Title: Hotchkiss v. White

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

191 Kan. 534 (1963)
382 P.2d 325
GUY HOTCHKISS, JR., and MARGUERITE HOTCHKISS, Appellants,
v.
VELMA R. WHITE, IRA H. BUNDY, LOYD BLOSSER and BESS BLOSSER, Appellees.
No. 43,279

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 8, 1963.
George E. Teeple, of Mankato, argued the cause, and N.J. Ward, of Belleville, was with him on the briefs for the appellants.
Charles A. Walsh, of Concordia, argued the cause, and Percy H. Collins, Jr., of Belleville, was with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This is an appeal from the judgment determining the boundary line between adjoining tracts of land purchased by separate parties from the owners of a single tract.
The action was instituted and tried as a declaratory judgment action. The facts alleged in the petition may be summarized.
The defendants, Ira H. Bundy and Velma R. White, were the *535 owners of the following described real estate located in Republic County, Kansas:
On or about November 1, 1951, they agreed to sell six acres of the tract to defendants, Loyd and Bess Blosser, and entered into the following written memorandum:
On December 12, 1951, they executed a deed to defendants Blossers which was recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Republic County, Kansas, February 2, 1953. The deed described the land conveyed as follows:
On November 9, 1954, plaintiffs and Velma R. White and Ira H. Bundy entered into a contract for the purchase and sale of the following described property:
Thereafter, on December 15, 1959, by mutual agreement, defendant vendors made, executed, and delivered to defendants, Loyd and Bess Blosser, a correction deed describing the land as follows:
The deed was filed for record in the Office of the Register of Deeds, Republic County, Kansas, December 16, 1959. It will be noted that the correction deed places the beginning point 71.9 feet further to the north than the original deed.
On December 21, 1959, plaintiffs entered into an extension agreement with defendants Velma R. White and Ira H. Bundy. The original agreement did not fix a definite time for the payment of the final balance due. Seven thousand dollars had been paid in installments. An additional seven thousand dollars was to be paid, but no time was fixed.
The plaintiffs learned of the correction deed for the first time on December 29, 1959.
The petition alleges that an actual controversy exists between the parties growing out of the transactions and sets out seven different claims and contentions. In the interest of some brevity, the contentions are highly summarized.
The plaintiffs contend that the defendants, Blossers, own only the land described in their original deed, and that the Blossers contend that the metes and bounds described in the tract purchased by them begins 71.9 feet north of the southeast corner of the west half of the southwest quarter of the section; that the defendants, by the correction deed, are attempting to unlawfully take land from the plaintiffs which they acquired under their purchase agreement, and that the defendants contend an error was made in the first conveyance to the Blossers and that the correction deed contains the proper description of the land which the Blossers were to acquire; that there was no mistake in the first conveyance but that if there was such a mistake the plaintiffs had no knowledge thereof and were not a party thereto but entered into the purchase agreement in good faith.
The plaintiffs further contend that if a description, as set forth *537 in the correction deed, is not determined to be the description of the property owned by the Blossers, then the plaintiffs have a claim against each of the defendants for damages. The petition sets out additional claims by the plaintiffs as to their rights under the original purchase agreement and the extension agreement with the defendants, Velma R. White and Ira H. Bundy.
The petition requested a determination of "the rights of the parties in and to the real estate in controversy" and that the correct description as to the tracts concerned be fixed.
The defendants, Blossers, answered, claiming that they had been in open and notorious possession of the land described in the correction deed, had made valuable improvements thereon, and that the plaintiffs acquiesced and consented to the possession and ownership asserted by them.
The defendants, Velma R. White and Ira H. Bundy, filed their answer adopting the allegations of the answer of the Blossers and further alleged fraudulent representation on the part of plaintiff, Guy Hotchkiss, in procuring the extension agreement. The plaintiffs replied with a general denial to the answer of the defendants. Velma R. White and Ira H. Bundy.
The Blossers then filed an amended answer which does not require special consideration here. The plaintiffs filed an extended reply thereto. The reply, among other things, alleged that at no time had there been sufficient possession by the defendants, Blossers, of any portion of the land in controversy so as to give them any claim thereto. The reply specifically alleged:
We will not extend this opinion with a discussion as to the controversy over the pleadings, the trial of the issues, or the final disposition of the case in the court below. We pause here to raise a jurisdictional question. It should suffice to say that at this point the parties were in complete disagreement as to the nature of the issues before the court for determination. There was a serious dispute as to whether the conflicting contentions presented questions for determination by a jury as a matter of right.
*538 The first matter for consideration is whether the controversial pleadings present a controversy justiciable under the declaratory judgment act. (G.S. 1949, 60-3127, et seq.) Even though the parties have not raised the question, it is one which the court will raise on its own motion.
In the recent case of Alliance Mutual Casualty Co. v. Bailey, 191 Kan. 192, 380 P.2d 413, it was stated at page 198 of the opinion:
It appears from the record that neither the parties nor the trial judge were certain as to whether the conflicting contentions contained in the pleadings, and the issues to be tried, constituted an action for ejectment, a boundary dispute, estoppel by acquiescence, estoppel because of fraudulent representations, or estoppel because, as concluded by the trial judge, "plaintiffs were in privity with defendants, Velma R. White and Ira H. Bundy, when they contracted to purchase the remaining land owned by said vendors".
Certainly the parties are not in accord as to how their contentions arose and what the controlling contentions are. The abstracts set out some ninety-two pages of conflicting testimony on the question.
In Alliance Mutual Casualty Co. v. Bailey, supra, the court stated further at page 198 of the opinion:
*539 The rule governing the question now before the court was well stated in McAdam v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 186 Kan. 505, 351 P.2d 202, where the court stated:
Two other recent cases have followed the rule that a declaratory judgment action is not proper where the parties fail to agree in the pleadings as to how their contentions arose and what the contentions are. (See, Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 189 Kan. 385, 369 P.2d 350, and State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters v. Gardiner, 189 Kan. 544, 370 P.2d 91.)
The conflicting contentions and the diverse of issues raised by the pleadings compel a conclusion that the action is not one suitable for relief in the form of a declaratory judgment.
The judgment is reversed with instructions to dismiss the action.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.