Title: In the Matter of Robert Thomas Woods v. New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 54  
In the Matter of Robert Thomas 
Woods,
            Appellant,
        v.
New York City Department of 
Citywide Administrative Services,
            Respondent.
James A. Brown, for appellant.
Fay S. Ng, for respondent.
PIGOTT, J.:
After petitioner passed a civil service examination,
his name was placed on a list maintained by the respondent New
York State Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS)
of those eligible to be appointed as a New York City firefighter. 
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No. 54
He was on military duty when his name was reached on the list. 
We hold that Military Law § 243 (7) required DCAS to place
petitioner on a "special eligible list", from which he could be
certified for appointment after his military duty ended.  It is
irrelevant, under the governing statutes, whether he met the
qualifications for appointment when his name was first reached,
so long as he met them when the time to certify him for
appointment arrived. 
I.
On December 14, 2002, petitioner took an open
competitive civil service examination to become a firefighter
with the New York City Fire Department.  One of the
qualifications to be a firefighter is that a candidate, by the
date of appointment, must have successfully completed 30 semester
credits from an accredited college or university or obtained a
four-year high school diploma and completed two years of
honorable full-time U.S. military service.  At the time
petitioner took the examination, he had fulfilled neither of
these requirements.
Petitioner passed the examination and was placed on the
eligible list.  The list was set to expire on May 5, 2008.
Petitioner enlisted in the U.S. Army in April 2006.  In
April 2007, while he was serving in the Army, the Fire Department
notified petitioner by letter of its intent to appoint him from
the eligible list.  To be appointed, petitioner needed to
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No. 54
complete certain medical and psychological testing.  Petitioner's
mother responded to the letter and advised the Fire Department
that her son was scheduled to be discharged from the Army in
September 2008.  She was told that upon his discharge, he should
contact the Fire Department to complete the remaining parts of
the examination.
On January 18, 2008, while he was still on active
military duty, petitioner's list number was reached for possible
certification and appointment.  All names certified on January
18, 2008 were later appointed to the Fire Department on January
21, 2008. 
Petitioner was released from the Army in July, 2008. 
Upon his release, petitioner contacted the Fire Department to
take the medical and psychological parts of the examination and
submit to a background investigation.  In August, 2008,
petitioner filed an "Application Under State Military Law for
Determination of Rights on Eligible List" with the DCAS, seeking
a determination of his rights under Military Law § 243.  That
section provides that any person whose name is on an eligible
list and comes up for certification while on duty, shall be
placed on a special eligible list if a request is made within 90
days of discharge.  DCAS denied petitioner's request to be placed
on a special eligible list on the ground that when his name had
been reached on January 18, 2008, he had not completed two years
of military service.
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No. 54
II.
Petitioner commenced this article 78 proceeding,
challenging the determination of DCAS as arbitrary and capricious
and in violation of sections 243 (7) and 243 (7-b) of the
Military Law. Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the
proceeding. 
The Appellate Division, with two justices dissenting,
affirmed (72 AD3d 474 [1st Dept 2010]).  The majority reasoned
that at the time petitioner was reached for certification on
January 18, 2008, and January 21, 2008, when final appointments
from the list were made, petitioner had completed neither of the
alternative requirements of the position.  Thus, the court held
that "in January 2008, petitioner could not have been certified,
not because he was in military service, but because he had failed
at that time to meet the eligibility requirements.  Thus, he was
not qualified for placement on a special eligible list from which
selection for the position of firefighter could have been made,
and respondent's determination was not arbitrary or capricious"
(id. at 475). 
Petitioner appealed to this Court as of right,
contending that DCAS was obligated to place him on a special
eligible list because he qualified for such status pursuant to
Military Law § 243 (7).  We agree, and now reverse.
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No. 54
III.
Military Law § 243 (7) provides, in relevant part:
"Any person whose name is on any eligible
list shall, while in military duty, retain
his rights and status on such list.  If the
name of any such person is reached for
certification during his military duty, it
shall be placed on a special eligible list in
the order of his original standing, provided
he makes request therefor following
termination of his military duty and during
the period of his eligibility on such list"
(emphasis added).
Here, it is undisputed that petitioner's name appeared
on the examination's eligible list, and was "reached for
certification" while he was serving in the military. Petitioner
timely submitted the paperwork necessary for placement on a
special eligible list after his discharge, thereby complying with
the statutory requirements.
 
DCAS argues that petitioner was nonetheless ineligible
to be placed on a special eligible list because he did not have
the required two years of military service when his name was
reached on the original eligible list.  But DCAS has misconceived
the statutory scheme.  Section 243 (7) says "shall", not "may",
and makes no exception for those who do not meet qualifications
at the time their names are reached.  It gives DCAS no discretion
to refuse to put names on a special eligible list.  Discretion is
given by Civil Service Law § 50 (4) not to certify names of
people who do not meet qualifications, but that discretion is
exercisable at the time when a decision about certification is
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No. 54
made -- in this case, when petitioner had completed his military
service and his name was or should have been reached on the
special list.  By then, petitioner had the necessary
qualifications.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed, with costs, the petition granted, DCAS's
determination denying petitioner placement on a special eligible
list annulled and the matter remitted to Supreme Court with
directions to remand to DCAS for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed, with costs, petition granted, respondent's
determination denying petitioner placement on a special eligible
list annulled and matter remitted to Supreme Court, New York
County, with directions to remand to respondent for further
proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein. Opinion by
Judge Pigott. Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo,
Read, Smith and Jones concur.
Decided April 5, 2011
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