Title: In re Commitment of Simons

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 97026-Agenda 7-September 2004.
In re COMMITMENT OF STEPHEN E. SIMONS (The People of 							
the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Stephen E. Simons, Appellee).
Opinion filed December 16, 2004.
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Madison County,
respondent, Stephen Simons, was found to be a sexually violent
person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (the Act)
(725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2002)) and committed to the custody
of the Department of Health and Human Services for control, custody,
and treatment. Respondent appealed, arguing that the trial court erred
in admitting certain expert testimony without first conducting a Frye
hearing. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The
appellate court agreed, reversed the trial court's judgment, and
remanded the cause for further proceedings. No. 5-02-0579
(unpublished under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed the State's
petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).
BACKGROUND
	On February 20, 2001, the State filed a petition to have
respondent committed to the Department of Health and Human
Services as a sexually violent person. The petition alleged that
respondent has a history of committing sexually violent offenses,
including a 1988 conviction for the aggravated criminal sexual abuse
of a child under the age of 13 and a 1992 conviction for the
aggravated criminal sexual assault of a child under the age of 13. In
1996, respondent pleaded guilty to the criminal sexual assault of his
13-year-old stepdaughter and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. In
exchange for that guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss two
additional charges of aggravated criminal sexual assault that were
pending against respondent, one involving a 13-year-old girl and the
other involving a 14-year-old girl. The petition further alleged that
respondent was scheduled for release from prison on February 21,
2001, and that he suffers from numerous mental disorders, including
paraphilia and antisocial personality disorder, that make it substantially
probable that he will again engage in acts of sexual violence.
	A bench trial commenced, and respondent filed a motion in
limine as to the State's two expert witnesses, Dr. Jacqueline N. Buck
and Dr. Paul J. Heaton. Dr. Buck and Dr. Heaton are clinical
psychologists who evaluated respondent and were prepared to testify
that respondent is a sexually violent person as defined by the Act. In
support of his motion, respondent argued that, in preparing their
opinions, Dr. Buck and Dr. Heaton relied upon certain actuarial risk
assessment instruments, including the Minnesota Sex Offender
Screening Tool-Revised (MnSOST-R), the Static-99, the Violent
Risk Assessment Guide (VRAG), and the Sex Offender Risk
Assessment Guide (SORAG). According to respondent, actuarial risk
assessment is a novel scientific methodology that has yet to gain
general acceptance in the psychological and psychiatric communities.
Accordingly, respondent argued, any expert testimony based upon
actuarial risk assessment must be excluded under Frye. In response,
the State argued that (1) actuarial principles are not the least bit novel
and therefore are not subject to Frye; and (2) even if the particular
actuarial instruments at issue are novel, they have gained general
acceptance in the relevant psychological and psychiatric communities.
The trial court agreed with the State, denied respondent's motion, and
allowed Dr. Buck and Dr. Heaton to testify.
	Dr. Buck testified that she is a licensed clinical psychologist
employed by the special evaluation unit of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (Department). In this capacity, Dr. Buck was assigned to
evaluate respondent and determine whether he would be eligible for
civil commitment under the Act following his release from prison. Dr.
Buck's evaluation began with a review of the master file for each of
respondent's several convictions. The master file includes all of the
records relating to the particular conviction, including police reports,
criminal court records, Department records, and any psychological or
psychiatric evaluations. After reviewing the master files, Dr. Buck met
with the three other psychologists employed by the Department's
special evaluations unit to discuss respondent's case. All four
psychologists agreed that respondent appeared to fit the criteria for
civil commitment and that a face-to-face interview should be
conducted. Dr. Buck interviewed respondent for 90 minutes at the Big
Muddy River Correctional Center. Based upon both the interview and
her review of respondent's files, Dr. Buck concluded that respondent
suffers from paraphilia, alcohol abuse in a controlled environment, and
antisocial personality disorder with narcissistic tendencies. According
to Dr. Buck, these mental disorders "affect a person's emotional and
volitional capacity and predispose that person to engage in acts of
sexual violence."
	Dr. Buck's evaluation also included an assessment of
respondent's probability of reoffending. She first used a personality
test called the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised. According to Dr.
Buck, respondent scored a 32 on this test, placing him in a category
of persons who are two to four times more likely to reoffend with acts
of violence.
	Dr. Buck then used a number of actuarial risk assessment
instruments, including the MnSOST-R, the Static-99, the VRAG, the
SORAG, and the Hanson and Bussiere meta-analysis. The
MnSOST-R was developed using a group of 256 sex offenders who
were followed for six years after their release from the Minnesota
Department of Corrections. Dr. Buck gave respondent a score 13 on
the MnSOST-R, which places him in the category of offenders having
an 88% chance of reoffending within six years. The Static-99 is based
upon a study of thousands of sex offenders from England, Canada,
and the United States. According to Dr. Buck, the creators of the
Static-99 regard a score of six or higher as being "a very high risk."
Dr. Buck gave respondent a score of seven, which places him "in the
top twelve percent of persons who were scored on this tool and who
sexually reoffended." The VRAG is an instrument designed to predict
violent reoffenders, as opposed to sexual reoffenders. On the VRAG,
Dr. Buck gave respondent a score of 20, which places him in the
category of offenders having a 55% chance of reoffending within 7
years and a 64% chance of reoffending within 10 years. On the
SORAG, which examines the risk of sexual recidivism, Dr. Buck gave
respondent a score of 30, "which placed him at the 98th percentile in
terms of risk to reoffend." The Hanson and Bussiere meta-analysis
was derived from a review of 51 published studies, which collectively
covered approximately 28,000 convicted and released sex offenders.
The study evaluated more than 100 variables and identified those that
are statistically significant in terms of distinguishing offenders who are
likely to sexually reoffend from offenders who are unlikely to sexually
reoffend. According to Dr. Buck, respondent "has a number of risk
factors that stem from the study."
	Dr. Buck concluded her testimony with the opinion that, if
respondent is released to the community, it is substantially probable
that he will reoffend with additional acts of sexual violence.
	Dr. Heaton testified that he is a clinical psychologist employed by
Affiliated Psychologists, Ltd., in Chicago, which has contracted with
the Illinois Department of Human Services to provide psychological
assessments in connection with the Act. Dr. Heaton begins each
assessment with a review of all available documents, including the
master file, medical records, school records, and psychological
evaluations. He then administers a battery of psychological tests,
which is followed by a comprehensive clinical interview. Finally, after
compiling all of the collected information, as well as any available
actuarial data, Dr. Heaton writes his evaluation.
	Following his interview with and testing of respondent, Dr.
Heaton diagnosed respondent with paraphilia, alcohol abuse, and
antisocial personality disorder, all of which affect a person's emotional
and volitional capacity and predispose that person to commit acts of
sexual violence. Dr. Heaton then employed several actuarial
instruments to assess respondent's probability of reoffending. The
Hanson and Bussiere meta-analysis identified several risk factors that
reinforced his clinical impressions. On the Static-99, Dr. Heaton
testified that, although Dr. Buck scored respondent "a little bit higher"
than he did, Dr. Heaton's score likewise placed respondent "in the
category of individuals who were found to have a high risk of
reoffense." On the MnSOST-R, Dr. Heaton gave respondent a score
of 13, which placed respondent "in the range representing a high risk
for reoffense." Based upon both his clinical evaluation of respondent
and the actuarial data, Dr. Heaton concluded that respondent suffers
from mental disorders that predispose him to act in sexually violent
ways and that he therefore meets the criteria for commitment under
the Act.
	At this point, the State rested, and respondent declined to put on
any evidence. The trial court found respondent to be a sexually violent
person under the Act and committed him to the Department of Health
and Human Services for care and treatment in a secured facility.
	Respondent appealed, in part arguing that the trial court erred in
admitting the testimony of Dr. Buck and Dr. Heaton without first
conducting a Frye hearing. Relying upon the appellate court's decision
in People v. Taylor, 335 Ill. App. 3d 965 (2002), the appellate court
agreed with respondent, reversed the trial court's judgment, and
remanded the cause for further proceedings. No. 5-02-0579
(unpublished under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed the State's
petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

DISCUSSION
	Although not raised by the parties, we wish to begin our
discussion by clarifying the appropriate standard of review for a trial
court's Frye rulings.
	In Illinois, the admission of expert testimony is governed by the
standard first expressed in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923). Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 76-77 (2002). Commonly called the "general acceptance" test,
the Frye standard dictates that scientific evidence is admissible at trial
only if the methodology or scientific principle upon which the opinion
is based is "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs." Frye, 293 F.  at 1014. In
this context, "general acceptance" does not mean universal
acceptance, and it does not require that the methodology in question
be accepted by unanimity, consensus, or even a majority of experts.
Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d  at 78. Instead, it is sufficient that the
underlying method used to generate an expert's opinion is reasonably
relied upon by experts in the relevant field. Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d  at
77. Significantly, the Frye test applies only to "new" or "novel"
scientific methodologies. Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d  at 78-79. Generally
speaking, a scientific methodology is considered "new" or "novel" if
it is " 'original or striking' " or "does 'not resembl[e] something
formerly known or used.' " Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d  at 79, quoting
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1546 (1993).
	Historically, this court has applied an across-the-board abuse of
discretion standard when reviewing Frye rulings. See, e.g., Donaldson
v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 76 (2002);
People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 187 (1996). After careful
consideration, we believe that the better approach is that advocated by
Chief Justice McMorrow in her Miller special concurrence, namely,
that reviewing courts may rely upon materials that were not part of
the trial record to determine whether a Frye hearing is required and,
if so, whether the scientific technique at issue is generally accepted in
the relevant scientific community. See Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 204
(McMorrow, J., concurring); see also Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d  at 104-07 (McMorrow, J., concurring, joined by Garman, J.). Accordingly,
we hereby adopt a dual standard of review with respect to the trial
court's admission of expert scientific testimony. The decision as to
whether an expert scientific witness is qualified to testify in a subject
area, and whether the proffered testimony is relevant in a particular
case, remains in the sound discretion of the trial court. The trial
court's Frye analysis, however, is now subject to de novo review. In
conducting such de novo review, the reviewing court may consider
not only the trial court record but also, where appropriate, sources
outside the record, including legal and scientific articles, as well as
court opinions from other jurisdictions. See Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 203
(McMorrow, J., concurring).
	As Chief Justice McMorrow correctly explained in Miller,
allowing for de novo review in this context makes sense for several
reasons, foremost of which "is the fact that the general acceptance
issue transcends any particular dispute." See Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 204
(McMorrow, J., concurring). Indeed, " '[t]he question of general
acceptance of a scientific technique, while referring to only one of the
criteria for admissibility of expert testimony, in another sense
transcends that particular inquiry, for, in attempting to establish such
general acceptance for purposes of the case at hand, the proponent
will also be asking the court to establish the law of the jurisdiction for
future cases.' " Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 204 (McMorrow, J., concurring),
quoting Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35, 40 (D.C. App. 1988).
Application of less than a de novo standard of review to an issue that
transcends individual cases invariably leads to inconsistent treatment
of similarly situated claims. See Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 204-05
(McMorrow, J., concurring). Because "[t]he general acceptance of a
scientific technique does not change from one courtroom to another,"
the legal assessment of that general acceptance should not change
from court to court either. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 205 (McMorrow, J.,
concurring).
	In addition, Chief Justice McMorrow correctly noted that a de
novo standard that permits reliance on materials outside the trial
record is not, in this context, problematic. See Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at
205 (McMorrow, J., concurring). Under the Frye standard, the trial
court is not asked to determine the validity of a particular scientific
technique. Rather, the court's responsibility is to determine the
existence, or nonexistence, of general consensus in the relevant
scientific community regarding the reliability of that technique.
" 'Accordingly, because the focus is primarily on counting scientists'
votes, rather than on verifying the soundness of a scientific conclusion,
there will not be the concerns about witness credibility and hearsay
normally associated with citations to empirical or scientific studies
whose authors cannot be observed or cross-examined.' " Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 205 (McMorrow, J., concurring), quoting Jones, 548 A.2d 
at 42.
	Significantly, this court in both Donaldson and Miller implicitly
acknowledged the utility of the de novo standard in the Frye context,
even when purporting to apply an abuse of discretion standard. In
both of those cases, this court went outside the trial court record to
assess the validity of the trial court's Frye ruling. In Miller, for
example, the court expressly relied upon numerous court decisions
and journal articles that had been published "[s]ince the time of the
pretrial hearing." Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 189. In Donaldson, the court
had to go outside the record to ascertain the very definition of the
scientific principle at issue. Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d  at 82 n.2. Thus,
today's decision to formally endorse a de novo standard for Frye
rulings is not so much a departure from this court's existing analytical
framework as it is a recognition of the analytical framework under
which this court has been operating for sometime, albeit under the
wrong name.
	Finally, we note that several other state supreme courts employ
a de novo standard when reviewing Frye rulings. See, e.g., State v.
Tankersley, 191 Ariz. 359, 365, 956 P.2d 486, 492 (1998); Castillo
v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d 1264, 1268 (Fla.
2003); State v. Shively, 268 Kan. 573, 576, 999 P.2d 952, 955 (2000);
Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191, 201 n.5, 803 A.2d 1034, 1040 n.5
(2002); State v. Bailey, 677 N.W.2d 380, 398 (Minn. 2004); State v.
Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 167, 699 A.2d 596, 619 (1997); State v. Gore,
143 Wash. 2d 288, 304, 21 P.3d 262, 271 (2001).
	Turning now to the case at hand, we are asked to decide whether
actuarial risk assessment, as utilized by Dr. Buck and Dr. Heaton, is
admissible under Frye. The appellate court is sharply divided on this
question. One view is represented by People v. Taylor, 335 Ill. App.
3d 965 (2002). In Taylor, as in the present case, the trial court held
that the actuarial instruments at issue, including the MnSOST-R and
the Static-99, were not scientific methodologies subject to Frye.
Taylor, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 972. In reversing, the Second District of
the appellate court first stated:
		"Whether these tools are viewed as psychological tests or
actuarial instruments, they certainly constitute a scientific
methodology for predicting sexual offender recidivism. As
such a methodology has yet to be adopted in a court
proceeding in Illinois, the State was obligated to show that
these instruments have gained acceptance in the relevant
scientific community as required under Frye." Taylor, 335 Ill.
App. 3d at 977.
The next question became whether the State had met its burden of
proving that actuarial risk assessment has gained general acceptance
in the psychological and psychiatric communities. Taylor, 335 Ill.
App. 3d at 977. The court held that it had not. Although the court
conceded that "many psychologists and psychiatrists utilize these
instruments to predict whether a sexual offender is likely to reoffend,"
the court remained convinced that "the instruments are still in the
experimental stages and that the validity of these instruments has not
been established." Taylor, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 978. The court was
most concerned about the absence of published peer-reviewed studies
concerning the validity of these instruments, as such studies "are
important steps in the acceptance of a new methodology by the
psychological community." Taylor, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 978.
	The opposite view is represented by In re Detention of Erbe, 344
Ill. App. 3d 350 (2003), in which the Fourth District held that (1)
actuarial risk assessment is not a novel scientific method subject to
Frye, and (2) even if it is, it meets the general acceptance test. In
Erbe, the court methodically examined each step of the Frye inquiry,
concluding at each step that testimony based upon actuarial risk
assessment is admissible. First, the court held that actuarial
instruments such as the MnSOST-R, the Static-99, and the VRAG
"do not purport to involve a scientific principle, method, or test to
which Frye applies." Erbe, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 364. Rather, these
instruments " 'are simply actuarial tables-methods of organizing and
interpreting a collection of historical data.' " Erbe, 344 Ill. App. 3d at
364, quoting In re Commitment of R.S., 339 N.J. Super. 507, 540,
773 A.2d 72, 92 (2001), aff'd, 173 N.J. 134, 801 A.2d 219 (2002).
The court then explained that, even if actuarial risk assessment does
constitute a scientific methodology, it still is not subject to Frye
because actuarial science is not the least bit "new" or "novel." Erbe,
344 Ill. App. 3d at 365. According to the court, "[o]ur society uses
actuarial methods to predict human behavior all the time," particularly
in relation to liability insurance and economics. Erbe, 344 Ill. App. 3d
at 366. Moreover, the court cited a study showing that, as early as
1928, the State of Illinois was using actuarial data to predict
recidivism. Erbe, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 366, citing W. Grove & P.
Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective,
Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction
Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2 Psychol. Pub.
Pol'y & L. 293, 293 (1996). Finally, the court held that, even
assuming that Frye applies, actuarial risk assessment is generally
accepted by professionals who assess sex offenders for risk of
reoffending. Erbe, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 367. The court emphasized that,
of the numerous appellate decisions nationwide addressing the
admissibility of actuarial instruments such as the MnSOST-R and the
Static-99, only Taylor found them inadmissible. Erbe, 344 Ill. App. 3d
at 368-72.
	After careful consideration, we emphatically agree with Erbe's
conclusion that, whether or not actuarial risk assessment is subject to
Frye, there is no question that it is generally accepted by professionals
who assess sexually violent offenders and therefore is perfectly
admissible in a court of law. As of this writing, experts in at least 19
other states rely upon actuarial risk assessment in forming their
opinions on sex offenders' risks of recidivism. See State ex rel.
Romley v. Fields, 201 Ariz. 321, 328, 35 P.3d 82, 89 (2001); People
v. Therrian, 113 Cal. App. 4th 609, 614-16, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 415, 419-20 (2003); Roeling v. State, 880 So. 2d 1234, 1238-40 (Fla. App.
2004); In re Detention of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 619 (Iowa App.
2002); In re Care & Treatment of Teer, No. 89,652, slip op. at 3-4
(Kan. App. 2004) (unpublished order); Commonwealth v. Wright, No.
032449A, slip op. at 1 (Mass. Super. 2004); In re Risk Level
Determination of R.B.P., 640 N.W.2d 351, 353-56 (Minn. App.
2002); Goddard v. State, No. 25779, slip op. at 5 (Mo. App. 2004);
State v. Legg, 319 Mont. 362, 366, 84 P.3d 648, 651 (2004); Slansky
v. Nebraska State Patrol, 268 Neb. 360, 370-75, 685 N.W.2d 335,
345-49 (2004); In re Commitment of R.S., 173 N.J. 134, 136-37, 801 A.2d 219, 220-21 (2002); People v. Girup, 9 A.D.3d 913, 780 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2004) (mem. op.); In re D.V.A., 676 N.W.2d 776,
778-80 (N.D. 2004); State v. McKinnis, 153 Ohio App. 3d 654, 661-62, 795 N.E.2d 160, 165-66 (2003); State v. Gibson, 187 Or. App.
207, 214, 66 P.3d 560, 564-65 (2003); In re Care & Treatment of
Tucker, 353 S.C. 466, 469, 578 S.E.2d 719, 721 (2003); In re
Commitment of Morales, 98 S.W.3d 288, 291 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003);
In re Detention of Thorell, 149 Wash. 2d 724, 753-56, 72 P.2d 708, 724-25 (2003); In re Commitment of Tainter, 259 Wis. 2d 387, 399,
655 N.W.2d 538, 544 (2002).
	Significantly, eight of these states have directly addressed the
Frye question and concluded either that Frye is inapplicable to
actuarial risk assessment or that actuarial risk assessment satisfies the
general acceptance standard. See Romley, 201 Ariz. at 328, 35 P.3d 
at 89 (Frye not applicable); Therrian, 113 Cal. App. 4th  at 614-16, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d  at 419-20 (Frye not applicable); Roeling, 880 So. 2d  at
1238-40 (general acceptance standard met); Holtz, 653 N.W.2d  at 619
(general acceptance test met); Goddard, slip op. at 5 (general
acceptance test met); R.S., 173 N.J. at 136-37, 801 A.2d  at 220-21
(general acceptance test met); Thorell, 149 Wash. 2d  at 753-56, 72 P.2d  at 724-25 (general acceptance test met); Tainter, 259 Wis. 2d at
399, 655 N.W.2d  at 544 (general acceptance test met). It is also
worth noting that actuarial risk assessment is not exclusively an
instrument of the State; experts for the offender rely upon it as well.
See, e.g., People v. Calhoun, 118 Cal. App. 4th 519, 522-23, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 166, 168 (2004); In re Detention of Walker, 314 Ill. App. 3d
282, 290 (2000) (according to respondent's expert, "the research is
very clear in stating that the most accurate predictions of the risk of
future offenses are those based upon actuarial assessments of
probability"); Legg, 319 Mont. at 366, 84 P.3d  at 651; State v.
Purser, 153 Ohio App. 3d 144, 150-53, 791 N.E.2d 1053, 1057-59
(2003); McKinnis, 153 Ohio App. 3d at 661-62, 795 N.E.2d at 165-66; Zimmer v. State, No. 05-03-01253-CR, slip op. at 2 (Tex. App.
2004) (unpublished order).
	We recognize, of course, that "relying exclusively upon prior
judicial decisions to establish general scientific acceptance can be a
' "hollow ritual" ' if the underlying issue of scientific acceptance has
not been adequately litigated." People v. Basler, 193 Ill. 2d 545, 554
(2000) (McMorrow, J., dissenting), quoting People v. Kirk, 289 Ill.
App. 3d 326, 333 (1997), quoting 1 J. Strong, McCormick on
Evidence §203, at 870 n.20 (4th ed. 1992). This is not a concern here,
however, as the general acceptance of actuarial risk assessment has
been thoroughly litigated in several states, as several of the above
citations illustrate. In Roeling, for example, the court began by
examining the testimony of the four expert psychologists who testified
at trial:
		"All of the experts except the one offered by appellant
testified that they use such instruments on a regular basis;
that they are generally accepted among forensic clinical
psychologists who evaluate persons alleged to be sexually
violent predators, provided they are used in conjunction with
a clinical assessment (as those testifying in appellant's case
did); and that the use of risk-assessment instruments in
conjunction with a clinical assessment was a superior method
of evaluating an individual to reliance on a clinical assessment
alone. Even appellant's expert conceded that such
instruments were being used 'with great frequency by people
doing these evaluations'; and that an evaluation based on only
a clinical assessment would at best be equal to (but no better
than) a pure actuarial approach." Roeling, 880 So. 2d  at
1239.
Next, the court exhaustively examined the academic literature, which
confirms that "[t]he opinions relied upon by the trial court are ***
consistent with conclusions reached by a number of other
psychologists, including those who have developed the actuarial tools
and conducted cross-validation and meta-analyses to confirm their
reliability." Roeling, 880 So. 2d  at 1239, citing J. Becker & W.
Murphy, What We Know and Do Not Know About Assessing and
Treating Sex Offenders, 4 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 116 (1998); D.
Epperson, Cross-Validation of the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening
Tool-Revised, ATSA Presentation, San Diego, CA (November 3,
2000); M. Grann, Actuarial Assessment of Risk for Violence:
Predictive Validity of the VRAG and the Historical Part of the HCR-20, 27 Crim. Just. & Behav. 97 (2000); W. Grove & P. Meehl,
Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and
Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The
Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 293
(1996); R. Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk
Assessment?, 4 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 50 (1998); R. Hanson & D.
Thornton, Improving Risk Assessments for Sex Offenders: A
Comparison of Three Actuarial Scales, 24 L. & Hum. Behav. 119
(2000); R. Hanson & M. Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. of Consulting
& Clinical Psychol. 348 (1998); R. Hanson & A. Harris, Where
Should We Intervene?: Dynamic Predictors of Sexual Offense
Recidivism, 27 Crim. Just. & Behav. 6 (2000); R. Hare, Psychopathy
and the Predictive Validity of the PCL-R: An International
Perspective, 18 Behav. Sci. & L. 623 (2000); G. Harris, Appraisal
and Management of Risk in Sexual Aggressors: Implications for
Criminal Justice Policy, 4 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 73 (1998); M.
Rice & G. Harris, Cross-Validation and Extension of the Violence
Risk Appraisal Guide for Child Molesters and Rapists, 21 L. & Hum.
Behav. 231 (1997). Lastly, the court surveyed the nationwide
jurisprudence concerning the admissibility of expert testimony based
in part upon the use of actuarial risk assessment. According to the
court:
		"Not one court has held such testimony inadmissible as a
matter of law. Rather, the debate has been over whether the
testimony must pass the Frye test." Roeling, 880 So. 2d  at
1239.
Based on all of this information, the court ultimately concluded that
"expert opinion testimony regarding propensity to commit acts of
sexual violence in the future which is based in part on use of the
[RRASOR, Static-99 and MnSOST-R] risk-assessment instruments"
satisfies the Frye test. Roeling, 880 So. 2d  at 1239.(1)
	As importantly, we were unable to identify any state outside of
Illinois in which expert testimony based upon actuarial risk assessment
was deemed inadmissible on the question of sex offender recidivism.
In fact, in several jurisdictions actuarial risk assessment is mandated
by either statute or regulation. In New York, for example, the Sex
Offender Registration Act creates the Board of Examiners of Sex
Offenders (the Board), which is charged with developing "guidelines
and procedures to assess the risk of a repeat offense by [sex offenders]
and the threat posed to the public safety." N.Y. Correct. Law
§§168-l(1), (5) (McKinney 2003). Such guidelines must be based
upon certain risk factors specifically defined by the legislature. N.Y.
Correct. Law §168-l(5) (McKinney 2003). In response to this
mandate, the Board created an objective risk assessment instrument,
which considers 15 risk factors and assigns a numerical value to the
existence of certain circumstances regarding each specified factor. See
People v. Salaam, 174 Misc. 2d 726, 729-30, 666 N.Y.S.2d 881, 883-84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (discussing history of the risk assessment
instrument). These values are then totaled to arrive at the offender's
presumptive risk level. Salaam, 174 Misc. 2d at 729-30, 666 N.Y.S.2d  at 883-84. Where the total score is 70 points or less, the
offender is presumptively level one (low risk); more than 70 points but
less than 110 points, he is presumptively level two (moderate risk);
and if 110 points or more, he is presumptively level three (high risk).
Salaam, 174 Misc. 2d at 729-30, 666 N.Y.S.2d  at 883-84. Prior to
the release of a convicted sex offender, a member of the Board
calculates the offender's presumptive risk level and makes a
recommendation to the original sentencing court. N.Y. Correct. Law
§168-l (6) (McKinney 2003). The court then holds a risk assessment
hearing to determine the offender's actual risk level, taking into the
account the Board's recommendation as well as any additional
evidence or testimony submitted by the parties. N.Y. Correct. Law
§168-n (McKinney 2003).
	A similar scheme exists in Minnesota, where the Sex Offender
Community Notification Act (the Notification Act) directs the
commissioner of corrections to create "end-of-confinement review
committees" at each state facility where predatory offenders are
confined. Minn. Stat. §244.052(3) (2004). The purpose of these
committees is to "assess on a case-by-case basis the public risk posed
by predatory offenders who are about to be released from
confinement." Minn. Stat. §244.052(3) (2004). To assist the
committees in discharging this mandate, the Notification Act also
directed the commissioner of corrections to develop, by January 1,
1997, "a risk assessment scale which assigns weights to *** various
risk factors *** and specifies the risk level to which offenders with
various risk assessment scores shall be assigned." Minn. Stat.
§244.052(2) (2004). The commissioner did so, and the result is the
MnSOST-R. In re Risk Level Determination of R.B.P., 640 N.W.2d 
at 354. Using the MnSOST-R, the end-of-confinement review
committees are statutorily required to assess predatory offenders who
are about to be released from confinement and "determine the
offender's risk assessment score and risk level." Minn. Stat.
§244.052(3)(d)(i) (2004). An offender's risk level, which is subject to
administrative review, ultimately determines the level of community
notification that is required under the Notification Act. Minn. Stat.
§§244.052(4)(b), (6) (2004).(2)
	Finally, we note that the academic literature contains many
articles confirming the general acceptance of actuarial risk assessment
by professionals who assess sexually violent offenders for risk of
recidivism. In one article, the authors maintain that actuarial risk
assessment "is a state-of-the-art technique, and courts should insist
that it be employed as a major instrument of risk assessment." E.
Janus & R. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with
Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 1443, 1445 (2003). This same article notes that
"[r]espected researchers urge the 'complete replacement of existing
practice with actuarial methods,' and suggest that the use of clinical
methods, where actuarial ones are available, would be 'unethical.' "
40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 1485, quoting V. Quinsey, Violent
Offenders: Appraising and Managing Risk 171 (1998); W. Grove &
P. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective,
Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction
Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2 Psychol. Pub.
Pol'y & L. 293, 320 (1996). The authors go on to explain:
		"The principle of actuarial superiority is not novel. *** It has
been tested extensively, and has broad acceptance in the
literature, both in general, and in the specific literature
concerning sexual offending. Similarly, the science underlying
ARA is not new. Statistical decision theory and its
application to human judgment have been around for fifty
years. The same methodology has been applied in numerous,
diverse contexts, including weather forecasting, law school
admissions, disability determinations, predicting the quality of
the vintage for red Bordeaux wines, and predicting the
quality of sound in opera houses." 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at
1486.
Ultimately, the authors conclude that "[risk] assessments should be
conducted in the most scientifically credible and reliable fashion
possible" and that "[t]he weight of the evidence points to the
superiority of actuarial assessment of risk over clinical assessment of
risk." 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 1498.
	In another article, a board certified forensic and clinical
psychologist describes actuarial risk assessment as "a quantum leap"
in the science of violence risk analysis, noting that a combination of
actuarial and clinical methods "is commonly advocated by leading
forensic practitioners who routinely predict violence in the course of
their forensic work." C. Mee & H. Hall, Risky Business: Assessing
Dangerousness in Hawaii, 24 U. of Haw. L. Rev. 63, 92 (2001).
Another forensic psychologist writes that "overall research has
increasingly revealed that actuarial risk instruments*** exhibit more
predictive reliability and validity than the clinical judgment of
psychologists and psychiatrists alone" and that "[i]n a wide variety of
medical and social science studies, actuarial assessments consistently
meet or surpass the accuracy of clinical assessments." J. Fabian,
Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond: "Mental Abnormality,"
and "Sexual Dangerousness": Volitional vs. Emotional Abnormality
and the Debate Between Community Safety and Civil Liberties, 29
Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1367, 1434 (2003), citing N. Hilton & J.
Simmons, The Influence of Actuarial Risk Assessment in Clinical
Judgments in Tribunal Decisions about Mentally Disordered
Offenders in Maximum Security, 25 L. & Hum. Behav. 394 (2001).
More recently, the Static-99's creators, R. Karl Hanson & David
Thornton, wrote that "Static-99 *** has been widely adopted as a
measure of sex offense recidivism risk, with routine applications in
jurisdictions as diverse as Sweden, Texas, and Taiwan." R. Hanson &
D. Thornton, Notes on the Development of Static-2002, User Report
No. 2003-01, Department of the Solicitor General of Canada (2003).
	Taking all of this together-the case law, the statutory law, and
the academic literature-we are more than convinced that actuarial risk
assessment has gained general acceptance in the psychological and
psychiatric communities. We therefore hold that the trial court
properly admitted the expert testimony of Dr. Buck and Dr. Heaton,
which relied in part upon actuarial risk assessment.

CONCLUSION
	Fore the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
	JUSTICE KARMEIER took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	I cannot join the majority's disposition of this case. The majority
decides this case entirely on issues the parties did not brief, and
ignores the doctrine of stare decisis in doing so.  
	Much of the evidence against defendant in the civil commitment
proceeding against him was based on "actuarial risk assessment."
Defendant filed a motion in limine arguing that this was a novel
methodology, which the circuit court should not admit without
holding a Frye hearing. The State maintained that no Frye hearing was
required, because "actuarial principles" are not novel. Alternatively,
the State argued that even if actuarial risk assessment was novel, it
satisfied the Frye requirement of general acceptance. The circuit court
agreed with the State that no Frye hearing was required and did not
rule on the State's alternate argument that actuarial risk assessment
passed the Frye test. The appellate court reversed, holding that the
circuit court erred in failing to hold a Frye hearing.
	In reversing the appellate court, the majority forthrightly admits
that the first issue discussed is one "not raised by the parties," that is,
"the appropriate standard of review for a trial court's Frye rulings."
Slip op. at 5. Initially, this court in general ought to be wary of
addressing issues sua sponte, without the benefit of briefing by the
parties. In the instant case the State affirmatively relies on the
unquestioned assumption that the standard of review is "abuse of
discretion," and defendant does not dispute that this is the proper
standard. Nor can one fault the parties for failing to argue the standard
of review, given this court's unambiguous recent statement that "We
review Frye issues under an abuse of discretion standard." Donaldson
v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 76 (2002). See
also People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 187-88 (1996) ("The decision
of whether to admit expert testimony about a new scientific technique
is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court *** the trial
court did not abuse its discretion").
	Given the fact that the standard of review has not been put into
issue by the parties, I am troubled by the court's decision to interject
the issue on its own. The majority does not explain its decision to do
so, but certainly the importance of the issue cannot be the rationale,
as a case is sure to come up in the future in which the parties actually
address the subject. See People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d 426, 453
(2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("the majority is being disingenuous
if it is suggesting that the importance of the issue mandates that we
resolve it in this particular case"). And the doctrine of stare decisis
compels an opposite approach. According to this doctrine, " 'absent
powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike.' " People v. Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d 210, 228 (2002) (McMorrow, J.,
dissenting, joined by Freeman and Kilbride, JJ.), quoting 5 Am. Jur.
2d Appellate Review §599 (1995). Not only do we address the
standard of review without the parties even having mentioned it, we
reverse our own recent precedent without even so much as an
acknowledgment of stare decisis. This is perplexing, to say the least.
It would be one thing if the majority and I differed on the question of
whether there is cause to overcome the doctrine of stare decisis in this
particular case. Certainly there are occasions on which there exists
sufficient reason to overturn prior precedent, notwithstanding the
doctrine (see, e.g., People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378-89 (1998)
(changing standard of review of dismissals of petitions under Post-Conviction Hearing Act)), and whether sufficient reason exists for a
departure from stare decisis in any given case is a question upon
which reasonable minds might sometimes differ. But the majority fails
even to admit that the doctrine exists.  
	This cannot be because the majority is unaware of the doctrine.
Dissenting members of this court have taken pains to remind
majorities of the doctrine's existence in recent case law-including
cases authored by the very justice who writes for the majority in the
instant case. See, e.g., Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d  at 227 (McMorrow, J.,
dissenting, joined by Freeman and Kilbride, JJ.) ("the majority opinion
is notable for its complete silence with respect to the application of the
principle of stare decisis while overturning two recent and unanimous
decisions of this court"). Thus, I confess, I find myself utterly
perplexed by the majority's failure even to acknowledge the doctrine's
existence in the instant case. The dissonance is especially striking,
given that the author of the majority opinion in the instant case was a
member of the Donaldson majority, and did not join the two specially
concurring justices in that case who called for de novo review of Frye
"general acceptance" determinations. See Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d  at
104 (McMorrow, J., concurring, joined by Garman, J.). Why does this
case represent an exception to the principle, embodied in the doctrine
of stare decisis, that the laws of Illinois ought not to change whenever
individual justices of this court change our minds? See Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d  at 228 (McMorrow, J., dissenting, joined by Freeman and Kilbride,
JJ.) ("stare decisis 'is the means by which courts ensure that the law
will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and
intelligible fashion *** [apart from] the proclivities of individuals' "),
quoting Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510 (1994). The majority is silent on this subject. I am
concerned that by failing to address the issue, the majority leaves this
court open to the charge that Illinois is governed no longer by law, but
by the vagaries of the day-to-day preferences of the members of this
court.
	After having changed Illinois law sua sponte, the majority goes
on to frame the issue as "whether actuarial risk assessment *** is
admissible under Frye." Slip op. at 8. With all due respect to the
majority, that is not the question before us. The question is whether
the circuit court erred in failing to hold any Frye hearing at all. The
circuit court found that no Frye hearing was required, and the
appellate court disagreed-but neither court ever determined whether
actuarial risk assessment is admissible under the Frye test. 
	The majority sidesteps the question of whether actuarial risk
assessment is subject to Frye, the only question decided by the lower
courts. Instead, the majority implicitly determines that the answer to
this question is irrelevant, because actuarial risk assessment satisfies
the Frye test. I note that this ratio decendi is only possible because of
the earlier change to the standard of review. If the standard of review
is abuse of discretion, as the parties assume and as this court has held
as recently as two years ago, we would have to determine whether
actuarial risk assessment is subject to Frye. If it is not subject to Frye,
we would affirm. But if it is subject to Frye, there would be no
possible conclusion other than that circuit court abused its discretion
in failing to hold a Frye hearing, as there is no Frye-related evidence
we could review to affirm the circuit court's conclusion-I note that in
determining that actuarial risk assessment passes the Frye test, the
majority relies wholly on materials which the circuit court never
considered. 
	I state no opinion on whether actuarial risk assessment ought to
pass the Frye test in an appropriate case. I simply believe that this is
not the proper case to decide the issue, given the tortuous path down
which the majority propels Illinois law in doing so.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this dissent.
 
 
 
1.                
         
         
              Similarly thorough analyses can be found in the following decisions, all of which rely upon some 
combination of expert testimony, academic literature, and the nationwide jurisprudential consensus that clearly exists on this question: 
Holtz, 653 N.W.2d  at 619; Erbe, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 364-72; Goddard, slip op. at 5; R.S., 173 N.J. at 136-37, 801 
A.2d at 220-21; Thorell, 149 Wash. 2d  at 753-56, 72 P.2d  at 724-25.
2.                
    Other states that mandate the use of actuarial risk assessment include Alabama (Ala. Code §122533(6) (2004) 
(directing sentencing commission to develop risk assessment instrument based on a study of Alabama felons)); Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§183414.5(1)(a)(IV) (2004) (defining "sexually violent predator" in terms of offender's results on risk assessment screening instrument)); 
Florida (Fla. Admin. Code R. 65E25.001(2)(b) (2004) (mandating use of Static-99 in sexually violent predator evaluations)); Nebraska (Neb. 
Admin. Rs. & Regs. tit. 272, ch. 19, §§013.02, 013.07 (2004) (creating sex offender risk assessment instrument)); Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §§179D.720(1), (2) (Lexis 2001) (directing attorney general to establish factor-based guidelines for assessing risk of sex offender 
recidivism); New Jersey (N.J. Rev. Stat. §2C:78(a) (2004) (directing attorney general to develop factor-based procedures for assessing risk 
of sex offender recidivism)); New Mexico (N.M. Stat. Ann. §9313(D)(4) (Michie 2004) (directing sex offender management board to create a 
risk assessment screening tool); Oregon (Or. Admin. R. 2550600011(2004) (mandating use of Static-99 in predatory sex offender 
evaluations)); Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws §1137.16(1)(b) (Supp. 2003) (directing sex offender board of review to use a "validated risk 
assessment instrument" in sexually violent predator evaluations)); Texas (Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 62.035 (West Supp. 2004) 
(directing risk assessment review committee to "develop or select from among existing tools a sex offender screening tool")); and Virginia 
(Va. Code Ann. §37.170.4(C) (Lexis Supp. 2004) (directing department of corrections to evaluate sexually violent offenders using either the 
Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offender Recidivism or "a comparable, scientifically validated instrument")).