Title: State v. Meade

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  July 24, 1998

		IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

	Respondent on Review,

	v.

JAMES PENNY MEADE, JR.,

	Petitioner on Review.

(CC 95-1031; CA A90793; SC S44069)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted September 8, 1997.

	Jon S. Henricksen, Gladstone, argued the cause for
petitioner on review.  With him on the petition was Jon F.
Strock, Gladstone.

	Douglas Zier, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent on review.  With him on the brief were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor
General.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
and Durham, Justices.**

	GILLETTE, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The order
of the circuit court is reversed.  The case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.

	Durham, J., dissented and filed an opinion.

	*Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court,

	 Sid Brockley, Judge.

	 146 Or App 202, 933 P2d 355 (1997).

    **Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision; Kulongoski, J.,
did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.

		GILLETTE, J.

 		In this criminal case, defendant was charged with
sodomy and sexual abuse, based on allegations that he had
unlawful sexual contact with his girlfriend's eight-year-old
daughter.  The trial court granted defendant's pretrial motion to
suppress certain statements that he made to two Lake Oswego
detectives during a police interview.  On appeal by the state,
the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statements were
admissible.  State v. Meade, 146 Or App 202, 933 P2d 355 (1997). 
We allowed review and now affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals.  

		Two plainclothes police detectives met defendant upon
his arrival at the Portland International Airport after a lengthy
international flight.  The detectives displayed their badges,
assured defendant that his family was fine and that his luggage
would be taken care of, and then escorted him to an interview
room at the Port of Portland Police Department, a few minutes'
drive away from the terminal.  Once in the interview room, the
detectives advised defendant of his Miranda rights, told him that
they were investigating allegations that he had touched his
girlfriend's daughter inappropriately, and informed him that he
would be taken into custody at the conclusion of the interview.  

		The detectives initially questioned defendant for about
an hour, during which time defendant fully and freely answered
their questions, even to the point of acknowledging that it was
"possible" that he had made sexual contact with the child
inadvertently or unconsciously.  Eventually, defendant admitted
that he "might have" had an erection and touched the girl's
bottom, conceding that such an event "could have happened." 

		At that point, defendant stated that, if he needed a
lawyer, he wanted one.  The detectives paused but, before they
had the opportunity to say anything further, defendant leaned
forward in his chair, put up his hands as if to stop the
detectives from speaking, and said, "You've talked a lot.  I want
to say a few things."  He then began talking about how he
realized that his relationship with the girl's mother was "going
down the drain."  He complimented the detectives on the way in
which they had handled the investigation, but said that he
thought that they wanted him to confess to something that he had
not done.  One of the detectives responded, "No, I don't want you
to confess to something that you didn't do, but I have this
investigation and I believe you did it."  The detective then
resumed questioning defendant and, again, defendant responded
fully, making several additional incriminating statements.  At
the conclusion of the interview, which lasted for about another
hour, the detectives arrested defendant.

		Defendant was charged with three counts of sodomy in
the first degree and three counts of sexual abuse in the first
degree, all involving the eight year old.  Before trial,
defendant moved to suppress all the statements that he had made
during the interview.  He claimed that he was never advised of
his Miranda rights, that he was overtired from his trip and,
therefore, that he was unable to waive his rights knowingly and
intelligently, and that the interview continued improperly after
he mentioned his need for a lawyer.

		The trial court found that defendant had been advised
of his Miranda rights and that the statements that he made before
he mentioned his need for a lawyer were freely and voluntarily
made.  However, the court held that defendant's statement to the
effect that, if he needed a lawyer, then he wanted one,(1) was an
"equivocal" request for counsel and that the police continued
questioning after that request but did not limit their questions
to an effort to clarify whether defendant desired to have a
lawyer present.  The trial court concluded that the failure to
limit the interrogation in that way warranted suppression of the
statements that followed defendant's equivocal request for
counsel.  

		The state appealed.  ORS 138.060(3).  The Court of
Appeals assumed, without deciding, that defendant's statement to
the effect that, if he needed a lawyer, then he wanted one, was
an equivocal request for counsel but concluded, applying federal
standards, that "[defendant's] immediately ensuing unilateral
statements to the detectives evinced '"a willingness and a desire
for a generalized discussion about the investigation,"' and,
under the totality of the circumstances, effected a waiver of the
right to counsel. * * *  Accordingly, subsequent renewal of
interrogation did not violate that right."  Meade, 146 Or App at
206 (citations omitted).  For the reasons that follow, we agree.

		Defendant's right to the assistance of counsel during
custodial interrogation arises out of his right against self-
incrimination as provided in Article I, section 12, of the Oregon
Constitution,(2) and the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.(3)  This court has recognized that a level of
coercion is inherent in any custodial setting and that a lawyer's
presence at a custodial interrogation is one way to ensure the
right to be free from compelled self-incrimination.  State v.
Sparklin, 296 Or 85, 89, 672 P2d 1182 (1983).  When a defendant
chooses to have the advice of counsel before he responds to
police questions and the police honor that choice, "the coercive
atmosphere of police interrogation is to some degree dispelled." 
Ibid.  

		For that reason, when a suspect in police custody makes
an unequivocal request to talk to a lawyer, all police
questioning must cease.  State v. Charboneau, 323 Or 38, 54, 913
P2d 308 (1996); State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 572, 789 P2d 1352
(1990).  When the request is equivocal, however, the police may
follow up with questions intended to clarify whether the suspect
meant to invoke his right to counsel.  Charboneau, 323 Or at 55-56; Montez, 309 Or at 572.  In either case, the suspect may
thereafter waive the right to have counsel present during that or
later interrogations.  Montez, 309 Or at 572.  

		As did the Court of Appeals, we assume that defendant's
reference to a lawyer was an equivocal request for counsel.  The
state argues that defendant waived the right to counsel
immediately after making that reference, when he prevented the
detectives from speaking, stating "You've talked a lot.  I want
to say a few things," and then went on to speak about his
relationship with the victim's mother, about how the detectives
were handling the investigation, and about whether the detectives
wanted him to confess to something that he had not done.

		We acknowledge at the outset that this case does not
present precisely the same factual context as that involved in
Montez and Charboneau.  In each of those cases, the suspect's
equivocal invocation of the right to counsel was followed by
neutral questions from the interviewing officers directed solely
at determining whether the suspect was or was not invoking the
right to counsel.  In the present case, by contrast, the officers
were prevented from asking such neutral questions immediately by
defendant's choice to launch into his monologue.  When the
officers did resume taking part in the discussion, their
questions were aimed at the merits of the case.  This case thus
presents a question not addressed by either Montez or Charboneau: 
May the interrogating officers' obligation, discussed in those
cases, to clarify an equivocal invocation of the right to counsel
be obviated, if the suspect thereafter, and without prompting
from the officers, initiates further substantive conversation
concerning the charge under investigation?  For the reasons that
follow, we hold that the officers' duty to clarify the suspect's
intention may, under certain circumstances, be obviated.

		This court has not been called on previously to rule on
whether or under what circumstances a suspect's initiation of
conversation with the police after equivocally invoking the right
to counsel constitutes a waiver of that right under the Oregon
Constitution.  Although unresolved, the question is not
difficult.  Every case necessarily turns on its own facts, but
there is no conflict between Montez and Charboneau and the idea
that a suspect's own actions may, in a given case, eliminate any
need for clarification by the officers.  The state may show by
forms of evidence other than a suspect's responses to clarifying
questions from the police that the suspect had the requisite
state of mind, viz., was willing to enter into a generalized
discussion of the substance of the charges without the assistance
of counsel.

		Applying the foregoing standard to the facts of this
case, we hold that defendant, without prompting from the police,
initiated further conversation that evinced a willingness and a
desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation. 
Defendant's physical gestures cut off further questions by the
officers.  Having asserted control over the conversation, he then
chose to reopen the topic of the investigation.  The officers had
no obligation to inquire further.(4)  We agree with the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that, on this record, although defendant's
statements

	"were not necessarily inculpatory, they pertained
directly or indirectly to the substance of the
investigation. * * * The tenor and thrust of his
statements, from his announcement, 'I want to say a few
things,' to his statements denying the allegations,
indicated his willingness to talk with the detectives
about the accuracy of their investigation against him."

Meade, 146 Or App at 210.(5)

		Having concluded that defendant initiated the
conversation with the detectives,(6) we turn to the remaining
issue, viz., whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary under
the totality of the circumstances.  See Montez, 309 Or at 572
(suggesting that separate criterion).  The Court of Appeals
found, as do we, that the following facts are significant: 
Defendant is highly educated, having earned a doctorate degree in
psychology; defendant was advised of his Miranda rights at the
beginning of the interview, waived them immediately, and engaged
in a lengthy, substantive discussion with the detectives about
the case; the trial court found that defendant understood his
rights when he waived them initially, that he was alert
throughout the interview, and that his statements before the
equivocal request for counsel were "the result of free,
unconstrained, and informed choice;" and, finally, the period
between the time when defendant equivocally invoked his rights
and then initiated substantive discussion was very short. 
Nothing occurred during that period that reasonably could have
altered defendant's understanding of his rights. 

		Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the totality
of the circumstances indicates that defendant voluntarily waived
his rights against self-incrimination under both the state and
federal constitutions.  The detectives permissibly resumed the
interrogation when defendant finished his monologue.  The trial
court erred in suppressing defendant's later incriminating
statements.(7)  

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
order of the circuit court is reversed.  The case is remanded to
the circuit court for further proceedings.  

	DURHAM, J., dissenting.	State v. Meade

	I would affirm the trial court's determination that
defendant did not intentionally waive his right to counsel before
he made the incriminating statements in dispute here. 
Accordingly, I dissent.

	Our nation's debate regarding the decision in Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), is
now over thirty years old.(8)  Miranda is not a state law decision
but this court has relied on that case to determine the content
of state law regarding police interrogations.  For example, in 
determining what procedural safeguards are necessary to protect
the right of a person suspected of crime, under Oregon
Constitution, Article I, Section 12, not to be compelled to
testify against himself in a criminal prosecution, this court has
held repeatedly that Miranda warnings are the procedural
mechanism by which police officers must effectuate that state
constitutional provision.  See, e.g., State v. Sparklin, 296 Or
85, 88, 672 P2d 1182 (1983); State v. Mains, 295 Or 640, 645, 669
P2d 1112 (1983).  As a result, settled state law requires police
officers to deliver familiar warnings to a suspect at the
commencement of an interrogation, and to scrupulously honor that
person's request for a lawyer, expressed at any time during the
interrogation.  Sparklin, 296 Or at 89 "[W]e require the police
to inform a detained person that he may terminate questioning at
any time and that he may have an attorney to advise him before he
speaks."  (Emphasis added.)

	In State v. Kell, 303 Or 89, 96, 734 P2d 334 (1987),
this court, quoting the following passage of Miranda with
approval, confirmed that a suspect may request a lawyer in any
manner during a police interrogation.  Miranda, 384 US at 444-45,
states:

	"Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed.  The defendant
may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently.  If, however, he indicates in any manner
and at any stage of the process that he wishes to
consult with an attorney before speaking there can be
no questioning."  (Emphasis added.)

	The suspect's right to request a lawyer's assistance in
any manner during an interrogation is the starting point in the
analysis of the issue posed by this case.  Despite the clarity of
that requirement, courts still face several difficult problems in
resolving disputes arising from equivocal requests for counsel
asserted during police interrogations.  First, under current
court interpretations of the right to counsel, police must honor
that right only if the suspect invokes it.  In the absence of a
legally sufficient invocation, police may secure a suspect's
uncounseled incriminating statements even though the suspect has
a lawyer, refers to the lawyer or a need for legal advice, and it
is obvious to every police interrogator that the suspect needs to
speak with a lawyer before speaking to the police.

	Second, the courts have developed no simple, clear test
for determining whether a suspect's oral reference to a need for
legal advice during a police interview amounts to an invocation
of the right to counsel.  The majority's(9) conclusion that the
suspect must make an unequivocal request for a lawyer rests the
effectuation of the suspect's constitutional right on his or her
ability to speak to police interrogators in assertive, definite
terms and without pauses, questions, or conditions.  Some
suspects, and particularly those familiar with police
interrogations, are familiar with those requirements and follow
them without difficulty.(10)  Others, and especially women, members
of some racial minority groups and the poorer, less-educated
social classes, more often speak with authority figures in non-assertive, hedged speech patterns.  Those groups commonly
incorporate questions and other qualifications and conditions
into their speech in order to avoid rudeness and to maintain 
respectful or friendly relationships with police officers.(11)  For
many suspects in those groups, as well as other suspects who,
because of their ignorance or fear, are unfamiliar with the
procedures and pressures that sometimes accompany police
interrogation, ambivalent invocations of the right to counsel
seem to be the rule, not the exception.

	Exacerbating the difficulty in determining whether a
suspect's reference to a lawyer matches the majority's adjectival
legal standard (i.e., an "unequivocal" invocation) is the fact
that invocations, such as they are, commonly occur in isolated,
unrecorded settings that require courts to reconstruct the
suspect's statements after-the-fact, most often from the
recollections of police officers.  Sophisticated interview
strategies usually permit or encourage officers, in reacting to
an ambivalent invocation, to solicit clarification of a suspect's
statements at length or to restate Miranda warnings and the
consequences, some of which are negative, of an invocation of
constitutional rights.(12)

  If the suspect, in responding,
conditions or qualifies the request for counsel, the interview
continues uninterrupted because the suspect's answer shows that
the invocation was equivocal.(13)  	

	The courts have taken three different approaches in
addressing these problems surrounding a suspect's ambiguous
invocation of the right to counsel.(14)  The identified approaches
are the "per se approach," the "threshold of clarity approach,"
and the "clarification approach."  Under the per se approach
followed in a minority of jurisdictions, police must cease
questioning a suspect even though the suspect's invocation of the
right to counsel is ambiguous.  The flaw in that approach is that
it terminates police interviews needlessly, even though the
suspect desires to continue.

	Under the threshold of clarity approach, the police may
disregard a request for counsel during an interview unless the
request meets the court's minimum standard of clarity or
certainty.  That standard treats the suspect's ambiguous
reference to a need for a lawyer during the interview as if it
did not exist.  Police operating under the threshold of clarity
standard may disregard as a nullity a request for counsel that is
accompanied by any question, condition, or qualification that
renders the request ambiguous or equivocal.(15)

	Finally, under the clarification approach that is the
majority rule in most American jurisdictions, police must obtain
clarification of an ambiguous invocation of the right to counsel
before proceeding with an interview.(16)

  That approach permits
police to use simple questions to clarify the suspect's true
intention regarding continuing the interview without counsel and,
thus, produces a more accurate understanding of whether the
suspect's statement was an invocation of the right to counsel.

		"The majority of courts that have decided the
question of the appropriate standard to use in
assessing ambiguous or equivocal invocations of the
right to counsel have chosen to take a third approach,
adopting a rule that permits clarification of unclear
assertions.  This third approach charts a middle course
between the other two standards, instructing police to
respond to ambiguous assertions of the right to counsel
by clarifying the suspect's request.  In contrast to
the threshold-of-clarity standard, this clarification
approach gives some legal effect to ambiguous or
equivocal assertions of the right to counsel. 
Specifically, under the clarification standard, hedged
assertions of the right to counsel that would be
accorded no significance under the threshold-of-clarity
standard may be given legally operative effect,
limiting further police interrogation.  On the other
hand, unlike the per se invocation rule, which
absolutely bars further police interrogation upon any
assertion of the right to counsel, the clarification
approach permits police to continue the interrogative
exchange with the suspect after a less than clear
invocation of the right to counsel.  The ensuing police
questioning is, at least in theory, limited solely to
questions designed to clarify whether the suspect
intended her ambiguous statements to invoke the Fifth
Amendment right to assistance of counsel."

Ainsworth, n 4 ante at 308-09 (footnotes omitted).

	The majority begins its analysis by adopting the view
of the Court of Appeals that defendant made an "equivocal"
request for counsel when he announced, during the police
interview, that if he needed a lawyer, he wanted one.  I agree
with that assumption.  Whether defendant's statement is labeled
as "equivocal" or "ambiguous," the court may construe it
plausibly as an invocation of the right to counsel, but need not
necessarily so construe it.(17)  What remained in doubt about
defendant's statement after he uttered it was not whether an
objective listener reasonably could take the statement as an
invocation, but whether defendant intended his imperfect
expression to constitute an invocation of his rights.

	The majority acknowledges, and I agree, that this
court's case law recognizes "the interrogating officers'
obligation * * * to clarify an equivocal invocation of the right
to counsel * * *."  State v. Meade, 327 Or at ____.  (Slip op at
7) citing State v. Charboneau, 323 Or 38, 55, 913 P2d 308 (1996);
State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 572-73, 789 P2d 1352 (1990).  That
obligation aligns Oregon with the majority rule, discussed
earlier, that requires use of the clarification approach by
police in responding to ambiguous invocations of the right to
counsel.

	The majority next asks whether certain circumstances
may obviate the officers' duty to clarify the suspect's
intention, and answers that such circumstances may exist.  Again,
I agree.

	The duty to clarify the suspect's intention is rooted
in common sense, not ceremony.  The right to request counsel is
personal to the suspect and may be invoked at any time and in any
manner during interrogation.  The objective of asking a
clarifying question is to determine with certainty whether the
suspect, by his ambiguous reference to counsel, actually intended
to exercise his personal right to seek legal advice before
proceeding with the interview.  In the face of an ambiguous
invocation, asking a clarifying question provides assurance that
the "'right to choose between speech and silence remains
unfettered throughout the interrogation process.'"  Connecticut
v. Barrett, 479 US 523, 528, 107 S Ct 828, 93 L Ed 2d 920 (1987)
(quoting Miranda, 384 US at 469).  A helpful secondary effect of
the duty is that it relieves police officers of the difficult
burden of guessing whether a suspect's statement was an
unequivocal or merely ambiguous invocation and, thus, protects
the admissibility of subsequent incriminating statements should
the suspect choose to make them.

	In view of the practical justifications for the
clarification approach, not every invocation will require
subsequent clarification through questions by the police.  For
example, no clarifying question is necessary if the suspect
accompanies an ambiguous invocation with other statements, not
prompted by police interrogation, that make it clear that the
suspect did not intend to invoke the right to counsel, or that
the suspect, despite the ambiguous invocation, desires to
continue to interview without the assistance of counsel.  In
those circumstances, the suspect's actual intention is not in
doubt.  If the suspect removes the doubt about his intention and
asks to continue the interview without counsel present, it
matters little that he does so spontaneously rather than in
response to clarifying questions from the police.

	The majority concludes that two aspects of defendant's
conduct during his interrogation clarified his ambiguous
invocation of the right to counsel or, at least, obviated the
need for clarifying questions.  The first is defendant's physical
gesture with his hands that, according to the plurality, "cut off
further questions by the officers" and enabled defendant to
"assert[] control over the conversation * * *."  327 Or at ____
(slip op at 8).

	That analysis, while dramatic, is not accurate.  I
agree that the officers have no duty to interrupt a suspect who
desires, during an interview, to make a statement of the kind
portrayed here.  Notwithstanding defendant's gesture with his
hands and his brief oration, the officers had ample opportunity
immediately after those actions to seek clarification of
defendant's earlier ambiguous reference to his desire for a
lawyer.  Defendant's gestures and his assertion of a desire to
say a few things to the officers do not make clear his intention
in expressing a need for a lawyer.

	The second aspect of defendant's conduct concerns the
substance of defendant's statement to the police.  The majority
states that clarifying questions are unnecessary if the state can
show "that the suspect had the requisite state of mind, viz., was
willing to enter into a generalized discussion of the substance
of the charges without the assistance of counsel."  327 Or at
____ (slip op at 8).  As I discuss above, I have no objection to
that general legal standard.  However, the majority concludes
that defendant's statement here satisfies that standard, because
defendant "evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized
discussion about the investigation" and "chose to reopen the
topic of the investigation."  327 Or at ____ (slip op at 8). 

	It is important to keep in mind what defendant actually
said to the officers.  He said that he was losing his
relationship with his girlfriend and that he was not guilty of
the criminal actions that the officers had discussed with him. 
Contrary to the majority's view, those statements do not express,
either expressly or by implication, a willingness and a desire
for a general discussion about the criminal charges.  I agree
that defendant's assertion of his innocence pertained to the
investigation of possible criminal activity, but his statement
expressed no desire to extend the police interrogation.

	Significantly, defendant's statement to the officers
also did not clarify his earlier ambiguous invocation of the
right to counsel.  Defendant never mentioned, let alone made
clear, his imperfectly expressed desire for a lawyer's
assistance.  To use the test that the majority articulates,
defendant's statement did not answer the question whether he was
"willing to enter into a generalized discussion of the substance
of the charges without the assistance of counsel."  Id. (Emphasis
supplied.)  As a result, defendant's statement did not obviate
the officers' fulfillment of their obligation to seek
clarification of defendant's ambiguous request for a lawyer.

	The majority's rationale, that defendant "evinced a
willingness and a desire" to speak about the investigation and
that he "chose to reopen the topic of the investigation,"
(emphasis added) suggests that the majority seeks to rely on a
body of law that the United States Supreme Court uses in
analyzing whether an incarcerated suspect has "initiated" an
interrogation with the police.  Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 US 1039,
103 S Ct 2830, 77 L Ed 2d 405 (1983) (plurality decision);
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477, 101 S Ct 1880, 68 L Ed 2d 378
(1981).  Edwards states the initiation rule as follows:

	"[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have
counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid
waiver of that right cannot be established by showing
only that he responded to further police-initiated
custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of
his rights.  We further hold that an accused, such as
Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the
police only through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been
made available to him, unless the accused himself
initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police."  451 US at 484-85
(footnote omitted).

	The majority's attempt to make the law of initiation
apply here produces a bad fit.  That law is designed to assist
police officers in determining whether they can speak again with
a suspect after he has invoked his rights, the interrogation has
ceased, and a period of time has elapsed.  As Edwards confirms, a
waiver of rights cannot be established in this context "by
showing only that [the suspect] responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of
his rights."  451 US at 484.  That requirement demonstrates that
the initiation rule is inapplicable to a suspect's statements,
like defendant's brief oration here, that respond directly to
police-initiated interrogation.  The majority's effort to
bifurcate this single, police-initiated interview, and to suggest
implicitly that defendant, having "initiated" the second phase of
the interview, was not responding to interrogation by the police,
produces a serious distortion of the relevant facts and the
initiation rule.

	The majority's approach carries a potential for
mischief.  That approach will induce officers not to seek
clarification of an ambiguous invocation of rights, but instead
to wait until a suspect says something that relates, even
indirectly, to the matters under discussion (including as little
as an assertion of innocence), and then proceed with the
interrogation.  Correctly analyzed, the majority's purported
exception to the clarification approach likely will swallow it
whole.

	I see no reason to adopt such a sweeping exception in
cases of this kind.  Because defendant's invocation of his rights 
was ambiguous, and his subsequent oration did not clarify the
ambiguity, the policy reasons that support the clarification
approach point to the correct legal answer.  When defendant
finished speaking, the officers had a clear opportunity to seek
clarification of defendant's ambiguous invocation of his right to
counsel and should have done so.  Instead, despite the reasonable
import of defendant's request, they presumed that he did not want
a lawyer, never asked him what he meant, and pressed ahead with
the interrogation.  The trial court concluded, that during these
events, defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his
constitutional right to counsel.  I would affirm that conclusion.

	Accordingly, I dissent.

1. 	The trial court did not make specific findings as to
defendant's exact words, but simply paraphrased the statement in
this way.

2. 	Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part:

		"No person shall * * * be compelled in any
criminal prosecution to testify against himself."

3. 	The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part:

		"No person shall * * * be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."

4. 	The dissent at bottom differs only with this
application of the facts to the law.  Close cases reasonably can
be expected to produce differences of opinion.  That is what has
occurred here.

5. 	Neither would defendant's claim be well taken under
federal law.  In Davis v. United States, 512 US 452, 461, 114 S
Ct 2350, 129 L Ed 2d 362 (1994), the United States Supreme Court
held that the Fifth Amendment allows a police officer to continue
interrogating a suspect after the suspect knowingly and
voluntarily waives his Miranda rights until and unless the
suspect clearly requests a lawyer.  Because defendant in this
case did not clearly articulate his request for a lawyer, the
Fifth Amendment as it presently is interpreted did not preclude
the detectives from continuing the interrogation. 

6. 	Defendant suggests that his statements to the
detectives after his mention of a lawyer "only * * * ambiguously
'evince a willingness' to open up a generalized discussion about
the investigation," and he invites this court to adopt a rule
requiring police officers to ask questions meant to clarify the
suspect's intent before resuming interrogation unless it is clear
that the suspect desires such a generalized discussion.  We
disagree that defendant's comments are ambiguous in that regard
and, therefore, we decline to consider in the abstract whether
such a rule would be necessary. 

7. 	The trial court did not base its ruling on any theory
that defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was defective in
any factual respect.  Rather, it is clear from reading the
court's opinion as a whole that the court's ruling was based
solely on the legal conclusion that the police could not, as a
matter of law, further interview defendant, after defendant's
mention of a lawyer, without first clearing up whether defendant
was invoking his right to counsel.  Thus, the familiar rule of
Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487, 443 P2d 621 (1968) (trial court
is presumed to have found facts consonant with its legal ruling),
plays no role here.

8. 	It cannot be gainsaid that Miranda has attracted its
share of controversy.  One author reports that the Miranda
opinion "was assailed by police, prosecutors, politicians, and
media," was attacked by the administrations of two presidents,
was cited in Congress as a justification for impeaching Chief
Justice Earl Warren, and continues to receive calls for its
reversal from academic and media sources.  Richard A. Leo, The
Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J Crim L & Criminology 621, 622-23 (1996); Paul G. Cassell and Bret S. Hayman, Police
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of
Miranda, 43 UCLA L Rev 839, 840 (1996) (describing Miranda as
"the Supreme Court's most famous criminal law decision," and
citing a 1974 survey of the American Bar Association that ranked
Miranda as "the third most notable decision of all time"). 
Miranda has its academic critics.  Paul G. Cassell, Protecting
the Innocent From False Confessions and Lost Confessions - and
From Miranda, 88 J Crim L & Criminology 497, 538 (1998); Paul G.
Cassell and Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops?  A Thirty-Year
Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50
Stan L Rev 1055 (1998); Joseph D. Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and
the Legal Mind:  Formalism's Triumph over Substance and Reason,
24 Am Crim L Rev 243 (1986).  Miranda also has its supporters. 
John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?,
50 Stan L Rev 1147 (1998) (questioning data and statistical
methodologies relied on by Miranda's critics); Peter Arenella,
Miranda Stories, 20 Harv J L & Pub Pol'y 375 (1997) (hereinafter
Arenella); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda is Unjustified
- and Harmful, 20 Harv J L & Pub Pol'y 347 (1997); Yale Kamisar,
Police Interrogation and Confessions 223 (1980); Richard A. Leo
and Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda: 
Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J Crim L & Criminology 557
(1998).  That debate aside, I accept, for purposes of this
opinion, that Miranda-type warnings are a procedural safeguard
that this court has adopted and enforced to effectuate rights
protected by Oregon Constitution, Article I, section 12.

9. 	The presence of at least four judges of the Oregon
Supreme Court is necessary for the transaction of the court's
business.  ORS 2.100.  The four-judge quorum requirement is
satisfied here.  The concurrence of a majority of that quorum in
the lead opinion permits entry of judgment in this case.  For
that reason, I refer to the lead opinion as the majority opinion. 
However, because the lead opinion has received the affirmative
votes of less than a majority of this seven-member court, the
lead opinion does not carry the precedential weight of a majority
opinion of the entire Oregon Supreme Court.

10. 	"Repeat players in the criminal justice
system not only know their 'rights,' some of
them learn the hard way that they cannot talk
themselves out of trouble in a police
interrogation room.  In short, some of these
repeat suspects are not relying on their
Miranda rights as much as their realization
that talking to the police in this setting is
a lose-lose proposition.  Repeat players who
have learned this lesson will not talk to the
police regardless of the legal regime
controlling the interrogation process unless
the length and pressures of the interrogation
sap their will."

Arenella, n 1 ante at 378 (footnote omitted).

11. 	See Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register:  The
Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 Yale LJ
259, 315-19 (1993), which discusses recent social science
research and concludes:
	

	"Current legal doctrine, premised on the expectation
that an invocation of rights should be direct and
unequivocal in form, does not serve the interests of
the many speech communities whose discourse patterns
deviate from the implicit norms in standard, 'male
register' English." (Footnote omitted; hereinafter
Ainsworth.)

See also Comment, Davis v. United States:  Leaving Less
Articulate Suspects to Fend for Themselves in the Face of
Custodial Interrogation, 22 New Eng J on Crim & Civ Confinement
29 (1996); Comment, Hung Up On Semantics:  A Critique of Davis v.
United States, 23 Hastings Const LQ 313 (1995).

12. 	"Appellate courts have warned that the
clarification standard does not sanction
police attempts, whether by coercion or
persuasion, to discourage suspects from
invoking the right to counsel."

Ainsworth, n 4 ante at 312, citing Thompson v. Wainwright, 601
F2d 768, 772 (5th Cir 1979):

		"[T]he limited inquiry permissible after an
equivocal request for legal counsel may not
take the form of an argument between
interrogators and suspect about whether
having counsel would be in the suspect's best
interests or not.  * * * Such measures are
foreign to the purpose of clarification,
which is not to persuade but to discern."

13. 	My point is that police should incorporate into their
interview procedures the routine use of a simple, straightforward
question that seeks clarification of a suspect's intention in
referring ambiguously to a desire for a lawyer's help, not that
police should avoid that tactic.  As long as a suspect, properly
advised of his rights, voluntarily and intelligently waives his
right to counsel and chooses to speak to the police alone, the
success of the police in obtaining incriminating statements, and
the foolishness of the suspect's choice when viewed in
retrospect, are not matters of constitutional concern.

	"[T]he Constitution is not offended when criminal
suspects make foolish decisions that do not promote
their self-interest.  Since Miranda does not bar the
police from using deceit and trickery to gain suspects'
confidence once they have waived their rights, the
police are free to play a confidence game in which
their eventual betrayal of that trust generates non-coerced incriminating admissions."  Arenella, n 1 ante
at 382 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).

	For an assessment of the problems that surround modern
pschological methods of police interrogation, despite police
observance of Miranda warning requirements, see Richard A. Leo
and Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: 
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of
Psychological Interrogation, 88 J Crim L & Criminology 429
(1998); Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception:  The Changing
Nature of Police Interrogation in America, 18 Crime, L & Soc
Change 35 (1992).

14. 	The three prevailing judicial standards for testing the
adequacy of the invocation of the right to counsel during police
interrogation are discussed, with citations to relevant
authorities, in Ainsworth, n 4 ante at 301-15; Comment, Davis v.
United States: "Maybe I Should Talk to a Lawyer" Means Maybe
Miranda is Unraveling, 23 Pepp L Rev 607, 618-25 (1996); Comment,
How Do You Get a Lawyer Around Here?  The Ambiguous Invocation of
a Defendant's Right to Counsel Under Miranda v. Arizona, 79 Marq
L Rev 1041, 1049-57 (1996); Note, So You Kinda, Sorta, Think You
Might Need a Lawyer?:  Ambiguous Requests for Counsel After Davis
v. United States, 49 Ark L Rev 275, 282-84 (1996); Comment,
Ambiguous or Equivocal Requests for Counsel in Custodial
Interrogations after Davis v. United States, 81 Iowa L Rev 161
(1995); Comment, Criminal Procedure:  United States Supreme Court
Adopts the Threshold of Clarity Standard for Ambiguous Requests
for Counsel, 46 Fla L Rev 483, 486-93 (1994).

15. 	In Davis v. United States, 512 US 452, 114 S Ct 2350,
129 L Ed 2d 362 (1994), the United States Supreme Court approved
the admission of a suspect's statements to law enforcement
officers in an interview after the officers clarified that,
despite an ambiguous invocation of the right to counsel, the
suspect desired to continue without a lawyer.  A five-member
majority indicated that the police were not required to ask
clarifying questions in this context, because the suspect's
invocation was ambiguous.  Davis, 512 US at 459-62.  Because the
officers had sought clarification of the suspect's intention
before continuing the interrogation, the latter view expressed by
the Davis majority appears to be dictum.      

16. 	See n 7 ante (listing reviews that cite pertinent
authorities).  The concurring opinion of Justice Souter in Davis 
reports that state court authority and pre-Davis federal court
authority were "lopsided" in favor of the clarification approach,
512 US at 466 n 1, and that, in the Davis case, the clarification
approach was supported by national organizations representing
chiefs of police, district attorneys, and sheriffs, as well as
the United States Department of Justice.  512 US at 467 n 2.  

17. 		"Although the terms 'ambiguous' and
'equivocal' are generally used
interchangeably in the case law addressing
this issue, they should be distinguished. 
Properly speaking, a statement is ambiguous
if the addressee is unsure which of two or
more interpretations to adopt to understand
the meaning of an utterance; the statement is
equivocal if the speaker is uncertain or
ambivalent about what he or she really means
to say.  Ambiguity is judged by the effect on
the listener, whereas equivocality is
assessed by the intent of the speaker."

Ainsworth, n 4 ante at 299 n 203.  I, too, use the terms
"ambiguous" and "equivocal" interchangeably to refer to a
statement that plausibly may invoke the right to silence or to
counsel, but need not necessarily be construed in that manner.