Title: State ex rel. R.A.M.E., Inc. v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. R.A.M.E., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-575.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-575 
THE STATE EX REL. R.A.M.E., INC., APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. R.A.M.E., Inc. v. Indus. Comm.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-575.] 
Workers’ compensation — Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-3-03(J)(1) — Employer’s 
failure to provide safety equipment not established — Reconsideration 
ordered. 
(No. 2009-0831 — Submitted December 15, 2009 — Decided  
February 24, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 08AP-426,  
2009-Ohio-1377. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, appellant, R.A.M.E., Inc., challenges appellee 
Industrial Commission of Ohio’s finding that R.A.M.E. committed a violation of 
a specific safety requirement (“VSSR”).  In early 2004, R.A.M.E. was installing 
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the roof on a new school building. R.A.M.E. hired appellee Shawn Pawich Sr. as 
a general laborer/roofer on that project. On February 9, 2004, Pawich was 
working on the roof, but was not wearing the safety harness that he had brought to 
the job site. Pawich fell off the roof, and after his workers’ compensation claim 
was allowed, he alleged that R.A.M.E. had violated Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-3-
03(J)(1), which states:  “Lifelines, safety belts or harnesses and lanyards shall be 
provided by the employer and it shall be the responsibility of the employee to 
wear such equipment when * * * exposed to hazards of falling where the 
operation being performed is more than six feet above ground * * *.” 
{¶ 2} The harness that Pawich had brought to work belonged to his 
brother. Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-3-03(C)(2) permits employees to supply their 
own protective equipment so long as it provides protection equivalent to that 
offered by the employer. At his VSSR hearing, Pawich testified that he had 
borrowed his brother’s harness because R.A.M.E. had not provided him with one. 
Several of Pawich’s coworkers, however, had been deposed, and each one stated 
that R.A.M.E. had provided harnesses and other safety equipment to them on their 
first day. 
{¶ 3} A commission staff hearing officer concluded that R.A.M.E. had 
not provided Pawich with a safety harness: 
{¶ 4} “[A]t about the time the injured worker sustained his injury of 
record, he was in the possession of a safety harness which belonged to his brother.  
There is no reason that the claimant would seek to borrow a safety harness 
belonging to another person if his employer had provided him with one.” 
{¶ 5} The hearing officer’s finding rendered irrelevant Pawich’s failure 
to wear his brother’s harness, because a claimant’s negligence is immaterial if the 
employer did not comply with the specific safety requirement initially. State ex 
rel. Danstar Builders, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 108 Ohio St.3d  315, 843 N.E.2d 761. 
A violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-3-03(J)(1) was accordingly found. 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 6} After rehearing was refused, R.A.M.E. filed a complaint in 
mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.  The court of appeals 
upheld the VSSR, but based its decision on an allegation that had never been 
raised at the VSSR hearing.  In a deposition that preceded the VSSR hearing, 
Pawich had stated that R.A.M.E. had offered him a safety harness, but only in 
exchange for a fee or deposit. Pawich did not, however, repeat that allegation at 
the hearing, nor did the hearing officer refer to that deposition in his order. The 
court of appeals nevertheless relied on that statement and concluded that  
R.A.M.E.’s offer of a safety harness to Pawich did not satisfy Ohio Adm.Code 
4123:1-3-03(J)(1), because an employer does not “provide” safety equipment 
within the meaning of the safety code when it offers equipment for a fee.  It thus 
concluded that the commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that 
R.A.M.E. had violated that requirement. 
{¶ 7} This cause is now before this court on appeal as of right. 
{¶ 8} The reasoning contained in both the commission’s order and the 
court of appeals’ decision cannot be sustained. The court of appeals held that an 
employer that charges a fee for safety equipment does not “provide” that 
equipment within the meaning of Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-3-03(J)(1). The staff 
hearing officer, however, never found that R.A.M.E. had charged a fee for safety 
gear.  To the contrary, Pawich never made that argument to the hearing officer, so 
the credibility of that statement has never been ruled upon by the commission. 
{¶ 9} The hearing officer instead determined that only one conclusion 
could be drawn from Pawich’s possession of his brother’s harness on the date of 
injury: that R.A.M.E. had not offered a harness to Pawich.  This logic also cannot 
withstand scrutiny.  There are several reasons why Pawich might have had his 
brother’s harness at the time of injury — familiarity, convenience, or comfort, for 
example. For the hearing officer to find that Pawich’s possession of another 
harness compelled the conclusion that R.A.M.E. had not offered Pawich a safety 
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harness and had therefore violated a specific safety requirement was an abuse of 
discretion. 
{¶ 10} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and a limited writ 
is issued ordering the commission to vacate its order.  Because the evidence is 
extensive and conflicting, however, the case is not now amenable to a declaration 
that no VSSR was committed.  Credibility may be a key issue, and this is a 
determination that lies exclusively with the commission.  We therefore reverse the 
court of appeals and issue a limited writ that orders the commission to vacate its 
order, reconsider the application, and issue a new order. 
Judgment reversed  
and limited writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
__________________ 
Stefanski & Associates, L.L.C., and Janice T. O’Halloran, for appellant. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Kevin J. Reis, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
Philip J. Fulton Law Office, Philip J. Fulton, and William A. Thorman III, 
for appellee Shane Pawich Sr. 
______________________