Title: Brandenburg v. Luethi

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 37 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2085   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Kelli Brandenburg and Bruce Brandenburg, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Briarwood Forestry Services, LLC, 
          Defendant, 
McMillan-Warner Mutual Insurance Company and 
Robert Luethi, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
348 Wis. 2d 265, 831 N.W.2d 825 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished)  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 12, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 15, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Trempealeau 
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Damon 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., PROSSER, J., 
concur in part; dissent in part. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners, the cause was 
argued by Thomas Terwilliger, with whom on the briefs was 
Timothy J. Burnett and Terwilliger, Wakeen, Piehler & Conway, 
S.C., Wausau.  
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants, the cause was argued by Dan 
Arndt, with whom the brief was Emily Ruud and Arndt, Buswell, & 
Thorn S.C., Sparta.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 37
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP2085 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV57) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Kelli Brandenburg and Bruce Brandenburg,   
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants   
 
 
v. 
 
Briarwood Forestry Services, LLC and Jeffrey L. 
Steinke,   
 
 
Defendants, 
 
McMillan-Warner Mutual Insurance Company and 
Robert Luethi, 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners.   
FILED 
 
JUN 12, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  The question we address in this 
case is whether Robert Luethi, who hired an independent 
contractor to spray herbicide on his property, may be held 
liable to his neighbors, the Brandenburgs, for the extensive, 
permanent damage they claim the spraying caused to 79 trees on 
adjoining property.  Bruce Brandenburg, who owned property at 
the top of a steep slope above Luethi's pasture, claimed damage 
to all eight trees on his land; Kelli Brandenburg, who also 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
2 
 
owned property at the top of the slope, claimed damage to 71 of 
115 trees on her land. 
¶2 
More specifically, we must determine whether this case 
falls into one of the exceptions to the well-settled independent 
contractor rule that states that, in general, "one who contracts 
for the services of an independent contractor is not liable to 
others for the acts of the independent contractor."1    
¶3 
Under 
one 
of 
those 
exceptions, 
the 
"inherently 
dangerous activity" exception, an employer of an independent 
contractor may be liable for the torts of an independent 
contractor if the activity of the independent contractor is 
inherently dangerous.  This exception is what the parties 
disagree about.  Plaintiffs say the exception is good law and it 
applies here because this activity is inherently dangerous.  
Luethi says that it is not good law and does not apply here.  
Further, he argues that the exception is unworkable and should 
be altered or abandoned altogether.   
¶4 
The "inherently dangerous" exception has long been 
recognized in treatises, in our case law and in case law from 
other jurisdictions.  The test for whether an activity is 
inherently dangerous has two parts. An activity is inherently 
dangerous 1) if the activity poses a naturally expected risk of 
                                                 
1 Lofy v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 42 Wis. 2d 253, 263, 166 
N.W.2d 809 (1969). 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
3 
 
harm and 2) if it is possible to reduce the risk of the activity 
to a reasonable level by taking precautions.2 
¶5 
For the reasons explained below, we see no reason to 
abandon our precedent concerning the "inherently dangerous" 
exception.  It is a widely accepted and long-established rule of 
negligence law that is rooted in good policy.  The rule imposes 
liability on the parties who are in the best position to take 
precautions to avoid harm to third parties where the activity to 
be done is inherently dangerous. 
¶6 
We therefore turn to the exception's application.    
In  some negligence cases, including somewhat unusual negligence 
claims such as the one against Luethi, "[w]e require a plaintiff 
to plead facts, which if proved true, would establish the 
following four elements: (1) the existence of a duty of care on 
the part of the defendant, (2) a breach of that duty of care, 
(3) a causal connection between the defendant's breach of the 
duty of care and the plaintiff's injury, and (4) actual loss or 
damage resulting from the [breach]."3   
¶7 
Under Wisconsin law, "every person is subject to a 
duty to exercise ordinary care in all of his or her activities" 
and, therefore, "the elements of duty and breach are usually 
presented to the trier of fact in a question asking whether the 
defendant was negligent, and then the elements of causation and 
                                                 
2 Wagner v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 143 Wis. 2d 379, 392-93, 421 
N.W.2d 835 (1988). 
3 Hoida, Inc. v. M & I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶23, 291 
Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17. 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
4 
 
damages are addressed."4   Thus, generally, a trier of fact in a 
usual negligence case is presented with three questions: was the 
defendant negligent?, was that negligence the cause of the 
harm?, and what are the damages?5  As noted above, this case is 
somewhat different. 
¶8 
The threshold question is whether Luethi may be liable 
for the negligence of the independent contractor he hired to 
spray herbicides.  To answer that, we have to examine the nature 
of the activity itself because if spraying is an inherently 
dangerous activity, then it gives rise to a duty of ordinary 
care for Luethi for the acts of the independent contractor.  If, 
on the other hand, the activity is not inherently dangerous (and 
if no other exceptions apply), the duty of ordinary care is that 
                                                 
4 Behrendt v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., 2009 WI 71, ¶¶3, 
14, 318 Wis. 2d 622, 768 N.W.2d 568. 
5 Id., ¶16.  There we stated: 
In Nichols v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co., we 
reiterated that Gritzner and Rockweit were 'still good 
law in Wisconsin.'  There we held that in a negligence 
case, a defendant's conduct is not examined in terms 
of whether or not there is a duty to do a specific 
act, but rather whether the conduct satisfied the duty 
placed upon individuals to exercise that degree of 
care as would be exercised by a reasonable person 
under the circumstances.  
See also Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶30 n.15 (applying 
Palsgraf minority approach and stating, "[T]he majority 
opinion clearly concludes that [defendants] have a duty to 
exercise ordinary care under the circumstances.  What the 
majority opinion turns on is whether the circumstances of 
this case require [defendants] to undertake all the 
affirmative acts that [plaintiff] requests."). 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
5 
 
of the independent contractor, and Luethi cannot be liable for 
the acts of the other person. 
¶9 
In many cases, this determination of whether a given 
activity is inherently dangerous will be one of fact, but in the 
unusual case where the facts are undisputed and no reasonable 
jury could find otherwise,6 it is appropriate to decide it as a 
question of law.  As the relevant suggested verdict form in 
Wisconsin Jury Instruction——Civil 1022.6 notes, "There are times 
when the [question about inherent dangerousness] will not be 
necessary."   
¶10 The record contains uncontroverted evidence that the 
chemical used here is capable of killing 56 "woody plant" 
species, including oak, birch, poplar and maple trees.  It 
therefore poses a "naturally expected risk of harm" to trees on 
neighboring properties.  The record also contains undisputed 
testimony and exhibits showing that it is possible to reduce 
that risk by taking precautions.  Therefore, both parts of the 
inherently dangerous test are satisfied, and we agree with the 
court 
of 
appeals 
that 
under 
Wisconsin 
law, 
under 
these 
circumstances, "spraying the herbicides was an inherently 
dangerous activity, and, as a result, the general rule of 
                                                 
6 See Morgan v. Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 735-36, 
275 N.W.2d 660 (1979) (on the question of causation in a 
negligence case, stating that "whether negligence was a cause-
in-fact of an injury is a factual question for the jury if 
reasonable men could differ on the issue, and the question only 
becomes one of law for judicial decision if reasonable men could 
not disagree"). 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
6 
 
nonliability for an independent contractor's torts did not 
apply."7   
¶11 The threshold question in the negligence determination 
is resolved here in favor of a determination that Luethi may be 
liable for the acts of the independent contractor on the grounds 
that the spraying here was an inherently dangerous activity——it 
posed a risk of naturally expected harm, and it was possible to 
reduce the risk.  With that question resolved, the negligence 
claim 
may 
now 
proceed, 
with 
the 
plaintiffs 
having 
the 
opportunity to show that Luethi failed to use ordinary care with 
regard to the activity and that such failure was the cause of 
the damage claimed,8 followed by an appropriate damage question.  
¶12   This is consistent with the approach applied in 
Wisconsin Jury Instruction——Civil 1022.6 and the Suggested 
Verdict Form 1 (Inherently dangerous activity).  It is also 
                                                 
7 Brandenburg v. Luethi, No. 2012AP2085, unpublished slip 
op., ¶24 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2013). 
8 The suggested verdict form that follows Wisconsin Jury 
Instruction——Civil 
1022.6, 
Liability 
of 
one 
employing 
independent contractor, presents three questions.  
The first is, "Was the work performed by the (owner) 
(principal contractor) inherently dangerous?"  
The second is, "If you answered 1 "yes," then answer this 
question: Did (owner) fail to use ordinary care in (describe the 
work done)?"  
And the third is, "If you answered question 2 "yes," then 
answer this question: Was that failure to use ordinary care a 
cause of (injury to (third person)) (damage to (third person)'s 
property)?"  A note states, "There are times when the [first] 
question will not be necessary." 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
7 
 
consistent with the Restatement sections on which we have relied 
in the prior cases addressing this question.   
¶13 The Restatement sections describe a framework that 
imposes liability on an employer for the acts of the independent 
contractor where three facts are established: that there exists 
a naturally expected risk of harm, that there exists an 
opportunity to take precautions against the harm, and that the 
employer "knows or has reason to know" that it poses a risk and 
requires precautions.  The concurrence/dissent rightly points 
out that Wisconsin case law clearly adopts the "inherently 
dangerous exception" as described in the Restatement sections 
discussed herein.  However, it is equally clear that Wisconsin 
courts have rejected a strict liability approach in "inherently 
dangerous" cases.  Adopting such an approach would erase the 
distinction between "inherently dangerous" and "extrahazardous 
activity," which we explicitly declined to do in Wagner.  Wagner 
v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 143 Wis. 2d 379, 392-93, 421 N.W.2d 835 
(1988).  
¶14 At this point in the case, there has been no 
determination by a trier of fact of what Luethi knew or had 
reason to know about the danger inherent in the work.  To impose 
strict liability would therefore contravene the applicable 
section of the Restatement and change the law by erasing one 
requirement——making an employer liable for activities even where 
it is not established that the employer knew or had reason to 
know of the danger inherent in the work.   The lack of clarity 
on the analysis in prior cases is partly due to the fact that 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
8 
 
this particular question has not been squarely addressed because 
the application of the "inherently dangerous" exception has been 
mentioned in other contexts rather than being subjected to full 
analysis.  Nevertheless, imposing strict liability without any 
resolution of the knowledge requirement, within the framework of 
the duty of ordinary care, is unsupported by the Restatement 
sections.  This "knows or has reason to know" factor seems to 
come into play on the question of whether Luethi failed to use 
ordinary care with regard to the activity.  No resolution of 
that question has been made at this point in the record; 
therefore, the court of appeals correctly stated that the case 
should be remanded for the relevant further determinations to be 
made, specifically whether Luethi exercised ordinary care to 
prevent damage to the Brandenburgs' property.         
¶15 We therefore affirm the court of appeals and remand 
this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶16 Luethi hired an independent contractor who sprayed a 
potent herbicide——one capable of killing oak, birch, poplar and 
maple trees and 52 other woody species, according to its label——
on part of his property to rid it of a plant called prickly ash, 
which had grown thickly on the property, with some plants 
reaching a height of seven feet.  There was no written contract 
between Luethi and the contractor, and Luethi placed no time 
restrictions on the spraying company. 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
9 
 
¶17 A few days after the herbicide was applied, Luethi's 
neighbors, the Brandenburgs, noticed that leaves were falling 
off of the birch trees and other plants on their property.  
Based on an investigation that identified the herbicide as the 
cause of the damage,9 they sued Luethi as well as the independent 
contractor, Briarwood Forestry, and its employee and its 
insurer.10  The only basis in the complaint for the claim was 
that the independent contractor was negligent for failing to 
take precautions to prevent the damage to their trees—— 
specifically, to keep the chemicals from drifting onto adjoining 
property. 
¶18 The 
circuit 
court 
for 
Trempealeau 
County, 
the 
Honorable John A. Damon presiding, looked to a six-factor test 
                                                 
9 The complaint alleges the following:  
[B]etween July 22, 2008, and October 20, 2008, [an] 
employee of the [Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, 
Transportation, and Consumer Protection] . . . led an 
investigation . . . .  Through laboratory analysis of 
samples taken from the trees and other plants on the 
plaintiffs' . . . property[,] the investigation 
determined that the active ingredient found in Garlon 
4 Specialty Herbicide and Agrisolutions 2,4-D LV4 was 
the direct cause of the total loss and extensive 
damage to said trees and other plants . . . .   
10 The record shows that a third-party complaint was 
subsequently filed by Briarwood Forestry stating that "[b]ecause 
of a mistake, the policy was issued by [the insurer], excluding, 
rather than specifically including, liability coverage for 
damages related to or resulting from the spray application of 
herbicides."  The complaint stated that Briarwood Forestry 
"believed they had liability insurance coverage for liability 
that may result from or be related to the spray application of 
herbicides" and attributed the mistake to "an error in the 
communication between the agent and the insurance company." 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
10 
 
discussed in a case from a Kansas district court that bore some 
factual resemblance to this case in that it also involved a 
claim concerning damage caused to plants by a neighbor's 
herbicide spraying.  See Desaire v. Solomon Valley Co-op, Inc., 
No. 94-1271-PFK (D. Kan., Sept. 14, 1995).  The circuit court, 
applying the factors cited in that case, held that spraying 
herbicides was not "abnormally dangerous" or "ultrahazardous."  
Therefore, it held that Luethi had no duty to the Brandenburgs 
and that only the independent contractor could be liable for any 
damage the spraying caused.  The circuit court therefore granted 
Luethi's summary judgment motion.   
¶19 In making its ruling, the circuit court stated, "I 
can’t find that [under] the language used in Desaire this was 
abnormally dangerous and I can't find this reaches the level of 
ultrahazardous activity[.]" 
¶20 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed that ruling 
on the grounds that the circuit court had relied on an improper 
standard.  The relevant question was, the court of appeals said, 
whether the activity was inherently dangerous——not whether it 
was abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous.  Brandenburg v. 
Luethi, No. 2012AP2085, unpublished slip op., ¶¶1, 16 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Apr. 23, 2013). 
¶21 Applying the test for inherently dangerous activities 
that we clarified in Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 392-93, the court of 
appeals concluded that "the risk of harm" posed by spraying 
herbicides "is one that could be naturally expected to arise in 
the 
absence 
of 
precautions." 
Brandenburg 
v. 
Luethi, 
No. 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
11 
 
2012AP2085, unpublished slip op., ¶22 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 
2013).  It also concluded, "Undisputed evidence also showed that 
the risk of harm could be reduced to a reasonable level by 
taking certain precautions."  Id., ¶23.  "Consequently, spraying 
the herbicides was an inherently dangerous activity . . . ."  
Id., ¶24.  Its holding was essentially that no reasonable jury 
could find otherwise on the facts in the record and that the 
circuit court had erred when it used a test derived from 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 520.  (We note that 
Section 520 had also been the basis for the Desaire court's 
holding.)  As the court of appeals noted, that Restatement 
section falls under "Strict Liability" and defines those 
circumstances where there can be liability "without the need of 
a finding of negligence."  Restatement (Second) of Torts  § 520 
cmt. f (1977).  It therefore reversed the judgment and remanded 
for further proceedings. 
¶22 We granted review. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶23 "Whether the circuit court has applied the correct 
legal standard is a question of law reviewed de novo."  Landwehr 
v. Landwehr, 2006 WI 64, ¶8, 291 Wis. 2d 49, 715 N.W.2d 180.  As  
noted above, the circuit court applied the standard employed in 
Desaire, which, in the course of answering a different question 
presented, contained discussion about what factors courts 
consider in determining "whether a given action is abnormally 
dangerous."  Desaire v. Solomon Valley Co-op, Inc., No. 94-1271-
PFK at *4 (D. Kan., Sept. 14, 1995).   
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
12 
 
¶24 The circuit court granted Luethi's summary judgment 
motion.  "There is a standard methodology which a trial court 
follows when faced with a motion for summary judgment."  Green 
Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 314-15, 401 N.W.2d 816 
(1987).  "The first step of that methodology requires the court 
to examine the pleadings to determine whether a claim for relief 
has been stated."  Id.   
If a claim for relief has been stated, the inquiry 
then shifts to whether any factual issues exist. Under 
section 802.08(2), Stats., summary judgment must be 
entered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."   
Id.  "When this court is called upon to review the grant of 
a summary judgment motion . . . we are governed by the 
standard articulated in section 802.08(2), and we are thus 
required to apply the standards set forth in the statute 
just as the trial court applied those standards."  Id. at 
315. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶25 The claims in this case are simple negligence claims.  
The only twist is the fact that it involves an independent 
contractor.  The legal principles for negligence cases involving 
independent contractors are discussed in the treatise Prosser 
and Keeton on Torts.  In the section concerning negligence and 
independent contractors, the treatise writers describe how the 
courts moved from a general rule of liability for one hiring an 
independent contractor to the present general rule of non-
liability. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts 
§ 71, at 509 (5th ed. 1984).  The independent contractor 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
13 
 
exception to that general rule appears in its current form in 
cases as early as 1851.  Id. at 509, n.4.  The treatise authors 
state that courts "continue[] to repeat the general rule of 
nonliability with exceptions" and state that the exceptions 
"overlap and shade into one another." Id. at 510.    
¶26 The treatise explains the origins of the inherently 
dangerous activities exception, in an 1876 case,11 which held the 
employer could be found liable for the negligence of the 
contractor, and it notes that "'[i]nherent danger' converges not 
only with 'special precautions' but also with 'non-delegable 
duty.'"  Id. at 512 n.44.  
¶27 By 1895, we had recognized as "well-established" both 
the independent contractor rule and the "inherently dangerous" 
exception.  In a case involving extensive flood damage to 
property allegedly caused by someone opening a dam in order to 
drive logs down a river, we stated that we had "repeatedly held"  
that the well-established general rule is to the 
effect that, where one person employs another to 
furnish the materials and do a specific job of work as 
an independent contractor, he does not thereby render 
himself liable for injuries caused by the sole 
negligence of such contractor or his servants; and 
that the well-recognized exception to such general 
rule, to the effect that where the performance of such 
contract, in the ordinary mode of doing the work, 
necessarily or naturally results in producing the 
defect or nuisance which caused the injury, then the 
                                                 
11 The case, Bower v. Peate, 1 Q.B. 321 (1876), "gave rise 
to an exceptional category of work likely to be peculiarly 
dangerous 'unless special precautions are taken.'" W. Page 
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 71, at 512 (5th ed. 
1984). 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
14 
 
employer is subject to the same liability to the 
injured party as the contractor. 
Carlson v. Stocking, 91 Wis. 432, 436, 65 N.W. 58 (1895) 
(emphasis added) (quotations omitted) (citing earlier cases).  
The rule was stated in that case in the context of a dispute 
about whether the person whose acts had allegedly caused the 
damage was an independent contractor.  Id. at 432.  As detailed 
below, later cases continued the practice of repeatedly citing 
the rule of non-liability with an exception for activities that 
could be characterized as inherently dangerous.12   
¶28 Nevertheless, Luethi argues that the law does not 
impose liability on him for the acts of the independent 
contractor in this instance, and if it does, it should not.  He 
advances two types of arguments. First, he makes a series of 
arguments about why the inherently dangerous exception is not or 
should not be recognized in Wisconsin law, especially where 
homeowners are concerned.  Second, he argues that even if the 
exception is recognized by Wisconsin law, it does not apply in 
                                                 
12 We agree with the general statement of the inherently 
dangerous exception as set forth by the Chief Justice's 
concurrence/dissent.  Concurrence/Dissent, ¶5.  However, we are 
not convinced that our precedent has fully explained the steps 
applicable 
to 
the 
analysis 
of 
the 
inherently 
dangerous 
exception.  For example, in setting forth the inherently 
dangerous exception the concurrence/dissent quotes Brooks v. 
Hayes, 133 Wis. 2d 228, 395 N.W.2d 167 (1986).  However, Brooks 
did not apply the inherently dangerous exception at all; 
therefore, it did not illuminate any analysis in terms of the 
inherently dangerous exception's application.  Instead, Brooks 
concerned the negligence of an independent contractor under "a 
breach of contract theory."  Id. at 241.  In contrast to Brooks, 
our opinion today sets forth the proper analysis in applying the 
inherently dangerous exception to the general rule. 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
15 
 
this case because herbicide spraying is not an inherently 
dangerous 
activity. 
 
The 
Brandenburgs 
contend 
that 
the 
"inherently dangerous" exception is clearly expressed in the 
law, is straightforward to apply, and is consistent with good 
policy.  They argue that it applies on the facts of this case.13  
We address the arguments in turn. 
¶29 Luethi argues first that the inherently dangerous 
exception does not control because it "has been a confusing and 
evolving doctrine in Wisconsin, which has been described but not 
applied."  He contends that "no precedent has applied the rule 
the Brandenburgs now seek to resurrect in more than 25 years," 
that "no applicable precedent subsequent to Lofy14 . . . has 
actually applied the rule in either direction," and that in the 
cases cited, the rule, though stated, has never operated to 
allow recovery for a plaintiff.   
¶30 Even though there may not be a Wisconsin case on all 
fours with the specific facts in this case, we see no reason 
                                                 
13 The Brandenburgs argue, in the alternative, that even if 
a higher standard is required before holding that an employer 
may be liable for the acts of an independent contractor, it is 
met here because spraying qualifies as an extrahazardous 
activity under the test set forth in Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 392-
93  (defining an extrahazardous activity as "one in which the 
risk of harm remains unreasonably high no matter how carefully 
it is undertaken").  Because we resolve this case on the basis 
of the "inherently dangerous" exception to the independent 
contractor rule, we do not address their alternative argument.    
14 Lofy, 42 Wis. 2d 253. 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
16 
 
that the accepted rule needs to be revisited.15  The law is well-
founded in the Restatement, very familiar to treatise writers, 
and often repeated in Wisconsin cases dating to the early 
nineteenth century.  In Finkelstein v. Majestic Realty Corp., 
198 Wis. 527, 224 N.W. 743 (1929), which involved contractors 
apparently knocking loose a piece of terra cotta that fell from 
a balcony and killed a child below, the court observed,  
It is conceded that the contractors were independent 
contractors, and that ordinarily the owner cannot be 
held 
liable 
for 
the 
negligent 
acts 
of 
such 
contractors. On the other hand, it is also clear that 
there are exceptions to the general rule, which 
consist of cases like the one herein involved, where 
the work itself is inherently dangerous to the public 
. . . . 
Id. at 536-37.   
¶31 We mentioned the exception again, in 1931, in Medley 
v. Trenton Investment Company, 205 Wis. 30, 236 N.W. 713 (1931), 
a case in which a landlord was sued for the wrongful death of a 
tenant after a contractor fumigated a neighboring apartment and 
the victim died from exposure to the fumes: 
[I]t does not follow, because the relationship . . .  
was that of independent contractor and employer, that 
the defendant may not be liable. . . . As between 
owners and principal contractors and third persons, it 
seems clear, under our decisions, that the owner or 
principal contractor is not liable for the negligent 
acts of an independent contractor unless the act to be 
done or the work to be performed is inherently 
                                                 
15 See State v. Kucik, No. 2009AP933-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶46 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2010) (Fine, J., concurring) 
("Simply put, there is no specific on-all-fours case because the 
issue has apparently not come up before now.  That, of course, 
is no reason to not decide the issue.").  
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
17 
 
dangerous or naturally or necessarily creates the 
nuisance or the defect . . . .  
Id. at 35-36. 
¶32 The principle was invoked in Lofy by plaintiffs who 
sought to hold a school district liable for the alleged 
negligence of a bus driver who was an independent contractor.  
Lofy v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 42 Wis. 2d 253, 263, 166 N.W.2d 
809 (1969).  There we noted the rule and the "inherently 
dangerous" exception and then rejected the argument that it 
applied in that case: 
The general rule is that one who contracts for the 
services of an independent contractor is not liable to 
others for the acts of the independent contractor.  
There are exceptions to the rule, such as where 
services 
contracted 
for 
involve 
inherent 
danger . . . .  The operation of a bus between 
Cumberland and Madison over modern highways cannot be 
considered inherently dangerous. 
Id. at 263. 
¶33 We have also looked to the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts in prior cases and have examined the principles set forth 
in sections 413, 416 and 427 in resolving questions arising in 
negligence claims involving independent contractors.16  
Sections 
416 
and 
427 
impute 
the 
independent 
contractor's negligence to the principal employer 
irrespective of whether the employer is himself or 
herself at fault on the basis that the dangerous 
activities involved give rise to a nondelegable duty. 
"They arise in situations in which, for reasons of 
                                                 
16 Restatement (Third) of Torts, Section 59, states that it 
replaces sections 416 and 427.  Neither party cited to that 
section or in any way relied on it, and we will thus not discuss 
it further. 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
18 
 
policy, the employer is not permitted to shift the 
responsibility for the proper conduct of the work to 
the contractor."  
Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 391 (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, Introductory Note to secs. 416-429).  We cited to both 
Prosser and Keeton's treatise and the Restatement for these 
principles in Snider v. Northern States Power Co., 81 Wis. 2d 
224, 233, 260 N.W.2d 260 (1977): 
 
This principle of imposing liability on an otherwise 
immune contracting owner is limited to enterprises in 
which there is a high degree of risk in relation to 
the environment or a specific unreasonable risk to 
third parties. The emphasis is upon the peculiar 
nature of the risk and on the need for special and 
unusual care. Prosser, supra, at 472-73. Restatement 
2d, Torts, in discussing this nondelegable duty, 
refers to "peculiar unreasonable risk" (sec. 413, p. 
384), "peculiar risk" (sec. 416, p. 395), and "special 
danger to others . . . inherent in or normal to the 
work" (sec. 427, p. 415). 
¶34 As Snider recognized, these sections overlap in 
certain respects.17 
                                                 
17 It 
appears 
that 
Section 
413 
could 
have 
potential 
application to the facts of this case; however, the Brandenburgs 
did not allege in the complaint that any harm was caused by 
Luethi.  Rather, the sole basis identified in the complaint for 
the claim was the negligence of Briarwood Forestry Services, 
LLC, and its employee for failing to ensure that the herbicide 
was safely applied.  Section 413 is entitled "Duty to Provide 
for Taking of Precautions Against Dangers Involved in Work 
Entrusted to Contractor," and it falls under Chapter 15, 
Liability of an Employer of an Independent Contractor, under the 
heading, "Topic 1, Harm Caused by Fault of Employers of 
Independent Contractors."  It states: 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work 
which the employer should recognize as likely to 
create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable 
risk of physical harm to others unless special 
precautions are taken, is subject to liability for 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
19 
 
¶35 Section 416 is entitled "Work Dangerous in Absence of 
Special Precautions" and it falls in Chapter 15, Liability of an 
Employer of an Independent Contractor, under the heading, "Topic 
2: Harm Caused by Negligence of a Carefully Selected Independent 
Contractor."  It states: 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work 
which the employer should recognize as likely to 
create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical 
harm to others unless special precautions are taken, 
is subject to liability for physical harm caused to 
them by the failure of the contractor to exercise 
reasonable care to take such precautions, even though 
the employer has provided for such precautions in the 
contract or otherwise. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 (1965). 
 
¶36 A comment to Section 416 states in part: 
There is a close relation between the rule stated in 
this Section, and that stated in § 427, as to dangers 
inherent in or normal to the work. . . . The rules 
stated in the two Sections have been applied more or 
less interchangeably in the same types of cases, and 
frequently have been stated in the same opinion as the 
same rule, or as different phases of the same rule.  
The rule stated in this Section is more commonly 
stated 
and 
applied 
where 
the 
employer 
should 
anticipate the need for some specific precaution, such 
as a railing around an excavation in the sidewalk.  
The rule stated in § 427 is more commonly applied 
                                                                                                                                                             
physical harm caused to them by the absence of such 
precautions if the employer (a) fails to provide in 
the contract that the contractor shall take such 
precautions, or (b) fails to exercise reasonable care 
to provide in some other manner for the taking of such 
precautions. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413 (1965).   
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
20 
 
where the danger involved in the work calls for a 
number of precautions . . . . 
Id., §416, cmt. a. 
¶37 Section 427 is entitled "Negligence as to Danger 
Inherent in the Work" and it falls under the same chapter and 
topic heading.  It states: 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work 
involving a special danger to others which the 
employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in 
or normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has 
reason to contemplate when making the contract, is 
subject to liability for physical harm caused to such 
others by the contractor's failure to take reasonable 
precautions against such danger. 
Id., § 427.  A comment to this section clarifies that, like the 
rule stated in Section 416, "the rule here stated applies only 
where the harm results from the negligence of the contractor in 
failing to take precautions against the danger involved in the 
work itself, which the employer should contemplate at the time 
of his contract."  Id. § 427 cmt. d.  Further, "the rule stated 
here has no application . . . as to negligence in the operative 
details of the work which involve no peculiar risk, which the 
employer may reasonably assume will be carried out with proper 
care."  Id. 
¶38 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concisely 
summarized 
the 
applicable principles derived from our case law, which has 
consistently referenced the Restatement sections above: 
Following Lofy and Wagner, the 
following 
principles 
are clear: (1) a principal employer is generally not 
liable for an independent contractor's negligence; (2) 
a 
principal 
employer 
may 
be 
liable 
to 
a third 
party for the independent contractor's negligence, if 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
21 
 
the independent contractor was performing inherently 
dangerous work; and (3) a principal employer may be 
liable to the independent contractor's employee, if 
the 
independent 
contractor 
was 
performing extrahazardous work.  The Brandenburgs are 
not 
employees 
of 
Briarwood. 
Thus, 
to 
hold Luethi liable 
for 
Briarwood's 
negligence, 
the Brandenburgs must show that Briarwood's work was 
inherently dangerous. Contrary to Luethi's assertions, 
they 
need 
not 
show 
that 
the 
work 
was 
extrahazardous. . . .  
If the [circuit] court felt the need to reference the 
Restatement, it should have looked to § 427, which is 
directly on point. . . .  
Under Wagner and the applicable jury instruction, two 
elements 
are 
necessary 
for 
an 
activity 
to 
be 
considered inherently dangerous: (1) the activity must 
pose a naturally expected risk of harm; and (2) it 
must be possible to reduce the risk to a reasonable 
level by taking precautions.  Based on the undisputed 
facts, we conclude as a matter of law that Briarwood's 
application of herbicides met this standard. 
Brandenburg v. Luethi, No. 2012AP2085, unpublished slip op., 
¶¶16, 20, 21, (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2013) (citations omitted).  
We agree. 
¶39 While it is true that in some earlier cases the 
distinction between the categories of "extrahazardous" and 
"inherently dangerous" activities appears unclear, we dispelled 
any confusion on that point in Wagner, when we specifically 
explained the difference between the two: "We do not regard an 
activity which is inherently dangerous because of the absence of 
special precautions to be synonymous with an activity that is 
extrahazardous.  A person engaged in an activity of the first 
type, i.e., one that is inherently dangerous without special 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
22 
 
precautions, can take steps to minimize the risk of injury."   
Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 392. 
¶40 In short, we have consistently acknowledged the rule 
and the exception that applies here. The lack of cases in which 
the exception has applied in precisely the way it applies here 
does not persuade us that the rule does not exist.18   
¶41 Luethi also argues that, if the "inherently dangerous" 
exception is good law, homeowners and landowners should be 
exempt from its application because no Wisconsin cases dealing 
with this exception have applied it to an individual homeowner.  
For 
the 
reason 
already 
given——that 
absence 
of 
factually 
identical cases does not persuade us of the invalidity of the 
rule——we disagree.  Nor has Luethi pointed us to precedent as a 
legal basis supporting a contrary rule if an individual 
homeowner is involved. 
¶42 In a similar vein, he argues that if liability exists 
as to a homeowner, public policy factors19 should preclude 
                                                 
18 We are not unaware that the exception has its occasional 
detractor.  A dissenting opinion in a 1992 Colorado case 
concluded that the exception was impractical and unnecessary and 
stated that "clearer more predictable theories of liability are 
available to address the policy considerations that purportedly 
support the inherently dangerous doctrine." 
Huddleston by 
Huddleston v. Union Rural Elec. Ass'n, 841 P.2d 282, 295 (Colo. 
1992) (Rovira, J., dissenting). 
19 We have summarized those factors as follows: 
In Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 598–99, 85 N.W.2d 
345 (1957) this court first articulated the following 
six public policy factors that could be used by courts 
to limit liability in negligence claims: 1) [T]he 
injury is too remote from the negligence; 2) Recovery 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
23 
 
liability under these circumstances.  Specifically, he argues 
that the injury is too remote from the negligence, that the 
injury 
is 
wildly 
out 
of 
proportion 
to 
the 
tortfeasor's 
culpability, that allowing recovery would place an unreasonable 
burden on the tortfeasor, and that allowing recovery would enter 
a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.  In support 
of his public policy arguments, he relies on our holdings in 
Casper v. American International South Insurance Co., 2011 WI 
81, 336 Wis. 2d 267, 800 N.W.2d 880, and Hoida, Inc. v. M & I 
Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17.   
¶43 In the first case, Casper, we found the that the 
injury was too remote from the negligence to permit a finding of 
liability for Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Jeffrey Wenham, who 
had approved a route that was driven by Mark Wearing, a truck 
driver who, while under the influence of multiple drugs, caused 
a tragic accident: 
[The CEO] did not hire Wearing. He did not train 
Wearing. He did not supervise Wearing. In fact, he 
never met the man driving the truck that collided with 
                                                                                                                                                             
is too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of 
the negligent tort-feasor; 3) [I]n retrospect it 
appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence 
should have brought about the harm; 4) Allowing 
recovery would place too unreasonable a burden upon 
[the tortfeasor]; 5) Allowing recovery would be too 
likely to open the way to fraudulent claims; or 6) 
Allowing recovery would enter a field that has no 
sensible or just stopping point.  
Fandrey ex rel. Connell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 WI 62, 
¶1 n.1, 272 Wis. 2d 46, 680 N.W.2d 345 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
24 
 
the Caspers' vehicle that day in May. Any negligence 
on [the CEO's] part was remote from the Caspers' 
injury in terms of time, distance, and cause. 
Casper, 336 Wis. 2d 267, ¶96.   
¶44 In Hoida, the plaintiff sought recovery from a 
disbursing agent of money that was disbursed to a subcontractor 
who took $650,000 in construction loan proceeds without doing 
the work.  Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶43.  We declined on public 
policy grounds to assign liability to a disbursing agent for a 
construction loan, where that agent "acted solely at the 
direction" of the bank. We did so on the grounds that permitting 
recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on such agents to 
verify details of the progress of construction projects.  Id.   
¶45 Luethi analogizes his position to that of the CEO in 
Casper, 
for 
whom 
the 
ultimate 
harm 
was 
not 
reasonably 
foreseeable, and to the disbursing agent in Hoida, who would 
have been unreasonably burdened by the responsibility of 
checking on the progress of the work.  The plaintiffs disagree 
that such analogies are valid. 
¶46 We do not see the situation of a person hiring an 
independent contractor doing inherently dangerous work as 
raising the types of concerns that precluded liability in the 
cases Luethi cites.  He cannot be compared to the CEO who did 
not hire or even meet the truck driver who caused the harm and 
whose only connection to the accident was the fact that he had 
approved the route the driver was on.  Nor is a person who hires 
an independent contractor to do inherently dangerous work on his 
own property fairly compared to a disbursing agent for a 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
25 
 
construction loan.  This is true for many reasons, including 
that the property where the work was done was Luethi's own. 
Also, the construction project was of a magnitude much larger 
than a one-time application of herbicide. 
¶47 Further, the public policy factors have in fact 
already been balanced in favor of potential liability in these 
cases.  Public policy reasons underlie the "inherently dangerous 
activity" exception in the first place, as the Restatement  
sections discussed note.  As one court observed, the "inherently 
dangerous" exception "accords with basic intuitions of fairness, 
and it is also consistent with what is often efficient 
economically."  Huddleston by Huddleston v. Union Rural Elec. 
Ass'n, 841 P.2d 282, 287 (Colo. 1992).  The reason for its 
existence is that the employer is in a better position than 
third parties to take precautions against harm to unwitting 
third parties, and should not be permitted to shift liability to 
a 
contractor 
where 
inherently 
dangerous 
activities 
are 
involved.20  We do not agree that the injury is so remote from 
the negligence that public policy precludes liability – indeed 
it follows directly from it.  Also, we do not agree that holding 
Luethi liable imposes an unreasonable burden under these 
circumstances.  
                                                 
20 Restatement (Second) Torts, Introductory Note to §§ 416-
429.  ("[F]or reasons of policy, the employer is not permitted 
to shift the responsibility for the proper conduct of the work 
to the contractor.")  
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
26 
 
¶48 Alternatively, Luethi asks that we adopt a rule that 
liability may exist for a homeowner only where an activity is 
"extrahazardous," using the test employed by the Kansas district 
court in Desaire, which applied the six factors from Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 520.  Section 520, which falls in the 
division 
concerning 
strict 
liability, 
defines 
"abnormally 
dangerous" activities using the following standard:  
In determining whether an activity is abnormally 
dangerous, the following factors are to be considered: 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to 
the person, land or chattels of others; 
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will 
be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of 
reasonable care; 
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of 
common usage; 
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place 
where it is carried on; and 
(f) extent to which its value to the community is 
outweighed by its dangerous attributes. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977).   
¶49 The Desaire decision relied on Section 520.  From the 
cases to which the Desaire court cites, it can be inferred that 
the claim involved in the case may have been a claim for strict 
liability rather than a negligence claim though that is not 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
27 
 
clearly stated.21  What is clear is that application of the 
factors from Section 520 is appropriate where a claim for strict 
liability is made.  To apply such a standard to negligence 
claims such as this one would be a departure from Wisconsin law, 
as the court of appeals correctly noted.22  To import strict 
liability from a products liability context to a negligence 
claim would mean "reliev[ing] [a plaintiff] of proving specific 
acts of negligence and protect[ing] him from [applicable] 
defenses . . . ."  Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 
N.W.2d 55 (1967).   
                                                 
21 This is partly because the Desaire court was not actually 
deciding the "abnormally dangerous" activity issue; it was 
merely commenting on the issue in the context of deciding a 
completely unrelated matter, that "the state district court did 
not issue a final and hence binding order on the Co-op's 
independent contractor status." Desaire v. Solomon Valley Co-op, 
Inc., No. 94-1271-PFK, at *3 (D. Kan., Sept. 14, 1995).  
22 The court of appeals stated, 
Moreover, even absent any conflict with Wisconsin law, 
we are not convinced that Desaire's reliance on § 520 
was correct. Section 520 is found in Chapter 21 of the 
Restatement, which deals with situations in which a 
person may be subject to strict liability for harm 
caused by abnormally dangerous activities. See, e.g., 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 519, 520B, 520C 
(1977). Chapter 21 does not address employer liability 
for harm caused by an independent contractor. That 
topic is instead discussed in Chapter 15, which 
contains a section that specifically addresses an 
employer's 
liability 
for 
inherently 
dangerous 
activities. See id., § 427 ("Negligence as to Danger 
Inherent in the Work").   
Brandenburg v. Luethi, No. 2012AP2085, unpublished slip 
op., ¶20, (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2013). 
 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
28 
 
¶50 Having established what the law in Wisconsin is, we 
turn to Luethi’s final argument, which is that even if the 
"inherently dangerous" exception is the law and the Wagner and 
Lofy standards govern, herbicide spraying does not qualify as 
inherently dangerous.  The plaintiffs, of course, disagree. 
¶51 To support his argument that herbicide spraying is not 
inherently dangerous, Luethi points to Comment f to Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, Section 413.  That section states: 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work 
which the employer should recognize as likely to 
create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable 
risk of physical harm to others unless special 
precautions are taken, is subject to liability for 
physical harm caused to them by the absence of such 
precautions if the employer 
(a) fails to provide in the contract that the 
contractor shall take such precautions, or 
(b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in 
some other manner for the taking of such precautions. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413 (1965). 
¶52 The comment to which Luethi refers provides that "the 
extent of the employer's knowledge and experience in the field 
of work to be done is to be taken into account," and Luethi 
asserts that in light of this comment, he cannot be held liable 
because he "had no knowledge of the peculiar risks involved, nor 
special precautions needed to mitigate them, nor any reason to 
foresee 
[the 
contractor] 
would 
ignore 
standard 
safety 
precautions such as instructions on the chemicals' labels."  
Luethi's knowledge or lack thereof are matters to be considered 
as to whether he exercised ordinary care. 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
29 
 
¶53 Section 413, the section with the comment to which 
Luethi cites, falls into the first part of Chapter 15 of the 
Restatement 
(Second), 
"Liability 
of 
an 
Employer 
of 
an 
Independent Contractor." The chapter is divided into two parts: 
the first, Topic 1, covers "Harm Caused by the Fault of 
Employers of Independent Contractors," and the second, Topic 2, 
covers "Harm Caused by the Negligence of a Carefully Selected 
Independent Contractor."  Topic 2, which includes sections 416 
and 427, which we discussed above, overlaps with Section 413, as 
was acknowledged in Snider, in that all three contain language 
conditioning liability on, among other things, what the employer 
"should recognize" or "has reason to know" about the nature of 
the danger involved in the work.   
¶54 Under sections 416 and 427, an employer's assertions 
of a lack of knowledge about an activity's dangerousness are not 
dispositive on the question of its inherent dangerousness 
because liability may be imposed for activity "which the 
employer should recognize as likely to create during its 
progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless 
special precautions are taken" (as Section 416 states), and for 
activity involving "a special danger to others which the 
employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal 
to the work, or which he contemplates or has reason to 
contemplate when making the contract" (as Section 427 states).   
¶55 The Restatement sections at issue thus explicitly 
condition liability not on actual knowledge but on the inherent 
dangers an employer of an independent contractor "should 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
30 
 
recognize," 
"has 
reason 
to 
know," 
or 
"has 
reason 
to 
contemplate."  This "knows or has reason to know" factor seems 
to come into play on the question of whether Luethi failed to 
use ordinary care with regard to the activity.    
¶56 In many cases, the determination of an activity's 
inherent dangerousness will be a question of fact.23  However, in 
certain circumstances involving undisputed facts, a court may 
hold an activity is inherently dangerous as a matter of law.  As 
noted above, Wisconsin Jury Instruction–Civil 1022.6 includes a 
note referring to the threshold "inherently dangerous" question 
that says, "There are times when the [first] question will not 
be necessary." 
¶57 For example, in Lofy, this court held as a matter of 
law that "[t]he operation of a bus between Cumberland and 
Madison over modern highways cannot be considered inherently 
dangerous."  Lofy, 42 Wis. 2d at 263.  See also Brooks v. Hayes, 
133 Wis. 2d 228, 395 N.W.2d 167 (1986).   Here the court of 
appeals, citing the extensive and uncontroverted evidence, 
determined that certain precautions could reduce the risk to a 
reasonable level: 
At 
the 
fact-finding 
hearing, 
Brian 
Borreson, 
Briarwood's 
owner, 
testified 
that 
when 
spraying 
herbicides, there is a risk that drift will occur and 
cause damage to neighboring properties. Lee Shambeau, 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., Mueller v. Luther, 31 Wis. 2d 220, 230-231, 
142 N.W.2d 848 (1966) and Wis. JI——Civil, 1022.6, Liability of 
One Employing Independent Contractor (including as a suggested 
verdict form a jury question on whether the work performed was 
inherently dangerous). 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
31 
 
Luethi's expert witness, also described various ways 
that sprayed herbicides can cross property lines, and 
he admitted that herbicide drift can cause harm. In 
addition, the Brandenburgs' expert, Gary LeMasters, 
testified that spraying herbicides involves a risk of 
drift onto neighboring properties. Luethi did not 
present any evidence to the contrary. Thus, the 
undisputed 
evidence 
established 
that 
Briarwood's 
spraying of the herbicides posed a risk of harm. 
Moreover, 
common 
sense 
dictates 
that 
herbicides 
sprayed outdoors on one property will not necessarily 
be contained to that property. Consequently, the risk 
of harm is one that could be naturally expected to 
arise in the absence of precautions. 
Undisputed evidence also showed that the risk of harm 
could be reduced to a reasonable level by taking 
certain 
precautions. 
Both 
Borreson 
and 
Shambeau 
testified that various practices can be used to reduce 
the possibility of drift, including: (1) avoiding 
spraying during high velocity winds; (2) spraying when 
the wind is blowing away from a neighbor's property; 
(3) spraying in cooler weather; (4) using low pressure 
spray nozzles; (5) using a thickening agent; and (6) 
keeping spray nozzles close to the ground. While these 
practices do not completely eliminate the possibility 
of drift, Borreson testified they "should be fairly 
effective in controlling the situation[.]" Similarly, 
Shambeau testified that the risk of drift can never be 
eliminated "100 percent," but it can be reduced by 
taking precautions. LeMasters agreed that the risk 
cannot be completely eliminated, but he stated the 
herbicides in question can be "applied safely without 
drift[.]" The circuit court aptly summarized the 
witnesses' testimony, stating that, although the risk 
of harm can never be eliminated entirely, it can be 
reduced "to a large degree by using reasonable care." 
The undisputed evidence therefore established that 
Briarwood's application of the herbicides posed a 
naturally expected risk of harm, and that certain 
precautions could be taken to reduce the risk to a 
reasonable level. 
Brandenburg v. Luethi, No. 2012AP2085, unpublished slip op., 
¶¶22-24 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2013). 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
32 
 
 
¶58 We agree with the court of appeals for the reasons it 
stated that in this case, under our precedent, the activity is 
inherently dangerous, because the activity poses a naturally 
expected risk of harm, and taking certain precautions could 
reduce the risk to a reasonable level. 
¶59 That determination resolves the threshold question in 
this claim as to Luethi.  Because the activity involved was 
inherently dangerous, Luethi may be liable despite hiring an 
independent contractor.  The next questions to answer are 1) 
whether Luethi failed to use ordinary care with regard to any 
danger inherent in the herbicide spraying that he knew or had 
reason to know about, and 2) if so, whether any harm that 
occurred was caused by the spraying.  As the court of appeals 
noted, "[T]he factual question remains for the jury to determine 
whether Luethi exercised ordinary care to prevent damage to 
the Brandenburgs' property."  Id., ¶24.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶60 The record contains uncontroverted evidence that the 
chemical used here is capable of killing 56 "woody plant" 
species, including oak, birch, poplar and maple trees.  It 
therefore poses a "naturally expected risk of harm" to trees on 
neighboring properties.  The record also contains undisputed 
testimony and exhibits showing that it is possible to reduce 
that risk by taking precautions.  Therefore, both parts of the 
inherently dangerous test are satisfied, and we agree with the 
court 
of 
appeals 
that 
under 
Wisconsin 
law, 
under 
these 
circumstances, "spraying the herbicides was an inherently 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
33 
 
dangerous activity, and, as a result, the general rule of 
nonliability for an independent contractor's torts did not 
apply."24   
¶61 The threshold question in the negligence determination 
is resolved here in favor of a determination that Luethi may be 
liable on the grounds that the spraying here was an inherently 
dangerous activity.  With that question resolved, the negligence 
claim 
may 
now 
proceed, 
with 
the 
plaintiffs 
having 
the 
opportunity to show that Luethi failed to use ordinary care with 
regard to the activity and that such failure was a cause of the 
damage claimed, followed by an appropriate damages question.  
This is consistent with the approach applied in Wisconsin Jury 
Instruction——Civil 1022.6 and the Suggested Verdict Form 1 
(Inherently dangerous activity).  It is also consistent with the 
Restatement sections on which we have relied in the prior cases 
addressing this question.   
¶62 The Restatement sections describe a framework that 
imposes liability on an employer for the acts of the independent 
contractor where three facts are established: that there exists 
a naturally expected risk of harm, that there exists an 
opportunity to take precautions against the harm, and that the 
employer "knows or has reason to know" that it poses a risk and 
requires precautions.  The concurrence rightly points out that 
Wisconsin case law clearly adopts the "inherently dangerous 
                                                 
24 Brandenburg v. Luethi, No. 2012AP2085, unpublished slip 
op., ¶24 (Wis. Ct. App., Apr. 23, 2013). 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
34 
 
exception" as described in the Restatement sections discussed 
herein.  However, it is equally clear that Wisconsin courts have 
rejected a strict liability approach in "inherently dangerous" 
cases.  Adopting such an approach would erase the distinction 
between "inherently dangerous" and "extrahazardous activity," 
which we explicitly declined to do in Wagner.   
¶63 At this point in the case, there has been no 
determination by a trier of fact of what Luethi knew or had 
reason to know about the danger inherent in the work.  To impose 
strict liability would therefore contravene the applicable 
section of the Restatement and change the law by erasing one 
requirement——making an employer liable for activities even where 
it is not established that the employer knew or had reason to 
know of the danger inherent in the work.   The lack of clarity 
on the analysis in prior cases is partly due to the fact that 
this particular question has not been squarely addressed because 
the application of the "inherently dangerous" exception has been 
mentioned in other contexts rather than being subjected to full 
analysis.  Nevertheless, imposing strict liability without any 
resolution of the knowledge requirement, within the framework of 
the duty of ordinary care, is unsupported by the Restatement 
sections.  This "knows or has reason to know" factor seems to 
come into play on the question of whether Luethi failed to use 
ordinary care with regard to the activity.  No resolution of 
that question has been made at this point in the record; 
therefore, the court of appeals correctly stated that the case 
should be remanded for the relevant further determinations to be 
No. 
2012AP2085   
 
35 
 
made, specifically "whether Luethi exercised ordinary care to 
prevent damage to the Brandenburgs' property."        
¶64 We therefore affirm the court of appeals and remand 
this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—Affirmed and cause remanded to the circuit 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶65 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  When a landowner employs an independent 
contractor to perform an activity that this court declares is 
inherently dangerous as a matter of law, who should bear the 
cost of the damage to the innocent neighbor's property?  Should 
it be the employer who hires the independent contractor to 
perform the inherently dangerous activity and reaps the benefits 
of that activity?  Or should it be the innocent neighbor who 
suffers the damages caused by the independent contractor's 
negligence?1 
¶66 Our case law has already answered this question:  
"[A]n employer of an independent contractor is vicariously 
liable for the torts of an independent contractor if the 
activity of the independent contractor is inherently dangerous."2   
                                                 
1 In these situations liability has been imposed on the 
employer based on two policy concerns:  Fairness and economic 
efficiency.  Huddleston v. Union Rural Elec. Ass'n, 841 
P.2d 282, 287 (Colo. 1992).  See Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of 
Vicarious Liability, 93 Yale L. J. 1231, 1271-73 (1984).   
2 Brooks v. Hayes, 133 Wis. 2d 228, 233-34, 242-43, 395 
N.W.2d 167 (1986).  Although Brooks was not decided on the 
grounds that the inherently dangerous exception applied, it did 
properly state the test for the vicarious liability of an 
employer for the torts of its independent contractor while 
performing an inherently dangerous activity.  Simply because 
Brooks was decided on other grounds does not render its 
statement of law inaccurate.  Wisconsin does not consider 
statements germane to a controversy as dicta.  See Zarder v. 
Humana Ins. Co., 2010 WI 35, ¶52 n.19, 324 Wis. 2d 325, 782 
N.W.2d 682.    
See also Wagner v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 143 Wis. 2d 379, 391, 
421 N.W.2d 835 (1988) (cited by majority op., ¶39); Finkelstein 
v. Majestic Realty Corp., 198 Wis. 527, 537, 224 N.W. 743 (1929) 
(cited by majority op., ¶30); Medley v. Trenton Inv. Co., 205 
Wis. 30, 36, 236 N.W. 713 (1931) (cited by majority op., ¶31).  
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶67 The majority opinion professes that it "sets forth the 
proper analysis in applying the inherently dangerous exception 
to the general rule,"3 but its analysis does not comport with the 
principles underlying the inherently dangerous exception.4 
¶68 The general rule, upon which we all agree, is that 
employers of independent contractors are not generally liable 
for the torts committed by their independent contractors.  An 
                                                                                                                                                             
Vicarious liability applies when the law imposes a duty on 
an employer, regardless of the employer's own actions, for the 
tortious actions of another: 
Vicarious liability is a form of strict liability 
without fault.  A master may be held liable for a 
servant's torts regardless of whether the master's own 
conduct is tortious. . . . [V]icarious liability is a 
separate and distinct theory of liability, and should 
not be confused with any direct liability that may 
flow from the master's own fault in bringing about the 
plaintiff's harm.  Vicarious liability is imputed 
liability. 
Kerl 
v. 
Dennis 
Rasmussen, 
Inc., 
2004 
WI 
86, 
¶21, 
273 
Wis. 2d 106, 682 N.W.2d 328.  
The majority opinion's use of the term "strict liability" 
is misleading.  Majority op., ¶¶13, 14, 62, 63.  Once the 
activity has been deemed "inherently dangerous," the plaintiff 
must still show that the independent contractor was causally 
negligent.  If there was negligence on the part of the 
independent contractor in performing that inherently dangerous 
activity, then the employer is also liable, regardless of his or 
her own personal negligence. 
3 Majority op., ¶27 n.12. 
4 This 
opinion 
addresses 
the 
"inherently 
dangerous" 
exception and does not address the "extrahazardous activity" 
exception, which has different rules for liability.  See Wagner, 
143 Wis. 2d at 387-88, 391-98. 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
3 
 
employer may, however, be liable for the torts of an independent 
contractor in two circumstances:  
(1) "the employer may be liable for any negligence of 
his own in connection with the work to be done," and  
(2) 
under 
certain 
circumstances 
such 
as 
the 
independent 
contractor's 
performance 
of 
inherently 
dangerous activities, the employer may be "liable for the 
negligence of the contractor, although [the employer] 
has . . . done everything that could reasonably be required 
of him [or her]."5   
¶69 These two bases of liability of the employer of an 
independent contractor are analyzed separately in the case law 
and the literature. 
¶70 This case addresses only a claim against the employer 
(Luethi) for the tortious acts committed by his independent 
contractor.  The complaint does not allege that any wrongful 
acts were committed by Luethi.6  As the majority opinion notes, 
summary judgment determinations rely solely on allegations in 
the complaint.7   
¶71 By 
confusing 
the 
two 
separate 
inquiries 
of 
an 
employer's liability, the majority reaches the conclusion that 
vicarious liability attaches to the employer as a matter of law 
                                                 
5 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of 
Torts § 71, at 510, 511 (5th ed. 1984). 
6 Majority op., ¶17 ("The only basis in the complaint for 
the 
claim 
was 
that 
the 
independent 
contractor 
was 
negligent . . . ."). 
7 Majority op., ¶24. 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
4 
 
for his or her independent contractor's torts in performing an 
inherently dangerous activity, but that such an employer can 
nonetheless avoid liability if he or she exercised ordinary 
care.   
 
¶72 Because the court has already determined as a matter 
of law that the herbicide spraying by the independent contractor 
in the instant case constituted an inherently dangerous activity 
and 
nothing 
in 
the 
complaint 
or 
record 
avers 
Luethi's 
negligence, no inquiry into Luethi's level of care is necessary.  
¶73 Accordingly, I agree with the majority opinion that 
the matter is to be remanded to the circuit court to determine 
whether the independent contractor was causally negligent in 
damaging the neighbor's property.  I disagree that on remand the 
circuit court must resolve the question of whether Luethi failed 
to use ordinary care with regard to the activity.  Neither the 
complaint nor the summary judgment record raises the issue of 
the negligence of Luethi himself. 
¶74 I reach my conclusions by reasoning as follows:  
I. The principles of tort law in the Restatements and 
the literature lead to the conclusion that an employer of 
an independent contractor is vicariously liable for the 
causal 
negligence 
of 
the 
independent 
contractor 
who 
performs an inherently dangerous activity.  See ¶¶75-89, 
infra. 
II. Wisconsin case law has adopted these principles 
and has applied them.  See ¶¶90-97, infra. 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
5 
 
III. By declaring as a matter of law that the activity 
of the independent contractor was inherently dangerous, the 
majority opinion has by definition already concluded as a 
matter of law that a reasonable person in the position of 
Luethi knew or had reason to know of the inherent danger in 
the activity.  See ¶¶98-104, infra. 
IV. The 
Wisconsin jury instruction on 
"inherent 
dangerousness," on which the majority opinion rests its 
reasoning, requires clarification in light of our existing 
case law.  See ¶¶105-118, infra. 
I 
 
¶75 In order to clarify the nature of the liability in the 
instant case, I lay out the state of the law regarding instances 
in which an employer of an independent contractor is liable for 
the independent contractor's negligence. 
 
¶76 The general rule, as I stated above, is that one who 
contracts for the services of an independent contractor is not 
liable to others for the acts of the independent contractor.8   
¶77 An employer may, however, be liable for the torts of 
an independent contractor under a variety of exceptional 
circumstances.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts organizes the 
bases for an employer's liability when he or she employs an 
independent contractor into two distinct categories:  
(1) "harm caused by fault of employers of independent 
contractors"9 and  
                                                 
8 Lofy v. Joint School Dist. No. 2, 42 Wis. 2d 253, 263, 166 
N.W.2d 809 (1969). 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
6 
 
(2) "harm caused by negligence of a carefully selected 
independent contractor."10   
¶78 These two categories are described in the Third 
Restatement as (1) "direct liability in negligence"11 and (2) 
"vicarious liability."12 
¶79 In the first category, direct liability, an employer 
of an independent contractor may be held liable for the injuries 
caused by the employer's own negligence.13  That is, liability 
for the employer exists on "occasions where the employer may be 
liable for his [or her] own negligence, even if the work 
entrusted to the contractor is such that the employer is not 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Restatement (Second) of Torts ch. 15, topic 1, intro. 
note, at 371 (1965). 
10 Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 15, topic 2, intro. 
note, at 371 (1965).  "The liability imposed is closely 
analogous to that of a master for the negligence of his servant.  
The statement commonly made in such cases is that the employer 
is under a duty which he is not free to delegate to the 
contractor."  Id.  See also 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden & 
Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 432 (2d ed. Practitioner 
Treatise Series 2011).   
The 
inherently 
dangerous 
doctrine 
is 
also 
sometimes 
referred to as a nondelegable duty or as a peculiar risk.  See, 
e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 416, 427 (1965); 2 Dan B. 
Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts § 432.     
11 Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm, § 55, at 363 (2012). 
12 Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm, § 57, at 400 (2012). 
13 See Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 388 ("[A] principal employer 
may be liable to the independent contractor's employee for 
injuries caused by the principal employer's affirmative act of 
negligence.") (citing Barth v. Downey Co., Inc., 71 Wis. 2d 775, 
239 N.W.2d 92 (1976)). 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
7 
 
otherwise 
answerable 
for 
the 
negligence 
of 
the 
contractor . . . ."14   
¶80 The Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm acknowledges a variety of potential 
negligent acts on the part of the employer that would create 
liability, as listed in the relevant sections of the Restatement 
(Second):15 
The hirer's negligence might take various forms, 
including the failure to use reasonable care in 
selecting a competent contractor;16 giving orders or 
directions 
to 
the 
contractor 
without 
exercising 
reasonable care;17 failing to exercise reasonable care 
                                                 
14 U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Frantl Indus., Inc., 72 
Wis. 2d 478, 487, 241 N.W.2d 421, 426 (1976). 
15 The comment to this section notes that "Sections 55 and 
56 subsume and replace the direct-liability provisions set out 
in §§ 410-415 of the Restatement Second of Torts."  Restatement 
(Third) of Torts:  Liability for Physical & Emotional Harm § 55 
cmt. a (2012).   
16 This provision adopts and replaces the liability in 
selection of a contractor discussed in Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 411, which states: 
§ 411 Negligence in Selection of Contractor 
An employer is subject to liability for physical harm 
to third persons caused by his failure to exercise 
reasonable care to employ a competent and careful 
contractor 
(a) to do work which will involve a risk of physical 
harm unless it is skillfully and carefully done, or 
(b) to perform any duty which the employer owes to 
third persons. 
17 This provision adopts and replaces the liability in 
orders 
or 
directions 
negligently 
given 
by 
the 
employer, 
discussed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 410, which states: 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
8 
 
as to dangerous conditions on the land;18 failing to 
use reasonable care as to artificial conditions and 
                                                                                                                                                             
§ 410 Contractor's Conduct in Obedience to Employer's 
Directions 
The employer of an independent contractor is subject 
to the same liability for physical harm caused by an 
act or omission committed by the contractor pursuant 
to orders or directions negligently given by the 
employer, as though the act or omission were that of 
the employer himself. 
Similarly, if the employer retains control over the actions 
of the independent contractor's work, the employer remains 
liable for negligent acts caused by the work as discussed in 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414: 
§ 414 Negligence in Exercising Control Retained by 
Employer 
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, 
but who retains the control of any part of the work, 
is subject to liability for physical harm to others 
for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise 
reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to 
exercise his control with reasonable care. 
18 As the comment states, this liability for "failing to use 
reasonable care as to artificial conditions and activities on 
the land that pose a risk of physical harm to those off the 
land" replaces the specific rules relating to owners or 
possessors of land.  Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 412, 415 
(1965). 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 412, creates liability 
for failure of the principal employer to properly inspect the 
contractor's work to ensure that the land or chattel is in 
reasonably safe condition: 
§ 412 Failure to Inspect Work of Contractor After 
Completion 
One who is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
maintain land or chattels in such condition as not to 
involve unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others and 
who entrusts the work of repair and maintenance to an 
independent contractor, is subject to liability for 
bodily harm caused to them by his failure to exercise 
such care as the circumstances may reasonably require 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
9 
 
activities on the land that pose a risk of physical 
harm to those off the land;19 and failing to exercise 
reasonable care as to the manner in which the 
                                                                                                                                                             
him to exercise to ascertain whether the land or 
chattel is in reasonably safe condition after the 
contractor's work is completed. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 412, at 382 (1965). 
 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 415, provides for 
liability when a principal employer landowner opens the land for 
public use and fails to exercise reasonable care in protecting 
the public from harms caused by an independent contractor: 
§ 415 Duty to Supervise Equipment and Methods of 
Contractors or Concessionaires on Land Held Open to 
Public 
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public 
for any purpose is subject to liability to members of 
the public entering for that purpose for physical harm 
caused to them by his failure to exercise reasonable 
care to protect them against unreasonably dangerous 
activities of, or unreasonably dangerous conditions 
created 
by, 
an 
independent 
contractor 
or 
concessionaire employed or permitted to do work or 
carry on an activity on the land. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 415, at 390 (1965). 
19 The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414A provides for 
liability when a principal employer landowner knows or has 
reason to know that the independent contractor's activities or 
conditions create an unreasonable risk to those outside the 
land: 
§ 414A Duty of Possessor of Land to Prevent Activities 
and Conditions Dangerous to Those Outside of Land 
A possessor of land who has employed or permitted an 
independent contractor to do work on the land, and 
knows or has reason to know that the activities of the 
contractor or conditions created by him involve an 
unreasonable risk of physical harm to those outside of 
the land, is subject to liability to them for such 
harm if he fails to exercise reasonable care to 
protect them against it. 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
10 
 
contractor performs any part of the work over which 
the hirer has retained control.20 
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 55 cmt. a (2012) (footnotes 
added).   
 
¶81 In those cases falling in the first category of 
employer liability, in which the employer's own negligence is at 
issue, the employer is liable if the employer breached his or 
her duty of ordinary care.21 
                                                 
20 This 
provision 
adopts 
and 
replaces 
the 
principal 
employer's liability for failure to take precautions against 
peculiar known risks of harm discussed in Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 413: 
§ 413 Duty to Provide for Taking of Precautions 
Against 
Dangers 
Involved 
in 
Work 
Entrusted 
to 
Contractor 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work 
which the employer should recognize as likely to 
create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable 
risk of physical harm to others unless special 
precautions are taken, is subject to liability for 
physical harm caused to them by the absence of such 
precautions if the employer 
(a) fails to provide in the contract that the 
contractor shall take such precautions, or 
(b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in 
some other manner for the taking of such precautions. 
21 For example, in a case alleging negligent hiring or 
selection of an independent contractor, the jury determines 
whether 
the 
employer 
acted 
negligently 
in 
selecting 
the 
contractor based on competence, insurance, or other factors.  
See Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 389-90. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts lists factors that 
determine the amount of care required in the selection and 
hiring of competent contractors: 
(1) [t]he danger to which others will be exposed if 
the contractor's work is not properly done; (2) the 
character of the work to be done——whether the work 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶82 Conversely, in cases in the second category, i.e., 
vicarious liability, the employer's own negligence is not at 
issue.  Once an activity falls into this second category, the 
liability of an employer of an independent contractor depends on 
the tortious acts of its independent contractor, not the 
tortious act of the employer. 
¶83 The Restatement (Second) of Torts explicitly notes 
that for this category of liability, the potential negligence of 
the employer is irrelevant: 
The rules stated in the following §§ 416-429 [under 
the heading "Harm Caused by Negligence of a Carefully 
Selected Independent Contractor"], unlike those stated 
in the preceding §§ 410-415 [under the heading "Harm 
Caused 
by 
Fault 
of 
Employers 
of 
Independent 
Contractors"], 
do 
not 
rest 
upon 
any 
personal 
negligence of the employer.  They are rules of 
                                                                                                                                                             
lies within the competence of the average man or is 
work which can be properly done only by persons 
possessing special skill and training; and (3) the 
existence of a relation between the parties which 
imposes upon the one a peculiar duty of protecting the 
other. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 411 cmt. C, at 378 (1965). 
Similarly, in a case alleging a failure to inspect the 
contractor's work, an employer of an independent contractor may 
be liable for failure to properly inspect the independent 
contractor's work to ensure that it was left in a reasonably 
safe condition.  See Brown v. Wis. Natural Gas Co., 59 
Wis. 2d 334, 208 N.W.2d 769 (1973).   
The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes that highly 
fact-based determinations are required to determine the amount 
of care required by the employer, because of "an almost infinite 
variety of construction and repair work done by all sorts and 
kinds of contractors on buildings and chattels used for 
infinitely varying purposes . . . ."  Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 412 cmt. c, at 383 (1965). 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
12 
 
vicarious liability, making the employer liable for 
the 
negligence 
of 
the 
independent 
contractor, 
irrespective of whether the employer has himself been 
at fault.  They arise in situations in which, for 
reasons of policy, the employer is not permitted to 
shift the responsibility for the proper conduct of the 
work to the contractor.  The liability imposed is 
closely analogous to that of a master for the 
negligence of his servant. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts ch. 15, topic 2, intro. note, at 
394 (1965) (emphasis added). 
 
¶84 The Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm echoes this declaration, stating 
that the rules it sets forth are "consistent with the Second 
Restatement of Torts" and asserting that the rules in this 
second category are "appropriately viewed as rules of vicarious 
liability."22  The Restatement (Third) goes on to reiterate the 
irrelevance of the principal employer's own negligence:  "These 
rules subject the hirer, even absent the hirer's own negligence, 
to liability for harm caused by the tortious conduct of another 
actor——the independent contractor."23 
¶85 The 
Restatements 
(Second) 
and 
(Third) 
of 
Torts 
identify the "inherently dangerous" exception as falling into 
this second category of vicarious liability.   
¶86 Section 416 of the Restatement (Second) states that an 
employer is subject to vicarious liability for the torts of an 
independent contractor under circumstances with an increased 
risk that can be reduced through special precautions: 
                                                 
22 Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm, § 57 cmt. A, at 401 (2012). 
23 Id. (emphasis added). 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
13 
 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work 
which the employer should recognize as likely to 
create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical 
harm to others unless special precautions are taken, 
is subject to liability for physical harm caused to 
them by the failure of the contractor to exercise 
reasonable care to take such precautions, even though 
the employer has provided for such precautions in the 
contract or otherwise. 
2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 at 395 (1965).   
¶87 Similarly, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427 states 
that an employer of an independent contractor in a situation 
involving inherently  dangerous activities is subject to 
vicarious liability for harm caused by the contractor's tortious 
acts. 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work 
involving a special danger to others which the 
employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in 
or normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has 
reason to contemplate when making the contract, is 
subject to liability for physical harm caused to such 
others by the contractor's failure to take reasonable 
precautions against such danger. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427, at 415 (1965). 
¶88 The Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm echoes this rule, declaring that an 
employer may be vicariously liable for the torts of its 
independent contractor if the activity carries a peculiar risk, 
i.e., a heightened risk if reasonable care is not taken: 
An actor who hires an independent contractor for an 
activity that the actor knows or should know poses a 
peculiar risk is subject to vicarious liability for 
physical harm when the independent contractor is 
negligent as to the peculiar risk and the negligence 
is a factual cause of any such harm within the scope 
of liability. 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
14 
 
Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm § 59 (2012).24 
 
¶89 The view of the Restatements (Second) and (Third) and 
the law of vicarious liability of an employer of an independent 
contractor are reflected in the literature.  The Prosser and 
Keeton treatise notes that the "inherently dangerous" exception 
is one of many exceptions to the general rule that there is no 
vicarious liability upon an employer for the causal negligence 
of the independent contractor.25  Specifically, this category of 
cases goes beyond the reasonable precautions taken by an 
employer, "hold[ing] the employer liable for the negligence of 
the 
contractor, 
although 
[the 
employer] 
has . . . done 
everything that could reasonably be required of him [or her].  
They are thus cases of vicarious liability."26  See also 2 Dan B. 
Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts 
§ 432 (2d ed. Practitioner Treatise Series 2011);  Francis M. 
Dougherty, Annotation, Liability of Employer with Regard to 
Inherently 
Dangerous 
Work 
for 
Injuries 
to 
Employees 
of 
Independent Contractor, 34 A.L.R. 4th 914 (1984 & Supp.).  
II 
 
¶90 Wisconsin case law has followed these tort principles 
explained above involving inherently dangerous activities.   
                                                 
24 The Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for Physical 
and Emotional Harm § 59 cmt. a (2012) notes that it replaces 
Sections 416 and 427 of the Restatement (Second). 
25 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 71, 
at 512 (5th ed. 1984). 
26 Id. at 511. 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶91 As the majority opinion correctly notes,27 our case law 
has cited Sections 416 and 427 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts when assessing whether an employer can be held vicariously 
liable for the torts of its independent contractor:  "Sections 
416 and 427 impute the independent contractor's negligence to 
the principal employer irrespective of whether the employer is 
himself or herself at fault on the basis that the dangerous 
activities involved give rise to a nondelegable duty."  Wagner 
v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 143 Wis. 2d 379, 391, 421 N.W.2d 835 (1988) 
(emphasis added) (cited by the majority op., ¶33.).   
¶92 In Hackett v. Western Union Tel. Co., 80 Wis. 187, 49 
N.W. 822 (1891), this court recognized that employing an 
independent contractor to do inherently dangerous work renders 
the employer liable for injuries caused by the sole negligence 
of the contractor.  The Hackett court described the liability as 
follows:  
[W]here the performance of such contract, in the 
ordinary mode of doing the work, necessarily or 
naturally results in producing the defect or nuisance 
which causes the injury, then the employer is subject 
to the same liability to the injured party as the 
contractor. 
Hackett, 80 Wis. at 193. 
 
¶93 The court reiterated this principle of vicarious 
liability of an employer who employs an independent contractor 
to perform inherently dangerous activity in subsequent cases, 
notably in Carlson v. Stocking, 91 Wis. 432, 435, 65 N.W. 58 
(1895) (cited in majority op., ¶27) and Medley v. Trenton Inv. 
                                                 
27 Majority op., ¶33. 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
16 
 
Co., 205 Wis. 30, 36, 236 N.W. 713 (1931) (cited in majority 
op., ¶31). 
¶94 The majority opinion properly concludes that spraying 
herbicides is inherently dangerous as a matter of law in the 
context and facts of the instant case.  Majority op., ¶¶58-60.  
If an activity is inherently dangerous and an independent 
contractor, in performing that activity, negligently causes harm 
to a third party, then the employer of the independent 
contractor is liable, irrespective of the employer's own 
negligence.   
¶95 Applying the rule to the instant case, Luethi may be 
liable for the harm caused to the innocent neighbor plaintiff if 
it is proved that the independent contractor was causally 
negligent in spraying the herbicides, an inherently dangerous 
activity.  The only remaining question, in my opinion, for the 
circuit court on remand is whether the independent contractor 
was causally negligent in damaging the innocent neighbor 
plaintiff's property.  The inquiry should end here. 
¶96 Yet the majority opinion appends a confusing and 
unnecessary additional step to the inquiry on remand.   
¶97 I turn now to the majority opinion's additional step, 
requiring the innocent neighbor plaintiff to prove on remand 
that Luethi (the employer of the independent contractor in the 
present case) knew or had reason to know about the danger 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
17 
 
inherent in the spraying of the herbicide.  See majority op., 
¶¶13-14, 53-56.28   
III 
¶98 In the present case, this court has declared that as a 
matter of law the activity of the independent contractor 
spraying herbicides was inherently dangerous.29  In order to 
declare an activity "inherently dangerous" as a matter of law, 
the majority opinion rules that the activity poses a "naturally 
expected risk of harm."  Majority op., ¶¶4, 10, 11, 58.  
Wisconsin 
Civil 
Jury 
Instruction 
1022.6 
explains 
that 
"[i]nherently dangerous work is work from which one can 
naturally expect harm to arise unless something is done to avoid 
that harm."  If a risk of harm is "naturally expected," then the 
reasonable person, as a matter of law, knows or has reason to 
know that an increased risk of harm is "inherent in or normal to 
the work."30   
¶99 Once the court has determined as a matter of law that 
the activity is "inherently dangerous," that is, that the 
activity poses a naturally expected risk of harm, the court has 
                                                 
28 The majority opinion at ¶59 states: "The next questions 
to answer are 1) whether Luethi failed to use ordinary care with 
regard to any danger inherent in the herbicide spraying that he 
knew or had reason to know about . . . ." 
29 Majority op., ¶¶58, 56 & n.23 (citing Mueller v. Luther, 
31 Wis. 2d 220, 230-231, 142 N.W.2d 848 (1966)).   
30 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427 (1965). 
Ordinarily, as the majority opinion correctly notes, the 
issue of whether an activity is inherently dangerous is a 
question of fact for the fact finder.  Majority op., ¶56. 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
18 
 
determined that a reasonable person in the position of Luethi 
knew or had reason to know the activity was inherently 
dangerous.  Majority op., ¶¶8, 55.  The end! 
¶100 Sister state jurisdictions have similarly recognized 
that the "knows or has reason to know" element is included 
within 
the 
designation 
of 
an 
activity 
as 
"inherently 
dangerous."31   
¶101 In Huddleston v. Union Rural Electric Association, 841 
P.2d 282 (Colo. 1992), the Colorado Supreme Court outlined the 
link between "inherently dangerous" activities and the "knows or 
has reason to know" element as follows: 
For purposes of the "inherently dangerous" activity 
exception, 
therefore, 
the 
focus 
is 
on 
dangers 
recognizable 
in 
advance 
or 
contemplated 
by 
the 
employer as being "inherent" in the activity, or the 
circumstances of performance, when carried out in its 
ordinary way, and not on risks created by or following 
from the contractor's unforeseeable departure from the 
ordinary or prescribed way of performing the work 
under the circumstances.  
Against this backdrop of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts and related case law, we conclude that an 
activity will qualify as "inherently dangerous" when 
it presents a special or peculiar danger to others 
that is inherent in the nature of the activity or the 
particular circumstances under which the activity is 
to be performed, that is different in kind from the 
ordinary risks that commonly confront persons in the 
community, and that the employer knows or should know 
is inherent in the nature of the activity or in the 
particular circumstances under which the activity is 
to be performed. 
Huddleston, 841 P.2d at 289-90 (emphasis added).   
                                                 
31 See 2 Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm § 5, cmt. e, at 420 (2012). 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
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¶102 Thus, in order to determine whether an activity is 
"inherently dangerous," a court must look to the "knows or has 
reason 
to 
know" 
element 
before 
determining 
an 
activity 
"inherently dangerous," not the other way around.  Whether the 
employer "knows or has reason to know" of the inherent danger is 
part of the objective test for determining whether an activity 
is inherently dangerous. If a danger is "inherent," it must 
necessarily be one that an employer of an independent contractor 
(using the reasonable person objective standard) expects to 
occur from the particular activity. 
¶103 Nevertheless, the majority opinion reasons that on 
remand the factfinder must determine whether a reasonable person 
knew or had reason to know what the court has already determined 
to be "the naturally expected risk of harm."  I find this 
reasoning perplexing and contradictory to the majority opinion's 
holding that, as a matter of law, reasonable people know or have 
reason to know that the spraying of herbicides in the instant 
case is inherently dangerous.   
¶104 The "knew or had reason to know" element is satisfied 
in the present case as a definitional part of "inherently 
dangerous," rather than as an additional question of fact to be 
determined after this court declares the activity inherently 
dangerous as a matter of law.   
IV 
¶105 The majority opinion declares that in order to 
determine whether vicarious liability exists for Luethi in the 
instant case, the fact finder must examine "whether Luethi 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
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failed to use ordinary care with regard to any danger inherent 
in the herbicide spraying that he knew or had reason to know 
about."  Majority op., ¶59.   
¶106 Nevertheless, the majority opinion asserts that "if 
spraying [herbicides] is an inherently dangerous activity, then 
it gives rise to a duty of ordinary care for [the employer of 
the independent contractor] for the acts of the independent 
contractor."  Majority op., ¶8.  Yet, as our case law adopting 
the principles of tort law for inherently dangerous activities 
clearly demonstrates, the employer's behavior does not govern 
the liability of the employer for the causal tortious conduct of 
the independent contractor who is engaged in an inherently 
dangerous activity.  The employer in such circumstances is 
vicariously liable irrespective of his or her own fault. 
¶107 The majority opinion asserts that the need to address 
the factual question of the due care of the employer who employs 
an independent contractor derives from Wisconsin's pattern jury 
instruction for the liability of an employer for the torts of an 
independent contractor and from Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 413. 
A 
¶108 The majority opinion comments on the special verdict 
form and the pattern jury instructions as follows: 
The suggested verdict form that follows Wisconsin Jury 
Instruction——Civil 1022.6, Liability of one employing 
independent contractor, presents three questions. 
The first is, "Was the work performed by the (owner) 
(independent contractor) inherently dangerous?" 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
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The second is, "If you answered 1 "yes," then answer 
this question:  Did (owner) fail to use ordinary care 
in (describe the work done)?"  
And the third is, "If you answered question 2 "yes," 
then answer this question: Was that failure to use 
ordinary care a cause of (injury to (third person) 
(damage to (third person)'s property)?" 
Majority op., ¶11 n.8.32 
¶109 The instant case is a summary judgment case.  No jury 
instruction or special verdict is involved. 
 
¶110 The majority opinion confuses whose ordinary care and 
wrongdoing is at issue in the instant case, which is a vicarious 
liability case.  It is the independent contractor's causal 
negligence that matters, not Luethi's.  Luethi was not spraying 
any herbicides himself in the instant case.  He is vicariously 
liable for the causal negligence of his independent contractor 
in applying the herbicides——an inherently dangerous activity.   
¶111 I am unpersuaded by the jury instruction's references 
to the employer's failure to use ordinary care.  The comments to 
the jury instruction are not supported by the case law cited.33   
¶112 The Wagner case, cited by the jury instruction,34 
specifically states that the employer's liability for the 
negligent acts of its independent contractor in performing 
                                                 
32 See majority op., ¶¶10-12, 61 (citing Wis JI——Civil 
1022.6, Suggested Verdict Form 1). 
33 The comments assert that "the risk of injury or damage 
(under the inherently dangerous exception) from the work was so 
great that the owner or principal contractor should have taken 
reasonable steps to avoid it."  Wis JI——Civil 1022.6 cmt. 
(2005). 
34 Wis JI——Civil 1022.6 at 1-2 (citing and quoting Wagner, 
143 Wis. 2d at 391). 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
22 
 
inherently dangerous activities exists "irrespective of whether 
the employer is himself or herself at fault."35   
¶113 The other cases cited in the comments to the jury 
instruction declare that the employer's own acts and negligence 
are irrelevant to the determination of the employer's vicarious 
liability for the causal negligence of an independent contractor 
performing an inherently dangerous activity: 
While it may be just to hold the party authorizing the 
work . . . exempt from liability for injury resulting 
from negligence which he had no reason to anticipate, 
there is, on the other hand, good ground for holding 
him liable for an injury caused by an act certain to 
be attended with injurious consequences, if such 
consequences are not in fact prevented, no matter 
through whose default the omission to take the 
necessary measures for prevention may arise. 
Wertheimer v. Saunders, 95 Wis. 573, 581, 70 N.W. 824 (1897) 
(emphasis added).  That is, regardless of any wrongdoing on the 
part of the employer, when the activity is one that is "certain 
to be attended with injurious consequences," liability attaches 
to the employer for the causal negligence of the independent 
contractor. 
 
¶114 In Finkelstein v. Majestic Realty Corp., 198 Wis. 527, 
224 N.W. 743 (1929) (also cited in the comments to the jury 
instruction), there were multiple theories of negligence of an 
independent contractor for a roof tile that fell onto a roadway: 
First, the employer's failure to inspect; and second, the 
negligence of the independent contractor in applying the roof 
tiles.  The Finkelstein jury found no negligence on the part of 
                                                 
35 Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 391. 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
23 
 
the independent contractors and thus only the employer's own 
negligence was at issue.  Nevertheless, the Finkelstein court 
stated the general rule for the liability of an employer who 
employs an independent contractor who negligently performs an 
inherently dangerous activity as follows:  
[I]f the injuries had resulted from the negligent act 
of the contractors, the owner would be jointly liable 
with them. But the jury has expressly absolved the 
contractors 
from 
negligence, 
and 
therefore 
the 
liability must rest solely upon the owner. 
Finkelstein v. Majestic Realty Corp., 198 Wis. 527, 537, 224 
N.W. 743 (1929). 
 
¶115 Thus, it is clear, as we have explained previously, 
that there are two separate inquiries in determining the 
liability of an employer who employs an independent contractor:  
(1) whether the employer himself engaged in any wrongdoing; and 
(2) whether, in the case of an independent contractor performing 
an inherently dangerous activity, the independent contractor 
committed causal negligence in performing the activity.  If the 
activity is inherently dangerous, the employer's liability is 
vicarious:  the negligence of the independent contractor 
attaches to the employer regardless of the principal employer's 
own actions. 
¶116 Rather than clarify the jury instruction, the majority 
opinion simply extends the confusion.  I am persuaded that the 
Wisconsin Jury Instructions Committee should consider clarifying 
the jury instruction in light of the case law upon which the 
instruction relies. 
B 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
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¶117 In an attempt to buttress its conclusion that the 
employer's personal duty of ordinary care is relevant in the 
instant case, the majority opinion also relies on Section 413 of 
the 
Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Torts, 
a 
section 
that 
it 
acknowledges is entirely inapplicable to the instant case.  
Section 413 discusses only the fault of the employer, not the 
vicarious liability at issue in the instant case.36    
¶118 Indeed, the majority opinion properly acknowledges 
that Section 413 is inapplicable to the instant case because the 
innocent neighbor plaintiff alleges no wrongdoing on the part of 
Luethi.37  Specifically, the plaintiffs "did not allege in the 
complaint that any harm was caused by [Luethi]."  Majority op., 
¶33 n.19.  
* * * * 
¶119 By muddling through direct liability and vicarious 
liability of an employer who employs an independent contractor 
and failing to state the doctrines clearly, the majority opinion 
has injected confusion into the law.  Furthermore, the majority 
opinion has shifted the liability for inherently dangerous 
activities 
from 
an 
employer 
who 
employs 
the 
independent 
contractor for an inherently dangerous activity, the person who 
reaped the benefits of the contracted work, to the innocent 
neighbor plaintiff, who had no knowledge about or control over 
the spraying of herbicides.   
                                                 
36 See majority op., ¶¶33, 51-53. 
37 Majority op., ¶33 n.19. 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
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¶120 The majority opinion has subverted the long-standing 
rationale for the "inherently dangerous exception," and indeed 
jeopardizes the vitality of the "inherently dangerous" doctrine.  
If a plaintiff must show that an employer who employs an 
independent contractor has breached the employer's own duty of 
ordinary care, in what way does a case of "inherently dangerous" 
activity differ from any other negligence claim against the 
employer? 
¶121 As the Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm explains, the "inherently dangerous 
activity" doctrine imposing vicarious liability on an employer 
of an independent contractor for the tortious actions of the 
independent contractor is motivated by public policy concerns.38  
That is, once the activity is one that a reasonable person knows 
or has reason to know would pose a peculiar risk, the liability 
for creating such a risk falls on the employer for the torts of 
the independent contractor, not the innocent third parties 
harmed by such torts. 
 
¶122 The majority opinion has apparently converted 
a 
longstanding rule that an employer of an independent contractor 
is vicariously liable for the torts of an independent contractor 
in performing inherently dangerous activities into one of an 
employer's liability for the employer's personal negligence and 
has converted a rule that places the burden of risk for 
inherently dangerous activities on the person creating those 
                                                 
38 Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for Physical & 
Emotional Harm § 59 cmt. d (2012).  See also note 1, supra. 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
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dangers into a rule placing that burden on innocent third 
parties.  This outcome is contrary to the letter and the 
rationale of our case law, the Restatements of Torts, treatises, 
and case law from other states. 
¶123 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶124 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and DAVID T. PROSSER join this opinion. 
 
No.  2012AP2085.ssa 
 
 
 
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