 
16-3-114(c)(ii)(A).

 [¶27.]  In light of our decision in Cook v. 
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment for the City of Laramie, 776 P.2d 181 (Wyo. 1989), we 
also find it necessary to discuss whether the Fire Chief should have conducted a 
hearing in the process of determining that V-1 Oil's tank violated the UFC. The 
Fire Chief's determination that the propane tank in question violated the UFC 
and that it did not warrant an exception due to "special features" was, in 
effect, a variance denial. In Cook, we held that "[a] variance decision must be 
supported by adequate findings." Id. at 185. Furthermore, no evidence of 
consideration of the "distinct hazard" criteria of UFC § 1.103(b) is 
provided.

 [¶28.]  In this case, because of the absence of 
any record as to specific findings of fact the Fire Chief made prior to 
concluding that the tank violated the UFC, it is impossible to know which 
"special features" were considered. While it may be argued6 that V-1 Oil was entitled at the 
very least to an informal hearing before the Fire Chief, this much is clear: 
absent a hearing, the Fire Chief failed to provide any indication that he had 
considered any neighborhood conditions (i.e., "special features" or "distinct 
hazards") in the tank's vicinity. Consequently, prior to the Fire Chief's 
testimony at the subsequent State Council hearing, it was impossible to tell 
whether the Fire Chief exercised any discretion or professional judgment in 
reaching his decision or whether he simply applied a literal reading of the 
2,000 gallon tank capacity language in UFC § 82.105(a).

 [¶29.]  Nothing in this record demonstrates that 
either a variance or fire code modification application has ever been considered 
throughout the course of these proceedings. The second order to remove was filed 
July 6, 1988 and more than three years have now passed. By this time, it appears 
from the record that a new UFC has been adopted.7 Fashioning any judicial remedy 
following reversal presents factual uncertainties unresolvable on this 
record.

 IV. 
CONCLUSION

 [¶30.]  This case is reversed and remanded to the 
district court to be returned for the Rock Springs City Fire Chief to determine 
whether he wishes to recommence the proceedings based on the 1988 notice to 
remove or whether he desires to issue another notice. If objection is taken to 
any notice given pursuant to the UFC, the Fire Chief shall provide an 
opportunity for V-1 Oil to object and present evidence which might justify 
non-enforcement or issuance of a variance under the provisions of the UFC which 
are now in effect. Any appeal or subsequent variance request will be considered 
by the applicable City appeal board if one has been established and, if not, 
then again by the Wyoming Council on Fire Prevention, Electrical Safety, and 
Energy Efficiency in Buildings pursuant to the provisions of W.S. §§ 35-9-106(c) 
and 35-9-121(c) as considered by this opinion and the UFC provisions presently 
in effect.

 [¶31.]  Reversed and remanded.

 CARDINE, 
J., 
files a dissenting opinion.

 FOOTNOTES

 1 Since we reverse and 
remand, problems of record and documentation which perplex this court will be 
discussed to avoid reappearance if another appeal should hereafter result in 
this proceeding. The 1985 UFC as adopted by city ordinance enactment is not 
included in this record. Attachments to the appellate briefs provide the only 
source of documentation which include limited segments of the UFC's 421-page 
detail.

      The 1985 edition of 
the UFC as a general publication, library identification KF3975.I58 1985, 
included in text a proposed ordinance for the enactment by city or governmental 
officials by reference. That proposal provided two items within its thirteen 
sections of particular interest for this litigation. UFC § 5 
provided:

 ESTABLISHMENTS OF LIMITS 
IN WHICH STORAGE OF LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GASES IS TO BE 
RESTRICTED.

      The limits referred to 
in Section 82.105(a) of the Uniform Fire Code, in which storage of liquefied 
petroleum gas is restricted, are hereby established as follows:

 _______________________

      NOTE: These limits should 
include the heavily populated and the congested commercial areas. These limits 
should be detailed unless such limits have been established by other 
regulations.

 Additionally, UFC § 8 
provided:

 APPEALS.

      Whenever the chief 
disapproves an application or refuses to grant a permit applied for, or when it 
is claimed that the provisions of the code do not apply or that the true intent 
and meaning of the code have been misconstrued or wrongly interpreted, the 
applicant may appeal from the decision of the chief to 
________________________________________________ ____________________ within 30 
days from the date of the decision appealed.

      Since the date of 
consideration of this facility by the City authorities, a new Compiled 
Ordinances of the City of Rock Springs, Wyoming (1989) has been adopted. Further 
consideration of action to force the removal of V-1 Oil's LPG storage facility 
should now be conducted within established geographical boundary designations 
and other criteria provided in the most current city ordinance.

 2 The City has, since all 
of this litigation occurred, established a Building Codes Appeal Board by City 
Ordinance No. 91-02, enacted April 2, 1991. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether 
that board has extended authority to consider a City Ordinance Section 
7-108.3(f) UFC appeal. Any reference to the UFC is noticeably absent from the 
lists of Uniform Codes (i.e., Uniform Building Code, Uniform Mechanical Code, 
Uniform Plumbing Code, Uniform Housing Code, Uniform Code for Abatement of 
Dangerous Buildings, Uniform Sign Code, Uniform Swimming Pool, Spa and Hot Tub 
Codes) specifically mentioned in Sections 7.108.1 and 7.108.2 of the Rock 
Springs City Ordinances. Nothing else demonstrates that another appeal board as 
required by the UFC has been established.

 3 Originally, enforcement 
was vested in the state fire marshall, Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 166 (1977), with delegating authority to local government 
agencies. W.S. 35-436.21 (1975 Cum.Supp.). Upon recodification and creation of 
the Department of Fire Prevention and Electrical Safety, Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 97 
(1983), local enforcement was more effectively directed by enactment of W.S. 
35-9-121. The obvious purpose of the inclusion of the alternative language for 
appeal in W.S. 35-9-121(c) was to assure an appeal board, e.g., the state 
agency, in the event the local unit of government did not choose to create its 
own appeal instrumentality. See 1983 Dig. of H.J., 47th Gen.Sess., at 66. Under 
the prior law before the 1983 decentralization of regulation, the provision for 
appeal was with the State Council, see Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 166 (1977), W.S. 
35-436.10(c) (1977), or the municipality and county-created appeal board without 
directive provision in case the municipality or county chose not to establish 
the appeal board.

 4 The litigants did not 
consider constitutionality issues created by the application of a subsequently 
adopted use regulation to the existent physical structure as an improvement on 
the premises where danger to public health and safety is not dispositively 
considered. Consequently, neither do we. See Sun Ridge Development, Inc. v. City 
of Cheyenne, 787 P.2d 583 (Wyo. 1990); Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717 (Wyo. 1985), dismissed 476 U.S. 1110, 106 S. Ct. 1961, 90 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1986); 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
Cal., 482 U.S. 304, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1987), cert. denied 493 U.S. 1056, 110 S. Ct. 866, 107 L. Ed. 2d 950 (1990).

 5 There can be no question 
that the right of V-1 Oil to seek a variance from UFC compliance is 
significantly different than its right to appeal an adverse decision of the Fire 
Chief. See United States Steel Corp. v. Wyoming Environmental Quality Council, 
575 P.2d 749 (Wyo. 1978) (Thomas, J., specially 
concurring); 3 Anderson, American Law of Zoning 3d, § 20.02 (1986) (variance 
defined); and 1 Anderson, supra, § 6.08 at 466 (nonconforming 
use - elements of existing use). A variance in zoning terminology is defined 
as:

 [A]uthorization for the 
construction or maintenance of a building or structure, or for the establishment 
or maintenance of a use of land, which is prohibited by a zoning ordinance. It 
is a right granted by a board of adjustment pursuant to power vested in such 
administrative body by statute or ordinance and is a form of administrative 
relief from the literal import and strict application of zoning 
regulations.

 3 Anderson, supra, § 20.02 
at 365 (footnotes omitted).

      We do not attempt to 
distinguish, for the purpose of this decision, differences among conditional 
use, nonconforming use and variance, and especially so since the record 
indicates that the City has now replaced the 1985 UFC with the 1988 UFC which, 
according to the testimony, "is different." See 3 Anderson, supra, § 20.05 at 374, "Conditional 
use distinguished." See also, for differentiation, Harding v. Board of Zoning 
Appeals of City of Morgantown, 159 W. Va. 73, 219 S.E.2d 324 (1975).

      This case does not 
present a zoning controversy, see W.S. 15-1-601 through 15-1-611 (1980 and 1991 
Cum.Supp.), relating to city and town zoning. The appeal board provided by W.S. 
35-9-121 is completely different from the zoning board of adjustment authorized 
to be established by W.S. 15-1-605 (1991) and, at least in present terms, also 
different from the Building Codes Appeal Board created by Ordinance 91-02, 
adopted April 2, 1991. In technical terminology, the variance discussed in this 
appeal is distinguishable from a zoning variance and could more accurately be 
described as an exception application arising from the general provisions 
created by the after-the-fact adoption of the UFC to a structure presently 
existent and in use.

 6 Helpful insight is found 
in Thornley v. Wyoming Highway Dept., Motor Vehicle Division, 478 P.2d 600 (Wyo. 
1971). In Thornley, (a case dealing with the constitutionality of Wyoming's Financial 
Responsibility Act and the failure of the superintendent to conduct a hearing to 
establish potential culpability prior to driver license suspension) we 
said:

      Our administrative 
procedure act and our rules of civil procedure both contemplate administrative 
proceedings where there is a hearing and administrative proceedings where there 
is no hearing. If the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required 
by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing, the 
proceeding is called a "contested case." If such hearing is not required, the 
proceeding is a non-contested case. * * *

 * * * * * *

      [Though Thornley was 
not a "contested case"], [t]hat is not to say, however, that the superintendent 
should not grant a hearing, in his discretion, if and when a need therefor has 
been shown.

 Id. at 603.

      In some respects, this 
case is analogous to Thornley. Here, the Fire Chief had a duty and 
responsibility to determine whether any UFC § 82.105(a) "special features" 
existed which might warrant alteration of the tank capacity limitation. Both of 
the violation notices sent to V-1 Oil by the Fire Chief contained nothing more 
than a mere statement that, "[t]he tank(s) at this location well exceeds the 
2,000 gallon limit." The conclusive finding of a violation absent any showing 
that the Fire Chief considered the "special features" pursuant to UFC § 
82.105(a) does not create a record from which an aggrieved party may 
appeal.

 7 For the most part, a 
casual examination of the 1988 UFC does not reveal many significant differences 
in effect and terminology relative to the proposed model ordinances: "Scope" and 
"Existing Conditions," UFC § 1.103(a) and (b); "Establishments of Limits in 
Which Storage of Liquefied Petroleum Gases is to be Restricted," UFC § 5; 
"Appeals," UFC § 8; and "Board of Appeals," UFC § 2.303. However, it is apparent 
that a significant difference exists between UFC § 82.105(a) (1985) regarding 
aggregate capacity and UFC § 82.104(b) (1988), "Maximum Capacity Within 
Established Limits." With regard to the present issue, the significant 
difference is the removal in the latter edition of the alternative capacity 
criteria within the discretion of the chief. The 1988 UFC limits the size of the 
tank within the appropriately designated area to a maximum capacity of the 2,000 
gallons without exception.

 CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting.

 [¶32.]  I dissent.

 [¶33.]  We put form over substance in this 
reversal and remand which will require the parties to go through the same 
procedure (order, notice, contested case hearing, and appeal) just completed. If 
the Board, after hearing the experts and all evidence, had found the fire chief 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously, it would have vacated the order of removal, 
the effect being to allow the tank to remain. The effect would be a variance. 
The Board, after hearing the evidence, affirmed the fire chief's action, and so 
should we.

 [¶34.]  There is substantial support for the 
Board's finding that the fire chief had not acted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner. The majority acknowledges that the fire chief applied a rule of "common 
sense." The rule of "common sense" has heretofore been urged upon this Court 
with considerable vigor. Brown v. State, 816 P.2d 818 (Wyo. 1991) (Urbigkit, 
C.J., dissenting). Having had the foresight to apply this rule, the fire chief's 
determination of removal requirement is surely entitled to considerable 
weight.