Title: Griebel v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Griebel v. State1988 WY 129763 P.2d 475Case Number: 87-179, 87-180Decided: 10/28/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARC 
GRIEBEL, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE 
STATE OFWYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

GEORGE BOB COEN, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

Charles E. 
Hamilton of Hamilton Law Associates, Riverton, for appellants.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Paul S. Rehurek, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., argued, for 
appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired.*

* Retired June 30, 1988, 
but continued to participate in the decision of the court in this case pursuant 
to order of the court entered July 1, 1988.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellants pled guilty 
to interference with a police officer, § 6-5-204(a), W.S. 1977, and each 
received a sentence of 120 days in jail and a $250 fine. On appeal they claim 
procedural irregularities in the sentencing procedure. Specifically, the 
dispositive issue is whether the sentencing judge1 erred in failing to disclose to 
appellants, before sentencing, that he had viewed a videotape taken of them 
while they were in police custody. We reverse.

FACTS

[¶2.]     Appellants were 
arrested on August 11, 1986, for violating a provision of the Riverton City Code 
which makes it illegal, except under specified circumstances, for a minor to "be 
or remain in or upon any of the streets, alleys or public places in the city at 
night after the hour of 12:00 midnight until 6:00 A.M. * * *." Appellants were 
taken to the Riverton police station, where an altercation erupted among Officer 
Keabler and the two youths. As a result of this activity, appellants were 
charged with assaulting an officer engaged in the performance of his duties, a 
felony. Section 6-5-204(b), W.S. 1977. At appellants' preliminary hearing, 
Officer Keabler testified to the events occurring at the police station. During 
a recess which followed the officer's testimony, the prosecutor allowed defense 
counsel to view a videotape which the State planned to offer as evidence in the 
preliminary hearing. The videotape, a product of the jail security system, 
purportedly showed appellants striking each other in the face and otherwise 
injuring themselves while confined in the jail cell. After defense counsel 
viewed the tape, a plea bargain was entered and appellants pled guilty to the 
reduced charge of interference with a peace officer, a misdemeanor. Section 
6-5-204(a), W.S. 1977. The record does not reflect that the videotape was viewed 
in open court or received by the judge at the preliminary 
hearing.

[¶3.]     At appellants' 
sentencing, the court informed appellants that it had received presentence 
reports and asked appellants' attorney if he had been provided copies of them. 
Appellants' attorney responded in the affirmative. The court then provided an 
opportunity for him to comment on Mr. Coen's presentence report, which 
recommended "a combination of jail time and probation." Appellants' attorney 
informed the judge that Mr. Coen had arranged to attend alcohol rehabilitation 
classes. It was also brought to the court's attention that Mr. Coen had been 
involved in a dragracing incident in Jackson several months after the Riverton 
incident and that he had dropped out of college. The court then announced that 
it was sentencing Mr. Coen to a jail term of 120 days and a fine of 
$250.

[¶4.]     Turning to Mr. Griebel, 
the court asked defense counsel if he "had a chance to review all of the 
information submitted [to him] in his case." The attorney replied in the 
affirmative and said that he did not wish to address the court about that 
information. Mr. Griebel's presentence report recommended "probation with 
conditions directly related to alcohol usage * * *." The judge announced that 
Mr. Griebel would receive the same sentence as Mr. Coen. The judge then made the 
following comments:

"Now let me tell both you 
gentlemen my impressions. I've just heard it again today that both of you 
throughout the course of your conduct in relation to these charges have read 
your versions of these offenses quite carefully. Both of you have the tendency 
to want to blame everybody else for your conduct. I've seen that in an in-depth 
analysis of your situation Mr. Griebel, even from the time that your parents 
lost control of you sir and you still apparently deny any serious problems with 
alcohol and/or drugs. Mr. Coen may be in a somewhat different situation. But 
inherent in both of these cases all I've heard was how the police have been 
picking on you gentlemen and just as recently in your episode in Jackson that 
the local boy was not pursued but you were arrested, and I suspect Mr. Coen that 
alcohol was also involved in that incident, wasn't it? Well, both of you 
gentlemen have been through numerous episodes with the law. Both of you 
apparently still deny that you have any serious problems because of your 
versions submitted to the presentence officers in these cases and in view of the 
things that you said to the Court. I viewed last night, in the privacy of my 
home on my VCR, the tape of part of your arrest procedures at the city jail. I 
also viewed your conduct while handcuffed, both of you, in your cells. It occurs 
to me that both of you deliberately banged your heads against the cell, your 
bodies and inflicted injuries upon each other in a deliberate effort to make it 
look like the police had beaten you up to substantiate your story apparently 
about what you're still sticking to in these matters. I find that kind of 
thinking totally - totally weird - and I strongly suspect in view of the fact 
that the reports that I have received that neither of you that night were 
involved in the consumption of any alcohol, that you were spaced out on drugs of 
some kind, because I cannot for the life of me visualize conduct which I saw by 
you two gentlemen and your actions and your language, unless you were spaced out 
on drugs, because I just don't think that somebody rational would engage in such 
conduct. That is one of the reasons, plus your past records and your continual 
denial of your use of alcohol and the problems it causes you as not being fit 
candidates for a probated sentence at this time. You may appeal my judgment and 
sentence if you wish through your counsel. Court is 
adjourned."

The sentencing 
hearing terminated at this point. Appellants contend that the sentencing judge 
erred in relying on the videotape without notice to 
appellants.

DUTY TO 
DISCLOSE

[¶5.]     A sentencing court is 
entitled to have presented to it whatever information is available that will 
assist it in the difficult task of sentencing, as it needs to inform itself 
about the circumstances surrounding the events and the facts relating to the 
accused. MJP v. State, Wyo., 706 P.2d 1108 (1985). On a sentencing 
matter, a court has broad discretion to consider a wide variety of factors about 
the defendant and his crime. Cavanagh v. State, Wyo., 505 P.2d 311 (1973). Much of this 
information will be included in the presentence report prepared under Rule 
33(c), W.R. Cr.P., which provides:

"(c) Presentence 
investigation.

"(1) When Made. - The 
probation service of the court shall make a presentence investigation and report 
to the court before the imposition of sentence or the granting of probation 
unless the court otherwise directs.

"(2) Report. - The report 
of the presentence investigation shall contain any prior criminal record of the 
defendant and such information about his characteristics, his financial 
condition and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in 
imposing sentence or in granting probation, or in the correctional treatment of 
the defendant, and such other information as may be required by the court. The court, before imposing sentence, shall 
disclose to the defendant or his counsel all of the material contained in the 
report of the presentence investigation and afford an opportunity to the 
defendant or his counsel to comment thereon. The material disclosed to the 
defendant or his counsel shall also be disclosed to the attorney for the state." 
(Emphasis added.)

This rule 
imposes an obligation upon the sentencing court to disclose the information in 
the presentence report and provide an opportunity for the defendant or his 
counsel to comment upon that information. This policy helps to insure that the 
defendant is sentenced on the basis of accurate information. It also insures 
that the defendant is given a meaningful opportunity to rebut or mitigate the 
presentence information, whether or not it is accurate.

[¶6.]     The disclosure of 
presentence information is addressed in Standard 18-5.4 of the ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice which provides:

"Fundamental fairness to 
the defendant requires that the substance of all derogatory information which 
adversely affects the defendant's interests and which has not otherwise been 
disclosed in open court should be called to the attention of the defendant and 
defense attorney in a form sufficient to give an adequate opportunity for 
rebuttal." III ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 
18-5.4, p. 363 (1980).

The comments to 
this standard make it clear that in order to discourage evasion of this 
disclosure requirement "it must be understood that the disclosure obligation 
contemplated here runs to all sentencing data that will reach the court, 
regardless of when prepared, by whom, and how conveyed." Id. at 376. This 
principle is reflected in the case law of several jurisdictions.[fn1a] 

[¶7.]     The State concedes that 
the videotape was apparently not in the presentence report, but argues that we 
must affirm appellants' sentences because the record does not demonstrate how 
the court obtained the videotape. We disagree. The disclosure obligation rests 
upon the court. The record clearly discloses that the videotape, which had been 
in the possession of the deputy county attorney, somehow came into the 
possession of the sentencing judge. Under these circumstances, it was the 
responsibility of the court to make a record concerning disclosure of the tape 
in the same way that it made a record of disclosure of the presentence report. 
What occurs on remand is not now before us. Our obligation is to apply the law 
as we find it - not ignore it because we think it will make no difference on 
resentencing - and we assume appellants will not be punished for exercising 
their constitutional right to appeal.

[¶8.]     We hold that 
appellants' sentences must be reversed for "procedural conduct prejudicial to 
defendant[s]," Hicklin v. State, Wyo., 535 P.2d 743, 751, 79 A.L.R.3d 1050 
(1975), and we remand for resentencing.

BROWN, J., Retired, files a 
dissenting opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 County Court Judge 
Donald Hall was the sentencing judge. The sentence was appealed to Robert Ranck, 
District Court Judge, who affirmed the sentence.

[fn1a] 
Commonwealth v. Phelps, 450 Pa. 597, 301 A.2d 678, 679 (1973) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopts ABA standard); Commonwealth v. Schwartz, 275 Pa. Super. 112, 418 A.2d 637, 638 (1980) ("[A]ny ex parte information received by a judge before 
sentencing should be disclosed to a defendant so that he may have an opportunity 
to examine it and dispute its accuracy."); State v. Leckis, 79 N.J. Super. 479, 
192 A.2d 161, 165 (1963) ("In passing sentence a judge should limit himself to 
what he has learned in the course of the trial or hearing before him, and the 
information officially and reliably recorded in the presentence report."); 
Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175, 297 A.2d 696, 706 fn. 13 (1972) ("Any 
information which might influence the judgment of the sentencing judge * * * 
should * * * be called to the defendant's attention so as to afford him an 
opportunity to refute or discredit it."); Zeff v. Sanford, 31 F. Supp. 736, 738 
(N.D.Ga. 1940) ("[A]ny information not received from the accused himself or not 
given in his presence, which might influence the judgment, should be called to 
his attention * * * so that he may be afforded an opportunity to object to its 
use and to rebut same.").

BROWN, Justice Retired, 
dissenting.

[¶9.]     The majority opinion is 
apparently premised on the assumption that in some surreptitious manner a 
videotape came into the possession of the trial judge. This impression can be 
created from reading appellants' brief, but not from reading the record. The 
record does not tell us the circumstances under which the trial judge received 
the videotape; whether it was proper or improper.

[¶10.]  The existence of the tape was not unknown 
to appellants. The record reveals that it was viewed during a recess at the 
preliminary hearing. The record further discloses that, at sentencing, the trial 
judge stated that he had viewed the tape.

[¶11.]  It seems to me most strange that, if this 
business about the judge viewing the tape came as a surprise to appellants or 
their counsel, something would have been said at sentencing. No objection was 
made nor was any comment made or explanation requested. The sentencing judge 
never had a chance to rule on the question now before the Supreme 
Court.

[¶12.]  On appeal the court should not consider 
matters not brought to the attention of the lower court. Furthermore, this court 
should not consider any matter upon which the record is silent, Mentock v. 
Mentock, 638 P.2d 156 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶13.]  Not every trial error mandates a 
reversal. Assume arguendo that the videotape was handled improperly. In that 
event, I believe the error was harmless. In Lozano v. State, 751 P.2d 1326 
(Wyo. 1988), 
the trial judge saw the appellant violate the terms of her probation. In that 
case, the trial judge in effect was aware of evidence that was not formally 
before the court. On appeal of revocation of her probation, the appellant, for 
the first time, asserted that it was error for the trial judge not to recuse 
himself from the revocation hearing. This court gave short shrift to the alleged 
error. Similarly, in the case before us, the sentencing judge had evidence 
before him that was not formally before the court. Although factually different, 
the underlying rationale of the Lozano case should apply 
here.

[¶14.]  At the sentencing hearing, after remand, 
I will be interested to see what appellants can do to explain or contradict what 
is shown on the videotape.

[¶15.]  I would affirm.