Title: Faulk v. CVS Caremark Corp.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11650 
 
CAROLYN O. FAULK & another1  vs.  CVS CAREMARK CORPORATION  
& others.2 
 
 
 
October 24, 2014. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
 
The petitioners, Carolyn O. Faulk and Stanley D. Howard, 
appeal from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying 
their petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  We affirm. 
 
 
 The petitioners commenced an action in the Superior Court 
against Faulk's former employer, respondent CVS Caremark 
Corporation, and two of her former supervisors, respondents 
Danny Ramoutarsingh and David Seetaram.  The complaint alleged  
that the respondents wrongfully terminated Faulk's employment, 
and included claims of, among other things, age and gender 
discrimination in violation of G. L. c. 151B.  The complaint 
also stated that Howard had provided financial support to Faulk 
after CVS Caremark terminated her employment, and that he seeks 
damages (essentially, reimbursement) from CVS Caremark on that 
basis.  In their G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition the petitioners 
complained primarily about two events that occurred in the trial 
court:  the denial of Faulk's request for the appointment of 
counsel and the respondents' successful motion to dismiss 
Howard's claims on the basis that he lacks standing. 
 
                                                 
1 Stanley D. Howard. 
 
2 Danny Ramoutarsingh and David Seetaram. 
2 
 
 
After a separate and final judgment entered against Howard, 
he filed a notice of appeal in the trial court, on January 21, 
2014.  On the same date, the petitioners also filed, in the 
Appeals Court, a motion to stay the trial court proceedings.  On 
January 27, 2014, while the motion to stay was pending, the 
respondents filed a motion for sanctions in the trial court.  
Then, after a single justice of the Appeals Court denied the 
motion to stay, the petitioners filed their G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
petition on February 7, 2014.  In addition to seeking relief 
from the denial of Faulk's request for counsel and the dismissal 
of Howard's claims, the petitioners also sought a stay of the 
then-scheduled hearing on sanctions.  A single justice of this 
court denied the petition on February 12, 2014.  On that same 
date, the trial court allowed the respondents' motion for 
sanctions and dismissed the petitioners' underlying complaint 
without prejudice. 
 
 
Because the petitioners' complaint has been dismissed, 
their claim regarding the denial of Faulk's motion for the 
appointment of counsel, as well as their efforts to stay the 
trial court proceedings, are moot.  See Rasten v. Northeastern 
Univ., 432 Mass. 1003 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1168 
(2001).  Even if these issues were not moot we would not disturb 
the single justice's ruling.  Relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is 
properly denied where, as here, "there are other routes by which 
the petitioning party may adequately seek relief."  Sabree v. 
Commonwealth, 432 Mass. 1003, 1003 (2000).  The petitioners bear 
the burden to allege and demonstrate the absence or inadequacy 
of other remedies.  See, e.g., Russell v. Nichols, 434 Mass. 
1015, 1016 (2001).  They have not, and cannot, meet this burden.  
Faulk could have sought interlocutory review of the denial of 
her motion for the appointment of counsel in the Appeals Court, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par.  See Greco v. 
Plymouth Sav. Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019-1020 (1996) ("Review 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3, does not lie where review under c. 231, 
§ 118, would suffice").  In addition, she could have sought 
review of the denial of her motion in a direct appeal from the 
judgment of dismissal.  As to the dismissal of Howard's claims, 
he too had an adequate alternative remedy, one which he in fact 
pursued:  a direct appeal in the Appeals Court.3 
 
 
The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in 
denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
 
                                                 
3 The Appeals Court has since dismissed Howard's appeal for 
failure to prosecute. 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law.