Title: Ronald Gilbert v. Rogina Investments

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel 04/04/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1050161
_________________________
Ronald Gilbert
v.
Rogina Investment Corporation
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-04-4611)
COBB, Chief Justice.
Ronald Gilbert, the defendant in an action involving a
dispute over a ground lease, appeals from a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff, Rogina Investment Corporation ("Rogina").
We affirm.
1050161
Section 35-4-6, Ala. Code 1975, states:
1
"No leasehold estate can be created for a longer
term than 99 years. Leases for more than 20 years
shall be void for the excess over said period unless
the lease or a memorandum thereof is acknowledged or
approved as required by law in conveyances of real
estate and recorded within one year after execution
in the office of the judge of probate in the county
2
I.  Background
Alabama appellate courts have addressed questions
regarding the contract that is the subject of this action on
two previous occasions.  See Tedescki v. Rogina Inv. Corp.,
547 So. 2d 454 (Ala. 1989), and Rogina Inv. Corp. v. Gilbert,
816 So. 117 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (table).  Beatrice Tedescki
executed a ground lease on January 24, 1978, leasing to
Merritt Rogers, Bill Ingram, Ben Power, and Charles Yarbrough
certain real property located on the southeast corner of the
intersection of U.S. Highway 31 and Lorna Road in Hoover ("the
lease agreement").  The lease was for a term of 25 years,
commencing March 1, 1978, but the lessees had the option of
extending the lease for eight successive five-year periods.
The lease agreement was recorded in the Jefferson County
Probate Office on August 9, 1978, as required by § 35-4-6,
Ala. Code 1975.   An amendment to the lease agreement was
1
1050161
in which the property leased is situated."
3
executed on December 1, 1978, and recorded in the Jefferson
County Probate Office on July 18, 1985.
In August 1978, Rogers, Ingram, Power, and Yarbrough
executed a mortgage in favor of the National Bank of Commerce
("NBC"), assigning and conveying the lease agreement and the
leasehold estate created thereby to NBC.  NBC in turn assigned
its rights, title, and interest in the mortgage and the lease
to Rogina on December 11, 1979.  Rogers, Ingram, Power, and
Yarbrough defaulted on the indebtedness secured by the
mortgage; thus, Rogina foreclosed on the leasehold interest.
A foreclosure sale was held, and Rogina was the highest bidder
for the leasehold interest of Rogers, Ingram, Power, and
Yarbrough.  The ground lease was then conveyed to Rogina.
Tedescki died in 1989 and bequeathed the property which is the
subject of the lease agreement to her nephew, Gilbert.
On September 16, 1991, Rogina exercised its first option
to extend the term of the ground lease from March 1, 2003,
through February 29, 2008.  On March 3, 2000, Rogina exercised
the remainder of its options to extend the term of the ground
lease through February 28, 2043.
1050161
4
The lease agreement contains the following pertinent
provisions:
"Unless prohibited by the terms of any mortgage or
deed of trust, the Lessees may, during the first
twenty (20) years of the primary term of this lease
make such alterations, structural or otherwise, to
the leased property as the Lessees deem desirable in
the conduct of [their] business, including but not
limited to, the demolition of any building presently
existing on said property or any part thereof
without the written consent of Lessor.  Lessees,
without the written consent of the Lessors or
Lessors successors in interest, shall, during the
first twenty (20) years of the primary term of this
lease, have the right to tear down or materially
demolish any improvements made by the Lessees on the
leased property, or make any material change or
alteration in such improvements.
".....
"During the last five (5) years of the primary term
hereof and any extension hereof, any demolition or
structural alteration to any improvement shall not
be done without the written consent of Lessor, or
Lessors successors in interest, which said consent
shall not be unreasonably withheld."
The recitation of the amendment to the lease agreement stated
that the January 1978 lease was the "base lease" and that the
parties had agreed to modify the "base lease."  Among the
modifications to the base lease was the following:
"Lessees covenant and guarantee that for the first
twenty-five (25) years of this lease an Omelet
Shoppe restaurant shall be operated on the premises
and the failure of Lessees to so construct and
1050161
5
operate an Omelet Shoppe restaurant on the leased
premises shall be a material breach of this
agreement and this lease shall be null and void at
the option of the Lessor; provided, however in no
event shall the termination of this lease for any
reason terminate any sub-lease or assignment which
Lessees herein have entered into with any third
party.  In the event of Lessees' default of this
provision, or any provision herein, sub-lessees
shall be entitled to continue in possession and to
make all rental payments direct to Lessor in Lessees
stead."
In 2001, the Omelet Shoppe ceased operation at its
location on the leased property.  The structure that housed
the Omelet Shoppe was left in a state of disrepair, including
a leaking roof, rotten eaves, water damage to the interior,
and exposed electrical wires.  Rogina hired a contractor to
stabilize the structure.  Rogina wrote Gilbert informing him
of the work being done on the Omelet Shoppe structure.
Gilbert responded, stating that Rogina did not have his
permission to make the repairs to the Omelet Shoppe structure
and that by making the repairs Rogina was in violation of the
lease agreement.  Gilbert likewise claimed that the lease
agreement was void because the amendment to the lease
agreement executed on December 1, 1978, was not recorded with
the Jefferson County Probate Office until July 18, 1985.  
1050161
6
On March 5, 2003, Rogina and O'Henry's Coffee, Inc.,
entered into a letter of intent.  O'Henry's indicated that it
would sublease the Omelet Shoppe building for a base term of
five years at a rate of $5,000 per month and make the
alterations necessary to  open a coffee shop in the structure.
On April 23, 2003, Rogina's attorney wrote Gilbert's attorney
seeking Gilbert's permission for O'Henry's to make the
structural alterations.  In a September 5, 2003, letter,
Gilbert's attorney stated that "no consent has been given to
allow the requested modifications to the Omelet Shoppe
property."  On November 10, 2003, Rogina's attorney again
wrote Gilbert's attorney seeking Gilbert's written consent to
allow O'Henry to make structural alterations to the Omelet
Shoppe building.  Gilbert replied on November 21, 2003, that
he "deem[ed] the written lease that was executed in 1978 to
have expired after twenty (20) years" and that "any subsequent
occupancy of the subject property by Rogina has been on an
unwritten lease basis."  Gilbert stated, however, that he was
willing to negotiate a new contract with Rogina.  Gilbert
further stated that even if the 1978 lease agreement was still
in effect, he had insufficient information on which to make an
1050161
7
informed decision about the structural changes O'Henry's
wanted to make to the Omelet Shoppe building.  Rogina,
however, had provided Gilbert's attorney in April 2003 with a
conceptual rendering of the proposed new facade for the Omelet
Shoppe building, a proposed floor plan, a memorandum from
O'Henry's explaining the work to the exterior of the building
that would need to be performed, and a copy of the letter of
intent between Rogina and O'Henry's.  Rogina's attorney wrote
Gilbert's attorney on January 9, 2004, reminding him of the
information provided in April 2003 as well as providing a
letter from Randy Adamy, president of O'Henry's, regarding
anticipated traffic volume at the proposed coffee shop.
Gilbert never asked for any other information from Rogina
regarding O'Henry's, nor did he consent to the modifications
O'Henry's proposed.  According to Tracy Messina, Rogina's
president, Gilbert was unwilling to consent to the structural
changes 
O'Henry's 
wanted 
unless 
Rogina 
made 
monetary
concessions, including an escalation in rent and an up-front
lump-sum payment of $50,000, neither of which were required
under the lease agreement.
1050161
8
On February 9, 2004, Rogina received a letter written on
behalf of O'Henry's and stating that O'Henry's had found
another suitable location for its new store and that if Rogina
was unable to resolve its issues with Gilbert within 30 days
O'Henry's would move its project to that location.  Because
Rogina and Gilbert were unable to resolve their differences,
O'Henry's selected the other location for its new store.
On July 29, 2004, Rogina sued Gilbert, alleging breach of
contract 
and 
tortious 
interference 
with 
a 
business
relationship; Rogina also sought a judgment declaring that
under the lease agreement Rogina should not be required to
seek Gilbert's approval for structural alterations to the
Omelet Shoppe building and that the lease agreement is valid
and effective through February 28, 2043.  Gilbert moved the
trial court for a partial summary judgment on the declaratory-
judgment aspect of Rogina's complaint, stating that the lease
agreement was void under § 35-4-6, Ala. Code 1975, because the
amendment to the lease agreement was not recorded with the
judge of probate's office within one year of its execution.
The trial court denied Gilbert's summary-judgment motion,
holding that
1050161
9
"the original lease was for a period of over twenty
years and was duly recorded in compliance with Ala.
Code [1975,] § 35-4-6.  Furthermore, the amendment
to this lease did not serve to extinguish the
original lease that it modifies.  Therefore, the
original lease as modified by and including the
amendment 
thereto 
is 
valid 
and 
enforceable.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
OVERRULED.  By so holding, the purpose of Ala. Code
[1975,] § 35-4-6 is not frustrated.  This Court has
fully considered the other, subsequent, arguments
made by the parties, but because of this ruling
regarding Ala. Code [1975,] § 35-4-6 the Court
pretermits any discussion of those arguments at this
time."
(Capitalization in original.)  Gilbert filed a motion to
alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's order denying his 
summary-judgment motion, which the trial court denied.
Rogina, in turn, moved the trial court for a partial summary
judgment, asking the trial court to declare that the language
of the lease agreement did not obligate Rogina to obtain
Gilbert's consent to demolish or to make structural
alterations to the buildings on the leased premises until five
years before  the extension options of the lease agreement
were to expire.  The trial court granted Rogina's motion for
a partial summary judgment, declaring that Rogina did not have
to seek Gilbert's consent to demolish or to make structural
1050161
10
alterations to the buildings on the premises until March 1,
2038, five years before the lease agreement was to expire.  
After conducting a bench trial on Rogina's claims of
breach of contract and tortious interference with a business
relationship, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of
Rogina on both claims and awarded Rogina actual damages of
$130,500.00, prejudgment interest of $8,236.66, and attorney
fees of $40,716.50.  The trial court's final judgment also
provided:
"Further, in the event an appeal is filed and the
judgments of the Court are superseded and the
judgments of the Court are upheld on appeal, further
and additional compensatory damages WILL BE DEEMED
ENTERED, without further action or order from this
Court, in favor of [Rogina] against [Gilbert], in
the amount of Four Thousand, Five Hundred and no/100
Dollars ($4,500.00) per month for each month
following August[] 2005 through the conclusion of
said appeal but no later than April 1, 2008."
(Capitalization in original.)  Gilbert filed a motion asking
the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate its order
pertaining to the accrual of damages while on appeal, which
the trial court denied.  Gilbert appeals.
II.  Standard of Review
The evidence in this case was presented to the trial
judge in a bench trial at which evidence was presented ore
1050161
11
tenus; thus the ore tenus standard of review is applicable.
As this Court has previously noted:
"'"When a judge in a nonjury case hears oral
testimony, a judgment based on findings of fact
based on that testimony will be presumed correct and
will not be disturbed on appeal except for a plain
and palpable error."'  Smith v. Muchia, 854 So. 2d
85, 92 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Skelton, 675 So. 2d 377, 379 (Ala. 1996)); see also
First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Duckworth, 502 So. 2d
709 (Ala. 1987). As this Court has stated,
"'"The ore tenus rule is grounded upon the
principle that when the trial court hears
oral testimony it has an opportunity to
evaluate the demeanor and credibility of
witnesses."  Hall v. Mazzone, 486 So. 2d
408, 410 (Ala. 1986).  The rule applies to
"disputed issues of fact," whether the
dispute is based entirely upon oral
testimony or upon a combination of oral
testimony and documentary evidence.  Born
v. Clark, 662 So. 2d 669, 672 (Ala. 1995).
The 
ore 
tenus 
standard 
of 
review,
succinctly stated, is as follows:
"'"[W]here the evidence has been
[presented] 
ore 
tenus, 
a
presumption 
of 
correctness
attends 
the 
trial 
court's
conclusion on issues of fact, and
this Court will not disturb the
trial court's conclusion unless
it is clearly 
erroneous 
and
against the great weight of the
evidence, but will affirm the
judgment if, under any reasonable
aspect, 
it 
is 
supported 
by
credible evidence."'
1050161
12
"Reed v. Board of Trs. for Alabama State Univ., 778
So. 2d 791, 795 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Raidt v. Crane,
342 So. 2d 358, 360 (Ala.1977)).  However, 'that
presumption [of correctness] has no application when
the trial court is shown to have improperly applied
the law to the facts.'  Ex parte Board of Zoning
Adjustment of Mobile, 636 So. 2d 415, 417 (Ala.
1994)."
Robinson v. Evans, 959 So. 2d 634, 637 (Ala. 2006). 
III.  Analysis
On appeal, Gilbert raises five issues: (1) whether the
failure by Rogina and its predecessor in interest to record
the amendment to the lease agreement in the office of the
probate judge within one year of its execution voided the
lease agreement after 20 years; (2) whether the trial court
erred to reversal by failing to disqualify the law firm
representing Rogina because the possibility existed for an
attorney in that firm to be a witness at trial; (3) whether
Gilbert was in breach of the lease agreement; (4) whether the
trial 
court 
committed 
reversible 
error 
by 
awarding 
the accrual
of monthly attorney fees while this action is pending on
appeal; and (5) whether the trial court's verdict was against
the great weight of the evidence.
A.  Filing Requirement of § 35-4-6, Ala. Code 1975
Section 35-4-6, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
1050161
This Court has previously enunciated the doctrine of
2
merger in a real-estate transaction as follow: "[A]bsent fraud
or mistake, when a contract to sell or convey land is
consummated by execution and delivery of a deed, that contract
becomes 'functus officio' and the deed becomes the sole
memorial of the parties' agreement."  Swanson v. Green, 572
So. 2d 1246, 1248 (Ala. 1990) (footnote omitted).
13
"No leasehold estate can be created for a longer
term than 99 years.  Leases for more than 20 years
shall be void for the excess over said period unless
the lease or a memorandum thereof is acknowledged or
approved as required by law in conveyances of real
estate and recorded within one year after execution
in the office of the judge of probate in the county
in which the property leased is situated."
Gilbert argues that, under the doctrine of merger,  the
2
amended lease agreement is "the one and only lease" and thus
is void because the amendment was not recorded in the
Jefferson County Probate Office until six and one-half years
after it was executed.  In support of his argument, Gilbert
cites Ex parte Achenbach, 783 So. 2d 4 (Ala. 2000). 
In Achenbach, the parties were the successor lessors and
successor lessee to a ground lease of certain property in
Madison County.  The original term of the ground lease was for
24 years and 9 months, and the ground lease included
irrevocable renewal rights for successive 5-year periods, up
to an aggregate of 99 years.  It was undisputed that the lease
1050161
14
was never recorded in the Madison County Probate Office.  This
Court, in reversing the judgment of the Court of Civil
Appeals, held that  according to the plain meaning of § 35-4-
6, Ala. Code 1975, "a lease that is made for more than 20
years and that is not properly recorded, is void for any
portion of that lease period that exceeds 20 years," 783 So.
2d at 7, and that "a party cannot be estopped from asserting
that a lease is void under [§ 35-4-6]."  783 So. 2d at 8.
Rogina, however, argues that the original lease agreement
and the amendment to the lease agreement must be construed as
a whole as one lease and that novation of the lease agreement
did not occur upon the execution of the amendment.  In support
of its argument, Rogina cites Byrd Cos. v. Birmingham Trust
National Bank, 482 So. 2d 247 (Ala. 1985).  In Byrd, the
parties entered into a lease agreement on August 1, 1963; the
term of the lease was 18 years with an option to renew for an
additional 8 years but only if the lessee gave the lessor
notice of its desire to renew the lease at least 6 months
before the expiration date of the lease.  The lease agreement
stated that "'the date of commencement to be evidenced, upon
its ascertainment, by the execution by the parties of an
1050161
15
agreement supplemental hereto setting forth such date.'" 482
So. 2d at 249.  On August 31, 1964, the parties executed an
amendment to the lease agreement that provided that the lease
term would begin on September 1, 1964, and end on August 31,
1982.  The lease agreement was recorded in the probate office
on September 1, 1964, and the amendment was recorded on
September 9, 1964.  On August 5, 1965, the parties executed an
instrument entitled "Modification and Ratification of Lease,"
which stated that the August 1, 1963, lease agreement was
currently in full force and effect and that the lease
agreement was modified so as to provide that the commencement
date of the original term of the lease and amendment was April
9, 1965.  On August 2, 1982, the lessee sent the lessor a
letter stating that it was exercising its option to renew the
lease and extend it for eight years; the lessor, however,
claimed that the term of the lease was never changed from the
August 31, 1964, amendment to the lease agreement.  
This Court held that all three documents –- the lease
agreement, the amended lease agreement, and the modification
and ratification of the lease –- constituted the lease, and,
taken as a whole, there was no ambiguity and nothing for this
1050161
16
Court to construe.  Thus, the Court concluded, the term of the
lease was for 18 years from April 9, 1965.  The lessee,
therefore, had given notice of its intent to exercise its
option to renew at least six months before the expiration of
the initial lease term.  
The lessor also argued that the lessee failed to record
the lease within one year as prescribed in § 35-4-6 because
the lease agreement was recorded 13 months after it was
executed.  This Court, however, disagreed, holding that the
lessee's interesse termini ripened into a leasehold estate of
a term for years on September 1, 1964, when the lease
commenced.  Thus, the lease was recorded only eight days after
the 
leasehold 
relationship 
began 
and 
well 
within 
the 
statutory
time frame for recording the lease.
Rogina is correct that the amendment to the lease
agreement relates back to the lease agreement executed on
January 24, 1978.  The amendment specifically refers to the
January 1978 lease agreement as the "base lease" and states
that "the parties hereto have agreed to modify the base lease
in connection with the rent to be paid thereunder in Paragraph
5 and the termination provisions in Paragraph 5(f), all as
1050161
17
hereinafter set forth."  As this Court noted in Byrd: "'If
instruments 
taken 
together 
constitute but 
one lease, they must
be construed as a whole.'"  482 So. 2d at 251 n. 3 (quoting 3
J. Grimes, Thompson on Real Property § 1052 (repl. ed. 1980)).
The lease agreement and the amendment thereto constitute only
one lease; thus they must be construed as such.  
Regarding statutory interpretation, it is well settled
that "[w]hen interpreting a statute, this Court will first
look to the plain meaning of the words as written by the
Legislature.  If the plain meaning of the language is
unambiguous, then 
there 
is 
no 
room for 
judicial 
construction."
Ex parte Achenbach, 783 So. 2d at 7 (citations omitted).
Rogina argues that § 35-4-6 is unambiguous in requiring the
recording of only a "lease or a memorandum thereof";
therefore, it asserts, this Court cannot construe the statute
to require the recording of an amendment to a lease.  We
agree.  Further, interpreting § 35-4-6 to require the
recording of amendments to leases would run afoul of the law
in Alabama that an oral contract or an oral amendment to a
contract relating to real property can be enforced under the
part-performance exception to the Statute of Frauds or in
1050161
18
instances of fraud, see Darby v. Johnson, 477 So. 2d 322 (Ala.
1985), and that a lease may be modified by oral agreement.
See Southland of Alabama, Inc. v. Julius E. Marx, Inc., 341
So. 2d 127 (Ala. 1976).  That being said, if a lease for a
term of less than 20 years is amended so as to give the lessee
an absolute and unconditional right to hold over for more than
20 years, then the lease and amendment or a memorandum thereof
must be recorded with the probate judge.  See Tennessee Coal,
I. & R. R. v. Pratt Consol. Coal Co., 156 Ala. 446, 47 So. 2d
337 (1908); but cf. Harco Drug Co. v. Notsla, Inc., 382 So. 2d
1, 3 (Ala. 1980).  
Because Rogina met the requirements of § 35-4-6 by filing
the lease with the Jefferson County Probate Office within one
year of its execution, the lease is valid for its entire term,
including the eight optional extensions of five years each.
Because we conclude that Rogina did not violate the
requirements of § 35-4-6, we pretermit consideration of
Rogina's arguments regarding judicial estoppel and res
judicata.
B.  Trial Court's Refusal to Disqualify Rogina's Counsel and
Their Law Firm
1050161
19
Gilbert argues that the trial court committed reversible
error by denying Gilbert's motion to disqualify Rogina's
attorney, Chervis Isom, as well as Isom's firm, Baker,
Donelson, 
Bearman, 
Caldwell 
& 
Berkowitz, 
P.C., 
from
representing Rogina because of statements made by Isom in a
letter and because of the possibility that he might be called
as a witness at trial.  In his brief, Gilbert states:  "It is
apparent from the above two quotes that the letter of Mr. Isom
contains material which is adverse to his client's interest."
(Gilbert's brief, p. 17.)  Although it is not exactly clear to
which passages Gilbert is referring, it appears to be the
following two quotes found in a section of his brief
addressing another argument:
"The ground lease does not require Mr. Gilbert
to provide a non-disturbance agreement to Rogina's
subtenants.  As a practical matter, this transaction
cannot go forward unless O'Henry's can obtain a non-
disturbance agreement from Mr. Gilbert.
"....
"Hence the net return to Rogina will be $1500.00
per month."
Besides stating that Isom made statements adverse to his
client's interests, Gilbert in his brief quotes Rule 3.7, Ala.
R. Prof. Cond., "Lawyer as Witness," and cites Harkins & Co.
1050161
The Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct replaced the
3
Alabama 
Code 
of 
Professional 
Responsibility, 
effective 
January
1, 1991.  Rule 3.7, Ala. R. Prof. Cond., covers the subject
formerly covered by DR 5-102.
20
v. Lewis, 535 So. 2d 104 (Ala. 1988), which construes  DR 5-
102, Alabama Code of Professional Responsibility,  and
3
LeaseAmerica Corp. v. Stewart, 19 Kan. App. 2d 740, 876 P.2d
184 (1994), which expounds upon Kansas's versions of Rule 3.7
and DR 5-102.  Gilbert's claim regarding Isom, however, is not
cognizable because we are unable to discern how Isom's words
are "adverse" to his client.
In his motion before the trial court seeking to
disqualify Isom, Gilbert appears to argue that the language he
quoted Isom's letter is contradictory to Rogina's claim in its
complaint that Gilbert breached the lease agreement with
Rogina by unreasonably withholding consent to the proposed
modifications to the subject property.  However, as Rogina
noted both in its response to Gilbert's motion and in its
brief before this Court, it never contended before the trial
court that Gilbert breached the lease agreement by refusing to
provide 
a 
nondisturbance 
agreement. 
 As 
Rogina 
notes, 
evidence
in the record indicates that O'Henry's was willing to continue
1050161
We further note that we find no substantiation of
4
Gilbert's argument that Isom's law firm should also have been
disqualified from representing Rogina.  Although DR 5-102 may
have contemplated the recusal of an entire firm in an instance
such as Gilbert alleged in his motion, no such requirement is
found in Rule 3.7, Ala. R. Prof. Cond.  Instead, Rule 3.7
provides that a lawyer may act as an advocate in a trial in
which another lawyer from his firm may be a witness except
where such representation would be adverse to a current or
former client of that lawyer.
21
with the transaction without a nondisturbance agreement.
Instead, Rogina argued that Gilbert breached the lease
agreement 
by 
unreasonably 
withholding 
consent 
for 
O'Henry's 
to
make the desired alterations to the structure that formerly
housed the Omelet Shoppe.  
In reviewing the ruling on Gilbert's motion to disqualify
Isom, we are unable to find any argument as to how Isom's
reference to a monthly net return of $1,500 was adverse to his
client's interests.  Considering the foregoing, we conclude
that the trial court properly denied Gilbert's motion to
disqualify Isom.4
C.  Gilbert's Remaining Arguments
As to Gilbert's remaining arguments, he fails to cite  a
single authority in support of those arguments.  Further, he
argues for the first time in his reply brief that this Court
1050161
22
should overrule its holding in Tedescki v. Rogina Investment
Corp., supra, and that Rogina had a duty to mitigate its
damages.  This Court will not consider those arguments.  
"'The law of Alabama provides that where no legal
authority is cited or argued, the effect is the same
as if no argument had been made.'  Bennett v.
Bennett, 506 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Ala. Civ. App.
1987) (emphasis added).  '[A]n argument may not be
raised, nor may an argument be supported by
citations to authority, for the first time in an
appellant's reply brief.'  Improved Benevolent &
Protective Order of Elks v. Moss, 855 So. 2d 1107,
1111 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003), abrogated on other
grounds, Ex parte Full Circle Distribution, L.L.C.,
883 So. 2d  638 (Ala. 2003).  Where an appellant
first cites authority for an argument in his reply
brief, it is as if the argument was first raised in
that reply brief, and it will not be considered."
Steele v. Rosenfeld, LLC, 936 So. 2d 488, 493 (Ala. 2005).
IV.  Conclusion
The trial court correctly applied the law in holding that
lease was not void by operation of law after 20 years and it
did not err in denying Gilbert's motion to disqualify Rogina's
attorney.  We therefore affirm the judgment.
AFFIRMED.
See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and Parker, JJ.,
concur.
Lyons and Murdock, JJ., concur in the result.
1050161
It just happened in this case that the lessee had
5
purportedly exercised several of its lease extensions at once,
thereby adding an additional block of greater than five years
to the end of the initial term of the lease and allowing the
trial court's interpretation room for operation that it
otherwise would not have had.  I also note that there is
language elsewhere in the lease agreement that arguably
contemplates the exercise of extensions, one at a time, at the
end of the primary term and of each successive extension term
of the lease agreement.
23
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
I disagree with the trial court's judgment in this case
in the following respects:
1.  A provision of the lease agreement states that
demolition or structural alterations require the written
consent of the lessor "[d]uring the last five (5) years
of the primary term hereof and any extension hereof."
(Emphasis added.) As I read it, the plain meaning of this
language is that the lessor's consent is required both
during the last 5 years of the initial, 25-year term of
the lease agreement and during any and all extensions of
that term -- not just during the last 5 years of a period
consisting of multiple extensions.   Moreover, the quoted
5
passage from the lease agreement must be read in pari
materia with the earlier provision of the lease agreement
1050161
24
stating that "Lessees, without the written consent of the
Lessors ..., shall, during the first twenty (20) years of
the primary term of this lease, have the right to tear
down or materially demolish any improvements made by the
Lessees on the leased property, or make any ...
alterations in such improvements."  (Emphasis added.)
2.  If, however, as the trial court held, the lease
agreement did not require the consent of the lessor
during the period in question, how could the lessor be
contractually liable for failing to give that consent?
Likewise, if the lessor's consent was not required by the
lease agreement, how could the failure to give that
consent provide the basis  for a claim of interference
with a contractual relationship?
3.  I question the authority of the trial court to
structure a monthly additur to its damages award in the
event of an appeal.
Because the concerns expressed in paragraphs 2 and 3 are
not argued to this Court with citations to legal authority, I
concur in the result.