Title: Gund v. County of Trinity

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
JAMES GUND et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
COUNTY OF TRINITY et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S249792 
 
Third Appellate District 
C076828 
 
Trinity County Superior Court 
11CV080 
 
 
August 27, 2020 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, and 
Kruger concurred. 
 
Justice Groban filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice 
Chin concurred. 
 
 
 
1 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
S249792 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
We entrust to police officers the enormous responsibility 
of ensuring public safety with integrity and appropriate 
restraint, a mission they sometimes pursue by requesting help 
from the very public they’re sworn to protect.  When members 
of the public engage in “active law enforcement service” at a 
peace officer’s request, California law treats those members of 
the public as employees eligible for workers’ compensation 
benefits.  (Lab. Code, § 3366, subd. (a).)1  While this allows such 
individuals to receive compensation for their injuries without 
regard to fault, it comes with a catch:  Workers’ compensation 
then becomes an individual’s exclusive remedy for those injuries 
under state law.  (§ 3602, subd. (a); Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 
52 Cal.3d 1, 16 (Shoemaker).)  That can make a difference for 
some members of the public who answer a peace officer’s call to 
help 
with 
“active 
law enforcement,” 
because 
workers’ 
compensation benefits are narrower in scope than the menu of 
damages available in tort claims.  Whether compensation for a 
member of the public injured in the course of responding to a 
request for assistance from law enforcement is limited to 
workers’ compensation, or whether civil damages are available, 
depends on the question at the heart of this case:  What does it 
                                                 
1  
All statutory references are to the Labor Code unless 
otherwise noted. 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
 
mean for an individual to engage in “active law enforcement 
service”?     
Norma and James Gund received a call from Trinity 
County Sheriff’s Corporal Ronald Whitman, who asked them to 
assist law enforcement by checking on a neighbor who had called 
911 requesting help.  When the Gunds did so, they walked into 
an active murder scene and suffered a violent attack.  What we 
must resolve is whether Mr. and Mrs. Gund engaged in active 
law enforcement service and are limited to workers’ 
compensation benefits for their injuries based on Corporal 
Whitman’s 
request 
for 
assistance, 
which 
they 
allege 
misrepresented the potential danger.   
We conclude the Gunds were indeed engaged in “active 
law enforcement service.”  When the Gunds provided the 
requested assistance, they delivered an active response to the 
911 call of a local resident pleading for help.  A response of this 
kind unquestionably falls within the scope of a police officer’s 
law enforcement duties.  Whether or not any alleged omissions 
in Corporal Whitman’s request could conceivably prove relevant 
to legal actions alleging malfeasance, they do not change our 
conclusion about the scope of workers’ compensation in this 
tragic case.  We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.    
I. 
On the afternoon of March 13, 2011, the California 
Highway Patrol (CHP) received a phone call from Kristine, a 
female caller.2  Kristine whispered, “Help me,” and said she 
                                                 
2  
Because we are reviewing a motion for summary 
judgment, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
 
 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
 
lived at end of the Kettenpom airstrip.  Kettenpom is situated 
in the southwest corner of Trinity County, a mountainous 
expanse of 3,200 square miles.  (Trinity County, About Trinity 
County  [as of Aug. 24, 
2020].)3  The County is inhabited by fewer than 15,000 people. 
(U.S. Census Bureau, Population of Trinity County, California: 
Census 2010 and 2000 Interactive Map, Demographics, 
Statistics, 
Graphs, 
Quick 
Facts 
 [as 
of Aug. 24, 2020].)  The CHP dispatcher relayed the content of 
Kristine’s call to the Trinity County Sheriff’s Department.  The 
Sheriff’s Department is in Weaverville, almost 100 miles away 
from Kettenpom.  (Trinity County, California, Sheriff 
Department 
 [as of Aug. 24, 2020].)  The CHP dispatcher 
explained she was hesitant to call Kristine back in case she was 
trying to avoid being overheard.  Twice, a Trinity County 
dispatcher nonetheless attempted to contact Kristine, but the 
calls went straight to voicemail.  The county dispatcher relayed 
this information to Trinity County Sheriff’s Corporal Ronald 
Whitman. 
Corporal Whitman knew the Gunds lived in the vicinity of 
the Kettenpom airstrip.  En route to Kristine’s home but still 
some distance away, he called Norma Gund and explained that 
                                                 
plaintiffs as the losing parties, resolving evidentiary doubts and 
ambiguities in their favor.”  Elk v. Hills Power, LLC v. Bd. of 
Equalization (2013) 57 Cal.4th 593, 606.)    
3  
All Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, 
docket number and case name at .  
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
 
her neighbor, Kristine, had called 911.  He asked Mrs. Gund if 
she would go check on Kristine, as they were much closer to 
Kristine’s home and he was still hours away.  After Mrs. Gund 
agreed, Corporal Whitman asked if Mr. Gund was home, and 
Mrs. Gund said no.  He instructed Mrs. Gund not to go to 
Kristine’s home by herself.  Mrs. Gund asked what Kristine said 
on the call, and Corporal Whitman responded that she said, 
“Help me.”  Mrs. Gund then inquired:  “Are you sure?  Is that all 
she said?”  Corporal Whitman responded, “She said two words, 
‘Help me.’ ”  Mrs. Gund told Corporal Whitman that Mr. Gund 
had just arrived home, and Corporal Whitman said, “Good.”  
Corporal Whitman did not tell Mrs. Gund that Kristine had 
whispered on the phone, that the CHP dispatcher believed she 
had been trying to call secretly, or that the county dispatcher’s 
return calls to Kristine went straight to voicemail.   
Mrs. Gund confirmed for Corporal Whitman that she’d 
been to Kristine’s property before, to help the previous owner 
with snow and fallen trees.  Corporal Whitman mentioned the 
impending arrival of a major storm, which “must be what this is 
all about.”  “It’s probably no big deal,” he continued.  Corporal 
Whitman then asked if Mrs. Gund had ever met Kristine’s 
boyfriend and if he seemed violent.  Mrs. Gund confirmed that 
she had met Kristine’s boyfriend.  In response to whether he 
ever seemed violent, Mrs. Gund indicated she “didn’t know.  He 
seemed real mellow.”  Corporal Whitman gave Mrs. Gund his 
cell phone number and instructed her to call him as soon as she 
and her husband had checked on Kristine.  Believing the 
emergency to be weather related, the Gunds drove to Kristine’s 
home.  They speculated that maybe a tree had fallen or that 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
 
Kristine, a young city girl, was having trouble with her wood 
burning stove. 
After arriving at Kristine’s home, Mrs. Gund went in first, 
while Mr. Gund stayed in the truck.  Immediately after entering 
Kristine’s home, Mrs. Gund was attacked by the man who had 
just murdered Kristine and her boyfriend.  Mr. Gund, hearing 
some of the commotion, entered the home and saw the man 
holding down his wife and cutting her throat with a knife.  The 
man then attacked Mr. Gund, as well — tasing him, punching 
him, and cutting his throat.  During the attack, Mr. Gund saw 
on the floor a motionless body with a bag over the head.  Mrs. 
Gund escaped to the truck and drove to a nearby store for help.  
Mr. Gund managed to disarm the attacker and flee on foot to his 
home.  He got another vehicle and reunited with Mrs. Gund at 
the store. 
The Gunds filed this action against Trinity County (the 
County) and Corporal Whitman.  The First Amended Complaint 
alleges causes of action for:  liability for the act or omission of a 
public employee; vicarious liability for the act or omission of a 
public employee; misrepresentation by a public employee, with 
actual malice; and vicarious liability for misrepresentation by a 
public employee, with actual malice.  The Gunds contend 
Corporal Whitman sought to secure their assistance by falsely 
assuring them that Kristine’s call was probably weather related 
and knowingly withholding the following facts:  Kristine 
whispered, the CHP dispatcher thought Kristine was calling 
secretly, and the county dispatcher’s return calls went straight 
to voicemail. 
The County and Corporal Whitman moved for summary 
judgment.  Workers’ compensation, they argued, was the Gunds’ 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
 
exclusive remedy because they sustained their injuries while 
engaged in active law enforcement service under section 3366.4  
The Gunds argued that section 3366 did not apply because, 
given Corporal Whitman’s alleged misrepresentations, they did 
not understand themselves to be engaged in “active law 
enforcement service” when they complied with his request, nor 
would a reasonable person have understood this to qualify under 
that standard. 
The trial court granted the summary judgment motion.  
Despite the Gunds’ contention that they relied on Corporal 
Whitman’s alleged misrepresentations, the trial court found 
that section 3366 applied because a response to a 911 call under 
the circumstances in this case amounts to assisting a peace 
officer in active law enforcement.  The Gunds appealed.  
Although the Court of Appeal agreed that the Gunds provided 
active law enforcement service at Corporal Whitman’s request, 
it noted the trial court’s failure to acknowledge factual 
contentions that Corporal Whitman misled them about the 
nature of the requested activity.  The Court of Appeal ultimately 
found the misrepresentations did not change the outcome in the 
trial court.  The appellate court reasoned that because Corporal 
Whitman’s direct response to Kristine’s 911 call would have 
been considered active law enforcement, so too should the 
                                                 
4 
The County and Corporal Whitman alternatively argued 
that the Gunds’ suit was barred for the following reasons:  
(1) the Gunds were employees because they assisted upon 
command under section 3366; (2) County Resolution No. 163-87 
deems volunteers to be employees if they provide “service” to the 
county; and (3) they have governmental immunity from tort 
liability.  The Court of Appeal did not reach these arguments; 
neither do we. 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
 
Gunds’ response on his behalf.  The Court of Appeal concluded 
that responding to a 911 call for unspecified help — which the 
Gunds did here — “is clearly active law enforcement” and 
section 3366 applies, rendering workers’ compensation benefits 
the Gunds’ exclusive remedy.  (Gund v. County of Trinity (2018) 
24 Cal.App.5th 185, 195 (Gund).) 
We ordered review on the court’s own motion to decide the 
scope of workers’ compensation coverage available to the 
plaintiffs in this situation, as the availability of such coverage 
would constrain them in seeking other redress for their injuries.  
Specifically, we address whether plaintiffs engaged in active law 
enforcement under section 3366 after a peace officer asked them 
to check on a neighbor who dialed 911 for help and the officer 
allegedly misrepresented the situation. 
II. 
Workers’ compensation spreads the cost of injuries 
associated with the risks of employment even as it also limits 
the extent of recovery a covered worker could have gained 
through ordinary civil litigation.  (§ 3600, subd. (a); Shoemaker, 
supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 16.)  In a typical workers’ compensation 
claim, benefits are available for an employee’s injury “arising 
out of and in the course of the employment” where “the injury is 
proximately caused by the employment.”  (§ 3600, subds. (a), 
(a)(3).)  But volunteers are typically not eligible for these 
benefits.  (See § 3352, subd. (a)(9) [volunteers are not 
employees].)  Civilians like the Gunds who volunteer to assist 
law enforcement only become “employee[s]” — whose exclusive 
remedy lies in the workers’ compensation scheme — if they fall 
within the scope of section 3366’s coverage.  (§ 3366, subd. (a); 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
 
see § 3602, subd. (a) [workers’ compensation is “the sole and 
exclusive remedy of the employee”].) 
Section 3366, subdivision (a) provides the following:  “For 
the purposes of this division, each person engaged in the 
performance of active law enforcement service as part of the 
posse comitatus or power of the county, and each person . . . 
engaged in assisting any peace officer in active law enforcement 
service at the request of such peace officer, is deemed to be an 
employee of the public entity that he or she is serving or 
assisting in the enforcement of the law, and is entitled to receive 
compensation from the public entity in accordance with the 
provisions of this division.” 
To determine whether a civilian is an “employee,” we 
approximate the typical workers’ compensation inquiry in the 
atypical context defined by the terms of this statute.  First, we 
consider whether a peace officer asked for assistance with a task 
that qualifies as active law enforcement service.  Second, we ask 
whether the civilian was injured while engaged in that 
requested service.  This two-step framework incorporates the 
typical workers’ compensation requirement that an injury arise 
out of and in the course of the employment because the volunteer 
is only an “employee” if they are engaged in active law 
enforcement service at the request of the police.  Put differently, 
a peace officer’s request informs whether a civilian’s injury arose 
out of and in the course of qualifying employment. 
No one in this case disputes that the Gunds assisted “at 
the request of” a peace officer, nor is there any dispute that they 
were “engaged in assisting” that officer when they sustained 
their injuries.  (§ 3366, subd. (a).)  But to apply this framework 
here we must decide if Corporal Whitman’s requested assistance 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
 
was for a task of “active law enforcement service.”  (Ibid.)  We 
begin by considering the statute’s language and structure, 
bearing in mind that “our primary goal is to determine and give 
effect to the underlying purpose of the law.”  (Goodman v. 
Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332; People v. Valencia (2017) 
3 Cal.5th 347, 357 [“ ‘the words of the statute must be construed 
in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose’ ”].)  We start 
by considering the ordinary meaning of the statutory language, 
the language of related provisions, and the structure of the 
statutory scheme.  (Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 
Cal.5th 1241, 1246; see also Larkin v. Workers’ Compensation 
Appeals Bd. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 152, 157–158.)  If the language of 
a statutory provision remains unclear after we consider its 
terms, structure, and related statutory provisions, we may take 
account of extrinsic sources — such as legislative history — to 
assist us in discerning the relevant legislative purpose.  (Winn 
v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 148, 156; see 
also Holland v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 1 (2014) 58 Cal.4th 
482, 490.) 
Based on what we glean from the language, structure, and 
legislative history of section 3366 — as well as related statutory 
provisions that round out the relevant context — we conclude 
that Corporal Whitman requested “active law enforcement 
service” when he asked the Gunds to respond to Kristine’s 911 
call for help, and that “active law enforcement service” is what 
the Gunds provided. 
A. 
 “[A]ctive law enforcement service” is not a phrase defined 
by section 3366, nor is it parsed by any other related statutory 
provision.  The Gunds contend it reaches only a narrow subset 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
 
of policing tasks:  the type of active investigation and 
suppression of crime entailing risk of death or serious injury 
while providing protection to the public.  But defendants assert 
“active law enforcement service” simply identifies the main 
duties of a police officer.  These words arguably support either 
the Gunds or the defendants, because one could reasonably 
understand “law enforcement” to either describe a specialized 
portion of police activity or to encompass most of what police do.  
A literal reading of “law enforcement service” conveys the idea 
of service to enforce the law, and perhaps especially — given 
how the term “law enforcement” is less commonly associated 
with civil regulatory law — efforts to investigate violations of or 
otherwise enforce criminal or traffic laws.  (See, e.g., 
Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training v. Superior 
Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278, 298 [“ ‘Law enforcement officers 
carry upon their shoulders the cloak of authority to enforce the 
laws of the state’ ”].)  This reading treats as separate from “law 
enforcement” the broader range of public welfare and routine 
order maintenance functions police officers may perform, 
irrespective of how tenuously such activities connect to 
enforcing criminal or traffic law.  (See Decker, Emergency 
Circumstances, Police Responses, and Fourth Amendment 
Restrictions (1999) 89 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 433, 445–446, 
fn. omitted [“police serve to ensure the safety and welfare of the 
citizenry at large,” which “may involve approaching a seemingly 
stranded motorist or lost child to inquire whether he or she 
needs assistance, assisting persons involved in a natural 
disaster, or warning members of a community about a 
hazardous materials leak in the area”]; Michigan v. Bryant 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
 
(2011) 562 U.S. 344, 368 [“Police officers in our society function 
as both first responders and criminal investigators”].)   
Yet judicial opinions and the public discourse routinely 
embrace a more capacious understanding of “law enforcement,” 
treating police officers as all but synonymous with “law 
enforcement officers.”  (See, e.g., Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 215, 216 [using both “law enforcement 
officers” and “police officers” in discussing the reasons for 
imposing vicarious liability on a public entity when such an 
officer commits a sexual assault while on duty].)  From this 
vantage point, “active law enforcement service” plausibly refers 
to the full range of work law enforcement officers do — 
stretching far beyond the investigation of crime, the suppression 
of criminal offenses, and the detention of criminals.  It is this 
subtle but meaningful distinction in what “law enforcement” 
means that we must address at the outset.  
We have good reasons to embrace, in this context, a more 
capacious understanding of what “law enforcement service” 
means.  For reasons detailed below, we conclude that the term 
“active law enforcement service” — as used in section 3366 
— falls short of encompassing every conceivable function a 
peace officer can perform.  But neither is it quite so narrow that 
we are compelled to hold it only applies to the arrest and 
detention of criminals, or the direct suppression of crime.  We 
conclude that “active law enforcement service” includes a peace 
officer’s duties directly concerned with functions such as 
enforcing laws, investigating and preventing crime, and 
protecting the public.  Whatever the outer limits of the term, 
“active law enforcement” certainly includes the arrest and 
detention of criminals, as well as — given the range of reasons 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
 
that ordinarily trigger emergency calls to police — responses to 
emergency calls for unspecified assistance, such as Kristine’s 
911 call for help.  (See, e.g., Livingston, Police Discretion and the 
Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the 
New Policing (1997) 97 Colum. L.Rev. 551, 559 [investigation, 
arrest, and prosecution of those committing serious crimes is 
“straightforward” police intervention]; see also id. at p. 567 [the 
modern “ ‘crime-fighting’ ” strategy of policing includes rapid 
response to 911 calls for service].)  
Consider at the outset the structure of section 3366.  It 
applies when an individual is injured while engaged in active 
law enforcement service, either on command or voluntarily at 
the request of a peace officer.  Government Code section 26604 
indicates that sheriffs “shall command the aid” of inhabitants as 
they think necessary to execute their duties.  This authority for 
calling forth citizens to aid in law enforcement is the posse 
comitatus power.  (Kopel, The Posse Comitatus and the Office of 
Sheriff: Armed Citizens Summoned to the Aid of Law 
Enforcement (2015) 104 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 761, 769–
806.)  The posse comitatus power predates the nation’s founding 
and has a complicated history.  (Id. at pp. 792–793.)  At the 
federal level, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 contained posse 
comitatus provisions enabling federal law enforcement officers 
to compel northerners to assist in the capture of enslaved people 
who had escaped bondage.  (Id. at pp. 798–800.)  After the Civil 
War, the power was used in reverse to enforce civil rights 
legislation in the Reconstruction south.  (Id. at pp. 800–801.)  
But the more familiar use of the posse comitatus power was the 
western frontier version:  where a sheriff summoned the posse 
to pursue an escaped outlaw or confront a violent gang.  (Id. at 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
 
p. 802.)  During this era, preservation of the peace did not fall 
exclusively to peace officers.  (Pressel, The Western Peace 
Officer (1972) pp. 30–31.)  On the frontier, preserving the peace 
was public duty.  (Ibid.)  Amicus curiae Rural County 
Representatives of California explains that unlike with the 
large, organized police forces for urban centers, peace officers in 
remote areas — like Trinity County — still rely on community 
members to assist in ensuring community safety.  
Until January 1, 2020, it was a misdemeanor for civilians 
to refuse many of these commands for assistance.  Penal Code 
former section 150 established what assistance a peace officer 
could command by criminalizing the failure to join the posse 
comitatus, or power of the county.  A peace officer could 
command, with threat of criminal sanction, assistance in 
making an arrest, recapturing an escapee, preventing a breach 
of the peace, or preventing the commission of any other criminal 
offense.  (Pen. Code, former § 150.)  These services are ones for 
which an individual inherently exposes herself to risks in order 
to protect the public.  (See Gund, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 
198.)  So although section 3366’s implicit reference to Penal 
Code former section 150 limits the type of services a peace officer 
can command upon penalty of misdemeanor to services that 
appear crime-facing, that reference does not necessarily limit 
what assistance qualifies as active law enforcement service.  
Sheriffs may still “command the aid of as many inhabitants of 
the sheriff’s county as he or she thinks necessary in the 
execution of his or her duties.”  (Gov. Code, § 26604.)  These 
provisions suggest that the range of active law enforcement 
services an officer can request, or command without the 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
 
possibility of misdemeanor charges, may prove somewhat 
broader than assistance with crime-fighting activity alone. 
Section 3366, subdivision (a) contains additional language 
bearing on our construction of “active law enforcement service.”  
It deems individuals providing this “active law enforcement 
service” as employees of the public entity they are serving “in 
the enforcement of the law.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  This variation 
on law enforcement service is consistent with the idea that the 
statute covers a range of activity somewhat more limited than 
all police work, and it reinforces the notion that coverage 
extends only to those individuals undertaking certain explicit 
action “in the enforcement of the law.”  (Ibid.)  Taken together, 
section 3366 and Penal Code former section 150 are most 
reasonably understood to suggest that the concept of active law 
enforcement service, whatever its scope, may stop short of 
covering all the general work of a police officer — including, for 
instance, clerical work bearing a more remote relationship to 
“the enforcement of the law” — but its purview is more capacious 
than simply criminal investigation and prevention of specific 
crimes.   
The statute’s language, structure, and legislative history 
also suggest a more capacious understanding of “active law 
enforcement service” to encompass protection of civilians from 
the kinds of physical threats to their well-being that could 
plausibly expose volunteers to material risk of injury.  The 
statute provides compensation to individuals who sustain 
injuries while assisting peace officers with such active law 
enforcement service.  (§ 3366, subd. (a).)  Read in the context of 
how workers’ compensation laws usually operate, section 3366 
is best understood as an exception to an exclusion from coverage.  
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
 
(See § 3352, subd. (a)(9) [volunteers are not employees]; § 3366 
[individuals engaging in active law enforcement service at the 
request of a peace officer are employees].)  Such exceptions to 
exclusions are to be read broadly, consistent with the directive 
to construe workers’ compensation provisions with the purpose 
of extending coverage.  (See Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship 
(2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 466, fn. 16 [citing Machado v. 
Hulsman (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 453, 455–456]; § 3202 [workers’ 
compensation provisions shall be liberally construed with the 
purpose of extending benefits].)   
Moreover, providing coverage through a workers’ 
compensation model means that, although the extent of 
compensation may be limited, civilians can get that 
compensation without fighting over the specifics of an officer’s 
request for help or whether the request amounted to a negligent 
misrepresentation.  (§ 3600, subd. (a)(3).)  Through this system, 
determinations of coverage turn on whether an individual’s 
injuries arose out of and in the course of the employment, rather 
than on the subjective awareness of particular individuals.  
(§ 3600, subd. (a).)  This model makes it much simpler and 
quicker for injured civilians to get compensation.  It’s also 
amenable to consistent application — as individuals engaged in 
the same service will not face disparate coverage determinations 
based on subjective factors, like their understanding of potential 
risk.  An overly narrow interpretation of active law enforcement 
service, or one that turns on subjective factors, would leave 
without recourse many individuals injured while obliging a 
peace officer’s request for assistance, undermining its civilian-
protective purpose. 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
 
This broader, civilian-protective interpretation also fits 
with the statute’s history.  The Law Revision Commission 
proposed the bill enacting section 3366 in direct response to this 
court’s 1961 decision in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District 
(1961) 55 Cal.2d 211 (Muskopf).  In Muskopf, we abolished the 
“vestigial remains” of common law sovereign immunity due to 
its significant erosion over time.  (Id. at p. 221.)  In response, the 
Legislature temporarily suspended Muskopf’s effect (Stats. 
1961, ch. 1404, pp. 3209–3210) and directed the Law Revision 
Commission to complete a study of the issue (see Assem. Conc. 
Res. No. 22, Stats. 1957 (1956–1957 Reg. Sess.) res. ch. 202, 
p. 4590).  The Law Revision Commission considered a report by 
Professor Arlo Van Alstyne about injuries sustained when 
citizens aid police in law enforcement.  (See A Study Relating to 
Sovereign Immunity (Jan. 1963) 5 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. 
(1963) pp. 404, 452–453.)  Van Alstyne suggested that “the 
elimination of possible misgivings as to financial consequences 
in the event injury is sustained might conceivably tend to 
promote more willing and wholehearted cooperation by citizens 
when called upon to give aid in law enforcement.”  (Id. at p. 453.)  
Van Alstyne proposed alternative possibilities to compensate 
citizens injured while providing that requested assistance:  
absolute tort liability or limited workers’ compensation benefits.  
(Id. at pp. 453–454.) 
The Law Revision Commission chose to propose the 
workers’ compensation benefits model, noting it was “better 
policy to extend to such persons the same benefits and 
protections that are provided to peace officers generally.”  
(Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, Number 
6 — Workmen’s Compensation Benefits for Persons Assisting 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
 
Law Enforcement or Fire Control Officers (Jan. 1963) 4 Cal. Law 
Revision Com. Rep. (1963) p. 1505, fn. 4 (Recommendation 
Relating to Sovereign Immunity); see id., at pp. 1505–1506.)  
The Law Revision Commission’s ultimate recommendation 
suggested expanding coverage from only those commanded into 
service to include those assisting upon request because “[m]any 
people would assume that they are required to assist police 
officers whenever requested to do so, and others would feel it 
their civic duty whether required to by law or not.”  (Cal. Law 
Revision Com., Second Supp. to Mem. 23 (May 18, 1962) study 
52(L), 
at 
p. 
1.) 
 
The 
Law 
Revision 
Commission’s 
recommendation elaborated that “[w]hen a person not trained 
in law enforcement . . . is required by law to assume the risk of 
death or serious injury to provide such protection to the public, 
or when he undertakes to do so at the request of a peace 
officer . . . , he and his dependents should be provided with 
protection against the financial consequences of his death or 
injury.”  (Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, 
supra, 4 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., at p. 1505.)  
The bill’s author, Senator James A. Cobey, also served on 
the Law Revision Commission — and he appears to have shared 
this concern.  In his floor statement, Senator Cobey echoed the 
Law Revision’s Commissions recommendation that when 
someone without law enforcement training “is required by law 
to assume the risk of death or serious injury to provide such 
protection to the public, or when he undertakes to do so at the 
request of a peace officer . . . , he and his dependents should be 
provided 
with 
some 
protection 
against 
the 
financial 
consequences of his death or injury.”  (Floor statement by 
Senator James A. Cobey regarding Sen. Bill No. 47 (1963 Reg. 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
 
Sess.) (Cobey Floor Statement).)  He also included this same 
language in his letter to Governor Edmund Brown.  (James A. 
Cobey, Senate Bill Author, letter to Governor Edmund G. 
Brown, June 21, 1963 (June 1963 Cobey Letter).)   
A complementary concern familiar from the history and 
underlying logic of workers’ compensation was also at play in 
the legislative drafting process:  limiting expansive liability for 
public agencies.  Senator Cobey repeatedly explained that the 
exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation 
scheme “will prevent such persons from bringing civil actions for 
damages and will eliminate the possibility of public entities 
having to pay catastrophic judgments.”  (Cobey Floor Statement, 
supra; and June 1963 Cobey Letter, supra.)  The legislative 
analysis for the bill also notes that using the workers’ 
compensation system responds to a lack of uniformity of law and 
practice in an area that “contains large potential liability.”  
(Legis. Analyst, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 47 (1963 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended May 3, 1963, p. 1.)  That limiting the extent of public 
agency liability was a guiding concern for the Legislature is no 
surprise, as section 3366 was enacted as part of a restructuring 
of governmental immunity after Muskopf.   
When eventually enacted by the Legislature, the bill 
containing section 3366 was almost identical to what the Law 
Revision Commission had embraced.  (Compare Stats. 1961, ch. 
1684, § 2, p. 3306 with Recommendation Relating to Sovereign 
Immunity, supra, 4 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., at p. 1506.)  
Reading the Law Revision Commission’s deliberation alongside 
the legislative history, and what we can glean from the structure 
of the statute, we discern three purposes that the legislation 
appears crafted to serve:  (1) creating an incentive for 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
 
individuals to provide requested law enforcement service; 
(2) compensating, without concern for fault, someone who is 
injured while assisting a peace officer with law enforcement 
duties; and (3) limiting the state’s financial exposure.   
These goals are best served by a more capacious 
understanding of “active law enforcement service.”  The 
workers’ compensation model makes the public agency liable for 
the costs of the injuries of people assisting police with requested 
active law enforcement service, whether or not the requesting 
officer was ultimately at fault.  (§ 3600, subd. (a)(3); see also 
Shoemaker, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 16.)  By expanding 
availability of workers’ compensation, the bill tended to make it 
easier for individuals to provide assistance, instead of triggering 
the complexities inherent in making coverage turn on whether 
individuals correctly discerned whether they were being 
commanded or requested to provide assistance.  This latter 
scenario is one the Law Revision Commission sought to avoid.  
The simpler, quicker availability of these benefits can 
incentivize individuals to oblige a peace officer’s request for 
help, because they will ostensibly be less concerned with the 
financial consequences of potential injury or death. 
Moreover, because peace officers and citizens providing 
requested assistance may not always know the extent of risk a 
response implicates, the bill appears to make workers’ 
compensation coverage available whenever a peace officer 
requests assistance in “active law enforcement service” — as law 
enforcement duties often entail a risk of injury.  (§ 3366, subd. 
(a) [“engaged in assisting any peace officer in active law 
enforcement service at the request of such peace officer”].)  What 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
20 
 
coverage under section 3366 depends on is the nature of the 
requested assistance.   
B. 
A more expansive interpretation of active law enforcement 
service — covering tasks that objectively qualify as a peace 
officer’s law enforcement duties directly concerned with 
functions like enforcing laws, investigating and preventing 
crime, and protecting the public — is also consistent with 
previous opinions interpreting section 3366, and related 
provisions of the Labor Code.  (See McCorkle v. City of Los 
Angeles (1969) 70 Cal.2d 252, 263, fn. 11; Page v. City of 
Montebello (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 658.)  In McCorkle, we 
concluded that an individual who assists an officer by simply 
providing “facts within his own knowledge” does not provide 
active law enforcement service because “[t]he legislative 
purpose of [section 3366] was to cover a person who assumes the 
functions and risks of a peace officer.”  (McCorkle, supra, 70 
Cal.2d at p. 263, fn. 11.)  Whatever the ultimate scope of law 
enforcement duties is, it does not include the assistance 
provided in McCorkle.  In Page, the Court of Appeal accepted the 
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board’s determination that an 
informant who assisted in apprehending individuals dealing 
narcotics provided active law enforcement service.  (Page, supra, 
112 Cal.App.3d at pp. 661–662.)  These cases are consistent with 
the idea that active law enforcement service encompasses tasks 
undertaken to protect the public in addition to those directly 
concerned with enforcing the law or investigating and 
preventing crime.  This construction further vindicates the 
purpose of the provision’s enactment:  to mitigate the financial 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
21 
 
consequences for individuals assuming the law enforcement 
duties and risks of police officers.     
The phrase “active law enforcement service” appears 
elsewhere in the Labor Code.  (See, e.g., §§ 3212.6, 3212.9, 4850.)  
When a phrase appears in two statutes dealing with the same 
subject matter, we usually interpret the phrase to have the same 
meaning across the provisions.  (People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 
Cal.4th 1152, 1161.)  Section 4850, subdivision (a) provides for 
a paid leave of absence in lieu of temporary disability payments 
for individuals holding positions listed in subdivision (b) if they 
are injured in the course of their duties.  Subdivision (b) 
includes, among others, city police officers, firefighters, sheriffs, 
officers or employees of sheriff’s offices, and certain personnel in 
a district attorney’s office.  But subdivisions (c)(1), (c)(2), and 
(c)(3) of section 4850 exclude employees of certain offices “whose 
principal duties are those of a telephone operator, clerk, 
stenographer, machinist, mechanic, or otherwise, and whose 
functions do not clearly come within the scope of active law 
enforcement service.”     
As with the cases interpreting section 3366, we can 
discern from cases parsing “active law enforcement service” 
when it appeared in an earlier version of section 4850 an 
awareness of the Legislature’s purpose to protect employees 
taking on physical hazards on behalf of the public.  (See, e.g., 
Kimball v. County of Santa Clara (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 780, 785 
(Kimball); Biggers v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1999) 69 
Cal.App.4th 431, 440–441 (Biggers).)  Biggers focused on this 
notion, noting that courtroom bailiffs provide active law 
enforcement service because they expose themselves to hazards 
as they protect the public — for example, by confiscating guns 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
22 
 
and knives and having contact with inmates.  (Biggers, supra, 
69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 440–441.)  Interpreting active law 
enforcement service to reach tasks a police officer undertakes to 
enforce the law, investigate and prevent criminal activity, or 
protect the public is consistent with enhanced coverage for 
police officers:  Guarding against loss of livelihood tends to make 
individuals more likely to undertake these types of law 
enforcement duties — which provide public benefit but are often 
dangerous.  Whatever its ultimate scope, the investigation and 
prevention of criminal activity constitute ready examples of how 
an individual may provide active law enforcement service.   
These Labor Code provisions further buttress the case for 
reading “active law enforcement service” in section 3366 as a 
broad reference to a peace officer’s duties directly concerned 
with functions such as enforcing laws, investigating and 
preventing criminal activity, and protecting the public.  Section 
4850 draws certain distinctions relevant here by categorically 
establishing positions subject to coverage and excluding from 
coverage positions whose primary duties are routine and 
clerical.  (See § 4850, subds. (b), (c).)  Sections 3212.6 and 3212.9 
have similar structures.  Some positions merit enhanced 
coverage under distinctions drawn by the statute, while others 
are expressly excluded.  But section 3366 does not address the 
principal duties of a full-time employee; it establishes a special 
circumstance in which an otherwise uncovered individual may 
receive workers’ compensation.  Neither the statute nor any 
relevant prudential principle makes the interpretive question 
here turn on whether a volunteer performs a “principal duty” of 
law enforcement officer.  Simply asking if a civilian performed 
one of a peace officer’s principal duties could trigger 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
23 
 
unnecessarily intricate questions not only about the limits of 
principal duties, but about whether that question should be 
resolved by focusing on the actions of individual officers or 
larger bureaucratic units.  A test that pivots on “principal 
duties” would also virtually guarantee that compensable 
activities would include those less directly connected to law 
enforcement, such as filling out a report or engaging in 
community outreach.  Instead of asking if the civilian performed 
any task that could conceivably be described as a principal duty 
of a law enforcement officer, we must determine under section 
3366 whether the type of task an officer requests constitutes a 
duty directly concerned with enforcing the laws, investigating or 
preventing criminal activity, or protecting the public.    
Certain Government Code provisions, both current and 
former, also use the phrase “active law enforcement service” to 
establish which employees are eligible for various benefits.  (See, 
e.g., Gov. Code, §§ 20436, subd. (a), 31469.3, subd. (b), 31470.3; 
see id., former §§ 20019, 20020.)  As with the Labor Code, the 
term is undefined.  In outlining which government employees 
are eligible for particular retirement benefits, Government Code 
former sections 20019 and 20020 provided coverage for local 
“ ‘ “safety members,” ’ ” including “ ‘all local policemen.’ ”  
(Crumpler v. Board of Administration (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 567, 
576 (Crumpler), quoting Gov. Code, former § 20019.)  The term 
“ ‘ “[l]ocal policemen” ’ ” meant “ ‘any officer or employee of a 
police department of a contracting agency, except one whose 
principal duties are those of a telephone operator, clerk, 
stenographer, machinist, mechanic, or otherwise and whose 
functions do not clearly fall within the scope of active law 
enforcement service even though such an employee is subject to 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
24 
 
occasional call, or is occasionally called upon, to perform duties 
within the scope of active law enforcement service.’ ”  (Crumpler, 
at p. 576, italics and fn. omitted, quoting Gov. Code, former 
§ 20020.)   
Courts of Appeal construing active law enforcement for 
purposes of these Government Code provisions also discuss the 
physical hazards of law enforcement activity.  (See, e.g., 
Crumpler, supra, 32 Cal.App.3d at p. 578; Neeley v. Board of 
Retirement (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 815, 822 (Neeley).)  But in 
Crumpler, the Court of Appeal concluded that active law 
enforcement service means “the active enforcement and 
suppression of crimes and the arrest and detention of criminals,” 
with specific attention to crimes against people or property.  
(Crumpler, supra, 32 Cal.App.3d at p. 578; see id., at pp. 578–
579.)  Supporting this conclusion, the Court of Appeal discussed 
a formal opinion from the Attorney General contending that 
“active law enforcement service” in these Government Code 
provisions does not extend to everything a police officer does, but 
rather is limited to physically active work — such as the arrest 
and detention of criminals — that exposes officers to physical 
risk.  (Id. at p. 577, citing 22 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 224, 229.)  The 
Court of Appeal in Boxx v. Board of Administration (1980) 114 
Cal.App.3d 79 also focused on criminal investigation, finding 
that a Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA) 
officer provided active law enforcement service because he was 
required to make arrests for criminal activity occurring in and 
around HACLA property.  (Id. at p. 86.)  Although these cases 
discuss crime suppression and investigation, they ground much 
of their reasoning in exposure to hazard to provide public 
protection.  Read in this light, action meant to prevent specific 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
25 
 
criminal activity — by showing a potential perpetrator that a 
would-be victim is not isolated, for example — constitutes a 
common and readily available example, rather than the 
exclusive category, of the hazards the covered public employees 
undertake.  (See Glover v. Bd. of Retirement (1989) 214 
Cal.App.3d 1327, 1333 [“The common thread running through 
cases [that interpret the term ‘safety member’] is the concept 
that the classification of a ‘safety member’ engaged in active law 
enforcement is largely controlled by the extent to which the 
category exposes its holders to potentially hazardous activity”].)   
The term “active law enforcement service,” then, 
encompasses the duties of peace officers directly concerned with 
enforcing the laws, investigating and preventing criminal 
activity, and protecting the public.  These Labor Code and 
Government Code provisions, and their associated appellate 
court cases, underscore that “active law enforcement service” is 
best understood as capacious — but not entirely open ended — 
to include these core public protection, enforcement, and crime-
fighting functions.  Drawing precise lines to define these 
functions is a task we can leave for another day.  For today, it’s 
enough to conclude that responding to a 911 call for assistance 
of an unknown nature — which possibly includes responding to 
criminal activity — falls well within the lines defining “active 
law enforcement service.”   
C. 
 
Responding to a 911 call for assistance of an unknown 
nature is what the Gunds did, so they are properly deemed 
employees under section 3366.  In applying our two-step 
framework here, we first ask whether Corporal Whitman asked 
the Gunds to assist with a type of task that qualifies as active 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
26 
 
law enforcement service.  For purposes of our review, there is no 
dispute that the Gunds acted at Corporal Whitman’s request.  
The dispute centers on whether the requested assistance 
amounts to active law enforcement service, which we conclude 
encompasses tasks within a peace officer’s duties to investigate 
and prevent crime, enforce the laws, and protect the public.   
 
At its core, the request from Corporal Whitman was that 
the Gunds respond to a 911 call for help of an unspecified 
nature.  Responding to a 911 call for unspecified help serves a 
vital public protection purpose.  As the Gunds assert, Corporal 
Whitman explained that Kristine called 911 seeking help.  
Because he was far away, Corporal Whitman sought the Gunds’ 
help to check on Kristine at her home.  That Corporal Whitman 
or one of his law enforcement colleagues would ordinarily 
provide such a response is unremarkable and uncontroversial.  
Whatever the limits of “active law enforcement service” under 
section 3366 as we defined the phrase above, the requested 
service here falls within it. 
 
The specific details of the exchange between Corporal 
Whitman and Mrs. Gund do not change the essential nature of 
his request that the Gunds respond to a 911 call for unspecified 
help.  After requesting Mrs. Gund’s assistance, Corporal 
Whitman implored her not to go alone to Kristine’s home, which 
prompted her to ask what Kristine said in the 911 call.  Corporal 
Whitman relayed that Kristine said, “Help me.”  Mrs. Gund 
asked, “Are you sure? Is that all she said?”  Corporal Whitman 
confirmed, “[S]he said two words, ‘Help me.’ ”  Corporal 
Whitman made clear he did not know the reason for Kristine’s 
call for help.  After learning the Gunds were familiar with 
Kristine’s property because they had assisted the previous 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
27 
 
owner with snow and fallen trees, Corporal Whitman noted 
there was a big storm coming.  He said, “[t]hat must be what 
this is all about.  It’s probably no big deal.”  But he followed by 
asking Mrs. Gund if she knew Kristine’s boyfriend and if he ever 
seemed violent.  Mrs. Gund replied that she “didn’t know,” but 
offered that “[h]e seemed real mellow.” Despite Corporal 
Whitman’s assessment that there was likely a weather 
emergency and that it was “probably no big deal,” his general 
request was still one for a response to a 911 call for help of an 
uncertain nature.5 
The dissent treats Corporal Whitman’s assessment that 
Kristine’s 911 call “must be” weather related and “probably no 
big deal” as an assurance to the Gunds about what awaited them 
at their neighbor’s home.  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 5.)  But Corporal 
Whitman also conveyed that Kristine had said two words, 
“ ‘Help me.’ ”  He used equivocal language to assess the 
situation, noting that the issue “must be” weather-related and 
that it was “probably no big deal.”  After this speculation, he 
asked whether Kristine’s boyfriend seemed violent.  Though it 
may have been eminently sensible for the Gunds to conclude 
Kristine was likely having a weather-related emergency based 
on this assessment, that sensibility did not convert the 
requested assistance in response to a 911 call for unspecified 
                                                 
5  
The dissent claims our conclusion does not consider 
relevant “the words, facts, and context” of a peace officer’s 
request.  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 17; see also id. at pp. 4, 5, 8–9.)  
We conclude instead that the information discussed in Corporal 
Whitman’s call to Mrs. Gund did not alter the essential nature 
of the requested task — which remained a response to a 911 call 
for help of an uncertain nature and, thus, “active law 
enforcement service.” 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
28 
 
help into a request concerning a weather-related issue that 
could conceivably prove beyond the scope of “active law 
enforcement service.” 
Under 
these 
circumstances, 
Corporal 
Whitman’s 
omissions — Kristine’s whispering, the CHP dispatcher’s belief 
the call was secret, and the county dispatcher’s return calls 
going straight to voicemail — may have provided additional 
context for the Gunds to suspect they might encounter a 
dangerous situation.  But these omissions do not change our 
conclusion that Corporal Whitman’s request was that the Gunds 
respond to a 911 call for unspecified help — a typical law 
enforcement task often associated with investigation of possible 
criminal activity, response to such activity, or protection of the 
public.6  (See, e.g., Crumpler, supra, 32 Cal.App.3d at p. 577, 
citing 22 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. at p. 229.)   
                                                 
6  
The dissent takes our conclusion to mean that 
misrepresentations — even lies — do not matter in situations 
where police request assistance from volunteers.  (Dis. opn., 
post, at pp. 3, 5, 8–10.)  But our conclusion isn’t that 
misrepresentations are irrelevant — it’s that even viewing the 
facts in the light most favorable to the Gunds, Corporal 
Whitman’s request remained one for active law enforcement 
service. 
 
Nor 
do 
we 
foreclose 
the 
possibility 
that 
misrepresentations may affect the availability of other remedies 
such as tort actions.  (See post, at pp. 32–33, 33, fn. 7.)  The 
dissent’s conclusion seems to be instead that the presence of an 
alleged misrepresentation can by itself remove an activity from 
even possibly being within the scope of “active law enforcement 
service.”  (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 3, 4–6, 9, 16–17.)  But it’s worth 
bearing in mind that even as the Gunds here seek to limit the 
purview of workers’ compensation so they can pursue what they 
consider to be a viable tort claim, many injured volunteers lack 
 
 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
29 
 
We next ask whether the Gunds were injured while 
engaged in assisting with that law enforcement service — 
mirroring the typical workers’ compensation requirement that 
an injury arise out of and in the course of employment.  (§ 3600, 
subd. (a)(3).)  There is no question the Gunds “engaged in 
assisting” Corporal Whitman.  And they sustained their injuries 
while responding, as requested, to a 911 call for help, an active 
law enforcement task.  After entering Kristine’s home, the 
Gunds faced her murderer, who cut their throats and punched 
and tased Mr. Gund.  
Under these circumstances, Corporal Whitman requested 
that the Gunds assist in active law enforcement service, and the 
Gunds were injured in the course of providing that service.  
Section 3366 applies, and workers’ compensation benefits are 
the Gunds’ exclusive state law remedy.  (§ 3602, subd. (a).)   
III. 
  
We have established that the state has liability for the 
Gunds’ injuries under workers’ compensation because they were 
injured in the course of assisting with active law enforcement 
service at the request of a peace officer.  The Gunds nonetheless 
argue that any misrepresentation by the requesting officer 
about the nature of the risk involved trumps the application of 
this statutory test.  
                                                 
a viable tort claim and must instead make do with workers’ 
compensation or nothing.  The last thing we should imply is that 
police are free to conveniently gerrymander the scope of section 
3366 simply by baking into their requests for volunteer 
assistance misrepresentations creating enough ambiguity for a 
reasonable person to conclude the task does not involve “active 
law enforcement service.” 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
30 
 
 
Corporal Whitman’s misrepresentations matter, the 
Gunds allege, because whether they engaged in active law 
enforcement depends in part on what they subjectively believed 
to be true about Kristine’s 911 call and their provided service.  
To support this proposition, the Gunds rely on the plurality 
opinion in People v. Ray (1999) 21 Cal.4th 464 (lead opn. of 
Brown, J.) (Ray).  This reliance is misplaced.  Ray is a Fourth 
Amendment case concerning the community caretaking 
function exception to the warrant requirement for a search.  (See 
id. at pp. 467–468.)  In the Fourth Amendment context, a 
plurality opinion concluded that the community caretaking 
exception to the warrant requirement does not apply where a 
stated reliance on property protection is pretext for a crime-
solving rationale.  (Id. at p. 477.)  There, the subjective and 
reasonable belief of the officer directs whether the exception 
applies.  (Id. at pp. 476–477.)   
 
But nowhere on the textured surface of section 3366 is 
there a place onto which we can graft a subjective 
understanding component.  First, community caretaking does 
not incorporate subjectivity in a way that supports a place for it 
in this scheme.  We recently disapproved the lead opinion in 
Ray, rejecting its rationale for allowing warrantless entries 
under the community caretaking doctrine.  (People v. Ovieda 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1038.)  Second, Ray does not interpret 
section 3366 or any other California statute with the phrase 
“active law enforcement service,” and, unlike Ray, the present 
case does not interpret federal constitutional law.  Third, 
California cases that have construed the phrase “active law 
enforcement service” in other statutes considered what an 
individual actually did, suggesting an objective inquiry.  (See 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
31 
 
Neeley, supra, 36 Cal.App.3d at p. 818, fn. 2; Biggers, supra, 69 
Cal.App.4th at p. 441.)  Determining whether an individual 
provides active law enforcement service remains an objective 
inquiry.  As we concluded above, the alleged omissions may have 
provided more information as to the danger the Gunds faced, 
but they do not change our conclusion that Corporal Whitman’s 
request that the Gunds respond to a 911 call for help is a task 
within the law enforcement duties of a peace officer, and 
therefore a request for active law enforcement service.   
The Gunds seem to imply that misrepresentations matter 
because they bear on whether an individual subjectively 
understood the hazards involved in assisting an officer.  This 
approach risks consequences that are difficult to justify.  Under 
their approach, the subjective understanding of an individual 
request would be central to our analysis.  That would potentially 
leave individuals providing the same type of assistance with 
different coverage determinations depending on the specifics of 
a request or the individual’s ability to assess the risks inherent 
in the type of requested service.  
The Gunds additionally contend that section 3366 does not 
apply when a plaintiff alleges that a request for assistance 
contains misrepresentations, because the misrepresentations 
render any assistance involuntary.  They rely on Moyer v. 
Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222 for this 
proposition.  But their reliance on Moyer is misplaced.  In Moyer, 
we discussed an employee’s choice to accept a rehabilitation 
program for which section 139.5 required such acceptance to be 
“ ‘voluntary and not be compulsory.’ ”  (Id. at p. 229.)  Moyer does 
not bear on whether an individual voluntarily provides active 
law enforcement service.   
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
32 
 
Furthermore, even when an employer intentionally 
conceals and misrepresents hazards in order to induce an 
individual to accept employment, workers’ compensation is the 
individual’s exclusive remedy.  (See Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire 
Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 157–158 (Cole); Wright v. 
FMC Corp. (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 777, 779; Buttner v. American 
Bell Tel. Co. (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 581, 584.)  In Cole, we 
explained that an employer’s intentional and deceitful conduct 
should not take an action outside of the workers’ compensation 
system because it would convert the focus of litigation into an 
issue of the employer’s state of mind and away from whether the 
injury arose out of and in the course of employment.  (Cole, 
supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 158.)  We reasoned that allowing actions 
for damages based on the employer’s state of mind would 
significantly disturb the balance of the workers’ compensation 
system:  swift and certain payment for the injured employee in 
exchange for the employer’s immunity from liability at law.  
(Ibid.) 
 
Put 
differently, 
allowing 
allegations 
of 
misrepresentation to take claims like this outside the workers’ 
compensation system would disturb the carefully balanced 
scheme the Legislature designed.   
A plaintiff may, however, allege a tort claim under 
circumstances not argued here.  A plaintiff may pursue tort 
claims for intentional misconduct that has only a questionable 
relationship to the employment, an injury that did not occur 
while the employee was performing a service incidental to and 
a risk of the employment, or where the employer stepped out of 
its proper role.  (Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 702, 713 
(Fermino) [citing Cole, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 161].)  These types 
of injuries are beyond the compensation bargain.  (Fermino, 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
33 
 
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 714.)  But these are not the types of 
injuries the Gunds assert.  Their assertion that Corporal 
Whitman’s misrepresentations caused their injuries turns on 
his state of mind and does not present a case in which he 
engaged in some conduct beyond the employment-like 
relationship created by section 3366.  Also lying well beyond the 
compensation bargain, and an exception to the exclusivity 
provision, are injuries where the employer’s motive violates a 
fundamental policy of the state.  (Charles J. Vacanti, M.D. v. 
State Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 812.)  The Gunds 
assert that Corporal Whitman’s alleged misrepresentations 
inducing their assistance constitute such a violation of 
fundamental policy.  We need not address that contention here, 
though, because the Gunds did not raise this argument in the 
trial court, the Court of Appeal, or their Opening Brief.  The first 
time the Gunds raise this argument is in their Reply Brief.  This 
argument is, therefore, forfeited.  Our holding today does not 
foreclose a civil action where this argument is properly raised.7 
Finally, although workers’ compensation does not provide 
the full menu of remedies available in tort, it is far from 
meaningless.  Injured civilians, like the Gunds, can receive 
compensation for their injuries without having to fight over 
what an officer communicated or whether it amounted to 
negligence.  (§ 3600, subd. (a)(3).)  This is a simpler path to 
compensation.  The workers’ compensation scheme also 
accounts for injuries resulting from employer misconduct.  
                                                 
7 
Our holding also does not bear on the viability of claims 
under Title 42 United States Code section 1983.  (See Martinez 
v. California (1980) 444 U.S. 277, 284, fn. 8 [“ ‘Conduct by 
persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . cannot be immunized by state law’ ”)].) 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
34 
 
Section 4600, subdivision (a) provides for treatment “that is 
reasonably required to cure or relieve the injured worker from 
the effects of the worker’s injury.”  And section 4553 provides 
that the amount of coverage recoverable “shall be increased one-
half . . . where the employee is injured by reason of the serious 
and willful misconduct” of certain agents of the employer.  The 
purpose of this provision is to provide “more nearly full 
compensation to an injured employee” who is injured as a result 
of such willful misconduct.  (State Dept. of Correction v. 
Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 885, 889.)  This 
enhanced workers’ compensation benefit is available against 
public employers.  (Id. at p. 891.)  This means that although the 
workers’ compensation scheme allows more limited recovery 
than what is available through tort litigation (see, e.g., 
Shoemaker, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 16), plaintiffs like the Gunds 
may be able to recover more complete compensatory damages if 
they are able to establish willful misconduct. 
Simply alleging a request for assistance contained a 
misrepresentation, without more, does not preclude application 
of section 3366 and the exclusivity provision.  Neither do 
misrepresentations alter our construction of “active law 
enforcement service,” which considers the type of task rather 
than an individual’s subjective understanding of risk.  
IV. 
Section 3366 protects the public by spreading the costs of 
injuries risked by the people who volunteer to assist police by 
providing “active law enforcement service.”  When members of 
the public assist the police by performing a task within the 
purview of officers’ conventional “law enforcement” duties — 
those directly concerned with enforcing the laws, investigating 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
35 
 
or preventing crime, or providing public protection — members 
of the public assuming the risk of helping are protected by 
workers’ compensation just as police officers are.  Both the 
relevant words and underlying logic of the statute compel us to 
understand “active law enforcement service” requested by a 
peace officer in capacious terms.  Encompassed by these words 
are activities objectively associated with functions such as 
public protection or criminal investigation and enforcement, 
without regard to whether the requesting officer sufficiently 
conveys the full extent of the risks or whether a volunteer 
subjectively understands the risks police were asking her to 
assume.  This is the reading most consistent with section 3366’s 
purpose as reflected in its language, structural logic, and 
legislative history.  Officers rightly concerned about public 
protection would do well to help volunteers understand the risks 
they may be assuming to assist in “active law enforcement 
service,” but nothing in the statute renders the term malleable 
enough to make access to workers’ compensation turn on the 
contingency of whether volunteers understood they were 
assuming substantial risk to assist in policing.  Whatever the 
ultimate limits of “active law enforcement service” in this 
context, we cannot find a sensible rationale to exclude the 
Gunds’ police-requested sortie to check on a neighbor who called 
911 for unspecified help.  
No one disputes the Gunds were selfless neighbors and, 
when carrying out Corporal Whitman’s request, model citizens.  
With little information, they agreed to help their neighbor in a 
time of need.  And they suffered mightily for providing that help.  
But we cannot fashion a rule that somehow shrinks the scope of 
workers’ compensation for the Gunds — effectively leaving them 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
36 
 
with no remedy at all for their injuries if they lack a viable tort 
claim — while keeping it robustly consistent with its 
legislatively determined scope for countless other volunteers.  
When injuries to a volunteer trigger provisions making society 
bear the cost of those harms through workers’ compensation, 
this means greater protection for volunteers assisting law 
enforcement, and greater clarity for society about the costs it 
must bear through its institutions when harms tragically occur.  
Because the help the Gunds provided was active law 
enforcement service, and the workers’ compensation bargain 
offers protection with one hand even as it removes access to civil 
recourse with the other, the only remedy available to the Gunds 
is through workers’ compensation.  This outcome makes it easier 
for police to benefit from the public’s help, and ultimately, for 
the public to benefit from the police’s help. 
So we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
1 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
S249792 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Groban 
 
On a small ranch in a remote area, near the end of winter, 
Norma Gund received an unexpected call from Trinity County 
Sheriff’s Corporal Ronald Whitman.  Corporal Whitman told Ms. 
Gund that her neighbor had called 911 asking for unspecified help.  
After learning that Ms. Gund and her husband, James Gund, had 
been to the neighbor’s house “many times” before to help the prior 
owner with weather-related events such as “snow and fallen trees,” 
Corporal Whitman remarked “There’s a big storm coming.  That 
must be what this is all about.  It’s probably no big deal.”  The 
Gunds are a middle-aged couple who have no law enforcement 
training or experience.  But, having heard Corporal Whitman’s 
assessment that the 911 call “must be” weather related and was 
“probably no big deal,” the Gunds readily obliged with his request 
to go check on their neighbor.    
 While driving to their neighbor’s house, the Gunds 
speculated that their neighbor — “a young, naïve city girl” who had 
just recently moved to the area — might be having trouble 
operating her wood-burning stove or, perhaps, a tree had fallen on 
her house.  Unbeknownst to the Gunds, Corporal Whitman had 
omitted crucial facts including that their neighbor had whispered 
on the 911 call; had desperately repeated “help” over and over 
again before abruptly ending the call; and the Highway Patrol 
dispatcher who had received the call was leery of calling the 
neighbor back because it sounded like “she’s trying to hide the fact 
that she’s calling [911] from somebody.”  Corporal Whitman also 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Groban, J., dissenting 
 
2 
 
failed to mention that a different dispatcher had nevertheless twice 
attempted to call the neighbor back, but those calls went 
unanswered.     
Oblivious to any potential risk and thinking she was about to 
assist a neighbor with a nondangerous task, Ms. Gund entered the 
neighbor’s house alone and unarmed while Mr. Gund waited in the 
car.  Inside the house, a murderer had just killed the Gunds’ 
neighbor and her boyfriend.  The still-present murderer 
immediately attacked Ms. Gund with a stun gun and a knife, 
brutally slashing her throat and face.  Upon hearing the 
commotion, Mr. Gund got out of the car and approached the house.  
He saw the murderer cutting his wife and, when he ran inside to 
try to protect her, the murderer began to attack Mr. Gund.  Ms. 
Gund fled the scene and frantically drove to a nearby store to seek 
help.  Meanwhile, Mr. Gund fought for his life as the murderer 
repeatedly “Tased” him, punched him, and cut his throat.  
Somehow, Mr. Gund managed to wrestle the knife out of the 
murderer’s hands and escaped by running through the woods back 
to his home.  The Gunds suffered near-fatal injuries but 
miraculously survived.  
Based on the belief that the Gunds were providing “active law 
enforcement service” (Lab. Code, § 3366, subd. (a)) when they 
became the unwitting victims of this horrific crime, the majority 
holds that the Gunds are limited to workers’ compensation and 
cannot sue in tort to recover damages for their injuries.  The 
majority’s view is premised on an assumption I cannot accept:  An 
unarmed, untrained middle-aged couple, by stumbling upon an 
active murder scene, were in fact working as law enforcement 
officers.  In reality, neither the Gunds nor Corporal Whitman 
reasonably believed that, by asking the Gunds to check on the 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Groban, J., dissenting 
 
3 
 
neighbor to help with a weather-related event, Corporal Whitman 
was actually asking the Gunds to perform a law enforcement 
officer’s job of investigating a crime, arresting a criminal, or 
performing some other particularly hazardous task for the 
protection of the public.  The Gunds’ understanding was objectively 
reasonable in light of Corporal Whitman’s opinion that the call 
“must be” all about a big storm coming and was “probably no big 
deal.”  But in the majority’s view, Corporal Whitman’s assessment 
of the nature of the 911 call does not matter.  Corporal Whitman’s 
failure to inform the Gunds that their neighbor had whispered on 
the 911 call does not matter.  Corporal Whitman’s failure to inform 
the Gunds that the neighbor had desperately repeated “help” over 
and over again before abruptly ending the call does not matter.  
Corporal Whitman’s failure to inform the Gunds that the county 
dispatcher’s return calls went unanswered does not matter.  The 
Gunds’ prior experiences in helping with weather-related events at 
the neighbor’s house does not matter.  Even lies do not matter.   
I disagree.  
I. DISCUSSION 
I begin by noting the points on which I agree with the 
majority, as our agreement is considerable.  I agree with the 
majority’s proposed two-part test to determine whether Labor Code 
section 3366, subdivision (a) (section 3366) applies.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 8.)  I also agree that the peace officer’s request informs 
the determination of whether section 3366 applies.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 8, 23.)  I agree that the civilian’s subjective beliefs 
regarding the nature of the requested assistance or its attendant 
risks are irrelevant.  (Id. at pp. 30–31.)  I further agree that the 
question of whether a peace officer requested the civilian to assist 
with a task that qualifies as active law enforcement service is an 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Groban, J., dissenting 
 
4 
 
objective inquiry.  (Id. at pp. 20, 30–31.)1  Finally, I agree that a 
request to investigate possible criminal activity is a request for 
active law enforcement service.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 25.)   
My disagreement lies with the majority’s conclusion that the 
“specific details” of the exchange between Corporal Whitman and 
Ms. Gund “do not change the essential nature of his request.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 26.)  In my view, the details change everything.  
The majority frames its test to determine whether something 
qualifies as active law enforcement service at an exceedingly high 
level of generality, first by describing the phrase as “capacious” (id. 
at pp. 11, 14, 19, 25, 35) and then by focusing on only the “essential 
nature of the requested task” (id. at p. 27, fn. 5).  But if we agree 
that “ ‘the words, facts, and context’ of a peace officer’s request” 
matter (ibid.), then the “specific details” (id. at p. 26) of the 
exchange between Ms. Gund and Corporal Whitman should matter 
too.  I do not understand why the majority limits its inquiry by 
excluding any analysis of what the parties objectively understood 
about the nature of the requested task.  While I agree with the 
majority that the inquiry is objective, I would formulate the 
objective test differently.  We should examine everything that was 
said, and everything that was not said, when Corporal Whitman 
made his fateful request of the Gunds, and ask whether an 
                                                 
1  
The majority describes the Gunds’ position as being 
premised on “what they subjectively believed to be true about 
[their neighbor’s] 911 call” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 30) and whether 
they “subjectively understood the hazards involved in assisting 
an officer” (id. at p. 31).  I do not interpret the Gunds’ argument 
in the same way.  The Gunds seem to agree the inquiry is 
objective, asserting that the question is “whether a reasonable 
person . . . would reasonably perceive a need for assistance 
related to the enforcement of law or suppression of crime” based 
on Corporal Whitman’s request.   
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Groban, J., dissenting 
 
5 
 
objectively reasonable person would understand his request to be 
one for assistance with a task that qualifies as active law 
enforcement service.   
While I believe many requests to respond to a 911 call of an 
uncertain nature will objectively be understood as a request for 
assistance with active law enforcement service, Corporal 
Whitman’s request was different.  Corporal Whitman expressly 
characterized the nature of the call, assuring Ms. Gund that the 
request “must be” about “a big storm coming” and was “probably no 
big deal.”  He also failed to relay to Ms. Gund critical details of the 
911 call that would make her aware of the true nature of the 
request and the potential danger.  The majority believes that this 
context does not matter.  I believe it is crucial.  Indeed, the 
Legislature recognized in enacting section 3366 that peace officers 
are authority figures that most people respect, trust, and obey.  
(Second Supp. to Mem. No. 23 (1962), Subject: Study No. 52(L) – 
Sovereign Immunity (Workmen’s Compensation for Persons 
Assisting Peace Officers) (May 18, 1962) Cal. Law Revision Com. 
(1962) p. 1 (hereafter Second Supplement To Memorandum 23) 
[recognizing that many people would feel it was their “civic duty” 
to assist a police officer whenever requested to do so].)  Thus, at the 
core of section 3366 is an acknowledgment that civilians give 
considerable deference to peace officers.  Although the majority 
observes this principle (maj. opn., ante, at p. 17), it ultimately 
devalues it by discounting the import of Corporal Whitman’s 
representation to Ms. Gund that the call “must be” related to the 
weather.  But if we agree that the inquiry is objective rather than 
subjective, and if we agree that any civilian receiving such a 
request would likely defer to the authority of the peace officer, then 
Corporal Whitman’s judgment as to what the 911 call “must be” 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Groban, J., dissenting 
 
6 
 
about is key.  Corporal Whitman — the person with law 
enforcement experience and the person who had spoken directly 
with a dispatcher regarding the 911 call — told Ms. Gund that the 
call “must be” related to the weather and was “probably no big 
deal.”  The Gunds had every right to believe him.2   
I also cannot accept the majority’s conclusion that Corporal 
Whitman’s alleged omissions would simply have provided “more 
information” to the Gunds.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 31.)  This, in my 
view, is a significant understatement.  The majority and I agree 
that the inquiry here is an objective one, but I believe that this 
inquiry should take into account the relevant facts and 
circumstances of the particular case.  We must therefore ask 
ourselves if an objectively reasonable person would consider the 
following facts to be material in determining the type of assistance 
requested and whether to agree to render the requested assistance: 
(1) the 911 caller had desperately repeated “help” over and over 
again before abruptly ending the call; (2) the Highway Patrol 
dispatcher who had received the call was leery of calling the 
neighbor back because it sounded like “she’s trying to hide the fact 
that she’s calling [911] from somebody”; and (3) the Trinity County 
dispatcher had nevertheless twice attempted to call the neighbor 
back, but those calls went unanswered.  We should further ask 
ourselves whether a reasonable person would have found these 
facts to be highly relevant before deciding whether to enter the 
                                                 
2  
The majority emphasizes that Corporal Whitman advised 
Ms. Gund not to go to her neighbor’s house alone (maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 26), but this advice came before he rendered his 
opinion that the call was “probably no big deal.”  And, although 
Corporal Whitman also asked Ms. Gund whether the caller’s 
boyfriend had ever seemed violent, Ms. Gund replied “he seems 
real mellow.”   
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Groban, J., dissenting 
 
7 
 
home, alone and unarmed.  Possessed of these details, would Mr. 
Gund really have chosen to wait in the car while sending his wife 
into the neighbor’s house alone?   
To accept the majority’s holding that the Gunds were asked 
to and did in fact engage in an inherently dangerous law 
enforcement task, one must accept its implicit suggestion that the 
Gunds acted incredibly recklessly by having Ms. Gund walk in to 
the home unarmed, with little or no preparation, while her 
husband waited in the car.  One must also accept the majority’s 
implicit, if not explicit, assumption that Corporal Whitman asked 
two untrained, unarmed middle-aged civilians to risk injury or 
death to “investigate and prevent crime, enforce the laws, and 
protect the public” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 26) without the aid of 
trained law enforcement officers.  Even the Trinity County Sheriff’s 
Department denied that it would ever do such a thing, stating in a 
press release issued shortly after the incident that it would never 
“send a citizen to perform a Deputy’s job.”  (Sabalow, This couple 
was attacked by knife-wielding killer. Did their sheriff put them in 
harm’s 
way?, 
Sacramento 
Bee 
(Aug. 
29, 
2018) 
 [as 
of August 27, 2020] (hereafter Sabalow).) 3   I believe that a 
reasonable person, upon hearing Corporal Whitman’s description 
of the 911 call — which characterized the call as “no big deal” and 
weather related and omitted crucial details that would have 
alerted the Gunds to the potential danger — would not have 
understood Corporal Whitman’s request to be seeking help with 
                                                 
3  
All Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, 
docket number, and case name at . 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Groban, J., dissenting 
 
8 
 
“the investigation and prevention of criminal activity.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 22.) 
The majority at one point suggests that misrepresentations 
may matter if they alter the “essential nature of the requested 
task” (maj. opn., ante,  at p. 27, fn. 5; see id. at p. 28, fn. 6), but then 
it later implies that misrepresentations are irrelevant since 
workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy even where 
employees 
allege 
that 
their 
employers 
intentionally 
misrepresented the hazards of employment in order to induce them 
to accept employment (id. at pp. 31–32).4  Though the majority does 
not explain how to distinguish between misrepresentations that go 
to the “essential nature of the requested task” (id. at p. 27, fn. 5) 
from other kinds of misrepresentations, I understand that the 
majority may be rightly concerned about a holding that concludes 
that misrepresentations are never relevant to the analysis.  The 
majority may also be wary of creating a bright-line rule under 
which all responses to 911 calls would constitute active law 
enforcement service, as some clearly do not.  Many 911 calls verge 
on the absurd, with callers complaining about the size of clams 
served at a restaurant, cats stuck under the hood of a car, or a lack 
of internet service.  (Jarosz, Abuse of 911: Alarming number of 
callers use emergency service as customer service line, KTVU Fox 2 
(Sept. 
25, 
2018) 
 [as of August 27, 2020].)  The majority considers the 
context and content of the request, but only to determine whether 
the peace officer conveyed a request to respond to a 911 call seeking 
unspecified help.  It therefore appears to conclude that all 
responses to 911 calls of an uncertain nature constitute active law 
enforcement as a matter of law, irrespective of whether the parties 
to the request themselves understood that the response would 
require members of the public to assume the functions and risks of 
a peace officer.  But the majority cannot have it both ways:  If the 
context and content of what was known and conveyed as part of the 
peace officer’s request matters in some instances, then it must 
matter in all instances.  I certainly think it matters here.  
I do not mean to suggest that Corporal Whitman 
intentionally misrepresented the true nature of the situation or 
wished the Gunds any harm.  Corporal Whitman was hours away 
from the 911 caller’s home and may have simply been trying to find 
a solution to a very difficult dilemma.  Nevertheless, as a general 
matter, if a peace officer’s misrepresentations and omissions 
regarding the nature of the 911 call or the requested assistance 
may be ignored (see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 31–32), then a peace 
officer could intentionally lie about the potential danger involved 
and assure the civilian that no harm will come to him or her, and 
the civilian still would be unable to pursue a remedy in tort.  Under 
the majority’s holding, if the peace officer requests assistance with 
a task that entails a possibility of requiring a law enforcement 
response, then the civilian is bound by section 3366 regardless of 
what the civilian reasonably understood about the nature of the 
requested task in light of the peace officer’s misrepresentations.  
This cannot be right.  
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Groban, J., dissenting 
 
10 
 
To illustrate this quandary further, consider the disparate 
results that would likely result under the majority’s holding in the 
following two scenarios:  Suppose a peace officer requests a civilian 
to help a neighbor who was having trouble starting her car, even 
though the officer knew the caller had reported an armed intruder.  
The majority would likely hold that because the peace officer’s 
misrepresentation “alter[ed] the essential nature of the requested 
task” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 27, fn. 5), section 3366 does not apply.  
But suppose the officer, rather than relaying the report of an armed 
intruder, had simply misrepresented to the civilian that the 911 
caller had asked for “unspecified help.”  The officer then goes on to 
tell the following additional lies:  “This person always calls about 
car problems.  It must relate to car problems.  There is nothing to 
worry about, you will be completely safe.”  The majority would 
presumably conclude that because the peace officer requested 
assistance with “a 911 call for unspecified help — a typical law 
enforcement task” (id. at p. 28), section 3366 applies.  The only true 
difference between these two hypothetical scenarios is, in the first 
scenario, the peace officer lied by stating that the caller specifically 
requested help with her car, whereas in the second scenario, the 
peace officer lied by stating the caller asked for unspecified help 
and also by misrepresenting that the call “must relate to car 
problems.”  Under the majority’s formulation, the civilian in the 
first scenario has a tort remedy, but the civilian in the second 
scenario does not.  I see no reason for this distinction.   
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Gunds 
were “enforcing the laws, investigating or preventing crime, or 
providing public protection.”   (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 34.)  Neither 
Ms. Gund (who thought that her neighbor might be having 
“trouble with her wood-burning stove”), Mr. Gund (who let his 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Groban, J., dissenting 
 
11 
 
wife walk into the neighbor’s house while he waited in the car), 
Corporal Whitman (who said the call “must be all about” “a big 
storm coming”) nor the Trinity County Sheriff’s Department 
(which said it would never “send citizen to perform a Deputy’s 
job” (Sabalow, supra, at )) thought the Gunds were “assuming the 
law enforcement duties and risks of police officers.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 20.)  When peace officers perform active law enforcement 
service, they do so knowingly and with some level of preparation.  
Similarly, in those few cases in which we have analyzed whether 
certain civilians were entitled to workers’ compensation when they 
were commanded to assist in a law enforcement task, those 
civilians knew they were assuming the functions and risks of a 
peace officer and were at least somewhat prepared to do so.  (See, 
e.g., Monterey County v. Rader (1926) 199 Cal. 221, 223 [civilian 
was given a firearm and was led by trained officers in attempting 
to capture criminals].)  Here, in contrast, Ms. Gund entered the 
house alone and unarmed, neither of the Gunds demonstrating any 
concern for her safety.  The Gunds clearly did not expect to, and 
were not prepared to, investigate a possible crime, arrest a 
criminal, or prevent a breach of the peace, nor should they have 
been given their reasonable understanding, based on Corporal 
Whitman’s request, that checking on their neighbor would not 
require them to perform a law enforcement task.   
And the Gunds were right not to assume that their response 
to the 911 call would require them to “enforce[] the laws, 
investigat[e] or prevent[] crime, or provid[e] public protection”   
(maj. opn., ante, at p. 34) since most 911 calls do not involve 
criminal activity.  (Neusteter et al., The 911 Call Processing 
System: A Review of the Literature as it Relates to Policing, Vera 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Groban, J., dissenting 
 
12 
 
Institute of Justice (July 2019) p. 34 [most 911 calls “are unrelated 
to crimes in progress”].)  The Sacramento Police Department 
reports that its officers have spent only 4 percent of their time this 
year responding to calls reporting violent crimes and only 19 
percent of their time responding to calls reporting nonviolent 
crimes.  (Asher & Horwitz, How Do the Police Actually Spend Their 
Time?, 
N.Y. 
Times 
(June 
19, 
2020) 
 [as of August 27, 2020].)  Similarly, of the 
nearly 18 million 911 calls logged by the Los Angeles Police 
Department in 2010, less than 8 percent reported violent crimes.  
(Rubin & Poston, LAPD responds to a million 911 calls a year, but 
relatively few for violent crimes, L.A. Times (July 5, 2020) 
 [as of August 27, 2020].)  The Gunds were 
not entering their neighbor’s house to perform an inherently 
dangerous law enforcement task.  Instead, the Gunds reasonably 
understood that they were being asked to provide neighborly 
assistance with a weather-related problem and tragically stumbled 
into a murder scene. 
 The majority purposefully avoids “[d]rawing precise lines to 
define” what tasks would fall within “active law enforcement 
service” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 25) and instead repeatedly describes 
the phrase as being “capacious” (id. at pp. 11, 14, 19, 25, 35).  
Nonetheless, the majority nowhere suggests that assisting a 
neighbor with snow, a fallen tree, a wood-burning stove, or some 
other weather-related problem objectively qualifies as active law 
enforcement service.  Nor could it reasonably do so given that, as 
the majority acknowledges, the phrase “active law enforcement 
service” as used elsewhere in the Labor and Government Code has 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Groban, J., dissenting 
 
13 
 
long been defined as encompassing “a peace officer’s duties directly 
concerned with functions such as enforcing laws, investigating and 
preventing criminal activity, and protecting the public.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 22; see also Kimball v. County of Santa Clara (1972) 24 
Cal.App.3d 780, 785 [active law enforcement service encompasses 
particularly hazardous job functions undertaken for the protection 
of the public].)  The court in Crumpler v. Board of Administration 
(1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 567, for example, held that animal control 
officers who are hired by the police department, wear uniforms, and 
carry guns do not principally perform “active law enforcement 
service” because they do not deal with hazardous crimes “against 
persons and property.”  (Crumpler, at p. 579.)  The court found 
persuasive an Attorney General opinion — one which was issued 
10 years prior to section 3366’s enactment — that defines “active 
law enforcement service” as including “duties which expose officers 
to physical risk” such as “ ‘the active investigation and suppression 
of crime; the arrest and detention of criminals and the 
administrative control of such duties.’ ”  (Crumpler, at p. 577, 
quoting 22 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 227, 229 (1953).)  This definition is 
in accord with the Legislature’s intent in enacting section 3366 that 
only those civilians who “assume the risk of death or serious injury 
to provide . . .  protection to the public” at the request of a peace 
officer 
would 
be 
covered 
by 
workers’ 
compensation.  
(Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, Number 6 — 
Workmens’ Compensation Benefits for Persons Assisting Law 
Enforcement or Fire Control Officers (Jan. 1963) 4 Cal. Law 
Revision Com. Rep. (1963) p. 1505.)  Simply put, a civilian does not 
risk death or serious injury for the protection of the public by 
helping a neighbor with a weather-related event. 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Groban, J., dissenting 
 
14 
 
I am additionally unpersuaded by the majority’s policy 
rationales for its holding.  The majority reasons that “quicker 
availability of [workers’ compensation] benefits can incentivize 
individuals to oblige a peace officer’s request for help, because they 
will ostensibly be less concerned with the financial consequences of 
potential injury or death.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)  Though a 
person might conceivably be motivated to assist a peace officer 
based on the availability of workers’ compensation, I am skeptical 
that the average civilian would make a quick assessment of 
possible tort or statutory recovery outcomes before complying with 
a peace officer’s request.  As noted above, the Legislature 
recognized that most people will feel compelled to assist peace 
officers as part of their “civic duty” and regardless of whether 
compensation for their injuries might be available.  (Second Supp. 
To Mem. 23, supra, at p. 1.)  I certainly cannot imagine that the 
Gunds were thinking about the ready availability of workers’ 
compensation when they agreed to check on their neighbor at 
Corporal Whitman’s request.  Moreover, the rule embraced by the 
majority — one that allows peace officers to omit crucial 
information or even to lie in order to convince civilians to render 
assistance without risking tort liability — will only disincentivize 
civilians from agreeing to help.  (See Commission on Peace Officer 
Standards & Training v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278, 298 
[“ ‘The abuse of a patrolman’s office can have great potentiality for 
social harm’ ”]; Schuster v. City of New York (1958) 5 N.Y.2d 75, 
80–81 [154 N.E.2d 534] [the government “owes a special duty to 
use reasonable care for the protection of persons who have 
collaborated with it in the arrest or prosecution of criminals” 
because it would otherwise “become difficult to convince the civilian 
to aid and co-operate with the law enforcement officers”].)         
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Groban, J., dissenting 
 
15 
 
More fundamentally, I am wary of the majority’s tendency to 
view the availability of workers’ compensation as beneficial to 
civilians, no matter the circumstances.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 
15–19.)   The so-called workers’ compensation bargain is just 
that — a bargain.  “It should not be viewed as a victory of 
employees over employers.”  (Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change 
and the Law of Industrial Accidents (1967) 67 Colum. L.Rev. 50, 
71.)  Workers’ compensation may be “a simpler path to 
compensation” for the Gunds (maj. opn., ante, at p. 33), but it is not 
their preferred path, which is why they so vigorously oppose its 
application here.  The majority’s ruling precludes the Gunds from 
seeking “pain and suffering” damages (San Bernardino County v. 
State Indus. Acc. Commission (1933) 217 Cal. 618, 625), which 
includes damages to compensate them for their physical pain as 
well 
as 
any 
“fright, 
nervousness, 
grief, 
anxiety, 
worry, 
mortification, shock, humiliation, indignity, embarrassment, 
apprehension, terror or ordeal” they have suffered since becoming 
the victims of a particularly brutal attack (Capelouto v. Kaiser 
Foundation Hospitals (1972) 7 Cal.3d 889, 892–893).  I do not think 
anyone doubts that the Gunds have suffered considerable pain and 
suffering as a result of this horrible crime, but the majority’s 
holding will not allow them to be compensated for it.  The Gunds 
will also be unable to seek punitive damages to compensate them 
for defendants’ alleged wrongdoing.  (Johns-Manville Products 
Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 465, 478.)   
The majority worries about creating a rule that looks closely 
at the specific details and context of the peace officer’s request, 
believing this would open the door for defendants to refuse to 
provide workers’ compensation by claiming that the request did not 
specifically seek assistance with a law enforcement task.  (Maj. 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Groban, J., dissenting 
 
16 
 
opn., ante, at p. 28, fn. 6.)  While this is a legitimate concern, I 
believe it is overstated.  The facts of this case are incredibly unique 
and are unlikely to recur.  Many cases in which a peace officer seeks 
a civilian’s assistance in responding to a 911 call of an uncertain 
nature will likely fall within the scope of section 3366.  If, for 
example, Corporal Whitman shared the key details of the 911 call 
and did not further opine that the call “must be” about the weather 
and was “probably no big deal,” an objectively reasonable person 
might well conclude that responding to the call entailed the 
possibility of performing a law enforcement task.  We can recognize 
that the singular facts presented here entitle the Gunds to seek tort 
relief without precluding courts from finding, in another case, that 
a different peace officer’s request for a civilian to respond to a 
different 911 call is covered by section 3366.  We can also do so 
without more broadly undermining our workers’ compensation 
system 
or 
the 
Legislature’s 
intent 
to 
provide 
workers’ 
compensation to civilians who assume the functions and risks of a 
peace officer.    
We need not decide how every factual scenario, however 
unlikely or bizarre, might be decided under this highly esoteric 
statute.  In this case, Corporal Whitman affirmatively described 
the call as weather related and assured Ms. Gund that the call was 
“probably no big deal” while also failing to disclose the details of 
the call that would have revealed the potential danger and need for 
law enforcement service.  The Gunds had every reason to believe 
Corporal Whitman and almost lost their lives in doing so.  They 
should not lose their tort claims as well.   
II. CONCLUSION 
In sum, I agree with the majority that section 3366 applies 
when a civilian agrees to perform active law enforcement service at 
 
GUND v. COUNTY OF TRINITY 
Groban, J., dissenting 
 
17 
 
a peace officer’s request.  But I disagree that Corporal Whitman 
asked the Gunds to perform an active law enforcement task.  
Instead, it was objectively reasonable for the Gunds to believe that 
Corporal Whitman asked them to render neighborly assistance 
with a relatively risk-free weather-related problem.  It was 
objectively reasonable because Corporal Whitman told the Gunds 
that the 911 call “must be” weather related and was “probably no 
big deal.”  He also failed to disclose important details from the 911 
call that would have made them aware of the potential danger they 
faced and that they were being asked to assume the particularly 
hazardous functions and risks of a law enforcement officer.  More 
broadly, I believe that the words, facts, and context of the peace 
officer’s request matters.  The majority does not see their 
significance here, but I do.  I would therefore hold that the Gunds 
are not subject to section 3366 and would reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal.  Because the majority holds otherwise, I 
respectfully dissent.      
GROBAN, J. 
 
I Concur: 
CHIN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Gund v. County of Trinity   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XX 24 Cal.App.5th 185 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S249792  
Date Filed:  August 27, 2020  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior    
County:  Trinity    
Judge:  Richard Scheuler    
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Zwerdling, Bragg & Mainzer, Bragg, Mainzer & Firpo and Benjamin H. Mainzer for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
 
Porter Scott and John R. Whitefleet for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Arthur J. Wylene for Rural County Representatives of California and League of California Cities as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Benjamin H. Mainzer 
Bragg, Mainzer & Firpo, LLP 
804 Third Street 
Eureka, CA 95501 
(707) 445-7917 
 
John R. Whitefleet 
PORTER SCOTT 
350 University Avenue, Suite 200 
Sacramento, CA 95825   
(916) 929-1481