Title: Sidwell v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Sidwell v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div1999 WY 38977 P.2d 60Case Number: 97-216Decided: 04/14/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

ED 
SIDWELL, Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee (Respondent).

 

                                

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater 
County, The Honorable Jere Ryckman, Judge.

  

Michael D. Newman of 
Honaker, Hampton & Newman, Rock Springs, WY.  Argument by Mr. Newman, representing 
appellant.

 William U. Hill, Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney 
General. Argument by Mr. Haggerty, representing 
appellee.

 

    Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* JJ.

   * Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument; retired November 2, 
1998.

 

    LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

   
[¶1]      A hearing examiner denied injured worker 
Ed Sidwell's (Sidwell) claim for permanent partial disability benefits. The 
hearing examiner found that Sidwell had voluntarily sought and accepted a lower 
paying job, a job he had applied for prior to his work-related back injury. From 
this, the hearing examiner concluded that Sidwell had not lost any earning power 
because of his injury, and he was thus not entitled to benefits. Sidwell   petitioned for review with the 
district court, which affirmed the hearing examiner's 
decision.

 

  [¶2]      We affirm.

 

                               
ISSUES

 

  [¶3]      Appellant Sidwell presents the following 
issues for our review:

 

            Did the Office of 
Administrative Hearings act arbitrarily, capriciously, or otherwise 
unlawfully within the meaning of 
W.S. § 16-3-114(c), in ruling that Petitioner was not eligible for a 
permanent partial disability award 
pursuant to W.S. 27-14-405 (h) on the grounds that any decrease in income 
was             
voluntary and he had applied for the same lesser paying job with his 
employer prior to his second work 
related injury?

 

            Was the Office of 
Administrative Hearings' decision denying benefits supported by substantial 
evidence within the meaning of W.S. 
§ 16-13-114(c)?

 

  Appellee Worker's Compensation Division 
(Division) states the issue:

 

            A. 
The Employee underwent surgeries for two separate low back injuries. After his 
second surgery he sought a 
lower-paying job, in part, to avoid re-injuring his back. After a third back 
injury he sought, and accepted, the same 
lower-paying job. The OAH denied permanent disability for the third injury 
because the Employee lost no "earning capacity" and his job change was 
"voluntary."

 

Was 
the Hearing Examiner's Decision supported by substantial evidence and in 
accordance with law?

 

                                
FACTS

 

  [¶4]      This appeal arises from the latest of 
three back injuries suffered by Ed Sidwell. Sidwell first injured his lower back 
in 1973 while employed as a diesel mechanic in Utah. As a result, he underwent 
disc removal surgery. In 1991, Sidwell again injured his lower back, this time 
while employed as a diesel mechanic for Cummins Intermountain, Inc. of Rock Springs 
(Cummins). Shortly thereafter, Sidwell underwent spinal fusion surgery. After 
recovering from this surgery, Sidwell returned to work for Cummins as a diesel 
mechanic.

 

  [¶5]      In September of 1994, a position in the 
Cummins parts department became available. Sidwell applied for the position 
because the physical demands of being a mechanic were getting "tougher and 
tougher every day." Sidwell was not hired for the parts department position at 
that time.

 

  [¶6]      In November of 1994, Sidwell suffered 
another back injury while using a slide hammer to remove fuel injectors from an 
engine.  Sidwell was diagnosed with 
a back strain just above the point of the fusion. Although this injury did not 
require surgery, Sidwell participated in occupational therapy, which included a 
work conditioning program designed to 
enable him to return to work as a mechanic. As a result of the 1994 injury, 
Sidwell received a one percent increase in permanent physical impairment, 
bringing his whole body impairment to a total of 15 percent. While recuperating 
from this injury, Sidwell kept in close contact with the branch manager at Cummins, Craig Palmer. Sidwell 
informed Palmer that he wished to return to work in a less physically demanding 
position, preferably in the parts department. Sidwell believed a position in the 
parts department would be less strenuous and would prolong his 
career.

 

  [¶7]      In June of 1995, Sidwell's chiropractor 
issued a medical release enabling him to return to light duty work for two weeks 
before resuming work at normal capacity. When Sidwell presented this release to 
Palmer, the manager told Sidwell that there was no light duty work at Cummins 
and that he would have to obtain a full 
medical release before he could return to work. Around the same time, a position 
in the Cummins parts department became available.

 

  [¶8]      After obtaining a full medical release, 
Sidwell returned to work in July of 1995. He was temporarily assigned to fill 
the vacant parts department position. Pursuant to company policy, Cummins posted 
a job announcement for this position, and Sidwell applied.  While the bidding for the position 
proceeded, Sidwell continued to work in the parts department but was paid his 
previous diesel mechanic's wage, $17.25 per hour. Sidwell eventually received 
the parts department position, which pays $14.41 per hour.

 

  [¶9]      In an attempt to alleviate this wage 
discrepancy, Sidwell applied for a permanent partial disability award. The 
Division did not approve Sidwell's claim for benefits, finding that the wages 
were comparable. After a contested case hearing, a hearing examiner from the 
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) also denied Sidwell's claim for benefits. The hearing examiner's 
findings included the following:

 

            22. 
In light of the fact that the employee had applied for a position as a parts man 
at the rate of $14.00 per hour 
prior to his injury, and after the injury was offered that job and accepted 
that position, the Office finds 
that there was no apparent loss of earning capacity and any 
decrease in income was 
voluntary.

 

  [¶10] 
  Sidwell filed a petition 
for review with the district court, and the district court affirmed the hearing 
examiner's decision.  Sidwell timely 
appeals that decision.

 

             
            STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

  [¶11] 
  When considering an appeal 
from a district court's review of agency action, we accord no special deference 
to the district court's conclusions. Manning v. State ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Div., 938 P.2d 870, 872 (Wyo. 1997). Instead, we review the case as 
if it had come to us directly from the administrative agency. Id. at 872-73. 
Judicial review of administrative decisions is limited to a determination of the 
matters which are specified in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (Michie 1997), which mandates that the reviewing court 
shall:

 

            (ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 

                        
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

 

            * * 
*

 

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

 

  [¶12] 
  Whether Sidwell is entitled 
to permanent partial disability benefits is a question of fact. State ex rel. 
Worker's Compensation Div. v. White, 837 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Wyo. 1992). We afford 
respect and deference to an agency's findings of fact if they are supported by 
substantial evidence. Haagensen v. State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 949 P.2d 865, 867 (Wyo. 1997). 
"Substantial evidence" is a term of art, best described as relevant evidence 
that a reasonable mind can accept as adequate to support an agency's conclusion. 
Id. On appeal, our task is not to reweigh conflicting evidence, but only to 
examine the record to determine if substantial evidence supports the agency's 
conclusion. Wyoming Steel & Fab Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 876 (Wyo. 
1994). Therefore, we examine only the evidence which favors the prevailing 
party, allowing every favorable inference, while omitting consideration of any 
conflicting evidence. Id.

 

                             
DISCUSSION

 

  [¶13] 
  Sidwell claims he is 
entitled to a partial disability award based on his reduction in wages, from 
$17.25 per hour which he earned as a mechanic to the $14.41 he now earns in the 
parts department.  Sidwell bears the 
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, all essential elements of 
his claim. Matter of Workers' Compensation Claim of Jacobs, 924 P.2d 982, 984 
(Wyo. 1996).  Sidwell's claim, 
including the nature and amount of benefits, is governed by laws in effect at 
the time of his 1994 injury. Id.

 

  [¶14] 
  The applicable statute, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405 (Michie 1997), provides in pertinent 
part:

 

(h) An injured employee awarded permanent partial 
impairment benefits may apply for a permanent partial disability award subject 
to the following terms and conditions:

 

(i) The injured employee is because of the injury, 
unable to return to employment at a comparable or higher wage than the wage 
the employee was earning at the time of injury;

 

(ii) An application for permanent partial disability 
is filed not before three (3) months after the date of ascertainable loss or 
three (3) months before the last scheduled impairment payment, whichever occurs 
later, but in no event later than one (1) year following the later date; 
and

 

            (iii) The 
employee has actively sought suitable work, considering the employee's health, 
education, training, and 
experience.

 

(Emphasis added.) Under this 
section, an injured worker may be eligible for an award similar to what was 
previously known as loss of earning capacity or impairment of earning 
capacity.  See State ex rel. 
Worker's Compensation Div. v. White, 837 P.2d  at 1097 (establishing sevenfactor 
test used to determine impairment of earning capacity under former statute). The 
hearing examiner found that Sidwell had no apparent loss of earning capacity and 
that any decrease in income was voluntary. The hearing examiner determined that 
"in light of the fact that the Claimant had applied for [the parts] position 
prior to the injury, the Office of Administrative Hearings specifically finds 
that the Claimant has not satisfied his burden of proof."

 

  [¶15] 
  Sidwell argues the decision 
was improper because "voluntary decrease in income" is not listed in § 
27-14-405(h). Although "voluntary decrease in income" is not a factor mentioned 
in § 27-14-405(h), the clear import of the hearing examiner's decision is that 
Sidwell was not, because of his injury, unable to return to work at a comparable or higher wage. Thus, the 
question is whether, under subsection (i), Sidwell was "because of the injury, 
unable to return to employment at a comparable or higher wage" than the wage he 
was earning at the time of his injury.

 

  [¶16] 
  Substantial evidence 
supports a finding that Sidwell was not, because of his injury, unable to return 
to work at a comparable or higher wage. First, the record establishes that 
Sidwell would have taken the parts department position, and the accompanying pay 
cut, regardless of his injury. Sidwell originally applied for the parts department position prior to his 1994 
injury, knowing full well that it paid less than the mechanic position. After 
rehabilitating his back, Sidwell again sought the parts 
position.

 

  [¶17] 
  Second, the record confirms 
that Sidwell was given a full medical release to return to work as a diesel 
mechanic. Although some evidence indicates that Sidwell was advised not to 
return to work as a mechanic after the 1994 injury, the evidence from Sidwell's 
health care providers is contradictory. Both his occupational therapist and spine surgeon recommended that Sidwell 
not return to work as a mechanic. However, Sidwell's chiropractor later issued a 
full medical release. Palmer, the Cummins branch manager, interpreted this 
release to mean Sidwell was "healed well enough to return back to his normal 
duties as a journeyman diesel mechanic." More important, Sidwell testified that 
he was physically capable of doing the mechanic work and would have returned to 
work as a mechanic if the parts department position had not been available. 
Palmer confirmed that Sidwell would have been assigned to work as a mechanic if 
he had not been needed, and later hired, 
in the parts department.

 

  [¶18] 
  When viewed through our 
"substantial evidence" spectacles, the evidence outlined above establishes that 
Sidwell was given a full medical release to return to work and that he was 
physically capable of performing the work of a mechanic. Instead of returning to 
work as a mechanic, Sidwell sought and accepted the lower paying parts department position, a position he 
would have taken prior to his injury had it been offered. This supports the 
hearing examiner's finding that Sidwell voluntarily took a pay cut. There was, 
thus, substantial evidence to establish that Sidwell was not, because of his 
injury, unable to return to employment at a comparable or higher 
wage.

 

  [¶19] 
  Sidwell also contends that 
the hearing examiner acted improperly because he did not determine whether 
Sidwell's pre- and post-injury wages were "comparable." Sidwell is correct in 
asserting that the Division, in its 
final determination letter, based its denial of benefits on a finding that 
Sidwell's $17.25 per hour pre-injury earnings and $14.41 per hour post-injury 
earnings were comparable.  Sidwell, 
presenting no authority, argues that the hearing examiner was thus limited to 
deciding only whether the wages were comparable.  However, in its "Notice of Referral For 
Hearing," the Division disclosed that the issue to be decided was "Denial by the 
division of disability award." Thus, contrary to Sidwell's assertion, the 
referral by the Division was not limited 
to the comparable wage issue. Moreover, the record reveals that Sidwell did not 
limit his presentation of evidence to the comparable wage issue. As discussed 
above, substantial evidence supports a finding that Sidwell voluntarily took the 
lower paying job. Given this, the hearing examiner was not required to determine 
whether, under the circumstances presented here, Sidwell's pre- and post-injury 
wages were comparable.

 

                             
CONCLUSION

 

  [¶20] 
  There was conflicting 
evidence whether Sidwell was, because of his injury, unable to return to work at 
a comparable or higher wage. The hearing examiner found that Sidwell voluntarily 
sought and accepted a lower paying job, a job he would have accepted before his 
injury had it been offered. We hold that the hearing examiner's decision denying benefits is supported by 
substantial evidence.

 

  [¶21] 
  
Affirmed.