Title: Lantz v. Bowman

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Lantz v. Bowman1994 WY 93881 P.2d 1079Case Number: 93-252Decided: 09/30/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
James 
M. LANTZ,

Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

Linda 
S. BOWMAN, f/k/a Linda S. Lantz,

Appellee 
(Respondent).

 

Appeal 
from District Court of Fremont County, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Sky 
D. Phifer of Phifer Law Office, Lander.

Representing 
Appellee:

John 
T. Pappas of Western Law Associates, P.C., Lander.

Wesley 
A. Roberts of Wesley A. Roberts, P.C., Riverton, Guardian Ad 
Litem.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., THOMAS, MACY and TAYLOR, JJ., and CARDINE, J. 
(Retired).

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant James 
M. Lantz appeals from the district court's order which set aside an entry of 
default against Appellee Linda S. Bowman.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUE

[¶3]      Lantz states the 
issue on appeal as follows:

1. 
Did the trial [c]ourt abuse it[]s discretion in setting aside the Entry of 
Default entered against Respondent?

FACTS

[¶4]      Lantz and Bowman 
divorced in New Mexico in 1986, and Bowman received primary custody of the 
parties' minor children. Lantz filed a petition in the Wyoming district court on 
August 18, 1993, to change custody, time sharing, and child support. When Lantz 
filed his petition, the children were visiting him for the summer at his home in 
New Mexico. Lantz alleged in his petition that a substantial change in 
circumstances had occurred which materially affected the welfare of the children 
and which justified custody being awarded to him. Specifically, Lantz alleged 
that the children had been subjected to unstable living conditions and had been 
continually abused while they were living with Bowman and her 
husband.

[¶5]      The district 
court awarded temporary custody to Lantz on August 20, 1993, and set a hearing 
date for September 3, 1993, to consider Lantz's motion for a temporary 
restraining order and an injunction to prevent the return of the children to 
Bowman.

[¶6]      Bowman was served 
with the petition and a summons on August 21, 1993. She immediately retained 
counsel, who filed an entry of appearance on August 24, 1993. The district court 
determined that another custody proceeding regarding the parties' minor children 
was pending in New Mexico. The New Mexico district court and the Wyoming 
district court agreed to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. The 
New Mexico district court ordered Lantz to return the children to Bowman. After 
conferring with counsel on August 26, 1993, the Wyoming district court entered a 
revised order for temporary custody which directed that Bowman would retain 
custody of the children pending the disposition hearing which had been 
rescheduled from September 3, 1993, to September 28, 1993. The Wyoming district 
court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the 
children.

[¶7]      On September 17, 
1993, upon a motion presented by Lantz, the clerk of the Wyoming district court 
entered a default against Bowman because Bowman had not filed an answer to 
Lantz's petition. Bowman sought to have the default set aside or, in the 
alternative, to have the Wyoming district court hold a hearing prior to entering 
a default judgment.

[¶8]      At the 
disposition hearing which was held on September 28, 1993, the issue of setting 
aside the entry of default was the first matter which the district court 
considered. At the hearing, Bowman asserted that the district court should set 
aside the entry of default because, even if an answer were required, under the 
circumstances of the case, the answer would be surplusage as the issues had been 
joined in prior proceedings. Bowman maintained that custody of the children was 
a matter which did not lend itself to disposition by default since the district 
court must consider all the relevant evidence when it is determining what is in 
the best interests of the children.

[¶9]      The Wyoming 
district court set aside the entry of default and directed Bowman to file an 
answer. Bowman filed her answer later that day. After considering the merits of 
the case and not finding any credible evidence of child abuse, the Wyoming 
district court continued custody in Bowman.

DISCUSSION

[¶10]   Lantz contends that the Wyoming 
district court erred by setting aside the entry of default against Bowman. The 
district court did not err. W.R.C.P. 55 pertains to default situations. That 
rule provides in pertinent part:

(a) 
Entry. - When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is 
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and 
that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the 
party's default.

. 
. . .

(c) 
Setting aside default. - For good cause shown the court may set aside an 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).

[¶11]   A default may be entered against a 
party only when that party has failed to plead or otherwise defend in the 
action. First Southwestern Financial Services v. Laird, No. 93-283, slip 
op. at 3, ___ P.2d ___, at ___ (Wyo. Sept. 30, 1994). In this case, the issues 
were clearly joined when, at the August 26, 1993, conference, Bowman generally 
denied the allegations presented by Lantz in his petition.

[¶12]   The district court acted properly 
when it set aside the entry of default for "good cause shown" under W.R.C.P. 
55(c). The three factors which are applied to determine whether a motion made 
under W.R.C.P. 60(b) should be granted may also be applied to determine whether 
the "good cause" standard of W.R.C.P. 55(c) has been met. Vanasse v. 
Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 998 (Wyo. 1993); 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 55.10[2] (1985). Under the three-factor test, we 
consider:

"`1. 
Whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced; 2. Whether the defendant has a 
meritorious defense; and 3. Whether culpable conduct of the defendant led to the 
default.'"

Carlson 
[v. Carlson], 
836 P.2d [297,] 301-02 [(Wyo. 1992)] (quoting Amernational Indus., Inc. v. 
Action-Tungsram, Inc., 925 F.2d 970, 976 (6th Cir. 
1991)).

Vanasse, 
847 P.2d  at 998 (Wyo. 1993), quoted in First Southwestern Financial 
Services, No. 93-283, slip op. at 5, ___ P.2d at ___.

[¶13]   Lantz was not prejudiced when the 
district court set aside the entry of default. He was aware, as a result of the 
August 26, 1993, conference, that Bowman generally denied the allegations 
contained in his petition. Both parties agreed that an investigation concerning 
the allegations of child abuse needed to be completed before the district court 
acted on Lantz's petition.

[¶14]   Bowman obviously had a meritorious 
defense. She categorically denied the allegations asserted by Lantz in his 
petition, and she eventually prevailed at the hearing on the merits of the case. 
Finally, Bowman did not engage in any culpable conduct. While willful neglect or 
intentional failure to answer may, even in child custody proceedings, justify 
the entry of a default, here we have not been given even so much as a suggestion 
that Bowman's failure to answer was the result of neglect or intentional 
indifference. See Lake v. Lake, 63 Wyo. 375, 182 P.2d 824 (1947) (per 
curiam); see also Spitzer v. Spitzer, 777 P.2d 587, 590-94 (Wyo. 1989); 
Owens v. Owens, 626 So. 2d 640 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993). Under the 
circumstances presented in this case, the district court had no real alternative 
other than to set aside the entry of default.

CONCLUSION

[¶15]   The district court did not err when 
it set aside the entry of default and conducted a disposition 
hearing.

[¶16]   Affirmed.