Title: State v. Upton

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  December 30, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Relator,
v.
GEORGE WASHINGTON UPTON,
aka Dominique DiGiorgio,
Defendant-Adverse Party.
(CC No. 04-419; SC S52316)
En Banc
Original proceeding in mandamus.
Argued and submitted September 9, 2005.
Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for relator.  With him on the briefs were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Jesse Wm. Barton, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
brief for adverse party.
DE MUNIZ, J.
Peremptory writ of mandamus to issue.
DE MUNIZ, J. 
This is an original mandamus proceeding.  The issue it  
presents is whether a trial court has the authority under Oregon
law to submit certain "sentence enhancement factors" (1) to a
jury for factual determination as required under the Sixth
Amendment principles articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 466, 120 S Ct 2348, 147 L
Ed 2d 435 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 US 296, 124 S Ct
2531, 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004).
Defendant is charged in a six-count "second superseding
indictment" with racketeering (ORS 166.720), two counts of first
degree aggravated theft (ORS 164.057), one count of first degree
attempted aggravated theft, one count of first degree forgery
(ORS 165.013), and one count of falsifying business records (ORS
165.080).  The indictment alleges that defendant committed the
offenses between August 15, 2003 and April 15, 2004.  Each felony
count of the indictment also alleges:
"The state further alleges the aggravating factors
of persistent involvement based on the following
convictions:  1) December 22, 1980, Fresno County,
California Superior Count, Grand Theft - 2 Counts; 2)
February 2, 1981, Fresno County, California Superior
Court, Theft by Fraud; 3) March 25, 1886, Washoe
County, Nevada District Court, Attempt to Obtain Money
under False Pretenses, Obtaining Signature by False
Pretenses - 2 Counts; 4) June 7, 1991, Eldorado County,
California Superior Court, Vehicle Theft; 5) September
13, 1991, Santa Barbara, California Superior Court,
Grand Theft; 6) October 4, 1993, Kootenani County,
Idaho District Court, Grand Theft."
In addition, counts 1, 2, and 3 of the indictment further allege
the aggravating factor of "vulnerable victim."  Oregon sentencing
guidelines identify the aggravating or sentence enhancement
factors alleged in the indictment as justification for the
imposition of sentences that exceed the presumptive sentence for
each of the felony counts. (2)  OAR 213-008-0002(1)(b)(B),
(D). (3)  
Defendant demurred to the indictment, arguing that
aggravating factors could not be alleged in the indictment
because an Oregon trial court had no statutory authority to
submit an aggravating or enhancing factor to a jury as required
under the Sixth Amendment.  The trial court refused to dismiss
defendant's indictment but nevertheless concluded that
"[d]efendant's involvement in past crimes as well as the language
regarding vulnerable victim may not be submitted to the jury." 
The state petitioned for a writ of mandamus and this court issued
an alternative writ of mandamus commanding the trial court either
to vacate its order or show cause for not doing so.  The trial
court declined to vacate its order.  For the reasons explained
below, we conclude that a trial court may submit the
determination of sentence enhancement factors to a jury as
required under the Sixth Amendment. 
After we issued the alternative writ of mandamus in
this case, the governor signed Senate Bill (SB) 528 (2005), which
authorizes a court to submit to a jury what the bill describes as
"enhancement facts."  Or Laws 2005, ch 463.  Under SB 528, an
"enhancement fact" is a "fact that is constitutionally required
to be found by a jury in order to increase the sentence that may
be imposed upon conviction of a crime."  Or Laws 2005, ch 463, §
1(2).  The new law provides that the state must give notice to a
defendant that it intends to rely on an enhancement fact by
pleading the enhancement fact in the accusatory instrument, or by
other timely written notice.  Or Laws 2005, ch 463, § 2.  An
enhancement fact that relates to a charged offense, must be
submitted to a jury, unless a defendant waives a jury
determination of that fact.  Or Laws 2005, ch 463, § 3. 
Because of the potential impact of SB 528 on this and
many other pending cases, this court requested that the parties 
file supplemental briefs addressing SB 528.  The parties have
done so ably.  Defendant contends that SB 528 does not provide
authority to submit the determination of aggravating factors to a
jury in this case, and that, in any event, SB 528 is
unconstitutional for several reasons.  Before discussing
defendant's constitutional challenges, we observe that
defendant's arguments regarding SB 528 are based primarily on
defendant's assumption that a trial court lacked authority to
empanel a sentencing jury before the enactment of SB 528. 
Defendant contends that, before SB 528 was enacted, there was no
statutory authorization for a trial court to empanel a jury to
decide facts solely for sentencing purposes.  According to
defendant, whether trial courts may empanel a jury for that
purpose depends on whether the legislature granted courts that
authority in the sentencing guidelines.  According to defendant,
that authority does not exist.  We now turn to that question.   
We begin with two pertinent criminal trial statutes
that delineate the jury's function.  ORS 136.030 and ORS 136.320
provide that questions of fact are for the jury.  ORS 136.030
provides:
"An issue of law shall be tried by the judge of
the court and an issue of fact by a jury of the court
in which the action is triable."
Similarly, ORS 136.320 provides:
"Although the jury may find a general verdict,
which includes questions of law as well as fact, it is
bound, nevertheless, to receive as law what is laid
down as such by the court; but all questions of fact,
other than those mentioned in ORS 136.310, shall be
decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon addressed
to it." (4)
Read together, ORS 136.030 and ORS 136.320 thus
authorize the trial court to submit "all questions of fact" to
the jury that a criminal defendant is entitled to have the jury
decide.  Furthermore, in a criminal trial, ORCP 58 B(8) and 59 B
authorize the trial court to instruct jurors regarding any
aggravating or enhancing factor that they must resolve.  See ORS
136.330 (ORCP 58(B) and 59(B) applicable in criminal trials).  In
other words, there are statutes that are generally applicable to
the conduct of a criminal trial that authorize a trial court to
submit sentencing enhancing factors to a jury. 
Defendant does not address directly why that general
legislative mandate reflected in ORS 136.030 and ORS 136.320 does
not authorize a trial court to empanel a jury to resolve
questions of fact related to sentencing.  Instead, defendant
focuses on the sentencing guideline statutes and rules, asserting
that certain of those statutes and rules expressly forbid jury
participation in the sentencing function.
Defendant's analysis begins with ORS 137.669, which
provides that the sentencing guidelines "shall control the
sentences for all crimes committed," and that the guidelines
"shall be mandatory and constitute presumptive sentences." 
Defendant also points to OAR 213-005-0001(1), which, consistent
with ORS 137.669, describes "gridblocks" that designate 
presumptive sentences and provides that a "sentencing judge
should select the center of the range in the usual case and
reserve the upper and lower limits for aggravating and mitigating
factors sufficient to warrant a departure."  
Defendant next identifies ORS 137.671(1), which
provides that a sentencing court may impose a sentence outside
the presumptive range if the sentencing court "finds there are
substantial and compelling reasons justifying a deviation from
the presumptive sentence."  Defendant notes that OAR 213-008-0001
likewise states that a sentencing court shall impose the
presumptive sentence unless "the judge finds substantial and
compelling reasons to impose a departure."  
Finally, defendant points to OAR 213-008-0002, which
sets forth a nonexclusive list of aggravating and mitigating
factors and provides that those factors "may be considered in
determining whether substantial and compelling reasons for a
departure exist."  Defendant asserts that the provisions he has
identified in the sentencing guidelines and the appellate
decisions (5) interpreting them establish that the sentencing
guidelines require a judge, not a jury, to determine any
aggravating or enhancing factors necessary to justify a sentence
beyond the presumptive range.
We agree that the statutes and rules cited by defendant 
provide that a sentencing court must determine whether
substantial and compelling reasons justify a sentence beyond the
presumptive range for a particular crime.  As we shall explain,
however, those statutes and rules do not place any limitation on
the use of a jury to make the factual findings necessary to
support the imposition of an enhanced sentence. 
Under the sentencing guidelines, imposition of a
sentence that exceeds the presumptive range requires two steps. 
First, there must be a determination of whether the state has
proved the existence of aggravating or enhancing factors. 
Second, there must be a determination of whether the factors so
proved provide a substantial and compelling reason that justifies
imposing a sentence beyond the presumptive range.  The statutes
and rules cited by defendant, however, do not purport to identify
who may make the factual findings that are the necessary basis
for the sentencing court's ultimate determination.  OAR 213-008-0002(1), for example, provides only that the nonexclusive list of
aggravating factors "may be considered [by the court] in
determining whether substantial and compelling reasons for a
departure exist."  In other words, even if the jury finds that an
aggravating or enhancing factor was proved, the court is not
required to order a sentencing departure based on that finding.  
In a related argument, defendant asserts that the
relevant sentencing guideline statutes are inconsistent with the
Sixth Amendment requirements established in Apprendi and Blakely,
because those cases require the state to prove the existence of
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt in order to support
a sentence that exceeds the presumptive range.  For that
proposition, defendant relies on ORS 137.090(1)(c), which
requires that a sentencing court, in determinating "aggravation
or mitigation," consider any "evidence relevant to aggravation or
mitigation that the court finds trustworthy and reliable." 
Although that provision does not refer to a burden of proof,
defendant argues that, because evidence is "relevant" under OEC
401 only if it makes a fact "more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence," ORS 40.150, the legislative
requirement that evidence be "relevant" essentially converts the
proceeding into one that allows the court to determine
aggravating facts by a preponderance of the evidence.  We
disagree with defendant's reading of the pertinent statutes.  In
our view, nothing in the statutes defendant has identified
prohibits implementation of the Sixth Amendment requirement that
enhancing factors be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Before the trial court, defendant made an additional
argument to support his contention that the alleged aggravating
or enhancing factors cannot be submitted to a jury.  In that
regard, defendant argued that it would violate the "fundamental
fairness" requirement of the Due Process Clause to permit the
state to submit evidence of "persistent involvement" in criminal
activities enhancing facts to a jury at trial for subsequent
sentence enhancement purposes.  Such facts defendant asserted,
would be unduly prejudicial.
We reject that argument.  Apprendi and Blakely
establish that under the Sixth Amendment each aggravating or
enhancing factor encompassed with the sentencing guideline
statute is essentially a new element of an aggravated form of the
underlying offense.  Because each aggravating or enhancing factor
is a new "material element" of the charged offense, the state
must prove that factor to a jury unless a defendant agrees to
some other procedure. 
In summary, Apprendi and Blakely extend a criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment jury trial right to the determination
of a sentence enhancement factor.  The provisions of ORS 136.030
and ORS 136.320 -- authorizing a trial court to submit all
questions of fact to a jury -- are consistent with that federal
constitutional requirement.  Defendant's argument that the text
of the sentencing guideline statutes preclude a jury from
determining sentencing enhancing factors is unpersuasive.  There
is a difference between the determination by a jury of
aggravating factors and the determination by the court of whether
those facts provide substantial and compelling reasons to impose
a sentence that exceeds the presumptive range.  As explained
above, the pertinent sentencing guideline statutes generally
refer to a sentencing court's authority to depart based on
"substantial and compelling reasons."  See, e.g., ORS 137.671
(court may depart "if it finds there are substantial and
compelling reasons justifying" the departure).  Under Blakely,
the Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to have a jury determine
any aggravating factor that a court may then use to justify a
sentence that exceeds the presumptive range.  Nothing in Blakely
precludes a sentencing court from deciding whether jury-determined aggravating factors constitute a substantial and
compelling reason to impose a sentence that exceeds the
presumptive range. 
We turn next to defendant's arguments regarding the
applicability and constitutionality of SB 528.  As set out above,
SB 528 authorizes a trial court to submit "sentence enhancement
facts," to a jury.  Such facts are defined as any fact that is
constitutionally required to be submitted to a jury in order to
support an enhanced sentence.  Or Laws 2005, ch 463, §§ 1-7.  SB
528 applies to all criminal actions commenced or pending on or
after its effective date, as long as a sentence has not yet been
imposed.  Or Laws 2005, ch 463, § 21(1)-(2).  It also applies to
any case that has been remanded to a trial court and in which a
new sentence has not yet been imposed at the time of the bill's
effective date.  Or Laws 2005, ch 463, § 21(3).  As a result,
although the indictment in this case alleges that defendant
committed the charged offenses before the effective date of SB
528, its provisions nevertheless apply to defendant under section
21(2).  
Defendant makes three primary challenges to the
application of SB 528.  First, defendant argues that applying SB
528 to his case is an impermissible ex post facto application of
the law in violation of Article I, section 21, of the Oregon
Constitution and Article I, section 10, of the United States
Constitution.  Second, he contends that this court should
invalidate portions of SB 528 because the title does not comply
with the requirements set out in Article IV, section 20, of the
Oregon Constitution.  Finally, defendant argues that SB 528
amends existing sentencing guideline provisions without saying
so, thereby violating Article IV, section 22, of the Oregon
Constitution, which states that a bill may not revise or amend an
existing act unless it is "set forth, and published at full
length."
Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution
provides, in part, that "[n]o ex-post facto law * * * shall ever
be passed * * *."  Article I, section 10, of the United States
Constitution similarly provides, in part, that "[n]o State shall
* * * pass any * * * ex post facto Law * * *."  Generally, the ex
post facto clauses of both constitutions prohibit retroactive
legislation that makes actions criminal after the fact, or
increase the punishment for previously committed acts.  State v.
MacNab, 334 Or 469, 475, 51 P3d 1249 (2002); see, e.g., Stogner v.
California, 539 US 607, 611-13, 123 S Ct 2446, 156 L Ed 2d 544
(2003) (discussing federal ex post facto clause).  Article I,
section 21, also prohibits retroactive alterations of evidentiary
rules that make it easier for the state to obtain a conviction. 
State v. Fugate, 332 Or 195, 213-14, 26 P3d 802 (2001).  
Defendant's ex post facto argument is premised on his
claim that SB 528 unconstitutionally alters evidentiary rules
because "this new scheme helps the state, not just by restoring
its ability to secure aggravated departures, but also by
generally allowing the state to present evidence and jury
instructions on factors that highlight the aggravated nature of a
defendant's crimes in way that the jury otherwise would not
hear."  Defendant concedes, however, that SB 528 permits
bifurcation of the penalty phase from the guilt phase to avoid
presenting prejudicial evidence to the jury when it determines
guilt.  See Or Laws 2005, ch 463, § 3(4) (so stating).  Moreover,
criminal defendants may choose, as they see fit, either a jury or
the court to serve as the factfinder for the purpose of
determining aggravating factors at sentencing.  Or Laws 2005, ch
463, § 3(1)(b)(B).  
Nevertheless, defendant argues that by permitting the
introduction of evidence and instructions regarding aggravating, 
but not mitigating, factors, SB 528 "disallows defendant from
counter-balancing the prosecution's case on aggravation."  We 
reject that aspect of defendant's argument because it
misperceives the manner in which aggravating and mitigating
factors operate under the sentencing guidelines.  Aggravating and
mitigating factors listed in OAR 213-008-0002 are proven
independently of one another.  Under the sentencing guidelines
after Apprendi and Blakely, a jury need not consider the effect
of any mitigating fact to decide whether an aggravating fact
exists.  Furthermore, it is the court, not the jury that makes
the ultimate decision whether aggravating or mitigating facts
justify a sentence beyond or below the presumptive range.
In our view, SB 528 changes only the method for
determining the available punishment; it does not, however,
increase that punishment.  To the extent that SB 528 changes the
quantum of proof required under the sentencing guidelines, it
inures to defendant's advantage to require the state to prove any
enhancing factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  For a statute to
violate state or federal ex post facto clauses, the statute must
at least effect some kind of disadvantageous change upon a
defendant.  MacNab, 334 OR at 475 (so stating).  We conclude that
SB 528 does not disadvantage defendant in any manner that
violates the ex post facto clauses of either the federal or state
constitutions.
Defendant also appears to argue that SB 528 violates
the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution because defendant did
not receive notice that he might be subject to aggravating or
enhancement factors found by a jury.  Defendant, however, was on
notice that aggravating factors might apply, because the
aggravating factors justifying a sentence exceeding the
presumptive range were alleged in his indictment and set out in
the pertinent statutes.  See ORS 137.761(1) (court may depart if
it determines that "there are substantial and compelling reasons
justifying a deviation from the presumptive sentence"); OAR
213-008-0002(1)(b) (nonexclusive list of aggravating factors for
upward departure sentences).  After Apprendi and Blakely, a trial
court must base an enhanced sentence on facts found by a jury. 
The new approach does not prejudice defendant; indeed, it
vindicates his constitutional rights.
As previously noted, defendant also challenges SB 528
under the "single subject" clause of Article IV, section
20, (6) and the "full text" clause of Article IV, section 22, (7)
of the Oregon Constitution.  His arguments are based on his
assumption that jury factfinding is not permitted under the
sentencing guideline statutes.  Specifically, he argues that (1)
the legislature did not list the allegedly affected statutes --
ORS 137.671(1) and ORS 137.090(1)(c) -- in the title, and (2) the
legislature did not publish those allegedly affected statutes in
their entirety.  
As previously explained, SB 528 establishes a procedure
by which a trial court may submit sentence enhancement factors to
a jury.  Those enhancements factors include any fact that may be
constitutionally required to be submitted to a jury in order to
support the imposition of an enhanced sentence.  Because, under
Blakely and Dilts, enhancement facts that support an upward
departure from the sentencing guidelines' presumptive range fall
into that category, the new procedure is available for that
purpose.  SB 528 also amends OEC 101 to provide that, although
the evidence code generally does not apply to sentencing
proceedings, the code does apply to factfinding proceedings under
the new procedure established by sections 2 through 7 of the Act. 
Or Laws 2005, ch 463, § 8(4)(d).
SB 528 also amends the dangerous offender statutes, ORS
161.725-ORS 161.737, and sexually violent dangerous offender
statutes, ORS 137.765-ORS 137.767.  Those statutes previously  
provided that the findings needed to support enhanced sentences
in those cases were to be made by the trial court during a
separate post-verdict hearing.  SB 528 amends those provisions to
require jury factfinding to support those sentences, unless the
defendant waives his or her right to a jury on the requisite
facts.  Or Laws 2005, ch 463, §§ 9-12.
The relating clause of SB 528 states:  "Relating to
crime; creating new provisions; amending ORS 40.015, 136.280,
137.765, 137.767, 161.725 and 161.735; and declaring an
emergency."  Defendant contends that that title is insufficient
under Article IV, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution:
"Every Act shall embrace but one subject, and
matters properly connected therewith, which subject
shall be expressed in the title.  But if any subject
shall be embraced in an Act which shall not be
expressed in the title, such Act shall be void only as
to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the
title."
That provision establishes requirements for both the body of an
act and its title, requiring that the body state only one
subject, and that that subject be expressed in the title. 
Fugate, 332 Or at 201; McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or 426, 438, 909
P2d 846 (1996).
Specifically, defendant argues that the subject of SB
528 is not expressed in its title.  Once again, his argument is
based on the premise that the sentencing guidelines rules and
implementing statutes preclude jury factfinding for enhanced
sentences, and that SB 528 must amend those provisions in order
to permit jury factfinding for that purpose.  He asserts that the
provisions in question, specifically -- ORS 137.671(1), OAR 213-008-0001, and ORS 137.090(1)(c) -- must be amended in order to
permit a trial court to empanel a jury to make findings in
support of an enhanced sentence.  Defendant also claims that,
because the title does not state that SB 528 amends those
provisions, the bill is void to the extent that it attempts to do
so.  We disagree.
SB 528 is not intended to, and does not, amend those
provisions.  SB 528 only provides a procedure that permits juries
to make findings of fact on which a trial court may base its
ultimate sentencing determination.  The provisions, however, that
require trial courts to determine whether there are substantial
and compelling reasons that justify an enhanced sentence remain
in place.
Defendant's related argument based on Article IV,
section 22, of the Oregon Constitution fails for the same reason. 
Defendant contends that, to the extent that SB 528 applies to
findings necessary to support an enhanced sentence, it violates
that constitutional provision.  As the state correctly argues,
however, ORS 137.671(1) and ORS 1327.090(1)(c) remain valid laws,
unchanged by SB 528, and still require that a judge conclude that
there are substantial and compelling reasons to support a
sentence that exceeds a presumptive range.  At the same time, SB
528 now provides that a jury may make the factual findings
relevant to the determination of sentence. 
Finally, citing Wardius v. Oregon, 412 US 470, 93 S Ct
2208, 37 L Ed 2d (1973), defendant asserts that SB 528, as
written, violates the Due Process Clause.  He contends that,
because SB 528 creates a procedure under which a jury determines
aggravating or enhancing factors, but does not do the same for
mitigating factors, it is a "one-sided" rule of the type that the
United States Supreme Court held to be impermissible in Wardius.
Wardius, however, does not require that every procedure
relating to both a defendant and the state ensure identical
rights in order to satisfy due process.  Rather, Wardius
addressed only a narrow procedural requirement that is not at
issue here.  In Wardius, the Court held that a statute may not
require a defendant -- who has no burden of proof at trial -- to
disclose certain alibi witnesses, when the state had no
comparable obligation to disclose its witnesses.  Id. at 478-79. 
The holding in Wardius, however, did not establish a
constitutional rule that a defendant and the state must be
treated identically in all respects. 
In our view, permitting the submission of aggravating 
or enhancing facts for jury determination does not provide any
advantage to the state.  Instead, SB 528 effectuates a criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment jury trial right.  As we have
previously stated, to the extent that defendant argues that he
must be able to present mitigating evidence to "outweigh" the
aggravating evidence offered by the prosecution, defendant is
mistaken.  A sentence that exceeds, or is below, a presumptive
sentencing range may be based on a single factor, as long as the
court concludes that the factor represents a substantial and
compelling reason to impose a sentence that departs from the
presumption range.  Again, as described above, a jury makes the 
initial factual determination that a trial court may, in turn,
choose to rely on to impose a sentence that exceeds the
presumptive range.  The court need not "weigh" departure factors
against each other, nor must the court explain why it does not
believe that an aggravating or mitigating factor is not
substantial and compelling.  To the extent that defendant is
arguing that he is not permitted to counter or rebut the state's
"aggravation" evidence before a jury, he is incorrect; nothing in
SB 528 precludes a defendant from fully litigating any issue of
fact properly before the jury.
Finally, defendant argued in the trial court that ORS
132.540(2) prevents any reference in an indictment to alleged
"persistent involvement" in crime by listing prior convictions. 
ORS 132.540(2) provides: 
"The indictment shall not contain allegations that the
defendant has previously been convicted of the
violation of any statute which may subject the
defendant to enhanced penalties, except where the
conviction constitutes a material element of the crime
charged."
(Emphasis added.)  Under Apprendi and Blakely, any fact that
supports an enhanced sentence is, in effect, a "material element"
of the charged offense, which a criminal defendant can require
the state to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v.
Sawatzky, 339 Or ___, ___, ___ P3d ___ (2005); see Apprendi, 530
US at 490 (establishing that any fact that increases punishment
beyond statutory maximum must be proven beyond reasonable doubt
to satisfaction of jury).   Moreover, SB 528 now permits the
pleading of an "enhancement fact" in an accusatory instrument. 
As a result, despite ORS 132.540(2), the indictment in this case
properly makes reference to defendant's alleged prior
convictions.
The trial court in this case did, as a matter of law,
have the authority to submit the alleged "persistent involvement"
and "vulnerable victim" enhancement factors to a jury in
compliance with the constitutional jury trial right announced in
Apprendi and Blakely.  Consequently, the trial court's ruling
that it did not have the authority to submit the alleged
enhancing factors to the jury at defendant's trial was error.
Peremptory writ of mandamus to issue.
1. The Oregon sentencing guidelines use the words
"aggravating factors" to describe facts that a court may rely on
to impose a sentence that exceeds the presumptive sentence
prescribed in the guidelines for a particular conviction.  The
parties use both descriptions -- "aggravating factors,"
"enhancing factors," and "sentence enhancement factors."  Newly
enacted Senate Bill 528 (2005) uses the words "enhancement
facts."  The words mean the same thing and may be used
interchangeably. 
2. The sentencing guidelines, however, do not apply to the
allegation that defendant falsified business records because a
violation of ORS 165.080 is classified as a Class A misdemeanor.
3. OAR 213-008-0002(1)(b) identifies a nonexclusive list of
facts, which it labels "aggravating factors," on which a
sentencing court may rely to impose a sentence that exceeds the
presumptive sentence prescribed for a particular conviction. 
See State v. Dilts, 337 Or 645, 651-52, 103 P3d 95 (2004)
(summarizing departure process).  Those factors include:
"(B) The offender knew or had reason to know of
the victim's particular vulnerability, such as extreme
youth, age, disability or ill health of the victim,
which increased the harm or threat of harm caused by
the criminal conduct.
"* * * * *
"(D) Persistent involvement in similar offenses or
repetitive assaults.  This factor may be cited when
consecutive sentences are imposed only if the
persistent involvement in similar offenses or
repetitive assaults is unrelated to the current
offense."
OAR 213-008-0002(1)(b)(B).
4. The exceptions noted in ORS 136.310 are not applicable in this case.
5. Defendant cites this court's decision in State v. Dilts, 337
Or 645, 651, 103 P3d 95 (2004), and the Court of Appeals decision
in State v. Sawatzky, 195 Or App 159, 167, 96 P3d 1288 (2004),
which notes that judicial findings of "substantial and compelling
reasons" are a predicate for imposition of a departure sentence. 
However, we do not agree that the wording to which defendant
refers supports a conclusion that the guidelines preclude jury
factfinding of the aggravating facts that a court may consider in
determining whether "substantial and compelling reasons" support
the imposition of a sentence that exceeds the presumptive range.
6. Or Const, Art IV, § 20 ("Every Act shall embrace but
one subject, and matters properly connected therewith * * *[.]").
7. Or Const, Art IV, § 22 ("No act shall ever be revised,
or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised,
or section amended shall be set forth, and published at full
length.").