Title: The People v. Terrell Gifford

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 80  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Terrell Gilford,
            Appellant.
Rosemary Herbert, for appellant.
Justin J. Braun, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
At 2:00 AM on Monday, March 8, 2004, a fight erupted on
the dance floor at "Skate Key," a now-defunct indoor roller
skating rink in the Bronx.  By the time the combatants were spent
or separated, James Earl Jones had suffered what turned out to be
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No. 80
a mortal stab wound in the chest, and Kyle Williams had suffered
potentially life-threatening stab wounds in the stomach and back. 
A female witness who was standing within inches of Jones when he
was stabbed helped him outside where he collapsed in the street. 
She immediately and spontaneously identified defendant Terrell
Gilford as Jones's attacker to a police sergeant assigned to the
area outside Skate Key, who asked if anyone knew who stabbed the
victim.  Defendant fled on foot, with the sergeant and witness in
pursuit.
Two uniformed police officers, who were notified at
2:15 AM of an assault in progress, joined in the chase in their
patrol car and finally caught up with defendant a few blocks away
from Skate Key.  They handcuffed defendant with his hands behind
his back and placed him in the back seat of their cruiser.  The
sergeant instructed these two officers to transport defendant to
the nearby hospital where Jones had been taken by ambulance, and
to conduct a showup.  At the time, the sergeant suspected that
Jones was "probably going to lose his life."
When the two officers reached the hospital, one of them
stayed with defendant in the car, which was parked in the
emergency room parking lot.  The other officer went into the
hospital where he learned Jones's name, and discovered that he
was "unconscious" and "being worked on," rendering a showup
impossible.  On his way out of the emergency room, though, he ran
into the witness and a male companion, who were walking quickly
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in his direction.  In light of their distraught and rushed
appearance (the witness appeared to have been crying), the
officer, acting on a hunch, asked them why they were there.  When
the witness responded that "her friend" James Jones had been
stabbed, the officer asked the two of them "if they knew anything
about what had happened at Skate Key and they said that they
did."  He then "asked them if they would be able to in any way .
. . identify any suspects involved in the case and they also said
they would."  The officer did not know that the witness had
already identified defendant to the sergeant as Jones's attacker.
 
The officer radioed for a patrol car.  He explained to
the witness and her companion that he would place them in this
car to "view someone" or to "show [them] someone who might have
been involved in the incident."  Once this patrol car arrived,
the witness and her companion climbed inside, and the officer
told them that he was going to "put a bright light on the
individual [whom he] would show them and that at any time if they
identified that person they should let [him] know."  The officer
next called on the operator of the newly-arrived patrol car to
turn on the "take-down" lights on top of the vehicle.  At the
officer's signal, his fellow officer then guided defendant, who
remained rear-handcuffed, to the lighted area and stood next to
him.  When the officer asked the witness and her companion if
they could identify defendant, the witness said "[T]hat's him,"
and her companion agreed.  The witness related to the officer
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No. 80
that "the person [whom he] had shown them was responsible for
injuring Mr. James Jones, specifically stabbing him"; the
stabbing took place inside Skate Key; "there was a confrontation
amongst people"; and defendant "had a knife and . . . had stabbed
[Jones]."  Her companion added "that there was a fight and . . .
he also observed [defendant] to have a knife in his possession." 
This showup took place at about 2:45 AM, no more than 45 minutes
after the crime. 
On April 1, 2004, the grand jury indicted defendant for
a litany of crimes in connection with the fight at Skate Key. 
Defendant moved to suppress the showup identifications.  Defense
counsel argued that there were no exigent circumstances with
respect to the witness or her companion; that the officer
improperly conducted a joint or simultaneous showup with the
witness -- who had already identified defendant just minutes
before -- and her companion; that the officer told them that
defendant was a "suspect"; that defendant was "spotlighted" by
"take-down" lights; and that defendant was removed from a police
car, wearing handcuffs, and flanked by police officers in plain
view of the witness and her companion.  Defense counsel further
maintained that the showup was impermissibly duplicative because 
the police officers had to have known that a showup was
unnecessary to establish probable cause since defendant was
already under arrest.
The Judge denied defendant's motion, citing People v
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Duuvon (77 NY2d 541 [1991]).  He found that the "chain of events"
in this case was "unbroken," related in temporal and geographic
proximity and, in addition, driven by the exigency of the
victim's critical condition; and that "the show-up took place
within a short period of time after the commission of the crime
and in close proximity to the scene of the crime."  Further, he
concluded, the showup was conducted to "preserv[e] . . . the
witnesses' fresh memories of the event," and "[t]he fact that
[defendant] was identified in front of a police car while in
handcuffs [did] not render the show-up unduly suggestive."
Defendant subsequently waived his right to a jury and
was tried in a bench trial before the same Judge who presided
over the suppression hearing.  At the trial, the witness made an
in-court identification of defendant as Jones's attacker;
Williams testified that defendant had stabbed him in the stomach. 
The Judge acquitted defendant of the most serious of the charges
facing him for Jones's death -- second-degree murder -- but
convicted him of first-degree manslaughter.  The Judge also
acquitted defendant of the most serious of the charges with
respect to Williams -- attempted murder in the second degree --
but convicted him of first-degree assault.
On appeal, the Appellate Division upheld defendant's
first-degree manslaughter conviction.  Exercising its interest-
of-justice jurisdiction, the court reviewed defendant's
unpreserved challenge to the first-degree assault conviction and
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No. 80
reduced it to first-degree attempted assault (65 AD3d 840, 841
[1st Dept 2009]).  Finally, the court found "no basis for
suppression of the showup or in-court identifications, because
the showup was within permissibly close temporal and geographic
proximity to the crime, took place shortly after the witness had
already made a reliable identification, and was conducted in a
manner that was not unduly suggestive" (id. at 841-842 [citations
omitted]).
The due-process inquiry for showups calls upon the
suppression court to decide whether the showup was reasonable
under the circumstances –- i.e., justified by exigency or
temporal and spatial proximity -- and, if so, whether the showup
as conducted was unduly suggestive (People v Ortiz, 90 NY2d 533,
537 [1997]).  Whether a showup is reasonable under the
circumstances and/or unduly suggestive are mixed questions of law
and fact.  As a result, the determination of the hearing court in
this case, undisturbed by the Appellate Division and supported by
evidence in the record, is beyond our further review.
Finally, defendant's claim that the evidence was
insufficient to show his intent to cause serious physical injury
to Williams is unpreserved.
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Order affirmed, in a memorandum.  Chief Judge Lippman and Judges
Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided May 3, 2011
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