Title: Brown v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
FREDERICK W. BROWN, 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 235, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0002006181 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 20, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
October 25, 2010 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 25th day of October 2010, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the State’s motion to affirm, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Frederick Brown, filed this appeal from 
the Superior Court’s sentence for a violation of probation (VOP).  The State 
of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground 
that it is manifest on the face of Brown’s opening brief that his appeal is 
without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that Brown pled guilty in July 2000 to one 
count of second degree rape of a victim under the age of 16.  After ordering a 
psychological evaluation, the Superior Court sentenced Brown to twenty 
 
2
years at Level V incarceration to be suspended after serving a ten-year 
mandatory term of imprisonment for decreasing levels of supervision.  
Among other conditions of his sentence, Brown was ordered to have no 
unsupervised contact with any child under the age of eighteen.  Brown did not 
appeal his conviction or sentence.   
 
(3) 
Brown’s present appeal is from the Superior Court’s April 2010 
sentence following a hearing at which Brown was found to have violated the 
conditions of his probation.  The Superior Court revoked Brown’s probation 
and sentenced him to serve ten years at Level V incarceration.  In his opening 
brief on appeal, Brown asserts that the evidence presented at the hearing was 
insufficient to find him in violation of the terms of his probation.  He 
contends that the only evidence was the hearsay testimony of his probation 
officer.  He contends that there was no medical evidence to prove that he had 
overdosed on alcohol, no evidence to prove that he was not taking his 
psychiatric medications as prescribed, and no evidence that he had had 
unsupervised contact with this girlfriend’s minor daughter.  Finally, Brown 
asserts that the Superior Court’s sentence was excessive given that Brown 
was charged only with administrative violations of his probation, not new 
criminal conduct. 
 
3
 
(4) 
We find no merit to Brown’s contentions.  In a VOP hearing, 
unlike a criminal trial, the State is only required to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the defendant violated the terms of his probation.1  A 
preponderance of evidence means “some competent evidence” to “reasonably 
satisfy the judge that the conduct of the probationer has not been as good as 
required by the conditions of probation.”2  Furthermore, the rules of evidence 
are relaxed in a VOP hearing, and hearsay evidence is admissible.3  Thus, we 
find no merit to Brown’s objections to his probation officer’s hearsay 
testimony. 
 
(5) 
Moreover, Brown’s probation officer testified about her personal 
knowledge that Brown was not taking his required medications as prescribed.  
The GPS monitor Brown was required to wear placed him at the home of his 
girlfriend’s daughter on the night he was arrested.  The probation officer 
interviewed the girl who admitted that Brown had visited her on at least two 
occasions.  We conclude that the evidence was more than sufficient to 
establish Brown’s VOP by a preponderance of the evidence.   
 
(6) 
Brown’s final argument is that the Superior Court’s sentence was 
excessive given that Brown had not been charged with any new criminal 
                                                 
1 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 716 (Del. 2006). 
2 Id. (quoting Collins v. State, 897 A.2d 159, 160 (Del. 2006)). 
3 Id. 
 
4
conduct.   This Court’s appellate review of a sentence is extremely limited, 
however, and generally ends upon a determination that the sentence is within 
the statutory limits prescribed by the legislature.4  In sentencing a defendant 
for a VOP, the trial court is authorized to impose any period of incarceration 
up to and including the balance of the Level V time remaining to be served on 
the original sentence.5  In this case, Brown originally was sentenced to a 
twenty-year term of imprisonment, to be suspended after serving ten years.  
Accordingly, the Superior Court’s ten-year sentence of imprisonment for 
Brown’s VOP reflected the amount of Level V time remaining to be served 
on Brown’s original sentence and thus was authorized by law and was neither 
arbitrary nor excessive.  
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Justice 
                                                 
4 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992). 
5 11 Del. C. § 4334(c).