Title: Crowdus v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

431 N.E.2d 796 (1982)
Jesse CROWDUS, Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 381S56.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
March 5, 1982.
*797 Christopher C. Zoeller, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Richard Albert Alford, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
PRENTICE, Justice.
Defendant (Appellant) was convicted of Count I, Possession of Cocaine, a Class D Felony, as a lesser included offense of the charge of Delivery of Cocaine, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(1) (Burns Supp. 1981), and Count II, Delivery of Cocaine, a Class B Felony, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(1) (Burns Supp. 1981). He was sentenced to two (2) years imprisonment upon Count I and eleven (11) years imprisonment upon Count II, such sentences to run concurrently. This direct appeal presents four issues, one of which requires us to reverse and remand for a new trial.
After the jurors had deliberated for almost two hours, they requested that the trial court give them an instruction on entrapment and inform them of what would happen if they could not reach a unanimous decision. Over Defendant's timely objection, the trial court gave the following additional instructions:
Supplemental Instruction B is commonly referred to as an Allen charge. Allen v. United States, (1896) 164 U.S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed. 528. In Lewis v. State, (1981) Ind., 424 N.E.2d 107, we explicitly disapproved the giving of Allen charges and we stated the procedure to follow in responding to any type of problem occasioned by inquiry from the jurors during deliberations:
It was error for the trial court to give Supplemental Instruction B over Defendant's objection, and Defendant is entitled to a new trial. Burnett v. State, (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 1314.
With respect to the giving of Supplemental Instruction A, we note that the ruling in Lewis is not limited to Allen charges. Once deliberations commence, the trial court should not give any additional instructions. This rule precludes the trial court from giving any special emphasis, inadvertent or otherwise, to a particular issue in the case, and thus avoids the possibility that the additional instruction(s) may tell the jury what it ought to do concerning that issue. Wallace v. State, (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 34, 36; Cameron v. State, (1979) Ind., 383 N.E.2d 1039, 1041.
We have recognized only one limited and narrow exception to this rule:
We have not yet confronted a record where this exception may apply; however, it is clear that it is not applicable in the case at bar.
*799 The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.
GIVAN, C.J., and DeBRULER, HUNTER and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.