Title: Laverne Haase v. Badger Mining Corporation

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 97 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1681 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Laverne Haase,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Larry Braatz, Norb Braun, Fidel Castillo,  
Gregory Ebel, Lawrence Ferge, Leon  
Fuerst, Carol Guyette, Estate of Ray  
Guyette, David Hamilton, Floyd Hanson,  
Jerald Heuer, Daniel Janiak, Rick  
Knudsen, Wesley Kupsky, Sr., James  
Mohrman, James Maroney, Terry Olejnik,  
Robert Parry, Donald Quaintance, Delores  
Radtke, Estate of Marvin Radtke,  
Candelario Rodriguez, Dale Sittman, Alois  
Steger, John Stilp, William Surprise,  
Jacob Vertz, Richard Weber and Arthur  
Zinkel,  
          Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Badger Mining Corporation,  
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Mine Safety Appliances Company, Minnesota  
Mining & Manufacturing, North Safety  
Products Company, The Norton Company,  
Textron Inc., Liberty Mutual Insurance  
Company, Travelers Casualty and Surety,  
American Optical Corporation, Dalloz  
Safety Inc. and Employers Insurance  
Company of Wausau,  
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 192 
Reported at:  266 Wis. 2d 970, 669 N.W.2d 737 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 26, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
 
2
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago   
 
JUDGE: 
Bruce Schmidt   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Brian Hamill, Ronald L. Lampe and Dempsey, Williamson, Young, 
Kelly & Hertel, LLP, Madison; and Louis L. Plotkin, Rodney P. 
Vincent and Gertler, Gertler, Vincent & Plotkin, LLP, New 
Orleans, LA, and oral argument by Louis L. Plotkin. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there were briefs by Michael 
J. Cohen, Catherine R. Grogan and Meissner Tierney Fisher & 
Nichols, S.C., Milwaukee; and Cathy R. Gordon and Swartz 
Campbell LLC, Pittsburgh, PA, and oral argument by Cathy R. 
Gordon. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jeffrey O. Davis, Nora 
M. Platt, O. Thomas Armstrong and Quarles & Brady LLP, 
Milwaukee, on behalf of Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Tene S. Davis and 
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Kansas City, MO; and Victor E. 
Schwartz, Leah Lorber, Kimberly D. Sandner and Shook, Hardy & 
Bacon, L.L.P, Washington, D.C., on behalf of Coalition for 
Litigation Justice, Inc. 
 
 
 
2004 WI 97 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-1681  
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 1029) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Laverne Haase,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Larry Braatz, Norb Braun, Fidel Castillo,  
Gregory Ebel, Lawrence Ferge, Leon  
Fuerst, Carol Guyette, Estate of Ray  
Guyette, David Hamilton, Floyd Hanson,  
Jerald Heuer, Daniel Janiak, Rick  
Knudsen, Wesley Kupsky, Sr., James  
Mohrman, James Maroney, Terry Olejnik,  
Robert Parry, Donald Quaintance, Delores  
Radtke, Estate of Marvin Radtke,  
Candelario Rodriguez, Dale Sittman, Alois  
Steger, John Stilp, William Surprise,  
Jacob Vertz, Richard Weber and Arthur  
Zinkel,  
 
          Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Badger Mining Corporation,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Mine Safety Appliances Company, Minnesota  
Mining & Manufacturing, North Safety  
Products Company, The Norton Company,  
Textron Inc., Liberty Mutual Insurance  
Company, Travelers Casualty and Surety,  
American Optical Corporation, Dalloz  
Safety Inc. and Employers Insurance  
Company of Wausau,  
 
          Defendants. 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Laverne Haase, 
seeks review of a decision of the court of appeals that affirmed 
an order of the circuit court dismissing his products liability 
claim against Badger Mining Corporation.1  Haase contends that 
the court of appeals erred in adopting and applying Restatement 
(Third) of Torts § 5 (1998) and using it as the basis to defeat 
his strict liability claim.  Additionally, he maintains that he 
presented sufficient evidence for a strict liability claim under 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).   
¶2 
We agree with Haase that Restatement (Third) of Torts 
§ 5 (1998) is inapplicable to the case at hand.  However, we 
disagree with his assertion that he presented sufficient 
evidence to support a strict liability claim under Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).  Because we determine that 
Badger's 
product, 
silica 
sand, 
underwent 
a 
material 
and 
substantial change after leaving its possession, we conclude 
that Badger cannot be held strictly liable.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I 
                                                 
1 Haase v. Badger Mining Corporation, 2003 WI App 192, 266 
Wis. 2d 970, 669 N.W.2d 737 (affirming an order of the circuit 
court for Winnebago County, Bruce K. Schmidt, Judge).  
No. 
02-1681   
 
 
 
3
¶3 
Haase was employed at the Neenah Foundry from 1955 to 
1996.  In 1999, he was diagnosed with silicosis, a lung disease 
caused by prolonged inhaling of silica particles.  It is 
undisputed that Haase was exposed to harmful silica particles 
while working at Neenah. 
¶4 
Upon learning his diagnosis, Haase filed suit against 
Badger and several respirator manufacturers, alleging that he 
had contracted silicosis as a result of his exposure to silica 
sand at Neenah.2  Because Badger's sand is central to this case, 
it is important to understand where it comes from, how it was 
used at Neenah, and the nature of Haase's exposure to it.   
¶5 
From 1980 to 1996, Badger supplied silica sand to 
Neenah.  Badger begins its process of mining sand by drilling 
holes in the earth to locate sandstone.  After locating the 
sandstone, Badger uses various techniques to loosen it, such as 
blasting, drilling, and ripping.  It then places the crushed 
sandstone in a slurry box with water to remove clays and other 
impurities.  The sand, which is over 99% pure silica, is dried 
in large kilns.  After cooling, Badger screens and blends the 
sand so that its size conforms to its customers' specifications. 
¶6 
At Neenah, the silica sand is mixed with benonite, 
clay, and sea coal and compressed into molds.  Molten iron is 
then poured into these molds to create iron castings, such as 
manhole covers.  Once the molten metal cools and solidifies, the 
                                                 
2 The respirator manufacturers settled with Haase prior to 
trial. 
No. 
02-1681   
 
 
 
4
mold is broken apart and the casting comes out.  The compacted 
sand surrounding the casting is vibrated, shaken out, and often 
reused in the process.  The castings, meanwhile, go through a 
shot blast process where BB's are fired at them to remove any 
excess sand.  Workers remove additional burned sand from the 
castings by grinding it off with machines. 
¶7 
During his tenure at Neenah, Haase held several 
positions.  From 1955 to 1993, he worked in the molding 
department.  This is where the silica sand is compressed into 
molds for the iron castings.  While working on the rollover 
molding line, Haase was not required to wear a respirator and 
did not wear one.   
¶8 
In addition to the rollover molding line, Haase 
periodically worked on the cleanup crew.  There, he would shovel 
and sweep excess silica sand and dust left over from the foundry 
process.  Haase would also shovel sand down in pits where there 
was a large amount of fine, black dust.  At trial, he explained 
that this was very dusty work and at times he could not even see 
the end of his shovel.  Haase stated that he wore a respirator 
when working cleanup.   
¶9 
Finally, from 1993 until his retirement in 1996, Haase 
worked as a grinder.  He would grind burned silica sand and 
other imperfections off the iron castings.  Again, he testified 
that this was a dusty job and that he wore a respirator at all 
times while working. 
No. 
02-1681   
 
 
 
5
¶10 Haase asserted two theories of liability in his case 
against Badger:  negligence and strict liability.3  At the close 
of his case-in-chief, Badger moved for dismissal based on 
insufficiency of the evidence.  The circuit court granted the 
motion. 
¶11 In dismissing Haase's strict liability claim against 
Badger, 
the 
circuit 
court 
relied 
on 
Haase's 
own 
expert 
witnesses, Dr. Henry Anderson and Dr. Yehia Hammad.  Both 
experts acknowledged that when the silica sand left Badger, it 
could not cause silicosis because the granules were too large to 
be inhaled.   
¶12 The circuit court also adopted and applied the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 5 (1998).  It reasoned that 
because a raw material such as silica sand could not be 
defectively designed, Badger could not be held strictly liable.  
In reaching this conclusion, the circuit court correctly 
recognized 
that 
Wisconsin 
courts 
had 
yet 
to 
adopt 
the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 5 (1998). 
¶13 The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Haase's 
claims.  Like the circuit court, the court of appeals adopted 
and applied the Restatement (Third) of Torts (1998) § 5.  Haase 
v. Badger Mining Corporation, 2003 WI App 192, ¶29, 266 
Wis. 2d 970, 699 N.W.2d 737.  It observed that "§ 5 is the 
logical extension of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A 
                                                 
3 On review to this court, Haase challenges only the circuit 
court's dismissal of his strict liability claim.  Therefore, we 
do not address any issues regarding his negligence claim. 
No. 
02-1681   
 
 
 
6
(1965)."  Id.  The court explained, "[i]n essence, § 5 
recognizes that a raw material such as sand is inherently safe 
in its design and is not an unreasonably dangerous product."  
Id.   
¶14 Additionally, the court of appeals concluded that 
Haase's strict liability claim would have failed even if the 
circuit court had applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 402A (1965).  Id., ¶27.  The court emphasized the testimony of 
Haase's expert witnesses, who noted that Badger's sand was too 
large to become respirable and harmful in its natural form.  
Id., ¶28.  Accordingly, it determined that there was no evidence 
that the sand was in any way unreasonably dangerous at the time 
Badger delivered it to Neenah.  Id.  
II 
¶15 A motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
may be granted when "the court is satisfied that, considering 
all credible evidence in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom the motion is made, there is no credible evidence 
to sustain a finding in favor of such a party."  Weiss v. United 
Fire and Casualty Co., 197 Wis. 2d 365, 388, 541 N.W.2d 753 
(1995) (quoting Wis. Stat. § 805.14(1)). 
¶16 In ruling upon a motion made at the close of a 
plaintiff's case, a circuit court may grant the motion if it 
finds, as a matter of law, that no jury could disagree on the 
proper facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom, and that there 
is no credible evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff.  
No. 
02-1681   
 
 
 
7
Id. (citing American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dobrzynski, 88 Wis. 
2d 617, 625, 277 N.W.2d 749 (1979)). 
¶17 Because circuit courts are better positioned to decide 
the weight and relevancy of the testimony, we accord them 
substantial deference.  Id. at 388-89 (citing James v. Heintz, 
165 Wis. 2d 572, 577, 478 N.W.2d 31 (Ct. App. 1991)).  Thus, we 
will not overturn a circuit court's decision to dismiss for 
insufficient evidence unless the record reveals that it was 
"clearly wrong."  Id. at 389 (quoting Helmbrecht v. St. Paul 
Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 94, 110, 362 N.W.2d 118 (1985)).  A 
circuit court is "clearly wrong" when it grants a motion to 
dismiss despite the existence of "any credible evidence" to 
support the claim.  See id. 
III 
 
¶18 This case presents us with two issues.  First, we must 
decide whether the court of appeals erred in adopting and 
applying the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 5 (1998).  Second, 
we must determine whether Haase presented sufficient evidence 
for a strict liability claim under Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 402A (1965).    
 
¶19 Our discussion begins with an examination of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 5 (1998).  Section 5 is entitled 
"Liability of Commercial Sellers or Distributors of Product 
Components For Harm Caused by Products Into Which Components Are 
Integrated" and provides: 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise 
distributing 
product 
components 
who 
sells 
or 
No. 
02-1681   
 
 
 
8
distributes a component is subject to liability for 
harm to persons or property caused by a product into 
which the component is integrated if: 
(a) the component is defective in itself, as defined 
in this Chapter, and the defect causes the harm; or 
(b)(1) the seller or distributor of the component 
substantially participates in the integration of the 
component into the design of the product; and 
(2) the integration of the component causes the 
product to be defective, as defined in this Chapter; 
and 
(3) the defect in the product causes harm. 
¶20 Haase contends that the court of appeals erred in 
adopting this rule and using it as the basis to defeat his 
strict liability claim.  Specifically, he asserts § 5 is 
inapplicable to his case because it concerns claims involving 
component parts of finished products where the finished product 
is alleged to have caused harm.  Haase argues that Badger's 
silica sand was not a component part of Neenah's finished 
product (the metal casting).  Moreover, he maintains that 
Neenah's finished product did not cause his lung disease. 
¶21 We agree with Haase that § 5 is inapplicable here.  To 
begin, Badger's silica sand was not a component part because it 
was not integrated into Neenah's finished products.  This 
conclusion is supported by a comment to the rule, which notes 
that "[p]roduct components include raw materials, bulk products, 
and other constituent products sold for integration into other 
products."  Restatement (Third) of Torts (1998) § 5 cmt. a 
(emphasis added).   
No. 
02-1681   
 
 
 
9
¶22 Furthermore, Badger's silica sand did not cause the 
metal casting to be defective as required by § 5(b)(2).  Rather, 
it was the sand itself that was allegedly defective.  See 
Restatement (Third) of Torts (1998) § 5(b)(2).  Finally, the § 
5(b)(3) requirement cannot be met because no defect in the metal 
castings caused Haase's silicosis.  See Restatement (Third) of 
Torts (1998) § 5(b)(3).    
¶23 Although we recognize that Restatement (Third) of 
Torts may offer new insights into strict liability law, we 
decline to adopt § 5 here as it is inapplicable to the facts of 
this case.  Because we determine that it is inapplicable, the 
decision of the court of appeals should not be cited for the 
proposition that Wisconsin has adopted Restatement (Third) of 
Torts § 5 (1998).  Thus, the status of Restatement (Third) of 
Torts § 5 (1998) in Wisconsin is that we have neither adopted 
nor rejected it. 
IV 
¶24 We turn next to the issue of whether Haase presented 
sufficient 
evidence 
for 
a 
strict 
liability 
claim 
under 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).  That section 
provides: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to 
his property is subject to liability for physical harm 
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to 
his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling 
such a product, and  
No. 
02-1681   
 
 
 
10
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or 
consumer without substantial change in the condition 
in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the 
preparation and sale of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product 
from or entered into any contractual relation with the 
seller. 
 
¶25 To establish a strict liability claim under this rule, 
a plaintiff must prove all of the following elements:   
(1) that the product was in defective condition when 
it left the possession or control of the seller, (2) 
that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer, (3) that the defect was a cause  . . .  of 
the plaintiff's injuries or damages, (4) that the 
seller engaged in the business of selling such 
product, or, put negatively, that this is not an 
isolated or infrequent transaction not related to the 
principal business of the seller, and (5) that the 
product was one which the seller expected to and did 
reach the user or consumer without substantial change 
in the condition it was when he sold it.   
Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967) 
(emphasis added).   
 
¶26 A central dispute in this case is whether there was a 
change in the silica sand after leaving Badger's control to 
warrant a dismissal for strict liability.  Accordingly, we begin 
our analysis with the fifth element, which includes this 
"substantial change" doctrine.  If the evidence shows that there 
was a substantial change in the product after it left the 
seller, then the strict liability claim fails because all five 
elements must be met.   
No. 
02-1681   
 
 
 
11
 
¶27 The 
seminal 
case 
in 
Wisconsin 
explaining 
what 
constitutes a "substantial change" for the purposes of strict 
liability actions is Glassey v. Continental Insurance Company, 
176 Wis. 2d 587, 500 N.W.2d 295 (1993).  There, a worker was 
injured when a screw-on cap blew off of a pressurized spray tank 
and struck him in the forehead.  Id. at 593.  Prior to the 
accident, the tank's original filler cap had been replaced with 
a non-standard "plumbers cap."  Id. at 595.  The circuit court 
held that the substantial change to the tank barred a strict 
liability claim as a matter of law.  Id. at 594. 
 
¶28 After reviewing the evidence, the court of appeals 
agreed with the circuit court's dismissal of Glassey's claim.  
Id. at 600.  It concluded that "[m]anufacturers or sellers 
cannot be held strictly liable if the condition of the product 
substantially changes in a way that is material to the accident 
after the product leaves their control."  Id.  In doing so, the 
court defined a substantial and material change as "a change in 
the design, function or character of the product linked to the 
accident."  Id.   
¶29 The decision in Glassey was based heavily on an 
analysis of the public policy grounds that underlie the rule of 
strict liability as set forth in Dippel.  The focus of the 
analysis lies in the allocation of risk: 
'The reason, which has been reiterated most often, is 
that the seller is in the paramount position to 
distribute the costs of the risks created by the 
defective product he is selling.  He may pass the cost 
on to the consumer via increased prices.  He may 
protect himself either by purchasing insurance or by a 
No. 
02-1681   
 
 
 
12
form of self-insurance.  In justification of making 
the seller pay for the risk, it is argued that the 
consumer or user has the right to rely on the apparent 
safety of the product and that it is the seller in the 
first instance who creates the risk by placing the 
defective product on the market.  A correlative 
consideration, where the manufacturer is concerned, is 
that the manufacturer has the greatest ability to 
control the risk created by his product since he may 
initiate or adopt inspection and quality control 
measures thereby preventing defective products from 
reaching the consumer.' 
Id. at 602-03 (quoting Dippel, 37 Wis. 2d at 450-51). 
¶30 The court explained that such policies "are not 
promoted 
by 
imposing 
the 
strict 
liability 
rule 
when 
a 
substantial and material change is made to a product after it 
leaves the control of the manufacturer or seller."  Id. at 603.  
On the contrary, "[t]he party in the best position to pay for 
the cost of changes to products is the party who makes the 
changes."  Id.  Furthermore, "[i]nspection and quality control 
measures will not prevent changes made to the product after it 
leaves the manufacturer or sellers control."  Id.  For these 
reasons, the court determined that "[i]n situations where the 
product has undergone a substantial change by a third party, the 
policy of compensating persons injured by dangerous products is 
more equitably served by common law negligence rules."  Id. 
 
¶31 Haase contends that Badger's product did not undergo a 
substantial and material change because its silica content 
remained the same throughout the foundry process.  He notes that 
Neenah did not change the amount of silica in Badger's sand.  
Rather, Haase maintains that Badger controlled it, intentionally 
creating a product that was almost 100% pure silica. 
No. 
02-1681   
 
 
 
13
 
¶32 The problem with Haase's argument is that the evidence 
reveals that the very characteristic which made Badger's silica 
sand dangerous, its respirability, did not arise until the sand 
had been fractured into dust by Neenah during the foundry 
process.  This fact was confirmed by his expert witnesses at 
trial. 
¶33 Dr. Yehia Hammad, a certified industrial hygienist, 
testified that when Badger's sand leaves its facilities, it 
cannot cause silicosis because the granules are too large and 
not in the size range that can be inhaled into the lungs.  He 
explained, "That's like all of us sitting on the beach with 
respirators  . . . because the sand is very large and cannot get 
into our lungs." 
 
¶34 Similarly, Haase's medical expert, Dr. Henry Anderson, 
testified that even a very small grain of sand cannot get into 
the lungs.  He noted that the sand had to be very fine and so 
small that it cannot be seen with the naked eye.  Thus, both 
experts acknowledged that for the sand to be respirable and 
potentially harmful to the lungs, it must be fractured into 
smaller particles.  This occurred during processes at Neenah. 
¶35 Nevertheless, 
Haase 
attempts 
to 
minimize 
the 
significance of this evidence.  He argues that when a product is 
substantially changed before it reaches the plaintiff, the 
question becomes whether the manufacturer expected (or could 
have objectively foreseen) such a change.  If so, Haase insists 
that strict liability may then apply. 
No. 
02-1681   
 
 
 
14
¶36 Haase asserts that Badger expected the sand to undergo 
a 
substantial 
change 
and 
foresaw 
that 
respirable 
silica 
particles would be created from its product.  He complains that 
the court of appeals failed to consider Badger's expectation 
that its sand would be changed into a respirable form. 
¶37 For support, Haase relies on the third circuit case of  
Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Company, Inc., 729 F.2d 238 (3rd Cir. 
1984).  In Whitehead, the court reversed a district court's 
summary judgment order denying a plaintiff relief in a duty to 
warn case.4  Id. at 241.  The defendants maintained that the 
plaintiff was not entitled to relief because the lead ingots 
supplied to the plaintiff's employer had undergone a substantial 
change when they were converted to airborne and particulate lead 
during the employer's manufacturing processes.  See id. at 249-
50. 
¶38 In reversing the summary judgment order, the court 
explained that under New Jersey law the general substantial 
change rule "is limited to changes for which it is not 
foreseeable that the alteration will cause injury."  Id. at 250.  
It concluded that New Jersey followed a rule that exposed a 
manufacturer to strict liability if that manufacturer could 
foresee the change that would cause the user/consumer harm.  Id.  
The court explained: 
In this case it was objectively foreseeable that lead 
particles would be generated by Alpha's use of lead 
                                                 
4 At oral argument, counsel for Haase clarified that he was 
not raising a duty to warn argument in this review. 
No. 
02-1681   
 
 
 
15
ingot.  The fact that defendants supplied lead in 
ingot form, rather than in the form of airborne 
particles or metal fines, is of no consequence.  The 
law of torts does not turn on such nice distinctions 
of physical chemistry. . . .  The relevant question is 
whether the production of airborne and particulate 
lead 
was 
a 
foreseeable 
consequence 
of 
Alpha's 
operations. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 
¶39 Haase's reliance on Whitehead is misplaced.  We do not 
follow the foreseeability rule adopted by the New Jersey courts 
and applied in the Whitehead decision.  In fact, the New Jersey 
rule was advanced by the plaintiff in Glassey, and we expressly 
rejected it: 
Glassey urges that the rule to be applied in Wisconsin 
should be that 'a subsequent change in a product will 
not relieve a manufacturer from strict liability 
unless the subsequent alteration itself created the 
defect that constituted the sole cause of injury, and 
the change was not reasonably foreseeable by the 
manufacturer.'  Glassey cites Soler v. Castmaster, 
Division of H.P.M. Corp., 484 A.2d 1225 (N.J. 1984), 
in support of this rule. 
We reject this rule because it does not promote the 
policies 
that 
underlie 
the imposition 
of 
strict 
products 
liability 
on 
a 
manufacturer 
or 
seller. . . . Foreseeability 
is 
not 
an 
element 
considered in strict products liability claims, but 
instead is an element of negligence. 
Glassey, 176 Wis. 2d at 604 (emphasis added).   
 
¶40 Importantly, 
Soler 
relied 
on 
Whitehead 
for 
the 
proposition that a manufacturer can be held strictly liable if 
the substantial change is foreseeable.  See Soler, 484 A.2d at 
1232.  By explicitly rejecting Soler, we have implicitly 
rejected Whitehead for this proposition. 
No. 
02-1681   
 
 
 
16
¶41 Thus, even if we look past the fact that it was a duty 
to warn case, Whitehead is distinguishable because it rests on 
legal principles contradictory to Wisconsin law.  We have 
reiterated these principles before: "Glassey underscored that 
'[f]oreseeability is not an element considered in strict 
liability claims.' . . . We cannot fathom that this holding 
could be clearer."  Green v. Smith  Nephew A.H.P., Inc., 2001 WI 
109, ¶68, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727 (citation omitted).  
We take this opportunity to reiterate them once again.5 
¶42 In the end, we determine that the evidence here 
reflects that Badger's sand underwent a substantial change for 
the purposes of § 402A.  As a result, we are satisfied that the 
circuit court's decision to dismiss Haase's claim was not 
"clearly wrong" because there was no credible evidence to 
sustain a finding in his favor. 
V 
¶43 In sum, we agree with Haase that Restatement (Third) 
of Torts § 5 (1998) is inapplicable to the case at hand.  
However, we disagree with his assertion that he presented 
sufficient evidence to support a strict liability claim under 
                                                 
5 Although Wisconsin has rejected the forseeability rule, we 
do note that the authors of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A 
(1965) took no position on the issue.  In a caveat to the 
Restatement, they wrote:  
The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the 
rules stated in the Section may not apply . . . (2) to 
the seller of a product expected to be processed or 
otherwise substantially changed before it reaches the 
user or consumer . . .  
No. 
02-1681   
 
 
 
17
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).  Because we 
determine that Badger's product, silica sand, underwent a 
material and substantial change after leaving its possession, we 
conclude 
that 
Badger 
cannot 
be 
held 
strictly 
liable.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
02-1681   
 
 
 
1