Title: Dodds v. Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

371 So. 2d 878 (1979) Leslie Diane DODDS and Cheryl Ann Dodds, by John T. Armstrong, Jr., their guardian ad litem v. DEPOSIT GUARANTY NATIONAL BANK, Executor of Estate of Mrs. Bettye P. Brown Dodds. No. 51257. Supreme Court of Mississippi. June 6, 1979. *879 Armstrong & Hoffman, Edward E. Patten, Jr., Hazlehurst, for appellants. E.R. Arrington, Hazlehurst, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, C.J., and BROOM and BOWLING, JJ. PATTERSON, Chief Justice, for the Court: This is an appeal to determine whether an adopted child may share in a testamentary trust established by a grandmother for the benefit of the children or descendants of her son. The Chancery Court of Copiah County held the adopted child belonged to the class created by the testament and was entitled to participate in the trust dispensations. Edwin Dodds is the only child of William and Bettye P. Dodds who adopted him in 1942. In September 1959 Edwin married Carol Smith, his first wife, and to this union were born Leslie and Cheryl Dodds, now minors. Edwin and Carol Dodds were separated in October 1974 and divorce proceedings were filed by her on January 21, 1975. The day before the divorce was filed Mrs. Bettye P. Dodds, then a widow, executed her will creating the testamentary trust. In pertinent part it provides: Mrs. Dodds died on November 22, 1975. Thereafter her will was filed for probate, and inasmuch as the marital status of her son had changed subsequent to the will's execution, the question of the proper beneficiaries of the trust becomes important. On April 29, 1975, Edwin Dodds was divorced from his first wife by whom he had two children. He married Emma Jane Lambert on February 13, 1976, and later adopted her child by a previous marriage. The adoption decree, in addition to other things, provided: Pursuant to a petition for the approval of an accounting of Mrs. Dodds' estate, which included a prayer for judicial construction of the testamentary trust, the trial court held the adopted child would take under the trust along with the natural daughters of Edwin Dodds by his first wife. The guardian ad litem of the natural daughters appeals from such decision. The guardian contends the trial court erred in its application of the facts to Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-17-13 (1972) because it permits an adopted child to inherit from a collateral relative although the statute limits the inheritance to the adopting parents or the children of such parents. The appellant also argues the court erred in concluding the testatrix intended an adopted child to be included in the trust. We think a determination of whether Jerry Matthew Dodds is a child of Edwin Dodds will largely resolve the present issue. There can be no doubt that the appropriate statutory provisions for adoption were followed. There likewise can be no doubt from the adoption decree that Edwin Dodds intended the child of his present wife to be endowed with every right a natural child of their union would have enjoyed. We embrace the language of Thornton v. Anderson, 207 Ga. 714, 64 S.E.2d 186 (1951), to express our thoughts of the adoption statutes. It was there stated: And, see In Re Schwab Adoption Case, 355 Pa. 534, 50 A.2d 504 (1947), wherein it is stated: In Fairchild Construction Co. v. Owens, 224 So. 2d 571 (Miss. 1969), although the Court was concerned with compensation payments to an adopted child from his natural father, we nevertheless used this significant language in construing the statutes: We conclude, as did the trial court, that Jerry Matthew Dodds is the lawful child of Edwin Brown Dodds just the same as if he had been born to Edwin Dodds and his present wife. If Jerry Matthew Dodds is a child of Edwin Dodds, does Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-17-13 (1972) prohibit his participation in the testamentary trust established by his father's adopting mother? The section provides in part: It is immediately observable from the statute that an adopted child shall inherit from and through his adopting parents and similarly from the other children of the adopting parents. The only limitation of the inheritance is that it be governed by "subsection (a)" above which raises the question of whether the legislature intended to distinguish between the rights of inheritance of an adopted child and a natural child. We are unable to discern any such intention but rather conclude the legislature intended to elevate an adopted child to the same status in law as a natural child for inheritance from the adopting parents and their children. The question remains of whether the trust benefits flow to the adopted child from his adopting father or whether they flow from a collateral relative by adoption, not mentioned in Section 93-17-13(a), that is to say from Mrs. Bettye Brown Dodds who adopted Edwin as her son, who in turn adopted Jerry Matthew Dodds as his son. The trust provision, Article IV, subsection (1), by its plain terms states that the trustee shall hold the described property for the use and benefit of "my son Edwin Brown Dodds," and "shall distribute to my son for the benefit of himself and his children" so much, etc. An analogous situation was presented in In re Carlton's Estate, 348 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1977). The Supreme Court of Florida stated the following: Presently, we can say no more than Jerry Matthew Dodds is a descendant of Edwin Dodds and as such is entitled, in our opinion, to share in the trust as a member of the class created by the trust unless there is language within the will directing otherwise. *882 In considering the language of the will, including the trust, we do so with the realization the testatrix was not unaware of the adoption laws because she and her husband had adopted Edwin. She also unquestionably knew Edwin's age and that he was separated from his wife with the probability of a divorce in the offing. Knowing these things and the likelihood of her son's remarriage and the prospects of other children, the testatrix, rather than limiting the trust benefits to her granddaughters in existence by their names, as she had done in another devise, used the words "his or her" and "per stirpes" in designating the benefits of the trust in the event of the son's death prior to his children reaching thirty-five years of age. The precise language is: We think this clearly indicates the testatrix's intention for Edwin's children to share in the trust whether they were then in existence or not. Neither was the trust limited to the natural children of Edwin as could have been easily done. The overall language of the will permits no construction, in our opinion, other than the testatrix's desire to devise to her son the benefits of the trust to be shared with "his children" as a class without distinction as to whether the children were natural or adopted. We conclude the trial court correctly construed the adoption statute and the testatrix's intention as expressed in her will. AFFIRMED. SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, LEE, BOWLING and COFER, JJ., concur.