Title: Kaldwell v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Kaldwell v. State1995 WY 213908 P.2d 987Case Number: 94-271Decided: 12/29/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Kalico KALDWELL, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming,

 Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from The District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Wyoming Public 
Defender Program: Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Deborah Cornia, 
Appellate Counsel; Diane M. Lozano, Assistant Public Defender, for 
Appellant.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Prosecution Assistance Program, Theodore E. 
Lauer, Director, and Gregory J. Blenkinsop, Student Intern, for 
Appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The sole question 
raised by this case is whether the district court committed an abuse of 
discretion in refusing to grant a motion by Kalico Kaldwell (Kaldwell) to 
withdraw his plea of nolo contendere. The motion was made prior to the 
imposition of sentence pursuant to WYO.R.CRIM.P. 32(d). Our examination of the 
record discloses no abuse of discretion by the trial court. We hold that the 
trial court properly applied the standard articulated in the rule and correctly 
concluded Kaldwell had failed to demonstrate any fair and just reason for the 
withdrawal of his plea. Even had a fair and just reason been presented, no abuse 
of discretion will be found if the requirements of WYO.R.CRIM.P. 11 were 
satisfied and the plea was intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily entered. 
The Judgment and Sentence of the Court is affirmed.

[¶2]      In his Brief of 
the Appellant, Kaldwell sets forth the issue as:

Did the trial court abuse 
its discretion by denying Appellant's motion to withdraw his nolo 
contendere plea?

The State of 
Wyoming, in its Brief of the Appellee, restates the same issue, in substantially 
identical language, as follows:

Did the district court 
abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to withdraw his plea of 
nolo contendere prior to sentencing?

[¶3]      On August 25, 
1993, Kaldwell was charged by an information with two counts of delivery of 
marijuana in violation of WYO. STAT. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (1988) and 
35-7-1014(d)(xxi) (1988).1 Kaldwell waived his right to a 
preliminary examination, was bound over to the district court, and released on 
his own recognizance. He failed to appear on three separate occasions, but did 
appear for arraignment on April 7, 1994, and then entered a plea of not guilty. 
The record discloses the following dialogue on that occasion (emphasis 
added):

THE COURT:             
Are you presently under the influence of alcohol or drugs?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: Do you have any mental illness or deficiency 
that would prevent you from understanding these proceedings?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT:             
Or that would prevent you from intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily 
entering a plea to the charges?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

[¶4]      Subsequently, a 
plea agreement was reached between the State and Kaldwell and, on May 27, 1994, 
Kaldwell appeared for the purpose of changing his plea. On that occasion, the 
trial judge advised Kaldwell of: the nature of the charges against him; the 
mandatory minimum and maximum penalties provided by law; the assessments that 
could be levied at sentencing; the ramifications of a nolo contendere plea; his 
right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding; his 
right to persist in his plea of not guilty and proceed to a jury trial where he 
would have the right to assistance of counsel and the presumption of innocence; 
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; the right to subpoena 
other witnesses and produce evidence on his behalf; the right to be free of 
self-incrimination; and the right to an appeal should he be found guilty. There 
is no contention that Kaldwell did not receive the advice from the court 
required by WYO.R.CRIM.P. 11. Significantly, at both the original arraignment 
and the proceeding at which he changed his plea, he was advised of the potential 
of a prison sentence. Kaldwell did enter a plea of nolo contendere at that time, 
and there followed a demonstration of the factual basis for Kaldwell's plea of 
nolo contendere.

[¶5]      On August 12, 
1994, in open court, Kaldwell asked to withdraw the plea of nolo 
contendere, asserting he had entered the plea to secure his release from 
jail. The judge recalled the plea had been voluntary and unconditional, but he 
agreed to review the transcript of the proceeding. The judge stated, "[i]f 
there's some glitch in the transcript of those proceedings, I'll certainly 
consider it [allowing the withdrawal of the plea of nolo 
contendere]."

[¶6]      On August 23, 
1994, after the trial court had reviewed the transcript of the proceeding in 
which Kaldwell entered his plea of nolo contendere, it denied Kaldwell's 
motion to withdraw his plea. Kaldwell's defense counsel was granted leave to 
withdraw from representation because of the possibility he could be called as a 
witness regarding the motion to withdraw the plea. Kaldwell's replacement 
counsel filed a written motion to withdraw the plea of nolo contendere on 
August 29, 1994. The hearing on that motion was held on September 1, 1994, and 
the motion was again denied. On September 2, 1994, Kaldwell was sentenced to a 
term of not less than twenty, nor more than thirty, months in the Wyoming state 
penitentiary. He appealed from that judgment and sentence.

[¶7]      In Wyoming, 
withdrawal of a plea of nolo contendere is provided for in WYO. R.CRIM.P. 
32(d): 

Plea 
withdrawal. - If a motion for 
withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is made before sentence is 
imposed, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the 
defendant of any fair and just reason. At any later time, a plea may be 
set aside only to correct manifest injustice. (Emphasis added.)

In Dichard v. 
State, 844 P.2d 484, 486 (Wyo. 1992), we said:

As indicated by the 
rule's permissive tenor, whether or not to permit a withdrawal of a guilty or 
nolo contendere plea lies within the discretion of the district court. See, 
e.g., Reay v. State, 800 P.2d 499 (Wyo. 1990).

The action of 
the trial court in denying a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is to be set 
aside only for abuse of that recognized discretion. Dichard.

[¶8]      In Reay v. State, 
800 P.2d 499, 500 (Wyo. 1990) (citing Zanetti v. State, 783 P.2d 134, 137 (Wyo. 
1989), we approved the district court's conclusion that "[a] defendant seeking 
to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing must present a plausible reason 
for withdrawal." We have clarified, both prior to and following Reay, the 
interaction between WYO.R.CRIM.P. 11 and WYO.R.CRIM.P. 32 with respect to 
withdrawal of a plea:

Withdrawal of a plea of 
guilty before sentencing is not an absolute right. Denial by the district court 
is within its sound discretion and there must be a plausible reason for 
withdrawal. United States v. Webster, 9 Cir. 1972, 468 F.2d 769, cert. den., 410 U.S. 934, 93 S. Ct. 1385, 35 L. Ed. 2d 597; United States v. Valdez, 5 Cir. 1971, 
450 F.2d 1145. See also United States v. Needles, 2 Cir. 1973, 472 F.2d 652. 
Where an exhaustive voir dire of defendant before accepting plea makes it 
abundantly clear that the plea was entered voluntarily, with full understanding 
of its consequences, and there is a factual basis, there is no abuse of 
discretion. United States v. Fernandez, 2 Cir. 1970, 428 F.2d 578. When a 
patient and understanding judge gives every consideration to a defendant's 
change of position the day before trial and the defendant attempts to mock the 
administration of justice, there is no abuse of discretion. Burnett v. United 
States, 10 Cir. 1968, 404 F.2d 29.

Ecker v. State, 
545 P.2d 641, 642 (Wyo. 1976).

[¶9]      In Triplett v. 
State, 802 P.2d 162, 165 (Wyo. 1990), we expressed the rule in this 
way:

In Schmidt [Schmidt v. 
State, 668 P.2d 656 (Wyo. 1983)], this court held that simply the presentation 
of a plausible reason to withdraw the plea of guilty does not establish an abuse 
of discretion in denying the motion. In that case, the court ruled that abuse of 
discretion is not demonstrated even if a "plausible" or a "just and fair" reason 
for withdrawal is presented if the requirements of Rule 15 [now Rule 11], 
W.R.Cr.P., have been met and the record is clear that the defendant 
intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered into his plea of guilty. If 
those criteria are satisfied, it is not an abuse of discretion to refuse to 
allow withdrawal of the plea. See also Osborn [Osborn v. State, 672 P.2d 777 
(Wyo. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S. Ct. 1331, 79 L. Ed. 2d 726 
(1984)]; Ecker [Ecker v. State, 545 P.2d 641 (Wyo. 1976)].

Triplett and our 
other cases make clear that a defendant has no absolute right to withdraw his 
plea of guilty prior to sentencing. These are the pertinent standards in this 
case.

[¶10]   The hearing on the written motion 
to withdraw the plea of nolo contendere, filed by Kaldwell's replacement 
counsel, included both direct and cross-examination of Kaldwell. Kaldwell 
testified he had entered his plea of nolo contendere because the original 
attorney "told me to plead guilty to the charge and I could go home." Kaldwell 
said he believed he then would be permanently released from the charges. The 
judge said:

I think what we have here 
is a serious question of credibility as to what's happened here on the stand 
today from the defendant. It looks to me like it's a case of recent fabrication, 
that he has this frame of mind that he really didn't know that he would be up 
for sentencing. He should have known back in May that there were sentencing 
consequences, for a variety of reasons.

First, the court advised 
him of that fact.

Secondly, he was asked to 
go to the probation department and do a presentencing report.

Thirdly, when he was 
brought back to this court in return of a bench warrant, the probation agent - 
and I recall very vividly at that hearing, I told Mr. Kaldwell, "you don't have 
to cooperate if you don't want to, but it is something the court will take into 
account at your sentencing."

All of these events took 
place some time before the sentencing. Only after the presentencing report was 
developed and it became evident to Mr. Kalico - or to Mr. Kaldwell that there's 
possible penitentiary consequences, only then did he decide to withdraw - to 
file a motion to withdraw his plea.

I think that based on 
that scenario I have no choice but to deny the motion to withdraw the plea, and 
to set this matter for sentencing tomorrow, along with all other 
matters.

[¶11]   At the sentencing hearing, on 
September 2, 1994, Kaldwell presented a motion for reconsideration. This 
included an unsworn statement in the form of an affidavit by his original 
counsel stating:

I, [name of original 
counsel], previous attorney for Defendant, Kalico Kaldwell, do solemnly swear 
that prior to Defendant's arraignment, [name of prosecuting attorney], Assistant 
District Attorney, did state to me that "If the Defendant would plea guilty to 
one count of delivery of marijuana that I'll let him out of jail." Prior to 
arraignment I relayed said information to the Defendant. I did not elaborate 
further on the District Attorney's statement nor explain to the Defendant that 
he would still be possibly subjected to a prison sentence. He didn't ask. I 
don't recall if I had further conversations relative to Defendant's plea prior 
to his arraignment.

The judge 
remarked that this unsworn statement merely confirmed Kaldwell's testimony at 
the previous motion hearing and, therefore, did not constitute new evidence in 
support of the motion to withdraw.

[¶12]   Kaldwell contends the district 
court did abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw his plea of 
nolo contendere. He claims he was confused at the May 27 arraignment, and 
he did not understand, nor did his defense attorney explain, the ramifications 
of his plea. He argues, when the consequences of that plea were articulated, he 
only understood he would get to go home, and he thought he would be free from 
prosecution. He contends he maintained his innocence to his attorney. He points 
to the facts that his formal education only extended through grade seven; he 
suffered a stroke in 1984, for which he received social security benefits; he 
suffered another mild stroke in 1990; and his scores on the California 
achievement tests were borderline and dropped after the first stroke. He asserts 
his plea was unknowing and involuntary and in contravention of the requirements 
of WYO. R.CRIM.P. 11. These are the fair and just reasons he offers to justify 
the withdrawal of his plea.

[¶13]   An examination of the record fails 
to support Kaldwell's claims that he believed the plea would enable him to have 
the charges dropped, and he would be free from prosecution. The court advised 
him of the charges of delivery of marijuana; stated he was exposed to a possible 
sentence of ten years in the Wyoming state penitentiary if he should plead 
guilty; defined the terms of the plea agreement pursuant to which the State 
agreed to drop the second count and recommend release on his own recognizance 
until sentencing; stated a nolo contendere plea was equivalent to a plea 
of guilty; told Kaldwell the guilty plea constituted a waiver of the right to 
trial and appeal; advised Kaldwell he could return to his home in Fort Collins, 
but he could not leave Fort Collins, except to return to Cheyenne for his court 
appearance; stated a presentence report would be prepared; and the court 
required Kaldwell to contact the Department of Probation and Parole before 
leaving Cheyenne so he would know when to return for sentencing. Kaldwell 
listened to the State's offer of proof and replied in the negative when the 
court asked him if he had any basis to contest that information. The court 
specifically asked, "[h]as anybody promised you anything else in exchange for 
your no contest plea?" Kaldwell replied, "[n]o sir." The court then determined 
he had not been threatened, and his plea was entirely voluntary. The court found 
Kaldwell was competent and represented by competent counsel.

[¶14]   Following arraignment and 
Kaldwell's plea, the trial court afforded him two opportunities to present his 
motions to withdraw his plea. The court reviewed the transcript of Kaldwell's 
arraignment and pointed out Kaldwell had a number of reasons for understanding 
the consequences of his plea. The court noted it had advised him of that fact; 
he was asked to go to the probation department for a presentence report; he was 
advised his lack of cooperation would be something the court would take into 
account at the sentencing; and the State presented a factual basis for the plea 
to which he did not object. We hold, as did the trial court, that Kaldwell 
intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered his plea of nolo 
contendere.

[¶15]   Concerning Kaldwell's claims that 
he had difficulty understanding the proceeding, Kaldwell had been convicted of 
five different felonies in the years 1962, 1963, 1975, and 1976. In Mehring v. 
State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1108 (Wyo. 1993), we held knowledge of the criminal 
justice system is a factor to consider in determining the voluntariness of a 
plea. The following colloquy occurred between the prosecuting attorney and 
Kaldwell at the evidentiary hearing:

Q.        You've pled 
guilty before in court; is that correct? You have stood up before a judge and 
said Guilty, Your Honor before?

A.        
Yes.

Q.        Okay. On 
each and every occasion, you've had a sentencing; isn't that 
correct?

A.        I'm not 
sure on that. I'm not sure what you're saying.

Q.        Mr. 
Kaldwell, what I'm saying is, no matter if you're found guilty by a jury, if you 
plead guilty to a judge, as a matter of course, and you know it, a sentencing 
follows. Isn't that true?

A.        
Yes.

Although 
Kaldwell argues he had not been in the criminal justice system since 1985, his 
prior experiences in criminal proceedings involving felonies were indeed factors 
to be considered in determining whether he understood the process.

[¶16]   Kaldwell argued he had attended 
school only through the fifth grade, but he later agreed he had attended through 
the seventh grade. This contention is less than candid, however, because the 
presentence investigation report demonstrates he finished the seventh grade in 
Denver and went on to complete the eleventh grade. Nowhere in the interactions 
with his attorney or the court did Kaldwell advise he was not capable of 
understanding the nature and quality of this act in entering a plea of nolo 
contendere and its consequences. He states the motivation for his plea was 
that he wanted to be released from jail so he could go home, but his capacity to 
understand, not his motive, is the question we must address.

[¶17]   With respect to the contention that 
the two strokes affected his ability to understand the proceedings, the record 
discloses a California achievement test administered in 1985 indicated his 
intelligence scores were borderline. These scores were lower than the scores 
from his previous incarceration in 1976, but the differences were not extreme. 
The 1985 report opined Kaldwell did suffer some brain damage from the 1984 
stroke but, "he seems to be getting all the sympathy possible rather than 
working at overcoming the new handicap." Kaldwell presented no evidence 
concerning how the mild stroke in 1990 affected his ability to make a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary plea.

[¶18]   In Dichard, 844 P.2d  at 487, we 
found the testimony produced at the motion hearing was so "patently 
inconsistent" with the defendant's testimony when he entered his plea that his 
credibility was seriously in question. Similarly, in this instance, the 
testimony Kaldwell offered at the motion hearing was patently inconsistent with 
the testimony offered when he entered his plea. The inconsistency was so 
pronounced that the judge commented on it in the record and indicated a concern 
of recent fabrication. In our view, Kaldwell's position is not only incredible, 
but it broaches upon being irrational.

[¶19]   In any event, Kaldwell's attorney 
did not present the issue of diminished capacity to the court during the 
arraignment or call it to the attention of the State at the sessions leading to 
the plea bargain. Kaldwell's counsel did not treat him as if he were functioning 
under diminished capacity in the course of his conferences with Kaldwell. 
Probably, Kaldwell did not manifest diminished capacity to his 
counsel.

[¶20]   After examining this record, we 
hold there was no abuse of discretion by the district court when it denied 
Kaldwell's motion to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere. On the day of 
the arraignment, Kaldwell possessed sufficient intelligence to know he was 
charged with unlawful delivery of marijuana; he understood the nature of the 
charges; and he knew a plea of nolo contendere constituted an admission 
of guilt that could subject him to imprisonment. The State presented a factual 
basis for the plea. It is inconceivable, especially considering the judge's 
comments during the arraignment, that Kaldwell could believe his plea would 
relieve him of the consequences of his actions. That plea was entered 
intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily. Even if we were to acknowledge that 
Kaldwell presented a "plausible" or a "just and fair" reason to withdraw the 
plea, he has no absolute right to do so.

[¶21]   The denial by the trial court of 
Kaldwell's motion to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere is affirmed, and the 
Judgment and Sentence of the Court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTE

1           
WYO. STAT. § 35-7-1031 (1988) forbids the unlawful manufacture or 
delivery of controlled substances and provides, in pertinent part:

(a)       Except as 
authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, 
or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance. Any 
person who violates this subsection with respect to:

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

(ii)        Any other 
controlled substance classified in Schedule I, II or III, is guilty of a crime 
and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, fined 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both; * * *.

WYO. STAT. § 
35-7-1014(d)(xxi) (1988) lists the controlled substances included in Schedule I 
and provides, in pertinent part:

(d) Hallucinogenic 
substances. - Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, 
any material, compound, mixture or preparation which contains any quantity of 
the following hallucinogenic substances, their salts, isomers and salts of 
isomers whenever the existence of these salts, isomers and salts of isomers is 
possible within the specific chemical designation (for purposes of this 
paragraph only, the term "isomer" includes the optical, position and geometric 
isomers): * * *.

(xxi) 
Tetrahydrocannabinols; synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the 
plant or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic 
substances, derivatives and their isomers with similar chemical structure and 
pharmacological activity such as the following: delta 1 cis or trans 
tetrahydrocannabinol and their optical isomers; delta 6 cis or trans 
tetrahydrocannabinol and their optical isomers; delta to the 3, 4 cis or trans 
tetrahydrocannabinol and its optical isomers. Since nomenclature of these 
substances is not internationally standardized, compounds of these structures, 
regardless of numerical designation of atomic positions are covered; * * 
*.