Title: The New Jersey Democratic Party, Inc., et al. v. Hon. David Samson, et al.

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Plaintiffs sought to have Senator Torricelli's name removed from the ballot and the Democratic State Committee authorized to name a replacement. A stay of the printing and distribution of all ballots was also sought. The Law Division granted a stay and issued an Order to Show Cause. Before that court held its hearing, the Supreme Court certified the matter on its own motion pursuant to Rule 2:12-1. The Court continued the stay ordered by the Law Division and directed the parties to appear for argument on October 2, 2002. After hearing the arguments of the parties and reviewing the record before it, the Supreme Court issued an Order on October 2, 2002, that granted the relief sought by plaintiffs. The Court appointed Assignment Judge Linda R. Feinberg, J.S.A.J. (Mercer County) to supervise the preparation and distribution of revised ballots. Costs attendant to the preparation and mailing of revised ballots were directed to be paid by plaintiffs. The Order also noted that the Court's formal opinion in the matter would be filed in due course. HELD : In the absence of explicit direction from the Legislature, the Court has construed N.J.S.A. 19:13-20 to promote the goals underlying our election laws -- to ensure an opportunity for voters to exercise their right of choice in the November 2002 senatorial election consonant with an orderly process for the handling of ballots. To that end, the Court has granted the relief sought by plaintiffs. 1. Fifty years ago, Chief Justice Arthur Vanderbilt restated the principles that guide the Court's decision in this case: "Election laws are to be liberally construed so as to effectuate their purpose. They should not be construed so as to deprive voters of their franchise or so as to render an election void for technical reasons." In 1965, Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub stated that: "The right to vote would be empty indeed if it did not include the right of choice for whom to vote." He went on to quote from the United States Supreme Court, "The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government." (pp. 9-11) 2. Over the past fifty years, the Court has interpreted New Jersey's election laws in a variety of factual contexts. As Chief Justice Robert Wilentz said in Catania v. Haberle, "The general rule applied to the interpretation of our election laws is that absent some public interest sufficiently strong to permit the conclusion that the Legislature intended strict enforcement, statutes providing requirements for a candidate's name to appear on the ballot will not be construed so as to deprive the voters of the opportunity to make a choice." When the Court has before it a case concerning the election laws, it is directed by principle and precedent to construe those laws to preserve the paramount right of the voters to exercise the franchise. (pp. 12-17) 3. Other states have explicitly dealt with the consequences when a vacancy occurs outside the window of time provided in the relevant statute. That other state legislatures have spoken clearly on this question highlights the lack of a legislative declaration in the New Jersey statute. (pp. 17-20) 4. The parties present contrary views on what the Legislature must have intended when a vacancy occurs outside the statutory time frame. The Court agrees with plaintiffs that the statute simply does not contain a legislative declaration that the filling of a vacancy within forty-eight days of the election is prohibited. In the absence of that declaration, the Court must consider the "fundamental purpose" of the statute, construing it in a manner that is consistent with the probable intent of the draftsman. (pp. 20-22) 5. The Court does not believe that the Legislature intended to limit voters' choice in a case where there is sufficient time to place a new candidate on the ballot and to conduct the election in an orderly manner. The Attorney General argued that the Court must consider "whether the dual interests of full voter choice and an orderly administration of the election can be effectuated if the requested relief were to be granted." In adopting that approach, the Court notes that it reconciles apparently conflicting goals in a practical manner. If the Court's action is not what the Legislature intended, it anticipates that the Legislature will amend the statute accordingly (pp. 22-24) 6. On the record before it, and with due regard for the representations at oral argument of the Attorney General and counsel for the county clerks, the Court finds that there is sufficient time before the general election to place a new candidate's name on the ballot. Furthermore, the Court is convinced that absentee ballots, using express mailing for both outgoing and returns, can be handled in a manner that will not disenfranchise absentee voters. Judge Linda Feinberg is overseeing that process, which will be orderly and expeditious. The end result will be that all voters will be able to cast their ballots for a candidate of their choice in the general election. (pp. 24-26) 7. Defendants argued that by adopting the position the Court has taken, electoral chaos will result because any candidate who fears losing at the polls can withdraw to allow someone else to run instead. The Court assumes, however, that it is difficult for any party, logistically, politically, and financially, to replace a candidate closer than forty-eight days to an election. Defendants' failure to present any evidence of a rush of withdrawals in states that allow substitutions close to the election is telling. Most important, if the Legislature credits defendants' "parade of horribles," it can amend the statute expressly to preclude or otherwise condition ballot substitutions after the forty-eighth day. (pp. 26-28) 8. Title 19 reflects the significant role of the two parties in the electoral system. Plaintiffs' remedy does not, however, preclude voters from casting ballots in favor of any one of the third-party candidates who have qualified to seek election to the United States Senate. (pp. 28-29) 9. The expeditious handling of amended absentee ballots will assure that overseas military and civilian voters will have their votes counted in the election. If Judge Feinberg concludes at some point that it is necessary to extend the time for certifying the election to allow absentee ballots to be calculated, that remedy is available. (pp. 29-30) The relief sought by plaintiffs is GRANTED. JUSTICES COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, and ALBIN join in CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ's opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 24 September Term 2002 THE NEW JERSEY DEMOCRATIC PARTY, INC.; THE NEW JERSEY DEMOCRATIC STATE COMMITTEE, and THE HON. BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, in her official capacity AS CHAIR OF THE NEW JERSEY DEMOCRATIC PARTY and OF NEW JERSEY DEMOCRATIC STATE COMMITTEE; and JOHN or JANE DOE, yet to be selected DEMOCRATIC PARTY CANDIDATE FOR THE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES SENATOR, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HON. DAVID SAMSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, in his official capacity; HON. REGENA THOMAS, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY in her official capacity; HON. RAMON DE LA CRUZ, Director of New Jersey Division of Elections; HON. MICHAEL J. GARVIN, Clerk, County of Atlantic, in his official capacity; HON. KATHLEEN A. DONOVAN, Clerk, County of Bergen, in her official capacity; HON. PHILIP E. HAINES, Clerk, County of Burlington, in his official capacity; HON. JAMES BEACH, Clerk, County of Camden, in his official capacity; HON. ANGELA F. PULVINO, Clerk, County of Cape May, in her official capacity; HON. GLORIA NOTO, Clerk, County of Cumberland, in her official capacity; HON. PATRICK J. McNALLY, Clerk, County of Essex, in his official capacity; HON. JAMES N. HOGAN, Clerk, County of Gloucester, in his official capacity; HON. JANET E. HAYNES, Clerk, County of Hudson, in her official capacity; HON. DOROTHY K. TIRPOK, Clerk, County of Hunterdon, in her official capacity; HON. CATHERINE DiCOSTANZO, Clerk, County of Mercer, in her official capacity; HON. ELAINE M. FLYNN, Clerk, County of Middlesex, in her official capacity; HON. M. CLAIRE FRENCH, Clerk, County of Monmouth, in her official capacity; HON. JOAN BRAMHALL, Clerk, County of Morris, in her official capacity; HON. M. DEAN HAINES, Clerk, County of Ocean, in his official capacity; HON. RONNI D. NOCHIMSON, Clerk, County of Passaic, in her official capacity; HON. GILDA T. GILL, Clerk, County of Salem, in her official capacity; HON. R. PETER WIDIN, Clerk, County of Somerset, in his official capacity; HON. ERMA GORMLEY, Clerk, County of Sussex, in her official capacity; HON. JOANNE RAJOPPI, Clerk, County of Union, in her official capacity; HON. TERRANCE D. LEE, Clerk, County of Warren, in his official capacity; MR. DOUGLAS FORRESTER, Candidate for the United States Senate (Republican); MR. TED GLICK, Candidate for the United States Senate (Green Party); MS. ELIZABETH MACRON, Candidate for the United States Senate (Libertarian Party); and MR. NORMAN E. WAHNER, Candidate for the United States Senate (New Jersey Conservative Party), Defendants-Respondents, and MR. GREGORY PASON, Candidate for the United States Senate (Socialist Party) Defendant. Argued October 2, 2002 - Decided October 2, 2002 (Opinion Filed October 8, 2002) On certification to the Superior Court, Law Division, Middlesex County. Angelo J. Genova argued the cause for appellants (Genova, Burns & Vernoia, attorneys). David Samson, Attorney General of New Jersey, argued the cause pro se and for respondents Regena Thomas, Secretary of the State of New Jersey, and Ramon de la Cruz, Director of New Jersey Division of Elections. John M. Carbone argued the cause for respondents Hon. Michael J. Garvin, Clerk, County of Atlantic, Hon. Kathleen A. Donovan, Clerk, County of Bergen, Hon. Philip E. Haines, Clerk, County of Burlington, Hon. James Beach, Clerk, County of Camden, Hon. Angela F. Pulvino, Clerk, County of Cape May, Hon. Gloria Noto, Clerk, County of Cumberland, Hon. Patrick J. McNally, Clerk, County of Essex, Hon. James N. Hogan, Clerk, County of Gloucester, Hon. Janet E. Haynes, Clerk, County of Hudson, Hon. Dorothy K. Tirpok, Clerk, County of Hunterdon, Hon Catherine DiCostanzo, Clerk, County of Mercer, Hon. Elaine M. Flynn, Clerk, County of Middlesex, Hon. M. Claire French, Clerk, County of Monmouth, Hon. Joan Bramhall, Clerk, County of Morris, Hon. M. Dean Haines, Clerk, County of Ocean, Hon. Ronni D. Nochimson, Clerk, County of Passaic, Hon. Gilda T. Gill, Clerk, County of Salem, Hon. R. Peter Widin, Clerk, County of Somerset, Hon. Erma Gormley, Clerk, County of Sussex, Hon. Joanne Rajoppi, Clerk, County of Union, Hon. Terrance D. Lee, Clerk, County of Warren (Carbone and Faasse, attorneys). Peter G. Sheridan and William E. Baroni, Jr., argued the cause for respondent Mr. Douglas Forrester (Graham, Curtin & Sheridan and Blank Rome Comisky & McCauley, attorneys; Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Baroni, Dorothy A. Harbeck and Christopher J. Keale, on the letter brief). Elizabeth Macron argued the cause pro se. Brian W. McAlindin argued the cause for respondent Mr. Norman E. Wahner (Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, attorneys). Ted Glick argued the cause pro se. Evan H.C. Crook, Burlington County Solicitor, submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf of respondent Hon. Philip E. Haines, Clerk, County of Burlington. Alfred B. Vuocolo, Jr., Mercer County Counsel, submitted a certification in lieu of brief on behalf of respondent Hon. Catherine DiCostanzo, Clerk, County of Mercer. Gil D. Messina, Assistant Monmouth County Counsel, submitted a letter and certification in lieu of brief on behalf of respondent Hon. M. Claire French, Clerk, County of Monmouth (Malcolm V. Carton, Monmouth County Counsel, attorney). Ronald Kevitz, Morris County Counsel, submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf of respondent Hon. Joan Bramhall, Clerk, County of Morris. Thomas C. Miller, Somerset County Counsel, submitted a certification in lieu of brief on behalf of respondent Hon. R. Peter Widin, Clerk, County of Somerset. The opinion of the Court was delivered by PORITZ, C.J. By order dated October 2, 2002, we granted relief permitting the New Jersey Democratic State Committee to select a candidate to replace Senator Robert G. Torricelli on the November 2002 ballot. We issued the Order without opinion because, in our view, the interests of justice require[d] the immediate issuance of an Order disposition with the Court s opinion to follow in due course. New Jersey Democratic Party v. Samson, ___ N.J. ___, at ___ (slip op. at 5). This opinion sets forth the basis for our disposition. Election laws are to be liberally construed so as to effectuate their purpose. They should not be construed so as to deprive voters of their franchise or so as to render an election void for technical reasons. [Kilmurray v. Gilfert, 10 N.J. 435, 440-41 (1952) (citations omitted).] The concept is simple. At its center is the voter, whose fundamental right to exercise the franchise infuses our election statutes with purpose and meaning. It has not always been so. In 1965, Chief Justice Weintraub spoke eloquently of the gradual alteration of our understanding in respect of that right we now deem fundamental. Universal suffrage did not come early in our history, but today, despite an impoverished beginning, the right to vote has taken its place among our great values. Indeed the fact that the voting franchise was hoarded so many years testifies to its exalted position in the real scheme of things. It is the citizen s sword and shield. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S. Ct. 526, 585, 11 L. Ed. 2d 481, 492 (1964). It is the keystone of a truly democratic society. [Gangemi v. Rosengard, 44 N.J. 166, 170 (1965).] Those ideas now appear self-evident -- as does a corollary principle also described by Chief Justice Weintraub: [T]he right to vote would be empty indeed if it did not include the right of choice for whom to vote. . . . The right to vote freely for the candidate of one s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government. [Ibid. (citations omitted) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1378, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 523 (1964)).] A fundamental principle of our representative democracy is, in Hamilton s words, that the people should choose whom they please to govern them. 2 Elliot s Debates 257. As Madison pointed out at the Convention, this principle is undermined as much by limiting whom the people can select as by limiting the franchise itself. [Id., 395 U.S. at 547, 89 S. Ct. at 1977, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 531.] It is in the public interest and the general intent of the election laws to preserve the two-party system and to submit to the electorate a ballot bearing the names of candidates of both major political parties as well as of all other qualifying parties and groups. [Kilmurray, supra, 10 N.J. at 441 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Hand v. Larason, 163 N.J. Super. 68, 75 (Law Div. 1968) (holding that one candidate could not win primaries of both parties because the public interest, as it is served by the multiparty political system, is a lodestar to the construction of Title 19 ).] Subsequently, in Wene v. Meyner, 13 N.J. 185 (1953), the Court permitted votes to be counted in a gubernatorial primary election when the voter had neither voted in a primary election of a political party for two subsequent annual primary elections nor signed and filed with the district board a declaration designating the political party in whose primary [the voter] desires to vote. Id. at 190-91 (quoting R.S. 19:23-45 (current version at N.J.S.A. 19:23-45)). Regarding the voters technical noncompliance with the statute, the Court explained: A statute is not to be given an arbitrary construction, according to the strict letter, but rather one that will advance the sense and meaning fairly deducible from the context. The reason of the statute prevails over the literal sense of terms; the manifest policy is an implied limitation on the sense of the general terms, and a touchstone for the expansion of narrower terms. As said by Mr. Chief Justice Vanderbilt in Kilmurray v. Gilfert . . . : Election laws are to be liberally construed, so as to effectuate their purpose. They should not be construed so as to deprive voters of their franchise or so as to render an election void for technical reasons. [Id. at 197 (citations omitted); see also Clemency v. Beech, 306 N.J. Super. 244, 248 (1997) (allowing candidate s name to appear on ballot despite late filing of required documents).] In Gangemi, supra, 44 N.J. at 174, the Court struck down a statutory residency requirement for elective office that affected only two municipalities in the State. Although the case did not involve questions of statutory interpretation, Chief Justice Weintraub discussed in some detail the right of choice for whom to vote. Id. at 170. In the context of a limitation upon eligibility for elective office, he observed that the restraint is on the right to vote as well. Ibid. Ultimately, the Court found the residency requirement to be constitutionally infirm. Id. at 173-74. To the extent that alternative interpretations of the election laws are possible, Gangemi teaches that limitations on the right of voter choice in some circumstances will override other considerations. Twenty-five years later, in Catania v. Haberle, 123 N.J. 438 (1991), the Court again considered a statutory provision that governed the filling of a vacancy on the ballot and the substitution of one candidate for another. There, no Republican had won sufficient votes in the primary election so the Republican County Committees selected a candidate to run in a special election for the New Jersey Assembly. Notice of the Committees meeting to fill the vacancy was not given within seven days of the primary as required by N.J.S.A. 19:13-20(b)(1), with the result that the Secretary of State refused to accept the Committees candidate. Chief Justice Wilentz began his analysis with the principle set down in Kilmurray: The general rule applied to the interpretation of our election laws is that absent some public interest sufficiently strong to permit the conclusion that the Legislature intended strict enforcement, statutes providing requirements for a candidate s name to appear on the ballot will not be construed so as to deprive the voters of the opportunity to make a choice. [Catania, supra, 123 N.J. at 442-43 (citing Kilmurray, supra, 10 N.J. at 440-41); see also Fulbrook v. Reynolds, 304 N.J. Super. 125, 133 (Law Div. 1997) (allowing replacement candidate for city council to further voters choice of candidates).] Anticipating that other cases would follow in which this Court would have to make similar judgment calls in respect of similar statutory provisions, the Chief Justice continued: Concerns have been expressed that by giving this deadline provision a directory, rather than mandatory, construction we will create doubts about many other sections of the election law, a law that is driven by deadlines. Our only response is that this Court has traditionally given a liberal interpretation to that law, liberal in the sense of construing it to allow the greatest scope for public participation in the electoral process, to allow candidates to get on the ballot, to allow parties to put their candidates on the ballot, and most importantly to allow the voters a choice on Election Day. Obviously, there will be cases in which provisions must be interpreted strictly, mandatorily, for in some cases it will be apparent that that interpretation serves important state interests, including orderly electoral processes. But those cases must be decided on their own facts, under the law involved. This Court has never announced that time limitations in election statutes should be construed to bar candidates from the ballot when that makes no sense and when it is obviously not the Legislature s intent. There are states that have such rules, but New Jersey is not one of them. [Catania, supra, 123 N.J. at 448 (citations omitted).] When this Court has before it a case concerning the New Jersey election laws, we are directed by principle and precedent to construe those laws so as to preserve the paramount right of the voters to exercise the franchise. We have understood our Legislature, in establishing the mechanisms by which elections are conducted in this State, to intend that the law will be interpreted to allow the greatest scope for public participation in the electoral process, to allow candidates to get on the ballot, to allow parties to put their candidates on the ballot, and most importantly to allow the voters a choice on Election Day. Ibid. a. (1) In the case of an office to be filled by the voters of the entire State, the candidate shall be selected by the State committee of the political party wherein such vacancy has occurred. .... d. A selection made pursuant to this section shall be made not later than the 48th day preceding the date of the general election, and a statement of such selection shall be filed with the Secretary of State. . . . By its terms, Section 20 establishes an absolute right in a State committee to replace a candidate up to and including the forty-eighth day before the general election. See footnote 3 Here, we confront a vacancy created outside of the statutory window. Nothing in N.J.S.A. 19:13-20 addresses the precise question whether a vacancy that occurs between the forty-eighth day and the general election can, in that circumstance, be filled. [a]ny vacancy in a party nomination occurring less than eighteen days before the general election that is caused by the declination, death, disqualification, or withdrawal of any person nominated at the primary election . . . shall not be filled before the general election. In such case, the votes cast for the [withdrawn] candidate . . . are to be counted and recorded, and, if the candidate receives a plurality of the votes cast, such vacancy shall be filled . . . by the respective party vacancy committee . . . . [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1-4-1002 (West 2002).] In Washington, the Legislature has similarly declared that when a vacancy occur[s] after the sixth Tuesday prior to [the] state primary or general election and time does not exist in which to correct ballots (including absentee ballots), . . . then the votes cast or recorded for the person who has died or become disqualified shall be counted for the person who has been named to fill such vacancy. [Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 29.18.160 (West 2002). See footnote 4] That other state legislatures have spoken clearly on this questionSee footnote 5 highlights the lack of a legislative declaration in the New Jersey statute. How the New Jersey Legislature would intend the issue to be resolved is the crux of this case. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-24 SEPTEMBER TERM 2002 ON CERTIFICATION TO Superior Court, Law Division THE NEW JERSEY DEMOCRATIC PARTY, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Movants, v. HON. DAVID SAMSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, in his official capacity, et al., Defendants-Respondents. DECIDED October 8, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Chief Justice Poritz CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY