Title: Laqualia v. Laqualia

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT  
 
 
 
 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2011 ME 114 
Docket: 
Pen-10-644 
Argued: 
September 13, 2011 
Decided: 
November 17, 2011 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, 
JJ. 
 
KAREN A. LAQUALIA 
 
v. 
 
JOHN A. LAQUALIA 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
 
[¶1]  Karen A. Laqualia appeals from the District Court’s (Bangor, Dobson, 
J.)1 divorce judgment ending her marriage to John A. Laqualia.  She challenges the 
trial court’s failure to award her attorney fees and its valuation and distribution of 
certain marital and nonmarital assets.  Karen also appeals from the District Court’s 
(Bangor, Jordan, J.) refusal to consider her post-judgment motion to enforce the 
preliminary injunction entered pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 903(1)(B)(3) (2010) 
when she filed this action for divorce.  Karen has consolidated her appeals before 
us.  We affirm most of the divorce judgment but remand for a single issue 
concerning the distribution of the marital estate, and affirm the trial court’s action 
with respect to the post-judgment motion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Karen originally filed this action in the District Court sitting in Ellsworth, but it was subsequently 
transferred to Bangor. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  On August 16, 1994, Karen and John entered into a premarital 
agreement, and, eleven days later, they married.  At the time of their marriage, 
Karen had amassed a sizeable estate worth more than $2,000,000 that included a 
house in Bangor, and a camp in Trenton, as well as paintings, jewelry, and 
investment accounts.  Karen acquired these assets, and continued to receive on-
going payments during the marriage, as a result of a consulting arrangement that 
she entered into prior to the marriage, but which was subsequently amended 
through a settlement agreement reached after she and John married. 
[¶3]   John’s premarital estate was valued at $20,000.  During the marriage, 
with some assistance from Karen, he developed a computer software business 
known as PeakKnowledge.  Karen and John used the income from 
PeakKnowledge, the payments Karen received from her consulting arrangement, 
and her assets, to live lavishly, travel, and acquire substantial real and personal 
property. 
[¶4]  In 2007, Karen initiated this divorce, citing irreconcilable differences.  
After nearly three years of highly contentious litigation, the parties presented more 
than eighteen hours of testimony and admitted boxes of exhibits to the court 
(Dobson, J.) during a three-day trial in May 2010.  Because Karen and John have 
no children from the marriage, the only issues to be decided by the court involved 
 
3 
property.  That property included (1) three pieces of real property: a condominium 
in Bangor, a residence in Florida, and the camp in Trenton; (2) retirement and 
investment accounts; (3) valuable personal property; and (4) PeakKnowledge.  The 
parties’ premarital agreement affected the division and distribution of this property.  
John challenged the application of the premarital agreement, but the court found it 
to be “fully enforceable and binding on the parties.” 
[¶5]  At trial, Karen advanced myriad theories and claims purporting to 
support her demand that John be ordered to make significant payments to her.  The 
trial court considered these claims and, in the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law it issued simultaneously with its judgment, found that, “[b]ecause of the 
manner of presentation of multiple and duplicative exhibits making exaggerated 
and unfounded claims interspersed with legitimate claims, it is impossible to 
ascertain with precision how much John might owe Karen.”  The trial court then 
held: 
John does not owe Karen anything other than those amounts which 
will be set off against the equitable distribution to John herein and 
representing (1) claimed Contempt damages in the approximate 
amount of $40,000 . . . and (2) funds paid out of PeakKnowledge for 
the benefit of Carol Trevains in the amount of $50,000 and (3) 
Trenton rental income of $21,000 and [$34,297.71 to compensate 
Karen for two tax-related issues]. 
Based on these findings, and, after applying the parties’ premarital agreement to 
the evidence presented to divide the real and personal property, the court ordered 
 
4 
John to pay Karen $145,000.  The court then ordered Karen to pay John $300,000 
to achieve an “equitable distribution.” 
[¶6]  On August 23, 2010, Karen filed a request for further findings of fact 
and conclusions of law.  In addition to forty-one other requests, she asked the court 
to determine whether John had violated the preliminary injunction by 
discontinuing her health insurance.  The trial court responded to Karen’s requests 
to the extent appropriate and otherwise “decline[d] to respond to [Karen]’s request 
for further findings of fact and conclusions of law.” 
[¶7]  In Karen’s November 5, 2010, notice of appeal, she listed the trial 
court’s decisions regarding health insurance in her statement of the issues.  Then, 
on November 22 and 24, 2010, Karen moved the District Court and us2 to enforce 
the preliminary injunction, claiming John removed her from his health insurance 
policy in violation of the injunction.  On February 7, 2011, the trial court held it 
lacked jurisdiction to enforce the preliminary injunction during the pendency of 
Karen’s appeal.  Karen timely appealed from this judgment, and she consolidated 
her appeals before us. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶8]  Karen claims multifarious errors for our review.  Her statement of 
issues spans five single-spaced pages.  She listed the issues under ten headings, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  Karen subsequently withdrew her motion here. 
 
5 
which are further described in a total of fifty-two subheadings.  Nevertheless, 
Karen’s claimed errors effectively coalesce into four issues. 
[¶9]  First, Karen contends the trial court erred in its valuation of certain 
assets and in its equitable distribution of the marital estate.  Second, Karen asserts 
the trial court erred in distributing her nonmarital property to John to create an 
“equitable distribution.”  Third, Karen argues the trial court erred in holding it 
lacked jurisdiction to consider her motion to enforce the preliminary injunction 
after she filed her notice of appeal.  Fourth, Karen claims the trial court erred in 
denying her request for attorney fees.  We address each contention below. 
A. 
Valuation of Property  
[¶10]  Karen contends the trial court erred in its finding that the business, 
PeakKnowledge, is worth $51,000.  “We review the court’s factual findings, 
including determinations about an asset’s value or its classification as marital or 
nonmarital property, for clear error.”  Bond v. Bond, 2011 ME 54, ¶ 10, 
17 A.3d 1219 (citing Wandishin v. Wandishin, 2009 ME 73, ¶ 12, 976 A.2d 949).  
A trial court’s factual finding is not clearly erroneous if there is any competent 
evidence in the record to support it.  Bond, 2011 ME 54, ¶ 15, 17 A.3d 1219.  
Further, “[w]e review the court’s distribution of the property for an abuse of 
discretion.”  Id. ¶ 10 (citing Carter v. Carter, 2006 ME 68, ¶ 14, 900 A.2d 200). 
 
6 
[¶11]  The testimony of Karen’s own expert, Dr. Robert Strong, supports the 
trial court’s finding.  Dr. Strong testified the “simple net asset value” of 
PeakKnowledge was $51,644.  Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in adopting 
that value. 
[¶12]  Additionally, Karen challenges the trial court’s valuation of the Lotus 
vehicle, the ING account and NY Life IRA, and the Trenton camp.  With the 
exception of the Lotus vehicle, the trial court awarded all of these assets to Karen.  
Fluctuations in their value, then, are of minimal relevance.  A divorce court’s 
failure to consider the value of nonmarital property once the parties presented 
evidence on the subject would be an abuse of discretion.  See Kruy v. Kruy, 
2002 ME 14, ¶¶ 5-6, 789 A.2d 99.  Where the parties fail to present evidence on 
the nonmarital property’s value or, as here, where the trial court finds their 
evidence inconclusive and contradictory,3 a party cannot bemoan the trial court’s 
failure to adopt her view.  See id. ¶ 6.  In any case, the court’s valuation of that 
property remains a question of fact, which we will not overturn so long as any 
competent evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding.  See Bond, 
2011 ME 54, ¶ 15, 17 A.3d 1219.  The record supports the trial court findings as to 
value of the assets, including the Lotus, and as a result, we affirm. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  In a note to the trial court’s chart of assets, it specifically addressed Karen’s inconclusive evidence 
regarding the value of the ING account. 
 
7 
B. 
Distribution of Property 
[¶13]  We have long recognized a three-step process for distributing 
property in a divorce.  See Grishman v. Grishman, 407 A.2d 9, 11 (Me. 1979).  
The trial court must first distinguish marital from nonmarital property.  Id.  Then, 
the court must set apart nonmarital property.  Id.  Finally, the court must divide 
marital property “in such proportion as the court deems just.”  Id. 
[¶14]  All property acquired by either or both spouses during marriage is 
presumed to be marital property.  19-A M.R.S. § 953(3).  This presumption may be 
overcome by showing the property was acquired pursuant to one of five statutory 
exceptions.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 953(2)(A)-(E).  One of the exceptions is 
“[p]roperty excluded by valid agreement of the parties.”  19-A M.R.S. § 953(2)(D).  
Although section 953 does not define “valid agreement,” we hold that a “valid 
agreement” pursuant to section 953(2)(D) includes a premarital agreement that is 
enforceable pursuant to Maine’s Uniform Premarital Agreement Act. 4   See 
19-A M.R.S. §§ 601-611. 
[¶15]  When a valid premarital agreement excludes property from the 
marital estate, a divorce court lacks statutory authority to award this separate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  Maine law recognizes the validity of premarital agreements.  In 1987, Maine adopted the Uniform 
Premarital Agreement Act.  P.L. 1987, ch. 302, codified at 19-A M.R.S. §§ 601-611.  The Act permits 
parties to a contemplated marriage to agree as to the disposition of property in the event of marital 
dissolution.  19-A M.R.S. § 604(3).  The Act also permits “modification or elimination of spousal 
support.”  Id. § 604(4). 
 
8 
property to the other spouse because a divorce court “shall set apart to each spouse 
the spouse’s property.”  See 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1) (emphasis added).  “The trial 
court has no discretion in the allocation of the nonmarital property; it must be 
transferred to the spouse to whom it belongs.  The equitable considerations 
applicable to the just division of marital property do not apply to the setting apart 
of nonmarital property.”5  Levy, Maine Family Law § 7.5.1 at 7-24 (6th ed. 2009); 
see Long v. Long, 1997 ME 171, ¶ 9, 697 A.2d 1317 (holding “[t]he other spouse 
has no right to an equitable share of the marriage partner’s ‘separate property’ and 
that property is not subject to the court’s equitable powers of distribution”). 
[¶16]  The trial court held the premarital agreement between John and Karen 
was valid and binding on the parties, and John does not challenge that ruling on 
appeal.6  Pursuant to the premarital agreement, all property in Karen’s name alone 
at the time of the divorce is her nonmarital separate property.7  The court did award 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  We note a single case in which a divorce court awarded a spouse’s nonmarital property to 
implement a spousal support obligation; if this reflects a true exception to the rule, this exception does not 
apply here because Karen and John’s premarital agreement unequivocally bars awarding spousal support.  
See Palacci v. Palacci, 613 A.2d 951, 953, 955 (Me. 1992). 
6  At oral argument, John suggested that the passage of time somehow undermined the enforceability 
of the premarital agreement.  In his brief, however, John challenged only the trial court’s application of 
the agreement, not its validity.  To the extent he intended to advance this novel theory at oral argument, 
we decline to consider it.  See United States v. Pulido, 566 F.3d 52, 60 n.4 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that 
absent extraordinary circumstances, arguments raised for the first time at oral argument are waived). 
7  The relevant sections of the premarital agreement state: 
5.1.  Except as herein specifically provided to the contrary, the Parties adopt as their 
property regime that of separation of property.  They intend that their property remain 
separate throughout their marriage.  They further acknowledge that there are between 
them no rights or obligations respecting sharing of property, and each spouse renounces 
 
9 
to Karen the property in her name, as required by the terms of the parties’ 
premarital agreement.  That property included the camp in Trenton, valued at over 
$680,000, investment accounts worth more than $1,300,000, and jewelry, art, and 
antiques worth $120,000.  In keeping with the premarital agreement, the court also 
awarded John the property held solely in his name as his nonmarital property, 
which was much less valuable. 
[¶17]  As noted above, pursuant to the terms of the premarital agreement, 
only property not titled solely in either party’s name can be considered part of the 
marital estate.  The agreement states, “[Karen and John] may accumulate some 
portion of their earnings or profits in assets in their separate names [which] shall be 
treated as the sole property of the Party in whose name the asset appears.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
such rights and obligations now and for the future.  The Parties acknowledge the 
possibility that either or both of them may use the proceeds of their separate property to 
acquire, in whole or in part, property in joint or common ownership between them or 
otherwise identified as marital property.  In that event, the Parties agree that each will 
have the right to trace the proceeds of his or her separate property so used, and that no 
presumption of gift to the marital estate or the other Party shall arise.  Reference is 
specifically made to the Service Contract/Consulting Agreement dated August 30, 1991, 
by and between KAG Consulting, Inc. and CHE, Inc. which will remain the sole property 
of the Wife. 
5.2.  The Parties agree that each of them will have separate incomes during the course 
of their marriage and that they may accumulate some portions of their earnings or profits 
in assets in their separate names, the character of which assets under Maine law would be 
marital property, but which by agreement of the Parties, shall be treated as the sole 
property of the Party in whose name the asset appears.  Upon separation or dissolution of 
the marriage, such asset or assets shall remain the property of the Spouse in whose name 
the asset appears and be treated as the non-marital property of that Spouse.  
Appreciation in the value of such asset shall be treated in the same manner. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
10 
[¶18]  Karen and John’s only marital property was PeakKnowledge, the 
house in Florida, the condominium in Bangor, and a Commonwealth account 
worth $13,000.  Pursuant to the parties’ agreement during this litigation, the court 
awarded Karen the house in Florida and the condominium in Bangor.  The court 
awarded John PeakKnowledge and divided the Commonwealth account in half, 
awarding each party $6,500. 
[¶19]  After dividing the marital estate, the court then attempted to create 
“an equitable distribution that does justice between the parties,” by ordering Karen 
to pay John $300,000.  The court’s order was in error, however, because the size of 
the marital estate did not support the award, and the court could not distribute 
Karen’s nonmarital property to John.  The court repeated this error in its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law when it held, “[e]quitable distribution in Maine 
permits the Court to do equity (even if that means a distribution from Karen’s 
nonmarital assets) . . . .” 
[¶20]  The presumptively marital property awarded exclusively to Karen 
comprised the Bangor condominium, which was acquired and held by 
PeakKnowledge, and the house in Florida, which was held in both names.  By the 
terms of the premarital agreement, it was each party’s burden to “trace the 
proceeds of his or her separate property” if he or she wished to overcome the 
presumption that property acquired after marriage and not held solely in either 
 
11 
name was marital.  Although Karen has asserted that both items are either entirely 
or primarily her nonmarital property, in light of the disputed and confusing 
evidence presented on this issue, we cannot say that the court erred in failing to 
identify any nonmarital component of either asset.  Therefore, the trial court was 
permitted to award both properties to Karen while considering their combined 
$141,500 value as marital property, subject to distribution.  See Bond, 
2011 ME 54, ¶ 10, 17 A.3d 1219. 
[¶21]  Because there is insufficient evidence in the record to support a 
finding that $300,000 of the assets awarded to Karen were marital property, the 
record will not support an award of $300,000 to John in order to create an 
equitable division of the marital estate.  We vacate that portion of the trial court’s 
judgment and remand to allow the trial court to determine whether any sum—
within the value of the marital estate—should be awarded to John to create an 
equitable division of the martial estate.  As always, we are mindful “that an equal 
division is not necessarily an equitable one.”  Spooner v. Spooner, 2004 ME 69, 
¶ 27, 850 A.2d 354 (citing Doucette v. Washburn, 2001 ME 38, ¶ 24, 
766 A.2d 578).  On remand, the trial court may permit the parties to present 
additional evidence or argument, or it may issue a decision based on the evidence 
and arguments already presented. 
 
12 
C. 
Action on Motion to Enforce Preliminary Injunction 
[¶22]  As set forth above, following her notice of appeal from the divorce 
judgment, Karen moved the trial court to enforce the preliminary injunction, which 
she alleged John violated by removing her from his health insurance policy.  
Karen’s motion raises two related issues.  First, whether the divorce court had 
jurisdiction to consider her motion pursuant to M.R. App. P. 3(b) and M.R. Civ. P. 
62(a) (2011) after she filed her notice of appeal, and second, whether the 
preliminary injunction requiring John to maintain her health insurance was 
effective after the District Court issued its divorce judgment. 
[¶23]  When Karen began this divorce proceeding more than four years ago, 
a preliminary injunction took effect, pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 903(1)(B)(3) and 
M.R. Civ. P. 104.  That injunction enjoined John from “voluntarily removing  
[Karen] from a policy of health insurance that provides coverage for [her].”  
19-A M.R.S. § 903(1)(B)(3).  Despite that injunction, John allowed Karen’s 
coverage to briefly lapse in October 2008.  In an April 2009 order, the court 
(Ellsworth, R. Murray, J.) required John to reimburse Karen for costs she incurred 
as a result of that lapse. 
[¶24]  At trial in May 2010, Karen again asserted that she had incurred costs 
during the pendency of the divorce as a result of John’s actions with regard to her 
health insurance coverage.  In its August 16, 2010, judgment, however, the court 
 
13 
specifically declined to reimburse Karen for these additional claims and ended 
John’s obligation to provide health insurance for Karen. 
[¶25]  Karen’s December 2010 motion to “enforce” the preliminary 
injunction asserts that John removed her from his policy after the August 16, 2010, 
divorce judgment.  In its order finding it was not authorized to consider Karen’s 
motion because of the pending appeal, the court specifically noted that M.R. App. 
P. 3(b), which delineates what trial courts can and cannot do during the pendency 
of an appeal, did not permit a court “to enforce a Preliminary Injunction pending 
appeal.” 
[¶26]  As the court correctly noted, trial courts retain only limited 
jurisdiction to act once a case has been appealed.  See M.R. App. P. 3(b).  
Determining precisely where the court may or may not act while an appeal is 
pending is even more complicated in family cases, which always involve 
preliminary injunctions, and which frequently involve orders pending judgment. 
[¶27]  When a party asks a trial court to enforce an order during an appeal, 
the court must first determine if the order was stayed pending the appeal.  M.R. 
Civ. P. 62 reads: 
(a) Automatic Stay, Exceptions--Injunctions and Receiverships.  
Except as stated herein, no execution shall issue upon a judgment nor 
shall proceedings be taken for its enforcement until the expiration of 
21 days after its entry or until the time for appeal from the judgment 
as extended by the rules governing appeals has expired.  Unless 
otherwise ordered by the court, an interlocutory or final judgment in 
 
14 
an action for an injunction or in a receivership action or an order 
relating to the care, custody and support of minor children or to the 
separate support or personal liberty of a person or for the protection 
of a person from abuse or harassment shall not be stayed during the 
period after its entry and until an appeal is taken or during the 
pendency of an appeal.  The provisions of subdivision (d) of this rule 
govern the suspending, modifying, restoring or granting of an 
injunction during the pendency of an appeal. 
 
. . . . 
 
(d) Injunction Pending Appeal.  When an appeal is taken from an 
interlocutory or final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an 
injunction, the court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or 
grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal upon such terms 
as to bond or otherwise as it considers proper for the security of the 
rights of the adverse party. 
M.R. Civ. P. 62. (Emphasis added).  Subsection (a) excepts certain trial court 
orders, specifically including those involving spousal support, from the usual 
appellate stay.  In its discretion, a trial court could choose to stay any order, 
including its entire judgment, pending appeal, pursuant to subsections (a) and (d).  
See Adams v. Adams, 620 A.2d 286, 287-88 (Me. 1993).  But if it has not stayed 
the portions of its judgment subject to M.R. Civ. P. 62(a), those provisions take 
effect and remain in effect throughout the appeal period.  See Most v. Most, 
477 A.2d 250, 263-64 (Me. 1984); see also Sylvester v. Sylvester, 429 A.2d 223, 
227 (Me. 1981). 
[¶28]  When a divorce judgment terminates a temporary order of spousal 
support by ordering a payment in lieu of support, or when the level of support is 
 
15 
reduced to reflect a weighted division of property, a trial court may well decide to 
stay those portions of its judgment—leaving the previously ordered, temporary 
payment scheme in place—if one of the parties files an appeal.  See Adams, 
620 A.2d at 287-88. 
[¶29]  Here, the divorce judgment implicitly ended John’s obligation to 
provide health insurance to Karen and the court did not stay that portion of its 
order.  See Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 78, 81-82 (Me. 1979).  Absent the trial 
court’s express determination otherwise, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 62(a), the court’s 
order ending John’s obligation to provide health insurance for Karen was not 
stayed pending appeal.8  Adams, 620 A.2d at 287. 
[¶30]  Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 62(d), a court does have the discretion to 
“restore” a preliminary injunction during the pendency of an appeal and, if read 
generously, Karen’s motion could be construed as a request to restore the 
preliminary injunction.  From that vantage point, the trial court could have 
considered the merits of Karen’s request. 
[¶31]  Even if the court had considered the merits of Karen’s request 
however, its response should have been to deny the motion.  Health insurance 
coverage is a form of support.  See generally Levasseur v. Levasseur, 2010 ME 5, 
987 A.2d 528 (discussing the provision of health insurance in the child support 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  It is incumbent on the parties to move the court to act should they wish to avoid the usual effect of 
M.R. Civ. P. 62(a). 
 
16 
context).  When one adult is required to provide health insurance for another adult, 
it is considered spousal support.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5)(G) (listing health 
insurance as a factor to be considered in awarding support). 
[¶32]  When, as here, the divorcing couple’s premarital agreement 
unequivocally bars the awarding of spousal support, neither spouse can be required 
to provide the other with health insurance.  The divorce judgment ended John’s 
obligation to provide health insurance, and that portion of the judgment was not 
stayed pending appeal pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 62(a). 
D. 
Attorney Fees 
 [¶33]  “We review the divorce court’s order regarding attorney fees for an 
abuse of discretion.”  Ellis v. Ellis, 2008 ME 191, ¶ 26, 962 A.2d 328.  The trial 
court found, and the record supports, that, “[b]oth parties contributed substantially 
to the greater than usual cost of litigation.”  Given the contentiousness 
demonstrated by the parties’ motion practice, we conclude that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in ordering each party to pay his or her own attorney fees.  
See Ellis, 2008 ME 191, ¶ 26, 962 A.2d 328 (noting that the trial court may take 
into account parties’ conduct during litigation in awarding attorney fees). 
 
17 
[¶34]  To the extent Karen claims other errors in the trial court, she has 
waived those issues through her failure to develop them.9  See In re David H., 
2009 ME 131, ¶ 31 n.6, 985 A.2d 490 (citing Mehlhorn v. Derby, 2006 ME 110, 
¶ 11, 905 A.2d 290). 
The entry is: 
The District Court’s judgment is affirmed in part 
and vacated in part.  Case remanded to the District 
Court 
solely 
to 
reconsider 
the 
equitable 
distribution of the assets discussed in this opinion.  
Judgment is affirmed in all other respects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
N. Laurence Willey, Jr., Esq., and Thomas M. Matzilevich, Esq., Willey 
Law Offices, Bangor, for appellant Karen A. Laqualia 
 
Dana E. Prescott, Esq., Prescott, Jamieson, Nelson & Murphy, LLC, Saco, 
for appellee John A. Laqualia 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
N. Laurence Willey, Jr., Esq., for appellant Karen A. Laqualia 
 
Dana E. Prescott, Esq., for appellee John A. Laqualia 
 
Bangor District Court docket number FM-2010-45 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  For example, Karen perfunctorily claims that the District Court interfered with her right of contract 
in violation of the Maine Constitution and United States Constitution.  She waives this argument, but in 
any event, it lacks merit because Karen and John executed their premarital agreement after the Uniform 
Premarital Agreement Act took effect.  See Hoag v. Dick, 2002 ME 92, ¶ 10, 799 A.2d 391 (declining to 
apply UPAA to agreement executed before effective date of legislation).