Title: Esry v. Carden

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Kathy ESRY v. James CARDEN

96-406                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 21, 1997


1.   New trial -- test on appeal when motion for new trial denied -
     - substantial evidence defined and discussed. -- The test on
     appeal for a denial of a motion for a new trial is whether
     there is substantial evidence to support the jury verdict;
     substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient force and
     character to compel a conclusion one way or the other with
     reasonable certainty; it must force the mind to pass beyond
     suspicion or conjecture; in examining whether substantial
     evidence exists, all evidence must be examined in the light
     most favorable to the party on whose behalf the judgment was
     entered and given its highest probative value, taking into
     account all reasonable inferences deducible from it; the
     weight and value of testimony is a matter left within the
     exclusive province of the jury. 

2.   New trial -- verdict against party with burden of proof --
     test not strictly applied when that party appeals denial of
     motion for new trial. -- In instances where the verdict is
     against the party that has the burden of proof and that party
     appeals the denial of a motion for a new trial, the
     substantial-evidence test is not applied strictly; in such
     instances, a literal application of the rule would be
     untenable, as the defendant may have introduced little or no
     proof yet been granted the verdict. 

3.   Jury -- proper basis of general verdict -- without knowledge
     of basis for verdict, jury's findings will not be questioned.
     -- When a jury returns a general verdict, such a verdict could
     be based upon a finding of no liability, no damages, or both;
     when special interrogatories concerning liability or damages
     are not requested, the appellate court is in the position of
     not knowing the basis for the jury's verdict, and it will not
     question nor theorize about the jury's findings.       

4.   Evidence -- jury's verdict supported by substantial evidence -
     - court would not question jury's general verdict. -- Where
     appellant's testimony revealed several areas in which the jury
     could possibly have questioned her credibility and the
     legitimacy of her injuries, it was feasible that the jury
     could have determined, without speculation, that although the
     wreck was the fault of the defendant, appellant's injuries
     were not a result of the wreck, and it was conceivable that
     the jury could have determined that the defendant was not at
     fault although he testified that he was, there was substantial
     evidence to support the jury's verdict; taking into
     consideration all of the evidence submitted and the fact that
     the jury returned a general verdict for the defendant, it was
     impossible to know exactly how the jury balanced the evidence
     submitted; therefore it was not within the supreme court's
     domain to question the jury's general verdict. 

5.   Evidence -- ruling on admission or exclusion of evidence not
     reversed absent abuse of discretion -- door may be opened for
     otherwise inadmissible evidence under collateral-source rule.
     -- A trial court's ruling on the admission or exclusion of
     evidence will not be reversed absent abuse of discretion; it
     is generally improper for either party to introduce or elicit
     evidence of the other party's insurance coverage; however, a
     party opens the door for the introduction of evidence which
     might otherwise be inadmissible under the collateral-source
     rule when that person testifies about his or her financial
     condition in a false or misleading manner.

6.   Evidence -- trial court determined door had not been opened
     for introduction of insurance-related evidence -- no abuse of
     discretion found. -- Where the trial court made no
     determination that the jury had been misled by the testimony
     concerning appellee's disabilities, but instead, determined
     that the door had not been opened for the introduction of
     insurance-related evidence, the trial court was in a much
     better position to determine whether the jury was misled by
     the testimony; the supreme court could not speculate upon the
     jury's general verdict and determine whether such testimony
     was prejudicial; absent proof that the trial court denied a
     motion to include insurance evidence despite a finding that
     the jury was prejudiced, the trial court did not abuse its
     discretion in ruling upon the exclusion of such evidence; the
     trial court's decision was affirmed.


     Appeal from Grant Circuit Court; Phillip H. Shirron, Judge;
affirmed.
     Mitchell, Blackstock and Barnes, by: Jack Wagoner III, for
appellant. 
     Matthews, Sanders, & Sayes, by: Margaret M. Newton and Mel
Sayes, for appellees.  

     W.H."Dub" Arnold, Chief Justice.
          This is a personal-injury case where Kathy Esry, the
appellant, brought suit against James Carden, the appellee, to
recover for injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile accident. 
At trial, appellant testified that she had incurred damages for
medical bills, lost wages and mileage expenses totalling over
$8400; appellee challenged these damages.  Appellee testified that
the accident was minor and that neither he nor his passenger was
injured; additionally, he testified that the accident was his
fault.  The jury returned a general verdict in favor of appellee
despite his testimony that he was responsible for the accident.  
     On appeal, appellant argues that the verdict for the appellee
resulted from trial court errors which created a false picture for
the jury, thus depriving appellant of a fair trial.  Specifically,
appellant claims that (1) the jury's verdict was against the
preponderance of the evidence; (2) the trial court erred in denying
the appellant's motion for a new trial; and (3) the trial court
erred in suppressing evidence related to the appellee's insurance
coverage to rebut his testimony that he did not work because of
disabilities.  We conclude that there was substantial evidence to
support the jury's finding and that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in the exclusion of evidence related to insurance
coverage; therefore, we affirm.
    I.  Sufficiency of Evidence to Support the Jury's Verdict
     Appellant's first and second arguments regard the sufficiency
of the jury's verdict and the trial court's denial of the motion
for a new trial.  Rule 59(a) of the Ark. Rules of Civil Procedure
allows a motion for a new trial to be granted upon a showing of one
of eight reasons.  One permissible reason is that "the verdict or
decision is clearly contrary to the preponderance of the evidence
or is contrary to law."  Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6).  In Hall v.
Grimmett, 318 Ark. 309,