Title: Byrd v. Knuckles

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Byrd v. Knuckles, 120 Ohio St.3d 428, 2008-Ohio-6318.] 
 
 
 
BYRD ET AL., APPELLEES, v. KNUCKLES, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Byrd v. Knuckles, 120 Ohio St.3d 428, 2008-Ohio-6318.] 
Child support – Modification of arrearages by agreement of parties – R.C. 
3119.83. 
(No. 2007-1913 – Submitted September 30, 2008 – Decided December 11, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clermont County, 
No. CA2006-11-095, 2007-Ohio-4541. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} The issue in this case is whether the parties to a child-support order 
can agree to modify a child-support arrearage.  For the reasons that follow, we 
conclude that they can, and we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Background 
{¶ 2} Appellee Christina Byrd Reeder and appellant, Brian K. Knuckles, 
are the biological parents of a child.  Knuckles was ordered to pay child support 
and ultimately owed a child-support arrearage of $7,420.16.  Reeder and Knuckles 
agreed that Reeder would renounce half the arrearage and that Knuckles would 
consent to the adoption of their child by Brad Reeder, Reeder’s husband.  After 
the adoption, the child-support order was terminated, and Knuckles filed a motion 
to abate half the arrearage, in accordance with the agreement.  The juvenile court 
denied the motion, relying on R.C. 3119.83, which states that “a court or child 
support enforcement agency may not retroactively modify an obligor’s duty to pay 
a delinquent support payment.”  The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that 
the juvenile court had not abused its discretion.  We accepted Knuckles’s 
discretionary appeal. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Analysis 
{¶ 3} The juvenile court concluded that the agreement between Reeder 
and Knuckles was prohibited by R.C. 3119.83, which states, “Except as provided 
in Section 3119.84 of the Revised Code, a court or child support enforcement 
agency may not retroactively modify an obligor’s duty to pay a delinquent support 
payment.”  Several factors convince us that this section of the Revised Code 
should not be read in the restrictive manner used by the juvenile court. 
{¶ 4} R.C. 3119.84, the exception to R.C. 3119.83, states, “A court with 
jurisdiction over a court support order may modify an obligor’s duty to pay a 
support payment that becomes due after notice of a petition to modify the court 
support order has been given to each obligee and to the obligor before a final 
order concerning the petition for modification is entered.”  This provision plainly 
states that a court may retroactively modify a child-support payment that became 
due after the obligee of the order had notice of the petition to modify the support 
order.  In this case, not only did Reeder receive notice of the petition to modify the 
support order, she did not contest the petition in juvenile court, in the court of 
appeals, or before this court.  It is clear to us that R.C. 3119.83 and 3119.84 do 
not categorically prohibit juvenile courts from modifying support orders.  See 
Nelson v. Nelson (1990), 65 Ohio App.3d 800, 805, 585 N.E.2d 502 (“this court is 
cognizant that, in certain situations, equitable principles and equitable defenses, 
when established by a proper evidential predicate, may be applicable, which 
would permit the parents to enter into an extrajudicial agreement that may have 
retroactive application regarding child support”). 
{¶ 5} Further, nothing in R.C. 3119.83 or any other part of the statutory 
scheme indicates that it is intended to nullify reasonable agreements reached by 
the parties to a child-support order.  R.C. 3119.83 prohibits judges from 
retroactively modifying child-support orders; it does not prohibit parties from 
January Term, 2008 
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agreeing to modify child-support orders.  See United States Department of Health 
and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Child 
Support Enforcement, Policy Interpretation Question PIQ-99-03, Compromise of 
Child Support Arrearages (Mar. 22, 1999) (child-support arrearages may be 
compromised by the parties, but judicial “retroactive modification of arrearages * 
* * without the concurrence of the obligee (or State assignee) * * * is expressly 
prohibited”). 
{¶ 6} Finally, pursuant to R.C. 3123.18, when a court has determined 
that a child-support obligor is in default under a support order, the arrearage 
becomes a “final judgment which has the full force, effects, and attributes of a 
judgment.”  Appellee Clermont County Department of Job and Family Services 
and both amici, Butler County Child Support Enforcement Agency and the Ohio 
Child Support Directors’ Association, argue that the child-support arrearage in 
this case is a judgment and, therefore, that the parties should be free to 
compromise it.  See Sowald & Morganstern, Domestic Relations Law (4th 
Ed.2002) 993, 20:27 (“As a general rule, arrearages may be forgiven by the 
obligee as long as public assistance is not involved”).  In this case, which does not 
involve public assistance, we conclude that the judgment, like any other judgment 
in Ohio, can be compromised and settled.  See  Columbiana Cty. Bd. of Commrs. 
v. Samuelson (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 62, 63, 24 OBR 142, 493 N.E.2d 245; 
Gholson v. Savin (1941), 137 Ohio St. 551, 560-562, 19 O.O. 309, 31 N.E.2d 858.   
{¶ 7} Nothing in this opinion should be construed to require judges to 
accept all agreements regarding the modification of child-support arrearages that 
are presented to them.  There could be situations in which agreements are 
unreasonable, made under duress, or otherwise flawed.  It is clear in this case, 
however, that the agreement between Reeder and Knuckles suffers from none of 
these defects.  To the contrary, the agreement facilitated the adoption of their child 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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by Reeder’s husband.  We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Edward E. Santen, Theresa B. Ellison, and Gayle A. Walker, for appellee 
Clermont County Department of Job and Family Services, Division of Child 
Support Enforcement. 
George Pattison, for appellant. 
Amy S. Roehrenbeck and Kimberly C. Newsom Bridges, urging reversal 
for amicus curiae Ohio Child Support Directors’ Association. 
Greg Sauer and Brian J. Davidson, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
Butler County Child Support Enforcement Agency. 
______________________