Title: Chestang v. Chestang

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

769 So. 2d 294 (2000)
Russell C. CHESTANG, Jr.
v.
Edgar Frank CHESTANG.
1981370.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 28, 2000.
*295 Stewart L. Howard of Brooks & Hamby, P.C., Mobile, for appellant.
Thomas R. McAlpine of Whitfield & McAlpine, P.C., Mobile, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
Russell C. Chestang, Jr. (the "nephew"), appeals from a circuit judge's order holding him in contempt of court for violating an injunction prohibiting him from interfering with the enjoyment of an easement and ordering him to pay approximately $25,000 in damages and attorney fees to Edgar Frank Chestang (the "uncle"). We affirm.
Russell C. Chestang, Sr., granted an easement over his property in Mobile County for the benefit of his brother, Edgar Frank Chestang. After Russell Chestang granted him an easement, Edgar Frank Chestang hired a surveyor and contractors to survey the easement and to build a road across it. The easement allowed easier access than was otherwise available from public roadways, to property that Edgar Frank Chestang owned and from which he removed timber and dirt for sale.
On August 19, 1998, Russell C. Chestang, Sr., died. After his death, his son, Russell C. Chestang, Jr., and others began interfering with the uncle's use of the easement. *296 The uncle filed a verified complaint for injunctive relief, and the trial court issued a temporary restraining order on September 2, 1998, enjoining the nephew from interfering with his uncle's use of the easement.
The trial judge conducted an ore tenus hearing on September 9, 1998. On September 14, 1998, the judge entered an injunctive order in which he found the easement valid. He also wrote:
(C.R. at 25-26.)
The nephew attempted to appeal the injunction, but the Court of Civil Appeals, on December 8, 1998, dismissed his appeal, apparently as untimely. Chestang v. Chestang (No. 2980210), 771 So. 2d 521 (Ala.Civ. App.1998) (table). During the pendency of that appeal, the nephew continued to interfere with the uncle's use of the easement. The uncle moved the trial court to hold the nephew in contempt. The trial judge held an ore tenus hearing on the uncle's motion on March 9, 1999, and on March 30, 1999, entered the following order:
The nephew moved for a "reconsideration," which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
The nephew argues that the trial judge's order makes an adjudication of criminal contempt, rather than civil contempt, and that the provisions of § 12-11-30(5), Ala.Code 1975, therefore limit the amount of damages the trial judge could impose. That Code section provides:
(Emphasis added.) Because we take note of the sentence emphasized in this quotation of the Code section, and because we conclude that the order of March 30, 1999, made an adjudication of civil contempt, rather than criminal contempt, we reject the nephew's argument.[2]
In 1994, this Court adopted Rule 70A, Ala. R. Civ. P., defining "civil contempt" and "criminal contempt" as applied in "contempt proceedings arising out of civil actions." That rule defines civil contempt as the "willful, continuing failure or refusal... to comply with a court's lawful ... order ... that by its nature is still capable of being complied with." Rule 70A(a)(2)(D), Ala. R. Civ. P.
In his March 30, 1999, order, the trial judge found that the nephew had "intended to make it extremely difficult for the [uncle's] dirt haulers to use the road" and that the nephew had engaged in "a repeated pattern of harassment [of] the [uncle] and his agents." Thus, the trial court found that the nephew had willfully failed to comply with the September 14, 1998, injunctive order and had continued in that willful failure. In addition, the September 14, 1998, order was one that, "by its nature [was] still capable of being complied with," because it enjoined the nephew from interfering with the uncle's use of the easement from that date forward. Thus, the nephew's actions came within the definition of "civil contempt" in Rule 70A.
The order of March 30, 1999, was clearly not an adjudication of criminal contempt. Rule 70A(a)(2)(C) defines two categories of "criminal contempt." One of those categories is clearly not applicable to this case.[3] The other category of "criminal contempt" is defined as:
Rule 70A(a)(2)(C)(ii), Ala. R. Civ. P. (Emphasis added.) A key element of this category of "criminal contempt" is that the contempt order is designed to punish. Further, the Code section cited by the nephew, § 12-11-30(5), speaks of a court's "punish[ing]" a criminal contempt by imposing fines and by imprisoning the contemnor. In this present case, the contempt order does not impose a term of imprisonment. Further, the trial court's order clearly indicates (by its reference to the testimony about the financial loss the uncle had suffered) that the money it ordered the nephew to pay was in the nature of compensatory damages rather than in the nature of a punitive fine.
The nephew argues that "civil contempt proceedings look only to the future" and that this case, therefore, must present an instance of criminal contempt, because the behavior made the subject of the nephew's liability had already occurred. This argument is without merit. In Lightsey v. Kensington Mortgage & Finance Corp., 294 Ala. 281, 287, 315 So. 2d 431, 436 (1975), Justice Merrill addressed the question "whether Alabama permits compensatory fines[4] in favor of the adverse party in contempt proceedings." In that case, after discussing the law of other states, this Court explicitly recognized that such an award may be made. See also Moody v. State ex rel. Payne, 355 So. 2d 1116 (Ala. 1978); and Town of Leighton v. Johnson, 540 So. 2d 71 (Ala.Civ.App.1989). Such an award, by its very nature, must be predicated on past action that has caused injury to the party moving for a finding of contempt of court. Therefore, the fact that the compensatory award in the trial judge's March 30, 1999, order is based on the nephew's past actions does not require the conclusion that the order was an adjudication of criminal contempt.
The nephew argues that the trial judge's award of attorney fees should be reversed, because, he says, an award of attorney fees is not allowed in a case of criminal contempt. As stated above, however, this is a case of civil contempt, and attorney fees may be awarded in such a case. Moody v. State ex rel. Payne, 355 So. 2d  at 1119. The nephew's argument on this point, therefore, is without merit.
The nephew's final argument is that the amount of the trial judge's award of damages was not supported by the evidence. We disagree. The evidence was conflicting as to the amount of damage the uncle had incurred. "Where evidence is presented to the trial court ore tenus, a presumption of correctness exists as to the court's findings on issues of fact; its judgment based on those findings of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous, without supporting evidence, manifestly unjust, or against the great weight of the evidence." Hart v. Jackson, 607 So. 2d 161, 162 (Ala.1992).
The uncle's contractor, James Edward Taylor, testified in part as follows concerning the income lost as a result of the nephew's actions:
(R.T. at 57.) Mr. Taylor also testified that he estimated the uncle's revenue loss at *299 approximately $5,000 per week. Mr. Taylor and others testified that the accumulated work stoppages amounted to four or four and one-half weeks. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court's judgment was "clearly erroneous, without supporting evidence, manifestly unjust, or against the great weight of the evidence." Hart v. Jackson, supra.
In light of the broad discretion trial judges have to enforce their own orders, see Jones v. City of Opelika, 242 Ala. 24, 4 So. 2d 509 (1941), and given the ore tenus standard of review, we affirm the judgment.
AFFIRMED.
HOOPER, C.J., and COOK, LYONS, and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur.
[1]  The transcript of the show-cause hearing includes the following testimony from James Edward Taylor, the uncle's contractor:

"Q. Have you had problems with that equipment on that dirt pit?
"A. We've had some problems with vandalism to it. We've had a service truck that wastaking the fire extinguisher out and it was shot inside, you know, the service truck. We had some wires pulled off of some off-the-road trucks. We've had some nails and screws and rocks put into fuel tanks. We've had, what I feel like, an excessive amount of flats. We've had a lot of stuff that costs us a good bit of money to correct. Yes, sir."
(R.T. at 50.)
[2]  The nephew does not challenge the trial judge's finding that he had violated the September 14, 1998, order. He does not argue that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he was, in fact, in contempt. Therefore, the key question is whether it was civil contempt or criminal contempt.
[3]  That category is defined as:

"Misconduct of any person that obstructs the administration of justice and that is committed either in the court's presence or so near thereto as to interrupt, disturb, or hinder its proceedings...."
Rule 70A(a)(2)(C)(i), Ala. R. Civ. P.
[4]  The use of the word "fine" contributes somewhat to the confusion about the distinction between civil and criminal contempt. However, as Justice Merrill discussed in Lightsey, 294 Ala. at 285, 315 So. 2d  at 436, quoting from Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797 (1911), the distinction is not always clear. See also State v. Thomas, 550 So. 2d 1067, 1073 (Ala.1989). This present case, however, clearly presents an adjudication of civil contempt.