Title: McGhee v. Rork

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

McGhee v. Rork1999 WY 34978 P.2d 577Case Number: 98-163Decided: 03/31/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
KAREN 
McGHEE and JEFFREY McGHEE, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

PETER E. RORK, M. D., 
Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Teton County, The Honorable H. Hunter Patrick, 
Judge.

Representing 
Appellants:

David G. Lewis, 
Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing 
Appellee:

Jeffrey C. 
Brinkerhoff and Hampton K. O'Neill of Brown, Drew, Massey & Sullivan, 
Casper, Wyoming.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN & HILL, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellants Karen 
McGhee and Jeffrey McGhee appeal from the judgment which was entered after the 
jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee Peter Rork, M. 
D.

[¶2]      We affirm. 

ISSUES

[¶3]      The McGhees state 
three issues on appeal:

1. Whether the 
District Court abused its discretion in the denial of the plaintiffs' Motion to 
Transfer Venue; and by its failure to excuse for cause certain jurors who were 
subject to challenge under Wyoming Statute § 1-11-203.

2. Whether the 
District Court abused its discretion by disallowing the cross examination of the 
Defendant Dr. Rork's clinical partner on his observations of the pre-surgical 
condition of the Plaintiff Karen McGhee.

3. Whether the 
District Court erred as a matter of law by refusing to instruct the jury with 
the Wyoming Pattern Jury Instruction on causation.

FACTS

[¶4]      On September 7, 
1995, Karen McGhee, a recovery room nurse at St. John's Hospital in Jackson, 
suffered an injury to her right knee while she was pushing a gurney with a 
patient on it. A few weeks later, she noticed that her right knee would not 
extend completely, and she consulted with Dr. Rork, a board certified orthopedic 
surgeon. He took a history from Karen and examined her knee. He told her that 
she had a "bucket handle" tear of the meniscus. According to Dr. Rork, when the 
meniscus is torn, "it can develop a frayed edge and then go on to a free flap of 
an edge" which prevents the knee from extending completely. Over the course of 
time, the joint surface can become rough to the point "where you actually erode 
all the articular cartilage off the joint."

[¶5]      Dr. Rork ordered 
an MRI, and the MRI confirmed that Karen had a tear in the meniscus but showed 
that the tear was in the anterior horn of the lateral meniscus. Dr. Rork 
performed arthroscopic surgery on September 29, 1995, to repair the tear. After 
the surgery, Karen developed what appeared to be a femoral nerve palsy or 
weakness in the quadriceps muscle of her leg. Dr. Rork referred her to a 
specialist, who confirmed that she had a femoral nerve 
palsy.

[¶6]      The McGhees filed 
suit against St. John's Hospital and Zimmer, Inc., the manufacturer of the 
machine used during Karen's surgery. Nine months before the trial, the McGhees 
named Dr. Rork as a defendant as well. They settled with the hospital and Zimmer 
but proceeded to trial against Dr. Rork.

[¶7]      Six business days 
before the trial, the McGhees filed a motion to transfer venue, claiming that 
the jury pool in Teton County had been poisoned by publicity about Dr. Rork's 
plans to build an outpatient surgery center and about a newly approved procedure 
he had been chosen to perform on arthritic knees. They also argued that 
twenty-one people who were in the prospective juror pool were potentially biased 
because they or their family members of the first degree had been Dr. Rork's 
patients. The trial court did not grant the McGhees' motion; however, it added 
thirty people to the pool of potential jurors.

[¶8]      A jury was 
chosen, and both attorneys passed the panel for cause. At the end of the trial, 
the jury returned a verdict finding that Dr. Rork had not been negligent in 
treating Karen. The McGhees filed a motion for a new trial, and the trial court 
denied their motion. They appeal to this Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Challenges 
for Cause

[¶9]      The McGhees 
insist that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their for-cause 
challenges against some of the jurors. Although none of the challenged 
individuals were seated on the jury, the McGhees maintain that they were forced 
to use their peremptory challenges when these particular veniremen should have 
been excused for cause.

[¶10]   W.R.C.P. 38(a) affords the right to 
a jury trial in this case, providing that "issues of fact arising in actions for 
the recovery of money only . . . shall be tried by a jury unless a jury trial be 
waived." A proper demand for a jury trial was made by the McGhees. Further, a 
potential juror may be challenged for cause if that person "has formed or 
expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, or is biased 
or prejudiced for or against the accused." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-105(a)(ii) 
(Michie 1997).

[¶11]   This Court recently quoted the test 
which a trial court must apply in determining whether a juror should be 
dismissed for cause:

"The test to be 
applied in determining whether a prospective juror should be dismissed for cause 
is whether that person would render a fair and impartial verdict based on the 
evidence presented at trial and the instructions given by the court. Whether a 
juror is biased is a question of fact for the trial judge. A trial judge's 
decision will only be reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion."

Prindle v. 
State, 945 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632, 
635 (Wyo. 1996) (citations omitted)). We will not conclude that an abuse of 
discretion occurred if we determine that the trial court could reasonably have 
concluded as it did. Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 857 (Wyo. 
1998).

[¶12]   The McGhees claim that three 
members of the jury pool should have been dismissed for cause because one member 
was a potential future employee of Dr. Rork, one potential juror had family 
members who had been patients of Dr. Rork and his partners and who were likely 
to be patients again in the future, and one person had a previous and potential 
future doctor/patient relationship with Dr. Rork. The McGhees challenged these 
veniremen for cause, but the trial court denied the challenges, and the McGhees 
were forced to use their peremptory challenges against them. At the end of the 
jury selection process, however, the McGhees' attorney passed the jury panel for 
cause. "When a defendant passes a jury panel for cause, he waives his claim to 
reversible error." Prindle, 945 P.2d  at 1182. Because the McGhees accepted the 
jury as it was impaneled, they cannot establish reversible error. 945 P.2d  at 
1182-83.

B. Transfer of 
Venue

[¶13]   The McGhees contend that the trial 
court abused its discretion by denying their motion to transfer venue. Dr. Rork 
responds that the trial court properly denied the motion because it failed to 
show the requisite prejudice against the McGhees or their ability to obtain a 
fair trial in Teton County.

[¶14]   Our well established standard of 
review for determining whether a trial court abused its discretion is stated as 
follows:

A court does not 
abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of 
reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse 
of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did.

Hilterbrand v. 
State, 930 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Wyo. 1997). W.R.C.P. 40.1 governs motions to 
transfer venue. That rule provides in pertinent part:

(a) Transfer of 
Trial.

(1) The court 
upon motion of any party made within 15 days after the last pleading is filed 
shall transfer the action to another county for trial if the court is satisfied 
that there exists within the county where the action is pending such prejudice 
against the party or the party's cause that the party cannot obtain a fair and 
impartial trial, or that the convenience of witnesses would be promoted thereby. 
All parties shall have an opportunity to be heard at the hearing on the motion 
and any party may urge objections to any county. If the motion is granted the 
court shall order that the action be transferred to the most convenient county 
to which the objections of the parties do not apply or are the least applicable, 
whether or not such county is specified in the motion. After the first motion 
has been ruled upon, no party may move for transfer without permission of the 
court.

W.R.C.P. 
40.1(a)(1).

[¶15]   The McGhees claim that the pretrial 
publicity prejudiced their ability to convene an impartial jury. In April of 
1997, two articles appeared in the local newspaper about the plan to open an 
outpatient surgery center across the street from St. John's Hospital. Although 
the articles stated that the doctors - Dr. Rork being one of them - would 
provide a cheaper alternative to the hospital, they also stated that such a 
center could be very harmful to the hospital. The newspaper also ran a couple of 
articles in September of 1997 about the fact that Dr. Rork was one of 250 
doctors worldwide who had been chosen to perform a newly approved experimental 
knee-cartilage surgery.

[¶16]   We have adopted a two-pronged test 
for determining whether a change of venue should be granted because of pretrial 
publicity. "First, the nature and extent of the publicity must be considered; 
second, the difficulty or ease in selecting a jury must be considered along with 
the amount of prejudice which actually appears during voir dire examination." 
Murry v. State, 713 P.2d 202, 208 (Wyo. 1986). In the case at bar, none of the 
articles complained of pertained to this case in any way. The publicity about 
the proposed surgery center was not necessarily favorable to Dr. Rork because 
many people in Jackson Hole may have perceived it as being a serious threat to 
the hospital and to the community. We hold that the publicity about Dr. Rork's 
professional plans and accomplishments which preceded this case had nothing to 
do with the case and did not prejudice this proceeding.

[¶17]   Regarding the McGhees' concern that 
so many of the potential jurors or their families had been Dr. Rork's patients, 
we conclude that this fact alone was not sufficient to require the venue to 
change. As we said in Murry: "We know of no rule of law that mandates that a 
prospective juror be excused just because he knows a party, a witness or some 
other principal in the trial. If there were such a rule, a change of venue would 
be required in virtually every case in Wyoming." 713 P.2d  at 207. It is an 
undeniable fact that the small communities in Wyoming breed many acquaintances 
within their populations. As a result, potential jurors are often going to have 
some sort of familiarity with the parties. Such acquaintances do not necessarily 
create unfair prejudices. The voir dire process is designed to detect prejudices 
which may be present and to eliminate them. See Murry, 713 P.2d  at 208; Shaffer 
v. State, 640 P.2d 88, 103 (Wyo. 1982). In our opinion, that process worked in 
this case.

C. Expert 
Testimony

[¶18]   The McGhees claim that the 
testimony from Kenneth Lambert, M. D., an orthopedic surgeon, with regard to his 
thoughts on whether the meniscus tear would have caused the knee to lock was 
improperly limited. Dr. Rork counters that the excluded testimony was 
impermissible because it had not been designated and was surprise 
standard-of-care opinion.

[¶19]   The trial court has broad 
discretion in making its evidentiary rulings, and we will not overturn its 
decisions in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Hermreck v. State, 956 P.2d 335, 339 (Wyo. 1998). Once a trial court has ruled on whether to allow 
expert testimony, this Court will overturn that determination in only extreme 
cases where a clear indication exists of an abuse of discretion which resulted 
in prejudicial error. Stauffer Chemical Company v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1099 
(Wyo. 1989).

[¶20]   Dr. Lambert saw Karen as a patient 
just a few days after her surgery because Dr. Rork was out of town and she had 
been experiencing pain and swelling in her right leg. Dr. Lambert reviewed the 
videotape of the surgery to "be sure there hadn't been an injury to the 
[peroneal] nerve."

[¶21]   The McGhees designated Dr. Lambert 
as a treating physician who would "testify as to his observations, diagnoses, 
treatment, and opinions about Karen McGhee's condition." They did not designate 
him as a standard-of-care witness. The McGhees' attorney asked Dr. Lambert if he 
saw anything during his review of the videotape which could have caused Karen's 
knee to lock. Dr. Rork's attorney objected, arguing that this was an attempt to 
elicit expert testimony to show Dr. Rork was negligent for performing an 
unnecessary surgery and that this testimony constituted impermissible 
standard-of-care testimony. The trial court agreed and sustained the objection. 
A few pages later in the trial transcript, however, Dr. Lambert 
stated:

[W]hen you're 
bringing in an arthroscope, trying to find something that explains what the 
patient symptoms were. . . . 

You're asking me 
what - before what could I see that could cause it to lock. And with the 
arthroscope it's very hard to be sure because you have basically inflated the 
joint; and so a lot of times things that might stick in the joint aren't there 
anymore, just by the distortion of filling . . . it with 
fluid.

So it's 
sometimes difficult to find something that causes a knee to lock or to be sure 
that it is.

[¶22]   The McGhees sought to introduce 
standard-of-care testimony from a witness whom they had designated as a treating 
physician. Even though the trial court sustained the objection to the elicited 
testimony, it ultimately came in when Dr. Lambert testified that, with the 
arthroscope, it is very difficult to find something which is causing a knee to 
lock or to be sure that the knee is locking. Without having an offer of proof 
from the McGhees' attorney, it appears to us that their question was answered. 
They certainly have not shown a clear indication that there was an abuse of 
discretion which resulted in prejudicial error.

D. Causation 
Instruction

[¶23]   The McGhees allege that the trial 
court improperly instructed the jury on the Wyoming law of causation. Dr. Rork 
claims that this issue is moot because the jury never reached the issue of 
causation.

[¶24]   The verdict form which was given to 
the jury provided in pertinent part:

1. Was the 
Defendant, Peter Rork, M. D., negligent as that term has been defined in these 
instructions?

Answer: Yes 
_____ No ______

If your answer 
is "no", stop. Sign the verdict form and deliver it to the bailiff. If your 
answer is "yes", continue by answering question 2.

2. Do you find 
the negligence of Peter Rork, M.D. was a proximate cause of any damages 
sustained by Karen McGhee?

Answer: Yes 
_____ No ______

[¶25]   The jury answered the first 
question "no." It, therefore, was not allowed to proceed to the second question. 
The issue of whether the jury was properly instructed on Wyoming law of 
causation is, accordingly, moot, and a determination on this issue is not 
necessary. Bard Ranch Co. v. Frederick, 950 P.2d 564, 566 (Wyo. 
1997).

[¶26]   Affirmed.