Title: Valentine v. Conrad

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Valentine v. Conrad, 110 Ohio St.3d 42, 2006-Ohio-3561.] 
 
 
VALENTINE, APPELLANT, v. CONRAD, ADMR.; PPG 
INDUSTRIES, INC. ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Valentine v. Conrad, 110 Ohio St.3d 42, 2006-Ohio-3561.] 
Evidence – Expert opinion – Reliability – Evid.R. 702(C) – Expert opinions that  
chemical exposure in workplace caused  disease and death of plaintiff’s 
decedent not supported by scientific principles or methodology – No basis 
in literature for finding causal connection between exposure to particular 
chemicals and particular disease contracted by plaintiff’s decedent — 
Opinions inadmissible. 
 (No. 2004-1619 – Submitted September 21, 2005 – Decided July 26, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Pickaway County,  
No. 03CA17, 158 Ohio App.3d 615, 2004-Ohio-4521. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} The question presented in this appeal is whether Evid.R. 702(C) 
requires a scientifically valid connection between the opinion of an expert witness 
and the resources relied upon by the expert. 
{¶ 2} David E. Valentine was employed by PPG Industries, Inc., from 
1969 to 1997, and it is alleged that he was exposed to various toxic chemicals 
throughout his employment. In 1997, Mr. Valentine was diagnosed with 
glioblastoma multiforme, a form of brain cancer. As a result of the cancer, Mr. 
Valentine died in May 1999. 
{¶ 3} Mr. Valentine’s widow, Linda Valentine, appellant, filed a claim 
for death benefits with the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, alleging that her 
husband’s exposure to chemicals throughout his employment with PPG Industries 
caused the development of his cancer and his resulting death. The Industrial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
Commission denied the claim, and Valentine filed an administrative appeal in the 
Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas against appellee PPG Industries, Inc., 
the parent company of appellee PPG Industries Ohio, Inc. 
{¶ 4} To establish that she qualified for workers’ compensation benefits, 
Valentine was required to prove that her husband’s illness was contracted in the 
course of his employment with PPG Industries. R.C. 4123.01(F); State ex rel. 
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Krise (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 247, 254, 71 O.O.2d 226, 327 
N.E.2d 756. In an effort to establish that fact, Valentine presented expert 
testimony from two of her husband’s treating physicians, Dr. Michael E. Miner 
and Dr. Herbert B. Newton, and from an industrial hygienist, Norman Brusk. 
{¶ 5} Dr. Miner concluded that, based on a reasonable medical 
probability, Mr. Valentine’s brain tumor was directly and proximately caused by 
his exposure to chemical toxins in his workplace and that his death was directly 
caused by that exposure. Dr. Newton similarly opined that, based on a reasonable 
medical probability, the development of the tumor and ultimate death were 
directly and proximately related to Mr. Valentine’s chemical exposure. The 
doctors based their opinions on the totality of their experience as practitioners, 
their knowledge of Mr. Valentine’s condition and background, medical and 
genetic research, animal studies, and epidemiologic studies. Additionally, both 
doctors considered it significant that a former coworker of Mr. Valentine, Harold 
McConnaughey Jr., developed glioblastoma multiforme and died within two 
weeks of Mr. Valentine. Both doctors acknowledged that no chemical is known to 
cause glioblastoma multiforme and that ionizing radiation, which is not involved 
in this case, is the only proven cause of the disease. 
{¶ 6} Mr. Brusk opined that Mr. Valentine’s employment with PPG 
Industries placed him at a heightened risk of developing brain cancer. Mr. Brusk 
based his opinion on his experience as an industrial hygienist, his assessment of 
Mr. Valentine’s workplace, and epidemiological studies. Mr. Brusk did not render 
January Term, 2006 
3 
a professional opinion regarding whether any specific chemical, or group of 
chemicals, is capable of causing glioblastoma multiforme. 
{¶ 7} The trial court excluded the expert opinions as unreliable under 
Evid.R. 702(C). Because the expert testimony was inadmissible, the trial court 
found that Valentine was unable to establish causation and granted summary 
judgment for PPG Industries. The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed, 
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the expert 
testimony as unreliable. 
{¶ 8} The matter is before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
{¶ 9} The determination of the admissibility of expert testimony is 
within the discretion of the trial court. Evid.R. 104(A). Such decisions will not be 
disturbed absent abuse of discretion. Miller v. Bike Athletic Co. (1998), 80 Ohio 
St.3d 
607, 
616, 
687 
N.E.2d 
735. 
“Abuse 
of 
discretion” 
suggests 
unreasonableness, arbitrariness, or unconscionability. Without those elements, it 
is not the role of this court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. 
Calderon v. Sharkey (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 218, 222, 24 O.O.3d 322, 436 N.E.2d 
1008. 
{¶ 10} Evid.R. 702 provides:  
{¶ 11} “A witness may testify as an expert if all of the following apply: 
{¶ 12} “(A) The witness’ testimony either relates to matters beyond the 
knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a misconception 
common among lay persons;  
{¶ 13} “(B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the subject matter 
of the testimony; 
{¶ 14} “(C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, 
technical, or other specialized information.”   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
{¶ 15} That the opinions related to matters beyond the knowledge and 
experience of laypersons is not disputed. See Evid.R. 702(A). Moreover, the 
credentials and experience of the witnesses clearly qualify them as experts under 
Evid.R. 702(B). In fact, the experience of Drs. Newton and Miner as Mr. 
Valentine’s personal physicians makes them uniquely qualified to discuss his 
health. The sole issue in this case, then, is whether the testimony in question is 
reliable under Evid.R. 702(C). 
{¶ 16} In determining whether the opinion of an expert is reliable under 
Evid.R. 702(C), a trial court examines whether the expert’s conclusion is based on 
scientifically valid principles and methods. Miller, 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 687 N.E.2d 
735, paragraph one of the syllabus. A court should not focus on whether the 
expert opinion is correct or whether the testimony satisfies the proponent’s burden 
of proof at trial. Id. Accordingly, we are not concerned with the substance of the 
experts’ conclusions; our focus is on how the experts arrived at their conclusions. 
{¶ 17} The qualification and reliability requirements of Evid.R. 702 are 
distinct. Because even a qualified expert is capable of rendering scientifically 
unreliable testimony, it is imperative for a trial court, as gatekeeper, to examine 
the principles and methodology that underlie an expert’s opinion. Cf. Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 
125 L.Ed.2d 469 (“under [Fed.R.Evid. 702] the trial judge must ensure that any 
and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but 
reliable”); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner (1997), 522 U.S. 136, 142, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 
L.Ed.2d 508 (discussing the gatekeeping role of the trial judge under Fed.R.Evid. 
702). It is that determination that ensures that the testimony will be helpful to the 
trier of fact. 
{¶ 18} Experts often base their opinions on data and research from within 
their field of study. Evid.R. 702(C) requires not only that those underlying 
resources are scientifically valid, but also that they support the opinion. Although 
January Term, 2006 
5 
scientists certainly may draw inferences from a body of work, trial courts must 
ensure that any such extrapolation accords with scientific principles and methods. 
In this respect, we find persuasive Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner. In Joiner, the United 
States Supreme Court, in discussing the reliability requirements of Fed.R.Evid. 
702, stated, “A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap 
between the data and the opinion proffered.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 
146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508. Because expert opinion based on nebulous 
methodology is unhelpful to the trier of fact, it has no place in courts of law. 
{¶ 19} Valentine asserts that this conclusion invades the province of the 
jury. This argument demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose 
and operation of Evid.R. 702. A decision not to admit expert evidence under 
Evid.R. 702 does not invade the province of the jury. Instead, such a decision 
prevents the jury from considering information that would not assist in rendering 
a verdict founded on reliable expert evidence. 
{¶ 20} Valentine also asks us to impose an affirmative duty on a trial 
court to acquaint itself with the scientific literature that underlies an expert’s 
opinion. The abuse-of-discretion standard, which applies to admissibility 
determinations, already targets the potential problem that this proposal attempts to 
avoid. To the extent that doing so is necessary to avoid making an unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or unconscionable decision, a trial court is obliged to apprise itself of 
the details of proffered evidence. There is no indication that the trial court failed 
to do so in this case. 
{¶ 21} The trial court concluded that the proffered opinions were not 
based on reliable scientific methodology, finding that the underlying conclusion 
of the experts’ opinions (i.e., that the chemicals to which Mr. Valentine was 
exposed are capable of causing glioblastoma multiforme) was not scientifically 
reliable. None of the experts’ opinions cited any studies showing a causal 
connection between chemical exposure and glioblastoma multiforme. The 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
epidemiological studies did not involve persons in the same industry in which 
Valentine worked and did not identify a particular chemical or group of chemicals 
that cause glioblastoma multiforme. Similarly, the animal studies cited did not 
indicate that brain tumors develop across species. Moreover, the fact that a 
number of the chemicals to which Mr. Valentine was exposed have been 
classified as carcinogens does not establish that they are capable, individually or 
collectively, of causing glioblastoma multiforme. To arrive at their opinions, the 
experts were required to extrapolate from the conclusions of the underlying 
materials. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the experts did 
not adequately explain the scientific basis for doing so. 
{¶ 22} The experts relied heavily on differential diagnosis to reach their 
conclusions. “Differential diagnosis” describes the process of isolating the cause 
of a patient’s symptoms through the systematic elimination of all potential causes. 
See Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (C.A.6, 2001), 243 F.3d 255, 260, quoting 
Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (1994) 214. 
Although differential diagnosis is a standard scientific method for determining 
causation, see Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB (C.A.4, 1999), 178 F.3d 257, 
262, its use is appropriate only when considering potential causes that are 
scientifically known. For example, in Westberry, the plaintiff alleged that 
breathing airborne talc caused aggravation of a preexisting sinus condition. 
Because the parties did not dispute that inhalation of high levels of talc causes 
irritation in mucous membranes, differential diagnosis was a valid method to 
establish causation. Id. at 264-265. In contrast, Drs. Newton and Miner were 
unable to establish that any of the chemicals to which Mr. Valentine was exposed 
are capable of causing glioblastoma multiforme. Accordingly, differential 
diagnosis is not a reliable method for determining legal causation in this case. 
{¶ 23} Although the experts are highly qualified, their experience, by 
itself, does not establish the legal reliability of their opinions as applied to the 
January Term, 2006 
7 
facts of this case. Nor does the contemporaneous death of Mr. Valentine’s 
coworker, Harold McConnaughey, demonstrate reliability. “When an unusual 
event follows closely on the heels of another unusual event, the ordinary person 
infers a causal relation * * *. But lay speculations on medical causality, however 
plausible, are a perilous basis for inferring causality.” Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 
(C.A.7, 1996), 78 F.3d 316, 318. “[T]he courtroom is not the place for scientific 
guesswork, even of the inspired sort. Law lags science; it does not lead it.” Id. at 
319. Expert opinion based on unscientific principles and methodology is 
unhelpful to the trier of fact and has no place in courts of law. Accordingly, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the expert testimony 
proffered by Valentine. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 24} I concur in Justice Lundberg Stratton’s thorough dissent, in which 
she sets forth the qualifications and testimony of the experts at issue.  The expert 
testimony offered was of a quality that easily surpasses the standard for summary 
judgment, and the trial judge abused his discretion in finding otherwise.  This case 
should have been decided by a jury weighing the competing testimony of 
qualified experts. 
{¶ 25} This is a workers’ compensation case, not a products-liability case.  
Therefore, Valentine need not prove that one specific chemical caused her 
husband’s disease.  She need not identify a specific product or manufacturer.  Nor 
is this an intentional-tort case against PPG Industries, Inc.  Valentine does not 
claim that PPG Industries knew of and ignored the dangers of the chemicals her 
husband worked with.  She makes no claim that PPG Industries was negligent.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
She claims only that her husband became ill because of his job.  A neurosurgeon, 
a neuro-oncologist, and an industrial hygienist testified that workplace exposure 
did cause Valentine’s husband’s cancer. 
{¶ 26} Their testimony should have been enough to establish at least a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the decedent’s cancer was caused by 
his exposure to cancer-causing substances in his workplace.  It is true that 
Valentine’s experts did not prove that one specific chemical caused his brain 
tumor.  The trial judge’s criticism of their methodology would be appropriate if 
the doctors had been required to prove such a link.  Instead, they were charged 
with looking at the whole of Valentine’s workplace environment and whether that 
environment contributed to cause his cancer. 
{¶ 27} The death of Mr. Valentine’s co-worker, McConnaughey, of the 
same rare disease at virtually the same time is the key element in the experts’ 
conclusion that there was a connection between Mr. Valentine’s workplace 
exposure to chemicals and his cancer.  At the heart of their methodology are 
statistics – cold, hard numbers.  It is enormously unlikely statistically that, simply 
by chance, two men who worked at the same job at the same location would die 
within a week of each other of the same rare brain cancer that causes only one in 
roughly every 14,000 deaths in the United States.  Only 17 people worked with 
the same chemicals over the same duration of time at PPG Industries as Valentine 
and his colleague.  The odds that two people from that same group of 17 workers 
would randomly contract this cancer are one in 1,442,206. 
{¶ 28} Beyond the statistically extreme improbability that Mr. Valentine’s 
and McConnaughey’s cancers occurred as a result of chance, the experts 
identified compelling risk factors.  Mr. Valentine and McConnaughey worked 
with benzene, a known human carcinogen.  They worked with acrylonitrile and 
ethylene oxide, which cause brain tumors in rats.  They worked in an environment 
with deficient personal protective equipment and ventilation.  Lab workers no 
January Term, 2006 
9 
longer use benzene because of its potential danger and have adopted safety 
procedures worlds away from those employed in the early years by Mr. Valentine 
and McConnaughey.  Mr. Valentine used cancer-causing agents in a dangerous 
manner over a long period of time.  McConnaughey did the same.  They ended up 
with the same disease by chance? 
{¶ 29} There is less than one chance in a million, quite literally, that the 
well-qualified doctors who testified on behalf of Valentine were wrong about the 
cause of her husband’s death.  The trial court seized upon that fraction of a speck 
of a chance to deny death benefits in this workers’ compensation case, without 
ever giving a jury a chance to consider the testimony of the parties’ experts.  If 
three or four or five co-workers had died of the same brain cancer, would the 
court have allowed Valentine’s experts to testify without a proven link between a 
particular chemical and glioblastoma multiforme?  Applying the trial court’s 
reasoning, the answer would have to be no.  Statistics are irrelevant in the trial 
court’s analysis. 
{¶ 30} Statistics aided the experts’ differential diagnosis, which is a 
reliable method for determining causation.  “[T]he overwhelming majority of the 
courts of appeals that have addressed the issue have held that a medical opinion 
on causation based upon a reliable differential diagnosis is sufficiently valid to 
satisfy the first prong of the Rule 702 inquiry.” Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB 
(C.A.4, 1999), 178 F.3d 257, 262.  The Sixth Circuit is among the courts of 
appeals that have found differential diagnosis to be an “appropriate method for 
making a determination of causation for an individual instance of disease.” 
Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (C.A.6, 2001), 243 F.3d 255, 260.  Hardyman 
describes the method: 
{¶ 31} “ ‘A reliable differential diagnosis typically, though not invariably, 
is performed after “physical examinations, the taking of medical histories, and the 
review of clinical tests, including laboratory tests,” and generally is accomplished 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
by determining the possible causes for the patient's symptoms and then 
eliminating each of these potential causes until reaching one that cannot be ruled 
out or determining which of those that cannot be excluded is the most likely.’ ” 
Hardyman, 243 F.3d at 260-261, quoting Westberry, 178 F.3d at 262, quoting 
Kannankeril v. Terminix Internatl., Inc. (C.A.3, 1997), 128 F.3d 802, 807. 
{¶ 32} The differential diagnoses done by the doctors in this case were 
reliable and met the requirements of Evid.R. 702.  A jury should have considered 
their testimony. 
{¶ 33} Instead, the trial judge essentially tried the case on the merits at the 
summary judgment stage.  It may be that the trial court found Valentine’s experts 
unconvincing, but that is a far cry from their being unqualified to testify.  A trial 
court’s use of the magical word “methodology” can transform testimony that the 
trial judge does not agree with into testimony that is “unqualified.”  Does this 
court really believe that Evid.R. 702 was designed to keep experts in their field 
like Drs. Miner and Newton from testifying in a case like this?  Or are we to 
believe that the real cancer experts are not at James Cancer Hospital but at the 
courthouse in Chillicothe?  
 
RESNICK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 34} I believe that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded 
the opinions of plaintiff’s expert witnesses.  The opinions were sufficiently 
reliable to establish a genuine issue of material fact on causation in order for the 
issue to withstand summary judgment.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 35} The decedent worked with and was exposed to a number of 
chemicals in the workplace, including toxic agents and carcinogens, on a daily 
basis for 30 years.  He succumbed to an extremely rare form of brain cancer, 
glioblastoma multiforme, at age 52.  He did not smoke or abuse alcohol and had 
January Term, 2006 
11 
no family history of brain cancer.  He was in excellent health until his diagnosis.  
Within seven days of Valentine’s death, a laboratory co-worker, Hal 
McConnaughey, who had been exposed to the same chemicals, also died of the 
same rare brain tumor, at age 49.  These two deaths are significant in that 
glioblastoma multiforme occurs in approximately 1.5 of every 10,000 males in the 
United States. 
{¶ 36} Three expert witnesses offered opinions that the decedent’s disease 
was directly and proximately caused by his long-term exposure to toxic chemicals 
in the workplace.  Two of the witnesses were his treating physicians; the third was 
an industrial hygienist who had evaluated his work environment.  It is not 
disputed that these experts are eminently qualified professionals and that their 
opinions related to “matters beyond the knowledge” of laypersons.  Evid.R. 
702(A).  The trial court, however, concluded that the opinions were not based on 
reliable scientific information. 
{¶ 37} These experts used their professional knowledge to synthesize and 
extrapolate information from various sources to connect the decedent’s exposure 
to toxic chemicals in the workplace with his brain tumor.  I believe that these 
opinions reached the threshold level of admissibility of evidence under Evid.R. 
702 and that it was arbitrary and unreasonable for a judge to summarily dismiss 
their conclusions as unreliable. 
Norman Brusk 
{¶ 38} Norman Brusk, a certified industrial hygienist with more than 30 
years’ experience in this field, evaluated the decedent’s work environment and 
concluded that he had “unquantifiable, but significant exposures to cancer causing 
and potentially cancer causing chemicals via airborne, skin absorption and 
ingestion routes of exposure.”  During the earlier years, in the 1960s and 1970s, 
the decedent did not wear any protective clothing or use protective equipment 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
while working, so his exposure to carcinogens would have been even greater then 
than in later years. 
{¶ 39} Brusk also cited a number of studies in which clusters of workers 
who had been exposed to toxic chemicals were diagnosed with brain cancer.  At a 
petrochemical research facility, “patterns suggest that the brain cancer excess 
resulted from occupational exposures.”  A study comparing chemists with 
architects “supports the suggestions that chemical exposure is a cause of both 
leukemic and hematopoetic tumors and brain tumors and thus indicates the 
occupational hazards in chemical work.”  Another study of petrochemical workers 
indicated an excessive number of brain tumors and that they are likely to be 
occupational-related.  A study of women in China concluded that persons in 
occupations in which they were exposed to organic solvents had a significantly 
elevated risk for brain cancer. 
{¶ 40} Brusk concluded, “Based on my assessment of Mr. Valentine’s 
workplace, the above studies, my experience as an industrial hygienist as well as a 
chemist, and the occurrence of clusters of brain cancers in chemical related fields, 
it is my professional opinion that Mr. Valentine had a higher risk of developing 
brain cancer because of his position as a laboratory technician than of employees 
in the general workforce and of the population as a whole. 
Dr. Michael Miner 
{¶ 41} Dr. Michael Miner has practiced neurosurgery for more than 25 
years.  He is a professor of neurological surgery and Director of the Division of 
Neurosurgery at the Ohio State Medical School.  He has “worked extensively 
with patients with glioblastoma multiforme” and has performed “extensive 
research on people with brain tumors both clinically and in the laboratory.” 
{¶ 42} Dr. Miner relied on his 25 years of neurosurgical practice, his 
research, medical literature on genetics, animal studies, and human 
epidemiological studies to conclude that the decedent’s brain tumor was directly 
January Term, 2006 
13 
and proximately caused by extensive exposure to a combination of chemical 
toxins in the workplace.  In support of his opinion, Dr. Miner cited genetic 
research that documented the impact of the carcinogen benzene on the P53 
suppressor gene in animals.  Animals exposed to benzene developed the type of 
brain tumor that the decedent developed.  The decedent had been exposed to 
benzene, a substance no longer commonly used in laboratories because of its 
potential danger. 
{¶ 43} Dr. Miner also pointed to laboratory studies that documented brain 
tumors in rats that had been exposed to acrylonitrile and ethylene oxide.  These 
are substances to which the decedent was exposed and that are known to either 
cause or have the potential to cause changes in human cells that result in cancer. 
{¶ 44} Dr. Miner relied upon epidemiological studies that documented a 
higher than expected incidence of brain tumors in people exposed to carcinogens 
like those to which the decedent had been exposed.  The studies indicated an 
increased risk of cancer, including brain cancer, in laboratory technicians and 
chemists who had routinely handled solvents.  Dr. Miner cited studies of persons 
who had worked in the petroleum industry.  Those studies also documented an 
increased risk of brain tumors from exposure to solvents, especially benzene. 
{¶ 45} Dr. Miner explained that the decedent and McConnaughey worked 
with the same carcinogens for a number of years in the same environment, and 
both developed an extremely rare form of brain cancer.  There were few, if any, 
other people at PPG Industries, Inc., who had worked in the same environment for 
a similar number of years.  Epidemiological studies usually involve a large group 
of people and would not reveal the significance of these tumors, because the two 
men would have been subsumed in a large group of employees who did not work 
in the identical environment.  Dr. Miner explained that epidemiological studies 
are not designed to examine small groups.  Furthermore, recreating the exact 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
chemical exposure that these men sustained over such a long period would be 
impossible. 
{¶ 46} Dr. Miner concluded that “cumulative evidence in medical 
literature and experience does provide substantial basis to state that long term 
excessive exposure to the solvents and other cancer causing chemicals identified 
in Mr. Valentine’s specific working environment can cause brain cancer 
(glioblastoma multiforme).” 
Dr. Herbert Newton 
{¶ 47} Dr. Herbert Newton is Director of the Division of Neuro-Oncology 
at the Ohio State University Medical Center and the James Cancer Hospital.  He 
is also an associate professor of neurology and pediatrics in the Department of 
Neurology at Ohio State.  During his tenure at the James Cancer Hospital, Dr. 
Newton has diagnosed and cared for more than 1,000 patients with brain tumors, 
over half of them with glioblastoma multiforme. 
{¶ 48} Dr. Newton also opined that, based on a reasonable medical 
probability, the decedent’s brain tumor was directly and proximately related to his 
exposure to numerous potentially neurocarcinogenic chemicals over many years.  
He noted that the decedent’s type of brain tumor is rare; it is responsible for 
approximately seven of every 100,000 deaths per year in the United States.  
Furthermore, it takes decades for a brain tumor to develop.  Dr. Newton 
concluded that these facts are consistent with the decedent’s history of chronic 
toxic exposure for over 30 years at PPG Industries.  Dr. Newton also noted the 
death of McConnaughey, the decedent’s co-worker. 
{¶ 49} Dr. Newton’s opinion relied on epidemiological evaluations of 
“clusters” of persons in the petroleum and chemical industries who developed 
brain tumors.  In one cluster, 19 persons from the same plant with long-term 
exposure to many solvents were diagnosed with brain tumors.  Another cluster 
consisted of six chemists from the same building who developed gliomas.  The 
January Term, 2006 
15 
study concluded that the employees at the complex had a risk of developing a 
brain tumor eight times that of the general population. 
{¶ 50} Dr. 
Newton 
acknowledged 
the 
limitations 
of 
human 
epidemiological research in the study of brain tumors.  Brain tumors are 
uncommon in the general population.  It is difficult to define a group to evaluate 
in terms of amount and duration of toxic exposure.  And it would be difficult and 
inherently inaccurate to reconstruct employees’ chemical exposures in the 
workplace for purposes of a study. 
{¶ 51} Ohio favors the admission of expert evidence so long as it is 
relevant and reliable and will assist the trier of fact.  State v. Nemeth (1998), 82 
Ohio St.3d 202, 211, 694 N.E.2d 1332.  Evid.R. 702.  Evidence should not be 
excluded merely because it is questionable or confusing.  Miller v. Bike Athletic 
Co. (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 614, 687 N.E.2d 735.  These experts’ opinions 
would be subject to cross-examination, and the credibility of the conclusions 
should be matters for the trier of fact.  Nemeth, 82 Ohio St.3d at 211, 694 N.E.2d 
1332. 
{¶ 52} I agree that, to be admissible, an expert’s opinion must be based on 
valid, reliable information in light of the multitude of professional experts in our 
litigious society known as “hired guns.”  And with advances in science and 
technology, courts must ensure that the underlying basis of expert testimony 
meets the legal standard for admissibility of evidence under Evid.R. 702.  
However, in our zealousness to curb abuse, we cannot permit a court to 
unreasonably and arbitrarily exclude expert evidence. 
{¶ 53} In Wilson v. CSX Transp., Inc. (Tenn.App.2003), No. E 2002-
00291-COA-R9-CV, 2003 WL 1233536, a Tennessee court of appeals ruled that 
the testimony of three expert witnesses was admissible to establish a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding the cause of the death of Ricky J. Wilson, a 
carman for CSX.  Wilson was diagnosed at age 40 with the same type of brain 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
tumor as Valentine’s, a glioblastoma multiforme, and leukemia.  He died two 
years later. 
{¶ 54} Wilson’s widow alleged that his exposure to various toxic 
chemicals at work, such as benzene and other carcinogens, caused or contributed 
to cause his brain cancer and leukemia.  She presented testimony of a chemist, a 
pathologist-toxicologist, and a physician.  The trial court had permitted the 
testimony of the chemist and the pathologist-toxicologist, but had excluded the 
testimony of the physician, claiming that his testimony lacked studies or statistical 
data to back up the opinion. 
{¶ 55} Applying the Tennessee standard of admissibility of expert 
evidence, that a court “must assure itself that the opinions are based on relevant 
scientific methods, processes, and data, and not upon an expert’s mere 
speculation,” the court concluded that the opinion was based on valid and relevant 
science, not speculation.  Id. at *5.  The CSX experts offered opinions in 
opposition to the plaintiff’s experts; however, the appellate court explained that 
the weight and credibility of the competing scientific views are matters 
appropriately left to the trier of fact.  Id.  See, also, Hand v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. 
(Tenn.App.1998), No. 03A01-9704-CV-00123, 1998 WL 281946, *4, in which 
the court allowed expert testimony that Hand’s exposure to certain solvents, 
including benzene and other carcinogens, during his 25 years with the railroad 
caused or contributed to the glioblastoma multiforme, of which he died at age 58. 
{¶ 56} Like Judge Abele in the court below, I, too, am troubled by the 
application of the law to the facts of this case.  Three highly qualified expert 
witnesses proffered opinions based upon information, experience, and science that 
cumulatively supported their conclusions.  Two of the experts were the decedent’s 
treating physicians, who are associated with outstanding medical institutions, the 
Ohio State University School of Medicine and the James Cancer Hospital.  The 
third expert, Norman Brusk, has more than 30 years’ experience in industrial 
January Term, 2006 
17 
hygiene.  These witnesses were not “hired guns.”  They did not use unscientific 
principles and methodology.  These opinions are not “junk science.” 
{¶ 57} I believe that the opinions of experts Miner, Newton, and Brusk 
were sufficiently reliable for admission and that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it excluded their testimony.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent and 
would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Larrimer & Larrimer and Terrence W. Larrimer; Young, Tootle & Dumm 
and Gary Dumm, for appellant. 
 
Thompson Hine, L.L.P., Timothy J. Coughlin, and Karen E. Rubin; 
Habash, Reasoner & Frazier, L.L.P., and Stephen J. Habash; Shoemaker, Howarth 
& Taylor and Kevin Shoemaker, for appellees. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, Elise W. 
Porter, and René L. Rimelspach, Assistant Solicitors, for amicus curiae Ohio 
Attorney General. 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy, and Marc J. 
Jaffy, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio AFL-CIO. 
 
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers; Philip J. Fulton Law 
Office and Philip J. Fulton, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of 
Trial Lawyers. 
 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., William M. Todd, and Greta M. 
Kearns, urging affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce, Ohio 
Manufacturers Association, National Federation of Independent Business/Ohio, 
and Ohio Chemistry Technology Council. 
______________________