Title: People v. Suarez

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ARTURO JUAREZ SUAREZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S105876 
 
Napa County Superior Court 
CR103779 
 
 
August 13, 2020 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred.  
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Cuéllar 
concurred. 
 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
S105876 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
After this case was transferred from Placer County to 
Napa County, a jury found defendant Arturo Juarez Suarez 
guilty of the first degree murders of José Martinez, Juan 
Martinez, J.M., and A.M. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found 
true the allegations that he personally used a firearm in the 
murders of José and Juan (id. § 12022.53, subd. (d)) and that he 
personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the murders 
of J.M. and A.M. (id. § 12022, subd. (b)(1)).  (All undesignated 
statutory references are to the Penal Code.)  The jury found true 
the special circumstances that he committed these murders 
while lying in wait (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(15)) and that he 
had been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the 
first or second degree (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)).  The jury also found 
him guilty of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), unlawful 
penetration by a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)), and kidnapping 
to commit rape (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)) of Y.M., and the jury found 
true the enhancement allegations for those offenses.  Following 
the penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death.  The trial 
court sentenced him to death.  This appeal is automatic.  
(§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment.   
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
2 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase  
1. Prosecution Case 
a. Before the murders  
 
Arturo Juarez Suarez (Juarez) was a seasonal worker at 
the Parnell Ranch in Auburn in 1998.  He lived in a trailer on 
the ranch and worked six days a week, typically taking Sundays 
off.  He was married to Maria Isabel Juarez de Martinez (Isabel), 
and he was friends with her brothers José and Juan Martinez, 
all of whom had grown up in the same town in Mexico.   
 
José and his wife Y.M. lived in Galt with their five-year-
old son, J.M., and three-year-old daughter, A.M.  Juan also lived 
with them.  Juarez often spent holidays and weekends with the 
family.  He had a good relationship with J.M. and A.M.   
 
Y.M. testified that Juarez made her uncomfortable on two 
occasions, a few years before the capital crimes.  One time, he 
grabbed her waist, she told him to let her go, he said he was not 
going to do anything, and he let her go.  She slapped his face, 
and he told her not to hit him.  Another time, he touched her 
ribs and her neck, and she told him to leave her alone.  She told 
José about one of these occasions, and it caused some problems 
that were ultimately resolved.    
 
On July 4, 1998, José, Y.M., J.M., A.M., and Juan visited 
San Francisco without telling Juarez.  When they returned, 
Juarez and his friend Ernesto Orozco were at the Martinezes’ 
home.  Juarez and Orozco spent the night there.  Y.M. thought 
Juarez seemed upset when they said that they had not been able 
to call him before they had left for San Francisco that day.  
Orozco testified that he did not notice any problems, but on the 
drive there, he commented that the Parnell Ranch seemed like 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
3 
a nice place to live, and Juarez replied, “You’re way off.  One can 
go crazy here by oneself.”   
 
Before leaving, Juarez made plans with José for the next 
weekend.  Y.M. testified that her family planned to pick him up 
from the Parnell Ranch on Sunday, July 12 and give him their 
car to attend an immigration appointment on Monday, July 13.  
Juarez told his boss, Jack Parnell, that he planned to work on 
July 12 and take off July 13. 
b. July 12, 1998      
 
At 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. on July 12, José, Y.M., J.M., A.M., and 
Juan arrived at the Parnell Ranch.  José wore a watch, Juan 
wore gold chains, and both carried wallets.  Y.M. wore green 
shorts, a white shirt, and tennis shoes.   
 
When they arrived, they did not see Juarez.  Y.M. went to 
his trailer to retrieve some soap to wash their car.  As she 
returned to the car, she saw Juarez and José walking together 
toward it.  She did not see Juan.  Before washing the car, José 
needed to fix an issue with the car’s battery, and Juarez gave 
him a knife to assist.  While José fixed the issue, Juarez left.  
When Juarez returned, he asked José to accompany him, which 
José did.  Y.M. finished washing the car, went toward the trailer, 
and saw Juarez and José standing in the field.      
 
Juarez returned and asked Y.M. for the car keys, which 
she gave him.  He went into his trailer, changed his pants, and 
asked her if she wanted anything from the store.  She requested 
chips and a tea drink.  Around this time, she noticed a rifle 
“standing there,” although she did not recall its precise location.  
Once he left, she walked around the ranch with her children for 
an hour and a half. 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
4 
 
Juarez returned with chips, a tea drink, and beer.  Y.M. 
asked where José and Juan were, and Juarez said that they 
were cleaning and cutting a deer that he had killed.  Juarez 
asked her to cut some aluminum foil for the deer meat and said 
that he was going back to the deer.  After cutting some foil, Y.M. 
sat in a chair outside the trailer.  J.M. and A.M. played 
Nintendo, which Juarez had turned on for them, inside the 
trailer, and later came outside.   
 
Suddenly, Juarez put a rope around Y.M.’s neck, dragged 
her to the trailer, and kicked her.  Her children cried; J.M. 
yelled, “Don’t hit my mommy,” and A.M. hugged J.M.  Juarez 
shouted at J.M. to shut up.  Y.M. lost consciousness. 
 
Inside the trailer, Juarez put a chain around Y.M.’s neck, 
tied her wrists behind her back, and tied her feet.  When she 
regained consciousness, Y.M. was lying on the floor on her back.  
He cut her shorts and underwear with scissors, exposing her 
private parts, and he unzipped his pants.  He put his fingers in 
her anus and his penis in her vagina.  He said, “Since you didn’t 
want to willingly, now you’re gonna get fucked up.”  She 
screamed for her husband.  She did not hear her children at this 
time.  
 
Juarez tied Y.M. to something before leaving and coming 
back.  She lapsed in and out of consciousness.  He told her not 
to move too much or else she would get strangled.  He put a 
handkerchief around her mouth, using gray tape; turned on the 
radio loud; and left.  She lost consciousness.  Eventually, she 
untied herself and left, leaving behind a tennis shoe and taking 
a knife to defend herself.  She did not turn off the radio.  She ran 
to Dorothy Parnell’s home, located on the ranch.  Dorothy let her 
inside and called 911 at 9:15 p.m.   
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
5 
 
Jack and his son Jacob Parnell testified about that day.  In 
the late morning or the afternoon, Jack told Juarez to clean an 
area near a barn on the ranch, and Juarez seemed abrupt, which 
was out of character.  Around 5:00 p.m., Jack saw Juarez driving 
the Martinezes’ car much faster than usual.  Around 6:30 or 7:00 
p.m., Jacob saw Y.M. and her children walking around the 
ranch.  Between 7:15 and 7:30 p.m., Jacob saw Juarez driving a 
tractor with a trailer.  Also, sometime in the days or weeks 
before that day, Jack saw Juarez coming from a target range 
area on the ranch and carrying a small caliber rifle, which he 
had not seen him carry before.         
c. The investigation    
 
When law enforcement officers arrived at the Parnell 
Ranch, Y.M. was hysterical.  She wore a long shirt that had 
blood on it, a bandanna around her neck, and beige underwear 
that Dorothy had given her.  She had a sock and a tennis shoe 
on her left foot, and a sock and a cord tied around her ankle on 
her right foot.  She had blue-green underwear, with its crotch 
area cut, wrapped around her waist.  She had rope marks 
around her ankles, wrists, and throat, and duct tape in her hair 
and wrapped around her neck.  Her face and lip were swollen, 
and she had dried blood in her mouth, blood coming out of her 
right ear, and abrasions, bruises, and discoloration around her 
eyes.  That night, she repeated “Arturo bad” and described his 
attack. 
 
Around 9:30 p.m., Deputy Mark Reed and Deputy Kurt 
Walker entered Juarez’s trailer to look for him.  He was not 
there.  Deputy Reed located and seized a .22-caliber rifle and a 
.30-06 rifle.  The .22-caliber rifle was loaded, and there was 
ammunition for the .30-06 rifle in the trailer.  Around 11:45 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
6 
p.m., Detective William Summers and Deputy Randy Owens 
entered Juarez’s trailer in an effort to locate identifying 
information.   
 
The following day, Y.M. returned to the Parnell Ranch and 
noticed, in front of the trailer, a piece of broken wood that had 
not been there the day before.  That afternoon, Detective Desiree 
Carrington searched the trailer pursuant to a warrant.  Outside 
the trailer, she saw a wooden stick, twine, a chair, an iced tea 
can, a beer can, a golf club, clear glass, duct tape, rope, a silver 
chain, a pair of green shorts with a brown belt, and three .22-
caliber expended casings.  In the screened porch, she found duct 
tape, a silver chain, a roll of plastic wrap inside an aluminum 
foil box, aluminum foil, and a pair of scissors.  Inside the trailer, 
she saw twine, a black wallet or checkbook cover, a white tennis 
shoe, a roll of duct tape, boxes of ammunition, and a 12-pack of 
beer, among other items.  There were boots under the bed, and 
inside them were three metal chains, a watch, and two wallets 
containing identification for José and Juan, $147 in American 
currency, and $80 in Mexican pesos.  These items did not have 
dirt on them, and the clasps on the chains appeared undamaged.  
 
A piece of duct tape containing strands of dark hair was 
found in the field.  A criminalist testified that the hair could 
have come from A.M.’s head.  From the location of the tape, 
deputies noticed a set of faint tire tracks leading toward some 
berry bushes.  Following them with the assistance of search 
dogs, they came across a manmade opening in the bushes, with 
some sticks and wood placed in front of it.  This opening was 
approximately a quarter-mile from the trailer.  There, they 
found an area of freshly moved dirt that appeared to be a grave.  
There were no apparent blood trails or smears leading up to it.  
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
7 
Near it, there was a blood-spattered, square-nosed shovel 
without a handle and a round-nosed shovel.   
 
The grave was rectangular, measuring approximately five 
and a half to six feet in length, two feet in width, and three feet 
in depth.  Its walls were cut smoothly, at 90-degree angles.  An 
excavation team unearthed a child’s leg at approximately 19 
inches deep.  They then unearthed, first, a male child lying 
facedown; second, a female child lying faceup with a stick in her 
hand and her mouth open and covered with dirt; third, an adult 
male lying faceup with his legs and his right arm outstretched 
and his left arm crossed over his chest; and, finally, an adult 
male lying faceup with his legs outstretched and his hands 
crossed over his chest.  There was a .22-caliber expended casing 
inside the grave and an apparent blood stain on the floor of the 
grave.   
d. The autopsies and Y.M.’s injuries    
 
Dr. Donald Henrikson performed the autopsies.  J.M. had 
a depressed skull fracture and linear fractures extending into 
the base of his skull; contusions and abrasions on his face, back, 
and wrist; and hematomas in his shoulders, chest, and soft 
tissue near his skull.  He had residue of adhesive tape around 
his mouth, cheek, arms, and legs.  His mouth, trachea, and 
bronchial tree were full of dirt, and dirt was mixed with 
moisture near his mouth and nose.  He was hit at least once on 
his back and eight times on his head.  His back injury was 
consistent with a tubular instrument, such as a shovel handle, 
and his head injury was consistent with a shovel head.  The 
blunt force trauma likely rendered him unconscious but was not 
sufficient to cause his death.  He died of asphyxiation by 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
8 
obstruction of the airway due to aspiration of foreign material 
(soil).    
 
A.M. had three fractures in her skull, hematoma over both 
sides of her head, and contusions and abrasions on her face, 
head, trunk, arms, and legs.  She held a twig, and her airways 
had mud in them.  She had residue of adhesive tape on her chin, 
arms, and left ankle.  The blunt force trauma likely rendered 
her unconscious but was not sufficient to cause her death.  She 
died of asphyxiation due to obstruction of her airway by 
aspiration of foreign material (soil).   
 
José died of two gunshot wounds to his head, one to the 
back of his head and one in front of his left ear.  Both were 
contact wounds, fired from less than an inch away.  He also had 
abrasions and contusions on his head, trunk, arms, and right 
leg, and abrasions and contusions on his back, which suggested 
that he might have been dragged while supine.   
 
Juan died of three gunshot wounds to his head, all of 
which were fired from less than an inch away:  one to his upper 
right forehead; one to the left side of his nose; and one to the 
back of his head on the right.  He also had abrasions and 
contusions on his trunk and arms.   
 
Kim Marjama, a sexual assault nurse examiner, 
conducted a sexual assault examination of Y.M.  Y.M. had 
swelling, contusions, abrasions, and lacerations on her face, 
blood in her right inner ear canal, and a hematoma in her right 
eye.  There were swelling, contusions, and abrasions on her 
neck, and a red linear abrasion encircling her neck.  She had 
contusions and abrasions on her arms and legs, and red linear 
abrasions encircling her wrists and ankles.  In addition, she had 
marked edema bilaterally to her labia and a divot in her right 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
9 
inner labia.  She had marked edema and contusions in the 
periurethral area, and erythematous edema and an abrasion to 
the posterior fourchette.  She had normal findings inside her 
vagina, and no sperm was found.  Marjama testified that the 
posterior fourchette injuries were consistent with blunt force 
trauma, which was consistent with penile penetration, and that 
the divot in the labia was indicative of digital penetration. 
e. Juarez’s flight and arrest 
   
 
On Monday, July 13, Juarez went into a drugstore in 
Auburn, purchased a shirt and a cowboy hat, and asked for 
quarters.  He used a pay phone outside the store.  He called, 
among others, his cousin Pablo Juarez and asked Pablo to pick 
him up at a bus station in Sacramento.  Pablo did so.  Juarez 
told Pablo that he had been in a fight.  He said he had killed 
José, Juan, and the children, beaten Y.M., and shot José and 
Juan and put them in a hole.  He told Pablo the children had 
wanted to see their father and uncle, but he did not say how he 
had killed the children.  He left Pablo’s home that night. 
 
On Tuesday, July 14, Juarez arrived at Josefina Torres 
Yanez’s apartment in Wilmington, where she lived with Jorge 
Lucho and their children.  Juarez told Torres that he had shot 
and killed his brothers-in-law in self-defense because they were 
going to kill him.  He told her that he had killed the two children 
by hitting them with a stick or a shovel.  He did not know why 
he had killed the children, but he said they had been crying and 
he had been nervous.  He told her that he had hit and dragged 
Y.M. by her neck but had not raped her.  Juarez told Lucho that 
he had gotten into an argument with two coworkers, and while 
defending himself, he had shot and killed them.  Torres also 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
10 
testified that approximately a week earlier, Juarez had told her 
that his in-laws would kill him and he wanted to commit suicide.   
 
On Wednesday, July 15, law enforcement officers arrested 
Juarez at the apartment.  From the apartment, they seized a 
cowboy hat and a bag containing some clothing, a pocket knife, 
and a pen.  Following his arrest, Long Beach Police Detective 
Dennis Robbins and FBI Special Agent Elizabeth Stevens 
transported him to the police station.  During the drive, Juarez 
asked Stevens, who spoke Spanish, why they had arrested him 
(or something to that effect), and she told him he was being 
arrested for four murders and the rape of a female.  He said he 
did not rape the female.  He also said he had planned to leave 
the following day for Mexico.   
 
At the station, he said the murders were true but he did 
not rape the woman.  Detective Robbins and Agent Stevens 
interrogated Juarez for approximately an hour.  Juarez said he 
got into a heated discussion with his brothers-in-law after they 
had accused Juarez of womanizing, which he denied.  He was 
carrying a rifle, which Juan requested and placed on the ground.  
Juarez then shot the men with the rifle and dragged their bodies 
to a hole.  He returned to the trailer and beat his brother-in-
law’s wife.  He did not know why he beat her but said he had 
experienced sleeplessness and nervousness.  He then walked the 
children to the hole.  He did not know what he intended to do 
with them.  During the walk, the girl became tired, so he let go 
of the boy’s hand and carried her.  Once there, he hit the boy 
with the wooden part of a shovel, then hit the girl too, put their 
bodies in the hole, and put dirt on them.  He walked back to the 
trailer, saw police cars, and ran up a hill.   
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
11 
 
After being transported to Placer County, Juarez was 
interrogated the next morning by Sergeant Bob McDonald and 
Detective Michael Bennett.  Interpreter Frank Valdes 
translated their questions into Spanish for Juarez.  A tape of the 
interrogation was played.  
 
In the interrogation, Juarez initially said he shot José and 
Juan during an argument.  He said that he then beat and tied 
Y.M. and touched her vagina.  The children cried, and he taped 
them to quiet them; he removed the tape when he went outside 
the trailer, leaving Y.M. tied up.  He then walked with the 
children because they wanted to see their father.  The children 
calmed down.  He walked them to the hole, hit them over the 
head with a stick, put them with José and Juan, and put some 
dirt over them. 
 
Later in the interrogation, he said that he had planned it 
all for about a week.  Although he initially said he dug the hole 
that day, he subsequently said he dug the hole on Monday or 
Tuesday.  He dug the hole deep enough to fit Y.M.  Asked if he 
planned this because he had problems with the family, he 
replied affirmatively.  He said he killed José and Juan near the 
hole, after telling them that he had shot a deer and needed them 
to go to it.  He took their wallets and jewelry to avoid their being 
identified.  He said he killed the children because he did not 
have any other way out.  He also said that for five or six years 
he had suffered from sleeplessness and nervousness that 
affected his actions.  
f. Other evidence   
 
Criminalists testified that the casing found inside the 
grave and the three casings found around the trailer had been 
fired from Juarez’s .22-caliber rifle.  Bullet fragments recovered 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
12 
from José and Juan could have been fired from the rifle, but 
there were insufficient points of comparison to conclude that 
they were.  Scrapings from J.M. and A.M. revealed adhesive 
residue.  DNA analysis was conducted of several items, 
including the shovel, Juarez’s black pants, Y.M.’s blue 
underwear, and the scissors.  Juan could not be eliminated as a 
contributor of the DNA on the shovel.  Juarez and Y.M. could 
not be eliminated as contributors of the DNA on his black pants 
and on her blue underwear.  Juarez could not be eliminated as 
a contributor of the DNA on the scissors, and a random match 
of this profile would be expected in approximately one in 21,000 
Hispanics.  Juarez’s fingerprint also was found on duct tape.  
Finally, the jury visited the Parnell Ranch. 
2. Defense Case  
 
The defense cross-examined some witnesses about 
Juarez’s demeanor after July 12 and his complaints of 
headaches, sleeplessness, and nervousness.  The defense also 
presented four witnesses.  Y.M. testified that Juan sometimes 
did not accompany the family to the Parnell Ranch, so she did 
not know if Juarez thought Juan would accompany them on July 
12.  Detective Diana Stewart testified that on July 13, Y.M. had 
said she was not sure whether she had seen Juarez’s penis 
because she had lapsed in and out of consciousness.  A 
pathologist testified that Y.M.’s injuries could have been caused 
by hands or fingers, and it was inconclusive whether 
penetration had occurred.  An interpreter testified about 
translation and transcription errors in the taped interrogation.   
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
13 
B. Penalty Phase   
1. Prosecution Case 
 
Y.M. testified about the deceased victims.  Juan, who was 
27 years old, participated in activities with Y.M.’s family.  José, 
who was 37 years old, enjoyed helping people, playing soccer, 
and playing with his children.  He planned to own a business 
and a home.  J.M. and A.M. were affectionate and protected one 
another.  J.M. enjoyed going to school and being outside, and 
A.M. enjoyed playing with toys, going to McDonald’s, and going 
to the park.   
 
When Y.M. learned about their deaths, it was “like a 
nightmare,” and she “felt that [her] life had no meaning.”  She 
felt alone and hopeless.  She had to learn how to drive and to 
find work to support herself.  She wished she could turn back 
time and give her life for her children, and she felt a lot of pain 
for having been unable to do anything for them as they watched 
her being beaten.  She missed everything about her family.  She 
did not have plans for the future; she said that it was very 
difficult but that she will move on “with the help of God.”     
 
During her testimony, the prosecutor introduced a 
photograph of the family, a photograph of Juan with J.M. and 
A.M., and a home video of J.M. and A.M. on the day of their 
murders.   
2. Defense Case  
 
Juarez’s mother, Maria Suarez Aguilar, had 10 children 
with her husband, Tomas Juarez Gonzalez, in Santa Gertrudis, 
Mexico.  One of the children, Abundio, died in an accident.  The 
family was poor; they slept in the same room and did not have a 
bathroom inside the house.  Sometimes there was no food for the 
children.  Juarez was one of the youngest children.  His mother 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
14 
did not take him to see a doctor or a dentist, even when he had 
the measles.  He began work around the age of 10 and gave her 
his money.  He later sent her money from the United States.  
 
She testified that until about 10 years ago, her husband 
drank almost every day, and he hit her and said nasty things to 
her.  He yelled at the children but did not hit them.  She recalled 
a time when her son Abundio took her to Mexico City to protect 
her.  
 
Juarez’s living siblings testified about their childhoods 
and expressed their love for him.  Benjamin Juarez Suarez 
testified that their home did not have electricity or hot water 
when Juarez was born.  Their father drank, hit their mother, 
and yelled at her and the children.  Sometimes they had no food, 
and their father used their money to purchase alcohol.  When 
their mother left for Mexico City, some of the siblings, including 
Juarez, stayed with their father.  The family suffered when 
Abundio died.  Isaias Juarez Suarez testified that their father 
drank and hit, kicked, and ripped clothing off their mother.  
When this happened, Juarez became frightened and sad.  Their 
father also called the children vulgar names and hit Juarez 
several times.  Later, one of Isaias’s children died from 
leukemia, and Juarez provided money for his treatments and 
funeral.  Silviano Juarez Suarez testified that their father 
drank, but he hit the children only if they did something wrong.   
 
Beatriz Juarez Suarez testified that their father drank 
and yelled at their mother and the children.  During one 
argument, he threw a glass, which cut her sister Celia Juarez.  
Celia testified about that argument and about their father 
drinking and hitting their mother, their mother leaving for 
Mexico City, and the lack of food at home.  She testified that 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
15 
their father yelled at Juarez and hit him if he did something 
wrong.  Daniel Juarez Suarez testified that their father drank 
and sometimes hit or squeezed Juarez.  Miroslava Juarez 
Suarez testified that their father hit their mother, used money 
to buy alcohol instead of food, and hit the children when they 
did something that he did not like.  Maria Juarez Suarez 
testified about their father drinking and hitting them, their 
mother leaving for Mexico City, and the lack of food at home.  
One time, their father threw her onto the bed and tried to rape 
her, but she freed herself.   
 
In addition, Benjamin’s wife testified that she once saw 
their father go after Abundio with a knife.  Daniel’s wife testified 
that Juarez was one of her children’s godfathers and that he 
wrote her a letter when her father died.  A neighbor also testified 
about their father’s drinking, and other witnesses testified 
about Juarez’s generosity.  Juarez’s former teacher testified that 
he received good grades, was diligent, polite, and extroverted, 
and finished secondary school.  He did not attend preparatory 
school because he thought it would be better to work and support 
his family. 
 
Juarez’s daughter, Liliana Juarez Martinez, testified that 
she loved him.  Juarez’s wife, Isabel, testified that she gave birth 
to their daughter Liliana in 1990, and they married in a civil 
ceremony.  She gave birth to their second daughter Jessica in 
1992.  She lived with Juarez in the United States for a few years, 
but she returned to Mexico in 1995 when she experienced 
medical problems.  He sent her money about every three weeks, 
and he brought his daughters toys when he visited them. 
 
Isabel testified that in 1998 she asked for a separation 
because she was jealous, but he did not agree.  They ultimately 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
16 
resolved the issue between them.  She also testified that he 
complained of headaches and sleeplessness, for which he 
obtained some medicine in 1998.  Around this time, in March 
1998, Juarez told Daniel that he was having headaches and back 
pain, and Juarez looked sad and serious.  In April 1998, Juarez 
appeared sad and moody to Beatriz and her husband. 
 
A clinical psychologist and psychosocial and cultural 
expert testified that Juarez’s father brought shame to the family 
and affected the children’s emotional and social development.  
When Juarez’s mother departed for Mexico City, it created a 
sense of abandonment, and Abundio’s death caused significant 
grief.  The expert testified about the effects of poverty on their 
childhood and about the general experiences of migrant 
workers. 
 
James Esten, a correctional consultant, testified as an 
expert that Juarez would be able to adapt to the conditions of 
life imprisonment without parole, without posing a threat to 
others.  While Juarez was housed in Placer County and Napa 
County, he received no disciplinary write-ups, and his security 
classification was reduced. 
II.  JURY SELECTION ISSUES 
A. Challenges to Death Qualification 
 
“ ‘A prospective juror may be challenged for cause based 
upon his or her views regarding capital punishment only if those 
views 
would 
“ ‘prevent 
or 
substantially 
impair’ ” 
the 
performance of the juror’s duties as defined by the court’s 
instructions and the juror’s oath.’ ”  (People v. Wall (2017) 
3 Cal.5th 1048, 1061–1062.)  Juarez contends that this process 
of excluding prospective jurors whose views would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of their duties creates an 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
17 
unconstitutional death penalty scheme and violates his rights 
under statutory, constitutional, and international law.  He 
further contends that this process violates the rights of excluded 
prospective jurors.  Except as discussed below, he does not argue 
that the excluded jurors failed to meet the applicable standard 
for exclusion; rather, he asks us to reconsider our decisions 
permitting such exclusion.    
 
Even if we assume that Juarez did not forfeit these claims 
and has standing to assert them, they lack merit.  Juarez argues 
that our state statutes do not permit the death qualification 
process and asks us to overturn our contrary conclusion in 
People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566 (Riser).  In Riser, we 
interpreted Penal Code former section 1074 (now Code Civ. 
Proc., § 229), which provided in relevant part that “ ‘[a] 
challenge for implied bias may be taken for all or any of the 
following causes, and for no other . . .  [subdivision] 8. If the 
offense charged be punishable with death, the entertaining of 
such conscientious opinions as would preclude his finding the 
defendant guilty; in which case he must neither be permitted 
nor compelled to serve as a juror.’ ”  (Riser, at p. 573, quoting, 
Pen. Code, former § 1074, subd. (8).)  We held that even though 
“a literal reading of section 1074, subdivision 8, does not compel 
the exclusion of jurors incapable of exercising the discretion 
contemplated by section 190” to decide whether death or life 
imprisonment is the appropriate punishment, “[i]t would be 
doing violence to the purpose of these sections of the Penal Code 
. . . to construe section 1074, subdivision 8, to permit these 
jurors to serve” and “would in all probability work a de facto 
abolition of capital punishment, a result which, whether or not 
desirable of itself . . . is hardly appropriate for this court to 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
18 
achieve by construction of an ambiguous statute.”  (Riser, at 
pp. 575–576.)   
 
We have confirmed our holding in Riser, supra, 
47 Cal.2d 566.  (See, e.g., People v. Mabry (1969) 71 Cal.2d 430, 
445; People v. Gonzales (1967) 66 Cal.2d 482, 497–499; People v. 
Smith (1966) 63 Cal.2d 779, 789.)  In People v. Hovey (1980) 
28 Cal.3d 1, 9, footnote 9 (Hovey), we stated, “Th[e] legislative 
‘preference for one jury qualified to act throughout the entire 
case’ [citation] would seem to be inconsistent with a literal 
reading of section 1074, subdivision 8, and thus supports the 
judicial gloss placed on that section by Riser and its progeny.”  
Juarez provides no persuasive reason to overturn our precedent.  
Nor does he demonstrate that the process lacks statewide 
uniformity in its application.     
 
In addition, we have considered and rejected claims that 
the death qualification process is unconstitutional.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 912–915 (Mendoza); 
People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1286; People v. Tully 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1066 (Tully); People v. Taylor (2010) 
48 Cal.4th 574, 602–604 (Taylor).)  As we summarized in 
Mendoza:  “ ‘The death qualification process is not rendered 
unconstitutional by empirical studies concluding that, because 
it removes jurors who would automatically vote for death or for 
life, it results in juries biased against the defense.  [Citations.]  
[¶] Lockhart [v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162] . . . , which 
approved the death qualification process, remains good law 
despite some criticism in law review articles.  [Citations.]  “We 
may not depart from the high court ruling as to the United 
States Constitution, and defendant presents no good reason to 
reconsider our ruling[s] as to the California Constitution.”  
[Citation.] [¶] . . . Nor does the process violate a defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
19 
constitutional rights, including the Eighth Amendment right 
not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, by 
affording the prosecutor an opportunity to increase the chances 
of getting a conviction.  [Citations.]  Defendant claims the voir 
dire process itself produces a biased jury.  We have held 
otherwise.  [Citation.]  [¶] Death qualification does not violate 
the Sixth Amendment by undermining the functions of a jury as 
a cross-section of the community participating in the 
administration of justice.’ ”  (Mendoza, at p. 914.)  We have 
rejected the arguments that “the death-qualification process 
fails to produce the heightened reliability required for death 
judgments” and that the death qualification process violates 
equal protection “because capital defendants receive different, 
more conviction-prone juries than other defendants.”  (Id. at 
p. 913.)   
 
We 
have 
found 
“flawed 
the 
premise 
underlying 
defendant’s assertion that death qualification, by eliminating 
the segment of the community that opposes the death penalty, 
skews the data courts typically rely on to determine ‘evolving 
standards of decency’ for Eighth Amendment purposes.  
Through the death qualification process, individuals may be 
excused not only for their unyielding opposition to capital 
punishment but also for their intractable support of it.  
[Citations.]  We reject defendant’s contention that death 
qualification is irrational because it disqualifies individuals 
based on their moral beliefs when the penalty phase 
determination 
is 
‘ “inherently 
moral 
and 
normative.” ’  
[Citation.]  Disqualified jurors are properly excused for cause, 
not on the basis of their personal, moral beliefs regarding the 
death penalty, but because of their inability to ‘temporarily set 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
20 
aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.’ ”  (Taylor, 
supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 603–604.) 
 
We have rejected the argument that death qualification 
violates a defendant’s right to a jury selected from a 
representative cross-section of the community.  (Taylor, supra, 
48 Cal.4th at p. 603.)  We have concluded that “ ‘[t]he impacts of 
the death qualification process on the race, gender, and religion 
of the jurors do not affect its constitutionality.’ ”  (Mendoza, 
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 914; accord, Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 
p. 1066.)  We have rejected “[the] further assertion that death 
qualification violates [a defendant’s] right to a representative 
jury because empirical studies show that the process results in 
a disproportionate number of ethnic minorities, women, and 
religious individuals being removed from capital juries.”  
(Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 603.)  “As the high court 
explained 
in 
rejecting 
a 
defendant’s 
claim 
of 
an 
unrepresentative jury, unlike the impermissible removal of 
ethnic minorities or women from jury service, ‘ “[d]eath 
qualification” . . . is carefully designed to serve the State’s 
concededly legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury that can 
properly and impartially apply the law to the facts of the case at 
both the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial.  There is 
very little danger . . . that “death qualification” was instituted 
as a means for the State to arbitrarily skew the composition of 
capital-case juries.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Lockhart v. McCree, supra, 
476 U.S. at pp. 175–176.)  Although Juarez cites recent studies 
purporting to show troubling data that “blacks are significantly 
more likely than whites to be excluded from capital juries 
through death qualification,” these studies do not establish, 
contrary to our precedent, that the death qualification process 
is unconstitutional.  
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
21 
 
We also find unpersuasive the related claim that this 
process violates the rights of excluded prospective jurors.  As the 
high court has stated, “the removal for cause of ‘Witherspoon-
excludables’ in capital cases does not prevent them from serving 
as jurors in other criminal cases, and thus leads to no 
substantial deprivation of their basic rights of citizenship.  They 
are treated no differently than any juror who expresses the view 
that he would be unable to follow the law in a particular case.”  
(Lockhart v. McCree, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 176; see Witherspoon 
v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510.)  Again, the death qualification 
process “is carefully designed to serve the State’s concededly 
legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury that can properly 
and impartially apply the law to the facts of the case at both the 
guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial.”  (Lockhart, at 
pp. 175–176.)    
 
Finally, we have concluded that the death qualification 
process does not violate international law.  (See People v. Krebs 
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 351.)  In sum, we reject Juarez’s 
contentions that the death qualification process violates 
statutory, constitutional, or international law.   
B. Excusal of Prospective Juror Deborah B. for 
Cause  
 
Juarez contends that the trial court erred in excusing 
Prospective Juror Deborah B. based on her views about the 
death penalty.   
 
“Under Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 
[83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844] (Witt), we consider whether the 
record fairly supports the trial court’s determination that [a 
prospective juror’s] views on the death penalty would have 
prevented or substantially impaired her performance as a 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
22 
juror.”  (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 357.)  
“ ‘ “Generally, a trial court’s rulings on motions to exclude for 
cause are afforded deference on appeal, for ‘appellate courts 
recognize that a trial judge who observes and speaks with a 
prospective juror and hears that person’s responses (noting, 
among other things, the person’s tone of voice, apparent level of 
confidence, and demeanor), gleans valuable information that 
simply does not appear on the record.’ ” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 358.)  
“ ‘When the prospective juror’s answers on voir dire are 
conflicting or equivocal, the trial court’s findings as to the 
prospective juror’s state of mind are binding on appellate courts 
if supported by substantial evidence.’ ”  (People v. Wall, supra, 
3 Cal.5th at p. 1062.)   
 
In Prospective Juror Deborah B.’s jury questionnaire, she 
wrote, “If the person is found guilty and the jurors have found 
them guilty then I believe in the death penalty.”  She believed 
the state should automatically put someone to death for 
intentionally killing a human being, murdering more than one 
human being, randomly killing a human being for no apparent 
reason, or killing a child.  Asked in what kind of murder case life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole might be 
appropriate, she wrote, “I believe if you went out to murder 
someone and you killed them — death penalty — if the murder 
was an accident life without the possibility of parole.”  She said 
that she did not have views or beliefs that would make it either 
impossible or extremely difficult for her to consider or vote for 
the death penalty, and she would not automatically vote for the 
death penalty or life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole based on the information she knew about this case.  She 
identified herself as belonging to group 4, which was defined as 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
23 
having some doubts or reservations about the death penalty but 
not always voting against it.     
 
She expressed some hesitation, however, about her ability 
to vote for the death penalty.  Asked her general feelings about 
the death penalty, she wrote, “I do not feel this is my job giving 
someone the death penalty[.]  I am not God.”  She said she did 
not have strong opinions about the death penalty, but 
commented, “I just would not like to give someone a death 
penalty.”  Asked whether she supported the death penalty, she 
checked both the yes and the no boxes, explaining, “I believe in 
the death penalty but would not want to be the juror who had to 
make the decision.”  She likewise checked both the yes and the 
no boxes when asked whether she opposed the death penalty; 
whether she would refuse to find the defendant guilty or the 
special circumstances true solely to avoid having to make a 
decision on the death penalty; whether she would automatically 
vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; and 
whether she would automatically vote for the death penalty.  
She created and checked a box labeled “not sure” when asked 
whether she could personally vote for the death penalty if the 
facts warranted it, and commented, “I am not sure if I could do 
this or not.”   
 
During questioning pursuant to Hovey, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, 
Deborah B. confirmed that she was not philosophically opposed 
to the death penalty, but she had strong reservations about 
personally serving as a juror in a capital case.  She said that she 
would not be able to vote for a death sentence if the aggravating 
factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors and 
even if there were four murders, including two murders of 
children.  When asked whether she would be willing to serve as 
a juror in a capital case, she responded, “I would.  But like I told 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
24 
him I probably couldn’t.  You know, I’m just being truthful.  And 
the more I thought about it the whole week that I been here and 
then came back, I just kept confirming that in my mind.  I’m a 
teacher, and I deal with children every day.  I just — I just 
couldn’t play that role.  Even though maybe I did feel that’s what 
he deserved, that’s not my right I feel for myself.  Maybe other 
people feel they could do that, and that’s fine.  And maybe that’s 
what he did deserve, but I in my heart could not do that.  I would 
be a hold up or — I just couldn’t do that.” 
 
When asked whether she would listen to and follow the 
trial court’s instructions, she responded, “Absolutely.”  When 
asked whether she could, as opposed to would, vote for the death 
penalty if the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances, she responded, “I mean is it my right 
to be able to vote no?  I mean I just couldn’t do that.  I couldn’t 
in my heart.  That’s — I couldn’t unless that was the law.  
Because the law says if the evidence is — if the evidence was 
there, and that was something I had to do, then I guess I would 
have to do it.” 
 
She then confirmed that there was no conceivable set of 
facts under which her view would allow her to vote for the death 
penalty, explaining, “It’s just really hard.  I know if it was my 
own children, and this happened to them, then of course I would 
say yes I could.  And I would want that for my own family.  But 
that’s not the situation right now.  This is something completely 
different.  And I don’t think I — even though I felt he was guilty, 
and he deserved a punishment, that that could be up to me to 
give to him.”  She agreed that her view was essentially “there is 
no reason to put on a penalty phase because [she] wouldn’t listen 
to or weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in any 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
25 
meaningful way because whatever ended up happening [she’d] 
be voting for life without parole rather than death anyway.” 
 
The trial court excused Prospective Juror Deborah B. over 
the defense’s objection.  The court stated, “I couldn’t get one iota 
of willingness to impose the death penalty in this or any other 
case.”  The court continued, “In evaluating her demeanor she 
was completely certain when she answered the question she was 
asked about whether she could impose a death sentence.  I am 
entirely satisfied that this is a person who would not be able to 
follow the court’s instructions to evaluate the evidence, and only 
reach a decision as to death or life without parole after having 
done so.  This is a person who would not be able to impose a 
death sentence no matter what case was before her.”  
 
The trial court did not err.  Although Deborah B. 
supported the death penalty in theory, she gave equivocal 
responses in her questionnaire about her ability to impose it.  
She then said during Hovey questioning that she would not be 
able to vote for a death sentence if the aggravating factors 
substantially outweighed the mitigating factors and even if 
there were four murders, including two murders of children.  
She agreed that her view was essentially “there is no reason to 
put on a penalty phase because [she] wouldn’t listen to or weigh 
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in any 
meaningful way because whatever ended up happening [she’d] 
be voting for life without parole rather than death anyway.”  To 
the extent Juarez argues that the trial court erred because 
Deborah B. said she would follow the law, we disagree.  She said 
that she could not vote for the death penalty “unless that was 
the law . . . and that was something [she] had to do.”  But a 
“prospective juror’s statement that he thought he could vote for 
death ‘if [he] had to’ would not necessarily have established that, 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
26 
contrary to the trial court’s finding, he could perform his duties 
as a juror.  Clearly, a juror is never required to vote for the death 
penalty.”  (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 
60 Cal.4th 335, 401.)  We therefore find that substantial 
evidence supports the trial court’s excusal of Deborah B.  
C.  Denial of Challenges for Cause 
 
Juarez contends that the trial court erred in denying his 
challenges for cause of 16 prospective jurors who, he claims, 
were biased in favor of the death penalty.  “[T]o preserve this 
claim for appeal we require, first, that a litigant actually 
exercise a peremptory challenge and remove the prospective 
juror in question.  Next, the litigant must exhaust all of the 
peremptory challenges allocated by statute and hold none in 
reserve.  Finally, counsel (or defendant, if proceeding pro se) 
must express to the trial court dissatisfaction with the jury as 
presently constituted.”  (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 
186.)  
 
Juarez failed to preserve his claim for appeal.  He 
exercised peremptory challenges against only six of the 16 
prospective jurors.  He did not exhaust all of his peremptory 
challenges as to the main jury panel, although he did as to the 
alternate panel.  Nor did he express dissatisfaction with the jury 
to the trial court.  Indeed, he does not deny these facts but rather 
urges us to set aside the forfeiture rule.  We have previously 
declined to do so (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 61), 
and he provides no persuasive reason for us to do so here. 
III.  INTERPRETER ISSUES  
 
Juarez 
contends 
that 
“shoddy 
and 
inaccurate 
interpretative and translation assistance and services” violated 
his state constitutional right “to an interpreter throughout the 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
27 
proceedings” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 14) and to his state and 
federal constitutional rights to due process, to be present during 
trial, to confront witnesses, and to a reliable process and 
sentence.   
A. Issues Regarding Y.M.’s Preliminary Hearing 
Testimony  
 
Juarez challenges the use of an unsworn, uncertified 
interpreter, Ximena Oliver, to interpret Y.M.’s testimony at the 
preliminary hearing.   
 
In general, interpreters are required to take an oath and 
to be certified.  (Evid. Code, § 751, subd. (a); Gov. Code, § 68561, 
subd. (a).)  A trial court, however, may use an interpreter who is 
not certified if there is “good cause” to do so.  (Gov. Code, 
§ 68561, subd. (a).)  In that situation, the court must find, 
among other things, that good cause exists and that the 
interpreter is qualified to interpret the proceedings.  (See Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 2.893 [formerly rule 984.2].)   
 
It is uncontested that Oliver was neither sworn nor court-
certified, except with respect to administrative hearings.  When 
Juarez moved to dismiss the information on these grounds, the 
trial court denied the motion.  The court found that Juarez had 
not waived his right to her oath or certification, but he had 
waived any issues as to the accuracy or competency of her 
interpretation and there was no prejudice.    
 
“Improper procedures in the use of an interpreter do not 
rise to the level of a constitutional violation unless they result 
in prejudice demonstrating defendant was denied his right to a 
fair trial.”  (People v. Superior Court (Almaraz) (2001) 
89 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1360; see id. at pp. 1359–1360 [failure to 
follow procedural requirements or administer oath for an 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
28 
interpreter alone does not deprive a defendant of the 
constitutional right to an interpreter].)  Further, “a conviction 
will not be reversed because of errors or irregularities that 
occurred at a preliminary hearing or grand jury proceeding, 
absent a showing that the asserted errors ‘deprived [the 
defendant] of a fair trial or otherwise resulted in actual 
prejudice relating to [the] conviction.’ ”  (People v. Carrington 
(2009) 
47 Cal.4th 145, 
178; 
People 
v. 
Estrada 
(1986) 
176 Cal.App.3d 410, 414, 416 [applying standard and finding no 
prejudice as a result of a noncertified interpreter having served 
as defendant’s personal interpreter at the preliminary hearing].)   
 
We see no prejudice here.  At the time of Oliver’s 
interpretation, Juarez had an independent interpreter.  Oliver’s 
interpretation contained some errors, but defense counsel 
represented that a certified interpreter had listened to Oliver’s 
interpretation and determined it to be “guardedly acceptable.”  
And more importantly, Y.M. testified at trial, and Juarez 
acknowledges that any “[p]rejudice was restricted to the 
preliminary hearing, and could have been cured by subsequent 
trial testimony.”  
 
Juarez next challenges the use of his interpreter to 
translate an outburst at the preliminary hearing and his 
absence when his interpreter did so.  While Y.M. testified, the 
prosecutor remarked that she was “obviously upset” and asked 
for a break.  The court declared a recess until the next morning.  
The court then reconvened and stated for the record that Y.M. 
had yelled something in Spanish.  The court believed her 
statements were made shortly after the recess, but there was 
some dispute about their timing relative to the recess. 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
29 
 
When the court reconvened, counsel and Juarez’s 
interpreter, Terri Bullington, were present, but he was not.  The 
court initially asked Bullington to interpret Y.M.’s statements, 
but defense counsel asked that Oliver instead interpret them.  
After clarifying that Oliver was in the building, the court agreed.  
The court asked whether defense counsel wanted Juarez there, 
and upon learning that he was not in the building, defense 
counsel agreed to make a record and catch him up.  Oliver then 
interpreted Y.M.’s statements.  While doing so, Oliver said that 
“[u]nless the other interpreter knows,” she did not know how to 
interpret the word “desgraciado.”  Bullington remarked, “That 
caught me, too.  Like ‘a horrible person.’ ”  Oliver elaborated 
about that word and ultimately summarized that Y.M. had said, 
“damn you” three times; “desgraciado” twice; “I hope you burn 
in hell”; and “I cannot take this any longer.”  The court said that 
unless counsel wished to address anything, it would recess and 
repeat this interpretation the next day.  The court then said, 
“Ms. Bullington?”  Bullington said, “I can add two things.  She 
also said, ‘I hate you’ and she said, ‘Why?’ ”  The court asked 
whether Bullington could add anything else, and Bullington 
said that she agreed with Oliver’s interpretation.  The next 
morning, defense counsel confirmed that Bullington had 
translated a transcript of this session to Juarez.  
 
Juarez moved to dismiss the entire action, arguing that 
his absence from and Bullington’s involvement in this session 
violated his rights.  The trial court denied the motion.  The court 
explained that the bailiff had loaded him immediately into the 
transport van for his security after Y.M. had yelled and two 
courtroom spectators had leaned forward and tried to say 
something to him.  Despite his absence, the court had thought 
that Y.M.’s statements should be interpreted “while memories 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
30 
were freshest.”  The court concluded that this was not a critical 
stage of the proceedings.  The court further explained that it 
initially asked Bullington to interpret Y.M.’s statements 
because it believed Oliver had left.  But after learning otherwise, 
the court asked for Oliver’s interpretation.  Bullington then 
volunteered a couple of comments about that interpretation.  
The court concluded that this did not compromise Juarez’s 
relationship with her.  The court ultimately struck Y.M.’s 
statements from the record.  When Juarez subsequently moved 
to dismiss the information on these grounds, the trial court 
denied the motion, finding that he was present during all 
testimony in support of the charges, that Bullington’s 
involvement “did not deny [him] his right to a dedicated 
interpreter,” and that he suffered no prejudice. 
 
“ ‘A criminal defendant’s right to be personally present at 
trial is guaranteed under the federal Constitution by the 
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  It is also required 
by section 15 of article I of the California Constitution and by 
sections 977 and 1043.’  [Citation.]  ‘Under the Sixth 
Amendment, a defendant has the right to be personally present 
at any proceeding in which his appearance is necessary to 
prevent “interference with [his] opportunity for effective cross-
examination.” ’  [Citation.]  ‘Due process guarantees the right to 
be present at any “stage that is critical to [the] outcome” and 
where the defendant’s “presence would contribute to the 
fairness of the procedure.” ’  [Citation.]  ‘ “The state 
constitutional right to be present at trial is generally 
coextensive with the federal due process right.  [Citations.]”  
[Citation.]  Neither the state nor the federal Constitution, nor 
the statutory requirements of sections 977 and 1043, require the 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
31 
defendant’s personal appearance at proceedings where his 
presence bears no reasonable, substantial relation to his 
opportunity to defend the charges against him.  [Citations.]’  
[Citation.]  ‘Defendant has the burden of demonstrating that his 
absence prejudiced his case or denied him a fair trial.’ ”  (People 
v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 798–799, fn. omitted 
(Blacksher).)  
 
Here, Juarez was present until the court recessed.  He was 
absent when Oliver interpreted Y.M.’s outburst.  The outburst 
occurred at the preliminary hearing, possibly after the court 
recessed; it did not respond to a question or describe the crimes 
with which he was charged, and it was ultimately struck from 
the record.  We conclude that his presence “was not necessary 
for effective cross-examination or to contribute to the fairness of 
the procedure.  His absence did not deprive him of the full 
opportunity to defend against the charges.”  (Blacksher, supra, 
52 Cal.4th at p. 799.)  In any event, it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 902 
[federal constitutional error “ ‘pertaining to a defendant’s 
presence is evaluated under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard’ ”].)  Bullington translated the transcript to him, 
and he “suggests nothing counsel might have done differently 
had he been able to consult with [him]” at the session.  (People 
v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 864.)  We thus conclude that 
Juarez fails to show how his absence “affected his ability to 
defend himself or otherwise prejudiced his case.”  (Blacksher, at 
p. 800.)  
 
We further conclude that Bullington’s involvement in the 
session did not violate Juarez’s rights.  “A person unable to 
understand English who is charged with a crime has a right to 
an interpreter throughout the proceedings.”  (Cal. Const., art. I, 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
32 
§ 14.)  “The California Constitution, as interpreted by the 
California Supreme Court, makes it clear that a defendant is 
entitled to two interpreters, one to interpret the witnesses’ 
testimony and the other to be the personal interpreter for the 
defendant.”  (People v. Estrada, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 415.)  Here, Oliver interpreted Y.M.’s statements.  Oliver 
prompted Bullington to assist in defining one word, and 
Bullington added to Oliver’s interpretation.  This assistance did 
not deprive Juarez of his right to an interpreter.  (Cf. People v. 
Aguilar (1984) 35 Cal.3d 785, 793 [separate defense interpreter 
may 
“ ‘serve 
to 
ensure 
the 
accuracy 
of 
. . . witness 
interpreters’ ”].)  Moreover, even if we assume that a violation 
occurred, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (See 
People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1005, 1010–1012.)  There 
is nothing in the record to show that his “ability to communicate 
[with Bullington] or comprehend was impeded” (id. at p. 1014; 
see id. at pp. 1014–1016) or that he was otherwise prejudiced or 
deprived of a fair trial (People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th 
at p. 178).   
B. The Courtroom Audio Equipment  
 
Juarez contends that the courtroom audio equipment in 
Placer County and Napa County “prejudicially interfered with 
proper interpretative assistance.”  He argues that counsel, 
witnesses, and interpreters expressed difficulty hearing 
throughout the proceedings.  He also points out issues with 
Y.M.’s testimony.   
 
At the preliminary hearing, Y.M. did not use a 
microphone, but her interpreter did.  At trial, Y.M. used a 
microphone and her testimony was recorded, but she spoke 
“very, very quietly.”  After her trial testimony on March 14, 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
33 
2001, defense counsel told the court the following morning that 
they could not hear her “at all yesterday, basically,” that they 
“were having some difficulty with translation,” and that Juarez 
“was having difficulty following.”  Defense counsel requested 
that Juarez listen to Y.M.’s testimony in Spanish rather than 
have his interpreter interpret it for him.  He confirmed that he 
preferred this approach and added, “If she could raise her voice 
so I could hear what she says because yesterday I couldn’t hear 
anything.”  The court granted the request and provided her an 
additional microphone.  
 
Trial courts should endeavor to ensure that all 
participants can adequately hear the proceedings, making 
appropriate use of technology.  Our review of the record here 
reveals that the acoustics and audio equipment in the 
proceedings were poor.  But the record also reflects that counsel, 
witnesses, 
and 
interpreters 
routinely 
interrupted 
the 
proceedings to express their difficulty hearing and to request 
clarification, which they received.  Juarez does not claim on 
appeal that the trial court denied any request he made to clarify 
the proceedings or otherwise minimize the hearing difficulties. 
 
As to Y.M.’s March 14 testimony, defense counsel 
expressed difficulty hearing and requested clarification, which 
he received, a couple times.  It was not until the next day that 
defense counsel said they could not hear Y.M. “at all yesterday, 
basically.”  Had defense counsel raised the issue sooner, the 
court could have remedied the issue sooner.  And once defense 
counsel raised the issue, the court accommodated the defense’s 
requests.  Moreover, there is little in the record to suggest that 
Y.M.’s interpreter could not hear her or accurately interpret her 
testimony into English, or that Juarez’s interpreter could not 
hear 
Y.M.’s 
interpreter 
or 
accurately 
translate 
her 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
34 
interpretation into Spanish, except for defense counsel’s 
reference the next day to “some difficulty with translation.”  We 
are unable to conclude on this record “that the hearing 
difficulties adversely affected the defense, or prejudiced 
defendant in any way.”  (People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 
479–480.) 
C. The Accuracy of Interpreters 
 
Juarez argues that the interpreter Valdes made errors 
during Juarez’s interrogation on July 16, 1998 in Placer County, 
that the transcript of the same interrogation contained 
additional errors, and that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion for a mistrial on these grounds.  Juarez further argues 
that Valdes should not have served as the interpreter for both 
him and the interrogators.   
 
“ ‘A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of 
prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction.  
[Citation.]  Whether a particular incident is incurably 
prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial 
court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial 
motions.’ ”  (People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1038.)   
 
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by determining that any prejudice here was curable.  
An interpreter testified that despite some errors, Valdes’s 
interpretation retained its integrity, and there was adequate 
communication during the interrogation.  The court found only 
one significant error in the transcript and concluded that it was 
“imminently [sic] correctable.”  The court told the jury that the 
transcript contained transcription inaccuracies and that the 
tape, not the transcript, was the evidence.  As to the one 
significant error, the court told the jury, “On page 44 of the 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
35 
transcript the defendant was asked the question: [¶] ‘Why didn’t 
you kill her?  You were going to come back and kill her?’  [¶] And 
the transcript indicates that his answer was, ‘No.  First I was 
going to take her to see the children.’  [¶] When it comes time to 
evaluating the tape, listen carefully to that answer, for example, 
because you may find that the actual answer is, ‘No, well, first I 
was going to take the children,’ which is significantly different.”  
Later, the defense also presented testimony to the jury about 
interpretation and transcription errors in the interrogation.  
Considering these circumstances, we conclude that the alleged 
errors related to his interrogation did not violate his 
constitutional rights or deprive him of a fair trial. 
 
Juarez next argues that there were other interpretation 
errors “throughout this record,” citing as examples three 
instances in which interpretations were incorrect or clarified.  
To the extent he raises for the first time on appeal errors 
committed by witness interpreters, he has forfeited his claim.  
(People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 411.)  In any event, he 
fails to show that any errors violated his rights or prejudiced 
him. 
 
Finally, he contends that the trial court erred in denying 
his request for a supplemental “check” interpreter.  The court 
denied his request because he failed to show his need for such 
an interpreter, but the court did permit him to tape-record the 
testimony of Spanish-speaking witnesses.  On appeal, he argues 
that he needed a “check” interpreter because “[c]ounsel were in 
no position themselves to know when translations were full and 
accurate, and the issue had been a recurring one.”  He relies on 
People v. Aranda (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 230, 237, which stated, 
“When a showing is made, at trial, that an interpreter may be 
biased or his skills deficient, one solution may be appointment 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
36 
of a ‘check interpreter.’ ”  But Juarez did not make such a 
showing; thus the court did not err. 
IV.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A. Denial of Motion to Suppress 
 
Juarez contends that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress evidence seized from his trailer.   Admitting 
this evidence, he contends, violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights and his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair 
trial, due process, and a reliable penalty determination.   
1. Searches of Trailer on July 12 
 
Shortly after arriving at the Parnell Ranch on July 12, 
Deputies Walker and Reed entered Juarez’s trailer to look for 
him and the missing family members.  They were inside the 
trailer for “[p]robably less than two minutes.”  They “lifted up 
things, looked underneath things, opened up cupboards,” and 
opened up “anything and everything . . . that somebody could 
hide in.”  Deputy Walker saw some duct tape and “something to 
indicate that somebody had been tied up.”  When he went into 
the bed area, “[i]mmediately [he] could see there was 
ammunition for various guns, rifles, all around.”  Deputy Reed 
found two rifles in the bed area, one under and one above the 
bed.  They seized the rifles but nothing else.  Deputy Walker 
testified that they seized the rifles for safekeeping because the 
Parnell Ranch was “such a big area, 160 acres,” they were 
concerned Juarez might come back to the trailer, and they did 
not want the rifles to “be used against [them] or anyone else.”  
Upon exiting, they did not place crime scene tape or a deputy at 
the trailer door because they did not have “enough manpower at 
that point.”  They also searched the yard surrounding the 
trailer. 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
37 
 
Around 11:45 p.m. that night, Detective Summers and 
Deputy Owens entered Juarez’s trailer in an effort to locate 
identifying information about him and the missing family 
members.  Detective Summers testified that he was inside for 
approximately three minutes, but Deputy Owens guessed that 
he was inside for 10 or 15 minutes.  Detective Summers saw 
some duct tape, ammunition, and cord, among other things.  He 
picked up a checkbook cover and found José’s driver’s license 
inside it.  He seized the license and two envelopes containing 
vehicle registration and tax records. 
 
At the suppression hearing, Detective Summers explained 
that before he entered the trailer, he had limited information 
about the identities of the suspect and the missing family 
members.  In particular, there was some confusion as to whether 
the suspect’s name was Arturo Suarez or Arturo Juarez.  Other 
witnesses testified about the identifying information known 
that night.  Some suggested it was limited; some suggested 
otherwise.    
 
The Placer County trial court denied the motion to 
suppress evidence seized during these warrantless entries.  The 
court concluded that Juarez abandoned his trailer because he 
fled the crime scene, was located “several hundred miles away,” 
and did not intend to return.  Accordingly, there was no 
requirement for a warrant.  In addition, the court concluded that 
Deputy Reed’s entry was a “legitimate protective sweep.”  The 
court found that “it was clear that there was no entry with the 
purpose of searching, but rather [there was] a protective or a 
body search . . . simply searching for people.”  “It was a quick 
walk-through,” and it was justified by “unquestionably” exigent 
circumstances because “[t]here was a fresh report of a violent 
assault” and the suspect and the family members, including 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
38 
children, were missing.  The court concluded that when the 
officers “noticed the rifles,” the rifles were appropriately seized 
“as a matter of public safety since the defendant . . . from the 
officer’s point of view could return to the residence and use the 
weapons offensively.”   
 
The court further concluded that Detective Summers’s 
entry was justified by exigent circumstances because the 
suspect and the family members remained missing.  The court 
found that “[t]estimony is, frankly, confused on the point at 
which the defendant’s full identity was determined by the 
police.”  But the court found that “it was clear, at least in 
Detective Summers’s mind, that he was seeking verification of 
the identity” given that “he did not conduct a general search of 
the premises but simply went to the property for the very 
superficial walk-through” and seized items that “obviously 
contained elements of identity.”  As to this last part, the defense 
renewed the motion to suppress on the ground that trial 
testimony regarding what identifying information was known 
that night affected the ruling.  The Napa County trial court 
concluded that there was no need for a reopened hearing 
because the testimony “does nothing to undercut the ruling itself 
that the defendant had abandoned” the trailer. 
 
“ ‘ “In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must 
find the historical facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the 
facts in order to determine whether the law as applied has been 
violated.  We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry 
under the deferential substantial-evidence standard.  The ruling 
on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed 
question of law and fact that is subject to independent 
review.” ’ ”  (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 
60 Cal.4th at p. 364.)  “ ‘[W]e consider the correctness of the trial 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
39 
court’s ruling itself, not the correctness of the trial court’s 
reasons for reaching its decision.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 364–365.) 
 
A warrantless entry into a home is a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment unless an exception to the warrant 
requirement exists.  (See Florida v. Jardines (2013) 569 U.S. 1, 
6 [“[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first 
among equals.”].)  “ ‘A long-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement exists when “exigent circumstances” make 
necessary the conduct of a warrantless search. . . . “ ‘[E]xigent 
circumstances’ means an emergency situation requiring swift 
action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to 
property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or 
destruction of evidence.” ’ ”  (People v. Panah (2005) 
35 Cal.4th 395, 465.) 
 
We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the 
motion to suppress the rifles.  There were exigent circumstances 
justifying Deputy Reed’s entry.  Juarez had recently attacked 
Y.M. in his trailer.  When law enforcement officers arrived at 
the Parnell Ranch, Y.M. appeared “[v]ery upset,” bloody, and 
“extremely swollen.”  Juarez remained at large, and the family 
members, including a three-year-old child and a five-year-old 
child, were missing.  Law enforcement officers thought that 
Juarez might return to the trailer, and they did not know 
whether the missing family members also might be in the 
trailer.  (See People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 466 
[exigent circumstances justified entry into an apartment to look 
for a missing child].)  Once inside the trailer, Deputies Reed and 
Walker conducted a “quick walk-through,” and Deputy Reed 
properly seized the rifles to prevent Juarez from using them 
“against [law enforcement] or anyone else.”  (See Warden v. 
Hayden (1967) 387 U.S. 294, 298 [exigencies justified police 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
40 
entering home, searching for the suspect and any weapons that 
he had used or might use against them, and seizing weapons 
found in a toilet flush tank and a clip of ammunition found 
under a mattress]; People v. Ngaue (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 896, 
904 [seizure of gun “was justified for officer safety” while suspect 
remained at large].)  
 
Whether 
exigent 
circumstances 
justified 
Detective 
Summers’s entry approximately two hours later to search for 
identifying information presents a closer issue.  But any error in 
the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence seized 
during that entry was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
only evidence seized during that entry concerned the identities 
of Juarez and José.  There was no dispute as to their identities 
and thus no prejudice as to this evidence.  In light of our 
conclusions, we need not decide whether Juarez abandoned his 
trailer before the warrantless entries.  
2. Search of Trailer on July 13  
 
Detective Carrington sought a search warrant on July 13.  
In her eight-page affidavit, she said she had spoken to Detective 
Summers and Detective Stewart.  She learned that Juarez lived 
in a trailer and that he had attacked Y.M., dragged her inside, 
restrained her with duct tape and twine or rope, and raped her.  
Y.M.’s injuries “were consistent with choking, beating, and 
sexual assault.”  Y.M.’s husband, brother-in-law, and children 
were missing after having last been with Juarez.  When deputies 
responded to her 911 call, they searched Juarez’s trailer and 
seized two rifles.  Detective Summers also searched it; he found 
José’s identification in a checkbook and saw duct tape, twine or 
rope, scissors, aluminum foil, ammunition, and a tennis shoe in 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
41 
the trailer.  Judge Kearney issued the warrant.  Detective 
Carrington searched the trailer, its screened porch, and yard. 
 
The trial court denied the motion to suppress evidence 
seized pursuant to this warrant.  The court again concluded that 
the trailer had been abandoned.  In addition, the court 
concluded that there was probable cause to search it.  The court 
found that the affidavit contained “obviously reliable police 
information,” which came largely from Detective Carrington 
speaking with Detective Summers.  The court further concluded, 
“even if you were to excise all of the information obtained by 
Detective Summers, there’s enough other information in the 
warrant that would allow it to stand on its own merits.”  
Moreover, even if there was “some technical defect of the 
warrant,” Detective Carrington acted in good faith.  Finally, the 
court concluded that the warrant encompassed the yard 
surrounding the trailer because it was “clearly part of the 
curtilage of the property,” but “[e]ven if there was some question 
regarding the search of the yard, virtually all of the evidence 
was in plain view and certainly there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy being out in the yard and subject to view 
by anyone.”    
 
On appeal, Juarez contends that the search of his trailer 
was unlawful because he did not abandon the trailer and the 
affidavit relied on hearsay and information obtained during 
earlier entries.  He also contends that, even if valid, the warrant 
did not authorize a search of the yard or specify with 
particularity the items to be seized from the yard. 
 
We conclude that the affidavit established probable cause.  
The description of Y.M.’s attack in the trailer, together with her 
injuries, made “it substantially probable that there was specific 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
42 
property lawfully subject to seizure presently located in” the 
trailer.  (People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 483.)  The fact 
that Detective Carrington learned this information after 
speaking to Detective Summers and Detective Stewart does not 
eviscerate the probable cause.  (Cf. United States v. Ventresca 
(1965) 380 U.S. 102, 108 [“Thus hearsay may be the basis for 
issuance of the warrant ‘so long as there [is] a substantial basis 
for crediting the hearsay.’ ”]; People v. Gonzales (1990) 
51 Cal.3d 1179, 1206, fn. 3 [“a fellow officer’s observations, 
reported by the affiant as hearsay, are competent and 
presumptively reliable”].)  Nor was it improper to include in the 
affidavit information about Deputy Reed’s warrantless entry 
into the trailer.  (Cf. People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 722 
[affidavit can include information obtained during prior, lawful 
warrantless searches].)  And even if the information about 
Detective Summers’s warrantless entry was excised from the 
affidavit, it would still establish probable cause given the 
description of Y.M.’s attack in the trailer, together with her 
injuries.  (See People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1303 
[“It is the general rule that if probable cause clearly remains 
after tainted information is excised from the affidavit, a warrant 
is still valid.”].) 
 
We further conclude that evidence was properly seized 
from the yard, an area surrounding the trailer and enclosed by 
a wire fence.  The warrant authorized a search of “the premises 
located at and described as:  [¶] A silver single wide Spartan 
trailer license AB8476 wit [sic] a wooden screened porch on the 
Parnell Ranch” at an address on Mount Vernon Road in Auburn, 
County of Placer, California.  Because the warrant authorized a 
search of this residence, it “also authorize[d] without so stating 
the search of the residence’s curtilage.”  (U.S. v. Gorman (9th 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
43 
Cir. 1996) 104 F.3d 272, 273; see also People v. Smith (1994) 
21 Cal.App.4th 942, 950 [“ ‘[A] warrant to search “premises” 
located at a particular address is sufficient to support the search 
of outbuildings and appurtenances in addition to the main 
building when the various places searched are part of a single 
integral unit.’ ”]; LaFave, Search and Seizure (5th ed. 2018) 
§ 4.10(a), pp. 932–934.)  In any event, several of the items in the 
yard were in plain view as Detective Carrington approached the 
trailer to execute the warrant and accordingly could be seized.  
(See People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 166.)  
 
We thus conclude that the trial court did not err in denying 
the motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the warrant.  
In light of our conclusion, we again need not decide whether 
Juarez abandoned his trailer before this evidence was seized.  
B. Admission of Confessions  
 
Juarez contends that his confession on July 15 and all 
subsequent statements should have been suppressed because he 
was not advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 
384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) and the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820 
(Vienna Convention) and because his statements were 
involuntary.   
1. Background  
 
Juarez was arrested on July 15, 1998, around 8:40 p.m.  
He was “[v]ery calm, very quiet, [and] very cooperative.”  Around 
9:15 p.m., Detective Robbins and FBI Special Agent Stevens, 
who spoke Spanish, drove him to the Long Beach police station.  
During the drive, Juarez asked Agent Stevens what he was 
being arrested for or something to that effect, and she told him 
that he was being arrested for the murder of four people and the 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
44 
rape of a female.  He said he did not rape the woman.  She said 
those were serious charges; Juarez did not respond.  He then 
asked how they found him or something to that effect, and she 
said that “he placed a telephone call.”  At some point, he 
commented that she spoke Spanish and that he was going to 
Mexico.  She asked where he was from in Mexico; when he told 
her, she said her family was from Mexico.  They arrived in Long 
Beach around 9:20 or 9:30 p.m.   
 
Around 10:10 p.m., in an interview room at the Long 
Beach police station, Juarez asked what were the charges 
against him, and Agent Stevens told him that he was being 
charged with four counts of murder and one count of rape.  He 
said he did not rape the female.  She asked whether he was 
willing to talk to them about the events, and he said the 
homicides or the murders were true.  He said that he had seen 
the news and that the homicides were true but he did not rape 
the woman.  She asked whether he was willing to talk to them 
about the events, and he said he was.   
 
She said they needed to advise him of his rights and asked 
if he read in Spanish; he said he did.  She gave him an 
advisement form, and he read it.  She then read it to him and, 
after each line, asked whether he understood or had questions; 
he said he understood and did not have questions.  She asked if 
he was willing to give up his rights and speak to them, and he 
signed the form without hesitation.   
 
Translated into English, the form, titled “Consideration of 
Civil Rights,” stated:  “I, Arturo Juarez Suarez, have been 
informed about my civil rights as follows.”  “I have the right to 
remain silent.”  “Anything [I] say will be used and can be used 
against [me] in a court of law.”  “I have a right to speak to an 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
45 
attorney and have him present with me while being 
interrogated.”  “If I can’t pay to contract an attorney, one will be 
assigned to represent me before the interrogation, if I desire 
one.”  “I understand every one of these rights that have been 
explained before, and I wish to discuss the case with the officer.”  
“Any declarations that I make at this moment are free and 
voluntary without any promises of indulgence, severity or 
compensation.” 
 
After Juarez signed the form, Detective Robbins and 
Agent Stevens questioned him.  Detective Robbins asked most 
of the questions, while Agent Stevens acted as an interpreter.  
Juarez said that during an argument, he shot and killed his two 
brothers-in-law and put them in a hole; he tied up and beat the 
woman; and he beat the two children, put them in the hole, and 
threw dirt on them.  He was “[v]ery calm, quiet, cooperative, 
[and] speaking very clearly.”  He did not indicate that he wanted 
a lawyer, did not want to talk, or did not understand the 
questions.  
 
The interrogation ended around 11:20 p.m.  Afterward, 
Agent Stevens asked whether he was cold because she was 
“freezing”; when he indicated he was, she gave him a shirt.  She 
did not recall providing him with anything to drink or eat, but 
believed they might have offered him something to drink, which 
he declined.  He did not indicate that he was hungry or express 
any other discomfort. 
 
Around 1:00 a.m., Detective Bennett and Sergeant 
McDonald transported Juarez to Placer County by plane.  He 
was “[v]ery calm, extremely cooperative [and] [m]aybe a little 
sleepy.”  He slept for “a good part” of the flight but did not eat.  
Upon arrival, he was booked.  Sergeant McDonald did not know 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
46 
whether he ate during booking but testified that there would 
have been food available.  Sergeant McDonald also recalled 
telling him in English that they would talk later that day, to 
which he said okay or something to that effect.  
 
Around 11:00 a.m. on July 16, Detective Bennett and 
Sergeant McDonald interrogated Juarez with the assistance of 
an interpreter.  The interrogation was videotaped and lasted 
approximately two hours.  During the interrogation, he was 
calm, and he was offered a soda and pizza.   
 
At the beginning of the interrogation, Sergeant McDonald 
showed Juarez the form he had signed the day before and asked 
whether he recalled and understood it and whether they could 
talk.  Juarez nodded his head as Sergeant McDonald asked 
these questions.  He subsequently admitted that he shot José 
and Juan during an argument; that he beat and tied Y.M. and 
touched her vagina; and that he hit the children and put them 
in the hole. 
 
Near the end of this interrogation, Sergeant McDonald 
asked Juarez to confirm that he remembered the form he had 
previously signed regarding his rights, which he did.  Sergeant 
McDonald asked him to describe his rights, and Juarez replied, 
“That I don’t understand anything.”  Sergeant McDonald 
responded that Juarez had read, signed, and said he understood 
the form.  Juarez replied, “I cannot understand what rights I can 
have.”  Sergeant McDonald then asked whether Juarez knew, 
when they began their conversation, that he had the right to 
remain silent; Juarez replied, “Yes.”  Sergeant McDonald asked 
whether 
Juarez 
understood, 
when 
they 
began 
their 
conversation, that he had the right to talk to an attorney; Juarez 
replied, “Yes.”  Sergeant McDonald asked whether Juarez 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
47 
understood that he had the right to talk to an attorney before he 
talked to them; Juarez replied, “Yes.”  Sergeant McDonald asked 
whether Juarez decided to talk to them; Juarez replied, “Yes.”  
Sergeant McDonald asked, “Because you wanted to and you 
didn’t want to talk to an attorney?” and Juarez replied, “What 
am I going to gain by talking to a lawyer?”  Sergeant McDonald 
said, “Okay.  Again, there’s nothing else you want to ask?”  
Juarez did not reply.  After Detective Bennett asked about how 
the family can heal from this, Sergeant McDonald asked why 
Juarez decided to talk “in Long Beach” and “today.”  Juarez said 
that he would have felt “very bad” if he did not talk.  Juarez then 
asked when he would go to court.  The interpreter responded to 
him.  After receiving permission to do so, the interpreter also 
briefly explained to him what to expect for the first court 
appearance.  The interpreter then said something about his not 
understanding the justice system, to which Detective Bennett 
said, “We still don’t.” 
 
The next morning, Sergeant McDonald and other law 
enforcement officials took Juarez on a walk-through at the 
Parnell Ranch, which lasted for about 15 or 20 minutes.  The 
walk-through was taped, although only some sound was 
discernible.  Juarez was shackled, but he appeared cooperative 
and relaxed.  A sheriff’s department employee, Virginia Ferral, 
spoke Spanish and acted as an interpreter, but she was not a 
certified interpreter and did not translate her conversations 
verbatim. 
 
Ferral testified that she asked Juarez, “Do you remember 
the rights that were discussed and the right to an attorney?”  He 
said, “Yes.”  He then asked, “Can I have an attorney here?”  She 
testified that Sergeant McDonald told her to say words to the 
effect of “it’s up to you,” and she told Juarez “if you want.”  Ferral 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
48 
testified that Juarez then expressed concern about his safety in 
jail because some inmates wanted to kill him.  The court found 
that “[i]t is unclear from the record which phrase was said or 
translated to [him], but it’s clear that [he] asked for nothing 
further regarding an attorney but turned to security concerns.” 
 
Ferral testified that in response to his question about 
security, she told him she understood but wanted to know 
whether he would do this walk-through.  She also told him that 
they and the jail staff were obligated to protect him, that they 
could move him to another place, and that they would talk to the 
person in charge of the jail.  The group then proceeded with the 
walk-through.   
 
That afternoon, Juarez was arraigned, and the prosecutor 
advised him of his rights under the Vienna Convention.  Juarez 
said, “What for?”  After conferring with him, defense counsel 
said, “I believe at this time we would like to wait.  [¶] We would 
not request any such notification right now.” 
2. Asserted Violation of Miranda and Voluntariness   
 
“ ‘ “As a prophylactic safeguard to protect a suspect’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the United 
States Supreme Court, in Miranda, required law enforcement 
agencies to advise a suspect, before any custodial law 
enforcement questioning, that ‘he has the right to remain silent, 
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, 
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if 
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior 
to any questioning if he so desires.” ’ ”  (People v. McCurdy 
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1085–1086.)  “ ‘ “Critically, however, a 
suspect can waive these rights.”  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]  ‘The 
waiver must be “voluntary in the sense that it was the product 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
49 
of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, 
coercion, or deception” [citation], and knowing in the sense that 
it was “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the 
right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 
abandon it.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 1086.)  
 
“ ‘The Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution 
and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution make 
“inadmissible any involuntary statement obtained by a law 
enforcement officer from a criminal suspect by coercion.” ’  
[Citation.]  The prosecution must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that a defendant freely and voluntarily gave police 
statements before the statements can be admitted.  [Citation.]  
‘ “Voluntariness does not turn on any one fact, no matter how 
apparently significant, but rather on the ‘totality of [the] 
circumstances.’ ” ’  [Citation.]  The test considers several factors, 
including any element of police coercion, the length of the 
interrogation and its location and continuity, and the 
defendant’s maturity, education, and physical and mental 
health.  [Citation.]  The determinative question ‘ “is whether 
defendant’s choice to confess was not ‘essentially free’ because 
his will was overborne.” ’ ”  (People v. Peoples (2016) 
62 Cal.4th 718, 740.)   
 
“On appeal, we review independently the trial court’s legal 
determinations of whether a defendant’s statements were 
voluntary [citation], whether his Miranda waivers were 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made [citation], and 
whether his later actions constituted an invocation of his 
[rights] [citation].  We evaluate the trial court’s factual findings 
regarding the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s 
statements and waivers, and ‘ “accept the trial court’s resolution 
of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
50 
credibility, if supported by substantial evidence.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 115.)  When “an interview is 
recorded, the facts surrounding the admission or confession are 
undisputed and we may apply independent review.”  (People v. 
Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 843.)  
a. Confession in Long Beach on July 15  
 
Juarez claims that his confession at the Long Beach police 
station should have been suppressed.  The trial court concluded 
that he was advised of his rights, “appeared to understand his 
rights,” and confessed “freely and voluntarily” after a “full and 
knowing waiver of his rights.”  The court found that “some of the 
words [in the advisement form] could have been better,” but the 
discrepancies were “[a]t best” characterized as “insignificant” 
and “the substance of the Miranda rights were conveyed to [him] 
orally and in writing.”  The court also found, as to all of the 
interviews, that he was “calm and cooperative” and “readily 
appeared willing to talk to the police and to fully explain the 
circumstances of the crime”; there was no evidence “of 
discomfort or stress” or that “he was forced to sign anything or 
to waive his rights”; and all of the defense’s arguments about his 
being “cold, tired or hungry are purely speculative.  No evidence 
suggests that [he] actually was influenced by these factors.” 
 
We conclude that Juarez was adequately advised of his 
rights.  The advisement form in question states that he has the 
right to remain silent, anything he says can and will be used 
against him in a court of law, he has the right to speak with an 
attorney and the right to have the attorney present while being 
interrogated, and if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be 
assigned for him before the interrogation if he so desires.  Juarez 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
51 
read the form, Agent Stevens read it to him, and Juarez said he 
understood and did not have any questions.   
 
Juarez argues that the form was inadequate and 
misleading.  An interpreter, Santiago Flores, testified that the 
word “civil” in the form’s title did not encompass criminal; the 
word “silencio” in the first sentence could mean “to be still [or] 
quiet”; the word “consultar,” which means “to seek advice,” 
should have been used to explain the right to an attorney, rather 
than “hablar,” which means “to talk, to carry on conversation”; 
and the word “discutir” in the fifth sentence could mean “to 
discuss” or “to argue or debate.”  The last sentence — 
“[c]ualquiera de las declaraciones que yo haga en este momento 
son libres y voluntarias, con ninguna promesa de indulgencia 
(severidad) o recompensa” — also could be interpreted in 
multiple ways.  When asked to translate this sentence, Flores 
translated it as “[a]ny declarations that I make at this moment 
are free and voluntary without any promises of indulgence, 
severity or compensation.”  When defense counsel subsequently 
asked whether this sentence has more than one translation, 
Flores testified, “No, I don’t believe so.”  Following up, defense 
counsel asked whether this sentence could also mean “I can 
speak freely without any consequences as a result of my 
providing information.”  Flores responded that “[i]t could” and 
elaborated, “If I — ‘whatever declaration I make would be made 
without any punishment.’  It could mean that. ‘I’m free to talk, 
but I won’t be punished for it.’ ”  When the prosecutor 
subsequently asked Flores to translate this sentence again, 
Flores translated it as “[a]ny declarations that you are making 
at this moment are free and voluntary with no promise of 
indulgence, leniency, severity or compensation.”  Finally, the 
signature line stated only “signature.”  
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
52 
The high court has “never insisted that Miranda warnings 
be given in the exact form described in that decision.”  
(Duckworth v. Eagan (1989) 492 U.S. 195, 202.)  Rather, “[t]he 
inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably ‘conve[y] to 
[a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.’ ”  (Id. at p. 203.)  
In Duckworth, the high court concluded that the warnings at 
issue “touched all of the bases required by Miranda.  The police 
told respondent that he had the right to remain silent, that 
anything he said could be used against him in court, that he had 
the right to speak to an attorney before and during questioning, 
that he had ‘this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer 
even if [he could] not afford to hire one,’ and that he had the 
‘right to stop answering at any time until [he] talked to a 
lawyer.’ ”  (Ibid.)   
 
The advisement form in this case likewise touches all of 
the bases required by Miranda.  It states that Juarez has the 
right to remain silent, anything he says can and will be used 
against him in a court of law, he has the right to speak with an 
attorney and the right to have the attorney present while being 
interrogated, and if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be 
assigned for him before the interrogation if he so desires.  The 
trial court found that “some of the words [in the advisement 
form] could have been better,” but the discrepancies were “[a]t 
best” characterized as “insignificant” and “the substance of the 
Miranda rights were conveyed to [him] orally and in writing.”  
Although we agree that some of the words in the advisement 
form could have been more precise, “we are not persuaded . . . 
that the language was so ambiguous or confusing” that it did not 
reasonably convey his rights.  (People v. Wash (1993) 
6 Cal.4th 215, 236; cf. U.S. v. Botello-Rosales (9th Cir. 2013) 
728 F.3d 865, 867 [Miranda warnings failed to reasonably 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
53 
convey the defendant’s right to appointed counsel because the 
warnings suggested that the right to appointed counsel would 
be “contingent on the approval of a request or on the lawyer’s 
availability” and did not make clear that appointed counsel 
would be “without cost”].) 
 
We further conclude that, after being advised of his rights, 
Juarez validly waived them and voluntarily confessed.  “To 
establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the 
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the 
totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.”  (People v. 
Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1171.)  In assessing whether the 
waiver was knowing and intelligent, relevant circumstances 
include “ ‘(i) the defendant’s mental capacity; (ii) whether the 
defendant signed a written waiver; (iii) whether the defendant 
was advised in his native tongue or had a translator; 
(iv) whether the defendant appeared to understand his rights; 
(v) whether the defendant’s rights were individually and 
repeatedly explained to him; and (vi) whether the defendant had 
prior experience with the criminal justice system.”  (U.S. v. Price 
(9th Cir. 2019) 921 F.3d 777, 792.) 
 
Juarez read the advisement form written in Spanish and 
Agent Stevens read it to him, asking him after each line whether 
he understood or had any questions.  Although Juarez points out 
on appeal that he had spent his life “working in fields or 
pastures,” there is no indication that he was incapable of 
understanding his rights.  Having reviewed the advisement 
form, he said he understood and did not have any questions.  He 
signed the form without hesitation and then actively engaged in 
the interrogation, providing an extensive account of the events.  
Agent Stevens acted as an interpreter during the interrogation.  
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
54 
She previously had translated between Spanish and English in 
her role as a law enforcement agent.  She had learned Spanish 
from her mother, who was Mexican.  Although she did not know 
whether there was a different dialect used in the region of 
Mexico where Juarez had lived, she testified that he spoke “very 
clearly,” she “[n]ever” had any trouble understanding his 
responses, and at no point did he indicate that he did not 
understand the questions.  Nor did he indicate that he did not 
want to talk.  Rather, the trial court found that he “appeared to 
understand his rights” and “readily appeared willing to talk to 
the police and to fully explain the circumstances of the crime.” 
 
Nor do the circumstances he emphasizes amount to 
coercion.  There was no suggestion of “ ‘physical intimidation,’ ” 
“ ‘coercive tactics,’ ” promises, or threats.  (People v. Spencer 
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 672; see id. at pp. 672–674.)  When he said 
he was cold, he was given a shirt.  He did not indicate that he 
was hungry or otherwise uncomfortable.  Nor did he indicate 
that his nervousness or sleeplessness affected his ability to 
understand his rights or the questions.  Instead, the trial court 
found that he was “calm and cooperative,” and there was no 
evidence “of discomfort or stress” or that “he was forced to sign 
anything or to waive his rights.”  Finally, the fact that he lacked 
experience with the criminal justice system did not invalidate 
his waiver or render his subsequent statements involuntary in 
the circumstances here.  (See U.S. v. Bautista-Avila (9th Cir. 
1993) 6 F.3d 1360, 1364–1366 [finding valid waiver despite the 
defendant’s lack of experience with the justice system].)  
b. Confession in Placer County on July 16 
 
Juarez next claims that his confession in Placer County 
should have been suppressed.  “Where a subsequent 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
55 
interrogation is ‘ “reasonably contemporaneous” ’ with the prior 
waiver, and the prior waiver was ‘knowing and intelligent,’ 
police need not undertake a Miranda readvisement.  [Citation.]  
In determining whether a subsequent interrogation is 
reasonably contemporaneous, we consider the totality of the 
circumstances.  Relevant considerations include:  ‘1) the amount 
of time that has passed since the initial waiver; 2) any change 
in the identity of the interrogator or location of the 
interrogation; 3) an official reminder of the prior advisement; 
4) the suspect’s sophistication or past experience with law 
enforcement; and 5) further indicia that the defendant 
subjectively understands and waives his rights.’ ”  (People v. 
Spencer, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 668.)  
 
The trial court concluded that the admonition provided 
approximately 14 hours earlier in the Long Beach interrogation 
was “reasonably contemporaneous with [the Placer County] 
interview.”  The court found that at the beginning of the Placer 
County interrogation, Juarez “indicated that he recalled the 
rights given earlier; that he understood them, and that he 
agreed to talk.”  At the end of the interrogation, Sergeant 
McDonald again discussed with Juarez the advisement form 
that Juarez had signed in Long Beach.  The court found that 
when Sergeant McDonald asked Juarez whether he understood 
his rights, Juarez “was unable to articulate his rights generally, 
but as to each individual right, [he] replied that he understood 
that he had the right to remain silent and the right to an 
attorney.”  When Sergeant McDonald asked Juarez whether he 
decided to talk to the officers because he wanted to do so and did 
not want to talk to an attorney, Juarez responded, “What am I 
going to gain by talking to a lawyer?”  As to this response, the 
court found that it “indicates at least an understanding that the 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
56 
right to an attorney exists, but [Juarez] made a conscious 
decision, perhaps unwise, not to exercise it.” 
 
Our review of the record confirms that approximately 13 
or 14 hours elapsed between Juarez’s waiver in Long Beach and 
his interrogation in Placer County, and he remained in custody 
during that time.  At the beginning of the Placer County 
interrogation, 
Sergeant 
McDonald 
showed 
Juarez 
the 
advisement form he signed in Long Beach, and Juarez indicated 
that he recalled and understood it.  The Placer County 
interrogation was conducted in a different location by different 
law enforcement officials, and Juarez lacked experience with the 
justice system.  But considering the totality of the 
circumstances, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
Placer 
County 
interrogation was reasonably contemporaneous with the earlier 
advisement and waiver in Long Beach, and no Miranda 
readvisement was necessary at the outset of the Placer County 
interrogation.  (Cf. People v. Pearson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 306, 317 
[interview was reasonably contemporaneous with advisement 
and waivers that occurred 27 hours earlier].) 
 
Juarez nevertheless contends that his statements made 
during the initial Long Beach interrogation and the subsequent 
Placer County interrogation should have been suppressed 
because he did not understand his rights.  In support of his 
argument, he relies on his statements at the end of the Placer 
County interrogation indicating that he did not understand his 
rights.  Those statements were made approximately 14 hours 
after the initial Long Beach interrogation, during which he told 
Agent Stevens that he understood his rights, he signed the 
advisement form, and he confessed to the murders.  Juarez 
argues:  “What are we to believe:  a self-serving statement about 
the past [interrogation in Long Beach by Agent Stevens] that 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
57 
was not recorded, or a videotaped statement of [Juarez during 
the interrogation in Placer County]?” 
 
But the trial court found, after evaluating Agent Stevens’s 
credibility, that in the Long Beach interrogation, “[Juarez] told 
Agent Stevens that he did understand his rights,” “he signed the 
form,” he “had no questions,” and he “appeared to understand 
his rights” when he waived them in Long Beach.  We accept the 
trial court’s evaluations of credibility where, as here, substantial 
evidence supports them.  In light of these credibility findings 
and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation in Long Beach, we have concluded that Juarez 
validly waived his rights before that interrogation.  (See 
pt. IV.B.2.a., ante.)   
 
As to the subsequent Placer County interrogation, Juarez 
indicated at the outset of that interrogation that he recalled and 
understood the advisement form he had signed in Long Beach.  
He then proceeded to confess again to the murders.  It is true 
that at the end of the approximately two-hour interrogation, 
Sergeant McDonald asked Juarez to describe his rights, and 
Juarez said, “That I don’t understand anything” and “I cannot 
understand what rights I can have.”  But Sergeant McDonald 
then followed up by asking Juarez to confirm that at the time he 
began the interrogation in Placer County, he understood he had 
the right to remain silent and the right to talk to an attorney 
stated on the form he had signed in Long Beach.  For each right, 
Juarez did so confirm.  Then, when Sergeant McDonald asked 
whether Juarez decided to talk to the officers because he wanted 
to do so and did not want to talk to an attorney, Juarez said, 
“What am I going to gain by talking to a lawyer?”  Although this 
remark suggests that Juarez did not appreciate the value of 
speaking to an attorney, we conclude that this remark, 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
58 
considered in its context, is insufficient to call into question the 
validity of his earlier waiver.  The videotape of the interrogation 
shows that the brief remark was not a genuine question 
intended to elicit an explanation of the possible benefit of 
speaking to an attorney.  The remark occurred in the course of 
Sergeant McDonald wrapping up the interrogation, and it is 
evident from Juarez’s tone, body language, and lack of further 
questions that he was not seeking or expecting to receive 
information about what he could gain from talking to an 
attorney.  Instead, the remark simply appeared to convey 
Juarez’s perception that it would be futile to consult a lawyer in 
light of his predicament.  Even if this perception was “unwise,” 
as the trial court suggested, it fails to show that Juarez did not 
understand he had the right to speak with a lawyer.    
 
Thus, considering Juarez’s statements at the end of the 
Placer County interrogation in context, we do not find those 
statements to alter our conclusions that he validly waived his 
rights before the Long Beach interrogation and that no 
readvisement 
was 
required 
before 
the 
Placer 
County 
interrogation.   
We additionally conclude that his confession was 
voluntary.  In arguing to the contrary, Juarez emphasizes many 
of the same circumstances discussed above and adds that he was 
tired and weak after flying to Placer County.  He asserts that he 
got little sleep and no food from his arrest around 8:40 p.m. on 
July 15 until his interrogation during the morning of July 16 in 
Placer County.  But the record contains no indication that 
Juarez complained of hunger or weakness during the Placer 
County interrogation, or that any coercion rendered Juarez’s 
statements involuntary. 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
59 
c. Walk-through of the Parnell Ranch on July 17 
 
When Juarez moved to suppress his statements made 
during the walk-through as involuntary and obtained in 
violation of his rights, the trial court denied his motion.  But the 
court subsequently excluded the videotape of the walk-through 
as unduly prejudicial.  Because there was no possible prejudice 
at trial stemming from his walk-through at the ranch, we need 
not address this issue. 
3. Asserted Violation of the Vienna Convention  
 
Juarez further argues that the police did not advise him 
in a timely manner of his right to have his consulate notified of 
his arrest, in violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention 
and Penal Code section 834c.  He argues that the trial court 
should have suppressed his statements, found the violation 
intentional, and considered it in the voluntariness inquiry. 
 
When Juarez presented this claim in the trial court, the 
court concluded that he was not advised in a timely fashion of 
his right to have his consulate notified of his arrest under the 
Vienna Convention.  (See Vienna Convention, supra, art. 36, 
par. 1(b), at p. 101 [requiring law enforcement officers to inform 
arrested foreign nationals, “without delay,” that they have the 
right to have their consulate notified of their arrest].)  The court 
found that the violation was negligent, not intentional, based on 
statements by law enforcement officers and the district attorney 
that they did not know of the Vienna Convention, despite 
opportunities to learn of it.  The court further concluded that the 
violation was not of constitutional dimension.  The court 
declined to suppress his statements or preclude the prosecutor 
from seeking the death penalty.   
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
60 
 
After Juarez’s trial, “the United States Supreme Court [in 
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon (2006) 548 U.S. 331] made it clear 
that an officer’s failure to notify a suspect of his or her consular 
rights does not, in itself, render a confession inadmissible.”  
(People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 756.)  The California 
Legislature also enacted Penal Code section 834c, effective in 
2000, to address Vienna Convention requirements.  (Stats. 1999, 
ch. 268, § 1, pp. 2338–2341.)  The statute requires the police, 
upon arresting or detaining a known or suspected foreign 
national “for more than two hours,” to advise the foreign 
national of his or her consular rights but does not specify a 
remedy for violations.  (§ 834c, subd. (a)(1).) 
 
We find no violation of section 834c since that statute was 
not effective until after Juarez’s arrest.  But we proceed on the 
assumption that Juarez’s consular rights were violated by law 
enforcement’s failure to timely advise him of his right to have 
his consulate notified of his arrest under the Vienna 
Convention.   
 
As the high court held in Sanchez-Llamas, such a violation 
does not, by itself, require suppression.  “Article 36 [of the 
Vienna Convention] has nothing whatsoever to do with . . . 
interrogations.  Indeed, Article 36 does not guarantee 
defendants any assistance at all.  The provision secures only a 
right of foreign nationals to have their consulate informed of 
their arrest or detention — not to have their consulate 
intervene, or to have law enforcement authorities cease their 
investigation pending any such notice or intervention.  In most 
circumstances, there is likely to be little connection between an 
Article 36 violation and evidence or statements obtained by 
police.”  (Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, supra, 548 U.S. at p. 349; 
accord, People v. Vargas (July 13, 2020, S101247) __ Cal.5th __ 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
61 
[2020 Cal. Lexis 4311, at pp. *65–67] [reversal not warranted 
“[d]espite the ‘technical violation’ of the Vienna Convention”].)  
However, “ ‘[a] defendant can raise an Article 36 claim as part 
of a broader challenge to the voluntariness of his statements to 
police.’ ”  (People v. Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 757, quoting 
Sanchez-Llamas, at p. 331; accord, People v. Sanchez (2019) 
7 Cal.5th 14, 51.)   
 
Juarez does so here.  Contrary to his argument, however, 
the record supports the factual finding that the violation was 
not intentional.  Agent Stevens, Detective Robbins, Sergeant 
McDonald, and Detective Bennett each testified to being 
unaware of the Vienna Convention at the time of Juarez’s 
arrest.  The district attorney also testified that he did not 
become aware of the advisement requirement under the Vienna 
Convention until around Juarez’s arraignment, at which time 
Juarez was advised of his rights under the Vienna Convention.  
The trial court “accept[ed] the statements of the law 
enforcement officers” and “the district attorney” that they “did 
not know of the Vienna Convention,” despite opportunities to 
learn of it.  The trial court thus found that the violation of the 
Vienna Convention was negligent, not intentional.  The trial 
court made that finding after assessing the credibility of 
numerous witnesses who testified about the circumstances 
surrounding the violation, and substantial evidence supports 
the finding. 
 
In addition, Juarez argues that the trial court failed to 
consider the violation when evaluating the validity of his waiver 
and the voluntariness of his confessions.  As noted, the trial 
court found no violation of Juarez’s constitutional rights due to 
the Vienna Convention violation.  The court then found “from 
the totality of the circumstances” that Juarez’s statements were 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
62 
“freely and voluntarily given after a sufficient advisement of his 
constitutional rights.”  Although the court did not expressly 
refer to the Vienna Convention violation in concluding that he 
validly waived his rights and voluntarily confessed, the court 
considered “the totality of the circumstances,” and on this 
record, we decline to find error.  In any event, we review 
independently whether Juarez validly waived his rights and 
voluntarily confessed.  (See People v. Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th 
at p. 115.) 
 
We find that Juarez has not established a relation 
between his lack of consular notice and his confessions.  (See 
People v. Leon, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 846.)  Juarez has not shown 
that had he been advised of his consular rights earlier, he would 
have requested that the consulate be notified.  Even after he was 
advised of his rights at his arraignment, he did not request such 
notification.  It is true that defense counsel said she had “had 
numerous contacts” with the consulate on his behalf.  And he 
submitted a declaration — which the trial court deemed not 
competent evidence in the absence of cross-examination — 
stating, among other things, “Had I known I could talk to 
someone from the Mexican Consulate, before speaking with the 
officers, I would have done so.”  But his statement was largely 
“unpersuasive in view of the other evidence, because it was 
‘conclusory, self-serving, and not subject to cross-examination.’ ”  
(U.S. v. Amano (9th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3d 801, 805.)  As the trial 
court found, Juarez “readily appeared willing to talk to the 
police and to fully explain the circumstances of the crime.”  We 
conclude that in the totality of the circumstances, the failure to 
timely advise him of his consular rights did not overcome his 
will and render his waiver invalid or his confessions 
involuntary.  There was no error in admitting his confessions.   
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
63 
C.  CALJIC No. 2.28 
 
The Placer County District Attorney’s Office retained Dr. 
Frank Dougherty, a forensic psychologist, to observe the July 
16, 1998 interrogation live by means of a closed circuit television 
transmission.  Dr. Dougherty “discussed various aspects of 
possible mental health defenses and issues regarding [Juarez] 
. . . and consulted with Deputy District Attorney Thomas 
Beattie and various sheriff’s deputies regarding interview 
techniques and anticipated prosecutorial issues related to 
[Juarez’s] actual or potentially alleged mental health.”  Dr. 
Dougherty believed he took “some contemporaneous notes,” but 
he was unable to locate any notes after a “diligent” search.  He 
did not provide any consultation on this case after July 16.  The 
defense learned of his existence in October 2000, contacted him 
in December 2000, and interviewed him.  The prosecutor 
subsequently represented that Dr. Dougherty said, “It doesn’t 
look like there’s anything wrong with him,” but the prosecutor 
was not aware of any notes taken by Dr. Dougherty. 
 
The defense asked the trial court to instruct the jury 
pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.28, which explained the rules of 
discovery and permitted the jury to consider failures to timely 
disclose evidence.  The court denied the request.  The court 
reasoned that “it’s not clear that this witness had notes, 
although he may have.”  Even if he did, “it would be entirely 
speculative to assume that those notes would include anything 
that would aid the jury because those notes would only be about 
things that the jury can view through the videotape anyway, and 
thus any conjecture that this jury might enter into as to how a 
psychologist watching the interview or anybody else watching 
the interview would give additional useful information would be 
just that:  conjecture.”  Juarez contends that the trial court 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
64 
erred, depriving him of due process and a fair, reliable, and 
impartial determination of his guilt and sentence. 
 
Section 1054.1 requires the prosecutor to disclose to the 
defendant, among other things, the names, addresses, and 
“[r]elevant written or recorded statements of witnesses,” and 
“reports of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecution 
intends to call at trial, including any reports or statements of 
experts made in conjunction with the case.”  (Id., subds. (a), (f).)  
When a party fails to comply with its discovery obligations, the 
trial court may, among other things, “advise the jury of any 
failure or refusal to disclose and of any untimely disclosure.”  
(Id., subd. (b).)  Here, it was not clear that the prosecutor failed 
to comply with discovery obligations.  The prosecutor never 
intended to call and did not call Dr. Dougherty as a witness.  
Although Dr. Dougherty “may have” taken notes, the trial court 
observed, “it’s not clear” that he did.  Under these 
circumstances, the prosecutor’s asserted failure to comply with 
discovery obligations and the trial court’s refusal to instruct the 
jury as requested did not deprive Juarez of due process or a fair, 
reliable, and impartial determination of his guilt and sentence.  
The July 16 interrogation was videotaped and played for the 
jury, and as the trial court reasoned, it is mere “conjecture” that 
any notes taken by Dr. Dougherty would have provided 
“additional useful information” to aid the jury’s own viewing of 
the videotaped interrogation. 
D.  Sufficiency of Evidence for Felony Murders of 
José and Juan  
The jury was instructed that it could convict Juarez of the 
first degree murders of José and Juan based on the theories of 
premeditation and deliberation, lying in wait, or felony murder.  
The jury found him guilty of the first degree murders.  
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
65 
 
Juarez claims that there was insufficient evidence of 
felony murder, i.e., that he killed José and Juan during the 
commission of a robbery.  Juarez argues that the trial court 
erred in instructing the jury as to that theory and in declining 
to provide a requested instruction concerning “independent 
felonious intent.”  He emphasizes that when he moved pursuant 
to section 1118.1 for the entry of a judgment of acquittal on the 
felony-murder special circumstances regarding José and Juan, 
the court granted his motion.  In considering his section 1118.1 
motion, the court indicated that it might grant the motion 
because “what was going on here was a robbery in the course of 
a murder, not a murder in the course of a robbery,” and “there 
is such a solid basis in the evidence for the multiple murder and 
lying in wait special circumstances, that it is a neater, cleaner, 
more understandable way to present to the jury the only issues 
that are really going to make much difference anyway.”  The 
prosecutor did not object to the motion, and the court granted it.  
 
Preliminarily, we reject Juarez’s contention that the trial 
court erred in declining to provide a requested instruction 
concerning “independent felonious intent.”   After the prosecutor 
argued against giving the instruction, the court questioned 
defense counsel about it, asking whether a killing that occurred 
during the commission of a robbery could support a felony 
murder conviction even if the robbery was committed for 
purposes of concealing the killing.  Defense counsel essentially 
withdrew the request by responding, “I have to concede at this 
point in time that Mr. — the prosecution is correct, and I was 
thinking of something else, and unfortunately, the case law does 
not support my thought process.”  The court then denied the 
request.  
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
66 
 
Even assuming the issue was preserved for review, we find 
no error.  The jury was instructed that for felony murder, the 
unlawful killing must occur during the commission or attempted 
commission or as a direct causal result of the crime of robbery 
and the perpetrator must have had the specific intent to commit 
that crime.  The jury was also instructed that for the crime of 
robbery, “the perpetrator must have formed the specific intent 
to permanently deprive an owner of his property before or at the 
time that the act of taking the property occurred” and “before or 
at the time of the application of force or violence, or the use of 
fear or intimidation.”  Thus, “[w]ith the robbery and felony-
murder instructions given, the jury was adequately instructed 
that [Juarez] must have possessed the intent to commit robbery 
at the time of the killing to be guilty of felony murder . . . .”  
(People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 499.)  
 
As to his remaining contentions, “[w]hether we review 
[the] claim as asserted instructional error in [instructing the 
jury on a particular theory of first degree murder for which there 
was insufficient evidence] or insufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the jury’s verdict, we apply essentially the same 
standard.  [Citation.]  We ‘review the whole record in the light 
most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it 
discloses substantial evidence — that is, evidence which is 
reasonable, credible, and of solid value — such that a reasonable 
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’ ”  (People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 550.)  
 
“Robbery is defined as ‘the felonious taking of personal 
property in the possession of another, from his person or 
immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by 
means of force or fear.’  (§ 211.)  Robbery requires the ‘specific 
intent to permanently deprive’ the victim of his or her property.”  
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
67 
(People v. Mora and Rangel, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 489.)  
“Liability for first degree murder based on a felony-murder 
theory is proper when the defendant kills in the commission of 
robbery, burglary, or any of the other felonies listed in section 
189. . . .  [T]o find a defendant guilty of first degree murder 
based on a killing perpetrated during a robbery, the evidence 
must show the defendant intended to steal the victim’s property 
either before or during the fatal assault.”  (People v. Lewis (2001) 
25 Cal.4th 610, 642.)  “ ‘ “[T]he killing need not occur in the 
midst of the commission of the felony, so long as that felony is 
not merely incidental to, or an afterthought to, the killing.’  
[Citation.]  In addition, a homicide occurs in the perpetration of 
an enumerated felony for the purpose of the felony-murder rule 
if both offenses were parts of ‘ “one continuous transaction.” ’  
[Citation.]  ‘ “There is no requirement of a strict ‘causal’ 
[citation] or ‘temporal’ [citation] relationship between the 
‘felony’ and the ‘murder.’ ” ’  [Citation.]  In addition, 
‘[c]ircumstantial evidence may provide sufficient support for a 
felony-murder 
conviction.’ ” 
 
(People 
v. 
Prince 
(2007) 
40 Cal.4th 1179, 1259.)   
 
 
Here, there was evidence that when José and Juan arrived 
at the Parnell Ranch, José wore a watch, Juan wore gold chains, 
and both carried wallets.  After their arrival, Juarez asked José 
to accompany him into the field, which he did.  Y.M. did not see 
Juan.  When Y.M. subsequently asked where José and Juan 
were, Juarez said that they were cleaning and cutting a deer 
that he had killed.  Although there were no eyewitnesses to the 
murders, the evidence indicated that during this time, Juarez 
shot José and Juan and buried them.  The following day, law 
enforcement officers discovered boots under the bed in Juarez’s 
trailer, and inside them were three metal chains, a watch, and 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
68 
two wallets containing identification for José and Juan, $147 in 
American currency, and $80 in Mexican pesos.  These items did 
not have dirt on them, which suggested that the items were 
removed before placing the men in the grave.  In addition, the 
clasps on the chains appeared undamaged; the jury may have 
reasonably inferred from this fact that Juarez sought to 
preserve the value of these items as opposed to hastily taking 
them as an afterthought to the murders.  Rather than 
destroying the items, Juarez also placed them within his boots 
under his bed.   
 
It is true that there was evidence showing that Juarez had 
planned to kill José and Juan, and when asked in the 
interrogation why Juarez took their jewelry and wallets, Juarez 
said that “[w]hen [he] saw those things it occurred to [him] to 
take it” and that he took the items because they would be able 
to identify José and Juan, not because they were valuable.  
Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
judgment, however, we find that a reasonable trier of fact could 
conclude that Juarez had a concurrent intent to rob and kill José 
and Juan and that the robberies were not merely incidental to, 
or an afterthought to, the murders.  (Cf. People v. Brooks (2017) 
3 Cal.5th 1, 65 [“And although defendant may have intended to 
commit arson for the additional purpose of concealing [the 
victim’s] identity and his role in her killing, we have observed 
that concurrent intent to kill and to commit the target felony 
does not preclude a felony-murder theory of first degree 
murder.”].)  The record discloses legally sufficient evidence of 
Juarez’s guilt of felony murder based on robbery.  We further 
conclude that even though the trial court granted the 
section 1118.1 motion as to the felony-murder special 
circumstances, the felony murder theory of guilt was still 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
69 
properly before the jury, and the trial court did not err in 
instructing the jury on that theory.  
 
Even assuming that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the felony murder theory of guilt and that the trial court 
erred in instructing the jury on that theory, we would still 
uphold the first degree murder verdicts here.  “A first degree 
murder verdict will be upheld if there is sufficient evidence as 
to at least one of the theories on which the jury is instructed, 
‘absent an affirmative indication in the record that the verdict 
actually did rest on the inadequate ground.’ ”  (People v. Nelson, 
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 552 [upholding first degree murder verdict 
where there was sufficient evidence of the primary prosecution 
theory of first degree murder based on premeditation and 
deliberation, even though there was insufficient evidence to 
support the theory of first degree murder based on lying in 
wait].)  Juarez does not challenge the sufficiency of evidence for 
the lying-in-wait and premeditation and deliberation theories 
on which the jury was instructed.  The record contains ample 
evidence in support of these theories:  Among other things, he 
dug the hole in advance of their arrival, he walked José and 
Juan toward the hole after telling them that he had shot a deer 
and needed them to go to it, and he shot them in the head from 
less than an inch away.  The jury found true the special 
circumstance that he killed them while lying in wait, which in 
itself makes the killing first degree murder.  Accordingly, we 
uphold the first degree murder verdicts for the murders of José 
and Juan.   
E. Constitutionality of Lying-in-wait Special 
Circumstance  
 
Juarez claims that the lying-in-wait special circumstance 
is unconstitutional because it is vague and fails to adequately 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
70 
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.  We 
have previously rejected these claims.  (See, e.g., People v. Cage 
(2015) 
62 Cal.4th 256, 
281; 
People 
v. 
Lewis 
(2008) 
43 Cal.4th 415, 516.)  He also challenges the lying-in-wait 
special-circumstance instruction, CALJIC No. 8.81.15, as 
confusing and contradictory.  We have previously rejected these 
challenges.  (See, e.g., People v. Cage, at pp. 280–281; People v. 
Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 332–333.)  Juarez provides no 
reason to revisit those decisions here.  
F. Sufficiency of Evidence for Lying-in-wait 
Special Circumstance as to J.M. and A.M. 
 
Juarez contends that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the jury’s finding that he killed J.M. and A.M. while 
lying in wait.   
 
“A sufficiency of evidence challenge to a special 
circumstance finding is reviewed under the same test applied to 
a conviction.  [Citation.]  Reviewed in the light most favorable to 
the judgment, the record must contain reasonable and credible 
evidence of solid value, ‘such that a reasonable trier of fact could 
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  (People 
v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 201.) 
 
At the time of the 1998 murders, “ ‘the elements of the 
lying-in-wait special circumstance required an intentional 
killing, committed under circumstances that included a physical 
concealment or concealment of purpose; a substantial period of 
watching and waiting for an opportune time to act; and, 
immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting 
victim from a position of advantage.  [Citations.] . . . .  [The 
period of waiting and watching] need not continue for any 
particular length “ ‘of time provided that its duration is such as 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
71 
to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation and 
deliberation.’ ”  [Citation.]  “ ‘ “The element of concealment is 
satisfied by a showing ‘ “that a defendant’s true intent and 
purpose were concealed by his actions or conduct.  It is not 
required that he be literally concealed from view before he 
attacks the victim.” ’ ” ’ ”  [Citation.]  The factors of concealing 
murderous intent, and striking them from a position of 
advantage and surprise, “are the hallmark of a murder by lying 
in wait.”  [Citation.]’  [Citations.]  ‘[T]he lying-in-wait special 
circumstance requires “that the killing take place during the 
period of concealment and watchful waiting. . . .”  [Citation.]’  
[Citation.]  ‘ “During” means “at some point in the course of.” ’  
[Citation.]  [¶] Moreover, when the capital crime[s] occurred, the 
lying-in-wait special circumstance required a showing that the 
defendant ‘intentionally killed the victim while lying in wait.’  
(§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(15), italics added.)”  (People v. Hajek 
and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1183–1184.)   
 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
judgment, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have 
found true this special circumstance.  The record contains 
evidence that Juarez walked J.M. and A.M. approximately a 
quarter-mile to a remote location, where he had dug a hole that 
already contained the bodies of José and Juan and that was deep 
enough to hold additional bodies.  “[T]he jury could reasonably 
infer that a matter of minutes elapsed” on the walk.  (People v. 
Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 826 [substantial period of 
watching and waiting where “more than a quarter of a mile 
separated the spot where defendant first saw the girls and 
where he shot them”].)  The jury could also reasonably conclude 
that he concealed his purpose as they walked.  It is true that the 
children had seen him attack their mother, they had cried, and 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
72 
he had put tape on them.  But Juarez said that he removed the 
tape and that the children wanted to see their father.  The jury 
could reasonably infer that despite having been upset, the 
children — aged three and five — were willing to walk with 
Juarez because he was an adult with whom they were familiar.  
Juarez himself said that the children had calmed down and that 
A.M. became tired, so he let go of J.M.’s hand and carried her.  
Finally, the record contains evidence that once near the hole, he 
struck the children’s heads and put them in the hole.  This is 
sufficient to infer a substantial period of watching and waiting, 
followed by a surprise attack from a position of advantage.   
G. Sufficiency of Evidence for Felony Murders of 
J.M. and A.M. 
 
The jury was instructed that it could convict Juarez of the 
first degree murders of J.M. and A.M. based on the theories of 
premeditation and deliberation, lying in wait, or felony murder.  
The jury found him guilty.  Juarez claims, however, that there 
was insufficient evidence of felony murder — that is, that he 
killed them in the commission of the rape or penetration by a 
foreign object of Y.M. — and the trial court erred in instructing 
the jury as to that theory.  He acknowledges that the felony-
murder special circumstances as to J.M. and A.M. were 
dismissed. 
 
We need not decide whether sufficient evidence supported 
the theory of felony murder here.  The jury’s true findings 
regarding the lying-in-wait special circumstance show that the 
jury found that Juarez killed J.M. and A.M. while lying in wait.  
Because there was sufficient evidence to support the first degree 
murder verdicts based on the lying-in-wait theory (see pt. IV(F), 
ante) and no indication that the verdicts rested on the felony 
murder theory, the verdicts must be upheld.  
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
73 
H. Admission of Photographs   
 
The prosecutor sought to introduce 14 crime scene and 25 
autopsy photographs depicting the four murder victims.  The 
defense objected to all but three of them.  The trial court 
considered each photograph and excluded eight as cumulative 
or unduly prejudicial, directed the prosecutor to crop one, and 
allowed the remaining to be introduced. 
 
During the guilt phase, Detective Summers testified about 
the excavation of the grave and photographs depicting the 
victims within it.  The photographs were displayed on a screen, 
and at times, the prosecutor enlarged parts of them.  When the 
defense objected to these enlargements, the trial court directed 
the prosecutor to inform the defense before enlarging anything 
on the screen, but noted that the overhead projections were of 
“significantly lower quality than the actual photographs” and 
“there has been nothing more than a restoration on the screen” 
of the actual photographs.  Dr. Henrikson also testified during 
the guilt phase about the autopsies and photographs from them. 
 
Juarez contends that the trial court abused its discretion 
and violated his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, due 
process, and reliable verdicts and sentence.  
 
“ ‘ “This court is often asked to rule on the propriety of the 
admission of allegedly gruesome photographs.  [Citations.]  At 
base, the applicable rule is simply one of relevance, and the trial 
court has broad discretion in determining such relevance.” ’ ”  
(People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 163.)   “ ‘ “A trial court’s 
decision to admit photographs . . . will be upheld on appeal 
unless the prejudicial effect . . . clearly outweighs their 
probative value.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
74 
 
Here, the trial court exercised its discretion in excluding 
some photographs and admitting others.  We have examined the 
photographs.  The crime scene photographs were relevant to 
show that the murders occurred, where and how the victims 
were buried, and the order in which they were buried.  (See 
People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 475 [photographs 
showed “the locations and positions in which [the] bodies were 
found”].)  The autopsy photographs were relevant to show the 
manner of the killings and to clarify testimony regarding the 
victims’ injuries and causes of death.  (Ibid.)  Although the 
photographs were numerous, “none gratuitously duplicated any 
other.”  (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 867; see People 
v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 476–477 [no abuse of 
discretion for admitting eight photographs of victim]; People v. 
Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 131–135 [no abuse of discretion 
for admitting 24 photographs of two victims].)   
 
Nor were the photographs “ ‘so gruesome as to have 
impermissibly swayed the jury.’ ”  (People v. Burney (2009) 
47 Cal.4th 203, 243.)  The excavators proceeded carefully in an 
effort to preserve and photograph the original positions of the 
bodies.  Similarly, the autopsy photographs did not contain 
gratuitous details.  Contrary to Juarez’s argument, they were 
wholly unlike the autopsy photographs in People v. Marsh 
(1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 987, 996–999, which were “gruesome 
solely because of the autopsy surgeon’s handiwork; removing the 
skull, opening the body cavity, covering the child’s face with the 
exposed underside of the bloody scalp, etc.”  We conclude the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate Juarez’s 
constitutional rights.   
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
75 
I. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
Juarez 
contends 
that 
the 
prosecutor 
committed 
misconduct by eliciting inadmissible and prejudicial testimony.  
This misconduct, he contends, violated his rights to due process 
and a reliable guilt and penalty determination.  
1. Testimony by Deputy Walker  
 
While discussing motions in limine, defense counsel noted 
that a responding officer had described “[Y.M.] running her 
finger across her neck in a gesture,” but defense counsel did not 
believe that the prosecutor intended to introduce this evidence.  
The court said, “Well, let’s — why don’t we deal with this 
whenever you think it first needs to come up.”  The prosecutor 
said, “That’s fine, Your Honor.” 
 
During the guilt phase, Deputy Walker testified about 
talking to Y.M. on the night of the crimes.  He asked her whether 
she had been tied up.  When the prosecutor asked about her 
response, the defense objected on hearsay grounds, but the court 
overruled the objection.  Deputy Walker testified, “I don’t 
remember if I got a response in regards to the duct tape, but I 
do remember regards [sic] to the scarf that was around her 
neck.”  The prosecutor asked, “Did she physically manipulate or 
move the scarf in some fashion in response to your question?” to 
which Deputy Walker replied affirmatively.  The prosecutor 
then asked, “How did she do that?”  Deputy Walker replied, “She 
took the scarf, put it in her mouth and said, ‘Arturo bad,’ ” and 
Deputy Walker made a “grating noise” and “dr[ew] his right 
index finger across his neck.” 
 
The defense objected and, outside the presence of the jury, 
moved for a mistrial, arguing that the gesture and noise were 
hearsay, prejudicial, and conveyed that Y.M. wanted Juarez to 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
76 
be killed.  Although opposing this, the prosecutor described the 
gesture as Y.M. “expressing anger regarding [Juarez] and 
perhaps a desire to get even for what has occurred.”   
 
The trial court urged counsel to remember “those matters 
with respect to which there are in limine orders in place and 
which have not been ruled on,” and observed that defense 
counsel “did what he needed to do in order to assure that he 
could get a ruling on this evidence before the jury heard it.”  The 
court, however, denied the motion for a mistrial.  The court 
concluded that the gesture fell within the hearsay exception for 
excited utterances and carried “little, if any,” prejudice.  The 
court explained that the gesture was “highly ambiguous.”  “[I]t 
is extraordinarily unlikely that what [Y.M.] was trying to convey 
was [Juarez] has done a terrible thing and should receive the 
death penalty.”  Instead, “it is highly likely what she was trying 
to convey is yes, I had some kind of a binding of some sort around 
my neck,” or at most, “an expression of undifferentiated 
outrage.”  The court also denied the defense’s request to 
admonish the jury to disregard Deputy Walker’s testimony, 
without prejudice to the defense later requesting an instruction 
that the jury should disregard any victim’s views on how this 
case should be resolved.   
 
“ ‘ “A prosecutor’s . . . intemperate behavior violates the 
federal Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct ‘so 
egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to 
make the conviction a denial of due process.’ ” ’  [Citations.]  
Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial 
fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state 
law only if it involves ‘ “ ‘the use of deceptive or reprehensible 
methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.’ ” ’ ”  
(People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841.)  “ ‘ “It is, of 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
77 
course, misconduct for a prosecutor to ‘intentionally elicit 
inadmissible testimony.’  [Citations.]”  [Citation.]  Such 
misconduct is exacerbated if the prosecutor continues to elicit 
such evidence after defense counsel has objected.’  [Citation.]  
However, a prosecutor cannot be faulted for a witness’s 
nonresponsive answer that the prosecutor neither solicited nor 
could have anticipated.”  (Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1035; 
People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 998.) 
 
Whether the prosecutor, in asking Deputy Walker how 
Y.M. physically manipulated or moved the scarf, could have 
anticipated the testimony about her gesture and noise presents 
a close issue.  The prosecutor did not directly ask whether she 
made a gesture or a noise, although defense counsel had alerted 
the prosecutor to the issue and the trial court had expressly 
reserved the issue.  But even assuming the prosecutor elicited 
this testimony in violation of the court’s request to rule on it, the 
prosecutor’s “asking of a single question” did not constitute a 
“pattern of conduct so egregious that it rendered the trial 
fundamentally unfair.”  (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 
952.)  Nor did the prosecutor’s conduct cause prejudice at the 
guilt phase or the penalty phase of the trial.  The gesture and 
noise were a brief and passing element of a lengthy trial, with 
little if any prejudicial weight in comparison to the totality of 
other evidence.  We find no prejudicial misconduct or trial court 
error. 
2. Testimony by Orozco  
 
The trial court ordered that “no other crimes evidence, no 
character evidence, and no reputation evidence be introduced 
during the guilt phase,” without a court order.  Before Orozco 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
78 
testified, the prosecutor stated that he no longer intended to 
introduce testimony about Juarez’s womanizing. 
 
During Orozco’s testimony, the prosecutor asked whether 
he recalled “anything [Juarez and he] talked about on the way 
back” 
after 
visiting 
the 
Martinezes. 
 
Orozco 
replied 
affirmatively.  The prosecutor asked, “And what was that?”  
Orozco responded in Spanish, but the interpreter did not 
translate his response in the jury’s presence.  Outside the jury’s 
presence, the interpreter translated his response:  “ ‘He was 
talking to me about being with a girl in Santa Gertrudis.’ ” 
 
The defense moved for a mistrial, arguing that the 
prosecutor violated his representation regarding Orozco’s 
testimony.  The court denied the motion but agreed to strike 
Orozco’s response and instruct the jurors that to the extent they 
understood it, they should disregard it. 
 
Shortly after resuming, the prosecutor asked Orozco 
whether Juarez said anything about the Martinezes on the 
drive.  Orozco responded no, and further testified that Juarez 
did not mention being threatened by José or Juan.   
 
There was no misconduct.  Although the prosecutor asked 
an open-ended question, it is not clear that the prosecutor 
solicited or anticipated Orozco’s response.  And even if we 
assume that the prosecutor did anticipate Orozco’s response, it 
did not render the trial fundamentally unfair or cause prejudice.  
The response was brief and stated in Spanish, and the court 
struck it and instructed the jury to disregard it. 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
79 
V.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Denial of Discovery Motion Regarding 
Discriminatory Prosecution 
 
Juarez contends that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion for discovery to pursue a claim of discriminatory 
prosecution by the Placer County District Attorney’s Office 
(District Attorney).  He asks us to remand the case to the trial 
court to consider his claim of discriminatory prosecution after 
he receives discovery.   
 
“ ‘[D]iscriminatory enforcement of the laws may be a valid 
defense in a case in which the [defense] can establish deliberate 
invidious 
discrimination 
by 
prosecutorial 
authorities.’  
[Citation.]. . . .  In Murgia[ v. Municipal Court (1975)] 
15 Cal.3d [286, 306], we held that when a defendant seeks to 
defend a criminal prosecution based on discriminatory 
prosecution, ‘traditional principles of criminal discovery 
mandate that defendants be permitted to discover information 
relevant to such a claim.’ ”  (People v. Montes (2014) 
58 Cal.4th 809, 828.)  “Under our state law standard, a Murgia 
motion must ‘ “describe the requested information with at least 
some degree of specificity and must be sustained by plausible 
justification.” ’  [Citation.]  We have held a showing of ‘plausible 
justification’ requires a defendant to ‘show by direct or 
circumstantial evidence that prosecutorial discretion was 
exercised with intentional and invidious discrimination in his 
case.’  [Citation.]  Similarly, under the federal standard, a 
defendant must produce ‘ “some evidence” ’ tending to show the 
existence of both a discriminatory effect and the prosecutor’s 
discriminatory intent.”  (Id. at p. 829.)  On appeal, we assume 
that the motion was validly made and consider “whether 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
80 
defendant made the requisite showing under state or federal 
standards to obtain the discovery he sought.”  (Ibid.) 
 
Juarez argues that he made the requisite showing based 
on two facts alleged in his motion.  First, since 1977, there were 
only three other cases involving multiple murders and murders 
of children; the defendants (James Hill, Kenneth McGraw, 
Theresa Knorr) were Caucasian and were offered plea bargains.  
Second, in the preceding decade, the District Attorney sought 
the death penalty at trial against only two defendants, both of 
whom were African American. 
 
The Attorney General argues that Juarez failed to make 
the requisite showing and relies on additional facts identified by 
the District Attorney.  First, the cases against Hill, McGraw, 
and Knorr were distinguishable.  Hill had been admitted to a 
mental hospital before killing his two children; McGraw had 
been found incompetent to stand trial for killing his pregnant 
estranged wife and daughter, and a key prosecution witness had 
died before McGraw’s criminal proceedings resumed; and 
Knorr’s case had been transferred to another county, where the 
District Attorney did not participate.  Second, Juarez’s date 
range for death penalty trials was arbitrary and misleading.  
Based on the prosecutor’s “personal knowledge of the cases, [his] 
personal review of court files, and on [his] direct communication 
with [deputy district attorneys],” the District Attorney charged 
46 defendants (of whom 26 were White, 19 were persons of color, 
and one was of unknown ethnicity) with special circumstances 
between 1977 and 2000, and sought the death penalty at trial 
against eight of them, of whom five were White, two were 
African American, and one was of unknown ethnicity.  
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
81 
 
The trial court denied the motion after finding no showing 
of discriminatory effect or discriminatory intent based on a case-
by-case analysis or a statistical analysis.  The court noted that 
no case in the county’s history involved the “degree of criminal 
conduct in terms of multiple homicides and sexual assault” as 
existed here. 
 
We see no error.  Juarez’s case-by-case analysis boils down 
to merely two cases, both of which involved fewer murders and 
no rape allegations.  Neither comparison is persuasive.  In 
addition, his statistics about the District Attorney seeking the 
death penalty at trial “failed to take into account the case 
characteristics of the homicides” and used an arbitrary date 
range, as suggested by the District Attorney’s additional 
information in this regard.  (People v. Montes, supra, 58 Cal.4th 
at pp. 830–831.)  Juarez has not made the requisite showing.   
B. Use of Jail Visitation Logs 
 
Before trial, the prosecutor’s investigator reviewed 
Juarez’s jail visitation logs and contacted persons listed on 
them.  Juarez contends that this conduct violated his statutory 
and constitutional rights and urges us to set aside his 
convictions and sentence.    
1. Background  
 
In December 1999, defense counsel learned that the 
prosecutor’s investigator, Joe Bertoni, had contacted two of its 
experts.  The defense filed an emergency application to restrain 
the prosecutor from accessing the identities of defense experts 
or contacting them, and to order the prosecutor to disclose all 
defense experts of whom they had become aware or whom they 
had contacted and the source of that information.  At a 
December 13, 1999 hearing, the defense explained that the 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
82 
prosecutor had obtained the information from jail visitation 
logs.  The trial court ordered the prosecutor to provide the 
defense with copies of the jail visitation logs, a list of all persons 
contacted from them, and a summary of all information 
obtained.  The court also ordered the prosecutor not to review 
the logs or contact persons on them and not to disclose 
information obtained to the Attorney General, pending a further 
hearing.  The defense subsequently moved to estop the 
prosecutor from seeking the death penalty, to recuse the District 
Attorney, and to require the prosecutor to demonstrate that no 
part of its case relied on information thus obtained.  
 
At the hearing in January 2000, the acting corrections 
support supervisor, Donna Sylvia, testified that the jail 
maintains visitation logs for security reasons but routinely 
provides them to law enforcement.  The logs contain the date 
and time of each visit, classify the visit as either personal or 
professional, and contain a remarks field that typically lists the 
visitor’s name, contact information, and relationship (if 
personal) or occupation (if professional).  The logs typically do 
not contain the purpose of the visits, although a clerk could 
enter that information in the remarks field.  For example, the 
log refers once to “psych eval” in the remarks field.   
 
Bertoni testified that he routinely reviewed visitation logs 
in his investigations to identify potential witnesses and was not 
aware of any rule prohibiting such review.  He accessed the logs 
in Juarez’s case through his network terminal on two occasions 
(once in 1998 and again around July 1999), and due to a system 
change, he requested and received them through the jail records 
custodian on a third occasion (around Sept. or Oct. 1999).  On 
that third occasion, he requested them after being asked to do 
so in a memorandum by Deputy District Attorney Peggy Turner, 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
83 
who indicated she acted on behalf of Deputy District Attorney 
Thomas Beattie.  The memorandum asked Bertoni to review the 
logs and gather information about professionals listed in them, 
including whether, where, and what they had previously 
testified.  
 
Bertoni testified that in reviewing the logs, he identified 
personal visitors who might lead to additional interviews and 
sought information about professional visitors.  He contacted 
four of the personal visitors as part of his “continuing 
investigation.”  He searched the Internet and contacted 
associations in regard to two professional visitors; from this, he 
learned that one of the professionals had testified in Sonoma 
County.  He then called the two professionals, identified himself, 
said that they might be witnesses in this case, and asked for 
their curricula vitae and experience testifying.  One of the 
professionals agreed to provide her curriculum vitae and said 
that she had testified approximately “40/60” for the prosecution 
and the defense but did not clarify to which side the percentages 
corresponded.  Bertoni testified that he did not recall but may 
have referred to the other professional by name in his call with 
her.  Bertoni did not ask about their conversations with Juarez, 
and no confidential communications were divulged.  He provided 
the information he collected to Turner and Beattie.   
 
Following the hearing, the trial court concluded that the 
prosecutor did not violate any express statutory provision, but 
the court made note of section 987.9, which authorizes a capital 
defendant to “request the court for funds for the specific 
payment of investigators, experts, and others for the 
preparation or presentation of the defense,” and provides that 
“[t]he fact that an application has been made shall be 
confidential and the contents of the application shall be 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
84 
confidential.”  In order to facilitate section 987.9’s purpose and 
spirit, and to permit the defense to prepare its case in an 
atmosphere of confidentiality, the court ordered the jail not to 
disclose, and the District Attorney not to obtain, any 
information pertaining to the defense expert witnesses in the 
case unless an exception applied.  “Expert witnesses” for 
purposes of this order meant persons retained by the defense 
pursuant to section 987.9.  The court declined to preclude the 
prosecutor from seeking the death penalty or to recuse the 
District Attorney because the court found the defense had failed 
to establish the necessity of either sanction.  The court found no 
showing of material prejudice.  The court declined to speculate 
that the prosecutor held the key to the defense’s case based on 
the names of two potential experts.  The court reasoned that the 
information about the two experts would have been 
subsequently disclosed to the prosecutor or would have been 
rendered irrelevant.  The court noted that “[t]here may well be 
other tactical arguments or information that might be gleaned 
from the presence or absence of any particular witness,” but in 
the very early stage of the trial preparation process here, the 
court was “only given the possibility of prejudice without any 
actual showing of prejudice.” 
 
Several months later, the defense renewed its motion to 
estop the prosecutor from seeking the death penalty and to 
recuse the District Attorney.  The defense claimed that the 
prosecutor improperly contacted the California Medical 
Forensic Group (CMFG), which provided medical and mental 
health care to inmates, and learned that Juarez’s file did not 
contain any psychotherapist records.  The defense argued that 
the prosecutor sought this information to determine whether 
there was any medical or mental condition that might bear on 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
85 
the Miranda issues or on the mitigating evidence at the penalty 
phase.  The prosecutor responded that he had contacted CMFG 
because he had issued a subpoena and did not want to 
inadvertently receive materials subject to the psychotherapist 
privilege.  The trial court denied the motion.  The court 
characterized the prosecutor’s conduct as “probably ill advised” 
and “probably improper” but “an honest attempt to avoid 
problems of getting information they didn’t have a right to.”  The 
court subsequently ruled that the prosecution could not 
introduce Juarez’s jail medical records in its case-in-chief. 
2. Discussion 
 
Juarez seems to agree with the Attorney General that a 
prosecutor can access jail visitation logs for purposes other than 
gathering information about a defendant’s possible defenses.  
(Cf. People v. Loyd (2002) 27 Cal.4th 997, 1010 [“California law 
now permits law enforcement officers to monitor and record 
unprivileged communications between inmates and their 
visitors to gather evidence of crime”].)  He focuses his claim on 
the prosecutor’s use of the jail visitation logs to obtain 
information about defense experts.  He contends that this 
conduct violated state statutes and his constitutional right to 
counsel, his right against self-incrimination, and his rights to 
due process and equal protection.  He also asserts with little 
analysis that this conduct violated Evidence Code section 1017 
and his rights to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures 
and to privacy and association.  
 
We begin with Juarez’s statutory claims.  Civil Code 
section 1798.24 of the Information Practices Act of 1977 (Civ. 
Code, § 1798 et seq.) prohibits agencies from disclosing 
“personal information in a manner that would link the 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
86 
information disclosed to the individual to whom it pertains,” 
absent an exception.  Subdivision (e), however, permits 
disclosing information to another agency when the disclosure is 
necessary for the agency to perform its duties and “the use is 
compatible with a purpose for which the information was 
collected.”  (Civ. Code, § 1798.24, subd. (e).)  When information 
is transferred to or from a law enforcement agency, “a use is 
compatible if the use of the information requested is needed in 
an investigation of unlawful activity under the jurisdiction of 
the requesting agency.”  (Ibid.)  Subdivision (o) additionally 
permits disclosing information “[t]o a law enforcement or 
regulatory agency when required for an investigation of 
unlawful activity” unless the disclosure is otherwise prohibited 
by law.  (Civ. Code, § 1798.24, subd. (o).)  Information that is 
permitted to be disclosed under subdivision (e) or subdivision (o) 
“shall be provided when requested by a district attorney.”  (Civ. 
Code, § 1798.68.)  Because the Information Practices Act of 1977 
provides that information required for an investigation of 
unlawful activity “shall be provided” to a district attorney upon 
request, we do not find a violation of this statute by the 
prosecutor’s access to the jail visitation logs here.  
 
Section 987.9 provides that in a capital case trial, “the 
indigent defendant, through the defendant’s counsel, may 
request the court for funds for the specific payment of 
investigators, experts, and others for the preparation or 
presentation of the defense.”  (§ 987.9, subd. (a).)  “The fact that 
an application has been made shall be confidential and the 
contents of the application shall be confidential.”  (Ibid.)  In light 
of section 987.9’s directive that not only the contents of a defense 
application for payment of experts but also the mere “fact that 
an application has been made” “shall be confidential,” we find it 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
87 
troubling that the prosecutor in this case directed the 
investigator to review the visitation logs for the purpose of 
learning about the defense’s possible experts.  Through these 
efforts, the prosecutor learned about two experts who were 
consulted but who ultimately did not testify.  In other words, the 
prosecutor’s purpose was to learn — and he in fact did learn — 
what he could about the defense plans from whatever could be 
gleaned from the identities of the defense’s possible experts.  
Although section 987.9 does not expressly make confidential the 
fact that a defense expert visited a defendant in jail, the 
prosecutor’s conduct is difficult to square with the evident 
purpose of section 987.9.  (See People v. Berryman (1993) 
6 Cal.4th 1048, 1071 [“ ‘The confidentiality requirement was 
evidently intended to prevent the prosecution from learning of 
the application for funds and thereby improperly anticipating 
the accused’s defense.’ ” (italics added)].) 
 
However, even if we find the prosecutor’s learning about 
the defense’s possible experts to be an improper invasion of 
Juarez’s statutory entitlement to confidentiality in consulting 
defense experts, we cannot reverse the judgment unless we find 
it “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [the 
defendant] would have been reached” at the guilt phase in the 
absence of the prosecutor’s conduct (People v. Watson (1956) 
46 Cal.2d 818, 836) or that there is “a reasonable (i.e., realistic) 
possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict” 
at the penalty phase in the absence of the prosecutor’s conduct 
(People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448).  Here, neither the 
prosecutor nor the investigator sought to learn, or actually 
learned, of any conversations among Juarez, the experts, and 
defense counsel.  The circumstances here differ from those in 
Morrow v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1261, 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
88 
where the prosecutor “orchestrate[d] an eavesdropping upon a 
privileged attorney-client communication in the courtroom and 
acquire[d] confidential information.”  (Ibid. [dismissal is 
appropriate because there was a “ ‘substantial threat of 
demonstrable prejudice’ ” as a matter of law].) 
 
Further, the record does not show that the conduct aided 
the prosecution or harmed the defense.  The trial court, alert to 
the confidentiality guarantee in section 987.9, restricted the 
prosecution’s access to information about defense experts in 
December 1999, approximately 15 months before trial.  There is 
no showing of specific insights that the prosecutor divined about 
defense strategy before then.  And neither the Attorney General 
nor Juarez identify any specific evidence offered by the 
prosecution that was developed as a result of the visitation logs.  
Nor has Juarez pointed to any specific evidence that the defense 
chose not to present as a result of the prosecutor’s conduct.  
Juarez also has not shown that the prosecutor’s conduct actually 
impaired Juarez’s ability to consult with counsel or any expert, 
or his ability to otherwise assist in his defense.  We conclude 
that, despite the impropriety of the prosecutor’s conduct, 
reversal on statutory grounds is unwarranted. 
 
We further reject Juarez’s related assertion that the 
attorney-client and work-product privileges were violated.  None 
of the information obtained from the visitation logs constituted 
“a confidential communication between client and lawyer.”  
(Evid. Code, §§ 952, 954.)  Nor did the information constitute 
attorney work-product material — that is, “ ‘ “any writing 
reflecting ‘an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or 
legal research or theories.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Zamudio (2008) 
43 Cal.4th 327, 355; see id. at p. 355, fn. 14.)  
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
89 
 
We next consider whether the prosecutor’s conduct 
violated Juarez’s right to counsel under article I, section 15 of 
the California Constitution.  In Barber v. Municipal Court 
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 742, 745 (Barber), we considered the proper 
remedy when an accused’s constitutional right to counsel has 
been denied by the actions of an undercover police officer who 
posed as a codefendant and attended the accused’s confidential 
attorney-client conferences.  We held that the right to counsel 
guaranteed by the Constitution “embodies the right to private 
consultation with counsel” and “is violated when a state agent 
is present at confidential attorney-client conferences.”  (Id. at 
p. 752.)  Rejecting an exclusionary remedy, we concluded the 
appropriate remedy was dismissal of the charges.  (Id. at 
pp. 759–760.) 
 
We distinguished Barber in People v. Alexander (2010) 
49 Cal.4th 846 (Alexander), where we emphasized that “the 
officer in Barber participated in many meetings during which 
defense strategy was thoroughly discussed; he conveyed, to some 
degree, the nature of the anticipated defense with his superiors; 
and he inserted himself directly into the defense preparations 
. . . .  All of this occurred because the officer, with the knowledge 
of the prosecution, deceived the defendant and their attorneys 
concerning his true status.  [Citation.]  In addition, there was 
evidence that the defendants ‘[had] been prejudiced in their 
ability to prepare their defense’ after they learned an 
undercover officer had been in their midst.”  (Id. at p. 895.)  In 
Alexander, “detectives intercepted one telephone call between 
defendant and a defense investigator that covered only limited 
topics related to certain witnesses, and the interception occurred 
pursuant to a judicially approved warrant, not ‘trickery’ by the 
authorities.  There was no evidence anyone other than the 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
90 
officers monitoring the call learned of its contents, and much of 
what was discussed in that call was repeated in subsequent calls 
that were not privileged.”  (Ibid.)  On these facts, we declined to 
decide whether the defendant’s state constitutional right to 
counsel was violated; we instead concluded that reversal was 
not warranted even assuming a violation.  (Ibid.)  Finding “[n]o 
evidence establish[ing] that the prosecution gained anything 
from intercepting the call or that the defense was affected 
negatively in a way that could have changed the trial’s 
outcome,” we concluded that the defendant had not shown “a 
reasonable probability” of prejudice.  (Id. at p. 899.) 
 
Similarly 
here, 
even 
assuming 
Juarez’s 
state 
constitutional right to counsel was violated, there is no 
reasonable probability or possibility that absent the violation, a 
result more favorable to him would have been reached at either 
the guilt or the penalty phase of the trial.  In this case, unlike in 
Barber, no state agent attended confidential attorney-client 
conferences, and all attorney-client communications remained 
confidential.  Moreover, as noted, neither the investigator nor 
the prosecution learned the content of any conversations 
between Juarez and the experts, and the record does not show 
that the prosecutor’s conduct impaired the preparation of his 
defense or aided the state’s presentation of the evidence against 
him. 
 
We turn now to Juarez’s claim that the prosecutor’s 
conduct violated his right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment.  “In Weatherford v. Bursey (1977) 429 U.S. 545, 
549 [51 L.Ed.2d 30, 97 S.Ct. 837] (Weatherford) the Supreme 
Court rejected a per se rule that ‘ “whenever the prosecution 
knowingly arranges and permits intrusion into the attorney-
client relationship the right to counsel is sufficiently endangered 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
91 
to require reversal and a new trial.” ’  Although the high court 
did not establish a definitive standard for determining when 
surreptitious state participation in communications between a 
defendant and his or her attorney or . . . the attorney’s agent, 
does violate the Sixth Amendment, it stated that unless the 
record supports ‘at least a realistic possibility of injury to [the 
defendant] or benefit to the State, there can be no Sixth 
Amendment violation.’  [Citations.]  In other words, a court 
properly rejects a Sixth Amendment claim based on 
surreptitious state participation in communications between a 
defendant and his or her attorney or the attorney’s agent when 
the record demonstrates there was no realistic possibility of 
injury to the defendant or benefit to the prosecution.”  
(Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 888–889.) 
 
Weatherford was an undercover law enforcement agent 
who, along with Bursey and two others, vandalized an office.  
Bursey was arrested and charged, and Weatherford, in order to 
maintain his undercover status, was fictitiously arrested and 
charged as well.  Weatherford was invited to two meetings with 
Bursey and his attorney Wise to discuss defense tactics.  
Weatherford did not share any information he obtained from 
those meetings.  But he did testify at Bursey’s trial regarding 
his undercover activities and the vandalism.  After Bursey was 
convicted, Bursey initiated a civil rights action against 
Weatherford and others, alleging a deprivation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.  (Weatherford v. 
Bursey, supra, 429 U.S. at pp. 547–549 (Weatherford).)   
 
The high court observed that Weatherford’s testimony did 
not reveal anything about the meetings, that none of the state’s 
evidence was obtained as a result of his participation in the 
meetings, and that the district court found that Weatherford did 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
92 
not communicate about the meetings to his superiors or to the 
prosecution.  (Weatherford, supra, 429 U.S. at pp. 555–556.)  
“Moreover, this is not a situation where the State’s purpose was 
to learn what it could about the defendant’s defense plans and 
the informant was instructed to intrude on the lawyer-client 
relationship or where the informant has assumed for himself 
that task and acted accordingly.”  (Id. at p. 557.)  “There being 
no tainted evidence in this case, no communication of defense 
strategy to the prosecution, and no purposeful intrusion by 
Weatherford,” the Sixth Amendment was not violated.  (Id. at 
p. 558.) 
 
We applied Weatherford in People v. Ervine (2009) 
47 Cal.4th 745 (Ervine).  There, the trial court found that jail 
personnel had read defendant’s privileged materials during a 
search of his cell, but no privileged information had been 
communicated to the prosecution.  We found no Sixth 
Amendment violation in the absence of evidence that 
confidential information was conveyed to the prosecution.  (Id. 
at pp. 763–765, 768.)   
 
We again applied Weatherford in Alexander, where the 
defendant challenged the recording of a telephone call involving 
himself, his mother, and a defense investigator.  We said the 
“critical facts are comparable [to those in Weatherford] in all 
important respects.”  (Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 889.)  
“In both cases a law enforcement officer who was assisting in the 
investigation of the defendant’s offenses, and who testified at 
the defendant’s trial, became privy to trial strategy discussions 
between the defendant and the defense attorney or the 
attorney’s agents.  In both, the record supported the findings 
that the information the officer learned was not conveyed to the 
prosecutors and that the officer’s investigation or testimony at 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
93 
trial was not affected by information learned during the 
discussions.”  (Ibid.)  Neither case was “ ‘a situation where the 
State’s purpose was to learn what it could about the defendant’s 
defense plans.’ ”  (Id. at p. 890.)  We also noted that the 
“defendant’s mother repeated to others much of what was 
discussed during the three-way call” and that the prosecutors 
therefore “would have learned much of its contents,” further 
decreasing “any possibility that interception of the call hindered 
the defense or benefited the prosecution.”  (Id. at pp. 889–890.)  
We thus concluded “the record demonstrates no realistic 
possibility that defendant was injured by, or the prosecution 
benefited from, the monitoring and recording of the three-way 
call” and, accordingly, there was no Sixth Amendment violation.  
(Id. at p. 891.) 
 
Here, unlike in Weatherford, Ervine, and Alexander, the 
prosecutor purposefully instructed the investigator to review 
the visitation logs in order to learn about possible defense 
experts.  And the investigator did learn confidential information 
— namely, the identities of two defense experts — and 
proceeded to research the background and qualifications of 
those experts, presumably to gain insight into the defense plan.  
This conduct improperly invaded the confidentiality to which 
Juarez was entitled in preparing his defense.  Nevertheless, the 
prosecutor did not learn the content of any conversation between 
Juarez and the experts, and the Attorney General and Juarez 
do not point to any trial evidence that was derived or developed 
from the investigator’s access to the visitation logs, nor does 
Juarez identify any evidence he would have developed or 
presented had the improper access not occurred.  For these 
reasons and others stated above, we conclude that “the record 
demonstrates no realistic possibility that defendant was injured 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
94 
by, or the prosecution benefited from,” the investigator’s access 
to the visitation logs, and we thus find no Sixth Amendment 
violation.  (Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 891.) 
 
Juarez additionally asserts a violation of his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.  The Fifth 
Amendment “prohibits the direct or derivative criminal use 
against an individual of ‘testimonial’ communications of an 
incriminatory nature, obtained from the person under official 
compulsion.”  (People v. Low (2010) 49 Cal.4th 372, 390.)  Juarez 
notes that the experts signed into the jail, but he identifies no 
statement obtained by compulsion and personal to him, much 
less used against him at trial.  (See Maldonado v. Superior Court 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 1112, 1127 [“this constitutional provision 
simply bars the direct or derivative use of such officially 
compelled disclosures to convict or criminally punish the person 
from whom they were obtained”]; cf. Izazaga v. Superior Court 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 367–369 [statements of witnesses are not 
personal to the defendant and therefore fall outside this clause].)  
His claim therefore fails.   
 
Juarez’s asserted violation of his due process rights fares 
no better.  He claims that the prosecutor’s use of the logs 
“disrupt[ed] the reciprocity mandated by the due process clause” 
because the defense did not have access to the logs or 
comparable access to information about prosecution experts.  
“However, as we have explained, because the concern of the due 
process clause is ‘the right of the defendant to a fair trial,’ the 
focus of the reciprocity inquiry under the due process clause is 
whether any lack of reciprocity ‘ “interferes with the defendant’s 
ability to secure a fair trial.” ’ ”  (People v. Valdez (2012) 
55 Cal.4th 82, 120.)  To the extent there was any lack of 
reciprocity here, it did not compromise his ability to present a 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
95 
defense or tilt the balance toward the state to any significant 
degree. 
 
Nor do we find merit in his undeveloped equal protection 
argument.  Juarez contends that the prosecutor could access the 
identities of possible defense experts only because he was 
incarcerated and not released on bail.  But he offers no reason 
why the state may not require persons visiting an incarcerated 
defendant to identify themselves to prison authorities, even 
though persons visiting a defendant who is not incarcerated 
need not. 
 
Finally, as to the prosecutor’s contact with CMFG, Juarez 
argues that the prosecutor learned from CMFG “what it needed 
to know about any evidence of mental conditions that [Juarez] 
might use during pretrial motions, or at a penalty phase,” and 
he asserts with little analysis that this interfered with the 
development of a defense and violated his right against self-
incrimination, to equal protection, and to a fair trial.  The 
prosecutor’s inquiry into the existence of an inmate’s 
psychotherapy records is also troubling.  (See Evid. Code, 
§ 1017, subd. (a) [psychotherapist-patient privilege applies 
“where the psychotherapist is appointed by order of the court 
upon request of” defense counsel in order to advise a criminal 
defendant on presenting a defense based on his or her emotional 
or mental condition].)  But the trial court prohibited the 
prosecutor from introducing Juarez’s jail medical records.  For 
this reason, and for the reasons discussed above, the 
prosecutor’s conduct did not violate these constitutional rights 
or deprive Juarez of a fair trial. 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
96 
C. Denial of Motion for a Mistrial Following Y.M.’s 
Testimony 
 
Juarez contends that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion for a mistrial after Y.M. testified.  Her testimony, he 
argues, was so inflammatory that it deprived him of the jury’s 
reasoned moral response and violated his rights to due process, 
a fair trial, and a reliable penalty determination.   
 
Y.M. testified about the victims’ personal characteristics 
and the emotional and financial impact of their deaths on her.  
During her testimony, two photographs of the victims and a 
short videotape of the children were displayed.  At one point, the 
prosecutor asked how she felt when she thought about her 
children these days.  She responded, “I feel a lot of pain for not 
having been able to do anything for them.  I wish I could turn 
time back and give my life for them.  I still remember the day 
when I was being beaten, and the thing that terrifies me the 
most is having been unable to do anything for them.  Their little 
faces.  Their desperation at seeing how their mother was being 
beaten, and me unable to do a thing for them.”  Following her 
response, the court recessed. 
 
Once her testimony concluded, the defense moved for a 
mistrial.  The defense argued that Y.M.’s testimony was so 
emotionally charged that it was impossible for the jury to make 
a dispassionate decision about life or death.  The defense also 
argued that when she left the courtroom during the recess, she 
cried “very loudly” in the hallway.  Although the trial judge did 
not hear her crying, the prosecutor and the courtroom deputy 
did, but when the deputy went into the hallway, he found her 
quiet and no jurors present.  The court denied the motion, 
stating that at the end of the morning, “when [Y.M.] was 
describing the helplessness she felt as she saw her children’s 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
97 
fear for her, she began to cry uncontrollably.”  Her emotionalism 
lasted “about half a minute,” and the court recessed.  She was 
“remarkably composed throughout most of her testimony.”  She 
became “slightly tearful” on one or “[p]erhaps more than one 
other occasion” but “not to a point where, other than to cause 
her to pause before answering a question, it disrupted [the] 
proceedings in any way.”  The court concluded that what the jury 
saw and heard was not “particularly emotionally charged” given 
the facts of the case.  
 
“Victim impact evidence is admissible during the penalty 
phase of a capital trial.  [Citation.]  Section 190.3, factor (a) 
permits the prosecution to establish aggravation by offering 
evidence of the circumstances of the crime, including the impact 
of the crime on surviving victims and on a victim’s family.”  
(People v. Peoples, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 752–753.)  “ ‘[T]he 
trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on 
mistrial motions.’ ”  (People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 
p. 1038.)  
 
We see no basis to conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion.  Y.M.’s testimony spanned less than one day, 
comprising around 15 transcript pages, and it concerned the 
victims and the impact of their deaths on her.  We have routinely 
permitted the admission of similar evidence.  (See, e.g., People 
v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 574–579 [testimony about 
victim’s character, immediate reaction to victim’s death, and 
impact of victim’s death and videotape depicting victim]; People 
v. Peoples, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 753 [photographs of victim].)  
We have also stated that it is “a normal human response to the 
loss of a child” for a mother to cry on the stand, and that 
circumstance “does not render that testimony inflammatory.”  
(People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 298.)  Even though 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
98 
Juarez argues that we have unreasonably expanded the holding 
in Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808 (Payne) to allow such 
testimony, he presents “no persuasive reason for us to overrule 
our own decisions regarding victim-impact evidence.”  (People v. 
Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056, 1086.)  The trial court gave a 
reasoned ruling that Y.M.’s testimony did not invite an 
irrational response from the jury, and we conclude that her 
testimony did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. 
D. Execution-impact Evidence 
 
The trial court ruled that Juarez could not introduce 
testimony about the anticipated impact of his execution on his 
family unless it illuminated some positive quality in his 
background.  Over his objection, the court accordingly instructed 
the jury:  “You may not consider sympathy for the defendant’s 
family respecting the possibility of his execution except as it may 
illuminate some positive quality of the defendant’s background 
or character.”  Juarez contends this rendered his trial 
fundamentally unfair and violated his constitutional rights to 
present a defense, due process, equal protection, and a reliable 
penalty determination.  He does not argue that the court 
improperly excluded specific testimony; rather, he argues that 
the impact of an execution is a circumstance of the crime and 
asks us to reexamine our contrary position. 
 
We have held that “[t]he impact of a defendant’s execution 
on his or her family may not be considered by the jury in 
mitigation.”  (People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 601; 
accord, People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 197–198.)  
None of the reasons offered by Juarez persuades us to revisit our 
precedent.  First, he argues that the Eighth Amendment does 
not permit excluding evidence that might have mitigating value.  
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
99 
“But nothing in that constitutional rule ‘limits the traditional 
authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not 
bearing on the defendant’s character, prior record, or the 
circumstances of his offense.’ ”  (People v. Wall, supra, 3 Cal.5th 
at p. 1071; see People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1286–
1287.)  Second, he argues that our position conflicts with Payne, 
supra, 501 U.S. 808, but it does not.  (Cf. People v. Bennett, at 
p. 602 [Payne made clear that “a defendant must be allowed to 
introduce 
mitigating 
evidence 
‘concerning 
his 
own 
circumstances,’ ” but “execution-impact evidence is irrelevant 
under section 190.3 because it does not concern a defendant’s 
own circumstances”].)  Finally, he observes that some courts 
have admitted execution-impact evidence, but none of the cases 
he cites are binding on this court.   
E. Prosecutorial Misconduct  
Juarez contends that the prosecutor engaged in repeated 
misconduct that impermissibly skewed his case toward death.  
He refers specifically to the prosecutor’s conduct concerning the 
jail visitation logs, Dr. Dougherty, and Orozco.  Even though we 
have found and assumed misconduct, we conclude that for the 
reasons discussed, the misconduct, considered singly or 
cumulatively, “did not cause reversible prejudice” or amount to 
“a ‘pattern’ of misconduct so ‘egregious’ that it infected the trial 
with fundamental unfairness.”  (People v. Shazier (2014) 
60 Cal.4th 109, 150, 151; see also People v. Mendoza (2007) 
42 Cal.4th 686, 705, 706, 709.)  
VI.  OTHER ISSUES 
 
A. International Law  
Juarez contends that he was deprived of a fair trial and a 
reliable penalty in violation of customary international law as 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
100 
informed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the 
International Convention Against All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination.  But we have held that “ ‘[i]nternational law 
does not prohibit a sentence of death when, as here, it was 
rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and 
statutory requirements.’ ”  (People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 
59 Cal.4th 446, 489; see also People v. Hillhouse (2002) 
27 Cal.4th 469, 511.) 
In 
addition, 
he 
contends 
that 
because 
racial 
discrimination 
permeates 
the 
death 
penalty, 
capital 
punishment itself violates international law and norms.  He 
relies on statistical studies that purport to show racial 
disparities in the charging, sentencing, and imposition of the 
death penalty, particularly with respect to African-American 
defendants.  We have rejected similar arguments and do so 
again here.  (See, e.g., People v. Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th 
at p. 1253; People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 703; People 
v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1055.)   
B. Challenges to the Death Penalty 
 
Juarez 
raises 
a 
number 
of 
challenges 
to 
the 
constitutionality of California’s death penalty statute that we 
have repeatedly rejected.  Juarez provides no persuasive reason 
to revisit the following precedent:  
 
The death penalty statute as construed by this court does 
not fail to perform the narrowing function required by the 
Eighth Amendment.  (People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 
304.)  Disputing this, Juarez argues in his reply brief that we 
have misinterpreted Pully v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37 and 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
101 
Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967 in so holding.  His 
argument does not persuade us to revisit our conclusion.  
 
Juarez claims that the failure to require the jury 
unanimously find true the aggravating factors relied on violates 
the federal Constitution.  “ ‘Nothing in the federal Constitution 
requires the penalty phase jury to make written findings of the 
factors it finds in aggravation and mitigation[] [or] agree 
unanimously that a particular aggravating circumstance 
exists.’ ”  (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 295.)  Nor is 
the death penalty statute unconstitutional for not requiring 
“findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating 
circumstance (other than Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (b) or (c) 
evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the 
appropriate 
sentence.” 
 
(People 
v. 
Rangel 
(2016) 
62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235.)  The high court’s recent decisions 
interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee do not 
alter our conclusions.  (See Rangel, at p. 1235; People v. Lee 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 651–652; see also McKinney v. Arizona 
(2020) __ U.S. __, __ [140 S.Ct. 702, 708] [“Ring [v. Arizona 
(2002) 536 U.S. 584] and Hurst [v. Florida (2016) __ U.S. __ 
[136 S.Ct. 616]] did not require jury weighing of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances”].)   
 
“ ‘ “ ‘The sentencing factor of “circumstances of the crime” 
(§ 190.3, factor (a)) is not unconstitutionally vague and does not 
result in the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death 
penalty.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Powell, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 193.)  
“ ‘The jury may properly consider evidence of unadjudicated 
criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b) [citation], [and] 
jury unanimity regarding such conduct is not required 
[citation].’ ”  (Ibid.)  The trial court does not violate a defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
102 
constitutional rights by failing to instruct the jury it must 
unanimously agree the defendant committed a prior crime 
under section 190.3, factor (c).  (People v. O’Malley, supra, 
62 Cal.4th at p. 1014.) 
 
The trial court’s instructions need not “delete inapplicable 
sentencing 
factors, 
delineate 
between 
aggravating 
and 
mitigating circumstances, or specify a burden of proof either as 
to aggravation (except for other crimes evidence) or the penalty 
decision.”  (People v. Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 305.)  “Nor 
are potentially mitigating factors unconstitutionally limited by 
the adjectives ‘extreme’ and ‘substantial’. . . .”  (Ibid.)  The 
sentencing factors are not vague and ill-defined.  (Ibid.)   
The absence of written findings, intercase proportionality 
review, and disparate sentence review does not render the 
statute 
unconstitutional. 
 
(People 
v. 
Pearson 
(2013) 
56 Cal.4th 393, 478; People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, 
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 469; Ervine, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 811.)  
Imposition of the death penalty does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s 
prohibition 
against 
cruel 
and 
unusual 
punishment.  (People v. Adams (2014) 60 Cal.4th 541, 581–582.)   
Finally, these asserted flaws, considered together, do not 
render the statute unconstitutional.  (See People v. Pearson, 
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 479.)   
C.  Cumulative Prejudice 
 
Juarez contends that the combined errors require reversal 
of his convictions and sentence.  He additionally contends that 
to the extent errors at the guilt phase do not require reversal of 
his convictions, they nevertheless require reversal of his 
sentence.   
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
103 
 
We have assumed error but found no prejudice at the 
preliminary hearing by the use of the unsworn, uncertified 
interpreter, the use of Juarez’s interpreter to interpret Y.M.’s 
outburst, and Juarez’s absence when his interpreter did so.  We 
have declined to decide whether sufficient evidence supported 
the theory of felony murder for the murders of J.M. and A.M., 
and while we have found sufficient evidence supported the 
theory of felony murder for the murders of José and Juan, we 
have assumed that even if there was no sufficient evidence, we 
still would uphold each of the first degree murder verdicts.  We 
have additionally assumed or found error but no prejudice at 
trial regarding the difficulties that made it hard to hear the 
court proceedings, the accuracy of interpreters, the failure to 
timely advise Juarez of his right to have his consulate notified, 
the trial court’s denial of his motions to suppress evidence 
obtained during Detective Summers’s entry into the trailer and 
Juarez’s statements made during the walk-through, Deputy 
Walker’s testimony about Y.M.’s gesture, Orozco’s testimony 
about Juarez’s talk of “being with a girl,” and the prosecutor’s 
use of the jail visitation logs and contact with CMFG.  
Considering these actual or assumed errors altogether, we 
conclude that their cumulative effect does not warrant reversal 
of his convictions or sentence.  (See People v. Page (2008) 
44 Cal.4th 1, 54; People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 501.)   
 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
104 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C.J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
S105876 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
Today’s opinion recognizes that while “ ‘the State has a 
strong interest in having jurors who are able to apply capital 
punishment within the framework state law prescribes,’ ” a 
criminal defendant “ ‘has the right to an impartial jury drawn 
from a venire that has not been tilted in favor of capital 
punishment by selective prosecutorial challenges for cause.’ ”  
(People v. McKinzie (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1302, 1328.)  “A 
prospective juror is properly excluded if he or she is unable to 
conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, 
including the death penalty where appropriate.”  (Ibid., internal 
quotation marks omitted.)  Here we decline to reconsider our 
decisions upholding the death qualification process.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 16–21.) 
It bears mention, however, that although the United 
States Supreme Court in Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 
162, 168–173, rejected arguments that the death qualification 
process leads to conviction-prone juries, “a range of studies have 
continued to emerge post-Lockhart that build on the research 
[submitted in Lockhart] showing that death-qualified jurors are 
quite different from non-death-qualified jurors.”  (Levinson et 
al., Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial 
Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States (2014) 
89 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 513, 569, fn. 247 (hereafter Levinson); see id. 
at pp. 543, 568–569 [critiquing Lockhart and citing studies 
finding that death-qualified jurors tend to be more conviction-
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
 
2 
prone 
than 
ordinary 
jurors]; 
Rozelle, 
The 
Principled 
Executioner:  Capital Juries’ Bias and the Benefits of True 
Bifurcation (2006) 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 769, 784–785 [study of 1,201 
capital jurors from over 350 trials found that death-qualified 
jurors have disproportionately punitive orientations, are more 
likely to hold racial stereotypes, and are more likely to be pro-
prosecution and conviction-prone]; see also Butler, Death 
Qualification and Prejudice:  The Effect of Implicit Racism, 
Sexism, and Homophobia on Capital Defendants’ Right to Due 
Process (2007) 25 Behav. Sci. & L. 857; Butler & Wasserman, 
The Role of Death Qualification in Venirepersons’ Attitudes 
Toward the Insanity Defense (2006) 36 J. Applied Soc. Psych. 
1744.) 
In a multifaceted study of 445 jury-eligible citizens in six 
death penalty states, including California, researchers found 
that “the process of death qualification results in capital jurors 
with significantly stronger implicit racial biases . . . and explicit 
racial biases than jury-eligible citizens generally.”  (Levinson, 
supra, 89 N.Y.U. L.Rev. at p. 569; see id. at pp. 559–560.)  The 
study further found that “death-qualified juries possess stronger 
implicit 
biases 
because 
the 
process 
results 
in 
the 
disproportionate elimination of non-White jurors.”  (Ibid., italics 
omitted; see id. at pp. 559.) 
This latter finding coheres with a substantial body of 
evidence that Black jurors are significantly more likely than 
Whites to be excused for cause.  (Frampton, For Cause:  
Rethinking Racial Exclusion and the American Jury (2020) 118 
Mich. L.Rev. 785, 792–805 (hereafter Frampton); Cover, The 
Eighth Amendment’s Lost Jurors:  Death Qualification and 
Evolving Standards of Decency (2016) 92 Ind. L.J. 113, 136–138 
(hereafter Cover) [examining 1,445 venire members in 11 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
 
3 
capital trials in Louisiana between 2009 and 2013]; Eisenberg, 
Removal of Women and African-Americans in Jury Selection in 
South Carolina Capital Cases, 1997–2012 (2017) 9 Ne. U. L.Rev. 
299, 316, 335–337 (hereafter Removal); Eisenberg et al., If It 
Walks Like Systematic Exclusion and Quacks Like Systematic 
Exclusion: Follow-Up on Removal of Women and African- 
Americans in Jury Selection in South Carolina Capital Cases, 
1997–2014 (2017) 68 S.C. L.Rev. 373, 387–388.)  In many cases, 
the magnitude of racial disparities is greater among jurors 
excused for cause than among jurors excused through 
peremptory strikes.  (See Frampton, at pp. 800–801; Removal, 
at pp. 335–339, 342–344.)  And this phenomenon is not limited 
to capital cases.  (See Frampton, at pp. 794–795 [study of 316 
Louisiana criminal trials with 14,616 prospective jurors, 62 
percent White and 33 percent Black, showed that jurors 
challenged by prosecutors for cause were 59 percent Black and 
34 percent White, while jurors targeted by prosecutors for 
peremptory strikes were 54 percent Black and 41 percent 
White]; id. at pp. 796–798 [study of 83 Mississippi criminal 
trials with 4,717 prospective jurors, 60 percent White and 34 
percent Black, showed that jurors challenged by prosecutors for 
cause were 80 percent Black and 21 percent White, while jurors 
targeted by prosecutors for peremptory strikes were 68 percent 
Black and 32 percent White].) 
Thus, although much attention has appropriately been 
paid to the inefficacy of Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 
in combating racial discrimination in peremptory strikes, there 
is significant evidence that removal of jurors for cause is an 
equally if not more significant contributor to the exclusion of 
Black jurors, which may result in juries with higher levels of 
implicit bias. 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
 
4 
Here, defendant raises these concerns but does not tie 
them to the record in this case.  It would be difficult to do so.  As 
one observer explains, “This data is buried in attorneys’ notes 
and in transcripts of the jury voir dire proceedings in individual 
capital cases.  Strike data are enormously labor intensive to 
obtain and to aggregate in a meaningful way.”  (Cover, supra, 92 
Ind. L.J. at p. 130.)  Thus, a starting point for addressing this 
issue may be to require public reporting of the demographic 
composition of jury venires and of the prospective jurors who are 
excused for cause.  (See, e.g., id. at pp. 148–149 [proposing 
legislation or a rule of court to require reporting of such data].)  
Transparency is an important first step to understanding the 
extent to which racial dynamics affect jury selection. 
Several efforts are presently underway in California to 
make juries more inclusive and representative of our 
communities.  These include a bill to reform the legal framework 
for rooting out discrimination in the exercise of peremptory 
strikes (Assem. Bill No. 3070 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended July 8, 2020) and a bill to expand the jury pool to 
include all people who have filed a state tax return (Sen. Bill No. 
592 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.)).  Other proposals may soon be in 
the works.  (See Cal. Courts Newsroom, California Supreme 
Court Names Jury Selection Work Group (July 6, 2020).)  If the 
goal of these efforts is to better ensure that juries reflect a cross-
section of our communities, then the topics worthy of attention  
 
 
PEOPLE v. SUAREZ 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
 
5 
may include whether current standards and processes for 
excusal of prospective jurors for cause contribute to racial 
disparities in jury selection and to implicit biases in the 
resulting petit juries.  
LIU, J. 
 
I Concur: 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Suarez   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal  XXX 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S105876 
Date Filed:  August 13, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior    
County:  Napa    
Judge:  Scott Snowden    
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Snedeker, Smith & Short, Michael R. Snedeker and Lisa R. Short for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Alice B. Lustre and Leif M. Dautch, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Michael R. Snedeker     
Lisa R. Short 
Snedeker, Smith & Short 
PMB 422, 4110 SE Hawthorne Blvd. 
Portland, OR 97214-5246 
(503) 234-3584 
 
Leif Dautch 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 
(415) 703-5089