Title: P. v. Dykes

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 6/15/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S050851 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
EARNEST EDWARD DYKES, JR., 
) 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 118376 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Defendant Earnest Edward Dykes appeals from a judgment of the Alameda 
County Superior Court imposing a sentence of death following his conviction of 
the first degree murder of Lance Clark (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 one count of 
attempted murder (§§ 664, 189), and one count of robbery (§ 211), both involving 
Bernice Clark.  In connection with each count, the jury found true an allegation 
that defendant personally used a firearm.  (§ 12022.5.)  With respect to the charge 
of attempted murder, the jury found not true an allegation that the attempted 
murder had been willful, deliberate, and premeditated.  (§§ 189, 664, subd. (a).)  
In connection with the attempted murder and robbery counts, the jury found true 
the allegations that the victim suffered great bodily injury and that she was a 
victim age 70 years or older.  (§ 12022.7, subd. (c).)  The jury found true a 
robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).)  At 
                                            
1  
Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.  
2 
the penalty phase of the trial the jury determined that the punishment should be 
death.  The trial court imposed a sentence of death and imposed sentence on the 
noncapital offenses.  Defendant‟s appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)   
We affirm the judgment in its entirety.  
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase Evidence 
Bernice Clark owned an apartment building in Oakland.  During a period of 
unemployment, defendant, who was 20 years of age, resided for several months 
with his mother in one of the apartments in Bernice‟s building.  The apartment 
defendant shared with his mother overlooked the rear parking lot of the building.   
Tenants, including defendant, were aware that Bernice carried ample cash 
with her on her frequent visits to the apartment building.  On her visits, Bernice 
cashed checks for tenants and lent them money; she had cashed a check for 
defendant.  Indeed, another tenant, LaCondra Douglas, had warned Bernice not to 
carry cash with her.  Douglas testified that defendant had expressed an intent to 
rob Bernice prior to the commission of the charged crimes.  Tenants testified that 
they had observed Lance Clark, the murder victim, who was Bernice‟s young 
grandson, accompanying Bernice on her rounds on multiple occasions.     
In November 1992, defendant acquired a .45-caliber revolver.  Bianca 
Rodriguez, then his girlfriend, testified that at his request she gave him the money 
with which to purchase the weapon. Douglas testified that about two months prior 
to the commission of the charged crimes, she sold defendant approximately 20 
bullets for his handgun.   
On the afternoon of July 26, 1993, Bernice, who was then 70 years of age, 
and her grandson Lance, then nine years of age, drove to the rear parking lot of the 
apartment building, where she consulted with her handyman.  Bernice testified 
3 
that she was approached by one of her tenants, Edward Tyson, who asked to 
borrow $20.  She agreed, and while he was signing a receipt, a man approached 
wearing a stocking mask.  The man placed a dark object against her head.  She 
recognized the man as defendant and told him that he looked like one of her 
tenants.  She heard a shot, then defendant said something about money or a 
holdup, and she recalled a struggle over her wallet.  She heard only one shot, but 
her recollection of the crime was confused, and she was unable to hear well after 
the weapon discharged.   
Tyson testified that on the afternoon of July 26, 1993, Bernice agreed to 
lend him $20.  He heard her drive to the rear parking lot and approached her as she 
sat in the driver‟s seat with the door open.  Tyson observed Lance seated in the 
passenger seat of the vehicle.  As Tyson signed a receipt, a man approached 
wearing a light-colored hooded sweatshirt.  He had a woman‟s nylon stocking 
over his head.  The man demanded money of Tyson, but Tyson backed away and 
denied he had any.  Tyson witnessed the man point his weapon at Bernice and 
demand money.  Tyson heard Bernice inform the man that he resembled one of 
her tenants named Earnest.  Tyson fled, and as he passed a gap in the fence he 
heard a firearm “dry fire.”  He subsequently heard two shots in quick succession, 
the first followed by a sound of breaking glass.  After an interval he heard a third 
shot.  He heard the robber continue to demand money after the first shot.   
Alphonso Odom, who had been staying for several months with a resident 
of the apartment building located next to the one owned by Bernice, testified that 
he was acquainted with defendant and with Bernice.  Odom observed defendant in 
front of the apartment building a few minutes prior to the shooting.  Defendant 
was wearing a grey hooded sweatshirt and green or blue acid-washed jeans.  
Odom observed Bernice drive with her grandson to the rear of the apartment 
building.  Shortly thereafter, Odom heard two shots and witnessed the second shot 
4 
being fired as he stood on his apartment balcony.  He observed defendant standing 
by Bernice‟s vehicle holding a firearm and wearing a gray sweatshirt and green or 
blue acid-washed jeans.  He heard the sound of breaking glass after the second 
shot, and observed defendant flee over the back fence.   
Odom ran from his apartment to the scene of the shooting, joining Tyson, 
who had returned after initially fleeing.  They observed Lance slumped over in the 
automobile.  Bernice‟s neck was bleeding.  Lance had been shot and soon stopped 
breathing.  Emergency medical personnel were unable to revive him. 
Tyson remained at the scene, while Odom returned to his apartment.  Tyson 
gave a statement to the police, picked defendant‟s photograph from a photo lineup, 
and reported that the robber‟s voice sounded like defendant‟s.  Odom, on the other 
hand, did not contact the police concerning his knowledge of the crime until after 
he was arrested on unrelated charges a few days subsequent to the commission of 
the charged offenses.  He hoped for leniency in return for information he was able 
to provide.  His testimony was impeached with prior felony convictions.   
Defendant changed his attire and returned to the scene of the shooting.  
There he spoke with a police officer, stating that he had observed Tyson speaking 
with Bernice as she sat in her vehicle and that as he crossed the parking lot he 
heard shots.  An unidentified, armed Black male wearing jeans and a white hooded 
sweatshirt ran past him and fled over the back fence.  The officer testified that 
defendant appeared composed and was not intoxicated.  Odom overheard some of 
this discussion, reporting that defendant told the officer, “that‟s messed up.  The 
dude ran right by me.”   
In the afternoon or evening of July 26, 1993, Odom lent his bicycle to 
defendant.  When defendant returned with some beer, defendant said to Odom, 
“that was f‟d up, you know, what happened.”  Odom agreed and said he knew 
5 
defendant was responsible for the shooting.  Odom testified that defendant 
admitted he was the culprit and said, “man, I didn‟t mean it to go down like that.”   
Lance was killed by a single gunshot that passed through his body from his 
left chest, exiting on the lower right side of his back.  There was a large entry 
wound, indicating the same bullet had passed through Bernice‟s neck before it 
struck Lance.  The forensic pathologist, Dr. Paul Hermann, was unable to 
determine with certainty Lance‟s position when he was shot, but the pathologist 
believed Lance had been leaning to the left.  Bernice received an injury to her neck 
but survived. 
An examination of Bernice‟s automobile produced a bullet lodged inside 
the rear door on the passenger side.  The impact of the bullet had shattered the 
door‟s window.  Another bullet later was discovered in the front passenger floor 
area. 
Dr. Lansing Lee, a firearms expert, testified that the bullets discovered in 
Bernice‟s vehicle were for a .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol.  Although the 
ammunition was manufactured for a semiautomatic weapon, it also could be fired 
by a certain vintage Colt .45-caliber revolver.  Such a weapon could be fired by 
single action if the shooter pulled back the hammer using two pounds of pressure.  
The weapon also could be fired without pulling back the hammer, but would 
require at least eight pounds of pressure to fire.   
Sergeant Madarang of the Oakland Police Department was interviewing 
Tyson at the police station on the day of the crime when he received a telephone 
call from someone who would identify herself only as Connie, stating that she had 
sold defendant some bullets a few days preceding the crime, and that defendant 
had told her he planned to rob Bernice.  In her own testimony, LaCondra Douglas 
would admit only that she placed an anonymous call to the police on that date, 
denying she had reported that defendant had purchased ammunition from her.   
6 
On August 7, 1993, defendant telephoned the Oakland Police Department, 
stating he “want[ed] to know if I shot somebody.”  He mentioned Bernice and 
provided his location, but denied responsibility for the crime.  He was arrested and 
transported to the police department for interrogation.  Arresting officers directed 
him not to speak while he was being transported, but he did so in a rambling 
manner, wondering how he could be identified and stating he would not commit 
anything like the charged crimes.  Once defendant arrived at the police station, he 
was advised of his constitutional rights and interrogated by Officers Chenault and 
Madarang.  During two hours of questioning, he denied responsibility for the 
crime.  He reported that he had heard the shots because he had been walking 
through the parking lot on his way to purchase beer, and repeated his story of 
having witnessed an unidentified Black male flee from the scene.  Ultimately the 
officers confronted him with evidence in their possession, including statements of 
eyewitnesses.  Defendant became distressed and admitted involvement in the 
shooting.  The unrecorded statement reflected the circumstance that he was aware 
prior to the shooting that Lance was in the vehicle.   
Defendant subsequently made two tape-recorded statements.  These were 
played for the jury.  In the first statement, he explained that his family expected 
more of him than he was able to deliver and that he needed money to attend Laney 
Community College.  He observed Bernice from the rear of his apartment and 
decided to rob her.  He approached the vehicle and demanded money.  She did not 
respond quickly, so he unsuccessfully attempted to fire a warning shot, and on the 
second attempt fired a shot to the rear of the vehicle, intending to destroy the rear 
window.  Bernice said “don‟t be silly, child” and told him to take the money from 
her wallet but leave the cards.  He had one hand on the wallet and the other hand, 
which was holding his firearm, on the headrest of the driver‟s seat.  During the 
struggle over the wallet, the weapon fired accidentally.  He claimed he had not 
7 
observed Lance in the vehicle.  He departed from the scene, changed his clothes, 
and returned to the apartment building to see what was happening.  He 
subsequently threw the murder weapon, a .45-caliber Colt service revolver 
manufactured in 1917, into the Oakland Estuary.  He stated he had drunk four cans 
of Olde English 800 malt liquor prior to committing the crime and one afterwards, 
but in his statement he informed the police he was not under the influence of 
alcohol when he committed the crime.  Defendant sobbed during the recorded 
statements and reiterated “I didn‟t mean for it to go down like that.  I‟m no killer.”  
He informed the officers he had spent two weeks following his commission of the 
crime drinking alcohol and using marijuana, feeling that his world was coming to 
an end.  After his father notified him he had been mentioned in the newspaper as a 
suspect in the crime, he telephoned the police department. 
Defendant testified on his own behalf at trial, giving substantially the same 
narrative he had given in his taped statements.  He testified he had spent the 
afternoon preceding the crime applying for employment, and then returned home 
and performed household chores.  When he observed Bernice drive into the rear 
parking lot of the building, he formed the intent to rob her.    He retrieved his 
loaded firearm, and then took some stockings from his mother‟s room to wear as a 
mask.  Donning jeans over his shorts and pulling the hood of his sweatshirt over 
his head to disguise himself from Bernice, he proceeded to the parking lot and 
confronted Bernice without ever observing Lance in her vehicle.  He demanded 
her money.  She said, “Don‟t be stupid, child.”  When she hesitated, he attempted 
to fire his weapon, but failed.  A second attempt resulted in a warning shot aimed 
at the rear of the vehicle.  Bernice tried to remove the cash from her wallet, but 
defendant grabbed the wallet. 
In his trial testimony, defendant claimed for the first time that after he fired 
the warning shot, LaCondra Douglas‟s boyfriend drove into the parking lot and 
8 
defendant became flustered and rushed, leading to the accidental firing of the 
weapon during his struggle with Bernice over her wallet.  He denied intending to 
shoot Bernice or injure her.  He seized the cash from the wallet and fled through a 
gap in the rear fence, wondering whether he really had shot Bernice.  He changed 
his clothing, found a hiding place for his firearm, purchased some beer, and 
shortly thereafter returned to the parking lot to find out what had transpired.  He 
lied to the police, trying to offer a description of the shooter that “somewhat” 
matched his own appearance, in case he had been observed during the shooting.  
He subsequently disposed of his weapon and spent the ensuing days in a state of 
intoxication, “trying to forget.”  He testified that he “was just doing stuff like [he] 
felt this was [his] last days on earth or something.”  After discussion with his 
father, he telephoned the police department to determine whether there was a 
warrant for his arrest.  During the initial stage of his interrogation, he had denied 
responsibility for the crimes because he was frightened.   
In the course of his testimony, defendant denied that his girlfriend had 
given him the money to buy the firearm and claimed that LaCondra Douglas had 
provided him with the ammunition free of charge, months prior to the crime.  He 
testified he had test-fired the weapon and found its firing unpredictable.  
Defendant testified he had observed Lance accompanying Bernice on only one 
occasion.  Defendant denied he had stated prior to committing the crime that he 
intended to rob Bernice, claiming he merely had been present when other tenants 
discussed robbing her.  He acknowledged he was on probation for illegal 
possession of a firearm at the time he committed the crime and knew he should not 
be armed, but he claimed he needed a weapon to protect himself from the drug 
dealers who trafficked in his neighborhood.   
9 
B.  Penalty Phase Evidence 
Penalty phase evidence introduced by the prosecution included testimony 
from Bernice, Lance‟s sister Kristie, and Lance‟s elementary school teacher.  They 
described how they had learned of Lance‟s death and described the impact of his 
death upon them.  Bernice recounted the difficult course of her recovery from her 
physical injuries. 
Oakland Police Officer Rand Monda described the circumstances of 
defendant‟s prior illegal possession of a loaded, concealed firearm.   
Defendant‟s mother, father, sister, brother, and aunt testified on his behalf, 
describing their love for him and their hope that he would be granted a sentence of 
life imprisonment. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Asserted Errors Affecting the Guilt Phase of Trial 
 
1.  Denial of motion to exclude statements  
Defendant claims statements he made to the police and the deputy district 
attorney at the police station following his arrest were obtained in violation of 
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda), because the police failed to 
honor his asserted unequivocal request for counsel.  He also contends he made 
these statements involuntarily.  Finally, he challenges as involuntary the 
statements he made in the police vehicle as he was being transported to the police 
station after his arrest.  Defendant argues that the trial court‟s failure to suppress 
the statements constituted a violation of rights secured by the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and requires reversal of his conviction and sentence 
of death. 
 
a.  Factual background 
At the in limine hearing on defendant‟s motion to exclude his statements 
from evidence, the parties presented starkly contrasting accounts of defendant‟s 
10 
interactions with arresting officers Grier and Fritz, and his interviews with 
Sergeants Madarang and Chenault. 
On August 7, 1993, defendant telephoned a police dispatcher to inquire 
about his potential responsibility for the charged crimes.  Officer Fritz arrived to 
arrest him.  Fritz placed defendant in his patrol car, advised him that he was under 
arrest on suspicion of murder, and directed him not to ask questions concerning 
the case.  Fritz did not advise defendant of his Miranda rights or pose any 
questions.  Defendant began to talk, inquiring how he had been identified and 
remarking that he had not been in trouble recently.  Fritz then asked Officer Keller 
to join him in the police vehicle.  Fritz again informed defendant that he should 
not inquire about the charges or make any statements.  Defendant nonetheless 
continued to speak, again questioning who had identified him and inquiring, “are 
you sure it‟s me?”  After approximately 10 minutes, Officer Keller exited from the 
vehicle and Fritz drove defendant to the police station, arriving at approximately 
10 a.m.     
Defendant was placed in an interview room and was offered food, drink, 
and cigarettes.  Sergeant Madarang, the primary investigating officer, was at that 
time in Sacramento.  He returned to Oakland, entering the interrogation room with 
his partner, Sergeant Chenault, at approximately 12:20 p.m.  He asked defendant 
some preliminary questions.  Sergeant Madarang then read defendant the full 
Miranda advisements directly from a printed form, which defendant initialed.  
Defendant agreed to speak with the officers.  Over the next hour and a half, he 
denied any responsibility for the shooting and claimed to have been merely a 
witness.  At approximately 2:00 p.m., the officers took a break, offering defendant 
refreshment and a bathroom break.  They returned for further interrogation at 
approximately 3:30 p.m.  Defendant continued for approximately an hour to deny 
guilt.  The detectives informed defendant that witnesses had identified him as the 
11 
shooter, and challenged him with the evidence they had gathered against him.  
Defendant became emotional and stated he wished to explain what really 
happened.  At approximately 4:45 p.m., defendant confessed to the crime, 
explaining he decided to rob the victim because he was under financial pressure 
from his family.   
Sergeant Madarang subsequently initiated a tape-recorded interview in 
which defendant again confessed.  Defendant acknowledged he had been advised 
of his rights when the officers first arrived to question him.  Sergeant Madarang 
again read the Miranda advisements to defendant.  After confirming that his 
initials were on the Miranda form, defendant stated he understood his rights and 
wished to speak with the detectives.  At the end of the tape-recorded interview, 
defendant confirmed he was not promised anything or threatened in any way.   
After the tape-recorded interview with Sergeant Madarang, defendant 
participated in another tape-recorded interview with Deputy District Attorney 
O‟Connor, again confessing to the murder.  At the beginning of this second 
interview, defendant confirmed that he already had spoken to the officers, that he 
had done so freely and voluntarily, and that the officers had read the Miranda 
advisements to him.  After the deputy district attorney again read defendant the 
Miranda advisements, defendant initialed a second Miranda form and stated he 
understood his rights and, having those rights in mind, wanted to speak.   
Defendant testified at the hearing that he had telephoned the police because 
he had read a newspaper article about the shooting.  According to defendant, he 
made no requests for action on the part of the police department, but was informed 
an investigator would arrive to speak with him.  He was placed in the patrol car.  
He inquired whether the officers had a warrant, but said nothing else.  After his 
arrest he waited two to three hours in a small room at the police station before 
being interviewed by the officers.  
12 
Defendant claimed that when the officers began to interrogate him, they 
failed to advise him of his rights.  He claimed he requested counsel, but was 
informed “there isn‟t one right now, but we‟ll get one for you,” and the 
interrogation continued.  According to defendant, the officers accused him of 
committing the murder, stated he could not make a statement later if he waited for 
a lawyer, threatened him with not seeing his girlfriend unless he told the truth, and 
informed him the matter was not sufficiently serious to warrant a judgment of 
death.  Defendant testified the police informed him that a truthful confession 
would be beneficial to him and result in imprisonment only for a few years, and 
advised him that if he did not tell the truth then, his statement would constitute 
damaging evidence when he was brought before a court and at trial.    According 
to defendant, he again requested counsel and to telephone his parents.  Defendant 
testified he confessed only after the officers ignored his requests for counsel, 
asserted that they had witnesses against him, stated that he would have no 
opportunity to make a statement later, and patted him on the shoulder urging him 
to confess.  On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that he had been 
offered food and drink throughout the interviews, that he had been advised of his 
constitutional rights in past unrelated matters, that he knew he could speak with a 
lawyer, and that on prior occasions he had been arrested and had refused to talk to 
the police.   
Sergeants Madarang and Chenault testified that defendant did not request to 
speak with an attorney during their interrogations.  They denied defendant‟s other 
assertions.  The officers denied threatening or making promises to defendant to 
persuade him to confess.  They denied having discussed the death penalty or 
offered benefits in exchange for the confession.  The officers did not say it would 
“make a difference” to the court or the prosecution if defendant told the truth.  
They did not threaten defendant would not see his parents or girlfriend unless he 
13 
confessed, nor did they inform him that if he confessed he would be subject to 
imprisonment for only a few years.  Sergeant Madarang denied patting defendant 
on the shoulder.  Madarang testified that throughout the interviews, the officers 
provided defendant with soft drinks and with cigarettes at his request, allowed him 
to use the restroom, and offered him food.   
In argument on the motion, the prosecutor stressed defendant‟s written and 
recorded acknowledgements that he had been advised of his rights in a timely 
manner.  Defense counsel did not seriously contest the Miranda issue, stating in 
response to the prosecutor‟s argument:  “I think the issue is not whether or not he 
was properly admonished.  I believe that the timing — you know, I see no reason 
to disbelieve, frankly, the time of that.”  Instead, defense counsel argued:  “The 
issue is whether or not he was told it was a capital offense, whether he was told 
things would be better for him.”     
The trial court denied the motion to suppress and admitted defendant‟s 
statements, accepting the officers‟ version of the events as true and concluding 
that defendant properly was advised of and waived his Miranda rights.  The court 
made a finding that Sergeants Madarang and Chenault were credible witnesses, 
based on “the content of their testimony” and the court‟s “personal observations of 
their demeanor as they testified.”  The court concluded it was established beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant had received timely admonitions and knowingly 
and intelligently had waived his rights.  The court further found, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that defendant‟s statements “were freely and voluntarily given.”  
Specifically, the trial court concluded “that there [were] no circumstances of 
coercion or force, and that the totality of the circumstances indicate[d] that these 
statements were voluntarily given.”  With respect to the statements made to the 
deputy district attorney, the trial court reached the same conclusions, finding 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was “appropriately and in a timely 
14 
fashion advised . . . of his constitutional rights, and . . . freely and voluntarily 
waived those rights.”  
 
b.  Defendant‟s challenge to the admissibility of his confessions            
Defendant asserts his initial confession to Sergeants Madarang and 
Chenault was obtained in violation of Miranda because it was elicited from him 
after his unequivocal request for counsel.  Defendant also asserts his second 
confession to Deputy District Attorney O‟Connor was the tainted product of his 
initial confession.  We conclude the trial court properly denied defendant‟s motion 
to suppress these two confessions. 
Pursuant to Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, “a suspect [may] not be 
subjected to custodial interrogation unless he or she knowingly and intelligently 
has waived the right to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney, and, if 
indigent, to appointed counsel.”  (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 
992; see also People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 114, disapproved on another 
ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)  After a knowing 
and voluntary waiver, interrogation may proceed “ „until and unless the suspect 
clearly requests an attorney.‟ ”  (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1111, 
1124.)  The prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating the validity of the 
defendant‟s waiver by a preponderance of the evidence.  (People v. Bradford 
(1994) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1034, citing Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 
168.) 
In considering a claim on appeal that a statement or confession is 
inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of a defendant‟s Miranda rights, 
we “review independently the trial court‟s legal determinations . . . .  We evaluate 
the trial court‟s factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the 
defendant‟s statements and waivers and „ “accept the trial court‟s resolution of 
15 
disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by 
substantial evidence.” ‟ ”  (People v. Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 115.) 
The trial court in the present case was aware that the prosecution‟s burden 
was to establish the validity of defendant‟s waiver by a preponderance of the 
evidence but, apparently to demonstrate its confidence in its conclusion, applied 
the stricter beyond a reasonable doubt standard.  The court stressed that it credited 
the officers who testified that defendant was advised of his Miranda rights in a 
timely manner and that he never requested counsel.  The two tape-recorded 
interviews, the first with the officers and the second with the deputy district 
attorney, further corroborate the officers‟ version of the events.  In the tape-
recorded interviews, defendant acknowledged that he had been advised of his 
rights at the commencement of the prior interrogation, that he initialed the waiver 
form, and that he wished to speak to the authorities.  We accept the trial court‟s 
resolution of the factual dispute that existed between the defense and the 
prosecution witnesses, along with its credibility determination, because both 
findings were amply supported by the evidence. 
Defendant‟s attack on the credibility of all of the police officers, 
unsupported by the record of the suppression hearing, is insufficient to provide a 
basis for rejecting the trial court‟s findings.  Defendant urges that the very 
comprehensiveness of the officers‟ denials that they urged defendant to confess 
undermines the officers‟ credibility.  We are persuaded, however, that the trial 
court‟s determination that the officers were credible witnesses is supported by 
substantial evidence.  In sum, defendant‟s Miranda claim lacks merit.  Having 
concluded that defendant‟s initial confession to the officers was not obtained in 
violation of Miranda, we reject defendant‟s related claim that his second 
confession to the deputy district attorney was the tainted product of his initial 
confession.  
16 
Defendant also challenges the admission of the statements on the ground 
they were involuntary.  Any involuntary statement obtained by a law enforcement 
officer from a criminal suspect by coercion is inadmissible pursuant to the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article I, section 7 of the 
California Constitution.  (People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 267; People v. 
Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 67.)  To determine the voluntariness of a confession, 
courts examine “ „whether a defendant‟s will was overborne‟ by the circumstances 
surrounding the giving of a confession.”  (Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 
U.S. 428, 434.)  In making this determination, courts apply a “totality of the 
circumstances” test, looking at the nature of the interrogation and the 
circumstances relating to the particular defendant.  (People v. Haley (2004) 34 
Cal.4th 283, 298; People v. Massie (1999) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576.)  With respect to 
the interrogation, among the factors to be considered are “ „ “the crucial element 
of police coercion [citation]; the length of the interrogation [citation]; its location 
[citation]; its continuity . . . .” ‟ ”  People v. Massie, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 576.)  
With respect to the defendant, the relevant factors are “ „ “the defendant‟s maturity 
[citation]; education [citation]; physical condition [citation]; and mental 
health.” ‟ ”   (Ibid.)  “A statement is involuntary [citation] when, among other 
circumstances, it „was “ „extracted by any sort of threats . . . , [or] obtained by any 
direct or implied promises . . . .‟ ” ‟ ”   (People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 79.) 
As with Miranda claims, the trial court‟s legal conclusion as to the 
voluntariness of a confession is subject to independent review on appeal.  (People 
v. Haley, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 298; People v. Massie, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 
p. 576.)  The trial court‟s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, its evaluation 
of credibility, and its findings as to the circumstances surrounding the confession 
are upheld if supported by substantial evidence.  (People v. Haley, supra, 34 
Cal.4th at p. 298; People v. Massie, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 576.)  The state bears 
17 
the burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  (People v. Haley, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 298.)   
In the present case, again applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, 
the trial court concluded that “there [were] no circumstances of coercion or force, 
and that the totality of the circumstances indicates that these statements were 
voluntarily given.”  The interrogating officers specifically denied defendant‟s 
claims, including that they offered him benefits for confessing, issued threats, or 
misled him concerning the potential punishment he faced.  The trial court credited 
the officers‟ testimony, and its credibility determination is supported by 
substantial evidence.   
Under all the circumstances, we agree with the trial court that defendant‟s 
statements were made voluntarily.  Although defendant was required to wait 
approximately two hours before the interrogation began, the delay was not the 
result of improper police conduct.  Rather, it arose because the police had not 
planned to arrest or interview defendant prior to his own telephone call to the 
police; Sergeant Madarang, the lead investigator, was in Sacramento and was 
required to travel to Oakland to interview defendant.  During defendant‟s 
interrogation, the officers provided defendant with soft drinks and cigarettes, 
allowed him to use the restroom, and offered him food.  Most important, as the 
trial court found, the officers did not engage in any impermissibly coercive tactics 
in procuring defendant‟s confession. 
Defendant contends his own unbalanced mental state rendered him 
susceptible to coercion.  His claim that he was mentally disturbed is based 
primarily upon the circumstance that he telephoned the police dispatcher and that 
he spoke in a rambling manner in the police vehicle while being transported to the 
police station.  This conduct, however, may be explained by the stress and emotion 
felt by defendant after recognizing that he would face responsibility for the crime.  
18 
In any event, his own vulnerability does not demonstrate official coercion.  
“Insofar as a defendant‟s claims of involuntariness emphasize that defendant‟s 
particular psychological state rendered him open to coercion, this court has noted 
that „[t]he Fifth Amendment is not “concerned with moral and psychological 
pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.” ‟ ”  
(People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 502, italics added.)  Although defendant 
may have felt vulnerable, there is no indication of police coercion during his initial 
contacts with the police or during the subsequent interrogations.  Similarly, 
although defendant claims his decision to confess was based upon his youth and 
his absence of experience with the criminal justice system, there was no indication 
of police exploitation of these circumstances.  On the contrary, during his tape-
recorded interviews, defendant expressly stated that he was speaking freely and 
voluntarily. 
Consequently, the trial court properly concluded that defendant‟s 
confession was made voluntarily. 
 
c.  Defendant‟s challenge to statements he made in the patrol 
car         
Defendant contends his spontaneous statements made en route to the police 
station on August 7, 1993 were similarly involuntary because he was mentally 
disturbed at the time he made the statements.   
In response to an ambiguous challenge to the voluntariness of statements 
defendant made in Officer Fritz‟s patrol vehicle, the trial court found that these 
statements “were freely and voluntarily given.”  In addition, according to the trial 
court, although defendant was not given Miranda advisements, his statements 
were made spontaneously and “were not the product of custodial interrogation.”  
Accordingly, the trial court concluded that these spontaneous statements were 
admissible.  The trial court also stated that based upon its personal observation of 
19 
Officer Fritz as he testified, it found that the officer was “a believable and credible 
witness.”   
Defendant again contends his unbalanced mental state is evidenced by his 
conduct in contacting the police and in his repetitive and rambling statements 
made while he was seated in Officer Fritz‟s patrol car.  Fritz did not describe 
defendant‟s statements as rambling or incoherent.  Defendant himself testified that 
he said nothing at all in the patrol car, whether rambling or otherwise, other than 
to inquire whether the officers had a warrant.  Fritz credibly testified that he did 
nothing more than sit and listen to defendant.  There is no evidence of any official 
coercion or of exploitation of defendant‟s youth or asserted inexperience.  
Defendant‟s claimed psychological vulnerabilities do not suggest his statements 
were involuntary.  (See People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal. 4th 1370, 1403; People 
v. Smith, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 502.)  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial 
court properly denied defendant‟s motion to suppress the statements defendant 
made in the police car.  
 
2.  Prior consistent statements  
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to 
enhance the credibility of prosecution witness Alphonso Odom through the 
admission of Odom‟s prior consistent statements.  Defendant claims in essence 
that these prior out-of-court statements constituted hearsay and were not made 
admissible by Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (b).  In pertinent part, that 
provision limits the admission of a prior out-of-court statement to circumstances in 
which there has been an express or implied charge that the witness is fabricating or 
is influenced by bias or other improper motive, and the statement was made before 
any potential bias or motive to lie arose.  Defendant points out that the defense had 
not yet impeached Odom when the statements were admitted, and he claims that, 
20 
in any event, Odom already had a motive to fabricate when he made the prior 
statements.   
This claim arises in the following factual setting.  At trial, Odom recounted 
his observations on the day the crimes were committed.  He testified he was 
present at his home that afternoon.  He resided in the apartment building next to 
the building in which defendant resided.  He observed defendant, wearing 
distinctive clothing, standing near the mail box area of his own apartment 
building.  From the vantage point of his apartment balcony, Odom observed 
defendant proceed down the driveway toward the back of the building and the 
parking lot where the murder occurred.  Returning to the interior of the apartment, 
Odom heard a shot.  He ran to the balcony and witnessed the shooting that resulted 
in Lance‟s death.  Odom hurried to the scene and attempted to provide assistance 
to Lance until he realized that the boy was dead.  Odom returned to his home as 
the police approached.  Odom observed defendant return to the scene and “act 
surprised” during defendant‟s discussion with the responding officers.  Later that 
day, Odom made it known to defendant that he, Odom, realized defendant was the 
perpetrator of the crime.  Defendant responded “it wasn‟t supposed to go down 
that way.” 
During his trial testimony, Odom experienced some difficulty recalling the 
precise course of events, explaining that the years intervening between the crimes 
and the trial rendered precise recollection difficult.  He was uncertain whether he 
had seen defendant at the mailboxes on one or two occasions, that is, whether he 
had returned to his apartment during defendant‟s visit to the mailboxes.  During 
his testimony, initially he recalled having heard only one shot, but later, with the 
assistance of his prior statements to refresh his recollection, reported having heard 
two shots.  Odom was uncertain of the precise words employed by defendant in 
making the foregoing admission.   
21 
Defendant complains of three occasions on which the prosecutor displayed 
to Odom his prior statement to the police, his preliminary hearing testimony, or 
notes from a photographic lineup, thereafter requesting that Odom ratify the prior 
statements. 
In the first example, Odom testified that the person he observed at the door 
of Bernice‟s automobile with a gun in hand was wearing the same clothing he had 
observed defendant wearing just before the gunshots sounded.  During further 
direct examination on the following day of trial, in the context of identifying the 
shooter, Odom testified, “I didn‟t see a face, I just seen the same clothing.”    The 
prosecutor then read Odom‟s preliminary hearing testimony, as follows:  “Q:  Was 
there any question in your mind that was [defendant] you saw? [¶] A:  No , there 
was no question in my mind, because I had just seen him in that clothing.”  Odom 
confirmed he had given that answer at the prior hearing, adding “Like I said I seen 
him in that clothing.”  The prosecutor essentially repeated the question and 
received the same answer.  Ultimately the prosecutor inquired:  “Is it your 
testimony now that you have no question as you sit there now that it was the 
defendant . . . that you saw at the door of the car? [¶] A:  Yes. [¶] [Q:] You do or 
do not have? [¶] A:  I mean, yes, it was Earnest Dykes.” 
In the second example, Odom testified concerning his encounter with 
defendant on the day of the crime when defendant admitted his culpability.  Odom 
recalled at trial that defendant said something to the effect “it wasn‟t supposed to 
go down like that,” but Odom apologized, expressing some uncertainty regarding 
the exact wording of this admission.   The prosecutor responded:  “Well, no need 
to apologize.  And you testified yesterday that [defendant] told you that he did 
this, is that correct?”  The examination continued:  “[¶]  A:  Yes.  [¶]  Q:  When 
you picked the photograph out, photograph number two, on August 10th, you 
picked that photograph as being the person who told you they did it, is that 
22 
correct?  [¶]  A:  Come again?  I didn‟t . . . .  [¶]  Q:  When you picked 
[defendant‟s] photograph out of the group of photographs, you picked his 
photograph as being the person who told you he did it, is that correct?  [¶]  A:  
Yes.  Yes.  [¶]  Q:  So in other words you were saying the same thing at that time 
as you said here in court yesterday?  [¶]  A:  Yes.” 
 
The final example occurred when Odom testified that defendant told him he 
took the money he stole from Bernice Clark and his weapon to a girlfriend‟s 
residence after the crime.  According to Odom‟s testimony, defendant commented 
that he had stolen “about a hundred bucks.”  Odom was uncertain of defendant‟s 
exact words.  In response to a question posed by the prosecutor, Odom verified 
that in his statement to the police and when he testified under oath at the 
preliminary hearing, he stated that Dykes told him he “got about a hundred 
bucks.”   
Defendant concedes that his attorney did not interpose timely objections to 
the questions on the ground asserted on appeal.  As defendant also acknowledges, 
numerous decisions by this court have established the general rule that trial 
counsel‟s failure to object to claimed evidentiary error on the same ground 
asserted on appeal results in a forfeiture of the issue on appeal.  (People v. Partida 
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-435; People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 357.)  
Defendant asserts that the forfeiture rule should not apply, because there is a 
“heightened need for reliability and fairness in a capital case.”  This court, 
however, has rejected the claim that the forfeiture rule does not apply in capital 
cases.  (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 115 [rejecting a claim that we 
should conduct “ „plain error review‟ ” notwithstanding forfeiture in capital cases]; 
People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 28.)  Defendant fails to establish the existence 
of any “structural defect” such as was identified by the high court in Arizona v. 
23 
Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 309-310, that would lead us to overlook our 
forfeiture doctrine. 
Defendant adds that, even if the evidentiary claim was forfeited, the 
underlying claim should be reached on the theory that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct in conducting the examination of Odom, rendering the trial 
fundamentally unfair.  But trial counsel‟s failure to object in a timely manner to 
asserted prosecutorial misconduct also results in the forfeiture of the claim on 
appeal.  (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 952.)  Contrary to defendant‟s 
assertion, even if we assume there was merit to the claim, a timely objection and a 
request for admonition would not have been futile.  
In any event, defendant‟s claims are not meritorious.  Defendant assumes 
that the sole possible basis for the admission of Odom‟s prior statements was 
Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (b), but that the evidence did not meet the 
requirements of that provision.  This statute permits the admission of a prior 
consistent out-of-court statement when there has been a charge that the testimony 
at the hearing has been fabricated or “influenced by bias or other improper motive, 
and the statement was made before the bias, motive for fabrication, or other 
improper motive is alleged to have arisen.”  (Evid. Code, § 791, subd. (b).)  
Defendant claims that the prior consistent statements were elicited before there 
had been any attempt to impeach Odom, and after Odom already had developed a 
motive to fabricate.  He asserts that Odom‟s motive to fabricate — the desire to be 
released from jail — arose before he contacted the police to offer assistance in 
their investigation. 
Even if Odom‟s out-of-court statements were not admissible because they 
were not made “before the bias, motive for fabrication, or other improper motive 
is alleged to have arisen” (Evid. Code, § 791, subd. (b)), if defendant had 
interposed hearsay objections to the introduction of the prior statements, the 
24 
prosecutor might have been able to demonstrate that at least the first two 
statements were admissible as examples of prior identification pursuant to 
Evidence Code section 1238.2  As the Law Revision Commission comment to that 
provision explains:  “Under Section 1238, evidence of a prior identification is 
admissible if the witness admits the prior identification and vouches for its 
accuracy.”  (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 4 West‟s Ann. Evid. Code 
(1995 ed.) foll. § 1238, p. 249; see People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621, 626 
[“Unlike other testimony that cannot be corroborated by proof of prior consistent 
statements unless it is first impeached [citations], evidence of an extrajudicial 
identification is admitted regardless of whether the testimonial identification is 
impeached, because the earlier identification has greater probative value . . . .”], 
overruled on other grounds in People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 263; see 
also People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 480; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2000 
ed.) Hearsay, § 163, pp. 876-877.)3   
The prosecutor also might have been able to secure the admission of all 
three of the statements on the ground that the witness had been forgetful and 
                                            
2  
Evidence Code, section 1238 provides:  “Evidence of a statement 
previously made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the 
statement would have been admissible if made by him while testifying and:  [¶]  
(a) The statement is an identification of a party or another as a person who 
participated in a crime or other occurrence;  [¶]  (b) The statement was made at a 
time when the crime or other occurrence was fresh in the witness‟ memory; and  
[¶]  (c) The evidence of the statement is offered after the witness testifies that he 
made the identification and that it was a true reflection of his opinion at that time.”   
3  
Other elements required under this hearsay exception also appear to be 
present, in that defense counsel stipulated that the written statements accurately 
reflected what the witness had said on the prior occasions, and Odom‟s statements 
to the police and the selections he made at the photo lineup occurred less than two 
weeks following the commission of the crime.   
25 
evasive during his testimony, rendering prior statements admissible for their truth 
as prior recorded recollections pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1235 and 770.  
Discussing the two provisions, we explained that “[t]hose statutes . . . provide for 
the admission against a hearsay challenge of a prior statement by a witness „if the 
statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing and is offered in 
compliance with Section 770.‟  [Citation.]  Under Evidence Code section 770, 
prior inconsistent statements are admissible only if:  „(a) The witness was so 
examined while testifying as to give him an opportunity to explain or to deny the 
statement; or  [¶]  (b) The witness has not been excused from giving further 
testimony in the action.‟ ”  (People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal. 4th at p. 296.)  Under 
certain circumstances, testimony may be considered inconsistent with prior 
statements when it reflects absence of recollection or evasiveness.  (See People v. 
Green (1971) 3 Cal.3d 981, 987-988; see also People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 
p. 297.) 
We need not speculate whether, in response to defense objections, the 
prosecutor could have established the proper foundation for admissibility of each 
of Odom‟s prior out-of-court statements under these provisions, because it is clear 
that admission of the statements was harmless.  Defendant admitted in his 
recorded confessions and in his trial testimony that he robbed Bernice and was 
responsible for the shot that injured her and killed Lance.  Prosecution witness 
Edward Tyson, along with the surviving victim, Bernice, also provided detailed 
eyewitness testimony.  Defendant himself testified that he demanded money from 
Bernice, and his claim that he did not recall the exact amount was impeached by 
his prior inconsistent statement to the police at the time of his arrest that he had 
garnered exactly $142.   
Defendant counters that prejudice occurred because Odom‟s credibility was 
essential to the prosecution‟s case.  According to defendant, Odom‟s credibility 
26 
was important not only because Odom testified that defendant admitted 
committing the crimes and assertedly provided details that were not available from 
other witnesses, but also because Odom‟s testimony provided a significant basis 
for the charge of premeditated murder and premeditated attempted murder.  
Defendant claims this was because Odom testified he observed defendant standing 
near the apartment building mailbox shortly before the first shot rang out — 
testimony assertedly giving rise to an inference that defendant planned the crime 
in advance “and that he was waiting for Mrs. Clark to arrive in order to commit 
the crime.”  But defendant himself testified that he decided up to one-half hour in 
advance of the crime to rob Bernice and also decided on that occasion to arm 
himself with a loaded firearm, even though his purpose was to confront an elderly 
woman who was known to lend money freely.  It added little to the proof of 
premeditation for Odom to suggest that defendant had been standing outside the 
apartment building shortly before committing the crime.   
Moreover, to the extent defendant‟s claim is based upon the argument that 
the jury would infer that critical portions of Odom‟s trial testimony were true 
because Odom had made prior statements that were consistent with his trial 
testimony on other points, the contention lacks merit.  The same inference could 
be gleaned through many other instances in which the prosecutor referred to 
Odom‟s prior consistent statements.  The prosecutor repeatedly referred to 
Odom‟s prior statements and testimony during his direct examination of Odom, 
and no objection was forthcoming at trial (or, for that matter, on appeal).  4 
                                            
4  
As noted in connection with defendant‟s claim that we should overlook 
defense counsel‟s failure to object at trial to the admission of the evidence, 
defendant has not identified any “structural error” that would require reversal in 
the absence of a showing of prejudice.  (See People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 
1114, 1160.) 
27 
 
3.  Prosecutorial misconduct  
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct on a 
number of occasions during the guilt phase of the trial.  He claims a violation of 
his right to a fair trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal 
Constitution and parallel provisions of the state Constitution. 
We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct pursuant to a settled 
standard.  “Under California law, a prosecutor commits reversible misconduct if 
he or she makes use of „deceptive or reprehensible methods‟ when attempting to 
persuade either the trial court or the jury, and it is reasonably probable that without 
such misconduct, an outcome more favorable to the defendant would have 
resulted. [Citation.]  Under the federal Constitution, conduct by a prosecutor that 
does not result in the denial of the defendant‟s specific constitutional rights — 
such as a comment upon the defendant‟s invocation of the right to remain silent — 
but is otherwise worthy of condemnation, is not a constitutional violation unless 
the challenged action „ “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the 
resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ‟ ”  (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 
Cal.4th 248, 298; People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839.)  In addition, “ „a 
defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a 
timely fashion — and on the same ground — the defendant made an assignment of 
misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the 
impropriety.‟  [Citation.] ”  (People v. Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 952.)  
Objection may be excused if it would have been futile or an admonition would not 
have cured the harm.  (See People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820.)   
In considering defendant‟s claims, we recall the limited issues that were in 
dispute in the present case.  In view of defendant‟s testimony and his confessions, 
defense counsel admitted in his argument to the jury that defendant had fired the 
shot that injured Bernice Clark, and that he had committed a robbery and a 
28 
robbery murder.  Defense counsel disputed that defendant intended to kill Bernice.  
Counsel also urged the jury to conclude that because Lance‟s killing assertedly 
was accidental and occurred while defendant was attempting to disengage from 
Bernice in their struggle over her wallet, the killing was not committed to 
“advance” the felony within the meaning of the robbery-murder special-
circumstance allegation.  Although the point is not critical to the discussion of the 
present issue, to avoid confusion we note that there is no requirement that the 
prosecution prove an additional or different element that the killing be committed 
to “advance” the felony.  (People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 907-908.)5  
                                            
5  
As we have explained, “[t]he felony-murder special circumstance applies to 
a murder committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in 
the commission of, the attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after 
committing or attempting to commit, various enumerated felonies . . . .  [Citation.]  
A strict causal or temporal relationship between the felony and the murder is not 
required; what is required is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
intended to commit the felony at the time he killed the victim and that the killing 
and the felony were part of one continuous transaction.”  (People v. Coffman and 
Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 87.)  Relying upon People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 
1, 61, we have explained that the felony-murder special circumstance was 
intended to apply to those who “killed „to advance an independent felonious 
purpose,‟ ” but was not intended to apply when the felony was “ „merely 
incidental to the murder . . . .‟ ”  (People v. Horning, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 907, 
and cases cited.)  The pattern jury instruction reflects the so-called Green rule.  
(CALJIC No. 8.81.17 [proof is required that “[t]he murder was committed in order 
to carry out or advance the commission of the crime . . . .  In other words, the 
special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not established if the 
[crime] was merely incidental to the commission of the murder”].)  The “carry out 
or advance” language found in the pattern instruction is based upon our cases and 
constitutes merely another way of describing the Green rule — that a felony 
murder is not established by proof of a felony that was merely incidental to a 
murder.  (People v. Horning, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 907-908; People v. 
Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 505.) 
29 
a.  Opening statement 
Defendant contends the prosecutor‟s opening statement was argumentative, 
unsupported by the record, and constituted an appeal to passion and prejudice.  He 
refers to the following comments:  “You know, there‟s three ways to get money.  
You can earn it, you can borrow it, or you can steal it, and [defendant] chose to 
steal it at gunpoint from a senior citizen in the company of a nine-year-old child 
and a dog.  [¶]  After you hear all the evidence from the technician and two 
criminalists you will be convinced that the same bullet that passed through Mrs. 
Clark‟s neck then passed through her grandson‟s body and killed him.  And he 
died looking at her, and she had to sit there next to him in the car.  I think it 
probably goes without saying that that sort of experience almost defies 
description.”   
There was no objection and the claim is forfeited.  (People v. Prince (2007) 
40 Cal.4th 1179, 1275.)   
In any event, the claim lacks merit.  With one possible exception, the 
statement was closely tied to the evidence presented by the prosecutor.  
Respondent acknowledges that the evidence may not have established that the 
victim died looking at his grandmother, but there was evidence that could support 
the view that the child was leaning toward his grandmother when he was shot.  As 
we have commented, “remarks made in an opening statement cannot be charged as 
misconduct unless the evidence referred to by the prosecutor „was “so patently 
inadmissible as to charge the prosecutor with knowledge that it could never be 
admitted.” ‟ ”   (People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1108.)  In the present case, 
the jury was instructed that the prosecutor‟s opening statement did not constitute 
evidence.  As we have declared in a comparable case, “[a]ny inconsistency 
between the opening statement and the evidence was inconsequential.  
[Defendant] was permitted to confront all witnesses and to challenge and rebut all 
30 
evidence offered against him.  Under these circumstances, [defendant] suffered no 
conceivable prejudice.”  (Id. at pp. 1109-1110.) 
Defendant contends that the quoted language describing him in an 
unflattering and critical light was argumentative and constituted an appeal to 
passion.  The comments, along with the prosecutor‟s description of Bernice 
Clark‟s tragic experience, were based upon evidence to be presented at the trial, 
however, and were within the “broad scope of permissible argument.”  (People v. 
Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 387 [the prosecutor properly could claim the 
defendant lied, lacked humanity, was frightening, and was barely human].) 
 
b.  Examination of witnesses   
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct “during the 
examination of witnesses by improperly injecting emotion into the guilt phase of 
the trial, seeking to elicit inadmissible evidence, and implying that the defense was 
obstructionist.”  
Defendant refers to the examination of Bernice Clark, alleging in his 
opening brief that the prosecutor asked her whether her grandson was “dead and 
buried by the time she was released from the hospital.”  The prosecutor did not 
make the comment that appears in defendant‟s opening brief.  Rather, in the 
context of exploring the witness‟s memory of events from the time of the crime to 
the point when she gave a statement to the police during her hospital stay, the 
prosecutor inquired whether she recalled making the statement, whether she 
recalled when during the stay she had made the statement, whether she slept a 
great deal in the hospital, whether she remembered visitors, or whether the 
hospital stay “sort of [ran] together when you think back on it?”  Bernice 
responded that she was not told about her grandson‟s death while she was in the 
hospital.  When she added that she recalled hospital visits from her granddaughter 
31 
and son, this colloquy ensued:  “Q:  And they had not told you yet that —  [¶]  A:  
No.  [¶]  Q:  That Lance was dead?  [¶]  A.  No.  [¶]  [Q:]  Did you go to his 
funeral?  [¶]  A:  No.  [¶]  [Q:] You weren‟t even aware that it happened?  I mean, 
was he buried by the time you found out that he was dead?  [¶]  A:  No, I found — 
I got to see him.  I got to go to the mortuary.  I just wasn‟t up to going to the 
funeral.”  (Italics added.) 
There was no objection to the italicized question (or any portion of the 
surrounding examination), and the claim is forfeited.  (People v. Prince, supra, 40 
Cal.4th at p. 1275.)  In any event, as in comparable cases the question “was not so 
likely to evoke sympathy in the jurors that we could conclude the question was 
misconduct, or even if it was, that any misconduct was prejudicial.” (People v. 
Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 302 [the prosecutor asked the victim‟s father 
whether he had participated in making funeral arrangements for the victim].) 
Defendant claims the prosecutor sought to portray prosecution witness 
Alphonso Odom in a sympathetic light by asking him irrelevant questions that 
served to inform the jury that the witness had a young son who had accompanied 
him to court and that Odom also had brought the child with him to an interview 
with the prosecutor.  The court sustained defendant‟s relevancy objection.  The 
defense did not object on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct, and the claim is 
forfeited.  (See People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1275.)  In any event, any 
misconduct was harmless.  When the court sustained the relevancy objection — if 
not before — the jury likely understood that Odom‟s status as a parent was 
irrelevant.  
Defendant claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by proffering 
evidence of Odom‟s prior consistent statements.  The question whether the prior 
statements were admissible and whether their admission was prejudicial already 
has been resolved against defendant.  In any event, defendant did not object to the 
32 
admission of the statements on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct, and the 
claim is forfeited.  (People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1275.) 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during cross-
examination of defendant.  He refers to a question asking whether defendant had 
discussed his testimony with his attorney prior to testifying.  An objection to the 
question was sustained, and defendant did not answer it.  No conceivable prejudice 
ensued.  (See People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 94 [the 
prosecutor noted the defendant had not mentioned the battered woman syndrome 
defense until her attorneys were appointed].)  Defendant claims the comment 
added to the prejudice he suffered when the prosecutor during his closing 
argument to the jury assertedly accused the defense of fabrication, but, as we shall 
explain, we have concluded that the prosecutor‟s argument does not bear that 
interpretation.   
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct while cross-
examining defendant by commenting upon defendant‟s answers.  He refers to the 
following line of questioning concerning defendant‟s statements to the police and 
his failure to inform the police that, as he testified at trial, LaCondra Douglas‟s 
boyfriend arrived at the scene during the robbery:   
“Q:  Well, you were trying to tell them the whole truth about what  
happened, weren‟t you? 
“A:  Yes, I just didn‟t tell — didn‟t put him in it. 
“Q:  Well, you could have said somebody pulled in, you didn‟t know who 
they were, right? 
“A:  I knew who the car . . . belonged to. 
“Q:  Right.  But you hadn‟t had any compunction about lying to the police 
up to that point, right? 
“A:  I wasn‟t lying, I just didn‟t put him in there, sir.  
33 
[¶] . . . [¶]  
“Q:  You‟re not scared? 
“A:  I‟m just telling you the whole truth. 
“Q:  The jury will be the judge of that, Mr. Dykes.”   
Defense counsel objected on the ground the statement was argumentative, 
and the court sustained the objection.   
As the examination progressed, the prosecutor asked defendant:  “In other 
words, you‟re pretty good at lying with a straight face, are you, Mr. Dykes[?]”  
The court sustained a defense objection.   
The prosecutor is entitled to attempt to impeach the credibility of a 
defendant‟s testimony (see People v. Chatman, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 382) and 
point out inconsistencies between his or her testimony and prior inconsistent 
statements.  When a defendant chooses to testify concerning the charged crimes, 
the prosecutor can probe the testimony in detail and the scope of cross-
examination is very broad.  (Id., at pp. 382-383; People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 
Cal.4th 668, 754.)  Moreover, because the trial court sustained objections to the 
argumentative element of the prosecutor‟s questioning, we assume any prejudice 
was abated.  (See People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 943; see also People 
v. Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 299.) 
Defendant challenges other aspects of the prosecutor‟s cross-examination.  
On direct examination, defendant testified he owned a firearm purely for self-
protection because “at the time there [were] a lot of dope dealers on the street, they 
[were] having altercations . . . up the street . . . [and] I just felt I didn‟t want to be 
caught in it and be made a statistic.”  On cross-examination, the prosecutor also 
elicited testimony that defendant had purchased the firearm because there were 
drug dealers in the neighborhood.  The prosecutor then asked defendant whether 
he had been a drug dealer himself, an accusation defendant denied.  Then the 
34 
prosecutor inquired:  “Do you recall telling the police when you gave the 
statement that you gave up selling dope when you met your girlfriend?”  (Italics 
added.)  It is worth observing that according to Sergeant Chenault‟s interview 
notes from defendant‟s first unrecorded confession (marked for identification but 
not introduced into evidence), defendant informed the officers that when he met 
his girlfriend he “got out of dope.”   
Defendant did not respond to the question.  Rather, he volunteered:  “Sir, I 
had a conviction on — well, I don‟t think they convicted me of that, but I got 
caught in the car with my cousin who was a dope dealer, that‟s how it came 
about.”  The prosecutor elicited the admission that “this isn‟t the first gun that 
[defendant] ever owned,” and that defendant had been on probation for illegal 
possession of a firearm when the murder occurred.  The prosecutor inquired 
whether the other firearm owned by defendant had served merely for protection, 
too, and defendant answered in the affirmative.  The prosecutor pursued the 
information volunteered by defendant in his previous answer:   
“Q:  Do you recall when you were arrested with [the firearm] you were 
caught with drugs possessed in a package for sale? 
“A:  They didn‟t catch me with . . . drugs, sir. 
“Q:  Were you selling drugs with your gun back then? 
“A:  No I wasn‟t, sir. 
“Q:  And it‟s your testimony that you have never indicated to anyone that 
you were a drug dealer at that time? 
“A:  No I didn‟t, sir. 
“Q:  I‟m sorry? 
“A:  I didn‟t indicate nothing. 
“Q:  And just for clarity when you were interviewed with the police you 
denied selling narcotics when you met your girlfriend, Bianca? 
35 
“Mr. Strellis [defense]:  Objection.  Irrelevant. 
“The Court:  Sustained.”  (Italics added.) 
The prosecutor maintained the question was relevant to defendant‟s 
statement regarding his reason for possessing the firearm, but the trial court again 
sustained the defense objection.   
Defendant did not interpose a timely objection to this line of questioning.  
Counsel‟s ultimate objection was on the ground of relevancy, not prosecutorial 
misconduct, and he did not request an admonition.  This claim is forfeited.  
(People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1275.) 
Defendant‟s claim also lacks merit.  It constitutes misconduct to examine a 
witness solely for the purpose of implying the truth of facts stated in the question 
rather than in the answer to be given, and a prosecutor should not pursue a line of 
questioning that is damaging but irrelevant.  (People v Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th 
at p. 753; see also People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 52; People v. Hamilton 
(1963) 60 Cal.2d 105, 116, overruled on other grounds in People v. Morse (1964) 
60 Cal.2d 631, 637, fn. 2, and People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 866.)  On 
the other hand, in the present case, defense counsel asked defendant why he 
purchased the firearm, opening the door to examination on the same point by the 
prosecution.  The prosecutor was entitled to explore the credibility of defendant‟s 
claim that he had purchased a firearm solely for self-protection. The prosecution 
could have impeached defendant‟s denial that he had ceased his involvement with 
drugs (when he met his girlfriend) with the inconsistent statement defendant made 
to Sergeants Madarang and Chenault.  In addition, during cross-examination, 
defendant volunteered information concerning his arrest, and the prosecution was 
entitled to explore defendant‟s assertions.  We note that eventually a relevancy 
objection was sustained by the court and that the prosecutor did not refer to drug 
dealing in his closing argument, thereby diminishing the impact of this evidence.   
36 
Defendant also contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by objecting 
to the defense cross-examination of witness Dr. Lansing Lee, the ballistics expert.  
The murder weapon was not discovered; defendant testified that he had disposed 
of it in the Oakland Estuary.  During the defense examination of Lee, defense 
counsel inquired whether the murder weapon‟s functioning, including its trigger 
pull, would be “partly personal to the history of the particular firearm?”  The 
expert answered in the affirmative.  The defense then inquired:  “And we have no 
idea since we don‟t have the firearm that fired the projectiles in this case?”  The 
prosecutor objected:  “Well, objection, your honor.  That assumes facts not in 
evidence that the defense doesn‟t know where the gun is.  There‟s no evidence.”  
The court responded by requesting that defense counsel rephrase the question.  
Defendant now contends the prosecutor‟s objection “furthered the prosecutor‟s 
goal of arguing that the defense was obstructing the case, even to the point of 
creating a defense out of whole cloth.”   
The defense did not object on the ground of misconduct and the claim is 
forfeited.  (People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1275.)  In any event, 
defendant admitted he had disposed of the murder weapon, providing damaging 
evidence that the weapon was not available for testing by the ballistics expert 
because of defendant‟s effort to escape responsibility for the crimes.  There was no 
conceivable prejudice arising from the prosecutor‟s speaking objection. 
Defendant claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting 
inadmissible evidence of absence of remorse.  He refers to the prosecutor‟s 
examination of Sergeant Madarang.   
The prosecution questioned Sergeant Madarang concerning the course of 
events leading to defendant‟s tape-recorded statements to the police.  Madarang 
described defendant‟s initial denial of responsibility, commenting that defendant‟s 
manner was composed, he did not appear intoxicated, and the denial was quite 
37 
convincing — except that, as Madarang testified, the officer was aware of facts 
contradicting some of defendant‟s assertions.  When Madarang confronted 
defendant with eyewitness accounts, defendant became emotional, eventually 
admitting most of his role in the crimes during two statements interrupted by 
audible sobbing.  Defense counsel agreed that the tape-recorded statements should 
be played to the jury “because I feel the inflection with which the words are said is 
part of the impact of the words.”  After the jury listened to the tape-recorded 
statements, the prosecutor asked Madarang whether defendant had wept during the 
period of questioning in which he denied responsibility.  Madarang replied in the 
negative.  In cross-examining Madarang, defense counsel established that 
defendant‟s voice had not been recorded during the period he denied responsibility 
but during the taped confessions “we can hear for ourselves what his voice 
sounded like.” 
Defendant did not object to the question posed to Sergeant Madarang, and 
the claim is forfeited.  (People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1275.)  Defendant 
now contends that an admonition would not have cured the harm.  He asserts that 
“[t]he evidence of lack of remorse was designed to prejudice the jury against 
[defendant] by depicting him as a cold, remorseless killer who only displayed 
emotion when he was faced with having his confession audio taped.”  He claims 
the inadmissible testimony made him appear to be a “hardened killer” and 
constituted “inadmissible negative character evidence.”  
“[U]nless a defendant opens the door to the matter in his or her case-in-
chief [citation], his or her remorse is irrelevant at the guilt phase.”  (People v. 
Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 307.)  Defendant‟s sobbing during his tape-recorded 
statements to the police and to the deputy district attorney, however, supported the 
inference that he experienced remorse.  Indeed, during the prosecution‟s case-in-
chief, when the prosecutor sought to introduce transcripts of defendant‟s tape-
38 
recorded confessions, the defense urged the jurors to listen to the recordings 
themselves in order to permit them to hear evidence of defendant‟s emotional 
state.  Defendant testified that after committing the crime, he was unable to sleep, 
lost weight, and sought relief in drugs and alcohol, thereby suggesting emotional 
turmoil.  In addition, the issue of defendant‟s demeanor and state of mind during 
his various statements to the police was relevant to the credibility of those 
statements.  Under these circumstances, we conclude misconduct did not occur. 
c.  Closing argument   
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in several 
respects.  We observe, however, that “[a] prosecutor is given wide latitude to 
vigorously argue his or her case and to make fair comment upon the evidence, 
including reasonable inferences or deductions that may be drawn from the 
evidence.”  (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 726.) 
Defendant claims the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing 
argument by accusing him of fabricating a defense.  Defendant cites the following 
portion of the prosecutor‟s argument in support:  “And you might wonder as an 
aside, yesterday, when defendant was on the stand, how we get this new version, 
and I‟ll come back to this, that he was attempting to pull his hand out and get away 
[when the gun fired], at least that‟s the way I got it on his direct examination.  He 
knows the legal niceties here, ladies and gentlemen, he‟s had two years to study 
these instructions.  He‟s got two lawyers.  So ask yourself, why now, in the 11th 
hour, we get the version he‟s attempting to pull his hand free of the car, he‟s just 
attempting to get away.  He never actually said it.  And he changed his story on 
cross-examination.  But the gist of it, as I got it, is he was no longer committing 
robbery.  And so I guess his act of trying to pull the hand from the car, trying to 
abandon the robbery, would not be an act in the furtherance of the robbery, I‟m 
39 
not trying to get the money, and therefore the special circumstance is untrue.”  
(Italics added.)   
Defense counsel objected to the argument, denying that defendant had 
suggested he was no longer engaged in the robbery when the fatal shot was fired.  
Defense counsel stated that “[t]he instruction, part of which counsel has read to the 
jury, points out that escape is part and parcel of a robbery.  Had he studied the 
instruction it would have been clear that he would have read all of it and not part 
of it.”  In other words, defense counsel objected to the implication that defendant‟s 
testimony was tailored to fit a defense, because counsel conceded that a homicide 
committed during flight from a robbery constitutes felony murder. 
In response, the court informed the jury that in closing argument, counsel 
may state the facts and the law according to their understanding of each.  The 
court admonished, however, “I have stated the rules here, that if there is any 
variance as to what the facts are, as stated by either counsel, and what you believe 
them to be, accept your recollection of the facts [and] you are to follow the law as 
I state it.” 
Defendant‟s claim lacks merit.  Defendant testified at the guilt phase of the 
trial, and the prosecutor was entitled to challenge his credibility and point to 
inconsistencies between his testimony and his earlier statements.  It was within the 
broad bounds of permissible argument to suggest that defendant‟s trial testimony 
concerning the sequence of events leading to the murder, far from representing the 
truth, differed from his prior statements and was framed to coincide with an 
imagined defense based upon the asserted accidental nature of the killing.  The 
commentary was appropriate in spite of defense counsel‟s concession that the 
accidental nature of the killing did not prevent conviction for felony murder.  
Defense counsel relied upon the claim of accident to urge that defendant lacked 
the intent to kill Bernice Clark, and defense counsel made the (unfounded) claim 
40 
that the felony-murder special-circumstance allegation was not true because of the 
prosecutor‟s failure to prove an additional element of proof that the killing was 
intended to advance the robbery.  The prosecutor‟s comment did not suggest that 
defense counsel had participated in fabricating a defense for defendant, nor did it 
constitute a personal attack upon counsel or counsel‟s credibility.  (See People v. 
Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1154, disapproved on another ground in 
People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.)  Under the circumstances, 
the comment did not “focus[] the jury‟s attention on irrelevant matters and divert[] 
the prosecution from its proper role of commenting on the evidence and drawing 
reasonable inferences therefrom.”  (People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846.) 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing 
argument at the guilt phase of the trial by commenting upon the asserted absence 
of remorse displayed by defendant.  Defendant refers to the following statement:  
“When you listen to those tapes, ladies and gentlemen, and you hear him crying, 
you don‟t see him crying here in court, you didn‟t see him crying on the witness 
stand yesterday.  Do you really think those tears — who are they for?  You think 
they‟re for Lance Clark or Bernice?  Do you really think that?  When he‟s crying 
on the tape, he‟s crying for himself, because he realizes his plan is not going to 
work, he‟s been identified.”  (Italics added.) 
Because there was no objection to the comment, the claim is forfeited.  
(People v. Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 952.)  We discern no reason that 
defendant could not have objected and sought an admonition.  Moreover, as noted, 
defense counsel urged the court to permit the jury to hear the statements in which 
defendant‟s sobs were recorded.  Defendant‟s own testimony suggested emotional 
turmoil.  The prosecutor could comment upon an anticipated argument by defense 
counsel.  (See People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846.)   
41 
Defendant next contends the prosecutor improperly introduced the issue of 
race into the deliberations during his rebuttal to defense counsel‟s closing 
argument.  (It bears noting that defendant is Black; Bernice Clark is White, as was 
Lance Clark.  It appears that the jury did not include any Black members.) 
In his closing argument defense counsel informed the jury it would be 
instructed not to be influenced by “mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, 
prejudice public opinion, or public feeling.”  Defense counsel then argued:  “Why 
do you imagine the district attorney showed you the pictures of the dead lad?  
Why do you think he talked about Lance?  Do you think there was any possibility 
he was appealing to your prejudice?  [¶]  He talked about people who are different 
from you, different lifestyle, different person.[6]  Do you think there was a 
message in there?  It gets lost, but it‟s there and it has an honest meaning.”  Later 
in his closing argument, defense counsel continued:  “Do you understand why it 
was important that you see the picture of Lance, that you be told that he‟s — that 
[defendant] is different?  Because we need some passion here.  We need some 
blood.  The cold facts are troublesome.”  Defense counsel returned to the theme of 
the jury‟s duty not to be moved by passion or prejudice, but to determine with care 
whether the prosecution had proved its case:  “How can we make it beyond a 
reasonable doubt?  We can if we‟re angry enough, if we want to pick the bad 
thing, if we want to make the choice?  Because, after all, this is — he‟s different 
from us.  But absent that kind of thinking, how do we make the choice?”  Defense 
                                            
6  
The prosecutor previously had argued that defendant had planned the 
robbery, selecting “somebody he‟s got absolutely nothing against, and yet he‟s the 
kind of person that would pick someone like that to do this to, because he just 
doesn‟t care.  He‟s not like you.  That doesn‟t make sense to you.  But then, 
you‟ve never found yourself in a courtroom facing these kind of charges, either.  
And that‟s the difference between you and [him].”   
42 
counsel added:  “Now, [defendant], according to the district attorney, is not 
worthy of belief.  He‟s — you know, he‟s different.  He doesn‟t work.  He‟s 
just — you know, he‟s a different species.”   
The prosecutor began his rebuttal with the following statement:  “I guess 
I‟m going to have to take the bait, because the defense — I‟m sitting there trying 
to bite my tongue.  The defense plays the race card as only a desperate defense 
attorney [sic].  I‟m shocked, even someone of Mr. Strellis‟s reputation would 
resort to that.”  Defense counsel attempted to interject “Is the inference[?],” but 
the prosecutor continued:  “I‟m not asking you to convict [defendant] because he‟s 
Black.  I‟m asking you to convict him because he‟s guilty.  He didn‟t rob Bernice 
Clark and kill Lance Clark because they‟re White.  He did it because he thought 
they had money.  This case has nothing to do with race.  [¶]  He is different from 
some other people.  He‟s different from Mr. Odom.  He‟s different than Mr. 
Chenault.  He‟s different than LaCondra Douglas.  He‟s different than his 
girlfriend.  He is a murderer.  [¶]  Mr. Strellis is going to stand up here and tell you 
he‟s not any different than anybody else.  If there are any other murderers in the 
courtroom, please stand up.  He is different.  [¶]  But to suggest that it‟s because 
he‟s Black or somehow he‟s being prosecuted because he‟s Black that is the basis, 
sort of appeal to you, and again, I feel an obligation to respond to it.  [¶]  You 
know, for someone that wants you to really consider the facts and just go onto the 
facts, Mr. Strellis didn‟t mention the facts in his hour that he puffed on to you with 
his hot air about the law in Scotland or whatever it was.”  
The prosecutor‟s references to race did not constitute misconduct, but rather 
represented fair rebuttal to defense counsel‟s suggestion that the prosecution had 
attempted to play on the all-White jury‟s emotions and racial prejudice.  The 
argument “did little more than urge the jury not to be influenced by [defense] 
43 
counsel‟s arguments, and to instead focus on the testimony and evidence in the 
case.”  (People v. Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 952.) 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor‟s comment, “I‟m shocked, even 
someone of Mr. Strellis‟s reputation would resort to that,” implied that Strellis had 
a poor reputation in the community.  Defendant claims the statement relied upon 
the existence of evidence of poor reputation that was not contained in the record. 
It is not clear from the statement that the prosecutor was suggesting that 
Strellis had a poor reputation.  “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct 
based on remarks to the jury, the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood the 
jury understood or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or 
erroneous manner.  [Citations.]  In conducting this inquiry, we „do not lightly 
infer‟ that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging 
meaning from the prosecutor‟s statements.”  (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 
894, 970, disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at 
p. 421, fn. 22.)  We are not persuaded that the jury drew the damaging inference 
suggested by defendant, but even if the comment was inappropriate, it constituted 
a mere passing reference of no real import to the case. 
In any event, the prosecutor certainly did not accuse defense counsel of 
fabricating evidence or deceiving the jury on the facts.  As noted above, the 
comment did not “focus[] the jury‟s attention on irrelevant matters and divert[] the 
prosecution from its proper role of commenting on the evidence and drawing 
reasonable inferences therefrom.”  (People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846.)  
As we observed in a similar context, “[i]t was clear the prosecutor‟s comment was 
aimed solely at the persuasive force of defense counsel‟s closing argument, and 
not at counsel personally.”  (People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1155.)  
We have found misconduct to be absent from similar prosecutorial remarks.  
(Ibid., citing People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 559-560 [the prosecutor 
44 
warned the jury not to “fall for” defense counsel‟s “ridiculous” effort to let the 
defendant “walk free”]; People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1215-1216 [the 
prosecutor argued that defense counsel was a great lawyer because he spoke “out 
of both sides of his mouth”]; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 306-307 [the 
prosecutor argued that law students are taught to create confusion to benefit the 
defense]; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 538 [the prosecutor claimed that the 
defense attorney‟s job was to confuse the jury and obscure the facts].) 
Defendant draws our attention to another occasion on which he claims the 
prosecutor demeaned defense counsel.  The prosecutor stated:  “Mr. Strellis wants 
to try to confuse you about what the meaning of the special circumstance 
instruction is.  Well, he‟s a skilled attorney, and he‟s doing the best he can.”  
Because there was no objection at the trial, this claim is forfeited.  (People v. 
Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 952.)  In any event, such comments fall within the 
broad scope of permissible comment, as demonstrated by the cases cited above. 
Defendant contends the prosecutor misrepresented the law pertaining to 
voluntary intoxication when he stated:  “No act is less criminal because someone 
is in a state of voluntary intoxication.  But you get to consider it on whether or not 
they actually formed the required mental state. . . .  It is only if you‟re intoxicated 
to the effect that you cannot appreciate what you‟re doing, where you don‟t 
actually have the required intent for the crime, that intoxication can be a defense.”  
This claim is forfeited because defense counsel did not object.  (People v. Prince, 
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1275.)  In any event, the court instructed the jury properly 
on the issue of intoxication, and it is not reasonably likely the jury would have 
45 
understood the prosecutor — as defendant asserts — to claim that this defense 
may be established solely by evidence of “extreme” intoxication.7 
Next, defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
commenting on defendant‟s character.  Defendant refers to these remarks:  “To 
show the kind of person [defendant] is, he uses people.  This is the kind of guy 
that will spend 90 bucks on a hot gun, and yet will kill somebody and rob a 
woman in order, to tell you, to get money for college tuition.  And it doesn‟t stop 
there.  It‟s not even his 90 bucks that he spends.  He leeches $50 of it off his 
girlfriend, against her better judgment.”  Defendant also refers to another 
comment:  “[Defendant] is the kind of person that, I think the evidence shows, will 
cause you to reexamine and rethink all your ideas about human decency and what 
should flow from what, as far as who deserves something, who doesn‟t deserve 
something, whether or not the right thing ever really happens in this world.  [¶]  
And you‟re never going to meet Lance Clark, because of him, because of his 
greed, his selfishness, his self-centeredness, his refusal to do honest work.”  The 
prosecutor also claimed defendant lied under oath “at will.” 
Because there was no objection to these comments, this claim is forfeited.  
(People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1275.)  In any event, for the most part 
these remarks constituted proper comment upon the evidence and upon 
defendant‟s credibility as a witness.  “Referring to the testimony and out-of-court 
                                            
7  
The jury was instructed that: “Where a specific intent or mental state is an 
essential element of the crime  . . .  you should consider the defendant‟s voluntary 
intoxication in your determination of whether the defendant possessed the required 
specific intent or mental state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime.”  
The jury also was instructed:  “Intoxication of a person is voluntary if it results 
from the use of any intoxicating liquor, drug or other substance knowing that it is 
capable of an intoxicating effect or when he or she willingly assumes the risk of 
that effect voluntarily.”   
46 
statements of a defendant as „lies‟ is an acceptable practice so long as the 
prosecutor argues inferences based on evidence rather than the prosecutor‟s 
personal belief resulting from personal experience or from evidence outside the 
record.”  (People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1030.)  There was evidence 
to support the inference that defendant lied when, among other occasions, he 
returned to the scene after the crimes and claimed he had observed an unknown 
Black man commit the crimes; when he contacted the police department to turn 
himself in; when he gave his statements to the police; in his testimony when he 
denied his girlfriend had given him money to purchase a firearm; and in his 
testimony when he denied having observed Lance in the car prior to the shooting.  
Moreover, the prosecutor is entitled to make a vigorous argument, and 
“opprobrious epithets” may be employed if “reasonably warranted by the 
evidence.”  (Ibid. [noting cases permitting argument that described the defendant 
as an “animal,” “professional robber,” or “vicious gunman”].)  To the extent the 
prosecutor suggested that the jury draw inferences concerning defendant‟s guilt 
from conclusions regarding defendant‟s general bad character, any misconduct 
would not have affected the outcome or fairness of the trial in light of the 
overwhelming evidence of guilt introduced by the prosecution and defendant‟s 
own testimony. 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in referring to 
the trial of O.J. Simpson.  He refers to the following comment:  “I just wanted to 
remind you the reason why we‟re here, if this seems like a big imposition on you, 
because I know that it is, it‟s been hard sometimes to break the news to you or I 
see on the judge‟s face, when we‟re going to break early or when there‟s going to 
be a delay to start.  I assure you, we haven‟t been wasting time.  It‟s just with the 
O.J. case, I know you‟re reliving some of the big imposition those jurors have on 
their life but I assure you, as the judge has indicated, when we do break early or 
47 
oftentimes we‟re here before and after you come and go, but there are very 
important legal issues that we‟ve been working on.”  
Because there was no objection, any claim of misconduct is forfeited.  
(People v. Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 952.)  In any event, it is not reasonably 
likely the jury would understand this comment to refer, as defendant claims, “to 
the common view, at least among non-Black jurors, that Simpson got away with 
murder,” nor would it, as defendant claims, “prejudice the jury in the 
prosecution‟s favor.”  
Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly bolstered the credibility of a 
prosecution witness with this comment:  “If you believe [defendant], Sergeant 
Chenault is lying, risking his career and everything it stands for, to somehow 
frame this man.”  This claim was forfeited because there was no objection below, 
and in any event the remark constituted fair comment on the evidence.  (See 
People v. Chatman, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 381-383.) 
Defendant contends that his failure to object to various asserted instances of 
misconduct should not stand as a barrier to appellate review of his claims.  He 
argues that an objection and admonition would have been futile, because the 
misconduct was pervasive and created a “hostile trial atmosphere.”  As our 
discussion has demonstrated, the prosecutor did not engage in pervasive 
misconduct.  Defendant‟s reliance upon People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th 800, is 
misplaced.  Unlike that case, which we have characterized as representing an 
“extreme” example of pervasive and corrosive prosecutorial misconduct that 
persisted throughout the trial (see People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1212), 
the present case did not involve counsel experiencing — as did counsel in Hill — 
a “constant barrage” of misstatements, demeaning sarcasm, and falsehoods, or 
ongoing hostility on the part of the trial court, to appropriate, well-founded 
objections.  (See People v. Hill, supra,  17 Cal.4th at p. 821 [counsel risked 
48 
“repeatedly provoking the trial court‟s wrath, which took the form of comments 
before the jury suggesting [counsel] was an obstructionist [who was ] delaying the 
trial with „meritless‟ objections”].)8     
4.  Asserted cumulative error  
We have not identified any error that was prejudicial, whether considered 
separately or cumulatively.  (See People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 156.) 
B.  Asserted Errors Affecting the Penalty Phase of Trial 
1.  Evidence that defendant possessed a loaded and concealed weapon   
Defendant raises two challenges to the admission of penalty phase evidence 
concerning an incident in which he was discovered in illegal possession of a 
concealed weapon.  His first claim is that the evidence was inadmissible because 
the incident did not involve a threat or implied threat of violence within the 
meaning of section 190.3, factor (b), and that admission of this evidence 
                                            
8  
Defendant contends the asserted misconduct constituted “plain error” that 
should be reviewed on appeal notwithstanding our rules pertaining to forfeiture.  
He claims that “virtually all jurisdictions” permit the reviewing court to reverse a 
conviction in some instances in which the error was not preserved in the trial 
court.  This court has recognized exceptions to the forfeiture rule in cases of 
pervasive prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct (see, e.g., People v. Hill, supra, 17 
Cal.4th at p. 821), but, as explained above, the instances cited in defendant‟s case 
do not fall within that category of cases.  Defendant refers also to a federal rule of 
procedure permitting appellate courts to reach a claim of error that was not 
preserved below, when the error is clear or obvious and affects the defendant‟s 
substantial rights.  (See United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725, 730; Fed. 
Rules Crim. Proc., rule 52(b), 18 U.S.C.)  Under that rule, however, ordinarily an 
error that “ „affect[s] substantial rights,‟ ” occurs only when the defendant can 
demonstrate prejudice.  (United States v. Olano, supra, 507 U.S. at p. 734.)  
Defendant has not demonstrated prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct, and even 
within the terms of the authority he relies upon, he fails to establish any behavior 
that is “ „inconsistent with the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings . . . .‟ ”  
(People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 277 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)  
49 
constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
His second claim is that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to strike 
certain testimony by Oakland Police Officer Rand Monda concerning the incident 
in question. 
The prosecution presented evidence establishing that on December 16, 
1991, defendant was detained on grounds not specified at trial.  It was stipulated 
that defendant‟s “detention and arrest . . . [was] based on legal cause.”  Officer 
Monda testified that at approximately 9:30 p.m., he exited from his vehicle and 
approached defendant, who was wearing dark clothing, including a cap, “a dark 
puffy black jacket with a hood over his head, [and] . . . large black ski 
gloves . . . .”  The officer directed defendant to identify himself and noticed that 
defendant was “fidgeting.”  In the absence of any request by the officer, defendant 
removed his cap and gloves and placed them on the roof of the patrol vehicle.  
Monda patted defendant down for his own safety and noticed that one of 
defendant‟s gloves contained a firearm.  The weapon was a loaded and cocked 
.25-caliber semiautomatic firearm.  One round was in the chamber of the weapon, 
and three rounds were in the clip.  Monda requested that defendant sit in the back 
of the patrol vehicle while the officer checked for outstanding warrants and called 
for backup.  Defendant was not handcuffed.  Monda recalled that defendant had 
shouted at him from inside the vehicle when Monda retrieved the weapon.  The 
officer testified that the incident was memorable, because he had not observed the 
weapon at the beginning of the encounter and “could have been shot.”  He 
explained:  “Well, he had the . . . large ski glove in his hands.  He had his hand in 
the glove and his gun, the gun was in his hand and he could have shot me and I 
didn‟t even see it.  I wouldn‟t have even seen it coming.”  Monda thereafter 
transported defendant to jail.   
50 
Defendant claims the evidence was inadmissible because the incident did 
not involve a threat or implied threat of violence.9  He contends that an 
interpretation of section 190.3, factor (b) that would permit the admission of such 
evidence would heighten the risk of arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. 
Section 190.3, factor (b) permits the introduction of evidence in 
aggravation consisting of “[t]he presence . . . of criminal activity by the defendant 
which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or 
implied threat to use force or violence.”   
Evidence establishing that a defendant knowingly possessed a potentially 
dangerous weapon while in custody is admissible under section 190.3, factor (b), 
even when the defendant has not used the weapon or displayed it with overt 
threats.  (People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 589.)  Even in a noncustodial 
setting, illegal possession of potentially dangerous weapons may “show[ ] an 
implied intention to put the weapons to unlawful use,” rendering the evidence 
admissible pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b).  (People v. Michaels (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 486, 536.)  For example, in the Michaels case, evidence was presented that 
the defendant had been discovered with a firearm concealed in the glove 
compartment of his parked vehicle and had been arrested for unlawful possession 
of knives on prior occasions.  We noted the criminal character of the defendant‟s 
possession of these weapons, adding that similar knives had been used in charged 
                                            
9  
Defendant objected on the same ground prior to trial.  The trial court 
overruled the objection, observing that “someone who carries a loaded and 
concealed handgun is carrying a classical instrument of violence that is normally 
used only for criminal purposes.”  
51 
offenses and that the concealed firearm had been employed in a robbery 
committed one day before the discovery of the weapon in the defendant‟s vehicle.  
Citing all of these circumstances, we concluded that the trial court did not err in 
admitting the prosecution‟s evidence for the purpose of demonstrating the 
defendant‟s commission of a prior crime involving the threat of violence.  The 
defendant, we pointed out, was free to present evidence upon which the jury could 
base a contrary conclusion, such as “evidence . . . to show that his possession was 
for the purpose of self-protection, or the protection of someone else, not for 
criminal violence.”  (Ibid.)  
Similarly, in the present case the jury legitimately could infer an implied 
threat of violence from all the circumstances, including the “criminal character of 
defendant‟s possession” (People v. Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 536; see 
§§ 12025, subd. (a), 12031, subd. (a)), the concealment of the loaded and cocked 
weapon in a manner that rendered it available for instant, surprise use, and 
defendant‟s use of a similar firearm in committing the present offense.  
Defendant contends that possession of a firearm ordinarily is not illegal, 
that his possession would have been legal had he obtained a special permit to carry 
a concealed weapon, and that in some states permits are not required for the 
possession of concealed and loaded firearms.  These circumstances do not detract 
from the conclusion that a jury could determine that defendant‟s possession of a 
loaded and concealed firearm, without the permit required in California,  
constituted a crime, and that an inference of an implied threat of violence properly 
could be drawn from the circumstances of the incident. 
Defendant makes a brief reference to the Second Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, commenting that “[g]enerally, a defendant may lawfully 
possess a firearm,” and surmising that it is “doubtful that the mere carrying of a 
firearm constitute[s] an implied threat of force or violence” and that the 
52 
circumstance “that in California, such carrying is unlawful and constitutes a 
misdemeanor, does not transform the conduct from one of innate self-protection 
into a threat against others.”   
In support of his claim, defendant refers to the Solicitor General‟s briefing 
in a federal case.  (United States v. Haney (10th Cir. 2001) 264 F.3d 1161.)  More 
recently, however, the United States Supreme Court decided District of Columbia 
v. Heller (2008) ___ U.S. ___ [171 L.Ed.2d 637] (Heller).  In that case, the high 
court determined that a District of Columbia law prohibiting the possession of an 
operable handgun in the home was inconsistent with the Second Amendment.  
(Heller, supra, ___ U.S. at pp. ___ [171 L.Ed.2d at pp. 679, 683-684.)  Defendant 
does not contend that the California statutes prohibiting possession of a concealed, 
loaded firearm in a public place are void under the Second Amendment.  He 
merely suggests that, because persons have a right to bear arms, their possession 
of a firearm does not, in itself, suggest a threat of violence.  We have concluded, 
however, that the evidence in the present case would permit the jury to infer an 
implied threat of violence.  
In any event, the court in Heller disapproved a statute that prohibited 
possession of an ordinary handgun in the home.  Although the high court 
determined that the Second Amendment referred to an “individual right to keep and 
bear arms” (Heller, supra, ___ U.S. at pp. ___ [171 L.Ed.2d at pp. 659, 675-677]), 
the court warned that this right was not unlimited.  The court did not recognize a 
“right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for 
whatever purpose,” observing that historically, most courts have “held that 
prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second 
Amendment or state analogues.”  (Id. at p. ___ [171 L.Ed.2d at p. 678].)  The high 
court‟s decision in Heller does not require us to conclude that possession in a public 
place of a loaded, cocked, semiautomatic weapon with a chambered round, 
53 
concealed in a large glove and ready to fire, cannot be defined as a crime under 
state law.  Moreover, nothing in that decision requires us to conclude that such 
conduct cannot be considered as carrying an implied threat of violence.  
In a related claim, defendant contends the trial court should have stricken 
Officer Monda‟s testimony that he “didn‟t even see the gun” and that he “could 
have been shot.”  According to defendant, “[e]ven if evidence regarding this 
incident was admissible as evidence in aggravation under factor (b), Officer 
Monda‟s testimony that he remembered the incident „because [he] could have 
been shot,‟ was irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, and should have been stricken.”   
This evidentiary claim is forfeited, as is defendant‟s related suggestion that 
the testimony in question constituted improper victim-impact evidence, because, 
as defendant concedes, defense counsel did not object to the testimony at trial on 
the basis stated in this claim.  (See People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 433-
434.)10  In any event, the testimony was relevant to Monda‟s credibility and 
reliability as a witness, specifically to his ability to recall the incident accurately 
after the lapse of three and one-half years.  The evidence also was relevant to the 
question whether defendant‟s possession of the firearm carried an implied threat of 
violence within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (b).  The evidence was not 
offered or referred to in argument as victim impact evidence.  We are confident 
the jury understood in what respect the evidence was relevant in light of pattern 
instructions explaining how the jury was to consider evidence in connection with 
section 190.3, factors (a) and (b) (see CALJIC Nos. 8.84.1, 8.85, 8.88), and pattern 
instructions concerning the consideration of and burden of proof applicable to 
                                            
10  
Defendant‟s assertion that this court must reach the claim because it 
represents “plain error” is without merit, for the reasons stated ante, at page 48, 
footnote 8.   
54 
evidence of illegal possession of a firearm.  (See CALJIC Nos. 3.31, 8.87, 16.460, 
16.470; see also CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02, 2.90.)   
Defendant claims the trial court should have excluded this evidence 
because it was more prejudicial than probative within the meaning of Evidence 
Code section 352.  To the extent the trial court retains such discretion in this 
context (see People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1200-1201), the failure of the 
court to exercise that discretion is forfeited on appeal when the claim was not 
raised below.  (People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1205, disapproved on 
another ground in People v. Griffin (2004)  33 Cal.4th 536, 555, fn.5.) 
2.  Admission of victim-impact evidence   
Defendant contends “almost all” of the victim-impact evidence introduced 
at trial was admitted in error.  Defendant claims that this evidence introduced 
passion and prejudice into the penalty phase proceedings and created an 
“unreasonable risk of an arbitrary result.”  He asserts the evidence was so 
prejudicial that its admission deprived him of due process of law and resulted in an 
arbitrary penalty decision in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution and parallel provisions of the California 
Constitution. 
Over objection, the prosecutor presented victim-impact evidence through 
the testimony of Lance‟s teacher, Judy Schaff, his grandmother, Bernice Clark, 
and his sister, Kristie Clark.  In addition, three still photographs and a videotape 
were introduced into evidence. 
Schaff testified that she was on vacation when she learned Lance had been 
murdered; that Lance was a quiet student who was well-liked by other students; 
that he helped others; that she had seen Lance for the last time at a school party 
55 
attended by Lance‟s sister Kristie; and that the school conducted a memorial for 
Lance.   
Bernice Clark testified concerning the plans she and Lance had for the day 
he was murdered, her profound sense of loss after his murder, and the sense of 
loss, fear, and dislocation suffered by Lance‟s younger brother as a result of the 
murder.  Some comments were especially poignant.  For example, Bernice 
testified that on the day he was murdered, Lance planned to buy a toy for his 
younger brother with money he had saved from his allowance.  She also said of 
Lance that “[h]e was always going to be my protector and he would go, every 
night and do his exercise” in order to grow big and sufficiently strong to protect 
her.   
Kristie Clark was 21 years of age when the murder occurred.  She testified 
that she learned of the murder on the day it occurred while she was shopping for 
clothing to wear to her grandfather‟s funeral.  She described her shock when a 
physician at the Oakland Children‟s Hospital gave her the news that Lance was 
dead.  She was unable to share the news with her grandmother, Bernice Clark, for 
several days, because of her grandmother‟s uncertain medical condition.  She 
described the sorrow experienced by Bernice and by Lance‟s younger brother, for 
whom Lance had served as a protector and comforter.  Kristie was the family 
member who made the funeral arrangements for Lance.  She described in moving 
terms the sorrow and sense of unreality she experienced while making those 
arrangements:  “We . . . special ordered [a casket], a medium-sized one because 
the large ones made him look too small and the baby one made him look too big.”  
She said of Lance‟s younger brother that after the murder, he “was still kind of 
waiting for him to come home.  I mean he realized he was buried, he did attend his 
funeral, but that didn‟t all click together.” 
56 
Kristie also described Lance.  She testified that he had been an amusing 
child who loved animals; that he had celebrated his birthday just four or five days 
prior to the murder; that he was a Cub Scout; and that she had served almost as a 
surrogate mother for him because his mother was “unreliable.”  She described the 
impact of Lance‟s murder on her.  She said she missed having Lance comfort her 
when she was sad (“he would come up and give you a hug and kiss and say I love 
you”), and that “you miss more than anything just the little things.  I mean eating 
popcorn, sitting in your chair with you at night or, . . . watching videos with you, 
and just little things you miss.” 
The prosecutor played a videotape depicting preparations for and 
enjoyment of a family trip to Disneyland.  Kristie identified persons depicted in 
the videotape.   
The applicable law is settled.  “In a capital trial, evidence showing the 
direct impact of the defendant‟s acts on the victims‟ friends and family is not 
barred by the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.  
[Citation.]  Under California law, victim impact evidence is admissible at the 
penalty phase under section 190.3, factor (a), as a circumstance of the crime, 
provided the evidence is not so inflammatory as to elicit from the jury an irrational 
or emotional response untethered to the facts of the case.”  (People v. Pollock 
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1180.) 
In Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808 (Payne), the United States 
Supreme Court explained that a relevant consideration for sentencing authorities 
traditionally has been the “specific harm caused by the crime.”  (Id. at p. 825.)  In 
order to understand the harm caused by the crime, a state may choose to permit the 
introduction of victim-impact evidence because such evidence is “designed to 
show . . . each victim‟s „uniqueness as an individual human being . . . .‟ ”  (Id. at 
p. 823, italics omitted.)  The high court determined that the state should not be 
57 
prevented from “offering „a quick glimpse of the life‟ which a defendant „chose to 
extinguish‟ [citation], or demonstrating the loss to the victim‟s family and to 
society which has resulted from the defendant‟s homicide.”  (Id. at p. 822.)  In 
sum, “[a] State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and 
about the impact of the murder on the victim‟s family is relevant to the jury‟s 
decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.”  (Id. at 
p. 827.)   
On the other hand, as the high court recognized, “[i]n the event that 
evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial 
fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides a mechanism for relief.”  (Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825.)  State law is 
consistent with these principles.  “Unless it invites a purely irrational response 
from the jury, the devastating effect of a capital crime on loved ones and the 
community is relevant and admissible as a circumstance of the crime under section 
190.3, factor (a).”  (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1056-1057; 
cf. People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 835-836.) 
It is difficult to discern the exact nature of defendant‟s claim.  He argues 
that victim-impact evidence necessarily is prejudicial, but the high court has 
concluded that states are not precluded from permitting such evidence at the 
penalty phase of a trial.  Defendant argues that victim-impact evidence is 
particularly prejudicial when the victim is a child.  As defendant contends, 
evidence concerning the impact of the death of a child on his or her family and 
friends is particularly poignant, but within the meaning of Payne, supra, 501 U.S. 
808, such evidence remains relevant to the jury‟s understanding of the harm 
caused by the crime.   
In the present case, the trial court carefully considered whether the 
proposed testimony fell within appropriate limits, making every effort to ensure 
58 
that it was not inflammatory.  Lance‟s parents did not testify, because the 
prosecutor feared that their testimony would be inflammatory, a concern shared by 
the trial court.  The court emphatically admonished counsel to prepare witnesses 
well to avoid inflammatory emotional remarks and to ensure they did not blurt out 
their views concerning the crime itself, the defendant, or the appropriate penalty.  
The child‟s grandmother and his sister testified regarding their feeling of loss, but 
the testimony was not dramatic or inflammatory.  (See People v. Smith (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 334, 365 [permissible victim-impact evidence included mother‟s testimony 
concerning the loss of her child:  “ „I don‟t think the pain will ever go away . . . I 
think the worst part of it is . . . what goes on in my mind what happened to him.  
What he went though is . . . just very difficult‟ ”]; People v. Benavides, supra, 35 
Cal.4th at p. 105 [permissible victim-impact evidence was admitted through the 
testimony of the aunt and cousins of an infant victim, concerning the agony caused 
to the family, including the infant‟s sister, by the victim‟s death].)  And, contrary 
to defendant‟s claim, the evidence received in the present case had no tendency to 
arouse racial animus.  
Defendant contends Bernice Clark should not have been permitted to testify 
concerning anything but “the immediate effects of the crime.”  He complains 
specifically that she should not have been permitted to describe her and Lance‟s 
plans for the day, including Lance‟s intention to buy a toy using money he had 
saved from his allowance.  Such testimony, however, plainly concerns the 
circumstances of the crime within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (a).  We 
have rejected similar claims.  (People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 833 
[victim-impact evidence is not limited to “the immediate temporal and spatial 
circumstances of the crime” but includes “ „[t]hat which surrounds [the crime] 
materially, morally, or logically‟ ”].) 
59 
Defendant contends the testimony of the witnesses concerning the impact 
of the crime on them was too extensive.  We disagree.  The prosecutor‟s 
questioning was relatively brief — 5 pages of transcript in the case of Schaff, 9 
pages of transcript in the case of Bernice Clark, and 18 pages of transcript in the 
case of Kristie Clark.  Defendant counters that victim-impact evidence ordinarily 
is permitted when it supplies a “quick glimpse” of the victim and the impact of his 
or her death on others, but that in the present case, “most” of the single day 
devoted to the evidentiary portion of the penalty phase was devoted to victim-
impact evidence.  He does not identify any persuasive basis for a rule that victim-
impact evidence may not form a substantial portion of a prosecutor‟s case in 
aggravation.  Indeed, we have rejected the claim that the evidence must be 
confined to a single witness.  (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 364; see 
also People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1183.) 
Defendant contends the witnesses should not have been permitted to testify 
concerning the victim‟s character, but such evidence conveys the insight into the 
victim that the high court has concluded is appropriate.  (Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at 
pp. 823, 827.)  Contrary to defendant‟s claim, this evidence was not inflammatory.  
Rather, it resembled victim-impact testimony we have accepted as appropriate in 
many cases.  (See, e.g., People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 652, 682 [the 
evidence included testimony by the victim‟s wife and children concerning the 
sorrow they felt and the devastating impact of the crime on their lives, as well as 
evidence concerning the victim‟s professional life]; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 
Cal.4th 381, 444 [family members expressed love for the victims and explained 
their sense of loss; photographs depicted the victims in life].) 
Defendant contends that section 190.3, factor (a) must be construed to 
restrict the scope of victim-impact evidence in order to avoid constitutional 
deficiencies, including concerns that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and 
60 
permits arbitrariness in the penalty decision.  Defendant contends that this court 
must afford a narrow interpretation to section 190.3, factor (a), limiting victim-
impact evidence to evidence (1) given by a family member who was at the scene 
of the crime or immediately thereafter; (2) describing circumstances known to or 
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant at the time of the murder and (3) presented 
by a single witness.  We have rejected similar claims, and defendant has not 
persuaded us to reconsider those decisions.  (People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th 
at p. 1183; see also People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 364-365, People v. 
Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1057.) 
Defendant also challenges the court‟s decision to permit the prosecution to 
present evidence in the form of the eight-minute videotape, that, as noted above, 
depicted Lance Clark and family members preparing for and enjoying a trip to 
Disneyland.  The videotape began with a clip of Lance having climbed up a tree.  
It then portrayed Lance spending time with family members.  The tape included 
parts of the drive to Southern California and displayed the family interacting in a 
hotel room.  The videotape occasionally focused on Lance, who often is smiling or 
making amusing gestures to the camera, but it also included footage of other 
family members.   
Defendant contends that the videotape constituted improper victim-impact 
evidence because it was inflammatory and went beyond the “quick glimpse” of the 
victim contemplated by Payne, supra, 501 U.S. 808.  He stresses that the 
videotape was highly prejudicial in light of Kristie Clark‟s courtroom demeanor 
and testimony, which “contrasted sharply and painfully” with the happy images of 
her, Lance Clark, and others on the videotape.  He stresses the prejudicial impact 
of observing a young murder victim happily climbing a tree and seeing him, his 
younger brother, and other family members happily anticipating and undertaking a 
journey to Disneyland. 
61 
There is no bright-line rule pertaining to the admissibility of videotape 
recordings of the victim at capital sentencing hearings.  (People v. Prince, supra, 
40 Cal.4th at p. 1288.)  We consider pertinent cases in light of the general 
understanding that the prosecution may present evidence for the purpose of 
reminding the sentencer that “ „the victim is an individual whose death represents 
a unique loss to society and in particular to his family‟ ” (Payne, supra, 501 U.S. 
at p. 825), but that the prosecution may “not introduce irrelevant or inflammatory 
material” that “ „diverts the jury's attention from its proper role or invites an 
irrational, purely subjective response.‟ ”  (People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at 
p. 836.) 
“Courts must exercise great caution in permitting the prosecution to present 
victim-impact evidence in the form of a lengthy videotaped or filmed tribute to the 
victim.  Particularly if the presentation lasts beyond a few moments, or emphasizes 
the childhood of an adult victim, or is accompanied by stirring music, the medium 
itself may assist in creating an emotional impact upon the jury that goes beyond 
what the jury might experience by viewing still photographs of the victim or 
listening to the victim's bereaved parents.”  (People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 
p. 1289.) 
Videotaped evidence nevertheless may be relevant to the penalty 
determination, because it “humanize[s] [the victim], as victim impact evidence is 
designed to do.”  (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 797.)  For example, a 
videotaped photomontage may convey the family and society‟s loss; it may 
“help[] the jury to see that defendant took away the victim‟s ability to enjoy her 
favorite activities,” and may “further illustrate[] the gravity of the loss by showing 
[the victim‟s] fresh-faced appearance before she died.”  (Ibid.) 
The trial court exercised appropriate caution to avoid introducing irrelevant 
drama and undue emotion into the penalty determination.  The court carefully 
62 
reviewed the videotape prior to its admission, ordered the audio portion deleted, 
and vigorously cautioned the prosecutor to ensure that Kristie Clark‟s commentary 
during the playing of the videotape should be unemotional.   
Like the trial court, we have reviewed the tape to determine whether it 
contains elements that are irrelevant to the penalty determination.  We agree with 
the trial court that the material, which merely depicts ordinary activities and 
interactions between Lance Clark and his family, was relevant to humanize the 
victim and provide some sense of the loss suffered by his family and society.  The 
videotape is an awkwardly shot “home movie” depicting moments shared by 
Lance with his family shortly before he was murdered.  The videotape does not 
constitute a memorial, tribute, or eulogy; it does not contain staged or contrived 
elements, music, visual techniques designed to generate emotion, or background 
narration; it does not convey any sense of outrage or call for vengeance or 
sympathy; it lasts only eight minutes and is entirely devoid of drama; and it is 
factual and depicts real events.  (See, e.g., People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
pp. 366-367; People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 797-798.)  The evidence 
supplemented but did not duplicate Kristie Clark‟s testimony, and her narration 
was not objectionable.  We conclude the trial court did not err. 
Defendant claims the prosecutor should have accepted his offer to stipulate 
that he would not offer evidence in mitigation in the event the prosecution would 
agree not to introduce victim-impact evidence.  He points out that the court in 
Payne expressed the view that it would be unfair to deny the prosecution the 
opportunity to offer evidence of the harm caused by the defendant‟s crime while 
permitting the defendant to introduce relatively unlimited evidence to paint a full 
picture of his or her life experience and character for the purpose of eliciting 
sympathy.  Contrary to defendant‟s view, however, the high court did not suggest 
that prosecution victim-impact evidence was admissible solely to rebut the 
63 
mitigating impact of evidence submitted by the defense.  As noted, the court 
stressed the traditional and permissible place in the sentencing determination of a 
consideration of the “specific harm caused by the crime in question.”  (Payne, 
supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825.)  As for defendant‟s offer to refrain from producing 
evidence in mitigation in return for similar silence from the prosecution, it was not 
within defendant‟s power to force the prosecution to refrain from presenting a 
persuasive case in aggravation through the introduction of relevant, admissible 
evidence.  Ordinarily the prosecution “ „cannot be compelled to accept a 
stipulation if the effect would be to deprive the state‟s case of its persuasiveness 
and forcefulness.‟ ”  (People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 182, disapproved 
on another ground in People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117-118; see also 
People v. Salcido, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 147.)  
Defendant adds that the victim-impact evidence should not have been 
admitted or permitted to form a basis for the prosecutor‟s argument because, in his 
view, there was little evidence in aggravation and the mitigating factors far 
outweighed the aggravating factors — a claim he bases in part upon the 
circumstance that the jury‟s deliberations on penalty occupied a period of 
approximately seven days.  We have not restricted victim-impact evidence to cases 
in which it would have little effect upon the verdict.  Victim-impact evidence is 
relevant to the penalty determination because such evidence provides the jury with 
an idea of who the victim was and of the impact of his or her death on family and 
close friends.  The relevance of the evidence does not depend upon the strength or 
weakness of the prosecution‟s case in aggravation.  Although this type of evidence 
should not be admitted if it is inflammatory, as long as it is otherwise admissible, 
it properly may form a basis — along with the prosecutor‟s related argument — 
for the jury‟s decision in favor of the death penalty. 
64 
 
3.  Asserted prosecutorial misconduct   
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in an egregious “pattern of 
misconduct” throughout the penalty phase, thereby denying him a fair trial under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and parallel 
provisions of the California Constitution, and requiring this court to set aside the 
death judgment.  We disagree. 
As at the guilt phase of the trial, at the penalty phase a prosecutor commits 
misconduct under the federal standard by engaging in conduct that renders the trial 
so unfair as to constitute a denial of due process.  (Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 
477 U.S. 168, 181; Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974) 416 U.S. 637, 642; People 
v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 858.)  State law characterizes the use of deceptive 
or reprehensible methods as misconduct.  (People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 
p. 858.)  In order to preserve any claim of prosecutorial misconduct, there must be 
a timely objection and request for admonition.  (Ibid.)  “ „[O]therwise, the point is 
reviewable only if an admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the 
misconduct.‟ ”  (Ibid.) 
“For prosecutorial misconduct at the penalty phase, we apply the 
reasonable possibility standard of prejudice first articulated in People v. Brown 
[(1988)] 46 Cal.3d [432,] 448, and which, as we have later explained, is the „same 
in substance and effect‟ as the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test for prejudice 
articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.”  (People v. Wallace 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1092.) 
Defendant faults the prosecution for dwelling on the victim-impact 
evidence in his closing argument to the jury, claiming that the prosecutor “urged 
the jurors to identify with the victims and the emotional pain of their loss, . . . a 
tactic that . . . tends to inflame the emotions of the jurors.”  Even if we were to 
overlook defendant‟s failure to object to the argument, we would reject this claim.  
65 
In closing argument, a prosecutor may rely upon the impact of the victim‟s death 
on his or her family.  The prosecutor in the present case merely commented upon 
evidence we have determined was admissible, as he was entitled to do.  (See 
People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1419.)  Although the prosecutor‟s 
argument had emotional impact, it was permissible.  We have acknowledged that 
emotion need not be eliminated from the penalty determination.  Although 
emotion “ „must not reign over reason,‟ ” it “ „need not, indeed, cannot, be entirely 
excluded from the jury‟s moral assessment.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 1418.) 
Defendant asserts the prosecutor suggested the existence of facts outside 
the record and misstated the evidence.  The prosecutor, in closing argument, 
addressed section 190.3, factor (i), concerning the age of the defendant at the time 
of the crime.  He stated:  “The law allows you to consider the defendant‟s age.  
And he was young when he did this.  He wasn‟t 18, but he wasn‟t an older 
individual.  [¶]  But ask yourself this, he‟d been on probation for a year and a half 
for illegally possessing a gun, the gun was taken from him, and yet he chose to 
rearm himself and hatch this plan.  He might not be old chronologically, but as 
criminal age goes, he was well down the road.  The system had tried leniency on 
him, probation had been tried.  [¶]  What did probation do?  What did it result in?  
The leniency extended him through the court, what was the result of that?  A 
woman shot through the neck and a dead child right beside her, with a different 
gun.  [¶]  Did he learn from going through the court system the first time?  What 
did he learn?  He bought a bigger gun, and he made himself a promise, I‟m not 
going to be identified, I‟m going to wear a disguise, and if that doesn‟t work, 
there‟s something else I can do to make sure I don‟t get identified „cause I don‟t 
want to go to jail.‟  [¶]  So you can consider his age at the time of the crime.  But 
before you find any mitigation there, consider not his chronological age but what 
66 
his state of mind was and what choices he‟d made before.  It‟s not the first time 
he‟d been in this position.” 
Defendant claims on appeal that the italicized language constituted 
misconduct.  He charges the prosecutor with misstating the evidence, because 
defendant was not “well down the road” to a life of crime but had one assertedly 
minor prior conviction.  In addition, defendant claims the prosecutor‟s statement 
implied, or at least invited speculation, that defendant had a more extensive 
criminal record than appeared through the evidence introduced at trial.  Defendant 
adds that the prosecutor should not have referred to the failure of probation, 
arguing that such a statement suggests that the only effective form of correction 
for failure on probation would be the death penalty. 
These claims are forfeited because the defense did not object in the trial 
court.  (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 800.)  In any event, the 
prosecutor‟s argument did not in the least suggest the existence of a more 
extensive criminal record than was established at trial, nor did it suggest an 
abstract rule that the sole appropriate punishment for failure on probation was the 
penalty of death.  In addition, the prosecutor was entitled to request that the jury 
draw inferences from the record concerning defendant‟s culpability, on the basis 
of the evidence admitted pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b).  It was for the jury 
to decide whether the inferences were reasonable.  (See People v. Wallace, supra, 
44 Cal.4th at p. 1094 [“the absence of any deterrent effect from defendant‟s earlier 
brushes with the law was [a] . . . reasonable inference”].)11 
                                            
11  
Defendant invites us to consider inferences that could be drawn by the jury 
from an examination of a report prepared by his investigator concerning 
postverdict discussions with jurors.  (The report was attached to defendant‟s 
motion for new trial.)  As we shall explain, the verdict cannot be impeached by 
such inadmissible hearsay.  (See post, pp. 99-101.) 
67 
Defendant claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by comparing 
defendant to other criminals during his discussion of section 190.3, factor (g), 
“whether or not the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial 
domination of another person.”  The prosecutor argued:  “This is not a situation 
where Leonard Lake is orchestrating the thing and perhaps influencing other 
people to do his bidding for him, or Mr. Koresh, down in Texas, or maybe with his 
extreme influence of the people that he was leading, caused them to do things they 
wouldn‟t ordinarily do.  Not the reverend Jim Jones, down in Guyana.  [¶]  
[Defendant] did this by himself.  He thought about it himself.  He planned this out 
himself.  He profited by it himself.  [¶]  Factor (g) does not apply.  There‟s no 
mitigation there.” 
Defendant claims his culpability was not comparable with that of the 
named individuals and that the argument constituted an appeal to passion and 
prejudice.  This claim was not raised below and hence is forfeited.  (People v. 
Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 800.)  In any event, the claim is without merit.  The 
prosecutor‟s point was that defendant did not act under the domination of another 
person.  The reference to other named criminals served to illustrate the very 
different circumstances under which section 190.3 factor (g) in mitigation might 
apply.  The prosecutor merely argued that unlike the persons who were dominated 
by Jim Jones, for example, defendant acted alone.  Contrary to defendant‟s claim, 
the prosecutor did not suggest defendant himself was a mass murderer or serial 
killer with followers under his domination. 
Defendant claims that several portions of the prosecutor‟s closing argument 
improperly compared the murder victim‟s family with defendant‟s family.  In 
discussing section 190.3, factor (k), the prosecutor explained that the defense was 
entitled to present evidence to persuade the jury to impose a sentence less than 
death.  He characterized the testimony the jury had heard from defendant‟s family 
68 
as a “bare request” that the jury spare his life.  He sought to persuade the jury that 
such a “bare request” was not sufficient to supply a basis for the lesser 
punishment:  “They offered no opinion as to his character, they didn‟t tell you 
about anything good he‟d ever done, but just the bare request, he‟s my relative, 
don‟t execute him.  That‟s it.  That‟s all that‟s been offered to you in mitigation.”  
(Italics added.) 
Then, turning to the jury‟s duty to weigh circumstances in aggravation and 
mitigation, the prosecutor argued: “And you‟re going to weigh that [the defense 
evidence] against the circumstances of the crime, the harm to the victim‟s family, 
and his other criminal conduct.  [¶]  [I]t‟s a weighing process.  And when you 
weigh what you heard yesterday by the defense against the rest of the case, it‟s 
inconceivable that the scales could turn out any other way.” 
Returning to his argument that the jury should accord little weight to the 
defense evidence in mitigation, the prosecutor continued:  “He has offered nothing 
to you that extenuates the gravity of the offense for which you‟ve convicted him.  
You haven‟t heard anything redeeming about him.  [¶]  Sure his mom came in, and 
I respect that, his father came in, and a couple of relatives that have seen him a 
total of five times in two years.  You know, they‟re asked — called upon to come in 
here and try to say something to save [defendant].  And they did that, as a good 
family member would do.  But don‟t you think they‟d have seen him more than five 
times in two years if they were that concerned about it?  [¶]  Kristie went to see 
Bernice more times in two days than those two relatives have gone to see 
[defendant] in the two years since he committed this murder.  That will show you 
something about legitimate concern or legitimate care.  [¶]  And what I don‟t want 
you to think is I‟m somehow casting aspersions about his family.  I‟m not.  He‟s 
got a good family.  In fact, the point is, the punishment is for [defendant], it‟s not 
for [his] family.”  (Italics added.) 
69 
The prosecutor continued in the same vein, comparing defendant with other 
persons in order to emphasize defendant‟s personal culpability.  He also sought to 
minimize the weight of defendant‟s mitigating evidence on the ground that any 
mitigating value related to the witnesses, and not to defendant:  “[Defendant] had a 
better upbringing, had better parents than the victim in this case did.  He‟s had a 
job.  He had a girlfriend, a nice woman, that he shook down for $50 to buy his 
second handgun, against her better judgment.  [¶]  But he knows what life‟s about.  
He knows the choices he makes.  And he knows what life has to offer . . . .  But he 
chose a different path, and he chose it more than once.  [¶]  [Defendant] is 
responsible for this murder.  Not his father, not his mother, not either one of his 
relatives, not his sister.  [¶] The punishment that you decide in this case is for 
[defendant], and [defendant] alone, for what he did.”   
Defendant complains on appeal that the prosecutor improperly compared 
the regard borne by the victim‟s family for the victim, with the relative absence of 
concern about defendant, as inferred by the prosecutor from the testimony of 
members of defendant‟s family.  Again, there was no objection and hence the 
claim of misconduct is forfeited.  (People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 800.)  
The claim also lacks merit.  We do not believe the import of the prosecutor‟s 
argument was that suggested by defendant.  (See People v. Howard (1992) 
1 Cal.4th 1132, 1192 [cautioning against lightly inferring that the prosecutor 
intended, or the jury understood, his or her remarks to have their most damaging 
meaning].)  The witnesses in the present case merely recounted their attachment to 
the victim, an appropriate subject — and one appropriate for comment by the 
prosecutor.  (See also id. at pp. 1191-1192.)  Moreover, a prosecutor may compare 
the mitigating weight of a defendant‟s personal history with the impact of the 
crime on the victim‟s family.  (People v. Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 324.)  
70 
We also agree with respondent that the prosecutor‟s comments concerning 
defendant‟s family simply noted the absence of mitigating evidence and, as the 
prosecutor cautioned expressly, were not intended to disparage defendant‟s family.  
It was appropriate to remind the jury that the penalty would be imposed upon 
defendant, not his family.  (See People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 261-262 [the 
prosecutor argued that sympathy for the victim‟s family should not extend to the 
defendant].)  
Defendant claims misconduct based upon the comment that defendant “had 
a better upbringing, had better parents than the victim in this case did.”  He asks us 
to recall earlier statements defendant characterizes as suggesting that, because the 
victim‟s family expressed more concern for the victim than defendant‟s family 
expressed for him, the victim‟s life possessed a higher value than defendant‟s life.  
Defendant also challenges the following argument as a distortion of the proper 
weighing function assigned to the jury:  “The reason we are here is because 
[defendant] took this person, this living breathing child, and turned him into this.  
[The prosecutor displayed an autopsy photograph to the jury.]  [¶]  That is the 
beginning and end of why we‟re here.  [¶]  As I said to you before, the value that 
you place on anything is measured by the price that someone has to pay for taking 
it.  [¶]  [Defense counsel]:  I‟m going to object to that.  [¶]  [Prosecutor]:  So by 
your verdict —  [¶]  [Defense counsel]:  Your honor, I‟m going to object to that as 
inappropriate.  [¶]  [The court]:  The objection‟s overruled  [¶]  [Prosecutor]:  
Again, the price I‟m going to be asking you is for the life of this man.  The death 
penalty, under the laws of this state, is the appropriate punishment for what has 
occurred, for what [defendant] alone, himself, has done, and what you, by your 
unanimous verdict, have held him responsible for.  What was the life of Lance 
Clark worth?  That‟s the question submitted to you.  [¶]  What is the proper 
71 
punishment for the person who took that life.  What should happen to that 
person?”  (Italics added.) 
The prosecutor subsequently argued:  “We have the death penalty in this 
state . . . because you can‟t bring those people back.  What value do you place on 
the people who are gone and can‟t protect themselves.  They‟re just part of 
eternity.”  (Italics added.)  Defense counsel objected to this last argument, but the 
objection was overruled. 
Defendant contends the prosecutor‟s argument constituted a prohibited 
attempt to inflame the passions of the jury.  The argument essentially requested the 
jury to weigh the circumstances of the crime, including the victim-impact 
evidence, against the circumstances in mitigation, including the evidence that the 
jury had received concerning defendant‟s background.  The prosecutor may urge 
that the death penalty is appropriate in light of the seriousness of the crimes 
(People v. Salcido, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 160) and may “ „remind[] the sentencer 
that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is 
an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society . . . .‟ ”  (Payne, 
supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825.)   
Notwithstanding the defense‟s assertion that the prosecutor‟s italicized 
language suggested a mechanical weighing process, when we view these 
statements in the context of the prosecutor‟s argument as a whole we conclude he 
did not urge such a mechanical process but instead argued the jury should make a 
subjective moral evaluation of the appropriate punishment.  In addition, we have 
held that the prosecutor may remark upon the function of the death penalty in 
exacting retribution on behalf of the community, as long as his or her remarks are 
not inflammatory and do not represent the prosecutor‟s main theme or argument.  
(People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1178-1179.)  We conclude the 
72 
prosecutor‟s argument did not extend beyond permissible bounds by appealing 
solely to emotion. 
Hewing to his theme that the jury should not accord much mitigating 
weight to the testimony given by defendant‟s family, however sympathetic the 
family members themselves appeared to the jury, the prosecutor argued:  “You 
might ask yourself, why were those questions asked of [defendant‟s] father about 
his war record, which is admirable, and his 20 years of employment in Alameda 
County after he got out [after] serving 20 years in the Navy.  They would like for 
you to feel that — they don‟t want you to focus on him and his conduct, 
[defendant‟s] conduct, they want you to focus on the father and have you diverted 
into thinking that if you impose the death penalty that somehow it‟s hurting the 
father.  That misses the point.  You don‟t judge somebody in this world by what 
their parents are like.  [¶]  The defense wants to make you feel like you‟ll be 
punishing good people that don‟t deserve punishment if you return a death verdict 
in this case.  And I think we can understand why.  There‟s nothing redeeming in 
[defendant] to point to.  And so we‟ll try to hide behind his family.  What other 
reason could there be for bringing that out?  [Defendant] has a good family.”  
(Italics added.) 
Continuing the argument that the defense had presented the testimony of 
defendant‟s family solely to cause the jury to develop feelings of sympathy for the 
family members, the prosecutor argued that other reasons for calling family 
members did not exist, but certainly would have been argued had they been 
present.  “And you can bet your last dollar, if he had a dysfunctional family, that 
would be urged to you as a reason to give him life without parole.  He never had a 
square shot in this world.  He had a bad father, a bad mother, wasn‟t brought up 
right, never had a chance.  That isn‟t the case.  He had a good family.  And you 
73 
saw them here.  And, if anything, that‟s less of a reason for him to do what he 
did.”  (Italics added.) 
The prosecutor then claimed that if defendant had experienced the difficult 
family life endured by the murder victim, the defense certainly would have 
presented such evidence.  Because, in the prosecutor‟s view, the defense would 
have made that argument had the evidence been available, the defense was 
“try[ing] to have it both ways.”  Thus, the prosecutor argued:  “Think for a minute.  
What if Lance Clark had grown up and this had never happened to him, and he 
went out and did something like [defendant] did, and he was on trial?  If he were 
being defendant, they‟d say, well, his father is a drug addict and a thief, how do 
you expect him to turn out.  See, they try to have it both ways.  They want you to 
judge him by virtue of his parents.”  (Italics added.) 
Defendant contends the italicized portions of the argument constituted 
misconduct because they invited irrelevant speculation and suggested that the 
decision to present the testimony of defense witnesses concerning defendant‟s 
upbringing was cynical and hypocritical.  This claim is forfeited because there was 
no objection.  (People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 800.)  In any event, the 
claim also lacks merit, because the prosecutor‟s central argument was that the 
defense evidence in mitigation was meaningful only because it elicited sympathy 
for the defendant‟s family.  He urged the jury not to find mitigation on the basis of 
such sympathy.  He suggested that sympathy for defendant‟s family could not be 
considered in mitigation.  This argument is consistent with the law.  (People v. 
Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 456; see also People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 
1166, 1205.)  The suggestion of cynicism and hypocrisy on the part of the defense 
was a passing comment, not the sort of sustained broadside attack on defense 
counsel we condemned in People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pages 832-834. 
74 
Defendant claims the argument was particularly harmful because it played 
on the jurors‟ prejudice against criminal defendants based upon the assumption 
that all criminals seek to avoid responsibility for their actions, whereas he 
accepted responsibility by contacting the police and by testifying.  In our view, 
however, the jury was perfectly capable of drawing its own inferences from the 
evidence and deciding whether it believed defendant had taken full responsibility 
for his actions.  In the context of the argument as a whole, any prejudice arising 
from the prosecutor‟s suggestion could have been cured by a timely objection and 
admonition to the jury, and it was not reasonably possible there would have been a 
different outcome in the absence of the prosecutor‟s argument. 
Defendant contends that the alleged misconduct in closing argument was 
particularly prejudicial, in part because “[t]he facts of [the] case did not strongly 
support the death penalty” and the jury deliberated the question of punishment for 
“at least seven full days.”  He also directs our attention to misconduct that 
assertedly occurred at the guilt phase of the trial, and claims that pervasive 
attempts to disparage defense counsel and to inflame the jury affected the verdict. 
It is not our function to reweigh the case in aggravation and mitigation.  In 
any event, although defendant characterizes his crime as an “impulsive robbery” 
ending in a death that was “not a calculated murder,” there was evidence 
establishing that the robbery had been planned; that defendant had armed himself 
for the purpose of robbing a woman who was 70 years of age; and that when 
defendant shot Bernice Clark, he intended to kill her because she had recognized 
him and would be able to identify him.  The jury properly was instructed that 
counsel‟s statements do not constitute evidence and that the jurors should decide 
the case purely upon the basis of the admitted evidence.  Most jurors presumably 
are aware that defense counsel‟s duty to provide a vigorous defense extends to the 
penalty phase.  In sum, it is not reasonably possible the verdict was affected by the 
75 
prosecutor‟s suggestion that defense counsel would seize on any conceivable 
circumstance to influence the jury. 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by requesting 
that the jury imagine the murder victim‟s experience:  “Think about what it must 
have felt like for Lance Clark to have a hot piece of lead tear through his chest, go 
through his heart, his lungs, his liver and come out his back.”  Defendant does not 
allege the argument misstates the evidence, and we have concluded that at the 
penalty phase, the prosecutor ordinarily may ask the jury to consider the pain 
suffered by the victim.  (People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 568; People v. 
Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1233-1234.)  Contrary to defendant‟s claim, it is not 
improper at that phase of the trial for the prosecutor to “invite the jurors to put 
themselves in the place of the victims and imagine their suffering.”  (People v. 
Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1212.)  We do not consider the prosecutor‟s 
statement inflammatory.  
Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly urged the jury to consider 
the absence of mitigating evidence as a circumstance in aggravation.  (See People 
v. Davenport  (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-289.)  Defendant claims “[t]he 
prosecutor clearly argued that the evidence provided by [defendant‟s] family — a 
factor in mitigation under [section 190.3] factor (k) — constituted evidence in 
aggravation and did not provide any extenuation for the crime, nor anything that 
the jury should consider.  Further, by arguing that [defendant] had a better family 
than did the victim, the prosecutor implied that [defendant] should be punished for 
victimizing someone less fortunate than himself.”  Because defendant failed to 
object in the trial court, the issue is forfeited.  (People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th 
at p. 800; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 659, fn. 9.)  This claim was not 
revived by the filing of a motion for new trial raising the Davenport claim.  
(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 254.) 
76 
In any event, the prosecutor did not argue that the absence of evidence in 
mitigation constituted evidence in aggravation.  In our view, he merely argued that 
defendant‟s proffered evidence in mitigation was not entitled to great weight, 
because its chief impact was to render the jury sympathetic to defendant‟s family 
members — and sympathy for family members is not properly considered in 
mitigation.  The prosecutor‟s comparison between defendant‟s family and that of 
the victim, if considered in context, served to highlight the absence of any 
mitigating evidence of personal hardship in defendant‟s background.  
4.  CALJIC No. 8.84.1   
During discussion of proposed penalty phase instructions to the jury, 
defendant requested that the language of pattern instruction CALJIC No. 8.84.1 be 
modified.12  Counsel argued:  “I do have a request for a modification . . . where 
the [instruction] reads, „you must neither be influenced by bias nor prejudice 
against the defendant, nor swayed by public opinion or public feelings‟ . . . and 
„the people and the defendant have a right to expect that you will consider all of 
the evidence, follow the law, exercise your discretion conscientiously, and reach a 
just verdict.‟  [¶]  I would like to add a sentence to that . . . [saying] that you are to 
reach your verdict based upon the evidence, and should not either speculate, you 
know, not be subject either to speculation or conjecture.”  Counsel contended that 
the jury, rather than engage in conjecture, must make the penalty decision solely 
                                            
12  
The court delivered the pattern instruction as follows:  “You must 
determine what the facts are from the evidence received during the entire trial 
unless you are instructed otherwise.  [¶]  You must accept and follow the law that I 
. . . state to you.  Disregard all other instructions given to you in other phases of 
this trial.  [¶]  You must neither be influenced by bias nor prejudice against the 
defendant nor swayed by public opinion or public feelings.  Both the people and 
the defendant have a right to expect that you will consider all of the evidence, 
follow the law, exercise your discretion conscientiously and reach a just verdict.”   
77 
upon the basis of the evidence introduced at trial.  He stated:  “Clearly it‟s the law 
. . . that they can‟t speculate or conject[ure], but are only supposed to use the 
evidence as it‟s been presented to them.  That was — conjecture, for some reason 
got left out of this instruction when they went over to capital.  And I believe that to 
be a fair statement of the law.”   
The trial court declined defense counsel‟s invitation to modify the 
instruction, commenting that the proposed amendment to CALJIC 8.84.1 could 
have confused the jury in that it stood in tension with the normative and 
individualized nature of the jury‟s task at the penalty phase of the trial.   
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by 
refusing to add the language proposed by the defense.  He claims that without the 
modification, the pattern instruction “allowed the jury to speculate regarding 
matters outside the guilt and penalty phase evidence.”    
“To determine whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury, „we 
examine the entire record, including the instructions and arguments, to determine 
whether the jury was misled to the prejudice of the defendant about the scope of 
its sentencing discretion.  [Citation.]  We must ascertain whether, overall, the jury 
was adequately informed of the full nature of its sentencing responsibility, both as 
to the manner in which the various factors are to be weighed and as to the scope of 
its sentencing discretion.  [Citation.]‟ ”  (People v. Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 
p. 1215.)  Ordinarily, “ „[w]e presume that jurors comprehend and accept the 
court‟s directions.‟ ”  (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 773.)13 
                                            
13  
Defendant asserts that evidence submitted in support of his motion for new 
trial supports the view that jurors “in fact speculated about matters outside the 
record.”  He refers to hearsay evidence, consisting of postverdict remarks by jurors 
to a defense investigator.  In a later discussion, we conclude those remarks should 
not be considered to impeach the verdict.  (See post, pp. 99-101.)  
78 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion.  Defendant‟s concern that the 
jury not base its decision upon the existence of facts not introduced in evidence 
was met by other instructions.  The trial court reminded the jury that they “must 
decide all questions of fact in this case from the evidence received in this trial and 
not from any other source.”  (CALJIC No. 1.03.)  The jury‟s factfinding function 
was described adequately in this and other instructions.14  
5.  Asserted error in responding to a question by the jury concerning 
section 190.3, factor (k) and the absence of remorse  
 
Defendant contends that the court erred in responding to a question posed 
by the jury during deliberations.  According to defendant, the court‟s response 
directed that remorse not be considered as a factor in mitigation, and indeed that 
absence of remorse should be considered in aggravation.  He claims the court‟s 
asserted error violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution by elevating absence of remorse 
into a circumstance in aggravation. 
Defendant‟s claim is based upon the following circumstances.  On the fifth 
day of deliberations, the jury delivered the following note to the court:  “We the 
jury . . . request the following, the second paragraph on page 45 [of the written 
jury instructions] . . . states that we, as jurors, shall consider, take into account and 
                                            
14  
We refer to portions of CALJIC Nos. 8.84.1 as delivered at trial (“You 
must determine what the facts are from the evidence received during the entire 
trial unless you are instructed otherwise”) and 8.85 as delivered at trial (“In 
determining which penalty is to be imposed on the defendant you shall consider all 
of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case 
except as you may be hereafter instructed”).  The trial court also repeated guilt 
phase instructions defining evidence, circumstantial evidence, inferences, and the 
manner in which various types of evidence should be considered and weighed.   
79 
be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  
Are we to assume that these circumstances are A through K as stated on pages 25 
through 27, or can we look at all the circumstances, regardless of being on A 
through K . . . , or not?”  
The court responded that “the factors of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances are stated in jury instruction 8.85, factors A through K . . . .  [¶]  
However, I need to ask you a question as to the meaning of the last . . . paragraph 
of the note . . . .  [¶]  The last question, the one I‟m inquiring about is, „or can we 
look at all circumstances, regardless of being an A through K factor or not?‟ ”  At 
defense counsel‟s request the court inquired:  “My question is, is there any 
particular evidence or testimony that is the subject of your inquiry here?”   
The jury foreperson initially requested to consult with the jury as a whole, 
but then responded:  “I would think it would be in regard to the circumstances in 
regard to information at the trial — all the information.”  The foreperson repeated:  
“I would think it would be in regard to the circumstances related to the trials, the 
testimony, and it would be in general.”  
The court responded as follows:  “Then I will give you what is . . . a partial 
response, but I still think I need to have you focus with a little more specificity . . . 
as to what it is you‟re asking about or what it is you‟re thinking about in terms of 
that last question.”  The court continued:  “When jury instruction 8.88 . . . states 
„after having heard all of the evidence and after having heard and considered the 
arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the 
applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which you 
have been instructed‟ . . . the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances are defined in jury instruction 8.85 . . . and they are . . . found 
within items that are labeled parenthesis A through parenthesis K.  [¶]  Now, my 
question is, is there any particular testimony or evidence that you are inquiring 
80 
about with respect to where it fits or could fit in that framework of factors that are 
listed A through K?”  
The jury responded with two additional notes to the court.  The notes read 
as follows:  “Can we, as jurors, consider, take into account and be guided by 
anything other than the evidence which was received during both phases of the 
trial, as they pertain to factors A through K?  Can we look at factors other than A 
through K, such as the remorse or lack of remorse exhibited by the defendant?”  
The second note read as follows:  “Under K are we allowed to consider the pleas 
by both the victim‟s family and defendant‟s family?    
The court excused the jury for the day and discussed the notes with counsel.  
The matter was discussed in chambers again the following morning.  Ultimately, 
the court responded to the two notes in comments and instructions that span six 
pages of transcript.  Defense counsel agreed that the court‟s statements represented 
the appropriate response to the jury‟s questions.   
Concerning remorse, the court responded to the jury‟s question as follows:  
“You may properly consider evidence tending to show remorse or the lack of 
remorse exhibited by the defendant, as you determine the evidence to be.  [¶]  To 
the extent such evidence tends to show the defendant‟s lack of remorse regarding 
the crimes of which he has been convicted, if you determine such to be the case, 
such evidence may not be considered by you as a factor or circumstance in 
aggravation.  [¶]  Lack of remorse, if such is the case, is not a factor in 
aggravation and cannot be considered as such by you.  [¶]  However, you may 
consider such evidence as tending to establish the absence or lack of remorse as a 
mitigating factor, in other words, as tending to show that remorse, an appropriate 
factor in mitigation in any case, under factor K, in instruction 8.85, is absent in 
this case.  [¶]  Whether the evidence does, in fact, show the presence or absence of 
remorse as a mitigating factor under factor K, and the weight and significance, if 
81 
any, which should be given such facts are exclusively matters for your 
determination.”  (Italics added.) 
The court proceeded to discuss victim-impact evidence and the question 
whether the jury might consider factors other than those enumerated in the statute.  
“The factors set forth in jury instruction 8.85, paragraphs A through K, is the 
exclusive list of those factors which you shall consider, take into account and be 
guided by, if applicable.  In other words, the only factors you shall consider, take 
into account and be guided by are those factors defined in paragraphs A through K 
in this instruction.  [¶]  However, I remind you of another principle . . . that you 
must consider the instructions as a whole . . . .”  The court then reread pattern 
instructions CALJIC Nos. 8.85 and 8.88 to the jury.   
As defense counsel at trial himself agreed, the court‟s instruction properly 
informed the jury in what respects remorse or absence of remorse were pertinent 
to section 190.3, factor (k), explaining plainly and repeatedly that absence of 
remorse may not be considered as a circumstance in aggravation, but that absence 
of remorse may be considered as “ „relevant to the question of whether remorse is 
present as a mitigating circumstance . . . .‟ ”  (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 
313, 356.)  
Defendant concedes that this court has concluded that a prosecutor may 
urge the jury to consider absence of remorse for the purpose of demonstrating the 
absence of a mitigating circumstance.  Defendant claims, however, that although 
“such argument is permissible, an instruction from the trial court directing the jury 
to consider lack of remorse under [section 190.3,] factor (k) presents a reasonable 
likelihood of transforming lack of remorse into a factor in aggravation.”  This 
claim lacks merit, in view of the circumstances that the instruction was necessary 
because the jury requested guidance on this specific point (see § 1138), that the 
court gave an answer (consistent with the law) stressing evidence of absence of 
82 
remorse could not be considered in aggravation, and that the answer to the jury‟s 
question was approved by defense counsel.  (See People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal. 
4th 197, 237 [a response that is generally consistent with the law cannot be 
challenged for the first time on appeal in the absence of a request for modification 
or clarification]; see also People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 729 [if a party 
fails to object to a court‟s response to a question posed by the jury during 
deliberations, any claim on appeal based upon the court‟s response ordinarily is 
forfeited], disapproved on another ground in People v Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at 
p. 421, fn. 22; People v. Benavides, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 114 [same]; People v. 
Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 698 [same]; People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th 
at p. 430 [failure to object deemed a tacit approval]; and see People v. Hughes 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 402 [trial counsel‟s agreement with court‟s response 
forfeits a claim of error on appeal].)  
We do not find any merit in defendant‟s claims that the court‟s response 
was argumentative, favored the prosecution, or suggested that evidence in 
mitigation could not be considered or was absent.  
6.  Absence of unanimity instruction  
Defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that 
it should not consider a factor in aggravation unless it had unanimously 
determined that defendant committed the act and that (in the case of § 190.3, 
factor (b)) it was established beyond a reasonable doubt that the uncharged 
criminal activity carried an implied threat of violence.  Defendant claims a 
violation of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution. 
The jury was instructed it could not consider the uncharged criminal 
activity in aggravation unless defendant‟s guilt was proved beyond a reasonable 
83 
doubt.  The court supplied extensive instruction on the elements of the firearms 
offenses, concerning which evidence was introduced at the penalty phase.  The 
court declined to require that the jury agree unanimously that the prior crime or 
crimes had been committed.  The trial court also declined to instruct the jury that it 
must agree unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that the uncharged 
criminal activity involved a threat or implied threat of violence.  The trial court 
acted appropriately. 
The “jury need not unanimously agree on the truth of aggravating factors.”  
(People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1066.)  More specifically, “[j]ury 
unanimity is not required with respect to unadjudicated criminal conduct.”  
(People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1316.)  Juries are not required to agree 
unanimously on “foundational” matters such as that a crime involving violence 
has been committed.  (See People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1066-1067, 
see also People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 402.)  We also have rejected 
claims that Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 
536 U.S. 584, or Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, require juries to 
enter unanimous findings concerning aggravating factors.  (People v. Salcido, 
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 167; see also People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 
649.)  We decline defendant‟s invitation to reconsider our prior decisions.   
7.  Court‟s asserted suggestion that the jury could reconsider its guilt 
phase “not true” finding  
As noted, at the guilt phase of the trial the jury convicted defendant of the 
first degree murder of Lance Clark and found true a felony-murder special-
circumstance allegation.  The jury also convicted defendant of the attempted 
murder of Bernice Clark but found not true an allegation that the attempted murder 
was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.        
84 
The jury posed the following question during deliberations:  “Even though 
we agreed that the death of Lance Clark was murder of the first degree because it 
happened during the commission of a robbery (felony-murder law . . . ) are we 
now permitted to look at the willful, premeditated and deliberate nature of this 
killing under factor A?”15   
The court responded:  “You may consider such factors under factor A of 
jury instruction 8.85 in your consideration of the circumstances of the crime of 
which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of 
any special circumstance found to be true.”   
Defense counsel did not object to the court‟s response to the jury‟s question 
or request that the jury be reminded of its “not true” finding in connection with the 
allegation that the attempted murder of Bernice was willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated.  Indeed, the court stated on the record that the court and counsel 
discussed the jury‟s questions and agreed upon the wording of the court‟s 
response.16 
                                            
15  
This question was presented to the court at the same time the jury inquired 
whether counsel had entered into a stipulation concerning the prior incident 
involving a threat of violence.    
16  
The court off the record discussed the jurors‟ queries with counsel, then 
returned to proceed on the record to summarize the substance of the unrecorded 
conferences.  In doing so, the court failed to comply with section 190.9, which 
requires all conferences and proceedings during capital trials to be “on the record 
with a court reporter present.”  (See also People v. Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
p. 110 [quoting statute].)  The record is adequate for us to determine whether 
defense counsel preserved objections for appeal and to conclude that certain 
claims are forfeited, however, because the court placed a nearly contemporaneous 
description of the unreported conferences on the record and provided defense 
counsel and the prosecutor with an opportunity to comment and to preserve 
objections for the record.  (See id., pp. 111-112 & fn. 8.)  
85 
On appeal, defendant claims that the court‟s response failed to take into 
account the danger that the jury would reconsider its prior verdict.  He claims the 
jury‟s verdict on the charge of attempted murder of Bernice Clark — a verdict 
convicting defendant of the attempted murder but acquitting him of having 
committed a willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder — established 
that the jury acquitted defendant of having committed a willful, deliberate, 
premeditated murder of Lance Clark, and that the jury should have been so 
informed to avoid violating double jeopardy principles that defendant invokes for 
the first time on appeal.  Defendant claims that the unusual facts of the case 
established an implied acquittal, thereby requiring deviation from the general rule 
that, if the trial is based upon an accusatory pleading charging two or more crimes, 
“[a]n acquittal of one or more counts shall not be deemed an acquittal of any other 
count” (§ 954), and also from the general rule that “ „ “[t]he murder of two 
persons, even by the same act, constitutes two offenses, for each of which a 
separate prosecution will lie, and . . . a conviction or acquittal in one case does not 
bar a prosecution in the other.” ‟  [Citations.]”  (People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 
Cal.4th 1016, 1039, fn. 4.)  He points to the circumstance that a single shot 
accomplished both the attempted murder and the murder, claiming that the jury‟s 
verdict on the attempted murder charge therefore essentially constituted a special 
verdict or finding with respect to the mental state involved in the murder.  He 
claims this asserted special verdict should have barred “reconsideration” of 
willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation as circumstances of the crime under 
section 190.3, factor (a).  He asserts the court‟s response  constituted an error 
under section 190.3, factor (a), which refers only to consideration of circumstances 
86 
of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and that the error violated the 
federal double jeopardy clause.17  He also urges that the asserted error constituted 
a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because it 
undermined the reliability of the proceedings. 
We note that even if we were to accept the debatable general premise of 
defendant‟s collateral estoppel argument, his claim contains analytical flaws.  For 
example, the “not true” finding constituted a finding that the prosecutor had failed 
to prove that the attempted murder of Bernice Clark was willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated, but the verdict did not establish that the jury agreed none of those 
mental states had been established.  The verdicts certainly did not reflect a finding 
that the attempted murder of Bernice was not willful.  A killing is willful if intent 
to kill is proved (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 29), and the attempted-
murder verdict established the jury found intent to kill.  (People v. Smith (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 733, 739.)  The element of willfulness was the focus of the parties‟ closing 
arguments and was impervious to any possible attack based upon collateral 
estoppel principles. 
In any event, defendant‟s claim is forfeited on appeal, because defendant 
did not object or request clarification at trial; he instead agreed with the court‟s 
formulation.   
The court is under a general obligation to “clear up any instructional 
confusion expressed by the jury,” but “[w]here . . . the original instructions are 
themselves full and complete, the court has discretion . . . to determine what 
additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury‟s request for information.”  
                                            
17  
Defendant refers to parallel provisions of the California Constitution but 
does not present separate argument and analysis based upon California law.  
Accordingly we do not address his claim under California constitutional law. 
87 
(People v. Gonzalez, (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1212, 1213; see also People v. 
Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 985; § 1138.)  
When the trial court responds to a question from a deliberating jury with a 
generally correct and pertinent statement of the law, a party who believes the 
court‟s response should be modified or clarified must make a contemporaneous 
request to that effect; failure to object to the trial court‟s wording or to request 
clarification results in forfeiture of the claim on appeal.  (People v. Marks, supra, 
31 Cal. 4th at p. 237; see also People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 729; 
People v. Benavides, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 114; People v. Martinez, supra, 31 
Cal.4th at p. 698.)  
It is appropriate to apply this forfeiture rule in the present case.  Guilt phase 
instructions permitted the jury to convict defendant of the first degree murder of 
Lance Clark on a felony-murder theory, which does not require proof of malice 
(People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 474-475; see also People v. Patterson 
(1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 626), or alternatively on the theory that the murder was 
committed with malice aforethought.  (§§ 188, 189.)  The jury evidently was 
concerned because it had based the first degree murder verdict on a felony-murder 
theory, but was uncertain whether at the penalty phase it was permissible to 
consider such mental elements as to which it had been instructed with respect to 
the other theory of first degree murder.  The court‟s answer to the jury‟s question 
was correct in that a jury that has convicted the defendant of first degree murder 
on the basis of a felony-murder theory may consider, as part of its evaluation of 
defendant‟s culpability and its moral and normative decision concerning the 
appropriate penalty, the defendant‟s state of mind with respect to the murder — 
that is, whether the defendant also intended to kill or acted with malice 
88 
aforethought.18  It was this information that the court‟s response conveyed, and we 
conclude the jury would have understood the court‟s response in this manner.  If 
the defendant wished to limit or clarify the information conveyed by the court, 
defense counsel should have requested limitation or clarification.   
Defendant contends that although defense counsel did not object or request 
clarification at the time the court responded to the jury‟s question, his attorney 
subsequently brought the matter to the court‟s attention.  We shall recount the 
action taken by defense counsel, but we emphasize that the ensuing discussion did 
not concern the response by the court that defendant now attacks on appeal.  
Rather, the discussion occurred after the court had proposed a response, secured 
defense counsel‟s agreement to the suggested wording, and delivered the agreed-
upon explanation to the jury.  Additionally, the discussion noted below occurred 
after the jury had resumed its deliberations, and after two of its members 
subsequently were excused.  
The sequence of events was as follows.  After two deliberating jurors were 
excused and alternate jurors were seated, the court and counsel discussed the 
principle that, after substitution of jurors during deliberations, the jury should be 
                                            
18  
The defendant‟s culpable mental state may be considered as a circumstance 
of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a).  (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
81, 175.)  Even when the verdict is based upon a felony-murder theory, it is 
appropriate to consider any apparent premeditation on the part of the defendant as 
an aggravating circumstance of the crime.  (See People v. DePriest (2007) 42 
Cal.4th 1, 57 [in denying a motion to modify the verdict, the trial court properly 
weighed the sentencing factors, including the “premeditated and brutal nature” of 
the attack on the robbery-murder victim]; see also People v. Sturm (2006) 37 
Cal.4th 1218, 1246, fn. 1 (dis. opn. of Baxter, J.) [“Of course, the guilt jury‟s 
failure to return a „premeditated murder‟ verdict did not prevent the penalty jurors 
from concluding, as a circumstance of the crime [citation], that the murder was 
premeditated”].)  
89 
directed to begin its deliberations anew.  The court expressed concern that the 
jurors might believe that because of the substitution they must “begin deliberations 
regarding the guilt phase of this trial again and that‟s clearly not the intent of the 
instruction or the law.”  (Italics added.)  The court therefore proposed that the jury 
be directed to commence the penalty phase deliberations anew.  Defense counsel 
commented:  “And for the record . . . I am specifically requesting this because at 
the time of the guilt phase they found a nonpremeditated murder and I don‟t . . . 
want to revisit that.  They have made a finding and I believe we have a right to 
have that finding be an appropriate finding.”  This comment clearly suggests that 
defense counsel did not believe the court‟s response to the jury‟s question 
suggested to the jury that it should reconsider its prior verdicts.  
The prosecutor‟s subsequent reply is significant, because defense counsel 
stated he agreed with it.  The prosecutor responded that it could not be determined 
that the jury acquitted defendant of the premeditated murder of Lance Clark and 
that, in any event, “they‟re free under the law to consider the circumstances of the 
offense as they see fit, . . . based on all the evidence . . . .  But the fact that they 
had a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the murder was willful, deliberate and 
premeditated would not prevent them from considering either the theory of willful, 
deliberate and premeditated or certain parts of it and you never know if they had a 
reasonable doubt as to one part . . . .  [¶]  In any event, the burden of proof of the 
circumstances of the events is not beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore a jury 
could have conceivably been convinced to some extent that it was actually 
deliberate and premeditated or some part thereof and yet not be convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt of that, but would be free to revisit those views as it bears on 
the circumstances of the offense because there is a different burden of proof, and 
by their finding that the attempted murder was not the finding, not the true 
90 
premeditation clause, does not prevent them from considering any part of the state 
of mind that that instruction defines.”  (Italics added.)   
The court stated it agreed with defense counsel that the jury should not 
recommence deliberations on the guilt verdicts.  At the same time, the court added, 
“[t]he law is clear they should consider the circumstances of the crime as one of 
the factors under [section 190.3, factor (a)] as one of the things they may consider 
in determining appropriate penalty.  [¶]  So certainly they are free and I have told 
them previously in response to earlier notes that is precisely what they may 
do . . . .”   
Defense counsel responded, “I‟m not arguing with his [the prosecutor‟s] 
statement as to what they can consider, I believe the instruction [concerning 
recommencing deliberation] as amended more accurately tells them what they‟re 
supposed to be doing and with this jury I may not live long enough for them to go 
back and relitigate both parts of the case.”  (Italics added.) 
The court instructed the jury to begin its deliberations “from the 
beginning,” but explained:  “You must therefore set aside and disregard all past 
deliberations at the penalty phase of the trial and begin deliberating anew.  This 
means that each remaining original juror must set aside and disregard the earlier 
deliberations at the penalty phase of the trial as if they [had] not taken place.”   
Under the circumstances described above, trial counsel did not preserve the 
issue that defendant now seeks to raise. 
Moreover, we conclude it is not reasonably likely the jury would 
understand the court‟s response as an invitation to reconsider its verdict (see 
People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 69; see also People v. Coffman and 
Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 123), especially in light of the apparent purpose of 
the jury‟s question — to determine generally whether it could consider 
defendant‟s mental state with reference to the murder of Lance Clark despite the 
91 
circumstance that the murder verdict rested upon a felony-murder theory.  Our 
examination of the arguments of counsel supports our conclusion.  The focus of 
the closing arguments was upon intent to kill rather than premeditation; the 
prosecutor‟s closing argument did not suggest that the jury reconsider its prior 
guilt phase verdicts; and defense counsel reminded the jury that it had determined 
the attempted murder was not premeditated — a reminder that was not rebutted. 
Thus, in his closing argument at the penalty phase of the trial, the 
prosecutor did not ask the jury to reconsider its prior finding that the allegation 
that the attempted murder of Bernice Clark occurred with premeditation, 
deliberation, and willfulness was not true.  Rather, he informed the jury that he 
anticipated the defense would renew its claim that the shooting was accidental or 
at least did not involve intent to kill.  He reminded the jury it had found intent to 
kill when it convicted defendant of the attempted murder of Bernice.  The 
prosecutor argued that the robbery was planned and that when defendant prepared 
for the robbery, he contemplated the possibility he might employ deadly force 
against a weak and elderly victim.  The prosecutor stressed that intent to kill could 
be inferred from this preparation and from the circumstance that defendant 
realized Bernice had recognized him. 
For its part, the defense‟s closing argument reminded the jury of its 
apparent conclusion that the attempted murder of Bernice Clark involved intent to 
kill but was not premeditated, and it focused on asking the jury to recognize some 
lingering doubt concerning the question whether the shooting involved an intent to 
kill or was entirely accidental.  Defense counsel urged that even if defendant 
formed the intent to kill, the death penalty was not warranted.  The prosecutor did 
not offer argument in rebuttal to this point.   
In addition, the jury did not pose a question specifically directed at 
reconsideration of prior guilt phase verdicts or findings, nor was the court‟s 
92 
response directed to that possibility.  We also note defense counsel‟s evident 
understanding that the trial court‟s response had not invited the jury to reconsider 
its prior guilt phase verdicts.   
Furthermore, the court instructed and reinstructed the jury (in the terms of 
the statute) that it should consider the circumstances of the crimes of which 
defendant was convicted, thereby rendering it unlikely the jury would consider an 
allegation that it had found not to be true.19  Finally, after the alternate jurors had 
been seated, the court reminded the reconstituted jury to recommence deliberation 
solely on the potential penalty phase verdict — thereby informing the former 
alternates who had not participated in the guilt verdicts and findings that their task 
did not include reconsidering those matters.  Under these circumstances, it is not 
reasonably likely the jury, including the newly seated alternates, would have 
reexamined the guilt phase verdicts. 
8.  Asserted juror misconduct 
Defendant contends that prejudicial juror misconduct occurred at the 
penalty phase of the trial.  His principal argument is that the trial court abused its 
discretion by declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing concerning the issue of 
juror misconduct.  He also claims the trial court erred by denying his motion for 
new trial.  He contends the error violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Seventh Amendments to the federal Constitution.  
                                            
19  
As we have observed, having received appropriate instruction — and 
reinstruction — in the language of section 190.3, factor (a), which permits the 
jurors to consider the circumstances of the crimes of which the defendant was 
convicted, it is not reasonably likely they “were misled to believe they should 
ignore their own not guilty verdict . . . .”  (People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at 
p. 69.) 
93 
On November 5, 1995, following the jury‟s verdict of death, defendant 
submitted a motion for new trial based upon asserted prosecutorial misconduct.  
Attached to the motion were reports prepared by the defense investigator 
concerning postverdict interviews with several jurors.  The trial court granted 
defense counsel‟s request for additional time in which to prepare a written motion 
for new trial based upon the allegation of juror misconduct. 
On November 30, 1995, defense counsel filed the anticipated motion for 
new trial based upon his claim of juror misconduct.  The motion alleged that 
“three separate claims of jury error must be addressed.  [¶]  First . . . did the jury 
discuss the opinion that death did not mean death, despite the court[‟s] 
instructions.  Second, did the jury discuss the defendant[‟s] lack of remorse as a 
factor in aggravation.  Third, did the jury discuss that „life does not mean life.‟    
Based upon these facts, it would appear that the jury discussed, and hence may 
have considered information that was improper.”  (Fns. omitted.)  Attached to the 
motion were unsworn reports, prepared for defense counsel by the defense 
investigator, concerning interviews with several jurors.  The motion was based 
exclusively on the three enumerated claims and concluded with a request for an 
evidentiary hearing after which, the motion asserted, “the parties can discuss [the] 
impact, if any of the record.”  The motion added that “since the error goes only to 
the penalty phase, if the court were to reduce the sentence to [life in prison without 
possibility of parole], the issue becomes [moot].”   
In his opposition, filed December 11, 1995, the prosecutor contended that 
the unsworn hearsay reports prepared by the investigator were not a competent 
basis upon which to grant a motion for new trial and that, in any event, prejudicial 
juror misconduct had not been demonstrated. 
More than one week later, the trial court conducted a hearing, advising 
counsel that it had considered with care defendant‟s motion and the People‟s 
94 
opposition.  The court inquired whether the parties wished to comment, and 
defense counsel responded that “the next logical step would be the submission of 
affidavits.”  Defense counsel claimed he had not submitted affidavits in support of 
the motion, because he understood from the court that it first would make a 
“threshold decision” concerning the truth of the allegations, in order to avoid 
“bothering the jury.”  
The prosecutor objected that the court had not suggested such a bifurcated 
proceeding.  More significantly, the court emphatically denied it had done so.  The 
court also denied having instructed defense counsel concerning how to approach 
the jurors.   
The court concluded that the investigator‟s unsworn reports to defense 
counsel were not admissible to impeach the verdict.  It added that, even if the 
investigator‟s hearsay reports were considered, defendant‟s allegations lacked 
merit.  Finally, the court determined that the motion did not provide a sufficient 
basis for conducting an evidentiary hearing.   
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in declining to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of asserted juror misconduct and in 
denying the motion for new trial.  He renews the claims he made in the trial court 
based on statements allegedly made by Jurors R.A., S.L., and F.C. to the defense 
investigator. 
According to defendant, Juror R.A. “recalled a discussion that a death 
sentence did not mean the defendant actually would be executed.”  As we read the 
record, when the investigator asked the juror whether she remembered anyone 
“discussing the topic that the Death Penalty does not necessarily mean that 
someone will be put to death, in light of the fact that there have been very few 
executions in recent history,” R.A. responded that “she remembered that there was 
some opinion stated along that topic” and that “a few people commented on that 
95 
topic.”  She added that “she did not think it influenced anyone‟s opinion nor their 
decision to vote for the death penalty.” 
Defendant claims Juror S.L.‟s misconduct appears from her comment to the 
defense investigator that “ „to be honest, if we thought he would actually get death, 
we probably wouldn‟t put him to death.‟ ”20   
Defendant claims that Juror F.C.‟s misconduct is evident because, 
according to defendant, she informed the investigator that “she had relayed to 
other jurors that she had „worked for a lawyer in the Fresno courthouse‟ and had 
seen many people get sentenced to life without possibility of parole, but 
nonetheless be released from prison.”  The record, however, reflects the 
circumstance that F.C. told the investigator about her work experience.  The 
investigator‟s report does not relate that F.C. stated she conveyed her supposed 
work experience — which occurred between 1973 and 1974, more than 20 years 
prior to the trial and prior to the enactment of the current death penalty statute — 
to other jurors as the source of her belief that persons sentenced to life in prison 
without parole may be released from prison.21  According to the investigator, F.C. 
                                            
20  
According to the defense investigator‟s report attached to the motion, when 
Juror S.L. was asked what caused her to decide on a death verdict, she “began 
immediately by saying that in her opinion, „to be honest, if we thought he would 
actually get death, we probably wouldn‟t put him to death.  There have been only 
two in the last 28 years.‟ . . .  She explained that it was her opinion that there was 
little likelihood that he would actually get the death penalty . . . .”  When 
questioned further concerning her opinion that it was unlikely defendant would be 
executed, “she reaffirmed that [it] was her opinion only.”  When asked whether 
other jurors “felt the same way or had used the same reasoning,” she responded “it 
was her opinion that they may have felt somewhat similar to her in that a death 
penalty does not necessarily mean that he would actually be executed.” 
21  
The defense investigator‟s account of Juror F.C.‟s statement reflects that, 
when asked the “main factors” she considered in arriving at the verdict, she 
mentioned various aspects of the evidence, adding that the jury “felt that there was 
(footnote continued on next page) 
96 
also stated that “the jurors felt that their concerns about his getting out of prison 
were not considered to be reasons to give the death penalty.”  She informed the 
investigator that she told other jurors who wondered whether a death sentence 
would be carried out that the speculation was not appropriate and “that they should 
consider the death penalty as something that for all their knowledge they might 
give a verdict out and he might be executed the next week.”22 
                                                                                                                                                       
(footnote continued from previous page) 
a likelihood that the defendant would „do it again.‟ ”  According to the defense 
investigator, F.C. informed him that “she worked for a lawyer in the Fresno 
courthouse and said that she had seen many people get sentenced to life without 
possibility of parole and in fact eventually get out of prison.  [¶]  She stated that 
she . . . did not want to see this defendant get out of prison.  She said that all of the 
jurors were afraid that he would get out because of his young age and she said that 
she knew of three instances where people had gotten life without parole and had 
actually gotten out of prison.  [¶]  She said that there were several of the jurors 
who similarly commented that they had heard of it happening.  She believes that 
there were at least three other jurors who had heard of cases where people had 
been given life, but were actually released from prison earlier.”  She added that 
“[s]ome of the jurors said that if they gave [defendant] the death penalty, it was 
possible that he would never get executed, but it would certainly be harder for him 
to get out of jail and certainly a harder punishment by being sentenced to death 
and incarcerated,” but “she stated that she told the jurors that that was not 
appropriate to consider and that they should disregard such activities and they 
should consider the death penalty as something that for all their knowledge they 
might [return] a verdict . . . and he might be executed the next week.”  
22  
In his appellate briefs, defendant refers to a number of other alleged 
instances of juror misconduct that he claims were disclosed by the investigator‟s 
reports and should have been the basis for a hearing or a new trial.  The People 
respond that defendant did not raise these concerns in the trial court in connection 
with his motion for new trial or his request for an evidentiary hearing, and 
therefore the additional claims of misconduct should be forfeited on appeal.  We 
agree that failure to raise the issue of juror misconduct and seek relief from the 
court on that basis results in a forfeiture of the issue on appeal.  (See People v. 
Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 950 [failure to object to juror misconduct and 
request mistrial]; People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 124.)  The 
circumstance that defendant raised some juror misconduct claims in his motion for 
(footnote continued on next page) 
97 
The trial court is vested with broad discretion to act upon a motion for new 
trial.  (See People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1260.)  When the motion is 
based upon juror misconduct, the reviewing court should accept the trial court‟s 
factual findings and credibility determinations if they are supported by substantial 
evidence, but must exercise its independent judgment to determine whether any 
misconduct was prejudicial.  (People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 192; see 
also People v. Ault, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1263-1265.)  A juror‟s receipt or 
discussion of evidence not submitted at trial constitutes misconduct.  (People v. 
San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 650.)  Juror misconduct raises a rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice; a trial court presented with competent evidence of juror 
misconduct must consider whether the evidence suggests a substantial likelihood 
that one or more jurors were biased by the misconduct.  (People v. Tafoya, supra, 
42 Cal.4th at p. 192.) 
The trial court has discretion to determine whether to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes raised by a claim of juror 
misconduct.  (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 604.)  “Defendant is not, 
however, entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of right.  Such a hearing 
should be held only when the court concludes an evidentiary hearing is „necessary 
to resolve material, disputed issues of fact.‟  [Citation.]  „The hearing . . . should 
be held only when the defense has come forward with evidence demonstrating a 
strong possibility that prejudicial misconduct has occurred.[23]  Even upon such a 
                                                                                                                                                       
(footnote continued from previous page) 
new trial does not serve to preserve other bases for his claim on appeal.  (People v. 
Masotti (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 504, 508.) 
23  
Defendant suggests that this standard — that the defense should make a 
prima facie showing of a “strong possibility” of prejudicial misconduct — “may 
be unreasonably elevated” and inconsistent with federal constitutional law.  
(footnote continued on next page) 
98 
                                                                                                                                                       
(footnote continued from previous page) 
(Italics added.)  He does not expand upon this tentative assertion or supply 
persuasive authority.  We rejected a related contention in People v. Loker (2008) 
44 Cal.4th 691, 747 [the defendant claimed the California rule — calling for 
setting aside the verdict for juror misconduct only if “there appears to be a 
substantial likelihood of juror bias” — was inconsistent with federal constitutional 
law].)  We also note the discussion and standard enunciated by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit:  “ „[C]ourts are, and should be, hesitant 
to haul jurors in after they have reached a verdict in order to probe for potential 
instances of bias, misconduct or extraneous influences.‟  [Citation.]  „This is to 
avoid harassment of jurors, inhibition of deliberation in the jury room, a deluge of 
post-verdict applications mostly without merit, . . . an increase in opportunities for 
jury tampering . . . [and] to prevent jury verdicts from being made more 
uncertain.‟  [Citations.]  As we explained . . . , a trial court is required to hold a 
post trial juror interrogation only when reasonable grounds for investigation exist.  
[Citation.]  Reasonable grounds are present when there is „clear,‟ „strong‟ and 
„incontrovertible‟ evidence.”  (United States v. Rosario (2d Cir. 1997) 111 F.3d 
293, 298-299, italics added; United States v. Angulo (9th Cir. 1993) 4 F.3d 843, 
847 [“in determining whether a hearing [under Remmer v. United States (1954) 
347 U.S. 227] must be held, the court must consider the content of the allegations, 
the seriousness of the alleged misconduct or bias, and the credibility of the 
source”].)   
 
We note that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
held that the trial court has broad discretion in this context.  “[I]t is within the trial 
court‟s discretion to determine whether and when to hold an evidentiary hearing 
on [juror misconduct] allegations.  If the judge orders an investigative hearing, it is 
within his discretion to determine its extent and nature.  [Citations.]  As a matter 
of common sense, a trial judge in making these decisions will necessarily be 
directed by the content of the allegations, including the seriousness of the alleged 
misconduct or bias, and the credibility of the source.”  (United States v. Hendrix 
(9th Cir. 1977) 549 F.2d 1225, 1227-1228, fn. omitted; see also United States v. 
Shryock (9th Cir. 2003) 342 F.3d 948, 973.)  Presumably, a trial court would have 
discretion to view an unsworn report by a defense investigator as lacking in 
sufficient credibility.  A report that falls short of asserting that the juror said he or 
she had conveyed information to other jurors based upon his or her work 
experience may be considered lacking in seriousness.  Federal court decisions 
recognize the breadth of the trial court‟s discretion in such matters.  “The decision 
to investigate jury misconduct allegations rests within the sound discretion of the 
[trial] court.”  (United States v. Rosario, supra, 111 F.3d at p. 299 [also referring 
to the court‟s “very broad discretion”]; United States v. Shryock, supra, 342 F.3d 
(footnote continued on next page) 
99 
showing, an evidentiary hearing will generally be unnecessary unless the parties‟ 
evidence presents a material conflict that can only be resolved at such a hearing.‟  
[Citation.] ”  (People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 604.)  The trial court‟s 
decision whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of juror 
misconduct will be reversed only if the defendant can demonstrate an abuse of 
discretion.  (Ibid.; People v. Carter, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1216; People v. Jones, 
supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 317; People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 686; People 
v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 694, disapproved on another ground in People v. 
Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22].) 
Contrary to defendant‟s assertion, ordinarily a trial court does not abuse its 
discretion in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of juror 
misconduct when the evidence proffered in support constitutes hearsay.  (People v. 
Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1256 [“Normally, hearsay is not sufficient to 
trigger the court‟s duty to make further inquiries into a claim of juror 
misconduct”]; see also People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 605; People v. 
Carter, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1217.)  Moreover, a trial court does not abuse its 
discretion in denying a motion for new trial based upon juror misconduct when the 
evidence in support constitutes unsworn hearsay.  (People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d 
                                                                                                                                                       
(footnote continued from previous page) 
at p. 973.)  In a case in which defense counsel presented “unverified conjecture” 
prior to the verdict that a juror may be biased because of a relationship with 
government witnesses, “[i]n the absence of a showing which, on its face, would 
disqualify [the] juror . . . , the court act[s] properly in taking into account . . . the 
failure of counsel to provide an affidavit” detailing evidence of misconduct.  
(United States v. Bradshaw (10th Cir. 1986) 787 F.2d 1385, 1390.)  The evidence 
proffered by the defense in the present case was not such that the court‟s failure to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing constituted error under either the state or federal 
standards. 
100 
at p. 697 [the defense presented the unsworn statement of a juror and an affidavit 
by an investigator recounting the juror‟s statement to him, but the evidence was 
not competent, and this court‟s decision in People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 
395 is not to the contrary]; People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1318-1319 
[“The sole evidence of the alleged misconduct was the declaration of a defense 
investigator that purports to relate a conversation with a juror.  It is settled, 
however, that „a jury verdict may not be impeached by hearsay affidavits‟ ”].)  
Defendant does not offer a persuasive basis for deviating from the general 
rule governing unsworn hearsay as a basis for a motion for new trial or for a 
request to hold an evidentiary hearing on an allegation of juror misconduct.  The 
trial court afforded defense counsel approximately one month to amend or 
supplement his original motion for new trial to include the juror misconduct claim.  
We accept as true the trial court‟s assertion that it did not suggest to defense 
counsel in off-the-record conversations that counsel was not obliged to support the 
motion for new trial with affidavits or declarations from jurors.  Defendant does 
not point to any discussion on the record in which the court made such a 
suggestion.  The prosecution‟s written opposition to the motion — filed almost 
two weeks prior to the hearing on the motion — relied in part upon the failure of 
defense counsel to submit juror affidavits, citing governing decisions by this court, 
yet defense counsel did not respond by submitting such affidavits prior to or at the 
hearing.  Defense counsel evidently had full access to the jurors, and there is no 
indication that the defense could not have obtained juror affidavits.  We note, too, 
that the defense motion was not even supported by a declaration from the 
investigator, but merely by his unsworn reports to defense counsel.  Defense 
counsel did not seek to call the investigator to testify.  In addition, defense counsel 
did not request a continuance for the purpose of securing juror affidavits.   
101 
Defendant contends the investigator‟s reports did not constitute hearsay, 
because they were not offered for their truth.  In other words, according to 
defendant, it was immaterial whether the jurors‟ statements to the investigator 
were true.  Rather, according to defendant, they constituted objective evidence that 
improper matters had been discussed during deliberations.  
We are not persuaded.  The investigator‟s report itself interposed a level of 
hearsay (see, e.g., People v. Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1318), and the 
investigator‟s assertions concerning juror statements were probative only if the 
investigator‟s assertions — that the jurors had made the comments — were true.   
Finally, we disagree with defendant that his motion alleged such serious 
misconduct that the court abused its discretion by declining to order an evidentiary 
hearing.  The purported statements by jurors concerning the effect on them of the 
possibility of defendant‟s release from prison and the probability of an execution 
constituted indications of juror mental processes that are made inadmissible by 
Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a).  (See People v. Steele (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 1230, 1261 [statements of jurors “regarding their understanding of the 
meaning of a life sentence and what they would have done had they believed 
differently came squarely within the prohibition against impeaching a verdict with 
evidence of the juror‟s mental processes”].)  To the extent the comments reflected 
speculation concerning punishment, in People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1230, 
and other decisions, we have accepted similar discussions as an inevitable feature 
of the jury system.  (See id. at pp. 1264-1265; see also People v. Schmeck (2005) 
37 Cal.4th 240, 307 [no misconduct in jury‟s discussion of a television talk show 
program concerning a prisoner who was released although he had been sentenced 
to life in prison without the possibility of parole, or in jurors‟ speculation 
concerning the defendant‟s possible release]; People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 
p. 1219 [no misconduct when a juror who had been employed at the county jail 
102 
expressed the opinion that the court would reduce a death sentence to life 
imprisonment]; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 267-268 [jurors discussed 
a recent escape from Vacaville prison, and a juror known to have served as an 
employee at that prison suggested that a life prisoner has a far greater opportunity 
to escape than a prisoner condemned to death]; People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at 
p. 696 [juror who referred to former Chief Justice Rose Bird, and asserted that the 
death penalty had not been carried out since the 1960‟s, did not commit 
misconduct].) 
With respect to defendant‟s claim that Juror F.C. committed misconduct by 
informing the jury that she had knowledge concerning the release of prisoners 
based upon her work with a lawyer in the Fresno County courthouse, the 
investigator‟s reports did not state that Juror F.C. said she had conveyed outside 
information to other jurors in the form of her asserted “experience” in the Fresno 
County courts.  (See People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1219 [a juror who 
suggested the court would commute a death sentence had been employed at a 
county jail, but there was no indication she “did anything but express a personal 
opinion” to other jurors].)  The circumstance that the juror herself may have 
considered this asserted experience goes in large part to her internal thought 
processes and, in any event, does not constitute misconduct.  (Ibid.  [“ „Jurors 
bring to their deliberations knowledge and beliefs about general matters of law and 
fact that find their source in everyday life and experience‟ ”].) 
Under all the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that the investigator‟s unsworn reports did not constitute a basis for 
holding an evidentiary hearing.  For the same reasons, the court did not err in 
denying the motion for a new trial.  No error under state law or federal 
constitutional law occurred. 
103 
9.  Challenges to California‟s death penalty scheme   
Contrary to defendant‟s claim based upon the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the California death 
penalty statute is not impermissibly broad, whether considered on its face or as 
interpreted by this court.  (People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1141; People 
v. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 680; People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 626; 
see also People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 663 [rejecting an overbreadth 
claim based upon asserted overinclusiveness of the felony-murder special 
circumstance].)   
As in prior decisions, we reject the claim that section 190.3, factor (a), on 
its face or as interpreted and applied, permits arbitrary and capricious imposition 
of a sentence of death in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  (People v. Williams, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 648; People v. Morgan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 626.)  The statute does 
not create a presumption in favor of death (People v. Salcido, supra, 44 Cal.4th at 
p. 163), nor does it permit an unconstitutional aggregation of aggravating factors.  
(People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 690-691.) 
The absence of intercase proportionality review does not violate the federal 
or state Constitutions.  (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 156-157 
[rejecting claims based upon due process and equal protection guarantees, the 
prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment, and § 1170 (f)]; see also People v. 
Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 681.) 
“[N]othing in the federal Constitution requires the penalty phase jury to 
(1) make written findings of the factors it finds in aggravation and mitigation 
[citations]; (2) agree unanimously that a particular aggravating circumstance exists 
[citations]; (3) find all aggravating factors proved beyond a reasonable doubt or by 
a preponderance of the evidence [citations]; (4) find that aggravation outweighs 
104 
mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt [citations]; or (5) conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate penalty.  [Citations].”  (People v. 
Williams, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 648-649.)  The application of these principles to 
penalty determinations does not violate equal protection principles established by 
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.  (People v. Cruz, supra, 44 
Cal.4th at p. 681 [“capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital 
defendants, [so] the death penalty law does not violate equal protection by denying 
capital defendants certain procedural rights given to noncapital defendants”]; 
People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 311.)   
“[E]xcept for prior violent crimes evidence and prior felony convictions 
under section 190.3, factors (b) and (c), the court need not instruct regarding a 
burden of proof . . . .”  (People v. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 681.)   Because 
“ „[u]nlike the guilt determination, “the sentencing function is inherently moral 
and normative, not factual” [citation] and, hence, not susceptible to a burden-of-
proof quantification‟ ” (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 589), it is 
sufficient that the jury was instructed that “ „[t]o return a judgment of death, each 
of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in 
comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life 
without possibility of parole.‟ ”  (Ibid.)  Moreover, “[t]he United States Supreme 
Court decisions rendered in Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 and Apprendi v. 
New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 do not compel a different conclusion.”  (People v. 
Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 589; see also People v. Williams, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 649 [the high court‟s decision in Cunningham v. California, supra, 
549 U.S. 270, does not compel a different result].)  Under the principles recited 
above and contrary to defendant‟s claim, Evidence Code section 520, establishing 
that a party “claiming that a person is guilty of crime or wrongdoing has the 
105 
burden of proof on that issue,” does not apply to the normative decision on penalty 
that is performed by the trier of fact at the penalty phase of a capital trial.   
10.  CALJIC No. 8.85   
Defendant contends that asserted defects in pattern instruction CALJIC 
No. 8.85 prejudicially affect the jury‟s understanding of its weighing function, in 
violation of the prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment contained in the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth 
Amendment‟s guarantee of equal protection of the laws, as well as parallel state 
constitutional provisions.  We decline to reconsider prior decisions holding that 
the instruction “is not unconstitutionally vague” (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 107, 192; People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 728); that the 
instruction is not flawed for its failure to identify which facts may be considered 
aggravating and which may be considered mitigating (People v. Cruz, supra, 44 
Cal.4th at p. 681; People v. Valencia, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 309); that the trial 
court is not compelled to delete assertedly inapplicable factors from the instruction 
(People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 191-192); that the instruction does not 
“ „inherently encourage the double counting of aggravating factors‟ ” (People v. 
Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 289); and that the trial court is not compelled to 
instruct the jury on the court‟s own motion not to consider the same facts twice in 
aggravation, in the absence of any misleading argument by the prosecutor.  (Ibid.) 
Defendant contends the instruction failed to guide the jury in its 
consideration of “[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant, 
other than the crimes for which the defendant has been tried in the present 
proceedings, which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the 
express or implied threat to use force or violence.”  (CALJIC No. 8.85.)  This 
claim lacks merit because pattern instructions adequately direct the jury in their 
106 
consideration of unadjudicated criminal activity.  (People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 
Cal.4th 743, 793.)  We are not persuaded by defendant‟s added claim that the 
instruction, given in the terms of the statute, permitted the jury to consider 
unreliable evidence of defendant‟s possession of a loaded firearm, an assertedly 
nonviolent act.  (See ibid.)  Moreover, the high court has determined that section 
190.3, factor (b), the language of which is reproduced in the pattern instruction, is 
not unconstitutionally vague.  (Tuilaepa v. California, (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 977-
980; People v. Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 727.)  This court has rejected claims 
that the consideration of prior unadjudicated crimes denies due process, equal 
protection, or the right to a reliable sentencing procedure.  (People v. Cain, supra, 
10 Cal.4th at pp. 69-70.)  The terms “force” and “violence” are readily 
understandable and do not require explanation.  (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 
Cal.4th 861, 922, disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin, supra, 45 
Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.)  
CALJIC No. 8.85 instructs the jury in the terms of section 190.3, factors (d) 
(“extreme mental or emotional disturbance”) and (h) (“mental disease or defect or 
the effects of intoxication”).  Defendant contends the giving of this instruction 
resulted in a violation of his rights under the state and federal Constitutions 
because the jury was not instructed that these factors properly may be considered 
solely in mitigation.  Defendant refers to anecdotal evidence and a 1994 academic 
study suggesting that public attitudes toward these factors may cause them to be 
considered in aggravation.   
It is unnecessary to instruct the jury that section 190.3, factors (d) and (h) 
may be considered solely in mitigation.  (People v. Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 61; 
People v. Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 728.)  The pattern instruction does not 
suggest that the absence of a mitigating factor should be considered in 
aggravation.  (People v. Page, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 61.)  Speaking of the same 
107 
academic study cited by defendant, this court observed that “ „[w]e presume that 
jurors comprehend and accept the court‟s directions.‟  [Citation.]  The 
presumption that the jurors in this case understood and followed the mitigation 
instruction supplied to them is not rebutted by empirical assertions to the contrary 
based on research that is not part of the present record and has not been subject to 
cross examination.”  (People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 773.)   
11.  CALJIC No. 8.88   
Defendant challenges CALJIC No. 8.88, an instruction that concerns the 
jury‟s function in weighing the circumstances in aggravation and mitigation and in 
deciding the appropriate penalty.  Defendant contends that this instruction is 
“vague and imprecise, fail[s] to adequately describe the weighing process the jury 
must apply in capital cases, and deprived [defendant] of the individualized 
consideration the Eighth Amendment requires.”  We have held, however, that the 
pattern instruction “properly instructs the jury on its sentencing discretion and the 
nature of its deliberative process.”  (People v. Valencia, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
p. 310.)  Defendant claims the instruction was misleading and improperly 
weighted the scale in favor of death, because it permitted the jury to impose the 
death penalty even if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the 
aggravating circumstances, so long as it found “substantial” aggravating 
circumstances.  This contention lacks merit.  (People v. Salcido, supra, 44 Cal.4th 
at p. 163; People v. Page, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 57.)  
Defendant contends the instruction failed to provide an accurate description 
of the jury‟s weighing function.  He claims the instruction called for a quantitative, 
mechanical weighing process rather than a qualitative evaluation of the applicable 
factors, and that it failed to convey that a single mitigating factor may warrant a 
sentence less than death.  We do not agree.  The instruction itself informs the jury 
108 
that “[t]he weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a 
mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the 
arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them.  You are free to assign whatever 
moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate . . . .”  (CALJIC No. 8.88; see 
People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1161 [the instruction “properly 
describes the weighing process as „ “merely a metaphor for the juror‟s personal 
determination that death is the appropriate penalty under all of the 
circumstances” ‟ ”]; see also People v. Page, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 56.)  The 
court was not obliged to instruct the jury that a single mitigating circumstance 
could outweigh multiple aggravating circumstances.  (People v. Salcido, supra, 44 
Cal.4th at pp. 162-163.) 
Contrary to defendant‟s claim, the instruction is not defective because of an 
asserted failure to inform the jury which circumstances warrant the penalty of life 
in prison without the possibility of parole.  The instruction adequately conveys 
that unless substantial aggravating factors outweigh mitigating circumstances, a 
sentence of death is not appropriate.  (People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 
1181.)  The defendant is not under an obligation to demonstrate that mitigating 
circumstances “warrant” the lesser penalty.  The instruction is not defective for its 
asserted failure to describe or define the penalty of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole.  (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 372.)  
Defendant‟s reliance upon Shafer v. South Carolina (2001) 532 U.S. 36 is 
unavailing.  (People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1317 [In Shafer, the court 
explained that “the South Carolina instructions were defective because they failed 
to inform the jury of the defendant‟s parole eligibility status,” whereas the 
109 
California instructions “explicitly informed the jury that there would be no 
possibility of parole”].)24 
Defendant claims the instruction fails to inform the jury concerning the full 
scope of evidence that may be considered mitigating, asserting that the instruction 
implies that the sole pertinent circumstance in mitigation must concern the capital 
crime.  As noted, however, we have concluded the instruction “properly instructs 
the jury on its sentencing discretion and the nature of its deliberative process” 
(People v. Valencia, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 310), and we presume jurors 
understand the instructions notwithstanding “empirical assertions to the contrary 
based on research that is not part of the present record and has not been subject to 
cross examination.”  (People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 773.) 
12.  Presumption against the death penalty   
Defendant contends the court‟s failure to instruct that the jury should 
entertain a presumption in favor of a life sentence violated his federal 
constitutional right to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, his Eighth Amendment rights to a reliable penalty determination 
and to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, and his right to equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Contrary to defendant‟s claim, he was not 
entitled to an instruction informing the jury that a presumption exists in favor of a 
sentence less than death.  (People v. Mungia, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1142; People 
v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 373.) 
                                            
24 
As explained ante, we decline to consider the unsworn juror 
affidavits claimed by defendant to suggest jurors believed that capital-offense 
defendants serving life terms without possibility of parole actually may be 
released.  (See post, pp. 99-101.) 
110 
13.  Proportionality   
Defendant contends the penalty of death is disproportionate to his 
individual culpability.  He claims a violation of article I, section 17 of the 
California Constitution and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 
contained in the state and federal Constitutions. 
Defendant‟s claim that the punishment is disproportionate to his culpability 
requires us to consider “ „the nature of the offense and/or the offender, with 
particular regard to the degree of danger both present to society.‟ ”  (People v. 
Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 479.)  We inquire “whether the punishment is 
grossly disproportionate to the defendant‟s individual culpability . . . .”  (Ibid.)  
“ „[W]e examine the circumstances of the offense, including its motive, the extent 
of defendant‟s involvement, the manner in which the crime was committed, the 
consequences of defendant‟s acts, and defendant‟s personal characteristics 
including age, prior criminality, and mental capabilities.‟ ”   (People v. Tafoya, 
supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 198.) 
Defendant draws our attention to his youth at the time of the crime.  He was 
20 years of age when he committed the murder.25  He contends he acted 
impulsively and lacked the intent to kill the murder victim.  He refers to the jury‟s 
verdict finding him guilty of the attempted murder of Bernice Clark but without 
premeditation.  He refers also to evidence suggesting he was intoxicated at the 
time of the crime.  He asserts he had “virtually no criminal history,” claiming the 
evidence of the prior firearm offense demonstrated he did not act violently or 
                                            
25  
Defendant‟s briefing claims he was 19 years of age at the time of the crime, 
but the record demonstrates that defendant was born on December 23, 1972.  The 
crime occurred in July 1993, when defendant was 20 years of age. 
111 
resist arrest, and that the prior offense constituted a misdemeanor rather than a 
felony. 
We acknowledge that defendant‟s youth stands in his favor.  His prior 
record, although denominated a misdemeanor, suggests a disregard for safe and 
appropriate use of firearms that, even under defendant‟s account, is evident in the 
present crime, as well.  Many of the other circumstances upon which defendant 
relies are common to felony-murder cases, and yet it does not constitute a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment to sentence a person to death who personally 
kills during an enumerated felony but who does not premeditate — or even lacks 
intent to kill.  (People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1322; People v. Anderson 
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1140, 1147.)  Defendant has requested that we conclude he 
did not act with premeditation, relying upon the jury‟s verdict on the attempted 
murder charge.  If we consider the jury‟s verdict on the latter charge in connection 
with the capital offense, it also causes us to conclude that defendant actually did 
form the intent to kill before he discharged his weapon, because intent to kill is an 
element of the offense of attempted murder.  Thus, defendant‟s claim that the 
murder constituted an entirely accidental killing is not persuasive — particularly 
when we consider evidence suggesting he shot Bernice Clark because she had 
recognized him.  There was ample evidence demonstrating that defendant planned 
the robbery and armed himself with a loaded weapon for the purpose of 
confronting an elderly woman, as the trial court found when it considered the 
proportionality question in connection with the automatic motion for 
reconsideration of the jury‟s verdict (§190.4, subd. (e)).  The court also pointed to 
evidence suggesting that defendant was aware Lance Clark frequently 
accompanied his grandmother on her rounds and that, indeed, defendant must have 
observed Lance in the automobile when he observed Bernice drive to the rear of 
the apartment building.  The claim that defendant may have been intoxicated at the 
112 
time of the capital offense does not diminish the degree of danger defendant 
evidently presents to society, nor does it diminish his culpability in robbing and 
shooting an elderly woman who was known to lend money to her tenants.  Finally, 
none of defendant‟s claims on appeal counter the nature and tragic result of the 
crime itself. 
Defendant contends we should rely upon section 1181, subdivision 7 and 
section 1260, provisions that govern motions for new trial and the authority of 
appellate courts to modify judgments, as a basis for exercising our own authority 
to reduce the capital sentence.  Prior decisions establish that these provisions do 
not confer authority on this court to “substitute its judgment as to the choice of 
penalty for that of the trier of fact, and . . . the court may not reduce a capital 
defendant‟s sentence from death to life imprisonment simply because it disagrees 
with the jury‟s penalty determination.”  (People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 
p. 1080; see also People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1268-1269.)  
Accordingly, we reject defendant‟s claim that the statutory provisions constitute a 
“procedural entitlement that is protected by the due process clause.”  Our 
conclusion does not impair defendant‟s right to meaningful appellate review 
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment or the due process clause of the 
United States Constitution; defendant‟s rights in this regard are confined to and 
satisfied by our having considered, and rejected, his assertion that his sentence of 
death is disproportionate to his individual culpability.  
Contrary to defendant‟s claim, we are not required also to conduct intercase 
proportionality review.  (People v. Mungia, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1142; see also 
People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1322-1323 [questioning the defendant‟s 
assertion that we have “categorically forbidden such review”].) 
113 
14.  Prosecutorial discretion 
Contrary to defendant‟s claim, the California death penalty provisions do 
not violate the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution by virtue of the assertedly “unbridled” charging discretion these 
provisions vest in prosecutors.  (People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1298; 
People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 152.) 
15.  Method of execution   
Defendant‟s challenge to California‟s method of execution, and to the 
administrative procedure followed in adopting it, is not cognizable on appeal, 
“ „because alleged imperfections in the method of execution do not affect the 
validity of the death judgment itself.  Defendant‟s attack on asserted illegalities in 
the execution process that may or may not exist when his death sentence is carried 
out are premature.‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 536; see 
also Baze v. Rees (2008) __ U.S. __ [170 L.Ed.2d 420] [Kentucky‟s three-drug 
protocol for lethal injection, a protocol that is identical to California‟s, does not 
violate the Eighth Amendment].) 
16.  International law   
We have rejected the contention that California‟s death penalty statutes 
violate international law.  (People v. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 689; People v. 
Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 620.)  Defendant argues that even if capital 
punishment itself is consistent with international norms, its asserted use as a 
“regular punishment for substantial numbers of crimes” is not.  As noted above, 
however, the death penalty statutes adequately narrow the class of persons subject to 
the penalty of death under state and federal law.  Imposition of that penalty in a 
manner consistent with state and federal law does not constitute a violation of 
international law.  (People v. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 689; People v. Brown, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 404.)  Contrary to defendant‟s contention, the trial and post-
114 
verdict proceedings in his case were conducted in a manner consistent with state and 
federal law. 
17.  Cumulative prejudice   
Contrary to defendant‟s claim, the errors we have found or assumed are so 
insignificant in the context of the trial as a whole that there is no reasonable 
possibility that they affected the outcome of the proceedings, whether such errors 
are considered singly or cumulatively. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Dykes 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S050851 
Date Filed: June 15, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: Jeffrey W. Horner 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Karen L. Landau, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald S. Matthias, Eric D. Share and René A. 
Chacón, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Karen L. Landau 
2626 Harrison Street 
Oakland, CA  94612 
(510) 839-9230 
 
René A. Chacón 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 1100 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-1375