Title: Lasley v. Hylton

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
TABITHA LASLEY, A MINOR, 
      OPINION BY 
BY JUANITA LASLEY, HER NEXT FRIEND, 
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
ET AL. 
 
   October 31, 2014 
 
v.  Record No. 132048 
 
DANIEL HYLTON 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BOTETOURT COUNTY 
Larry B. Kirksey, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider the legal duty that a host owes 
to a child social guest when the child's parent is present and 
supervising the child. 
I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
Over Labor Day weekend of 2008, Daniel Hylton ("Hylton") 
hosted a cookout for friends and neighbors at his property in 
Botetourt County, Virginia.  Among his guests were Gene Moseley 
("Moseley") and his two daughters, eight-year old Tabitha Lasley 
("Tabitha") and twelve-year old Casey Lasley ("Casey").  
Although Hylton and Moseley were well-acquainted, Hylton had 
never met Tabitha or Casey. 
 
When they arrived, Casey and Tabitha saw a teenage boy 
riding a green all-terrain vehicle ("ATV").  Neither girl had 
ridden an ATV before.  With Moseley's permission, Tabitha 
accepted a ride on the back of the green ATV.  Thereafter, 
either Hylton asked Casey if she would like to drive an ATV, or 
Casey asked Hylton for permission to do so. 
2 
 
Hylton owned two ATVs — the green ATV and a smaller, red 
ATV.  Prominent safety warnings were stickered to the seat and 
body of the red ATV, including one that read: "NEVER permit 
children under age 12 to operate this ATV."  The owner's manual 
contained additional warnings, including one that stated: "The 
minimum recommended age for this ATV model is 12.  Children 
under age 12 should never operate an ATV with engine size 70cc 
or greater."  The red ATV had an engine size of approximately 
86cc.  Despite these warnings, Hylton routinely permitted 
neighborhood children to drive the red ATV provided they 
received permission from their parents and wore a helmet and 
shoes. 
 
Hylton and Moseley set Casey up on the red ATV.  Hylton 
explained the controls; then Casey drove across the property.  
While watching her older sister, eight-year old Tabitha asked 
Hylton if she could drive the ATV as well.  Hylton told her that 
she had to get her father's permission first.  When Tabitha 
asked Moseley for permission to drive the red ATV, he agreed.  
Moseley called Casey back so that Tabitha could take a turn.  
Casey had difficulty bringing the ATV to a stop and actually 
struck Moseley in the process. 
 
Tabitha put on the helmet with help from another adult, and 
Moseley helped Tabitha onto the ATV.  As the engine was running, 
Hylton explained where the gas pedal, clutch, and brakes were 
3 
located.  Then Tabitha accelerated, reaching an estimated speed 
of five to ten miles per hour.  Almost immediately, she lost 
control and began to swerve.  Moseley yelled for Tabitha to 
stop, but before she could do so, she tipped the ATV and was 
thrown to the ground.  Tabitha sustained multiple injuries, 
including a fractured shoulder. 
 
Tabitha, by her mother, Juanita Lasley, and Juanita Lasley 
in her own right (collectively "Lasley"), filed an amended 
complaint in the Circuit Court of Botetourt County.  The 
complaint alleged that Hylton had been negligent and grossly 
negligent by allowing and assisting Tabitha to operate the ATV, 
failing to advise Moseley and Tabitha of the warnings displayed 
on the ATV, and failing to heed those warnings. 
 
At trial, Hylton testified that he relied on Moseley, as 
Tabitha's parent, to decide whether she could safely drive the 
ATV.  Moseley never asked Hylton, and Hylton never agreed, to 
supervise the girls.  In fact, Moseley was present and assisted 
both girls while they rode.  Hylton also testified that he knew 
Tabitha was about eight years old and that he never asked 
whether she had driven an ATV before.  Hylton acknowledged that 
he never discussed the warnings displayed on the ATV or the 
risks of driving an ATV with Moseley or Tabitha. 
 
At the conclusion of Lasley's case, Hylton moved to strike 
the evidence.  The circuit court, relying on Ingle v. 
4 
Clinchfield Railroad Co., 169 Va. 131, 192 S.E. 782 (1937), 
granted Hylton's motion and entered judgment in his favor.1  The 
court reasoned that in the absence of evidence of a special 
relationship or evidence that Hylton assumed a duty to supervise 
Tabitha, he had no duty to Tabitha that could support a finding 
of negligence: 
It is clear that Tabitha Lasley was under the 
supervision of her father at the time this took 
place and that's not disputed.  It is clear that 
the Defendant inquired of the supervising parent 
with regard to the activity that was requested.  
It is clear and not disputed that the supervising 
parent gave his permission.  I think it's clear 
under 
Virginia 
[l]aw 
that 
if 
a 
child 
is 
supervised by a parent and that the parent sees 
no peril in the child's activity, that it would 
be demanding too much of the Defendant to foresee 
the peril in the situation. 
 
 
Lasley assigns error to the circuit court's ruling that 
Hylton, as a matter of law, did not have a duty to prevent 
Tabitha from riding the ATV.  Lasley also assigns error to the 
circuit court's reliance on Ingle, asserting that it is 
distinguishable on its facts. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The General Duty of a Host to Social Guests 
 
We review the trial court's rulings de novo, as "[t]he 
issue whether a legal duty in tort exists is a pure question of 
                                                 
1 The circuit court did not make a separate finding 
regarding whether the facts supported a claim for gross 
negligence, apparently concluding that only simple negligence 
was implicated. 
5 
law."  Kellermann v. McDonough, 278 Va. 478, 487, 684 S.E.2d 
786, 790 (2009). 
 
As an initial matter, the parties do not dispute that 
Tabitha and her family were Hylton's social guests at the 
cookout.  Virginia law imposes a duty upon a host to conduct his 
or her activities with reasonable care under the circumstances.  
Bradshaw v. Minter, 206 Va. 450, 453, 143 S.E.2d 827, 829 
(1965).  Bradshaw is instructive though distinguishable, as 
explained in Part II.D. 
 
In Bradshaw, the host permitted his guest to ride one of 
his horses, which he knew was "spirited" and "liked to run."  
Id. at 451-52, 143 S.E.2d at 828.  He had no knowledge of his 
guest's riding experience, and he failed to adequately disclose 
the horse's propensities to her.  Almost immediately, the horse 
threw the guest to the ground, causing her injuries.  Id. This 
Court held that "[w]here the activities of the host are 
involved, the test should be one of reasonable care under the 
circumstances."  Id. at 453, 143 S.E.2d at 829.  However, a host 
is not subject to liability if the guest knew or should have 
known of the host's activities and any accompanying risk.  Id. 
Consequently, as a general rule a host has a duty to social 
guests for his or her activities.  But when the risk is open and 
obvious, as Hylton asserts in the present case, the host is not 
liable.  See Smith v. Lamar, 212 Va. 820, 823, 188 S.E.2d 72, 74 
6 
(1972) (quoting Perlin v. Chappell, 198 Va. 861, 864, 96 S.E.2d 
805, 808 (1957)) ("'Reasonable care' or 'ordinary care' is a 
relative term, and varies with the nature and character of the 
situation to which it is applied. . . .  The test is that degree 
of care which an ordinary prudent person would exercise under 
the same or similar circumstances to avoid injury to another.'") 
B. 
The Host's Specific Duty to a Child Who Is Supervised by a 
Parent 
 
 
Before we reach the question of whether the ATV constituted 
an open and obvious risk, the facts of this case present an 
issue of first impression for this Court.  We have never 
articulated the duty that a host owes to a child social guest 
when the parent is present and supervising. 
 
The parties do not dispute that Tabitha's father, Moseley, 
was present and supervising her activities.  Lasley urges us to 
find that this fact is irrelevant, arguing that Moseley's 
presence did not circumscribe Hylton's duty to Tabitha to 
conduct his activities with reasonable care.  In effect, Lasley 
argues that Hylton had an absolute duty to prohibit Tabitha from 
driving the ATV or at least to discuss the danger with Moseley 
before she did.  We disagree. 
 
In Ingle, the Court held that the operators of a train had 
no legal duty to a child accompanied by, and under the 
supervision of, her mother.  169 Va. at 139-40, 192 S.E. at 785-
7 
86.  In that case, a mother and her three children were walking 
along a path parallel to, and approximately four feet from, the 
end of the rail ties underlying the tracks.  The path was in the 
railroad company's right-of-way, and pedestrians made sufficient 
use of it to charge the company with notice of its use.  
Consequently, the Court concluded that the mother and her 
children were the railroad's licensees.  The evidence showed 
that the daughter was walking about 150 feet in front of her 
mother; the mother heard the train approaching; and the mother 
called to the daughter to stop.  Inexplicably, the daughter 
stepped onto the ties and was struck by the train.  Id. at 134-
37, 192 S.E. at 783-84. 
 
The Court noted that cases holding that train operators 
"must take notice of an unattended small child on the right of 
way and anticipate that from childish impulses it may run in 
front of the train" were inapposite, because the daughter "was 
attended by her mother."  Id. at 139, 192 S.E. at 785.  The 
Court reasoned that if the mother "saw no peril in taking them 
down the pathway which was four feet from the end of the ties, 
it would be demanding too much of the railroad company to 
require that it should have . . . foreseen peril in the 
situation."  Id. at 140, 192 S.E. 785-86. 
 
Ingle alone does not control the outcome of this case 
though, for reasons asserted by Lasley on brief: Hylton's 
8 
"active and direct commission of negligence . . . placed Tabitha 
in peril."  Under the rule in Bradshaw, Hylton had a duty to his 
guests to exercise reasonable care while carrying on his 
activities.  Consequently, we must determine under what 
circumstances a host is liable for harm to a child social guest, 
when that harm is attributable to his alleged active negligence 
and the child's parent is present and supervising. 
C. Case Law from Other States 
 
Virginia recognizes that a parent has a general duty to 
supervise and care for a child's safety though, as noted, we 
have yet to reconcile it with the duties of a social host.  See 
Chapman v. City of Virginia Beach, 252 Va. 186, 193, 475 S.E.2d 
798, 803 (1996) ("A parent has a duty to exercise ordinary care 
for the child's safety . . . ."). Although this is a question of 
first impression in Virginia, other courts have considered it 
and ruled that the parent's duty is superior to the duty of a 
social host when the parent is supervising and knows or should 
know of an obvious danger. 
 
Two decisions that are particularly instructive, due to 
their factual similarity with the present case, are Vares v. 
Vares, 571 S.E.2d 612 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) and Kay v. Ludwick, 
230 N.E.2d 494 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967).  In Vares, the host invited 
his extended family to his home for a regular family gathering, 
known as "Farm Day," during which the family members performed 
9 
various chores intended to maintain the fifty-acre property.  
Vares was assigned the task of cutting down a tree.  Initially, 
he permitted his son to help clear some brush.  Then, Vares 
directed his son to stand back before he and two other men 
felled the tree.  Nonetheless, the child moved into the path of 
the falling tree, which struck and injured him.  Vares, 571 
S.E.2d at 614. 
 
The court began by noting that a landowner has a general 
"duty to exercise ordinary care for the protection of one of 
tender years, after his presence in a dangerous situation is or 
should have been known."  Id. at 616 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  However, the court also noted that 
this duty does not apply when "the minor child is being actively 
supervised by a parent who has full knowledge of the condition 
of the premises and appreciation of the danger thereby 
presented."  Id.  Because Vares was present and supervising the 
child when he was injured, the court concluded that the duty of 
care "belonged to Vares" and not to the host. Id. 
 
In Kay, a four-year old girl and her mother were guests at 
Ludwick's home.  During their visit, Ludwick permitted someone 
to mow her lawn with a "riding-type rotary power mower" as the 
child played outside.  The child attempted to climb onto the 
rear of the mower, and her foot fell into the path of the blade, 
which severed her heel.  The mother and child alleged that 
10 
Ludwick was negligent in permitting the mower to be operated 
while the child played outside, failing to warn the child, and 
failing to supervise or protect the child.  Kay, 230 N.E.2d at 
496.  The court rejected their arguments, concluding that "[t]he 
primary responsibility for the safety of this minor child rested 
with its mother" who was present and apparently supervising the 
child.  Id. at 497.  The court noted that the mother "observed 
no apparent harm in permitting her child to play in the yard 
while the mower was in operation" and to require more from the 
host would be to impose "a duty superior to the one the parent 
here owed to the child."  Id. at 497-98. 
D. 
The ATV Presented Open and Obvious Risks 
 
The fact that Moseley was present and actively supervising 
Tabitha is not in dispute.  The evidence adduced at trial also 
demonstrated that the danger to Tabitha was open and obvious.  
Moseley therefore knew or should have known of the risk of 
injury. 
 
In Bradshaw, the guest had no way of knowing about the 
horse's "spirit" or propensity to run unless the host disclosed 
those risks.  206 Va. at 452, 143 S.E.2d at 828.  Consequently, 
the Court concluded that it was for the jury to determine 
whether the host was negligent in permitting the guest to ride 
without informing her of the horse's characteristics.  Id. at 
455, 143 S.E.2d at 830. 
11 
 
Here, however, Moseley had ample opportunity to observe the 
variety of warnings clearly affixed to the ATV.  There were four 
warnings on the ATV itself: one on the visible, top side of the 
left-front wheel well; one on the visible, top side of the 
right-front wheel well; one on the visible, top side of the 
left-rear wheel well; and one on the passenger seat.  One 
explicitly warned against allowing children under 12 to operate 
the ATV.  Furthermore, Moseley witnessed firsthand that his 
twelve-year old daughter had difficulty controlling the ATV, as 
she struck him while attempting to stop.  Moseley had every 
right and opportunity to refuse to give eight-year old Tabitha 
permission to ride the ATV.  He had every reason to know of the 
risks involved. 
 
The prominently displayed warnings, which were pertinent to 
the very circumstances that increased the likelihood of 
Tabitha's injury, distinguish this case from those where we have 
held that the question of whether a danger is open and obvious 
is for the jury.  See, e.g., Volpe v. City of Lexington, 281 Va. 
630, 638-39, 708 S.E.2d 824, 828 (2011) (holding that a jury 
should decide whether an artificial "hydraulic" created by a 
low-head dam was open and obvious).  Where the danger is open 
and obvious, the law places the "primary duty to inform, advise, 
and protect a child" on the child's parents.  Washabaugh v. 
12 
Northern Va. Construction Co., 187 Va. 767, 773, 48 S.E.2d 276, 
279 (1948). 
 
Lasley, relying on Evans v. Evans, 280 Va. 76, 695 S.E.2d 
173 (2010), contends that a rule subordinating a host's duty 
under these circumstances effectively imputes the negligence of 
the parent to the child.  Her reliance on Evans is unavailing, 
since that case merely states a narrow exception to the intra-
family immunity rule, whereby a child has the right to recover 
from a negligent parent for a motor vehicle accident. See id. at 
78 n.1, 695 S.E.2d at 174 n.1.  Whether an ATV could be 
considered a motor vehicle is a question that is not presented 
in this case.2 
 
Finally, we note that this rule is consistent with social 
norms.  When a person invites neighbors, friends, or family to 
his or her home, that person does not expect to stand in loco 
parentis to child guests that accompany their parents.  Rather, 
that person justifiably should expect his or her guests to 
exercise the same care and responsibility towards their children 
as they would in their own home.  An invitation to a social 
                                                 
2 Further, this rule does not mean that a host does not owe 
a duty to a child social guest.  If it is reasonably foreseeable 
that the parent will not or cannot realize the risks involved 
with a host's activity, then the host's duty would remain to 
conduct activities with reasonable care for the benefit of child 
social guests.  Similarly, if the host is supervising the child, 
then the host would also have such a duty. 
 
13 
event is not an invitation to relinquish parental 
responsibility. 
  III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, we confirm that a host owes a child 
social guest a legal duty to exercise reasonable care for the 
child's safety.  We also conclude that Hylton satisfied this 
duty when he ensured that Tabitha was being supervised by 
Moseley and had his permission to ride the ATV. 
We hold that if a child's parent is present and 
supervising, and knows or should know of open and obvious risks 
associated with an activity, a host does not breach the duty of 
reasonable care when he or she allows the child to participate 
in an activity with the parent's permission.  Therefore, we 
affirm the judgment of the circuit court.3 
Affirmed. 
 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS and JUSTICE GOODWYN 
join, concurring. 
 
Today, the Court in RGR, LLC v. Settle, ___ Va. ___, ___ 
S.E.2d ___ (2014)(this day decided), espouses a general maxim of 
legal duty owed by possessors of property to the entire world. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Below Hylton raised the recreational use immunity statute, 
Code § 29.1-509, as a defense.  Lasley argued on brief that the 
statute did not apply to the facts of this case.  However, since 
the circuit court did not rule on the argument below, we do not 
consider it. 
14 
 
However, in this case in which Lasley requests application of a 
general maxim as the legal duty and expressly disavows reliance 
on a specific duty owed by possessors of land to social guests, 
the majority ignores the general maxim and fails to explain why 
it does not apply in this case.  Instead it creates a new 
specific duty for possessors of land.  Although I believe it 
worthwhile to note this inconsistent application and adoption of 
new legal theories, fortunately, it is not necessary for me to 
address it in resolving this matter because I would affirm the 
circuit court's judgment for different reasons. 
Lasley did not assert that Hylton violated the duty owed by 
a host to a social guest.  Lasley’s claim was unrelated to 
Tabitha’s status as a social guest on Hylton's premises.  
Instead, Lasley contended that Hylton violated a general duty 
not to injure Tabitha.  See RGR, ___ Va. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at 
___ (every person has a duty of ordinary care in the use and 
maintenance of their property to prevent injury or death to 
others).  Because Lasley failed to assert the breach of any duty 
owed by Hylton to Tabitha recognized under our tort law prior to 
the RGR decision, I would hold that the circuit court did not 
err in granting Hylton's motion to strike. 
 
In the circuit court, Lasley asserted that Hylton breached 
two separate duties to Tabitha.  First, citing Kellermann v. 
15 
McDonough, 278 Va. 478, 684 S.E.2d 786 (2009), Lasley claimed 
that the duty of parental supervision shifted from Mosely to 
Hylton such that Hylton became responsible for Tabitha's care.  
Second, Lasley contended that even if the duty of supervision 
did not shift to Hylton, Hylton owed an independent duty to use 
ordinary care not to harm another person.  Lasley maintained, 
prior to trial, that her cause of action was not based on the 
duty owed by Hylton to a social guest on his premises.1 
At trial, Hylton moved to strike Lasley's evidence on the 
grounds that the evidence did not establish Hylton owed a duty 
to Tabitha absent a shifting of the parental duty of supervision 
or the existence of a relationship between Hylton and Tabitha.  
In response, Lasley argued that Hylton "did in fact take on that 
supervisory role," but if the court found he did not "assume 
                                                 
1 In fact, Lasley's original complaint, as well as her first 
amended complaint, included a count against Hylton based on his 
status as property owner and host, in which she alleged that 
Hylton owed duties to his social guests to have his premises in 
a reasonably safe condition for his guests' use, to warn his 
social guests of unsafe conditions about which he knew or should 
have known, and to use ordinary care not to injure his social 
guests by his affirmative negligence.  After Hylton filed a 
demurrer based, in part, on the recreational use immunity 
statute, Code § 29.1-509, Lasley responded that "[t]he facts on 
whose land this incident took place [are] irrelevant to 
[Lasley's] case and the allegations contained in the Complaint," 
and "[t]his incident could have occurred at a park, on a public 
road, school yard, or in the neighbor's front yard, and 
[Lasley's] basic causes of action would be nearly identical."  
Thereafter, Lasley filed her second amended complaint in which 
she did not include the count against Hylton based on his duty 
to social guests. 
16 
that responsibility, there is an independent duty on his part 
not to do anything to contribute to putting someone else in 
danger."  According to Lasley, her claim was based on Hylton's 
"failure to comply with his duty to use ordinary care to protect 
her."  Thus, in responding to the motion to strike, Lasley did 
not assert a duty owed by Hylton to social guests on his 
premises.2 
 
On appeal, Lasley has continued to renounce any reliance on 
a theory of negligence based on Hylton's relationship to Tabitha 
as a social guest on his premises.  Specifically, on brief, 
Lasley maintains that her cause of action does not pertain to 
her status as a social guest on Hylton's premises.  
Additionally, Lasley has abandoned her claim based on a 
violation of the duty to supervise Tabitha.  She argues only 
that Hylton owed "a general duty not to injure others 
negligently."  In distinguishing Ingle v. Clinchfield Railroad 
Co., 169 Va. 131, 192 S.E. 782 (1937), Lasley asserts that 
Tabitha's "status as a licensee or invitee is irrelevant" to her 
claim.  Furthermore, arguing that the recreational use immunity 
statute is not applicable, Lasley states that her claim does not 
concern the ownership or use of land because "[t]his ATV wreck 
                                                 
2 Lasley also did not assert a duty based on a theory of 
negligent entrustment.  See, e.g., Kingrey v. Hill, 245 Va. 76, 
78, 425 S.E.2d 798, 799 (1993). 
 
17 
could have occurred on a road, at a park, on a public road, 
school yard, or in the neighbor's front yard, and [Lasley's] 
causes of action would be identical."3 
 
At oral argument, Lasley expressly disavowed reliance on 
the relationship between Hylton and Tabitha as host and social 
guest as the basis for the duty supporting her claim.  Indeed, 
when pressed to acknowledge this relationship, Lasley answered 
that her claim did not have anything to do with the ownership of 
the land or the duty owed to a licensee or invitee, but was 
based entirely on Hylton's ownership of the ATV and his action 
in allowing her to ride it. 
 
Despite Lasley's repeated assertions that her claim is not 
based on the duty owed by Hylton to a social guest on his 
premises, the majority undertakes to specifically determine what 
duty a host owes to a child social guest on his land when the 
child's parent is present and supervising.  The majority begins 
its analysis with Bradshaw v. Minter, 206 Va. 450, 143 S.E.2d 
827 (1965), in which the Court discussed the duty owed by a 
landowner to a licensee, which includes a social guest, on the 
owner's premises.  While the Court in Bradshaw reiterated that a 
possessor of land generally owes no duty to a social guest to 
                                                 
3 The recreational use immunity statute applies not only to 
conditions on the premises but to activities upon the premises 
as well.  Code § 29.1-509(B). 
 
18 
keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, the Court 
recognized a duty of reasonable care where the guest is injured 
by the landowner's affirmative negligence.  Id. at 452-53, 143 
S.E.2d at 828-29.  The majority adopts this theory as the basis 
for Lasley's claim, and in doing so, addresses a claim Lasley 
has not in fact asserted.4 
 
In sum, I would hold the circuit court did not err in 
granting Hylton's motion to strike because Lasley failed to 
assert any duty owed to Tabitha recognized under Virginia tort 
law.5  In the circuit court and in this Court, Lasley has 
asserted that her claim is based on a general duty not to injure 
others negligently without specifying a specific duty arising 
out of Lasley's relationship with Tabitha, either as her host or 
otherwise.  Therefore, the majority has addressed a claim that 
Lasley has not asserted and, indeed, has expressly disavowed.  
In my view, the Court should await the arrival of a case in 
which the appellant actually asserts the breach of a duty owed 
by a landowner to a child social guest on the premises to define 
                                                 
4 As noted previously, in her original and first amended 
complaints, Lasley asserted a claim based on her status as 
social guest on Hylton's premises and alleged Hylton owed a duty 
to use ordinary care not to injure his social guests by his 
affirmative negligence.  However, she did not include this claim 
in her second amended complaint. 
5 Although Lasley asserted her claim was based in part on the 
duty of supervision, which the circuit court ruled was not 
supported by the evidence, she has not asserted this duty on 
appeal. 
19 
the scope of the duty.  See Commonwealth v. Harley, 256 Va. 216, 
219-20, 504 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1998). 
For these reasons I concur only in the Court's judgment,  
affirming the circuit court's dismissal of the claim in this 
case.