Title: San Diegans for Open Government v. Public Facilities Financing Authority of the City of San Diego

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
PUBLIC FACILITIES FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE 
CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S245996 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division One 
D069751 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
37-2015-00016536-CU-MC-CTL 
 
 
December 26, 2019 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, and Groban concurred.  
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye filed a concurring and dissenting 
opinion. 
 
1 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC 
FACILITIES FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF 
SAN DIEGO 
S245996 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
A citizens’ taxpayer organization sued to invalidate 
certain contracts allegedly made in violation of Government 
Code section 1090.  The question is whether Government Code 
section 1092 gives plaintiff the statutory standing to do so.  We 
hold that section 10921 does not provide plaintiff a private right 
of action because it was not a party to the contracts.  The Court 
of Appeal’s judgment to the contrary is reversed.  The matter is 
remanded for further proceedings.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
Under section 1090, government officials and employees 
cannot be financially interested in any contract made by them 
in their official capacity or by any body of which they are a 
member.  The statute codifies the long-standing common law 
rule prohibiting public officials from having personal financial 
interests in contracts they form in their official capacities.  
(Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1072.)  Both the 
common law and section 1090 “recognize ‘[t]he truism that a 
person cannot serve two masters simultaneously.’ ”  (Lexin, at p. 
1073, quoting Thomson v. Call (1985) 38 Cal.3d 633, 637 
                                        
1  
All 
unspecified 
statutory 
references 
are 
to 
the 
Government Code.   
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
(Thomson); see also San Diego v. S. D. & L. A. R. R. Co. (1872) 
44 Cal. 106, 113.)  Section 1090 has a broad reach, prohibiting 
both direct and indirect financial interests in public contracts.  
(See Moody v. Shuffleton (1928) 203 Cal. 100, 103-105.)  The 
penalty for a violation is substantial:  The interested official 
must disgorge any profits earned, and may not recover any 
consideration paid, under the contract.  (Thomson, at pp. 646-
652.)   
Section 1092 provides that any contract made in violation 
of section 1090 “may be avoided at the instance of any party 
except the officer interested therein.”  (§ 1092, subd. (a).)  The 
dispute here revolves around the meaning of the phrase “any 
party.”  Some background will provide context.   
In 2007, the City of San Diego issued bonds to finance the 
construction of Petco Park.  In 2015, the City sought to refinance 
the remaining debt on those bonds.  It adopted an ordinance and 
its Public Facilities Financing Authority (PFFA) passed a 
resolution authorizing the issuance of new bonds to accomplish 
the refinancing.2  Shortly thereafter, San Diegans for Open 
Government (plaintiff) sued the City and PFFA (collectively, 
defendants), asserting that aspects of the refinancing 
transaction violated section 1090 because at least one member 
of the financing team, which included both city employees and 
private organizations, had a financial “interest in one or more 
contracts for the sale of the 2015 Bonds.”  Plaintiff claimed it 
was seeking relief “under Code of Civil Procedure Sections 860 
                                        
2  
PFFA is a joint powers authority that was originally 
established by the City and its redevelopment agency to assist 
in the financing of public capital improvements.   
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
et seq. and 1060 et seq.”  The complaint asserted a single cause 
of action, alleging that the bond issuance violated provisions of 
the California Constitution, the City’s charter and municipal 
code, and section 1090.  Plaintiff sought a judgment declaring 
the bond transaction’s approval unlawful and an injunction 
prohibiting defendants from acting to further the bond issuance.   
Plaintiff ultimately agreed to entry of judgment as to all 
allegations except the section 1090 violation.  Defendants then 
argued that plaintiff lacked standing as to that issue, citing San 
Bernardino County v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 
679 (San Bernardino).  Plaintiff argued it had standing under 
section 1092 and Code of Civil Procedure section 526a.3  Plaintiff 
also mentioned it had timely filed its action under the validation 
statutes.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 860 et seq.)  The trial court ruled 
for defendants, concluding that section 1092 only confers 
standing on the parties to a challenged contract, and that 
plaintiff also lacked standing under Code of Civil Procedure 
section 526a.  The remaining action was dismissed.   
                                        
3  
Code of Civil Procedure section 526a permits certain 
individuals and corporations to sue “to obtain a judgment, 
restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, 
or injury to” a local agency’s funds or property.  (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 526a, subd. (a); see also Weatherford v. City of San Rafael 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1245 (Weatherford).)  The “primary 
purpose” of the statute “is to ‘enable a large body of the citizenry 
to challenge governmental action which would otherwise go 
unchallenged 
in 
the 
courts 
because 
of 
the 
standing 
requirement.’ [Citation.]”  (Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 
267-268.)   
 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
Plaintiff appealed.  In the Court of Appeal, the parties 
agreed that Code of Civil Procedure section 863 did not provide 
plaintiff an independent right of action to assert a section 1090 
violation.4  As to whether plaintiff could proceed under Code of 
Civil Procedure section 526a, plaintiff argued that it could, 
while defendants argued subdivision (b) of that provision barred 
plaintiff’s claims for relief.5   
The Court of Appeal held that the term “party” in section 
1092 means “any litigant with an interest in the subject contract 
sufficient to support standing,” and that plaintiff possessed such 
an interest.  (San Diegans for Open Government v. Public 
Facilities Financing Authority of City of San Diego (2017) 16 
Cal.App.5th 1273, 1284 (San Diegans).)  Because it found 
plaintiff could pursue its claim under section 1092, it did not 
decide whether plaintiff could proceed under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 526a.  (San Diegans, at p. 1285, fn. 4.) 
                                        
4  
The parties presented no argument here on whether or 
how Code of Civil Procedure section 863 might apply to this 
action.  We express no opinion on the matter.   
5  
Subdivision (b) of Code of Civil Procedure section 526a 
prohibits the granting of an injunction “restraining the offering 
for sale, sale, or issuance of any municipal bonds” for public 
improvements or 
facilities. 
 
Defendants 
asserted 
this 
subdivision barred plaintiff from proceeding under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 526a because, if plaintiff obtained the relief it 
sought, the effect would be to enjoin the bond issuance.   
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
General Rules Regarding Standing and Causes of 
Action 
“Unlike the federal Constitution, our state Constitution 
has no case or controversy requirement imposing an 
independent jurisdictional limitation on our standing doctrine.”  
(Weatherford, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1247-1248.)  Typically, to 
have standing, a plaintiff must plead an actual justiciable 
controversy and have some “special interest to be served or some 
particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the 
interest held in common with the public at large.”  (Carsten v. 
Psychology Examining Com. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 793, 796.)  This 
requirement has been relaxed in some contexts.  For example, 
California courts have consistently held that taxpayers have 
standing to prevent illegal conduct by public officials despite the 
lack of a special interest or right distinct from that belonging to 
the general public.  (See e.g., Weatherford, at p. 1248; Crowe v. 
Boyle (1920) 184 Cal. 117, 152; Mock v. City of Santa Rosa (1899) 
126 Cal. 330, 345.)   
Though standing requirements are construed more 
liberally in litigation enforcing public rights, a plaintiff suing 
under a particular statute still must show that it is among those 
with “a statutory right to relief.”  (Weatherford, supra, 2 Cal.5th 
at p. 1248.)  Here, the question is whether plaintiff has a cause 
of action creating a right to relief under section 1092.  “Whether 
a statute gives rise to a private right of action is a question of 
legislative intent.”  (County of San Diego v. State of California 
(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 609; see also Boorstein v. CBS 
Interactive, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 456, 466.)  The intent 
may be express or implied (Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc. 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 592, 597 (Lu)), but either way “the Legislature 
must clearly manifest an intent to create a private cause of 
action under [the] statute” (id. at p. 601, fn. 6, citing Moradi-
Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 
295).  The burden of persuasion is with the party claiming a 
statutory right to sue.  (Lu, at p. 601.)   
B. 
Plaintiff Cannot Sue Under Section 1092 
Section 1092 provides in relevant part that “[e]very 
contract made in violation of any of the provisions of Section 
1090 may be avoided at the instance of any party except the 
officer interested therein.”  (§ 1092, subd. (a).)  Defendants argue 
the phrase “any party” includes only parties to the challenged 
contract.  Plaintiff argues the phrase applies more broadly to 
embrace other interested persons and organizations like itself.   
The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff.  It reasoned 
that the “important policy embodied in section 1090 . . . will not 
be vindicated if public officials believe section 1090’s substantive 
provisions may only be enforced by the very public officials or 
public entities who have violated the statute’s provisions.”  (San 
Diegans, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1283-1284.)  “[A] public 
official’s duty to avoid even temptation cannot be advanced by 
adopting a rule which limits civil enforcement to that public 
official or public entities controlled by the official.”  (Id. at p. 
1284.)  The court also found that the “weight of authority” stood 
for the proposition that “standing to assert section 1090 claims 
goes beyond the parties to a public contract.”  (Ibid.)6  Based on 
                                        
6  
In support of this conclusion, the Court of Appeal cited 
Thomson, supra, 38 Cal.3d 633, Stigall v. City of Taft (1962) 58 
 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
“that authority and the important and strict policy embodied in 
section 1090,” the court interpreted “section 1092’s reference to 
‘any party’ to include any litigant with an interest in the subject 
contract sufficient to support standing.”  (San Diegans, at p. 
1284.)  This would include, according to the court, parties with 
interests sufficient to support standing under Code of Civil 
Procedure sections 526a and 863.  (San Diegans, at p. 1285.)   
We read the statute differently.  “We begin with the text 
of the statute as the best indicator of legislative intent.”  (Tonya 
M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 844.)  The statute 
refers to a “contract made in violation” of section 1090, then 
provides that any such contract “may be avoided by any party 
except the officer interested therein.”  (§ 1092, subd. (a).)  The 
most natural reading of this language is that the phrase “any 
party” refers back to the contract; that is, any party to the 
contract can sue to avoid it.  The use of the word avoid in section 
1092 also supports this construction.  Typically, we speak of a 
party to a contract avoiding its legal obligations thereunder.  
(See e.g., Rest.2d Contracts, § 7 [“[a] voidable contract is one 
where one or more parties have the power . . . to avoid the legal 
relations created by the contract”].)  Indeed, the Restatement 
Second of Contracts notes that “[a]voidance is often referred to 
as ‘disaffirmance.’ ”  (Rest.2d Contracts, § 7, com. b, p. 20.)  A 
                                        
Cal.2d 565 (Stigall), California Taxpayers Action Network v. 
Taber Construction, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 115 (California 
Taxpayers), McGee v. Balfour Beatty Construction, LLC (2016) 
247 Cal.App.4th 235 (McGee), Davis v. Fresno Unified School 
Dist. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 261 (Davis), Gilbane Building Co. 
v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1527 (Gilbane), 
Finnegan v. Schrader (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 572 (Finnegan), 
and Terry v. Bender (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 198 (Terry). 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
non-party does not possess the power to affirm or disaffirm a 
contract.  (Ibid. [“[u]sually the power to avoid is confined to one 
party to the contract, but [under certain circumstances] the 
contract may be voidable by either one of the parties”].)   
This conclusion finds further support in provisions of the 
Civil Code governing the formation and interpretation of 
contracts.  (See Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. 
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 1143, 1156 [reviewing the “Legislature’s use 
of the words ‘marital status’ ” in the Family and Probate Codes 
to determine the meaning of that word in a Government Code 
provision]; see also Pesce v. Dept. Alcoholic Bev. Control (1958) 
51 Cal.2d 310, 312; Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians 
v. Brown (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1428.)  Civil Code section 
1559, for example, provides that a “contract, made expressly for 
the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time 
before the parties thereto rescind it.”  (Italics added.)  In this 
provision, the Legislature uses the term “party” to refer to a 
contractual party,7 as distinguished from a “person,” who is not 
a contractual party.8  The careful usage of these terms in the 
                                        
7  
See also Civil Code sections 1558 [“[i]t is essential to the 
validity of a contract . . . that the parties should exist [and] that 
it should be possible to identify them,” italics added]; 1636 [“[a] 
contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual 
intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting,” 
italics added]; 1689, subd. (a) [“[a] contract may be rescinded if 
all the parties thereto consent,” italics added].   
8  
See also Civil Code sections 1556 [“[a]ll persons are 
capable of contracting, except minors, persons of unsound mind, 
and persons deprived of civil rights,” italics added]; 1586 [“[a] 
proposal may be revoked at any time before its acceptance is 
 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
Civil Code indicates that, when the Legislature uses the term 
“party” in a statute referencing a contract, it typically means a 
party to that contract.   
The San Bernardino court construed section 1092 in this 
fashion.  There, two taxpayer groups attempted to rely on 
section 1092 and Code of Civil Procedure section 526a to avoid 
a settlement agreement between a county and a partnership 
after a supervisor who voted in support pled guilty to accepting 
bribes.  (San Bernardino, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 683.)  The 
trial court overruled the defendants’ demurrer, which argued 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing.  (Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal 
reversed.  Rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that they were 
entitled to sue under section 1092, the court reasoned that 
nothing in the statute’s plain language “grants nonparties to the 
contract . . . the right to sue on behalf of a public entity that may 
bring a claim as provided in section 1092.”  (San Bernardino, at 
p. 684.)  Indeed, “the Legislature’s choice of the word ‘party’ in 
section 1092—as opposed to, say, ‘person’—suggests the 
Legislature intended only parties to the contract at issue 
normally to have the right to sue to avoid contracts made in 
violation of section 1090.”  (Ibid.)   
Plaintiff argues the term “party” in section 1092 should be 
read to include persons who are not parties to the challenged 
contract.  Plaintiff argues section 1092’s exception, which 
prohibits “the officer interested therein” from suing to avoid a 
                                        
communicated to the proposer, but not afterwards,” italics 
added]; 1670.7 [declaring void any contract that “purports to 
allow a deduction from a person’s wages” for emigration and 
transportation costs, italics added]. 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
contract (§ 1092, subd. (a)), supports its construction.  Because 
the agency, not the officer, would normally be the party to the 
contract, there would have been no reason according to plaintiff 
for the Legislature to create this exception unless the term 
“party” includes those who are not parties to the contract.   
This argument is easily rejected.  To be sure, on the 
government’s side, the public agency typically would be the 
contractual party.  But the financially interested officer could of 
course be one of the other parties to a challenged contract.  In 
County of Shasta v. Moody (1928) 90 Cal.App. 519, for example, 
the defendant owned a printing business and was also a county 
supervisor.  While the defendant held that public office, “he did 
printing, advertising, job work and sold supplies to . . . various 
county officials of the county of Shasta, including the board of 
supervisors,” and was paid for that work.  (Moody, at p. 520.)  In 
other words, the county was one party to the contract that 
allegedly violated section 1090, and the financially interested 
officer was the other party to that contract.  (See also Berka v. 
Woodward (1899) 125 Cal. 119, 121.)  The exception prohibiting 
suit by an interested officer would prevent that officer from 
suing on his or her own behalf, as a contractual party, to avoid 
the contract.  Thus, the phrase “any party” need not be read to 
include nonparties in order for that exception to make sense.   
Plaintiff also argues the term “party” could be read to 
include a party to litigation concerning the contract.  Plaintiff 
points out that, in the article of the Government Code in which 
sections 1090 and 1092 are found,9 the word “party” is followed 
                                        
9  
Sections 1090 and 1092 are in article 4 of chapter 1 of 
division 4 of title 1 of the Government Code.   
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
by the qualifier “to any proceeding” on one occasion (§ 1091.4, 
subd. (b)) and by the qualifier “to litigation” on another (§ 1091, 
subd. (b)(15)).  Plaintiff urges that the use of these qualifiers 
shows the term “party” has a broader meaning in this context 
and includes persons other than the contractual parties.10   
These textual arguments fall short.  As mentioned, the 
sentence in which the phrase “any party” appears begins by 
referencing a “contract made in violation” of section 1090.  
(§ 1092, subd. (a).)  The word “party” may not be directly 
adjacent to the qualifiers set out above, but it is most natural to 
read that word as referring back to the contract mentioned at 
the beginning of the sentence.  Indeed, the Legislature may have 
thought it unnecessary to qualify the term “party” in section 
1092, subdivision (a), because that subdivision already 
references a contract made in violation of section 1090.  To add 
the qualifier “contracting” to the phrase “any party” in section 
1092 arguably would have been redundant.   
In any event, the ultimate question is whether the 
Legislature has clearly manifested an intent to create a private 
right of action.  (Lu, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 601, fn. 6.)  If the 
                                        
10  
The concurring and dissenting opinion makes a similar 
point.  It notes that the word “party” appears in this article 35 
times; that, in 32 of those instances, the word is directly 
preceded or followed by the qualifiers “contracting,” “to the 
contract,” or “to a contract”; that, in two of those instances, the 
word is followed by the qualifiers “to any proceeding” and “to 
litigation”; and that, “[o]nly in section 1092 does the word ‘party’ 
appear without any qualifier.”  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 7; 
see also id. at p. 7, fn. 5.)  Thus, it is fair to infer “that the 
Legislature intended for the word ‘party’ within section 1092 to 
encompass more than a ‘contracting party.’ ”  (Id. at p. 7.)   
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
Legislature has clearly expressed an intent one way or the other, 
“that usually ends the inquiry.”  (Animal Legal Defense Fund v. 
Mendes (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 136, 142.)  If it has “expressed 
no intent on the matter either way, . . . there is no private right 
of action [citation], with the possible exception that compelling 
reasons of public policy might require judicial recognition of 
such a right.”  (Ibid., citing Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund 
Ins. Companies, supra, 46 Cal.3d  at pp. 304-305.)   
Here, the Legislature has clearly expressed an intent that 
parties to public contracts may sue to avoid those contracts 
under section 1092.  As to nonparties, however, there is no such 
clear expression of intent.11  Accordingly, we cannot find that 
plaintiff has a private right of action unless there are compelling 
policy reasons to do so.  Those reasons do not exist here.  The 
Court of Appeal based its interpretation of section 1092 on both 
case law and the necessity of vindicating the policies embodied 
in section 1090.  Neither reason compels us to read an intent 
into the statute that does not appear on its face.   
 
1. 
The Case Law 
None of the cases cited by the Court of Appeal addressed 
the precise issue presented:  Whether a nonparty taxpayer can 
                                        
11  
Moreover, as noted, the Legislature has prohibited 
injunctions restraining municipal bond offerings, sales, and 
issuances.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 526a, subd. (b).)  There appear to 
be sound policy reasons underlying that prohibition.  (Cf. 
McLeod v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 
1156, 1167-1168.)  Construing section 1092 to permit nonparties 
to sue to avoid contracts for section 1090 violations would 
effectively provide an end-run around the Legislature’s bar on 
claims seeking to enjoin municipal bond issuances.   
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
sue under section 1092 to avoid a government contract on 
conflict-of-interest grounds.  The case law has been less than 
clear in discussing the distinction between standing and causes 
of action.  Although a number of cases cited by both parties 
purport to address a taxpayer’s “standing” to enforce section 
1090, these cases ultimately address whether a taxpayer had a 
cause of action under either Code of Civil Procedure section 526a 
or section 1092.  In Terry, supra, 143 Cal.App.2d 198, for 
example, the plaintiff brought a taxpayer action under Code of 
Civil Procedure section 526a, alleging a city’s payment of a 
warrant would violate section 1090.  (Terry, at pp. 201, 206-207.)  
The Court of Appeal did not discuss whether the plaintiff could 
sue under section 1092.  Instead it ruled that Code of Civil 
Procedure 
section 
526a 
provided 
“express 
statutory 
authorization to maintain [the] action.”  (Terry, at p. 208.)   
Similarly, in Gilbane, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th 1527, the 
plaintiff sued under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a 
alleging that contracts between a school district and certain 
construction companies violated section 1090.  (Gilbane, at p. 
1530.)  The Court of Appeal found the plaintiff had 
“associational standing” under Code of Civil Procedure section 
526a, and did not discuss whether section 1092 authorized the 
plaintiff to sue.  (Gilbane, at p. 1531.)  Terry and Gilbane thus 
stand for the proposition that a nonparty taxpayer can invoke 
the substantive prohibitions of section 1090 in an action 
authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 526a.   They do 
not, however, support the conclusion that a nonparty taxpayer 
can sue to avoid a public contract under section 1092.   
Neither do Stigall, Thomson, and Finnegan.  In Stigall, 
supra, 58 Cal.2d 565, this court did not address whether the 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
plaintiff could sue under section 1092.  We simply noted that the 
plaintiff taxpayer sought a declaration that a plumbing contract 
was invalid under section 1090 (Stigall, at pp. 566-568), and 
then proceeded to the merits of the claim.12  In Thomson, supra, 
38 Cal.3d 633, the question was “what remedies are available 
once a section 1090 violation is found and the fully performed 
underlying contract is adjudged void.”  (Thomson, at p. 638.)  It 
had already been determined in an earlier suit that the contract 
violated section 1090.  (Thomson, at pp. 637-638.)  Thus, we 
were not called upon in Thomson to determine whether the 
plaintiff could sue under section 1092.13   
In Davis, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th 261, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that a taxpayer had alleged facts sufficient to state a 
section 1090 claim.  (Davis, at pp. 270, 271, 301.)  The court also 
opined that “[t]he term ‘any party’ [in section 1092] is not 
restricted to parties to the contract.”  (Id. at p. 297, fn. 20.)  That 
statement was dictum; as the court noted, the defendants had 
not challenged the plaintiff’s “standing to bring the conflict of 
                                        
12  
Like Stigall, Finnegan involved a “taxpayer’s suit” seeking 
a declaration that a government contract violated section 1090.  
(Finnegan, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)  The court did not 
address the question of standing.  Nor did it address whether 
the plaintiff was authorized to bring his suit under section 1092.   
13  
The concurring and dissenting opinion argues that 
“Thomson . . . shows that a nonparty can seek to avoid the terms 
of a contract.”  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, p. 6.)  But our analysis 
in Thomson, supra, 38 Cal.3d 633 did not expressly rely on the 
operation or application of section 1092.  We do not dispute that 
a taxpayer can invoke the conflict-of-interest rule in section 
1090 to challenge a public contract.  The question is whether he 
or she may do so under section 1092, and Thomson provides no 
answer.   
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
interest claim under . . . section 1090.”  (Ibid.)  Thus, Davis also 
does not support the conclusion that a nonparty taxpayer can 
sue under section 1092.   
That leaves McGee and California Taxpayers.  In McGee, 
supra, 247 Cal.App.4th 235, a taxpayer sued claiming that an 
agreement between a school district and a construction company 
violated a number of statutes, including section 1090.  (McGee, 
at p. 239.)  A demurrer was sustained in part on the ground the 
plaintiff lacked standing.  (Id. at p. 246.)  The Court of Appeal 
reversed, holding the plaintiffs had alleged a cause of action for 
a section 1090 violation.  (McGee, at p. 246.)  It did not mention 
section 1092.  While McGee supports the conclusion that a 
taxpayer can assert a section 1090 violation, it does not hold that 
the plaintiff can sue under section 1092.   
Like McGee, California Taxpayers, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th 
115, involved a reverse validation claim that an agreement 
between a school district and a construction company violated 
section 1090 and other statutes.  (California Taxpayers, at pp. 
123-124.)  The result was similar as well.  The Court of Appeal 
reversed an order sustaining a demurrer as to the section 1090 
claim.  (California Taxpayers, at pp. 122, 145.)  The court took 
note of San Bernardino, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th 679, but 
reasoned that Gilbane, Davis, and McGee “ha[d] recognized that 
an action under . . . section 1090 may be brought by a taxpayer.”  
(California Taxpayers, at p. 141.)  As explained, none of those 
cases addressed whether a nonparty taxpayer can sue under 
section 1092.  California Taxpayers does not do so either.   
In summary, there seems to be no dispute that a nonparty 
taxpayer whose action meets the requirements of Code of Civil 
Procedure section 526a can sue under that section alleging a 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
government contract violates section 1090.  (See, e.g., Terry, 
supra, 143 Cal.App.2d 198; Gilbane, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th 
1527.)  Additionally, some cases have assumed that a plaintiff 
can invoke section 1090 without explaining the statutory 
authorization for the plaintiff’s lawsuit.  (See, e.g. Thomson, 
supra, 38 Cal.3d 633; Stigall, supra, 58 Cal.2d 565; California 
Taxpayers, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th 115; McGee, supra, 247 
Cal.App.4th 235; Davis, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th 261; Finnegan, 
supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 572.)  But whether a plaintiff may invoke 
section 1090 and whether a plaintiff may sue to avoid a contract 
under section 1092 are distinct questions.  None of the cases the 
Court of Appeal cites support the conclusion that a nonparty 
may sue under section 1092 to avoid a contract.  The only case 
to directly consider the question held that section 1092 did not 
create a private right of action.  (San Bernardino, supra, 239 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 684-685.)   
 
2. 
Compelling Policy Reasons  
Nor is the Court of Appeal’s interpretation  of section 1092 
necessary to vindicate the policies embodied in section 1090.  
Section 1092 is not the only vehicle for enforcing the substantive 
prohibitions in section 1090.  On the contrary, the conflict-of-
interest rule is backed by an array of administrative, civil, and 
criminal enforcement mechanisms.   
First, the Attorney General or a district attorney can 
criminally prosecute a person who willfully violates section 1090 
(§ 1097.1, subd. (b)) and, if convicted, that person can be 
punished by a fine or by imprisonment, and is “forever 
disqualified from holding any office in this state”  (§ 1097, subd. 
(a)).  Second, the Fair Political Practices Commission (the 
Commission) can bring an administrative action against any 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
person who has violated section 1090.  (§ 1097.1, subd. (a).)  The 
Commission can “investigate possible violations of Section 1090” 
(§ 1097.2, subd. (a)), issue subpoenas (§ 1097.2, subd. (e)), and 
hold hearings to determine if a violation occurred (§ 1097.2, 
subd. (c)).  The Commission may also file “a civil action for an 
alleged violation of Section 1090.”  (§ 1097.3, subd. (a).) If held 
liable, the violator may be fined up to $10,000 or three times the 
value of the financial benefit received.  (Ibid.)  The existence of 
such a comprehensive enforcement scheme is strong evidence 
the Legislature did not intend to create a private right of action 
for nonparties to the contract.  (See Animal Legal Defense Fund 
v. Mendes, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 143-144; Crusader Ins. 
Co. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 121, 136.)   
Because violations of section 1090 can be challenged by 
contractual parties under section 1092, by taxpayers under Code 
of Civil Procedure section 526a where appropriate, and by the 
Attorney General, district attorneys, and the Fair Political 
Practices Commission, there is no compelling reason to conclude 
that section 1092 creates a private right of action for nonparties 
to sue to avoid public contracts.14   
C. 
Plaintiff May Be Able To Proceed Under Code of Civil 
Procedure Section 526a 
Below, the parties debated whether plaintiff’s claims for 
relief were permitted or barred by Code of Civil Procedure 
section 526a, based on the particular facts alleged.  As 
mentioned, the Court of Appeal declined to address the question.   
                                        
14  
To the extent Holloway v. Showcase Realty Agents, Inc. 
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 758 is inconsistent with this opinion, we 
disapprove that decision.   
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
The parties argued each side of the issue in their briefs to 
this court.  Neither party disputes that Code of Civil Procedure 
section 526a is, as a general rule, available to taxpayers who 
wish to challenge government contracts affected by financial 
conflicts of interest.  We agree.  (See ante, pp. 15-16.)  But the 
statute also prohibits the granting of an injunction “restraining 
the offering for sale, sale, or issuance of any municipal bonds” 
for public improvements or facilities.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 526a, 
subd. (b).)  The parties have disagreed as to how that prohibition 
applies here, given the nature of plaintiff’s request for relief.  
The prayer for relief in plaintiff’s complaint indicated that it was 
seeking, among other things, a judgment declaring the bond 
transaction invalid.  At oral argument, plaintiff suggested for 
the first time that it was only seeking disgorgement of payments 
received by the allegedly-conflicted officers for their role in 
administering the bond issuance.  The question of what 
particular form of relief plaintiff is seeking, and whether such 
relief is available under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a, 
should be answered first by the Court of Appeal.  The parties 
agreed at oral argument that a remand would be the best course 
of action were we to find section 1092 does not provide plaintiff 
a private right of action.    
 
 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed.    The matter 
is remanded for the Court of Appeal to decide whether this 
plaintiff may proceed under Code of Civil Procedure section 
526a or any other statutory provision.   
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
We Concur: 
 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.   
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC 
FACILITIES FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF 
SAN DIEGO 
S245996 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion  
by Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye 
 
The purpose of the conflict-of-interest statutes, including 
Government Code sections 1090 and 1092,1 is to protect the 
public.  This purpose takes on special importance in the context 
of municipal bonds because of the prevalent use and economic 
importance of these bonds in the state of California.2  California 
relies on these bonds to make capital improvements and to build 
and maintain public works, each of which is “a quintessentially 
public function.”  (Department of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis (2008) 
553 U.S. 328, 342; see Cal. Debt, supra, table 3.)  Consistent 
with the fact that these bonds are “the way to shoulder the 
cardinal civic responsibilities [of] protecting the health, safety, 
and welfare of citizens,” it is the citizenry, or taxpayers, who 
                                        
1  
All further statutory references are to the Government 
Code unless otherwise indicated. 
2  
See California Debt and Investment Advisory Committee, 
2018 Summary of California Public Debt Issuance (hereafter 
California Debt), tables 1, 2  [as of Dec. 23, 2019] 
[reporting that in 2018 California and its political subdivisions 
issued approximately $62 billion in public debt, of which $50 
billion was in the form of bonds].  All Internet citations in this 
opinion are archived by year, docket number, and case name at 
. 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
2 
ultimately pay for these bonds.  (Department of Revenue of Ky. 
v. Davis, at p. 342, fns. omitted.) 
One would think, then, that municipal bond issuances 
would be subject to the most exacting scrutiny — the kind of 
scrutiny needed to detect and remedy conflicts of interest that 
could both undermine public confidence in this crucial financing 
vehicle and saddle taxpayers with large enduring financial 
obligations.  Yet, today’s majority opinion holds otherwise.  The 
majority interprets section 1092’s language providing that “any 
party” may bring a judicial action to avoid a contract involving 
a prohibited conflict of interest as conferring standing only upon 
the parties to the very contract to be avoided.  I disagree.  I do 
not believe the Legislature created a scheme that counts on the 
foxes to guard the henhouse, and leaves taxpayers helpless to 
halt even the most egregiously conflicted government bond 
issuances.  The likely result under the majority’s rule is that no 
one will bring a challenge to avoid a government contract 
afflicted with a conflict of interest.  Because I do not believe 
section 1092 should to be read so narrowly as to deliver this 
unfortunate outcome and nothing in its language compels such 
an interpretation, I respectfully dissent. 
I.  STANDING UNDER SECTION 1092 
The question before us is one of statutory interpretation.  
Section 1090 states, “Members of the Legislature, state, county, 
district, judicial district, and city officers or employees shall not 
be financially interested in any contract made by them in their 
official capacity, or by any body or board of which they are 
members.”  (§ 1090, subd. (a).)  Section 1092, in turn, specifies, 
“Every contract made in violation of any of the provisions of 
Section 1090 may be avoided at the instance of any party except 
the officer interested therein.”  (§ 1092, subd. (a).)  
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
3 
In parsing the term “any party” in section 1092, we must 
decide whether the term refers to only parties to the challenged 
contract or whether it applies more broadly to encompass a 
taxpayer group like plaintiff San Diegans for Open Government 
(SDOG).  If the former, then only contractual parties to a 
“contract made in violation of . . . Section 1090” have standing 
under section 1092 to challenge the contract.  (§ 1092, subd. (a).) 
As with any statutory construction case, we begin “by 
considering the statute’s language and structure, bearing in 
mind that our fundamental task in statutory interpretation is to 
ascertain 
and 
effectuate 
the 
law’s 
intended 
purpose.” 
(Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1246 
(Weatherford).)  In the context of standing, we have recognized 
that although “th[e] analysis [to determine standing] is 
grounded in the statutory text, the text read in isolation can be 
insufficient to adequately capture . . . other . . . considerations 
that have traditionally informed the outer limits of standing.”  
(Id. at pp. 1248-1249.)  We therefore maintain a “sensitivity to 
the larger context . . . to better effectuate the Legislature’s 
purpose in providing certain statutory remedies.”  (Id. at 
p. 1249.) 
The majority holds that the term “any party” in section 
1092 means “any party to the contract.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.)  
I disagree.  I believe the term “any party” is ambiguous and 
capacious enough to reach plaintiff taxpayer group.  Indeed, 
when section 1092 is read in light of the statutory structure and 
the imperative to “effectuate the . . . intended purpose” of the 
conflicts-of-interest statutes, the term should be understood to 
confer standing on interested taxpayers.  (Weatherford, supra, 
2 Cal.5th at p. 1246.) 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
4 
A.  The Text of Section 1092 
I begin with the text of section 1092, which, as noted, 
states, “Every contract made in violation of any of the provisions 
of Section 1090 may be avoided at the instance of any party 
except the officer interested therein.”  (§ 1092, subd. (a).)  The 
majority asserts that because section 1092 mentions a “contract 
made in violation of . . . Section 1090,” the term “any party” 
“refers back to the contract” and should be read to mean 
contractual parties.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.)  But simply 
because this is one plausible interpretation of section 1092 
does not mean it is the only such interpretation. 
The term “any party” is easily understood to mean a 
“person” or “litigant,” a designation encompassing nonparties to 
the challenged contract.  (See Merriam-Webster Online Dict. 
 
[as 
of 
Dec. 23, 2019] [defining “party” to include “a particular 
individual:  person”]; Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) p. 1350, 
col. 1 [defining “party” both as “[s]omeone who takes part in a 
transaction” and “[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit is 
brought”]; accord Black’s Law Dict., at p. 1695, col. 2 [defining 
standing as “[a] party’s right to make a legal claim or seek 
judicial enforcement of a duty or right” (italics added)].) 
A number of courts, including the Court of Appeal in this 
case, have reached conclusions that are consistent with this 
reading.  (See San Diegans for Open Government v. Public 
Facilities Financing Authority of City of San Diego (2017) 
16 Cal.App.5th 1273, 1280-1283, 1284-1285 (San Diegans) 
[discussing these cases]; Davis v. Fresno Unified School Dist. 
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 261, 297, fn. 20 [“The term ‘any party’ is 
not restricted to parties to the contract”].)  The only Court of 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
5 
Appeal to have adopted a more constrained construction is San 
Bernardino County v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 
679.  The majority opinion approves of San Bernardino, 
contending that its interpretation of section 1092 is “[t]he most 
natural.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.)  Yet every Court of Appeal to 
have considered San Bernardino has disagreed with it.  (See 
Holloway v. Showcase Realty Agents, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 
758, 767-770 [noting that “[s]ince the time of the trial court’s 
decision in the present case, a number of cases have criticized 
the rationale in San Bernardino” and joining the chorus of 
criticism]; San Diegans, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 1284 [“we 
do not agree with the limited interpretation of section 1092 
adopted by the court in San Bernardino”]; McGee v. Balfour 
Beatty Construction, LLC (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 235, 248 
(McGee).)  This seems to leave room for doubt concerning 
whether the majority’s restrictive reading of section 1092 is, in 
fact, the most reasonable. 
Neither of the two remaining bases the majority musters 
to support its interpretation of section 1092 entirely persuades 
me either.  The majority first says that because section 1092 
allows a “contract made in violation . . . of Section 1090 [to] be 
avoided” and “[a] nonparty does not possess the power to [avoid] 
a contract,” we should infer that only contractual parties have 
standing under section 1092.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 7-8.)  But 
our own case law offers a counterexample to the idea that 
nonparties cannot avoid a contract. 
 
In Thomson v. Call (1985) 38 Cal.3d 633 (Thomson), a 
taxpayer group that was not a party to a government contract 
successfully avoided the municipality’s responsibilities under 
that contract on the basis that the agreement violated section 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
6 
1090.3  The facts of Thomson are as follows:  a councilman (Call) 
sold the City of Albany, by way of a middleman, a parcel of land 
he and his wife owned.  (38 Cal.3d at p. 637.)  The Calls received 
$258,000 from the transaction.  (Id. at p. 643.)  When the 
transaction was found to violate section 1090, the trial court’s 
solution was to allow the City of Albany “to retain the land and, 
at the same time, recover the $258,000 plus interest from the 
Calls.”  (Thomson, at p. 646.)  We recognized the “harsh[ness]” 
of this remedy but ultimately approved of it, reasoning that “the 
goals and policy concerns underlying section 1090” warranted 
such solution.  (Id. at p. 647.)  Thomson thus shows that a 
nonparty can seek to avoid the terms of a contract.4  In light of 
such precedent, I do not see why we would be compelled to 
interpret section 1092’s reference to “avoid[ance]” to mean that 
only a party to the contract may seek such a remedy.  (§ 1092, 
subd. (a).) 
 
The majority next looks to the “provisions of the Civil 
Code” to buttress its conclusion that the term “any party” in 
                                        
3  
Not incidentally, this is exactly what SDOG has said it is 
seeking to do in this case:  unwind a bond purchase agreement 
alleged to have been made in contravention of section 1090 so 
the City of San Diego would be reimbursed for the costs it paid 
under the agreement. 
4  
The majority asserts that Thomson “provides no answer” 
to the ultimate question before us, whether a nonparty taxpayer 
may invoke section 1092 to challenge a public contract.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 14, fn. 13.)  In other words, Thomson is not 
controlling in the present case.  I do not contend that it is.  
Rather, I reference Thomson to show that it is not just parties 
to a contract who may sue to “avoid[] [the] legal obligations 
thereunder,” and thus “[t]he use of the word avoid in section 
1092” does not bear the weight the majority’s construction puts 
on it.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.) 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
7 
section 1092 means any contracting party.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 8.)  I agree that we should look to the “ ‘structure and . . . 
surrounding provisions’ ” of section 1092 to ascertain its 
meaning.  (Weatherford, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1246-1247.)  But 
it is the provisions neighboring section 1092 that are most 
germane, not those from outside the Government Code. 
 
In the article where section 1092 is found, the word “party” 
appears 35 times.  In all of these instances, when the Legislature 
intends the word “party” to mean “contractual party,” it modifies 
the word “party” with a qualifier — “contracting,” “to the 
contract,” “to a contract” — that makes its intent unmistakably 
clear.  (See §§ 1091, subds. (b)(2), (3), (5), (6), (8), (14), (d) 
[referring to “contracting party”], 1091.5, subd. (a)(4), (10) 
[same], 1091, subd. (b)(10) [“party to the contract”]; § 1091.5, 
subds. (a)(11), (b) [same], 1091.5, subd. (a)(14) [“party to a 
contract”].)5  In short, it appears that when the Legislature 
intends to refer to contracting parties, it does not simply say 
“party.”  Only in section 1092 does the word “party” appear 
without any qualifier.  It is fair to infer from the absence of any 
modifying language in this context that the Legislature 
intended for the word “party” within section 1092 to encompass 
more than a “contracting party.”6 
                                        
5  
In two instances, statutes within this article refer to 
“party to litigation” and “party to any proceedings.”  (§§ 1091, 
subd. (b)(15), 1091.4, subd. (b).) 
 
6  
The majority states that to add a qualifier “to the phrase 
‘any party’ in section 1092 arguably would have been 
redundant.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.)  I cannot entirely 
 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
8 
 
In sum, read in isolation, the term “any party” in section 
1092 is at least ambiguous.  In my view, the term is as 
susceptible to applying “broadly to embrace other interested 
persons” who are not parties to a contract as it is to a more 
restrictive reading.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.)  Any ambiguity is 
removed however when I consider the purpose, policy, and aim 
of section 1092. 
 
B.  The Purpose of Section 1092 
 
Because section 1092 provides a mechanism to enforce the 
rule against conflicts of interest set forth in section 1090, a few 
words regarding the purpose of section 1090 are appropriate.  
The goals behind section 1090 are to “eliminat[e]” financial 
temptation faced by public officials, “avoid[] the appearance of 
impropriety,” and “assur[e] the [municipality] of the officer’s 
undivided and uncompromised allegiance.”  (Thomson, supra, 
38 Cal.3d at p. 648.)  In light of these goals, we have said that 
                                        
disagree with this carefully couched assertion, because in saying 
that a qualifying addition “arguably would have been 
redundant,” the majority acknowledges that it arguably would 
not have been redundant.  (Ibid.)  Indeed, such an addition 
would not have been clearly surplusage.  Even the provisions 
cited by the majority show that the Legislature may modify the 
word “party” although the statutory language already 
references a contract.  (See id. at p. 8 & fn. 7.)  For instance, 
Civil Code section 1689 provides that “[a] contract may be 
rescinded if all the parties thereto consent.”  (Civ. Code, § 1689, 
subd. (a), italics added; see also id., § 1559 [“[a] contract, made 
expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by 
him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it”].)  As such, 
had the Legislature wanted to, it easily could have drafted 
section 1092 to read, “Every contract made in violation of any of 
the provisions of Section 1090 may be avoided at the instance of 
any party thereto,” without being redundant. 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
9 
section 1090 deserves “strict enforcement.”  (Thomson, at 
p. 650.) 
 
The “strict enforcement” of section 1090 necessarily 
depends in part on who may sue to enforce its substance.  
(Thomson, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 650.)  Simply put, however 
strict the prohibitions of section 1090 are, if no one could — or 
would — bring suit to vindicate its provisions, then section 1090 
is a paper tiger.  In the context of a different conflict-of-interest 
statute (section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure), we have 
recognized the need to empower “ ‘a large body of the citizenry 
to challenge governmental action which would otherwise go 
unchallenged 
in 
the 
courts 
because 
of 
the 
standing 
requirement.’ ” (Weatherford, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1251.)  That 
same need arises in the context of section 1090, and this is where 
section 1092 plays a crucial role. 
 
Section 1092 allows “any party except the officer interested 
therein” to bring suit.  (§ 1092, subd. (a), italics added.)  The 
majority’s interpretation of section 1092 means that in 
circumstances in which every party to the contract is for one 
reason or another an interested government official no one will 
be able to sue for avoidance under the statute.  (See, e.g., People 
v. Superior Court (Sahlolbei) (2017) 3 Cal.5th 230, 235, 243 
[discussing a case in which the counterparty to a government 
contract was an interested person because, while working for a 
school district, she “advised the district to retain her consulting 
company . . . , which the district did”]; California Taxpayers 
Action Network v. Taber Construction, Inc. (2017) 12 
Cal.App.5th 115, 145; McGee, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 249.) 
 
Even when it is not the case that all parties to a contract 
are “[m]embers of the Legislature, state, county, district, 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
10 
judicial district, . . . [or] city officers or employees,” such parties 
may still have little incentive to unwind a transaction that they 
have ratified.  (§ 1090, subd. (a).)  Government officials would 
appear to have little financial or political motivation to sue on 
behalf of the public when, by suing, the officials themselves 
could be implicated for alleged collusion, delay, malfeasance, or 
negligence.  A private counterparty to the contract also may 
have little reason to bring suit, given that it won the contract or 
otherwise engaged with the public entity and so likely would not 
want to disrupt the status quo, invite bad press, or rouse 
suspicion that it engaged in bribery or collusion with a public 
official. 
 
In other words, I believe the court below was correct when 
it said, “The strict and important policy embodied in section 
1090 . . . will not be vindicated if public officials believe section 
1090’s substantive provisions may only be enforced by the very 
public officials or public entities who have violated the statute’s 
provisions.”  (San Diegans, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1283-
1284.)  Because “a public official’s duty to avoid even temptation 
cannot be advanced by adopting a rule which limits civil 
enforcement to that public official or public entities controlled 
by the official,” I would not adopt such a rule.  (Id. at p. 1284.) 
 
The majority recognizes the public policies that support 
the decision below but maintains that “the Court of Appeal’s 
interpretation of section 1092 [is not] necessary to vindicate the 
policies embodied in section 1090.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16.)  
According to the majority, this is because there are other 
mechanisms “for enforcing the substantive prohibitions in 
section 1090.”  (Ibid.)  These are:  criminal prosecutions under 
section 1097, civil or administrative actions brought by the Fair 
Political Practices Commission (FPPC), and civil actions “by 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
11 
taxpayers under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a where 
appropriate.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.)  In my opinion, none of 
these provisions quite fills the gap left by the majority’s 
construction of section 1092. 
 
Neither the threat of criminal prosecution nor action by 
the FPPC protects the public in the way that section 1092 does 
— or at least, should.  An official may be criminally prosecuted 
only if he or she “willfully and knowingly” violates section 1090.  
(People v. Chacon (2007) 40 Cal.4th 558, 570; see § 1097, subd. 
(a).)  This heightened mens rea requirement leaves a swath of 
instances in which the official may have had an improper 
interest, the public was deprived of his or her “absolute loyalty 
and undivided allegiance,” and yet there is no recourse to be had 
from the Attorney General or district attorney.  (Stigall v. Taft 
(1962) 58 Cal.2d 565, 569.) 
 
The FPPC, meanwhile, cannot act except upon “written 
authorization from the district attorney of the county in which 
the alleged violation occurred.”  (§ 1097.1, subd. (b).)  Thus, in a 
case in which the district attorney, for whatever reason, 
withholds authorization, the FPPC cannot even begin “an 
investigation that might lead to administrative or civil action” 
against an interested official.  (Ibid.)  Moreover, neither the 
FPPC nor criminal prosecutors can offer the public the remedy 
available under section 1092:  avoidance of the contract.  
Although the penalties afforded in FPPC or criminal actions are 
not insubstantial (see §§ 1097, subd. (a), 1097.3, subd. (a)), their 
target are the officials themselves, not the resulting contracts 
foisted on the public.  And the public may be both less interested 
in sending someone to prison than unwinding a raw deal and 
less well served by a fine than by halting a bond transaction 
infected with self-interest. 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
12 
 
This leaves us with Code of Civil Procedure section 526a.  
An action brought under section 526a that disputes the validity 
of a bond is subject to a short 60-day statute of limitations.  (See 
McLeod v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 
1156, 1166-1170.)  This is in contrast to the four-year statute of 
limitations afforded to actions brought under Government Code 
section 1092.  (§ 1092, subd. (b).) 
 
More importantly, in examining the limits of Code of Civil 
Procedure section 526a, we come full circle with the importance 
of bonds and the public interest.  The majority refers to this 
limitation, acknowledging that under subdivision (b) of section 
526a “no injunction shall be granted restraining the offering for 
sale, sale, or issuance of any municipal bonds for public 
improvements or public utilities.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 526a, 
subd. (b); see maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)7  In other words, when 
municipal bonds are at stake — precisely the instance in which 
the taxpayers bear the costs of paying for the public debt — 
taxpayers may not seek to “restrain[] the offering for sale, sale, 
or issuance” of any of those bonds under section 526a.  (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 526a, subd. (b).)  Yet the availability of such a 
remedy is crucial.  Once bonds have issued, attempts to claw 
them back, rewrite their terms, or otherwise renegotiate the 
issuance may prove impossible.  In the absence of preemptive 
                                        
7  
Relying on this provision, the majority argues that 
“[c]onstruing section 1092 to permit nonparties to sue to avoid 
contracts for section 1090 violations would effectively provide an 
end-run around the Legislature’s bar on claims seeking to enjoin 
municipal bond issuances.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12, fn. 11.)  
Given that parties to the contract presumably could bring such 
claims, however, there is no reason to think that actions seeking 
injunctions on municipal bond issuances are, by necessity, the 
“end-run[s]” the majority makes them out to be.  (Ibid.) 
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
13 
remedies like an injunction, self-interested governmental 
dealings may well inflict costly and irreparable harm on the 
public. 
 
Put differently, today majority’s opinion holds that in 
cases in which government officials make contracts that amount 
to writing checks on the public’s checkbooks, the public cannot 
stop them.  This did not need to be the outcome.  Section 1092 is 
readily capable of being read as conferring standing on nonparty 
taxpayer groups to bring a challenge in such circumstances.  
I would read the section thusly. 
II.  CONCLUSION 
 
Like the Court of Appeal, I believe “plaintiff taxpayers 
have standing under Government Code section 1092 to 
challenge the [City of San Diego’s] ordinance on the grounds 
participants in the proposed transaction violated the conflict of 
interest provisions of section 1090.”  (San Diegans, supra, 
16 Cal.App.5th at p. 1276, fn. omitted.)  I therefore would affirm 
the judgment below. 
 
The majority today reverses and remands to the Court of 
Appeal “to decide whether this plaintiff may proceed under Code 
of Civil Procedure section 526a.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)  
Although I dissent from the decision to reverse, I do not oppose 
a remand given the majority’s disposition. 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion San Diegans for Open Government v. Public Facilities Financing Authority of the City 
of San Diego 
 _____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XXX 16 Cal.App.5th 1273 
Rehearing Granted 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S245996 
Date Filed:  December 26, 2019 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  San Diego 
Judge:  Joan Marie Lewis 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Briggs Law Corporation, Cory J. Briggs, Anthony N. Kim; Higgs Fletcher & Mack, John Morris and 
Rachel E. Moffitt for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Mara W. Elliott, City Attorney, David J. Karlin and George F. Schaefer, Assistant City Attorneys, and 
Meghan Ashley Wharton, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Meghan Ashley Wharton 
Deputy City Attorney 
1200 Third Avenue, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 533-5800 
 
Rachel E. Moffitt 
Higgs Fletcher & Mack LLP 
401 West A Street, Suite 2600 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 236-1551