Title: State v. Azbell

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Azbell, 112 Ohio St.3d 300, 2006-Ohio-6552.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. AZBELL, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Azbell, 112 Ohio St.3d 300, 2006-Ohio-6552.] 
Criminal law — Statutory right to speedy trial — Determination of when charge 
is pending under R.C. 2945.71(C). 
(No. 2005-1788 – Submitted June 7, 2006 – Decided December 20, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Richland County, 
No. 2005-CA-0004, 2005-Ohio-4405. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
For purposes of calculating speedy-trial time pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(C), a 
charge is not pending until the accused has been formally charged by a 
criminal complaint or indictment, is held pending the filing of charges, or 
is released on bail or recognizance. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} Today this court must determine when a charge is considered 
“pending” for purposes of calculating speedy-trial time pursuant to R.C. 
2945.71(C).  For the reasons that follow, we hold that a charge is not pending for 
purposes of calculating speedy-trial time pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(C) until the 
accused has been formally charged by a criminal complaint or indictment, is held 
pending the filing of charges, or is released on bail or recognizance.  We therefore 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
{¶ 2} Defendant-appellee, Sandra Azbell, was arrested at a pharmacy on 
May 30, 2003 for deception to obtain dangerous drugs.  Officers took Azbell to 
the police station, where police provided her with Miranda warnings, gave her an 
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opportunity to make a statement, and then photographed, fingerprinted, and 
released her.  No charges were filed at that time, and Azbell was later indicted in 
April 2004.  Azbell was arrested on April 16, 2004, and was served with an 
indictment charging her with illegal possession of drug documents in violation of 
R.C. 2925.23(B)(1) and deception to obtain a dangerous drug in violation of R.C. 
2925.22(A), both felonies of the fifth degree. 
{¶ 3} Azbell filed a motion to discharge, claiming that she had not been 
brought to trial in accordance with the speedy-trial dictates of R.C. 2945.71.  The 
trial court held a hearing, at which Azbell claimed that the time began to run for 
speedy-trial purposes when she was arrested in 2003, and the state argued that the 
time began when charges were filed against her in 2004.  The trial court, from the 
bench, denied the motion to discharge based on speedy-trial grounds. 
{¶ 4} Azbell pleaded no contest to both charges and was found guilty.  
She appealed from the trial court’s decision on the motion to discharge, and the 
Richland County Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. 
{¶ 5} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
{¶ 6} The right to a speedy public trial is established in the Ohio 
Constitution, Article I, Section 10.  “In any trial, in any court, the party accused 
shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel; to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof; to 
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to procure the 
attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed * * *.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 7} R.C. 2945.71 codifies a defendant’s right to a speedy trial and 
provides the time within which a hearing or trial must be held for specific 
offenses.  In general, subsection (A) addresses minor misdemeanors, subsection 
January Term, 2006 
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(B) addresses misdemeanors other than minor misdemeanors, subsection (C) 
addresses felonies, and subsection (D) addresses cases involving both 
misdemeanors and felonies. 
{¶ 8} Applicable to this case, subsection (C) provides: “A person against 
whom a charge of felony is pending * * * [s]hall be brought to trial within two 
hundred seventy days after the person’s arrest.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 9} The crux of the issue in this case is when a charge is considered 
“pending” for purposes of calculating speedy-trial time pursuant to R.C. 
2945.71(C).  The defendant argues that the time begins to run on the date of a 
person’s arrest.  The state argues that a charge is not pending for speedy-trial 
purposes when a defendant is merely detained and released by law enforcement 
without being subject to the conditions of bond or being charged in a complaint.1   
{¶ 10} Although Ohio is free to offer more protections in our Constitution 
and statutes than the federal Constitution offers, we turn first to the United States 
Supreme Court for guidance on this issue.  In United States v. Marion (1971), 404 
U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468, the defendants moved to dismiss an 
indictment, claiming that their speedy-trial rights were violated because 
approximately three years had passed between the end of the criminal scheme 
charged and the return of the indictment.  In holding that “the Sixth Amendment 
speedy trial provision has no application until the putative defendant in some way 
becomes an ‘accused,’ ” the court held that “[t]hese provisions would seem to 
afford no protection to those not yet accused, nor would they seem to require the 
Government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular 
period of time.”  Id. at 313, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468. 
                                                          
 
1.  Although the state argues in its brief that Azbell was merely detained, not arrested, on May 30, 
2003, when she was brought to the Ontario police station, the state conceded in oral argument that 
Azbell was under arrest at that time.   
 
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{¶ 11} Thus, “it is either a formal indictment or information or else the 
actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that 
engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth 
Amendment.”  Id. at 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468.  Moreover, “[a] literal 
reading of the [Sixth] Amendment suggests that this right attaches only when a 
formal criminal charge is instituted and a criminal prosecution begins.”  United 
States v. MacDonald (1982), 456 U.S. 1, 6, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696. 
{¶ 12} The defendant states that dicta in Doggett v. United States (1992), 
505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520, suggests that mere arrest triggers 
the speedy-trial clock for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.  We quote with 
approval the resolution offered by the Tenth District Court of Appeals in State v. 
Weiser, Franklin App. No. 03AP-95, 2003-Ohio-7034, ¶ 25-26:  
{¶ 13} “[U]pon careful reading of Doggett and the forerunning cases of 
MacDonald and Marion, supra, it is clear the use of the term ‘arrest’ connotes 
more than an arrest without the filing of charges or posting of bond.  Instead, it 
intimates an arrest that ‘is the beginning of continuing restraints on defendant’s 
liberty imposed in connection with the formal charge on which defendant is 
eventually tried.’  United State v. Stead ([C.A.8] 1984), 745 F.2d 1170, 1172. 
{¶ 14} “The policy reasons espoused by the Doggett court when it stated 
‘arrest’ were the same as those discussed in MacDonald and Marion when the 
Supreme Court held speedy trial rights did not arise ‘until charges are pending,’ 
MacDonald, supra [456 U.S.] at 7 [102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.E.2d 696], or by ‘either a 
formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest 
and holding to answer a criminal charge * * *’ Marion, supra [404 U.S.] at 321 
[92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468].  Specifically, the Doggett court stated, ‘We have 
observed in prior cases that unreasonable delay between formal accusation and 
trial threatens to produce more than one sort of harm, including “oppressive 
pretrial incarceration,” “anxiety and concern of the accused,” and “the possibility 
January Term, 2006 
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that the [accused’s] defense will be impaired” by dimming memories and loss of 
exculpatory evidence.’  Doggett [505 U.S.] at 654 [112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 
520] [quoting Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 
L.Ed.2d 101].  As such, the Doggett court, as with previous decisions, continued 
to focus on the restraints upon an individual’s liberty which accompan[y] a formal 
accusation.  Therefore, while the Doggett court failed to explicitly state ‘and held 
to answer,’ the analysis makes clear this is the situation which must be present, 
and not mere arrest, to trigger speedy trial rights.”  (Footnote omitted.)  
{¶ 15} Several prior cases from this court are relevant.  In Westlake v. 
Cougill (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 230, 234, 10 O.O.3d 382, 383 N.E.2d 599, we held 
that the speedy-trial statute was tolled during the time between a nolle prosequi of 
a misdemeanor charge and the service of summons of the second filing of a 
misdemeanor charge arising out of the same conduct, since no charge was 
pending against the defendant during that period. 
{¶ 16} Further, in State v. Bonarrigo (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 7, 16 O.O.3d 
4, 402 N.E.2d 530, we held that the speedy-trial statute was tolled after a 
misdemeanor charge was nolled until the felony indictment, based upon the same 
conduct, was issued.  Quoting from United States v. Hillegas (C.A.2, 1978), 578 
F.2d 453, 458, we noted “ ‘After the Government’s dismissal of the complaint 
against him appellant * * * was no longer under any of the restraints associated 
with arrest and the pendency of criminal charges against him.  He was free to 
come and go as he pleased.  He was not subject to public obloquy, disruption of 
his employment or more stress than any citizen who might be under investigation 
but not charged with a crime.  Unless and until a formal criminal charge was filed 
against him, neither he nor the public generally could have any legitimate interest 
in the prompt processing of a nonexistent case against him.’  [Footnote omitted.]”  
Bonarrigo, 62 Ohio St.2d at 11, 16 O.O.3d 4, 402 N.E.2d 530, fn. 5. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 17} In addition, in State v. Broughton (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 253, 581 
N.E.2d 541, we considered a case in which a defendant was indicted on 
November 17, 1988, the indictment was dismissed as defective on July 18, 1989, 
and the defendant was later indicted on October 18, 1989.  Id. at 254, 581 N.E.2d 
541.  This court held, “For purposes of computing how much time has run against 
the state under R.C. 2945.71 et seq., the time period between the dismissal 
without prejudice of an original indictment and the filing of a subsequent 
indictment, premised upon the same facts as alleged in the original indictment, 
shall not be counted unless the defendant is held in jail or released on bail 
pursuant to Crim.R. 12(I).”  Id., paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 18} Finally, this court has held, “ ‘The speedy trial guarantee is 
designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to 
reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on 
an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by 
arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  
State v. Triplett (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 566, 568, 679 N.E.2d 290, quoting 
MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 8, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696. 
{¶ 19} As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned in United States v. 
Stead (C.A.8, 1984), 745 F.2d 1170, 1172, “arrest triggers the speedy trial right 
only where it is the beginning of continuing restraints on defendant’s liberty 
imposed in connection with the formal charge on which defendant is eventually 
tried. * * * [Thus], the protections of the Speedy Trial Act are not triggered by an 
arrest when the arrested person is immediately released without formal charge.” 
{¶ 20} In this case, although Azbell was arrested in May 2003, she was not 
“held to answer” because she was immediately released after being photographed 
and fingerprinted at the police station.  At the time of her arrest, she was not 
charged with any offense.  Thus, she was never subject to “actual restraints 
imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge.”  Marion, 404 U.S. at 
January Term, 2006 
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320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468.  Her liberty was not in jeopardy, one of the 
overriding concerns of speedy-trial violations.  See United States v. Loud Hawk 
(1986), 474 U.S. 302, 310-312, 106 S.Ct. 648, 88 L.Ed.2d 640.  Because no 
charge was outstanding and she was not held pending the filing of charges or 
released on bail or recognizance, Azbell did not become a “person against whom 
a charge of felony is pending” until she was arrested on the indictment in April 
16, 2004. 
{¶ 21} Therefore, we hold that for purposes of calculating speedy-trial 
time pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(C), a charge is not pending until the accused has 
been formally charged by a criminal complaint or indictment, is held pending the 
filing of charges, or is released on bail or recognizance.  Accordingly, we reverse 
the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
RESNICK and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs separately. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring. 
{¶ 22} In my view, resolution of this case involves a matter of statutory 
construction.  In reviewing a statute, we are to accord the plain meaning to the 
words of the statute, absent any ambiguity.  This statute is not ambiguous. 
{¶ 23} R.C. 2945.71 sets forth the statutory right to a speedy trial in Ohio 
and catalogs three classifications of persons against whom a charge is pending, 
dependent upon the degree of the offense with which the person is charged.  
Subdivision (A) pertains to “a person against whom a charge is pending in a court 
not of record, or against whom a charge of minor misdemeanor is pending in a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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court of record.”  (Emphasis added.)  Subdivision (B) pertains to “a person 
against whom a charge of misdemeanor, other than a minor misdemeanor, is 
pending in a court of record.”  (Emphasis added.)  And, thirdly, insofar as is 
relevant here, subsection (C) specifies:  
{¶ 24} “A person against whom a charge of felony is pending:  
{¶ 25} “ * * *  
{¶ 26} “(2) Shall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after 
the person’s arrest.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 27} Reading the statute in its entirety in order to discern the legislative 
intent, it is apparent to me that this statute applies only to persons against whom 
charges are pending. 
{¶ 28} More relevant here is the fact that the only subsection of this statute 
that applies to this case is subsection (C), which has as its predicate that it applies 
only to a person against whom a charge of felony is pending.  While the majority 
and dissenting opinions discuss which is the more preferable interpretation of this 
statute, the language used by the General Assembly does not refer to the 
circumstance confronting Sandra Azbell in this case:  that of being arrested but 
not charged.  No subsection of R.C. 2945.71 pertains to the circumstance in which 
a person has been arrested but not charged; nor does the statute require that upon 
arrest, a charge must be presented against that person within any stated time 
period.  Rather, this statute applies only to those who have charges pending 
against them. 
{¶ 29} In my view, this case does not implicate Azbell’s constitutional 
rights; the statutory definition of “speedy trial” in Ohio is contained in R.C. 
2945.71, and the plain language of that statute mandates that “[a] person against 
whom a charge of felony is pending * * * (2) [s]hall be brought to trial within two 
hundred seventy days after the person’s arrest.”  This statute does not specify any 
time within which the state must present charges. 
January Term, 2006 
9 
{¶ 30} Although the police arrested and questioned Azbell on May 30, 
2003, they released her less than an hour later and presented no charge against her 
until nearly 11 months later.  Accordingly, because R.C. 2945.71 applies only to 
those against whom a charge is pending, she cannot claim that the speedy-trial 
statute applied to her May 2003 arrest.  It does not.  For these reasons, I concur in 
the judgment reversing the decision to the contrary of the court of appeals. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 31} I respectfully dissent.  A person has constitutional speedy-trial 
protections guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  “In Ohio, beginning with the 
year 1869, this constitutional right, described as of ‘amorphous quality’ in Barker 
v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 522 [92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101], has been the 
subject of legislative enactment designed to quantify the right to a speedy trial in a 
more specific time frame.”  State v. Pachay (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 218, 219, 18 
O.O.3d 427, 416 N.E.2d 589. 
{¶ 32} The speedy-trial statute, R.C. 2945.71, requires that a person 
charged with a felony be brought to trial within 270 days after the person’s arrest.  
This is distinguished from the more “amorphous” constitutional right.  Under 
constitutional jurisprudence, the delay from accusation to trial becomes “ 
‘presumptively prejudicial’ at least as it approaches one year.”  Doggett v. United 
States (1992), 505 U.S. 647, 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520, fn.1; State v. 
Triplett (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 566, 569, 679 N.E.2d 290. 
{¶ 33} This case, then, becomes a question of statutory interpretation.  The 
majority reads the statute to determine that arrest is modified by the charge 
pending — that is, a defendant’s speedy-trial clock does not begin to run until 
after the indictment has been handed up and the person has been arrested.  I 
believe this is a tortured reading of the statute and bad public policy. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 34} R.C. 2945.71 establishes the time within which persons charged 
with different categories of crimes must be brought to trial.  The first three 
subsections list the three major categories of criminal offenses: minor 
misdemeanors, misdemeanors other than minor misdemeanors, and felonies.  
These three categories tell the reader under which subsection the reader will find 
the appropriate time period in which the defendant must be brought to trial.  
Subsection (C) begins, “A person against whom a charge of felony is pending.”  
This clause means the person has already been indicted or subject to a bill of 
information when the motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation is made.  In 
this case, a felony of the fifth degree is currently pending against the defendant 
Azbell.  Subsection (C)(2) requires that she “be brought to trial within two 
hundred seventy days after [her] arrest.”  It simply says “arrest”; it does not say 
“arrest after indictment,” or “arrest after a warrant is issued.”  Azbell was arrested 
on May 30, 2003.  She was taken to the police station, given Miranda warnings, 
photographed, and fingerprinted.  That is an arrest.  Her freedom was curtailed.  
The plain language of the statute required that she be brought to trial no later than 
February 25, 2004.  Our precedent also supports this conclusion. 
{¶ 35} First, it is important to distinguish previous speedy-trial 
jurisprudence.  Case-law precedent usually resolves an issue relating to the time 
period between the indictment and trial.  Generally, preindictment delay has not 
been found to be a violation of the speedy-trial guarantee.  State v. Luck (1984), 
15 Ohio St.3d 150, 15 OBR 296, 472 N.E.2d 1097.  Under traditional analysis, 
the statute of limitations and the Due Process Clause protect criminal defendants 
from delay between the alleged criminal incident and indictment, and the speedy-
trial provisions protect the criminal defendant from delay between indictment and 
trial.  United States v. Lovasco (1977), 431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 
L.Ed.2d 752, quoting United States v. Ewell (1966), 383 U.S. 116, 122, 86 S.Ct. 
773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627, and United States v. Marion (1971), 404 U.S. 307, 324, 92 
January Term, 2006 
11 
S.Ct.455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (“We * * *note that statutes of limitations, which 
provide predictable, legislatively enacted limits on prosecutorial delay, provide ‘ 
“the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges.” ’ * * * But 
we * * *acknowledge that the ‘statute of limitations does not fully define 
[defendants'] rights with respect to the events occurring prior to indictment,’ * * * 
and that the Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against 
oppressive delay”); State v. Bartnes (1988), 234 Mont. 522, 525, 764 P.2d 1271. 
{¶ 36} However, on at least one occasion, this court has looked at 
preindictment delay under a speedy-trial analysis.  We have previously adopted 
the language of the North Carolina Supreme Court: 
{¶ 37} “ ‘The situation of one against whom a warrant has been issued but 
not served and that of “the potential defendant” — the suspect who has not been 
formally charged — is practically the same. * * *  
{¶ 38} “ ‘* * * 
{¶ 39} “ ‘We can see little, if any, difference in the dilemma which 
unreasonable delay creates for the suspect who was belatedly charged, the 
accused named in a warrant promptly issued but belatedly served, and the indicted 
defendant whose trial has been unduly postponed. The same considerations which 
impel prompt action in the one situation are equally critical in the others.’ ” State 
v. Meeker (1971) 26 Ohio St.2d 9, 16, 55 O.O.2d 5, 268 N.E.2d 589, quoting 
State v. Johnson (1969), 275 N.C. 264, 271-272, 167 S.E.2d 274.   
{¶ 40} And we held, “Considering the basic purposes of the constitutional 
right to a ‘speedy trial,’ we conclude that such constitutional guarantees are 
applicable to unjustifiable delays in commencing prosecution as well as to 
unjustifiable delays after indictment.”  Id. at 16-17, 55 O.O.2d 5, 268 N.E.2d 589. 
{¶ 41} More convincingly, in Dillingham v. United States (1975), 423 
U.S. 64, 96 S.Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed.2d 205, there was a 22-month delay from arrest 
until indictment.  While Dillingham, unlike Azbell, was required to post bond 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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prior to his release, United States v. Palmer (C.A.5, 1974), 502 F.2d 1233, 1234 
(same case), he was not indicted until 22 months after his initial arrest.  The court 
held that United States v. Marion (1971), 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 
468, which had denied Sixth Amendment protections to preindictment delays, had 
been limited to “count[ing] a delay between the end of the criminal scheme 
charged and the indictment of a suspect not arrested or otherwise charged 
previous to the indictment.” Dillingham at 64, 96 S.Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed.2d 205.  In 
extending the speedy-trial guarantee to the period after an arrest, the court held: 
{¶ 42} “ ‘To legally arrest and detain, the Government must assert 
probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Arrest is a public 
act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on 
bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, 
curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, 
his family and his friends. 
{¶ 43} “ ‘Invocation of the speedy trial provision thus need not await 
indictment, information, or other formal charge.’ ” Id. at 65, 96 S.Ct. 303, 46 
L.Ed.2d 205, quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 320-321, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468. 
{¶ 44} When the police and prosecutor have all the necessary evidence to 
obtain an indictment or warrant, they should not be allowed to delay prosecution.  
I am not suggesting that the state be rushed into seeking an indictment before all 
possible evidence has been obtained.  However, in the case at bar, Azbell was 
arrested while allegedly attempting to purchase a controlled substance with a 
fraudulent prescription, and she was later indicted for that offense.  The state had 
in its possession all the evidence it needed to go forward at the time of her arrest.  
The state has presented no evidence, and there is nothing in the record to suggest, 
that the 11-month delay between arrest and indictment was based upon a lengthy 
and diligent search for additional evidence.  When all evidence is in the hands of 
the police, the state must move forward.  See People v. Hryciuk (1967), 36 Ill.2d 
January Term, 2006 
13 
500, 224 N.E.2d 250; see, also, People v. Hartman (1985), 170 Cal.App.3d 572, 
216 Cal. Rptr. 641. 
{¶ 45} For 11 months, Azbell lived under the threat of indictment, 
wondering whether the state was intending to prosecute her or whether her case 
had been dropped.  Azbell was under no obligation to pressure the state to press 
charges, nor was she in a position to demand that the state move forward with its 
prosecution.  See Meeker, 26 Ohio St.2d at 18, 55 O.O.2d 5, 268 N.E.2d 589; 
Johnson, 275 N.C. at 272, 167 S.E.2d 274. 
{¶ 46} I am not suggesting that every preindictment delay warrants 
analysis under the speedy-trial provisions of the United States and Ohio 
Constitutions.  Rather, in cases such as this where the statute is arguably unclear, 
or open to different interpretations, our speedy-trial jurisprudence suggests that 
we should read the statute to benefit the defendant. 
{¶ 47} I read the plain words of the statute to say that a person accused of 
a felony must be brought to trial within 270 days of her arrest.  Azbell was 
arrested on May 30, 2003; that the state took 11 months to gain an indictment is 
not her fault. 
{¶ 48} For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
James J. Mayer Jr., Richland County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten L. 
Pscholka-Gartner, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and J. Banning Jasiunas, 
Assistant State Public Defender, for appellee. 
______________________