Title: Bollettieri Resort Villas Condominium Association, Inc. v. the Bank of New York Mellon, etc.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-1680 
____________ 
 
BOLLETTIERI RESORT VILLAS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, 
INC.,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[October 12, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
We initially accepted jurisdiction to review Bollettieri Resort Villas 
Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Bank of New York Mellon, 198 So. 3d 1140 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2016), review granted, No. SC16-1680 (Fla. 2016), pursuant to article V, 
section 3(b)(4), of the Florida Constitution.  After further consideration of the 
subsequent opinion of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Klebanoff v. Bank of 
New York Mellon, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1480, 2017 WL 2818078 (Fla. 5th DCA 
June 30, 2017), and the more recent cases from the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
in Kebreau v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1550, 2017 WL 
2983999, at *1 (Fla. 4th DCA July 12, 2017), and the First District Court of 
 
 
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Appeal in Forero v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1577, 2017 
WL 2989493, at *4 (Fla. 1st DCA July 14, 2017), we have determined that the 
certified conflict has been resolved, and we conclude that we should exercise our 
discretion and decline review.  Accordingly, this case is hereby dismissed. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., 
concur.  
LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result. 
 
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED.  
 
LAWSON, J., concurring specially. 
I agree that the conflict certified in Bollettieri Resort Villas Condominium 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Bank of New York Mellon, 198 So. 3d 1140 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), 
review granted, No. SC16-1680 (Fla. 2016), has been resolved.  The original 
conflict issue, however, was no more than the latest symptom of a more serious 
problem: a widespread and fundamental misunderstanding, in Florida, regarding 
how the statute of limitations, § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2017), operates vis-à-vis a 
long-term note (and mortgage).  The law used to be well-settled and clear: 
The American cases are agreed that, when the acceleration provision 
is optional with the holder of the note, the Statute of Limitations does 
not run until the note is due according to its terms, in the absence of 
an exercise of the option to declare it due upon the default; in other 
words, the default does not ipso facto start the running of the statute. 
 
 
 
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Acceleration provision in note or mortgage as affecting the running of the Statute 
of Limitations, 34 A.L.R. 897 (1925). 
 
Contrast the above statement of once-uniformly-accepted “black letter law” 
with the following statement from Bollettieri: “[W]e agree with the Fifth District 
that a foreclosure action must be based on a [missed payment] default that occurred 
within the five-year statute of limitations period . . . .”  198 So. 3d at 1142.1  
Contrary to this assertion in Bollettieri, a missed payment default does not start the 
                                          
 
 
1.  I recognize that we made a similar declaration recently, in dicta.  Bartram 
v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 211 So. 3d 1009, 1015 (Fla. 2016) (“The Bank 
acknowledged, however, that it could not seek to foreclose the Mortgage based on 
Bartram’s [older missed payment] defaults . . . .”).  Ironically, the language in 
Bartram that would appear to incorrectly treat each missed payment default as 
creating a new cause of action accrual date (for statute of limitations purposes) 
originated from the bank’s own concession.  Id.; see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. 
Bartram, 140 So. 3d 1007, 1009 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (“The Bank argued that 
although the statute of limitations prevents the Bank from collecting some 
payments, it did not bar the collection of payments that were missed within the 
most recent five-year period.”), approved, 211 So. 3d 1009 (Fla. 2016).  This 
concession, it appears, arose from a failure to recognize the different legal 
principles that apply when analyzing a statute of limitations question and issues 
arising from application of the separate common law doctrine of res judicata.  In 
the latter context, Florida courts have created a special rule that can allow a second 
suit between the same parties based upon “the unique nature of the mortgage 
obligation and the continuing obligations of the parties in that relationship,” 
Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (Fla. 2004), and equitable 
principles.  Id.  In that different legal context, the rule fashioned by the Florida 
Supreme Court does give legal significance to the date of missed payments—but 
not for statute of limitations purposes.  Id. at 1008. 
 
 
 
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running of the statute of limitations.  34. A.L.R. 897.  This means that the action 
does not need to be based on a missed payment default within the five-year 
limitations period—which, of course, is the exact opposite of the rule on which the 
Second and Fifth Districts agreed.  Understanding why a missed payment is a non-
event for statute of limitations purposes requires applying basic rules regarding 
when any statute of limitations begins to run to the specific terms of the typical 
long-term promissory note and mortgage, which by contract do not automatically 
accelerate when a payment is missed. 
 
As explained in Kipnis v. Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank, AG, 202 So. 
3d 859, 861-62 (Fla. 2016), 
“[T]he time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of 
limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues.”  § 95.031, 
Fla. Stat. (2013).  “A cause of action accrues when the last element 
constituting the cause of action occurs.”  § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat.; see 
also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 678 So. 2d 818, 821 (Fla. 
1996) (“[A] cause of action cannot be said to have accrued, within the 
meaning of the statute of limitations, until an action may be 
brought.”). 
 
 
Under the terms of most long-term notes and mortgages, including the one at 
issue in Bollettieri, the total amount due under the note does not become due until 
maturity—most commonly thirty years after signing.  Lenders cannot and do not 
sue to collect missed payments.  Rather, the lender must bring suit for all amounts 
due under the note, see Gaynon v. Statum, 10 So. 2d 432, 433 (Fla. 1942) 
(explaining the rule against splitting causes of action), which it cannot do under the 
 
 
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terms of the note until maturity—unless it gives notice that it intends to act on a 
default (missed payment) by accelerating and declaring the entire balance due 
immediately.  The Bollettieri contract also clearly provides that the lender or 
holder may forbear and hold off on accelerating the note—and that forbearance 
will not constitute a waiver or defense against future collection of all sums due and 
owing under the note.  This means that the cause of action on a thirty-year note 
does not accrue until thirty years after signing—when the full balance is due—
unless the lender accelerates and declares the full balance due earlier.  See, e.g., 
Greene v. Bursey, 733 So. 2d 1111, 1114-15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).  The borrower 
who agreed that its default did not require suit any earlier has no contractual or 
other legal basis to bar a lender’s suit based upon the lender’s forbearance—unless, 
of course, we are going to rewrite the contract or abandon the original universal 
(and correct) rule that a missed payment does not trigger the running of the statute 
of limitations when acceleration is optional with the holder. 
 
Although my individual view expressed in this context has no precedential 
value, the district courts can, of course, reconsider this issue on their own. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D15-3186 
 
 
(Manatee County) 
 
 
 
 
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Shawn G. Brown of Frazier & Brown Law, PLLC, Tampa, Florida,  
 
for Petitioner 
Nancy M. Wallace of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee, Florida, William P. Heller of 
Akerman LLP, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Celia C. Falzone of Akerman LLP, 
Jacksonville, Florida, and Paul W. Ettori of Akerman LLP, Orlando, Florida,   
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Dennis A. Donet of Law Office of Dennis A. Donet, P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Enrique Arevalo