Title: Idaho v. Ochoa

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 48723 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
      Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
ALEJANDRA MARIA OCHOA, 
 
     Defendant-Respondent. 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) 
 
 
Boise, August 2021 Term 
 
Opinion filed: March 2, 2022 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk  
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Canyon County. D. Duff McKee, Senior District Judge. Jerold W. Lee, Magistrate 
Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is reversed and remanded. 
 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Appellant. Kenneth 
Jorgensen argued. 
 
Canyon County Public Defender, Caldwell, for Respondent. Jill Musser argued. 
 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
MOELLER, Justice. 
 
 
Alejandra Maria Ochoa was convicted of misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter by a 
Canyon County jury. She appealed her conviction to the district court, which vacated the judgment 
of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The district court held that the magistrate 
court erred in excluding certain toxicological evidence, refusing to grant defendant’s request to 
continue the trial, and allowing the State’s pathologist to testify. The State now appeals from the 
district court’s decision. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the decision of the district 
court. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Accident 
On April 26, 2018, Alejandra Maria Ochoa (“Ochoa”) drove her vehicle from a Jacksons 
convenience store parking lot onto Midway Road in Nampa. Surveillance footage from the 
convenience store showed that Ochoa failed to stop at the curb before entering the street. As she 
2 
 
crossed over the northbound lane, Ochoa began turning left onto the southbound lane. In so doing, 
Ochoa cut across the path of a motorcycle traveling in the northbound lane, which skidded and 
went down on its left side as it attempted to avoid Ochoa’s vehicle before she completed her turn. 
The motorcycle struck Ochoa’s vehicle. The operator of the motorcycle, the victim, was conscious 
and alert at the scene immediately following the accident. However, after paramedics transported 
the victim to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise, he continued losing blood and later 
died.  
B. Pretrial Proceedings 
The State charged Ochoa with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter. Ochoa pleaded not 
guilty, and her trial was initially set for March 20, 2019. The State filed a motion to continue the 
trial, and the magistrate court reset the trial for April 3, 2019.  
 
A toxicology report showed the victim had methamphetamine, amphetamines, and 
methadone in his system. The victim also had a small bag of heroin on his person. Before trial, the 
State moved to exclude the toxicology evidence related to the illegal substances found in the 
victim’s blood and the heroin found on his person. The State argued that the toxicology report was 
not relevant to Ochoa’s vehicular manslaughter charge because there was no evidence that the 
substances in the victim’s blood contributed to the collision. Alternatively, the State asserted that 
even if the evidence were admissible, it should not be admitted because the probative value of the 
evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The State also contended 
that the heroin found on the victim’s person after the accident would be highly prejudicial with 
little to no probative value. The magistrate court granted the motion regarding the bag of heroin 
and reserved ruling on the toxicology report until an evidentiary hearing took place.  
 
On March 26, 2019, eight days before trial, Ochoa moved to exclude the testimony of Dr. 
Glen Groben, the forensic pathologist who determined the victim’s cause of death, because she 
claimed Dr. Groben had not been disclosed as an expert witness prior to the discovery deadline. 
Dr. Groben’s medical evaluation was largely based on his analysis of the medical records created 
by the treating physicians at the hospital where the victim had died, and Ochoa objected to the 
State’s failure to disclose the records on which Dr. Groben relied. At a status conference held on 
March 28, 2019, the State argued that it had clarified prior to the deadline that Dr. Groben would 
be an expert witness, and that his coroner’s report, which included the basis of its conclusions, had 
been disclosed months before. However, the parties disputed whether Ochoa’s discovery request 
3 
 
required the State to provide the medical records themselves under Idaho Rules of Evidence 702, 
703, or 705. The magistrate court concluded the State did not need to provide all the data Dr. 
Groben had reviewed, but only the facts and data he had relied on—which were then contained in 
Dr. Groben’s report. The magistrate court denied Ochoa’s request to exclude Dr. Groben as a 
witness. Ochoa requested the trial be continued to give her additional time to prepare. This request 
was granted. Ochoa had not yet waived her speedy trial rights. 
 
On March 28, 2019, Ochoa made a specific request for all medical records Dr. Groben had 
reviewed or relied upon, including the toxicology report. The magistrate court issued a subpoena 
duces tecum for all medical records from St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center pertaining to the 
victim.  
 
The State moved again to continue the trial date because of witness unavailability. The 
motion was granted, and the trial was re-set for May 8, 2019. Ochoa received the medical records 
on April 10, 2019. Ochoa moved for another continuance based on the late receipt of the records, 
but the magistrate denied the request, concluding that Ochoa had known that the victim’s cause of 
death would be an element of the vehicular manslaughter charge and that she could have foreseen 
that the medical records would be relevant.  
 
On April 23, 2018, an evidentiary hearing was held on the State’s motion to exclude the 
toxicology report. Ochoa called David Cavanaugh, a former police officer, “Drug Recognition 
Expert master instructor,” “Collision Reconstruction Expert,” and owner of Northwest Forensic 
Crash Reconstruction. Cavanaugh testified that the presence of methamphetamine “in the system” 
could impair the ability of someone to operate the vehicle safely. Some ways to test impairment 
would be through field sobriety tests or observation of how the operator is driving the vehicle. In 
this case, Cavanaugh would have considered the victim’s speed, the victim steering his motorcycle 
into Ochoa instead of away, the use of only the rear brake to stop the motorcycle, and the bandages 
around his fingers—as evidence of possible methamphetamine use—to determine that the victim 
may have been impaired. He stated that to evaluate a driver for impairment levels it is important 
to observe physical indicators. This is because “there is no per se limit for drugs in Idaho;” in other 
words, unlike alcohol, there is not an established “legal limit” for drugs like methamphetamine. 
Cavanaugh conceded that if he received a toxicology report in a case in which he did not evaluate 
a person for impairment through the physical and physiological indicators, he would be unable to 
4 
 
say that person was impaired solely based on the toxicology report. The substance of his testimony 
was as follows: 
Q [PROSECUTOR]: And why is it important for you to do those 
evaluations when determining impairment level? 
A [CAVANAUGH]: Because, there is no per se limit for drugs in Idaho. 
So -- and I’m not aware of any State that has a per se limit for the parts per million 
or whatever number they use. So what we’re looking for is their ability to perform 
the divided attention tests and the physiological indicators such as pulse, blood 
pressure, pupil reaction to light and so on. So those are how we establish the 
criminal case. 
Q: So if you were to receive a toxicology result, say, in any case where you 
hadn’t evaluated the person for impairment, would you be able to say, just based 
on the toxicology result, that that person was impaired? 
A: No. 
Q: Why is that? 
A: There would have to be other -- other evidence. I would need to have 
something about -- again, it would begin -- it would start to add up the more 
information I had. So driving pattern, what was the probable cause for the stop, or 
the contact, and however the contact came about. What are some of the evidentiary 
things that were collected? Those would all be things that could go toward making 
that final conclusion.”  
. . . 
Q: Okay. And you wouldn’t be able to say with a reasonable degree of 
certainty that they were impaired and, therefore, that was the cause of the particular 
crash? 
A: That’s correct. 
The State next called Dr. Groben, who testified that the results of the toxicology report did 
not impact the manner and cause of the victim’s death. Even considering the substances in his 
system, the victim was going to die due to the extensive nature of his injuries. By the time the 
victim arrived at the hospital, he was already experiencing refractory hypotension—extremely low 
blood pressure due to severe loss of blood—and the attending physicians could not stop the 
bleeding.  
 
Ultimately, the magistrate court excluded testimony regarding the substances in the 
victim’s system. The magistrate court noted that no witness could say with a reasonable degree of 
certainty as to the victim’s level of impairment or whether the victim’s actions were affected by 
the substances to such a degree as to contribute to the accident. Therefore, the magistrate court 
found the probative value of the proffered evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect. The magistrate court summarized its ruling as follows: 
5 
 
In fact, I heard Mr. Cavanaugh say he could not put any reasonable degree of 
certainty without more information, make that type of opinion. So one – or even if 
there is some relevance to it, I’m going to find that the probative value is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value and, therefore, I am going to 
exclude, one, testimony or information regarding the methamphetamine, the 
amphetamines, or any methadone in the system of the deceased as being introduced 
into evidence. 
After the magistrate court’s ruling, Ochoa moved to continue the trial, reasoning that she had not 
had enough time to go through the recently received medical reports. The magistrate court denied 
the motion.  
 
On April 25, 2019, Ochoa moved again to continue the trial, arguing that by not yet 
disclosing the full toxicology report, the State had violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
On the afternoon before trial, Ochoa received the full toxicology report on the victim. It consisted 
of over 400 pages and contained information indicating the victim may have also had alcohol and 
marijuana in his system. On the day of the jury trial, before jury selection commenced, Ochoa 
renewed her motion for a continuance, arguing that she had just received the toxicology report and 
there were things in there that she should be able to explore before trial. Ochoa asserted that if she 
had more time to consult with an expert about the toxicology report and its conclusions, she could 
determine how close in time the victim used methamphetamine before operating the motorcycle. 
Under Brady, Ochoa asserted that she should have an opportunity to review the disclosures to 
determine whether there was exculpatory information contained in the full report. The magistrate 
court denied Ochoa’s motion to continue, citing her late request of the documents and it being 
outside the power and control of the State since the report was generated by a third-party agency, 
so it did not fall under Brady’s progeny.  
C. The Trial and Aftermath 
Ochoa’s four-day trial commenced on May 8, 2019. During the State’s case-in-chief, Dr. 
Groben, a now-retired forensic pathologist with the Ada County Coroner’s Office,1 testified that 
he had determined the cause of the victim’s death by examining the exterior of the victim’s body. 
Dr. Groben relied on the medical records, made by the physicians who had treated the victim and 
performed the emergency surgery, for information about the victim’s interior wounds. Ochoa 
objected to Dr. Groben’s testimony from the medical records on the basis that it was hearsay and 
                                                          
 
1 When Dr. Groben testified at the motion hearing on April 23, 2019, he was still working for the Ada County 
Coroner’s office; however, he had retired by the time he testified at trial. 
6 
 
that it violated Ochoa’s constitutional right to confrontation. The State asserted that Dr. Groben 
could testify to the facts and data contained in the medical records of the treating physicians that 
formed the basis of his opinion regarding the victim’s cause of death, which he attributed solely to 
blunt force trauma due to the motorcycle accident. On cross-examination, Dr. Groben noted the 
essential role the medical records had for him to determine the cause of death in this case—a case 
in which a person is treated by medical personal just prior to death. Because the original state of 
the injuries had been altered by treatment, only the medical records—not a full body autopsy—
would allow him to understand the injuries the physicians saw, i.e., the injuries as they were after 
the accident and prior to treatment. He needed the medical records to understand the injuries the 
physicians saw in the hospital. Dr. Groben explained the protocols for determining cause of death 
in a situation such as this one: 
Q [PROSECUTOR]: Is it normal for people in your field to look at medical 
records instead of opening up a body yourself? 
A [DR. GROBEN]: Well, they look at medical records – they better look at 
medical records whenever there are medical records.  
. . . 
Q: So Dr. Groben, you’re saying that, even if you did an autopsy, you wouldn’t be 
able to tell what the injuries were initially because they’ve been altered? 
A: Well, I would have – I would have seen what they did and been able to get an 
idea. But it was obvious that he had injuries to his pelvic region. So I would have 
been able to see what they had done. But to know exactly what was there before 
they started, of course I would have to review the medical records. It would be 
malpractice if I didn’t. 
. . . 
Q: . . . How often do you rely on medical records when doing body inspections? 
A: Well, if there’s a medical record, I’ll review it on every case I do. And I include 
it in my findings on every case I ever do where we went through the medical 
records. I’ve been doing it for 20 years. And in case like this where they’ve done 
surgery. It’s absurd for me to go in and look because they’ve already repaired 
everything. So I wouldn’t even be able to tell for sure the injuries for sure because 
they repaired it. So for me to know exactly what was there that caused their injury, 
it’s mandatory. Even if I’d done an autopsy, I would’ve reviewed the medical 
records and included that in my report because they’re the ones who found it and 
then changed it. So it was all changed by the time I got there. Medical records are 
absolutely important to determine -- for me to determine what caused this person’s 
death. 
The magistrate court overruled Ochoa’s objection and allowed Dr. Groben’s testimony, including 
allowing him to testify regarding the medical facts and data contained in the medical reports. The 
magistrate court reasoned that the testimony fell under the hearsay exception contained in Idaho 
7 
 
Rule of Evidence 703, and that the facts and data as to the injuries sustained by the victim would 
help the jury understand the cause of death.  
 
Dr. Groben then testified to the extensive injuries the victim suffered from the accident, 
including a collapsed lung, rib fractures, multiple fractures in his pelvis, and tearing of the arteries 
in his pelvis. The tearing of the pelvic arteries led to refractory hypotension. Refractory 
hypotension occurs when a person has lost around sixty percent of their blood supply. Dr. Groben 
explained: “So no matter how much blood you give them, no matter how many pressors, which 
are chemicals that you give them to increase their blood pressure, it won’t – it doesn’t do any good. 
And that’s what happened in this case.” Based on the injuries noted by the operating physicians, 
Dr. Groben concluded the victim had died from blunt force trauma and the massive blood loss 
caused by the accident.  
 
Nathan Madenford, a State Trooper with the Idaho State Police and a crash 
reconstructionist, was called to investigate this incident and testified in the State’s case. Trooper 
Madenford’s investigation concluded that the collision was caused by Ochoa entering the 
intersection and causing an immediate hazard in front of the victim’s line of travel. During his 
investigation, Trooper Madenford determined that the victim likely only applied the rear 
motorcycle brake, instead of both the front and rear brakes, and the victim applied the brake for 
about 68 feet before the victim laid the motorcycle down on its left side and slid into Ochoa’s 
vehicle. At the point of collision, Ochoa’s vehicle was in the southbound lane; however, when the 
victim’s motorcycle was on its side, it slid across the northbound lane into the southbound lane. 
Trooper Madenford also determined that the victim’s speed was about 50–55 miles per hour before 
he applied his brakes. The speed limit for the northbound lane of that road was 45 miles per hour. 
However, by Trooper Madenford’s calculations, the victim would not have been able to stop even 
if he was adhering to the speed limit.  
 
Ochoa called David Cavanaugh to testify in her case-in-chief. His ultimate opinion was 
that had the motorcycle been going the speed limit and used both motorcycle brakes effectively, 
the victim would have been twenty-six feet away from Ochoa when she exited his lane into the 
southbound lane. Cavanaugh estimated the victim’s speed to be almost 58 miles per hour at the 
time of the accident. He concluded that the victim’s speed and inefficient reaction caused the 
collision.  
8 
 
 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the charge of vehicular 
manslaughter. The magistrate court sentenced Ochoa to 365 days in jail with 325 days 
suspended—leaving her to serve 40 days in jail—and unsupervised probation for 24 months. In 
lieu of 30 days jail, she was given 200 hours of community service. In lieu of the remaining 10 
days in jail she was ordered to complete the “Alive at 25” driver awareness course.2 Additionally, 
her driving privileges were suspended for 180 days. Ochoa appealed her conviction to the district 
court. 
D. Appeal to the District Court 
On intermediate appeal, the district court addressed three issues: (1) whether the magistrate 
court erred by granting the State’s motion in limine and excluding the toxicology report; (2) 
whether the magistrate court erred by denying Ochoa’s motions to continue the trial; and, (3) 
whether the magistrate court erred by permitting Dr. Groben to testify about the medical records 
he relied on in reaching his conclusions. The district court held the magistrate court erred on all 
three issues, vacated Ochoa’s judgment of conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial.  
 
Regarding the exclusion of the toxicology report, the district court concluded that the 
victim’s drug use was relevant and the probative value of the evidence was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The district court rooted its decision in the principle 
of comparative negligence: rationalizing that the State had the burden to show Ochoa negligently 
violated the law and that introduction of negligence brings with it the issue of comparative 
negligence, which considers the victim’s fault. Although the district court acknowledged that no 
witness for Ochoa could testify as to whether, and to what degree, the victim might have been 
impaired by the substances in his blood, it reasoned that the jury should have been allowed to 
consider all factors that might have led to the victim’s death, including the victim’s possible 
impairment.  
 
Next, the district court determined that the magistrate court abused its discretion by 
denying Ochoa’s motion to continue the trial when Ochoa received the full toxicology records the 
day before trial. The district court concluded that Ochoa was prevented from reviewing the 
                                                          
 
2 Alive at 25 is a “4 ½ hour driver’s awareness course designed by the National Safety Council for young drivers ages 
15–24 which includes: [d]efensive driving classroom curriculum [to help] gain awareness and develop strategies to 
keep safe on the road. Decision-making and responsibility-taking [is taught] [] through interactive media, workbook 
exercises, role-playing, and class discussions.” Alive at 25, https://aliveat25.us (last visited March 1, 2022). Ochoa 
was 23 years old at the time of the incident. 
9 
 
extensive toxicology report—an essential component of trial preparation—especially considering 
the involvement of drugs in the victim’s system.  
 
Finally, the district court held that the magistrate court erred by allowing Dr. Groben to 
recite the medical facts and data from the victim’s medical records. The district court rationalized 
that Dr. Groben had not formed his own opinion regarding the victim’s cause of death, but merely 
relied on the findings in the medical reports. The district court held that Dr. Groben’s testimony 
was hearsay without a valid exception.  
 
The State appealed the district court’s decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of 
Appeals reversed the district court on all three issues. See State v. Maria Ochoa, No. 47796, 2020 
WL 6555168 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2020), review granted (Apr. 6, 2021). Ochoa petitioned for 
review, which this Court granted. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We have previously stated the proper standard of review for cases which come before us 
on a petition for review from a decision of the Court of Appeals as follows: “this Court gives 
serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of the 
lower court.” State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d 387, 389 (2007) (citing Head v. State, 
137 Idaho 1, 43 P.3d 760 (2002)).  
When considering an “appeal of a decision rendered by a district court while acting in its 
intermediate appellate capacity, this Court directly reviews the district court’s decision.” State v. 
Chernobieff, 161 Idaho 537, 539, 387 P.3d 790, 792 (2016) (quoting In re Doe, 147 Idaho 243, 
248, 207 P.3d 974, 979 (2009)). However, to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion, 
we independently review the record of the proceeding before the magistrate court. Id. Med. 
Recovery Servs., LLC v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 157 Idaho 395, 397, 336 P.3d 802, 
804 (2014) (quoting In re Doe, 147 Idaho at 248, 207 P.3d at 979). In independently reviewing the 
record,  
[t]he Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine 
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s 
findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those 
findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom 
and if the district court affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we affirm the district 
court’s decision as a matter of procedure.  
10 
 
Papin v. Papin, 166 Idaho 9, 18, 454 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2019) (quoting Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 
526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012)). Therefore, in reviewing a case on intermediate appeal, we 
do not directly review the decision of the magistrate court. Rather, “we are procedurally bound to 
affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court.” State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415, 224 P.3d 
480, 482 (2009). 
Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law and is subject to de novo review. State v. 
Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 P.2d 596, 602 (1993). The trial court’s broad discretion as 
to the admission and exclusion of evidence will only be reversed when there is a clear abuse of 
discretion. State v. Folk, 162 Idaho 620, 625, 402 P.3d 1073, 1078 (2017). Trial courts also enjoy 
broad discretion in deciding whether to admit expert testimony and whether to grant or deny a 
motion for continuance. Egbert v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 125 Idaho 678, 680, 873 P.2d 1332, 1334 
(1994) (“Our trial courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to admit expert testimony”); 
State v. Daly, 161 Idaho 925, 927, 393 P.3d 585, 587 (2017) (“In Idaho, ‘[t]he motion for 
continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the action of the court will 
be upheld unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.’ ”). When this Court reviews a trial 
court’s discretionary decision, it applies a four-prong test to determine whether there was an abuse 
of discretion: whether the trial court “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choice available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of 
reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 867, 421 P.3d 187, 198 (2018).  
III. 
  ANALYSIS 
A. The district court erred in reversing the magistrate court’s decision to not admit 
the results of the toxicology report. 
 
 
The State contends that the district court erred when it applied a comparative negligence 
standard to the toxicology report because comparative negligence is not a part of a vehicular 
manslaughter analysis. The State further maintains that the magistrate court’s decision to exclude 
the toxicology report was incorrect because it did not provide sufficient information from which a 
witness could testify as to the impairment of the victim. Thus, the report at best had only minimal 
probative value, and that value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. I.R.E. 403. 
 
As noted, a trial court enjoys broad discretion when deciding to admit or exclude evidence. 
Folk, 162 Idaho at 625, 402 P.3d at 1078 . In order to be admissible, evidence must first be relevant. 
11 
 
I.R.E. 402. Evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence[,] and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the 
action.” I.R.E. 401. “Relevant evidence is admissible unless these rules, or other rules applicable 
in the courts of this state, provide otherwise.” I.R.E. 402. “Whether a fact is ‘of consequence’ or 
material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties.” State v. 
Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 670, 462 P.3d 1125, 1134 (2020) (quoting State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 
355, 364, 247 P.3d 582, 591 (2010)). However, even if evidence is deemed relevant, it may still 
be excluded by the trial court if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . 
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” I.R.E. 403. “ ‘In other words, evidence should be 
excluded if it invites inordinate appeal to lines of reasoning outside of the evidence or emotions 
which are irrelevant to the decision making process.’ ” Garcia, 166 Idaho at 670, 462 P.3d at 1134 
(quoting State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 604, 809 P.2d 455, 465 (1991)).  
The State charged Ochoa with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter under Idaho Code 
section 18-4006, which provides in relevant part: “[m]anslaughter is the unlawful killing of a 
human being … without malice.” This includes vehicular manslaughter, which occurs when, “the 
operation of a motor vehicle is a significant cause contributing to the death because of . . . [t]he 
commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, without gross negligence.” I.C. 18-
4006(3)(c) (emphasis added). The statute does not specify a mental state, but the Court of Appeals 
has interpreted the statute as requiring at least ordinary negligence. State v. McNair, 141 Idaho 
263, 267, 108 P.3d 410, 414 (Ct. App. 2005). Accordingly, the State carries the burden to prove 
that Ochoa’s unlawful and negligent driving was a significant cause of the victim’s death. I.C. § 
18-4006(3)(c).  
Prior to trial, the magistrate court granted the State’s motion to exclude the victim’s 
toxicology results or any reference to them. The toxicology report showed the victim had 
methamphetamine, amphetamines, and methadone in his system. However, following a pretrial 
evidentiary hearing, the magistrate court concluded that no one had been able to testify that the 
levels of these substances present in his blood indicated that the victim was impaired. Without 
sufficient evidence of impairment, the magistrate court determined that the toxicology results were 
irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. However, on intermediate appeal, the district court held the 
magistrate court had erred because the toxicology results were relevant to show the victim’s 
12 
 
possible “comparative negligence.” The district court reasoned that because the State had to show 
Ochoa negligently violated the law, “introducing negligence brings with it the issue of comparative 
negligence.” 
In a civil negligence claim, the tortfeasor’s action must be the proximate cause of the 
injured party’s harm. See Haight v. Idaho Dep’t of Transportation, 163 Idaho 383, 414 P.3d 205 
(2018). We have previously explained the legal standard for proximate cause as follows:  
“[P]roximate cause focuses on whether legal policy supports responsibility being 
‘extended to the consequences of conduct.’ ” [Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 
875, 204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009).] ...“[T]rue proximate cause deals with ‘whether it 
was reasonably foreseeable that such harm would flow from the negligent 
conduct.’ ” State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011) (quoting 
State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374, 223 P.2d 750, 757 (2009)). 
Thompson v. State, 164 Idaho 821, 826, 436 P.3d 642, 647 (2018). A cause that would otherwise 
be a proximate cause may not be a proximate cause if there is an intervening superseding cause as 
well. “An intervening, superseding cause generally refers to an independent act or force that breaks 
the causal chain between the defendant’s culpable act and the victim’s injury. The intervening 
cause becomes the proximate cause of the victim’s injury and removes the defendant’s act as the 
proximate cause.” Id. at 828, 436 P.3d at 649 (quoting Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374–75, 223 P.2d at 
757–58). “In order to be considered an intervening, superseding cause, the victim’s conduct must 
have been an unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence.” Corbus, 150 Idaho at 606, 249 P.3d at 
405 (citing Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374, 223 P.3d at 757).” When comparative negligence is 
considered in tort negligence actions, “[a]s long as the plaintiff is less than fifty percent responsible 
for her injuries the plaintiff may recover.” Noel v. City of Rigby, 166 Idaho 575, 589, 462 P.3d 
103, 117 (2020). 
The statutory language for the crime of vehicular manslaughter at one time resembled the 
civil standard; it required a determination of “proximate cause.” However, in 1983, the legislature 
removed the proximate cause requirement and later replaced it with “significant cause.” H.B. 1, 
Ex. S.L. 1983, ch. 3, §17; H.B.143, S.L. 1997, ch. 103, § 1; I.C. § 18-4006(3).  The replacement 
of “proximate” with “significant” in the statute demonstrates that the standard for a “significant 
cause” is not the same as for “proximate cause.” A conviction for vehicular manslaughter, as 
defined in Idaho Code section 18-4006(3)(c), now only requires the State to prove that the 
defendant’s “operation of a motor vehicle is a significant cause contributing to the death,” not that 
the defendant’s operation of a motor vehicle is the only significant cause or the most significant 
13 
 
cause. Id. (emphasis added). The district court reasoned that discussion of negligence invites the 
issue of comparative negligence. Determination of proximate cause requires examination of other 
causes which may be superseding intervening causes. Similarly, comparison of multiple causes 
may put into perspective whether a cause was “significant.” However, the comparison of merely 
speculative causes will not establish that those causes are significant.  
The magistrate court’s decision to exclude the toxicology results is in line with our prior 
decision in State v. Robinett, 144 Idaho 110, 113, 106 P.3d 436, 439 (2005) (holding that a report 
showing blood alcohol content, by itself, was irrelevant to driving under the influence charge under 
an impairment theory because there was no accompanying evidence to show actual impairment). 
The mere presence of a controlled substance in the blood does not necessarily equate to impairment 
unless expert testimony can establish a causal link on a more probable than not basis. Absent such 
testimony, evidence of the presence of a controlled substance invites the jury to impermissibly 
speculate and runs the real risk that prejudice will overcome the lack of actual proof. Here, the 
magistrate court’s decision did not foreclose Ochoa from presenting any evidence regarding the 
victim’s role in the accident. For example, Ochoa was allowed to present evidence concerning the 
victim’s operation of the motorcycle, in particular that the victim was speeding and did not brake 
effectively. Importantly, the burden remained squarely on the State to show that Ochoa’s 
negligence was a significant cause of the collision.  
During oral argument before this Court, Ochoa suggested that determining whether one 
cause was significant requires an examination of all other potential causes as well. For example, 
one cause may seem like a significant cause if it is presented in a vacuum as the only cause; 
however, examination of other existing causes may reveal that cause to be insignificant in 
comparison. While we agree, generally, that a victim’s own negligence is relevant to a charge of 
misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter, there must be competent evidence of such negligence. 
Unlike the evidence regarding the victim’s driving pattern offered by Ochoa’s witness, the 
toxicology evidence at issue only established the presence of potentially impairing substances 
without corroborating evidence or testimony showing the victim was actually impaired. The report 
does not make it more or less probable that the victim was impaired than it makes it more or less 
probable that he was not impaired. Thus, the report does not make “a fact of consequence” more 
or less likely. I.R.E. 401. Because there was no evidence that the victim was actually impaired, 
there is nothing revealed in the toxicology report to compare to Ochoa’s criminal negligence in 
14 
 
failing to stop before entering the road. Such a comparison of causes, when one is purely 
speculative, is not appropriate, especially given the high likelihood that such evidence would result 
in unfair prejudice, as found by the magistrate court. I.R.E. 403. 
 
For these reasons, the district court erred in concluding that the magistrate court abused its 
discretion by excluding the toxicology evidence. The magistrate court’s finding that the probative 
value of the report was substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice was supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. No witness for Ochoa, based solely on the toxicology report, 
could describe whether and to what degree the victim was impaired. Cavanaugh only testified that 
methamphetamine could impair one’s ability to operate a vehicle safely; he conceded that in a case 
like this, where the toxicology report shows a positive result for substances, he would not be able 
to say that person was impaired based solely on the toxicology report. Cavanaugh further noted 
that he was unable to evaluate the impairment level through physical and physiological indicators, 
such as driving pattern or a field sobriety test. Dr. Groben, too, opined that he could not determine 
from the toxicology report alone whether the substances detected in the victim’s blood impaired 
or did not impair the victim at the time of the collision. Thus, admission of the toxicology report, 
without corroborating evidence to establish the victim’s impairment, would likely invite inordinate 
speculation or invoke an emotional response by the jury based on evidence that could not support 
the conclusion the defense wanted them to reach. Garcia, 166 Idaho at 670, 462 P.3d at 1134. 
The dissent focuses on the level of methamphetamine in the victim’s blood and suggests 
that this alone is sufficient proof of impairment to make it relevant. However, there is absolutely 
no foundation in the record establishing that the levels of methamphetamine detected provided a 
scientific basis for concluding the victim was impaired. While the victim may have had 1.7 times 
the recommended “therapeutic dose” of methamphetamine in his bloodstream, without competent 
scientific testimony, the dissent has no basis to conclude that this alone is sufficient to show 
impairment. The following statement from the dissent perfectly illustrates the type of improper 
conclusions Ochoa wanted the jury to make had the report been admitted: “I believe that evidence 
of a victim’s methamphetamine level reflecting 70% greater than the acceptable therapeutic range 
is certainly more than speculative evidence of impairment. It is objective evidence of the victim’s 
impairment.” Thus, the dissent, on its own, is willing to reach a scientific conclusion that no 
qualified expert was willing to testify to at trial. This is exactly the kind of speculation the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence, Rules 701(c) and 702 in particular, were designed to keep from the jury.  
15 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s reversal of the magistrate court because the 
magistrate court did not abuse its discretion by excluding irrelevant or incompetent scientific 
evidence. Likewise, the magistrate court did not abuse it discretion in concluding that any marginal 
relevance of such evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk it would unfairly prejudice 
the jury. The magistrate court correctly perceived these issues as ones of discretion, acted within 
its discretion, applied the correct legal standards, and reached its decision through the exercise of 
reason. Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 867, 421 P.3d at 198.  
B. The district court erred in reversing the magistrate court’s denial of the motion 
for a continuance. 
 
The State also contends that the district court erred by holding that the magistrate court 
abused its discretion by denying Ochoa’s motion for a continuance before jury selection 
commenced on the first day of trial.3 The State asserts that most of the delay in discovery was due 
to Ochoa’s own fault, and regardless, she failed to establish prejudice. Where a motion to continue 
is predicated on the late disclosure of evidence, the moving party must show prejudice that resulted 
in the denial of a fair trial. State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 255, 899 P.2d 959, 965 (1995). The State 
maintains that Ochoa has failed to show prejudice by demonstrating how she was denied a fair 
trial through the late reception of the full toxicology report.  
The decision to grant or deny a motion to continue rests within the sound discretion of the 
trial court:  
[W]here the denial of a motion to continue is attacked on the basis of late disclosure 
or discovery of evidence, the alleged tardiness of the disclosure must be shown to 
so prejudice the defendant’s case preparation that a fair trial was denied. State v. 
Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 770, 710 P.2d 1202, 1206 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
870, 107 S.Ct. 239, 93 L.Ed.2d 164 (1986); State v. Smoot, 99 Idaho 855, 858–59, 
590 P.2d 1001, 1004–05 (1978). To prove prejudice, a defendant must show there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for the late disclosure of evidence, the result of 
the proceedings would have been different. See, e.g., State v. Spradlin, 119 Idaho 
1030, 1034, 812 P.2d 744, 748 (Ct. App. 1991). Further, the bare claim that 
additional investigation could have been conducted is not sufficient to demonstrate 
unfair prejudice so as to support a motion for a continuance. Id.  
Tapia, 127 Idaho at 255, 899 P.2d at 965. 
                                                          
 
3 Although Ochoa argues on appeal that there were multiple motions to continue denied leading up to trial, the district 
court only concluded the magistrate court abused its discretion by denying the final motion Ochoa made the morning 
of trial. Therefore, this Court is limited to review the district court’s decision on that basis. The magistrate court’s 
decisions on the other continuance motions are not properly before this Court.  
16 
 
The district court erred when it reversed the magistrate court’s decision to deny Ochoa’s 
final motion to continue. The district court generally held that the late disclosure of the full report 
did not give Ochoa adequate time to prepare for trial. However, this is an oversimplification of the 
correct standard. To qualify for a continuance based on late discovery, a party must not only show 
that the late disclosure generally prejudiced the party, but they must also show that a fair trial was 
denied because there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been 
different had the additional time been granted. Id. Ochoa has failed to show prejudice to the 
magistrate court, the district court, and now to this Court.  
On the morning of trial, Ochoa argued that she needed a continuance because there was 
information in the toxicology report that she “didn’t get a chance to really explore more fully.” 
However, merely claiming that additional investigation could have taken place “is not sufficient 
to demonstrate unfair prejudice so as to support a motion for a continuance.” Id. Ochoa asserted 
that if she had more time, she could speak with an expert about whether the victim’s 
methamphetamine level result reflected whether the victim was using methamphetamine close to 
the time he operated the motorcycle. The problem with this argument is that the disclosure on the 
morning the trial commenced was not the first time Ochoa was advised of the results of the 
toxicology report. The substance of the report had been disclosed months earlier. The late 
disclosure, while containing more pages supporting the results of the report, did not change those 
results. This is confirmed by the fact that the State filed a motion to exclude the methamphetamine 
result from the toxicology report over two months before trial.  
On appeal to this Court, Ochoa also fails to show prejudice. Ochoa makes broad, sweeping 
statements about the toxicology report and its importance, but she fails to even assert how the 
proceedings would have been different had she been given a continuance. First, Ochoa had 
knowledge that the victim’s toxicology reports showed the presence of controlled substances for 
months, when the report of Dr. Groben was first disclosed, yet she did not contact an expert. Ochoa 
points to no new facts in the full toxicology report that support her theory of the case. For example, 
Ochoa does not assert how her trial strategy would have been different, whether she would have 
called different witnesses, or if she would have offered different evidence at trial. During oral 
argument on appeal, Ochoa suggested for the first time that perhaps the methamphetamine—which 
raises the heart rate—interacted poorly with the adrenaline the medical personnel gave the victim 
in an attempt to stop the bleeding. She suggested that this could have caused the victim to bleed 
17 
 
out faster. While that argument, if substantiated by a qualified expert, may have been sufficient to 
prove prejudice, this argument was not made or supported below.  
Importantly, all of the speculative arguments asserted by Ochoa are based solely on 
information contained in the summary report provided to Ochoa months before trial. Notably, 
Ochoa did not make the full 441 page report part of the record on appeal, so we cannot discern for 
ourselves how much new information was contained in it. Yet, she has been able to craft several 
theories related to causation by merely referencing the summary report she received. If the full 
report somehow provided new information and, thus, a basis for finding prejudice, Ochoa should 
have cited actual examples from the report. We must rule on the record of the case before us and 
the arguments that were actually made—not the arguments Ochoa now wishes she had raised. 
Simply put, Ochoa makes a bare claim on appeal that she was prejudiced by the late disclosure of 
the full toxicology report and that additional investigation was required before trial. As stated, 
these mere assertions are insufficient. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s decision to 
reverse the magistrate court’s denial of Ochoa’s motion for a continuance. 
Similarly, Ochoa’s alleged Brady violation is deficient. Brady requires all material 
exculpatory evidence known to the State or in its possession to be disclosed to the defendant. Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27, 995 P.2d 794, 797 (2000). 
“ ‘There are three [essential] components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be 
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence 
must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have 
ensued.’ ” Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 65, 106 P.3d 376, 391 (2004) (quoting Strickler v. Green, 
527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999)). At trial on May 8, 2019, Ochoa argued that the full toxicology report 
contained exculpatory evidence that should have been disclosed earlier under Brady. Yet, she did 
not point to any information in that report she considered to be exculpatory evidence. She stated 
that this was because she did not have time to review the full report. However, two and a half years 
later, on appeal, Ochoa still has not identified any new exculpatory evidence in the report. 
Accordingly, we conclude that Ochoa has failed to articulate prejudice by describing how delayed 
access to the full toxicology report may have aided her defense. 
In reviewing the district court’s decision to reverse the trial court’s denial of the 
continuance motion, we must independently review the record to determine whether there was an 
abuse of discretion. Med. Recovery Servs., LLC, 157 Idaho at 397, 336 P.3d at 804. In 
18 
 
independently reviewing this record, we cannot conclude that the magistrate court abused its 
discretion. Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the district court.  
C. The district court erred in reversing the magistrate court’s decision to allow the 
forensic pathologist to testify concerning the cause of death. 
 
The State contends that the district court erred in concluding that the magistrate court 
should have excluded Dr. Groben’s testimony regarding the victim’s cause of death. The district 
court concluded that Dr. Groben had not formed his own opinion regarding the cause of death; 
rather, he merely relied on the findings of other physicians in the medical reports. Therefore, the 
district court held Dr. Groben’s testimony was hearsay without a valid exception. The State argues 
that Dr. Groben’s testimony was admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 703. Alternatively, even 
if the testimony were not admissible, any error from the admission of his testimony was harmless.  
Generally, hearsay is inadmissible at trial unless there is a recognized exception. I.R.E. 
802. “ ‘Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.’ ” 
Losee v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 165 Idaho 883, 886, 454 P.3d 525, 528 (2019) (quoting 
State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 894, 980 P.2d 552, 558 (1999)). One exception to the hearsay bar 
regards expert testimony. Idaho Rule of Evidence 703 provides: 
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert 
has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field 
would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion or 
inference on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. 
But if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the 
opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the 
jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. 
Ochoa contends the district court got it right because Dr. Groben could not formulate his own 
opinion on the victim’s death. For support, Ochoa relies on State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 224 
P.3d 485 (2009).  
In Watkins, a jury indicted the defendant for lewd conduct with a minor. Id. at 420, 224 
P.3d at 487. As part of the State’s case-in-chief, it called an expert witness to testify that tests 
performed at her laboratory showed the defendant’s DNA was found in the semen on the minor 
victim’s underwear and inside the condom. Additionally, the victim’s DNA was found on the 
outside of the condom. Id. However, the expert did not receive the evidence or perform the tests 
herself; she relied on her colleague’s notes to form her conclusion. Id. On appeal, this Court 
rejected the argument that the expert’s testimony fell under the hearsay exception of Idaho Rule 
of Evidence 703. Idaho Rule of Evidence 703 allows experts to rely upon facts and data that are 
19 
 
not admissible on their own. However, the rule also states that those “[f]acts or data that are 
otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or 
inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the 
expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.” I.R.E. 703. This language 
“serves to prevent an expert witness from serving as a conduit for the introduction of otherwise 
inadmissible evidence.” Id. at 427, 224 P.3d at 494. This Court explained that the notes and 
statements of the expert’s colleagues were not admitted for the proper and limited purpose of 
evaluating the hearsay statements as evidence; rather, the expert’s hearsay testimony was offered 
to demonstrate the chain of custody of the evidence, the laboratory’s testing methodology, and to 
identify the locations on the panties and condom on which the defendant’s DNA was found. Id.  
Here, the magistrate court allowed Dr. Groben’s testimony under I.R.E. 703. Dr. Groben 
testified that he determined the victim’s cause of death by conducting an exterior examination of 
the body and relying on the medical records of the physician who the performed surgery on the 
victim at the hospital. It is worth noting again Dr. Groban’s explanation of his standard procedure 
in performing an autopsy:  
THE STATE: And then, did you perform any internal examination at all? 
 
DR. GROBEN: No.  
 
THE STATE: Why not? 
DR. GROBEN: [The treating physicians] had already done that at the hospital.  
THE STATE: So is it common for you to look at hospital records when you’re 
determining cause of death? 
DR. GROBEN: Yes.  
THE STATE: How often do you do that when you’re doing [an external 
examination]? 
DR. GROBEN: Whenever the case is appropriate, like this case.  
After an objection by Ochoa, the State continued to question Dr. Groben outside the presence of 
the jury.  
THE STATE: And was it important to your conclusion in this case to look at the 
medical records?  
DR. GROBEN: Yes.  
THE STATE: And why was it important? 
DR. GROBEN: Because they documented it, the doctors in the hospital are the 
ones who are trying to save his life and documented his injuries. That’s absolutely 
the best form of information I could get.  
THE STATE: But they didn’t determine his cause of death? 
DR. GROBEN: No.  
THE STATE: You did? 
DR. GROBEN: Yes.  
20 
 
THE STATE: Based on the injuries he had when he was at the hospital? 
DR. GROBEN: Right. 
On cross-examination, Dr. Groben clarified the essential role the medical records play in 
ascertaining the cause of death:  
DEFENSE COUNSEL: So Dr. Groben, you’re saying that, even if you did an 
autopsy, you wouldn’t be able to tell what the injuries were initially because they’ve 
been altered? 
DR. GROBEN: Well, I would have -- I would have seen what they did and been 
able to get an idea. But it was obvious that he had injuries in his pelvic region. So 
I would have been able to see what they have done. But to know exactly what was 
there before they started, of course I would have to review the medical records. It 
would be malpractice if I didn’t.  
DEFENSE COUNSEL: From the internal -- the external examination of [the 
victim], were you able to determine, just based on that external examination, what 
the cause of death was? 
DR. GROBEN: No.  
DEFENSE COUNSEL: So you were -- you had to rely on those medical records?  
DR. GROBEN: Yes.  
Unlike in Watkins, Dr. Groben’s testimony was not merely “serving as a conduit for the 
introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence.” Id. Dr. Groben detailed his specialized 
knowledge and training and described his methodology in cases like this. He testified that the facts 
and data in the medical records are facts and data he commonly relies on when formulating an 
opinion such as this. He explained that the information in such reports often contained a more 
accurate description of the victim’s injuries than an autopsy because the surgeons’ attempts to 
repair the injuries would alter the nature of the wounds. Dr. Groben noted the victim’s extensive 
injuries: a collapsed lung, rib fractures, multiple fractures in his pelvis, and tearing of the arteries 
in his pelvis. He observed that the most serious injury was the tearing of the arteries in the victim’s 
pelvis, which led to refractory hypotension (uncontrolled bleeding). Based on that information, Dr. 
Groben concluded the victim had died from blunt force trauma and blood loss related to the 
accident. Unlike the expert witness in Watkins, who testified to the conclusions her colleagues 
reached, Dr. Groben only testified as to the facts and data observed and recorded by his colleagues. 
Dr. Groben relied on the medical records to understand the injuries to the victim and then arrived 
at his own conclusion as to the cause of death. In short, there is no basis for Ochoa’s assertion that 
Dr. Groben was merely serving as a conduit for another doctor’s opinion in the medical records. 
Dr. Groben’s conclusions were his own.  
21 
 
Therefore, we hold that the district court erred when it reversed the magistrate’s decision 
to admit Dr. Groben’s testimony. The record establishes that the magistrate court admitted the 
testimony after recognizing the discretionary nature of the decision. It then acted within its 
discretion, applied the right legal principles, and reached its decision by the exercise of reason. 
Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 867, 421 P.3d at 198.  
D. Ochoa failed to preserve her due process argument for appeal. 
 
In her brief in support of the petition for review and during oral argument before this Court, 
Ochoa argued that she was denied due process because she was not able to cross-examine the 
State’s witnesses on the victim’s toxicology. “Due process ‘guarantees every defendant the right 
to a trial comporting with basic tenets of fundamental fairness.’ ” State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 
382, 313 P.3d 1, 38 (2012) (quoting State v. Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 735, 240 P.3d 575, 581 
(2010)). However, Ochoa did not raise this due process argument in her brief on appeal to this 
Court. “A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just 
if both are lacking.” State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). The only 
mention of due process in Ochoa’s brief is in a section heading stating that “[the admission of Dr. 
Groben’s testimony] deprived Ms. Ochoa of due process. . . .” Merely stating an issue in a heading, 
without citing any authority or offering any supportive argument, is simply not sufficient to 
preserve an issue. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s decisions regarding the exclusion 
of the toxicology report, the denial of Ochoa’s motions for a continuance, and the admission of 
Dr. Groben’s testimony. We remand this matter to the district court with instructions to reinstate 
Ochoa’s judgment of conviction. 
 
Chief Justice BEVAN, Justice BRODY, and Justice Pro Tem HORTON CONCUR. 
 
STEGNER, J., dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. I think the magistrate court erred by 
excluding the victim’s toxicology results which showed the victim had methamphetamine in his 
system above the recommended therapeutic level and the expert’s testimony concluding the 
22 
 
victim’s ingestion of methamphetamine was a contributing factor in the accident which led to his 
death. As a result, I would affirm the decision of the district court and grant Ochoa a new trial. 
The majority concludes that the victim’s toxicology results were irrelevant because the 
toxicology report did “not make it more or less probable that the victim was impaired [or] not 
impaired.” I respectfully disagree. What other evidence better indicates that the victim was 
impaired than a toxicology report indicating as much? I am hard-pressed to conclude anything 
would better reflect the victim’s impairment. The majority also concludes, wrongly in my opinion, 
that because Ochoa did not have expert evidence that indicated the victim was impaired, the 
magistrate court correctly excluded the evidence. The majority errs in two specific respects: first, 
Ochoa had expert testimony tying the victim’s methamphetamine use to his impairment; and 
second, even without the expert’s opinion, the evidence was such that it should have been admitted. 
At the hearing on the State’s motion to exclude evidence of the victim’s toxicology results, 
David Cavanaugh, an accident reconstructionist, testified. Cavanaugh was questioned about the 
impairing effects of methamphetamine in the victim at the time of the accident. Under cross-
examination by the State, the following exchange occurred: 
Q: So in this case, can you say with a reasonable degree of certainty that the 
person who tried to avoid this collision on the motorcycle made that choice [to steer 
into the crash rather than away from it] because he was impaired from drugs?  
A: It[’]s – in my opinion, it’s a contributing factor. But no, it’s not – it’s not 
the – it’s not necessarily, I should say, the reason he made a given decision, but I 
do believe it’s a contributing factor. 
In sum, the expert’s opinion, “to a reasonable degree of certainty,” was that methamphetamine in 
the victim’s bloodstream was a contributing factor to the poor driving choices made by him.The 
majority’s conclusion that “there must be competent evidence of [a victim’s own] negligence” in 
order to admit the toxicology results was satisfied with this testimony.  
Even though the experts for the State and Ochoa could not determine the exact degree of 
impairment of the victim, they both testified that “any amount” of methamphetamine would impair 
a driver to some degree. Driving under the influence of controlled substances is illegal in Idaho. 
See I.C. § 18-8004. Evidence that the victim had methamphetamine in his system is evidence of 
his own negligence in operating his motorcycle. The jury was permitted to hear of other factors 
indicating that the victim was impaired, including his rate of speed, his poor response to Ochoa’s 
23 
 
vehicle crossing his lane of traffic (his steering to the left into her vehicle as opposed to steering 
to the right to avoid the collision), and the fact that he engaged only the rear brake of his motorcycle 
as opposed to engaging both the front and rear brake. However, the jury was not apprised of the 
fact that the victim’s methamphetamine level was 70% higher than the maximum therapeutic level 
shortly after the time of the accident.1 Cavanaugh’s testimony that the victim’s impairment was a 
“contributing factor” in the ensuing collision with Ochoa’s vehicle is competent evidence of the 
victim’s impairment, yet it was wrongly withheld from the jury’s consideration.  
The majority too narrowly construes the experts’ opinions on impairment by focusing on 
their inability to determine the precise level of the victim’s impairment. When read as a whole, 
Cavanaugh’s 
and 
Madenford’s 
testimony 
acknowledged 
the 
impairing 
effects 
of 
methamphetamine in the context of operating a motorcycle and how the victim’s level of 
impairment contributed to his delayed response to Ochoa’s oncoming vehicle. Such testimony is 
not only helpful to the jury in reaching its verdict but is also necessary in determining whether 
Ochoa herself was a significant cause of the victim’s death. Sufficient evidence of the victim’s 
impairment was elicited through Cavanaugh such that she should have been allowed to present 
that evidence to the jury for consideration in reaching its verdict.  
The toxicology evidence should have been admitted even without the expert testimony 
because it was highly relevant and probative. It was established before trial that the victim had “a 
quantity of methamphetamine in his blood equal to 1.7 times a therapeutic dosage.” The bar for 
relevant evidence is a low one; evidence need only tend to make a fact of consequence more or 
less probable. I.R.E. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if . . . it has any tendency to make a fact more or 
less probable.”) (Italics added.) Rule 401 favors admissibility because “a court can exclude 
evidence as irrelevant only if it has no probative value.” WRIGHT & MILLER, Policy of Rule 401—
The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, 22 FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID. § 5162.2 (2d ed.) (Italics added.) 
The quantity of methamphetamine in the victim’s blood (70% above the maximum therapeutic 
level) certainly makes it more probable that he was impaired because of that methamphetamine. 
                                                          
 
1 Trooper Madenford testified that the acceptable therapeutic range for methamphetamine is 0-100, and that the 
victim’s range was approximately 170. The toxicology report itself is not in the record, therefore it is unclear how the 
level of methamphetamine in the victim’s blood was measured. However, methamphetamine is typically measured in 
terms 
of 
milligrams 
per 
liter 
of 
blood. 
Amphetamine 
Screen 
(Blood), University 
of 
Rochester 
Medical Center Health Encyclopedia (last visited Nov. 3, 2021), available at https://www.urmc.rochester.edu/encycl
opedia/content.aspx?contenttypeid=167&contentid=amphetamine_blood_screen. 
24 
 
Put another way, the fact of consequence, whether Ochoa was a significant cause of the victim’s 
death, is made less probable given the victim had methamphetamine in his bloodstream at an 
amount 70% above the upper end of the drug’s therapeutic range. See id. There are two possible 
conclusions that may be drawn from the victim having 70% more methamphetamine in his system 
than would be therapeutic: the first is that he was self-administering methamphetamine illegally; 
the second is that he was using methamphetamine in a way contraindicated by a valid prescription. 
Either of these two possibilities evidence culpable negligence on the part of the victim. As such, 
the victim’s actions and impairment were clearly relevant factors that the jury should have been 
allowed to consider in determining whether Ochoa’s conduct was a significant cause of the 
victim’s death. 
The majority notes that a comparison of multiple, potential causes “may put in perspective 
whether a cause was ‘significant.’ ” The majority then concludes that the mere possibility that the 
victim was impaired is speculative. I believe that evidence of a victim’s methamphetamine level 
reflecting 70% greater than the acceptable therapeutic range is certainly more than speculative 
evidence of impairment. It is objective evidence of the victim’s impairment. If the State wanted to 
rebut this evidence, that is the State’s prerogative. However, to reject its admission prevented 
Ochoa from presenting a defense to the charge against her. “A defendant in a criminal case has a 
constitutional right to present a defense, including the right to present the defendant’s version of 
the facts.” State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, 919, 342 P.3d 628, 631 (2015) (holding that a district 
court erred in excluding evidence that was relevant to the defendant’s theory of his case). This 
right is rooted in the Sixth Amendment and is a “fundamental element of due process of law.” 
State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 239, 220 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2009). Ochoa’s right to present a 
defense was significantly hindered by the exclusion of the toxicology evidence. 
The magistrate court abused its discretion by excluding the toxicology evidence. 
“Evidentiary decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Reyes, No. 
48628, 2021 WL 4848861, at *5 (Idaho Oct. 19, 2021) (quoting State v. Anderson, 162 Idaho 610, 
617, 402 P.3d 1063, 1070 (2017)). 
When reviewing a lower court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, this Court must 
analyze “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted 
25 
 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to 
it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” 
State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591, 448 P.3d 1005, 1019 (2019) (quoting Lunneborg v. My 
Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). The magistrate court did not act 
“consistently with the legal standards applicable” to it when it excluded the toxicology evidence. 
As noted, the threshold for admitting relevant evidence is low. See I.R.E. 401. “The Idaho Trial 
Handbook observes that Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 ‘requires only minimal relevance, treating 
evidence as relevant if it has any tendency to make facts more or less probable.’ ” State v. Garcia, 
166 Idaho 661, 671 n.3, 462 P.3d 1125, 1135 n.3 (2020) (quoting D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial 
Handbook § 13:1 (2d ed. 2005)) (italics added). The magistrate court acted outside the boundaries 
of its discretion in failing to consider this evidentiary principle in excluding toxicology evidence. 
See Bodenbach, 165 Idaho at 591, 448 P.3d at 1019. 
Because important evidence of the victim’s consumption of methamphetamine shortly 
before the accident was wrongly excluded from the jury’s consideration, I conclude the magistrate 
court abused its discretion in excluding this evidence. Accordingly, I would affirm the district 
court’s decision to afford Ochoa a new trial because it correctly determined that the magistrate 
court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s toxicology results. Therefore, I respectfully 
dissent.