Title: Miller v. City of Charlotte

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

219 S.E.2d 62 (1975)
288 N.C. 475
Louise MILLER
v.
CITY OF CHARLOTTE, a Municipal Corporation.
No. 64.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
November 5, 1975.
*64 Casey, Daly & Bennett, P. A., by Walter H. Bennett, Jr., Charlotte, for plaintiff-appellant.
Office of the City Atty. by H. Michael Boyd, Charlotte, for defendant-appellee.
MOORE, Justice.
The sole question presented by this appeal is: Did the trial court err in dismissing plaintiff's action on the ground that plaintiff filed notice of claim with the city manager rather than the city council, as required by the Charlotte City Charter? The Court of Appeals held not. We disagree.
The general rule in North Carolina on municipal tort notice requirements is stated *65 in Carter v. Greensboro, 249 N.C. 328, 106 S.E.2d 564 (1959), as follows: "Ordinarily, the giving of timely notice is a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action, and nonsuit is proper unless the plaintiff alleges and proves notice. [Citations omitted] ...."
Special notice requirements have been justified on the following grounds: (1) To give municipal authorities an early opportunity to investigate such claims while the evidence is fresh, so as to prevent fraud and imposition; (2) to inform defendant of all the facts upon which plaintiff's claim for damages was founded; (3) to enable defendant, after an investigation of the claim within the time fixed by statute to determine whether it should admit liability and undertake to adjust and settle said claim; (4) to prevent additional accidents by allowing the public entity a chance to take precautionary and corrective measures; and (5) to aid in establishing fiscal planning and budgeting based on potential liabilities. Perry v. High Point, 218 N.C. 714, 12 S.E.2d 275 (1940); Peacock v. Greensboro, 196 N.C. 412, 146 S.E. 3 (1928); Pender v. Salisbury, 160 N.C. 363, 76 S.E. 228 (1912); 56 Am. Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations § 686, p. 730; 52 N.C.L.Rev. 930 (1974).
We have held, however, that substantial compliance with pre-suit notice requirements is all that is required. In Graham v. Charlotte, 186 N.C. 649, 120 S.E. 466 (1923), the Court, citing 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 2718 [now 16 McQuillin, § 53.163], stated: "`... [A] substantial compliance with the statute is all that is required, and the notice need not be drawn with the technical nicety necessary in pleading." "This statement was approved in Webster v. Charlotte, 222 N.C. 321, 22 S.E.2d 900 (1942), and Peacock v. Greensboro, supra. See also Dennis v. Albemarle, 242 N.C. 263, 87 S.E.2d 561 (1955); 56 Am. Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations § 687, pp. 731-32.
In Perry v. High Point, supra, a notice of a claim against the city, addressed to the mayor and city council, the statutorily designated recipients, was delivered to the city manager. Since no notice of claim for damages had been given the mayor or the city council, the council refused to recognize or consider the claim. This Court held that delivery of notice to the city manager was sufficient. Justice Schenck, speaking for the Court, stated:
Accord, Penix v. City of St. Johns, 354 Mich. 259, 92 N.W.2d 332 (1958). Other jurisdictions are in accord, requiring only substantial compliance with municipal tort notice statutes. E. g., Heller v. City of Virginia Beach, 213 Va. 683, 194 S.E.2d 696 (1973); Vermeer v. Sneller, 190 N.W.2d 389 (Iowa 1971); Meredith v. City of Melvindale, 381 Mich. 572, 165 N.W.2d 7 (1969).
Two courts have specifically addressed the issue of whether substantial compliance should be required only as relates to the form and content of the notice itself or also as it relates to the manner of service on proper officials. Seifert v. City of Minneapolis, 298 Minn. 35, 213 N.W.2d 605 (1973); Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis, 253 Ind. 472, 255 N.E.2d 225 (1970). Both courts found no logical distinction between the two categories. The Indiana tribunal continued:
The substantial compliance doctrine and other issues concerning municipal tort notice statutes are discussed in 60 Cornell L.Rev. 417 (1975); 23 Drake L.Rev. 670 (1974); and 46 Ind.L.J. 428 (1970-71).
In the present case, the contents of the notice are clearly sufficient to meet the requirements of the charter. Only the giving of notice to the city manager rather than the city council is questioned.
The city manager is the operating head of the city. Section 4.21 of the Charlotte City Charter, in part, provides:
Section 4.23 of the Charlotte City Charter provides:
Here, the city manager, well within the time required by the charter, received notice of plaintiff's injury, in writing, stating the date, time and place of the happening of such injury and the manner in which the injury was received. The city manager acknowledged receipt of the notice of this claim and advised plaintiff's attorney that it was being forwarded to the city attorney for his study and recommendation. On 4 August 1970, the assistant city attorney wrote the plaintiff's attorney requesting additional information as to the monetary *67 value of plaintiff's claim and copies of the medical bills incurred.
On 6 August 1970, plaintiff's attorney answered the assistant city attorney, again outlining the injuries to Mrs. Miller, together with his evaluation of the monetary value of the claim, and stating that he would supply the medical bills at a later date. Thus, long before the ninety-day period in which a notice of claim was required to be filed under the city charter, the city manager, the chief administrative officer of the city, and the city attorney had full and complete information concerning plaintiff's injury and claim. Later, the plaintiff's lawyer furnished the city attorney the statement of medical expenses incurred by reason of the plaintiff's injuries. Thereafter, the assistant city attorney advised plaintiff's attorney:
On 6 April 1971, plaintiff's attorney was advised by the assistant city attorney that upon his recommendation the council had denied payment of the claim for lack of notice. The city relies upon Johnson v. City of Winston-Salem, 282 N.C. 518, 193 S.E.2d 717 (1973). In that case, the ordinance of Winston-Salem required that:
The evidence in that case disclosed that employees of the city sewer department and of the city's claim department had immediate notice of the plaintiffs' damages and the cause of such damages. Such notice was acquired by observation of these city employees and discussion between them, the city attorney and the plaintiff. No written notice was filed until 8 October 1970, more than nine months after the damage was incurred. On that date, the plaintiff wrote the mayor as follows:
The Winston-Salem ordinance required that the claim or demand be presented to the board of aldermen or the mayor, in writing, within ninety days. No written notice was given to any city employee or official that the plaintiff in that case had sustained any damage for nearly nine months after the damage was incurred. Even though, no claim or demand was presented to the board of aldermen or mayor. As one law review article has pointed out, "... actual notice by the city of circumstances surrounding an injury is not notice that the injured person intends to present a claim for damages," and therefore the city is not afforded an opportunity to properly investigate and prepare its course of action. 46 Ind.L.J., supra, at 438.
In the case under review, the city manager and the city attorney had written, formal notice within thirty days after plaintiff was injured that she expected the city to compensate her for her injuries. Thus, on *68 the facts, the case at bar is distinguishable from Johnson v. City of Winston-Salem, supra.
We note that Chapter 58 of the 1975 Session Laws amended the Charter of the City of Charlotte to allow notice of claim to be given "to the City Council or mayor, City Manager and/or City Attorney ...," and that Chapter 361 of the 1975 Session Laws enacted a new Statewide statute, G.S. 1-55.1, to provide, "... A person with a claim against a city arising in tort or contract must give written notice of the claim to the council or its designee within six months, and commence his action within two years, after the claim is due or the cause of action arises...." Thus, it is clear that the General Assembly recognizes that notice of a claim filed with a responsible official of a city, such as the city manager or the city attorney, or other designee of the council, is sufficient. Admittedly, these statutes are not applicable to the present case, but they do indicate the legislative intent to broaden rather than further restrict the officials to whom notice of claim may be given.
In the present case had the notice of plaintiff's claim gone directly to the city council, undoubtedly it would have been referred by the council to the city manager for investigation and recommendation. The city manager, in turn, would have referred it to the city attorney. Hence, we hold that when written notice of plaintiff's claim was filed with the city manager within the time prescribed by the city charter, referred by him to the city attorney, and subsequently presented to the city council by the city attorney, the requirements of notice under Section 9.01 of the Charter of the City of Charlotte were substantially and reasonably met and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's action.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court with direction that it be remanded to the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County for trial in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.