Title: Dunning v. Meaney

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

DUNNING_V_MEANEY.92-441; 161 Vt. 287; 640 A.2d 3

[Opinion Filed 05-Nov-1993]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 26-Jan-1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-441


 Glenn Dunning                                Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Washington Family Court

 Barbara (Dunning) Meaney                     September Term, 1993



 Dean B. Pineles, J.

 Brian J. Grearson of Grearson & Rose, P.C., Barre, for plaintiff-appellant

 Richard I. Burstein and Pamela Stafford, Randolph, for defendant appellee/
  cross-appellant



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.




      GIBSON, J.   Plaintiff Glenn Dunning appeals the denial of his motion
 to modify the divorce decree and award him sole physical rights and
 responsibilities for the parties' minor child, Travis.  Defendant Barbara
 (Dunning) Meaney cross-appeals, claiming the court erred by failing to
 terminate Glenn's shared legal rights and responsibilities for Travis and by
 denying attorney's fees.  We reverse the denial of attorney's fees, but
 otherwise affirm the court's decision.
      The parties were divorced on July 26, 1989.  Pursuant to stipulation,
 the court awarded Barbara physical rights and responsibilities for Travis,
 with legal rights and responsibilities relating to health, education, and

 

 general welfare to be shared by the parties.  The decree provided a liberal
 visitation schedule for Glenn and included a procedure for working out a
 change in the schedule if circumstances warranted.
      In 1990, Barbara finished the two-year program at Vermont Technical
 College and obtained full-time employment.  During this period, Travis spent
 approximately half of his time with Glenn, which was more time than the
 stipulated schedule provided.  This arrangement continued until Barbara was
 injured at work and became unemployed.
      Desiring to complete her bachelor's degree in the horticultural field,
 Barbara decided to attend the State University of New York in Albany and
 planned to move there in the summer of 1992.  Glenn objected to this move
 and the parties attempted to resolve the disagreement through the process of
 mediation, as provided in the divorce decree.  Mediation failed, however,
 and Glenn moved to modify the decree, seeking sole physical and legal
 responsibility for Travis.
      The court granted Barbara's motion to bifurcate the trial, ruling that
 it would consider the best interests of the child only if there were a
 threshold showing of a real, substantial and unanticipated change of circum-
 stances.  See Pill v. Pill, 154 Vt. 455, 459, 578 A.2d 642, 644 (1990)
 (court may consider best interests of children only after it has made
 threshold finding that there has been real, substantial and unanticipated
 change of circumstances).  The court did not reach the "best interests"
 issue because it concluded there was no change of circumstances sufficient
 to satisfy the threshold; it therefore refused to modify the physical or
 legal rights and responsibilities for Travis.

 

      On appeal, Glenn claims that (1) he was entitled to a hearing on his
 motion to amend the findings of fact; (2) the court erred in considering
 evidence that predated the divorce order; (3) the court's findings do not
 support its conclusions; and (4) the court should have examined the best
 interests of the child because the parties waived the threshold showing, or,
 alternatively, because the threshold showing was satisfied.  In her cross-
 appeal, Barbara argues that the court erred by failing to award attorney's
 fees, failing to modify the legal rights and responsibilities of the
 parties, and concluding that a future move may be a sufficient change of
 circumstances to warrant modification.
                                     I.
      Glenn first argues that the trial court erred in denying a hearing on
 his motion to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law.  A hearing
 on a motion to amend findings of fact and conclusions of law is not
 required.  V.R.C.P. 78(b)(2) (providing for disposition of motions without
 hearing).  The court denied the motion, stating that Glenn's arguments were
 essentially restatements of arguments that had already been fully consider-
 ed.  We find no abuse of discretion in this ruling.
      Second, Glenn asserts that the trial court erred by relying on evidence
 that predated the divorce decree.  In a modification proceeding, a trial
 court's findings concerning events that occurred prior to the divorce decree
 will not be reversible error unless there is a demonstration of prejudice.
 Hayes v. Hayes, 144 Vt. 332, 338,