Title: Robbs v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

nPresent:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 
Keenan, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
GROVER ROBBS 
                                             OPINION BY 
v.   Record No. 951973 
SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
                                           November 1, 1996 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The issues in this appeal of a criminal conviction are 
whether the Commonwealth violated either the five or the nine-
month provisions of the following speedy trial statute:  
 
 
Where a general district court has found that 
there is probable cause to believe that the accused has 
committed a felony, the accused, if he is held 
continuously in custody thereafter, shall be forever 
discharged from prosecution for such offense if no 
trial is commenced in the circuit court within five 
months from the date such probable cause was found by 
the district court; and if the accused is not held in 
custody but has been recognized for his appearance in 
the circuit court to answer for such offense, he shall 
be forever discharged from prosecution therefor if no 
trial is commenced in the circuit court within nine 
months from the date such probable cause was found. 
 
Code § 19.2-243. 
 
After a preliminary hearing on August 4, 1992, the General 
District Court of Hanover County found probable cause to believe 
that Grover Robbs committed grand larceny.  A grand jury later 
indicted Robbs, who was in custody, on that charge.  Before his 
case was set for trial in the circuit court, Robbs filed a motion 
on October 6, 1992 to suppress part of the evidence.  This motion 
was heard and overruled 20 days later. 
 
Thereafter, the case was set for trial on a date within five 
months of the preliminary hearing.  However, on the day before 
trial, the court sustained the Commonwealth's motion for a 
 
 
 
 
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continuance and the case was rescheduled for trial on February 
17, 1993.   
 
Several days later, the Commonwealth realized that Robbs had 
been continuously confined since his preliminary hearing and that 
the new trial date was more than five months from that hearing.  
Accordingly, the Commonwealth made a motion to release Robbs on a 
recognizance bond returnable on the trial date, which the trial 
court granted on December 14, 1992.  Upon Robbs's failure to 
appear on the trial date, a capias was issued for his arrest.  On 
March 17, 1993, 26 days later, Robbs was arrested and thereafter 
confined until he was tried. 
 
Subsequently, the trial court fixed Robbs's grand larceny 
case for trial on June 7, 1993, more than nine months after the 
preliminary hearing.  Prior to the trial date, Robbs filed a 
motion "to dismiss the charges against him" on the ground that he 
had been held in custody for more than five months after his 
preliminary hearing in violation of Code § 19.2-243.  Robbs 
contended that in computing the five-month period, the additional 
time he was in custody after his arrest on the capias should be 
added to the time he was in custody prior to the first trial 
date.  The trial court overruled Robbs's motion and, following a 
jury trial, Robbs was convicted on the grand larceny charge and 
sentenced to eight years imprisonment. 
 
On Robbs's appeal to the Court of Appeals, he also argued 
that his trial was held beyond the nine-month period following 
 
 
 
 
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his preliminary hearing, even after crediting the Commonwealth 
with the 26 days between the date he failed to appear before the 
trial court and the date he was arrested on the capias.  The 
Commonwealth responded that the trial was held within the nine-
month limitation period because it was entitled to an additional 
credit for the 20 days that elapsed between the date that Robbs 
filed his motion to suppress and the date the trial court ruled 
on that motion. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court and Robbs appealed to this Court.  We granted Robbs a 
delayed appeal, following our grant of a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
We agree with the Court of Appeals and the Commonwealth that 
the five-month limitation does not apply in this case.  If a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply the words as written. 
 Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985).  
Here, the five-month limitation would apply only if Robbs had 
been "continuously in custody," and he had not been in continuous 
custody since his second arrest began a separate confinement.
*T  
Hence, we find no merit in Robbs's contention regarding the 
alleged violation of the five-months limitation. 
                     
     
*Our decision makes it unnecessary to decide whether the 
second period of confinement was upon the capias, as the 
Commonwealth contends, or upon the original charge, as Robbs 
contends. 
 
 
 
 
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However, we agree with Robbs that the trial was held in 
violation of the nine-month limitation provision.  If the 20-day 
period measured from the time Robbs made his motion to suppress 
until the time the trial court ruled on it caused a delay in 
setting the case for trial, that delay is attributable to Robbs 
and thus cannot be counted in computing the nine-month limitation 
period.  The Commonwealth has the burden of showing that Robbs's 
motion and the time taken by the trial court to rule thereon 
caused such a delay.  Stephens v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 224, 231-
32, 301 S.E.2d 22, 26 (1983). 
 
This record shows only that 20 days after the motion was 
filed, the trial court heard oral argument on the motion and 
immediately thereafter ruled orally.  Nothing in the record shows 
that "the filing of the motion necessitated a slow-down of the 
judicial process," Id. at 233, 301 S.E.2d at 26, because (1) the 
case had not yet been set for trial and the filing of Robbs's 
motion did not necessitate a continuance of the trial date (as in 
Stephens) and (2) (unlike the situation in Stephens) the trial 
judge ruled immediately upon being presented with the motion and 
forthwith set the case for trial.   
 
Since the record fails to show that the motion delayed the 
court in setting the case for trial, we conclude that the Court 
of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment.  Accordingly, we will 
enter an order reversing the judgment, dismissing the indictment, 
and directing that Robbs be forever discharged from prosecution 
 
 
 
 
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for the offense charged in the indictment. 
 
Reversed and final judgment. 
CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO, with whom JUSTICE COMPTON and JUSTICE 
STEPHENSON join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
 
I would hold that the speedy trial rights of Grover Robbs 
under Code § 19.2-243 have not been violated.  In my opinion, the 
five-month limitation contained in Code § 19.2-243 has not been 
violated because Robbs was released on bond within the five-month 
period and, since his second arrest began a separate confinement, 
he was not entitled to include the time then spent in custody in 
computing the five-month limitation.  
 
I do not think the nine-month limitation contained in Code 
§ 19.2-243 has been violated because, in the computation of the 
nine-month period, the Commonwealth was entitled to have excluded 
not only the twenty-six day period following Robbs' failure to 
appear but also the twenty-day period between the filing of 
Robbs' motion to suppress and the trial court's disposition of 
the motion.  With respect to the twenty-day period, I think 
Stephens v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 224, 301 S.E.2d 22 (1983), 
cited by the majority, is controlling here. 
 
In that case, the defendant burglarized a business and was 
charged with four felonies and two misdemeanors.  He filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that his arrest was 
illegal.  The trial court heard argument on the motion and held 
it under advisement from May 22, 1981, to August 25, 1981, or for 
 
 
 
 
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more than three months.  We held that this delay did not result 
in a violation of the defendant's speedy trial rights under Code 
§ 19.2-243.  This was the rationale of our decision:  
 
When the defendant filed his motion to suppress he was 
not asking for a speedy trial.  It was an act which 
necessitated a slow-down of the judicial process.  What 
the defendant desired was favorable action on this 
motion. . . .  [H]e did not want precipitate action.  
He wanted careful consideration by the court.  Although 
defendant did not make a formal motion for a 
continuance, he was the moving party in a proceeding 
which necessitated the continuance, and he should not 
be permitted to take advantage of the delay thus 
occasioned. 
 
Id. at 233-34, 301 S.E.2d at 27-28. 
 
We concluded with this observation: 
 
In view of the gravity of the offenses involved, other 
circumstances surrounding the case, and the motion to 
suppress, we cannot say that the period of time taken 
by the trial court to consider defendant's motion was 
unreasonable or inordinate. 
 
Id. at 234, 301 S.E.2d at 28. 
 
While the motion to suppress in Stephens may have been more 
complex than the motion involved here, justifying the trial court 
in holding the motion under advisement for more than three 
months, there is nothing in principle to distinguish the present 
matter from Stephens.
*   Indeed, the rationale expressed there 
                     
     
*The majority attempts to distinguish the present case from 
Stephens on two grounds, first, that, here, "the case had not yet 
been set for trial and the filing of Robbs's motion did not 
necessitate a continuance of the trial date (as in Stephens)."  
But nothing in the Stephens opinion or the record on file in our 
 
 
 
 
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(..continued) 
fits this situation like a glove.  Accordingly, I would hold that 
the twenty-day period which elapsed before the trial court took 
up and disposed of Robbs' motion to suppress was neither 
unreasonable nor inordinate and, hence, was excusable. 
Clerk's office indicates that a date had been set for Stephens' 
trial at the time he filed his motion to suppress.  Be that as it 
may, it was reasonable for the trial court here to delay setting 
a trial date until Robbs' motion to suppress was disposed of; had 
the motion been granted, there might not have been any necessity 
to set a trial date.  Hence, the filing of the motion did cause a 
slow-down of the judicial process, and the slow-down was 
attributable to Robbs.  The other ground upon which the majority 
seeks to distinquish this case from Stephens is that "(unlike the 
situation in Stephens) the trial judge ruled immediately upon 
being presented with the motion and forthwith set the case for 
trial."  However, I fail to see why, and the majority does not 
say why, that should make any possible difference in the outcome 
of this case.