Title: The People v. Jair Williams

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 39  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Jair Williams,
            Appellant.
Warren S. Landau, for appellant. 
Phyllis Mintz, for respondent.
JONES, J.:
Defendant was indicted for murder and other charges
stemming from a shooting at a Brooklyn dance club in which a
woman was killed and a man, with whom she was dancing, was
wounded.  The People theorized that the male victim was the
intended target and the female victim was accidentally killed by
a bullet which struck her after passing through him.  
At trial, the court submitted the following seven
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No. 39
counts to the jury:  (count 1) murder in the second degree
(depraved indifference murder as to female victim); (count 2)
murder in the second degree (intending to cause male victim's
death, defendant caused female victim's death); (count 3)
manslaughter in the first degree (intending to cause serious
physical injury to male victim, defendant caused female victim's
death); (count 4) manslaughter in the second degree (defendant
recklessly caused female victim's death); (count 5) attempted
(intentional) murder in the second degree (as to the male
victim); (count 6) assault in the first degree (defendant
intended to cause and caused serious physical injury to male
victim); and (count 7) criminal possession of a weapon in the
second degree.  Counts 1-4 relate to the female victim, while
counts 5 and 6 relate to the male victim.     
On April 30, 2002, the second day of deliberations, the
jury announced its verdict.  The jury acquitted defendant of both
second-degree murder counts (depraved indifference murder and
intentional murder on a transferred intent theory), but convicted
defendant of manslaughter in the first degree and attempted
intentional murder in the second degree.  The jury also acquitted
defendant of assault in the first degree and criminal possession
of a weapon in the second degree.  Without notifying the parties
of its intended response to the jury verdict, or of the
instructions it proposed to give to the jury, the court responded
to the jury's verdict.  Defendant did not object to the court's
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No. 39
not providing such notice.
The court explained to the jury that by its verdict
acquitting defendant of transferred-intent murder, it found that
defendant did not intend to kill the male victim; whereas, by the
jury's finding defendant guilty of attempted murder, it found
that defendant had the requisite intent to kill the male victim. 
The court further explained that by acquitting defendant of
first-degree assault, the jury found that defendant lacked the
intent to cause the male victim serious physical injury; whereas
the jury's guilty verdict on the first-degree manslaughter count
necessarily required a finding that defendant intended to cause
the male victim serious physical injury.
The court then advised the jury that it would not
accept the verdict at that time, explained the inconsistencies in
the verdict and the concept of transferred intent to the jury,
instructed the jury to reconsider and decide what the People had
proven regarding defendant's state of mind, and directed the jury
to resume deliberations.  After the jury exited, defense counsel
argued that the court's decision not to accept the verdict was a
violation of defendant's right to a fair trial.  In counsel's
view, the verdict "should stand."
After deliberating for about an hour and a half, the
jury sent a note to the court announcing it could not reach a
unanimous verdict.  Before bringing the jury back in, the court
stated to counsel it would give an Allen charge and instruct the
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No. 39
jury to resume deliberations.  Defense counsel mounted a general
objection to the proposed Allen charge, arguing the court should
only instruct the jury to continue its deliberations.  The court
disagreed and issued an Allen charge to the jury.  Defendant
raised no objection that the actual charge given was coercive.
On the third day of deliberations, the jury reached a
second verdict.  According to the verdict sheet, the jury
convicted defendant of transferred intent murder, attempted
second-degree murder, and second-degree criminal possession of a
weapon, but acquitted him of depraved indifference murder, first-
degree manslaughter, second-degree manslaughter, and first-degree
assault.  The court informed the jury that the verdict sheet was
not completed in accordance with its instructions and the
instructions on the verdict sheet.  The court stated, "I told
you, if you found the defendant guilty of Count 1 and Count 2
[murder counts] return no verdict on Count 3 and Count 4
[manslaughter counts] . . ., leave the space blank on that
verdict sheet."  After explaining the error to the jury, the
court returned the jurors to the jury room with a new verdict
sheet.  
Later that day, the jury returned its third (and final)
verdict, but the verdict sheet did not indicate a verdict for
count 1 (depraved indifference murder) and count 6 (first-degree
assault).  The court explained that the jury had to return a
verdict on counts 1 and 6 and directed that if it had actually
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No. 39
reached a verdict on those counts, the jury foreperson should
complete the verdict sheet "at this time."  After talking to some
of the other jurors, the jury foreperson completed the verdict
sheet in open court.  Specifically, the jury foreperson checked
"not guilty" on the two counts the jury overlooked.   
Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder (on a
transferred intent theory), second-degree attempted murder and
weapon possession.  He was sentenced to 25 years to life in
prison.  The Appellate Division affirmed, and a Judge of this
Court granted defendant leave to appeal.
On appeal, defendant argues he was denied his
constitutional right to due process, a fair trial, and the
effective assistance of counsel because the trial court (1)
contrary to CPL 310.30, did not afford defense counsel notice of
and the opportunity to discuss the court's proposed response to
the initial verdict before the court addressed the jury, (2)
improperly directed the jury foreperson to complete the verdict
sheet in open court and caused the jury to deliberate in public
(in violation of the settled principle requiring jurors to
deliberate only in privacy and outside the courtroom), (3) gave a
coercive Allen charge, and (4) signaled, through its supplemental
instructions given in response to the first defective verdict,
that defendant should be convicted of murder.  These arguments
are unavailing.
Defendant's primary contention is that the jury's
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No. 39
reporting of a verdict inconsistent with the trial court's
instructions was the functional equivalent of a jury request for
further instruction or information, and that, consequently,
defendant was entitled to notice and a chance to be heard
pursuant to CPL 310.30.1  Defendant further maintains that this
argument does not have to be preserved because, similar to the
problem contemplated under CPL 310.30, the alleged error goes to
the mode of proceedings.  For the following reasons, we disagree. 
First, defendant's argument disregards the plain language of CPL
310.30 and 310.50 (2), and would render CPL 310.50 (2)
superfluous.2  CPL 310.30 applies to specific "request[s]" by the
1 CPL 310.30 provides:
"At any time during its deliberation, the
jury may request the court for further
instruction or information with respect to
the law, with respect to the content or
substance of any trial evidence, or with
respect to any other matter pertinent to the
jury's consideration of the case.  Upon such
a request, the court must direct that the
jury be returned to the courtroom and, after
notice to both the people and counsel for the
defendant, and in the presence of the
defendant, must give such requested
information or instruction as the court deems
proper.  With the consent of the parties and
upon the request of the jury for further
instruction with respect to a statute, the
court may also give to the jury copies of the
text of any statute which, in its discretion,
the court deems proper."
2 CPL 310.50 (2) provides:
"If the jury renders a verdict which in form
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No. 39
jury "for further instruction or information" by the court in
response to a problem or concern identified by the jury; whereas
CPL 310.50 (2) applies when a jury "renders a verdict which in
form is not in accordance with the court's instructions or which
is otherwise legally defective."  That is, CPL 310.50 (2)
addresses problems in a verdict of which the jury is necessarily
unaware.  Here, the trial court's explanation to the jury was a
response to a verdict that was inconsistent with the court's
instructions, not a response to a request for further instruction
or information.  Thus, the court's response was governed by CPL
310.50 (2), not section 310.30.
Second, while CPL 310.30 imposes upon the court the
specific statutory duty to give the parties notice of the jury's
request for further instruction or information before the court
is not in accordance with the court's
instructions or which is otherwise legally
defective, the court must explain the defect
or error and must direct the jury to
reconsider such verdict, to resume its
deliberation for such purpose, and to render
a proper verdict.  If the jury persists in
rendering a defective or improper verdict,
the court may in its discretion either order
that the verdict in its entirety as to any
defendant be recorded as an acquittal, or
discharge the jury and authorize the people
to retry the indictment or a specified count
or counts thereof as to such defendant;
provided that if it is clear that the jury
intended to find a defendant not guilty upon
any particular count, the court must order
that the verdict be recorded as an acquittal
of such defendant upon such count."
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No. 39
responds to the request (see People v O'Rama, 78 NY2d 270, 276-
277 [1991] [Court addressed the scope of the CPL 310.30's notice
requirement]), CPL 310.50 (2) does not.  Section 310.50 (2) only
provides that where a jury returns an inconsistent or legally
defective verdict, "the court must explain the defect or error
and must direct the jury to reconsider such verdict, to resume
its deliberation for such purpose, and to render a proper
verdict."  The trial court here was not obligated to discuss with
counsel its proposed explanation in response to the initial
verdict prior to the court's addressing the jury.  
Third, the Legislature deliberately differentiated
between what is required of the court pursuant to CPL 310.30 and
CPL 310.50 (2), respectively.  By not including (or
incorporating) CPL 310.30's notice requirement within the text of
CPL 310.50 (2), the Legislature made a conscious choice that the
notice requirement shall apply only to the court's response to a
jury's request for further instruction or information, and not to
the court's response to a jury's rendition of an inconsistent or
defective verdict.  
Defendant also claims that the trial court improperly
directed the jury foreperson to complete the verdict sheet in
open court and caused the jury to deliberate in public.  There is
nothing in the record suggesting that the court's direction
called for or encouraged deliberations among the jurors. 
Further, the record does not show that any public deliberations
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No. 39
in fact occurred.  What the record shows is that there was a
short (5-15 seconds) discussion among jurors after the court
asked the foreperson to complete a verdict sheet that had not
been filled out as to counts for which defendant was ultimately
acquitted; as such, the conversation among the jurors was
harmless.
In any event, the trial court, in directing the jury
foreperson to indicate a verdict as to counts 1 and 6, asked that
the foreperson perform what amounts to a ministerial (or
clerical) act, since CPL 310.50 (3) converts any incomplete
counts into acquittals.  We hold that the performance of the
instant ministerial act was not violative of the rule requiring
jurors to deliberate in secret outside the courtroom.  
Defendant's remaining contentions are not preserved for
appellate review.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
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Order affirmed. Opinion by Judge Jones. Chief Judge Lippman and
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith and Pigott concur.
Decided March 31, 2011
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