Title: TAYLOR v TAYLOR

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No, 12869 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T OF THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1975 ADDIE F. TAYLOR, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - J A M E S E. TAYLOR, Defendant and Respondent, Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding, Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Robert L. Stephens, Jr. argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Berger, Anderson, S i n c l a i r and Murphy, Billings, Montana James J, S i n c l a i r argued, Billings, Montana For Amicus Curiae : Honorable Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana James F. Walsh, 1 1 1 argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Submitted: May 9, 1975 Decided: JkiN 1 0 1975 Filed: J\)b{ lL,j -375 M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment of the d i s t r i c t court, Yellowstone County, the Honorable Nat Allen presiding. The judgment modified a divorce decree entered June 23, 1965, by s t r i k i n g those portions r e f e r r i n g t o the payment of alimony. Appellant Addie F. Taylor was granted a divorce from respondent James E. Taylor. The divorce decree provided t h a t a property settlement agreement be incorporated i n t o the decree. The property settlement agreement was dated June 16, 1965. It r e c i t e d t h a t husband and wife had lived separate and apart f o r many months; the wife intended t o f i l e f o r divorce; and, it was the d e s i r e of both t o s e t t l e and adjust between themselves t h e i r respective property r i g h t s and a l l claims each may o r might have against t h e other. Then followed nineteen separate paragraphs, the s a l i e n t features of each are: 1) A n agreement t o be f r e e from interference. 2) A n agreement t o release each other from a l l claims, except a s provided i n the agreement. 3) A n agreement by the husband t o pay a l l current b i l l s . 4 ) A n agreement by the husband t o support an adult daughter a t her California residence. 5) A n agreement t o furnish a l i s t of a l l obligations, 6) The p a r t i e s a r e not limited i n t h e i r remedies a t law o r i n equity f o r the enforcement of e i t h e r t h i s agreement o r the decree. 7) The husband can claim the minor son a s an income t a x deduction. 8) Personal property items. 9) Transfer of one car t o each. 10) Husband t o handle income t a x items and receive a l l refunds. 11) Husband t o execute a $1,000 note t o be paid off a t $25 per month f o r release of wife's claim on a check f o r $5,500, which was payable j o i n t l y on the s a l e of mineral property i n North Dakota. 12) Husband agrees t o t r a n s f e r the home t o the wife and t o pay the loan, taxes and insurance obligations. 13) Husband agrees t o pay support money f o r minor son and t o pay f o r a college education. 14) Small income checks endorsed t o wife. I I 15) The husband agrees t o pay t o the wife t h e sum of Four Hundred and no/100 Dollars ($400.00) per month beginning June 1, 1965, a s alimony, and a l i k e sum each and every month thereafter. I I 16) Husband w i l l pay balance due on furniture contract. 17) Each w i l l execute instruments necessary t o e f f e c t t h i s agreement. 1 I 18) This agreement i s made and entered i n t o f r e e l y and voluntarily by each of the p a r t i e s , and it s h a l l operate a s a complete property settlement between them. I I 19) "It i s understood t h a t t h i s i s not an agreement t o obtain a divorce, but i n the event t h a t e i t h e r of t h e p a r t i e s hereto s h a l l obtain a decree of divorce from the other, then t h i s agreement i s t o be made a part of any Decree headed ( s i c ) by the Court. 11 The complaint f o r divorce by the wife r e c i t e d t h a t there were three children, two of age, and one, a son, a minor. Custody was granted the mother with support a s provided i n paragraph 13, f o r t h e minor son. Without further explanation o r reference i n the complaint o r decree, except by reference, paragraph 4 provided f o r support of a daughter, of age, i n California. The decree provided s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r custody and support of the minor son. It then provided f o r alimony a t $400 per month, a s agreed i n paragraph 15; but limited the payments u n t i l re- marriage. Then, the property settlement agreement was incorporated i n the decree and t h e wife awarded her c o s t s and attorney fees. The p e t i t i o n by James E. Taylor, defendant i n the divorce case is simple. It r e c i t e s the decree provision f o r alimony and the property settlement agreement, a s note'd.abovee, then alleges: ( I . ) t h a t the alimony provision i s based on section 21-139, R.C.M. 1947; (2) t h a t A r t i c l e 11, Section 4, 1972 Montana Constitution provides i n pertinent part t h a t "* * * The State * * * s h a l l [not] discriminate against any person * * * on account of * * * sex * * *." and (3) t h a t section 21-139 i s unconstitutional i n t h a t it v i o l a t e s A r t i c l e 11, Section 4 , 1972 Montana Constitution, and the F i f t h and Fourteenth Amendments t o the United States Constitution. In response t o the p e t i t i o n , Addie Taylor alleged: (1) the alimony provision was not based upon section 21-139 b u t , r a t h e r , was the r e s u l t of an agreement and contract; (2) i n any event, even i f section 21-139 i s unconstitutional under the 1972 Montana Constitution, t h i s would be an impermissible ex post f a c t o appli- cation; and, (3) t h e alimony s t a t u t e , section 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, i s constitutional and r e f l e c t s a valid public policy consideration. Hearing was had and ex-wife Addie t e s t i f i e d the alimony provision i n the property settlement agreement was made a s an accommodation t o the husband and was accepted i n l i e u of a d i s t r i b u t i o n of other property. Addie t e s t i f i e d : I I I was going t o ask f o r a s e t amount, and J i m said t h a t he could not come up with t h a t amount of money, so we decided on alimony payments i n l i e u of a cash settlement 9~ * Yc." The d i s t r i c t court found t h a t section 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, permitting the court t o award alimony t o a wife i n a divorce proceeding where the divorce i s granted f o r an offense of the husband i s i n violation of Article 11, Section 4, 1972 Montana Constitution. The court then ordered stricken the alimony provisions i n the divorce decree. The issues on appeal, as stated, go to the constitutional questions involved. However, in our view, the case can be deter- mined, not on constitutional grounds, but, rather, on contract rights. If the decree is one not subject to modification as alimony, but rather one of contract, no constitutional problems arise. Constitutional issues will not be determined if the case may be determined on nonconstitutional grounds. See: Montana State University v . Ransier, Mon t . P. 2d 3 - 2 32 St.Rep. , and cases cited therein. In Washington v. Washington, 162 Mont. 349, 512 P.2d 1300, this Court considered whether or not, as a matter of law, the alimony provision of a property settlement agreement was integral to the agreement and not severable and as such not subject to modification by the court. On appeal, this Court analyzed the agreement that was incorporated into the decree and held that the 1 I alimony" was an integral part of the property settlement agree- ment and was not severable, and the settlement agreement was fully supported by consideration from the wife and could not be changed without the consent of both parties. The Court then went on to state that the payments were not alimony per se and the use of the term alimony was only a label, In Movius v. Movius, 163 Mont, 463, 517 P.2d 884,886,887, 31 St.Rep. 29, this Court considered another property settlement agreementht was incorporated into a decree. The Court stated: "Directing our attention to the first issue, the underlying question is whether the alimony provision of the property settlement is integral and not severable from the rest of the agreement and as such not subject to subsequent modification by the court. This question was recently before this Court in Washington v . Washington, Mon t . , 512 P.2d 1300, 30 St.Rep. 674. There we held that the alimony provisions of that particular agreement were not in fact alimony payments at all, but instead were an integrated part of a property settlement which could not be severed therefrom without destroying the contract, and accordingly were not subject to sub- sequent modification by the court. 11 W e reaffirm the principles announced therein, the a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d i n support, and the r a t i o n a l e applied t o resolution of the question. Here, however, although the agreement bears some s i m i l a r i t i e s t o the agreement i n Washington, i t s differences command an opposite r e s u l t . In Washington the wife didn't seek alimony o r support i n the divorce action but both p a r t i e s simply sought an equitable settlement of property r i g h t s ; the agreement incorporated i n the decree i n Washington provided t h a t the payments labeled a s alimony continued i f the wife remarried and became a charge against the husband's e s t a t e i f he died prior t o payment i n f u l l ; the agreement provided t h a t t h e wife would assume a pre-existing l i a b i l i t y of $10,000 against some of the property. wa ere, unlike Washington, Alice sought an alimony award f o r her support and maintenance i n her crossclaim f o r divorce, and the divorce decree made such an award pursuant t o the agreement of the parties. The alimony payments t o Alice terminated absolutely i n t h e event of her remarriage. The agreement here i s s i l e n t on l i a b i l i t y f o r future pay- ments i n the event of death of e i t h e r Alice o r Arthur. The alimony provisions here a r e c l e a r l y alimony and not payments i n settlement of property rights. Here Alice assumed no l i a b i l i t y f o r any pre-existing indebtedness nor i s there any evidence indicating t h a t she gave up anything i n the way of support and maintenance i n consideration of receiving a more favorable division of the property acquired during t h e i r marriage. "In short, here there i s no interrelationship between the alimony provisions and the property division t h a t would destroy the r e s t of the contract i f the amount of alimony payments were modified by t h e court. Absent such mutual interdependency, the alimony provisions of the agreement incorporated i n the decree a r e not an i n t e g r a l p a r t of t h e property settlement but a r e i n a l l respects separable there- from and subject t o subsequent modification by t h e court i n i t s discretion on a proper showing of changed circum- stances. I I Heretofore, we have s e t f o r t h the paragraphs of the agree- ment here and how they were adopted by reference i n the decree and changed i n part. S i m i l a r i t i e s t o the agreements i n both Washington and Movius e x i s t . W e hold t h a t the contract here i s more l i k e t h a t i n Washington, The testimony of Addie Taylor,not disputed, makes c l e a r t h a t t h e agreement was an independent bargain. Thus, whether section 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, i s constitutional or not has no I I bearing since the alimony" was part of a negotiated settlement of the p a r t i e s respective property r i g h t s . Obligations of a contract executed i n 1965 cannot be invalidated by subsequent passage of any law. Thus, we hold the alimony provision of the property s e t t l e - agreement ment / a s incorporated i n t o the decree of divorce, was intended t o a c t a s an inseverable contractual provision of t h e agreement and not impairable by a subsequent change i n the law, i f indeed there is. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand t h e matter t o the d i s t r i c t court f o r entry of judgment f o r appellant. W e do not award attorney fees a s requested since no pleading f o r such was made; nor, under our holding here t h a t the agreement was contractual could any attorney fee be awarded. Appellant s h a l l have her costs. J u s t i c e - W e Concur: ,/? > / Justices. /