Title: Schick v. Ferolito

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a majority of the Court. The issue raised in this appeal is whether a heightened standard of care applies to participants in the game of golf. Under such a standard, participants would be liable for reckless or intentional conduct, and not mere negligence. On July 27, 1994, two pairs of golfers reached the tenth hole of East Orange Golf Course and agreed to play the rest of the course as a foursome. Plaintiff, Jeffrey Schick and his father played the ensuing holes with defendant, John Ferolito, and Tom Ganella. At the sixteenth hole, an errant ball hit off the tee by defendant struck plaintiff in the right eye causing personal injuries. According to plaintiff, defendant hit an unannounced and unexpected second tee shot, or mulligan, after all members of the foursome had teed off. Defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that the heightened standard of care established by Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494 (1994) should apply to participants in the game of golf. Defendant further claimed that applying the Crawn standard (participants in recreational sports have a duty to avoid the infliction of injury caused by reckless or intentional conduct), he could not be held liable for plaintiff's injuries. The trial court agreed that a recklessness standard applied and dismissed the action. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the case was distinguishable from Crawn and that the negligence standard of care should apply. 327 N.J. Super. 530 (2000). The panel reasoned that the recklessness standard was appropriate in rough and tumble sports, where anticipated risks are an inherent or integral part of the game. As for golf, the court stated that the heightened standard would be appropriate only for anticipated risks of the game, such as errant or shanked balls, but not for unanticipated risks, such as an unexpected Mulligan, as occurred here. The Supreme Court granted certification. HELD: The recklessness or intentional conduct standard of care applies generally to conduct in recreational sporting contexts, including golf. Notwithstanding that holding, this matter must proceed to trial to permit a jury to resolve the disputed facts that encompass allegations of reckless conduct by defendant. 1. The facts presented through deposition testimony were disputed in several critical aspects. According to plaintiff, he and his father had teed off first on the sixteenth hole and returned to their golf cart, located ahead of the tee-box area at a forty-five degree angle to the left. Plaintiff claimed that he looked back to the tee after defendant and Ganella had already hit their tee shots, and observed defendant about to strike another ball. Plaintiff stated that he had only a few seconds to think about what was happening when defendant commenced his swing and hit a second tee shot. The ball struck plaintiff in the right eye socket, rendering him temporarily unconscious. Defendant's and Ganella's versions were different. Defendant was unable to recall whether it was a first or second tee shot that hit plaintiff. Defendant and Ganella both stated that defendant had motioned to plaintiff to move aside prior to striking the ball. Nevertheless, defendant did explain that he waved plaintiff to move aside because he believed plaintiff was in the line of fire. (Pp. 3-5) 2. In Crawn, a catcher in an informal softball game suffered an injury when a base runner slid into home plate. The Court held that the duty of care applicable to participants in informal recreational sports is to avoid the infliction of injury caused by reckless or intentional conduct. Two important considerations supported the decision to apply a standard of care that exceeded negligence: the promotion of vigorous participation in athletic activities, and the avoidance of a flood of litigation generated by participation in recreational games and sports. A majority of jurisdictions apply the recklessness standard of care to determine the duty that recreational players owe to one another. Several jurisdictions have applied this heightened standard of care specifically in the context of the game of golf. The Court perceives no persuasive reason to distinguish between contact and noncontact sports. Risk of injury is a common and inherent aspect of athletic effort generally. It may arise from the physical nature of the athletic endeavor, creating the possibility or likelihood of direct physical contact with another player or with a ball. The risk of injury is just as real when it arises from an instrumentality used in a game, such as a swinging golf club or the small, hard ball the club propels at a very high rate of speed. Even for an experienced golfer, the course a golf ball takes is often unpredictable through no conscious fault of the golfer. (Pp. 5-16) 3. The question presented here is whether plaintiff's case can survive a summary judgment motion under a recklessness standard. Recklessness, unlike negligence, requires a conscious choice of a course of action, with knowledge or a reason to know that it will create a serious danger to others. Although negligence also involves an act with knowledge that it creates a risk of danger to others, recklessness requires a substantially higher risk. The Court finds that this case presents a question of recklessness that is properly for a jury to determine. The facts are in conflict, but they are open to an interpretation that defendant hit a second shot off the tee without telling the others that he was about to do so - even while perceiving plaintiff to be in the line of fire. That scenario presents a set of facts that a jury could find constitutes reckless conduct. Thus, even analyzed under a recklessness standard of care, plaintiff's case survives defendant's motion for summary judgment and should proceed to trial. (Pp. 16-21) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED as MODIFIED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for trial. JUSTICE VERNIERO concurs with the majority's adoption of the recklessness standard in recreational sporting contexts, including golf; he dissents, however, from the majority's determination that a jury could find defendant's conduct sufficiently egregious to satisfy the recklessness standard. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA's opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO has filed a separate opinion concurring in part, and dissenting in part. JEFFREY SCHICK, Plaintiff-Respondent, V. JOHN FEROLITO, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________ Argued November 27, 2000 -- Decided March 12, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 327 N.J. Super. 530 (2000). James M. DeMarzo argued the cause for appellant (O'Donnell, McCord, Helfrich & DeMarzo, attorneys). Richard M. Chisholm argued the cause for respondent. The opinion of the Court was delivered by LaVECCHIA, J. On July 27, 1994, two pairs of golfers reached the tenth hole of East Orange Golf Course and agreed there to play the rest of the course as a foursome. Plaintiff Jeffrey Schick and his father, Wolfgang Schick, played the ensuing holes with defendant John Ferolito and Tom Ganella. At the tee-box on the sixteenth hole, a par four straightaway approximately 300 yards in length, an errant ball hit off the tee by defendant struck plaintiff in the right eye causing personal injuries. According to plaintiff, defendant hit an unannounced and unexpected second tee shot, or mulligan, after all members of the foursome had teed off. Defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that the heightened standard of care established by Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494 (1994), should apply to participants in the game of golf. That duty of care is to avoid the infliction of injury caused by reckless or intentional conduct. Id. at 497. The trial court agreed that a recklessness standard applied and dismissed the action. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the case was distinguishable from Crawn and that the negligence standard of care was applicable. Schick v. Ferolito, 327 N.J. Super. 530 (App. Div. 2000). The panel reasoned that the recklessness standard was appropriate in rough and tumble sports, where 'anticipated risks . . . are an inherent or integral part of the game.' Id. at 533-34 (quoting Crawn, supra, 186 N.J. at 504). As for golf, the court stated that the heightened standard would be appropriate only for anticipated risks of the game, such as errant or shanked balls, but not for unanticipated risks, such as an unexpected Mulligan as occurred here. Id. at 534. Because Crawn may have left open the question of whether the recklessness standard should apply generally to conduct in recreational sporting contexts, including golf, we granted certification. 164 N.J. 191 (2000). The Court's holding in Crawn placed New Jersey among the majority of jurisdictions that apply the recklessness standard of care to determine the duty that recreational players owe to one another. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992) (applying recklessness standard to injury in touch football); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 787 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (holding recklessness applies to injuries sustained in informal softball game); Ritchie-Gamester v. City of Berkely, 597 N.W.2d 517 (Mich. 1999) (applying recklessness standard to ice skating collision); Dotzler v. Tuttle, 449 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 1990) (applying recklessness to pick-up basketball game); Connell v. Payne, 814 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. App. 1991) (applying recklessness standard to injury in polo match); see also Daniel E. Lazaroff, Torts & Sports: Participant Liability to Co-Participants for Injuries Sustained During Competition, 7 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev. 191, 195, 198 (1990) (finding that recklessness standard of care is the modern trend ). Since Crawn, the recklessness standard of care has been applied in New Jersey to sporting environments that span team competitions, one-on-one competitions, and individualized sporting endeavors. See, e.g., Obert v. Baratta, 321 N.J. Super. 356 (App. Div. 1999) (applying recklessness standard when softball player sued teammate for injuries sustained as result of teammate's pursuit of fly ball during informal intra-office game); Rosania v. Carmona, 308 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div.) (applying reckless standard where karate student brought action against martial arts academy and instructor, seeking damages for retinal detachment suffered during karate proficiency test match with instructor), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 609 (1998); Calhanas v. South Amboy Roller Rink, 292 N.J. Super. 513 (App. Div. 1996) (applying recklessness standard where roller skater suffered broken leg from collision with another skater). In this matter, the trial court concluded that the heightened standard of recklessness or intentional conduct should apply also to participants in the game of golf. Several other jurisdictions have applied the heightened standard of care in the context of the game of golf. The Ohio Supreme Court was the first court to so extend the reckless disregard or intentional conduct standard to a noncontact sport. Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1990). In Thompson, the defendant inadvertently shanked a golf ball in the direction of the plaintiff, who was playing in her foursome. Id. at 709. Despite the defendant's alleged effort to yell fore, the plaintiff was struck by the ball and was injured. The court held that the danger of such an occurrence was an inherent part of the game and granted summary judgment for defendant. Ibid. In analyzing the facts under a reckless or intentional conduct standard of care, the court noted that the plaintiff was off to the defendant's right at such a sharp angle that she was not within the intended flight of defendant's ball. Ibid. Also, the defendant's shot was taken in accordance with the rules of golf; it was not a prohibited shot exposing the plaintiff to more danger than that which any golfer faces when participating in a round of golf. Ibid. The court stated: Shanking the ball is a foreseeable and not uncommon occurrence in the game of golf. The same is true of hooking, slicing, pushing, or pulling a golf shot. We would stress that [i]t is well known that not every shot played by a golfer goes to the point where he intends it to go. If such were the case, every player would be perfect and the whole pleasure of the sport would be lost. It is common knowledge, at least among players, that many bad shots must result although every stroke is delivered with the best possible intention and without any negligence whatsoever. [Ibid. (quoting Benjamin v. Nernberg, 102 Pa. Super. 471, 475-76 (1931)).] Recklessness, unlike negligence, requires a conscious choice of a course of action, with knowledge or a reason to know that it will create serious danger to others. Negligence may consist of an intentional act done with knowledge that it creates a risk of danger to others, but recklessness requires a substantially higher risk. The quantum of risk is the important factor. Ibid. Application of that standard to this matter requires an analysis of whether a finding of recklessness would be open to the jury. If so, summary judgment rightfully was denied defendant and the matter should proceed to trial. As was the case in Allen, we find that this case presents a question of recklessness that is properly for a jury to determine. The facts are in conflict, but they are open to an interpretation that defendant did hit a second shot off the tee without telling the others in his playing group that he was about to do so. That version of the facts explains the so-called mulligan reference by the Appellate Division. Defendant's conduct in that respect is certainly relevant, but of itself is not determinative of the quality of his act. Although the formal rules of golf do not recognize the term mulligan, informal custom may permit that familiar do-over. And the formal rules of the game allow for the taking of a second, or provisional shot, if certain conditions are met. United States Golf Ass'n, The Rules of Golf Rule 27.2. Provisional Ball, at 73-74 (2000- 01). The rules prescribe a strict form of notice to one's playing partners of intent to take a provisional shot. Id. at 73. Decisions on the Rules of Golf prescribe that the player must inform his opponent or fellow player that he intends to play a provisional ball and he must mention the words provisional ball. United States Golf Ass'n, Decisions on the Rules of Golf 27-2a/1, at 458 (2000-01). The following statements have been ruled not to satisfy the requirement of announcing a provisional ball: That might be lost, I am going to re-load. I'd better hit another one. That might be out of here. Id. at 459. As a practical matter, technical compliance with the rules at times may be lax on the course, but that should not compel a determination of recklessness. It is but one factor in the totality of circumstances to be examined in the context of a defendant's motion for summary judgment under a recklessness standard of care in a recreational sports context. What does bear emphasis in this matter is defendant's own testimony that he perceived plaintiff to be in the line of fire and that he waved plaintiff off in an effort to induce plaintiff to move from his location. Plaintiff did not move, or defendant did not wait for him to move, and defendant hit anyway. That scenario presents a set of facts that a jury could find constitutes reckless conduct because it may reflect a conscious choice of a course of action with knowledge or reason to know that the action will create serious danger to others. The dissent emphasizes the need for stringent application of the recklessness standard of care in a golf setting, or in the context of other recreational sports, in order to isolate truly egregious conduct on the part of fellow sports participants (slip op. at 14). On that we do not disagree. But, in this instance the dissent narrowly focuses only on the nature of defendant's shot when applying that standard. That approach does not appreciate the totality of defendant's conduct leading up to the striking of that errant shot. This case is not one reconciled on a motion for summary judgment under a recklessness standard of care on the simple basis of an unannounced mulligan or on the sole basis that defendant hit a shanked shot. Rather, a jury must assess a combination of alleged events in which defendant, believing plaintiff to be located in his line of fire thirty feet ahead of the tee-box where defendant stood and to the left at an angle of forty-five degrees, motioned plaintiff to move away from his present location, and knowing that plaintiff had not moved, proceeded to hit the tee shot anyway. True, it was an errant tee shot, but that does not excuse defendant's conduct because it does not fully address the question of whether the totality of defendant's action passes muster under a recklessness standard of care. We conclude that plaintiff's case, even analyzed under a recklessness standard of care, survives defendant's motion for summary judgment and should proceed to trial. The facts here more persuasively present a jury question concerning recklessness than did the facts in Allen, supra, 875 S.W.2d 438. There, the defendant had not testified in deposition that he perceived the plaintiff to be in his line of fire and that he had motioned to or warned the plaintiff to move away from that danger. In conclusion, we hold that the recklessness or intentional conduct standard of care applies generally to conduct in recreational sporting contexts, including golf. Notwithstanding that holding, this matter must proceed to trial. Properly instructed on the heightened standard of care, a jury must resolve the disputed facts that encompass allegations of reckless conduct by defendant. JEFFREY SCHICK, Plaintiff-Respondent, V. JOHN FEROLITO, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________ VERNIERO, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part. I concur in that part of the Court's opinion adopting the recklessness standard in recreational sporting contexts, including golf. The Court's analysis in that regard is persuasive. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority's determination that there are disputed material facts warranting a trial in this case. Only the most egregious acts of golfers should give rise to liability in this setting. Because that standard has not been satisfied here, I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstate the trial court's summary disposition in favor of defendant. The above cases, all decided on motions for summary judgment, illustrate the stringent manner in which the recklessness standard should be applied in recreational sport cases, especially golf. In one of those cases, Thompson v. McNeill, the parties disputed whether the defendant warned the plaintiff that she (the defendant) was about to take a second shot. In another case, Gray v. Giroux, the shot that caused injury was taken without warning to the plaintiff. In each instance, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. When a golfer steps onto the golf course, he or she knows that other golfers are likely to slice, hook, or shank shots. The likelihood of such wayward shots is an inherent part of the game. Courts from other jurisdictions have recognized that reality, correctly choosing not to expose golfers to liability for their erroneous or incompetent swings under factual situations similar to the present case. By that acknowledgment, plaintiff buttresses the inescapable conclusion to be drawn from this record, namely, that plaintiff stood outside the intended line of flight of defendant's shot. That being the case, the fact that defendant may have taken an unannounced mulligan is not material or relevant to the Court's disposition. Defendant's line of fire reference was explained by defendant to mean, [e]verybody's in the line of fire when you hit a golf ball. You play golf. Viewed in that context, defendant's reference does no more than support the notion that the risk of injury is a foreseeable, albeit unfortunate, aspect of all sporting games. Together, the parties' respective comments render the mulligan issue immaterial in my view. In the same vein, we need not decide whether a mulligan is a recognized part of golf. If required to reach that question, however, I would conclude that because golfers widely understand what is meant by a mulligan, this Court may take judicial notice of that term. See Wright v. Spinks, 722 N.E.2d 1278, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (taking judicial notice of meaning of mulligan). In so doing, I would find as a matter of law that the practice of taking a second shot off the tee is a foreseeable aspect of the game. See Mel Narol, Sports Torts: Standard on the Line, New Jersey Lawyer: The Weekly Newspaper, Nov. 20, 2000 at 7 ( With respect to whether hitting a mulligan is 'part of the game' of golf, the mere fact it is a long-time common occurrence in recreational golf, and even has a proper name attached to the shot, might be viewed as strong evidence that golfers recognize this as part of the game. ). It bears repeating that in Thompson v. McNeill, supra, 559 N.E.2d at 706, the parties disputed whether the defendant, after shanking her shot, warned or announced to the plaintiff that she (the defendant) was about to take an additional shot. Notwithstanding that dispute, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the trial court's summary disposition in favor of the defendant. The high court concluded that [the defendant's additional swing] was not a prohibited or reckless shot. [The defendant] did not recklessly expose [the plaintiff] to more danger than any golfer faces in participating in a game of golf. Id. at 709. Interestingly, the Ohio Supreme Court also observed that the defendant would not be liable for the plaintiff's injury even under a negligence standard because the plaintiff's position relative to [the defendant] placed [the plaintiff] outside the zone of danger. Id. at 709 n.2. Although that observation was not necessary for the court's holding, it indicates the extent of the willingness of some jurisdictions to shield amateur athletes from costly and onerous litigation. As noted, the parties in this case do not dispute that plaintiff was located at a forty-five degree angle from the tee at the time of defendant's swing. Generally, golfers intend to hit straight shots off the tee, not shots that hook or slice the ball either to the left or right. John Allan May, The Complete Book of Golf 54-55 (Gallery Books 1991). Someone in plaintiff's position, located at an acute angle from the tee on a straight-away hole, is not in the intended path of a fellow golfer's tee shot. Plaintiff conceded as much when he stated at his deposition that he did not believe that defendant intended to hit him with the ball. Thus, I do not share the majority's conclusion that the dispute concerning whether defendant warned or waved to plaintiff is material for purposes of summary judgment. A golfer is not required to warn other golfers of an impending shot if those other golfers are not within the shot's intended line of flight. See Carrigan v. Roussell, 177 N.J. Super. 272, 278-79 (App. Div. 1981). (Although Carrigan was decided on the basis of the now- inapplicable negligence standard, the court's statement that a golfer is not required to warn other golfers positioned outside the ambit of danger remains instructive.) Because I find that plaintiff was not in the intended path of defendant's shot, I would conclude that defendant owed no special duty to plaintiff. In sum, the judiciary should refrain from interposing any set of rules that would discourage the spirited pursuit of sporting games, unless those rules are clearly necessary to protect the public interest. Unfortunately, injuries do occur on the playing field, even in a non-contact sport like golf. On balance, the public is best served by having players assume the risks of those injuries absent egregious conduct on the part of their fellow participants. By my reading of the record, defendant's only offense is that he hit an errant ball. He intended no injury to plaintiff. Accordingly, the public is not harmed by sustaining the grant of summary judgment in favor of the amateur athlete in this case. Here, the Court's disposition exposes this and similarly- situated defendants to the possibility of punitive damages. That possibility reinforces my view that the unintended consequence of the majority's holding is that it may foster more sports-related lawsuits and potentially punish well-intended athletes engaged in a variety of sports. Although it erred in applying the negligence standard, the Appellate Division below correctly concluded that [u]nder plaintiff's version of the facts, defendant's conduct cannot be considered 'wantonly reckless' so punitive damages are not awardable. I would rely on that conclusion as additional support to dismiss plaintiff's complaint as a matter of law. NO. A-108 JEFFREY SCHICK, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOHN FEROLITO, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED March 12, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz