Title: Shaw v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GEORGE B. SHAW, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 728, 2010 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 1003008726 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  May 18, 2011 
Decided:  July 6, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 6th day of July 2011, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
A jury convicted George B. Shaw for Conspiracy in the Second 
Degree.1  During the trial, Shaw twice moved for a mistrial after unsolicited 
                                                           
1 11 Del. C. § 512 
A person is guilty of conspiracy in the second degree when, intending to promote or facilitate the 
commission of a felony, the person: 
(1) Agrees with another person or persons that they or 1 or more of them will engage 
in conduct constituting the felony or an attempt or solicitation to commit the felony; 
or 
(2) Agrees to aid another person or persons in the planning or commission of the 
felony or an attempt or solicitation to commit the felony; and the person or another 
person with whom the person conspired commits an overt act in pursuance of the 
conspiracy. 
 
2 
 
responses by two witnesses.  The trial judge denied Shaw’s motions for a mistrial.  
On appeal, Shaw claims that the trial court erroneously denied his mistrial motion 
because the state presented inadmissible evidence about his prior history of 
convictions for car thefts to the jury.  Because the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion by denying Shaw’s motion for a mistrial, we affirm. 
(2) 
On March 12, 2010, the police arrested Shaw, Michael Latham, and 
Matthew Nichols for attempting to steal a car from a car dealership in Newark, 
Delaware.  The State indicted Shaw, Latham, and Nichols for burglary in the third 
degree, attempted theft of a motor vehicle, and conspiracy in the second degree.  
Before trial, the State entered a nolle prosequi on Shaw’s third degree burglary 
count.  At the two day trial, the jury heard testimony from Latham and Nichols.  
Shaw testified on his own behalf.  The jury acquitted Shaw of attempted theft but 
convicted him of second degree conspiracy.   
(3) 
During the State’s second redirect examination of Nichols, the 
following exchange occurred: 
State:  Mr. Nichols, when you talked with Corporal Micolucci 
about a month ago, do you remember saying to him who actually 
was going to drive when you got this car, talking about who would 
be driving? 
 
Nichols:  Yes. 
 
State:  And what did you say, if you remember? 
 
3 
 
Nichols:  I didn’t suggest it, [Latham] did, he said that [Shaw] 
should because he’s done it before. 
 
State:  And was that in relation to the plan about . . .2 
 
At that point, defense counsel objected to Nichols’ testimony as “a hearsay 
statement from Mr. Latham that [Shaw] has done it before and that’s why [Shaw] 
was going to drive.”3  Counsel then moved for a mistrial based on Nichols’ 
testimony, and in response, the State asked the judge to strike Nichols’ statement 
from the record.  At sidebar, the trial judge denied defense counsel’s motion, but 
warned the prosecutor that “this business of the State asked direct and then the 
State has rebuttal that has new things in it and then the State does surrebuttal 
invites this kind of problem.”4  The judge then “strongly suggest[ed] that the State 
asks its questions on direct [and] refine its redirect to refuting things defense 
questioned about during cross-examination” so that there was only one round of 
direct, cross, and redirect examination.5   
(4) 
The trial judge then gave the following curative jury instruction with 
respect to Nichols’ testimony: 
                                                           
2 Tr. at 116. 
 
3 Tr. at 116. 
 
4 Tr. at 118. 
 
5 Id. 
 
4 
 
The Court:  Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, first of all, when we 
have these sidebar conferences you should not speculate about 
them, we discussed several things.  One of those things that we 
discussed is the witness’ having referred to [Shaw] allegedly 
having done it before, that’s based on hearsay.  You have to 
disregard that, that’s not even close to a proven fact.  Potentially it 
may be viewed as, by you as prejudicial, that would be wrong.  
Again, because it’s not something that has been proved, it’s just 
hearsay, it’s innuendo, it’s something that’s been suggested to you 
without any proof.  So in fairness, you have to totally put that out 
of your mind, disregard it entirely.6 
 
(5) 
Later in the trial, Latham testified during the prosecution’s case-in-
chief.  On direct examination, Latham testified, in relevant part: 
State:  And what did [Shaw] say when you offered to get him a job 
at Little Ceasar’s? 
 
Latham:  He was, I believe he was with it, but something happened, 
like--oh, well, I guess we weren’t out long enough for him to get it. 
 
State:  All right.  I didn’t understand your answer . . .7 
 
Defense counsel did not object to the question, but instead, renewed his motion for 
a mistrial at the end of the day’s proceedings.8  The trial judge denied the motion 
for a mistrial and offered a curative instruction, describing the statement as a 
                                                           
6 Tr. at 119-120. 
 
7 Tr. at 171. 
 
8 Defense counsel claims he did not object because he did not want to draw attention to the 
statement.  Tr. at 190.   
 
5 
 
“somewhat ambiguous remark.”9  Defense counsel declined the option of a 
curative instruction. 
(6) 
On appeal, Shaw claims that the trial judge should have granted his 
motion for a mistrial, because it was improper for the State to “elicit . . . highly 
prejudicial testimony” from Nichols.  Specifically, Shaw argues that the State 
could not have presented evidence of Shaw’s previous conviction for motor vehicle 
theft in its case-in-chief, because that would have been inadmissible evidence of 
prior bad acts.10  Therefore, because the State elicited that improper testimony from 
Nichols on its second redirect examination, the trial judge should have granted a 
mistrial.11 
(7) 
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of 
discretion.12  “A mistrial is appropriate only when there are no meaningful or 
practical alternatives to that remedy or the ends of public justice would otherwise 
be defeated.”13  Normally, a trial judge cures errors by the use of a curative 
instruction to the jury, and jurors are presumed to follow those instructions.14 
                                                           
9 Tr. at 189-191. 
 
10 See Del. R. Evid. 404(b). 
 
11 Shaw argues that Latham’s testimony informed the jury that Shaw had recently been 
incarcerated.  In all, Shaw contends the State presented the jury with testimony that Shaw had 
previously stolen cars and had previously been to prison. 
 
12 Chambers v. State, 930 A.2d 904, 909 (Del. 2007).  
 
13 Justice v. State, 947 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Del. 2008). 
6 
 
(8) 
To the extent Shaw’s claim is one of prosecutorial misconduct,15 we 
have stated that “[i]f defense counsel raised a timely and pertinent objection to 
prosecutorial misconduct at trial, or if the judge intervened and considered the 
issue sua sponte, we essentially review for ‘harmless error.’”16  The first analytical 
step in a “harmless error” inquiry requires a “de novo review of the record to 
determine whether misconduct actually occurred.  If we determine that no 
misconduct occurred, our analysis ends there.”17  Only if there is prosecutorial 
misconduct does the Court next apply the three-factor test, required by Hughes v. 
State,18  to determine “whether the improper comments or conduct prejudicially 
affected a defendant’s substantial rights.”19  Where the alleged misconduct “fails” 
the Hughes test and otherwise would not warrant reversal, we then apply the 
analysis, described in Hunter v. State,20 to determine whether the “prosecutor’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
14 Id. (quoting Guy v. State, 913A.2d 558, 565-66 (Del. 2006)). 
 
15 Shaw’s opening brief only contends prosecutorial misconduct for eliciting improper character 
evidence from a State’s witness.  Shaw did not ask this Court to analyze the prejudicial effect of 
the unsolicited responses under Pena v. State, 856 A.2d 548 (2004).  Thus, Shaw waived this 
argument and we will not consider it on appeal.  Supr. Ct. R. 14 (b)(vi)(A)(3).  
 
16 Id. (quoting Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 152 (Del. 2006)). 
 
17 Id. at 1100-01 (quoting Baker, 906 A.2d at 148). 
 
18 437 A.2d 559 (Del. 1981). 
 
19 Justice, 947 A.2d at 1101 (quoting Baker, 906 A.2d at 148-49). 
 
20 815 A.2d 730 (Del. 2002). 
 
7 
 
statements or misconduct are repetitive errors that require reversal because they 
cast doubt on the integrity of the judicial process.”21 
(9) 
Our de novo review of the record discloses no prosecutorial 
misconduct that would trigger further analysis under either Hughes or Hunter.  At 
sidebar, the State indicated that it had asked Nichols about whether the three men 
had discussed who would be driving the stolen car in response to “a recent 
implication on cross about fabricating [intent].”22  Specifically, the State explained 
that that question “was going to the fact that this was [Shaw’s] idea about taking a 
car, but he [(Nichols)] and [Latham] had talked further about it.”23  In its question, 
the State did not refer to, or ask, anything regarding Shaw’s criminal history.  
Rather, it was Nichols’ answer to the State’s open ended question that alluded to 
Shaw’s having “done it (stolen a motor vehicle) before.”  Nothing in the record 
suggests that the prosecutor knew that Nichols would have answered the question 
in a fashion that would allow an inference that Shaw had stolen vehicles in the 
past.24  Indeed, at sidebar, the prosecutor said, “I did not intend for [Nichols] to say 
that particular part of his answer.”25 
                                                           
21 Justice, 947 A.2d at 1101 (quoting Baker, 906 A.2d at 149). 
 
22 Tr. at 117, 119. 
 
23 Id. 
 
24 See Justice, 947 A.2d at 1101. 
 
25 Tr. at 119. 
8 
 
(10) Moreover, the trial judge’s curative instruction given immediately 
following defense counsel’s objection presumptively cures any reference to Shaw’s 
criminal history.26  “A curative instruction is a meaningful or practical alternative 
to declaring a mistrial, and juries are presumed to follow the instruction.”27  Shaw 
does not convince us that the curative instruction failed to address the prejudicial 
inference inadequately.  We also agree with the trial judge that Latham’s statement 
was too ambiguous to suggest a prior bad act.  Shaw fails to show that the denial of 
his motion for a mistrial prejudiced him, because the jury acquitted him on the 
attempted theft of a motor vehicle charge.  On these facts, the trial judge did not 
abuse his discretion by denying Shaw’s motion for a mistrial. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.  
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
26 Pena v. State, 856 A.2d 548, 551 (Del. 2004).  (“Prompt jury instructions are presumed to cure 
error and adequately direct the jury to disregard improper statements, even when the error 
references extraneous offenses.”) 
 
27 Justice, 947 A.2d at 1102.