Title: State v. Joshua O. Kyles

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 15 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1540-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Joshua O. Kyles,  
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 263 Wis. 2d 431, 662 N.W.2d 678 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 2, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 6, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
David M. Bastianelli   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J. joins dissent.  
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., joins dissent.  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner the cause was argued 
by Stephen W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Eileen A. Hirsch, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
2004 WI 15 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.    02-1540-CR 
(L.C. No. 
01 CF 1130) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Joshua O. Kyles,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 2, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming the order 
of the Circuit Court for Kenosha County, David M. Bastianelli, 
Judge.1  The circuit court granted the motion of Joshua O. Kyles, 
the defendant, to suppress marijuana seized in a frisk, a 
protective search for weapons during a routine traffic stop.  
"Frisk" refers to "measures to determine whether the person is 
in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of 
                                                 
1 State v. Kyles, No. 02-1540-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. March 27, 2003). 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
2 
 
physical harm."2  The circuit court ruled that the police officer 
lacked an articulable, reasonable objective basis to believe 
that the defendant was armed and dangerous.  Because it 
concluded that the protective search for weapons was invalid, 
the circuit court further concluded that no basis for the arrest 
existed and that the marijuana seized during the frisk was 
inadmissible evidence at the defendant's trial.  
¶2 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
order suppressing the marijuana.  Because we conclude that the 
totality of the circumstances was not sufficient to create 
reasonable suspicion to justify a protective search for weapons, 
we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  
¶3 
The dispute in the present case centers on two issues:  
first, whether the circuit court erred in allowing the officer 
to testify about his "belief that his safety was in danger"3 and 
further erred in considering the officer's belief that his 
safety was not in danger in deciding that no reasonable 
suspicion existed to justify the frisk; and second, whether the 
defendant's placing his hands in his pockets after being told by 
the officer to remove them is sufficient, in and of itself, to 
raise reasonable suspicion justifying a protective search for 
weapons.  With regard to both issues, the State asserts that the 
                                                 
2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968). 
3 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
3 
 
court of appeals erred in the present case and in State v. Mohr4 
and asks us to overturn the Mohr decision. 
¶4 
We conclude that an officer's belief that his safety 
or that of others was in danger when confronting an individual 
is not a prerequisite to conducting a protective search for 
weapons.  We do not accept the State's position that under no 
circumstances may an officer be questioned about his or her 
belief about whether his or her safety or that of others was in 
danger at the time the frisk was conducted.  We conclude that 
officers may be so questioned because officers may draw 
reasonable 
inferences 
from 
the 
facts 
in 
light 
of 
their 
experiences.  A court may therefore consider an officer's belief 
that his or her safety or that of others was or was not in 
danger 
in 
determining 
whether 
the 
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonable suspicion was met. 
¶5 
We conclude, as do the State and the defendant, that 
an individual's failure to obey the direction of an officer to 
keep his hands in the officer's sight is a significant factor to 
consider in determining the reasonableness of an officer's 
suspicion that the individual being frisked might be armed and 
dangerous.  We decline to hold, as the State urges, that the 
requirement 
of 
specific 
and 
articulable 
facts 
providing 
reasonable suspicion is automatically satisfied when a person 
fails to comply with an officer's order to keep his hands out of 
                                                 
4 State v. Mohr, 2000 WI App 111, 235 Wis. 2d 220, 613 
N.W.2d 186. 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
4 
 
pockets that could be concealing a weapon.  Circuit courts are 
aptly positioned to decide on a case-by-case basis, evaluating 
the totality of the circumstances, whether an officer had 
reasonable suspicion to justify a protective search in a 
particular case.  Finally, we decline the State's invitation to 
overturn the Mohr decision. 
I 
¶6 
The defendant challenges the officer's protective 
search for weapons conducted on him as a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment guarantee that persons be free from "unreasonable 
searches."5  In reviewing an order granting a motion to suppress 
evidence obtained during a protective search for weapons, we 
uphold a circuit court's findings of fact unless they are 
against the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence.6  The facts in the present case are undisputed.   
¶7 
Whether 
the 
facts 
satisfy 
the 
constitutional 
requirement for performing a protective search for weapons——that 
an officer must have reasonable suspicion that a person may be 
armed and dangerous to the officer or others——is a question of 
constitutional law for this court to decide.7  We are not bound 
                                                 
5 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . . ."  U.S. Const., Art. IV. 
6 State v. Williamson, 113 Wis. 2d 389, 401, 335 N.W.2d 814 
(1983). 
7 Id. 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
5 
 
by a circuit court's or court of appeals' decision on this 
question of law, but we benefit from the analyses of these 
courts.8   
¶8 
The 
controlling 
principles 
of 
constitutional 
law 
applicable 
to 
the 
"reasonable 
suspicion" 
standard 
of 
a 
protective search for weapons are firmly established, and 
neither 
party 
challenges 
these 
principles. 
 
The 
parties 
disagree, in the present case, over whether the facts satisfy 
the constitutional standard of "reasonable suspicion." 
¶9 
The touchstone for examining a frisk is the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968).  In Terry, the Court authorized a protective search of 
an individual suspected of criminal activity in order "to 
determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to 
neutralize the threat of physical harm."9  In order to limit the 
state's power to intrude upon individual rights, however, the 
Court held that to justify a particular intrusion, "the police 
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant the intrusion."10  The Court went on to 
                                                 
8 State v. Jackson, 147 Wis. 2d 824, 828, 434 N.W.2d 386 
(1989). 
9 Terry, 392 U.S. at 24; State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶22, 
234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795. 
10 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.  See McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶22; 
State v. Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d 200, 208-09, 539 N.W.2d 887 (1995); 
State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 139, 456 N.W.2d 830 
(1990). 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
6 
 
explain that "due weight must be given, not to his [the 
officer's] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' 
but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled 
to draw from the facts in light of his experience."11 
¶10 The reasonableness of a protective search for weapons 
is an objective standard, that is, "whether a reasonably prudent 
man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that 
his safety and that of others was in danger" because the 
individual may be armed with a weapon and dangerous.12  In 
determining whether a frisk was reasonable, a court may look "to 
any fact in the record, as long as it was known to the officer 
at the time he conducted the frisk and is otherwise supported by 
his testimony at the suppression hearing."13 
II 
¶11 We first state the relevant undisputed facts; we will 
expound upon the facts later in the opinion as we discuss the 
arguments of the parties.  At approximately 8:45 p.m. on 
December 23, 2001, a police officer pulled over a vehicle for 
the traffic violation of operating a vehicle without headlights 
after dark.  The defendant was a passenger in the vehicle.  No 
one in the vehicle was suspected of a crime. 
                                                 
11 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
12 Wis. Stat. § 968.25; Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; McGill, 234 
Wis. 2d 560, ¶¶19, 23. 
13 McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶24. 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
7 
 
¶12 A second officer came to the scene of the stop.  At 
the request of one of the officers, the defendant exited the 
vehicle to allow the police to perform a consensual search of 
the vehicle.  The officer's request to the defendant to exit the 
vehicle and the defendant's consent to the search of the vehicle 
have not been challenged. 
¶13 The defendant was wearing a "big, down, fluffy" coat, 
suitable for the cold winter weather that night.  The officer 
testified that when the defendant exited the vehicle he was 
behaving suspiciously:  he appeared nervous, looked around, and 
was "kind of trying to keep his hands in his pockets."  The 
officer also testified that the defendant did not try to flee. 
¶14 When the defendant exited the vehicle, he placed his 
hands in his coat pockets.  The officer directed the defendant 
to remove his hands from his pockets.  As the defendant was 
walking, at the officer's request, to the rear of the car, the 
defendant again placed his hands in his pockets.  Again the 
officer told the defendant to "keep your hands out of your 
pockets."  Again the defendant complied and removed his hands 
from his pockets.  The officer testified that the defendant's 
placement of his hands in his pocket was "like a nervous habit.  
He'd put them in, take them out, put them back in, take them 
out." 
¶15 About four to eight seconds elapsed between the time 
the defendant exited the vehicle and the time the officer 
conducted a frisk of the defendant.  Only one officer performed 
the protective search for weapons and testified about it.  No 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
8 
 
weapon was found on the defendant's person; however, marijuana 
was found. 
III 
¶16 We now address the question whether the totality of 
the circumstances supports the conclusion that the officer had 
reasonable suspicion to justify the protective search for 
weapons on the defendant. 
¶17 The parties disagree about the weight to be given the 
following 
six 
factors 
that 
compose 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances in the present case: 
(1) 
The officer testified that he "didn't feel any 
particular threat before searching" the defendant.  
(2) 
The 
defendant, 
during 
a 
four-to-eight-second 
interval, at least twice inserted his hands into 
and removed his hands from his coat pockets after 
being directed by the officer to remove his hands 
from his pockets; 
(3) 
The defendant wore a big, fluffy down coat in 
which a weapon could be secreted;  
(4) 
The defendant appeared nervous; 
(5) 
The stop occurred at night; and  
(6) 
The officer testified, in response to a question 
about the criminal activity in the area of the 
stop, that it was "pretty active." 
¶18 We address each of these six factors in turn and then 
examine them in their totality. 
(1) 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
9 
 
¶19 
The principal issue in this case, according to the 
State, is that the circuit court erred in allowing the officer 
to testify that he did not feel any particular threat that the 
defendant was armed before searching the defendant and erred in 
considering the officer's lack of belief that his safety was in 
danger. 
¶20 On cross-examination the officer was asked: "And you 
didn't feel any particular threat before searching Mr. Kyles 
[the defendant], correct?"  The officer answered: "No, I did 
not." 
¶21 The 
State 
first 
argues 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
misinterpreted the officer's testimony.  When asked why he 
conducted the frisk, the officer responded:  "Cause he was 
acting kind of nervous, suspicious, and I was looking for the 
possibility that he may have weapons on him."  The State 
contends that the officer conducted the frisk because he thought 
the defendant may have had a weapon. 
¶22 The State's principal position is not, however, that 
the circuit court misinterpreted the officer's testimony.  The 
State's principal position is two-fold:  First, the State argues 
that an officer's "subjective fear of the suspect"14 being 
searched, as the state poses the issue, is not a prerequisite to 
a valid frisk.  Second, the State argues that this court should 
                                                 
14 The State summarizes the defendant's testimony that he 
didn't feel any particular threat as a statement raising the 
issue of "subjective fear of the suspect."  See Brief and 
Appendix of Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, passim. 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
10 
 
bar any questioning of an officer about his or her "subjective 
fear of the suspect" frisked and should bar a court from 
considering an officer's "subjective fear of the suspect." 
¶23 As to the State's first position, we agree with the 
State that an officer's belief that his or her safety or that of 
others is in danger because the individual may be armed is not a 
prerequisite to a valid frisk.  Because an objective standard is 
applied to test for reasonable suspicion, a frisk can be valid 
when an officer does not actually feel threatened by the person 
frisked or when the record is silent about the officer's 
subjective fear that the individual may be armed and dangerous.  
The law is very clear on this point.15 
¶24 Numerous courts have considered the question whether a 
law enforcement officer's fear of a suspect's being armed is 
dispositive in evaluating the reasonableness of the officer's 
frisk, and with limited exceptions,16 most courts have concluded 
that it is not.  The lead case appears to be the Fifth Circuit's 
decision in United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 
                                                 
15 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(a) at 139 (3d 
ed. 1996) ("there is no requirement that an actual suspicion by 
the officer be shown"); § 9.5(a) at 253 ("it is not essential 
that the officer actually have been in fear"). 
16 Drawing on the language of various decisions, at least 
one court has stated that an officer's lack of subjective 
concern for his or her safety will prevent the facts from rising 
to the level of reasonable suspicion.  See United States. v. 
Lott, 870 F.2d 778, 784 (1st Cir. 1989) ("an officer cannot have 
a reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous when 
he in fact has no such suspicion") (emphasis in original).  We 
do not think this is an accurate statement of the law and agree 
with the numerous cases, discussed herein, that hold otherwise. 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
11 
 
1976) (reversed on other grounds by United States v. Causey, 834 
F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987)), that even though an officer's 
"subjective 
feelings 
may 
have 
been 
equivocally 
expressed . . . [w]e know of no legal requirement that a 
policeman must feel 'scared' by the threat of danger.  Evidence 
that the officer was aware of sufficient specific facts as would 
suggest 
he 
was 
in 
danger 
satisfies 
the 
constitutional 
requirement. . . . [N]o 
purpose . . . would 
be 
served 
by 
insisting on the retrospective incantation 'I was scared.'  Some 
foolhardy policemen will never admit fear.  Conversely, reliance 
on 
such 
litany 
is 
necessarily 
prone 
to 
self-serving 
rationalization by an officer after the fact.  It would be all 
too easy for an officer to belatedly recite that he was scared 
in situations where he neither had any reason to be scared, nor 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
12 
 
was indeed scared."17  Many cases have adhered to the Tharpe 
decision.18   
¶25 We agree with the rule set forth in Tharpe (relied 
upon heavily by the State) that an officer need not feel scared 
and need not believe that his or her safety or that of others is 
in danger because the individual is armed in order to conduct a 
valid weapons frisk.  
¶26 According to the State, the court of appeals in Mohr, 
especially at paragraphs 15 and 26,19 concluded that an officer's 
belief that his safety or that of others is threatened by a 
                                                 
17 Tharpe, 536 F.2d at 1100-01.  
18 See, e.g., United States v. Menard, 95 F.3d 9, 11 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (although defendant argued that officer "evidenced 
little if any concern for his safety . . . .  Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness does not require 'that a policeman must feel 
"scared" by the threat of danger.'"); United States v. Bonds, 
829 F.2d 1072, 1074-75 (11th Cir. 1987) (follows Tharpe); United 
States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 828 (8th Cir. 1986) (fact that 
suspect made no threatening moves or that officer did not notice 
bulge does not lessen reasonableness of officer's actions); 
United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 500 n.7 (6th Cir. 1985) 
(citing Tharpe for proposition that although officer did not 
view suspect as security risk, focus should be on whether 
officer reasonably perceived subject of frisk as potentially 
dangerous); Estep v. Peace, 1997 WL 33564933, *5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 
3, 1997) (same); People v. Galvin, 535 N.E.2d 837, 843 (Ill. 
1989), (although "an officer's subjective feelings may not 
dictate whether a frisk is valid," officer's testimony as to his 
subjective feelings is one factor that may be considered in 
totality of circumstances known to officer at time of frisk); 
State v. Evans, 618 N.E.2d 162, 169-70 (Ohio 1993) (follows 
Tharpe); State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291, 293-94 (Utah 1986) 
(same); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985) (same).  
19 State v. Mohr, 2000 WI App 111, 235 Wis. 2d 220, 613 
N.W.2d 186. 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
13 
 
suspect is a prerequisite for conducting a protective weapon 
search.  The State urges us to overturn the court of appeals' 
decision in Mohr.   
¶27 We do not agree with the State that the Mohr decision 
stands for the proposition, or should be read to hold, that an 
officer must be fearful of the suspect being frisked in order 
for the frisk to be valid.  The State has, in our opinion, 
mischaracterized the reasoning of the court of appeals' decision 
in Mohr.  Mohr does not hold that an officer's belief that his 
or her safety or that of others is in danger because the 
individual may be armed is a prerequisite to a valid frisk.  
Mohr does not substitute an officer's lack of subjective fear of 
the individual being frisked for the objective test applicable 
to a frisk.   
¶28 Mohr begins and ends with a reference to the objective 
standard, as do the decisions of the circuit court and court of 
appeals in the present case.  The court of appeals in Mohr 
reviewed all of the facts and circumstances, including the 
officer's conduct and the officer's lack of belief that his 
safety was threatened by the individual frisked, and concluded 
that no "reasonably prudent person in the officer's position 
would believe that his or her safety was in danger."20   
¶29 To the extent that Mohr did discuss whether an 
officer's belief that his safety was in danger may be considered 
in the totality of the circumstances, it did so in apparent 
                                                 
20 Mohr, 235 Wis. 2d 220, ¶16. 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
14 
 
response to the State's contention that the officer searched the 
defendant in Mohr for safety reasons and only to reiterate that 
"an officer's concern for his or her safety during a traffic 
stop is a legitimate and weighty consideration."21  The Mohr 
court recognized that an officer's concern for his or her 
safety, or lack thereof, is only one part of the rich tapestry 
of factors that is the totality of the circumstances inquiry.   
¶30 The State's contention that Mohr requires that an 
officer have an actual fear of the person frisked for the search 
to be valid is an erroneous reading of Mohr, and we disavow any 
such reading that might be mistakenly drawn from Mohr.  We 
repeat:  No legal requirement exists, for a court to hold that a 
frisk was valid, that an officer have a "subjective fear" of the 
person frisked, that is, that an officer believe that his or her 
safety or that of others is in danger because the individual may 
be armed and dangerous.22  
                                                 
21 Id., ¶14. 
22 Because of the State's mischaracterization of Mohr, the 
State argues that Mohr conflicts with the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
In Whren, the Court stated:   
The fact that the officer does not have the state of 
mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which 
provide the legal justification for the officer's 
action does not invalidate the action taken as long as 
the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the 
action.  . . . [T]hese cases foreclose any argument 
that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic 
stops depends on the actual motivations of the 
individual 
officers 
involved. 
 . . . Subjective 
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause 
Fourth Amendment analysis. 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
15 
 
¶31 In its second position, the State goes a step further 
and asks us to bar counsel from questioning an officer regarding 
his or her fear or belief that his or her safety or that of 
others was in danger when confronting an individual because the 
individual may be armed and to bar courts from considering such 
testimony. 
¶32 The defendant argues that if this court adopts the 
State's reasoning, a substantial amount of case law that has 
developed in the wake of Terry may be undercut.  The defendant 
contends that under the State's position, for example, an 
officer's 
particular 
training, 
experience, 
and 
perceptions 
cannot be considered in determining the reasonableness of a 
protective search for weapons.23  The State disagrees with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
517 U.S. at 813.  More recently the Court applied Whren to a 
situation where the standard was reasonable suspicion rather 
than probable cause, United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 
(2001).  Properly interpreted, Mohr does not conflict with these 
cases. 
 
These cases stand for the proposition that the actual 
motivation 
of 
an 
officer 
does 
not 
determine 
the 
constitutionality of a stop.  
The defendant in the present case concedes, and we agree, 
that there is no legal requirement that an officer be afraid for 
his or her safety or that of others.  The defendant argues only, 
and we agree, that the officer's belief that his or her safety 
or that of others was in danger is one factor that a circuit 
court 
may 
consider 
in 
evaluating 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances in examining the validity of a frisk.  The 
officer's motivation or intent to find contraband rather than 
weapons is not an issue in the present case.  
23 See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 270-71 (2002) 
(officer's subjective interpretation of the facts is considered 
as part of the totality of circumstances). 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
16 
 
defendant about the admissibility of the other factors if its 
position were adopted. 
¶33 We 
need 
not 
address 
the 
defendant's 
litany 
of 
unintended consequences of the State's position.  We do not 
accept the State's position that under no circumstances may an 
officer be questioned about his or her fear or belief that his 
or her safety or that of others was endangered by the person 
because the person may be armed.  We do not view the State's 
proposed bright-line, per se rule to be a correct or prudent 
interpretation of the law. 
¶34 Judging from the reported cases, law enforcement 
officers are frequently questioned about whether they believed 
their safety or that of others was endangered by the individual 
frisked because the individual may have been armed.  Although 
cases hold, as we do, that an officer's response to such a 
question is not determinative of the reasonableness of the 
frisk, they also hold that a court may nevertheless consider a 
police officer's fear or belief that his or her safety or that 
of others was in danger as part of the totality of the 
circumstances. 
¶35 For instance, in United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 
838 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Fifth Circuit recognized that 
"under clever cross-examination" the officer testified that, 
"before the patdown, he had no specific reason to believe 
Michelletti was armed."24  The circuit court concluded that 
                                                 
24 Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 842 (5th Cir. 1994). 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
17 
 
"[t]his statement somewhat detracts from our position [that the 
officer's suspicion was reasonably aroused] but does not prove 
that Officer Perry had no reason to be concerned about 
Michelletti."25  The Fifth Circuit then went on to cite the 
language in Tharpe, quoted above, approvingly. 
¶36 In United States v. Baker, like Tharpe and Michelletti 
a Fifth Circuit case, the court concluded that it "never held 
that an officer's objectively reasonable concern for his safety 
does not justify a protective Terry pat down for weapons where 
the officer has no actual fear for his safety."26  
¶37 Other jurisdictions also conclude that if an officer 
is questioned about his or her fear or belief that his or her 
safety or that of others was in danger because the person may 
have been armed, the response may be considered as part of the 
totality of the circumstances.  These jurisdictions conclude 
that an officer's own evaluation of the circumstances may 
provide insight to factor into the objective analysis.27  We 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 United States v. Baker, 47 F.3d 691, 694 (5th Cir. 1995). 
The Baker court stated that in Michelletti, the court "took note 
of the officer's testimony that he had no specific reason to 
believe that the defendant was armed but went on to find that 
several other factors surrounding the encounter satisfied the 
reasonable suspicion standard."   
27 See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 704 N.E.2d 375, 384 (Ill. 
1998) (an officer's subjective feeling is one of the factors 
that may be considered in the totality of the circumstances 
under Terry). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently wrote that although  
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
18 
 
agree with these jurisdictions that although an officer's 
perception 
is 
not 
determinative 
in 
determining 
the 
reasonableness of the frisk, it may be of some assistance to a 
court in weighing the totality of the factors.  
¶38 The State cites no case directly on point that 
forecloses consideration of an officer's subjective apprehension 
that an individual may be armed as part of the totality of the 
circumstances inquiry.28  One case cited by the State, the O'Hara 
                                                                                                                                                             
an officer's subjective belief alone is insufficient 
to validate or invalidate a Terry frisk, to completely 
disregard an officer's subjective belief excludes a 
potentially important element of the analysis. In 
stating that subjective belief alone is not enough to 
justify a frisk, the United States Supreme Court 
appears to recognize that subjective belief may be one 
of the factors in determining the reasonableness of an 
officer's decision to perform a Terry frisk.  In fact, 
in other situations, an officer's subjective factual 
determination based on experience and specialized 
training has been given due weight as part of the 
objective analysis.  
State v. Warren, 78 P.3d 590, 596 (Utah 2003). 
28 The State cites State v. Dumas, 786 So. 2d 80, 81-82 (La. 
2001).  In that case the court stated that "the court of appeal 
erred in according substantial weight to the testimony of the 
officers at the suppression hearing that subjectively they were 
not afraid of respondent" and that "[t]he relevant question is 
not whether the police officer subjectively believes he is in 
danger, or whether he articulates that subjective belief in his 
testimony at a suppression hearing, but 'whether a reasonably 
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the 
belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.'" 
(emphasis added).  The court did not conclude that the officer's 
testimony could not be considered. 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
19 
 
case, may be read (with a stretch) to imply that a court should 
not consider an officer's testimony relating to his lack of 
apprehension for his personal safety.  In O'Hara v. State, 27 
S.W.3d 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals concluded that whether the officer "was afraid or was 
not afraid" that the suspect was armed was "irrelevant" under an 
objective analysis.29  The O'Hara case has not been read to stop 
law enforcement officers in Texas who frisked an individual from 
being asked in court if they were concerned about their safety 
at the time of the frisk.30   
¶39 In sum, the State cites no case supporting its 
proposed per se bright-line rule that this court should bar any 
questioning of an officer about his or her "subjective fear of 
the suspect."  We conclude that an officer may be questioned 
                                                                                                                                                             
The State also cites United States v. Gonzalez, 954 F. 
Supp. 48, 50 (D. Conn. 1997).  In that case, the court stated 
that an objective test is the correct one for determining the 
reasonableness of a search under Terry but did not preclude the 
possibility that such a search may "include[] a subjective 
component."   
The State cites two additional cases for the proposition, 
with which we agree, that an officer's subjective feelings do 
not dictate the validity of a frisk.  See People v. Galvin, 535 
N.E.2d 837, 843 (Ill. 1989); State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291, 293 
(Utah 1986).  The Illinois Supreme Court in Galvin and the Utah 
Supreme Court in Warren, 78 P.3d 590, a case subsequent to 
Roybal, explained that an officer's subjective perceptions may 
nevertheless be taken into account. 
29 O'Hara v. State, 27 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2000). 
30 See, e.g., Jones v. State, 69 S.W.3d 275, 278 (Tex. App. 
2002).  
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
20 
 
about his or her fear or belief that his or her safety or that 
of others was in danger because the person frisked may have been 
armed and that a court may consider an officer's fear or belief 
that his or her safety or that of others was in danger in 
determining 
whether 
the 
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonable 
suspicion was met under the totality of the circumstances.  An 
officer's legal and subjective conclusions are, however, not 
determinative of the validity of the frisk; a court applies an 
objective standard to the facts known to the officer.  The 
officer's fear or belief that the person may be armed is but one 
factor in the totality of the circumstances that a court may 
consider in determining whether an officer had reasonable 
suspicion to effectuate a protective weapons frisk.  Sometimes 
an officer's perceptions will help sustain the objective 
reasonableness of an officer's frisk.  Other times, these 
perceptions may undercut a conclusion of reasonableness.31   
(2) 
¶40 The State argues that the "primary factor" indicative 
of reasonable suspicion in the present case is that during a 
four-to-eight-second interval the defendant at least twice 
inserted his hands into the pockets of his coat.  The defendant 
put his hands in his pockets at least once again after the 
officer requested that the defendant remove his hands from his 
pockets.  We recognize, as do the State and the defendant, that 
                                                 
31 See LaFave, supra note 15, § 3.2(c) at 40-41 (discussing 
probable cause). 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
21 
 
an individual's failure to obey the direction of an officer to 
keep his hands in the officer's sight is a significant factor to 
consider in determining the reasonableness of an officer's 
suspicion that an individual might be armed and dangerous.   
¶41 Officers need to see a person's hands so that they can 
determine whether the individual is reaching for a weapon.  
Officers have a legitimate, objective concern for their own 
safety when an individual reaches into his pockets.  This 
concern is heightened when individuals place their hands in 
their pockets after being instructed to remove their hands from 
their pockets.  Individuals are ill-advised in their encounters 
with law enforcement officers, whether for violations of traffic 
laws or criminal laws, to refuse to remove their hands from 
their pockets when requested to do so by an officer. 
¶42 This court has stated that an officer's testimony that 
a suspect twitched and acted nervous with his hands when validly 
pulled over for violating a traffic law "in particular justified 
the officer's suspicions about the presence of a weapon and 
supports the reasonableness of the frisk."32  In another case, 
this court concluded that a suspect's actions were threatening 
                                                 
32 McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶31.  In McGill, the suspect was 
a driver who had violated a traffic law, not a passenger, and 
the suspect had engaged in evasive driving maneuvers after the 
police officer turned on his vehicle's lights to perform the 
stop.  In addition, the suspect was described as "unusually 
nervous" and "smell[ing] of intoxicants and illegal drugs."  
Id., ¶¶29, 31.  In short, the totality of the circumstances in 
McGill was quite different from the facts in this case. 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
22 
 
when the suspect turned away from the officer in the dark so 
that the officer could not see the suspect's hands.33  
¶43 These cases are, according to the State, contravened 
by State v. Mohr, 2000 WI App 111, 235 Wis. 2d 220, 613 
N.W.2d 186.  The State urges us to overturn the Mohr decision 
for failing to appreciate the danger posed to an officer by an 
individual who refuses to remove his hands from his pockets 
contrary to police orders.   
¶44 In Mohr, a passenger in a car was twice ordered by 
police to remove his hands from his pockets.  Each time the 
passenger, who was described as being nervous and resistive, 
refused to do so.  The protective search for weapons occurred 25 
minutes after the stop began.  Examining the totality of the 
circumstances, the court of appeals held in Mohr that the 
protective search for weapons was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion.34   
¶45 The State repeatedly asserts that Mohr's facts were 
sufficient to justify reasonable suspicion.  The State asserts 
that the Mohr decision erred "in concluding that a nervous 
suspect keeping his hands in his pockets contrary to police 
                                                 
33 Williamson, 
113 
Wis. 2d at 
402. 
 
Professor 
LaFave 
comments that among the circumstances courts have in the past 
found sufficient to justify a pat down search are "an otherwise 
inexplicable sudden movement toward a pocket or other place 
where a weapon could be concealed [or] an otherwise inexplicable 
failure to remove a hand from a pocket."  LaFave, supra note 15, 
§ 9.5(a). 
34 Mohr, 235 Wis. 2d 220, ¶7. 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
23 
 
orders fails to provide reasonable suspicion that the suspect is 
dangerous."35  The State further asserts that the circuit court 
in the present case was misled by Mohr to believe it could not  
conclude that there was reasonable suspicion to support the 
protective frisk.36   
¶46 The State is correct that Mohr stands in contrast with 
other cases in which courts have concluded that a person's 
refusal to remove his hands from his pockets was sufficient 
under the totality of the circumstances of those cases to 
constitute reasonable suspicion justifying a protective weapons 
search.  Circumstances vary from case to case.  In Mohr, the 
court of appeals considered the position of the defendant's 
hands as one of the factors among the totality of the 
circumstances to be considered.  The court of appeals considered 
the duration of the stop and the delay before the police officer 
performed the frisk for weapons and concluded as a matter of law 
that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion justifying 
the frisk in that case.    
                                                 
35 Brief and Appendix of Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner at 
8. 
36 The circuit court stated it was bound by the Mohr case 
even though it disagreed with it.  The circuit court also stated 
that 
"there [was] 
no 
question in 
[its] 
mind 
[that the 
defendant's actions were not] even as aggravated as Mohr was." 
The 
circuit 
court 
concluded, 
"[T]here's 
no 
articulable, 
objective information here that there was [sic] indications that 
he [the defendant] was in fact dangerous as opposed to frisking 
him for officer safety." 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
24 
 
¶47  To avoid future decisions like Mohr and the decisions 
of the circuit court and court of appeals in the case at bar, 
the State asks that we hold that "the requirement for specific 
and 
articulable 
facts 
providing 
reasonable 
suspicion 
is 
satisfied when a person fails to comply with a police order to 
keep his hands out of pockets that could be concealing a 
weapon."37  Despite its assertions that it is not seeking a per 
se rule, we view the State as urging this court to adopt a per 
se "hands-in-the-pockets rule" that reasonable suspicion always 
exists when individuals place their hands in their pockets after 
an officer directs that they not do so.  
¶48  We do not adopt, as the State urges, a per se rule to 
govern these situations.  None of the decisions cited by the 
State establishes a per se rule that an individual's "hands in 
pockets" 
automatically 
establishes 
reasonable 
suspicion 
of 
dangerousness. 
 
Furthermore, 
a 
blanket 
exception 
to 
the 
requirement of an individualized suspicion of dangerousness 
ordinarily 
violates 
the 
basic 
principles 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment.38 
 ¶49  We adhere to our holdings in previous cases that a 
circuit 
court 
must 
consider 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances whether an individual's refusal to comply with an 
officer's direction to the individual to remove his hands from 
                                                 
37 Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner at 9. 
38 See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1997) 
(overturning this court's blanket exception to the "knock and 
announce" requirement). 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
25 
 
his pockets is sufficient to trigger reasonable suspicion to 
conduct 
a 
protective 
search. 
 
Circuit 
courts 
are 
aptly 
positioned to decide on a case-by-case basis, evaluating the 
totality of the circumstances, whether an officer had reasonable 
suspicion to effectuate a protective search for weapons in a 
particular case.    
¶50 Accordingly, we conclude that a person's returning his 
hands to his pockets after being asked to remove them by an 
officer is an important factor for a court to consider under the 
totality of the circumstances.  We refuse, however, to adopt a 
per 
se 
rule 
that 
in 
all 
cases, 
regardless 
of 
other 
circumstances, a person's placing his or her hands in his or her 
pockets after an officer directed that the hands be removed is 
sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion to effectuate a 
protective weapons frisk.  We consider the defendant's movement 
of his hands under the totality of the circumstances of the 
present case. 
(3) 
¶51 The 
State 
argues 
that 
the 
fluffiness 
of 
the 
defendant's coat was a factor contributing to reasonable 
suspicion in the present case.  It argues that a bulky coat may 
conceal a weapon that an ordinary coat could not.  In support of 
this proposition, the State cites numerous cases from other 
jurisdictions in which the size of a garment was a significant 
factor in supporting the reasonableness of a frisk.39  
                                                 
39 See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner at 29-30. 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
26 
 
¶52 The defendant responds that wearing a "big, down, 
fluffy coat" in the middle of a Wisconsin winter is not 
suspicious or unusual behavior and notes that the temperature 
was low in Kenosha during the evening of December 23, 2001. 
¶53 We agree with the defendant that wearing bulky winter 
clothing in the midst of a Wisconsin winter is not a suspicious 
activity in itself.  But factors consistent with innocent 
behavior, like wearing a bulky winter coat on a cold winter 
night, might, under particular facts and circumstances with 
reasonable inferences, give rise to the requisite reasonable 
suspicion required for a frisk.40  We therefore consider the 
fluffy coat in the context of the totality of the circumstances, 
especially in the context of the defendant's placing his hands 
in the pockets of his coat after being directed to remove them.   
(4) 
¶54 Overt nervousness is a fourth factor that the State 
argues is a legitimate factor to consider in determining whether 
a protective search for weapons was reasonable.41  We agree with 
the State and the defendant that our cases hold that unusual 
                                                 
40 State v. Jackson, 147 Wis. 2d 824, 835, 434 N.W.2d 386 
(1989) 
(if 
reasonable 
suspicion 
can 
be 
drawn 
from 
the 
circumstances notwithstanding the existence of other inferences, 
the stop was proper). 
41 See McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶29; Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 
213, 215. 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
27 
 
nervousness is a legitimate factor to consider in evaluating the 
totality of the circumstances.42 
¶55 The officer testified that when the defendant stepped 
out of the car he "appeared a little nervous" and "was looking 
around."  The officer further testified that he conducted the 
pat-down "cause he [the defendant] was acting kind of nervous, 
suspicious, and I was looking for the possibility that he may 
have weapons on him."  In response to a question from the 
circuit court, the officer testified that the defendant was 
taking his hands in and out of his pockets "like a nervous 
habit."  The officer also testified that the defendant appeared 
only "a little nervous," not unusually nervous, and also 
testified that nervousness is common during traffic stops.   
¶56 The State contends that the defendant's nervousness 
should be considered unusual in the present case because as a 
passenger in a stopped vehicle, the defendant would not be 
ticketed and therefore had no reason to be nervous.  The 
defendant 
responds 
that 
police 
encounters 
are 
inherently 
stressful 
for 
all 
persons, 
including 
passengers 
in 
an 
automobile, and that as an African-American the defendant was 
likely to be fearful in a traffic stop situation.43   
                                                 
42 McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶29; Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d  at 
215. 
43 The defendant cites David Harris, The Stories, the 
Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 
Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1999), in support of his position. 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
28 
 
¶57 The circuit court did not make a finding on whether 
the defendant's nervousness exceeded the nervousness that is 
commonly exhibited by a passenger in a vehicle stopped by law 
enforcement.  The defendant's nervousness is, according to the 
State, tied to the defendant's inserting and removing his hands 
from his coat pockets.  We agree with this approach and shall 
consider the defendant's nervousness in connection with the 
movement of his hands.   
(5) 
¶58 The State, the defendant, and the court agree that the 
time at which a frisk occurs is a factor to be considered in the 
totality of the circumstances.  Various cases have held that 
darkness, visibility, isolation of the scene, and the number of 
people in an area may all contribute to the determination of 
reasonable suspicion.44  The hour of the day may also be relevant 
in that the individual's activities may or may not be consistent 
with the typical behavior of law-abiding citizens at that time.  
¶59 The defendant argues that the facts of this case are 
distinguishable from various other cases in which the time of 
the frisk was relied upon as part of the totality of the 
circumstances.  Notably, he argues that the vehicle in which he 
                                                 
44 See, e.g., State v. Kelsey C.R., 2001 WI 54, ¶49, 243 
Wis. 2d 422, 626 N.W.2d 777 (stop occurred in darkness with few 
people around); McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶33 (police officer 
alone at night in dark driveway); Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 213-14 
(stop occurred at 4 a.m. and traffic was light); State v. 
Williamson, 113 Wis. 2d 389, 392, 335 N.W.2d 814 (1983) (stop 
occurred at 2 a.m. and visibility was poor).  
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
29 
 
was riding was pulled over on a busy city street, which one of 
the officers testified was "kind of dark" but near a well- 
lighted intersection. 
¶60 At oral argument the State argued that in this 
particular case the time of the stop and relative darkness of 
the scene were not particularly significant circumstances in 
determining 
reasonable 
suspicion. 
 
The 
two 
crucial 
and 
determinative facts in this case are, according to the State, 
the defendant's inserting his hands into and removing his hands 
from the pockets of his coat and the defendant's wearing a 
large, fluffy coat.  The State argued that these two factors 
occurring in midday would be enough to justify reasonable 
suspicion.   
¶61 Nevertheless, we consider the time of evening here 
(8:45 p.m., but dark) and the place of the stop (on a busy city 
street that was somewhat 
dark) in 
the totality of the 
circumstances.  
(6) 
¶62 Whether the geographical area in which a frisk occurs 
is perceived as a "high-crime" area can be one of the factors 
considered in justifying a frisk.  Our cases have so held.45  In 
response to a question about criminal activity in the area, the 
officer testified that the area in which he pulled over the 
vehicle was "pretty active."  
                                                 
45 See Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 211 ("an officer's perception 
of an area as 'high-crime' can be a factor justifying a 
search"); State v. Allen, 226 Wis. 2d 66, 77, 593 N.W.2d 504 
(Ct. App. 1999) (high crime reputation of the area).  
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
30 
 
¶63 The defendant responds that the phrase "pretty active" 
is meaningless because it is "pretty ambiguous."46  He argues 
that neither the officer nor the circuit court drew any 
inference from the officer's testimony regarding the level of 
crime in the area and that we should decline to do so as well.   
¶64 We need not address the question whether the phrase 
"pretty active" is equivalent to the phrase "high crime area" or 
whether a law enforcement officer or court, without more, may 
infer the presence of danger to an officer from the officer's 
characterization of the area as a "pretty active" crime area.47   
¶65 At oral argument the State argued that the crime rate 
of the area, like the time of the stop, was not a significant 
factor to be considered among the totality of the circumstances 
in the present case. 
¶66 The State argues that had the protective weapon search 
occurred in a "good area," that is, an area that does not have a 
high or pretty active crime rate, and in broad daylight, the 
other two factors (the hands in the pocket and the size of the 
coat) would have been enough to justify reasonable suspicion.  
                                                 
46 Brief of Defendant-Respondent at 18. 
47 See Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the 
Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in 
Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 99, 143 (1999) 
(arguing that the character of a neighborhood "should be 
considered only where the behavior that is relied upon to 
establish reasonable suspicion is behavior not commonly observed 
among law-abiding persons at the time and place observed."). 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
31 
 
In other words, the State urges us to concentrate only on what 
it considers to be the two triggering factors.   
¶67 Nevertheless, we decline the State's invitation to 
focus solely on what it considers to be the two triggering 
factors.  We consider the officer's characterization of the 
location of the stop as a "pretty active" crime area, along with 
all the other factors, as part of the totality of the 
circumstances.   
IV 
¶68 We have examined each of the six factors separately.  
We now examine them in their totality.   
¶69 The stop occurred at approximately 8:45 p.m., an hour 
in which it is common for people to be traveling.  The vehicle 
was stopped on a city street for a traffic violation, not a 
crime.  The officer described the area as a "pretty active" 
crime area.  The person who was subject of the search was a 
passenger in the vehicle.  It was a cold December evening, and 
the defendant was wearing a large, fluffy coat that could be 
used to hide a weapon.  
¶70 The defendant left the vehicle at the officer's 
direction.  When the defendant got out of the vehicle he put his 
hands in his coat pockets.  As the defendant walked to the back 
of the vehicle at the officer's direction, the officer asked him 
to keep his hands out of his pockets.  The defendant immediately 
complied with the officer's request.  In what the officer 
described as a "nervous habit," the defendant again inserted his 
hands into his pockets.  Again the officer directed the 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
32 
 
defendant to remove his hands from his pockets, and again the 
defendant promptly complied with the officer's request.  Thus, 
over a four-to-eight-second interval, the defendant apparently 
complied with the officer's request to take his hands out of his 
coat pockets and did keep his hands out of his pockets.   
¶71 The officer did not describe the defendant's hand 
gestures as threatening or menacing; they were described as "a 
nervous habit."  The officer testified that he didn't feel any 
particular threat when he frisked the defendant for weapons.  
The officer further testified that he "told [the defendant] to 
take his hands out of his pockets . . . and [the defendant] 
cooperated."  Nevertheless, the officer conducted a frisk for 
weapons.    
¶72 We are not persuaded that the two key factors 
emphasized by the State, the size of the overcoat and the 
defendant's placement of his hands in his pockets, even when 
considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, were 
sufficient to create reasonable suspicion in the mind of a 
reasonable law enforcement officer that the defendant was armed 
and dangerous.  We conclude that the officer could not, as a 
matter of law, have reasonably suspected that the defendant was 
armed 
and 
dangerous. 
 
The 
officer's 
belief 
under 
the 
circumstances of this case that the defendant was armed and 
dangerous was more "an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion 
or 'hunch'"48 than a reasonable inference.  There was not 
                                                 
48 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
No. 02-1540-CR    
 
33 
 
sufficient articulable, objective information to provide the 
officer with reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed 
and dangerous to the officer or others.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals, affirming the order of the 
circuit court suppressing the evidence.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶73 PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate. 
No.  02-1540-CR.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶74 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  I join the majority 
opinion insomuch as it holds that an officer's subjective belief 
that his or her safety or the safety of others is in danger is 
not a prerequisite to a valid protective search under Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1990).  Majority op., ¶30.  I also agree with 
the majority that "[b]ecause an objective standard is applied to 
test for reasonable suspicion, a frisk can be valid when an 
officer does not actually feel threatened by the person frisked 
or when the record is silent [regarding the officer's actual 
belief]."  Majority op., ¶23.  I also agree with the majority 
that there should not be a per se rule justifying a search 
anytime an individual places his hands in his pockets contrary 
to police orders.  Majority op., ¶48.   
¶75 However, I agree with Justice Crooks' dissent and 
would hold that under the totality of the circumstances present 
in this case there were sufficient articulable, objective facts 
to provide the arresting officer with a reasonable suspicion 
that the defendant may have been armed.  See State v. McGill, 
2000 WI 38, ¶33, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795; State v. 
Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d 200, 209, 539 N.W.2d 887 (1995).   
¶76 The pertinent inquiry in a Terry analysis is whether 
under the totality of the facts present, the officer could 
reasonably suspect that the individual with whom he is dealing 
is armed.  Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 209.  As the Court in Terry 
stated:  "it is imperative that the facts be judged against an 
objective standard:  would the facts available to the officer at 
the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of 
No.  02-1540-CR.jpw 
 
2 
 
reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was 
appropriate?"  Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.  As noted by the 
majority, if objectively, a reasonable person would suspect that 
a person is armed, the individual officer's subjective belief is 
inconsequential.  Majority op., ¶23.  An officer need not be 
absolutely certain that the individual is armed.  Terry, 392 
U.S. at 27.  A reasonable belief is not even required; all that 
is required is that the officer has a reasonable suspicion that 
the individual is armed.  Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 209.   
¶77 Utilizing the above standards I would hold that the 
search of the defendant was justified under the totality of the 
circumstances present at the time the defendant was frisked.  In 
evaluating the reasonableness of the search, the court must 
"look to the totality of the circumstances known to Officer 
[Rivera] in determining whether an officer in his position would 
reasonably suspect that [Kyles] might be armed."  Morgan, 197 
Wis. 2d at 209-10.  This court in Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 211-12, 
held that the fact that a search is conducted in a "high crime" 
area is one factor to be considered in evaluating the legitimacy 
of a search.  In Morgan, we found the search to be reasonable 
where the officer characterized the area as "'a fairly high-
crime-rate area.'"  Id. at 212-13.  Further, in State v. Allen, 
226 Wis. 2d 66, 77, 593 N.W.2d 504 (Ct. App. 1999), the court 
noted that the high-crime reputation of the area where the 
search was conducted constituted a factor contributing to the 
legitimacy of the search.  Here, the officer described the area 
as "pretty active" in terms of criminal activity.  Thus, the 
No.  02-1540-CR.jpw 
 
3 
 
location where the stop occurred here is a factor supporting the 
reasonableness of the search. 
¶78 This court has also recognized that the time of day 
when the stop occurs is a relevant factor to consider.  In 
McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶20, we noted that an increasing number 
of assaults on police officers occur between the hours of 6:00 
p.m. and 4:00 a.m.  See also, Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 211 
(accord).  In McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶32, this court stated 
that "[w]e have consistently upheld protective frisks that occur 
in the evening hours . . . ."  Here, the vehicle in which the 
defendant was a passenger was pulled over at approximately 8:45 
p.m. on December 23.  Therefore, the time of day when the 
defendant was frisked is a factor supporting the reasonableness 
of the search.  Further, in McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶32, we 
recognized that "at night, an officer's visibility is reduced by 
darkness and there are fewer people on the street to observe the 
encounter." 
 
Here, 
while 
there 
was 
testimony 
that 
the 
intersection where the stop occurred was well lit in one of the 
corners, the area where the stop occurred was a dark area.  
Given the time of night, this is an additional factor that 
supports the legitimacy of the search.   
¶79 Moreover, 
this 
court 
has 
recognized 
that 
overt 
nervousness is a factor to be considered in evaluating the 
reasonableness of a search.  Id., ¶29; Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 
214.  While the arresting officer testified that the defendant 
was nervous, he stated that the defendant was not unusually 
nervous.  However, the majority agrees with the State that the 
No.  02-1540-CR.jpw 
 
4 
 
defendant's nervousness needs to be evaluated in light of the 
defendant's actions in repeatedly placing his hands in his 
pockets.  Majority op., ¶57.  Further, the majority aptly notes 
that "'an otherwise inexplicable sudden movement toward a pocket 
or other place where a weapon could be concealed [or] an 
otherwise 
inexplicable 
failure 
to 
remove 
a 
hand 
from 
a 
pocket[]'" is a factor that often justifies a frisk.  Majority 
op., ¶42 n.33 (quoting 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 9.5(a) (3d. ed. 1996)).  In McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶37, this 
court explained that "during the course of the frisk, McGill 
kept reaching for his pockets, despite being told by the officer 
not to. . . . [This fact,] combined with his twitchy hand 
movements and his general nervousness, reinforced the officer's 
reasonable belief that the defendant was concealing something, 
perhaps a weapon, in that pocket."  We stated that McGill's 
twitchy hand movements and nervous behavior "in particular 
justified the officer's suspicions about the presence of a 
weapon and supports the reasonableness of the frisk."  Id., ¶31.  
¶80 The majority notes that the defendant repeatedly 
placed his hands inside his pockets in a "nervous habit," as he 
walked towards the back of the vehicle, even after the officer 
directed the defendant to remove his hands from his pockets.  
Majority op., ¶70.  The majority recognizes the need of law 
enforcement officials to see the hands of individuals with whom 
they are dealing and notes that this concern is heightened when 
individuals refuse to comply with an officer's request to remove 
their hands from their pockets.  Majority op., ¶41.  Given that 
No.  02-1540-CR.jpw 
 
5 
 
the defendant here repeatedly placed his hands in his pockets in 
a nervous fashion during a four to eight second interval——more 
than enough time to brandish and fire a handgun——this factor 
weighs heavily in favor of the legitimacy of the search.   
¶81 Finally, when asked about whether he could see a bulge 
in the defendant's coat, the officer stated that the coat was 
"so fluffy you couldn't see the bulge."  The State argues and 
the majority agrees that the fact the defendant was wearing a 
large fluffy coat is a factor to be considered as part of the 
totality of the circumstances present.  Majority op., ¶53.  The 
fact that the defendant was wearing a coat large enough to 
conceal a weapon without exhibiting a visible protrusion 
supports the reasonableness of the search. 
¶82 While each factor the majority identifies may not, by 
itself, be sufficient to justify the search, each factor weighs 
in favor of finding that the search was reasonable.  Here, the 
officer confronted two individuals in a pretty active crime area 
at night in a relatively dark portion of an intersection.  The 
defendant was wearing a coat that was large enough to conceal a 
weapon without any visible protrusion.  The defendant was 
walking to the rear of the vehicle and disregarded the officer's 
directions by repeatedly placing his hands inside his pockets in 
a nervous fashion over a four-to-eight-second interval.  I 
believe that "[a] reasonably prudent officer in possession of 
these facts would be warranted in the belief that his suspect 
may be armed and presently dangerous."  McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 
¶33.   
No.  02-1540-CR.jpw 
 
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¶83 The only factor weighing against the legitimacy of 
this search is that the officer did not consider the defendant 
to be "menacing."  Majority op., ¶71.  However, as the majority 
discusses at length, this factor is not dispositive.  Majority 
op., ¶39.  The majority states that "[w]e are not persuaded that 
the two key factors emphasized by the State, the size of the 
overcoat and the defendant's placement of his hands in his 
pockets . . . were 
sufficient 
to 
create 
[a] 
reasonable 
suspicion . . . that the defendant was armed and dangerous."  
Majority op., ¶72.  However, regardless of what factors the 
State "emphasized," I believe that under the totality of the 
circumstances, the following factors taken together validate the 
search:  1) the late hour of the day; 2) the relative darkness 
of the area where the search occurred; 3) the amount of criminal 
activity in the area; 4) the defendant's nervousness; 5) the 
defendant's persistent disobedience of police orders by placing 
his hands in his pockets as he approached the rear of the 
vehicle; and 6) the fact that the defendant's coat was large 
enough to conceal a weapon without any visible indication of 
such. 
¶84 The fact that the search here was justified is 
apparent because this court in Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 215, 
upheld a search under more benign conditions: 
In Morgan, two officers on patrol at 4 a.m. in what 
was described as a "fairly high-crime area" observed a 
car driving in and out of an alley.  The car had 
expired license plates, and the officers pulled it 
over.  The driver was unable to produce his license 
and appeared nervous.  We upheld the officers' 
No.  02-1540-CR.jpw 
 
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decision to frisk the driver based upon the totality 
of those facts.  
McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶25.  Applying the objective Terry 
analysis, I would hold that there were sufficient facts to 
provide the arresting officer with a reasonable suspicion that 
the defendant may have been armed.  McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 
¶33.  Under the totality of circumstances present here, an 
individual in Officer Rivera's position would reasonably suspect 
that Kyles might have been armed.  Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 209-
10.   
¶85 For the reasons discussed, I dissent.   
¶86 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this dissenting opinion.  
 
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¶87 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  I disagree with 
the majority that the facts of this case do not satisfy the 
totality of the circumstances test as outlined by the United 
States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and by 
this court in State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶22, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 
609 N.W.2d 795.  In order to satisfy this test, a police officer 
is required to show that he or she had reasonable suspicion 
about a threat of physical harm by the defendant, based on 
"specific and articulable facts . . . ." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; 
McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶22.  Those facts should be considered, 
along with rational inferences drawn from such facts, in 
determining the reasonableness of a protective frisk by an 
officer.   
¶88 The State has pointed to multiple specific facts about 
the search of the defendant, which made it reasonable for the 
officer in this case to be suspicious and protective of his own 
and 
the 
public's 
safety. 
These 
facts, 
and 
the 
rational 
inferences drawn from them, clearly show the reasonableness of 
the protective frisk conducted here.  The testifying officers 
noted the late time of day, the high degree of darkness, the 
"fair" amount of crime in the area, the apprehensive behavior of 
the defendant, the fact that the defendant’s coat was oversized 
No.  02-1540-CR.npc 
 
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and puffy, and the defendant's repeated disregard of officers' 
instructions not to put his hands into his coat pockets.  
¶89 Several of those facts have been found by this court 
in the recent past to be significant to a determination that the 
totality of circumstances weighed in favor of the officer 
conducting a protective frisk or a search. The majority 
reiterates those factors here, yet fails to give them sufficient 
weight.  Although the State has relied heavily on the fact that 
the defendant concealed his hands in his pockets, after being 
told not to do so, perhaps to the detrimental exclusion of the 
other factors, this court should not ignore the significance of 
the cumulative effect of all of the specific facts presented by 
this case.  In dismissing the numerous specific facts in this 
case, the majority ignores the reasonableness of the protective 
frisk conducted in this case.  
¶90 I also disagree with the majority's treatment of the 
court of appeals' language regarding an officer's "subjective 
fear" in State v. Mohr, 2000 WI App. 111, 235 Wis. 2d 220, 613 
N.W.2d 186.  The majority opinion disavows an interpretation of 
Mohr that requires an officer's subjective fear in order for a 
protective frisk or a search to be reasonable.  Nevertheless, 
the majority agrees with defendant's counsel that the officer's 
subjective fear is one factor that a circuit court may consider 
in evaluating the totality of the circumstances.  Majority op., 
¶24, footnote 16.  Thus, the majority clearly approves of giving 
No.  02-1540-CR.npc 
 
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this factor sufficient weight in evaluating the reasonableness 
of a protective frisk.   
¶91 I cannot agree with the majority that the subjective 
fear of the searching officer should be a factor, among others, 
in the totality of the circumstances test.  To the extent that 
Mohr contains language that mixes objective factors with the 
subjective factors of an officer's fear, impressions, or 
motives, I would withdraw that language.  The standard used to 
examine 
an 
officer's 
reasonable 
basis 
for 
conducting 
a 
protective frisk or a search should be the objective, "specific 
and articulable facts" required by the United States Supreme 
Court in Terry. 
¶92 The United States Supreme Court has disfavored the use 
of subjective officer intentions or feelings when determining 
the constitutionality of law enforcement actions. Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).  In Whren, the Court held 
that in the context of traffic stops the subjective motives of 
an officer do not make illegal conduct that otherwise satisfies 
the Fourth Amendment:  "We think these cases foreclose any 
argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops 
depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers 
involved.  . . . Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, 
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."  Id. at 813.  The 
majority feels that Whren and its progeny, United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), are not in conflict with Mohr, 
No.  02-1540-CR.npc 
 
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because they do not use subjective officer feelings as a factor 
within the totality of the circumstances. Although the United 
States Supreme Court does not discuss that particular use and 
its implications, I fail to see how use of the subjective 
factors may be disfavored at a macro level of constitutional 
analysis, yet may be accepted at a micro level.  When the Court 
specifies that "subjective intentions play no role" in "Fourth 
Amendment analysis," it certainly is logical to interpret 
"analysis" as encompassing the totality of the circumstances 
test itself.   
¶93 I believe the majority misses the opportunity to place 
the recent Wisconsin cases of McGill, Mohr, and this case along 
some understandable continuum of facts involving a totality of 
the circumstances analysis.  The majority opinion fosters the 
continued potential for confusion in this area with regard to 
just how much weight, if any, the subjective impressions of an 
officer should be given.  I would reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals in this case.  Here, the circuit court clearly 
felt obligated to place reliance on Mohr's subjective impression 
language.  Language that was, in my opinion, incorrect.  The 
specific 
and 
articulable 
facts, 
along 
with 
the 
rational 
inferences properly drawn from those facts, clearly demonstrate 
the reasonableness of the protective frisk conducted here, and 
the subsequent seizure of contraband.    
¶94 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  02-1540-CR.npc 
 
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¶95 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this dissenting opinion. 
 
 
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