Title: State of Missouri, Respondent vs. Richard D. Davis, Appellant.

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC89699 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
RICHARD D. DAVIS, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County 
The Honorable Marco Roldan, Judge 
 
Opinion issued June 29, 2010 
 
 
Richard D. Davis was tried and found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder and 
multiple counts of first-degree assault, forcible rape and forcible sodomy in connection 
with the deaths of Marsha Spicer and Michelle Huff Ricci.  In accordance with the jury’s 
recommendation, the trial court sentenced Mr. Davis to death on the first-degree murder 
count involving Ms. Spicer.  As to the remaining counts, the court sentenced Mr. Davis to 
13 life sentences as a persistent sex offender, nine life sentences as a persistent offender, 
and two 15-year sentences as a persistent offender.  For the reasons set forth below, this 
Court finds no reversible error in any of the points raised, finds that the sentence is 
proportional to the crime as required under section 565.035.3, RSMo 2000,1 and affirms. 
                                             
 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise indicated. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. 
General Background 
The evidence at trial, considered in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, 
State v. Armentrout, 8 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Mo. banc 1999), shows that on May 15, 2006, 
officers discovered a shallow grave in rural Lafayette County that contained the body of 
Marsha Spicer.  Police identified Richard D. Davis as a suspect in the Spicer 
investigation.  On May 19, 2006, officers executed a search warrant on Mr. Davis’ 
apartment and seized numerous items, among them a video camera and various 
videotapes, including tapes police designated as items 26 and 31.   
Item 26 depicts footage of Mr. Davis and his girlfriend engaging in forced sexual 
acts with Ms. Spicer while her hands are bound with duct tape.  It depicts Mr. Davis 
straddling Ms. Spicer’s head and forcibly placing his penis in her mouth, punching Ms. 
Spicer in the side and stomach, and vaginally and anally raping Ms. Spicer as his 
girlfriend adjusted the camera angles.  Item 31 shows Mr. Davis and his girlfriend 
performing forced sexual acts on a different victim, Michelle Huff Ricci.  It depicts Ms. 
Ricci with her hands bound with yellow speaker wire.  Portions of Item 31 show Mr. 
Davis vaginally raping Ms. Ricci while his girlfriend straddled her face, anally raping 
Ms. Ricci while forcing her face into his girlfriend’s genitals, forcibly placing his penis in 
Ms. Ricci’s mouth, and choking and striking Ms. Ricci on the head and back while she 
cried out in pain.    
Police interviewed Mr. Davis.  During the interview, Mr. Davis stated Ms. Spicer 
came to Mr. Davis’ apartment and they had consensual sex for a while until Ms. Spicer 
said she wanted to leave.  Then Mr. Davis and his girlfriend raped and sodomized Ms. 
Spicer.  Initially, Mr. Davis claimed that Ms. Spicer accidentally suffocated to death 
while he and his girlfriend raped her.  Mr. Davis eventually admitted, however, that he 
knew they were going to kill Ms. Spicer as soon as the sex “went too far,” as he decided 
he could not allow Ms. Spicer to leave the apartment for fear that she would alert the 
authorities.  After Ms. Spicer died, Mr. Davis and his girlfriend cleaned Ms. Spicer’s 
body with bleach and dumped her in the shallow grave in Lafayette County.   
During the interview, police also asked Mr. Davis about Ms. Ricci.  Mr. Davis 
stated that Ms. Ricci willingly had come to his apartment and that the two of them as well 
as Mr. Davis’ girlfriend had consensual sex.  Eventually, Mr. Davis and his girlfriend tied 
up Ms. Ricci against her will and raped and sodomized her.  Mr. Davis said he hit Ms. 
Ricci seven or eight different times and that he and his girlfriend tried to smother Ms. 
Ricci but she resisted too much. 
Based on Mr. Davis’ interview, the police seized more tapes that were hidden at 
Mr. Davis’ workplace.  These tapes, which the police labeled A, B, C and D, showed Mr. 
Davis raping, anally sodomizing and punching Ms. Spicer and Ms. Ricci.  In addition to 
the rape and sodomy, Tape A showed Mr. Davis grabbing Ms. Ricci by the hair, holding 
her face to the camera and boasting about the control he had over Ms. Ricci.  Tape B 
showed Mr. Davis’ attempt to smother Ms. Spicer and threaten to crush her larynx if she 
complained.  Tape C showed Mr. Davis’ girlfriend sitting her naked body down on Ms. 
Spicer’s face, smothering Ms. Spicer to death while Mr. Davis held Ms. Spicer down.  
Tape D showed Mr. Davis taunting and choking Ms. Ricci until she urinated.       
 
3
The State filed a 26-count amended information charging Mr. Davis with first-
degree murder for the death of Ms. Spicer as well as multiple counts of first-degree 
assault, forcible rape and forcible sodomy.  On July 31, 2008, the jury found Mr. Davis 
guilty of all counts except one count of first-degree assault against Ms. Ricci.   
During the penalty phase, the state submitted three statutory aggravators: (1) that 
he had one or more serious assaultive convictions; (2) that the murder of Ms. Spicer 
involved depravity of mind; and (3) that the murder of Ms. Spicer occurred while the 
defendant was engaged in the perpetration of rape.  The jury heard aggravating and 
mitigating evidence.  After hearing all the evidence, the jury found all three statutory 
aggravators and recommended Mr. Davis be sentenced to death on the first-degree 
murder count.  The trial court sentenced Mr. Davis to death in accordance with the jury’s 
recommendation.  He appeals his conviction and death sentence.  Because the death 
penalty was imposed, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction.  Mo. Const. art. V, § 3. 
B. 
Mr. Davis’ Ake Claims 
Mr. Davis was deemed indigent, and public defenders were appointed to represent 
him.  Beginning in June 2007 and extending into July 2008, Mr. Davis filed numerous 
motions requesting the court to compel his counsel to conduct their legal strategy in the 
way he preferred or permit him to represent himself and provide him various resources.   
On June 20, 2007, Mr. Davis filed a motion “to be my own lawyer.”  In that 
motion, Mr. Davis requested the court “to appoint someone to assist in investigating 
facts, deposing witnesses, gathering evidence, and to give [him] the means to represent 
himself.”  On June 25, 2007, Mr. Davis filed a motion stating, “If I can not have [counsel 
 
4
compelled to prepare the case according to Mr. Davis’ instructions], then if it is true and I 
can be the so-called lawyer, and have access to assistance in doing the above then I want 
to do that and have access to law library, people to help investigate for me, witnesses, and 
help I will need for trial.” 
Mr. Davis filed an additional motion the next day making similar conditional 
requests.  The following day, Mr. Davis filed two such motions.  The first asked “for 
court to appoint investigator, legal assistant to assist defendant in defending himself and 
investigating facts of the case,” and for the court to appoint someone to help with legal 
research and in preparing his defense and for access to a VCR and unspecified “tapes of 
evidence that will be used in a suppression hearing and at trial.”  Mr. Davis did not state 
what he intended his defense to be; he said only that it would “require experts in medical 
drugs.”  The second motion asked the court to order Mr. Davis’ attorneys to do certain 
things “or make Defendant his own lawyer and give him the help needed to find facts, 
investigate constitutional violations, secure evidence and prepair [sic] a very complex 
defence [sic].”  He filed an additional motion July 10, 2007, in which he conceded that he 
already had some access to a law library but asked (as he previously had done) for more 
library access and for a right to “30 photocopies per hour if needed and a lawyer to assist 
[Mr. Davis] in representing [him]self and someone to help … investigate.” 
The court held a hearing October 10, 2007, to address these various motions.  
Because Mr. Davis in these motions variously sought to represent himself and to have the 
court order his counsel to continue representing him but to do so according to Mr. Davis’ 
legal strategy rather than that of counsel, the court first sought to clarify what relief Mr. 
 
5
Davis really wanted. 
Mr. Davis at first responded, “I’ll do it myself, I’ll represent myself.”  He said he 
had thought it over and discussed it with his attorneys, that he was not intoxicated, could 
read and write English, and that no one was forcing him to decide to represent himself.  
The court asked Mr. Davis if he knew the rules of evidence and Mr. Davis said he would 
“try to learn it.”  The court continued, explaining that, without the assistance of counsel, 
Mr. Davis’ pretrial options would be limited.  The court remarked that the public 
defender’s office has “money to send out investigators, they have money to take 
depositions for records, things of that nature.”  The exchange continued: 
Court:  “And do you understand that there’s no absolute right in a lot of 
those things under the law for you to have?  In other words, you would 
have to come up with the money for that.  Do you understand that?”   
 
Mr. Davis:  “For like a, to talk to witnesses?” 
Court:  “Exactly.  Do you understand that?” 
Mr. Davis:  “So, basically, I couldn’t talk to witnesses or nothing?” 
Court:  “Well, there’s certain things about witnesses where money is 
required, to send out investigators, to take a deposition of certain records 
that need to be taken or something.  Do you understand that, obviously, 
those things cost money and you would have to obviously come up with 
that money?” 
   
Mr. Davis:  “No.  That’s one of the reasons I’m doing this, is because I was 
wanting this stuff done.  And I thought that I could maybe do it myself, that 
I could question, you know, like, the police officers or witnesses in my case 
and prepare and learn, you know, what they was going to testify to and 
remembered.” 
   
Court:  “Do you understand that that takes money to do that?  Do you 
understand that when the public defender is taking depositions, they’re 
paying for those depositions?  Do you understand that?” 
 
6
   
Mr. Davis:  “I believed that you could, you know, help me, appoint 
someone, like, to investigate where I can’t go talk to people and locate 
people.” 
   
Court:  “I’m telling you up front, you understand, I have no power to do 
that.  I can’t force people to work for free.  Do you understand that?” 
   
Mr. Davis:  “Yes.” 
After this exchange, the court continued inquiring as to whether Mr. Davis wished 
to represent himself.  After some further discussion, Mr. Davis decided to remain 
represented by appointed counsel.   Thereafter, however, he periodically filed additional 
motions asking that he be allowed to represent himself for the reasons stated previously 
and stating that his counsel would not prepare the case in the way he desired.  He always 
made these requests conditional on receiving things such as funding generally for pretrial 
investigations, defense and trial preparation, expert witnesses, and related expenses, as 
well as “cost for investigator to locate defense witnesses, secure evidences [sic], locate 
evidence, research defense issues” and “an investigator to locate witnesses, secure 
testimony and locate and secure physical evidence.”  These motions also stated that Mr. 
Davis wanted the court to provide funding for “copies of documents [and] discovery 
motions, [which] will be needed by defendant at great cost.”  Mr. Davis stated that he 
“will not be able to enter any evidence at a trial without funds to gather evidence” and 
that he would need telephone access because “[h]undreds of witnesses by the state have 
to have their testimony reviewed and some will need to be contacted.”  He also requested 
specific items such as “copy photos as exhibits;” “funds for transcripts;” “funds for 
photocopies in the law library;” “law books not in the law library;” and “funds to have 
 
7
photos copied or made off of D.V.D.” Mr. Davis did not explain to what issues these 
requests related or whether they were necessary to present evidence about a significant 
issue in his case or if, instead, they were just general resources he wanted to have 
available as he might need them.    
On July 7, 2008, the same day voir dire examination for Mr. Davis’ trial began, he 
filed a motion to “proceed in forma pauperis” and stated for the first time that if 
“defendant had the ability he would have contacted expert witnesses … on (Dissociative 
Identity Disorder) (DID) and the side effects of Lexapro and Paxil and other (4) four 
medications defendant was prescribed during the time relating to the charges.”  Mr. Davis 
also stated that he would “call witnesses who would testify to the (DID) and the fact that 
defendant had this disorder all his life.”  Mr. Davis would also “contact and call to court 
witnesses at his church who seen [sic] the (personality changes) (DID).”  
On July 17, 2008, the trial court held a hearing to address Mr. Davis’ latter 
motions.  The court stated that it already had conducted a lengthy hearing on the matter 
of removing Mr. Davis’ counsel.  Mr. Davis said he was “under the understanding that 
[he] had th[e] right, to represent [him]self and to have funds to do that.”  The court asked 
whether there was any other thing Mr. Davis wanted to say “[o]n representing [him]self.”  
Mr. Davis did not then make a record of what evidence he wanted to put on or what he 
needed the funds for or whether there was evidence to support a DID defense sufficient to 
justify hiring an expert.  Instead, he focused on obtaining copies of prior motions he had 
filed and other collateral matters. 
The jury began hearing guilt-phase evidence July 25, 2008.  On July 30, 2008, in 
 
8
the middle of trial, Mr. Davis filed his “objections for the court, pro se.”  In that motion 
Mr. Davis objected to “not being allowed to represent myself, not given the means, or 
funding for basic materials, photo copies, law books, investigator to locate witnesses who 
would prove defense of (NGRI) (coworkers, friends, family).  As stated in prior motions, 
witnesses who would have testified at suppression hearing to prove the claims of illegal 
search and seizure, involuntary statements.  As stated in my pro se motions, expert 
witness in regards to involuntary intoxication as stated in the pro se motion.”  The court 
overruled this motion.  
C. 
Colloquy Regarding Mr. Davis’ Right to Testify 
Before the parties rested in the guilt phase of Mr. Davis’ trial, the court, out of the 
presence of the jury, examined Mr. Davis concerning his right to testify.  The court 
explained that Mr. Davis had the right to testify but it understood that Mr. Davis was 
opting not to do so.  Mr. Davis responded that he had never agreed not to testify – he 
wanted to “explain the last two months that [he] was out there.”  The court advised Mr. 
Davis that if he testified he would have to comply with the procedural rules of the court 
and his counsel would conduct the examination.  Mr. Davis would not be allowed to “just 
sit there and tell the jury whatever he want[ed].”  Mr. Davis inquired whether he could 
have counsel ask questions of Mr. Davis’ choosing.  The court said “no,” and explained 
that selecting the questions to ask fell “under an attorney-client … strategy, what the 
strategy of the case is.”  The court ordered a recess, allowing Mr. Davis time to discuss 
the matter with counsel.  On returning from recess, the court reiterated to Mr. Davis that 
“it wouldn’t be a situation … where you will get on the stand and [Mr. Davis’ counsel] 
 
9
would say, tell the jury what you want to tell them.”  When asked again whether he 
wanted to testify, Mr. Davis said, “I could not testify to anything I would want to testify 
to because the counsel would not ask the questions I wanted to ask.”  Thereafter, Mr. 
Davis stated that he did not want to testify in the guilt phase.   
On August 5, 2008, near the end of the presentation of Mr. Davis’ evidence in the 
penalty phase of his trial, the court again, out of the presence of the jury, examined Mr. 
Davis about his right to testify.  Mr. Davis remarked that “you said I have the right to 
testify, but if I can’t get my lawyer to ask me questions, then I have no right to testify.”  
The court clarified, “today, if you’re going to testify, it’s going to be at the direction of 
your attorneys as to the questions that they deem are relevant, the questions that they 
know under the law the jury can hear, and things of that nature.”  Mr. Davis said that he 
understood, and the court again provided him with a recess to confer with counsel.  When 
Mr. Davis returned from the recess, he said that he wanted to testify and asked the court, 
“Can I have them – ask them to ask questions of me?”  The court agreed that Mr. Davis 
was free to give his counsel a list of questions he wanted to be asked but noted that “they 
might ask … [different] questions, though, because they’re making the decision of 
whether your questions are admissible or not admissible.”  The court gave Mr. Davis 15 
minutes to write his questions.  Afterward, Mr. Davis testified.  Mr. Davis does not 
identify on appeal any questions he wanted asked that counsel did not ask of him. 
D. 
Voir Dire of Juror Powell 
One of the jurors, Adam Powell, wrote in a pretrial questionnaire that the death 
penalty was used an “appropriate amount” and that he thought “most of the time the 
 
10
punishment fits the crime.”  Mr. Powell also checked boxes stating that he “somewhat 
favor[ed]” the death penalty and believed in the “eye for an eye” concept.  Mr. Powell 
checked another box saying that he believed one’s childhood experience “somewhat 
affects later behavior” and wrote that he believed “in some cases” the testimony of 
mental health professionals is “very necessary.”  Mr. Powell also wrote that mental health 
professionals “should be extended every right to assit [sic] in trial.” 
During voir dire, Mr. Powell said that he could vote for either death or life, had no 
preference for either sentence, would keep both options open, and, that, if he believed 
mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating circumstances, he would vote for life.  
Mr. Davis’ counsel asked Mr. Powell whether he was “willing to say that you could look 
at somebody’s childhood experience and give that meaningful consideration as a reason 
to vote against the death penalty.”  Mr. Powell replied, “I’m willing to look at it, but I 
believe as an adult you’re a person and no matter what happened in your childhood you 
know the difference between right and wrong and killing a person and not killing a 
person.”    The exchange continued: 
Mr. Davis’ counsel:  “But from your world view it’s not something that 
should be given meaningful consideration in deciding which punishment to 
give the deliberate murderer?” 
   
Mr. Powell:  “Again, I think that’s so abstract.  In some cases, yes, it could 
be, but I believe that most generally, no, as an adult human being you know 
that it’s right to kill a person or not right or what your feelings are.” 
   
Mr. Davis’ counsel:  “And, again, sort of to follow up on your 
questionnaire – and this might sort of tie in what you’ve just told me – it’s 
at least your philosophical belief that you do believe in the concept of an 
eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth and a life for a life?” 
   
 
11
Mr. Powell:  “I believe in that in the context of the justice system, that if 
that is what is laid forth by the justice system and that’s ordained how it 
works in a society, an orderly society, if that’s what’s rendered, I believe in 
that, yes.” 
   
Later, the State’s counsel questioned Mr. Powell:   
Prosecutor:  “Mr. Powell, as I understand it, sir, while you generally are not 
going to give a great deal of weight to evidence of someone’s childhood, 
for example, it is something that if the circumstances were appropriate, you 
would consider.”   
 
Mr. Powell:  “Being that we’re talking so vague, yes.  I mean, I could see 
where there could be something that I would consider but generally no.”   
 
Prosecutor:  “But it’s a matter of weight, how much credit you would give 
it, if you will.”   
 
Mr. Powell:  “Correct.”   
 
Prosecutor:  “As opposed to being unwilling to consider it at all.”   
 
Mr. Powell:  “Correct.” 
 
Afterward, Mr. Davis moved to strike Mr. Powell for cause on the ground that Mr. 
Powell essentially had stated that he could not give meaningful consideration to 
childhood experiences as a reason to vote against the death penalty.  The court denied the 
strike.  Mr. Powell served on Mr. Davis’ jury as the foreman. 
E. 
Evidentiary Rulings 
Prior to trial, Mr. Davis filed a motion to exclude as cumulative footage from the 
tapes of Mr. Davis’ crimes against Ms. Spicer and Ms. Ricci seized from Mr. Davis’ 
home and workplace – tapes 26, 31, A, B, C and D.  The court overruled the motion.  
During general voir dire, Mr. Davis objected to the State’s proposed use in opening 
statement of still photographs made from the tapes.  The objection to the still photographs 
 
12
was overruled.  The still photographs were shown to the jury during the State’s opening 
statement and closing arguments in the guilt phase.  Prior to opening statements, Mr. 
Davis renewed his objection to these still photographs and renewed his motion to exclude 
the playing of the tapes.  These objections were overruled but the court permitted a 
continuing objection to the still photographs.  Before closing arguments in the guilt phase 
Mr. Davis renewed his objection to the State introducing the still photographs.  The court 
overruled this objection.  Footage from tapes 26, 31, A, B, C and D was shown to the jury 
via two DVDs consisting of approximately 90 minutes of footage edited together from 
the nearly seven and one-half hours of activity recorded on the tapes.  
During the guilt phase of the trial, Detective John Howe testified generally as to 
the material on tapes 26 and 31.  These tapes were admitted into evidence but were not 
played for the jury during the trial.  Prior to Detective Howe’s testimony, Mr. Davis 
moved to prevent Detective Howe from providing “a lot of specific detail about what is 
on those tapes,” arguing that it would be unnecessarily repetitive to do so.  The court told 
the prosecutor that Detective Howe could generally summarize what was on the tapes, 
but could not make legal conclusions.  During Detective Howe’s testimony concerning 
one of the tapes, Mr. Davis objected to the State “trying to repeat the same thing over and 
over again.”  The court overruled the objection, stating that the descriptions were general.  
Detective Howe later testified generally about tapes A, B, C and D.  These tapes also 
were admitted into evidence but not played for the jury.  Mr. Davis did not object 
specifically to these tapes or to Detective Howe’s descriptions of these tapes. 
  At a later point in the guilt phase, video recordings of Mr. Davis’ statements and 
 
13
admissions made during the police interview were admitted and played during the 
testimony of Detective Chris Rapp.  Mr. Davis renewed his objection “for all the grounds 
previously expressed in the motion to suppress.”  The court overruled the objection. 
Mr. Davis did not present witnesses in the guilt phase but, instead, cross-examined 
the state’s witnesses to show that the murder was not intentional but that Mr. Davis just 
got “caught up” in the moment. 
In the guilt phase, the jury found Mr. Davis guilty of multiple counts of sexually 
assaulting Ms. Ricci.  In the penalty phase, the State presented evidence that Mr. Davis 
and his girlfriend took Ms. Ricci to a remote area, killed her, and set her body on fire in 
an attempt to destroy evidence of her death.  The State also showed that, while trying to 
escape arrest, they kidnapped a five-year-old child and sexually assaulted, sodomized and 
beat her.  When Mr. Davis was arrested not long thereafter, the police overheard him 
telling his girlfriend, “We got to do some things we wanted.”  The State also presented 
evidence that Mr. Davis had previously raped and sodomized a woman at knifepoint, as 
well as evidence of other crimes. 
Mr. Davis presented the testimony of a psychologist, Dr. Steven Mandracchia, in 
the penalty phase.  Dr. Mandracchia evaluated Mr. Davis’ mental condition at the time of 
the crimes and at trial and assessed whether developmental issues contributed to his 
conduct.  The doctor testified that physical and sexual abuse, including beatings by his 
stepfather, and lack of interpersonal connections in Mr. Davis’ family, as well as his 
exposure to inconstant adult figures, prevented normal development.  Dr. Mandracchia 
testified that by the age of six, family members were setting up real or simulated sexual 
 
14
acts for Mr. Davis and his sister to engage in, and by age 10 he was engaging in sexual 
activity with a number of people.  By age 15 regular sexual activity had become 
“routine,” and he began becoming involved in anal sex, rough sex and group sex.  An 
aunt made him engage in sexual activity with his sister.  There was evidence indicating 
that Mr. Davis was molested by his stepfather.  Medical records from the Western 
Missouri Mental Health Center showed that Mr. Davis was depressed, anxious, had low 
self-esteem, and his anger and his sexuality became associated.  Dr. Mandracchia 
concluded that Mr. Davis had several severe personality disorders, including antisocial 
personality disorder, narcissism and paranoid personality disorder.   
Mr. Davis testified in his own defense in the penalty phase.  He said he was sorry 
for what he had done to his victims and explained about the history of abuse in his 
family.  Mr. Davis also called a former girlfriend, another friend and his sister to testify 
on his behalf. 
F. 
Objections to the Jury Instructions and the Motion to Quash Mr. 
Davis’ Information 
 
 The amended information charged Mr. Davis with multiple counts of forcible 
rape, forcible sodomy, sexual abuse and first-degree assault against his two victims.  To 
avoid confusion as to which count referred to which act, each count in the information 
contained a reference to a specific act recorded on one of the six videotapes recovered 
during the Spicer investigation.  Similarly, each of the verdict-directing instructions 
submitted by the State included language that, also to avoid confusion, referenced one of 
the six tapes made by Mr. Davis.  For example, Instruction No. 13 stated:   
 
15
As to Count IV, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt:  First, that on or about May 14, 2006, … the defendant 
touched the breast of Marsha Spicer as depicted in “Tape B”…. 
   
At the guilt-phase instruction conference, defense counsel objected to each of 
these instructions on the ground that “language specifically pointing to a specific piece of 
evidence is prejudicial.”2  The State responded that the phrases were inserted in an effort 
to comply with the pattern instructions by directing the jury to the particular acts 
supporting each count.  The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objections, and the 
case was submitted using the State’s verdict-directing instructions.  
Also at the guilt-phase instruction conference, defense counsel objected that 
Instruction Nos. 70 and 71 – which instructed the jury to determine whether mitigating 
circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances – failed to place the burden on the 
State to prove that mitigating circumstances did not outweigh aggravating 
circumstances.3  The court overruled the objections.  Defense counsel also requested that 
the verdict-directing instruction for each of the 26 counts be modified so that the word 
“unanimously” would be added to the phrase “if you find and believe from the evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt” to return a guilty verdict on that count.  For example, 
                                             
 
2 Mr. Davis objected to the following verdict-directing instructions:  for Count IV—
Instruction No. 13; Count V—Instruction No. 15; Count VI—Instruction No. 17; Count 
VII—Instruction No. 19; Count VIII—Instruction No. 21; Count IX—Instruction No. 23; 
Count XIII—Instruction No. 31; Count XIV—Instruction No. 33; Count XV—
Instruction No. 35; Count XVI—Instruction No. 37; Count XVII—Instruction No. 39; 
Count XVIII—Instruction No. 41; Count XIX—Instruction No. 43; Count XX—
Instruction No. 45; Count XXI—Instruction No. 47; Count XXII—Instruction No. 49; 
Count XXIII—Instruction No. 51; Count XXV—Instruction No. 55; Count XXVI—
Instruction No. 57. 
3 See § 565.030.4(3).   
 
16
Instruction No. 5, as modified, would have added the word in brackets and read:   
As to Count I, if you [unanimously] find and believe from the evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt: ….  However, unless you [unanimously] find 
….  
 
The court rejected the proposed modification to the language contained in the approved 
pattern MAI-CR 3d 304.02 format for verdict-directing instructions.  
  On the last day of the guilt phase of Mr. Davis’ trial, Mr. Davis moved to quash 
the information, claiming that it violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 500 U.S. 466 (2000), 
in that the State was obligated to list in the information all of the statutory aggravators it 
sought to prove regarding Mr. Davis’ first-degree murder count but had failed to include 
them.  The trial court overruled this motion.    
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.  State v. 
Strong, 142 S.W.3d 702, 710 (Mo. banc 2004).  Mr. Davis argues on appeal that the trial 
court deprived him of his right to represent himself.  “Denial of a defendant’s right to 
self-representation is considered structural error,” State v. Black, 223 S.W.3d 149, 153 
(Mo. banc 2007), and “its deprivation cannot be harmless.”  McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 
U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984).  Mr. Davis also appeals the trial court’s denial of his attempt to 
strike Juror Powell for cause.  A ruling on a challenge for cause shall not be disturbed on 
appeal unless it is against the weight of the evidence and constitutes a clear abuse of 
discretion.  State v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144, 158 (Mo. banc 2008).   
Mr. Davis alleges error in admitting certain evidence and submitting certain 
instructions.  A trial court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  
 
17
State v. Simmons, 955 S.W.2d 729, 737 (Mo. banc 1997).  “A trial court's decision to 
admit evidence is an abuse of discretion when it is clearly against the logic of the 
circumstances then before the court, and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks 
the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration.”  State v. 
Smith, 136 S.W.3d 546, 550 (Mo. App. 2004).  “It is within the trial court's discretion to 
decide whether a tendered jury instruction should be submitted.”  Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 
at 150.  However, a “court is presumed to commit prejudicial error if it fails to use an 
applicable MAI.”  Id.  “If a proffered instruction is in conflict with substantive law, a 
court should decline to follow it.”  Id.   
Finally, in reviewing the imposition of a death sentence, section 565.035.3 
requires this Court to undertake a proportionality review to determine: 
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of 
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; (2) Whether the evidence 
supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating 
circumstance as enumerated in subsection 2 of section 565.032 and any 
other circumstance found; and (3) Whether the sentence of death is 
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime, the strength of the evidence, and the defendant. 
 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. 
No Ake or Faretta Violation Shown 
 
1. 
No Cases Hold a Misstatement of Ake Constitutes a 
Faretta Violation Where a Defendant Chooses Not to 
Represent Himself. 
 
Mr. Davis argues that the trial court misstated the law about what “basic tools” of 
an “adequate defense” he would be entitled to receive from the State under the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985), should 
 
18
Mr. Davis choose to represent himself.  He says this misstatement caused him to decide 
to withdraw his attempt to waive his right to counsel and represent himself, a right he is 
entitled to under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (recognizing a Sixth 
Amendment right to self-representation).  Therefore, he argues, this Court should find the 
alleged misstatement of his rights under Ake resulted in a violation, not of Ake but of 
Faretta, in that it meant that his decision not to represent himself was not made 
knowingly and intelligently. 
The argument that an error in explaining Mr. Davis’ right to basic tools of a 
defense under Ake itself can constitute a violation of Faretta is a novel and creative one, 
but Mr. Davis cites no case decided under either Faretta or Ake that supports it, and this 
Court has found none.  
In Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833-34, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees 
criminal defendants the right to self-representation at trial.  So long as the defendant 
unequivocally invokes the right to self-representation, does so in a timely manner, and 
the corresponding waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent, a trial court may not 
force an attorney on a competent defendant.  Black, 223 S.W.3d at 153.  To ensure a 
knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel, this Court has stated that trial courts must 
engage in a colloquy with the defendant to make certain the defendant understands 
“exactly what rights and privileges he is waiving, as well as the dangers associated with 
waiving constitutional rights.”  Id.  
No court has held either that the Faretta colloquy must include a discussion of 
 
19
what basic “tools of a defense” the constitution requires states to provide defendants or 
that the failure to do so accurately, or even at all, constitutes a violation of Faretta.  This 
is not surprising, for, as set out below, only a handful of courts even have suggested that 
Ake entitles defendants who are representing themselves to demand to be provided the 
tools necessary for a defense personally when they have chosen to reject the right to have 
those tools provided through counsel. 
Mr. Davis is forced to make this creative argument, however, for he cannot show a 
violation of Faretta directly. The court’s colloquy met the requirements of Faretta, and 
Mr. Davis always conditioned his invocation of his right to represent himself on the court 
providing to him the many resources that he requested; unless those tools were provided 
him, he did not want to represent himself. 
Similarly, Mr. Davis proceeded to trial with counsel, and he makes no claim on 
appeal that counsel sought but was denied any tool necessary for his defense as set out in 
Ake or otherwise.  He cannot show an Ake violation occurred in this manner. 
As a result, Mr. Davis’ claim of error turns on the relationship between his 
decision to relinquish his self-representation right under Faretta and the court’s 
statements to Mr. Davis that were designed to apprise Mr. Davis of the dangers of 
proceeding without counsel – warnings that the court was duty-bound to make but that 
Mr. Davis says also incorrectly told him that he could not get the assistance he desired be 
provided without cost should he waive counsel.  For the purposes of addressing this 
argument, therefore, this Court will presume, without deciding, that substantially 
misleading a defendant as to the rights he would have under Ake should he represent 
 
20
himself in some circumstances could constitute a Faretta violation. 
2.  
Ake Principles Do Not Apply to the Requests Davis Made.  
 
In Ake, 470 U.S. at 70, 74, the Supreme Court addressed the State’s obligations 
when a defendant is represented by counsel but is indigent and unable to pay for a 
psychiatric expert.  Ake held that where the indigent defendant has made a showing that 
his sanity at the time of an offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the 
constitution requires the State to provide the indigent defendant with access to psychiatric 
examination and assistance necessary to prepare an effective defense based on the 
defendant’s mental condition.  This requirement is “grounded in significant part on the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee of fundamental fairness.”  Id. at 76. 
Guided by fundamental fairness, Ake said the constitutional focus is on 
“identifying the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal … and … requir[ing] that 
such tools be provided to those defendants who cannot afford to pay for them.”  Id. at 77 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  To evaluate whether, and under what 
conditions, the “participation of a psychiatrist” was “important enough to preparation of a 
defense to require the State to provide an indigent defendant with access,” Ake balanced 
three factors:  (1) the private interest affected by the action of the State; (2) the 
governmental interest affected by providing the safeguard; and (3) the probable value of 
the additional or substitute procedural safeguards and the risk of an erroneous deprivation 
of the affected interest absent those safeguards.  Id.  Weighing these factors, Ake 
concluded that the State was required to provide a psychiatric expert once the defendant 
 
21
made a showing that his “mental condition [wa]s seriously in question” and “his sanity at 
the time of the offense [wa]s to be a significant factor at trial.”4  Id. at 83. 
Mr. Davis’ reliance on Ake is misplaced.  While Ake discusses broad principles 
that govern providing a defendant with access to “the basic tools of an adequate defense,” 
470 U.S. at 77, the actual holding of the case is narrow:  The State must supply a 
psychiatric expert for a represented but indigent defendant who has shown that his mental 
condition was seriously in question and his sanity at the time of the offense will be a 
significant factor at trial.  As the State notes, this holding is inapplicable to Mr. Davis’ 
situation for multiple reasons, many of which are relevant, and dispositive, here. 
3. 
Mr. Davis Did Not Show Another Expert was Necessary.  
 
First, the State notes, no subsequent United States Supreme Court case has 
extended Ake to experts other than psychiatric experts at trial, and Mr. Davis’ various 
requests encompassed many resources in addition to a psychiatric expert at trial.  While 
this is true, the majority of federal and state courts that have addressed this issue since 
Ake have concluded that the reasoning underlying Ake also would apply to other types of 
experts if the required showing is made that the issue the expert is to address will be a 
significant factor at trial on a key issue.  See, e.g., Terry v. Rees, 985 F.2d 283, 284 (6th 
Cir. 1993) (pathologist); Little v. Armentrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(hypnotism expert); Moore v. State, 889 A.2d 325, 338 (Md. 2005) (DNA analysis); Ex 
                                             
 
4 The defendant in Ake had satisfied this test because, among other reasons, his sole 
defense was that of insanity, he behaved so bizarrely at arraignment that the court ordered 
a competency examination, and he was initially deemed incompetent to stand trial and 
was permitted to proceed only after taking large doses of sedative drugs.  470 U.S. at 86. 
 
22
Parte Moody, 684 So.2d 114, 119 (Ala. 1996) (holding Ake applicable generally to non-
psychiatric experts).  But see O’Dell v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 491, 499 (Va. 1988) 
(holding Ake does not extend to funding for forensic experts).  
This Court concurs that where the required showing of significance and necessity 
is made, Ake’s rationale may extend to non-psychiatric experts in the appropriate case.  
This is not such a case, however.  Mr. Davis did not tell the court at the time of the 
hearing complained of that he needed the State to provide the assistance of an expert on a 
significant trial issue.  In his other motions, he mentioned experts with a measure of 
specificity only three times: On the eve of trial, he said he wanted an expert on 
“Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID)” and on the effects of several prescription drugs he 
had taken; during the presentation of evidence at his trial, he requested an “expert witness 
in regards to involuntary intoxication;” and in an earlier motion, he said he needed 
unspecified “experts in medical drugs.”  At no time did he offer any basis other than 
speculation to believe that these requests concerned significant issues at trial, nor did he 
show that these conditions would have been significant to his defense. 
To the contrary, Mr. Davis was examined by a psychologist prior to trial.  This 
psychologist also testified on Mr. Davis’ behalf in the penalty phase.  Although he was 
obviously available to do so, Mr. Davis’ psychologist did not provide testimony 
supporting an involuntary intoxication defense or that Mr. Davis was suffering from DID, 
 
23
however.5  Mr. Davis failed to make the required showing of a mental condition that was 
seriously in question that was to be a significant issue at trial and as to which he was 
denied expert assistance.  See Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83.  
4. 
Mr. Davis Made No Showing Supporting Extending Ake 
to Tools Other than Experts. 
 
Mr. Davis argues that Ake requires the State to furnish a self-represented 
defendant with tools for a defense beyond merely the provision of experts at trial, as was 
the case in Ake.  He does not cite authority to support this proposition, however.  This 
Court’s independent research also has not identified cases in which a showing was made 
sufficient to require provision of non-expert defense tools of the kind Mr. Davis sought 
from the trial court under Ake.  Two older state court decisions suggest that, were a 
particularized showing of importance and substantial need made, the principles 
underlying Ake might require making other types of essential tools available in a 
particular case.  See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 836 P.2d 1308, 1315 (Or. 1992) (Defendant 
“failed to establish the probable value to him of the public opinion poll in light of the 
extensive voir dire provided or that there was a significant risk of error in the proceedings 
without the poll”); State v. Hickey, 346 S.E.2d 646, 654 (N.C. 1986) (“In the present 
case, the defendant has failed to make a threshold showing of specific necessity for the 
assistance of an investigator” into background of key witness for the state). 
 Apart from Ake, prior Supreme Court cases have recognized that in some 
                                             
 
5 The expert who testified for Mr. Davis, Dr. Mandracchia, offered extensive testimony 
about Mr. Davis’ childhood sexual and physical abuse and about the other mental 
conditions Mr. Davis developed and that the doctor believed contributed to his conduct.   
 
24
circumstances the Constitution requires the provision of a free transcript on appeal, 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956), competent counsel at trial, Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963), and on direct appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 
U.S. 353, 358 (1963), and, for prison inmates, the right to reasonable access to a law 
library or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 
817, 828 (1977). 
None of these cases would entitle Mr. Davis to the “tools” he says were not 
provided.  Mr. Davis’ generalized requests concerned trial preparation, not appeal as in 
Griffin and Douglas.  He had counsel at trial whom he wanted to be rid of not because 
they were not competent but because they refused to allow him to decide the legal 
strategy to employ in his case.  While Mr. Davis did complain that he wanted more 
library time generally, he conceded in a motion that he already had access to a law library 
and never made a particularized showing to the court why the access he had was 
insufficient or whether the matters he needed to research were significant to his defense, 
which, in any event, was being handled at that time by counsel. 
This Court does not mean to suggest that a defendant never could show a right to 
tools other than an essential expert, a competent attorney and free transcript on appeal, or 
sufficient access to legal research facilities.  In a particular case, a defendant may be able 
to make the kind of particularized showing required by Ake.  Mr. Davis has not cited any 
case holding that Ake principles require provision of the generalized kinds of “tools” he 
said he wanted the court to grant him without cost, however.  Much less did he make a 
particularized showing of an issue seriously in question that was likely to be significant at 
 
25
his trial and for which he had shown the kind of need discussed below. 
5. 
No Showing Was Made of a Need for Other Assistance. 
Even when requesting a defense “tool” recognized under Ake or other authority, a 
defendant must make the required showing of need and significance under Ake.  Mr. 
Davis’ failure to do so is a fundamental bar to his claim on appeal.  Absent such a 
showing, the trial court was correct in telling him that the State was not required to 
provide him with his own investigator and that he would have to come up with the funds 
for most of the “tools” he wanted. 
While Mr. Davis made many motions seeking one or more general assistants or 
investigators who could go talk with and depose witnesses in his neighborhood and 
elsewhere who might be able to support a suppression motion or otherwise be helpful at 
trial, he failed to state facts with any particularity indicating what the investigator might 
uncover or how what the investigator found was important to an issue that reasonably 
could be expected to be significant at his trial.  In effect, he wanted the state to supply a 
personal assistant or paralegal who would follow Mr. Davis’ strategy decisions.  It 
appears more to have been a hope that if enough people were questioned, something good 
would be found, rather than a situation, as in Ake, where the need for an expert was clear 
and its relevance to a significant trial issue evident. 
Similarly, Mr. Davis’ request for general access to photocopies, a typewriter, a 
VCR, a telephone and so forth was accompanied only by the undeveloped assertion they 
would constitute help he would need for trial; he failed to couple these requests with facts 
as to why provision of such tools would be relevant to the issues before the trial court. 
 
26
Recognizing this deficiency, Mr. Davis suggests on appeal that it was the trial 
judge’s burden to show that the various types of assistance requested by Mr. Davis were 
not necessary to his defense.  This is contrary to Ake itself, which makes it clear that it is 
defendant who must make a “preliminary showing” that the basic tools he is requesting 
are “important enough to preparation of defense” for the State to be required to provide 
them.  Ake, 470 U.S. at 74, 77.  
Later federal and state decisions have explicated how this showing must be made; 
the prevailing test requires the defendant to show the trial court that there exists a 
reasonable probability both that an expert would be of assistance to the defense and that 
denial of expert assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair trial.  Moore v. Kemp, 
809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir. 1987).  This approach has been recognized by a host of 
jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Page v. Lee, 337 F.3d 411, 416 (4th Cir. 2003); Williams v. 
Collins, 989 F.2d 841, 845-46 (5th Cir. 1993); Little, 835 F.2d at 1244 (8th Cir. 1987); 
Moore, 889 A.2d 325 at 339; State v. Apelt, 861 P.2d 634, 651 (Ariz. 1993); Crawford 
v. State, 362 S.E.2d 201, 206 (Ga. 1987); Cade v. State, 658 So.2d 550, 554 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1995); State v. Touchet, 642 So.2d 1213, 1216 (La. 1994); Taylor v. State, 939 
S.W.2d 148, 152 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).  This Court joins them.  
It is not up to the judge to decide what the defense will present.  Only defendant 
and his counsel can make that choice.  For this reason, Ake provides that a defendant may 
request an ex parte hearing at which he or she can present how the sought-after evidence 
or assistance will support defendant’s trial strategy.  Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83 (“When the 
defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is 
 
27
likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist 
is readily apparent”).   
In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985), the Supreme Court made 
clear that this requirement specifically is applicable to requests for investigators.  It 
rejected a request of defendant to supply a criminal investigator, reaffirming that 
“undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance would be beneficial” are 
insufficient to support a finding of a constitutional right to state funding.6  For similar 
reasons, this Court has rejected an Ake request lacking in specificity.  See State v. 
Clemons, 946 S.W.2d 206, 222 (Mo. banc 1997) (to qualify under Ake, a defendant 
“must allege facts, not state mere legal conclusions or theories”).  See also Martinez v. 
Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000) (a trial 
court “is under no duty … to perform any ‘legal’ chores for the defendant”).  
Mr. Davis never sought an ex parte hearing and never otherwise made such a 
particularized showing that he needed assistance from an investigator to develop specific 
evidence on a significant trial issue as opposed to hoping someone would provide him the 
general assistance and research that, in fact, counsel was then providing.  The trial court 
was correct in telling Mr. Davis that it was not required to provide someone to perform as 
his investigative assistant and could not make someone work for free.7
                                             
 
6 In Caldwell the United States Supreme Court did not address the broader question of 
whether, had a specific showing been made, it would have extended the application of 
Ake beyond experts to other tools of the defense but instead simply noted that no 
showing had been made. 
7 As to Mr. Davis’ requests for a typewriter, VCR, DVD player, telephone, the right to 
make a set number of “copies,” transcripts, photocopies of exhibits, copies of motions, 
 
28
6.   
Application of Ake To Defendants who Represent Themselves.  
 Finally, and importantly, Mr. Davis’s claim is not encompassed within Ake 
because the defendant in Ake was represented by counsel and it was counsel who sought 
the funds for or appointment of a psychiatric expert.  Here, Mr. Davis does not claim that 
the public defender system did not have the funds to provide him with access to the kinds 
of investigative and trial preparation tools he desired.  Rather, Mr. Davis sought to 
represent himself and claimed that Ake requires not just that he be provided the basic 
tools for a defense but also that he be provided them personally rather than through 
counsel. 
Nothing in Ake indicates that the State must offer a defendant his choice of 
whether to receive these tools through counsel or himself.  Indeed, Ake suggests to the 
contrary.  At the same time it said that the State may be required to provide a psychiatric 
expert in some circumstances, Ake cautioned that an indigent defendant does not have a 
“constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to 
hire his own.”  470 U.S. at 83.  Instead, the “concern is that the indigent defendant have 
access to a competent psychiatrist,” and Ake left “to the State the decision on how to 
implement this right.”  Id.   
Given this language, it is perhaps not surprising that few courts even have 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
and “law books not in the law library,” he did not specify why he needed these or how 
they related to an issue seriously in question that was to be a significant matter at trial.  
Mr. Davis never showed that there was a reasonable probability both that any of the 
things he sought would be of assistance to his defense and that denial of them would 
result in a fundamentally unfair trial.  Instead, he seemingly wanted to bank these tools so 
he would have them on hand should he need them.  This is not the kind of assistance that 
Ake or the other cases require the court to provide. 
 
29
considered applying Ake principles in the self-represented litigant context.  In Moore, 
889 A.2d at 329 & n.3, the indigent defendant had only enough assets to retain counsel 
and then sought provision of a DNA expert from the state.  The Maryland Court of 
Appeals held that it was permissible to tie the provision of the “basic tools of an adequate 
defense” to provision of appointed counsel so that if the indigent defendant declined to 
accept state-provided counsel, he also waived state provision of Ake tools – in that case, a 
DNA expert.  Moore, 889 A.2d at 343-44.  
As Mr. Davis notes, one pre-Ake state case recognized an indigent defendant’s 
right to additional state-furnished resources despite the fact that the indigent defendant 
had retained private counsel hired by his mother and rejected appointed public defenders.  
English v. Missildine, 311 N.W.2d 292, 293-94 (Iowa 1981).  English is not persuasive 
authority that there is a federal constitutional rather than a prudential reason for so 
providing; it pre-dates Ake and instead of grounding the right to defense tools in 
fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause, as had Ake, English read a right to 
the resources in the Sixth Amendment.  Id.  The remaining cases Mr. Davis cites 
purporting to bolster the notion that Ake gives a self-represented litigant the right to all 
tools that are provided through counsel are rooted in a state statute or constitutional 
provision or independent federal right rather than in Ake.  See United States v. Sarno, 73 
F.3d 1470, 1491-92 (9th Cir. 1995) (not citing Ake, court notes right of self-represented 
litigant to some resources balanced against security considerations but finds that access 
was not unduly restricted); State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795, 799-800 (Utah 2000) (invoking 
Utah indigent defense statutes); State v. Silva, 27 P.3d 663, 669-77 (Wash. App. 2001) 
 
30
(invoking Washington state constitutional provision).  
This Court has no occasion today to address what additional situations might 
require the provision of certain additional basic tools of defense to a defendant who 
decides to represent himself, for a showing sufficient to take such a significant step has 
not been made here.  The burden was on Mr. Davis to make a particularized showing that 
there was a reasonable probability both that the tools he requested would be of assistance 
to his defense and that denial of such tools would result in his trial being fundamentally 
unfair.  Moore, 809 F.2d at 712.  He failed to make any such showing.8  Therefore, he 
has failed to show that the court erred in rejecting his requests and in stating he would not 
                                             
 
8 The dissent cites People v. Blair, 115 P.3d 1145, 1175 (Cal. 2005), to support its 
conclusion that the Sixth Amendment requires the State to provide an investigator, a 
runner and a variety of other resources to a defendant.  Blair does hold that the provision 
of such services, required by statute in all capital cases in California, also is required by 
the Sixth Amendment, although it cites no federal cases to support this constitutional 
interpretation.  Further, it notes that a court need not provide just any resources that 
defendant requests; rather, “the crucial question underlying all of defendant’s 
constitutional claims is whether he had reasonable access to the ancillary services that 
were reasonably necessary for his defense.”  Id.  The court determined that Blair failed to 
show that the tools of which he alleged he was deprived were reasonably necessary to his 
defense.  This Court reaches the same conclusion in this case.   
Moreover, despite the dissent’s suggestion that Mr. Davis could not know what he 
wanted until he found it and, therefore, he should be provided assistance without first 
having to demonstrate the necessity for it or its importance at trial, that is not the law.  
The burden is on the defendant to show necessity, not the court to show a lack of 
necessity.  Mr. Davis’ failure to show the trial court that there existed a reasonable 
probability both that a particular tool would be of assistance to his defense and that denial 
of that assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair trial supported the trial court’s 
statement to him that the court would not pay for an open-ended request for an 
investigator.  See, e.g., Moore, 809 F.2d at 712.  Further, Mr. Davis withdrew his request 
to represent himself and, as a represented person, it would have been simple for counsel 
to make a record both that there was a reasonable probability that the tools Mr. Davis 
requested would be of assistance to his defense and that denial of those tools would result 
in a fundamentally unfair trial, if that were the case.   
 
31
be entitled to the funding he sought should he proceed without counsel.  As such, Mr. 
Davis’ Faretta argument, based on his claim that the trial court misinformed him as to his 
entitlements under Ake, also fails. 
B. 
Mr. Davis Was Not Denied His Right to Testify 
 
Next, Mr. Davis claims that the trial court plainly erred in “coercing” his decision 
not to testify during the guilt phase because, Mr. Davis maintains, the court misled him 
by telling him that if he testified, he would have to do so by answering the questions put 
to him by counsel rather than in narrative form.  This argument is without merit. 9
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his own behalf at trial.  
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987).  A defendant knowingly and voluntarily may 
waive the right to testify.  Smith v. State, 276 S.W.3d 314, 317 (Mo. App. 2008).    
Here, the record shows that Mr. Davis was apprised fully of his right to testify and 
made the knowing and voluntary decision to waive that right when the court informed 
him that, as a matter of “attorney-client … strategy,” defense counsel would decide 
precisely what questions counsel would ask Mr. Davis (as, of course, would the 
                                             
 
9 Although he initially conceded that this point was unpreserved, Mr. Davis reversed 
positions in his reply brief, arguing that this claim of error was preserved because in a 
motion filed shortly before trial (titled “motion by pro se defendant to state his objections 
and be heard in writing due to public defenders and court not allowing pro se (motions,) 
(complaints,) (suppression grounds,) to be heard in court, made record of and ignored and 
covered up”), Mr. Davis had stated, “How can I not be a witness at my own trial and be 
allowed to have other witnesses and evidence to support my testimony?”  To preserve a 
claim of error, a defendant must, at a minimum, make an objection contemporaneous in 
time to the purported error.  State v. Stepter, 794 S.W.2d 649, 655 (Mo. banc 1990) (“To 
preserve a claim of error, counsel must object with sufficient specificity to apprise the 
trial court of the grounds for the objection”).  Asking a rhetorical and convoluted 
question in a pre-trial motion is not sufficient.  
 
32
prosecutor).  Mr. Davis inveighs against the court’s ruling that he would not be permitted 
to testify in narrative form, calling it “unnecessarily restrictive.”  The manner of a 
defendant’s right to testify may be restricted, however, to accommodate other “legitimate 
interests in the criminal trial process.” Rock, 483 U.S. at 55 (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  Although such restrictions “may not be arbitrary or 
disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve,” id. at 56, requiring the 
traditional question-and-answer technique of eliciting testimony – one of the most 
universal aspects of trial procedure – did not impose an unnecessarily restrictive rule, let 
alone one that is arbitrary or disproportionate.   
The court made clear that Mr. Davis was free to testify but simply required that he 
do so like all the other witnesses in his trial – by answering questions asked by counsel.  
As Rock intimates, “Numerous state procedural and evidentiary rules control the 
presentation of evidence and do not offend the defendant’s right to testify.”  Rock, 483 
U.S. at 55 n.11.  Examining witnesses pursuant to the traditional question-and-answer 
format is one such rule. Of course, “there is no ironclad rule prohibiting narrative 
testimony,” State v. Couch, 256 S.W.3d 64, 71 (Mo. banc 2008), so the court, in its 
discretion, could have permitted Mr. Davis to testify in the narrative form, but it did not 
abuse its discretion in requiring a question-and-answer format. 
The court also did not misinform Mr. Davis by telling him that he could not force 
his own counsel (or that for the State) to ask particular questions and not others. While 
the decision whether to exercise the right to testify rests exclusively with the defendant, 
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983), the tactical decisions as to how to conduct 
 
33
examination of witnesses, including that of the defendant, lie with counsel.10  Mr. Davis 
does not cite any authority holding to the contrary.  “This Court has long held that the 
‘entire subject of the manner of the examination of witnesses in open court is confided, of 
necessity, to the sound discretion of the trial judge.’”  Couch, 256 S.W.3d at 72, quoting, 
Daudt v. Steiert, 205 S.W. 222, 224 (Mo. 1918).  It was not plain error for the trial court 
to have informed Mr. Davis that, should he testify, he would have to answer questions of 
his counsel’s choosing according to the question-and-answer method.       
C. 
No Error in Failing to Strike Juror for Cause 
 
Mr. Davis maintains that the court erred in failing to sustain a motion to strike Mr. 
Powell for cause when his voir dire answers allegedly demonstrated he was unwilling to 
give meaningful consideration to the mitigating evidence that Mr. Davis would introduce 
during the penalty phase.  This, Mr. Davis says, violated the Eighth Amendment 
requirement “that the jury be able to consider and give effect to a capital defendant's 
mitigating evidence.”  Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285 (2004) (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
“The trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause shall not be disturbed on appeal 
unless it is against the weight of the evidence and constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.”  
State v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144, 158 (Mo. banc 2008).  In a capital case, the standard 
for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause is “whether the 
                                             
 
10 State v. Spiller, 778 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Mo. App. 1989) (“The general rule is that the 
extent of cross-examination and the subjects covered must, in virtually every case, be left 
to the judgment of counsel”); see also Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 578 (Mo. 
banc 2005) (“Defense counsel has wide discretion in determining what strategy to use in 
defending his or her client”). 
 
34
juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a 
juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”  Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 
412, 424 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).  For example, if it “appears that a 
juror cannot consider the range of punishment, apply the correct burden of proof, or 
follow the court’s instructions in a murder case, then a challenge for cause will be 
sustained.”  Johnson, 244 S.W.3d at 158.  “The determinative question is not whether a 
venireman has an opinion.  It is whether that opinion is of such intensity and holds such 
sway over the mind … that it will not yield to the evidence presented at trial.”  State v. 
Leisure, 749 S.W.2d 366, 372 (Mo. banc 1988). 
The court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Mr. Davis’ motion to strike Mr. 
Powell because the latter’s views about the persuasiveness of childhood experience 
evidence did not constitute a substantial impairment of his ability to perform his duties as 
a juror.  In his juror questionnaire, Mr. Powell stated that he believed childhood 
experiences somewhat affect later behavior.  He was of the view that an adult should 
“know the difference between right and wrong and killing a person and not killing a 
person,” but he maintained throughout questioning that he was willing to “look at” and 
consider evidence of childhood experience.  Mr. Powell agreed that the importance of 
evidence of childhood experiences was a matter of weight.  He never indicated that he 
would ignore such evidence; he simply was not inclined to give it much credit in the 
usual case. 
Willingness to give a piece of evidence meaningful consideration does not mean a 
juror must agree during voir dire that he is likely to find a particular type of evidence 
 
35
persuasive.  Juror “qualifications are not conclusively determined by any single response, 
but from the entire voir dire examination.”  State v. Lyons, 951 S.W.2d 584, 591 (Mo. 
banc 1997).  The totality of Mr. Powell’s answers on his pretrial questionnaire and 
during voir dire show that he was willing to meaningfully consider mitigating childhood 
experience evidence proffered by Mr. Davis.  Cf. State v. Simmons, 737 S.W.2d 473, 
473-74 (Mo. App. 1987) (no error where court denied strike of venire person who 
initially expressed a tendency to give greater weight to police officer’s testimony, but 
upon further questioning demonstrated an ability to evaluate all of the testimony).   
D. 
Evidentiary Rulings 
 
Mr. Davis next argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence footage 
from the sex tapes Mr. Davis made, the still photographs made from the tapes, testimony 
describing the contents of the tapes, and Mr. Davis’ videotaped confessional statements 
because these items were “excessively prejudicial duplicative evidence.”  
Evidence must be relevant to be admissible.  State v. Anderson, 76 S.W.3d 275, 
276 (Mo. banc 2002).  Relevancy has two-tiers:  logical and legal.  Id.  Evidence is 
logically relevant “‘if it tends to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence, or if it tends to corroborate evidence which itself is relevant and bears on 
the principal issue of the case.’”  State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 760 (Mo. banc 2002), 
quoting, State v. Mathews, 33 S.W.3d 658, 661 (Mo. App. 2000).  Mr. Davis concedes 
the logical relevance of the evidence he claims was admitted improperly.  
 
Evidence that is logically relevant is not necessarily admissible.  The probative 
 
36
value of logically relevant evidence must be weighed against the risks it poses of unfair 
prejudice, cumulativeness, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay or 
waste of time.  Anderson, 76 S.W.3d at 276.  Legally relevant evidence is evidence that 
survives this balancing and is admissible.  By contrast, evidence is not legally relevant 
and, therefore, must be excluded if its costs outweigh its benefits.  Id.  “The 
determination of legal relevance … rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.”  
Tisius, 92 S.W.3d at 760. 
     
Here, the trial court acted well within its discretion in determining that the risks of 
unfair prejudice were not great enough to outweigh the probative value of the disputed 
evidence.  While the videotape footage and still photographs made from that footage 
were highly disturbing, they were first-hand recorded accounts of the crimes charged in 
this case and so were of supreme probative value.  They were potentially prejudicial, but 
that prejudice arose from the gruesome nature of Mr. Davis’ crimes, not from any action 
of the State in the method of presenting the footage and photographs.  The court was 
within its discretion in determining that the probative value of this evidence outweighed 
its prejudicial effect.  See State v. Johnson, 930 S.W.2d 456, 462-63 (Mo. App. 1996) 
(“To exclude graphic evidence solely because it is graphic would deprive the State of 
evidence when it needs it the most: the evidence would be inadmissible to prosecute what 
are typically the most serious crimes”). 
As to the officers’ testimony describing the events on the tapes, Mr. Davis offers 
no evidence that it inflamed unfair prejudice. The officers simply described additional 
events on the tapes in general terms in order to avoid the more prejudicial alternative of 
 
37
playing all the footage in its entirety.  Similarly, Mr. Davis makes no showing that the 
court abused its discretion in allowing footage of Mr. Davis’ inculpatory statements made 
during the police interview.  Such admissions are highly relevant.  They do not become 
unfairly prejudicial simply because they hurt Mr. Davis’ case. 11
 
For similar reasons, this Court rejects Mr. Davis’ argument that the evidence was 
unduly cumulative.  In an effort to limit the jury’s exposure to the entirety of the 
disturbing footage on the tapes, the jury was only shown a 90-minute edited version of 
the over seven and one-half hours of film.  The officers’ testimony about the contents of 
the tapes went to a description of the footage that the jury was not shown.  Accordingly, 
these two strands of evidence were not duplicative.   While the still photographs the State 
used were taken from the videotape footage, their use permitted the State to avoid having 
to revisit particular segments of footage during opening statement and closing argument. 
Finally, Mr. Davis’ statements did not duplicate the above evidence.  In those interviews, 
Mr. Davis admitted some culpability but was evasive or misleading as to his 
responsibility for some of the crimes with which he ultimately was charged.   
E. 
Court Commenting about the Evidence 
A number of the instructions submitting particular counts included a reference to 
the particular tape on which the alleged crime was depicted.  For instance, Instruction No. 
13 stated: 
                                             
 
11 The State argues that Mr. Davis’ objections to the admission of his inculpatory 
statements to police and Detective Howe’s testimony regarding the contents of the tapes 
were not preserved properly and so should be reviewed for plain error.  Rule 30.20.  This 
Court concludes that the challenged evidence was admissible regardless of which 
standard of review is applied.  
 
38
As to Count IV, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
First, that on or about May 14, 2006, … the defendant touched the breast of 
Marsha Spicer as depicted in “Tape B”…. 
 
(emphasis added).12  This instruction format was used to assist the jury in differentiating 
the numerous offenses submitted, as contemplated by the Notes on Use for MAI-CR 3d 
304.02, which provide, in pertinent part: 
(c) Multiple Offenses – Same Victim, Short Period of Time.   
If the defendant is charged with more than one crime involving the same 
victim on the same day, the time should be shown on each instruction as “at 
about [time of day or night] on” or “between the hours of [time of day or 
night] on” a specific date. 
 …. 
If it is impossible to fix the occasion of the offense by time or date, the 
instruction should be modified by the Court to identify the occurrence by 
some other reference. 
 
MAI-CR 3d 304.02(c).  
 
Mr. Davis argues that these references were the equivalent of the trial court telling 
the jurors that the evidence referenced in the instruction would provide proof of the 
charged offense.  While trial courts are barred from conduct during trial that can be 
construed as demonstrating a belief that the defendant is guilty, State v. Davis, 653 
S.W.2d 167, 177 (Mo. banc 1983), overruled on other grounds by, Kuyper v. Stone 
County Comm’n, 838 S.W.2d 436, 439 (Mo. banc 1992), these references did not 
constitute such conduct. 
 
As the State notes, the references to “Tape B” and similar references in the verdict 
                                             
 
12 In particular, Counts IV through IX, XIII through XXIII and XXV through XXVI, 
submitted in Instructions Nos. 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 35, 47, 
49, 51, 55 and 57, contained this kind of reference. 
 
39
directors were appropriate under the Notes on Use direction to “identify the occurrences 
by some other reference.”  Merely referencing time and date would have been 
unworkable due to discrepancies in the accuracy of the time and date stamp on the 
camera used by Mr. Davis.  Mr. Davis has not suggested another method by which the 
jurors could have been informed how to determine which crime was being submitted in 
which verdict director.  Further, Instruction No. 3 advised the jury that the court “does 
not mean to assume as true any fact referred to in these instructions but leaves it to you to 
determine what the facts are.”  This language would have acted as a safeguard, reducing 
the chance the jury assumed that the charged offenses were in fact depicted on the tapes 
simply because the instructions referred to the tapes as depicting the crimes.  Mathes v. 
Sher Express, L.L.C., 200 S.W.3d 97, 110 (Mo. App. 2006) (“This instruction reduces 
the chances of a jury improperly concluding that a controverted fact has been assumed by 
the court to be true”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 
Moreover, the evidence of Mr. Davis’ guilt, set out in detail above, was so 
overwhelming that the references to the tapes in which the crimes were recorded in the 
verdict directors could not have had a decisive effect on the jury’s determination of guilt.  
The entirety of the portions of the tapes played for the jury provided substantial proof of 
each of the charged offenses and, in closing argument, Mr. Davis conceded his guilt of all 
the sex crime counts and assault counts of which he was convicted, only contesting the 
first-degree murder count and the assault count on which he obtained a “not guilty” 
verdict.  “Overwhelming evidence of guilt may lead an appellate court to find that a 
defendant was not prejudiced.”  State v. Banks, 215 S.W.3d 118, 121 (Mo. banc 2007).  
 
40
Because overwhelming evidence established Mr. Davis’ guilt for these offenses, any 
error in use of the “as depicted in” references to the tapes in the verdict-directing 
instructions was not prejudicial. 
F. Verdict Director Instructions Were Proper 
 
 
Mr. Davis also argues that the instructions did not inform the jury adequately that 
it had to find unanimously that the State proved each element of each crime submitted in 
order to find against him as to that crime.  The same point was raised and rejected in 
State v. Johnson, 284 S.W.3d 561, 575 (Mo. banc 2009).  Johnson held that the jury 
instructions as a whole sufficiently advised the jury that its verdicts on each count must 
be unanimous as to each element and additional instructions on the requirement of 
unanimity were not necessary. 
 
The Court reaffirms that holding. The jury was instructed, for example, that it 
could not find Mr. Davis guilty of first-degree murder, “unless [it found] and believe[d] 
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of these propositions.”  The 
jury also was instructed: 
You will then discuss the case with your fellow jurors.  Each of you 
must decide the case for yourself but you should do so only after you have 
considered all the evidence, discussed it fully with the other jurors, and 
listened to the views of your fellow jurors. 
Your verdict, whether guilty or not guilty, must be agreed to by each 
juror.  Although the verdict must be unanimous, the verdict should be 
signed by your foreperson alone. 
When you have concluded your deliberations, you will complete the 
applicable form to which you unanimously agree and return it with all the 
unused forms and the written instructions of the Court.   
 
 
As this Court noted in Johnson, this language was sufficient to apprise jurors that 
 
41
they must find unanimously every element of a particular offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt to return a guilty verdict on that offense. 
G. 
Motion to Quash Information  
Mr. Davis next argues that the court should have quashed the information because 
it failed to list statutory aggravators.  In support, Mr. Davis cites Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
500 U.S. 466 (2000).  As this Court has noted in numerous prior cases, neither Apprendi 
nor other cases require that the charging document list aggravating circumstances; the 
notice of aggravating circumstances under section 565.005.1 was adequate to notify Mr. 
Davis that he was charged with a capital offense.  See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 284 
S.W.3d 561, 589 (Mo. banc 2009); State v. Johnson, 207 S.W.3d 24, 48 (Mo. banc 
2007); State v. Gill, 167 S.W.3d 184, 194 (Mo. banc 2005).  The trial court did not err in 
declining to quash the information.  
H. 
Jury Instructions regarding Effect of Mitigation Evidence 
Next, Mr. Davis argues that Apprendi requires that juries in capital cases be 
instructed that the State bears the burden of proof during the section 565.030.4(3) step of 
determining whether mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances.  This 
Court reaffirms its prior holding that there is no requirement that the determination of the 
weight of mitigating and aggravating circumstances be established by the State beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Johnson, 284 S.W.3d. at 587-89.    
I. 
Independent Proportionality Review  
 
Finally, although Mr. Davis does not argue on appeal that his sentence is 
disproportionate to his crime, this Court has an independent obligation to conduct a 
 
42
proportionality review of the imposition of the death penalty in his case.  State v. 
Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 548 (Mo. banc 2003).  Section 565.035.3 requires that all 
death penalty cases be reviewed for proportionality.  State v. McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d 
257, 277 (Mo. banc 2008).  Under section 565.035.3, this Court must determine: 
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of 
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; 
(2) Whether the evidence supports the jury’s or judge’s finding of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance . . . ; 
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the 
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime, the strength 
of the evidence, and the defendant. 
 
 
This Court has undertaken an independent review of the record and does not find 
that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or some 
other arbitrary factor, nor has Mr. Davis identified any such factor to the Court.  The 
Court further finds that the evidence supports the jury’s determinations: (1) that Mr. 
Davis had prior assaultive convictions for forcible rape and forcible sodomy; (2) that the 
murder was committed with depravity of mind because the crime involved binding Ms. 
Spicer, subjecting her to repeated acts of gruesome physical and sexual torture with the 
purpose of promoting her death, and that Mr. Davis killed or aided in killing Ms. Spicer 
while she was bound helplessly, thereby exhibiting a callous disregard for human life; 
and (3) that Mr. Davis was in the course of perpetrating the rape of Ms. Spicer when he 
murdered her. 
 
To determine whether a sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate in 
comparison to the penalty imposed in similar cases, “[s]ection 565.035.3 requires 
consideration of all factually similar cases … including those resulting in a sentence of 
 
43
life imprisonment without the possibility of probation or parole.”  State v. Anderson, 306 
S.W.3d 529, 545 (Mo. banc 2010) (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in result in opinion joined in this regard by a majority of the court).13  This Court adheres 
to a familiar inquiry in applying this approach: It “continue[s] doing what it now does in 
regard to cases in which death was imposed – review them to determine whether the 
sentence of death is disproportionate in light of the crime, the defendant and the strength 
of the evidence … but … include[s] similar cases in which a life sentence was imposed in 
that analysis.” State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 560 (Mo. banc 2010) (Stith, J., 
concurring).   
   
The separate opinion of Judge Fischer suggests that because the legislature did not 
change section 565.035.3 once this Court, beginning in 1994, began determining 
proportionality only in relation to cases in which death was imposed, it must have agreed 
with this approach.  But, as discussed in detail in the concurring opinion of Judge Stith in 
Deck, 303 S.W.3d at 555-63, neither did the legislature change the statute during the 16-
year period from 1978 until 1994 when this Court applied section 565.035.3 to require 
that it consider similar cases in which either death or life in prison without parole were 
imposed (except making a change in 1984 that reinforced the requirement to consider 
both types of cases).  Id. at 556.  If there was an error in this Court not waiting for a 
                                             
 
13 Compare State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 550-53 (Mo. banc 2010) (no majority 
opinion on this issue as Judges Breckenridge, Stith and Wolff vote in favor of 
consideration of both cases in which death and life imprisonment were imposed, Judges 
Fischer and Russell and Chief Justice Price vote in favor of consideration only of cases in 
which death was imposed, with Judge Teitelman concurring in result only, thereby 
leaving only a plurality opinion on both sides of this issue).   
 
44
legislative reaction to its cases before changing its interpretation of the statute, it occurred 
in 1994, when this Court sub silencio began not considering cases in which life 
imprisonment was imposed, not in Deck or in Anderson’s return to this Court’s original 
jurisprudence. 
 
The separate opinion of Judge Fischer also suggests that there is some significance 
to the fact that this is the first time that an opinion denominated the “principal opinion” 
has interpreted the statute as requiring consideration of cases in which either death or life 
imprisonment are imposed.  But in Anderson, a majority of the Court determined that this 
is what the statute requires.  The scope of proportionality review is settled; Judge 
Breckenridge’s concurring opinion, in which Judges Wolff, Stith and Teitelman joined as 
to the proportionality issue, established the governing law on this matter.14  Anderson, 
306 S.W.3d at 545-47 (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and concurring in result); Id. 
at 551 (Wolff, J., dissenting) (Judges Stith and Teitelman join in Judge Wolff’s dissent). 
 
In any event, this Court’s analysis must be governed by the words of the statute.  
When the statute itself is clear, this Court need not speculate as to what the legislature’s 
inaction means.  See, e.g., Hyde Park Housing P’ship v. Dir. of Revenue, 850 S.W.2d 
82, 84 (Mo. banc 1993) (“Where the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no 
room for construction”).  Instead, this Court “must give effect to [the statute’s] plain 
meaning.”  Home Builders Ass’n of Greater St. Louis, Inc. v. City of Wildwood, 107 
                                             
 
14 In Anderson, the contrary and minority view – that the scope of proportionality review 
is limited to similar cases in which the death penalty was imposed, thereby excluding 
similar cases in which life without the possibility of probation or parole was imposed – 
had the support only of Judge Fischer, Chief Justice Price and Judge Russell.  Anderson, 
306 S.W.3d at 544 (principal opinion). 
 
45
S.W.3d 235, 239 (Mo. banc 2003).  To attempt to derive meaning from what the 
legislature did not do is an exercise in conjecture that in this case is entirely unnecessary. 
As set out in detail in the separate opinion of Judge Stith in Deck, 303 S.W.3d at 
555-63 (Stith, J., concurring in result), section 565.035 requires that the Court “shall 
accumulate the records of all cases in which the sentence of death or life imprisonment 
without probation or parole was imposed” and requires that this Court consider all “other 
similar cases” in determining whether the sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate in light of the crime, the defendant and the strength of the evidence.  As 
noted in Deck, 303 S.W.3d at 559 (Stith, J., concurring in result), it would be pointless to 
require the Court to accumulate the records of cases in which life imprisonment was 
imposed just so it could put them to one side and not look at them when considering 
proportionality – the only purpose for which the cases were accumulated in the first 
place.  Id.  This Court considers both types of cases here. 
After independently researching both death and life cases, this Court is hard-
pressed to find anything in the case law similar to the appalling and gruesomely 
documented murder committed by Mr. Davis.  This crime was unspeakable, Mr. Davis’ 
conduct cold and calculating, and the evidence of guilt overwhelming.  Ms. Spicer was 
beaten and sexually abused repeatedly before being smothered to death by Mr. Davis and 
his girlfriend for their sexual gratification.  Many of these events, including the point of 
Ms. Spicer’s death, were recorded on videotape by Mr. Davis himself.   
This Court has affirmed sentences of death where the jury finds the defendant 
acted with a depraved mind in strangling or smothering the victim to death after raping or 
 
46
sodomizing or attempting to rape or sodomize the victim.  State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d 
278, 283 (Mo. banc 1995); State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 3-4 (Mo. banc 1981).  The 
death penalty has been imposed in many cases in which the defendant has murdered a 
victim in the course of, or just after, raping that victim.  See, e.g., State v. McLaughlin, 
265 S.W.3d 257, 260 (Mo. banc 2008); State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 320 (Mo. 
banc 1996); State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 375 (Mo. banc 1994).  This Court also has 
affirmed sentences of death when the defendant has a prior conviction for a serious 
assaultive crime, such as rape.  See, e.g., State v. Sidebottom, 753 S.W.2d 915, 926, 927 
(Mo. banc 1988). 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Court concludes unanimously that the sentence imposed here was not 
disproportionate to the strength of the evidence, the crime or the defendant and the 
majority of the Court concludes that, for the reasons set out in this opinion, no reversible 
error occurred.  The judgment is affirmed as to both guilt and punishment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE 
  
Breckenridge, J., concurs; Fischer, J., concurs  
in separate opinion filed; Price, C.J., and Russell,  
J., concur in opinion of Fischer, J.; Teitelman, J.,  
concurs in part and dissents in part in separate  
opinion filed; Wolff, J., concurs in opinion of Teitelman, J. 
 
 
 
 
47
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
No. SC89699 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
RICHARD D. DAVIS, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
) 
 
CONCURRING OPINION 
I concur in the principal opinion except as to the proportionality analysis.  I concur 
that Davis' capital sentence is proportional to his crimes.  A comparison of similar cases 
in which the death penalty was imposed shows Davis' sentence is proportional and not 
imposed in a freakish or wanton manner.  See, e.g., State v. McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d 257 
(Mo. banc 2008) (a conviction of first degree murder, rape and armed criminal action); 
State v. Link, 25 S.W.3d 136 (Mo. banc 2000) (a conviction of first degree murder, 
kidnapping and forcible rape); State v. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. banc 1996) (a 
conviction of first degree murder; the facts showed a sexual assault occurred during the 
commission of the crime). 
For the first time in more than 17 years, in a principal opinion of this Court, 
proportionality review requires consideration of all "similar" cases including cases that 
resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of probation or parole.  
This departure from the longstanding precedent of proportionality review requiring the 
consideration of "similar" cases resulting in a death sentence is in my opinion an 
inaccurate statutory interpretation.  The principal opinion asserts that the requirement that 
this Court consider both life sentence and death sentence cases in its statutory 
proportionality review results from a plain reading of § 565.035, RSMo 2000.  Although 
that statute requires this Court to collect information on such cases, the statute's explicit 
language, contrary to the inference drawn by the principal opinion, leaves to this Court's 
discretion the use to make of that information.  The statute explicitly states that the Court 
shall have "whatever extracted information the [C]ourt desires with respect" to the 
information collected, and that the Court "shall include in its decision a reference to those 
similar cases which it took into consideration."  Section 565.035.6, .5 (emphasis added).  
Nowhere is there "plain language" requiring this Court to consider both life sentence and 
death sentence cases in conducting its statutory review.  See § 565.035.3, .5, .6.   
As I noted in the principal opinion in State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 552 (Mo. 
banc 2010) (citing State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. banc 1993)), the circumstances 
concerning the appropriateness of capital punishment is a very serious and ongoing 
public concern.  As such, it would be a rare scenario that the legislature would leave the 
holding in Ramsey – that review is of similar cases where death is imposed – unaddressed 
for 17 years.  At this point, our legislature should readdress this issue to make it clear to 
the members of this Court what type of statutory proportionality review, if any, should be 
required.   
 
2
 
Statutory proportionality review is not required by the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  Eighth Amendment proportionality as defined by the United 
States Supreme Court evaluates a particular defendant's culpability for his crime in 
relation to the punishment that he has received.  Getsy v. Mitchell, 495 F.3d 295, 305 (6th 
Cir. 2007).  It does not require a comparison of the defendant's sentence to that of 
similarly situated defendants.  Id.  Section 565.035.3 is an additional safeguard beyond 
the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.  "By statutorily incorporating a form of 
comparative proportionality review that compares a defendant's death sentence to others 
who have also received a sentence of death, [a] death penalty regime actually adds an 
additional safeguard beyond the requirements of the Eighth Amendment."  Getsy, 495 
F.3d at 306.  "'Since proportionality review is not required by the Constitution, states 
have great latitude in defining the pool of cases used for comparison'; therefore, 'limiting 
proportionality review to other cases already decided by the reviewing court in which the 
death penalty has been imposed' falls within this wide latitude."  Id. (quoting Williams v. 
Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 962-63 (6th Cir. 2004)).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
3
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC89699 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
RICHARD D. DAVIS, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Opinion Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part  
 
I respectfully dissent from the principal opinion to the extent it holds that Mr. 
Davis knowingly and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation.  Nearly all criminal defendants would be better served by accepting 
representation from an attorney rather than attempting to navigate the complexities of 
litigation on their own.  Perhaps for that reason, trial courts are required to ensure that the 
defendant’s waiver of counsel is made voluntarily with knowledge of the dangers 
associated with waiving constitutional rights.  Regardless of the wisdom of electing self-
representation, the fact remains that self-representation is a constitutional right 
guaranteed to all defendants who unequivocally and voluntarily waive the right to 
counsel in a timely manner.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); State v. 
Black, 223 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Mo. banc 2007).  Accordingly, the trial judge’s explanation 
of the potential pitfalls of self-representation should be thorough and complete, but it 
should not serve as a means of dissuading a defendant from knowingly and voluntarily 
exercising his or her right of self-representation. 
In this case, Davis made several motions requesting investigators and other 
assistance so that he could represent himself.  In discussing the availability of funding in 
the event Davis represented himself, the trial court repeatedly emphasized the likely 
unavailability of funding and, at the end of the discussion, stated: 
I’m telling you up front, you understand, I have no power to do that.  I 
can’t force people to work for free.  Do you understand that? 
 
The clear implication of the court’s statement is that if Davis elected to represent himself, 
then he would be wholly on his own, incarcerated with no assistance or funds to conduct 
even the most rudimentary investigation.  The court’s dire assessment of Davis’ options 
in self-representation may well have been in Davis’ best interests, but it also raised a 
substantial possibility that Davis improperly was dissuaded from exercising his 
constitutional right to self-representation.   
The principal opinion concludes that Davis’s claim for investigative assistance is 
not encompassed within Ake because nothing in Ake suggests that a state must offer a 
defendant the choice of whether to receive defense tools through counsel or himself.  The 
defendant in Ake was represented by counsel, and the issue of the state’s obligation to 
provide funding for a self-represented defendant was not at issue.  The Court’s silence 
speaks to the facts of the case and does not imply that a defendant who exercises his or 
 
2
her Sixth Amendment right to self-representation thereby forfeits any of the baseline due 
process requirements established in Ake.  To the contrary, courts have held that depriving 
a self-represented defendant of the means of presenting a defense violates the right of 
self-representation.  People v. Blair, 115 P.3d 1145, 1175 (Cal. 2005).   Therefore, a self-
represented defendant may not be placed in the position of presenting a defense “without 
access to a telephone, law library, runner, investigator, advisory counsel, or any other 
means of developing a defense.”  Id.    
The trial court’s statements in this case clearly implied that if Davis elected self-
representation, he very likely would be without the kinds of basic defense tools that are  
identified in Blair and that, as a matter of common knowledge, are necessary to defend 
against criminal charges.  It is difficult to fault Davis for not unequivocally and 
unconditionally asserting the right to self-representation because the trial court had all but 
guaranteed that if Davis proceeded to represent himself, he would, as a practical matter, 
have no access to meaningful investigative assistance.   
The principal opinion also rejects Davis’ argument because he did not state with 
particularity facts indicating what the investigator might uncover or how that  was 
important to an issue that reasonably could be expected to be significant at his trial.  It is 
true that Davis did not state with particularity, in advance, the facts or information an 
investigator might uncover.  But how could he?  The need for an investigation of 
witnesses presupposes a lack of knowledge as to what the potential witnesses know.  It 
would be difficult, if not impossible, for Davis to state, at the outset, particular facts 
demonstrating a specific need for an investigator.  The difficulty of this task was 
 
3
compounded by the trial court’s statements that incorrectly implied that if Davis elected 
self-representation, there would be no funding for him to investigate his case.   
In this context, there is substantial doubt as to whether Davis knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation.  Davis should be 
given the full opportunity to exercise his Sixth Amendment rights.  I would reverse and 
remand.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Judge 
 
4