Title: Pioneer Bank of Evanston, Wyo. v. Rykhus

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Pioneer Bank of Evanston, Wyo. v. Rykhus1992 WY 1822 P.2d 372Case Number: 91-155Decided: 01/06/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
PIONEER BANK OF EVANSTON, WYOMING,

 APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

MIKE RYKHUS, D/B/A 
ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, 

APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Uinta County; John D. Troughton, Judge.

John A. Thomas, 
Phillips, Lancaster & Thomas, P.C., Evanston, for 
appellant.

William D. 
Bagley, Cheyenne, for appellee. 

Before 
THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and KALOKATHIS, District 
Judge.

ORDER DISMISSING 
APPEAL

[¶1]      This case came on 
before the court upon the Brief of the Pioneer Bank of Evanston, Wyoming; the 
Brief of Appellee, Mike Rykhus; and the Reply Brief of Appellant Pioneer Bank of 
Evanston, Wyoming, and the Court, having carefully considered the briefs, 
together with the file and record before the court, and being fully advised in 
the premises, finds that:

1.         This 
appeal was taken from an Order Setting Aside Entry of Default and Default 
Judgment entered in the District Court.

2.         The 
Default Judgment was not a final judgment because when it was entered there were 
still pending claims against other parties, and the language required by Rule 
54(b), W.R.C.P., to make it a final judgment was not 
included.

3.         The 
Default Judgment was subject to revision by the District Court at any time prior 
to the dismissal of the action against Roy and Janice Seggern on June 17, 1990, 
on which date the Default Judgment became final.

4.         The 
Motion for Relief from Final Judgment and to Set Aside Entry of Default and 
Default Judgment was made within one (1) year after the Default Judgment became 
final and, even though it was not made within one year after the Default 
Judgment was entered, it was made within the time required by Rule 60(b), 
W.R.C.P.

5.         The 
District Court had jurisdiction to consider the motion for relief from the 
default judgment.

6.         The 
grant or denial of relief was a matter vested in the exercise of sound 
discretion by the District Court, and there was no abuse of discretion in this 
instance.

7.         An 
order granting relief under Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., is not a final order that is 
subject to appeal.

8.         Since 
this appeal is not properly taken from a final order, the appeal should be 
dismissed and the case remanded to the District Court.

It therefore 
is

[¶2]      ORDERED, that the 
appeal in this case be, and it hereby is, dismissed, and the case is remanded to 
the District Court for further proceedings.

URBIGKIT, C.J., not 
participating.