Title: Meyer v. State ex rel. Dept. of Revenue and Taxation

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Meyer v. State ex rel. Dept. of Revenue and Taxation1989 WY 22767 P.2d 617Case Number: 88-2Decided: 01/24/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
Richard MEYER, 
Petitioner,

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE ofWyoming, ex 
rel., DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND TAXATION, Respondent

 
 
Robert J. Reese of Reese & 
Mathey, Green River, for 
Petitioner.

 
 
Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General, 
Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Attorney General, and Mark Quiner, Assistant Attorney 
General for Respondent.  

 
 
J. Joseph Cardine, C.J., and Richard 
V. Thomas, Walter C. Urbigkit, and Richard J. Macy, JJ., and C. Stuart Brown, J. 
Ret.* 

 
 
*    Retired June 29, 
1988.

 
 
Cardine, Chief Justice 

 
 

[¶1.]          
This appeal 
is from a hearing examiner's order suspending appellant's driver's license for 
his driving under the influence conviction in municipal court. The issue 
presented for our determination is whether the driving under the influence 
conviction is valid in the absence of entry of a formal plea before his jury 
trial.

 
 
[¶2.]           
We hold that the hearing examiner was without authority to determine the 
validity of appellant's criminal conviction, and we affirm the order of 
suspension.

 
 
[¶3.]           
On October 25, 1986, appellant was arrested and charged with driving 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of a municipal 
ordinance similar to W.S. 31-5-233. On October 28, appellant's attorney 
filed an entry of appearance and demanded a jury trial. Arraignment was set for 
November 10, 1986, at 9:00 a.m. Appellant alleges that when he arrived for 
arraignment that day he was informed by court personnel that there would be no 
arraignment because his attorney had already entered an appearance and demanded 
a jury trial. On January 6, 1987, appellant was tried on the charge and 
convicted by a jury in Green River municipal 
court. The conviction was appealed to the District Court, Third Judicial 
District, and was affirmed on April 29, 1987.

 
 
[¶4.]           
Thereafter, based upon appellant's conviction and pursuant to W.S. 
31-7-128, appellee State of Wyoming, Department of Revenue and Taxation, 
sent appellant an "Order of Suspension and Notice of Opportunity for Hearing" 
providing for the suspension of appellant's driving privileges for ninety days. 
Appellant requested a hearing, which was held on September 2, 1987.  The independent hearing examiner 
received into evidence the record of appellant's conviction and upheld the 
suspension pursuant to W.S. 
31-7-128(b) (i), which provides:

 

   "(b) Upon receiving a record of a 
driver's conviction under W.S. 
31-5-233 or other law prohibiting driving while under the influence, the 
division shall suspend the license or non-resident operating privilege 
for:

 
 
"(i) Ninety (90) days for the first 
conviction."

 

Appellant appealed the independent 
hearing examiner's decision to the Third Judicial District Court, which 
certified the case to this court.

 
 
[¶5.]           
Appellant contends that the municipal court's failure to take a plea 
deprived that court of jurisdiction to hear the case, thus rendering the 
conviction void. Because the conviction was void, appellant argues, the license 
suspension based upon that conviction is invalid. Appellant cites no authority 
for the proposition that he may, in an administrative hearing, collaterally 
attack his criminal conviction, and there is ample authority supporting the 
contention that he may not. SeeState ex rel. Motor Vehicle 
Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 735 
( 
Wyo. 
1983), where we held that

 

   "there is no indication that the 
legislature intended the [motor vehicle] Division, an agency of the executive 
branch of the government, to act in an appellate capacity over the Courts, and, 
of course, such would be unconstitutional as a violation of the 
separation-of-powers doctrine."

 
 
 See also, Brown v. Idaho State Board 
of Pharmacy, 113      
 Idaho 547, 746 P.2d 1006, 
1009 (1987) ("An administrative agency is not the proper forum for 
challenging the validity of a criminal conviction.") and DeRasmo v. 
Smith, 15 Cal. App. 3d 601, 93 Cal. Rptr. 289, 294 (1971) ("The administrative agency, of course, could 
not declare the judgment of a court to be void."). 

 
 
[¶6.]           
We affirm the hearing examiner's order suspending appellant's driver's 
license.