Title: Massenburg v. City of Petersburg

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
SAM MASSENBURG, ADMINISTRATOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF COREY DEMETRIUS  
MASSENBURG, DECEASED, 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 190071 
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 December 12, 2019 
CITY OF PETERSBURG 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG 
Joseph M. Teefey, Jr., Judge 
 
In this case, we consider whether a municipality is entitled to sovereign immunity for 
negligence claims arising from a defective fire hydrant. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
Corey Demetrius Massenburg died during a fire at his Petersburg residence. His father, 
Sam Massenburg, qualified as the administrator of his estate and in that capacity filed a 
wrongful-death action against the City of Petersburg.  The complaint alleged that a fire began at 
Corey’s residence while he was inside.  Although firefighters arrived promptly, the closest fire 
hydrant “was effectively inoperable” because it “was not receiving an adequate or sufficient 
sustained flow of water.”  The complaint stated that the lack of water pressure was a systemic 
problem affecting the area in which the house was situated.  It faulted the City for failing to 
notify area residents that the infrastructure was “not adequate or sufficient to provide the 
required safe flow of water to fire hydrants in the area.”  Firefighters had to resort to the next 
closest hydrant “some 1,000 feet away,” and as a result, Corey “died from smoke inhalation and 
thermal injuries before firefighters could establish a sufficient water supply and remove him 
from the burning residence.” 
 
In response, the City filed a demurrer and plea in bar asserting that sovereign immunity 
barred Massenburg’s suit.  It contended that because Massenburg’s claim arose from its 
 
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governmental functions of operating a fire department and supplying water for fire protection, 
the City was immune from Massenburg’s suit.  The trial court conducted a combined hearing on 
the plea in bar and demurrer.  Because the City did not dispute the allegations in the complaint, 
the trial court declined Massenburg’s request for a jury trial on the plea and instead decided the 
case on the pleadings.  Ruling from the bench, the trial court observed that despite the “mix of 
factual allegations regarding maintenance of the water system,” the ultimate harm alleged in the 
complaint was that the City failed to extinguish the fire in a timely manner, which made 
firefighting the municipal function at issue.  Because responding to emergency calls for fires is 
an immune governmental function, the trial court concluded that sovereign immunity barred 
Massenburg’s suit.  It accordingly granted the City’s demurrer and plea in bar and dismissed the 
complaint with prejudice. 
 
We awarded Massenburg this appeal. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
Massenburg assigns error to the trial court’s failure to hold a jury trial on the City’s plea 
in bar and its ruling that sovereign immunity bars his complaint. 
A.  Plea in Bar 
 
“A plea in bar asserts a single issue, which, if proved, creates a bar to a plaintiff’s 
recovery.”  Hawthorne v. VanMarter, 279 Va. 566, 577 (2010).  The party asserting the plea in 
bar bears the burden of proof.  Id.  Two possible standards of review apply, depending on 
whether the plea’s proponent elects to meet that burden by presenting evidence or relying on the 
pleadings.  In the former situation, in which the “parties present evidence on the plea ore tenus, 
the circuit court’s factual findings are accorded the weight of a jury finding and will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless they are plainly wrong or without evidentiary support.”  Id.  In the 
 
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latter situation, “where no evidence is taken in support of a plea in bar, the trial court, and the 
appellate court upon review, consider solely the pleadings in resolving the issue presented.  In 
doing so, the facts stated in the plaintiff’s [complaint] are deemed true.”  Lostrangio v. 
Laingford, 261 Va. 495, 497 (2001).  This approach results in functionally de novo review of the 
trial court’s judgment. 
 
Massenburg argues that the trial court erred in granting the plea in bar when it involved 
factual questions that a jury should have decided.  This Court has held that the constitutional 
right to trial by jury, when properly invoked, applies to pleas in bar.  See Bethel Inv. Co. v. City 
of Hampton, 272 Va. 765, 769–70 (2006).  “If the facts underlying the plea in bar are contested, 
a party may demand that a jury decide the factual issues raised by the plea.”  Hawthorne, 279 
Va. at 577.  Unless the demand is limited to certain issues, “the party shall be deemed to have 
demanded trial by jury for all the issues so triable.”  Rule 3:21(c).  “Conversely, if the facts are 
disputed and no demand for a jury is made, the ‘whole matter of law and fact’ may be decided by 
the court.”  Hawthorne, 279 Va. at 578 (quoting Code § 8.01-336(B)). 
 
Massenburg demanded a jury trial in both his complaint and brief in opposition to the 
City’s plea in bar.  As the conditional language from Hawthorne indicates, however, a demanded 
jury trial is appropriate only “[i]f the facts underlying the plea in bar are contested.”  For 
purposes of its responsive pleadings, the City agreed with the facts as alleged in the complaint 
and sought to submit the case on the pleadings.  Although Massenburg requested discovery and 
trial on various issues related to the ultimate immunity question, the City’s decision not to 
contest the complaint’s allegations for purposes of the plea in bar means that the facts are not 
disputed.  See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Melendez, 260 Va. 578, 582, 594–95 (2000) (approving trial 
court’s decision to hear evidence and decide a plea in bar regarding applicability of a statute of 
 
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repose when the plaintiff objected “that the plea in bar involved disputed factual questions to be 
resolved by a jury”).  The trial court therefore did not err in deciding the case on the pleadings 
despite Massenburg’s jury demand.  And because the trial court did not take evidence, its rulings 
present issues of law this Court reviews de novo.  See Assurance Data, Inc. v. Malyevac, 286 Va. 
137, 143 (2013); Weichert Co. of Virginia, Inc. v. First Commercial Bank, 246 Va. 108, 108 
(1993) (“As no evidence was taken, we, like the trial court, rely solely on the pleadings in 
resolving the issue before us.”). 
B.  Municipal Sovereign Immunity 
 
The central issue in this appeal is whether sovereign immunity bars Massenburg’s suit. 
Virginia has long recognized that local governments share in the Commonwealth’s sovereign 
immunity.  See City of Richmond v. Long, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 375, 379 (1867).  Unlike counties, 
which share fully in the sovereign’s immunity from tort, Seabolt v. County of Albemarle, 283 Va. 
717, 719 (2012), whether a municipal corporation is entitled to sovereign immunity protection 
depends on the type of function it exercises when liability arises, City of Chesapeake v. 
Cunningham, 268 Va. 624, 634 (2004). 
 
Under longstanding principles, sovereign immunity protects municipalities from tort 
liability arising from governmental functions, but not proprietary functions.  Id.; see Long, 58 
Va. (17 Gratt.) at 378–79.  A municipality engages in a governmental function when it exercises 
powers and duties exclusively for the public welfare, effectively acting “as an agency of the state 
to enable it to better govern that portion of its people residing within its corporate limits.” 
Hoggard v. City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 147 (1939).  Proprietary functions, however, involve 
the municipality’s exercise of its powers and privileges primarily for its own benefit.  City of 
Virginia Beach v. Carmichael Dev. Co., 259 Va. 493, 499 (2000); Hoggard, 172 Va. at 148.  The 
 
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municipality lacks the protection of sovereign immunity for these ministerial activities even 
though “the general public may derive a common benefit” from their performance.  Hoggard, 
172 Va. at 148; see Cunningham, 268 Va. at 634. 
 
In determining whether a municipality is engaged in a governmental or proprietary 
function, this Court has rejected a simple inquiry into whether private entities also perform the 
same service.  Edwards v. City of Portsmouth, 237 Va. 167, 172 (1989).  Instead, “the test 
applied by the Court . . . is ‘whether, in providing such services, the governmental entity is 
exercising the powers and duties of government conferred by law for the general benefit and 
well-being of its citizens.’”  Carter v. Chesterfield Cty. Health Comm’n, 259 Va. 588, 593 
(2000) (quoting Edwards, 237 Va. at 172).  If so, the function is governmental and the 
municipality is immune.  If not, the function is proprietary and the municipality is potentially 
subject to liability.  Id. 
 
Our cases have previously classified certain municipal actions.  For instance, and as 
relevant to the case at bar, operation of a fire department is a governmental function.  Hoggard, 
172 Va. at 154 (noting that cases have held that “municipalities are not liable for such acts and 
omissions in the exercise of the police power, or in the performance of such municipal faculties 
as . . . the operation of fire departments”).  This is because firefighting falls within a 
municipality’s power and duty to provide emergency services “for the general safety and welfare 
of the citizenry.”  Gambrell v. City of Norfolk, 267 Va. 353, 359 (2004).  On the other hand, it is 
similarly well-settled that the routine operation and maintenance of a municipal water and sewer 
system is a proprietary function.  See Robertson v. W. Virginia Water Auth., 287 Va. 158, 161 
(2014) (holding water authority not entitled to sovereign immunity for damages resulting from 
flow from a broken sewer pipe); Woods v. Town of Marion, 245 Va. 44, 47 (1993) (reversing 
 
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granted plea of sovereign immunity when complaint alleged negligent maintenance of 
waterworks caused water to leak from pipes, freeze on a road, and contribute to a collision). 
 
This Court’s decision in City of Richmond v. Virginia Bonded Warehouse Corp., 148 Va. 
60 (1927), which addressed a situation implicating both firefighting and water-supply functions, 
controls this case.  There, the plaintiff company sought to install a fire-suppression sprinkler 
system in one of its warehouses.  Id. at 66.  To facilitate this process, the company requested that 
Richmond’s water department close the valve controlling the warehouse’s water supply.  Id. at 
67.  The water department dispatched an employee to shut off the supply, but he negligently 
failed to close the correct valve.  Id. at 68.  As a result, water flooded the warehouse and 
damaged stored goods.  Id. at 69.  The company brought a negligence action against Richmond, 
which claimed immunity because its act “in furnishing water to the sprinkler should be classed as 
a governmental act in like manner as the acts of the fire department.”  Id. at 72. 
 
This Court rejected Richmond’s position.  Even though the water’s use for sprinklers 
implicated Richmond’s firefighting function, the Court emphasized that the connection to that 
governmental function was too remote to trigger sovereign immunity.  Id. at 71.  We elaborated: 
The mere fact that a municipal corporation uses its water works 
system for the extinguishment of fires as well as for the 
distribution of water for domestic purposes, does not exonerate it 
from liability for an injury arising from negligence in the 
management of its water works not directly connected with the 
extinguishment of fires. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  The installation of the sprinkler, it found, was for the warehouse 
company’s private benefit rather than to aid Richmond in preventing or extinguishing fires.  Id. 
at 74.  Instead, Richmond had acted solely within its proprietary function of supplying water and 
therefore lacked sovereign immunity.  Id. 
 
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This case presents the inverse of Virginia Bonded Warehouse.  The sole negligence 
alleged in Massenburg’s complaint is that the City’s systemic negligent maintenance of its water 
system prevented a sufficient flow of water to the fire hydrant in front of the house, inhibiting the 
firefighters’ response.  Although this allegation is more “directly connected with the 
extinguishment of fires” than that in Virginia Bonded Warehouse, Massenburg’s complaint 
alleged the systemic nature of the City’s failure to maintain adequate water pressure, apparently 
in an effort to bring this case within the City’s proprietary water-supply function.  Id. at 71. 
 
At oral argument, however, counsel for Massenburg declined to argue this position, 
conceding that he did not possess information that there was insufficient pressure generally or 
that the water supply was otherwise inhibited in a systemic manner.  When asked whether a 
systemic lack of water pressure caused the harm, counsel argued that the cause was instead 
defective equipment that the City was supposed to take care of.  
I’m assuming the water pressure was fine.  There’s not a concern 
about a lack of supply of water.  The fire department just couldn’t 
get to it because the public works department didn’t take care of 
the things they were supposed to take care of. 
 
Upon the Court directing counsel’s attention to the complaint’s language alleging insufficient 
water supply, counsel stated that “the entire system was in disrepair, but there was not a shortage 
in the supply of water.  There was a shortage because . . . nobody had taken care of the pipes, the 
mains, the valves for the fire hydrant.”  When asked whether he continued to take the position 
that there was insufficient systemic pressure, counsel responded regarding the inoperable 
condition of the single fire hydrant closest to Corey’s house.  In addition, the complaint’s 
allegation that there was an operational fire hydrant 1,000 feet away calls into question the 
contention that the City’s negligence was systemic.  Massenburg’s case thus turns on the narrow 
 
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question of whether the City can be liable for injuries resulting from its failure to maintain the 
operability of the fire hydrant in front of the house. 
 
A fire hydrant, as the name suggests, exists to facilitate the firefighting function of the 
municipality that installed it.  That function is quintessentially governmental.  That fire hydrants 
can be put to other uses is inconsequential because the sole reason municipalities undertake the 
expense of installing fire hydrants is to promote their ability to respond to fire emergencies.  The 
fire hydrant in this case is distinct from the sprinklers in Virginia Bonded Warehouse.  Whereas 
the warehouse company installed the sprinkler system for its own private benefit and 
Richmond’s only involvement was supplying water to that system, in this case the City—not a 
private owner—installed the fire hydrants, and it did so to provide “for the general safety and 
welfare of the citizenry.”  Gambrell, 267 Va. at 359.  The City’s provision and maintenance of 
fire hydrants is therefore an immune governmental function.  See Carter, 259 Va. at 593.  
Moreover, to the extent that this governmental function coincides with the City’s proprietary 
functions in Massenburg’s surviving allegations, “‘the governmental function is the overriding 
factor’ and the doctrine of sovereign immunity will shield the locality from liability.”  
Carmichael Dev. Co., 259 Va. at 499 (quoting Taylor v. City of Newport News, 214 Va. 9, 10 
(1973); see Bialk v. City of Hampton, 242 Va. 56, 58 (1991).  Accordingly, the trial court did not 
err in granting the City’s demurrer and plea in bar of sovereign immunity and dismissing 
Massenburg’s complaint with prejudice. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
The trial court did not err in deciding the City’s plea in bar on the pleadings because the 
City did not dispute the complaint’s factual allegations.  It also properly granted the City’s 
demurrer and plea in bar of sovereign immunity because Massenburg’s complaint alleged 
 
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negligence arising from the City’s immune governmental function of providing and maintaining 
fire hydrants.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling dismissing Massenburg’s complaint 
with prejudice. 
Affirmed.