Title: In re Cabot Creamery Cooperative, Inc.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

IN_RE_CABOT_CREAMERY_COOP.94-589; 164 Vt 26; 663 A.2d 940

[Filed 14-Jul-1995]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                                 No. 94-589


In re Cabot Creamery Cooperative,                 Supreme Court
Inc. (Richard Scheiber, Appellant)
                                                  On Appeal from
                                                  Washington Superior Court

                                                  June Term, 1995


Alan W. Cheever, J.

Paul S. Gillies of Tarrant, Marks & Gillies, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant

Keith Aten of Downs Rachlin & Martin, St. Johnsbury, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



     ALLEN, C.J.  Petitioner appeals from the Washington Superior Court's
dismissal of his petition for extraordinary relief concerning an order of the
Environmental Board.  The court dismissed the petition because petitioner
failed to serve the Board as required by V.R.C.P. 75. We affirm the dismissal
because the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter. 

     Petitioner participated as a permissive party in administrative hearings
concerning an Act 250 land use permit of the Cabot Creamery Cooperative, Inc.
Petitioner resides in Cabot but is not an adjoining landowner.  He was
granted permissive party status under Environmental Board Rule 14(B).  In
August 1992, the District 5 Environmental Commission issued a revised land
use permit authorizing Cabot to dispose dairy processing wastewater and
washwater from its operations in the Village of Cabot on land in Marshfield,
Hardwick, Walden, and possibly other towns.  Petitioner appealed to the
Board, which, in August 1993, affirmed the permit subject to certain stated
conditions. Petitioner moved to reconsider and reopen, arguing primarily that
Cabot did not demonstrate changes in regulatory circumstances that would
justify 

 

a permit amendment.  The amended permit would allow Cabot to avoid
construction of the waste treatment facility required under its original 1986
Act 250 permit.  The Board denied the motion and affirmed the rationale in
its August 1993 decision which stated: 

     At the time that the District Commission's decisions were issued,
     the State of Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) believed
     that the Applicant would have to treat its waste through use of a
     wastewater treatment plant in order to meet state regulations.
     Subsequently, ANR concluded that a properly administered land
     application program was a preferable alternative to use of a waste
     treatment plant and would comply with those regulations.

Concluding that its findings were supported by the record, the Board denied
petitioner's motion.   In November 1993, petitioner again moved to alter or
reconsider, based this time on the Board's failure to consider whether the
change in circumstances underlying Cabot's permit amendment was beyond
Cabot's control.  The Board denied this motion as untimely and on the
additional ground that its decision was sound. 

     Petitioner sought extraordinary relief in superior court pursuant to
V.R.C.P. 81(b).(FN1)  Cabot opposed the petition on numerous grounds. The
superior court dismissed it because petitioner failed to serve the
Environmental Board as required by V.R.C.P. 75.  The present appeal followed.

     We have held that "[w]here . . . legislation does not affirmatively
indicate that review is `available by law,' . . . review by this Court is
nonetheless permitted by a petition for extraordinary relief" pursuant to
V.R.C.P. 75.  Hunt v. Village of Bristol, 159 Vt. 439, 440, 620 A.2d 1266,
1266 (1992).  Act 250 is not silent on the right to appeal.  In fact, it
explicitly limits the right to appeal a Board decision to certain enumerated
persons.  10 V.S.A.  

 

6085(c), 6089(b).(FN2)

     In In re George F. Adams & Co., 134 Vt. 172, 174-75,