Title: State v. Ritter

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Ritter  (96-288); 167 Vt. 632; 714 A.2d 624

[Filed 10-Apr-1998]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 96-288

                             OCTOBER TERM, 1997

State of Vermont                }     APPEALED FROM:
                                }
                                }
     v.                         }     District Court of Vermont
                                }     Unit 1, Bennington Circuit
Aaron Ritter                    }
                                }     DOCKET NO. 1101-10-95BnCr

  In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant Aaron Ritter appeals his dual convictions of second-degree
  aggravated domestic assault (13 V.S.A. § 1044).  He argues that the trial
  court's decision permitting a single act that violates both § 1044(a)(1)
  and § 1044(a)(2) to be punished as separate crimes impermissibly infringes
  his right against double jeopardy.  We agree and vacate one of the two
  convictions and remand for re-sentencing.

       On the morning of October 8, 1995, defendant and his girlfriend had an
  argument. Angered that his girlfriend had been out late the previous night,
  defendant hit and kicked her while she was lying on a couch in the living
  room.  Defendant's sister stopped the fight and brought the victim to a
  relative's house, where she complained that her ribs hurt and exhibited
  symptoms consistent with rib injury.

       At the time of the attack, defendant was subject to a restraining
  order previously obtained by his girlfriend.  In addition, defendant had a
  prior conviction for domestic assault and was subject to a conditional
  release order, also preventing him from having contact with his girlfriend.

       Defendant was charged with numerous offenses arising out of the
  attack, including two counts of second-degree aggravated domestic assault. 
  Prior to trial, defendant moved to merge the two counts of second-degree
  aggravated domestic assault, arguing that they violated the rule against
  multiplicity and defendant's right against double jeopardy.  The State
  agreed that if the trial resulted in convictions under both counts, the
  convictions should merge.  The trial court granted defendant's motion,
  ordering that if the jury returned guilty verdicts on both charges the
  State would be required to elect between them.  Approximately one week
  later, however, the court announced that it had reconsidered its prior
  decision and concluded that it was permissible to convict defendant under
  both counts.

       Defendant was subsequently convicted of violating an abuse prevention
  order and two counts of second-degree aggravated domestic assault.  At the
  sentencing hearing both defendant and the State argued for the imposition
  of concurrent sentences for the two aggravated domestic assault convictions
  and the conviction for violating the abuse prevention order.  Nevertheless,
  the trial court imposed consecutive sentences on all three counts.

       Defendant argues that the trial court violated his right against
  double jeopardy by permitting his dual convictions of second-degree
  aggravated domestic assault.  The Double

 

  Jeopardy Clause provides that no person may "be subject for the same
  offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."  U.S. Const. amend.
  V.  This provision has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and
  applies to the states.  See Benton v. Maryland,