Title: STATE v STUIT

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13556 I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1978 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, D U A N E STUIT, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert J. Boyd, Judge p r e s i d i n a . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Greg J. Skakles argued, Anaconda, Montana For Respondent: Honorable Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Denny Moreen argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana James J. Masar, County Attorney, Deer Lodge, Montana Submitted: January 3 0 , 1978 ~ e c i d e d CAR 2 2 1978 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court: Duane S t u i t an inmate of Montana s t a t e prison was con- victed by jury verdict f o r the crime of escape, a felony i n violation of section 94-7-306, R.C.M. 1947. The DistricL Court, Powell County, ordered defendant be punished by confine- ment i n Montana s t a t e prison f o r 10 years. Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction. On February 13, 1976, defendant, while i n the lawful custody of Montana s t a t e prison, f l e d the confines of the prison and made h i s way t o Colorado Springs, Colorado, where he surrendered himself t o l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s f i v e days a f t e r h i s escape. O n March 18, 1976, the county attorney f o r Powell County f i l e d an Information charging defendant with the crime of escape. Defendant entered a plea of not g u i l t y and r e l i e d on the defense of j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r escape due t o necessity, duress or f e a r of great bodily harm, as s e t out i n section 94-3-110, R.C.M. 1947. The crux of S t u i t ' s defense l i e s i n the contention h i s escape from Montana s t a t e prison was necessitated by h i s f a i l u r e t o obtain adequate medical attention. Defendant's r i g h t eye had been removed a s a r e s u l t of a childhood injury. I n i t s place a prosthesis o r glass eye was i n s t a l l e d . While an inmate a t Montana s t a t e prison defendant contracted a staph infection i n h i s r i g h t eye. Prison medical s t a f f doctors and s p e c i a l i s t s were provided f o r treatment of the infection. A t r e a t i n g physician recommended arrangements be made t o secure a new prosthesis f o r defendant. The prison warden t e s t i f i e d t h a t a new prosthesis could only be obtained i n Spokane, Weshington a t t h a t time, but the necessary equipment would soon be available i n Montana. Defendant contends the fear of infection spreading from the right eye to the left eye and the potential for loss of sight in his left eye necessitated his escape in order to obtain necessary medical care. Defendant raises two issues on appeal: 1 ) Whether the District Court erred in restricting defendant's voir dire by precluding defense counsel from questioning prospective jurors on their attitute toward the defense of justification? 2 ) Whether the District Court erred in its instructions to the jury? Defendant contends the District Court's limitation on the scope of voir dire questioning of prospective jurors denied defendant the right to trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed by Art. 11, Section 24, 1972 Montana Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The specific instances of purported error involved the state's objections to defense counsel's voir dire questioning of prospective jurors. The state objected on the grounds the questions propounded were irrelevant, misstated the law and counsel was arguing the case to the jury. The District Court sustained the state's objections. Upon reviewing the transcript of jury voir dire, we conclude the District Court did not err in sustaining the state's objec- tion. The court's ruling merely precluded defense counsel from arguing the case to the jury during voir dire. Defense counsel was not restrained from questioning jurors on the defense of justification. The purpose of voir dire is to enable counsel to determine the existence of bias and prejudice on the part of prospective jurors and to enable counsel to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges. State ex rel. Stephens v. District Court, (1976), - Mont . , 550 P.2d 385, 33 St.Rep. 469. This purpose was not undermined in the present case. I n h i s second issue defendant challenges the D i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s instructions t o t h e jury. Defendant contends Instruction Nos. 15 and 16, i n essence, directed a verdict of g u i l t y and placed upon defendant the burden of proving h i s defense. Instruc- t i o n No. 15 stated: "A person subject t o o f f i c i a l detention commits the offense of ESCAPE i f he knowingly o r purposely removes himself from o f f i c i a l detention." Instruction No. 16 stated: "To sustain the charge of ESCAPE, the S t a t e must prove t h a t each element of the offense was done purposely o r knowingly." Instruction No. 15 merely defines the crime of escape i n the language of section 94-7-306(2), R.C.M. 1947. In- s t r u c t i o n No. 16 establishes t h e s t a t e ' s burden of proof which i s t o e s t a b l i s h the mental s t a t e f o r each element of the crime of escape, a s provided i n section 94-2-103(1), R.C.M. 1947. W e f a i l t o conclude these instructions amount t o a directed verdict of g u i l t o r impose upon the defendant the burden of proving h i s defense. Other instructions given t o the jury s e t f o r t h t h e defense of necessity o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Instruction No. 12 specifically provided: "The Defendant has presented evidence showing t h a t he acted out of necessity o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The Defendant does not have a burden of proof t o sustain t h i s defense. I f h i s evidence r a i s e s a reasonable doubt a s t o h i s g u i l t , he i s e n t i t l e d t o a c q u i t t a l . He i s not obliged t o e s t a b l i s h t h i s defense beyond a reasonable doubt, o r even by a preponderance of the evidence. The prosecution must prove h i s g u i l t beyond a reasonable doubt." Defendant contends given Instruction No. 12A, (1) erron- eously placed an affirmative burden on defendant t o prove h i s defense of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and (2) erroneously required t h a t defendant be faced with a specific t h r e a t of death o r s u b s t a n t i a l bodily injury i n the immediate future to be justified i n h i s escape, thus imposing an objective standard rather than a sub- jective standard. Instruction No. 12A stated: "You are instructed that the defense of necessity or justification is available only i f the following conditions existed a t the time of the escape: "(1) The Defendant was faced with a specific threat of death, o r substantial bodily injury i n the immediate future. "(2) There i s no time for a complaint to the authorities o r there exists a history of f u t i l e complaints which make any result from such complaint illusory. ( 3 ) There i s not time or opportunity to resort t o the Courts. "(4) The prisoner immediately reports to the proper authorities when he has attained a position of safety from the immediate threat. "If you find from your consideration of a l l the evidence that a l l these conditions did not e x i s t a t the time of the escape, then you should find that the defense of necessity or justification is not available t o the Defendant." Instruction No. 12A i s derived from a California Court of Appeals decision, People v. Lovercamp, (1974), 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 118 Cal.Rptr. 110, which articulated the elements of the limited defense of necessity as justification for the crime of escape. Lovercamp has been recently construed i n another California Court of Appeals decision, People v. Condley, (1977), 69 Cal. App.3d 999, 138 Cal.Rptr. 515. In Condley the t r i a l court in- structed the jury: "The defendant has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that necessity forced him to escape. Preponderance of the evidence means such evidence a s , when weighed with that opposed t o it, has more convincing force and the greater probability of truth." 138 Cal.Rptr. 519. The defendant in Condley contended such an instruction constituted reversible error because the defense of necessity as justification for the crime of escape is of the type of ' I t * * * defenses asserted by an accused which raise factual issues collateral to the question of the accused's guilt or innocence and do not bear directly on any link in the chain of proof of any element of the crime. Among such defenses are those which raise no challenge to the sufficiency of the prosecution's proof of any element of the crime charged, but for reasons of public policy insulate the accused notwithstanding the question of 1 his guilt. (People v. Tewksbury, supra, 15 Cal.3d 953, 963-964, 127 Cal.Rptr. 135, 142-143, 544 P.2d 1335, 1342-1343.)" 138 Cal.Rptr. 520. The California Court then went on to conclude in Condley: "* * * the Lovercamp defense is founded upon public . policy and provides a justification distinct from the elements required to prove escape. Therefore, the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the defendants had the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence." 138 Cal.Rptr. 522. We hold that under Montana law the defense of justification is an affirmative defense which must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. In the present case, Instruction No. 12 provides that defendant, in asserting the defense of necessity or justifica- tion, is entitled to acquittal if the evidence he presents merely raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Instruction No. 12 goes on to specifically provide defendant "is not obligated to establish this defense beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance of the evidence." The burden of raising a reasonable doubt as to guilt is far less than the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence, which is the standard approved by California. We fail to find defendant's argument in this area persuasive. Defendant also contends Instruction No. 12A erroneously required that defendant be faced with a specific threat of death or substantial bodily injury i n the immediate future in order to be justified i n h i s escape, thus imposing an objective standard rather than a subjective standard. This same issue was addressed by the California Court of Appeals i n Lovercamp and Condley: "Under the limited circumstances described i n Lovercamp, when the defendant's decision t o escape i s objectively the 'only viable and reasonable choice available' w e excuse the offense as being justified under the circumstances. It would be ludicrous to apply a subjective standard t o deter- mine whether the defendant's escape is justified as being the only viable and reasonable choice. These terms thernselbes connote an objective standard. A s noted i n Lovercamp, 'It i s hardly earth shattering to observe that prisons are not Brownie Camps and that within the inmate population are those who, i f given the opportunity, w i l l depart without due process of law.' (s., a t p. 826, 118 Cal.Rptr., a t p. 111) Were we to adopt a subjective standard t o establish the elements of the Lovercamp defense, it would take l i t t l e imagination on the part of any inmate t o claim that the prison milieu i t s e l f creates, subjectively , the requisite elements of the overc cam^ - defense." People v. Condley, 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1011, 138 Cal.Rptr. 515, 521. W e are i n agreement with the objective standard imposed by the "Lovercam2 instruction" i n determining whether a defendant' s escape i s justified. The judgment of the District Court i s affirmed. / Justice. W e Concur: Chief JUS tic: