Title: AHEARN v. HOLLON

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

AHEARN v. HOLLON2002 WY 12553 P.3d 87Case Number: 01-150Decided: 08/26/2002
April Term, A.D. 2002

 

FRANCIS 
B. AHEARN,

Appellant(Plaintiff) ,

 
 

v.

 

JAMES 
D. HOLLON, JANE N.

HOLLON 
and J. HOLLON

ENTERPRISES, 
LLC,

Appellees(Defendants) .

 
 

The Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 
    

Representing 
Appellant:

Pro 
se.

Representing 
Appellee:

H. Rick Hollon, Douglas, WY.

 
 
   

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

*Chief Justice at time of expedited case 
conference.

 
 
      

LEHMAN, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      This 
is an appeal from a judgment of the district court ruling, in part, that 
appellee J. Hollon Enterprises, L.L.C. (JHE) had provided the required notice of 
default to appellant Francis B. Ahearn (Ahearn) concerning a sales contract 
entered into between those parties; that Ahearn failed to cure his default under 
such contract; and that JHE was entitled to take possession of the involved 
premises, including the lot, mobile home, and personal property at issue.  We affirm and assess sanctions on 
appeal.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Ahearn sets forth 
the following issues on appeal:

I.  Does 
a Purchaser under a Contract for Deed have to pay the amount shown on a Notice 
of Default if the amount shown on the Notice of Default does not conform to the 
terms of the Contract for Deed?

II.  Does 
a Seller under a Contract for Deed have the right to retake possession and 
control of the premises by force and change the locks of the personal residence 
of the Buyer without first filing an action in court to do so when the Contract 
calls for such an action to be filed in the event of an alleged default? 

JHE phrases the issues on appeal as:

I.  The District Court did not err in finding that 
Defendant J. Hollon Enterprises, LLC, provided proper notice of default. 

II.  The District Court did not err in finding that 
Plaintiff Ahearn had no right to the premises once Plaintiff Ahearn failed to 
timely cure the default and that Plaintiff wrongfully kept Defendant J. Hollon 
Enterprises, LLC, out of possession of the same; as well as finding that 
Defendant J. Hollon Enterprises, LLC, had the right to change the locks. 

FACTS

[¶3]      On September 26, 
1998, Ahearn and JHE entered into a Contract For Deed and Title ("Contract") 
concerning a lot, mobile home, and personal property.  Under the Contract, Ahearn was to pay 
JHE the amount of $24,000.00 which included a $250.00 earnest money deposit and 
a $250.00 amount at closing.  The 
remaining $23,500.00 was then to be paid by Ahearn to JHE, plus interest at the 
rate of ten percent per annum, in 180 equal monthly installments of $252.64 
beginning on November 10, 1998, and continuing on the 10th day of each month thereafter until paid 
in full.  Also attached to the 
Contract was an Amortization Schedule.  
As a part of this arrangement, Ahearn and JHE established an escrow 
account at Converse County Bank (escrow agent). 

[¶4]      The escrow agent 
was to hold a copy of the Contract, a Warranty Deed from JHE to Ahearn, a Quit 
Claim Deed from Ahearn to JHE, and a Certificate of Title to the mobile 
home.  Under the Contract and Escrow 
Instructions given to the escrow agent, the escrow agent was to deliver all 
escrow items to Ahearn upon full and complete payment and performance by Ahearn 
under the Contract.  Conversely, the 
escrow agent, at the option of JHE, was to deliver all escrow items to JHE in 
the event that Ahearn continued for more than thirty days to remain in default 
under the Contract after written notice had been given to him. 

[¶5]      Ahearn made only 
two payments.  The first payment was 
in the amount of $255.00 and was credited as of November 10, 1998, with the 
second payment being made in the amount of $280.00, credited as of December 21, 
1998.  These two payments plus the 
$250.00 earnest money deposit and $250.00 at closing were the only payments made 
by Ahearn.  Since Ahearn did not 
make the November 1998 payment in the correct amount and Ahearn was late making 
the December 1998 payment, JHE advised the escrow agent that it would no longer 
be able to rely on the Amortization Schedule attached to the Contract.  Instead, JHE would accept simple 
interest at ten percent per annum to be figured based upon the actual amount of 
the payments and the dates those were received. 

[¶6]      On July 26, 2000, 
JHE sent Ahearn a Notice of Default via certified mail, return receipt 
requested, since Ahearn was then in arrears under the Contract.  The Notice of Default indicated, in 
part, that if Ahearn failed to pay $4,770.44 through the escrow agent within 
thirty days of the date on the Notice of Default, he would be required to 
immediately vacate the premise and return possession of the premises to 
JHE.  Ahearn acknowledged receipt of 
the Notice of Default on August 8, 2000.  
A copy of the Notice of Default, along with a letter, was also sent to 
the escrow agent on this date by JHE.  
In addition, on August 8, 2000, JHE sent Ahearn a letter which enclosed a 
copy of the Notice of Default via regular mail.  This letter explained that the 
effectiveness of the Notice of Default was not dependent upon Ahearn's 
acknowledging his receipt of the Notice of Default or upon Ahearn's actual 
receipt of the Notice of Default.  
Rather, under the Contract, the Notice of Default was effective as of the 
date that it was mailed.  

[¶7]      Ahearn failed to 
cure his default under the Contract or make any additional payments to the 
escrow agent or otherwise.  On 
August 29, 2000, JHE delivered a Seller's Written Instruction to the escrow 
agent.  This Seller's Written 
Instruction notified the escrow agent that pursuant to the Contract and Notice 
of Default, Ahearn had remained in default under the Contract for more than 30 
days after written notice of such had been sent by mail to Ahearn.  Therefore, the escrow agent was 
instructed to deliver all escrowed items to JHE.  A copy of this instruction was also sent 
to Ahearn by JHE.  On this date, the 
escrow agent delivered the escrowed items to JHE as demanded.  

[¶8]      On August 30, 
2000, JHE recorded the Quit Claim Deed from Ahearn to JHE with the county 
recorder's office.  On August 31, 
2000, JHE sent two letters to Ahearn.  
These letters were identical except one indicated it was being sent 
certified mail, "return receipt requested," while the other was sent via regular 
post.  These letters advised Ahearn 
that he had failed to timely cure his default under the Contract; that the 
Seller's Written Instruction had been delivered to the escrow agent; and that 
the escrow agent had delivered the escrowed items to JHE.  These letters also advised that JHE 
retained title and ownership of the subject property; that the Quit Claim Deed 
from Ahearn to JHE had been recorded; and that Ahearn's contractual interest in 
the involved property had been cancelled and terminated.  Finally, these letters notified Ahearn 
that if he had not already vacated the premises, he was required to do so 
immediately.1  

[¶9]      On September 30, 
2000, Jane Hollon on behalf of JHE, went to the premises with the intent of 
cleaning it, changing the locks on the mobile home, and marketing it for 
sale.  Ms. Hollon believed at that 
time that Ahearn had vacated the property as required.  When Ms. Hollon arrived, she noticed 
that Ahearn's personal belongings still remained within the mobile home, thus 
she did not enter the mobile home.  
Ms. Hollon had a locksmith change the locks on the mobile home and left a 
handwritten note on the door which advised Ahearn that she had changed the locks 
and that if he needed to get his personal belongings, he should contact JHE's 
realtor.  Ms. Hollon then left the 
premises but ensured that the doors to the mobile home were locked.  

[¶10]   Later that day, the realtor for JHE 
spoke to Ahearn at the mobile home.  
Ms. Hollon then returned to the trailer and spoke with Ahearn.  During this conversation, it was agreed 
between Ahearn and JHE that Ahearn would vacate the premises by October 7, 
2000.  On October 2, 2000, JHE sent 
Ahearn two letters, one via certified mail return receipt requested and the 
other via regular mail, which restated the October 7, 2000 deadline.  Ahearn acknowledged receipt of the 
certified letter sent to him on October 3, 2000.  

[¶11]   On October 3, 2000, Ahearn's adult 
daughter, who resided within the premises with Ahearn, contacted JHE by 
telephone and requested that the vacate deadline be extended.  On October 4, 2000, JHE agreed to extend 
the deadline until October 29, 2000, and that Ahearn would pay to JHE the amount 
of $250.00 for rent for the three-week extension period.  On this same date, JHE mailed Ahearn and 
his daughter letters confirming this arrangement. 

[¶12]   Further, on October 4, 2000, Ahearn 
telephoned James D. Hollon on behalf of JHE.  Ahearn advised Mr. Hollon that he wanted 
to get together.  Mr. Hollon asked 
what Ahearn wanted to discuss, and Ahearn replied that he would send Mr. Hollon 
a letter.  Shortly, thereafter, JHE 
received a letter from Ahearn dated October 4, 2000.   This letter acknowledged that the 
$250.00 being sent was to be used as rent until the end of October and would not 
be applied to amounts owed under the Contract.  Soon after this letter was received by 
JHE, Mr. Hollon, on behalf of JHE, and Ahearn spoke again via telephone. Ahearn 
inquired if they could get to together and renegotiate.  Mr. Hollon declined, indicating that he 
was not interested in renegotiating and that JHE would stick to those terms that 
had been previously agreed upon.  

[¶13]   Ahearn did not vacate the premises 
by October 29, 2000; instead, he filed his complaint in this action on October 
25, 2000.  On November 21, 2000, JHE 
filed its answer to Ahearn's complaint and a counterclaim seeking possession of 
the premises, to eject Ahearn from the property, and damages.  On December 29, 2000, JHE filed a second 
answer to the complaint of Ahearn and refiled its counterclaim.  

[¶14]   After a trial was held, the 
district court entered a judgment which, in part, ruled that JHE had provided 
the required Notice of Default to Ahearn under the Contract; that Ahearn failed 
to cure his default under the Contract; and that JHE was entitled to take 
possession of the subject property.  
This appeal followed.2 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶15]   After trial, the district court 
issued specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.  In its recently published case of 
Hutchings v. Krachun, 2002 WY 98, ¶10, 49 P.3d 176, ¶10 (Wyo. 2002), this 
court reiterated our standard of review:  

The 
purpose of specific findings of fact is to inform the appellate court of the 
underlying facts supporting the trial court's conclusions of law and disposition 
of the issues.  Hopper v. All Pet 
Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 1993).  While the findings of fact made by a 
trial court are presumptively correct, we examine all of the properly admissible 
evidence in the record.  Because 
this court does not weigh the evidence de novo, findings may not be set aside 
because we would have reached a different result.  Rather, the appellant has the burden of 
persuading the appellate court that the finding is erroneous.  Id.  See also Maycock v. Maycock, 2001 
WY 103, ¶11;  33 P.3d 1114, ¶11 
(Wyo. 2001).  Findings of fact are 
not set aside unless inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, or 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence.  The definitive test of when a finding of 
fact is clearly erroneous is when, although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.  A determination that a finding is 
against the great weight of the evidence means that a finding will be set aside 
even if supported by substantial evidence. Id.  See also Mathis v. Wendling, 962 P.2d 160, 163 (Wyo. 1998).  
Conclusions of law made by the trial court are not binding on this court 
and are reviewed de novo.  Maycock, ¶12.  

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency 
of the Notice of Default

[¶16]   In his first issue on appeal, 
Ahearn asserts that because the amount of the default specified in the Notice of 
Default was incorrectly stated too high, the Notice of Default did not conform 
to the Contract and it was, therefore, void and of no effect.  Specifically, Ahearn erroneously 
contends that there could be no operative default until he received proper 
notice of his default pursuant to the Contract.

[¶17]   In this instance, it is appropriate 
to apply that reasoning used in the case of Kost v. First Nat'l Bank of 
Greybull, 684 P.2d 819, 823 (Wyo. 1984) wherein we 
stated:

We 
agree with appellant that failure to make payments, while constituting grounds 
for forfeiture of a conditional sales contract, does not operate to terminate 
the contract absent appropriate notice to the nonperforming party.  Angus Hunt Ranch, Inc. v. Bowen, 
Wyo., 571 P.2d 974, 978 (1977); Younglove v. Graham & Hill, Wyo., 526 P.2d 689 (1974).  We cannot agree, 
however, that the letters from Stahl and her attorney, invoking the default 
clause and requesting payments, failed to satisfy the notice requirements under 
the contract in this case.

Like 
in Kost, Ahearn's failure to make payments, while constituting grounds 
for forfeiture of the Contract, did not operate to terminate the Contract absent 
appropriate notice to Ahearn.  
Similarly as in Kost, we also hold that the Notice of Default sent 
by JHE to Ahearn invoking the default clause and requesting payment satisfied 
the notice requirements under the Contract.

[¶18]   As set forth in Kost, at 823 
(citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 612 P.2d 463, 465 (Wyo. 
1980) and cases cited therein) our appellate obligation in cases of this sort is 
to interpret and construe the contract as a matter of law in order to shed light 
on the intention and understanding of the parties.  Intention is determined from the words 
of the contract if the language is clear and unambiguous, considering the 
contract as a whole, and taking into account the relationships between the 
various parts.  In this instance, as 
was the case in Kost, the default provision in the Contract contemplates 
Ahearn's breach of any term of the Contract, including payment of money.  The purpose of the notice requirement 
with respect to default was to put Ahearn on notice that the default clause was 
being invoked by JHE, why such action was being taken, and how Ahearn might 
remedy the problem within the time allotted.  See also Angus Hunt Ranch, 
Inc. v. REB, Inc., 577 P.2d 645, 650 (Wyo. 1978).

[¶19]   The Contract provided, in 
applicable part:

27.       
NOTICES/ADDRESSES. Any and all notices or other communications 
required or permitted by this Contract or by law to be served on or given to 
either party hereto shall be in writing and shall be deemed actual notice and 
duly served, given, and received when and as of the date deposited in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, certified, return receipt requested, addressed to 
the respective party in accordance with the addresses listed as 
follows:

Buyer:             
Mr. Francis B. Ahearn

[Address]

Seller:             
J. Hollon Enterprises, L.L.C.

                        
[Address]

. . .

28.       RIGHTS 
UPON DEFAULT.  In the event of a 
default by Buyer, Seller shall notify Buyer in writing of such a default and 
Buyer shall have 30 (Thirty) days after such Notice of Default to cure the 
default.  Seller shall also send a 
copy of said notice to the Escrow Agent by U.S. mail, certified, return receipt 
requested.  Should Buyer fail to 
timely cure such a default in the performance of this Contract, Buyer shall 
immediately and peaceably vacate the premises and return possession of the real 
property, mobile home, and personal property to Seller in good, sound, and 
acceptable condition, repair and order; in addition, both Buyer and Seller agree 
that it would be impractical or extremely difficult to determine the actual 
damages suffered by Seller because of such default, that the amounts paid by 
Buyer to Seller on execution and acceptance of this Contract and at closing plus 
any amounts paid monthly as specified above constitute a reasonable estimate of 
such damages, that Seller may retain such amounts as rents and liquidated 
damages in the event of such a default, that Seller may retake possession of the 
premises pursuant to Wyoming law for Forcible Entry and Detainer or otherwise, 
that Seller shall retain title and ownership of the real property, mobile home, 
and personal property, that Seller shall have any other rights accorded by 
Wyoming law, and that this Contract shall be cancelled and terminated. . . . 

This 
language used within the Contract is absolutely clear and 
unambiguous.

[¶20]   The Notice of Default informed 
Ahearn of the nature of his default, namely that he was delinquent in his 
monthly payments.  The Notice of 
Default also informed him of the amount that Ahearn had to pay to cure the 
default and the applicable timeframe.  
Since Ahearn knew the amount of each monthly installment, he cannot 
reasonably maintain that the Notice of Default failed to inform him of the 
extent of his default.  In addition, 
a subsequent letter sent on behalf of JHE reaffirmed the nature of Ahearn's 
default and indicated that he could avoid cancellation and termination of the 
Contract by making payment within thirty days from the date in which the Notice 
of Default had been mailed.

[¶21]   Nonetheless, Ahearn complains that 
the amount of $4,770.44 indicated as his required payment to cure within the 
Notice of Default is too high and, therefore, the Notice of Default was 
ineffective.  In support of this 
argument, Ahearn makes numerous sundry calculations within his brief filed with 
this court and asserts that the $4,770.44 amount under each of these proffered 
calculations was inappropriately inflated.  
However, a simple review of Ahearn's posed calculations makes it patently 
clear that they are all incorrect.  
Namely, each of Ahearn's professed calculations fail to take into account 
both the amount of principal and interest owed by him to JHE under the Contract 
and property taxes paid by JHE although payment of such taxes was the obligation 
of Ahearn under the Contract.  The 
correct calculation of the amount to cure totaled an amount higher than the 
$4,770.44 demanded by JHE to be paid by Ahearn.  Obviously, JHE had every right to accept 
an amount less than that owed by Ahearn under the Contract.  Had Ahearn timely paid the amount of 
$4,770.44 as stated in the Notice of Default, the default would have been 
required to be deemed cured. 

[¶22]   Simply put, the Notice of Default 
and subsequent letter sent by JHE to Ahearn notified Ahearn of the manner in 
which he had breached the Contract and of the performance necessary to cure his 
default.  Such notice fully 
satisfied the express provisions set forth in the Contract and served to trigger 
the remedies under the default clause afforded to JHE.  Therefore, we hold that the district 
court did not err in finding that the Notice of Default was sufficient under the 
terms enunciated within the Contract; that Ahearn was unquestionably in default; 
and that he failed to cure the default in a timely fashion causing the 
cancellation and termination of the Contract under its express terms.  

Obtaining 
Possession of the Premises

[¶23]   In his last issue on appeal, 
Ahearn asserts that JHE improperly took possession of the premises by changing 
the locks on the mobile home.  
According to Ahearn, JHE was required to bring a Forcible Entry and 
Detainer action or similar court approved procedural action to appropriately 
take possession of the property.   
This argument also lacks merit.

[¶24]   As set forth above, paragraph 28 of 
the Contract plainly and clearly provides that upon Ahearn's failure to cure his 
default under the Contract, the Contract would be cancelled and terminated.  Upon cancellation and termination of the 
Contract, Ahearn was mandated to "immediately and peaceably vacate the premises 
and return possession of the real property, mobile home, and personal property" 
to JHE "in good, sound, and acceptable condition, repair and order."  The Contract at paragraph 28 further 
states that upon cancellation and termination of the Contract, JHE "may retake 
possession of the premises pursuant to Wyoming law for Forcible Entry and 
Detainer or otherwise" and that JHE "shall have any other rights 
accorded by Wyoming law" (emphasis added).  
Finally, the Contract provides that JHE "shall retain title and ownership 
of the real property, mobile home, and personal property" upon cancellation and 
termination of the Contract.  

[¶25]   The language of the Contract could 
not be any more unambiguous.  Upon 
Ahearn's failure to cure his default under the Contract, the Contract was 
cancelled and terminated by its explicit terms.  Ahearn then had an affirmative duty to 
return possession of the property to JHE but failed to do so even in the face of 
numerous requests by JHE that Ahearn take this action.  In addition, as soon as the Contract was 
cancelled and terminated, JHE immediately retained title and ownership to the 
subject property.  Moreover, upon 
the cancellation and termination of the Contract, while JHE had an ability to 
instigate a Forcible Entry and Detainer action or other procedural action in a 
court of law, the Contract indicated that was not JHE's only right.  JHE had the right to take any other 
action in an attempt to take possession of the property as it so chose.  This included the right to change the 
locks on the mobile home and giving Ahearn notice that if he wanted to obtain 
his personal effects, he should contact JHE's realtor.

[¶26]   Finally, Ahearn argues that 
allowing JHE to change the locks on the mobile home in an attempt to take 
possession of the property violates his constitutionally protected right to be 
secure in his person, possessions, and property and did not afford him due 
process.  Ahearn voluntarily entered 
into the Contract with JHE and, by doing so, must be accountable for 
understanding and abiding by the terms provided within that Contract.  Here, Ahearn clearly voluntarily 
contracted to abide by the terms of the Contract thereby waiving any asserted 
constitutional protections afforded him, whether real or imagined, as asserted 
by Ahearn.  Again, we find no merit 
in this aspect of Ahearn's argument.

[¶27]   As stated previously, this Contract 
provided that upon cancellation and termination of the Contract, Ahearn had an 
affirmative duty to return possession of the property to JHE, and JHE had the 
right to take possession of the property by Forcible Entry and Detainer, other 
legal procedural action in the courts, or otherwise.  Indeed, it is further recognized by this 
court that JHE ultimately took legal action with the court system to effectuate 
its obtaining possession of the involved property by filing its counterclaim in 
this case.

Accruing 
Rent

[¶28]   In its brief, JHE requests that 
this court require Ahearn to pay rent for the period of time he has apparently 
remained in possession of the premises since May 1, 2000, at the rate of $250.00 
per month.  A similar prayer for 
relief is contained within the counterclaim and refiled counterclaim of JHE 
filed in this action.  This court, 
however, is not in the position to act as a fact finder and, therefore, may not 
take the action requested by JHE.  
Notwithstanding, JHE may have appropriate remedy before the district 
court under its counterclaims or otherwise in order to effectuate the collection 
of those damages incurred by JHE as a result of Ahearn's remaining in possession 
of the premises since May 1, 2000.

Imposition 
of Sanctions

[¶29]   This court has previously well 
established that while we are generally reluctant to impose sanctions, we will 
make such an award in those rare circumstances where an appellate brief lacks 
cogent argument, is devoid of pertinent authority to support the claims of 
error, and/or fails to make adequate references to the record.  Gray v. Stratton Real Estate, 
2001 WY 125, ¶11, 36 P.3d 1127, ¶11 (Wyo. 2001) (citing Small v. Convenience 
Plus Partners, Ltd., 6 P.3d 1254, 1256 (Wyo. 2000)).  This is such a rare circumstance.  Moreover, while we may make allowances 
for pro se litigants, they are not excused from the requirement that their brief 
be supported by cogent argument and citations to pertinent authority.  Stone v. Stone, 7 P.3d 887, 891 
(Wyo. 2000). 

[¶30]   In this case, upon our review of 
those issues raised by Ahearn and the absolute lack of cogent argument and 
recitation of any pertinent authority in support of such issues, we have taken 
long pause to consider whether such sanctions should be properly imposed against 
Ahearn.  Further, we note that we 
have granted Ahearn considerable leeway in reviewing his brief and addressing 
those issues presented therein.  
Simply stated, there is no basis in law, equity or public policy for 
Ahearn to defeat the contractual obligations into which he freely entered with 
JHE.  Ahearn's arguments against 
non-enforcement of the Contract as adjudicated by the district court are not 
supported by pertinent authority and are completely lacking in merit.  We, therefore, certify that there is no 
reasonable basis for this appeal and that sanctions are appropriate.  W.R.A.P. 10.05.

[¶31]   JHE is directed to submit a 
statement of costs and attorney fees associated with responding to this 
appeal.  W.R.A.P. 10.06. Upon 
review, we will award an appropriate amount in the form of 
sanctions.

CONCLUSION

[¶32]   Given those reasons set forth 
above, the judgment of the district court is affirmed and appellate sanctions 
pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05 are awarded in favor of JHE and against Ahearn. 

FOOTNOTES

1The 
August 31, 2000 letter sent to Ahearn via certified mail, return receipt 
requested, was returned to JHE marked "unclaimed."

2Apparently 
Ahearn has remained on the premises since October 29, 2000, until this 
day.