Title: Vallo v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Vallo v. State1986 WY 187726 P.2d 1045Case Number: 86-119Decided: 10/15/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
Lisa Marie VALLO, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from DistrictCourtofTetonCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

Wyoming Public Defender Program: 
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Julie D. Naylor, Appellate Counsel, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming Defender Aid Program: Gerald M. Gallivan, 
Director, and William L. Combs, Student Intern, Laramie, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., John W. Renneisen, 
Allen C. Johnson, Sr. Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant pled not 
guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. In a 
"stipulated agreement" she admitted to all the essential elements of the crime 
charged and conditionally waived her right to a jury trial. Based on this 
stipulation the court found appellant guilty. On appeal she raises issues with 
respect to the trial court's denial of a motion to supress her statements to the 
police.

[¶2.]     This court will not 
address the supression issues, but rather remand the case to the trial court for 
the taking of a proper plea.

[¶3.]     An information was 
filed on September 5, 1985, charging appellant with possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana) with intent to deliver, in violation of § 
35-7-1031(a)(ii), W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum.Supp. On October 4, 1985, appellant filed 
a motion to suppress all statements made by her and all property seized as a 
result of her having made statements to the police. The police had questioned 
appellant and conducted a search and seizure pursuant to a search warrant on 
July 18, 1985.

[¶4.]     After a hearing on 
October 25, 1985, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress, and at 
her arraignment appellant pled not guilty. On November 15, 1985, a "stipulated 
agreement" was filed in the district court. In the "stipulated agreement" 
appellant admitted to all the essential elements of the crime charged and 
"conditionally" waived her right to a jury trial. In this stipulation appellant 
also preserved her right to appeal to the supreme court. Apparently she intended 
to appeal the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress her statements to 
the police.

[¶5.]     On December 2, 1985, 
the district court entered an order stating that the stipulation would not be 
accepted. The court apparently considered the case of Tompkins v. State, 
Wyo., 705 P.2d 836 (1985), cert. denied ___ 
U.S. ___, 106 S. Ct. 1277, 89 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1986). Appellant filed a motion on December 4, 1985, urging the district 
court to reconsider its order disallowing the stipulation. On January 21, 1986, 
the district court entered its order accepting the stipulation, and found 
appellant guilty, in violation of § 35-7-1031(a)(ii), W.S. 1977, 1985 
Cum.Supp.

[¶6.]     The stipulation left 
nothing for the court to decide, appellant having agreed that she did exactly 
what the statute proscribed. Admission to all the essential elements of the 
crime with no suggestion of a defense is tantamount to a plea of guilty. People 
v. Sullivan, 72 Ill. App.3d 533, 29 Ill.Dec. 82, 391 N.E.2d 241 (1979); and People v. Russ, 31 Ill. App.3d 385, 334 N.E.2d 108 
(1975).

[¶7.]     The plea here is, in 
effect, a conditional plea of guilty which we held to be improper in Tompkins v. 
State, supra. In that case we said:

"* * * [Appellant] is not 
challenging the constitutionality of the statute to which he pled guilty. He is 
only seeking a ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Inasmuch as our Rule 15 
does not allow for such a conditional plea, we hold that such is not 
permissible. * * *" (Emphasis added.) Id., at 840.

[¶8.]     Here, as in Tompkins, 
appellant was seeking a ruling on the admissibility of evidence. In Tompkins we 
set out the reasons why a conditional plea to test the admissibility of evidence 
is improper, and we need not repeat the rationale here.

[¶9.]     This case is remanded 
to the district court for the taking of a proper plea.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶10.]  The substantive appellate issue raised by 
defendant in her now aborted appeal invokes definitional questions of "in 
custody" and "interrogation" derived from a suppression hearing within the 
purview of the constitutional protection criteria of Art. 1, § 6, and Art. 1, § 
11 of the Wyoming Constitution and the Fifth 
Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980); 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966); Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, 
Massiah and Miranda: What Is "Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67 Geo.L.J. 
1 (1978).

[¶11.]  The trial court held that the defendant, 
in a pre-arrest informational exchange was in custody but not interrogated prior 
to the time that officers, acting under a search warrant, gave her the Miranda 
warning. The State denies custody as a principal posture of justification for 
introduction of the pre-warning evidence, but alternatively also questions 
whether interrogation occurred in this pre-Miranda warning 
discussion.

[¶12.]  A further issue follows from continued 
questioning after the Miranda warning was given, which questioning then utilized 
the original pre-Miranda warning response of defendant. See United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1986); Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 
(1963).

[¶13.]  The facts will not change upon remand as 
earlier involved in the statement-suppression questions, those issues being 
directly represented hereafter in the defendant's plea decision, or upon trial 
if that process is the only way for her to test the constitutional issues 
involved.

[¶14.]  I differ with my colleagues since I 
believe that the evidentiary admissibility of the statements as the substantive 
issue which brought this case to us on appeal should now be addressed for 
assistance to both the trial court and defendant.

[¶15.]  The factual situation is simple and 
specific. By failure to address those issues we invite further confusion and 
leave in question not only the propriety of the trial court's prior decision but 
also other constitutional questions that may follow, including the eternal 
inquiry whether fundamental constitutional error is or is not waived or 
forfeited by a guilty plea. See United States v. Broce, 753 F.2d 811 
(10th Cir. 1985).

[¶16.]  Consequently, I would reason, in the 
interest of judicial economy and trial constitutional fairness, that this court 
should now address the substantive issues on the record before us concurrently 
with remand on the procedural question.

[¶17.]  Additionally, attention could providently 
be given to Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P., and the different provisions of Rule 11(a)(2), 
F.R. Cr.P., whether by rule change or reasoned logic, so that Tompkins v. State, 
Wyo., 705 P.2d 836 (1985), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 106 S. Ct. 1277, 89 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1986), which created this issue ab initio, without briefing by the 
litigants, should be modified to permit appeal by stipulated resolution if the 
decision made by the court on the particular issue raised would be dispositive, 
whether affirmed or reversed.

[¶18.]  The complexities and variances existent 
in criminal pretrial negotiations deserve recognition in consideration of 
constitutional rights and interest, if not by conditional plea as afforded by 
federal rules then by appeal in endeavoring to reach procedural equality so as 
to assure the availability and effectuation of those constitutional rights and 
limitations to both the charged defendant and to the society which requires 
enforcement of criminal statutes for its intrinsic 
protection.

[¶19.]  Consequently, I concur with remand, but 
would have preferred that the court address the substantive issues 
involved.