Title: Bethel v. Board of Education of the Capital School District

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DAMON BETHEL, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 464, 2009     
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
Kent County 
 
 
§ 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE § 
C. A. No. 08A-08-004 
CAPITAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
§ 
  
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  November 25, 2009 
 
 
Decided:     December 4, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS , Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 4th day of December 2009, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
Damon Bethel (“Bethel”) appeals from a Superior Court order 
affirming the Board of Education’s (“Board”) decision to terminate Bethel as a 
teacher with the Capital School District (“School District”).  Bethel contends that 
the Board erred: (a) by depriving him of a fair and meaningful process, and (b) by 
relying on insufficient evidence to find immorality and misconduct in office 
pursuant to 14 Del. C. § 1420.  Because the Superior Court correctly held that the 
 
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Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and there was no error of 
law, we affirm. 
2. 
The School District employed Bethel as a special education teacher at 
Dover High School.  On May 30, 2007, Bethel received notice from the School 
District of its intent to terminate him, pursuant to 14 Del. C. § 1420, on the 
grounds of immorality and misconduct in office.1  In response, Bethel requested 
and received a closed pre-termination hearing.2  After the hearing, held on June 26, 
2008, the Hearing Officer issued a report on July 17, 2008 recommending Bethel’s 
termination. 
3. 
The report considered four events of alleged misconduct and/or 
immorality by Bethel: (1) an incident on April 21, 2007 involving the student 
Nicolai Tugultschinow (“Tugultschinow”); (2) improper grading practices; (3) 
using inappropriate language at a football game; and (4) sleeping during the work 
day.  Because the Hearing Officer did not rely on the alleged sleeping incident in 
reaching his conclusion, the facts relating to that particular allegation of 
misconduct need not be recounted. 
                                                 
1 See 14 Del. C. § 1420 (“Termination of any teacher's services during the school year shall be 
for 1 or more of the following reasons: Immorality, misconduct in office, incompetency, 
disloyalty, neglect of duty or willful and persistent insubordination.”). 
2 The right to a hearing is granted pursuant to 14 Del. C. § 1413.  At the hearing, both Bethel and 
the District were represented by counsel, and exercised their right to examine and cross-examine 
witnesses.  
 
3
 
4. 
After attending a church meeting in Dover on Friday, April 20, 2007, 
Bethel was supposed to meet a friend for a transportation home to Smyrna.  
Because the friend failed to appear,3  Bethel walked to a nearby Sunoco station on 
Route 13 in Dover, and attempted to place a collect call to his parents.  Sometime 
after midnight, Bethel saw one of his students, Tugultschinow, at the Sunoco 
station and asked him for a ride to the Wesley College area in downtown Dover.   
 
5. 
Bethel claims that he asked Tugultschinow for a ride to Wesley College 
so that he could find a taxi cab or other ride to his home in Smyrna.  The Hearing 
Officer found, however, that (as Tugultschinow testified) Bethel threatened to fail 
Tugultschinow if he did not drive him to the New and Fulton Street area, so that 
Bethel could buy marijuana.  Bethel also threatened to fail Tugultschinow if he 
would not have a car belonging to Bethel titled in his (Tugultschinow’s) name.  
 
6. 
After dropping off another student, Tugultschinow drove Bethel to 
downtown Dover.  Bethel claims that he ran from Tugultschinow’s car, leaving his 
book bag behind, because he saw a cab that he wanted to catch.  Tugultschinow 
                                                 
3 At the time, Bethel’s driving privileges were suspended due to a DUI conviction.   
 
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provided contrary testimony relating to how and why Bethel’s book bag was left 
behind in Tugultschinow’s car.4  
 
7. 
The Hearing Officer found Tugultschinow to be a credible witness and 
rejected Bethel’s account of the events, finding that Bethel’s testimony contained 
inconsistencies and incredible statements.5  
 
8. 
In November 2006, Dover High School principal Gene Montano 
(“Montano”) conducted an investigation into allegedly improper grading practices 
by Bethel.  A student, Justin Ames (“Ames”), told Montano that he gave Bethel 
$30 to change his final grade from a 39 to a 70.  Another student, Teddy Harmon 
(“Harmon”), told Montano that a friend had paid Bethel $10 to change Harmon’s 
grade from a 48 to a 69.6  Principal Montano examined Bethel’s grade book and 
learned that although Ames’ final grade was clearly a 30, his report card showed a 
                                                 
4 Tugultschinow testified that Bethel asked him to park his car and turn off his lights. While 
Tugultschinow was waiting, a prostitute tried to talk to him.  As Bethel was coming back with 
another individual, the prostitute jumped into Tugultschinow’s car, claiming they were going to 
assault her.  Frightened, Tugultschinow took off, and was eventually stopped by Wesley College 
security for erratic driving.  Officer Webster of Dover Police responded to the scene, and 
searched Bethel’s book bag.  Tugultschinow was neither charged nor arrested for these events.   
5 The inconsistencies include: (a) Bethel did not call a cab from the Sunoco station although he 
had cash on him; (b) Bethel claims that he left his book bag in Tugultschinow’s car because he 
was running for a cab, yet Officer Webster testified he saw Bethel “walking”―not running―in 
the area of New and Fulton Streets; and (c) Bethel claims that he could not obtain a record of the 
cab ride because the driver embezzled both the fare and the tip.   
6 Ames’ and Harmon’s written statements were admitted into evidence at the hearing.   
 
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grade of 70.  Montano testified that although a modification of a point or two 
might be appropriate, a 40-point change was definitely not.   
 
9. 
The Hearing Officer found that: (1) Bethel’s explanations for why he 
raised these students’ grades and why these students would provide statements 
against him were not credible,7 and (2) Bethel was insubordinate by contacting the 
students’ parents after being instructed to take no reprisals against them.  The 
Hearing Officer also found that Harmon’s attempt to recant his prior written 
statement at the hearing was “extremely unconvincing.”8 
 
10. The Hearing Officer found, based on the testimony of Assistant 
principal, Lynn Widdowson (“Widdowson”), that in the Fall of 2006 Bethel yelled 
an inappropriate profanity in the presence of students at a Dover High School 
football game.9 
                                                 
7 Bethel claims that: (1) there was a District policy that no student could receive a final grade 
below a 60, and (2) the textbook was above the student’s grade level and that their IEP’s were 
incomplete.  But Bethel did not provide evidence to verify either claim.  In addition, Bethel 
claims these two students were motivated to lie because he caught them cheating on a test and 
gave them both zeroes.  But Bethel also admitted the students were retested, thus presumably 
erasing the zeroes.   
8 The Hearing Officer found that Harmon indicated uncertainty about the events, and was 
frequently unintelligible.  Moreover, Harmon offered no explanation for the change in his 
statement other than that his friend said the payment did not occur, which itself was quite 
possibly false.  
9 Bethel yelled “look at the f—king score.”  Widdowson mistakenly believed that the incident 
occurred at a Dover-Smyrna Game, but Dover High School did not play against Smyrna that 
season.  Regardless, the Hearing Officer did not discount Widdowson’s testimony, because she 
was certain that Bethel made an inappropriate comment at a football game in the Fall of 2006.   
 
6
 
11. At the hearing, Bethel argued that the Board erroneously relied on the 
incidents that occurred in the fall of 2006 (i.e., the sleeping, grading, and profane 
language) as grounds for termination, because those events were “stale.”10  After 
supplemental briefing by the parties, the Hearing Officer concluded that those 
incidents could be considered if they were given the appropriate weight.  The 
Hearing Officer reasoned also that all these events occurred during the same school 
year and nothing in the statutory scheme regarding terminating teachers limited the 
time frame of the events that the Board may consider.11   
 
12. Ultimately, the Hearing Officer concluded that Bethel had committed 
acts constituting immorality and misconduct in office: (1) by coercing one of his 
students to transport him to a known open-air drug market so that Bethel could 
purchase illegal drugs, thereby exposing Tugultschinow to danger; (2) by accepting 
money in return for raising grades, thereby giving students inaccurate grades not 
reflecting their work, and insubordinately contacting the parents of the 
complaining students; and (3) by willfully and knowingly using vulgar or profane 
language at a school event.  Based on these conclusions the Hearing Officer 
recommended Bethel’s termination.   
                                                 
10 Bethel contends that the incidents occurred far in the past, and were not charged at the time 
they allegedly occurred.   
11  In particular, the Hearing Officer looked at the wording of 14 Del. C. § 1420 which states the 
grounds for terminating a teacher during the school year.  It is silent as to a time frame that may 
be considered.    
 
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13. On July 30, 2008, the Board adopted the Hearing Officer’s report and 
voted to terminate Bethel’s employment.  Bethel appealed to the Superior Court, 
which held that: (1) the Board’s adoption of the Hearing Officer’s report was not 
erroneous, and (2) the Board’s decision to terminate Bethel was supported by 
substantial evidence.  The Superior Court affirmed, and this appeal followed.   
 
14. On appeal, Bethel first claims that the Board violated his due process 
rights by depriving him of a fair and meaningful review process.  Second, Bethel 
claims that the Board relied on insufficient evidence in finding him culpable of 
immorality and misconduct in office.  Our standard of review “mirrors that of the 
Superior Court.” 12   Where substantial evidence exists to support the Board’s 
finding and there are no errors at law, this Court will affirm.13  Issues of statutory 
construction are reviewed de novo.14 
 
15. Bethel argues that he was denied due process because the Board did not 
provide a fair procedure and meaningful review.  Specifically, Bethel claims that 
Board erred in adopting the Hearing Officer’s report, because that report relied on 
earlier incidents (improper grading and use of inappropriate language) that should 
have been disregarded as irrelevant and stale.  Bethel relies on the Superior Court’s 
                                                 
12 Stoltz Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Consumer Affairs Bd.,  616 A.2d 1205, 1208 (Del. 1992). 
13 Id.  See also 14 Del. C. § 1414. 
14 E.g., the Hearing Officer’s determination that nothing in 14 Del. C. § 1420 limits the time 
frame of the events that might be considered by the Board.    
 
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observation in Geshner v. Del. Real Estate Comm’n15 that a “massive infusion” of 
irrelevant evidence in administrative proceedings is a denial of due process.  Bethel 
also argues that the Board impermissibly relied on hearsay evidence as the sole 
basis for its decision to terminate him.         
 
16. Chapter 14 of Title 14 of the Delaware Code sets forth the procedures 
for the termination of teachers.  The statute specifically provides that at a 
termination hearing, “[a]ny evidence shall be admissible during the hearing which 
is adjudged by the board to be pertinent to the reasons contained in the written 
notice which the teacher received and which stated the reasons for dismissal.”16   
As this Court has recognized, in such hearings, administrative boards are not 
constrained by the rigid evidentiary rules that govern jury trials.17  Rather, the 
agency may hear “all evidence which could conceivably throw light on the 
controversy.”18  
                                                 
15 1994 WL 680090 at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 1994). 
 
16 14 Del. C. § 1413(a)(6). 
17 Tenaglia-Evans v. St. Francis Hosp., 913 A.2d 570 (Table), 2006 WL 3590385 at *3 (Del. 
Dec. 11, 2006); see also Baker v. Hosp. Billing & Collection Serv. Ltd., 2003 WL 21538020 at 
*3 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2003).  
18 Tenaglia-Evans, 2006 WL 3590385 at *3 (quoting Ridings v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 
407 A.2d 238, 240 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979)).  
 
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17. Bethel’s reliance on Geshner is inapposite.19  The notice in Geshner 
stated that the basis for the hearing was 24 Del. C.§ 2912(a), a statute prohibiting 
false or fraudulent representation of a conviction in obtaining a real estate 
certificate.20  The court held that the consideration of any matter unrelated to that 
one narrow issue  (i.e., Geshner’s failure to disclose his prior conviction), violated 
his due process rights.21  In this case, however, Bethel’s notice specifically stated 
that the basis for the hearing was immorality and misconduct in office, and all the 
incidents considered by the Hearing Officer and the Board were pertinent to the 
grounds provided in Bethel’s notice. 
 
18. Neither 14 Del. C. § 1413 (which provides for a hearing by a 
terminating board) nor 14 Del. C. § 1420 (which articulates the grounds for 
terminating a teacher), explicitly limit the time frame of incidents that may be 
considered in a termination hearing.  Therefore, the Board was entitled to consider 
evidence about Bethel’s performance of his duties throughout the entire period of 
                                                 
19 See Geshner, 1994 WL 680090, at *6.  
20 Id. at *1-2.  
21 Id. at *6.  The board had considered such evidence as a citizen’s complaints against Geshner 
regarding fraud, civil judgment against him, prior arrests that did not lead to convictions, and 
suspicious conduct at work.  Id. at *2-3. 
 
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his employment with the District.22  Although cases may arise where the board 
relies on evidence too remote in time to be relevant to the proceeding, that did not 
occur in this case.  Here, all the incidents considered by the Board took place 
during the same school year, which was only one year before the hearing.23   
 
19. Finally, the Board did not impermissibly rely on hearsay evidence in 
reaching its decision to terminate Bethel.  Because the Board is not bound by the 
formal rules of evidence, it may admit and consider hearsay evidence,24 provided 
that such evidence is not the sole basis of the Board’s decision.25  Here, although 
the Board admitted hearsay evidence relating to the allegation of improper grading 
practices,26 the Board’s decision to terminate Bethel was grounded on all three 
incidents, not solely on the allegation of improper grading.  Moreover, Montano’s 
                                                 
22 See Mack v. Kent County Vocational-Technical Sch. Dist., 1987 Del. Super. LEXIS 1151 
(May 20, 1987) (“[T]he Board was entitled to consider testimony on the teacher's performance of 
duties throughout the total period of her employment with the District.”); see also Leach v. Bd. of 
Educ. of the New Castle County Vocational-Technical Sch. Dist., 295 A.2d 582, 584 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 1972) (stating that the Board had a right to consider the teacher’s conduct throughout the 
period of his school employment). 
23 The Hearing Officer explicitly recognized this principle in reaching his conclusions and 
weighed the incidents accordingly.  
24 Torres v. Allen Family Foods, 672 A.2d 26, 31 (Del. 1995). 
25 Shepherd v. Bd. of Educ. of Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 3327224, at *3 (Del. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 14, 2009) (stating that generally hearsay should not provide the sole basis for a board’s 
decision).    
26 Written statements of Bethel’s students.     
 
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inspection of Bethel’s grade book confirmed that the grade recorded therein did not 
match the grade on Ames’ report card.  Montano’s testimony was not hearsay. 
 
20. In administrative proceedings, “rudimentary requirements of fair play 
satisfy the due process requirements.”27  The record shows that the procedures 
employed at Bethel’s termination hearing did not fall below the minimum 
standards for a fair administrative hearing.  Bethel received adequate notice of the 
charges against him, had the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and 
manner and to present witnesses on his own behalf, and was afforded the 
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses called by the District.  The Board did 
not deny Bethel his due process rights.        
 
21. Bethel next claims that the Board’s decision is not supported by 
substantial evidence, which means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”28  Questions of conflict in 
testimony and witness credibility are to be resolved by the administrative agency, 
                                                 
27 XComp, Inc. v. Ropp, 2002 WL 1753168, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2002) quoting Sandefeur v. 
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 1993 WL 389217, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 1993). See 
also Vincent v. E. Shore Markets, 970 A.2d 160, 163-64 (Del. 2009) (Fundamental fairness 
includes “fair notice of the scope of the proceedings and adherence of the agency to the stated 
scope of the proceedings.”) 
28 Board of Educ., Laurel Special Sch. Dist. v. Shockley, 155 A.2d 323, 327 (Del. 1959).  
 
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not the reviewing court.29  Absent legal error, this Court cannot substitute its 
judgment for that of the Board.30  
 
22. Here, substantial evidence, as earlier described, supports the Hearing 
Officer’s factual findings that: (1) Bethel coerced one his students to transport him 
to a known drug market after midnight so that Bethel could purchase illegal drugs; 
(2) Bethel accepted money in exchange for raising certain students’ grades, gave 
students grades not accurately reflecting their performance, and was insubordinate 
by contacting the students’ parents; and (3) Bethel willfully and knowingly used 
inappropriate language at a school event.  Those incidents justify the Board’s 
decision to terminate Bethel on the basis of immorality and misconduct in office.31 
                                                 
29 Geshner 1994 WL 680090 at *5.  See also Lawrence v. Bd. of Educ. of the Appoquinimink 
Sch. Dist. 1994 WL 215221 at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. May 31, 1994) (“It is well settled that the 
Board is to make determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be accorded 
to their testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.”). 
30 Shockley 155 A.2d at 328. 
31 Delaware courts have construed “immorality,” in the context of Title 14, to mean “such 
immorality as may reasonably be found to impair the teacher’s effectiveness by reason of his 
unfitness or otherwise.”  Skripchuk v. Austin, 379 A.2d 1142,1143 (Del. 1977); Lawrence, 1994 
WL 315221 at *5.  Misconduct has been defined as a “transgression of some established and 
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, willful in 
character, improper or wrong behavior.”  Rousak v. Bd. of Educ. of the Cape Henlopen Sch. 
Dist., 1987 Del. Super. LEXIS 1392, at *8 (Dec. 23, 1987) quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1150 
(4th ed. 1968).  The term “misconduct in office” means “[a]ny unlawful behavior by a public 
officer in relation to the duties of his office, willful in character.”  Id.  It is sufficient that the 
“conduct was consistently contrary to the standard of behavior expected of a teacher.” Ballard v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Christina Sch. Dist. 1985 WL 188988 at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 1985). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Justice