Title: State v. Smith

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  November 18, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
ROCKY DEVON SMITH,
Petitioner on Review.
(C991426CR; CA A110289; SC S51233)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 8, 2004.
Eric M. Cumfer, Senior Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With him
on the brief were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, Office of
Public Defense Services, and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender.
Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. 
With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Mark Gardner, Judge. 187 Or App 562, 69 P3d 787, modified on recons, 190 Or App
576, 80 P3d 145 (2003).
**Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
BALMER, J.
This criminal case requires us to examine the scope of
a trial court's obligation when a defendant requests that the
court appoint new counsel because the defendant is dissatisfied
with his existing appointed counsel.  Here, defendant told the
court on the day of trial that he was dissatisfied with his
appointed counsel and counsel's preparation of defendant's case. 
The trial court listened to defendant's complaints, but it did
not inquire into the basis of the complaints or hold a hearing
regarding defendant's assertions.  The court, however, expressed
its confidence that defendant's appointed counsel was competent
and was prepared for trial.  The case proceeded to trial, and
defendant was convicted.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
trial court had erred in not inquiring into defendant's
complaints, reversed defendant's convictions, and remanded for a
new trial.  State v. Smith, 187 Or App 562, 69 P3d 787 (2003)
(Smith I).  On reconsideration, however, the Court of Appeals
withdrew its disposition of the case, vacated defendant's
convictions, and remanded for a new hearing on defendant's
pretrial complaints regarding his counsel and a determination of
whether the trial court's error was harmless.  State v. Smith,
190 Or App 576, 90 P3d 145 (2003) (Smith II).  Defendant
petitioned for review, arguing that the Court of Appeals' initial
disposition was correct and that he was entitled to a new trial. 
We allowed the petition.  Because we conclude that the trial
court did not err, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
I. PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The state charged defendant with robbery, assault, and
related firearms offenses.  On the day of trial, defendant
requested that the trial court appoint substitute counsel
because, defendant asserted, he lacked confidence in his counsel
and his counsel had failed to investigate his case adequately. 
The comments of defense counsel and defendant, and the trial
court's response, are set out in the transcript:
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: * * * Mr. Smith is present
and, as I indicated to the court in chambers this
morning, Mr. Smith has indicated to me that he is
concerned about my representation of him and he has
asked me to indicate to the court that he would like
new counsel assigned to the case.
"One, apparently, it's his belief I'm not prepared
and ready to go in this case.  And, number two, he,
apparently, had some problems with the way I've been
handling it with him over the past few days.
"With that said, I guess I would let my client
indicate to the court what his concerns are and have
the court address that with him."
"THE COURT:  Mr. Smith, this is your opportunity
to address the court."
"THE DEFENDANT:  For several months, I've been
working with [former counsel], I don't know if he was
just on retainer with [defense counsel], but I was not
too confident, either, with his ability, but I trusted
the fact that he was looking out for my best interests
rather than the quickest way to end the case.
"I mean no personal disrespect against [defense
counsel], but I just don't feel that I will be getting
a fair representation with someone that would rather
just see the case done and over with rather than hear
the truth or have the truth even be brought out.
"I have witnesses and other facts and none of them
have even been questioned.  Or, I just don't -- none of
my witnesses have been talked to except for one, and
she was asked a few questions of does she know what
happened?  Does she know what came in?  And this was
told to me by my previous lawyer * * * and that was it. 
None of the other ones that I have given to the law
firm have been spoken to.  I don't feel that I'm being
fairly represented by staying with [defense counsel]."
"THE COURT:  Well, let me comment on a couple
things.  First of all, I've been doing this job now,
this is my 18th year, so I've been a judge for a while
and I've seen a lot of attorneys come through the court
system.  I can tell you that were I charged with a
crime, there are probably about 10 attorneys that I
would personally consider representing me, out of the
10,000 that are practicing law here in the State of
Oregon. [Defense counsel] is on that list.  He's a very
good attorney.  He's probably a better attorney than
[former counsel] is, and if [defense counsel] tells me
that he's ready to go to trial in this matter and
represent your interests, I have to believe him.
"Now, this is a serious matter, extremely serious
matter for you and the court is entirely aware of that. 
We believe that if there was any kind of prejudice,
substantial prejudice to you in proceeding ahead at
this point in time with [defense counsel] representing
you, I wouldn't hesitate over the State's objection to
continue the matter.
"On the other hand, I'm not going to continue it
because at some point in time, we have to resolve this
matter and we have lots of other cases and lots of
other people that are trying to get their day in court.
"Based upon what I've heard at this particular
point in time, I'm not prepared to continue the trial. 
So we will be proceeding today."
The trial court denied defendant's request.
Defense counsel then noted for the record that the
prosecutor had just given him a summary of the testimony of a
codefendant who had entered into a plea agreement.  Defense
counsel, however, told the trial court that he was "not
indicating to the court that that affec[ted] [his] ability to be
prepared for trial," that he had anticipated what the witnesses
on the witness list had to say, and that he had copies of their
prior statements.  The trial court then recessed the proceedings
for 15 minutes to allow defendant and his counsel to discuss
whether to enter a plea or to go to trial.  Defendant chose to
proceed to trial, and a jury convicted him of the charged
offenses.
Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had
erred (1) by failing to inquire into defendant's claims regarding
the adequacy of his counsel; and (2) by failing to appoint
substitute counsel.  Defendant argued that, because of those
errors, the Court of Appeals should reverse his conviction and
grant him a new trial.  
The state responded that the trial court had listened
to and evaluated defendant's complaints but that it ultimately
had rejected them because defendant had offered no legitimate
basis for removing his court-appointed counsel.  The state
further argued that, if the trial court in fact had erred in not
making the required inquiry, the appropriate disposition was for
the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the trial court to
determine whether defendant's complaints were legitimate and
whether the trial court should have appointed substitute counsel
to represent him.  Responding to defendant's second assignment of
error, the state argued that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in denying defendant's motion for substitute counsel.  
A panel of the Court of Appeals held that the trial
court had erred by failing to inquire into defendant's complaints
concerning his appointed counsel.  Smith I, 187 Or App at 564. 
Based on that perceived error, the court reversed the trial
court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.  Id.
The state petitioned for reconsideration, again arguing
that, even if the trial court had erred, the proper remedy was
not a new trial but, rather, a remand to the trial court so that
it could conduct the required inquiry, decide whether it should
have appointed substitute counsel and, if it answered that
question affirmatively, order a new trial.  Specifically, the
state contended that, under Article VII (Amended), section 3, of
the Oregon Constitution, the Court of Appeals lacked authority to
reverse the trial court judgment because, even if defendant had
demonstrated legal error in the trial court's failure to inquire
into defendant's complaints, he had not established that he had
been prejudiced by that error.
In an en banc decision, the Court of Appeals granted
reconsideration, withdrew its earlier disposition, and remanded
to the trial court to conduct a hearing on defendant's complaints
about his counsel and to determine whether defendant's counsel
had been adequate.  The court first stated that, as the state had
contended, Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon
Constitution (1) requires the court to affirm the trial court
judgment, despite any error at trial, if the judgment "was such
as should have been rendered in the case."  Smith II, 190 Or App
at 578-79 (quoting State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 25, 77 P3d 1111
(2003) (quoting Article VII (Amended), section 3)).  The court
then explained that, because "the trial court had an affirmative
duty to inquire" into defendant's request for a new attorney but
had failed to make that inquiry, the Court of Appeals did not
have an adequate record on which to affirm the trial court's
judgment.  190 Or App at 580.  It therefore remanded the case to
the trial court to conduct the inquiry that it had not conducted
at trial.  As noted, we allowed defendant's petition for review.
II.  ANALYSIS
The parties focus their arguments in this court on
whether the proper disposition on remand is a new trial or a
hearing to determine whether defendant's complaints about his
counsel were legitimate and should have resulted in the
appointment of new counsel.  That disposition, however, becomes
an issue only if the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that
the trial court erred by not inquiring into those complaints.  As
noted, the state argued in the Court of Appeals that the trial
court did not err in that respect.  In this court, the state did
not advance that argument, but no one disagrees that the parties'
other arguments are premised on the assumption that the trial
court erred.  We, therefore, choose to begin our inquiry with the
threshold question whether the trial court erred by not inquiring
into defendant's complaints about his appointed counsel. (2) 
We also end with that inquiry, because, for the reasons that we
discuss below, we conclude that the trial court did not err.
On appeal, as previously noted, defendant argued that
the trial court had erred, first, in failing to inquire into
defendant's complaint about his appointed counsel and, second, in
denying defendant's request for new counsel.  The Court of
Appeals agreed with defendant on the first issue.  See Smith I,
187 Or App at 564 ("The trial court did not inquire into
[defendant's] complaints. * * * That was error."); Smith II, 190
Or App at 578 ("On reconsideration, we adhere to our holding that
the trial court's inquiry was inadequate under the applicable
case law.").  The Court of Appeals based its decision on two
earlier Court of Appeals cases.  See Smith I, 187 Or App at 564
(citing State v. Coffey, 158 Or App 112, 972 P2d 1219 (1999) and
State v. Grcich, 148 Or App 337, 939 P2d 649 (1997)).  Those
decisions, in turn, were based on this court's decision in State
v. Langley, 314 Or 247, 839 P2d 692 (1992), adh'd to on recons,
318 Or 28, 861 P2d 1012 (1993), and on earlier Court of Appeals
precedent.  See, e.g., Grcich, 148 Or App at 342-43 (citing
earlier Court of Appeals cases and Langley).  We now consider
whether Langley or any of this court's other cases requires the
inquiry that the Court of Appeals held was necessary here.
A. This Court's Decision in Langley
In Langley, the defendant sought reversal of his
conviction on multiple counts of aggravated murder, arguing,
among other things, that the trial court had erred in denying his
motion for appointment of new counsel.  On the first day of
trial, the defendant, who had been represented for nearly a year
by two court-appointed lawyers, moved for the appointment of new
counsel, asserting that he no longer could work with his lawyers. 
The trial court "appointed a third independent lawyer to advise
defendant about the ramifications of a pro se defense and to
assess defendant's complaints about his lawyers."  314 Or at 257. 
After considering advice from the third lawyer, the defendant
chose to continue to be represented by his appointed counsel, but
nevertheless moved for appointment of new counsel.  He argued
that, in an unrelated proceeding, the same appointed counsel had
not allowed him to put on all his evidence, had lied to him and
manipulated him, had not discussed strategy with him, and had not
prepared the defendant to testify.  The trial court denied the
motion for substitute counsel, stating that nothing had been
presented to the court to indicate that appointed counsel's
actions were not reasonable under the circumstances and that
appointment of substitute counsel would involve unnecessary delay
and waste of money.  314 Or at 257 n 8.
This court affirmed the trial court order denying the
defendant's motion for substitution of counsel.  The court first
noted that ORS 135.050(5) authorizes a court to substitute one
appointed counsel for another "'when the interests of justice
require such substitution,'" but that a defendant has "'no right
to have another court-appointed lawyer in the absence of a
legitimate complaint concerning the one already appointed for
him.'" 314 Or at 257 (quoting State v. Davidson, 252 Or 617, 620,
451 P2d 481 (1969)).  The court then observed:
     "Under Davidson, assessment of a defendant's
request for substitution of counsel requires a factual
assessment of whether the complaint is 'legitimate.' 
The trial court made such an assessment and found that
defendant's complaints did not require substitution of
counsel."
314 Or at 257.  The court went on to hold that a trial court's
denial of a motion for substitution should be reviewed for abuse
of discretion.  Id. at 258.  Finally, the court examined the
defendant's complaint under that standard, stating that a
"legitimate complaint" about court-appointed counsel was one that
was based on an abridgement of the defendant's constitutional
right to adequate assistance of counsel.  Id.  Because the record
demonstrated that defendant's objections were based on
dissatisfaction with counsel's choices of strategy, rather than
the adequacy of the representation, the trial court was not
required to appoint new counsel and did not abuse its discretion
in denying the defendant's motion.  Id. at 258-59.
This court's ruling in Langley thus touched on several
distinct issues related to the right to counsel.  The court
recognized that a defendant in a criminal case has a right to the
adequate assistance of counsel, id. at 258 and n 9, that Oregon
law authorizes courts to substitute one appointed lawyer for
another, id. at 257, that a defendant has no right to new
appointed counsel in the absence of a legitimate complaint about
existing counsel, id., and that a trial court ruling on a motion
to substitute counsel will be reviewed for abuse of the trial
court's discretion.  Id. at 258.  Those aspects of Langley are
not at issue here.  Rather, this case presents only the narrow
issue of the meaning of the passage in Langley, quoted
previously, that a defendant's request for substitute counsel
"requires a factual assessment of whether the complaint is
'legitimate,'" id. at 257, and this court's acceptance in Langley
of the trial court inquiry in that case.  We now consider the
basis and implications of that aspect of Langley in greater
detail.
To support its statement that the trial court must make
a "factual assessment" as to whether a defendant's complaint is
"legitimate," Langley cited this court's decision in Davidson. 
Davidson, however, simply affirmed a trial court order denying
the defendant's motion to substitute appointed counsel on the
grounds that the defendant had failed to offer an "adequate" or
"legitimate" reason for requesting a new lawyer.  This court's
review of the trial court proceedings in Davidson was short and
to the point:
"Defendant became dissatisfied with his appointed
attorney's services and asked that he be removed.  No
adequate reasons were given to the court for
defendant's dissatisfaction and the court denied the
motion. [After being granted the opportunity to
substitute a retained lawyer, but failing to retain
one,] [d]efendant was forced to trial with his court-appointed lawyer, after being given four continuances. 
Defendant conducted a large part of the trial himself
while his lawyer sat by his side.  To recite the facts
is to refute defendant's claim of error. * * *
[Defendant] had no right to have another court-appointed lawyer in the absence of a legitimate
complaint concerning the one already appointed for
him."
252 Or at 619-20.  Davidson thus did not use the phrase "factual
assessment" or impose an affirmative obligation on the trial
court to inquire into the reasons that a defendant has requested
substitute counsel.  Rather, it placed the obligation of coming
forward with "adequate reasons" for the substitution of counsel
or a "legitimate complaint" about existing counsel squarely on
the defendant.
In Langley, this court was not required to decide
whether a trial court, confronted with a request for substitute
counsel, was affirmatively required to inquire into and assess
the basis for the defendant's complaints about his counsel.  The
only issue in Langley, as in Davidson, was whether the trial
court had erred in denying defendant's motion to substitute
counsel.  While the trial court in Langley did inquire into the
defendant's complaints, appointing an independent lawyer to
assess them, nothing in Langley or in this court's earlier cases
required that it do so.  This court's acceptance of that trial
court procedure in Langley as adequate to refute the defendant's
claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new
counsel did not establish that an independent inquiry is a legal
requirement in every case when a defendant requests substitute
counsel.  
We acknowledge that the statement in Langley that
"assessment of a defendant's request for substitution of counsel
requires a factual assessment of whether the complaint is
'legitimate,'" 314 Or at 257, might be read to mandate that the
trial court do something more than allow a defendant to explain
the reasons for the defendant's motion for substitute counsel and
then to rule on that motion.  Such a reading, however, would be
erroneous.  That statement in Langley, read in context, simply
echoes the holding in Davidson that a motion to substitute
counsel should be granted if the defendant's complaint is
legitimate and denied if it is not. (3)  It recognizes that
determining the legitimacy of any complaint about appointed
counsel is case -- and fact -- specific, and it leaves to the
trial court the task of weighing whatever the defendant puts
before that court in light of all the other known circumstances,
such as the judge's personal observations of the performance of
counsel at trial.  
Our previous cases thus hold that a trial court has an
obligation to consider and grant or deny a motion for substitute
counsel and to exercise its discretion in doing so.  However,
those cases do not establish a rule of law that a trial court has
an affirmative duty to conduct an inquiry and make a factual
assessment in response to a defendant's complaints about
appointed counsel.
B. The Scope of the Right to Counsel
That conclusion does not end our analysis, however.  If
the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel requires a
trial court to conduct an inquiry into, and to make a factual
assessment of, a defendant's complaints about appointed counsel,
we will affirm the Court of Appeals' holding to that effect.  We
now turn to that issue.
State and federal constitutional provisions guarantee a
defendant in a criminal case the right to the assistance of
counsel.  Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to * * * be heard by himself and counsel." 
Similarly, the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right * * * to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence."  To implement those rights, judicial
decisions and statutes provide a defendant with the right to
appointed counsel if the defendant cannot afford to pay for a
lawyer.  Moreover, the defendant's right is not just to a lawyer
in name only, but to a lawyer who provides adequate assistance. 
As this court has explained:
"The mere act of appointment of counsel to
represent an indigent accused is obviously not
sufficient to provide the protection afforded by these
constitutional provisions.  Rather, the provisions call
for an adequate performance by counsel of those
functions of professional assistance which an accused
person relies upon counsel to perform on his behalf."
Krummacher v. Gierloff, 290 Or 867, 872, 627 P2d 458 (1981); see
also Langley, 314 Or at 258 ("The right to counsel requires
adequate performance of an appointed lawyer's professional
assistance.").  The Sixth Amendment right similarly requires not
just counsel, but effective counsel.  See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 US 668, 686, 104 S Ct 2052, 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984)
("'the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of
counsel'") (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 US 759, 771 n 14,
90 S Ct 1441, 25 L Ed 2d 763 (1970)).  In Strickland, the Court
emphasized the underlying purpose of requiring effective (or, to
use the more accurate word adopted by this court, "adequate")
counsel:
"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness
must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result."
Id.
The quotations from Krummacher and Strickland make it
apparent that the constitutional right is a right to adequate
counsel.  If that right is violated, then the defendant will
receive a new trial or other appropriate relief.  See, e.g.,
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 US ___, 125 S Ct 2456, 162 L Ed 2d 360
(2005) (in capital case, defense counsel's failure to examine
files of defendant's previous convictions violated defendant's
right to effective counsel in penalty phase; federal habeas
corpus relief granted and death sentence set aside); Stevens v.
State, 322 Or 101, 902 P2d 1137 (1995) (defense counsel's failure
to interview critical witnesses violated defendant's right to
adequate counsel; post-conviction relief granted).  However,
nothing in the text of the federal or state constitutional
provisions, or in any controlling case law that we have found,
suggests that a trial court constitutionally is required always
to make an inquiry or factual assessment during trial into a
defendant's complaint that his counsel is failing to provide
adequate assistance. (4)  
In Oregon, the legislature has established a post-conviction hearing procedure in which any person convicted of a
crime may challenge his or her conviction on the ground that it
resulted from a substantial denial of a state or federal
constitutional right.  ORS 138.510 to 138.686; see generally Jack
G. Collins and Carl R. Neil, The Oregon Postconviction-Hearing
Act, 39 Or L Rev 337 (1960) (describing origins of and explaining
statute).  Under the post-conviction statute, a defendant may
attack his or her conviction collaterally on the ground that he
or she received inadequate assistance of counsel at trial.  See
Stevens, 322 Or at 107-08 (stating principle); see also ORS
138.530(1)(a) (post-conviction relief "shall be granted" if
petitioner establishes "substantial denial" of petitioner's
constitutional rights).  In such a proceeding, a petitioner
challenging the adequacy of trial counsel is represented by new
counsel, is able to introduce evidence that trial counsel's
representation failed to meet the required standard of
professional competence, and has the opportunity to demonstrate
that trial counsel's performance prejudiced the petitioner.  See,
e.g., Stevens, 322 Or at 104-10 (describing elements of claim for
post-conviction relief and evidence in post-conviction
proceeding).  And, when a post-conviction petitioner meets the
standards for post-conviction relief, the court may order a new
trial or other appropriate relief.  ORS 138.520 (post-conviction
court may order release, new trial, modification of sentence, or
other relief).  In Stevens, for example, this court held that the
petitioner's counsel had been constitutionally inadequate in
failing to interview critical witnesses, and the court granted
post-conviction relief.  Stevens, 322 Or at 110; see also Lichau
v. Baldwin, 333 Or 350, 39 P3d 851 (2002) (finding inadequate
assistance of counsel and granting post-conviction relief where
counsel failed to investigate sufficiently a plausible alibi
defense).  
As discussed above, a defendant has a constitutional
right to the adequate assistance of counsel, and when a defendant
is prejudiced by a violation of that right, the defendant is
entitled to relief.  The post-conviction procedure provides a
constitutionally sufficient mechanism for a person convicted of a
crime to raise any claim of inadequate counsel and to obtain
appropriate relief. (5)
C. Permissible Trial Court Procedures
The availability of post-conviction relief does not
mean that a trial court, when confronted with a request for
substitute counsel, should not inquire or make a factual
assessment of the legitimacy of the defendant's complaints during
trial.  There are obvious advantages to resolving such claims as
early as possible in a criminal proceeding.  If a defendant's
complaint about counsel is well taken, the speedy appointment of
substitute counsel can eliminate an issue that might result in
reversal on appeal or the setting aside of a conviction in a
post-conviction proceeding.  Resolving inadequate assistance
claims during trial promotes finality in court decisions and
avoids duplicative proceedings.  See generally William W.
Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel -- The Trial Judge's
Role, 93 Harv L Rev 633 (1980) (describing limitations of
appellate review and collateral proceedings as means of assessing
adequacy of counsel and discussing benefits of active trial court
involvement to ensure adequate counsel). (6)
Yet, in many cases, the disadvantages of a factual
inquiry into a defendant's complaints about counsel during trial
will be substantial.  In the present case, for example, defendant
asserted that trial counsel had failed to interview potential
witnesses who, he contended, would support his version of the
facts of the case.  A full inquiry into that claim might well
have required the trial court to elicit information from defense
counsel as to which witnesses defense counsel had contacted and
why, and which witnesses counsel had intended to call and why or
why not.  Those inquiries obviously raise serious issues about
the disclosure of privileged communications, lawyer work product,
and trial strategy.  Lurking just beneath the surface are
additional questions of whether the trial court should or could
hold such a hearing in camera to avoid disclosure of confidential
information to the prosecution; whether an in camera hearing
would be consistent with the open courts provision of Article I,
section 10, of the Oregon Constitution; whether, if the case is
being tried to the court, a different judge should conduct the
inquiry; and whether, to avoid any conflict of interest, the
trial court should appoint new counsel to represent the defendant
in a hearing at which the defendant challenges the adequacy of
existing counsel.  
Other problems arise if the defendant's complaints
about appointed counsel are made not on the day of trial, as in
this case, but in the middle of trial or after the jury has been
instructed, but before it renders a verdict.  The potential
disruption and delay of conducting a factual inquiry in the
middle of a trial into a defendant's complaints about appointed
counsel should be apparent.  In some cases, the trial court may
conclude that the cost and length of trial and the nature of the
defendant's objections would result in little disruption to the
trial or that any disruption would be justified, but in other
cases the disruption would be significant and unjustified.   
A post-conviction proceeding substantially avoids the
pitfalls of a detailed inquiry and factual assessment by the
trial court during trial.  As we have described above, such post-conviction trial procedures ordinarily will be superior to a
truncated factual inquiry during a criminal trial as a way to
determine whether defense counsel was inadequate.  State and
federal habeas corpus proceedings, when available, similarly
provide procedures for a petitioner to make a full record in
support of claims of inadequate assistance of counsel.  
The foregoing discussion demonstrates how narrow our
holding is in this case.  We hold simply that defendant's
complaints here did not require the trial court independently to
"inquire" and to make a "factual assessment" based on that
inquiry regarding the adequacy of appointed counsel.  As we
discuss below, a trial court should exercise its discretion in
ruling on a motion for appointment of new counsel, engaging in
such inquiry as the nature of defendant's complaints requires. 
D. Defendant's Remaining Assignment of Error
We now turn to defendant's second assignment of error: 
that the trial court erred in denying his motion for appointment
of new counsel.  We review that ruling to determine whether the
trial court abused its discretion.  Langley, 314 Or at 258.
As the colloquy quoted earlier demonstrates, the trial
court listened as defense counsel summarized defendant's
complaints about the adequacy of trial counsel's representation. 
The court then permitted defendant to describe those complaints
himself on the record.  Defendant's complaints consisted of the
generalized concern that he would not receive "fair
representation" from his counsel and the specific objection that
his counsel had failed to investigate sufficiently, including
contacting only one of the potential witnesses identified by
defendant.  Defendant made no record as to the identity of those
witnesses, their possible testimony, or their connection to his
defense.  
The trial court responded to defendant's general
complaint by stating that he believed defense counsel was a "very
good" lawyer and that if he were charged with a crime, he would
put defense counsel on a short list of lawyers that he would
consider to represent him.  As to the specific complaint,
regarding investigation and preparation for trial, the trial
court credited defense counsel's statement that he was prepared
for trial, which defense counsel apparently had made to the trial
court in chambers:  "[I]f [defense counsel] tells me that he's
ready to go to trial in this matter and represent your interests,
I have to believe him." (7)  Defense counsel later confirmed to
the trial court that he was prepared for trial.  The trial court
thus heard and considered defendant's concerns and concluded that
defendant had not demonstrated a legitimate reason for the court
to appoint substitute counsel.  For those reasons, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
1. Article VII (Amended), section 3, provides, in part:
"If the supreme court shall be of opinion, after
consideration of all the matters thus submitted, that the
judgment of the court appealed from was such as should
have been rendered in the case, such judgment shall be
affirmed, notwithstanding any error committed during the
trial * * *."
2. See ORAP 9.20(2) (when Supreme Court allows petition for
review, it may consider the issues that were before the Court of
Appeals); Dunlap v. Dickson, 307 Or 175, 180 n 4, 765 P2d 203
(1988) (illustrating proposition; deciding case on basis of
argument raised in Court of Appeals, but not Supreme Court).
3. This court quoted the statement from Langley in State v.
Thompson, 328 Or 248, 254-55, 971 P2d 879, cert den, 527 US 1042
(1999), in the course of considering whether the trial court had
abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for
substitution of counsel.  Thompson, however, did not address the
issue presented here, because the defendant did "not claim that the
trial court failed to make a factual assessment of the legitimacy
of his complaints against his counsel."  Id. at 255.
4. Some circumstances, however, may be so egregious as to
require the court's immediate attention.  That might be the case
where, for example, counsel's conduct at trial in the presence of
the judge, the full details of which are established on the trial
record, raises serious doubts about whether counsel is adequate. 
Such rare circumstances, however, are not present here, and we do
not address them.  Cf. Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F3d 336 (5th Cir
2001), cert den, 535 US 1120 (2002) (granting habeas corpus relief
when defense counsel repeatedly fell asleep during guilt phase of
capital murder trial).  Similarly, where the trial court knows or
reasonably should know from the record before it that appointed
counsel may have a conflict of interest, the trial court is
obligated to inquire about that potential conflict.  See Wood v.
Georgia, 450 US 261, 271-74, 101 S Ct 1097, 67 L Ed 2d 220 (1981)
(so holding).  There is no allegation here of any conflict of
interest, and we do not address that issue.
5. Because of the availability of statutory post-conviction
relief, this case stands in contrast to State ex rel Juv. Dept. v.
Geist, 310 Or 176, 796 P2d 1193 (1990), where a parent in a
parental rights termination proceeding challenged the adequacy of
her appointed counsel on appeal.  This court held that, because the
legislature had established no specific procedure for a parent to
challenge the adequacy of appointed counsel, the court could
fashion such a procedure.  The court concluded that those
challenges should be raised and decided on direct appeal, rather
than in a separate post-judgment proceeding.  Id. at 185-87.
6. Judge Schwarzer argues that a trial court confronted with
a complaint about the adequacy of counsel should "conduct an
inquiry and make findings on whether bona fide grounds exist for a
change of counsel."  93 Harv L Rev at 652.  We agree that such an
inquiry may be appropriate in some circumstances.  However, for the
reasons discussed in this opinion, we conclude that the
constitutional right to adequate counsel does not impose such an
affirmative obligation on the trial court.  Rather, the appellate
court should focus on whether the trial court abused its discretion
in ruling on the motion to substitute counsel based on the record
the court had before it.
7. In the context of the trial court's other comments, we
take this statement to mean that the trial court did believe
defense counsel's assertion that he was prepared for trial and not
to mean that the court felt that it was required to believe defense
counsel or lacked the discretion to disbelieve him.