Title: BRYON THROCKMARTIN and VANESSA THROCKMARTIN V. CENTURY 21 TOP REALTY, a Wyoming corporation; and KATHIE HOVE; BRYON THROCKMARTIN and, VANESSA THROCKMARTIN V. VICKI MEANS NELSON; and REAL ESTATE PROFESSIONALS, INC., a Wyoming corporation, d/b/a RE/MAX PROFESSIONALS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BRYON THROCKMARTIN and VANESSA THROCKMARTIN V. CENTURY 21 TOP REALTY, a Wyoming corporation; and KATHIE HOVE; BRYON THROCKMARTIN and, VANESSA THROCKMARTIN V. VICKI MEANS NELSON; and REAL ESTATE PROFESSIONALS, INC., a Wyoming corporation, d/b/a RE/MAX PROFESSIONALS2010 WY 23226 P.3d 793Case Number: S-08-0250, S-08-0269Decided: 03/03/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
BRYON 
THROCKMARTIN and VANESSA 
THROCKMARTIN,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.CENTURY 21 TOP 
REALTY, a Wyoming corporation; and KATHIE 
HOVE,Appellees(Defendants).

BRYON 
THROCKMARTIN and, VANESSA 
THROCKMARTIN,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.VICKI MEANS 
NELSON; and REAL ESTATE PROFESSIONALS, INC., a Wyoming corporation, d/b/a RE/MAX 
PROFESSIONALS,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

 
 
 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

Jessica 
Rutzick, Jackson, Wyoming; and John R. Vincent, Riverton, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Rutzick.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Billie 
L.M. Addleman, and Gary R. Scott, Hirst Applegate, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming, 
representing Century 21 Top Realty and Kathie Hove; and *Phillip T. Willoughby, 
Casper, Wyoming; P. Craig Silva and Patrick J. Murphy of Williams, Porter, Day 
& Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming, representing Vicki Means Nelson and Real 
Estate Professionals, Inc., d/b/a Re/Max Professionals.  Argument by Messrs. Addleman and 
Silva.

 
 
*Order 
Allowing Withdrawal of Attorney entered on February 26, 
2009.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In November of 
2005, Bryon and Vanessa Throckmartin purchased a house in Gillette.  In August of 2006, they discovered that 
the basement of the house leaked very badly during significant rainfall, that 
the foundation had crumbled, and that the house was becoming uninhabitable.  Eventually it was condemned by the City 
of Gillette in mid-2007  a total loss for the Throckmartins.  They filed suit naming two real estate 
firms (and their respective agents) as defendants, as well as the sellers of the 
home and the home inspection experts who inspected the home for the 
Throckmartins, prior to closing.  
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the real estate 
firms and their agents in each of the captioned appeals.  Other litigation remains pending in the 
district court with respect to the sellers and the inspection 
specialists.

 
 
[¶2]      The Appellants in 
Case No. S-08-0250 are Bryon and Vanessa Throckmartin (Throckmartins).  The Appellees are Century 21 TOP Realty 
(TOP) and Kathie Hove (Hove) (during proceedings below it was explained that 
Century 21 and TOP are no longer associated).  TOP is a real estate brokerage firm and 
Hove is a sales representative and associate broker who worked for that 
firm.  The Throckmartins claimed 
that Top Realty and Hove engaged in professional negligence, breached the 
contract between them, engaged in fraudulent concealment of defects in the home, 
and breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in their contract 
and articulated in applicable statutes.  
Hove was a real estate agent who provided services to the Throckmartins 
in their endeavor to buy their first home.

 
 
[¶3]      The Throckmartins 
are also the Appellants in Case No. S-08-0269.  The Appellees are Vicki Means Nelson 
(Nelson) and Real Estate Professionals, Inc., d/b/a Re/Max Professionals 
(Re/Max).  Nelson and Re/Max had 
listed for sale the home which is at issue in this case and another employee of 
Re/Max was the first to show the Throckmartins that home.

 
 
[¶4]      We will affirm 
both of these cases.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶5]      In Case No. 
S-08-0250 the Throckmartins raise this issue:

 
 
            
Did the district court erroneously grant summary judgment in favor of 
Hove and Century 21 TOP Realty on [Throckmartins'] claims against them for 
professional negligence, breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and 
fair dealing, and fraudulent concealment?

 
 
TOP 
and Hove restate the issues like this:

 
 
            
1.  Whether [Throckmartins] can now assert a claim for 
professional negligence not previously plead?

 
 
            
2.  Did the district court correctly grant [TOP] and [Hove] 
summary judgment on [Throckmartins'] claim for breach of 
contract?

 
 
            
3.  Did the district court correctly grant [TOP] and [Hove] 
summary judgment on [Throckmartins'] claim for breach of the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing?

 
 
            
4.  Did the district court correctly grant [TOP] and [Hove] 
summary judgment on [Throckmartins'] claim for fraudulent 
concealment?

 
 
In 
their reply brief, the Throckmartins contend they did make a timely claim 
sounding in  professional 
negligence, that real estate professionals must abide by professional standards 
other than those found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-28-301 through 33-28-311 
(LexisNexis 2009), that the "intermediary" statute does not supersede the duty 
of care established in Hulse v. First 
American Title Co. (Hulse I), 2001 WY 95, 33 P.3d 122 (Wyo. 2001), and Hulse v. BHJ, Inc. (Hulse II), 2003 WY 
75, ¶ 10, 71 P.3d 262, 268 (Wyo. 2003), and that a question of fact exists 
as to whether Hove breached the duties set forth in the Real Estate License 
Act.

 
 
[¶6]      In Case No. 
S-08-0269, the Throckmartins challenge the district court's order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Nelson and Re/Max.  Nelson was the listing/selling agent for 
the parcel of real estate at issue in this appeal.  She worked for Re/Max.  In the initial pleadings another Re/Max 
agent was also named as a defendant, Val Elliot.  Elliot was eventually dismissed by 
stipulation of the parties, but her testimony affected the claims against Nelson 
and Re/Max, and we will recite portions of her testimony in our rendition of the 
circumstances that must be considered in resolving this case.  The home the Throckmartins purchased was 
listed with Re/Max, by the sellers.  
The issue raised in this appeal is simply stated to 
be:

 
 
            
Did the district court erroneously grant summary judgment in favor of 
[Nelson] and [Re/Max] on [Throckmartins'] claims against them for professional 
negligence, breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing, and fraudulent concealment?

 
 
In 
response, Nelson and Re/Max provide this statement of the 
issues:

 
 
The 
district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of [Nelson] and 
[Re/Max] because there were no genuine issues of material fact and [Nelson] and 
[Re/Max] were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

 
 
[A.]  Issue 
regarding contract:

 
 
The 
district court properly found that there were no genuine issues of material fact 
and there was no contract between Throckmartins and [Nelson] as a matter of 
law.

 
 
[B.]  Issue 
regarding disclosure:

 
 
The 
district court properly found that there were no genuine issues of material fact 
and there was no violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-28-111 as a matter of 
law.

 
 
[C.]  Issue 
regarding malpractice:

 
 
Throckmartins 
improperly raised on appeal for the first time a claim for real estate 
malpractice/negligence.

 
 
[D.]  Issue 
regarding breach of covenant:

 
 
The 
district court properly found that there were no genuine issues of material fact 
and as a matter of law, there was no contract and because there was no contract 
there could be no breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.

 
 
The 
Throckmartins assert in their reply brief that they did make a timely claim for 
professional negligence against Nelson and Re/Max, that there are genuine issues 
of material fact as to whether Nelson and Re/Max breached their duties to the 
Throckmartins, and that the provisions of § 33-28-303 are only the minimal 
standards by which realtors must abide.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶7]      The Throckmartins 
were referred to Hove by a real estate finance company employee when they first 
began looking to buy a home in the late summer of 2005.  Hove showed the Throckmartins several 
new construction homes that qualified for the sort of Wyoming Community 
Development Authority (WCDA) loan the Throckmartins were seeking at that 
time.  Those houses were under 
construction but not yet finished.  
Later, when Mrs. Throckmartin became employed, they qualified for 
different sorts of financing (other than WCDA first-time home owner loans), as 
well as for a larger loan (up to $175,000.00, which was the selling price of the 
home they eventually purchased).

 
 
[¶8]      The Throckmartins 
spotted a home they fancied which was offered for sale through Re/Max.  They sought out a different real estate 
agent who worked for Re/Max, not realizing that that was not the usual way of 
utilizing the services of a real estate agent.  However, no problems arose from the 
inclusion of that secondary real estate professional, other than that Hove did 
not show the Throckmartins the home that they were intent on buying.  Instead it was shown to them by a Re/Max 
agent.  Hove first saw the house on 
October 24, 2005, when she went over to that house (at the Throckmartins' 
request) to admit the home inspectors engaged by the Throckmartins.  A property condition statement covering 
that property had been provided to Hove, and in turn to the Throckmartins.  That condition statement revealed that 
there were problems with basement walls, but Mr. Throckmartin had discussed that 
directly with the seller and was apparently satisfied with the explanation 
provided.  The Throckmartins asked 
Hove to find a home inspector for them (because they did not have the time to do 
so themselves), and Hove proceeded to seek out a suitable inspector.  Hove contacted inspectors until she 
found one who was able to do the inspection in a manner that satisfied the 
Throckmartins' time lines.  A copy 
of the property condition statement was not provided to the inspector by Hove or 
by the Throckmartins.  The 
Throckmartins were very excited about the house and wanted to buy it very 
quickly.

 
 
[¶9]      Val Elliot worked 
with Nelson at Re/Max.  She recalled 
the Throckmartins coming into her office and asking to view the house they 
ultimately purchased.  She related 
that at that time the real estate market in Gillette was very fast-paced and 
properties, especially those in that price range, did not stay on the market 
very long and there were not very many of them available for sale.  She showed the Throckmartins only that 
one property and the owners of the house happened to be present at the time of 
that showing.  Elliot felt that the 
Throckmartins made an "impulse" decision to purchase the house on the spot.  Although Elliot had not seen the 
sellers' disclosure statement, she had some concerns about the house because the 
roof looked "worn."  Since the 
sellers were present when they looked at the house, Mr. Throckmartin talked with 
one of the owners, Nathan Neether, about the condition of the house.  The sellers were there because they were 
in the process of moving out and cleaning/fixing up the house.  Elliot did not talk to the owners of the 
house.  The Throckmartins followed 
Elliot's advice to the extent that they did not make an offer that same 
day.  Once Elliot found out that 
Hove was the Throckmartins' agent, she did not continue to participate in the 
sales process, although she did share in the commission for the 
sale.

 
 
[¶10]   Mr. Throckmartin's deposition 
reveals that they first took note of the disputed property in July of 2005, and 
looked at it for the first time in late July or early August.  He contacted Re/Max directly rather than 
working with Hove.  Once he 
understood that he needed to work with Hove, who would in turn work with Re/Max, 
that's what was done.  The 
Throckmartins decided immediately that they wanted the house, but they had to 
wait for the processing of the paperwork before an actual offer was made.  A few weeks after the Throckmartins took 
their initial look at the house, they went back and looked again after the 
owners had moved out.  They arranged 
for an inspection of the house before making their purchase.  The Throckmartins made their offer to 
purchase the disputed house on October 14, 2005.  The seller's property condition 
disclosure statement was made available to the Throckmartins.  They closed on the property on November 
30, 2005, and moved in shortly thereafter.  
Mr. Throckmartin's testimony was to the effect that both Hove and Nelson 
should have known about the poor condition of the house, but based that only on 
the circumstance that they were in the real estate business and they should know 
about the condition of houses they are selling.  He eventually conceded he had no 
personal information or knowledge that either Hove or Nelson actually knew about 
the defects in the house at issue.  
Mr. Throckmartin then enumerated the problems that came to light 
beginning in August of 2006, and ending with the condemnation of the house in 
2007.

 
 
[¶11]   Testimony from Hove indicated that 
the builder of the home lived in it in the period of approximately 1969-70, and 
from this it was deduced that it was built in the 1960's.  The home's basement walls were 
constructed of non-reinforced cement blocks and showed considerable signs of 
bowing.  Similar homes constructed 
by the same builder and located in the same neighborhood had experienced some 
similar foundation problems.  The 
house the Throckmartins purchased had been inspected in 2002 and that inspection 
resulted in a report that some of the basement walls were not structurally 
stable, although the condition of most of the basement walls could not be 
determined because they were covered with paneling.  That report also concluded that the 
house was not suitable for occupation as a residence.  The owners from whom the Throckmartins' 
made their purchase had bought the home "as is" and without having inspections 
done.  An inspector who was familiar 
with the area where the Throckmartins' home was located indicated that he had 
inspected about 25 homes in that area that had problems similar to those 
experienced by the Throckmartins. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶12]   Both cases were resolved by summary 
judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 56.  
In Loredo v. Solvay America, 
Inc., 2009 WY 93, ¶ 10, 212 P.3d 614, 618-19 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Hatton v. Energy Elec. Co., 2006 WY 151, 
¶¶ 8-9, 148 P.3d 8, 12-13 (Wyo.2006)), we summarized the generally 
applicable standard of review:

 
 
We 
evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and 
using the same materials as the district court.  Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, 
¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo.2006).  
Thus, our review is plenary.  
Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 
Inc., 2003 WY 102, ¶ 7, 75 P.3d 640, 647 
(Wyo.2003).

 
 
Wyo. 
R. Civ. P. 56 governs summary judgments.  
A summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c).  When reviewing a summary judgment, we 
consider the record in the perspective most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion and give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be 
fairly drawn from the record.  We 
review questions of law de novo without giving any deference to the district 
court's determinations.

 
 

Cathcart 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
2005 WY 154, ¶ 11, 123 P.3d 579, 586 (Wyo.2005), quoting Baker v. Ayres and Baker Pole and Post, 
Inc., 2005 WY 97, ¶ 14, 117 P.3d 1234, 1239 
(Wyo.2005).

 
 
            
"A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were 
proven, would establish or refute an essential element of a cause of action or a 
defense that the parties have asserted."  
Christensen v. Carbon County, 
2004 WY 135, ¶ 8, 100 P.3d 411, 413 (Wyo.2004) (quoting Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo.2002)).  The party requesting a summary judgment 
bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary 
judgment.  If he carries his burden, 
"the party who is opposing the motion for summary judgment must present specific 
facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists."  Id. We have explained the duties of the 
party opposing a motion for summary judgment as follows:

 
 
"After 
a movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, the opposing 
party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing 
there are genuine issues of material fact.  
The opposing party must affirmatively set forth material, specific facts 
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, and cannot rely only upon 
allegations and pleadings ..., and conclusory statements or mere opinions are 
insufficient to satisfy the opposing party's burden."

 
 
            
The evidence opposing a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment 
"must be competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be 
entirely eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere 
conjecture or wishful speculation."  
Speculation, conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or 
even probability, are insufficient to establish an issue of material fact.  Cook, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d  at 890, 
quoting Jones v. Schabron, 2005 WY 
65, pp 9-11, 113 P.3d 34, 37 (Wyo.2005).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶13]   In the circumstances presented 
here, the applicable law is quite difficult to parse.  Mr. Neether and Ms. Neether-Oedekoven 
were trying to sell a house.  The 
applicable statute has this to say about "seller:" "Seller' means a person who 
is attempting to sell or exchange real property and includes landlords as that 
term is commonly used in the rental, leasing or management of real 
property[.]"  § 
33-28-301(a)(vi).  "Seller's agent' 
means a licensee who is authorized to represent and act for the seller in a real 
estate transaction[.]"  § 
33-28-301(a)(vii).

 
 
[¶14]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-28-302 
describes the relationships between licensees and the 
public:

 
 
(a)  A broker shall not be required to offer 
or engage in more than one (1) of the brokerage 
relationships.  When 
engaged in any of the activities enumerated in W.S. 33-28-102(a)(iii), a 
licensee may act in any real estate transaction as an agent or intermediary or 
may work with the seller or buyer as a customer.  The licensee's duties and obligations 
arising from that relationship shall be disclosed to the seller or buyer 
pursuant to this article.

            
(b)  When engaged in any of the activities enumerated in W.S. 
33-28-102(a)(iii), a licensee may act as an agent only pursuant to a written 
agreement with the seller or buyer which discloses the duties and 
responsibilities set forth in W.S. 33-28-303 or 33-28-304.

            
(c)  When engaged in any of the activities enumerated in W.S. 
33-28-102(a)(iii), a licensee may act as a subagent with the duties and 
responsibilities set forth in W.S. 33-28-303(g), only pursuant to a written 
agreement between the seller and the seller's agent authorizing an offer of 
subagency to other brokers, or as an intermediary with the seller or buyer, 
which written agreement discloses the duties and responsibilities set forth in 
W.S. 33-28-305.

            
(d)  Repealed by Laws 2009, ch. 20, § 3.

            
(e)  A licensee may work with a single party in separate 
transactions pursuant to different relationships, including selling one (1) 
property as a seller's agent and working with that seller in buying another 
property as an intermediary or buyer's agent or subagent, if the licensee 
complies with this article in establishing a separate relationship in writing 
for each transaction.

            
(f)  A licensee may complete real estate forms and shall 
explain to the parties the effects thereof if the licensee is performing the 
activities enumerated or referred to in W.S. 33-28-102(a)(iii) in the 
transaction in which the forms are to be used.

            
(g)  Every contract, 
duty or relationship within this article, including intermediary or customer 
relationships, imposes an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance or enforcement.

            
(h)  If a real estate brokerage firm has more than one (1) 
licensee, the responsible broker and any licensee associated with or engaged by 
that responsible broker may be designated to work with the seller or the buyer 
as a designated agent.  For an 
in-house real estate transaction, the designated agent shall 
be:

                        
(i)  A broker;

                        
(ii)  An associate broker; or

            
(iii)  A salesman under the direct supervision of a broker, and 
the broker is not:

                                    
(A)  A party to the real estate transaction; 
or

                                    
(B)  A transaction manager.

            
(j)  Licensees employed or engaged by the same responsible 
broker may be designated agents for different buyers or sellers in the same 
transaction.  If the responsible 
broker is representing a buyer or a seller in an in-house transaction, the 
responsible broker shall immediately appoint a transaction manager.  The simultaneous designations shall not 
constitute dual agency or require the responsible broker or licensee to act as 
an intermediary unless otherwise required by this article.  A responsible broker or transaction 
manager shall have access to all necessary information but shall be prohibited 
from sharing any confidential information of any party to the transaction that 
the broker or manager may learn in the process of supervising the licensees or 
the transaction.

            
(k)  A licensee may work as an agent for the seller treating 
the buyer as a customer or as an agent for the buyer treating the seller as a 
customer but not as an agent for both the seller and the buyer.  A licensee may be designated to work as 
an intermediary for both the seller and the buyer in the same transaction.  The applicable designated relationship 
shall be disclosed in writing to the seller and buyer at the earliest reasonable 
opportunity.  A designated agent is 
not precluded from working with a buyer or seller in a real estate transaction 
solely because the agent was precluded from representing that person in an 
earlier separate real estate transaction.

            
(m)  No seller or buyer shall be vicariously liable for an 
agent's acts or omissions that have not been approved, directed or ratified by 
the seller or buyer.

            
(n)  Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the 
responsible broker's responsibility to supervise licensees associated with the 
broker or firm or to shield the broker from vicarious 
liability.

            
(o)  A licensee 
shall not establish dual agency with any seller or buyer. 

            
(p)  A customer relationship shall exist between a licensee and 
any party to a real estate transaction unless a single agency or intermediary 
relationship is established through a written agreement between the licensee and 
the party or parties.  When a buyer 
or seller is represented by another licensee, a licensee may work with the other 
buyer or seller as a customer, having no written agreement, agency or 
intermediary relationship with either party.  A licensee shall not owe any duty of 
confidentiality to a customer.

            
(q)  Proprietary ownership interest of listings shall be vested 
in the responsible broker.  
[Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶15]   The Throckmartins were buyers as 
that term is commonly understood:  
"Buyer' means a person attempting to purchase or exchange real property 
and includes tenants as that term is commonly used in the rental, leasing or 
management of real property[.]"  § 33-28-301(a)(ii).  "Buyer's agent' means a licensee who is 
authorized to represent and act for the buyer in a real estate 
transaction[.]"  § 
33-28-301(a)(iii).

 
 
[¶16]   The duties and obligations of a 
"seller's agent engaged by seller," are set out in 
§ 33-28-303:

 
 
(a)  A 
licensee engaged by a seller to act as a seller's agent has the following duties 
and obligations:

(i)  To 
perform the terms of the written agreement made with the 
seller;

                        
(ii)  To exercise reasonable skill and care for the 
seller;

            
(iii)  To promote the interests of the seller with the utmost 
good faith, loyalty and fidelity, including:

(A)  To 
seek a price and terms which are acceptable to the seller, except that the 
licensee shall not be obligated to seek additional offers to purchase the 
property while the property is subject to a contract for 
sale;

(B)  To 
present all offers to and from the seller in a timely manner regardless of 
whether the property is subject to a contract for sale;

(C)  To 
disclose to the seller adverse material facts actually known by the 
licensee;

(D)  To 
counsel the seller as to any material benefits or risks of a transaction which 
are actually known by the licensee;

(E)  To 
advise the seller to obtain expert advice as to material matters about which the 
licensee knows but the specifics of which are beyond the expertise of the 
licensee;

(F)  To 
account in a timely manner for all money and property received; 
and

(G)  To 
inform the seller that the seller may be vicariously liable for the acts of the 
seller's agent or seller's subagent that are approved, directed or ratified by 
the seller.

(iv)  To 
comply with all requirements of this article; and

(v)  To 
comply with any applicable federal, state or local laws, rules, regulations or 
ordinances.

            
(b)  The following information shall not be disclosed by a 
licensee acting as a seller's agent without the informed consent of the 
seller:

(i)  That 
a seller is willing to accept less than the asking price for the 
property;

(ii)  What 
the motivating factors are for the party selling the 
property;

(iii)  That 
the seller will agree to financing terms other than those 
offered;

(iv)  Any 
material information about the seller unless disclosure is required by law or 
failure to disclose the information would constitute fraud or dishonest 
dealing.

            
(c)  A licensee 
acting as a seller's agent owes no duty or obligation to the buyer, except that 
a licensee shall disclose to any prospective buyer all adverse material facts 
actually known by the licensee.  The 
adverse material facts may include adverse material facts pertaining to the 
title and the physical condition of the property, any material defects in the 
property and any environmental hazards affecting the property which are required 
by law to be disclosed.  The 
licensee acting as a seller's agent shall not perpetuate a material 
misrepresentation of the seller which the licensee knows or should know is 
false.

            
(d)  A seller's agent owes no duty to conduct an independent 
inspection of the property for the benefit of the buyer and owes no duty to 
independently verify the accuracy or completeness of any statement made by the 
seller or any independent inspector.

            
(e)  A seller's agent may show alternative properties not owned 
by the seller to prospective buyers and may list competing properties for sale 
and not be deemed to have breached any duty or obligation to the 
seller.

            
(f)  A seller may agree in writing with a seller's agent to 
extend an offer of subagency to other brokers to cooperate in selling the 
property.

            
(g)  Any broker acting as a subagent on the seller's behalf 
shall have the obligations and responsibilities set forth in subsections (a) 
through (e) of this section.  
[Emphasis added.]

 

[¶17]   An "agent engaged by buyer," has 
these duties and obligations according to § 33-28-304:

 
 
(a)  A 
licensee engaged by a buyer to act as a buyer's agent shall have the following 
duties and obligations:

(i)  To 
perform the terms of the written agreement made with the 
buyer;

(ii)  To 
exercise reasonable skill and care for the buyer;

(iii)  To 
promote the interests of the buyer with the utmost good faith, loyalty and 
fidelity, including:

(A)  To 
seek a price and terms which are acceptable to the buyer, except that the 
licensee shall not be obligated to seek other properties while the buyer is a 
party to a contract to purchase property;

(B)  To 
present all offers to and from the buyer in a timely manner regardless of 
whether the buyer is already a party to a contract to purchase 
property;

(C)  To disclose to the buyer adverse 
material facts actually known by the licensee;

(D)  To 
counsel the buyer as to any material benefits or risks of a transaction which 
are actually known by the licensee;

(E)  To 
advise the buyer to obtain expert advice as to material matters about which the 
licensee knows but the specifics of which are beyond the expertise of the 
licensee;

(F)  To 
account in a timely manner for all money and property received; 
and

(G)  To 
inform the buyer that the buyer may be vicariously liable for the acts of the 
buyer's agent that are approved, directed or ratified by the 
buyer.

(iv)  To 
comply with all requirements of this article; and

(v)  To 
comply with any applicable federal, state or local laws, rules, regulations or 
ordinances.

            
(b)  The following information shall not be disclosed by a 
licensee acting as a buyer's agent without the informed consent of the 
buyer:

(i)  That 
a buyer is willing to pay more than the purchase price for the 
property;

(ii)  What 
the motivating factors are for the party buying the 
property;

(iii)  That 
the buyer will agree to financing terms other than those 
offered;

(iv)  Any 
material information about the buyer unless disclosure is required by law or 
failure to disclose the information would constitute fraud or dishonest 
dealing.

            
(c)  A licensee acting as a buyer's agent owes no duty or 
obligation to the seller, except that a licensee acting as a buyer's agent shall 
not make any material misrepresentation or fraudulent misrepresentation 
regarding an adverse material fact actually known by the 
licensee.

            
(d)  A buyer's 
agent owes no duty to conduct an independent investigation of the 
buyer's financial condition and owes 
no duty to independently verify the accuracy or completeness of statements made 
by the buyer or any independent inspector.

            
(e)  A buyer's agent may show properties in which the buyer is 
interested to other prospective buyers without breaching any duty or obligation 
to the buyer.  Nothing in this 
section shall be construed to prohibit a buyer's agent from showing competing 
buyers the same property and from assisting competing buyers in attempting to 
purchase or lease a particular property.  
[Emphasis added.]

 

[¶18]   An "intermediary" shall not act as 
an advocate or agent for either party and shall be limited to providing those 
services described below in section (b)(ii) of § 
33-28-305:

 
 
(a)  A licensee engaged as an intermediary 
shall not act as an advocate or agent for either party and shall be 
limited to providing those services described in subsection (b)(ii) of this 
section.

            
(b)  A licensee engaged as an intermediary shall owe to each 
party with whom the intermediary has contracted the following duties and 
obligations:

(i)  To 
perform the terms of any written agreement made by the intermediary with any 
party or parties to the transaction, provided that the terms of the written 
agreement shall be consistent with this article;

(ii)  To 
exercise reasonable skill and care as an intermediary, 
including:

(A)  Presenting 
all offers and counteroffers in a timely manner regardless of whether the 
property is subject to a contract for sale;

(B)  Advising the parties to obtain expert 
advice as to material matters about which the intermediary knows but the 
specifics of which are beyond the expertise of the 
intermediary;

(C)  Accounting 
in a timely manner for all money and property received;

(D)  Keeping 
the parties fully informed regarding the transaction;

(E)  Obtaining 
the written consent of the parties before assisting the buyer and seller in the 
same real estate transaction;

(F)  Assisting 
the parties in complying with the terms and conditions of any contract which may 
include closing the transaction;

(G)  Disclosing 
to the parties any interests the intermediary may have which are adverse to the 
interest of either party;

(H)  Disclosing to all prospective buyers any 
adverse material facts actually known by the intermediary, including but not 
limited to adverse material facts pertaining to the title, the physical 
condition of the property, any defects in the property and any environmental 
hazards affecting the property required by law to be 
disclosed;

(J)  Disclosing 
to any prospective seller all adverse material facts actually known by the 
intermediary, including but not limited to adverse material facts pertaining to 
the buyer's financial ability to perform the terms of the transaction and the 
buyer's intent to occupy the property as a principal residence;  and

(K)  Disclosing to the parties that an 
intermediary owes no fiduciary duty either to buyer or seller, is not allowed to 
negotiate on behalf of the buyer or seller, may be required to disclose 
information he learns about a property to the other party, and may be prohibited 
from disclosing information about the other party which if known could 
materially affect negotiations in the real estate 
transaction.

(iii)  To 
comply with all requirements of this article; and

(iv)  To 
comply with any applicable federal, state or local laws, rules, regulations or 
ordinances.

            
(c)  The following information shall not be disclosed by an 
intermediary without the informed consent of all parties:

(i)  That 
a buyer is willing to pay more than the purchase price offered for the 
property;

(ii)  That 
a seller is willing to accept less than the asking price for the 
property;

(iii)  What 
the motivating factors are for any party buying or selling the property; 
or

(iv)  That 
a seller or buyer will agree to financing terms other than those 
offered.

            
(d)  An intermediary 
has no duty to conduct an independent inspection of the property for the benefit 
of the buyer and has no duty to independently verify the accuracy or 
completeness of statements made by the seller, or independent 
inspectors.

            
(e)  An intermediary has no duty to conduct an independent 
investigation of the buyer's financial condition or to verify the accuracy or 
completeness of any statement made by the buyer.

            
(f)  An intermediary may do the following without breaching any 
obligation or responsibility:

(i)  Show 
alternative properties not owned by the seller to a prospective 
buyer;

                        
(ii)  List competing properties for sale or 
lease;

            
(iii)  Show properties in which the buyer is interested to 
other prospective buyers; and

(iv)  Serve 
as an agent, subagent or intermediary for the same or for different parties in 
other real estate transactions.

            
(g)  An intermediary may cooperate with other brokers but shall 
not engage any subagents.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 

[¶19]   In Hulse I, ¶¶ 51-62, 33 P.3d  at 138-41, we 
clarified the duties owed by real estate professionals to 
clients:

 
 
The 
Hulses appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant 
BHJ, Inc., a licensed real estate brokerage, for the acts of its agent Amory 
Hubbard on claims they label negligent misrepresentation and fraud.  We take this opportunity to clarify the 
duties owed by licensed real estate brokers, agents, and salespersons and the 
causes of action that may arise as a result of an alleged breach of those 
duties.

 
 
            
The Hulses assert a claim of negligent misrepresentation against 
defendant BHJ, Inc. citing Restatement (Second) Torts § 552.  In Richey v. Patrick, a case involving 
claims by purchasers of real property against lay sellers, we discussed the tort 
of negligent misrepresentation as found in the Restatement and stated that in 
order for there to have been a negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff must 
show that

 
 
[o]ne 
who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other 
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for 
the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability 
for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the 
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining 
or communicating the information.  

 
 
                        
Richey, 904 P.2d 798, 802 
(Wyo.1995).

 
 
In 
Richey, we found that the sellers had 
not "supplied false information," as required by the claim, because the sellers 
had not supplied any information to 
the purchasers.  We said, "[a] 
nondisclosure of information cannot support a claim of misrepresentation; since 
nothing has been represented, an essential element of the claim is 
missing."  Id. at 802 (citing Burman v. Richmond Homes, Ltd., 821 P.2d 913, 919 (Colo.App.1991)).  We went 
on to hold that the crux of the purchasers' complaint was that the sellers 
should have informed them of a material fact, they owed a duty to do so, and it 
was this nondisclosure that caused the plaintiff's damage.  In Richey, we then clarified that the 
appropriate claim was one for negligent nondisclosure as found within Restatement (Second) Torts § 551.  However, we declined to apply the Restatement section to the plaintiffs' 
claim because we reasoned that the "as is" clause contained within the purchase 
contract signed by the sellers and purchasers placed the risk of discovery of 
adverse material facts upon purchasers of real estate.  Thus, we recognized the relationship 
between the parties was essentially contractual and held that when a contract 
places the burden on the purchaser to discover defects, they are barred from 
seeking relief for negligent nondisclosure. [Emphasis in 
original.]

 
 
Likewise, 
in our recent case of Snyder v. 
Lovercheck, we addressed as an issue of first impression whether a purchaser 
of realty could even bring a claim of negligent misrepresentation, a tort 
action, against a seller when the relationship between the parties arises in 
contract.  Again, we held that the 
contractual relationship is controlling.  
When purchasers of realty sign contracts with disclaimers and merger 
clauses stating that the purchaser is not relying on the representations of the 
sellers or their agents as to the condition of the property, the contract has 
allocated the risks of loss resulting from the purchaser's reliance on the 
seller's representations to the purchaser.  
In reasoning to our ultimate conclusion, this court had an extended 
discussion of the distinction between duties arising by tort and those arising 
by contract.  We 
said:

 
 
Tort 
law proceeds from a long historical evolution of externally imposed duties and 
liabilities.  Contract law proceeds 
from an even longer historical evolution of bargained-for duties and 
liabilities.  The careless and 
unnecessary blanket confusion of tort and contract would undermine the carefully 
evolved utility of both.  

In 
tort, the legislatures and the courts have set the parameters of social policy 
and imposed them on individual members of society without their consent.  The social policy in the field of 
contract has been left to the parties themselves to determine, with judicial and 
legislative intervention tolerated only in the most extreme cases.  Where there has been intervention, it 
has been by the application of well established contract doctrines, most of 
which focus on threats to the integrity of the bargaining process itself such as 
fraud or extreme imbalance in bargaining power.  

 
 

Snyder 
v. Lovercheck, 
992 P.2d  at 1087.

 
 
As 
illustrated by our holdings in Richey 
and Snyder, this court continues to 
value the freedom to contract between sellers and purchasers of realty.  We recognize that the parties to the 
contract may allocate the risks of loss as they so choose.  Having done so, absent proof of fraud, 
we generally allow the unambiguous language found in the parties' contract to 
control the scope of subsequent litigation.  We have been exceedingly reluctant to 
introduce tort principles into claims that are essentially contract 
actions.

 
 
However, 
this court's jurisprudence reflects that the inverse rule is likewise 
valid.  Contract principles that 
govern the parties to a contract are not controlling on claims against nonparty 
professionals whose duties arise in tort.  
Our precedents reveal a recognition that tort duties and liabilities 
imposed by the legislatures and courts are supported by underlying social 
policies which require the imposition of obligations on a defendant to act 
reasonably for the protection of a plaintiff.  By imposing tort duties, courts and 
legislatures have externally allocated the risks arising from certain 
relationships for the protection of the public.  Having done so, individual parties are 
limited in shifting those burdens from the obligor to the obligee by private 
action.

 
 
At 
this point in time, there can be no doubt that licensed professional real estate 
agents and brokers are a class of persons on whom the law has imposed 
affirmative tort duties.  Two 
decades ago this court stated in Hagar v. 
Mobley:

 
 
Real 
estate brokers and salesmen are licensed by the State of Wyoming and required to 
meet high standards of honesty, integrity, trustworthiness and competency.  Theirs is a regulated profession.  Failure to satisfy those standards is 
ground for suspension or revocation of a real estate broker's or salesperson's 
license.  An act licensing real 
estate agents must be construed in the light of an obvious purpose of protecting 
the public in the handling of important and valuable transactions relating to 
real property.  As a result, such an agent does not stand 
in the same shoes of a lay vendor.  
Such realtors owe the vendee the same duties of integrity owed the public 
at large.  They must be honest, 
trustworthy and competent.  
[Emphasis in original.]

 
 

Hagar 
v. Mobley, 
638 P.2d 127, 136 (Wyo.1981) (emphasis added and citation omitted).  In Hagar, we cited with approval the 
reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court reversing the dismissal of a claim against a 
realtor:

 
 
In 
this state, it is apparent that the rule of caveat emptor does not apply to 
those dealing with a licensed real estate agent.  Though not occupying a fiduciary 
relationship with prospective purchasers, a real estate agent hired by the 
vendor is expected to be honest, ethical, and competent and is answerable at law 
for breaches of his or her statutory duty to the public.  

 
 

Hagar, 
638 P.2d  at 137 (quoting Dugan v. 
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980)).

 
 
Furthermore, 
we cited with approval the Montana Supreme Court's then recent holding that real 
estate brokers have, like other professionals, certain standards of care which 
must be satisfied.  We said that the 
Montana court observed that the failure to maintain those standards of skill, 
competency, and integrity exposes realtors to, in effect malpractice 
actions.  Hagar, 638 P.2d  at 137 (citing McCarty v. Lincoln Green, Inc., 190 
Mont. 306, 620 P.2d 1221, 1225 (1980)).  
This court went on to state that we may exact a high standard of care 
from realtors and held that the standard of care for realtors may be adopted by 
the court from a legislative enactment.  
Id. (citing Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 
(Wyo.1981)).  We 
reiterated:

 
 
Realtors, 
just like doctors, lawyers, engineering consultants, and builders, hold 
themselves out as professionals; it is their job to know their profession.  People rely on and trust them.  Failure to comply with either the 
accepted standards in the field or the standards society is willing to recognize 
as acceptable, is actionable.  

 
 

Hagar, 
638 P.2d  at 138.  As to the question 
of damages, we held "[t]he liability of real estate agents, brokers and 
salespersons, as in all actions predicated upon the failure to perform some 
duty, sounds in tort.  In tort cases 
damages are generally awarded in order to compensate claimants for loss.  The measure of damages is the amount 
which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused by the breach of 
duty."  Hagar, at 139.

 
 
Subsequent 
to our holding in Hagar, parties have 
apparently seized on the language within the opinion stating the duty of care as 
"the broker is liable because of material 
representations of the principal if he repeats them and knows, or reasonably 
should know, of their falsity.  
Liability attaches in this context on grounds of negligence," id. at 137, and have asserted claims 
labeled "negligent misrepresentation" against both lay sellers and real estate 
brokers and agents.  "Negligent 
misrepresentation" and "negligent nondisclosure" are generic tort actions found 
within the Restatement (Second) Torts 
§§ 552 and 551 respectively.  These 
torts have specific elements and, as previously discussed, this court has 
addressed in various opinions whether to adopt and apply them to claims brought 
by plaintiffs against sellers of realty and real estate brokers and agents.  See Richey v. Patrick, 904 P.2d 798 
(Wyo.1995); Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079 (Wyo.1999); Sundown, Inc. v. 
Pearson Real Estate Co., Inc., 8 P.3d 324 (Wyo.2000).  We have also addressed the effect of 
various exculpatory clauses on the above causes of action.  At this juncture, we reaffirm all prior 
holdings and precedent as applied to lay vendors/sellers of real property and 
their agents or subagents, who are 
not licensed real estate professionals.  [Emphasis in 
original.]

 
 
However, 
notwithstanding any subsequent confusion in formulating, titling, or deciding 
tort claims against licensed real estate professionals premised upon their 
duties imposed by statute, it is abundantly clear that Hagar contemplated that the claim was 
one of professional negligence.  
This is the holding that we expressly reaffirm by this decision.  It is further supported by legislative 
enactments in 1997 by which the Wyoming Legislature essentially codified the 
court's holding in Hagar and went 
further to expand and clarify the duty of care owed by real estate professionals 
to parties when acting as seller's, buyer's or intermediary agents.  See Wyo. Stat.  § 33-28-303 (LexisNexis 2001) Seller's agent engaged by seller; Wyo. 
Stat.  § 33-28-304 (LexisNexis 2001) 
Agent engaged by buyer; Wyo. 
Stat.  Ann. § 33-28-305 (LexisNexis 
2001) Intermediary.  The Wyoming Legislature in 2000 adopted 
Wyo. Stat.  § 33-28-124 Act, error or omission in the rendering of 
real estate services, which provides:  
"A cause of action arising 
from an act, error or omission in the rendering of services provided by a 
licensee under this act shall be brought within the time limits provided under 
W.S. 1-3-107."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 is the statute 
of limitations for claims of professional negligence.  It is applicable to claims arising after 
the effective date of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-28-124.  
(FN9) [Emphasis added.]

 
 
As 
we held in Hagar, the court may adopt 
from legislative enactment a standard of care for realtors.  Id., 638 P.2d  at 137.  Wyo. Stat.  § 33-28-303(c) 
provides:

 
 
"A 
broker acting as a seller's agent owes no duty or obligation to the buyer, 
except that a broker shall disclose to any prospective buyer all adverse 
material facts actually known by the broker.  The adverse material facts may include 
adverse material facts pertaining to the title and the physical condition of the 
property, any material defects in the property and any environmental hazards 
affecting the property which are required by law to be disclosed.  The broker acting as a seller's agent 
shall not perpetuate a material misrepresentation of the seller which the broker 
knows or should know is false."  
(FN10)

 
 
In 
Hagar we said that the facts 
necessary to be disclosed are those that are "pivotal to the transaction from 
the buyer's perspective."  Id. at 138 (quoting Tennant v. Lawton, 26 Wash. App. 701, 
615 P.2d 1305, 1309-1310 (1980)).

 
 
Having 
hereby outlined what law is applicable to the liability of real estate brokers 
and salespersons, we note that the claims asserted by the plaintiffs, while 
labeled "negligent misrepresentation," essentially assert a breach of the duty 
of care owed by real estate professionals to non-client buyers.  However, as a reviewing court, we are 
not fact finders in the first instance.  
The district court's grant of summary judgment did not address the issue 
of whether BHJ, Inc.'s agent, Hubbard, exercised such care, skill, and diligence 
as others who are engaged in the profession would ordinarily exercise under 
similar circumstances in fulfilling the duties imposed upon him by statute.  We, therefore, vacate the district 
court's grant of summary judgment to BHJ, Inc. on the issue of "negligent 
misrepresentation" and remand for a determination under the applicable standard 
consistent with the law we have herein set out.

 
 
Also 
see Hulse II, ¶¶ 8-13, 71 P.3d at 264-69; Sam A. 
Mackie, Real-Estate Broker's 
Misrepresentation or Nondisclosure as to Condition or Value of Realty, 39 
Am. Jur. POF3d 309 (1996 and Supp. 2009).

 
 
[¶20]   With respect to the appeal in Case 
No. S-08-0250, the district court found that the Throckmartins signed a "Real 
Estate Brokerage Disclosure" that informed them of Hove's and TOP's role in this 
real estate transaction and fulfilled the requirements of § 33-28-306.  Likewise the "Contract to Buy and Sell 
Real Estate" also disclosed to the Throckmartins that TOP Realty was working 
with the buyer as an "intermediary."  
In addition, the contract assigned the buyers the responsibility for 
ascertaining the actual condition of the property, as well as making it clear 
that buyers could not rely on any representation made by sellers or sellers' 
agents as to the condition of the property, as well as the responsibility for 
obtaining inspections, including structural inspections.  The district court determined that, 
based on the above cited documentation, Hove would be treated as an 
"intermediary" and held to that standard.  
As an intermediary, Hove was required to disclose to the Throckmartins 
any adverse material facts actually known to her.  § 33-28-305(b)(ii)(H).  The Throckmartins received and signed 
for a copy of the sellers' disclosure statement which revealed there were 
problems with the home's foundation.  
Hove had not yet been into the house at the time the contract was signed 
by the Throckmartins.

 
 
[¶21]   For purposes of the summary 
judgment motion (and only for that purpose), the district court assumed it to be 
true that the foundation of the home the Throckmartins purchased was damaged, 
and that Neether and Neether-Oedekoven concealed the structural defects behind 
false walls and cabinets as alleged by the Throckmartins.

 
 
[¶22]   However, the Throckmartins were 
unable to come forward with any facts that suggested that the adverse material 
facts at issue here were "actually known" to Hove.  The Throckmartins rely heavily on Hove's 
failure to provide the inspector she hired, on behalf of the Throckmartins, a 
copy of the owner's disclosure statement.  
Indeed, during their depositions, the Throckmartins repeatedly admitted 
the sole basis of their contention that Hove "actually knew" of the defects, was 
that as a real estate professional, working in Gillette, she should have known, 
and had a duty to know, about the problems associated with homes in the 
neighborhood where the subject real estate was located.  Thus, the record is devoid of a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Hove breached her duties as an 
"Intermediary" or that she otherwise breached the terms of the contract between 
Hove and the Throckmartins.  The 
district court applied this same reasoning to § 33-28-302(g) (Every contract, duty or relationship within 
this article, including intermediary or customer relationships, imposes an 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing in its performance or enforcement.), i.e., that the Throckmartins had 
failed to come forward with any "genuine issue of material fact" which pointed 
to Hove's violation of those implied covenants.  Once again, the only contention the 
Throckmartins brought to the fore was that, as a real estate agent in Gillette, 
she had a duty to know the "actual condition" of all properties she sold to 
buyers.  Hove denied having any 
actual knowledge of the problems with the house at issue, and the Throckmartins 
have not pointed us to any pertinent authority that Hove had a duty to be aware 
of the condition of the properties she showed to buyers.  Although the principle of caveat emptor 
has been blunted in the arena of real estate by case law and statute, the 
primary responsibility for obtaining adequate inspections of newly purchased 
homes falls on the buyer, and the record on appeal will not support a factual 
finding that Hove did anything to frustrate, discourage, or impede the 
Throckmartins' full right to have complete inspections done on the home they 
decided to purchase.  The 
Throckmartins contend they did plead professional negligence and that the 
district court simply overlooked that claim.  Our review of the record establishes 
that no such claim was explicitly made and, furthermore, to the extent it was 
implicit in the pleadings, the district court implicitly granted summary 
judgment in that regard as well.  
Based on our review of the record and the governing law, we conclude the 
district court was correct in determining that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact in this matter, and that Hove and TOP were entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.

 
 
[¶23]   With respect to Case No. S-08-0269, 
the district court's reasoning is somewhat different because the business 
relationship between the Throckmartins, and Nelson and Re/Max, was different 
from the business relationship described immediately above in Case No. 
S-08-0250.  The district court 
identified the Throckmartins' claims against Nelson and Re/Max as follows:  breach of contract; that Nelson is 
subject to censure, probation, suspension or revocation of her license and a 
fine for violating provisions of § 33-28-111 (and, hence, guilty of 
professional negligence); fraudulent concealment; and breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.

 
 
[¶24]   The district court then enumerated 
what it considered the undisputed facts.  
In the "Exclusive Right to Sell Listing Contract Intermediary 
(Residential)" Nelson is identified as an "intermediary."  In the "Contract to Buy and Sell Real 
Estate (Residential)" Re/Max is identified as an "intermediary."  As noted above, buyers were cautioned 
that they could not rely on representations made by the seller or seller's 
agents as to the condition of the property.  Moreover, neither Nelson nor Re/Max had 
entered into a contractual relationship with the Throckmartins.  For purposes of the summary judgment 
motion (and only for that purpose), the district court once again assumed it to 
be true that the foundation of the home the Throckmartins purchased was damaged 
and that Neether and Neether-Oedekoven concealed the structural defects behind 
false walls and cabinets as alleged by the Throckmartins.

 
 
[¶25]   Continuing its reasoning process 
concerning breach of contract, the district court noted that a contract can be 
express or implied.  An implied in 
fact contract may arise where parties act in a manner conveying mutual agreement 
and an intent to promise. However, there are neither express nor implied duties 
imposed on Nelson or Re/Max by mutual agreement and, as a result, this cause of 
action fails.  See Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 
2003 WY 102, ¶¶ 15-20, 75 P.3d 640, 649-50 (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 
[¶26]   The district court noted that the 
Throckmartins contended that Nelson and Re/Max owed them a duty to fully 
disclose material facts and to affirmatively verify the truth of information or 
to investigate the property.  
Furthermore, they contended this duty was breached and, as a result, they 
suffered pecuniary damages.  These 
contentions amount to a claim for negligent nondisclosure and negligent 
misrepresentation.  See Hulse I, ¶ 48, 33 P.3d  at 137.  A cause of action for negligent 
nondisclosure is not recognized in Wyoming.  Sundown, Inc. v. Pearson Real Estate 
Co., 8 P.3d 324, 331-32 (Wyo. 2001).  
Continuing, the district court noted that the Throckmartins did not 
assert that Nelson and Re/Max affirmatively supplied false information.  Rather, they assert that Nelson and 
Re/Max failed to fully disclose all material facts, or to take reasonable steps 
to avoid the misrepresentations made by the Neethers.  However, alleged nondisclosure would not 
give rise to negligent misrepresentation, because "a nondisclosure of 
information cannot support a claim of misrepresentation, since nothing has been 
represented or misrepresented.  An 
essential element of the claim is missing."  See Hulse I, ¶ 53, 33 P.3d  at 138.  Alternatively, theThrockmartins are 
barred from bringing a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation because 
they signed the contract which contained a disclaimer to the effect that they 
were not relying on any representations made by Nelson and/or Re/Max.  Id., ¶ 63, 33 P.3d  at 141.  In wrapping up its discussion of the 
Throckmartins' § 33-28-111 claims, the district court noted that an intermediary 
in Wyoming

 
 
 
has no duty to conduct an independent inspection of the property for the benefit 
of the buyer and has no duty to independently verify the accuracy or 
completeness of statements made by the seller, or independent 
inspectors.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 33-28-305(d).

 
 
[¶27]   The district court addressed the 
Throckmartins' claims of fraudulent concealment, noting the rule that fraud must 
be established by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence, and that it will 
never be presumed.  That rule 
applies to a motion for summary judgment.  
Thus, assuming the party accused of fraud has presented facts that refute 
the allegation of fraud, the nonmoving party relying on a fraud claim must 
demonstrate the existence of genuine issues of material facts by clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing evidence.  
McKenney v. Pacific First Federal 
Savings Bank of Tacoma, Wash., 887 P.2d 927, 929 (Wyo. 1994).  Fraudulent concealment requires 
scienter, which refers to the knowledge of the facts being concealed.  This Court has expressly held that one 
cannot be guilty of fraudulently or intentionally concealing or misrepresenting 
facts of which he is not aware.  Meeker v. Lanham, 604 P.2d 556, 559 
(Wyo. 1979).  Nelson's testimony of 
her lack of actual knowledge of the defects sufficiently refutes the allegations 
of fraudulent concealment.  
Moreover, even affording the Throckmartins the most generous inferences 
from the information contained in the record, the district court opined, those 
facts (assumed to be true), at most give rise only to the inference that Nelson 
should have known of the foundation defects  "should have known" is far 
different from what she actually knew.  
Throckmartins have not demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact as to Nelson's actual knowledge of the defects by clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing evidence.

 
 
[¶28]   With respect to the asserted breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing which is implied in all 
contracts, the facts extant can lead only to the conclusion that there was no 
contract between Nelson and Re/Max and the Throckmartins.  Without a contract, there is no basis 
for imposition of the implied covenant, whether in contract or in tort, because 
either cause of action arises out of the contractual relationship.  Birt, ¶ 21, 75 P.3d  at 650.  We conclude that the district court was 
correct in determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact and 
that Nelson and Re/Max were entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶29]   The district court's summary 
judgment orders are affirmed as to both cases discussed 
above.