Title: Ex parte State of Alabama. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Thomas Robert Lane v. State of Alabama)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 05/27/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
____________________
1091045
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Thomas Robert Lane
v.
State of Alabama)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CC-05-1499;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-05-1443)
STUART, Justice.
This Court granted the State's petition for a writ of
certiorari to address whether an indigent defendant, who has
1091045
This Court also granted the writ to address whether the
1
decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Lane v. State,
[Ms. CR-05-1443, February 5, 2010] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2010)
conflicts with United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140,
152 (2006)(recognizing that "the right to counsel of choice
does not extend to defendants who require counsel to be
appointed for them"), and Ex parte Moody, 684 So. 2d 114, 121-
22 (Ala. 1996)(holding that "an indigent defendant is not
entitled to legal counsel of his choice, when counsel is to be
paid by public funds, but rather is entitled to competent
legal representation").  Our resolution of the question of
first impression resolves this case; therefore, we pretermit
discussion of the ground of conflict.
2
no right to choose initially a particular court-appointed
attorney, has a right to continued representation by a
particular court-appointed counsel.   The Court of Criminal
1
Appeals held that an indigent defendant has such a right.  We
reverse and remand.
In June 2003, Theresa Lane retained an attorney to
initiate divorce proceedings from Thomas Robert Lane ("Lane").
On October 6, 2003, Lane retained Buzz Jordan to represent him
in the divorce proceedings and paid him $500.  On October 13,
2003, the day after Theresa was murdered, Lane, at Jordan's
request, delivered his computer tower to Jordan's office and
paid Jordan an additional $1,000.  Lane was arrested for
Theresa's murder on October 13, 2004, and on October 14, 2004,
Lane was arraigned on a charge of noncapital murder; on
1091045
In the motion, the State argued that Jordan was a
2
necessary witness who would establish the following:  (1) the
chain of custody of Lane's computer; (2) the fact that Lane
had paid Jordan $1,000 in cash the day after Theresa's murder;
and (3) the fact that documents relating to Lane's divorce
proceedings found in Lane's house had not been filed by Jordan
in his capacity as Lane's divorce attorney and, thus, had been
falsified. 
The record indicates that although Jordan was removed as
3
counsel, Dailey's representation of Lane was continuous
3
October 7, 2005, Lane was arraigned on three counts of capital
murder. See §§ 13A-5-40(a)(2), 13A-5-40(a)(4), and 13A-5-
40(a)(7), Ala. Code 1975.  At some point after Lane's arrest,
the trial court determined that Lane was indigent and
appointed Jordan as lead counsel to represent him in the
criminal proceeding.  It further appears from the record that
the trial court also appointed James J. Dailey to represent
Lane. Approximately 19 months after Lane had initially
retained Jordan, the State moved to disqualify Jordan from
representing Lane in the criminal proceeding on the ground
that he was a necessary witness in the criminal proceeding.2
On September 25, 2005, after conducting a hearing on the
State's motion to disqualify, the trial court granted the
State's motion and ordered Jordan removed as Lane's trial
counsel.   On September 30, 2005, the trial court appointed
3
1091045
throughout the criminal proceeding.  
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court vacated the
4
murder conviction. 
4
Deborah McGowin to replace Jordan as lead counsel at Lane's
trial.  Jury selection for Lane's trial commenced on January
30, 2006.  Lane was convicted of two counts of capital murder
and the lesser-included offense of murder.   The trial court
4
sentenced Lane to death.  
Lane appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing,
among other issues, that the trial court erred in removing
Jordan as his trial counsel.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
agreed and, finding the error to be structural, reversed
Lane's convictions and sentence.  Lane v. State, [Ms. CR-05-
1443, February 5, 2010] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).
Specifically, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that an
indigent defendant who has developed an attorney-client
relationship with appointed counsel has a right to continued
representation by that counsel and that a trial court's
erroneous removal of appointed counsel denied an indigent
defendant his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  The court
further held that such an error was structural, precluding a
1091045
5
harmless-error analysis and requiring reversal of Lane's
convictions without a showing of prejudice. 
  
The State petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari,
alleging, among other grounds, a material question of first
impression: Does the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provide an indigent defendant who has developed
an attorney-client relationship with appointed counsel a
constitutional right to continued representation by the same
appointed counsel?
Initially, we note that Lane contends that the State does
not present this Court with a question of first impression and
in support cites Ex parte Tegner, 682 So. 2d 396 (Ala. 1996).
In Ex parte Tegner, a defendant charged with murder petitioned
this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Morgan Circuit
Court to revoke its order granting the State's motion to
remove his appointed counsel and prevent counsel from
representing him at trial.  This Court granted the petition
and issued the writ because the trial court, when it
considered the State's motion, did not evaluate the evidence
regarding the question of disqualification and did not weigh
the constitutional rights at issue.  This Court did not
1091045
6
address the constitutional issue whether an indigent defendant
has a Sixth Amendment right to continued representation by the
same appointed counsel.  Indeed, this Court specifically noted
that the trial court had not considered any constitutional
issues before removing Tegner's counsel.  Therefore, we reject
Lane's argument that this Court has previously addressed the
question presented in this case. 
The State's question -- Does an indigent defendant, who
does not have a right to counsel of choice but who has
developed 
an 
attorney-client 
relationship 
with 
court-appointed
counsel, 
have 
a 
Sixth 
Amendment 
right 
to 
continued
representation by the same court-appointed counsel? -- is
indeed a question of first impression.  
It is well established that an indigent defendant, who
requires that counsel be appointed for him or her, does not
have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel of the defendant's own
choice.  In Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988),
the United States Supreme Court discussed a defendant's right
to counsel of his or her own choice, stating:
"The 
Sixth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
Constitution
guarantees that '[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.'  In United
1091045
7
States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981), we
observed that this right was designed to assure
fairness 
in 
the 
adversary 
criminal 
process.
Realizing that an unaided layman may have little
skill in arguing the law or in coping with an
intricate procedural system, Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 69 (1932); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300, 307 (1973), we have held that the Sixth
Amendment secures the right to the assistance of
counsel, by appointment if necessary, in a trial for
any serious crime.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).  We have further recognized that the
purpose of providing assistance of counsel 'is
simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a
fair trial,' Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
689 (1984), and that in evaluating Sixth Amendment
claims, 'the appropriate inquiry focuses on the
adversarial 
process, 
not 
on 
the 
accused's
relationship with his lawyer as such.'  United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657, n. 21 (1984).
Thus, while the right to select and be represented
by one's preferred attorney is comprehended by the
Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment
is to guarantee an effective advocate for each
criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a
defendant will inexorably be represented by the
lawyer whom he prefers.  See Morris v. Slappy, 461
U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745
(1983).
"The Sixth Amendment right to choose one's own
counsel 
is 
circumscribed in several important
respects.  Regardless of his persuasive powers, an
advocate who is not a member of the bar may not
represent clients (other than himself) in court.
Similarly, 
a 
defendant 
may 
not 
insist 
on
representation by an attorney he cannot afford or
who for other reasons declines to represent the
defendant.  Nor may a defendant insist on the
counsel of an attorney who has a previous or ongoing
relationship with an opposing party, even when the
opposing party is the Government."
1091045
8
486 U.S. at 158-59 (footnote omitted).  See also Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624
(1989)("The [Sixth] Amendment [right to counsel] guarantees
[impecunious] defendants in criminal cases the right to
adequate representation, but those who do not have the means
to hire their own lawyers have no cognizable complaint so long
as they are adequately represented by attorneys appointed by
the courts.").
Likewise, in Alabama, "an indigent defendant is not
entitled to legal counsel of his choice, when counsel is to be
paid by public funds, but rather is entitled to competent
legal representation."  Ex parte Moody, 684 So. 2d 114, 121-22
(Ala. 1996).  See also Steeley v. State, 622 So. 2d 421, 425
(Ala. Crim. App. 1992)(stating that the right to counsel of
one's choice is not absolute, as is the right to assistance of
counsel); and Briggs v. State, 549 So. 2d 155 (Ala. Crim. App.
1989)(stating that an indigent defendant has no absolute right
to be represented by any particular counsel or by counsel of
his choice).
The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant
who retains counsel has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel of
1091045
9
his or her choice, and, when a trial court unjustly violates
that right, the error is structural -- not subject to a
harmless-error analysis.  In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006), the United State Supreme Court
addressed a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
retained counsel of his choice.  Specifically, the Court
considered whether a trial court's erroneous removal of
retained counsel, which resulted in the defendant's right to
counsel of his choice being violated, required that the
defendant's conviction be reversed.  In that case, Gonzalez-
Lopez had retained out-of-state counsel; the trial court,
however, refused to grant counsel's application for admission
pro hac vice, causing Gonzalez-Lopez to be represented by
different counsel at trial.  On appeal Gonzalez-Lopez argued
that the trial court, by refusing to admit his chosen counsel
pro hac vice, had denied him his right to paid counsel of his
choosing. The Government conceded that the trial court erred
when it denied Gonzalez-Lopez his counsel of choice.  The
United States Supreme Court, recognizing that a defendant who
retains counsel has a right to counsel of the defendant's own
choosing and accepting the Government's concession of error,
1091045
10
held that the trial court had erroneously denied Gonzalez-
Lopez his right to counsel of choice, that the error was
structural, and that reversal of Gonzalez-Lopez's conviction
was required.  The United States Supreme Court, however,
specifically stated:
"Nothing we have said today casts any doubt or
places any qualification upon our previous holdings
that limit the right to counsel of choice .... [T]he
right to counsel of choice does not extend to
defendants who require counsel to be appointed for
them. See Wheat [v. United States], 486 U.S. [153],
at 159 [(1988)]; Caplin & Drysdale[, Chartered v.
United States], 491 U.S. [617], at 624, 626
[(1989)]. 
Nor 
may 
a 
defendant 
insist 
on
representation by a person who is not a member of
the bar, or demand that a court honor his waiver of
conflict-free representation.  See Wheat, 486 U.S.,
at 159-160. ...  We have recognized a trial court's
wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of
choice against the needs of fairness, id., at
163-164, and against the demands of its calendar,
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983).  The
court has, moreover, an 'independent interest in
ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within
the ethical standards of the profession and that
legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe
them.'  Wheat, supra, at 160."
548 U.S. at 151-52.
The question before us, however, is distinguishable from
the question before the Court in Gonzalez-Lopez.  Gonzalez-
Lopez had a right to retain counsel of his choosing, and the
Government conceded that Gonzalez-Lopez's right to counsel of
1091045
11
choice had been violated; therefore, as the United States
Supreme Court concluded, the "erroneous deprivation of the
right to counsel of choice, 'with consequences that are
necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably
qualifies as "structural error."' [Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508
U.S. 275,] 282 [(1993)]." 548 U.S. at 150.  Because Gonzalez-
Lopez addressed the erroneous removal of retained counsel from
a defendant who had a right to counsel of choice and the
question presented to us addresses the erroneous removal of
counsel appointed by the court to represent an indigent
defendant who has no right to counsel of choice, the decision
in Gonzalez-Lopez provides little guidance. 
Two federal courts of appeals have addressed whether an
indigent defendant, who does not have a right to counsel of
choice but who has developed an attorney-client relationship
with appointed counsel, has a Sixth Amendment right to
continued representation by that same appointed counsel.  The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Daniels v. Lafler, 501 F.3d 735, 740 (6th Cir. 2007), in
analyzing whether the trial court violated an indigent
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice when it
1091045
12
removed appointed counsel, observed that in Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932), and in Gonzalez-Lopez, the United
States Supreme Court recognized the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel of choice only in relation to criminal defendants who
had retained counsel.  Specifically, the Daniels court noted
that the Court in Powell stated that "a criminal defendant who
hires, and pays for, an attorney has the right to select that
attorney," and in Gonzalez-Lopez held that "a defendant could
obtain a new trial without showing prejudice when the trial
court arbitrarily denied him the services of his retained
counsel –- in that case, by erroneously refusing to grant the
chosen attorney admission pro hac vice."  501 F.3d at 739.
The Daniels court concluded that "neither Powell nor Gonzalez-
Lopez suggests that the choice-of-counsel right at issue is
universal to all defendants,"  501 F.3d at 739, and  supported
its conclusion by noting that "[t]he Gonzalez-Lopez Court
explicitly stated that the basis for its decision was 'the
right of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to
choose who will represent him,' indicating that the erroneous
or arbitrary exclusion of court-appointed counsel might not
1091045
13
trigger the same constitutional scrutiny."  501 F.3d at 739.
Therefore, the Daniels court held: 
"[A] defendant relying on court-appointed counsel
has no constitutional right to the counsel of his
choice.  This does not mean that an indigent
defendant never could establish that the arbitrary
replacement of court-appointed counsel violated his
constitutional 
rights. 
 
The 
replacement 
of
court-appointed counsel might violate a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to adequate representation or
his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process if the
replacement prejudices the defendant -- e.g., if a
court replaced a defendant's lawyer hours before
trial or arbitrarily removed a skilled lawyer and
replaced him with an unskilled one.  But because
Daniels does not even allege prejudice here, we must
affirm the denial of his Sixth Amendment claim."
501 F.3d at 740.
In United States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302 (4th Cir. 2009),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
addressed whether the trial court exceeded the scope of its
discretion when it disqualified Basham's appointed counsel
based on a conflict of interest.  The Basham court held that
"the 
only 
right 
implicated 
by 
the 
district 
court's
disqualification of [the court-appointed attorney] was the
right to effective assistance of counsel."  561 F.3d at 324.
In reaching this conclusion the Basham court also relied upon
its holding in Miller v. Smith, 115 F.3d 1136, 1143 (4th Cir.
1091045
14
1997), 
that 
"'an 
indigent 
criminal 
defendant 
has 
no
constitutional right to have a particular lawyer represent
him.'"  561 F.3d at 324.  See also United States v. Van Anh,
523 F.3d 43, 48 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that indigent
defendants have no right to counsel of their own choosing).
Recognizing that an indigent defendant does not have the right
to counsel of his or her choosing, the Basham court agreed
with the Daniels court that the erroneous removal of appointed
counsel and replacement by alternate counsel may violate an
indigent defendant's right to adequate representation -- i.e.,
effective assistance of counsel -- and held that the proper
inquiry included consideration of whether the defendant
suffered prejudice by the removal of appointed counsel.  561
F.3d at 321-25.
Similarly, in State v. Reeves, 11 So. 3d 1031 (La. 2009),
the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that a criminal defendant
for whom counsel has been appointed has only the right to
effective representation.  11 So. 3d at 1056.  In Reeves, a
retrial had been ordered in an indigent defendant's case.  The
trial court refused to appoint the same counsel who had
represented the indigent defendant at the earlier trial to
1091045
15
represent him on retrial.  The indigent defendant was
represented by different counsel at the retrial and was
convicted.  On appeal, the indigent defendant argued that the
trial court's refusal to allow continued representation by
appointed counsel who had represented him at his earlier trial
denied his right to counsel of his choice and that that denial
constituted a structural error.  Recognizing that the indigent
defendant 
was 
represented 
by 
appointed 
counsel 
and,
consequently, that the defendant did not have a right to
counsel of choice, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the
trial court's actions, in refusing to appoint counsel who had
represented the defendant at his earlier trial and in
appointing alternate counsel to represent the defendant in his
retrial, did not result in structural error. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court also considered whether the
defendant had a right to counsel of his own choice, which
would have been violated because the trial court refused to
permit his existing close relationship with his initial
counsel to continue.  The Louisiana Supreme Court held that no
constitutional violation had occurred, stating: 
"The Supreme Court has rejected any claim that
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
guarantees 
a 
'meaningful
1091045
16
attorney-client relationship' between an accused and
his counsel. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14,
103 S.Ct. 1610, 1617, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983). The
fact situation in Morris concerned an indigent
defendant who was appointed an attorney from the
public 
defender's 
office. 
Appointed 
counsel
represented the defendant at preliminary hearings
and supervised an extensive investigation into the
case. However, shortly prior to trial, appointed
counsel was hospitalized for emergency surgery and
the public defender assigned a senior trial attorney
in that office to take over the defendant's
representation. The defendant objected at trial to
his newly-appointed counsel, arguing that substitute
counsel could not be as prepared as his original
counsel, and refusing to aid substitute counsel in
his defense. The defendant was convicted and
subsequently sought federal habeas relief. Although
the pro se federal habeas petition couched the
alleged errors in other terms, the federal appellate
court granted habeas relief, finding the Sixth
Amendment guarantees a right to counsel with whom
the 
accused 
has 
a 'meaningful attorney-client
relationship.' Further, the federal appellate court
found that the trial court abused its discretion and
violated this right by denying a motion for
continuance based on the substitution of appointed
counsel shortly before trial. In reversing the
federal appeals court ruling, the Supreme Court
stated:
"'The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel 'would be
without substance if it did not include the
right to a meaningful attorney-client
relationship, [citation omitted] (emphasis
added), is without basis in the law. No
authority 
was 
cited 
for 
this 
novel
ingredient of the Sixth Amendment guarantee
of counsel, and of course none could be.'
1091045
17
"Similarly, we have found nothing in our state
constitution, 
or 
in 
our 
review 
of 
state
jurisprudence, which shows that a criminal defendant
has 
a 
right 
to 
a 
particular 
attorney-client
relationship separate from the right to counsel of
choice. In [State v.] Scott, [921 So. 2d 904 (La.
2006), overruled in part on other grounds, State v.
Dunn, 974 So. 2d 658 (2008)], the defendant argued,
as here, that the removal of his appointed counsel
approximately 
one 
month 
prior 
to 
trial
unconstitutionally 
interfered 
with 
the
attorney-client relationship and violated his right
to counsel of choice.  In Scott, a conflict
developed between Scott's lead appointed counsel and
second-chair appointed counsel. The district court
granted lead counsel's motion and appointed new
second-chair counsel over the defendant's objection.
After reviewing the consistent jurisprudence holding
that an indigent defendant does not have the right
to choose his appointed counsel, and that lead
a p p o i n t e d  
c o u n s e l  
h a d  
p r o v i d e d
constitutionally-effective 
assistance 
to 
Scott, 
this
court 
found 
'no 
interference 
with 
the
attorney-client relationship and no violation of
defendant's right to counsel of choice.'  Here, we
similarly find that Reeves did not have a right to
choose his appointed counsel. Moreover, there is
nothing in our state constitution which supports the
defense's argument that a criminal defendant has a
right to a particular attorney-client relationship.
"Consequently, there is nothing in either the
federal or state constitutions which would provide
Reeves with the right to maintain a particular
attorney-client relationship in the absence of a
right to counsel of choice."
11 So. 3d at 1065-66 (footnotes omitted).
We agree with the holdings and analyses in Basham,
Daniels, and Reeves.  An indigent defendant has a Sixth
1091045
18
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel but does
not have a Sixth Amendment right to court-appointed counsel of
choice.  Because an indigent defendant does not have a right
to counsel of choice or a right to a "meaningful attorney-
client relationship" with particular counsel, we cannot
conclude that the erroneous removal of court-appointed counsel
constitutes a structural error. An indigent defendant may be
able to show that the removal of court-appointed counsel with
whom 
the 
defendant 
had 
developed 
an 
attorney-client
relationship has caused prejudice, resulting in the reversal
of his or her conviction, but the mere removal of the court-
appointed attorney, even if erroneous, is not structural
error, i.e., it does not "affect[] the framework within which
the trial proceeds."  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309
(1991).  See Perkins v. State, 808 So. 2d 1041, 1060-1062
(Ala. Crim. App. 1999).  Consideration of whether the indigent
defendant suffered prejudice by the erroneous removal of
court-appointed counsel is the proper inquiry.
  
In this case, the trial court determined that Lane was
indigent and appointed counsel to represent him.  Lane had no
constitutionally protected right to counsel of his choice or
1091045
19
to continued representation by a particular court-appointed
counsel.  Wheat, supra; Ex parte Moody, supra.  Therefore, the
trial court's erroneous removal of Lane's court-appointed
counsel was not structural error, and the Court of Criminal
Appeals erred in failing to determine whether the trial court
committed plain error when it removed Lane's court-appointed
counsel.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Criminal
Appeals for that court to determine whether the trial court
committed plain error when it removed Jordan as Lane's lead
counsel.  If the Court of Criminal Appeals determines that the
trial court did not commit plain error in this regard, then
the court shall complete its review of the case as required by
Rule 45A, Ala. R. App. P.  
Conclusion
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is
reversed, and this case is remanded for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Bolin and Parker, JJ., concur.
1091045
20
Houston, Special Justice,* concurs in the result.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall and Murdock, JJ., dissent.
Shaw, Main, and Wise, JJ., recuse themselves.**
*Retired Associate Justice Gorman Houston was appointed
on May 16, 2011, to serve as a Special Justice in regard to
this petition.
**Justice Shaw, Justice Main, and Justice Wise were
members of the Court of Criminal Appeals when that court
considered this case.  Note from the reporter of decisions:
Section 12-2-14, Ala. Code 1975, provides that "[w]hen by
reason of disqualification the number of judges competent to
sit in a case is reduced to ... six and there is equal
division among them" a member of the bar shall be appointed to
sit as a judge in the determination of the case.  Rule
16.6(b), Ala. R. App. P., provides that "when, by reason of
disqualification the number of justices competent to sit in
the determination of a case is reduced ... a majority of the
justices sitting shall suffice; but, in no event, may a cause
be determined unless at least four justices sitting shall
concur therein.
1091045
21
HOUSTON, Special Justice (concurring in the result).
I do not believe that the trial court erred in granting
the State's motion to dismiss Thomas Robert Lane's appointed
counsel on the basis of the existence of a conflict of
interest. Because I believe no error occurred, I do not reach
the issue decided by the Court of Criminal Appeals -- whether
the error was structural.  I agree, however, with the main
opinion that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in reversing
Lane's conviction on the basis that the trial court had
committed structural error in removing Lane's appointed
counsel.  Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the
main opinion to reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals. 
However, were I to reach the structural-error issue, I
would conclude that, although an indigent defendant is not
entitled to choose a particular court-appointed attorney at
the outset of the case, once counsel has been appointed an
attorney-client relationship is established that is no less
inviolable than if defendant himself had retained counsel.
1091045
22
Thus, I also agree with the rationale in Justice Woodall's
dissent. 
1091045
23
WOODALL, Justice (dissenting).
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that "there is no
difference between retained counsel and appointed counsel when
it comes to the right to continued representation by counsel
of choice."  Lane v. State, [Ms. CR-05-1443, February 5, 2010]
___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (emphasis added).
This Court, on the other hand, has concluded that, although
the 
erroneous 
removal 
of retained counsel constitutes
structural error, the erroneous removal of court-appointed
counsel does not but, instead, requires a showing that the
removal of court-appointed counsel prejudiced the defendant.
I cannot agree with such disparate treatment based solely on
whether the defendant can afford to retain his or her own
attorney. "To allow trial courts to remove an indigent
defendant's court-appointed counsel with greater ease than a
non-indigent 
defendant's 
retained 
counsel 
[stratifies]
attorney-client relationships based on defendants' economic
backgrounds."  Weaver v. State, 894 So. 2d 178, 189 (Fla.
2004).  Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
According to Thomas Robert Lane, "[m]ost jurisdictions
that have addressed this issue acknowledge that an indigent
1091045
24
defendant is not entitled to choose a particular court-
appointed attorney at the outset of the case, but reason that
once counsel is appointed, an attorney-client relationship is
established and '"is no less inviolable than if counsel had
been retained by the defendant himself."' McKinnon v. State,
526 P.2d 18, 24 (Alaska 1974) (quoting Smith v. Super. Ct. of
Los Angeles County, 440 P.2d 65, 74 (1968) (en banc))."
Lane's brief, at 17.  Lane appears to be correct. See, e.g.,
People v. Shari, 204 P.3d 453, 460 (Colo. 2009) ("While a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not
guarantee the right to select his appointed counsel, 'once
counsel is appointed, the attorney-client relationship is no
less inviolable than if the counsel had been retained by the
defendant.'"); Weaver, 894 So. 2d at 188-89 ("[T]he attorney-
client relationship is independent of the source of the
compensation because an attorney's responsibility is to the
person he represents rather than the individual or entity
paying for his services."); State v. Huskey, 82 S.W.3d 297,
305 (Tenn. 2002) ("We are persuaded ... that any meaningful
distinction between indigent and non-indigent defendants'
right to representation by counsel ends once a valid
1091045
25
appointment of counsel has been made."); Clements v. State,
306 Ark. 596, 608, 817 S.W.2d 194, 200 (1991) ("[W]here ... a
trial court terminates the representation of an attorney,
either private or appointed, over the defendant's objection
and under circumstances which do not justify the lawyer's
removal and which are not necessary for the efficient
administration of justice, a violation of the accused's right
to particular counsel occurs."); Stearnes v. Clinton, 780
S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) ("[A] defendant has the
right to retain counsel of his choice and establish an
attorney-client relationship.  It logically follows ... that
once an attorney is appointed the same attorney-client
relationship is established and it should be protected.");
People v. Davis, 114 Ill. App. 3d 537, 543, 449 N.E.2d 237,
241 (1983) ("We ... believe that for purposes of removal by
the trial court, a court-appointed attorney may not be treated
any differently than privately retained counsel."); English v.
State, 8 Md. App. 330, 335, 259 A.2d 822, 826 (1969) ("[O]nce
counsel has been chosen, whether by the court or the accused,
the accused is entitled to the assistance of that counsel at
trial."). 
1091045
26
I would adopt the reasoning of these cases. Unlike the
main opinion and the cases upon which it relies, these cases
properly 
focus 
on 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
attorney-client
relationship, a relationship that is independent of the manner
in which the attorney is selected and paid.  
 
Cobb, C.J., and Murdock, J., concur.