Title: Hardingham v. United Counseling Service of Bennington County, Inc.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

HARDINGHAM_V_UNITED_COUNSELING_SERV.94-096; 164 Vt 478; 672 A.2d 480

[Filed 22-Dec-1995]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                     No. 94-096


David N. Hardingham                                    Supreme Court

                                                       On Appeal from
    v.                                                 Chittenden Superior Court

United Counseling Service                              October Term, 1995
of Bennington County, Inc., et al.


Matthew I. Katz, J.

       John D. Shullenberger of Mickenberg, Dunn, Sirotkin & Dorsch,
  Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant

       Stephen G. Norton and John G. Beiswenger of Paul, Frank & Collins,
  Inc., Burlington, for defendants-appellees United Counseling Service,
  Halpin, O'Brien and Gordon

       Pietro J. Lynn of Dinse, Erdmann & Clapp, Burlington, for
  defendant-appellee Kowalski


PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Burgess, D.J.,
  Specially Assigned



       GIBSON, J.   Plaintiff David Hardingham, who was blinded as the result
  of drinking windshield wiper fluid during an alcoholic binge, appeals the
  superior court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of defendants,
  whom plaintiff accused of negligently assisting him while he was
  intoxicated.  In an earlier opinion, Hardingham v. United Counseling Serv.
  of Bennington, No. 94-096 (Vt. Sept. 1, 1995), we resolved all issues
  raised on appeal except for the issue of whether the superior court erred
  in ruling that, as a matter of law, defendants' conduct did not amount to
  gross negligence.  We ordered the parties to reargue this issue, on which
  the original four-member panel was equally divided.  Upon reargument, we
  reject plaintiff's argument that the superior court usurped the role of the
  jury by concluding, as a matter of law, that defendants were not grossly
  negligent in aiding him.  Accordingly, the court's grant of summary
  judgment in favor of defendants is affirmed.

 

                                     I.

       We restate the relevant facts set forth in our earlier opinion.  In
  November 1987, defendant United Counseling Service (UCS), a private,
  nonprofit organization providing counseling and psychiatric treatment to
  persons with mental illness, mental retardation, or substance-abuse
  problems, employed plaintiff, a known recovering alcoholic, as an emergency
  services counselor.  On February 3, 1988, defendant John Halpin, United
  Counseling Service's executive director, became aware that plaintiff was
  drinking again.  After failing to persuade plaintiff to seek psychological
  and medical attention, Halpin asked defendant Larry Gordon, UCS's
  coordinator of emergency services, to visit plaintiff.  Gordon went to
  plaintiff's apartment on February 4 and found him in an inebriated
  condition.  When plaintiff refused to seek treatment, Gordon called
  plaintiff's estranged wife, the emergency room at Southwestern Vermont
  Medical Center (SVMC), the police, and the Bennington Rescue Squad, but
  nobody was willing to take any action without plaintiff's cooperation. 
  Gordon left plaintiff's apartment and took all the alcohol he could find. 
  During a telephone conversation the next day, plaintiff told defendant
  David O'Brien, UCS's director of outpatient services, that he would enter a
  treatment program.

       On February 11, Halpin went to plaintiff's apartment and discovered
  plaintiff in an inebriated, semi-conscious state.  Halpin returned to UCS
  and explained plaintiff's condition to Gordon, O'Brien, and defendant
  Donald Kowalski, a psychiatrist and UCS's medical director. The three men
  went to plaintiff's apartment and found it in disarray.  While the men were
  at the apartment, plaintiff got up, went to a sink, and began to drink from
  an apparently full container of windshield wiper fluid.  O'Brien and
  Kowalski immediately took the container away from plaintiff, and Gordon
  called the police.  Notwithstanding plaintiff's vehement protests, the
  three men took him outside and helped police place him in the back of a
  patrol car.  The police took plaintiff to the SVMC emergency room. 
  Kowalski rode with plaintiff in the patrol car, but did not go into the
  hospital; instead, Gordon and O'Brien accompanied plaintiff to the
  emergency room.

 

       At the emergency room, plaintiff refused to take a blood test despite
  Gordon's request that he do so.  When plaintiff would not agree to go to a
  residential treatment program, Gordon signed an incapacitation order, and
  plaintiff was taken to the Rutland Regional Correctional Center.  At no
  time, did any of the three men inform police, emergency room personnel, or
  corrections employees that plaintiff had ingested, or had attempted to
  ingest, a bluish liquid that may have been windshield wiper fluid.  The
  following morning, plaintiff was admitted to the Rutland Medical Center and
  placed in the intensive care unit.  Tests revealed the presence of methyl
  alcohol in plaintiff's blood in sufficient concentration to present a
  threat to his life.  As a result of the methanol overdose, plaintiff
  suffered severe health problems, including blindness.

       In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants were negligent in
  failing to inform medical authorities that he had ingested windshield wiper
  fluid.  Defendants sought summary judgment.  The superior court granted
  their motions based on its conclusion that, as a matter of law given the
  facts of the case, (1) Vermont's Duty to Aid the Endangered Act, 12 V.S.A.
  § 519, immunized defendants from civil liability for acts of ordinary
  negligence, and (2) defendant's actions were not grossly negligent.  On
  reargument, plaintiff contends that the superior court usurped the role of
  the jury by concluding, as a matter of law, that defendants' actions did
  not constitute gross negligence.

                                     II.

       The concept of gross negligence has been defined by this Court in the
  context of our repealed guest-passenger statute.  Deyo v. Kinley, 152 Vt.
  196, 207-08, 565 A.2d 1286, 1293 (1989).  In that context, we stated that
  gross negligence is "`more than an error of judgment, momentary
  inattention, or loss of presence of mind;'" rather, `"it amounts to a
  failure to exercise even a slight degree of care'" and an "`indifference to
  the duty owed [to another].'"  Rivard v. Roy, 124 Vt. 32, 35,