Title: Hargraves v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

EFiled:  Jun 14 2018 03:29PM EDT  
Filing ID 62140858 
Case Number 400,2017 
issued a memorandum order denying the motion suppress. A copy of the Superior
Court’s order is attached here for reference.

(3) After the denial of the motion to suppress, Hargraves’ case proceeded
toabench trial. On September 26, 2017, the Superior Court found Hargraves guilty
of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, Carrying a Concealed Deadly
Weapon, and Resisting Arrest, and sentenced him to a total of twenty-four years at
Level V suspended after five years for ten years of Level IV supervision suspended
after six months for concurrent Level III supervision and monitoring,

(4) Hargraves’ counsel on appeal has filed a no-merit brief under Rule
26(c) and a corresponding motion to withdraw. Hargraves has submitted written
points, which are included in the brief. In his points, Hargraves contends that he was
illegally stopped by the police and that the evidence seized as a result of that illegal
stop—chiefly, a handgun from the waistband of his pants—should have been
suppressed. The State has responded to Hargraves’ points, the position taken by his,
appellate counsel, and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.

(5) When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence based on
an allegedly illegal stop, we conduct a de novo review “to determine whether the

totality of the circumstances, in light of the tral judge’s factual findings, support a
reasonable and articulable suspicion for the stop.”" In this case, having conducted
the required de novo review, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances, as
determined by the Superior Court in its thorough and well-reasoned order denying
the motion to suppress, supports the legal conclusion that the responding police

officer had reasonable and articulable suspi

 

n to stop Hargraves.

(©) When considering a Rule 26(c) brief and an accompanying motion to
withdraw, we must be satisfied that the appellant's counsel has made a conscientious
examination of the record and the law for claims that could arguably support the
appeal.? Also, we must conduct our own review of the record to determine whether
the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be
decided without an adversary presentation.?

(7) In this case, we have reviewed the record and concluded that
Hargraves's appeal is “wholly without merit." We are satisfied that Hargraves’
appellate counsel made a conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and
properly determined that Hargraves could not raise a meritorious claim on appeal.

‘The points raised by Hargraves on appeal were raised in the motion to suppress and

"Clay State, 164 A.34907, 915-16 (Del 2017) (quoting Loper-Vaquesv, Sate, 956 A.24 1280,
1285 (Del. 2008).

2 Penson v. Ohio, 488 US. 5,83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeal of Wisconsin, 486 US. 429,
442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 USS 73, 744 (1967).

3 Penson v. Ohio, 488 US. at 82

“Del. Supr. CLR. 26(0).
argued by his trial counsel at the evidentiary hearing. The Superior Court’s
‘memorandum order of September 22, 2017, denying the motion to suppress, is
affirmed on appeal.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is
GRANTED. The judgments of the Superior Court are AFFIRMED. The motion to
withdraw is moot.

BY THE COURT:

(s/ Karen L. Valihura
Iustice
e © ®

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE.

STATE OF DELAWARE, d
)
. } IDNo. 1704016072
)
DEVON K. HARGRAVES )
)
Defendant. )
)
)
zs
MEMORANDUM ORDER DENYING 8
MOTION TO SUPPRESS Re
Upon consideration of the Motion to Suppress Evidence (the “Motion”) filed by =2 =

 

Defendant Devon K. Hargraves on Avg 7, 2017 the Sat's Response to Defendant's Motion
to Suppress (the “Response”) filed by the State of Delaware on September 1, 2017; the evidence
‘rovided by the parties ata hearing held on September 11,2017 (the “Hearing”; the arguments
‘made on the Motion and Response bythe partes atthe Hearing; and for the reasons set forth
below, the Motion is DENIED.
INtRopucTION

This is a criminal action. The State has charged Mr. Hargraves with «possession of a
‘firearm by a person prohibited case. On April 23, 2017, persons contacted the Wilmington
Police Department (“WPD"), through several 911 calls, regarding shots fired in the eres of Noth
‘Van Buren Street. Corporal Donald Cramer responded tothe area. After ariving, Corporal
(Cramer attempted to stop Mr. Hargraves, wno matched the description of two 911 callers. After
several commands to stop, Mr. Hargraves fled from Corporal Cramer. WPD apprehended Mr.

Hargraves and found a firearm in Mr. Hargraves' possession,
‘Mr. Hargraves filed the Motion to suppress the gun found on his person arguing (i) that
Corporal Cramer seized Mr. Hargraves atthe point Corporal Cramer exited his police vehicle
and told Mr. Hargraves to stop; and (i) Corporal Cramer di not posses reasonable ariclable
suspicion when Corporal Cramer seized Mr, Hargraves,

‘The State opposes the Motion. The Sate claims that (}) Corporal Cramer’siital
spproach was an attempt at consensual encounter, (ji) Corporal Cramer hed reasonable
articulable suspicion to detain Mr. Hargroves based on his flight; (jii) Mr. Hargraves resisted
ares; and (iv) officer searched Mr. Hargrove incident to lawful rest

‘Facts!

‘On April 23, 2017, at least four callers reported to WPD that shots had been fired in the
sea of 2nd Street and North Van Buren Steet. The Court had an opportunity to listen to each of
the 911 calls. The first two callers didnot se the shooter. The third caller told the 911 operator
thatthe she saw the shooter pullout gun. Further, she informed the operator thatthe suspect
‘was a black male wearing a black shirt with 66 on it, a winter cap with snowflakes, and
‘dreadlocks. She told police he was walking up Conrad Street. The fourth caller spoke Spenish
and needed an interpreter. This caller first told police that the shooter was a black male with
‘black dreads and with a umber on his shirt. The caller then stated that the shooter had the
‘number 36 on his shir. The calle then decided thet the number was 63. Finally this same caller
‘told the operator that the man had 66 on his shirt and that he was right in front of the police.

‘The Court then heard testimony from Corporal Cramer. Corporal Cramer testified that he
‘responded to a Wilcom dispatch regarding shots fired near 217 N. Van Buren Street,
‘Wilmington, Delaware. The dispatcher informed Corporal Cramer that the suspect was a black

* Unless herwise noted, the fits inthis section ar from the Motion the Respnse, andthe Hein.
2
ale, wearing a black shit with the number 66 on it, black jeans, anda black winter cap with
snowflakes. Upon arriving, Corporal Cramer testified that he saw a black male with a black shirt
withthe number 6 omit dark pants, and a dark knit cap with white sowflakes on it

‘Corporal Cramer stopped his marked police car nearly fifteen feet from Mr. Hargraves.
As Corporal Cramer exited his vehicle he said “sir stop” to Mr. Hargraves. Corporal Cramer
‘testified that, at this point, Mr. Hargraves ignored Corporal Cramer. Corporal Cramer then told
‘Mr. Hargraves “sir stop can | talk to you?” Corporal Cramer said that Mr. Hargraves then tuned
‘toward him, saw that he was a police officer and then tuned away. Corporal Cramer then
testified that he told Mr. Hargraves to “stop and show me your hands.” Now, Mr. Hargraves
looked at Corporal Cramer, tured around, and walked away. Next, Mr. Hargraves touched and
sppeared to adjust something at his waistband. Corporal Cramer testified tat its normal for
‘people carrying @ handgun without @ holster to regularly touch and adjust the weapon to make
‘sure it does not fall out of the waistband. Mr. Hargraves then began to run away from Corporal
‘Cramer. Corporal Cramer drew his police firearm and pursued Mr. Hargraves. While running,
“Mr, Hargraves continued to adjust his waistband while fleeing fom the police. Two oficers
Joined the pursuit?

‘The officers deployed their tasers multiple times and took Mr. Hargraves into custody.
‘The officers recovered a handgun on Mr. Hargraves and charged Mr. Hargraves with (1) carrying
‘concealed deadly weapon, (2) possession of a weapon with a removed, obliterated or altered
‘serial number, (3) possession, purchase, own, or control of a deadly weapon by @ person
‘prohibited, (4) discharge firearm on street, and (5) criminal mischief under $1,000.

* The testimony regarding each specific ction of Mr Hargraves to each command by Corporal was gone over &
‘umber of ties athe Hearing. Give the Court's conclusion tht the nil command of sop” constiued
‘size, the Court finds any deropacy with he etmony oho tht recorded hee imate

3
ANALYSIS:

In the Motion and at the Hearing, Mr. Hargraves argued that Corporal Cramer lacked
reasonable suspicion atthe time of the seizure. Mr. Hargraves also argued that the seizure
‘occurred as soon as Corporal Cramer ordered Mr. Hargraves to stop. In the Response and the
‘Hearing the State argued that: i) Corporal Cramer's initia approach was an attempt at a
‘consensual encounter; (i) Corporal Cramer had reasonable aticulable suspicion to detain the
defendant based on his flight; (ii) Mr. Hargraves resisted ares; and (i) officers searched the
<dfendant incident toa lawful arest. At the Hearing, the partes focused on whether Corporal
‘Cramer's inital encounter was a seizure or consensual encounter.

‘The Fourth Amendment tothe United States Constitution and Article 1, § 6 of the
Deleware Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Delaware Supreme
(Court hes held that a person is seized only if, under the totality ofthe circumstances,
reasonable person inthe same position would not fel free to “go about his business” or “ignore
the police presence."*

‘The Court agrees with Mr. Hargraves that a seizure occurred when Corporal Cramer told
Mr. Hargrave to “stop.” Corporal Cramer is in his uniform, has just exited his vehicle and told
‘Mr. Hargraves to “stop.” At tis point in time, a easonable person in the same or similar
situation would not have felt free to go about his/her business. Therefore, the Court will focus
‘on whether Corporal Cramer had reasonable suspicion at the time he ordered Mr. Hargraves to
stop.

3 Harrie», Se, 806 A24 19,124 (Del. 2002).

“ Flannaryw State 805 A24 854, 857 Del. 2001),

 
Police officers may seize or detain an individual fora limited investigation if the “officer
‘nafs apaticularized and objective basis to suspect" that the individual “is commiting, has
committed, or is about to commit a crime."* Deleware codified this reasonable suspicion
standard in 11 Del C. § 1902. This Court bes explained that reasonable suspicion is evaluated
by the totality ofthe circumstances “as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained police
office in the same or similar circumstances, combining objective facts with such an officer's
subjective interpretation of those facts.””

“The United States and Delaware Supreme Courts have held tht certain anonymous tips
lack enough easonable suspicion to allow an officer to perform an investigatory sop. “If an
officer doesnot observe any violations prior tothe stop this Court must decide whether the tip
contained sufficient indicia of reliability to support a stop onthe basis ofthe tip alone."* In
Florida v. Lan anonymous tipster told police that there was “a young black male standing at a
particular bus stop and wearin

 

plaid shirt... carrying a gun.”® The U.S. Supreme Court
determined that this tip was insuficient to justify a stop and fisk ofthe defendant. The Court
‘reasoned that the informant did not demonstrate knowledge of concealed criminal activity.
Similarly. in Jones v. State, the police received an anonymous tip that reported a
“suspicious black male wearing a blue coat” had been in the same location for some time." An

officer responded and told the defendant to stop and remove his hands from his pockets.” The

5 Lope Vazque Site, 956 A24 1280 1288 (Del. 2008.

‘reeds. State, 765A 28 1257, 1262 (Del. 2001).

"ones v State, 745 A24 856, 661 (De. 199).

* Gui State, 3 A 1097, 2010 WL 3489506, a 3 (Del. 2010) (quoting Bloomingdale v Stave, 842 A24
1213, 1219 (Del 2004 itera quottons omit).

1529 US. 266,268 2000),

Sia wz.

Jones, 745 A.24 a 858,

Bia ates,
defendant threw cocaine and the officer arested the defendant." The Delaware Supreme Court,
{found thatthe 911 call did not have a sufficient indicia of reliability to allow the officer to seize
the defendant without further corroboration."

 

However, atip of readily observable criminal activity may not require police
corroboration. In Bloomingdale, tipster called 91) and told the operator tht the diver was all

 

‘over te roadway near James Steet and Route 141."! The Court found tha the officer had
reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. The Court reasoned that “an anonymous report of
‘contemporaneously-observed [criminal activity] doesnot suffer ftom the same lack of indicia of
reliability" as tips reporting “concealed, possessory offenses] because the (readily
observable] offense[s] are caried out inthe public and may be observed by any passerby."!7
Further, tipsters reporting readily observable crimes do not require “inside information or special
basis of knowledge for [the] conclusion thet criminal activity is occuting."*

Further, n State v, Johnson, a caller reported to Wilmington

 

ispetch that she saw
‘fight near 30th and Jefferson Street."” The caller told police that one suspect was a black male
with dark complexion and a beerd wearing a blue or black baseball eap and a navy blue shir.?”
‘She further informed dispatch thatthe suspect had a gun2" A police officer saw the defendant
‘matching the description of the suspect The officer exited his marked police car, drew his
‘weapon. and ordered the defendant on the ground This Court ruled thatthe officer had

 

id
1d AUST

' Bloomingdle, 2 A24 at 1213.

waar,

me

aa

2011 WL 300247, a1 (Del Supe. Jan 18,2011).
Bid

me

Bid

2

 
reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant The Johnson Court reasoned that the “defendant
was the only individual inthe area matching the description provided, and the anonymous 911
caller had provided sufficiently detailed information to prevent an improper random stop."**

Corporal Cramer had reasonable suspicion o detain Mr. Hargraves when he exited his
‘marked police car. Multiple witnesses called 911 reporting gunfire. Two witnesses provided
suliciently detailed descriptions of the shooter and his elothing. Further, one caller suid she saw
Mr. Hargraves holding the gun. The situation involved reporting a realy observable crime.

'WPD dispatch relayed a description to officer on parol. WPD dispach indicated tht
the shooter was aback male with deadlocks, wearing a blac shirt masked 66 and a dark winter
cap with snowflakes. Wilmington disptch's description of the shooter was sufciently detailed
to prevent an improper random stop. Corporal Cramer testified that he heard the description of
shooter from Wilmington dispatch. Corporal Cramer saw a black male with dreadlocks, aback
Shin with 66 on it anda winter cap with snowflakes in summer weather. Corporal Cramer
pulled his marked patrol car nearly fifteen feet fom Hargraves. Ase exited his vehicle,
Corporal Cramer told Mr. Hargraves to sop. At this point, Corporal Cramer executed a stop
‘with reasonable suspicion that Mr, Hargraves had committed a crime. This readily observable
ime and desiled description ofthe shooter provided Corporal Cramer reason to stop Mr.
Hargraves.

we
Bia
Conc.usion
For the above reasons, the Cour finds that there was reasonable suspicion to stop Mr.

Hargraves based on the information provided to police inthe 911 calls and relayed tothe officers,
from their dspetch. The conduct of Mr. Hargraves subsequent tothe intial command of stop—
‘ce. the adjusting the waistband, the fleeing from the scene, the continuing adjustment of the
‘waistband, the discovery of the firearm on Mr. Hargraves during the search—demonstrate
‘addtional facts that support probable cause forthe arrest.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED thatthe Motion is DENIED.

Dated: September 22,2017
‘Wilmington, Delaware

Judge

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