Title: LUNDE v. STATE ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIV.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LUNDE v. STATE ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIV.2000 WY 1346 P.3d 1256Case Number: 99-281Decided: 06/07/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
ANNETTE LUNDE, Appellant 
(Petitioner), v.STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee (Respondent).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Natrona County, The Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge. 

Representing 
Appellant: Stephenson D. Emery of 
Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.Representing 
Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy 
Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1] Appellant, 
Annette Lunde (Lunde), seeks review of the district court's order affirming an 
order denying benefits issued by a hearing examiner, after a hearing into 
Lunde's claim for additional worker's compensation benefits. The hearing 
examiner concluded that Lunde had failed to meet her burden of proof to 
demonstrate that, because of her work-related injury, she was unable to return 
to employment at a comparable or higher wage than the wage she was earning at 
the time of her injury. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Lunde 
advances these issues:

A. Whether the Office of 
Administrative Hearings ("Office") erred as a matter of law in denying Annette 
Lunde (Appellant) an award of loss of earnings benefits by concluding that, for 
purposes of Wyo. Stat. 27-14-405(h)(i), her pre-injury wage was comparable to a 
post-injury potential wage.

B. Whether the Office 
erred as a matter of law in denying appellant an award of loss of earnings 
benefits by refusing to consider what appellant would have earned if she had 
been able to continue her employment as a convenience store manager, the 
difference due to inflation between 1988 and 1997 wages, and the difference in 
cost of living and in wages between Sweetwater County, Wyoming in 1988 and 
Southern California in 1997 in deciding what is a comparable wage as that term 
is used in Wyo. Stat. 27-14-405(h)(i).

[¶3] Appellee, 
the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division (Division) provides this restatement 
of the issues:

I. Is the availability of 
permanent partial disability benefits a mixed question of law and 
fact?

II. Were the Hearing 
Examiner's findings of basic fact supported by substantial 
evidence?

III. Did the Hearing 
Examiner properly apply the permanent partial disability 
statute?

FACTS

[¶4] Lunde began 
working for Maverick Convenience Store in Rock Springs in April of 1979 and was 
continuously employed there until an on-the-job injury made it impossible for 
her to continue that work. On September 6, 1988, while in the course and scope 
of her employment,1 Lunde was bitten by a brown recluse 
spider, and the medical consequences of that event have left her disabled. Lunde 
did receive worker's compensation benefits for her injury. Because she was 
physically unable to return to work, Lunde's employment with Maverick Stores was 
terminated. She was treated for her injury in Wyoming for about one year and 
then moved to California in August of 1989 to live with her mother. She has 
received additional medical care there in the intervening years. Lunde has not 
been employed for any significant period of time since her injury and, at the 
time of the hearing, was receiving disability benefits from the Social Security 
Administration on the basis that she was disabled.2

[¶5] Lunde was 
earning $7.34 per hour at the time of her injury, and the conclusion of the 
vocational evaluation was that she could presently earn $7.25 per 
hour.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶6] Our 
standard of review in a case such as this is 
well-established:

A claimant for worker's 
compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the essential elements of 
the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the contested case hearing. 
Martinez v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 917 P.2d 619, 621 
(Wyo. 1996). When an agency decides that the party charged with the burden of 
proof has failed to meet that burden, the case is reviewed under the 
"[a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law" language of WYO. STAT. 16-3-114(c)(ii) (1990). City of Casper v. 
Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 1995). On appeal the complainant, Pederson in 
this instance, has the burden of proving arbitrary administrative action. Knight 
v. Environmental Quality Council of State of Wyo., 805 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1991); 
Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432, 439 (Wyo. 1974); Marathon Oil 
Co. v. Welch, 379 P.2d 832, 836 (Wyo. 1963); Whitesides v. Council of City of 
Cheyenne, 78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520, 526 (1957). The agency, as the trier of 
fact, is charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of 
witnesses. Utech, 895 P.2d  at 451, and cases there cited. The deference normally 
accorded to the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the 
administrative agency, and the agency's decision as to the facts will not be 
overturned unless it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence. Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 
1994). Demonstrating evidentiary contradictions in the record does not establish 
the irrationality of the ruling, but we do examine conflicting evidence to 
determine if the agency reasonably could have made its finding and order based 
upon all of the evidence before it. Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 971 (Wyo. 
1996); Knight, 805 P.2d  at 274; Ward v. Board of Trustees of Goshen County 
School Dist. No. 1, 865 P.2d 618, 623 (Wyo. 1993); State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Div. v. Ramsey, 839 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo. 
1992).

Claim of Pederson, 
939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997); Erdman v. Wyoming Workers' and Safety Compensation 
Division, 2000 WL 513798 at *2 (Wyo.), 5 P.3d 64, 65-66 (Wyo. 
2000).

DISCUSSION

[¶7] Of the 
greatest significance for purposes of this appeal is Lunde's contention that 
there were, for all intents and purposes, very few, if any, jobs available that 
she could perform given the limitations created by her injury. Continuing, she 
asserts that, in any event, the jobs utilized in the process of determining her 
current wage earning ability were definitely not jobs she could physically 
perform, and that several of the jobs used to calculate her wage earning ability 
were not available or she did not meet the essential qualifications for the 
jobs. There is no dispute that her attending physician described her 
occupational limitations as follows:

A sedentary job should be 
appropriate if it could be met with the following restrictions. Standing 
requirements of less than 15 minutes at a time and an intermittent 10 minute 
break for rest and elevation [of her leg]. Sitting should be limited to less 
than 45 minutes if the leg is not elevated or less than two hours if she is 
permitted to elevate it. She should be able to avoid more than one flight of 
stairs and not be required to lift or carry more than five 
pounds.

[¶8] Although 
there is clearly an apparent divergence between the attending physician's view 
of Lunde's occupational capabilities and the disability determination made by 
the Social Security Administration, the evidence presented by Lunde does not aid 
us in resolving that seeming contradiction.

[¶9] 
Counterpoised to Lunde's contentions is a vocational evaluation. which was 
performed at the request of the Division and which identified several general 
types of work that Lunde could perform despite her disability. The burden of 
proof Lunde was required to meet is set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 27-14-405(h)(i) 
(LEXIS 1999):

(h) An injured employee 
awarded permanent partial impairment benefits may apply for a permanent 
disability award subject to the following terms and 
conditions:

(i) the injured employee 
is because of the injury, unable to return to employment at a comparable or 
higher wage than the wage the employee was earning at the time of 
injury[.]

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
27-14-405(j) sets out a formula for calculating an award of benefits under 
27-14-405(h), if one is due. In Lunde's case, the Division determined that her 
capacity to earn $7.25 an hour was comparable to her $7.34 per hour earnings at 
the time of her injury and, therefore, she was not entitled to any additional 
benefits.

[¶10] Lunde 
argues that the vocational evaluation is flawed in many respects, and that the 
hearing examiner's conclusions relied almost entirely upon that vocational 
evaluation. Hence, the decision to deny benefits is arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, not supported by substantial evidence, or otherwise 
unlawful. Lunde contends that the hearing examiner should have considered 
inflation over the years 1988-1998, the higher cost of living in California, 
overtime pay that she had historically earned at Maverick, and the likelihood 
that she would be making about $12.50 per hour now, if she had been able to 
continue her career with Maverick Stores.

[¶11] We agree 
with the Division that the statute does not authorize nor permit the hearing 
examiner to consider those factors. Lunde's argument certainly has considerable 
logical appeal, but the statute does not provide for it, and Lunde has cited no 
pertinent authority nor presented cogent argument that could sustain such a 
holding by this Court. We find no error in this regard.

[¶12] However, 
we must, in the same breath, note the incongruity of the vocational evaluation 
with respect to these matters. The Division is resolute in its position that 
time and geography (inflation, relative cost of living, etc.) can play no role 
in calculating an award such as that sought by Lunde. Yet, the vocational 
evaluation was prepared in San Diego, California, by an employee of CRA Managed 
Care, Inc., and all of the information about jobs that were potentially 
available to Lunde are located in that geographical area.

[¶13] 
The evaluation presumed that the severely disabled Lunde could be hired for any 
one of several jobs listed in the evaluation at the mid-point of the salary 
range listed for those jobs. For example, for the job at the Union Bank of 
America (which required standing largely throughout the shift and the lifting of 
boxes of coins) the salary range was $6-$7 per hour (6 + 7 =  
             
              
               
            
        13; divided by 2 =      $6.50 
per hour). Six of the nine jobs listed in the evaluation paid in the $6-$7 per 
hour range. One job was listed at $6.00 per hour (that job, working for Avis car 
rental as a sales agent, required twisting, stooping, starting, and cleaning 
cars). Another job, working in customer service for Enterprise Rent-A-Car (which 
required college - AA, BA preferred),3 paid $2,200 per month 
(approximately $11.50 per hour). One bank teller job (which required standing, 
some stools, more sales oriented requiring greeting) paid $7.50-$10 per hour 
(7.50 + 10 = 17.50, divided by 2 = $8.75). Of the nine jobs listed, only four 
noted current or pending vacancies.

[¶14] The 
statute requires that the loss of earning capacity be based on what Lunde earned 
in Wyoming at the time of her injury. Likewise, if the Division is going to rely 
on a vocational evaluation to demonstrate current earning capacity, then that 
should be based on available jobs in Wyoming. In this case, as would be the case 
with any disabled worker, the jobs used in such an evaluation must be conducted 
with some basis in reality which gives recognition to the worker's disability. 
Lunde's contention that she was probably unable to perform most, if not all, of 
the jobs used in the evaluation - not to mention that she did not appear to 
qualify for many of them - is intuitively obvious even to the most casual 
observer. For these reasons we conclude that the vocational evaluation offered 
by the Division was of no evidentiary value in resolving this case and should 
not have been considered by the hearing examiner.

[¶15] However 
unavailing the evidence offered by the Division might have been, the burden of 
proof still rested on Lunde's shoulders. Her testimony was anecdotal, 
self-serving, in part based on an informal conversation with one employee in a 
single convenience store in California, was not supported by documentary 
evidence, affidavits, reports, or other reliable sources of information, and 
demonstrated that she was able to work periodically (but without any substantial 
showing that there was good reason that she was not able to work more than 
periodically, except for those periods when she was undergoing medical treatment 
procedures). Although a broad range of informal evidence, including hearsay, is 
admissible in a worker's compensation hearing, any offered evidence must be 
probative, trustworthy, and credible. Clark v. Worker's Safety and Compensation 
Division, 968 P.2d 436, 439 (Wyo. 1998); Wyo. Stat. Ann. 16-3-108(a) (LEXIS 
1999). Upon careful examination of all evidence in the record offered by Lunde, 
and leaving out of consideration the vocational evaluation for which the 
Division paid, we are compelled to conclude that Lunde did not meet the burden 
of proof placed on her by the governing statute. Thus, we hold that the ultimate 
conclusion of the hearing examiner must be affirmed.

[¶16] Because of 
this disposition, we need not further consider our holding in Adams v. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 975 P.2d 17 (Wyo. 1999). There, we 
held that comparable, as used in 27-14-405(h)(i), meant substantially equal or 
equivalent, and wages are only comparable if the difference between them is 
insignificant. Id., 975 P.2d  at 20. We are unable to apply that standard here 
because Lunde has failed to present evidence which would provide the raw 
materials for such a comparison to be made.4

[¶17] Lunde also 
asks that we consider her case in light of Claim of Nielsen, 806 P.2d 297 (Wyo. 
1991). We have reviewed Nielsen, a permanent total disability case determined 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403 (LEXIS 1999), and conclude that the holding of 
that case does not apply to the circumstances presented by Lunde's 
case.

[¶18] For these 
reasons, the order of the district court affirming the determination of the 
hearing examiner's denial of benefits is affirmed.

Footnotes

1 As manager 
of the store, Lunde performed a wide range of tasks associated with management 
of that business enterprise. In this instance, it was necessary for her to enter 
into a crawl space beneath the store in order to attach a drain to a soft drink 
dispensing machine. During the course of that task, she was bitten by a brown 
recluse spider.

2 20 C.F.R. 
404.1505 (1999) provides:

(a) The law 
defines disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by 
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment [which] can 
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last 
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. To meet this definition, you 
must have a severe impairment, which makes you unable to do your previous work 
or any other substantial gainful activity which exists in the national economy. 
To determine whether you are able to do any other work, we consider your 
residual functional capacity and your age, education, and work 
experience.

3 Lunde had 
neither an AA or BA degree.

4 Effective 
July 1, 2000, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 27-14-405(h)(i) has been amended to 
read:

(i) The 
injured employee is because of the injury, unable to return to employment at a 
wage that is at least ninety-five percent (95%) of the monthly gross earnings 
the employee was earning at the time of injury;

Enrolled Act No. 32, Senate, 2000 Budget 
Session.