Title: WATTERS v. STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WATTERS v. STATE OF WYOMING2004 WY 155101 P.3d 908Case Number: 03-80Decided: 12/07/2004NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
 

 

 

OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                
   

 

JAMES 
CHARLES WATTERS,

 

Appellant

(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee

(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina 
N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument presented by Ms. 
Kerin.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. 
Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Neil D. Skousen and Eric 
Phillips, Student Interns.  Argument 
presented by Mr. Phillips.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

HILL, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      James Charles 
Watters (Watters) appeals a conviction for first-degree sexual assault for the 
infliction of sexual intrusion on a victim, his foster daughter (TD), whom he 
knew or reasonably should have known was incapable of appraising the nature of 
her conduct because of a mental illness, deficiency or developmental 
disability.  Watters alleges error 
in the failure of the trial court to require the presence of the victim at a 
taint hearing, in finding the victim competent to testify, in admitting 
photographs of explicit sexual conduct between him and the victim pursuant to 
W.R.E. 404(b), and in excluding evidence of the victim's prior sexual activity 
with persons other than him.  He 
also claims an abuse of discretion in the term of sentence imposed.  Finding no error, we 
affirm.

 

[¶2]      In his brief, 
Watters sets forth five issues:

I.                     
Whether 
the trial court erred in not requiring the victim, TD, to be present for a taint 
hearing?

 

II.                   
Whether 
the trial court erred in finding TD competent to testify at 
trial?

 

III.                  
Whether 
the trial court erred in allowing evidence under W.R.E. 
404(b)?

 

IV.               
Whether 
the trial court erred in refusing to allow evidence pertaining to the prior 
sexual activity of TD, thus prohibiting [Watters] from fully presenting his 
defense of capacity to consent?

 

V.                 
Whether 
the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing [Watters] to 24 to 34 years 
in the Wyoming State Penitentiary for this crime?

 

The 
State substantially concurs with Watters' statement of the 
issues.

 

[¶3]      TD suffers from 
severe mental and developmental disabilities.  She has a full scale Intelligence 
Quotient of 59.  TD is unable to 
live by herself because she needs constant supervision in order to properly 
perform even basic life skills such as personal hygiene.  Her condition is severe enough that she 
is qualified for a Medicaid waiver and other social services.  TD was nine or ten years old when she 
went to live with a foster family, the Watters, in Glenrock, Wyoming.  She lived with Watters, who was a police 
officer, and Watters' wife Denise and their four biological children.  TD lived with the Watters family until 
she turned twenty-one years old, when she moved into the Options Group Home in 
Casper, Wyoming.  Watters and his 
wife were appointed guardians and conservators for TD after she turned 
twenty-one.

 

[¶4]      In April of 2002, 
Watters and his wife separated, and he moved out of the marital home.  On April 20th, Denise Watters discovered photographs on their 
computer that explicitly depicted Watters and TD engaging in sexual 
conduct.  She reported the discovery 
to her daughter, whose husband was a Casper police officer.  The computer hard drive was turned over 
to the police.

 

[¶5]      Four days later, 
Watters visited TD at the group home.  
Upon seeing Watters approach the house, TD ran to her basement 
bedroom.  TD was "scared that he was 
going to do something" but she failed to lock the door to her bedroom. Watters 
entered the bedroom, told TD to remove her pants, and engaged in sexual 
intercourse with her.  Watters and 
TD then went upstairs, and he obtained permission from the group home supervisor 
for TD to go with him to pick up a washing machine.  Watters and TD left the group home in 
his truck.  After picking up the 
washing machine, Watters dropped TD off at Liberty Baptist Church, where the 
group home supervisor said she would meet TD.  However, the group home supervisor was 
unable to go the church, so TD was returned to the group home by the pastor's 
wife.  Immediately after TD returned 
to the group home, she called her mother and informed her of what Watters had 
done.

 

[¶6]      Watters 
subsequently was charged with one count of first-degree sexual assault in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2003)1 and, in the alternative, one count 
of second-degree sexual assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(vi) 
(LexisNexis 2003).2  After a jury trial, Watters was 
convicted on the first-degree sexual assault charge.3  Watters was sentenced to a term of not 
less than 288 months nor more than 408 months in the State 
penitentiary.

 

[¶7]      Additional facts 
will be noted in our discussion below as relevant to the specific issues raised 
by Watters.

 

 

[¶8]      Prior to trial, 
Watters moved for a competency and a taint hearing pursuant to Larsen v. 
State, 686 P.2d 583 (Wyo. 1984) and Alicia v. State, 13 P.3d 693 
(Wyo. 2000).  The district court 
granted the motions and scheduled a combined competency/taint hearing for 
September 9, 2002.  On September 
6th, Watters filed a motion to continue the taint portion of the 
hearing stating that he had been unable to locate two police officers and serve 
them with subpoenas.  Watters 
presented that motion orally to the district court at the commencement of the 
September 9th hearing.  
The district court ruled that it would proceed with the competency 
hearing and continue the taint part of the hearing to September 
13th.  The court stated, 
however, that any evidence or argument related to the question of taint could be 
presented during the competency hearing if a party desired.  Neither party presented any evidence 
related to taint during the competency hearing.  The district court concluded that TD was 
competent to testify subject to consideration of the evidence on how any taint 
may have affected her ability to testify truthfully at 
trial.

 

[¶9]      The taint hearing 
resumed on September 13th.  
At the outset, Watters complained that the victim, TD, was not present 
and that he needed her testimony.  
The district court noted that it did not want to reschedule the taint 
hearing again because the trial was set for the following Monday, September 
16th.  The court further 
noted that TD had been present in court for the competency hearing, and Watters 
had made no mention that he needed her testimony at the taint 
hearing:

But 
my view of what was initially set by me was the competency portion of what I 
said I would hold as a joint hearing. I ordered that [TD] be here on the 
9th [for the competency hearing].  She was here.  She participated with my inquiry of her 
on the record.  And after that, I 
was ready, willing, and able to undertake hearing on other evidence the defense 
may have.  There was no mention of 
the need for her as a witness on that day, or we could have proceeded.  I presume that in granting the defense 
motion for a continuance, that if they needed to have her here as a witness 
today, they needed to have her here by subpoena, by stipulation of [the 
prosecutor], by some other process.  
And I don't think I can continue the hearing any further, because we've 
got to start the trial up on Monday morning.  And I don't even hear a request for 
continuance.  I'm not sure what the 
request really is that I'm being asked to rule on.

 

Watters 
requested a continuance at that point but the district court did not rule on the 
motion and proceeded with the hearing.  
At the conclusion of the hearing, Watters' counsel stated that he had no 
more evidence to produce.  The court 
then ruled that there was no evidence showing that TD had been 
tainted.

 

[¶10]   Watters argues that the district 
court erred by not granting his motion to require the victim's presence at the 
taint hearing.  He contends that the 
very nature of the hearing  to determine whether the victim's testimony was 
tainted by suggestive or coercive interview techniques or other improper 
influences  mandated the witness' presence.  By denying Watters an opportunity to 
question TD, he insists that the district court could not make a determination 
of whether her testimony was tainted.  
Watters claims that the alleged error is sufficient to support reversal 
of his conviction and a remand for a new trial.

 

[¶11]   The remedy requested by Watters at 
the taint hearing was for a continuance.

The 
grant or denial of a motion for continuance is a discretionary ruling.  Clearwater v. State, 2 P.3d 548, 
553 (Wyo. 2000).  We, therefore, 
review the trial court's ruling on [the defendant's] motion for continuance for 
abuse of discretion.  The ultimate 
question in determining whether an abuse of discretion has occurred is whether 
the trial court reasonably could have concluded as it did.  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 
151 (Wyo. 1998).  Review of a 
court's discretionary ruling on a continuance motion is highly dependent upon 
individual facts and circumstances.  
Cardenas v. State, 811 P.2d 989, 994 (Wyo. 1991).  The party attacking the court's ruling 
bears the burden of establishing the abuse of discretion.  Id.

 

Sincock 
v. State, 
2003 WY 115, ¶ 25, 76 P.3d 323, ¶ 25 (Wyo. 
2003).

 

[¶12]   At the commencement of the 
competency hearing, the district court had granted Watters' motion to continue 
the taint part of the hearing.  
However, the court explicitly informed the parties that if they could 
produce any evidence or argument related to the question of taint during the 
course of the competency hearing, they should do so.  The victim was present at the competency 
hearing and was sworn in as a witness.  
Watters made no effort to question her regarding taint.  It appears that Watters simply assumed 
that TD would be present when the taint hearing resumed four days later.  Watters had the duty to ensure the 
presence at the hearing of any witnesses from whom he desired to take 
testimony.  The burden of producing 
a witness for his defense rested with Watters.  Montez v. State, 670 P.2d 694, 699 (Wyo. 1983); see also Caton v. State, 709 P.2d 1260, 1266-67 fn. 7 
(Wyo. 1985).  The taint hearing was 
held on a Friday.  The trial was 
scheduled to begin on the following Monday.4  Under these circumstances, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Watters' motion for a 
continuance.

 

[¶13]   Further, Watters fails to explain 
in his brief how the district court's ruling prejudiced him.  At trial, Watters admitted that he had a 
sexual relationship with TD and that they had engaged in intercourse at the 
group home on April 24, 2002.  The 
issues in dispute during trial were whether the victim had the capacity to 
consent and whether Watters used a position of authority to force the victim to 
submit.  Thus, the question of 
whether the victim's statements were tainted by suggestive or coercive interview 
techniques or some other improper influence was no longer at issue during the 
trial because Watters admitted the truth of those statements.  Consequently, it is difficult to see how 
the court's ruling could have had any effect on the fairness of Watters' 
trial.  Since Watters fails to even 
make an attempt at explaining how this ruling prejudiced his right to a fair 
trial, we need not consider his claim of error any 
further.

 

[¶14]   Everyone is competent to be a 
witness except as otherwise provided by the Wyoming Rules of Evidence.  W.R.E. 601; English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 145 (Wyo. 1999).

"A 
person is generally competent to testify if he can understand, receive, remember 
and narrate impressions and is sensible to the obligations of the oath taken 
before testifying." [Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1199 (Wyo. 1997)]; 
Larsen v. State, 686 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo. 1984). "Intelligence, not age, 
is the guiding criteria in determining the competency of a witness." Baum v. 
State, 745 P.2d 877, 879 (Wyo. 1987).  
It is a well-established principle of law that competency of witnesses to 
testify is a question within the sound discretion of the trial court.  Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222, 
655 P.2d 342, 347 (1982); People v. Estorga, 200 Colo. 78, 612 P.2d 520, 
524 (1980); State v. Joblin, 107 Idaho 351, 689 P.2d 767, 771 (1984); 
State v. Howard, 247 Mont. 370, 806 P.2d 1038, 1039 (1991).  However, when children are called into 
the courtroom to testify, we have held that once the child's competency is 
called into question by either party, it is the duty of the court 
to make an independent examination of the child to determine competency, and 
that determination will not be disturbed unless shown to be clearly 
erroneous.  Burt v. Burt, 48 
Wyo. 19,41 P.2d 524, 525 (1935) (quoting 5 Jones Commentaries on Evidence 
3958, 3959, § 2107 (2d. Ed.)).  
See also Punches v. State, 944 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Wyo. 1997); 
Trujillo v. State, 880 P.2d 575, 579 (Wyo. 1994); Baum, 745 P.2d  
at 879; and Larsen, 686 P.2d  at 585.

 

We 
have directed the district courts to utilize a five-part test for determining 
the competency of child witnesses:

"(1) 
an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand; (2) 
the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is to 
testify, to receive an accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to 
retain an independent recollection of the occurrence; (4) the capacity to 
express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to 
understand simple questions about it."

 

Larsen, 
686 P.2d  at 585 (quoting State v. Allen, 70 Wash. 2d 690, 424 P.2d 1021 
(1967)).

 

English, 
982 P.2d  at 145 (emphasis in original).  
Although TD was twenty-one years of age at the time of the charged 
incident, both parties agree that the analysis for determining the competency of 
a child should apply here given her mental disabilities.  A direct comparison between the mental 
capacities of a child and mentally disabled adult cannot be precise, but we 
agree that the competency considerations applicable to a child witness are the 
appropriate criteria for determining the testimonial competency of a mentally 
disabled adult given their similarities.  
See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 552 A.2d 1064, 1067-69 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1988).

 

[¶15]   Initially, Watters posits that the 
issue of competency "encompassed both [the victim's] ability to testify and her 
legal capability to have consented, or withheld consent, to the sexual activity 
in question."  He claims that the 
State's position was contradictory:

 

Because 
of the way in which it charged the offense, citing W.S. § 6-2-302(a)(iv), the 
state was faced with the problem of having to prove that Mr. Watters knew or 
should have known that TD was "incapable of appraising the nature" of her 
conduct (engaging in sex with him) while simultaneously showing that this same 
"incapable" person had a sufficiently independent and reliable recall of events 
occurring months before trial to convict Mr. Watters of a very serious 
crime.

 

Counterintuitive 
as it is to consider that a complaining witness can be sufficiently mentally 
challenged to place her in a specially protected category of victims and at the 
same time as competent as any other person to supply (uncorroborated) linchpin 
testimony, that is what the state was faced with.

 

Watters 
complains that the trial court did not consider the "incongruity" of the State's 
position and that it "proceeded to actually only determine the witness's 
capacity to testify at trial."

 

[¶16]   Watters' argument conflates two 
distinct concepts.  The question of 
a witness's competency to testify is one determined by the trial judge.  English, 982 P.2d  at 145.  The question of a victim's competency to 
consent to sexual activity is one determined by the jury because it is an 
element of the crime charged.  
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(iv).  The trial court "only" determined TD's 
competency to testify at trial because that was the only question that was 
within its purview to answer.  
Furthermore, Watters' attack upon the State's position that the victim 
was competent to testify at trial, but not to consent to sexual activity, cannot 
withstand scrutiny.  In his brief, 
Watters states that the victim functioned at the level of a sixth grader.  The State's argument is that TD is the 
equivalent of a child witness.  We 
do not find it unreasonable or "counterintuitive" for the State to argue that a 
person who functions at the level of a sixth grader is competent to testify but 
does not possess the capacity to consent to sexual relations. 

 

[¶17]   Watters goes on to contend that the 
trial court failed to allow a full and fair competency hearing.  He complains that at the competency 
hearing, the examination of TD by the district court merely consisted of leading 
questions that did nothing to elicit anything other than a willingness on the 
part of the victim to please an authority figure like the judge.  Watters insists that the trial court 
just recited the factors set out in English to determine witness 
competence without revealing specific facts upon which its conclusion of 
competency rested.  Watters alleges 
prejudice from the district court's erroneous conclusion in that the jury was 
asked to reach the critical conclusion that consent did not exist on April 24, 
2002, based entirely upon the unreliable, uncorroborated testimony of TD, an 
incompetent witness with a low IQ, diminished mental age, impaired memory, and a 
pronounced desire to please her questioners. 

 

[¶18]   The transcript of the competency 
hearing supports the trial court's ruling.  
At the outset of the hearing, TD acknowledged that an oath was a promise 
to tell the truth and that she was willing to take one.  TD's answers were generally responsive 
to the questions asked.  She was 
able to give correct replies to general information questions asking for her 
name, age, and the address of the group home where she lived.  In response to questions about the 
incident on April 24th, TD was able to give 
responses that exhibited an ability to recall the incident and express it in a 
coherent manner:  She identified the 
people present at the home at the time of the incident, what happened between 
her and Watters, and that she contacted her mother after the incident.  Contrary to Watters' assertion, we find 
that the record reveals that the trial court did not just gloss over the factors 
set out in English; rather, it specifically referenced its examination of 
TD.  We also perceive Watters' 
allegation of prejudice to go toward witness credibility and the weight to be 
accorded to the victim's testimony and not to her competency to take the stand 
to testify.  Kavanaugh v. 
State, 769 P.2d 908, 911 (Wyo. 1989) (weight and credibility of a witness's 
testimony is determined by the jury). Our review of the record leads to the 
conclusion that the trial court's decision that TD was competent to testify was 
not clearly erroneous and was within the court's sound 
discretion.

 

Admission 
of Evidence Pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b)

[¶19]   On August 1, 2002, the State filed 
a Notice of Intent to Use Evidence in response to a Demand for Notice of Intent 
to Introduce Evidence under 404(b) filed by Watters.  The State indicated that TD would 
testify about sexual contact with Watters that took place at the family home in 
Glenrock in Converse County from December of 2000 until May of 2001.  TD would also testify that Watters had 
taken explicit photographs of them engaged in sexual activity and that he had 
shown her those pictures on his computer.  
The State intended to offer TD's testimony and the photographs for the 
following purposes:

 

To 
show a course of conduct or pattern of sexual abuse, to show motive, to place 
the offense in its proper setting and to properly understand the context of the 
charged offenses, to support the credibility of the victim and corroborate her 
testimony, and to overcome defense claim of fabrication or improper motive * * * 
[.]

 

Watters 
objected to the proposed evidence, and the trial court considered the matter 
during a motions hearing on August 13, 2002.  At the hearing, the State emphasized 
that TD's testimony about her sexual relationship with Watters prior to the 
incident on April 24, 2002, was relevant and admissible pursuant to W.R.E. 
404(b) to show a course of conduct and a pattern of sexual abuse.  The State asserted that the photographic 
evidence was admissible to corroborate that testimony.

 

[¶20]   The State also noted that the 
second-degree sexual assault charge required a showing that Watters was in a 
position of authority over TD, which he used to cause her to submit.  The State argued that the testimony was 
relevant to establish the context necessary to prove that element of the charged 
crime.  On August 26, 2002, the 
trial court issued an order admitting TD's proposed testimony and the 
photographs pursuant to Rule 404(b).  
The court noted that the proposed testimony of TD was properly 
characterized as "course of conduct evidence, which is admissible to give the 
jury a complete story when it is relevant and necessary to tell the complete 
story for the jury's understanding.'"  
Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 28, 31 (Wyo. 1999).  The trial court also cited identity as a 
proper purpose before concluding that the probative value of the evidence 
outweighed any prejudicial effect.5  At trial, TD testified about the prior 
sexual acts in Glenrock and described the explicit photographs taken by Watters 
of them engaging in sex.  Over 
Watters' objection, the trial court admitted all but one of the photos.6

 

[¶21]   On appeal, Watters reiterates his 
objection to TD's testimony and the photographs.  He complains that the State used a 
"shotgun" approach but that none of the proffered reasons for admission made any 
sense in the context of this case.  
Watters did not deny that he had sexual intercourse with TD on April 24, 
2002, at the group home.  
Accordingly, he argues that the 404(b) evidence was not relevant because 
it did not help determine whether TD had the capacity to consent to sex.  Watters insists that the evidence was 
not necessary to bolster TD's credibility either, since he did not make that an 
issue.  He claims that the State's 
true motive for getting this evidence before the jury was to argue 
character.  Watters points to two 
excerpts from the State's closing argument that he describes as "thinly veiled" 
improper character argument:

 

Now, 
not only the pictures and the photographs, what other evidence do you have that 
tells you what we know about this man?  What tells you that [Watters] knew his 
behavior was wrong?  The testimony 
that you have at your disposal for that, those photographs again.  There's no face. There's no heads.  Why is that? You think maybe he's trying 
to hide the identity in taking those photographs?  If it's a sweet, loving relationship, 
you just take pictures of two people holding each other or kissing.  Because these are pictures of sexual 
acts, that is an indication to you ladies and gentlemen of using an 
individual.  That's what that tells 
you.

 

            
.

 

Now, 
[defense counsel] indicated that we totally didn't talk about April 
24th, 2002, and the only thing that we wanted to talk about was 
Converse County.  But Converse 
County and what happened over there is primarily what happened through the 
whole 11 years of [TD's] life. (Sic). And that's what we're talking 
about here is who she is as a person.  
Because that's what they're trying to defend, that she was a consenting 
adult that could have a consensual relationship.

 

But 
we go back in history and tell you what kind of person she is.  And that's why it's relevant.  And then what was going on in that house 
over in Glenrock is relevant too because it shows you what [Watters] was 
doing with her, not a loving, consensual relationship, but using her for his own 
sexual gratification.  (emphasis 
by Watters).

 

Similarly, 
Watters argues that the photographs of his sexual conduct with TD were not 
probative of any element of the crime charged and were highly prejudicial 
because their explicit nature could only inflame the jury. 

 

[¶22]   The admission of evidence under 
Rule 404(b) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, 
¶ 18, 57 P.3d 332, ¶ 18 (Wyo. 2002).

 

We 
have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question 
of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice.  Griswold v. State, 2001 WY 14, 
¶ 7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶ 7 (Wyo. 2001).  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  Id.  "In the absence of an abuse of 
discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination." 
Id.  The burden is on the 
defendant to establish such abuse. Trujillo [v. State], 2 P.3d [567] at 
571 [(Wyo. 2000)].

 

Gleason, 
at ¶ 29 (quoting Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, ¶ 25 (Wyo. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 994, 122 S. Ct. 1554, 152 L. Ed. 2d 477 (2002)).

 

[¶23]   The State offered several purposes 
for admitting TD's testimony regarding the prior sexual acts with Watters that 
took place in Converse County.  At 
the motions hearing, the State focused on two of those purposes in 
particular:  course of conduct and 
bolstering TD's credibility.  The 
trial court agreed and admitted the testimony on this basis along with a finding 
that the evidence was probative of identity.  We agree with the trial court.  As the trial court noted, evidence is 
admissible to show course of conduct if it will present the jury with a complete 
story:

 

"* 
* * The testimony does not bear upon separate criminal occurrences or bad 
acts.  Rather, it is helpful to 
explain what happened between appellant and his victim, and is integral to 
understanding the context of the crime charged.  In some jurisdictions it is 
defined as the evidence of the context of the offense and consequently 
admissible with the reasoning that events do not occur in a vacuum and the jury 
has the right to have the offense placed in its proper setting.'" (Emphasis in 
original; citations omitted).

 

Miller 
v. State, 
755 P.2d 855, 861 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 
1044 (Wyo. 1987)). 

 

[¶24]   At trial, TD described how Watters 
appeared at the group home on the evening of April 24, 2002.  TD was eating dinner when she observed 
Watters approaching.  TD testified 
that she was scared because she was afraid that Watters was "going to do 
something."  TD ran downstairs to 
her bedroom to avoid Watters.  
However, she forgot to lock her door.  Watters entered the room and "sweet 
talked" TD into doing something she testified that she did not want to do  have 
sexual intercourse.  The testimony 
from TD regarding her prior sexual contact with Watters explained her 
actions:  It told the jury why she 
was scared and why she tried to avoid Watters.  The incident on April 24th did not happen in a vacuum  it was a direct 
outgrowth of the prior incidents.  
Even if Watters admitted that the incident at the group home occurred, 
the State was still entitled to present its case to the jury.  TD's testimony regarding the prior 
sexual incidents was short and concise  TD simply stated that Watters had 
engaged in sexual conduct with her while they lived at the Watters' marital home 
in Glenrock without describing the nature of the sexual conduct in any detail 
mitigating much of the prejudicial affect of the 
testimony.

 

[¶25]   TD's testimony was also relevant to 
the second-degree sexual assault charge against Watters.  That charge alleged that Watters was in 
a position of authority over TD and that he used that position to cause her to 
submit.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-303(a)(iv).  In Humphrey v. 
State, 962 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1998), the defendant was charged with 
second-degree sexual assault on his daughter who lived with him, his wife, and 
two "spiritual" wives.  The district 
court admitted testimony under Rule 404(b) relating to the defendant's 
relationship with his extended family, including instances of death threats, 
sexual encounters with the women in the household, and the strict discipline 
that was imposed by the defendant.  
Id. at 870.  We 
affirmed, concluding that the evidence was properly admitted to show course of 
conduct:

 

We 
have repeatedly stated that a defendant's uncharged misconduct is admissible to 
demonstrate a course of conduct which clarifies what happened between an accused 
and the victim or serves to enhance the natural development of the facts. 
[Citations omitted].

 

The 
relevance of the evidence is equally patent.  In this case, an essential element of 
the charged offenses required the State to show that Humphrey used his position 
of authority to cause the victim to submit.  We agree with the district court that 
testimony illustrating the family dynamics to which this victim was subjected 
was clearly relevant to show Humphrey's abuse of 
authority.

 

Humphrey, 
952 P.2d. at 871.  As in 
Humphrey, TD's testimony was relevant to the question of whether Watters 
had used his authority over her to cause submission.  Under the circumstances, we cannot find 
an abuse of discretion.

 

[¶26]   In addition to TD's testimony, the 
trial court admitted four photographs that graphically depicted sexual conduct 
between Watters and the victim.  The 
photographs did not depict the face of either party, but TD's doctor testified 
that he could identify her from distinctive scars on her body caused by a 
childhood water-scalding incident.

 

[¶27]   At trial, Watters argued that his 
sexual relationship with the victim was a loving, consensual one. The State 
countered that Watters was using his position of authority over the victim as 
her foster father/guardian to exploit her for sexual gratification. The 
existence of the photographs tends to undercut Watters' theory and bolster the 
State's. The photographs are evidence that the motivation for the sexual 
relationship was not love but sexual gratification, a point the State made in 
its closing argument. The photographs go directly to the parties' theories of 
the case and were clearly relevant evidence.  See Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 139 (Wyo. 1981) (Photographs depicting torture of murder victim were 
admissible as they were relevant to the State's theory of the case as it 
correlated to the defendant's motive to commit the murder and making them 
circumstantial evidence of guilt.).  
The explicit nature of the photographs may have made for unpleasant or 
uneasy viewing for the jury.  
However, there is no question that they possessed significant probative 
value under the circumstances of this case, and Watters has not convinced us 
that the probative value of the photographic evidence was outweighed by any 
prejudicial affect.

 

[¶28]   Finally, as part of his argument on 
this issue, Watters pointed to two extracts from the State's closing argument at 
trial and asserted that the State used this evidence to argue guilt based upon 
his character.  Our review of the 
record indicates that the argument the State was making was not related to 
character but to the charge that Watters had caused TD to submit through abuse 
of his position of authority over her and to the relevance of the photographs as 
identifying Watters and corroborating TD's testimony about the prior sexual 
acts.  We find no error in the 
State's argument.

 

[¶29]   Prior to trial, the State filed a 
Motion Regarding Victim's Prior Sexual Conduct or Reputation seeking to exclude 
any evidence of TD's prior sexual conduct or reputation on the basis that 
Watters had not complied with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-312(a).  That statute sets out a procedure for 
the introduction of evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct or reputation in 
any prosecution for a defined set of crimes, including first- and second-degree 
sexual assault:

 

(a)   In 
any prosecution under W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-305 [6-2-304] or for any lesser 
included offense, if evidence of the prior sexual conduct of the victim, 
reputation evidence or opinion evidence as to the character of the victim is to 
be offered the following procedure shall be used:

(i)                 
A 
written motion shall be made by the defendant to the court at least ten (10) 
days prior to the trial stating that the defense has an offer of proof of the 
relevancy of evidence of the sexual conduct of the victim and its relevancy to 
the defense;

(ii)               
The 
written motion shall be accompanied by affidavits in which the offer of proof is 
stated;

(iii)             
If 
the court finds the offer of proof sufficient, the court shall order a hearing 
in chambers, and at the hearing allow the questioning of the victim regarding 
the offer of proof made by the defendant and other pertinent 
evidence;

(iv)              
At 
the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that the probative value of 
the evidence substantially outweighs the probability that its admission will 
create prejudice, the evidence shall be admissible pursuant to this 
section.  The court may make an 
order stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant, which order may 
include the nature of the questions to be permitted.

(b)   This 
section does not limit the introduction of evidence as to prior sexual conduct 
of the victim with the actor.

(c)    Any 
motion or affidavit submitted pursuant to this section is privileged information 
and shall not be released or made available for public use or scrutiny in any 
manner, including posttrial [sic] proceedings.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-312 (LexisNexis 2003).  
The trial court considered the motion at a hearing held the morning of 
trial.  Initially, defense counsel 
stated there was no intent to introduce conduct or reputation evidence.  However, he backed off that position and 
conceded that the defense did want to inquire of TD whether she had ever had 
sexual relations with her foster brother.  
Defense counsel attempted to maneuver around the prohibition of § 
6-2-312(a) by arguing that there was a note in the police report indicating that 
TD had admitted prior sexual contact with that person and, therefore, the 
inquiry went towards TD's veracity rather than her reputation.  The trial court rejected Watters' 
argument.  The court concluded that 
Watters was seeking to present conduct evidence and that he had failed to 
present a motion and affidavits for an offer of proof as required by § 
6-2-312(a).  The State's motion was 
granted, and Watters was prohibited from presenting any evidence of the prior 
sexual conduct of the victim or any reputation or opinion evidence as to her 
character.  Watters was allowed to 
make inquiries into the victim's knowledge of sex and the scope and nature of 
any sex education she may have had. 

 

[¶30]   On appeal, Watters argues that 
evidence of TD's alleged prior sexual relationship with her foster brother was 
relevant to the question of whether she had the capacity to consent and that the 
trial court erred in barring it.  
Watters' argument is fatally flawed by his assumption that defense 
counsel successfully distinguished this evidence from that generally excluded by 
§ 6-2-312.  Watters' sole reference 
in his brief to that statute reads:

 

The 
defense distinguished this type of testimony from "character" or "reputation" 
testimony such as might fall under W.S. § 6-2-312.

 

We 
agree that evidence of a sexual relationship between TD and her foster brother 
is not character evidence through reputation or opinion.  It is, however, evidence 
of prior sexual conduct.  
Section 6-2-312 is clear and unambiguous  evidence of a victim's prior 
sexual conduct and reputation or opinion evidence of their character is not 
admissible in prosecutions for first-degree, second-degree, and third-degree 
sexual assault unless a written motion accompanied by affidavits in which an 
offer of proof of the relevancy of the evidence is made at least ten days prior 
to trial and the trial court finds the offer of proof sufficient.  The statute uses the word "shall" 
indicating a legislative intent that this procedure is a mandatory prerequisite 
to the admission of this evidence.  
Heinrich v. State, 638 P.2d 641, 645-46 (Wyo. 1981).  The record shows that Watters never 
attempted to comply with the requirements of § 6-2-312 prior to seeking 
admission of the evidence.  On 
appeal, Watters argues the relevancy of this evidence to his defense but he does 
not tell us why he should be excused from complying with the statute.  Watters' argument is simply not 
responsive to the district court's ruling and is not cogent.  We decline to address it further and 
summarily affirm the trial court's decision to bar the evidence of the victim's 
alleged prior sexual conduct.

 

[¶31]   Watters was sentenced to a term of 
not less than 288 months and not more than 408 months in the state 
penitentiary.  Watters contends that 
the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed that sentence.  Watters compares his sentence to those 
imposed in other cases in which the actions of the defendants were more 
egregious and complains that his punishment was excessive since there was no 
violence involved and this was his first offense.

 

[¶32]   The sentence imposed on Watters was 
within the limits proscribed by the legislature.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306(a)(i) 
(LexisNexis 3003) ("Sexual assault in the first degree is a felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not less than five (5) years nor more than fifty (50) 
years[.]").

 

Our 
rule is, when the imposition of a criminal sentence by a trial court is within 
the limits set by the legislature, the sentence will not be overturned, absent a 
clear abuse of discretion. [Citations omitted] This is consistent with the 
common law rule, but we do maintain a window of reviewability, even when the 
trial court has imposed a legally-prescribed sentence.  Wright v. State, 670 P.2d 1090 
(Wyo. 1983).

 

This 
window of reviewability, as described in Wright, 670 P.2d  at 1092 
(quoting Scheikofsky v. State, 636 P.2d 1107, 1113 (Wyo. 1981)), 
is:

 

A 
sentence will not be disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless the 
defendant can show an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to 
him, and circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or 
conduct which offends the public sense of fair play.

 

Smith 
v. State, 
922 P.2d 846, 848 (Wyo. 1996).  
"Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously."  
Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Martin 
v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)).

 

[¶33]   We do not consider sentences 
imposed upon similarly situated defendants except in cases where the mode of 
punishment is unusual or where the relative length of the sentence to 
imprisonment is extreme when compared to the gravity of the offense.  Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, 
¶ 41, 49 P.3d 975, ¶ 41 (Wyo. 2002); Smith, 922 P.2d  at 
849.  When assessing the 
reasonableness of a sentence, consideration is given to the crime, its attendant 
circumstances, and the character of the defendant.  Smith, 922 P.2d  at 849; 
Wright, 670 P.2d  at 1092.

 

[¶34]   We conclude that the sentence 
imposed upon Watters is entirely consistent with the crime, its attendant 
circumstances, and his character.  
This is not one of those rare cases where the factors identified above 
would direct us to a comparison of other sentences for the same crime.  Watters fails to present a convincing 
argument that the relative length of his sentence was extreme when compared to 
the gravity of his crime.  Indeed, 
in making his argument, Watters ignores the position of trust he held, and 
subsequently abused, as the victim's foster parent and guardian.  At sentencing, the trial court also 
noted that Watters did not take any responsibility for his actions and their 
harmful effects on a particularly vulnerable victim nor did he express any 
remorse.  Given these circumstances, 
we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion and, accordingly, we 
will not disturb the sentence imposed.

 

[¶35]   Finding no error, we affirm 
Watters' conviction and sentence.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-302(a)(iv):

 

(a)  Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim 
commits a sexual assault in the first degree if:

            
.

(iv)  The actor knows or reasonably should know that the victim 
through a mental illness, mental deficiency or developmental disability is 
incapable of appraising the nature of the victim's 
conduct.

 

  2Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-303(a)(vi):

 

(a)  Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim 
commits sexual assault in the second degree if, under circumstances not 
constituting sexual assault in the first degree:

            
.

(vi)  The actor is in a position of authority over the victim 
and uses this position of authority to cause the victim to 
submit[.]

 

3  The charges were listed as 
alternatives.  The jury was 
instructed to consider the first-degree sexual assault charge first.  If it concluded that Watters was guilty, 
then its deliberations ended.  The 
second-degree sexual assault charge was to be considered only if a not guilty 
verdict had been reached on the first-degree sexual assault 
charge.

  4The trial was 
subsequently postponed from Monday, September 16, 2002, to October 14, 2002, 
because of an illness to one of the attorneys.  We note that Watters did not make any 
motion to reopen the taint issue in the interim.

  5The trial 
court's order simply stated, "Finally, this judge would find that the proposed 
evidence is clearly relevant, and that the probative value of the evidence is 
not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice."  There was no analysis of the factors 
considered in balancing the probative value against the potential for unfair 
prejudice.  In Gleason v. 
State, 2002 WY 161, ¶¶ 26-30, 57 P.3d 332, ¶¶ 26-30 (Wyo. 2002), 
we stated that "a bald statement that probative value outweighs prejudicial 
effect will no longer be sufficient" and that a trial court must explain on the 
record why the proposed evidence is more probative than prejudicial.  Id. at ¶¶ 27, 30.  We set forth the factors that the court 
should consider when making that determination.  Id. at ¶ 27.  The Gleason opinion stressed that 
the process was mandatory.  
Id. at ¶ 27.  Our 
decision in Gleason was issued on October 24, 2002, one week after the 
jury rendered its verdict in this case.  
Since the Gleason decision was not extant at the time the trial 
court had to make its decision in this case, we will review its conclusions as 
best we can using the arguments of the parties and the record.  However, we again stress that the 
process we set down in Gleason is mandatory and must be complied with in 
cases subsequent to its publication.

 

6  The court denied admission 
of one photograph that it found to be cumulative and without any additional 
probative value in light of the admission of the other 
photographs.