Title: BARNES v. BARNES

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BARNES v. BARNES2000 WY 40998 P.2d 942Case Number: 98-313Decided: 03/06/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
RUSSELL GENE BARNES, 
Appellant (Defendant), v.JANE MCKAY BARNES, a/k/a JANE BETSCHART, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Goshen County, The Honorable Barton R. Voigt, 
Judge.

Pro se., 
representing appellant.Edward A. Buchanan of Knudsen Law Offices, 
Torrington, WY., representing appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1] Appellant 
Russell Barnes filed this appeal pro se challenging the district court's denial 
of his motion to vacate the divorce decree granted to appellee Jane McKay 
Betschart (formerly Jane Barnes). Finding no error, we 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Appellant 
presents the following issues:

1. Was the Appellant 
denied due process by not being afforded notice of the [divorce] hearing and the 
meaningful opportunity to be heard?

2. Did [Appellant's 
counsel] violate the Rules of Professional Conduct by continuing to represent 
the Appellant even after she was discharged?

3. Did the Court err in 
determining the distribution of property, child custody, and amount of child 
support?

[¶3] Appellee 
responds with these issues:

I. Should Appellant's 
appeal be dismissed for failure to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure?

II. Whether the district 
court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for order to vacate 
amended decree of divorce and its accompanying motions for a temporary 
restraining order and peremptory disqualification of 
judge?

III. Whether Appellant is 
precluded from arguing on this appeal the merits of the district court's 
decisions in the underlying divorce case and is restricted to arguing only the 
district court's denial of his assorted motions?

IV. Should Appellee be 
awarded attorney fees under W.R.A.P. 10.05?

FACTS

[¶4] On December 
18, 1996, the district court held a scheduled hearing on appellee's petition for 
divorce from appellant. Counsel for appellant was present, but appellant did not 
appear. Before continuing with the hearing, the district court held an in camera 
proceeding to determine the reason for appellant's absence. There, counsel for 
appellant explained that she and her client were present at a motions hearing on 
November 12, 1996, where the court set the time and the date for the present 
divorce hearing. Counsel recalled that, at that time, appellant agreed to 
provide information regarding appellant's income which had been requested by 
appellee. Counsel further stated that several days after the November hearing, 
she left town until December 5, 1996. Appellant did not contact her office while 
she was gone. Upon her return, counsel attempted to contact appellant several 
times, including a telephone call to his mother to determine appellant's 
location, but was unable to reach him. Counsel concluded by informing the court 
that appellant knew the date and time he was to be at court, and she did not 
know why appellant was not present. Appellee's counsel corroborated the fact 
that both parties had been present at the November 12 hearing, that notice of 
the current hearing was given at that time, and that appellant had not provided 
the information requested at the November hearing.

[¶5] The trial 
court proceeded with the hearing, finding that several continuances had 
previously been granted and appellant voluntarily chose not to be present at the 
hearing despite notice of its date and time. On January 24, 1997, appellant sent 
a letter to the judge apologizing for his absence and asking the court to advise 
him of what to do next. Because no certificate of service on either of the 
attorneys accompanied the letter, the court returned a copy of the letter to 
both counsel, unread, and placed the original in the file. On March 14, 1997, 
appellant filed a pro se "Objection Notice" in which he alleged that his counsel 
had no proper authority to represent him and that he was not "properly notified 
of any hearing in this matter." Appellant further alleged that "[due] to the 
criminal action . . . and [his] incarceration on February 6, 1997, [his] ability 
to conform to this decree is impossible."

[¶6] The record 
is silent as to when an original decree issued; however, on March 27, 1997, the 
trial court granted an Amended Decree of Divorce awarding primary custody of the 
two children to appellee. The trial court also determined property division and 
monthly child support to be paid by appellant. Fourteen months after the decree 
issued, on May 29, 1998, appellant filed a notice of appeal "pursuant to Rule 
60(b)" challenging the divorce decree. On June 22, 1998, that appeal was 
dismissed due to its untimely filing. Refusing to be deterred, on August 27, 
1998, appellant filed a motion to vacate the divorce decree with the trial 
court, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) and (6). Appellant claimed he was denied 
due process because he was not afforded notice of the hearing and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. This motion was accompanied by a motion for a temporary 
restraining order and a motion to peremptorily disqualify the judge.1 The district court issued a 
decision letter denying appellant's motions without a hearing on September 23, 
1998. An Order to that effect was filed on October 2, 1998, and this appeal 
followed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶7] Appellant 
claims error under both W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) and (6). These subsections 
provide:

(b) On motion, and upon 
such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (4) the judgment 
is void; . . . or

(6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time

. . . 
.

[¶8] Generally, 
we review a motion brought pursuant to Rule 60(b) to determine whether there has 
been an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. TRL v. RLP, 772 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Wyo. 
1989); McBride v. McBride, 598 P.2d 814, 816 (Wyo. 1979). "When the judgment is 
attacked pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), however, there is no question of 
discretion either the judgment is void or it is valid - and, once the question 
of its validity is resolved, the trial court must act accordingly." State ex 
rel. TRL, 772 P.2d  at 1054; see also Emery v. Emery, 404 P.2d 745, 749 (Wyo. 
1965).

DISCUSSION

[¶9] As an 
initial matter, appellee requests that we invoke our discretionary power under 
W.R.A.P. 1.03 to dismiss this appeal due to appellant's failure to follow 
various rules of appellate procedure. Appellant did not designate any record, 
but instead attached miscellaneous documents as an appendix to his brief. We 
decline to dismiss this case only because we find sufficient information in the 
official record to affirm the district court's denial of appellant's motions on 
their merits. See Rogers v. Rogers, 973 P.2d 1118, 1120-21 (Wyo. 1999). We note, 
however, that we will disregard appellant's attachments which are not contained 
in the official record of this matter.

[¶10] Relief 
under Rule 60(b)(4) is appropriate only if appellant demonstrates that the court 
that rendered the decision "lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the 
parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." DMM 
v. DFH, 954 P.2d 976, 978 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Wright, Miller & Kane, 
Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2nd § 2862, at 326-29 (1995)). Appellant 
does not contend that there is a jurisdictional error. The crux of appellant's 
claim is his assertion that he was denied due process because he was not present 
at a November 12 hearing; he was not notified of the date for the divorce 
hearing; and he had terminated counsel's representation approximately two weeks 
prior to the December hearing date.

[¶11] There is 
nothing in the record, however, to substantiate appellant's claims that he did 
not receive notice of the hearing date or that he terminated counsel prior to 
the December hearing. The district court, recognizing the importance of 
appellant's right to due process, verified on the record that appellant had 
received notice of the hearing and that appellant's absence was his own doing. 
Even had the appellant fired his counsel, he had sufficient time to retain new 
counsel and/or to appear at the hearing, but he chose not to do so. Appellant's 
belated ex parte submission of his apology for not appearing made no mention of 
his current claims. While his later-filed objection states that his counsel had 
no "proper authority" to represent him and that he was not "properly" notified 
of the hearing, his only reference to a request for relief is his plan to appeal 
the district court's decision. He did not do so until over a year later - well 
beyond the time allowed by rule. Based on this record, we find no denial of 
appellant's due process rights and, therefore, no error in the district court's 
denial of relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4).

[¶12] Appellant 
also argues that he is entitled to relief under the provision of W.R.C.P. 
60(b)(6) that permits relief for "any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment." We have repeatedly invoked the concept that this 
provision should be utilized only under extraordinary circumstances. Fluor 
Daniel (NPOSR), Inc. v. Seward, 956 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Wyo. 1998); Lee v. Sage 
Creek Refining Co., 947 P.2d 791, 794 (Wyo. 1997); Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 998 (Wyo. 1993); Hochhalter v. Great Western Enterprises, Inc., 708 P.2d 666, 669-70 (Wyo. 1985). Nothing in this record demonstrates the existence of 
extraordinary circumstances which justify relief under this "catch all" 
phrase.

[¶13] 
Appellant's failure to retain new counsel or to appear at the December hearing 
is not sufficient justification for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See Matter of 
Injury to Seevers, 720 P.2d 899, 903 (Wyo. 1986). In his brief to this court, 
appellant insists that his incarceration in the Wyoming State Penitentiary two 
months after the December hearing, and his resulting lack of access to court 
documents, justifies the time lapse between the issuance of the decree and his 
motion for relief under Rule 60(b). We find no mention of this excuse to the 
district court in appellant's Motion to Vacate. "This court generally refuses to 
consider issues not presented to the district court and then raised for the 
first time on appeal." Hoblyn v. Goins, 977 P.2d 1281, 1284 (Wyo. 1999) (citing 
Vigil v. Ruettgers, 887 P.2d 521, 526 (Wyo. 1994)).

[¶14] Moreover, 
even were we to accept appellant's claim that he was deprived of access to legal 
information, he admits he did have access as of November 1997. Appellant offers 
no explanation as to why it would be reasonable to wait until August of 1998 to 
file his motions. Given a lack of exceptional circumstances and his failure to 
file his motion within a reasonable time, we find that the district court 
clearly did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for relief 
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).

[¶15] We refuse 
to consider appellant's remaining claims as they are unsupported by the record, 
cogent argument, or pertinent authority. Osborn v. Estate of Manning, 968 P.2d 932, 933 (Wyo. 1998).

[¶16] Finally, 
we turn to appellee's request for sanctions pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05. We 
recognize that sanctions normally are not available where a discretionary ruling 
of the district court is questioned. Meyer v. Rodabaugh, 982 P.2d 1242, 1245 
(Wyo. 1999) (citing Russell v. Russell, 948 P.2d 1351, 1356 (Wyo. 1997)). In 
this case, however, the only discretionary ruling of the district court related 
to appellant's claim under Rule 60(b)(6). See DMM v. DFH, 954 P.2d  at 978. In 
regard to this claim, appellant failed to designate any record or mount cogent 
argument supporting his contentions. Indeed, there is no apparent reason for 
appellant's current appeal other than to end-run our determination that his 
direct appeal was untimely filed. We take this opportunity to reiterate what we 
said in Kennedy v. Kennedy, 483 P.2d 516, 518 (Wyo. 1971):

One of the principal 
purposes behind the adoption of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure was to put 
an end to delays in litigation; and Rule 60(b) was not intended as a means of 
enlarging by indirection the time for appeal except in compelling circumstances 
where justice requires that course or unless relief under the motion has been 
granted.

(Citation 
omitted.) See also Harris v. Taylor, 969 P.2d 142, 144 (Wyo. 1998); Ahearn v. 
Anderson-Bishop Partnership, 946 P.2d 417, 423 (Wyo. 
1997).

[¶17] The only 
purpose served by appellant's current use of our judicial system is the 
continued harassment of appellee and the waste of judicial resources. We, 
therefore, grant appellee's request for sanctions in this case. Appellee shall 
submit a statement of costs and attorney fees to this court; and, upon review, 
appropriate costs, fees and penalty will be awarded.

CONCLUSION

[¶18] The 
district court carefully preserved a record which clearly negates appellant's 
claims that he was denied due process and did not have an opportunity to be 
heard. Appellant has failed to designate any record to support a basis for 
granting relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Due to appellant's lack of record support for his claims, cogent argument, or 
the citation of pertinent authority, we grant appellee's request for 
sanctions.

[¶19] The 
judgment of the district court is affirmed.

1 The denial of these 
motions is not a subject on appeal.