Title: State ex rel. Wilcox v. Seidner

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State ex rel. Wilcox , Appellant, v. Seidner, Warden, Appellee. 
The State ex rel. Morgan, Appellant, v. Seidner, Warden, Appellee. 
The State ex rel. Munici, Appellant, v. Seidner, Warden, Appellee. 
The State ex rel. Munici, Appellant, v. Seidner, Warden, Appellee. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Wilcox v. Seidner (1996),  Ohio St.3d       .] 
Habeas corpus not available to challenge either the validity or the 
sufficiency of an indictment. 
 
(Nos. 96-901, 96-912, 96-919 and 96-920 -- Submitted July 10, 1996 -- 
Decided August 21, 1996.) 
 
Appeals from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, Nos. 96CA006342, 
96CA006349, 96CA006365 and 96CA006347. 
 
These are appeals from dismissals of habeas corpus petitions filed in the 
Court of Appeals for Lorain County by appellants, inmates incarcerated in the 
Lorain Correctional Institution under the custody of appellee, Warden Larry 
Seidner.  In these four cases, appellants filed the same form petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the court of appeals.  They alleged that their indictments 
contained no allegation that the charged offenses were committed at some place 
within the territorial jurisdictions of their sentencing courts.  The court of appeals 
 
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granted appellee’s motions and dismissed the petitions because, inter alia, habeas 
corpus is not available to challenge either the validity or sufficiency of 
indictments.     
 
These causes are now before this court upon appeals as of right.  They raise 
an identical legal issue and are consolidated for purposes of opinion.  In this 
regard, appellants have filed the same form merit brief.  Appellee has filed 
motions to strike appellants’ briefs.    
____________________ 
 
Donald W. Wilcox, pro se. 
 
Leslie Morgan, pro se. 
 
Steven. Munici, pro se. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Charles L. Wille, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
Motions to Strike 
 
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Preliminarily, appellee moves to strike appellants’ briefs because of their 
alleged failure to comply with this court’s Rules of Practice.  In April 1996, 
appellants filed notices of appeal in this court from the court of appeals’s 
judgments dismissing their habeas corpus petitions.  On the same dates appellants 
filed their notices, they also filed briefs.  The briefs contained  copies of nondate-
stamped notices of appeal to this court.  Appellants served appellee with copies of 
the notices of appeal and briefs in April.  In late April 1996, we ordered the clerk 
of the court of appeals to certify and transmit the records in these cases.    The 
clerk of the court of appeals, in accordance with S.Ct.Prac.R. V(3), sent copies of 
the indexes listing the items included in the records to the parties on May 6 and 7, 
1996.  On May 10, the records were transmitted to this court. 
 
Appellee claims that appellants violated S.Ct.Prac.R. VI(1)(B)(5)(a), 
XIV(2)(A), and VI(1)(A).  Here, it is evident that appellants did technically violate 
S.Ct.Prac.R. VI(1)(B)(5)(a), which provides that an appellant’s brief in this court 
shall contain an appendix with a copy of “[t]he date-stamped notice of appeal to 
the Supreme Court.”  Appellants’ briefs, filed on the same date as their notices of 
appeal, contained nondate-stamped copies of their notices. 
 
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However, there was no violation of S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(2)(A), since 
appellants properly served copies of their notices and briefs on appellee.  Further, 
S.Ct.Prac.R. VI(1)(A) was not violated because it merely provides that appellants 
shall file their merit briefs “within 40 days from the date the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court receives and files the record from the court of appeals or the administrative 
agency.”  S.Ct.Prac.R. VI(1)(A) does not expressly preclude the filing of an 
appellant’s brief prior to the time the record is transmitted to the court. 
 
Therefore, it appears that only S.Ct.Prac.R. VI(1)(B)(5)(a) was technically 
violated.  Given the relatively minor violation of this rule and the fundamental 
tenet of judicial review in Ohio that courts should decide cases on their merits, this 
court denies appellee’s request to strike appellants’ briefs.  See State ex rel. 
Montgomery v. R & D Chem. Co. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 202, 204, 648 N.E.2d 821, 
823, quoting DeHart v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 189, 193, 23 
O.O.3d 210, 213, 413 N.E.2d 644, 647 (“‘Fairness and justice are best served 
when a court disposes of a case on the merits.’”). 
 
Appellee alternatively requests that we permit him to file briefs in these 
cases within thirty days of the date that the records were certified and filed.  
Appellee complains that prematurely filed appellants’ briefs should not force 
 
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appellee to respond within thirty days of such briefs pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 
VI(2)(A) because he would be without benefit of the transmitted records in such 
cases.  However, even if we accept such contention, the records were filed in this 
court on May 10, so that the thirty-day time period that appellee requests has 
already passed.  Although appellee also claims that he did not receive notice of the 
date the records were filed (see S.Ct.Prac.R. V[3]), even if this were true, nothing 
in S.Ct.Prac.R. VI conditions any party’s duty to file a brief on issuance or receipt 
of such notice.  Here, appellee received timely service of appellants’ briefs and 
was sent copies of the indexes of  the transmitted records by the clerk of the court 
of appeals.  Appellee neither filed briefs within thirty days after the filing of 
appellants’ briefs as required by S.Ct.Prac.R. VI(2)(A) nor requested an extension 
under S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(3)(B)(2)(b).  In addition, appellee’s arguments on appeal 
are fairly represented by his motions to dismiss filed in the court of appeals.  
Based on the foregoing, we proceed to the merits of these appeals. 
Merits 
   
Appellants assert that the court of appeals erred in dismissing their habeas 
corpus actions.  Habeas corpus will issue in certain extraordinary circumstances 
where there is an unlawful restraint of a person’s liberty, notwithstanding the fact 
 
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that only nonjurisdictional issues are involved, but only where there is no adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Pirman v. Money (1994), 
69 Ohio St.3d 591, 593, 635 N.E.2d 26, 29.  In order to avoid a dismissal, a 
petitioner must state with particularity the extraordinary circumstances entitling 
him to habeas corpus relief.  State ex rel. Jackson v. McFaul (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 
185, 187, 652 N.E.2d 746, 748. 
 
Appellants claim that their indictments did not comply with R.C. 
2941.03(D) because none of the charges alleged that the offenses was committed 
within the territorial jurisdictions of their sentencing courts.  R.C. 2941.03 
provides that “[a]n indictment or information is sufficient if it can be understood 
therefrom:  *** (D) That an offense was committed at some place within the 
jurisdiction of the court ***.”  See, also, State v. Luna (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 
207, 210, 644 N.E.2d 1056, 1058 (trial court erred when it denied motion to 
dismiss indictment where there was no allegation in the indictment that the 
charged offense “‘was committed at some place within the jurisdiction of the 
court’” as required by R.C. 2941.03[D]). 
 
Appellants do not claim that the offenses for which they were ultimately 
convicted and sentenced did not occur within the territorial jurisdictions of their 
 
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sentencing courts.  As the court of appeals properly concluded, appellants’ claims 
merely attacked the validity or sufficiency of their indictments.  We have 
repeatedly held that habeas corpus is not available to challenge either the validity 
or sufficiency of an indictment, and these claims can be raised on direct appeal.  
Luna v. Russell (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 561, 562, 639 N.E.2d 1168, 1169, certiorari 
denied (1995), 513 U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 759, 130 L.Ed.2d 658; Wilson v. Rogers 
(1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 130, 623 N.E.2d 1210.   
 
In other words, an indictment cannot be collaterally attacked following a 
judgment of conviction “‘because the judgment of conviction necessarily binds a 
defendant, where the court rendering it had jurisdiction of the person of the 
defendant and also jurisdiction of the subject matter, i.e., jurisdiction to try the 
defendant for the crime for which he was convicted.’”  Hammond v. Dallman 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 666, 667-668, 590 N.E.2d 744, 746, quoting State v. 
Wozniak (1961), 172 Ohio St. 517, 522-523, 18 O.O.2d 58, 61, 178 N.E.2d 800, 
804.  Appellants could have raised this issue on direct appeal.  Luna, 70 Ohio 
St.3d at 562, 639 N.E.2d at 1169. 
 
Further, the indictments attached to appellants’ petitions in case Nos. 96-
912, 96-919, and 96-920 disclose that they did allege that the charged offenses 
 
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were committed within the sentencing courts’ territorial jurisdictions and thus 
fully complied with R.C. 2941.03(D).  In addition, although the appellant in the 
remaining appeal, case No. 96-901, did not attach a copy of his indictment to his 
petition filed in the court below, he did attach a copy to his appellate brief.  If the 
court could consider this new material, cf. State v. Ishmail (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 
402, 8 O.O.3d 405, 377 N.E.2d 500, paragraph one of the syllabus, this indictment 
also discloses no violation of R.C. 2941.03(D). 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the court of appeals are 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.