Title: Tammy Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2007 WI 98 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP935 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Tammy Kolupar, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc. and Randall 
Thompson, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 85 
Reported at: 293 Wis. 2d 265, 716 N.W.2d 547 
(Ct. App. 2006—Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 5, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Martin J. Donald 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Paul M. Erspamer and Lisko & Erspamer, S.C., Waukesha, and oral 
argument by Paul M. Erspamer. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by Kathryn 
Sawyer Gutenkunst, Brian M. Brejcha, and Cramer, Multhauf & 
Hammes, LLP, Waukesha, and oral argument by Kathryn Sawyer 
Gutenkunst. 
 
 
2007 WI 98
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP935  
(L.C. No. 
2000CV2571) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Tammy Kolupar, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc. and Randall 
Thompson, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.  This case is before us on a 
review of a published opinion of the court of appeals1 affirming 
a circuit court award of costs to Tammy Kolupar in her action 
                                                 
1 Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2006 WI App 85, 
293 Wis. 2d 265, 716 N.W.2d 547 (Kolupar II).  For the sake of 
clarity, we refer to the court of appeals opinion in Kolupar, 
293 Wis. 2d 265, as Kolupar II, and to this court's opinion in 
Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 112, 275 Wis. 
2d 1, 683 N.W.2d 58, as Kolupar I.  We do not designate by roman 
numeral the first court of appeals opinion in this matter, 
Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2003 WI App 175, 266 
Wis. 2d 659, 668 N.W.2d 798, because it is not referred to 
frequently in this opinion.  
No. 
2005AP935   
 
2 
 
against Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., and its employee, Randall 
Thompson, over the sale of a deficient used car.  This is the 
second time this case has been before us to resolve a question 
relating to the award of fees and costs.  In Kolupar v. Wilde 
Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 112, 275 Wis. 2d 1, 683 N.W.2d 
58 (Kolupar I), this court upheld the circuit court's award of 
$15,000 in attorney fees, and remanded this matter to the 
circuit court for a determination of an appropriate award of 
costs. 
¶2 
On remand, Kolupar submitted two sets of documentation 
to the circuit court, one showing that her expenses totaled 
$8795.66, and a revised version showing that they were $9933.44.  
The circuit court instead awarded Kolupar $3523.46 in costs, 
stating that Kolupar was entitled to "taxable costs,"2 i.e., 
those enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 814.04 (2005-06).3  Kolupar 
sought review of the order, contending that the circuit court 
erred by awarding only § 814.04 enumerated costs, and that she 
                                                 
2 Kolupar and Wilde use the term "taxable costs" to 
encompass only those listed items of cost set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 814.04, as opposed to "actual costs" or "reasonable 
costs."  Where Kolupar and Wilde use the term "taxable costs," 
we use "costs enumerated in § 814.04" or "§ 814.04 enumerated 
costs" to refer to the same concept.  We use "enumerated" 
because § 814.04(2) also provides for recovery of "[a]ll the 
necessary disbursements and fees allowed by law," encompassing 
recovery beyond those costs listed in § 814.04 when otherwise 
provided, such as under a fee-shifting statute. 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2005AP935   
 
3 
 
was 
entitled 
to 
"actual, 
reasonable" 
costs4 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2).5   The court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit 
court's 
award 
of 
costs 
on 
grounds 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) did not provide for the recovery of 
actual costs, and therefore the circuit court's award of 
"taxable costs" was not in err.  Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac 
Cadillac, Inc., 2006 WI App 85, ¶¶7-8, 293 Wis. 2d 265, 716 
N.W.2d 547 (Kolupar II). 
¶3 
The narrow issue before us is whether a retail buyer's 
recovery of costs under Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) is limited to 
costs enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 814.04 or also includes all 
other reasonable costs not enumerated in § 814.04.  We conclude 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) 
provides 
for 
the 
award 
of 
reasonable costs.  Because the court of appeals misconstrued 
§ 218.0163(2) in affirming the circuit court's award of costs, 
we reverse its decision.  Because the circuit court failed to 
apply the correct legal standard to its cost determination, we 
conclude it erroneously exercised its discretion in determining 
the amount of the award of costs. 
                                                 
4 Before this court, Kolupar argues that she is entitled to 
"reasonable," but not "actual," litigation costs.   
5 The current Wisconsin Stat. § 218.0163(2) was previously 
numbered Wis. Stat. § 218.01(9)(b) (1993-94) when the events 
giving rise to this action occurred.  The operative language of 
§ 218.0163(2) is identical to that of § 218.01(9)(b) (1993-94).  
To 
avoid 
confusion, 
we 
will 
use 
the 
current 
statutory 
designation throughout this opinion.  
No. 
2005AP935   
 
4 
 
¶4 
We therefore remand this matter to the circuit court 
to award Wis. Stat. § 814.04 enumerated costs, and to exercise 
its discretion to determine under Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) the 
amount of Kolupar's reasonable costs beyond those enumerated in 
§ 814.04.  Consistent with Shands v. Castrovinci, 115 Wis. 2d 
352, 361, 340 N.W.2d 506 (1983), we also grant Kolupar's request 
of reasonable attorney fees and reasonable costs for this appeal 
and direct the circuit court to determine and award such fees 
and costs.   
I 
¶5 
This lawsuit arose out of Tammy Kolupar's purchase of 
a 1985 Mercedes Benz 190E off Wilde Pontiac Cadillac's used car 
lot from Wilde's Pontiac sales manager, Randall Thompson.  
Kolupar alleged in her March 2000 complaint that Thompson 
received Kolupar's 1993 Pontiac Sunbird in exchange for the 
Mercedes, and represented to Kolupar that the Mercedes was in 
good mechanical condition.  Kolupar alleged she soon discovered 
the car had several problems, including faulty brakes and a 
broken odometer.  Kolupar stated she discovered after the sale 
that the Mercedes had not been owned by Wilde, but by Thompson 
personally.   
¶6 
Kolupar sued Wilde and Thompson6 for fraud, federal and 
state odometer law violations, breach of express and implied 
warranty and violations of Wisconsin's motor vehicle dealership 
                                                 
6 The circuit court entered a default judgment against 
Thompson on February 25, 2002.  See Kolupar I, 275 Wis. 2d 1, ¶7 
n.3.  Thompson is not a party to this appeal. 
 
No. 
2005AP935   
 
5 
 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 218.01 (1993-94), now largely incorporated 
within Wis. Stat. § 218.0116.7  A primary issue in the litigation 
was whether Thompson acted under Wilde's actual or apparent 
authority in selling the Mercedes.8   
¶7 
By letter dated December 26, 2001, Kolupar accepted an 
offer of settlement from Wilde disposing of the lawsuit for 
$6660 "plus the taxable costs of the action."  Notwithstanding 
this reference to "taxable costs," Kolupar's acceptance letter 
indicated the amount of costs was left unresolved:  "Since this 
offer will apparently resolve plaintiff's primary claim for 
damages, it would appear all that would be needed in this case 
is a hearing to determine the reasonableness and necessity of 
plaintiff's attorneys fees and litigation expenses."   
¶8 
The circuit court held a hearing on the issue of 
attorney fees and costs at which Kolupar requested $41,000 in 
attorney fees, and $11,000 in costs.  The Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court, Honorable Thomas R. Cooper, awarded $15,000 in 
"reasonable attorney fees," declaring that the case was "over-
tried" and "over-pled."  When Kolupar's attorney asked about the 
request for costs, Judge Cooper responded:  "Fees and costs, 
$15,000."   
¶9 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
award.  See Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2003 WI App 
                                                 
7 Again, to avoid confusion, we will use the current 
statutory designation throughout this opinion. 
 
8 For additional facts about the underlying dispute in this 
case and the first appeal, see Kolupar I, 275 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶7-16.  
No. 
2005AP935   
 
6 
 
175, 266 Wis. 2d 659, 668 N.W.2d 798.  This court affirmed the 
award 
of 
attorney 
fees, 
concluding 
that 
on 
the 
limited 
documentation provided by Kolupar's attorney, the determination 
of the award was a proper exercise of the court's discretion.  
See Kolupar I, 275 Wis. 2d 1.  However, this court disagreed 
with the court of appeals on the issue of costs, concluding that 
the circuit court in effect denied all costs and failed to 
provide an explanation for its decision.  Id., ¶55.  Justice 
Prosser, writing for the majority, explained:   
The 
court 
made 
a 
formal 
finding 
that 
$15,000 
represented a reasonable attorney fee, but then the 
court aggregated the cost award as part of the $15,000 
award. In effect, the court awarded no costs. 
Section 218.01(9)(b) does not state that the court may 
award costs or attorney fees.  Costs and attorney fees 
are linked; the court is authorized to award costs, 
including a reasonable attorney fee.  While the court 
may retain discretion to award $0 in costs or nominal 
costs, a decision to do so must be explained.  Here, 
the court offered no explanation.  The court may have 
believed 
the 
party's settlement for $6,600 plus 
taxable costs included the costs requested by Kolupar.  
Or perhaps the court believed the costs should not be 
awarded at all.  An explanation is required.  
Id., ¶¶54-55.  This court then remanded the matter to the 
circuit court to address the issue of costs.   
 
¶10 Before the circuit court on remand, Wilde contended 
that Kolupar was entitled to only "taxable costs" enumerated in 
Wis. Stat. § 814.04.9 
 
Kolupar 
argued 
that 
under 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 814.04 provides, in relevant part: 
Except as provided in [sections not relevant 
here] when allowed costs shall be as follows: 
No. 
2005AP935   
 
7 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) Attorney fees.  (a) When the amount recovered or 
the value of the property involved is greater than the 
maximum amount specified in s. 799.01(1)(d), attorney 
fees shall be $500; when it is equal to or less than 
the maximum amount specified in s. 799.01(1)(d), but 
is $1,000 or more, attorney fees shall be $300; when 
it is less than $1,000, attorney fees shall be $100. 
In all other cases in which there is no amount 
recovered or that do not involve property, attorney 
fees shall be $300. 
(c) No attorney fees may be taxed on behalf of any 
party unless the party appears by an attorney other 
than himself or herself. 
(2) Disbursements.  All the necessary disbursements 
and fees allowed by law; the compensation of referees; 
a reasonable disbursement for the service of process 
or other papers in an action when the same are served 
by a person authorized by law other than an officer, 
but the item may not exceed the authorized sheriff's 
fee for the same service; amounts actually paid out 
for certified and other copies of papers and records 
in 
any 
public 
office; 
postage, 
photocopying, 
telephoning, 
electronic 
communications, 
facsimile 
transmissions, and express or overnight delivery; 
depositions including copies; plats and photographs, 
not exceeding $100 for each item; an expert witness 
fee not exceeding $300 for each expert who testifies, 
exclusive of the standard witness fee and mileage 
which shall also be taxed for each expert; and in 
actions relating to or affecting the title to lands, 
the cost of procuring an abstract of title to the 
lands.  Guardian ad litem fees shall not be taxed as a 
cost or disbursement. 
(4) Interest on verdict.  Except as provided in s. 
807.01(4), if the judgment is for the recovery of 
money, interest at the rate of 12% per year from the 
time of verdict, decision or report until judgment is 
entered shall be computed by the clerk and added to 
the costs. 
(6) Judgment by default.  If the judgment is by 
default or upon voluntary dismissal by the adverse 
party the costs taxed under sub. (1) shall be one-half 
No. 
2005AP935   
 
8 
 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2), 
a 
fee-shifting 
statute, 
she 
was 
entitled to reasonable expenses above and beyond taxable costs 
enumerated in § 814.04.  On November 10, 2004, Kolupar submitted 
a letter and detailed ledger requesting an award of $8795.66 in 
costs.10  On December 1, 2004, Kolupar submitted a revised 
request with supporting documentation seeking $9933.44 in costs.  
¶11 The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Honorable M. 
Joseph Donald, ruled as follows:  
 
I think in this case on the legal issues in terms 
of the costs, the question of costs is clear to me, 
and I'm going to rule that in this matter that it is 
taxable costs.  There are different statutes with fee-
shifting provisions, but this statute, as is indicated 
by the Court, that this matter is back here for costs 
and that is taxable costs.  That's 814 taxable costs. 
                                                                                                                                                             
what they would have been had the matter been 
contested. 
(7) Judgment offer not accepted.  If the offer of 
judgment pursuant to s. 807.01 is not accepted and the 
plaintiff fails to recover a more favorable judgment 
the 
plaintiff 
shall 
not 
recover 
costs 
but 
the 
defendant shall have full costs to be computed on the 
demand of the complaint. 
(8) Actions for municipal corporations.  In all 
actions brought for the benefit of any county, town, 
village, city or other municipal corporation of this 
state by a citizen taxpayer, the plaintiff shall be 
entitled to recover for the plaintiff's own use, in 
case the plaintiff shall prevail, the taxable costs of 
such action and such part of the recovery as the court 
considers reasonable, as attorney fees, not to exceed 
20% of such recovery, and not to exceed $500. 
10 Kolupar's cover letter requests "an award of $8844.12 in 
actual and reasonable litigation expenses."  The enclosed 
ledger, however, lists $8795.66 as the "amount due." 
No. 
2005AP935   
 
9 
 
     . . . . 
So now that I have ruled that it's taxable costs 
or 814 costs, I'm now confronted with trying to figure 
out what are taxable costs based on the submissions.  
And this detailed ledger has a lot of entries on it, 
but there were not receipts for every entry.  There 
were receipts for major entries, and this Court——I'm 
going to at least be reasonable in my determination as 
to what the costs are.  
¶12 A written order issued after the hearing provided 
"[t]hat plaintiff receive taxable costs under Chapter 814 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes" for the following items:  process server, 
$68.00; investigation to locate Thompson, $80.00; Gramann 
Reporting, 
$55.97; 
transcript/Susan 
Kolupar, 
$74.80; 
transcript/Tammy Kolupar, $206.90; deposition, $393.10; court 
reporting, $50.00; deposition fees, $606.30; deposition fees 
$586.50; 
transcript, 
$208.58; 
deposition 
fees, 
$273.45; 
mediation/Willis 
Zick, 
$350.00; 
process 
server, 
$117.95; 
transcript, 
$164.15; 
process 
server, 
$27.76; 
photocopies, 
$54.50; and transcript, $205.50.  The order awarded a total of 
$3523.46 in costs.  It denied Kolupar's request for attorney 
fees and costs incurred in the remanded proceeding. 
¶13 Kolupar appealed from the order to the court of 
appeals, asserting that the circuit court erred in awarding only 
taxable costs under Chapter 814 and not reasonable costs under 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2).  The court of appeals affirmed the 
No. 
2005AP935   
 
10 
 
circuit court based on its interpretation of § 218.0163(2).11  
See Kolupar II, 293 Wis. 2d 265, ¶¶7-8.  The court of appeals 
read § 218.0163(2) as not providing recovery of reasonable costs 
because a paragraph within the same subsection, § 218.0163(1m), 
provided for "actual costs," while subsection (2) provided for 
only "costs," which the court of appeals took to mean "taxable 
costs" enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 814.04(2).  Kolupar filed a 
petition seeking review of the court of appeals decision, which 
we granted.  
II 
¶14 The primary issue before us is as follows:  Is a 
retail buyer's recovery of costs under Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) 
limited to the costs enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 814.04, or does 
it also include all other reasonable costs not enumerated in 
§ 814.04?  This question requires us to interpret § 218.0163(2) 
                                                 
11 However, the court of appeals' analysis begins by 
treating this case as one of contract interpretation.  It 
suggests that the terms of the settlement letter indicate 
Kolupar agreed to seek only "taxable costs."  See Kolupar II, 
293 Wis. 2d 265, ¶4.  In attempting to ascertain the intent of 
the parties, the court of appeals construed "taxable costs" to 
mean 
"those 
costs 
'allowed 
as 
items 
of 
cost 
under' 
Wis. Stat. Rule 814.04," 
which, 
under 
§ 814.04(2), 
includes 
"[a]ll the necessary disbursements and fees allowed by law."  
Id., ¶6.  The court of appeals then considered whether 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) allowed recovery of disbursements and 
fees in addition to those enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 814.04.  
We note that the settlement letter contains ample evidence 
suggesting that Kolupar did not intend to merely seek "taxable 
costs," and that it is unclear what the parties intended by the 
use of this term.  Regardless, the parties do not argue this 
case as one of contract interpretation, and we do not construe 
it as such.  
No. 
2005AP935   
 
11 
 
and other relevant Wisconsin statutes, a matter of law that we 
review de novo.  Village of Cross Plains v. Haanstad, 2006 WI 
16, ¶9, 288 Wis.2d 573, 709 N.W.2d 447. 
¶15
Our review of a circuit court's valuation of an award 
of costs is limited to whether the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion.  Anderson v. MSI Preferred Ins. Co., 
2005 WI 62, ¶19, 281 Wis. 2d 66, 697 N.W.2d 73.  
  A proper 
exercise of discretion requires the circuit court to employ a 
logical rationale based on the appropriate legal principles and 
facts of record."  Id. (citations omitted). 
III 
¶16 In general, "parties to a lawsuit bear the cost of 
their own attorney fees absent legislative authorization to 
shift costs."  Kolupar I, 275 Wis. 2d 1, ¶17.  This is the so-
called "American rule."  Watkins v. LIRC, 117 Wis. 2d 753, 758, 
345 N.W.2d 482 (1984).   
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 814.04 sets forth the items of costs 
that "shall" be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff in a civil 
lawsuit.12 
 Section 814.04 introduces the items of cost 
authorized under the section by stating:  "[e]xcept as provided 
in [statutory sections not applicable here] . . . when allowed 
costs shall be as follows: . . . ."  Wisconsin Stat. § 814.01 
provides costs "shall be allowed" as a matter "of course to the 
plaintiff upon recovery."  
                                                 
12 Exceptions to this general rule are set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 814.04.   
No. 
2005AP935   
 
12 
 
¶18 Under Wis. Stat. § 814.04(2), a plaintiff is entitled 
to recover the following costs:  a reasonable disbursement for 
the service of process or other papers in an action; amounts 
actually paid for copies of records and other papers in a public 
office; 
postage, 
photocopying, 
telephoning, 
electronic 
communications and facsimile transmissions; express or overnight 
delivery; depositions, including copies; plats and photographs; 
and expert witness fees, including mileage for each expert 
witness.  Section 814.04(2) further provides that a plaintiff is 
entitled to "[a]ll the necessary disbursements and fees allowed 
by law" in addition to those enumerated in the section.   
¶19 Among the "necessary disbursements and fees allowed by 
law" are those authorized under fee-shifting statutes.  Numerous 
Wisconsin statutes contain fee-shifting provisions, including 
those relating to consumer protection, frivolous lawsuits and 
privacy rights.13   
¶20 Kolupar's action against Wilde and Thompson alleged 
violations 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0116, 
a 
consumer 
protection 
statute regulating motor vehicle dealers, salespersons and sales 
finance companies.  Section 218.0163(2) provides that "[a]ny 
retail 
buyer . . . suffering 
pecuniary 
loss 
because 
of 
a 
violation by a licensee of [subsections of § 218.0116] may 
recover damages for the loss in any court of competent 
                                                 
13 For a complete listing of the 50-plus fee-shifting 
provisions in Wisconsin law, see 3 Hon. Robert D. Sundby & 
Steven P. Means, Law of Damages in Wisconsin, Chapter 37, 
Attorney Fees, Appendicies 37A and 38B (Russell M. Ware ed., 4th 
ed. 2005). 
No. 
2005AP935   
 
13 
 
jurisdiction together with costs, including reasonable attorney 
fees." 
¶21 On appeal, Kolupar contends that the circuit court 
erred by determining costs under Wis. Stat. § 814.04, when this 
court's 
remand 
directed 
the 
circuit 
court 
to 
apply 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2).  She argues that because § 218.0163(2) 
is a fee-shifting statute, she is entitled to recover all 
reasonable costs in addition to costs enumerated in § 814.04.   
¶22 Wilde responds that Kolupar should be judicially 
estopped from contending that she is entitled to more than 
Wis. Stat. § 814.04 
enumerated 
costs 
because 
she 
requested 
"taxable costs" in her first appeal.  Additionally, Wilde notes 
that Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) allows recovery of "costs," while 
§ 218.0163(1m) provides for "actual costs."  Wilde agrees with 
the court of appeals that this difference indicates that the 
legislature 
intended 
recovery 
of 
actual 
costs 
under 
§ 218.0163(1m), 
but 
only 
§ 814.04 
enumerated 
costs 
under 
§ 218.0163(2).  Alternately, Wilde argues that the award of 
costs was not an erroneous exercise of discretion because the 
circuit court declared that the award was "reasonable" and 
awarded two items of costs not enumerated in § 814.04. 
A 
¶23 Before turning to the merits, we address Wilde's 
estoppel argument.  We note that Wilde did not advance this 
argument in its briefs to the circuit court or court of appeals.  
Generally, arguments raised for the first time on appeal are 
deemed waived.  See, e.g., State v. Van Camp, 
	

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

No. 
2005AP935   
 
14 
 
  (1997).  Setting aside the question of waiver, we conclude 
Wilde's estoppel argument lacks merit.   
¶24 Judicial estoppel precludes a party from asserting 
inconsistent positions in a legal proceeding.  Mrozek v. Intra 
Financial Corp., 2005 WI 73, ¶22, 281 Wis. 2d 448, 699 N.W.2d 
54.  This equitable doctrine is intended "to protect against a 
litigant playing 'fast and loose with the courts' by asserting 
inconsistent positions."  Id. (citation omitted).  A party 
asserting judicial estoppel must show:  "(1) the later position 
is clearly inconsistent with the earlier position; (2) the facts 
at issue are the same in both cases; and (3) the party to be 
estopped convinced the first court to adopt its position."  Id. 
(citation omitted).   
¶25 At a minimum, Wilde has not fulfilled the third 
requirement of estoppel; it cannot show that Kolupar convinced 
this court (or any other) that she was entitled to "taxable 
costs" only, i.e., Wis. Stat. § 814.04 enumerated costs.  This 
court remanded for the circuit court to address the issue of 
costs under Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2); it did not remand for the 
circuit court to address "taxable costs," if, in fact, Kolupar 
requested only "taxable costs."  The record is devoid of any 
evidence that Kolupar is trying to "play fast and loose" with 
the system.  Judicial estoppel is therefore inappropriate here. 
B 
¶26 We 
now 
consider 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2).  Kolupar contends that the provision 
of "costs, including reasonable attorney fees" in § 218.0163(2) 
No. 
2005AP935   
 
15 
 
should be read to include reasonable costs to effectuate the 
purpose of the consumer protections in Wisconsin's motor 
dealership statute.  Wilde argues the court of appeals correctly 
concluded that the legislature's provision of "actual costs" in 
§ 218.0163(1m), as compared with "costs" in § 218.0163(2), 
indicates that the legislature intended recovery of § 814.04 
enumerated costs only for consumer plaintiffs with claims under 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0116. 
¶27 "[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
"[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it 
is used; not in isolation but as a part of a whole; in relation 
to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46.  
"A cardinal rule in interpreting statutes is to favor a 
construction that will fulfill the purpose of the statute over a 
construction that defeats the manifest object of the act."  
Watkins, 117 Wis. 2d at 761.  "[A] plain-meaning interpretation 
[of a statute] cannot contravene a textually or contextually 
manifest statutory purpose."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49.  
¶28 Additionally, when multiple statutes address the same 
subject area, we read the statutes in pari materia such that 
both statutes will be operative.  Providence Catholic School v. 
Bristol School Dist., 231 Wis. 2d 159, 178, 605 N.W.2d 238 
(1999).  If the potential for conflict between the statutes is 
No. 
2005AP935   
 
16 
 
present, we will read the statutes to avoid such a conflict if a 
reasonable construction exists.  Id. 
¶29 Wilde urges us to adopt the court of appeals' 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2).  The court of 
appeals cast the issue presented in this case as follows:  
"[T]he core question is whether the legislature intended that 
the word 'costs' in [§ 218.0163(2)] to include actual litigation 
expenses."  Kolupar II, 293 Wis. 2d 265, ¶7.  The court of 
appeals then noted that while the legislature used only the word 
"costs" in § 218.0163(2), it permitted the recovery of "actual 
costs" in § 218.0163(1m) when a prohibited practice affected an 
auto dealer (as opposed to a retail buyer like Kolupar) and was 
"willful."  The court of appeals took the legislature's use of 
"actual costs" in a paragraph within the same subsection of 
§ 218.0163 to mean that the legislature, by use of "costs" in 
§ 218.0163(2), intended recovery of only Wis. Stat. § 814.04 
enumerated costs for retail buyers who prevail on claims under 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0116.   
¶30 We believe the court of appeals' analysis is incorrect 
for three reasons.  First, it casts the issue as between 
Wis. Stat. § 814.04 enumerated costs and "actual costs" without 
considering a third alternative, "reasonable costs."  An auto 
dealer who prevails on a claim under § 218.0163(1m) is entitled 
to the "actual costs" of the litigation.  The legislature has 
seen fit to distinguish an award of "actual costs" from the 
"costs" a prevailing party is entitled to receive under 
§ 218.0163(2).  See Nelson v. McLaughlin, 211 Wis. 2d 487, 565 
No. 
2005AP935   
 
17 
 
N.W.2d 123 (1997) ("[W]here the legislature uses similar but 
different terms in a statute, particularly within the same 
section, it is presumed that the legislature intended such terms 
to 
have 
different 
meanings."). 
 
Nevertheless, 
while 
the 
legislature's 
choice 
of 
the 
term 
"actual 
costs" 
in 
§ 218.0163(1m) necessarily precludes a construction of the term 
"costs" in § 218.0163(2) to mean "actual costs," it does not 
follow that the legislature also precluded the recovery of 
"reasonable 
costs" 
by 
its 
use 
of 
the 
term 
"costs" 
in 
§ 218.0163(2).   
¶31 Second, as Kolupar argues, the court of appeals' 
interpretation in this case conflicts with the manifest purpose 
of the statute and prior cases construing fee-shifting remedies.   
¶32 Third, the court of appeals' opinion interprets 
Wis. Stat. § 814.04 and Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) in a manner 
that renders them inconsistent with each other.  For the reasons 
set forth below,14 we conclude that Wis. Stat. §§ 218.0116 and 
218.0163(2) plainly manifest a legislative purpose to provide 
recovery of the reasonable expenses of the litigation, and that 
such an interpretation is necessary to harmonize otherwise 
conflicting provisions of Wis. Stat. §§ 218.0163(2) and 814.04. 
¶33 In addressing a retail buyer's claim under Wisconsin's 
"lemon 
law," 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171, 
the 
former 
Wis. Stat. § 218.015 (1993-94), this court noted that "remedial 
statutes should be liberally construed to suppress the mischief 
                                                 
14 See ¶¶41-42, infra. 
No. 
2005AP935   
 
18 
 
and advance the remedy that the statute intended to afford."  
Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 978, 542 
N.W.2d 148 (1996); see also Hartlaub v. Coachmen Ind., Inc., 143 
Wis. 2d 791, 801, 422 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1987) (noting that 
remedial statutes such as the "lemon law" should be construed 
"with a view towards the social problem which the legislature 
was addressing when enacting the law"). 
¶34 When construing the award provisions of a remedial 
statute, this court examines the purposes of the underlying 
statute.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Hodge v. Town of Turtle Lake, 
180 Wis. 2d 62, 79, 508 N.W.2d 603 (1993); Watkins, 117 Wis. 2d 
753; Shands, 115 Wis. 2d at 358.  In Shands, this court 
concluded that the manifest purposes of the unfair trade 
practices statute entitled a successful claimant in a tenant-
landlord dispute to an award of reasonable appellate attorney 
fees where the statute did not explicitly address recovery of 
appellate fees.  Shands, 115 Wis. 2d at 361.  First, the Shands 
court discerned that the statute's provision of reasonable 
attorney fees encouraged tenants to enforce their rights where 
"the amount of pecuniary loss [might be] small compared with the 
cost of litigation."  Id. at 358.  Second, the court in Shands 
noted that a tenant who sues under the statute "acts as a 
'private attorney general' to enforce the tenants' rights set 
forth in the administrative regulations," in the process 
enforcing not only their individual rights, but the public's 
rights under the statute as well.  Id.  Third, the court in 
Shands observed that suits under the statute "have the effect of 
No. 
2005AP935   
 
19 
 
deterring impermissible conduct by landlords" by subjecting them 
to double damages and attorney fees.  Id. 
¶35 The 
applicable 
statute 
in 
this 
case, 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0116, is remedial in nature, offering retail 
buyers protection against certain unfair practices of auto 
dealers, salespersons and finance companies.  Specifically, the 
statute prohibits a number of unsavory practices, including 
fraudulent 
misrepresentation 
and 
use 
of 
deceptive 
sales 
practices, in the retail sale or lease of a motor vehicle. See 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(1)(bm), (c), (cm), (dm), (e), (em), (f), 
(im), (m) and (p).  
¶36 The statute's primary mechanism for suppressing such 
prohibited conduct is to authorize retail buyers to sue for 
damages.  See Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2).  Thus, as in Shands, a 
meaningful remedy is essential to deterring the prohibited 
conduct and effectuating the purposes of the statute.  In this 
case, recovery of only Wis. Stat. § 814.04 enumerated costs 
would discourage litigants with legitimate claims from seeking 
relief, and thus undermine the statute's effectiveness in 
suppressing the prohibited "mischief."   
¶37 For 
the 
retail 
buyer 
with 
a 
claim 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0116, the cost of the litigation may be 
significant, and even, as here, exceed the total recovery under 
the statute.  Such costs may include costs of discovery and 
court-imposed costs (here, two failed mediations) that are not 
enumerated § 814.04 costs.  If the cost of litigation reduces or 
even eliminates recovery, retail buyers will be less likely to 
No. 
2005AP935   
 
20 
 
enforce their rights under the statute.  We therefore conclude 
that Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) authorizes recovery of reasonable 
costs, as well as reasonable attorney fees, to retail purchasers 
who prevail on claims under Wis. Stat. § 218.0116.15   
¶38 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
addressed 
the 
issue 
of 
recoverability of reasonable costs in Chmill v. Friendly Ford-
Mercury of Janesville, 154 Wis. 2d 407, 453 N.W.2d 197 (Ct. App. 
1990) 
(Chmill 
II), 
under 
the 
fee-shifting 
provision 
of 
Wisconsin's "lemon law," Wis. Stat. § 218.015(7) (1987-88),16 
reaching the same conclusion we reach today.  Chmill II was 
preceded by Chmill v. Friendly Ford-Mercury of Janesville, 144 
Wis. 2d 796, 809, 424 N.W.2d 747 (Ct. App. 1988) (Chmill I), 
which concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to reasonable 
attorney fees for appellate proceedings before the court of 
appeals and remanded to the circuit court to "determine a 
reasonable attorney fee award . . . for the appeal to this 
court."  On remand, the circuit court denied the plaintiff's 
request for reasonable costs in the prior court of appeals 
                                                 
15 An 
award 
of 
reasonable 
litigation 
costs 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) provides for costs above and beyond 
Wis. Stat. § 814.04 enumerated costs, but not for the double 
recovery of Wis. Stat. § 814.04 enumerated costs.  "Fee-shifting 
statutes contemplate that those recovering under them will be 
made whole.  They do not contemplate double awards of any 
items."  Chmill v. Friendly Ford-Mercury of Janesville, 154 Wis. 
2d 407, 413 n.2, 453 N.W.2d 197 (Ct. App. 1990)(Chmill II).  
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 218.015(7) (1987-88) is now found at 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7), and the statutory language pertinent 
to this discussion remains unchanged.  
No. 
2005AP935   
 
21 
 
proceeding, and denied reasonable attorney fees and costs in the 
remanded proceeding.  Chmill II, 154 Wis. 2d at 411-12.   
¶39 The court of appeals reversed, ordering the award of 
reasonable costs in both the appellate and remanded proceedings, 
and reasonable attorney fees in the remanded proceeding.  Id. at 
413, 416-18.  Regarding the circuit court's failure to award 
reasonable costs, the court of appeals held that the circuit 
court "read Chmill I too literally.  It improperly exercised its 
discretion because it ignored the context of our statement.  
That context shows that we intended to apply sec. 218.015(7), 
Stats., which permits an award of 'costs, disbursements and 
reasonable attorney fees,' not just fees.  We intended to award 
the awardable."  Chmill II, 154 Wis. 2d at 413. 
¶40 Wilde contends that Chmill II is distinguishable 
because 
Wis. Stat. § 218.015(7) 
(1987-88) 
provides 
for 
the 
recovery of "costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney fees," 
while Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) provides for "costs, including 
reasonable attorney fees."  While the inclusion of the term 
"disbursements" 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 218.015(7) 
(1987-88) 
more 
clearly sets forth the legislature's intent that the party be 
made whole, there is no getting around the fact that providing 
"costs, including reasonable attorney fees" under § 218.0163(2) 
denominates something very different than enumerated costs under 
§ 814.04. 
 
¶41 Moreover, 
reading 
the 
cost 
provisions 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) and Wis. Stat. § 814.04 in pari materia 
precludes an interpretation of § 218.0163(2) that would limit 
No. 
2005AP935   
 
22 
 
recovery to enumerated § 814.04 costs.  See State v. Denis L.R., 
2005 WI 110, ¶57 n.21, 283 Wis. 2d 358, 699 N.W.2d 154 (statutes 
are read together in pari materia to avoid any conflicts).  Both 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) and Wis. Stat. § 814.04 treat attorney 
fees as a subcategory of costs.  Among the enumerated costs 
included within § 814.04 are "attorney fees," which are strictly 
limited to a maximum amount of between $100 and $500, depending 
on the amount of the total recovery.  Wis. Stat. § 814.04(1)(a).   
¶42 If, 
as 
Wilde 
argues, 
the 
term 
"costs" 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) 
means 
only 
Wis. Stat. § 814.04 
enumerated costs, the only attorney fees available under 
§ 218.0163(2) would be those enumerated under § 814.04(1)(a).  
But § 218.0163(2) explicitly provides for award of "costs, 
including reasonable attorney fees."  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, a 
construction 
of 
"costs" 
to 
mean 
only 
Wis. Stat. § 814.04 
enumerated costs would put language providing for "reasonable 
attorney fees" in § 218.0163(2) in direct conflict with the 
attorney fee provisions of § 814.04.17  A construction of "costs" 
                                                 
17  Enumerated costs under § 814.04 include attorney fees 
which are strictly limited to a maximum amount of between $100 
and $500, depending on the amount of the total recovery.  
Wis. Stat. § 814.04(1)(a).  Enumerated costs do not include 
reasonable attorney fees.  Supra, ¶41.  
No. 
2005AP935   
 
23 
 
to mean "reasonable costs" is therefore necessary to harmonize 
§ 218.0163(2) and § 814.04(1)(a).18   
IV 
 
¶43 We consider next whether the circuit court's award of 
costs represented an erroneous exercise of its discretion.  We 
examine the record of the remanded proceeding to determine if 
the 
circuit 
court 
reached 
its 
conclusion 
by 
a 
reasoned 
application of the appropriate legal standard to the relevant 
facts.  Franke v. Franke, 2004 WI 8, ¶55 n.38, 268 Wis. 2d 360, 
674 N.W.2d 832 ("When a circuit court exercises discretion, the 
record on appeal must reflect the circuit court's reasoned 
application of the appropriate legal standard to the relevant 
facts in the case.") (citation omitted).   
                                                 
18 We note that a decision of the United States Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals not cited by either party construes 
language identical to that of Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) and 
reaches a different conclusion than the one we reach here.  See 
Bob Willow Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 872 F.2d 788, 
799 (7th Cir. 1989).  In Bob Willow Motors, the federal 
appellate court construed language in Wis. Stat. § 218.01(9)(a) 
(1983-84) 
providing 
for 
recovery 
of 
"costs 
including 
a 
reasonable attorney fee" to permit recovery of "no more than 
ordinary taxable costs as found in 28 U.S.C. § 1920."  Id.  
However, we note that the Bob Willow Motors court awarded costs 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which does not include a limited 
attorney fee among the costs enumerated under that section, 
unlike Wis. Stat. § 814.04(1)(a).  Accordingly, unlike Wis. 
Stat. § 218.0163(2) and § 814.04(1)(a), § 218.01(9)(a) (1983-84) 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1920 do not appear to conflict with one another.  
See, supra, ¶¶41-42.  Regardless, this court is not bound by a 
federal court's interpretation of Wisconsin law.  See, e.g., 
Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 
400, 573 N.W.2d 842 (1998).  
No. 
2005AP935   
 
24 
 
¶44 On remand, Wilde argued that Kolupar I directed the 
circuit 
court 
to 
address 
"taxable 
costs" 
enumerated 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 814.04 
because, 
it 
contended, 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0163(2) provided for only these costs.  However, Wilde did 
not concede that Kolupar was entitled to § 814.04 enumerated 
costs, but rather contended that it was within the circuit 
court's discretion to award "$0 costs," including no § 814.04 
enumerated costs.  Kolupar argued that she was entitled to 
reasonable costs under § 218.0163(2), as well as § 814.04 
enumerated costs, because an award of such costs was necessary 
to effectuate the purposes of the statute.  
¶45 At the hearing on costs, the circuit court made the 
following ruling:  
The matter is remanded back to the Court with the 
decision that it can be zero; it can be nominal, and 
it also can be astronomical, if I buy the arguments of 
the plaintiff.  But it's clear to me that I'm going to 
do what I think is right and fair. 
I think in this case on the legal issues in terms of 
the costs, the question of costs is clear to me, and 
I'm going to rule that in this matter that it is 
taxable costs.  There are different statutes with fee-
shifting provisions, but this statute, as is indicated 
by the Court, that this matter is back here for costs 
and that is taxable costs.  That's 814 taxable costs.   
In terms of the recommendation, or at least the 
argument that it should be zero, I just don't buy it 
because I think the Supreme Court could have made that 
determination.  I think they sent it back here for a 
reason, and that was to determine costs.   
So now that I have ruled that it's taxable costs or 
814 costs, I'm now confronted with trying to figure 
out what are taxable costs based on the submissions.  
And this detailed ledger has a lot of entries on it, 
No. 
2005AP935   
 
25 
 
but there were not receipts for every entry.  There 
were receipts for major entries, and this Court——I'm 
going to at least be reasonable in my determination as 
to what the costs are.  I'm just going to read off 
those costs that I'm going to approve in this matter 
based on the ledger and the information that I have 
received.   
The court then detailed the items of costs that it would award.  
Among 
these 
were 
two 
items 
of 
cost 
not 
enumerated 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 814.04, a mediation fee and the cost of an 
investigation 
to 
locate 
Thompson. 
 
The 
court 
failed 
to 
acknowledge that these two items were not § 814.04 enumerated 
costs, or explain why it was awarding these costs but not others 
requested by Kolupar.   
¶46 After listing the items of cost to be awarded, the 
circuit court concluded:  "All right.  Those are the costs that 
I find that are reasonable in this matter and I'm awarding in 
this case, and that's the ruling of the Court."  
¶47 The written order of costs that followed the circuit 
court's bench ruling provided as follows:  "IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED:  1. That plaintiff received taxable costs under Chapter 
814 of the Wisconsin Statutes for the following items [listing 
17 items of cost, see supra, ¶12].  2. That plaintiff's request 
for costs on her appeal are denied for those reasons stated on 
the record."  
¶48 Because 
the 
record 
does 
not 
show 
that 
the 
determination of the amount of the award was based on a reasoned 
application of the appropriate legal standard, we conclude the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
calculating the amount of the award.   
No. 
2005AP935   
 
26 
 
¶49 We note that the circuit court erroneously concluded 
that Kolupar was entitled to only those costs enumerated in 
Wis. Stat. § 814.04. 
 As we concluded earlier, Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0163(2) provides for recovery of reasonable costs in 
addition to § 814.04 enumerated costs.  We acknowledge that this 
court's remand order did not distinguish between § 814.04 
enumerated costs and reasonable costs under § 218.0163(2).  
However, as noted, the remand ordered a calculation of costs 
under § 218.0163(2), not § 814.04, and contemplated an exercise 
of discretion, which an award of § 814.04 enumerated costs does 
not contemplate.   
¶50 We observe that the circuit court stated that it would 
"at least be reasonable in my determination as to what the costs 
are" and later declared "[t]hose are the costs that I find that 
are reasonable in this matter."  We note also that the court, 
while 
declaring 
that 
it 
was 
awarding 
costs 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 814.04, 
then 
awarded 
two 
items 
of 
cost 
not 
enumerated in that section.  Based on these facts, it could be 
argued that the circuit court, in fact, applied the appropriate 
legal standard by awarding reasonable costs under § 218.0163(2) 
in addition to § 814.04 enumerated costs.19  
¶51 Our review of the record, however, shows that the 
circuit court did not engage in a considered process of 
                                                 
19 We address this argument sua sponte.  Wilde argues that 
the circuit court's order was a proper exercise of its 
discretion, but not for the reasons discussed here.  See infra, 
¶¶52-53.  
No. 
2005AP935   
 
27 
 
determining which expenses were, in fact, "reasonable."  The 
circuit court merely stated that it would award what was 
"reasonable," but did not explain why it was "reasonable" to 
award certain costs and not others.  Rather, the circuit court 
declared that it was awarding Wis. Stat. § 814.04 enumerated 
costs only, and then awarded without explanation two costs not 
included under § 814.04.  To demonstrate that the court properly 
exercised its discretion——in spite of its misstatements of the 
legal standard——the record would need to show that the circuit 
court engaged in a process in which it actually applied the 
correct legal standard.  Because the record does not demonstrate 
that the circuit court applied the correct legal standard here, 
we conclude that it erroneously exercised its discretion in 
determining the amount of the award of costs.   
¶52 Wilde 
contends 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
properly 
exercised its discretion in calculating the amount of the cost 
award 
because 
Kolupar's 
requests 
for 
costs 
were 
poorly 
documented and unclear.  Wilde asserts that Kolupar failed to 
provide receipts for many expenses.  It states that on November 
8, 2004, Kolupar requested expenses in the amount of $8844.12, 
but on December 1, 2004, Kolupar submitted an itemized request 
for costs in the amount of $9933.44.  Kolupar stated at the 
hearing that she provided documentation for "the big ticket 
items," accounting for approximately $8000 of the costs.  She 
adds that other costs were for items for which receipts are 
typically not available, such as mileage.  
No. 
2005AP935   
 
28 
 
¶53 We conclude that inconsistencies in the amounts 
requested or alleged inadequate documentation for requested 
costs do not support the conclusion that the circuit court 
properly exercised its discretion here.  We note there is little 
evidence that the circuit court actually based its attempted 
exercise of discretion on these grounds.  Moreover, the 
difference between a request of $8844.12 and $9933.44 is 
logically not a basis for an award of $3523.46.  Further, we 
cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that the documentation 
provided by Kolupar is indecipherable or otherwise inadequate on 
the whole.  Whether requested individual items of cost are 
adequately documented is a question for the circuit court on 
remand. 
¶54 Kolupar argues that much of her costs were the result 
of Wilde's litigation tactics, and court-mandated expenses.  The 
question of whether Wilde's litigation tactics in fact drove 
particular 
costs 
is 
relevant 
to 
a 
determination 
of 
the 
reasonableness of Kolupar's costs, among other factors.20  This 
matter requires an exercise of discretion by the circuit court 
on remand. 
                                                 
20 Judge Ralph Adam Fine addressed Wilde's litigation 
tactics in his dissent to the first court of appeals decision in 
this matter, Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2003 WI 
App 175, ¶23, 266 Wis. 2d 659, 668 N.W.2d 798.  Judge Fine 
concluded Wilde "delayed and obfuscated the litigation process" 
and "pursued a scorched-earth Rambo-litigation policy that has 
no place in our justice system."  
No. 
2005AP935   
 
29 
 
¶55 What is not relevant to the reasonableness of an award 
of costs, however, is the pecuniary value of the action as 
compared with the costs of litigation.  As discussed, an 
important purpose of fee-shifting statutes is to encourage 
injured parties to enforce their statutory rights when the cost 
of 
litigation, 
absent 
the 
fee-shifting 
provision, 
would 
discourage them from doing so.  See, e.g., Shands, 115 Wis. 2d 
at 358.  Providing for reasonable attorney fees and costs 
ensures that individuals will enforce the rights provided to 
them under the statute by the legislature, even when the costs 
of litigation exceed the value of the action.   
V 
¶56 Finally, Kolupar requests in her brief-in-chief an 
award of reasonable attorney fees and reasonable costs under 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) for this appeal.  We construe her 
request as a motion for reasonable attorney fees and reasonable 
costs.  For many of the same reasons that we hold that 
§ 218.0163(2) requires an award of reasonable costs in addition 
to Wis. Stat. § 814.04 enumerated costs, we conclude that a 
plaintiff 
prevailing 
on 
a 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0116 
claim 
is 
entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and reasonable 
costs for appellate proceedings.   
¶57 As noted, this court in Shands resolved the question 
of the recoverability of reasonable attorney fees for an appeal 
under a fee-shifting statute, holding that the purposes of the 
remedial 
statute 
entitled 
the 
plaintiff 
to 
an 
award 
of 
reasonable attorney fees in an appeal.  We have concluded today 
No. 
2005AP935   
 
30 
 
that 
the 
purposes 
of 
another 
remedial 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0116, require an award of reasonable costs in 
the circuit court proceeding.  Likewise, failure to award 
reasonable attorney fees and reasonable costs to a prevailing 
plaintiff 
under § 218.0116 in appellate proceedings would 
discourage litigants with legitimate claims from pursuing their 
right to an appeal, and thus undermine the effectiveness of 
§ 218.0116.  We therefore conclude that Kolupar is entitled to 
reasonable attorney fees and reasonable costs for this appeal, 
and we direct the circuit court to determine an amount of 
reasonable fees and costs and to award such fees and costs.  
VI 
¶58 In sum, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) 
provides for the award of reasonable costs as well as reasonable 
attorney fees.  Because the court of appeals misconstrued 
§ 218.0163(2) in affirming the circuit court's award of costs, 
we reverse its decision.  Because the circuit court failed to 
apply the correct legal standard to its cost determination, we 
conclude it erroneously exercised its discretion in determining 
the amount of the award of costs.  
¶59 We therefore remand to the circuit court to award 
Wis. Stat. § 814.04 
enumerated costs, and to exercise its 
discretion 
to 
determine 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2) 
the 
amount of Kolupar's reasonable costs beyond those enumerated in 
§ 814.04.  Consistent with Shands, 115 Wis. 2d at 361, we also 
grant 
Kolupar's 
request 
of 
reasonable 
attorney 
fees 
and 
No. 
2005AP935   
 
31 
 
reasonable costs for this appeal and direct the circuit court to 
determine and award such fees and costs.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2005AP935.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶60 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  Tammy Kolupar 
received 
more 
costs 
than 
she 
was 
permitted 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(2).  Rather than anxiously awaiting the 
deadline for appeal in hopes that Wilde Pontiac would decide an 
appeal over $430 was not worth it, she filed an appeal herself.   
¶61 With today's decision, Kolupar's litigation gamble 
pays off.  She now heads back to the circuit court with a chance 
to recover even more costs.   
¶62 Kolupar's attorneys are not doing too badly either.  
On top of the $15,000 in reasonable attorney fees initially 
awarded, the majority is awarding attorney fees for this appeal.      
¶63 Given the issues presented in this case, remand is not 
the proper step.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶64 Generally, parties to a lawsuit bear their own costs, 
including 
attorney 
fees 
and 
other 
disbursements, 
"absent 
legislative authorization to shift costs."  Kolupar v. Wilde 
Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 112, ¶17, 275 Wis. 2d 1, 683 
N.W.2d 58 (Kolupar I).  "'[T]o the extent that a statute does 
not authorize the recovery of specific costs, they are not 
recoverable.'"  Kleinke v. Farmers Coop. Supply and Shipping, 
202 Wis. 2d 138, 147, 549 N.W.2d 714 (1996) (quoting State v. 
Foster, 100 Wis. 2d 103, 106, 301 N.W.2d 192 (1981)). 
¶65 Wisconsin Stat. § 
218.0163(2) 
is 
a 
fee-shifting 
statute.  It provides the following: 
Any retail buyer, lessee or prospective lessee 
suffering pecuniary loss because of a violation by a 
licensee of s. 218.0116 (1) (bm), (c), (cm), (dm), 
(e), (em), (f), (im), (m) or (p) may recover damages 
No.  2005AP935.jpw 
 
2 
 
for the loss in any court of competent jurisdiction 
together with costs, including reasonable attorney 
fees. 
Kolupar is entitled to § 218.0163(2) costs.  See Kolupar I, 275 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶55. 
¶66 Wisconsin Stat. § 218.0163(2) does not define "costs."  
There is not a definition of "costs" anywhere in Wis. Stat. ch. 
218.  However, the legislature has provided an entire chapter on 
court 
costs, 
fees, 
and 
surcharges. 
 
Wis. Stat. ch 814.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 814.04 specifically addresses items of costs.  
It begins with the following:  
Except as provided in ss. 93.20, 100.195(5m)(b), 
100.30(5m), 
106.50(6)(i) 
and 
(6m)(a), 
115.80(9), 
281.36(2)(b)1., 
767.553(4)(d), 
769.313, 
[814.025], 
802.05, [[814.245]], 895.035(4), 895.506, 895.443(3), 
895.444(2), 
895.445(3), 
895.446(3), 
943.212(2)(b), 
943.245(2)(d), 
943.51(2)(b), 
and 
995.10(3), 
when 
allowed costs shall be as follows: 
The legislature has not included § 218.0163(2) in the list of 
statutes exempted from § 814.04.  Therefore, when a court 
considers an award of "costs" pursuant to § 218.0163(2), it 
should award costs consistent with § 814.04. 
¶67 Wisconsin Stat. § 814.04(2) provides for "[a]ll the 
necessary 
disbursements 
and 
fees 
allowed 
by 
law." 
 
The 
reasonable attorney fees provided by § 218.0163(2) constitute 
"fees allowed by law."  Therefore, a plaintiff that suffers a 
pecuniary loss covered by § 218.0163(2) may recover § 814.04 
costs, including reasonable attorney fees. 
¶68 The majority's contention that attorney fees are 
"strictly limited" by § 814.04(1)(a) is not supported by the 
language of § 814.04.  See majority op., ¶42 n.17.  To the 
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contrary, the attorney fees provided by § 814.04(1) set a 
minimum amount of attorney fees.  Wisconsin Stat. § 814.04(2) 
then permits a defendant to recover additional "fees allowed by 
law."  Wisconsin Stat. § 218.0163(2) is a law that allows the 
recovery of "reasonable attorney fees."  Attorney fees are a 
type of fees.  Accordingly, a plaintiff recovering under 
§ 218.0163(2) will recover reasonable attorney fees, which will 
be at least those provided by § 814.04(1).    
¶69 In this case, the circuit court awarded Kolupar costs 
that went beyond those provided by § 814.04.  Specifically, 
Kolupar received $80 for an investigation to locate a defendant 
and $350 for a mediation fee.  Neither of these costs fall into 
a category provided in § 814.04.  Accordingly, Wilde Pontiac had 
grounds for an appeal because the award of costs exceeded those 
allowed by law.   
¶70 Why then should this case not be remanded?  Simple 
answer:  Wilde Pontiac never filed an appeal.   
¶71 Kolupar filed the appeal in this case.  She sought 
more costs than were awarded by the circuit court, in the form 
of actual costs.  The court of appeals then properly concluded 
that Kolupar was not entitled to actual costs.  The court of 
appeals did not address the issue related to the circuit court 
awarding costs beyond the scope of § 814.04 because Wilde 
Pontiac never raised it. 
¶72 Given that the issue related to the circuit court 
awarding costs beyond the scope of § 814.04 was not properly 
before the court of appeals, it certainly is not properly before 
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this court.  Wilde Pontiac never filed an appeal in this case.  
Nonetheless, the court has addressed the issue and come up with 
a contorted interpretation of the statute in the process.   
III 
¶73 Kolupar heads back to the circuit court with a new 
interpretation of § 218.0163(2): it "provides for the award of 
reasonable costs."  Majority op., ¶3.   
¶74 The legislature did not modify the word "costs" with 
the word "reasonable," at least not in § 218.0163(2).  Other 
provisions of § 218.0163 suggest that it could have if that 
indeed was what it intended.  After all, the legislature did use 
the word "reasonable" in the very next provision.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0163(3).   
¶75 Why did the legislature not modify the word "costs" 
with the word "reasonable"?  Likely because the word "costs" 
unmodified has meaning in the statutes.  Specifically, it means 
that § 814.04 will apply. 
¶76 The majority has inflated the scope of § 218.0163(2) 
by arbitrarily inserting "reasonable" as a modifier of the word 
"costs." 
IV 
¶77 This litigation has dragged on too long.  With today's 
decision, there is no end in sight.  Kolupar has managed to 
prevail on this appeal when she is the one that benefited from 
an overly generous award of costs.  The fact that she now heads 
back to the circuit court to collect "reasonable" costs turns 
the plain language of § 218.0163(2) on its head. 
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¶78 For the forgoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
¶79 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
joins this opinion. 
 
 
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