Title: WYOMING REFINING COMPANY v. CLARENCE A. BOTTJEN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WYOMING REFINING COMPANY v. CLARENCE A. BOTTJEN1985 WY 31695 P.2d 647Case Number: 84-182Decided: 02/22/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming

WYOMING REFINING COMPANY, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT-EMPLOYER), 

v. 

CLARENCE A. BOTTJEN, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF-EMPLOYEE).

Rehearing Denied March 
19, 1985.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, WestonCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

 
 
Stanley K. 
Hathaway and Rick A. Thompson of Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, Cheyenne, for appellant. 

Donald B. Hansen 
of Jones, Dumbrill & Hansen, Newcastle, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal results 
from the award of worker's compensation benefits to appellee Clarence A. Bottjen 
some ten years after exposure to the condition which caused the ailment. 
Appellant-employer Wyoming Refining Company contests the award, contending 
appellee's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. We agree with 
appellant and reverse.

[¶2.]     Appellant raises two 
issues:

"I. Did the district 
court err in awarding worker's compensation benefits since the 
appellee-employee's claim was barred by the statute of 
limitations?

"II. Is revival and 
reinstatement of the employee's previously barred claim for worker's 
compensation benefits, by retrospective application of an amended statute of 
limitations, unconstitutional?"

[¶3.]     Since we hold 
appellee's claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, we need 
not address appellant's second issue regarding the constitutionality of reviving 
a previously barred claim.

[¶4.]     The facts are not in 
dispute. Appellee worked at a refinery from 1956 to 1971. During that time, the 
refinery was owned by Sioux Oil Company and later by Tesoro Oil Company. 
Appellant purchased the refinery in 1977, some six years after appellee worked 
there. Appellant assumed the worker's compensation accounts of its predecessors 
upon purchase of the refinery.

[¶5.]     On December 27, 1982, 
appellee learned that he suffered from asbestosis as a result of exposure to 
asbestos during his fifteen-year employment at the refinery. On June 17, 1983, 
appellee filed a claim for worker's compensation, which was awarded by the 
district court.

[¶6.]     The cause of action of 
an injured employee accrues at the time of an injury occurring during the course 
of his employment. State ex rel. 
Director, Worker's Compensation Division v. Tallman, Wyo., 589 P.2d 835 (1979); Claim of Evans, Wyo., 417 P.2d 17 (1966); Claim of Heil, 65 
Wyo. 175, 197 P.2d 692 (1948). Therefore, appellee's claim is governed by the laws in effect 
at the time of the injury. In the Matter 
of Barnes, Wyo., 587 P.2d 214 (1978), and Bemis v. Texaco, Wyo., 
400 P.2d 529 (1965), reh. denied 401 P.2d 708 (1965). As stated above, appellee 
learned of his condition on December 27, 1982.1 The applicable statute of 
limitations in effect at that time read:

"(a) No order or award 
for compensation involving an injury which is the result of a single brief 
occurrence rather than occurring over a substantial period of time, shall be 
made unless in addition to the reports of the injury, an application or claim 
for award is filed with the clerk of court in the county in which the injury 
occurred, within one (1) year after the day on which the injury occurred or for 
injuries not readily apparent, within one (1) year after discovery of the injury 
by the employee. The reports of an accident do not constitute a claim for 
compensation.

"(b) The right of 
compensation for injury which occurs over a substantial period of time is barred 
unless a claim for benefits is filed with the clerk of the district court within 
one (1) year after a diagnosis of injury is first communicated to the employee, 
or within three (3) years from the date of last injurious exposure to the 
condition causing the injury, whichever 
occurs first, excluding injury caused by ionizing radiation to which the 
three (3) year limitation does not apply. If death results from ionizing 
radiation within either of these periods, a claim must be filed with the clerk 
of court as provided within one (1) year after that date." (Emphasis added.) 
Section 27-12-503, W.S. 1977.

[¶7.]     The above statute, 
amended in 1983, now reads:

"(a) No order or award 
for compensation involving an injury which is the result of a single brief 
occurrence rather than occurring over a substantial period of time, shall be 
made unless in addition to the reports of the injury, an application or claim 
for award is filed with the clerk of court in the county in which the injury 
occurred, within one (1) year after the day on which the injury occurred or for 
injuries not readily apparent, within one (1) year after discovery of the injury 
by the employee. The reports of an accident do not constitute a claim for 
compensation.

"(b) The right of 
compensation for injury which occurs over a substantial period of time is barred 
unless a claim for benefits is filed with the clerk of the district court within 
one (1) year after a diagnosis of injury is first communicated to the employee, 
or within three (3) years from the date of last injurious exposure to the 
condition causing the injury, whichever 
occurs last, excluding injury caused by ionizing radiation to which the 
three (3) year limitation does not apply. If death results from ionizing 
radiation within either of these periods, a claim shall be filed with the clerk 
of court as provided within one (1) year after the date of discovery." (Emphasis 
added.) § 27-12-503, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement).

The only 
significant change in the new statute which became effective on May 27, 1983, is 
from the phrase "whichever occurs first" to "whichever occurs last" in 
subsection (b).

[¶8.]     The law in effect at 
the time appellee became aware of his condition in December of 1982 was the old 
version of § 27-12-503, W.S. 1977, quoted above. That law required a claim to be 
filed within one year after the appellee was informed of the injury or within 
three years from the date of the last injurious exposure which caused the 
condition, whichever occurred first. Appellee was informed of his condition in 
1982; the last injurious exposure to the asbestos which caused the condition was 
in 1971. Therefore, what occurred first was appellee's exposure to asbestos from 
1956 to 1971. Appellee's claim is barred since it had to be brought within three 
years of the last injurious exposure in 1971, or by 1974.

[¶9.]     We were faced with a 
similar situation in the case of State ex 
rel. Director, Worker's Compensation Division v. Tallman, supra. In that 
case, an employee was diagnosed as having pulmonary fibrosis as a result of 
exposure to bentonite dust while working in a mill from 1937-1948. In 1976, it 
was determined the employee suffered from pulmonary fibrosis and made a claim 
for worker's compensation. We held his claim was barred under § 27-12-503, W.S. 
1977, and stated:

"It is evident that 
employee's claim accrued in 1976 when it was determined he suffered from 
pulmonary fibrosis. Provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act in force at the 
time of injury govern. [Citations.]

"In a Worker's 
Compensation case, a `cause of action' exists in favor of an employee at the 
time he received an injury arising out of an industrial accident occurring 
during the course of his employment. [Citations.]

* * * * * 
*

"The limitation is 
two-pronged. Under the first prong, an employee may file his claim within one 
year after the diagnosis of injury is communicated to him. Under the second 
prong, he may file his claim within three years from the last injurious exposure 
to the condition causing the injury. The crucial language is then `whichever 
occurs first.' What did occur first in this case was the `expiration of three 
(3) years from the last injurious exposure to the condition causing the injury.' 
Under this second prong, employee's claim is barred. There is no ambiguity; it 
is obvious from the words of the statute that the legislative intent of the 
second prong is to achieve exactly the result reached here, that is, to deny 
compensation for an injury (disease) which occurs over a substantial period of 
time if the claim is filed more than three years after the last injurious 
exposure." State ex rel. Director, 
Worker's Compensation Division v. Tallman, supra, at 
838-839.

[¶10.]  There is no dispute that the result would 
be different under the new version of § 27-12-503, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement), which has been in effect since May 27, 1983. We cannot, however, 
apply the statute retrospectively in the absence of clear legislative 
intent:

"* * * [I]n the absence 
of a clear manifestation of legislative intent to the contrary, statutes of 
limitation are construed as prospective and not retrospective in their 
operation, and the presumption is against any intent on the part of the 
legislature to make such a statute retroactive. Thus, rights accrued, claims 
arising, proceedings instituted, orders made under the former law, or judgments 
rendered before the passage of an amended statute of limitations will not be 
affected by it, but will be governed by the original statute unless a contrary 
intention is expressed by the legislature in the new law." 51 Am.Jur.2d 
Limitation of Actions § 57, p. 635 (1970).

[¶11.]  In Mustanen v. Diamond Coal & Coke 
Company, 50 Wyo. 462, 62 P.2d 287 (1936), we held that a 1935 amendment to a 
worker's compensation statute enlarging the employee's right to recover benefits 
should not apply retrospectively to a claim from an injury occurring in 1930. We 
followed the general rule that ordinarily a statute has prospective application 
only.

"* * * As early as 1878, 
speaking of a statute of limitations, this court, in Lee v. Cook, 1 Wyo. 417, 
stated: `The effect of retrospective remedies is inevitably to disturb the 
interests of involuntary and innocent parties, and to create general distrust of 
legislation. Hence, it is the violent presumption of the court, that whatever 
language a legislature may use in a remedial statute, it intends for the statute 
only a future operation, and the presumption will yield only when it is 
impossible to avoid a retrospective operation.' The rule is applicable to 
workmen's compensation cases. * * *" Id., 50 
Wyo. 477, 62 P.2d 292.

Furthermore, we 
think a decision to the contrary would be in derogation of § 8-1-107, W.S. 1977 
(August 1978 Replacement), which reads:

"If a statute is repealed 
or amended, the repeal or amendment does not affect pending actions, 
prosecutions or proceedings, civil or criminal. If the repeal or amendment 
relates to the remedy, it does not affect pending actions, prosecutions or 
proceedings, unless so expressed, nor shall any repeal or amendment affect 
causes of action, prosecutions or proceedings existing at the time of the 
amendment or repeal, unless otherwise expressly provided in the amending or 
repealing act."

The obvious 
thrust of this statute is to foreclose retrospective application of the new 
version of § 27-12-503 in this case. See also, Matter of Estate of Boyd, Wyo., 606 P.2d 1243 
(1980).

[¶12.]  In sum, the language of § 27-12-503, W.S. 
1977, in effect at the time of the injury is clear and unambiguous. Appellee's 
claim had to be brought within three years of the date of his last injurious 
exposure to asbestos. We are sympathetic to the unenviable position he was 
placed in under the old statute of limitations. We believe this is the kind of 
situation the new statute was designed to alleviate. However, we are not at 
liberty to apply the new statute retrospectively under established principles of 
law absent clear legislative manifestation. Such would be an invasion of the 
legislative province.

[¶13.]  Reversed.

1 In an instance involving 
a latent disease, such as this, we treat the date of diagnosis as the date of 
injury for purposes of determining when the statute of limitations commences to 
run.

CARDINE, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom ROSE, Justice, 
joins.

[¶14.]  I dissent. 

[¶15.]  Appellant was an insulator employed at 
appellee's refinery at Newcastle, Wyoming. For fifteen years he insulated 
pipelines at the refinery using asbestos materials. His last exposure to 
asbestos was in 1971. He was first diagnosed as suffering from asbestosis in 
December 1982. It was undisputed that his condition resulted from and during the 
course of his employment.

[¶16.]  The statute governing the filing of 
worker's compensation claims in effect in 1971, § 27-12-503, W.S. 1977, required 
that his claim be filed within three years after the last exposure to the 
substance causing injury or within one year after its diagnosis and 
communication to the worker, "whichever occurs first."

[¶17.]  Justice Raper, in State, ex rel. Director, Worker's Compensation 
Division v. Tallman, 
Wyo., 589 P.2d 835, 838 (1979), discussing the statute, 
stated:

"The limitation is 
two-pronged. Under the first prong, an employee may file his claim within one 
year after the diagnosis of injury is communicated to him. Under the second 
prong, he may file his claim within three years from the last injurious exposure 
to the condition causing the injury. The crucial language is then `whichever 
occurs first.' What did occur first in this case was the `expiration of three 
(3) years from the last injurious exposure to the condition causing the injury.' 
Under this second prong, employee's claim is barred."

And Justices 
Rose and McClintock, in a specially concurring opinion, 
stated:

"[Employee] in this case 
does suffer from an occupational disease of which he could have had no possible 
knowledge until after the statute of limitations had run. I cannot conceive of 
legislation which is more unfair. I would hope the Wyoming Legislature would 
address the problem - forthwith."

[¶18.]  The legislature did address the problem 
when it amended § 27-12-503, W.S. 1977, to provide for the filing of a claim of 
this kind within three years after the last exposure or one year after diagnosis 
and communication of the fact of injury, whichever occurred last. This amendment 
became effective May 27, 1983. On June 17, 1983, which was within one year after 
the diagnosis of appellant's injury and after the effective date of the 
amendment to the statute, appellant filed his claim for worker's compensation. 
The trial court allowed the claim and awarded the worker compensation for his 
injury.

[¶19.]  I would affirm the trial court's 
decision. Section 27-12-503(b), W.S. 1977, as amended and in effect prior to 
appellant filing his claim, provided as follows:

"The right of 
compensation for injury which occurs over a substantial period of time is barred 
unless a claim for benefits is filed with the clerk of the district court within 
one (1) year after a diagnosis of injury is first communicated to the employee, 
or within three (3) years from the date of last injurious exposure to the 
condition causing the injury, whichever occurs last * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

What occurred 
last in this case was the diagnosis and communication of the fact of injury to 
the worker during December 1982. The amended statute, § 27-12-503(b), supra, 
became effective May 27, 1983. The statute provided that a claim such as the one 
presented by appellant could be filed within one year from the date of diagnosis 
and communication of the fact of injury. Appellant filed his claim on June 17, 
1983, which was after the effective date of the statute and within the one-year 
period provided by the State for filing.

[¶20.]  It seems clear to me that this holding 
would be in accord with the intent of the legislature, that is that legitimate 
claims for injuries to workers in their employment be paid by worker's 
compensation. It afforded the worker one year from the date he became aware of 
his injury to file his claim. Appellant here became aware of his injury during 
December 1982 and filed his claim June 17, 1983. The claim was filed within the 
one-year period allowed. It seems plain that the legislature amended the statute 
at our urging to provide worker's compensation coverage in the very situation 
presented by this case. This claim and all other claims diagnosed and made known 
to a worker in the future will be governed by the amended statute, § 
27-12-503(b), supra, and subject to a new one-year limitation period for filing. 
This proposed construction of the amended statute is just and 
reasonable.

[¶21.]  The general law, as stated in 51 
Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 57, in discussing the legislative intent and 
the adoption of a statute relating to periods of limitation, 
provides:

"[I]t is within the power 
of the legislature to pass a statute of limitations, or to change the period of 
limitation previously fixed, and to make such statute or changes applicable to 
existing causes of action, provided a reasonable time is given by the new law 
for the commencement of suit before the bar takes effect."

[¶22.]  The analysis of the majority opinion 
would require that appellant's claim be filed during 1974 or be forever barred. 
In 1974, appellant's injury had not been diagnosed; he was not aware that he 
would in the future be suffering from asbestosis, and he could not have filed a 
claim which at that time did not exist. This result does not comport with the 
intent of the legislature when it amended § 27-12-503(b), 
supra.

"In the construction of 
statutes of limitation, the courts may, where the legislature has not 
sufficiently manifested its intention, consider the reasonableness of the result 
of a particular construction in the light of the practical effect of the 
adoption of a different construction." 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 
52.

[¶23.]  This amended statute is clear on its face 
and provides for the filing of claims for a period of one year from diagnosis of 
the injury and communication of that fact to the worker. This claim was filed 
within that period of limitation. The statute, as I construe it, operates 
presently upon claims still alive and within one year of May 27, 1983, but does 
not operate retroactively because any injury discovered and diagnosed prior to 
May 27, 1982, would be barred and not subject to filing with the clerk of court 
under the provisions of § 27-12-503(b), as amended.

[¶24.]  For the reasons stated, I would affirm 
the decision of the trial court.