Title: Beamer v. DFS

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KAITLYN BEAMER,1 
 
 
Respondent Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES, 
 
Petitioner Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 630, 2018 
§ 
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§     
§  File No. CS18-03-03TS  
§                     
§  Petition No. 18-06448 
§                         
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  May 9, 2019 
 
 
 
 
  Decided:  July 10, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; SEITZ and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
 
ORDER 
 
 
Upon consideration of the appellant’s brief filed under Supreme Court Rule 
26.1, her attorney’s motion to withdraw, the response of the Division of Family 
Services (“DFS”), and the response of the attorney ad litem, it appears to the Court 
that:   
(1) 
The respondent below-appellant, Kaitlyn Beamer (“the Mother”), filed 
an appeal from the Family Court’s decision, dated December 7, 2018, terminating 
                                               
 
1 The Court previously assigned a pseudonym to the appellant under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
2 
 
her parental rights over her son (“the Child”).2  On appeal, the Mother’s counsel 
(“Counsel”) has filed an opening brief and motion to withdraw under Supreme Court 
Rule 26.1.  Counsel represents that she has made a conscientious review of the record 
and the law and found no meritorious argument in support of the appeal.  The Mother 
has not submitted any points for the Court’s consideration.  In response to Counsel’s 
submission, DFS and the Child’s attorney ad litem have moved to affirm the Family 
Court’s termination of the Mother’s parental rights.  After careful consideration, this 
Court concludes that the Family Court’s judgment should be affirmed. 
(2) 
The Child was born in May 2015.  On July 21, 2016, DFS was awarded 
temporary custody of the Child by emergency ex parte order.  DFS alleged that the 
Mother, who had recently come to Delaware from Florida, was currently homeless 
and was suspected to have active substance-abuse issues as well as untreated mental-
health issues.  There were also concerns that the Mother would flee to Florida with 
the Child. 
(3) 
At the preliminary protective hearing on July 25, 2016, the Family 
Court appointed counsel to represent the Mother.  The Mother contested whether 
there was probable cause to believe the Child was dependent, neglected or abused, 
or that there was a substantial imminent risk thereof, in her care.  A DFS employee 
                                               
 
2 The Family Court also terminated the parental rights of the Child’s father, who is not a party to 
this appeal.  We only recite the facts in the record as they relate to the Mother’s appeal. 
3 
 
testified that they received a hotline report in June that the Child was abused and 
neglected by the Mother.  The employee made contact with the Child’s maternal 
grandmother who was living in a debris-crowded residence inappropriate for a child.  
The maternal grandmother reported that she had fought recently with the Mother, 
the Mother was using synthetic heroin, that the Mother had mental-health problems 
and was seeking to avoid DFS, and that the Mother was not caring for the Child well.  
The maternal grandmother had recently dropped the Mother and Child off near the 
Maryland state line.   
(4) 
DFS made contact with the Mother after receiving a report that she was 
acting erratically near a restaurant in Seaford.  The Mother, the maternal 
grandmother, and the maternal great-grandmother had gotten into a fight at the 
restaurant.  A DFS employee spoke to all three women at the police station.  At that 
time, the Mother’s pupils appeared to be pinpoint, which can be indicative of 
someone using opiates, and she was shaking and sweating.  With the Mother’s 
consent, DFS developed a safety plan for the Child to live with the maternal great-
grandmother and for the Mother to have supervised visits.  The maternal great-
grandmother was only available as a temporary placement for the Child because of 
her age and health issues.  In light of this and the Mother’s refusal to comply with 
the safety plan as discussed below, DFS obtained emergency ex parte custody of the 
Child and placed him with a foster family. 
4 
 
 
(5) 
DFS learned that the Florida Child Protective Services had received a 
medical neglect report for the Child shortly after he was born at home with severe 
jaundice.  The Florida medical neglect case was closed as unsubstantiated.  At the 
Mother’s first supervised visit with the Child, she appeared ill and behaved 
erratically.  She threatened to return to Florida and revoked her consent to the child 
safety plan.  She also refused to undergo substance-abuse and mental-health 
evaluations, despite her previous agreement to do so as part of the safety plan.  The 
Mother testified that she had no substance-abuse problems, but took Lexapro for her 
anxiety.  As a pagan, the Mother opposed vaccines and immunizations.  The Mother 
hoped to move somewhere in Florida where her friends could support her. 
(6) 
The Family Court found there was probable cause to believe that the 
Child was dependent, neglected or abused, or that there was a substantial risk 
thereof.  Probable cause factors included unstable housing, allegations of substance-
abuse and untreated mental-health issues, medical concerns for the Child, and the 
Mother’s risk of flight.  The Family Court also found that it was in the best interests 
of the Child to be in DFS’s custody, that  DFS had made reasonable efforts to prevent 
the unnecessary removal of the Child from his home, and that DFS exercised due 
diligence to identify adult relatives of the Child. 
5 
 
(7) 
On August 22, 2016, the Family Court held an adjudicatory hearing for 
the Mother as the suspected father had not yet undergone genetic testing.  The 
Mother stipulated to a finding of dependency based on her mental-health issues, but 
understood that additional elements would be included in the reunification case plan.  
She waived her right to an adjudicatory hearing.   
(8) 
The psychologist who evaluated the Mother’s mental health testified 
that the Mother met the criteria for generalized anxiety disorder and adjustment 
disorder with depression.  He was puzzled by some of the Mother’s statements and 
believed that six months of counseling might allow a therapist to determine if the 
Mother had additional mental-health issues.  He also testified that the Mother was 
unable to explain why her pagan beliefs included opposition to vaccines and 
immunizations.  The Mother told a DFS worker that she would become a Jehovah’s 
Witness so the Child would not receive shots.   
(9) 
Based on the Mother’s stipulation, the Family Court found that the 
Child was dependent and should remain in DFS’s custody.  The Family Court also 
found that DFS had made reasonable efforts to prevent the unnecessary removal of 
the Child from his home and to identify adult relatives of the Child.  The Family 
Court granted DFS’s motion (supported by the Child’s attorney ad litem and opposed 
by the Mother) to schedule the Child for vaccinations.   
6 
 
(10) On September 26, 2016, the Family Court held a dispositional hearing.  
The Mother’s case plan for reunification was accepted into evidence without 
objection.  The case plan elements included the Mother’s consistent visitation with 
the Child, compliance with the psychologist’s recommendations for mental-health 
counseling for at least six months, completion of a substance-abuse evaluation and 
compliance with any recommendations for treatment, completion of a parenting 
class, employment, and safe housing.  The DFS treatment worker testified that the 
Mother had recently tested positive for barbiturates.  The Mother had missed her last 
two visits with the Child, but otherwise the visits were going well.  The Family Court 
granted the request of the Child’s attorney ad litem for increased visitation (twice a 
week instead of once a week) with the Mother.  The Family Court found that the 
Child was dependent and should remain in DFS’s custody.  The Family Court also 
found that DFS was making reasonable efforts to reunify the Child with the Mother.   
(11) On November 21, 2016, the Family Court held a review hearing.  The 
Mother arrived for the hearing, left after telling her attorney that she did not want to 
be there, and then joined the hearing late.  The DFS treatment worker testified that 
the genetic testing confirmed the identity of the father, who lived in Washington.  
DFS was starting the application process under the Interstate Compact for the 
Placement of Children (“ICPC”).  Since the last hearing, the Mother had cancelled, 
missed, or failed to confirm most of the scheduled visits with the Child.  She also 
7 
 
left two visits early, one after twenty minutes because she was having an anxiety 
attack and feared rejection.  The Mother was not receiving mental-health or 
substance-abuse treatment.  She had also failed to start a parenting class.  The Mother 
worked with her mother cleaning houses, but had not provided any proof of income.  
The Family Court found that the Mother had made minimal progress on her case 
plan, that the Child continued to be dependent, and that DFS had made reasonable 
efforts toward reunification. 
(12) On February 13, 2017, the Family Court held a second review hearing.  
The Mother had only visited the Child twice since the last hearing.  The Mother 
testified that she had left messages about visits, but her calls were not returned.  The 
foster care worker testified that visits were always on Tuesdays and Thursdays as 
long as the Mother confirmed the day of the visit or the day before that she would 
attend the visit, and the Mother was not doing that.  The worker also testified that 
she would return any messages the Mother left for her.   
(13) The Mother had met a psychiatric nurse practitioner, who diagnosed the 
Mother with anxiety and adjustment disorder and prescribed Lexapro, which the 
Mother declined to take.  The Mother testified that she did not refuse to take Lexapro, 
which she did not feel she needed, and was open to taking it.  The Mother continued 
to deny any problems with substance abuse, but had seen a substance-abuse 
counselor twice and had a negative urine screen.  She had not yet completed 
8 
 
parenting classes.  The Mother continued to earn money cleaning houses but, as 
before, had not provided any proof of income.  The Child, who had moved to a new 
foster home,   had accidentally burned himself on a stove, but was otherwise doing 
well.  The Family Court found that the Mother had made some progress on her case 
plan, but expressed concern that she only visited the Child twice in a three-month 
period.  The Family Court found that the Child was dependent and should remain in 
DFS’s custody.  The Family Court also found that DFS was making reasonable 
efforts toward permanency for the Child.   
(14) On May 8, 2017, the Family Court held a third review hearing.  The 
Mother failed to appear for the hearing.  The ICPC application was denied because 
the father had moved and not provided a new address.  He provided his new address 
to the Washington ICPC worker.  The foster care worker testified that the Mother 
had attended thirteen out of twenty-two scheduled visits, with seven of the missed 
visits attributable to the Mother and two of the missed visits attributable to the foster 
care agency.  Visits generally went well, but the Mother had to be told twice not to 
let the Child eat packets of artificial sugar.  The Mother had completed parenting 
classes.  The Mother was receiving substance-abuse counseling through Brandywine 
Counseling and could also receive mental-health counseling there.  She had two 
positive urine screens for barbiturates.  She continued to clean houses with her 
mother, but had not provided any proof of income.  The treatment worker testified 
9 
 
that the Mother often did not respond to her calls or letters.  The Child was doing 
well in foster care.   
(15) The Family Court found that the Mother had made some progress, 
albeit late, on her case plan.  The Family Court found that the Child was dependent 
and should remain in DFS’s custody.  The Family Court also found that DFS was 
making reasonable efforts toward permanency for the Child.   
(16) On August 7, 2017, DFS filed a motion to change the plan from 
reunification to termination of parental rights for purposes of adoption.  The Family 
Court ruled that the motion would be considered at the next hearing.  At the August 
21, 2017 permanency hearing, DFS and the Mother stipulated that the Mother had 
made more progress on her case plan and should have more time to complete her 
case plan with the goal of reunification remaining in effect.  The ICPC process for 
the Father was ongoing.   
(17) The Mother had attended eleven of twenty-eight offered visits with the 
Child, with thirteen of the missed visits attributable to the Mother and four of the 
missed visits attributable to the foster care agency or for another reason.  The Mother 
testified that she often forgot to confirm visits in advance as she was required to do.  
The DFS treatment worker testified that if the Mother improved her visitation 
attendance, DFS would consider unsupervised visits as well as longer visits and 
possible overnight visits.  The Mother was receiving mental-health and substance-
10 
 
abuse counseling through Brandywine Counseling.  All of the Mother’s urine 
screens tested positive for barbiturates.  There were concerns that the Mother had 
not appeared for some sessions and was not doing group sessions.  The Mother 
denied using barbiturates.   
(18) The Mother had provided proof of her income.  She still planned to 
return to Florida as soon as the Child was returned to her custody.  The Child was 
doing well in foster care.  The Family Court found that the Child was dependent and 
should remain in DFS’s custody.  The Family Court also found that DFS was making 
reasonable efforts toward permanency for the Child.  The Family Court deferred 
ruling on the motion to change goal, but warned the Mother that she need to improve 
her visitation with the Child significantly for reunification to occur.   
(19) On November 20, 2017, the Family Court held another permanency 
review hearing.  DFS asked to change the permanency plan to termination of parental 
rights for both parents.  The second ICPC application for the Father had been denied 
because he failed to maintain contact with Washington officials.  DFS did not have 
a working phone number for the Father.  
(20) The Mother’s visits were suspended for two weeks in September while 
DFS investigated an allegation that the Mother had threatened to kill the Child.  After 
the investigation was closed and supervised visits resumed in mid-September, the 
Mother attended eleven out of seventeen scheduled visits.  All of the missed visits 
11 
 
were attributable to the Mother.  Foster care workers testified that some visits went 
well and others did not.  The Child was often upset to leave the foster home and 
sometimes aggressive toward the Mother, which led to the Mother yelling at the 
Child and squeezing him too hard during one visit.  The Mother would often fall 
asleep during visits, which she attributed to her work schedule.   
(21) The DFS treatment worker testified that a parent aide was going to start 
working with the Mother during the visits and that the psychologist who previously 
evaluated the Mother was going to meet her again and observe how she was bonding 
with the Child.  There was a fire at the Mother’s residence, making it unsuitable for 
the Child.  DFS was concerned that the Mother continued to live there despite 
warnings that it was unsafe.  DFS was also concerned by what appeared to be self-
inflicted cut marks on the Mother’s wrists.  Brandywine Counseling intended to 
discharge the Mother because she had not attended treatment services for more than 
a month.  She continued to have urine screens that tested positive for barbiturates, 
but it was possible one of the psychiatric medications she took was causing false 
positive results.   
(22) The Mother testified that she was seeing a former counselor at 
Connections for treatment.  The Mother said she tried to inform DFS that she was 
receiving treatment at Connections, but was unable to do so.  The Mother continued 
to clean houses with her mother and said she would provide evidence of that to DFS.  
12 
 
She also testified that she was living in a different house since the fire, but had not 
previously informed DFS of the change in her residence.  She planned to return to 
Florida once the Child was returned to her.  
(23) DFS sought to change the goal to termination of parental rights because 
the Child had been in DFS’s care for an extended period, the Mother’s visitation 
with the Child was erratic, and there were still concerns about her mental health.  
The Family Court judge deferred ruling on DFS’s motion to change the goal because 
she wanted to learn more about the Mother’s progress at Connections, the impact of 
parent-aide services, and the results of the psychologist’s bonding assessment.   
(24) On February 5, 2018, the Family Court held another permanency 
review hearing.  A psychiatrist testified regarding the different drugs that she had 
prescribed for the Mother’s anxiety.  One of those medications could have caused 
false positive results for barbiturates.  She testified that the Mother’s current 
medication was working and that the Mother was compliant with her mental-health 
treatment.  The Mother’s counselor at Connections testified that the Mother was 
compliant and engaged with her treatment, which included individual and group 
sessions.  Her urine screens were negative for drugs, but there were only three 
screens in Connections’ system.  
(25) The psychologist who originally evaluated the Mother testified 
regarding his reevaluation of the Mother in November 2017, which included 
13 
 
observing her with the Child for ninety minutes.  He testified that he remained 
concerned by some of the things she said and her vagueness regarding her mental 
health and mental-health treatment.  Based on his observation of the Mother’s 
interaction with the Child, he concluded that the Mother became easily frustrated 
with the Child and was more focused on her needs than the Child’s needs.  For 
example, the Mother insisted on watching a television show with the Child even 
though the Child was fidgeting, uninterested, and too young for the show.   
(26) The Mother’s responses to the Personality Assessment Inventory were 
highly defensive.  The psychologist again diagnosed the Mother with an anxiety 
disorder, but testified that the Mother’s high defensiveness and vague responses 
made it difficult to trust what she was saying and accurately determine the status of 
her mental health.  Based on his evaluations of the Mother, the psychologist believed 
that the Mother was not sufficiently tuned into the Child’s needs, there was a risk 
she could not provide adequate care for the Child, and it would not safe for the Child 
to be returned to the Mother’s care at that time.   
(27) A family interventionist testified regarding the eight visits she observed 
between the Mother and the Child.  She spoke with the Mother about holding the 
Child too tightly, showing him movies that were more appropriate for adults than 
toddlers, and giving him artificial sweeteners as a treat.  She also observed, and 
spoke to the Mother, about falling asleep during the visits.  
14 
 
(28) During a visit in January, she noticed that the Mother had bad burns, 
which the Mother said came from sleeping near a space heater.  The family 
interventionist was concerned that if the Mother could sleep through something like 
that, then she could sleep through the Child needing assistance.  Later in the month  
the Mother had more burn marks that she attributed to the space heater.   
(29) The family interventionist also testified that she believed the Mother 
sometimes tried to avoid changing the Child’s diapers.  When the interventionist 
asked the Mother to bring larger diapers, she said that she should not have to because 
she was paying child support and the foster parents were receiving money.  The 
Mother subsequently claimed she looked in several stores for the right size of 
diapers, but could not find them.  The family interventionist said that the Mother 
tried, but sometimes struggled to deal with the Child when he was acting up and that 
she would get frustrated quickly.  There were also times that the Mother did not 
recognize the Child was done with an activity like coloring or reading and would 
continue to do it by herself.  Based on the testimony, it appears that the Mother 
attended ten of fifteen visits scheduled since the last hearing, although she only 
attended fifteen minutes of one of the visits, instead of the scheduled two hours.  The 
Mother missed five visits, with three of the missed visits attributable to the Mother.  
(30) The DFS treatment worker testified that the Child was usually reluctant 
to go to visits.  She also testified that the Mother tried to make visits and that it is 
15 
 
not unusual for a parent to miss some visits.  She expressed concern about the 
Mother’s behavior during some of the visits as well as the visible burn marks.  She 
testified that the Mother had asked about reducing the visits, but would not make the 
request in writing as DFS requested.   
(31) In light of her doubts concerning the Mother’s truthfulness and the 
limited number of urine screens since the last hearing, the treatment worker 
questioned whether the Mother was in compliance with the mental-health and 
substance-abuse portions of her case plan.  She testified that the Mother had 
submitted evidence that she was cleaning houses with her mother and was in 
compliance with that portion of her case plan.  DFS had determined that the Mother 
was living in a place appropriate for a child.  DFS did not observe any space heaters 
in the house, despite the testimony that the Mother suffered burns from a space 
heater. 
(32) The treatment worker testified that the maternal grandmother had 
expressed concerns regarding the Child’s safety with the Mother.  Despite the 
Mother’s progress on some elements of her case plan, DFS still wished to change 
the goal to termination of parental rights and adoption because DFS remained 
concerned that the Child would not be safe in the Mother’s care and the Child had 
been in DFS’s custody for a long time.    
16 
 
(33) The Mother testified that she sought medical care for the burns after 
learning there were concerns about what happened.  She removed the space heaters.  
She also testified about her mental-health and substance-abuse treatment.  She said 
that she had asked about changing the dates and times of the visits, not reducing the 
number of visits.  She felt as though the visits were going well and planned to return 
to Florida when the Child was returned to her. 
(34) At this point, the Family Court granted DFS’s motion to change the 
plan from reunification to termination of parental rights for purposes of adoption.  
The Family Court found that the Mother had made insufficient progress on her case 
plan, despite having been given additional time and parent-aide resources.  In the 
court’s view, the Mother continued to display parenting deficiencies and lacked 
understanding of the Child’s needs.  There was conflicting testimony regarding the 
Mother’s mental health.  The Family Court expressed concern that, even if trial home 
placement of the Child with the Mother was appropriate in a few months, the Mother 
was likely to flee to Florida with the Child. 
(35) An initial termination of parental rights hearing was held on June 4, 
2018, but was continued until September because the Mother was receiving 
treatment for an MRSA infection and sepsis at Johns Hopkins Medical Center.  The 
father had not responded to his counsel’s communications or had any contact with 
17 
 
DFS.  The father had received the petition for termination of parental rights, but did 
not appear for the hearing.   
(36) The foster care worker testified that the Child was healthy, but 
displayed aggressive behavior toward other children in the foster care home since 
the arrival of a new baby.  The worker also testified that, since the change in goal, 
the Mother had visitation once a month with the Child.  The visit in March went fine, 
but the Mother did not schedule a visit in April because she was helping a sick friend.  
At the May visit, the Mother could barely walk.     
(37) On September 17, 2018, the Family Court held a termination of parental 
rights hearing. All of the Family Court’s previous orders were admitted into 
evidence, as well as a TPR Social Report prepared by DFS.  A physician from 
Nanticoke Memorial Hospital testified that the Mother’s behavior during a visit to 
the emergency room in May 2018 for a sepsis infection led to police involvement.  
The Mother became belligerent when a nurse confronted her about something she 
was taking that she would not identify as required by hospital policy.  During a 
search, the police found syringes and a spoon in the Mother’s purse.  The Mother 
left the hospital against the doctor’s medical advice.  The doctor testified that a 
serious infection could affect a person’s mental cognition and abilities, but he did 
not think that was the case with the Mother based on his interactions with her.  A 
18 
 
police officer testified that the Mother was charged with disorderly conduct and 
possession of drug paraphernalia.    
(38) A foster care worker testified that the Mother visited with the Child in 
March and May, but did not schedule a visit in April.  Both visits were fine.  She 
testified that in early September the Mother had called to tell her that she was out of 
the hospital and to ask whether the Child was with the same foster care family.  The 
worker informed her that the Child was with a different family and gave her the 
phone number of the new worker handling the case.  The Child was moved to a 
different family in mid-June because his previous family was unable to cope with 
caring for three children under the age of five.   
(39) The new foster care worker testified that the Child was doing well in 
his new foster care home where he was the only child.  When she spoke to the Mother 
during the first week of September, she gave the Mother the number of the DFS 
permanency worker to contact and told her that the Child was with a new foster care 
family.  The family was interested in adopting the Child.  The foster care worker 
testified that the Mother did not ask how the Child was doing or for a visit with the 
Child.  The foster care mother testified that the Child was doing well and very active.   
(40) The DFS permanency worker testified that she spoke with the Mother 
for the first time at the termination of parental rights hearing.  She did not 
communicate with the Mother while she was hospitalized or in rehabilitation and 
19 
 
played phone tag with the Mother after she was released from rehabilitation.  The 
DFS worker testified that the Mother was not compliant with the visitation portion 
of her case plan, but had completed a parenting class.  She was not aware of whether 
the Mother was currently employed or receiving any mental-health or substance-
abuse treatment.  She also did not know where the Mother resided.   
(41) The maternal grandmother testified that the Mother was transferred 
from Johns Hopkins Medical Center to a rehabilitation center in Maryland.  She was 
released from the rehabilitation center during the third week of August.  The 
maternal grandmother testified that, as things occurred, she notified the Mother’s 
counsel, who had permission to share that information with DFS while the Mother 
was in the hospital and rehabilitation center.  The maternal grandmother was 
presently staying with the Mother at the house where the fire occurred.  The man 
who owned the house had died and left it to the maternal grandmother.  She had not 
decided what she was going to do with the house, but was going to let the Mother 
stay there indefinitely or sell the house and buy a smaller one for the Mother.  The 
maternal grandmother testified that the Mother was not currently working.      
(42) The Mother testified that after leaving Nanticoke Memorial Hospital in 
mid-May she went to Peninsula Regional Medical Center for two weeks.  She then 
went to Johns Hopkins Medical Center because they had a program for people who 
do not accept blood transfusions.  On June 14, 2018, she was transferred to a 
20 
 
rehabilitation center in Maryland.  She was discharged from the rehabilitation center 
on August 23, 2018.   
(43) The Mother testified that she could care for an active toddler.  She had 
seen her Connections counselor twice since August 23, 2018.  She intended to see a 
psychiatrist and return to cleaning houses with her mother.  She admitted that she 
had not requested a visit with the Child after her discharge from rehabilitation.   
(44) On December 7, 2018, the Family Court issued a decision terminating 
the parental rights of the Father and the Mother.  As to the Mother, the Family Court 
found by clear and convincing evidence that the Mother had failed to plan adequately 
for the Child’s needs under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5).  The Family Court found that 
the Child had been in DFS care for more than one year, that the Mother had failed 
to complete her case plan despite receiving additional time to do so, that her 
visitation with the Child was inconsistent, that she failed to demonstrate appropriate 
parenting skills during the visits, and that she was unable to assume promptly legal 
and physical custody of the Child or pay for his support in accordance with her 
financial means.  The Family Court next considered the best-interest factors under 
13 Del. C. § 722 and found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of 
parental rights was in the best interests of the Child.     
21 
 
(45) On appeal, this Court reviews the Family Court’s factual and legal 
determinations as well as its inferences and deductions.3  We will not disturb the 
Family Court’s rulings on appeal if the court’s findings of fact are supported by the 
record and its explanations, deductions, and inferences are the product of an orderly 
and logical reasoning process.4  We review legal rulings de novo.5  If the Family 
Court correctly applied the law, then our standard of review is abuse of discretion.6   
(46) The statutory procedure for terminating parental rights requires two 
separate inquiries.7  First, the Family Court must determine whether the evidence 
presented meets one of the statutory grounds for termination.8  When the statutory 
basis for termination of parental rights is failure to plan adequately for the child’s 
needs under § 1103(a)(5) and the child is in DFS’s custody, there must be proof of 
a least one additional statutory factor under § 1103(a)(5)(a) and proof that DFS made 
reasonable efforts to reunify the family.9  Second, the Family Court must determine 
whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child.10  Both of 
these requirements must be established by clear and convincing evidence.11   
                                               
 
3 Long v. Div. of Family Servs., 41 A.3d 367, 370 (Del. 2012). 
4 In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995). 
5 Id. 
6 CASA v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth and Their Families, 834 A.2d 63, 66 (Del. 2003). 
7 Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000). 
8 13 Del. C. § 1103(a) (listing the grounds for termination of parental rights). 
9 Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del. 2008). 
10 13 Del. C. § 722(a). 
11 Powell, 963 A.2d at 731. 
22 
 
(47) The Family Court did not err in finding, by clear and convincing 
evidence, a statutory basis for the termination of the Mother’s parental rights.  The 
record supports the Family Court’s conclusion that the Mother failed to plan 
adequately for the Child’s needs and that the Child was in DFS’s custody for more 
than a year.  The Mother’s failure to plan included her inconsistent visitation with 
the Child and her lack of parenting skills, even after completion of a parenting class 
and receipt of parent-aide services.  DFS reduced visitation to once a month after the 
change in goal in February 2018, but the Mother still only visited the Child twice 
between February 2018 and September 2018.  She was in the hospital and a 
rehabilitation center for much of the summer, but there is no indication that she asked 
or tried to have any contact with the Child during that time.  Even after the Mother 
was released from rehabilitation, she did not ask how the Child was doing or for a 
visit with the Child.  The Mother had the opportunity to explain her failure to visit 
the Child regularly on appeal, but failed to submit anything for this Court to consider.   
(48) Although the Family Court did not expressly address whether DFS 
made reasonable efforts to reunify the Mother with the Child in the termination of 
parental rights order, it did note that it had made this finding throughout the 
dependency proceedings.  DFS’s reunification efforts included developing a case 
plan for the Mother, helping the Mother obtain the necessary services to complete 
the case plan, facilitating the Child’s visits with the Mother (even though the Mother 
23 
 
often failed to take advantage of this opportunity), and providing the Mother with 
parent-aide services.  DFS even asked for the Mother to have extra time to complete 
her case plan.  The record therefore supports a finding that DFS made reasonable 
efforts to reunify the Mother with the Child.     
(49) The Family Court found that all but one of the best-interests factors 
under § 722 weighed in favor of the termination of parental rights.  Although we 
conclude that the Family Court erred in its consideration of one of the best-interests 
factors (the wishes of the parents), the Family Court did not err in concluding that 
termination of the Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interests.  The 
Family Court found that the first factor—the wishes of the Mother—weighed in 
favor of termination of parental rights because the Mother, who opposed termination 
of her parental rights, failed to complete her case plan.  We disagree.  In light of the 
Mother’s opposition to the termination of her parental rights, this factor weighed 
against termination of her parental rights.  The Mother’s failure to complete her case 
plan is already accounted for by the sixth best-interests factor—the parents’ past and 
present compliance with their rights and responsibilities to their child under 13 Del. 
C. § 701. 
(50) The Family Court did not err in concluding that the second factor—the 
Child’s wishes—weighed in favor of termination of parental rights.   Although the 
Child was too young for a court interview, the Child’s attorney ad litem supported 
24 
 
the termination of parental rights.  As to the third factor—the Child’s interaction and 
interrelationship with his relatives—the Family Court did not err in finding that the 
Mother’s irregular visitation and deficient parenting skills meant this factor weighed 
in favor of termination of parental rights.  The Family Court’s finding that the fourth 
factor—the Child’s adjustment to his home and community—weighed in favor of 
termination of parental rights is well-supported by the record.  The Child was doing 
well with his foster care family, which was an adoptive resource. 
(51) The Family Court’s conclusion that the fifth factor—the mental and 
physical health of all individuals involved—weighed in favor of termination of 
parental rights is also well-supported by the record.  The serious issues regarding the 
Mother’s mental health and physical health were litigated throughout the 
dependency proceedings.  As to the sixth factor—the parents’ compliance with their 
rights and responsibilities under 13 Del. C. § 701—the Family Court did not err in 
concluding that the Mother’s failure to complete her case plan and inconsistent 
visitation meant this factor weighed in favor of termination of parental rights.  The 
Family Court did not err in finding that the seventh factor—evidence of domestic 
violence—was neutral because there was no evidence of domestic violence 
presented. 
(52) Finally, the Family Court found that the eighth factor—the criminal 
history of the parents—weighed in favor of the termination of the Mother’s parental 
25 
 
rights because she had pending misdemeanor charges (disorderly conduct and 
possession of drug paraphernalia) arising from the incident at Nanticoke Memorial 
Hospital and a traffic violation.  In light of the limited and relatively minor nature of 
these offenses, we question the Family Court’s conclusion that this factor weighed 
in favor of termination parental rights.  At most, it seems to us that the Mother’s 
misdemeanor offenses made this factor neutral as to the termination of parental 
rights.   
(53) Notwithstanding the Family Court’s error as to the first best-interests 
factor, we conclude that the Family Court did not err in concluding that termination 
of the Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interests.  When balancing the 
relevant factors, the Family Court may give different weight to different factors.12  
Even with the Mother’s wishes weighing against termination of parental rights and 
her criminal history a neutral factor, the weight of the factors in favor of termination 
of parental rights (the second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth factors) support the 
Family Court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the 
Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interests.   
(54) The Family Court found by clear and convincing evidence that the 
Mother’s parental rights should be terminated.  After careful consideration of the 
                                               
 
12 Bower v. Dep’t of Servs. for Child, Youth & Their Families, 2016 WL 3382353, at *4 (Del. June 
9, 2016) (citing Fisher v. Fisher, 691 A.2d 619, 623 (Del. 1997)). 
26 
 
parties’ positions and the record on appeal, including the transcripts of all of the 
Family Court hearings, we conclude that the Mother’s appeal is wholly without 
merit.  We are also satisfied that the Mother’s counsel has made a conscientious 
effort to examine the record and the law and has properly determined that the Mother 
could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.  The Mother was given an 
opportunity to, but did not, challenge this determination.  We therefore affirm the 
Family Court’s termination of parental rights.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice