Title: State v. Gundlah

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

STATE_V_GUNDLAH.92-409; 160 Vt. 193; 624 A.2d 368


  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
  40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
  Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
  order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


				  No. 92-409


  State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

					       On Appeal from
       v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
					       Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit

  Charles Gundlah, ex rel.                     September Term, 1992
  Susan Smallheer


  George F. Ellison, J.

  Gary Kessler, Supervising Appellate Prosecutor, Montpelier, for
    plaintiff-appellee

  Richard V. Aborjaily and John W. Vorder Bruegge, Law Clerk (On the Brief),
    Norwich, for defendant-appellee,

  Robert B. Hemley and Dennis R. Pearson of Gravel and Shea, Burlington, for
    appellant, Susan Smallheer


  PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       ALLEN, C.J.   Appellant Susan Smallheer appeals a contempt order that
  did not recognize her asserted newsgatherer's qualified testimonial
  privilege.   Because defendant Charles Gundlah subsequently pled nolo
  contendere, appellant's testimony will no longer be needed at the trial and
  her appeal regarding the newsgatherer's privilege is moot.  We therefore
  dismiss her appeal of the contempt order; however, we reverse on attorneys'
  fees and prospective coercive contempt sanctions.
       This appeal arises out of the criminal prosecution of Charles Gundlah
  for an alleged escape from the Woodstock Correctional Center on April 8,
  1991.  Appellant is a reporter who interviewed defendant by telephone and
  published the results of the interviews in articles appearing in the May 1,
  1992 and May 30, 1992 issues of the Rutland Herald.  The May 1 article
  contains an alleged confession to the escape by Mr. Gundlah.
       The State placed appellant on its witness list and, in response,
  defendant subpoenaed her to a deposition.  Appellant appeared at the
  deposition but, claiming a newsreporter's privilege, refused to answer
  questions and filed a motion to quash the subpoena.  The trial court denied
  her motion to quash and granted both the State's and defendant's motions to
  compel.  After appellant continued to refuse to answer questions regarding
  her interview with defendant, the trial court found her in contempt of court
  and ordered the payment of $3,985.05 as compensatory damages to the State
  and defendant's attorney, with additional prospective fines of $1,000 for
  the first day and $2,000 per additional day of continued disregard for the
  court's motion to compel.
       Appellant raises three issues on appeal.  First, she claims that the
  trial court failed to recognize a newsgatherer's qualified First Amendment
  testimonial privilege.  Her second claim is that the Vermont Constitution
  provides more protection to the press than the First Amendment and protects
  a newsgatherer's qualified testimonial privilege.  Finally, appellant argues
  that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering attorneys' fees and
  prospective sanctions in its contempt order.
       Appellant's first two arguments are moot.  On March 10, 1993, defendant
  pled nolo contendere to the charge of escape.  Because there will be no
  trial, appellant's testimony is no longer sought.  A case becomes moot when
  the issues are no longer "live".  Doria v. University of Vermont, 156 Vt.
  114, 117, 589 A.2d 317, 319 (1991).  Moreover, the mootness doctrine
  requires that there be an actual controversy in existence at all stages of
  review.  Id.  Although mootness generally precludes appellate review, we
  recognize an exception to the doctrine in cases that are capable of
  repetition but evade review.  Id. at 118, 589 A.2d  at 319.  In cases that
  are not class actions, this exception is narrowly limited to situations
  where two elements are present:  (1) the duration of the challenged action
  was too short to be fully litigated prior to its expiration, and (2) there
  is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be
  subjected to the same action again.  In re S.H., 141 Vt. 278, 281,