Title: Hedberg v. Wakamatsu

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12624 
 
LESLIE HEDBERG & another1  vs.  MAY WAKAMATSU. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 7, 2019. - July 11, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Evidence, Hearsay, Unavailable witness, Declaration against 
interest.  Witness, Unavailability.  Practice, Civil, 
Hearsay. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
March 31, 2015. 
 
 
The case was tried before Heidi E. Brieger, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Patrick T. Jones (Richard W. Paterniti also present) for 
the plaintiffs. 
 
Brian H. Sullivan (Rebecca A. Cobbs also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Thomas J. Carey, Jr., for Mark S. Brodin & another. 
 
Elise Sanguinetti, of California, Jeffrey R. White, of 
Connecticut, Amy Brogioli, of Illinois, Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin 
J. Powers, & Elizabeth N. Mulvey for American Association for 
Justice & another. 
                     
1 Peter Hedberg. 
2 
 
 
Chad P. Brouillard & Emily A. Chadbourne for Massachusetts 
Defense Lawyers Association. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In this medical malpractice action for injuries 
arising after surgery, judgment entered for the defendant 
following a jury trial.  Central to the plaintiffs' appeal are 
out-of-court statements made by a medical student who 
participated in the surgery.  The trial judge held that the 
statements could not be entered in evidence as statements of a 
party opponent made by an agent, and on a motion for 
reconsideration also determined that those statements were 
inadmissible as statements against interest by an unavailable 
declarant.  While we conclude that there was no error in the 
judge's decision under our current law of evidence, we take this 
opportunity to adopt as a matter of common law Proposed Mass. R. 
Evid. 804(a)(3) (1980), which would allow a declarant, in a 
civil case, to be deemed unavailable if he or she testifies to a 
3 
 
lack of memory about the subject matter in question.2,3  On this 
record, if the judge had had the benefit of the grounds for 
finding unavailability that we adopt in this opinion, it would 
have been an abuse of discretion for the judge not to have 
determined that the declarant was unavailable and that his 
statements were against his pecuniary interest.  Because that 
testimony is particularly relevant to the cause of the 
                     
 
2 Evidence law in Massachusetts remains uncodified.  In 
1982, we declined to adopt the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of 
Evidence out of concern that such an adoption "would tend to 
restrict the development of common law principles pertaining to 
the admissibility of evidence."  See Announcement Concerning the 
Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence (Dec. 30, 1982).  We 
did, however, invite parties to cite to the proposed rules, and 
have since adopted many of them as a matter of common law.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Sneed, 413 Mass. 387, 396 (1992) (adopting 
Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 803[18]); Ruszcyk v. Secretary of Pub. 
Safety, 401 Mass. 418, 423 (1988) (adopting Proposed Mass. R. 
Evid. 403 and 801[d][2][D]); Commonwealth v. Weichell, 390 Mass. 
62, 71-72 (1983), S.C., 446 Mass. 785 (2006) (adopting Proposed 
Mass. R. Evid. 801[d][1][C]). 
 
 
3 We decline to resolve here whether unavailability may be 
established in criminal cases due to a witness's lack of memory.  
We do note that in a criminal matter, any evidence sought to be 
admitted through this hearsay exception must also satisfy a 
defendant's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights and be corroborated by circumstances 
clearly indicating the trustworthiness of the statement.  See 
Commonwealth v. Caruso, 476 Mass. 275, 293-295, 295 n.15 (2017).  
See also Commonwealth v. Lao, 450 Mass. 215, 222-223 (2007), 
S.C., 460 Mass. 12 (2011) (we have previously determined that 
protections under art. 12 are "coextensive with the guarantees 
of the Sixth Amendment"); Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 447 Mass. 
56, 57 n.1 (2006). 
 
4 
 
defendant's injuries, and could be considered relevant to the 
question of duty of care, its absence is grounds for a new 
trial.  As we have determined that the statements should have 
been admitted in evidence as statements against interest by an 
unavailable witness, we need not determine whether they also 
could have been admitted as statements by the agent of a party 
opponent.  The jury's verdict is vacated, and the case is 
remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial consistent with 
this opinion.4 
 
Background.  On May 16, 2012, the plaintiff Leslie Hedberg5 
underwent a vaginal hysterectomy performed by the defendant.  
The defendant was assisted by a third-year resident and a third-
year medical student, Davis Stephen.6  The surgery required that 
Leslie be in the dorsal lithotomy position, lying on her back 
with her legs in stirrups, her hips and knees flexed, and her 
thighs apart.  The surgery lasted approximately three hours and 
forty-five minutes, and afterward Leslie almost immediately 
complained of pain, numbness, and tingling in her left leg and 
                     
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Mark S. 
Brodin and Nickolas I. Merrill, the American Association for 
Justice and the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Lawyers, and the 
Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association. 
 
 
5 Because the plaintiffs share a last name, we refer to 
Leslie Hedberg by her first name. 
 
 
6 Davis Stephen has since become a doctor. 
5 
 
foot.  After a neurology consultation, her symptoms were deemed 
the likely result of injury to her sciatic nerve "either [by] 
stretching (positional) or possibly due to surgical stitching." 
 
Leslie submitted an affidavit that relayed a conversation 
she had with Stephen on May 17, 2012, the day after the surgery.  
She averred:  "After I told him that I had a horrible night in 
the hospital with the leg pain, he said 'I am awfully sorry, we 
had a hard time positioning that leg.'  He said he was holding 
retractors and may have been leaning against my leg.  He then 
said, 'I am so sorry Mrs. Hedberg, I am so sorry.'"  Testifying 
at trial as an offer of proof, Leslie reiterated these 
statements and added that, as he was leaving, Stephen said to 
her, "I'll pray for you." 
Stephen testified by deposition in 2017 that he did not 
remember the surgery or Leslie's postsurgery care other than a 
vague memory of discussing whether she required a neurology 
consultation with the resident who participated in the surgery.  
He further noted that he did not recall any discussion with 
Leslie regarding the positioning of her leg or whether he had 
leaned on it during surgery. 
Before trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine 
seeking to exclude Leslie's testimony regarding Stephen's 
statements.  Recognizing that the question of what constitutes a 
statement of an opposing party's agent was a complicated one, 
6 
 
the judge excluded Stephen's statements as inadmissible hearsay 
and excluded any questions based on those statements that were 
asked during Stephen's deposition.  The judge also denied the 
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, in which the plaintiffs 
reiterated their agency argument and further argued that 
Stephen's comments were admissible as statements against 
interest.  Following judgment in favor of the defendant, the 
plaintiffs appealed, and we transferred the case to this court 
on our own motion. 
Discussion.  On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that Stephen's 
statements should have entered in evidence through Leslie's 
testimony either (1) as an exemption to the rule against hearsay 
made by an opponent party's agent under Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(2)(D) (2019); or (2) as statements against interest by 
an unavailable declarant under Mass. G. Evid. § 804(b)(3).  We 
now adopt as a matter of common law, in civil cases, Proposed 
Mass. R. Evid. 804(a)(3), which will allow a declarant to be 
deemed unavailable if he or she testifies to a lack of memory 
about the subject matter in question.  We conclude that it is 
clear from this record that it would have been an abuse of the 
judge's discretion to exclude the statements at issue had a lack 
of memory been adopted as a means of establishing unavailability 
in Massachusetts.  Because that testimony relates directly to 
the ultimate cause of Leslie's injuries, and could also be 
7 
 
relevant to a duty of care analysis, we determine that the 
plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial with the benefit of that 
testimony.  The question whether the statements should have been 
admitted as statements by the agent of a party opponent, 
therefore, need not be addressed, as we have determined that the 
statements were otherwise admissible. 
Certain exceptions to the rule against hearsay are 
conditioned upon the declarant being unavailable to testify.  
See Mass. G. Evid. § 804(a).  Under the Federal rules of 
evidence, a declarant is unavailable if the declarant "(1) is 
exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement because the court rules that a privilege 
applies; (2) refuses to testify about the subject matter despite 
a court order to do so; (3) testifies to not remembering the 
subject matter; (4) cannot be present or testify at the trial or 
hearing because of death or a then-existing infirmity, physical 
illness, or mental illness; or (5) is absent from the trial or 
hearing and the statement's proponent has not been able, by 
process or other reasonable means, to procure" the defendant's 
attendance (emphasis added).  Fed. R. Evid. 804(a).  These 
exceptions indicate a preference for live testimony, but 
recognize that, in certain circumstances, "hearsay, if of the 
specified quality, is preferred over complete loss of the 
evidence of the declarant."  Advisory Committee's Note to Fed. 
8 
 
R. Evid. 804(b).  As it pertains to lack of memory as a grounds 
for establishing unavailability, concern about whether that lack 
of memory is legitimate is minimized by the fact that the 
declarant must testify to a lack of memory, "which clearly 
contemplates his production and subjection to cross-examination" 
and allows a judge, as a preliminary question of fact upon which 
admissibility depends, the opportunity to credit or discredit 
the declarant's asserted lack of memory.  Advisory Committee's 
Note to Fed. R. Evid. 804(a).  See P.C. Giannelli, Understanding 
Evidence 505 (5th ed. 2018) (Giannelli); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 104(a). 
Under current Massachusetts law, "[a] declarant is 
considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant (1) 
is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement because the court rules that a privilege 
applies; . . . (4) cannot be present or testify at the trial or 
hearing because of death or a then-existing infirmity, physical 
illness, or mental illness; or (5) is absent from the trial or 
hearing and the statement's proponent has not been able to 
procure the declarant's attendance by process or other 
reasonable means."  Mass. G. Evid. § 804(a)(1), (4), (5).  See 
Commonwealth v. Bray, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 751, 758 (1985).  
Because we have never previously indicated a reason why lack of 
memory should not establish unavailability, and see no reason 
9 
 
why it should not, we now decide to adopt, in civil cases, 
Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 804(a)(3).  In doing so, we follow an 
overwhelming majority of other States in recognizing a 
declarant's lack of memory as a means to establish 
unavailability.7 
In an unavailability analysis, "[t]he crucial factor 
[should] not [be] the unavailability of the witness but rather 
the unavailability of his testimony."  Walden v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 654 F.2d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 1981).  The exceptions to the 
rule against hearsay are all grounded in "a circumstantial 
probability of trustworthiness, and a necessity for the 
evidence."  Giannelli, supra at 461 n.3, quoting 5 Wigmore, 
Evidence § 1420, at 251 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (Wigmore).  That 
                     
 
7 See Fla. Stat. § 90.804(1)(c); Ga. Code Ann. § 24-8-
804(a)(3); La. Code Evid. Ann. art. 804(a)(3); Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§ 27-804(1)(c); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2804.A.3; Or. Rev. Stat. 
§ 40.465(1)(c); S.D. Codified Laws § 19-19-804(a)(3); Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.04(1)(c); Ala. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); Alaska R. Evid. 
804(a)(3); Ariz. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); Ark. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); 
Colo. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); Del. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); Haw. R. Evid. 
804(a)(3); Idaho R. Evid. 804(a)(3); Ill. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); 
Ind. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); Iowa R. Evid. 5.804(a)(3); Ky. R. Evid. 
804(a)(3); Me. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); Md. Rule 5-804(a)(3); Mich. 
R. Evid. 804(a)(3); Minn. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); Miss. R. Evid. 
804(a)(3); Mont. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); N.H. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); 
N.J. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); N.M. R. Evid. 11-804.A(3); N.C. R. 
Evid. 804(a)(3); N.D. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); Ohio R. Evid. 
804(A)(3); Pa. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); R.I. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); S.C. 
R. Evid. 804(a)(3); Tenn. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); Tex. R. Evid. 
804(a)(3); Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(3); Vt. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); 
Wash. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); W. Va. R. Evid. 804(a)(3); Wyo. R. 
Evid. 804(a)(3). 
10 
 
trustworthiness serves to mitigate the lack of cross-
examination:  "under certain circumstances the probability of 
accuracy and trustworthiness of a statement is practically 
sufficient, if not quite equivalent to that of statements tested 
in the conventional manner."  Giannelli, supra, quoting Wigmore, 
supra at 253.  With that in mind, we hold that, in civil cases, 
where a declarant testifies to a lack of memory of the subject 
matter in question and the judge, as a preliminary question of 
fact upon which admissibility depends, credits the declarant's 
lack of memory, the declarant is unavailable for the purposes of 
the recognized exceptions to the rule against hearsay under 
Mass. G. Evid. § 804(b).  See 2 McCormick on Evidence § 253 
(K.S. Broun ed., 7th ed. 2016). 
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that it is clear 
that Stephen remembers very little concerning Leslie's surgery 
or postoperative care, including the statements at issue.  As he 
was unavailable for purposes of our newly announced evidentiary 
law, we consider whether the statements fall under one of the 
hearsay exceptions premised on a declarant being unavailable.  
We conclude that they do. 
In Commonwealth v. Carr, 373 Mass. 617, 623-624 (1977), we 
adopted Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which 
recognizes a statement against a declarant's interest as an 
exception to the rule against hearsay so long as the declarant 
11 
 
is unavailable and that the statement is against his interest in 
such a way "that a reasonable [person] in his position would not 
have made the statement unless he believed it to be true."8  This 
includes statements against one's pecuniary interest.  "A 
statement that jeopardizes the declarant's employment can be 
sufficient to trigger [Fed. R. Evid.] 803's pecuniary interest 
exception, provided it is so contrary to that interest that a 
reasonable person would not have made it unless it were true."  
United States v. Slatten, 865 F.3d 767, 825 (D.C. Cir. 2017), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1990 (2018).  "Pecuniary interests are 
those relating to a person's financial situation in some 
manner."  Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Kuhl, 296 Md. 446, 457 
(1983).  In this instance, Stephen was a third-year medical 
student with a burgeoning career and an unshaped reputation in 
the medical profession.  His admission to having mistakenly 
leaned on a patient's leg during a surgery in such a manner that 
may have left her with a permanent injury is against his 
pecuniary interest, as it reflects negatively on his ability and 
judgment as a physician.  A statement that leaves a negative 
impact on one's professional reputation and competence, we 
                     
 
8 In a criminal matter, a statement against penal interest 
that tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability and is 
offered to exculpate the defendant or is offered by the 
Commonwealth to inculpate the defendant must be accompanied by 
corroborating circumstances indicating the trustworthiness of 
the statement.  Mass. G. Evid. § 804(b)(3). 
12 
 
conclude, is sufficiently against one's pecuniary interest as to 
allow the statement to be admitted.  See Carr, supra; Slatten, 
supra. 
Where evidence is erroneously excluded, a new trial is 
warranted "unless, on the record, the appellate court can say 
with substantial confidence that the error would not have made a 
material difference."  DeJesus v. Yogel, 404 Mass. 44, 49 
(1989).  We have no such confidence in this case.  The 
statements in question go directly to the cause of Leslie's 
injuries, and could be relevant to a question of the defendant's 
duty of care, and we cannot confidently determine what impact it 
may have had on the jury's ultimate verdict.  Because we have 
determined that it would have been an abuse of discretion had 
the judge, with the benefit of this decision, excluded Stephen's 
statements, and we lack substantial confidence that the absence 
of those statements would not have made a material difference, 
we vacate the jury's verdict and remand this case to the 
Superior Court for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.