Title: Earlywine v. Peterson

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Earlywine v. Peterson1994 WY 132885 P.2d 861Case Number: 93-219Decided: 11/23/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Margie C. 
EARLYWINE,

Appellant 
(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

Lance K. PETERSON and 
Virginia B. Peterson, ex rel., Wyoming Real Estate 
Commission,

Appellees 
(Respondents).

Rehearing Denied December 
21, 1994.

Appeal from The District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

 

Carol A. 
Serelson, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., William G. Hibbler, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, whose 
real estate license was suspended for four months for her failure to disclose to 
a buyer that she, as both seller and listing agent, was in default on the 
mortgage to her own seller, appeals the district court's decision affirming the 
Wyoming Real Estate Commission's disciplinary suspension 
order.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents the following issues for our review: 

I. Did the Court err in 
not reversing the ruling of the Wyoming Real Estate Commission when the 
Commission's Findings of Fact are not supported by substantial 
evidence?

II. Did the Court err in 
not allowing the Appellant to raise the issue of a conflict of interest on the 
part of the Hearing Officer?

[¶4]      Appellee 
rephrases the issues and raises an additional issue:

I. Whether the failure of 
Earlywine to comply with the requirements of Rule 7.01(e)(1) and (2), Wyoming 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, should result in summary disposition of her 
appeal.

II. Whether the 
Commission, holding that Earlywine failed to disclose a known matter which was 
material to a real estate transaction, in violation of Commission Rule, Chapter 
II, Section 13(a)(xii), is supported by substantial 
evidence.

III. Whether the 
Commission decision is flawed because of alleged improper notice or conflict of 
interest by the hearing officer.

FACTS

[¶5]      In September, 
1986, appellant purchased undeveloped property, located in Laramie County, from 
Genevieve Carey (Carey). The property was secured by an installment note and 
mortgage in favor of Carey requiring annual payments of $8,266.56. The first 
payment was due on or before August 1, 1987, with subsequent payments due by 
September 1st for the following nine years. Appellant did not make the first 
payment on the installment note.

[¶6]      In April, 1988, 
appellant sold a portion of the subject property to Alan J. VanDerLeest and 
Arlis M. Bauer (VanDerLeest) for $34,000. Appellant received a $5,000 down 
payment and assigned the contract for deed amount of $29,000 to Carey. In return 
for that assignment, Carey executed and delivered to appellant a Partial Release 
of Real Estate Mortgage, dated April 29, 1988.

[¶7]      On January 11, 
1989, appellant, still having made no payment on the installment note, listed 
the remaining portion of the property with the Multiple Listing Service. The 
listing indicated appellant was both owner and listing agent of the property. On 
January 29, 1989, appellant received an offer from Lance K. Peterson and 
Virginia B. Peterson (Petersons) for purchase of the remaining property. On 
January 30, 1989, appellant and the Petersons agreed upon a purchase price of 
$39,000 to be financed with a contract for deed. The Petersons had worked with 
another real estate agent, Mary Meredith (Meredith), to locate the 
property.

[¶8]      On February 21, 
1989, Carey's attorney notified appellant's attorney that Carey had declared the 
mortgage in default. Between that date and the closing date of March 15, 1989, 
appellant attempted to negotiate an arrangement with Carey to cure appellant's 
default. Carey rejected appellant's first offer of monthly payments but accepted 
her second proposal on April 19, 1989, after the closing. Appellant never 
informed the Petersons of the default, and her agreement with Carey to make 
monthly payments ended when the check appellant wrote to cover the first payment 
was returned for insufficient funds.

[¶9]      At the March 15, 
1989 closing, the Petersons were provided with a title insurance policy which 
identified the encumbrance on the property, but Meredith assumed that mortgage 
would be paid off or arrangements made for payments through an escrow agent. 
Appellant made no arrangements to either pay off the mortgage or make payments 
on it and did not inform the Petersons of the mortgage and 
default.

[¶10]   On June 26, 1990, Carey filed a 
complaint against appellant to foreclose on the property. On October 3, 1990, 
Carey's attorney informed the Petersons of the default and action to foreclose. 
Upon advice of counsel, the Petersons suspended payments on their contract for 
deed with appellant in October, 1990. The Petersons were able to renegotiate 
their contract with Carey after her foreclosure upon appellant, but in doing so 
they incurred legal expenses of approximately $1,200. 

[¶11]   On November 12, 1991, the Petersons 
filed a complaint with the Wyoming Real Estate Commission alleging appellant had 
failed to disclose matters material to the transaction in violation of WYO. 
STAT. § 33-28-111 (1987) and Chapter II, Section 13(a)(xii) of the Real Estate 
Commission rules and regulations.

[¶12]   The commission held a contested 
case hearing November 18, 1992, and issued its decision on March 26, 1993, 
suspending appellant's associate broker's license for four months. Appellant 
filed a petition for review in district court on March 31, 1993, and on 
September 17, 1993, the district court entered an order affirming the 
commission's decision. The district court has stayed enforcement of the 
suspension pending this appeal.

DISCUSSION

1. 
Commission's Findings of Fact

[¶13]   Appellant asserts as her first 
claim of error that the commission's findings of fact were not supported by 
substantial evidence. Appellant specifically contests the commission's finding 
that appellant knew she was in default on the date of 
closing.

[¶14]   In reviewing a challenge to an 
agency's findings of fact in a contested case, this court examines the agency 
decision as if it was the reviewing court of first instance. Sheridan Race 
Car Ass'n v. Rice Ranch, 864 P.2d 30, 32 (Wyo. 1993). We employ the 
following standard of review:

We examine the entire 
record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support an agency's 
findings. If the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we 
cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the agency, and must uphold 
the findings on appeal. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a 
reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusion of the agency. It is 
more than a scintilla of evidence.

Little 
America Refining Co. v. Witt, 854 P.2d 51, 58 (Wyo. 
1993) (quoting Trout v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 721 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Wyo. 1986)) (citations omitted).

[¶15]   We find from our review of the 
record that the commission could reasonably have concluded that appellant knew 
she was in default on the date of closing. From the following testimony and 
exhibits presented at the hearing, the commission could have inferred appellant 
knew of her default:

· Appellant's 
acknowledgment, in her affidavit admitted as an exhibit at the hearing, that 
after the VanDerLeest payoff, the loan with Carey was still not 
current;

· Appellant's testimony 
that she knew she was in default before the VanDerLeest 
sale;

· Appellant's testimony 
that her attorney had advised her she was in default;

· Testimony of 
appellant's attorney that appellant knew she was behind in payments, coupled 
with appellant's letter to Petersons informing them that their failure to make 
timely payments put them in default on their loan with 
appellant.

[¶16]   We conclude that the above outlined 
testimony and exhibits, considered in conjunction with appellant's failure to 
ever make a payment on the installment loan with Carey, constitute substantial 
evidence in support of the commission's finding. We thus affirm the commission's 
finding that appellant knew of the default on the date of 
closing.

[¶17]   Appellant raises two additional 
questions in her argument of this issue. She questions first the authority of 
the commission to hear this matter in the absence of a finding that she was 
acting as a real estate agent in the sale of the property. Appellant did not 
raise this question before either the commission or the district court and this 
court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Campbell 
v. Dep't of Family Services, 881 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Wyo. 1994). We therefore 
do not address this question.

[¶18]   Appellant next contends that the 
charge she failed to disclose a material fact was not alleged in the complaint, 
and she had no notice of it. Again, appellant raised no objection at the hearing 
before the commission or in her petition for review before the district court. 
We therefore will not consider the question. Furthermore, the complaint includes 
the charge as one of the allegations, and the charge was clarified at the 
hearing before the commission.

2. Hearing 
Officer's Conflict of Interest

[¶19]   Appellant raised for the first 
time, in her petition for review before the district court, the issue of the 
hearing officer's possible conflict of interest. Appellant contends the hearing 
officer should have disqualified himself from hearing this matter because he is 
involved in estate work in which appellant has been acting as the real estate 
agent.

[¶20]   Appellant has failed to demonstrate 
how this creates a conflict of interest for the hearing officer or what interest 
he has in the outcome of this dispute. This court will not consider issues 
unsupported by cogent argument or pertinent authority. Wyrulec Company v. 
Schutt, 866 P.2d 756, 762 (Wyo. 1993); Davis v. State, 859 P.2d 89, 
94 (Wyo. 1993). Since appellant has provided neither, we decline to address the 
question of the hearing officer's possible conflict of 
interest.

3. Violation 
of Appellate Rules

[¶21]   Citing violations of the Wyoming 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, appellee urges this court to dismiss appellant's 
appeal or, in the alternative, accept only appellee's statement of the facts and 
award appellee attorney fees. Appellee points to deficiencies in appellant's 
brief including its failure to include a statement describing the nature of the 
case, the course of proceedings and the disposition of the case below and 
appellant's failure to provide appropriate references to the designated 
record.

[¶22]   We agree appellant's brief is 
deficient in this regard and additionally note that appellant's statement of 
facts inappropriately includes generous portions of argument and rhetoric. While 
we agree this court would be justified in dismissing appellant's appeal for her 
violations of appellate rules, State Game & Fish Comm'n v. Thornock, 
851 P.2d 1300, 1303-04 (Wyo. 1993), we decline to do so since we have rejected 
appellant's contentions on the merits. We also deny appellee's request for 
attorney fees.

CONCLUSION

[¶23]   The decision of the district court 
is affirmed.