Title: Secrist v. Mark IV Constructors, Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

472 So. 2d 1015 (1985)
Michael Jerome SECRIST
v.
MARK IV CONSTRUCTORS, INC.
83-1319.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 7, 1985.
*1016 Joseph M. Brown, Jr. and Richard E. Browning of Cunningham, Bounds, Yance, Crowder, & Brown, Mobile, for appellant.
Victor T. Hudson and Stephen E. Clements of Reams, Vollmer, Philips, Killion, Brook & Schell, Mobile, for appellee.
BEATTY, Justice.
Appeal by plaintiff, Michael Jerome Secrist, from summary judgment for defendant, Mark IV Constructors, Inc. (Mark IV). We affirm.
Defendant Mark IV was the general contractor constructing a building on the campus of Jefferson Davis Junior College in Brewton. Progressive Roofing and Fine Sheet Metal Company, Inc., (Progressive) was the subcontractor engaged by Mark IV to perform certain roofing and sheet metal work on the building. Plaintiff Secrist was an employee of Progressive working on the job at Jefferson Davis Junior College. While in the process of moving toeboards once used by Progressive employees to aid in the application of shingles to the building's roof, Secrist fell and was injured. Plaintiff Secrist filed a complaint against Mark IV and also against several co-employees. Following further pleading and discovery, Mark IV moved for summary judgment, based upon "the pleadings, the depositions on file, the discovery requests and the responses thereto," and a brief in support of the motion. In due course, the trial court, in an order made final pursuant to Rule 54(b), A.R.Civ.P., granted summary judgment in favor of Mark IV. Plaintiff appeals from that summary judgment.
The familiar principle applicable to summary judgment is stated in Bryant v. Morley, 406 So. 2d 394, 395 (Ala.1981):
Or, as stated in Campbell v. Southern Roof Deck Applicators, Inc., 406 So. 2d 910, 913 (Ala.1981):
Plaintiff contends that the general contractor owed a duty to the employees of the subcontractor to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises of the job site in a reasonably safe condition, and further contends that summary judgment was inappropriate because the facts establish that the general contractor failed to furnish safety belts to the subcontractor's roofer, Secrist, as required by the condition of the roof in question. Plaintiff cites us to the cases of Southern Minerals Co. v. Barrett, 281 Ala. 76, 199 So. 2d 87 (1967), and Knight v. Burns, Kirkley & Williams Construction Co., 331 So. 2d 651 (Ala.1976), as authority for this position.
In the Southern Minerals case, an employee of a subcontractor was engaged as a brickmason's helper in constructing a manhole in a sewer line which had been excavated by a general contractor. The walls of the excavation caved in, injuring the subcontractor's employee, who subsequently brought an action against the general contractor for negligently failing to provide a reasonably safe place for the employee to work. That decision explained the legal relationship of the general contractor to the employee of a subcontractor and the duty owed by the former to the latter, at 281 Ala. 80-81, 199 So.2d 90-91:
"The following is from Lamson & Sessions Bolt Co. v. McCarty, (234 Ala. [60] at 63, 173 So. [388] at 391 [1937]):
In support of his contention that the roof was a dangerous condition requiring the use of a safety belt, plaintiff quotes from the deposition of Harvey Hill, a former employee of Progressive Roofing on the Jefferson Davis Junior College job:
Plaintiff contends that the accepted standard in the roofing industry required that safety belts be used on this particular job, and that this was brought to the attention of the on-site supervisor for Mark IV, who thereafter failed to take the necessary action in providing safety belts. Both Hill and plaintiff Secrist deposed that they asked this supervisor, John Peavy, for the safety belts. Plaintiff stated:
According to plaintiff, Peavy acknowledged in his deposition his authority to oversee the general safety of the job:
With respect for plaintiff's argument, nevertheless, the authority which Mr. Peavy possessed in this relationship with his own employer does not furnish the answer to the basic legal question posed by these facts, i.e., what was the legal relationship between Mark IV and Secrist? The answer lies in the analysis of their respective positions as invitor and invitee, as discussed in Southern Minerals, supra. As invitor, Mark IV, the general contractor, was under a duty to have the premises free from danger, or if they were dangerous, to give his invitee, Secrist, sufficient warning to enable him, through the exercise of reasonable care, to avoid the danger. This duty includes the duty to warn the invitee of danger of which the invitor knows or ought to know, and of which the invitee does not know. Authorities cited, supra.
It is well settled that "an owner [general contractor] is not responsible to an independent contractor [subcontractor] for injury from defects or dangers which the contractor *1020 knows of, or ought to know of. If the defect or danger is hidden and known to the owner, and neither known to the contractor, nor such as he ought to know, it is the duty of the owner to warn the contractor and if he does not do this, of course, he is liable for resultant injury." Veal v. Phillips, 285 Ala. 655, 657-8, 235 So. 2d 799, 802 (1970). This principle was applied in Quillen v. Quillen, 388 So. 2d 985, 989 (Ala.1980), which quoted the rule applicable to an invitor-invitee relationship:
From the material before the trial court and furnished by the plaintiff himself, the dangerous slope of the roof in question, and any concommitant need for safety belts while working thereon, was at the very least as well known to the plaintiff as it was to the general contractor. It certainly was not a danger unknown to the employee-invitee, for he was one of those who called it to the attention of his own employer's foreman, Jim Ward. Plaintiff's own deposition established that it was Progressive's foreman, Ward, who decided that safety belts would not be used:
If, therefore, the slope of the roof constituted a dangerous condition, under the facts of this case, it was an open and obvious danger which the plaintiff should have recognized and, in fact, did recognize. Under those facts, the general contractor cannot be held liable for the injuries plaintiff sustained when he fell from that roof.
Let the judgment be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES and SHORES, JJ., concur.