Title: Risley v. Moberg

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

69 Wn.2d 560 (1966) 419 P.2d 151 EVANELLE RISLEY, Respondent, v. JOHN MOBERG et al., Appellants.[*] No. 38344. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. October 13, 1966. *561 Ray L. Greenwood, for appellants. John R. Lewis, for respondent. LANGENBACH, J.[] This is an action for injuries alleged to have been sustained in an intersection automobile collision. The plaintiff's automobile sustained damages to its left rear fender in the amount of $65. Defendants appealed from an adverse jury verdict and judgment. At the close of respondent's case-in-chief, her counsel excused her main witness, an orthopedist who had treated her. He was about to rest her case, when the following occurred to which error is assigned: EXAMINATION BY COURT In prior cross-examination, the following colloquy occurred: Appellants established that respondent had been treated by a chiropractor from October 1 to December 7, 1962, and January 22 until March 28, 1963, for neck and back injuries as well as other complaints.[1] She had a cervical affliction in the neck at the first seven cervical vertebrae in her spine. About February 19, 1963, an industrial insurance claim had been filed with the state. This information was not given to the orthopedist who testified for respondent. Another medical doctor testified for appellants. In his opinion, the respondent's present condition was the result of a degenerative disease of the cervical spine and this was not related to the accident trauma. A majority of patients with neck strain get over it within 3 to 6 months. It thus becomes apparent that the trial judge's questioning of respondent's doctor was an essential and vital part of her case. In these questions, the court assumed the existence of these injuries and her condition as a result of the accident in question. Appellants made timely motions that the court's questions and the doctor's answers be striken from the record and for a new trial. In the trial judge's memorandum opinion denying the motion for a new trial, he said the following: [1] The law in this state clearly prohibits the trial judge from commenting upon the evidence. Const. art. 4, § 16 provided: "Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law." In speaking of this constitutional prohibition, Heitfeld v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Keglers, 36 Wn.2d 685, 699, 220 P.2d 655, 18 A.L.R.2d 983 (1950), said the following: *564 The Heitfeld court, then, reviewed all the Washington cases holding either the trial judge's comments violated or did not violate the constitutional prohibition. In reconciling these cases, the Heitfeld court said, at 706: In Heitfeld, during a colloquy with counsel concerning the admissibility of evidence, the trial judge (in the presence of the jury) made the comment that the plaintiff had already proven an element of his case. This court holding that this was not commenting on the evidence said, at 706: What was stated in State v. Jackson, 83 Wash. 514, 523, 145 Pac. 470 (1915), is equally applicable and cogent here: [2] In the case at bar, looking at the questions in the context of this relatively short trial,[2] the judge's questions appear of great magnitude and importance. The questions assumed the crux of respondent's case a factual issue for the jury, viz, whether she had sustained injuries as a result of this accident. Appellants always contended that respondent did not receive any injuries from the accident. The judge, by assuming this fact, appeared personally to corroborate and seemingly to indorse the credibility of respondent and her doctor. The judge frankly admitted this had a material and substantial influence upon the jury. The effect was prejudicial to appellants. Consequently, the judgment based upon the verdict must be set aside. Appellants are granted a new trial; the costs will abide its outcome. It is so ordered. ROSELLINI, C.J., DONWORTH and WEAVER, JJ., concur. FINLEY, J., concurs in the result. [*] Reported in 419 P.2d 151. [] Judge Langenbach is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution. [1] Respondent made the following visits in 1962, October 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 15, 17, 25; November 1, 26, 28; December 3, 7; and in 1963, January 22; February 19, 21, 25, 28; March 6, 8, 14, 17, 19, 21, 25, 27 and 28. [2] Respondent's case was three witnesses: appellant-husband, herself and the orthopedist.