Title: Palmer v. GTE

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 6/26/03 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
DEBBIE PALMER, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S104997 
 
v. 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B133517 
 
 
) 
 
GTE CALIFORNIA, INC., 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. PC014620Z 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
 
Motions for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are 
subject to strict time limits that begin to run when the party seeking such relief is 
served with a written notice of entry of judgment.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 629, 659, 
660.)1  A party intending to move for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict must do so within 15 days of such service.  (§§ 659, 629.) 
 
Is the statutory requirement of giving written notice of entry of judgment 
satisfied by serving a copy of the file-stamped judgment?  The answer is “yes,” at 
least in every county that no longer maintains a judgment book.2  To start the 
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.  
2  
Under the traditional method for “entering” a civil judgment in California, 
dating from the Statutes of 1851 (Stats. 1851, ch. 8, § 201, p. 82), the clerk of the 
superior court made a notation in a book known as the “judgment book.”  (County 
of Los Angeles v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 61, 63.)  Under this 
traditional method, entry of judgment could occur on a day other than the day on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Fn. continued on next page) 
 
 
2
statutory time periods for bringing and ruling on motions for a new trial and for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it is not necessary to serve on the opposing 
party a separate document entitled notice of entry of judgment and to file in the 
trial court that document, as well as a copy of the judgment and proof of its 
service. 
I 
 
Plaintiff Debbie Palmer began working for defendant GTE California 
(GTE) in 1979.  In April 1995, Palmer sued GTE and two supervisors in superior 
court for sexual harassment, workplace discrimination, and false imprisonment.  In 
1998, the trial court granted summary judgment to the individual defendants.  On 
February 11, 1999, after several weeks of trial, the jury returned a special verdict 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Fn. continued from previous page) 
 
which the clerk filed the original judgment in the superior court file; therefore, 
giving notice of the filing date did not give notice of the date of entry. 
 
In 1974, by enacting section 668.5, the Legislature provided an alternative 
method for entering a judgment.  (Stats. 1974, ch. 1169, § 2, p. 2503; see also 
Stats. 1983, ch. 464, § 1, p. 1794 [amending § 668.5].)  Under section 668.5, a 
county may dispense with the judgment book if, before filing the original 
judgment in the superior court file, the clerk records the judgment on microfilm or 
enters it either in the register of actions or in the court’s electronic data-processing 
system.  Under this newer method, “the date of filing the judgment with the clerk 
shall constitute the date of entry.”  (§ 668.5.) 
 
Today, few if any counties in this state still use the traditional judgment 
book system for entering judgments.  In counties using the newer system, a 
judgment’s date of filing, as shown on a file stamp, is the judgment’s date of entry.  
Thus, in these counties, serving a file-stamped copy of a judgment gives notice of 
the judgment’s date of entry. 
 
Given the near universal adoption of the newer system, the concept of 
“entry,” as distinct from filing, appears to have lost its utility, and its survival has 
become a frequent source of confusion, as this case illustrates.  Its complete 
removal from our system of civil procedure will, however, require an extensive 
statutory revision by the Legislature.  
 
 
3
finding GTE liable for $790,000 in damages to Palmer on her claims of gender 
harassment in the workplace and false imprisonment. 
 
On February 24, 1999, judgment was entered.  On February 26, 1999, 
Palmer’s attorney mailed to GTE’s counsel a photocopy of the file-stamped and 
dated judgment.  GTE’s counsel and the courtroom clerk then told Palmer’s 
attorney that serving a photocopy of the conformed judgment did not comply with 
section 664.5, which requires that a document entitled notice of entry of judgment 
be prepared, served, and filed in the trial court along with proof of its service.  In 
response, Palmer’s counsel on March 10, 1999, filed in the trial court a document 
entitled notice of entry of judgment, to which were attached a copy of the 
judgment, a proof of the earlier service by mail on February 26 of the conformed 
copy of the judgment, and a proof of service by mail on March 9 of the notice of 
entry of judgment. 
 
On March 24, 1999, 26 days after Palmer had served GTE with a copy of 
the conformed judgment, GTE moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
and filed notice of its intention to move for a new trial.  On May 3, 1999, 66 days 
after Palmer served the copy of the conformed judgment, the trial court made its 
rulings.  On Palmer’s claim of gender harassment in the workplace, the court 
granted GTE’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and, if its order 
were to be vacated or set aside on appeal, the court alternatively ordered a new 
trial on that claim.  On Palmer’s claim of false imprisonment, the court denied 
GTE’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but it ordered a new trial 
on that claim unless Palmer consented to having the $175,000 awarded on that 
claim reduced to $35,000. 
 
Palmer moved to strike these orders because GTE had not filed its moving 
papers within the 15-day jurisdictional window after the date of “service . . . by 
any party of written notice of entry of judgment” (§ 659), and because the trial 
 
 
4
court had not ruled on the motions within the 60-day jurisdictional period after 
such service (§ 660).  The trial court denied Palmer’s motion. 
 
On July 1, 1999, Palmer filed a notice of appeal from the order granting a 
new trial on the false imprisonment claim and granting judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict on the gender harassment claim.  On July 20, GTE filed its notice of 
appeal from the judgment and from the order denying GTE’s motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on the claim of false imprisonment. 
 
On appeal, Palmer argued that GTE’s motions for a new trial and for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict were untimely, and therefore the trial court’s 
order granting those motions was void, having been made after the trial court’s 
jurisdiction had lapsed.  The Court of Appeal agreed.  Citing sections 659 and 660, 
it concluded that the time limits for bringing and ruling on these posttrial motions 
are triggered by serving “written notice of entry of judgment.”  (§§  659, subd. 2, 
660.) 
 
The Court of Appeal rejected GTE’s contention that to start the time frames 
for these posttrial motions the serving party must not only serve written notice of 
entry of judgment, as required by sections 629, 659, and 660, but must also 
comply with additional requirements set out in section 664.5.  Section 664.5 
provides that “the party submitting an order or judgment for entry shall prepare 
and mail a copy of the notice of entry of judgment to all parties” and “shall file 
with the court the original notice of entry of judgment together with the proof of 
service.”  (§ 664.5, subd. (a).)  GTE argued below, as it does here, that these 
posttrial motion time frames begin only when, in addition to serving written notice 
that judgment has been entered, the party giving notice files in the trial court an 
original notice of entry of judgment document, accompanied by proof of its 
service.  Rejecting that view, the Court of Appeal concluded that a written notice 
of entry of judgment served by a party need not be served pursuant to section 
 
 
5
664.5 to start the statutory 15-day period (§ 659) for a party to move for a new 
trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or to start the 60-day period 
(§ 660) for the court to rule on the motions. 
 
Thus, the Court of Appeal held that GTE had not timely moved for a new 
trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, rendering void the trial court’s 
order granting those two motions.  Because the filing of the two motions did not 
extend the time to appeal, however, the Court of Appeal found plaintiff Palmer’s 
notice of appeal to be untimely, having been filed more than 60 days after she 
served GTE with “a document entitled ‘notice of entry’ of judgment.”  (Cal. Rules 
of Court, former rule 2(a)(2).)  GTE’s cross-appeal was timely, but the Court of 
Appeal concluded there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict in 
favor of Palmer on her claims of false imprisonment and gender harassment in the 
workplace, and thus upheld the judgment. 
 
We granted GTE’s petition for review because of disagreement in the 
Courts of Appeal on what constitutes service of notice of entry of judgment 
sufficient to trigger the statutory deadlines for bringing and determining motions 
for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  
II 
 
Defendant GTE frames the question before us this way:  “What act 
commences the jurisdictional time frame for filing and deciding posttrial motions” 
when the clerk of the court does not mail notice of entry of judgment to the 
parties?  To answer that question, we must consider the interplay between section 
664.5, which describes mailing notice of entry of judgment, and sections 629, 659, 
and 660, which govern the filing of posttrial motions for a new trial and judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
 
Section 664.5 provides:  “[I]n any contested action or special proceeding 
. . . the party submitting the order or judgment for entry shall prepare and mail a 
 
 
6
copy of the notice of entry of judgment to all parties who have appeared . . . and 
shall file with the court the original notice of entry of judgment together with the 
proof of service by mail.”  (§ 664.5, subd. (a).)  Citing that language, GTE argues 
that the jurisdictional time for filing and ruling on motions for a new trial or for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict is triggered only by serving a document 
entitled notice of entry of judgment, and filing in the trial court the original 
document and proof of its service.  We disagree. 
 
A. 
The Statutory Scheme 
 
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (§ 629) or a notice of 
intention to move for a new trial (§ 659) may be filed with the court clerk and 
served on each adverse party “[b]efore the entry of judgment.”  (§ 659, subd. 1.)  
Otherwise, they must be brought by the earliest of three deadlines:  (1) within 15 
days of “the date of mailing notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court 
pursuant to Section 664.5”; (2) within 15 days of service on the moving party “by 
any party of written notice of entry of judgment”; or (3) “within 180 days after 
entry of judgment.”  (§§ 629, 659, subd. 2.)  The 60 days during which the trial 
court has jurisdiction to rule on such a motion is similarly linked to the clerk’s 
mailing or a party’s service of written notice of entry of judgment.3  Neither 
                                             
 
3 
“[T]he power of the court to rule on a motion for a new trial shall expire 60 
days from and after the mailing of notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the 
court pursuant to Section 664.5 or 60 days from and after service on the moving 
party by any party of written notice of the entry of the judgment . . . .”  (§ 660.) 
 
“The court shall not rule upon the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict until the expiration of the time within which a motion for a new trial must 
be served and filed, and if a motion for a new trial has been filed with the court by 
the aggrieved party, the court shall rule upon both motions at the same time.  The 
power of the court to rule on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
shall not extend beyond the last date upon which it has the power to rule on a 
motion for a new trial.”  (§ 629.) 
 
 
7
section 659 nor section 660 expressly requires the party serving notice either to 
prepare a separate document entitled notice of entry of judgment or to file any 
document.  
 
In construing a statute, our role is limited to ascertaining the Legislature’s 
intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.  (Hunt v. Superior Court (1999) 
21 Cal.4th 984, 1000; People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 621.)  We look 
first to the words of the statute because they are the most reliable indicator of 
legislative intent.  (In re J.W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 209.)  If the statutory 
language on its face answers the question, that answer is binding unless we 
conclude the language is ambiguous or it does not accurately reflect the 
Legislature’s intent.  (People v. Broussard (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1067, 1071-1072; 
Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562; see Esberg v. Union Oil Co. (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 262, 268.) 
 
As the Court of Appeal noted, the posttrial motion sections (§§ 659, 660) 
involved here peg their jurisdictional time limits to mailing of notice of entry of 
judgment by the clerk of the court pursuant to section 664.5, but neither section 
refers to section 664.5 in describing service by a party.  Thus, the plain language 
of sections 659 and 660 expressly incorporates the provisions of section 664.5 
only when the court clerk mails notice of entry of judgment. 
 
Instead of looking first to the language of posttrial motion sections 629, 
659, and 660, which govern the trial court’s jurisdiction over motions for a new 
trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, GTE looks first at section 664.5 to 
determine what it requires of a party represented by counsel who submits a 
judgment (or order) for entry.   
 
Section 664.5 requires the party who has submitted a judgment to the trial 
court for entry to prepare a separate document entitled notice of entry of judgment, 
to mail a copy “to all parties who have appeared,” and to file in the trial court the 
 
 
8
original notice of entry and proof of its service on the opposing party by mail.  
(§ 664.5, subd. (a).)  GTE argues that both the language of section 664.5 and this 
court’s opinion in Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc. v. Customized Worldwide 
Weather Ins. Agency, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 51 (Van Beurden), which we discuss 
in part C., post, compel reading all the requirements of section 664.5 into the 
posttrial motion sections, which say nothing about several of these formalities. 
 
As noted earlier, section 664.5 provides that in “any contested action . . . 
the party submitting an order or judgment for entry shall prepare and mail a copy 
of the notice of entry of judgment to all parties who have appeared . . . and shall 
file with the court the original notice of entry of judgment together with the proof 
of service by mail.”  (§ 664.5, subd. (a), italics added.)  The Legislature revised 
this provision in 1981 and 1982 in response to trial courts’ concern over the costs 
entailed by the existing requirement that the court clerk mail to the parties all 
notices of entry of judgment.  (Stats. 1981, ch. 904, § 1, p. 3437; Stats. 1982, ch. 
559, § 1, pp. 2505-2506; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Background of Assem. Bill No. 
1925 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) June 25, 1981, p. 1.)  The legislative history 
indicates a concern that the added language does “not speak to” what event 
triggers the time limits for “motions for new trial or motions to vacate.”  (Sen. 
Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1925 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.), as 
amended May 27, 1981, p. 3.)  Notwithstanding that prescient expression of 
concern, the Legislature has not amended the relevant provision of the posttrial 
motion sections since 1982, when it amended section 664.54 to place the burden on 
                                             
 
4  
The 1982 amendment to section 664.5 excluded certain family law matters 
from the general rule in civil actions that the prevailing party prepare and mail 
notice of entry of judgment, and instead left the responsibility for giving such 
notice with the court clerk.  (Stats. 1982, ch. 559, § 1, pp. 2505-2506.)  Notice of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Fn. continued on next page) 
 
 
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the party submitting a judgment to prepare, file, and serve notice of its entry.  
Thus, those sections continue to peg their time limits to “service . . . by any party 
of written notice of entry of judgment.”  (§ 659, 660.) 
 
 
B. 
Court of Appeal Cases Before Our 1997 Decision in Van 
 
 
Beurden  
 
In light of the nonparallel provisions of the two statutory schemes at issue, 
one for entry of judgment and one for posttrial motions, it is not surprising that the 
issue of deadlines for posttrial motions has been addressed in a number of Court of 
Appeal decisions. 
 
In Tri-County Elevator Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 271 
(Tri-County), the prevailing party on March 22, 1982, mailed to the losing party a 
conformed copy of the judgment showing the date on which it was filed.  On 
March 29, the court clerk mailed notice of entry of judgment to the losing party, 
which did not file its notice of intention to move for a new trial until April 9, 1982.  
(Id. at p. 274.)  The trial court denied the motion because it was filed 18 days after 
service of the conformed copy of the judgment and therefore beyond the 15-day 
jurisdictional window in which a notice of intention to move for a new trial must 
be filed.  (Ibid.) 
 
The Court of Appeal denied writ relief to the losing party.  The court 
concluded that once section 664.5 had been amended to impose “the duty of 
giving notice of entry” on the party submitting the judgment for entry, a party who 
served an adverse party with a “conformed copy of the judgment” showing the 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Fn. continued from previous page) 
 
entry of judgment in many family law proceedings must be made on a standard 
Judicial Council form.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.134.)  
 
 
10
date the judgment had been filed with the court clerk had in fact given “written 
notice, in substance and effect, of the entry of the judgment” sufficient to trigger 
the 15-day period to file a notice of intention to move for a new trial under section 
659.  (Tri-County, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at pp. 275-276.)  This was true because 
the judgment was filed in a county that did not maintain a judgment book, but 
instead kept a copy of the judgment in its file of actions.  (Id. at p. 276.)  The date 
of filing such a judgment with the clerk is “the date of its entry.”  (§ 668.5.)  The 
Court of Appeal rejected the contention that the prevailing party’s failure to file its 
proof of service on the opposing party at the same time it filed notice of entry of 
judgment (§ 664.5) was a failure by the prevailing party to comply with the 
requirements of section 659.  (Tri-County, supra, at p. 277.)  In sum, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that “the procedure set forth in section 664.5 is inapplicable in 
determining, for purposes of section 659, the sufficiency of notice of entry of 
judgment given by a party.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  
 
That reasoning was followed by the Court of Appeal in National 
Advertising Co. v. City of Rohnert Park (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 614, which 
addressed a related problem of the timeliness of a notice of appeal.  At issue there 
was a rule of court governing the deadlines for filing a notice of appeal.  (Cal. 
Rules of Court, former rule 2(a).)  The relevant version of rule 2(a) required 
“service of written notice of entry of judgment . . . upon the party filing the notice 
of appeal.”  (National Advertising, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 618, fn. 1.)  
Relying on Tri-County’s reading of section 659’s parallel language calling for 
“written notice of entry of judgment,” the Court of Appeal in National Advertising 
concluded that serving an “endorsed copy of the judgment showing the date of its 
entry” was service of a document sufficient to give written notice of entry of 
judgment so as to start the 60-day period for filing a notice of appeal.  (National 
Advertising, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 618.) 
 
 
11
 
And in Ramirez v. Moran (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 431, the Court of Appeal 
held that a conformed copy of a judgment was a document sufficient to give 
written notice of the entry of judgment to start the time in which a posttrial motion 
must be brought.  In Ramirez, the defendant’s counsel mailed a conformed copy of 
the judgment to the plaintiff’s counsel along with a cover letter mentioning 
enclosure of a conformed copy.  (Id. at p. 436.)  The Court of Appeal concluded 
that these documents gave “sufficient” notice of entry of judgment to trigger the 
15 days in which the plaintiff had to file his notice of intention to move for a new 
trial (§ 659), notwithstanding the absence of a “customary proof of service” in the 
form of an affidavit (see § 1013a).  (Ramirez, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 436.)  
What matters, the Court of Appeal said, is not proof of service, but the sufficiency 
of notice of entry of judgment.  (Id. at p. 436.) 
 
C. 
This Court’s Decision in Van Beurden 
 
In 1997, this court decided Van Beurden, supra, 15 Cal.4th 51.  The 
question there was whether the court clerk’s mailing to the parties of a file-
stamped copy of the judgment with proof of service triggered section 660’s 60-day 
period in which a trial court must rule on a motion for a new trial.  We held that to 
be a clerk’s mailed notice of entry of judgment under section 664.5, the notice 
“must affirmatively state that it was given upon ‘order of the court’ or ‘under 
section 664.5.’ ”  (Van Beurden, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 64.)  The file-stamped 
copy of the judgment sent by the clerk did neither. 
 
Unless the motion for a new trial was timely, it did not extend the time to 
appeal.  Accordingly, we observed that the copy of the superior court clerk’s 
mailed notice and the certificate of its mailing maintained in the court file would 
permit “an appellate court” to “readily determine whether an appeal was timely.”  
(Van Beurden, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 64-65.) 
 
 
12
 
Having found that the notice sent by the clerk (§ 664.5, subd. (b)) was 
insufficient to start the 15-day period in which to file a notice of intention to move 
for a new trial, the Van Beurden court addressed whether any other event had 
triggered the 15-day period.  The court stated that unless notice consistent with its 
reading of section 664.5 is given by the clerk, “the time for ruling on a motion for 
a new trial will be shortened only if the party submitting the order or judgment for 
entry serves notice of entry of judgment on all the parties, files the original notice 
with the court, and files a proof of service” as provided in section 664.5, 
subdivision (a)(2).  (Van Beurden, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 65, italics added.)  This 
comment was made without reference to the facts in Van Beurden, because there 
the prevailing party had made no attempt to give notice of entry of judgment to the 
party filing a notice of intention to move for a new trial.    
 
As discussed below, the Courts of Appeal have sought, with difficulty, to 
reconcile that comment in Van Beurden with the statutory language of the posttrial 
motion statutes and with the pre-Van Beurden cases, which required neither a 
separate document entitled “notice of entry of judgment” nor a filing of that 
document in the trial court along with a proof of service. 
 
D. 
Court of Appeal Decisions After Van Beurden  
 
In People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Cherry Highland Properties 
(1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 257 (Cherry Highland), the Court of Appeal addressed the 
question of what event would trigger section 660’s 60-day period in which a trial 
court must rule on a motion for a new trial.  The action was a condemnation in 
which the state prevailed; the property owner, however, objected to the proposed 
judgment and submitted its own judgment.  When the court signed the property 
owner’s judgment, the property owner on July 8, 1998, mailed to the state a notice 
of the entry of judgment.  On July 20, the property owner filed in the trial court a 
notice of its intention to move for a new trial, and it filed proof of service of the 
 
 
13
notice of entry it had mailed on July 8.  (Cherry Highland, at p. 261.)  The Court 
of Appeal sought to reconcile section 664.5, which controls notice of entry of 
judgment, with section 660, which defines the jurisdictional time limit for ruling 
on a new trial motion. 
 
Section 660 provides:  “[T]he power of the court to rule on a motion for a 
new trial shall expire 60 days from and after the mailing of notice of entry of 
judgment by the clerk . . . or 60 days from and after service on the moving party 
by any party of written notice of the entry of judgment,” or if such notice is not 
given, “then 60 days after filing of the first notice of intention to move for a new 
trial.”  The Court of Appeal in Cherry Highland concluded that under the express 
language of section 660 the operative act was service of notice on the moving 
party.  The court reasoned that because the property owner was the moving party, 
it could not serve itself, and therefore the “time within which to rule on the new 
trial motion . . . did not begin until” the property owner on July 20, 1998, filed its 
notice of intention to move for a new trial.  (Cherry Highland, supra, 76 
Cal.App.3d at p. 263.) 
 
Alternatively, the Court of Appeal in Cherry Highland rested its holding on 
the statement in Van Beurden, supra, 15 Cal.4th at page 65, that the time for ruling 
on a motion for a new trial “ ‘will be shortened only if the party submitting the 
order or judgment for entry [under section 664.5] serves notice of entry of 
judgment on all the parties, files the original notice with the court, and files a 
proof of service.’ ”  (Cherry Highland, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 261.)  
Applying that language, the Court of Appeal concluded that the jurisdictional 60-
day period for the trial court to rule on the property owner’s new trial motion 
began only on July 20, 1998, when the owner filed proof of serving notice of entry 
of judgment.  (Ibid.) 
 
 
14
 
The next year, in Dodge v. Superior Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 513 
(Dodge), a different division of the same Court of Appeal that had decided Cherry 
Highland addressed section 660 but reached a different result.  On February 11, 
1999, after the jury in Dodge returned a verdict for the plaintiff, he personally 
served defense counsel with conformed copies of the judgment.  On February 19, 
the defendants moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict.  The court did not enter its minute order granting a new trial, however, 
until the 61st day after service of the judgment.  The plaintiff moved to strike the 
order because it was made beyond section 660’s 60-day period.  The trial court 
denied the motion.  Citing Van Beurden, supra, 15 Cal.4th 51, the court concluded 
that the plaintiff had failed to comply with section 664.5 because he had served on 
the defendants merely a conformed copy of the judgment rather than a document 
entitled notice of entry of judgment, plus the filing in the trial court of such notice 
and proof of its service.  Accordingly, the trial court ruled that the 60 days did not 
begin to run until the defendants filed a notice of intention to move for a new trial. 
 
The Court of Appeal disagreed.  It found section 664.5 irrelevant because 
notice of entry of judgment was not mailed, as contemplated by that section, either 
by the plaintiff or the court clerk, but instead was personally served on the 
opposing party.  After examining the language of section 660, the court concluded 
that “[t]he triggering event” under section 660 is “ ‘service on the moving party,’ 
not filing the proof of service.”  (Dodge, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 520.)  It 
explained:  “The language is perhaps tacit admission of the fact that parties often 
file proof of service at a later date, particularly where as here they use a registered 
process server and may not have immediate access to the proof of service.”  (Id. at 
p. 522.) 
 
In the context of the cases discussed above, the Court of Appeal here 
concluded that “Palmer’s service of a file-stamped copy of the judgment was 
 
 
15
written notice of entry of judgment under sections 659 and 660” sufficient to start 
the requisite time limits for moving for a new trial or for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and for ruling on those motions.  In the Court of 
Appeal’s view, the operative act under sections 659 and 660 was service, and 
therefore it was “immaterial” whether service is personal or by mail. 
III 
 
Like the Court of Appeal here, we conclude that under the express terms of 
sections 629, 659, and 660, the time limits for bringing and ruling on motions for a 
new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict start to run either on the 
date of the court clerk’s mailing or on the date of service on the moving party of 
notice of entry of judgment.  To be service “pursuant to Section 664.5” (§§ 659, 
660) the notice of entry of judgment mailed by the clerk must “affirmatively state” 
it is given “ ‘upon order by the court’ or ‘under section 664.5’ ” (Van Beurden, 
supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 64).  Otherwise, the time limits for motions for a new trial 
or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (§ 629) are triggered by service on the 
moving party of “written notice” of the “entry of judgment.”  (§§ 659, 660.)  
When the moving party is served by mail, service is complete at the time the 
notice of entry of judgment is deposited in the mailbox.  (§ 1013, subd. (a); 
Westrec Marina Management, Inc. v. Jardine Ins. Brokers Orange County, Inc. 
(2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1048.) 
 
The written notice of entry of judgment served on the party who moves for 
a new trial need not, for the purposes of these sections, be a separate document 
entitled notice of entry of judgment.  We have long held that no particular form of 
notice is required, and that in counties that do not maintain a judgment book a file-
stamped copy of the judgment suffices as “written notice” for these sections.  (Van 
Beurden, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 57, fn. 2; McCordic v. Crawford (1943) 23 Cal.2d 
1, 5 [“Section 660 . . . does not in fact prescribe any set form of notice.”].) 
 
 
16
 
Finally, nothing in sections 629, 659, or 660 expressly requires the party 
serving written notice of entry of judgment to file any document with the trial 
court.  When this court in Van Beurden, supra, 15 Cal.4th at page 65, said that 
“the time for ruling on a motion for a new trial will be shortened only if the party 
submitting the order or judgment for entry serves notice of entry of judgment on 
all the parties, files the original notice with the court, and files a proof of service,” 
(italics added) it overstated the statutory requirements.  If a prevailing party, 
consistent with section 664.5, serves written notice of the entry of judgment on the 
party moving for new trial and files the original notice of entry and a proof of 
service, the prevailing party necessarily will have complied with sections 659 and 
660 by “serving written notice” on a party that intends to move for a new trial.  
The posttrial motion statutes do not, however, require filing of the original notice 
of entry (or of a file-stamped copy of the judgment) accompanied by proof of 
service in order to start the time limits for bringing and determining the posttrial 
motions.  Van Beurden’s suggestion that more is required by a party to trigger the 
time limits for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is dictum 
because it was unnecessary to its holding.5  “ ‘Language used in any opinion is of 
course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, 
and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.’ ”  (People 
v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 17, quoting Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 
524, fn. 2.) 
                                             
 
5  
We disapprove Cherry Highland Properties, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at 
pages 261-263, to the extent it suggests that service by any party of written notice 
of entry of judgment, sufficient to trigger the deadlines of sections 659 and 660 for 
posttrial motions, is not accomplished until a notice of entry of judgment 
accompanied by proof of its service has been filed with the trial court. 
 
 
17
 
GTE contends that because section 664.5 speaks of a separate document 
entitled notice of entry of judgment, such a document is likewise required for 
notice of entry of judgment sufficient to start the deadlines for motions for a new 
trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  In support, GTE cites to rule 
2(a) of the Rules of Court, governing the time limits for filing an appeal.  In 1999, 
the year of the events at issue here, rule 2(a) provided that “a notice of appeal from 
a judgment shall be filed on or before” 60 days after the clerk mails notice of entry 
of judgment or “60 days after the date of service of a document entitled ‘notice of 
entry’ of judgment” by or on the party filing the notice of appeal.  (Cal. Rules of 
Court, former rule 2(a).)  At most this provision confirms our view that the 
requirements of section 665.4 (party submitting a judgment for entry must prepare 
and serve notice of entry document, and file it with proof of service) exceed those 
of sections 659 and 660 (moving party must be served with written notice of entry 
of judgment).  Moreover, the current version of rule 2(a), which took effect on 
January 1, 2002, provides that a notice of appeal must be filed “60 days after the 
party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document 
entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a file-stamped copy of the judgment, 
accompanied by proof of service.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2(a)(2), italics 
added.)  New rule 2(a) thus expressly permits service with either a file-stamped 
copy of judgment or a separate pleading entitled Notice of Entry.  (See also Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 122(a) [In appeals to the appellate division of superior court, 
“a file-stamped copy of the judgment or appealable order may be used in place of 
the document entitled ‘notice of entry.’ ”].) 
 
GTE urges us to read into sections 659 and 660 a requirement that the 
original notice of entry of judgment or a file-stamped copy be filed in the trial 
court.  GTE argues that “[a]llowing a party to forgo” filing the original notice of 
entry of judgment or a file-stamped copy “permits the commencement of the 
 
 
18
jurisdictional timeframe on a date no one can verify” except counsel for the party 
serving the notice “when he or she digs a proof of service” out of the file.  GTE 
contends that unless the party serving written notice is required to file the served 
document, the trial court, which has only 60 days from the date of service to rule 
on the motions, may have nothing in its file indicating the crucial date of service.  
But it is not enough to argue that imposing a requirement would be a useful 
addition to the statutory scheme.  In construing sections 659 and 660, our task is to 
“ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to 
insert what has been omitted . . . .”  (§ 1858.)  Sections 659 and 660 simply do not 
require that a party giving notice of entry file either a proof of service or a copy of 
the served document, and we may not insert additional unwritten requirements into 
those sections, no matter how beneficial we might think them to be.6  
 
To some degree, the existing statutory scheme relies for its proper 
functioning on the prudence and courtesy of counsel for the parties.7  Counsel who 
                                             
 
6  
If a valid motion for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
is denied, the party that serves notice of that order must accompany the order or 
the notice with proof of service of that document on the opposing party.  (Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 3(f).)  Because the notice or the order extends the time to 
appeal, this “proof of service establishes the date when an extension of the time to 
appeal begins to run.”  (Advisory Com. com., West’s Ann. Codes, Rules (2003 
supp.) foll. rule 3, p. 21.)  The service and filing requirement in rule 3(a)(1), (c)(1) 
& (f), which extends the time to appeal, thus parallels that in rule 2(a)(1) & (2), 
which governs the normal time to appeal.  
7  
At oral argument, counsel for GTE expressed concern that, unless required 
to serve a separate document entitled “Notice of Entry of Judgment,” an attorney 
might bury such notice in a “chatty ten-page letter.”  Of course, any deliberate 
attempt to deceive or mislead opposing counsel would be a serious breach of 
counsel’s professional responsibilities and grounds for discipline.  More to the 
point, our decision today makes it perfectly clear that any attorney who receives in 
the mail a file-stamped copy of a judgment, accompanied by proof of service,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Fn. continued on next page) 
 
 
19
has served notice of entry of judgment should thereafter promptly file a copy of 
the served document together with a proof of service.  Although not statutorily 
required, the act of filing those documents ensures that the date on which the 
notice of entry was served, thereby triggering the statutory periods for making and 
determining posttrial motions, appears of record in the superior court file.  And, as 
the Court of Appeal here pointed out, counsel for a party making a posttrial 
motion for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should, 
although not statutorily required to do so, inform the trial court of (1) the date on 
which entry of judgment was served, and (2) the date on which the court’s 
jurisdiction to rule on the motions will expire.  Providing this information will 
assist the trial court in timely fulfilling its responsibilities in ruling on posttrial 
motions.
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Fn. continued from previous page) 
 
will understand that this constitutes service of notice of entry of judgment 
sufficient to trigger the deadlines for posttrial motions. 
 
 
20
 
DISPOSITION 
 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
RICHLI, J.*
                                             
 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, 
Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution. 
 
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Palmer v. GTE California 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 1/30/02 - 2d Dist., Div. 3 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S104997 
Date Filed: June 26, 2003 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: John P. Farrell 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Sullivan, Sottile & Taketa, Mark Sullivan, Timothy B. Sottile, Donn S. Taketa; Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & 
Walker, Paul Grossman, George W. Abele and Heather A. Morgan for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Law Offices of Kerry R. Tepper, Kerry R. Tepper; Law Offices of Louis E. Goebel and Louis E. Goebel 
for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Paul Grossman 
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker 
555 South Flower Street, Twenty-Third Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90071 
(213) 683-6000 
 
Louis E. Goebel 
Law Offices of Louis E. Goebel 
2445 Fifth Avenue, Suite 410 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 239-2611