Title: Eisenbarth v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Eisenbarth v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.1992 WY 143840 P.2d 945Case Number: 91-230Decided: 11/04/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Dennis 
EISENBARTH, Appellant (Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
HARTFORD 
FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Connecticut insurance corporation, licensed and authorized 
to do business in the State of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal from 
District Court, GoshenCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

 
 
James A. 
Eddington of Jones, Eddington & Weaver, Torrington, for appellant.

 
 
Stuart R. 
Day of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, for appellee.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT*, and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Dennis 
Eisenbarth (Eisenbarth) sought to recover damages from his insurer, appellee 
Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford). Hartford determined that its farm-ranch policy 
excluded coverage for damages arising from the death of cattle which were 
pastured in Eisenbarth's corn field. The policy excluded coverage for damage to 
property which was in Eisenbarth's "care, custody or control." The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of Hartford, and Eisenbarth seeks review of that 
order.

 
 

[¶2.]     We reverse and remand 
with instructions that the summary judgment for Hartford be vacated, that the issue of "care, 
custody or control" be presented to the fact finder, and for such further 
proceedings as are necessary to adjudicate Eisenbarth's unresolved 
claims.

 
 

[¶3.]     Eisenbarth tenders this 
statement of the issues:

 
 
     Did the defendant 
[Hartford] have 
a duty to defend plaintiff and did the lower court err in vacating its prior 
granting of partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on defendant's 
failure to defend plaintiff on a claim of negligence which was covered by the 
farm liability policy purchased by plaintiff?

 
 
     Did the lower court 
err in reversing its prior decision and granting summary judgment to defendant 
on the   applicability of the 
"care, custody [or] control" exclusion contained within the farm liability 
policy purchased by plaintiff?

 
 

[¶4.]     Hartford answers with this 
abstract of the issues:

 
 
     Did the trial court 
properly grant summary judgment to the appellee on the basis that appellee had 
no duty to defend appellant for an occurrence excluded from coverage by the 
"care, custody or control" exclusion contained in appellant's farm liability 
policy?

 
 

[¶5.]     The facts are really 
not much in dispute, though there is a great difference of opinion as to their 
significance. After some preliminary discussions in late 1985, Eisenbarth agreed 
by written contract signed on January 10, 1986, "for boarding approximately 100 
cows on corn stalks for approximately 60 days * * *." The cows were owned by 
Donald E. Brooks whose ranch is located just north of Lusk, over 60 miles from 
Eisenbarth's farm. Many stockmen were grazing cattle on corn stalks that winter 
because feed was in short supply. Eisenbarth had had cattle of his own before 
and was considering acquiring cattle again at the time he entered into the 
contract with Brooks, but because Brooks was in a bind, he decided to enter into 
the boarding contract. The cattle were trucked to Eisenbarth's farm on January 
9, 1986, and arrived there about 3:00 p.m. The cows were maintained in a corral 
until the following morning when Eisenbarth turned them out into the corn field 
in accordance with Brooks' instructions and the boarding agreement. The cattle 
grazed in the corn field for about two hours that day. Many of the cattle 
returned to the corral on their own to drink, but those which had not were 
herded back to the corral by Eisenbarth. About 3:00 p.m. on January 10, Brooks 
arrived at Eisenbarth's farm and brought salt and mineral for the cows which 
Eisenbarth fed to them. The boarding contract was also signed that day. Over the 
next several days, Eisenbarth continued to let the cattle into the corn field 
and then herd them back to the corral, after a couple hours of feeding, as he 
did on the first day. Brooks made clear to Eisenbarth that he did not want 
supplemental feeding because of costs, rather he wanted the cattle to feed on 
the corn stalks as per the agreement. On Monday, January 13, 1986, Eisenbarth 
first noticed that a cow was sick. He contacted a veterinarian to examine that 
cow, as well as others that became sick over the next 24 hours. He also tried to 
contact Brooks but was initially unable to get through to him because of a 
telephone problem at Brooks' ranch. Brooks was finally able to get to 
Eisenbarth's place on Tuesday afternoon, and from that point forward, Brooks 
worked with the veterinarians to treat the cattle which were sick and dying. 
Ultimately, 31 of the cattle died. On January 16, Eisenbarth reported the 
situation to his insurance carrier.

 
 

[¶6.]     Brooks filed suit 
against Eisenbarth alleging, inter alia, negligence on the part of Eisenbarth. 
Hartford 
determined the claim was excluded by the "care, custody or control" language of 
its policy and refused to defend. After trial, a jury found that Brooks was 40 
percent negligent and Eisenbarth was 60 percent negligent, and judgment was 
entered against Eisenbarth accordingly. The proceedings in that case are not a 
part of the record in this matter.

 
 

[¶7.]     On July 13, 1987, 
Eisenbarth filed his complaint seeking to recover from Hartford $7,103.09 as the 
costs of defending the Brooks lawsuit, $7,994.40 as the judgment he paid in that 
suit, for interest, for damages for bad faith and distress, for punitive 
damages, and for the costs and attorney fees for the suit. Hartford petitioned to 
have the case removed to federal court, and by order entered on September 4, 
1987, removal was granted. Because Hartford had failed to seek removal within 30 
days after receipt of Eisenbarth's complaint, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 
1446(b), the federal court remanded the action back to the Wyoming district 
court by order entered on November 6, 1987.

 
 

[¶8.]     By order entered on 
April 13, 1988, the district court denied Hartford's motion for summary judgment, finding 
that "[t]here is a genuine issue of material fact relating to the question of 
care, custody and control, and of defendant's failure to provide a defense * * 
*." By order entered on June 20, 1989, the district court granted Eisenbarth's 
motion for partial summary judgment in the amount of $18,245.21 plus attorneys 
fees and costs yet to be determined. The district court also denied Hartford's motion to 
reconsider the denial of its motion for summary judgment. By order entered on 
October 18, 1989, Eisenbarth was also awarded $12,057.38 as attorney fees and 
costs for the instant litigation. On March 14, 1990, Richard E. Day of Williams, 
Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, entered 
an appearance on behalf of Hartford. On June 21, 1990, the new counsel 
filed a motion asking that the district court reconsider or modify the partial 
summary judgment in favor of Eisenbarth.

 
 

[¶9.]     On November 17, 1990, 
Donald E. Jones, a respected member of the Wyoming and Goshen County Bars, who served as 
counsel for Eisenbarth, died after a lengthy illness. The litigation had been 
held on the district court's docket because of Mr. Jones' illness, and time was 
allowed after that untimely and unfortunate occurrence for new counsel to assume 
the prosecution of Eisenbarth's claims. On September 3, 1991, the district court 
vacated its prior judgments in favor of Eisenbarth and entered summary judgment 
in favor of Hartford. A timely notice of appeal was filed 
on September 17, 1991. The case was heard upon oral argument before this court 
on May 6, 1992.

 
 

[¶10.]  We review a summary judgment in the same 
light as the district court, using the same materials and following the same 
standards. Summary judgment is proper only where there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. American Holidays, Inc. v. Foxtail Owners Ass'n, 821 P.2d 577, 578 
(Wyo. 1991), quoting Zmijewski v. Wright, 809 P.2d 280, 282 (Wyo. 1991).

 
 

[¶11.]  Our primary function in this instance is 
to construe the contract of insurance. General principles of construction will 
be followed when interpreting conditions of an insurance agreement. Commercial 
Union Ins. Co. v. Stamper, 732 P.2d 534, 539 (Wyo. 1987).

 
 
Basic 
tenets stated in McKay v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the 
United States [421 P.2d 166, 
168 (Wyo. 1966)], and applied in controversies 
involving insurance policies in the State of Wyoming are:

 
 
     1. "[T]he words used 
will be given their common and ordinary meaning. Neither will the language be 
`tortured' in order to create an ambiguity."

 
 
     2. "The intention of 
the parties is the primary consideration and is to be ascertained, if possible, 
from the language employed in the policy, viewed in the light of what the 
parties must reasonably have intended."

 
 
     3. "Such [insurance 
policy] contracts should not be so strictly construed as to thwart the general 
object of the insurance."

 
 
     "* * * [T]he parties 
have the right to employ whatever lawful terms they wish and courts will not 
rewrite them."

 
 
     4. "Absent ambiguity, 
there is no room for construction and the policy will be enforced according to 
its terms."

 
 
     5. "* * * [W]here such 
[insurance policy] contracts are so drawn as to be ambiguous and uncertain and 
to require construction, the contract will be construed liberally in favor of 
the insured and strictly against the insurer. Also, if the contract is fairly 
susceptible of two constructions, the one favorable to the insured will be 
adopted." [citations in the quotation are omitted]

 
 
Commercial 
Union, 732 P.2d  at 539.

 
 

[¶12.]  If the language of an insurance contract 
is plain and unequivocal, our usual rule is that interpretation of the contract 
is a question for the court to resolve as a matter of law. Ricci v. New 
Hampshire Ins. Co., 721 P.2d 1081, 1085 (Wyo. 1986). A primary objective of 
interpreting an insurance contract is to ascertain the objectives of the parties 
and to ascribe to the terms used the plain, ordinary and customary meaning in 
order to effectuate the parties' intent. Worthington v. State, 598 P.2d 796, 806 (Wyo. 
1979).

 
 

[¶13.]  Eisenbarth entered into this agreement 
with Brooks:

 
 
     This contract between 
Don Brooks and Dennis Eisenbarth is entered into for boarding approximately 100 
cows on corn stalks for approximately 60 days under the following terms and 
conditions: 

 
 
     1. The rate charged 
will be 50 cents per head per day, beginning Jan. 10, 
1986.

 
 
     2. If the corn stalks 
should become covered with snow to prevent sufficient grazing, other feed will 
be provided on those days in the amount specified by the owner of the 
cattle.

 
 
     3. The price for 
supplemental feed will be: Alfalfa hay $70 per ton fed; Ear corn $95 per ton 
fed; Ground oat-sweetclover hay $75 per ton fed; Bean straw $50 per ton fed; 
Corn silage $28 per ton fed.

 
 
4. The 50 
cents per head per day rate will not be charged on the days supplemental feeding 
is necessary.

 
 
     5. Salt and mineral 
will be provided but at the expense of the owner of the 
cattle.

 
 
     6. A daily count of 
the cattle will be taken and any cattle not accounted for will be 
located.

 
 
     7. The electric fence 
will be maintained and the cattle managed within the 
fence.

 
 
     8. The owner will be 
notified of any sick cattle.

 
 

[¶14.]  The word "board," when used as a verb (in 
its gerund, or verbal noun, form as it was in the agreement between Eisenbarth 
and Brooks) has a commonly understood meaning:

 
 
Board 
means: "to provide with regular meals or with regular meals and lodging, usually 
for compensation."

 
 
Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary, at 243 (1961).

 
 

[¶15.]  Eisenbarth did just that, i.e., he made 
his corn fields available to Brooks, for compensation, so that Brook's cattle 
would be provided with regular feed and accommodations, either in the fields 
themselves or in the nearby corrals. Indeed, Eisenbarth's deposition reveals 
that Brooks did not want anything more than that, and boarding the cattle did 
not automatically cause them to be in Eisenbarth's care, custody or control 
under the insurance policy language.

 
 

[¶16.]  This record demonstrates that leasing 
pasture and range and pasturing cattle in corn fields, etc., is a common 
practice in the Wyoming farm/ranch community. In addition, we 
are comfortable in acknowledging that such "boarding" of cattle is a reality of 
farming activity in this state. Wyoming farmers and ranchers might well be 
surprised to learn that by selling the grass or corn in their field to another 
who puts his livestock in the field, they void coverage of their ranch liability 
policy and become liable for any loss of livestock. It would be a devastating 
thing for farmers if they were expected to assume full responsibility for such 
cattle for the minimal income it provides to them. In this instance, Eisenbarth 
could have earned a maximum of $3,000.00 for providing feed for these 100 cattle 
for 60 days. If his farm/ranch liability policy excluded coverage for his 
operation and he is fully responsible for them, because they were in his "care, 
custody or control" he faced the prospect of having to pay damages of $50,000.00 
to $100,000.00! According to the written agreement of the parties, the only 
thing Brooks paid for was the feed.

 
 

[¶17.]  The meaning of the terms "care, custody 
or control" is, to a large extent, dependent upon circumstances. Employers 
Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Puryear Wood Products Co., 247 Ark. 673, 447 S.W.2d 139, 142 (1969) (insured did not have "care, custody or control" of trailer it 
was filling with sawdust). The "care, custody or control" clause is almost 
universally used in liability policies, but its construction is to a large 
extent dependent upon circumstances, and the phrase should be applied with 
common sense and practicality. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Crafton, 233 Ark. 
1020, 350 S.W.2d 506, 507 (1961) (and cases cited therein) (insured did not have 
"care, custody or control" of car which he parked for person using his dock 
facilities); and see American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bentley, 170 Ind. App. 
321, 352 N.E.2d 860, 864-65 (2 Dist. 1976) (boy scout leader did not have "care, 
custody or control" of troop equipment which he stored on his premises in a 
small shed which was rented to the troop). These cases teach that the fact that 
merely because the cattle were on land owned by Eisenbarth and within his fences 
does not in and of itself mean that they were within his care, custody or 
control as those terms are used in a ranch comprehensive liability 
policy.

 
 

[¶18.]  A liability policy is designed to insure against accidents of the trade, 
though not to guarantee the moral hazards of a claim based upon property owned, 
rented or used by the insured where the insured might benefit by falsely 
claiming that the property was damaged by accident or by exaggerating the loss. 
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Smith, 121 Ga. App. 272, 173 S.E.2d 738, 740 (1970) 
(painter was only in control of outside of tank it was painting and not of an 
interior mechanism which was damaged in the process of painting the tank). That 
court also opined, we think appropriately, that were it to determine whether the 
damaged mechanism was under the insured's "control," that it would soon be 
counting angels as well as splitting hairs! In regard to the "moral hazard" 
question, also see United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Schnabel, 504 P.2d 847, 850 
(Alaska 1972). To the extent Eisenbarth did somewhat more than board the cattle, 
he apparently did it as an accommodation to Brooks, out of an innate sense of 
good husbandry, and in compliance with governing law. W.S. 6-3-203 (1988) 
(cruelty to animals); W.S. 11-29-106 and 11-30-112 (1989) (cruelty to animals 
and abuse or negligent treatment by bailee).

 
 

[¶19.]  As noted above, we will not construe a 
contract of insurance so strictly as to thwart the general object of the 
insurance. This policy was designed to provide liability insurance protection to 
Eisenbarth in conducting his farm operations. See Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. 
v. Brethren Mutual Ins. Co., 38 Md. App. 197, 379 A.2d 1234, 1238-43 (1977), for 
a thorough discussion of what constitutes "farming." If Hartford wished to exclude 
this particular sort of farming activity, it could easily have provided for the 
exclusion more specifically than through the "care, custody or control" 
exclusion, since the activity Eisenbarth engaged in was wholly consistent with a 
farm operation. See County of Broome v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 88 A.D.2d 720, 451 N.Y.S.2d 272, 274 (1982).

 
 

[¶20.]  Under these circumstances, we must give 
our primary attention to what these parties intended. Did Brooks intend to give 
"care, custody or control" to Eisenbarth? Did Eisenbarth intend to assume such a 
level of responsibility? A jury decided in the case between Brooks and 
Eisenbarth that Eisenbarth was negligent (60%) in his feeding of the cattle, but 
that Brooks was also negligent (40%). While not determinative of the issue here 
presented, this jury apparently found at least joint responsibility and some 
level of joint care, custody or control. The question then is what are the 
limits of the exclusion intended by the "care, custody or control" language in 
the Hartford 
policy. Must Eisenbarth have total care, custody or control (100%) in all 
decisions affecting the livestock? What is the effect of minimal or joint care, 
custody or control? What level of "care, custody or control" calls the exclusion 
to play? Does it mean any level, some level, or complete "care, custody or 
control?" It would have been a simple matter for the writer of the insurance 
contract to clearly state that care, custody or control of its insured, no 
matter how slight, would exclude coverage if that was the intent of the parties. 
Having failed to do so, we hold that total (not shared) care, custody or control 
is necessary for the exclusion to apply. Whether there was total care, custody 
or control in Eisenbarth is a genuine issue of material fact which precludes 
application of the exclusion as a matter of law. We conclude, therefore, that 
whether the insured was exercising that degree of "care, custody or control" 
over property at the time of injury as would exclude coverage under his 
insurance policy is a question that should be resolved by the trier of fact. 
Arnold v. Adventure Line Mfg. Co., 209 Kan. 80, 495 P.2d 1007, 1011 (1972); 
Arrigo's Fleet Serv. Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 54 Mich. App. 482, 
221 N.W.2d 206, 212-14 (1974).

 
 

[¶21.]  Hartford relies on several cases which have 
resolved similar issues regarding interpretation of a "care, custody or control" 
exclusion to the benefit of the insurer. To some extent, the cases are factually 
distinguishable, but more importantly we simply do not find them persuasive 
because, to the extent they are applicable in the instant case, they are 
contrary to the applicable rules of contract interpretation. We begin our 
discussion of these cases with this general direction in 
mind:

 
 
     One of the more common 
forms of liability policies now written is upon farmers, and these inevitably 
will continue to become of greater importance as time progresses. Necessarily 
they partake of a combination of coverages, including comprehensive personal 
liability, use of powered equipment, acts of animals, employer's liability, and 
other features. Irrespective of the amount of the premium charged, whether great 
or small, the purpose of the farmer in purchasing coverage is clear, his needs 
are known, and such policies should be construed liberally to grant the 
protection sought.

 
 
     The basic principles 
governing the construction of insurance policies in general are fully applicable 
to a comprehensive farm liability policy, though such policy is designed 
specifically for the protection of those engaged in farming. A provision providing for coverage for the 
loss of property of others caused by the insured or arising out of farming 
operations will be given a reasonable interpretation to find coverage where 
possible. [emphasis added]

 
 
7A 
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, (Berdal ed. 1979) § 
4501.17.

 
 

[¶22.]  In the case Howard Associates, Inc. v. 
Home Indemnity Co., 34 Colo. App. 390, 528 P.2d 980 (1974), the Colorado Court 
of Appeals found that an auctioneer had "control" of 19 cattle which were 
trampled to death in a stampede while held by him for further transport, or at 
least that degree of control contemplated by the exclusion. We find sufficient 
distinction in that case in that the auctioneer was in total control, not 
expected to contact the owner, but only transport the cattle. The decision is 
not persuasive.

 
 

[¶23.]  In Insurance Co. of North America v. 
Adkisson, 121 Ill. App.3d 224, 76 Ill.Dec. 673, 459 N.E.2d 310 (3 Dist. 1984), the "care, custody or control exclusion" was held to apply 
in circumstances where the insured placed a stud bull in his livestock trailer 
which he was transporting home to service his cows. The exclusion was applicable 
where the insured failed to secure the trailer door and the bull fell from the 
trailer during transport and died of his injuries. Those circumstances are also 
readily distinguishable from the instant case. The insured was in total control 
of all aspects of transportation - not expected to consult the owner about the 
same. We also note that that decision conflicts virtually head on with Garvison 
v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 96 Or. App. 85, 771 P.2d 310 (1989) (horse 
trainer can be caring for animal without necessarily having "physical control"). 
The case Asam v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 413 So. 2d 1056 (Ala. 1982), is also 
distinguishable on its facts, but more importantly because it contains only 
conclusions with regard to the scope of a "care, custody or control" 
exclusion.

 
 

[¶24.]  The district court erred in granting 
summary judgment for Hartford. Reversed and remanded to the district 
court with directions to vacate the summary judgment for Hartford, that the issue 
of "care, custody or control" be presented to the fact finder, and for such 
further proceedings as are necessary to adjudicate Eisenbarth's unresolved 
claims.

 
 

MACY, 
C.J., filed a 
dissenting opinion in which GOLDEN, J., joined.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
J., filed a 
separate dissenting opinion.

 
 

MACY, Chief 
Justice, dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, 
joins.

 
 

[¶25.]  I dissent. I cannot disagree with the 
majority's recitation of established law as it is applied to insurance 
agreements. The problem is that the majority is not looking at the contract 
between the parties to the insurance contract to determine their intent but is 
looking at the livestock boarding contract between Eisenbarth and Brooks to 
determine what they intended. What they intended has nothing to do with what 
Hartford Fire Insurance Company intended when it drafted the insurance 
agreement.

 
 

[¶26.]  The care, custody, and control exclusion 
states:

 
 
This policy 
does not apply:

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
2. Under 
Coverage G - Personal Liability:

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
     d. to property damage 
to property occupied or used by the Insured or rented to or in the care, custody 
or control of the Insured or as to which the Insured is for any purpose 
exercising physical control[.]

 
 
This 
language is clear and unequivocal and means what is says; i.e., if Eisenbarth 
had either the care, custody, or control of Brooks' livestock, Hartford Fire 
Insurance Company would not be liable for any loss of Brooks' livestock. It is 
that simple. The facts clearly show that Eisenbarth, at a minimum, had custody 
of Brooks' livestock regardless of what Eisenbarth and Brooks intended by their 
contract.

 
 

[¶27.]  We should not torture the meaning of 
words in order to create an ambiguity so that a different result can be 
achieved. Absent any ambiguity, the policy should be enforced according to its 
terms.

 
 

GOLDEN, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶28.]  I join in Chief Justice Macy's dissent; 
in addition, I write separately, and only briefly, to voice my concerns about 
several other points raised by the court's opinion.

 
 

[¶29.]  The court's opinion ignores the 
undisputed facts, most if not all of which come from the insured's own 
testimony. The insured conceded that until his "boarding" agreement with Brooks, 
he had never taken in another's cattle to feed on his corn stalks. The insured's 
farming business was raising an irrigated crop, not feeding another's cattle. 
The insured conceded that under his agreement with Brooks, he (the insured) was 
to take care of the cattle as if they were his own. The court strains to 
characterize the "boarding" agreement as a pasturing agreement, ignoring the 
express terms of the agreement which place the cattle in the insured's 
possession and require him to provide them with owner-obtained feed if the snow 
covers the corn stalks, to provide them with owner-obtained salt and mineral, to 
take a daily count of them, to locate any cattle not accounted for, to maintain 
an electric fence and manage the cattle within that fence, and to watch the 
cattle for signs of sickness and notify the owner of any sick cattle. 
Implicitly, and as a matter of common sense, the agreement required the insured 
daily to take the cattle to and from his corral and corn field. The insured 
concedes that he placed bean straw in his corral before the cattle arrived so 
that they would be on a dry surface. He provided the cattle water in the corral. 
He discussed with Brooks the amount of time the cattle should be allowed to 
graze on the corn stalks, stating, in his view, he should limit them to two 
hours a day at the outset, rather than let them graze for an unlimited time. 
Having obtained Brooks' consent on this point, the insured monitored the grazing 
time accordingly. The insured's activities under the agreement were required; 
they were not, by any stretch of the court's imagination, merely the insured's 
voluntary "accommodation."

 
 

[¶30.]  I am baffled by the court's taking 
judicial notice of what would surprise a farmer like the insured or a rancher 
like Brooks. In my view those matters are not the kinds of things of which 
courts may take judicial notice. I am amused by the court's lame attempt to 
"distinguish" the livestock and agriculture cases dealing with the "care, 
custody or control" exclusion on which the insurer relies; tellingly, the court 
has no livestock and agriculture cases dealing with that exclusion on which to 
rely.

 
 

[¶31.]  Finally, I fail to understand why the 
court has remanded the case for the trier of fact to decide whether the insured 
was exercising that degree of "care, 
custody or control" over the cattle as would exclude coverage under the 
insurance policy. In violation of our appellate rule, the court has already 
rewritten the contract (insurance policy) by holding that, as a matter of law, 
the exclusion applies only if the insured exercised total (not shared) care, 
custody or control. Further, the court has characterized as irrelevant 
"accommodation" all of those expressly and implicitly required activities 
performed by the insured beyond the "pasturing" of the cattle. Since the court 
has clearly indicated the result it desires and has stacked the cards 
accordingly, why prolong the inevitable?

 
 

[¶32.]  In summary, I find no genuine issues of 
material fact and would hold that, by application of the unambiguous exclusion 
to the undisputed facts, the insurer is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.