Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: DAVID E. OLIVAS V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: DAVID E. OLIVAS V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2006 WY 29130 P.3d 476Case Number: 05-79Decided: 03/16/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF:

 
 
DAVID E. 
OLIVAS,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY 
AND COMPENSATION DIVISION,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty

The 
Honorable Jere Ryckman, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
David M. 
Gosar of Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Steven 
R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Michael N. Thatcher, Student 
Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Thatcher.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      David E. Olivas 
(Olivas) suffered a work-related injury, and temporary total disability benefits 
were approved.  After receiving a 
permanent partial impairment rating, he applied for permanent partial disability 
benefits.  The Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division (the Division) denied benefits on the grounds that Olivas 
had not been actively seeking work.  After a contested case hearing, a hearing 
examiner upheld the denial of benefits.  The district court affirmed and Olivas 
has appealed to this Court.  We 
conclude that the order denying benefits is facially insufficient to permit 
review; we reverse the district court's order affirming, and remand to vacate 
the order denying benefits.

 
 

ISSUES

[¶2]      Olivas sets out 
three issues for review:

 
 
ISSUE 
I:          
Did the OAH err as a matter of law by impliedly rejecting Mr. Olivas's 
position that, because NO 
jobs were available to him that paid 95% of his monthly gross earnings at the 
time of injury, he qualified for permanent partial disability benefits?  As a matter of law, if Employee-Claimant 
searches for "suitable employment" and discovers that no jobs exist that pay 95% 
of his previous earnings, and this fact is confirmed by the credible testimony 
of Employee-Claimant and an employment advisor, and furthermore, the Division 
stipulates that this element of the claim is not disputed, is he required to 
apply for lesser paying jobs in order to satisfy the "actively sought suitable 
work" portion of the permanent partial disability statutes, W.S. § 
27-14-405(B)(III)?

 
 
ISSUE 
II:         
Did the OAH err as a matter of law by rejecting Employee-Claimant's 
position that enrollment in full time vocational retraining met the "actively 
sought suitable work" requirement of W.S. § 
27-14-405(B)(III)?

 
 
ISSUE 
III:        
Is the Order Denying Benefits supported by substantial evidence, or is 
the decision arbitrary and capricious, due to the 
following:

 
 

1.      
Mr. 
Olivas met the actively seeking work requirement because he was employed full 
time when the evidentiary hearing was held.  This employment was in the field in which 
he obtained vocational retraining.

 
 

2.      
An 
essential finding was not supported by substantial evidence. The OAH erroneously 
determined that Mr. Olivas testified that he would not accept any employment 
that interfered with his schooling when, in fact, Mr. Olivas testified that he 
would have accepted employment that paid $20 per hour  an amount approximately 
80% of his monthly gross earnings at the time of injury.

 
 

3.      
The OAH 
erroneously determined that Mr. Olivas was not actively seeking work when no 
work was available to him that paid 95% of the $25 per hour he was making at the 
time of injury.

 
 

4.      
The OAH 
erroneously determined that Mr. Olivas was not actively seeking work when it 
failed to recognize that attending vocational retraining full time satisfies 
this requirement.

 
 

5.      
The 
OAH's determination that Mr. Olivas was not actively seeking work is contrary to 
the substantial evidence presented regarding his persistent and sustained 
efforts to find employment.

 
 
The 
Division responds with a statement of two issues:

Issue 
I:            
Whether substantial evidence supports the hearing examiner's finding that 
Olivas was not actively seeking suitable work?

 
 
Issue 
II:            
Whether the hearing examiner's decision denying benefits is in accordance 
with law?

 
 
FACTS

[¶3]      In November 
of 2000, Olivas suffered a work-related injury to his shoulders while employed 
as a miner for FMC Corporation in Rock 
Springs, Wyoming.  In March of 2001, Olivas was awarded 
temporary total disability benefits.  Believing that his injury foreclosed any 
future in the mining industry, Olivas accepted a severance package ending his 
employment with FMC on April 29, 2001.  
In August, Olivas moved to New 
Mexico.  In 
December, a functional capacity evaluation concluded that Olivas could not 
physically perform the tasks associated with his former employment, and that he 
was able to work at just above a medium level with restrictions on using his 
arms above shoulder height.  In 
January of 2002, Olivas began taking classes at the Albuquerque Technical 
Vocational Institute (ATVI) training to become a heating and cooling service 
technician.

 
 
[¶4]      Olivas filed 
three applications for permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits.1  The first application was filed on 
January 25, 2002.  In the 
application, Olivas checked the "no" box in response to the question, "Are you 
currently registered with Job Service?"  
On an attached form where the claimant could set forth his work search 
record, Olivas handwrote a note indicating that he was attending school to learn 
a new trade as he could no longer medically perform his former job, and that 
there were no other mining jobs available in the Albuquerque area.  The application was denied because 
Olivas had not received a permanent partial impairment rating as required by 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(g) (LexisNexis 2005) and the Division's Rules and 
Regulations.

 
 
[¶5]      After obtaining 
an impairment rating, Olivas filed a second application on September 20, 
2002.  Again, Olivas indicated in 
the application that he was not currently registered with Job Service.  On the attached form for his work search 
record, Olivas wrote the following:

 
 
I am 
currently attending a Junior College in Albuquerque, New 
Mexico to study a new trade.  As per my Dr. I can no longer do my old 
job as a miner, that I've done for the past 28 years.

 
 
Upon 
request I can send you verification of my school records and anything else that 
you might need to process this claim.

 
 
P.S. As 
a full time student (13 credit hrs.) I have not seeked [sic] other 
employment.

 
 
The 
Division issued a Final Determination denying benefits because Olivas had not 
been actively seeking work as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2005).  Olivas did not 
object to that determination.

 
 
[¶6]      This proceeding 
arose out of Olivas's third application for PPD benefits.  The application was filed on August 4, 
2003.  This time, Olivas checked the 
"yes" box to the question regarding whether he had registered with Job 
Service.  On the work search record 
form, Olivas listed six employers he had contacted and filed applications for 
employment with on July 23 or 26, 2003.  
The Division issued a Final Determination on August 11, 2003, denying the 
application for PPD benefits.  
Again, the Division concluded that Olivas was not actively seeking work 
as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(iii). 

 
 
[¶7]      Olivas filed his 
objection and a contested case hearing was held on March 25, 2004.  Prior to the hearing, the parties 
stipulated that the only question was whether or not Olivas had actively sought 
employment and that he otherwise met all conditions for receiving PPD 
benefits.  Both parties presented 
evidence:  Olivas through exhibits 
and the testimony of two witnesses (including himself), and the Division through 
exhibits.  Olivas testified that 
initially after arriving in Albuquerque, he registered with the New Mexico 
Department of Labor and began searching the newspapers and internet for 
jobs.  However, Olivas decided to go 
to school to obtain vocational training for a new career because there were no 
mining jobs in the Albuquerque area, his physical limitations 
foreclosed employment in the construction industry, and his skills were not 
otherwise transferable to any other area thus leaving him qualified for minimum 
wage type jobs only.  Olivas 
testified that, while in school, he continued his job search activities:  He checked the newspaper and would go to 
the placement center at the school three times a week to check the job 
listings.  He also noted that he 
remained registered with the Department of Labor where he would use his account 
to access on-line job listings.  Olivas admitted that he did not consider 
minimum wage type jobs because he wanted to continue with his schooling.  He claimed that he would have taken a 
job that paid $20.00 an hour and that he even applied for two of those jobs but 
was unqualified and not hired.  At 
one point, Olivas testified that he had contacted his former Wyoming employer to see 
if it had work available within his physical restrictions, but was told that no 
jobs were available.

 
 
[¶8]      On 
cross-examination, Olivas declared that he looked for part-time, as well as 
full-time jobs, but admitted that his schooling was his first priority and 
finding a job was secondary.  With 
respect to his failure to mark "yes" to the question about registering for Job 
Service on his first two applications or list any job search efforts, Olivas 
claimed that he was confused by the application and that he mistakenly believed 
that he did not need to fill out that part of the application because he was 
searching for jobs on-line.2  At one point, Olivas declared that he 
had no intention of quitting school to take a job, although he later stated that 
if something appealing in a part- or full-time capacity had come up, he would 
have taken it.

 
 
[¶9]      Theresa Torres 
was an employment advisor at ATVI during the time that Olivas was a 
student.  She testified that Olivas 
was in the placement center two to three times a week for a year to a year and a 
half.  Torres helped Olivas look for 
all types of employment including part-time, full-time, as well as short and 
long term.  She described Olivas as 
"extremely diligent and very focused" on his job search but noted that there 
were no jobs that paid $20.00 an hour or more for which Olivas was qualified, 
and that any jobs that paid less would have conflicted with his 
schooling.

 
 
[¶10]   On April 23, 2004, the hearing 
examiner issued an Order Denying Benefits concluding that "applying for only six 
positions in more than two years [was] not a systematic sustained work [search] 
effort."  Olivas filed a Petition 
for Review of the hearing examiner's decision with the district court, which 
affirmed.  His appeal is now before 
this Court.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]   In a contested case hearing the 
burden of proving all the essential elements of a claim for workers' 
compensation benefits rests upon the claimant.  Phillips v. TIC-The Industrial Company of 
Wyoming, Inc., 2005 WY 40, ¶25, 109 P.3d 520, 531 (Wyo. 2005); In re Worker's Compensation Claim of 
Johnson, 2001 WY 48, ¶7, 23 P.3d 32, 35 (Wyo. 2001).  This Court does not afford any special 
deference to the district court's decision reviewing the agency decision.  Rather, we review the case as if it had 
come directly from the administrative agency.  Bush v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 2005 WY 120, ¶4, 120 P.3d 176, 178-79 (Wyo. 2005). 
 The scope of our review is dictated 
by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2005):

 
 
To the 
extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 

(i)                 
Compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

 
 

(ii)               
Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 
 

(A)       
Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 
 

(B)       
Contrary 
to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

 
 

(C)      
In 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

 
 

(D)      
Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or

 
 

(E)       
Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

 
 
When 
both parties present evidence in a contested case proceeding and factual 
findings are made, the appropriate standard of review is the substantial 
evidence test.  Newman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Division, 2002 WY 91, ¶22, 49 P.3d 163, 171 (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 
We 
afford respect and deference to a hearing examiner's findings of fact if they 
are supported by substantial evidence.  Our task is to examine the entire record 
to determine whether substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner's 
findings.  We will not substitute 
our judgment for that of the hearing examiner when substantial evidence supports 
his decision.  Substantial evidence 
is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the 
agency's conclusions.  A hearing 
examiner's conclusions of law are afforded no special deference and will be 
affirmed only if truly in accord with law.

                        

Salas v. 
General Chemical, 2003 
WY 79, ¶9, 71 P.3d 708, ¶9 (Wyo. 2003) (citations omitted). * * * A claimant for 
worker's compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the essential 
elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the contested case 
hearing.  Salas, ¶9.

 
 
Even 
when the factual findings are found to be sufficient under the substantial 
evidence test,  this court may be required to apply the arbitrary and 
capricious standard as a "safety net" to catch other agency action which 
prejudiced a party's substantial right to the administrative proceeding or which 
might be contrary to the other WAPA review standards.

 
 

State ex 
rel. Department of Transportation v. Legarda, 2003 
WY 130, ¶10, 77 P.3d 708, ¶10 (Wyo. 2003) citing Bryant v. State ex rel. Department of 
Transportation, 2002 WY 140, ¶¶9-11, 55 P.3d 4, ¶¶9-11 (Wyo. 2002) 
(citations omitted.)

 
 

Abeyta 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division, 2004 
WY 50, ¶5, 88 P.3d 1072, 1074-75 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 

DISCUSSION

[¶12]   The parties' arguments center on 
whether or not the hearing examiner's conclusion that Olivas had failed to prove 
that he had "actively sought suitable work" as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-405(h)(iii) was supported by substantial evidence.  We need not make that determination today 
because the hearing examiner's findings of fact and conclusions are insufficient 
to permit an adequate review of the order denying benefits. 

 
 
[¶13]   Recently, we have stressed 
that:

 
 
A 
hearing officer is required to support his conclusions with adequate findings of 
fact.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-110 (LexisNexis 2005).  A 
hearing officer has "the duty to make findings of basic facts upon all of the 
material issues in the proceeding and upon which its ultimate findings of fact 
or conclusions are based.  Unless 
that is done there is no rational basis for judicial review."  Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 446 P.2d 550, 
555 (Wyo. 
1968). In order for this Court to have a rational basis upon which to conduct a 
review:

 
 
All of 
the material evidence offered by the parties must be carefully weighed by the 
agency as the trier of the facts; conflicts in the evidence must be resolved, 
and the underlying or basic facts which prompt the ultimate conclusion on issues 
of fact drawn by the agency in sustaining the prima facie case made, or in 
rejecting it for the reason it has been satisfactorily met or rebutted by 
countervailing evidence, must be sufficiently set forth in the decision 
rendered.

 
 
            
            
Id. at 
557.

 
 

Bush, ¶9, 
120 P.3d  at 180; see also Decker v. State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Medical Commission, 2005 WY 160, 
¶27, 124 P.3d 686, 695 (Wyo. 2005). 

 
 
[¶14]   Pursuant to the parties' 
stipulation, the statutory context in which Olivas's claim was to be resolved is 
exclusively found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(iii), which states that a 
claimant is eligible to receive PPD benefits if they have "actively sought 
suitable work" with that requirement conditioned on a consideration of the 
claimant's "health, education, training and experience."  At the time Olivas's claim arose, the 
Division's Rules and Regulations defined "actively sought work" to 
mean:

 
 
For 
purposes of benefit eligibility, an individual is actively seeking work if 
they:

 
 

(i)                 
Have 
engaged in a systematic and sustained effort to obtain 
work;

 
 

(ii)               
Registers 
for work and continues to report to a department office in effort to obtain 
suitable employment;

 
 

(iii)             
Are 
available for suitable employment;

 
 

(iv)              
Furnishes 
the department with tangible evidence of their effort; or

 
 

(v)                
Have 
contacted the employer from the time of injury to inquire if they have work 
available within their medically documented restrictions.

 
 

Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division, Rules, Regulations and Fee Schedules, Chapter 1, 
Section 4(x) (Oct. 1999).3  The burden was on Olivas to establish by 
a preponderance of the evidence that he actively sought suitable work 
considering his health, education, training, and experience.  The hearing examiner concluded that 
Olivas had failed to meet that burden:

 
 
This 
Office is sympathetic to Olivas's argument that he faced the unenviable choice 
of searching for and accepting inadequate employment or completing college to 
better his life.  This Office 
commends Olivas for his choice to better himself and his family; however, this 
Office cannot ignore the express language of the Wyoming Statutes or the rules 
and regulations.  Olivas would 
clearly qualify for vocational rehabilitation benefits, but did not apply for 
such.  This issue before this Office 
was PPD benefits and whether Olivas sought employment.  This Office finds applying for only six 
positions in more than two years is not a systematic sustained work effort. 
 Olivas admitted completing college 
was his first priority and he would not have accepted any employment, which 
interfered with his classes or the necessary study time.  The Legislature and the Division have 
expressly required a claimant be actively engaged in seeking employment when 
applying for PPD.  Olivas was 
attending college and not actively seeking employment.  Accordingly, the Division Final 
Determination Denying Benefits must be upheld.

 
 
[¶15]   The hearing examiner's conclusions 
are inadequate for several reasons.  First, the hearing examiner failed to 
completely analyze whether Olivas was "actively seeking work" as that phrase was 
defined in the Division's Rules and Regulations.  When determining the meaning of 
administrative rules and regulations, we apply the same analysis used to 
interpret statutory language.  State ex rel. Wyoming Department of 
Revenue v. UPRC, 2003 WY 54, ¶12, 67 P.3d 1176, 1182-83 (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 
In 
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 
legislature's intent.  Fontaine v. Board of CountyComm'rs, 4 P.3d 890, 894 (Wyo. 2000); State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. 
Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1983).  Legislative intent must be ascertained 
initially and primarily from the words used in the statute.  Allied-Signal, Inc. v. State Board of 
Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 
1991); Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, 
Inc., 806 P.2d 834, 837 (Wyo. 1991).  When the words are clear and unambiguous, 
a court risks an impermissible substitution of its own views, or those of 
others, for the intent of the legislature if any effort is made to interpret or 
construe statutes on any basis other than the language invoked by the 
legislature.  Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d  at 219. 

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
Therefore, 
in performing our review, we look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
words to determine if the statute is ambiguous.  Olheiser v. State ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Div., 866 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo. 
1994) (citing Parker Land & Cattle 
Company v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo. 1993)).  A statute is clear and unambiguous if its 
wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning with 
consistency and predictability. Parker 
Land & Cattle, at 1043.  Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it 
is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. 
Id.   Ultimately, whether a statute is 
ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court.  Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d  at 
219.

 
 

UPRC, at 
Id.; (quoting McClean v. State, 2003 WY 17, ¶6, 62 P.3d 595, 597-98 (Wyo. 2003)).  The 
word "or" is used in the rule defining "actively sought work" to separate the 
fourth and fifth alternatives listed.  In the construction of statutes, the word 
"or" is usually used in the disjunctive sense, and "when two [or more] clauses 
are expressed in the disjunctive, this generally indicates alternatives, 
requiring separate treatment."  Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. State 
Board of Control, 578 P.2d 557, 566 (Wyo. 1978) (citing Matter of Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976)); see also Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, ¶46, 96 P.3d 1027, 1043 (Wyo. 2004).  The 
word "or" will be used in a conjunctive sense (i.e., interchangeable with the 
word "and") only when it is necessary to harmonize provisions of a statute. 
 Amoco v. Board of Commissioners of 
CarbonCounty, 876 P.2d 989, 993 (Wyo. 1994).  In this case, there is no need to 
harmonize the provisions of the Rule, and the word "or" is taken in this context 
in its disjunctive sense with each clause in the Rule being "considered 
separately, without requiring that the subjects [of each] be satisfied".4  Basin Electric Power Cooperative, 578 P.2d 557, 566.  Here, the hearing 
examiner's only stated reason for denying benefits was that Olivas's six 
applications for employment in the two years since his work-related injury did 
not constitute "a systematic sustained work effort."  This, of course, is a reference to the 
first alternative set out in the Division's rule defining "actively seeking 
work."  The hearing examiner failed 
to make any findings of fact or conclusions related to the other alternatives 
provided under the rule.  Since 
Olivas had to make the requisite showing under only one of the alternatives to 
meet his burden of proof to demonstrate that he had actively sought work and 
thus qualified for PPD benefits, the hearing examiner's failure to do so renders 
his order denying benefits inadequate.

 
 
[¶16]   In addition, our ability to review 
the hearing examiner's decision is further compromised by the hearing examiner's 
failure to make findings of fact and conclusions regarding all of the material 
evidence offered by Olivas.  If this 
evidence had been considered and deemed credible, Olivas may have met his burden 
of proof and demonstrated that he had actively sought work.  For example, Olivas testified that even 
after he began attending school, he had remained registered with New Mexico's equivalent of Wyoming's Job Service, and that he continued 
to check the newspaper listings and on-line postings, as well as visit the 
placement center at ATVI two to three times a week to check on available jobs. 
 Olivas testified that these efforts 
continued over approximately a two-year period and that despite those efforts, 
he claimed there were no available jobs for which he was qualified except 
minimum wage fast food type jobs.  The hearing examiner failed to make any 
findings or conclusions regarding this testimony.  If Olivas was deemed credible, then a 
finder of fact could possibly conclude that Olivas's efforts constituted "a 
sustained and systematic effort to obtain work" considering his "education, 
training and experience."  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(iii) and Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division Rules, 
Regulations and Fee Schedules, Ch. 1, Section 4.  Further, Olivas testified that he 
contacted his former employer, where he had been working when he suffered his 
compensable injury, and inquired whether or not it had any work available within 
his physical restrictions.  Olivas 
was informed that there were no jobs available.  Again, if deemed credible, this testimony 
would apparently qualify Olivas for PPD benefits under subsection (v) of the 
Division's rule defining "actively sought work."  The hearing examiner did not make any 
findings or conclusions regarding this testimony either.  There are other examples that we need not 
delineate here.  The consequence is 
that the hearing examiner's findings of fact and conclusions are simply not 
adequate to permit us to effectively review the order denying 
benefits.

 
 
[¶17]   Compounding the problem, we note 
that the hearing examiner made no findings or conclusions regarding Olivas's 
credibility as a witness.  The 
hearing examiner is the trier of fact and, accordingly, is charged with weighing 
the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses.  KG 
Construction, Inc. v. Sherman, 2005 WY 116, ¶23, 120 P.3d 145, 150 (Wyo. 
2005).  Indeed, it is the hearing 
examiner's responsibility to do so.  Ikenberry v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 5 P.3d 799, 809 (Wyo. 2000).  A hearing examiner's determination of 
credibility will not be overturned unless it is clearly contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence.  Brierley v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Division, 2002 WY 121, ¶16, 52 P.3d 564, 571 (Wyo. 
2002).  Though supplemented with 
documentary exhibits, Olivas's case that he actively sought work and thus 
qualified for PPD benefits rested largely upon his own testimony.  The only mention of Olivas's credibility 
by the hearing examiner came in the Findings of Fact:  "Olivas credibly testified his physical 
limits prevented him from obtaining employment in the construction industry." 
 The hearing examiner clearly found 
Olivas to be a credible witness, at least to some degree.  Nevertheless, no other findings or 
conclusions are made regarding credibility.  Given the nature of the evidence 
presented by Olivas, however, the necessary implication of the hearing 
examiner's decision denying benefits was that Olivas was not a credible witness. 
 This Court is not in a position to 
make determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses.  The determination of the weight and 
credibility of the evidence is assigned by law to the administrative agency as 
trier of fact, and it is not within this Court's prerogative to perform that 
duty.  Leavitt v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Division, 980 P.2d 332, 335 (Wyo. 1999) (citing McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278 
(Wyo. 1980)). 
 Unlike us, the hearing examiner has 
observed the witnesses and listened to their testimony leaving him "in the best 
position to judge the demeanor, truth and veracity of witnesses and to decide 
which evidence is most dependable."  Id. (citing State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. Colvin, 681 P.2d 269, 271 (Wyo. 1984)).  We "will not overturn the hearing 
examiner's determinations regarding witness credibility unless they are clearly 
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence."  Taylor v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Division,  
2005 WY 148 ¶8, 123 P.3d 143, 146 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Boyce v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Division, 2005 WY 9, ¶6, 105 P.3d 451, 454 (Wyo. 
2005)).  The hearing examiner's 
failure to set out why Olivas was not a credible 
witness (if, in fact, that was his conclusion) inhibits our ability to properly 
perform our review on appeal.  When 
the resolution of a claim for benefits rests largely, if not exclusively, on an 
assessment of a claimant's credibility, a hearing examiner's failure to make 
findings regarding the claimant's credibility on the record renders an effective 
review of the order denying benefits impossible.

 
 
[¶18]   We have noted that whether a 
claimant has "actively sought suitable work" is qualified by a requirement that 
the claimant's efforts be considered within the context of his "health, 
education, training and experience."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(iii); see also Abeyta, 88 P.3d  at 1076.  The question the hearing examiner must 
answer on remand is whether or not Olivas met his burden of proof and showed 
that, considering his education, training, and experience, there was no suitable 
work available for him.

 
 

CONCLUSION

[¶19]   Under the facts of this case, the 
hearing examiner's failure to make a determination regarding the weight and 
credibility of Olivas's testimony, coupled with the failure to consider all of 
the material evidence offered, renders its order denying benefits insufficient 
to permit appellate review.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand the 
matter to the district court with instructions to vacate the order denying 
benefits and remand to the Office of Administrative Hearings for further 
findings consistent with this opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
statutory provisions relevant to Olivas's claims for PPD benefits are found in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(g) and (h) (LexisNexis 
2005):

 
 
     (g)  An injured employee's 
impairment shall be rated by a licensed physician using the most recent edition 
of the American Medical Association's guide to the evaluation of permanent 
impairment.  The award shall be paid 
as provided by W.S. 27-14-403 for the number of months determined by multiplying 
the percentage of impairment by forty-four (44) 
months.

 
 
     (h)  An injured employee awarded 
permanent partial impairment benefits may apply for a permanent disability award 
subject to the following terms and conditions:

 
 
(i)  The injured employee is because of the injury, unable to 
return to employment at a wage that is at least ninety-five percent (95%) of the 
monthly gross earnings the employee was earning at the time of 
injury;

(ii)  An application for permanent partial disability is filed 
not before three (3) months after the date of ascertainable loss or three (3) 
months before the last scheduled impairment payment, whichever occurs later, but 
in no event later than one (1) year following the later date; 
and

(iii)  The employee has actively sought suitable work, 
considering the employee's health, education, training and 
experience.

 
 

2A document 
was admitted showing that Olivas had been registered with the New Mexico 
Department of Labor's AlbuquerqueWorkforceDevelopmentCenter since November of 
2001.

 
 

3The Division's rules currently define 
"actively seeking work" as follows:

 
 
For purposes 
of benefit eligibility, a claimant is actively seeking work if the claimant 
provides tangible evidence of the work search to the Division.  Completion of the work search form will 
be considered tangible evidence.  The work search must contain a minimum of 
five contacts per week over the course of a six week period.  The six week period must be immediately 
preceding the date the application is filed with the Division or 
immediately following the date the application is filed with the 
Division.  The contacts listed on 
the work search must be made for work the clamant is reasonably qualified to 
perform and is willing to accept.  Actions that would be considered an 
active search for employment include completing job applications, faxing or 
mailing resumes (include proof), or visiting the employers in person.  [Emphasis in 
rule.]

 
 
3 Weil's 
Code of Wyoming Rules, Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, Rules, 
Regulations and Fee Schedules of the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division, Chapter 1, Section 4, Definitions, 025 220 00-1 
(2005).

 
 

4The Division 
implicitly concedes this interpretation of the rule when it asserts in its brief 
that "Olivas failed to provide sufficient evidence that he satisfied any of 
these methods of actively seeking work.'"