Title: State v. Jarmon

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 111,608 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
VINCENT R. JARMON, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
When an instructional error was not raised in the district court and is asserted for 
the first time on appeal, failing to give a legally and factually appropriate instruction will 
result in reversal only if the failure was clearly erroneous. 
 
2. 
 
To establish a clearly erroneous instruction error, the defendant must firmly 
convince the court the jury would have reached a different result without the error. 
 
3. 
 
In a prosecution for burglary, the failure to instruct a jury on the elements of the 
intended felony underlying burglary constitutes error. 
 
4. 
 
The omission of an instruction defining the intended felony underlying a charge of 
burglary is subject to harmless error analysis. 
 
2 
 
 
 
5. 
 
An untimely motion for new trial that asserts ineffective assistance of counsel may 
be treated as a collateral attack on a judgment under K.S.A. 60-1507. 
 
6. 
 
An untimely motion for new trial that is deemed a collateral attack on a judgment 
does not confer on the movant greater procedural rights than those provided to a timely 
movant filing under K.S.A. 60-1507. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed February 26, 
2016. Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; BRUCE C. BROWN, judge. Opinion filed June 15, 2018. The 
judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the district court is affirmed in 
part and reversed in part. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Heather Cessna, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for 
appellant.  
 
Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, 
and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.:  Vincent Jarmon appeals from his jury conviction for one count of 
burglary.  
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
At the time of the events that led to the conviction, Tommy Luallen and his 
mother, Mathilda Luallen, owned a commercial building in Wichita. Tommy was in 
3 
 
 
 
business with Larry Farmer. Tommy and Farmer bought storage units at auctions and 
resold the contents. They stored their inventory at the building in Wichita.  
 
On May 6, 2013, Tommy Luallen and Farmer went to the building and discovered 
a hole in the back wall of the building. They attempted to remedy the breach by placing a 
board in front of it and piling marble sinks, tubs, a stove, a barrel, and other items in front 
of the board. On the morning of May 7, 2013, Farmer went to the building and opened 
the front door. He heard a noise in the back and saw a light shining where he would not 
normally expect to see any light. He backed out of the building and quietly closed the 
door and then called the police.  
 
Officer Edward Johnson of the Wichita Police Department responded to report of 
a burglary in progress. He initially encountered Farmer, who told him someone was 
inside the building. Johnson and another officer entered through the front door, while a 
third officer went to the back of the building to seal it off. They announced their presence 
and made their way toward the back. There they encountered Jarmon and arrested him. 
Jarmon had chips on his clothing, similar in appearance to the wall insulation through 
which the holes in the back wall had been broken. He had a red bracelet belonging to 
Farmer on his left wrist. In Jarmon's pocket were found screws and washers that came 
from Farmer's business.  
 
Farmer inspected the back room and saw that the tubs and sinks and barrel had 
been moved. A second hole was found above the earlier opening and higher than the 
stacked up items.  
 
Bags not belonging to Farmer were found in the room; these bags were filled with 
Farmer's property. Open toolboxes were scattered around and many tools were missing 
from them. A jewelry display and other goods had been swept off shelves and were lying 
4 
 
 
 
on the floor. A string of Hot Wheels toy cars led to the hole and out into the alley. Over 
120 Hot Wheels cars were missing, as were some jewelry, tools, stereo equipment, CDs, 
and DVDs. Jarmon did not have permission to be in the building.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The State charged Jarmon with one count of felony burglary. A jury found him 
guilty as charged, and the court sentenced him to a standard term of 32 months of 
incarceration and 12 months of postrelease supervision.  
 
Jarmon took a timely appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the 
conviction itself but reversed on a peripheral question of the effectiveness of trial 
counsel, particularly with respect to a conflict of interest when arguing Jarmon's pro se 
motion for change of counsel. The court remanded for a renewed hearing on the motion 
to replace trial counsel. State v. Jarmon, No. 111,608, 2016 WL 757570 (Kan. App. 
2016) (unpublished opinion).  
 
This court granted the State's petition for review with respect to the remand for a 
hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel and granted Jarmon's cross-petition for 
review with respect to the first issue he raised to the Court of Appeals—the omission of 
the theft instruction.  
 
The Omission of an Instruction on the Elements of Theft 
 
The jury was instructed on the elements of burglary. One of the elements was that 
Jarmon entered the building with the intent to commit a theft, but the instructions 
neglected to define theft. He asserts that the omission of a definition of theft constituted 
reversible error.  
5 
 
 
 
 
When a jury instruction is alleged to be erroneous, 
 
"(1) [f]irst, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both 
jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) 
next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was 
legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that 
would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, the 
appellate court must determine whether the error was harmless." State v. Plummer, 295 
Kan. 156, 163, 283 P.3d 202 (2012). 
 
Jarmon did not object to the burglary instruction. When, as here, an instructional 
error is asserted for the first time on appeal, failing to give a legally and factually 
appropriate instruction will result in reversal only if the failure was clearly erroneous. 
State v. Solis, 305 Kan. 55, 65, 378 P.3d 532 (2016). "To establish a clearly erroneous 
instruction error, the defendant must firmly convince the court the jury would have 
reached a different result without the error." 305 Kan. at 65. This standard applies with 
equal force when the defendant fails to object to an instruction that omits an element of a 
crime. The error is harmless if the appellate court has a firm belief beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of changing the result of the trial. State v. 
Watson, 256 Kan. 396, 404, 885 P.2d 1226 (1994).  
 
The standard of review in Kansas is consistent with the standard applied by the 
United States Supreme Court when reviewing the omission of an element of a crime in 
jury instructions. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 144 L. Ed. 2d 
35 (1999). In Neder, unlike here, the defendant preserved the issue by objecting to the 
missing element instruction. Relying on Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 
87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967), the Neder Court applied the standard test for 
6 
 
 
 
harmlessness:  "whether it appears 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained 
of did not contribute to the verdict.'" 527 U.S. at 15. The court noted that the standard is 
essentially the same as the analysis used in other cases that deal with errors infringing 
upon the jury's fact-finding role:  "Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational 
jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?" 527 U.S. at 18. 
 
Here, the standard is relaxed because Jarmon did not object to the instructions. As 
with other instructional errors reviewed for clear error, the error may be deemed harmless 
unless Jarmon can convince this court that the jury would have reached a different verdict 
if it had been informed of the elements of theft.  
 
Jury Instruction 7 read:   
 
"In Count 1, the defendant, Vincent R. Jarmon, is charged with Burglary. The defendant 
pleads not guilty. 
 
"To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 
 
1. That the defendant entered a building that is not a dwelling; 
 
2. That the defendant did so without authority; 
 
3. That the defendant did so with the intent to commit a theft therein; 
 
4. That this act occurred on or about the 7th day of May, 2013, in Sedgwick 
County, Kansas."  
 
This instruction generally tracked the PIK Crim. 4th 58.120 burglary instruction 
but omitted the PIK language "[t]he elements of [theft] are (set forth in Instruction 
7 
 
 
 
No. ___) (as follows:  ________________________)." The instructions as given 
provided the jury with no definition of the crime of theft. 
 
PIK Crim. 4th 58.010, defining theft, would have added language similar to this 
instruction:   
 
"To establish that the defendant intended to commit a theft, each of the following claims 
must be proved:   
 
"Larry Farmer was the owner of the property. 
 
"The defendant exerted unauthorized control over the property. 
 
"The defendant intended to deprive Larry Farmer permanently of the use or 
benefit of the property. 
 
"This act occurred on or about the 7th day of May, 2013, in Sedgwick County, 
Kansas."  
 
See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5801 (defining theft). 
 
In a burglary prosecution, failure to provide the elements of the underlying 
intended crime constitutes error. See, e.g., State v. Richmond, 258 Kan. 449, 458, 904 
P.2d 974 (1995); Watson, 256 Kan. 396, Syl. ¶ 6; State v. Rush, 255 Kan. 672, 679, 877 
P.2d 386 (1994); State v. Linn, 251 Kan. 797, 802, 840 P.2d 1133 (1992). Because 
Jarmon did not object to the instructions as given or request an instruction on the 
elements of theft, we apply the clearly erroneous standard set out above. Jarmon must 
firmly convince this court that the jury would have reached a different result if it had 
been instructed on the elements of theft.  
 
8 
 
 
 
An examination of the record leads us to conclude that the State's evidence was 
overwhelming and was never directly contested. It was clear that Jarmon did not have 
permission to be in the building and he had exerted significant effort in creating a hole 
that would give him access to the storeroom. He had warehouse property in his pockets; 
he was wearing a bracelet found in the warehouse; a trail of warehouse property could be 
followed from the warehouse through the hole and out into the alley; and warehouse 
property had been placed in bags that had been brought into the warehouse by someone 
other than the owners. Property that had been present in the building shortly before 
Jarmon was found there was missing when the building was searched after his arrest. 
This was compelling and uncontested evidence that he intended to permanently deprive 
the owners of their property.  
 
No evidence was introduced of Jarmon's purpose or presence in the building other 
than the abundant circumstantial evidence of theft. Jarmon did not testify on his own 
behalf. On cross-examination, Johnson testified that the weather was "cool" at the time of 
the arrest. During closing argument, Jarmon's counsel contended that he was homeless 
and might have been looking for shelter and not looking to appropriate property. Counsel 
pointed out that Jarmon was wearing a jacket, which might be seen as evidence that 
Jarmon entered the building to avoid the "cool" weather.  
 
Of course, if Jarmon had not been wearing a jacket, counsel could have argued 
that this was evidence likewise tending to show that he might have entered the building in 
order to escape from the weather. Wearing a jacket was not relevant to his motivation for 
breaking into the warehouse, because Jarmon could have been warmly dressed, not 
warmly dressed, or even naked, and the same argument could have been advanced based 
on the fact that he was wearing (or not wearing) clothing. The relevant and substantial 
evidence with respect to his clothing was the presence of warehouse property in Jarmon's 
pockets. 
9 
 
 
 
 
Even if a jury might have been persuaded that he initially entered the building for 
shelter from the elements, the evidence was compelling that he left the building with 
property not belonging to him and then returned to the building in order to obtain more of 
that property. Some property was missing entirely; some property was found in the alley 
behind the building; and some property was found on Jarmon's person. This evidence 
undermined any contention that he was in the building only for warmth and did not 
intend to permanently deprive the owners of their property. 
 
The present case contrasts with Rush, 255 Kan. 672, where this court reversed a 
burglary conviction for failure to instruct on the elements of theft. In Rush, a homeless 
man forced entry into a store where he was found by police. Nothing was missing from 
the building, and the defendant had nothing on his person except his personal belongings. 
The defendant stated that he intended only to sleep in the building, not to take anything. 
In the present case, however, no evidence was put forward that Jarmon was homeless; 
property was missing from the building, Jarmon had store property in his pockets and on 
his wrist, and he had placed store property in bags that he brought with him. The 
evidence of theft was much greater than in Rush. 
 
We are not firmly convinced that the jury would have reached a different verdict if 
the district court had given a theft instruction. A rational jury would have concluded that 
at least one of the reasons why Jarmon went into the building was to steal property. The 
instructional error was therefore harmless. 
 
The Motion to Replace Trial Counsel Prior to Sentencing 
 
Several weeks after the trial ended, Jarmon filed a pro se motion requesting a new 
trial based on the alleged ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Immediately prior to 
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sentencing, the court conducted an inquiry on the motion and heard the arguments of his 
trial counsel, the attorney for the State, and Jarmon himself. The court then denied the 
motion and heard arguments on sentencing. Jarmon argued on appeal that the district 
court abused its discretion when it denied his motion, and the Court of Appeals agreed. 
The State challenges this holding on review. 
 
Jarmon maintains that the standard of review is a mixed question of law and fact, 
with the ultimate conclusion subject to de novo review. The State, on the other hand, 
asserts that the issue is reviewed for abuse of judicial discretion. The State is correct. 
See State v. Pfannenstiel, 302 Kan. 747, 760-61, 357 P.3d 877 (2015) (duty to conduct 
inquiry on substitution of counsel can lead to three types of errors, each of which is 
reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion); State v. Richardson, 290 Kan. 176, 185, 
224 P.3d 553 (2010) (discretion not abused in refusing to appoint new counsel for 
defendant). 
 
An abuse of discretion occurs when judicial action is (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or 
unreasonable, i.e., no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court; 
(2) based on an error of law, i.e., the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal 
conclusion; or (3) based on an error of fact, i.e., substantial competent evidence does not 
support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of 
discretion is based. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 
___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). 
 
Because Jarmon's motion for new trial was filed out of time, the Court of Appeals 
treated it as a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507. It remanded for a hearing, complete with 
new appointed counsel. In so doing, the Court of Appeals provided Jarmon with 
procedural rights superior to those granted many petitioners who file timely K.S.A.      
11 
 
 
 
60-1507 pleadings. When 60-1507 pleadings are timely filed, the petitioners are not 
guaranteed a hearing and are not automatically provided with court-appointed attorneys.  
 
Jarmon charged in his motion that his attorney, Latina Wharton, provided 
ineffective assistance and "deliberately and with intention sabotage[d] the defendant's 
jury trial." He set out several grounds for his allegation:  Wharton was aware that he was 
homeless and was in the building because he was homeless; Wharton refused to object to 
the introduction of photographs of the building; Wharton failed to object to the 
publication of a photograph showing him in handcuffs; and Wharton "failed to give any 
opening statements to a defense" and, after being summoned to the judge's bench, she 
never returned to complete opening statements. He then asked the court to dismiss 
Wharton and grant him a new jury trial.  
 
The district court conducted an inquiry in which it gave Jarmon, Wharton, and the 
prosecutor ample opportunity to speak. Jarmon repeated the contentions contained in his 
motion. Wharton initially stated that she was "willing to work with Mr. Jarmon." She 
explained that she, not the State, introduced the photograph of Jarmon, which she did for 
the purpose of suggesting that the weather was cold and he had sought shelter in the 
building. The prosecution also spoke to some of Jarmon's concerns and portrayed 
Wharton as having performed admirably.  
 
The district court made two findings:  that there was no basis for granting a new 
trial and that there was an insufficient basis for replacing Wharton as counsel. In 
particular, the court addressed Wharton's decision not to introduce direct evidence of 
Jarmon's homeless condition and motives for being in the building:   
 
 
"Now, there are certain strategies, though, if she calls you to the stand to testify 
oh, I was homeless, didn't have any place to stay, that's why I went in there, you're 
12 
 
 
 
opened up to cross-examination, which probably would have been—had horrible results 
for you, with [the prosecutor] asking you questions about this. That would have been a 
total meltdown in your case. She did an excellent job of using other evidence to point out 
to the jury and she made the argument in closing argument, I remember thinking about 
that, and thinking that's a good point, and yeah, she's doing a good job there bringing that 
out, that you know, hey, trying to argue that you were in there for the purposes of 
shelter."  
 
 
The Court of Appeals determined that there was necessarily a conflict of interest 
when Wharton responded to her client's motion. Jarmon, 2016 WL 757570, at *5. The 
Court of Appeals initially noted, apparently agreeing with the State, that Jarmon's motion 
for new trial was filed out of time and was therefore jurisdictionally deficient. The court 
then elected to treat the motion as a collateral challenge to the conviction under K.S.A. 
60-1507. 2016 WL 757570, at *5.  
 
In State v. Reed, 302 Kan. 227, 236, 352 P.3d 530 (2015), the defendant filed a 
motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel before sentencing but three months 
after the guilty verdict. This court held that a district court has jurisdiction under K.S.A. 
22-4506 (applying to "any person who is in custody under a sentence of imprisonment") 
to treat the motion as a collateral attack on the sentence. The court cited State v. Kirby, 
272 Kan. 1170, 1192-93, 39 P.3d 1 (2002), which held that a posttrial but presentencing 
motion for new trial that alleged ineffective assistance of counsel could be treated as a 
postconviction motion under K.S.A. 22-4506. 
 
The Court of Appeals remanded for a hearing on Jarmon's "collateral challenge to 
his conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel." 2016 WL 757570, at *7. 
At this hearing he was to receive new appointed counsel.  
 
13 
 
 
 
Because Jarmon's motion for new trial was untimely, the only mechanism for 
considering the motion was to treat it as a collateral attack on his conviction along the 
lines of Reed. But such a collateral attack does not guarantee the movant a full hearing 
and neutral appointed counsel. K.S.A. 60-1507(b) allows a district court to summarily 
dispose of a motion based on the files and records of the case and without the presence of 
the prisoner. K.S.A. 22-4506(b) requires appointment of counsel only when the court 
finds that the motion presents substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact. By 
granting Jarmon a full hearing with new counsel, the Court of Appeals provided him with 
more procedural rights than he may have received if he had filed his motion on time or 
had filed a true 60-1507 motion. 
 
In State v. Sharkey, 299 Kan. 87, 95, 322 P.3d 325 (2014), the court noted that an 
untimely motion for new trial is subject to a summary denial without appointing counsel 
if the judge determines that the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively show 
that the movant is entitled to no relief. See K.S.A. 60-1507(b). Such a disposition would 
have provided Jarmon less protection than he received in the present case under a 
challenge based on asserted conflicts of interest. Normally, a court would conduct a 
preliminary examination to determine whether the requested relief was a realistic 
possibility. He would not be automatically entitled to a hearing, much less to appear and 
testify at the hearing. The Court of Appeals skipped the statutory step allowing the 
district court to conduct a preliminary investigation of the merits of the claim. Under the 
Court of Appeals reasoning, Jarmon was entitled to an inquiry sufficient to develop on 
the record the interests of the parties because he filed his motion out of time.  
 
The Court of Appeals erroneously created a right to the appointment of new, 
neutral counsel. This court has held that a claim of conflict of interest between a 
defendant and counsel does not require "automatic substitution of counsel." Pfannenstiel, 
302 Kan. at 764. Kansas caselaw has consistently held that a district court need not 
14 
 
 
 
appoint new counsel until it finds, after an initial inquiry into potential conflict of interest, 
that a defendant has established "justifiable dissatisfaction with his or her current 
attorney." 302 Kan. at 765; see also State v. Brown, 300 Kan. 565, 575, 331 P.3d 797 
(2014); State v. Wells, 297 Kan. 741, 754, 305 P.3d 568 (2013). 
 
In order to demonstrate justifiable dissatisfaction, a defendant seeking new 
counsel must show a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable disagreement, or a complete 
breakdown in communication between counsel and the defendant. Pfannenstiel, 302 Kan. 
at 759-60. Jarmon's motion articulated a statement of attorney dissatisfaction, which 
triggered the district court's duty to inquire into a potential conflict of interest. 302 Kan. 
at 760.  
 
Because Jarmon's motion was untimely, he was not entitled to assistance of 
conflict-free counsel to argue for a new trial. Pfannenstiel, 302 Kan. at 763. He was also 
not entitled to conflict-free counsel to argue for the existence of a conflict with his 
current appointed counsel. 302 Kan. at 765.  
 
The present case is substantially similar to the circumstances of Pfannenstiel, 
where the defendant filed a pro se motion for substitute counsel based on a conflict of 
interest and the district court questioned the defendant and his counsel at a hearing before 
denying the request. 302 Kan. at 755-57. 
 
Pfannenstiel held that, while a district court's questioning of defense counsel 
during its inquiry into the potential conflict does not automatically create a conflict, 
counsel must tread a fine line to ensure her or his statements do not create a conflict. 
302 Kan. at 765-66. Inquiry by the district court of defense counsel is necessary, but 
statements by counsel that go beyond factual recitations and argue against the client's 
position create an actual conflict of interest. 302 Kan. at 766. Counsel may make 
15 
 
 
 
statements regarding decisions of trial strategy and are "a generally appropriate area of 
inquiry." 302 Kan. at 767. Likewise, comments by counsel that the defendant may have 
misunderstood what counsel told him or her do not cross the line of conflict of interest, 
despite being adverse to defendant's statements. 302 Kan. at 767. 
 
Here, the statements by Jarmon's defense counsel amounted to an explanation of 
trial strategy; a clarification of the factual basis for some of the events at trial; and a 
clarification that, contrary to Jarmon's allegations, she had advanced Jarmon's theory of 
defense during closing arguments. Although some of these statements contradicted 
Jarmon's allegations, they constituted factual recitations rather than advocacy against 
Jarmon's motion.  
 
The record supports the district court's conclusion that there was no conflict 
between Jarmon and Wharton sufficient to justify either a new trial or the appointment of 
new counsel. Some of the allegations in Jarmon's motion are clearly false. Wharton 
definitely presented an opening argument that, while brief, was complete. Some of the 
allegations were vague and failed to point out a true inadequacy of representation. The 
introduction of the photograph was a deliberate and legitimate, albeit unsuccessful, trial 
strategy. The claim that Wharton failed to advocate based on his homelessness was not 
quite true and was also a matter of trial strategy, which prevented her from calling him as 
a witness subject to cross-examination.  
 
This was a difficult case to defend. Jarmon was caught in a warehouse, having 
obviously broken through a wall to obtain entry. He was caught with warehouse property 
in his pockets, on his wrist, in bags that he evidently brought with him, and in the act of 
taking property out through the hole in the wall. He was marginally articulate and had an 
extensive criminal history involving theft and trespass, which made it dangerous to place 
him on the stand.  
16 
 
 
 
 
It is inappropriate to send this case back for a hearing on the motion for new trial 
or the motion to replace counsel. The Court of Appeals mandated appointment of new 
counsel for a collateral challenge that had no support in the record and files. A challenge 
such as the one that Jarmon raised is normally subject to summary denial without 
appointment of counsel. The district court would have little before it at such a hearing 
that it did not have at its inquiry on the conflict of interest:  testimony by Jarmon, 
Wharton, and the prosecution, as well as its own observations about the conduct of the 
defense. It is extraordinarily unlikely that the court would reach a different conclusion 
than it did at the time of the hearing on the motion. A remand in cases such as this one 
would reward defendants who file untimely motions for new trial by providing them with 
full-fledged evidentiary hearings supported by appointed counsel. There is no support for 
such an outcome either in caselaw or statute. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals ruling on the motion for new trial. The 
conviction of burglary and the denial of the motion for new trial by the district court are 
affirmed.