Title: LARSEN v. BANNER HEALTH SYSTEM

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LARSEN v. BANNER HEALTH SYSTEM2003 WY 16781 P.3d 196Case Number: 02-252Decided: 12/23/2003
October 
Term, A.D. 2003

 

 

SHIRLEY M. 
LARSEN and POLLY M.

LEYVA,

 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

BANNER 
HEALTH SYSTEM, an Arizona

Corporation, 
formerly known as Lutheran

Hospitals 
and Homes Society of America,

 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

 

W.R.A.P. 
11 Certified Question 

from 
the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming

The 
Honorable William F. Downes, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

John 
H. Robinson of Jamieson & Robinson, LLC, Casper, WY; and Timothy W. Miller 
of Reeves & Miller, Casper, WY.  
Argument by Messrs. Robinson and Miller.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Robert 
M. Shively and Amy M. Taheri, Casper, WY; and Jeffrey J. Campbell of Campbell, 
Yost, Hergenroether, Clare & Norell, P.C., Phoenix, AZ.  Argument by Mr. 
Shively.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ., and PRICE, 
D.J.

 

LEHMAN, 
J., 
delivered the opinion of the court.  
PRICE, D.J., filed a dissenting opinion.

 

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      This case 
comes before this court as a certified question from the United States District 
Court for the District of Wyoming.  
We are called upon to answer the question of whether Wyoming allows 
recovery of purely emotional damages in a negligence action brought by a mother 
and daughter who were separated because two babies were switched at birth.  We answer the certified question in the 
affirmative. 

 

 

 

[¶2]      The issue 
presented by the certified question is:

 

Whether 
a mother and daughter, who were separated for forty-three years because a 
hospital switched two newborn babies at birth, can maintain a negligence action 
in which the only alleged damages are great emotional pain, humiliation, 
anxiety, grief, and expenses for psychological counseling?

 

 

 

[¶3]      The certification 
order from the United States District Court sets forth a brief statement of 
facts relevant to the certified question.  
Those facts are as follows:

 

            
At 3:07 a.m. on April 8, 1958, Jean Morgan gave birth to a baby girl, 
Debra, at Campbell County Memorial hospital.  Shortly thereafter, Polly Leyva gave 
birth to a baby girl named Shirley.  
The hospital staff switched Shirley and Debra in those early morning 
hours when the respective mothers were unconscious.  When the mothers regained consciousness, 
Debra went home with Polly Leyva and Shirley went home with Jean 
Morgan.

 

            
The members of the hospital staff who switched the newborns and then 
failed to correct the mistake were acting within the scope of their employment 
for Banner Health System formerly known as Lutheran Hospitals and Homes Society 
of America.  Banner Health Systems 
has staffed and operated Campbell County Memorial Hospital at all relevant 
times.

 

            
Shirley "Morgan" grew up in the Morgan home, however, she did not look 
like the other Morgan children due to a darker skin coloration.  Because Shirley had a darker complexion, 
James Morgan, the "father," openly and frequently asserted that Shirley was not 
his child.  The complaint alleges 
that due to James' mistrust, Shirley was ostracized and "terribly mistreated" by 
James Morgan and the Morgan siblings.

 

            
On April 3, 2001, a DNA test was performed to resolve the lingering 
doubts that James Morgan harbored about his wife's infidelity.  The test established that James Morgan 
was not Shirley's father.  A 
subsequent test performed on May 3, 2001, revealed that Jean Morgan was not 
Shirley's mother.

 

            
After the results of the tests, Shirley began searching for her 
biological mother.  She was able to 
determine that only two children were born at that hospital on that day.  She subsequently contacted Debra with 
the shocking news.  On October 4, 
2001, Debra called Polly Leyva and informed her of the disturbing 
revelation.  Shortly after this 
phone call, Shirley introduced herself to Polly as her biological daughter.  Unfortunately, Shirley's real father 
died several years ago.

 

            
Plaintiffs in this action are Shirley Larsen (f/k/a Shirley Morgan) and 
Polly Leyva.  Plaintiffs have 
brought a negligence claim against the Defendant, Banner Health Systems, for 
switching the children at birth.  
However, the complaint only alleges damages for "great emotional pain, 
humiliation, anxiety, grief, and the expenses for psychological 
counseling."  On August 28, 2002, 
the defendant filed a motion to dismiss arguing that "[t]here is no cause of 
action recognized in Wyoming for mere negligence which results only in alleged 
emotional injury."  

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶4]      We review the 
certified question pursuant to W.R.A.P. 11.  Under this rule we are asked to settle 
questions of law in which it appears there is no controlling precedent from this 
court.  W.R.A.P. 11.01.  

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶5]      This case 
requires us to examine the situations in which a plaintiff may make a claim for 
emotional damages.  "Compensation 
for emotional distress is not a new concept in Wyoming."  Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 194 (Wyo. 1986).  Yet, as this 
case demonstrates, difficulty arises in determining exactly when a plaintiff may 
make a claim for emotional damages.  
A brief review of our previous decisions on this subject shows that the 
circumstances in which we allow plaintiffs to make claims for emotional damages 
are limited.

 

[¶6]      Traditionally 
recovery for mental or emotional injury was only allowed when such injury was 
linked to an actual or threatened physical impact.  Id., at 195 (citing W. Keeton, 
Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 54 at 362-64 (1984)).  Recovery was generally not allowed in 
cases where negligent acts caused purely emotional harm and there was no impact 
or threat of impact.  Gates, 
719 P.2d  at 195.  The reasons 
for limiting emotional damages in such a manner have generally been identified 
as:  1) emotional disturbance 
which is not severe enough to have physical consequences is relatively harmless 
so the task of compensating for it would be unduly burdensome; 2) bodily 
harm provides a guarantee of genuineness without which emotional distress is too 
easily feigned; and 3) where a defendant's conduct is merely negligent the 
magnitude of his fault is not such that he should be required to compensate the 
plaintiff for a purely mental disturbance.  
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178-79 (Mass. 1982) (citing 
Restatement, Second, Torts § 436A, cmt. b). 

 

[¶7]      Many state courts 
have modified this traditional rule.  
These courts have recognized that in some instances other considerations 
subjugate the reasons for limiting emotional damages.  Therefore, some courts have embraced the 
idea that a duty of care should extend to at least some plaintiffs who suffer 
purely mental injuries.  Gates, 
719 P.2d  at 195 and n.1 (collecting cases).  In Wyoming we have modified the 
traditional rule and have allowed recovery for purely emotional injury.  However, like most states, Wyoming has 
clearly restricted the instances in which recovery for emotional injury without 
accompanying physical injury will be allowed.  Blagrove v. JB Mechanical, Inc., 
934 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Wyo. 1997).   

 

[¶8]      Recovery for 
purely emotional distress is permitted in Wyoming in certain limited underlying 
actions.  These actions are:  "1) some intentional torts, 
Waters v. Brand, 497 P.2d 875, 877-878 (Wyo. 1972) (false imprisonment); 
Cates v. Eddy, 669 P.2d 912, 921 (Wyo. 1983) (malicious prosecution); 
2) violation of certain constitutional rights, Town of Upton v. 
Whisler, 824 P.2d 545, 549 (Wyo. 1992); and 3) breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 833 (Wyo. 1994)."  Blagrove, 934 P.2d  at 
1275-76.  We have also recognized 
the torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, but we 
have done so only under limited circumstances.  Blagrove, 934 P.2d  at 1275; 
Gates, 719 P.2d  at 195 (negligent infliction of emotional distress 
limited by the requirements of a family relationship and observation of serious 
bodily harm); Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1066 (Wyo. 
1986) (intentional infliction of emotional distress limited by the requirements 
of extreme or outrageous conduct and severe emotional distress).      

 

[¶9]      This court has 
also considered the issue of purely emotional damages in a negligence action 
involving a car collision.  In 
Daily v. Bone, 906 P.2d 1039 (Wyo. 1995), Bone failed to stop the 
snowmobile he was driving at a stop sign.  
Bone's failure to stop caused a collision with Daily's vehicle.  Id., at 1042.  Daily was not physically injured in the 
collision; Bone, however, was killed as a result of the impact.  Id.  Witnessing Bone's impact and death 
caused Daily posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, and agoraphobia.  Id.  We held that recovery in tort for 
injuries arising out of an automobile accident should not be denied simply 
because the plaintiff's injuries were mental rather than physical, as long as 
the plaintiff could prove negligence, impact, and damages proximately flowing 
therefrom.  Id., at 1044. 

 

[¶10]   Our holding in Daily 
convinced some that we had established a claim for negligence alleging only 
mental injury.  In Blagrove, 
however, we explained that our decision in Daily "has the limited scope 
of allowing recovery for mental injury absent physical injury in an automobile 
collision case."  Blagrove, 
934 P.2d  at 1276 (holding that as a general rule emotional distress damages in 
connection with property damage are not compensable).    We went on to explain that 
Daily resulted from the particular facts of that case and "did not 
generally establish that a claim for negligence alleging only mental injury had 
been recognized in Wyoming."  Id.  However, we note that Blagrove 
was a case in which the defendant's negligence resulted in property damage; and 
we qualified the previous statement by also saying that Daily did not 
provide "an analysis which would extend its result to a property damage 
situation."   

 

[¶11]   Our most recent in-depth discussion 
of the availability of emotional distress damages in negligence actions is found 
in Long-Russell v. Hampe, 2002 WY 16, 39 P.3d 1015 (Wyo. 2002).  The plaintiff in Hampe claimed 
that her attorney was negligent when handling her divorce, which involved child 
custody issues.  We were called upon 
to answer certified questions that required us to decide whether damages for 
emotional suffering could be awarded in a legal malpractice action where the 
basis for the claim was the attorney's negligence.  We answered those questions in the 
negative.  Hampe, ¶1. 

 

[¶12]   In reaching our decision in 
Hampe we set forth our case law regarding emotional damages as described 
above.  Hampe, at ¶10.  We then stated that we found the 
reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court consistent with our established law on 
the subject and adopted a Minnesota decision to govern in similar cases in 
Wyoming.  Hampe, at ¶11 
(adopting Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 1996)).  In 
Lickteig, also a legal malpractice case, the Minnesota Supreme Court held 
that emotional distress damages may be an element of damages in only three 
circumstances.  First, the plaintiff 
may recover for the mental anguish accompanying a physical injury suffered as a 
result of another's negligence.  
Second, if the plaintiff as a result of another's negligence experiences 
emotional distress after actually being exposed to physical harm, he may recover 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Third, the plaintiff may recover where 
there has been a "direct invasion of the plaintiff's rights such as that 
constituting slander, libel, malicious prosecution, seduction, or other like 
willful, wanton, or malicious conduct."  
Hampe, ¶11 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village 
of Isle, 122 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Minn. 1963)).

 

[¶13]   The Minnesota Supreme Court then 
stated, "as in other negligence actions, emotional distress damages are 
available in limited circumstances.  
There must be a direct violation of the plaintiff's rights by willful, 
wanton or malicious conduct; mere negligence is not sufficient."  Lickteig, 556 N.W.2d  at 562.  Following the recitation of the excerpt 
from Lickteig, we went on to conclude that "based solely on an allegation 
of negligence, a litigant is not entitled to present an emotional damages claim 
to a jury."  Hampe, at 
¶11.   Based on the certified 
question before us it appears that the plaintiffs similarly do not meet any of 
the three instances in which we allow recovery for emotional distress 
damages.  They have not alleged 
physical injury, exposure to physical harm, or any "willful, wanton, or 
malicious conduct."  

 

[¶14]   Additionally, the parties in 
Hampe and Lickteig had an attorney client relationship.  A similar type of relationship exists 
between a patient and her doctor and hospital.  Both types of claims arise from a 
relationship based on breach of contract and breach of a fiduciary duty.  Hampe, ¶¶8-9.  Hampe similarly contained 
elements of damage that resulted from a disturbance in the parent-child 
relationship.  Therefore, 
Hampe appears at first glance to be controlling.  

 

[¶15]   However, an important distinction 
must be made between Hampe and the instant case.  Factoring into our decision in 
Hampe was our concern for the issues surrounding child custody.  In Hampe, we cited to a Colorado 
case for its discussion of the child custody issues.  We stated, "[w]ith specific regard to 
the claim relating to child custody, we view with favor the case McGee v. 
Hyatt Legal Services, Inc., 813 P.2d 754, 758-59 (Colo.App. 1990), for the 
additional guidance it provides."  
Hampe, ¶13.  We noted 
that court's concerns about

 

the 
impossibility of quantifying intangible injuries to the parent-child 
relationship, the effect recognition of damages would have on the district 
court's authority to regulate and supervise custody decisions which must turn on 
the best interests of the child, the certainty of some significant level of 
emotional disturbance in the dissolution of a marriage which includes a child 
custody component (especially one burdened with a high level of animosity), as 
well as the certainty that neither parent can reasonably expect full-time 
custody of the children because of the statutorily required liberal visitation 
with the non-custodial parent.

 

Hampe, 
¶13.  Therein lies the 
difference.  

 

[¶16]   In McGee the Colorado 
Supreme Court found that joint custody orders as opposed to sole custody orders 
do not constitute a compensable loss.  
McGee, 813 P.2d at 757-58   A close look at McGee 
reveals that the Colorado Supreme Court's reasons for denying recovery were 
not simply because the claim involved only intangible injuries which would be 
hard to quantify.  The court also 
considered In re Marriage of Segel which recognized that such claims 
would circumvent and undermine the statutory scheme authorizing courts to 
regulate and supervise the custody of children whose parents are involved in 
dissolution proceedings.  
Id., at 758 (citing In re Marriage of Segel, 224 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1986)).   While we 
recognize that the nature of the injuries claimed in this case is similarly 
intangible, the concerns that a court's authority will be undermined is 
completely absent.   

 

[¶17]   Furthermore, divorce proceedings 
provide the parties with due process of law before the parent-child relationship 
is disrupted because each party is presented with notice and the opportunity to 
be heard by an independent third party.  
The final decision to disrupt the parent-child relationship rests with a 
judge charged with making such decisions in the best interests of the 
child.  In the case now before us an 
independent third party did not review the merits of each party and then make an 
informed decision.  The disruption 
in the parent-child relationship was allegedly due solely to defendant's 
negligence.  Additionally, child 
custody orders are subject to modification in future proceedings.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204 
(LexisNexis 2003).  Obviously we 
would never lightly dismiss or condone attorney negligence, but in a limited 
sense, some of the damage incurred due to attorney negligence in a case 
involving child custody may be mitigated by future modification.  

 

[¶18]   A last important distinction must 
be noted.   As mentioned in 
Hampe, some level of emotional disturbance has to be expected in a 
divorce proceeding involving custody issues.  Hampe, ¶13.  The parties are aware of such a 
disturbance and can conceivably prepare to cope with the disturbance when they 
begin divorce proceedings.  A parent 
leaving the hospital with a newborn child does not reasonably expect the same 
kind of disturbance. Additionally, in a divorce proceeding neither parent can 
reasonably expect, nor does he/she often get, full-time custody.  The parent-child relationship is rarely 
completely severed in divorce proceedings.  
Each parent's relationship with the child, although altered, remains 
intact.  The parent-child 
relationship in this case was completely severed.  

 

[¶19]   We, therefore, conclude that this 
case is not "similar" to Hampe and that Hampe did not speak 
directly to the issue now before us.  
We determine that the decisions preceding Hampe as cited above did 
not squarely address the issue either.  
Having never addressed a case with circumstances such as this one, we 
looked to other jurisdictions for similar cases involving babies switched at 
birth and emotional damages.  Our 
research turned up three cases.  
Although the cases discussed the issue, for various reasons they did not 
generally provide an analysis that was particularly useful to our specific 
discussion.  Wishard Memorial 
Hosp.v. Logwood, 512 N.E.2d 1126 (Ind.App. 1987) (The court denied recovery 
for purely emotional damages resulting from the switched babies.  However, the switch was only for a 
number of hours and was discovered before either infant left the hospital.); 
Twigg v. Hospital Dist. of Hardee County, Fla., 731 F. Supp. 469 (M.D. 
Fla. 1990) (The court dismissed any claims "insofar as plaintiffs may be 
attempting to file a separate cause of action for psychic trauma alone."  Id., at 472.  The court provided no further analysis 
on the subject, however, because plaintiffs asserted that they were not seeking 
compensation for psychic trauma alone but as damages appended to other claims, 
and those claims were allowed to go forward.); De Leon Lopez v. Corporacion 
Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116 (1st Cir. 
1991) (The court allowed a grandfather to recover for his emotional damages 
resulting from one of his twin granddaughters being switched at birth.  However, the defendant did not dispute 
that under Puerto Rico law the grandfather could bring an action for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.).              

 

[¶20]   Appellants have argued for the 
application of an exception that would modify the restrictions placed on 
recovery for emotional damages without accompanying physical injury.  We have previously shown that we are 
willing, in very limited circumstances, to overrule 
what was the common law at the time it was handed down but which has now become 
outdated.  Nulle v. 
Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1172-73 (Wyo. 
1990).  However, like 
the Minnesota Supreme Court, we are not eager to expand the availability of 
damages for emotional distress.  We 
continue to be concerned about the ramifications of expansion for the same 
reasons cited above.  Nevertheless, 
our reluctance cannot result in the application of a rule that was not meant to 
govern this type of situation.   
Our primary concern is the burden overbroad liability for emotional 
damages would impose on our court system.  
See Gates, 719 P.2d  at 197.   Therefore, the availability of 
such damages must be limited to plaintiffs who can prove that emotional injury 
occurred under circumstances tending to guarantee its authenticity.  Lickteig, 556 N.W.2d  at 
560.  

 

[¶21]   As mentioned previously, many 
jurisdictions have in at least some fashion modified the traditional rule 
requiring actual or threatened physical impact.  However, most jurisdictions still 
require proof of a physical manifestation of emotional distress.  Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 
598-99 (Tex. 1993) (collecting cases).  
Several jurisdictions have recognized a general right to recover for 
negligently inflicted emotional distress.  
Id., at 599.1  Some jurisdictions allow recovery where 
the claimant establishes the breach of some independent duty.  Boyles, 
at 598-99  (citing 
Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992); Corgan v. 
Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. 1991); Oswald v. LeGrand, 453 N.W.2d 634 (Iowa 1990); Clomon v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 572 So. 2d 571 
(La. 1990)).  It is the independent 
duty exception to the general rule prohibiting recovery for strictly emotional 
damages that appellants urge us to apply.   

 

[¶22]   The Iowa Supreme Court has set 
forth a good description of this exception.  "An 
exception exists where the nature of the relationship between the parties is 
such that there arises a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid causing 
emotional harm.'"  Lawrence v. 
Grinde, 534 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Iowa 1995) (quoting Oswald v. LeGrand, 
453 N.W.2d at 639).2  This exception is applied in 
circumstances involving contractual relationships for services that carry with 
them deeply emotional responses in the event of breach.  Lawrence, at 421.  Iowa has thus recognized the propriety 
of recovery of emotional distress in actions involving:  1) medical malpractice from 
negligent examination and treatment of a pregnant woman and her premature fetus; 
2) a son when he saw the negligence of another cause injury to his mother; 
3) negligent delivery of a telegram announcing the death of a loved one; 
and 4) negligent performance of a contract to provide funeral 
services.  Lawrence, 534 N.W.2d  at 421.   

 

[¶23]   Other 
courts have recognized similar exceptions and have allowed recovery for the 
negligent transmission of telegraph messages, especially those messages 
announcing death or indicating a potential for mental distress. Clomon v. 
Monroe City Sch.Bd., 572 So. 2d  at 583 (citing Graham v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 34 So. 91 (La. 1930); Russ v. Western Union Telegraph 
Co., 23 S.E.2d 681 (N.C. 1943); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. 
Redding, 129 So. 743 (Fla. 1930)).  
Courts have also allowed similar recovery for the mishandling of 
corpses.  Id. (citing 
Fortuna v. St. Bernard Memorial Gardens, Inc., 529 So. 2d 883 
(La.App. 1988); Shelmire v. Linton, 343 So. 2d 301 (La.App. 1977); 
French v. Ochsner Clinic, 200 So. 2d 371 (La.App. 1967); Blanchard v. 
Brawley, 75 So. 2d 891 (La.App. 1954); Clark v. Smith, 494 S.W.2d 192 
(Tex.Civ.App. 1973); Allen v. Jones, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1980); Torres 
v. State, 228 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1962)).

 

[¶24]   Oregon has recognized a similar 
exception but appears to have limited it to medical procedures.  That state allows recovery "if the 
defendant care provider breached a specific duty to be aware of and guard 
against particular adverse psychological reactions or consequences to medical 
procedures.'"  Simons v. 
Beard, 72 P.3d 96, 102 (Or.App. 2003) (miscarriage) (quoting Curtis v. 
MRI Imaging Servs. II, 956 P.2d 960 (Ore. 1998) (administering MRI)).   

 

[¶25]   Alaska similarly recognizes a 
"preexisting duty exception" to the physical injury rule.  Kallstrom v. United States, 43 P.3d 162, 166 (Alaska 2002).  Under 
this exception a plaintiff may recover when the parties stand in a contractual 
or fiduciary relationship and the nature of this relationship imposes a duty 
that would forseeably result in emotional harm to the plaintiff.  Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 
203 (Alaska 1995).  The contract 
must generally be highly personal and laden with emotion.  Id.  The Alaska Supreme Court limits this 
rule by requiring that the emotional injury be serious or severe.  Id., at 205.  

 

[¶26]   We prefer Iowa's application of the 
independent duty exception because this expression is narrowly tailored and well 
reasoned.  Under this exception 
recovery exists only in circumstances involving contractual services that carry 
with them deeply emotional responses in the event of breach.  There must be a close nexus between the 
negligent action at issue and extremely emotional circumstances.  Lawrence, 534 N.W.2d  at 421.  Whether this exception should be applied 
in Wyoming requires that we determine whether to extend a limited duty of care 
to those who suffer mental distress in the above-mentioned limited 
circumstances.  In making this 
determination we seek to balance the view that a negligent act should have some 
end to its legal consequences against the view that the injured party has the 
right to recover for all harm caused.  
Gates, 719 P.2d  at 196.   Key policy factors to be 
considered are: 

 

(1) the 
forseeablility of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the 
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (3) the 
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the moral blame 
attached to the defendant's conduct, (5) the policy of preventing future 
harm, (6) the extent of the burden upon the defendant, (7) the 
consequences to the community and the court system, and (8) the 
availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.  

 

Gates, 
719 P.2d  at 196 (citing Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 
551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976)).  

 

[¶27]   First, we consider the 
forseeability of harm to the plaintiff.  
As noted in Gates, this is a vague test that essentially results 
in the court setting a legal duty and then outlining the policy principles that 
urge us to recognize such a duty.  However, it is clear that the 
independent duty exception is based on the principle of forseeability.  The exception is only applicable when 
there is a previous relationship between the parties, and this relationship is 
based on services that carry with them deeply emotional responses in the event 
of breach.  Under such circumstances 
both parties are aware of the emotional aspects attending their relationship and 
are likewise aware of the potential for emotional damage.  We can easily conclude that it is 
foreseeable that when two babies are switched at birth the parties involved will 
experience emotional distress when the error is discovered.  As the Iowa Supreme Court said:  "[T]he birth of a child involves a 
matter of life and death evoking such mental concern and solicitude' that the 
breach of a contract incident thereto will inevitably result in mental anguish, 
pain and suffering.'"  
Oswald, 453 N.W.2d  at 639; see also Geibel v. United 
States, 667 F. Supp. 215, 220 (W.D. Pa. 1987); Taylor v. Baptist Medical 
Center, Inc., 400 S.2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981).  We 
have characterized the parent-child relationship as one of the "earliest and 
most hallowed of the ties that bind humanity."  Matter of Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976).  

 

[¶28]   Second, we consider the closeness 
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered.  In instances where the independent duty 
exception is applied there is a closeness between the defendant's conduct and 
the injury because the exception is limited to instances where the parties had 
some sort of relationship.  The very 
nature of the exception requires that the defendant's conduct be sufficiently 
close to the injury suffered.  In 
such cases, there is a direct link between the injured party and the 
defendant.  Although the holding in 
Daily was limited to automobile collisions, in that decision we 
recognized that a difference exists between a claim asserted by a "bystander" 
and a claim asserted by a direct victim of a traditional completed tort.  Daily, 906 P.2d  at 1045.  The degree of closeness between the 
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered is one such distinction.  Cases involving babies that have been 
switched at the hospital present the direct victims of a tort.  The concerns related to the closeness of 
"bystanders" are thus not present.  
Recovery in such instances would be predicated upon a traditional, 
completed tort.  

 

[¶29]   Third, we must be concerned with 
whether there is some certainty that the plaintiff suffered an injury.  This element relates to the concern 
noted by the Lickteig court that the injury must occur under 
circumstances tending to guarantee its genuineness.  Lickteig, 556 N.W.2d  at 560.  The limited nature of the independent 
duty exception alleviates some of this concern as it applies only when the 
relationship carries deeply emotional responses in the event of breach.  In fact, the one thing common 
to the limited circumstances in which the exception is applied is that the 
circumstances present a great likelihood of genuine mental distress.  Clomon v. Monroe City Sch.Bd., 
572 So. 2d  at 583.  In 
this particular case, a mother and daughter learned after forty-three years that 
they had been separated because two babies had been switched at birth.  Little doubt remains that the parties 
involved in such an occurrence will suffer emotional distress.  Indeed, the parties have lost the 
affection and close companionship that attends the parent-child 
relationship.  The parties have 
bonded with other persons and recognized those persons as their own family only 
to shockingly discover that they are not related by blood, as they had once 
believed.  

 

[¶30]   Fourth, we consider the moral blame 
attached to the defendant's conduct.  
This factor is used to determine whether the defendant is morally 
culpable before imposing liability.  
Moral blame generally results from situations in which the defendant had 
direct control over establishing and ensuring proper procedures to avoid the 
harm caused or where the defendant is the party best in the position to prevent 
the injury.  See generally Duncan 
v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 745 (Wyo. 1999).  Traditionally, the reason for denying 
recovery for purely mental disturbances relied upon the judgment that a 
defendant who is merely negligent is not so blameworthy that he should be 
required to compensate for mental disturbances.  However, we think moral blame does 
attach to the defendant's conduct when babies are switched at the hospital.  The hospital has sole control over the 
babies and its identification procedures, and it is the hospital that is in the 
best position to prevent such an injury.  
We, therefore, think that moral blame must attach to such conduct.  

 

[¶31]   The fifth and sixth factors, the 
policy in preventing future harm and the burden on the defendant in this 
instance, can be discussed together.  
We find it imperative that hospitals have procedures to ensure that 
newborn children are given to the proper parent.  The need to prevent future harm is 
completely obvious and an extended discussion is unnecessary.  Furthermore, the burden placed upon the 
defendant to avoid such harm in the future would not be so great.  Procedures for the identification and 
safety of newborn babies are available and can easily be used. 

 

[¶32]   Seventh, we must determine the 
consequence to the community and the court system.  This factor has generally been thought 
of as weighing the negative aspects of creating a new cause of action.  As noted previously, we are concerned 
that additional liability may impose a great burden on our court system.  However, we think the independent duty 
exception, as described by the Iowa Supreme Court, is sufficiently limited in 
scope so as to avoid an overwhelming burden.  As noted in Gates, we suspect 
that recovery will not occur often because of the limitations placed on the 
action.  Gates, 719 P.2d  at 
198.   The instances in which 
this exception is available are initially limited by the exception itself 
because there must be a relationship for services that carries with it deeply 
emotional responses in the event of a breach.  Lawrence, 534 N.W.2d  at 421. 

 

[¶33]   An additional limitation on the 
independent duty exception as recognized by Iowa is the requirement that the 
distress inflicted be "so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to 
endure it."  Lawrence, 534 N.W.2d  at 421 (citing Restatement, Second, Torts).  This same limitation exists on 
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) as recognized in Wyoming, 
which comes from Restatement, Second, Torts § 46.  Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 1065; see 
also Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Wyo. 1997).  Claims of IIED are made when "[o]ne who 
by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional distress to another."  
Leithead, at 1065 (quoting Restatement, supra, § 
46(1)).  Outrageous conduct is 
defined as conduct which goes "beyond all possible bounds of decency' and which 
is regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community.'"  Kanzler, at 
1341 (quoting Restatement, § 46 cmt d).  
Nevertheless, IIED is additionally limited by the requirement of severe 
emotional distress.  The reason 
given for this limitation is "[c]omplete emotional tranquility is seldom 
attainable in this world, and some degree of transient and trivial emotional 
distress is a part of the price of living among people."  Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 1067 
(quoting Restatement, supra, cmt j.)  Therefore, the law only intervenes where 
the distress inflicted is "so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to 
endure it."  Id.   

 

[¶34]   The independent duty exception 
requires only negligence, not that the defendant intentionally or recklessly 
caused the emotional harm.  The 
additional requirement that the defendant's conduct be extreme and outrageous is 
similarly absent.  While the 
independent duty exception is applicable when a contractual relationship that 
carries with it deeply emotional responses in the event of breach exists and 
breaching the contract therefore seems to carry some element of outrageousness, 
it is to a lesser degree.  It is 
thus entirely appropriate and perhaps more essential that the same limitation of 
severity apply when recognizing the independent duty exception.    

 

[¶35]   The recognized court and jury 
functions for the question of severity are likewise applicable.  "It is for the court to determine 
whether on the evidence severe emotional distress can be found; it is for the 
jury to determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact existed."  Kanzler, at 1341 (quoting 
Restatement, supra, cmt. j).  
The intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be 
considered in determining its severity.  
Leithead, at 1067 (quoting cmt j).  Thus, the determination will have to be 
made that the emotional injury is severe on a case by case basis.   

 

[¶36]   Under this seventh factor, we 
additionally recognize that the parent-child relationship is intangible and it 
will likely be hard to value.  
However, such a valuation would be no harder than valuing the loss of 
society, care, and attention in a wrongful death action.3  "Recovery of damages for mental injury 
is not novel to Wyoming jurisprudence." Daily, 906 P.2d  at 1044.   Similarly intangible and 
inherently difficult to measure are pain 
and suffering damages, but they are sought and awarded in nearly all tort 
actions.  We also acknowledge that 
tort 
damages are compensatory in nature and seek to put the plaintiff in the same 
position he would have been in but for the defendant's negligence.  While a 
monetary award will not restore intangible relationships, it is currently the 
best solution our system offers.  
Hancey v. United States, 967 F. Supp. 443, 445 (D. Colo. 
1997).  We also recognize that legal 
consequences from wrongs must be limited to some controllable degree, but 
we 
trust the jury to assess reasonable damages.  The courts can control juries that are 
ruled by passion or prejudice.  
Gates, 791 P.2d  at 200; see also Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. 
Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1289 (Wyo. 1983) (the court has duty to grant 
remitter or additur where a verdict shocks the conscience of the court); 
Booth v. Hackney, 516 P.2d 180, 181 (Wyo. 1973) (verdict can be set aside 
when it appears to be so excessive that it denotes passion, prejudice, bias or 
some erroneous basis).  

 

[¶37]   The procedures by which courts can 
control juries combined with the limited nature of the exception and the 
requirement of severe emotional distress convinces us that the negative aspects 
of recognizing the independent duty exception are reasonably limited. Therefore, 
under the seventh factor we determine that our courts will not be unduly 
burdened by this exception to the general rules limiting emotional damages.    

 

[¶38]   The eighth and final factor is the 
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.  Aside from the current issues 
surrounding the cost of medical malpractice insurance, we note that insurance is 
quite prevalent.  Hospitals are 
insured for all types of losses related to the birth of a child.  Although we have said this previously, 
because of the current issues surrounding medical malpractice insurance it bears 
repeating:  this exception is 
extremely limited.  The exception 
only applies when there is a contract for services that carries deeply emotional 
responses in the event of breach.  
Although some level of emotion attends every situation involving one's 
health, we do not anticipate that every area of healthcare will carry the deeply 
emotional responses sufficient to sustain this exception.

 

[¶39]   After applying the balancing of 
factors test "it is difficult for the court, on the basis of natural justice, to 
reach the conclusion that this type of action will not lie.  Human tendencies and sympathies suggest 
otherwise."   Nulle, 797 P.2d  at 1174 (quoting Hoffman v. Dautel, 368 P.2d 57, 59 (Kan. 
1962)).  Accordingly, we hold that 
in Wyoming, in the limited circumstances where a contractual relationship exists 
for services that carry with them deeply emotional responses in the event of 
breach, there arises a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid causing emotional 
harm.  However, as can be seen by 
our discussion, this exception is extremely limited.  We persist in seeking to assure that our 
already burdened court system will not be additionally burdened by an overly 
broad liability for emotional damages.    

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶40]   For the reasons fully explained 
above we answer the certified question in the affirmative.  A mother and daughter, who were 
separated for forty-three years because the hospital switched two newborn babies 
at birth, can maintain a negligence action in which the only alleged damages are 
great emotional pain, humiliation, anxiety, grief, and expenses for 
psychological counseling.

 

  

            
PRICE, District 
Judge, dissenting.

 

[¶41]   I respectfully 
dissent.

 

[¶42]   The majority again expands the 
traditional rule disallowing recovery for mental or emotional injury only when 
such injury is linked to an actual or threatened physical impact.  Although the majority says one thing, it 
clearly does the other.  It claims, 
"we are not eager to expand the availability of damages for emotional 
distress."  ¶20.  Claiming that, "[t]herefore, the 
availability of such damages must be limited to plaintiffs who can prove that 
emotional injury occurred under circumstances tending to guarantee its 
authenticity," it cites Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, 
P.A., 556 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 1996).  
Id.  An examination of 
this case reveals that the Minnesota court limited this kind of recovery.  "There must be a direct violation of the 
plaintiff's rights by willful, wanton or malicious conduct; mere negligence is 
not sufficient."  
Lickteig, at 562.  

 

[¶43]   By adopting the Iowa independent 
duty exception, the majority fails in its effort and stated concern:  "Our primary concern is the burden 
overbroad liability for emotional damages would impose on our court system." 
¶20.  The majority then 
states:

 

            
The recognized court and jury functions for the question of severity are 
likewise applicable.  "It is for the 
court to determine whether on the evidence severe emotional distress can be 
found; it is for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact 
existed."  Kanzler, at 1341 
(quoting Restatement, supra, cmt. j).  The intensity and the duration of the 
distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity.  Leithead, at 1067 (quoting cmt 
j).  [¶35.]

 

[¶44]   This certainly opens the door for a 
number of cases to be considered by the trial courts.  As one commentator has 
stated:

 

It is 
difficult to imagine how a set of rules could be developed and applied on a 
case-by-case basis to distinguish severe from nonsevere emotional harm.  Severity is not an either/or 
proposition; it is rather a matter of degree.  Thus, any attempt to formulate a general 
rule would almost inevitably result in a threshold requirement of severity so 
high that only a handful would meet it, or so low that it would be an 
ineffective screen.  A middle-ground 
rule would be doomed, for it would call upon courts to distinguish between large 
numbers of cases factually too similar to warrant different treatment.  Such a rule would, of course, be 
arbitrary in its application.

 

Richard N. 
Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional HarmA 
Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U.Fla.L.Rev. 477, 511 (1982), 
cited in Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 600 (Tex. 
1993).

 

[¶45]   It is the expansion of this holding 
to many medical malpractice cases that concerns me.  In the current times of medical 
malpractice issues, insurance and possible resulting loss of doctors in Wyoming, 
I predict this case will add fuel to the fire.  After all, legal malpractice does not 
give rise to a claim for emotional distress but medical malpractice will.  Long-Russell v. Hampe, 2002 WY 
16, 39 P.3d 1015 (Wyo. 2002).  Even 
though the majority tries to limit this expansion, I predict it will 
not:

 

Accordingly, 
we hold that in Wyoming, in the limited circumstances where a contractual 
relationship exists for services that carry with them deeply emotional responses 
in the event of breach, there arises a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid 
causing emotional harm.  However, as 
can be seen by our discussion, this exception is extremely limited.  We persist in seeking to assure that our 
already burdened court system will not be additionally burdened by an overly 
broad liability for emotional damages.  
[¶39.] 

 

[¶46]   As I see it differently, I dissent 
and would answer the certified question in the negative.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Citing the following cases, Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, 
Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981); Montinieri v. Southern New England 
Telephone Co., 398 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Conn. 1978); Rodrigues v. State, 
472 P.2d 509, 519 (Haw. 1970); Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Maine, 
Inc., 534 A.2d 1282 (Me. 1987); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772 (Mo. 1983); Johnson v. Supersave Markets, Inc., 686 P.2d 209, 
213 (Mont. 1984); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assoc., 395 S.E.2d 85 (N.C. 1990); Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109, 
113 (Ohio 1983); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 679 (Pa. 
1979).

 

2We note that we cited to the Lawrence case in Hampe, at 
¶12.  However, the purpose for which 
we cited to it was the general proposition cited by Lawrence that the 
majority view is that emotional distress is not a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of legal malpractice.  
See Lawrence, 534 N.W.2d  at 422.     

 

3We seek to clarify that this statement is in no way intended to indicate 
a retreat from the holding that mental suffering is not a compensable damage 
under the wrongful death statute.  
See Knowles v. Corkill, 2002 WY 119, 51 P.3d 859 (Wyo. 
2002).