Title: MARRIAGE OF NENEMAN

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 84-503 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1985 IN RE THE MAR.RIAGE OF ADRIENNE Petitioner, Counter-Respondent and Appellant, and JOHN F. NENEJ%Ml, Respondent, Counter-Petitioner and Respondent. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade, The Honorable Thomas McKittrick, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Hartelius 6 Ferguson; Channing ,T. Hartelius, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent : Lawrence Anderson, Great Falls, Montana Submitted on Briefs: April 18, 1985 Decided: July 25, 1985 Filed: "' " , +&I$$ Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. The Cascade County D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d a d e f a u l t judgment i n f a v o r o f t h e husband on August 31, 1984. The wife appeals. W e r e v e r s e . The i s s u e s on appeal a r e : 1. Should t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s e n t r y o f d e f a u l t judg- ment be s e t a s i d e ? 2 . Was t h e motion t o set a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment timely f i l e d w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t Court? 3. Was t h e n o t i c e o f appeal t o t h i s Court t i m e l y f i l e d ? John and Adrienne Neneman w e r e married i n 1953. The Cascade County D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d a d i s s o l u t i o n d e c r e e i n August 1981, r e s e r v i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e f o r f u r t h e r proceedings. T r i a l on t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f prop- e r t y was set f o r September 11, 1984. The w i f e ' s second a t t o r n e y p e t i t i o n e d t h e c o u r t t o withdraw and t h e wife a t t e n d e d t h e h e a r i n g on t h e p e t i t i o n . The c o u r t granted counsel permission t o withdraw on J u l y 2 3 , 1984, f i x e d a September 11 hearing d a t e and advised t h e w i f e t o g e t a lawyer. The c o u r t s t a t e d : " [TI h a t ' s a long t i m e t o have t h e s e c a s e s pending. And I t h i n k what I would do, i f I were i n your p o s i t i o n , I would s t a r t immediately t o knock on doors and f i n d y o u r s e l f a lawyer. And you can t e l l t h a t lawyer w e do have a September 11th d a t e - - - - -- and you have a lawyer by then. "Okay. J u s t f o r t h e r e c o r d , --- t h a t d a t e we have h e r e t o f o r e set i s a f i r m d a t e and I - - - - - - - e x ~ e c t a l l ~ a r t i e s t o be r e a d ~ t o wroceed I - - - - - * on September 11." (emphasis added) - 7 A f t e r t h e h e a r i n g b u t on t h a t same day, opposing counsel hand d e l i v e r e d a n o t i c e t o t h e w i f e r e q u i r i n g h e r t o a p p o i n t another a t t o r n e y . That n o t i c e s t a t e d : "TO: THE A B O V E - N A M E D PETITIONER and COUNTER-RESPONDENT ADRIENNE M. N E N E M A N "PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS of M.C.A. S37-61-405, the Respondent and Counter-Petitioner herewith gives you notice to appoint other counsel in this cause or appear in person in this cause on or before August 6, 1984. "DATED this 23 day of July, 1984." The husband filed a motion for default judgment, and on August 14, 1984, the District Court granted the motion with- out a hearing. The court ordered the husband's counsel to prepare a judgment to be entered. The husband's application for entry of default judgment stated in pertinent part: "1. The . . . [wife's] counsel . . . was permitted to withdraw as counsel for Petitioner on July 23, 1984. "2. On July 23, 1984, pursuant to the provisions of MCA S37-61-405, the Respondent and Counter-Petitioner [hus- band] gave the Petitioner and Counter-Respondent [wife] notice to appoint other counsel in this cause or appear in person in this cause on or before August 6, 1984. "3. Th.e . . . [wife] has failed to aw~oint counsel in this cause and has L L - - otherwise failed to appear in person in this cause on or bFfore August 6, 1984 to advise the Court that she intended to proceed without counsel in this cause." (emphasis added) No copy of this application was mailed to the wife, and no response was filed on her behalf. The court entered judgment based upon the husband's application. The notice of entry of judgment was filed and mailed to the parties on August 31, 1984. Fourteen days later on September 14, the wife filed a motion to set aside the de- fault judgment. A hearing was s ~ t for September 17 and then reset for October 11, 1984. At the request of the husband's counsel, the court ordered the hearing continued until Novem- ber 26, 1984. The wife filed a notice of appeal to this Court on October 24, 1984. Should t h e District C o u r t ' s e n t r y of d e f a u l t judgment be set a s i d e ? Section 37-61-405, MCA s t a t e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "When an a t t o r n e y . . . c e a s e s t o a c t a s such, a p a r t y t o an a c t i o n f o r whom he was a c t i n g a s a t t o r n e y must, b e f o r e any f u r t h e r proceedings a r e had a g a i n s t him, be required by t h e adverse p a r t y , by w r i t t e n n o t i c e , t o appoint a n o t h e r a t t o r - ney o r appear i n person." The purpose of t h i s s t a t u t e i s t o n o t i f y an unrepresented p a r t y t h a t he o r she w i l l be expected t o appear a t t h e n e x t scheduled h e a r i n g , e i t h e r i n person o r r e p r e s e n t e d by coun- sel. T h i s Court has s t a t e d : " W e do n o t b e l i e v e a c t u a l n o t i c e must be p e r s o n a l l y served on t h e unrepresented p a r t y opponent. But w e do hold t h e represented p a r t y must make a p o s i t i v e showing he has attempted t o communicate adequate n o t i c e t o t h e unrepresented p a r t y . I f t h e represented p a r t y can show he made a good-faith e f f o r t t o n o t i f y t h e unrepresented p a r t y and a d v i s e him he should s u b s t i t u t e counsel o r appear i n person, and t h e n o t i c e a l s o sets f o r t h - t h e d a t e o f t h e next hearing o r a c t i o n i n t h e m a t t e r pending, then t h e y e p r e s e n t a p a r t y w i l l be deemed t o have s a t i s f i e d t h e r e q u i s i t e s o f s e c t i o n 93-2104, R.C.M. 1947 [now 5 37-61-405, M C A ] ." Audit S e r v i c e s v. Kraus Const., Inc. (Mont. 1 9 8 0 ) , 615 P.2d 183, 189, 37 St.Rep. 1225, 1232-33, quoting McPartlin v. Fransen (1978), 178 Mont. 178, 185, 582 P.2d 1255, 1259 (emphasis added) . Although t h e husband's n o t i c e t o t h e w i f e t o a p p o i n t counsel required h e r t o appear on August 6, 1984, no h e a r i n g o r a c t i o n i n t h e m a t t e r was scheduled t o t a k e p l a c e u n t i l t r i a l on September 11, 1984. Opposing c o u n s e l ' s n o t i c e should have s t a t e d t h a t t h e wife would be expected t o appear on September 11, 1984 with o r without counsel. A 1 though t h e husband 's p e t i t i o n f o r d e f a u l t judgment a c c u r a t e l y s t a t e d t h a t t h e w i f e had f a i l e d t o appear i n person o r t o a p p o i n t counsel on o r b e f o r e August 6, 1984, t h a t d a t e had no s i g n i f i c a n c e . Rule 55, M.R.Civ.P. governs d e f a u l t judgments. Rule 5 5 ( b ) ( 2 ) , M.R.Civ.P. s e t s o u t t h e c r i t e r i a f o r n o t i c e and o p p o r t u n i t y t o be heard and s t a t e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : ". . . I f t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom d e f a u l t judgment i s sought has appeared i n t h e a c t i o n , he ( o r , i f appearing by represen- t a t i v e , h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ) s h a l l be served w i t h w r i t t e n n o t i c e o f t h e a p p l i - c a t i o n f o r judgment a t l e a s t 3 days p r i o r t o t h e h e a r i n g on such a p p l i c a t i o n . " The husband a s s e r t s t h a t t h e w i f e ' s f a i l u r e t o appear on August 6 , 1984, negated h e r r i g h t t o receive w r i t t e n n o t i c e o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r d e f a u l t judgment. T h i s Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y held t h a t Rule 55 (b) (2) , M.R.Civ.P. r e q u i r e s s e r v i c e o f a w r i t t e n n o t i c e o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r judgment by d e f a u l t upon t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom t h e judgment i s sought i f he has appeared i n t h e a c t i o n . - - - - - "When t h e . . . [ p a r t y a g a i n s t whom d e f a u l t judgment i s sought] has appeared e i t h e r i n person o r by counsel, a d d i t i o n a l d u t i e s then devolve upon t h e p a r t y e n t i t l e d t o t h e judgment." Peterson v. Montana Bank o f Bozeman, N.A. (Mont. 1984), 687 P.2d 673, 677, 41 The wife f i r s t appeared i n t h i s a c t i o n when she f i l e d t h e p e t i t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n o f marriage i n 1980. Since t h e wife h a s appeared, Rule 5 5 ( b ) ( 2 ) , M.R.Civ.P. r e q u i r e s 3 days w r i t t e n n o t i c e o f t h e husband's motion f o r d e f a u l t judgment. The f a i l u r e o f t h e husband t o s e r v e t h e r e q u i s i t e n o t i c e renders t h e o r d e r o f d e f a u l t judgment premature and voidable. See Sowerwine v . Sowerwine (1965), 145 Mont. 81, 85, 399 P.2d Rule 55 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P. allows t h e c o u r t f o r good cause shown t o "set a s i d e an e n t r y of d e f a u l t and, i f a judgment by d e f a u l t has been e n t e r e d , . . . [ t o ] set it a s i d e i n accordance with Rule 60 (b) ." Rule 6 0 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P. i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t s t a t e s : "On motion . . . t h e c o u r t may r e l i e v e a p a r t y . . . from a f i n a l judgment, o r d e r , o r proceeding f o r t h e following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, s u r p r i s e , o r excusable n e g l e c t ; . . . (6) any o t h e r reason j u s t i f y i n g r e l i e f from t h e opera- t i o n of t h e judgment." It i s a c l o s e q u e s t i o n whether t h e f a c t s a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a f i n d i n g of mistake, inadvertence o r s u r p r i s e under Rule 60 (b) (1) , M.R.Civ.P. F J e t h e r e f o r e l i m i t o u r holding t o Rule 6 0 ( b ) ( 6 ) , M.R.Civ.P. Appellant argues t h a t t h e e n t r y o f a voidab1.e judgment should i n i t s e l f be s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y r e l i e f from t h e d e f a u l t judgment. Although some c a s e s conclude t h a t a f a i l - u r e t o g i v e n o t i c e t o t h e d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y j u s t i f i e s a vaca- t i o n o f t h e d e f a u l t judgment, t h e p r e f e r a b l e view i s t h a t lack of n o t i c e may be t r e a t e d a s an a d d i t i o n a l o r a l t e r n a t i v e ground f o r e x e r c i s i n g d i s c r e t i o n t o set a s i d e a d e f a u l t judgment. "The p r e f e r a b l e view i s t h a t t h e l a c k o f n o t i c e does n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y e n t i t l e t h e d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y t o r e l i e f , b u t i s merely one c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o be weighed by t h e c o u r t i n e x e r c i s i n g i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n determining a Rule 55 ( c ) motion. " 10 C. Wright, A. M i l l e r & M. Kane, Federal P r a c t i c e and Procedure 5 2695, a t 509 (2d ed. 1 9 8 3 ) . W e hold that. lack o f n o t i c e does not a u t o m a t i c a l l y e n t i t l e a p a r t y t o r e l i e f , b u t i s a c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o be weighed by t h e c o u r t i n e x e r c i s i n g i t s d i s c r e t i o n . This view is c o n s i s t e n t with o u r holdings i n S i k o r s k i & Sons, Inc. v. S i k o r s k i (1973), 162 Mont. 442, 512 P.2d 1147, and Williams v. Superior Homes, Inc. (1966), 148 Mont. 38, 417 P.2d 92. The f a c t s h e r e show a r e q u e s t t o set a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment within 1 4 days o f e n t r y . I n a d d i t i o n , w e have t h e s e t t i n g o f a f i r m t r i a l d a t e o f September 11 w i t h a d i r e c t admonition by t h e judge t o t h e p a r t y h e r s e l f t h a t s h e should have a lawyer by t h a t d a t e . Taking a l l o f t h e f a c t s i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n , w e conclude t h a t t h e circumstances o f t h i s c a s e j u s t i f y s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment under Rule 60 (b) ( 6 ) , M.R.Civ.P. I1 Was t h e motion t o set a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment t i m e l y f i l e d w i t h t h e District Court? Under Rule 60 (b) (6) , M.R.Civ.P., t h e w i f e ' s motion t o set a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment must be made w i t h i n a reason- a b l e t i m e . Notice o f e n t r y of d e f a u l t judgment was mailed on August 31, 1984. On September 1 4 , 1984, t h e w i f e f i l e d h e r motion t o set a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment. C l e a r l y t h i s i s w i t h i n a reasonable t i m e a s contemplated i n t h e r u l e . FJe conclude t h a t t h e motion t o s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment was t i m e l y f i l e d . 111 Was t h e n o t i c e o f appeal t o t h i s Court t i m e l y f i l e d ? Under Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P., a p a r t y has 30 days t o f i l e a n o t i c e o f appeal a f t e r a motion t o set a s i d e a d e f a u l t judgment i s denied o r a f t e r d e n i a l by o p e r a t i o n o f law. A s noted above, t h e motion t o set a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment was f i l e d o n September 1 4 , 1984, under Rules 5 5 ( c ) & 60 (b) , M.R.Civ.P. Rule 60 (c) , M.R.Civ.P. provides t h a t motions f i l e d pursuant t o Rule 60 (b) " s h a l l be heard and determined w i t h i n t h e t i m e s provided by Rule 59 . . ." Rule 59 (d) , M.R.Civ.P. r e q u i r e s t h a t a h e a r i n g on t h e motion s h a l l be had w i t h i n 10 days a f t e r it has been served. H e r e t h e wife f i l e d t h e motion on September 1 4 and t h e hear- i n g was scheduled f o r September 17, w e l l w i t h i n t h e 10-day l i m i t . Rule 5 9 ( d ) a l s o g i v e s t h e c o u r t t h e power to continue t h e h e a r i n g f o r n o t t o exceed 30 days. Here t h e c o u r t i n i t i a l l y c o n t i n u e d t h e h e a r i n g from September 17 t o O c t o b e r 11 which was w i t h i n t h e 30-day l i m i t . However, t h e c o u r t t h e n c o n t i n u e d t h e h e a r i n g beyond t h e 30-day l i m i t t o Novem- b e r 26. A s a r e s u l t , t h e w i f e ' s motion t o v a c a t e t h e d e f a u l t judgment was deemed d e n i e d on O c t o b e r 17, 1984. S e e W a l l i n d e r 17. L a g e r q u i s t (Mont. 1 9 8 2 ) , 653 P.2d 840, 39 S t - R e p . 2063. The w i f e f i l e d h e r n o t i c e o f a p p e a l on O c t o b e r 2 4 , 1984, w e l l w i t h i n t h e 30-day p e r i o d u n d e r Rule 5 , M.R.App.Civ.P. W e i n v i t e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e c h a n g e s made i n Rule 59 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P., which became e f f e c t i v e O c t o b e r 9 , 1984. W e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l was t i m e l y f i l e d . W e set a s i d e t h e o r d e r o f d e f a u l t judgment and remand t h e c a u s e t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s . W e c o n c u r : /