Title: Morrison v. Northwest Nazarene University

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 37850-2010 
 
PAUL MORRISON, 
 
       Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
NORTHWEST NAZARENE UNIVERSITY, 
 
       Defendant-Respondent. 
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Boise, February 2012 Term 
 
2012 Opinion No.  52 
 
Filed: March 22, 2012 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for Canyon County.  The Hon. Juneal C. Kerrick, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
John C. Doubek; Doubek & Pyfer, LLP; Helena, Montana; argued for appellant. 
 
John A. Bailey; Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey, Chtd; Pocatello; argued for 
respondent. 
 
 
 
EISMANN, Justice. 
 
This is an appeal challenging the district court’s ruling on summary judgment that the 
plaintiff’s action for personal injuries suffered when he fell from a climbing wall was barred by 
the hold harmless agreement he signed prior to engaging in that activity.  We affirm the 
judgment of the district court. 
  
I. 
Factual Background. 
 
As a team building exercise, Paul Morrison’s employer wanted him and his coworkers to 
participate in a program at Northwest Nazarene University that included a climbing wall activity.  
Several days prior to doing so, Morrison’s employer required him to sign an agreement prepared 
by the University holding it harmless from any loss or damage he might incur due to the 
University’s negligence or that of its employees. 
 
2 
Morrison was severely injured when he fell while on the climbing wall.  He filed this 
action alleging that his injuries were caused by the negligence of the University employees who 
were supervising the climbing wall activity.  One of Morrison’s coworkers was assigned to 
control the safety rope used to keep the wall climber from falling, and Morrison alleges that his 
fall was caused by the negligent failure of a University employee to train and supervise that 
coworker. 
 
The University moved for summary judgment on the ground that Morrison’s cause of 
action was barred by the hold harmless agreement.  The district court agreed and dismissed this 
action.  Morrison then timely appealed. 
 
II. 
Did the District Court Err in Failing to Invalidate the Hold Harmless Agreement 
Due to the Inequality in Bargaining Power? 
 
“Freedom of contract is a fundamental concept underlying the law of contracts and is an 
essential element of the free enterprise system.”  Rawlings v Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 
Idaho 496, 499, 465 P.2d 107, 110 (1970).  Agreements exempting a party from liability for 
negligence will be upheld unless the  party owes to the other party a public duty created by 
statute or the other party is at an obvious disadvantage in bargaining power.  Lee v. Sun Valley 
Co., 107 Idaho 976, 978, 695 P.2d 361, 363 (1984). 
 
In this case, there is no allegation of any public duty that the University owed to 
Morrison.  However, he contends that there was an obvious disadvantage in bargaining power 
because his employer required that he sign the hold harmless agreement.  The existence of 
unequal bargaining power is not, by itself, sufficient to relieve a party from the provisions of a 
hold harmless agreement.  Rather, the party must be “compelled to submit to a provision 
relieving the other from liability for future negligence [because] . . . the party injured has little 
choice, as a practical matter, but to use the services offered by the party seeking exemption.”  
57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 63 (2004).  It is essentially the same test for determining whether 
unequal bargaining power between parties to a contract is sufficient to constitute procedural 
unconscionability.  See Lovey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 139 Idaho 37, 42, 72 P.3d 877, 
882 (2003) (“Lack of voluntariness can be shown . . . by great imbalance on the parties’ 
bargaining power with the stronger party’s terms being nonnegotiable and the weaker party 
 
3 
being prevented by market factors, timing, or other pressures from being able to contract with 
another party on more favorable terms or to refrain from contracting at all.”) 
 
In this case, Morrison stated in his affidavit:  “My said employer told us before we went 
to the team building exercises that I needed to sign the release in order to participate.  All 
employees were expected to participate and I signed it.”  He also stated that he was not given the 
option of refusing to sign the release and it was required by his employer.  Morrison was not 
injured by signing the release.  He was injured by falling from the climbing wall.   Absent from 
his affidavit is any statement that he told his employer that he did not want to climb the climbing 
wall and that his employer ordered him to do so anyway.1 
“With respect to adult participants, the general rule is that releases from liability for 
injuries caused by negligent acts arising in the context of recreational activities are enforceable.”  
57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 65 (2004).  The agreement that Morrison signed stated as a 
separate paragraph:  “The undersigned has read and voluntarily signs this release and waiver of 
liability and indemnity agreement.  The undersigned further agrees that no oral representations, 
statements or inducements apart from the foregoing agreement have been made.”  Morrison has 
not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact showing that there was an obvious 
disadvantage in bargaining power sufficient to relieve him of the provisions of the hold harmless 
agreement that he signed. 
 
 
III. 
Did the District Court Err in Ruling that the Hold Harmless Agreement Was Valid and 
that It Applied to the Cause of Action Alleged in the Complaint? 
 
Morrison contends that the hold harmless agreement is invalid because it is overly broad 
and is ineffective to bar his claim because it does not clearly identify the conduct that caused his 
injuries.  “Interpretation of unambiguous language in a contract is an issue of law.”  McDevitt v. 
Sportsman’s Warehouse, Inc., 151 Idaho 280, 283, 255 P.3d 1166, 1169 (2011). 
The agreement is entitled “Release / Hold Harmless / Indemnity / Assumption of Risk 
Agreement,” and it states as follows: 
                                                 
1 We need not decide whether an employer’s demand that an employee participate in a hazardous activity would be 
sufficient to void a hold harmless agreement between the employee and the third party that conducted such activity. 
 
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Release:  The undersigned, in consideration of being permitted to participate in 
the Northwest Nazarene University Challenge Course Adventure Program, for 
educational purposes does irrevocably, personally and for his or her heirs, assigns 
and legal representatives, release and waive any and all past, present or future 
claims, demands, and causes of action which the undersigned now has or may in 
the future have against Northwest Nazarene University, its members, directors, 
administrators, representatives, officers, agents, employees, and assigns, and each 
of them (hereinafter jointly and severally referred to as “Releasees”), for any and 
all past, present or future loss of or damage to property, and/or bodily injury, 
including death, however caused, resulting from, arising out of or in any way 
connected with his/her participation in or use of the Northwest Nazarene 
University Challenge Course Adventure Program. 
 
Hold Harmless/Indemnity:  The undersigned agrees to defend, indemnify and 
hold harmless the Releasees and each of them from any loss, liability, damage or 
cost she/he might incur due to her/his participation in or use of the Northwest 
Nazarene University Challenge Course Adventure Program whether caused by the 
negligence of the Releasees or otherwise.  The undersigned further covenants not 
to cause any action at law or in equity to be brought or permit such to be brought 
in his or her behalf, either directly or indirectly, on account of loss or damage to 
property and/or bodily injury, including death, against the Releasees, resulting 
from, or arising out of, or in any way connected with any claims, demands, and 
causes of action which now or in the future may be asserted against the Releasees 
arising out of or by reason of said course described above, including any injury, 
loss or damage that might occur at any place in connection therewith. 
 
Assumption of Risk:  The undersigned further states and affirms that he/she is 
aware of the fact that the aforesaid course, even under the safest conditions 
possible, may be hazardous, that he/she assumes the risks of any and all loss or of 
damage to property and/or bodily injury, including death, however caused, 
resulting out of or in any way connected with the Northwest Nazarene University 
Challenge Course Adventure Program; that he/she is of legal age and is competent 
to sign this Waiver of Claims and Release of Liability; and that he/she has read 
and understands all of the provisions herein contained.  Risks include but are not 
limited to the following:  [a list of various types of actions that can cause injury 
and various types of injuries]. 
 
 
Morrison contends that the hold harmless agreement is invalid because it is overbroad.  It 
exempts the University and “its members, directors, administrators, representatives, officers, 
agents, employees, and assigns, and each of them” from “any and all past, present or future 
claims, demands, and causes of action which the undersigned now has or may in the future have” 
for all “bodily injury, including death, however caused, resulting from, arising out of or in any 
way connected with his/her participation in or use of the Northwest Nazarene University 
 
5 
Challenge Course Adventure Program.”  It also specifically mentions negligence.  The hold 
harmless agreement is not overbroad.  It only applies to all causes of action “resulting from, 
arising out of or in any way connected with his/her participation in or use of the Northwest 
Nazarene University Challenge Course Adventure Program.”2  Due to the dangers inherent in 
climbing the climbing wall, the University can certainly require such a release from anyone 
choosing to engage in that activity.  
 
The agreement is likewise not inapplicable because of its failure to mention the specific 
conduct that is alleged to have constituted negligence in this case.  In Anderson & Nafziger v. G. 
T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 178, 595 P.2d 709, 712 (1979), this Court stated, “Clauses 
which exclude liability must speak clearly and directly to the particular conduct of the defendant 
which caused the harm at issue.”  That language can be misinterpreted, because neither that case 
nor the cases it cited nor our subsequent cases have held that an exculpatory clause must list the 
specific, allegedly negligent conduct at issue. 
 
The Anderson & Nafziger Court cited three cases as support for the statement.  The first 
one was Valley National Bank v. Tang, 499 P.2d 991 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).  In that case, the 
court stated “that clauses which purport to exclude liability for negligence must speak clearly and 
directly to the conduct at issue,” id. at 994, which it explained as meaning that an exculpatory 
clause would not cover negligence unless the wording was broad enough to include future 
negligent conduct within its scope.  It stated, “The principal reason for such a construction is to 
assure that there has been actual agreement between the parties that the defendant shall not be 
liable for the consequences of future conduct which would otherwise be negligent.”  Id.  The 
second case was Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. City of Topeka, 518 P.2d 372 (Kan. 1974).  The court 
held that a contract requiring a railroad to “save the said City of Topeka harmless from all costs, 
damages and expenses for the payment of which the said city may become liable to any person 
or persons or corporation by reason of the granting of said right of way to said railway 
company,” id. at 375, was not broad enough to require the city to pay the railroad the cost of 
relocating its tracks due to an urban renewal project.  The court stated, “As we view the ‘hold 
harmless’ clause, to which the railroad is deemed to have agreed, there is no suggestion it was 
intended to provide protection against liability for expenses, loss or damage created or made 
                                                 
2 There is no contention that the conduct of the University employee was reckless or that the employee intentionally 
injured Morrison. 
 
6 
necessary by actions of the city-franchisor.”  Id. at 376.  The third case was Walker Bank & Trust 
Co. v. First Sec. Corp., 341 P.2d 944 (Utah 1959), in which the beneficiary of a life insurance 
policy sued a bank for damages because the policy had lapsed due to the bank’s failure to charge 
the insured’s account with drafts for the monthly premiums.  The insured had signed an 
authorization to pay the drafts from her account, but the bank misplaced it.  The authorization 
included a provision stating, “I understand and agree that your compliance herewith shall 
constitute a gratuity and courtesy accorded me as your customer, and that you assume or incur no 
liability whatsoever in the premises, and I further agree to hold you harmless of and from any 
and all claims arising hereunder.”  Id. at 947.  The court held that the hold harmless agreement 
only barred claims resulting from the bank’s “compliance herewith,” not its failure to comply 
with the agreement.  The court stated: 
It will be noted that the language quoted above purports only to protect the 
bank from liability arising from its compliance with the authorization, indicating 
that if it did so it would “incur no liability whatsoever.”  . . .  But there is no 
provision that it would be protected in the event of entire failure to fulfill the 
arrangement. 
 
Id. (emphasis theirs).  None of the cases held that an exculpatory clause was ineffective because 
the specific conduct that gave rise to the cause of action was not listed.  
In Anderson & Nafziger, the buyer contracted to purchase three pivots that the seller 
agreed to deliver and install in mid-May, and the buyer brought an action for damages when the 
seller failed to do so.  The purchase contract included a provision limiting the seller’s liability 
which stated as following: 
It is hereby understood and agreed that all work ordered hereunder is 
precarious and uncertain in its nature, and all pulling of pumps, reinstalling 
pumps, repair work, alterations, well work, sand pumping, corrections, or other 
work herein specified, etc., shall be strictly at the Purchaser’s risk.  The Seller will 
not be liable for damage of any kind, particularly including loss or damage for 
diminuation or failure of crop, shortage of water, inability or failure to supply 
same, or for diminuation or cessation of water flow; nor shall the Seller be liable 
for any damages or delays of any kind on account of sticking of pump in the well 
in any position, either when being pulled out or being reinstated nor shall the 
Seller be liable for any damages on account of delay in making repairs or 
installing by virtue of some defect in the well, or by virtue of the well not being in 
condition to receive the machinery, or by virtue of unforeseen or changing 
conditions in the well or in or about the premises on which the well is located. 
 
 
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Anderson v. Nafziger, 100 Idaho at 178, 595, P.2d at 712.  This Court held that the clause did not 
preclude liability for crop loss caused by the failure to deliver the pivots because “[a] reading of 
the total clause indicates that the clause is aimed at limiting the seller’s liability for crop loss 
which is caused by installation or repair work done by seller.”  Id.  The clause listed specific 
types of conduct and causes of damage to which it applied.  It did not have a general provision 
excluding liability for any delay in delivering or installing the equipment. 
 
A review of this Court’s other cases shows that the hold harmless agreement need not 
specify the exact conduct that was allegedly negligent or caused harm.  In H. J. Wood Co. v. 
Jevons, 88 Idaho 377, 400 P.2d 287 (1965), a landowner had entered into a contract for the 
purchase and installation of an irrigation pump in her well.  The sales contract included a hold 
harmless agreement stating as follows: 
Seller shall not be liable for damage or for consequential damage, 
particularly including loss or damage for diminution or failure of crops, shortage 
of water, or inability or failure to supply same, whether due to improper 
installation or performance of the machinery or otherwise . . . it being understood 
and agreed by Buyer that this work is uncertain and precarious in its nature. 
 
Id. at 378, 400 P.2d at 289.  The landowner sought damages, alleging that she suffered crop 
losses because “the pump never functioned properly,” because the seller “removed the pump to 
make repairs and failed to provide appellant with a substitute pump,” and because “in making 
repairs to said pump [the seller] carelessly and negligently lost the tail pipe of said pump in the 
well, causing an inadequate flow or supply of water during the irrigation season.”  Id. at 380, 400 
P.2d at 288.  The trial court sustained the seller’s objection to any evidence of crop loss, and then 
dismissed the landowner’s claim.  On appeal, this Court held that it was not error to exclude 
evidence of crop loss because “[t]he foregoing quoted portion of the contract is unambiguous and 
clearly exempts respondent from liability for crop damage.”  Id. at 381, 400 P.2d at 289.  There 
was nothing in the exculpatory clause specifying that the seller would not be liable for failing to 
provide the landowner with a substitute pump while hers was being repaired or for negligently 
losing the tail pipe in the well, both of which were conduct that she alleged caused her damage.  
In fact, the clause did not even include the word “negligence.” 
 
In Rawlings v Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496, 465 P.2d 107 (1970), the 
landowner entered into a contract for the purchase and installation of irrigation pumping 
machinery.  He later brought an action seeking damages on the ground that he suffered crop loss 
 
8 
because of the allegedly negligent installation of the pumping equipment.  Paragraph 10 of the 
contract between the parties included an exculpatory clause stating: 
Seller or Holder shall not be liable for consequential damage particularly 
including loss or damage for diminution or failure of crops, shortage of water, or 
inability or failure to supply same, due to installation or performance of the 
property sold hereunder, or repair work, pump or well service, nor shall Seller be 
liable for collapsing, telescoping, separating or otherwise injuring the well or 
pump, for any cause whatsoever, including negligence, since the Buyer and Seller 
agree that the work is hazardous and precarious in its nature . . . . 
 
Id. at 497, 465 P.2d at 108.  The trial court dismissed the landowner’s claim based upon the 
above contract provision, and the landowner appealed.  In upholding the dismissal, we stated, “It 
is our opinion that the language contained in paragraph 10 of the contract is clear and 
unambiguous and its effect is to preclude the seller’s liability for consequential damages such as 
are sought by the appellant.”  Id. at 499, 465 P.2d at 110.  We did not require that the 
exculpatory clause mention the specific conduct that was allegedly negligent.  In fact, the 
specific conduct that allegedly constituted negligent installation was not even identified in the 
opinion. 
 
In Steiner Corp. v. American District Telegraph, 106 Idaho 787, 683 P.2d 435 (1984), the 
plaintiff contracted with the defendant to install and maintain a fire alarm system in the 
plaintiff’s building.  The system failed to detect a fire because the defendant had not checked the 
electrolyte levels in the system’s batteries for eight months even though they were to be 
inspected monthly.  The parties’ contract included a provision stating that the defendant “shall be 
exempt from liability for loss or damage due directly or indirectly to occurrences, or 
consequences therefrom, which the service is designed to detect or avert,” and that the 
exculpatory clause applied if the loss or damage “results directly or indirectly to person or 
property from performance or nonperformance of obligations imposed by this contract or from 
negligence, active or otherwise, of the [defendant], its agents or employees.”  Id. at 789, 683 
P.2d at 437.  The plaintiff sued for strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligence.  This 
Court first held that the complaint did not allege a cause of action under those theories, but then 
stated that even if the plaintiff could allege a cause of action it was barred by the exculpatory 
clause.  Id. at 791, 683 P.2d at 439.  We stated, “This unambiguous clause was clearly intended 
to apply to exclude liability under any of the bases urged by Steiner.”  Id.  The clause did not 
specifically mention the failure to inspect or maintain the batteries. 
 
9 
 
In Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976, 695 P.2d 361 (1984), the plaintiff, prior to going 
on a trail ride, signed a rental agreement that included an exculpatory clause stating: 
Upon my acceptance of horse and equipment, I acknowledge that I assume full 
responsibility for my safety.  I further understand that I ride at my own risk, and I 
agree to hold the above entity, its officers, employees, etc., harmless from every 
and all claim which may arise from injury, which might occur from use of said 
horse and/or equipment, in favor of myself, my heirs, representatives or 
dependents.  I understand that the stable does not represent or warrant the quality 
or character of the horse furnished. 
 
Id. at 977, 695 P.2d at 362.  Prior to the plaintiff mounting his horse, the defendant’s employee 
adjusted the cinch on the saddle.  During the ride, the saddle loosened, and the plaintiff was 
injured when it rotated and the horse reared as he was attempting to dismount.  We upheld the 
dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim on the ground that it was barred by the exculpatory clause, 
stating, “The agreement clearly and simply states that Sun Valley should be held ‘harmless for 
every and all claim which may arise from injury, which might occur from use of said horse 
and/or equipment,’ which is both unambiguous and applicable to the facts alleged by plaintiff.”  
Id. at 978, 695 P.2d at 363.  The exculpatory clause did not even mention negligence, nor did it 
specifically list the failure to properly adjust the cinch as being within its scope.  Justice Bistline 
dissented for that very reason.  Id. at 981, 695 P.2d at 366. 
 
Finally, in Empire Lumber Co v Thermal-Dynamic Towers, Inc., 132 Idaho 295, 971 P.2d 
1119 (1998), a warehouse lease contained a provision stating, “Except for reasonable wear and 
tear and damage by fire or unavoidable casualty, Lessee will at all times preserve said premises 
in as good repair as they now are or may hereafter be put to . . . .” Id. at 297, 971, P.2d at 1121. 
We held that the clause did not exempt the lessee from liability for fire damage caused by the 
lessee’s negligence, stating, “The lease language does not clearly indicate, as required by this 
Court’s decision in Anderson & Nafziger, that the parties intended to release TDT from liability 
for its negligent acts.”  Id. at 300, 971 P.2d at 1124.  The clause made no mention of negligence, 
nor could its language be construed to apply to negligence.  Hold harmless agreements are 
strictly construed against the person relying upon them.  Anderson & Nafziger, 100 Idaho at 178, 
595 P.2d at 712. 
 
The decisions of this Court have not held that a hold harmless agreement must describe 
the specific conduct or omission that is alleged to be negligent in order for it to bar recovery.  
That is consistent with the general law.  “The parties to a release need not have contemplated the 
 
10 
precise occurrence that caused the plaintiff’s injuries but rather may adopt language to cover a 
broad range of accidents by specifying injuries involving negligence on the part of the 
defendant.”  57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 53 (2004).  In this case, the agreement stated that 
Morrison held the University harmless “from any loss, liability, damage or cost she/he might 
incur due to her/his participation in or use of the Northwest Nazarene University Challenge 
Course Adventure Program whether caused by the negligence of the Releasees or otherwise.”  
That language clearly stated that the clause applied to negligence and to any loss or damage he 
might incur from his participation in the program.  The district court did not err in dismissing his 
negligence claim because it was barred by the hold harmless agreement. 
 
IV. 
Is the Defendant Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees? 
 
In its issues on appeal, the University states that it “requests attorney fees on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), Idaho Code § 12-121, and/or Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(e)(1).”  However, it did not again mention attorney fees until it states in the conclusion 
section of its brief, “Respondent further requests an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 12-120 (3), Idaho Code § 12-121, and/or I.R.C.P Rule 54(e)(1).”  As we held in 
Weaver v. Searle Brothers, 129 Idaho 497, 503, 927 P.2d 887, 893 (1996), where a party 
requests attorney fees on appeal but does not address the issue in the argument section of the 
party’s brief, we will not address the issue because the party has failed to comply with Idaho 
Appellate Rule 35. 
 
V. 
Conclusion. 
 
We affirm the judgment of the district court.  We award the respondent costs, but not 
attorney fees, on appeal. 
 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices W. JONES, and HORTON CONCUR.   
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
J. JONES, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur in Part II of the Court’s opinion but dissent with respect to Part III. In my view, 
the Release/Hold Harmless/Indemnity/Assumption of Risk Agreement (Agreement) does not 
contain language effective to release Northwest Nazarene University (NNU) from liability for its 
own negligent actions; the release language in the Agreement is overly broad; and it would be 
contrary to public policy to provide immunity under the particular facts of this case. 
 
Although this Court disfavors contracts purporting to absolve parties from certain duties 
and liabilities, contracting parties are free to enter into such agreements if they comply with strict 
criteria. As this Court summarized in Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70, 75, 233 P.3d 1, 6 (2008): 
Freedom of contract is a fundamental concept underlying the law of contracts. 
Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496, 499, 465 P.2d 107, 110 
(1970). A contracting party may absolve himself from certain duties and liabilities 
under the contract, subject to certain limitations. Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. 
Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 178, 595 P.2d 709, 712 (1979). However, courts 
look with disfavor on such attempts to avoid liability and construe such provisions 
strictly against the person relying on them, especially when that person is the 
preparer of the document. Id. Clauses which exclude liability must speak clearly 
and directly to the particular conduct of the defendant which caused the harm at 
issue. Id. 
 
 
Where a party seeks to obtain contractual absolution from the consequences of that 
party’s own negligence, the release language must be particularly clear. As stated in 57A 
American Jurisprudence, 2d Negligence § 52 (2004): 
Because the law does not favor contract provisions that relieve a person from his 
or her own negligence, and such provisions are subject to close judicial scrutiny, a 
greater degree of clarity is required to make such provisions effective. The 
exculpatory provision must be expressed in clear, explicit, and unequivocal 
language showing that this was the intent of the parties. The wording of such an 
agreement must be so clear and understandable that an ordinarily prudent and 
knowledgeable party to it will know what he or she is contracting away; it must 
be unmistakable.  
 
American Jurisprudence continues the discussion in section 53: 
To be effective, the intentions of the parties with regard to an exculpatory 
provision in a contract should be delineated with the greatest of particularity, and 
the clause must effectively notify the releasor that he or she is releasing the other 
person from claims arising from that person’s own negligence. 
 
An exculpatory clause will be given effect if the agreement clearly and 
unambiguously expresses the parties’ intention to exonerate by using the word 
 
12 
“negligence” and specifically including injuries definitely described as to time, 
place, and the like. Thus, the better practice is to expressly state the word 
“negligence” somewhere in the exculpatory provision. However, a specific 
reference to the “negligence” of the maker of the clause or agreement is not 
required if the clause clearly and specifically indicates an intent to release the 
defendant from liability for a personal injury caused by the defendant’s 
negligence, if protection against negligence is the only reasonable construction, or 
if the hazard experienced was clearly within the contemplation of the provision. 
However, words conveying a similar import must appear; the provision must 
specifically and explicitly refer to the negligence of the party seeking a release 
from liability. A preinjury release will not cover negligence if it neither 
specifically enumerates negligence, nor contains any other language that could 
relate to negligence. 
 
A general release will not bar claims outside the parties’ contemplation at the time 
it was executed. For example, a claim for negligence will not be barred by using 
broad and sweeping language, as by an agreement to release from “any and all 
responsibility or liability of any nature whatsoever for any loss of property or 
personal injury occurring on this trip.” Thus, an exculpatory clause must clearly 
set out the negligence for which liability is to be avoided. 
 
The parties to a release need not have contemplated the precise occurrence that 
caused the plaintiff’s injuries but rather may adopt language to cover a broad 
range of accidents by specifying injuries involving negligence on the part of the 
defendant. 
 
Id. § 53. 
 
The Agreement addresses four subjects―release, hold harmless, indemnity, and 
assumption of risk. The first paragraph of the Agreement, entitled “Release,” is a general release 
of liability,3 whereby participants in NNU’s Challenge Course Adventure Program (Program) 
release and waive claims against NNU and its agents and employees for property damage or 
bodily injury arising out of the Program. The word “negligence” does not appear anywhere in the 
Release. The second paragraph of the Agreement is a hold harmless/indemnity provision,4 
whereby the participant “agrees to defend, indemnify and hold harmless” NNU and its agents 
and employees from liability incurred due to participation in the Program “whether caused by the 
negligence of the Releasees or otherwise.” Thus, the participant is obligated to defend and hold 
                                                 
3 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a “release” is “[t]he relinquishment or concession of a right, title, or claim.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1403 (9th ed. 2009). 
4 According to Black’s, a “hold-harmless clause” is synonymous with an “indemnity clause,” which is “[a] 
contractual provision in which one party agrees to answer for any specified or unspecified liability or harm that the 
other party might incur.” Id. at 800, 837−38. 
 
13 
harmless the releasees against claims arising out of his or her participation in the Program. This 
paragraph specifically includes indemnity for claims alleging negligence on the part of NNU and 
its agents and employees. The last paragraph deals with assumption of risk,5 stating that the 
participant is aware that the course may be hazardous and that participants assume the risk of 
property damage and bodily injury. However, as with the Release, this paragraph makes no 
mention of negligence on the part of NNU and its agents and employees.   
 
It is significant that only the hold harmless/indemnity paragraph of the Agreement 
includes a provision relating to the negligence of NNU. The word “negligence” appears nowhere 
else in the Agreement, particularly not in the Release nor in the assumption of risk paragraph. It 
is important to keep in mind that a hold harmless/indemnity clause does not operate as a bar to a 
claim in the same way as a “release” or “assumption of risk” clause might. So, where the party 
seeking immunity faces the double whammy of our construction principles―construing release 
provisions strictly against the person relying on them and requiring such provisions to speak 
clearly and directly to the particular instrumentality that caused the harm―I simply cannot find 
that the release language here is sufficient to waive Morrison’s claim. NNU could have included 
a provision in the Release absolving it and its agents and employees from liability, but it did not. 
It could have done likewise in the assumption of risk paragraph, but it did not. Where such 
language is specifically included in one paragraph dealing with specific subject matter and not in 
the other paragraphs, both of which deal with other specific subject matter, I think we ought to 
give weight to that fact, particularly when required to construe such agreements against the 
avoidance of liability.  
 
Therefore, in my view, the release paragraph of the Agreement is insufficient to 
immunize against claims asserting injury for negligent acts by NNU and its agents and 
employees. In my estimation, NNU had a duty to operate the program in a non-negligent manner 
and Morrison has asserted sufficient facts to survive summary judgment as to whether NNU 
breached such duty. Morrison claims that he was not properly instructed on how to scale down 
the climbing wall and that the person holding the rope, which is apparently designed to keep a 
                                                 
5 According to Black’s, “assumption of the risk” is “[t]he principle that one who takes on the risk of loss, injury, or 
damage cannot maintain an action against a party that causes the loss, injury, or damage.” Id. at 143. Although 
implied assumption of the risk has been abolished as a defense in Idaho, this Court still recognizes that express 
assumption of risk may preclude a negligence claim. Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 989−90, 695 P.2d 369, 
374−75 (1985).  
 
14 
participant from falling, was not properly instructed and supervised in performing that task. 
According to Morrison: 
I had very little knowledge of climbing before [the accident]. I trusted and relied 
that the people running the course would properly instruct me and the people who 
were holding the rope that allowed me to scale down the wall. I do not believe 
that they gave me nor Donna Robbins, who was holding my rope, adequate 
instruction before this event nor do I believe that they adequately supervised 
Donna in properly handling the rope while I descended the wall. 
 
 
The person holding the rope, Donna Robbins, agreed that she had not been properly 
instructed nor supervised. According to her affidavit, “I did feel that I had not been given 
adequate training to act as the belayer and I felt that I was neglected by the employees at the 
Rope Course when I was needing help.” In her statement made immediately after the accident, 
which was incorporated into her affidavit, she expanded: 
The female assistant on site asked me to balet [sic] if I wasn’t going to climb the 
wall. I wasn’t comfortable working the equipment but I knew I should be a part of 
the team and help [belay]. I remember feeling like I was thrown in there and did 
not receive any further instruction other than where to hold my hands. After she 
strapped me in I was good to go. Soon she realized I was having trouble knowing 
what to do and informed me that I needed to pull the rope tight and slide the extra 
rope through my other hand to make it tight. She then placed another girl to my 
right and instructed her to coil the rope. I was the only one baleting [sic] and had 
one girl to my right holding the extra rope. As soon as they pulled the [ladder] 
away and Paul started climbing, I began to have trouble with the rope. The 
assistant assured me I was strapped down to the pole behind me and that I needed 
to walk forward away from the pole until I felt it was tight enough to not leave 
any slack. As soon as Paul reached the middle of the wall, his legs began to get 
tired and he would rest a little. But every time he would stop to rest, the rope 
pulled me into the air and the others around were laughing and joking around 
about the [sight] of me and my feet being off the ground and my body being 
pulled into the air. At first, it was comical but I felt like I couldn’t control him. I 
knew he had to keep climbing or else this strain on me would begin to hurt. So I 
just cheered him on. I looked around and everyone was just smiling so I figured I 
wasn’t going anywhere and there was nothing to worry about. Paul looked down 
and looked a little worried. He asked me if I was ok. I said yes. When Paul finally 
got to the top, he rang the bell and was ready to let go. When he did, if felt like an 
extreme pull on me and the assistant came quickly to briefly explain what to do. 
She told me to hold onto the [brake] (that also releases the rope). I think she 
thought she was explaining it to me−but she wasn’t. I told her I didn’t know how 
to use it. She said “its really easy,” just make sure you pull down the level.” She 
was walking away from me as she was saying this and she seemed very busy with 
other people. I didn’t think it would be too difficult. As I pulled the lever, Paul 
began to come down fast and I honestly don’t remember what I was thinking. I 
 
15 
tried to grab the rope but it just stung my fingers and I knew I couldn’t stop it that 
way. I kept trying to figure it out quickly. The girl to my right was helpless as 
well. The rope was just flying out her hands. I looked up and Paul’s feet, then 
butt, hit the rocks very fast and head hit very hard on the wooden frame around 
the rocks. 
 
My feeling throughout the rock-climbing activity was that I was alone and 
assigned to do it because I had to. I wasn’t comfortable at all but the assistant felt 
I was well taken care of. Even though I didn’t answer her twice when she asked 
for volunteers, so she called me out and handed me the [belay]. But I did want to 
be a part of the team and help but had never done it before and was pretty 
intimidated. 
 
 
Even if we were permitted to import the specific reference to negligent conduct from the 
hold harmless/indemnity paragraph into the Release, that paragraph suffers from another 
infirmity. It is overly broad. It purports to release NNU and its agents and employees from any 
claims for property damage or bodily injury “however caused, resulting from, or arising out of or 
in any way connected with his/her participation in or use of the Northwest Nazarene University 
Challenge Course Adventure Program.” The sweeping nature of the provision runs afoul of the 
specificity requirements noted in sections 52 and 53 of American Jurisprudence. This Court has 
found a similar all-encompassing provision in a lease agreement to be overly broad. In Jesse v. 
Lindsley, we dealt with an exculpatory clause that attempted “to relieve the landlord of liability 
for any type of injury, wherever it may occur.” 149 Idaho at 76, 233 P.3d at 7. We held, “The 
clause is too broad and does not speak clearly and directly to the particular conduct of the 
defendant intended to be immunized,” citing Anderson & Nafziger, 100 Idaho 175, 178, 595 
P.2d, 709, 712 (1970). We stated: 
While we have not considered the question of the enforceability of an overbroad 
exculpatory clause, we have considered the issue of enforceability of an 
overbroad contract provision in another area where a contractual provision is 
disfavored and strictly construed―covenants not to compete in contracts of 
employment. See Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 141 Idaho 415, 420, 111 
P.3d 100, 105 (2005). A covenant not to compete is reasonable and enforceable 
only if the covenant “(1) is not greater than necessary to protect the employer in 
some legitimate business interest; (2) is not unduly harsh or oppressive to the 
employee; and (3) is not injurious to the public.” Id. Applying the same principle 
here, it appears that the language absolving Lindsley of any liability for any 
occurrence anywhere on his property is simply too broad. 
 
Id. at 76−77, 233 P.3d at 7−8.  
 
16 
In its opinion, the Court nicely summarizes some of our pre-Jesse cases regarding the 
degree of specificity required in a lease provision, and in my view none of those cases preclude 
the result I suggest here. In Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976, 695 P.2d 361 (1984), the 
plaintiff was injured when the saddle on a rented horse slipped, causing the horse to buck.  Id. at 
977, 695 P.2d at 362.  The Court found that the plaintiff’s action was precluded by an agreement 
he signed acknowledging that he assumed the risk of riding and holding the defendant “harmless 
from every and all claim which may arise from injury, which might occur from use of said horse 
and/or equipment.”  Id.  Although the Court articulated little reasoning for its holding, a fall from a 
horse due to a loose saddle is a danger inherent in horseback riding itself.  Thus, the agreement’s 
language was sufficient to put the plaintiff on notice of that risk.  Of interest, however, is that the 
release specifically identified the “equipment” as a potential source of injury, which is not the case 
here.6 In H. J. Wood Co. v. Jevons, the Court evaluated a sales contract for an irrigation pump 
stating the seller “shall not be liable for damage or for consequential damage, particularly including 
loss or damage for diminution or failure of crops … whether due to improper installation or 
performance of the machinery or otherwise.”  88 Idaho 377, 378, 400 P.2d 287, 289 (1965).  The 
plaintiff’s claims for crop loss in that case all stemmed from the allegation that “the pump never 
functioned properly” and the consequences of that malfunction, which is clearly and directly 
contemplated by the “performance of the machinery” language in the agreement.  See id.  Thus, the 
Court correctly applied the rule.   
Another irrigation equipment contract case, Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., was 
similar.  93 Idaho 496, 465 P.2d 107 (1970).  There, the claim for crop loss was based on negligent 
                                                 
6 In this regard, a case cited in section 53 of American Jurisprudence is relevant. In Beardslee v. Blomberg, 70 
A.D.2d 732, 733 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979), a spectator at a stock car race volunteered to take part in a “Powder Puff 
Derby,” a stock car race for women. When the spectator’s car struck a retaining wall of the race track, she alleged 
the defendant raceway was negligent in “providing her with an unsafe vehicle, a defective helmet, and in failing to 
supply her with a fire suit.”  Id.  The defendant relied on a release she had signed to bar her claim (the language of 
which is not entirely quoted in the opinion), but the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, stated:   
 
The release absolves the defendants from liability for any injury plaintiff might sustain while in 
the “restricted area”, which includes the race track proper. It does not, however, specifically refer 
to equipment furnished by the defendants. Releases from liability for negligence are closely 
scrutinized and strictly construed, and a release general in its terms will not bar claims outside the 
parties' contemplation at the time it was executed …. Furthermore, since the release herein is not 
entirely free of ambiguity, an issue of fact exists as to whether the risk of faulty equipment or the 
failure to furnish essential equipment was within the contemplation of the parties at the time it was 
executed …. 
 
Id. 
 
17 
installation of pumping equipment, and the Court barred the claim based on an agreement 
exculpating the seller from liability for consequential damage “due to installation … of the 
property sold hereunder.”  Id. at 497, 465 P.2d at 108.7  Although the particular negligent conduct 
was not addressed, further specificity was not necessary to put the buyer on reasonable notice of 
the claim he was waiving.  Id.  Buying any item under a contract specifically limiting liability for 
defects in installation clearly brings to mind the discrete array of possible installation-related 
conduct that entails. Such a contract does far more to notify the signer than simply including 
blanket language barring liability for any type of negligent conduct imaginable. 
Similarly, in Steiner Corp. v. American District Telegraph, the defendant contracted with 
the plaintiff to perform two discrete services—to install and maintain a fire detection system.  106 
Idaho 787, 683 P.2d 435 (1984).  When the defendant failed to check the batteries of the system for 
eight months, the system failed to detect a fire in the plaintiff’s building.  Again, the Court found 
that such negligence fell under an exculpatory clause holding the defendant harmless for “loss or 
damage due … to occurrences … which the service is designed to detect or avert” resulting from 
“performance or nonperformance of obligations imposed by this contract or from negligence” of 
the defendant.  Id. at 789, 683 P.2d at 437.  This agreement specifically spoke to the alleged 
conduct by expressly referring to the discrete duties under the contract—to install and maintain.  In 
signing the agreement, the plaintiff undoubtedly understood he was giving up claims for fire 
damage arising from failure to maintain the system, which reasonably included checking the 
batteries.     
Conversely, in Anderson & Nafziger, the Court refused to find that a sales agreement for 
irrigation pivots contemplated liability for crop loss caused by delay in delivering the pivots, based 
on a strict reading of the agreement’s language.  100 Idaho at 178, 595 P.2d at 712.  Although the 
agreement contained blanket language stating that “[t]he Seller will not be liable for damage of any 
kind, particularly including loss or damage for diminuation [sic] or failure of crop,” the Court held 
that the agreement did not apply.  Id.  The Court stated, “A reading of the total clause indicates that 
the clause is aimed at limiting the seller’s liability for crop loss which is caused by installation or 
repair work done by seller.”  Id.  With a loose reading, the Court might have found that the blanket 
language exempting liability “for damage of any kind” extended not only to that caused by 
                                                 
7 The contract later specifically identified negligence of the seller as a possible cause.  Id.    
 
18 
installation and repair, but also by delay in delivery.  However, the Court declined such a broad 
reading, focusing strictly on the language in the contract.8  
 
The upshot of these pre-Jesse cases is that where the dangers or risks inherent in a 
particular undertaking are, or should be, apparent to a reasonable person and where the release 
agreement employs clear and direct language to negate liability for such risks or dangers, the 
release will be effective to shield the releasee from liability. On the other hand, where a reasonable 
releasor cannot be expected to comprehend the risk or danger that results in injury and where the 
release does not contain language that speaks directly to limitation of liability for injury caused by 
such risk or danger, the release will not be enforced. 
 
In the situation at hand, it cannot be said that the danger of falling from the rock wall was 
not readily apparent to any reasonable person. Morrison would surely have known that he could 
lose his grip or footing and fall. However, the activity involved a danger that was not so readily 
apparent. This activity involved equipment and a procedure that may have appeared on the surface 
to alleviate or eliminate the risk. The belaying rope, like a trapeze artist’s safety net, was there, 
apparently to protect participants from the danger of a fall. This certainly would give a participant a 
certain measure of comfort and well being―knowing that the element of danger might well be 
alleviated or eliminated by the safety equipment. It is one thing to expose a participant to the 
“dangers inherent” in a particular activity and ask him to waive a consequent claim for damages, 
but it is quite another to give the participant the illusion of protective measures−thereby providing 
a false sense of security―and then fail to properly implement those protective measures. It is akin 
to a bait and switch. If protective measures are carried out in a competent manner, then an accident 
occurring in the course of the proceedings cannot be held against the sponsor. However, if those 
protective measures are inherently inadequate, by reliance on untutored or incapable personnel in 
their handling, the sponsors should not be shielded from responsibility by a waiver signed by an 
unwitting participant.  
 
It makes sense to encourage sponsors of risky activities to adopt safety measures designed 
                                                 
8 Another case, Empire Lumber Co. v. Thermal-Dynamic Towers, Inc., also shows the Court taking a closer look at 
an exculpatory clause, although the result there was more obvious.  132 Idaho 295, 971 P.2d 1119 (1998).  In 
Empire Lumber, a lessee sought to apply a lease provision to excuse its liability for a fire allegedly caused by its 
negligence.  Id.  The Court disagreed because the lease merely stated, “Except for reasonable wear and tear and 
damage by fire or unavoidable casualty, Lessee will at all times preserve said premises in as good repair as they now 
are or may hereafter be put to ….”  Id. at 297, 971 P.2d at 1121.  As the Court properly found, that clause clearly 
only contemplated incidental or unavoidable damage—not negligence.  Id.       
 
19 
to alleviate or eliminate the risk to participants. It is not particularly good policy, however, to allow 
sponsors to escape liability when those safety measures are handled in an incompetent or negligent 
manner, unless participants are clearly put on notice that safety measures or equipment may not 
provide the margin of safety that one might reasonably anticipate. Nothing in the Release here 
indicates the employment of “equipment,” as the language in Lee did, nor of the possibility that 
any safety equipment might be operated in a faulty manner. Sponsors should be encouraged to 
adopt safety measures, but they should be held accountable where those measures are performed in 
a negligent fashion. 
 
In the past, this Court has not been reluctant to embrace concepts of this nature, designed to 
provide redress where it may not have been previously available. For instance, the Court has 
adopted the doctrine that, “[e]ven when an affirmative duty generally is not present, a legal duty 
may arise if ‘one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior duty to do so.’” Baccus 
v. Ameripride Services, Inc., 145 Idaho 346, 350, 179 P.3d 309, 313 (2008). “In such case, the duty 
is to perform the voluntarily-undertaken act in a non-negligent manner.” Id. As with a voluntarily 
assumed duty, it makes good sense and policy to require that an activity sponsor who purports to 
make a risky activity safe, by the apparent incorporation of protective measures, be required to 
ensure the protective measures are carried out in a non-negligent manner or provide specific 
warning to participants that a risk of negligence in that regard inheres in the activity.9  
 
For all or any one of the foregoing reasons, I would vacate the judgment of the district 
court on the ground that the Agreement was ineffective to shield NNU from liability for 
Morrison’s claim. I would therefore remand for further proceedings. 
 
 
                                                 
9 As we have noted on a number of occasions, “Public policy may be found and set forth in the statutes, judicial 
decisions or the constitution.” Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho at 75, 233 P.3d at 6 (quoting Bakker v. Thunder Spring-
Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 189, 108 P.3d 332, 336 (2005)).