Title: State v. Hederson

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 151 
Docket: 
Cum-15-410 
Argued: 
April 6, 2016 
Decided: 
October 13, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
GEORGE H. HEDERSON 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  The State of Maine appeals from an order entered by the trial court 
(Cumberland County, Wheeler, J.) granting George H. Hederson’s motion to 
dismiss one count of a complaint alleging violation of a protective order 
(Class D), 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1) (2015).  On appeal, the State contends that 
the court erred when it dismissed that count after concluding that the 
no-contact bail conditions ordered by a New Hampshire bail commissioner 
are not “similar” to a protective order for purposes of Maine statutes 
governing protection from abuse, see 19-A M.R.S. §§ 4001-4014 (2015).  
We remand the matter to the Unified Criminal Docket for further proceedings. 
 
2 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
 
[¶2]  On January 29, 2015, Hederson was arrested in New Hampshire on 
a domestic violence charge.  He was released later that day on a $5,000 
personal recognizance bail,1 subject to a “domestic violence/stalking criminal 
order of protection including orders and conditions of bail.”  The bail order 
and conditions, also issued the same day by a New Hampshire bail 
commissioner, required that Hederson stay 150 feet away from the victim and 
that he not contact, threaten, or abuse the victim.  The order also established 
an arraignment date of March 5, 2015, and stated that the conditions were 
imposed “pending arraignment.” 
[¶3]  On April 4, 2015, Hederson allegedly assaulted the victim in 
Portland, Maine.  On April 6, Hederson was charged by complaint in Maine 
with violation of a protective order (Class D), 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1) (Count I), 
based on the New Hampshire order; and domestic violence assault (Class D), 
17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A) (2015) (Count II). 
[¶4]  On June 24, 2015, Hederson filed a motion to dismiss Count I on 
the ground that “a criminal bail order of protection issued by a bail 
                                         
1 This practice appears to be similar to release in Maine on an unsecured bond.  
Compare N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 597:2(I)(a) (LEXIS through ch. 330, 2016 Reg. Sess.), with 15 M.R.S. 
§ 1026(2-A) (2015). 
 
3 
commissioner in New Hampshire is not the same or similar to ‘[a] temporary, 
interim, or final protective order’ contemplated in [section 4011].”2  The court 
heard oral argument and granted Hederson’s motion to dismiss Count I, 
concluding that the conditions of release prohibiting contact were not a 
“similar order” within the meaning of section 4011.  The court reasoned that 
bail conditions are not similar to a protection from abuse order because the 
latter requires a finding of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence, see 
19-A M.R.S. § 4006(1), and the former does not.  The State filed a motion for 
reconsideration, which the court denied.  The State timely appealed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶5]  The State’s authority to appeal is controlled by 15 M.R.S. 
§ 2115-A (2015).  Section 2115-A provides, in pertinent part, that 
[a]n appeal may be taken by the State in criminal cases on 
questions of law . . . from a pretrial dismissal of an indictment, 
information or complaint[] or from any other order of the court 
                                         
2  Title 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1) (2015) provides: 
1.  Crime Committed.  Except as provided in subsections 2 and 4, violation of the 
following is a Class D crime when the defendant has prior actual notice, which may be 
notice by means other than service in hand, of the order or agreement: 
A.  A temporary, emergency, interim or final protective order, an order of a tribal 
court of the Passamaquoddy Tribe or the Penobscot Nation or a similar order 
issued by a court of the United States or of another state, territory, commonwealth 
or tribe; or 
B.  A court-approved consent agreement. 
 
4 
prior to trial which, either under the particular circumstances of 
the case or generally for the type of order in question, has a 
reasonable likelihood of causing either serious impairment to or 
termination of the prosecution. 
 
15 M.R.S. § 2115-A(1). 
[¶6]  Although section 2115-A provides the State with the authority to 
appeal, “the question always remains whether in any particular case it is 
inappropriate for us to exercise that jurisdiction.”  State v. Doucette, 
544 A.2d 1290, 1292 (Me. 1988).  On the record before the Court, we note an 
unanswered question of sufficient significance so as to present the possibility 
that we are being called upon to issue a purely advisory opinion.  The scant 
record from the New Hampshire proceedings includes only copies of the bail 
bond and the “criminal order of protection including orders and conditions of 
bail,” both signed by a bail commissioner, and the complaint, signed by a 
justice of the peace.  The documents required Hederson to appear before the 
Ossipee Circuit Court on March 5, 2015, for arraignment.  The issue of bail 
would presumably be reviewed de novo by a judge at that appearance. 
 
[¶7]  The arraignment date had passed by April 4, the date of the alleged 
assault in Maine, but we have no record of what, if anything, happened on 
March 5.  One possibility is that the bail conditions, which constitute the 
principal issue in the State’s appeal, were modified or even eliminated 
 
5 
because the no-contact condition was expressly ordered to remain pending 
until the arraignment date.  If the bail conditions were eliminated, any opinion 
by us regarding the issues raised in the briefs would be purely advisory.  If the 
bail conditions were addressed or modified by a judge, then our analysis will 
depend on the terms of the order entered by the judge, and not on the expired 
terms in the bail commissioner’s order. 
[¶8]  On this record, without clarification of the status of the bail 
conditions after the arraignment date, we cannot adequately address the 
issues raised by the parties.  Accordingly, we remand the matter to the 
trial court to determine the facts and circumstances regarding the conditions 
of bail, if any, in the New Hampshire proceedings as they existed on 
April 4, 2015. 
The entry is: 
The matter is remanded to the Unified Criminal 
Docket for further proceedings consistent with 
this decision.  The court may reopen the record 
for receipt of further evidence at its discretion.  
If the State intends to pursue an appeal after 
further action by the court, it shall file a notice 
of appeal in the ordinary course. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Stephanie Anderson, District Attorney, and Kate Tierney, 
Asst. Dist. Atty., Prosecutorial District Two, Portland, for 
appellant State of Maine 
 
Jamesa J. Drake, Esq., Drake Law, LLC, Auburn, for appellee 
George H. Hederson 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Kate Tierney, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellant State of Maine 
 
Jamesa J. Drake, Esq., for appellee George H. Hederson 
 
 
 
Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2015-1855 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY