Title: Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Olivito

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Olivito, 110 Ohio St.3d 64, 2006-Ohio-3564.] 
 
 
MAHONING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. OLIVITO. 
[Cite as Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Olivito,  
110 Ohio St.3d 64, 2006-Ohio-3564.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Multiple violations of Disciplinary Rules and 
failure to cooperate in the disciplinary process — Two-year suspension 
with one year stayed on condition. 
(No. 2005-2030 — Submitted February 22, 2006 — Decided July 26, 2006.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 04-082. 
___________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Richard Aaron Olivito of Steubenville, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0041242, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1989. 
{¶ 2} On December 6, 2004, relator, the Mahoning County Bar 
Association, charged respondent with several violations of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility.  Respondent answered the complaint, and a panel of 
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline held a hearing on the 
complaint in July 2005.  The panel then prepared findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, which the board adopted, as well as a recommendation, which the board 
modified. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 3} Sometime in either March or May 2003, Catherine and Michael 
Accola retained respondent to represent them in a bankruptcy matter and to obtain 
occupational driving privileges for Mr. Accola.  Both respondent and Mrs. Accola 
testified that the Accolas paid respondent a fee at their first meeting.  Respondent 
characterized this as a flat-fee arrangement, but no written fee agreement was 
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executed.  While there is some dispute as to the exact fee, the Accolas did give 
cash to respondent at the outset, and both parties understood that some further 
payment would be made. 
{¶ 4} Respondent did little, if any, work on the Accola bankruptcy until 
August 2003.  Sometime in August, respondent asked Robyn Wilson, a paralegal 
employed by the attorney from whom respondent rented office space, to help 
prepare the Accolas’ bankruptcy petition.  Wilson worked on the petition for 
about a month and talked with the Accolas several times to gather information 
and discuss the petition.  Wilson apparently did most of the work on the petition 
and gave a final draft to respondent sometime after Labor Day. 
{¶ 5} Although the bankruptcy petition was completed in early 
September 2003, respondent did not file the petition until October 17, 2003 – 
either seven months (from March) or five months (from May) after the Accolas 
retained him.  Respondent did not have the Accolas review or sign the completed 
petition.  Instead, respondent forged the Accolas’ signatures in three places on the 
petition.  Respondent also falsely represented on the petition that he had received 
no payment for attorney fees. 
{¶ 6} The Accolas’ creditors’ hearing was scheduled before the 
bankruptcy trustee on December 15, 2003.  Respondent did not appear at the 
hearing and failed to notify the trustee or the court of his absence in a timely 
fashion.  He also did not communicate with his clients before the hearing. 
{¶ 7} The bankruptcy trustee, Elaine Greaves, rescheduled the creditors’ 
hearing for December 29, 2003, but respondent did not communicate with his 
clients between the first and second hearings.  On December 23, 2003, respondent 
filed a one-page motion to withdraw as counsel.  In the motion, respondent once 
again falsely claimed that the Accolas had not paid him attorney fees, citing as a 
reason for withdrawal the “[c]omplete failure to pay counsel for his preparation 
and time in regards to this matter.” 
January Term, 2006 
3 
{¶ 8} Respondent further claimed that he had sent the motion to the 
Accolas by ordinary mail on December 19, 2003.  Mrs. Accola testified that she 
never received the motion to withdraw, nor did respondent inform her or her 
husband before the December 29 creditors’ hearing that he was intending to 
withdraw.  Trustee Greaves expressed concern that, factoring in mailing time by 
regular mail and the intervening holiday, the timing of the motion to withdraw did 
not give the Accolas sufficient notice of respondent’s withdrawal to enable the 
Accolas to obtain another attorney before the second creditors’ hearing. 
{¶ 9} Respondent arrived late for the December 29 hearing, and when he 
appeared, he made several additional misrepresentations to trustee Greaves.  He 
falsely claimed that the Accolas had given him permission to sign their signatures 
to the petition, that he had provided them with a copy of the petition, and that he 
had “completely apprised” his clients of its contents.  He told the trustee that he 
had saved the Accolas’ home from foreclosure, despite the fact that the Accolas 
did not own a home.  He also claimed that the Accola bankruptcy was very 
complex and that he had reviewed the petition with a former bankruptcy trustee, 
neither of which was true. 
{¶ 10} Respondent admitted violating DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) for forging his 
clients’ signatures in the bankruptcy petition.  Respondent, however, denied all 
other alleged violations.  Nevertheless, the board found that respondent had 
additionally violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (barring conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (barring conduct that adversely reflects on 
a lawyer’s fitness to practice law), 2-110(A)(2) (requiring a lawyer to take 
reasonable steps to prevent damage or prejudice to a client before withdrawing 
from representation), and 6-101(A)(3) (prohibiting the neglect of an entrusted 
legal matter). 
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{¶ 11} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the board 
considered the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Section 10 of the Rules 
and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). 
{¶ 12} As aggravating factors, the board found that although respondent’s 
misconduct affected only two clients in a single matter, there was a pattern of 
misconduct within that matter.  Respondent made a number of false or misleading 
statements to the bankruptcy court and the panel.  Because of respondent’s 
actions, his clients and the bankruptcy court had to suffer through the 
inconvenience of three separate hearings when this simple bankruptcy could have 
been accomplished in just one hearing.  While respondent participated in the 
disciplinary process, the panel found that respondent did not engage in “full and 
free disclosure,” nor did he display a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings.  
Instead, respondent “tended to obfuscate, waste time, attack his own clients and 
other witnesses, and argue with Relator’s counsel.  Literally hundreds of pages of 
the deposition transcripts, submitted by stipulation as evidence, were taken up 
with Respondent’s largely irrelevant, redundant, argumentative and sometimes 
rude questions and speeches.”  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c), (d), (e), (f), and 
(g). 
{¶ 13} The mitigating factors identified by the board were the absence of 
a prior disciplinary violation by respondent and that respondent’s misdeeds 
affected two clients in one matter, rather than a series of clients and matters.  
Respondent also acknowledged the wrongful nature of his conduct in forging his 
clients’ signatures, although he admitted none of the other violations.  The relator 
also stipulated that the Accolas received a bankruptcy discharge based on the 
petition filed by respondent, and in that regard, the clients were not harmed.  
Respondent additionally submitted several letters attesting to his good character 
January Term, 2006 
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and his interest in defending the rights of the poor and the downtrodden.  See 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (e). 
{¶ 14} Relator recommended that respondent be suspended for two years.  
Respondent suggested a public reprimand.  The panel recommended that 
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with six months 
stayed.  The board concluded that a two-year suspension with one year stayed was 
warranted for respondent’s misconduct.  The case is now before us on 
respondent’s objections to the board’s recommendation. 
Review 
{¶ 15} Respondent does not now deny violations of DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-
102(A)(5), and 1-102(A)(6).  However, he contends that the board erred in 
concluding that he failed to take reasonable steps before withdrawing to protect 
his clients’ interests in violation of DR 2-110(A)(2) and that he neglected his 
clients’ interests in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3).  He also objects to any actual 
suspension of his law license. 
{¶ 16} We have reviewed the board’s report and have also considered the 
written and oral arguments presented by the parties in response to that report.  We 
hold that respondent violated all of the provisions cited in the board’s report, and 
we also agree that the board’s recommendation of a two-year suspension with one 
year stayed is the appropriate sanction. 
{¶ 17} Respondent claims that the board erred in finding a violation of 
DR 6-101(A)(3), and he offers a number of excuses for the delay in filing the 
Accolas’ bankruptcy petition: his clients’ lack of cooperation, the complexity of 
the bankruptcy, and turnover in staff.  However, none of respondent’s excuses 
justifies the delay in this matter.  The Accolas retained respondent in either March 
or May 2003.  Yet respondent has no time records, calendar, or other documents 
to prove that he did any work on the Accola bankruptcy until August 2003.  
Respondent claims that the delay was due in large part to the Accolas’ failure to 
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disclose certain records and the complexity of the bankruptcy.  But one witness, a 
bankruptcy attorney, described the Accola bankruptcy as a “simple case.”  Trustee 
Greaves also testified it would not take six months to resolve some of the 
problems and delays that respondent attributed to the Accolas and that, once all 
the information was received from the clients, preparing the petition would take 
“a matter of hours or less.”  In fact, the paralegal who prepared the petition on 
respondent’s behalf was able to obtain the necessary information from the 
Accolas and prepare the bankruptcy petition within a month’s time.  Thus, we 
agree with the panel that respondent inexcusably neglected the Accola bankruptcy 
over a matter of months. 
{¶ 18} Respondent also claims that the board erred in finding a violation 
of DR 2-110(A)(2).  He contends that the Accolas had effectively discharged him 
when they filed the grievance against him with relator on December 15, 2003.  
However, Mrs. Accola specifically stated in the grievance that she had not 
discharged respondent from her case.  She also testified that she still considered 
respondent her attorney when she attended the December 29 creditors’ hearing.  
Moreover, respondent attempted to withdraw as counsel for the Accolas before he 
had taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his 
clients, before he had provided notice of withdrawal, and before giving his clients 
an opportunity to employ other counsel.  Thus, we also hold that respondent did 
not take proper steps to withdraw as the Accolas’ counsel. 
{¶ 19} Finally, respondent objects to any suspension of his law license, 
arguing that his behavior “would merit at best a public reprimand, or a fully 
stayed suspension.”  Contrary to respondent’s assertion, his conduct here involves 
egregious wrongdoing beyond the forging of his clients’ signatures.  Indeed, in 
addition to forging his clients’ signatures to their bankruptcy petition under 
penalty of perjury, respondent made numerous misrepresentations to the 
bankruptcy court in an attempt to avoid the consequences of his deceit.  
January Term, 2006 
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Moreover, respondent neglected his clients’ case for several months and failed to 
take proper steps to protect his clients before attempting to withdraw as their 
counsel. 
{¶ 20} In cases involving multiple violations, including acts of fraud or 
deceit involving signatures on court documents, neglect of clients, conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice, and conduct adversely reflecting on the 
attorney’s fitness to practice, we have imposed an actual suspension.  See, e.g., 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Shaffer, 98 Ohio St.3d 342, 2003-Ohio-1008, 785 N.E.2d 
429, ¶13-14 (one-year suspension with six months stayed on conditions for 
attorney’s course of conduct to defraud relating to forged signatures on power of 
attorney); Disciplinary Counsel v. Bandy (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 291, 294, 690 
N.E.2d 1280 (two-year suspension with 18 months stayed for violations relating 
to fraudulent signatures on a will); Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Papcke (1998), 81 
Ohio St.3d 91, 94, 689 N.E.2d 549 (18-month suspension with 12 months stayed 
for violations relating to notarizing fraudulent signatures).  In addition, we have 
held that when an attorney engages in a course of conduct that violates DR 1-
102(A)(4) – as here – the attorney will be actually suspended from the practice of 
law for an appropriate period of time.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh 
(1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 658 N.E.2d 237, at syllabus. 
{¶ 21} We acknowledge that respondent has no prior disciplinary record 
but disagree with the stipulation that respondent did not act with dishonest or 
selfish motives in filing the Accolas’ bankruptcy petition.  Respondent’s pattern 
of misconduct, his many false statements, including those made during the bar 
investigation and the disciplinary process, his lack of complete cooperation in the 
disciplinary process, and his apparent lack of understanding of and remorse for 
his misconduct convince us that the board’s recommended sanction in this matter 
is appropriate.  Cf. Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Jurczenko, 106 Ohio St.3d 123, 
2005-Ohio-4101, 832 N.E.2d 720. 
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{¶ 22} Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of 
law for two years with one year stayed, provided that respondent commit no 
further misconduct during the suspension period.  If respondent fails to comply 
with this condition, the stay will be lifted, and respondent will serve the full two-
year suspension.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Green Haines Sgambati Co., L.P.A., and Ronald E. Slipski; Comstock, 
Springer & Wilson Co., L.P.A., and David C. Comstock Jr., for relator. 
 
Kravitz, Gatterdam & Brown, L.L.C., Max Kravitz, William Bluth, Paula 
Brown, and Jacob Cairns, for respondent. 
______________________