Title: JUAN CEJA, a/k/a JONATHAN ISRAEL ALMADA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JUAN CEJA, a/k/a JONATHAN ISRAEL ALMADA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 71208 P.3d 66Case Number: S-08-0180Decided: 05/29/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
JUAN 
CEJA, a/k/a JONATHAN ISRAEL 
ALMADA,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; David 
E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Westling.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      Mr. Ceja was 
convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor by possessing child 
pornography.  He claims the district 
court erred by refusing to exclude the testimony of the investigating officer 
who obtained his oral admission to possession of pornographic materials because 
the State failed to produce the officer's notes of his interview in 
discovery.  

 
 
[¶2]      Finding no 
violation of the discovery rules, we affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Ceja presents 
a single issue on appeal:

 
 

I.              
Did 
the trial court's misinterpretation of W.R.Cr.P. 16 constitute an abuse of 
discretion and a denial of a fair trial?

 
 
 
 
The 
State presents a similar issue.  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      On September 
5, 2007, Jose Robledo contacted the Gillette Police Department and reported that 
his roommate, Juan, was in possession of child pornography.  Based upon the information received from 
Mr. Robledo, officers obtained a warrant to search the residence shared by Juan 
and Mr. Robledo.  

 
 
[¶5]      When the officers 
arrived at the residence to execute the search warrant, they encountered a man 
who identified himself as Jonathan Almada.  
After informing him of his Miranda 
rights in English, Detective Gary Owens questioned him about Mr. Robledo's 
claims.  He admitted that he had 
DVDs containing child pornography and stated that he had child pornography on 
his computer.      

 
 
[¶6]      The officers 
arrested Mr. Almada.  Once he was in 
custody, the authorities learned that Jonathan Almada was an alias and his real 
name was Juan Ceja Castillo.  The 
State charged him with one count of sexual exploitation of a child in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-303(b)(iv) and (d) (LexisNexis 2007), for possession of 
child pornography as defined in § 6-4-303(a)(ii)(B).1  Because Castillo was his mother's middle 
name, the caption was amended to identify the defendant as Juan Ceja.   

 
 
[¶7]      Mr. Ceja filed a 
demand for discovery on September 11, 2007.  Among other items, he requested:        

   

1.    
As 
to the Defendant, disclosure of, and the right to inspect and/or copy, any 
written confession or inculpatory statement, or the substance of any oral 
confession or inculpatory statement, and the identity of the person to whom the 
confession or inculpatory statement was made and identity of all persons present 
when the statement was given.

 
 

2.    
Disclosure 
of, and the right to inspect and/or copy, the handwritten notes, reports or 
memoranda of the officer[s] who participated in taking the Defendant's 
statement, and any subsequent statements and the handwritten notes, reports, and 
memoranda of any officer[s] who witnessed or were present during the taking of 
all or any part of the Defendant's statement.      

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Ceja also 
filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement, including 
his admission that the pornographic materials and computer belonged to him.  He claimed his statements were not 
voluntary because he did not have an adequate understanding of the English 
language and he was informed of his rights and interrogated in English.  At the suppression hearing, Detective 
Owens testified that he had notes from his interview with Mr. Ceja.  The district court denied the motion to 
suppress.    

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. Ceja then 
filed a motion in limine to prevent the State from offering his statements to 
the officers into evidence at trial.  
He claimed that the evidence should be excluded because the State ignored 
its discovery obligations by failing to produce the detective's notes to the 
defense.  The district court denied 
the motion in limine.    

 
 
[¶10]   A jury trial commenced on March 17, 
2008.  At the conclusion of the 
trial, the jury found Mr. Ceja guilty of sexual exploitation of a child.  The district court entered judgment upon 
the jury's verdict and sentenced him to serve three to ten years in prison.  Mr. Ceja appealed.   

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]   The issue on appeal pertains to 
whether the district court properly ruled on a discovery matter.  We review discovery rulings for abuse of 
discretion.  Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 303 (Wyo. 
1999); Dodge v. State, 562 P.2d 303, 
307 (Wyo. 1977).  In determining 
whether the trial court abused its discretion, "the ultimate issue is whether 
or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did.'"  State v. Naple, 2006 WY 125, ¶ 8, 143 P.3d 358, 361 (Wyo. 2006) quoting Lawson v. State, 994 P.2d 943, 947 
(Wyo. 2000).  

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶12]   Mr. Ceja challenges the district 
court's ruling that the State did not violate its discovery obligation when it 
withheld Detective Owens' notes.  He 
claims that the district court was incorrect in ruling that he was not entitled 
to the notes under W.R.Cr.P. 16 and abused its discretion by refusing to exclude 
the evidence of his admission that the pornography belonged to him.  

 
 
[¶13]   A criminal defendant does not have 
a general constitutional right to discovery.  Instead, his discovery rights are 
governed by statute, rule and court order.  Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 577 (Wyo. 
1990); Capshaw v. State, 714 P.2d 349, 351 (Wyo. 1986).  Thus, while a 
defendant may request or demand certain information from the State, he is 
entitled to the information only insofar as required by statute, rule or case 
law.  W.R.Cr.P. 16(a)(1)(A)(2) 
governs discovery of the defendant's statements to law 
enforcement:

 
 
   (a) Disclosure of Evidence by the State. 

 
 
(1)  Information Subject to 
Disclosure.

 
 
            
            
(A)  Statement of 
Defendant.

 
 
         
            
       
(i) Upon written demand of a defendant the state shall permit the 
defendant to inspect and copy or photograph:

 
 
                        
             
1. Any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, or 
copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the state, the 
existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become 
known, to the attorney for the state;

 
 
                        
            
2. The substance of any oral statement which the state intends to offer 
in evidence at the trial made by the defendant whether before or after arrest; 
and

 
 
                        
            
3. Recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand jury which relates 
to the offense charged.

                        
. . . . 

 
 
(2) 
Information Not Subject to Disclosure.   
Except as provided in subparagraphs (1)(A), (1)(B), and (1)(D), this rule 
does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other 
internal state documents made by the attorney for the state or other state 
agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, or of 
statements made by state witnesses or prospective state witnesses except as 
provided in Rule 26.2.

 

[¶14]   In this case, there was no written 
or recorded statement.  Instead, the 
State offered Detective Owens' testimony that Mr. Ceja had verbally admitted the 
pornographic materials belonged to him.  
Pursuant to its clear language, Rule 16(a)(1)(A)(i)(2) applies to this 
situation, and Mr. Ceja was entitled to disclosure of the "substance of" the 
oral statement the State intended to offer into evidence.  As recognized by the district court, 
Rule 16(a)(2) does not require the State to provide discovery of law 
enforcement's internal reports, etc., except as provided in Rule 16(a)(1).                
      

 
 
[¶15]   This Court addressed an issue 
similar to the one presented here in Dennis v. State, 963 P.2d 972 (Wyo. 
1998).  Dennis was convicted of 
taking indecent liberties with a minor.  
At trial, "the prosecutor repeatedly referred to Dennis'[s] statement 
during a police interview that he did not really care about the ages of the 
girls he associated with because he was a player.'"  Id. at 975.  Dennis's statement to the police was 
oral and apparently had not been recorded.  
The officer had, however, taken notes during the interview, and his notes 
included the "player" reference.  
The officer prepared a report, which was provided to the defense in 
discovery, but his notes were not.  
The report did not state that Dennis had used the term "player" to 
describe himself.  Dennis moved for 
a mistrial because the officer testified about the "player" statement at trial 
and it had not been provided to the defense.  Id.  

  

[¶16]   On appeal, this Court concluded 
that the State's omission of the word "player" from the discovery provided to 
the defense was not a violation of Rule 16.  We explained:  

 
 
This 
particular statement falls under Rule 16(a)(1)(A)(i)(2), and the omission of the 
word player' is not a vital or an integral part of the substance of defendant's 
oral statement to the police.  The 
district court correctly ruled that the State had disclosed the substance of the 
oral statement.  Rule 16(a)(2) does 
not require disclosure of the officer's notes.

 
 

Id. 
at 
975-76.  

 
 
[¶17]   This Court's ruling in Dennis is consistent with the Tenth 
Circuit's interpretation of the similar Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.2  In United States v. Hernandez-Muniz, 170 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir. 1999), the Tenth Circuit ruled that an agent's 
preliminary hearing testimony about the defendant's oral statement to law 
enforcement was sufficient to meet the requirement to disclose the "substance 
of" the defendant's oral statement.  
Id. at 1010.  The court noted:

 
 
The 
underlying purposes of Rule 16 further support our conclusion. Rule 16 is 
designed to provide the defendant with sufficient information to make an 
informed decision about a plea, to allow the court to rule on admissibility 
motions before trial, to minimize prejudicial surprise at trial, and to 
generally increase the efficiency of litigation. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 advisory committee 
notes to the 1974 amendment. The disclosure of the defendant's statement at the 
preliminary hearing, along with provision of the hearing transcript, combine to 
satisfy these purposes. Defendant cannot now complain about a lack of notice or 
prejudice in this matter. The district court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the statement.

 
 

Id. 
 The court specifically noted that neither 
the rules nor due process require disclosure of the substance of the defendant's 
statement in a particular form or manner.  
Id.  at 1010-11.  Consistently, the Tenth Circuit ruled in 
United States v. Martinez, 455 F.3d 1127, 1131 (10th Cir. 2006), that disclosure 
of an officer's written report concerning defendant's statement will ordinarily 
suffice to meet the government's disclosure requirements under F.R.Cr.P. 16. 

 
 
[¶18]   In this case, the State gave notice 
of the substance of Mr. Ceja's oral statements on a number of occasions prior to 
the trial.  In the affidavit of 
probable cause which accompanied the felony information and arrest warrant, 
Detective Owens averred:

 
 
I 
asked "Almada" about the pictures he has shown Jose [Robledo] of young 
boys.  "Almada" admitted to having 
three or four DVDs with child pornography on them.  "Almada" also stated there may be some 
child pornography on his computer as well, as he had used it to look at child 
pornography on the internet."  
"Almada" stated he had told Jose that the pictures were his "secret" and 
they "were not legal."  Officers 
located the DVDs containing the child pornography in "Almada's" bedroom. 

 
 
[¶19]   In its traverse to Mr. Ceja's 
motion in limine, the State confirmed that it had provided the officer's reports 
to the defense as part of discovery.  
Although the reports are not included in the record on appeal, there is 
no indication that they failed to include the information about Mr. Ceja's 
admissions.3  

 
 
[¶20]   Additionally, Detective Owens 
testified about Mr. Ceja's statement at the pre-trial hearing on the motion to 
suppress and defense counsel had the opportunity to cross examine him.  The hearing was recorded and Mr. Ceja 
obtained a copy of the transcript, which he introduced into evidence at the 
pre-trial liminal hearing.  

 

[¶21]   The State disclosed Mr. Ceja's oral 
statements on a number of occasions prior to trial and there is no indication 
the disclosure was inaccurate or varied in any material fashion from the 
testimony provided at trial.4  In accordance with Dennis and the federal cases, the State 
complied with Rule 16 by disclosing the "substance of" Mr. Ceja's verbal 
statements; he was not entitled to have that information provided in a specific 
form or manner or to receive a copy of the officer's notes in pre-trial 
discovery.  The State provided Mr. 
Ceja with sufficient notice of the statements it intended to use at trial to 
satisfy the purposes of Rule 16.  
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Ceja's 
motion in limine to exclude the detective's testimony about his 
admissions.

 
 
[¶22]   Affirmed.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Section 
6-4-303 states in relevant part: 

 
 
(a)  As used in this 
section:

            
   . . . 
.

  (ii) "Child pornography" 
means any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, 
computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether or not made or produced 
by electronic, mechanical or other means, of explicit sexual conduct, 
where:

  . . . .   

     (B)  The visual depiction is of explicit 
sexual conduct involving a child or an individual virtually indistinguishable 
from a child[.]

 
 
            
. . . .   

(b) 
A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a child if, for any purpose, he 
knowingly:

            . . . 
.

                (iv) Possesses child pornography . . . 
.

                        
. . . .

(d) 
The sexual exploitation of a child by possession of sexually exploitive material 
pursuant to paragraph (b)(iv) of this section is a felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both.

 
 
            
   

 
 

2F.R.Cr.P. 
16 states in relevant part:

 
 

(a) 
Government's Disclosure.

     (1) Information Subject to 
Disclosure.

(A) 
Defendant's Oral 
Statement. 
Upon a defendant's request, the government must disclose to the defendant the 
substance of any relevant oral statement made by the defendant, 
before or after arrest, in response to interrogation by a person the defendant 
knew was a government agent if the government intends to use the statement at 
trial.

. . . .

     (2) Information Not Subject to 
Disclosure. 
Except as Rule 16(a)(1) provides 
otherwise, this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, 
memoranda, or other internal government documents made by an attorney for the 
government or other government agent in connection with investigating or 
prosecuting the case. 

 
 

3We urge counsel to assure all evidence relevant to the issues on appeal 
is included in the record on appeal.  
See, e.g., Martinez, 455 F.3d  at 1131 (noting the 
court was hampered in its "assessment of whether the disclosure obligation was 
fully satisfied" because the report was not included in the record). 

 
 

4Mr. Ceja tentatively argues that we should remand the case to allow him 
to argue that the failure to produce the notes was a violation of the State's 
responsibility to provide the defense with exculpatory evidence in accordance 
with Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 
83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).  
While Mr. Ceja hinted at a potential Brady violation in his argument on the 
motion in limine, he did not make a direct, cogent argument supported by 
pertinent authority in support of that position to the district court.  His argument was, instead, directed at a 
violation of court rules.  We do not 
consider Brady arguments raised for 
the first time on appeal. Adams v. State, 
2005 WY 94 ¶ 27, 117 P.3d 1210, 1219 (Wyo. 2005).  In addition, the Tenth Circuit ruled in 
Hernandez-Muniz, 170 F.3d  at 1011, 
that Brady does not require that 
exculpatory information from the defendant's statement to law enforcement be 
provided in a specific form or manner so long as it is 
provided.