Title: LOUIS L. MORENO v. STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND TAXATION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LOUIS L. MORENO v. STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND TAXATION1989 WY 129775 P.2d 497Case Number: 88-324Decided: 06/09/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
LOUIS L. MORENO, 
APPELLANT (PETITIONER),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF 
REVENUE AND TAXATION, APPELLEE (RESPONDENT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

Patricia Schick, 
Laramie, for appellant.

Peter J. 
Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., Shirley Kingston, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Petitioner Louis L. 
Moreno, a self-employed mechanic, challenges a district court affirmance of the 
proposed suspension of his driver's license by the State of Wyoming. He argues that 
W.S. 31-7-105(d) (Cum.Supp. 1988), which denies an independent administrative 
hearing examiner the discretion to allow limited driving privileges to a person 
convicted of driving while under the influence (DWUI) twice in a five year 
period, creates an irrebuttable presumption of the person's unsafe driving 
behavior in violation of the federal and state 
constitutions.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Moreno was convicted of 
driving while under the influence (DWUI) in violation of W.S. 31-5-233 
(Cum.Supp. 1985) on June 25, 1985. On November 3, 1987, he was arrested and 
charged with DWUI in violation of W.S. 31-5-233 (Cum.Supp. 1988). He later 
received notice of a ninety-day suspension of his license based on the results 
of a field chemical test under W.S. 31-6-102(e) (Cum.Supp. 
1988).

[¶4.]     On January 5, 1988, 
Moreno pled 
guilty to his second DWUI violation and was convicted. In a January 29, 1988 
letter, respondent the State of Wyoming Department of Revenue and Taxation 
(Department) notified him that under W.S. 31-7-105(d)(iii)(A) (Cum.Supp. 1988), 
his driver's license would be suspended through November 30, 1988, because the 
January offense was Moreno's second conviction for DWUI within the same 
five-year period.

[¶5.]     On February 23, 1988, 
the Department received a letter from Moreno requesting a hearing on the enhanced 
suspension of his license and arguing that he needed to drive to be able to 
work. Moreno 
received timely notice of a hearing and was granted a temporary driver's permit 
for March 3, 1988, to May 2, 1988. The hearing took place on April 5, 1988. The 
hearing officer concluded in his written order: "Wyoming Law prohibits 
modification of a suspension based upon a second Driving While Under the 
Influence conviction within a five (5) year period." Moreno's driving 
privileges were then ordered suspended from May 3, 1988, through February 2, 
1989.

[¶6.]     Moreno challenged the 
constitutionality of the enhanced suspension provision in W.S. 
31-7-105(d)(iii)(A) in a petition for judicial review in the district court 
filed April 29, 1988. On November 29, 1988, the district court affirmed the 
hearing officer's final order in all respects. This appeal from the district 
court's decision followed.

[¶7.]     Moreno's issue focuses on 
that portion of W.S. 31-7-105(d), which provides in pertinent 
part:

* * * the [hearing 
examiner's] discretion to continue or modify any order of suspension so as to 
allow driving privileges is limited as follows:

* * * * * 
*

(iii) It may be extended 
to a person convicted under W.S. 31-5-233 or other law prohibiting driving while 
under the influence only if:

(A) Within the five (5) 
year period preceding the date of the most recent offense, the person has not 
been convicted under W.S. 31-5-233 or other law prohibiting driving under the 
influence * * *.

[¶8.]     Moreno admits in his brief 
that he has received procedural due process. Cf. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 1589, 
29 L. Ed. 2d 90, 94 (1971). He also admits the classification made by the state in 
treating second time DWUI offenders differently from other DWUI offenders is 
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Moreno further concedes that a Wyoming driver's license 
is a privilege and not a property right and recognizes this court's recent 
pronouncement that proceedings to suspend or revoke a driver's license are 
civil, not criminal, in nature. Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Hull, 751 P.2d 351, 356 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶9.]     Having made these 
concessions, Moreno argues that the above quoted provision 
violates substantive due process by creating an "irrebuttable presumption" which 
deprives him of the ability to prove hardship and receive limited driving 
privileges after his second DWUI conviction within a five-year period. He 
contends that while this statute does not necessarily affect a property right, 
it does indirectly affect his "status" and the effect it has upon his status 
affects his ability to earn a living as a self-employed mechanic. Through this 
line of reasoning, he argues the state does not have a legitimate interest in 
denying all persons convicted of DWUI twice within a five-year period the right 
to limited driving privileges without allowing them a chance to prove individual 
need for them.

[¶10.]  Moreno supports his arguments by relying 
on the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S. Ct. 2230, 37 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1973), where the Court struck down a 
state statute which mandatorily classified an applicant to a state funded 
university as nonresident for tuition purposes if the applicant listed an 
out-of-state address on the application form. Without discussing the nature or 
character of an applicant's alleged property entitlement to pay a certain level 
of tuition, and writing for a rather fractured plurality in which three justices 
specially concurred and three justices dissented, Justice Stewart 
held:

[I]t is forbidden by the 
Due Process Clause to deny an individual the resident [tuition] rates on the 
basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence, when that 
presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State 
has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial 
determination.

Vlandis, 412 U.S.  at 452, 93 S. Ct.  at 2236, 37 L. Ed. 2d  at 71.1 

[¶11.]  This court recognizes that the U.S. 
Const. amends. V and XIV and Wyo.Const. art. 1, § 6, contain procedural and 
substantive components. Cheyenne Airport Board v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 727 (Wyo.), appeal dismissed, 476 U.S. 1110, 106 S. Ct. 1961, 90 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1985). Federal substantive due process protections 
apply indirectly to the states through U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV, and state 
constitutional protections under Wyo.Const. art. 1, § 6, must guard the minimum 
due process rights guaranteed by the federal protections. Under the substantive 
component of those constitutional provisions the exercise of the state police 
power must promote a legitimate public objective with reasonable means. A due 
process infringement of an individual's nonfundamental life, liberty, or 
property entitlement occurs only when it amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of 
that entitlement. Id.

[¶12.]  Having restated this court's substantive 
due process analysis under the federal and state constitutions, however, we do 
not feel obligated to adopt, in the way Moreno urges, the reasoning of Vlandis 
and several other cases listed in footnote 1, supra. To a certain extent, those 
holdings represent anomalies in substantive due process and equal protection 
analysis. A "per se" application of Vlandis, which does not consider the 
character of the alleged life, liberty, or property interest affected, the 
presence of a suspect class susceptible to invidious discrimination or an 
adverse impact on individual fundamental constitutional rights, might be 
interpreted to inject a strict judicial scrutiny standard of review into the 
substantive due process analysis every time a litigant can locate a conclusive 
statutory presumption. See Vlandis, 412 U.S.  at 460-64, 93 S. Ct. 2240-42, 37 L. Ed. 2d  at 
76-79 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.); and Id., 412 U.S.  at 464-70, 93 S. Ct.  at 2242-45, 
37 L. Ed. 2d  at 78-81 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J. and 
Douglas, J.). That approach would wreak havoc with traditional due process and 
equal protection analyses which focus first on the asserted life, liberty, or 
property entitlement involved or an alleged invidious discrimination against a 
discrete minority, or infringement of a fundamental constitutional 
right.

[¶13.]  Slightly more recent Court precedent 
applies Vlandis in terms of a traditional substantive due process and equal 
protection analysis, rather than recognizing it as a branch of substantive due 
process analysis in and of itself. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining 
Company, 428 U.S. 1, 23-24, 96 S. Ct. 2882, 2896, 49 L. Ed. 2d 752, 770-71 (1976) 
(upholding as constitutional a provision in Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine 
Health Safety Act of 1969 as amended in 1972, which provision makes irrebuttable 
presumption of total disability from pneumoconiosis once clinical evidence of 
miner's complicated pneumoconiosis is established); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768-74, 95 S. Ct. 2457, 2468-70, 45 L. Ed. 2d 522, 540-43 (1975). In 
Weinberger, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a provision in the 
Social Security Act which denied a wage earner's widow or stepchild insurance 
benefits unless the widow or stepchild had been related to the wage earner for 
nine months before his death. Weinberger, 422 U.S.  at 755-56, 
95 S. Ct.  at 2462, 45 L. Ed. 2d  at 533. The Court specifically reviewed the 
district court's decision that a per se application of Vlandis and the other 
cases explained in footnote 1, supra, required the Court to hold that the 
challenged provision violated substantive due process because it conclusively 
presumed that all widows and stepchildren who apply for wage earner insurance 
married the wage earner to obtain the insurance benefits. Weinberger, 422 U.S.  at 768-69, 95 S. Ct.  at 2468, 45 L. Ed. 2d  at 540. A six-person majority of the Court analyzed the holding of 
Vlandis and related case law, explaining that several of the holdings in those 
cases could be distinguished as involving obvious fundamental rights, which are 
reviewed under heightened judicial scrutiny. Weinberger, 422 U.S.  at 771-72, 95 S. Ct.  at 2469-70, 45 L. Ed. 2d  at 542 (explaining the holdings in Cleveland Board 
of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644-48, 94 S. Ct. 791, 798-99, 39 L. Ed. 2d 52, 62-64 (1974); and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 
1216, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 562 (1972)). Accord Turner v. Department of Employment 
Security, 423 U.S. 44, 46, 96 S. Ct. 249, 250, 46 L. Ed. 2d 181, 183-84 (1975). The majority further distinguished the remaining 
cases Moreno 
relies on here as holdings in which the Court found the challenged statutes to 
lack a rational relation to a legitimate state objective. Weinberger, 422 U.S. 
at 772, 95 S. Ct.  at 2470, 45 L. Ed. 2d  at 542-43 (explaining the holding in United 
States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 515, 93 S. Ct. 2832, 
2836, 37 L. Ed. 2d 767, 774 (1973)). The Court then reproved a per se application 
of Vlandis and reviewed the challenged Social Security provision under 
traditional substantive due process analysis applicable to nonfundamental 
interests. Accord L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, §§ 16-34 at 1622 (2d 
ed. 1988); J. Nowack, R. Rotunda, and J. Young, Constitutional Law, ch. 15, § II 
at 553-54 (2d ed. 1983).

[¶14.]  This court has noted the irrebuttable 
presumption rule of Vlandis only twice when it was invoked to challenge the 
habitual criminal statute. See Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420, 429 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1224, 105 S. Ct. 1215, 84 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985); 
and Evans v. State, 655 P.2d 1214, 1222 (Wyo. 1982). In neither of those cases did we 
adopt a per se application of the rule that failed to analyze the character of 
the individual litigant's asserted right. Considering these opinions and our 
above discussion concerning the status of the irrebuttable presumption rule in 
present United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, we will not apply Vlandis and 
its progeny to this case in a way that might circumvent this court's established 
substantive due process or equal protection analysis. See Weinberger, 422 U.S.  at 768-74, 95 S. Ct.  at 2468-71, 
45 L. Ed. 2d  at 540-44. A statute violates substantive due process when a litigant 
with standing shows that the challenged statute adversely affects a recognized 
life, liberty, or property entitlement and in doing so does not promote a 
legitimate state objective by reasonable means. Cf. Griswold v. State of 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 1682, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510, 515-16 
(1965); Cheyenne Airport Board, 707 P.2d  at 727. State appellate courts writing 
to Moreno's fact 
situation have similarly declined to recognize a substantive due process 
violation. See Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194, 613 P.2d 884, 888 (1980) (en banc), 
and other cases collected at Annotation, Automobiles: Validity and Construction 
of Legislation Authorizing Revocation or Suspension of Operator's License for 
"Habitual," "Persistent," or "Frequent" Violations of Traffic Regulations, 48 
A.L.R.4th 367, § 6 at 411-15 (1986).

[¶15.]  Moreno concedes he has no property right in his 
driver's license and that W.S. 31-7-105(d)(iii)(A) promotes a legitimate state 
objective by reasonable means. By doing so, he twice concedes the 
constitutionality of the statute he challenges.

[¶16.]  The classification in W.S. 
31-7-105(d)(iii)(A), which mandates that no second time DWUI offender can be 
eligible to receive a discretionary grant of limited driving privileges, is 
constitutional under the due process guarantees of both the U.S.Const.amends. V 
and XIV and Wyo. Const.art. 1, § 6.

[¶17.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The irrebuttable 
presumption rule of Vlandis was also applied in a per se fashion in the 
following cases: Turner v. Department of Employment Security and Board of Review 
of Industrial Commission of Utah, 423 U.S. 44, 46, 96 S. Ct. 249, 250, 46 L. Ed. 2d 181, 183-84 (1975) (striking down state unemployment compensation statute making 
pregnant women ineligible for unemployment benefits for period beginning twelve 
weeks before expected delivery date and six weeks after childbirth); Cleveland 
Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644-48, 94 S. Ct. 791, 798-99, 39 L. Ed. 2d 52, 62-64 (1974) (striking down mandatory provision requiring pregnant 
school teacher to take unpaid maternity leave five months before expected 
childbirth, with leave request to be made at least two weeks before her 
departure); United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 515, 
93 S. Ct. 2832, 2836, 37 L. Ed. 2d 767, 774 (1973) (striking down provision of 
federal Food Stamp Act denying eligibility to households containing persons 
eighteen years old or older who had been claimed as dependents for federal 
income tax purposes by taxpayers who were themselves ineligible for food stamp 
relief). The holdings in Vlandis, Murry, and Cleveland, relied on Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1216, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 562 (1972), 
in which the Court struck down an Illinois statute creating the irrebuttable 
presumption that all unmarried fathers were unqualified to raise their children 
based on the fundamental character of a single father's parental right.