Title: Vermont v. Chaplin

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Chaplin (2010-477)
 
2012 VT 6
 
[Filed 31-Jan-2012]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2012 VT 6
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2010-477
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2011
 
State of Vermont
}
APPEALED FROM:
 
}
 
 
}
 
     v.
}
Superior Court, Chittenden Unit,
  
 
}
Criminal Division
 
}
 
Richard C. Chaplin
}
DOCKET NO. 3864-10-09
  Cncr
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge: Linda Levitt
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
In this case, a search warrant was issued to search the home of
defendant, and the search turned up incriminating evidence.  In response
to a motion to suppress, however, the superior court determined that the
warrant was not supported by an affidavit showing probable cause to believe
that defendant had committed a crime under the standards contained in V.R.Cr.P.
41(c).  We agree and affirm.   
¶ 2.            
In the early morning hours of August 10, 2009, Bob's Auto in Essex was
burglarized.  A number of items were stolen, including over one hundred
Vermont vehicle inspection stickers, a speaker, and numerous SnapOn brand
sockets and wrenches.  In connection with this crime, an Essex police
detective (the detective) applied for a warrant to search defendant's
home.  
¶ 3.            
The detective submitted a twelve-paragraph affidavit of probable cause
in support of his application, which relied on evidence from a surveillance
video, the statements of a named informant, and the statements of two
confidential informants.  The surveillance video came from a convenience
store at the location of the burglary.  According to the affidavit, the
surveillance video showed "a dark colored minivan, possibly blue or green in
color," which drove past the camera at 3:13 a.m. during the morning of the
burglary.  The affidavit noted that the tire tracks and the terrain
suggested that "the perpetrator's vehicle may have sustained minor front end
damage to the undercarriage." 
¶ 4.            
On August 24, 2009, pursuant to a search warrant, two inspection
stickers were found in the residence of an individual who subsequently became
the named informant in this case.  The recovered inspection stickers were
identified as two of those that had been stolen from Bob's Auto.  As described
in the affidavit, the named informant admitted to selling inspection stickers
but denied participating in the burglary.  In a sworn interview, she told
the detective that he should "look at the person who provided the inspection
stickers to her source."  She stated that she did not know this person's
name, but she offered an extensive description: an older, overweight male, who
is balding with dark hair and a moustache, has children, lives with his
girlfriend in an apartment behind Essex High School, drives a maroon minivan,
has about five DWIs, was in court around August 17, and is the cousin of
someone else identified by name.  The detective asked the named informant
to find out the name of the individual she described, and they exchanged telephone
numbers for future contact.  That evening, the detective received a
voicemail from the named informant's telephone number.  The caller stated
that she had a tip regarding the burglary in Essex and went on to state that it
was Ricki Chapman, who lives behind the high school and drives a maroon van
with "Rick and Jess" on the back plate.  
¶ 5.            
The probable cause affidavit went on to state that the named informant
had told a paid confidential informant (identified as "CS 63") that "Ricki has
the stolen speaker in his car and has the tools in his house."  A second
paid informant (identified as "CS 60") conveyed to the detective that "Ricki
Chaplin has a set of SnapOn tools for sale and that these tools were recently seen
in his apartment."  The affidavit further conveyed that Chaplin had
"indicated to the CS 60 that he had access to inspection stickers."  The
affidavit stated, without elaboration, that each informant "ha[d] provided
information in the past that has been corroborated by other investigative
means."  
¶ 6.            
Finally, the detective's affidavit stated that he had confirmed that
Richard Chaplin lived with his girlfriend Jessica in an apartment at 38 Thasha
Lane, which runs behind the high school in Essex.  The detective had
checked the residence and observed "a maroon/purple Dodge Caravan bearing VT
REG ETL147 parked in front of 38 Thasha Lane."  This vehicle was
registered to defendant and his girlfriend.  The affidavit stated, "The
shape, color and size of Chaplin's van appears [sic] to match that of the van
captured on video at the scene of the burglary."  The detective concluded
that stolen property might be found at the residence or in the vehicle and that
photographs of the vehicle's undercarriage might assist in comparing it to the
vehicle in the surveillance video. 
¶ 7.            
On the basis of this affidavit, a judicial officer issued the warrant on
August 28, 2009.  This warrant was executed four days later, on September
1.  Following defendant's arrest on charges of burglary under 13 V.S.A.
§ 1201(a), the Chittenden Superior Court, Criminal Division, granted a
motion to suppress the evidence gathered pursuant to the warrant, concluding
that the detective's affidavit did not provide sufficient information to
support a finding of probable cause.  Consequently, the court dismissed
the charges against defendant for lack of a prima facie case.  The State
of Vermont appeals from this decision. 
¶ 8.            
A judicial officer properly issues a warrant where "there is probable
cause to believe that the grounds for the application exist based upon an
affidavit."  V.R.Cr.P. 41(c)(1); see also State v. Platt, 154 Vt.
179, 185, 574 A.2d 789, 793 (1990) ("The key inquiry in determining whether probable
cause exists is whether the information provided in the affidavit reveals
circumstances from which a person of reasonable caution would conclude that a
crime has been committed and that evidence of the crime will be found in the
place to be searched.").  In reviewing a motion to suppress evidence that
was gathered pursuant to a search warrant, the inquiry is limited to whether
the application for the warrant contained sufficient information to establish
probable cause.  State v. McManis, 2010 VT 63, ¶ 6, 188 Vt. 187, 5 A.3d 890 ("In evaluating whether probable cause existed at the time the court
issued the warrant, we examine the information available to the court at that
time . . . ."); see also Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n.1 (1964) ("It is elementary that in passing on the validity of a
warrant, the reviewing court may consider only information brought to the
magistrate's attention.").  Our review is therefore limited to the "four
corners" of the warrant application.  See McManis, 2010 VT 63,
¶ 6 (" When determining whether an affidavit establishes probable
cause, we look only to the four corners of the affidavit; information known to
the officer but not conveyed to the magistrate is irrelevant.' " (quoting United
States v. Brooks, 594 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2010))).  Thus, the
essential question here is whether the information provided in the detective's
affidavit established probable cause to believe that evidence of the burglary
would be found at defendant's residence.[1] 

¶ 9.            
In reviewing a motion to suppress, we are deferential to the factual
determinations and inferences made in the initial determination of probable
cause, but we review conclusions of law without deference.  State v.
Bauder, 2007 VT 16, ¶ 9, 181 Vt. 392, 924 A.2d 38.  Where, as here,
the motion is to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant, the initial
finding of probable cause by a judicial officer is given "great
deference."  See State v. Maguire, 146 Vt. 49, 53, 498 A.2d 1028,
1030 (1985) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)). 
This deference to the judgment of an issuing officer encourages the use of
warrants.  See State v. Ballou, 148 Vt. 427, 434, 535 A.2d 1280,
1284 (1987) ("We are cautioned against a grudging or negative attitude . . .
toward warrants' because that attitude will encourage warrantless searches."
(quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965))). Even
under this heightened deference with regard to factual determinations and
inferences drawn therefrom, however, the ultimate question of whether the
factual claims in an affidavit are sufficient to amount to probable cause is
still a matter of law appropriate for fresh appellate review.  See Spinelli
v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969).  Our review is thus "to
ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause existed."  State v. Defranceaux, 170 Vt. 561, 562, 743 A.2d 1074, 1075 (1999) (mem.).
¶ 10.        
The central evidence in the affidavit is that provided by the named
informant to the detective.  According to Vermont Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41(c)(1), a judicial officer's determination that probable cause
exists may be based on hearsay "in whole or in part, provided there is a
substantial basis for believing the source of the hearsay is credible and for
believing that there is a factual basis for the information furnished." 
This rule codifies the two-pronged test from Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 
at 114-15, and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.  at 415-16.[2]  See Reporter's Notes, V.R.Cr.P.
41(c).  The two-pronged test ensures that a judicial officer can assess
the evidence provided by knowing its basis and that there is a particular
reason to view this hearsay evidence as reliable. See Ballou, 148 Vt. at
434, 535 A.2d  at 1284 ("[T]he first prong requires that the affidavit transmit
the factual basis for any conclusions drawn by the informant so that the
judicial officer can perform an independent analysis of the facts and
conclusions.  The second prong requires that facts be presented to the
judicial officer that show either the informant is inherently credible or that
the information from the informant is reliable on this occasion." (citations
omitted)).  We stress that the above requirements of Criminal Rule
41(c)(1) apply to evidence from any informant, whether or not named. 
¶ 11.        
We conclude that, with regard to the statements of the named informant,
the affidavit of probable cause fails both prongs of the test.  First, the
affidavit does not establish the factual basis for the named informant's
information.  As we explained in State v. Barrett, 132 Vt. 369,
373, 320 A.2d 621, 624-25 (1974):
[T]he
basis of knowledge' test . . . is not concerned with the integrity or veracity
of the informant, but with the actual source of the information from which the
magistrate is to be drawing his conclusion as to probable cause. Is it the
direct sensory perception of the informer, or is he merely repeating someone
else's conclusion? To pass muster, the informant must transmit the factual
basis for the conclusions, so that the magistrate may make his own direct
analysis.
Although nothing in the affidavit describes
the source of her information, the detail of the named informant's description
may suggest some direct observation on her part.  Even if we are willing
to draw an inference that the named informant has personally observed Richard
Chaplin from the detailed nature of her physical description and that the
detail of her description itself establishes a factual basis for her
identification of Richard Chaplin, these inferences do not establish a factual
basis for her identification of Richard Chaplin as someone involved in the
burglary.  Although the named informant may have had direct
acquaintance with Chaplin's appearance and household, this information is not
the basis for the search.  Cf. State v. Robinson, 2009 VT 1,
¶¶ 16-19, 185 Vt. 232, 969 A.2d 127 (concluding that probable cause was not
established by informant's correct description of the time, location, and
vehicle that the defendant would be driving because these were "mere innocent
details"); Goldberg, 2005 VT 41, ¶ 14 (explaining that corroborating
"peripheral details" of an informant's story "did nothing to confirm the
allegations of criminal conduct").  The incriminating assertionthat
Chaplin participated in the burglarycontained nothing to suggest that it was
anything "more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or
an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation."  Spinelli,
393 U.S.  at 416.  This failure to establish the factual basis for the
informant's claim is the most significant of many flaws in the warrant
application.  Without an explanation of its factual basis, the informant's
evidence fails the first prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test and
therefore cannot establish probable cause.
¶ 12.        
Additionally, although some indicia of reliability are
presentparticularly, the fact that the named informant was named in the
affidavit and provided a sworn statementthe affidavit leaves doubts about
whether her statements were reliable.  Reliability of particular hearsay
statements is generally established either "if the informant acted against
penal interest, or if police corroborated the information to the point where
it would be reasonable for them to rely on it as accurate.' "  Goldberg,
2005 VT 41, ¶ 11 (quoting State v. Morris, 165 Vt. 111, 130, 680 A.2d 90, 102-03 (1996)).  Although the named informant acted against her penal
interest in admitting that she was selling inspection stickers, her statement
that Chaplin committed the burglary was certainly not against her penal interests
but instead was intended to show that she did not commit the burglary. 
Cf. Ballou, 148 Vt. at 435 n.3, 535 A.2d  at 1284 n.3 (cautioning against
misuse of the admission against penal interest exception).  Similarly,
although the affidavit describes some independent corroboration of a few
aspects of the named informant's statementsChaplin's address, residence with
his girlfriend, and ownership of a minivanthere were many reasons for
pause.  The license plate did not match that described by the informant,
and significantly, the color of the minivan, maroon or purple, did not match
the "possibly blue or green" color seen in the surveillance video.  There
was ample possibility for the police to confirm other aspects of the
informant's statements, but the affidavit describes no such efforts.  Cf. Goldberg,
2005 VT 41, ¶ 14, 178 Vt. 96, 872 A.2d 378 (noting that police's only attempt
at corroboration was driving by the residence and performing a DMV check).
¶ 13.        
The State relies heavily on State v. Arrington, 2010 VT 87, 188
Vt. 460, 8 A.3d 483, and we agree it is helpful to its position even though it
involves a warrantless arrest.  It does not hold, however, that the fact
that the informant is named to the court and the defendant, and gives an affidavit
under the penalty of perjury, is determinative irrespective of other
factors.  See id. ¶¶ 19-20 (informant's name and affidavit are
factors showing reliability).  The State's case is significantly weaker
than that in Arrington because of the absence of other factors important
in that decision.  For example, the informant in Arrington
described accurately the make and color of the defendant's vehicle and the
route, and time of arrival, of the defendant to sell her drugs.  Id.
¶ 17.  There is nothing similar here. 
Additionally, the informant in Arrington, a drug dealer, was identifying
the direct seller to her, and her story of their interaction was consistent
with a common pattern and with her behavior.  Id. ¶ 15.  The
situation is markedly different here. 
¶ 14.        
The statements of the confidential informants also do not satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli
test.  The only information that CS 63 provided was other statements made
by the named informant.  While this evidence might slightly support the
credibility of the named informant by showing that she made similar statements
to others and not just to the detective, it does not establish the basis for
the named informant's statements, which is the crucially missing link.  
¶ 15.        
The information from CS 60 is also problematic.  The factual basis
for CS 60's statement that Chaplin had a set of SnapOn brand tools for sale in
his apartment was not explained.  In fact, the affidavit obfuscates the
basis for this information by use of the passive voice: "these tools were
recently seen."  The second piece of information, however, does describe
something of a first-hand basis.  According to CS 60, Chaplin "indicated"
to CS 60 that he had "access to" inspection stickers.  The difficulty with
this statement is that it is too vague to allow any meaningful analysis of its
content.  See Ballou, 148 Vt. at 434, 535 A.2d  at 1284 (information
must be such that "the judicial officer can perform an independent analysis of
the facts and conclusions"); Barrett, 132 Vt. at 373, 320 A.2d  at 625
(information must be such that "the magistrate may make his own direct
analysis").  
¶ 16.        
Moreover, the affidavit's bare statements that CS 63 and CS 60 had provided
information in the past that had been corroborated by other means are not
sufficient to establish inherent credibility.  We have twice recently
rejected this kind of general language.  In Robinson, we found
inadequate the affiant's statements that the informant "ha[d] provided . . .
reliable and credible information in the past" and that he had "been able to
verify this [informant's] previous information and found it creditable." 
2009 VT 1, ¶ 4.  In McManis, we found lacking a deputy sheriff's
statement that "CI also provided [him] with other information in regards to the
distribution of illegal drug[s], which [he] was able to confirm."  2010 VT
63, ¶ 11.  In this case, the detective's affidavit actually provided even
less detail than either of these examples.  There was no description of
the content of past information provided, how it was corroborated, or how it
proved useful.  We now reaffirm that "[t]he mere statement that the
informant had in the past provided unspecified, albeit purportedly creditable,'
accurate,' or reliable' information . . . does not establish the informant's
inherent credibility." Robinson, 2009 VT 1, ¶ 14.[3]
¶ 17.        
At certain points, the State concedes that the Aguilar-Spinelli
test was not met, but it contends that hearsay that could not itself establish
probable cause can nevertheless elevate suspicions based on personal
observations to the level of probable cause.  There is some support for
this contention.  See Spinelli, 393 U.S.  at 418 ("We conclude,
then, that in the present case the informant's tip . . . was not sufficient to
provide the basis for a finding of probable cause. This is not to say that the
tip was so insubstantial that it could not properly have counted in the magistrate's
determination. Rather, it needed some further support."); State v. Delmonaco,
481 A.2d 40, 45 (Conn. 1984) ("Even though the suspicions engendered by the
informant's report' may be insufficient to justify issuance of a warrant
independently, where the affiants' own observations are very incriminating, the
informant's report may bridge the gap and ripen into a judgment' of probable
cause." (quoting Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 418)); 2 W. LaFave, Search &
Seizure § 3.3(f), at 194 (4th ed. 2010) ("Yet another type of case is that in
which it cannot quite be said that probable cause is established without
necessary resort to the hearsay,' but where this other information standing
alone is nonetheless highly suspicious. May it be said in such a case that the
informant's story, albeit lacking a showing of the basis of knowledge, may be
taken into account for the purpose of supplying the little bit more' which is
needed to elevate this other information up to the level of probable cause? . .
. [T]he answer is unquestionably yes.").  The idea is that even hearsay
that itself fails to establish probable cause under the Aguilar-Spinelli
test should still be considered alongside other nonhearsay evidence when
viewing the affidavit as a whole.  According to this argument, then, the
hearsay evidence from the named informant and CS 60 could be considered
alongside the other aspects of the affidavit.  In this way, the State
argues, the surveillance video and the detective's personal observations of
Chaplin's minivan supported a nonhearsay basis for suspicion, and the hearsay
evidence could elevate this suspicion to probable cause.  
¶ 18.        
Even assuming that the State is correct that sometimes hearsay that is
otherwise inadequate under the Aguilar-Spinelli test can
nonetheless be used to bolster nonhearsay-based suspicions, this is not such a
case.  In this case, the detective did not hold an independently supported
suspicion of the defendant and then find that suspicion corroborated by hearsay
evidence.  The only nonhearsay basis for suspicion was the fact that
Chaplin owned a minivan, the color of which is not described as matching that
observed in the surveillance video.  Such an innocuous fact, which would
have drawn no attention independent of the hearsay, cannot then be used to
bootstrap hearsay statements over the Aguilar-Spinelli test
threshold.  
¶ 19.        
One noteworthy omission in this case was the lack of corroboration of
many of the details of the informant's identification.  The informant
described the name, gender, age, weight, hair color, hair loss, facial hair,
children, living arrangement, automobile, license plate, criminal history,
relative, and recent appearance in court of the perpetrator.  Virtually
all of this information was easy to verify, and the detective verified
virtually none of it.  Some of the limited information he attempted to
verify was wrongthe perpetrator's name and license plate. This is hardly a
case where the nonhearsay information pulls the hearsay information over the
line.
¶ 20.        
We are also concerned that the State asks us to do precisely what it
cautions against.  We are reminded that "[a]ffidavits must be viewed in a
common sense manner and not be subjected to hypertechnical scrutiny," Ballou,
148 Vt. at 434, 535 A.2d  at 1284, and that the determination of probable cause
should be "based upon a common-sense reading of the entire affidavit," Spinelli,
393 U.S.  at 415.  A common-sense reading of the detective's affidavit
shows the statements of the named informant to be the linchpin.  To say
that her statements merely corroborated the detective's personal observations
would be to put matters backwards.  The privacy protections afforded by
the Aguilar-Spinelli testthe assurance that warrants shall not
be issued on the basis of unsubstantiated rumor or reputationare not to be
subverted in this way.  Regardless of whether independently insufficient
hearsay might be used to lend credibility to an otherwise vulnerable
investigation, an independently insufficient investigation cannot be used to
lend credibility to otherwise vulnerable hearsay.
Affirmed.
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber, Chief
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Denise R. Johnson,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 

[1]  The affidavit of probable cause for
arrest includes some pieces of information that were not present in the
affidavit of probable cause included in the search warrant application. 
Our review is limited to what was included in the affidavit upon which the
search warrant was issued.
[2]  "Although the Supreme Court has since
abandoned this standard and held that the United States Constitution requires a
totality of the circumstances' approach to probable cause determinations, Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983), we have continued to apply the
two-pronged test to cases decided under the Vermont Constitution."  State
v. Goldberg, 2005 VT 41, ¶ 9, 178 Vt. 96, 872 A.2d 378.
[3]  We additionally reject another argument
offered by the State concerning the credibility of the confidential informants
for Aguilar-Spinelli purposes.  The State contends that the
confidential informants should be considered "named informants" because their
identity is known to the police.  The State's support for this proposition
is based on a misreading of Arrington, 2010 VT 87, ¶¶ 19-20.  In Arrington,
the declarant made a sworn statement, and her identity was available to the
defendant.  As we explained there, "the informant fully exposed herself
and her information to scrutiny, she gave the basis of her information, she
exposed herself to retaliation, and she assumed the obligation of her
oath."  Id. ¶ 20.  That is not normally the case with
confidential informants, like those involved in this case.  Indeed, a
confidential informantas opposed to an anonymous tipsteris by definition
known to the police.  As Arrington explained, confidential
informants not named by the police are precisely the type of source at which
the Aguilar-Spinelli test is directed.  Id.