Title: Abuzahra v. City of Cambridge

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12920 
 
SAID S. ABUZAHRA1  vs.  CITY OF CAMBRIDGE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 2, 2020. - February 17, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Eminent Domain, Validity of taking, Right to damages.  Statute, 
Construction.  Practice, Civil, Attorney's fees, Costs, 
Interest, Frivolous action. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
August 17, 2017. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to compel pro tanto payment was heard by 
Bruce R. Henry, J. 
 
 
An interlocutory proceeding was had in the Appeals Court 
before Peter J. Rubin, J.; review by a panel of the Appeals 
Court was sought; and the Supreme Judicial Court on its own 
initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
John S. Leonard for the defendant. 
 
John E. Bowen for the plaintiff. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The issue presented is whether G. L. c. 79, the 
so-called "quick take" statute, permits a property owner to both 
                                                          
 
 
1 Individually and as trustee of Equity Realty Trust. 
2 
 
 
accept a pro tanto payment for an eminent domain taking and 
simultaneously challenge the lawfulness of that taking.2  Under 
c. 79, once a taking authority records an order of taking, the 
authority generally must tender a payment pro tanto to the 
property owner.  G. L. c. 79, § 8A.  However, the statutory 
framework is silent as to whether the acceptance of the pro 
tanto payment by the property owner precludes a challenge to the 
validity of the taking. 
 
The plaintiff argues that the defendant city of Cambridge 
(city) must immediately tender him the full amount of the pro 
tanto payment, along with accrued interest since the time of 
taking, because G. L. c. 79 as it is currently written does not 
condition his acceptance of the pro tanto payment on waiving his 
right to challenge the taking of his real property.  The city 
disagrees, arguing that the statutory framework and case law 
prohibit a property owner from accepting a pro tanto payment so 
long as the property owner pursues a claim challenging the 
lawfulness of the taking.  According to the city, if the 
plaintiff challenges the taking, which is his statutory right, 
then he will have neither his property, which has been taken 
pursuant to the quick take statute, nor the pro tanto amount. 
                                                          
 
2 Our decision is limited to takings made pursuant to G. L. 
c. 79 and does not address takings made under any other 
authority, including G. L. c. 80A. 
3 
 
 
 
We conclude that G. L. c. 79 permits the plaintiff to both 
accept a pro tanto payment and simultaneously challenge the 
validity of the underlying taking.  We do so because of the 
enormous power that the quick take statute provides, which 
immediately transfers ownership of the property from the 
property owner to the taking authority independent of judicial 
processes; the clear requirement of a pro tanto payment; and the 
absence of any statutory provision waiving pro tanto payments 
when the taking itself is challenged.  Therefore, we affirm the 
order by a single justice in the Appeals Court, vacating a 
decision by a Superior Court judge that denied the plaintiff's 
motion to compel payment of the pro tanto amount, and we remand 
the matter to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
Background.  1.  Statutory framework.  The main statutory 
framework for eminent domain proceedings in Massachusetts is 
G. L. c. 79, which has been described as the "quick take" 
statute.3  Upon the recording of an order of taking by a taking 
                                                          
 
 
3 Massachusetts also has a statutory framework for so-called 
"straight condemnations," in which no taking occurs until the 
amount of valuation of the property is determined by a court.  
See G. L. c. 80A.  However, the vast majority of eminent domain 
takings in Massachusetts are made under G. L. c. 79.  See 
Massachusetts Municipal Law § 30.2, at 30-2 (Mass. Cont. Legal 
Educ. 2d ed. 2015) (characterizing G. L. c. 80A as "a rarely 
used alternative procedure" for eminent domain takings because 
"it is a lengthy, cumbersome procedure with its own pitfalls 
4 
 
 
authority,4 title to the property passes immediately by operation 
of law to the taking authority, and the right to damages for the 
taking vests in the property owner, "unless otherwise provided 
by law."  G. L. c. 79, § 3.  The taking authority must pay such 
damages "within sixty days after the right thereto becomes 
vested . . . and shall, except as provided in [G. L. c. 79, 
§ 7D], be made immediately available to the persons entitled 
thereto . . . ."  G. L. c. 79, § 7B.5 
In addition, G. L. c. 79, § 8A, states that, within sixty 
days of when the order of taking is recorded, the taking 
authority "shall . . . offer in writing to every person entitled 
to damages on account of such taking a reasonable amount . . . , 
either in settlement under [G. L. c. 79, § 39,] of all damages 
for such taking . . . or as a payment pro tanto."   The statute 
                                                          
 
that may offset any perceived advantages [compared to G. L. 
c. 79]"). 
 
 
4 General Laws c. 79 refers throughout to the "board of 
officers" who have made a taking and the "body politic or 
corporate" on behalf of which a taking was made.  For brevity, 
in this opinion we simply refer to the "city" or "taking 
authority." 
 
 
5 General Laws c. 79, § 7D, expressly provides two bases on 
which a damages payment can be withheld:  (1) when the taking 
authority cannot ascertain the identity of the property owner; 
or (2) when the property owner is "under a legal disability" 
from receiving the payment.  In either case, the taking 
authority is required to place the damages award in a savings 
account, where it is to remain until the property owner can 
withdraw it.  Id.  Neither of these exceptions apply here. 
5 
 
 
also provides:  "If such person elects to accept the offer as a 
pro tanto payment, such election shall be without prejudice to 
or waiver or surrender of any right to claim a larger sum by 
proceeding before an appropriate tribunal."  Furthermore, 
"[a]fter a pro tanto payment has been made or after an offer of 
payment has been made in writing as required by this section and 
not accepted, no interest shall be recovered except upon such 
amount of damages as shall upon final adjudication be in excess 
of said payment or in excess of the written offer of payment as 
herein described."  Id. 
Finally, G. L. c. 79, § 18, provides that a property owner 
may challenge the lawfulness of a taking within three years from 
when the right to damages has vested.  See Devine v. Nantucket, 
449 Mass. 499, 506 (2007). 
2.  Facts.  We summarize the relevant undisputed facts and 
the procedural posture of this case. 
In October 2016, the city effected an eminent domain taking 
in fee of the plaintiff's real property pursuant to G. L. c. 79.  
At the time of the taking, ownership of the property was in 
dispute in separate litigation.  Consequently, the city withheld 
its tender of the pro tanto payment to the plaintiff and instead 
paid the full $3,700,000 amount to the city treasurer pursuant 
to G. L. c. 79, § 7D.  In August 2017, the plaintiff commenced 
the underlying action in Superior Court that sought to, among 
6 
 
 
other things:  (1) invalidate the city's October 2016 taking; 
and (2) either obtain an assessment of temporary damages, or, if 
the taking was found to have been valid, a determination of 
permanent damages.  In its answer to the plaintiff's complaint, 
the city stated that it would tender the full pro tanto payment 
amount to the proper owner of the property once the separate 
ownership litigation was resolved.  In October 2018, two years 
after the city's taking, the plaintiff secured a final judgment 
establishing his ownership over the property at issue. 
In December 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion in this case 
to compel the full tender of the pro tanto payment along with 
accrued interest.  In his motion, the plaintiff asserted that he 
was entitled to receive the pro tanto payment for the city's 
October 2016 taking of his property and simultaneously maintain 
a claim challenging the validity of that taking.  In May 2019, a 
Superior Court judge issued an interlocutory order denying the 
plaintiff's motion to compel, reasoning that it was "somewhat 
incongruous" for the plaintiff to demand both payment of the pro 
tanto and the return of his property.  The judge further ordered 
the city "to place the pro tanto funds, plus accumulated 
interest, with the Court [to] be held in an interest-bearing 
account" until the issue of the validity of the taking is 
resolved. 
7 
 
 
The plaintiff filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 231, 
§ 118, first par., seeking interlocutory review of the Superior 
Court judge's order.  A single justice of the Appeals Court 
reversed the order.  The single justice determined that, "as a 
matter of law, the defendant[] must now pay [the plaintiff]" 
because "the [pro tanto] payment is required by [G. L. c. 79, § 
7B], and the statute admits of no exception for cases in which 
the underlying taking is challenged."  Subsequently, the city 
filed a motion for reconsideration, which the single justice 
denied.  The city then appealed to the full Appeals Court 
pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, second par., and we transferred 
the case here on our own motion. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  The issue whether 
G. L. c. 79 permits a property owner to both accept a pro tanto 
payment and challenge the validity of the underlying taking is a 
pure question of law.  Therefore, we review the Superior Court 
judge's decision below de novo.  See Barr Inc. v. Holliston, 462 
Mass. 112, 114 (2012) (no deference accorded to interlocutory 
order resolving pure question of law reported for appellate 
review by judge of Superior Court). 
 
2.  Statutory interpretation.  "Ordinarily, where the 
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive 
as to legislative intent."  Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare 
Corp., 483 Mass. 612, 620 (2019), quoting Ciani v. MacGrath, 481 
8 
 
 
Mass. 174, 178 (2019).  However, where the statutory language is 
ambiguous or unclear, "we consider the cause of its enactment, 
the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object 
to be accomplished, [such that] the purpose of its framers may 
be effectuated" (quotation omitted).  Spencer v. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 479 Mass. 210, 217 (2018), quoting Water Dep't of 
Fairhaven v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 740, 744 
(2010).  We have also emphasized that "eminent domain statutes 
must be strictly construed because they concern the power to 
condemn land in derogation of private property rights."  
Providence & Worcester R.R. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 453 
Mass 135, 141 (2009), citing Devine, 449 Mass. at 506.  Informed 
by these principles, we conclude that the statutory text, the 
legislative history, and the required strict construction of 
takings statutes compel the conclusion that, under G. L. c. 79, 
a property owner may both accept a pro tanto payment and 
challenge the validity of the underlying taking. 
We begin with the recognition that "[t]he taking of land 
from a private owner against his will for a public use under 
eminent domain is an exercise of one of the highest powers of 
government."  Devine, 449 Mass. at 506, quoting Lajoie v. 
Lowell, 214 Mass. 8, 9 (1913).  Takings under c. 79 are 
especially significant because the rights of the parties vest 
upon the recording of the order of taking.  G. L. c. 79, § 3. 
9 
 
 
Not only does the taking authority have the power to impose its 
will on the property owner through eminent domain, but the 
taking itself is swift and occurs automatically outside of 
judicial processes.  Given this dynamic, the statutorily 
mandated pro tanto payment ensures that property owners receive 
some initial recourse following the deprivation of their 
property, and also incentivizes taking authorities to exercise 
their significant eminent domain powers with discretion. 
Turning to the statutory text, G. L. c. 79, § 8A, requires 
that the taking authority offer the property owner a reasonable 
amount "either in settlement under [G. L. c. 79, § 39,] of all 
damages for such taking . . . or as a payment pro tanto."  The 
statute also provides that the taking authority must offer the 
pro tanto payment to the property owner within sixty days of the 
recording of the order of taking.  Id.  This language tracks 
other provisions of c. 79 that provide for a strict time frame 
for the payment of damages, as noted by the single justice.  See 
G. L. c. 79, § 7B ("Any check for the payment of such damages 
[awarded in the order of taking] shall be issued either within 
sixty days after the right thereto becomes vested, or within 
fifteen days after demand therefor by any person entitled 
thereto is made . . . and shall, except as provided in section 
[G. L. c. 79, § 7D], be made immediately available to the 
persons entitled thereto . . ."). 
10 
 
 
Although prompt payment of the pro tanto amount is clearly 
required under §§ 8A and 7B, the effect of challenging the 
taking itself is not addressed in either provision.  General 
Laws c. 79, § 18, the statute that permits the property owner to 
challenge the validity of the taking, is not cross-referenced by 
either § 8A or § 7B.  Moreover, the only legal challenge that § 
8A describes is that of a property owner who seeks greater 
damages before a court, which the statute allows even after the 
pro tanto payment has been accepted.  That section provides:  
"If such person elects to accept the offer as a pro tanto 
payment, such election shall be without prejudice to or waiver 
or surrender of any right to claim a larger sum by proceeding 
before an appropriate tribunal."  G. L. c. 79, § 8A.  It does 
not, however, in any way discuss waiver of the right to 
challenge the taking itself.  Therefore, while §§ 8A and 7B are 
clear that the city must offer the pro tanto payment within a 
relatively short time frame, and acceptance of the pro tanto 
payment does not constitute a waiver of one's right to challenge 
the amount of the taking, c. 79 is silent as to whether 
acceptance of that offer affects the plaintiff's statutory right 
to challenge the taking itself under § 18.  In this sense, § 8A 
is somewhat ambiguous. 
"'To the extent there is any ambiguity in the statutory 
language, we turn to the legislative history' as a guide to 
11 
 
 
legislative intent."  Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 118 (2018), 
quoting Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 478 Mass. 169, 182 (2017).  We 
also seek, where possible, to "construe the various provisions 
of a statute in harmony with one another, recognizing that the 
Legislature did not intend internal contradiction."  Lynch v. 
Crawford, 483 Mass. 631, 639 (2019), quoting DiFiore v. American 
Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. 486, 491 (2009). 
The purpose and importance of the prompt payment of pro 
tanto amounts is set out in the legislative history.  The idea 
of a statutorily mandated pro tanto payment for takings under 
G. L. c. 79 was first proposed by the Judicial Council in 1957.6  
At the time, the Judicial Council stated that the twin purposes 
of a mandatory pro tanto payment were: 
"[T]o stop interest on that [pro tanto] amount, thus 
protecting taxpayers, and to enable the landowner, whose 
life, business[,] and financial condition[] may be 
seriously interfered with, to get some payment with 
reasonable promptness without waiving his claim for more, 
                                                          
 
 
6 As we recently noted: 
 
"The Judicial Council was created in 1924 when a 
legislative commission suggested it be implemented to 'make 
a continuous study of the courts, report annually to the 
Governor on the work of the judicial branch and suggest 
rules of practice and procedure to the courts.'  Johnedis, 
'Creation of the Appeals Court and Its Impact on the 
Supreme Judicial Court,' The History of the Law in 
Massachusetts:  the Supreme Judicial Court 1692-1992, at 
451 (1992).  It was comprised of judges from various courts 
and lawyers, and eventually played a significant role in 
the founding of the Appeals Court.  Id." 
 
Commonwealth v. Billingslea, 484 Mass. 606, 611 n.8 (2020). 
12 
 
 
if he wishes to submit his claim to a judge or jury. . . .  
In proposing a mandatory requirement of an offer and pro 
tanto payment, we realize that in dealing with many land 
takings a reasonable time is needed by the taking authority 
to examine title, to examine the land in many cases, to 
consider the various factors bearing on valuation and other 
matters of detail in administration before a considered 
offer and payment can be made." 
 
Thirty-third Report of the Judicial Council, Pub. Doc. No. 144, 
at 72-73 (1957).  Two years later, in the 1959 legislative 
session, the Legislature acted on the Judicial Council's 
recommendation and enacted G. L. c. 79, § 8A, into law.  See St. 
1959, c. 626, § 3.  Although G. L. c. 79, § 8A, has been amended 
at various points over the years, the core of the statute has 
not changed.  See, e.g., St. 1993, c. 110, § 135 (amending 
interest rate).  "Since 1959, a pro tanto payment of damages 
must be tendered to the person whose land is taken."  Fifty-
third Report of the Judicial Council, Pub. Doc. No. 144, at 115 
(1977).  We have not located, in any version of § 8A, an express 
exception to such payment for when the property owner challenges 
the taking, nor have we located any discussion of such an 
exception in the legislative history. 
 
The statutory text and legislative history do, however, 
reflect a recognition that, given that title to the property 
passes immediately to the taking authority upon the recording of 
the order of taking, eminent domain takings made under c. 79 may 
impose sudden and heavy financial burdens on property owners.  
13 
 
 
Such individuals must necessarily contend with a period of delay 
in which they have neither their property nor just compensation 
for the taking, as time may be required to conduct further 
assessments of all damages reasonably owed to the property 
owner.  This concern does not abate when the property owner 
seeks to challenge the validity of the taking, and the burden on 
property owner in these instances is perhaps even greater than 
on the property owner who accepts the pro tanto payment.  Not 
only must the property owner initiate the legal challenge on his 
or her own accord, see G. L. c. 79, § 18, but the challenge must 
come after the taking has already occurred.  As this case 
readily demonstrates, the resolution of such litigation may not 
come for years. 
 
Furthermore, we must consider not just this particular 
property owner, who does not live on the property and appears to 
have the means to pursue this litigation without the benefit of 
the pro tanto amount.  We must also consider the person of 
limited means who was living in his or her family home before it 
was taken, and who is determined to remain and contest the 
taking.  Without the pro tanto amount, such a person may be 
forced to give up the family home, as without this payment, the 
14 
 
 
person would have neither a place to live nor, perhaps, money to 
litigate.7 
 
Most importantly, if the Legislature intended to condition 
acceptance of the pro tanto award on the waiver of one's right 
to contest the underlying taking, we conclude it would have 
                                                          
 
 
7 We acknowledge that challenges to takings also impose 
significant burdens on taking authorities.  The city notes that 
construction financing of public projects is unavailable to 
municipalities so long as there is an outstanding challenge to 
the title of the property.  Allowing property owners to both 
accept pro tanto amounts and contest the lawfulness of the 
takings may also increase the number of such challenges.  In 
addition, the city contends that if the taking is ultimately 
found to be unlawful, the detriment it would suffer from the 
stalled public project is compounded by the risk that the 
property owner may not be able to repay the full pro tanto 
amount.  Therefore, according to the city, the plaintiff would 
be unjustly enriched, insofar as he could contest title to the 
property and "have the benefit of spending the [p]ro [t]anto 
award while the [c]ity is deprived of any productive use of the 
property." 
 
 
We note, however, that G. L. c. 79, § 8A, provides that, 
should final damages be less than the pro tanto award, the 
property owner is required to repay the difference back to the 
taking authority, along with interest.  Thus, the Legislature 
has already accounted for the possibility that a property owner 
may be required to return some undefined portion of the pro 
tanto amount to the taking authority, and the taking authority 
assumes the "risk" that the property owner may not be able to do 
so.  That risk also exists in the event a property owner 
successfully challenges the taking, although obviously the 
amount of money that must be returned would be greater.  In such 
cases, as the single justice reasoned, the city's interest in 
recouping the pro tanto amount can be protected by the 
imposition of a judicial lien on the property.  See G. L. 
c. 223, § 42.  Accordingly, we agree with the single justice 
that "[u]nder the statutory scheme, the risk, if any, is to be 
borne by the city, not by landowners who have been deprived of 
the use and enjoyment of their property." 
15 
 
 
written G. L. c. 79 to reflect this legislative judgment, as 
other States have done.  For example, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 
§ 1255.260 (Thomson/West 2007), which governs eminent domain 
"quick takes" in that State, provides: 
"If any portion of the money deposited [by a taking 
authority] pursuant to this chapter is withdrawn, the 
receipt of any such money shall constitute a waiver by 
operation of law of all claims and defenses in favor of the 
persons receiving such payment except a claim for greater 
compensation" (emphasis added). 
 
Based on this clear statutory language, California courts have 
held that the acceptance of damages under § 1255.260 constitutes 
a waiver of one's right to contest the underlying taking, see 
Clayton v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 67 Cal. App. 4th 
28, 33 (1998), as the statute reflects the California 
Legislature's "reasonable" judgment that a condemnee must choose 
between either accepting preliminary damages or contesting the 
taking, Mt. San Jacinto Community College Dist. v. Superior 
Court of Riverside County, 40 Cal. 4th 648, 665-666 (2007).  
Other States have enacted similarly clear laws concerning the 
acceptance of damages for eminent domain quick takes.  See S.C. 
Code Ann. § 28-2-490 (condemnee who withdraws damages deposited 
with court "waives all objections and defenses . . . to the 
taking of his property, except for any claim to greater 
compensation"). 
16 
 
 
No such language appears in our statute.  In drafting G. L. 
c. 79, the Legislature was attentive to the issue of waiver, as 
it expressly stated that acceptance of a pro tanto award would 
not constitute a waiver to a challenge to the amount of the 
award.  However, no further discussion of waiver appears in the 
chapter.  While the Legislature may choose to amend G. L. c. 79 
to provide for such an express waiver, the chapter as it is 
currently written does not condition acceptance of the pro tanto 
award on waiving one's right to contest the taking.  Eminent 
domain statutes must also, as we have previously explained, be 
strictly construed to protect individual property rights.  See 
Providence & Worcester R.R., 453 Mass at 141; Devine, 449 Mass. 
at 506. 
In sum, given the enormous power that the quick take 
statute provides, which immediately transfers ownership of the 
property from the land owner to the taking authority independent 
of judicial processes, the clear requirement of a pro tanto 
payment, the absence of any statutory provision waiving pro 
tanto payments when the taking itself is challenged, and the 
requirement to strictly construe G. L. c. 79 to preserve 
individual property rights, we conclude that a property owner 
may accept the pro tanto amount and simultaneously challenge the 
lawfulness of the taking. 
17 
 
 
 
3.  Distinguishable case law.  The city argues that, per 
G. L. c. 79, § 3, the plaintiff's right to the pro tanto payment 
has not yet vested because venerable case law provides that the 
plaintiff cannot accept the pro tanto payment so long as he 
contests the validity of the taking.  The city relies primarily 
on Opinion of the Justices, 360 Mass. 894, 899-900 (1971), in 
which we stated that a property owner who files a petition for 
damages under G. L. c. 79, § 14, or accepts a settlement of 
damages under G. L. c. 79, § 39, cannot simultaneously challenge 
the validity of the taking.  The city also cites Barnes v. 
Springfield, 268 Mass. 497, 502-503 (1929), in which this court 
concluded that petitioners who accepted damages awarded by the 
Superior Court for the taking of their real property could not 
thereafter contest the lawfulness of the taking. 
We find the city's argument unpersuasive for several 
reasons.  First, the very point the city relies upon in Opinion 
of the Justices was expressly overruled just three years later.  
In Raimondo v. Burlington, 366 Mass. 450, 450 (1974), we 
considered "whether a landowner can maintain a suit challenging 
the validity of a taking of her property and at the same time 
file a petition for the assessment of damages under G. L. c. 79, 
§ 14."  We held that a property owner may do so in light of the 
adoption of Mass. R. Civ. P. 18 (a), 365 Mass. 764 (1974), which 
18 
 
 
eliminated the distinction between actions at law and suits in 
equity.  Id. at 451-452. 
Second, and more importantly, the Massachusetts cases cited 
by the city are inapposite.  Opinion of the Justices and Barnes 
concerned a property owner's petition for, or acceptance of, 
judicially awarded final damages, and not a statutorily mandated 
pro tanto award as provided for in G. L. c. 79, § 8A.  We have 
long recognized that: 
"A payment pro tanto is merely what is implied by its name 
and is not a final settlement.  It is a payment '(f)or so 
much; for as much as may be; as far as it goes.'  Black's 
Law Dictionary [1364 (4th ed. rev. 1968)].  The statute 
plainly distinguishes between a payment pro tanto and a 
final [damages] settlement." 
 
Horne v. Boston Redev. Auth., 358 Mass. 460, 464 (1970).  Cf. 
G. L. c. 79, § 39 ("Every settlement under this section shall be 
in writing and in full satisfaction of all damages for such 
taking with interest thereon and taxable costs, if any" 
[emphasis added]).  This distinction is also supported by the 
fact that pro tanto awards are often far below the final damages 
amounts that are ultimately awarded to the property owner.  See, 
e.g., R. H. White Realty Co. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 371 Mass. 
452, 453 (1976) (pro tanto award was $1,171,000 while jury 
awarded damages in amount of $2,850,000); M.B. Claff, Inc. v. 
Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 59 Mass. App. Ct. 669, 671 
(2003), S.C., 441 Mass. 596 (2004) (pro tanto award was $80,000 
19 
 
 
while jury awarded damages in amount of $700,000).  For these 
reasons, the Massachusetts cases cited by the city do not 
constitute authorities "otherwise provided by law," G. L. c. 79, 
§ 3, that would prevent the plaintiff from accepting the pro 
tanto award.8  Accordingly, we conclude that the case law as well 
as the text of G. L. c. 79, as informed by its legislative 
history, do not condition a property owner's acceptance of the 
pro tanto payment under G. L. c. 79, § 8A, on waiving his or her 
right to contest the validity of the taking under G. L. c. 79, 
§ 18.9 
                                                          
 
8 The city also relies on a number of out-of-State cases.  
Because those cases involved statutes that differ from ours, we 
decline to adopt their reasoning.  We also discern no "universal 
principle" concerning the acceptance of pro tanto amounts for 
eminent domain "quick takes," as the case law and statutes in 
other jurisdictions appear to differ widely. 
 
 
9 However, our decision does not address or resolve the 
issue of "accrued interest" on the pro tanto amount.  General 
Laws c. 79, § 8A, states: 
 
"After a pro tanto payment has been made or after an offer 
of payment has been made in writing as required by this 
section and not accepted, no interest shall be recovered 
except upon such amount of damages as shall upon final 
adjudication be in excess of said payment or in excess of 
the written offer of payment as herein described." 
 
Here, interest on the pro tanto amount was frozen when it was 
offered by the city at the time of the taking.  If the plaintiff 
is ultimately successful in challenging the taking, then he 
would be required to return the full pro tanto amount to the 
city, "plus costs and interest at the rate calculated pursuant 
to the provisions of [G. L. c. 79, § 37,] from the date when 
such damages were assessed."  Id.  Conversely, if the plaintiff 
is ultimately unsuccessful in challenging the validity of the 
20 
 
 
 
4.  Appellate attorney's fees and compounded interest.  
Finally, the plaintiff seeks an award of double appellate 
attorney's fees, costs, and compounded interest on the pro tanto 
amount under Mass. R. A. P. 25, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1654 
(2019), which permits such an award where an appellate court 
determines that an appeal is frivolous.  "An appeal is 
frivolous, so as to risk potential imposition of a sanction, 
where there can be no reasonable expectation of a reversal under 
well-settled law."  Marabello v. Boston Bark Corp., 463 Mass. 
394, 400 (2012), citing Avery v. Steele, 414 Mass. 450, 455 
(1993).  In addition, the determination "whether an appeal is 
frivolous is left to the sound discretion of the appellate 
court."  Oxford Global Resources, LLC v. Hernandez, 480 Mass. 
462, 478 (2018), quoting Marabello, supra.  Furthermore, "[w]e 
are hesitant to deem an appeal frivolous and grant sanctions 
except in egregious cases."  Symmons v. O'Keeffe, 419 Mass. 288, 
303 (1995).  Although we affirm the single justice's order, the 
city's appeal here was not frivolous, because it involved a 
                                                          
 
taking, then G. L. c. 79, § 8A, permits the plaintiff to recover 
interest on the final damages amount, provided that the amount 
of final damages exceeds the amount of the pro tanto payment.  
We also note that the plaintiff's pending action in Superior 
Court also contests the adequacy of the pro tanto amount, and 
the resolution of this claim could further affect the 
calculation of any interest owed to the plaintiff.  Given these 
pending considerations, we conclude that an award of accrued 
interest on the pro tanto amount is premature at this time. 
21 
 
 
novel question of law that this court previously did not have 
occasion to address.  Therefore, we decline the plaintiff's 
request.10 
Conclusion.  We hold that G. L. c. 79 permits the plaintiff 
to accept the pro tanto payment under G. L. c. 79, § 8A, and 
simultaneously challenge the validity of the underlying taking 
under G. L. c. 79, § 18.  Accordingly, we affirm the order of 
the single justice in the Appeals Court, vacating the decision 
by the Superior Court judge that denied the plaintiff's motion 
to compel payment of the pro tanto amount, and we remand the 
matter to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
 
10 We also decline the plaintiff's request that this court 
retain jurisdiction over this case until the city has tendered 
the pro tanto payment.