Title: State Ex Rel. Peters v. Bedwell

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

371 N.E.2d 709 (1978)
STATE of Indiana On the Relation of Henry A. Peters and Gary Houchins, Relators,
v.
Jesse H. BEDWELL, Judge of the Sullivan Circuit Court, Sullivan County, Indiana, and the Sullivan Circuit Court, Sullivan County, State of Indiana, Respondents.
No. 1077S754.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
January 24, 1978.
*710 Fred P. Bamberger, Fred S. White, Robert T. Bodkin, Jack N. Vanstone, Evansville, E.D. Powell, Sullivan, for relators.
Jesse H. Bedwell, pro se.
Robert E. Springer, Sullivan, George N. Craig, Brazil, for plaintiff.
Joe S. Hatfield, Evansville, for defendant Wirth Osteopathic Hospital, Inc.
HUNTER, Justice.
The relators, Peters and Houchins, two of the defendants below, seek a writ of mandate compelling the trial court to enter judgment on a jury verdict in their favor. An alternative writ was issued by this Court pending full briefing. Argument was held at which time no appearance was made for the respondent. A response and a reply to the response have now been filed.
This case originated when the plaintiff below, Colleen Craig, filed a complaint for money damages against the defendants, Peters, Houchins, Gray and the Wirth Osteopathic Hospital. The complaint alleged medical malpractice and negligence on the part of the various defendants, resulting in injuries to the plaintiff. Following certain delays, a jury trial was held, which concluded on September 14, 1977. On that day the jury returned general verdicts in favor of the relators and the hospital.
On September 16, 1977, the defendants, Peters, Houchins and Gray moved for the entry of judgment on the jury verdicts, pursuant to Ind.R.Tr.P. 58. On the same day the plaintiff moved for judgment on the evidence pursuant to Ind.R.Tr.P. 50(A). On September 23, 1977, the trial court entered a judgment partially granting the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the evidence *711 and otherwise confirming the jury's verdicts. The verbatim judgment is here set out omitting caption and formal parts:
In summary, the trial court entered judgment against the relators-doctors on the issue of their liability for negligence. He further ordered that a jury trial be held to determine the amount of compensatory *712 damages only. The relators question the ability or authority of a trial court to enter judgment in favor of a party having the burden of proof contrary to the jury's verdict.
The pertinent portions of the relevant trial rules are:
Ind.R.Tr.P. 50(A).
Ind.R.Tr.P. 59(E)(7) [emphasis supplied].
When this Court and the Legislature approved Trial Rule 50 in its present form, the following emphasized language was inserted in paragraph (A) of the rule as first proposed:
3 Harvey, Indiana Practice 365 (1970). This is key language which has an extensive history. It is the standard to be applied when reviewing a verdict for the party having the burden of proof.
When this Court and the Legislature approved Trial Rule 59, the following language was deleted from 59(B):
4 Harvey, Indiana Practice 111 (1971).
This deletion is a manifestation of an intent to maintain the prior meaning of the words "sufficient evidence" as that standard relates to the authority of the judge to grant a 59 motion. Trial Rule 59(E)(7) does authorize the judge to grant a judgment if he determines that the verdict is "clearly erroneous as contrary to. . the evidence." This is new legal language. As a grant of authority it must be construed so as not to be in conflict with the constitutional mandate that the right to trial by jury shall be maintained inviolate. Ind.Const. art. 1, § 20. Where there is any dispute on the operative facts, the jury is the finder of fact, and it may choose to believe or disbelieve any witness. A party with the burden of proof may establish a prima facie case and the jury may, nonetheless, find against him.
It is only where there is no reasonable dispute as to the facts, where the evidence for the party bearing the burden of proof is uncontradicted and unimpeached, that the trial court may enter judgment in favor of a party having the burden of proof. Friedline v. State (1884), 93 Ind. 366; Gaff v. Greer (1882), 88 Ind. 122; Fowler Utilities Co. v. Chaffin Coal Co. (1909), 43 Ind. App. 438, 87 N.E. 689; Stephens v. American Car & Foundry Co. (1906), 38 Ind. App. 414, 78 N.E. 335; Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Martin (1930), 283 U.S. 209, 51 S. Ct. 453, 75 L. Ed. 983; Federal Ins. Co. v. Summers (1st Cir.1968), 403 F.2d 971.
The trial court in its judgment in the present case did find that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case and that the relators-defendants did not contradict this evidence. But as to the ultimate burden of producing evidence, there was no finding either way which would indicate the evidence was without reasonable dispute. The entry of judgment was, therefore, erroneous.
Because of our treatment of this issue it is unnecessary to reach relators' other issues.
*713 For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is erroneous because it is inadequate and the alternative writ should be made permanent.
It is so ordered.
GIVAN, C.J., and DeBRULER and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.
PRENTICE, J., not participating.