Title: Lambousis v. Johnston

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Lambousis v. Johnston1983 WY 6657 P.2d 358Case Number: 5737Case Number: 5737Decided: 01/26/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHN 
LAMBOUSIS, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

SYLVIA M. JOHNSTON, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT). No. 5737

Appeal from the District Court,LaramieCounty, Paul T. Liamos, Jr., 
J.

Don W. Riske, 
Riske & Edmonds, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Mitchell E. 
Osborn, Grant & Grant, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J.,* and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE[fn**] and BROWN, JJ.

* Became Chief Justice on 
January 1, 1983.

[fn**] Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Between 1974 and 1978 
appellant transferred to appellee various sums of money. In an action in the 
district court to recover the money, appellant alleged an oral agreement between 
the parties to the effect that the appellee would repay the money to appellant 
if certain contingencies occurred. The trial judge granted appellee's motion for 
a summary judgment, holding that appellant's claims were barred by the statute 
of frauds and that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact.

[¶2.]     We will 
reverse.

[¶3.]     Appellant lists the 
issues as:

"1. Whether the Wyoming 
Statute of Frauds (W.S. 16-1-101(a)(i)) bars the enforcement of the oral 
agreements between the parties.

"2. Whether the Wyoming 
Statute of Frauds (W.S. 16-1-101(a)(i)) bars the appellant's claim of unjust 
enrichment contained in his second cause of action.

"3. Whether the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel prevents the appellee from asserting the Wyoming Statute 
of Frauds (W.S. 16-1-101(a)(i)) as a defense. 

"4. Whether the district 
court judge erred in granting the appellee's motion for summary 
judgment."

[¶4.]     The parties developed a 
social relationship in 1973; the relationship expanded to encompass financial 
matters. Beginning in October, 1974, appellant, who had experience in the stock 
market, transferred various sums of cash to appellee, who invested in stocks and 
other investments in her own name. Appellant recommended the investments to her. 
During the next few years, other sums, always in cash, were transferred by 
appellant to appellee for investment. She made investments in her own name and 
sold them when appellant advised her to do so. Appellee liquidated some of these 
investments at a substantial profit. Coincidentally with a deterioration in the 
social relationship in 1979, the flow of cash dried up.

[¶5.]     Appellant contends that 
there was an oral agreement between the parties to the effect that cash 
transferred to appellee would be repaid when the investments were liquidated, 
if, but only if, the investments realized a profit.1 In addition to alleging an oral 
agreement to repay the principal, appellant alternatively alleged unjust 
enrichment or promissory estoppel.

[¶6.]     Appellee testified that 
she initially considered the money transferred to her to be a loan, but that she 
later considered the money to be a gift. Appellee acknowledges that she received 
twelve separate transfers of money from appellant totaling $20,263.63. Appellant 
claims that the amount was $36,513. Appellee also acknowledges that she realized 
a profit from the money she received from appellant.2 Appellee denied an agreement to 
repay any of the money received and asserted that the money transferred was a 
gift. Appellee alleged as defenses the statute of frauds, laches, or that the 
amended complaint failed to state a cause of action.

[¶7.]     The trial court granted 
appellee's motion for a summary judgment, holding that the statute of frauds, § 
16-1-101(a)(i), W.S. 1977, barred all causes of action and that there was no 
genuine issue as to any material fact.

[¶8.]     When considering a 
summary judgment on appeal we have said that we have the same duty as the trial 
court. If the record is complete, we consider the same material as the trial 
court did, and inquire from the viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion. It is also settled that the moving party in a summary judgment 
proceeding has the burden of proving the absence of any genuine issue of fact. 
Dubus v. Dresser Industries, 
Wyo., 649 P.2d 198 (1982).

[¶9.]     Section 16-1-101, W.S. 
1977, the statute of frauds, now recodified as § 1-23-105, Cum.Supp. 1982, 
provides in part:

"(a) In the following 
cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some note or 
memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith:

"(i) Every agreement that 
by its terms is not to be performed within one (1) year from the making 
thereof."

[¶10.]  Appellant's position is that although the 
agreement with appellee was oral, it was not barred by the statute of frauds 
because he had fully performed. We have consistently held that an action on an 
oral contract is not barred by the statute of frauds when one of the parties has 
fully performed. Engle v. First National 
Bank of Chugwater, Wyo., 590 P.2d 826 (1979); Allen v. Allen, Wyo., 550 P.2d 1137 (1976); Hageman & Pond, Inc. v. 
Clark, 69 Wyo. 154, 238 P.2d 919 (1951); Stewart v. McKeon, 36 Wyo. 106, 252 P. 1024 
(1927). This is true even if full performance by plaintiff takes longer than a 
year. 

[¶11.]  This court has held in two cases that 
full performance, even if it took longer than year, took a contract outside the 
statute of frauds. In Stewart v. 
McKeon, supra, there was a verbal agreement between a dancehall conductor 
and the plaintiff; the defendant dancehall conductor was to pay $200 a month to 
the plaintiff as long as the plaintiff assured that dancing was discontinued at 
a competing hall. The agreement was not to exceed three years. The plaintiff 
actually did perform for sixteen months. We ruled that this complete performance 
of his part of the agreement removed the contract from the statute of 
frauds.

[¶12.]  In Engle v. First National Bank of 
Chugwater, supra, appellant Shreve, a plaintiff below, had a contract to do 
some work building a house. No definite time for completion was established. The 
case does not state when the oral contract was entered into, but it does say 
that Shreve began work on the house in March or April of 1974. Appellant Engle, 
who did part of the construction work, also entered into an oral contract with 
the purchasers of the house. The case also does not state when Engle entered 
into the contract, but he began work in June, 1974. On May 14, 1975, work was 
still continuing on the house. This would make it more than a year since 
appellant Shreve had begun working on the house, and eleven months since 
appellant Engle had begun working on the house. It is obvious that appellant 
Shreve had entered into the contract more than a year before, and probable that 
appellant Engle had. On June 29, 1976, the house was not yet completed, although 
appellants Engle and Shreve had done substantial work on it. The appellants 
Engle and Shreve filed liens on September 20, 1976. We said in that case that 
the agreements had been substantially performed by Shreve and Engle. We ruled 
that the contract was outside the statute of frauds because the contract was no 
longer executory, having been performed by one party.

[¶13.]  The major treatises are in 
accord:

"* * * But unlike other 
provisions of the Statute, the one-year provision does not apply to a contract 
which is performed on one side at the time it is made, such as a loan of money, 
nor to any contract which has been fully performed on one side whether the performance is completed within 
a year or not. * * *" (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) Contracts § 
130, p. 331 (1979).

"The weight of authority 
supports the proposition that if performance on one side can be fully executed 
within a year, and is so executed, the contract is not within the Statute, and 
in many cases the mere fact that it is executed on one side withdraws it from 
the Statute." (Emphasis added.) Williston on Contracts, § 504, p. 626 (3rd ed. 
1960).

"Furthermore, the same 
result is and should be reached if the plaintiff has fully performed, even 
though such full performance was not completed within a year. There is nothing 
in the statute to require a distinction; and it is the fact that full 
performance has been rendered that affords a reason for enforcement, and not the 
time within which it was rendered. For, observe that the defendant's promise is 
made enforceable without regard to the time necessary for its complete 
performance." 2 Corbin on Contracts, § 457, pp. 575-577 
(1950).

[¶14.]  In this case, we agree with appellant 
that the record shows that appellant had completely performed, and that 
therefore, the statute of frauds does not apply. Appellant testified concerning 
the agreement:

"A. The agreement was 
that the money that I will invest for her, my own money, I will take afterwards 
when the stock is ripen [sic] to be sold. I will get my money and she will keep 
the profits out of it.

"Q. Okay. Focusing in on 
the very first time you made a transfer, was there an agreement with regard to 
the stock? Did you advise her of the stock to purchase?

"A. Right, because I was 
buying the same stocks myself.

"Q. Okay. 

"A. And I told her, you 
will sell when I tell you to sell because I know what the score is with the 
stock. Every stock she bought, I had bought myself as 
well."

Appellant 
further testified:

"A. Okay. Then I said 
whenever I need the money I will let you know and we will sell the stock or 
whatever you get from the oil wells and I'll get the money back. * * 
*"

[¶15.]  Appellant then testified that about two 
and one-half years before June, 1982, he told appellee he was going to need some 
of the money. In January, 1982, he told her to sell all the remaining stock. At 
that point, appellant had fully performed his part of the agreement. The actions 
of the parties after the initial transfer of money are entirely consistent with 
the agreement described by appellant, except that appellee did not sell the 
stock to pay back the money.

[¶16.]  Appellee contends that appellant raises 
for the first time on appeal the theory that there were several separate 
agreements rather than one agreement. We deem it immaterial whether there was a 
single agreement or numerous individual agreements. In either event, appellant 
fully performed. His part of the alleged agreement was complete. There was no 
testimony or suggestion that appellant promised to transfer more money to 
appellee or to do anything further. It is of no consequence what appellant might 
have done had not the romance fallen on bad times.

[¶17.]  The trial court's determination that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact was apparently based on its finding 
that the statute of frauds barred appellant's claims. Our disposition of the 
case makes it unnecessary to address other issues raised by 
appellant.

[¶18.]  The trial court erred in granting a 
summary judgment and holding that appellant's action was barred by the statute 
of frauds and that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact.

[¶19.]  Reversed and remanded for 
trial.

FOOTNOTES

1 In appellant's third 
cause of action he asked that the amount of money transferred to appellee be 
returned to him, plus the profits or proceeds from her investments. However, 
appellant said in his deposition that the agreement between the parties 
contemplated, "I will get my money and she will keep the profits out of 
it."

2 For the purpose of this 
opinion the exact amounts of cash transferred and the profits realized by 
appellee are unnecessary.