Title: CAA v. ZWA

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CAA v. ZWA2004 WY 1885 P.3d 432Case Number: C-03-6Decided: 03/04/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

IN 
THE INTEREST OF KRA, minor child:

 

CAA, 
n/k/a CAF,

 

Appellant(Respondent),

 

v.

 

ZWA,

 

Appellee(Respondent).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Michele J. Neves, Casper, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
James A. Hardee, Douglas, Wyoming.

 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      KRA was born 
to ZWA (Father) and CAF (Mother), an unmarried couple who separated shortly 
thereafter.  This case began as an 
action to establish paternity.  
Paternity was established and shared custody, alternating weekly, was 
ordered.  Mother appeals, claiming 
that the district court's findings of fact are insufficient and unsupported by 
the record, and that shared custody is not in the child's best interests.  We will affirm.

 

 

[¶2]      Mother presents 
the following issues:

 

I.                     
Whether 
the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law 
pursuant to Rule 52 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure.

 

II.                   
Whether 
the trial court's decision was contrary to the evidence.

 

III.                  
Whether 
the trial court's decision was in the best interests of the minor 
child.

 

Father 
raises two issues:

 

1.                  
Is 
the January 31, 2003 order of the district court, which continues the temporary 
order issued March 4, 2002, an appealable order as required by Wyoming Appellate 
Rules 1.04 and defined by Wyoming Appellate Rule 1.05?

 

2.                  
If 
the order is appealable, did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering 
continued shared custody?

 

 

[¶3]      Mother and 
Father met while he was finishing his senior year of high school.  They dated for a time and Father then 
moved into the trailer where Mother and her daughter from a previous marriage 
lived.  Shortly thereafter, Father 
left for the National Guard and Mother moved out of the trailer into her 
parents' home.  Mother then 
contacted Father and informed him that she was pregnant.  Upon returning from his service with the 
National Guard, Father moved in with Mother and her parents.  After living with Mother's parents for a 
time, the couple, along with Mother's daughter, moved to Wright, where KRA was 
born.  Three months later, Mother 
left Wright with the two children and returned to her parents' home in 
Douglas.  After a failed attempt at 
reconciliation, Mother and Father went their separate ways.  Father purchased a home in Douglas and 
obtained employment as a "hot oiler" in an oil field, and Mother married and 
returned to Wright, where her new husband worked and had a 
home.

 

[¶4]      In August of 
2001, the Department of Family Services filed a paternity action.  After genetic testing confirmed Father's 
paternity, he filed a Petition to Establish Custody and Visitation.  On March 4, 2002, a custody and support 
hearing was held.  Because Mother 
appeared pro se, the district court stayed the proceedings to allow 
Mother to obtain counsel and entered a temporary order for custody and 
support.  The temporary order 
directed Father to pay $137.50 per month in child support, and prescribed shared 
custody in alternating weeks.

 

[¶5]      This order 
remained in effect until December 12, 2002, when the parties appeared 
again.  Both parties argued that 
they should be awarded primary custody.  
Mother contended that as a stay-at-home-mom she was better suited to care 
for KRA than Father, whose employment required him to leave KRA with a 
babysitter.  Mother also argued that 
the shared custody arrangement is difficult for KRA because KRA and Mother's 
other daughter have bonded and the children are upset when they are apart.  Finally, Mother expressed concern that 
Father did not properly attend to KRA's medical needs and that he returned her 
from visits dirty, hungry, thirsty, with smelly hair and dirty fingernails, and 
without proper clothing for cold weather.

 

[¶6]      Father urged the 
district court to award him primary custody, claiming that if Mother were 
awarded sole custody, she would attempt to deny him visitation.  Father claimed that Mother had 
encouraged her other daughter to disparage her father, and that Mother had 
influenced her other daughter to become estranged from her father.  Father also stated that he worried 
Mother would tell KRA things that were not true, causing her to be "confused and 
emotionally and mentally unstable . . .."  
Father also indicated that Mother had not finished high school, and 
expressed concern that she would not properly stress the importance of 
education.

 

[¶7]      At the end of the 
hearing, the district court requested that the parties submit findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, which they did.  
On January 31, 2003, the district court issued its Order for Custody and 
Visitation with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.  The order briefly outlined the relevant 
facts, stated the parties' respective strengths and weaknesses with regard to 
parenting, and then concluded:

 

1.         
Neither party is clearly more or less capable of providing for [KRA] than 
the other.  [Father] likely would 
provide a better atmosphere for [KRA] to have a relationship with both her 
parents, but his work schedule would require him to rely significantly on 
babysitters.  [Mother] is able to 
provide personal care for [KRA], and [KRA] would live with her sister in 
[Mother's] custody.  However, 
[Mother] may deprive her daughter of a complete, emotionally secure relationship 
with her father.

 

2.         
Each party should complete a co-parenting class within sixty (60) days of 
the date of this decision.

 

3.         
[KRA] has been able to maintain a good relationship with both of her 
parents and her sister under the existing shared custody arrangement.  The shared custody arrangement meets 
[KRA's] needs better than sole custody with either parent 
would.

 

4.         
It is in [KRA's] best interest that the current Temporary Order 
establishing joint/shared custody be continued until three months prior to 
[KRA's] eligibility to enter Kindergarten in the school district of either 
parent.  The time for an exchange of 
custody should be modified to 3:00 p.m. on Sunday.

 

5.         
The existing child support computations are accurate and should be 
continued.

 

Mother 
appeals from this order.

 

 

We 
have previously reiterated the well recognized standard of review for custody 
determinations:

 

"Custody, 
visitation, child support, and alimony are all committed to the 
sound discretion of the district court.  It has been our consistent principle 
that in custody matters, the welfare and needs of the children are to be given 
paramount consideration.  The 
determination of the best interests of the child is a question for the trier of 
fact.  We do not overturn the 
decision of the trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or 
the presence of a violation of some legal principle.'"  Fink [v. Fink], 685 P.2d 
[34,] 36 [(Wyo. 1984)]."

 

Reavis 
v. Reavis, 
955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998) . . .. Judicial discretion is a composite of many 
things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶ 9, 22 P.3d 861, ¶ 9 (2001); Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 
(Wyo.1998).

 

"Our 
review entails evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial 
court's decision, and we afford to the prevailing party every favorable 
inference while omitting any consideration of evidence presented by the 
unsuccessful party.  We cannot 
sustain findings of fact not supported by the evidence, contrary to the 
evidence, or against the great weight of the evidence.  Similarly, an abuse of discretion is 
present when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored. RDS 
v. GEMN, 9 P.3d 984, 986 (Wyo.2000)."

 

Pace, 
at ¶ 10.

 

Produit 
v. Produit, 
2001 WY 123, ¶ 9, 35 P.3d 1240, 1242-43 (Wyo. 2001).

 

 

Is 
This An Appealable Order?

 

[¶8]      Initially, we 
must address Father's contention that the district court's order is not an 
appealable order as defined in W.R.A.P. 1.05.  Father takes issue with the following 
language of the order: "that the Temporary Order for custody entered in this 
case in March, 2002, is adopted and continued until three (3) months before 
[KRA] is eligible to begin Kindergarten in the school district of either parent, 
provided, however, that custody exchanges shall occur at 3:00 p.m. on 
Sunday."  He contends that this 
order merely continues the temporary order and sets a determinable time for a 
final order to be entered.

 

[¶9]      The pertinent 
language of W.R.A.P. 1.05 reads: "An appealable order is: (a) An order affecting 
a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the 
action and prevents a judgment . . .."  
We applied this section in Steele v. Neeman, 6 P.3d 649, 653 (Wyo. 
2000).  There, the parties were attempting to 
modify a divorce decree.  Because 
the mother had moved with the child to New York, subject matter jurisdiction was 
a concern.  Id. at 652.  Prior to a hearing on the merits, the 
district court issued an order establishing subject matter jurisdiction.  Id.  After the hearing on the merits, the 
mother appealed the court's prior order establishing jurisdiction. Id. 
 The father claimed that the 
appeal was untimely, asserting that the order was an appealable order under 
W.R.A.P. 1.05, and since mother filed her notice outside the allowable 
thirty-day time period, her appeal should be dismissed.  Steele, 6 P.3d  at 653.  We concluded that the order was not 
appealable under W.R.A.P. 1.05.  
Steele, 6 P.3d  at 653.  
We stated:

 

The 
resolution of the jurisdictional issue by the district court did not 
determine the merits of the controversy.  
This is self-evident from the fact that the very order cited by Father 
also sets the merits of the controversyhis petition to modify visitationfor 
hearing.  Since that order did not 
determine the merits of the controversy and resolve all outstanding issues, it 
was not a final, appealable order under W.R.A.P. 1.05(a).

 

Id.

 

[¶10]   From the language of W.R.A.P. 
1.05 and the holding of Steele, we glean three necessary 
characteristics of an appealable order.  
It must affect a substantial right, determine the merits of the 
controversy, and resolve all outstanding issues. See also Public Service 
Commission v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 608 P.2d 660, 661 (Wyo. 
1980) ("a judgment or order which determines 
the merits of the controversy and leaves nothing for future consideration is 
final and appealable, and it is not appealable unless it does those 
things.").

 

[¶11]   Clearly, the present order affects 
a substantial right as we have long recognized parents' fundamental right to 
"care for, educate, and associate with their children."  Matter of MLM, 682 P.2d 982, 990 
(Wyo. 1984).  Likewise, the order determines the 
merits of the controversy.  In this 
case, the controversy was over the issue of child support, custody and 
visitation.  The parties presented 
evidence of their abilities and limitations with respect to these issues, and 
the district court's order made specific findings with regard to these 
issues.  The order adequately 
addressed the merits of the controversy.

 

[¶12]   The final requirement is that an 
appealable order must resolve all outstanding issues.  Father maintains that the "order is not 
dispositive of custody but merely maintains the status quo until such time as a 
proper and fully considered custody determination can be made."  In domestic cases involving children, a 
district court can only resolve issues as they exist at the time it hears the 
case.  Because of the dynamic nature 
of family relationships, district courts have continuing jurisdiction to address 
new issues as they may arise.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (LexisNexis 2003), provides:

 

A 
court having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, custody and 
visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of a material 
change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question and that the 
modification would be in the best interests of the children . . 
..

 

The 
present order resolved the issue of custody when it ordered "that the Temporary 
Order for custody entered in this case in March, 2002, is adopted and continued 
until (3) months before [KRA] is eligible to begin Kindergarten . . .."  While it remains uncertain what 
visitation and custody arrangement will be in KRA's best interests when she 
begins school, the order clearly states that currently "[t]he 
shared custody arrangement meets [KRA]'s needs better than sole custody with 
either parent would."  The order 
addressed child support and custody and no issues remain 
unresolved.

 

[¶13]   Since the order affects a 
substantial right, determines the merits of the controversy, and resolves all 
outstanding issues, we find that it is an appealable 
order.

 

Mother's 
Arguments

 

[¶14]   Mother's 
appeal is based on three arguments.  
She contends that the district court failed to make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as required by W.R.C.P. 52, that the district court's 
decision was contrary to the evidence, and that the decision was not in the 
child's best interests.

 

[¶15]   Prior to the introduction of any 
evidence, Mother requested, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 52,1 that the district court make 
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The district court's final order, 
entitled "Order for Custody and Visitation with Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law," clearly complies with the requirements of W.R.C.P. 52.  In this order, the district court 
adequately outlines its findings and separately states its conclusions.  We find Mother's argument on this issue 
to be without merit.

 

[¶16]   Mother next argues that the 
district court's decision was contrary to the evidence.  Mother's appellate brief lists each of 
the district court's findings and conclusions individually, and then states 
whether she accepts or disputes them.  
With every disputed finding, she presents an argument why the finding is 
inaccurate, generally focusing only on evidence that supports her position and 
ignoring any contrary evidence.  To 
argue successfully that the decision was contrary to the evidence, Mother must 
demonstrate that a material factor deserving significant weight was ignored or 
that a finding was contrary to the evidence or against the great weight of the 
evidence.  In re MS, 9 P.3d 984, 986 
(Wyo. 2000) (quoting Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998)).  This can be a difficult task, 
considering we "afford to the prevailing party every favorable inference while 
omitting any consideration of evidence presented by the unsuccessful 
party.'"  In re MS, 9 P.3d  at 986 
(quoting Reavis, 955 P.2d at 431).  
We have stated that "[t]he trial judge is in the best position to assess 
the credibility of witnesses and weigh their testimony, and, thus, this Court 
accords considerable deference to the trial judge's findings."  Clark v. Clark, 980 P.2d 821, 823 (Wyo. 
1999).  While the district court's final order 
may not have characterized every fact as Mother would have liked, or articulated 
every one of Mother's strengths and Father's weaknesses, the record indicates 
that both Mother and Father are capable of providing KRA adequate care and 
support, and that the shared custody arrangement is working well and allows both 
parents adequate parenting time to develop a relationship with KRA.  We find nothing in the record 
demonstrating that the district court's decision was contrary to the 
evidence.

 

[¶17]   Finally, Mother argues that the 
district court's decision was not in KRA's best interests.  Mother contends that the weekly 
alternating shared custody arrangement, where the parents are living seventy 
miles apart, and which results in KRA being with her step-sister only every 
other week, is not in KRA's best interests.

 

[¶18]   Fashioning a custody arrangement 
that will best serve the child's best interests is within the discretion of the 
trier of fact.  Produit, 2001 WY 
123, ¶ 9, 35 P.3d  at 1242-43 (quoting Reavis, 955 P.2d at 431).  We have stated:

 

The 
best interests of the children is the primary consideration when parental 
custody matters are being determined. Fanning v. Fanning, 717 P.2d 346, 352 
(Wyo.1986). "[T]he goal to be achieved is a reasonable balance of the rights 
and affections of each of the parents, with paramount consideration being given 
to the welfare and needs of the children.'"  Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1287 
(Wyo.1993) (quoting Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 720 
(Wyo.1965)).

 

Dowdy 
v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 440 (Wyo. 1993).  The district court must order a custody 
arrangement that will most adequately serve the child's best interests.  While there are instances where shared 
custody may be appropriate, we have consistently held that we do not favor such 
an arrangement.  Produit, 
2001 WY 123, ¶ 
15, 
35 P.3d  at 1244; 
Reavis, 
955 P.2d  at 432; 
Martin v. Martin, 798 P.2d 321, 322 (Wyo. 1990).

 

There 
are several reasons for our reluctance to embrace the concept, but first and 
foremost is the recognition that stability in a child's environment is of utmost 
importance to the child's well-being, and divided custody places the stability 
of a child's environment at risk. Whether termed "divided," "shared," or "joint" 
physical custody, "a measure of instability is inherent" in the 
arrangement.  Gurney [v. Gurney], 
899 P.2d [52] at 55 [(Wyo.1995)].  
We do not dispute that there may be cases where joint or shared physical 
custody may approximate the former family relationships more closely than other 
custodial arrangements, or for other good reason may be in the best interests of 
the children.  However, 
divided physical custody may not be indiscriminately substituted for an award of 
sole custody to one parent in order to appease one party.

 

Reavis, 
955 P.2d  at 432.  In Reavis, the district court ordered 
shared custody stating that this arrangement would promote "an ongoing, strong 
and healthy parent to child relationship between both mother and father.'"  Id. at 432.  We reversed, finding nothing in the 
record to support that notion.  
Id.

 

[¶19]   Here, unlike Reavis, the record 
demonstrates good reason that shared custody is in KRA's best interests, and 
that shared custody most closely approximates the former family 
relationship.  At trial, Father 
presented evidence that if Mother was given primary custody, she would attempt 
to alienate KRA from him.

 

Q         
(By [Father's attorney])  
[Father], when you were cohabitating with [Mother] and [her other 
daughter], did you observe [Mother] and [her other daughter] discussing [her 
other daughter's] father?

 

A         
I know [Mother] has not, really, ever talked directly to [her other 
daughter] about her father, but she would talk to me, call him names and things 
like that, and [her other daughter] would be right there.  I know that she has taught [her other 
daughter] to call her dad spic, and has taught her to call her dad 
fucker.

 

            
I know [her other daughter] has told her dad that he is not her 
dad.

 

Q         
[Father], do you have any concerns about what might happen with your 
daughter if she is left in that environment?

 

A         
That is a lot of my concern.  
I feel that [KRA] if she is with [Mother] will be told certain things 
that aren'tthat are not [true], be told lies, that she will grow up confused 
and emotionally and mentally unstable through a lot of them, reactions, and/or, 
things that [Mother] may tell her.

 

            
I feel that just the whole emotional and mental stability of everyone on, 
it seems like, on her side of the family, doing a lot of one week be best 
friends, next week be worst enemies.  
I feel that that's unstable for [KRA].  She's  I am just, I guess worried that 
she will be taught things, and told things that are not the truth and that it 
could truly hurt her emotionally later on.

 

The 
district court found that "[Mother] has actively encouraged her other daughter . 
. . to disparage and otherwise denigrate and be estranged from her father," and 
that "[Mother's] attempt to unnecessarily criticize [Father] . . . indicates her 
inability to understand the importance of [KRA's] relationship with her father . 
. .."  The district court concluded 
that "[Mother] is able to provide personal care for [KRA], and [KRA] would live 
with her sister in [Mother's] custody.  
However, [Mother] may deprive her daughter of a complete, emotionally 
secure relationship with her father."  
We must afford considerable deference to the district court's findings as 
"[t]he trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses and weigh their testimony,"  
Produit, 2001 WY 123, ¶ 22, 35 P.3d  at 1246.

 

[¶20]   We also note that at the time of 
the hearing, the parties had been exercising shared custody for over nine months 
and the district court found that "[t]he current shared custody arrangement has 
not caused difficulties for [KRA]."  
At the time of the writing of this opinion, KRA will have been in the 
shared custody arrangement for two years.  
We have recognized that stability in a child's environment is of utmost 
importance to the child's well-being.  
Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo. 1995).  To change the custody arrangement that 
KRA has known for two years would jeopardize that stability and be contrary to 
her best interests.  We will affirm 
the district court's order of shared custody.

 

 

[¶21]   Contrary to Father's assertion, we 
conclude that the order that is the subject of this appeal is an appealable 
order as defined in W.R.A.P. 1.05 because it affects a substantial right, 
determines the merits of the controversy, and resolves all outstanding 
issues.  We also conclude that the 
district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were sufficient to meet 
the requirements of W.R.C.P. 52, that its decision was not contrary to the 
evidence, and that under the facts of this particular case, shared custody 
serves the child's best interests.  
The order of the district court is affirmed.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

  1W.R.C.P. 52 reads, in pertinent 
part:

 

(a)        
General and special findings by court. - Upon the trial of 
questions of fact by the court, or with an advisory jury, it shall not be 
necessary for the court to state its findings, except generally for the 
plaintiff or defendant, unless one of 
the parties requests it before the introduction of any evidence, with the view 
of excepting to the decision of the court upon the questions of law involved in 
the trial, in which case the court shall state in writing its special findings 
of fact separately from its conclusions of law; provided, that without 
such request the court may make such special findings of fact and conclusions of 
law as it deems proper and if the same are preserved in the record either by 
stenographic report or by the court's written memorandum, the same may be 
considered on appeal. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)