Title: STATE v WILLIS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 82-322 IN T I I E SUPREIflJ COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1983 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- VICTOR M.ARVIN WILLIS, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade, The Honorable John PI. McCarvel, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Ralph T. Randono argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana George Schunk argued, Legal Intern, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: September 12, 1983 Decided: December 13, 1983 Clerk Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. Willis was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent and agqra~rated burglary in the District Court of Cascade County following a jury trial. The Court sentenced Pillis to a term of fifteen years on each count to be served concurrently and designated Willis a nondangerous offender. Willis appeals both the convictions and the sentences. We affirm. The rape victim was awakened in her apartment by a man with his hands around her throat at approximately 5:00 to 5:15 a.m. on December 21, 1981. When she screamed for help, the man's hands tightened around her throat and he told her to "shut up." She did not recognize his voice this first time he spoke. She attempted to scream again and her attack- er again told her, this time in a different tone of voice, to "shut up." This time she immediately recognized Willis's voice and used his name, to which he did not respond. He also called her by her nickname and told her to ". . . shut up, or I'll hurt you." The victim recognized the cologne or aftershave Willis was wearing, and although the light was dim, she recognized Wj-llis's profile by the light from a street light shining through a window. A review of the file, including the initial police reports, shows that the victim has never had any doubt regarding the identity of her attack- er. There were, however, discrepancies between the victim's description of her attacker s clothing and the clothing Willis was said to have been wearing that night. After the rape, when the victim was able to get away from Willis, she grabbed a robe and ran barefoot and scream- ing into the street. Still screaming, she knocked on neighbors' doors but they did not respond. Joyce Carter, a woman who heard her screams while delivering newspapers, came to her assistance and took her to the sheriff's department. Carter saw the attacker as he ran to his car. She ~bserved Willis drive away in his car which she identified as a bright blue Ford small car. At the time she thought the car was either a Pinto or a Mustang from the front but not from the rear and at that time could not remember the name of the other Ford compact car. At the time of the rape, Willis owned a bright blue Ford Maverick. From the sheriff's department, the victim was taken directly to a hospital for a rape examination. The doctor testified that the physical evidence showed that she had had sexual intercourse within the preceding twelve hours. He also noted the presence of abrasions on both sides of her neck. Defendant Willis relied on an alibi defense at his trial. He had several witnesses who testified that he had been with them at an all-night beer party and did not leave until approximately 5:30 a.m. This testimony was impeached on rebuttal by the testimony of Officer Renman, who testified that he had interviewed the witnesses shortly after the rape and at that time they stated that the drinking party had broken up earlier. Officer Renman used his handwritten notes of these interviews to refresh hjs recol-lection during direct examination-in-chief on rebuttal. Whether these handwritten notes are subject to discovery under section 46-15-302(2), MCA, is appellant's basic issue on appeal. Three issues are raised which we summarize as follows: 1. Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial when a police officer testified at the trial from notes which had not been produced in response to a motion to produce? 2. Are the notes of a police officer, taken during interviews with defense witnesses, exempt from discovery under the "prosecution work product" exception to section 46-15-302 (2) , MCA? 3. Must handwritten police officers' notes of the prior inconsistent statements of defense witnesses, used for impeachment, be produced as exculpatory under section 46-15-302 (2) , MCA? The defendant both raises and disposes of the first issue regarding whether a mistrial should have been declared. when it was discovered for the first time during trial that there were police offi.cer's notes in existence. The record shows that defense counsel was informed of the existence of Officer Renman's personal notes during the omnibus hearing held approximately two months prior to trial-. In addition, defense counsel's own motion to produce filed prior to trial specifically mentions Officer Renmanls handwritten notes. Defense counsel can hardly state that he first discovered the existence of the notes at trial when they were discussed at the omnibus hearing and were later specifically identified in his motion to produce. An examination of the relevant statute is dispositive of this appeal. That statute provides: "46-15-302. Discovery of writings and objects. In all criminalcases oriainallv triable in the district court, the follow: ing rules shal.1 apply: "(2) Upon motion of the defendant within a reasonable time before trial, the court may, upon a showinq of good cause, order the prosecution to produce, prior to trial at a time and place designated by the court, for inspection, photographing, or copying by the defendant designated books, statements, papers, or objects obtained from the defendant or others by the prose- cution which are material, relevant, and necessary to the preparation of the defen- dant's case. This subsection does not apply to the work product of the prosecu- tion, which is documents drawn up by law enforcement officials for internal commu- nications and law enforcement officers ' field notes, except that any exculpatory information contained in such documents or notes must be produced." (Emphasis added. ) We note that the statute first requires a showing of %>* A good cause before a court can order the prosecution to pro- duce evidence. A thorough review of the record fails to disclose any showing of good cause by defense counsel in requesting the officer's field notes. These notes were taken during inter- views with defense counsel's own witnesses. He had continual access to these witnesses from the investigation stage of the ma.tter through the final resolution. There is nothing to indicate tha.t any of these witnesses were oth.er than totally cooperative with defense counsel. However, even if they had been hostile or uncooperative, other forms of discovery, such as the taking of their depositions, were available to coun- sel. He did not avail himself of these other discovery methods. Counsel also cou1.d have reviewed the notes during trial but chose not to take advantage of this privilege. Instead, he elected to move for a mistrial but. did not prevail. Defense counsel argues, and we agree, that discovery is an important aspect of criminal procedure. He cites Williams v. Florida (1970), 399 U.S. 78, 82, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446, which states that the primary purpose of discovery is to avoid a "poker game attitude" in which players enjoy an absolute right to conceal their cards until played. We agree with this statement also. However, there is no risk of concealment under the circumstances disclosed here. These were defense witnesses, not prosecution witnesses, and were clearly accessible and cooperative. All counsel had to do to discover the contents of the notes was to ask his own wit- nesses what thev said to Officer Renman, depose him with a subpoena duces tecum, or examine the notes at the trial. None of these available remedies was utilized. There was no showing of good cause nor could there be such a showing under these circumstances. In conclusion, we find that in order for counsel to prevail under section 46-15-302 ( 2 ) , MCA, there must first be a showing of good cause before the court can order produc- tion. There was no such showing here. Since there was no showing of this first requirement of good cause, we never reach the issue of the work product exclusion or the excep- tion of exculpatory material. We affirm. 344.$44m& Chi-ef Justice We concur: trict Judge, sitting in place of Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr.