Title: Browning v. Maytag Corp.

State: georgia

Issuer: Georgia Supreme Court

Document:

401 S.E.2d 725 (1991) 261 Ga. 20 BROWNING v. MAYTAG CORPORATION. No. S90Q1273. Supreme Court of Georgia. March 15, 1991. *726 Dillard, Landers & Bower, Terry A. Dillard, Bryant H. Bower, Waycross, for petitioners. J. Thomas Whelchel, Brunswick, for respondent. BELL, Justice. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (hereafter the Eleventh Circuit) has certified the following question to this Court: The facts of this case, as set out by the Eleventh Circuit, are as follow: Responses of this Court. We conclude that § 51-1-11(c) cannot be applied to bar products liability actions based on negligence where the cause of action accrued before the effective date of § 51-1-11(c), July 1, 1987. We acknowledge that in Hatcher we held without qualification that § 51-1-11(b)(2) was a bar if the action was filed more than ten years after the product was sold, but we interpret Hatcher as not controlling on whether the limitation of § 51-1-11(c) can be applied retroactively to bar causes of action that accrued before the effective date of that limitation. As was noted by the Eleventh Circuit, Browning, supra, 902 F.2d at 882-883, Hatcher is distinguishable on its facts from the present case, as the injury in Hatcher did not occur until after the effective date of the strict liability limitation, § 51-1-11(b)(2). Accordingly, in Hatcher this Court did not address whether § 51-1-11(b)(2) could be imposed retroactively to causes of action that accrued before the effective date of § 51-1-11(b)(2), July 1, 1978. We now undertake to address the question of retroactivity with respect to § 51-1-11(c). The controlling principle is that a statute "which affects substantive rights may operate prospectively only. [Cit.]" Enger v. Erwin, 245 Ga. 753, 754, 267 S.E.2d 25 (1980). Accord Brown v. Hauser, 249 Ga. 513, 514-515(1), 292 S.E.2d 1 (1982). If the Brownings' cause of action accrued or vested before the enactment of § 51-1-11(c), the Brownings' right to bring that action is a substantive right that § 51-1-1(c) cannot operate retroactively to bar. Enger v. Erwin, supra, 245 Ga. at 754-755, 267 S.E.2d 25; Brown v. Hauser, supra, 249 Ga. at 514-515, 292 S.E.2d 1. The Brownings' cause of action accrued at the time of the injury, some two years before the effective date of § 51-1-11(c). Thus, to apply § 51-1-11(c) retroactively to defeat the Brownings' substantive right to bring their cause of action would be unconstitutional. Accordingly, we hold that § 51-1-11(c) may not be applied to bar the Brownings' claim. Certified question answered. All the Justices concur.