Title: Roger Stewart Harris v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC00-1598
____________
ROGER STEWART HARRIS,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[March 27, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court finding Roger
Stewart Harris guilty of first-degree murder and imposing the death penalty.  We
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed
below, we affirm Harris’s conviction but vacate his sentence of death and remand
for a new penalty phase proceeding.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On Monday, December 7, 1998, the body of Donna Harris was discovered
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in her van which had been parked in a truck stop parking lot for several days.  An
autopsy revealed the cause of death to be a wound to the back of the head.  Roger
Harris (Harris), the victim’s husband, had reported her missing on Friday,
December 4, 1998.  Harris quickly became a suspect in his wife’s murder, and on
January 22, 1999, was indicted for first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit
first-degree murder.  
The evidence presented at trial revealed the following facts:  In late June
1998, Jennifer Palmer moved in with Roger and Donna Harris to care for the
Harrises' two children.  On July 3, 1998, Donna moved out of the house with the
children apparently because Harris and Palmer had developed a sexual relationship. 
After the July 4 weekend, Donna returned home and ordered Palmer to leave. 
Palmer moved in with the Harrises’ neighbors but continued to care for the Harris
children for a little over a month.  During this time, Harris and Palmer continued
their sexual relationship.  When Donna discovered that Harris and Palmer had
continued their sexual relationship, Palmer was fired.  At this point, Harris told
Palmer he was going to leave his wife, and Harris and Palmer agreed to be married.  
In mid-October, Harris told Palmer he decided not to divorce Donna
because she had threatened to take their children to Kentucky so that he would
never see them again.  However, Harris and Palmer resumed their relationship after
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one week and continued to discuss marriage.  In order to marry Palmer without
divorcing Donna and risk losing his children, Harris told Palmer that he planned to
kill Donna.
On December 2, 1998, Harris and Palmer discussed killing Donna.  Palmer
worked her shift at a local bar and after work called the Harris home two or three
times but no one answered.  Harris later called the bar and told Palmer, “I did it.  I
am washing my hands and I need you here.”  Palmer went to Harris’s home and
observed him cleaning some items for about fifteen minutes and disposing of
several items into a black garbage bag.  Harris placed the black garbage bag into
Palmer’s car and told her to throw it away.  Harris also gave Palmer a white bag
and instructed her to throw its contents into the water.  Harris told Palmer the white
bag contained a gun he made by welding pieces together.  Palmer then left the
Harris house in her car and pursuant to Harris’s instructions, waited for him to pass
her at the end of the road.  Harris was driving his wife’s van.  
Palmer followed Harris to a truck stop, but she parked and waited at a
nearby gas station.  Palmer then moved her car to a nearby restaurant, and ten to
fifteen minutes later Harris walked up to Palmer’s car.  As they drove towards
Harris’s home, Harris undressed and instructed Palmer to throw away his clothes. 
Harris told Palmer he was going to call the police the next day and report Donna
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).  
2.  (1) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain (moderate
weight); and (2) the murder was cold, calculated and premeditated, without any
pretense of legal or moral justification (substantial weight).  The trial court
considered a third aggravator, the murder was committed during the unlawful
discharge of a destructive device, but found that this factor did not exist.  
3.  (1) No significant history of prior criminal activity (given moderate
weight); (2) extreme mental or emotional disturbance (found not to exist); and (3)
extreme duress or the substantial domination of another person (found not to exist).
4.  (1) Harris was a loving son to his mother (given very little weight); (2)
Harris was a loving brother to his sister (given very little weight); (3) Harris
provided financial and emotional assistance to his sister (given little weight); (4)
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missing.  After dropping Harris off at home, Palmer dumped the items given to her
by Harris at various locations in Columbia County.  Palmer was arrested on
December 7, 1998, and indicted for accessory after the fact to first-degree murder
and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.  Palmer pled guilty to both charges
and pursuant to the plea agreed to testify truthfully concerning her knowledge of
Donna Harris’s death.  
On April 27, 2000, a jury found Harris guilty as charged.  After penalty
proceedings, the jury returned a recommendation of death by a vote of seven to
five.  Following the Spencer1 hearing on June 9, 2000, the trial court sentenced
Harris to death on June 23, 2000, finding two aggravating circumstances,2 and
considering three statutory mitigators3 and sixteen nonstatutory mitigators.4
Harris acted as a surrogate father for his niece (given little weight); (5) Harris did
good deeds for others (given very little weight); (6) Harris's work record (given little
weight); (7) Harris’s ability to work under supervision and adverse conditions
(given little weight); (8) Harris’s ability to form caring and loving relationships
(given no weight); (9) Harris exhibited appropriate cordial behavior at trial (given
little weight); (10) Harris was a loving father (the court found this was not a
mitigating factor and did not consider it as such); (11) Harris did not flee after the
crime (the court found this was not a mitigating factor and did not consider it as
such); (12) Harris had a sweet and loving character (the court found this was not a
mitigating factor and did not consider it as such); (13) Harris was a good material
provider for his family (given little weight); (14) history of conflict within the family
(the court found this mitigating factor did not exist and did not consider it as such);
(15) Harris’s military record (given little weight); and (16) Harris was decorated
during his military service (given little weight).
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Harris raises nine issues on appeal:  (1) whether the trial court erred in
allowing the State to introduce prior consistent statements; (2) whether the trial
court erred in allowing the State’s firearm expert to display a plastic replica of the
murder weapon; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting inflammatory
photographs; (4) whether the trial court erred in finding the murder was committed
for pecuniary gain; (5) whether the trial court erred in finding the murder was
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of
legal or moral justification; (6) whether the imposition of the death penalty in this
case is proportionate; (7) whether the jury was misled as to the significance of its
verdict; (8) whether Harris’s death sentence is constitutional in light of the jury’s
seven-to-five vote; and (9) whether Florida’s death penalty statute violates the
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Florida and federal constitutions.  
GUILT PHASE
Admission of Prior Consistent Statements
First, Harris argues the trial court erred in admitting Palmer’s prior consistent
statements through the testimony of her friend, Shannon Harding. Harding testified
over defense objection to statements Palmer made about her relationship with
Harris and the plan to kill Harris’s wife.  On the issue of prior consistent
statements, we recently said:
     It is well established that prior consistent statements are generally
not admissible to bolster a witness’s testimony at trial.  See Chandler
v. State, 702 So. 2d 186, 197 (Fla. 1997).  In order to be admissible,
prior consistent statements, like any other hearsay statements, must
qualify under a hearsay exception.  See id.  Otherwise, prior consistent
statements can be admitted as nonhearsay “if the following conditions
are met: the person who made the prior consistent statement testifies at
trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning that statement; and
the statement is offered to ‘rebut an express or implied charge . . . of
improper influence, motive, or recent fabrication.’”  Id. at 197-98; see
also § 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995).
Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 743 (Fla.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 632 (2001). 
Thus prior consistent statements can be admitted as nonhearsay if two conditions
are met.  First, the person who made the prior consistent statement must testify at
trial and be subject to cross-examination concerning the statement.  This condition
was met in this case because Palmer testified at trial and was subject to cross-
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examination.  Second, and the point of disagreement between Harris and the State
is that the statement must be offered to rebut an express or implied charge of
improper influence, motive, or recent fabrication.  The State argues that because
Palmer admitted on cross-examination she was motivated to testify against Harris
because she desired a favorable sentence, defense counsel “opened the door” to
her prior consistent statements.  We agree with the State.
During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Palmer about the
circumstances surrounding her trial testimony, asking, “And you understand or feel
that you might could help your cause by helping the state prosecute Roger, do you
not,” to which Palmer responded, “Yes, sir.”  Defense counsel also asked, “Is it
not true that you feel like in your mind the better job you do testifying, the better
deal you will get when it comes time to be sentenced, when the number of years is
determined,” to which Palmer responded, “Yes, sir.”  Defense counsel’s line of
questioning was an attempt to show that Palmer was motivated to testify against
Harris because she desired to obtain a favorable sentence from the State, and thus
was sufficient to create an inference of improper motive to fabricate.  See Foster v.
State, 778 So. 2d 906, 916 (Fla. 2000); Rodriguez v. State, 609 So. 2d 493, 500
(Fla. 1992).  
Harris claims, however, that Palmer was angry with Harris for failing to leave
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his wife, and because this motive existed before the statements were made to
Harding, Palmer’s prior consistent statements are inadmissible.  
Palmer admitted on cross-examination that she felt sad and upset when
Harris stated he was not leaving his wife.  However, on direct examination Palmer
testified Harris decided not to divorce his wife because he was afraid of losing his
children, not because he no longer wished to marry Palmer.  There is no indication
in the record that Harris attempted a reconciliation with his wife or that Palmer
believed Harris was ending their relationship to be with his wife.  Harris and
Palmer’s plan was to kill Donna so that Harris could keep his children and marry
Palmer.  Therefore, we find no merit to Harris’s argument that Palmer’s motive to
testify falsely existed before the statements were made to Harding.  
Because Palmer’s statements were made to Harding before Palmer’s arrest,
and therefore prior to the existence of a motive to fabricate, they were properly
admitted.  See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 574 So. 2d 87, 92-93 (Fla. 1991) (finding
prior consistent statement admissible when defendant attempted to impeach witness
by suggesting she fabricated her testimony after negotiating a favorable plea,
because prior consistent statement was made before the plea agreement).
Admission of Plastic Replica of Murder Weapon
Next, Harris argues the trial court erred in allowing the State’s firearm expert
5.  This evidence was retrieved, with Palmer's assistance, from various
locations in Columbia County.  
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to display a plastic replica of the murder weapon.  David Williams, an expert in
firearms and tool mark identification, identified the following evidence: a six-inch
piece of pipe with threads on both ends, a copper fitting, a piece of copper tubing
with what appeared to be a cartridge casing inside, a spring, what appeared to be a
primer, a bolt with a finishing nail punch, a pair of vice-grip pliers, a number of .357
magnum cartridges (illustrative of all other cartridges received), another piece of
pipe, a brass connector, and a bolt that had been sharpened to a point on one end.5 
Williams testified that he laid out these components in a manner in which they could
have been assembled to build a weapon and photographed the assemblage.  From
the photograph Williams explained to the jury how the components could be
assembled into a weapon.
The State then showed Williams a plastic replica of the photographed assemblage
and asked Williams if the replica accurately depicted the manner in which the
components could have been assembled.  Williams agreed that the replica was a
possible combination of the components he examined, but admitted he did not
have all the components and it was possible that additional items were placed on
the weapon.  Williams also identified a section of the victim’s skull he had received
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from the medical examiner, and demonstrated to the jury how the plastic replica fit
into a hole in the skull section.
Harris claims the plastic replica was erroneously admitted as demonstrative
evidence because the State failed to establish any information about the weapon.
The record does not support Harris’s claim.  Harris told Palmer the white bag he
wanted her to dispose of contained a gun he had made by welding pieces together. 
There was expert testimony identifying the recovered components and explaining
how the components could have been assembled to build a weapon.  There was
also expert testimony linking the weapon to the hole in the victim’s skull.  As we
explained in Alston v. Shiver, 105 So. 2d 785, 791 (Fla. 1958):
     Demonstrative evidence is admissible only when it is relevant to the
issues in the case.  Such evidence is generally more effective than a
description given by a witness, for it enables the jury, or the court, to
see and thereby better understand the question or issue involved.  For
this reason it is essential, in every case where demonstrative evidence
is offered, that the object or thing offered for the jury to see be first
shown to be the object in issue and that it is in substantially the same
condition as at the pertinent time, or that it is such a reasonably exact
reproduction or replica of the object involved that when viewed by the
jury it causes them to see substantially the same object as the original.
     The person offering such evidence should be required to give a
good reason for its acceptance into evidence, and this is particularly
true if the object be not the original, but only a replica or a facsimile.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to display the plastic
replica because it met the requirements as outlined in Alston.  See, e.g., Heath v.
6.  The trial court’s instruction on the plastic replica is as follows:
Members of the jury, an item is about to be shown to you.  It is not
evidence in this case.  It should not be considered as evidence.  It is
merely a demonstrative aid which you can consider in weighing and
evaluating the positive and direct evidence which you have received. 
You may display the aid.
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State, 648 So. 2d 660, 664 (Fla. 1994) (stating that rulings on evidentiary matters
generally are within the sound discretion of the trial court).  
The jury had previously seen the components laid out and assembled in
Williams’ photograph; the replica was simply a physical representation of the
assembled components to enable the jury to better understand the weapon. 
Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury on the replica and its display was
relatively short.6  The replica was the same size as the component exhibits and was
a reasonably exact reproduction of the assembled weapon in Williams’ photograph. 
See Brown v. State, 550 So. 2d 527, 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (“The demonstrative
exhibits which the state used during the victim’s testimony . . . in order to depict
the knife before it was broken and the extent of the victim’s stab wounds, were
sufficiently accurate replicas to be allowable within the trial court’s discretion.”);
Wade v. State, 204 So. 2d 235, 238-39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967) (finding that trial court
did not err by admitting demonstrative evidence when it was relevant to the issues
in the case and when it was a reasonably exact replica of the object involved);
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Robinson v. State, 145 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962) (concluding that scale
model of the death weapon did not mislead or confuse the jury and was
appropriately identified by the state’s expert witness).  Finally, the probative value
of the replica outweighed any prejudicial effect because the replica was used to
explain the manner in which the components could have been combined to build a
weapon and the manner in which the weapon was consistent with the victim’s head
injury.  See § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2000).
Admission of Inflammatory Photographs and Videotape
Harris argues as his final guilt phase issue that the trial court erred in
admitting irrelevant inflammatory photographs of the murder victim and a videotape
of the crime scene.  
     We have consistently held that the initial test for determining the
admissibility of photographic evidence is relevance, not necessity. 
See Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2000).  Photographs are
admissible if “they assist the medical examiner in explaining to the jury
the nature and manner in which the wounds were inflicted.”  Bush v.
State, 461 So. 2d 936, 939 (Fla. 1985).  Moreover, photographs are
admissible “to show the manner of death, location of wounds, and the
identity of the victim.”  Larkins v. State, 655 So. 2d 95, 98 (Fla. 1995). 
On the other hand, trial courts must be cautious in not permitting
unduly prejudicial or particularly inflammatory photographs before the
jury.  However, a trial court’s decision to admit photographic evidence
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.  See Mansfield,
758 So. 2d at 648.
Brooks v. State, 787 So. 2d 765, 781 (Fla. 2001).  The mere fact that photographs
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may be gruesome does not necessarily mean they are inadmissible.  The admission
of such photographs is within the trial court's discretion and will only be reversed
when an abuse of discretion has been demonstrated.  See Rose v. State, 787 So.
2d 786 (Fla. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1349 (2002).  
In this case, the State introduced several photographs of the victim’s body
as well as a short videotape of the van where the body was discovered.  Harris
objects to this evidence as inflammatory.
Photographs 2 and 6
The medical examiner, Dr. Floro, identified State’s exhibits 2 and 6 as
photographs of the victim’s head and skull.  The defense objected to photographs
2 and 6 because maggots are visible in both photographs.  The trial court overruled
the objection, finding the photographs necessary to show the cause and manner of
death.  Dr. Floro testified that the victim had a wound to the back of the head.  Dr.
Floro then used photograph 2 to explain the external nature of the wound,
describing the shape and size of the wound, and photograph 6 to describe the path
of the object that entered the victim’s head.  We find both photographs relevant to
Dr. Floro’s expert testimony as to the cause of death and therefore admissible.  See
Rose v. State, 787 So. 2d 786, 794-95 (Fla. 2001) (finding that autopsy photos,
even when difficult to view, are admissible to the extent they fairly and accurately
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establish a material fact and are not unduly prejudicial); Larkins v. State, 655 So. 2d
95 (Fla. 1995); Bush v. State, 461 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1984).  
The videotape and photographs 63, 64, 65, and 68
The videotape is approximately eight minutes long and was shot from
outside the van in the truck stop parking lot.  Defense counsel objected to the
admission of the videotape, arguing that it was gruesome and that its prejudicial
impact outweighed its probative value.  The prosecutor noted the most gruesome
portions of the videotape had been redacted, and argued that the videotape showed
the position of the victim inside the van and the victim’s clothes, both important to
the jury’s understanding of how the murder occurred.  The trial judge cleared the
courtroom, viewed the videotape, and then allowed the videotape to be shown to
the jury.  Photographs 63, 64, and 65 show the victim’s body inside the van from
three different points of view, while 68 is a view of the cargo area of the van.  In
both the videotape and the photographs, the victim’s body is seen in a state of
decomposition.  However, we find both the videotape and the photographs relevant
to establish the manner in which the murder was committed and to assist the deputy
sheriff who described the crime scene to the jury.  See Pope v. State, 679 So. 2d
710, 713-14 (Fla. 1996) (finding that photos of the bloody bathroom where the
stabbing occurred and the victim’s bloody clothes were relevant to establish the
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manner in which the murder was committed and to assist the crime scene technician
in explaining the condition of the crime scene when the police arrived).  Because the
videotape and photographs were relevant to issues being considered by the jury,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these items of evidence.  
Photograph 103
Photograph 103 documents the victim’s skull with the murder weapon
inserted into the hole in the skull.  Williams, the firearms and tool mark identification
expert, used the photograph to explain that the reconstructed weapon fit the hole in
the skull.  Defense counsel objected to photograph 103 as cumulative.  We find this
photograph relevant to understanding the way the weapon caused the wound in the
victim’s skull.  See Larkins, 655 So. 2d at 98.  “Relevant evidence which is not so
shocking as to outweigh its probative value is admissible.”  Pope, 679 So. 2d at
714.  Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the photographs and videotape.  See Gorby v. State, 630 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla.
1993) (finding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting numerous
photographs as well as a videotape of the crime scene where the trial court
conscientiously considered all of the photos and rejected those it found to be too
prejudicial or cumulative).
PENALTY PHASE
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Pecuniary Gain Aggravator
Harris claims the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the murder was
committed for pecuniary gain and in finding that the murder was committed for
pecuniary gain.  We agree.  In order to establish the aggravating factor of pecuniary
gain, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was
motivated, at least in part, by a desire to obtain money, property, or other financial
gain.  See Rogers v. State, 783 So. 2d 980, 993 (Fla. 2001); Finney v. State, 660
So. 2d 674, 680 (Fla. 1995); Clark v. State, 609 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. 1992).  In
reviewing aggravating factors, it is not this Court's function to reweigh the evidence
to determine whether the State proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a
reasonable doubt–that is the trial court’s job.  See Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693,
695 (Fla. 1997).  Rather, this Court’s task on appeal is to review the record to
determine whether the trial court applied the correct rule of law for each aggravating
circumstance and, if so, whether competent, substantial evidence supports its
finding.  See id.  
After a review of the record, we conclude the pecuniary gain aggravator is
not supported by competent, substantial evidence in this case.  To support this
aggravating factor, the trial court found that Harris was trying to transfer property
owned jointly to his name alone, that he was the beneficiary of life insurance
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policies on his wife, that he emptied his wife's checking account four days after the
murder, that the contents of the wife's purse had been dumped on the floor of the
van, and that Harris did not want to pay child support.  The five factors relied on
by the trial court to support the pecuniary gain aggravator are purely circumstantial,
and although an aggravating factor may be supported entirely by circumstantial
evidence, “the circumstantial evidence must be inconsistent with any reasonable
hypothesis which might negate the aggravating factor.”  Hildwin v. State, 727 So.
2d 193, 194 (Fla. 1998).
These pieces of circumstantial evidence, however, are not inconsistent with a
reasonable hypothesis that negates the aggravating factor.  For example, the fact
that the defendant was the beneficiary of his wife's life insurance policy is not
suspect in and of itself.  Any number of husbands and wives name each other as
beneficiaries on their life insurance policies.  Additionally, the fact that the contents
of the wife's purse was dumped on the floor of the van would fit into a theory that
someone else killed and robbed the victim.  Moreover, there was evidence that
money ($20) was among the contents of the purse.  But most importantly, there is
absolutely no evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the defendant did
not want to pay child support.   
The State’s theory of the case, and a majority of Palmer’s testimony,
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centered around the fact that Harris wanted to divorce his wife to be with Palmer,
but because Harris’s wife threatened to take the children if Harris sought a divorce,
Harris decided to kill her instead.  The record supports this as the motive for the
murder and simply does not support the pecuniary gain as a motive for this murder. 
It cannot be said that the facts relied on demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt
that the murder was motivated, even in part, by pecuniary gain.   The trial court
relied on the fact that Harris was the beneficiary of his wife’s life insurance policies,
yet the State failed to produce documentation for any policies in effect at the time
of the victim’s death.  The trial court also found that Harris did not want a divorce
because his wife would gain custody of the children and he would have to pay child
support.  Again, the State presented no evidence to show that potential child
support payments played a role in Harris’s decision to kill his wife.  
The instant case is unlike Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1997), where
the defendant confessed he and the victim were arguing about a child support
award before he killed her.  In Walker, we found the pecuniary gain aggravator
established beyond a reasonable doubt because the defendant’s pecuniary motive
of avoiding child support permeated the case.  Id. at 317; see also Thomas v. State,
693 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1997) (upholding the pecuniary gain aggravator where the
defendant planned the kidnapping and murder of his wife to avoid paying his part
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of a settlement agreement in their pending divorce).  Here, the theme that permeated
the case is that the defendant wanted to marry Palmer but did not want to lose
custody of his children.  Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred in
instructing the jury that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain and in finding
and weighing the pecuniary gain aggravator.
  Cold, Calculated, and Premeditated Aggravator
Next, Harris claims the trial court erred in concluding the murder was
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of
legal or moral justification (CCP).  In order to establish the CCP aggravator, the
evidence must show: 
[T]hat the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection and not
an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage (cold),
and that the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to
commit murder before the fatal incident (calculated), and that the
defendant exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated), and that
the defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification.  
Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1994) (citations omitted).  We find
competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding of
this aggravator.  
Harris argues the trial court erred in finding the CCP aggravator because the
murder was not cold and calculated.  Harris claims he “exploded” one night
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because of his obsession with the potential loss of his children and because he was
in love with another woman and wanted out of his loveless marriage.  “[T]he ‘cold’
element generally has been found wanting only for ‘heated’ murders of passion, in
which the loss of emotional control is evident from the facts . . . .” Walls v. State,
641 So. 2d 381, 387-88 (Fla. 1994).  Contrary to Harris’s claim, the record shows
that Harris’s actions with respect to his wife’s murder were calm and deliberate. 
There was no evidence of a domestic dispute, and no evidence that Harris lost
control in a “heated murder of passion.”  The victim was shot once in the back of
the head, “which is by its very nature cold,” and there was no evidence of
resistance or provocation on the victim’s part.  Fennie v. State, 648 So. 2d 95, 99
(Fla. 1994) (upholding cold prong of CCP where victim was shot in the back of the
head).  
Furthermore, the events leading to Donna Harris’s murder support the
elements of a calculated plan and heightened premeditation.  The evidence showed
that Harris planned his wife’s murder for a period of weeks.  For example, Harris 
constructed a weapon, asked Palmer to time herself on a route similar to that used
on the night of the murder, chose the time and place of the murder, planned where
to leave the van after the murder, and planned how to dispose of the evidence with
Palmer’s help.  
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Lastly, Harris argues his fear of losing his children was a pretense of moral
or legal justification.  Supplementing this fear, Harris argues, is the fact that he did
not see his daughter from a previous marriage for three years after the couple
separated.  Harris’s fears do not demonstrate a pretense of moral or legal
justification.  As the trial court logically stated in its sentencing order:
The Defendant’s stated reason of not wanting to lose his children is
highly suspect in light of the testimony regarding his multiple plans to
kill his wife so that he could be with his girlfriend.  If the Defendant
had had any real concern for his children, he would have considered
the impact that losing their mother at such young ages would have on
them.  The only concern of the Defendant that has been demonstrated
by the record in this case is his concern for himself and his personal
desires.  
In other words, the trial court found that Harris's claim of fear of losing his children
did not negate the cold and calculated nature of this murder.  See Banda v. State,
536 So. 2d 221, 225 (Fla. 1988) (defining a pretense of moral or legal justification
as any “claim of justification or excuse that, though insufficient to reduce the
degree of homicide, nevertheless rebuts the otherwise cold and calculating nature of
the homicide").
Because there is competent, substantial evidence in the record supporting the
finding that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated without any pretense
of moral or legal justification, we find the trial court did not err in finding the CCP
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aggravator.
Trial Court's Treatment of Mitigating Evidence
Harris also challenges the trial court’s treatment of the mitigation in this case. 
We find no merit in the arguments concerning the weight the trial court gave to the
statutory mitigator of lack of significant history of criminal activity.  The weight
assigned to a mitigating circumstance is within the trial court's discretion, and Harris
has failed to demonstrate an abuse of that discretion.  See Rogers v. State, 783 So.
2d 980 (Fla. 2001).  Likewise, we find no error in the trial court's failure to find
separate mitigating circumstances based on Harris's alleged family conflict and his
ability to form loving relationships because these factors were used to support
other mitigators that were found and considered.  
We do, however, find merit in Harris's argument that the trial court failed to
consider all of the evidence presented in support of the mitigating circumstance of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  In its discussion of this mitigator in the
sentencing order, the trial court noted that Harris was deemed unfit for continued
military service in the United State Air Force based on a diagnosis of anxiety
disorder and depression, that Harris’s mother testified she and her father have
unstable mental histories, and that she suffers from anxiety attacks and panic
disorder.  It is well settled that the decision as to whether a mitigating circumstance
-23-
has been established is within the trial court’s discretion.  See, e.g., Foster v. State,
679 So. 2d 747, 755 (Fla. 1996).  However, the trial court must consider all of the
evidence presented in support of the mitigator.  See Provenzano v. State, 497 So.
2d 1177, 1184 (Fla. 1986).  
In this case the trial court did not consider all of the evidence presented in
support of the statutory mitigator of extreme mental or emotional disturbance
because the sentencing order failed to address any of the evidence presented at the
Spencer hearing.  At this hearing, Harris presented uncontroverted evidence that he
had a familial pattern of mental illness, that he had suffered a traumatic head injury
as a teenager, and that he had symptoms of possible manic depression with mood
swings in 1995.  He also presented evidence that he was diagnosed with bipolar II
disorder and was prescribed Depakote in 1996, and that sixty days before his
wife’s death, he had a psychiatric consultation.  The trial court erred in failing to
consider this additional mental health evidence in making its determination
concerning the extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigator.  As we said in
Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 419-20 (Fla. 1990):
[T]he sentencing court must expressly evaluate in its written order
each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant to determine
whether it is supported by the evidence and whether, in the case of
nonstatutory factors, it is truly of a mitigating nature. . . .  The court
next must weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating
-24-
and, in order to facilitate appellate review, must expressly consider in
its written order each established mitigating circumstance.  Although
the relative weight given each mitigating factor is within the province of
the sentencing court, a mitigating factor once found cannot be
dismissed as having no weight.  To be sustained, the trial court's final
decision in the weighing process must be supported by "sufficient
competent evidence in the record."
See also Reese v. State, 694 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1997).  Moreover, as Harris correctly
argues, the trial court should have, at the very least, evaluated this evidence in the
context of a nonstatutory mental mitigator.  See Stewart v. State, 620 So. 2d 177
(Fla. 1993).
As has been discussed above, the trial court in this case erred in instructing
the jury that it could consider the pecuniary gain aggravating factor and in finding
that the pecuniary gain aggravator was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  The
only valid aggravator remaining is that the murder was cold, calculated, and
premeditated.  In addition to finding an aggravating circumstance that was not
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court failed to evaluate all of the
evidence submitted by the defendant in support of his claim that the murder was
committed while he was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  Under the
circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that these errors had no effect on the
jury's recommendation of death or on the trial court's sentencing decision.  The jury
recommended death by the narrowest of margins, seven to five.  Only one more
-25-
vote was needed for a life recommendation.  The scales might have been tipped in
favor of life had the jury not been instructed on the aggravating circumstance of
pecuniary gain.  Thus, it cannot be said that the jury's consideration of the
pecuniary gain aggravator was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Additionally, when a trial court erroneously includes in its sentencing
evaluation an aggravating circumstance that has not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt and fails to consider and properly evaluate mitigating evidence,
this Court is deprived of the tools to meaningfully review the sentence imposed or
to undertake a proportionality review.  See, e.g., Woodel v. State, 804 So. 2d 316,
327 (Fla. 2001)  (vacating the sentence of death and remanding because the trial
court failed to evaluate the mitigating circumstances in the sentencing order); Ford
v. State, 802 So. 2d 1121, 1134-35 (Fla. 2001) (outlining the trial court's obligation
to evaluate mitigating evidence), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2308 (2002).  Because we
cannot say that the consideration by the jury and the trial judge of this aggravating
factor was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse the sentence imposed
in this case and remand for a new penalty phase proceeding.  See Crook v. State,
813 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2002); Rhodes v. State, 547 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1989).  
Because the defendant is entitled to a new penalty phase proceeding, we do
not address Harris's remaining penalty phase issues.
-26-
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Harris's conviction for first-degree
murder.  However, we vacate his sentence of death and remand this case to the trial
court for a new penalty phase proceeding.
It is so ordered. 
ANSTEAD, C.J., PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., and SHAW and
HARDING, Senior Justices, concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion.
WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring.
I concur in the majority's decision to reverse and remand for a new penalty
phase.  I agree that the error in instructing the jury on a pecuniary gain aggravator
that is unsupported by the evidence cannot be deemed harmless as to either the
advisory sentence or the imposition of the death penalty.  The jury was instructed
on only two aggravators and this Court has now determined that there was
insufficient evidence to support the pecuniary gain aggravator.  In light of the
seven-to-five advisory sentence of death, the existence of only one valid remaining
aggravating factor, and the lack of any significant prior criminal history, it cannot be
stated that any error in submitting the pecuniary gain aggravator to the jury for its
-27-
consideration was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Just as we cannot state
beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial judge would have imposed a sentence of
death without the invalid aggravator, we cannot state beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury would have recommended the death penalty without consideration of
the pecuniary gain aggravator.
Any harmless error analysis as to the possible effect on the jury's
recommendation is even more critical in light of Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428
(2002), in which the United States Supreme Court stated that it is the jury as trier of
fact that must find the existence of any aggravating circumstance that qualifies the
defendant for the death penalty.  The seven-to-five death recommendation by a jury
instructed on one valid and one invalid aggravating circumstance makes it entirely
possible that Harris was sentenced to death without a majority of his jury finding
that one valid aggravating circumstance existed.
Finally, even if we were not reversing because of the pecuniary gain
aggravator, in my view the death recommendation in this case by a bare majority of
the jurors raises constitutional concerns in light of Ring.  See generally Bottoson v.
Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 709-710 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, C.J., concurring in result
only); id. at 717 (Shaw, J., concurring in result only); id. at 722 (Pariente, J.,
concurring in result only).
-28-
WELLS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in affirming the conviction of guilt.  I dissent from reversing the
sentence.  Any error on the part of the trial judge in respect to pecuniary gain is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Green v. State, 641 So. 2d 391 (Fla.
1994).
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Columbia County, E. Vernon Douglas,
Judge - Case No. 99-87CF
James E. Taylor, Jr., Orlando, Florida,
for Appellant
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Barbara J. Yates, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee