Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Hillman

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Hillman, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-447.] 
 
                                                                
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-447 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. HILLMAN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Hillman, Slip Opinion No.  
2022-Ohio-447.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Attorney violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3) (requiring an attorney to keep the client 
reasonably informed about the status of the client’s matter) and 3.4(d) 
(requiring an attorney to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with 
a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party)—Two-year 
suspension imposed, stayed in its entirety on conditions. 
(No. 2021-0443—Submitted September 8, 2021—Decided February 17, 2022.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2020-042. 
______________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Steven Edward Hillman, of Dublin, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0002578, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1973.  We 
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2 
have twice suspended him from the practice of law for his failure to timely register 
as an attorney.  See In re Attorney Registration Suspension of Hillman, 123 Ohio 
St.3d 1475, 2009-Ohio-5786, 915 N.E.3d 1256; In re Attorney Registration 
Suspension of Hillman, 130 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2011-Ohio-5627, 956 N.E.3d 310.  
And on March 24, 2016, we imposed a conditionally stayed one-year suspension 
on Hillman for his failure to file a federal personal income-tax return for 2011.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Hillman, 145 Ohio St.3d 489, 2016-Ohio-1172, 50 N.E.3d 
539, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 2} In a July 2020 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged 
Hillman with four ethical violations arising from his conduct in the representation 
of a single client. 
{¶ 3} After conducting a hearing, a three-member panel of the Board of 
Professional Conduct unanimously dismissed two of the four alleged rule 
violations.  Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the panel and the board 
found that Hillman had failed to reasonably communicate with his client and had 
failed to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with discovery requests in the 
client’s case.  The board recommends that we suspend Hillman from the practice 
of law for two years with the entire suspension stayed on the conditions that he 
engage in no further misconduct and pay the costs of these proceedings.  Hillman 
objects to the board’s findings of misconduct and its recommendation that he be 
required to pay the costs of the proceedings.  For the reasons that follow, we 
overrule Hillman’s objections and adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and 
recommended sanction. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} James Watkins’s Toledo, Ohio home was severely damaged by a fire 
in February 2017.  Allstate Insurance, the insurer of Watkins’s home, denied his 
claim, and in April 2017, Watkins retained Hillman on a contingent-fee basis to 
pursue his claim against Allstate.  On January 5, 2018, Hillman filed a complaint 
January Term, 2022 
 
3 
against Allstate on Watkins’s behalf in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas.  
Attorneys Andrew Scheper, Patrick Schomaker, and Carmen Sarge of Rolfes Henry 
Co., L.P.A., represented Allstate in that case. 
{¶ 5} In January 2019, Allstate sent Hillman interrogatories, requests for 
production of documents, and a notice of Watkins’s deposition.  Hillman then filed 
a motion for a protective order, claiming that the notice of deposition constituted 
harassment because Watkins had previously been questioned under oath regarding 
the claim. 
{¶ 6} In February, Sarge emailed Hillman, informing him that a response to 
Allstate’s discovery request was overdue and asking him to respond within two 
days.  Hillman replied that he did not recall receiving discovery requests—although 
they had been sent to him in the same email and envelope as the deposition notice 
for which he had sought the protective order.  Scheper emailed the discovery 
requests to Hillman a second time and requested a response by March 8.  After that 
deadline passed, Allstate filed a motion to compel discovery. 
{¶ 7} During a March 12 pretrial conference, Hillman stated that he would 
immediately provide Allstate with the requested documents and Watkins’s 
responses to the first set of interrogatories but that he would not be able to send the 
verification page for the interrogatories until a short time after the conference.  
Based on that representation, Allstate withdrew its motion to compel.  The court 
informed the parties that it would deny the motion for a protective order.  The next 
day, Schomaker emailed Hillman to confirm their conversation, to request potential 
dates for Watkins’s deposition, and to ask when he could expect to receive the 
verification page. 
{¶ 8} Having received no response, Scheper emailed Hillman on March 22 
to propose dates for the deposition.  Six days later, Hillman informed Scheper that 
he and Watkins were available on most of the proposed dates, but he failed to 
address the outstanding discovery issues.  Scheper scheduled the deposition for 
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April 12, on the condition that the requested discovery be provided to Allstate on 
or before April 9.  Although Allstate received Watkins’s discovery responses by 
April 8, Watkins did not sign the requested verification page until he appeared for 
his deposition on April 12. 
{¶ 9} On April 23, Scheper sent Hillman an Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) Form 4506-T and a letter instructing Watkins on how to sign the form, 
which would authorize Allstate to obtain a transcript of Watkins’s tax returns, and 
offered to submit a formal discovery request to obtain Watkins’s authorization if 
required.  Scheper also informed Hillman that Scheper’s firm had issued two 
subpoenas for Watkins’s banking records and that he would provide Hillman with 
copies of any records that he received in response to the subpoenas.  Hillman did 
not respond to that letter or a follow-up email about the tax documents.  Allstate 
then sent Hillman a formal request for the production of the tax-related documents. 
{¶ 10} In a second set of interrogatories served on June 7, Allstate sought 
information regarding the source of two deposits to Watkins’s bank account.  Three 
days later, Scheper furnished Hillman with a copy of a subpoena duces tecum that 
Allstate had served on Watkins’s housemate.  Hillman acknowledged receipt of the 
subpoena and informed Scheper that Watkins had no memory of the bank deposits 
that were the subject of Allstate’s discovery requests.  He also asked Scheper to 
send him copies of the records that Allstate had obtained from Watkins’s bank.  
Although Scheper had previously provided those records to Hillman, he sent them 
to him again. 
{¶ 11} Hillman did not respond to Allstate’s request for the production of 
Watkins’s tax documents or Scheper’s emails reminding Hillman that those 
responses (and the response to the subpoena that had been served on Watkins’s 
housemate) were past due.  Nor did Hillman comply with the deadlines that Scheper 
established in those emails.  He did, however, email Schomaker to inform him that 
“[w]hen” he received a copy of the subpoena that was served on Watkins’s 
January Term, 2022 
 
5 
housemate, he would “review the papers and advise [Schomaker] accordingly”—
but Hillman had acknowledged receipt of that document weeks earlier. 
{¶ 12} On July 25, Allstate filed a second motion to compel discovery 
seeking responses to all of its outstanding discovery requests, but Hillman did not 
respond to that motion.  The court granted the motion on August 9 and stated its 
intention to grant sanctions against Watkins—up to and including dismissal of the 
complaint with prejudice—if the requested information was not provided to Allstate 
within 14 days.  The board found that Hillman had not informed Watkins of that 
ruling. 
{¶ 13} On August 16, Scheper sent Hillman another copy of IRS Form 
4506-T, with notification that Watkins was required to sign and date the form 
himself.  Several days later, Hillman returned the form, which he had signed on 
Watkins’s behalf, along with unverified responses to the pending discovery 
requests.  Those responses, which were handwritten by Hillman, largely denied that 
Watkins had any knowledge or documentation regarding the matters in question.  
Schomaker informed Hillman that he considered the responses to be “evasive and 
incomplete” and that he expected to receive complete responses by August 23.  In 
response, Hillman submitted miniaturized copies of two checks and nothing more. 
{¶ 14} On September 11, Allstate filed a motion for discovery sanctions 
requesting the dismissal of Watkins’s complaint and an award of reasonable 
attorney fees.  Allstate thereafter offered to settle the case for $100,000.  Hillman 
informed Watkins of that offer and of his belief that the offer was too low, but he 
did not tell Watkins that the pending motion for discovery sanctions could result in 
the dismissal of the case with prejudice.  Hillman then made a counteroffer of 
$600,000.  Allstate rejected that offer. 
{¶ 15} On October 2, 2019, the trial court granted Allstate’s motion for 
discovery sanctions and dismissed Watkins’s case with prejudice for failure to 
comply with the court’s discovery orders.  Watkins obtained new counsel and 
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successfully appealed the court’s judgment of dismissal.  His case was still pending 
at the time of Hillman’s January 2021 disciplinary hearing. 
{¶ 16} The 
board 
found 
that 
Hillman’s 
conduct 
violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed 
about the status of the matter) and 3.4(d) (requiring a lawyer to make a reasonably 
diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing 
party). 
Hillman’s Objection to the Board’s Findings of Misconduct 
{¶ 17} In his first objection, Hillman argues that the record demonstrates 
that he frequently spoke with Watkins by telephone and that he kept Watkins fully 
apprised of the status of his case through those calls.  Indeed, at his disciplinary 
hearing, Hillman testified that he always kept Watkins informed of what was going 
on in his case—including the risk of its dismissal—and that it was Watkins who 
refused to cooperate with discovery orders.  Hillman claimed that he had attempted 
to comply with Allstate’s discovery requests by sending the documents that Allstate 
had sent to him to Watkins but that Watkins did not return them.  However, the 
board heard conflicting testimony on those issues and found the testimony offered 
by Watkins and Allstate’s counsel to be more credible than Hillman’s. 
{¶ 18} We have long recognized that “it is of no consequence that the 
board’s findings of fact are in contravention of [the] respondent’s or any other 
witness’s testimony.  ‘Where the evidence is in conflict, the trier of facts may 
determine what should be accepted as the truth and what should be rejected as 
false.’ ”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Zingarelli, 89 Ohio St.3d 210, 217, 729 N.E.2d 
1167 (2000), quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 478, 120 N.E.2d 118 
(1954).  We generally defer to the hearing panel’s credibility determinations unless 
the record weighs heavily against those findings because the panel was able to 
observe the witnesses firsthand.  Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 
January Term, 2022 
 
7 
14, 2003-Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 8, citing Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Cleary, 
93 Ohio St.3d 191, 198, 754 N.E.2d 235 (2001). 
{¶ 19} In this case, Watkins’s testimony demonstrated that he was unaware 
of many important facts regarding his case, even beyond those identified by the 
board.  For example, Watkins stated that Hillman called him one morning to inform 
him that he needed to appear for a deposition later that day.  When he asked Hillman 
whether he had previously informed him of the deposition, Hillman gave him the 
address and told him, “ ‘[G]et down here[;] * * * we got a deposition to do.’ ”  And 
although Hillman claimed that he had sent the verification page for the first set of 
interrogatories to Watkins for his signature, Watkins testified that he had not 
received it.  While Watkins acknowledged that Hillman sent him an IRS form, he 
explained that he returned it unsigned, believing that it was not relevant to his case.  
He testified that if Hillman had told him that he was required to sign the document, 
he would have done so immediately. 
{¶ 20} Watkins testified that he had no idea that Hillman had intended to 
file a motion for partial summary judgment or that he had filed it more than two 
weeks after the deadline imposed by the court.  In addition, Watkins testified that 
Hillman failed to inform him that Allstate had filed a second motion to compel 
discovery and had asked the court to dismiss his case with prejudice.  He stated that 
if he had known that there was a risk of dismissal, he would have asked the court 
for a continuance so that he could look for a new attorney.  Instead, Hillman notified 
Watkins of the dismissal by text message two days after the dismissal occurred and 
did not respond to further communications from Watkins.  Shortly thereafter, 
Watkins received a large yellow envelope from Hillman that contained all the 
documents that had been filed in his case.  Watkins testified that with the exception 
of the IRS form, he had never seen those documents before he received them in the 
large yellow envelope.  He stated that after he had gone to the courthouse to confirm 
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that his case had been dismissed, he immediately began to search for a new attorney 
to pursue an appeal. 
{¶ 21} The evidence shows that Hillman not only failed to keep Watkins 
apprised of important developments in his case, but that he also failed to provide 
complete and timely responses to Allstate’s discovery requests.  For example, 
Hillman claims that he gave Allstate’s counsel all the documents they requested or 
that he furnished releases, signed by Watkins, to allow Allstate to obtain those 
documents.  But the evidence shows that Hillman provided to Allstate’s counsel 
only illegible, miniaturized copies of checks—even though Watkins’s wife had 
timely provided to Hillman larger and fully legible copies of the checks—and the 
IRS form that Hillman had signed on Watkins’s behalf.  Although Hillman and 
Watkins both testified that Hillman had Watkins’s oral consent to sign that IRS 
form, the preprinted instructions on the form plainly stated that it could be signed 
by a representative of the taxpayer only if the taxpayer had expressly delegated that 
authority on a separate IRS form and a copy of the separate form was attached.  
Thus, Hillman’s claim that he provided “[e]very document that opposing counsel 
wanted” is simply not true. 
{¶ 22} On these facts, we find that the record does not weigh heavily against 
the board’s credibility determinations.  On the contrary, we find that it amply 
supports 
the 
board’s 
findings 
that 
Hillman’s 
conduct 
violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3) and 3.4(d).  We therefore overrule Hillman’s objections to 
those findings and adopt the findings as our own. 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 23} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
January Term, 2022 
 
9 
{¶ 24} As for aggravating factors, the board found that Hillman has a 
history of prior discipline, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, and caused harm to 
a vulnerable client.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1), (3), and (8).  However, the board 
declined to find that Hillman had refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of 
his misconduct, noting that he had expressed regret about the way that the events 
transpired and had acknowledged that there were things that he would do differently 
if he were confronted with a similar situation.  Just one mitigating factor is 
present—the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(2). 
{¶ 25} In determining the appropriate sanction for Hillman’s misconduct, 
the board considered the sanctions that we imposed for comparable misconduct in 
four cases— Disciplinary Counsel v. Engel, 154 Ohio St.3d 209, 2018-Ohio-2988, 
113 N.E.3d 481; Dayton Bar Assn. v. Wilcoxson, 153 Ohio St.3d 279, 2018-Ohio-
2699, 104 N.E.3d 772; Dayton Bar Assn. v. Scaccia, 150 Ohio St.3d 85, 2016-Ohio-
3299, 79 N.E.3d 506; and Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Bancsi, 141 Ohio St.3d 
457, 2014-Ohio-5255, 25 N.E.3d 1018. 
{¶ 26} In Wilcoxson, we imposed a fully stayed six-month suspension on 
an attorney who failed to timely file a lawsuit on behalf of a client, failed to inform 
the client that the lawsuit was untimely until after the court dismissed it, failed to 
provide the client’s file to the client’s new counsel, and initially failed to cooperate 
in the ensuing disciplinary investigation.  Id. at ¶ 2, 7, 14.  The only aggravating 
factor was Wilcoxson’s failure to notify the client that he did not carry professional-
liability insurance.  Id. at ¶ 8.  And in contrast to Hillman, Wilcoxson had no prior 
discipline and presented evidence of his good character and reputation.  See id.  
Based on those differences, the board concluded that Hillman’s misconduct 
warranted a more severe sanction than Wilcoxson’s misconduct did. 
{¶ 27} In the three other cases, we imposed partially stayed term 
suspensions on attorneys who had prior disciplinary records when they engaged in 
misconduct similar to Hillman’s misconduct in this case.  For example, in Bancsi 
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and Engel, we imposed two-year suspensions with 18 months conditionally stayed 
for misconduct that included the failure to act with reasonable diligence in the 
representation of a single client and the failure to keep the client reasonably 
informed about the status of the client’s matter.  Bancsi at ¶ 5-10, 19; Engel at  
¶ 6-8, 31.  Like Hillman, Bancsi failed to respond to discovery requests, which 
resulted in the dismissal of the client’s case and caused harm to the client.  Bancsi 
at ¶ 5-10.  And both Bancsi and Engel committed additional misconduct that has 
not been found in this case—namely, Bancsi engaged in conduct that was 
prejudicial to the administration of justice, id. at ¶ 10, and Engel failed to cooperate 
in disciplinary counsel’s investigation, Engel at ¶ 8.  While Hillman’s case has 
several aggravating factors in common with Bancsi’s and Engel’s cases, Bancsi and 
Engel had each been disciplined for other client-related misconduct on at least two 
prior occasions.  See Bancsi at ¶ 1; Engel at ¶ 2.  In contrast, Hillman’s prior 
discipline arose from his failure to timely register as an attorney and his failure to 
file a personal income-tax return. 
{¶ 28} Finally, in Scaccia, we imposed an 18-month suspension with the 
final six months conditionally stayed on an attorney who failed to provide 
competent representation to a client, failed to act with reasonable diligence, 
knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, and intentionally 
or habitually failed to make reasonably diligent efforts to comply with legally 
proper discovery requests.  150 Ohio St.3d 85, 2016-Ohio-3299, 79 N.E.3d 506, at 
¶ 10, 22.  Mitigating factors included Scaccia’s cooperative attitude toward the 
disciplinary proceedings, evidence of his good character and reputation, and the 
imposition of other sanctions for his misconduct.  Id. at ¶ 19.  But Scaccia also 
refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct, and like Bancsi and 
Engel, he had twice been suspended for other client-related misconduct.  Id. at ¶ 2, 
19. 
January Term, 2022 
 
11 
{¶ 29} Here, the board has acknowledged that we required Bancsi, Engel, 
and Scaccia to serve a period of actual suspension from the practice of law.  
Nonetheless, the board has emphasized that unlike the prior disciplinary actions 
against Bancsi, Engel, and Scaccia, Hillman’s prior disciplinary actions did not 
involve client-related misconduct.  On these facts, the board determined that 
Hillman’s misconduct warranted a sanction somewhere between the six-month 
fully stayed suspension ordered in Wilcoxson and the partially stayed term 
suspensions ordered in Bancsi, Engel, and Scaccia.  It therefore recommended that 
we suspend Hillman from the practice of law for two years and stay the entire 
suspension on the conditions that he engage in no further misconduct and pay the 
costs of these proceedings. 
Hillman’s Objection to the Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 30} Hillman objects to the board’s recommendation that he be ordered 
to pay the costs of these proceedings.  Specifically, he contends that it would be 
unfair to assess against him the full $2,005 cost of the hearing transcript because 
half the charges against him were dismissed by the panel and because, he alleges, 
no transcript was ordered and the panel chair purportedly stated that no transcript 
was needed.  These arguments have no merit. 
{¶ 31} Despite Hillman’s claims that a transcript was neither ordered nor 
deemed necessary, Gov.Bar R. V(12)(K) expressly requires the board to file a 
certified report of its proceedings—including a transcript of the testimony—with 
the clerk of this court.  For that reason, a transcript was prepared and filed in this 
case.  While we acknowledge that the panel unanimously dismissed two of the four 
alleged rule violations, we note that all the charges in this case arose out of the same 
facts and circumstances.  Thus, we conclude that the dismissed charges did not have 
a significant impact on the costs of this litigation.  In any event, we do not find the 
costs incurred by the board in this case to be excessive or unreasonable.  We 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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therefore overrule Hillman’s objection to the board’s recommendation that we 
assess the costs of these proceedings against him. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 32} We overrule each of Hillman’s objections to the board’s findings of 
misconduct and its recommendation that he be required to pay the costs of these 
proceedings.  Having considered the ethical obligations that Hillman violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors, and the applicable precedent, we accept the 
board’s recommended sanction.  Accordingly, Steven Edward Hillman is 
suspended from the practice of law for two years, stayed in its entirety on the 
conditions that he engage in no further misconduct and pay the costs of these 
proceedings.  If he fails to comply with the conditions of the stay, the stay will be 
lifted and he will serve the entire two-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to Hillman. 
Judgment accordingly. 
DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs, with an opinion. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring. 
{¶ 33} I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to address the 
dissent’s assertion that the sanction imposed here—the suspension of respondent, 
Steven Edward Hillman, from the practice of law for two years, with the suspension 
stayed in its entirety on the conditions that he engage in no further misconduct and 
pay the costs of these proceedings—is “a mere finger wag at Hillman.”  Concurring 
and dissenting opinion, ¶ 49.  To support its position that a two-year suspension 
with 18 months stayed is necessary in this case, the dissent cites Hillman’s past 
professional misconduct.  However, that past misconduct did not involve matters 
affecting a client.  The primary purpose of our attorney-discipline system is not to 
January Term, 2022 
 
13 
punish offending attorneys but to protect the public from attorneys whose 
misconduct draws their fitness to practice law into question.  Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-6510, 858 N.E.2d 368, ¶ 10.  Because 
a stayed suspension is adequate to protect the public under the circumstances of this 
case, I concur in the majority’s opinion. 
Past Misconduct 
Attorney-Registration Suspensions 
{¶ 34} This court has twice suspended Hillman from the practice of law for 
his failure to timely register as an attorney.  See In re Attorney Registration 
Suspension of Hillman, 123 Ohio St.3d 1475, 2009-Ohio-5786, 915 N.E.3d 1256; 
In re Attorney Registration Suspension of Hillman, 130 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2011-
Ohio-5627, 956 N.E.3d 310. 
{¶ 35} Gov.Bar R. VI(10)(B) provides that an attorney who has failed to 
file a certificate of registration and pay the applicable attorney-registration fee 
within 60 days of the date on which the attorney’s registration is due shall be 
notified of the apparent noncompliance by this court’s Office of Attorney Services.  
“If the attorney does not file evidence of compliance or come into compliance on 
or before the date set forth in the notice, the attorney shall be summarily suspended 
from the practice of law in Ohio.”  Id.  An attorney who is suspended for failing to 
register may be reinstated to the practice of law by applying for reinstatement with 
the Office of Attorney Services, filing the certificate of registration, paying the 
registration fee, and paying a reinstatement fee.  Id. at Sections (2)(A) and (10)(D).  
If the attorney meets these conditions for reinstatement, the Office of Attorney 
Services “shall record the reinstatement on the roll of attorneys.”  Id. at Section 
(10)(D). 
{¶ 36} As in civil contempt, in which the contemnor holds the key to his or 
her release from jail through the opportunity to purge the contempt, see Docks 
Venture, L.L.C. v. Dashing Pacific Group, Ltd., 141 Ohio St.3d 107, 2014-Ohio-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
4254, 22 N.E.3d 1035, ¶ 15, an attorney who is under an attorney-registration 
suspension holds the key to his or her reinstatement to the practice of law, see 
Gov.Bar R. VI(10)(D).  The suspension is lifted when the attorney complies with 
the registration and reinstatement conditions.  An attorney-registration suspension 
protects the public, because when the attorney is unregistered, he or she may not 
practice law.  And there is no indication that Hillman’s two prior failures to register 
harmed a client.  In fact, we previously noted that “[i]n both cases, [Hillman] was 
reinstated shortly after the suspension was imposed.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Hillman, 145 Ohio St.3d 489, 2016-Ohio-1172, 50 N.E.3d 539, ¶ 1. 
Tax Evasion 
{¶ 37} After Hillman was convicted of a misdemeanor offense for his 
willful failure to file a federal personal income-tax return for the year 2011, this 
court imposed on him a conditionally stayed one-year suspension for his failure to 
file returns for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011.  Id. at ¶ 2, 5, 11. 
{¶ 38} Arguably, Hillman harmed the public by not paying all the income 
taxes that he owed in a timely manner, but that misconduct did not harm a client’s 
matter.  And once again, the sanction that this court imposed in that case was 
designed to give Hillman the key to his continued practice of law; his suspension 
was “fully stayed on the conditions that he make all payments on his back taxes as 
required by the Internal Revenue Service, timely pay his current taxes, complete a 
class in law-office management within one year after the issuance of [this court’s 
order], and engage in no further misconduct.”  Id. at ¶ 11.  So, as with his attorney-
registration suspensions, Hillman had the opportunity to maintain the privilege of 
practicing law in Ohio. 
{¶ 39} The dissent, however, asserts that Hillman’s prior suspensions 
would justify this court’s imposing an actual suspension from the practice of law in 
this case.  It goes even further than that, suggesting that “this court should impose 
the stayed one-year suspension from Hillman’s most recent prior disciplinary case 
January Term, 2022 
 
15 
because he has certainly engaged in further misconduct.”  Concurring and 
dissenting opinion at ¶ 79.  However, Hillman fully served his stayed, one-year 
suspension regarding his income-tax-return misconduct, and the relator in that case 
(who is the same relator here, disciplinary counsel) never sought to have the stay 
lifted based on evidence that Hillman had violated the conditions of the stay during 
the term of the suspension.  The dissent points to no authority for its position that 
we could lift the stay of the one-year suspension now, and the Rules for the 
Government of the Bar do not provide this court with authority to lift a stayed 
suspension in a separate case years after—or possibly even decades after—the 
suspension has expired. 
Current Misconduct 
{¶ 40} That brings us to the current misconduct.  In this case, Hillman 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably 
informed about the status of the matter) and 3.4(d) (requiring a lawyer to make a 
reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an 
opposing party). 
{¶ 41} Over a period of months, Hillman failed to timely and completely 
respond to various discovery requests and orders in litigation against Allstate 
Insurance, the insurer of his client’s home, notwithstanding his representations to 
opposing counsel and the trial court that he would respond to the requests and 
comply with the orders.  And when the trial court threatened discovery sanctions 
up to and including dismissal of the client’s lawsuit with prejudice, Hillman failed 
to inform the client of the potential sanctions, even though a settlement offer by 
Allstate was on the table.  After Hillman still failed to comply with the discovery 
orders, the trial court granted Allstate’s motion for discovery sanctions and 
dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.  Nonetheless, the client obtained new counsel 
and successfully appealed the court’s judgment of dismissal, which mitigated the 
harm to the client.  So, the dissent’s assertion that Hillman’s misconduct 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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“eventually cost his client the case” is not accurate.  Concurring and dissenting 
opinion at ¶ 51.  The client’s case was still pending at the time of Hillman’s January 
2021 disciplinary hearing. 
{¶ 42} The majority properly distinguishes this case from Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Engel, 154 Ohio St.3d 209, 2018-Ohio-2988, 113 N.E.3d 481; Dayton 
Bar Assn. v. Scaccia, 150 Ohio St.3d 85, 2016-Ohio-3299, 79 N.E.3d 506; and 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Bancsi, 141 Ohio St.3d 457, 2014-Ohio-5255, 25 
N.E.3d 1018.  In those cases, this court imposed actual suspensions on the 
attorneys, but the attorneys had each been disciplined for prior client-related 
misconduct on at least two occasions.  See Engel at ¶ 2, 31; Bancsi at ¶ 1, 19; 
Scaccia at ¶ 2-3, 26.  In contrast, this is Hillman’s first disciplinary case in which 
his misconduct concerned a client matter. 
{¶ 43} And his misconduct here is similar to the misconduct this court 
found in Columbus Bar Assn. v. Kluesener, 150 Ohio St.3d 322, 2017-Ohio-4417, 
81 N.E.3d 457.  In Kluesener, this court imposed a fully stayed suspension on an 
attorney who failed to keep his client reasonably informed and failed to comply 
with discovery requests and orders, which contributed to the trial court’s dismissal 
of the client’s lawsuit with prejudice.  Id. at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 44} What Hillman did was inexcusable.  He failed to respond to 
Allstate’s discovery requests and to comply with the trial court’s orders to respond 
to those requests, and his failure to comply caused the dismissal of his client’s 
lawsuit with prejudice, caused the client to have to obtain new counsel, and caused 
the client to have to appeal the trial court’s dismissal of his lawsuit in order to 
salvage it.  Nonetheless, the proper sanction for this misconduct is the one that this 
court imposes today—the suspension of Hillman from the practice of law for two 
years, with the suspension stayed in its entirety on the conditions that he engage in 
no further misconduct and pay the costs of these proceedings.  And if during that 
two-year period Hillman engages in any misconduct—e.g., failing to file a personal 
January Term, 2022 
 
17 
income-tax return, failing to timely and completely comply with a discovery 
request or order, or failing to keep a client reasonably informed—this court will 
revoke the stay and impose an actual suspension from the practice of law. 
{¶ 45} So, once again, Hillman has the key to his continued practice of law, 
just as he did when we twice suspended him for his failures to register as an attorney 
and when we imposed a stayed suspension relating to his failure to file tax returns.  
This does not mean, as the dissent asserts, that we are saying that “[b]ad lawyering 
in civil cases in Ohio is okay.”  Concurring and dissenting opinion at ¶ 83.  Nor 
does our decision in this case “provide[ ] a green light for lawyers to play discovery 
games in civil cases throughout Ohio.”  Id. at ¶ 81. 
{¶ 46} This court does not impose sanctions based on the perceived quality 
of an attorney’s representation.  Rather, we sanction attorneys for conduct that 
violates the Rules of Professional Conduct after reviewing the facts of the case, any 
mitigating and aggravating factors, and our precedent.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Leon, 155 Ohio St.3d 582, 2018-Ohio-5090, 122 N.E.3d 1242, ¶ 17.  And based on 
the evidence presented in this case, Hillman violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3) and 
3.4(d).  For those violations, he should be and is sanctioned today.  But in 
sanctioning him, our goal is to protect the public from an attorney whose 
misconduct draws his fitness to practice law into question, not to punish the 
offending attorney.  Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-6510, 858 N.E.2d 
368, at ¶ 10.  And the public is adequately protected here by a stayed two-year 
suspension from the practice of law that will become an actual suspension if 
Hillman commits further misconduct or fails to pay the costs of these proceedings.  
This sanction is consistent with our precedent. 
{¶ 47} For these reasons, I concur in the majority opinion. 
_________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
FISCHER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 48} I concur in the portion of the majority opinion’s decision adopting 
the Board of Professional Conduct’s findings that respondent, Steven Edward 
Hillman, violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3) by failing to keep his client reasonably 
informed about the status of his case and violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(d) by failing to 
make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with the opposing party’s discovery 
requests.  However, I heartfully dissent from the sanction imposed by the majority 
opinion because the sanction does not, in my view, adequately protect the public. 
{¶ 49} The majority opinion suspends Hillman from the practice of law for 
two years, all stayed on the conditions that he engage in no further misconduct and 
pay the costs of these proceedings.  But a sanction for misconduct such as that 
involved here that does not include actual time out of practice, especially for a 
lawyer who, like Hillman, has been disciplined multiple times before, does not 
adequately protect the public.  Rather, the majority opinion’s sanction is the 
equivalent of a mere finger wag at Hillman.  The imposition of such a slight 
sanction under these circumstances, I fear, will open the door for more lawyers to 
engage in deceptive and dilatory discovery practices or other misconduct during 
civil litigation. 
{¶ 50} Hillman should have some actual time out from the practice of law—
at least six months—to protect the public, and there should be additional conditions 
for his reinstatement, including specific educational requirements and the 
appointment of a monitoring attorney, to ensure that his future clients, if any, are 
properly served.  Hillman’s attempts at gamesmanship (or his incompetence, or 
both) during discovery in his client’s case exemplify why some members of the 
general public and some litigants believe that lawyers “churn files,” ignore 
discovery requests, and aim to waste the opposing parties’ time and money.  Such 
gamesmanship or incompetence (or both) may not and should not be tolerated.  
Therefore, I would suspend Hillman from the practice of law for two years with 18 
January Term, 2022 
 
19 
months stayed on the same conditions imposed by the majority opinion, plus a few 
additional conditions detailed below. 
I.  Hillman’s misconduct during discovery complicated the litigation and 
eventually cost his client the case 
{¶ 51} On the surface, Hillman’s misconduct appears to have been the result 
of his having been in over his head.  But looking at the details of his discovery 
violations and the advice (or lack thereof) that he gave his client, it is apparent that 
Hillman’s violations were, at least to some degree, strategic measures designed to 
conceal his own shortcomings.  He was incompetent and/or engaged in 
gamesmanship during the discovery process; he was dishonest to opposing counsel 
and he unnecessarily complicated and prolonged the litigation for both sides, 
frustrating the entire judicial process and harming his vulnerable client.  Although 
the majority opinion accurately recites the facts that it presents, a more detailed 
recitation of the facts is necessary to illustrate the egregiousness of Hillman’s 
violations. 
A.  Hillman took over 70 days to respond to the first set of interrogatories and 
deceitfully told opposing counsel that a response to the interrogatories would be 
forthcoming 
{¶ 52} Allstate Insurance, the insurer of a home that was severely damaged 
by fire, denied the insurance claim filed by the home’s owner, James Watkins.  
Watkins retained Hillman to pursue the insurance claim, and Hillman filed a 
complaint against Allstate in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas.  On 
January 22, 2019, Allstate served Hillman with its first set of interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents, as well as a notice of Watkins’s deposition, 
which had been scheduled for February 26.  Allstate sent those documents to 
Hillman by email and regular U.S. mail, using one envelope.  Watkins’s response 
to the interrogatories and requests for production of documents was due on or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
before February 19.  So Hillman had a little under one month to provide the 
requested responses and to agree on a date for Watkins’s deposition. 
{¶ 53} In response to the notice of Watkins’s deposition, Hillman filed a 
motion for a protective order on February 15, claiming that Allstate’s purpose in 
requesting the deposition was to harass Watkins, because Watkins had already been 
questioned under oath regarding the claim.  Notably, Hillman did not address the 
first set of interrogatories, even though they were sent to him at the same time as 
the notice of deposition.  In fact, Hillman did not provide the interrogatories to 
Watkins at all during January and February 2019.  Hillman did not respond to 
Allstate’s requests by the deadline. 
{¶ 54} Allstate emailed Hillman on February 20, the day after the 
interrogatories were due, advising him that the deadline had passed.  Allstate simply 
requested that Hillman provide responses to its discovery requests by February 22.  
On that same day, Hillman replied to Allstate’s email and stated that he did “not 
recall receiving discovery requests in this case,” and he requested that Allstate send 
the requests in Microsoft Word format.  It is clear that Hillman had received the 
discovery requests—they were sent with the notice of deposition that Hillman had 
acknowledged.  But giving Hillman the benefit of the doubt, Allstate did as Hillman 
requested. 
{¶ 55} On February 25, in an attempt to accommodate Hillman, Allstate 
emailed him the discovery requests in both PDF and Microsoft Word formats.  
Allstate requested a response on or before March 8, which was 17 days after the 
original deadline.  And since Hillman had not provided Allstate with the 
information necessary to go forward with the deposition on February 26, Allstate 
also canceled the deposition and rescheduled it for March 12.  But yet again, 
Hillman neither filed a response to the discovery requests by March 8 nor told 
Allstate that a response was forthcoming.  By that point, Hillman had evaded 
providing discovery for more than two weeks.  Therefore, on March 11, after 
January Term, 2022 
 
21 
several attempts to obtain responses to its discovery requests from Hillman 
voluntarily, Allstate filed its first motion to compel discovery. 
{¶ 56} The trial court scheduled a telephonic status conference for March 
12 to address Allstate’s motion to compel and the motion for a protective order filed 
by Hillman.  Before the conference, Hillman and counsel for Allstate had a separate 
telephone call.  Hillman assured Allstate that he would immediately provide the 
requested discovery responses and that he would send Watkins’s verification of the 
responses soon thereafter.  Based on Hillman’s representation, Allstate informed 
the court that it did not want to proceed with the motion to compel, so the court 
issued an order denying it.  The court also denied the motion for a protective order 
filed by Hillman.  Allstate relied in good faith on Hillman’s promises to provide 
the responses in a timely manner. 
{¶ 57} But contrary to Hillman’s representations to Allstate, he did not 
immediately send any responses.  On March 13, the day following the status 
conference and the call between Hillman and Allstate’s counsel, Allstate emailed 
Hillman to confirm that the discovery responses were forthcoming and to schedule 
the long-delayed deposition of Watkins.  Additionally, Allstate requested that 
Hillman provide Watkins’s verification page within ten days after Hillman’s 
sending the responses to the interrogatories.  According to the record before us, 
Hillman did not respond to Allstate’s March 13 email. 
{¶ 58} On March 22, Allstate emailed Hillman again, stating that Allstate 
had not received the discovery responses and asking Hillman to confirm that he 
would send them within the next seven days and to confirm the status of Watkins’s 
verification of the responses.  Allstate again asked Hillman to provide available 
dates for Watkins’s deposition over the following 30 days.  Hillman finally replied 
to Allstate’s email on March 28, two weeks after Allstate’s first follow-up email, 
and indicated that he and Watkins were available for the deposition on April 8, 9, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
11, or 12.  But again, Hillman failed to address the outstanding-discovery issue or 
Watkins’s verification of any responses. 
{¶ 59} Allstate agreed to schedule the deposition for April 12.  In the same 
email, Allstate advised Hillman for the third time that Allstate had yet to receive 
the discovery responses that Hillman had promised to provide immediately on 
March 12.  Finally, on April 8, 48 days after the responses were initially due and 
almost one month after Hillman had assured Allstate that the responses would be 
provided immediately, Allstate received Watkins’s responses to its interrogatories 
and requests for production of documents, but the responses were unverified. 
B.  Hillman’s delay in providing discovery continued, with some responses being 
produced over 90 days after the deadline and then only after Hillman was 
ordered by the court to comply with its discovery orders 
{¶ 60} Upon receiving the unverified responses, Allstate emailed Hillman 
and asked that he provide Watkins’s verification by the close of business on April 
9, 2019.  Hillman did not do so.  It was not until April 12, the date of Watkins’s 
deposition, that Hillman first presented Watkins with the verification page so that 
Watkins could sign it and Hillman could return it to Allstate. 
{¶ 61} On April 23, Allstate emailed Hillman an Internal Revenue Service 
Form 4506-T Request for Transcript of Tax Return (“Form 4506-T”) and 
informally asked that Watkins sign and return the form so that Allstate could access 
Watkins’s tax returns for certain years.  Allstate attached to the email a letter 
containing instructions on how to complete the form, including how to fill out the 
form if Watkins did not file tax returns for the specified years.  Allstate also stated 
that Hillman should advise Allstate if he required a formal discovery request to 
obtain the release.  Allstate attached two subpoenas duces tecum directed to J.P. 
Morgan Chase and Huntington National Bank relating to Watkins’s accounts. 
{¶ 62} On May 20, because Hillman had not responded to the informal 
discovery request, Allstate served Hillman by email and regular U.S. mail with its 
January Term, 2022 
 
23 
second requests for production of documents.  In the requests, Allstate formally 
asked that Watkins sign and return the Form 4506-T tax release for years 2012 
through 2017 by June 17. 
{¶ 63} On June 7, Allstate served Hillman by email and regular U.S. mail 
with its second set of interrogatories, third requests for production of documents, 
and a subpoena duces tecum to Benito Canales (“Canales”), a man for whom 
Watkins had provided caretaking services.  The response to the discovery requests 
was due on July 5, and the information requested in the subpoena to Canales, which 
pertained to Canales’s medical expenses, was due on or before June 24.  Canales 
did not have to appear in person if he provided the requested documents. 
{¶ 64} On June 10, Allstate emailed Hillman yet another copy of the 
subpoena duces tecum.  Hillman replied that same day, acknowledging that he had 
received the subpoena but telling Allstate that Canales could not drive.  Hillman 
further stated that Watkins needed a copy of the Huntington bank materials 
obtained by Allstate so that Watkins could answer the second set of interrogatories 
and third requests for production of documents.  In response, Allstate emailed 
Hillman and told him that it had already sent him those documents on May 17; yet 
Allstate provided them to Hillman a second time.  Allstate also inquired as to 
whether Canales’s inability to drive affected his ability to produce the requested 
medical-expense documents.  Hillman never replied. 
{¶ 65} On June 11, Hillman served Allstate with a motion for partial 
summary judgment, but he did not file the motion with the court nor tell Allstate 
that he was not going to file the motion.  In an abundance of caution, on June 27, 
Allstate filed a motion to strike Watkins’s summary-judgment motion, and on June 
28, Allstate filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion.  And having still 
received no response to Allstate’s second requests for production of documents, 
Allstate emailed Hillman on June 19 asking that the documents be provided within 
ten days.  Hillman did not reply to that email or provide the documents by June 29. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
{¶ 66} On June 27, Allstate sent to Hillman by email certain filings and 
documents relevant to Watkins’s case.  Approximately 20 minutes later, Hillman 
responded to the email, stating that Watkins had advised him that Canales had 
received paperwork asking him to “come to Cincinnati.”  Hillman told Allstate that 
once he “receive[d] what [Allstate had] sent [ to Canales], [Hillman would] review 
the papers and advise [Allstate] accordingly.”  Approximately 30 minutes later, 
Allstate replied to Hillman’s email, stating that Canales had probably received the 
subpoena that Allstate sent to Hillman on June 10. 
{¶ 67} Still having received no response to its second and third requests for 
production of documents and second set of interrogatories, Allstate emailed 
Hillman on July 10 and asked that he provide Watkins’s responses within seven 
days and provide Canales’s responses within ten days.  According to the record 
before us, Hillman also did not reply to that email.  Instead, on July 16, Hillman 
served Allstate with a copy of another motion for partial summary judgment that 
Hillman had filed that day.  However, the trial court had previously issued an order 
requiring that all motions for summary judgment in the case be filed by July 1.  
Allstate therefore filed a motion to strike the motion as untimely, which the court 
granted. 
{¶ 68} As of July 25, Hillman still had not provided Allstate with responses 
to the second and third requests for production of documents and second set of 
interrogatories.  Allstate thus filed a second motion to compel discovery and served 
Hillman with a copy of the motion by email and regular U.S. mail.  Hillman did not 
file a response to the motion.  On August 9, the trial court issued an order granting 
Allstate’s second motion to compel, requiring Hillman to respond to Allstate’s 
discovery requests on or before August 23.  The court warned, “If such responses 
[were] not provided [within 14 days of the order], the Court w[ould] award 
sanctions against [Watkins], up to and including dismissal of all claims [Watkins] 
has presented in this case, with prejudice.” 
January Term, 2022 
 
25 
{¶ 69} On August 16, Allstate sent to Hillman a fourth copy of Form 4506-
T with instructions on how to complete it and indicated that Watkins needed to sign 
the form even if he did not file tax returns for the specified years.  Watkins testified 
that at some point, Hillman provided him with the form but that Watkins did not 
know how important it was for him to sign and return it and that had he known, he 
“would have signed it right away.” 
{¶ 70} On August 19, Hillman finally responded to Allstate’s second set of 
interrogatories and third requests for production of documents, which had been sent 
to him in early June.  The responses to the interrogatories, however, were again 
unverified, were in Hillman’s handwriting, and primarily stated that Watkins did 
not know the answers or could not recall them.  In addition, Hillman, not Watkins, 
had signed the Form 4506-T. 
{¶ 71} Allstate’s counsel emailed Hillman on August 20 and informed him 
that Allstate considered the responses evasive and incomplete.  Allstate’s counsel 
needed the requested information to determine Watkins’s financial ability to 
purchase certain items that he claimed had been lost in the fire.  He asked for 
complete, verified responses by August 23.  In response, Hillman provided only 
barely legible, miniaturized copies of two checks. 
C.  Hillman’s discovery-delay tactics resulted in the dismissal of his client’s case, 
and his client had no knowledge of the misconduct that had occurred 
{¶ 72} On September 11, 2019, Allstate filed a motion for discovery 
sanctions asking the court to dismiss Watkins’s complaint.  Allstate served Hillman 
with the motion by regular U.S. mail.  While the motion was pending, Allstate made 
an offer to Watkins to resolve the case.  Although Hillman advised Watkins of 
Allstate’s offer, he failed to tell Watkins that there was a pending motion to dismiss 
the case.  Watkins rejected Allstate’s offer.  On October 2, the court issued an order 
dismissing Watkins’s complaint with prejudice for failing to comply with the civil 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
rules pertaining to discovery and failing to comply with the court’s discovery 
orders.  The court then ordered Hillman to pay Allstate $1,506 in attorney fees. 
{¶ 73} On October 3, the day after the case had already been dismissed, 
Hillman filed a memorandum opposing any discovery penalties.  Allstate also 
withdrew its settlement offer.  On October 4, Hillman sent Watkins a text message 
saying, “The judge just dismissed us.  I will send you the judge’s decision.  He is 
wrong and I will appeal.”  Watkins, understandably shocked, called Hillman but 
Hillman did not answer.  Watkins then went to the courthouse, where he confirmed 
that his case had been dismissed. 
{¶ 74} Within the following week, Watkins received an envelope that 
Hillman had mailed to him on October 5, 2019.  The envelope contained multiple 
filings, emails, and other paperwork from Watkins’s case that Watkins had not 
previously seen, aside from the Form 4506-T.  Watkins immediately decided that 
he needed to hire new counsel, which he did. 
II.  Hillman’s misconduct warrants more than a stayed suspension 
{¶ 75} The narration of the discovery process in the underlying matter 
presented above is more detailed than the general outline provided in the majority 
opinion and sets forth a descriptive and exacting study of a violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(d).  Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(d) is clear: “A lawyer shall not do any of 
the following: * * * [I]n pretrial procedure, intentionally or habitually make a 
frivolous motion or discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to 
comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  The above closer look at the facts reveals that Hillman is a lawyer who 
willfully chose to not respond to discovery requests in a professional manner in a 
rather basic but high-stakes case. 
{¶ 76} And importantly, this is not the first time that Hillman has faced 
disciplinary action; he has been disciplined three times before.  See In re Attorney 
Registration Suspension of Hillman, 123 Ohio St.3d 1475, 2009-Ohio-5786, 915 
January Term, 2022 
 
27 
N.E.3d 1256 (“In re Hillman I”); In re Attorney Registration Suspension of 
Hillman, 130 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2011-Ohio-5627, 956 N.E.3d 310 (“In re Hillman 
II”); Disciplinary Counsel v. Hillman, 145 Ohio St.3d 489, 2016-Ohio-1172, 50 
N.E.3d 539 (“Hillman”).  Hillman has repeatedly shown either his anathema to 
meeting deadlines or his inability to meet them.  His disciplinary history shows a 
pattern of his failing to timely file important documents, including his failures to 
timely register as an attorney, see In re Hillman I and In re Hillman II, and his 
failure to file a federal personal income-tax return for 2011, see Hillman.  In 
Hillman’s most recent disciplinary case, this court suspended him for one year, with 
the entire suspension stayed on the conditions that he pay his back taxes, pay his 
current taxes, complete a class in law-office management, and engage in no further 
misconduct.  Hillman at ¶ 11. 
{¶ 77} And here we are again.  Even after taking a class in law-office 
management, Hillman engaged in further misconduct by mishandling client matters 
and missing numerous discovery deadlines.  Hillman has demonstrated that he 
cannot effectively manage a case; he failed to make timely, necessary filings in 
Watkins’s case and attempted to hide his shortcomings by deceiving Watkins and 
opposing counsel.  While the majority opinion agrees with the board that Hillman 
lacked a dishonest or selfish motive, based on all the facts in the record, I am not 
so sure.  But even if Hillman did not have a dishonest or selfish motive, the record 
before us combined with Hillman’s disciplinary history indicates that an actual 
suspension is necessary to protect the public.  A lawyer who has repeatedly failed 
to meet deadlines and who has not shown that he can presently meet them is a 
continuing danger to his clients and the public. 
{¶ 78} The board recommends that we impose a two-year suspension with 
the entire suspension stayed on the conditions that Hillman engage in no further 
misconduct and pay the costs of these proceedings.  In reaching that 
recommendation, the board identified three cases in which lawyers were given 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
actual suspensions from the practice of law for misconduct similar to that at issue 
in this case.  See Cleveland Metro Bar Assn. v. Bancsi, 141 Ohio St.3d 457, 2014-
Ohio 5255, 25 N.E.3d 1018, ¶ 5-10, 19; Dayton Bar Assn. v. Scaccia, 150 Ohio 
St.3d 385, 2016-Ohio-3299, 79 N.E.3d 506, ¶ 10, 22; Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Engel, 154 Ohio St.3d 209, 2018-Ohio-2988, 113 N.E.3d 481, ¶ 6-8, 31.  But the 
board distinguished those cases from this case, focusing on the fact that Hillman’s 
prior disciplinary actions did not involve client-related misconduct. 
{¶ 79} While I agree with the board that Hillman’s prior misconduct did not 
affect his clients, his noncompliance with the rules and the law shows a pattern of 
his inability to meet important deadlines that could, and in this case obviously did, 
affect a vulnerable client.  This pattern of misconduct, if not remedied, will harm 
Hillman’s future clients.  The aggravating factors present here—Hillman’s three 
prior suspensions, his long history of missed personal or professional deadlines, 
and the egregious facts of this case, which include Hillman’s harming his 
vulnerable client—indicate that Hillman is the type of lawyer who conceals his 
inaptitude by playing “discovery games” and then hides that misconduct by not 
informing the affected client of the discovery violations and the consequential 
orders of the court.  Therefore, while Hillman’s prior misconduct does not weigh 
so heavily as to warrant a suspension that includes no stayed portion, I cannot agree 
that a fully stayed suspension is appropriate.  I believe that Hillman’s misconduct 
warrants, at the very least, a two-year suspension with only 18 months stayed.  See 
Engel at ¶ 26-30.  In the alternative, I believe that this court should impose the 
stayed one-year suspension from Hillman’s most recent prior disciplinary case 
because he has certainly engaged in further misconduct.  See Hillman, 145 Ohio 
St.3d 489, 2016-Ohio-1172, 50 N.E.3d 539, at ¶ 11. 
{¶ 80} Not only is an actual suspension warranted under our caselaw, but it 
is also necessary to protect the public and to deter other lawyers from engaging in 
January Term, 2022 
 
29 
the same type of misconduct.  All lawyers should know that abusing the discovery 
rules through a lack of reasonable diligence is a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(d). 
{¶ 81} Discovery games such as those that Hillman engaged in harm the 
public by obligating the judicial system to use its time and resources to resolve 
avoidable discovery disputes caused by the offending lawyer’s dilatory behavior, 
whether that behavior was purposeful or due to the lawyer’s incompetence.  Not 
only do such actions waste the courts’ resources, but they also waste the time and 
resources of opposing counsel and their clients.  The type of gamesmanship 
exhibited by Hillman is what the public might expect to see from a “crooked 
lawyer” in a “soap opera.”  That type of behavior is unacceptable.  The majority 
opinion’s decision to not impose an actual suspension to protect the public from the 
sort of gamesmanship that Hillman engaged in provides a green light for lawyers 
to play discovery games in civil cases throughout Ohio. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 82} I concur in the portion of the majority opinion’s decision adopting 
the board’s findings and in the majority opinion’s conclusions regarding the 
violations that Hillman committed.  But for the reasons stated above, I must 
respectfully dissent from its decision regarding the sanction imposed.  A sanction 
that includes an actual suspension is necessary to protect the public from an attorney 
who has had multiple prior disciplinary sanctions and who has exhibited a disregard 
for court orders and professionalism by choosing to engage in gamesmanship 
through unnecessary delay, silence, evasion, and ignoring the rules pertaining to 
discovery in civil cases.  Also, the conditions for Hillman’s return to the practice 
of law should include his completion of 12 hours of continuing legal education 
(“CLE”) on the topic of law-office management, in addition to the normal CLE 
requirements under Gov.Bar R. X.  I would also require Hillman to work with an 
appointed monitoring attorney during any stayed portion of his suspension, with 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
the monitoring attorney focusing on Hillman’s time management and law-office 
organization and management. 
{¶ 83} The type of gamesmanship illustrated by Hillman in this case is one 
of the main reasons why more and more litigants do not trust the judicial system to 
resolve their disputes.  By not imposing a more severe sanction on Hillman, this 
court essentially ignores one lawyer’s misconduct that is representative of a more 
pervasive issue and simply says, “Bad lawyering in civil cases in Ohio is okay.”  I 
cannot agree with that message.  Therefore, I respectfully concur in part and dissent 
in part. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Karen H. Osmond and Kelli 
C. Schmidt, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Steven E. Hillman, pro se. 
_________________