Title: State v. Allen Alexander

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Allen Alexander  a_49_16.opn.html Original Wordprocessor Version (NOTE: The status of this decision is Unpublished .) SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. Allen Alexander (A-49-16) (078515)Argued January 3, 2018 -- Decided April 30, 2018TIMPONE, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, we address whether the trial court erred when it failed to instruct a jury sua sponte on aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of robbery. The victim, Ernesto Espinal, and defendant, Allen Alexander, provided differing accounts of the incident that occurred on July 4, 2012. According to Espinal, he was walking alone to catch a train when defendant and three other individuals confronted him. Defendant ordered that Espinal give him twenty dollars. Espinal ignored the demand and continued walking. Suddenly, defendant grabbed Espinal around his neck and commanded another individual to “cut” Espinal. Defendant’s associate cut Espinal across his forehead with a knife while defendant continued to hold Espinal’s neck. Defendant and the others then left without taking any money from Espinal. According to defendant, he and three of his friends were walking together when he bumped into Espinal. Espinal made a facial expression and said “something in Spanish.” Believing Espinal had said “nothing nice,” defendant confronted Espinal. Espinal and defendant exchanged profanities. Defendant testified that one of his friends “tried to jump in it,” but defendant grabbed his friend and told him to “leave it alone.” His friend pushed defendant away and punched Espinal. Defendant and his friends walked away. According to defendant, he never asked Espinal for money and he did not see anyone go through Espinal’s pockets or take Espinal’s wallet. He further testified that he did not see a weapon in his friend’s hand when his friend punched Espinal. An Essex County Grand Jury returned an indictment against defendant charging him with second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery, first-degree robbery, fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and third- degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. The indictment did not charge defendant with aggravated assault. The State’s case against defendant went to trial before a jury under a theory of accomplice liability. At the close of the evidence, the court conducted a charge conference. At no point did either party request an aggravated assault charge. The trial court instructed the jury that “[a] person is guilty of robbery if in the course of committing a theft he knowingly inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon another.” It then explained each element the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a robbery conviction. Later, the court instructed: “Robbery is a crime of the second degree except that it is a crime of the first degree if the actor is armed with or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon. In this case the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon while in the course of committing the robbery.” Defense counsel neither requested an aggravated assault charge nor objected to its omission from the trial judge’s jury instructions. The jury convicted defendant of all charges. Defendant appealed his convictions. An Appellate Division panel reversed and remanded for a new trial. The panel observed that, even absent requests for charges or objections to charges, trial judges have an independent obligation to instruct on lesser-included charges when the facts adduced at trial clearly indicate that a jury could convict on the lesser while acquitting on the greater offense. The panel concluded that “there is a rational basis in the evidence for the jury to acquit defendant of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery, as well as to convict defendant of aggravated assault.” The Court granted the State’s petition for certification. 229 N.J. 593 (2017).HELD: Under the circumstances of this case, aggravated assault is, at most, a related offense of the State’s robbery charge. The trial court had no obligation to charge the jury sua sponte on aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of the State’s robbery charge. 1 1. A trial court’s decision to charge on a lesser-included offense is governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e). Under that statute, the trial court cannot charge a jury on “an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict convicting the defendant of the included offense.” N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e). A party must request a charge or object to an omitted charge at trial for the rational basis test to apply. In the absence of a request or an objection, courts apply a higher standard, requiring the unrequested charge to be clearly indicated from the record. Trial courts have an independent duty to sua sponte charge on a lesser-included offense only where the facts in evidence clearly indicate the appropriateness of that charge. The evidence supporting a lesser-included charge must “jump[] off the page” to trigger a trial court’s duty to sua sponte instruct a jury on that charge. State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 42 (2006). In State v. Funderburg, the Court “decline[d] to impose” a “burdensome requirement on trial courts” to carefully examine every piece of the record “to see if some combination of facts and inferences might rationally sustain a [lesser-included] charge” and noted that not “every potential lesser-included offense must be charged to the jury.” 225 N.J. 66, 83 (2016). In contrast to lesser- included offenses, a trial court may instruct the jury on a related offense only when the defendant requests or consents to the related offense charge, and there is a rational basis in the evidence to sustain the related offense. (pp. 11-15)2 Just because a charge meets the rational basis test does not mean it meets the clearly indicated standard. The facts of this case call for review under the higher, clearly indicated standard. Defendant had several opportunities to request an aggravated assault charge but failed to do so. It was not until his appeal that defendant argued the trial court erred in not charging the jury sua sponte on aggravated assault. Reversal would be appropriate only if the basis for a lesser- included-offense charge were to “jump[] off the page[s]” of the record. Denofa, 187 N.J. at 42. The Court reaffirms that the clearly indicated standard is the appropriate lens through which to review any obligation to charge the jury sua sponte on a lesser-included offense, but does not apply that standard here. (pp. 15-17)3. On direct appeal, defendant only challenged the lack of an instruction concerning “serious bodily injury” aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1). Under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a), a person is guilty of robbery if that person “inflict[ed] bodily injury or use[d] force” on the victim “in the course of committing a theft.” The statute provides that robbery “is a crime of the first degree if in the course of committing the theft the actor attempts to kill anyone, or purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury, or is armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon.” N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b). Here, the State charged robbery as a first-degree crime exclusively on the “deadly weapon” prong. As a result, based on its indictment, the State had to prove that defendant: (1) “inflict[ed] bodily injury or use[d] force” on the victim; and (2) possessed, used, or threatened to use “what appeared to be . . . a knife” during the commission of the robbery. By contrast, aggravated assault under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) requires proof of an attempt “to cause serious bodily injury.” “Serious bodily injury” aggravated assault under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) requires a greater injury element than that in the State’s robbery charge, cf. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(d)(3), and must be established by proof of more facts than those needed to establish “bodily injury,” cf. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(d)(1). Under the circumstances of this case, aggravated assault is, at most, a related offense of the State’s robbery charge. The trial court had no duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on “serious bodily injury” aggravated assault. (pp. 17-19)4. Defense counsel did not argue that other forms of aggravated assault—beyond N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)—may constitute lesser-included offenses of robbery before the trial court or Appellate Division. Those arguments are therefore not properly before the Court, and the Court declines to address them. (pp. 19-20)5. The Court notes and rejects the State’s argument that the opinion in State v. Sewell, 127 N.J. 133 (1992), affirmatively held that assault is never a lesser-included offense of robbery. There may be circumstances in which the evidence adduced at trial supports a charge on assault as a lesser-included offense of robbery. Here, the trial court had no obligation to charge the jury sua sponte on aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of the State’s robbery charge. (pp. 20-21) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and defendant’s convictions are REINSTATED. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ- VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 49 September Term 2016 078515STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.ALLEN ALEXANDER, a/k/a KARON KEENAN, Defendant-Respondent. Argued January 3, 2018 – Decided April 30, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Barbara A. Rosenkrans, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Robert D. Laurino, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Barbara A. Rosenkrans, of counsel and on the briefs). Michael Confusione argued the cause for respondent (Hegge & Confusione, attorneys; Michael Confusione, on the brief). Sarah C. Hunt, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah C. Hunt, of counsel and on the brief). Jaime B. Herrera, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae Office of the Public Defender (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Jaime B. Herrera, of counsel and on the brief). 1 JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, we address whether the trial court erredwhen it failed to instruct a jury sua sponte on aggravatedassault as a lesser-included offense of robbery. The State alleged that defendant Allen Alexander conspiredwith another to rob Ernesto Espinal at Gateway Center in Newark.According to the State, defendant held the victim around hisneck while another man cut the victim’s forehead. Defendant andhis co-conspirator left without taking any items from thevictim. Newark Police eventually arrested defendant in connectionwith the incident. A grand jury indictment charged defendantwith second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery, first-degreerobbery, fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, andthird-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. Ajury ultimately convicted defendant of all charges. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, finding thatthe trial court erred in failing to charge the jury sua sponteon “serious bodily injury” aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1). We find that the trial court had no obligation toissue a sua sponte jury instruction. We therefore reverse theAppellate Division’s decision and reinstate defendant’sconvictions. 2 I. A. We derive the following facts from testimony presentedduring defendant’s trial. The victim, Ernesto Espinal, anddefendant provided differing accounts of the incident thatoccurred on July 4, 2012. According to Espinal, he was walking alone through GatewayCenter to catch a train in Newark Penn Station when defendantand three other individuals confronted him. Defendant orderedthat Espinal give him twenty dollars. Espinal ignored thedemand and continued walking toward the train station.Suddenly, defendant grabbed Espinal around his neck andcommanded another individual to “cut” Espinal. Defendant’sassociate cut Espinal across his forehead with a knife whiledefendant continued to hold Espinal’s neck. Defendant and theothers then left the area without taking any money from Espinal. Espinal further stated that after the incident, he had “alot of blood” on his face. He eventually received aid from aDunkin’ Donuts employee and a security person. Police escortedhim in an ambulance to University Hospital for treatment. Atthe hospital, he received stitches, which were removed sevendays later. His facial injury left a permanent scar. Defendant gave the jury a different account. According todefendant, he and three of his friends were walking together 3 through Gateway Center when he bumped into Espinal. Espinalmade a facial expression and said “something in Spanish.”Believing Espinal had said “nothing nice,” defendant confrontedEspinal. Espinal and defendant exchanged profanities. Defendant testified that one of his friends “tried to jumpin it,” but defendant grabbed his friend and told him to “leaveit alone.” His friend pushed defendant away and punchedEspinal. Defendant and his friends walked away. According todefendant, he never asked Espinal for money and he did not seeanyone go through Espinal’s pockets or take Espinal’s wallet.He further testified that he did not see a weapon in hisfriend’s hand when his friend punched Espinal. B. Espinal gave a statement to the Newark Police Departmentafter he left the hospital. The Newark Police Department, inturn, opened an investigation into the incident. As part of theinvestigation, law enforcement created a flyer using stillimages from the surveillance video captured at Gateway Center.Investigators circulated the flyer within the police departmentvia email. A sergeant, who had past interactions withdefendant, identified one of the photos as defendant. Detective Filberto Padilla later conducted a six-photoarray at Espinal’s home. Espinal selected defendant’s picture 4 as depicting his assailant. Newark Police arrested defendantthe following day on July 20, 2012. C. On October 17, 2012, an Essex County Grand Jury returned anindictment against defendant charging him with second-degreeconspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A.2C:15-1(b); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d); andthird-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose,N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d). The indictment did not charge defendantwith aggravated assault. The State’s case against defendant went to trial before ajury on January 23, 2014 under a theory of accomplice liability.At the close of the evidence, the court conducted a chargeconference. At no point did either party request an aggravatedassault charge. During its closing argument, the State assertedthat robbery means “in the course of committing a theft, aperson causes bodily injury or uses force,” and that using adeadly weapon “makes it a first degree robbery.” Defensecounsel did not object to the State’s explanation. After summations, the trial court instructed the jury todisregard statements by the attorneys that conflict with thecourt’s charges. The trial court proceeded to instruct the jury 5 on the charges in the indictment. The court read the State’srobbery-indictment charge verbatim: [Defendant] . . . did knowingly commit an act of robbery upon Ernesto Espinal, and in the course of committing said robbery was armed with, did use, or threaten the immediate use of what appeared to be a deadly weapon, a knife contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:15- 1, a crime of the first degree and against the peace of this State, the Government and dignity of same.The trial court instructed the jury that “[a] person is guiltyof robbery if in the course of committing a theft he knowinglyinflicts bodily injury or uses force upon another.” It thenexplained each element the State had to prove beyond areasonable doubt to sustain a robbery conviction. Later, thecourt instructed: Robbery is a crime of the second degree except that it is a crime of the first degree if the actor is armed with or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon. In this case the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon while in the course of committing the robbery. Defense counsel neither requested an aggravated assaultcharge nor objected to its omission from the trial judge’s juryinstructions. The jury convicted defendant of all charges. Atsentencing, the trial court merged the conspiracy convictioninto the robbery conviction and sentenced defendant to anaggregate fifteen-year term of imprisonment, with an eighty-five 6 percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No EarlyRelease Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a). D. Defendant appealed his convictions. In an unpublishedopinion, a two-member Appellate Division panel reversed andremanded for a new trial. The panel observed that, even absentrequests for charges or objections to charges, trial judges have“an independent obligation to instruct on lesser-includedcharges when the facts adduced at trial clearly indicate that ajury could convict on the lesser while acquitting on the greateroffense.” (quoting State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 361 (2004)).The panel then noted that “to justify a lesser[-]includedoffense instruction, a rational basis must exist in the evidencefor a jury to acquit the defendant of the greater offense aswell as to convict the defendant of the lesser, unindictedoffense.” (alteration in original) (quoting State v.Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 81 (2016)). Synthesizing the twotests, the panel stated the relevant inquiry as follows: “theevidence must clearly indicate that there is a rational basis toacquit the defendant of the greater offense, and to convict thedefendant of the lesser offense.” After reviewing the elements of aggravated assault underN.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1), as well as defendant’s testimony anddefense counsel’s summation, the panel reasoned that “[t]he jury 7 could have found that defendant did not participate, eitherdirectly or as an accomplice, in a theft or attempt to committheft.” The panel noted defendant’s concession that he and hisfriend had an altercation with the victim, “and the friendpunched the victim hard enough for the victim to fall to theground.” It concluded that “there is a rational basis in theevidence for the jury to acquit defendant of robbery andconspiracy to commit robbery, as well as to convict defendant ofaggravated assault.” We granted the State’s petition for certification. 229 N.J. 593 (2017). We also granted the motions of the AttorneyGeneral and the Office of the Public Defender to participate asamici curiae. II. A. The State urges us to reverse the Appellate Divisiondecision, arguing that the trial court properly instructed thejury on robbery. The State relies on our decision in State v.Sewell, 127 N.J. 133 (1992), to insist that “[a]ssault simply isnot an included crime of robbery.” Emphasizing that defendantnever requested an aggravated assault charge, the State assertsthat the trial court had no obligation “to dissect the evidencewith a fine-tooth comb in search of some improbableagglomeration of facts to sustain an unrequested jury 8 instruction.” The State also submits that the appellate panelfailed to recognize the difference between lesser-included andrelated offenses, underscoring that trial courts are notpermitted to instruct a jury on related offenses withoutdefendant’s consent. B. Defendant counters that the trial court did not need to“sift through the record for possible charges” becausedefendant’s testimony “clearly indicated” that a charge onaggravated assault was appropriate. Defendant asserts thatassault may be a lesser-included offense of robbery undercertain circumstances like those presented here. Defendantargues that the trial court’s failure to instruct on aggravatedassault left the jury without an alternative in the event itfound that the State failed to meet its burden of proving atheft had occurred. As a result, defendant maintains that thejury never had the option to “adopt[] defendant’s testimony” andfind him “guilty of an assault but not guilty of robbery.” C. The Attorney General echoes the State’s arguments thataggravated assault is not a lesser-included offense of armedrobbery, and that the trial court had no obligation to instructthe jury on the unrequested charge. The Attorney General arguesthat the appellate panel “improperly sifted through the record” 9 to piece together “an unsupported combination of facts andinferences it deemed adequate to support the charge.” TheAttorney General asserts that the record did not clearlyindicate that an aggravated assault charge was appropriate. TheAttorney General submits that a sua sponte instruction onaggravated assault would have prejudiced defendant by deprivinghim of adequate notice of the charge against him. D. Like defendant, the Public Defender stresses thataggravated assault may be a lesser-included offense of robberyunder particular circumstances. The Public Defender argues thatthe trial court erred by failing to charge the jury sua sponteon aggravated assault. The Public Defender asserts thatdefendant had “fair notice” that aggravated assault may becharged as a lesser-included offense because the trial evidence“clearly indicated a rational basis upon which the jury couldhave acquitted defendant of robbery and convicted him ofaggravated assault.” III. A. We review for plain error the trial court’s obligation tosua sponte deliver a jury instruction when a defendant does notrequest it and fails to object at trial to its omission. Statev. Cole, 229 N.J. 430, 455 (2017); Funderburg, 225 N.J. at 79. 10 To warrant reversal, the unchallenged error must have been“clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2.“The mere possibility of an unjust result is not enough.”Funderburg, 225 N.J. at 79. Rather, “[t]he possibility must bereal, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whetherthe error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not havereached.” State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971). B. A trial court’s decision to charge on a lesser-includedoffense is governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e). Under that statute,the trial court cannot charge a jury on “an included offenseunless there is a rational basis for a verdict convicting thedefendant of the included offense.” N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e). Wehave explained that “whether the lesser offense is strictly'included’ in the greater offense . . . is less important . . .than whether the evidence presents a rational basis on which thejury could acquit the defendant of the greater charge andconvict the defendant of the lesser.” State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 178 (2009) (ellipses in original) (quoting State v.Brent, 137 N.J. 107, 117 (1994)). A party must request a charge or object to an omittedcharge at trial for the rational basis test to apply. “Theappropriate time to object to a jury charge is 'before the juryretires to consider its verdict.’” Funderburg, 225 N.J. at 79 11 (quoting R. 1:7-2). When a defendant requests a lesser-included-offense charge, “the trial court is obligated, in viewof defendant’s interest, to examine the record thoroughly todetermine if the rational-basis standard has been satisfied.”State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J. 265, 278 (1986). “The rational-basis test sets a low threshold” for a lesser-included-offenseinstruction. State v. Carrero, 229 N.J. 118, 128 (2017) (citingCrisantos, 102 N.J. at 278). In the absence of a request or an objection, we apply ahigher standard, requiring the unrequested charge to be “clearlyindicated” from the record. In State v. Garron, we explainedthat the “primary obligation” of trial courts is to “see thatjustice is done.” 177 N.J. 147, 180 (2003). That obligationincludes ensuring “that a jury is instructed properly on the lawand on all clearly indicated lesser-included offenses, even ifat odds with the strategic decision of counsel.” Ibid. OurCourt has long held that trial courts have an independent dutyto sua sponte charge on a lesser-included offense “only wherethe facts in evidence 'clearly indicate’ the appropriateness ofthat charge.” State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 397 (2002)(quoting State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295, 298 (1985)); accordFunderburg, 225 N.J. at 81; State v. Thomas, 187 N.J. 119, 132(2006) (quoting Jenkins, 178 N.J. at 361). 12 The “clearly indicated” standard does not require trialcourts either to “scour the statutes to determine if there aresome uncharged offenses of which the defendant may be guilty,”Brent, 137 N.J. at 118 (quoting State v. Sloane, 111 N.J. 293,302 (1988)), or “'to meticulously sift through the entire record. . . to see if some combination of facts and inferences mightrationally sustain’ a lesser charge,” Funderburg, 225 N.J. at 81(quoting Choice, 98 N.J. at 299). Instead, the evidencesupporting a lesser-included charge must “jump[] off the page”to trigger a trial court’s duty to sua sponte instruct a jury onthat charge. State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 42 (2006). We recently addressed the parameters of our trial courts’duty to charge a jury sua sponte on a lesser-included offense inthe absence of a request or an objection by the defendant. InFunderburg, the defendant was charged with attempted murderafter stabbing his ex-girlfriend’s new boyfriend during analtercation. 225 N.J. at 72-74. The defendant did not requesta jury charge on attempted passion/provocation manslaughter as alesser-included offense of attempted murder at trial. Id. at75. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded fora new trial, finding that the trial court erred in failing todeliver that instruction. Ibid. We reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, concludingthat the trial court was not required to charge the lesser- 13 included offense sua sponte because “the facts before [it] didnot clearly indicate that the objective elements of attemptedpassion/provocation manslaughter were present.” Id. at 82. Inreaching that conclusion, we “decline[d] to impose” a“burdensome requirement on trial courts” to carefully examineevery piece of the record “to see if some combination of factsand inferences might rationally sustain a [lesser-included]charge.” See id. at 83 (quoting Choice, 98 N.J. at 299). Wealso noted that not “every potential lesser-included offensemust be charged to the jury.” Ibid. We therefore found thatthe trial court’s failure to deliver an unrequestedpassion/provocation manslaughter charge to the jury was not inerror. Id. at 83-84. C. In contrast to lesser-included offenses, trial courts arenever required to charge a jury sua sponte on related offenses.State v. Maloney, 216 N.J. 91, 107-08 (2013) (discussing Thomas,187 N.J. at 129-33). Related offenses are those that “share acommon factual ground, but not a commonality in statutoryelements, with the crimes charged in the indictment.” Thomas,187 N.J. at 132. Jury instructions on related offenses raiseconstitutional concerns because criminal defendants have rightsto a grand jury presentment and fair notice of criminal chargesagainst them. Id. at 130, 132-33. To prevent infringement of 14 those rights, a trial court may instruct the jury on a relatedoffense only when “the defendant requests or consents to therelated offense charge, and there is a rational basis in theevidence to sustain the related offense.” Id. at 133. IV. We now apply those legal principles to the relevant factsto determine whether the trial court erred in not charging thejury sua sponte on aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1),as a lesser-included offense of robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1. A. As a preliminary matter, we review the appropriate standardfor assessing a trial court’s obligation to give unrequestedinstructions on lesser-included offenses. The appellate panelnoted the clearly indicated standard applies to cases ofunrequested jury instructions but improperly applied therational basis test in its analysis. The panel ultimatelyconcluded, after reviewing the trial evidence, that “there is arational basis in the evidence for the jury to acquit defendantof robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery, as well as toconvict defendant of aggravated assault.” Yet, just because a charge meets the rational basis testdoes not mean it meets the clearly indicated standard. As weexplained earlier, when a defendant fails to request a lesser-included charge or object to its omission at trial, the need for 15 that charge is subject to a higher threshold. In that scenario,unless that need is clearly indicated from the evidence, we willnot find plain error. See Denofa, 187 N.J. at 42. The facts of this case call for review under the higher,clearly indicated standard. Defendant had several opportunitiesto request an aggravated assault charge before the trial courtbut failed to do so. At a pretrial conference, the parties andthe trial court discussed the jury instructions to be charged,which did not include aggravated assault. Defense counsel notedhis objection only to the court’s accomplice liability charge.Similarly, at a conference before closing arguments, the trialcourt specifically asked counsel if they had any additionalrequests after it read the charges to counsel on the record.Defense counsel again failed to request an aggravated assaultcharge or to object to its omission at a charge conferencebefore closing arguments. Defense counsel likewise did notsubmit a proposed aggravated assault instruction after closingarguments and before the court charged the jury. It was not until his appeal that defendant argued the trialcourt erred in not charging the jury sua sponte on aggravatedassault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1). Reversal would be appropriateonly if the basis for a lesser-included-offense charge were to“jump[] off the page[s]” of the record. Denofa, 187 N.J. at 42. 16 B. Although we reaffirm that the clearly indicated standard isthe appropriate lens through which to review any obligation tocharge the jury sua sponte on a lesser-included offense, we neednot apply that standard here. On direct appeal, defendant only challenged the lack of aninstruction concerning “serious bodily injury” aggravatedassault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1). The New Jersey Code ofCriminal Justice provides that an offense is a lesser-includedoffense if: (1) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or (2) It consists of an attempt or conspiracy to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or (3) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission. [ N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(d) (emphases added).]Section 1-8(d) “calls for a comparison of the statutorydefinitions of the respective offenses to ascertain whether theyhave common or overlapping elements that require proof ofidentical facts.” State v. Muniz, 118 N.J. 319, 324 (1990). 17 Under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a), a person is guilty of robbery ifthat person “inflict[ed] bodily injury or use[d] force” on thevictim “in the course of committing a theft.” The statuteprovides that robbery “is a crime of the first degree if in thecourse of committing the theft the actor attempts to killanyone, or purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict seriousbodily injury, or is armed with, or uses or threatens theimmediate use of a deadly weapon.” N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b). Here,the State charged robbery as a first-degree crime exclusively onthe “deadly weapon” prong. As a result, based on itsindictment, the State had to prove that defendant: (1)“inflict[ed] bodily injury or use[d] force” on the victim; and(2) possessed, used, or threatened to use “what appeared to be. . . a knife” during the commission of the robbery. By contrast, aggravated assault under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) requires proof of an attempt “to cause serious bodilyinjury.” The Code defines “serious bodily injury” as “bodilyinjury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causesserious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss orimpairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.”N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(b). Flowing from that definition, “seriousbodily injury” aggravated assault under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)requires a greater injury element than that in the State’srobbery charge, cf. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(d)(3), and must be 18 established by proof of more facts than those needed toestablish “bodily injury,” cf. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(d)(1). For thesame reasons, aggravated assault here is not equivalent to anattempt or conspiracy to commit robbery or one of its includedoffenses. Cf. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(d)(2). Under the circumstances of this case, aggravated assaultis, at most, a related offense of the State’s robbery charge.Defendant did not request or consent to an aggravated assaultcharge at any stage before or during his trial. Thomas, 186 N.J. at 133. So, a sua sponte charge would have violateddefendant’s constitutional grand jury presentment and noticerights. See id. at 130. For all the reasons discussed, the trial court had no dutyto instruct the jury sua sponte on “serious bodily injury”aggravated assault. We find no plain error. C. In defense counsel’s brief to our Court and during oralargument, counsel argued that other forms of aggravated assault-- beyond N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) -- may constitute lesser-included offenses of robbery. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2)(requiring the accused to attempt to cause or purposely orknowingly cause “bodily injury to another with a deadlyweapon”); N.J.S.A. 2C:12-2(b)(3) (requiring the accused torecklessly cause “serious bodily injury to another with a deadly 19 weapon”). Counsel did not raise those arguments before thetrial court or Appellate Division. They are therefore notproperly before this Court, and we decline to address them. SeeDYFS v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 339 (2010) (noting that “issuesnot raised below will ordinarily not be considered on appeal”). D. Finally, we note and reject the State’s argument that ouropinion in Sewell affirmatively held that assault is never alesser-included offense of robbery. In Sewell, we “determine[d] the level of culpabilitynecessary to convert theft into robbery.” 127 N.J. at 134. Inour discussion of the mental state that must accompany theinjury or force used in the course of a theft, we consideredwhether robbery’s injury/force component is the equivalent ofsimple assault. Id. at 142-48. Recognizing that “one could befound guilty of second-degree robbery in some contexts in whichone could not similarly be found guilty of simple assault,” wedetermined that “robbery cannot be viewed merely as theftaccompanied by simple assault.” Id. at 146. The Legislature added the words “or force” to the robberystatute, expanding the concept of robbery to include qualifyingacts that do not require the perpetrator to inflict bodilyinjury. Id. at 146-47. Clearly then, “the shorthandunderstanding that robbery equals theft plus assault is 20 inconsistent with the clear, [but admittedly] complicated,language of the [New Jersey] Code [of Criminal Justice].” Id.at 147. Sewell should not be over-read as completely barringassault as a lesser-included offense of robbery. There may becircumstances in which the evidence adduced at trial supports acharge on assault as a lesser-included offense of robbery.Those circumstances are not before us and we comment no further.Here, we determine only that the trial court had no obligationto charge the jury sua sponte on aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of the State’s robbery charge. V. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division andreinstate defendant’s convictions. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. 21 This archive is a service of Rutgers School of Law.