Title: Patel v. Martin

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12500 
 
JAY PATEL & another1  vs.  LEO MARTIN & others.2 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     September 6, 2018. - November 28, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Civil, Discovery, Interlocutory appeal.  Attorney at 
Law, Attorney-client relationship.  Privileged 
Communication. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 23, 2015. 
 
 
A motion for a protective order was heard by Jeffrey A. 
Locke, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Peter S. Brooks (Gregory M. Boucher also present) for the 
defendants. 
 
David V. Lawler for the plaintiffs. 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Dipika, Inc. 
 
 
2 Seymour H. Marcus, also known as Sy H. Marcus; and Ellen 
Rea Marcus, as trustee of the Grossman Munroe Trust.  Leo Martin 
and Seymour Marcus are alleged to have acted on behalf of the 
Grossman Munroe Trust, but only Ellen Rea Marcus was a trustee. 
2 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The primary issue on appeal is whether a party 
in a civil case has the right to an immediate appeal from a 
discovery order under the doctrine of present execution.  The 
defendants here argue that, after the motion judge ordered the 
disclosure of communications that they contend are protected 
from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege, they will be 
irremediably harmed if they cannot immediately appeal from that 
order.  We conclude that a party has no such right of 
interlocutory appeal.  In so holding, we note that a party 
nevertheless retains two other avenues to seek immediate 
appellate review of an interlocutory order:  by requesting the 
trial court judge to report the decision to the Appeals Court 
under Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 
(1996); or by petitioning for redress from a single justice of 
the Appeals Court under G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par. 
 
Although the appeal is not properly before us under the 
doctrine of present execution, we exercise our discretion under 
our superintendence authority to reach the merits and conclude 
that we must remand the matter to the motion judge for further 
factual findings. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts as alleged in the 
complaint and that are undisputed in the record.  In September 
2012, Ellen Rea Marcus, as trustee of the Grossman Munroe Trust 
3 
 
 
(trustee), executed a purchase and sale agreement with the 
Masonic Temple Association of Quincy, Inc. (Masons), for the 
purchase of the Masonic Temple in Quincy (property).  Pursuant 
to a rider to the purchase and sale agreement, the agreement 
could not be assigned by the trustee without the prior written 
consent of the Masons.  In a separate agreement executed in 
April 2013, the trustee assigned the rights to the property 
under the purchase and sale agreement to Jay Patel in return for 
$100,000; Patel intended to develop a hotel on the property.  On 
September 30, 2013, before the sale of the property closed, a 
fire caused severe damage to the property.  Shortly thereafter, 
the Masons claimed that they had never consented to the 
assignment, refused to recognize it, and received over $6 
million from an insurance claim arising from the fire.  In 
December 2015, Patel and his "hotel-operating company," Dipika, 
Inc. (collectively, developer plaintiffs), brought a civil 
action in the Superior Court against the trustee, Seymour H. 
Marcus, and Leo Martin (collectively, trust defendants), 
claiming that they suffered economic damages from the trustee's 
failure to obtain the required consent for the assignment of the 
property. 
 
During the course of discovery, the developer plaintiffs 
noticed the deposition of David Levin, the attorney who 
represented the Masons with respect to the sale of the property 
4 
 
 
and who had also routinely represented the trust defendants on 
real estate legal matters for over twenty years.  The trust 
defendants moved for a protective order to bar Levin from 
disclosing his confidential attorney-client communications with 
them, claiming that Levin represented them as well as the Masons 
in the real estate transaction concerning the property, even 
though Levin took the position that he had represented only the 
Masons. 
 
After an evidentiary hearing, the motion judge found that 
there was an attorney-client relationship between Levin and the 
trust defendants after the fire regarding insurance claims and 
third-party claims arising from the fire, but that, with respect 
to the purchase and sale of the property, Levin represented the 
Masons, not the trust defendants.  He therefore ruled that 
communications between Levin and the trust defendants before the 
fire were not protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
 
The trust defendants filed a notice of appeal in the 
Superior Court seeking review by an Appeals Court panel under 
the doctrine of present execution and, "in an abundance of 
caution," also brought a petition in the Appeals Court pursuant 
to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., seeking interlocutory relief 
from a single justice of the Appeals Court.  The single justice 
stayed action on the § 118 petition until a panel of the Appeals 
Court decided whether it had jurisdiction of the appeal under 
5 
 
 
the doctrine of present execution to resolve the discovery 
dispute arising from the claim of attorney-client privilege.  We 
transferred the appeal to this court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Appellate review of interlocutory orders.  
When a final judgment enters in a civil case in the Superior 
Court under Mass. R. Civ. P. 54, as amended, 382 Mass. 829 
(1981), a party aggrieved has the right to appeal from the 
judgment to a panel of the Appeals Court.  See G. L. c. 231, 
§ 113.  As part of that appeal, a party may claim that a judge 
erred in the entry of various types of interlocutory orders that 
were issued during the course of the civil case.  If a party 
wishes to seek appellate review of an interlocutory discovery 
order before the entry of final judgment, however, the party 
generally has only two alternatives.  First, the party may ask 
the judge under Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a) to report the 
interlocutory finding or order to the Appeals Court, and the 
judge may do so where he or she concludes that the finding or 
order "so affects the merits of the controversy that the matter 
ought to be determined by the [A]ppeals [C]ourt before any 
further proceedings in the trial court."  Mass. R. Civ. P. 
64 (a).  Second, the party has the right to petition for relief 
under G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., from a single justice of 
the Appeals Court, who may, in his or her discretion, grant the 
relief.  The single justice also has the authority to transfer 
6 
 
 
the petition to a panel of the Appeals Court, where it will be 
treated as a full interlocutory appeal.  See McMenimen v. 
Passatempo, 452 Mass. 178, 187 (2008), citing CUNA Mut. Ins. 
Soc'y v. Attorney Gen., 380 Mass. 539, 540 (1980).  But a party 
has no right under § 118, first par., to bring the petition 
directly to a panel or to seek review of the single justice's 
ruling by the panel.  See McMenimen, supra at 189-190; Corbett 
v. Kargman, 369 Mass. 971, 971-972 (1976). 
 
However, in narrowly limited circumstances, where "an 
interlocutory order will interfere with rights in a way that 
cannot be remedied on appeal" from a final judgment, and where 
the order is "collateral to the underlying dispute in the case" 
and therefore will not be decided at trial, a party may obtain 
full appellate review of an interlocutory order under our 
doctrine of present execution.  Maddocks v. Ricker, 403 Mass. 
592, 596, 598 (1988).  See Marcus v. Newton, 462 Mass. 148, 151-
152 (2012); Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 779-780 (1979).3  
The doctrine is intended to be invoked narrowly to avoid 
                                                          
 
 
3 The phrase "doctrine of present execution" appears to 
derive from Vincent v. Plecker, 319 Mass. 560, 564 n.2 (1946), 
where this court, in deciding whether an order was appealable as 
a "final decree," noted, "Though part of a single controversy 
remains undetermined, if the decree is to be executed presently, 
so that appeal would be futile unless the decree could be 
vacated by the prompt entry of an appeal in the full court, the 
decree is a final one."  We first used the phrase "doctrine of 
present execution" in Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 780 
(1979). 
7 
 
 
piecemeal appeals from interlocutory decisions that will delay 
the resolution of the trial court case, increase the over-all 
cost of the litigation, and burden our appellate courts.  See 
Borman, supra at 779.  See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981). 
 
Our doctrine of present execution is similar to the Federal 
"collateral order doctrine," which permits full appellate review 
of a small class of collateral interlocutory decisions "that are 
conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the 
merits, and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the 
final judgment in the underlying action."  Mohawk Indus., Inc. 
v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009), quoting Swint v. 
Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995).  But, as we note 
later, the application of the Federal collateral order doctrine 
has at times varied from our application of the doctrine of 
present execution.  See note 4, infra. 
 
In civil cases, we have granted "the right to an immediate 
appeal under the doctrine of present execution where protection 
from the burden of litigation and trial is precisely the right 
to which [a party] asserts an entitlement."  Estate of Moulton 
v. Puopolo, 467 Mass. 478, 485 (2014).  Thus, for example, we 
allow immediate appeals from an order denying a motion to 
dismiss by a government official who claims absolute or 
qualified immunity, because the purpose of such immunity is to 
8 
 
 
protect public officials from the burden of litigation itself.  
Duarte v. Healy, 405 Mass. 43, 44 n.2 (1989).  If the motion to 
dismiss were denied in error, the official would have to defend 
the litigation, which is precisely what the immunity is designed 
to prevent; even if the erroneous order were ultimately reversed 
after trial, the right to immunity from suit would still have 
been "lost forever."  Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 688 
(1999).  Similarly, the doctrine has been applied to allow an 
immediate appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss under 
the "anti-SLAPP" statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H, which was enacted 
to protect those exercising their rights of petition and speech 
from lawsuits intended to chill their exercise of those rights 
by the threat of costly and time-consuming litigation.  See 
Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 477 Mass. 141, 157-158 
(2017); Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 
161 (1998).  The interests of defendants under the anti-SLAPP 
statute cannot be adequately vindicated on appeal from a final 
judgment, because they will already have suffered the burdens of 
litigation arising from their exercise of protected rights.  See 
Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 521 (2002). 
 
We have also allowed immediate appeal from an interlocutory 
order disqualifying a party's counsel in a civil case under the 
doctrine of present execution.  We concluded that an order 
depriving a party of his or her choice of counsel, if error, 
9 
 
 
cannot realistically be remedied on appeal from a final 
judgment.  Maddocks, 403 Mass. at 600.  Even if the appellate 
court were to determine that the judge erred in disqualifying 
the attorney, "[i]n practice, . . . it is unlikely that an 
appellate court would reverse a judgment and require a new trial 
in the absence of a demonstration, almost impossible to make, 
that any erroneous disqualification order significantly 
prejudiced the rights of the client."  Id.4 
 
We have not, however, generally allowed interlocutory 
discovery orders to be immediately appealable under the doctrine 
of present execution.  See Cronin v. Strayer, 392 Mass. 525, 527 
(1984).  The United States Supreme Court has also not generally 
allowed such appeals under the collateral order doctrine.  
Mohawk Indus., Inc., 558 U.S. at 108, quoting Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., 449 U.S. at 377 ("we have generally denied review of 
pretrial discovery orders"). 
                                                          
 
 
4 The United States Supreme Court has concluded under its 
collateral order doctrine that an order disqualifying counsel in 
a civil case is not immediately appealable.  Richardson-Merrell, 
Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 440 (1985).  In response to the 
argument that a disqualification order will effectively be 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment because of the 
difficulty in showing that the party suffered prejudice, the 
Court declared that "the difficulties in proving prejudice . . . 
go more to the issue of the showing required to reverse a final 
judgment than to whether a disqualification order should be 
subject to immediate appeal."  Id. at 438.  "Absent a 
requirement of prejudice, the propriety of the trial court's 
disqualification order can be reviewed as effectively on appeal 
of a final judgment as on an interlocutory appeal."  Id. 
10 
 
 
 
The trust defendants contend that the judge's partial 
denial of their motion for a protective order regarding their 
communications with Levin deprives them of their right to 
protect privileged attorney-client communications from 
disclosure to third parties, and that this right cannot be 
adequately vindicated on appeal after final judgment because the 
confidentiality of those privileged communications, once 
disclosed, cannot be restored.  They also contend that the 
subject of the interlocutory appeal -- the existence of an 
attorney-client relationship regarding the property transaction 
between Levin and the trust defendants before the fire -- is 
collateral to the merits of the controversy, which concerns the 
assignment of the purchase and sale agreement to Patel. 
 
In response, the developer plaintiffs argue that a partial 
denial of a motion for protective order is ultimately a 
discovery order, and that litigation should not generally be 
interrupted by allowing piecemeal appeals from such orders.  
They contend that the trust defendants may challenge the order 
on appeal after final judgment and, if the order is determined 
to be error, they can seek a remedy of a new trial where the 
attorney-client communications that were disclosed, and all 
information derived from those disclosures, are excluded from 
evidence. 
11 
 
 
 
The trust defendants make fair points, but the developer 
plaintiffs have the better argument.  The trust defendants are 
correct that the existence of an attorney-client relationship 
between Levin and the trust defendants regarding the sale of the 
property is an issue that is collateral to any issue that will 
be decided at trial.  They are also correct about the importance 
of protecting the confidentiality of privileged attorney-client 
communications in order to encourage "full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients."  Upjohn Co. 
v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).  And we recognize 
that, if those communications are indeed privileged and are 
disclosed in discovery, a successful postjudgment appeal cannot 
change the fact that communications that the trust defendants 
intended to be confidential will have been disclosed to the 
developer plaintiffs. 
 
But we agree with the developer plaintiffs that, although a 
successful postjudgment appeal cannot entirely eliminate the 
harm that arises from an order allowing third parties to learn 
the content of privileged communications, the trust defendants 
do have a viable postjudgment remedy.  Unlike an order 
disqualifying a party's counsel, the consequences of an adverse 
discovery order can be ascertained, the prejudice identified, 
and the error remedied by barring the use of any evidence 
derived from the protected communications at a new trial or 
12 
 
 
other subsequent proceeding.  See Borman, 378 Mass. at 782 
("review [of order to testify at depositions] after a definitive 
determination of rights and liabilities would not be futile").  
See also Mohawk Indus., Inc., 558 U.S. at 109 ("vacating an 
adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial in which the 
protected material and its fruits are excluded from evidence" is 
adequate remedy to erroneous disclosure of privileged material).  
In short, an appellate court on postjudgment appeal cannot 
prevent privileged communications from having been disclosed to 
the developer plaintiffs, but it can protect the trust 
defendants from the harm arising from those communications 
having been used against them at trial.  If the trust defendants 
were prejudiced at trial by the admission of evidence derived 
from the privileged communications revealed pursuant to the 
order, an appellate court may grant them a new trial, where no 
evidence derived from those communications will be admitted. 
 
Notably, the trust defendants here are claiming a right of 
immediate appeal from a discovery order, which commonly involves 
claims of denial of rights or invasions of privilege.  See 
Borman, 378 Mass. at 784 (orders compelling witness testimony 
"are among the most common of everyday incidents to the process 
of disposing of cases, and objections on the ground of privilege 
. . . are frequently raised" [citation omitted]).  Discovery 
orders may direct a witness to testify at a deposition about 
13 
 
 
information that a witness claims would be self-incriminating, 
see id. at 781-782, or that a witness claims is protected by 
various privileges other than the attorney-client privilege, 
such as the spousal privilege or the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.  Discovery issues regarding the scope of the 
attorney-client privilege -- and its application to documents 
sought in discovery -- may arise whenever a party produces a 
privilege log identifying documents that the party refuses to 
disclose because they purportedly contain protected attorney-
client communications or attorney work product.  Whenever a 
judge orders disclosure in any of these discovery disputes, the 
aggrieved party can claim that its rights cannot be fully 
vindicated on appeal, because otherwise protected communications 
or documents will be revealed that the party was entitled to 
keep confidential.  But if that intrinsic harm were to suffice 
to make all such discovery orders appealable under the doctrine 
of present execution, we would be inviting "the inundation of 
appellate dockets with what have heretofore been regarded as 
nonappealable matters" (citation omitted), Cronin, 392 Mass. at 
529, with the resulting delays and increased litigation costs 
that come with piecemeal interlocutory appeals.  Where a 
postjudgment appeal offers a viable, albeit imperfect, remedy, 
we will not grant a right to interlocutory appeal from a 
discovery order simply because it involves an issue of 
14 
 
 
privilege.  We thus conclude that orders requiring the 
disclosure of privileged material, such as the order in this 
case, are not categorically irremediable, and therefore are not 
appealable under the doctrine of present execution.5 
 
We note that our analysis is consistent with that of other 
courts.  The Supreme Court was confronted with this same 
question, interpreting the Federal collateral order doctrine, in 
Mohawk Indus., Inc., 558 U.S. at 103.  Explaining that the Court 
"routinely require[s] litigants to wait until after final 
judgment to vindicate valuable rights, including rights central 
to our adversarial system," id. at 108-109, the Court noted that 
an erroneous privilege disclosure order is akin to other common 
errors that may take place throughout the life of a case.  The 
                                                          
 
 
5 The trust defendants note that we stated in Preventive 
Med. Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 810, 823 (2013), 
that the harm to a party from the disclosure of privileged 
attorney-client communications to an adversary "could be 
irreparable."  We recognized the potential for irreparable harm 
in that case in the context of requiring judicial supervision of 
the protocol used by the Commonwealth to search the electronic 
mail (e-mail) messages of a criminal defendant -- which were 
seized pursuant to a search warrant -- where the e-mail messages 
may contain privileged attorney-client communications, not in 
the context of deciding whether to allow an immediate appeal 
from a discovery order in a civil case under the doctrine of 
present execution.  See id.  We recognize here that there is 
intrinsic irreparable harm where a judge erroneously orders the 
disclosure of privileged communications, but conclude that this 
intrinsic harm alone does not suffice to require a right to 
interlocutory appeal under the doctrine of present execution 
where there is a viable postjudgment remedy for the use of this 
privileged information against the party at trial. 
15 
 
 
Court concluded that such errors may be remedied in the same way 
as other erroneous evidentiary rulings:  by reversing the 
judgment and remanding for further proceedings in which the 
protected material and its fruits are inadmissible in evidence.  
Id.  For those reasons, interlocutory appeals from attorney-
client privilege disclosure orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 are 
not permitted as of right under the Federal collateral order 
doctrine.  Id. at 114.  Numerous State appellate courts have 
reached the same conclusion as a matter of State law.  See, 
e.g., Melia v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 202 Conn. 252, 258-259 
(1987); Expedia, Inc. v. Columbus, 305 Ga. App. 450, 453 (2010); 
Abrams v. Cades, Schutte, Fleming & Wright, 88 Haw. 319, 325 
(1998). 
 
Ultimately, the doctrine of present execution represents a 
balancing act that weighs the harm to cost-effective litigation 
arising from piecemeal interlocutory appeals against the harm 
that a litigant may suffer from a trial court order that is 
irremediable on postjudgment appeal.  We conclude that the sheer 
volume of potential appeals that would be permitted by including 
privilege-related discovery orders within the doctrine of 
present execution, and the inevitable adverse impact on judicial 
efficiency, outweighs the intrinsic harm that potentially might 
be suffered by an aggrieved party who is denied an immediate 
right to appeal. 
16 
 
 
 
In reaching this balance, we note that denying a litigant 
the right to a full interlocutory appeal under the doctrine of 
present execution does not bar a litigant from moving or 
petitioning for immediate appellate review of an interlocutory 
order.  Where a party believes that the legal questions at issue 
regarding a discovery order are so significant or novel that 
they warrant interlocutory appeal, the party may generally 
request the Superior Court judge to report the decision to the 
Appeals Court under Mass. R. Civ. P. 64.  Or the party may 
petition a single justice of the Appeals Court under G. L. 
c. 231, § 118, first par., and seek redress from the single 
justice, as the trust defendants did here, or ask the single 
justice to refer the petition to a full panel of the Appeals 
Court.  And where a party or nonparty feels so strongly about 
the injustice of an order compelling discovery that it is 
willing to suffer the sanctions that might arise from disobeying 
the order, the party or witness can obtain full appellate review 
of the order as a matter of right by refusing to comply with the 
order and appealing from the resulting order of dismissal or 
contempt.  See Cronin, 392 Mass. at 528, citing Matter of Roche, 
381 Mass. 624, 625 n.1 (1980).6  We are satisfied that this 
                                                          
 
 
6 We recognize that, as here, an attorney who denies the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship with the moving 
party regarding the subject matter of the litigation is not 
going to refuse to testify and risk a contempt finding.  But we 
17 
 
 
collection of alternative remedies will adequately protect the 
rights of litigants who are egregiously harmed by interlocutory 
discovery orders. 
 
2.  Partial denial of motion for protective order based on 
trust defendants' claim of attorney-client privilege.  Having 
concluded that the trust defendants are not entitled under the 
doctrine of present execution to appeal from the partial denial 
of their motion for a protective order, based on their claim 
that they had an attorney-client relationship with Levin 
regarding the sale of the property before the fire, we have two 
options.  We can exercise our discretion under our 
superintendence authority to reach the merits of this appeal, 
where the issue "has been briefed fully by the parties . . . 
[and] raises a significant issue" regarding attorney-client 
relationships and the doctrine of privilege, "and addressing it 
would be in the public interest."  Marcus, 462 Mass. at 153.  Or 
we can dismiss the appeal, and allow the single justice of the 
Appeals Court to decide the G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., 
petition that he stayed pending resolution of the appeal.  We 
                                                          
 
decline to grant a right of interlocutory appeal to a party in a 
civil proceeding simply because that avenue of appeal is not 
available.  We do not address whether a right of interlocutory 
appeal would be appropriate in these circumstances if the appeal 
concerned a privilege issue in a criminal or grand jury 
proceeding. Cf. Matter of a R.I. Grand Jury Subpoena, 414 Mass. 
104, 110 (1993); Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 411 Mass. 489, 
494 (1992). 
18 
 
 
exercise the first option, and after considering the trust 
defendants' argument, we conclude that the motion judge's order 
cannot stand based on the limited findings that he made.  We 
therefore vacate his order and remand the matter to the motion 
judge for further factual findings and reconsideration of the 
motion in light of those additional findings.  We express no 
view as to how the motion should ultimately be decided.  After 
the judge makes those findings and issues a new order, the 
aggrieved party may avail itself of the options we have 
identified for interlocutory appellate review -- i.e., 
requesting the judge to report his ruling to a panel of the 
Appeals Court or filing a petition under § 118, first par. -- 
but, for reasons we have already explained, will not be entitled 
to an interlocutory appeal under the doctrine of present 
execution. 
 
a.  Standard of review.  A judge's ultimate conclusion as 
to whether an attorney-client relationship existed is a mixed 
question of law and fact, which we review de novo.  See McCarthy 
v. Slade Assocs., Inc., 463 Mass. 181, 190 (2012), quoting 
Commissioner of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 453 Mass. 293, 303 
(2009) ("Mixed questions of law and fact, such as whether there 
has been a waiver, generally receive de novo review"); 2 P.R. 
Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States § 11.38, at 
1253-1255 (2017) (most questions concerning issues of attorney-
19 
 
 
client privilege involve "a mixture of law and fact").  In doing 
so, we accept a judge's findings of fact "unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge . . . the credibility of the 
witnesses."  Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1408 
(1996). 
 
b.  Summary of the evidence and the judge's findings.  It 
was undisputed that Levin represented the Masons, as the sellers 
of the property, in connection with the purchase and sale 
agreement, and that he was identified as their attorney of 
record on the agreement that was signed in September 2012.  The 
question before the judge was whether Levin had also established 
an attorney-client relationship with the trust defendants, who 
were the buyers in this transaction.  Levin testified that he 
had not; the trust defendants testified that he had. 
 
Levin acknowledged that he had represented the trust 
defendants in a large number of matters, including real estate 
matters, for over twenty years, and that he did over ninety per 
cent of the trust defendants' legal work. He testified that, in 
the spring of 2012, when he learned that the trust defendants 
were seeking to make an offer on the property, he was 
representing the trust defendants in a number of other real 
estate transactions.  In Levin's electronic mail messages with 
the trust defendants, he discussed the purchase and sale 
20 
 
 
agreement in conjunction with other pending matters.  The trust 
defendants and Levin agreed that, because he was representing 
the Masons as the sellers, the trust defendants would identify 
Miriam Marcus as their attorney of record in the agreement.  
Levin admitted that he never communicated with Miriam Marcus, 
and instead communicated directly with the trust defendants 
because he knew that Martin always negotiated real estate 
transactions personally.  Levin sent draft documents to the 
trust defendants for review, prepared a power of attorney form 
for Martin so that he could sign the purchase and sale agreement 
on behalf of the Grossman Munroe Trust, and acknowledged having 
"many conversations" with Martin concerning the transaction 
after the agreement was signed in September 2012, particularly 
about deadlines in the agreement and seeking an extension to 
perform due diligence obligations.  Levin also testified that he 
discussed with the trust defendants their concerns about 
financing, construction, and permits related to the division of 
condominium units on the property; those issues were 
incorporated into a rider to the purchase and sale agreement.  
Levin billed the Masons and the trust defendants each one-half 
of his fee in connection with the purchase and sale transaction.  
The bill sent to the trust defendants listed the Masonic Temple 
transaction with other pending real estate matters on which he 
represented the trust defendants. 
21 
 
 
 
Throughout his testimony, Levin contended that he never 
provided particularized legal advice or assistance to the trust 
defendants in connection with the sale of the property, but did 
provide advice "affect[ing] both sides" at group meetings 
regarding various issues.  Levin characterized his role in the 
matter as a simple one:  the parties had discussed agreed-upon 
terms, and he worked to memorialize them into a working purchase 
and sale agreement.  He made himself available to answer 
questions from the defendants, but he described these 
communications as "direction, not [advice]."  Levin testified 
that he explicitly told the trust defendants that he would not 
be able to represent them in the purchase and sale transaction. 
 
The trust defendants disputed Levin's testimony.  Seymour 
Marcus testified that Levin had explicitly told him that Levin 
was going to represent both sides, and that Levin had 
represented opposing parties to a transaction with them before, 
in the context of lenders and borrowers and also buyers and 
sellers.  Marcus stated that Levin offered particularized legal 
advice in meetings -- without the Masons present -- on 
permitting and construction issues regarding the property and on 
what "[his] liabilities are to the Masons."  He said that Levin 
instructed them to list Miriam Marcus as their attorney solely 
as a formality. 
22 
 
 
 
Martin testified that he never executed a real estate 
transaction without representation, and virtually always used 
Levin to negotiate agreements and draft documents.  Martin 
contradicted Levin's testimony that Levin merely wrote the terms 
that the parties had agreed upon, claiming that Levin proposed 
amendments to the purchase and sale agreement and made 
suggestions and comments throughout the negotiation process.  
Martin also testified that Levin never told the trust defendants 
that he would be unable to represent them.  Rather, Martin 
testified, Levin made clear that he was representing both sides, 
and asked the trust defendants to list Miriam Marcus as their 
attorney only to avoid the appearance of impropriety. 
 
At the close of the evidentiary hearing, the judge 
announced his findings and subsequent order.  Because it was 
undisputed that the trust defendants approached Levin for legal 
advice -- and indeed received such advice -- regarding their 
exposure to insurer claims and other liability after the fire, 
the judge first found that there was an attorney-client 
relationship between Levin and the trust defendants after the 
fire.  With respect to the matters involving the purchase and 
sale agreement before the fire, the judge found that the Masons 
and the trust defendants shared a common interest in the sale, 
transfer, and development of the property, but not a common 
23 
 
 
interest in the sense "that their interests were aligned with 
regard to this transaction."  He noted: 
"[A] purchase and sale agreement generally is designed to 
protect the rights and enforce the obligations of a buyer 
and seller, which almost by definition are antagonistic one 
to the other.  And in a transaction of this complexity, it 
seems impossible that a single attorney could represent 
both sides in a very complex and sophisticated real estate 
transaction." 
 
The judge continued: 
 
 
"I accept the testimony as I've heard it that there 
was a longstanding relationship between Mr. Levin and 
Mr. Marcus and his various ventures that extended 
perhaps up to [twenty-five] years and involved 
countless real estate transactions . . . where Mr. 
Levin served essentially as in-house counsel for Mr. 
Marcus and his various holdings.  And I acknowledge 
that . . . any communications [with Levin] as to all 
of those real estate transactions in the past would 
fall under the attorney-client umbrella that Mr. Levin 
had with Mr. Marcus and his entities.  That does not 
mean in this particular transaction, however, that 
. . . Mr. Levin necessarily represented Mr. Marcus and 
Mr. Martin. 
 
 
 
"A party asserting a privilege has the burden of 
proving that the privilege exists.  I don't find in 
this case that the [trust defendants have] proved to 
my satisfaction that Mr. Levin acted as the attorney 
for Mr. Marcus and Mr. Martin with regard to the 
negotiations leading to the signing of a [purchase and 
sale agreement] or with regard to negotiations leading 
to an extension of that [purchase and sale 
agreement]." 
 
The judge thus found that there was no attorney-client 
relationship between the trust defendants and Levin with respect 
to the purchase and sale transaction before the fire. 
24 
 
 
 
c.  Analysis.  On appeal, the trust defendants do not 
contend that there was an express contract whereby Levin agreed 
to represent them with respect to the Masonic Temple purchase 
and sale transaction.  Rather, they argue that the attorney-
client relationship was implied as a matter of law by the 
conduct of the parties, particularly based on their reasonable 
belief that Levin was representing them.  An attorney-client 
relationship may be impliedly formed "when (1) a person seeks 
advice or assistance from an attorney, (2) the advice or 
assistance sought pertains to matters within the attorney's 
professional competence, and (3) the attorney expressly or 
impliedly agrees to give or actually gives the desired advice or 
assistance. . . .  In appropriate cases the third element may be 
established by proof of detrimental reliance, when the person 
seeking legal services reasonably relies on the attorney to 
provide them and the attorney, aware of such reliance, does 
nothing to negate it" (citation omitted).  DeVaux v. American 
Home Assur. Co., 387 Mass. 814, 817-818 (1983). 
 
The judge's findings raise issues both of law and of fact, 
none of which can be resolved without remand to the motion judge 
for further findings.  The issue of law is that the judge, after 
finding that the interests of the buyer and seller in this 
purchase and sale transaction were "antagonistic" to each other, 
stated that "in a transaction of this complexity, it seems 
25 
 
 
impossible that a single attorney could represent both sides in 
a very complex and sophisticated real estate transaction."  It 
is not clear from the record precisely what the judge meant by 
this statement, especially where the judge found that Levin 
represented both the trust defendants and the Masons after the 
fire, when their interests remained adverse.7 
 
It is not ethically impossible for an attorney to represent 
clients with adverse interests.  Under Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.7 (a), as amended, 430 Mass. 1301 (1999) -- the version of 
rule 1.7 in effect at the time of this transaction -- an 
attorney could represent clients with directly adverse 
interests, even in complex real estate transactions, where the 
attorney reasonably believed that his or her representation of 
each client would not adversely affect the relationship with the 
other client and each affected client consented after 
consultation.8  But even where an attorney would have violated 
                                                          
 
 
7 The Masons later sued the trust defendants, and Levin 
testified that he only stepped aside from representing the trust 
defendants after that lawsuit commenced. 
 
 
8 Subsequent to the transaction at issue in this case, our 
rules of professional responsibility were amended.  Under the 
current Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1335 
(2015), an attorney may represent clients with directly adverse 
interests where the attorney reasonably believes that he or she 
will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to 
each affected client, the representation is not otherwise 
prohibited by law, the representation does not involve the 
assertion of a claim by one client against another in the same 
26 
 
 
this rule by jointly representing clients with adverse interests 
without consent, the attorney still would have had a separate 
attorney-client relationship with each client.  See RFF Family 
Partnership, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 465 Mass. 702, 721 
(2013).  And where there is an attorney-client relationship, 
even one that an attorney ethically should not have entered into 
without consent because of a conflicting representation, the 
client is entitled to protect confidential communications with 
the attorney.  See id., quoting In re Teleglobe Communications 
Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 369 (3d Cir. 2007) ("even where a law firm 
actually violates Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7[a] by representing two 
clients with adverse interests without the consent of each 
client, 'counsel's failure to avoid a conflict of interest 
should not deprive the client of the privilege'"). 
 
Where we cannot be sure what the motion judge meant by his 
finding that it seems "impossible" for Levin, who was already 
representing the Masons with respect to the sale of its 
property, also to represent the trust defendants with respect to 
that transaction, we believe it prudent to remand the matter to 
the judge for clarifying findings on this issue.  It is unclear 
what role, if any, that finding played in his ultimate 
                                                          
 
litigation or proceeding, and each affected client gives 
informed written consent. 
27 
 
 
determination that Levin did not enter into an attorney-client 
relationship with the trust defendants until after the fire. 
 
We must also remand for further findings because we cannot 
evaluate whether the judge's findings were clearly erroneous 
without credibility findings regarding the conflicting testimony 
of Levin and the trust defendants.  For example, the judge did 
not resolve contradictory testimony as to whether Levin 
explicitly told the trust defendants that he could not represent 
them because he was simultaneously representing the Masons, 
which bears on the trust defendants' claim of detrimental 
reliance.  The judge found only that the trust defendants had 
failed to satisfy their burden of proving that they had an 
attorney-client relationship with Levin regarding the 
negotiation of the purchase and sale agreement and its 
extension, but he did not explain why. 
 
Importantly, the judge did not address the undisputed fact 
that Levin billed both the Masons and the trust defendants for 
his legal work regarding this transaction, splitting his fee 
equally between them.  Where, as here, an attorney bills an 
existing client for legal services, and where the client pays 
for those services, it is reasonable to infer that they had an 
attorney-client relationship with regard to those services.  See 
Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467, 476 (1996) ("It seems clear that 
[the client] would not have contributed toward payment of [the 
28 
 
 
law firm's] bills if they had received no legal advice from the 
firm").  An attorney's billing for legal services and a client's 
payment of the bill for such services may not be dispositive of 
the existence of an attorney-client relationship, but a finding 
of no attorney-client relationship with respect to legal 
services that were billed and paid warrants an explanation.  See 
Matter of Stern, 425 Mass. 708, 712-713 (1997) (trustee acted as 
legal advisor and attorney-client relationship was formed where, 
inter alia, trustee was paid fees specifically to act as 
attorney); Droz v. Karl, 736 F. Supp. 2d 520, 524-525 (N.D.N.Y. 
2010) (while not dispositive, payment of fee to attorney is 
"indicator[] of an attorney-client relationship"). 
 
As to this issue, we note that an attorney-client 
relationship may impliedly be formed when an attorney provides 
"advice or assistance" (emphasis added).  DeVaux, 387 Mass. at 
817-818.  Where "advice" has been defined as "[g]uidance 
offered," see Black's Law Dictionary 65 (10th ed. 2014), we may 
interpret "assistance" here to mean "services rendered."  See 1 
P.R. Rice, Attorney–Client Privilege in the United States, supra 
at § 7.10, at 1273-1277 ("Legal assistance requires the 
involvement of the judgment of a lawyer in his capacity as a 
lawyer," and it "requires an attorney to render the type of 
services that his education and certification to practice 
qualify him to render for compensation" [quotation omitted]); 
29 
 
 
Sheinkopf v. Stone, 927 F.2d 1259, 1266 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(describing attorney's obtaining of party's check and having 
that party sign various documents as "assistance . . . 
rendered," and distinguishing "legal advice" from actual, 
concrete transactions).  The question whether Levin provided 
"assistance" to the trust defendants that created an attorney-
client relationship is related to, but distinct from, the 
question whether he provided them with legal "advice."  The 
motion judge may wish to consider this issue on remand. 
 
Conclusion.  The order of the Superior Court judge 
partially denying the trust defendants' motion for a protective 
order is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further 
findings consistent with this opinion and for reconsideration of 
the motion in light of those findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.