Title: People v. Poore

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER ERIC POORE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S104665 
 
Riverside County Superior Court 
INF-033308 
 
 
June 27, 2022 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Kruger, 
Groban, Jenkins, and Guerrero concurred. 
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion.  
 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
S104665 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
Defendant Christopher Eric Poore shot and killed Mark 
Kulikov and took two carloads of his property.  He was convicted 
of first degree murder, robbery, burglary, and firearm 
possession by a felon.1  The jury found that defendant had fired 
a gun and committed the murder for financial gain and by 
means of lying in wait2 but rejected all gang enhancement 
allegations.3  The penalty was set at death.  The court denied a 
motion to modify the death verdict, imposed a $10,000 
restitution fine, and stayed additional sentences totaling 41 
years to life in prison.  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase 
1. Prosecution Evidence 
a. Planning 
 
In 1998, defendant was housed in Pelican Bay State 
Prison (Pelican Bay).  Prison authorities had “validated” him as 
 
1 
Penal Code sections 187, subdivision (a), 211, 459, and 
12021, subdivision (a)(1). 
2  
Penal Code sections 190.2, subdivision (a)(1) and (a)(15), 
12022.5, subdivision (a), 12022.53, subdivision (d), 1192.7, 
subdivision (c)(2) and (c)(8). 
3  
Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1).  All further 
statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
specified. 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
an associate of the Aryan Brotherhood, a white supremacist 
gang.4  While awaiting parole, defendant told inmate Michael 
Hammett, another Aryan Brotherhood associate, that he 
wanted to become a full member of the gang and a “shot caller.”  
Typically, Aryan Brotherhood aspirants were required to 
commit violent crimes to gain entry.  Once released, defendant 
planned to earn membership by “tak[ing] care of” some 
undisclosed business for the gang.  Hammett put defendant in 
touch with his wife, Kathleen O’Donnell.  O’Donnell frequently 
acted as a go-between for Aryan Brotherhood inmates and 
people outside prison.  
 
When paroled, defendant flew to Crescent City to help 
O’Donnell move, and the two began a romantic relationship.  
Because this trip violated the terms of his parole, defendant was 
briefly reincarcerated at the California Institute for Men at 
Chino.  
 
In the fall of 1999, defendant was out of jail and living in 
a Palm Springs townhouse that belonged to his mother’s fiancé.  
He drove a new Jeep and kept a DeLorean in the garage.  He 
was 
romantically 
involved 
with 
Melinda 
McGuire, 
a 
methamphetamine user who spent time at her friend Mark 
Kulikov’s house.  Kulikov also occasionally allowed Debra Feller 
and Brian White to stay there.  McGuire introduced Kulikov to 
defendant, who began visiting the home.   
 
4  
A prison gang expert testified that a person is “validated” 
as a gang member if the Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation receives “tangible, credible information” from at 
least three different sources tying the person to the gang.  
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
b. The Murder and Related Crimes 
 
 McGuire went to defendant’s townhouse on November 6, 
1999, and the next day they visited her sister, Cherice Wiggins.  
Wiggins was trying to sell a .32-caliber Colt revolver, and 
defendant expressed interest in buying it.  He said he wanted 
the gun to confront someone named Morris.  Morris McCormies 
was another person who frequented Kulikov’s home.  Wiggins 
either loaned defendant the gun or allowed him to pay for it 
later.  She gave him the weapon and ammunition inside a black 
plastic box.  
 
On November 8, defendant and Jamie Wolden drove to 
Kulikov’s house looking for McCormies, who owed Wolden 
money.  Kulikov was home with two visitors, Debra Feller and 
Gary Richards.  Kulikov gave Wolden a beer, then walked into 
the bedroom with defendant.  Shortly thereafter, Wolden joined 
them.  Defendant asked Kulikov for drugs or money, but Kulikov 
said he had none.  He invited defendant to take his stereo, 
television, or anything else that he could pawn.  Defendant 
protested that he needed more because “he was about to lose his 
Jeep.”  Although the men had been conversing calmly, defendant 
suddenly pulled a revolver and shot Kulikov several times.  
Kulikov, who was unarmed, never rose from his chair.  As 
defendant left the room, he told Wolden that Aryan Brotherhood 
members had told him to commit the murder.  He reminded 
everyone in the house that “his bros get out on parole every day,” 
which Wolden understood as a threat to anyone who 
“snitch[ed].”  
 
Defendant removed the empty shell casings, put them in 
his pocket, and reloaded the revolver.  He directed Wolden and 
Richards to take two large stereo speakers to his townhouse.  He 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
covered Kulikov’s body with a blanket, ordered Debra Feller to 
pack her things, and asked where he could find a floor safe that 
he believed contained drugs and jewelry.  Feller said there was 
no safe but defendant refused to believe her, and they looked for 
it throughout the house.  Defendant collected electronics 
equipment and other valuables, packing them in large boxes.  
 
Wolden and Richards drove to defendant’s residence as 
instructed and unloaded Kulikov’s speakers in the garage.  
Richards remained at the townhouse with McGuire, and Wolden 
drove back to Kulikov’s house.  Once there, Wolden called 
defendant names, expressing his displeasure about the murder, 
then walked home.  
 
Brian White arrived at Kulikov’s house around 4:00 p.m.  
Defendant displayed his gun, and Feller told White, “Just do 
what he says.”   Defendant said the Aryan Brotherhood had 
ordered him to kill Kulikov and take his drugs because Kulikov 
was not doing enough to help people in the gang.  White did not 
believe this explanation but helped defendant search the house.  
White and Feller then drove more of Kulikov’s possessions to the 
townhouse.  McGuire was at the townhouse and noticed Feller 
crying.  Feller told her that defendant had shot and killed 
Kulikov.  Confronted by McGuire, defendant replied, “He’s just 
asleep, asleep for good.”  He told McGuire he shot Kulikov five 
times but refused to explain why.  
 
Later that evening, White and Feller drove back to 
Kulikov’s house to retrieve their own belongings.  Once away 
from defendant, they drove to Yucca Valley and ultimately 
decided to contact the police.   
 
Around 8:30 or 9:00 p.m. the next night, defendant and 
McGuire went to the home of Jo-Lin Ferdinand and Cameron 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
Blodgett.  The couple was away on vacation, and defendant had 
been house-sitting for them.  At one point, McGuire heard 
defendant moving bricks or rocks on the patio.  Later she noticed 
that defendant no longer had her sister’s gun.  He explained that 
he had buried it.  
c. Arrest and Investigation 
 
An anonymous caller told police someone was dead in 
Kulikov’s house.  Responding officers entered through the 
unlocked back door.  They discovered Kulikov’s body in the 
master bedroom, slumped on a chair and partially covered by a 
comforter.  He had been shot three times in the face, twice in the 
chest, and once in the hand.  The house was in disarray, and his 
vehicle was missing.  
 
Later that evening, White and Feller called the Palm 
Springs Police Department to report the murder. Detectives 
interviewed them separately and arrested White for a parole 
violation.  Feller led detectives to defendant’s empty townhouse, 
then later recognized defendant’s Jeep parked in Blodgett’s 
driveway.  The officers obtained Blodgett’s phone number and 
had Feller call it as a ruse to get defendant to leave the house.  
It worked.  Defendant asked Feller if something was wrong, 
then hung up.  Shortly afterward, defendant and McGuire left 
the residence and were taken into custody.   
 
Police searched the townhouse and found a black plastic 
gun box containing .32-caliber ammunition.  Five expended .32-
caliber shell casings were recovered from a trash bag.  Stereo 
equipment, speakers, cameras, a television, and other items 
belonging to Kulikov were located in the townhouse and garage.  
Kulikov’s truck was seized from the Morongo Valley residence 
where White and Feller had parked it.  
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
 
The Blodgett-Ferdinand house was also searched.   
Looking under some missing bricks and freshly turned dirt in 
the backyard, a detective found a .32-caliber Colt revolver with 
six live rounds in the cylinder.  Ballistics matched the expended 
cartridges from the trash bag to the recovered Colt.  Bullets 
recovered from the crime scene could have been fired from the 
Colt but were too damaged to yield a definitive match.  
 
Defendant talked about the murders while in the county 
jail. Seeing Steven Pearson’s Aryan Brotherhood tattoo, 
defendant told Pearson he had tried to become a member by 
robbing a drug dealer for the gang.  Instead, “he got frustrated 
and shot the guy in the head and chest” while the victim was 
sitting in his bedroom.  Defendant said he took the man’s 
property and hid the gun under some bricks at another house. 
He also confessed to his cellmate, Neal O’Neill, saying he shot a 
man in the body, hand, and head while in the back bedroom of 
the man’s house.  He claimed to have been acting as “a hitman 
for the Aryan Brotherhood.”  Afterward, he had hidden the gun 
underneath a brick in a backyard patio.   
d. Efforts to Intimidate and Eliminate Witnesses 
 
Defendant wrote McGuire a letter from jail instructing her 
to testify he had not obtained a gun from her sister and that she 
never knew him to possess any gun.  He opined that any 
contrary statements she had given to the authorities were 
“bullshit” and must have been coerced.  Rather than give false 
testimony, McGuire turned the letter over to the police.  
 
In January 2000, defendant’s sister mailed Kathleen 
O’Donnell a packet of police reports and related materials in the 
Kulikov murder case.  At that time, O’Donnell and defendant 
communicated about his case almost daily.  O’Donnell 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
highlighted portions of the documents reflecting Brian White’s 
cooperation with police and child molestation charges that had 
been dismissed.  Testimony from a longtime Aryan Brotherhood 
member and other associates established that this paperwork 
was a “death warrant” for White.  At defendant’s direction, 
O’Donnell sent the annotated packet and White’s mug shot to 
Kenneth Cook, a gang associate who was in the same prison 
where White was incarcerated for his parole violation.  
 
Defendant and Cook had been in the county jail together 
before Cook was transferred to Chino state prison.  Defendant 
told Cook five witnesses in his case needed to be “dealt with,” 
meaning killed.  He said his sister would mail Cook the 
information.  In return, defendant promised Cook a new Jeep 
and other items.  Cook never received the “death warrant” 
packet.  But, from a conversation with White on the yard, Cook 
realized that White was one of the witnesses defendant had 
targeted.  Cook was worried that if he did not kill White, he 
could be killed himself.  Cook was soon transferred to a different 
prison, however, and did not have an opportunity to act.  
 
Defendant also sought help from fellow Riverside jail 
inmates Steven Pearson and Neal O’Neill.  Defendant reported 
where White was incarcerated and asked if Pearson knew any 
Aryan Brotherhood associates who would “take care of” White 
for him.  He promised to have his sister put money in their 
prison accounts in payment for White’s murder.   After Pearson 
demurred, defendant offered his cellmate, O’Neill, a Jeep and a 
DeLorean to kill the witnesses against him.  He suggested the 
male witnesses should be shot and the female witness injected 
with a drug overdose.  
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
 
Defendant also wanted to use O’Neill’s nitroglycerin heart 
medication to kill someone in the Indio County jail, where 
defendant had been transferred.  O’Neill refused to give up his 
pills.  O’Neill later realized the pills were missing and alerted 
jail authorities to defendant’s plan.  Corrections officers 
searched defendant’s cell and found a pharmacy bottle of 
nitroglycerin pills in his property box.  Defendant was returned 
to the Riverside County jail, strip-searched, and X-rayed.  The 
X-ray revealed a bindle hidden in defendant’s rectum containing 
tobacco, cigarettes, a lighter, and an improvised syringe.  
2. Defense Evidence 
 
Defendant testified, admitting prior convictions for 
burglary, grand theft, methamphetamine possession, and 
felonious possession of a firearm.  He had been incarcerated at 
several facilities, including Pelican Bay.  He denied belonging to 
the Aryan Brotherhood but conceded prison authorities had 
validated him as an associate.  After his parole, his family gave 
him housing and paid his bills.  
 
Defendant claimed that two or three days before the 
murder he purchased speakers and stereo equipment from 
Kulikov for $1,000.  Kulikov promised to deliver the items to 
him.  Another witness recalled that defendant had offered 
Kulikov a $150 down payment for the equipment.  
 
On November 7, while he was visiting McGuire’s family, 
Cherice Wiggins said that she had a Colt revolver for sale.  
Wanting to buy the gun as a present for his mother’s fiancé, he 
promised to pay Wiggins $200 when his mother returned from 
vacation.  He locked the gun inside a toolbox in his Jeep.  
 
The next morning, Wolden asked defendant for a ride to 
Kulikov’s house.  When they were halfway there defendant 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
changed his mind about accompanying Wolden.  Instead, he 
drove to Blodgett’s house, got out, and loaned Wolden his Jeep 
for the afternoon.  He warned Wolden not to get pulled over 
because there was a gun in the Jeep’s toolbox.  
 
Defendant said he arrived at the Blodgett’s house shortly 
before noon.  The couple had recently given him a key, so he 
went inside, made coffee, and talked with them for a while.  He 
then spent the rest of the day working on Blodgett’s truck, 
cleaning the yard, and building a dog run.  He stayed there until 
after 4:00 p.m.  Blodgett testified, however, that the yard work 
was done earlier that weekend and defendant did not work on 
the truck.  Blodgett and Ferdinand both recalled defendant 
arriving and making coffee, but they became busy and could not 
say exactly where defendant was in the house or what time he 
left.   
 
According to defendant, Debra Feller and Brian White 
came to the townhouse in Kulikov’s truck and delivered the 
stereo equipment defendant had purchased.  They also dropped 
off boxes of personal items defendant had agreed to let them 
store there.  White and Feller left in Kulikov’s truck around 6:30 
or 7:00 p.m.  Defendant and Blodgett met at a local pub around 
9:00 p.m.  Except for a brief period around 10:00 or 11:00 p.m., 
when he took McGuire back to the townhouse, defendant was 
with Blodgett until around 2:30 in the morning.  
 
Defendant and McGuire went to Blodgett’s house the next 
evening to feed the pets and housesit.  Defendant worried the 
police were coming when he saw a figure in a suit run across the 
backyard.  He admitted taking the gun from the Jeep and 
burying it under the brick patio.  
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
 
Steven Pearson’s county jail cellmate testified that 
Pearson had a reputation as a “snitch” who made up stories to 
gain favor with the authorities.  Eleaza Mead testified that 
Debra Feller was laughing about the murder and defendant’s 
arrest.  According to Mead, Feller said defendant had not 
committed the murder but was the most likely person to be 
blamed. Robert Hamilton testified the police pressured Jamie 
Wolden.  Wolden told him the police were going to charge him if 
he did not name defendant as Kulikov’s killer.  On rebuttal, the 
prosecution 
introduced 
Hamilton’s 
previous 
statements.  
Hamilton initially told police that Wolden said he did not know 
who shot Kulikov.  Later, Hamilton disclosed that Wolden said 
defendant committed the murder.  
B. Penalty Phase 
 
The prosecution presented evidence of defendant’s 
violence in custody.  The jury also heard victim impact 
testimony from Kulikov’s family.  The defense declined to cross-
examine any of these witnesses and presented no penalty phase 
evidence or argument. 
1. In-custody Behavior 
a. California Medical Facility, Vacaville (1993) 
 
On May 29, 1993, while serving a sentence for firearm 
possession, defendant was housed at the California Medical 
Facility in Vacaville.  There, he struck inmate Roger Pyatt in 
the mouth, knocking out his dentures.  Defendant later 
admitted the assault, claiming Pyatt had insulted him in front 
of other inmates.  Pyatt suffered from serious mental illness and 
developmental disability, which were evident to all inmates and 
staff.  Most other inmates either ignored Pyatt’s odd behavior or 
tried to protect him.   
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
b. California State Prison, Calipatria (1994–1995) 
 
Defendant committed several assaults and weapons 
violations while incarcerated at the Calipatria State Prison on 
another gun charge.  
 
On August 22, 1994, officers heard noises coming from 
defendant’s cell.  They arrived to find defendant’s cellmate, 
Foster, with a swollen eye; defendant was uninjured.  The two 
began fighting again and did not stop until officers activated an 
alarm.  Defendant said he and Foster “ ‘were not getting along’ ” 
and admitted, “ ‘I just got a lucky punch in.’ ”  
 
On April 16, 1995, defendant and his cellmate Bennett 
participated in a prison yard melee along with a number of other 
inmates.  Bennett and others used weapons.  Ignoring repeated 
commands and warning shots, the group did not desist until a 
correctional officer produced a rifle.  
 
On May 21, 1995, defendant was with inmate Burke in the 
prison yard.  Inmate Collins attacked Burke with fists and a 
weapon.  The two continued fighting until a corrections officer 
fired a rubber round from his gas gun.  While all the inmates lay 
prone at the officer’s command, defendant jumped up and kicked 
Burke in the head.  He did not stop until the officer loaded a 
rifle.  
 
On June 7, 1995, defendant and his white cellmate 
Bennett fought with two African-American inmates who entered 
the yard.  Defendant fought inmate Carroll, punching, then 
slashing and stabbing at him.  One officer ordered them down 
and another fired a rubber bullet directly at defendant, stopping 
the fight.  Defendant threw his weapon toward the fence, where 
it was recovered.  Carroll sustained lacerations and puncture 
wounds to the chest, stomach, and arm.  
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
 
Defendant was involved in a similar fight on July 4, 1995.  
When two African-American inmates entered the yard, 
defendant and his cellmate Bennett immediately attacked them.  
The men disregarded orders to stop, and officers fired rubber 
rounds at them.  Bennett’s fight ended, but defendant and 
inmate Thomas continued punching each other even after 
officers deployed tear gas.  More rubber bullets were fired to 
finally end defendant’s attack.  
 
On November 15, 1995, officers found a weapon fashioned 
from razor blades in defendant’s cell.  The blades had a handle 
at one end made from masking tape and thread.  A sheath made 
from a milk carton and tape covered the blades.  The weapon 
was hidden on defendant’s shelves, inside an envelope 
addressed to him.  
 
The following week, on November 24, 1995, defendant was 
involved in another interracial fight, when he and another 
inmate attacked African-American inmates Tolliver and Hyder.  
The men ignored commands and the firing of rubber bullets, 
stopping only after officers threw tear gas into the yard.  
 
 On December 10, 1995, officers found contraband razors 
hidden in the garbage and inside a towel in defendant’s shelving 
unit.  
 
On December 19, 1995, defendant initiated a fight with 
inmate McCarter.  Rubber bullets and tear gas were required to 
stop the fight.   
c. California State Prison, Corcoran (1996) 
 
The following year, defendant was convicted of weapon 
possession as an inmate (§ 4502) and incarcerated at the 
Corcoran State Prison.  His in-custody violence continued.  On 
October 19, 1996, he attacked inmate Hernandez on the yard.  
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
They continued fighting after officers fired a wooden round.  
Inmate Burns intervened and hit defendant, who struck Burns 
and returned to punching Hernandez.  The fight ended when 
officers fired another round.  
 
A little over two weeks later, on November 4, 1996, 
defendant fought with inmate Munoz in the prison yard.   
d. Riverside County Jail (2000) 
 
Defendant joined a fight in the Riverside County jail while 
awaiting trial on the current charges.  On February 16, 2000, 
several men from another jail were brought into a holding cell.  
Defendant backed an African-American inmate named Clarence 
Keyes into a corner and began punching him.  Keyes curled into 
a fetal position, trying to protect himself.  Defendant punched 
him 10 to 12 times before finally obeying deputies’ orders to stop.  
2. Victim Impact 
 
Several members of Kulikov’s family testified about the 
impact of his murder.  Kulikov was 42 years old when he died 
and was the only son of Frances and Alex Kulikov.  After 
surviving rheumatic fever as a child, Kulikov grew especially 
close to his mother.  They talked regularly on the phone, 
including the morning of his death.  Before he moved away to 
Palm Springs, Kulikov worked with his father on the family’s 
Arizona produce farm.  
 
Kulikov’s parents and one of his three sisters were 
traveling to a family member’s funeral in Pismo Beach when 
they learned of his death.  They initially thought Kulikov had 
been killed in a car accident because he had planned to drive to 
the funeral.  Learning from the news that he had been 
murdered, Kulikov’s parents were devastated.  His mother was 
medicated for depression, and his father was saddened that 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
Kulikov did not live to carry on the family name.  Kulikov’s 
sisters described their close relationships and the pain his 
killing caused.  
 
Kulikov’s wife of nearly 20 years, Joie, testified about their 
whirlwind courtship and wedding.  She said Kulikov was a kind, 
generous, supportive husband, and a devoted father to their 
daughter.  They had moved to Palm Springs shortly before their 
daughter started kindergarten and were in the same house 
when she left for college, just a few months before the murder.  
Around that time, Kulikov’s behavior changed.  He was 
preoccupied and began entertaining new friends at the house 
while she was away at work.  Joie moved out of the house about 
two months before the murder, trying to persuade Kulikov to 
break away from his new friends.  She was in denial upon 
learning of the murder and felt lonely and sad that they would 
not grow old together.  
 
Kulikov’s daughter described happy memories of her 
father.  They talked often and she was proud of him.  Learning 
of her father’s death while she was away at college was 
devastating.  She had nightmares afterward and thought about 
him daily.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Pretrial Issues 
1. Physical Restraints  
 
After a hearing, the court ordered that defendant wear a 
REACT stun belt and be confined to a specially constructed 
restraint chair during trial.  Defendant contends these 
restraints inflicted pain, caused his absence from part of the 
trial, “likely interfered with his ability to communicate with his 
counsel, compromised his ability to concentrate on his trial[,] 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
and affected his demeanor before the jury when he testified at 
the guilt phase.”  He argues their use violated numerous 
constitutional rights.5  Ample evidence supports the court’s 
finding of manifest need, and the court acted within its 
discretion in selecting the restraints employed. 
a. Background 
 
Before trial, the prosecution moved for defendant to be 
restrained during the proceedings.  The motion represented that 
defendant had threatened to kill witnesses and sought help from 
other inmates to do so.  While in custody, he committed 
numerous acts of violence.  He smuggled both contraband and 
improvised weapons, including an improvised syringe with 
which he planned to kill a witness.  To ensure courtroom 
security, the prosecution urged that defendant wear a REACT 
belt and be shackled to a chair affixed to the floor.  The defense 
opposed all restraints, asserting the only acceptable security 
options were to have more bailiffs in the courtroom or to move 
defendant’s chair farther away from the witness stand.  
 
At the hearing, the prosecutor argued he was not obliged 
to present evidence in support of his motion.  He relied on a 
footnote from People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 293, 
footnote 12 (Duran), which described the decision to impose 
restraints as “a judicial function in which the prosecutor plays 
no necessary part.”  The court rejected the argument, explaining 
that a finding of manifest need for restraints had to be based on 
competent evidence.  The prosecutor then drew the court’s 
 
5  
Although defendant’s briefing does not state with 
specificity, he appears to be raising claims under the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal 
Constitution. 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
attention to the People’s Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence 
in Aggravation, which described defendant’s solicitations to 
have witnesses killed, his acquiring of materials to make a 
nitroglycerin “hot shot,” and his many fights and weapons 
violations in custody.  After further argument, the court stated, 
“I’ll make a finding at this time that there is good cause, based 
upon the totality of the facts and circumstances, that there be 
restraints.”  However, the court declined to rule on the type of 
restraints that would be ordered until it heard from security 
personnel on the “evident necessity for the restraints and the 
type of restraints . . . available.”  The next day, the court 
announced that case law required it to conduct a hearing, make 
factual findings concerning the need for restraints, and weigh 
the benefits and burdens of shackling against less restrictive 
alternatives.  The court then heard testimony. 
 
Officer Miramontes, a correctional corporal at the Indio 
jail, described defendant’s custodial history.  At Pelican Bay, 
defendant had been placed in a secure housing unit, the highest 
prison security level.  Only high-ranking gang members or 
inmates with a history of assaulting other inmates are typically 
placed there.  Defendant’s file indicated he had been validated 
as an Aryan Brotherhood associate at both Pelican Bay and 
Tehachapi state prisons.  He had disciplinary markers at 
Riverside County jail for assaulting inmate Clarence Keyes, 
“slipp[ing] his handcuffs,” possessing nitroglycerin pills that did 
not belong to him, and secreting a syringe, tobacco, and lighter 
inside his body.  The syringe was considered a weapon, and the 
pills could be used to poison another inmate.  He also fought 
with his cellmate.  Due to his many assaults on other inmates, 
defendant was placed in administrative segregation housing, 
was allowed no inmate contact, and was kept handcuffed outside 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
his cell.  Miramontes noted that inmates were not searched 
when leaving the jail for court, and the jail had no X-ray 
machine that could detect a weapon hidden inside the body.  
Although defendant always treated staff with respect, 
Miramontes believed he needed to be restrained in the 
courtroom because he would be a risk to inmates who testified 
against him.   
 
Miramontes explained that a REACT belt can deliver a 
painful shock one to two seconds after an initial warning beep.  
Captain Patrick Tyrrell of the Riverside Sheriff’s Department 
testified that, based on his 30 years of experience, the delay 
between perception of a danger and activation of the REACT 
belt is enough time for an attack to occur.  Former Riverside 
County Sheriff’s Deputy David Bowser agreed that this delay 
made reliance on the REACT belt problematic in defendant’s 
case.  
 
Bowser, now an investigator with the district attorney’s 
office, testified about the evidence showing defendant had 
solicited witness Brian White’s murder.  Prison officials had 
intercepted a packet of documents defendant’s sister and 
Kathleen O’Donnell had sent to inmate Kenneth Cook.  The 
packet contained photographs of White and highlighted police 
reports describing child abuse allegations against White that 
had been dismissed. Former Aryan Brotherhood member Brian 
Healey informed Bowser that the green highlighting and the 
packet in its entirety represented a death warrant against 
White.  The prosecution also played audiotapes Bowser had 
obtained of monitored conversations with a visitor in which 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
defendant talked about inmates he wanted to kill and how he 
would conform his conduct until he got the chance to explode.6  
 
Finally, Leo Duarte, a special agent with the Department 
of Corrections and Rehabilitation, testified about defendant’s 
prison record and gang affiliation.  Defendant was an Aryan 
Brotherhood associate and was trying to become a full member.  
Any assault on a witness, courtroom officer, prosecutor, or law 
enforcement officer would enhance defendant’s status within 
the gang and further his membership goal.  Duarte reviewed the 
records of defendant’s incarceration from 1990 to 1997, noting 
there were “well over 25” disciplinary incidents.  Defendant 
frequently refused to comply with instructions, possessed 
contraband weapons, and fought with other inmates, sometimes 
stabbing them.  Duarte listed some of these incidents for the 
record.  
 
After testimony concluded, the parties discussed seating 
defendant in a special chair with a waist belt.  Defense counsel 
protested that such a chair would prevent defendant from 
standing with the rest of the courtroom when the jury entered 
and departed.  He urged that defendant “should have no more 
than the REACT belt.”  The prosecutor argued the chair should 
be bolted to the floor.  At a later hearing, the court announced 
its tentative inclination to seat defendant in the restraint chair 
 
6  
As one example, defendant told a visitor:  “It just happens 
like that you know.  Just frustration with this place and the cops 
and you know my situation in general; you know what I mean?  
Just builds up and I shove it all down, shove it all down, put my 
smile on you know, shove it all down, till the chance that I get 
to explode.  Ahhha-ha-ha!  Then they wonder why I beat people 
half to death.  (laughs)  When I’m done I’m like, ahhhhha-ha.  
It’s almost like a cigarette after sex!  (laughs).”  
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
with a REACT belt.  The chair resembled other chairs at counsel 
table except that it had a hole in the lower lumbar area, which 
was hidden when someone sat in the chair.  The prosecutor 
again sought to have the chair bolted to the floor, observing he 
had found it “relatively easy” to stand when he tested the chair, 
but the court responded that the REACT belt and additional 
courtroom personnel would be sufficient.  In light of the court’s 
decision to use the chair, defense counsel withdrew his offer to 
stipulate to use of the REACT belt and objected to the use of any 
restraints whatsoever.  Nevertheless, the court found there was 
manifest need, based on “the totality of the facts and 
circumstances,” to restrain defendant with both the security 
chair and the REACT belt.  At defense counsel’s suggestion, 
however, the court ordered that defendant and all counsel 
remain seated when jurors entered or left the courtroom.   
b. Analysis 
 
“In general, the ‘court has broad power to maintain 
courtroom security and orderly proceedings’ (People v. Hayes 
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1269 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 
645]), and its decisions on these matters are reviewed for abuse 
of discretion.  (People v. Stevens (2009) 47 Cal.4th 625, 633 [101 
Cal.Rptr.3d 14, 218 P.3d 272].)  However, the court’s discretion 
to impose physical restraints is constrained by constitutional 
principles.  Under California law, ‘a defendant cannot be 
subjected to physical restraints of any kind in the courtroom 
while in the jury’s presence, unless there is a showing of a 
manifest need for such restraints.’  (People v. Duran (1976) 16 
Cal.3d 282, 290–291 [127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322].)  
Similarly, the federal ‘Constitution forbids the use of visible 
shackles . . . unless that use is “justified by an essential state 
interest” — such as the interest in courtroom security — specific 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
to the defendant on trial.’  (Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 
624 [161 L.Ed.2d 953, 125 S.Ct. 2007], italics omitted.)  We have 
held that these principles also apply to the use of an electronic 
‘stun belt,’ even if this device is not visible to the jury.  (People 
v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1219 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 
P.3d 95].)”  (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 558–559 
(Lomax).) 
 
“In determining whether there is a manifest need to 
restrain the defendant, courts consider several factors, 
including evidence that the defendant poses a safety or flight 
risk or is likely to disrupt the proceedings.”  (People v. Simon 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 115 (Simon).)  Although no formal hearing 
on the matter is required (Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 559), 
“when the use of restraints is based on conduct of the defendant 
that occurred outside the presence of the trial court, sufficient 
evidence of such conduct must be presented on the record so that 
the court may make its own determination of the nature and 
seriousness of the conduct and whether there is a manifest need 
for such restraints.  [Citation.]  The court may not, we have 
emphasized, merely rely on the judgment of law enforcement or 
court security officers or the unsubstantiated comments of 
others.”  (Simon, at p. 115.)  Finally, when the evidence 
establishes a manifest need for restraints, the court should 
impose the least obtrusive or restrictive restraint that would be 
effective under the circumstances.  (Ibid.; see People v. Mar, 
supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1226.) 
 
Defendant first complains the court’s decision to impose 
restraints was based solely upon the prosecutor’s unsworn 
allegations of dangerousness.  This argument is based on the 
court’s statement at the close of the first hearing that “at this 
time” it found “good cause, based upon the totality of the facts 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
and circumstances,” to impose some type of restraints.  The 
court made this announcement after hearing the prosecutor 
describe the violent incidents the People intended to present in 
aggravation, including defendant’s many in-custody fights and 
weapons violations along with his attempts to have witnesses 
killed.  Read in context, the statement appears to reflect the 
court’s tentative view, pending confirmation of these incidents 
through evidence presented to the court.  It began that inquiry 
the next day. 
 
The record indicates the court well understood its 
obligation to base its decision on evidence and not merely the 
representations of counsel.  (See People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 
618, 651–652; Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 291.)  At the outset 
of the first hearing, the court disputed the prosecutor’s assertion 
that he was not obliged to present evidence because a footnote 
in Duran stated that “[t]he imposition of restraints . . . is 
normally a judicial function in which the prosecutor plays no 
necessary part.”  (Duran, at p. 293, fn. 12.)  The court required 
that “the showing . . . of manifest need for the restraints must 
be through evidence.”  They debated the issue at some length 
and, near the end of the hearing, the court repeated its concern 
that it had heard no testimony about the need for restraints or 
the type of restraints available.  The prosecutor said he could 
provide further documentation of defendant’s misconduct, and 
the court responded, “I think that would be advisable, . . . so that 
we can make an assessment of the evident necessity for the 
restraints and the type of restraints which are available through 
the sheriff’s department.”  The debate continued at the start of 
the next hearing until the court insisted that it could not make 
a ruling until it had received evidence.  The court told the 
prosecutor:  “With respect to the issue of court security, it is 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
indeed the court’s duty to provide for court security.  But with 
respect to the Duran case and the footnote that you referred to 
earlier, that does not indicate that the People have no part in 
presenting the evidence before the court.  Indeed, the court is 
not the party which presents evidence.  And if there is no 
evidence presented to the court, then the court cannot make a 
reasoned and intelligent decision.”7  The court went on to discuss 
a Court of Appeal case holding “that the court must conduct a 
prior hearing to determine the need for restraints, and must 
consider the defendant’s history individually on the record.”  
Thereafter, the court heard testimony from five witnesses before 
ultimately finding “manifest need” for the restraints it imposed.  
Considering the record as a whole, it is clear the court 
understood its obligation to base its ruling on evidence and 
proceeded accordingly. 
 
Next, defendant contends the restraints were not justified 
and were improperly ordered as a general prophylactic measure.  
On the contrary, the court’s conclusion was well supported.  The 
court heard extensive evidence at the hearing about defendant’s 
violent and dangerous behavior in custody.  He solicited 
assistance in having witnesses killed, was repeatedly found with 
weapons in custody, had “slipped his handcuffs” while at the 
county jail, stole dangerous medication, and hid a syringe inside 
a body cavity.  For the better part of a decade, he repeatedly 
assaulted other inmates, amassing a disciplinary record of “well 
over 25 incidents.”  Contrary to defendant’s assertion that prior 
 
7  
We note that the next sentence in the Duran footnote 
referred to by the prosecutor reads in part, “the prosecutor may 
bring to the court’s attention matters which bear on the issue” 
of restraints.  (Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 293, fn. 12.) 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
violence or misbehavior outside the courtroom cannot establish 
manifest need, we have repeatedly upheld the use of shackles 
and other restraints when a defendant has assaulted other 
inmates or possessed weapons while in custody.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 347 (Miracle) [four 
violent incidents in custody justified handcuffs and leg 
shackles]; Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 116–117 [possession of 
shanks and materials for making explosives justified stun belt]; 
People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1049–1050 [five 
jailhouse fights and possession of razors justified leg restraints]; 
People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 838 [possession of two 
shanks and threats against jail deputies justified leg restraints]; 
People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 943–944 (Hawkins) 
[three jailhouse fights and extensive criminal record justified 
restraint in a security chair].)8  “The fact that these incidents 
occurred outside of the courtroom does not diminish their 
relevance or their support for the trial court’s order.”  (Miracle, 
at p. 347.) 
 
Defendant’s in-custody fights and weapons offenses alone 
constituted “a record showing of violence” justifying the 
imposition of restraints.  (Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 291.)  
But there was more.  The court heard evidence that defendant 
had solicited Aryan Brotherhood associates to kill Brian White, 
who would be one of the primary witnesses against him at trial.  
Defendant’s assembly of this “death warrant,” combined with 
 
8  
Although defendant protests that some of his disciplinary 
incidents were remote in time, the evidence showed he was 
moved to administrative segregation while awaiting trial 
because of his frequent fighting.  Defendant’s persistent history 
demonstrates a long-standing record of violence, rather than a 
remote or isolated incident. 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
his demonstrated readiness to use violence, indicated he posed 
a significant threat to the witnesses testifying against him.  A 
documented risk of violence against witnesses may also justify 
the use of restraints.  In People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 
775, for example, we upheld shackling during the testimony of 
a witness the defendant had held hostage and terrorized.  And 
in People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 
391–392 (Bryant, Smith and Wheeler), we concluded stun belts 
were permissible in a multidefendant trial to prevent escape 
attempts and potential assaults against prosecution witnesses.  
Although defendant protests that he never disrupted courtroom 
proceedings, the decision to impose restraints need not be based 
solely on a defendant’s courtroom conduct.  (Hawkins, supra, 10 
Cal.4th at p. 944; Livaditis, at p. 744.)  Defendant’s compliance 
with court staff in pretrial proceedings did not necessarily 
foreshadow how he would behave when confronted with 
witnesses against him, some of whom he had threatened to kill 
or tried to have killed.  The argument ignores defendant’s own 
taped statements that when frustration at his situation builds 
up, he will “shove it all down, till the chance that I get to 
explode” and acknowledging that he “beat[s] people half to 
death.”  
 
Defendant also complains his restraints were excessive.  
“Generally, when physical restraints are called for, a trial court 
should impose ‘the least obtrusive or restrictive restraint’ that 
will ensure effective security.”  (Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at 
p. 562.)  Here, the court considered evidence from several 
witnesses 
about 
the 
appropriate 
available 
restraints.  
Miramontes, Tyrrell, and Bowser all described the delay 
between the supervising monitor’s detection of impending 
danger, the REACT belt’s activation, and ultimate delivery of a 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
shock.  Tyrrell and Bowser each testified that this delay could 
allow sufficient time for the wearer to initiate an assault.  
Finally, Special Agent Duarte related that a courtroom assault 
would enhance defendant’s status with the Aryan Brotherhood 
and might provide additional incentive to engage in such 
conduct.  When asked, these witnesses agreed that the safest 
course to prevent attacks, absent chains, would be for defendant 
to wear the stun belt and be tethered to the floor.  Another 
witness, Sergeant Susan Trevino, discussed the option of a 
security chair with restraints that would be apparent to the 
jury.  The trial court had broad discretion to evaluate this 
evidence and decide which security measures were appropriate.  
(Miracle, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 348; see People v. Stevens, supra, 
47 Cal.4th at p. 642.)  Defendant had a lengthy history of 
violence.  He stood well over six feet tall with an estimated 
weight nearing 250 pounds.  Considering all the circumstances, 
we cannot conclude the court exceeded “ ‘the bounds of reason’ ” 
(Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 390) by 
ordering that defendant wear the REACT belt and be confined 
to a chair.  These security measures were less restrictive and 
obtrusive than the restraint chair Sergeant Trevino discussed. 
c. Prejudice 
 
Defendant urges that the restraints were prejudicial 
because they were painful, which caused him to be absent from 
part of the trial, impaired his participation, and impugned the 
dignity of the courtroom.  It is settled “that courtroom shackling, 
even if error, was harmless if there is no evidence that the jury 
saw the restraints, or that the shackles impaired or prejudiced 
the defendant’s right to testify or participate in his defense.”  
(People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 596 (Anderson).)  We 
have concluded defendant’s restraints were justified by manifest 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
need and the court did not err in imposing them.  Even were a 
claim of error successfully made, the record does not support 
defendant’s assertions of prejudice. 
 
When jury selection was underway, defense counsel noted 
outside the jurors’ presence that the security chair had been 
placed in its lowest position and defendant found it 
uncomfortable.  The prosecutor said that, according to sheriff’s 
deputies, the chair was most effective when placed in its lowered 
setting.  The court declined to order the chair raised.  The next 
day, defendant moved for reconsideration.  He declared that he 
had a preexisting back injury that sometimes made him unable 
to get out of bed.  He stated, “Because of my height and the 
position of my knees, keeping my chair as low as possible 
aggravates my back condition and makes my left leg go numb.”9 
Finally, he predicted that continued use of the lowered chair 
could cause undue pain and prevent his attendance at trial.  The 
court observed that the chair was meant to be used in its lowest 
position and should have been in that position from the 
beginning.  Although it might reconsider the order if presented 
with evidence substantiating defendant’s claims, the court did 
not find the declaration alone sufficient evidence of a back 
condition to justify a change in the chair’s height.  The court 
further observed that defendant’s chair was of the same type as 
the others at counsel table and allowed defendant sufficient leg 
room under the table.  While the seat of defendant’s chair was 
lower than the others, due to his height he still sat taller than 
 
9  
Various documents reflect defendant’s height as six feet 
one inch, six feet two inches, or six feet five inches.  During 
argument below, counsel did not make a specific record of 
defendant’s height. 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
the attorneys.  After this ruling, defense counsel conveyed 
defendant’s request “to voluntarily absent himself from the 
proceedings until he can sit up,” indicating the chair had caused 
pain and “problems” the night before.  The court replied that 
defendant “can certainly voluntarily absent himself from the 
proceedings at any time.  And if he wants to do that, he can do 
that.”  
 
When trial resumed four days later, the court noted that 
defendant was voluntarily absent.  Defense counsel reported 
that defendant had previously instructed his attorneys to simply 
sit in court and put on no defense.  Counsel was not concerned 
about defendant’s absence during part of jury selection but 
noted, “at some point we need to have Mr. Poore here to decide 
what he’s going to do . . . in this trial.”  Counsel planned to 
discuss the matter with defendant that afternoon.  The next 
morning, defendant was again absent.  Counsel reported that he 
had been unable to speak with defendant because jail officials 
had “taken [him] somewhere for x-rays.”  Voir dire continued 
without defendant’s presence, but he returned to court the next 
day.10  The following week, defense counsel said defendant had 
called from jail and “could barely speak” due to an illness that 
was also affecting a courtroom deputy.  Although counsel 
conceded defendant had voluntarily absented himself from part 
of the voir dire once before, he believed defendant was required 
to be present for the actual selection of jurors.  After reviewing 
 
10  
The record indicates the court had divided the entire panel 
into smaller groups for voir dire.  After examination of each 
subgroup, the court entertained stipulations and challenges for 
cause.  Defendant was present for a substantial part of the 
general voir dire, including that of the two panelists he asserts 
were wrongly excused for cause.  (See, post, at pp. 32–41.) 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
the case law, the court agreed jury selection could not proceed 
further until defendant was present.  It ordered that defendant 
be examined by a medical expert and called a recess until 
afternoon to permit this examination.  Defendant had 
complained of nausea but had not requested a doctor.  When 
proceedings resumed, defendant was present.  
 
Defendant first complains his restraints caused such pain 
that they were presumptively prejudicial.  Although it is true 
the state may not impose “ ‘wanton and unnecessary’ pain” on 
inmates or pretrial detainees (Hope v. Pelzer (2002) 536 U.S. 
730, 738), defendant presents “no authority for the proposition 
that, even when the need for shackling is manifest, the 
restraints must be removed if they cause discomfort.”  (People v. 
Smith (2015) 61 Cal.4th 18, 45.)  Assuming such a claim is 
appropriate, it is unsupported here.  Defendant asserted the 
security chair’s height caused him back pain but presented no 
independent verification of his complaints.  The court was not 
required to accept defendant’s uncorroborated declaration at 
face value.  The court invited the defense to submit additional 
evidence that the chair’s position was inflicting pain, but none 
was forthcoming.  Moreover, although defendant absented 
himself from trial for two days, he did not renew his complaints 
of pain after returning to court, even though the chair remained 
in its lowest position.  Especially when, as here, there is no 
suggestion the jury saw the restraints,11 we will not presume 
 
11  
Because there is no indication the restraints were ever 
seen by jurors, defendant’s claim that the restraints “violated 
the dignity and decorum of the courtroom” is similarly 
unsupported.  Defendant faults the court for failing to ask jurors 
whether they saw the restraints, but doing so would have 
defeated the purpose of keeping the restraints concealed.  
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
prejudice without evidence the restraints hampered the 
defendant’s ability to participate in the trial.  (See People v. 
Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 156; Anderson, supra, 25 
Cal.4th at p. 596.)  The record contains no independent evidence 
that the chair’s height caused discomfort or that defendant’s 
height, or any other condition, made such discomfort likely. 
 
Nor did the court abuse its discretion in ordering that the 
chair be kept in its lowest position.  The issue of restraints was 
discussed many times, and several witnesses testified about the 
best ways of securing defendant to prevent a courtroom attack.  
Some options were highly restrictive, like a security chair with 
visible restraints or a chair bolted to the floor.  The court 
considered all of these options and chose a middle course, opting 
to use a security chair that was not affixed to the floor but was 
kept in its lowest position.  The lowered seat height would have 
made it difficult for defendant to rise quickly from a seated 
position.  Considering the testimony about reaction time delays 
in activating the stun belt, it was reasonable for the court to 
order a chair height setting that would provide the most 
security.  
 
Defendant’s related claim that the restraints negatively 
affected his demeanor also lacks support in the record.  
Defendant complains the stun belt had “the possibility of an 
impact on [his] mental faculties or demeanor” and that this 
 
Defendant’s additional complaint that the court should have 
instructed jurors to disregard any visible restraints is also 
unavailing.  We have cautioned that such an “instruction should 
not be given unless requested by defendant,” since it might draw 
attention to the restraints and create prejudice that might 
otherwise have been avoided.  (Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at 
p. 292.)  Defendant did not request the instruction. 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
“potential impact” warrants reversal of his conviction.  (Italics 
added.)  The phrasing of these claims reveals their speculative 
nature.  Defendant points to no evidence whatsoever 
demonstrating that the restraints interfered with his ability to 
participate in the trial.  Indeed, defendant testified at length in 
the guilt phase.  There is no indication he suffered any 
impairment while doing so, nor did he ever voice such a 
complaint. 
 
Finally, defendant contends pain from the restraints 
caused him to be absent from trial.  The record does not support 
defendant’s claim that his absence was related to any discomfort 
from the stun belt or security chair.  After defendant complained 
about the chair height, proceedings did not resume until four 
days later.  Defendant was voluntarily absent at that session 
and the next day, when defense counsel reported that he had 
been taken for X-rays.  But the record does not demonstrate that 
this absence was due to continuing pain from one day of sitting 
in a lowered chair, followed by a four-day respite, as opposed to 
disaffection with the court’s ruling.  No evidence was ever 
produced as to what defendant’s X-rays showed, and he returned 
to court the day after they were reportedly taken.  When 
defendant was absent the following week, he complained not of 
back pain but of a respiratory or intestinal illness.  There is no 
claim that this illness was related to the restraints. 
 
To the extent defendant asserts error due to his absence 
itself, we conclude he waived his constitutional right to be 
present and the evident statutory error was harmless. 
 
“A criminal defendant accused of a felony has the 
constitutional right to be present at every critical stage of the 
trial, including during the taking of evidence.”  (People v. Bell 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
31 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 114 (Bell); see Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 
U.S. 337, 338.)  Voir dire of prospective jurors is a critical stage 
for purposes of this constitutional right.  (People v. Wall (2017) 
3 Cal.5th 1048, 1059 (Wall).)  However, a capital defendant may 
waive the constitutional right to be present, so long as the 
waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  (Ibid.; see Bell, 
at p. 114.)  Defendant made such a waiver.  Immediately after 
the court denied his request to raise the seat height, defendant 
conferred with his attorney, who conveyed, in his presence, 
defendant’s request “to voluntarily absent himself from the 
proceedings until he can sit up.”  Thereafter, the court and 
defense counsel consistently described defendant’s absence as 
voluntary.  The record presents no reason to doubt the validity 
of defendant’s waiver.  There was no constitutional error.  (See 
Bell, at p. 115.) 
 
There was, however, statutory error under sections 977 
and 1043, a point the Attorney General concedes.  “ ‘[W]hen read 
together, sections 977 and 1043 permit a capital defendant to be 
absent from the courtroom only on two occasions:  (1) when he 
has been removed by the court for disruptive behavior under 
section 1043, subdivision (b)(1), and (2) when he voluntarily 
waives his rights pursuant to section 977, subdivision (b)(1).’  
([People v.] Jackson [(1996)] 13 Cal.4th [1164,] 1210.)  ‘ “Section 
977 requires . . . that the defendant personally execute, in open 
court, a written waiver of the right to be present.” ’  (People v. 
Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 418 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 334, 187 P.3d 
56].)”  (Wall, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1060.)  Those requirements 
were not met.  But in such an instance reversal is required “only 
if it is reasonably probable defendant would have obtained a 
more favorable result absent the error.  (See People v. Watson 
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].)”  (Bell, supra, 7 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
32 
Cal.5th at p. 116; see Wall, at pp. 1060–1061; People v. Weaver 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 968.)  Defendant was absent for part of 
the voir dire but was back in court when the parties exercised 
peremptory challenges and agreed upon the jury as sworn.  
Defendant does not explain how his attorneys’ questioning of 
some prospective jurors might have differed had he been 
present, nor does he offer any other fact-based argument for how 
he might have suffered prejudice.  Accordingly, “we find no 
reasonable probability in this case that a different jury would 
have been chosen or that the jury chosen would have reached a 
different verdict had [defendant] been present during” the entire 
voir dire.  (Wall, at p. 1061.) 
2. Jury Selection 
a. Excusals for Cause  
 
Defendant contends the court violated his state and 
federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair and 
impartial jury by erroneously dismissing two prospective jurors 
based on their death penalty views.  Although the question is 
close, in light of the deference given to trial courts based on their 
ability to observe prospective jurors’ intonation and demeanor, 
we conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s rulings. 
 
“Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to an 
impartial jury, and ‘a prospective juror’s personal views 
concerning the death penalty do not necessarily afford a basis 
for excusing the juror for bias.’  [Citation.]  Instead, consistent 
with the constitutional imperative, prospective jurors may be 
dismissed for cause only if their views on capital punishment 
‘ “would ‘ “prevent or substantially impair” ’ the performance of 
[their] duties as defined by the court’s instructions and [their] 
oath.” ’ ”  (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 810–811 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
33 
(Turner); see Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt); 
Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 521–522.)  A 
panelist’s bias against the death penalty need not be shown with 
“ ‘unmistakable clarity.’ ”  (Witt, at p. 424.)  “Jurors commonly 
supply conflicting or equivocal responses to questions directed 
at their potential bias or incapacity to serve.”  (People v. 
Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 426.)  Indeed, some “prospective 
jurors ‘simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the 
point where their bias has been made “unmistakably clear”; 
these [prospective jurors] may not know how they will react 
when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable 
to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings.’ ”  (People 
v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 607 (Beck and Cruz).) 
Nevertheless, excusal is appropriate if, “the trial judge has been 
‘left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would 
be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.’  ([Witt,] 
at p. 426; accord, People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 
1066 [210 Cal.Rptr.3d 667, 384 P.3d 693].)”  (People v. 
Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, 751 (Armstrong).) 
 
“Our review in this area is necessarily deferential because 
‘the trial court, through its observation of the juror’s demeanor 
as well as through its evaluation of the juror’s verbal responses, 
is best suited to reach a conclusion regarding the juror’s actual 
state of mind.’  (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 41 [140 
Cal.Rptr.3d 383, 275 P.3d 496]; see Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 
U.S. 1, 7 [167 L.Ed.2d 1014, 127 S.Ct. 2218].)  In applying 
deferential review, ‘appellate courts recognize that a trial judge 
who observes and speaks with a prospective juror and hears that 
person’s responses (noting, among other things, the person’s 
tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor), 
gleans valuable information that simply does not appear on the 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
34 
record.’  (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 451 [15 
Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271] . . . .)  Accordingly, the trial court’s 
determination as to the juror’s true state of mind is binding on 
appeal if supported by substantial evidence.  ([People v.] 
Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1066; Martinez, supra, 47 
Cal.4th at pp. 426–427.)”  (Turner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 811.) 
 
Defendant’s claim points to two panelists in particular.  
Their questionnaire and voir dire responses provide background 
for their ultimate excusal.  Panelist N.S. indicated some support 
for the death penalty in her jury questionnaire.  She responded, 
“For it,” when asked for her feelings about the death penalty but 
did not elaborate.  In response to the court’s voir dire question, 
she explained that she agreed with the death penalty “[i]f the 
case is right” and “under certain circumstances.”  N.S. checked 
questionnaire boxes indicating the death penalty should 
“sometimes” be imposed for intentional killings and “usually” 
imposed for killings during a robbery or for financial gain.  
However, when asked to rate her support for the death penalty, 
she checked an option that stated, “I have no position for or 
against the death penalty; however, would consider the 
imposition of the death penalty in some cases.”  She also 
indicated that her views about the death penalty had changed, 
explaining that there were too many cases of wrongful 
imprisonment brought to light by DNA testing.  In voir dire, she 
said she had seen a talk show featuring five men who had been 
released from prison after DNA exonerated them.  Finally, when 
asked 
in 
the 
questionnaire 
what 
the 
death 
penalty 
accomplishes, N.S. wrote, “The only thing it really does is make 
the family of the murdered victim feel compensated.”  
 
Panelist J.W.’s questionnaire responses were equivocal.  
J.W. wrote:  “If I felt the defendant was guilty beyond any doubt 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
35 
I would be for the death penalty but would rather vote for life in 
prison.”  When questioned in voir dire, J.W. said she realized the 
criminal standard only required proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  J.W. marked on the questionnaire that death 
was “sometimes” the appropriate punishment in some 
situations, “usually” appropriate for a killing during a robbery, 
and “never” appropriate for the killing of a relative. She checked 
a box indicating that she was in favor of the death penalty but 
would not always vote for death and would weigh the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  Even so, she was 
“somewhat” concerned that religious beliefs would impact her 
vote, explaining that she had never before “come face to face 
with a death penalty decision.”  
 
Later in voir dire, the prosecutor posed questions to a 
small group of panelists that included N.S. and J.W.  After one 
panelist who was generally opposed to the death penalty 
confirmed that he could set aside those feelings, weigh the 
aggravating and mitigating factors, and impose death if it was 
warranted, the prosecutor asked how others felt about the death 
penalty.  N.S. spoke up immediately, saying, “I’m for the death 
penalty, but I would have to be honest and say if it got down to 
the point that I had to say[,] ‘Kill him,’ I really can’t honestly 
say.  I don’t know if I could do it or not.”  The prosecutor thanked 
her for the answer, and J.W. interjected, “Sir, I feel the same 
way she does.”  The prosecutor asked, “So when it comes down 
to it, you’re not sure?”  J.W. responded, “I am not sure if when it 
comes down to the nitty-gritty, whether I could do that, vote to 
kill him.”  
 
The prosecutor later returned to N.S., asking about her 
apparent reluctance to serve.  N.S. explained:  “Well, because of 
. . . the death penalty thing, I really . . . — I would — might be 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
36 
doing an injustice, because even though he was found 100-
percent guilty in every respect, I don’t know if I could live with 
myself after saying I am putting someone to death.  I don’t know 
if I could live with myself.”  She then summarized, “I might be 
able to do it, but I don’t know.”  Over defendant’s objection, the 
court granted the prosecution’s challenges and excused N.S. and 
J.W. for cause.12   
 
The record supporting these rulings is thin, but we 
conclude it is sufficient to support the excusals.  Although the 
jurors had expressed some degree of support for the death 
penalty in theory, each separately spoke up and volunteered a 
doubt that she could actually cast such a vote.  “Even if a 
prospective 
juror’s 
questionnaire 
responses 
express 
a 
willingness to consider the death penalty, an excusal for cause 
is appropriate if oral questioning establishes that the juror’s 
views on capital punishment would, in fact, substantially impair 
her ability to return a death sentence.”  (People v. Winbush 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 429 (Winbush).)  While the records 
supporting impairment are typically more robust than the one 
we encounter here, we have frequently upheld the excusal of 
panelists who doubt their own ability to vote to impose the death 
penalty despite their general support for it.  In Turner, supra, 
10 Cal.5th at page 813, for example, the court did not err in 
excusing a juror who “may have supported the death penalty in 
theory,” but whose “voir dire responses made it clear she felt 
great reluctance about actually voting to impose it.”  The record 
was similar in People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044 (Baker).  
 
12  
When the jury was ultimately selected, neither side came 
close to exhausting its allotted peremptory challenges, with the 
prosecution using only half. 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
37 
There, we upheld the dismissal of a juror whose questionnaire 
had professed openness to the death penalty but who 
equivocated in voir dire and, when asked if he could actually 
vote for death, ultimately answered, “ ‘I don’t know.  I just don’t 
know.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1086.)  Our death penalty cases are replete 
with similar examples of panelists whose excusals were upheld 
after they expressed doubts about their personal ability to vote 
for the death penalty even when objectively, in their judgment, 
the facts would warrant it.  (See, e.g., People v. Suarez (2020) 10 
Cal.5th 116, 141 (Suarez) [“ ‘I am not sure if I could do this or 
not’ ”]; People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 564–565 (Miles) [“ ‘I 
don’t know if I could follow the law.  There’s . . . just a good 
chance that I would or I wouldn’t.  You’re going to have to pick 
me and have me sit here and see, because I just don’t know’ ”]; 
People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 831 [“ ‘I don’t know.  I 
don’t know’ ”].) 
 
Defendant protests that a juror is not substantially 
impaired simply because she cannot predict how she would vote 
before hearing the evidence.  In a similar vein, he argues it is 
error to excuse a prospective juror who refuses to guarantee a 
vote for death.  (See Armstrong, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 756.)  But 
neither of these characterizations captures what N.S. and J.W. 
actually said.  The trial court carefully explained to the panelists 
that jurors only had a choice to vote for death under very limited 
circumstances.  If mitigating evidence predominated over 
aggravating evidence, they had to vote for life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.  If mitigating and aggravating 
evidence were equal, again, they had to vote for life 
imprisonment.  “Only if the aggravating or bad evidence is 
greater than the mitigating or good evidence [did they] have a 
choice.”  The court explained that the law would not tell jurors 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
38 
what to do but that they only had the option to vote for death 
when they found the aggravating evidence so substantial in 
comparison to mitigating evidence that death was warranted.  
These instructions accurately described the showing necessary 
before a death sentence could even be considered.  Even so, N.S. 
and J.W. each interjected to voice doubts about whether she 
could realistically vote for death in any circumstance.  “While it 
is true that a prospective juror is not disqualified merely 
because she would find it difficult to impose the death penalty” 
(Turner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 814; see People v. Merriman 
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 53), these panelists did not merely note the 
difficulty of reaching a penalty decision.  They went on to 
question their actual ability to vote for death under any 
circumstances.  “When a prospective juror repeatedly says he 
does not know whether he could realistically impose the death 
penalty, we will not second-guess the trial court’s determination 
that the juror is substantially impaired.”  (Turner, at p. 815; see 
Miles, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 565–567; Wall, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
p. 1063.) 
 
Defendant also argues the court should not have 
dismissed these panelists without probing their views through 
more questioning, in particular concerning whether they could 
set aside their beliefs and vote for death.  Initially, we note that 
this argument misapprehends the reason the panelists were 
substantially impaired from serving.  The basis was not that 
they opposed the death penalty and would have to consider 
whether they could nevertheless follow the instructions and 
impose that sentence if it was warranted.  In fact, both women 
wrote in their questionnaires that they generally supported the 
death penalty, at least in some circumstances.  The problem 
here was that, despite their theoretical support for the penalty, 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
39 
both doubted that they themselves could cast such a vote.  As 
N.S. said twice in that regard:  “I don’t know if I could live with 
myself.”    
 
We do agree, though, that the questioning of these 
panelists was sparse and probably approaches the minimum of 
what may suffice to support a cause excusal on appeal.  “Before 
excusing a juror for cause, ‘ “the court must have sufficient 
information regarding the prospective juror’s state of mind to 
permit a reliable determination” ’ concerning whether the 
juror’s views on capital punishment would impair his or her 
performance as a juror in a capital case.  (People v. Leon (2015) 
61 Cal.4th 569, 592 [189 Cal.Rptr.3d 703, 352 P.3d 289], italics 
omitted . . . , quoting People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 
445.)  To ensure that its excusal of a prospective juror for cause 
is consistent with the constitutional standard, the court must 
make ‘ “a conscientious attempt to determine a prospective 
juror’s views . . . .” ’ ”  (People v. Schultz (2020) 10 Cal.5th 623, 
652.)  The questioning here, particularly of J.W., was minimal.  
After N.S. volunteered her doubts and J.W. spoke up to say she 
felt the same way, the prosecutor merely asked J.W. to clarify 
whether she was “not sure” if she could vote for death “when it 
comes down to it,” and J.W. confirmed that she was “not sure” 
whether she could return such a vote.  Neither the court nor 
attorneys for either side followed up on this response.  J.W.’s 
demeanor may have made her inability to serve apparent to all 
in the courtroom.  But the cold record seldom captures 
indications like facial expressions, tones of voice, or hesitancy in 
responding.  The court and counsel should take care to ensure 
that the record captures these relevant but more nuanced and 
unvocalized pieces of information.  As we have repeatedly 
reminded trial courts, prospective jurors should be questioned 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
40 
at sufficient length to clearly establish their ability to impose 
the death penalty, and a thorough voir dire assists our review of 
Witt claims.  (See People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 
860 (Capistrano); People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 539.) 
 
Nevertheless, “[t]he trial court was in the best position to 
observe [the panelists’] demeanor, vocal inflection, and other 
cues not readily apparent on the record, and we reasonably infer 
that the trial court based its decision not only on what [the 
panelists] said, but also on how [they] said it.”  (People v. Flores 
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 388.)  According substantial deference to 
the trial court, as we must (see Uttecht v. Brown, supra, 551 U.S. 
at p. 7), we conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the 
excusal of N.S. and J.W. for cause.  These panelists had been 
advised of a capital juror’s duty.  With that standard in mind, 
and without being faced with a direct question, they each 
volunteered doubts about their ability to fulfill this duty.  “If a 
prospective juror states unequivocally that he or she would be 
unable to impose the death penalty regardless of the evidence, 
the prospective juror is, by definition, someone whose views 
‘would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his 
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his 
oath.” ’  (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.)”  (Capistrano, supra, 
59 Cal.4th at p. 859.)  Here, while the panelists did not state 
absolutely that they could not impose a death sentence, they 
clearly expressed doubts about their ability to do so even if the 
evidence warranted it.  Under our precedents, their expressions 
of doubt demonstrated substantial impairment.  (See Baker, 
supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 1086–1087; Turner, supra, 10 Cal.5th 
at p. 815; Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 142–143; Miles, 
supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 565–566.)  Tellingly, defendant did not 
seek to question these panelists below, nor does he suggest here 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
41 
any questions that could have shed more light on the issue.  The 
record is sufficient to support the court’s ruling. 
 
Finally, relying on the dissenting opinion in Capistrano, 
defendant suggests deference to the trial court is inappropriate 
because the record includes no reference to the excused 
panelists’ demeanor.  The voir dire process here was very 
different from the one we considered in Capistrano.  There, the 
trial court conducted a preliminary screening and asked 
whether any panelists would be unable to impose the death 
penalty.  It then excused, without further questioning, all who 
answered “yes.”  (Capistrano, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 854.)  Over 
the dissent’s criticism that this inquiry was insufficient, we 
concluded the panelists’ unequivocal responses demonstrated 
their substantial impairment to serve as capital jurors.  (Id. at 
p. 859.)  We also concluded deference was owed to the trial court 
even though the questioning was brief.  “The fact remains the 
trial court was present at the voir dire and we were not.”  (Id. at 
p. 860.)  The voir dire here was more extensive than in 
Capistrano, encompassing questions from the court and counsel 
posed to a small group of panelists.  The court had ample time 
to observe the demeanor of N.S. and J.W., both while answering 
questions and reacting to the answers of others.  Moreover, 
deference to its ruling is appropriate even if the court did not 
specifically comment about their demeanor on the record.  (See 
People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 249.)  Again, 
however, we emphasize that a more complete record of 
demeanor and other nonverbal information substantially assists 
the process of review.  
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
42 
b. Constitutionality of Death Qualification  
 
Defendant next argues the process of disqualifying jurors 
who would not impose the death penalty violates due process 
and the right to an impartial jury and is inconsistent with the 
framers’ understanding of the Sixth Amendment.  Because he 
did not raise these objections below, they are forfeited.  (See 
People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 913; People v. Howard 
(2010) 51 Cal.4th 15, 26 (Howard).)  They also fail on the merits.  
We have rejected similar challenges in previous cases, and 
defendant’s new argument about original intent does not 
persuade us to reconsider our settled views.  
 
Apart from his constitutional arguments, defendant 
suggests we reconsider People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566, 
which approved of the death qualification process in California.  
Although a literal reading of the cause challenge statute (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 229) does not require the exclusion of jurors who 
cannot or will not vote for the death penalty, Riser explained 
that permitting such jurors to serve would do violence to the 
purpose of the death penalty law and “would in all probability 
work a de facto abolition of capital punishment, a result which, 
whether or not desirable of itself, it is hardly appropriate for this 
court to achieve by construction of an ambiguous statute.”  
(Riser, at p. 576.)  We recently reaffirmed Riser’s holding 
(Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 138) and, finding no compelling 
reason to depart from it, do so again. 
 
As defendant acknowledges, both this court and the 
United States Supreme Court have consistently upheld the 
constitutionality of the death qualification process.  The 
exclusion of panelists who are substantially impaired from 
performing their duties as a capital juror does not violate the 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
43 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an impartial jury.  (Lockhart 
v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 177–178; People v. Taylor (2010) 
48 Cal.4th 574, 602.)  The high court’s decision in Lockhart 
“remains good law despite some criticism in law review articles.  
[Citations.]  ‘We may not depart from the high court ruling as to 
the United States Constitution, and defendant presents no good 
reason to reconsider our ruling[s] as to the California 
Constitution.’ ”  (Howard, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 26.)  Nor does 
the death qualification process violate capital defendants’ 
constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of 
the community.  (Lockhart, at pp. 173–177; Suarez, supra, 10 
Cal.5th at p. 139; Taylor, at p. 603.)  “ ‘Death qualification,’ 
unlike the wholesale exclusion of blacks, women, or Mexican-
Americans from jury service, is carefully designed to serve the 
State’s concededly legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury 
that can properly and impartially apply the law to the facts of 
the case at both the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital 
trial.  There is very little danger, therefore, . . . that ‘death 
qualification’ was instituted as a means for the State to 
arbitrarily skew the composition of capital-case juries.”  
(Lockhart, at pp. 175–176, fn. omitted.) 
 
Relying primarily on law review articles, defendant 
argues the high court’s death qualification jurisprudence should 
be reexamined in light of the original understanding of the jury 
trial right.  Because the practice of removing potential jurors 
who could not vote for death did not develop until the early 
nineteenth century, defendant argues it is too “recent” a 
development to command adherence today.  He notes that the 
United State Supreme Court has reexamined much of its Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence on this basis in the past 15 years 
(see, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
44 
(Apprendi); Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36) and 
overturned several venerable precedents in the process.  That 
may be.  However, this court is not the United States Supreme 
Court, and we are not empowered to alter federal constitutional 
law.  Defendant’s challenge to the Witherspoon-Witt framework 
is more appropriately addressed to the high court.  (See 
Capistrano, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 864.)  Because defendant 
raises no separate challenge to our holdings under the 
California Constitution, we have no occasion to reconsider those 
decisions. 
B. Penalty Phase Issues 
1. Absence of Penalty Phase Defense  
 
Defendant contends the absence of a penalty phase 
defense rendered his death verdict constitutionally unreliable.  
We have consistently rejected such claims and do so again here. 
a. Background 
 
Shortly after the jury returned guilty verdicts, defense 
counsel reported that defendant wanted to represent himself in 
the penalty phase.  (See Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 
806.)  Asked how long his penalty phase presentation would last 
if the motion were denied, counsel responded that, based on his 
discussions with defendant, “my time would probably be zero.”  
 
At the next hearing, the court observed that defendant 
had no constitutional right to self-representation midtrial and 
asked him to explain the request.  Defendant said he disagreed 
with his attorney’s strategy for the penalty phase.  Specifically, 
counsel “would attempt . . . to show mitigating factors that I 
don’t approve of.”  Defendant said “the only thing” he wanted to 
defend against was “the gang allegations.”  Although he 
recognized the jury had just found the gang allegations untrue, 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
45 
he believed his Aryan Brotherhood validation would be brought 
up again.  “Other than that,” he said, “I don’t plan on putting on 
any mitigating evidence at all.”  Defendant wanted to call 
Richard Terflinger and Joseph Hayes on the “gang issues.”  He 
also thought they could testify as “character witnesses” for him.  
Guilt phase evidence revealed that both were Aryan 
Brotherhood members.  Defense counsel disagreed with this 
strategy.  The prosecutor also objected to testimony from these 
witnesses, whom he believed defendant wanted to bring to court 
for “an inappropriate reason.”  
 
The court observed that the Faretta request was untimely.  
It advised defendant that, pursuant to People v. Bradford (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 1229 and People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991 (Lang), 
he could insist that no mitigating evidence be presented but 
would then be estopped from claiming ineffective assistance of 
counsel on appeal.  The court also cited People v. Bloom (1989) 
48 Cal.3d 1194 (Bloom), noting that defendant’s desire to 
present no mitigating evidence had to be respected, despite 
counsel’s opposition.  Defendant affirmed for the record that he 
would be instructing counsel to present no mitigating evidence 
if the motion for self-representation was denied.  After further 
argument, the court denied the Faretta motion, citing the 
lateness of the request and the quality of counsel’s 
representation.   
 
Defense counsel then informed the court that he would not 
be calling Terflinger or Hayes.  Instead, pursuant to defendant’s 
instructions, he would present no mitigating evidence.  The 
court asked whether defendant was “asking the jury essentially 
to put him to death.”  Defendant answered, “No,” and counsel 
said, “I don’t know whether he’s asking that or not, Your Honor, 
but he just says he doesn’t want to put on any mitigating 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
46 
evidence.”  The court stated that if defendant did not present 
mitigating evidence or argument, he would be effectively asking 
the jury to put him to death.  Counsel responded, “I can’t get into 
his mind, Your Honor.  We have a good relationship . . . .  But I 
cannot get into his mind, because I have talked to him at length 
about this very matter.”  The court encouraged counsel to review 
Bloom, Bradford, Lang, and several other cases, and set the 
matter for further consideration in the afternoon, explaining, “I 
need to know whether the defendant has made an intelligent 
choice in deciding that he does not wish his lawyer to present 
any evidence in mitigation.  And so we may need to take a 
waiver with respect to that.”  
 
When they returned, defense counsel summarized cases 
holding that the client may choose to forgo a mitigation defense 
and counsel does not render ineffective assistance by complying 
with that choice.  (See, e.g., People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 
1132, 1185–1186.)  He then stated, “Mr. Poore has made it clear 
to me that he does not want me to present a . . . case in 
mitigation . . . .  And, of course, if he wants me not to do that, I 
will not do that, and I will sit here and say no questions, no 
objections[,] and no final argument, I suppose.”  The court then 
questioned defendant as follows: 
 
“THE COURT:  Mr. Poore, you’ve heard what your 
attorney has just said; correct? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
“THE COURT:  Is that what you wish him to do? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
“THE COURT:  You understand that there may be some 
evidence which is mitigating evidence? 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
47 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
“THE COURT:  And you understand that there may be 
some argument that your attorney can make which may 
convince the jurors that life without possibility of parole would 
be the appropriate penalty rather than death? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
“THE COURT:  But you don’t wish him to make that 
argument; is that correct? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  That’s correct. 
 
“THE COURT:  So it is your position that you are ordering 
your attorney not to present any mitigating evidence; correct? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Correct. 
 
“THE COURT:  And you are ordering your attorney not to 
argue against the death penalty; correct? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Correct. 
 
“THE COURT:  Knowing that the jury may order the 
death penalty, you do not wish to resist that; is that correct? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Correct.”  
 
The penalty phase proceeded, with the defense asking no 
questions on cross-examination.  When the prosecution rested, 
defense counsel announced that the defense waived its opening 
statement, would call no witnesses, and rested its case.  The 
proceedings were adjourned.   The next day, however, the court 
informed the attorneys it wanted to revisit defendant’s decision 
not to present mitigating evidence.  The court explained it 
wanted to question defendant further about his decision to 
ensure it was knowing and voluntary.  Further, “I also wish to 
seek to persuade the defendant to change his mind, to encourage 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
48 
him to consult further with counsel before making a final 
decision, and to advise him that his decision may, in fact, result 
in a verdict of death, and will not be a basis for reversal on 
appeal.”  
 
The parties returned in the afternoon.  Defense counsel 
stated that he had spoken with defendant “once again about his 
right to present mitigating evidence, about the witnesses that 
we would call,” noting that they had spoken of these subjects 
before.  He reported that defendant still did not wish to present 
a case in mitigation.  The court then inquired: 
 
“THE COURT:  All right.  Mr. Poore, you understand that 
you have the right to present mitigating evidence in this case? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
“THE COURT:  You also understand that you have the 
right not to present mitigating evidence if you choose not to do 
so? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
“THE COURT:  What are your wishes in that respect? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  To not present any mitigating 
evidence at all. 
 
“THE COURT:  Is there anything which the court can do 
to convince you that you should present mitigating evidence in 
this case? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  No. 
 
“THE COURT:  Is there anything which has improperly 
influenced you not to present mitigating evidence? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  No. 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
49 
 
“THE COURT:  Has anyone threatened you or coerced you 
to not present mitigating evidence? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  No. 
 
“THE COURT:  Has anyone made you any promises to not 
present mitigating evidence? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  No. 
 
“THE COURT:  Have you discussed with [defense counsel] 
the existence of specific mitigating evidence? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.  Thoroughly. 
 
“THE COURT:  Have you discussed their readiness to 
present that mitigating evidence? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
“THE COURT:  Have you discussed with [defense counsel] 
their recommendation that mitigating evidence be presented? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
“THE COURT:  I previously encouraged you to consult 
further with counsel before making a final decision concerning 
the presentation of mitigating evidence.  [¶] Have you had an 
opportunity to speak with counsel concerning that? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
“THE COURT:  On more than one occasion? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
“THE COURT:  Has there been any change in your stance 
whatsoever with respect to the presentation of mitigating 
evidence? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  None, Your Honor. 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
50 
 
“THE COURT:  You understand that your decision may, 
in fact, result in a verdict of death? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
“THE COURT:  You understand also that this decision to 
not present mitigating evidence may not only result in a verdict 
of death, but it will not be a basis for reversal on appeal? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
“THE COURT:  And knowing all of that, you still choose 
not to present any mitigating evidence? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.”  
 
The court then asked defense counsel whether it would 
refrain from presenting mitigating evidence for any other reason 
besides defendant’s choice.  Counsel responded in the negative, 
noting he had been prepared to call certain witnesses but 
defendant did not want them to testify.  Counsel stated, “The 
only reason I’m not presenting mitigating evidence is because 
he does not want mitigating evidence.”  Counsel then explained 
that he did not accede to defendant’s desire to call Terflinger and 
Hayes because he “did not feel that those two gentlemen would 
be witnesses that would help my case . . . if I were allowed to call 
them.”13  Thereafter, counsel confirmed the defense would 
present no closing argument.  
 
13  
In proceedings held outside the prosecution’s presence, 
defendant said Terflinger and Hayes could have shed light “from 
a different side” on his experiences in prison.  Defense counsel 
was of the firm view that the witnesses would harm the defense, 
however, because they would be questioned about their gang 
membership, their long prison terms, and “every bad thing that 
they had ever done in . . . prison.”  He believed the gang 
allegations against defendant “would still be in the jury’s mind,” 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
51 
b. Analysis 
 
Contrary to his position in the trial court, defendant now 
argues a “capital defendant cannot unilaterally waive his 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right to have the jury 
consider mitigating evidence.”  He further contends the jury’s 
inability to consider mitigating evidence rendered his sentence 
unreliable.  Settled case law, which defendant’s briefing largely 
ignores, is to the contrary. 
 
The failure to present mitigating evidence at the penalty 
phase of a capital murder trial “does not, in and of itself, render 
a judgment of death constitutionally unreliable.”  (People v. 
Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 112; Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at 
p. 1030; Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1228.)  “Rather, the 
required reliability is attained when the prosecution has 
discharged its burden of proof at the guilt and penalty phases 
pursuant to the rules of evidence and within the guidelines of a 
constitutional death penalty statute, the death verdict has been 
returned under proper instructions and procedures, and the 
trier of penalty has duly considered the relevant mitigating 
evidence, if any, which the defendant has chosen to present.  A 
judgment of death entered in conformity with these rigorous 
 
and testimony from Terflinger and Hayes would harm the jury’s 
view of any other mitigation evidence he might present.  
Defendant said he wanted to call Terflinger and Hayes because 
“they’re not family members.”  He did not “care about putting 
them through the process of the penalty phase” because he 
believed “that they could have offered evidence as far as . . . 
knowing me in prison, what my experiences would have been, 
and what might have led up to most of the circumstances that 
the District Attorney has brought out in the penalty phase.”  
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
52 
standards does not violate the Eighth Amendment reliability 
requirements.”  (Bloom, at p. 1228.) 
 
Our cases have also held that a defendant is not deprived 
of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by “counsel’s 
acquiescence in the defendant’s own decision that no defense 
shall be presented on his behalf.”  (People v. Amezcua and Flores 
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 886, 925, italics added (Amezcua and Flores).)  
“To require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence over 
the defendant’s objection would be inconsistent with an 
attorney’s paramount duty of loyalty to the client and would 
undermine the trust, essential for effective representation, 
existing between attorney and client.”  (Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d 
at p. 1031.)14 
 
As the record quoted above demonstrates, defendant was 
thoroughly advised of his right to present mitigating evidence.  
The court questioned defendant directly twice, using “the same 
kind of care that is required when ensuring that the waiver of 
any substantial right is personally and properly made.”  
(Amezcua and Flores, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 926.)  The court 
explored whether defendant had discussed specific mitigating 
evidence with counsel.  It confirmed that defendant understood 
he could be sentenced to death as a consequence of his refusal to 
 
14  
Because defendant does not contend the absence of a 
penalty phase defense deprived him of the effective assistance 
of counsel, we need not decide whether such decisions about 
penalty phase evidence are among the “objective[s] of the 
defense” over which a represented defendant retains control, for 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment.  (McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 
584 U.S. ___ [138 S.Ct. 1500, 1508] (McCoy).) 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
53 
present mitigating evidence.  The court even asked whether 
there was anything it could do to change defendant’s mind.15 
 
In his reply brief, defendant attempts to argue that he did 
want to present mitigating evidence, but his lawyer 
unreasonably refused to call the two witnesses he wanted to 
testify.16  Defendant does not attempt to describe with any 
particularity what mitigating evidence Terflinger and Hayes 
would have presented.  He initially told the court their 
testimony would respond to a suggestion that his gang 
affiliation indicated future dangerousness, but because the 
prosecutor did not present such evidence the need for this 
anticipated rebuttal did not arise.  Although defendant later 
suggested the witnesses could have presented “a different side” 
of his prison experiences, his attorney strongly believed that 
their testimony would be harmful to the defense. 
 
Defendant had no right to control how his lawyer would 
present a defense if he chose one because “[t]rial management is 
the lawyer’s province.”  (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. __ [138 
 
15  
Defendant suggests we should ignore the second colloquy 
because it came after the parties had rested.  In raising the 
matter again at this stage, it is clear the court wanted to ensure 
an adequate record and confirm that defendant was fully 
advised of his right to present mitigating evidence.  The jury had 
not yet received its penalty phase instructions, and from the 
court’s remarks it is apparent the court would have reopened 
the case if defendant changed his mind.   
16  
Despite defendant’s present assertion that he had a “clear 
conflict” with his attorney, we note that he did not pursue a 
motion under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.  He did not 
object when counsel informed the court that “we have a good 
relationship,” nor does he claim the denial of his Faretta motion 
was error. 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
54 
S.Ct. at p. 1508].)  Counsel properly has the prerogative to 
control “choices affecting conduct of the trial, including the 
objections to make, the witnesses to call, and the arguments to 
advance.”  (Gonzalez v. United States (2008) 553 U.S. 242, 249, 
italics added; see McCoy, at p. __ [138 S.Ct at p. 1508].)  “When 
a defendant chooses to be represented by professional counsel, 
that counsel is ‘captain of the ship’ and can make all but a few 
fundamental decisions for the defendant.”  (People v. Carpenter 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 376; see In re Barnett (2003) 31 Cal.4th 
466, 472.)  
 
Defendant’s attorney was not required to present 
testimony from gang members Terflinger and Hayes simply 
because defendant wanted these witnesses to appear.  Counsel 
reasonably believed the witnesses would not help the defense.  
Guilt phase evidence was offered on defendant’s purported 
association with the Aryan Brotherhood and the role it may 
have played in his offenses.  However, having heard that 
evidence, the jury rejected all gang enhancement allegations.  If 
defendant had called two known gang members to testify on his 
behalf, the jury might well have second guessed its decision, 
undermining the credibility of the defense.  Moreover, the jury 
received evidence in the guilt phase of a letter in which 
defendant said he was trying to bring these same two men to 
court.  Witnesses familiar with the Aryan Brotherhood testified 
that individuals associated with the gang frequently sought to 
call other gang members as witnesses because trips away from 
prison gave members an opportunity to conduct illicit gang 
business.  Indeed, the prosecution presented evidence indicating 
that Terflinger, in particular, had been trying to arrange a trip 
to court that fall.  Defense counsel’s refusal to call them did not 
render the death verdict unreliable. 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
55 
2. Delay in Providing Habeas Counsel  
 
In People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 202, we 
rejected as speculative a capital defendant’s claim that the state 
would “likely” fail to provide him with habeas corpus counsel in 
a timely manner, in violation of numerous constitutional 
provisions.  Defendant makes a similar claim here, arguing he 
has been on death row for nearly 20 years yet is still awaiting 
habeas counsel.  He contends California’s delay in this regard 
violates his rights to counsel, reliable proceedings, and other 
elements of due process.  Although more definite in its 
articulation, defendant’s challenge is no more meritorious than 
the one we rejected in Williams.  Defendant filed a habeas 
corpus petition in propria persona but withdrew it a week after 
his appellate counsel filed the opening brief in this appeal.  He 
has presented us with no reason to doubt that counsel will 
ultimately be appointed to represent his interests in collateral 
proceedings.  Accordingly, his arguments here are speculative. 
 
Moreover, defendant’s claim is not the sort we have 
considered cognizable on direct appeal because it “ ‘does not 
affect the validity of the judgment and is not a basis for reversal 
of the judgment on appeal.’ ”  (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 50, 106.)  “On direct appeal, defendant is restricted to 
claims ‘bear[ing] on the validity of the death sentence itself.’ ”  
(Ibid.; see People v. Charles (2015) 61 Cal.4th 308, 336 
[challenge to state’s execution method not cognizable on appeal]; 
People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 919 [claim of error 
relating to sealing of attorney’s billing records not cognizable on 
appeal].)  Defendant’s claim is premature and provides no basis 
for disturbing the judgment. 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
56 
3. Delay in Death Penalty Review  
 
Defendant argues the delay in California’s administration 
of the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment.  We have consistently rejected 
this claim, explaining that “the automatic appeal process 
following judgments of death is a constitutional safeguard, not 
a constitutional defect [citations], because it assures careful 
review of the defendant’s conviction and sentence [citation].”  
(Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 606.) 
 
We also recently considered the related claim under Jones 
v. Chappell (C.D.Cal. 2014) 31 F.Supp.3d 1050, reversed by 
Jones v. Davis (9th Cir. 2015) 806 F.3d 538, that systematic 
delays render California’s capital punishment scheme arbitrary 
and capricious in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  (People 
v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1368–1375.)  We found no 
support for the claim.  Differences relating to when defendants 
complete the judicial review process “are not necessarily 
attributable to arbitrariness . . . , but may instead represent the 
legitimate variances present in each individual case,” including 
the nature of the facts, length of the record, complexity and 
number of issues raised, quality of the briefing, and other 
matters.  (Id. at p. 1374.)  Moreover, we observed, there is no 
“randomness or a lack of rationality” in a system of judicial 
review that affords each case the amount of time needed for this 
court’s careful examination of each claim based on its specific 
factual context.  (Id. at p. 1375.) 
 
Defendant’s briefing offers no basis to reexamine these 
conclusions.  (See People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 453–
454 (Rhoades); Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 488; People v. 
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 645.) 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
57 
4. Challenges to Death Penalty Statute  
 
Defendant raises a number of challenges to the 
constitutionality of California’s death penalty statute.  He 
acknowledges that we have previously rejected all of these 
claims but presents them again to urge reconsideration and 
preserve the issues for federal review.  (See People v. Schmeck 
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 303–304.)  We adhere to our settled 
precedents, which hold: 
 
The class of offenders eligible for the death penalty under 
section 190.2 is not impermissibly broad.  (People v. Potts (2019) 
6 Cal.5th 1012, 1060 (Potts); People v. Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5th 989, 
1018.)  The special circumstances are not so numerous or 
expansive as to defeat their constitutionally required narrowing 
function.  (Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 488.) 
 
Section 190.3, factor (a), which permits aggravation based 
on the circumstances of the crime, does not result in arbitrary 
and capricious imposition of the death penalty.  (Rhoades, 
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 455; People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 
1013 (Capers).) 
 
The jury’s use of unadjudicated criminal conduct in 
aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b) does not violate due 
process or result in cruel and unusual punishment.  (People v. 
Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 954 (Hoyt); Bryant, Smith and 
Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 469.) 
 
As we have often explained, the jury’s penalty choice is a 
normative decision, not a factual one.  (Beck and Cruz, supra, 8 
Cal.5th at p. 670.)  For this reason, California’s death penalty 
scheme does not violate the federal Constitution for failing to 
require written findings (People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 
678 (Molano)); unanimous findings as to the existence of 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
58 
aggravating factors or unadjudicated criminal activity (Capers, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1013); or findings beyond a reasonable 
doubt as to the existence of aggravating factors (other than 
section 190.3, factor (b) or (c) evidence), that aggravating factors 
outweigh mitigating factors, or that death is the appropriate 
penalty (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 213 (Fayed); 
People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 350 (Krebs)).  The high 
court’s decisions in Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. 
Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, and Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 
U.S. 92 do not alter these conclusions.  (Rhoades, supra, 8 
Cal.5th at p. 455; Capers, at pp. 1013–1014.) 
 
Defendant challenges two aspects of the jury instructions 
concerning mitigating evidence.  The predicate for these claims 
fails because defendant instructed his counsel to present no 
mitigating evidence in the penalty phase.  In any event, we have 
held the words “extreme” and “substantial” in CALJIC No. 8.85 
do not unduly constrain the jury’s consideration of mitigating 
circumstances.  (Molano, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 678; People v. 
Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 94.)  The court was not 
constitutionally required to instruct that certain factors were 
relevant only for mitigation.  (Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 351; 
Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1061.) 
 
The federal Constitution does not require intercase 
proportionality review.  (Hoyt, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 955; 
Rhoades, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 455–456.)  Nor does the death 
penalty law violate equal protection because it provides 
different procedures for capital and noncapital defendants.  
(Fayed, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 214; Rhoades, at p. 456.)  
California’s capital sentencing scheme does not violate 
international norms or the Eighth Amendment.  (Beck and Cruz, 
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 671; Molano, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 679.) 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
59 
 
Finally, “considering the arguments in combination, and 
viewing the death penalty law as a whole, it is not 
constitutionally 
defective. 
 
Defendant’s 
challenges 
to 
California’s death penalty scheme ‘are no more persuasive when 
considered together,’ than when considered separately.  
[Citation.]  ‘California’s capital sentencing scheme as a whole 
provides adequate safeguards against the imposition of 
arbitrary or unreliable death judgments.’ ”  (People v. Anderson 
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 426.) 
C. Cumulative Error  
 
Defendant asserts that cumulative prejudice resulting 
from errors in the guilt and penalty phases requires reversal of 
the judgment.  Although the court committed statutory error by 
allowing defendant to be absent from trial without a written 
waiver (see § 977, subd. (b)(1); Wall, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1060), 
we have identified no additional errors, nor any ruling that 
caused defendant undue prejudice.  Accordingly, the claim fails.  
(See People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 417.) 
 
 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
60 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J.
 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
S104665 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
In a line of cases tracing back to People v. Lang (1989) 
49 Cal.3d 991, this court has held that counsel to a capital 
defendant 
does 
not 
provide 
constitutionally 
ineffective 
assistance under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution by acquiescing to the defendant’s desire not to 
present evidence in mitigation at the penalty phase.  (Lang, at 
p. 1031.)  We have said that a defendant may “request not to 
present certain evidence for nontactical reasons,” and counsel’s 
agreement to that request is not deficient performance.  (Ibid.; 
see, e.g., People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 112 [“[I]f a 
competent defendant decides for nontactical reasons to present 
no mitigating evidence, he cannot later label counsel ineffective 
for honoring the defendant’s own wishes.”].) 
This rule appears in some tension with the high court’s 
recent decision in McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 584 U.S. __ 
[138 S.Ct. 1500] (McCoy).  McCoy held that a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel is violated when 
defense counsel concedes guilt over the client’s objection.  
(McCoy, at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1509].)  The high court 
explained that decisions about the objectives of a criminal 
defense are “reserved for the client.”  (Id. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at 
p. 1508].)  This includes the decision “that the objective of the 
defense is to assert innocence.”  (Ibid.)  In McCoy’s framing, “the 
objective of the defense” appears to mean the verdict the 
defendant seeks to obtain — guilt of the charged offense, guilt of 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Liu, J., concurring 
2 
a lesser offense, or innocence.  By contrast, “[t]rial management 
is the lawyer’s province:  Counsel provides his or her assistance 
by making decisions such as ‘what arguments to pursue, what 
evidentiary objections to raise, and what agreements to conclude 
regarding the admission of evidence.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
It is not obvious that decisions about the particular 
evidence to present at the penalty phase — or whether to 
present mitigation evidence at all — should be considered part 
of “the objective of the defense” that remains within a 
represented defendant’s control under the division of roles 
articulated in McCoy.  (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. __ [138 
S.Ct. at p. 1508].)  Rather, those decisions would seem to be 
aspects of “[t]rial management” reserved to counsel:  They are 
“strategic choices about how best to achieve a client’s objectives” 
as opposed to “choices about what the client’s objectives in fact 
are.”  (Ibid.)  Following McCoy, when a capital defendant at the 
penalty phase has decided to seek a verdict of life without the 
possibility of parole rather than death, counsel may be 
empowered to decide what evidence to bring forward to advance 
that objective, and ceding that authority to the defendant may 
constitute ineffective assistance. 
In this case, defendant Christopher Eric Poore has argued 
that his counsel’s acquiescence in his desire not to present 
certain mitigating evidence rendered his death verdict 
unreliable for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, but he has 
not argued that it was ineffective assistance of counsel under 
the Sixth Amendment.  The court’s opinion therefore does not 
reach that Sixth Amendment question.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 52, fn. 14.)  Whether McCoy affects our precedent on the right 
of a capital defendant to control counsel’s presentation of 
mitigating evidence awaits assessment by our court in a case in 
PEOPLE v. POORE 
Liu, J., concurring 
3 
which the issue is presented.  With that understanding, I join 
the court’s opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Poore 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S104665 
Date Filed:  June 27, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Riverside 
Judge:  Randall D. White 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
R. Clayton Seaman, Jr., and Patricia A. Scott, under appointments by 
the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald S. Matthias, Assistant 
Attorney General, Theodore M. Cropley, Anthony Da Silva and 
Michael T. Murphy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Patricia A. Scott 
Attorney At Law 
P.O. Box 11056 
Prescott, AZ 86304 
(928) 233-5415 
 
Michael T. Murphy 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9211