Title: HELLICKSON v BARRETT MOBILE HOME T

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No, 12288 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1973 GLEN L. HELLICKSON, 1 1 1 , Plafntiff and Appellant, -VS - BARRETT MOBILE HOME TEUNSPORT, INC., Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Honorable Truman G. Bradford, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : John C. Hall argued, Great Falls, Montana. For Respondent: Swanberg, Koby and Swanberg, Great Falls, Montana. Raymond F, Koby argued, Great Falls, Montana. Submitted: January 22, 1973 Decided: WR 12 l g n Clerk M r . Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment entered i n the d i s t r i c t court of the eighth judicial d i s t r i c t , Cascade County, Hon, Truman G, Bradford presiding. Plaintiff Glen L, Hellickson 111, brought action t o recover money allegedly due under a contract with de- fendant Barrett Mobile Home Transport, Inc. Trial without a jury began on October 29, 1971. Judgment for plaintiff was entered on February 16, 1972. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment, except that portion making an award t o p l a i n t i f f , Defendant i s a Minnesota corporation doing business i n Montana and other s t a t e s , consisting mainly of transporting mobile homes i n interstate and intrastate commerce. To carry on i t s business defendant employs persons t o drive truck units t o tow the mobile homes from one location t o another. In January 1964, defendant engaged plaintiff t o tow mobile home units with lai in tiff's truck, The parties entered into a leasing agreement, on a form provided by the s t a t e of North Dakota, whereby p l a i n t i f f leased h i s 1963 Ford truck t o defendant a t the r a t e of $50 per month. The agreement was for a term of one year from the date of execution and on a month t o month basis thereafter, The agreement could be terminated by either party upon t h i r t y days written notice t o the other party. Although the truck was leased t o defendant, plaintiff was t o use the truck t o carry out the terms of the employment agreement. The employment agreement between the two parties was oral, A greater portion of the controversy here concerns the terms of that oral employment agreement, particularly since the terms of that agreement were altered from time t o time. Essentially when the agreement began, p l a i n t i f f was t o receive 85% of the revenue derived from the operation of p l a i n t i f f ' s truck i n hauling mobile homes for defendant, less certain deductions. The t r i a l court found that on o r about M a y 1, 1964, defendant changed the method of compensating its drivers. The compensation was changed from 85% t o 75% and certain deductions were no longer made. Around June 1965, the general scheme of compensation was again changed so that, for interstate hauls, defendant's drivers were paid on a mileage scale based on cents per mile. While employed by defendant, p l a i n t i f f operated a terminal for defendant's business i n Great Falls. The parties had an oral agreement for the reimbursement of certain costs i n connection with the operation of the terminal. Plaintiff claimed certain amounts were still owed t o him for the operation of the terminal, along with other items. Defendant maintained that either a l l items had been paid or were offset by amounts owed t o defendant by p l a i n t i f f . Other items of disagreement w i l l be considered l a t e r i n t h i s opinion, Plaintiff and defendant mutually terminated their agree- ments i n October or November 1965, Plaintiff f i l e d h i s f i r s t complaint i n June 1966. After briefs and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were f i l e d , the court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law awarding plaintiff judgment i n the amount of $415.58, plus costs and interest from November 1, 1965. Because p l a i n t i f f contends that additional sums were con- clusively established a s s t i l l owing t o p l a i n t i f f , he appeals. Plaintiff raises some questions concerning modification of a written agreement by o r a l testimony. Basically, hwever, the controlling issue is p l a i n t i f f ' s third issue: A r e the findings of fact supported by the evidence? The t r i a l court issued thorough findings of fact on a complicated, complex, and conflicting factual situation. Collateral issues raised are directly dependent upon our duty i n considering those findings, A review of the rules pertaining t o the function of an appellate court i n situations such a s i s involved here is appro- priate. In Hornung v. Lagerquist, 155 Mont. 412, 420, 473 P.2d 541, t h i s Court said: I t Our duty i n reviewing findings of fact i n a c i v i l action tried by the d i s t r i c t court without a jury i s confined t o determining whether there i s substantial credible evidence t o support them. St. Highway Com'n v. West Great Falls Flood Con- t r o l and Drainage District, 155 Mont. 157, 468 P.2d 753, 27 St.Rep. 320, and cases therein sited. I t See also: State Highway Comm'n v, Vaughan, 155 Mont. 277, 281, The meaning of "substantial credible evidencet' was thoroughly considered recently i n Staggers v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co,, M o n t . Y 496 P,2d 1161, 29 St. Rep, 357, 360. The judgment of the t r i a l court s i t t i n g without a jury has the same effect a s a verdict of a jury. State v. Naughton, 103 Mont. 306, 310, 63 P.2d 123. Certain presumptions aid us i n considering the findings of fact. The findings of the t r i a l court and the judgment based thereon a r e presumed correct. Nat, Farmers Union Prop, v. Gen. Guaranty Ins., 150 Mont, 297,301, 434 P.2d 708; Christensen v. Hunt, 147 Mont. 484, 490, 414 P.2d 648. In examining the evidence, we must veiw the testimony i n a light most favorable t o the prevailing party, Estate of Hosova, 143 Mont. 74, 78, 387 P.2d 305; Holland v. Konda, 142 Mont. 536, 541, 385 P. 2d 272. However, while the presumptions is i n p l a i n t i f f ' s favor, he i s also the appealing party and as such, the burden is upon him t o overcome the presumption of the correctness of the t r i a l court's findings of fact, Nissen v, West Const, Equip,Co., 133 Mont. 143, 146, 320 P.2d 997. Here, the credibility of the witnesses i s of prime impor- tance. Since only two people other than plaintiff and defendant's president t e s t i f i e d , the witnesses found t o be most believable t o the t r i a l judge bear particular signficance. The credibility and weight given the witnesses, however, i s not for t h i s Court t o determine. This is a primary function of a t r i a l judge s i t t i n g without a jury; it i s of special consequence where the evidence is conflicting. Eliason v, Eliason, 151 Mont. 409, 416, 443 P.2d 884; Strong v. Williams, 154 Mont. 65, 68, 460 Pe2d 90; Dutton v. Rocky Mtn, Phosphates, 151 Mont. 54, 71, 438 P.2d 674. In light of the principles stated above, we consider the findings of fact contested by plaintiff and determine whether substantial evidence exists t o support them. Plaintiff excepted generally t o a l l but three of the findings issued by the t r i a l court, Plaintiff argued that virtually a l l of the findings ex- cepted t o were not supported by the evidence, W e do not find it necessary t o delineate a l l the evidence i n support of each finding of fact, we a r e concerned here only with the major disagreements. Wherever the testimony i s directly con- f l i c t i n g , we presume the t r i a l judge t o be correct. Only he had the opportunity t o observe the demeanor, candor and spontaneity of the witnesses. A l l minor points are within the legal maxim codified by section 49-125, R.C.M. 1947: "The law disregards t r i f l e s . I I Here, one major disagreement was whether the lease agree- ment rental of $50 per month was i n addition t o the compensation received for hauling mobile homes, a s p l a i n t i f f contended; or whether it was a part of the compensation, a s defendant contended. Although plaintiff maintained a t t r i a l that the $50 per month amounts were due him from the inception of the employment agreement, p l a i n t i f f acquiesced i n defendant's manner of payment for twenty- two months. H e made no written demand on defendant for the alleged amount due. Richard Ward, p l a i n t i f f ' s witness i n support of h i s contention, exhibited such uncertainty i n relating h i s version of the same oral agreement that the t r i a l judge could readily have given h i s testimony l i t t l e weight. On the other hand, defendant's witness, Earl Wallace, who was present when the employment agreement between plaintiff and defendant was i n i t i a l l y discussed, substan- tiated defendant's recollection. Plaintiff knew from h i s very f i r s t pay report that the $50 per month rental was a part of, not i n addition t o , the regular compensation. Yet, he did l i t t l e , i f anything, t o gain what he claimed a t t r i a l was due, The t r i a l court had substantial evidence t o find: "That during the e n t i r e period from January, 1964 through October, 1965 the o r a l arrange- ment extant between plaintiff and defendant contemplated that the commissions paid by the l a t t e r t o the former would include and not be i n addition t o the rental f: 9 : *". Another element of controversy concerned responsibility for repairs. Plaintiff contended a t t r i a l that defendant was obligated for repairs on the truck. True, the lease agreement form did indeed impose the obligation for repairs on defendant, However, a t no time u n t i l the commencement of t h i s action in June 1966, did plaintiff ever present any claim for repair ex- penses t o defendant, In about April 1965, plaintiff sold h i s 1963 Ford truck and the lease agreement on that vehicle terminated; no new agreement was ever executed. The evidence= inconclusive as t o whether the repair expenses claimed due were for the truck i n the original agreement. Further, it i s not entirely clear whether any repair expenses were attributable t o the operation of p l a i n t i f f ' s truck while i n defendant's service or during p l a i n t i f f ' s own personal use. The t r i a l court found plaintiff acquiesced t o the oral modification that defendant was not obligated for repair expenses t o either of p l a i n t i f f ' s trucks. It concluded that plain- t i f f was now estopped from recovering those claims. W e agree. The f i n a l major disagreement concerns the actual compensa- tion received for hauling mobile homes. Plaintiff conceded the agreement could indeed be changed from an 85% compensation r a t e t o 75%, and then t o a mileage basis, However, plaintiff asserts these changes could not be made unilaterally; consent t o the changes must be mutual and must be communicated t o the other party, While plaintiff claimed he was not notified of the change, there was evidence from which the t r i a l judge could have found that the notice of the change had been communicated t o a l l terminal offices. It was established by defendant's witness, Wallace, that a t the time the employment agreement was f i r s t discussed defendant's president informed p l a i n t i f f the compensation might fluctuate during the course of employment. In any event, a l e t t e r from plaintiff t o defendant indicated p l a i n t i f f was aware of the change by M a y 13, 1964, Y e t , plaintiff continued t o work for defendant; t h i s employment even continued through a subsequent r a t e change. This course of conduct was sufficient, we believe, t o preclude recovery f o r the compensation claim. The rule stated i n 53 Am Jur 2d, Master and Servant, $ 73, p. 148, is applicable : "Where, however, there is no definite term of employment fixed by contract, [as i n t h i s case] a notice by the master that for the future he w i l l pay less wages t o the servant and the con- tinued service thereafter of the servant without objection, creates a new contract based upon sufficient considera tion, I t W e find no fault i n the conclusions of law rendered by the t r i a l court. P l a i n t i f f ' s appeal does not concern i t s e l f with legal issues, but basically i s on factual grounds. W e cannot r e t r y factual determinations made by the t r i a l court. W e a r e further persuaded that the monetary award was correct by the fact that plaintiff failed t o remit certain revenues collected by him for defendant and due defendant, There i s ample justification i n the record for the t r i a l court's decision. The judgment of the t r i a l court i s affirmed, I