Title: STATE EX REL DEPT OF HWYS v PUB

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12765 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 19 74 THE STATE OF MONTANA, ACTING BY AND THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , PUBLIC EMPLOYEES CRAFT COUNCIL OF MONTANA, REPRESENTING THE MONTANA DISTRICT COUNCIL OF LABORERS, THE J O I N T COUNCIL OF TEAMSTERS NO. 23, THE MONTANA MACHINISTS COUNCIL , OPERATING ENGINEERS , AND PA INTERS ; VIRGIL BUETTNER AS PRESIDENT OF SAID COUNCIL AND JAMES L. MURRAY AS SECRETARY-TREASURER OF SAID COUNCIL, D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s . A p p e a l f r o m : D i s t r i c t C o u r t of the F i r s t Judicial D i s t r i c t , H o n o r a b l e P e t e r G. M e l o y , Judge presiding. C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For A p p e l l a n t : Jack H o l s t r o m argued, and D a n i e l J. Sullivan appeared, H i g h w a y Legal D e p a r t m e n t , H e l e n a , M o n t a n a For R e s p o n d e n t s : H i l l e y and L o r i n g , G r e a t Falls, M o n t a n a B e n j a m i n W. H i l l e y argued and E m i l i e L o r i n g argued, G r e a t Falls, M o n t a n a S u b m i t t e d : N o v e m b e r 18, 1974 D e c i d e d : DE C 9 - x 7974 M r . Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This case involves a s t r i k e by approximately 285 teamsters, operating.eagineers, machinists, laborers, and painters employed by appellant Montana Department of Highways t o perform a l l high- way maintenance functions on interstate, primary, and certain secondary roads i n the Butte, Great Falls, Missoula, Bozeman, and Helena areas, These employees were responsible for the repair, reconditioning, and general upkeep of roughly 3,000 miles of roads. Their major duties were: removing snow and i c e from the traveled surfaces and applying traction materials such a s sand and chemicals; patching, resurfacing, and regrading road surfaces; repairing bridges and other highway structures; repairing, re- placing, or installing snow fences, culverts, ditches, fences, t r a f f i c safety devices, signs and signals, guardrails, and t r a f f i c delineators within right-of-way l i m i t s ; stockpiling traction materials for snow season use; repairing and maintaining road- side r e s t areas, litter barrels, and campsites; repairing and maintaining s t a t e motor pool vehicles, snow plows, road patrols, caterpillars, and other equipment utilized i n appellant's maintenance operations; and performing services during emergencies, such a s assisting stranded motorists, removing obstructions (over- turned vehicles, rock slides, e t c , ) , and providing t r a f f i c control, O f necessity, these a c t i v i t i e s w e r e performed on a 24 hour basis. The s t r i k e by respondent Public Employees Craft Council against appellant occurred on January 21, 1974, and appellant applied t o the d i s t r i c t court of Lewis and Clark County the same day for a temporary restraining order prohibiting the strike. The d i s t r i c t court granted appellant's request and scheduled a show cause hearing t o determine whether the s t r i k e should be permanently en- joined. Respondent f i l e d a motion t o dismiss appellant's complaint, and a show cause hearing thereon was scheduled for March 28, 1974. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the allegations contained in appellant's complaint--including those relating to disruption of highway maintenance programs and injury to the health, safety, and welfare of the traveling public--were ad- mitted. It should be noted here, however, that the issues before us and discussed hereafter in this opinion, do not involve injury to the health, safety and welfare of the traveling public. Nevertheless, the district court granted the motion to dismiss and dissolved the temporary restraining order. Appellant appeals from that order. There is but one issue: Did the district court err in determining that the maintenance employees of the Hontana De- partment of Highways have the right to strike under ~ontana's PublicEmployees Collective Bargaining Act ? The portion of the Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act in dispute, section 59-1603(1), R . C . M . 1947, provides: "Public employees shall have and shall be protected in the exercise of, the right of self-organization, to form, join or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing on questions of wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar- gaining or other mutual aid or protection. free from interference, restraint or coercion. " (~mphasis a d d e d ) . This language is almost idential to that found in the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley A c t ) , 1947, which at 29 U . S . C . A . , 5 157, provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist in labor organizations, to bar- gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection * * *. " (Emphasis a d d e d ) . The phrase "concerted activities" does not appear in any other Montana statute, and this Court has never been called upon to interpret it. The phrase first appeared in the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act, 1932, at 29 U . S . C . , 5 102; then in the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner A c t ) , 1935, at 49 Stat.449, 452; and again in the Taft-Hartley Act, 1947, 29 U . S . C . A . , 5 157. Consequently, some forty years of federal interpretation is behind this language. The United States Supreme Court, as well as innumerable lower federal courts, has consistently held that It concerted activities" includes strikes. Automobile Workers v . ~'~rien, 339 U.S. 454, 94 L ed 978, 70 S.Ct. 781; Bus Employees v . Wisconsin Board, 340 U . S . 383, 389, 71 Sect. 359, 95 L ed 364; Weber v . Anheuser-Busch, 348 U . S . 468, 75 S.Ct. 480, 99 L ed 546. These cases all involved state legislative attempts to limit the right to strike in the private sector. The Supreme Court found such efforts to be in conflict with the protections afforded by the Taft-Hartley Act and thus unconsitutional under the Supremacy Clause (Article V I ) of the United States Constitution. In Bus - Employees, the Supreme Court stated: "We have recently examined the extent to which Congress has regulated peaceful strikes for higher wages in industries affecting commerce. Automobile Workers v . Ol~rien, 339 U . S . 454 ( 1 9 5 0 ) . We noted that Congress, in 5 7 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, as amended by the Labor Management Re- lations Act of 1947, ex ressly safeguarded for employees F: in such industries the right * * * to engage in * * * concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, e . g . , to strike. t It Appellant contends that a different interpretation of "con- certed activities" ought to prevail here, since public rather than private employees are involved. The California Supreme Court consi- dered the same proposition in Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v . Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 8 Cal.Rptr. 1, 355 P . 2 d 905, 997. In that case the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act created a public authority for transportation of passengers in a four county area in and around Los Angeles. Stats. 1957, ch. 547, as amended by Stats. 1959, ch. 519. Sub- division ( c ) of section 3 . 6 of that Act provided that employees of the Transit Authority had the right, among others, to engage "in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." When the employees struck, the Transit Authority sought a declaratory judgment that they were without the legal right to strike because they were public employees. The court held unequivocally that the grant of the right t o engage i n I1 concerted activitiesff meant the same thing for public employees a s it did for private employees, that i s , it included the right to strike: "When legislation has been judicially construed and a subsequent s t a t u t e on the same or an analogous subject i s framed i n the identical language, it w i l l ordinarily be presumed that the Legislature intended that the language a s used i n the l a t e r enactment would be given a like interpretation. This r u l e i s applicable t o s t a t e statutes which are patterned a f t e r federal statutes. [Citing cases] Although the cases which have interpreted the italicized words involved private employees, the a c t before us incorporates the exact language, consisting of 16 words, found i n the e a r l i e r statutes, and it i s unlikely that the same words would have been repeated without any qualifica- tion i n a l a t e r s t a t u t e i n the absence of an intent that they be given the construction previously adopted by the courts. I1 W e think similar standards of judicial construction apply i n the present case. For example, section 19-102, R.C.M. 1947, pro- vides : "Words and phrases used i n the codes or other statutes of Montana are construed according t o the context and the approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such others a s - have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning i n law, or a r e dekined i n the succeeding section, a s amended, are t o be construed according t o such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition. " (Emphasis added). After more than forty years of construction by federal and I I s t a t e courts, concerted activities" indisputably has become a labor 11 law t e r m , a technical phrase which has acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning i n law". That meaning includes strikes. Appellant may wish that the s t a t u t e read otherwise but t h i s Court i s not a t l i b e r t y t o amend our statutes. State v. Midland National Bankel= Mont. 339, 343, 317 P.2d 880. This Court con- cludes that ~ o n t a n a ' s legislature meant the phrase "concerted activities" t o have a meaning identical t o that found i n analogous statutes of other jurisdictions. To hold otherwise would flaunt a cardinal principle of statutory construction. This conclusion i s reinforced by the fact that employees under ~ o n t a n a ' s Collective Bargaining Act, Sections 59-1601 through 59-1616, R.C.M. 1947, a r e nowhere prohibited from striking. Two other classes of Montana public employees---nurses and teachers-- have specific restrictions or bans on their right to strike. See sections 41-2209 and 75-6120(2) ( c ) , R . C . M . 1947. We comment further that the purposes expressed in the nurses, teachers and public employees acts are similar. As to the nurses, section 41-2201, R . C . M . 1947, enacted in 1969, the purpose was expressed If* * * to encourage the practice of mutually and peace- fully agreeing upon the establishment and maintenance of desirable employment practices * * *." In the teachers act, section 75-6116, R . C . M . 1947, enacted in 1971, the purpose was expressed I ' * * * to establish procedures which will facilitate and encourage amicable settlement of disputes. I ' In the public employees act, section 59-1601, R . C . M . 1947, enacted in 1973, the purpose was expressed " * * * to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining to arrive at friendly adjustment * * *." If the legislaturehd intended to limit respondent's right to strike, it could have done so expressly as it did with nurses and teachers, since as heretofore shown all this legislation had the same expressed purpose. Since respondent had the right to strike specifically granted its members by the legislature, the order of the district court dismissing the complaint and dissolving the temporary restraining order is affirmed. 4 i - . - 1 . , I -r-lii,,----- ,--, - ------------ --:- Chief Justice.