Title: BECKER v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BECKER v. STATE2002 WY 12653 P.3d 94Case Number: 01-48, 01-49, 01-50Decided: 08/27/2002
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

GUY 
WAYNE BECKER,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Mary 
Guthrie, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Guthrie.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; T. Alan Elrod, Assistant 
Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Crystal 
S. Swanson, Student Intern.  
Argument by Ms. Swanson.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Guy Wayne Becker 
(Becker) pleaded nolo contendere to four counts of second-degree sexual assault 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2001) and one count 
of third-degree sexual assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  On appeal, 
Becker claims that he was mentally ill when he entered the pleas and that his 
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to have him evaluated 
by a mental health professional, permitting him to enter his pleas in the first 
instance and then not attempting to have the pleas withdrawn prior to 
sentencing.  We find that Becker was 
provided with effective assistance of counsel and affirm.

 

ISSUES

[¶2]      Becker sets forth 
the following statement of the issues:

Whether 
appellant Guy Becker was denied effective assistance of counsel 
because:

A.     His 
attorney did not have his mental condition evaluated.

B.     His 
attorney permitted him to plead nolo contendere only hours after he had been 
released from the hospital because of a drug overdose.

C.    His 
attorney did not move to have his pleas withdrawn prior to 
sentencing.

 

The 
State responds with a statement of the issues from its 
perspective:

I.                     
Did 
appellant receive effective assistance of counsel when the record directly 
contradicts his claims that his counsel failed to pursue a motion to suspend 
proceedings and for a mental evaluation of appellant?

II.                   
Did 
appellant receive effective assistance of counsel when he knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily entered his pleas of nolo 
contendere?

III.                  
Did 
appellant receive effective assistance of counsel when there was no fair and 
just reason for withdrawal of his nolo contendere pleas before 
sentencing?

 

BACKGROUND

[¶3]      In case number 
01-50, Becker was charged with four counts of second-degree sexual assault in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(v).  The charges were based on allegations 
that Becker had inflicted sexual intrusion on his granddaughter over a period of 
years when the victim was between the ages of four and seven.  A three-day trial was held between March 
14 and March 16, 2000.  The jury was 
unable to reach a verdict, and the district court declared a mistrial.  Subsequently, a new trial was scheduled 
for August of 2000.

 

[¶4]      While awaiting 
retrial, Becker was free on an appearance bond. During the interregnum between 
the mistrial and the new trial, Becker engaged in sexual activity with two other 
minors that would form the basis of three additional charges.  Accordingly, a bench warrant for his 
arrest was issued on August 17, 2000, and Becker taken into custody that 
afternoon.

 

[¶5]      The next morning, 
August 18, 2000, Becker and his counsel appeared before the district court for a 
scheduled hearing.  Initially, the 
hearing had been scheduled for the entry of a guilty plea.  However, Becker's counsel informed the 
court that after his arrest the night before, there was concern that Becker may 
have overdosed on Valium in an apparent suicide attempt.  Becker was taken to the hospital, where 
he was forced to regurgitate the contents of his stomach.  Accordingly, counsel expressed concern 
about Becker's competency to proceed with either trial or a plea.  Counsel requested a continuance of the 
trial scheduled for August 21 and filed a motion to suspend the proceedings 
pending a mental health evaluation of Becker.  The district court responded by noting 
that more information was needed about whether or not Becker had, in fact, 
attempted suicide and recessed the hearing to allow the parties to 
investigate.

 

[¶6]      Meanwhile, the 
State filed two additional Informations against Becker on the same day.  The first, case number 01-48, charged 
Becker with two counts of second-degree sexual assault for inflicting sexual 
intrusion on a victim who was less than twelve years old.  The second, case number 01-49, charged 
Becker with one count of third-degree sexual assault for inflicting sexual 
contact on a minor victim.  All 
three charges arose out of incidents occurring after the 
mistrial.

 

[¶7]      The district 
court resumed the hearing late in the afternoon on August 18, 2000.  No further mention of Becker's alleged 
suicide attempt, his mental capacity, or the motion to suspend the proceedings 
for an evaluation was made at this hearing.  Instead, Becker, appearing with his 
counsel, and the State presented a plea agreement to the court.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, Becker 
agreed to plead no contest to: (1) the first two counts of second-degree sexual 
assault in the case involving his granddaughter in case number 01-50; (2) the 
two counts of second-degree sexual assault in the first Information filed on 
August 18 in case number 01-48; and (3) the one count of sexual assault in the 
third-degree in the second Information filed on August 18 in case number 
01-49.  In exchange, the State 
agreed to recommend the sentences for charges within each case be concurrent to 
each other but would not offer any recommendation on whether the charges in the 
various cases should run consecutively or concurrently to one 
another.

 

[¶8]      After receiving 
the details of the plea agreement, the court proceeded to explain them to 
Becker, who acknowledged that he understood the terms.  The court informed Becker of the rights 
he would be giving up if he pleaded nolo contendere and the potential sentences 
he faced under the charges.  Becker 
stated that he was not under the influence of any substance or disability that 
would prevent him from understanding the proceedings.  Becker then proceeded to plead no 
contest to four counts of second-degree sexual assault and one count of 
third-degree sexual assault.  The 
State provided a factual basis for each of the charges to which Becker 
pleaded.  The district court then 
questioned Becker to ascertain whether his pleas were voluntary and of his own 
volition.  After finding that a 
factual basis existed for the pleas to the charges and that the pleas had not 
been improperly induced or coerced, the district court accepted and entered the 
pleas.

 

[¶9]      The sentencing 
hearing was held on December 20, 2000.  
Becker was sentenced to a term of not less than 20 nor more than 40 years 
on each of the second-degree sexual assault counts in case number 01-50 with the 
sentences to run consecutively to each other.  Becker was also sentenced to 20- to 
40-year terms for the two second-degree sexual assault counts in case number 
01-48 with those sentences also to run consecutively to each other.  A sentence of not less than 10 nor more 
than 15 years was imposed on the third-degree sexual assault count in case 
number 01-49.  Each of the sentences 
in the three cases was imposed consecutively to the sentences from the other 
cases.

 

[¶10]   Becker filed his notice of appeal 
on January 19, 2001.  On January 23, 
2001, the Department of Corrections filed a Motion for Ex Parte Order of 
Transfer seeking authority to transfer Becker from the State Penitentiary to the 
State Hospital.  In a letter 
accompanying the motion, the warden of the penitentiary stated that Becker was 
". . . suffering from severe variant of a major depressive 
episode.  He is severely depressed 
and suffers from a magnitude of co-morbid cognitive deficiencies."  The warden noted that Becker's condition 
rendered him an acute suicide risk if he was housed with the penitentiary 
population.  A memorandum signed by 
members of the penitentiary's medical services staff supported the warden's 
request.  On January 25, 2001, the 
district court authorized Becker's transfer to the State 
Hospital.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶11]   For purposes of our review, a plea 
of nolo contendere is functionally equivalent to a guilty plea. Ochoa v. 
State, 848 P.2d 1359, 1361 (Wyo. 1993). A guilty plea must be "knowing and 
voluntary." McCarty v. State, 883 P.2d 367, 372 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting 
Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28, 113 S. Ct. 517, 523, 121 L. Ed. 2d 391 
(1992)).  "The validity of a guilty 
plea is tested by determining whether the plea represents a voluntary and 
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the 
defendant.'" McCarty at Id. (quoting North Carolina v. 
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 
(1970)).

 

[¶12]   We recently set forth in detail our 
standard for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and, in 
particular, the specialized test for claims of ineffectiveness where the entry 
of a guilty plea is challenged:

 

Wyoming 
has a well-established and oft-repeated standard for reviewing claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel:

"When 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 796 (Wyo. 1995); Starr v. 
State, 888 P.2d 1262, 1266-67 (Wyo. 1995); Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo. 1994); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo. 1986). The 
reviewing court should indulge a strong presumption that counsel rendered 
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment. Herdt, at 796; Starr, at 1266; 
Arner, at 104; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

            
Under the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and 
Frias, an appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance was deficient and that 
prejudice resulted. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; 
Starr, at 1266; King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 125 (Wyo. 1991) 
(Cardine, J., dissenting); Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628, 629 (Wyo. 
1986); Frias, 722 P.2d  at 145. In other words, to warrant reversal on a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that 
his counsel failed to render such assistance as would have been offered by a 
reasonably competent attorney' and that counsel's deficiency prejudiced the 
defense of [the] case.' Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1990). 
The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.' 
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.'

Chapman 
v. State, 
2001 WY 25, ¶ 6, 18 P.3d 1164, 1168-69 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Grainey v. 
State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Wyo. 2000)). This test has been specialized 
for cases where entry of a guilty plea is challenged on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of counsel:

When 
an attorney has allegedly misadvised his client with respect to the entry of a 
guilty plea, a determination must be made of whether the decision to plead and 
forego the defense of his case resulted in prejudice to the client. That 
determination involves two interrelated questions: whether, in the absence of 
counsel's error, the recommendation of a reasonably competent attorney 
concerning the plea would differ from that given; and, whether, absent the 
error, the outcome of a trial would have been more advantageous to the client 
than the result of his plea. Hill [v. Lockhart], 474 U.S. [52] at 59-60, 
106 S.Ct. [366] at 370-71 [88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985)]. The defendant may also 
establish the necessary prejudice by proof of circumstances indicating that, in 
deciding whether or not to plead guilty, he placed special emphasis on the 
challenged aspect of his attorney's advice. He must suggest to the reviewing 
court a plausible reason why, had his representation been as he claims it should 
have been, he would have chosen to forsake the benefits of his plea agreement 
for the risks of trial. Id.; see also Worthen [v. Meachum], 842 F.2d 
[1179] at 1184 [(10th Cir. 1988)].

Lower 
v. State, 
786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1990); see also Brock v. State, 981 P.2d 465, 469 
(Wyo. 1999). The burden of proving that counsel was ineffective rests on the 
appellant. Sorensen v. State, 6 P.3d 657, 660 (Wyo. 2000), cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 1093, 121 S. Ct. 818, 148 L. Ed. 2d 702 (2001) (quoting 
Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo. 1986)).

 

Reyna 
v. State, 
2001 WY 105, ¶ 19, 33 P.3d 1129, 1134-35 (Wyo. 2001).

 

DISCUSSION

[¶13]   Becker claims that his trial 
counsel was ineffective in three ways: (1) failing to continue the plea hearing 
so that his mental condition could be evaluated; (2) permitting Becker to plead 
despite his mental condition; and (3) failing to move for withdrawal of his nolo 
contendere pleas prior to sentencing.  
At its heart, Becker's claim is that his pleas were not knowing or 
voluntary because of his mental condition and his counsel's failure to prevent 
him from pleading or to take corrective action thereafter constituted a 
deficient performance.  Becker 
alleges that the deficient performance of his counsel resulted in prejudice 
because there was a reasonable probability of a different result since he could 
have made pleas of not guilty by reason of mental illness or gone to trial under 
that defense.

 

[¶14]   After examining the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the pleas, we conclude that the record does not 
support Becker's claims.  At the 
outset, we note that the mere fact that Becker may have suffered from some 
mental health problems that were manifested in terms of depression or suicidal 
thoughts is not sufficient in and of itself to render his pleas 
involuntary.  See Eathorne v. 
State, 448 So. 2d 445, 449 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984) and State v. Byrge, 594 N.W.2d 388, 392 fn. 3 (Wis.App. 1999) ("A person is not incompetent simply 
because he or she is not in good mental health or because he or she has thoughts 
that a mature, healthy individual would not have.").

 

[T]he 
mere presence of mental illness or other mental disability at the time Bolius 
entered his plea does not necessarily mean that he was incompetent to plead 
under the Dusky test. Dusky v. United States, 1960, 362 U.S. 402, 
80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824. The mental illness or disability must have been so 
debilitating that Bolius was unable to consult with his lawyer and did not have 
a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings.

 

Bolius 
v. Wainwright, 
597 F.2d 986, 990 (5th Cir. 1979).  There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that Becker's alleged mental disability was so debilitating as to 
render him incapable of consulting with his lawyer or unable to understand and 
participate in the sentencing proceedings.  
The record, in fact, shows that Becker was fully cognizant of the 
proceedings and that his plea was knowledgeably and voluntarily 
given.

 

[¶15]   When the hearing commenced on the 
morning of August 18, 2000, Becker's counsel notified the court of the alleged 
suicide attempt the night before and questioned Becker's competence to proceed 
with a plea hearing.  She also filed 
a written motion with the court to suspend the proceedings pending a mental 
health evaluation.  At that point, 
the district court noted that it did not have any factual basis to conclude that 
Becker had, in fact, attempted suicide.  
Accordingly, the court recessed the hearing for the specific purpose of 
allowing the parties, including defense counsel, time to 
investigate.

 

[¶16]   When the hearing recommenced on 
that afternoon, neither party nor the court mentioned the attempted suicide or 
Becker's mental condition.  Instead, 
the parties proceeded directly to the details of the plea agreement.  Ideally, Becker's counsel should have 
addressed the issue and at least explained why it was no longer a concern.  However, that failure does not 
necessarily constitute a deficient performance on her part.  Clearly, since she raised the issue at 
the morning hearing and filed a written motion to suspend the proceedings in 
favor of an evaluation, counsel was aware of the potential concerns surrounding 
Becker's mental condition.  As 
Becker admits, his counsel had provided him with exemplary representation during 
the proceedings, including obtaining a hung jury in his first trial.  Becker concludes from the silence in the 
record during the afternoon plea hearing, that his counsel had suddenly become 
ineffective.  However, one can also 
infer from that silence that counsel followed the district court's direction to 
investigate the alleged suicide and Becker's mental condition during the hearing 
recess and concluded that there was no substance to any claim of mental 
impairment and that the best course of action was to simply proceed with the 
plea agreement.  Such an inference 
is supported by the comments of Becker's counsel during the afternoon plea 
hearing:

 

I 
would wish to add one thing at this point, that Mr. Becker after full 
consultation with myself and the defense team including Miss Parnell and Mr. 
Goldberg, in light of the fact that there would be new physical evidence and 
pending charges, that Mr. Becker wished to not fight these 
charges.

 

     He 
would also like the Court to know that it was his sincere desire to avoid having 
his granddaughter take the stand again, and to avoid having these other two 
young women have to get on the stand and testify.

 

We 
presume that counsel rendered adequate representation and exercised reasonable 
professional judgment in all significant decisions.  Reyna, 2001 WY at ¶ 19.  In the absence of any evidence to the 
contrary, we will presume that counsel's "full consultation" with Becker 
included consideration of his mental capacity and his ability to knowingly and 
voluntarily plead to the charges against him.

 

CONCLUSION

[¶17]   A claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel based on an allegedly invalid plea of guilty or no contest to 
criminal charges must necessarily be accompanied by a demonstration that the 
plea was not knowledgeable or voluntary.  
If the plea is attacked through a claim that the defendant was mentally 
incompetent to render a knowledgeable or voluntary plea, then the defendant must 
show that he was so debilitated that he was unable to consult with his attorney 
and did not have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings at the 
time the plea was given.

 

[¶18]   In this case, the record indicates 
that Becker's pleas were knowingly and voluntarily given with full cognizance 
and understanding of the consequences.  
The mere fact that Becker may have been suffering from depression and 
expressed suicidal inclinations is not, in and of itself, enough to make him 
incompetent to plead.  The record 
supports the conclusion that Becker was competent to plead and, accordingly, he 
has failed to negate the presumption that his counsel provided adequate 
representation.  Becker's pleas and 
sentences are affirmed.