Title: Brown v. Virginia State Bar

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
CURTIS TYRONE BROWN 
 
v.  Record No. 050315     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
November 4, 2005 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR 
 
FROM THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD 
 
 
In this appeal of right, Curtis Tyrone Brown challenges 
the jurisdiction and rulings of the Virginia State Bar 
Disciplinary Board (Board) in a proceeding in which the Board 
suspended Brown's license to practice law in this Commonwealth 
for a period of one year.  The dispositive issue is whether 
Brown was entitled to a hearing before a three-judge panel 
when the Virginia State Bar (Bar) stipulated that his demand 
for such a panel was timely.  Because we conclude that the Bar 
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the three-judge panel 
when it stipulated that Brown's demand was timely, we will 
reverse the decision of the Board and remand the case for 
further proceedings before a three-judge panel. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
On September 30, 2003, the First District Subcommittee of 
the Virginia State Bar served Brown with a Subcommittee 
Determination (Certification) alleging multiple violations of 
the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct.  In response, 
Brown mailed to the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary System 
Clerk's Office his demand that proceedings before the Board be 
 
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terminated and that further proceedings be conducted before a 
three-judge panel pursuant to Part Six, § IV, Para. 
13(I)(1)(a)(1)(b) of the Rules of Court (2003).1  The Bar filed 
an objection arguing that the demand was untimely because it 
was not filed with the Clerk within 21 days after Brown 
received the Certification as required by Para. 
13(I)(1)(a)(1).  The Board entered an order on January 9, 2004 
setting a briefing schedule on the Bar's objection and 
scheduling a telephone conference call to consider the matter.  
In its response filed pursuant to that order, the Bar withdrew 
its objection to Brown's demand for a three-judge panel and 
stipulated that the demand was timely. 
Brown responded to the January 9 scheduling order noting 
that, "the Assistant Bar Counsel has withdrawn his objections 
to the demand for a three-judge panel, therefore, there are no 
issues in dispute."  Brown again demanded a three-judge panel 
and asserted that the Board did not have jurisdiction to 
consider the matter.  On January 22, 2004, the Board entered 
an order stating:  "The parties are hereby advised that [the 
Bar's objection] will be considered at said hearing 
                     
1 Part Six, § IV, Para. 13 (I)(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 
was amended in 2004 and 2005.  Because the relevant 
proceedings in this case began in 2003, we apply the rule as 
it existed in 2003.  Further references to subsections of Part 
Six, § IV, Para. 13(I)(1)(a) of the Rules of Court (2003) will 
be cited as "Para. 13(I)(1)(a)" along with the relevant 
subsections. 
 
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notwithstanding Bar Counsel's retraction of the objection to 
Respondent's demand that further proceedings be conducted 
before a three-judge court . . . ." 
The Board considered the matter by telephone conference 
call on August 6, 2004 and ruled that the Bar may not waive 
the 21 day requirement for filing the demand for a three-judge 
panel because that requirement is jurisdictional.  The Board 
entered an order declaring Brown's demand untimely.  Following 
a hearing, the Board found that Brown violated the Virginia 
Rules of Professional Conduct and suspended Brown's license 
for one year.  Brown timely appealed to this Court, and this 
Court stayed suspension of his license pending appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
 
At the time Brown filed his demand for a three-judge 
panel, Para. 13(I)(1)(a)(1) provided in relevant part: 
 
After a Subcommittee or District Committee 
certifies a matter to the Board, and the Respondent 
has been served with the Certification, the 
Respondent shall, within 21 days after service of 
the Certification: 
(a) file an answer that shall be conclusively 
deemed to be a consent to the jurisdiction of the 
Board; or 
(b) file a demand that the proceedings before 
the Board be terminated and that further proceedings 
be conducted pursuant to Va. Code § 54.1-3935, 
whereupon further proceedings before the Board shall 
terminate, and Bar Counsel shall file the Complaint 
required by Va. Code § 54.1-3935. 
 
We have held that the requirements of this Rule, while 
jurisdictional in nature, do not involve subject matter 
 
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jurisdiction.  Fails v. Virginia State Bar, 265 Va. 3, 7, 574 
S.E.2d 530, 532-33 (2003); Smolka v. Second Dist. Comm. of the 
Virginia State Bar, 224 Va. 161, 165-66, 295 S.E.2d 267, 269 
(1982).  Both the Board and a three-judge panel have subject 
matter jurisdiction to consider charges of a district 
disciplinary committee.  The issue in this case is which 
entity acquired jurisdiction over the parties to the 
proceeding. 
 
When considering the appropriate forum for a bar 
disciplinary proceeding, the respondent is analogous to a 
plaintiff who may choose the court in which to file an action.  
Under Para. 13(I)(1)(a)(1)(a), when a respondent files an 
answer to a Certification, the answer is "conclusively deemed 
to be a consent to the jurisdiction of the Board."  Brown 
never filed an answer to the Certification and, therefore, did 
not invoke the jurisdiction of the Board.  Compare Fails, 265 
Va. at 7, 574 S.E.2d at 532-33.  Rather, Brown sought to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the three-judge panel. 
 
The Bar, in a posture analogous to a defendant, may 
object to the election made by the respondent based on defects 
in the service of process.  However, like a defendant who 
objects to defects in the service of process but then enters a 
general appearance, the Bar may waive those objections.  See 
Gilpin v. Joyce, 257 Va. 579, 581, 515 S.E.2d 124, 125 (1999) 
 
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(citing Nixon v. Rowland, 192 Va. 47, 50, 63 S.E.2d 757, 759 
(1951)).  In this proceeding, when the Bar withdrew its 
objection to Brown's demand for a three-judge panel and 
stipulated that the demand was timely filed, the Bar submitted 
itself to the jurisdiction of the three-judge panel.  At that 
point the Board's jurisdiction over Brown and the Bar 
terminated.  Therefore, the Board did not have jurisdiction to 
enter an order suspending Brown's license to practice law. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the Board's order of 
November 24, 2004 and remand the matter with directions to Bar 
Counsel to "file the Complaint required by Va. Code § 54.1-
3935."  Para. 13(I)(1)(a)(1)(b).2 
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
2 Because of this disposition, we need not consider 
Brown's remaining assignments of error.