Title: Commonwealth v. Tavares

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11508 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SANDRO TAVARES. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 9, 2015. - May 14, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, & Duffly, JJ. 
 
 
 
Homicide.  Joint Enterprise.  Evidence, Joint venturer, Intent, 
Argument by prosecutor, Firearm.  Intent.  Malice.  Jury 
and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, 
Question by jury, New trial, Argument by prosecutor, 
Capital case.  Firearms.  License. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 27, 2009.  
 
 
The cases were tried before Elizabeth B. Donovan, J.  
 
 
 
Dennis Shedd for the defendant. 
 
Sarah Montgomery Lewis, Assistant District Attorney (John 
P. Pappas, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  In October, 2011, a jury in the Superior 
Court convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree 
based on deliberate premeditation in connection with the fatal 
2 
 
shooting of Manuel Monteiro and Jovany Eason.1  The defendant did 
not fire the gun that killed the victims, but was convicted on a 
theory of joint venture with the shooter, who took the gun from 
the defendant's hand and began shooting.   
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that there was insufficient 
evidence to convict him of murder in the first degree based on a 
joint venture theory, that the judge erred in not instructing 
the jury on involuntary manslaughter and in misstating the law 
of joint venture in her response to a jury question, and that 
the prosecutor made improper statements in his closing argument.2  
We conclude that the judge's mistaken response to the jury 
question regarding the law of joint venture created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Therefore, 
we vacate the defendant's conviction on the murder charges and 
remand for a new trial on those indictments.3  
                     
 
1 The defendant was tried with a codefendant, Emmanuel Pina, 
who also was convicted of murder in the first degree and a 
related firearm possession offense.  This appeal concerns only 
the defendant.  Pina's appeal from his convictions remains 
pending.   
 
 
2 The defendant argues, in the alternative, that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Because we resolve this case 
on the issue of the response to the jury question, we do not 
discuss the defendant's argument regarding ineffective 
assistance of counsel.   
 
 
3 The defendant also challenges his conviction of possession 
of a firearm without a license in violation of G. L. c. 269, 
 
3 
 
 
Background.  Because the defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence presented, we summarize the facts 
the jury could have found in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Earle, 458 Mass. 341, 342 
(2010).  We reserve certain facts for further discussion in 
connection with other issues raised. 
 
Around 1 A.M. on August 2, 2009, an argument erupted at a 
bar and restaurant (bar) in the Dorchester section of Boston 
that was a popular gathering spot for members of the Cape 
Verdean community.  The argument led to a physical fight in the 
restroom of the bar, and later to the fatal shooting of the two 
victims.  Much of the incident was recorded by surveillance 
cameras inside and outside the bar and outside a building across 
the street.  
 
 
The argument began shortly after the defendant and a 
companion, Stephen Depina, arrived at the bar.4  The defendant 
embraced a friend who was at the bar and said to him, "I don't 
understand why you hang with the Draper Street niggas."  Eason, 
who was standing behind the defendant at the time, and who was 
friendly with people from the Draper Street neighborhood, 
                                                                  
§ 10 (a).  We conclude that there was no error related to this 
conviction.   
 
4 That night, the defendant was wearing a distinctive black 
shirt with white writing, which is visible on the surveillance 
footage.   
4 
 
overheard this comment, and an angry exchange ensued.  Adilson 
Resende was working security at the bar that night, and he 
separated the two men; immediately thereafter, the defendant 
left the bar with Depina.  Once outside, the defendant and 
Depina turned right and walked south.   
 
Inside the bar, the dispute continued.  Otelino Goncalves, 
another patron, argued with Eason; other men became involved as 
well, and the argument moved to the restroom.  Around the same 
time, the defendant's codefendant, Emmanuel Pina, approached the 
bar from the south, crossed to the other side of the street, 
and, less than a minute later, came back across the street and 
entered the bar.5  Once inside, Pina headed directly to the 
restroom and joined Goncalves in arguing with Eason and two of 
Eason's friends.  The owner of the bar attempted to quell the 
argument, but the situation quickly escalated into a physical 
fight, with punches and kicks being thrown, and Resende and a 
bartender rushed in to intervene.  Goncalves and Pina were 
forced out of the restroom and out the front door of the bar, 
with Goncalves exiting first, Pina second, and Adelberto Brandao 
(another patron who had assisted the employees in removing 
                     
 
5 The prosecutor asserted in his closing argument that the 
surveillance video showed Pina first approaching the area 
outside the bar several minutes earlier, alongside the defendant 
and Stephen Depina.  However, we view the video evidence 
referred to as inconclusive on this point, even when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  
5 
 
Goncalves and Pina) third.  Eason left the bar on his own about 
fifteen seconds ahead of Goncalves and Pina and headed to his 
motor vehicle, which was parked right in front of the bar.  
 
While the fight was developing inside the restroom, the 
defendant and Stephen Depina returned to the area outside the 
bar; the defendant was carrying a gun.  The defendant waited by 
the side of the bar for a few seconds before moving back to the 
sidewalk in front of the building and then crossing to the other 
side of the street.  
 
As Eason was opening his vehicle's door to leave, Goncalves 
approached him, and the two squared off in the middle of the 
street as if to engage in a second round of their earlier fight.  
Before the fight began, however, the defendant approached Eason 
from the sidewalk across the street and pointed the gun at him.  
Joao Depina, another patron who was inside the bar watching this 
scene through a window, saw the defendant try to "rack" the gun, 
meaning to pull the slide back in order to position a bullet in 
the chamber so that the gun could be fired.  Eason pointed his 
hand at the defendant, and the men backed away from one another.   
 
Pina then grabbed or took the gun from the defendant.6  With 
gun in hand, Pina ran toward Eason, shooting at him.  One shot 
                     
 
6 The transfer of the gun from the defendant to Pina was not 
recorded on the surveillance cameras.  Although there was some 
uncertainty as to the exact manner in which Pina took the gun 
 
6 
 
broke through a window near the front door of the bar and hit 
Monteiro (a cook in the restaurant portion of the bar who was 
standing at the window watching the altercation outside) in the 
chest.  Monteiro collapsed shortly after being hit; he died from 
the gunshot wound and was pronounced dead at the scene.   
 
Eason, meanwhile, was running north up the street followed 
by Pina, who was continuing to shoot at him, hitting Eason 
multiple times in the back.  A few seconds behind Pina ran 
Brandao and the defendant.  At an intersection, Eason turned 
left, where he fell to the ground and was later discovered by 
police officers.  Pina turned right and ran up another street.  
The defendant followed Pina to the corner of the intersection, 
but then turned and ran off in another direction.  Emergency 
medical personnel arrived shortly thereafter and transported 
Eason to Boston Medical Center, but he died of gunshot wounds 
before arriving at the hospital.    
 
The defendant as well as Pina were indicted for the murders 
of Monteiro and Eason and for possession of a firearm without a 
license in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  In late 
November, 2009, approximately one month after the defendant's 
indictments issued, the defendant was arrested in Atlanta, 
                                                                  
from the defendant, a point we discuss infra, the witnesses 
agreed that the defendant made no attempt to withhold the gun 
from Pina.   
7 
 
Georgia, where he had been living under an assumed name.  He and 
Pina were tried before a jury in September, 2011, and at the 
close of the evidence, the defendant moved for a required 
finding of not guilty, which was denied.  The judge instructed 
the jury on principles of joint venture and transferred intent.  
After deliberation, the jury convicted the defendant and Pina of 
murder in the first degree of both victims on the theory of 
deliberate premeditation.7  The jury also found the defendant 
guilty of the firearm possession charge.  The defendant filed a 
timely appeal from his convictions.   
 
Discussion.  1.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The 
defendant contends that the judge erred in declining to grant 
his motion for a required finding of not guilty, because there 
was insufficient evidence to convict him of deliberately 
premeditated murder.  As previously noted, we consider the 
evidence on this issue in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, and, "drawing all inferences in [the 
Commonwealth's] favor," ask whether evidence existed to "permit 
a rational jury to find each essential element of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt."  Earle, 458 Mass. at 346.  See 
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).  
                     
 
7 During deliberations, the jury submitted a question to the 
judge concerning whether joint venturers must both be convicted 
of the same offense.  We discuss this question in part 2.b, 
infra.  
8 
 
 
Because the defendant's murder convictions were based on 
his role in the killings as a joint venturer, the Commonwealth 
was required to prove to the jury that "the defendant knowingly 
participated in the commission of the crime charged, alone or 
with others, with the intent required for that offense."  
Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 467-468 (2009).  "The 
defendant's intent may be inferred from his knowledge of the 
circumstances and participation in the crime," Commonwealth v. 
Norris, 462 Mass. 131, 139 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Carnes, 457 Mass. 812, 823 (2010), and any inferences drawn 
"need only be reasonable and possible, and need not be necessary 
or inescapable."  Commonwealth v. Elliot, 430 Mass. 498, 500 
(1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Pucillo, 427 Mass. 108, 113 
(1998).   
 
The defendant clearly was present at the scene of the 
murders and actively participated in the events leading to the 
two victims' deaths, thereby meeting the first part of the test 
for joint venture.  See Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 Mass. 245, 
253 (2013).  However, the defendant contends that he lacked the 
intent required to sustain a conviction of murder in the first 
degree based on deliberate premeditation and that, therefore, 
the second prong of the test for joint venture -- possession of 
the requisite intent for the offense, see id. -- was absent with 
respect to this crime.  Thus, the question regarding the 
9 
 
sufficiency of the evidence is whether the evidence concerning 
the defendant's intent was sufficient.   
In order to have committed murder in the first degree with 
deliberate premeditation, a defendant must have had or shared an 
"intent to kill or cause death," Norris, 462 Mass. at 139, which 
was the "product of 'cool reflection.'"  Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 
455, quoting Commonwealth v. Freeman, 442 Mass. 779, 783 (2004).  
Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 732 (2010), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Coleman, 434 Mass. 165, 167 (2001).  "[N]o 
particular period of reflection is required, and . . . a plan to 
murder may be formed in seconds."  Gambora, supra at 733, 
quoting Coleman, supra at 168.  Thus, if there was evidence 
presented from which the jury could infer that the defendant 
intended to kill Eason, and the decision was the result of some 
period of reflection, however short, then the defendant's motion 
for a required finding of not guilty was properly denied.8      
 
Here, the jury could have found that Pina intended to kill 
Eason, and that the defendant shared that intent.  First, the 
                     
 
8 As the judge instructed the jury, any intent that the 
defendant had to kill Jovany Eason also applied to Manuel 
Monteiro, according to the doctrine of transferred intent.  See 
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 463 Mass. 857, 863 (2012) (where 
defendant intended to kill one victim, but in attempting to do 
so caused another victim's death, defendant is treated as if he 
intended to kill bystander).  The defendant does not challenge 
the adequacy of the transferred intent instruction or its 
application to this case, and our own review indicates that the 
instruction was correct.   
10 
 
evidence that Pina fought in the restroom with Eason, and that 
Pina then obtained a gun and ran after Eason repeatedly firing 
at him, is sufficient to support a guilty verdict for Pina of 
murder in the first degree based on deliberate premeditation.  
See Commonwealth v. Williams, 422 Mass. 111, 123 (1996).  
Turning, then, to the defendant's conduct, and drawing all 
reasonable inferences in the Commonwealth's favor, the jury 
could have found that the defendant's actions demonstrated 
"knowledge of the circumstances and participation in the crime," 
leading to the conclusion that the defendant shared Pina's 
intent with respect to killing Eason.  See Norris, 462 Mass. at 
139.  Considered in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the defendant's argument with Eason inside the bar 
sparked the entire violent encounter.  While others continued 
the argument, the defendant obtained the weapon that was 
ultimately used to kill Eason and went back to wait near the 
bar, suggesting that the defendant knew what was happening 
inside and that he was lying in wait for Eason to come out with 
the others who had been fighting.  When Eason emerged from the 
bar, the defendant pointed the gun at Eason and attempted to put 
a bullet in the chamber, so that the gun could be fired at any 
moment.  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 456 Mass. 476, 488 (2010) 
(jury "may infer an intent to kill from the use of a firearm").  
Although the defendant did not shoot Eason himself, he allowed 
11 
 
Pina to take the gun from him and then ran behind Pina as Pina 
pursued Eason.  Thus, from the defendant's actions, the jury 
reasonably could conclude that the defendant planned to kill 
Eason, that he participated in the killing by obtaining the 
murder weapon, and that he allowed or encouraged Pina to follow 
through with the murder.  See Akara, 465 Mass. at 255-256 
(defendant could have been found to have shared principal 
shooter's intent, where jury could have inferred that defendant 
passed gun to principal, stood by principal as he fired, and 
fled scene with principal); Commonwealth v. Brooks, 422 Mass. 
574, 577 (1996) (even if defendant did not shoot victim, 
evidence that defendant carried firearm, obscured his face, and 
fled scene with shooters supported conviction of murder in first 
degree).9     
                     
 
9 The defendant relies on Commonwealth v. Elliot, 430 Mass. 
498 (1999), to support his argument that in the present case, 
there was insufficient evidence of his intent to kill with 
deliberate premeditation.  In Elliot, the defendant passed a gun 
to the principal shooter, who had made clear his intent to shoot 
the victim; the jury found the principal shooter guilty of 
murder in the first degree, and the defendant guilty of murder 
in the second degree.  See id. at 498-500.  We agree with the 
defendant that in Elliot, there was more direct evidence of the 
defendant's intent in passing the gun to the principal than 
there is in the present case.  Nevertheless, for the reasons 
just discussed in the text, we conclude that, here, there was 
sufficient evidence presented for the jury to have inferred that 
the defendant possessed the required intent for the crime of 
murder in the first degree.  
 
12 
 
 
2.  Jury issues.  The defendant argues that the judge erred 
in instructing the jury and in responding to a jury question.  
First, although the defendant did not request an involuntary 
manslaughter instruction, or object when the judge did not give 
one,10 the defendant asserts that the evidence warranted this 
instruction and that the judge committed error in not giving it.  
Second, the defendant argues that the judge committed a separate 
error in the response she gave to the jury when they sought 
clarification on the law as it pertains to joint venture.  The 
defendant did not object at that time to the judge's response to 
the jury question.  Because the defendant did not raise these 
issues during the trial, we review to determine if they created 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 223 (2014).   
 
a.  Involuntary manslaughter.  Notwithstanding the fact 
that the defendant did not pursue an involuntary manslaughter 
instruction at trial, on review, it is clear that the facts, 
when considered in the light most favorable to the defendant, 
see Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 443 (2006), 
                     
 
10 At the charge conference, Pina's trial counsel did 
request instructions on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, 
which the trial judge declined to give.  The defendant's trial 
counsel indicated that he was content with the murder 
instructions and did not object during the charge conference or 
at the close of the charge.   
 
13 
 
supported such an instruction.11  An instruction on involuntary 
manslaughter also would have been consistent with the 
defendant's trial strategy.12   
 
At the close of trial, the judge instructed the jury on 
murder in the first and second degrees.  Malice, for purposes of 
murder in the second degree, may consist of the intent to kill; 
the intent to cause grievous bodily harm; or the intent to 
commit an act that, in the circumstances known to the defendant, 
created a plain and strong likelihood of death (third prong 
malice).  See Earle, 458 Mass. at 346-347.  A "fine line" 
distinguishes murder in the second degree based on third prong 
malice from involuntary manslaughter, see Commonwealth v. Lyons, 
444 Mass. 289, 293 (2005), which has been defined as "an 
unintentional, unlawful killing caused by wanton or reckless 
                     
 
11 Because the defendant's intent was open to multiple 
interpretations based on the evidence, considering the facts in 
the light most favorable to the defendant, rather than to the 
Commonwealth, plays a significant role in our analysis of what 
crime the jury could have found that the defendant committed.  
Thus, although we concluded, supra, that the trial evidence was 
sufficient to support a conviction of murder in the first 
degree, viewed differently, the same evidence also could have 
supported a conviction of involuntary manslaughter.  
 
 
12 In closing, the defendant's trial counsel argued as his 
principal point that neither the video evidence nor any other 
evidence reliably showed that it was the defendant who brought 
the gun to the scene.  But trial counsel's alternative argument 
was that even if the defendant was the person who obtained the 
gun and pointed it at Eason, there was no evidence from the 
defendant's actions that he intended to kill Eason.   
14 
 
conduct."13  Earle, supra at 347.  "The difference between the 
elements of the third prong of malice and . . . involuntary 
manslaughter lies in the degree of risk of physical harm that a 
reasonable person would recognize was created by particular 
conduct, based on what the defendant knew.  The risk for the 
purposes of third prong malice is that there was a plain and 
strong likelihood of death . . . [whereas] [t]he risk that will 
satisfy the standard for . . . involuntary manslaughter 
'involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will 
result to another.'"  Lyons, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Sires, 413 Mass. 292, 303 n.14 (1992).  See Commonwealth v. 
Vizcarrondo, 427 Mass. 392, 396 (1998), S.C., 431 Mass. 360 
(2000), and 447 Mass. 1017 (2006).  Thus, where a defendant is 
charged with murder, an instruction on involuntary manslaughter 
is appropriate if any "reasonable view of the evidence would 
[permit] the jury to find 'wanton and reckless' conduct rather 
than actions from which a 'plain and strong likelihood' of death 
would follow."  See Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 331 
                     
 
13 This court has described conduct amounting to involuntary 
manslaughter as both "wanton or reckless" and "wanton and 
reckless."  See Commonwealth v. Chase, 433 Mass. 293, 301 
(2001).  Expressed either way, the words articulate a single 
standard, not two.  See id.     
15 
 
(2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Jenks, 426 Mass. 582, 585 
(1998).14   
 
In this case, although the defendant brought the gun to the 
scene and pointed it at Eason, the defendant never fired the 
gun.  Moreover, much of the defendant's handling of the gun 
occurred out of view of the surveillance cameras,15 and the 
nature of the events that were not captured on camera was in 
dispute.  For example, the jury could have found that the 
defendant never tried to "rack" the gun and, instead, simply 
pointed the gun at Eason and then backed away.16  The jury also 
could have found that Pina grabbed the gun unexpectedly from the 
defendant, and that the defendant did not know Pina would take 
                     
 
14 The Commonwealth argues that in order for the defendant 
to be convicted of involuntary manslaughter, the jury would have 
to find that Monteiro's and Eason's deaths were the result of 
wanton or reckless conduct, because the Commonwealth proceeded 
against the defendant based on a theory of joint venture.  
However, this presumes that the defendant and Pina could only 
have been found guilty of the same crime, which is not the case.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 405 Mass. 646, 658-659 
(1989).  We return to this point infra.   
 
 
15 One of the cameras in front of the bar shows the 
defendant walking into view pointing the gun at Eason, and then 
backing out of view.  Seconds later, the camera shows Pina 
running back into view with the gun.   
 
 
16 Although Joao Depina testified on direct examination that 
he saw the defendant try to "rack" the gun, the jury also heard 
evidence that during this witness's first interview with police, 
which was the same night as the shootings, he did not say this.    
Rather, in his first interview, he reported that he saw the 
"second guy" (Pina) playing with the gun and then shooting it.  
 
16 
 
the gun or that he would fire it.17  Had the jury reached these 
conclusions, they might have also believed, as the defendant now 
suggests, that the defendant's actions of returning to the area 
outside of the bar and pointing the gun at Eason were meant only 
to scare or intimidate him, and not to kill him.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 126 (2013) (evidence that 
defendant pointed loaded gun at victim "might imply an intent to 
kill, but it equally implies an intent to frighten and deter"). 
The jury could therefore have determined that a reasonable 
person with the defendant's intent toward Eason and subjective 
knowledge of the circumstances might not have anticipated that 
his actions would likely lead to Eason's death, but would 
certainly have understood that he had created a high degree of 
likelihood of substantial harm to Eason.18  Compare Commonwealth 
                     
 
17 As previously noted, although the prosecutor suggested 
that Pina arrived at the area outside the bar with the defendant 
and Stephen Depina, the evidence supporting this inference was 
inconclusive.  Thus, the jury could have found that the 
defendant and Pina were never in the same place at the same time 
before the moment that the defendant appeared pointing the gun 
at Eason, a conclusion that is consistent with the theory that 
the defendant was surprised by Pina's actions of grabbing and 
shooting the gun. 
 
 
18 It is true that, in general, firing a gun at a person or 
group of people is presumed to create a plain and strong 
likelihood of death, rather than wanton and reckless conduct.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 332 (2007); 
Commonwealth v. Jenks, 426 Mass. 582, 586 (1998); Commonwealth 
v. Alebord, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 7 (2006), S.C., 467 Mass. 106, 
 
17 
 
v. Horne, 466 Mass. 440, 444-446 (2013) (firing at covered 
window of home late at night created high degree of likelihood 
of substantial harm to another, but not plain and strong 
likelihood of death).  Contrast Commonwealth v. Childs, 445 
Mass. 529, 533-534 (2005) (pointing loaded, cocked gun into 
occupied motor vehicle created plain and strong likelihood of 
death due to gun's close proximity to vehicle's occupants and 
potential for gun to fire); Elliot, 430 Mass. at 500 (pointing 
gun and then passing it to companion who had made plain his 
intent to shoot victim constituted conduct from which plain and 
strong likelihood of death would result).   
 
The facts of this case thus could have been reasonably 
interpreted in a manner that warranted an instruction on 
involuntary manslaughter.  However, in the absence of any 
request by the defendant for such an instruction, or of any 
indication that the defendant brought this interpretation of the 
facts to the judge's attention, the judge was not required to 
give the instruction sua sponte.  See Commonwealth v. Berry, 431 
Mass. 326, 337-338 & n.15 (2000), citing Commonwealth v. 
Roberts, 407 Mass. 731, 737 (1990) (judge not required to charge 
on lesser included offense, absent request).  Cf. Commonwealth 
v. Stokes, 460 Mass. 311, 315 (2011) (in trial resulting in 
                                                                  
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2830 (2014).  But, here, the defendant 
did not fire the gun.   
18 
 
murder conviction, no error occurred requiring allowance of 
defendant's motion for new trial where judge did not instruct on 
lesser included offense supported by evidence and no party had 
requested such instruction).  Nevertheless, the fact that such 
an instruction would have been appropriate had one been 
requested remains important as we consider the impact of the 
next error that the defendant claims.   
 
b.  Response to jury question regarding joint venture.19  
During deliberations, the jury submitted to the judge the 
following question:  "If person A aids and abets person B, does 
the degree of charge of person B affect the degree of charge of 
person A?"  The judge interpreted this question as:  "[i]s the 
aider and abettor liable to the same degree as the perpetrator?" 
and responded to the jury that "[t]he aider and abettor is 
liable to the same degree as the perpetrator of the crime."  The 
defendant's trial counsel indorsed this interpretation of the 
jury's question and the judge's response.  However, on appeal, 
the defendant argues that this response constituted error, 
because it obscured the fact that one who aids and abets the 
                     
 
19 Following closing arguments, the judge instructed the 
jury on the concept of joint venture using the language of 
"aiding and abetting" that this court indorsed in Commonwealth 
v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 467, 470 (2009).  On appeal, the 
defendant objects not to the judge's initial instructions on 
joint venture, but only to her response to the jury's question.   
19 
 
commission of a crime need not necessarily be convicted of the 
same offense as the principal.   
 
In the context of this case, the jury's question was open 
to more than one interpretation.  The question could have meant 
that the jury had already decided that Pina had committed murder 
in the first degree, and that the defendant, by actively 
participating with Pina in the crime and sharing the intent 
necessary, had aided and abetted Pina in the commission of that 
offense; if the jury had reached this judgment, then the judge 
properly conveyed in her response that the defendant was liable 
for that offense to the same degree as Pina.  However, it is 
equally possible the question meant the jury had determined that 
Pina was guilty of murder in the first degree and that the 
defendant had "aided and abetted" the killings in some fashion, 
but the jury had not yet decided whether the defendant met all 
of the elements required to convict him of murder in the first 
degree as well -- and perhaps most specifically, the element of 
intent.  
 
If the jury's question is understood in this second way, 
the judge's response becomes misleading, because it suggests 
that if the jury found that the defendant aided or assisted Pina 
in the killings and that Pina was guilty of murder in the first 
degree, then the jury were required to also find the defendant 
guilty of first-degree murder.  This is incorrect.  Two or more 
20 
 
defendants may have knowingly participated together in a 
criminal act, such as an unlawful killing, but may have had 
different mental states or levels of culpability with respect to 
that act.  In such a situation, each participating defendant may 
nevertheless be convicted as an aider and abettor (or joint 
venturer), so long as each participant had, at a minimum, the 
mental state required for the particular offense or offenses of 
which he or she was convicted.  See Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 
Mass. 266, 268 & n.2, 293-295 (2014) (in circumstances of case, 
jury could have found two defendants to have participated as 
joint venturers in some or all of several crimes charged 
[including kidnapping, robbery, murder, and assault and battery 
by means of dangerous weapon] but could have also "assign[ed] a 
different level of culpability in the resulting murder, so long 
as the [two defendants] each had, at a minimum, the required 
intent for the crimes of which they were convicted"); 
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 405 Mass. 646, 647-648, 658-659 
(1989) (in group assault case where one defendant killed victim 
and was convicted of murder in first degree, codefendants could 
be convicted of manslaughter if jury found that codefendants 
only intended to commit assault and battery).  Accordingly, we 
have not required that all who participate as joint venturers in 
a single killing be found guilty of the same offense.  See Wood, 
supra at 294; Cunningham, supra at 658-659.  See also Elliot, 
21 
 
430 Mass. at 498-500 (codefendants tried for murder as joint 
venturers; defendant who did not shoot victim convicted of 
murder in second degree; shooter convicted of murder in first 
degree).   
 
Given the unique context of this trial, in which the 
evidence that Pina committed murder in the first degree based on 
deliberate premeditation was strong,20 but the evidence of the 
defendant's intent was open to a number of different 
interpretations, it was error for the trial judge to respond to 
the jury's question in a way that eliminated the possibility 
that the defendant could be found guilty of a lesser offense 
than Pina.  We turn then to the question whether this error, 
when considered along with the lack of an instruction on 
involuntary manslaughter, created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice requiring a new trial for the defendant.  
 
Where there has been an error in a trial resulting in a 
conviction of murder in the first degree, "a new trial is called 
for unless we are substantially confident that, if the error had 
not been made, the jury verdict would have been the same."  
Figueroa, 468 Mass. at 229, quoting Commonwealth v. Ruddock, 428 
Mass. 288, 292 n.3 (1998).  We cannot be confident that the jury 
                     
 
20 Pina was shown on the surveillance video chasing Eason 
with a gun, and Brandao testified that he saw Pina shooting at 
Eason as they ran.  
22 
 
would still have returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the 
first degree had the judge not erroneously indicated that the 
defendant, if found to have aided and abetted Pina, had to be 
convicted of the same offense as Pina.  As we have discussed, 
that the defendant knowingly participated in the deaths of Eason 
and Monteiro was clear based on the evidence, but whether the 
defendant's state of mind leading up to and during the killings 
amounted to malice was a question of fact that the jury could 
have resolved in more than one way.  Even assuming that the jury 
did conclude that the defendant acted with malice, they could 
have found the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree 
rather than in the first degree.  See Wood, 469 Mass. at 294.  
This result was a real possibility, given that the defendant was 
not the shooter, and the jury may have therefore concluded that 
he was less culpable for the deaths than Pina.  See id. at 294-
295 (jury may act within their discretion in deciding to hold 
principal murderer responsible to greater degree than joint 
venturer).  See also Elliot, 430 Mass. at 498-500.  Any 
confidence that the jury verdict would have been the same absent 
the error is further weakened by the facts that (1) the judge 
did not explain to the jury during her instructions on joint 
venture that the codefendants could be convicted of different 
offenses; and (2) the evidence relating to the defendant would 
have supported an instruction on involuntary manslaughter, even 
23 
 
though, as earlier discussed, the absence of such an instruction 
was not error.  
 
In sum, the jury could have found the defendant guilty of a 
less severe offense than murder in the first degree.  Because 
the response to the jury's question obscured or eliminated the 
possibility that the defendant could be convicted of any lesser 
offense, the response created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice, and the defendant is entitled to a new 
trial.   
 
3.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  Because the defendant 
asserts that several aspects of the prosecutor's closing 
argument were improper, issues that may arise again at retrial, 
we comment briefly on each of the defendant's objections.   
 
a.  Appeals to sympathy.  The defendant first argues that 
the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury's sympathy by 
referring to Monteiro as "an uncle, a husband, and a friend to 
many people and he's none of those things anymore," and by 
stating that Monteiro "did not deserve to wind up dead under a 
sheet on the floor in the restaurant where he worked with a 
bullet in his chest."   
 
"The prosecutor was entitled to 'humanize the proceedings' 
by telling the jury 'something of the person whose life has been 
lost,' but he also was required to argue in such a way as to 
ensure that the verdict was 'based on the evidence rather than 
24 
 
sympathy for the victim and [his] family.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Mejia, 463 Mass. 243, 253 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 494-495 & n.3 (1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 
298, and 428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998).  
Thus, we have suggested that remarks that unduly emphasized the 
loss suffered by a victim's family, while not prejudicing the 
defendant, "were better left unsaid."  Mejia, supra.  Similarly, 
a prosecutor's statement that the victim "didn't deserve to die 
this way" has been held improper, because it had no relevance to 
the question of the defendant's guilt, although it did not 
create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Gentile, 437 Mass. 569, 580 (2002).  The 
prosecutor's comments in the present case were similar.  
Although it was appropriate for the prosecutor to humanize the 
victims in his closing argument, placing unnecessary emphasis on 
the losses suffered by the victims' families and on the 
unforeseeable nature of Monteiro's death was improper and should 
be avoided.   
 
b.  References to malice.  Next, the defendant argues that 
the prosecutor improperly asked the jury to infer that the 
defendant acted with malice based only on the defendant having 
pointed the gun at Eason.  The defendant objects to the 
following statements by the prosecutor: 
25 
 
"This fellow right here, Sandro Tavares, malice, taking the 
gun, pointing it at him.  What is his intent?  He had every 
opportunity to walk away that night.  He had walked away. 
But he came back with a purpose and part of his purpose was 
a 45-caliber semi-automatic weapon.  That's malice, 
pointing it at someone.  [Was] it his intent just to scare 
him?  Well, you saw him in the aftermath that that clearly 
wasn't the intent when the bullets started flying.  
Specific intent to kill."   
 
 
Some of the prosecutor's statements ("malice, taking the 
gun, pointing it at him;" "[t]hat's malice, pointing it at 
someone") do suggest that the jury could infer malice directly 
from the defendant's act of pointing the gun at Eason.  Such a 
suggestion, when not combined with other facts that support the 
inference, is improper, because although we have said that 
malice may be inferred from the act of shooting at someone, we 
have not adopted the same inference merely from pointing a gun.  
See Braley, 449 Mass. at 332.  Contrast Lewis, 465 Mass. at 126.  
Thus, although the prosecutor referenced the defendant leaving 
and returning to the scene, and later referenced the subsequent 
shootings, we agree with the defendant that the cited statements 
improperly suggested to the jury that the act of pointing the 
gun at Eason alone was enough to find malice.   
 
c.  References to accountability.  Finally, the defendant 
argues that the prosecutor, in his closing, improperly made 
repeated references to holding the defendant accountable for his 
actions.  Although some cases have suggested that directing the 
jury to hold the defendant accountable is improper, see 
26 
 
Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 458 Mass. 791, 796-797 (2011); 
Commonwealth v. Torres, 437 Mass. 460, 464-465 (2002), others 
have viewed such remarks as "characteristic of 'enthusiastic 
rhetoric, strong advocacy, and excusable hyperbole,' [that do] 
not cross the line between fair and improper argument."  
Commonwealth v. Freeman, 430 Mass. 111, 120 (1999), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 426 Mass. 466, 472 (1998).  Here, where 
the prosecutor's references to the defendant's accountability 
for his actions were each connected to specific acts of the 
defendant that were in evidence, the comments were not improper.   
 
4.  Possession of a firearm.  The defendant also was 
convicted of possession of a firearm without a license in 
violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  The parties agree that, 
ordinarily, the Commonwealth is not required to prove that a 
defendant does not have a license to carry a firearm unless the 
defendant comes forward with evidence of a license.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 802 (2012).  The defendant 
argues, however, that the judge's instructions on the elements 
of the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm included a 
reference to the absence of a license, and that therefore the 
Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant did not 
have a license.   
 
The defendant's argument is without merit.  In general, 
when reviewing jury instructions "[w]e evaluate the instruction 
27 
 
as a whole," rather than "consider[ing] bits and pieces . . . in 
isolation" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 
198, 207 (2012).  Here, the judge prefaced her instruction on 
unlawful possession of a firearm by stating explicitly to the 
jury that license was not an issue in this case, and that they 
were not required to consider the issue of the defendant's 
possession of a license.  Considering the judge's instructions 
as a whole in light of that statement, the jury clearly would 
have understood that the Commonwealth did not have to prove that 
the defendant did not have a gun license.  Thus, "[t]he balance 
of the instructions conveyed the proper law."  Id. at 210.   
 
5.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's 
conviction of murder in the first degree is reversed, and the 
case remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial.  The 
conviction of possession of a firearm without a license in 
violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.