Title: State v. Brantner

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2020 WI 21 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP53-CR 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Dennis Brantner, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 25, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 3, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac   
 
JUDGE: 
Peter L. Grimm   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KELLY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the court, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and DALLET, JJ., 
joined, and in which ROGGENSACK, C.J. and ZIEGLER, J., joined as 
to parts I, II, III.B, III.C, and IV. ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
HAGEDORN, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Taylor Rens and Krug & Rens LLC, West Allis. There was an 
oral argument by Taylor Rens. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there were briefs filed by Lisa 
E.F. Kumfer, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument 
by Lisa E.F. Kumfer. 
 
 
2020 WI 21 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP53-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF457) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Dennis Brantner, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
FEB 25, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KELLY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and DALLET, JJ., joined, 
and in which ROGGENSACK, C.J. and ZIEGLER, J., joined as to parts 
I, II, III.B, III.C, and IV. ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined.  
 
Brian K. Hagedorn, J., did not participate. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to the circuit 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   Fond du Lac County sheriff's 
detectives arrested Mr. Brantner at the Kenosha County courthouse 
and transported him to the Fond du Lac County jail to face criminal 
charges unrelated to this case.  During the booking process, a 
sheriff's deputy discovered a cache of narcotics and prescription 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
2 
 
medications in Mr. Brantner's boot, a discovery that gave rise to 
his trial in this case in the Fond du Lac County circuit court.  
Mr. Brantner says he should not have been tried in Fond du Lac 
County because he did not possess the drugs when the deputy 
discovered them——not because the drugs were not there——but because 
the arrest in Kenosha County terminated, as a matter of law, his 
ability to possess any contraband on his person.  We disagree.  
Mr. Brantner did not lose possession of the drugs in his boot upon 
his arrest in Kenosha County.  And because he still possessed the 
drugs in Fond du Lac County, venue there was proper. 
¶2 
Mr. Brantner also says that two of the charges on which 
the jury convicted him were multiplicitous.  One of the charges 
was for possession of 20mg oxycodone pills in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 961.41(3g)(am) (2017-18).1  The other was for possession 
of 5mg oxycodone pills in violation of the same statute.  We agree 
with Mr. Brantner, and so reverse the court of appeals with respect 
to his multiplicity challenge.2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Six years ago, Mr. Brantner was in the Kenosha County 
circuit court defending against a charge that he was a "felon in 
possession of a firearm."  As he left the courtroom, he immediately 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 This is a review of the court of appeals, State v. Brantner, 
No. 2018AP53-CR, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2019), 
which summarily affirmed the Fond du Lac County postconviction 
court's denial of Mr. Brantner's postconviction motion, the 
Honorable Peter L. Grimm, presiding. 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
3 
 
encountered two Fond du Lac County sheriff's detectives.  They 
were there to arrest him in connection with a thirty-year-old 
homicide.  The detectives handcuffed Mr. Brantner with a belly 
belt, patted him down, searched his pockets, and transported him 
to Fond du Lac County for processing. 
¶4 
The booking process at the Fond du Lac County jail 
required Mr. Brantner to remove the outer layer of his clothing, 
including his footwear.  He removed his right boot easily enough 
but encountered difficulty with his left boot.  He said he had a 
muscle spasm in his calf, which he addressed by striking his leg 
for 20-30 seconds.  One of the detectives offered to help him 
remove the boot, but Mr. Brantner declined.  Eventually, with the 
muscle spasm apparently resolved, Mr. Brantner successfully 
removed his remaining boot and turned it over to the sheriff's 
deputy processing his belongings.  Inside the boot the deputy found 
a bag containing a total of 54 pills, comprising:  (1) 35 20mg 
oxycodone pills; (2) two 5mg oxycodone pills; (3) two pills 
containing both 325mg of acetaminophen and 5mg of hydrocodone; (4) 
11 12.5mg zolpidem pills; and (5) four 10mg cyclobenzaprine pills.  
Nothing in the record indicates that, before Mr. Brantner handed 
his boot to the deputy, the detectives had known the drugs were in 
Mr. Brantner's boot.  
¶5 
Mr. Brantner did not have a valid prescription for any 
of the pills in his boot, so the State charged him with five counts 
of possession——one for each category of drug and dosage. The State 
also paired each possession charge with a corresponding felony 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
4 
 
bail-jumping charge.3  Consequently, the list of charges against 
Mr. Brantner comprised:4 
(1)  Possession of oxycodone (20mg), a Schedule II 
narcotic substance, without a valid prescription, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(am); 
(2)  Felony bail jumping contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.49(1)(b) for possessing oxycodone 20mg; 
(3)  Possession of oxycodone (5mg), a Schedule II 
narcotic substance, without a valid prescription, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(am); 
(4)  Felony bail jumping contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.49(1)(b) for possessing oxycodone 5mg; 
(5)  Possession of hydrocodone, a Schedule II narcotic 
substance, without a valid prescription, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(am); 
(6)  Felony bail jumping contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.49(1)(b) for possessing hydrocodone; 
(7)  Possession of zolpidem, a controlled substance, 
without a valid prescription, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(b); 
(8)  Felony bail jumping contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.49(1)(b) for possessing zolpidem; 
(9)  Possession of cyclobenzaprine, a prescription drug, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 450.11(7)(h); and 
                                                 
3 One of the conditions of Mr. Brantner's bond in the Kenosha 
County felon-in-possession case was that he commit no new crimes. 
4 Initially, the charges against Mr. Brantner on counts one, 
three, and five also included penalty enhancers pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 961.495 (2017-18) for possession of a controlled substance 
within 1000 feet of the Fond du Lac County jail; however, the State 
voluntarily dismissed all of the penalty enhancers prior to voir 
dire. 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
5 
 
(10)  Felony bail jumping contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.49(1)(b) for possessing cyclobenzaprine.5 
 
¶6 
The jury found Mr. Brantner guilty on all counts and he 
received his sentence in due course.  He subsequently filed a 
postconviction motion in which he claimed that venue did not lie 
in Fond du Lac County and that the two charges for possessing 
oxycodone (counts one and three) were multiplicitous.  The court 
denied Mr. Brantner's motion, and the court of appeals summarily 
affirmed.  We granted Mr. Brantner's petition for review and now 
affirm the court of appeals with respect to venue, but reverse 
with respect to counts one and three because they are 
multiplicitous.    
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶7 
Although venue is not an element of a crime, the State 
must nonetheless establish it beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. 
Dombrowski, 44 Wis. 2d 486, 501-02, 171 N.W.2d 349 (1969).  We 
review venue challenges for sufficiency of evidence, so "[w]e will 
not reverse a conviction based upon the State's failure to 
establish venue unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the 
state and the conviction, is so insufficient that there is no basis 
upon which a trier of fact could determine venue beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  State v. Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d 395, 407–08, 
572 N.W.2d 845 (1998).  Whether such a basis exists is a question 
of law we review independently of the court of appeals.  State v. 
Smith, 2012 WI 91, ¶24, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d 410 ("The 
                                                 
5 Counts one, three, and five are Class I felonies; the bail 
jumping charges are Class H felonies; and counts seven and nine 
are misdemeanors. 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
6 
 
question of whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a 
verdict of guilt in a criminal prosecution is a question of law, 
subject to our de novo review."). 
¶8 
Whether two or more charges are multiplicitous is a 
question of law subject to our independent review.  State v. 
Patterson, 2010 WI 130, ¶12, 329 Wis. 2d 599, 790 N.W.2d 909; 
State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶52, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 643 N.W.2d 437. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶9 
Mr. Brantner challenges his conviction for two reasons.  
First, he says that he should not have been tried in Fond du Lac 
County because his arrest in Kenosha County terminated, as a matter 
of law, his ability to possess any contraband on his person.  
Therefore, he concludes, he had a right to have a jury hear his 
case in Kenosha County, the last geographical location he says he 
possessed the pills in his boot.  Second, he claims the State may 
not charge him with two separate charges for possessing oxycodone 
simply because the pills contained different amounts of the 
narcotic.  We conclude that Fond du Lac County was a proper venue 
for the case, but that the oxycodone-related possession charges 
were multiplicitous. 
A.  Venue 
¶10 Mr. Brantner says he is entitled to trial in Kenosha 
County because, generally speaking, the State must try a defendant 
in the county in which the crime occurred.  Wis. Stat. § 971.19(1) 
("Criminal actions shall be tried in the county where the crime 
was committed, except as otherwise provided.").  Answering Mr. 
Brantner's argument requires us to consult the criminal statutes 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
7 
 
defining the crimes' elements so that we may identify where they 
were fulfilled.  As relevant here, possession of controlled 
substances is unlawful pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g), which 
says: 
No person may possess or attempt to possess a controlled 
substance or a controlled substance analog unless the 
person obtains the substance or the analog directly 
from, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order of, 
a practitioner who is acting in the course of his or her 
professional practice, or unless the person is otherwise 
authorized by this chapter to possess the substance or 
analog.[6] 
The unauthorized possession of prescription drugs is unlawful 
according to Wis. Stat. § 450.11(7)(h), which says:  "Except as 
provided in sub. (1i)(b), no person may possess a prescription 
                                                 
6 The penalty for possessing a Schedule II narcotic drug, 
such as oxycodone, is provided by Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(am):  
Schedule I and II Narcotic Drugs.  If a person possesses 
or attempts to possess a controlled substance included 
in schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, or a 
controlled substance analog of a controlled substance 
included in schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, 
the person is guilty of a class I felony. 
 
The penalty for possessing non-scheduled controlled substances 
is provided by Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(b): 
Other drugs generally.  Except as provided in pars. (c) 
to (g), if the person possesses or attempts to possess 
a controlled substance or controlled substance analog, 
other than a controlled substance included in schedule 
I or II that is a narcotic drug or a controlled substance 
analog of a controlled substance included in schedule I 
or II that is a narcotic drug, the person is guilty of 
a misdemeanor, punishable under s. 939.61. 
 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
8 
 
drug unless the prescription drug is obtained in compliance with 
this section."7   
¶11 The crimes with which Mr. Brantner was charged were 
obviously possessory in nature, which means he committed the crimes 
where he "possessed" the pills in his boot.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g) ("No person may possess . . . ."); Wis. Stat. 
§ 450.11(7)(h) ("[N]o person may possess . . . .").  So we must 
discern the meaning of the term "possess" within the context of 
§§ 961.41(3g) and 450.11(7)(h).  The answer to that question, as 
applied to the facts of this case, will tell us where venue lies. 
¶12 This is not the first time we have had cause to explore 
the meaning of "possess" in our statutes.  In Schwartz v. State, 
192 Wis. 414, 212 N.W. 664 (1927), the State claimed the defendant 
unlawfully possessed intoxicating liquor by virtue of its mere 
presence in his business premises.  We said that "[i]t is perfectly 
plain that the possession of liquor which is made unlawful is the 
possession under some claim of right, control, or dominion with 
knowledge of the facts."  Id. at 418.  And in State v. Peete, 185 
Wis. 2d 4, 517 N.W.2d 149 (1994), we recognized that "the 
Wisconsin criminal jury instructions provide a standard definition 
for the term 'possession[,]'" and that "the term 'possession' has 
                                                 
7 Subsection (1i)(b), which addresses opioid antagonists, is 
not relevant to this case.  Wis. Stat. § 450.11(1i)(b).  And Mr. 
Brantner does not claim he obtained the cyclobenzaprine in 
compliance with § 450.11. 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
9 
 
a consistent, established meaning throughout the Wisconsin 
criminal statutes . . . ."  Id. at 15-16.8   
¶13 Both parties recommended Wis JI——Criminal 6030 (2016) to 
us as an appropriate explanation of this "consistent, established 
meaning."  This instruction describes two senses in which we may 
understand the term "possession."  In the first sense, "possessed" 
means "the defendant knowingly had actual physical control of a 
substance."  Id.  In the second sense, a "substance is (also) in 
a person's possession if it is in an area over which the person 
has control and the person intends to exercise control over the 
substance."  Id. 
¶14 We can glean from Schwartz and Wis JI——Criminal 6030, 
therefore, that "possessing" something requires both knowledge and 
control.  Here, it is the "control" component of possession with 
which Mr. Brantner takes exception.  The instruction's first 
definition of control contemplates the ability to kinetically 
influence the object in question.  The instruction expresses this 
idea as "actual physical control," which Black's Law Dictionary 
defines as "[d]irect bodily power over something, esp. a vehicle."  
Actual Physical Control, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
¶15 The second "control" test does not require the ability 
to physically manipulate the object directly.  Instead, it reflects 
                                                 
8 State v. Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 4, 517 N.W.2d 149 (1994), 
addressed Wis JI——Criminal 920 (2000), the general "possession" 
instruction.  This case, of course, focuses on Wis JI——Criminal 
6030 (2016), which is the jury instruction specific to Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g).  However, the definition is the same in each 
instance, which the comments to Wis JI——Criminal 6030 acknowledge. 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
10 
 
the defendant's ability to exercise power over the object 
indirectly.  In the words of the jury instruction, possession 
occurs when the object is in an area over which the defendant has 
control, and he intends to exercise that control.  "Control" is a 
common and frequently used word.  There is nothing technical or 
specialized about it, and so we look to the dictionary for a 
common, ordinary definition.9  Turning to Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary, we find two particularly helpful 
definitions.  First, Webster's says "control" means "to exercise 
restraining or directing influence over."  Control, Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary (496 (1986) (definition 
4(a)(1))).  It also provides that "control" means "to have power 
over."  Id. (definition 4(a)(2)).  Similarly, The Oxford English 
Dictionary, as relevant here, offers the following definitions of 
"control":  (1) "The fact or power of directing and regulating the 
actions of . . . things; direction, management; command[;] and (2) 
"To exercise power or authority over; to determine the behavior or 
action of, to direct or command; to regulate or govern."  Control, 
The Oxford English Dictionary (definitions 2.a. (noun) and 3.a. 
(verb), respectively).  Likewise, Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"control," in relevant part, as meaning "[t]o exercise power or 
influence over."  Control, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  
The consistent principle linking all of these definitions is that 
                                                 
9 See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 
WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("Statutory language 
is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."). 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
11 
 
an individual may control an object without directly and personally 
affecting it physically.  Instead, one may control the object 
through the exercise of authority, direction, or command.  We will 
refer to this type of control as "indirect power." 
¶16 The sum of this definitional work is that, within the 
meaning of Schwartz and Wis JI——Criminal 6030, Mr. Brantner 
possessed the pills in his boot if he knew they were there and he 
either:  (1) "had actual physical control" (that is, "direct bodily 
power") over them; or (2) they were "in an area over which [he] 
ha[d] control and [he] intend[ed] to exercise control over" them 
(that is, he had "indirect power" over the pills).  If those 
elements coincided in Fond du Lac County, then venue was proper. 
¶17 According to Mr. Brantner, they did not coincide.  He 
says he "lost possession of the pills when he was taken into 
custody in Kenosha County because that is when he lost control of 
the pills."10  Specifically, he says his arrest meant he could no 
longer "ingest, sell, destroy or otherwise dispossess himself of 
[the pills].  He could not do anything except leave them right 
where they were."  He concludes that under these circumstances, 
"[w]hen a government bears down on an individual with such heavy 
force, the individual loses control of any substances on his person 
as a matter of law."  That an individual should cease to control—
—and consequently cease to possess——everything on his person upon 
arrest is a surprising proposition.  That has never been the law 
                                                 
10 Mr. Brantner does not challenge the knowledge component of 
possession, and so we need not address it here. 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
12 
 
in Wisconsin, and our courts regularly uphold convictions in which 
police discover contraband after arresting the person who 
possesses it.  See, e.g., State v. Delap, 2018 WI 64, 382 
Wis. 2d 92, 913 N.W.2d 175 (affirming judgment of conviction for, 
inter alia, possession of drug paraphernalia discovered in search 
after arrest); State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 
N.W.2d 97 (defendant convicted based on drugs found in his vehicle 
after arrest); State v. Stewart, 2011 WI App 152, 337 Wis. 2d 618, 
807 N.W.2d 15 (affirming denial of motion to suppress cocaine 
discovered in search of trunk after arrest and thereby upholding 
conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver); State 
v. Smiter, 2011 WI App 15, 331 Wis. 2d 431, 793 N.W.2d 920 
(affirming judgment of conviction for possession of cocaine with 
intent to deliver stemming from discovery of cocaine pursuant to 
a vehicle search after defendant's arrest for possession of 
marijuana). 
¶18 But the deeper problem with Mr. Brantner's argument is 
that it misses the point of our "possession" jurisprudence.  In 
this case, one of the following must be the possessor of the pills:  
(1) Mr. Brantner; (2) the sheriff's deputies; or (3) no one.  The 
purpose of our analysis is not to make metaphysical distinctions, 
but merely to distinguish between these three possibilities.  We 
can rule out the deputies as the possessors pretty easily——they 
did not know the pills existed until Mr. Brantner handed them his 
boot, which means the knowledge element of possession was 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
13 
 
missing.11  Mr. Brantner rules himself out as the possessor because 
he claims he lacked control over them.  So he says we must conclude 
that nobody possessed the pills.  The pills, that is to say, that 
were in his boot.  Not only is such a conclusion counterintuitive, 
it does not logically follow from the definition of "possession."  
Here is why. 
¶19 As we observed above, Mr. Brantner contests only the 
"control" component of possession——he admits he knew the pills 
were in his boot.  The evidence presented in his trial, however, 
leaves no doubt about his control of the pills in Fond du Lac 
County.  He took off his right boot with no difficulties during 
the booking process, but claimed a muscle spasm kept him from 
removing his drug-laden boot.  Finding no reprieve in his delaying 
tactics, he eventually removed the boot and handed it to the 
sheriff's deputy in the processing room.  So Mr. Brantner exercised 
"direct bodily power" over the pills by first delaying their 
conveyance to the deputy and then physically handing them over.  
In his brief, Mr. Brantner largely concedes that this is evidence 
of control over the pills: 
If th[is] situation had unfolded inside a friend's 
living room, with no law enforcement involvement 
whatsoever, then Brantner clearly would be exercising 
actual physical control over the pills by removing his 
boot and handing it to his friend.  Handing an object to 
                                                 
11 We base our analysis on the understanding that the 
detectives did not know of the pills in Mr. Brantner's boot before 
they transported him to Fond du Lac County, and we express no 
opinion on how this case would resolve had they known of them while 
still in Kenosha County. 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
14 
 
someone is precisely the type of act that "actual 
physical control" refers to in ordinary circumstances. 
We agree that this is precisely the type of act that exemplifies 
actual physical control.  Mr. Brantner, however, says this does 
not count in this case because of the extraordinary circumstances 
in which he handed over the boot.  In Mr. Brantner's telling, those 
circumstances relieved him of possession of the pills as a matter 
of law because he was handing officials the evidence necessary to 
arrest him for the crimes with which the State eventually charged 
him.  But Mr. Brantner never explained how his "extraordinary 
circumstances" proposition could negate the physical control he 
actually exerted over the drug-containing boot.  If we were to 
credit his position, we would have to conclude that the boot 
somehow made its way from Mr. Brantner to the sheriff's deputy 
with no human intervention.  The laws of physics, as we presently 
understand them, do not allow for such a phenomenon.     
¶20 Mr. Brantner also argues the evidence was insufficient 
to prove the alternative method of establishing control, to wit, 
through the exercise of indirect power over the pills.  Upon arrest 
in Kenosha County, he says, he lost his ability to direct the 
disposition of the pills.  He says the State's argument that he 
"maintained possession of the pills solely by manifesting an intent 
to exercise control over them" is nonsensical:  "The State's claim 
that Brantner maintained physical control over the pills through 
the power of thought is odd.  Brantner is unable to find any 
authority from any jurisdiction holding that an individual 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
15 
 
maintained constructive possession of an item on his person without 
maintaining actual physical possession [of] it." 
¶21 Mr. Brantner need not go far to find the authority he 
believes does not exist.  He already acknowledged that Wis JI——
Criminal 6030 (which he recommended to us) provides a second means 
of establishing the control element of possession.  Under Schwartz 
and this jury instruction, a factfinder could conclude that Mr. 
Brantner still controlled the pills after his arrest if he could 
have exerted indirect power over them through the exercise of 
authority, direction, or command.  If he had wanted to avoid venue 
in Fond du Lac County, he could have asked the detectives (while 
they were all still in Kenosha County) to remove his boot because 
he no longer wished to have on his person the contraband it 
contained.  The detectives surely would have been willing to assist 
him in accomplishing that goal, and in doing so they would have 
demonstrated that Mr. Brantner had indirect power over the pills 
in his boot.  Mr. Brantner dismisses this as a Hobson's choice:  
"If Brantner was required to tell the officers about the pills to 
terminate his possession of them, then Brantner was effectively 
required to choose between the protections of the right to remain 
silent and the right to venue."  But that is not true at all.  Mr. 
Brantner has the right to proper venue, not venue in Kenosha County 
come what may.  He chose to maintain the secrecy of the pills, 
which inevitably led to their presence in Fond du Lac County.  And 
upon arrival in Fond du Lac County, he could have made the request 
he chose not to make in Kenosha County.  The fact that he chose to 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
16 
 
remain silent does not mean he did not have indirect power over 
the pills, it just means he decided not to exercise it. 
¶22 We conclude the evidence was such that the jury could 
determine that Mr. Brantner possessed the pills in Fond du Lac 
County beyond a reasonable doubt, which made venue in that county 
proper.  Mr. Brantner admittedly knew of the pills' presence in 
his boot.  And he exercised direct physical power over them when 
he handed his drug-laden boot to the officials during the booking 
process.  He also had indirect power over the pills even after the 
arrest because he could have requested the detective's assistance 
in ridding himself of the contraband's presence.  The fact that he 
chose not to exercise that indirect power does not mean he lacked 
control over the pills.  For these reasons, we affirm the court of 
appeals with respect to the venue issue.12 
B.  Multiplicity 
¶23 The State charged Mr. Brantner with (amongst other 
offenses) possession of 20mg oxycodone pills (Count 1), and 5mg 
oxycodone pills (Count 3), both in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(am). 
 
Mr. 
Brantner 
says 
these 
counts 
are 
                                                 
12 Mr. Brantner also says the Wisconsin and United States 
Constitutions guaranteed to him the right to a trial in Kenosha 
County, not Fond du Lac County.  See, e.g., Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 7 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 
right to . . . a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district wherein the offense shall have been committed; 
which county or district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law.").  But he also recognized, as he must, that these rights 
were dependent on the location at which he committed the offenses.  
As demonstrated above, he committed them in both Kenosha and Fond 
du Lac Counties.  Consequently, venue in Fond du Lac County was 
consistent with his asserted constitutional rights. 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
17 
 
multiplicitous because § 961.41(3g)(am) proscribes possession of 
this drug without regard to the dosage of the pills.  We agree. 
¶24 Claims are multiplicitous when the State charges a 
defendant more than once for the same offense.  State v. Ziegler, 
2012 WI 73, ¶59, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238; State v. Rabe, 
96 Wis. 2d 48, 61, 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980) ("Multiplicity arises 
where the defendant is charged in more than one count for a single 
offense.").  Such charges violate our state and federal 
constitutions because they place the defendant in jeopardy of 
multiple convictions for the same offense.  Ziegler, 342 
Wis. 2d 256, ¶59 ("The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and its parallel 
provision of the Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, Section 8(1), 
prohibit multiple punishments for the same offense.").  Charges 
are not multiplicitous, however, when the statutes "authorize 
cumulative punishments for the same offense."  State v. Davison, 
2003 WI 89, ¶¶36-37, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 666 N.W.2d 1 ("In situations 
where the legislature intends to authorize cumulative punishments 
for the same offense, we no longer say that the charges are 
'multiplicitous' or that they violate double jeopardy.  Use of the 
term 'multiplicitous' should be limited to situations in which the 
legislature has not authorized multiple charges and cumulative 
punishments."). 
¶25 "We review multiplicity claims according to a well-
established two-pronged methodology."  Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 
¶60.  First, we employ the "elements-only" test to determine 
whether the offenses are identical in both law and fact.  Id., 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
18 
 
(citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).  
The result of this step determines whether we will presume, in the 
second step of the analysis, that the statutes provide for 
cumulative punishment.  Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶¶43-44.  If the 
offenses are identical in law and fact, we presume "that the 
legislature did not intend to permit multiple punishments."  
Patterson, 329 Wis. 2d 599, ¶15.  "The State may rebut that 
presumption only by a clear indication of contrary legislative 
intent."  Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, ¶61.  If the offenses differ 
in law or fact, then they are not the "same" for double jeopardy 
purposes, and we therefore presume that the statutes allow for 
cumulative punishment.  Patterson, 329 Wis. 2d 599, ¶15.  The 
defendant can overcome the presumption if he can prove that, 
notwithstanding the separate offenses, "the legislature did not 
intend to authorize cumulative punishments."  Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 
256, ¶62.  If it did not, then there has been a due process 
violation as opposed to a double jeopardy violation.  Id. 
1.  The "Elements-Only" Analysis 
¶26 Mr. Brantner says the offenses described in Counts 1 and 
3 of the State's Complaint are the same both in law and in fact 
because they both charge him with possessing oxycodone contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(am).  Offenses are identical in law "if 
one offense does not require proof of any fact in addition to those 
which must be proved for the other offense."  Ziegler, 342 
Wis. 2d 256, ¶60.  They are identical in fact unless they are 
"separated in time or are of a significantly different nature."  
State v. Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d 25, 31, 291 N.W.2d 800 (1980).  To be 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
19 
 
"separate in time" means that "there was sufficient time for 
reflection between the acts such that the defendant re-committed 
himself to the criminal conduct." Multaler, 252 Wis. 2d 54, ¶56.  
Charges are "'different in nature' even when they are the same 
types of acts as long as each required 'a new volitional departure 
in the defendant's course of conduct.'"  Id., ¶57. 
¶27 We begin with assessing whether the offenses described 
in Counts 1 and 3, both of which charged Mr. Brantner with 
violating Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(am), are identical in law.  This 
statute says: 
No person may possess or attempt to possess a controlled 
substance or a controlled substance analog unless the 
person obtains the substance or the analog directly 
from, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order of, 
a practitioner who is acting in the course of his or her 
professional practice, or unless the person is otherwise 
authorized by this chapter to possess the substance or 
the analog.   
§ 961.41(3g).  The statute goes on to distinguish between different 
types of controlled substances to determine the gravity of the 
offense.  According to Wis. Stat. § 961.16(2)(a)11., the pills 
referenced in both Counts 1 and 3 were Schedule II narcotic drugs, 
which comprise (inter alia), "[a]ny material, compound, mixture or 
preparation which contains any quantity" of oxycodone.  (Emphasis 
added.)  Possession of Schedule II narcotic drugs (such as 
oxycodone) is a Class I felony: 
(am) Schedule I and II narcotic drugs.  If a person 
possesses or attempts to possess a controlled substance 
included in schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, 
or a controlled substance analog of a controlled 
substance included in schedule I or II which is a 
narcotic drug, the person is guilty of a Class I felony. 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
20 
 
§ 961.41(3g)(am).  Because our statutes proscribe possession of 
pills without regard to the amount of oxycodone they might contain, 
there is no legal distinction between possessing a pill containing 
20mg of oxycodone as opposed to one containing only 5mg of 
oxycodone.  That, however, is the only difference between Counts 
1 and 3.  As a result, neither count "require[d] proof of any fact 
in addition to those which must be proved for the other offense."  
See Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, ¶60.  We must therefore conclude 
that the offenses described in Counts 1 and 3 are identical in 
law. 
¶28 The State says Counts 1 and 3 are different in fact 
because they were different in both time and nature.  It says they 
are different in nature because it "had to prove that Brantner 
committed two different volitional acts of possession by obtaining 
two different types of oxycodone pills from different sources, 
showing that each possession required 'a new volitional departure' 
by Brantner."  See, e.g., Multaler, 252 Wis. 2d 54, ¶57 (explaining 
that charges are "'different in nature' . . . as long as each 
required 'a new volitional departure in the defendant's course of 
conduct.'").  The counts are different in time, the State says, 
because "Brantner either had to have taken possession of the 20mg 
oxycodone pills at some point when Michael[13] had a prescription 
for 20mg oxycodone pills, or obtained them from somewhere else."  
Either way, the State says, "Brantner had to complete the act of 
                                                 
13 Michael is Mr. Brantner's brother, and it is the State's 
theory that Mr. Brantner stole the pills from him. 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
21 
 
taking possession of each type of pill separately, therefore those 
acts were separate in time . . . ."  See, e.g., Multaler, 252 
Wis. 2d 54, ¶56 (explaining that offenses are different in time if 
"there was sufficient time for reflection between the acts such 
that 
the 
defendant 
re-committed 
himself 
to 
the 
criminal 
conduct."). 
¶29 Although the State is correct about what it had to prove, 
it is not possible to reconcile its conclusion with the evidence 
of record.14  The evidence certainly shows that Mr. Brantner 
possessed 20mg and 5mg oxycodone pills.  But nothing in the record 
directly establishes that Mr. Brantner obtained the different 
dosages via "two different volitional acts" or temporally 
separated acts of acquisition.  To remedy this dearth of evidence, 
the State proposed that we conclude the offenses were different in 
both nature and time through necessary inference from the evidence 
of record.   
¶30 The State's inferential reasoning cannot, by itself, 
connect its premises to its conclusions.  Instead, its argument 
outsourced most of the evidentiary work to some pretty hefty 
                                                 
14 The record says very little about how Mr. Brantner obtained 
the pills.  At trial, the jury heard a recording of a phone call 
between Mr. Brantner and his significant other in which Mr. 
Brantner commented that he had gotten the pills from his brother, 
Michael, and that he'd had the pills since 2010.  Detective Vergos 
testified that he attempted to ascertain the source of the pills 
by searching Michael's home.  He testified that he discovered 
prescription pill bottles that matched four of the five types of 
pills and dosages found in Mr. Brantner's boot, but that he found 
no evidence that Michael had a prescription for 20mg oxycodone 
pills. 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
22 
 
assumptions.  The foundational assumption is that Mr. Brantner 
could not have obtained the 20mg and 5mg pills at the same time.  
It derives this assumption from one of two alternative scenarios, 
both of which rely on their own chain of assumptions.  The first 
scenario started with the assumption that Mr. Brantner obtained 
all of the oxycodone pills from his brother's house.  The State 
further assumed that his brother never had both 20mg and 5mg pills 
in the house at the same time.  This assumption, however, required 
supporting assumptions of its own.  So it assumed that the brother 
obtained both the 20mg and 5mg pills from valid prescriptions.  It 
then observed that, when Mr. Brantner was arrested, his brother 
had a prescription for only the 5mg oxycodone pills.  From this 
the State assumed that the 20mg pills must have come from a prior 
(and now superseded) prescription.  The State had to also assume 
that the brother did not fill the prescription for the 5mg pills 
until he had used all of the 20mg pills from the assumed previous 
prescription.  If we stack up all of these assumptions, the State 
says, we reach the conclusion that Mr. Brantner's brother never 
had 20mg and 5mg pills in the house at the same time.  And that 
necessarily means Mr. Brantner had to have acquired the pills at 
different times.  
¶31 Alternatively, the State allows for the possibility that 
the 20mg and 5mg pills actually were in the brother's house at the 
same time.  In this scenario, the State assumes that the brother 
assiduously kept his 20mg and 5mg pills separated into their 
respective, closed containers.  To obtain both types of pills, 
therefore, Mr. Brantner would have had to open two separate 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
23 
 
containers to access the drugs, thereby introducing a temporal 
distinction (however small) between the acquisitions. 
¶32 The State needs all of these assumptions (or their 
alternatives) to be true to operationalize its "necessary 
inference" argument.  But one need not be a cynic to recognize 
that the State's assumptions describe a world that is substantially 
neater and more precise than the one in which we live.  It is 
altogether possible that each of the State's assumptions (or its 
alternatives) reflect the process by which Mr. Brantner actually 
obtained the 20mg and 5mg oxycodone pills.  But there is nothing 
to say that any of the assumptions is necessarily true.  For 
example, Mr. Brantner's brother could have obtained the 20mg pills 
without a prescription, making it possible for him to have the 
20mg and 5mg pills in the house at the same time.  Or he may have 
had prescriptions for both 20mg and 5mg pills that overlapped; or 
he may not have finished the 20mg pills before filling the 
prescription for the 5mg pills, either of which circumstance would 
make it possible for both dosages to be present in the house at 
the same time.  And nothing says that, assuming Mr. Brantner's 
brother had 20mg and 5mg pills in the house at the same time, he 
would keep them carefully separated into different containers.  
And even if he did, nothing says Mr. Brantner did not just swipe 
the containers at the same time and only later emptied them into 
a bag for transport in his boot. 
¶33 All of this means that, according to the record before 
us, there is nothing to suggest that Mr. Brantner must have 
obtained the 20mg and 5mg pills separately.  If Mr. Brantner 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
24 
 
obtained all the oxycodone pills simultaneously, it is not possible 
for there to have been different volitional departures in his 
course of conduct (meaning the offenses are not "different in 
nature").  And simultaneous acquisition also necessarily means 
they cannot be "different in time."  Nothing in the record suggests 
that the State's assumptions describe the method by which Mr. 
Brantner obtained the oxycodone pills.  So, unless we credit those 
assumptions (and we do not), the offenses described in Counts 1 
and 3 are the same in fact.15   
¶34 We conclude that, pursuant to the Blockburger elements-
only test, the offenses described in Counts 1 and 3 are identical 
in law and fact.   
2.  Cumulative Punishment 
¶35 Our resolution of the elements-only test means we 
presume our statutes do not permit multiple punishments for the 
offenses described in Counts 1 and 3.  See Patterson, 329 
Wis. 2d 599, ¶15.  However, we allow the State to "rebut that 
presumption . . . by a clear indication of contrary legislative 
intent."  Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, ¶61; see also Whalen v. United 
                                                 
15 It is worth noting that there is no easily discernible 
limiting principle to the State's inferential assumptions.  For 
example, the State's reasoning would appear to support charging 
Mr. Brantner with 37 counts of possessing oxycodone pills——one 
count for each of the 35 20mg pills, and one count for each of the 
5mg pills.  The State could simply postulate that Mr. Brantner 
took one pill from his brother each day to reduce the chances of 
discovery, thereby resulting in an assumed total of 37 individual 
volitional acts.  The State's reasoning would require no evidence 
that Mr. Brantner obtained the pills like this, only that he could 
have obtained them in that manner. 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
25 
 
States, 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980) ("Accordingly, where two 
statutory provisions proscribe the 'same offense,' they are 
construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in the absence 
of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent."). 
¶36 In this case, however, we need not perform this analysis.  
The State's argument with respect to this aspect of the 
multiplicity rubric anticipated success in demonstrating that the 
offenses described in Counts 1 and 3 are different in fact.  If it 
had succeeded, of course, Mr. Brantner would have borne the burden 
of rebutting the presumption that the statutes allow for multiple 
punishments.  So the State focused its argument entirely on 
explaining why Mr. Brantner could not rebut the presumption.  As 
it turns out, the State did not succeed in proving the offenses 
are different in fact, and its brief did not provide for such a 
contingency.  So Mr. Brantner enjoys the presumption that the 
statutes do not allow for multiple punishments for the same 
offense, and the State has offered no argument against that 
presumption.  We will not develop an argument where the State has 
chosen not to.  See Clean Wis., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 
2005 WI 93, ¶180 n.40, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 N.W.2d 768 ("We will 
not address undeveloped arguments.").  Therefore, we conclude that 
the presumption remains and, consequently, that Counts 1 and 3 are 
multiplicitous.16 
                                                 
16 The State concedes "that if one of the oxycodone charges 
is vacated [as multiplicitous], then the corresponding bail 
jumping charge must be vacated as well."  The parties did not fully 
address this issue before the court, and we will therefore rely on 
the State's concession in this case rather than deciding the issue. 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
26 
 
C.  Resentencing 
¶37 The circuit court fashioned a complex sentence based on 
the ten charges for which the jury returned a guilty verdict.  In 
particular, the court sentenced Counts 1 and 3 differently, despite 
both having been oxycodone-related charges, because it believed it 
was "more logical and fair to consider one [of the two oxycodone 
charges]——Count 1 for prison."  However, because Counts 1 and 3 
are multiplicitous, Mr. Brantner argues that "[t]he appropriate 
remedy . . . is resentencing on all counts."  The State says the 
appropriate remedy is to remand the matter to the circuit court to 
allow it to determine whether resentencing is appropriate.  We 
agree with the State. 
¶38 "[W]hen a defendant is convicted of and sentenced for 
multiple offenses and one conviction and sentence is vacated 
because it was held to be multiplicitous, the validity of all 
sentences is implicated and resentencing on the remaining 
convictions is permissible."  State v. Sinks, 168 Wis. 2d 245, 
255, 483 N.W.2d 286 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing State v. Martin, 121 
Wis. 2d 670, 672-73, 360 N.W.2d 43 (1985)).  Accordingly, "the 
trial court has the inherent power to resentence, but it need not 
exercise that power."  Sinks, 168 Wis. 2d at 255.  We therefore 
remand the matter to the circuit court to exercise its discretion 
in determining whether resentencing is appropriate in light of our 
conclusion that Counts 1 and 3 are multiplicitous.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶39 We affirm the court of appeals with respect to its 
conclusion that venue in Fond du Lac County was proper.  We reverse 
No. 
2018AP53-CR   
 
27 
 
the court of appeals with respect to its conclusion that Counts 1 
and 3 were not multiplicitous and remand to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
¶40 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part, reversed and part, and the cause is remanded to 
the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
¶41 BRIAN K. HAGEDORN, J., did not participate. 
No.  2018AP53-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶42 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.  (concurring).  Part of 
our obligation as supreme court justices is to take complicated 
legal issues and decide them in a way that simplifies and explains 
them.  I write in concurrence because the majority opinion does 
the opposite.  It takes a simple issue, possession, and makes it 
complicated.  It also has the potential to confuse the meaning of 
possession, which is employed throughout Wisconsin's criminal 
code.  Therefore, although I agree that possession was shown at 
trial, I join none of the majority's discussion of possession.  I 
do, however, join the majority opinion's discussion and decision 
on the double jeopardy issue.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶43 On March 27, 2015, Fond du Lac County Sheriff's Office 
detectives took Dennis Brantner into custody on an arrest warrant 
as he was leaving the Kenosha County Courthouse.  Upon arresting 
Brantner, Detective Vergos asked Brantner if he had anything on 
him that the detective should know about before he patted him down 
for the detectives' safety.  Brantner did not disclose 54 pills, 
controlled substances, which he had placed in his left boot.   
¶44 Brantner was handcuffed to a belly belt for the trip to 
Fond du Lac County.  When the detectives and Brantner arrived at 
the Fond du Lac County Jail, Brantner said he had cramps in his 
legs.  He then asked to go to the bathroom.  His handcuffs were 
removed, and Detective Vergos took him to the bathroom.  Detective 
Vergos remained with Brantner until he was finished.  Detective 
Vergos then took Brantner to the booking area where Brantner was 
No.  2018AP53-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
told to remove his outer shirt and boots.  Brantner took off his 
outer shirt, but said that he had cramps in his legs and indicated 
difficulty in removing his left boot.  Detective Vergos offered to 
help him remove his boot.  Brantner refused the detective's help 
and removed both boots himself.  He gave them to the booking 
officer, who found a baggie containing 54 pills inside Brantner's 
left boot.   
¶45 At trial, Detective Vergos testified and a video 
recording of Brantner's intake was played for the jury.  The 
circuit court also admitted into evidence and played audios of 
Brantner's jail phone calls, where he admitted that he got the 
pills from his brother, Michael. 
¶46 The State charged Brantner with three counts of 
possession of narcotic drugs and two misdemeanors for the other 
pills in the baggie.  Before trial, Brantner contested venue in 
Fond du Lac County, asserting that he did not possess the drugs in 
Fond du Lac County.  He asserted that because he was handcuffed to 
a belly belt during his transport to Fond du Lac County, he could 
not control the pills in his boot and therefore, he did not possess 
them.  He contends that the last time he possessed them was in 
Kenosha County before he was handcuffed.  
¶47 At trial, the circuit court gave the following jury 
instruction on the offense of possession of a controlled substance: 
[T]he Wisconsin Statutes make[] it a crime to possess a 
controlled substance.  
 
Before you may find the defendant guilty of this 
offense, the State must prove by evidence which 
satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
following three elements were present.   
No.  2018AP53-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
 
One, the defendant possessed a substance oxycodone, 
"OP" "20" 20 milligrams.   
 
"Possessed" means that the defendant knowingly had 
actual physical control of a substance. 
 
A substance is also in a person's possession if it 
is in an area over which the person has control and the 
person intends to exercise control over the substance. 
. . . .  
 
Two, the substance was oxycodone.  Oxycodone is a 
controlled substance whose possession is prohibited by 
law, without a valid prescription.    
 
Three, the defendant knew or believed that the 
substance was oxycodone, a controlled substance, and the 
defendant did not have a valid prescription.   
 
You cannot look into a person's mind to determine 
knowledge or belief.  Knowledge or belief must be found, 
if found at all, from the defendant's acts, words, and 
statements, if any, and from the facts and circumstances 
in this case bearing upon knowledge or belief. 
 
A criminal case is required to be tried in the 
county where the crime was committed. 
 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant committed the offense charged in Fond du Lac 
County, you should find the defendant guilty. 
The definition of possession in the instructions given at trial is 
word-for-word consistent with Criminal Jury Instruction 920, which 
is employed to define possession throughout the criminal 
code:  "'Possession' means that the defendant knowingly had actual 
physical control of the item."  Wis JI——Criminal 920 (2000).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶48 Brantner's arguments about possession are focused on 
trying to avoid venue in Fond du Lac County.  Sufficiency of the 
evidence is the standard used for deciding whether the State proved 
facts sufficient to support venue in Fond du Lac County.  State v. 
No.  2018AP53-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d 395, 407-08, 572 N.W.2d 845 (1998).  An 
appellate court "will not reverse a conviction based on the failure 
of the State to establish venue unless the evidence, viewed most 
favorably to the State and the conviction, is so insufficient that 
there is no basis upon which a trier of fact could determine venue 
beyond a reasonable doubt."  State v. Swinson, 2003 WI App 45, 
¶19, 261 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 12. 
¶49 Brantner grounds his venue argument in the contention 
that he did not possess the pills in Fond du Lac County because he 
could not reach them while he was handcuffed.  His argument misses 
the mark for several reasons.  First, even if one were to buy 
Brantner's argument that he could not possess the pills while 
handcuffed, which I do not, handcuffs were removed when he got to 
the Fond du Lac County Jail.  His antics about leg cramps and 
difficulty removing his left boot demonstrate physical control of 
the pills that he knew were in his boot.  Furthermore, it was 
Brantner who handed his left boot containing the pills to the 
booking clerk. 
¶50 Second, Brantner has never objected to the correctness 
of those instructions——either at trial or in his petition for 
review.  Nor does he bring a claim of ineffective assistance based 
on an erroneous jury instruction.  Therefore, before us, the 
instructions on possession, set forth above, are uncontroverted.  
State v. Shea, 221 Wis. 2d 418, 430, 585 N.W.2d 662 (1998).  Third, 
the jury made a finding of possession consistent with the circuit 
court's instructions on possession, i.e., that Brantner knowingly 
had actual physical control of the pills.  It was uncontroverted 
No.  2018AP53-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
that the pills were in Brantner's boot, pills that he obtained 
from his brother, Michael.  Pills in a boot are not different from 
the facts in State v. Harris, 190 Wis. 2d 718, 721, 528 N.W.2d 7 
(Ct. App. 1994), where Harris was charged in Milwaukee County with 
possession when cocaine was discovered in his shoe during a 
probation search.   
¶51 Fourth, possession has "a consistent, established 
meaning throughout the Wisconsin criminal statutes."  State v. 
Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 4, 16, 517 N.W.2d 149 (1994) (giving essentially 
the same instruction in regard to possession as the circuit court 
gave here).  There was sufficient evidence for a jury reasonably 
to find that Brantner knowingly had actual physical control of the 
pills in Fond du Lac County.  That he also knowingly had actual 
physical control of the pills in Kenosha County does not diminish 
the evidence of possession in Fond du Lac County.  As Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.19(2) provides:  "Where 2 or more acts are requisite to the 
commission of any offense, the trial may be in any county in which 
any of such acts occurred."  State v. Elverman, 2015 WI App 91, 
¶38, 366 Wis. 2d 169, 873 N.W.2d 528.   
¶52 Finally, Brantner knowingly had actual physical control 
of the pills in his boot in Fond du Lac County, which boot was on 
his foot until he took it off and handed it to the booking agent.  
Brantner's ruse that he was having leg cramps and therefore had 
difficulty removing his boot only goes to confirm that he knew the 
pills were in his boot when he was in Fond du Lac County, and he 
was exerting control over them so that he would not be required to 
hand them over to the booking agent.  The uncontested facts 
No.  2018AP53-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
presented at trial were sufficient evidence for a jury to find 
that Brantner "knowingly had actual physical control" of the pills 
until he gave his boot to the officer at the Fond du Lac County 
Jail.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶53 The majority opinion takes a simple issue, possession, 
and makes it complicated.  The majority opinion also has the 
potential to confuse the meaning of possession, which is employed 
throughout Wisconsin's criminal code.  Therefore, although I agree 
that possession was shown at trial, I join none of the majority's 
discussion of possession.  I do, however, join the majority 
opinion's discussion and decision on the double jeopardy issue.  
Accordingly, I respectfully concur.   
¶54 I am authorized to state that Justice ANNETTE KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2018AP53-CR.pdr 
 
 
 
1