Title: Boulette v. Boulette

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 177 
Docket: 
Yor-16-62 
Submitted 
On Briefs: September 29, 2016 
Decided: 
December 6, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
MELODY BOULETTE 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD BOULETTE JR. 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  Richard Boulette Jr. appeals from a judgment of the District Court 
(Biddeford, Driscoll, J.) amending a final protection from abuse order dated 
January 25, 2016, in favor of his ex-wife.  For the reasons below, we affirm the 
lower court’s judgment, but dismiss as untimely the portion of Richard’s 
appeal addressing the temporary protection from abuse order and final 
protection from abuse order dated December 28, 2015, and January 11, 2016, 
respectively.1 
                                         
1  Richard’s notice of appeal states that his appeal is taken from the January 11 judgment 
granting his ex-wife’s final protection from abuse order, and from the “1-21-16 order,” presumably 
the subsequent judgment entered on January 25, 2016, amending the final protection from abuse 
order.  In his brief, Richard does not clearly state which order in particular he seeks to appeal, but 
mentions all three without asking for specific relief.   
 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  Melody and Richard Boulette Jr. were divorced on July 2, 2015.  
The divorce judgment granted the parties shared parental rights and 
responsibilities and shared residence with respect to their two sons.   
[¶3]  In October 2015, Richard filed a motion to modify the divorce 
judgment, seeking primary residence of the children.  He alleged that Melody 
was trying to “turn the children against [him] so she can play happy family 
with” her boyfriend, whom Richard did not want around the children.   
[¶4]  On December 28, 2015, while that motion was pending, Melody 
sought and received a temporary protection from abuse order, granting her 
temporary sole parental rights and responsibilities for the children.  After a 
contested hearing on January 11, 2016, the District Court (Biddeford, 
Mathews, J.) entered a final protection from abuse order that barred Richard 
from having contact with Melody or the children “subject to a future family 
court action”—the hearing on Richard’s motion to modify the divorce 
judgment.    
[¶5]  Eleven days later, the District Court (Biddeford, Driscoll, J.) held a 
hearing on Richard’s motion to modify the divorce judgment.  After 
considering the evidence presented, the court issued an order dated 
 
 
3 
January 25, 2016, that addressed both that motion and the contact provisions 
of the protection from abuse order.  In that order, the court denied Richard’s 
motion to modify, finding that Richard had presented “no credible evidence to 
support his theories of harm or reasons for modifying or enforcing the 
[divorce] judgment.”  The court also addressed the basis for the protection 
from abuse order, finding that on Christmas Eve 2015, Richard had abused 
Melody and the children by verbally threatening Melody, banging on her 
apartment door, and smashing several windows on her car, all in the presence 
of the children.   
[¶6]  Despite this finding, based on the agreement of the parties, the 
court issued an amended protection from abuse order that reinstated the 
contact schedule created by the parties’ July 2, 2015, divorce judgment, and 
allowed limited contact between Melody and Richard consisting of email 
correspondence concerning the children.  On February 11, 2016, Richard filed 
a notice of appeal designating the order of January 11, 2016, as the order 
appealed from, but noting that the “1-21-16 order has been modified.”  
Because it is not clear from his notice of appeal or his brief which order 
Richard now appeals from, we will assume that he appeals from all three 
 
 
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protection orders: the December 28, 2015, temporary order; the January 11, 
2016, final protection order; and the January 25, 2016, amended orders.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶7]  Richard admits to the events of Christmas Eve 2015 that led to the 
court’s finding of abuse, but he argues that he has taken responsibility for his 
actions and is not a threat to his family, and for this reason contends that the 
protection orders should not have been entered.  
[¶8]  Although neither party raised the issue of timeliness, we will 
consider it on our own initiative, and dismiss those appeals determined to be 
untimely.  See State v. Williams, 510 A.2d 537, 538-39 (Me. 1986); State v. One 
1977 Blue Ford Pick-Up Truck, 447 A.2d 1226, 1229 (Me. 1982); Begin v. Jerry’s 
Sunoco, Inc., 435 A.2d 1079, 1081 (Me. 1981).  An appeal is untimely if the 
notice of appeal is not filed with the clerk of the court from which the appeal is 
taken within twenty-one days after the entry of judgment and the court has 
not granted an extension of time.  M.R. App. P. 2(a), (b)(3), (b)(5). 
 
[¶9]  To the extent that Richard appeals from the court’s entry of 
Melody’s temporary protection from abuse order on December 28, 2015, or 
the final protection from abuse order entered on January 11, 2016, his appeal 
is untimely.  Richard did not file his notice of appeal until February 11, 2016, 
 
 
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more than twenty-one days after either order was entered.  See M.R. 
App. P. 2(b)(3).  Because “[s]trict compliance with the time limits of M.R. 
App.  P. 2(b) . . . is a prerequisite to the Law Court entertaining an appeal,” we 
must dismiss that portion of Richard’s appeal that seeks to vacate the orders 
dated December 28, 2015, and January 11, 2016.  Bourke v. City of S. Portland, 
2002 ME 155, ¶ 4, 806 A.2d 1255; M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3). 
 
[¶10]  To the extent that Richard intends to appeal from the January 25, 
2016, order amending the final protection from abuse order, his appeal is 
timely.2  See M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3).  “We review a trial court’s finding of abuse 
for clear error and will affirm a trial court’s findings if they are supported by 
competent evidence in the record, even if the evidence might support 
alternative findings of fact.”  Walton v. Ireland, 2014 ME 130, ¶ 22, 104 A.3d 
883 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶11]  The District Court (Biddeford, Mathews, J.) found after the 
January 11, 2016, hearing that Melody was entitled to a protection from abuse 
order.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 4002(1).  Richard did not timely appeal from that 
                                         
2  It is not clear from Richard’s brief what relief he seeks.  He asserts that he is not a “threat” to 
Melody or his children, which we understand to argue that the court erred in ordering limited 
contact between him and Melody.  His notice of appeal included the claim that Melody’s time with 
the children is “grossly overboard,” but at the January 25, 2016, hearing he agreed to the return of 
visitation rights to those established by the July 2, 2015, divorce judgment.  For this reason, we 
assume he appeals only that portion of the amended order limiting his contact with Melody. 
 
 
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order.  After the January 25, 2016, hearing, the only changes made to the 
protection from abuse order were changes made by agreement of the parties, 
because neither party had filed a motion to amend the protection order.  We 
therefore affirm the judgment amending the final protection from abuse 
order. 
The entry is: 
Richard Boulette Jr.’s appeal of the temporary 
protection 
from 
abuse 
order 
entered 
December 28, 2015, and the final protection 
from abuse order entered January 11, 2016, is 
dismissed.  The District Court’s judgment of 
January 25, 2016, amending the protection from 
abuse order entered on January 11, 2016, is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Richard Boulette Jr., appellant pro se 
 
Melody Boulette did not file a brief 
 
 
 
Biddeford District Court docket number PA-2015-600 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY