Title: State v. Jamerson

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 115,629 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JAMES LEE JAMERSON, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
Interpretation of sentencing statutes is a question of law over which an appellate 
court exercises unlimited review. 
 
2. 
 
Whether a sentence is illegal within the meaning of K.S.A. 22-3504 is also a 
question of law over which an appellate court has unlimited review. 
 
3. 
 
Under K.S.A. 22-3504(1), courts may correct an illegal sentence at any time. 
 
4. 
 
When one or more of the sentences in a multiconviction case is illegal under 
K.S.A. 22-3504, district courts may only correct the illegal sentence or sentences. 
 
2 
 
 
 
5. 
 
When correcting an illegal sentence, the district court's authority in setting the 
length of the new prison term includes determining whether the corrected sentence will 
run consecutive to, or concurrent with, the other sentences. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished decision filed February 3, 
2017. Appeal from Shawnee District Court; EVELYN Z. WILSON, judge. Decision filed January 25, 2019. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming in part, vacating in part, and remanding with directions is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part. Judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded with directions. 
 
Joseph A. Desch, of Law Office of Joseph A. Desch, of Topeka, argued the cause, and was on the 
brief for appellant. 
 
Jodi E. Litfin, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause, and Rachel L. Pickering, assistant 
solicitor general, Chadwick J. Taylor, former district attorney, Michael F. Kagay, district attorney, and 
Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The decision of the court was delivered by 
 
NUSS, C.J.:   James Lee Jamerson challenges his resentencing after the district 
court granted his motion to correct an illegal sentence but then also modified the duration 
and concurrent nature of one of his legal, nonbase sentences. The primary issue presented 
asks:  to what extent can a district court modify multiple sentences when only some of 
them are held to be illegal following a motion to correct an illegal sentence? 
 
We conclude the district court may only correct the illegal sentences. We affirm in 
part and vacate in part the decision of that court, affirm in part and reverse in part the 
decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand with directions. 
 
3 
 
 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In 2001, Jamerson pled no contest to (1) second-degree murder, a severity level 1 
person felony; (2) aggravated robbery, a severity level 3 person felony; and (3) 
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a severity level 5 person felony. Jamerson and 
the State agreed to recommend a 288-month controlling prison sentence, and the district 
court agreed to follow the recommendation. In its implementation, the court determined 
Jamerson had a criminal history score of D and sentenced him to a standard grid box term 
of 253 months for second-degree murder; a downward departure to 35 months for 
aggravated robbery; and a downward departure to 35 months for conspiracy. The court 
ordered the aggravated robbery sentence to run consecutive to the second-degree murder 
sentence and the conspiracy sentence to run concurrent with both. This resulted in a total 
controlling sentence of 288 months' imprisonment. 
 
Fourteen years later in 2015, Jamerson filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal 
sentence, and his appointed counsel later filed a supplemental motion. Jamerson argued 
his criminal history score was incorrect at sentencing. After holding an evidentiary 
hearing, the court determined Jamerson's criminal history should have been H, not the 
more serious D. To correct the error, Jamerson and the State both recommended that the 
second-degree murder sentence be reduced from 253 months to 176 months. This would 
in turn reduce the controlling sentence to 211 months' imprisonment. 
 
At resentencing, the court noticed another error in Jamerson's sentences. 
Specifically, the 2001 sentencing court had erroneously also applied Jamerson's criminal 
history to the nonbase sentences of aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit 
aggravated robbery. Under the sentencing guidelines, the court does not apply the 
defendant's criminal history score to nonbase sentences but instead uses the gridbox 
applicable for no criminal history, or I. K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 21-4720(b)(5) ("Nonbase 
4 
 
 
 
sentences will not have criminal history scores applied, as calculated in the criminal 
history I column of the grid, but base sentences will have the full criminal history score 
assigned."). The error did not impact Jamerson's aggravated robbery conviction because 
the court's downward departure to 35 months coincidentally was a gridbox sentence for a 
severity level 3 person felony with no criminal history. But the 35-month sentence for 
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery was an illegal upward departure when using the 
correct criminal history score. That gridbox sentence should have been 31 months 
(mitigated), 32 months (standard), or 34 months (aggravated). 
 
In an apparent effort to keep the new sentence as close as possible to the one in 
2001, the 2015 court resentenced Jamerson to the aggravated gridbox sentence of 186 
months for second-degree murder; the standard gridbox sentence of 59 months for 
aggravated robbery; and the aggravated grid box sentence of 34 months for conspiracy. 
The court ordered all three sentences to run consecutive for a total controlling sentence of 
279 months' imprisonment. 
 
Jamerson appealed, arguing the court only had authority to correct the illegal 
second-degree murder sentence and lacked jurisdiction to modify his unchallenged 
aggravated robbery and conspiracy sentences. 
 
The Court of Appeals panel concluded the 2015 resentencing court had 
jurisdiction to modify the conspiracy sentence from the erroneous downward departure of 
35 months to the appropriate aggravated term of 34 months because the sentence itself 
was illegal, independent of the illegal base sentence for second-degree murder. State v. 
Jamerson, No. 115,629, 2017 WL 462716 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion). But 
it concluded the court did not have jurisdiction to deviate from the original sentence by 
making the conspiracy sentence run consecutive to the second-degree murder and 
aggravated robbery sentences or to resentence Jamerson to 59 months for aggravated 
5 
 
 
 
robbery. The panel held Jamerson should have a controlling sentence of 221 months—
186 for the base sentence for second-degree murder; 35 for aggravated robbery, 
consecutive to the murder; and 34 for conspiracy, to be served concurrently with the 
other two sentences. 2017 WL 462716, at *4. 
 
The State petitioned this court for review of the panel's decision. Our jurisdiction 
is under K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (review of Court of Appeals decision). 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Issue:  When correcting an illegal base sentence, did the resentencing court have 
jurisdiction to vacate and resentence Jamerson's two nonbase sentences? 
 
Standard of review 
 
Jamerson's arguments require us to interpret sentencing statutes. Their 
interpretation is a question of law over which this court exercises unlimited review. State 
v. Guder, 293 Kan. 763, 765, 267 P.3d 751 (2012). Furthermore, whether a sentence is 
illegal within the meaning of K.S.A. 22-3504 is also a question of law over which we 
have unlimited review. State v. Lee, 304 Kan. 416, 417, 372 P.3d 415 (2016). The court 
may correct an illegal sentence at any time. K.S.A. 22-3504(1); State v. Dickey, 305 Kan. 
217, 219, 380 P.3d 230 (2016). 
 
The State argues Guder should be overruled. 
 
The State first urges this court to reexamine our holding in Guder because here it 
leads to an absurd result. The State asks us to either reverse or carve out an exception to 
Guder and hold that some authority still exists to treat criminal sentences as a single 
6 
 
 
 
entity. Per the State, this is especially compelling in instances where the record clearly 
shows the State and defense reached the original sentence in a plea deal by considering 
the sentence in its entirety. The State complains that under Guder a defendant can game 
the system and undermine a plea agreement by waiting until after sentencing to object to 
incorrect criminal history scores. 
 
The Guder court, however, thoroughly analyzed legislative intent and the effect of 
the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act, K.S.A. 21-4701 et seq. (KSGA), on common law 
sentencing power and rejected this particular argument. Moreover, this court has 
repeatedly held that the KSGA deprived district courts of the jurisdiction to modify 
sentences except to correct arithmetic or clerical errors, to consider or reconsider 
departures from presumptive sentences, or to modify sentences by reinstating previously 
revoked probations. Guder, 293 Kan. at 766. We recently reaffirmed our holding from 
Guder in State v. Warren, 307 Kan. 609, 612-13, 412 P.3d 993 (2018). So we again reject 
the State's argument. 
 
The State argues Guder does not apply. 
 
 
Alternatively, the State argues Guder does not apply because of the procedural 
differences between the facts in Guder and in this case. Specifically, the resentencing 
court here found Jamerson's sentence illegal under K.S.A. 22-3504 (correction of 
sentence), whereas Guder involved the court's authority to modify a nonvacated portion 
of a sentence on remand from an appellate court. The State argues Guder and its progeny 
should only be applied to cases following a remand. 
 
 
In a case based on a motion to correct an illegal sentence and without remand 
instructions, the State contends K.S.A. 21-4720(b) (now cited as K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-
6819) should control. That statute permitted the sentencing judge to exercise discretion 
7 
 
 
 
when deciding whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences in a multiple 
conviction case: 
 
 
"The sentencing judge shall otherwise have discretion to impose concurrent or 
consecutive sentences in multiple conviction cases. The sentencing judge shall state on 
the record if the sentence is to be served concurrently or consecutively." K.S.A. 21-
4720(b). 
 
The State suggests that correcting an illegal sentence should follow the same rules as 
those applied to sentencing on all counts for the first time. It asserts that K.S.A. 21-
4720(b) gives the district court authority to alter every sentence in a multiple conviction 
case at resentencing, not just the illegal ones. 
 
Admittedly, the statutory authority to correct an illegal sentence does not come 
from the KSGA. Rather, K.S.A. 22-3504—one chapter later in the Kansas Statutes—
provides the authority for correction of an illegal sentence. And it simply says that the 
court may correct an illegal sentence at any time, and that clerical mistakes in judgments, 
orders, or other parts of the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or 
omission may be corrected by the court at any time. K.S.A. 22-3504. The only guidance 
the statute provides on correcting an illegal sentence is that the defendant shall receive 
full credit for time spent in custody under the sentence prior to correction and that he or 
she is entitled to a hearing and counsel. 
 
Absent further direction by the statute itself, we must turn to the KSGA for 
guidance on correctly sentencing offenders. See K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6802 (the 
sentencing guidelines in the KSGA apply equally to all offenders in all parts of the state); 
K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6819 (sentencing in multiple conviction cases). Reading K.S.A. 
2017 22-3504 for the correction of an illegal sentence and the KSGA together would 
8 
 
 
 
logically advise that correcting an illegal sentence should follow the same statutory rules 
as resentencing after a remand. Procedurally, we find no reason a district court's 
conclusion (that a sentence is illegal) is different in any legally significant way from the 
holding by this court that a sentence is illegal under K.S.A. 22-3504. In either scenario 
the sentence must be corrected to become one complying with the KSGA. On concluding 
one or more of the sentences in a multiconviction case to be illegal, the district court, like 
an appellate court, must vacate the illegal sentence and correct it by resentencing in 
accordance with the KSGA. See State v. Warren, 307 Kan. 609, 412 P.3d 993 (2018) 
(when multiconviction cases are remanded for resentencing, district courts may not 
modify sentences that have not been vacated and are not illegal). But this does not mean 
the district court has authority to resentence anew for all of the convictions in a multiple 
conviction case. Rather, as we have held in cases directing resentencing of an illegal 
sentence on remand, the court may vacate and resentence only the illegal one in a 
multiconviction case. Guder, 293 Kan. 763. 
 
The dissent faults us for a perceived lack of detailed analysis. And it also argues 
that K.S.A. 22-3504(1) only authorizes a "correction" of an illegal sentence, faulting us 
for characterizing a sentence "correction" as "resentencing" under the KSGA. However, 
to make the sentence "right"—to use one of the dissent's synonyms for "correct"—
requires resentencing of the illegal portion of the sentence in a way that conforms to the 
KSGA. As explained above, the district court does not have authority to resentence anew 
for all of the convictions in a multiple conviction case when only one or more, but not all, 
of the sentences are illegal. The court may only resentence the illegal sentence(s). Guder, 
293 Kan. 763. In this regard, the dissent overstates our holding as incorporating the entire 
KSGA. Its main disagreement with our decision appears to be more with our holding in 
Morningstar, an issue we address in the next section. 
 
9 
 
 
 
The State argues Morningstar provides authority to reconsider the entire sentence. 
 
As a further alternative, the State argues that our decision in State v. Morningstar, 
299 Kan. 1236, 329 P.3d 1093 (2014), provides a court with authority to reconsider the 
entire sentence at resentencing. While this is not entirely correct, Morningstar does lend 
some support to the State's position that the 2015 court had more discretion in 
resentencing Jamerson than the Court of Appeals panel allowed. 
 
The defendant in Morningstar was convicted of rape of a child under 14, 
aggravated battery, abuse of a child, and child endangerment. He was originally 
sentenced to an off-grid hard 25 life sentence for the rape conviction under Jessica's Law. 
He also received term-of-years sentences for the remaining convictions, to run concurrent 
with each other and the rape sentence. We vacated the off-grid rape sentence because the 
State failed to prove the defendant's age to the jury as required by statute. We remanded 
for resentencing on the rape conviction "'as a felony on the KSGA nondrug sentencing 
grid.'" 299 Kan. at 1238. 
 
Requiring a grid sentence for rape made it the base sentence because rape was a 
higher severity level grid offense than the other convictions. Because rape—and not 
aggravated battery—was now the base sentence, the aggravated battery sentence had to 
be recalculated without applying the criminal history score. K.S.A. 21-4720(b)(5). The 
district court also ordered the new gridbox rape sentence—the primary sentence—to run 
consecutive to the other convictions. Morningstar argued that the court was prohibited 
from changing the sentence for his primary crime from running concurrent with, to 
consecutive to, his other sentences. 
 
The Morningstar court found that argument largely unpersuasive because in 
multiple conviction cases like Morningstar, whether a sentence runs consecutive to the 
10 
 
 
 
defendant's other sentence or sentences is related to, if not intertwined with, the 
sentencing court's discretion to choose the appropriate term of months. The district court 
necessarily has to apply the KSGA provisions governing the terms of grid sentences to 
determine the sentence's length. In doing so, the court has to exercise its independent 
judgment—within the limitations imposed by the KSGA—to determine the appropriate 
sentence. Further, both K.S.A. 21-4608 and K.S.A. 21-4720 permitted a court to run two 
or more sentences consecutive with one another but did not dictate the order in which 
consecutive grid sentences must be imposed or served. 299 Kan. at 1243-46. 
 
Under Morningstar, here the 2015 court did not have the authority at resentencing 
to modify the original (legal) aggravated robbery sentence. But it did have authority to 
modify the original (illegal) sentences for second-degree murder and conspiracy, which 
would include whether they would run consecutive to, or concurrent with, the other 
sentences. Morningstar, 299 Kan. 1236, Syl. ¶ 5 ("When a term of imprisonment is 
vacated on appeal and remanded for resentencing, the district court's authority in setting 
the length of the new prison term includes determining on remand whether it will run 
consecutive to the defendant's other terms of imprisonment."). The KSGA permits a 
district court imposing a term of imprisonment upon resentencing to determine anew 
whether the prison terms runs consecutive to a defendant's other sentences. 
 
In conclusion, we hold that our decisions from Guder and Morningstar apply to 
resentencing based on a motion to correct an illegal sentence. This holding means that 
here the district court erred in increasing the legal aggravated robbery sentence from 35 
to 59 months. But it did have authority to resentence the illegal sentences for both 
second-degree murder (from 253 to 186 months) and conspiracy (from 35 to 34 months). 
And despite the holding of the panel, this included the authority to order the conspiracy 
sentence to run consecutive to the others. 
 
11 
 
 
 
Consequently, we reverse and remand for resentencing. The original 35-month 
sentence for aggravated robbery, which was not illegal, is to be reinstated. This will make 
a total controlling sentence of 255 months (186 months for second-degree murder, 35 
months for aggravated robbery, and 34 months for conspiracy). 
 
 
LUCKERT, J., not participating. 
 
WILLIAM R. MOTT, District Judge, assigned.1 
 
* * * 
 
 
JOHNSON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:  I agree with the majority 
that, in conformance with our holding in State v. Guder, 293 Kan. 763, 267 P.3d 751 
(2012), the district court erred when it modified Jamerson's original sentence for 
aggravated robbery because that sentence was not illegal and, therefore, was not subject 
to correction under K.S.A. 22-3504(1). Likewise, I agree that, when the district court 
discerned that the originally imposed sentences for second-degree murder and conspiracy 
to commit robbery were nonconforming with the criminal history statutory provisions, 
i.e., were illegal, the district court had authority under K.S.A. 22-3504(1) to correct the 
illegality. Where I part company with the majority is when it interprets K.S.A. 22-
3504(1) as investing a district court with the discretion to modify the legal portions of a 
previously imposed sentence. 
 
                                                 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  District Judge Mott was appointed to hear case No. 115,629 
vice Justice Luckert under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, § 6(f) of 
the Kansas Constitution. 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
First, there is no statutory basis upon which to characterize a sentence correction 
under K.S.A. 22-3504(1) as a "resentencing" under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines 
Act (KSGA), K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6801 through 21-6824. The majority acknowledges 
that the district court's authority to change Jamerson's sentences in response to his motion 
to correct an illegal sentence does not emanate from the KSGA. Quite to the contrary, not 
long after the adoption of the KSGA, State v. Miller, 260 Kan. 892, 897, 926 P.2d 652 
(1996), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Berreth, 294 Kan. 98, 273 P.3d 752 
(2012), explained that in the KSGA "no provisions are made for modifying a sentence 
that has already been imposed" and "[t]hat this elimination of the court's authority to 
modify was intentional."  
 
 
More recently, in Guder, we reiterated that "[t]he 1992 amendments to the Kansas 
sentencing statutes deprived district courts of the jurisdiction to modify sentences except 
to correct arithmetic or clerical errors, to consider or reconsider departures from 
presumptive sentences, or to modify sentences by reinstating previously revoked 
probations. [Citations omitted.]" 293 Kan. at 766. Further, corroborating that the 
Legislature acted intentionally, Guder pointed out:   
 
 
"When it enacted the KSGA, our legislature explicitly addressed remands 
following reversal. K.S.A. 21-4720(b)(5) provides that, in the event that a conviction of 
the primary crime is reversed on appeal, the sentencing court is to follow all of the KSGA 
provisions concerning sentencing in multiple conviction cases.  
 
"Nothing in the statutory scheme, however, allows resentencing on other 
convictions following the vacating of a sentence on appeal. It is telling that the legislature 
expressly set out the authority of district courts to resentence on remand, without giving 
them authority to resentence on other convictions when only the sentence for the primary 
conviction is vacated. It is also telling that, in repealing the old statute and replacing it 
with a new version in 2010, the legislature retained the limitation to remands when the 
primary conviction is reversed. See L. 2010, ch. 136, sec. 300(b)(5). We will not add 
13 
 
 
 
words to the statute that would provide jurisdiction to resentence on other counts when 
only the sentence on the primary conviction is vacated. This court ascertains the 
legislature's intent through the statutory language it uses, and it will not read a statute to 
add something not readily found in it. State v. Finch, 291 Kan. 665, Syl. ¶ 2, 244 P.3d 
673 (2011)." 293 Kan. at 766-67. 
 
Consequently, if the district court's new sentence is to survive, it must comply with the 
sentence-correction provisions of K.S.A. 22-3504, which, as the majority acknowledges, 
is contained in the statutory chapter labeled as "Criminal Procedure," rather than in the 
chapter where the KSGA resides. 
 
 
Normally, our first step in determining whether a district court's acts fall within the 
purview of a statute is to look at what the statute actually says, giving common words 
their ordinary meanings. See State v. Phillips, 299 Kan. 479, 495, 325 P.3d 1095 (2014). 
(legislative intent ascertained through statutory language, giving common words their 
ordinary meanings). In our case, the applicable statutory language is quite 
straightforward:  "The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time." K.S.A. 22-
3504(1). Here, however, the majority briefly summarizes the provisions of K.S.A. 22-
3504, opines that they do not include explicit directions for the district court, and declares 
that logic would advise us to interpret K.S.A. 22-3504 as importing the resentencing 
provisions of the KSGA. Slip op. at 7-8.  
 
 
Granted, one can find a rule of statutory construction to support a desired result in 
many instances. But incorporating an entire act into a plainly worded statute because we 
believe it would be the logical thing to do is directly contrary to our most basic statutory 
construction concepts. To begin, when there is no ambiguity in a statute, we simply have 
no need to resort to canons of construction. Phillips, 299 Kan. at 495. "When a statute is 
plain and unambiguous, this court must give effect to the statute's express language, 
instead of determining what the law should or should not be." Redd v. Kansas Truck 
14 
 
 
 
Center, 291 Kan. 176, 188, 239 P.3d 66 (2010). When the statutory language is plain, we 
refrain from reading something into the statute that is not readily found in its words. State 
v. Brooks, 298 Kan. 672, 685, 317 P.3d 54 (2014). Most certainly, we do not read an 
entire act into a single statute, unless that statute's language could be read to permit such 
incorporation. I submit that such a reading of K.S.A. 22-3504(1) is not justified or 
rational. 
 
 
By implication, then, the majority must have found ambiguity in K.S.A. 22-
3504(1). The words we need to address—the court may correct an illegal sentence at any 
time—seem clear enough. No one quibbles about the meaning of "the court" or "at any 
time," and the parties here do not dispute that Jamerson's murder and conspiracy 
sentences were each "an illegal sentence." Consequently, if an ambiguity is to be found, it 
must be divined from the words "may correct."  
 
 
Perhaps it is useful to consider not only what the statute says, but also what it does 
not say. For instance, K.S.A. 22-3504(1) does not say that the court may modify an illegal 
sentence at any time. It does not say that a court may resentence a person with an illegal 
sentence at any time. It only authorizes a correction. I understand the ordinary meaning 
of the common word "correct," to be to make something right, e.g., to correct a 
grammatical error. Cf. Webster's New World College Dictionary 333 (5th ed. 2016) 
(defining "correct" as "to make right; change from wrong to right; remove errors from"). 
In other words, to correct something means to fix what is wrong with it. One does not, in 
ordinary parlance, "correct" something that is not wrong in the first place. Rather, 
something that is already correct can be changed; it can be altered; it can be modified; it 
can be transformed; it can be redone, refashioned, remade, remodeled, revamped, 
revised, or reworked. But it cannot be corrected.  
 
15 
 
 
 
 
There are circumstances under which the imposition of a concurrent sentence 
could be illegal as nonconforming to statutory provisions. See, e.g., K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 
21-6606(c) (sentence for new crime while on probation shall be consecutive to probated 
sentence). In that circumstance, the concurrent sentencing would need correction. Here, 
however, the concurrent sentence for the conspiracy conviction was within the judge's 
discretion and legal. K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6606(a) (sentence shall run concurrent or 
consecutive as the court directs). In other words, the court's use of an illegal criminal 
history score did not render the concurrent sentencing illegal. Accordingly, when the 
district court changed the concurrent conspiracy sentence to a consecutive conspiracy 
sentence, she was not correcting an illegal sentence; she was exercising a discretion that 
was only available to her for a sentencing under the KSGA. Consequently, as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, K.S.A. 22-3504(1) did not authorize the modification of the legal 
portion of the conspiracy sentence. 
 
 
Finally, the majority attempts to find support in State v. Morningstar, 299 Kan. 
1236, 329 P.3d 1093 (2014). That reliance is misplaced; Morningstar is factually 
distinguishable. Morningstar's conviction for off-grid rape was reversed because the State 
failed to prove an essential element of that crime. The case was remanded for sentencing 
on the lesser included offense of on-grid rape, i.e., the district court was directed to 
impose an initial sentence on a new conviction. The reversal also caused a change in the 
primary crime in a multiple conviction case. As noted above, Guder explained that the 
Legislature treats a conviction reversal in a multiple convictions case differently than an 
illegally imposed sentence. And, as the majority notes, a minority opined that 
Morningstar suffered from flawed rationale. See Morningstar, 299 Kan. at 1247-50 
(Johnson, J., joined by Beier, J., dissenting). 
 
 
In short, I would agree with the majority that the district court erred in increasing 
the legal aggravated robbery sentence from 35 to 59 months but did not err in correcting 
16 
 
 
 
the second-degree murder sentence to 186 months and correcting the conspiracy sentence 
to 34 months. But I would hold that the district court erred when it resentenced Jamerson 
to serve his conspiracy sentence consecutively. 
 
 
 
BEIER, J., joins in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.