Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Virginia Rose Ray

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 45 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-1743-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Virginia Rose Ray, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Virginia Rose Ray,  
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST RAY 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 23, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
2004 WI 45 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-1743-D  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Virginia Rose Ray, Attorney at  
Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Virginia Rose Ray,  
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 23, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   We 
review 
the 
findings 
of 
fact, 
conclusions of law, and recommendations of Referee Catherine M. 
Rottier for sanctions, pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).1  Attorney 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) provides:   
(2) If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme 
court shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject 
or modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline. The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
03-1743-D   
 
2 
 
Virginia Rose Ray was found to have engaged in professional 
misconduct in the course of her practice of law in violation of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct.  The referee recommended a 
five-month suspension of her license to practice law, the 
payment of restitution, and the payment of the costs of the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR). 
¶2 
We approve the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
of the referee.  However, we determine that the misconduct of 
Attorney Ray warrants the imposition of a six-month suspension 
of her license.  
¶3 
Attorney Ray was licensed to practice law in Wisconsin 
in 1988.  Pursuant to In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Ray, 2002 WI 116, 256 Wis. 2d 19, 651 N.W.2d 727, her license 
was suspended for 60 days.  The suspension has not yet been 
lifted because she has not satisfied the conditions of the order 
and has not petitioned for such relief.  That case involved 12 
ethical violations.  Six concerned Attorney Ray's failure to 
cooperate 
with 
the 
Board 
of 
Attorneys 
Professional 
Responsibility, two were trust account violations, two were 
excessive fee violations, and two were violations of the 
prohibition against an offensive personality and failure to 
maintain respect.   
¶4 
The current disciplinary matter concerns three counts 
arising out of matters that occurred prior to imposition of the 
2002 suspension: (1) charging an unreasonable fee, in violation 
No. 
03-1743-D   
 
3 
 
of SCR 20:1.5(a);2 (2) improper termination of representation, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.16(d);3 and (3) refusal to cooperate with 
the OLR's investigation of the grievance, in violation of SCR 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.5(a) provides: 
(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The 
factors 
to 
be 
considered 
in 
determining 
the 
reasonableness of a fee include the following:  
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;  
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer;  
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services;  
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or 
by the circumstances;  
(6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client;  
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and  
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.  
3 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides: 
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. 
The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to 
the extent permitted by other law. 
No. 
03-1743-D   
 
4 
 
21.15(4)4 and SCR 22.03.5  Neither side has appealed from the 
referee's report.   
                                                 
4 SCR 21.15(4) provides: 
(4) Every 
attorney 
shall 
cooperate 
with 
the 
office of lawyer regulation in the investigation, 
prosecution and disposition of grievances, complaints 
filed with or by the director, and petitions for 
reinstatement. 
 An 
attorney's wilful 
failure to 
cooperate 
with 
the 
office 
of 
lawyer 
regulation 
constitutes violation of the rules of professional 
conduct for attorneys. 
5 SCR 22.03 provides:  Investigation. 
(1) The director shall investigate any grievance 
that presents sufficient information to support an 
allegation of possible misconduct.  
(2) Upon 
commencing 
an 
investigation, 
the 
director shall notify the respondent of the matter 
being investigated unless in the opinion of the 
director the investigation of the matter requires 
otherwise. The respondent shall fully and fairly 
disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served 
by ordinary mail a request for a written response. The 
director 
may 
allow 
additional 
time 
to 
respond. 
Following receipt of the response, the director may 
conduct further investigation and may compel the 
respondent to answer questions, furnish documents, and 
present 
any 
information 
deemed 
relevant 
to 
the 
investigation. 
(3) Staff involved in the investigation process 
shall include in reports to the director all relevant 
exculpatory and inculpatory information obtained. 
(4) If the respondent fails to respond to the 
request for written response to an allegation of 
misconduct or fails to cooperate in other respects in 
an 
investigation, 
the 
director, 
or 
a 
special 
investigator acting under SCR 22.25, may file a motion 
with the supreme court requesting that the court order 
the respondent to show cause why his or her license to 
No. 
03-1743-D   
 
5 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
practice law should not be suspended for willful 
failure 
to 
respond 
or 
cooperate 
with 
the 
investigation. 
All 
papers, 
files, 
transcripts, 
communications, and proceedings on the motion shall be 
confidential and shall remain confidential until the 
supreme court has issued an order to show cause. The 
license of an attorney suspended for willful failure 
to respond or cooperate with an investigation may be 
reinstated by the supreme court upon a showing of 
cooperation with the investigation and compliance with 
the terms of suspension. The director or the special 
investigator shall file a response in support of or in 
opposition to the reinstatement within 20 days after 
the filing of an attorney's request for reinstatement. 
Upon a showing of good cause, the supreme court may 
extend the time for filing a response. 
(5)(a) Except 
as 
provided 
in 
sub 
(b), 
the 
director shall provide the grievant a copy of the 
respondent's 
response 
to 
the 
grievance 
and 
the 
opportunity to comment in writing on the respondent's 
response. 
(b) In limited circumstances when good cause is 
shown, the director may provide the grievant a summary 
of 
the 
respondent's 
response 
prepared 
by 
the 
investigator in place of a copy of the response.  
(6) In the course of the investigation, the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance. 
(7) The duty of the respondent to cooperate with 
the investigation does not affect the respondent's 
privilege 
against 
self-incrimination, 
but 
the 
privilege may be asserted only in respect to matters 
that may subject the respondent to criminal liability.  
(8) The 
director, 
or 
a 
special 
investigator 
acting under SCR 22.25, may subpoena the respondent 
and others and compel any person to produce pertinent 
books, papers, and documents. The director, or a 
special investigator acting under SCR 22.25, may 
No. 
03-1743-D   
 
6 
 
¶5 
The court will adopt the referee's findings of fact 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous. 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Charlton, 174 Wis. 2d 844, 498 N.W.2d 380 
(1993).  The court does not grant deference to the referee's 
conclusions of law and reviews them on a de novo basis.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Norlin, 104 Wis. 2d 117, 310 
N.W.2d 789 (1981).  The court also may impose whatever sanction 
it sees fit regardless of the referee's recommendation.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 261 Wis. 2d 
45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶6 
This case concerns Attorney Ray's representation of a 
divorce client.  She and her client entered into a written 
agreement under which he would pay her a flat fee of $5000 for 
representation through entry of the judgment of divorce.  
¶7 
Per the agreement, Attorney Ray began representing the 
client in January 2002.  Most of her efforts thereafter were 
devoted to an attempt to free the client from a default judgment 
for which she was not responsible.  However, the client was 
still entitled to proceed to trial but only on financial matters 
arising out of the divorce. 
¶8 
In mid-April Attorney Ray sought to withdraw from 
representing the client.  She apparently had become aware of 
financial matters concerning the client that were contrary to 
representations he had made to her.  The client apparently did 
                                                                                                                                                             
obtain 
expert 
assistance 
in 
the 
course 
of 
an 
investigation. 
No. 
03-1743-D   
 
7 
 
not object to Attorney Ray withdrawing and she indicated she 
would assist him in finding new counsel.  She also told the 
client she would refund $4000 of the retainer.  
¶9 
The two were not immediately successful in obtaining 
new counsel and that required Ray to continue to represent him 
as necessary.  By early May the client had new counsel and that 
ended Attorney Ray's representation.  She agreed to facilitate 
the change in counsel but now refused to refund any of the 
retainer.  This led the client to submit a grievance to the OLR.   
¶10 The OLR sent letters to Ray in July and August 2002 
requesting a response but she did not respond.  She was also 
asked to attend a district committee meeting a few months later 
but did not attend.   
¶11 The OLR alleged in count one that the original fee 
arrangement was unreasonable.  However, the referee found that 
the OLR offered no evidence proving that Attorney Ray charged 
more than other attorneys would have charged for the same 
services.  Rather, the OLR had conceded that the $5000 was 
unreasonable only because it was intended to cover for services 
through entry of judgment and Attorney Ray did not provide 
services for that period.   
¶12 Accordingly, the referee concluded, as a matter of 
law, that the OLR had not met its burden of proof on count one 
since there was nothing inherently unreasonable about the fee.   
¶13 We do not find the referee's findings of fact to be 
clearly erroneous.  We further agree with the referee's 
conclusion that there was no violation of SCR 20:1.5(a).   
No. 
03-1743-D   
 
8 
 
¶14 The OLR further alleged in count two that Attorney Ray 
improperly 
terminated 
her 
representation 
given 
that 
SCR 
20:1.16(d) requires that an attorney refund any unearned advance 
payment of fee.   
¶15 The referee found as a matter of fact that there had 
been no refund of the unearned fee and further concluded, as a 
matter of law, that the rule was violated.  
¶16 With respect to the exact amount of the unearned fee, 
the referee concluded that Attorney Ray had spent at least 12.5 
total hours in representing the client and, at a reasonable rate 
of $200 per hour, the value of her services was $2500.  The 
referee therefore concluded that the remaining $2500 should be 
refunded to the client.  
¶17 The referee's findings of fact with respect to this 
count are not clearly erroneous.  Given the evidence presented 
at the hearing, the establishment of $2500 as the unearned fee 
is reasonable.  We further agree with the referee that there 
was, as a matter of law, a violation of SCR 20:1.16(d). 
¶18 The OLR further alleged in count three that Attorney 
Ray failed to cooperate with the investigation of the grievance.  
Given that she admitted her lack of cooperation, the referee 
found and concluded that a violation of SCR 21.15(4) and SCR 
22.03 had occurred.  
¶19 The OLR had asked that the referee recommend a nine-
month suspension, restitution of $4000 to the client, and 
payment of the costs of the disciplinary proceeding.  It 
contended that progressive discipline was required given that 
No. 
03-1743-D   
 
9 
 
Attorney 
Ray 
previously 
had 
been 
suspended, 
thereby 
demonstrating a pattern of misconduct particularly with respect 
to failing to cooperate with the OLR.   
¶20 The referee concluded that a nine-month suspension "is 
too 
much 
and 
verges 
on 
the 
punitive, 
rather 
than 
the 
rehabilitative."  The referee therefore recommended a five-month 
suspension along with restitution of $2500 and payment of the 
costs.   
¶21 We agree that restitution and payment of costs is an 
appropriate part of the sanction to be imposed in this case.  
However, we believe that a five-month suspension is insufficient 
and that the period of suspension should be six months.   
¶22 Prior disciplinary cases have frequently followed a 
progressive discipline scheme.  See e.g., In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Louderman, 230 Wis. 2d 200, 601 N.W.2d 625 
(1999) (public reprimand follows three private reprimands).  
Given that this is Attorney Ray's second disciplinary matter, a 
suspension in excess of the previous two-month suspension is 
clearly warranted.  A six-month suspension will require Attorney 
Ray, pursuant to SCR 22.28(3),6 to formally petition for 
reinstatement, rather than simply be reinstated upon the OLR's 
affirmation that she has complied with the conditions of the 
suspension order.  Given her substantial recent disciplinary 
                                                 
6 SCR 22.28(3) provides: "(3) The license of an attorney 
that is revoked or suspended for misconduct for six months or 
more shall be reinstated pursuant to the procedure set forth in 
SCR 22.29 to 22.33 and only by order of the supreme court." 
No. 
03-1743-D   
 
10 
 
hearing, a full reinstatement proceeding under SCR 22.297 will 
serve to verify to the legal community and the public that 
                                                 
7 SCR 22.29 provides: Petition for reinstatement.   
(1) A petition for reinstatement of a license 
suspended for a definite period may be filed at any 
time commencing three months prior to the expiration 
of the suspension period.  
(2) A petition for reinstatement of a license 
that is revoked may be filed at any time commencing 
five years after the effective date of revocation. 
(3) A petition for reinstatement shall be filed 
in the supreme court. A copy of the petition shall be 
served on the director and on the board of bar 
examiners. 
(3m) The petitioner shall file 9 copies of a 
petition for reinstatement. 
(4) The petition for reinstatement shall show all 
of the following: 
(a) The 
petitioner 
desires 
to 
have 
the 
petitioner's license reinstated. 
(b) The petitioner has not practiced law during 
the period of suspension or revocation. 
(c) The petitioner has complied fully with the 
terms of the order of suspension or revocation and 
will 
continue 
to 
comply 
with 
them 
until 
the 
petitioner's license is reinstated. 
(d) The petitioner has maintained competence and 
learning in the law by attendance at identified 
educational activities. 
(e) The petitioner's conduct since the suspension 
or revocation has been exemplary and above reproach. 
(f) The petitioner has a proper understanding of 
and attitude toward the standards that are imposed 
upon members of the bar and will act in conformity 
with the standards. 
No. 
03-1743-D   
 
11 
 
Attorney Ray can again be entrusted with the responsibilities 
that accompany the practice of law in this state.  This will be 
in addition to any conditions she must yet satisfy to be 
relieved from the 2002 suspension.   
¶23 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Attorney Virginia 
Rose Ray to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period 
of six months, effective the date of this order. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(g) The petitioner can safely be recommended to 
the legal profession, the courts and the public as a 
person fit to be consulted by others and to represent 
them and otherwise act in matters of trust and 
confidence and in general to aid in the administration 
of justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of 
the courts. 
(h) The petitioner has fully complied with the 
requirements set forth in SCR 22.26. 
(j) The petitioner's proposed use of the license 
if reinstated. 
(k) A full description of all of the petitioner's 
business activities during the period of suspension or 
revocation. 
(m) The petitioner has made restitution to or 
settled all claims of persons injured or harmed by 
petitioner's misconduct or, if not, the petitioner's 
explanation of the failure or inability to do so. 
(5) A 
petition 
for 
reinstatement 
shall 
be 
accompanied by an advance deposit in an amount to be 
set by the supreme court for payment of all or a 
portion of the costs of the reinstatement proceeding. 
The supreme court may extend the time for payment or 
waive payment in any case in which to do otherwise 
would result in hardship or injustice. 
No. 
03-1743-D   
 
12 
 
¶24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Attorney Ray shall refund to the client involved 
in this matter the unearned retainer of $2500. 
¶25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney Ray shall comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of an 
attorney whose license to practice law has been suspended, to 
the extent she has not already done so arising out of the prior 
suspension.  
¶26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Attorney Ray shall pay to the OLR the costs of 
this proceeding in the amount of $4721.59.   
 
No. 
03-1743-D   
 
 
 
1