Title: Vaughan's Landscaping v. Dodson

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, S.J. 
 
 
VAUGHAN'S LANDSCAPING & MAINTENANCE, 
ET AL. 
                                OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
v.  Record No. 001740                    June 8, 2001 
 
TIMOTHY JASON DODSON 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this workers' compensation case, we consider whether the 
worker's injuries arose out of and in the course of his 
employment. 
 
The following evidence was presented by the worker and his 
employer at a hearing before a deputy commissioner of the 
Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission).  
Timothy Jason Dodson (Dodson), a manual laborer who was 19 years 
old at the time of his injuries, worked for David Vaughan, the 
owner of Vaughan's Landscaping & Maintenance (Vaughan).  Dodson, 
a passenger in the employer's pickup truck, was injured on 
Saturday, June 24, 1995, when the truck, driven by Vaughan, 
sideswiped a tree. 
 
The two men mowed lawns on the morning of the accident.  
When they completed the last job between 1:00 and 1:30 p.m., 
Vaughan drove his truck and trailer, loaded with lawn 
maintenance equipment, to Bentonville where he purchased beer 
and wine. 
 
While the two men proceeded toward Page County where both 
lived, they began drinking Vaughan's beer and wine.  As they 
were driving, they noticed friends pitching horseshoes in a yard 
beside the road.  The two men stopped and spent some time there 
pitching horseshoes and continuing to drink alcohol.  While 
there, one of the owners of the property talked to Vaughan about 
doing some yard work in the future. 
 
Vaughan testified that when they left this location, Dodson 
was "[p]retty drunk."  Dodson admitted that he was drunk and 
that probably drinking a little more alcohol would have caused 
him to "pass out."  While Vaughan was driving toward Page County 
on what he described as a one-lane gravel road, he "took [his] 
eyes off the road" to glance back at a bottle that Dodson had 
thrown out the window.  According to Vaughan, this "caused me to 
get off the road . . . [j]ust enough that the truck skinned down 
the side of the tree."  When the truck "skinned" the tree, 
Dodson's arm was injured. 
 
Dodson filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits 
with the Commission, which Vaughan and his insurance company 
contested.  After a hearing, the deputy commissioner, citing 
American Safety Razor Co. v. Hunter, 2 Va. App. 258, 261, 343 
S.E.2d 461, 463 (1986), denied the claim on the ground that 
Dodson had abandoned his employment by reaching an advanced 
 
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stage of intoxication that rendered him incapable of engaging in 
his work-related duties. 
 
On Dodson's appeal, the Commission reversed the deputy 
commissioner's decision and awarded Dodson benefits.  The 
Commission ruled that the principle set forth in American Safety 
Razor Co. was inapplicable because Vaughan had obviously 
encouraged and condoned Dodson's conduct by illegally providing 
the alcohol and facilitating its consumption by the then under-
age claimant.  For those reasons, the Commission concluded that 
Vaughan "will not now be heard to assert the claimant's 
intoxication as a defense to his claim for benefits." 
 
On Vaughan's appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals 
reversed the decision of the Commission because the Court 
concluded that Dodson's injury did not occur in the course of 
his employment and was therefore not compensable.  The Court 
reasoned that Dodson's self-induced, severe intoxication was 
unrelated to any work-related duty or function, and that it 
rendered him incapable of performing his job duties of operating 
yard maintenance equipment and other strenuous activities.  
Vaughan's Landscaping & Maintenance v. Dodson, 30 Va. App. 135, 
141, 515 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1999). 
 
Upon a rehearing en banc, the decision of the Commission 
was affirmed without an opinion by an evenly divided Court, the 
panel's opinion was withdrawn, and its mandate was vacated. 
 
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Dodson v. Vaughan's Landscaping & Maintenance, 32 Va. App. 667, 
667-68, 529 S.E.2d 854, 854-55 (2000).  Because the case has 
significant precedential value, see Code § 17.1-410, we granted 
an appeal to Vaughan. 
 
Vaughan contends that Dodson's severe level of intoxication 
rendered him incapable of performing his duties and, therefore, 
removed him from the course of his employment under the 
principle articulated in American Safety Razor, 2 Va. App. at 
261, 343 S.E.2d at 463.  The evidence indicates, however, that 
Vaughan did not expect Dodson to work any more that day after 
finishing the job and starting back to Page County.  Under these 
circumstances, we do not think the principle articulated in 
American Safety Razor is applicable.  Hence, we reject this 
contention. 
 
Here, the evidence was that Dodson's injuries were incurred 
while Vaughan was taking him to Luray, which is in Page County, 
at Dodson's request.  The evidence also showed that when Dodson 
finished his work, Vaughan usually returned Dodson to Dodson's 
home after work.  However, Vaughan sometimes took Dodson to 
Luray when Dodson requested, as he had on the day of his 
injuries.  If an employer furnishes an employee transportation 
to and from work, injuries that occur during such transportation 
are compensable as arising out of and in the course of 
 
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employment.  Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company v. 
Barnard, 236 Va. 41, 45, 372 S.E.2d 369, 371 (1988). 
 
Vaughan recognizes that this accident would normally be 
considered to have occurred in the course of Dodson's 
employment.  Nevertheless, Vaughan argues that the accident did 
not arise out of and in the course of Dodson's employment for 
two reasons. 
 
First, Vaughan contends that when he was driving Dodson to 
Luray, he was not doing so as Dodson's employer but as his 
friend after "they had opted to get drunk after work, an 
activity that was in no way connected to the employment."  We 
disagree. 
 
The Commission made a factual finding that Vaughan 
discussed future business while they were pitching horseshoes 
with his friends and that Dodson was under Vaughan's control 
during the trip to Luray in Vaughan's truck.  The Commission's 
conclusion that the accident occurred in the course and scope of 
Dodson's employment implicitly incorporated a factual finding 
that Vaughan was acting as Dodson's employer when he resumed the 
trip to Luray.  We do not review the Commission's factual 
findings unless they are unsupported by credible evidence.  See 
Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. Kremposky, 227 Va. 265, 269, 
315 S.E.2d 231, 233 (1984).  In this case, we cannot say that 
this evidence was not credible or was insufficient to support 
 
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the Commission's implied finding that Vaughan was taking Dodson 
to Luray in his capacity as Dodson's employer. 
 
Vaughan's second reason why the accident did not occur in 
the course of employment is that the period of drinking and 
pitching horseshoes was such a deviation "from the business 
purpose of the ride home, that it effectively broke the nexus to 
the employment before the return trip home was resumed."  In 
support of this argument, Vaughan cites cases stating that if an 
employee so materially deviates from the employment–related 
purposes of his trip as to constitute a "frolic of his own," any 
accident occurring at that time is not considered to have 
occurred in the course of employment.  See, e.g., Taylor v. 
Robertson Chevrolet Co., 177 Va. 289, 295, 13 S.E.2d 326, 329 
(1941). 
 
Here, however, we are not considering an employee's 
deviation, but whether the employer's resumption of the trip to 
transport Dodson to the location of his choice was a trip in the 
course of his employment.  In taking Dodson to Luray, Vaughan 
was fulfilling his agreement as Dodson's employer to provide 
transportation to and from work.  Accordingly, we hold that 
Dodson's injuries arose out of and in the course of his 
employment and that the Commission's award of benefits should be 
upheld. 
 
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be 
 
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Affirmed. 
 
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