Title: TIMOTHY JELLE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

TIMOTHY JELLE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 111119 P.3d 403Case Number: No. 04-130Decided: 09/07/2005
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
TIMOTHY 
JELLE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
            
Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; 
Diane Courselle, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program; and Christopher M. 
Cook, Intern.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant, 
Timothy Jelle, appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress 
statements he made to law enforcement officers.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

            
1.         
Was the appellant in custody when he was interrogated by law enforcement 
officers?

 
 
            
2.         
Were the appellant's statements to law enforcement officers voluntarily 
made?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶2]      The appellant 
entered a conditional guilty plea to felony delivery of a controlled 
substance.  He reserved his right to 
appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress statements he made 
to law enforcement officers.1  That motion alleged only that the 
appellant was subjected to custodial interrogation without first having been 
advised of his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).  In a supporting memorandum and during 
the motion hearing, however, the appellant also claimed that his statements were 
not voluntary, and the motion was treated as if it included that 
allegation.

 
 
[¶3]      The underlying 
facts of the case were developed at the motion hearing through the testimony of 
three police officers and the appellant.  
On January 3, 2002, Michael Dimmick was transported by ambulance from his 
residence on South Gillette 
Avenue in Gillette, to the local hospital.  Dimmick was unresponsive and in critical 
condition.  He died around noon on 
that same day.  Investigating 
officers were informed that Dimmick had become ill after consuming psilocybin 
mushrooms the previous evening, and that the appellant was the source of those 
mushrooms.2

 
 
[¶4]      The investigating 
officers responding to Dimmick's residence learned that he and others had 
ingested psilocybin mushrooms during a party or gathering at a nearby residence 
on Cottonwood Lane.  
Detective Sergeant Rozier and Detective Clark went to that location in an 
unmarked police vehicle.  They 
watched the residence from a distance as they discussed their options and waited 
for a search warrant.  At about 
12:40 p.m., a young man later identified as the appellant drove up and entered 
the residence.  The two detectives 
then walked to the front of the house and knocked on the door.  They were greeted by a woman named Vicky 
Abril, who angrily shouted at them for awakening her and demanded that they 
leave.  They did so, returning to 
their police car.

 
 
[¶5]      Soon thereafter, 
two more unmarked police cars arrived, driven by Detectives Boisvert and 
Wells.  The four detectives were 
discussing the situation when the appellant left the residence, got back in his 
car, and began to drive away.  
Detectives Boisvert and Clark got into one police car and followed the 
appellant into the alley.  
Detectives Rozier and Wells got into another police car and started down 
the alley from the opposite direction.  
The appellant stopped his vehicle in response to Detective Boisvert 
having activated the flashing grill lights in his vehicle.

 
 
[¶6]      Detective Clark 
testified that he walked up to the appellant's car door, identified himself as a 
police officer, and told the appellant that the officers were trying to find out 
what had happened at the Cottonwood Lane residence the night before.3  Detective Clark testified that he told the appellant he was not 
under arrest and he did not have to talk to them if he did not want to do 
so.  Detective Boisvert then walked 
up while Detective Clark began to question the appellant.  After a few minutes, Detective Clark 
left the conversation to speak with Detective Rozier, who had remained in the 
other police car with Detective Wells.

 
 
[¶7]      Detective 
Boisvert testified that the appellant was sitting in his vehicle for the first 
minute of the conversation, but got out upon Detective Clark's request.  When Detective Clark left to speak to 
Detective Rozier, Detective Boisvert took over questioning the appellant.  The appellant admitted being at the 
Cottonwood Lane residence the night before, but denied that 
there were any "narcotics" there.4  He also admitted that he "might have" 
smoked marijuana with Dimmick "at some point," but had not "done anything 
stronger."  In response to Detective 
Boisvert's statement that others who were present the night before had 
identified him as the source of the psilocybin mushrooms, the appellant claimed 
that he had not provided the mushrooms and "wouldn't know where to get it."  Detective Boisvert then asked the 
appellant if he had any "narcotics" on his person or in his vehicle.  The appellant replied that he did not, 
and consented to Detective Boisvert's search of both.  No controlled substances were found.5

 
 
[¶8]      Detective Wells 
testified that, when she saw Detective Boisvert begin to search the car, she 
"walked up there to make sure that there were two officers there."  She introduced herself to the appellant 
as a police officer and asked if he would talk to her about what had happened 
the night before.  He agreed.  During their conversation, Detective 
Boisvert was searching the appellant's car and the other two detectives were in 
one of the police vehicles.

 
 
[¶9]      Upon the 
appellant once again denying that he brought the mushrooms to the Cottonwood 
Lane 
residence, Detective Wells told him that he "needed to look at the big 
picture."  She then explained to him 
that others who had ingested the mushrooms might also be harmed, and they needed 
to find out if the mushrooms had caused Dimmick's death.6  The appellant then became emotional and 
admitted that he had supplied the mushrooms.  He began to cry and said that he felt 
responsible for Dimmick's death.

 
 
[¶10]   Detective Wells testified that she 
probably concluded their discussion by lecturing the appellant about his drug 
use, and that she patted him on the back to console him.  As Detective Boisvert concluded the 
search of the vehicle, Detective Wells asked the appellant to give her a written 
statement, which he did, writing it on the trunk of the car.7  Detective Wells then told the appellant 
that an autopsy would be done on Dimmick's body to determine the cause of death, 
and that he could be charged with delivery of a controlled substance.  The appellant then drove away, which he 
was able to do without either of the police cars having to be 
moved.

 
 
[¶11]   The appellant's brief testimony at 
the motion hearing differed from that of the detectives.  In particular, he testified that, not 
only did the detectives not volunteer a statement that he was free to go and 
need not answer their questions, they said instead, when he asked each of them 
in turn, that he could not leave "until [we] are done asking questions."  He also testified that he did not feel 
as though he was free to leave until after Detective Wells told him he could 
leave, after he gave the written statement.  All who testified agreed that the entire 
encounter lasted thirty minutes or less.

 
 
[¶12]   In the decision letter supporting 
the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, the district court 
reviewed the above facts and then set forth three conclusions of law:  (1) the officers had made a proper 
investigatory stop of the appellant; (2) the appellant was not in custody; and 
(3) the appellant's statements, including the written statement, were 
voluntarily made.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶13]   
Our standard for reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress has 
been reiterated many times:

 
 
"Findings 
of factual issues made by the district court considering a motion to suppress 
are not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.  Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 
(Wyo.1994).  Since the district 
court conducts the hearing on the motion to suppress and has the opportunity to 
assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the 
necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, evidence is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the district court's determination.  Id.  [I]ssue[s] of law . . . [are] reviewed 
de novo.  Id., Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1170-71 
(Wyo.1997)."

 
 

Mackrill 
v. State, 2004 WY 
129, ¶ 12, 100 P.3d 361, 364 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 ( Wyo. 1999)).  See also Vassar v. State,  2004 WY 125, ¶ 12, 99 P.3d 987, 992 (Wyo. 
2004) and Grant v. State, 2004 WY 45, ¶ 10, 88 P.3d 1016, 1018 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶14]   This standard includes application 
of the following law to the issue of Miranda and custodial 
interrogation:

 
 
            
Statements made by a suspect during custodial interrogation are 
admissible into evidence, providing certain advisements are made.  Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).  Statements made 
during custodial interrogation must be excluded upon a showing that the 
defendant was not advised of his Miranda 
rights.  Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000), cert. 
denied, 535 U.S. 1106, 122 S. Ct. 2315, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1069 (2002).  In Dickerson, 530 U.S.  at 
435, 120 S. Ct. 2326, the United States Supreme Court 
stated:

 
 
"Accordingly, 
we laid down concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies 
and courts to follow.'  . . .  Those guidelines established that the 
admissibility in evidence of any statement given during custodial interrogation 
of a suspect would depend on whether the police provided the suspect with four 
warnings.  These warnings (which 
have come to be known colloquially as Miranda rights') are:  a suspect has the right to remain 
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he 
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an 
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so 
desires.'"

 
 
Custodial 
interrogation means "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a 
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way."  Miranda, 384 U.S.  at 
444, 86 S. Ct. 1602.  See also Glass v. State, 853 P.2d 972, 
976 (Wyo.1993) and Wunder v. State, 
705 P.2d 333, 334 (Wyo.1985).  
Neither general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime 
nor statements volunteered freely without compelling influences are considered 
to fall within this definition.  Miranda, 384 U.S.  at 
477-78, 86 S. Ct. 1602.

 
 
            
The totality of the circumstances must be considered in determining 
whether a suspect is in custody when questioned.  In Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347, 96 S. Ct. 1612, 48 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1976), the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that a 
person who is the "focus" of a criminal investigation is, by that fact, "in 
custody."  The United States Supreme 
Court made clear that "Miranda 
implicitly defined focus,' for its purposes, as questioning initiated by 
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 
way.'"  Id. at 347, 96 S. Ct. 1612 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S.  at 
444, 86 S.Ct. 1602) (emphasis in original).  The proper inquiry is to ask "whether a 
reasonable man in Appellant's position would have considered himself to be in 
police custody."  Glass, 853 P.2d  at 
976.

 
 
            
Several factors are relevant to be considered in determining whether a 
restraint is "custodial" for Miranda 
purposes.  Among these are:  (1) whether a suspect is questioned in 
familiar or neutral surroundings; (2) the number of police officers present; (3) 
the degree of physical restraint and whether it is comparable to those 
associated with a formal arrest; and (4) the duration and character of the 
interrogation.  See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel 
and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure 
§ 6.6(c) at 527 (2nd ed.1999); see also 
Wunder, 705 P.2d  at 335.  The 
nature of the interrogator, the nature of the suspect, the time and place of the 
interrogation, the progress of the investigation at the time of the 
interrogation, whether the suspect is informed that his detention would not be 
temporary, and the elapsed amount of time between questioning and the arrest may 
be important factors as well.  Wunder, 705 P.2d  at 335; J.F. Ghent, 
Annotation, What Constitutes "Custodial 
Interrogation" Within Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring that Suspect be 
Informed of His Federal Constitutional Rights Before Custodial Interrogation, 
31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970).  No one 
factor alone will necessarily establish custody for Miranda purposes, and not all factors 
will be relevant to a given case.

 
 

Gunn v. 
State, 2003 WY 
24, ¶¶ 7-10, 64 P.3d 716, 719-20 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶15]   A determination that a defendant 
was subject to custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda does not answer the separate 
question of whether any statements given were given voluntarily.  Our standard for reviewing the district 
court's ruling on the latter issue emulates our general standard for the review 
of rulings on motions to suppress evidence:

 
 
"A trial 
court's ruling on a defendant's motion to suppress a statement on the grounds 
that it was involuntary, is reviewed de novo.  In conducting such a review, we defer to 
the trial court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly 
erroneous.  This Court considers all 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination 
because the trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence and to assess 
the credibility of witnesses.  The 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Wyoming 
Constitution Article 1, §§ 6 and 11, require that confessions be voluntary.  A statement that is obtained by coercion 
is not trustworthy and may not be used at trial against the person who made 
it.  A defendant is deprived of the 
right to due process of law if an involuntary statement is admitted at his 
trial.  A statement is considered to 
be voluntary if the defendant of his own free and deliberate choice, and not 
because of intimidation, coercion or deception, makes it.  The prosecution has the burden to prove, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant's statement is 
voluntary.  Edwards v. State, 973 P.2d 41, 48 
(Wyo.1999)."

 
 

Gordon 
v. State, 2004 WY 
105, ¶ 13, 97 P.3d 64, 68 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 
12, 84 P.3d 320, 328 (Wyo. 2004)).  See also Gunn, 2003 WY 24, ¶ 5, 64 P.3d 
at 719 (voluntariness is a question of law 
reviewed de novo).  We have identified the following factors 
that trial courts may consider in determining whether a statement was made 
voluntarily:

 
 
"[T]he 
atmosphere and events surrounding the elicitation of the statement, such as the 
use of violence, threats, promises, improper influence or official misconduct, 
the conduct of the defendant before and during the interrogation and the 
defendant's mental condition at the time the statement is made[,] . . . whether 
the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of the 
situation; whether Miranda warnings 
were given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant understood and 
waived Miranda rights; whether the 
defendant had the opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else prior to the 
interrogation; whether the challenged statement was made during the course of an 
interrogation or instead was volunteered; whether any overt or implied threat or 
promise was directed to the defendant; the method and style employed by the 
interrogator in questioning the defendant and the length and place of the 
interrogation; and the defendant's mental and physical condition immediately 
prior to and during the interrogation, as well as educational background, 
employment status, and prior experience with law enforcement and the criminal 
justice system.'"

 
 

Gunn, 
2003 WY 
24, ¶ 12, 64 P.3d at 716 (quoting Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 
1195-96 (Wyo. 1997); State v. Evans, 944 P.2d 1120, 1125-26 
(Wyo. 1997); People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 845 
(Colo. 1991); and People v. Pearson, 725 P.2d 782, 783 
( 
Colo. 
1986)).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶16]   The State makes no argument that 
the questioning of the appellant was anything other than interrogation as 
contemplated by Miranda.  That leaves as the relevant issue 
the question of whether the appellant was in custody during that 
interrogation.  Under the legal 
standards set forth above, the question of whether a defendant is in custody is 
answered by looking to the "totality of the circumstances."  That is the same standard, of course, 
for determining whether a statement was made voluntarily.  In its decision letter, the district 
court went through that process by summarizing the testimony from the hearing, 
and then concluding both that the appellant was not in custody and that his 
statements were made voluntarily.  
Those are the conclusions that we now review de novo.

 
 
[¶17]   
The district court emphasized certain facts in concluding that the 
appellant was not in custody and that his statements were voluntarily made.  First, the appellant's car was not 
"blocked in" by the detectives' cars and he was able to drive away at the end of 
the encounter.  Second, the 
appellant was informed that he was not under arrest and that he did not have to 
talk to the officers.8  Third, the detectives were in plain 
clothes and immediately identified themselves as police officers.  Fourth, the entire encounter lasted less 
than thirty minutes.  Fifth, there 
were no threats, raised voices, or weapons drawn.  Sixth, the appellant was not arrested or 
restrained.  And seventh, Detective 
Wells was forthright in telling the appellant he could be charged with a 
crime.

 
 
[¶18]   These findings by the district 
court are supported by evidence in the record and are, in our view, sufficient 
basis for the district court's conclusions.  Other facts contained in the motion 
hearing testimony provide additional reasons for denial of the motion:  (1) the encounter occurred in neutral 
territory, in an area where the appellant had been before and with which he was 
familiar; (2) the appellant only noticed three officers at the scene, and at no 
time did the officers use "mass presence" to intimidate the appellant; (3) no 
team or tandem interrogation took place; and (4) the questioning occurred in a 
public place in broad daylight.  We 
conclude that the State met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the appellant was not in custody and that his statements were 
voluntarily made.9

 
 
[¶19]   There is one more matter we must 
discuss.  As mentioned above, the 
motion to suppress mentioned only an alleged Miranda violation, but the supporting 
memorandum and argument at the hearing also raised the question of the 
voluntariness of the appellant's statements to law enforcement.  In addition, the appellant also 
contended in the memorandum that the initial stop of his vehicle was not 
valid.  Indeed, the district court 
addressed this issue before reaching its conclusions on the custody and 
voluntariness issues.  Apparently, 
the appellant has abandoned this issue on appeal, inasmuch as he states in his 
appellate brief that, by concluding that the initial stop was reasonable, the 
district court "answered the wrong question."  Nevertheless, because the issue was 
raised to some extent below, we will briefly comment upon 
it.

 
 
[¶20]   The district court concluded that 
Detective Boisvert's stopping of the appellant's vehicle was a second-tier 
investigatory stop under the following recognized 
construct:

 
 
            
In determining whether encounters between police and citizens are 
constitutionally valid, we have classified these encounters into three 
categories or tiers.

 
 
"[1]  The most intrusive encounter, an arrest, 
requires justification by probable cause to believe that a person has committed 
or is committing a crime.  [2]  The investigatory stop represents a 
seizure which invokes Fourth Amendment safeguards, but, by its less intrusive 
character, requires only the presence of specific and articulable facts and 
rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has 
committed or may be committing a crime.  
[3]  The least intrusive 
police-citizen contact, a consensual encounter, involves no restraint of liberty 
and elicits the citizen's voluntary cooperation with non-coercive 
questioning."

 
 

McChesney, 
988 P.2d 
at 1074 (quoting   Wilson  v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 220 ( Wyo. 1994)); see also Innis v. State, 2003 WY 66, ¶ 
16, 69 P.3d 413, 419 (Wyo. 2003).  The appellant does not suggest that the 
encounter was anything other than an investigatory stop; instead, he alleges 
that the stop did not meet the following test for constitutional validity in 
such a circumstance:

 
 

Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968) and its progeny establish that law 
enforcement officers may stop and temporarily detain citizens short of arrest if 
the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be 
committing a crime.

 
 

McChesney, 
988 P.2d 
at 1075 (citing Wilson , 874 P.2d at 220).  In turn, whether "reasonable suspicion" 
exists is determined as follows:

 
 
In order 
to establish the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a second tier Terry or investigatory stop, "the police 
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences [drawn] from those facts, reasonably warrant 
that intrusion."  Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107, 109 
(Wyo.1985) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S.  at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d  at 
220.

 
 
"Reasonable 
suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of 
information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.  Both factorsquantity and qualityare 
considered in the totality of the circumstancesthe whole picture,' United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981), that must be taken into 
account when evaluating whether there is reasonable 
suspicion."

 
 

McChesney, 
988 P.2d  at 
1075.  We have previously recognized that it is 
difficult precisely to articulate what "reasonable suspicion" and "probable 
cause" mean, but we have also distinguished between them as 
follows:

 
 
            
"Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause 
not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with 
information that is different in quantity or content than that required to 
establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can 
arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable 
cause."

 
 

Damato 
v. State, 2003 WY 
13, ¶ 18, 64 P.3d 700, 707-08 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting United States v. Tuter, 240 F.3d 1292, 1296 n.2 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied 534 U.S. 886 (2001) and citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 
330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990)).  "Reasonable suspicion" should be 
evaluated through the application of common sense and ordinary human experience. 
 Damato, 2003 WY 13, ¶¶ 
16-17, 64 P.3d  at 707 (quoting 
United States v. Wood, 
106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir. 1997) and Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996)).

 
 
[¶21]   Simply put, the question is why 
Detective Boisvert stopped the appellant's car.  He did so because the detectives had 
learned the following from interviews with several people present at Dimmick's 
residence on South Gillette Avenue:  
(1) Dimmick became ill and later died, after consuming psilocybin 
mushrooms the evening before at the Cottonwood Lane residence; (2) the appellant 
was the identified source of the psilocybin mushrooms; (3) search warrants were 
being obtained for both residences; (4) the registered owner of the vehicle, 
Shelli Jelle, had the same last name as the named suspect; and (5) the person 
driving the vehicle, later identified as the appellant, had just entered and 
quickly left the Cottonwood Lane residence.  Certainly, these circumstances justified 
an investigatory stop of the appellant's car.  Not only did the detectives have a 
reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred (delivery of a controlled 
substance), and that the appellant had committed that crime, they also had an 
immediate need to ensure that evidence was not being removed from the scene of 
that crime.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶22]   
The detectives had reasonable suspicions that justified the 
investigatory stop of the appellant's car.  
The appellant was not in custody while he was being questioned, and the 
statements he made were voluntary.

 
 
[¶23]   We affirm.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

  1W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) 
states:

 
 
Conditional Pleas.  With the 
approval of the court and the consent of the attorney for the state, a defendant 
may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing 
the right, on appeal from the judgment, to seek review of the adverse 
determination of any specified pretrial motion.  A defendant who prevails on appeal shall 
be allowed to withdraw the plea.

 
 
  2Psilocybin is a controlled 
hallucinogenic substance.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1014(d)(xix) (LexisNexis 2005).

 
 
  3None of the detectives were wearing 
police uniforms, but were in "street clothes."

 
 
  4The appellant contends in his 
appellate brief that psilocybin is not technically a "narcotic drug" as that 
term is defined by statute.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1002(a)(xv) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  The implication 
is that he was not lying by denying the presence of "narcotics."  While that may be true, we do not find 
it material to resolution of the issues before this Court.

 
 
  5Detective Boisvert testified that 
his purpose in searching the appellant and his vehicle was to make sure no 
controlled substances were being taken from the Cottonwood Lane house before a 
search warrant could be obtained.

 
 
  6The appellant had learned of 
Dimmick's death while he was briefly in the Cottonwood 
Lane house just before the 
officers contacted him. 

 
 
  7The written statement was admitted 
into evidence at the motion hearing and is contained in the record on 
appeal.  It reads as follows:  "At about 9:00 pm I brought some 
mushrooms over to the Wright's house.  
Seth and Mike said they would try them with me, now Mike is dead.  Tim Jelle"

 
 
  8Without saying so directly, the 
district court clearly resolved any credibility contest against the appellant 
and in favor of the detectives.  The 
appellant testified that he was not told that he was free to go or that he did 
not have to talk to the officers.  
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the district court's 
credibility finding was clearly erroneous.

 
 

  9The appellant was seventeen years 
old at the time, but nothing has been made of this "age factor."  Neither has the appellant attempted to 
overcome the record evidence of voluntariness with any evidence of a mental 
condition, or lack of maturity, or other factor that could have affected 
voluntariness.  See Gunn, 2003 WY 24, ¶ 11, 64 P.3d  at 
720-21 (quoting Lewis v. State, 2002 
WY 92, ¶ 18, 48 P.3d 1063, 1068 (Wyo. 2002)) (once the State has met its burden, a 
defendant may be required to present evidence demonstrating 
involuntariness).  But see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2151, 
158 L. Ed. 2d 938 (2004) (custody test for Miranda purposes is an objective test 
under which the suspect's age and experience are not relevant factors).  While both questionswhether a defendant 
was in custody for Miranda purposes, and whether his statements were 
voluntarily madeare answered by looking to the totality of the circumstances, 
voluntariness, unlike custody, is not limited to an objective test.  When voluntariness is at issue, we look 
to the "nature of the defendant."  
See CSC v. State, 2005 WY 106, ¶¶ 28-35, ___ P.3d ___, ___ 
(Wyo. 2005) (No. C-04-12, published 8/30/05) and Hannon, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 51, 84 P.3d  at 
340.