Title: Hampton v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Susan K. Carpenter 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
 
 
 
Public Defender of Indiana 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Jonathan O. Chenoweth 
 
 
 
 
George P. Sherman 
Deputy Public Defender 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 84S04-1103-PC-161 
 
 
 
KEVIN L. HAMPTON,  
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Vigo Superior Court, No. 84D06-0808-PC-2678 
The Honorable Michael J. Lewis, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 84A04-1002-PC-122 
_________________________________ 
 
February 14, 2012 
 
Dickson, Justice. 
 
 
We affirm the denial of the defendant's post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel but hold that an instruction on the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt does not obviate the necessity, where the conduct of the defendant constituting the com-
mission of a charged offense is proven exclusively by circumstantial evidence, of an additional 
jury instruction advising the jury that proof by circumstantial evidence must be so conclusive and 
sure as to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence. 
 
 
The defendant was convicted of murder, rape, and criminal deviate conduct following the 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Feb 14 2012, 11:32 am
2 
 
brutal death of D.L. in Terre Haute, Indiana, in 2000.  On direct appeal, the defendant challenged 
the sufficiency of evidence, the denial of his motion for mistrial, and the structure and length of 
his sentence, but he did not claim ineffective assistance of counsel.  The Court of Appeals af-
firmed the convictions and resulting sentences.  Hampton v. State, 873 N.E.2d 1074 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2007), trans. not sought.  The defendant next sought post-conviction relief asserting that his 
appellate counsel's failure to challenge the refusal of a tendered instruction constituted an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of his right to the effective assistance of counsel.  The post-conviction 
court denied relief, finding that the trial court refused the tendered instruction because it believed 
that the State presented direct evidence at trial, namely DNA evidence.  Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Order, Appellant's App'x at 76.  Additionally, the post-conviction court 
found Indiana precedent unclear regarding the question as to whether DNA evidence is "direct" 
or "circumstantial" evidence, id. at 81–83, and concluded that the decision of the defendant's ap-
pellate counsel to pursue other issues on direct appeal did not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Appellant's App'x at 76.   
 
 
In appealing a denial of post-conviction relief, the defendant has asserted a single claim: 
that his appellate attorney rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to 
assert on direct appeal that the trial court erred in refusing, over defense objections, to instruct 
the jury that "[w]here proof of guilt is by circumstantial evidence only, it must be so conclusive 
in character and point so surely and unerringly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude every rea-
sonable theory of innocence."  See Ind. Pattern Jury Instruction—Criminal 12.01 (Indiana Judges 
Association, 2d ed. 1991) (emphasis added).1  (This instruction has often previously been given 
                                                 
1 The jury was instructed regarding the nature of direct and circumstantial evidence through Indi-
ana Pattern Jury Instruction 12.01.  The trial court thus read the following to the jury, but omitted the final 
sentence (emphasized below): 
Direct evidence means evidence that directly proves a fact, without an inference, and which 
in itself, if true, conclusively establishes that fact. 
Circumstantial evidence means evidence that proves a fact from which an inference of the ex-
istence of another fact may be drawn. 
An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another 
fact or group of facts. 
It is not necessary that facts be proved by direct evidence.  Both direct evidence and circum-
stantial evidence are acceptable as a means of proof.  Where proof of guilt is by circumstantial ev-
3 
 
using the word "hypothesis" instead of "theory," but we favor "theory" as more understandable to 
jurors.  See, e.g., 2 W.W. Thornton, Instructions to Juries §§ 2312–13 (1914).)  The defendant's 
post-conviction argument is based on the premise that the DNA evidence presented in his case 
was not direct but circumstantial evidence, thus compelling the use of the rejected instruction.  
The DNA evidence, collected from vaginal swabs and from the victim's tank top, was consistent 
with a profile of the defendant's DNA "to a degree of scientific certainty."  Trial Tr. at 527, 1001.  
The State has responded with multiple arguments: (a) that the defendant's appellate counsel 
properly omitted this issue on appeal because his trial counsel had referred to the DNA evidence 
at issue as direct rather than circumstantial evidence, and thus the issue was waived and not 
available for appellate challenge; (b) that it was reasonable for defense trial counsel to view the 
DNA evidence as direct evidence, and, therefore, an appellate challenge to this view would have 
little likelihood of success; (c) that, because the challenged instruction is not required when there 
is direct eyewitness identification or a defendant's confession, it should not be required when 
there is DNA evidence for the same reasons; and (d) that, even if the appellate defense counsel's 
performance was deficient, no prejudice resulted because the jury was otherwise properly in-
structed on reasonable doubt.   
 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, believing that the "in-
struction on proof beyond a reasonable doubt . . . nicely covered the issue and rendered harmless 
any potential error" in refusing the tendered instruction.  Hampton v. State, 936 N.E.2d 1274, 
1276–77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).  Although we ultimately reject the defendant's claim of post-
conviction court error, we granted transfer to provide clarification for the bench and bar regard-
ing the "reasonable theory of innocence" instruction because we disagree with the Court of Ap-
peals that the giving of a conventional reasonable doubt instruction renders unnecessary the giv-
ing of the "reasonable theory of innocence" instruction. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
idence only, it must be so conclusive in character and point so surely and unerringly to the guilt 
of the accused as to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence. 
Ind. Pattern Jury Instruction—Criminal 12.01 (emphasis added). 
4 
 
1.  Instructing Juries to Use Caution when Evidence is Circumstantial 
 
A.  Need for a Special Instruction 
 
 
The importance of a "reasonable theory of innocence" instruction is deeply imbedded in 
Indiana jurisprudence.  Nichols v. State, 591 N.E.2d 134, 136 (Ind. 1992) (citing Sumner v. 
State, 5 Blackf. 579 (Ind. 1841)).  Our cases have long recognized the need for such an instruc-
tion where appropriate.  See, e.g., Gambill v. State, 675 N.E.2d 668, 675 (Ind. 1996); Lloyd v. 
State, 669 N.E.2d 980, 985 (Ind. 1996); Stahl v. State, 616 N.E.2d 9, 11–12 (Ind. 1993); Myers 
v. State, 532 N.E.2d 1158, 1159 (Ind. 1989); Cox v. State, 475 N.E.2d 664, 666–68 (Ind. 1985); 
Spears v. State, 272 Ind. 634, 636–40, 401 N.E.2d 331, 334–35 (1980), overruled on other 
grounds by Hicks v. State, 544 N.E.2d 500 (Ind. 1989); McAdams v. State, 226 Ind. 403, 412, 81 
N.E.2d 671, 675 (1948); Gears v. State, 203 Ind. 400, 407–08, 180 N.E. 592, 594–95 (1932); 
Wolfe v. State, 200 Ind. 557, 564–68, 159 N.E. 545, 547–49 (1928); Robinson v. State, 188 Ind. 
467, 470–71, 124 N.E. 489, 490 (1919); Dunn v. State, 166 Ind. 694, 696–97, 78 N.E. 198, 198–
99 (1906); Hampton v. State, 160 Ind. 575, 576–77, 67 N.E. 442, 442 (1903); Wantland v. State, 
145 Ind. 38, 39–40, 43 N.E. 931, 932 (1896).  "[T]his Court has never departed from the convic-
tion that the ['reasonable theory of innocence'] standard is a proper one to be employed at the tri-
al court and a defendant is entitled to an instruction to that effect."  Spears, 272 Ind. at 638, 401 
N.E.2d at 335. 
 
 
We note that a number of more recent American appellate decisions appear to place less 
emphasis on the need for similar instructions.  See Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosen-
berg, "Perhaps What Ye Say Is Based Only on Conjecture"—Circumstantial Evidence, Then and 
Now, 31 Hous. L. Rev. 1371, 1400–01 nn.121–22 (1995) (noting that at least twenty-nine states 
have eliminated a specific jury instruction on circumstantial evidence).2  This trend sprang after 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S. Ct. 
127, 99 L. Ed. 150 (1954), in which the Court rejected a claim of reversible error for the refusal 
"to instruct [the jury] that where the Government's evidence is circumstantial it must be such as 
                                                 
 
2 Our own research, state by state, revealed little change since the Rosenberg & Rosenberg article 
was published. 
5 
 
to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt."  Id. at 139, 75 S. Ct. at 137, 99 
L. Ed. at 166.  Without extensive explanation, the Court concluded that "the better rule is that 
where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt, such an additional 
instruction on circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect."  Id. at 139–40, 75 S. Ct. at 
137, 99 L. Ed. at 166.  We understand Holland to hold that including an additional "reasonable 
theory of innocence" instruction is not required but not that it is constitutionally erroneous.   
[T]he Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor re-
quires them to do so as a matter of course.  Cf. Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 440–41, 7 S. 
Ct. 614, 618–20, 30 L. Ed. 708 (1887).  Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on 
the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, see Jackson 
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320, n.14, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, n.14, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), 
the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising 
the jury of the government's burden of proof.  Cf. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 
485–86, 98 S. Ct. 1930, 1934–35, 56 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1978).  Rather, “taken as a whole, 
the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.”  
Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S. Ct. 127, 137, 99 L. Ed. 150 (1954).   
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1243, 127 L. Ed. 2d 583, 590 (1994) (altera-
tion in original).   
 
 
Subsequent to Holland, opinions from several states began to conclude that a "reasonable 
theory of innocence" instruction incorrectly suggests that circumstantial evidence is inherently 
less reliable.3  See, e.g., State v. Humphreys, 8 P.3d 652, 661–62 (Idaho 2000); People v. Bryant, 
499 N.E.2d 413, 420–21 (Ill. 1986); State v. Wilkins, 523 P.2d 728, 737 (Kan. 1974); State v. 
Lewisohn, 379 A.2d 1192, 1210 (Me. 1977); State v. Smith, 591 P.2d 664, 671–72 (N.M. 1979); 
State v. Jenks, 574 N.E.2d 492, 502 (Ohio 1991), superseded by state constitutional amendment 
on other grounds as recognized in State v. Smith, 684 N.E.2d 668 (Ohio 1997); Easlick v. State, 
90 P.3d 556, 559 n.3 (Okla. 2004); State v. Roddy, 401 A.2d 23, 34–35 (R.I. 1979); State v. 
Gosby, 539 P.2d 680, 684–86 (Wash. 1975).  Still other states reversed course by simply citing 
the Holland decision without any cogent analysis.  See State v. Grippon, 489 S.E.2d 462, 464–67 
(S.C. 1997) (Toal, J., concurring) (quoting Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra, at 1402) ("[T]he 
                                                 
 
3 For a discussion of this inclination see Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra, at 1402 ("Many of the 
states following Holland do so without meaningful discussion of the issues presented, merely citing the 
Supreme Court decision, quoting its conclusory final paragraphs, and pointing to the growing number of 
states that have already eliminated the cautionary charge.  These jurisdictions seem to regard the common 
law rule as no more than an antiquated doctrine waiting to be jettisoned in favor of the enlightened mod-
ern trend."). 
6 
 
widescale abandonment of the special circumstantial evidence charge has resulted mostly from a 
'bandwagon effect' following Holland, rather than from a reasoned rejection of the longstanding 
rule.").   
 
 
In contrast, however, numerous jurisdictions uphold the requirement of a "reasonable 
theory of innocence" instruction.  For example, New York's high court explained: 
[T]he rule [requiring the instruction] draws attention to the fact that proof by circumstan-
tial evidence may require careful reasoning by the trier of facts.  By highlighting this as-
pect, the rule hopefully forecloses a danger legitimately associated with circumstantial 
evidence—that the trier of facts may leap logical gaps in the proof offered and draw un-
warranted conclusions based on probabilities of low degree. 
People v. Ford, 488 N.E.2d 458, 465 (N.Y. 1985) (citation omitted).  Other jurisdictions continue 
to instruct that juries should consider whether circumstantial evidence excludes every reasonable 
hypothesis, explanation, or theory of innocence.  See, e.g., People v. Bacon, 240 P.3d 204, 225–
26 (Cal. 2010); Davis v. State, 674 S.E.2d 879, 880–84 (Ga. 2009); State v. Percy, 822 So. 2d 
823, 828 (La. Ct. App. 2002); People v. DeWitt, 433 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); 
McInnis v. State, 61 So. 3d 872, 875–76 (Miss. 2011); State v. Steele, 211 N.W.2d 855, 867 
(N.D. 1973); State v. Teague, 680 S.W.2d 785, 790 (Tenn. 1984). 
 
 
We believe that discarding the "reasonable theory of innocence" jury instruction is un-
wise.  While a criminal conviction may properly rest entirely upon circumstantial evidence, there 
is a qualitative difference between direct and circumstantial evidence with respect to the degree 
of reliability and certainty they provide as proof of guilt.  Such a supplemental instruction is a 
safeguard urging jurors to carefully examine the inferences they draw from the evidence present-
ed, thereby helping to assure that the jury's reasoning is sound.  Additionally, it serves to 
"reiterat[e] the magnitude of the ['proof beyond a reasonable doubt'] standard to juries when the 
evidence before them is purely circumstantial."  Nichols, 591 N.E.2d at 136.  In this regard, the 
"reasonable theory of innocence" instruction informs the jury that if a reasonable theory of inno-
cence can be made of the circumstantial evidence, then there exists a reasonable doubt, and the 
defendant is entitled to the benefit of that doubt.   
 
 
Such a "reasonable theory of innocence" instruction, when appropriate, is not satisfied by 
the instruction on reasonable doubt.  The State argues that our statement in Nichols—that the 
7 
 
"reasonable theory of innocence" instruction is a way of restating "proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt"—renders the instruction "duplicitous."4  Appellee's Br. at 12.  To the contrary, providing 
the jury with an additional cautionary instruction in evaluating circumstantial evidence not only 
supports but further enhances the concept of requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  It ad-
monishes the jury to tread lightly where the evidentiary gap between logical certainty and guilt is 
more tenuous.  For these reasons, we find it altogether appropriate that juries receive, where ap-
propriate, a "reasonable theory of innocence" instruction in addition to the standard reasonable 
doubt instruction.   
 
B.  Language of the Instruction 
 
 
This special advisement has traditionally been accomplished in Indiana by an instruction 
like the one rejected by the trial court in the present case.  Language within Indiana Pattern Jury 
Instruction 12.01 provides: "Where proof of guilt is by circumstantial evidence only, it must be 
so conclusive in character and point so surely and unerringly to the guilt of the accused as to ex-
clude every reasonable theory of innocence."  Ind. Pattern Jury Instruction—Criminal 12.01 
(emphasis added).  Effective juror comprehension and application, however, are compromised by 
impediments in the instruction's language—especially the uncertainties embedded in the phrases 
"proof of guilt" and "by circumstantial evidence only." 
 
 
First, the instruction's language—that it applies where proof of "guilt" is "circumstantial 
only"—is potentially confusing.  "Proof of guilt" could require that any evidence which supports 
an individual element of the charged offense be circumstantial, or it could require that all the ev-
                                                 
 
4 The State also relies on our opinion in McCurry v. State, 558 N.E.2d 817 (Ind. 1990), in support 
of this position.  Appellee's Br. at 12.  But the precedential value of language in McCurry regarding a 
"covering" instruction is not controlling.  The case was decided on the basis of waiver because the assert-
ed instruction error in McCurry was not properly preserved at trial.  Id. at 819.  Additionally, the language 
is contrary to our holdings in several subsequent cases, including Nichols.  See, e.g., Davenport v. State, 
749 N.E.2d 1144, 1150 (Ind. 2001) (holding that refusal of a tendered instruction on circumstantial evi-
dence was proper because the evidence was not solely circumstantial); Carr v. State, 728 N.E.2d 125 (Ind. 
2000) (same); Gambill, 675 N.E.2d at 675 ("[A] defendant is entitled to an instruction which states that 
when proof of guilt is attempted by circumstantial evidence alone, the circumstances must exclude all 
reasonable hypothesis [sic] of innocence."); Lloyd, 669 N.E.2d at 985 (stating that a defendant is entitled 
to a "reasonable hypothesis" instruction when a case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence); Nichols, 
591 N.E.2d at 136 (stating that the "reasonable hypothesis" instruction is necessary when the evidence 
presented at trial is "solely circumstantial").   
8 
 
idence related to all elements of a charge be circumstantial.  Compare Spears, 272 Ind. at 636–
40, 401 N.E.2d at 334–35 (finding sufficient absence of direct evidence to warrant "reasonable 
theory of innocence" instruction despite direct evidence that the defendant and the victim were 
fighting earlier in the evening and that the victim was later found unconscious in the hallway, 
and that he died from skull fractures likely caused when his head hit the floor), with Davenport v. 
State, 749 N.E.2d 1144, 1149–50 (Ind. 2001) (affirming refusal of "reasonable theory of inno-
cence" instruction where victim died of strangulation and had thirty-nine injuries and witness 
observed defendant beating on the victim several hours earlier).  In most criminal prosecutions, 
there is some direct evidence that the charged crime was committed by someone.  Thus, if the 
phrase "by circumstantial evidence only" is construed to not require jurors to consider whether 
there exist reasonable alternative theories of innocence whenever the occurrence of a criminal 
offense is shown in part by direct evidence, then the instruction would rarely, if ever, be used.  
On the other hand, the mens rea element for a criminal offense is almost inevitably, absent a de-
fendant's confession or admission, a matter of circumstantial proof.  Thus, requiring jurors to 
consider the possible existence of an alternate reasonable theory of innocence whenever proof of 
the mens rea element is circumstantial would lead to use of the instruction in most all criminal 
cases.  See Spears, 272 Ind. at 639–40, 401 N.E.2d at 335 (requiring the "reasonable theory of 
innocence" instruction when circumstantial evidence is the exclusive proof of the actus reus5 but 
not when used to prove the mens rea: "To hold otherwise would require a circumstantial evi-
dence instruction in every case involving a crime containing the element of intent.  Unnecessary 
confusion would result from such a course.").   
 
 
From our review of jurisdictions employing an instruction similar to our "reasonable the-
ory of innocence" instruction, we find no consistent approach to resolving these issues.  Missis-
sippi requires an instruction requiring the "exclusion of all reasonable hypotheses consistent with 
innocence" whenever there is any "direct evidence" such as "an admission or confession by the 
defendant to a significant element of the offense, or eyewitness testimony to the gravamen of the 
offense charged."  McInnis, 61 So. 3d at 876 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Kirkwood v. State, 52 
So. 3d 1184, 1187 (Miss. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In Michigan, juries are in-
                                                 
 
5 The Latin phrase "actus reus" refers to the "wrongful deed that comprises the physical compo-
nents of a crime and that generally must be coupled with the mens rea [the criminal state of mind], to es-
tablish criminal liability."  Black's Law Dictionary 41–42 (9th ed. 2009).   
9 
 
structed that "[i]f the direct and circumstantial evidence, taken together, is open to two reasona-
ble constructions, one indicating guilt and the other innocence, it is your duty to accept the con-
struction indicating innocence.”  DeWitt, 433 N.W.2d at 329 (emphasis added).  But Tennessee 
calls for the instruction only when "the evidence is entirely circumstantial."6  State v. Knight, 
969 S.W.2d 939, 941–42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (emphasis added); see also Teague, 680 
S.W.2d at 790.   
 
 
Notwithstanding the strong support in Indiana case law for the concept of a "reasonable 
theory of innocence" instruction, in actual fact, the refusal of such instruction has rarely been 
found to be error, often based on the presence of evidence liberally deemed to be "direct" rather 
than "circumstantial."  See, e.g., Davenport, 749 N.E.2d at 1149–50 (finding direct evidence 
where son observed his mother being beaten by the defendant, sought to intervene but was struck 
by defendant and went to bed, and the next day the mother was found murdered by strangulation, 
which was not witnessed by the son); Clemens v. State, 610 N.E.2d 236, 243–44 (Ind. 1993) 
(finding direct evidence from the defendant's admission that he was present when the victim sus-
tained his mortal injuries and the pathologist testified that those injuries must have been inflicted 
intentionally); Chapman v. State, 556 N.E.2d 927, 931 (Ind. 1990) (finding direct evidence from 
testimony of bank teller who identified defendant as person standing outside bank before the 
robbery, but who could not see the facial features to identify the hooded robber who perpetrated 
the robbery).  While this Court in Spears, which reversed a murder conviction, evaluated the ne-
cessity of giving a "reasonable theory of innocence" instruction by considering whether there 
was any direct evidence showing the actus reus of a charged crime, rather than just direct evi-
dence of any element of the crime, 272 Ind. at 636–40, 401 N.E.2d at 334–35, this distinction has 
not yet been applied in any of our ensuing cases.  Other than Spears, we find no case from this 
                                                 
6 See Tenn. Pattern Instruction—Criminal 42.03, TnCrimLaw, http://www.tncrimlaw.com/TPI_ 
Crim/42_03.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2012) ("When the evidence is made up entirely of circumstantial 
evidence, then before you would be justified in finding the defendant guilty, you must find that all the 
essential facts are consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, as that is to be compared with all the facts 
proved; the facts must exclude every other reasonable theory or hypothesis except that of guilt; and the 
facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the defendant as to convince the mind beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant is the one who committed the offense."). 
10 
 
Court since 1928 that reversed a conviction due to a trial court's refusal to give a "reasonable 
theory of innocence" instruction.  Landess v. State, 200 Ind. 440, 164 N.E. 267 (1928).7   
 
 
These issues are not clarified by the present pattern instruction, which fails to clearly in-
form jurors whether the requirement of heightened scrutiny of circumstantial evidence applies 
only when there is a complete absence of direct evidence on every element of an offense, or 
when there is an absence of direct evidence with respect to a significant element or crucial com-
ponent of guilt, or when there is an absence of direct evidence proving any single element of the 
charged statutory offense, or otherwise.   
 
 
Second, the instruction unnecessarily calls upon the jury to determine whether evidence 
of guilt is "circumstantial."  Such an evaluation is already the province of the trial judge in decid-
ing whether such instruction is required in light of the nature of the evidence presented.  Distin-
guishing between direct and circumstantial evidence as proof of a particular fact is a legal deter-
mination appropriate for judicial evaluation.  It may require intricate legal analysis.   
 
 
Direct evidence is "[e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and 
that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption."  Black's Law Dictionary 636 (9th 
ed. 2009).  Conversely, circumstantial evidence is "[e]vidence based on inference and not on per-
sonal knowledge or observation."  Id.  Indiana case law has expressed it thusly: "Direct evidence 
means evidence that directly proves a fact, without an inference, and which in itself, if true, con-
clusively establishes that fact.  Circumstantial evidence means evidence that proves a fact from 
which an inference of the existence of another fact may be drawn."  Gambill, 675 N.E.2d at 675.  
And to explain the meaning of "inference," the jury in Gambill was further instructed: "An infer-
ence is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or 
                                                 
 
7 For other cases from this Court rejecting a claim of error for refusal to give a "reasonably theory 
of innocence" instruction, see, e.g., Carr, 728 N.E.2d at 130–31; Lloyd, 669 N.E.2d at 985; Stahl, 616 
N.E.2d at 11–12; Clemens, 610 N.E.2d at 243–44; Page v. State, 518 N.E.2d 1089, 1092–93 (Ind. 1988); 
Goolsby v. State, 517 N.E.2d 54, 62–63 (Ind. 1987); Armour v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1294, 1300 (Ind. 1985); 
Murray v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1283, 1288 (Ind. 1985); Cox, 475 N.E.2d at 666–68; Brendel v. State, 460 
N.E.2d 919, 921–22 (Ind. 1984); Roarks v. State, 448 N.E.2d 1071, 1074–75 (Ind. 1983); Haynes v. 
State, 431 N.E.2d 83, 87–88 (Ind. 1982); Faught v. State, 271 Ind. 153, 161–62, 390 N.E.2d 1011, 1017 
(1979); Hitch v. State, 259 Ind. 1, 11–12, 284 N.E.2d 783, 789 (1972); Turner v. State, 254 Ind. 195, 
198–200, 258 N.E.2d 641, 642–43 (1970); Wolfe, 200 Ind. at 564–68, 159 N.E. at 547–49.  
11 
 
group of facts."  Id.  But every evidentiary assertion at trial is "direct evidence" of something.  
That is, it is a fact offered as true and if accepted by the jury as such, conclusively establishes 
that fact. 
In the grouping of circumstantial evidence, difficulty has arisen from not keeping in mind 
that most circumstantial evidentiary facts must ultimately in turn become themselves a 
proposition and be proved by "direct" evidence and also from confining the latter term to 
assertions of some main fact in issue.  For example, the finding of a bloody knife upon 
the accused after a secret killing is a circumstance from which an important inference 
may be drawn; yet this fact of the finding must be proved by some person's assertion. 
IA John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 25, at 955 (Tillers rev. 1983) (footnote omitted).  Thus, as 
another example, footprints or fingerprints that place an accused at the scene of a crime may be 
direct evidence of the accused's presence at some point in time but only circumstantial proof that 
the accused committed the charged offense.8   
 
                                                 
8 The complexities of distinguishing direct from circumstantial evidence have received consider-
able academic attention.  For example, some authorities distinguish between "direct" and "circumstantial" 
evidence based on the conclusion that the assertion is offered to prove.  "Since the purpose of using evi-
dence is to confirm or deny a proposed conclusion, it is the conclusion to which evidence must be related 
in order to define the types of evidence in functional terms."  Lyman Ray Patterson, The Types of Evi-
dence: An Analysis, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1965).  In simple terms, in a criminal trial that which the State 
seeks to prove (e.g., robbery) is the "proposed conclusion."  For example, if the State seeks to prove that P 
robbed J, then eyewitness testimony, "I saw P rob J," if believed by the jury, can lead only to the conclu-
sion that P robbed J.  See id.  "The evidence is direct evidence because it is the basis of a direct inference 
which coincides with the proposed conclusion, and the inference is the only inference relative to the pro-
posed conclusion that can be properly drawn."  Id.  The following delineation is helpful: "Direct evidence 
is a proposition which is consistent only with either the proposed conclusion or its contradictory; circum-
stantial evidence is consistent with both the proposed conclusion and its contradictory."  Id. at 5–6 (em-
phasis added). 
For example, if the proposed conclusion is that defendant and others robbed the victim, the vic-
tim's voice identification of the defendant as one of the robbers is consistent with only the pro-
posed conclusion and is, therefore, direct evidence.  Similarly, if the proposed conclusion is that 
the defendant and others robbed the victim, the defendant's testimony that he did not rob the vic-
tim is consistent with only the opposite of the proposed conclusion and is, therefore, direct evi-
dence.  On the other hand, testimony that the defendant was seen in the company of the robbers 
an hour before the robbery is consistent with both the conclusion and its opposite, i.e., it is con-
sistent with both the defendant's guilt and his innocence.  Although the testimony is relevant to 
the proposed conclusion, it is only circumstantial evidence of defendant's guilt. 
Stubbs v. State, 463 S.E.2d 686, 688–89 (Ga. 1995) (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted) (citations 
omitted). 
12 
 
C.  Reformulating the Use and Language of the Instruction 
 
 
To preserve our historic recognition that juries in criminal cases should be reminded to 
use particular caution when considering whether to find guilt based solely on crucial circumstan-
tial evidence, we conclude that a special instruction is appropriate, but we reformulate the man-
ner of use and language of the instruction.  First, we find it inappropriate to include language 
burdening the jury with the task of deciding whether to apply the reasonable theory of innocence 
standard.  Whether an instruction is supported by the evidence is a matter for the trial court to 
determine, and it need not be reevaluated by the jury.  Second, because Indiana jurisprudence 
recognizes the importance of such an instruction in certain cases involving circumstantial evi-
dence but our case law reveals a reluctance to find reversible error for failure to give the instruc-
tion if there is substantial direct evidence of guilt, we elect to apply the approach taken in Spears 
and direct that the "reasonable theory of innocence" instruction is appropriate only where the tri-
al court finds that the evidence showing that the conduct of the defendant constituting the com-
mission of a charged offense, the actus reus, is proven exclusively by circumstantial evidence.  
As discussed above, to deny the availability of a "reasonable theory of innocence" instruction 
whenever there is any direct evidence of the fact that a criminal offense has occurred, however, 
could render the instruction unlikely ever to be used, but requiring the instruction whenever there 
is no direct evidence of any single element would compel its use in almost all criminal cases be-
cause mens rea is often shown only by circumstantial evidence.   
 
 
We thus hold that, when the trial court determines that the defendant's conduct required 
for the commission of a charged offense, the actus reus, is established exclusively by circum-
stantial evidence, the jury should be instructed as follows: In determining whether the guilt of the 
accused is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you should require that the proof be so conclusive 
and sure as to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence.   
 
2.  Denial of Post-Conviction Relief 
 
 
In this appeal from the denial of post conviction relief, the defendant asserts that his ap-
pellate attorney rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to include 
13 
 
on direct appeal any challenge to the trial court's refusal to give the defendant's tendered jury in-
struction regarding "reasonable theory of innocence."   
 
 
Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which the defendant must establish 
his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.  Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5); Ben-Yisrayl v. 
State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000).  Post-conviction proceedings do not offer a super-appeal, 
"[r]ather, subsequent collateral challenges to convictions must be based on grounds enumerated 
in the post-conviction rules."  Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Ind. 2002) (citing P.-C.R. 
1(1)); Ben-Yisrayl, 738 N.E.2d at 258.  A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is a 
proper ground for post-conviction proceedings.  Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 746.  Claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of appellate counsel are evaluated using the Strickland standard articulated by the 
Supreme Court.  Id. at 760; Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 676 (Ind. 2004).  "To establish a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate to the post-conviction 
court that counsel performed deficiently and the deficiency resulted in prejudice."  Lee v. State, 
892 N.E.2d 1231, 1233 (Ind. 2008) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. 
Ed. 2d at 693).   
 
 
This standard asks whether, "considering all the circumstances," counsel's actions were 
"reasonable[] under prevailing professional norms."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 
2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694.  "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferen-
tial."  Id. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694; Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 193 
(Ind. 1997).  And even if appellate counsel's performance is deficient, "to prevail, petitioner must 
demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of the direct appeal would have been dif-
ferent."  Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 760 (citing Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 194); see also Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698 ("A reasonable probability is a probabil-
ity sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.").  When evaluating a claimed deficiency 
in appellate representation due to an omission of an issue, a post-conviction court is properly 
deferential to appellate counsel's choice of issues for appeal "unless such a decision was unques-
tionably unreasonable."  Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 194.  Such deference is appropriate because the 
selection of issues for direct appeal "is one of the most important strategic decisions of appellate 
counsel."  Id. (citing Ben-Yisrayl, 738 N.E.2d at 261).  "Appellate counsel's performance, as to 
14 
 
the selection and presentation of issues, will thus be presumed adequate unless found unques-
tionably unreasonable considering the information available in the trial record or otherwise 
known to the appellate counsel."  Ben-Yisrayl, 738 N.E.2d at 261.  In crafting an appeal, counsel 
must choose those issues which appear from the face of the record to be most availing.  "Experi-
enced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out 
weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few 
key issues."  Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751–52, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3313, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987, 
994 (1983).  Thus, to prevail in such claim in post-conviction proceedings, it is not enough to 
show that appellate counsel did not raise some potential issue; instead, the defendant must show 
that the issue was one which a reasonable attorney would have thought availing. 
 
 
"When appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the 
position of one appealing from a negative judgment."  Fisher, 810 N.E.2d at 679.  Thus, the de-
fendant "must convince this Court that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistaka-
bly to a decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court."  Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 
745.  "In other words, the defendant must convince this Court that there is no way within the law 
that the court below could have reached the decision it did."  Id.  We review the post-conviction 
court's factual findings for clear error, but do not defer to its conclusions of law.  Id. at 746 (cit-
ing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)); Fisher, 810 N.E.2d at 679.   
 
 
In denying relief, the post-conviction court found (a) that the trial court considered the 
DNA evidence as direct evidence, thereby precluding the instruction, and (b) that, because Indi-
ana precedent was unclear regarding whether DNA evidence should be considered "direct" or 
"circumstantial" evidence, the appellate defense counsel's choice not to pursue this issue on di-
rect appeal did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.   
 
 
The defendant's appeal asserts that the post-conviction court should have found that his 
appellate counsel was deficient for failing to raise on direct appeal the trial court's rejection of 
the tendered "reasonable theory of innocence" instruction and that the defendant suffered suffi-
cient prejudice from such defective performance.  The post-conviction court's denial of relief was 
essentially predicated on its conclusion (1) that, if the DNA evidence is considered direct rather 
15 
 
than circumstantial evidence (as the trial court found), then the tendered instruction was properly 
refused, and (2) that the characterization of DNA evidence is unclear under Indiana law, thereby 
providing a reasonable strategic basis for the appellate defense counsel to forego the issue on ap-
peal.  Whether the DNA evidence precluded the tendered instruction implicates both the defi-
cient performance prong and the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance analysis.  If the tri-
al court committed no error, then there is no defective performance in failing to claim such error 
on appeal.  Likewise, if there was no error in rejecting the instruction, there would be no result-
ing prejudice from the failure to assert such an appellate claim.  To evaluate the correctness of 
the post-conviction court's denial of relief, we turn to the issue of DNA and its characterization 
as direct or circumstantial evidence.  This Court has never specifically addressed this issue, nor, 
apparently, have our sister states.9   
 
 
In the present case, the evidence the State proffered at trial as "direct evidence" was DNA 
recovered from the crime scene and from the victim.  Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, Appellant's App'x at 75–76; Appellant's Br. at 4–6; Appellee's Br. at 7–8.  The vaginal 
swabs taken from the victim revealed semen that matched the DNA of the defendant.  Trial Tr. at 
524–27; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Appellant's App'x at 75–76.  At the 
post-conviction trial, the State argued that the DNA is direct evidence of "identity," that the de-
fendant was the perpetrator of the three charged offenses—murder, rape, and criminal deviate 
                                                 
9 We find few cases that specifically address whether DNA is direct or circumstantial evidence: 
Thomas v. State, 824 So. 2d 1, 34–35 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (stating that DNA evidence is likely cir-
cumstantial without so holding), overruled on other grounds by Ex Parte Carter, 889 So. 2d 528 (Ala. 
2004); Trower v. State, 867 So. 2d 1043, 1047 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) ("The case law of Mississippi treats 
DNA evidence as a type of circumstantial evidence.").  Trower unequivocally stated that DNA evidence 
is circumstantial, yet three years later the Mississippi Supreme Court said differently: "In addition to di-
rect scientific evidence such as fingerprints and DNA, 'direct evidence has been held to include evidence 
such as eyewitness testimony, the defendant's confession to the offense charged, or the defendant's admis-
sion as to an important element thereof.'"  Garrett v. State, 921 So. 2d 288, 292 (Miss. 2006) (citation 
omitted); see also Bennett v. State, 933 So. 2d 930, 948 (Miss. 2006) (utilizing the exact same language).  
Other courts have proceeded on the assumption that DNA evidence is circumstantial, while admitting that 
"circumstantial evidence is frequently more reliable and stronger than direct proof by eyewitness testimo-
ny."  People v. Rush, 672 N.Y.S.2d 362, 364 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that DNA evidence recov-
ered from rape victim and matched to defendant was sufficient to uphold conviction); see also Haynes v. 
State, 127 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Ark. 2003) (holding that circumstantial evidence, DNA matched to defend-
ant found on ski mask worn during crime, was sufficient to uphold conviction).  Our own cases show a 
similar approach.  See, e.g., Jones v. State, 780 N.E.2d 373, 376 (Ind. 2002) (characterizing evidence 
from trial, including DNA matched to defendant, as circumstantial). 
16 
 
conduct.  Post-Conviction Relief Hr'g Tr. at 16–17.  On appeal, the State also argues that DNA 
could be regarded as direct evidence of rape by proving "that a person had sexual intercourse 
with the victim."  Appellee's Br. at 10.   
 
The defendant contends that DNA evidence must always be circumstantial because it es-
tablishes only a "statistical probability" that the defendant was the donor.  Appellant's Br. at 13.  
This, the defendant argues, requires the jury "to infer that [the defendant] was indeed the donor."  
Id.  We think, however, that the defendant's point goes to the weight and credibility of the evi-
dence, and not to whether DNA evidence is direct or circumstantial.  For example, if an eyewit-
ness testifies to seeing the defendant commit the crime, yet on cross-examination admits that she 
is not "absolutely" positive of her identification of the defendant but is only "ninety-eight per-
cent" positive that it was the defendant she saw, we would not say that her testimony is circum-
stantial evidence.  Eyewitness testimony is considered direct evidence.  See Nichols, 591 N.E.2d 
at 136–37.  No inferential steps are involved, the jury must decide only whether to believe the 
eyewitness and, in so doing, what weight to give to her testimony.  The eyewitness testimony is 
consistent only with the "proposed conclusion" that the defendant committed the crime.  Her 
statement that she is "ninety-eight percent" positive of the identification goes to the credibility of 
her testimony.  Expert testimony of a "high statistical probability" in matching DNA is much the 
same.  That the DNA match may not be absolute goes to the weight and credibility of the evi-
dence.  But whether that expert testimony is direct or circumstantial is determined by the fact or 
facts which the evidence seeks to prove.  The DNA evidence in this case was direct evidence on-
ly of the defendant's presence with the victim at some prior time, but only circumstantial as to 
the defendant's criminal conduct and requisite intent as to each of the charged crimes.10 
 
 
As proof of the defendant's guilt with respect to the offense of rape,11 the DNA evidence 
                                                 
10 See infra note 12. 
 
11 In Indiana, the criminal offense of rape is defined as follows: 
[A] person who knowingly or intentionally has sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite 
sex when: 
(1) the other person is compelled by force or imminent threat of force; 
(2) the other person is unaware that the sexual intercourse is occurring; or 
(3) the other person is so mentally disabled or deficient that consent to sexual intercourse 
cannot be given; 
17 
 
requires the inferential step that intercourse was "compelled by force or imminent threat of 
force," or otherwise without the victim's consent without providing a basis upon which that in-
ference may be made.  See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a).  "Direct evidence is a proposition which is 
consistent only with either the proposed conclusion or its contradictory; circumstantial evidence 
is consistent with both the proposed conclusion and its contradictory."  Lyman Ray Patterson, 
The Types of Evidence: An Analysis, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 5–6 (1965). (emphasis added).  In this 
context, the State asserts that DNA found in the victim and matched to the defendant, if accepted 
by the jury, is consistent only with the State's "proposed conclusion" that the defendant raped the 
victim.  We disagree.  This same evidence is equally consistent with the contradictory proposi-
tion that the defendant and the victim engaged in consensual intercourse.12  To the extent that the 
DNA provided direct evidence of the defendant's presence or relationship with the victim at or 
before the time the crimes were committed, it was not direct evidence of the defendant's physical 
conduct comprising the actus reus of the charged offense of rape.   
 
 
The same analysis applies to the role of the DNA evidence with respect to the crimes of 
murder and criminal deviate conduct in this case.  As to both offenses, the DNA evidence, while 
consistent with a conclusion that the perpetrator of these crimes was the defendant, is simultane-
ously consistent with a conclusion that the defendant was at some point in the presence of the 
victim but did not "kill" her or force her "to perform or submit to deviate sexual conduct."  Ind. 
Code § 35-42-1-1 (murder); Ind. Code § 35-42-4-2 (criminal deviate conduct).   
 
Application of our analysis today leads us to conclude that the DNA evidence in the pre-
sent case should be considered as circumstantial and not direct evidence of the defendant's con-
duct comprising the physical components of each of the charged criminal offenses (actus reus).  
On the other hand, such focus upon actus reus has not been the prevailing basis of prior Indiana 
case law, which had usually found the "reasonable theory of innocence" instruction properly re-
jected when any one element of a criminal offense has been proven by direct evidence.  Under 
                                                                                                                                                             
commits rape, a Class B felony. 
Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a). 
 
12 DNA evidence may not always be circumstantial.  For example, if the victim were legally inca-
pable of consent, such as a "child under fourteen years of age," the same type of DNA evidence offered in 
this case may be direct evidence of the actus reas for statutory rape.  See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3 (child 
molesting).   
18 
 
such line of authority, the rejection of the instruction would not have been error in the present 
case because of the direct evidence in this case proving that the victim was raped, murdered, and 
criminally sexually battered by someone, or the DNA direct evidence identifying the defendant 
as having a prior involvement with the victim.  The existing state of the law could have led the 
defendant's appellate counsel to conclude that there was little if any merit in pursuing on appeal 
the refusal of the "reasonable theory of innocence" instruction.  Due to past variations in applica-
tion of the "proof of guilt" language in the "reasonable theory of innocence" instruction, the law 
on this issue was unfavorable to the defendant at the time of his trial and direct appeal.   
 
 
We cannot conclude that the evidence before the post-conviction court leads unerringly 
and unmistakably to a decision contrary to the court's denial of the defendant's petition for post-
conviction relief.  Given the facts and the unfavorable state of the law, the defendant's appellate 
counsel did not fail to raise a strongly availing appellate issue by failing to challenge the trial 
court's rejection of the "reasonable theory of innocence" instruction, and thus the denial of post-
conviction relief was not erroneous.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 
We affirm the judgment denying the defendant's petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.