Title: DHW v. Jane Doe

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO   
Docket No. 46476 
 
In the Matter of: Jane Doe I and John Doe, 
Children Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. 
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
AND WELFARE, 
 
    Petitioner-Respondent, 
v. 
JANE DOE, 
    Respondent-Appellant, 
and 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM, 
    Intervenor-Respondent. 
 
 
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Boise, February 2019 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: March 14, 2019 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Lincoln County. Hon. Daniel Dolan, Magistrate Judge.   
Decree terminating parental rights, affirmed. 
Jeremy L. Pittard, Attorney at Law, Burley, for appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
_____________________________ 
 
 
BURDICK, Chief Justice. 
Jane Doe (“Mother”) appeals from a Lincoln County magistrate court’s judgment 
terminating her parental rights to her minor children. The judgment also terminated the parental 
rights of the children’s father (“Father”). He appeals in a separate action.  
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The children were placed in the custody of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
(the “Department”) following a March 2016 petition under the Child Protection Act (“CPA”). 
After the filing of the petition, the parents stipulated to an unstable home environment. In June 
2016, the magistrate court ordered the parents to follow case plans provided by the Department. 
Roughly eight months later, the State filed a motion to terminate both parents’ parental rights 
based on failure to comply with their case plans and prior neglect. After holding a trial, the 
magistrate court terminated both parents’ parental rights.  
 Mother timely appeals and argues that the Department did not make adequate efforts to 
reunify the family and that the magistrate court erred by finding that the Department’s efforts 
were reasonable. We affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This appeal concerns the termination of Mother’s parental rights to her two minor 
children. Mother and Father are the biological parents of the children. Prior to the termination 
trial, the children and parents were the subjects of a nearly two-year-long CPA proceeding. 
When the prosecutors first filed a petition under the CPA, the parents were listed with separate 
addresses, but were living together. However, the parents ended and rekindled their relationship 
at various times prior to and during the CPA proceeding. By the time of the termination trial, 
Mother and Father were permanently separated and Mother was residing with her parents at their 
home.  
The Department became involved in early March 2016 after receiving reports of drug use 
and neglect involving the minor children. Prior to this, the Department had received referrals for 
the family on two prior occasions in 2013 and 2014 for the same issues. The Department’s 
investigation revealed that both children had been born premature, exposed to drugs in-utero, and 
tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. Based on these concerns, the Lincoln County 
prosecutors filed a petition under the Child Protection Act in March 2016.  
The Lincoln County magistrate court opened a CPA proceeding and placed the children 
in the legal custody of the Department under a protective order. However, the court ordered the 
children to remain with their parents for the time being. A week later, the Department and a 
Lincoln County law-enforcement officer conducted an unannounced home visit. The visit 
revealed that the home was in a state of disarray. Mother was not “able to remain still” and “had 
what appeared to be methamphetamine sores on her face.” She admitted to no longer living at 
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home after an incident of domestic violence involving Father which the children had witnessed. 
She also stated that she had used methamphetamine within the past week and picked the children 
up afterwards. Declaring the children to be in imminent danger, the officer removed the children 
from the parents’ custody and placed them in foster care. The children were placed with the 
foster parent who ultimately would care for the children during the CPA proceeding. At the 
subsequent shelter-care hearing, the court ordered the children to remain in the Department’s 
custody. At the adjudicatory hearing a month later, both parents stipulated to an unstable home 
environment as the basis for the CPA proceedings and the children remained in the Department’s 
custody.  
About a month after the adjudicatory hearing, Mother agreed to both participate in and 
accomplish a case plan provided by the Department. The case plan contained sixteen tasks aimed 
at addressing “all original areas of concern that brought the family to the attention of the 
Department” and ensuring “the children will have a safe, stable, sanitary and drug-free home 
environment.” The Department stated its primary goal was reunification and its secondary goal 
was adoption. Mother preferred making the secondary goal guardianship with her parents rather 
than adoption. The Department explained that guardianships are disfavored because they are an 
impermanent solution. The court indicated (according to the court minutes) that “[g]uardianship 
is something to keep in mind as they work through the plan.” 
Over the next several months, the court held numerous review hearings to assess the 
parents’ progress with the case plan and the Department’s efforts to reunify the family. In her 
appellate brief, Mother admits that she failed to satisfactorily complete her case plan during this 
time: 
Suffice it to say that the Appellant recognizes that she did not complete her case 
plan. She also acknowledges that during the pendency of these proceedings she 
was a single parent who was dealing with a severe drug addiction and challenging 
mental health issues. 
During the same timeframe, the Department’s stated primary goal was reunification but 
changed the secondary goal to adoption by relative. To this end, the Department actively sought 
out and evaluated various family members as possible foster-care placements. Mother’s parents 
applied to become foster parents but were denied due to concerns about their medication use. 
They administratively appealed the Department’s decision, but the appeal was denied for failure 
to include proper medical forms. They did not appeal the Department’s decision to the district 
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court. The Department also looked into having the children’s paternal grandparents and maternal 
aunt as possible foster parents, but their applications were also denied.  
Almost a year after the children were first placed in the Department’s custody, the court 
held a permanency hearing. The Department informed the court that it was looking into whether 
the children’s great uncle was a suitable placement. In its report, the Department had changed its 
primary goal to adoption and its secondary goal to guardianship in one place, but changed the 
goals to reunification and adoption (nonrelative) in another. The Department advised the court it 
would inquire into whether the great uncle was a suitable foster parent, but would then schedule 
a POST (“Permanency Option Selection Team”) meeting. At this hearing, Mother testified and 
the court extended the disposition of the permanency hearing for 30 days in order to allow the 
parents to show improvement. However, those 30 days were extended to almost 90 days after the 
hearing was continued until June 2017.  
Days after the court originally extended the permanency hearing, the Department filed a 
petition to terminate parental rights. The Department notified the court that its attempts to 
contact the children’s great uncle were unsuccessful. The court accepted the Department’s 
recommendation for adoption as the permanent plan. The court advised the parties to prepare for 
a termination trial.  
The termination trial was delayed while the parties inquired into whether a guardian ad 
litem should be appointed for the children’s father. Mother’s parents independently filed a 
petition for guardianship of the minor children four days prior to the October trial date. The court 
then continued the October trial date due to lack of proof regarding whether the parents had been 
properly served. During the interim, the court heard the grandparents’ petition for guardianship. 
The court concluded that Idaho Code sections 16-1604 and 16-1629(8) give the Department the 
power and right to determine where and with whom the children reside. The court dismissed the 
petition because the Department did not consent to the guardianship. 
Commencing in January 2018, the termination trial was split over three days in January 
and March 2018. Mother did not testify. The parties submitted written closing arguments in July 
2018 and the court issued its memorandum decision and final judgment in October 2018.               
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Should this Court inquire into the magistrate court’s approval of the Department’s 
reasonable efforts to reunify the children with Mother on appeal of the judgment 
terminating her parental rights?  
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2. Does substantial, competent evidence support the magistrate court’s finding that 
termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children? 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under Idaho Code section 16-2005(1), a court may terminate parental rights if it finds 
that at least one of the grounds for termination is present and termination is in the best interests 
of the child. In re Doe (2014–23), 157 Idaho 920, 923, 342 P.3d 632, 635 (2015). The grounds 
for termination of parental rights must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Idaho Dep’t 
of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2016-14), 161 Idaho 596, 598, 389 P.3d 141, 143 (2016). Clear and 
convincing evidence is “evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or 
reasonably certain.” Doe I v. Doe II, 150 Idaho 46, 49, 244 P.3d 190, 193 (2010) (quoting In re 
Adoption of Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006)). 
 
However, on appeal, “this Court will not disturb the magistrate court’s decision to 
terminate parental rights if there is substantial, competent evidence in the record to support the 
decision.” Id. (citing State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 345, 144 P.3d 597, 599 (2006)). As such, 
“[f]indings are competent, so long as they are supported by substantial, albeit possibly, 
conflicting, evidence.” Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243, 246, 220 P.3d 1062, 1065 (2009) (quoting 
Roe v. Doe, 142 Idaho 174, 177, 125 P.3d 530, 533 (2005)) “Substantial, competent evidence is 
‘such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Doe, 
150 Idaho at 49, 244 P.3d at 193 (quoting Doe, 143 Idaho at 345–46, 144 P.3d at 599–600). This 
Court “must conduct an independent review of the record, ‘but must draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the magistrate court’s judgment, as the magistrate court has the 
opportunity to observe witnesses’ demeanor, to assess their credibility, to detect prejudice or 
motive and to judge the character of the parties.’” In Interest of Doe I, 163 Idaho 274, 277, 411 
P.3d 1175, 1178 (2018) (quoting In re Doe (2014-23), 157 Idaho at 923, 342 P.3d at 635).  
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The Department’s efforts at reunification and aiding a parent with a case plan 
are not relevant on appeal of the termination of parental rights.  
In her brief, Mother collapses her first four issues on appeal into a single, four-page 
argument section.1 Her brief then presents the following argument:  
                                                 
1 As set out in her brief, Mother’s issues were as follows: 
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[Mother] is asserting that Judge Dolan should have taken into account in his 
determination the Department’s reasonable reunification efforts to: (1) aid Jane Doe 
in her labors to work the CPA case plan; and (2) the department’s decision with 
whom they should place the children with during the pendency of the CPA action. 
Mother concedes that this Court has definitively held that the “inquiry into reunification efforts is 
not relevant for the court to terminate parental rights.” Dep’t of Health and Welfare v. Doe 
(2017-21), 163 Idaho 83, 96, 408 P.3d 81, 94 (2017). Nevertheless, she contends that a party 
who disagrees with a magistrate court’s decision to adopt the Department’s recommendations 
regarding reunification and placement is left without appellate recourse. So Mother asks this 
Court to “reverse its current precedent and analyze [her] due process claim by looking at the 
reasonable reunification efforts of the Department and the magistrates’ approval of those 
efforts.”  
In lieu of declining to consider mother’s issues on appeal for failure to match her 
argument to her issues2, we reformulate those issues to conform with her argument as follows: 
Should this Court inquire into the magistrate court’s approval of the 
Department’s reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with her children on appeal 
from a judgment terminating her parental rights?  
Having consolidated the issues, we will now address Mother’s arguments relating to (1) the 
placement of the children and (2) the Department’s efforts in aiding the completion of her case 
plan. 
First, Mother’s argument regarding the magistrate court’s approval of the Department’s 
placement decision is without merit. As she acknowledges, the magistrate court did not need to 
consider where the child was placed in order to properly terminate Mother’s parental rights. 
                                                                                                                                                             
1. 
Did the magistrate court err by not addressing in its termination memorandum and, in 
consequence, deciding that the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare did not violate Jane 
Doe’s due process rights by not allowing her children to be placed with family? 
2. 
Did the magistrate court err in continually determining during the course of the CPA proceeding 
that the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare had made reasonable efforts to place the 
children in the least restrictive environment to them by placing the children in foster care 
instead of with two able and willing grandparents?  
3. 
 Did the Department of Health and Welfare violate Jane Doe’s due process rights by not 
reasonably and adequately aiding her in her efforts to work the CPA case plan.   
4. 
Did the magistrate court err in approving adoption as the permanent plan as outlined in the Orders 
Approving Adoption as the Permanent Plan filed on September 21, 2017, and on June 6, 2017? 
2 See  Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) (“Regardless of whether an issue is 
explicitly set forth in the party’s brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the issue is only mentioned in passing and 
not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court.”).  
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Even if the magistrate court did consider this when it terminated Mother’s parental rights, this 
Court has made clear that “[o]nce the Department has legal custody of a child under the CPA, the 
Department and not the court has the authority to determine where the child should live.” Matter 
of Doe (2017-16), 163 Idaho 565, 570, 416 P.3d 937, 942 (2018) (citing In re Doe, 134 Idaho 
760, 767, 9 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2000)). In fact, even if the Department’s decisions were relevant to 
the termination of parental rights, those decisions are only subject to approval by the magistrate 
court. See I.C. § 16-1629(8) (“The department, having been granted legal custody of a child, 
shall have the right to determine where and with whom the child shall live . . .  all other 
determinations relating to where and with whom the child shall live shall be subject to judicial 
review by the court and, when contested by any party, judicial approval.”). This review is for the 
“limited purposes outlined in the statute.” Matter of Doe, 163 Idaho at 570, 416 P.3d at 942 
(citing In re Doe, 134 Idaho at 767, 9 P.3d at 1233 (listing purposes)).   
Mother fails to point out in the record where she contested the Department’s placement 
and why the court should have disapproved of that placement. The Department chose to place the 
children with a foster parent during the CPA proceedings after the parents stipulated to an unsafe 
home environment. The Department actively sought to place the children with their maternal 
grandparents, paternal grandparents, and a maternal great-uncle. However, finding all the 
proposed family members either unsuitable or unwilling, the Department decided to maintain 
placement with the foster parent. Even though no objection was raised below, the Department 
also expressed adequate justification for declining to pursue a guardianship with the maternal 
grandparents: (1) the Department viewed it as a disfavored option due to its impermanency; and 
(2) Mother was currently living with the maternal grandparents and she would be required to 
leave their home if a guardianship with them was put in place. Thus, even if it were relevant to 
termination, Mother makes no showing that the magistrate court abused its discretion by 
approving the placement.  
Moving on to Mother’s second argument, she is correct that this Court has held that 
inquiry into the Department’s efforts at reunification is irrelevant to the termination of parental 
rights. See In re Doe I (2017-21), 163 Idaho at 96, 408 P.3d at 94. Rather, “[r]easonable 
reunification efforts are a requirement under the Child Protective Act, which imposes a duty to 
ensure such efforts are made throughout the child protective action.” Id. (citing Idaho Dep’t of 
Health & Welfare v. Doe (2016-11), 160 Idaho 824, 834, 379 P.3d 1094, 1104 (2016)). 
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Nevertheless, this Court has indulged such arguments after articulating that they are not pertinent 
to the termination of parental rights. See, e.g., In re Doe (2016-11), 160 Idaho at 834, 379 P.3d at 
1104; In re Doe (2015-21), 160 Idaho 154, 162, 369 P.3d 932, 940 (2016); In re Doe (2009-19), 
150 Idaho 201, 207, 245 P.3d 953, 959 (2010). When doing so, this Court has assessed the 
magistrate court’s findings for substantial, competent evidence. In re Doe (2016-11), 160 Idaho 
at 834, 379 P.3d at 1104. 
Mother argues that this Court should evaluate these efforts in termination-of-parental-
rights cases because a magistrate court’s approval of the Department’s actions cannot be 
appealed before the final order is entered. Mother contends that waiting for the final judgment 
places her in a procedural no man’s land because this Court holds that an inquiry into 
reunification efforts is irrelevant to a final judgment that terminates parental rights. Mother 
admits that an aggrieved party “could possibly do an interlocutory appeal,” but claims that such 
an appeal “would only prolong the proceedings of which time seems to be of the essence . . .”  
We are not persuaded. Mother’s argument confuses immediate appellate review and 
relevancy. As shown by In re Doe (2016-11) and the cases cited alongside it, such findings can 
be reviewed by this Court. 160 Idaho at 834, 379 P.3d at 1104. However, those cases also 
demonstrate that such findings are irrelevant to termination proceedings because reasonable 
efforts are requirements under the CPA, not Idaho’s parental-rights termination statute.  
This Court rejected a similar argument in Idaho Department of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 
151 Idaho 498, 260 P.3d 1169 (2011). There, the parent argued that due process and the Idaho 
Code required the Department to make “reasonable efforts at reunification” before terminating 
parental rights. Id. at 506, 260 P.3d at 1177. The parent argued that the CPA’s imposition of 
“reasonable efforts at reunification” required the Department to give her adequate time to 
complete the case plan before proceeding to termination. Id. Unpersuaded, this Court observed 
that “[b]oth the termination statute and the CPA seek to balance aims that are sometimes in 
conflict—such as the best interests of the child and family unity.” Id. However, once the parent 
stipulated to the purview of the CPA and the court placed the child in the Department’s legal 
custody, the Department was authorized to petition for termination under Idaho Code section 16-
1624. Id. Thus, the question relevant to termination was whether the Department could prove the 
statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because that question is left to the trial 
process, the parent’s due-process rights were not violated. Id.  
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Here, the parents stipulated to jurisdiction under the CPA and the court placed the 
children in the Department’s legal custody. Thereafter, the Department had the statutory 
authority to petition for termination. I.C. § 16-1624(1). Once the Department petitioned to 
terminate Mother’s parental rights, the Department still had to prove the statutory basis for 
termination by clear and convincing evidence. I.C. § 16-2005. Thus, her due process rights were 
protected. Accordingly, Mother fails to present a compelling argument for why a lack of 
immediate appellate recourse for a court’s determination of the Department’s reasonable efforts 
impacts her due process rights for termination of parental rights.     
Even if this Court were to review Mother’s argument, the magistrate court’s findings are 
supported by substantial, competent evidence. Mother’s first appellate brief contains only two 
citations to the record. The first citation refers to the fact that she brought up the Department’s 
efforts in closing arguments. The second citation is a broad gesture to 82 pages of testimony 
from Mother’s addiction-specialist physician which is tacked on to her concluding statement: 
By carefully looking at the record before it, this Court should conclude 
that the Department did not reasonably aid in the reunification of the children by 
failing to provide adequate treatment for [Mother] and by not allowing [the minor 
children] to be placed with [Mother’s] parent which would have greatly aided 
[Mother] in her efforts to complete the case plan. (See Tr. pgs. 498–580 
(testimony of Dr. Hadlock)) 
Mother’s physician was the sole testimony presented on the March 2018 trial date. 
Mother began treatment with the physician in April 2017, a little more than a year after the 
children were placed in the Department’s custody. He criticized some of the provider’s handling 
of Mother’s medications and opined that he would have approached Mother’s mental health and 
substance-abuse issues differently. He even went so far to say that some of the medication 
management tactics might have exacerbated her condition. He opined that this may have made it 
more difficult for her to complete her case plan.  
Even so, Mother does not elaborate how or why this testimony shows that the magistrate 
court’s finding on this issue is not supported by substantial, competent evidence. The physician 
also revealed that Mother tested positive for methamphetamine in December 2016 and April 
2017 as well as “bath salts” in January 2017. Likewise, the physician’s belief that Mother had 
been stable the entire year he had treated her was undercut when he admitted he was unaware of 
Mother’s July 2017 delusions about a judge monitoring her through the television. This occurred 
at the same time Mother reported that she was not taking her mental health medications as 
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directed. The physician later indicated the medication stoppage was the result of a 
miscommunication.  
“If the trial court’s findings of fact are based upon substantial and competent, although 
conflicting evidence, they should not be disturbed on appeal.” Doe I v. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 906, 
71 P.3d 1040, 1053 (2003) (citing Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 832, 41 P.3d 257, 260 (2002)). 
Here, substantial, competent evidence supports the court’s findings that the Department’s efforts 
were reasonable notwithstanding the physician’s testimony. The following finding by the 
magistrate court is representative of the Department’s efforts and its results:  
Mother has not provided proof of completion of mental health treatment. Mother 
was giving [sic] a list of 6 different provides [sic] for mental health services 
contained in exhibit 8. Mother chose to go to Crosspointe, Mother did not 
complete her treatment at Crosspointe. Mother changed to Valley Community 
Counseling in the late summer of 2017 and started with a new mental health 
counselor, [J.J.]. It was reported Mother was doing better when working with 
[J.J.]. Mother was better able to stay on task and was not having delusions of 
being monitored by a Judge through her TV. In December 2017, less than 6 
months later, [J.J.] discharged Mother from mental health treatment for non-
compliance. After being discharged by [J.J.] Mother notified [E.D], Mother’s 
Department case worker that she, Mother, no longer needed mental health 
counseling. At the close of the evidence on March 16, 2018 there is no evidence 
that Mother had obtained new mental health counselling. 
Mother’s social worker testified about when she questioned Mother concerning her discharge 
from counseling:  
Q. . . . And what was the nature of that discussion? What did you tell her about 
that treatment?  
A. That I was informed that she had been discharged from the services due to 
noncompliance.  
Q. And what was her response to that?  
A. She appeared confused. She felt that she had done what she was asked of with 
[J.J.].  
Q. And since that time in January, has she notified you that she has obtained 
another provider for counseling? 
A. No. During our conversation, I advised her that it was important to find a new 
counselor, an agency to go through, and she felt that she does not need any more 
counseling at this time.  
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This testimony shows that the court’s finding that the Department made reasonable efforts is 
supported by substantial, competent evidence. Mother’s failure to complete the case plan was 
due, at least in part, to her efforts, not because the Department’s efforts were substandard.  
As a practical matter, Mother fails to articulate why she failed to bring any of these 
concerns to the court’s attention before closing arguments at the termination trial. Mother 
correctly recognizes that “[o]nce a child has been placed in the legal custody of the State, the 
Department must make reasonable efforts to reunify children with their parents if there are no 
aggravating circumstances.” In Interest of Doe, 164 Idaho 143, 146, 426 P.3d 1243, 1246 (2018). 
However, Mother overlooks that the court is required to make case-specific findings regarding 
the Department’s reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency goal at both review and 
permanency hearings. See I.C. § 16-1622(2)(c). Though Mother failed to include the transcript of 
review hearings in the record, the court minutes reveal that Mother inquired about finding closer 
testing facilities and stated that the Department’s reports don’t reflect some of her progress. 
Without more, Mother has failed to show error on this issue. W. Cmty. Ins. Co. v. Kickers, Inc., 
137 Idaho 305, 306, 48 P.3d 634, 635 (2002) (“In the absence of a record that is adequate to 
review the appellant’s claims, we will not presume error below.”) 
Lastly, in her reply brief, Mother presents a wholly new argument contending that the 
Department committed a “gross due process violation” by allowing the foster mother to 
participate in the post-permanency meeting in which the Department decided against 
guardianship. Mother takes issue that her interests weren’t represented at that meeting.  
Mother’s argument is unpersuasive. First, this argument is not touched upon in her 
original brief. Shepherd v. Shepherd, 161 Idaho 14, 20, 383 P.3d 693, 699 (2016) (“[T]his Court 
will not consider arguments raised for the first time in the appellant’s reply brief.”). Second, 
Mother does not support this argument with relevant legal authority other than an unsupported 
reference to due process. Lastly, Mother stipulated to an unstable housing environment as the 
basis for CPA jurisdiction so she affirmatively assented to the Department’s custody over her 
children. And “[o]nce the Department has legal custody of a child under the CPA, the 
Department and not the court has the authority to determine where the child should live.” Matter 
of Doe (2017-16), 163 Idaho at 570, 416 P.3d at 942 (citation omitted). 
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B. Mother has failed to show that the magistrate court’s finding on best interests of 
the children was not supported by substantial, competent evidence.   
To terminate the parent-child relationship, a court must find by clear and convincing 
evidence that at least one of the statutory bases for termination is present and that termination is 
in the best interest of the child. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 162 Idaho 266, 269, 
396 P.3d 695, 698 (2017) (citing In re Doe (2015-03), 159 Idaho 192, 196, 358 P.3d 77, 81)). 
Here, Mother challenges the magistrate court’s finding that termination is in the children’s best 
interests.   
On this issue, Mother simply rehashes her argument regarding the prior issues on appeal 
instead of challenging the magistrate court’s findings on best interests of the children. Mother 
argues that placing the children in a guardianship with her parents was in their best interests. 
Mother acknowledges that the children have been in foster care for the duration of the CPA 
proceedings but argues that the children have a strong bond with her and her parents. She argues 
that the magistrate court “erred in not ordering the Department to fully and fairly explore the 
guardianship with the maternal grandparents.”  
These arguments do not show error in the magistrate court’s decision on best interests of 
the children. A magistrate court’s decision on termination of parental rights will not be disturbed 
so long as it is supported by substantial, competent evidence. See Doe I v. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 
906, 71 P.3d 1040, 1053 (2003). Because Mother does not argue that the court’s decision lacked 
substantial, competent evidence, we decline to presume error on appeal. W. Cmty. Ins. Co., 137 
Idaho at 306, 48 P.3d at 635 (“Error will not be presumed but must be affirmatively shown on 
the record by appellant.”) (citation omitted).  
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the magistrate court’s decree terminating 
Mother’s parental rights.  
Justices BRODY, BEVAN, STEGNER, and MOELLER CONCUR.