Title: State v. Moeser

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2022 WI 76 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP2184-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jeffrey L. Moeser, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 398 Wis. 2d 795, 963 N.W.2d 576 
 (2021 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 23, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 6, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Portage   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert J. Shannon   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which KAROFSKY, J., joined.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which DALLET, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there was a brief 
filed by John T. Bayer and Bayer Law Offices, Milwaukee. There 
was an oral argument by John T. Bayer.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
John W. Kellis, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by John W. Kellis, assistant attorney general.  
 
 
2022 WI 76 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP2184-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2017CF515) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jeffrey L. Moeser, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
NOV 23, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which 
ROGGENSACK, 
REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
HAGEDORN, 
and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which KAROFSKY, J., joined.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which DALLET, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   This is a review of 
an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. 
Moeser, No. 2019AP2184-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
June 24, 2021), affirming the Portage County circuit court's1 
denial of Jeffrey Moeser's motion to suppress evidence.  Moeser 
was convicted of operating while intoxicated (OWI) sixth 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Robert Shannon presided. 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
2 
 
offense, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) (2019-20).2  We 
affirm. 
¶2 
Moeser challenges the warrant which compelled him to 
submit to a blood draw.  He argues that the warrant is 
constitutionally defective because the affiant was not placed 
under oath or affirmation when he signed the affidavit which 
accompanied the warrant application.  According to Moeser, this 
omission failed to satisfy the requirement under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 
11 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
that 
warrant 
applications be "supported by oath or affirmation."3  As a 
result, Moeser argues that the circuit court erroneously denied 
his motion to suppress evidence and that the court of appeals 
erred in affirming that decision. 
¶3 
We conclude that the affidavit fulfilled the oath or 
affirmation requirement under the United States and Wisconsin 
constitutions because "[t]he purpose of an oath or affirmation 
is to impress upon the swearing individual an appropriate sense 
of obligation to tell the truth," and here the officer was 
impressed with that obligation.  State v. Tye, 2001 WI 124, ¶19, 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 All subsequent references to the constitutional oath or 
affirmation requirements in both the United States and Wisconsin 
constitutions 
are 
hereinafter 
referred 
to 
collectively, 
sometimes 
as 
"the 
constitutional 
oath 
or 
affirmation 
requirement" or "Fourth Amendment requirement," unless otherwise 
noted. 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
3 
 
248 Wis. 2d 530, 636 N.W.2d 473; accord U.S. const. amend. IV; 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 11.  In other words, the constitutional 
guarantee is satisfied because the facts and circumstances 
demonstrate that Sergeant Brown executed this affidavit "in a 
form calculated to awaken [Sergeant Brown's] conscience and 
impress [his] mind with [his] duty to [tell the truth]."  Wis. 
Stat. § 906.03(1); accord Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶19.  The United 
States and Wisconsin constitutions do not require that any 
specific language or procedure be employed in the administration 
of 
an 
oath 
or 
affirmation. 
 
Instead, 
constitutional 
requirements, relevant case law, and the Wisconsin Statutes all 
indicate that the oath or affirmation requirement is an issue of 
substance, not form.  Here, the facts sufficiently demonstrate 
that 
the 
constitutional 
right 
to 
be 
free 
from 
abusive 
governmental searches is satisfied.  Therefore, the circuit 
court did not err in denying Moeser's motion to suppress, and 
the court of appeals is affirmed. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
On October 14, 2017, at about 1:30 a.m., Sergeant 
Steven Brown of the Portage County Sheriff's Office stopped 
Jeffrey Moeser for suspected OWI.  A record check return 
revealed that Moeser had five prior convictions for operating 
while intoxicated.  Sergeant Brown administered field sobriety 
tests as well as a preliminary breathalyzer test.  The 
breathalyzer test returned a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 
0.195 percent.  Because of his prior convictions, the legal 
limit for Moeser was a BAC of 0.02 percent.  See Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
4 
 
§ 340.01(46m)(c).  Sergeant Brown then arrested Moeser for 
suspected drunk driving and transported him to St. Michael's 
Hospital in Stevens Point, Wisconsin, for a blood draw. 
¶5 
Once at the hospital, Moeser refused to consent to a 
blood draw, causing Sergeant Brown to seek a search warrant.  
The affidavit in support of the warrant was completed by 
Sergeant Brown in the presence of Lieutenant Jacob Wills, a 
notary public.  
¶6 
The 
document 
was 
titled, 
"AFFIDAVIT." 
 
At 
the 
beginning of the affidavit, Sergeant Brown handwrote his name 
before the text, "being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and 
says."  The second paragraph stated, "I have personal knowledge 
that the contents of this affidavit are true and that any 
observations or conclusions of fellow officers referenced in 
this 
affidavit 
are 
truthful 
and 
reliable." 
 
Immediately 
following that section, Sergeant Brown personally penned in the 
probable cause section, which contained facts specific to 
Moeser's arrest.  Sergeant Brown then signed and dated the 
affidavit, noting that it was completed at St. Michael's 
Hospital before Lieutenant Wills.  Sergeant Brown's signature 
line was immediately above the jurat,4 which read, "Subscribed 
and sworn to before me."  Lieutenant Wills notarized the 
affidavit by signing it and affixing his seal.  A judicial 
                                                 
4 A jurat is "[a] certification added to an affidavit or 
deposition stating when and before what authority the affidavit 
or deposition was made."  Jurat, Black's Law Dictionary (11th 
ed. 2019). 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
5 
 
officer 
came 
to 
the 
hospital 
and 
approved 
the 
warrant 
application at 3:07 a.m.  
¶7 
Moeser's blood was drawn pursuant to the warrant and 
revealed a BAC of 0.220 g/100mL.  The State filed a criminal 
complaint charging Moeser with OWI sixth offense, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a), and operating with a prohibited 
alcohol concentration sixth offense, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(b), both felony charges.  
¶8 
Moeser filed a motion to suppress the blood test 
evidence, 
arguing 
that 
the 
warrant 
did 
not 
satisfy 
constitutional oath or affirmation requirements because Sergeant 
Brown was not placed under oath or affirmation.  It is 
undisputed that Sergeant Brown made no oral oath or affirmation, 
either before or after signing the affidavit.  It is also 
undisputed that he made no such oath or affirmation before the 
judicial officer.   
¶9 
The State argued that Sergeant Brown was under oath or 
affirmation because the language of the affidavit clearly 
manifested the intention to be under oath. 
¶10 The circuit court heard the motion on stipulated facts 
and orally denied Moeser's motion to suppress.  The circuit 
court 
found 
that 
"the 
language 
in 
the 
affidavit 
indicates . . . that Sergeant Brown swore to the truth of the 
information provided in the affidavit."  It found that "Sergeant 
Brown did realize that he was swearing to the truth of what he 
indicated in his affidavit."  The circuit court denied Moeser's 
motion and subsequently memorialized that ruling by written 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
6 
 
order.  The order stated, "The motion to suppress blood test 
evidence based upon noncompliance with the oath requirement is 
denied."  Thereafter, Moeser pled guilty to OWI sixth offense, 
and was sentenced. 
¶11 Moeser filed a notice of appeal, and the court of 
appeals affirmed.  Moeser, No. 2019AP2184-CR.  The court of 
appeals concluded that Sergeant Brown's affidavit was not 
constitutionally defective.  Id., ¶22.  
¶12 Moeser petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted.  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 "Review of a decision denying a motion to suppress" 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution "presents a 
question of constitutional fact."  State v. Coffee, 2020 WI 53, 
¶19, 391 Wis. 2d 831, 943 N.W.2d 845.  Under a two-step standard 
of review, we first "uphold a circuit court's findings of 
historic fact unless they are clearly erroneous."  State v. 
Dumstrey, 2016 WI 3, ¶13, 366 Wis. 2d 64, 873 N.W.2d 502.  We 
then "independently apply constitutional principles to those 
facts."  State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 
786 N.W.2d 463. 
¶14 This case also requires us to interpret statutes.  
"Interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review 
de novo, although we benefit from the analyses of the circuit 
court and the court of appeals."  Est. of Miller v. Storey, 2017 
WI 99, ¶25, 378 Wis. 2d 358, 903 N.W.2d 759.  
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
7 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶15 On appeal, Moeser does not challenge whether there was 
probable cause to arrest him, nor does he challenge that there 
was probable cause in the affidavit.  Rather, he argues that 
Sergeant Brown was not administered any oath or affirmation and, 
therefore, the warrant is constitutionally defective.  The State 
responds that the oath or affirmation requirement was met 
because Sergeant Brown swore to or affirmed the facts of the 
affidavit.  In other words, the State asserts that Sergeant 
Brown manifested "the intent to be bound by his . . . statement 
under circumstances that emphasize the need to tell the truth."  
¶16 In analyzing these arguments, we will first discuss 
the oath or affirmation requirement under the United States and 
Wisconsin constitutions.  We then turn to relevant case law.  
After that, we analyze Wisconsin Statutes' oath or affirmation 
requirements.  In short, these sources lead to the conclusion 
that 
Sergeant 
Brown's 
affidavit 
survives 
constitutional 
scrutiny. 
A.  Constitutional Requirements  
¶17 The United States and Wisconsin constitutions protect 
and guarantee that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
8 
 
affirmation."5  U.S. Const. amend. IV; accord Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 11.  Consequently, an oath or affirmation is an "essential 
prerequisite to the issuance of a valid search warrant" under 
both our state and federal constitutions.  Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, 
¶13 (quoting State v. Baltes, 183 Wis. 545, 552, 198 N.W.2d 282 
(1924)).  When it comes to the administration of an oath or 
affirmation, 
neither 
constitution 
requires 
that 
specific 
language or procedure be used. 
¶18 The terms "oath" and "affirmation" have long been 
understood 
broadly 
and 
require 
no 
specific 
language 
or 
procedure.  In the 1744 case of Omychund v. Barker, Lord Chief 
Baron Parker of the English Exchequer of Pleas expressed a broad 
view of oaths: "[An oath's] forms are various. . . . It is plain 
that by the policy of all countries, oaths are to be 
administered to all persons according to their own opinion, and 
as it most affects their conscience . . . ."  Omychund v. 
Barker, 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 29 (High Ct. Ch. 1744).  Accordingly, 
the court held that a member of the Hindu6 religion could swear 
an oath before testifying according to his own custom.  Id. at 
                                                 
5 "Historically, we generally have interpreted Article I, 
Section 11 [of the Wisconsin Constitution] to provide the same 
constitutional guarantees as the Supreme Court has accorded 
through its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment."  State v. 
Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶18, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598. 
6 The English Exchequer of Pleas used a now derogatory term 
which referred to members of the Hindu religion.  See Gentoo, 
Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2021) (a "[n]ow historical and 
rare" term describing "[a] non-Muslim inhabitant of Hindustan or 
India; a Hindu").  We instead use the term "Hindu." 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
9 
 
27-34.  Whereas the court's usual custom was "use of the 
corporal ceremony, the kissing of the Evangelists," Hindus were 
permitted to swear oaths by touching the foot of a Hindu priest.  
Id. at 15, 21.  In 1788, the High Court of Errors of 
Pennsylvania echoed this broad view.  Lewis v. Maris, 1 U.S. (1 
Dall.) 278, 288 (Pa. Ct. Err. & App. 1788) (recognizing oath as 
valid regardless of the precise ceremony performed).   
¶19 During the Founding era, an "oath" was "an affirmation 
or denial of any thing, before one or more persons who have 
authority to administer the same, for the discovery and 
advancement of truth and right, calling God to witness, that the 
testimony is true."  Oath, Giles Jacob, A New Law Dictionary (J. 
Morgan ed., 10th ed. 1782).  An "affirmation" was "[a]n 
indulgence allowed by law to the people called quakers, who in 
cases where an oath is required from others, may make a solemn 
affirmation that what they say is true; and if they make a false 
affirmation, they are subject to the penalties of perjury."7  
Affirmation, Jacob, supra.  In fact, it was recognized during 
the Founding that an "oath" could be written rather than 
spoken:  "Affidavit, Signifies in law an oath in writing; and to 
make affidavit of a thing, is to testify upon oath."  Affidavit, 
                                                 
7 These definitions remain largely the same today.  In 
Black's Law Dictionary, an "oath" is "[a] solemn declaration, 
accompanied by a swearing to god or a revered person or thing, 
that one's statement is true or that one will be bound to a 
promise."  Oath, Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 4.  An 
"affirmation" is a "solemn pledge equivalent to an oath but 
without 
reference 
to 
a 
supreme 
being 
or 
to 
swearing."  
Affirmation, Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 4. 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
10 
 
Jacob, supra.  These definitions do not require that any 
specific language or procedure be used in their administration.   
¶20 "The Constitution's text does not alone resolve this 
case. . . . We must therefore turn to the historical background 
of the [text] to understand its meaning."  Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-44 (2004).  Originating in the 17th 
century, "English law required officials seeking search warrants 
to swear an oath as a means of controlling the unfettered 
discretion of the searcher."  Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶8.  That 
requirement was removed, and general warrants, or Writs of 
Assistance, were prone to abuse.  Id.  In Gray v. Paxton, 1 
Quincy 541 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1761), a case involving Writs of 
Assistance, Boston attorney James Otis Jr. delivered a five-hour 
speech where he criticized, among other things, this lack of an 
oath requirement:  "Their menial servants may enter, may break 
locks, bars, and everything in their way; and whether they break 
through malice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire.  Bare 
suspicion without oath is sufficient."  James Otis Jr., Against 
Writs of Assistance (Feb. 24, 1761).  Among those in the 
audience was John Adams, who described the speech as having 
"breathed into this nation the breath of life" and "the first 
scene of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain.  
Then and there the child Independence was born."  Charles 
Francis Adams, The Life and Works of John Adams 276 (1856).   
¶21 Accordingly, many states adopted oath or affirmation 
requirements in their constitutions.  For example, Maryland's 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
11 
 
constitution provided a very general procedure for administering 
oaths:  
That the manner of administering an oath to any 
person, ought to be such as those of the religious 
persuasion, profession or denomination of which such 
person is one, generally esteem the most effectual 
confirmation, by the attestation of the Divine Being.  
And that the people . . . holding it unlawful to take 
an oath on any occasion, ought to be allowed to make 
their solemn affirmation, in the manner that quakers 
have been heretofore allowed to affirm . . . . 
Md. Const. Decl. of Rts. art. XXXVI (1776).  In contrast, 
Pennsylvania's constitution adopted no general procedure but did 
require 
certain 
specific 
oaths, 
such 
as 
for 
public 
officials:  "I . . . do swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully 
execute the office of . . . for the . . . of . . . and will do 
equal right and justice to all men, to the best of my judgment 
and abilities, according to law."  Pa. Const. § 40 (1776).  
Similarly, in its first act, Congress prescribed the language 
and procedure to fulfill the requirement under Article VI, 
Section 3 that senators and representatives "be bound by Oath or 
Affirmation, to support this Constitution."  That act stated:  
That the oath or affirmation required by the sixth 
article of the Constitution of the United States, 
shall be administered in the form following, to wit, 
"I, A.B. do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may 
be) that I will support the Constitution of the United 
States."  The said oath or affirmation shall be 
administered within three days after the passing of 
this act, by any one member of the Senate, to the 
President of the Senate, and by him to all the members 
and to the Secretary . . . . 
An Act to Regulate the Time and Manner of Administering Certain 
Oaths, ch. 1, § 1, 1 Stat. 23 (1789).  These examples 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
12 
 
demonstrate a broad spectrum of how specific an oath requirement 
could be.  The Founders knew how to write a more demanding oath 
or affirmation requirement.  However, they did not do so in the 
Constitution's oath or affirmation requirement.   
¶22 The historical background and definitions show that 
the Fourth Amendment requirement was meant to prohibit warrants 
that are not supported by any oath or affirmation at all, such 
as Writs of Assistance.  However, there is no indication that 
any specific language or procedure is necessary.  Where the 
founding generation believed that specific words or procedures 
were required to fulfil an oath requirement, the text said so.  
Absent an express statement to the contrary, oaths were broadly 
understood——an oath could include an affidavit, swearing before 
God, or even touching a priest's feet.  
¶23 In short, the words "oath" and "affirmation" are not 
specifically defined in the language of either the United States 
or Wisconsin constitutions, nor does either constitution mandate 
that any specific language or procedure be used in oath or 
affirmation administration.  
B.  Case Law 
¶24 We next turn to constitutional oath or affirmation 
requirements in case law.  The constitutional analysis in case 
law similarly does not support Moeser's call for rigid oath or 
affirmation administration requirements.  Instead, case law 
consistently elevates substance over form when it comes to the 
administration of an oath or affirmation, and courts across the 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
13 
 
country have declined to impose rigid rules, "magic words" 
requirements, or formal procedures.  
¶25 Whether 
the 
constitutional 
oath 
or 
affirmation 
administration requirement is rigid and specific was previously 
considered in State v. Tye, where we concluded that the 
requirement "is a matter of substance, not form, and it is an 
essential 
component 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
and 
legal 
proceedings."  
Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶19.  In 
Tye, an 
investigator drafted an affidavit in support of a search warrant 
application but never took an oath or affirmation and also 
failed to sign the affidavit.  Id., ¶¶4-5.  Nonetheless, a 
judicial officer issued the warrant, and the search was 
conducted.  Id., ¶¶5-6.  The defense successfully sought to 
suppress the evidence obtained.  Id., ¶2.   
¶26 On appeal, because the affidavit in Tye was completely 
lacking, we affirmed the suppression.  The court nonetheless 
recognized that "[t]he purpose of an oath or affirmation is to 
impress upon the swearing individual an appropriate sense of 
obligation to tell the truth."  Id., ¶19.   Tye rejected the 
call to impose rigid rules or magic words to govern the 
administration of oaths or affirmations.  Id.; see also State v. 
Johnson, No. 2019AP1398-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶33 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Sept. 9, 2020) ("[W]e note that although the validity of an 
oath or affirmation is a 'matter of substance, not form,' we 
consider the better practice for all parties involved in the 
search warrant application process is to utilize the directory 
methods of administering an oath or affirmation that our 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
14 
 
legislature 
has 
proved 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 906.03(2) 
and 
(3). . . . [H]owever, the failure to do so in this case did not 
invalidate the search warrant.") (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶19).   
¶27 We note that Tye's interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment oath or affirmation requirement is consistent with 
oath or affirmation administration in non-Fourth Amendment 
contexts.  The court of appeals in this case relied heavily upon 
Kellner v. Christian, 197 Wis. 2d 183, 539 N.W.2d 685 (1995), a 
civil case.  Moeser, No. 2019AP2184-CR, ¶¶19-23.  While not 
inconsistent with the principles in Tye, Kellner is nonetheless 
distinguishable 
because 
constitutional 
oath 
or 
affirmation 
requirements were never argued or considered.  Kellner is also 
distinguishable because it was based upon a specific statute 
which 
is 
inapplicable 
here. 
 
That 
statute 
concerned 
a 
requirement that claims against state employees be "sworn."  
Kellner, 197 Wis. 2d at 194.  The statute had the purpose of 
ensuring that the attorney general could effectively review 
claims in a timely and cost-effective manner.  Id.  Kellner, 
however, did reiterate that the oath must "impress the person 
who takes the oath with a due sense of obligation" to tell the 
truth.  Id. at 192.   
¶28 As a result, Wisconsin case law broadly recognizes 
that "[t]he purpose of an oath or affirmation is to impress upon 
the swearing individual an appropriate sense of obligation to 
tell the truth."  Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶19.  There are no rigid 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
15 
 
requirements or magic words.  It is a matter of substance, not 
form. 
¶29 Moeser spends much of his argument attempting to 
distinguish United States v. Brooks, 285 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 
2002), and United States v. Fredericks, 273 F.  Supp. 2d 1032 
(D.N.D. 2003), both of which found the oath or affirmation 
requirement 
satisfied. 
 
He 
argues 
that 
the 
cases 
are 
distinguishable 
because 
Sergeant 
Brown's 
affidavit 
uses 
different words than the affidavits in those cases.  He also 
argues that those cases are distinguishable because Sergeant 
Brown did not personally present the affidavit to the judicial 
officer. 
 
However, 
Moeser's 
arguments 
elevate 
form 
over 
substance, failing to acknowledge that "[t]he purpose of an oath 
or affirmation is to impress upon the swearing individual an 
appropriate sense of obligation to tell the truth."  Tye, 248 
Wis. 2d 530, ¶19.   
¶30 In Brooks, the Eighth Circuit concluded that, despite 
not being given an oral oath, the affiant officer was deemed to 
be under oath because: 
[H]e intended to undertake and did undertake that 
obligation by the statements he made in his affidavit 
and by his attendant conduct.  In other words, a 
person may be under oath even though that person has 
not formally taken an oath by raising a hand and 
reciting formulaic words. 
Brooks, 285 F.3d at 1106; see also 3 Am. Jur. 2d Affidavits § 7 
(2022) ("It is not essential that the affiant should hold up his 
hand and swear in order to make his act an oath, but it is 
sufficient if both affiant and the officer understand that what 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
16 
 
is done is all that is necessary to complete the act of 
swearing."). 
¶31 The court in Fredericks, like Brooks, concluded that a 
person may be deemed to be under oath in the absence of a raised 
hand or oral recitation: 
In determining whether the Fourth Amendment's 
oath or affirmation requirement has been fulfilled, 
the Court may consider the language used in the search 
warrant 
application 
as 
well 
as 
the 
applicant's 
conduct.  [Brooks,] 285 F.3d 1102, 1105–06.  As the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in [Brooks], 
a person may be under oath even though that person has 
not formally taken an oath by raising a hand and 
reciting formulaic words. 
Almost all of the apposite cases indicate that 
this is the relevant inquiry because a person who 
manifests an intention to be under oath is in fact 
under oath.  In Atwood v. State, 146 Miss. 662, 111 
So. 865, 866 (1927), for instance, where both the law 
enforcement officer, who signed the affidavit in the 
presence of a justice of the peace, and the justice of 
peace, who affixed his jurat, knew an oath was 
required and did what they thought was necessary for 
the administration of an oath, the court concluded 
that "by construction, what occurred amounted to the 
taking of the necessary oath."  The court added that 
"[o]ne may speak as plainly and effectually by his 
acts and conduct as he can by word of mouth."  Id. 
The Court finds that, under the circumstances, 
[the 
officer's] 
"Affidavit 
for 
Search 
Warrant" 
satisfied the oath or affirmation requirement and that 
the search warrant was not issued in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.  The Affidavit begins by stating 
"that the undersigned being duly sworn deposes and 
states to the Court . . . ."  Additionally, the 
Affidavit reveals that [the officer] signed the 
document upon presentation to the tribal court and 
[the judge] attested that the Affidavit was sworn to 
and subscribed by [the officer] in her presence. 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
17 
 
The nature of the document as well as [the 
officer's] 
attendant 
conduct 
indicates 
that 
[the 
officer] realized that he was swearing to the truth of 
what he said.  [His] recitation that he was "duly 
sworn" reflects his intention to be under oath.  [His] 
conduct was also consistent with this intention as he 
took the document to a tribal court judge and signed 
it in her presence.  As it is apparent that [the 
officer] had manifested an intent to be under oath, as 
such, he can be considered to be under oath for Fourth 
Amendment purposes. 
Fredericks, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 1037–38.8 
¶32 Professor Wayne LaFave has instructed that, "No 
particular ceremony is necessary to constitute the act of 
swearing . . . . It is only necessary that something be done in 
the presence of the magistrate issuing the search warrant which 
is understood by both the magistrate and the affiant to 
constitute the act of swearing."  2 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., 
Criminal Procedure § 3.4(c) (4th ed. 2021) (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting Simon v. State, 515 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1973)).  Several federal cases are in accord that "a person who 
manifests an intention to be under oath is in fact under oath."  
Brooks, 285 F.3d at 1105; accord United States v. Bueno-Vargas, 
383 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that "signing a 
statement under penalty of perjury satisfies the standard for an 
                                                 
8 Moeser also finds Brooks and Fredericks distinguishable 
because here the Sheriff's Office had a procedure that did not 
require administering an oral oath, which the State conceded was 
erroneous.  However, "we are not bound by the parties' 
interpretation of the law or obligated to accept a party's 
concession of law."  State v. Carter, 2010 WI 77, ¶50, 327 
Wis. 2d 1, 785 N.W.2d 516.  Regardless, this does not affect our 
conclusion that the facts and circumstances overall demonstrate 
that Sergeant Brown was impressed with the need to tell the 
truth.  
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
18 
 
oath or affirmation, as it is a signal that the declarant 
understands the legal significance of the declarant's statements 
and the potential for punishment if the declarant lies"); United 
States v. Richardson, 943 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding 
a statement was not an oath or affirmation because it "did not 
manifest a recognition of [the affiant's] duty to speak the 
truth"); United States v. Mensah, 737 F.3d 789, 805-06 (1st Cir. 
2013) (requiring no verbal act to find a defendant "under oath" 
for purposes of perjury).  
¶33 Similarly, contrary to Moeser's arguments, numerous 
state court jurisdictions decline to impose rigid rules or 
procedures, instead concluding that the oath requirement is a 
matter of substance over form.  See, e.g., Atwood, 111 So. at 
866 ("The form of the oath is immaterial so long as it appeals 
to the conscience of the party making it, and binds him to speak 
the truth."); State v. Kemp, 20 P.2d 499, 500 (Kan. 1933) 
(affiant not formally sworn but deemed to have been sworn when 
he completed an affidavit before a notary); Farrow v. State, 112 
P.2d 186, 190 (Okla. Crim. App. 1941) (deputy who was not 
formally sworn, but read and signed an affidavit, deemed to be 
under oath); State v. Knight, 995 P.2d 1033, 1041-42 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2000) ("[T]he important nature of the affidavits in this 
instance and [the officer's] exercise of the formalities in 
completing 
the 
affidavits 
sufficiently 
fulfilled 
the 
requirements of an oath or affirmation."); State v. Douglas, 428 
P.2d 
535, 
538-39 
(Wash. 
1967) 
(no 
formal 
oath 
orally 
administered 
but 
text 
of 
affidavit 
nonetheless 
showed 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
19 
 
constitutional compliance); State v. Gutierrez-Perez, 337 P.3d 
205, ¶¶4, 28 (Utah 2014) (although no oral oath or affirmation 
was made, court determined that a checked box on an electronic 
application 
for 
a 
warrant 
stating, 
"By 
submitting 
this 
affidavit, I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah 
that the foregoing is true and correct," was "more than enough 
to impress upon [the affiant] the solemnity of the occasion").  
¶34 Courts in many other jurisdictions, including Alaska, 
California, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, Ohio, and South Carolina, "have held that a verbal 
admonishment is not necessary to constitute an 'oath.'" People 
v. Ramos, 424 N.W.2d 509, 519 n.36 (Mich. 1988) (collecting 
cases); Blackburn v. Motor Vehicles Div., 576 P.2d 1267, 1269-70 
(Or. Ct. App. 1978) (also collecting cases) ("[M]erely signing a 
form of affidavit in the presence of a notary or an official 
authorized to administer an oath is sufficient."). 
¶35 This survey of case law hence confirms that no 
particular 
"magic 
words" 
or 
specific 
procedures 
are 
constitutionally required in order for an individual to be 
deemed to be under oath.  Instead, cases elevate substance over 
form, recognizing that "[t]he purpose of an oath or affirmation 
is to impress upon the swearing individual an appropriate sense 
of obligation to tell the truth."9  Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶19.  
                                                 
9 Two other cases Moeser cites as supporting more rigid 
requirements are State v. Hodges, 595 S.W.3d 303 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2020), and Markey v. State, 37 So. 53 (Fla. 1904).  In Hodges, 
the Texas Court of Appeals held that an officer who completed an 
affidavit before a notary did not satisfy the oath or 
affirmation requirement because there was no oral oath.  Hodges, 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
20 
 
¶36 As 
a 
result, 
Wisconsin 
is 
in 
good 
company 
in 
concluding 
that 
an 
oath 
or 
affirmation 
may 
still 
be 
constitutionally compliant absent a prescribed oral script and 
specific procedure.  When the facts or circumstances indicate 
that the oath or affirmation was administered "in a form 
calculated to awaken the [swearing individual's] conscience and 
impress [his or her] mind with [his or her] duty to [tell the 
truth]," then the oath or affirmation requirement is satisfied.  
Wis. Stat. § 906.03(1).  In other words, we reaffirm the 
principle that "[t]he purpose of an oath or affirmation is to 
impress upon the swearing individual an appropriate sense of 
                                                                                                                                                             
595 S.W.3d at 305–06.  Though the affidavit stated that the 
affiant was "duly sworn," and the jurat said, "after being sworn 
by me," the court concluded that these statements were false 
because no oral oath was taken.  Id. at 306.  Wisconsin case law 
and many other federal and state cases do not support the rigid 
standard outlined in Hodges.  Unlike Wisconsin's case law, 
Hodges appears to prioritize form over substance, and we decline 
to adopt that new standard.  
As for the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Markey, that 
case is distinguishable.  The issue in Markey was whether the 
defense could cross-examine witnesses to show that a defendant 
charged with perjury was not under oath.  Markey, 37 So. at 59-
60.  The court's narrow ruling was that the phrase, "being duly 
sworn," was not conclusive proof of an oath for purposes of a 
criminal jury trial.  Id.  In fact, Markey recognized more 
generally that "[w]hile the oath must be solemnly administered, 
and by an officer duly authorized, it is immaterial in what form 
it is given."  Id. at 59 (quoting 2 Francis Wharton & William 
Draper Lewis, A Treatise on Criminal Law § 1251 (1896)). 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
21 
 
obligation to tell the truth."  Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶19.  
After all, "[a]n oath is a matter of substance, not form."10  Id.  
C.  Statutory Requirements 
¶37 We next address the Wisconsin Statutes.  Given the 
lack of specific constitutional requirements, we consider 
whether the Legislature has provided for even greater protection 
than that in the Constitution.  However, Wisconsin Statutes 
likewise do not require any specific language or procedure for 
oath or affirmation administration. 
¶38 For example, Wis. Stat. § 906.03, titled "Oath or 
affirmation," 
sets 
forth 
the 
following 
requirements 
for 
witnesses testifying: 
(1)  Before testifying, every witness shall be 
required to declare that the witness will testify 
truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a 
form calculated to awaken the witness's conscience and 
impress the witness's mind with the witness's duty to 
do so. 
(2)  The oath may be administered substantially 
in the following form:  Do you solemnly swear that the 
testimony you shall give in this matter shall be the 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so 
help you God. 
(3)  Every person who shall declare that the 
person has conscientious scruples against taking the 
oath, or swearing in the usual form, shall make a 
                                                 
10 As 
Professor 
Wayne 
LaFave 
explains, 
"Whether 
the 
information is transmitted orally or in writing, the 'Oath or 
affirmation' requirement means the information must be sworn to.  
'No particular ceremony is necessary to constitute the act of 
swearing.'"  2 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure 
§ 3.4(c) (4th ed. 2021) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Simon v. 
State, 515 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973)).   
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
22 
 
solemn declaration or affirmation, which may be in the 
following form:  Do you solemnly, sincerely and truly 
declare and affirm that the testimony you shall give 
in this matter shall be the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth; and this you do under the pains 
and penalties of perjury. 
(4)  The assent to the oath or affirmation by the 
person making it may be manifested by the uplifted 
hand. 
§ 906.03 (emphases added).  This statute repeatedly employs the 
flexible language, "may," when it considers the administration 
of an oath to a witness.  Even though § 906.03 provides sample 
language in two potential versions which "may" be used in the 
administration of an oath or affirmation, it requires neither.  
The statute requires only that an oath or affirmation be "in a 
form calculated to awaken the witness's conscience and impress 
the 
witness's 
mind 
with 
the 
witness's 
duty 
to 
[testify 
truthfully]."  § 906.03(1).  
¶39 Similarly, Wis. Stat. § 887.03, titled "Oath, how 
taken," states, "Any oath or affidavit required or authorized by 
law may be taken in any of the usual forms, and every person 
swearing, affirming or declaring in any such form shall be 
deemed to have been lawfully sworn."  § 887.03 (emphases added).  
The language remains substantially the same since first enacted 
in 1849, shortly after our state constitution was ratified.11  
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 887.03 was first enacted as Wis. Stat. 
ch. 99, § 6 in 1849: 
In all cases in which an oath or affidavit is 
required or authorized by law, the same may be taken 
in any of the usual forms, and every person swearing, 
affirming or declaring, in any such form, shall be 
deemed to have been lawfully sworn, and to be guilty 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
23 
 
This statute continues to provide considerable flexibility, as 
an oath or affirmation "may" be taken in any of the "usual 
forms."  It also references that there are occasions where one 
may be "deemed to have" taken an oath:  "every person swearing 
or declaring in any such form shall be deemed to have been 
lawfully sworn."  As a result, § 887.03 declines to impose rigid 
rules governing oath administration.  
¶40 More specifically, Wis. Stat. § 968.12, titled "Search 
warrant," states: 
(2)  Warrant upon affidavit.  A search warrant 
may be based upon sworn complaint or affidavit, or 
testimony recorded by a phonographic reporter or under 
sub. (3)(d), showing probable cause therefor.  The 
complaint, 
affidavit 
or 
testimony 
may 
be 
upon 
information and belief.  The person requesting the 
warrant may swear to the complaint or affidavit before 
a notarial officer authorized under ch. 140 to take 
acknowledgments or before a judge, or a judge may 
place a person under oath via telephone, radio, or 
other means of electronic communication, without the 
requirement of face-to-face contact, to swear to the 
complaint or affidavit.  The judge shall indicate on 
the search warrant that the person so swore to the 
complaint or affidavit. 
§ 968.12(2) (emphases added).12  This statute, by its language, 
also does not impose particular language or a specific procedure 
                                                                                                                                                             
of 
perjury 
for 
corruptly 
or 
falsely 
swearing, 
affirming or declaring in any such form. 
The only major difference is the current version no longer 
includes the crime of perjury.  That now exists under Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.31(1).  
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.12 also provides: 
(1)  Description and issuance.  A search warrant 
is an order signed by a judge directing a law 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
24 
 
for oath administration.  In fact, it uses the permissive word, 
"may," concerning warrants based upon an affidavit.  Id.  
¶41 In short, the Wisconsin Statutes also do not invoke 
specific, mandated language or formulaic procedures in the 
administration of an oath or affirmation.  
D.  Facts and Circumstances 
¶42 We next consider the facts and circumstances in this 
case 
and 
conclude 
that 
Sergeant 
Brown 
satisfied 
the 
constitutional oath or 
affirmation requirement.  Sergeant 
Brown's act of testifying to the court in the form of the 
affidavit 
was 
"calculated 
to 
awaken 
[Sergeant 
Brown's] 
conscience and impress [his] mind with [his] duty [to tell the 
truth]."  Wis. Stat. § 906.03(1).  We agree with the circuit 
court's 
conclusion 
that 
"the 
language 
in 
the 
affidavit 
indicates . . . that Sergeant Brown swore to the truth of the 
information provided in the affidavit."  The facts in this case 
                                                                                                                                                             
enforcement 
officer 
to 
conduct 
a 
search 
of 
a 
designated person, a designated object or a designated 
place for the purpose of seizing designated property 
or kinds of property.  A judge shall issue a search 
warrant if probable cause is shown. 
 . . . . 
(3)  Warrant upon oral testimony.  
(a)  General rule.  A search warrant may be based 
upon sworn oral testimony communicated to the judge by 
telephone, 
radio 
or 
other 
means 
of 
electronic 
communication, under the procedure prescribed in this 
subsection. 
§ 968.12(1), (3)(a).  
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
25 
 
further support that Sergeant Brown was sufficiently impressed 
with his duty to tell the truth. 
¶43 We consider the language in the "AFFIDAVIT" Sergeant 
Brown signed.13  To review, the first sentence includes Sergeant 
Brown's handwritten name and states, "being first duly sworn on 
oath, deposes and says."  The first sentence of the second 
paragraph says, "I have personal knowledge that the contents of 
this affidavit are true."  Sergeant Brown then personally penned 
the probable cause section, detailing facts specific to Moeser's 
arrest.  Sergeant Brown signed and dated the affidavit directly 
above the jurat and indicated that the affidavit was completed 
at the hospital.  Lieutenant Wills signed and dated the jurat as 
"Subscribed and sworn to before me," and affixed his notary 
seal. 
¶44 "The purpose of an oath or affirmation is to impress 
upon the swearing individual an appropriate sense of obligation 
to tell the truth."  Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶19.  The language in 
Sergeant Brown's affidavit, his signature, and Lieutenant Wills' 
notarization satisfy this requirement.  Sergeant Brown wrote his 
name below the title, "AFFIDAVIT," and next to the words, "being 
                                                 
13 An affidavit is, by definition, a sworn statement.  See 
Affidavit, Giles Jacob, A New Law Dictionary (J. Morgan ed., 
10th ed. 1782) ("Affidavit, Signifies in law an oath in writing; 
and to make affidavit of a thing, is to testify upon oath."); 
Affidavit, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 29 (3d ed. 1992) ("A written declaration made under 
oath before a notary public or other authorized officer."); 
Affidavit, Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 4 ("A voluntary 
declaration of facts written down and sworn to by a declarant, 
usually before an officer authorized to administer oaths.").  
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
26 
 
first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says," both of which 
impressed that he was signing a sworn statement.  Just two 
paragraphs down, the affidavit contained a statement expressly 
affirming that "the contents of this affidavit are true."  
Sergeant Brown completed the affidavit by verifying its contents 
with his signature just above the jurat, which again reminded 
him that the document was "sworn."  Finally, in Sergeant Brown's 
presence, Lieutenant Wills further impressed the seriousness of 
the occasion by notarizing the affidavit.14 The words in the 
affidavit impressed Sergeant Brown with the duty to tell the 
truth.15  This placed Sergeant Brown under oath or affirmation 
and subjected him to the possibility of criminal penalty for 
                                                 
14 Moeser makes much of the fact that Sergeant Brown did not 
himself swear before or present the affidavit to a judge.  
However, no constitutional language requires that procedure.  
Though it is "necessary that something be done in the presence 
of the magistrate issuing the search warrant," this requirement 
"should not be read literally, for 'Oath or affirmation' for 
Fourth Amendment purposes does not require a face-to-face 
confrontation between affiant and magistrate.  Nor does it mean 
that a swearing before a notary or court clerk is insufficient."  
LaFave, et al., supra note 10, § 3.4(c) & n.51 (citations 
omitted); see also Oath, Jacob, supra note 13 (emphasis added) 
("Oath . . . [i]s an affirmation or denial of any thing, before 
one or more persons who have authority to administer the 
same . . . ."); 3 Am. Jur. 2d Affidavits § 7 (2022) (footnotes 
omitted) ("The affiant must swear to the affidavit, and the fact 
of swearing must be certified by a proper officer.  The notary 
and affiant must be present together for giving of oath."); Wis. 
Stat. § 968.12(2) ("The person requesting the warrant may swear 
to the complaint or affidavit before a notarial officer . . . or 
before a judge . . . ."). 
15 Moeser argues that Sergeant Brown's use of a preprinted 
form undermines the solemnness.  This argument too elevates the 
affidavit's form over its substance.  
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
27 
 
false 
swearing 
if 
he 
knowingly 
lied. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.32(2); LaFave et al., supra ¶32 (quoting Simon, 515 P.2d 
at 1165)  ("[T]he 'true test' is whether the procedures followed 
were such 'that perjury could be charged therein if any material 
allegation contained therein is false.'").  
¶45 The case law supports this conclusion.  Sergeant 
Brown's affidavit contains far more than the affidavit in Tye, 
where the oath or affirmation requirement was not satisfied 
because the officer failed to either sign or swear to the truth 
of the affidavit.  See Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶5. 
¶46 As a result, given that "[t]he purpose of an oath or 
affirmation is to impress upon the swearing individual an 
appropriate sense of obligation to tell the truth," the facts 
and circumstances here demonstrate that Sergeant Brown executed 
this affidavit "in a form calculated to awaken [Sergeant 
Brown's] conscience and impress [his] mind with [his] duty to 
[tell the truth]."  Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶19; Wis. Stat. 
§ 906.03(1).  This substance must be elevated over Moeser's 
complaints regarding form. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶47 Moeser challenges the warrant which compelled him to 
submit to a blood draw.  He argues that the warrant is 
constitutionally defective because the affiant was not placed 
under oath or affirmation when he signed the affidavit which 
accompanied the warrant application.  According to Moeser, this 
omission failed to satisfy the requirement under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
28 
 
Section 
11 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
that 
warrant 
applications be "supported by oath or affirmation."  As a 
result, he argues that the circuit court erroneously denied his 
motion to suppress evidence and that the court of appeals erred 
in affirming that decision. 
¶48 We conclude that the affidavit fulfilled the oath or 
affirmation requirement under the United States and Wisconsin 
constitutions because "[t]he purpose of an oath or affirmation 
is to impress upon the swearing individual an appropriate sense 
of obligation to tell the truth," and here the officer was 
impressed with that obligation.  Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶19; 
accord U.S. const. amend. IV; Wis. Const. art. I, § 11.  In 
other words, the constitutional guarantee is satisfied because 
the facts and circumstances demonstrate that Sergeant Brown 
executed this affidavit "in a form calculated to awaken 
[Sergeant Brown's] conscience and impress [his] mind with [his] 
duty to [tell the truth]."  Wis. Stat. § 906.03(1); accord Tye, 
248 
Wis. 2d 530, 
¶19. 
 
The 
United 
States 
and 
Wisconsin 
constitutions do not require that any specific language or 
procedure be employed in the administration of an oath or 
affirmation.  Instead, constitutional requirements, relevant 
case law, and the Wisconsin Statutes all indicate that the oath 
or affirmation requirement is an issue of substance, not form.  
Here, the facts sufficiently demonstrate that the constitutional 
right 
to 
be 
free 
from 
abusive 
governmental 
searches 
is 
satisfied.  Therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying 
No. 
2019AP2184-CR   
 
29 
 
Moeser's motion to suppress, and the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.bh 
 
1 
 
¶49 BRIAN 
HAGEDORN, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
Fourth 
Amendment requires that for a warrant to issue, it must be 
"supported by Oath or affirmation."  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  The 
majority opinion explains that neither the amendment's text nor 
its original understanding mandate that an oath or affirmation 
follow a particular form.  Rather, the historical record 
suggests that the Fourth Amendment's oath or affirmation 
requirement is satisfied when an affiant:  (1) knowingly and 
intentionally makes a statement; (2) affirms, swears, or 
declares that the information in the statement is true; and (3) 
does so under circumstances that impress upon the affiant the 
obligation to tell the truth.1   
¶50 In this case, Sergeant Brown made a statement——the 
affidavit——in which he affirmed he had "personal knowledge that 
the contents of this affidavit are true . . . ."  And by signing 
the statement before a notary with knowledge it would be 
presented 
to 
a 
magistrate——implicating 
the 
potential 
consequences of swearing falsely——Sergeant Brown acted under 
circumstances that impressed upon him the solemn obligation to 
tell the truth.  This was enough to pass constitutional muster——
but not by much.       
                                                 
1 See State v. Gutierrez-Perez, 337 P.3d 205, ¶19 (Utah 
2014); see also United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 46, 50 (2d 
Cir. 1977) (defining an oath or affirmation as a "formal 
assertion of, or attestation to, the truth of what has been, or 
is to be, said."); Affirmation, Giles Jacob, A New Law 
Dictionary 
(J. 
Morgan 
ed., 
10th 
ed. 
1782) 
(defining 
an 
affirmation as a "[s]olemn affirmation that what they [s]ay is 
true"). 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.bh 
 
2 
 
¶51 Although I disagree with its ultimate conclusion, the 
dissent offers strong counterarguments that call the sufficiency 
of the oath into question.  In particular, the affidavit could 
be read to suggest a separate oath had already taken place, when 
the record is clear that it did not.  I do not view this 
sloppiness as fatal for the reasons already described, but law 
enforcement should ensure the procedures employed to obtain 
warrants are clear and consistent.  While the oath requirement 
is not a high bar, it is a constitutional prerequisite to 
obtaining 
a 
warrant. 
 
Giving 
careful 
attention 
to 
this 
requirement ensures searches are conducted in a manner that 
respect constitutional rights and do not risk undermining 
otherwise lawful efforts to collect evidence.  Accordingly, I 
concur with and join the majority opinion. 
¶52 I am authorized to state that Justice JILL J. KAROFSKY 
joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶53 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The oath or 
affirmation requirement is not simply a matter of good practice.  
It is a constitutional imperative and an essential check on 
governmental power.   
¶54 The majority states that the purpose of the oath or 
affirmation requirement is to "impress upon the swearing 
individual an appropriate sense of obligation to tell the 
truth."  Majority op., ¶3 (citing State v. Tye, 2001 WI 124, 
¶19, 248 Wis. 2d 530, 636 N.W.2d 473).  Yet in this case, it is 
undisputed that the first sentence of Sergeant Brown's affidavit 
was not true.  It says Sergeant Brown was "first duly sworn on 
oath."  He wasn't. 
¶55 The majority forgives this untruth, concluding that, 
despite the first sentence of the affidavit being false, somehow 
Sergeant Brown's conscience was "awakened" and his mind was 
"impressed" with the duty to tell the truth.  Id.  In essence, 
"good enough under the circumstances," says the majority. 
¶56 But the question is not whether it is "good enough 
under the circumstances."  Rather, the threshold question is:  
what is required under the warrant clause of both the United 
States and Wisconsin constitutions? 
¶57 Justice Scalia, although in a different context, 
writing on behalf of the Court in Crawford v. Washington, faced 
a similar dilemma of dueling methods sufficient to establish 
reliability 
of 
testimony. 
 
He 
"readily 
concede[d]" 
that 
admitting reliable out-of-court testimony might be a good enough 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
way to find the truth.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 
(2004).  However, he observed that the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution required a specific mechanism for 
determining the truth:  confrontation.  While acknowledging that 
confrontation is not the only way for getting at the truth, he 
determined that it was the one and only way the Founders chose.    
Id. ("The Constitution prescribes a procedure for determining 
the 
reliability 
of 
testimony 
in 
criminal 
trials, 
and 
we . . . lack authority to replace it with one of our own 
devising."). 
¶58 So it is here.  The swearing of an oath or making an 
affirmation before a judicial officer may not be the only 
mechanism that is sufficiently reliable to support the requisite 
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.  It is, 
however, the mechanism that the Founders chose. 
¶59 The writings of a founding father and subsequent 
United States Supreme Court Chief Justice, John Marshall, teach 
that the oath is a "solemn requirement."  Laurent Sacharoff, The 
Broken Fourth Amendment Oath, 74 Stan. L. Rev. 603, 679 (2022) 
(citing United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 27, 28-29 (C.C.D. Va. 
1807)).  Yet, the majority attempts to replace this "solemn 
requirement" with a malleable mechanism of its own devising.  
Rather than focusing on the meaning of the words of the warrant 
clause, it instead examines the purpose of the clause and the 
purported intent of the affiant to determine that there was 
sufficient compliance with its purpose here. 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶60 In my view, the majority errs when it eschews the 
constitutional imperative and instead determines that the 
"constitutional guarantee is satisfied" upon an examination of 
Sergeant Brown's subjective intent.  See majority op., ¶3.  The 
majority arrives at this conclusion via a flawed framework and 
focus.   
¶61 To the contrary, I determine that the constitutional 
oath 
or 
affirmation 
requirement 
mandates 
more 
than 
an 
examination of the affiant's intent.  It commands that an oath 
or affirmation actually take place, whether in writing or 
orally, and that it is done before a judicial officer in some 
fashion.1  Because, as the majority correctly acknowledges, it is 
"undisputed that he made no such oath or affirmation before the 
judicial officer," id., ¶8, Sergeant Brown's affidavit does not 
meet the constitutional oath or affirmation requirement.  As a 
consequence, the warrant is invalid and the blood draw evidence 
must be suppressed. 
¶62 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
                                                 
1 I recognize that pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 968.12(3), "[a] 
search 
warrant 
may 
be 
based 
upon 
sworn 
oral 
testimony 
communicated to the judge by telephone, radio or other means of 
electronic communication," and I do not mean to cast aspersions 
on this method or suggest that it is constitutionally suspect.  
A real-time interaction between an affiant and a judicial 
officer by electronic means conducted pursuant to the statutory 
procedures is the functional equivalent of "before a judicial 
officer."  Further, for purposes of "administering an oath or 
affirmation," a notary, although not a judge, is a "judicial 
officer."  See Wis. Stat. § 140.01(7). 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
I 
¶63 In the early morning hours of October 14, 2017, 
Sergeant Steven Brown stopped Jeffrey Moeser for suspected 
operating while intoxicated (OWI).  Majority op., ¶4.  After 
conducting field sobriety tests, as well as a preliminary breath 
test, Sergeant Brown transported Moeser to the hospital for a 
blood draw.  Id. 
¶64 At the hospital, Moeser refused to consent to the 
blood draw.2  Id., ¶5.  As a consequence, Sergeant Brown sought a 
search warrant.  Id.  To support his warrant application, 
Sergeant Brown completed a fill-in-the-blank form entitled, 
"Affidavit." 
¶65 Sergeant Brown filled in his name in the blank space 
appearing before the pre-printed text, that stated, "being first 
duly sworn on oath, deposes and says."  Id., ¶6.  The affidavit 
further set forth that Sergeant Brown "ha[s] personal knowledge 
that the contents of this affidavit are true and that any 
observations or conclusions of fellow officers referenced in 
this affidavit are truthful and reliable."  Id.  He signed and 
dated the affidavit in the presence of his colleague, Lieutenant 
                                                 
2 As is his constitutional right.  State v. Prado, 2021 WI 
64, ¶47, 397 Wis. 2d 719, 960 N.W.2d 869 (explaining that "a 
person has a constitutional right to refuse a search absent a 
warrant or an applicable exception to the warrant requirement"). 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
Jacob Wills, a notary public.  The notary's jurat3 includes the 
phrase, "Subscribed and sworn to before me."   
¶66 However, it is undisputed that Sergeant Brown made no 
oral oath or affirmation before signing the affidavit, and he 
made no oath or affirmation before any judicial officer.  Id., 
¶8.  Despite this shortcoming, a judicial officer approved the 
warrant application and Moeser's blood was drawn.  Id., ¶¶6-7. 
¶67 Moeser 
later 
moved 
to 
suppress 
the 
blood 
draw 
evidence, 
arguing 
that 
the 
warrant 
did 
not 
satisfy 
the 
constitutional oath or affirmation requirement.  Id., ¶8.  The 
circuit court denied the motion, indicating that "Sergeant Brown 
did realize that he was swearing to the truth of what he 
indicated in his affidavit." 
¶68 Subsequently, Moeser appealed, and the court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision over Judge 
Kloppenburg's dissent.  State v. Moeser, No. 2019AP2184-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 24, 2021).  The court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
"the 
affidavit 
satisfied 
the 
requirement that search warrants be supported by oath or 
affirmation."  Id., ¶1. 
¶69 Judge Kloppenburg dissented.  Observing that "it is 
undisputed that Sergeant Brown did not swear to the truthfulness 
of the statements in the affidavit before either the notary or 
                                                 
3 "'Jurat' is the name given to a notary's written 
certificate, which should appear after the signature of a person 
who has given an oath, or has made a sworn statement."  Estate 
of Hopgood ex rel. Turner v. Boyd, 2013 WI 1, ¶4 n.4, 345 
Wis. 2d 65, 825 N.W.2d 273.   
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
the court commissioner" and that relevant statutes and case law 
"plainly require that the truth of an affidavit supporting a 
warrant must be sworn to before either a notary or a judge," 
Judge Kloppenburg determined that "the warrant is void."  Id., 
¶42 (Kloppenburg, J., dissenting). 
¶70 The majority now affirms the court of appeals.  It 
reasons "that the affidavit fulfilled the oath or affirmation 
requirement under the United States and Wisconsin constitutions 
because '[t]he purpose of an oath or affirmation is to impress 
upon the swearing individual an appropriate sense of obligation 
to tell the truth,' and here the officer was impressed with that 
obligation."  Majority op., ¶3.  In the majority's view, "the 
constitutional guarantee is satisfied because the facts and 
circumstances demonstrate that Sergeant Brown executed this 
affidavit 'in a form calculated to awaken [Sergeant Brown's] 
conscience and impress [his] mind with [his] duty to [tell the 
truth]."  Id.  The majority continues:  "The United States and 
Wisconsin constitutions do not require that any specific 
language or procedure be employed in the administration of an 
oath or affirmation.  Instead, constitutional requirements, 
relevant case law, and Wisconsin Statutes all indicate that the 
oath or affirmation requirement is an issue of substance, not 
form."  Id.   
II 
¶71 Although 
there 
is 
disagreement 
in 
constitutional 
analyses about how much weight should be given to the original 
meaning of the constitutional text, there appears a general 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
agreement that, no matter the approach, it deserves some weight 
and matters at least to some degree.  See Thomas Y. Davies, 
Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 
742-45 (1999).  Accordingly, I begin by focusing my analysis on 
three primary sources in determining the meaning of the 
constitutional oath or affirmation provision:  the plain 
language of the text, the constitutional debates and practices 
of the time, and the earliest interpretations and applications 
of the provision.4   
¶72 I do not endeavor to provide an exegesis discussing 
these sources.  Rather, the discussion below provides an 
abbreviated review sufficient to support the conclusion that 
Sergeant Brown's affidavit does not meet the constitutional 
imperative that an oath or affirmation actually take place.  For 
additional support, I also examine relevant modern case law and 
statutes. 
A 
¶73 The text of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation."  This 
                                                 
4 Although I recognize 
that a historical inquiry is 
established in our case law, see, e.g., Appling v. Walker, 2014 
WI 96, ¶7, 358 Wis. 2d 132, 853 N.W.2d 888; Dairyland Greyhound 
Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶19, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 
N.W.2d 408, I nevertheless am wary of a legal analysis that puts 
a court in the position of amateur historian.  Such a framework 
is ripe for cherry-picking historical evidence that supports a 
favored conclusion.  See State v. C.G., 2022 WI 60, ¶111, 403 
Wis. 2d 229, 976 N.W.2d 318 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986)); see 
generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Worse Than Nothing (2022). 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
requirement is echoed by the Wisconsin constitution.  Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 11.5   
¶74 In an attempt to buttress its result, the majority 
likewise looks to the text of the constitutional provision, and 
specifically to definitions of "oath" from the founding era.  
See majority op., ¶19.  But in doing so, it often cites 
authority that supports the conclusion of this dissent.   
¶75 For example, the majority cites a 1782 dictionary 
defining "oath" as "an affirmation or denial of any thing, 
before one or more persons who have authority to administer the 
same, for the discovery and advancement of truth and right, 
calling God to witness, that the testimony is true."  Id. 
(citing Oath, Giles Jacob, A New Law Dictionary (J. Morgan ed., 
10th ed. 1782)).  According to this definition, apparently 
espoused by the majority, an oath must be accomplished before 
one who has authority to "administer" the oath.  "Administering" 
an oath thus presupposes that the affiant has undertaken some 
sort of action before another indicating recognition of the need 
to tell the truth.  Swearing an oath invokes the deity to be a 
witness to the oath and risks punishment from the divine if the 
truth is not told.6   
                                                 
5 Aside 
from 
minor 
differences 
in 
punctuation 
and 
capitalization, the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 
are identical. 
6 See Oath, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining 
"oath" as "[a] solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to 
God or a revered person or thing, that one's statement is true 
or that one will be bound to a promise").  One who falsely 
swears an oath also may face legal consequences, such as 
criminal charges for perjury or false swearing.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 946.31, 946.32. 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
¶76 Other founding era dictionaries confirm the active 
nature of an oath, i.e., it is something that must be done 
before another.  For example, a 1775 dictionary defines an 
"oath," as relevant here, as "[a] solemn attestation, the form 
of attestation before a magistrate, an appeal to the Divine 
Being by the mention of something sacred . . . ."  Oath, John 
Ash, The New and Complete Dictionary of the English Language 
(1775).  This definition confirms that there must actually be an 
"attestation," which must be accomplished "before a magistrate." 
¶77 The constitutional text thus weighs against the 
majority's conclusion.  As will be more fully set forth below, 
Sergeant Brown did nothing "before" anyone that could be called 
a "solemn attestation," or that risked punishment from a deity 
if the truth is not told.  In essence, he did nothing 
constituting an "oath" as envisioned by the constitutional 
mandate, "supported by oath." 
B 
¶78 To further examine the meaning of the text, I turn 
next to the constitutional debates at the time of the founding.  
The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment came about as a 
response to Britain's use of Writs of Assistance "in the 
American colonies to search wherever government officials chose 
with nearly absolute and unlimited discretion."  Tye, 248 
Wis. 2d 530, ¶8; see also State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶17, 
341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460.  These writs were perceived by 
the colonists as fundamental violations of the right to be 
undisturbed in their person and property, and accordingly each 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
of the state constitutions following independence guaranteed the 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  Tye, 
248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶9.   
¶79 In 
the 
process 
of 
crafting 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, James Madison served as the drafter for the 
federal rights amendments.  His original proposed language for 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
included 
an 
oath 
or 
affirmation 
requirement:   
The rights of the people to be secured in their 
persons, their houses, their papers, and their other 
property from all unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated by warrants issued without 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or 
not particularly describing the places to be searched, 
or the persons or things to be seized. 
Davies, supra ¶71, at 697 (citing James Madison, Speech to the 
House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in 12 The Papers of 
James Madison 197, 201 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977)).   
¶80 The final language of the amendment likewise contained 
the oath or affirmation requirement, which was not altered by a 
subsequent committee report, the House, the Senate, or the state 
legislatures, where it was ratified "without any apparent 
controversy."  Id. at 723.  This consistency of the oath or 
affirmation language reflects the central nature of this 
requirement in the Fourth Amendment's text.   
¶81 A similar series of events played out in Wisconsin.  
Even prior to statehood, the territorial legislature enacted a 
requirement mandating an oath in an application for a search 
warrant.  Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶10.  And when Wisconsin 
attained statehood, it also included in its constitution an 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
amendment protecting the people against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.  Like the Fourth Amendment, the initial proposed 
language of Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin constitution 
included language dictating that warrants must be "supported by 
oath or affirmation."  Milo M. Quaife, ed., The Attainment of 
Statehood 228 (1928).  This proposed language set forth: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrants to search any place or seize any person or 
thing shall issue without describing, as near as may 
be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation. 
Id.  Again, this language remained consistent through the 
constitutional debate.  Indeed, "[i]t is evident from the 
debates that the adoption of Article I, Section 11 was 
relatively uncontroversial . . . ."  Williams, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 
¶25.  Accordingly, Article I, Section 11 was enshrined in our 
state constitution.  Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶10.  The debates 
thus reflect both the central importance of the oath or 
affirmation requirement and the consensus surrounding its 
necessity. 
¶82 An examination of the practices at the time following 
adoption of these constitutional provisions further confirms 
that an oath or affirmation is an "act" done before a judicial 
officer.   
¶83 During our nation's founding era, justices of the 
peace were central to the warrant-issuing process.  Indeed, they 
issued the majority of warrants.  Sacharoff, supra ¶59, at 623 
(citing 2 Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae: The History 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
Of The Pleas Of The Crown 107 (W.A. Stokes & E. Ingersoll eds., 
Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1st Am. ed. 1847)).  These 
justices of the peace relied upon published justice of the peace 
manuals, which "in turn, greatly influenced the Framers and 
ratifiers."  Id. at 624.   
¶84 The manuals for justices of the peace often contained 
forms for complaints to obtain a warrant, and such forms 
included standard language that a complainant "swears" to the 
information therein.  Id. at 630-31.  "[This] warrant process 
occurred before a magistrate who was required to carefully 
examine and assess the witness to ensure the truth of the 
allegations."  Id. at 607. 
¶85 Such forms setting forth standard language were also 
in use in Wisconsin.  See Edwin E. Bryant, A Treatise on the 
Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace, and 
the Powers and Duties of Constables in Executing Process in the 
State of Wisconsin 940 (1884).  These forms likewise set forth a 
jurat:  "Subscribed and sworn to before me, this ___ day of 
____, A.D. 18__, ______ ______, Justice of the Peace."  Id.7  And 
                                                 
7 In full, an example form complaint for a search warrant in 
Wisconsin's Justice of the Peace manual sets forth: 
State of Wisconsin 
_____ County 
C.D., being first duly sworn, complains on oath before 
me and says that one harness of the value of thirty 
dollars, and one saddle of the value of ten dollars, 
of the goods and chattels of the said C.D. were, on 
the ____ day of ____, A.D. 18__, feloniously taken, 
stolen 
and 
carried 
away 
from 
his 
premises 
and 
possession, 
at 
said 
county, 
and 
that 
the 
said 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
even today, example forms consistently contain a statement in 
the jurat that the information in the affidavit was "Subscribed 
and sworn to before me."  Indeed, the affidavit in this case was 
affixed with a similar jurat.   
¶86 Thus, from the early days of the republic, an 
affidavit in support of a search warrant necessarily was 
accompanied by an act of swearing before a judicial officer, 
supporting this dissent's conclusion that an affiant must 
complete some sort of act to have properly sworn an oath or made 
an affirmation.  Stated differently, the practices at the time 
of the founding make clear that an oath must be taken, and it 
must be done before a judicial officer.  
C 
¶87 An examination of the earliest interpretations and 
applications 
of 
the 
constitutional 
oath 
or 
affirmation 
requirement also informs our inquiry.  Early legislative 
enactments reinforced the need for an oath in an application for 
                                                                                                                                                             
complainant verily believes that the said stolen goods 
and chattels are concealed in the dwelling house of 
one A.B. (or, particularly describe the place to be 
searched), in the _____ of _____, in said county; and 
that the following are the reasons for and grounds of 
such belief:  (Here set forth reasons, etc., to 
satisfy the magistrate that there is cause for such 
belief.) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, this ___ day of 
____, A.D. 18__, ______ ______, Justice of the Peace. 
Edwin E. Bryant, 
A Treatise on the Civil and Criminal 
Jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace, and the Powers and Duties 
of Constables in Executing Process in the State of Wisconsin 940 
(1884). 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
certain search warrants.  Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶11.  Indeed, 
the Wisconsin legislature passed a statute indicating just this 
in 1848, the same year Wisconsin attained statehood.8  Id.  The 
text of this original statutory provision has been amended 
numerous times, but it still today refers to a "sworn complaint" 
or "sworn oral testimony."  Id.; Wis. Stat. § 968.12 (emphasis 
added).9  Additionally, the modern statute indicates that the 
complaint must be sworn to "before a notarial officer authorized 
under ch. 140 to take acknowledgments or before a judge" or may 
be taken telephonically in compliance with certain statutory 
procedures.  Wis. Stat. § 968.12(2) & (3).   
                                                 
8 See State v. Tye, 2001 WI 124, ¶11 n.10, 248 Wis. 2d 530, 
636 N.W.2d 473; Wis. Stat. § 2, ch. 142 (1849) ("Any such 
magistrate when satisfied that there is reasonable cause, may 
also, 
upon 
like 
complaint 
made 
on 
oath, 
issue 
search 
warrants . . . ."). 
9 In relevant part, Wis. Stat. § 968.12 provides: 
(2) Warrant upon affidavit.  A search warrant may be 
based upon sworn complaint or affidavit, or testimony 
recorded by a phonographic reporter or under sub. 
(3)(d), 
showing 
probable 
cause 
therefor. 
 
The 
complaint, 
affidavit 
or 
testimony 
may 
be 
upon 
information and belief.  The person requesting the 
warrant may swear to the complaint or affidavit before 
a notarial officer authorized under ch. 140 to take 
acknowledgments or before a judge, or a judge may 
place a person under oath via telephone, radio, or 
other means of electronic communication, without the 
requirement of face-to-face contact, to swear to the 
complaint or affidavit.  The judge shall indicate on 
the search warrant that the person so swore to the 
complaint or affidavit. 
(3) Warrant upon oral testimony.  (a) General rule.  A 
search warrant may be based upon sworn oral testimony 
communicated to the judge by telephone, radio or other 
means of electronic communication, under the procedure 
prescribed in this subsection. 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
15 
 
¶88 We find an additional example of the early application 
of the oath or affirmation requirement by one of the preeminent 
jurists in our country's history during the course of his 
participation in a notorious trial.  As part of the trial of 
Aaron Burr in 1807, Chief Justice John Marshall was asked to 
rule on the admissibility of an affidavit.  For an oath to be a 
"legal oath," Chief Justice Marshall commented that it must be 
"taken 
by 
a 
'complete 
magistrate' 
who 
is 
'qualified.'"  
Sacharoff, supra ¶59, at 680 (citing Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 28-29).  
His ruling demonstrates that an oath is "a solemn requirement 
that could not be relaxed."  Id. at 679.   
¶89 The upshot of all of this is that an oath is an "act" 
that must take place.  The groundwork for such a premise is laid 
by dictionaries from the founding era and built upon through the 
constitutional debates and practices of the time, as well as the 
first interpretations and applications after enactment.  The 
affiant must do something, and that something is to actually 
take an oath. 
D 
¶90 I turn next to examine applications of an oath or 
affirmation requirement in Wisconsin case law.  This case law 
again drives home the point that an "oath" is an act that must 
take place.   
¶91 In Kellner v. Christian, 197 Wis. 2d 183, 191, 539 
N.W.2d 685 (1995), we concluded that "in order for a notice to 
be properly 'sworn to' under Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5), a claimant 
must make an oath or affirmation as to the truthfulness of the 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
16 
 
contents of the notice."  In doing so, we described the oath or 
affirmation 
requirement 
as 
mandating 
"in 
some 
form 
an 
unequivocal and present act by which the affiant consciously 
takes upon himself the obligation of an oath."  Id. at 192 
(emphasis added).   
¶92 We have also distinguished an oath or affirmation from 
an "acknowledgement" in that "oaths and affirmations require a 
person to swear or affirm the truth of a statement."  Estate of 
Hopgood ex rel. Turner v. Boyd, 2013 WI 1, ¶30, 345 Wis. 2d 65, 
825 N.W.2d 273.10  "They are solemn, formal, and signify an 
obligation to speak the truth."  Id.  We have also described an 
oath or affirmation as something that "must be administered."  
Id., ¶31; see also State v. Johnston, 133 Wis. 2d 261, 267, 394 
N.W.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that the defendant was 
under oath after the oath was administered by the clerk of 
court).  Use of the word "administer" strengthens the premise 
                                                 
10 Admittedly, 
Hopgood, 
like 
Kellner, 
addressed 
the 
requirement that a notice of claim pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.82(5) be "sworn to," and not a search warrant.  However, 
this is distinction without a difference.  Why should it mean 
one thing to "swear to" a statement's truth in one context and 
something else in another?   
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
17 
 
that an oath is an "act" taken by the affiant before and in 
interaction with another.11  
III 
¶93 With the above discussion as a guide, I turn finally 
to 
apply 
the 
teachings 
of 
the 
constitutional 
text, 
constitutional debates and practices of the time, earliest 
legislative enactments, and case law to the facts at hand. 
¶94 As the historical evidence demonstrates, and as the 
majority correctly observes, an oath or affirmation has long 
been an "essential prerequisite to the issuance of a valid 
search warrant."  Majority op., ¶17; Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶13; 
State v. Baltes, 183 Wis. 545, 552, 198 N.W. 282 (1924).  For a 
constitutional "essential prerequisite," the majority treats the 
oath or affirmation requirement rather loosely.  There is no 
dispute here that Sergeant Brown did not, either orally or in 
writing, swear or affirm that he would tell the truth at any 
point in the process of filling out or signing his affidavit.  
The law does not support the majority's "look the other way" 
approach.   
¶95 Sergeant 
Brown's 
affidavit, 
by 
itself, 
was 
insufficient to fulfill the constitutional oath or affirmation 
                                                 
11 The majority quotes from a commonly-cited treatise on 
criminal procedure to support its conclusion.  Majority op., ¶32 
(quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 3.4(c) 
(4th ed. 2021) (citations omitted)).  However, as the majority 
further acknowledges, LaFave also states that "[n]o particular 
ceremony is necessary to constitute the act of swearing," 
further supporting this dissent's conclusion that an oath 
requires an act.  See LaFave, et al., supra, § 3.4(c) (emphasis 
added).  Thus, this treatise still supports this dissent's 
premise that "something must be done."   
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
18 
 
requirement.  I agree with the majority that an oath need not be 
oral.  See majority op., ¶19 (indicating that "it was recognized 
during the Founding that an 'oath' could be written rather than 
spoken").  However, nothing in the affidavit constitutes a 
written oath and the parties agree that no oral oath was ever 
"taken" before a judicial officer.  If, instead of "being first 
duly sworn," the affidavit began with "I swear or affirm that 
the contents of this affidavit are true," we would likely not 
have this case before us.  And if Sergeant Brown had made an 
oral oath before the notary swearing or affirming the truth of 
the 
affidavit's 
contents, 
we 
likely 
would 
be 
on 
solid 
constitutional ground. 
¶96 However, neither of these things happened.  The 
affidavit instead falsely asserts that Sergeant Brown was "first 
duly sworn."  It is undisputed that he was not.  This court has 
previously held that "the total absence of any statement under 
oath to support a search warrant violates the explicit oath or 
affirmation requirement."  Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶3.  Such is 
the case here. 
¶97 I further agree with the majority that an oath is a 
matter of substance, not form.  See majority op., ¶36.  But this 
does not mean that law enforcement can dispense with the act of 
an oath altogether and still call it an oath.  There may not be 
"magic words" required, but there still must be an oath.  Here, 
Sergeant Brown's "oath" was deficient as a matter of substance 
because there was no actual oath taken by the affiant.   
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
19 
 
¶98 Indeed, there was no "oath" "taken" "before" anyone.  
There was no attestation, much less an attestation before a 
magistrate.  Because Sergeant Brown did not commit any act 
before any other person that would indicate he was under oath at 
any point in the process of drafting, signing, or notarizing the 
affidavit, I conclude that he was not under oath for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
constitution. 
¶99 The 
oath 
or 
affirmation 
requirement 
is 
not 
a 
technicality or meaningless hoop through which law enforcement 
must jump.  See Kellner, 197 Wis. 2d at 192 (explaining that 
"the requirement of an oath is not a mere technicality"); Tye, 
248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶14 (agreeing with the State's acknowledgement 
that the "failure to swear to the information upon which a 
warrant is obtained cannot be dismissed as a mere failure to 
comply with a technicality").  It is instead a constitutional 
imperative.  I would hold law enforcement to the constitutional 
standard, thereby "preserv[ing] the integrity of the search 
warrant process," Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶19, and upholding the 
vitality of the oath or affirmation requirement. 
¶100 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶101 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2019AP2184-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1