Title: First Weber Group, Inc. v. Synergy Real Estate Group, LLC

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2015 WI 34 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP1205 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
First Weber Group, Inc. and James R. Imhoff, 
Jr., 
          Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Synergy Real Estate Group, LLC and James N. 
Graham, 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 353 Wis. 2d 492, 846 N.W.2d 348) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No: 2014 WI App 41 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 24, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 4, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Juan B. Colás 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
petitioners-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by Kim Moermond, General Counsel, Madison, and oral 
argument by Kim Moermond. 
 
For the respondents-respondents, there was a brief filed by 
James N. Graham, Accession Law LLC, Madison, and oral argument 
by James N. Graham. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Debra P. Conrad on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Realtors Association. 
 
 
 
2015 WI 34
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2013AP1205 
(L.C. No. 
2012CV4349) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
First Weber Group, Inc. and James R. Imhoff, 
Jr.,   
 
 
Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners,   
 
 
v. 
 
Synergy Real Estate Group, LLC and James N. 
Graham,   
 
 
Respondents-Respondents.   
FILED 
 
MAR 24, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, First Weber Group, 
Inc. v. Synergy Real Estate Group, LLC, 2014 WI App 41, 353 
Wis. 2d 492, 846 N.W.2d 348, which affirmed the circuit court's1 
order denying First Weber Group, Inc.'s petition to compel 
arbitration.2   
                                                 
1 The Honorable Juan B. Colás, Dane County Circuit Court, 
presided. 
2 First Weber Group, Inc. and James R. Imhoff, Jr. 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
2 
 
¶2 
An arbitration panel ordered James N. Graham3 to pay 
First Weber for a disputed real estate brokerage commission.  
After Graham failed to pay, First Weber filed an action in 
circuit court to confirm the arbitration award.  In that 
confirmation action, First Weber also requested the court to 
award it "costs and reasonable attorney fees" and "such other 
relief as the Court deems just and equitable."  The circuit 
court ordered Graham to pay First Weber the commission awarded 
in the arbitration.  However, the circuit court denied First 
Weber's request for costs and reasonable attorney's fees, 
reasoning that, "[u]nder Wis. Stat. § 814.01, no costs may be 
awarded when confirming an arbitration award."  Graham paid only 
the commission award. 
¶3 
First Weber subsequently filed an arbitration request 
with the Realtors Association of South Central Wisconsin, Inc. 
("Realtors Association"), of which First Weber and Graham were 
                                                                                                                                                             
("Imhoff") are the named petitioners.  First Weber Group and 
Imhoff are members of the Realtors Associations of South Central 
Wisconsin, Inc.  Imhoff is a licensed real estate broker and the 
owner and chief executive officer of First Weber Group, which is 
a real estate business entity licensed to do business in 
Wisconsin.  We will refer to the petitioners as "First Weber." 
3 Graham and Synergy Real Estate Group, LLC ("Synergy") are 
the two named respondents.  Graham was an officer and a member 
of Synergy until he resigned his membership therein, on 
October 16, 2009.  On December 31, 2009, Graham dissolved 
Synergy.  Synergy was a real estate business entity licensed to 
do business in Wisconsin.  Graham is a licensed real estate 
broker and was a member of the Realtors Association of South 
Central Wisconsin, Inc.  We will refer to the respondents as 
"Graham." 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
3 
 
members.  First Weber's arbitration request asked the Realtors 
Association to arbitrate a contractual dispute over "costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees" because judicial confirmation of the 
commission award was necessary.  The Realtors Association 
scheduled the matter regarding costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees for arbitration.  Graham refused to attend the arbitration 
hearing regarding costs and reasonable attorney's fees.  As a 
result, no arbitration hearing was held.  First Weber then filed 
a petition in circuit court to compel arbitration of the dispute 
over costs and reasonable attorney's fees, arguing that Graham 
was bound by an arbitration agreement.  The circuit court denied 
the petition, holding that First Weber's arbitration request was 
untimely.  The court of appeals affirmed, also concluding that 
the arbitration request was untimely. 
¶4 
Graham argues that First Weber's petition to compel 
arbitration was correctly denied because it was untimely.  
Although Graham concedes that he is bound by an arbitration 
agreement, he argues that it does not require him to arbitrate 
untimely claims.  Graham also argues that, on grounds of 
estoppel, First Weber cannot arbitrate the dispute over costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees because it did not appeal the 
circuit court's resolution of this dispute in the previously 
filed 
action 
confirming 
the 
arbitrator's 
award 
of 
the 
commission.   
¶5 
First Weber argues that an arbitrator, rather than a 
court, should decide whether its arbitration request was timely.  
First Weber also argues that its arbitration request was timely.  
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
4 
 
First Weber further argues that it is not barred on grounds of 
estoppel from arbitrating the dispute over costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees.  Finally, First Weber argues that the circuit 
court in the present action erred by failing to defer to the 
Realtors Association's determination that this dispute is 
arbitrable. 
¶6 
We conclude that under the arbitration agreement, 
Graham's timeliness and estoppel defenses against arbitration 
are to be determined in the arbitration proceedings, not by a 
court in a proceeding under Wis. Stat. § 788.034 to compel 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 788.03 (2011-12) provides in relevant part:  
The party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect or 
refusal 
of 
another 
to 
perform 
under 
a 
written 
agreement for arbitration may petition any court of 
record having jurisdiction of the parties . . . for an 
order directing that such arbitration proceed as 
provided for in such agreement. . . .  The court shall 
hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the 
making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure 
to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall 
make an order directing the parties to proceed to 
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement. If the making of the arbitration agreement 
or the failure, neglect or refusal to perform the same 
is in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the 
trial thereof. 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
5 
 
arbitration.5  Graham's timeliness and estoppel defenses against 
arbitration are procedural arbitrability issues to be determined 
during the arbitration process, rather than by a court.  Graham 
has not overcome the presumption in favor of arbitration.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' decision and 
remand the cause to the circuit court with the instruction that 
First Weber's petition to compel arbitration be granted.6   
                                                 
5 The circuit court and court of appeals did not rely on 
Graham's estoppel argument.  Before the circuit court, Graham's 
estoppel 
argument 
relied 
on 
issue 
preclusion 
and 
claim 
preclusion.  However, Graham's response brief to this court 
devotes less than one page to his estoppel argument and does not 
indicate which type of estoppel he is relying upon.  We do not 
separately address Graham's estoppel argument.  For the same 
reasons that we conclude that Graham's timeliness argument is to 
be determined during the arbitration process, we conclude that 
his estoppel argument is to be determined during the arbitration 
process, not by a court.  See also Cirilli v. Country Ins. & 
Fin. Servs., 2009 WI App 167, ¶18, 322 Wis. 2d 238, 776 
N.W.2d 272 ("Evaluating the collateral estoppel effect of the 
prior 
judgment 
does 
not 
challenge 
the 
validity 
of 
the 
arbitration clause or call into question whether this dispute 
falls within the scope of the arbitration clause.  Therefore, 
the effect of the prior judgment on this dispute is an issue to 
be decided by an arbitrator.") (citations omitted). 
6 We do not resolve whether First Weber's arbitration 
request is barred on grounds of timeliness or estoppel because 
these issues are to be determined in the arbitration process.  
We express no opinion on whether these issues of timeliness or 
estoppel have already been decided in the arbitration process or 
how a Realtors Association arbitrator should rule on these 
issues if subsequently confronted with them.  Because we 
conclude that the circuit court erred by determining the 
procedural question of whether First Weber's arbitration request 
was timely, we do not determine whether the circuit court erred 
by 
showing 
no 
deference 
to 
the 
Realtors 
Association's 
determination that the present dispute is arbitrable. 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
6 
 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶7 
First Weber is a member of the Realtors Association.  
Graham was a member of the Realtors Association from January 
2006 through the end of 2011.  In order to become a member of 
the Realtors Association, every prospective member must sign a 
membership application form that states: "I agree to abide by 
the Code of Ethics of the National Association of REALTORS®, and 
the Constitution, Bylaws, Rules and Regulations of [the Realtors 
Association of South Central Wisconsin], the State Association 
and the National Association."  It is undisputed that Graham and 
First Weber signed this document.   
¶8 
The agreement to arbitrate is contained in the Code of 
Ethics of the National Association of Realtors ("Code of 
Ethics"), which Realtors Association members are obliged to 
follow.  Article 17 of the Code of Ethics and Standards of 
Practice reads in relevant part:  
In the event of contractual disputes or specific 
non-contractual disputes as defined in Standard of 
Practice 
17-4 
between 
REALTORS® 
(principals) 
associated with different firms, arising out of their 
relationship as REALTORS®, the REALTORS® shall submit 
the dispute to arbitration in accordance with the 
regulations of their Board or Boards rather than 
litigate the matter. 
Article V, section 7 of the Constitution of the Realtors 
Association states that its members must follow the Code of 
Ethics' arbitration requirement. 
¶9 
The Code of Ethics also requires that a request for 
arbitration be filed in a timely manner.  Section 47(a) of the 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
7 
 
Code of Ethics and Arbitration Manual provides in relevant part: 
"Requests for arbitration must be filed within one hundred 
eighty (180) days after the closing of the transaction, if any, 
or within one hundred eighty (180) days after the facts 
constituting the arbitrable matter could have been known in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, whichever is later."  Several 
Realtors Association publications, including its standardized 
form for requesting arbitration, contain a similar timeliness 
requirement with virtually identical language.  Section 47(a) 
further provides that the 180-day time limit is suspended under 
certain 
circumstances 
and 
that 
questions 
concerning 
this 
suspension "will be determined by the Board President or the 
President's designee."7   
¶10 First Weber paid a brokerage commission to Graham 
because he represented a buyer who purchased real estate 
                                                 
7 Section 47(a) of the Code of Ethics and Arbitration Manual 
provides in relevant part:  
Suspension of filing deadlines: If the Board's 
informal 
dispute 
resolution 
processes 
(e.g., 
ombudsmen, mediation, etc.) are invoked or initiated 
by a complainant (or potential complainant) with 
respect to an otherwise potentially arbitrable matter 
that becomes the subject of a subsequent arbitration 
request, the one hundred eighty (180) day filing 
deadline shall be suspended beginning with the date of 
the complainant's (or potential complainant's) request 
for informal dispute resolution service or assistance 
and shall resume when the informal dispute resolution 
procedures are concluded or terminated.  Questions 
about when informal dispute resolution began or ended 
will be determined by the Board President or the 
President's designee. 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
8 
 
property being sold by First Weber in the fall of 2008.  First 
Weber later determined that Graham was not entitled to the 
commission.   
¶11 First Weber and Graham agreed to arbitrate the dispute 
over the brokerage commission.  Specifically, on February 25, 
2009, First Weber signed a standardized Realtors Association 
form for requesting arbitration.  On April 8, 2009, Graham 
signed a standardized Realtors Association form agreeing to 
First Weber's arbitration request.  Each form stated:  
In the event I do not comply with the arbitration 
award and it is necessary for any party to this 
arbitration 
to 
obtain 
judicial 
confirmation 
and 
enforcement of the arbitration award against me, I 
agree to pay the party obtaining such confirmation the 
costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in 
obtaining such confirmation and enforcement.   
¶12 On October 8, 2009, a Realtors Association arbitration 
panel held a hearing and ordered Graham to pay $5,440 to First 
Weber within the next 15 days.  Graham failed to pay.  On 
October 7, 2010——almost one year after the arbitration award was 
ordered——First Weber filed an action under Wis. Stat. § 788.09 
(2009-10)8 to confirm the $5,440 arbitration award.9  In its 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 788.09 (2009-10) provides: 
At any time within one year after the award is 
made any party to the arbitration may apply to the 
court in and for the county within which such award 
was made for an order confirming the award, and 
thereupon the court must grant such an order unless 
the award is vacated, modified or corrected under s. 
788.10 or 788.11.  
9 Dane County case no. 10CV5329.  
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
9 
 
initial filing, First Weber "pray[ed] for an order confirming 
the arbitration award, for entry of judgment in conformity 
therewith, against the Respondents individually (jointly and 
severally liable), and award [First Weber] costs and reasonable 
attorney fees, and for such other and further relief as the 
Court deems just and equitable."   
¶13 On March 8, 2011, in a non-final written order,10 the 
circuit court11 confirmed the $5,440 arbitration award for the 
commission.  On March 16, 2011, in a non-final written order,12 
the circuit court denied First Weber's claim for costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees.  The circuit court reasoned that  
[t]he exception to the American rule is narrowly drawn 
to permit arbitrators, not the court, to award costs 
and fees where such fees are expressly provided for in 
the arbitration agreement.  [citations omitted]  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 814.01, no costs may be awarded when 
confirming an arbitration award.  [citation omitted]  
This statutory rule is not altered by a contract 
provision.   
First Weber filed a motion for reconsideration 14 days later.   
                                                 
10 The circuit court stated that "[t]his Order is not the 
final document this Court will issue for purposes of the time 
limit for appeal." 
11 The Honorable John C. Albert, Dane County Circuit Court, 
presided over the confirmation action. 
12 See Werner v. Hendree, 2011 WI 10, ¶62, 331 Wis. 2d 511, 
795 N.W.2d 423 (citation omitted) ("[A] document must meet three 
conditions in order to be considered a final judgment or order 
for purposes of appeal: the document must (1) be entered by the 
circuit court, (2) dispose of the entire matter in litigation as 
to one or more parties, and (3) state on its face that it is the 
final document for purposes of appeal."). 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
10 
 
¶14 On October 14, 2011, in a non-final oral ruling, the 
circuit court again confirmed the arbitration award and ordered 
Graham to pay the $5,440 commission awarded in the arbitration 
within 30 days.  The court denied First Weber's claim for costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees, reasoning that "the weight of 
authority precludes me from awarding attorney's fees especially 
in this case where both parties are attorneys . . . ."  On 
October 31, 2011, Graham sent a check to First Weber in the 
amount of $5,440.  The check was accompanied by a letter stating 
that, by cashing the check, First Weber would agree to "satisfy 
any and all claims against [Graham] which were raised or which 
could have been raised in [the confirmation action] or in the 
underlying commission and arbitration dispute.  [First Weber] 
release[s] 
[Graham] 
from 
any 
further 
liability 
arising 
therefrom."   
¶15 On December 5, 2011, the circuit court issued a final 
written order denying costs and reasonable attorney's fees, 
reasoning that the court "does not have authority to award costs 
and fees in a confirmation proceeding."  The circuit court also 
explained that its decision  
resolves only the confirmation itself, and does not 
involve any other claims, or potential claims, from 
the underlying transaction; nor does it address, or 
negate the validity and/or enforceability of the 
Arbitration Agreement between the parties, or any 
other issues arising from it, excepting only the award 
provided in the arbitration proceedings.     
¶16 On or about May 8, 2012, First Weber requested the 
Realtors Association to arbitrate the contractual dispute with 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
11 
 
Graham over costs and reasonable attorney's fees allegedly due 
because First Weber previously had to file a Wis. Stat. § 788.03 
action to confirm the arbitration award for the commission.  On 
June 5, 2012, the Realtors Association notified Graham that 
First Weber's arbitration request had been referred to a 
Realtors Association hearing panel.  On August 27, 2012, the 
Realtors Association notified Graham that an arbitration hearing 
was scheduled for September 26, 2012.  On September 11, 2012, 
Graham sent an e-mail to the Realtors Association's professional 
standards administrator, stating that he would not attend the 
hearing.  On September 26, 2012, the arbitration panel convened 
at the scheduled time and Graham did not appear.  At the 
hearing, a Realtors Association official called Graham, who said 
that he would not attend the hearing.  The arbitration panel 
determined that it could not arbitrate the matter without Graham 
present, so it cancelled the hearing. 
II. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶17 On November 2, 2012, First Weber filed a Wis. Stat. 
§ 788.03 petition to compel Graham to arbitrate.  The petition 
sought to compel arbitration of the parties' dispute over 
payment of costs and reasonable attorney's fees.  According to 
First Weber, Graham was contractually obligated, under the 
language of the agreement to arbitrate, to pay the costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees that First Weber incurred in the 
previous court confirmation action.   
¶18 On April 12, 2013, the circuit court denied the 
petition to compel arbitration.  In its ruling, the circuit 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
12 
 
court first rejected Graham's argument that First Weber's claim 
for costs and reasonable attorney's fees was barred by issue 
preclusion or claim preclusion.13  In so doing, the court 
reasoned that Graham, by virtue of his membership in the 
Realtors Association, "agreed to submit to arbitration any 
dispute with another member arising from their relationship as 
Realtors.  A dispute about payment of fees and costs incurred in 
confirming an arbitration award under the agreement is within 
the 
scope 
of 
arbitrable 
disputes." 
 
However, 
the 
court 
nonetheless denied the petition to compel arbitration because it 
concluded 
that 
the 
request 
to 
arbitrate 
was 
untimely.  
Specifically, the court held that "the dispute was no longer 
arbitrable"14 because it found that First Weber's arbitration 
request was filed beyond a 180-day time limit imposed by the 
arbitration agreement and Realtors Association's rules.  Hence, 
                                                 
13 The circuit court stated that, in the prior confirmation 
action, the circuit court: 
did not consider or decide on the merits whether 
[First Weber] was entitled under the arbitration 
agreement to recover the costs of confirming the 
award.  The court simply decided that the statutory 
fees and costs did not apply . . . and that in an 
[sic] confirmation of award case it lacked authority, 
i.e. competency to proceed, to decide whether a party 
was entitled to fees and costs of the confirmation 
proceeding 
under 
the 
terms 
of 
the 
arbitration 
agreement. 
14 Relying on Kimberly Area School District v. Zdanovec, 222 
Wis. 2d 27, 39, 586 N.W.2d 41 (Ct. App. 1998), the circuit court 
stated that "[i]t is a general rule that arbitrability is to be 
determined by the courts." 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
13 
 
while the circuit court did deny the petition to compel 
arbitration, the basis for the denial was that the court deemed 
the arbitration request to be untimely, not because the costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees issue was an improper subject for 
arbitration.   
¶19 On March 20, 2014, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's order denying First Weber's petition to compel 
arbitration.  First Weber Grp., Inc., 353 Wis. 2d 492, ¶2.  The 
court of appeals likewise held that Graham was bound by an 
arbitration agreement and assumed, without deciding, that the 
dispute over costs and reasonable attorney's fees was within the 
scope of that agreement.  Id., ¶¶4-7, 29, 31, 33.  The court of 
appeals reasoned that the 180-day time limit for requesting 
arbitration "is an issue of substantive arbitrability reserved 
for judicial determination."  Id., ¶43.  The court of appeals 
concluded that First Weber's arbitration request was untimely 
and affirmed the circuit court's order on that basis.  Id., 
¶¶49-55.   
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶20 First Weber's petition to compel arbitration involves 
contract interpretation, which is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  Cirilli v. Country Ins. & Fin. Servs., 2009 WI 
App 167, ¶10, 322 Wis. 2d 238, 776 N.W.2d 272 (citations 
omitted).   
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
¶21 The parties seem to agree that Graham is bound by an 
agreement to arbitrate contractual disputes with other Realtors 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
14 
 
arising from their relationship as Realtors.15  The parties also 
seem to agree that the arbitration agreement covers the subject 
matter of the dispute at issue.  Thus, the crux of the issue 
before us is whether the timeliness of the arbitration request 
should be decided by a court or in arbitration.   
¶22 Graham argues that First Weber's claim for costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees is not arbitrable because First 
Weber's arbitration request was untimely.16  Graham also argues 
that this timeliness issue is for a court, rather than an 
arbitrator, to decide.  First Weber argues that the issue of 
timeliness is procedural and for an arbitrator, rather than a 
court, to decide.   
¶23 We hold that Graham's timeliness and estoppel defenses 
against arbitration are to be determined in the arbitration 
proceedings, not by a court in a proceeding under Wis. Stat. 
§ 788.03 to compel arbitration.  We base our decision on 
Wisconsin's public policy favoring arbitration, the arbitration 
agreement, the Realtors Association's arbitration procedures, 
                                                 
15 Courts routinely hold that Realtors are parties to an 
arbitration agreement by virtue of their membership in a local 
Realtors association that requires them to arbitrate certain 
disputes.  See Lane v. Urgitus, 145 P.3d 672, 681 (Colo. 2006) 
(collecting cases). 
16 Graham argues in his brief to this court that, although 
the present dispute "was 'arbitrable' in the sense that it was 
the type of claim that could have been arbitrated if pursued in 
a timely manner in the proper venue, the claim was not 
'arbitrable' when pursued more than a year after first pursuing 
the claim in litigation."  
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
15 
 
the limited role of courts in actions to compel arbitration 
under § 788.03, and relevant case law.    
A. Public Policy Favoring Arbitration 
¶24 Wisconsin has a "policy of encouraging arbitration as 
an alternative to litigation . . . ."  Kemp v. Fisher, 89 
Wis. 2d 94, 
100, 
277 
N.W.2d 859 
(1979). 
 
"The 
Wisconsin 
Arbitration Act embodies this state's clearly established public 
policy to enforce agreements to arbitrate."  Cirilli, 322 
Wis. 2d 238, ¶11 (citation omitted).  "[A]rbitration is meant to 
be a swift and inexpensive process that is guided by a 
contractual agreement."  Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Jackson, 
190 Wis. 2d 597, 611, 527 N.W.2d 681 (1995).  Indeed, "the goal 
of arbitration is 'to resolve the entire controversy out of 
court without the formality and expense that normally attaches 
to the judicial process.'"  Borst v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2006 WI 
70, ¶61, 291 Wis. 2d 361, 717 N.W.2d 42 (quoted source omitted).   
¶25 In an action to compel arbitration, a court presumes 
that its role is limited to determining whether the parties 
agreed to arbitrate the subject matter of the dispute at issue.  
See Kimberly Area Sch. Dist. v. Zdanovec, 222 Wis. 2d 27, 37-39, 
586 N.W.2d 41 (Ct. App. 1998).  When exercising that role, a 
court employs a "strong presumption" that the parties agreed to 
arbitrate the subject matter of the dispute at issue when "the 
contract in question contains an arbitration clause."  Cirilli, 
322 Wis. 2d 238, ¶14 (citing Kimberly Area Sch. Dist., 222 
Wis. 2d at 39).  
B. The Arbitration Agreement and Procedure 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
16 
 
¶26 First Weber and Graham are parties to an arbitration 
agreement. 
 
When 
they 
became 
members 
of 
the 
Realtors 
Association, they agreed to comply with the National Association 
of Realtors' Code of Ethics.  Article 17 of the Code of Ethics 
provides that, in the event of a contractual dispute "between 
REALTORS® (principals) associated with different firms, arising 
out of their relationship as REALTORS®, the REALTORS® shall 
submit the dispute to arbitration in accordance with the 
regulations of their Board or Boards rather than litigate the 
matter."  Under section 44(a) of the Code of Ethics and 
Arbitration Manual, "[t]he duty to submit to arbitration 
continues 
in 
effect 
even 
after 
membership 
lapses 
or 
is 
terminated, provided that the dispute arose while the respondent 
was a REALTOR® . . . ."  The Realtors Association's rules 
expressly require its members to obey this agreement to 
arbitrate.  For example, Article V, section 7 of the Realtors 
Association's Constitution requires its members to obey "the 
duty to arbitrate controversies arising out of real estate 
transactions as specified by Article 17 of the Code of 
Ethics . . . ."  The Realtors Association provides penalties for 
failure to comply with the duty to arbitrate.  Specifically, 
Article V, section 2 of the Realtors Association's Constitution 
provides that "[a]ny member of the [Realtors Association] may be 
reprimanded, fined, placed on probation, suspended, or expelled 
by 
the 
Board 
of 
Directors 
for 
a 
violation 
of 
this 
Constitution . . . ." 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
17 
 
¶27 The 
arbitration 
agreement 
at 
issue 
requires 
an 
arbitration request to be timely filed.  Section 47(a) of the 
Code of Ethics and Arbitration Manual, which is binding on 
Realtors 
Association 
members, 
provides: 
"Requests 
for 
arbitration must be filed within one hundred eighty (180) days 
after the closing of the transaction, if any, or within one 
hundred eighty (180) days after the facts constituting the 
arbitrable matter could have been known in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, whichever is later."  This provision is 
not statutory.  It is not agreed upon outside of the arbitration 
process.  It is not a statute of limitations or a statute of 
repose.  The 180-day time limit is required only because it is 
contained in the Realtors' agreement to arbitrate by reference 
to the Realtors Association's rules and the National Association 
of Realtors' Code of Ethics.  In addition, this time limit 
comprises an element of reasonableness and can be suspended 
under certain circumstances.  The Realtors Association arbiters 
are "comparatively more expert [than a court] about the meaning 
of their own rule" and "comparatively better able to interpret 
and to apply it."  Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 
U.S. 79, 85 (2002).  Thus, "it is reasonable to infer that the 
parties intended the [arbitration] agreement to reflect that 
understanding."  Id. (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. 
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-45 (1995)).  "[P]arties to an 
arbitration 
contract 
would 
normally 
expect 
a 
forum-based 
decisionmaker 
to 
decide 
forum-specific 
procedural 
gateway 
matters."  Id. at 86. 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
18 
 
¶28 Likewise, 
the 
Realtors 
Association's 
arbitration 
procedures are designed to allow disputes to be resolved through 
the arbitration process.17  The arbitration procedures provide a 
process by which a controversy will be determined to be 
arbitrable or be dismissed.  Nowhere is it contemplated that 
courts may make this determination.  In particular, after 
receiving an arbitration request, the Realtors Association 
forwards the request to a Grievance Panel, which determines, 
inter alia, "whether the controversy described is an arbitrable 
matter."  The Grievance Panel either dismisses the arbitration 
request or refers the matter for arbitration before a Hearing 
Panel.  Either decision by the Grievance Panel may be appealed 
to 
the 
Realtors 
Association's 
Board 
of 
Directors, 
which 
determines whether to dismiss the matter or refer it for 
arbitration.18  If arbitrable, the matter is arbitrated before a 
Hearing Panel, which renders a binding decision.  The fact that 
the Realtors Association's arbitration process is to determine 
"whether the controversy described is an arbitrable matter" 
supports a conclusion that the timeliness issue is for the 
                                                 
17 This procedure is described in various documents in the 
record, including a document titled "REALTORS® Association of 
South Central Wisconsin, Inc. Filing Ethics Complaints and 
Arbitration 
Requests" 
and 
the 
Realtors 
Association's 
standardized forms for requesting and agreeing to arbitration.   
18 In the present case, the Grievance Panel referred the 
matter for arbitration and notified Graham to that effect.  
Graham did not appeal that decision or argue to the Realtors 
Association that First Weber's arbitration request was untimely. 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
19 
 
Realtors Association's arbitration process, not a court, to 
decide.  See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 86.  
¶29 In sum, the Realtors Association's rules and grievance 
process intend that disputes between its members be resolved out 
of court and demonstrate that its arbitration process may 
determine whether an arbitration request was timely. 
C. Courts Have a Limited Role in Arbitration 
 
¶30 We now turn to the limited role that Wisconsin courts 
have in arbitration.  We first discuss a court's role under Wis. 
Stat. § 788.03, which authorizes courts to compel arbitration 
according to the terms of an arbitration agreement.  We will 
next discuss case law that explains that a court's role in an 
action to compel arbitration is generally limited to determining 
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the subject matter of 
the dispute at issue.   
1. Legislative Guidance 
¶31 The legislature has determined that the courts have a 
limited role in the context of arbitration.  "Judicial review of 
arbitration 
awards 
is 
very 
limited." 
 
Milwaukee 
Prof'l 
Firefighters, Local 215, IAFF, AFL-CIO v. City of Milwaukee, 78 
Wis. 2d 1, 21, 253 N.W.2d 481 (1977).  The legislature has 
recognized, however, that not all disputes can be resolved 
without court intervention.  For example, if a party refuses to 
pay an arbitration award, that award can be enforced through a 
petition to confirm under Wis. Stat. § 788.09.  Similarly, Wis. 
Stat. § 788.03 authorizes a circuit court to compel parties to 
arbitrate a dispute according to the terms of their arbitration 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
20 
 
agreement.  Employers Ins. of Wausau, 190 Wis. 2d at 613-14.  
The case at issue is an action under § 788.03 seeking to compel 
Graham to arbitrate.   
¶32 In an action to compel arbitration under Wis. Stat. 
§ 788.03, "the issues are limited to 'the making of the 
arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect or refusal to 
perform' under the agreement."19  Pilgrim Inv. Corp. v. Reed, 156 
Wis. 2d 677, 684, 457 N.W.2d 544 (Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Wis. 
Stat. § 788.03).  When determining whether a dispute is 
arbitrable, a "court's function is limited to a determination 
whether there is a construction of the arbitration clause that 
would cover the grievance on its face and whether any other 
provision of the contract specifically excludes it."  Joint Sch. 
Dist. No. 10, City of Jefferson v. Jefferson Ed. Ass'n, 78 
Wis. 2d 94, 111, 253 N.W.2d 536 (1977); see also Cirilli, 322 
Wis. 2d 238, ¶14.  "When the court determines arbitrability it 
must exercise great caution. The court has no business weighing 
                                                 
19 In an action to compel arbitration, a court also may 
consider whether a party failed to appoint an arbitrator as 
required by the terms of an arbitration agreement.  Employers 
Ins. of Wausau v. Jackson, 190 Wis. 2d 597, 613-16, 527 
N.W.2d 681 (1995).   
Graham argues that the petition to compel arbitration must 
be denied because his failure to arbitrate is not a failure "to 
perform under a written arbitration agreement," see id. at 613, 
because the arbitration agreement does not require him to 
arbitrate untimely claims.  This argument hinges on whether the 
arbitration request was untimely.  As we conclude in this 
opinion, Graham's timeliness argument is to be decided in the 
arbitration process, not by a court. 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
21 
 
the merits of the grievance. It is the arbitrators' decision for 
which the parties bargained."  Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10, 78 
Wis. 2d at 111.   
¶33  First 
Weber 
and 
Graham 
seem 
to 
agree 
that 
a 
controversy over costs and reasonable attorney's fees is 
arbitrable under their arbitration agreement.  The disagreement 
between First Weber and Graham rests on whether arbitration of 
First Weber's claim is precluded on the basis of timeliness or 
estoppel and whether a court or arbitration should decide these 
issues.20   
2. Substantive Arbitrability and Procedural Arbitrability 
¶34 "Arbitrability questions generally fall into one of 
two categories."  1 Larry Edmonson, Domke on Commercial 
Arbitration § 15:4 (3d ed. 2014).  "Substantive arbitrability 
refers to whether the dispute involves a subject matter which 
the parties have contracted to submit to arbitration."  Id.  
"Procedural arbitrability concerns issues such as whether 
certain procedures apply to a particular dispute, whether such 
procedures were followed or excused, and whether unexcused 
failure to follow procedure avoids the duty to arbitrate."  Id.  
"The threshold question of whether a matter is subject to 
                                                 
20 As we explained earlier, we do not separately address 
estoppel.  Our discussion of why the timeliness issue is to be 
decided in the arbitration process explains why the estoppel 
issue is to be decided in the arbitration process.  See supra 
note 4.  
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
22 
 
arbitration must be determined from the terms of the parties' 
agreement."  Id.   
¶35 Graham and First Weber dispute whether the time limit 
at issue is a matter of procedural arbitrability.  Although 
Graham concedes that timeliness "may be" a procedural issue, he 
contends that it "is also a substantive issue."  The distinction 
between substantive arbitrability and procedural arbitrability 
issues is important because issues of substantive arbitrability 
generally are decided by courts, whereas issues of procedural 
arbitrability generally are determined during the arbitration 
process.  Graham also argues that we should not follow Howsam 
because it is distinguishable.  First Weber argues that an 
arbitrator, rather than a court, may decide the time limit issue 
because it is a matter of procedural arbitrability.  First Weber 
urges us to rely on Howsam and BG Group, PLC v. Republic of 
Argentina, 572 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014), in which the 
United States Supreme Court held that a time limit for seeking 
arbitration is an issue of procedural arbitrability.  We 
determine that issues such as timeliness and estoppel are 
matters of procedural arbitrability and are to be decided during 
the arbitration process, not by a court, unless the parties 
agreed otherwise.   
¶36 In an action to compel arbitration, a court's role 
generally is limited to determining the question of substantive 
arbitrability, unless the parties specifically agreed otherwise.  
See 
Kimberly 
Area 
Sch. 
Dist., 
222 
Wis. 2d at 
37-39.  
Specifically, the court decides "whether the [arbitration] 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
23 
 
agreement 
could 
cover 
the 
controversy," 
not 
whether 
the 
agreement "expressly covers the dispute."  Racine Educ. Ass'n v. 
Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 176 Wis. 2d 273, 284, 500 N.W.2d 379 
(Ct. App. 1993) (citing Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10, 78 Wis. 2d at 
111).  Given the limited role of a court, the court must order 
arbitration if the arbitration agreement could cover the subject 
matter of the dispute.  Id. at 284-85.  Any doubt concerning the 
scope of the agreement must be resolved in favor of compelling 
arbitration.  Cirilli, 322 Wis. 2d 238, ¶14 (citing AT & T 
Techs. v. Commc'ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986)).  
¶37 Issues of procedural arbitrability are to be resolved 
during arbitration, rather than by a court, unless the parties 
agreed otherwise.  BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1207-08; Howsam, 537 
U.S. at 83-84.  Issues of procedural arbitrability "include 
claims of 'waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.'"  
BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1207 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983)).  They 
also include "the satisfaction of 'prerequisites such as time 
limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other conditions precedent 
to an obligation to arbitrate.'"  Id. (quoting Howsam, 537 U.S. 
at 85) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).  "Questions 
of mere delay, laches, statute of limitations, and untimeliness 
raised to defeat compelled arbitration are issues of procedural 
arbitrability 
exclusively 
reserved 
for 
resolution 
by 
the 
arbitrator."  Edmonson, supra, § 15:4.  The vast majority of 
state courts hold that these procedural issues are presumptively 
for an arbitrator to decide.  BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1207 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
24 
 
(citing Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 § 6, Comment 2, 
7 U.L.A. 13 (Supp. 2002)).  "The timeliness of a demand for 
arbitration is an issue for arbitrators, rather than the 
courts."  Edmonson, supra, § 19:2 (3d ed. Supp. 2014). 
¶38 In the present case, the circuit court determined that 
the subject matter of costs and reasonable attorney's fees was 
within the scope of the arbitration agreement.  The court of 
appeals assumed, without deciding, that this determination was 
correct.  Graham does not dispute that the subject matter of 
costs and reasonable attorney's fees is within the scope of the 
arbitration agreement.  Instead, the circuit court, court of 
appeals, and Graham all reason that the timeliness of the 
request to arbitrate is an issue for the court to decide.  In 
light of the distinction between a substantive arbitrability 
issue and a procedural arbitrability issue, we conclude that 
timeliness 
and 
estoppel 
clearly 
fall 
within 
the 
latter 
category.21  By way of further example, we now discuss Howsam, BG 
Group, and Kimberly Area School District. 
¶39 In Howsam, Karen Howsam relied on investment advice 
from Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.  Howsam, 537 U.S. at 81.  Their 
client 
service 
agreement 
contained 
a 
clause 
requiring 
arbitration of any dispute between them that concerned or arose 
                                                 
21 We reject Graham's argument that the timeliness issue is 
a matter of both substantive and procedural arbitrability.  He 
cites no authority for that proposition.  The overwhelming 
weight of authority, which we find highly persuasive, holds that 
timeliness is a matter of procedural arbitrability. 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
25 
 
from their client relationship.  Id.  The agreement also 
provided that Howsam could select the arbitration forum.  Id. at 
82.  Howsam requested the National Association of Securities 
Dealers ("NASD") to arbitrate her dispute with Dean Witter.  Id.  
Under the NASD's rules, an arbitration request must be filed 
within six years of the event giving rise to the dispute.  Id.  
Dean Witter filed suit, asking a U.S. district court to declare 
the dispute ineligible for arbitration because the arbitration 
request was filed beyond the NASD's six-year time limit.  Id.  
The district court dismissed the action, holding that an NASD 
arbitrator, not the court, should decide whether the request was 
timely.  Id.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit reversed, concluding that the time limit concerned the 
dispute's "arbitrability" and thus was an issue for a court to 
decide.  Id.   
¶40 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, 
holding that the time limit was an issue for an arbitrator to 
decide.  Id. at 82-83.  The Court held that the timeliness issue 
was 
a 
matter 
of 
procedural 
arbitrability 
and 
hence 
was 
presumptively for an arbitrator to decide.  Id. at 84-85.  The 
Court also held that Howsam failed to overcome that presumption 
because she failed to demonstrate that the parties intended to 
have a court decide the timeliness issue.  Id. at 85-86.  The 
Court relied on the similarity between a time limit and other 
potential defenses against arbitration, such as waiver and 
delay, which the Court in previous decisions held were matters 
of procedural arbitrability.  Id. at 84-85.  The Court also 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
26 
 
relied on the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000, which 
sought to incorporate the law of the vast majority of states and 
which explained that time limits are matters of procedural 
arbitrability.  Id. (citing Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 
2000 § 6(c), and comment 2, 7 U.L.A. 12-13 (Supp. 2002)). 
¶41 Similarly, in BG Group, the United States Supreme 
Court reaffirmed that a time limit for seeking arbitration is a 
matter of procedural arbitrability.  In that case, the United 
Kingdom and Argentina had a treaty for resolving disputes 
between one of those nations and an investor from the other 
nation.  BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1203.  The treaty allowed for a 
dispute to be arbitrated if it had been submitted to a court and 
18 months had elapsed without a final decision.  Id.  Argentina 
and a British investor, BG Group, agreed to arbitrate a dispute 
in Washington, D.C.  Id. at 1204.  The arbitrators determined 
that they had jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that BG 
Group did not file suit and wait 18 months before seeking 
arbitration.  Id. at 1205.  The arbitrators awarded BG Group 
$185 million in damages.  Id.    Each side filed a petition for 
review in the District Court for the District of Columbia, with 
BG Group seeking to have the award confirmed and Argentina 
seeking to have the award vacated.  Id.  Argentina argued in 
part that the arbitrators lacked jurisdiction because BG Group 
did not file suit and wait 18 months before seeking arbitration.  
Id.  The district court confirmed the award.  Id.  The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the 
district court's decision.  Id.  Interpreting and applying the 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
27 
 
treaty's litigation requirement de novo, the court of appeals 
held that the arbitrators lacked jurisdiction.  Id.   
¶42 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, 
holding that a court must defer to the arbitrators' decision 
that they had jurisdiction, because the litigation requirement 
was a matter of procedural arbitrability.  Id. at 1206-08, 1213.  
The Court reasoned that the litigation requirement "determines 
when the contractual duty to arbitrate arises, not whether there 
is a contractual duty to arbitrate at all."  Id. at 1207 
(citation omitted).  Furthermore, that requirement's 18-month 
waiting period was "highly analogous" to the time limit at issue 
in Howsam, which was also a matter of procedural arbitrability.  
Id. at 1207-08.  Argentina failed to overcome the presumption 
that the litigation requirement issue, as a matter of procedural 
arbitrability, was presumptively for an arbitrator to decide.  
Id. at 1210.  Therefore, when reviewing the arbitration award, a 
court must show "considerable deference" to the arbitrators' 
decision that the litigation requirement was not applicable.  
Id. 
¶43 In contrast to Howsam and BG Group, the court of 
appeals in Kimberly Area School District was presented with a 
dispute over substantive arbitrability.  In that case, a federal 
lawsuit 
was 
filed 
against 
a 
teacher 
for 
her 
allegedly 
inappropriate discipline of students.  Kimberly Area Sch. Dist., 
222 Wis. 2d at 31-32.  The parties to the federal lawsuit signed 
a settlement agreement providing that a three-person panel would 
decide whether the teacher should be fired, the panel's decision 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
28 
 
would be final and binding, and the teacher would not contest 
the panel's decision.  Id. at 32-33.  The panel voted to fire 
the teacher.  Id. at 34.  The teacher then filed a grievance 
seeking to arbitrate the settlement agreement, because she had a 
right to arbitrate under the teachers union's collective 
bargaining agreement.  Id. at 35.  
¶44 The court of appeals held that the teacher had no 
right to arbitrate over the settlement agreement.  Id. at 46.  
The court of appeals first determined that it had jurisdiction 
to decide the question because it was one of substantive 
arbitrability.  Id. at 41-42.  The court of appeals next 
determined that the dispute was not arbitrable.  Id. at 45-46.  
The court of appeals stated that "a settlement agreement 'is an 
arbitrable subject when the underlying dispute is arbitrable, 
except in circumstances where the parties expressly exclude the 
settlement agreement from being arbitrated.'"  Id. at 46 
(quoting Niro v. Fearn Int'l, Inc., 827 F.2d 173, 175 (7th Cir. 
1987)).  Because the settlement agreement expressly excluded the 
possibility of arbitrating the panel's decision, the parties had 
not agreed to arbitrate a dispute over the settlement agreement.  
Id.  Thus, Kimberly Area School District does not stand for the 
proposition that an issue like timeliness or estoppel is a 
proper matter for a court to consider in an action to compel 
arbitration.  Instead, that case is consistent with the 
proposition that the court generally may weigh in on a 
substantive arbitrability issue, such as whether the subject 
matter of the dispute is subject to arbitration.  
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
29 
 
¶45 We find Howsam and BG Group highly persuasive.22  In 
those cases, the Supreme Court explained that courts presume 
that the question of substantive arbitrability is for a court to 
decide and that matters of procedural arbitrability are for an 
arbitrator to decide.  BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1206-07.  These 
presumptions are consistent with Wisconsin law.23  The rationale 
behind the presumption associated with substantive arbitrability 
is to protect parties from being compelled to arbitrate a 
dispute that they did not agree to arbitrate.  Howsam, 537 U.S. 
at 83-84; First Options, 514 U.S. at 945; see also Kimberly Area 
Sch. Dist., 222 Wis. 2d at 39.  The rationale behind the 
                                                 
22 Graham argues that Howsam is distinguishable because the 
time limit at issue in that case was not part of an arbitration 
agreement, but rather was imposed only by the forum in which 
arbitration was sought.  However, the Supreme Court in BG Group 
relied on Howsam, although the time limit at issue in BG 
Group was part of an arbitration agreement.  BG Grp., PLC v. 
Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1203, 
1206-08 (2014).  Moreover, the time limit at issue in Howsam was 
"effectively incorporated . . . into the parties' agreement."  
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 86 (2002).  
Graham further argues that Howsam is distinguishable because it 
involved federal law, not Wisconsin law.  However, Wisconsin 
courts traditionally have followed the United States Supreme 
Court's principles regarding a court's limited function in 
actions to compel arbitration.  See Cirilli, 322 Wis. 2d 238, 
¶¶12-14.  Thus, Graham's arguments for distinguishing Howsam are 
not persuasive.  Graham's response brief does not address BG 
Group, although First Weber's brief-in-chief devotes an entire 
page to that case.   
23 Wisconsin courts have already adopted the presumption 
that the question of substantive arbitrability is generally for 
a court to decide.  See Kimberly Area Sch. Dist., 222 Wis. 2d at 
39. 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
30 
 
presumption associated with procedural arbitrability is that it 
advances the public policy of encouraging arbitration and 
enforcing arbitration agreements, see First Options, 514 U.S. at 
945; promotes arbitration's goal of speedy dispute resolution, 
see John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 558-59 
(1964); and prevents courts from ruling on the merits of an 
underlying claim when determining whether to compel arbitration, 
see Cirilli, 322 Wis. 2d 238, ¶¶13, 17-18.  Accordingly, the 
presumption 
associated 
with 
procedural 
arbitrability 
is 
consistent with Wisconsin's public policy favoring arbitration, 
the arbitration agreement at issue, the Realtors Association's 
arbitration procedure, and the limited role of our state courts 
in actions under Wis. Stat. § 788.03 to compel arbitration.  See 
supra ¶¶24-32. 
¶46 In sum, Howsam, BG Group, and Kimberly Area School 
District demonstrate that a court's role in an action to compel 
arbitration is limited.  If the arbitration agreement could 
cover the subject matter of the dispute, which is an issue of 
substantive arbitrability, the court must order arbitration and 
resolve all doubts as to the scope of the agreement in favor of 
compelling arbitration.  Issues like timeliness or estoppel are 
matters of procedural arbitrability to be determined during the 
arbitration process, not by a court, unless the parties agreed 
otherwise. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶47 The purpose of the court's limited role in arbitration 
is 
to 
advance 
Wisconsin's 
public 
policy 
of 
encouraging 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
31 
 
arbitration and enforcing agreements to arbitrate.  Graham's 
argument, if accepted, would conceivably conflate the important 
distinction between issues of substantive arbitrability and 
issues of procedural arbitrability.  Such a result would 
undermine 
the 
purpose 
of 
arbitration, 
wherein 
arbitrable 
disputes are "to be decided, not by the court asked to order 
arbitration, but as the parties have agreed, by the arbitrator."  
See AT & T Techs., 475 U.S. at 650.  Graham's argument that 
First Weber's arbitration request was untimely highlights why a 
court may not decide this timeliness issue.  Graham argues that 
First Weber's "claim was no longer valid" after the 180-day time 
limit expired and that, "[a]fter 180 days, there is no longer a 
viable claim."  If we were to determine whether First Weber's 
claim is "valid" or "viable," we would impermissibly rule on the 
merits of First Weber's claim.  See Cirilli, 322 Wis. 2d 238, 
¶¶13, 17. 
¶48 In the case at issue, whether we are considering the 
public policy behind arbitration, the arbitration agreement and 
procedure, a court's limited role in an action to compel 
arbitration under Wis. Stat. § 788.03, and the relevant case 
law, each militates in favor of a determination that Graham's 
timeliness and estoppel arguments properly belong in the 
arbitration process, not before the court.   
¶49 We conclude that under the arbitration agreement, 
Graham's timeliness and estoppel defenses against arbitration 
are to be determined in the arbitration proceedings, not by a 
court in a proceeding under Wis. Stat. § 788.03 to compel 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
32 
 
arbitration.  Graham's timeliness and estoppel defenses against 
arbitration are procedural arbitrability issues to be determined 
during the arbitration process, rather than by a court.  Graham 
has not overcome the presumption in favor of arbitration.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' decision and 
remand the cause to the circuit court with the instruction that 
First Weber's petition to compel arbitration be granted. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
No. 
2013AP1205   
 
 
 
1