Title: Wecker v. Kilmer

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

294 N.E.2d 132 (1973)
Larry L. WECKER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Warren L. KILMER, M.D., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 1272S165.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
April 4, 1973.
Lowell E. Enslen, McHie Enslen & Moran, Rudolph Tanasijevich, Hammond, for plaintiff-appellant.
Fred F. Eichhorn, Jr., and David C. Jensen, Schroer, Eichhorn & Morrow, Hammond, for defendant-appellee.
HUNTER, Justice.
This cause has been presented to this Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 15(N) of *133 the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure,[1] which we have accepted. On August 18, 1967, plaintiff while riding in a vehicle driven by his mother, was injured in a collision with another vehicle in LaPorte County, Indiana. The other vehicle was driven either by John D. Lloyd or Karen Lee Lloyd of Canton, New York. On the same day, plaintiff received medical attention from defendant, a physician. In this suit plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent in his care and treatment.
On February 20, 1968, plaintiff executed a release in favor of the Lloyds. The release reads as follows:
The consideration of $25,261.00 was paid by Nationwide Insurance Company, liability carrier of the Lloyds. All alleged acts of malpractice of defendant were performed prior to execution of the release.
After plaintiff filed his complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. An appeal was taken to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The Seventh Circuit stated that whether defendant is entitled to the benefit of the release is controlled by Indiana law. There being no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Indiana, the Seventh Circuit requested this Court to provide them with instructions concerning the following question:
We are faced with a situation where an alleged subsequent tortfeasor aggravates an injury caused by the alleged original tortfeasor. We must decide if the above described general release accrues to the benefit of the subsequent tortfeasor as well as the original tortfeasor. The defendant argues that the weight of authority is of the view that a general release to one responsible for the original injury bars an action by the injured party against a physician or surgeon for negligent treatment of the injury, citing 40 A.L.R.2d 1075. The rationale for this point of view is based on the principle of proximate causation. The theory goes that the aggravation of injuries is foreseeable by the original tortfeasor and proximately caused by his actions. Indiana has at least one case espousing this view of proximate cause. See Suelzer v. Carpenter (1916), 183 Ind. 23, 107 N.E. 467. (However this case did not involve a release). Other jurisdictions then apply this proximate cause theory to a general release given to the original wrongdoer. The argument goes that since a general release to the original tortfeasor would include release of liability for aggravation proximately resulting, such a release must be deemed to embrace any claim for the same aggravation against the negligent physician; otherwise, the injured party would receive double satisfaction for the same injury. See Derby v. Prewitt (1962), 12 N.Y.2d 100, 236 N.Y.S.2d 953, 187 N.E.2d 556, 558.
This fear of double recovery is unfounded because the amount received from the original tortfeasor for the release would have to be credited against any amounts received in an action against a subsequent tortfeasor. Thus, if the injured party had received full satisfaction for all his injuries from the original tortfeasor he would be denied any recovery in an action against the subsequent tortfeasor. If less than full satisfaction were received from the original tortfeasor then that amount would have to be credited against any recovery received from the subsequent tortfeasor so that the injured party would never receive more than full satisfaction. In addition, the subsequent tortfeasor will never be liable for more damages than those caused by his own actions.
This allegedly prevailing view is also illogical because the alleged original tortfeasor has disclaimed any liability in the release. If one were injured in an accident where no one was at fault and one's injuries were subsequently aggravated by the negligent acts of a physician, one would not be without a cause of action against the physician. We have no proof that the alleged original tortfeasor was in fact a tortfeasor. It should only be to *135 avoid unjust enrichment and prevent double recovery that any monies received from other sources would be credited against a recovery from the negligent physician.
We note that this so-called prevailing view has received intensive criticism from modern commentators.
We also note that the "prevailing view" has become continually less acceptable to courts over the past two decades. See Anno., 39 ALR3d 260.
Two factors should be controlling in determining the effect of an agreement purporting to operate as a release:
(1) Whether the injured party has received full satisfaction; and
(2) Whether the parties intended that the release be in full satisfaction of the injured party's claim, thus releasing all successive tortfeasors from liability. See Harper & James, Torts (1956), § 10.1, Prosser on Torts (4th ed. 1971) at 304. Both are questions of fact and normally to be determined by the jury. The actual form or title of the release is immaterial and parol evidence should be permitted to determine the intent of the parties.
Also, the position of the alleged subsequent tortfeasor under the release is somewhat analogous to an alleged third party beneficiary.
It is therefore clear that the above quoted release, standing alone, does not bar the claim asserted by plaintiff against the defendant in this litigation. The controlling factors are whether the plaintiff in fact received full satisfaction for his injuries and whether the parties to the release intended it to be in full satisfaction, both of which require a factual determination beyond the face of the instrument.
The Clerk of this Court is now hereby ordered and directed to certify a copy of this opinion to the Honorable John Paul *136 Stevens, Judge and the Honorable Luther M. Swygert, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.
[1]  (N) Certification of Questions of State Law From Federal Courts. When it shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United States, to any circuit court of appeals of the United States, or to the court of appeals of the District of Columbia, that there are involved in any proceeding before it questions or propositions of the laws of this state, which are determinative of the said cause, and there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme Court of this State, such federal appellate court may certify such questions or propositions of the laws of this state to the Supreme Court of this state for instructions concerning such questions or propositions of state law which certificate the Supreme Court of this state, by written opinion, may answer.