Title: Hodges v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-878 
____________ 
 
 
WILLIE JAMES HODGES,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[March 16, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Willie James Hodges appeals an order denying his motion to vacate a 
judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of death under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the postconviction 
court’s order as to Hodges’s conviction but vacate the death sentence and remand 
for a new penalty phase. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Hodges was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.  On 
appeal, we affirmed the conviction and the death sentence.  Hodges v. State, 55 So. 
 
 
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3d 515, 519 (Fla. 2010).  The evidence showed that the victim was bludgeoned and 
stabbed in her home.  Id.  Her relatives came to the home while the intruder was 
still inside.  Id.  The relatives heard window glass breaking, and one of them saw 
the intruder run away and scale a fence into a neighbor’s yard.  Id.  A claw hammer 
and a braided brown leather belt were found by the body.  Id. at 520.  The victim’s 
purse was missing.  Id. at 519.  Some photographs and a knife with a black plastic 
handle were found on the ground outside the broken window.  Id. at 520.  The 
hammer and the knife were the probable murder weapons.  Id.  Police used a 
canine to track the suspect’s path of escape.  Id. at 519.  Along the path they found 
a jacket, two shoes, and two white socks.  Id.  The victim’s daughter testified that 
the jacket looked like the one she had seen on the fleeing intruder.  Id. at 520.  A 
witness who was married to Hodges’s niece testified that he had previously seen 
Hodges wearing the jacket and shoes that were admitted into evidence.  Id.  
Another witness testified that Hodges owned a braided leather belt and carried a 
knife with a black handle and identified the items in evidence as similar.  Id.  
Another witness testified that some of the photographs found outside the victim’s 
window were photographs that she had mailed to Hodges, and she identified her 
handwriting on the back of one of the photos.  Id.  The parties also stipulated that 
Hodges’s writing was on another one of the photos, and Hodges’s fingerprints 
were on two of the photos.  Id. 
 
 
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A DNA profile developed from blood on one of the socks was compared to 
Hodges’s DNA profile and was found to match on all thirteen available markers, 
with a random match probability of one in 990 quadrillion.  Id at 521.  Analysis 
conducted on mitochondrial DNA collected from a hair found on the victim’s 
clothing and a hair found on the jacket did not exclude Hodges as the donor but 
would exclude 99.88 percent of randomly selected individuals.  Id.  Male DNA 
detected in material from an anal swab of the victim matched Hodges’s DNA 
profile on the six available markers and would exclude 96 percent of the male 
population.  Id.  Material from the other sock yielded two separate partial DNA 
profiles that were consistent with Hodges’s DNA but would exclude 99.92 and 
99.9 percent of the male population, respectively, and all of the female population.  
Id.  There was also testimony that Hodges admitted his guilt to a cellmate and to 
the daughter of a woman he had dated.  Id. at 522. 
Evidence of a collateral murder was admitted under the Williams1 rule.  Id. 
at 521.  The evidence included DNA from sperm cells detected on a vaginal swab, 
which matched Hodges’s DNA profile on five markers.  Id.  A separate sample of 
epithelial cells from the swab matched his profile on seven markers.  Id. at 521-22.  
There was also evidence that a bruise on the body of the victim of the collateral 
                                          
 
 
1.  See Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959). 
 
 
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murder was probably a bite mark, and a forensic dentist testified that the mark was 
consistent with Hodges’s teeth.  Id. at 522. 
The jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of ten to two.  Id. at 
525.  The trial court found five aggravating circumstances were proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant was under sentence of imprisonment at the 
time of the murder; (2) the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony 
involving violence; (3) the murder was committed while the defendant was 
engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit sexual battery; (4) the 
murder was committed for pecuniary gain; and (5) the murder was especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  Id. at 542.  The court found the following statutory 
mitigating circumstances: (1) at the time of the murder the defendant was under the 
influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (2) the capacity of the 
defendant to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially 
impaired; and (3) the age of the defendant at the time of the crime.  Id.  The court 
also found numerous nonstatutory mitigating circumstances having to do with 
Hodges’s low intelligence, difficult upbringing and background, mental and 
emotional problems, and similar or related matters.  Id.   
In his direct appeal to this Court, Hodges argued: (1) that the trial court 
should have allowed the jury to determine the issue of mental retardation; (2) that 
the trial court erred in finding he was not mentally retarded; (3) that the trial court 
 
 
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erred in ruling that the State could discuss the collateral crime evidence in its 
rebuttal argument; (4) that the trial court allowed the collateral crime evidence to 
become a feature of the trial; (5) that the trial court erred in refusing to allow 
Hodges to waive a penalty-phase jury; and (6) that the death sentence was 
impermissible under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  Id. at 526.  We 
rejected all of Hodges’s arguments, concluded that the evidence was sufficient to 
support the verdict and the death sentence was proportionate, and we affirmed the 
conviction and sentence.  Hodges filed a petition for certiorari in the United States 
Supreme Court, which was denied.  Hodges v. Florida, 565 U.S. 846 (2011). 
In his motion for postconviction relief, Hodges raised the following claims: 
(1) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to retain a DNA and statistics expert to 
help counsel challenge the admissibility of the State’s DNA and statistics evidence 
and cross-examine the State’s experts; (2) counsel was ineffective in cross-
examining the State’s scientific experts regarding their statistical calculations and 
in failing to present expert testimony to rebut the State’s scientific evidence; (3) 
counsel was ineffective in failing to consult an expert and to object to testimony 
about DNA from the body of the collateral crime victim on the ground that the 
testing and analysis did not comply with applicable standards for accuracy and 
reliability; (4) counsel was ineffective in failing to present the testimony of 
Hodges, who would have testified that the personal belongings linking him to the 
 
 
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crime scene were stolen from him prior to the murder; (5) counsel was ineffective 
in failing to cross-examine the State’s witnesses who identified the jacket and 
shoes linking Hodges to the crime scene on their inability to identify the items as 
the specific items they had seen before; (6) counsel was ineffective in failing to 
obtain telephone service records to impeach the testimony of a witness who 
testified that Hodges confessed to her in a telephone conversation; (7) counsel was 
ineffective in calling a witness whose testimony had the effect of identifying 
Hodges as the likely perpetrator; (8) counsel was ineffective in failing to rebut the 
testimony of a forensic dentist who testified about the identification of Hodges 
from the bite-mark evidence in the collateral crime case; (9) counsel was 
ineffective in cross-examining a crime scene investigator because the questioning 
brought out improper and unfavorable opinion testimony about possible or likely 
events relative to the murder; (10) counsel was ineffective in advising Hodges 
regarding the impeachment he would face if he testified; (11) counsel was 
ineffective in failing to object to the trial court’s failure to state reasons for denying 
Hodges’s request to waive a penalty-phase jury; and (12) Florida’s death penalty 
statute is unconstitutional. 
The trial court held evidentiary hearings on claims 1 through 10, Hodges 
abandoned claim 11, and the trial court denied claim 12.  As to the remaining 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court ruled that Hodges failed 
 
 
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to establish that counsel’s performance was deficient and even if it was, there is no 
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.   
II.  ANALYSIS 
On appeal from the denial of his motion for postconviction relief, Hodges 
raises the following claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to consult 
experts to assist him to prepare to challenge the State’s DNA and bite-mark 
evidence, cross-examine the State’s experts, and present evidence to rebut the 
State’s scientific evidence; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
failing to present Hodges as a witness at trial; (3) trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by calling a witness who gave testimony that incriminated Hodges; (4) 
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to obtain telephone records 
to impeach the testimony of a witness who testified that Hodges confessed his guilt 
in a telephone conversation; (5) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-
examine witnesses who identified articles of clothing linked to Hodges; and (6) 
trial counsel was ineffective in cross-examining a crime scene technician in a way 
that brought out testimony that was harmful to the defense. 
A defendant challenging a conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance 
of counsel has the burden of showing that counsel was deficient and that the 
deficiency prejudiced the defense.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
 
 
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687 (1984); Bolin v. State, 41 So. 3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010).  To establish 
deficiency, the claimant must show a specific act or omission that falls below an 
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.  See 
Foster v. State, 132 So. 3d 40, 52 (Fla. 2013); Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 
927, 932 (Fla. 1986).  To establish prejudice under Strickland, “the defendant must 
demonstrate that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ”  
Hoskins v. State, 75 So. 3d 250, 254 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694).  This standard does not require that a defendant show “ ‘that counsel’s 
deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome’ of his penalty 
proceeding, but rather that he establish ‘a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in [that] outcome.’ ”  Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 44 (2009) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94). 
“Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law 
and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the trial 
court’s factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but 
reviewing the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.”  Pagan v. State, 29 So. 3d 
938, 949 (Fla. 2009); see also Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d 730, 737 (Fla. 2011); 
Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).  “[W]hen a defendant fails to 
make a showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to delve into whether he has 
 
 
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made a showing as to the other prong.”  Mungin v. State, 932 So. 2d 986, 996 (Fla. 
2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1182 
(Fla. 2001)).   
“There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance was not 
ineffective.”  Pagan, 29 So. 3d at 949.  “A fair assessment of attorney performance 
requires” that courts “evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time” 
and “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
Claim 1 
Hodges asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to consult experts 
and present expert testimony regarding the State’s scientific evidence of DNA and 
bite-mark analysis.  He argues that such experts could have helped him to prepare 
to challenge the State’s evidence, cross-examine the State’s experts, and develop 
and present rebuttal evidence and argument.   
At the evidentiary hearing, Hodges presented the testimony of Dr. Kevin 
Noppinger, an expert in DNA analysis.  Dr. Noppinger testified that in their 
analyses, the State’s experts arrived at random match probabilities using the 
“inclusion principle,” but at trial, Dr. Martin Tracey, a population geneticist 
testifying as an expert witness for the State, improperly relied upon the “exclusion 
principle” in his random match probability testimony.  The “inclusion principle” 
 
 
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expresses the probability of a random match in positive or inclusionary terms, 
while the “exclusion principle” gives the probability of excluding the random 
match.  Dr. Noppinger testified that under prevailing scientific standards, 
expressing the random match probability statistics using the exclusion principle is 
not scientifically accepted and the inclusion principle is the preferred method of 
presenting match probability statistics.  In Dr. Noppinger’s opinion, expressing 
random match probability statistics using the exclusion principle can be misleading 
because it can make the probability of a random match seem smaller than it 
actually is.  Hodges argues that trial counsel’s failure to object or cross-examine 
Dr. Tracey when he testified about random match probabilities using the exclusion 
principle can be attributed to counsel’s failure to retain a DNA expert to help him 
prepare for trial.  Dr. Noppinger also testified that the other DNA testimony 
presented at trial did not conform to the applicable standards and on this basis, 
Hodges argues that counsel should have used available scientific expertise to 
challenge the accuracy and reliability of the State’s testing, lab reports, and expert 
testimony. 
There are two components of DNA analysis and both must be provided to 
the trier of fact in order for DNA evidence to have probative value: (1) an 
examination of the biological material in evidence in comparison with a known 
DNA sample; and (2) statistical analysis to determine the probability of matching 
 
 
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the tested material to random individuals in the general population or specified 
subgroups.  “The first step uses principles of molecular biology and chemistry to 
determine that two DNA samples look alike.  The second step uses statistics to 
estimate the frequency of the profile in the population.”  Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d 
817, 827 (Fla. 2003); see also Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1997) (“It is 
important to recognize, though, that DNA testing is a two-step process.  The fact 
that a match is found in the first step of the DNA testing process may be 
‘meaningless’ without qualitative or quantitative estimates demonstrating the 
significance of the match.”).  Hodges contends that the State’s expert witnesses 
testified that their analyses discovered “matches” with Hodges’s DNA without 
providing the necessary random match probability statistics and that trial counsel 
failed to object because he had not consulted his own DNA expert and therefore 
had not informed himself about the applicable standards for presenting DNA 
evidence.  However, at Hodges’s trial, the State chose to have its laboratory 
analysts present the biological features of their test results first and then present Dr. 
Tracey to testify as to the statistical analyses applicable to all the DNA testing.  All 
the DNA tests presented at trial were accompanied by statistical analyses provided 
separately by Dr. Tracey.2 
                                          
 
 
2.  The only exception was the DNA test of the swab from the bite mark on 
the victim of the collateral murder.  The expert only found one marker, which did 
not exclude Hodges, but the analyst considered the finding to be of little 
 
 
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In the order denying postconviction relief, the trial court discussed Dr. 
Noppinger’s criticisms of the State’s scientific experts who testified at trial.  The 
court found that State expert Melton, who performed the mitochondrial DNA 
analysis on the cuttings from one of the socks as well as the hairs from the jacket 
and the victim’s jeans, had statistical calculations on some but not all of the tested 
samples in her written report but did not testify about statistics.  Melton testified 
that the mixed DNA sample obtained from the sock was difficult to analyze and 
she could say only that Hodges could not be excluded as the source.  Dr. 
Noppinger acknowledged that Melton had valid statistical calculations in her report 
for the samples derived from the hairs. 
State expert Hatler performed DNA analysis on other sock cuttings.  Based 
on three markers from the top of the sock and four markers from the heel and toe, 
she developed partial profiles that were consistent with Hodges’s DNA.  Dr. 
Noppinger found fault with the fact that Hatler provided no statistical calculations 
in her testimony, but he conceded that her written report included the calculations.   
                                          
 
significance and therefore did not include the test result in her written report, and 
the testing was apparently not reviewed by another analyst in accordance with 
standard procedures.  However, as we discuss below, there is no reasonable 
probability that an objection by trial counsel on this basis would have made a 
difference to the outcome. 
 
 
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State expert Johnson performed DNA testing on the anal swab from the 
body of the victim of the instant murder, the vaginal swab from the victim of the 
collateral murder, and the swab from the bite mark on the collateral murder victim.  
Dr. Noppinger said that Johnson’s testing of the bite-mark swab was not properly 
reported in writing and was not reviewed by a second analyst as required by 
national standards.  The trial court found that the anal swab sample was analyzed 
on six markers, all of which matched Hodges.  As for the vaginal swab from the 
collateral crime victim, the sperm fraction matched Hodges on five markers and 
the epithelial cells on seven markers.  Johnson’s written report included frequency 
calculations for these test results. 
State expert Zuleger tested the blood found on one of the socks and 
developed a profile consisting of thirteen markers, all of which matched Hodges. 
Dr. Noppinger did not say there were any errors, fallacies, or miscalculations 
in any of the experts’ laboratory testing or statistical calculations.  As the trial court 
found, Dr. Noppinger could not say that the experts’ descriptions of their results as 
“matching” Hodges was improper.  The analysts who conducted the laboratory 
tests did not testify about their frequency calculations—even though they included 
such calculations in their written reports for some of their tests—because the State 
chose to have all of the probability statistics presented by its statistical expert, Dr. 
Tracey. 
 
 
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Dr. Noppinger found fault with Dr. Tracey’s testimony because Dr. Tracey 
expressed the statistical calculations in terms of exclusion rather than inclusion, 
which, in Dr. Noppinger’s view, can be misleading.  However, Dr. Noppinger 
conceded that neither method is more accurate than the other.  Hodges has not 
directed us to any authority that directly supports the argument that testimony such 
as Dr. Tracey’s is considered misleading according to a consensus of scientific 
opinion. 
Even though the State’s DNA analysts did not initially testify about random 
match probability statistics, trial counsel cross-examined them based on the 
statistics in their written reports.  And although Dr. Tracey testified in terms of 
exclusion on direct examination, he acknowledged several of the random match 
probabilities in inclusive terms on cross-examination. 
At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel admitted that his understanding of 
DNA evidence principles was crude.  Nevertheless, the trial court found that the 
DNA evidence did not go unchallenged and that counsel’s performance was not 
deficient. 
Hodges presented Dr. Daniel Spitz, a forensic pathologist, to testify at the 
evidentiary hearing regarding the bite mark.  Dr. Spitz testified that the bite-mark 
identification evidence presented at trial did not provide a definitive match to 
Hodges and that bite-mark identification evidence in general is regarded as highly 
 
 
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questionable by the scientific community.  On this basis, Hodges argues that trial 
counsel should have retained a bite-mark expert, learned about the current status of 
bite-mark evidence, and been prepared to challenge the admissibility and reliability 
of the bite-mark evidence.  The trial court found that while trial counsel did not 
challenge the admissibility of the bite-mark identification testimony, he did not 
allow the testimony to go unchallenged.  On cross-examination, trial counsel 
brought out that the witness had prepared no written report, that the number of 
marks available for comparison was limited, and that diffusion had affected all the 
points of comparison.  The trial court found that trial counsel’s performance was 
not deficient because at the time of the trial, bite-mark identification evidence was 
considered admissible, see, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 527 So. 2d 179, 181 (Fla. 1988), 
and that even if the law has changed based on current scientific opinion, an 
attorney’s performance cannot be found deficient for failing to anticipate a change 
in the law.  Walton v. State, 847 So. 2d 438, 445 (Fla. 2003).  
As authority for his claim that trial counsel was deficient in failing to consult 
experts to challenge the State’s DNA evidence, Hodges cites State v. Fitzpatrick, 
118 So. 3d 737 (Fla. 2013).  In Fitzpatrick, trial counsel failed to prepare any 
challenge to the State’s scientific evidence as to the timing of sexual activity in 
relation to the time of the victim’s death, which allowed the State to present an 
unsound but unrebutted theory of the defendant’s guilt of murder.  The present 
 
 
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case is different because if counsel had raised the kinds of challenges Hodges 
claims he should have raised, it would not have undermined the State’s case to any 
significant extent.  Counsel admitted that his understanding of DNA evidence was 
rudimentary, but based on his experience in criminal trials, he thought there was 
little to be gained by challenging the DNA evidence.  He made a strategic decision 
based on consideration of alternative courses of action.  See, e.g., Crain v. State, 78 
So. 3d 1025, 1037 (Fla. 2011).  Where consulting an expert “would not have 
changed the statistical numbers in any way,” trial counsel’s tactic of bringing out 
the limitations of the expert testimony through cross-examination is reasonably 
effective representation.  Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 425 (Fla. 2004). 
The trial court found that while trial counsel could have done more to 
challenge the DNA evidence, in light of the defense strategy to concede that the 
tested items belonged to Hodges, trial counsel’s actions were reasonable.  Where 
the defense strategy is such that identification by DNA evidence is not of central 
importance, a trial court’s conclusion that such a tactical decision by counsel was 
not deficient performance has been upheld.  See McDonald v. State, 952 So. 2d 
484, 495 (Fla. 2006). 
The DNA from the swab of the bite mark did not play a significant role in 
the trial.  The analyst testified that she was able to extract only one marker, which 
was of extremely limited use in comparison to the known sample.  The witness 
 
 
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said only that Hodges could not be excluded as the contributor.  Thus, there is no 
reasonable probability that trial counsel’s failure to cross-examine the witness on 
the lack of probability statistics or the lack of peer review in the laboratory testing 
process affected the outcome of the trial.  Even if trial counsel could have done 
more to challenge the testimony concerning DNA testing on the swab from the site 
of the bite mark on the collateral crime victim, we affirm the denial of relief on this 
point because Hodges failed to establish that he was prejudiced by any deficiency.   
The DNA profile from blood found on a sock recovered from the 
perpetrator’s path of escape from the victim’s home matched Hodges’s DNA, and 
the statistical frequency of the profile was one in 990 quadrillion.  The DNA 
testing on the anal swab matched Hodges’s profile to the exclusion of 96 percent of 
the male population.  As the trial court found, the DNA evidence and statistics 
presented at trial did not go unchallenged.  However, because Hodges told his 
lawyer that his clothes and other personal items had been in a suitcase that was 
stolen weeks before the murder, counsel did not focus on the DNA evidence but 
planned a defense that would account for Hodges’s DNA being on the items.  
Hodges’s own expert, testifying at the evidentiary hearing, conceded that all of the 
State’s statistical data was sound.  Therefore, Hodges has failed to show that there 
is any reasonable probability that more thorough preparation on trial counsel’s 
 
 
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part, with a view to challenging Dr. Tracey’s testimony or cross-examining him on 
his calculations, would have affected the outcome. 
The trial court found that trial counsel did cross-examine the State’s experts 
about their DNA findings, bringing out admissions that other than the blood on one 
of the socks, the other tests, including mitochondrial DNA analysis of hairs from 
the jacket and the victim’s clothing, merely concluded that Hodges could not be 
excluded as the contributor of the sample and that the probabilities of matching 
persons other than Hodges were not infinitesimally small as the probability was 
with the blood on the sock.  
When a defense attorney does not have a strong understanding of the science 
of DNA evidence, effective representation in a criminal case may call for 
consultation with experts.  However, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, in addition to showing a deficiency in performance falling below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, the defendant has the burden of showing that 
absent the deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would 
have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  “In making 
this determination, a court . . . must consider the totality of the evidence before the 
judge or jury.”  Downs v. State, 453 So. 2d 1102, 1108 (Fla. 1984) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).  
 
 
- 19 - 
One of the socks found on the path tracked by the scent-tracking canine had 
blood on it.  DNA extracted from the blood matched Hodges’s DNA on all thirteen 
markers.  The probability of the DNA profile matching a randomly selected 
individual was inconceivably small.  Two DNA samples found on the other sock 
also matched Hodges, with the probability of a random match being no more than 
one tenth of one percent.  DNA from the hairs collected at or near the crime scene 
matched Hodges with a random match probability of slightly over one tenth of one 
percent.  Material from the anal swab matched Hodges and excluded 96 percent of 
the male population.  Photos that belonged to Hodges were found at the scene.  
Two witnesses testified that Hodges told them he committed the crime.  In light of 
the totality of the evidence, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief on the ground 
that there is no reasonable probability that more thorough preparation by trial 
counsel through consultation with experts would have made any difference to the 
outcome of the trial.   
Claim 2 
Hodges argues that trial counsel was deficient in failing to present Hodges as 
a witness for the defense because the defense strategy depended on his testimony.  
Hodges asserts that the defense strategy, as revealed in counsel’s opening 
statement, was based on the claim that the jacket, shoes, and photographs found at 
or near the crime scene were stolen from him weeks before the murder, supporting 
 
 
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the inference that whoever stole the items left them at the crime scene and was the 
probable perpetrator.  In his opening statement, trial counsel told the jury that the 
evidence would show that these items were stolen from Hodges weeks before the 
murder.  However, the defense did not present any evidence to support that 
assertion.  Hodges argues that after the jury was told in the opening statement that 
the evidence would show the items had been stolen, trial counsel’s failure to put 
Hodges on the witness stand was an abandonment of the only defense strategy, 
which left Hodges with no viable defense. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Hodges stated that if he had been called to testify 
at trial, he would have stated that the jacket, shoes, and photographs had been in a 
suitcase that was stolen shortly before the murder.  Hodges also would have 
testified that while working on a car at his cousin’s house, which was next door to 
the victim’s house, he cut his hand and wiped off the blood on a cloth that he left 
there, which he claims would have explained how a sock with his blood on it had 
come to be found in the area of the murder.   
Hodges argues that his testimony would have created sufficient doubt that 
the outcome might have been different.  He also said he would have denied making 
the incriminating statements testified to by his ex-girlfriend’s daughter and would 
have told the jury there was no telephone at the house where the ex-girlfriend and 
 
 
- 21 - 
her daughter lived at the time when the daughter claimed the telephone 
conversation had taken place. 
Hodges claims that he decided not to testify in his own defense at trial 
because of faulty legal advice given to him by trial counsel.  Hodges claimed at the 
evidentiary hearing that trial counsel advised him that if he testified at trial, the 
prosecutor would be allowed on cross-examination to question him about 
everything in his past, including pending charges.  At the time of the trial, there 
were pending murder charges against Hodges in Ohio and in Alabama.  The facts 
of the Ohio murder were admitted into evidence at trial under the Williams rule.   
Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he would not have 
advised Hodges the State could impeach him through questioning about a pending 
murder charge if he testified.  Trial counsel said that he would have advised 
Hodges that if Hodges testified, the State would be able to ask him if he had ever 
been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving an element of fraud and, if 
so, how many times.  Counsel would have told Hodges that only if Hodges denied 
having been convicted would the State be allowed to introduce evidence of his 
prior convictions.  Counsel said he also advised Hodges that since the facts of the 
Ohio murder had been admitted under the Williams rule, the State could question 
him about the Ohio murder and his answers might be used against him in Ohio, 
 
 
- 22 - 
since that case was still pending in Ohio.  But trial counsel insisted he would not 
have advised Hodges that he could be questioned about other pending charges. 
The trial court found that counsel provided detailed and thorough advice to 
Hodges about the benefits and risks of testifying in his own defense and that 
Hodges’s decision, made in consultation with his counsel, was given careful 
consideration.  The trial court found that trial counsel was an experienced criminal 
trial attorney and would not have given legally erroneous advice on such an 
elementary question of criminal procedure.  The trial court found that Hodges 
made the decision not to testify upon receiving advice of counsel based on all the 
circumstances, including counsel’s concerns about the effect Hodges’s testimony 
might have on the penalty phase. 
The trial court found Hodges’s testimony on this point incredible and found 
as a matter of fact that trial counsel did not advise Hodges that if he testified he 
could be cross-examined about or impeached with information concerning past 
misconduct or collateral offenses.  This finding was based on the trial court’s 
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.  In judging the credibility of 
witnesses, the trial court has a superior vantage point.  See Moore v. State, 132 So. 
3d 718, 727 (Fla. 2013).  An appellate court does not substitute its judgment for 
that of the trier of fact when the finding of fact is supported by competent, 
substantial evidence.  See Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 923 (Fla. 2001).  The 
 
 
- 23 - 
trial court’s finding of fact on this point is supported by competent, substantial 
evidence in the record and must be upheld.  
Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that his opening statement 
was based on what Hodges told him concerning his personal items being stolen, 
and Hodges’s decision not to testify was made later in the trial.  Advising a 
defendant of the scope and possible consequences of impeachment and cross-
examination is reasonable representation.  See, e.g., Bell v. State, 965 So. 2d 48, 
58-59 (Fla. 2007).  Making a reasonable strategic choice after considering possible 
alternative courses of action is not ineffective assistance.  Occhicone v. State, 768 
So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000).  Trial counsel’s advice, as the trial court found, was 
legally correct and was reasonable advice under the circumstances.  We conclude 
that competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that trial 
counsel did not give erroneous advice causing Hodges to decide not to testify when 
it would have been more advantageous to him to testify.   
But whether trial counsel was deficient for telling the jury in his opening 
statement that the evidence would show that Hodges’s personal items were stolen 
prior to the murder, knowing that there would be no such evidence presented if 
Hodges did not testify, raises a different question.  If Hodges had testified that his 
personal items had been stolen, this might have explained how these personal items 
could have been found at or near the crime scene without him being involved in the 
 
 
- 24 - 
crime.  Hodges also emphasizes that he would have testified that prior to the 
murder he was working on a car at his cousin’s house next door, cut his hand, and 
wiped blood on a cloth that he left at his cousin’s house.  The argument is that 
Hodges’s testimony on these matters might have raised a doubt in the minds of the 
jurors sufficient to have brought about a different outcome at trial.   
At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that when he gave his 
opening statement, he believed Hodges might testify, although he knew there was a 
possibility he would not, and he told the jury so.  Hodges’s decision not to testify 
was made later in the trial, after the close of the State’s evidence.  Defense co-
counsel testified that, based on the evidence presented by the State and the need to 
prepare for a likely penalty phase, he did not think Hodges should testify.  Trial 
counsel testified that even without Hodges’s testimony, he believed his opening 
statement was sound trial strategy because it suggested a plausible scenario for the 
jury to consider that would constitute a basis for doubt about Hodges’s guilt.  The 
trial court found that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance. 
We need not determine whether trial counsel’s representation as to the 
matter of the opening statement and Hodges not testifying was deficient if there is 
no reasonable probability that trial counsel’s course of action, even if deficient, 
prejudiced the defense.  See, e.g., Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932.  The totality of the 
 
 
- 25 - 
evidence before the jury must be considered in making this determination.  See 
Downs, 453 So. 2d at 1108.  
In light of the DNA evidence obtained from the bloody sock, the other sock, 
the hairs collected from the victim’s body, the jacket found along the path taken by 
the murderer, and the anal swab, as well as the photos left at the crime scene with 
Hodges’s fingerprints and handwriting on them, the testimony of the two witnesses 
that Hodges confessed to the murder, and the fact that witnesses identified the 
clothes, knife, and belt as similar to items belonging to or worn by Hodges, we 
conclude that no prejudice has been demonstrated. 
Claim 3 
A neighbor of the victim told police that on the day of the murder, he 
confronted a trespasser who came over a fence into his yard.  The neighbor’s 
description was used to create a sketch, which did not look much like Hodges, and 
the neighbor failed to select Hodges from a photo lineup.  Trial counsel planned to 
call this neighbor as a witness in an attempt to show that the intruder in his yard—
who was also likely the murderer—was not Hodges.   
Before presenting the neighbor as a witness, trial counsel went to the 
neighbor’s home and displayed a group of photos to him.  The neighbor was 
unable to identify the photo of Hodges as the man he had seen in his yard.  On the 
day the man was to testify at trial, trial counsel, with the court’s permission and in 
 
 
- 26 - 
the presence of the prosecutor, had the neighbor look at Hodges in the courtroom, 
and the neighbor said Hodges resembled the man he had seen in his yard.  The 
State and the defense signed a stipulation to this effect, which was read to the jury. 
In his testimony, the neighbor said that Hodges looked like the man he had 
seen in his yard.  Trial counsel then called the neighbor’s wife to testify, and she 
confirmed that the neighbor had been unable to choose Hodges’s photo from a 
lineup.  Hodges argues that for trial counsel to present the neighbor as a witness 
knowing that he might identify Hodges as the man he had seen in his yard, was 
ineffective assistance because it helped convict Hodges.  Hodges argues that trial 
counsel should have been accompanied by another person when he went to the 
witness’s home so he would have had a third-party witness to testify about what 
happened.  Had he done so, he could have used the third party’s testimony to 
impeach the neighbor by confirming that the neighbor failed to identify Hodges 
from the group of photos shown to him by trial counsel.  
The trial court found that trial counsel was surprised by the neighbor’s 
change of testimony and responded by calling the neighbor’s wife to counter the 
effect of her husband’s testimony.  The trial court found that calling the neighbor’s 
wife was a reasonable effort at impeachment and the neighbor’s wife confirmed 
that two nights previously her husband had been unable to select Hodges from the 
group of photos shown to him by trial counsel.  The trial court found that trial 
 
 
- 27 - 
counsel did an effective job of addressing the identification testimony in his 
closing argument to the jury and made reasonable choices as to how to proceed 
after weighing the risks and benefits of different courses of action, which is 
reasonable representation under Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 487-88 (Fla. 
2012).  The trial court concluded that counsel’s chosen course of action was a 
reasonable response to the situation and that trial counsel handled the matter as 
well as possible under the circumstances.  The court concluded that there was no 
substantial deficiency in the representation and that even if counsel had taken any 
of the actions Hodges now argues were required, there is no reasonable probability 
that the result would have been different.  The trial court’s factual findings are 
supported by competent, substantial evidence and its legal conclusions are correct. 
An assessment of an attorney’s performance under Strickland requires an 
effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  The trial court 
found trial counsel’s conduct reasonable under the circumstances, and we affirm 
the denial of relief on this point. 
Claim 4 
At trial, a witness for the State testified that Hodges confessed to her in a 
telephone conversation that he committed the murder.  The witness knew Hodges 
 
 
- 28 - 
through her mother, who had dated Hodges.  The witness testified that she received 
the telephone call during which Hodges confessed while she was at her mother’s 
house in the “May timeframe” of 2003.  At the evidentiary hearing, Hodges denied 
both the confession and the telephone conversation.  He claimed that the residence 
where the witness claimed to have received the call did not have a telephone.  
Hodges showed that the telephone service provider had no record of the call.  
Hodges contends that trial counsel was deficient in failing to obtain telephone 
service records to impeach the witness’s testimony by showing that there was no 
phone service in her mother’s home in May 2003.   
There was testimony at the evidentiary hearing that sometimes the witness’s 
mother’s home had telephone service and sometimes it did not.  This evidence did 
not show that the call could not have taken place; it merely showed that the phone 
company had no record of the call having taken place because the records no 
longer existed.  Hodges’s argument that had trial counsel investigated, he would 
have discovered evidence that could have been used to impeach the witness is 
speculative.   
The trial court found that Hodges did not prove that the residence did not 
have phone service at the time the witness said she received the call from Hodges, 
only that there are no records of the service in existence now.  The trial court 
concluded that Hodges failed to show that trial counsel’s performance was 
 
 
- 29 - 
deficient.  Further, the trial court concluded that even if counsel had been able to 
show that there was no phone in the home in May 2003, the court could not find 
that the witness’s testimony would have been significantly diminished.  The 
witness stated only that the call occurred in the “May timeframe,” and considering 
that the trial took place nearly five years after the phone call in question, even if 
records could have been obtained and used at trial to show that there was no 
telephone service in the home in May 2003, this would not have proven that the 
conversation did not take place nor would it have necessarily undermined the 
witness’s credibility.  Because the jury still could have credited the witness’s 
testimony regarding the content of the conversation, the trial court concluded there 
is no reasonable probability the jury would have been affected by any 
impeachment trial counsel could have achieved by showing the home had no 
phone service, especially in light of the fact that another trial witness also offered 
testimony that Hodges confessed to him that he committed the murder.   
The trial court’s factual determinations concerning this claim are supported 
by competent, substantial evidence, and we therefore defer to them.  On de novo 
review, we hold there is no error in the trial court’s legal conclusion that Hodges 
failed to show deficient performance on this point.  We therefore affirm the denial 
of postconviction relief on this claim. 
Claim 5 
 
 
- 30 - 
Hodges claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine 
the State witnesses who identified certain items of clothing, referred to by their 
brand names, as having been worn by the fleeing perpetrator and previously seen 
in the possession of Hodges.  The victim’s daughter testified that when she entered 
her mother’s house, she saw through a window someone running away from the 
house wearing a blue and gray jacket.  She identified a jacket that police found 
outside the house as the jacket she saw the fleeing person wearing.  The jacket was 
described by reference to the designer label, “Members Only.”  The husband of 
Hodges’s niece testified that the jacket and shoes found near the crime scene and 
admitted into evidence were the jacket and shoes he had previously seen Hodges 
wearing.  The shoes bore the “Timberland” label.   
Hodges argues that effective cross-examination of these witnesses would 
have forced them to concede that they could not testify with certainty that the items 
were the same as those previously seen, only that the items in evidence looked like 
or were similar to the items they had previously seen Hodges wearing.  There were 
no particular identifying marks on the items that would have permitted the 
witnesses to know that these mass-produced items were the specific items they had 
seen previously. 
As previously mentioned, trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing 
that Hodges told him the personal items found at or near the crime scene had been 
 
 
- 31 - 
in a suitcase that was stolen from him weeks before the murder.  Trial counsel 
planned the defense around this position and therefore did not focus on the issues 
surrounding the identification of the jacket and shoes. 
Hodges’s argument is that trial counsel should have cross-examined the 
witnesses to get them to admit that the most they could say about the jacket and 
shoes in evidence was that they were the same style, size, color, and possibly brand 
name as the items the witnesses had seen previously.  The trial court observed that 
counsel certainly could have cross-examined these witnesses with these questions 
but ultimately concluded that the failure to do so was not deficient representation.  
The trial court reasoned that jurors are aware that items such as Members Only 
jackets and Timberland shoes are mass produced by the tens of thousands and that 
identification testimony such as was received in this case is understood to mean 
that the items in evidence appeared to be of the same type as the items the 
witnesses had seen previously.   
To be effective it is not necessary for counsel to present evidence explaining 
facts that are common knowledge.  See Reed, 875 So. 2d at 423.  Moreover, trial 
counsel’s strategy, based on information given to him by Hodges, was not to 
contest that the items belonged to Hodges.  We agree with the trial court that there 
was no deficiency and conclude that the trial court did not err in denying relief as 
to this claim.  
 
 
- 32 - 
Claim 6 
Hodges claims that trial counsel was ineffective in cross-examining a crime 
scene technician who testified for the State because counsel’s questioning elicited 
testimony that was harmful to the defense.  Hodges’s position now is that trial 
counsel should have pursued a defense based on the theory that the sock with the 
blood on it, which was linked to Hodges by DNA evidence, had either been stolen 
from him with the blood already on it before the crime or had been used to wipe 
off blood from a cut Hodges sustained while working on a car at the house next 
door to the murder scene and was then discarded and left in the area where it was 
later found.   
At trial, trial counsel asked the technician if there were similar socks found 
in the house, and the witness answered yes.  Counsel asked the technician whether 
she believed the perpetrator covered his hands before entering the home, and she 
answered no.  Counsel asked the technician whether she thought the perpetrator 
covered his hands with the socks after the murder, and she answered yes.  Counsel 
asked the technician whether the blood could have been deposited on the sock 
before the murder, and the witness answered that it was possible but unlikely.   
Hodges asserts that the crime scene technician lacked the expertise to 
reconstruct the criminal scenario, but that trial counsel’s questioning essentially 
allowed her to do so.  According to Hodges, eliciting this testimony was deficient 
 
 
- 33 - 
representation because it helped the State’s case by supporting the theory that the 
murderer had covered his hands with socks he found in the house and cut himself 
while breaking a window to exit the house when the victim’s relatives came to the 
front door. 
In ruling on the postconviction motion, the trial court discussed trial 
counsel’s cross-examination of the crime scene technician in detail and found that, 
as a whole, it was thorough and effective.  Through cross-examination of the crime 
scene technician, trial counsel brought out that the blood could have already been 
on the sock for an indefinite period of time before the murder because there is no 
way to tell the age of a bloodstain.  Counsel also brought out that the bloodstain 
was small, that there was no evidence to show how it got on the sock, and that it 
might have no connection whatsoever to the case.   
The trial court found that the factual inferences that Hodges faults trial 
counsel for bringing out were already there for the jury to draw.  Trial counsel 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that some of his questioning was intended to 
lead the witness to overreach, thereby depicting her as a “hired gun” willing to say 
anything to help the prosecution.  The trial court found that trial counsel’s tactics in 
this regard were not unreasonable.  Trial counsel made strategic choices from the 
available courses of action.  The trial court concluded that there was no deficiency 
and no possible prejudice from trial counsel’s course of action.   
 
 
- 34 - 
We affirm the denial of relief on the ground that Hodges has failed to show 
that there is a reasonable probability that any alleged deficiency in counsel’s 
performance affected the outcome.  
Cumulative Prejudice Analysis 
We have resolved three of Hodges’s claims based on a lack of prejudice, 
without resolving whether counsel’s performance was deficient.  These three 
claims are those relating to: (a) the failure to challenge the admissibility of the 
DNA testing on the swab from the site of the bite mark on the victim of the 
collateral murder; (b) trial counsel’s comment in his opening statement that 
evidence would show that Hodges’s personal effects found at or near the scene of 
the murder had been previously stolen; and (c) the cross-examination of the crime 
scene technician regarding the blood on the sock. 
Even without the DNA evidence from the collateral murder, without trial 
counsel’s unsupported opening statement, and without the testimony that the blood 
was not likely deposited on the sock before the murder, the evidence established 
the following: Hodges’s DNA was on both of the socks found on the path taken by 
the murderer from the victim’s home; DNA from the hairs collected at or near the 
crime scene matched Hodges with a random match probability of slightly over one 
tenth of one percent; material from the anal swab matched Hodges and excluded 96 
percent of the male population; photos that belonged to Hodges and contained his 
 
 
- 35 - 
fingerprints and handwriting were found at the crime scene; a belt and a knife 
found at the crime scene were identified as similar to a belt and knife owned by 
Hodges; a jacket found on the path the murderer took away from the crime scene 
was similar to a jacket that Hodges was seen wearing near the time of the murder; 
and Hodges confessed that he committed the murder to two witnesses who testified 
at trial.  As a result, Hodges has not demonstrated that any alleged deficiency in 
these three areas would undermine confidence in the outcome. 
Hurst 
During the pendency of Hodges’s appeal from the denial of his motion for 
postconviction relief, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Hurst 
v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016), in which it held that Florida’s former capital 
sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because it “required the judge to 
hold a separate hearing and determine whether sufficient aggravating 
circumstances existed to justify imposing the death penalty” even though “[t]he 
Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to 
impose a sentence of death.”  On remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40, 
57 (Fla. 2016), we held that  
before the trial judge may consider imposing a sentence of death, the 
jury in a capital case must unanimously and expressly find all the 
aggravating factors that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
unanimously find that the aggravating factors are sufficient to impose 
death, unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh the 
 
 
- 36 - 
mitigating circumstances, and unanimously recommend a sentence of 
death.   
Hurst v. Florida and Hurst apply retroactively to defendants in Hodges’s 
position who were sentenced under Florida’s former, unconstitutional capital 
sentencing scheme after the United States Supreme Court decided Ring in 2002.  
Mosley v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S629, S640 (Fla. Dec. 22, 2016).  And in light 
of the nonunanimous jury recommendation to impose a death sentence, it cannot be 
said that the failure to require a unanimous verdict here was harmless.  See 
Franklin v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S573, S575 (Fla. Nov. 23, 2016) (“In light of 
the non-unanimous jury recommendation to impose a death sentence, we reject the 
State’s contention that any Ring- or Hurst v. Florida-related error is harmless.”).  
We therefore reverse Hodges’s death sentence and remand for a new penalty 
phase. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief as 
to Hodges’s conviction but reverse Hodges’s death sentence and remand for a new 
penalty phase.  
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
POLSTON and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
 
 
- 37 - 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
CANADY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the decision to affirm the denial of relief regarding Hodges’s 
conviction.  But I dissent from the decision to require a new penalty phase.  As I 
have previously explained, Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), should not be 
given retroactive effect.  See Mosley v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S629, S641-44 
(Fla. Dec. 22, 2016) (Canady, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
POLSTON and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Escambia County,  
Terry David Terrell, Judge - Case No. 172003CF005683AXXXXX 
 
Robert A. Norgard of Norgard, Norgard, & Chastang, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee