Title: Commonwealth v. Hinds

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12953 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ADRIAN HINDS. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     January 6, 2021. - April 20, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  Evidence, 
Expert opinion, Motive, Hearsay.  Witness, Expert.  Jury 
and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, 
Examination of jurors, Challenge to jurors, Hearsay. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 27, 2016. 
 
 
The cases were tried before David Ricciardone, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Elaine Fronhofer for the defendant. 
 
Joseph G.A. Coliflores, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
Michael Tumposky, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In March 2016, the defendant, Adrian B. Hinds, 
fought with Miranda Arthur-Smith and Nathaniel Cherniak.  As a 
result, the defendant was indicted on two counts of assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon resulting in serious 
injury, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (c) (i).1  The defendant, who is 
black, claimed that Cherniak, who is white, had initiated the 
attack out of racial animus and that the defendant acted in 
self-defense. 
 
To support this argument, the defendant proposed having two 
experts testify at trial about the cultural significance of a 
symbol that Cherniak had tattooed on his arm.  The defendant 
alleged that the symbol -- which he claimed was the number 211 -
- was affiliated with groups that espoused white supremacist 
ideology.2  After holding voir dire for each expert, the judge 
excluded both experts on reliability grounds under the Daubert-
Lanigan standard.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 
U.S. 579, 585-595 (1993).  See also Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 
 
 
1 The defendant also was indicted on two counts of armed 
assault with intent to murder, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b), one count 
of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. 
c. 265, § 15A (b), and one count of cruelty to an animal, G. L. 
c. 272, § 77.  At trial, the judge dismissed for insufficient 
evidence so much of the G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b), charge as 
alleged that the assault and battery occurred by means of a 
dangerous weapon, and the jury found the defendant not guilty of 
the remaining charges. 
 
 
2 Whether the symbol was the number 211 was disputed at voir 
dire by the Commonwealth. 
3 
 
Mass. 15, 25-26 (1994).  At trial, the Commonwealth alleged that 
the defendant attacked Arthur-Smith and Cherniak without 
justification.  The defendant subsequently was convicted on both 
counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon 
resulting in serious injury. 
 
On appeal, we consider, among other issues, whether the 
judge erred in excluding the defendant's experts.  We conclude 
that the judge abused his discretion in excluding one of the 
experts.  Because this error was prejudicial, we reverse and 
remand for a new trial.3 
 
Background.  We summarize the evidence at trial, reserving 
certain facts for our discussion of the issues.  We start by 
noting what was undisputed.  The defendant and the victims knew 
each other before the fight.  At the time of the incident, the 
defendant lived with his mother in the same Westfield apartment 
building as Arthur-Smith and Cherniak, who lived together.  
Indeed, the defendant and Cherniak were even friendly with one 
another, but the friendship ended approximately six months 
before the fight that gave rise to this case.  As will become 
apparent, the parties agreed on few other details. 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs from the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services and Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
4 
 
 
1.  The Commonwealth's case.  Cherniak testified that his 
relationship with the defendant soured when the defendant 
accused him of being with the Russian mafia, a Mexican cartel, 
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 
and of being an undercover agent of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration.  Cherniak further testified that several days 
before the altercation, the defendant confronted him in the 
apartment building with a hammer and said that Cherniak was 
going to be sent to a concentration camp. 
 
Arthur-Smith testified that the altercation began when she 
was pushed to the ground after leaving the apartment building to 
head to her car.  She felt something strike the back of her head 
and, after turning over, recognized the defendant as the 
attacker.  She testified that the defendant struck her from four 
to five times with a hammer.  Arthur-Smith claimed that the 
defendant smelled as if he had not bathed in some time and that 
during the attack the defendant said to her:  "That's for 
messing with my mother."  As the attack ensued, Arthur-Smith 
yelled out Cherniak's name. 
 
Cherniak testified that upon hearing Arthur-Smith yelling 
his name, he left their apartment with a knife.  When Cherniak 
opened the front door of the building, he saw the defendant 
standing over Arthur-Smith, who was bleeding.  At that point, 
Arthur-Smith's pet dog ran out of the building, causing Arthur-
5 
 
Smith to stand up to chase the dog.  The defendant went inside 
the building.  Cherniak, too, went inside, heading back to his 
apartment to retrieve pepper spray; he then returned outside.  
Thereafter, the defendant went back outside, hammer again in 
hand.  Cherniak sprayed the defendant with the pepper spray, and 
the defendant struck Cherniak with the hammer several times.  
After this, the defendant entered his car and drove away. 
 
2.  The defendant's case.  The defendant offered a 
different version of events.  To begin, the defendant testified 
that while living in the Westfield apartment building, both he 
and his mother experienced several racially charged incidents 
and that their cars' tires had been slashed while parked near 
the apartment complex.4  The defendant did not testify that 
Cherniak was behind these incidents.  He did, however, testify 
that his friendship with Cherniak ended when Cherniak repeatedly 
asked the defendant to sell drugs for him, assuming that the 
defendant was a drug dealer because, as the defendant testified 
that Cherniak said, "You're black, you drive a Porsche, and 
you're only twenty-something years old."  Further, the defendant 
 
 
4 The defendant testified that he contacted the police about 
the vandalism done to his car.  An officer testified at trial 
that he had responded to a report of vandalism to the car but 
believed that the alleged slash marks on the tires were 
consistent with damage to the rim from driving over potholes. 
6 
 
testified that Cherniak told the defendant that he had been a 
member of a "biker club" or "gang" in New York City.5 
 
In contrast to Cherniak and Arthur-Smith's testimony, the 
defendant testified that the altercation began when he heard a 
loud bang outside his apartment, which the defendant believed 
was the door to the building slamming shut.  The defendant was 
in the shower when he heard the noise.6  Because his car 
previously had been vandalized, he looked out the window to 
check on it.  From his apartment window, the defendant saw 
Arthur-Smith and Cherniak standing near his car and Cherniak 
using a knife to slash his rear tire.7  Seeing that Cherniak had 
a knife, the defendant grabbed a hammer before leaving his 
apartment. 
 
The defendant testified that he verbally confronted Arthur-
Smith and Cherniak when they returned inside the apartment 
building.  Standing in the building's hallway, Cherniak 
 
 
5 Nathaniel Cherniak denied telling the defendant that he 
was in a gang. 
 
 
6 When an officer investigated the defendant's apartment 
after the altercation, he found the shower was still running. 
 
 
7 The size of the knife was disputed.  After the fight, the 
police did not ask to see, collect, or photograph the knife.  
Instead, Miranda Arthur-Smith brought the knife into the police 
station two weeks before trial.  The defendant alleged that the 
knife Arthur-Smith brought to the police station was not the one 
Cherniak had used.  Instead, the defendant claimed it was 
smaller than the one used by Cherniak in the fight, which had 
approximately a sixteen-inch blade. 
7 
 
responded to the defendant by saying something to the effect of 
"What are you going to do about it?"  Arthur-Smith then sprayed 
the defendant with pepper spray, making it difficult for the 
defendant to keep his eyes open.  The defendant saw Cherniak 
pull out a knife.  The defendant then went toward the door 
leading outside, swinging his hammer as he went.  Arthur-Smith 
sprayed the defendant as she backed out through the exterior 
door.  As the defendant reached the steps that led down from the 
building's exterior door, he heard what sounded like someone 
falling.  Cherniak then followed the defendant out of the 
building and started to slash his knife at the defendant.  In 
return, the defendant swung his hammer at Cherniak, making 
contact with him several times.  When the defendant realized 
that he could get by Cherniak and reenter the building, he did 
so, returning to his apartment.8 
 
Once inside, the defendant testified that he decided to try 
to find his mother, who was not home at the time, and to warn 
her about what had happened.9  The defendant brought his hammer 
with him as he went back outside.  When the defendant left the 
 
 
8 Arthur-Smith denied spraying the defendant with pepper 
spray and claimed not to have seen any damage to the tires of 
the defendant's car.  Cherniak likewise denied slashing the 
defendant's tires. 
 
 
9 The defendant claims that he did not try to telephone his 
mother because she had not been answering her telephone that 
day. 
8 
 
building, Cherniak was standing near the defendant's car.  
Cherniak sprayed the defendant with the pepper spray, and the 
defendant responded by swinging the hammer towards Cherniak.  
The defendant made contact with Cherniak, causing him to stop 
spraying the pepper spray.  The defendant then got into his car 
and drove away, eventually pulling over due to the damage to one 
of his tires.10 
 
3.  Percipient witnesses.  Although there were three other 
percipient witnesses who saw parts of the fight and testified at 
trial, none of these witnesses saw who the initial aggressor 
was.  The first witness, who was located near the parking lot at 
the time, testified that he saw the defendant standing over 
Arthur-Smith outside the building and then Cherniak running 
outside.  That witness did not hear Arthur-Smith yell Cherniak's 
name.  The second witness, who was inside her apartment at the 
time, testified to hearing a commotion outside and seeing a 
black man and a white man fighting when she looked out her 
window. 
 
Finally, the third witness testified that from inside her 
apartment she heard scuffling, grunting, and loud talking, 
though not yelling.  After looking out a window, which looked 
directly out over the parking lot, she saw a black man and a 
 
 
10 The officer who found the car confirmed that one of its 
rear tires had "sustained some significant damage." 
9 
 
white man fighting and a woman running after a dog.  She further 
saw the black man go back into the apartment building, then 
return outside with a hammer.  At this point, the white man 
sprayed the black man with something, and the black man hit the 
white man in the head with the hammer.  After fighting, the 
black man got in his car and drove away. 
 
4.  Procedural history.  The jury found the defendant 
guilty on two indictments charging assault and battery by means 
of a dangerous weapon resulting in serious bodily injury, G. L. 
c. 265, § 15A (c) (i).  The defendant appealed, and we 
transferred the case to this court sua sponte. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Expert testimony.  At trial, the defendant 
argued that he acted in self-defense.  The defendant's theory of 
the case was that Cherniak and Arthur-Smith were motivated to 
attack him by racial animus.  Corroborating this theory was a 
tattoo Cherniak had on his arm.  The defendant argued that the 
tattoo was of the number 211 and that this symbol was used by 
both the 211 Crew -- a white supremacist prison gang -- and the 
211 Bootboys -- a white supremacist group operating out of New 
York City.  According to the defendant, Cherniak's tattoo 
signaled his affinity to beliefs espoused by these groups.  To 
support this theory, the defendant sought to introduce the 
testimony of two experts:  Dr. Sophie Bjork-James, who has a 
doctorate in cultural anthropology and studies the white 
10 
 
nationalist movement, and Dr. Jesse De La Cruz, who has a 
doctorate in educational leadership and is an expert on gangs.  
Each would testify that Cherniak's tattoo was affiliated with a 
group that espoused white supremacist beliefs. 
 
The judge excluded both experts on reliability grounds.  On 
appeal, the defendant argues that the judge's decisions to 
exclude De La Cruz and Bjork-James's expert testimony were 
abuses of discretion.  We agree as to Bjork-James's testimony 
but not as to De La Cruz's testimony. 
 
"The role of expert testimony is to assist jurors in 
interpreting evidence that lies outside their common 
experience."  Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 761 
(2010).  Admission of such testimony is "governed by what has 
come to be known as the Daubert-Lanigan standard."11  
Commonwealth v. Camblin, 478 Mass. 469, 475 (2017).  See Mass. 
G. Evid. § 702 & comments (2021).  To satisfy this standard, 
expert testimony must both "rest[] on a reliable foundation" and 
 
 
11 Expert testimony also may be admitted under the standard 
set out in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 640 (2005), 
overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 
87 (2013) (Frye standard requires "theory and methodology in 
question to be generally accepted by a relevant scientific 
community").  See also Commonwealth v. Powell, 450 Mass. 229, 
238 (2007) ("Where general acceptance is not established by the 
party offering the expert testimony, a full Daubert analysis 
provides an alternate method of establishing reliability" 
[citation omitted]).  At oral argument, however, the defendant 
conceded that the Daubert-Lanigan standard applies in this case. 
11 
 
be "relevant to the task at hand."  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.  
See Commonwealth v. Polk, 462 Mass. 23, 32 (2012). 
 
Within this framework, "[t]he judge is the gatekeeper of 
the evidence" and must make a threshold determination that the 
testimony is both relevant and "sufficiently reliable to go 
before the jury."  Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 Mass. 395, 417 
(2014).  Whether the methodology applied by the expert satisfies 
gatekeeper reliability is a preliminary question of fact upon 
which admissibility depends on the judge to determine.  Mass. G. 
Evid. § 104(a) (2021).  The judge does not, however, determine 
whether to credit the expert's ultimate opinion; this is a 
matter of weight for the jury to decide.  See Commonwealth v. 
Roberio, 428 Mass. 278, 281 (1998), S.C., 440 Mass. 245 (2003) 
("Once the expert's qualifications were established and assuming 
the expert's testimony met the standard of . . . Lanigan, . . . 
the issue of credibility was for a jury, not the judge"). 
 
"We review a judge's determination to admit or exclude 
expert testimony under Daubert-Lanigan for an abuse of 
discretion."  Commonwealth v. DiCicco, 470 Mass. 720, 729 
(2015).  See Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. 304, 312 (2000).  
Although "our review under this standard is deferential and 
limited, it is not perfunctory.  A judge's findings must apply 
the correct legal standard to the facts of the case and must be 
supported by an examination of the record."  Commonwealth v. 
12 
 
Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 639 (2005), overruled on other grounds 
by Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87 (2013).  See Commonwealth 
v. Crawford, 429 Mass. 60, 66 n.13 (1999).  Our analysis begins 
with the issue of relevance. 
 
a.  Relevance.  We begin by recognizing that the judge did 
not base his ruling as it relates to either defense expert on 
relevance grounds.  Nor did either the Commonwealth or the 
defendant raise the issue of relevance at trial or on appeal.12  
Nevertheless, a proper understanding of the relevance of the 
expert testimony at issue here is crucial.  See Kumho Tire Co. 
v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153-154 (1999) (judges must 
determine whether expert's testimony reliably speaks to issue 
for which it is offered to prove).  Relevance is the first rule 
of evidence; it is where our analysis must begin.  See State v. 
Goodson, 281 Kan. 913, 922 (2006) ("A determination of relevance 
is the first step in analyzing if evidence is admissible").  
Failure to grapple fully with the relevance of the defendant's 
expert testimony may have led the parties and the judge astray.  
Consequently, we start our inquiry here. 
 
The judge appears to have assumed that at least Bjork-
James's opinion was relevant in part to show that Cherniak 
belonged to a gang.  This was not and is not the defendant's 
 
 
12 The defendant, however, was asked about the issue at oral 
argument. 
13 
 
theory.  Instead, the defendant argued that Arthur-Smith and 
Cherniak attacked him first, and that the incident was a "race-
based attack and that he acted in self-defense."  To this end, 
De La Cruz and Bjork-James's testimony was relevant not to show 
that Cherniak belonged to a gang, but rather that he may have 
had some affinity for white supremacist ideology, regardless of 
whether he was actually a member of any gang or white 
supremacist group.  In short, De La Cruz and Bjork-James's 
testimony went to whether Cherniak was motivated to attack the 
defendant based on his alleged white supremacist beliefs.13 
 
"The relevance threshold for the admission of evidence is 
low."  Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 442 Mass. 135, 144 (2004).  To be 
relevant, the proposed evidence need only have a tendency to 
make a material fact more or less probable that it would be 
without the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Moore, 480 Mass. 799, 
808 (2018); Mass. G. Evid. § 401 (2021). 
 
In light of these considerations, "evidence of motive need 
not be conclusive"; instead, "it need only provide a link in the 
chain of proof."  Commonwealth v. Watt, 484 Mass. 742, 748 
(2020).  Courts routinely have admitted evidence concerning 
 
 
13 At one point, the judge appeared to acknowledge this, 
noting that "the Defendant has a theory that the Complainant's a 
white supremacist and that this led to him being attacked." 
14 
 
tattoos to show motive.14  See, e.g., People v. Valdez, 55 Cal. 
4th 82, 131 (2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 948 (2013) (evidence 
of tattoo relevant to show motive); Wolfe v. State, 273 Ga. 670, 
673-674 (2001) (same); State v. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221, 225-
226 (2013) (tattoos relevant to racial motive of both defendant 
bearing them and codefendant in malicious harassment case); 
People v. James, 348 Ill. App. 3d 498, 509-510 (2004), cert. 
denied, 544 U.S. 910 (2005) (evidence of tattoo relevant to show 
motive).  See also People v. Slavin, 1 N.Y.3d 392, 395, cert. 
denied, 543 U.S. 818 (2004) ("tattoos may have reflected 
defendant's inner thoughts").  Cf. Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 456 
Mass. 182, 188-189 (2010) (that prosecutor reasonably expected 
to elicit evidence supporting comment made during opening 
statement about how tattoo of victim's name on defendant's neck 
might provide possible motive for murder was supported by 
record). 
 
If credited, Bjork-James's or De La Cruz's testimony would 
have provided evidence that Cherniak's tattoo was associated 
with a group that espouses white supremacist beliefs.  Combined 
with the defendant's testimony about the racially charged 
 
 
14 Analogous reasoning also has supported entering in 
evidence gang-affiliated clothes and symbols in order to 
demonstrate motive.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lopes, 478 Mass. 
593, 604 (2018) ("testimony that the defendant had been seen 
wearing clothing that bore an 'H' [signifying Homes Ave. gang 
membership] was relevant in proving the defendant's motive"). 
15 
 
statements that Cherniak made to him and which allegedly ended 
their friendship, and presuming the jury found that the 
Cherniak's tattoo was a "211," the expert testimony would have 
provided the jury with a link between the tattoo and a motive 
for Cherniak to attack the defendant.15  Thus, the proffered 
testimony was relevant. 
 
b.  Reliability.  Under the Daubert-Lanigan standard, "the 
touchstone of admissibility is reliability."  DiCicco, 470 Mass. 
at 729, quoting Commonwealth v. Vao Sok, 425 Mass. 787, 796 
(1997).  See Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 26.  To this end, the 
proponent of the expert testimony must establish, among other 
factors, that the testimony is "based on facts or data of a type 
reasonably relied on by experts to form opinions in the relevant 
field," that the testimony is based on a reliable methodology, 
and that methodology "is applied to the particular facts of the 
case in a reliable manner."16  Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 
 
 
15 We previously have held "that evidence of a victim's 
prior violent conduct may be probative of whether the victim was 
the first aggressor where a claim of self-defense has been 
asserted and the identity of the first aggressor is in dispute."  
Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 650 (2005).  Because 
the defendant offers the evidence for the nonpropensity purpose 
of motive, and because the Commonwealth did not object on the 
ground of impermissible character evidence, we need not examine 
any further implications that arise from Adjutant. 
 
 
16 The proponent of the expert testimony also must 
demonstrate that the witness is qualified as an expert and that 
the witness's testimony will assist the jury.  Commonwealth v. 
 
16 
 
773, 783 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011).  See Mass. 
G. Evid. § 702 (requirements for admission of expert testimony). 
 
i.  Soft sciences.  Both of the defendant's proffered 
experts are social scientists.  Commentators often refer to 
disciplines like these as "soft sciences."  See, e.g., Goodman, 
A Hedgehog on the Witness Stand -- What's the Big Idea?:  The 
Challenges of Using Daubert to Assess Social Sciences and 
Nonscientific Testimony, 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 635, 641 (2010).  
Before assessing either Bjork-James's or De La Cruz's testimony, 
we take this opportunity to comment on the application of 
Daubert-Lanigan to the soft sciences. 
 
Whereas experts in the "hard sciences" primarily base their 
findings on repeatable experiments conducted under controlled 
conditions, experts in the "soft sciences" base their findings 
largely on nonrepeatable observations.  See generally Brodin, 
Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert:  Reflections 
of a Skeptic, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 867, 869 (2005).  At times, we 
have suggested that the Daubert-Lanigan standard differs when 
applied to "soft" sciences as when compared to how it is applied 
to "hard" sciences.  See, e.g., Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. at 
 
Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 783 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 
(2011).  Because the Commonwealth concedes that the testimony of 
De La Cruz and Bjork-James would have aided the jury, we do not 
discuss this factor further.  Insofar as the qualifications of 
Bjork-James are at issue, we discuss that at note 23, infra. 
17 
 
311-312.  See also Mass. G. Evid. § 702 & comments  ("The 
application of the Daubert-Lanigan factors in cases involving 
the 'hard' sciences may not apply in the same way in cases 
involving the 'soft' sciences").  This suggestion recognizes an 
important truth.  The soft sciences are not entitled to less 
consideration than their hard science counterparts, but the 
methodologies of each do differ.  Our law of evidence reflects 
this point. 
 
The Daubert-Lanigan standard initially was developed to 
assure the reliability of expert testimony based on hard 
sciences like pharmacology and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
testing.  See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583.  See also Lanigan, 419 
Mass. at 16.  These origins guided the United States Supreme 
Court in Daubert to identify what factors courts should consider 
when determining whether an expert's methodology is reliable.  
See generally Brodin, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 871-873.  
Specifically, courts should consider (1) whether the method "can 
be (and has been) tested," (2) whether it "has been subjected to 
peer review and publication," (3) its "known or potential rate 
of error," (4) "the existence and maintenance of standards 
controlling the technique's operation," and (5) whether the 
method has achieved "general acceptance" within the relevant 
community.  Daubert, supra at 593-594. 
18 
 
 
These nonexclusive factors, however, are not easily imposed 
on the methodologies used by the soft sciences.  Because 
different subject matters allow for varying degrees of 
certainty, the metrics used to assess reliability understandably 
vary across areas of expertise.  See Reinhard, "Sociological 
Gobbledygook":  Gill v. Whitford, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and the 
Court's Selective Distrust of "Soft Science," 67 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. 700, 747 (2020) ("Soft sciences[, unlike hard sciences,] 
are stuck in an unending state of 'maybe,' or 'yes, but only in 
the event that --' or 'it depends'").  See also Commonwealth v. 
Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 847-849 (2011) (different levels of 
certainty where expert's discipline "is clearly as much an art 
as a science").  For this reason, different "types of 
methodology may require judges to apply differing evaluative 
criteria to determine whether scientific methodology is 
reliable."17  Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. at 314 n.5.  See Kumho 
Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 150 ("[W]e can neither rule out, nor rule 
in, for all cases and for all time the applicability of the 
factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now do so for subsets 
 
 
17 Conversely, once an expert's testimony based on soft 
science is admitted, it also is important for jurors to 
understand that it is not hard science.  See Commonwealth v. 
Torres, 469 Mass. 398, 407 (2014) ("Of particular concern is the 
danger that the jury is misled into an understanding that the 
'science' at hand is 'hard' science, when in fact it is 'soft' 
science"). 
19 
 
of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of 
evidence.  Too much depends upon the particular circumstances of 
the particular case at issue"); Ernest E. v. Commonwealth, 486 
Mass. 183, 190-191 (2020) (application of Daubert-Lanigan to 
soft sciences). 
 
In other words, "[n]ot all of the factors identified in 
Daubert[-Lanigan] will be applicable in every case."  Palandijan 
v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100, 111 (2006).  Consequently, while 
Daubert-Lanigan establishes "various guideposts for determining 
admissibility including general acceptance, peer review, and 
testing," we have also stressed that "[e]stablishing the 
reliability of personal observations may in some circumstances 
require examining other criteria."  Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. at 
314 n.5.  Therefore, in order to respect the methodological 
distinctions that divide soft from hard sciences, application of 
the Daubert-Lanigan standard to soft sciences requires 
flexibility with special attention being paid to the criteria of 
reliability that different disciplines develop.18  Id.  See 
Goodman, 59 Am. U. L. Rev. at 680 ("Ultimately, courts should 
develop a suitable set of factors to test a particular social 
 
 
18 Assessing the reliability of the methodology employed by 
an expert's testimony in light of the standards developed within 
the relevant field also helps to avoid what some commentators 
have labeled as "selective distrust" of the soft sciences.  See 
Reinhard, 67 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 708. 
20 
 
science methodology").  With these considerations in mind, we 
turn to the case at hand. 
 
ii.  Defendant's experts.  In excluding Bjork-James, the 
judge found that the methodology employed by Bjork-James to 
connect the number 211 to white supremacist gangs was 
unreliable.  In excluding De La Cruz's testimony connecting 
Cherniak's tattoo to white supremacist gangs, the judge found 
that the testimony was based on insufficient facts, that it was 
not based on reliable methods, and that De La Cruz did not 
reliably apply these methods to the facts of the case.  We agree 
with the defendant that the decision to exclude Bjork-James was 
an abuse of discretion, but we disagree with the same argument 
concerning De La Cruz.19 
 
A.  Bjork-James.  During voir dire, Bjork-James testified 
that her method of analysis was based on ethnography, which is 
premised on observing people in their everyday locations in 
order to understand society from their point of view, and media 
studies, which focuses on the cultural significance people 
 
 
19 The Commonwealth does not challenge, and the judge did 
not rule on, the underlying basis of either De La Cruz or Bjork-
James's testimony.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 703 (2021).  
Consequently, we do not inquire further into whether the sources 
used by these experts pass muster under our law of evidence.  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Watt, 484 Mass. 742, 746 (2020) ("Expert 
testimony must be based on facts within the witness's direct 
personal knowledge, facts already introduced in evidence, or 
unadmitted but independently admissible evidence" [quotations 
and citation omitted]). 
21 
 
afford media.20  Bjork-James drew from these approaches in her 
research into the white supremacist movement's development on 
the Internet.21  To this end, she studied online postings on 
known white supremacist websites.  When she found a post that 
users of the website commented on, or one that shared themes22 
with other posts, she would keep track of the information 
contained therein.  When neither of these factors was present, 
Bjork-James would disregard the post.  In this way, Bjork-James 
identified themes that emerged among various posts she studied. 
 
One pattern that Bjork-James noticed as part of her 
academic research was the use of numbers among white nationalist 
groups to identify themselves.  Among these numbers was the 
number 211, which Bjork-James tracked as recurring among online 
posts about a record label whose bands were affiliated with the 
white supremacist movement and that had ties to the 211 
 
 
20 Although not dispositive of either term's meaning within 
the discipline of cultural anthropology, "ethnography" is also 
defined as "[t]he scientific description of the customs of 
individual peoples and cultures," Lexico, https://www.lexico.com 
/en/definition/ethnography [https://perma.cc/H28R-4FYH], whereas 
"media studies" is defined as "[t]he study of the mass media as 
an academic subject," Lexico, https://www.lexico.com/en 
/definition/media_studies [https://perma.cc/V5SP-L8ND]. 
 
 
21 Bjork-James had been studying the white supremacist 
movement since 2004.  During that time, she had published her 
findings in several academic journals as well as in a peer-
reviewed manuscript. 
 
 
22 "Themes" is an academic term in this context and 
signifies a focus on recurring information and patterns. 
22 
 
Bootboys, a group harboring white supremacist beliefs.  Bjork-
James used reports authored by the Southern Poverty Law Center 
and the Anti-Defamation League to confirm the connection between 
bands and the white supremacist movement.  When asked by defense 
counsel during voir dire whether she knew of any other cultural 
significance of the number "211" outside of the white 
supremacist movement, Bjork-James responded that she did not. 
 
The judge credited Bjork-James's testimony concerning how 
tattoos and symbols are used by individuals to signal affinities 
with white supremacist groups.23  The judge even found that "as a 
matter of cultural anthropology," Bjork-James knew of "no other 
use of the number '211,' except in reference to 211 Crew or 211 
Bootboys."  Despite that, the judge concluded that the defendant 
presented "no reliable methodology to support alleged expert 
testimony that the Complainant's tattoo is connected to a white 
supremacist group or ideology." 
 
 
23 Despite basing his ruling on methodology rather than 
qualifications, the judge also found that Bjork-James was not an 
expert in tattoos, noting that "[s]he does claim some expertise 
in symbols, but only in a broad sense as they pertain to white 
supremacist and similar groups."  However, Bjork-James was being 
offered as an expert on symbols, an area in which the judge 
found she was qualified.  Insofar as the judge factored Bjork-
James's lack of expertise in tattoos into his analysis, this was 
error.  See Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 406 Mass. 843, 852 (1990) 
("There is no requirement that testimony on a question of 
discrete knowledge come from an expert qualified in that 
subspecialty rather than from an expert more generally 
qualified"). 
23 
 
 
Although "conclusions and methodology are not entirely 
distinct from one another," General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 
U.S. 136, 146 (1997), a judge acting as gatekeeper must limit 
his or her analysis to the reliability of an expert's 
methodology, not the persuasiveness of the conclusion.  See 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 ("The focus, of course, must be solely 
on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they 
generate").  "Of course, if the judge rules the opinion evidence 
admissible, that ruling is not final on the reliability of the 
opinion evidence."  Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 26.  "Vigorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful 
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and 
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."  
Commonwealth v. Sliech-Brodeur, 457 Mass. 300, 328 n.40 (2010), 
quoting Daubert, supra at 596.  See Commonwealth v. Torres, 469 
Mass. 398, 407 (2014) ("How the expert proceeds with the 
application of [a method] is usually fertile ground for cross-
examination").  In other words, an expert may have a reliable 
method and still fail to persuade a jury of his or her 
conclusions.  But acting as gatekeeper, the judge must leave the 
determination of the credibility of the expert and the weight to 
be attributed to the expert's testimony to the trier of fact. 
 
Here, the judge incorrectly focused on the persuasiveness 
of Bjork-James's conclusions, not the reliability of her 
24 
 
methodology.  Furthermore, the judge appears to have focused on 
the wrong conclusions.  When evaluating Bjork-James's analysis 
of the number 211 and its use by white supremacist groups, the 
judge found that the examples used by Bjork-James to draw this 
link "do not match the distinctive font of the Complainant's 
tattoo."  For this reason, the judge found that "the alleged 
connection between the Complainant's tattoo and him espousing 
any racist ideology is too specious to pass muster under" the 
Daubert-Lanigan standard.24  Yet the defendant offered Bjork-
James not to tie Cherniak or his tattoo specifically to the 
white supremacist movement, but rather to provide testimony on 
the significance of the number 211 to the principles of white 
supremacy more generally.25  Assuming the jury found that 
Cherniak's tattoo was of the number 211, Bjork-James's testimony 
would have been relevant as to whether the tattoo indicated any 
affinity of his with the white supremacist movement.  Jurors 
 
 
24 During its closing at Bjork-James's voir dire, the 
Commonwealth also emphasized that the link between the cultural 
anthropologist's testimony and Cherniak's tattoo was absent.  To 
this end, the Commonwealth argued that Bjork-James could not 
"definitively" say that Cherniak's tattoo was a 211 symbol. 
 
 
25 Defense counsel stressed this point during Bjork-James's 
voir dire, arguing that although the jury could believe that 
Cherniak's tattoo was something other than a 211, if the jury 
thought it was that number then the cultural anthropologist's 
testimony was "relevant because [Cherniak] has a symbol on his 
body that [Bjork-James] says is one of the symbols that 
circulates among [white supremacist] groups." 
25 
 
reasonably could have inferred either that Cherniak did or did 
not share the movement's insidious beliefs. 
 
Put differently, Bjork-James's testimony was conditionally 
relevant on the jury finding that Cherniak's tattoo was of the 
number 211.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 104(b).  The judge's role in 
this regard was to determine whether a jury could reasonably 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that Cherniak's tattoo 
was the number 211.  See Commonwealth v. Ware, 482 Mass. 717, 
729 n.16 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Meola, 95 Mass. App. 
Ct. 303, 308 n.13 (2019) ("A judge, when addressing an issue of 
conditional relevance, does not decide whether he or she 
believes that the item being offered in evidence is what it is 
purported to be.  Rather, the judge decides whether a trier of 
fact 'could reasonably find the conditional fact . . . by a 
preponderance of the evidence'").   In determining that 
Cherniak's tattoo did not match the font of the samples on which 
Bjork-James's testimony relied and was thus not related to the 
beliefs espoused by white supremacists, the judge intruded on 
the role of the jury.26 
 
 
26 An analogous situation would be where an expert is 
analyzing whether DNA on a victim's shirt was that of a 
defendant.  The judge's role there would be to assess the 
reliability of the science, not to determine whether the shirt 
was worn by the victim.  Rather, the judge would determine 
whether a jury could reasonably decide by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the shirt was worn by the victim.  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 104(b). 
26 
 
 
"Numerous decisions in federal and other state cases also 
have upheld the admission of expert testimony to explain the 
culture and beliefs of White supremacy groups and gangs and to 
interpret tattoos, symbols, and graffiti associated with these 
groups when such evidence was relevant to the issues at trial."  
People v. Lindberg, 45 Cal. 4th 1, 46-47 (2008), cert. denied, 
557 U.S. 908 (2009).  In testifying about this culture, Bjork-
James applied the sort of comparative methodology commonly used 
by social scientists beyond the court room setting.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Young, 916 F.3d 368, 380-381 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 113 (2019) ("'collect[ing] as much 
information as possible,' then balancing 'each new incoming 
piece of information against the body of information you've 
built to that point'" is method "generally employed in the 
social sciences" [citation omitted]); United States vs. Paracha, 
U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 03 CR. 1197(SHS), slip op. at 35 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 3. 2006) (determining as reliable methodology "gathering 
multiple sources of information, including original and 
secondary sources, cross-checking and juxtaposing new 
information against existing information and evaluating new 
information to determine whether his conclusions remain 
consonant with the most reliable sources").  See also Goodman, 
59 Am. U. L. Rev. at 681 ("Because so much of social science 
. . . is based on document selection and interpretation, courts 
27 
 
should focus on this factor in assessing a social science 
expert's methodology" [footnote omitted]). 
 
Therefore, it was an abuse of discretion to exclude Bjork-
James's testimony concerning the cultural significance of the 
number 211.  The defendant offered the anthropologist's 
testimony to provide the jury with the basis to infer that 
Cherniak shared the white supremacist beliefs that Bjork-James's 
research linked to the number 211, and that these beliefs in 
turn motivated Cherniak to initiate the fight at issue.  
Although the defendant certainly could have articulated this 
theory more precisely to the judge, the judge imposed too high a 
burden on the testimony's admissibility, asking that it persuade 
him of factual conclusions rather than merely demonstrate a 
reliable methodology.  Cf. Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 452 
Mass. 337, 358 (2008) ("In excluding even the portion of 
Shapiro's report and testimony that consisted of counting data 
found in Wal–Mart's own business records, the motion judge acted 
not on the basis of any challenge to Shapiro's methodology, but 
essentially on his view that the records themselves were 
insufficiently reliable").  This was error. 
 
B.  De La Cruz.  The same is not true for De La Cruz.  
Whereas Bjork-James outlined a reliable method for assessing 
symbolism, De La Cruz did not.  Although De La Cruz did discuss 
the methods used by sociologists to understand how gangs 
28 
 
identify themselves at one point, he did so in general terms, 
discussing the difference between quantitative and qualitative 
analysis in a manner untied to a specific methodology.  Even if 
invoking these terms in the abstract would be sufficient to 
identify a method at work here, De La Cruz did not discuss 
specifically how these different approaches guided his own 
research, instead giving the impression that these were 
approaches in which he was trained.  Such academic training 
"might have taught him a methodology, [but] it is not itself a 
methodology."  Commonwealth v. Franceschi, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 
602, 610 (2018). 
 
Furthermore, when asked how he had researched the meaning 
of the number 211, De La Cruz recalled having come across the 
figure during his doctoral research.27  To refresh his memory, De 
La Cruz read twenty to twenty-five articles on the Internet 
about groups that used the number 211 to identify themselves.  
De La Cruz did note that the number was associated with white 
supremacist beliefs.  At no point during his voir dire, however, 
did De La Cruz indicate what guided his selection of the 
particular articles he read or his research in general.  Nor did 
De La Cruz provide a reliable method for determining whether a 
 
 
27 De La Cruz's dissertation examined gang membership; it 
did not appear to examine how to determine whether a symbol is 
associated with a gang.  The dissertation also did not appear to 
cover any gangs that used the number 211 to identify themselves. 
29 
 
symbol was affiliated with white supremacist groups.28  Although 
Daubert-Lanigan must be flexibly applied to the soft sciences, 
there is a breaking point.  When an opinion "is connected to 
existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert," that point 
has long since been passed.  General Elec. Co. 522 U.S. at 146. 
 
In sum, De La Cruz was qualified to testify about the 
significance of the number 211 to white supremacist gangs.  He 
also may have had a methodology that he could have reliably 
applied to uncover this significance.  But he did not articulate 
the foundation for such a method here.  See Kumho Tire Co., 526 
U.S. at 153 (although expert was qualified, he lacked reliable 
methodology).  "Because the admissibility of expert testimony is 
a preliminary question of fact, the proponent's burden of proof 
to demonstrate the reliability of the expert opinion is by a 
preponderance of the evidence."  Camblin, 478 Mass. at 476.  See 
 
 
28 De La Cruz did reference a test that the United States 
Department of Justice uses to determine gang membership, which 
assign points to a subject based on how many of a set of 
criteria for gang membership the subject matches.  Once the 
subject acquires ten points, then the test considers the subject 
a gang member.  Based on these criteria, De La Cruz concluded 
that Cherniak was "definitely associated with" white supremacist 
groups.  However, the criteria were not developed to determine 
whether a symbol was associated with the white supremacist 
movement and instead based some of the points allotted to 
whether a subject had a "[k]nown gang tattoo or marking."  
Whether the 211 tattoo was associated with white supremacists, 
however, was the reason why the defendant called De La Cruz to 
testify.  Consequently, it appears De La Cruz used the criteria 
to confirm rather than investigate the issue. 
30 
 
Mass. G. Evid. § 104(a).  Voir dire is the time to educate the 
judge -- as well as create a record -- about the methods and 
criteria of reliability used by the proponent's expert.  The 
defendant failed to do so for De La Cruz.  Therefore, we discern 
no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision to exclude De La 
Cruz from testifying. 
 
c.  Prejudicial error.  Regardless of the infirmities of De 
La Cruz's testimony, the decision to exclude Bjork-James was 
prejudicial error.  See Crawford, 429 Mass. at 68.  This is not 
a case in which, despite the exclusion of the evidence, the 
defendant was able to elicit "significant other testimony" 
concerning a key pillar of the defense.  Compare Commonwealth v. 
German, 483 Mass. 553, 570 (2019) (exclusion of expert testimony 
did not prevent defendant from eliciting other evidence on 
witness identification); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 475 Mass. 445, 
454-455 (2016) (same).  Cherniak and Arthur-Smith both testified 
that the defendant initiated the fight.  Yet without Bjork-
James's testimony, the defendant's only evidence that Cherniak 
initiated the attack due to racial animus was his own testimony. 
 
When the credibility of the victim's testimony is so 
central to the Commonwealth's case, the significance of expert 
testimony concerning the victim's motives for starting the fight 
is equally apparent.  See Polk, 462 Mass. at 33.  We cannot say 
that the exclusion of Bjork-James's testimony "did not influence 
31 
 
the jury, or had but a slight effect."  Commonwealth v. 
Pfeiffer, 482 Mass. 110, 129, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 498 
(2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 
(1994).  A new trial is necessary. 
 
2.  Other issues.  We turn now to other issues raised on 
appeal that may recur on retrial.29 
 
a.  Jury selection.  The defendant argues that he was 
denied a fair trial because the judge failed to make the 
requisite inquiry of prospective jurors and because the judge 
improperly declined to allow him to exercise his final 
peremptory challenge.  We consider each argument in turn, 
reviewing the judge's decisions for abuse of discretion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, 433 Mass. 439, 442-443 (2001). 
 
i.  Indifference inquiry.  "A criminal defendant is 
entitled to a trial by an impartial jury pursuant to the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights."  Commonwealth v. Williams, 
 
 
29 The defendant also appeals the judge's decision to 
exclude another expert witness for the defense due to late 
notice.  Because this issue is unlikely to recur, we note only 
that a finding of prejudice requires more than speculation about 
whether, if the Commonwealth wished to hire an expert in 
response to the defendant's expert, it would have time to do so.  
See generally Commonwealth v. Durning, 406 Mass. 485, 496 
(1990).  See also Commonwealth v. Dranka, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 38, 
42 (1998), quoting Chappee v. Vose, 843 F.2d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 
1988) ("the preclusive sanction should be reserved for 'hard 
core transgressions'"). 
32 
 
481 Mass. 443, 447 (2019).  To ensure this impartiality, a judge 
must hold individual voir dire if "it appears that a 
[prospective] juror might not stand indifferent" in the case.  
Id.  See G. L. c. 234A, § 67A (detailing individual voir dire 
requirement). 
 
Although the judge enjoys broad discretion in determining 
both the scope of this inquiry and whether a prospective juror 
stands indifferent, see Commonwealth v. Perez, 460 Mass. 683, 
688 (2011), citing Commonwealth v. Vann Long, 419 Mass. 798, 803 
(1995), "this discretion is not unfettered."  Williams, 481 
Mass. at 447.  Specifically, a "judge's conclusion must be 
supported by a voir dire that sufficiently uncovers whether the 
prospective juror can fairly evaluate the evidence and follow 
the law."  Id.  Cf. Seabrooks, 433 Mass. at 443 (when "a judge 
has explored the grounds for any possible claim that a juror 
cannot be impartial, and has determined that a juror stands 
indifferent, we will not conclude that the judge abused his 
discretion by empanelling the juror unless juror prejudice is 
manifest").  Such support for the judge's conclusions was 
lacking here in regard to several jurors. 
 
During attorney-conducted voir dire, defense counsel asked 
the prospective jurors:  "Does anyone here currently presume 
[the defendant is] innocent?"  Seven prospective jurors 
indicated that they did not presume the defendant to be 
33 
 
innocent.  On this basis, the defense counsel challenged those 
seven jurors for cause.  The judge inquired whether three of 
these prospective jurors would be able to presume the defendant 
to be innocent.30  The judge did not, however, conduct individual 
voir dire with the other four because, he stated, defense 
counsel had failed to raise any specific concerns about them.31  
Regarding one of the four, the judge noted that this juror had 
been a prosecutor and believed that for this reason, the juror 
understood the presumption of innocence. 
 
Once it had become apparent that some jurors might have 
difficulty presuming the defendant to be innocent based on the 
jurors' answer to a question directly focusing on this issue, 
the judge had a duty to inquire further.32  See Williams, 481 
Mass. at 447.  "Although the judge may reasonably determine, 
after a meaningful inquiry, that a juror's doubts about his or 
her own impartiality are unfounded, that determination should be 
 
 
30 After conducting individual voir dire, the judge 
dismissed two of the jurors for cause while finding that there 
was no basis to challenge the third for cause. 
 
 
31 At this point, defense counsel reemphasized the basis of 
her challenge, noting:  "What I would say for specifics are that 
they didn't have their hands up for 'Who thinks he's innocent 
right now?'" 
 
 
32 Because the jurors in question affirmatively indicated 
that they might have difficulties presuming the defendant to be 
innocent, the Commonwealth's invocation that jurors are presumed 
to follow a judge's instructions is unavailing.  See 
Commonwealth v. Montez, 450 Mass. 736, 746 (2008). 
34 
 
made after the judge conducts an inquiry that could be 
reasonably expected to determine impartiality."  Commonwealth v. 
Auguste, 414 Mass. 51, 57-58 (1992).  The attorney voir dire 
question was a reasonable one, and one that clearly required 
further inquiry.  Whatever else a meaningful inquiry may 
include, it must include an actual inquiry.  See id. at 57.  The 
judge's failure to conduct individual voir dire of four jurors 
who indicated that they did not assume the defendant was 
innocent was error. 
 
Although we reverse on other grounds, we note why this 
error did not prejudice the defendant in order to provide 
further clarity to this area of law.  When a defendant is forced 
to use peremptory challenges because a judge fails to conduct an 
adequate individual voir dire, this does not necessarily 
constitute reversible error.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bryant, 
447 Mass. 494, 499-500 (2006) (defendant could have challenged 
peremptorily juror that judge declined to strike for cause); 
Commonwealth v. Nelson, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 645, 647-648 (2017) 
(same).  Instead, "prejudice generally is shown by the use of a 
peremptory challenge to remove the juror who allegedly should 
have been excused for cause together with evidence that the 
defendant later was forced to accept a juror he would have 
challenged peremptorily but was unable to because his peremptory 
35 
 
challenges had been exhausted" (emphasis in original).  
Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 838, 842 (2010). 
 
In sum, if a defendant both still has remaining peremptory 
challenges sufficient to cover the number of jurors that a judge 
should have inquired into for cause, and is unable to show that 
there were other deliberating jurors whom the defendant would 
have challenged peremptorily but for the error, then there is no 
prejudice.  Compare Commonwealth v. Susi, 394 Mass. 784, 789 
(1985) (reversal required where judge's erroneous refusal to 
dismiss juror for cause led to defendant exhausting peremptory 
challenges and being forced to accept juror he otherwise would 
have challenged), with Commonwealth v. Amazeen, 375 Mass. 73, 
83-84 (1978) (reversal not required where defendant had not 
exhausted peremptory challenges). 
 
Ultimately, defense counsel here exercised five of her six 
peremptory challenges, using three against prospective jurors 
with whom the judge had declined to conduct individual voir 
dire.  This left counsel with one final peremptory challenge.  
Yet despite having the right to use it, counsel did not use the 
peremptory for the fourth juror with whom the judge had declined 
to conduct individual voir dire.  Consequently, there is no 
prejudicial error. 
 
ii.  Final peremptory challenge.  After defense counsel 
exercised her peremptory challenges against the jurors that the 
36 
 
judge failed to strike for cause, the Commonwealth 
unsuccessfully raised a challenge based on Commonwealth v. 
Soares, 377 Mass. 461, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).  At 
this point, the judge informed the parties that they had reached 
the number needed to seat a jury.  The clerk dismissed the 
challenged jurors and subsequently began to announce the juror 
numbers that would comprise the jury.  Defense counsel then 
informed the judge that she had miscounted the number of seated 
jurors and had thought there would be more juror selection.  
Because another panel was unnecessary, defense counsel wanted to 
exercise the defendant's final peremptory against one of the 
seated jurors.  The judge declined. 
 
At issue on appeal is whether the judge abused his 
discretion by ruling that the time to exercise peremptory 
challenges had passed.  Neither peremptory challenges nor, more 
importantly, the timing of when they should be used are mandated 
by either the United States Constitution or the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  See Commonwealth v. Seng, 456 Mass. 490, 
496 (2010), citing Commonwealth v. Freiberg, 405 Mass. 282, 292, 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 940 (1989).  Instead, Mass. R. Crim. P. 
20 (c) (2), 378 Mass. 889 (1979), establishes parameters for 
when peremptory challenges may be used:  parties may exercise 
their peremptory challenges after a juror is found indifferent, 
but must exercise them before the jurors are sworn.  Within this 
37 
 
window, judges have discretion to further designate when parties 
may exercise their peremptory challenges.  See Rule 6(4)(i)(i) 
of the Rules of the Superior Court.33 
 
The defendant contends that the judge here failed to 
articulate any additional timing requirements.  The judge's 
instructions -- which we set out in the margin -- say 
otherwise.34  The judge first explained how jury empanelment 
would work at the outset of the process.  Then, after attorney-
 
 
33 Rule 6(4)(i)(i) of the Rules of the Superior Court 
provides: 
 
"After the trial judge finds that each juror stands 
indifferent, the parties shall exercise their peremptory 
challenges.  The trial judge may require exercise of 
peremptory challenges after completion of side bar inquiry 
of an individual juror, after filling the jury box with 
jurors found to stand indifferent, or at some other time 
after the trial judge's finding of indifference." 
 
34 "[W]e'll seat the twenty-four or so people, the three 
rows of eight that we have.  You'll both have, of course, 
because of the -- this case being what it is, six 
preemptory [sic] challenges.  You'll both have [fifteen] 
minutes for the panel questions.  Usually, we start with 
the Commonwealth and then go to the [d]efendant.  After we 
go through the phases, then, -- that is, the group 
questioning, the individual questioning, and the attorney-
conducted voir dire -- then I'll ask you if there are any 
cause requests.  And then I'll ask you to use your 
preemptory [sic] challenges.  And hopefully we'll get a 
jury impaneled with one panel. 
 
"If we have to go to a second panel, however, I'll discuss 
with you the size of that second panel, depending on our 
needs, how many jurors we actually need, to fill out the 
jury.  And then we'll adjust accordingly, depending on the 
number of preemptories [sic] left and things like that." 
 
38 
 
conducted voir dire had finished, the judge reminded the parties 
of where they were in the process, stating that "starting with 
the Commonwealth, I'll hear you on your challenges, either for 
cause, first, if any, and then preemptory [sic]; and then turn 
to the [d]efendant." 
 
Perhaps the judge could have expressed more emphatically 
his intent throughout.35  Nevertheless, the instructions are 
reasonably clear when taken together:  the parties had to 
exercise their peremptory challenges then or never.  Moreover, 
the defendant sought to exercise the peremptory challenge after 
the judge informed counsel that they had reached the number 
needed to seat a jury, and after the remaining prospective 
jurors were excused.  Having set the parameters, it was within 
the judge's discretion to deny defense counsel's request to 
exercise her final peremptory challenge once the time do so had 
passed.36  Thus, there was no error. 
 
 
35 For example, a better way to express the point would have 
been to say after informing the parties of when they would be 
able use their peremptory challenges the following sentence:  
"This will be the only time to use your peremptory challenges 
during the first panel." 
 
 
36 The defendant also argues that the judge's reference to a 
second panel made it appear that there would be two 
opportunities to use peremptory challenges.  That it did -- but 
only if a second panel was necessary.  As it turned out, one 
panel was sufficient. 
39 
 
 
b.  Hearsay.  At trial, the defendant testified that upon 
seeing Cherniak slash his tires, the defendant confronted 
Cherniak and Arthur-Smith.  According to the defendant, Arthur-
Smith responded by disputing the account and then said, "Even if 
you did, how the fuck can you prove that?"  The judge excluded 
the testimony on the ground of hearsay.  Because the defendant 
objected, we review for prejudicial error.37  See Commonwealth v. 
Santos, 460 Mass. 128, 137 (2011). 
 
"The rule against hearsay bars admission of out-of-court 
statements offered for their truth."  Commonwealth v. Mendes, 
463 Mass. 353, 367-368 (2012).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(c) 
(2021).  Statements offered to show the effect on the listener, 
however, are not offered for their truth and therefore are not 
hearsay.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Spinucci, 472 Mass. 872, 
 
 
37 Additionally, the defendant claims that the judge erred 
in preventing him from testifying that Cherniak had tried to get 
the defendant to use cocaine.  Specifically, the defendant 
appears to claim that the judge improperly excluded the 
testimony as hearsay, despite Cherniak's offers of cocaine 
allegedly striking fear in the defendant.  The judge did not 
exclude the testimony because it was hearsay but on other 
grounds.  (The judge did eventually allow the defendant to 
testify that Cherniak had asked him to sell drugs on numerous 
occasions.)  Because the defendant does not address the grounds 
on which the judge excluded the testimony, we do not address the 
issue.  Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 
1628 (2019) ("The appellate court need not pass upon questions 
or issues not argued in the brief").  The evidence may well be 
admissible at retrial if it is relevant to demonstrate the 
defendant's fear of the victim or some other relevant nonhearsay 
purpose that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of 
undue prejudice. 
40 
 
883 (2015); Commonwealth v. Daley, 439 Mass. 558, 569 n.8 
(2003).  See also Mass. G. Evid. § 801(c) note. 
 
Here, the defendant offered Arthur-Smith's statement to 
show the effect it had on him:  namely, how the statement 
confirmed the defendant's belief that Cherniak had slashed his 
tires.  In particular, the statement went to the defendant's 
fear of Cherniak and whether the defendant's resulting actions 
were reasonable.  Therefore, the statement was not hearsay, and 
it was relevant for a nonhearsay purpose.  The judge erred in 
barring its admission. 
 
Conclusion.  The judgments against the defendant are 
reversed, the verdicts are set aside, and the case is remanded 
to the Superior Court for a new trial and further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.