Title: State v. George A. Faucher

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-2702-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
George A. Faucher,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 
220 Wis. 2d 689, 584 N.W.2d 157 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 8, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 2, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas R. Wolfgram 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and 
oral argument by Suzanne Hagopian, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
97-2702-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-2702-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
George A. Faucher,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.  
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.  The State seeks review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Faucher, 
220 Wis. 2d 689, 584 N.W.2d 157 (Ct. App. 1998), which reversed 
a judgment of conviction and an order denying postconviction 
relief of the Circuit Court for Ozaukee County, the Honorable 
Tom R. Wolfgram.  The circuit court denied defendant George A. 
Faucher's postconviction motion for a new trial.  In his 
postconviction motion, the defendant asserted that the circuit 
court erred when it earlier had denied his motion to strike a 
juror for cause and for a mistrial after the challenged juror 
stated that he could set aside his opinion that the State's key 
witness, his neighbor of four years, was a "person of integrity" 
who "wouldn't lie." 
¶2 
We are presented with the following issue: did the 
circuit court err in refusing to strike a juror for cause when 
97-2702-CR 
 
2 
the juror testified at a special voir dire that for four years 
he had lived next door to the State's main witness, knew the 
witness to be a “person of integrity” who “wouldn't lie,” and 
subsequently stated that he could set his beliefs aside to 
consider the case impartially? 
¶3 
The circuit court found that the juror could be 
impartial and refused to strike him.  On examination of the 
record, we conclude that a reasonable judge could only conclude 
that a reasonable person in this juror's position could not be 
impartial. 
¶4 
In addition to reviewing the issue presented, we also 
take the opportunity this case affords us to clarify our jury 
bias jurisprudence.  The case at bar is but one of six jury bias 
cases this term for which we have granted petition for review.1  
From these cases we have come to recognize that our past 
decisions in this area of the law have to a degree lacked the 
clarity necessary to properly guide the bench and bar in the 
appropriate examination of prospective jurors for evidence of 
bias.  We believe that the resulting confusion stems from our 
inconsistent, 
and 
at 
times 
imprecise, 
use 
of 
the 
terms 
"implied," "actual," and "inferred" to describe a juror's bias. 
                     
1 In addition to the case at bar, during the 1998-1999 
Supreme Court term, we reviewed the following jury bias cases: 
State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 588 N.W.2d 1 (1999), State v. 
Broomfield, 223 Wis. 2d 465, 589 N.W.2d 225 (1999), State v. 
Erickson, No. 98-0273-CR (S. Ct. July 8, 1999)(of even date), 
State v. Kiernan, No. 97-2449-CR (S. Ct. July 8, 1999)(of even 
date), and State v. Mendoza, No. 97-0952-CR (S. Ct. July 8, 
1999)(of even date). 
97-2702-CR 
 
3 
 Today, we no longer refer to juror bias in these terms; their 
usefulness has run full course. 
¶5 
In their places we adopt the terms "statutory bias," 
"subjective bias," and "objective bias."  The value in using 
these terms is twofold: each is particularly descriptive of the 
reason a prospective juror may not serve and each term 
accurately describes the analysis a circuit court will make in 
discerning whether a juror is biased.  Further, our review of 
seven leading jury bias cases reveals that while we have not 
expressly 
used 
the 
terms 
we 
adopt 
today, 
the 
decisions 
implicitly recognize that when jurors were removed for cause, 
their removal was grounded in evidence of one of these three 
forms of bias.  Our adoption of these new terms does not, 
however, change our existing jurisprudence. 
I 
¶6 
The facts are undisputed for the purposes of this 
appeal.  George A. Faucher (Faucher), the defendant, was charged 
with second-degree sexual assault of a 70-year-old patient at a 
nursing home where the defendant was employed as a nursing 
assistant.  The charges against Faucher were supported by the 
witness account of a second nursing home employee, Paulette 
Hayes (Hayes), who testified at Faucher's trial that she saw the 
defendant fondling the victim's breast.  The defendant denied 
that he had ever fondled the resident, and further testified 
that he was not in the resident's room when the alleged assault 
occurred but, instead, was transporting other residents from the 
dining hall to their rooms. 
97-2702-CR 
 
4 
¶7 
The State presented six witnesses in addition to 
Hayes, although none of the others testified to seeing the 
defendant engage in inappropriate touching of the victim or any 
other resident.  Hayes was the State's key witness, and alluding 
to her significance, in his closing argument the prosecutor 
succinctly stated that "the heart of this case is really whether 
or not Paulette Hayes can be believed when she said that she 
poked her head into Room 103 . . . ."  He explained to the 
jurors that "[t]his case boils down to credibility of witnesses, 
that's it; who are you going to believe."  The case was at its 
essence a credibility contest between Hayes and Faucher. 
¶8 
The possibility of a partial jury was made evident at 
the close of the State's case when juror David Kaiser (Kaiser) 
notified the court that he recognized Hayes as an acquaintance. 
 During the initial voir dire, juror Kaiser did not see Hayes, 
who was not then present.  Nor did Kaiser recognize her name 
when read from a witness list; apparently, due to marriage, she 
had changed her last name.  The parties do not question that 
Kaiser did not have an opportunity to know that Hayes was a 
witness until she testified. 
¶9 
Alerted to the problem, the circuit court conducted a 
special, individual voir dire of Kaiser.  After establishing 
that juror Kaiser knew Hayes, the court asked Kaiser to 
describe, "in general, the nature of that acquaintanceship."  
Kaiser replied that "[s]he was our next-door neighbor, and I 
knew the family very wellwell, relatively, so I knew who sheI 
knew of her, and not only knew of her, and she was a girl of 
97-2702-CR 
 
5 
integrity, so."  Kaiser also admitted to living next door to 
Hayes for the four years prior to the trial. 
¶10 The voir dire continued: 
 
The Court: Is she still your next-door neighbor? 
 
Juror Kaiser: Off and on.  Her parents live next-door. 
 And so she's always over there visiting and stuff.  
We always go by and say hi and that kind of stuff. 
 
The Court: You don't socialize with her personally? 
 
Juror Kaiser: No, I do not. 
 
The 
Court: 
With 
that 
relationship, 
that 
acquaintanceship, could you judge her testimony the 
same as you judge the testimony of any other witness, 
giving her testimony no more or less credit just 
because of that relationship? 
 
Juror Kaiser: I know she's a person of integrity, and 
I know she wouldn't lie.  
 
Mr. Schneck [defense counsel]:  At this 
 
The Court:  Well, okay.  Do you haveyou haveCould 
you 
put 
any 
feelings 
that 
you 
have 
aside 
and 
decideweigh her testimony the same as you weigh the 
testimony of any other witness 
 
Juror Kaiser:  Yes. 
 
The 
Court: 
called 
to 
testify 
at 
this 
trial, 
instructed to by the Court? 
 
Juror Kaiser:  Yes. 
¶11 To 
questions 
by 
the 
prosecutor, 
juror 
Kaiser 
affirmatively responded that he could set aside his knowledge of 
other facts or details that he was aware of and decide the case 
only on what he heard in the courtroom. 
97-2702-CR 
 
6 
¶12 The 
defense counsel 
inquired 
further 
into 
juror 
Kaiser's ability to set aside his opinion regarding Hayes's 
credibility: 
 
Mr. Schneck:  Mr. Kaiser, you've indicated that you 
don't believe that [Hayes] would lie about anything; 
is that correct? 
 
Juror Kaiser: That's correct. 
 
Mr. Schneck: 
And that assessment was made by you 
based 
upon 
your 
knowledge 
of 
[Hayes] 
and 
your 
experiences with her being a next-door neighbor? 
 
Juror Kaiser:  Hmm-uhm. 
 
Mr. Schneck:  If the testimony in this case suggests 
that, in fact, she may have been mistaken in terms of 
what she saw, how are you going to be able to 
reconcile your past knowledge of her and come to an 
unbiased decision in terms of what is the truth? 
 
Mr. Gerol: 
Judge, I just don't think it's a proper 
question. 
 
I 
think 
it's 
almost 
getting 
to 
a 
predetermination. 
 
The Court: 
Mr. Kaiser, obviously, that was one 
part of the testimonypart of the evidence that we 
heard here in court, and there's other evidence.  Can 
you decide this case taking the evidence as a whole, 
and only on that evidence that you've heard here 
during the trial and will hear during the trial 
 
Juror Kaiser: Hmm-uhm. 
 
The Court: 
and apply it to the law as given to 
you by the Court, and be fair and impartial to both 
sides? 
 
Juror Kaiser: I can. 
 
The Court: 
If instructed by the Court, can you put 
asideand I do instruct you to put aside any feelings 
that you may have concerningput aside any personal 
97-2702-CR 
 
7 
feelings 
that 
you 
may 
have 
relative 
to 
your 
relationship, and judge the credibility of all the 
witnesses based upon the criteria that I will give 
you.  Can you do that? 
 
Juror Kaiser: Yes.  I just wanted to 
 
The Court: 
You won't give her testimony, if I 
instructed you, any more or less credit just because 
of that relationship; is that right? 
 
Juror Kaiser: That's correct. 
 
The Court: 
Thank you, Mr. Kaiser. 
¶13 Following this voir dire, defense counsel moved to 
strike juror Kaiser from the jury because of the bias he 
expressed. Defense counsel argued that it would be unfair to 
allow Kaiser to remain on the jury when he had formed an 
opinion, based on matters outside the evidence, that Hayes would 
not lie.  However, the circuit court had empanelled only 12 
jurors.  Because no alternates had been seated, defense counsel 
also moved for a mistrial, explaining that he did not want to 
proceed with a jury of 11. 
¶14 The court refused to grant a mistrial because, the 
court noted, Kaiser had testified that he "could put aside any 
feelings that he may have and judge the credibility of all the 
witnesses based upon the criteria that the Court will give him." 
 After the mistrial motion was denied, defense counsel consulted 
briefly 
with 
the 
defendant 
and 
informed 
the 
court 
that 
proceeding with 11 jurors "would be acceptable to him as a 
lesser solution to the request to declare a mistrial." 
97-2702-CR 
 
8 
¶15 Before a decision on the request was made, the court 
called Kaiser back into the courtroom and conducted a second, 
individual voir dire to determine if Kaiser had disclosed 
anything about his relationship with Hayes to the other jurors. 
 Kaiser admitted that he had told all of the other jurors that 
one of the State's witnesses was his neighbor, but testified 
that he had told them nothing about the witnessneither which 
witness he knew, nor his feelings regarding that witness. 
¶16 Immediately following the second, individual voir 
dire, defense counsel renewed its objection to Kaiser serving on 
the jury, arguing that in light of the strong opinion he held 
about Hayes's credibility, it would be impossible for him to 
follow the court's instructions to set those beliefs aside.  The 
court refused to alter its denial of the mistrial motion, ruling 
as follows:  "Well, he's already testified that he can do that, 
or he said that he can do that.  I mean, you have to take him at 
his word on that.  He was under oath, and he said he could put 
any feelings aside.  So, he's already been instructed on that." 
 Ultimately, the prosecutor agreed to proceed with 11 jurors, as 
did the defendant.  The circuit court excused Kaiser from the 
jury and the trial proceeded with the remaining 11.  The 11-
person jury returned a guilty verdict. 
¶17 The 
defendant filed 
a motion for 
postconviction 
relief, arguing that the circuit court erred in refusing to 
strike juror Kaiser for cause, thereby violating a number of the 
defendant's constitutional rights, including his right to an 
impartial jury.  He argued further that his waiver of a 12-
97-2702-CR 
 
9 
person jury was not voluntarily made given the circuit court's 
failure to strike Kaiser for cause.  The circuit court denied 
the defendant's request for a new trial, concluding that it did 
not err in refusing to grant defendant a mistrial. 
¶18 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
judgment of conviction and order denying postconviction relief, 
and it remanded for a new trial, resting its decision in large 
measure upon this court's decision in State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 
2d 660, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992).  We reasoned in Gesch that while a 
prospective juror related to a state witness by blood or 
marriage to the third degree may harbor no actual bias, the risk 
of unconscious bias was manifest because it is near impossible 
for such a juror to consciously estimate how the family 
relationship with a witness will affect his or her judgment.  
Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d at 667.  Using Gesch as analytical framework 
for its decision here, the court of appeals reasoned that the 
bias Kaiser openly expressed would be as difficult to set aside 
as was the bias implied to prospective jurors who were closely 
related to witnesses.  Faucher, 220 Wis. 2d at 697-700.  The 
court concluded that Kaiser was biased as a matter of law, and 
held that "because the totality of [Kaiser's] responses revealed 
bias so manifest that his assurances of impartiality were 
insufficient to preclude prejudice, a mistrial should have been 
ordered."  Faucher, 220 Wis. 2d at 691.  
¶19 Two days after the court of appeals released its 
decision, this court mandated State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 
579 N.W.2d 654 (1998), where we set forth the “manifest bias” 
97-2702-CR 
 
10
test a reviewing court is to use in determining whether the 
circuit court properly refused to strike a juror for cause.  We 
held that bias was manifest, requiring reversal, whenever a 
review of the record 1) does not support a finding that the 
prospective juror is a reasonable person who is sincerely 
willing to put aside an opinion or prior knowledge, or 2) does 
not support a finding that a reasonable person in the juror's 
position could set aside the opinion or prior knowledge.  Id. at 
661.  In an errata to its decision, the court of appeals 
summarily concluded that should it have had the benefit of 
Ferron prior to its decision in Faucher, neither the outcome nor 
the reasoning of its decision would have changed.  Faucher, 220 
Wis. 2d at 703 n.6.  Applying the second prong of Ferron, the 
court wrote without discussion that "the record would not 
support a finding that a reasonable person in the juror's 
position could actually set aside his opinion as to the 
witness's credibility."  Id.  The State appeals.2 
II 
¶20  Our use of the terms "implied," "actual," and 
"inferred" as descriptions of juror bias has been inconsistent 
and imprecise and has led to a degree of confusion among the 
                     
2 The court of appeals also concluded that defendant Faucher 
did not voluntarily waive his right to a 12-person jury when he 
chose to continue with 11 jurors following the circuit court’s 
refusal to strike juror Kaiser.  It held that by offering to 
continue the case with 11 jurors, Faucher did not abandon his 
right to raise on appeal the issue with which we are presented. 
 The State has not reasserted waiver, and we do not address it 
here. 
97-2702-CR 
 
11
bench and bar.  How many types of bias do we recognize in 
Wisconsin, and how is each type of bias to be uncovered?  These 
questions, although never explicitly asked, are at times 
implicit in circuit court decisions and parties' briefsusually 
through the absence of any discussion of inferred bias. 
¶21 Since at least our decision in State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 
2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Poelinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990), we 
have at times expressly stated that juror bias was either 
"actual" or "implied."  Id. at 730; State v. Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 
470, 478, 457 N.W.2d 484 (1990); Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d at 666.  
Accordingly, a circuit court's examination of a prospective 
juror3 involved consideration of the presence of one of these two 
types of bias.  However, with our recent decision in State v. 
Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 588 N.W.2d 1 (1999), we relied upon 
the language in Wyss that "bias may be inferred from surrounding 
facts and circumstances" to explicitly recognize for the first 
time that "inferred" bias was a type of bias, not merely the 
method by which bias was surmised.  See id., 223 Wis. 2d at 282 
(citing Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 730).  We then reversed the circuit 
court for failing to find that the challenged juror in Delgado 
had "inferred" bias.  Id. at 286. 
                     
3  Here, and throughout our discussion, our use of the term 
prospective juror should be read to include the term juror.  
While the search for juror bias during the initial voir dire 
considers a prospective juror's ability to be impartial, a 
juror's bias is the focus of the inquiry following the start of 
trial. 
97-2702-CR 
 
12
¶22 Further contributing to the confusion are those cases 
in which the term "inferred" is used as a verb to describe the 
process by which "actual" or "implied" bias is discovered.  One 
example is found in Wyss, where we wrote that "bias may be 
inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances."  Wyss, 124 
Wis. 2d at 730.  Another example is found in the court of 
appeals' explanation of our decision in Gesch: "the supreme 
court relied upon the family relationship to "infer" that the 
juror had developed strongly held opinions about his brother's 
character and credibility. The court then held that bias was 
"implied." Faucher, 220 Wis. 2d at 699.  Of course, the word 
"inferred" is most often used as a verb, and not an adjective, 
and therefore it is not surprising that courts and others have 
used the word "inferred" only to describe the method by which 
one draws a conclusion from the evidence presented that a 
prospective juror had actual bias or implied bias. 
¶23 In light of the confusion, we are convinced that the 
use of the terms "implied," "actual," and "inferred" to describe 
juror bias has outlived its utility and that the bench and bar 
will be better served with terminology that accurately reflects 
both the reason why a juror cannot be impartial, and the 
analysis a circuit court should use to discern whether a 
prospective juror is or is not impartial.   
¶24 As has been explained by this court on many occasions, 
a criminal defendant's right to receive a fair trial by a panel 
of impartial jurors is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 7 of 
97-2702-CR 
 
13
the Wisconsin Constitution, as well as principles of due 
process.  Louis, 156 Wis. 2d at 478; Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d at 666. 
 To be impartial, a juror must be indifferent and capable of 
basing his or her verdict upon the evidence developed at trial. 
 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).  The requirement that 
a 
juror 
be 
indifferent 
is 
codified 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.08(1)(1995-96).4  That statute requires the circuit court 
to examine on oath each person who is called as a juror to 
discover if he or she "has expressed or formed any opinion or is 
aware of any bias or prejudice in the case."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.08(1).  The statute directs that "[I]f a juror is not 
indifferent in the case, the juror shall be excused."  Id.  We 
have stated that even the appearance of bias should be avoided. 
 Louis, 156 Wis. 2d at 478. 
¶25 In light of these principles, the requirements of Wis. 
Stat. § 805.08(1), and our review of our leading jury bias 
cases, today we adopt the terms "statutory," "subjective," and 
"objective" as the proper terms to use in referring to juror 
bias.  We caution that these three terms do not neatly 
correspond to the terms "implied," "actual," and "inferred" as 
                     
4 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-
96 version unless otherwise noted.  
97-2702-CR 
 
14
we have used those terms in our prior cases;5 for instance, 
statutory bias is not a term we merely prefer over the term 
implied biasor actual or inferred bias for that matteras we 
explain below, statutory bias has a meaning independent of any 
one of the former terms.  The same is true of subjective and 
objective bias.  However, for the purposes of providing the 
circuit 
courts 
and 
practitioners 
with 
guidance, 
we 
do 
acknowledge that subjective bias is most closely akin to what we 
had called actual bias, and that objective bias in some ways 
contemplates both our use of the terms implied and inferred 
bias.  But because the case law does not always use the former 
terms in a consistent manner, there is not an absolute, direct 
correlation between the former terms and the terms we adopt 
today. 
A 
                     
5 Of our jury bias cases, Delgado describes "implied bias" 
and "actual bias" in a way that most closely corresponds, 
respectively, to the terms "statutory bias" and "subjective 
bias" as we adopt those terms today.  We explained in Delgado 
that the phrase "actual bias" as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 
805.08 (1989-90) means that "'the prospective juror "has 
expressed or formed any opinion, or is aware of any bias or 
prejudice in the case."'" Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 282 n.6 
(citing Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 730).  "Implied bias" we explained 
as "the type of bias set forth in § 805.08 based upon 'specific 
grounds that will automatically disqualify prospective jurors 
without regard to whether that person is actually biased, i.e., 
if "the juror is related by blood or marriage to any party or to 
any attorney appearing in this case or has a financial interest 
in the case."'"  Id.  However, as our discussion in Part II of 
this opinion makes clear, we have not always referred to 
"implied bias" and "actual bias" in this way. 
97-2702-CR 
 
15
¶26 What we shall now call "statutory bias" is the most 
easily described form 
of 
juror bias. 
 With 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.08(1), the legislature deemed biased those who were 
related by "blood or marriage to any party or to any attorney 
appearing in [the] case" and those who "[have] any financial 
interest in the case."  Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1).  Therefore, a 
person meeting one of these descriptions is statutorily biased 
and may not serve on a jury regardless of his or her ability to 
be impartial.  Although § 805.08(1) also speaks of those 
prospective jurors who have expressed or formed any opinion or 
are aware of any bias or prejudice in the case, these persons 
are not those to whom the term "statutorily biased" applies.  
These persons are more accurately described as those for whom 
evidence of "subjective bias" exists.  See Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 
at 282 n.6. 
¶27 We intend the term "subjective bias" to describe bias 
that is revealed through the words and the demeanor of the 
prospective juror.  While the term "subjective" is not meant to 
convey precisely the same sense of bias as did the term 
"actual," the two terms are closely related.  As did actual 
bias, subjective bias refers to the bias that is revealed by the 
prospective juror on voir dire: it refers to the prospective 
juror's state of mind. 
¶28 We have stated in another context that a subjective 
inquiry will often not be susceptible to direct proof.  See 
Stern v. Thompson & Coates, Ltd., 185 Wis. 2d 220, 236, 517 
N.W.2d 658 (1994).  And so it is true of a circuit court's 
97-2702-CR 
 
16
inquiry into the prospective juror's state of mind.  While there 
may be the occasion when a prospective juror explicitly admits 
to a prejudice, or explicitly admits to an inability to set 
aside a prejudice, most frequently the prospective juror's 
subjective bias will only be revealed through his or her 
demeanor.  Therefore, we caution that whether a prospective 
juror is subjectively biased turns on his or her responses on 
voir dire and a circuit court's assessment of the individual's 
honesty and credibility, among other relevant factors.  And just 
as was true of a circuit court's finding on actual bias, we 
believe that the circuit court sits in a superior position to 
assess the demeanor and disposition of prospective jurors, and 
thus, whether they are subjectively biased.  Given the circuit 
court's superior position to so assess the demeanor and 
disposition of prospective jurors, we remain convinced that 
"[i]n most cases a circuit court's discretion in determining the 
potential for [subjective] juror impartiality or bias will 
suffice to protect a defendant's right to an impartial jury."  
Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d at 666.  On review, we will uphold the 
circuit court's factual finding that a prospective juror is or 
is not subjectively biased unless it is clearly erroneous. 
¶29 On the other hand, the focus of the inquiry into 
"objective bias" is not upon the individual prospective juror's 
state of mind, but rather upon whether the reasonable person in 
the individual prospective juror's position could be impartial. 
 When assessing whether a juror is objectively biased, a circuit 
court must consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
97-2702-CR 
 
17
voir dire and the facts involved in the case.  However, the 
emphasis of this assessment remains on the reasonable person in 
light of those facts and circumstances.  We observe the 
following examples of the objective standard in our prior cases. 
 For instance, when a prospective juror is challenged on voir 
dire because there was some evidence demonstrating that the 
prospective juror had formed an opinion or prior knowledge, we 
explained that whether the juror should be removed for cause 
turns on whether a reasonable person in the prospective juror's 
position could set aside the opinion or prior knowledge.  
Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 498.  And when determining whether a 
defendant should receive a new trial because extraneous, 
prejudicial information reached one or more jurors prior to the 
verdict, we have phrased the objective inquiry as whether "there 
is a reasonable possibility that the information in [the 
juror's] possession would have a prejudicial effect upon a 
hypothetical average juror."  State v. Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d 254, 
282, 518 N.W.2d 232 (1994). 
¶30 Our jury bias case law demonstrates that in the past 
we have reviewed the circuit court's determination of whether a 
prospective juror was objectively biased under varying standards 
of review.  For instance, we viewed the objective question as 
one of law and reviewed the circuit court's determination de 
novo in Broomfield, 223 Wis. 2d at 480, but viewed the question 
as one of fact and reviewed for clear error in Delgado, 223 Wis. 
2d at 281.  Although we have inconsistently reviewed the 
question in the past, we are convinced that the circuit court's 
97-2702-CR 
 
18
determination on the question of objective bias should be 
reviewed under a deferential standard. 
¶31 Whether a juror is objectively biased is a mixed 
question of fact and law.  As is true of appellate review of 
factual findings generally, a circuit court's findings regarding 
the facts and circumstances surrounding voir dire and the case 
will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.  Whether those 
facts fulfill the legal standard of objective bias is a question 
of law.  This court does not ordinarily defer to the circuit 
court's determination of a question of law.  Figliuzzi v. 
Carcajou Shooting Club of Lake Koshkonong, 184 Wis. 2d 572, 590, 
516 N.W.2d 410 (1994).  However, a circuit court's conclusion on 
objective bias is intertwined with factual findings supporting 
that conclusion.  Therefore, it is appropriate that this court 
give weight to the circuit court's conclusion on that question. 
 See Figliuzzi, 184 Wis. 2d at 590 (although whether facts meet 
the legal determination of unreasonable interference is a 
question of law, this court gives weight to the circuit court's 
conclusion on reasonableness because the facts and the law are 
closely intertwined); see also Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz 
Brewing co., 126 Wis. 2d 349, 358, 377 N.W.2d 593 (1985) ("An 
appellate 
court 
need 
not 
defer 
to 
the 
trial 
court's 
determination on a question of law, although it should be given 
weight 
where 
the 
legal 
and 
factual 
determinations 
are 
intertwined. . . ."). 
¶32 The circuit court is particularly well-positioned to 
make a determination of objective bias, and it has special 
97-2702-CR 
 
19
competence in this area.  It is intimately familiar with the 
voir dire proceeding, and is best situated to reflect upon the 
prospective juror's subjective state of mind which is relevant 
as well to the determination of objective bias.  See Delgado, 
223 Wis. 2d at 285 ("[A] juror's honesty is an important factor 
in determining inferred bias. . . .").  We therefore give weight 
to the court's conclusion that a prospective juror is or is not 
objectively biased.  We will reverse its conclusion only if as a 
matter of law a reasonable judge could not have reached such a 
conclusion. 
B 
¶33 We have identified seven cases through which our jury 
bias jurisprudence has evolved, and as a primer for jury bias 
analysis using the terminology we adopt today, we consider where 
each of these cases would fall given this new terminology.  In 
chronological order of our original review, we consider Wyss, 
124 Wis. 2d 681, Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 470, Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 
Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d 254, Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, Delgado, 223 
Wis. 2d 270, and Broomfield, 223 Wis. 2d 465.  As further 
guidance, we have grouped our discussion of the cases according 
to the issues that were presented for our review: strike for 
cause, lack of juror candor, and extraneous information. 
Strike for Cause 
¶34 Louis, Gesch, and Ferron each involved review of a 
circuit court's order denying a defendant's motion to strike one 
or more jurors for cause.  The three cases are examples of the 
most frequent challenges to a prospective juror: the challenge 
97-2702-CR 
 
20
that an entire class is objectively biased, whereby the 
individual is challenged by virtue of his or her "membership" in 
the class.  In Louis this challenge was directed generally at 
all law enforcement officers and in Gesch at those who were 
siblings of witnesses.  The other frequent challenge is that 
which challenges the particular prospective juror where voir 
dire reveals some evidence that the individual has a prior 
opinion or knowledge as those terms are used in Wis. Stat. § 
805.08(1). 
¶35 In Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 470, we held that two members of 
the Milwaukee Police Department were not ineligible per se to 
serve as jurors and that the circuit court did not err in 
finding that the two officers were not actually biased.  Id. at 
478-79.  In so concluding, and with a view to the terminology we 
adopt 
today, 
we 
considered 
the 
presence 
of 
"statutory," 
"subjective," 
and "objective" 
bias 
and 
found 
insufficient 
evidence of all three.   
¶36 We observed first that law enforcement officials were 
not among those groups the legislature expressly excluded from 
jury service, id. at 479-80, a conclusion, under the terminology 
we 
adopt 
today, 
that 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
are 
not 
statutorily biased.  Next, we rejected the defendant's argument 
that "law enforcement officials would be biased against a 
defendant as a result of the nature of their occupation and 
their 
possible 
professional 
associations, 
no 
matter 
how 
attenuated, with some of the trial's participants."  Id. at 480. 
 We also wrote that "[a] prospective juror's knowledge of or 
97-2702-CR 
 
21
acquaintance with a participant in the trial, without more, is 
insufficient grounds for disqualification."  Id. at 484 (citing 
State v. Zurfluh, 134 Wis. 2d 436, 438, 397 N.W.2d 154 (Ct. App. 
1986)).  Using the terminology that we adopt today, we held that 
the challenged jurors were not objectively biased by mere virtue 
that they were employed as law enforcement officers and worked 
in the same department with the state's witness.  Today we might 
write that a reasonable person in the position of a law 
enforcement officer could remain impartial despite working in 
the same department as a state witness.   
¶37 We also considered the presence of actual bias and 
found none.  Id. at 483-84.  We held that the officers' comments 
that they could be impartial was supported by the record, 
writing that "[w]hile such expressions are not conclusive, 
evaluating the subjective sincerity of those expressions is a 
matter of the circuit court's discretion."  Id. at 484 (citing 
State v. Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d 14, 33, 280 N.W.2d 725 (1979)).  
As one might observe from this conclusion, we believed that 
there was no evidence of subjective biasthat the prospective 
jurors' states of mind revealed that they were impartial. 
¶38 The 
defendant 
in 
Gesch 
challenged 
as 
biased 
a 
prospective juror because he was a state's witness's brother.  
See Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660.  Although we reversed the circuit 
court's order denying the defendant's motion to strike the juror 
for cause, we found no evidence of subjective bias.  See id. at 
667 (the circuit court made an "admirable and thorough search 
for actual bias and found no actual bias" and we had no doubt 
97-2702-CR 
 
22
that 
the 
juror 
"honestly 
believed 
that 
he 
could 
remain 
impartial.").   
¶39 However, considering the relationship objectively, we 
concluded that the juror should have been removed for cause, 
reasoning that "where a prospective juror is related to a state 
witness by blood or marriage to the third degree, special 
problems exist that render a circuit court's search for actual 
bias an inadequate protection of a defendant's right to an 
impartial jury.  One such problem is the potential for 
unconscious bias."  Id. at 667.  We deemed it highly probable 
that a family member would not be able to remain impartial 
despite the family member's honest belief that he or she could 
do so, and held that "the mere probability of bias is so high 
that in order to assure a defendant the fundamental fairness to 
which the defendant is entitled, we must imply bias and exclude 
the juror as a matter of law."  Id. at 668.   
¶40 Our 
holding 
in 
Gesch 
is 
unique. 
 
In 
most 
circumstances, as we discussed when outlining the meaning of 
objective bias, the conclusion that an individual is objectively 
biased requires some view of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the voir dire and the case, as well as the 
prospective juror's answers.  We therefore urge a circuit court 
to engage in a thorough voir dire when a party challenges a 
prospective juror through the class  to which the prospective 
juror belongs.  However, Gesch remains an example that some 
relationships are so fraught with the possibility of bias that 
we must find objective bias regardless of the surrounding facts 
97-2702-CR 
 
23
and circumstances and the particular juror's assurances of 
impartiality. 
¶41 Finally, Ferron is our most recent case reviewing a 
circuit court's decision on a defendant's motion to strike for 
cause and it most clearly foreshadows the terminology we adopt 
today.  In Ferron, we articulated a standard of review which we 
would use to determine whether a challenged juror should have 
been removed for cause, explaining that a prospective juror 
should be removed whenever a review of the record: (1) does not 
support a finding that the prospective juror is a reasonable 
person who is sincerely willing to put aside an opinion or prior 
knowledge; or (2) does not support a finding that a reasonable 
person in the juror's position could set aside the opinion or 
prior knowledge.  Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 497.  We then explained 
that the first prong probed for evidence of bias from a 
subjective point of view, and the second from an objective point 
of view: 
 
Adopting this approach serves two purposes.  With a 
focus on prospective jurors' subjective willingness to 
set aside their biases, the first prong of this 
approach accounts for the circuit court's superior 
position to assess the demeanor and disposition of 
prospective jurors.  The second prong allows the 
appellate 
courts to 
determine whether 
under the 
particular circumstances surrounding the voir dire 
examination, no reasonable juror could put aside the 
bias or opinion which is revealed by the record. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
¶42 Because we found evidence under the first, subjective 
prong of Ferron that the challenged juror in Ferron was biased, 
97-2702-CR 
 
24
we did not reach the second, objective prong.  The challenged 
juror in Ferron explained during voir dire that should he be 
impaneled, he could not fail to consider the defendant's refusal 
to testify in his own defense.  After a lengthy voir dire in 
which the circuit court explained the law on a number of 
occasions, the juror stated that he could "probably" decide the 
case without considering the fact that the defendant did not 
take the stand.  Based in part upon this response, the circuit 
court was satisfied that the juror could be impartial. 
¶43 We reversed the circuit court on grounds that the 
juror's response that he "probably" could set aside his bias was 
evidence of a "lack of sincere willingness to set aside his bias 
[that] illustrate[d] that he was not 'indifferent in the case' 
as required by Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1)."  Id. at 503.  In accord 
with the terminology we adopt today, this juror was subjectively 
biasedthat is, his state of mind as revealed through his 
answers to the questions posed by the circuit court evinced his 
bias against the defendant. 
Lack of Juror Candor Cases 
¶44 A defendant's motion for a new trial made on the 
grounds that a juror lacked candor during voir dire presents a 
second scenario within which questions of juror bias are raised. 
 To successfully gain a new trial on this basis, a defendant 
must satisfy the circuit court that (1) a juror incorrectly or 
incompletely responded to a material question on voir dire and 
if so that (2) it is more probable than not that under the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the particular case, the juror was 
97-2702-CR 
 
25
biased against the moving party.  Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 726.  
Only the second prong directly involves considerations of bias. 
 See id. at 730. 
¶45 In Wyss, we upheld the circuit court's finding that 
the challenged juror was not biased.  We quite clearly agreed 
with the circuit court that the evidence from voir dire did not 
support a finding of actual bias, or in the terminology we adopt 
today, that the juror was subjectively biased.  Id. at 732. 
However, our discussion in Wyss leaves unclear whether either 
the circuit court or this court on review considered whether the 
juror's incorrect answers revealed objective bias.  We did state 
that there were no facts and circumstances from which bias may 
be inferred, but the sense in which we made this statement is 
unclear.   
¶46 In Delgado, where we reversed the circuit court's 
determination that a juror was not biased, this court much more 
explicitly discussed both subjective and objective bias.  We 
concluded that it was more probable than not, that under the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the particular case, the 
challenged 
juror 
was 
biased 
against 
the 
moving 
partya 
conclusion under the terminology we adopt today that the juror 
was objectively biased.  Id. at 286.   
¶47 In that case, we first noted that the circuit court 
found no evidence of actual bias, the equivalent of a finding 
that the juror was not subjectively biased, writing that "[i]n 
this case the circuit court found that Juror C. was honest, 
97-2702-CR 
 
26
acted in good faith and did not purposely give an incorrect or 
incomplete answer."  Id. at 282. 
¶48 However, we reversed the circuit court because it had 
failed to find "inferred" biasunder the terminology adopted 
today, the circuit court failed to engage in a consideration of 
whether under the facts and circumstances of the case the juror 
was objectively biased.  In determining whether a person is 
biased, a circuit court is supposed to consider the following 
factors: 
 
(1) did the question asked sufficiently inquire into 
the subject matter to be disclosed by the juror; 
 
(2) were the responses of other jurors to the same 
question sufficient to put a reasonable person on 
notice that an answer was required; 
 
(3) did the juror become aware of his or her false or 
misleading answers at anytime during the trial and 
fail to notify the trial court? 
Id. at 283 (citing Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 731).  We held that the 
circuit court failed to consider these factors, and had it done 
so, would have had to conclude that the juror was biased, for 
the answers to each of the three questions was affirmative.  The 
answers 
to 
these 
questions 
revealed 
that 
the 
juror 
was 
objectively biased. 
¶49 Finally, we also considered jurors' lack of candor in 
Messelt.  In reviewing the circuit court's order denying the 
defendant's motion for a new trial, we wrote that "[the 
defendant's] argument [was] that bias must be implied from the 
fact that prior to trial, [the jurors] possessed certain 
97-2702-CR 
 
27
information about Messelt's prior criminal activity."  Id. at 
270.  While we used the term "implied," the presence of such 
bias having always been a question of law, we reviewed only 
evidence of the jurors' subjective bias, the presence of which 
was factual in nature.  We upheld the circuit court's finding 
that the jurors could be impartial, noting that the circuit 
court believed that the two jurors could be impartial based upon 
its assessment of the jurors' credibility and the nature of the 
knowledge they had.  Our discussion of bias in Messelt, with 
respect to the two jurors who had knowledge of the defendant's 
criminal record, reviewed only the question of whether the 
jurors were subjectively biased.  Neither the circuit court nor 
this court explicitly considered whether either juror was 
objectively biased. 
Extraneous Information 
¶50 Juror 
impartiality 
may 
also 
be 
undermined 
when 
extraneous information reaches one or more juror's prior to a 
jury's verdict.  See generally, Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d 254, and 
Broomfield, 223 Wis. 2d 465.  In Messelt, we explained that 
whether extraneous information that reaches a juror constitutes 
prejudicial error requiring reversal of a verdict was a question 
97-2702-CR 
 
28
of law. 6  Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d at 281-82.  As such, where a 
circuit court must consider whether the extraneous evidence was 
prejudicial, its prejudicial effect is considered only from an 
objective bias standard.  See id. at 282 (citing State v. Poh, 
116 Wis. 2d 510, 523-25, 343 N.W.2d 108 (1984)(the "analysis 
will focus on whether there is a reasonable possibility that the 
information in [the juror's] possession would have a prejudicial 
effect upon a hypothetical average juror.").  The appropriate 
analysis under the test for extraneous, prejudicial information 
does not include considerations of subjective bias.  While the 
test for extraneous, prejudicial information was explained in 
Messelt, the defendant's failure to sufficiently satisfy the 
circuit court that any extraneous information reached a juror 
ended the inquiry into prejudicial error prior to the analysis 
for objective bias.7 
                     
6 To impeach a verdict, a defendant must first demonstrate 
that a juror's testimony is competent under sec. 906.06(2).  
Upon meeting that requirement, a defendant must demonstrate to 
the circuit court by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence 
that the juror made or heard the statements or engaged in the 
conduct alleged by the defendant.  Only if that burden is met 
will the circuit court make the legal determination of whether 
the 
extraneous 
information 
constitutes 
prejudicial 
error 
requiring reversal of the verdict. See State v. Messelt, 185 
Wis. 2d 254, 518 N.W.2d 232 (1994). 
7  Because the defendant failed to prove that any of the 
alleged 
extraneous 
information 
reached 
any 
juror 
who 
participated in deliberations, the defendant's motion for a new 
trial was denied without the circuit court considering the 
effect the extraneous information would have on the hypothetical 
juror. 
97-2702-CR 
 
29
¶51 In Broomfield, our most recent jury bias decision, we 
did reach the bias inquiry.  The defendant in Broomfield 
established that the challenged juror's testimony was competent 
for purposes of impeaching the verdict in his case, and that 
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence demonstrated that 
the 
juror 
had 
received 
extraneous 
information 
which 
was 
potentially prejudicial: namely overhearing two people talking 
about a prior hung jury involving the defendant, and other bad 
acts allegedly committed by the defendant.  We then considered 
whether either piece of extraneous information that the juror 
had overheard about the defendant was prejudicial and concluded 
that 
the 
information 
in 
the 
juror's 
possession 
did 
not 
constitute prejudicial error because the information would not 
have a prejudicial effect upon a hypothetical average juror.  
With the terminology adopted today, the information in the 
juror's possession was not sufficient to establish that the 
juror was objectively biased. 
III 
¶52 We now address the issue presented, which involves a 
defendant's motion to strike a juror for cause.  The transcript 
from the special voir dire clearly reveals that the circuit 
court was presented with evidence that juror Kaiser had formed 
an opinion regarding Hayes's credibility.  On three occasions 
during the special voir dire, juror Kaiser expressed his view 
that he considered Hayes's credibility unimpeachable.  First, he 
stated that he knew the witness, a former next door neighbor of 
four years, to be a "girl of integrity."  Second, when asked by 
97-2702-CR 
 
30
the court whether he could ignore his relationship as neighbor 
to Hayes, juror Kaiser responded "I know she's a person of 
integrity, and I know that she wouldn't lie."  Third, when asked 
by the defense counsel if he had indicated that he believed that 
Hayes would not lie about anything, juror Kaiser responded 
affirmatively.  Together, these three statements are evidence 
that juror Kaiser had an opinion and that he was not impartial. 
 The circuit court then asked juror Kaiser if he could set aside 
his opinion and be impartial.  Kaiser testified that he could 
and the circuit court was convinced that he would remain 
impartial.  
¶53 This court will uphold the circuit court's factual 
findings that a prospective juror is not subjectively biased 
unless the finding is clearly erroneous.   
¶54 Apprised of juror Kaiser's opinion, the circuit court 
appropriately engaged him to determine whether he could set 
aside his opinion of Hayes and serve impartially.  Kaiser 
unambiguously stated that he could set aside his opinion that 
Hayes would not lie and decide the case based only on the 
evidence. 
¶55 The circuit court believed that Kaiser was honest when 
he testified that he could set aside his opinion.  On our review 
of the record we conclude that the circuit court’s finding that 
Kaiser was a reasonable person who was sincerely willing to put 
aside his opinion is not clearly erroneous.  Unlike the result 
in Ferron, where we found that a juror was not sincerely willing 
to set aside an obvious bias where his last word on the subject 
97-2702-CR 
 
31
was that he "probably" could do so, see id. at 501, here, Kaiser 
was unambiguous in his belief that he could do so and stated 
unequivocally that he would follow the law.8  The record supports 
the circuit court's finding that Kaiser was a reasonable person 
and that he was sincere in his willingness to set his opinion 
aside.  The circuit court’s determination that juror Kaiser was 
not subjectively biased is not clearly erroneous.9 
¶56 We give weight to the circuit court's conclusion that 
a prospective juror is or is not objectively biased.  We will 
reverse its conclusion only if as a matter of law a reasonable 
judge could not have reached such a conclusion. 
¶57 The circuit court did not consider whether juror 
Kaiser was objectively biased.  Upon concluding that Kaiser was 
sincere in his willingness to set aside his opinion, the circuit 
court ended its inquiry.  The circuit court's decision not to 
dismiss Kaiser was based solely on Kaiser's statement that he 
could set aside his opinion, and the court's erroneous belief 
that it had to "believe his response."  On examination of the 
record, we conclude as a matter of law that a reasonable judge 
                     
8 We remain committed to our view that a prospective juror 
need not unambiguously state his or her ability to set aside a 
bias.  State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 579 N.W.2d 654 (1998). 
  However, where, as here, a prospective juror's unambiguous 
statement that he will follow the law and act impartially does 
serve as evidence weighing against a finding that the juror is 
subjectively biased. 
9 The circuit court found that Kaiser was not actually 
biased.  
97-2702-CR 
 
32
can reach only one conclusion; that is that the juror was 
objectively biased. 
¶58 We observe first that the record discloses what must 
be regarded as Kaiser's strongly held opinion regarding Hayes's 
credibility.  His responses on voir dire are telling.  First, 
when asked to describe the nature of his relationship with 
Hayes, he begins by explaining that Hayes was his next door 
neighbor, but tellingly ends his response not with a description 
of the relationship as asked to, but rather by expressing his 
opinion that Hayes was "a girl of integrity." 
¶59 Second, the circuit court expressly asked Kaiser if he 
"could judge her testimony the same as [he would] judge the 
testimony of any other witness, giving her testimony no more or 
less credit just because of that relationship?"  Instead of 
responding negatively or affirmatively as was appropriate given 
the nature of the question, juror Kaiser apparently felt it 
better to reiterate his opinion of Hayes, responding: "I know 
she's a person of integrity, and I know she wouldn't lie."  We 
believe this answer, which was not responsive to the court's 
question, belies the strength with which Kaiser held his 
favorable opinion of Hayes's credibility. 
¶60 Finally, after he subsequently assured the court that 
he could set his opinion aside and weigh Hayes's testimony as he 
weighed the testimony of any other witness, Kaiser agreed with 
the defense counsel restatement of his opinion that "based upon 
his knowledge of Ms. Hayes as a next-door neighbor, he believed 
that she would not lie about anything." 
97-2702-CR 
 
33
¶61 It is the strength of the opinion Kaiser held, coupled 
with the fact that Hayes was the crucial witness in the State's 
case, that leads us to the conclusion that a reasonable person 
in his position could not set the opinion aside despite the best 
of intentions to do so.  We agree with the court of appeals that 
 
the trial was a credibility contest between Hayes and 
Faucherthe sole witness and the alleged perpetrator 
of the crime. . . .  [G]iven the strength of the 
juror's opinion about Hayes' credibility it is utterly 
impossible for any court to determine with confidence 
that his judgment or action would not be swayed or 
controlled by his preconceived convictions. 
Faucher, 220 Wis. 2d at 698.  Despite Kaiser's best and most 
sincere efforts to do so, we conclude that Kaiser could not 
truly set aside his strongly held belief that Hayes would not 
lie when he was called upon to answer the only question he was 
likely to face as a juror in this case: was Hayes, or the 
defendant, telling the truth. 
¶62 The State argues that a reasonable person in Kaiser's 
position could have set aside his opinionbasing this conclusion 
on its belief that Kaiser's opinion was not strongly held.  It 
believes that the opinion wasn't strongly held because the four-
year relationship Hayes and Kaiser shared was not particularly 
close as Kaiser's relationship was primarily with Hayes's family 
and only secondarily with Hayes herself.  As evidence that the 
Kaiser-Hayes relationship was superficial, the State suggests, 
without providing support, that the trial court "implicitly 
inferred that the relationship was primarily between Mr. Kaiser 
and Ms. Hayes' parents."  We do not find any evidence from which 
97-2702-CR 
 
34
the circuit court could draw this inference from the voir dire, 
and we disagree with the State that that is the appropriate 
inference to draw from the voir dire. 
¶63 The State also characterizes the relationship between 
Hayes and Kaiser as one similar to the superficial relationship 
shared by co-workers in State v. King, 120 Wis. 2d 285, 354 
N.W.2d 742 (Ct. App. 1984).  In King, voir dire revealed that a 
juror knew the State witness as co-worker and the brother-in-law 
of another co-worker, and that the extent of the relationship 
was their exchange of greetings in the workplace.  Id. at 295.  
The juror testified that this relationship with the witness 
would not affect his ability to remain impartial.  Id.  The 
circuit court refused to strike the juror for cause, id., and 
the court of appeals affirmed. 
¶64 With its reliance on King, the State apparently 
suggests that the relationship between Hayes and Kaiser and the 
relationship described in King are so closely analogous that 
just as evidence that a juror and witness are co-workers is 
insufficient evidence of objective bias, so too should evidence 
that a juror and witness are neighbors be insufficient evidence 
of objective bias.  We agree with the State that evidence of 
only a superficial relationship fails to satisfy objective bias 
analysis.  However, the State's reliance on King is misplaced 
for two reasons.   
¶65 First, King and this case are clearly distinguishable 
for the juror in King expressed no opinion about the witness, 
whereas here Kaiser did express an opinion about Hayes. 
97-2702-CR 
 
35
¶66 Second, and of much greater import, our holding that a 
reasonable person in juror Kaiser's position could not have set 
aside his opinion is not based solely upon the relationship 
Kaiser had with Hayes.  We would reverse a trial judge as a 
matter of law if he or she held that all jurors who live next 
door to witnesses are objectively biased.  Instead, our 
conclusion that Kaiser is objectively biased is grounded in 
Kaiser's strongly held, initial assurances that Hayes was 
credible.  While his relationship to Hayes as a neighbor 
undoubtedly provides the crucible in which Kaiser's opinion 
developed, it is not that relationship, but rather his strongly 
held beliefs, that leads us to the conclusion that a reasonable 
person in Kaiser’s position could not set aside his opinion 
about the witness. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
1