Title: State v. McGlothan

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. McGlothan, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-85.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-85 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. MCGLOTHAN, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. McGlothan, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-85.] 
Clarification of State v. Williams regarding the evidence necessary to establish 
cohabitation for purposes of R.C. 2919.25. 
(No. 2012-1782—Submitted October 23, 2013—Decided January 16, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 97212,  
2012-Ohio-4049. 
____________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The state of Ohio appeals from a decision of the Eighth District 
Court of Appeals affirming Jeffrey McGlothan’s conviction for attempted 
felonious assault but reversing his conviction for domestic violence.  Despite the 
victim’s testimony that McGlothan was her boyfriend and had lived with her for 
about a year, a majority of the appellate court ruled that the state must prove they 
shared living expenses in order to convict McGlothan of domestic violence.  The 
appellate court misconstrued our decision in State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 459, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
683 N.E.2d 1126 (1997), because in this case the state proved that the victim was 
a family or household member and cohabitation pursuant to R.C. 2919.25.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the judgment of 
the trial court finding McGlothan guilty of domestic violence is reinstated. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} In February 2011, a grand jury indicted Jeffrey McGlothan on one 
count of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), with a repeat-
violent-offender specification, and one count of domestic violence in violation of 
R.C. 2919.25(A) as a result of an incident at the apartment he shared with his 
girlfriend.  The domestic violence count alleged that McGlothan knowingly 
caused or attempted to cause physical harm to “Cynthia Robinson, a family or 
household member.” 
{¶ 3} During a bench trial in June 2011, Robinson testified that at the 
time of the incident, McGlothan was her boyfriend and had lived with her in her 
apartment for “about a year.”  She further explained that McGlothan slept 
overnight at her apartment every night.  She also stated that he had helped her put 
things up on the wall when he moved into the apartment. 
{¶ 4} Robinson testified that one evening in January 2011, she let 
McGlothan inside the apartment and confronted him about where he had been 
earlier that day.  They began arguing, and McGlothan pushed Robinson and 
grabbed her by the shirt.  As a result, he detached a permanent tracheostomy tube, 
which enabled her to breathe.  McGlothan helped Robinson call 9-1-1, and 
emergency-room physicians were able to reinsert the tube without surgery.  
During trial, the court admitted Robinson’s medical records, which contained her 
statement that “her boyfriend purposely pulled her trach out.” 
{¶ 5} The court found McGlothan not guilty of felonious assault, but 
guilty of attempted felonious assault and domestic violence.  As a result, the court 
sentenced him to an aggregate two year prison term. 
January Term, 2014 
3 
 
{¶ 6} On appeal, a majority of the appellate court held that the state had 
failed to present sufficient evidence to support McGlothan’s conviction for 
domestic violence based on its analysis of our explanation of the term 
“cohabitation” in Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 459, 683 N.E.2d 1126.  The court 
explained, “Although Robinson testified that [McGlothan] was her boyfriend and 
he had slept over at her apartment for roughly a year, there was no testimony that 
the couple shared any living expenses, such as rent and utilities, which would 
demonstrate shared familial or financial responsibilities.”  8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 
97212, 2012-Ohio-4049, ¶ 22.  The dissenting judge did “not believe that it was 
necessary for the state to prove that the couple shared any living expenses when it 
was established that McGlothan lived there.”  Id. at ¶ 47 (Boyle, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
{¶ 7} On appeal to this court, the state asserts that by requiring evidence 
of shared living expenses to demonstrate shared familial or financial 
responsibilities, the court of appeals elevated one of the nonexhaustive factors set 
forth in Williams to an essential element of cohabitation.  It argues instead that 
shared living expenses is merely one factor that a court may consider in a 
cohabitation analysis.  The state further maintains that the Eighth District’s 
requirement of shared living expenses to establish cohabitation is contrary to 
decisions of the Second, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Districts. 
{¶ 8} In response, McGlothan claims that the appellate court did not hold 
that the state needed to prove shared financial responsibilities in order to establish 
cohabitation for purposes of R.C. 2919.25 but rather ruled that the state had failed 
to establish the cohabitation factors as set forth in Williams.  Specifically, he 
argues that it was reasonable for the court to conclude that Robinson’s testimony 
that he was her boyfriend and spent every night at her apartment was not by itself 
sufficient to prove cohabitation.  Moreover, he maintains that the appellate 
decision here does not conflict with decisions from other appellate courts. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
{¶ 9} In this case, then, we are called upon to clarify Williams regarding 
the evidence necessary to establish cohabitation as set forth in R.C. 
2919.25(F)(2). 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 10} R.C. 2919.25(A) provides: “No person shall knowingly cause or 
attempt to cause physical harm to a family or household member.”  (Emphasis 
added.)   
{¶ 11} R.C. 2919.25(F)(1) provides that “family or household member” 
means “(a) [a]ny of the following who is residing or has resided with the offender: 
(i) A spouse, a person living as a spouse, or a former spouse of the offender.” 
{¶ 12} At issue in this case is whether Robinson was a “person living as a 
spouse.”  R.C. 2919.25(F)(2) includes within the definition of “person living as a 
spouse” one “who * * * is cohabiting with the offender.” 
{¶ 13} The court of appeals misread our decision in Williams as 
supporting the proposition that evidence of shared living expenses is necessary to 
establish cohabitation.  Williams is factually distinguishable from this case, 
because there we addressed living arrangements between the victim and the 
defendant that were markedly different from the circumstances here.  In Williams, 
79 Ohio St.3d at 460, 683 N.E.2d 1126, the victim testified that she and the 
defendant “were going together” but that they did not live together.  The victim’s 
testimony that for a few months she stayed more nights at Williams’s place than 
at her own further illustrates that they did not share a residence but rather that 
each had a separate residence.  See id. Thus, in order to prove cohabitation when 
the victim and the defendant do not share the same residence, evidence of shared 
financial or familial responsibilities and consortium is required.  See id. at 463-
465. 
{¶ 14} After considering the General Assembly’s intent in enacting the 
domestic violence statutes, despite urging by Williams himself, we declined to 
January Term, 2014 
5 
 
“adopt a narrow definition of ‘reside’ which would limit ‘family or household 
members’ to those who actually share one residential address.”  Id. at 462.  In 
Williams, then, by determining that the offense of domestic violence “arises out of 
the relationship of the parties rather than their exact living circumstances,” id. at 
464, we interpreted the statute broadly to include those who did not live with the 
offender but who also deserved protection under the statute based on their 
relationship with the offender. 
{¶ 15} In contrast to Williams, Robinson testified that McGlothan was her 
boyfriend and that they had lived together in her apartment for approximately a 
year, thus establishing that they did share one residence.  Because the state 
demonstrated that the defendant was the victim’s boyfriend and that they had 
lived together for about a year, the state had no obligation to demonstrate the 
sharing of familial or financial responsibilities and consortium to prove 
cohabitation in this case.  Instead, based on Robinson’s testimony, the trial court 
could have reasonably determined that the state established cohabitation and thus 
that Robinson was a person living as a spouse with McGlothan.  Because the 
evidence also demonstrates that Robinson resided with McGlothan at the time of 
the incident, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Robinson was a 
family or household member. 
{¶ 16} Alternatively, even if the Williams factors did apply regarding the 
nonexhaustive list establishing shared familial or financial responsibilities, 
circumstantial evidence shows that McGlothan and Robinson, by sharing her 
apartment for about a year, did share shelter and utilities.  In addition, the trial 
court could have reasonably concluded that Robinson’s testimony demonstrated 
factors establishing consortium, such as affection, society, and aid of each other.  
Williams at 465. 
{¶ 17} Finally, we have explained that the General Assembly “recognized 
the special nature of domestic violence when it drafted the domestic violence 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
statutes” and “believed that an assault involving a family or household member 
deserves further protection than an assault on a stranger.”  Williams, 79 Ohio 
St.3d at 463, 683 N.E.2d 1126.  We have also acknowledged the desire of the 
legislature to “protect persons from violence by close family members or 
residents of the same household” and “to offer protections to a wide class of 
persons.”  State v. Carswell, 114 Ohio St.3d 210, 2007-Ohio-3723, 871 N.E.2d 
547, ¶ 32, 36.  In this regard, we recognize that McGlothan and Robinson were 
not strangers but rather lived together and were in a relationship from which the 
domestic violence arose.  Therefore, considering the intent of the General 
Assembly in enacting the statute, we determine that Robinson was a person living 
as a spouse and therefore, McGlothan’s crime falls within the purview of the 
domestic violence statute. 
{¶ 18} Accordingly, in this case, the state established that Robinson was a 
family or household member because her testimony demonstrates that she was a 
person living as a spouse who resided with McGlothan at the time of the incident.  
We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the 
judgment of the trial court finding McGlothan guilty of domestic violence. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. 
LANZINGER, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
____________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 19} I respectfully dissent.  The majority reverses the judgment of the 
Eighth District Court of Appeals and “reinstate[s] the judgment of the trial court 
finding McGlothan guilty of domestic violence.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 18.  
However, in his appeal to the Eighth District, McGlothan raised the issue of allied 
offenses in his fifth assignment of error, which the court of appeals held was 
moot.  8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97212, 2012-Ohio-4049, ¶ 43.  At the very least, 
January Term, 2014 
7 
 
the majority should remand the case to the court of appeals for resolution of 
McGlothan’s fifth assignment of error on allied offenses. 
{¶ 20} In addition, without expressly acknowledging the fact, the majority 
overrules a portion of State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 459, 683 N.E.2d 1126 
(1997).  It now decides that merely living in the same residence will satisfy the 
element of cohabitation for the domestic-violence statute, stating that “[b]ecause 
the state demonstrated that the defendant was the victim’s boyfriend and that they 
had lived together for about a year, the state had no obligation to demonstrate the 
sharing of familial or financial responsibilities and consortium to prove 
cohabitation in this case.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 21} Rather than clarifying Williams, this statement repudiates one of 
the cohabitation requirements set forth in Williams: 
 
[W]e conclude that the essential elements of “cohabitation” are (1) 
sharing of familial or financial responsibilities and (2) consortium.  
R.C. 2919.25(E)(2) and related statutes.  Possible factors 
establishing shared familial or financial responsibilities might 
include provisions for shelter, food, clothing, utilities, and/or 
commingled assets.  Factors that might establish consortium 
include mutual respect, fidelity, affection, society, cooperation, 
solace, comfort, aid of each other, friendship, and conjugal 
relations.  These factors are unique to each case and how much 
weight, if any, to give to each of these factors must be decided on a 
case-by-case basis by the trier of fact. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 465. 
{¶ 22} Williams clearly requires both elements: sharing familial or 
financial responsibilities as well as consortium.  One witness testifying about 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
living together for a year could satisfy both elements by indicating that there was 
a sharing of provisions for shelter or utilities and that there was society or 
companionship, provided that the fact-finder was satisfied that the evidence 
established these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  In this case, the court of 
appeals held that the state had not met its burden to show proof of cohabitation 
because there was insufficient evidence of shared living expenses.  Nevertheless, 
it affirmed the finding of guilt on the offense of attempted felonious assault. 
{¶ 23} There is no need to broaden the reach of the domestic-violence 
statute.  Moreover, I believe that this appeal seeks mere error correction, and thus, 
I would dismiss the case as having been improvidently allowed. 
____________________ 
FRENCH, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 24} I agree with the majority to the extent it rejects the court of 
appeals’ view that “cohabitation” necessarily requires proof that the victim and 
the offender shared living expenses, such as rent and utilities.  As we made plain 
in State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 459, 683 N.E.2d 1126 (1997), the first element 
of cohabitation requires proof that the offender and victim shared in either the 
“familial or financial” responsibilities of the household.  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 
465.  Nevertheless, I dissent because I believe that the evidence did not show that 
McGlothan shared in either household responsibility.  Robinson’s testimony 
concerned only the second element of cohabitation, “consortium.”  It was neither 
direct nor circumstantial proof that McGlothan shared in any of the familial or 
financial responsibilities of the household.  Because I would affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals, I respectfully dissent. 
O’NEILL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary 
H. McGrath, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
January Term, 2014 
9 
 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Erika Cunliffe, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. 
________________________