Title: Murray v. White

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-459


Robert Murray and Rhonda Murray,             Supreme Court
Individually and as Guardians of
Erik Murray                                  On Appeal from
                                             Orleans Superior Court
     v.
                                             October Term, 1990
Philip E. White, et al


Alan W. Cheever, J.

Deborah T. Bucknam, St. Johnsbury, for plaintiffs-appellees

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Geoffrey A. Yudien, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson and Dooley, (FN1) JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.) and
          Mahady, D.J., Specially Assigned


     ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant Luba Routsong appeals the trial court's denial
of her motion for summary judgment on the state constitutional and tort
claims against her.  Because we find defendant entitled to summary judgment
on the basis of qualified immunity, we reverse.
     This litigation stems from the investigation, incarceration, and
unsuccessful attempts to criminally prosecute and revoke the conditional
pardon of plaintiff, Robert Murray, for the alleged sexual molestation of
two minors.  Plaintiff, along with his wife and child, initiated the liti-
gation against thirteen individuals, claiming violations of plaintiff's
federal and state constitutional rights, as well as the commission of the
torts of malicious arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Defendant is
a former caseworker for the Vermont Department of Social and Rehabilitation
Services (SRS).  The background necessary for disposition of her appeal is
sketched below.
     On March 13, 1985, a mother telephoned the Vermont Probation and Parole
Office in Newport to complain that plaintiff, a neighbor, had sexually
molested her two daughters, ages seven and ten.  The Probation and Parole
Office notified Corporal Leo Willey of the Vermont State Police, who then
contacted defendant at the SRS office in Newport.  Defendant and Corporal
Willey interviewed the mother, father, and the two daughters at the family's
home, and took taped statements from the daughters at the state police
barracks later that day.  In those statements both daughters indicated that
they had been sexually molested by plaintiff.  Defendant then prepared the
daughters for testifying before the Parole Board, and was present at those
proceedings on March 29, 1985.  The Parole Board, two and a half months
later, reported to the Governor that it could not find, by substantial
evidence, support for the charge that plaintiff had committed a criminal
offense.  A notice of dismissal of the criminal charges that had been
brought against plaintiff was filed on June 25, 1987.
     In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant had undertaken a
"one-sided investigation of the fact situation," had purposefully withheld
information from psychologists who interviewed the daughters, and had, along
with Corporal Willey,
         manipulated [the] interviews with the . . . children on
         March 13, 1985, conducted them in a highly leading
         manner, taped only those portions of the interviews that
         were damaging to Mr. Murray and stopped the tape for
         portions of the interviews that tended to show that Mr.
         Murray had not molested the girls, and in transcribing
         the tapes altered words and meanings to the detriment of
         Mr. Murray.

Further, plaintiff contends that because of defendant's prior contacts with
the alleged victims' family and the resulting knowledge that the family
contained, and associated with, known child molesters, defendant knew, or
should have known, that the allegations against plaintiff were false and
should have conducted a more in-depth investigation of the allegations.
     Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiff
had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and, in any
event, that defendant was protected from liability by the doctrine of
qualified immunity.  Defendant subsequently filed a motion for summary
judgment with an accompanying affidavit by defendant, which denied some of
the allegations in plaintiff's complaint.
     The trial court heard oral argument on defendant's two motions.  The
court denied defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings.  The court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the federal constitu-
tional claims against her on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to
establish that defendant had performed an act that operated to deprive
plaintiff of his federal constitutional rights.  The court denied defend-
ant's motion as to the state constitutional and tort claims, stating that
there were material facts in dispute, and that there had not been an
adequate time for discovery.
     Defendant's motion for reconsideration of this ruling was denied.
Defendant then filed with the court a notice of appeal as of right, or in
the alternative, a motion for permission to appeal. (FN2) Such permission was
denied, leaving this appeal based on appealability as of right.
                                    I.
     As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the denial of defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment premised on qualified immunity falls
within the collateral order exception adopted by this Court in State v.
Lafayette, 148 Vt. 288, 290-91,