Title: State v. Joseph M. Carey

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Coleman, J., writing for a majority of the Court. This case involves the appropriateness of consecutive sentences imposed during a single sentencing proceeding following a conviction on two counts of vehicular homicide that involved multiple victims. On December 26, 1995, Joseph M. Carey was driving a vehicle while intoxicated. Carey had left a gathering at his father's house with passengers Joyce and Melissa Snook. While engaging a bend in the road at a high rate of speed, Carey's pick-up truck swerved onto the oncoming lane and struck a Ford Mustang head on. Melissa Snook was airlifted to the hospital where she later died. A passenger in the Mustang also died. The driver of the Mustang and Joyce Snook sustained severe injuries. Expert testimony revealed that Carey was driving between sixty-five and eighty-one miles per hour in a twenty-five miles per hour zone. Carey was convicted on two counts of vehicular homicide and two counts of assault by auto. The trial court imposed two presumptive terms of seven years with a three-year parole disqualifier on each of the two counts of vehicular homicide, and two one-year terms for the assault by auto convictions. The trial court determined that due to the multiple-victims, the seven year sentences were to be served consecutively, while the one-year assault by auto sentences were to run concurrently with each other and with the vehicular-homicide sentences. Carey therefore received an aggregate sentence of fourteen years imprisonment with six years of parole ineligibility. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed Carey's convictions, but vacated the consecutive sentences and remanded to the trial court for the purpose of imposing concurrent sentences. The Appellate Division concluded that the multiple-victim factor alone does not ordinarily result in consecutive sentences. The panel also found that the trial court had improperly double-counted the two deaths, given that death was an element of each of the vehicular-homicide offenses. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certification. HELD: It is appropriate to impose consecutive sentences on defendants who drive while under the influence of alcohol and cause accidents that result in multiple deaths or serious personal injuries to multiple persons. 1. Generally, the Code of Criminal Justice leaves the determination of whether to impose a consecutive sentence to the discretion of the court. In State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985), this Court recognized the need for sentencing uniformity and set forth six guidelines to assist trial courts in deciding whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. The third guideline in Yarbough focuses on five facts relating to the crimes and provides the clearest guidance to the courts. The five factors generally concentrate on such considerations as the nature and number of offenses for which the defendant is being sentenced, whether the offenses occurred at different times or places, and whether they involve numerous or separate victims. Carey's case satisfies two of the five factors. Namely, the existence of multiple-victims and numerous convictions. The question for the Court is whether these factors are sufficient to support consecutive sentences. (Pp.7-10) 2. Where the death of an individual is an element of the offense, that fact cannot be used as an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes. Although the trial court erred in considering the deaths as aggravating factors, it did not base its decision on that alone. Rather, the trial court properly considered the serious bodily injuries sustained by the two surviving victims. Moreover, the trial court was correct in considering two additional aggravating factors: i.e., the need for deterrence and that defendant was likely to reoffend. (Pp. 11-15) 4. The Appellate Division erred in exercising its original jurisdiction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences on a defendant who while driving drunk causes an accident resulting in multiple deaths or multiple persons sustain serious personal injuries. (Pp. 20-21) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the trial court's original sentence is reinstated. JUSTICE LONG has filed a separate, dissenting opinion, expressing the view that the majority misapplies Yarborough by giving primacy to one of the five factors - the multiple-victims factor. In addition, she believes that the majority fails to distinguish between cases where multiple victims result from multiple acts of violence (and where consecutive sentences are appropriate), and those where multiple victims result from only one violent act, as in this case. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, VERNIERO and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE COLEMAN'S opinion. JUSTICE LONG has filed a separate, dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE ZAZZALI joins. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 122 September Term 1999 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOSEPH M. CAREY, Defendant-Respondent. Argued March 13, 2001 -- Decided July 9, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Gerard C. Sims, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Mary Virginia Barta, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Peter A. Garcia, Acting Public Defender, attorney). Richard D. Pompelio submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae, New Jersey Crime Victims' Law Center. The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. (2) the reasons for imposing either a consecutive or concurrent sentence should be separately stated in the sentencing decision; (3) some reasons to be considered by the sentencing court should include facts relating to the crimes, including whether or not: (a) the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other; (b) the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence; (c) the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior; (d) any of the crimes involved multiple victims; (e) the convictions for which the sentences are to be imposed are numerous; (4) there should be no double counting of aggravating factors; (5) successive terms for the same offense should not ordinarily be equal to the punishment for the first offense; and (6) there should be an overall outer limit on the cumulation of consecutive sentences for multiple offenses not to exceed the sum of the longest terms (including an extended term, if eligible) that could be imposed for the two most serious offenses.See footnote 11 [Ibid.] Accordingly, we are persuaded that the extensive injuries sustained by Joyce Snook and Michael DiGangi warranted the trial court's reliance on the gravity and seriousness of harm aggravating factor independent of the deaths of the two other victims. The Appellate Division also concluded that the trial court erred in finding two other aggravating factors: deterrence and risk of reoffense. With respect to the deterrence factor, the Appellate Division reasoned that the vehicular-homicide statute was deterrence enough because the Legislature substantially increased the penalties for that crime just days before defendant's accident. We do not agree. The need for public safety and deterrence increase proportionally with the degree of the offense. State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 500 (1996). Here, the Legislature increased vehicular homicide from a third-degree offense to a second-degree offense. It follows that the need for deterrence increased as part of a legislative plan to reduce the slaughter and mayhem that occurs on our roads at the hands of drunken drivers. Thus, the trial court was correct in finding a need for deterrence. Regarding whether defendant was a risk to commit another offense, we have stated that an appellate court should not second-guess a trial court's finding of sufficient facts to support an aggravating or mitigating factor if that finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record. State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 216 (1989). The trial court found that defendant denied responsibility for the crash and did not acknowledge that he had an alcohol problem. That conclusion is supported by a letter sent to the judge by defendant. In that letter, defendant expresses remorse, but does not directly accept responsibility for the crash or admit that he has a problem of drinking and driving. In addition, William Ferguson's mother testified at the sentencing hearing that she recently had encountered defendant at a grocery store and that he had acted in a manner indicative of denial. That evidence does not irrefutably prove that defendant is likely to reoffend, but it does provide support for the trial court's conclusion. Considering also that the trial court was in a far better position to develop a feel of the case than was the Appellate Division, we conclude that the Appellate Division should not have disturbed the trial court's finding that defendant was likely to reoffend. We conclude, therefore, that the three aggravating factors found by the trial court are supported by the record and should not have been disturbed by the Appellate Division. [Murray v. United States, 358 A.2d 314, 321- 22 (D.C. 1976).] In the present case, it was especially foreseeable that driving while intoxicated would result in multiple victims because defendant had two passengers in his vehicle. In light of the foregoing principles, we hold that, in order to facilitate sentencing under Yarbough in vehicular homicide cases, the multiple-victims factor is entitled to great weight and should ordinarily result in the imposition of at least two consecutive terms when multiple deaths or serious bodily injuries have been inflicted upon multiple victims by the defendant. Kromphold, supra, 162 N.J. at 347-48, 359 (affirming consecutive sentences of drunk driver who caused single accident resulting in multiple victims); State v. Serrone, 95 N.J. 23, 27-28 (1983) (suggesting that multiple-victims factor especially supports imposition of consecutive sentences). The fact that two consecutive terms of imprisonment should ordinarily be imposed in multiple-victims cases does not prevent the sentencing court from setting the base term of each sentence below the maximum provided by the Code. That is precisely what occurred here. STATE OF NEW JERSEY Plaintiff-Appellant, V. JOSEPH M. CAREY, Defendant-Respondent. ___________________________ LONG, J., dissenting. The tragic events of December 27, 1995 occurred because twenty-two year old Joseph Carey drove his automobile while under the influence of alcohol on an icy road. As a result of that act, two lives were lost and two other serious injuries occurred. Society's interest in Joseph Carey's punishment is concomitantly great. I have no quarrel with the need for punishment. My difference with the majority stems from what I view as the mistaken rule of law it constructed in an effort to justify consecutive sentences on facts that would not otherwise have warranted them. NO. A-122 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOSEPH M. CAREY, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED July 9, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz