Title: Cates v. Eddy

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Cates v. Eddy1983 WY 95669 P.2d 912Case Number: 83-9Case Number: 83-9Decided: 09/16/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming


 
 

Opinions 
      of the Wyoming Supreme 
      Court

EARL C. CATES, SR., 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

BRUCE N. EDDY, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Walter C. 
Urbigkit, Jr. (argued) and Carole Shotwell of Urbigkit & Whitehead, P.C., 
Cheyenne, for appellant.

Dallas J. Laird, 
Casper, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This was a malicious 
prosecution action resulting from the arrest of plaintiff, Bruce Eddy 
(appellee), upon a criminal complaint and warrant issued because of alleged 
conduct of defendant, Earl Cates (appellant). Appeal is from the judgment in 
that action awarding both compensatory and punitive 
damages.

[¶2.]     We affirm the reduced 
judgment if remittitur is accepted; or, if it is not, we remand for a new trial 
on the issue of damages.

[¶3.]     The issues upon appeal, 
as stated by appellant, are:

"A. Did the Trial Court 
err in allowing the jury to return a verdict with excessive 
damages?

"B. Were the damages 
sufficiently proved in the Trial Court?

"C. Were the instructions 
on damages sufficient?

"D. Did the Trial Court 
err in denying a continuance when it was apparent prior counsel had totally 
failed to meet even a modicum of responsibility to prepare for 
trial?

"E. Did the Trial Court 
err on the instructions it gave on the issue of malicious prosecution, damages 
and burden of proof?

"F. Did Appellee as 
Plaintiff below properly plead and prove a cause of action for malicious 
prosecution?"

[¶4.]     The issues are stated 
in six paragraphs. We have combined paragraphs B and C and revised the order in 
which the issues are presented. Thus, the issues for consideration 
are:

1. Should the court have 
granted a continuance?

2. Were instructions 
sufficient as to burden of proof?

3. Were the elements of a 
malicious prosecution action correctly stated; were they 
proven?

4. Were the damages 
sufficiently proven, under proper instructions?

5. Were the damages 
excessive?

FACTS

[¶5.]     Prior to 1979, 
appellant and appellee became partners in the development and subdivision of 
lands and other business ventures. In 1979, they formed JEB Corporation to own 
and operate a farming operation on two parcels of land near Riverton, Wyoming. Appellee, Bruce Eddy, was president 
and manager of JEB. He divided his time between his dental practice in 
Casper, Wyoming and the farm near Riverton, devoting 
three to four days a week to the farming operation. An accountant in Lander was 
employed by JEB to keep the books and records of the corporation. Occasionally 
appellee signed checks in blank which he left with the accountant to be used for 
paying bills.

[¶6.]     The farming operation 
did not fare well. Large numbers of livestock were lost due to weather or for 
other reasons, supplies and equipment were confiscated or turned up missing, the 
corporation was heavily in debt, and during June or July of 1980, appellant took 
over the operation. The JEB checkbook and books and records of the corporation 
were delivered to appellant by the accountant.

[¶7.]     By this time, the 
business relationship between appellant and appellee had deteriorated 
significantly, and they had become involved in serious disputes over their 
affairs.

[¶8.]     There was outstanding a 
bill owed to Farmers Exchange at Riverton for agricultural supplies and 
equipment sold upon open account to JEB Corporation. On August 21, 1980, Farmers 
Exchange sent a statement of this account in the amount of $9,669.83 to 
appellant requesting payment. By letter, dated August 25, 1980, appellant 
advised Farmers Exchange that the statement should be submitted to Dr. Bruce 
Eddy (appellee) or James Willey (also a stockholder in JEB Corporation but not 
involved in this matter).

[¶9.]     On August 30, 1980, 
Farmers Exchange sent a second statement of this account to appellant with a 
service charge added showing a total balance due of $9,814.17. This statement 
was neither sent nor communicated to appellee.

[¶10.]  On September 4, 1980, appellant, by 
letter, advised Farmers Exchange to submit the statement to Bruce N. Eddy, JEB 
Ranch Company, for payment. On the same date, September 4, 1980, a JEB Ranch 
Company typewritten check over appellee's signature as maker in the amount of 
$9,814.17 was mailed to Farmers Exchange. The JEB Ranch Company checking account 
had been closed for some time before September 4, 1980. The check was deposited, 
marked by the bank, "Account Closed" and returned to Farmers 
Exchange.

[¶11.]  Farmers Exchange contacted appellee about 
the check. Appellee stated that he was unaware of it, that he would work it out, 
and requested that they send him a copy. After receiving a copy of the check, 
appellee called Farmers Exchange advising that he thought the signature was his, 
that he did not believe he had sent the check, and that he would try to work 
something out. On October 16, 1980, appellee, by letter to Farmers Exchange, 
advised that he did not make out the check, but wanted to resolve the problems 
of JEB Ranch and requested that prosecution be withheld. Appellee did nothing 
thereafter. On January 9, 1981, a complaint and warrant was issued that resulted 
in appellee's arrest on the same date.

[¶12.]  Appellee was arrested at his home in 
Casper, Wyoming, taken outside, and forced to stand 
spread-eagled over the hood of his car, where, in view of his neighbors, he was 
searched, handcuffed, placed in the police car, and driven to jail. He was 
arrested at 4:38 p.m. and released from jail at 5:20 p.m. the same day upon his 
oral recognizance to appear in court on January 18, 1981. On February 17, 1981, 
the charge was dismissed.

[¶13.]  Appellee was embarrassed, humiliated, 
depressed, concerned over the effect on his children and family of his arrest, 
unable to concentrate in his work, rescheduled appointments with patients, and 
concerned that the conviction of a felony might result in the loss of his dental 
license. He was seen by a psychiatrist and a psychologist who testified to the 
mental suffering and problems caused by his arrest. He incurred attorneys' fees 
in the amount of $5,000, although he testified that only part of that related to 
the arrest and the balance concerned other lawsuits in which he was involved and 
other matters. He claimed special damages of $450 for psychiatric fees, $165 for 
psychological consultation, $200 in investigative fees (he submitted to a lie 
detector test which was a factor in the charges against him being dismissed), 
and $5,000 attorneys' fees.

[¶14.]  Appellee had previously written 
insufficient funds checks on the JEB Ranch Company account, had previously been 
arrested and put in jail for several hours on a 
driving-while-under-the-influence charge, going through about the same book-in 
and release procedure. At the time, appellee was involved in twelve lawsuits, 
six of which he specifically remembered. There was also an ongoing grand jury 
investigation concerning machinery which the FBI had seized from the JEB Ranch 
Company at Riverton. This evidence was introduced by appellant as a factor 
involved in appellee's inability to function in his work and his emotional 
distress.

[¶15.]  After being released from jail, appellee 
telephoned appellant about the check. He testified that appellant told him that 
he had made out and sent the check to Farmers Exchange. Appellee's wife, Sue 
Eddy, testified to another telephone conversation she overheard in which 
appellant stated he would "get Bruce [appellee] arrested." Sue Eddy also 
testified that she was on a telephone extension when appellee called appellant 
after his arrest and that appellant, when asked if he had had appellee arrested, 
answered "yes."

[¶16.]  A business associate of both parties, 
Marvin Klassen, testified that in November 1980 appellant, in a conversation, 
advised him that he had appellee on a bum check charge and was going to put him 
in jail.

[¶17.]  Appellant denied completing the check, 
denied sending it to Farmers Exchange, and denied the telephone conversations 
with appellee. Appellant admitted advising Marvin Klassen in November of 1980 
that appellee was going to jail, but stated that conversation concerned the 
grand jury investigation in federal court over the confiscated equipment from 
the farm in Riverton.

[¶18.]  The jury found that appellant had 
intentionally, willfully, and maliciously, knowing the account was closed, 
obtained a check signed in blank by appellee, and had completed and mailed that 
check to Farmers Exchange for the purpose of procuring the arrest of appellee. A 
verdict was returned awarding appellee $100,000 compensatory 
damages.

[¶19.]  The trial was bifurcated, and the 
question of punitive damages was presented separately to the same jury the 
following day. Appellant's net worth was established as being in excess of 
$1,500,000. The jury returned a verdict awarding exemplary damages to appellee 
in the amount of $200,000. Appeal is from this judgment totaling 
$300,000.

I

            
Should the court have granted a 
continuance?

[¶20.]  This case was commenced by appellee 
filing his complaint on April 1, 1981. About a year later, on April 30, 1982, 
pretrial conference was held and the case then was set for trial by jury on 
October 4, 1982.

[¶21.]  On September 22, 1982, appellant's first 
attorney filed a motion for continuance. On September 29, just five days prior 
to trial, a motion to withdraw was filed, signed by both appellant and his 
attorney, stating that appellant "no longer wishes to retain the said [first 
attorney] * * *." On the same date an order was entered allowing the withdrawal 
noting, "that the defendant [appellant] has insisted on Counsel withdrawing, as 
of September 28, 1982." Appellant, then, on September 30, pro se, filed a motion 
for continuance. Second counsel was retained on the evening of September 30th 
and he filed, on October 1, 1982, yet another motion for continuance. The 
motions for continuance were denied at a hearing conducted immediately prior to 
the commencement of trial.

[¶22.]  The trial court has broad discretion in 
the granting or denying of a motion for continuance; and, absent a manifest 
abuse of discretion, the reviewing court will not disturb such ruling. Craver v. Craver, Wyo., 601 P.2d 999 
(1979); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Perez, 
Wyo., 508 P.2d 595 (1973). To find an abuse of discretion, the refusal must be 
so arbitrary as to deny appellant due process, and the burden rests upon 
appellant to prove actual prejudice and a violation of his rights. Bacon v. Carey Co., Wyo., 669 P.2d 533 
(1983); State v. Spurlock, 161 Mont. 
388, 506 P.2d 842 (1973).

[¶23.]  On review we look at the peculiar 
circumstances of the case and the reasons presented to the trial judge at the 
time of the request. Ungar v. 
Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 84 S. Ct. 841, 11 L. Ed. 2d 921, reh. denied 377 U.S. 925, 84 S. Ct. 1218, 12 L. Ed. 2d 217 (1964).

[¶24.]  This case had been pending for more than 
one and one-half years. Depositions were taken; pretrial had been held. 
Appellant, Cates, by his own admission, was aware of the trial date and his 
attorney's motion for continuance made approximately two weeks before trial. 
Only after Cates joined in the motion and insisted upon his first attorney's 
withdrawal, did the court allow the withdrawal. One day later, Cates employed 
his second attorney. This attorney again moved for a continuance which the court 
denied.

[¶25.]  Withdrawal of an attorney or his 
discharge in a civil case does not give a party an absolute right to a 
continuance. Grunewald v. Missouri 
Pacific Railroad Co., 331 F.2d 983 (8th Cir. 1964). Even though the denial 
of the continuance may have seriously inconvenienced appellant, the situation 
was due to his own making and that is a factor to be 
considered.

[¶26.]  Many jurisdictions weigh the appellant's 
right to counsel against the prompt administration of justice. Annot., 73 
A.L.R.3d 725. The trial court is better able to judge the matter, is more 
conversant with local conditions, status of the docket, and the capacity and 
disposition of counsel. It is more familiar with the background and general 
setting of the situation, which is frequently not embalmed in the formal record. 
Absent a clear abuse of judicial discretion, this court will not interfere. State v. Hathaway, 224 Iowa 478, 276 N.W. 207 (1937); See, Randolph v. 
Hays, Wyo., 665 P.2d 500 (1983). We do not find an abuse of discretion in 
this case.

II

Were instructions 
sufficient as to burden of proof?

[¶27.]  Appellant objected to Instruction No. 41 upon the grounds that it failed to 
inform the jury that appellee had the burden of proving each of the elements 
listed. The objection has merit. Better practice is that the jury be informed in 
a separate-issues instruction of the elements which make up plaintiff's claim, 
the defenses asserted, and the burden of proof as to each of these claims and 
defenses. Instruction No. 4 required that the elements be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence. It was followed by Instruction No. 5 which 
described the burden of proof and defined preponderance of evidence. This 
instruction provided that the party carrying the affirmative of an issue had the 
burden of proof as to that issue. Although the instructions in this case could 
have more clearly set forth the burden of proof of the respective parties as to 
the issues involved, there is no showing that prejudice resulted. Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co., Wyo., 559 P.2d 25 (1977). Considering instructions numbered 4 
and 5 together, and taking the instructions as a whole, the fact that plaintiff 
carried the burden of proof as to the elements described in Instruction No. 4 
was reasonably conveyed to the jury. A party is not prejudiced by a particular 
instruction when the matter complained of is covered in other instructions or by 
taking the instructions as a whole. Berta 
v. Ford, Wyo., 469 P.2d 12 (1970).

III

Were the elements of a 
malicious prosecution action correctly stated; were they 
proven?

[¶28.]  In Consumers Filling Station Co. v. 
Durante, 79 Wyo. 237, 333 P.2d 691 (1958), we set forth the elements 
necessary to an action for malicious prosecution as 
follows:

"(1) The institution or 
continuation of original judicial proceedings, either criminal or 
civil;

"(2) Such proceedings 
having been by or at the instance of the defendant * * *;

"(3) The termination of 
such proceedings in favor of the plaintiff * * *;

"(4) Malice in 
instituting the proceedings;

"(5) Want of probable 
cause; and

"(6) The suffering of 
injury or damage as a result of the action complained of." 333 P.2d  at 
694.

[¶29.]  No issues were raised on appeal 
concerning the existence of the elements specified for malicious prosecution in 
paragraphs three through six above. The jury found in favor of appellee with 
respect to each of these elements; that finding is amply supported by the record 
and not contested in this appeal.

[¶30.]  Thus, left for consideration are the 
provisions of paragraphs one and two which require,

"the institution * * * of 
original judicial proceedings * * * by or 
at the instance of the defendant * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶31.]  Appellant's position is that he did not 
sign the check; he did not sign an affidavit nor a complaint which caused the 
arrest warrant to issue; the proceedings were instituted by the payee of the 
check; and the prosecuting attorney of Fremont county made the decision to 
obtain the issuance of an arrest warrant and to prosecute. The essence of his 
defense is that the criminal proceeding was not instituted by him or at his 
instance, that, at most, he was passive or acquiesced in the proceedings, and 
that, therefore, appellee's action must fail.

[¶32.]  Applying the requirement "at the instance 
of" literally to this case might result in appellee being denied recovery and, 
as hereafter demonstrated, that would be wrong. Construing "at the instance of" 
to include a third person who surreptitiously furnishes information to one who 
then passes the information to the prosecuting attorney would be a strained 
construction, confusing to a jury, and one we are reluctant to 
accept.

[¶33.]  Appellant offered an instruction in the 
language of Consumers Fillings Station 
Co. v. Durante, supra, requiring "[t]he institution * * * of original 
judicial proceedings * * * [b]y, or at the instance of the defendant." The 
instruction was refused. Instead the jury was instructed that the criminal 
proceeding must have been, "initiated, caused or procured" by the defendant. (Emphasis 
added.) Appellant claims this was a departure from our pronouncements in 
Consumers Filling Station Co. v. Durante, supra, and 
error.

[¶34.]  The instruction given goes beyond Consumers Filling Station v. Durante, 
supra, enlarging the areas in which recovery is allowed for malicious 
prosecution. The reasons for the rule must be considered in deciding whether it 
should be adopted. Two competing policies are recognized in considering 
malicious prosecution actions. Both are beneficial and necessary to an orderly 
society.

[¶35.]  On the one hand, it is stated that 
malicious prosecution actions are not favored in the law because of a public 
policy in favor of uncovering and prosecuting crime. Large tort judgments 
against well-meaning individuals, acting honestly and in good faith, might 
seriously inhibit those attempting to perform what they believe a civic duty. A 
policy that discourages citizens from reporting crime or aiding in prosecution 
would be undesirable and detrimental to society in 
general.

[¶36.]  On the other hand, it is generally 
accepted that for every wrong there should be a right. That also is necessary to 
an orderly society, for the alternative is that the party wronged seek his own 
redress. Experience has shown that remedy to be unacceptable. Thus, one who is 
subjected to unjustifiable criminal or civil proceedings because of spite or 
malice, which result in damage and injury, should recover compensation for that 
loss.

[¶37.]  The competing policy considerations are 
nicely balanced; and requiring malice and lack of probable cause as necessary 
elements to an action for malicious prosecution affords adequate protection to 
the first policy and restriction upon the second. Allowing a malicious 
prosecution action where the proceeding was "initiated, caused or procured" by 
the defendant is fair. It will not be destructive of either of the stated 
policies.

[¶38.]  Appellant focuses upon the word 
"procure." He asserts that the court's instruction on causation, which states 
that one "initiating, causing or procuring the arrest or prosecution of 
criminal proceedings against another" is in error as to the causation 
requirement because of the presence of the word "procuring." While the specific 
articulation "procuring," "procured," "procurement," has not often appeared in 
Wyoming formulations of the tort to date,2 it is in common usage in defining 
the causation element of malicious prosecution, and adds no new element to the 
tort. It was used by this court in McIntosh v. Wales, 21 Wyo. 397, 134 P. 274 (1913), when the court stated,

"* * * [t]his court has 
repeatedly held that it could not protect a complainant * * * after procuring a warrant to issue on his 
complaint * * *." (Emphasis added.) 134 P.  at 276.

[¶39.]  Procuring is a common word, easily 
applied and understood. In fact, the presence of an additional articulation of 
the causation element may assist the fact finder in getting a better grip on 
this concept within the total cause of action. But quibbling over the presence 
or absence of "procuring" in the definition of the causation element of the tort 
ought not confuse the real debate here, viz, was causation present so as to 
render appellant liable.

[¶40.]  Appellant here contends that he signed no 
affidavit, had no contact with the prosecuting attorney nor the complaining 
witness, that four months expired between the issuance of the check and the 
arrest warrant, and that it was the prosecuting attorney who made the decision 
to issue the warrant; that whatever he did, it was not a proximate cause of appellee's harm. 
Although the question is not unique, the cases which have considered it upon 
similar facts are few.

[¶41.]  In Hryciuk v. Robinson, 213 Or. 542, 326 P.2d 424 (1958), defendant gave plaintiff permission to remove rock from his 
son's property. Thereafter a dispute arose between defendant and plaintiff and 
defendant said, I will "fix you." The son discovered the rock missing. Defendant 
advised his son that plaintiff had taken the rock. The son advised the police of 
this, and plaintiff was arrested. Plaintiff then filed an action for malicious 
prosecution.

[¶42.]  The Oregon Supreme Court 
stated,

"The test of liability in 
an action for malicious prosecution is: was defendant actively instrumental in 
putting the law in force? To sustain the action, it must affirmatively appear as 
part of the case of the party demanding damages that the party sought to be 
charged was the proximate and efficient 
cause of maliciously putting the law in motion. * * *" (Emphasis added.) 
Meyer v. Nedry, 159 Or. 62, 78 P.2d 339, 341 (1938).

 

[¶43.]  Motley v. Dugan, Mo. App., 191 S.W.2d 979 (1945), was a case in which a twelve-year-old girl took money; gave it to a 
twelve-year-old boy; who gave it to Streible, his father, who was arrested at 
Medley's home. Plaintiff, the arresting officer, later went back and obtained 
the money as evidence in the case. Defendants, two deputies, induced Medley to 
make an affidavit charging plaintiff with extortion. Plaintiff was arrested and 
thereafter instituted an action for malicious prosecution. The court 
stated,

"* * * appellants contend 
that there was no evidence that appellants were the procuring cause of the 
prosecution.

"We cannot agree with 
this contention. There was ample evidence to show that appellants were the procuring cause of the arrest * * *." 
(Emphasis added.) 191 S.W.2d  at 982.

The court 
further noted that, "[i]t is sufficient to show that he was the proximate and 
efficient cause of maliciously putting the law in motion."

[¶44.]  In White v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy 
Railroad, 417 F.2d 941 (8th Cir. 1969), a railroad investigator gave false 
information to the prosecuting attorney concerning an incident involving a 
railroad employee and a third person. The prosecuting attorney issued a warrant 
which resulted in the arrest of the railroad employee and an action for 
malicious prosecution against the railroad ensued.

[¶45.]  The court, after stating the general rule 
that a person who supplies information to prosecuting authorities is not liable 
as long as the ensuing prosecution is left to the official's discretion, noted 
that the rule was not without limitations, and stated,

"* * * Where the 
informant knowingly gives false or misleading information or in any wise directs 
or counsels officials in such a way so as to actively persuade and induce the 
officer's decision, then the informant may still be held liable. * * *" 417 F.2d  
at 943.

[¶46.]  Then quoting from an Iowa case, the court 
said:

"[I]t is apparent that 
the defendant set the machinery of the law in motion; at least, the jury was 
authorized to so find. It need not be shown that the defendant ordered or 
directed the warrant or process to issue, or that he participated in its 
execution. If he, on his own motion, gave information or made complaint to the 
officers of the law in such a manner as that, in the regular and ordinary course 
of events, an arrest must be made, or will probably follow, this is sufficient 
to warrant the jury in finding him the real prosecutor. * * 
*"

[¶47.]  In this case appellant contends that the 
acts were too remote in time (four months) and distant (no connection with 
prosecuting authorities) to be a proximate cause of appellee's arrest and 
damage. Proximate causation has universally been conceded to be, not a matter of 
metaphysical precision, but rather of policy and fairness.3 Considering the nature of 
appellant's acts and the virulent malice motivating them as revealed at the 
trial below4 this court has no difficulty in 
finding the scales balancing toward a finding of causation. Appellant set the 
law in motion by corruptly, deceitfully, and dishonestly manufacturing evidence 
of a crime, delivering that evidence to another, knowing that it might be given 
to law enforcement authorities and result in appellee's arrest. These acts were 
not passive, mere acquiescence, nor did they result from negligence. The acts 
were intentional, deliberate and malicious. The jury, under the court's 
instructions, which we approve, found them to be the cause of appellee's arrest. 
There was ample evidence to support that finding.

IV

Were the damages 
sufficiently proven, under proper instructions?

[¶48.]  Appellant contends that Instruction No. 
11 is insufficient in two respects: First, that it did not require a causal 
connection between the plaintiff's actual injury and the award of damages; and 
second, that it failed to instruct the jury that defendant's net worth should 
not be considered in its award of damages.

[¶49.]  Jury Instruction No. 10 provides 
that,

"* * * a Plaintiff who 
has suffered harm as a proximate result of a malicious pro-section [sic] by a 
Defendant is entitled to recover damages for such harm * * 
*."

[¶50.]  Jury Instruction No. 11 states in 
part,

"* * * You should allow 
him such amount of money as will reasonably compensate him for the damage 
resulting from the wrongful conduct of the defendant. * * 
*"

These 
instructions, taken together, plainly state that the damage awarded must "result 
from," or be "proximately" caused by the injury. The damage instructions given 
by the court were sufficient and did not contain prejudicial 
error.

[¶51.]  With respect to appellant's second 
contention, no evidence of defendant's financial status was received until after 
the jury had returned a verdict finding for the plaintiff and awarding 
compensatory damages. Thus, it was unnecessary to instruct concerning 
defendant's net worth during the first phase of the trial.

[¶52.]  Appellant also claims that Instruction 
No. 1(A) was insufficient. However, appellant did not object to the giving of 
this instruction nor offer a different instruction. Therefore, appellant has 
waived his right to object on appeal. Rule 51, W.R.C.P. 
provides,

"* * * No party may 
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he 
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. * * 
*"

See also, Sanders v. Pitner, Wyo., 508 P.2d 602 
(1973); Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. 
Robles, Wyo., 511 P.2d 963 (1973).

V

Were the damages awarded 
excessive?

[¶53.]  The jury returned its verdict in the 
liability phase of the trial awarding appellee $100,000 compensatory damages. 
The jury then was instructed by the court upon punitive damages, retired again 
to deliberate, and returned a punitive damage award in the amount of 
$200,000.

[¶54.]  Because of our deep and abiding faith in 
the jury system and knowledge that juries, even in the most complicated cases, 
generally achieve good results, we have an extreme reluctance to modify jury 
verdicts. Yet we are aware that no system is perfect and on occasion a jury will 
reach what is obviously an incorrect result in the eyes of all reasonable 
persons. Thus, the jury is not free to award any sum it might choose, however 
large or small, whether from anger, sorrow, prejudice, mistake, or other 
improper cause. Although considerable latitude is afforded the jury in arriving 
at its verdict in these kinds of actions, yet that verdict must fall within a 
range, however large, that is acceptable.5

[¶55.]  There is no precise formula for 
determining what damages ought to be awarded in a malicious prosecution action. 
We can look to other decided cases for guidance, but that is not determinative 
of the question, for each case presents its own peculiar facts and circumstances 
which must be evaluated. When the verdict of the jury, at first blush, appears 
outrageous, grossly excessive, or to be the result of passion, prejudice, 
mistake, or improper motive, so as to be obviously disproportionate to the 
injury shown, then it is the duty of the court to modify the verdict. Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 33 Wyo. 92, 237 P. 255 (1925); 52 Am.Jur.2d 251; Rule 59, W.R.C.P.

COMPENSATORY 
DAMAGES

[¶56.]  Compensatory damages in a malicious 
prosecution action consist of special and general damages and are awarded for 
the personal loss and injury of the malicious prosecution plaintiff. Special 
damages include expenses actually incurred for attorneys' fees, bonds, court 
expenses, loss of business or income, and for medical care and treatment if 
appropriate. In this case, appellant agreed in its brief and argument that 
appellee's special damages were in the amount of $5,815. This not being an issue 
in the case, we need not consider the matter further and accept that amount as 
correct.

[¶57.]  General damages are those awarded for 
mental and physical suffering, humiliation, embarrassment, shame, public 
disgrace, and harm to reputation and social standing. Town of Jackson v. Shaw, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1246 (1977).

[¶58.]  Considering the humiliation and 
embarrassment to respondent of being arrested at his residence, observed by his 
neighbors spread-eagled against his car and searched, taken by police to the 
station where he was photographed and booked in, having felony charges pending 
against him for approximately one and one-half months, and the mental and 
emotional anguish that he suffered because of the effect upon his children and 
family and upon himself and his profession, the award of compensatory damages in 
the amount of $100,000 is not excessive.

PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES

[¶59.]  Punitive damages are awarded not as 
compensation for injury and loss suffered by the plaintiff, but rather as 
punishment of the defendant and deterrence of future similar conduct by others. 
Ordinarily punishment is meted out by the courts with fines being paid to the 
public treasury. In malicious prosecution actions, the plaintiff benefits from 
the award and it is sometimes called "smart money." In Town of Jackson v. Shaw, supra, we 
stated that although punitive damages are not a favorite of the law and are to 
be allowed only with caution within narrow limits, that

"This court has 
traditionally accepted the doctrine of punitive damages but always with some 
reservation of the right to examine them closely and reduce them by accepted 
methods, if necessary. * * *" 569 P.2d  at 1252.

[¶60.]  Factors to be considered in arriving at 
the punitive damage award are:

(a) the financial 
condition or wealth of the defendant;

(b) the activity of the 
defendant causing the harm; and

(c) the nature and extent 
of the injury suffered.

As we said in Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, supra, 
financial wealth is not the sole criteria and it alone will not support a large 
award of damages where the injury does not support that 
award.

[¶61.]  In this case the "Account Closed" check 
had been outstanding for four months. Appellee was aware of the check and had 
suggested to the payee that he would "try to work something out." He was 
released forty-two minutes after he was arrested upon his oral recognizance. One 
and one-half months later the charges were dismissed without his ever appearing 
in court. On a previous occasion he had been through the same arrest, book-in 
and release procedure.

[¶62.]  The activities of appellant are such as 
to justify an award of punitive damages. The testimony of the parties was in 
total conflict concerning the issuance of the check, the telephone conversations 
between them, and the claimed admissions of culpability. The jury was in a 
position of having to accept the testimony of one party and reject the testimony 
of the other. In this circumstance they might act out of passion or emotion, 
rather than, as stated in a Allard v. 
Church of Scientology of California, 58 Cal. App. 3d 439, 129 Cal. Rptr. 797 
(1976), arriving at

"* * * a dispassionate 
determination of an amount necessary to assess defendant in order to deter * * * 
similar conduct in the future. * * *" 129 Cal. Rptr.  at 
805.

In that case the 
court reduced a punitive damage award from $250,000 to $50,000 
stating,

"* * * the decisional 
authority seems to indicate that the reviewing court should examine punitive 
damages and where necessary modify the amount in order to do justice. * * *" 129 Cal. Rptr.  at 805-806.

[¶63.]  Ordinarily a jury is involved with just 
one case. It cannot know what other jurors have done in similar cases or the 
range of verdicts in those cases. The court, on the other hand, sees many cases 
and, from those and its expertise, has a sense of where the verdict should fall. 
Examination of compilations of verdicts in cases similar to this case reveals 
not a single case in which the verdict was as large as this verdict.6 While this is not determinative of 
what the verdict should be, it is something we must consider. If the verdict is 
so large or small that it shocks the judicial conscience, the court has not only 
the right, but the duty, to grant remittitur or additur accordingly.7

[¶64.]  We hold, therefore, that the punitive 
damage award in this case is excessive by $100,000. Appellee may elect to accept 
a judgment of $200,000 by filing a remittitur of $100,000 with the clerk of the 
district court within fifteen days after the filing of the mandate of this 
court, or upon failure to file such remittitur, the judgment is reversed and the 
cause remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages.

[¶65.]  We feel that the issue of whether or not 
the trial was conducted according to the procedures set out in Campen v. Stone, Wyo., 635 P.2d 1121 
(1981), needs to be discussed, not only because of the possibility that appellee 
might choose a new trial rather than remittitur but also because of the 
likelihood that this problem will occur again. Ordinarily the supreme court 
refrains from addressing issues not raised by the parties, however, in this 
situation, we feel a need to clarify the rules set out in Campen. We do not feel 
this issue is dispositive because it was not objected to at trial, it was not 
raised on appeal, nor was it argued before the court.

[¶66.]  Campen, supra at 1132, sets out the 
procedure for a bifurcated trial when punitive damages are at 
issue.

"1. The plaintiff may 
claim in his complaint a right to punitive damages and then seek pretrial 
discovery of a defendant's wealth.

"2. Defendant may move 
for a protective order requiring the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing to 
the trial court that a viable issue exists for punitive damages. Upon such a 
showing, the pretrial discovery would be allowed.

"3. At trial, if evidence 
is produced making a prima facie case of punitive damages, the verdict form will 
make provision for compensatory damages and further ask the jury whether punitive 
damages should or should not be awarded. However, no provision would be made 
for the jury to determine the amount of punitive damages to be awarded at that 
point.

"4. If the jury finds 
that punitive damages should be awarded, it then hears evidence of the 
defendant's financial status and returns a separate verdict setting the award of 
punitive damages." (Emphasis added.)

The first 
verdict form should ask the jury whether punitive damages should or should not 
be awarded. If the jury decides that they should, then a second trial presents 
evidence of a defendant's financial worth.

[¶67.]  In the present situation, the first 
verdict form made no provision for a finding of punitive damages. In future 
proceedings the verdict form should indicate this provision. This would 
alleviate any possibility that the jury would include a monetary amount for 
punishment within the compensatory damage award.

[¶68.]  For the reasons stated above, in the 
event appellee refuses to accept the remittitur, the new trial shall be upon the 
issue of damages only, both compensatory and punitive. If the remittitur is 
accepted by appellee, the judgment, as reduced, is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Instruction No. 4 
provided:

"YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that 
in order to return a verdict for damages in an action for malicious prosecution, 
each of the following elements must be established by a preponderance of the 
evidence:

"(1) That the Defendant 
initiated, caused or procured the arrest or prosecution of the 
Plaintiff;

"(2) That the criminal 
proceeding against the Plaintiff terminated in his favor;

"(3) That the Defendant 
acted without probable cause in initiating or procuring the arrest or 
prosecution of the Plaintiff;

"(4) That the Defendant 
acted with malice; and

"(5) That the Plaintiff 
suffered injury or damage."

2 See, e.g., Penton v. Canning, 57 Wyo. 390, 118 P.2d 1002 (1941); Henning v. Miller, 44 Wyo. 114, 14 P.2d 437 (1932); McIntosh v. Wales, 21 Wyo. 397, 134 P. 274 (1913); Boyer v. Bugher, 19 Wyo. 463, 120 P. 171 
(1912).

3 Cf. Prosser, Law of 
Torts (4th ed. 1971), p. 237:

"This limitation [on 
defendant's legal liability] is sometimes, although rather infrequently, one of 
the fact of causation. More often it is purely one of policy, of our more or 
less inadequately expressed ideas of what justice demands, or of administrative 
possibility and convenience, none of which have any connection with questions of 
causation at all. * * *"

4 Witnesses testified that 
appellant stated he had a check he would use to put appellee in jail and that 
his partner would have to bring him cigarettes in jail.

5 35 A.L.R.2d 
308.

6 66 A.L.R.3d 
10.

7 Rule 59, W.R.C.P., 
provides, "* * * a new trial may be granted for * * * Error in the assessment of 
the amount of recovery, whether too large or too small."

ROSE, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, with whom BROWN, Justice, 
joins.

[¶69.]  I concur in the majority opinion except 
for the punitive-damage remittitur of $100,000. I think that jury damage 
verdicts should be permitted to stand. We do not add money to low verdicts and 
we should not reduce high verdicts. See my reasoning on this subject in my 
dissenting opinion in Town of Jackson v. 
Shaw, Wyo., 
569 P.2d 1246, 1258-1259 (1977).