Title: Dombrowski v. MARICOPA CTY. MUN. WAT. CONS. DIST. NO. 1

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

108 Ariz. 275 (1972) 496 P.2d 136 Robert J. DOMBROWSKI and Violet Dombrowski, husband and wife, Appellants, v. MARICOPA COUNTY MUNICIPAL WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT NO. 1, Appellee. No. 10712. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. April 24, 1972. Rehearing Denied May 23, 1972. Harrison, Myers & Singer, by Mark I. Harrison, Phoenix, for appellants. O'Connor, Cavanagh, Anderson, Westover, Killingsworth & Beshears, by Robert S. Tancer and John H. Killingsworth, Phoenix, for appellees. Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, Phoenix, Maxwell, Johnson & Smith, Scottsdale, Rolle, Jones & Benton, Westover, Keddie & Choules, Yuma, amici curiae. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a summary judgment in favor of defendant Maricopa County Municipal Water Conservation District No. 1, entered by the Superior Court of Maricopa County in a wrongful death action brought by the mother and stepfather of Arthur Gettas, a minor, who drowned in an irrigation canal owned and maintained by defendant. We are asked on appeal to reverse our previous decisions and to apply the attractive nuisance doctrine to the defendant water district. The facts necessary for a determination of this matter are as follows. On 17 June 1968, the deceased, age 14 years, and three others, visited the area south of Lower Lake Pleasant on the Beardsley Canal (which is owned and maintained by defendants). The area is uninhabited and is reached by a dirt road. About three miles south of the lake, the canal empties into a stilling pool which is used to slow down the rate of flow of the water. The small waterfall from the canal to stilling pool makes a whirlpool on one end. Defendants were aware of the fact that the canal was frequently used by unauthorized teenagers, and had once put up a fence and a "No Trespassing, Danger" sign, both of which were torn down by 17 June 1968. On 17 June 1968, decedent's three friends all floated over the waterfall and waited for Arthur. Arthur went over the falls a bit too far to one side and got caught in what has been variously described as an undertow, a swirlpool, or a whirlpool. He wasn't a strong swimmer and was unable to either stay afloat in the area of the whirlpool or swim out of the whirlpool. Two friends entered the water and tried to save him, but the whirlpool was so strong that at least one would-be rescuer was nearly sucked under the water. By the time they got Arthur out of the pond he was dead, and attempts at resuscitation were useless. SHOULD THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE BE APPLIED TO CANALS? Arizona was very early faced with the question of whether to apply the attractive nuisance doctrine to canals. In the case of Salladay v. Old Dominion Copper Mining Company, 12 Ariz. 124, 100 P. 441 (1909), *276 this court considered the question at some length: Salladay v. Old Dominion Copper Mining Company, supra, can be said to rest upon two bases: the public policy that required special treatment or immunity for waterways and the feeling that, "the danger [was] not only obvious, but * * * the object itself from which the danger arises [was] of such a character that, * * * `the defendant was entitled to assume that the plaintiff's natural guardians would protect him * * *'." 12 Ariz. at 130, 100 P. at 443. This court has built upon and extended the Salladay decision to provide almost complete immunity to irrigation districts in Arizona in the maintenance not only of the canals and diversion points, but also various mechanical and electrical equipment needed to operate the water distribution system. In a case concerning injuries received from an electrical shock at a pump house, we stated: The Court of Appeals also has recently discussed this problem: It may be that in a proper case there can be shown a "meaningful distinction" between the immunity that this court has historically given to open irrigation canals on the one hand, and the negligent design and maintenance of mechanical or electrical equipment, wiers, dams and diversion points in congested urban areas on the other hand. While this case is certainly tragic, we do not believe it presents such a "meaningful distinction" that it would require us to modify our previous decisions in this field of the law. We therefore affirm the decision of the trial court in granting the motion for summary judgment. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.