Title: State v. Perry

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
  ) 
  ) 
Respondent, 
  ) 
  ) 
v. 
  ) 
No. SC96087 
  ) 
JOSEPH FOUNTAIN PERRY, 
  ) 
  ) 
Appellant. 
  ) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LIVINGSTON COUNTY 
The Honorable Thomas N. Chapman, Circuit Judge  
A jury found Joseph Perry guilty of one count of possession of a controlled 
substance.  On appeal, he argues the circuit court erred in overruling his motions to 
suppress evidence and in sentencing him to eight years' imprisonment.  The circuit court's 
judgment is affirmed. 
Factual and Procedural History1 
While on patrol, a police officer drove past Perry's house.  She observed Perry 
backing his truck out of his driveway and began to follow him.  While following him, the 
officer radioed dispatch to verify Perry's driving status.  Based on a previous 
1  "In reviewing the trial court's overruling of a motion to suppress, this Court considers the 
evidence presented at both the suppression hearing and at trial to determine whether sufficient 
evidence exists in the record to support the trial court's ruling."  State v. Gaw, 285 S.W.3d 318, 
319–20 (Mo. banc 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Opinion issued June 12, 2018
 
2 
conversation with another officer, she believed Perry was driving with a suspended 
driver's license.2  Dispatch was unable to give her a definitive answer to Perry's driving 
status before he pulled into the driveway of his fiancé's house.  The officer stopped her 
vehicle in the street near the end of the driveway but did not block Perry's truck.  She 
then approached Perry, and the following exchange took place, as recounted at the 
suppression hearing: 
Prosecutor:  
What did you say first, exactly? 
 
Officer:  
["]Hey, Joe, can I talk to you?"  And then, "Joe, do you 
have a valid driver's license?" 
 
Prosecutor:   
Okay, did Joe reply to you in any way? 
 
Officer:  
He said, "Sure."  And I asked if I could see his driver's 
license, and he got it out of his wallet.  I do believe Joe 
did say that he was not suspended.  'Cause I said, "Joe, 
do you have a valid driver's license?  I believe you're 
suspended?"  And he goes, "I'm not suspended."  And I 
said, "Well do you have your driver's license on you 
and can I see it?"  he said, "Sure," and he reached in 
his back pocket and got it. . . . 
. . . . 
 
Prosecutor:  
[W]ould someone producing a valid license end your 
inquiry into suspicion? 
 
Officer:  
Oh, no.  Just because they hand me what looks to 
appear to be a valid license, I am still going to run it to 
check to make sure that it's valid. 
 
Prosecutor:   
So did you have his license in your hand? 
 
Officer:  
 
Yes.  He gave me his license. 
 
Prosecutor:   
And what did you do with it? 
                                              
2  It was later determined that Perry's driver's license was not suspended. 
 
3 
Officer:  
I was attempting to contact dispatch to run his LON, 
his driver's number, and I was unable to make any 
contact with dispatch on my handheld radio. 
 
Prosecutor:  
And why were you unable to make contact with 
dispatch? 
 
Officer:  
Come to find out later, I needed to change the antenna 
and the mike on my handheld; it was messed up and 
wasn't working. 
 
Prosecutor:  
Were you -- what were you doing then with that 
license? 
 
Officer:  
Well at the time I was -- I didn't realize that my radio 
was not working, so I was actually -- I had my radio 
on, I was trying to run the information, dispatch was 
not getting back with me.  I did not know that the 
transmission had not gone across, and that's when Mr. 
Perry started acting suspicious. 
 
Prosecutor:  
Would you tell the Court exactly what that means, how 
was he acting suspicious?  
 
Officer:  
Well, he got -- he was like turning around from me, 
and he had put his hand in his pocket and he'd pulled 
out what appeared to be a plastic bag and he had it in 
his clenched fist.  And I said, "Hey, Joe, come here for 
a minute."  And he goes, "I got to get this bike out of 
the back of my truck."  And with a clenched fist he 
reached up and grabbed this child's bike out of the 
back of the truck and then set it down.  And I said, 
"Joe, come here for a minute."  And he was like, he 
just kept ignoring me and kept trying to put distance 
between me and him.  And then he walked around to 
the front of the vehicle, and I heard him say, "Hey, 
Norm, come get this."  I followed him around the front 
of the truck, and he still had his hand clenched with the 
-- and he was kind of like pushing the bike along, and 
then all of a sudden I said, "Joe, come here for a 
minute."  He threw the bike down and took off 
running. 
 
4 
The officer pursued Perry on foot, ordering him to "stop running."  When Perry 
came to a chain-link fence, he hesitated and bent his body over a fence post before 
climbing over it.  After clearing the fence, Perry saw a sheriff's vehicle and surrendered 
himself.  A plastic bag containing methamphetamine was found in a hollowed-out post 
where Perry climbed over the chain-link fence.  Perry was charged with one count of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.  Prior to trial, Perry moved 
to suppress the methamphetamine.  The circuit court overruled his motions, and the jury 
found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled substance. 
At the sentencing hearing, when the circuit court asked for a recommended 
sentence, the prosecutor stated, "The range of punishment in this case enhanced to the B 
range is 5 to 15 years in the Department of Corrections."  After the prosecutor 
recommend an eight-year sentence, the following colloquy occurred while reviewing the 
sentencing assessment report: 
The Court: 
I did want to note one thing. . . . It looks like the 
offense says, possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute.  That is not what he was convicted 
of. 
 
Prosecutor:  
It was not. 
 
The Court: 
He was convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance. 
 
Prosecutor:  
Correct. 
 
The Court: 
But he has the enhanced range of penalties which 
are -- 
 
Prosecutor:  
It still is 5 to 15. 
 
 
5 
The Court: 
-- 5 to 15, it was just wrong on t[he offense].  Does 
that sounds [sic] right? 
 
Defense Counsel: 
That's correct, Your Honor. 
 
The circuit court sentenced Perry to eight years' imprisonment, the prosecutor's 
recommended sentence.  Perry appealed, and after opinion by the court of appeals, this 
Court sustained transfer.  Mo. Const. art. V, § 10. 
Analysis 
Perry first argues the circuit court erred in overruling his motions to suppress the 
methamphetamine because he was unlawfully seized when the officer requested his 
license without reasonable suspicion he was engaged in any criminal activity. 
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, there must be 
substantial evidence to support the ruling.  [T]he facts and reasonable 
inferences from such facts are considered favorably to the trial court's 
ruling and contrary evidence and inferences are disregarded. 
 
In reviewing the trial court's overruling of a motion to suppress, this Court 
considers the evidence presented at both the suppression hearing and at trial 
to determine whether sufficient evidence exists in the record to support the 
trial court's ruling.  Deference is given to the trial court's superior 
opportunity to determine the credibility of witnesses.  This Court gives 
deference to the trial court's factual findings but reviews questions of law 
de novo.[3] 
 
Gaw, 285 S.W.3d at 319–20 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  "At a 
hearing on a motion to suppress, the state bears both the burden of producing evidence 
and the risk of nonpersuasion to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the motion 
to suppress should be overruled."  State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 142 
                                              
3  "[L]egal determinations of reasonable suspicion . . . are reviewed de novo."  State v. Carrawell, 
481 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Mo. banc 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
6 
(Mo. banc 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The circuit court's ruling will be 
reversed only if it is clearly erroneous.  Carrawell, 481 S.W.3d at 837. 
 
Perry's argument raises the following issue: When a law enforcement officer 
requests that an individual produce a driver's license to verify whether he is driving on a 
suspended license—and he complies with the officer's request—has he been "seized" 
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution? 
"The Fourth Amendment protects the right of citizens to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, and it applies to state actors through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Article I, section 15 of the Missouri Constitution is coextensive with the 
Fourth Amendment; consequently, the same analysis applies under both provisions."  
State v. Lovelady, 432 S.W.3d 187, 190 (Mo. banc 2014) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted).   
A "seizure" occurs "[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force[4] or show 
of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen."  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 19 n.16 (1968).  "[A] person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment only if,[5] in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave."  United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).   
                                              
4  Nothing in the record suggests the officer made physical contact with Perry during their 
encounter. 
5  "[Mendenhall] says that a person has been seized 'only if,' not that he has been seized 
'whenever'; it states a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for seizure—or, more precisely, 
for seizure effected through a 'show of authority.'"  California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 
(1991). 
 
7 
The word "seizure" readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or 
application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is 
ultimately unsuccessful. . . . It does not remotely apply, however, to the 
prospect of a policeman yelling "Stop, in the name of the law!" at a fleeing 
form that continues to flee.  That is no seizure. 
 
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626.  "[T]he test for [the] existence of a 'show of authority' is an 
objective one: not whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his 
movement, but whether the officer's words and actions would have conveyed that to a 
reasonable person."  Id. at 628.  Moreover, "where [physical force] is absent, submission 
to the assertion of authority" is also required to effect a seizure.  Id. at 626. 
Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the 
person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of 
several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical 
touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice 
indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. 
 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.  "In the absence of some such evidence, otherwise 
inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of 
law, amount to a seizure of that person."  Id. at 555. 
Although the Fourth Amendment prevents police from seizing a person without a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the Amendment is not implicated by a 
consensual encounter between an officer and a private citizen.  "[F]or purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment, a seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches 
an individual and asks a few questions."  State v. Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Mo. 
banc 2016) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)).  "If a reasonable person 
would feel free to disregard the police and go about their business, the encounter is 
consensual and the Fourth Amendment is not triggered."  Id. 
 
8 
Perry argues his encounter with the officer was not consensual primarily because 
he surrendered his license to her upon request.  Without a license, he argues, a reasonable 
person is less likely to believe he can simply terminate a police encounter.  But 
surrendering one's license to law enforcement does not necessarily amount to a seizure 
for Fourth Amendment purposes.  Generally, "even when officers have no basis for 
suspecting a particular individual," police officers may ask questions of that individual or 
ask to examine the individual's identification "as long as the police do not convey a 
message that compliance with their requests is required."  Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434–35. 
Indeed, the manner in which the officer requested to see Perry's license did not 
convey a message that his compliance was required.  The officer's testimony at the 
suppression hearing indicates her requests for Perry's license were merely requests, not 
commands.  See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204 (2002).  At the 
suppression hearing, the officer testified she did not activate the lights before she exited 
her vehicle.  When she first approached Perry, she said, "Hey Joe, can I talk to you?"  She 
then asked, "Joe, do you have a valid driver's license?  I believe you're suspended."  Perry 
responded he was not suspended.  The officer then asked, "Well do you have your 
driver's license on you and can I see it?"  Perry said, "Sure," reached into his back pocket, 
pulled out his license out of his wallet, and handed it to the officer.  The record, therefore, 
reflects the officer did not demand Perry's license.  Rather, she asked whether she could 
see it. 
The fact Perry cooperated with the officer's request for his license did not 
terminate the consensual nature of their encounter nor did it establish he submitted to her 
 
9 
authority.  "The Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures; it 
does not proscribe voluntary cooperation."  Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439.  "While most 
citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without 
being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the 
response."  I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).  Perry's voluntary cooperation 
with the officer's request, therefore, did not terminate the consensual nature of their 
encounter. 
Perry focuses on the fact the officer informed him she believed his license was 
suspended, which made the encounter more coercive and thus nonconsensual.  The 
officer did inform Perry she believed his license was suspended.  This fact is merely one 
of many circumstances to consider in determining whether the encounter was consensual.  
Cf. id. ("Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate 
that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not 
responded, one cannot say that the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth 
Amendment.").   
In requesting Perry's license, there was no application or overwhelming show of 
force, no intimidating movements, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, and 
no threats or commands.  See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 204 ("There was no application of 
force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of 
weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no command, not even an authoritative tone of 
voice.").  Immediately after handing the officer his license, Perry began acting 
suspiciously by turning his back away from her, putting his hand in his pocket, pulling 
 
10 
out a plastic bag, and holding it in a clenched fist.  Only at this point did the officer issue 
the first of several commands ("come here for a minute"), but Perry "just kept ignoring 
[her] and kept trying to put distance between" the two.  The officer once again 
commanded Perry to "come here for a minute," but he "threw the bike down and took off 
running."  The officer pursued Perry on foot, ordering him to "stop running," another 
command Perry ignored.  The officer had not finished checking his license and, therefore, 
did not have an opportunity to return it to Perry before his suspicious behavior 
commenced.  This is consistent with the officer's testimony that Perry was free to leave 
until she observed him suspiciously taking the bag out of his pocket. 
Given the totality of the circumstances, Perry's initial encounter with the officer 
when she requested his license was consensual in nature.  When the officer actually 
required Perry to do something, he freely ignored her commands.  At no point during the 
entire encounter did the officer seize Perry.  Therefore, the Fourth Amendment was not 
implicated.  See, e.g., Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553 ("Only when [restraint on a person's 
freedom of movement] is imposed is there any foundation whatever for invoking 
constitutional safeguards."); Lammers, 479 S.W.3d at 631.  Accordingly, the circuit court 
did not err in overruling Perry's motions to suppress. 
Perry next argues he was sentenced "under a materially false belief" regarding the 
applicable enhanced range of punishment because the circuit court "held the mistaken 
belief that the range of punishment" for Perry, as a persistent offender, was between five 
and 15 years' imprisonment when he "could have actually received a minimum sentence 
of up to one year in the county jail or incarceration in the Department of Corrections for a 
 
11 
term less than five years."  Perry is correct that the range of punishment was misstated at 
the sentencing hearing.   
Perry was convicted of a class C felony and found to be a persistent offender.  The 
ordinary range of punishment for a class C felony is one year in the county jail up to a 
maximum of seven years in the Department of Corrections, and five to 15 years in the 
Department of Corrections for a class B felony.  Section 558.011.1(2), .2, RSMo Supp. 
2013.  At the time of sentencing, only the maximum sentence increased for a persistent 
offender, while the minimum sentence was unaffected—e.g., a persistent offender 
convicted of a class C felony was subject to a range consisting of the minimum sentence 
for a class C felony and the maximum sentence for a class B felony.  See § 558.016.7(3), 
RSMo Supp. 2013; see also, e.g., State v. Cowan, 247 S.W.3d 617, 619 
(Mo. App. 2008) (explaining the "statute only extends the maximum sentence but does 
not alter the minimum sentence").  As such, Perry was subject to a sentencing range of 
one year in the county jail to 15 years in the Department of Corrections, not a range of 
five to 15 years in the Department of Corrections. 
Perry concedes this argument is not preserved for review because he failed to 
object at the sentencing hearing.  Nevertheless, he requests this Court review his sentence 
for plain error.  "Any issue that was not preserved at trial can only be reviewed for plain 
error, which requires a finding that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice has 
resulted from the trial court error."  State v. Letica, 356 S.W.3d 157, 167 (Mo. banc 
2011).  "Relief under the plain error rule is granted only when the alleged error so 
substantially affects the rights of the accused that a manifest injustice or miscarriage of 
 
12 
justice inexorably results if left uncorrected."  State v. Hadley, 815 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Mo. 
banc 1991).  While the range of punishment was misstated at the sentencing hearing, 
Perry, who "bears the burden of establishing manifest injustice," as "determined by the 
facts and circumstances of the case," has failed to meet his burden.  State v. Baxter, 204 
S.W.3d 650, 652 (Mo. banc 2006).   
"A sentence passed on the basis of a materially false foundation lacks due process 
of law and entitles the defendant to a reconsideration of the question of punishment in the 
light of the true facts, regardless of the eventual outcome."  Wraggs v. State, 549 S.W.2d 
881, 884 (Mo. banc 1977).  As this Court explained in the companion case of State v. 
Pierce, No. SC96095, --- S.W.3d ---- (Mo. banc 2018), also handed down this date, under 
plain-error review, it is not enough for Perry to show the circuit court held a mistaken 
belief with respect to the range of punishment.  Rather, Perry must establish the circuit 
court imposed the eight-year sentence based on that mistaken belief. 
Perry has failed to establish the circuit court imposed sentence based on a 
mistaken belief.  The circuit court did not sentence Perry to the misstated minimum 
sentence; instead, it sentenced him to an even longer sentence.  Indeed, the eight-year 
sentence was precisely what the prosecutor recommended: 
Your Honor, this case was originally charged as possession with intent with 
prior and persistent.  He was facing 10 to life on that.  
 
The jury found him guilty of the lesser included of the Class C felony of 
possession.  It's methamphetamine.  The defendant has several felonies in 
the past.  The range of punishment in this case enhanced to the B range is 5 
to 15 years in the Department of Corrections. 
 
 
13 
I believe that Mr. Perry's actions indicate that he's not a candidate for 
probation.  His history indicates the same.  And although I'm not asking for 
a maximum sentence either, there should be some benefit to winning part of 
the trial, which is that he didn't face a range of 10 to life.  And so I am 
going to recommend that the Court impose a period of 8 years in the 
Department of Corrections and order that be executed. 
 
Consistent with Pierce, Perry has failed to make a case-specific showing that he 
was sentenced based on the circuit court's mistaken belief.  See Baxter, 204 S.W.3d at 
652.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in sentencing him to eight years' 
imprisonment. 
Conclusion 
 
The circuit court's judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Chief Justice 
 
 
 
Wilson, Russell and Powell, JJ., concur;  
Breckenridge, J., concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion filed;  
Draper and Stith, JJ., concur in opinion of Breckenridge, J. 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC96087 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
JOSEPH FOUNTAIN PERRY, 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
  ) 
 
OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART 
 
I concur in the principal opinion’s holding that the circuit court did not err in 
overruling Joseph Perry’s motions to suppress.  I respectfully dissent, however, from the 
principal opinion’s holding that the circuit did not err in sentencing Mr. Perry based on a 
mistaken belief as to the range of punishment.   
The principal opinion acknowledges the circuit court misunderstood the applicable 
sentencing range.  Nevertheless, it faults Mr. Perry for failing to establish the circuit court 
imposed his sentence based on a mistaken belief and points to the fact the circuit court did 
not sentence him to the misstated minimum punishment.    
But as stated in my separate opinion in the case of State v. Pierce, No. SC96095,     
-- S.W.3d -- (Mo. banc 2018), also handed down this date, Missouri courts have repeatedly 
held plain error results when a sentence is imposed by a circuit court that has expressly 
2 
 
misstated the range of punishment on the record.  Here, the circuit court expressly 
misstated, on the record, the range of punishment as five to 15 years in the department of 
corrections.  Pursuant to section 558.011.1(1), RSMo Supp. 2013, Mr. Perry’s enhanced 
range of punishment, as a prior and persistent offender, was one year in the county jail to 
15 years in the department of corrections.  The record, therefore, reflects the circuit court 
was under a mistaken belief as to the applicable enhanced sentencing range when it 
imposed Mr. Perry’s eight-year sentence.   
That Mr. Perry was not sentenced to the misstated minimum sentence is of no 
consequence.  This Court reasoned in Wraggs v. State, 549 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Mo. banc 
1977), “The pertinent question is whether the sentence was predicated on misinformation; 
whether the sentence might have been different if the sentencing judge had known that at 
least two of appellant’s previous convictions had been illegally obtained.”  (Emphasis 
added).   Knowing the correct range of punishment is necessarily a predicate to imposing 
any sentence, and sentencing a defendant when mistaken as to that applicable range 
inherently affects the sentencing process and might lead to a different sentence.   
Due process prohibits a sentencing court from imposing a sentence based on a 
materially false foundation such as the applicable range of punishment and entitles a 
defendant to “reconsideration of the question of punishment in light of the true facts, 
regardless of the eventual outcome.”  Id.  The principal opinion ignores these due process 
considerations and places on the defendant the nearly impossible burden of establishing he 
or she was sentenced solely on a mistaken belief as to the applicable sentencing range.  
3 
 
Consequently, I would hold Mr. Perry’s sentence was based on a materially false 
foundation because the circuit court was wrong as to the correct enhanced range of 
punishment.  Imposing sentence upon a mistaken belief as to the range of punishment is 
manifestly unjust and results in plain error.  I, therefore, would vacate Mr. Perry’s sentence 
and remand the case for resentencing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE