Title: State of Idaho v. Larry M. Severson First-degree murder

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 32128 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,                         
                                         
           Plaintiff-Respondent,         
                                         
 v.                                      
                                         
 LARRY M. SEVERSON,                    
                                         
           Defendant-Appellant.          
                                          
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Boise, December 2008 Term 
 
2009 Opinion No. 75 
 
Filed:  May 29, 2009 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Elmore County.  Honorable Michael E. Wetherell, District Judge. 
 
Judgment of conviction for first-degree murder and poisoning food and/or 
medicine is affirmed. 
 
Molly Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.  Diane 
Walker and Eric Fredericksen argued. 
 
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.  
Jessica Lorello argued. 
 
_____________________ 
 
 
J. JONES, Justice 
 
 
Larry Severson appeals his judgment of conviction for the first-degree murder and 
poisoning of his wife.  We affirm. 
I. 
 
Larry and Mary Severson met in Colorado in 1995.1  After dating for a little over one 
year, the couple married and moved to Mountain Home, Idaho.  By 2001, Severson and Mary 
began experiencing marital problems.  Then, in August 2001, the couple separated after Mary 
learned that Severson was having an affair with a younger woman.  Upon learning of the affair, 
Mary left Severson and returned to Colorado to stay with her mother. 
                                                 
1 Throughout the rest of this opinion, Larry will be referred to as “Severson.” 
2 
 
Initially, Mary and Severson planned on getting an uncontested divorce.  Less than four 
months after the couple separated, however, Mary changed her mind.  Instead of going forward 
with the divorce, Mary decided to return to Idaho and work on her marriage.  In the meantime, 
Severson continued to see his younger girlfriend, Jennifer Watkins.  Severson told Watkins that 
he and Mary were still getting divorced and even asked Watkins to marry him.  Watkins initially 
accepted Severson‟s proposal but ended up breaking off the relationship before Mary returned to 
Idaho.       
 
Mary arrived back in Idaho in December 2001.  Once she returned, she and Severson 
went to the local GNC store so she could purchase some Hydroxycut pills.  Mary had started 
taking Hydroxycut while she was in Colorado in order to help her lose weight.  During that time, 
the pills did not cause her to suffer any adverse side effects.  Shortly after Mary began taking the 
pills she purchased with Severson, however, she started experiencing stomach pain and vomiting 
blood.  This prompted Mary to inspect the pills and, upon doing so, she noticed that they were 
discolored and warm to the touch.  Mary immediately quit taking the pills and scheduled an 
appointment with her doctor.  At the doctor‟s office, Mary was diagnosed with an ulcer and 
given a prescription for Prevacid.  During a follow-up examination, she also received a 
prescription for the sleep aid Ambien.   
 
On February 14, 2002, Severson called Mary‟s doctor and requested a refill of Mary‟s 
Ambien prescription.  The doctor authorized the refill and Severson picked up the prescription 
later that same night.  The next morning, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Severson purportedly 
discovered Mary lying on the couch not breathing.  Upon finding his wife, Severson called his 
son and daughter-in-law, Mike and Nora, who immediately rushed to Severson‟s house.  Once 
there, Nora called 911 and Mike began performing CPR on Mary.  Before long, the paramedics 
arrived and transported Mary to the hospital.  Efforts to resuscitate Mary continued in the 
ambulance and at the hospital, but were ultimately unsuccessful.  Mary was pronounced dead at 
the hospital at approximately 4:15 a.m. that same morning.  An autopsy revealed that Mary had 
ingested significant amounts of the sleep aids Ambien and Unisom, however, her cause of death 
was listed as “undetermined.”   
 
Less than one day passed before the police began investigating Severson‟s role in Mary‟s 
death.  Searches of Severson‟s home and workplace revealed several pieces of evidence 
including a cardboard tray with broken pieces of Hydroxycut capsules, a pharmacy receipt for 
3 
Ambien, Ambien pills under a couch cushion where Mary was discovered, a plastic baggie 
containing Unisom pills that was hidden inside a hat with the word “dad” printed on it, Unisom 
tablets in Mary‟s bathroom and car, and an empty Ambien prescription bottle.  Additionally, two 
bottles of Hydroxycut and an envelope containing some contaminated pills were recovered from 
Severson‟s attorney, Jay Clark.2     
Severson was eventually indicted on one count of first-degree murder and one count of 
poisoning food and/or medicine.  Initially, the indictment alleged that Severson killed Mary by 
overdosing her with sleeping pills.  It was later amended to include possible murder by 
suffocation.  Although Severson objected to the amendment, the trial court permitted it after 
concluding that it did not charge Severson with a new offense and would not otherwise result in 
prejudice. 
After several changes in attorneys, the Elmore County Public Defender‟s Office was 
appointed to represent Severson at trial.  Ed Frachiseur was designated as lead counsel and 
Ellison Matthews was later appointed as co-counsel.  Mr. Frachiseur was appointed despite 
Severson‟s objection that he had a conflict of interest.  In a pro se motion to reinstate his former 
counsel, Severson argued that the appointment of Mr. Frachiseur violated his right to be 
represented by conflict-free counsel.  According to Severson, Mr. Frachiseur was operating 
under a conflict of interest because another public defender, Terry Ratliff, had represented 
Mary‟s mother in a civil suit that was directly related to the criminal case.3  Despite Severson‟s 
objections, the trial court concluded that Mr. Ratliff‟s conflict did not preclude Mr. Frachiseur 
from representing Severson.   
Severson‟s case proceeded to trial in October 2004.  At the conclusion of the seventeen-
day trial, the trial court delivered its instructions to the jury.  Although Severson requested that 
the trial court instruct the jury that, in order to find him guilty of murder, it must unanimously 
agree on the means by which he killed his wife, the court concluded that such an instruction was 
unnecessary.  After two days of deliberation, the jury returned a general verdict finding Severson 
guilty of both counts alleged in the indictment.  The verdict did not specify whether Severson 
murdered his wife by overdosing her, suffocating her, or both.  Severson then filed two motions 
                                                 
2 Severson allegedly gave Clark the pills so he could investigate a potential products liability claim. 
3 More specifically, the civil case involved the distribution of Mary‟s life insurance proceeds, the outcome of which 
turned on whether Severson was a “slayer” under Idaho Code section 15-2-803.  See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. 
Severson, 143 Idaho 628, 151 P.3d 824 (2007).   
4 
for judgment of acquittal and a motion for a new trial arguing, among other things, that there was 
insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty of murder.  The trial court denied Severson‟s 
motions and sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole for murdering his wife and to 
five years for poisoning food and/or medicine.  Severson now appeals the judgment of 
conviction, alleging that the trial court erred in it rulings on the conflict of interest, the 
amendment to the indictment, the unanimity instruction, and the sufficiency of the evidence.  He 
also argues that various acts of prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of his right to a fair trial.   
II. 
 
On appeal, we are concerned with six issues: (1) whether Severson was denied his right 
to be represented by conflict-free counsel; (2) whether the district court erred by allowing the 
State to amend the indictment without first returning it to the grand jury; (3) whether the district 
court erred in not instructing the jury that it must unanimously agree on the means by which 
Severson killed his wife in order to find him guilty of murder; (4) whether there was sufficient 
evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Severson murdered his wife; 
(5) whether various acts of alleged prosecutorial misconduct deprived Severson of his right to a 
fair trial; and (6) whether the accumulation of errors that occurred during Severson‟s trial 
rendered the trial unfair. 
A. 
Severson argues the district court deprived him of his right to be represented by conflict-
free counsel by refusing to impute Mr. Ratliff‟s conflict of interest to the entire Elmore County 
Public Defender‟s Office.  According to Severson, the district court‟s decision should be 
reversed because the court: (1) failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into the potential conflict; 
and (2) erred in concluding that the Public Defender‟s Office did not have a conflict of interest.  
The State argues that the district court adequately considered the potential conflict, provided 
Severson an opportunity to be heard on the issue, and correctly determined that Severson‟s 
lawyer did not have a conflict of interest.  Alternatively, the State argues that even if the trial 
court did not make a proper inquiry into the conflict, Severson‟s challenge should fail because he 
has not established that the conflict adversely affected his lawyer‟s performance or otherwise 
resulted in prejudice.4 
                                                 
4 Severson did not argue that the conflict adversely affected his lawyer‟s performance because he maintains that 
ineffective assistance claims are more appropriately raised in habeas corpus proceedings.  See State v. Roberts, 129 
5 
1. 
A trial court may appoint substitute counsel for an indigent defendant upon a showing of 
good cause.  State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 714-15, 52 P.3d 857, 859-60 (2002).  Whether 
substitute counsel should be provided is a decision that lies within the sound discretion of the 
trial court and will be reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 715, 52 P.3d at 860.  
The trial court‟s decision will only be regarded as an abuse of discretion if it violated the 
defendant‟s right to counsel.  Id.   
2. 
Although Severson acknowledges the district court conducted an inquiry into whether his 
public defender was operating under a conflict of interest, he argues that the inquiry was 
inadequate.  Severson bases his argument on what he regards as the court‟s failure to thoroughly 
consider Mr. Ratliff‟s representation of Mary‟s mother, his employment at the Public Defender‟s 
Office, and the extent he and Mr. Frachiseur collaborated on their cases.  Severson argues that 
such an in-depth inquiry was necessary because Mr. Ratliff‟s client would benefit if Severson 
were found guilty of murder.5  Additionally, Severson claims that Mr. Frachiseur had an interest 
in Severson being found guilty because he was assisting Mr. Ratliff in the civil case before being 
appointed as Severson‟s public defender.6  Finally, Severson challenges the court‟s failure to 
inquire into whether Mr. Ratliff could be effectively screened from the criminal case.  
Alternatively, Severson contends that even if the court conducted an adequate inquiry, it erred by 
failing to warn him of the risks associated with being represented by a lawyer operating under a 
conflict of interest and by not obtaining a knowing and intelligent waiver.  The State, on the 
other hand, maintains that the inquiry was adequate and that the trial court satisfied its duty once 
it determined that Mr. Ratliff was employed by the Elmore County Public Defender‟s Office.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Idaho 194, 197, 923 P.2d 439, 442 (1996); State v. Doe, 136 Idaho 427, 434-35, 34 P.3d 1110, 1117-18 (Ct. App. 
2001) (noting that appellate courts disfavor ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal). He argues a defendant 
need not show that a conflict adversely affected counsel‟s performance when an objection to the conflict is made at 
trial.   
5 If Severson were found guilty, he would be classified as a slayer and be precluded from receiving any of Mary‟s 
life insurance proceeds.  See I.C. § 15-2-803.  All of the proceeds would then go to Mr. Ratliff‟s client.   
6 Severson argues that the fact that Mr. Frachiseur met with Mr. Ratliff and the prosecutor before he was appointed 
as Severson‟s lawyer demonstrates that he was involved in the civil case because there is no other explanation for 
the meeting.  In making this claim, Severson relies on a letter Mr. Ratliff sent to the trial court, which stated “[t]wo 
days ago, Mr. Frachiseur and myself talked with Aaron Bazzoli as to the witnesses involved in this case.”  Other 
than this statement, there is no evidence to support Severson‟s contention that Mr. Frachiseur was involved in the 
civil case. 
6 
According to the State, the court‟s “only remaining obligation was to determine whether Mr. 
Ratliff‟s [undisputed] conflict was imputed to Mr. Frachiseur.”  
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.”7  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The amendment has been interpreted to include the right to 
be represented by conflict-free counsel.  Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981).  In order to 
ensure that a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial court has an affirmative duty to 
inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows or “reasonably should know that a particular 
conflict may exist.”  State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003); see also 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980).  A trial court‟s failure to conduct an inquiry, under 
certain circumstances, will serve as a basis for reversing a defendant‟s conviction.  Holloway v. 
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978); Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346-47.   
Whether a trial court‟s failure to adequately inquire into a potential conflict of interest is 
enough, on its own, to justify reversal depends on whether the defendant objected to the conflict 
at trial.  See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348; see also Selsor v. Kaiser, 22 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 
1994); Hamilton v. Ford, 969 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1992).  When a trial court fails to make 
a proper inquiry, but the defendant did not object to the conflict at trial, the defendant‟s 
conviction will only be reversed if he or she can prove that an actual conflict of interest 
adversely affected his lawyer‟s performance.  Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348; see also United States v. 
Sutton, 794 F.2d 1415, 1419 (9th Cir. 1986).  The defendant need not, however, show prejudice 
in order to obtain relief.  Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50.  On the other hand, once a defendant raises 
a timely objection to a conflict, the trial court is constitutionally obligated to determine whether 
an actual conflict of interest exists.8  Hamilton, 969 F.2d at 1011; see also Sutton, 794 F.2d at 
1419.  A court‟s failure to make a proper inquiry after a defendant‟s timely objection will result 
                                                 
7 The Amendment has been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to 
the states.  See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).  Idaho law also guarantees a criminal defendant‟s right 
to counsel.  See IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; I.C. § 19-852. 
8 Although the United States Supreme Court cases addressing a court‟s duty to inquire were decided in the context 
of joint representation of co-defendants, the principles outlined in those cases are not limited to joint representation 
conflicts.  See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 175 (2002) (noting that the duty to inquire applies when 
“counsel actively represent[s] conflicting interests”); United States v. Winkle, 722 F.2d 605, 610 (10th Cir. 1983) 
(concluding that Holloway applied to a conflict arising from defense counsel‟s prior representation of a government 
witness in litigation that was factually connected to the criminal case); State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 791-92, 171 
P.3d 1282, 1289-90 (Ct. App. 2007) (similar). 
7 
in the automatic reversal of the defendant‟s conviction.  See Holloway, 435 U.S. at 488-89; 
Hamilton, 969 F.2d at 1012; United States v. Rodriguez, 278 F.3d 486, 492 (5th Cir. 2002).   
Because the trial court‟s duty to inquire after a defendant makes a timely objection is a separate 
and distinct obligation, a defendant in such circumstances need not show that an actual conflict 
adversely affected the lawyer‟s performance.9  See Holloway, 435 U.S. at 488-90; Hamilton, 969 
F.2d at 1011-12.   
Here, because Severson objected to the conflict of interest at trial, the court had an 
affirmative duty to inquire into the potential conflict.  If the trial court failed to conduct an 
adequate inquiry, Severson‟s conviction must be reversed regardless of whether the conflict 
adversely affected his lawyer‟s performance.  The adequacy of a trial court‟s inquiry is a 
constitutional issue over which we exercise free review.  See State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 
77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct. App. 2003).     
In order to satisfy the inquiry requirement, a trial court‟s examination of the potential 
conflict must be thorough and searching and should be conducted on the record.  See id.; Smith v. 
Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991).  The court “must make the kind of inquiry that 
might ease the defendant‟s dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern.”  Smith, 923 F.2d at 1320.  
However, in determining whether a conflict exists, trial courts are entitled to rely on 
representations made by counsel.  Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1967).  A 
                                                 
9 The State argues that under Cuyler a trial court‟s failure to conduct a proper inquiry only requires reversal when 
the conflict adversely affected the lawyer‟s performance.  Read broadly, language from this Court‟s opinion in State 
v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 90 P.3d 278 (2003), appears to support the State‟s argument.  In Lovelace, we stated that 
“[Holloway’s automatic reversal rule] is limited to cases where a trial court improperly requires joint representation 
over timely objection. . . . Furthermore, Holloway has been overruled as to a per se reversal in favor of requiring a 
showing as in Cuyler that the potential conflict of interest adversely affected counsel‟s performance.”  Id. at 61, 90 
P.3d at 286.  Lovelace, however, dealt with a defendant‟s claim that his lawyer‟s conflict resulted in ineffective 
assistance of counsel – it did not involve a direct challenge to the trial court‟s failure to inquire into the conflict.  Id.  
Moreover, in Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002), the case we relied on in Lovelace, the United States Supreme 
Court acknowledged that Holloway still applies when a trial court fails to conduct an inquiry after a defendant‟s 
timely objection.  See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168 (“Holloway thus creates an automatic reversal rule only where 
defense counsel is forced to represent codefendants over his timely objection, unless the trial court has determined 
that there is no conflict.”).  In Mickens, the Court simply refused to extend Holloway to cases where the trial court 
had an independent duty to inquire but failed to do so.  Id. at 172-73.  Accordingly, Cuyler’s adverse affect 
requirement is limited to cases where a defendant failed to object to the conflict at trial.  See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348 
(“In order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must 
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer‟s performance.” (emphasis added)).  
Because Severson objected to the conflict at trial and is now challenging the court‟s alleged failure to conduct an 
adequate inquiry, Cuyler is inapplicable. 
8 
court may inquire further into the facts, but “is under no original or continuing obligation to do 
so.”  Id.   
Once a court conducts an inquiry, it must determine whether a conflict actually exists.  
Lopez, 139 Idaho at 259, 77 P.3d at 127.  If the court concludes defense counsel does have a 
conflict, it must obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver from the defendant or give the defendant 
an opportunity to acquire new counsel.  Id.  If, on the other hand, the court concludes that a 
conflict of interest does not exist, the representation may continue without a waiver.  See id. 
The record in this case demonstrates that the trial court conducted a proper inquiry into 
the potential conflict of interest.  After learning of the possible conflict, the court acknowledged 
that Mr. Ratliff‟s employment with the Elmore County Public Defender‟s Office might have 
created a conflict for Mr. Frachiseur.  The court then scheduled a hearing so it could “conduct a 
searching inquiry as to the potential conflict.”  At the hearing, the court allowed both sides to 
present testimony.  Although the court gave Severson the opportunity to voice his concerns about 
the representation, he declined to do so.  Mr. Frachiseur, however, informed the court that Mr. 
Ratliff was no longer representing Mary‟s mother in the civil case.  Based on this information, 
the court concluded that Mr. Ratliff‟s conflict would not justify removing Mr. Frachiseur as 
defense counsel.  It reasoned that because most of the issues in the civil case had been settled, 
“Mr. Ratliff would no longer have any financial interest in any further proceedings in that 
case.”10  The court then advised the parties that it would set forth the rest of its reasoning in a 
written opinion to be issued within a few days. 
In its written opinion, the court acknowledged that Mr. Ratliff‟s prior representation of 
Mary‟s mother created a conflict of interest that would preclude him from representing Severson.  
However, the court concluded that the conflict did not require the disqualification of Mr. 
                                                 
10 Severson argues that this finding is contrary to this Court‟s opinion in United Investors Life Insurance Co. v. 
Severson, 143 Idaho 628, 151 P.3d 824 (2007), in which we stated that the trial court‟s order granting Mary‟s 
mother‟s motion for partial summary judgment “did not make any final decision as to Severson‟s interest in or rights 
to the proceeds.”  Id. at 631, 151 P.3d at 827.  According to Severson, this Court‟s statement casts doubt on the trial 
court‟s conclusion that Mr. Ratliff no longer had a financial interest in the litigation.  Severson‟s argument is 
unpersuasive, however, because the quoted statement was discussing the trial court‟s order granting Mary‟s 
mother‟s motion for summary judgment regarding the $100,000.00 she was entitled to as a beneficiary.  Severson 
did not appeal this order.  The decision in United Investors dealt with whether Severson was entitled to the 
remaining $100,000.00 because the policy premiums were paid for with community property.  Because we held that 
Severson was precluded from receiving any of the insurance proceeds under the slayer statute and that Mary‟s estate 
should receive the remaining $100,000.00, the trial court did not incorrectly conclude that Mr. Ratliff no longer had 
a financial interest in the case. 
9 
Frachiseur.  The court reasoned that because the Elmore County Public Defender‟s Office was 
not a “firm,” Mr. Ratliff‟s conflict should not be imputed to Mr. Frachiseur under Rule 1.10 of 
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.  Additionally, there was no evidence that Mr. 
Frachiseur and Mr. Ratliff communicated about Severson‟s case or that they shared information 
adverse to Severson‟s interests.  Still, as a precaution, the court directed the Public Defender‟s 
Office to “completely screen Mr. Ratliff from involvement in any activities or information 
relating to [Severson‟s case].”   
The district court‟s inquiry into Mr. Ratliff‟s conflict satisfied its constitutional 
obligation.  The court held a hearing on the record and gave both sides the opportunity to address 
the potential conflict.  Although the court did not ask the specific questions Severson now claims 
were necessary, Severson was given the opportunity to draw the trial court‟s attention to his 
specific concerns, but failed to do so.  Additionally, after conducting the inquiry, the court 
concluded that Mr. Ratliff had a conflict of interest.  If the court‟s inquiry had been inadequate, it 
would have been unable to reach this conclusion.  Because the district court conducted an 
adequate inquiry into the conflict, Severson is not entitled to automatic reversal of his conviction.  
The issue remains, however, as to whether the court‟s decision not to impute the conflict to Mr. 
Frachiseur was in accordance with Idaho law. 
3. 
Severson argues that, even if the district court conducted a proper inquiry, it erred by not 
imputing Mr. Ratliff‟s conflict of interest to the Public Defender‟s Office.  He contends that the 
conflict should have been imputed because Mr. Frachiseur had “close personal and financial 
relations” with Mr. Ratliff.  Additionally, Severson challenges the district court‟s reliance on a 
screening mechanism.  He maintains that requiring the Public Defender‟s Office to screen Mr. 
Ratliff was an abuse of discretion because the Rules of Professional Conduct did not provide for 
screening at that time.  Alternatively, even if screening was proper, Severson maintains that it 
would only be an appropriate remedy if he consented to the conflict, which he did not.   
To determine whether an actual conflict of interest exists, Idaho Courts look to the 
standards set forth in the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.  See, e.g., State v. Wood, 132 
Idaho 88, 98, 967 P.2d 702, 712 (1998).  Rule 1.7 addresses conflicts of interests and, in 2004, 
provided that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent 
conflict of interest.”  Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.7.  A concurrent conflict of interest exists when 
10 
“the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client” or when “there is a 
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the 
lawyer‟s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by the personal 
interests of the lawyer.”  Id.  Representation may continue despite a concurrent conflict of 
interest when, among other things, a client waives the conflict through informed consent.  Id.   
Under Rule 1.10, a lawyer‟s concurrent conflicts of interest are imputed to his or her 
entire firm.  Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.10.  The rule, as it existed in 2004, provided: 
While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a 
client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so 
by Rule[] 1.7 . . . unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the 
prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the 
representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm. 
 
Id.  The Rules define the term “firm” as “lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, 
sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a 
legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.”  Id. 
cmt. 1; see also Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.0(c).  The comments to the Rules go on to state:    
With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, 
there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a 
firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be 
uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be 
clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an 
affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the 
department are directly employed.  
 
Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.0 cmt. 3.  Ultimately, however, whether an entity should be regarded as 
a “firm” must be evaluated in light of the underlying purpose of Rule 1.10, namely, ensuring 
client loyalty and confidentiality.  Id. cmt. 2; Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.10 cmt. 2. 
 
In this case there is no dispute that Mr. Ratliff‟s representation of both Mary‟s mother 
and Severson would give rise to a concurrent conflict of interest.  The issue is whether Mr. 
Ratliff‟s conflict should have been imputed to the entire Elmore County Public Defender‟s 
Office.  The answer to this question depends on whether a public defender‟s office constitutes a 
“firm” under the meaning of Rule 1.10. 
The classification of public defenders‟ offices under the Rules of Professional Conduct is 
a matter of first impression for this Court.  However, the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed the 
issue in an opinion rendered after the trial court‟s decision in this case.  See State v. Cook, 144 
11 
Idaho 784, 171 P.3d 1282 (Ct. App. 2007).  In Cook, the court drew a distinction between private 
law firms and public defenders‟ offices and declined to impute one public defender‟s conflict to 
the entire office.  Id. at 794, 171 P.3d at 1292.  In its decision, the court refused to adopt a per se 
rule regarding the treatment of public defenders‟ offices under the Rules.  Id.  Instead, it decided 
that it was preferable to analyze whether one public defender‟s conflict should be imputed to the 
entire office on a case-by-case basis.  Id.  Under this approach, the relevant inquiry is “whether 
„the circumstances demonstrate a potential conflict of interest and a significant likelihood of 
prejudice.‟”  Id. at 793, 171 P.3d at 1291 (quoting State v. Bell, 447 A.2d 525, 529 (N.J. 1982)).  
If so, there is a presumption that “„both an actual conflict of interest and actual prejudice will 
arise.‟”  Id.  In reaching its decision, the court reasoned that: 
automatically disqualifying a public defender where another attorney in the office 
has a conflict of interest would significantly hamper the ability to provide legal 
representation of indigent clients. This, together with the fact that such concurrent 
representation by public defenders generally will create no incentive (economic or 
otherwise) for diminished advocacy in such cases, convinces us that a per se rule 
imputing conflicts of interest to affiliated public defenders is inappropriate where 
there is no indication the conflict would hamper an attorney‟s ability to effectively 
represent a client.   
 
Id. at 794, 171 P.3d at 1292.   
Cook is in accord with this Court‟s recognition that per se rules requiring automatic 
disqualification are “unnecessary and patently unworkable.” City of Coeur d’Alene v. 
Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 844, 136 P.3d 310, 315 (2006).  Analyzing conflicts within a public 
defender‟s office on a case-by-case basis permits flexibility and ensures that indigent defendants 
receive adequate representation.  At the same time, it protects defendants who would otherwise 
be prejudiced by a public defender‟s conflict of interest.  The Cook framework also takes into 
account the unique nature of public defenders‟ offices.  Unlike other government attorneys, 
public defenders represent individual clients rather than the government itself.  Unlike lawyers in 
a firm, public defenders do not have a financial incentive to represent clients with conflicts of 
interest because they do not share legal fees.  For these reasons, we hold that the framework set 
12 
forth by the Court of Appeals in Cook is the appropriate standard for analyzing conflicts within 
public defenders‟ offices.11        
In this case, the first prong of Cook has clearly been established.  Mr. Ratliff‟s 
representation of Mary‟s mother created a conflict of interest.  Accordingly, whether the conflict 
should be imputed depends on whether the representation presented a significant likelihood of 
prejudice. 
There is no evidence in the record that would support the conclusion that Mr. Ratliff‟s 
conflict was likely to result in prejudice.  Nor is there any indication in the record that Mr. Ratliff 
and Mr. Frachiseur were acting in a manner adverse to Severson‟s interests.  In fact, Mr. Ratliff 
actually took steps to ensure that Severson received diligent representation.12  Additionally, Mr. 
Frachiseur was not the only attorney representing Severson – Mr. Matthews served as co-counsel 
throughout the entire trial.  The presence of co-counsel further diminished any likelihood of 
prejudice since there has been no indication that Mr. Matthews was operating under a conflict of 
interest.  Finally, the court‟s order requiring the public defender‟s office to screen Mr. Ratliff 
from Severson‟s case minimized the likelihood that Severson would be prejudiced by Mr. 
Frachiseur serving as his lawyer.13   See Cook, 144 Idaho at 794 n.8, 171 P.3d at 1292 n.8 (noting 
that the likelihood of prejudice is influenced by “whether an office has set up effective measures 
to prevent communication of confidential client information between lawyers employed on 
behalf of individual defendants”).  Because Mr. Frachiseur‟s representation of Severson did not 
                                                 
11 Severson argues that conflict rules should not be relaxed in the public defender context because indigent 
defendants have the same right to be represented by conflict-free counsel as those who retain their own lawyers.  He 
points out that public defenders get paid by the hour for capital cases and, therefore, have a financial incentive to 
represent clients with conflicts of interest.  Severson‟s argument is unconvincing since it disregards the other public 
policy reasons that favor distinguishing public defenders‟ offices from private law firms.  Severson also argues that 
Cook should be modified to require disqualification based on the statutory right to counsel contained in Idaho Code 
section 19-852.  That statute provides that “[a] needy person who is . . . under formal charge of having committed . . 
. a serious crime, is entitled . . . to be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person having his own 
counsel is so entitled.”  I.C. § 19-852.  Severson, however, fails to indicate why the statutory right to counsel 
demands a different result than the constitutional right to counsel.     
12 Before Mr. Frachiseur was appointed to represent Severson, Mr. Ratliff wrote a letter to the court expressing his 
concern that Severson‟s previous lawyers were not providing adequate representation.   
13 Severson‟s argument that screening was improper because it was not provided for under the Rules of Professional 
Conduct is unpersuasive.  Just because the Rules did not provide for screening at the time does not mean that 
screening was not an available tool.  Similarly, Severson‟s related argument that screening was only proper if he 
consented to the conflict is also unavailing.  The trial court was not required to obtain Severson‟s consent because 
Mr. Ratliff‟s conflict was not imputed to the entire public defender‟s office.  Nor was the court required to inquire 
into the feasibility of screening before entering its order.  The inquiry requirement is limited to determining whether 
a potential conflict exists.  In any event, once the trial court ordered that Mr. Ratliff be screened the Public 
Defender‟s Office was required to implement effective screening measures. 
13 
present a significant likelihood of prejudice, the trial court properly concluded that Mr. Ratliff‟s 
conflict of interest should not be imputed to the entire Public Defender‟s Office.  Accordingly, 
the court was not required to obtain Severson‟s consent for the representation to continue and 
Severson was not deprived of his right to be represented by conflict-free counsel.    
B. 
Severson argues that the trial court‟s decision allowing the State to amend the indictment 
to include possible murder by suffocation without first returning it to the grand jury deprived the 
court of jurisdiction.  He maintains that because the prosecutor chose to proceed by indictment, 
he was entitled to have the grand jury decide what actions gave rise to the charge.  Additionally, 
Severson argues that the amendment was improper because the grand jury considered whether he 
murdered his wife by suffocation, but declined to indict him on that basis.  The State counters 
that the grand jury‟s decision not to indict Severson for murder by suffocation did not preclude 
the court from granting the State‟s motion to amend the indictment.  Further, it maintains that 
Severson‟s focus on the amendment‟s affect on the court‟s jurisdiction is misleading.  According 
to the State, the issue is one of due process.  It contends the amendment to the indictment did not 
violate due process because it only modified the possible means by which the offense was 
committed and, therefore, did not prejudice Severson.   
1. 
Whether an amendment to an indictment should be permitted is a matter within the sound 
discretion of the trial court.  Idaho Crim. R. 7(e); see also State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 841-
42, 655 P.2d 46, 48-49 (1982).  The trial court‟s decision to allow or disallow an amendment will 
be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Id.  Permitting an amendment will only be regarded as an 
abuse of discretion when the amendment prejudices the substantial rights of the defendant.  Id. at 
842, 655 P.2d at 49.  Conversely, whether a charging document conforms to the requirements of 
the law and whether a court has jurisdiction are questions of law, over which this Court exercises 
free review.  State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004).      
2. 
Article I, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution guarantees that “[n]o person shall be held to 
answer for any felony or criminal offense . . . unless on presentment or indictment of a grand 
jury or on information of the public prosecutor.”  Under this provision, a prosecutor may choose 
to bring charges against a defendant by indictment or information.  State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 
14 
210, 214, 953 P.2d 650, 654 (Ct. App. 1998).  Because the charging document is the instrument 
that confers subject matter jurisdiction on a court, whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction 
depends on whether the charging document is legally sufficient.  State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 
228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004); State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 621, 115 P.3d 710, 
712 (2005).     
To be legally sufficient, a charging document must meet two requirements: it must impart 
jurisdiction and satisfy due process.  Quintero, 141 Idaho at 621, 115 P.3d at 712.  An indictment 
confers jurisdiction when it alleges that the defendant committed a criminal offense in the State 
of Idaho.  Id.; Jones, 140 Idaho at 757-58, 101 P.3d at 701-02.  Objections regarding an 
indictment‟s conferral of jurisdiction may be made for the first time on appeal.  Jones, 140 Idaho 
at 758, 101 P.3d at 702.  An indictment satisfies due process when, among other things, it 
contains “factual specificity adequate to „enable a person of common understanding to know 
what is intended‟ and to shield against double jeopardy.”  Id. (quoting State v. Grady, 89 Idaho 
204, 209, 404 P.2d 347, 349-50 (1965)).  Unlike jurisdictional challenges, objections to an 
indictment on grounds of due process are waived if not raised before trial.  Id.       
The indictments in this case were sufficient to vest the trial court with subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Both the original and the amended indictment alleged that Severson had committed 
a criminal offense in the State of Idaho.  Specifically, they accused Severson of committing first-
degree murder in Elmore County.  Because the indictments adequately alleged that Severson 
committed the crime of murder in the State of Idaho, they were sufficient to vest the court with 
jurisdiction to conduct a trial on that charge.  The remaining issue then, is whether the amended 
indictment complied with due process.14   
Due process requires that an indictment be specific enough to ensure that the defendant 
has a meaningful opportunity to prepare his defense and to protect the defendant from a 
subsequent prosecution for the same act.  State v. Gumm, 99 Idaho 549, 551, 585 P.2d 959, 961 
(1978); see also State v. Banks, 113 Idaho 54, 58, 740 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Ct. App. 1987).  
                                                 
14 Severson has not waived his due process challenge.  In his memorandum in opposition to the prosecutor‟s motion 
to amend the indictment, Severson relied, in part, on due process considerations to oppose the amendment.  In the 
motion he stated that “[t]he Idaho Constitution . . . guarantees a defendant due process . . . and guarantees a 
defendant the right to be advised of the charges against him.”  While Severson primarily characterizes the issue on 
appeal as one of jurisdiction, he also argues that it “rise[s] to the level of a constitutional violation.”  Accordingly, 
we will consider whether the amended indictment violated Severson‟s right to due process.   
15 
Accordingly, an indictment must do more than simply state the offense charged.  State v. 
McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 250, 65 P.2d 156, 159-60 (1937).  It must also clearly indicate the facts 
giving rise to the offense or the means by which the defendant committed the alleged crime.15  
See id.; Banks, 113 Idaho at 57, 740 P.2d at 1042.   
An indictment may be amended at any time before the prosecution rests without being 
returned to the grand jury, so long as doing so does not prejudice the defendant‟s substantial 
rights or charge the defendant with a new offense.  Idaho Crim. R. 7(e); see also I.C. § 19-1420; 
State v. O’Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 249, 796 P.2d 121, 126 (1990).  Thus, an amendment that 
merely alleges additional means by which the defendant may have committed the crime is 
permissible if it does not prejudice the defendant.  See Banks, 113 Idaho at 57-60, 740 P.2d at 
1042-45 (permitting amendment to information to include age of victim in order to reflect 
statutory rape as an alternative way of committing rape); see also People v. Liberty, 178 P. 868, 
868 (Cal. 1919) (holding that the trial court‟s decision to permit an amendment adding additional 
means by which the defendant committed the crime of engaging in lewd and lascivious acts with 
a minor was permissible because it did not prejudice the defendant‟s rights); People v. Coleman, 
276 N.E.2d 721, 724 (Ill. 1971) (holding that an amendment to an indictment alleging alternative 
means by which defendant may have killed his wife was permissible because it did not prejudice 
the defendant); People v. McKendrick, 486 N.E.2d 1297, 1303-04 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (holding 
that an amendment modifying the means by which the defendant committed sexual assault was 
permissible); State v. Powell, 664 P.2d 1, 3 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that it was within the 
trial court‟s discretion to amend the indictment to include alternative means of committing first-
degree murder).   Factors relevant to determining whether the defendant was prejudiced include 
whether the amendment alleging the additional facts took the defendant by surprise, impaired the 
defendant‟s ability to adequately prepare his defense, necessitated extensive further preparation 
                                                 
15 This requirement is also imposed by statute.  See I.C. § 19-1409(2) (stating that the indictment must contain “[a] 
statement of the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language”); I.C. § 19-1418(6) & (7) (stating 
that an indictment is sufficient if “the act or omission charged as the offense is clearly and distinctly set forth” and 
“is stated with such a degree of certainty as to enable the court to pronounce judgment upon conviction”); I.C. § 19-
1411(3) (stating that an indictment must be “direct and certain” in regards to the “particular circumstances of the 
offense charged, when they are necessary to constitute a complete offense”); see also Idaho Crim. R. 7(b) (stating 
that an indictment must include “a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the 
offense charged”).   
16 
by the defendant, or subjected him to double jeopardy.  Banks, 113 Idaho at 58-60, 740 P.2d at 
1043-45; Coleman, 276 N.E.2d at 724.    
The amendment to the indictment in this case was permissible under standards of due 
process and Rule 7(e).16  First, the amendment did not charge Severson with a new offense.  Both 
indictments charged Severson with the first-degree murder of his wife.  The amendment merely 
alleged an alternative way Severson might have committed the crime.17  Second, the amendment 
did not prejudice any of Severson‟s substantial rights.  It was made nearly one whole year before 
trial and, therefore, gave Severson more than adequate time to prepare his defense relating to the 
allegation of murder by suffocation.  It did not take Severson by surprise because he was aware 
that the prosecution had advanced the theory that Mary died from suffocation.18  Nor did it 
subject Severson to double jeopardy.  If the jury had convicted or acquitted Severson under the 
original indictment, he could not later be tried on the amended indictment.  Further, Severson has 
not presented any facts or arguments to support the conclusion that the amendment resulted in 
prejudice.  Because the amended indictment did not charge Severson with a new offense or result 
in prejudice, the amendment was permissible under principles of due process and Rule 7(e). 
C. 
Severson argues that the district court committed reversible error by rejecting his request 
to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree upon the specific means by which he killed his 
wife in order to find him guilty of murder.  Severson maintains that the district court‟s failure to 
give a specific unanimity instruction violated his right to a unanimous jury verdict because the 
jury could have found him guilty of first-degree murder for killing his wife by overdosing her 
with sleeping pills, suffocating her, or both.  The State, on the other hand, maintains that the 
                                                 
16 Because the indictment was amended to include additional acts that may have given rise to the offense, it is 
distinguishable from the indictments in the cases Severson cites, which never indicated the means by which the 
defendant committed the crime.  See, e.g., McMahan, 57 Idaho at 249-50, 65 P.2d at 159-60.  
17 Severson argues that under O’Neill an amendment is only permissible if the acts comprising the crime in the 
amended indictment are the same as those in the original indictment.  He relies on statements in O’Neill that “the 
facts alleged rather than the designation of the offense, control” and that the defendant was not “charged with a 
totally different crime, nor any acts different than those originally alleged.”  O’Neill, 118 Idaho at 249-50, 796 P.2d 
at 126-27.  However, Severson‟s characterization of O’Neill is misleading because that case dealt with an 
amendment that alleged a violation of a different statutory provision.  Here, both indictments charged Severson with 
murder under Idaho Code sections 18-4001, 4002, & 4003.   
18 Severson had a copy of the grand jury transcript of Dr. Groben‟s testimony, which indicated that Mary may have 
died by suffocation.  Additionally, Severson acknowledged that suffocation was a possible manner of death in his 
motion to dismiss or quash the grand jury indictment, which was filed in May 2003 – five months before the State 
sought permission to amend the indictment. 
17 
unanimity requirement does not apply to the jury‟s determination of the victim‟s cause of death.  
Alternatively, it argues that even if Severson was entitled to a unanimity instruction, the trial 
court‟s failure to give the instruction was harmless error. 
1. 
This Court exercises free review over whether a jury was given proper instructions.  
Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 265, 16 P.3d 937, 941 (Ct. App. 2000).  An error in jury 
instructions only constitutes reversible error when the instruction misled the jury or prejudiced 
the party challenging the instruction.  State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 1089 
(1998).  If the instructions, “considered as a whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and 
state the applicable law, then no error [has been] committed.”  Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 
N.A., 110 Idaho 15, 19, 713 P.2d 1374, 1378 (1985); see also Row, 131 Idaho at 310, 955 P.2d at 
1089. 
2. 
A trial court presiding over a criminal case must instruct the jury on all matters of law 
necessary for the jury‟s information.  I.C. § 19-2132.  In other words, a trial court must deliver 
instructions on the rules of law that are “material to the determination of the defendant‟s guilt or 
innocence.”  State v. Mack, 132 Idaho 480, 483, 974 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Ct. App. 1999).  This 
necessarily includes instructions on the “nature and elements of the crime charged and the 
essential legal principles applicable to the evidence that has been admitted.”  State v. Gain, 140 
Idaho 170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 2004).  Each party is entitled to request the delivery 
of specific instructions.  However, such instructions will only be given if they are “correct and 
pertinent.”  I.C. § 19-2132.  A proposed instruction is not “correct and pertinent” if it is: (1) an 
erroneous statement of the law; (2) adequately covered by other instructions; or (3) “not 
supported by the facts of the case.”  State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 285, 647 P.2d 734, 741 
(1982).   
 
Under Idaho law, a trial court is required to instruct the jury that it must unanimously 
agree on the defendant‟s guilt in order to convict the defendant of a crime.  Miller, 135 Idaho at 
267-68, 16 P.3d at 943-44; see also IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7; I.C. §§ 19-2316 & 2317; Idaho 
Crim. R. 31.  An instruction that the jury must unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the 
18 
offense, however, is generally not required.19  State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 19, 981 P.2d 738, 
744 (1999); see also Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631 (1991) (“We have never suggested that 
in returning general verdicts . . . jurors should be required to agree upon a single means of 
commission.”).  In Nunez, a police officer was indicted for several crimes relating to drugs and 
money stolen from the police station‟s evidence lockers.  Nunez, 133 Idaho at 15, 981 P.2d at 
740.  The officer was found guilty of racketeering, misuse of public monies, sales tax violations, 
and conspiracy to alter or destroy evidence.  Id. at 16, 981 P.2d at 741.  On appeal, the officer 
challenged the district court‟s decision not to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on 
the underlying act giving rise to the misuse of public monies charge.  Id. at 18-19, 981 P.2d at 
743-44.  We rejected the officer‟s argument and held that there is generally no “requirement that 
the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict.”  Id. at 19, 
981 P.2d at 744.  We reasoned that the jury must only reach a unanimous decision regarding the 
defendant‟s guilt – “not the underlying facts that establish the elements of the crime.”  Id.; see 
also Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 372-73, 33 P.3d 841, 846-47 (Ct. App. 2001) (concluding 
that a defendant charged with lewd conduct involving manual-genital and/or genital-genital 
contact was not entitled to a specific unanimity instruction because “[t]he prohibited acts [we]re 
merely alternative means by which [the] defendant . . . may be held criminally liable”).  To 
require unanimous factual findings would ignore the fact that “different jurors may be persuaded 
by different pieces of evidence, even [though] they agree upon the bottom line.”  Schad, 501 
U.S. at 631-32 (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 (1990) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring)).  Because the jury was not required to unanimously agree on the facts constituting 
the crime, a specific unanimity instruction was not required.  Nunez, 133 Idaho at 19, 981 P.2d at 
744.  
 
An instruction informing the jury that it must unanimously agree on the specific 
occurrence giving rise to the offense is necessary, however, when the defendant commits several 
acts, each of which would independently support a conviction for the crime charged.  See Miller, 
                                                 
19 The United States Supreme Court has indicated, however, that due process would not permit states to convict 
defendants of crimes so generic that any number of findings by the jury could result in a finding of guilt.  See Schad 
v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 633 (1991) (stating that “nothing in our history suggests that the Due Process Clause 
would permit a State to convict anyone under a charge of „Crime‟ so generic that any combination of jury findings 
of embezzlement, reckless driving, murder, burglary, tax evasion, or littering, for example, would suffice for 
conviction”). 
19 
135 Idaho at 268, 16 P.3d at 944; State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 167-68, 90 P.3d 910, 917-18 
(Ct. App. 2004); Gain, 140 Idaho at 172-73, 90 P.3d at 922-23.  In Miller, the defendant was 
convicted on one count of engaging in manual-genital contact with an eight-year-old girl.  Miller, 
135 Idaho at 264, 16 P.3d at 940.  Even though the evidence presented at trial revealed that the 
contact had occurred on six separate occasions, the trial court did not give a specific unanimity 
instruction to the jury.  Id. at 268, 16 P.3d at 944.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that a 
specific unanimity instruction should have been given.  Id.  The court reasoned that such an 
instruction was proper because each instance in which the contact took place was “a separate 
incident – a distinct union of mens rea and actus reus separated by a discrete period of time and 
circumstance from any other such similar incident.”  Id.  Since the prosecutor could have 
charged the defendant for each of the six instances, the defendant was entitled to have the jury 
instructed that it must agree on a single incident in order to find him guilty.  Id.       
 
The trial court in this case was not required to instruct the jury that it must unanimously 
agree on the means by which Severson killed his wife in order to find him guilty of murder.  
Such an instruction would not have been “correct and pertinent” under section 19-2132 because 
it was not supported by the facts of the case.  Severson was charged with the single act of 
murdering his wife.  The evidence presented at trial did not allege that he engaged in the conduct 
giving rise to the offense on more than one occasion.  Although the evidence showed that 
Severson could have murdered his wife by either overdosing her or suffocating her, it did not 
indicate that separate incidents involving distinct unions of mens rea and actus reus occurred.  
The very nature of the crime of murder eliminates this possibility.  Absent evidence of more than 
one instance in which Severson engaged in the charged conduct, the jury was not required to 
unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense.  See Gain, 140 Idaho at 174, 90 P.3d at 
924 (concluding that a specific unanimity instruction was not required where the State presented 
evidence of one incident that served as the basis for all three counts the defendant was charged 
with).  The jury could have found Severson guilty of murdering his wife by overdosing her, 
suffocating her, or both.  Because there was no risk that Severson could be convicted of the 
single act of murdering Mary on more than one occasion, the trial court did not err by not giving 
a specific unanimity instruction to the jury. 
20 
D. 
Severson argues that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty of 
murdering his wife.  He points out that, while the State presented evidence regarding the possible 
causes of Mary‟s death, it did not offer any evidence linking her death to a criminal act he 
committed.  The State maintains that it presented enough evidence for the jury to conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Severson murdered his wife. 
1. 
We will uphold a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict so long as there is 
substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution 
proved all essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Sheahan, 139 
Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003).  Evidence is substantial if a “reasonable trier of fact 
would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been 
prove[n].”  State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134, 135, 937 P.2d 960, 961 (Ct. App. 1997).  On appeal 
from a defendant‟s conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution in determining whether substantial evidence exists.  Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 286, 77 
P.3d at 975.  We will not substitute our own judgment for that of the jury on matters such as the 
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to certain evidence, and “the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”  Id. (quoting State v. Allen, 129 Idaho 556, 558, 929 
P.2d 118, 120 (1996)).  Accordingly, substantial evidence may exist even when the evidence 
presented is solely circumstantial or when there is conflicting evidence.  State v. Stevens, 93 
Idaho 48, 50-51, 454 P.2d 945, 947-48 (1969); State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 704, 132 P.3d 
455, 461 (Ct. App. 2005).  In fact, even when circumstantial evidence could be interpreted 
consistently with a finding of innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it 
also gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt.  State v. Slawson, 124 Idaho 753, 757, 864 P.2d 
199, 203 (Ct. App. 1993).   
2. 
For Severson to be found guilty of first-degree murder, the State was required to prove 
that Severson willfully, deliberately, and with malice aforethought and premeditation, killed 
Mary by overdosing her, suffocating her, or both.  See I.C. §§ 18-4001 to -4003.  Additionally, 
the State was required to prove the corpus delicti of the crime.  State v. Cutler, 94 Idaho 295, 
296, 486 P.2d 1008, 1009 (1971).  In homicide cases, the corpus delicti consists of two elements: 
21 
(1) the death of the individual “named in the charge as . . . being dead;” and (2) the death was 
caused by a criminal act of the defendant.  Id.  These two elements may be satisfied based solely 
on circumstantial evidence.  Id. at 297, 486 P.2d at 1010.   
Severson argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving the corpus delicti of 
the crime because the evidence it presented only indicated that Mary possibly died by suffocating 
or overdosing.  According to Severson, not only did the State fail to prove Mary‟s cause of death, 
it failed to show her death was the result of the criminal agency of another.20  In making his 
argument, Severson relies on two cases from other jurisdictions, which held that the prosecution 
did not satisfy its burden of proving the corpus delicti because it failed to prove the victim‟s 
cause of death.  See People v. Ehlert, 811 N.E.2d 620 (Ill. 2004); Frutiger v. State, 907 P.2d 158 
(Nev. 1995).  The cases Severson relies on, however, are distinguishable from the facts of this 
case.  In Ehlert, a mother was convicted of murdering her newborn child.  Ehlert, 811 N.E.2d at 
625.  On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed her conviction because the prosecution 
failed to prove that the baby was born alive or that it died from unnatural causes.  Id. at 628-30.  
Similarly, in Frutiger, the Nevada Supreme Court overturned the defendant‟s conviction for 
murder because, as a result of severe decomposition, pathologists could not conclusively 
determine the victim‟s cause of death.  Frutiger, 907 P.2d at 159, 161-62.  Although one 
pathologist concluded that the victim most likely died from chronic alcoholism, the evidence also 
showed the victim could have died from natural causes such as heart disease or hypertension.  Id. 
at 162.   
Unlike the situations in Ehlert and Frutiger, there was no evidence indicating Mary died 
from natural causes. The State‟s medical expert, Dr. Glenn Groben, testified that Mary‟s death 
was the result of a drug overdose, suffocation, or a combination of both.  The only reason he 
listed her death as “undetermined” was because the evidence supported both possible causes of 
death.  Regardless of whether Mary‟s death was caused by suffocation or overdosing, it was not 
the result of natural causes.  Accordingly, the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in 
Ehlert and Fruitiger.  Because the State was not required to prove the specific cause of Mary‟s 
death, the fact that Mary may have died from one of two possible causes did not preclude the 
jury from finding Severson guilty of murder.  See Cutler, 94 Idaho at 297, 486 P.2d at 1010; see 
                                                 
20 He points out that the State did not present a murder weapon and that its own experts admitted Mary‟s death could 
have been the result of her own accidental ingestion of the pills, sleep apnea, or taking Hydroxycut.   
22 
also Sheriff, Washoe County v. Middleton, 921 P.2d 282, 286 (Nev. 1996) (“The state is required 
only to show a hypothesis that death occurred by criminal agency; it is not required to show a 
hypothesis of a specific cause of death.”).    
Despite Severson‟s assertions, there was substantial and competent evidence to support 
the jury‟s conclusion that he killed his wife by overdosing her, suffocating her, or both.  
Although Mary‟s cause of death was ultimately listed as “undetermined,” a reasonable jury could 
have concluded that she was murdered.  The autopsy performed by Dr. Groben revealed that 
Mary had lethal levels of Unisom in her system and toxic levels of Ambien.  Dr. Groben only 
considered overdose a possible cause of death because there was evidence indicating Mary may 
have been suffocated.  Mary‟s autopsy revealed that there were bruises and abrasions on her face 
and cuts on the inside of her lip.  According to Dr. Groben, the marks were inconsistent with 
resuscitative efforts, but could have been caused by suffocation.21  More specifically, he believed 
that the marks were consistent with those that would result from being suffocated by someone‟s 
hand.     
There was substantial circumstantial evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Severson was the person who suffocated or overdosed Mary.  The fact that 
the State did not provide direct evidence to that effect does not prohibit this conclusion.  See 
Cutler, 94 Idaho at 297, 486 P.2d at 1010.  The evidence produced at trial revealed that it was 
unlikely that Mary‟s overdose was self-imposed,22 but there was substantial evidence linking 
Severson to her murder.  The evidence revealed that Severson had a motive to kill his wife, was 
preparing people for her death, had recently tried to poison her, had tried to conceal the 
circumstances surrounding her death, and had the opportunity and means to kill her.  
The evidence presented at trial revealed that Severson had both financial and personal 
incentives to kill Mary.  Before Mary died, she informed Severson that if he insisted on 
divorcing her, she would get everything and would request $3,000.00 per month in alimony.  
Severson then repeatedly told people that he wanted to divorce Mary but could not afford to 
                                                 
21 Severson maintains that marks were caused by the paramedics conducting CPR on Mary, intubating her, and 
securing an endotracheal tube holder on her face.  He points to several facts in the record that could arguably support 
his assertion.  Although Severson‟s explanations may be plausible, his argument ignores the fact that the State 
presented evidence indicating the abrasions were inconsistent with resuscitative efforts.  Accordingly, it was up to 
the jury to weigh the conflicting evidence in making its determination of guilt.  Stefani, 142 Idaho at 704, 132 P.3d 
at 461. 
22 Mary‟s treating physician testified that Mary did not have suicidal ideations.   
23 
because all of the couple‟s assets were in her name.  Additionally, Severson thought he was the 
beneficiary of Mary‟s $200,000.00 life insurance policy.23  Severson began looking into the 
policy the day Mary died.  In a conversation with his son, Severson indicated that he needed to 
look at the policy because Mary‟s mother had called and asked about it.  However, Mary‟s 
mother testified that she did not ask Severson about the policy until the next day and that, when 
she did ask about it, Severson denied its existence.  Finally, Severson‟s motive to kill Mary was 
supported by evidence that the Seversons were having marital problems and that Severson was 
pursuing other women.  Severson became engaged to another woman while still married to Mary 
and then started dating another woman immediately after Mary‟s death.   
There was also evidence indicating that Severson had been planning Mary‟s death.  
Shortly after Mary returned to Idaho, Severson began poisoning her and trying to prepare people 
for her death.24  More specifically, Severson was poisoning Mary‟s Hydroxycut with Drano.25  
When Mary first started suffering from stomach problems relating to the contaminated 
Hydroxycut, Severson began telling people that she was dying, but that Mary‟s doctor did not 
want her to find out.  He also told people that Mary was suffering from sleep apnea, which 
causes people to stop breathing in their sleep.  However, Mary was never treated for, and never 
reported suffering from, sleep apnea.26  Additionally, the emergency room physician who tried to 
resuscitate Mary testified that the “sleep apnea” symptoms Severson reported Mary allegedly 
suffered from did not fit any illness she was familiar with.  In light of this evidence, the jury 
could have reasonably concluded that Severson was deliberately planning Mary‟s death.         
                                                 
23 After Mary died, Severson found out that Mary‟s mother was the beneficiary.   
24 Severson does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for poisoning Mary. 
25 After beginning their investigation into Mary‟s death, the police discovered that Mary‟s Hydroxycut had been 
tampered with.  One of her bottles of Hydroxycut, which appeared to be unopened, had actually been opened and 
resealed.  The shrink-wrap had simply been glued to the bottle in order to appear unopened.  When investigators 
opened the bottle, they discovered the cotton that normally lies on top of the pills had been moved to the side and, in 
its place, were several discolored pills.  Another bottle of Hydroxycut had nearly forty discolored pills.  
Significantly, no other complaints of contaminated Hydroxycut had been made to the manufacturer or to the Food 
and Drug Administration.  Upon testing the discolored pills, investigators learned that they contained Drano.  The 
Drano found in the pills matched Hydroxycut capsule pieces and residue in a trash can found during the search of 
Severson‟s workplace.  Additionally, three months after Mary‟s death, Severson told the woman he was dating that 
Hydroxycut pills “will kill you and that you could fill the[m] up.”   
26 Although there was a note on one medical chart stating “? Sleep Apnea,” Mary was not treated for the condition 
and the doctor who wrote the note testified that he could not remember if Mary reported the condition or if someone 
else in the room with her did.   
24 
Finally, the evidence showed that Severson attempted to conceal the circumstances 
surrounding Mary‟s death.  Severson did not call 911 after he “found” Mary lying on the couch 
not breathing.  Instead, his daughter-in-law made the call after she arrived at Severson‟s home 
and realized that he had not called an ambulance.  After Mary died, Severson tried to hide the 
fact that she had been taking sleeping pills.  When asked at the hospital what medications Mary 
had been taking, Severson failed to mention that she was taking Ambien even though he 
requested and picked up a refill of the medication for her the day before.  He also told his 
daughter-in-law that Mary had not been taking anything to help her sleep.  Then, during the 
search of Severson‟s home, investigators found a baggie of Unisom pills hidden in the brim of a 
hat with the word “dad” printed on it.   
In sum, although the State‟s case against Severson was circumstantial, there was 
substantial and competent evidence to support the jury‟s conclusion that Severson was guilty of 
first-degree murder.  Severson was the only person besides Mary in the couple‟s home that night.  
He had access to Mary‟s sleeping pills and the means to suffocate her.  He “discovered” her 
lying on the couch not breathing, but did not call 911.  He had a motive to kill Mary, had 
recently tried to poison her, and tried to conceal facts relevant to the cause of her death.  While 
some of the evidence presented may have been susceptible to reasonable inferences of both guilt 
and innocence, deciding what inferences to draw was up to the jury.  See State v. Ojeda, 119 
Idaho 862, 865, 810 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Ct. App. 1991).  For these reasons, the jury could have 
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Severson murdered his wife by suffocating her, 
overdosing her, or both.        
E. 
Severson argues that the prosecution violated his constitutional right to a fair trial by 
committing various acts of prosecutorial misconduct.  He maintains that the prosecution engaged 
in misconduct by failing to disclose witnesses and evidence to the defense in a timely manner, 
ignoring direct orders from the trial court, intentionally asking questions to which the answer 
was known to be inadmissible, misrepresenting facts, and appealing to the “passions and 
prejudice of the jurors during closing argument.”  The State counters that Severson failed to raise 
some of these objections at trial, that the prosecution did not engage in misconduct, and that 
Severson was not deprived of his right to a fair trial. 
25 
1. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that a state may not 
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV; see also IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13.  The clause has been interpreted to require 
states to ensure that criminal defendants‟ trials be fundamentally fair.  Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 
99 Idaho 18, 19, 576 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1978).  To be regarded as fundamentally fair, a trial need 
not be error-free.  Id.; see also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968).   
As public officers, prosecutors have a duty to ensure that defendants receive fair trials.  
State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44, 71 P. 608, 610-11 (1903).  In carrying out this duty, a 
prosecutor must “guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors, and tend to 
hinder them from considering only the evidence introduced.”  Id. at 44, 71 P. at 611.  A 
prosecutor must also ensure that the jury receives only competent evidence. State v. 
Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469, 163 P.3d 1175, 1181 (2007).  Under certain circumstances, a 
prosecutor‟s failure to fulfill these duties will result in reversal of the defendant‟s conviction.  Id.  
On appeal, the standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct depends 
on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.  As a general rule, we will not 
consider arguments made for the first time on appeal.  State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 503, 616 
P.2d 1034, 1039 (1980).  When the alleged error constitutes a fundamental error, however, 
review on appeal is permissible.  State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251, 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971).  
Accordingly, when an objection to prosecutorial misconduct is not raised at trial, the misconduct 
will serve as a basis for setting aside a conviction only when the “conduct is sufficiently 
egregious to result in fundamental error.”  State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 
140 (1997).  Misconduct will be regarded as fundamental error when it “goes to the foundation 
or basis of a defendant‟s rights or . . . to the foundation of the case or take[s] from the defendant 
a right which was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to 
waive.”  State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 423, 776 P.2d 424, 432 (1989) (quoting State v. 
Garcia, 128 P.2d 459, 462 (1942)).  “However, even when prosecutorial misconduct has resulted 
in fundamental error, the conviction will not be reversed when that error is harmless.”  State v. 
Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007).  Under the harmless error doctrine, a 
conviction will stand if the Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result 
26 
would have been reached by the jury had the prosecutorial misconduct not occurred.  State v. 
LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 844, 655 P.2d 46, 51 (1982).      
Conversely, when an objection to alleged prosecutorial misconduct is raised at trial, we 
use a two-part test to determine whether the misconduct requires reversal.  See, e.g., State v. 
Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 448, 816 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Ct. App. 1991).  First, we ask whether the 
prosecutor‟s challenged action was improper.  State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 
P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003).  If it was not, then there was no prosecutorial misconduct.  Id.  
If the conduct was improper, we then consider whether the misconduct “prejudiced the 
defendant‟s right to a fair trial or whether it was harmless.”  Id.  The defendant carries the burden 
of proving prejudice.  State v. Wright, 97 Idaho 229, 232, 542 P.2d 63, 66 (1975).  When a 
defendant is unable to demonstrate prejudice, the misconduct will be regarded as harmless error.  
State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 111, 594 P.2d 146, 149 (1979).   
Because different standards govern the alleged acts of prosecutorial misconduct that 
Severson objected to at trial and those that he did not, his claims will be analyzed accordingly.  
2. 
 
Severson raises several challenges to the prosecutor‟s actions for the first time on appeal.  
Specifically, he challenges the prosecutor‟s lunch meeting with a witness who had yet to be 
cross-examined, late disclosure of evidence, “speaking objections,” and various comments made 
during closing arguments.  
a. 
 
Severson contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by meeting over lunch with 
a witness during a break from testimony.27  He maintains that the prosecutor‟s action was “just 
another example of an attempt by the prosecution to obtain an advantage over the defense.”  The 
State argues that the lunch meeting did not violate Severson‟s right to a fair trial. 
 
Severson‟s argument that the prosecutor‟s lunch with a witness constituted misconduct 
centers on one of the district court‟s instructions given on the first day of testimony.  
Immediately before a short recess, the district court informed the parties that they were not to 
meet with witnesses during breaks from their testimony.  In spite of the district court‟s 
                                                 
27 During a hearing outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel questioned the witness regarding his lunch with 
the prosecutor, but did not object to the conduct.  Nor did he object to the court‟s conclusion that the discussion over 
lunch was not inappropriate.  Accordingly, his challenge must be reviewed under the doctrine of fundamental error. 
27 
instruction, the prosecutor went to lunch with Dr. Groben after he had taken the witness stand, 
but before he had been cross-examined by defense counsel.  During cross-examination, Dr. 
Groben admitted to discussing Severson‟s case with the prosecutor at lunch.  The court then held 
a hearing outside of the presence of the jury to determine the extent of the conversation.  
Ultimately, the court concluded that the lunchtime conversation was not improper and decided 
further action was unnecessary.   
Severson has failed to show that the prosecutor‟s lunch with Dr. Groben constituted 
fundamental error.  The prosecutor‟s actions did not go to the foundation of Severson‟s case or 
implicate any of his constitutional rights.  Severson merely alleges that “the extent to which the 
State‟s willful violation of the district court‟s . . . order affected the trial proceedings can never 
be known.”  Severson‟s bare assertion does not fulfill his burden of establishing fundamental 
error.  Accordingly, he is not entitled to a reversal of his conviction on this basis. 
b. 
Severson argues that the prosecution‟s late disclosures of evidence, when considered with 
its other acts of misconduct, deprived him of his right to a fair trial.  Specifically, Severson refers 
to the State‟s failure to promptly provide the defense with a complete litigation packet and 
certain investigation notes.28  The State argues that we should not consider Severson‟s argument 
because he did not “offer any argument or authority on why the late disclosure of . . . evidence 
rises to the level of prosecutorial misconduct.”  Alternatively, the State argues that even if we 
consider Severson‟s claim, the late disclosures did not rise to the level of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  It maintains that the only time a prosecutor‟s failure to disclose evidence or 
witnesses should be treated as misconduct is when the failure is a violation of Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).29  According to the State, other failures to disclose are only 
discovery violations, the remedy for which is within the trial court‟s discretion.  Additionally, the 
State argues that, even if the late disclosures constituted misconduct, Severson failed to show he 
was prejudiced by the untimely disclosures. 
 
The State is incorrect in asserting that Severson did not support his position with 
argument or authority.  In making his argument that the prosecution‟s late disclosures should be 
                                                 
28 Although the late disclosures were brought to the attention of the trial court, Severson never objected to them.  His 
lawyer merely stated that he “wanted the record to reflect that we are getting large amounts of [late] discovery.”   
29 Brady requires prosecutors to disclose evidence that is material to the defendant‟s guilt or punishment.  Brady, 
373 U.S. at 87. 
28 
considered in determining whether he was deprived of a fair trial, Severson relies on Solles v. 
Israel, 868 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1989).  In Solles, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
acknowledged that late disclosures by the prosecution could constitute misconduct.  Id. at 248-
50.  However, the court held that defendants must show the untimely disclosures resulted in 
prejudice.  Id. at 250.  Only when defense counsel is unable to overcome the adverse affect of the 
late disclosures will the defendant‟s conviction be reversed.  Id.  
 
Although Severson has supported his position with authority, he nonetheless failed to 
show that the late disclosures constituted fundamental error.  The first late disclosure occurred 
when the State failed to provide documentation regarding the testing and calibration of 
equipment in a laboratory litigation packet.  The second instance occurred when the State 
belatedly turned over investigation notes prepared by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  
Nothing about the prosecution‟s late disclosures went to the foundation of Severson‟s case or 
otherwise deprived him of his rights.  Severson points to only two instances in which the State 
made untimely disclosures.  In neither instance is there evidence indicating that the late 
disclosure had an adverse impact on the fairness of Severson‟s trial.  Moreover, the record shows 
that the late disclosures were inadvertent and that the prosecution took prompt actions to provide 
the information to the defense once the mistakes were brought to its attention.  Accordingly, the 
late disclosures were not fundamental error.30   
c. 
Severson argues that the prosecution‟s disregard of the trial court‟s instruction not to 
make “speaking objections” was prosecutorial misconduct.31  He contends that by making 
“speaking objections” the prosecutor “improperly used [his] position of authority [as] an officer 
of the court to present improper evidence and argument to the jury that otherwise should not 
have been considered.”  The State argues Severson has failed to show that the objections 
constituted prosecutorial misconduct.  It maintains that the district court‟s instruction was not 
                                                 
30 With regard to the late disclosure of portions of the laboratory packet, the record shows that once the prosecution 
realized the packet was missing information, it took efforts to obtain the information and provide it to the defense.  
The prosecution delivered the information in time for Severson to have it examined by his own toxicologist.  
Similarly, the prosecution provided Severson with the federal investigation notes.  At a hearing before the court, 
Severson‟s lawyer admitted that he had an opportunity to review the notes and that the late disclosure did not create 
any problems for the defense.   
31 On the first day of trial, the court informed the lawyers “I don‟t want speaking objections.  I want objections.”     
29 
clear as to what constituted a “speaking objection” and that throughout the course of the trial the 
court allowed both parties to make objections similar to those challenged by Severson.  
Severson‟s challenge focuses on three responses the prosecution gave to defense 
counsel‟s objections.  Only two of those challenges, however, were raised at trial.32  Those will 
be dealt with later.  Severson‟s challenge to the speaking objection that was not raised at trial 
will only be reviewed for fundamental error.  That challenge relates to the prosecutor‟s response 
to a hearsay objection raised by the defense.  Defense counsel objected after the prosecutor asked 
a police officer where she was told certain pills were found.  In response to the objection, the 
prosecutor argued that the testimony was not hearsay because “I am offering [it] for 
impeachment evidence . . . not for the truth of the matter stated. . . . I believe the officer either 
misspoke or has a different recollection of where that item was found.  This officer knows that 
information and I believe has testified about it previously.”  
The prosecutor‟s speaking objection was not fundamental error.  Severson has failed to 
indicate how the statement resulted in an unfair trial or deprived him of any other fundamental 
right.  Moreover, in responding to the objection, the prosecutor was not attempting to 
deliberately violate the court‟s order.  Instead, the prosecutor was merely trying to explain why 
the statement was not being offered for its truth.  Because the prosecutor‟s statement did not give 
rise to fundamental error, it does not justify reversing Severson‟s conviction. 
d. 
 
Severson challenges several of the prosecutor‟s statements made during closing 
argument.  Specifically, he argues that the prosecutor improperly commented on his failure to 
testify, about Mary speaking from her grave, and about Mary‟s family.  He argues that these 
instances of prosecutorial misconduct, taken individually or together, constituted fundamental 
error because a curative instruction could not remove the taint of the misconduct in light of the 
lack of evidence offered by the State.  The State argues that Severson has failed to show that any 
prosecutorial misconduct constituted fundamental error. 
 
Severson‟s first challenge focuses on the prosecutor‟s statement that “[t]his is a 
circumstantial case, because nobody was in that house that night but Mary and Larry.  Nobody 
knows, that has testified, what happened between them.”  He argues that the statement was an 
                                                 
32 With regard to the third speaking objection, Severson objected to the prosecutor‟s initial question but not the 
speaking objection itself.     
30 
impermissible comment on his decision not to testify.  The State argues that, when considered in 
context, the prosecutor‟s statement was not emphasizing Severson‟s failure to testify.  It 
maintains the argument was merely a response to Severson‟s claim that the bruises on Mary‟s 
face could have been caused by resuscitative efforts. 
The Fifth Amendment prohibits prosecutors from making direct or indirect comments on 
a defendant‟s failure to testify in order to infer guilt.  State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588, 591, 671 
P.2d 1051, 1054 (1983); see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1967); Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).  However, the United States Supreme Court has noted that 
in determining whether a prosecutor‟s comment violated the Fifth Amendment, “a court should 
not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging 
meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the 
plethora of less damaging interpretations.”  Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 
(1974).  Additionally, such comments must be evaluated “in light of defense conduct and in the 
context of the entire trial.” Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting United 
States v. McKoy, 771 F.2d 1207, 1212 (9th Cir.1985)).      
  
Severson has failed to prove that the prosecutor‟s statement was an impermissible 
comment on his silence that constituted fundamental error.  Although the statement that “[t]his is 
a circumstantial case, because nobody was in that house that night but Mary and Larry.  Nobody 
knows, that has testified, what happened between them” could be interpreted as a reference to 
Severson‟s failure to testify, it could also be accorded other meanings.  For example, the 
comment could have been a reference to Dr. Groben‟s inability to conclusively establish Mary‟s 
cause of death.  Because we will not accord the prosecutor‟s comment its most damaging 
meaning, we are unwilling to conclude that the prosecutor was referencing Severson‟s silence.  
Nothing in the statement explicitly called for the jury to infer Severson was guilty because of his 
silence or to convict him on that basis.  In all likelihood, given the ambiguous nature of the 
statement, the prosecutor did not even consider the interpretation Severson would attach to it.  
Moreover, since the statement was a single, isolated comment made during the course of a 
seventeen-day trial, there was substantial evidence of Severson‟s guilt, and the trial court 
instructed the jury not to draw negative inferences from Severson‟s failure to testify, the 
statement did not deprive Severson of due process or render his trial fundamentally unfair.    
31 
Severson also challenges the prosecutor‟s statements regarding Mary speaking from her 
grave.  He relies on Rockman v. DeRobertis, 717 F. Supp. 553 (N.D. Ill. 1989), for the 
proposition that a prosecutor‟s reference to the victim speaking from the grave is improper.  In 
Rockman, the prosecutor stated that the victim was “in his grave crying out for a guilty verdict.”  
Id. at 568 (internal alteration marks omitted).  On appeal, the court held that the statement did not 
violate the defendant‟s right to due process even though it arguably inflamed the emotions of the 
jurors.  Id. at 569-70.  The court reasoned that the ample evidence supporting the defendant‟s 
conviction outweighed what little prejudice the statement created.  Id. at 570.  For this reason, 
the court concluded that the absence of the error would not have caused the jury to decide the 
case differently.  Id.   
In this case, the prosecutor‟s statements that Mary was speaking from her grave were 
somewhat inflammatory because they were likely designed to appeal to the sympathies and 
passions of the jury.  The comments did not, however, rise to the level of fundamental error.  In 
his closing argument, the prosecutor stated: “Mary still speaks to us today.  She is still telling us 
what happened that night and why she is dead. . . . Mary tells us, she speaks to us from her grave 
as to who killed her and why she died.”33  These statements were less inflammatory than those in 
Rockman, which actually stated that the victim was calling for a conviction from his grave.  
Here, the statements were simply referring to Mary‟s body providing evidence about the 
circumstances surrounding her death, not to her calling out for Severson‟s conviction.  Because 
the statements did not result in an unfair trial or deprive Severson of due process, they were not 
fundamental error.     
 
Next, Severson challenges the prosecutor‟s references to Mary‟s family.  On rebuttal, the 
prosecutor argued: “Mary Severson isn‟t a decedent.  Mary Severson was the 35-year-old mother 
of two boys.  Mary Severson was the daughter of Carol Diaz.  Mary Severson was the sister of 
                                                 
33 Severson also appears to challenge the prosecutor‟s statements that “I would love to talk to Mary Severson and 
find out, on the early-morning hours of February 15th, how she was feeling” and that “[t]here is no innocence in this 
courtroom except the innocence of Mary Severson.  She didn‟t have to die.”  Although Severson italicizes the 
statements in an excerpt of the prosecutor‟s argument in his brief, he does not argue how they gave rise to 
fundamental error.  He only argues that “the prosecutor‟s continued references to the victim speaking from the grave 
and to Ms. Severson‟s family had absolutely no value except to inflame the passions and sympathies of the jury.”  
However, the italicized statements do not reference Mary speaking from her grave or Mary‟s family.  Because 
Severson does not support his apparent challenge with argument or authority, we will not address the statements on 
appeal.  See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). 
 
32 
Maria Gray.  Mary Severson‟s life had purpose, and it had meaning.  Your duty today is to give 
her death justice.”  The prosecutor also referred to Mary just having spent her last Christmas 
with her family.   
It is generally recognized that a prosecutor may not comment on the victim‟s family 
during closing argument in order to appeal to the sympathies of the jury.  See, e.g., State v. 
Watlington, 579 A.2d 490, 493 (Conn. 1990) (holding that a prosecutor‟s reference to victims 
and their families during closing arguments was improper); People v. Harris, 866 N.E.2d 162, 
180 (Ill. 2007) (holding that a prosecutor‟s statements that the victim was both a father and a 
husband were improper).  Such extraneous statements are considered improper because their 
only purpose is to encourage the jury to identify with the victim.  Watlington, 579 A.2d at 493.  
Whether such comments constitute fundamental error, however, must be considered in the 
context of the entire trial.  Harris, 866 N.E.2d at 181.   
 
The prosecutor‟s references to Mary‟s family, while arguably improper, did not constitute 
fundamental error.  The statements were not dwelled upon or made in support of an argument 
that Severson receive a harsher punishment.  Instead, the statements merely reiterated evidence 
that had been produced at trial.  Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury on several occasions 
that the prosecutor‟s arguments were not to be regarded as evidence.  The statements did not 
impact the fairness of Severson‟s trial or deprive him of due process and, therefore, were not 
fundamental error.    
In sum, because none of the prosecutor‟s statements during closing argument rose to the 
level of fundamental error, they do not justify reversing Severson‟s conviction. 
3. 
On appeal, Severson renews several challenges to the prosecution‟s conduct that he 
raised at trial.  These challenges relate to two statements made during closing argument, late 
disclosure of witnesses, speaking objections, and attempts to introduce “clearly inadmissible” 
evidence.  As discussed above, when a defendant objects to alleged prosecutorial misconduct at 
trial, this Court need not engage in the fundamental error analysis.  State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 
571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007).  Instead, we utilize the two-part test for misconduct, which asks 
whether the conduct was proper and, if not, whether it was harmless error.  Id.      
33 
a. 
Severson challenges the prosecutor‟s statements during closing argument that he was 
having an affair with a “21-year-old tramp” two months before Mary‟s death and that he was 
“screwing some 21-year-old.”34  Severson argues that the statements were made solely to evoke 
feelings of anger towards him and sympathy for Mary.  The State argues that, while the 
prosecutor‟s choice of words was crude, the statements were not prosecutorial misconduct.   
Generally, both parties are given wide latitude in making their arguments to the jury and 
discussing the evidence and inferences to be made therefrom.  State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 
504, 616 P.2d 1034, 1040 (1980).  It is improper, however, for counsel to use inflammatory 
words to describe a witness or the defendant during closing arguments.  State v. Phillips, 144 
Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007); see also State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 507, 
988 P.2d 1170, 1181 (1999) (concluding that referring to the defendant as a “murdering dog” 
was improper); State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 715-16, 85 P.3d 1109, 1114-15 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(concluding that the prosecutor‟s statements that the defendant was a liar and a thief constituted 
misconduct).   
Here, the prosecutor‟s comments that Severson was “screwing” a “21-year-old tramp” 
were inflammatory and, therefore, improper.  The statements did not result in prejudice, 
however, given the weight of the evidence against Severson and the numerous limiting 
instructions issued by the judge.35  Moreover, Severson‟s affair with Watkins was established at 
trial and, therefore, the fact that the prosecutor used crude words to describe the affair did not 
result in prejudice.  Accordingly, the statements were not prosecutorial misconduct and do not 
justify reversing Severson‟s conviction. 
b. 
 
Severson argues that the prosecution‟s late disclosure of witnesses was prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Specifically, Severson refers to the State‟s late disclosure of fourteen witnesses.  In 
challenging the late disclosures, Severson makes the same arguments he did in his challenge to 
the late disclosure of evidence.  The State argues that the late disclosures did not rise to the level 
of prosecutorial misconduct.   
                                                 
34 Severson raised this objection to the trial court in his motion for a new trial. 
35 The judge instructed the jury on several occasions that statements made by counsel were not to be regarded as 
evidence. 
34 
During the course of jury selection, the defense discovered that the prosecution had 
belatedly disclosed fourteen witnesses.  Of the fourteen, twelve were foundational witnesses or 
witnesses that the defense could have discovered on its own.  For this reason, the district court 
concluded that the late disclosure only presented a problem with regard to the other two 
witnesses.  In order to remedy the late disclosure, the district court granted the defense the 
opportunity to meet with both witnesses and ordered the State to reveal what testimony the 
witnesses would be called upon to give.  The court also gave the defense the opportunity to make 
additional arguments after meeting with the witnesses, if doing so became necessary. 
 
The prosecution‟s late disclosure of witnesses was not prosecutorial misconduct.  The 
record shows that the late disclosures were inadvertent and that the prosecution took prompt 
action to provide the information to the defense once the mistakes were brought to its attention.36  
Moreover, Severson failed to demonstrate that the late disclosures resulted in prejudice.  Even if 
Severson had alleged that the late disclosures resulted in prejudice, the remedial actions taken by 
the district court would have likely cured any adverse effects.  For these reasons, the 
prosecution‟s late disclosures did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct.   
c. 
Next, Severson challenges two of the prosecution‟s “speaking objections.”  In addition to 
the previously-discussed speaking objection that Severson did not challenge at trial, there were 
two alleged speaking objections that Severson did object to below.   The first occurred during the 
State‟s examination of an agent from the FDA.  The defense objected when the prosecutor asked 
the agent why he did not recommend that the United States Attorney‟s Office prosecute 
Severson.  In response to the objection, the prosecutor replied, “[i]t would be his investigative 
jurisdiction if [the Hydroxycut] was not tampered with anywhere but at the end of the consumer 
line.”  The court then advised the prosecutor not to testify for the witness while trying to explain 
why the testimony was admissible.  The court also instructed the jury that “statements [made] by 
counsel are not evidence in this . . . trial.  You are to disregard any comments made by the 
State‟s counsel as to what he believed the evidence would be.”  The next instance occurred when 
the prosecution asked a witness how he responded when he learned from an acquaintance that 
                                                 
36 During a hearing regarding the late disclosure of witnesses, the prosecution explained that some of the “late 
disclosures” had already been discovered by Severson‟s former attorneys.  Other witnesses were actually on the 
witness list, had been withdrawn, or were merely foundational.  Additionally, once Severson objected to the late 
disclosures, the State informed him of what testimony the witnesses were expected to give.   
35 
Severson had said Mary was dying of cancer, but that her doctor did not want her to know.  
When the defense objected on grounds of relevance, the prosecutor argued that it was relevant 
“[t]o express his lack of belief in what the defendant had told [the acquaintance].”  After the 
prosecutor responded, the trial court excused the jury and ruled on the objection.  The court also 
told the prosecutor that if he intends to respond to objections by indicating what the witness will 
testify to, he should ask the court to excuse the jury.  Once the jury returned, the court gave it a 
limiting instruction reminding it that statements made by counsel were not to be regarded as 
evidence.   
The prosecutor‟s speaking objections were not prosecutorial misconduct.  Although a 
prosecutor engages in misconduct when he or she asks a question, knowing the answer is 
inadmissible, in such a manner that the jury is able to infer what the answer would have been in 
light of the question asked, State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469, 163 P.3d 1175, 1181 
(2007), Severson has not alleged that the prosecutor knew the answers to the above questions 
were inadmissible.  Similarly, he has not indicated what impermissible answers the jury might 
infer from the questions or statements.  While the statement that the FDA would have had 
jurisdiction if the tampering had not occurred at the end of the consumer line implies the 
consumer was responsible for the contaminated Hydroxycut, it in no way indicated Severson was 
responsible for the tampering.  Even if it had, there was other evidence linking Severson to the 
contamination.  Additionally, Severson has not articulated how the objections resulted in 
prejudice or why the curative instructions given to the jury were inadequate to remedy any 
prejudice the statements may have created.  Because the prosecutor‟s speaking objections did not 
constitute prosecutorial misconduct, they did not deprive Severson of his right to a fair trial. 
d. 
Severson contends that the prosecutor intentionally asked questions which he knew called 
for inadmissible testimony.  He argues that the improper questioning “could not have any effect 
but to contaminate the jury‟s verdict in this case.”  The State maintains that the prosecutor‟s 
questioning was proper and, even if it was not, Severson has failed to establish prejudice. 
In support of his argument, Severson points to one of the prosecutor‟s questions on 
redirect examination of a witness testifying about the Seversons‟ life insurance policies.  On 
cross-examination, the witness indicated that he was not aware of any request to increase Mary‟s 
coverage and normally would know if such a request had been made.  On redirect, the prosecutor 
36 
asked the witness “I take it there are some things you probably should be notified of and you are 
not notified of and do not have personal knowledge of . . . ?”  According to Severson, the 
question was improper because the prosecutor knew Mary‟s life insurance coverage had not been 
increased, but nonetheless tried to imply to the jury that it may have been.  He argues that this 
was prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutor was knowingly attempting to offer false 
evidence.  See Idaho R. of Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(3); see also United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 
1283, 1307 (7th Cir. 1976) (“It is improper conduct for the Government to ask a question which 
implies a factual predicate which the examiner knows he cannot support by evidence or for 
which he has no reason to believe that there is a foundation of truth.”).   
The prosecutor‟s question on redirect examination was not an attempt to offer false 
evidence.  The record indicates that the prosecutor was merely clarifying defense counsel‟s prior 
line of questioning and trying to establish the witness‟s basis of knowledge.  Although the 
question may have implied that the witness might not know if Mary‟s coverage had been 
increased, it did not rise to the level of presenting false evidence.  Defense counsel opened up the 
door to the questioning by asking the witness whether he would know if the coverage had been 
increased.  Moreover, any prejudice that may have resulted from the question was cured by the 
trial court‟s instructions to the jury that the prosecutor‟s statement was not evidence and that 
there was no evidence Severson had requested an increase in Mary‟s life insurance coverage. 
Severson also challenges a question the prosecutor asked a detective about receipts Mary 
had hidden in the fireplace.37  The prosecutor asked the detective “Okay.  If you could have the 
opportunity would you ask Mary Severson why she placed them there?”  According to Severson, 
the question was designed to “play on the passions and sympathies of the jury” and “insinuate[] 
wrong doing on the part of Mr. Severson.”   
Once again, however, Severson has failed to meet his burden of proof.  He simply alleges 
that the question was “clearly improper,” but does not indicate why.  Moreover, he has not 
indicated how the statement resulted in prejudice.  Because Severson failed to meet his burden of 
proving that he was prejudiced by acts of prosecutorial misconduct, his conviction cannot be 
reversed on this basis. 
                                                 
37 The receipts related to Severson‟s relationship with Watkins. 
37 
F. 
Lastly, Severson argues the “numerous and substantial errors” that occurred during his 
trial require that his conviction be vacated.  He maintains that even if the errors considered 
individually are harmless, when considered together they deprived him of his right to a fair trial.  
According to the State, Severson failed to prove that two or more errors occurred during his trial 
and, therefore, the cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable.  Alternatively, even if there were 
two or more errors, it argues that the judgment of conviction should not be vacated because the 
errors did not deprive Severson of due process. 
“Under the cumulative errors doctrine, an accumulation of irregularities, each of which 
might be harmless in itself, may in the aggregate reveal the absence of a fair trial in 
contravention of the defendant‟s right to due process.”  State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 
872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994).  For the cumulative error doctrine to apply there must have been more 
than one error.  State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 407, 958 P.2d 22, 33 (Ct. App. 1998).  
Moreover, errors not objected to at trial that are not deemed fundamental may not be considered 
under the cumulative error analysis.  State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590, 604, 836 P.2d 536, 550 
(1992). 
Severson was not deprived of his right to a fair trial by an accumulation of errors.  
Severson was only able to prove that the prosecutor made certain questionable statements during 
closing argument.  Only one of those statements was objected to at trial.  Because none of the 
other statements gave rise to fundamental error, they may not be considered under the 
cumulative error analysis.  Accordingly, Severson has failed to establish the requisite number of 
errors for the cumulative error doctrine to apply.   
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, Severson‟s judgment of conviction is affirmed.   
 
 
Justice BURDICK and Justice Pro Tem TROUT CONCUR.   
 
Justice W. JONES dissenting: 
 
I respectfully dissent as follows: 
 
 
I disagree with the majority‟s analysis on whether the numerous and substantial errors 
committed during trial require reversal pursuant to the cumulative error doctrine; therefore, I 
38 
respectfully dissent in the conclusion of that section and the result.  Further, I dissent from the 
majority‟s classification of the prosecutor‟s misconduct during closing arguments as not 
constituting fundamental error.  I find the prosecutor‟s conduct relentless and a blatant abuse of 
power; time and time again the prosecutor continued to engage in a pattern of conduct which 
waivered on and over the edge of appropriate conduct.  Severson‟s fifth issue on appeal asserted 
that he was “denied a fair trial due to the serious and unrelenting acts of prosecutorial 
misconduct.”  I am limiting my dissent to comments made by the prosecutor during closing 
arguments and whether the accumulation of any alleged errors warrant reversal pursuant to the 
cumulative error doctrine.  I do not find any one statement, in and of itself, sufficient to warrant 
reversal.  However, I do find a pattern of conduct where the prosecutor continually made 
arguments for the sole purpose of appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury. 
Severson did not object to any of the statements made during closing arguments; 
therefore, this Court reviews whether the statements constitute fundamental error.  See State v. 
Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 748, 170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007).  “An error is fundamental when it „so 
profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his 
fundamental right to due process.‟”  Id. (quoting State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 
871, 873 (1992)).  Any alleged misconduct on the part of the prosecutor must be shown to have 
materially contributed to the jury verdict.  State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 167, 610 P.2d 522, 
526 (1980). 
“While the due process clauses of the Idaho Constitution, art. 1, s 13, and the fourteenth 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution do not guarantee errorless trials . . . they do at least ensure 
that criminal trials shall be fundamentally fair.”  Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19, 576 
P.2d 1052, 1053 (1978).  “It is the duty of a prosecuting attorney to see that the accused has a 
fair and impartial trial.”  State v. Spencer, 74 Idaho 173, 183, 258 P.2d 1147, 1153 (1953) 
(finding that the prosecutor‟s misconduct warranted a new trial).  In closing arguments, “[t]he 
prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to the prejudices of the jury.”  ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Functions § 3-5.8 (3d. ed. 1993).  The 
prosecutor is charged with the dual task of ensuring that the government‟s case is presented 
“earnestly and vigorously, using every legitimate means to bring about a conviction, but also to 
see that justice is done and that every criminal defendant is accorded a fair trial.”  State v. 
Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 449, 816 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Ct. App. 1991). 
39 
Under the harmless error rule, “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not 
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”  I.C.R. 52.  The purpose of the harmless error 
doctrine is to prevent setting aside convictions for small errors or defects which were unlikely to 
affect the result at trial.  Reynolds, 120 Idaho at 451 n.5, 816 P.2d at 1008 n.5 (quoting Chapman 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).  “The cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation 
of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated show the 
absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant‟s right to due process.”  State v. Gross, 
146 Idaho 15, ___, 189 P.3d 477, 483 (Ct. App. 2008).  Therefore, the comments made by the 
prosecutor should be addressed by the cumulative effect of the improper statements.  Id.  In order 
to find cumulative error there must be an accumulation of actual errors.  State v. Hawkins, 131 
Idaho 396, 407, 958 P.2d 22, 33 (1998). 
The purpose of “[c]losing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution 
by the trier of fact in a criminal case. . . . [t]o enlighten the jury and to help the jurors remember 
and interpret the evidence.”  State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 
2007) (internal quotations omitted). 
Appellant alleges errors by the prosecutor during closing arguments when the prosecutor 
commented on Severson‟s right to remain silent and continually appealed to the passions and 
prejudices of the jury.  The violations are so numerous that I am quoting all offensive statements 
from closing arguments, even those not specifically cited to by appellant in his brief. 
 
The prosecutor made the following remarks in regard to Severson‟s right to remain silent: 
We are talking about science here; and [the defense attorney‟s] note -- that he tore 
down -- said, “[t]heory versus fact.”  Well, in the real life in this courtroom, the 
great leveler of society in here, theory and fact do work together. 
It is not a balloon, where one little microscopic pin breaks the whole balloon.  
This is a circumstantial case, because nobody was in that house that night but 
Mary and Larry.  Nobody knows, that has testified, what happened between them. 
. . . . 
[Mary‟s] mouth opened easily.  No one else in this courtroom has testified in front 
of you, that was there, that they injured Mary Severson‟s face.  The only thing 
that they can tell you, [from expert testimony], is, these injuries [to her mouth] are 
consistent with bruising of somebody who could have been smothered. 
 
(Emphasis added).  The prosecutor made the following remarks which could have ignited 
passion and prejudice in the jury by improperly appealing to their emotions: 
40 
[The trip back to Mountain Home in an attempt to rectify the marriage] didn‟t go 
over too well.  On December 18th, [Mary] came back for Christmas to stay, left 
her mom‟s house and came back [to Mountain Home], drove back for Christmas, 
her last Christmas with her family. 
. . . . 
The only thing we have got in this case is what the house can tell us of why Mary 
died, what the business tells us of why Mary died.  The Hydroxycut will tell us of 
why Mary died, and what Mary tells us about why and how she died. 
Mary does speak to us today 33 months later.  Mary still speaks to us today.  She 
is still telling us what happened that night and why she is dead. 
. . . . 
During [the time Mary was with her mother in Colorado] the defendant is out 
gallivanting around with [his girlfriend].  Some people are even saying, „Oh, I 
didn‟t know you had a daughter.”  “Well, it‟s my fiancée.”  [Severson] says it‟s 
his fiancée. 
. . . . 
So, Mary gets to come home in October to find that this 21-year-old tramp has 
gone inside her house and painted her guest bathroom. 
. . . . 
Yeah, [Mary] had some mild depression.  Who wouldn‟t, after finding out your 
husband is screwing some 21-year-old, having an affair with some 21-year-old 
girl, and you‟re getting shipped back to Colorado.  Who wouldn‟t be a little 
depressed about that, as a young woman? 
. . . . 
Could [somebody else have tampered with the Hydroxycut bottle]?  I suppose, in 
the same way that there are little green aliens could be coming to us from Mars or 
something.  It is possible in one way, shape, or form that that‟s exactly what 
somebody did. 
. . . . 
Mary tells us, she speaks to us from her grave as to who killed her and why she 
died.  All of these circumstances tell us that her body left the indelible evidence 
that [the defense] cannot get past, and nobody can get past. 
. . . . 
[The defendant‟s son] didn‟t see [the bruises on Mary‟s face prior to 
administering CPR].38  He wasn‟t doing that much.  That‟s force.  That‟s effort.  
That‟s putting your hand, at least plausibly, in somebody‟s face and making sure 
the breath is out of there.  And making sure you have done the job right, because 
by God that woman just won’t die.  She‟s strong; she is the strong one. 
. . . . 
                                                 
38 The prosecution asserted an argument at trial that the bruises were caused pre-mortem but did not develop until 
post-mortem.  The defense asserted the argument that the bruising was caused by recitation efforts. 
41 
Please don‟t hold that fact, that [the other prosecutor misspoke and] may have 
said [the defendant‟s girlfriend] was nineteen instead of the ripe old age of 21.  
Or, she still looks like she is about 19. 
And I guess all the witnesses say that they saw Larry running around with a girl 
they thought was his daughter, who was a teenager, who was all of age 18 or 19.  
That may have been playing in the [other prosecutor‟s] mind. 
. . . . 
[The defense attorney] talked a lot about what went on that day, and “[w]e don‟t‟ 
know this, and we don‟t know that.”  He is right.  I would love to talk to Mary 
Severson and find out, on the early-morning hours of February 15th, how she was 
feeling.  How did the meal make her feel?  How did it feel to go to dinner with her 
husband, and not be able to order the food you want?39 
How many sleeping pills did she take?  Why did she take them?  If she took them, 
did she know how many she took? 
I don‟t get [to] do that.  I don‟t get to ask those questions.  Nobody does.  All we 
know is that according to [the State‟s expert] -- I think a very credible individual, 
with nothing to lose in this matter -- gave you a good answer as to how he figured 
out the total[] [number of pills]. 
. . . . 
We are done:  [the defense counsel] and I, and [co-counsel].  Our job here before 
you is complete.  Innocent until proven guilty, yes.  Today ends that preposition. 
There is no innocence in this courtroom except the innocence of Mary Severson.  
She didn‟t have to die.  The only reason she did was the lust and greed of the 
defendant to get out of a marriage rather than divorce so he could get all the 
money and then some; and he could pursue his other women, not this fat woman 
that he saw in front of him who refused to give him the divorce. 
You have a difficult decision to make.  There‟s people in this courtroom who 
have been here the entire time that you have heard from.  Mary Severson isn‟t a 
body.  Mary Severson isn‟t a picture of bruises.  Mary Severson isn‟t a decedent. 
Mary Severson was the 35-year-old mother of two boys.  Mary Severson was the 
daughter of Carol Diaz.  Mary Severson was the sister of Maria Gray.  Mary 
Severson‟s life had a purpose, and it had meaning.  Your duty today is to give her 
death justice.  Thank you. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
I find the prosecutor‟s comment on Severson‟s right to remain silent the most egregious 
and offensive of all the comments made during closing arguments.  The comments served no 
other purpose then to draw attention to the fact that Severson chose to exercise his constitutional 
right not to testify at his trial.  I can see no other purpose in the statement.  The majority sweeps 
                                                 
39 This specific reference relates to testimony from the waitress that Mary had attempted to order cheesy bread or 
bread sticks and that Larry denied that request. 
42 
the statement under the rug by conclusively finding that the statement is “ambiguous” and a 
“single isolated comment” over the course of a “seventeen-day trial, [where] there was 
substantial evidence of Severson‟s guilt.”  I do not find the prosecutor‟s statements as innocent 
as the majority plays them out to be; further, I find a complete lack of other meanings which a 
jury may attach to the statement “nobody was in that house that night but Mary and Larry[] 
nobody knows, that has testified, what happened between them.”  In context it is clear that the 
prosecutor was referring to the events that occurred between Mr. and Mrs. Severson on the night 
of Mrs. Severson‟s death.  The prosecutor then clearly states that based on the fact that only two 
people were present, and one of them is dead, there is only one other person who has knowledge 
of the details which unfolded that fateful night, and that person did not testify.  The meaning is 
anything but ambiguous and a blatant violation of Severson‟s constitutional right to remain 
silent. 
[I]t is not possible to assess the effect that the prosecutor‟s improper comments 
had on the deliberating jury. . . . [I]t can and will give rise to whatever inferences 
the jurors individually or collectively decide to place upon it.  Jurors come from 
all walks of life and many and various are the inferences to which they may be 
drawn.  The obvious one is that men who have nothing to hide speak freely, 
whilst the guilty say nothing.  One might well suppose that for twelve jurors there 
will be twelve versions of that inference. 
 
State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588, 599, 671 P.2d 1051, 1062 (1983) (Bistline, J., dissenting). 
 
It is improper for a prosecutor to appeal to the emotions, passion or prejudice of the jury 
through the use of inflammatory tactics.  Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87, 156 P.3d at 588.  The 
majority finds that “[t]he prosecutor‟s references to Mary‟s family, while arguably improper, did 
not constitute fundamental error.”  I disagree.  It is improper for a prosecutor to make references 
to a victim‟s family during closing arguments.  The prosecutor‟s statements referring to Mary 
Severson as a mother, a daughter and a sister were used to serve only one purpose, and that is to 
appeal to the passions of the jury by referencing the victim‟s family.  I find that this behavior 
rises to the level of fundamental error and is not “merely reiterat[ing] evidence that had been 
produced at trial.”  The prosecutor‟s conduct used Mary‟s family as a means to convict Severson 
by appealing to the jury‟s passions and infringed on Severson‟s right to a fair trial. 
 
Further, I find that the repeated references to Severson‟s affair constitute fundamental 
error.  There is a subtle difference in producing evidence of Severson‟s affair at trial and 
referring to that affair as Severson “screwing some 21-year-old . . . tramp.”  I agree with the 
43 
majority that these statements are inflammatory and improper.  The prosecutor attempted to paint 
a picture for the jury of Severson running around womanizing while his wife laid dying at home 
wallowing in self-pity over her recent weight gain.  These tactics do not serve any purpose other 
than to gain a conviction through improper means. 
A review of the history of instances of prosecutorial misconduct in this state discloses an 
interesting pattern.  Originally, this Court found little humor in any misconduct committed by the 
prosecutor‟s office.  See State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 45, 71 P. 608, 611 (1903) (holding that acts 
of prosecutorial misconduct that prejudice the rights of the defendant warrant reversal).  
Currently, our appellate system has engaged in a pattern of finding all errors committed as a 
result of prosecutorial misconduct to constitute harmless error.  Over the last ten years this Court 
has addressed the issue of prosecutorial misconduct in eight separate cases, finding that 
misconduct occurred in five of those cases, but also finding that none of those cases warranted 
reversal of the conviction.  See State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 (2007); State v. 
Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 163 P.3d 1175 (2007); State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 
956 (2003); State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 16 P.3d 890 (2000); State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 
988 P.2d 1170 (1999).  Further, the court of appeals has found that prosecutorial misconduct 
existed in ten cases over the last five years.  See State v. Gerardo, 2009 WL 32488 (Ct. App. 
2009); State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 189 P.3d 244 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Contreras-
Gonzales, 146 Idaho 41, 190 P.3d 197 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 178 
P.3d 644 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Morgan, 144 Idaho 861, 172 P.3d 1136 (Ct. App. 2007); State 
v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 85 P.3d 1109 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Anderson, 138 Idaho 359, 63 
P.3d 485 (Ct. App. 2003).  But, further found that only three of those cases warranted reversal 
due to acts of misconduct by the prosecutor‟s office.  See Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 189 P.3d 477; 
State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 181 P.3d 496 (Ct. App. 2007); Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 156 P.3d 
583.  The court of appeals declined to address the issue of whether misconduct existed in two 
additional cases because the error was harmless in light of the evidence produced at trial.  See 
State v. Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 193 P.3d 878 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 
Idaho 199, 75 P.3d 1209 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Previously, this Court has stated that “[w]here the record shows that the prosecuting 
attorney has been guilty of misconduct calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse 
prejudice or passion against the accused by statement in [the prosecutor‟s] argument of facts not 
44 
proved by evidence, the conviction will be set aside and a new trial granted.”  Spencer, 74 Idaho 
at 183-84, 258 P.2d at 1154.  However, the Court quickly limited reversals to instances “[w]here 
the issue of guilt is debatable or it appears from the record that the jurors could have reasonably 
entertained doubt as to the defendant‟s guilt and that misconduct of the prosecuting attorney 
might well have influenced the result.”  Id. at 184, 258 P.2d at 1154.  “The standard for 
determining whether error of constitutional dimension is „harmless,‟ . . . [is whether] the court 
[is] able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. LePage, 
102 Idaho 387, 393, 630 P.2d 674, 680 (1981) (internal quotation omitted). 
 
There is no “authority for the proposition that a fair trial has been had when the verdict is 
tainted by the jury‟s exposure to inflammatory rhetoric.”  State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 869, 
655 P.2d 46, 76 (1982) (Bistline, J., dissenting). 
The harmless error doctrine should never be applied to criminal trials that were 
not fundamentally fair.  Where there has not been a fundamentally fair trial, there 
should be another trial which rises to that standard.  It simply will not do for five, 
seven, or nine appellate judges to uphold convictions derived by trials not 
fundamentally fair on the predicate that a review of the evidence convinces those 
judges that the defendant would always be convicted by any reasonable jury on 
the evidence which was proper.  It is, of course, usurpation of the jury function. 
. . .  
Can the day be far ahead when an accused can be denied a trial by jury, convicted 
by the court, and the conviction affirmed by an appellate court which reasons that 
its review of the evidence shows it to be is so overwhelming that any reasonable 
jury would have convicted the accused, for which reason the error in not affording 
the accused a trial by jury is naught but constitutional harmless error. 
 
Hodges, 105 Idaho at 599, 671 P.2d at 1062 (Bistline, J., dissenting). 
 
In the present case, the prosecutor‟s comments “were not only made by an officer of the 
court, but they were made in the closing or last speech to the jury, when there was no opportunity 
for defendant‟s counsel to criticize or answer them.”  Irwin, 9 Idaho at 42, 71 P. at 610. 
 
The prosecutor‟s office has been granted leeway by the appellate courts for too long with 
respect to allegations of misconduct.  “It seems that [prosecutors] frequently exert their skill and 
ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, and generally in so doing they 
transgress upon the rights of the accused.”  Id. at 44, 71 P. at 611.  As cautioned by the United 
States Supreme Court over forty years ago, the “harmless-error rules can work very unfair and 
mischievous results when, for example, highly important and persuasive evidence, or argument, 
45 
though legally forbidden, finds its way into a trial in which the question of guilt or innocence is a 
close one.”  Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22. 
Cumulatively, these errors taken as a whole were not harmless.  The relentless acts of the 
prosecutor deprived Severson of his right to a fair trial.  The cautionary tales that were developed 
in the appellate system along with the harmless error doctrine have become our current reality.  
The more certain a prosecutor is that s/he has conclusive evidence of a defendant‟s guilt; the 
freer s/he is to trample upon a defendant‟s constitutional rights.  Further, throughout this process 
the prosecutor remains secure in the knowledge that an appellate court will affirm, holding that 
the violations were simply “harmless error.”  At what point does a reviewing appellate court find 
that a prosecutor‟s misconduct that blatantly violates a defendant‟s constitutional rights 
constitutes non-harmless error?  This Court has determined that the turning point exists when we 
are certain that any jury would find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  How can an 
appellate court justify which defendants are entitled to a fair trial based entirely on the rationale 
that any reasonable jury would have convicted the defendant based on the evidence presented?  
For instance, could a trial court deny a defendant the assistance of counsel and deny him the right 
to a jury trial and find the defendant guilty of a crime and have an appellate court state that it is 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant would have been convicted in any event 
by any jury?  Even in light of the absurdity of this example, at which point does the error cross 
the arbitrary threshold of harmless?  Would it be the denial of counsel, the denial of a jury trial, 
or the combination of the two? 
Allowing the harmless error doctrine to dismiss instances of blatant prosecutorial 
misconduct has effectively substituted our appellate court for the right to trial by jury.  It seems 
that too often this Court has dismissed the claims of prosecutorial misconduct, holding that it is 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant would have been found guilty anyway.  
Although I believe there was substantial evidence supporting the guilty verdict in this case, I also 
believe Severson was not afforded a fair trial.  Justice is served only when a defendant is either 
convicted or acquitted following a fundamentally fair trial.  Since I do not believe Severson‟s 
trial was fundamentally fair, I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. 
Justice Pro Tem KIDWELL CONCURS.