Title: Halpern v. Wheeldon

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Halpern v. Wheeldon1995 WY 19890 P.2d 562Case Number: 94-147Decided: 02/24/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Marc 
HALPERN, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Chancy WHEELDON and Kim Wheeldon, d/b/a Mill Iron 
Ranch, Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal from District Court of Teton County, D. Terry 
Rogers, J.

Robert B. Ranck of Ranck 
& Schwartz, Jackson, and Timothy W. Miller, Casper, Wyoming, for appellant.

Richard J. Mulligan, 
Jackson, for 
appellees.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Marc 
Halpern appeals from the district court's order which granted a summary judgment 
in favor of Appellees Chancy Wheeldon and Kim Wheeldon, who were doing business 
as the Mill Iron Ranch.

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand.

Issues

[¶3]      Mr. Halpern 
presents these issues for our review:

1.         
Whether appellees owed a duty of reasonable care to 
appellant.

2.         
Whether being thrown while attempting to mount an oversized horse without 
a mounting block or proper assistance is an intrinsic risk of horseback riding 
that cannot reasonably be eliminated, altered or 
controlled.

3.         
Whether it was improper and erroneous for the district court to find that 
no dangerous condition was created by appellees.

Facts

[¶4]      Mr. Halpern and 
his family were vacationing in Teton County in May 1991. The Halperns contacted 
the Wheeldons to make arrangements for Mr. Halpern and his daughter to go 
horseback riding at the Wheeldons' ranch. The Wheeldons were involved in the 
business of renting horses and taking people on horseback rides for hire. Mrs. 
Halpern informed Mrs. Wheeldon that Mr. Halpern and his daughter had very little 
experience with horses. Mrs. Wheeldon assured Mrs. Halpern that the horses were 
docile and safe.

[¶5]      After the Halpern 
family had arrived at the ranch, Mr. Wheeldon and a ranch employee provided 
horses for Mr. Halpern and his daughter to ride. The ranch employee held the 
reins for Mr. Halpern while he attempted to mount his horse. When Mr. Halpern 
had difficulty mounting the horse, Mr. Wheeldon helped him by lifting him up 
onto the horse's back. The horse started to circle and back up, and eventually 
it began to buck. The horse pulled the reins away from the ranch employee and 
threw Mr. Halpern to the ground. Mr. Halpern's left ankle was severely broken as 
a result of the fall.

[¶6]      Mr. Halpern filed 
a lawsuit against the Wheeldons, alleging that the Wheeldons had been negligent 
by: (1) selecting a horse for him which was not docile, safe, or appropriate; 
(2) failing to secure the horse while he mounted; (3) failing to assist him 
while he was attempting to mount the horse; and (4) failing to warn him about 
the horse's erratic behavior. The Wheeldons filed a motion for a summary 
judgment. After considering the parties' arguments, the district court granted 
the Wheeldons' motion, and this appeal followed.

Discussion

[¶7]      "Summary judgment 
is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and when the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law." Sandstrom 
v. Sandstrom, 884 P.2d 968, 971 (Wyo. 1994). "A grant of summary judgment is 
reviewed from the viewpoint favorable to the party opposing the judgment. We 
accord no deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law." Smith, 
Keller & Associates v. Dorr & Associates, 875 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Wyo. 
1994) (citation omitted).

[¶8]      The district 
court stated that the Wheeldons were insulated from liability in this case 
pursuant to the Recreation Safety Act (the Act), WYO. STAT. §§ 1-1-121 to -123 
(Supp. 1992),1 and granted a summary judgment in 
their favor. The district court specifically found: "Getting thrown off or 
falling from a horse is an inherent risk in riding any horse. The risk is 
therefore intrinsic to the sport and one which cannot be reasonably altered, 
eliminated or controlled." Mr. Halpern argues that the Act did not apply in this 
case because his injury did not result from a risk which is inherent to the 
sport of horseback riding. We agree that the district court misapplied the Act 
and, therefore, erred by granting a summary judgment in favor of the 
Wheeldons.2

[¶9]      Section 1-1-123 
of the Act provides:

(a)  Any 
person who takes part in any sport or recreational opportunity assumes the 
inherent risk of injury and all legal responsibility for damage, injury or death 
to himself or other persons or property that results from the inherent risks in 
that sport or recreational opportunity.

(b)  A 
provider of any sport or recreational opportunity is not required to eliminate, 
alter or control the inherent risks within the particular sport or recreational 
opportunity.

(c)  
Actions based upon negligence of the provider not caused by an inherent 
risk of the sport or recreational opportunity shall be preserved pursuant to 
W.S. 1-1-109 [the comparative negligence statute].

"Provider" is defined as 
being "any person or governmental entity which for profit or otherwise, offers 
or conducts a sport or recreational opportunity." Section 1-1-122(a)(ii). The 
statutory definition of "sport or recreational opportunity" includes dude 
ranching and horseback riding. Section 1-1-122(a)(iii). Section 1-1-122(a)(i) 
defines "inherent risk" as being "any risk that is characteristic of or 
intrinsic to any sport or recreational opportunity and which cannot reasonably 
be eliminated, altered or controlled."

[¶10]   This Court has never interpreted 
the provisions of the Act. Under our well-established rules of statutory 
construction, we "endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the 
Legislature's intent." State Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 
872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994). We must first determine whether a statute is 
clear or ambiguous. "[A] statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that 
reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistency and 
predictability." Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 220 (Wyo. 1991). "[A] statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be 
vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations." 813 P.2d  at 219-20. 
"[W]hether an ambiguity exists in a statute is a matter of law to be determined 
by the court." 813 P.2d  at 220. If the language of a statute is clear and 
unambiguous, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and do not 
resort to the rules of statutory construction. Soles v. State, 809 P.2d 772, 773 
(Wyo. 1991).

[¶11]   Under the plain and ordinary 
language of the statute, a risk must satisfy two requirements in order to be 
classified as being an inherent risk. The risk must be characteristic of or 
intrinsic to the sport or recreational opportunity, and it must be one which 
cannot be reasonably eliminated, altered, or controlled. Section 1-1-122(a)(i). 
A provider has no duty to eliminate, alter, or control the inherent risks of an 
activity, and any person who chooses to take part in a sport or recreational 
opportunity assumes all inherent risks which are associated with that 
opportunity. Section 1-1-123(a), (b).

[¶12]   The Act employs assumption-of-risk 
language. The assumption-of-risk expression has a number of meanings, and the 
generic use of the expression leads to much confusion. See Anderson v. 
Louisiana-Pacific, 859 P.2d 85, 89 (Wyo. 1993) (Macy, C.J., concurring); 
Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 534-35 (Wyo. 1979). Under the clear and 
unambiguous language of the Act, the assumption-of-risk terminology is intended 
to limit the duty which a provider owes to a participant. This type of 
assumption of risk is known as primary assumption of risk. W. PAGE KEETON ET 
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 (5th ed. 
1984).

[¶13]   Primary assumption of risk must be 
distinguished from secondary assumption of risk. Secondary assumption of risk is 
generally considered to be an affirmative defense which a defendant may raise 
after the plaintiff has met his burden of proving that the defendant breached a 
legal duty which he owed to the plaintiff. See Annotation, Effect of Adoption of 
Comparative Negligence Rules on Assumption of Risk, 16 A.L.R.4TH 700 (1982). In 
other words, secondary assumption of risk is a type of contributory negligence. 
Cathy Hansen & Steve Duerr, Recreational Injuries & Inherent Risks: 
Wyoming's Recreation Safety Act, 28 LAND & WATER L.REV. 149, 156 (1993). In 
Wyoming, the absolute defense of secondary assumption of risk (contributory 
negligence) was abolished when the Legislature adopted the comparative 
negligence statute. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988) (amended 1994). Secondary 
assumption of risk is a basis for apportionment of fault under the comparative 
negligence scheme. Brittain, 601 P.2d  at 534. Since the Act is intended to limit 
the duty which a provider owes to a participant, our analysis in this case is 
not affected by the adoption of the comparative negligence statute. See Effect 
of Adoption of Comparative Negligence Rules on Assumption of Risk, supra § 
5.

[¶14]   In order to recover in any 
negligence action, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed a duty of 
care to him. See Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108, 111 (Wyo. 1989). Generally, the 
issue of duty is decided by the court as a matter of law. Id. In certain 
instances, however, the duty issue involves questions which are basic issues of 
fact. For example, in Thunder Hawk by and through Jensen v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Company, 844 P.2d 1045 (Wyo. 1992), we adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 339 (1965) as the test to be utilized in determining whether a 
defendant owes a duty to a child trespasser under the "attractive nuisance" 
doctrine. 844 P.2d  at 1048-49. In Thunder Hawk by and through Jensen, we stated 
that genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to whether the 
defendant owed a legal duty to the child trespasser and ruled that those issues 
should be resolved by the jury. Id.

[¶15]   The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
employed a similar analysis in Dillworth v. Gambardella, 970 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 
1992), when it interpreted Vermont's inherent risk statute. In that case, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the decision as to whether a 
risk is inherent involved the principle of primary assumption of risk and that, 
thus, a duty analysis must be employed. 970 F.2d  at 1119. However, the court 
stated that, because the Vermont Legislature had not defined what risks are 
inherent to a certain activity, the issue was properly presented to the jury as 
a question of fact. 970 F.2d  at 1119-20. See also Estate of Frant v. Haystack 
Group, Inc., 641 A.2d 765 (Vt. 1994).

[¶16]   In their arguments to this Court, 
the parties rely upon a recent law review article which analyzed the Act. Hansen 
& Duerr, supra. The authors of that article argue vehemently that the issue 
of whether a particular risk is inherent to a sport or recreational opportunity 
is a question of law which must be decided by the court. Hansen & Duerr, 
supra at 173-75. We have reviewed numerous cases and authorities on this issue, 
and we conclude that, when genuine issues of material fact exist, it is proper 
to present the issue to the jury of whether a risk is inherent to a particular 
activity.

[¶17]   We note that Wyoming's Recreation 
Safety Act is more concise than similar statutes in other states are. Many of 
our sister states' inherent risk statutes provide nonexclusive lists of risks 
which the Legislatures have determined are inherent to certain activities. See, 
e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-51 to -54 (1992 & Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 
6-1101 to -1109 (1990). When a court is presented with a case under that type of 
statute, it may compare the facts of the case to the list of legislatively 
defined inherent risks and decide, as a matter of law, whether the plaintiff's 
injury resulted from an inherent risk. See, e.g., Northcutt v. Sun Valley 
Company, 117 Idaho 351, 787 P.2d 1159 (1990); Schmitz v. Cannonsburg Skiing 
Corporation, 170 Mich. App. 692, 428 N.W.2d 742 (1988); Berniger v. Meadow 
Green-Wildcat Corp., 945 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1991). The Wyoming Legislature did not 
provide the courts with that type of guidance. We agree with the court in 
Dillworth:

To say that inherent risks are assumed by sports 
participants "as a matter of law" is of little solace to defendants when the 
question remains: what risks in a sport are inherent, obvious, or necessary to 
its participation, a question that ordinarily must be resolved by the 
jury.

970 F.2d  at 
1119.

[¶18]   We recognize that some trials could 
be avoided and that litigation costs could be reduced if the courts were to 
decide as a matter of law whether a particular risk is inherent to a sport or 
recreational opportunity. In appropriate cases where no genuine issues of 
material fact exist, the district court may decide as a matter of law that the 
provider does not owe a duty to the participant. However, in many cases, the 
costs of litigation will not be reduced because the losing party will appeal 
from the district court's legal determination in an attempt to persuade this 
Court that a particular risk is or is not inherent.

[¶19]   In this case, genuine issues of 
material fact exist with regard to whether the risks encountered by Mr. Halpern 
are intrinsic to the sport of horseback riding and whether the Wheeldons could 
have reasonably altered, eliminated, or controlled those risks. A genuine issue 
of material fact exists as to whether the Wheeldons could have assisted Mr. 
Halpern in mounting the horse in a different manner and, thereby, reduced or 
eliminated the risks which are associated with mounting.

[¶20]   As a procedural matter, the jury 
must decide whether the Wheeldons owed a duty to Mr. Halpern by determining 
whether the risks encountered by Mr. Halpern while he was mounting his horse are 
inherent to the sport of horseback riding. If the jury determines that the risks 
are inherent, the Wheeldons will be insulated from liability under the Act. If, 
however, the jury determines that the risks are not inherent and that the 
Wheeldons, therefore, owed a duty of care to Mr. Halpern, liability should be 
determined as it would be in any negligence case.

Conclusion

[¶21]   We hold that the district court 
erred by granting a summary judgment in favor of the 
Wheeldons.

[¶22]   Reversed and 
remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1 In 1993, the Legislature amended § 
1-1-122 of the Act to more extensively cover "equine" activities. Those 
amendments do not apply in this case because they did not become effective until 
July 1, 1993.

2 Since the district court based its 
decision upon the Act and we do not agree with the district court's conclusion, 
the scope of this opinion is limited to an analysis of the Act.