Title: Ex Parte Walker

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

530 So. 2d 856 (1988)
Ex parte Wayne Demetrius WALKER.
(Re David Wallace and Wayne Walker v. State).
87-549.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 29, 1988.
John Bertolotti, Jr., Mobile, for petitioner.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Prior report: Ala.Cr.App., 530 So. 2d 849.
BEATTY, Justice.
Writ Denied.
TORBERT, C.J., and ALMON, SHORES and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, JONES and ADAMS, JJ., dissent.
STEAGALL, J., not sitting.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
I would grant the writ of certiorari in this case to review the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and determine whether that Court's judgment is contrary to the holding of this Court in Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609 (1987).
The facts are not difficult. The defendant is black. There were nine blacks on the venire. The State used seven of its nine peremptory strikes to eliminate blacks from the trial jury. The defendant struck one black, and one black served on the jury that convicted the defendant. The Court of Criminal Appeals set out the reasons given by the State for exercising its strikes as it did:
The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the reasons given by the State were "race-neutral explanations." I cannot agree that they were, as a matter of law.
In Branch, this Court spelled out in great detail some of the guidelines that trial courts must use in determining whether there has been a Batson violation.[1]
Applying the Branch guidelines, I think it is unquestioned that the defendant made out a prima facie case of the State's discriminatory use of its peremptory challenges. The only question is whether the record contains a sufficient showing of "race-neutral explanations" for the State's exercise of its peremptory strikes, as the Court of Criminal Appeals found. In Branch, this Court set out the rule of law that applies once a prima facie case is made:
"Batson makes it clear, however, that `[t]he State cannot meet this burden on mere general assertions that its officials did not discriminate or that they properly performed their official duties. Rather, the State must demonstrate that "permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result."' Batson, 476 U.S.  at 94, 106 S. Ct.  at 1721, citing Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632, [92 S. Ct. 1221, 1226, 31 L. Ed. 2d 536] (1972). Furthermore, intuitive judgment or suspicion by the prosecutor is insufficient to rebut the presumption of discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S.  at 97, 106 S. Ct.  at 1723. Finally, a prosecutor cannot overcome the presumption `merely by denying any discriminatory motive or "affirming his good faith in individual selections."' Batson, 476 U.S.  at 98, 106 S. Ct.  at 1723, *858 citing Alexander, 405 U.S.  at 632 [92 S. Ct.  at 1226].
The public policy of this State relating to the qualification and selection of juries is succinctly stated in Ala. Code 1975, as follows:
§ 12-16-55:
§ 12-16-56:
I am aware of the State's concern about the effects of the Branch decision on the trial of criminal cases. The district attorneys of the State, acting by and through the district attorneys' association, filed an amicus brief in connection with the State's application for rehearing in the Branch case. In that brief, they argued:
"All lawyers who try cases know of the difficulty in picking a fair jury from a venire of jurors about whom the lawyers know very little. All trial lawyers are aware of the limits of voir dire questioning in eliciting a juror's feelings and biases on questions that go to the heart of how that juror will view a particular *859 case. Given this, all trial lawyers are forced to rely on common sense generalizations about jurors.
In their brief on application for rehearing, the district attorneys also argued:
I am acutely aware of the concerns by the district attorneys of this State, and I appreciate the concerns that members of this Court have expressed in dissenting and concurring opinions in Branch regarding the State's use of peremptory strikes. As author of the majority opinion in Branch, I believe that some of the fears expressed by those who disagree with Branch may not be justified. Even before the Branch decision was released, some courts had adopted procedures to meet the requirements of *860 Batson,[2] and I believe that the bench and bar, working together, can operate under the Batson requirements without undue hardship.
In Batson, the Supreme Court of the United States stated that prosecuting attorneys could use voir dire examination to assist them in exercising their peremptory strikes in a nondiscriminatory manner. In Branch, this Court did not delineate the various methods the State might use to exercise its peremptory challenges in a nondiscriminatory manner, but the Court did not foreclose the use by the State of various means to ferret out information about particular jurors, such as voir dire examination, questionnaires, or studies showing that jurors who have certain traits tend to vote in certain ways. See, Frederick, "Jury Behavior: A Psychologist Examines Jury Selection," 5 Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 571 (1978). It is my opinion that a well-worded questionnaire, prepared by a professional, would be a helpful tool in determining particular juror attitudes, and that it could be used to substantiate the exercise of particular peremptory challenges in a particular case. See Note: "Juror BiasA Practical Screening Device and the Case for Permitting Its Use," 64 Minn.L.Rev. 987 (1980), which examines the "Legal Attitudes Questionnaire," which supposedly predicts which potential jurors would be most likely to harbor certain biases in a criminal case. The "Legal Attitudes Questionnaire" is included as an appendix to that note. The use of juror questionnaires is discussed in a recent volume of the American Journal of Trial Advocacy, published by Cumberland School of Law, see, "Voir Dire: A Trial Technique in Transition," 10 Am.J.Trial Advocacy 37 (1987), which is a reprint of an article appearing at 4 Am.J.Trial Advocacy 522 (1981).
While the use of "body language" or nonverbal communications are not forbidden by Branch, the use of nonverbal communication, or any nonspecific juror profile, should be approached with care, and, if used, should be used only in a nondiscriminatory manner.
I cannot say absolutely that the State failed to follow the Branch guidelines in this case, but I can say, based on the statement of facts in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, that it would appear that the State exercised its peremptory strikes with little or no voir dire and that the State did not follow the guidelines of Branch; therefore, I would grant the writ and remand the cause to the Court of Criminal Appeals, with directions, as this Court did in Branch. Consequently, I must respectfully dissent.
JONES and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
[1]  This case was tried before the Branch case was decided, and the original opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals was released before this Court released Branch. Consequently, the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals did not have the Branch guidelines before them. Because of that fact, I would grant the writ in this case and remand the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals, with directions, as this Court did in Branch.
[2]  After the release of the opinion in Branch, I received a letter from a trial judge in the 10th Judicial Circuit, who enclosed a copy of a procedure that circuit had adopted to handle the Batson problem:

"MINUTES
"Circuit Criminal Judges' Meeting
"June 25, 1986 "4:30 p.m. "Judge Jasper's Courtroom
"All judges thoroughly discussed the Batson v. Kentucky ... case. Following a thorough discussion by all judges, the following policy was decided:
"POLICY TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE TENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT CRIMINAL DIVISION FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BATSON V. KENTUCKY
"Juries will be impanelled according to law in all cases being tried in the Criminal Division of the Tenth Judicial Circuit. At the conclusion of all strikes (with all veniremen in place), if there is a side bar Batson objection, the Court will retire to chambers with the district attorney, defense attorney, defendant and court reporter.
"Upon a prima facie showing of a Batson objection, the Court will require the district attorney to articulate reasons as per Batson.
"The Court will review the reasons. Should the Court sustain the objections, the struck juror/jurors will be reinstated and the state will be afforded strikes to replace those jurors who have been reinstated. The alternate strikes shall be made while the group is assembled in judge's chambers."