Title: McDorman v. Moseley, Jr.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: September 18, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2020
____________________
1190819
____________________
Virginia McDorman, as conservator for Sim T. Moseley, a
protected person
v.
Ralph Carmichael Moseley, Jr.
____________________
1190820
____________________
Sim T. Moseley, a protected person, by and through Virginia
McDorman, as conservator for Sim T. Moseley
v.
Ralph Carmichael Moseley, Jr.
Appeals from Jefferson Probate Court
(PR-11-3393)
1190819, 1190820
SELLERS, Justice.
Virginia McDorman, conservator for Sim T. Moseley, and
Sim T. Moseley, a protected person, by and through his
conservator, appeal, in two separate appeals, from a judgment
of the Jefferson Probate Court awarding Ralph Carmichael
Moseley, Jr., attorney fees pursuant to the Alabama Litigation
Accountability Act, § 12-19-270 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the
ALAA").  We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
I.  Jurisdiction
The timely filing of a notice of appeal is a
jurisdictional act, which cannot be waived. Harden v. Laney,
118 So. 3d 186 (Ala. 2013).  In this case, the parties do not 
raise the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction; we therefore
address the issue ex mero motu.  Thomas v. Merritt, 167 So. 3d
283 (Ala. 2013). Specifically, we consider whether these
appeals are governed by Act No. 1144, Ala. Acts 1971 ("the
local act"), in which case they are untimely, or by Rule
4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., in which case they are timely. 
Section 1 of the local act grants the Jefferson Probate
Court "general jurisdiction concurrent with that of the
Circuit Courts of this State, in equity, in the administration
2
1190819, 1190820
of the estates of ... minors and insane or non compos mentis
persons," which would include conservatorship proceedings
under 
the 
Uniform 
Guardianship and 
Protective Proceedings 
Act, 
§ 26-2A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. 
  
Section 4 of the local act requires that appeals to this
Court be filed within 30 days from a judgment or order of the
Jefferson Probate Court:
"Appeals may be taken from the orders, judgments and
decrees of such a Probate Court, relating to the
administration of such aforesaid estates, including
decrees on partial settlements and rulings on
demurrer, or otherwise, relating to action taken
pursuant to jurisdiction conferred by this act, to
the Supreme Court within thirty days from the
rendition thereof, or within thirty days from the
decision of such a Probate Court on a motion for new
trial, in the manner and form as is provided for
appeals from the Probate Courts to the Supreme
Court."
(Emphasis added.)  
Section 6 of the local act states that the primary intent
of the local act is to "expedite and facilitate the
administration of estates and such other matters as are
mentioned herein in counties of over 500,000 population."  
The general law governing appeals from the probate courts
is set forth in Ala. Code 1975, §§ 12-22-20 through 12-22-27. 
Section 12-22-21, Ala. Code 1975, considers the same
3
1190819, 1190820
procedural matter set forth in § 4 of the local act but
provides that appeals from the probate court to this  Court
"shall be governed by the Alabama Rules of Appellate
Procedure, including the time for taking an appeal."   Rule
4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., states that a party must file a
notice of appeal "within 42 days (6 weeks) of the date of the
entry of the judgment or order appealed from." In this case,
the Jefferson Probate Court entered a judgment on July 1,
2019.  The notices of appeals were filed in the probate court
on August 12, 2019 –- more than the 30 days provided by the
local act, but on the 42d day as provided by Rule 4(a)(1). 
Thus, we are presented with a conflict between, on the one
hand, a statute and a rule prescribing the time for taking an
appeal to this Court and, on the other, a local act providing
a more limited time.  In resolving this conflict, we look to
the intent of the legislature. 
"A general act may amend or repeal a local act by express
words or by necessary implication." Pittsburg & Midway Coal
Mining Co. v. Tuscaloosa Cnty., 994 So. 2d 250, 261 (Ala.
2008). In Connor v. State, 275 Ala. 230, 234, 153 So. 2d 787,
4
1190819, 1190820
791 (1963)(quoting 50 Am. Jur. Statutes § 564), this Court
observed, in relevant part:
"'There is no rule which prohibits the repeal by
implication of a special or specific act by a
general or broad one. The question is always one of
legislative intention, and the special or specific
act must yield to the later general or broad act,
where there is a manifest legislative intent that
the general act shall be of universal application
notwithstanding the prior special or specific act.'"
There being no express repeal of § 4 of the local act,
the question is whether § 12-22-21, being the latest
expression of the legislature, repeals by implication § 4 of
the local act, thus providing that appeals from the Jefferson
Probate Court to this Court must be filed within the 42-day
period prescribed by Rule 4(a).  We conclude that it does.   
In 1971, the legislature authorized this Court to
promulgate a new system of rules to govern procedure in
appeals to this Court, the Court of Civil Appeals, and the
Court of Criminal Appeals –- the purpose being to simplify
existing appellate procedure and to assure the speedy
determination of every proceeding on its merits. Act No. 964,
Ala. Acts 1971.1  Pursuant to its rule-making authority, this
1We note that § 150, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.),
provides: "The supreme court shall make and promulgate rules
governing the administration of 
all courts and rules governing
5
1190819, 1190820
Court adopted the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, which
became effective December 1, 1975.2  The legislature has
expressly indicated that the Alabama Rules of Appellate
Procedure govern procedure in this Court and the courts of
appeals unless stated otherwise.  Specifically, in 1977, as
part of its adoption of the "Code of Alabama 1975," the
legislature included § 12-1-1, Ala. Code 1975, which provides
that
"[a]ny provisions of this title regulating
procedure shall apply only if the procedure is not
governed by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure or any
other rule of practice and procedure as may be
Adopted by the Supreme Court of Alabama."
practice and procedure in all courts ...." See also § 12-2-
19(a), Ala. Code 1975, recognizing that "the Supreme Court now
has the initial primary duty to make and promulgate rules
governing practice and procedure in all courts ...."
2When the local act was enacted in 1971, the Alabama Rules
of Appellate Procedure were not in existence, and appeals to
this Court or to a court of appeals, unless otherwise
prescribed, were governed by statute and generally were
required to be filed within six months of the order or
judgment appealed from.  Title 7, § 788, Code of Alabama 1940
(1958 Recomp.).  Given the stated intent of the local act,
i.e., to expedite and facilitate the administration of
estates, the 30-day time frame provided in the local act was
apparently intended to shorten the 6-month time frame then in
existence for filing a notice of appeal in some appeals and to
standardize the time for taking an appeal. 
6
1190819, 1190820
See also, e.g.,  Appendix III, Ala. R. App. P. (providing a
list of statutes modified by the adoption of the Alabama Rules
of Appellate Procedure, including some statutes providing 30
days in which to appeal from probate court).    
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that § 12-22-21,
providing that "[a]ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be
governed by the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure,
including the time for taking an appeal," prevails as the
latest expression of legislative will and thus repeals by
implication § 4 of the local act providing that appeals to
this Court be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order
or judgment appealed from.  To hold otherwise would create an
exception only for appeals to this Court from the Jefferson
Probate Court that would become a trap for the unwary.3 
Having a uniform time standard for taking an appeal not only
supports judicial economy and aids lawyers with a single rule,
3By similar local act, the legislature granted the Mobile
Probate Court jurisdiction concurrent with the Mobile Circuit
Court in the administration of estates.  Act No. 974, Ala.
Acts 1961.  As originally enacted, Act No. 974 provided for
appeals to this Court within 30 days of the entry of the order
or judgment of the probate court.  In 1991, the legislature
amended § 5 of Mobile's local act to provide that appeals from
the Mobile Probate Court lie to this Court within the 42-day
period prescribed in the Alabama Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
See Act No. 91-131, Ala. Acts 1991.
7
1190819, 1190820
but it also eliminates, as presented here, a dual and
conflicting system for which there is no rational basis. 
Because we confirm that the notices of appeal were timely and
that jurisdiction is therefore proper, we now address the
merits of the appeals before us.
II.  Facts and Procedural History 
Virginia is the guardian of her son Sim. She is also the
conservator of Sim's estate. Sim has a brother, Ralph
Carmichael Moseley III ("Mike"), who was born during the
marriage of Virginia and Ralph. Sim also has a half brother,
Slate McDorman, who was born during the marriage of Virginia
and her current husband, Clarence L. McDorman, Jr. 
In February 2013, Mike, as brother and next friend of
Sim, petitioned the Jefferson Probate Court to, among other
things, remove Virginia as Sim's conservator because of an
alleged conflict of interest, appoint Ralph as successor
conservator, and order an accounting of the conservatorship.4 
Ralph filed a response consenting to the relief sought in the
petition and specifically to being appointed as successor
4Mike asserted in the petition that the alleged conflict
stemmed from a trust action pending in the Barbour Circuit
Court in which Virginia had been named a respondent both 
individually and in her capacity as Sim's conservator.   
8
1190819, 1190820
conservator for Sim. The probate court thereafter ordered
Virginia to file a full accounting for the entirety of the
conservatorship. 
During the pendency of the proceeding, a dispute arose
about an IRA  Ralph had created and funded for Sim's benefit. 
During discovery, Virginia requested that Ralph produce a 
copy
of "any and all receipts, checks, or other documents
reflecting contributions made by you to the IRA" belonging to
Sim.  Ralph answered that "[t]here has not been an IRA for a
number of years." 
On February 28, 2014, Slate, acting as counsel for
Virginia, sent Ralph a letter confirming everyone's desire
that the IRA matter be concluded without further effort and
expense. That letter states, in pertinent part:
"We need to reschedule a time for your deposition
and I ask that you provide available dates. It is
important that your testimony be taken in time for
us to include anything relevant in [Virginia's]
accounting. Please contact me with dates you are
available so that I may schedule your deposition.
"However, I believe everyone is in agreement
that this matter should be concluded without further
effort and expense. Although we still have questions
regarding Sim's IRA account and these questions must
be answered for [Virginia's] accounting, the largest
remaining issue of contention appears to be who will
be responsible to pay the court costs and fees
9
1190819, 1190820
requested in [the] petition filed last February. It
was requested in this petition that Sim be taxed all
costs and fees in our matter. Judge King granted
this request. Even though Sim has no means to pay
these costs as SSI payments are non-attachable, Sim
is upset knowing that he is responsible for these
costs. If we can resolve the issue of who is
responsible for these fees, I believe we can quickly
conclude the remaining issues.
"....
"In an effort to move toward reconciliation and
to avoid additional fees, I ask if you and/or Mike
will 
consider 
paying 
the 
current 
outstanding
expenses on Sim's behalf so that we can begin
placing this behind us. My mom[, Virginia,] has
spent a considerable sum recently on accountants and
others 
regarding 
her 
accounting 
for 
Sim's
conservatorship. She is not in a position to pay
anything toward the outstanding fees. However, if
this matter is not resolved, the fees will only
increase to the detriment of Sim."
(Emphasis added.)
On April 23, 2014, Virginia submitted to the probate
court an accounting for the conservatorship, along with a
"Settlement Agreement" executed by Sim and by Virginia as
Sim's conservator releasing Ralph from any and all claims
related directly or indirectly to Ralph's funding or removing
funds from an IRA Ralph had attempted to establish on behalf
of Sim. The agreement states:
"In accordance with Alabama Code section
26-2A-l52(19), Sim T. Moseley, by and through his
10
1190819, 1190820
Mother and Curator/Conservator Virginia Thomas
McDorman, does hereby agree that in exchange for the
total compromise payment of Five Thousand and
no/lO0ths Dollars ($5000) from Sim's father Ralph
Moseley, 
any 
and 
all 
claims 
disputes 
or
controversies of any kind against Ralph Moseley,
including but not limited to anything, arising from
or in any way related directly or indirectly to
Ralph Moseley funding or removing funds from an IRA
account attempted to be established on behalf of Sim
T. 
Moseley, 
are 
hereby 
fully 
released 
and
discharged, with no admission of liability. Each
party shall bear their own attorney fees, and Sim T.
Moseley shall bear all court costs in this matter."
(Emphasis added.) 
Virginia also filed with the accounting an affidavit
signed by Ralph stating that he agreed to withdraw any request
that Virginia be removed as conservator for Sim's estate and
affirming that his payment of $5,000 pursuant to the agreement
was in exchange for a full release of all claims against him. 
In December 2015, more than a year and a half after the
agreement and Ralph's affidavit were executed, Virginia and
Sim filed a motion to set aside the agreement, as well as a
motion to show cause why Ralph should not be held in contempt
of court. Virginia and Sim alleged that Ralph had fraudulently
induced them to execute the agreement by failing to truthfully
answer discovery and, more specifically, by withholding
information about an IRA with Charles Schwab & Company, which,
11
1190819, 1190820
they claimed, Ralph had established, funded, and maintained
using Sim's name and Social Security number. They further
stated that in 2013 Ralph closed the IRA and that in 2014 he
filed a fraudulent tax return on behalf of Sim, listing the
IRA distribution as income –- causing Sim to owe federal taxes
and impacting his qualification for various governmental
disability benefits. They further explained that the Internal
Revenue Service ultimately determined that Sim had been the
victim of identity theft and removed the tax deficiency from
Sim's records. Virginia and Sim finally noted that Virginia,
as Sim's conservator, had filed an action against Ralph in the
Jefferson Circuit Court alleging fraud and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 
Ralph responded to the motion to set aside the 
agreement, asserting that the allegations in the motion were
without merit because, he said, during the discovery process,
his counsel had informed Virginia's counsel that the Charles
Schwab IRA existed and that Ralph had named Sim as the owner
of the IRA.  Ralph stated that, with this knowledge,
Virginia's counsel wrote him a letter confirming everyone's
desire that the IRA matter should be concluded without further
12
1190819, 1190820
effort and expense.  Thus, Ralph argued that Virginia and Sim
were aware of the Charles Schwab IRA when they signed the
agreement.  Ralph requested that the probate court award him
attorney fees he incurred as a result of responding to and
opposing the motion to set aside the agreement and the motion
to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. 
On June 29, 2016, the probate court held a hearing on the
motions to set aside the agreement and to show cause why Ralph
should not be held in contempt of court.  Virginia and Sim did
not testify at that hearing.  On September 2, 2016, the
probate court entered an order denying the motions,
concluding, in relevant part, that the very words of the
agreement demonstrated that Virginia and Sim knew or
reasonably should have known about the existence of any IRA
and any distribution therefrom and that Virginia and Sim had
released all claims against Ralph relating to any IRA.  The
probate court further determined that the attempts by 
Virginia
and Sim to set aside the agreement were without merit, and it
ordered them to pay Ralph's attorney fees.  Ralph thereafter
filed a fee petition with an affidavit from his counsel
seeking $19,920 in attorney fees and $188.77 in expenses. 
13
1190819, 1190820
Virginia and Sim, through his counsel of record, each
filed a motion to reconsider the September 2016 order, arguing
for the first time that, when they executed the agreement, the
only IRA they were aware of was an IRA established during
Sim's employment at Children's Hospital of Alabama in
Birmingham. They contended that, had they known about the
Charles Schwab IRA, they would not have executed the
agreement. Virginia and Sim attached to the motions their
affidavits explaining their lack of knowledge of the Charles
Schwab IRA. 
On October 11, 2017, the probate court  entered an order
denying the motions to reconsider; the court ordered Virginia
and Sim to pay Ralph's attorney fees within 30 days.  The
probate court declined to consider the affidavits that
Virginia and Sim attached to their postjudgment motions,
noting:
"[Virginia's] 
and 
Sim's 
suggestions 
that 
the
Settlement and Release should be set aside because
it was induced by fraud was presented in the
December 2015 Motion to Show Cause and Motion to Set
Aside Settlement, and argued to the Court [on June
29, 2016]. Because no circumstances prevented  Sim
or [Virginia] from offering testimony at or before
the June 29 hearing, the newly presented affidavits
of Sim and [Virginia] ... may not be considered by
this Court.  Regardless, [Virginia] and Sim
14
1190819, 1190820
explicitly released [Ralph] from and against all
claims directly or indirectly related to any IRA. 
The Release was not limited to a particular time
frame, and therefore [Virginia] and Sim released
present and future claims relating to any IRA." 
Virginia and Sim thereafter filed a motion for relief from the
October 2017 order or, alternatively, to certify the order as
a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. 
On July 1, 2019, the probate court entered a judgment
disposing of all claims against Ralph, and certified its
judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  In
that judgment, the probate court reiterated its findings
regarding the validity of the agreement, discussed its
September 2016 and October 2017 orders, and addressed each of
the factors for an award of attorney fees as required by the
ALAA.  These appeals followed.  
III.  Standard of Review
The standard of review for an award of attorney fees
under the ALAA depends upon the basis for the trial court's
determination for the award.  Morrow v. Gibson, 827 So. 2d
756, 762 (Ala. 2002). If a trial court finds that a claim or
defense is without substantial justification because it is
groundless in law, that determination will be reviewed de
15
1190819, 1190820
novo, without a presumption of correctness. Pacific Enters.
Oil Co. (USA) v. Howell Petroleum Corp., 614 So. 2d 409 (Ala.
1993). If, however, a trial court finds that a claim or
defense is without substantial justification using terms or
phrases 
such 
as 
"frivolous," 
"groundless 
in 
fact,"
"vexatious," or "interposed for any improper purpose," that
determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
clearly erroneous, without supporting evidence, manifestly
unjust, or against the great weight of the evidence. Id.  The
latter standard is applicable here. The probate court
determined that the filings by Virginia and Sim were not
pleaded in good faith or that they otherwise failed to rise to
the level of initiating a legal and/or equitable action, thus
implying that the filings were interposed for an improper
purpose.
IV.  Analysis
The ALAA provides in § 12-19-272(a), Ala. Code 1975, in
relevant part, that, in any civil action, "the court shall
award, as part of its judgment ..., reasonable attorneys'
fees" against any party who has brought a civil action "that
a court determines to be without substantial justification,
16
1190819, 1190820
either in whole or part." The ALAA defines "without
substantial justification" in § 12-19-271, Ala. Code 1975, as
an action that is "frivolous, groundless in fact or in law, or
vexatious, or interposed for any improper purpose, including
without limitation, to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation, as determined by the
court."  Finally, the ALAA provides in § 12-19-273, Ala. Code
1975, that, when a court awards attorney fees under the ALAA,
it must "specifically set forth the reasons for such award."
Virginia and Sim first argue that the probate court
lacked jurisdiction to award attorney fees  in a related case
filed against Ralph in the circuit court. We agree.  While the
conservatorship proceeding was pending in the probate court,
Virginia, as Sim's conservator, filed an action against Ralph
in the circuit court, alleging fraud and the intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Ralph moved the circuit
court to dismiss the action but never included a motion in
that court for attorney fees under the ALAA.  The probate
court awarded Ralph attorney fees and expenses in the amount
of $20,108.77.  Virginia and  Sim assert that approximately
$10,915 of that amount represents  fees incurred by Ralph in
17
1190819, 1190820
defending the circuit court action. Ralph, on the other hand,
contends that the attorney-fee award properly included the
fees he incurred in the circuit court action, because, he
says, Virginia and Sim filed the circuit court action in an
attempt to circumvent the agreement they had filed in the
probate court action.  However, he cites no authority in 
support of that contention.  See Rule 28, Ala. R. App. P. 
Under the plain language of § 12-19-272, the probate court had
jurisdiction to award attorney fees regarding only fees
incurred in the probate court proceeding, not the circuit
court proceeding, "as part of its judgment." Accordingly, the
probate court erred in awarding attorney fees relating to the
circuit court proceeding, and we remand the cause with
instructions for the probate court to determine the amount of
fees Ralph incurred in defending the validity of the agreement
in the probate court.
Virginia and Sim also contend that the probate court's
award of attorney fees attributable to setting aside the
agreement in the probate court was erroneous, without
supporting evidence, manifestly unjust, or against the great
weight of the evidence.  As they argued below, Virginia and
18
1190819, 1190820
Sim assert that they were justified in their attempts to set
aside the agreement because, they say, the agreement was
induced by fraud insofar as Ralph had allegedly failed to
disclose the Charles Schwab IRA during discovery and because
the Internal Revenue Service had determined that Sim had been
the victim of identity theft. Ralph, on the other hand,
maintains that Virginia and Sim had knowledge of the existence
of the Charles Schwab IRA before executing the agreement. The
record indicates that the probate court held a hearing on the
matter, at which time Virginia and Sim did not testify,
although there were no circumstances preventing them from
doing so.  The transcript of that hearing, if one exists, is
not in the record.  Therefore, this Court will presume that
the probate court, exercising its equitable powers, correctly
resolved 
any issue 
concerning 
the 
alleged 
fraudulent
inducement in favor of Ralph.  See Davis v. Davis, 278 Ala.
328, 330, 178 So. 2d 154, 155 (1965)(noting the rule that,
"where no testimony is contained in the record on appeal, a
decree which recites that it was granted on pleadings, proofs
and testimony will not be disturbed on appeal").   
19
1190819, 1190820
In Cleghorn v. Scribner, 597 So. 2d 693, 696 (Ala. 1992),
this Court stated that, 
"in the absence of fraud, a release supported by a
valuable consideration, unambiguous in meaning, will
be given effect according to the intention of the
parties from what appears within the four corners of
the instrument itself, and parol evidence may not be
introduced to establish the existence of a mutual
mistake of fact when the release was signed as a
basis for a rescission of that release."
The agreement the parties negotiated is broad and it
unambiguously releases Ralph from "any and all claims ... of
any kind ... including but not limited to anything, arising
from or in any way related directly or indirectly to [Ralph]
funding or removing funds from an IRA account attempted to be
established on behalf" of Sim. (Emphasis added.)  "An" is an
indefinite article, which refers to a person, place, or thing
in a general or nonspecific manner.  Whereas, "the" is a
definite article, which refers to a specific person, place, or
thing.  Bryan A. Garner, The Redbook: A Manual on Legal Style
§ 10.38 (2d ed. 2006).  Use of the indefinite article "an" in
the agreement released Ralph from any and all claims relating
directly or indirectly to any IRA in general, including future
claims. 
See 
Jehle-Slauson 
Constr. 
Co. 
v. 
Hood-Rich, 
Architects
& Consulting Eng'rs, 435 So. 2d 716, 720 (Ala. 1983)(noting
20
1190819, 1190820
that, regarding future damages, "[i]f the parties had 
intended
to limit the release to prior contract litigation, they could
have specifically stated their intention in the release"). 
In its judgment, the probate court concluded that
Virginia and Sim's attempts to set aside the agreement and
their continued filings –- for more than three years after the
initial motion to set it aside –- were without substantial
justification. The judgment provides the factual background
concerning 
the 
filings 
and 
reflects 
an 
appropriate 
application
of the ALAA.  The judgment also sets forth substantial reasons
for the attorney-fee award as required by § 12-19-273.  As
part of its reasoning for the attorney-fee award, the probate
court noted that Virginia and Sim had made little to no effort
to determine the validity of their motions to set aside the
agreement, "because they negotiated the agreement and 
terms of
the [agreement] which explicitly released [Ralph] for all
claims relating to any IRA."  Finally, the probate court noted
that Virginia and Sim received what they requested in 2014,
i.e., that Ralph withdraw his objections to 
Virginia's serving
as Sim's conservator and that Ralph pay their court costs and
fee obligations.  Accordingly, we conclude that the award of
21
1190819, 1190820
attorney fees related to defending the validity of the
agreement in the probate court action was not erroneous,
without 
supporting 
evidence, 
manifestly unjust, 
or 
against 
the
great weight of the evidence.  Pacific Enters. Oil Co. (USA),
supra. 
V.  Conclusion  
We reverse the probate court's judgment awarding attorney
fees and remand the cause with instructions for the court to
determine the amount of fees attributable to defending the
validity of the agreement in the probate court action. In all
other respects, we affirm the judgment in favor of Ralph.  
1190819--AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 
1190820--AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Wise, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
22