Title: CHARLES ROBERT THOMAS, A MINOR BY AND THROUGH HIS NEXT FRIEND AND MOTHER, TERRY THOMAS, AND DENNIS THOMAS AND TERRY THOMAS, INDIVIDUALLY v. SOUTH CHEYENNE WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT, TEL, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CHARLES ROBERT THOMAS, A MINOR BY AND THROUGH HIS NEXT FRIEND AND MOTHER, TERRY THOMAS, AND DENNIS THOMAS AND TERRY THOMAS, INDIVIDUALLY v. SOUTH CHEYENNE WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT,  TEL, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION1985 WY 94702 P.2d 1303Case Number: 84-153Decided: 07/15/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
CHARLES ROBERT THOMAS, A 
MINOR BY AND THROUGH HIS NEXT FRIEND AND MOTHER, TERRY THOMAS, AND DENNIS THOMAS 
AND TERRY THOMAS, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

SOUTH 
CHEYENNE WATER AND SEWER 
DISTRICT, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT), TEL, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, 
(DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

 
 
Larry Lawton of 
Lawton, Edwards & Johnson, Cheyenne, for appellants.

John C. Brooks 
and John I. Henley (argued), of Vlastos, Reeves, Murdock & Brooks, P.C., 
Casper, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ. 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from a 
summary judgment granted South Cheyenne Water and Sewer District. We 
affirm.

[¶2.]     Appellant raises a 
single issue:

"Is it error to grant 
summary judgment for a defendant when expert testimony establishes a standard 
for the area, and that the defendant has violated that 
standard?"

[¶3.]     We have frequently 
reiterated our standard of review of summary judgments.

"`When a motion for 
summary judgment is before the supreme court, we have exactly the same duty as 
the district judge; and, if there is a complete record before us, we have 
exactly the same material as did he. We must follow the same standards. The 
propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness 
of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
This court looks at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, giving to him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the 
facts contained in affidavits, depositions and other proper material appearing 
in the record.' Reno Livestock 
Corporation v. Sun Oil Company (Delaware), 
Wyo., 638 P.2d 147, 150 (1981). See also, Blackmore 
v. Davis Oil Company, Wyo., 671 P.2d 334, 336 
(1983).

"A summary judgment 
should only be granted where it is clear that there are no issues of material 
facts involved and that an inquiry into the facts is unnecessary to clarify the 
application of law. Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 
542 P.2d 867 (1975). A material fact is one which has legal significance. 
Johnson v. Soulis, supra. It is a fact which would establish a 
defense. Wood v. Trenchard, Wyo., 
550 P.2d 490 (1976). After the movant establishes a prima facie case the burden 
of proof shifts to the opposing party who must show a genuine issue of material 
fact, Gennings v. First Nat'l Bank of Thermopolis, Wyo., 
654 P.2d 154 (1982), or come forward with competent evidence of specific facts 
countering the facts presented by the movant. Matter of Estate of 
Brosius, Wyo., 
683 P.2d 663 (1984). The burden is then on the non-moving party to show specific 
facts as opposed to general allegations. 10 Wright & Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2727, p. 538. The material presented must be 
admissible evidence at trial. Conclusory statements are not admissible. 
Bancroft v. Jaqusch, 
Wyo., 611 P.2d 819 (1980). We give the party defending 
the motion the benefit of any reasonable doubt." Roth v. First Security 
Bank of Rock Springs, Wyoming, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93, 95 
(1984).

[¶4.]     For purposes of summary 
judgment, the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and exhibits established the 
following undisputed facts: Appellant Charles Thomas was being cared for by a 
neighbor. He was playing outdoors with two boys. One of the boys suggested they 
go to a water meter vault located on the property of a nearby ceramics shop 
because he had left a toy there. A meter vault is an excavation containing a 
meter sufficiently deep in the ground to prevent freezing. It is covered by a 
door hinged on one side that can be raised to read the meter, but is otherwise 
closed. The meter vault and cover were purchased, paid for, and installed by 
Tel, Inc. on land owned by Tel, Inc.

[¶5.]     Appellant raised the 
cover and entered the meter vault. As he was climbing out, the vault door fell 
upon his hand causing amputation of two fingers. Appellant, his mother and 
stepfather sued Tel, Inc., the owner of the property, and South Cheyenne Water 
and Sewer District (hereinafter District) claiming that the open water meter 
vault was an attractive nuisance, that the appellees were negligent in the 
supervision and maintenance of the meter vault, and that damages - including 
punitive damages - ought to be awarded. The court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the District, on the grounds that the doctrine of attractive nuisance 
was not applicable because the District had no right of control nor attempted to 
exercise control over the meter vault in question, and that the District did not 
owe a duty to appellant and, therefore, could not be negligent. Appellant 
abandoned his reliance upon the attractive nuisance doctrine in this appeal, we 
suspect, because the District was not a possessor of the land upon which the 
meter vault was located. The Restatement, Second, Torts, requires for liability 
to attach that the person charged be "a possessor of land." It was undisputed 
that appellee's situation did not satisfy this requirement.1

[¶6.]     Appellant settled with 
defendant Tel, Inc., and that claim was dismissed with prejudice. Appellant then 
appealed from the summary judgment granted appellee. Appellant based the appeal 
solely on the question of the applicability of Rule 704, W.R.E., to a summary 
judgment.

[¶7.]     Appellant contends that 
his expert's affidavit precluded summary judgment on the basis of Rule 704, 
W.R.E., which provides that:

"Testimony in the form of 
an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact."

[¶8.]     The affidavit by 
Lawrence E. Carlson, a doctor of engineering, stated that the meter vault cover 
was most likely used for aerospace application; that it was not appropriate as a 
cover in this case; and that it would be

"inconvenient, if not 
difficult, for a meter reader to operate and is not standard. It was most likely 
not latched shut after routine meter 
readings." (Emphasis in original.)

He also stated 
that meter vault covers are "commonly specified by the water district." He 
stated that Boulder, Colorado provides covers to their customers and that 
Denver, Colorado requires one of several different 
types to be used. He stated that the meter vault cover in this case was totally 
inappropriate for its use and was unreasonably dangerous.

[¶9.]     An affidavit by the 
attorney for appellant stated

"[t]hat the undersigned 
verily believes that the depositions of the directors of water services in 
southeast Wyoming will establish the standard of care 
set out above, and the violation of said standard of care by the Defendant South 
Cheyenne Water and Sewer District."

Depositions of 
these directors were not taken. The District does not design, supply, 
manufacture, specify, or furnish requirements for meter vault covers. The 
District contends it has no duty to design or require a particular type of 
cover. Appellant contends that a duty should be imposed upon the District to 
design, specify, maintain, and supervise the meter vaults.

[¶10.]  In support of the motion for summary 
judgment, appellee District filed an affidavit of Floydine Gay, a secretary for 
the District, which stated that the business records reflected all visits by 
District personnel to the meter involved. It was read by meter reader Tracy Long 
on April 15, 1982 and again on May 10, 1982. No other District personnel were at 
the vault during the interim. She further stated that the meter 
vault

"is owned by and under 
the exclusive control of the water user or property owner, and is on land owned 
by persons or entities other than the District."

She also stated 
that the only interest of the 
District is that the meter vaults be frostproof and accessible for periodic 
readings. The meter pits are constructed and installed by persons over which the 
District has "no right of control, nor attempts to exercise any 
control."

[¶11.]  The affidavit by Tracy Long, a meter 
reader, corroborated the affidavit of Ms. Gay, stating that on April 15, 1982, 
he took a reading of the meter, opened the cover, recorded the numbers on the 
meter and closed the lid. He states further that he had returned to the meter 
pit on May 10, 1982, and that to his knowledge no readings were taken by 
personnel during the interim period of time.

[¶12.]  Appellant contends that his expert's 
affidavit established the dangerousness of this vault cover, particularly when 
this conclusion was supported by a detailed description of the object showing 
the items of danger.2 Looking at the evidence in a light 
most favorable to appellant, we accept the testimony that the meter vault cover 
was heavy and cumbersome; that it was "totally inappropriate" for its use; and 
that it was "unreasonaly dangerous."

[¶13.]  The case of Merit Motors, Inc v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1977), is pertinent. Although that case involves Rule 7033 rather than 704, F.R.E., the 
underlying rationale is applicable to the present case.

"On appeal appellants 
attempt to salvage their expert's opinion by relying on cases applying Rule 703 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, adopted in 1975. This rule was intended to 
broaden the acceptable bases of expert opinion, but it was not intended, as appellants 
seem to argue, to make summary judgment 
impossible whenever a party has produced an expert to support its position. 
Even Rule 703 requires that the grounds relied on by an expert must be `a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject.'" (Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Id. at 
672-673.

[¶14.]  To hold that Rule 704, W.R.E., prevents a 
court from granting summary judgment merely because of an expert's conclusion 
that has no basis in or out of the record would seriously undermine the policies 
of Rule 56, W.R.C.P. Rule 704 allows testimony on ultimate issues, Louisell 
& Mueller, Federal Evidence § 395, but that statement of law does not 
resolve the question. The standards of Boulder 
and Denver do not mandate a conclusion that 
Cheyenne does or 
should meet similar standards. There was no evidence of what national standards 
are nor what a majority of water districts require. In the absence of competent 
evidence, we cannot find the District negligent. The affidavit did not establish 
a standard in the industry or set out what duty was imposed on the District. A 
bare conclusion as to duty, stating no reasonable basis therefor, is not 
sufficient to prevent entry of summary judgment. See, Kimbley v. City of Green 
River, Wyo., 663 P.2d 871 
(1983); Hunter v. Farmers Insurance 
Group, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1239 
(1976).

[¶15.]  The trial court stated in the decision 
letter:

"Material presented to 
the Court by way of affidavit and summary judgment proceedings should be such as 
would be admissible in evidence at the time of trial. Keller v. Anderson, 554 P.2d 1253 (Wyo. 1976). Certainly the 
bald assertion contained in paragraph 5 of Mr. Lawton's deposition does not 
suffice. The arguments, the evidentiary submissions, and the memorandums all 
fail to show any statutory authority, 
regulatory authority, custom, or actual authority relied upon by the 
district to regulate, control, or supervise the installation of the vault door 
and vault. Further, no authority is submitted for the proposition that such duty 
in fact exists. Liability must be based upon duty. Medlock v. Van Wagner, 625 P.2d 207, 208 
(Wyo. 1981). 
That a water district customer may obtain a meter cover from a water district at 
Boulder, Colorado, and that a water district in Denver, Colorado, requires a 
cover of an approved type, is not in the view of this Court evidence that a duty 
has been established and may be imposed upon the South Cheyenne Water and Sewer 
District to do the same." (Emphasis added.)

We agree totally 
with this analysis.

[¶16.]  The elements of negligence are: (1) a 
duty, (2) a violation of that duty (3) which is the proximate cause of (4) 
injury to the plaintiff. Beard v. 
Brown, Wyo., 616 P.2d 726 (1980). The determination 
of duty is a question of law not within the province of a jury. Medlock v. Van Wagner, Wyo., 625 P.2d 207 (1981). The court must 
decide

"`[w]hether, upon the 
facts in evidence, such a relation exists between the parties that the community 
will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the other - or, more 
simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered invasion was 
entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant. This is entirely a 
question of law, to be determined by reference to the body of statutes, rules, 
principles and precedents which make up the law; and it must be determined only 
by the court.' Prosser, Law of Torts, § 37, p. 206 (4th Ed. 1971)." Caterpillar Tractor Company v. Donahue, Wyo., 
674 P.2d 1276, 1280 (1983).

If duty has not 
been established, there is no actionable negligence. Norman v. City of 
Gillette, Wyo., 658 P.2d 697 
(1983); Medlock v. Van Wagner, supra; 
Turney v. Sullivan, 89 Nev. 554, 516 P.2d 738 
(1973).

[¶17.]  The case of Salazar v. City of Sheridan, 44 
Colo. App. 
443, 618 P.2d 708 (1980), presented a similar factual situation. Appellant's 
children had been playing in Chase Park in the City of Sheridan, approximately 
one hundred yards from an entrance to a storm sewer culvert. The children 
entered the sewer through bars which had apparently been bent. One of the 
children lit a match and gas exploded resulting in injuries. The children's 
parents brought suit alleging liability on the part of the City of Sheridan contending that Sheridan negligently maintained Chase Park in 
too close of proximity to the storm sewer, that they maintained an attractive 
nuisance, or were negligent in failing to take reasonable precautions to prevent 
the entry of children into the sewer. Although the decision held that the City 
had a duty arising from a contractual acceptance of the responsibility for 
maintenance - which is not a consideration in the present case - the case also 
stated that:

"We see no basis for 
imposing liability on Sheridan based on the existence of Chase Park. 
The park was owned, controlled, operated, and maintained by defendant South 
Suburban Metropolitan Recreation and Park District, and there was no showing 
that Sheridan 
had any responsibility or duty in connection therewith." Id. at 
710.

In the absence 
of these elements, we cannot find a duty. See, Norman v. City of Gillette, 
supra.

[¶18.]  The uncontroverted evidence showed that 
the District did not own, control, possess, maintain, or attempt to exercise any 
control over the meter vault. Testimony that two cities in Colorado exercise control 
over meters is not sufficient to establish a duty generally applicable. The 
expert's affidavit did not establish the standard of care in the industry or in 
Wyoming; it stated only what was being done in 
two Colorado 
cities; the affidavit did not present fact or opinion sufficient to establish a 
duty owed by the District to appellant. Under these circumstances, the district 
court correctly found that a duty was not owed as a matter of law; and summary 
judgment was properly entered.

[¶19.]  Affirmed.

1 Restatement, Second, 
Torts § 339, states:

"A possessor land is 
subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by 
an artificial condition upon the land if

"(a) the place where the 
condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know 
that children are likely to trespass, and

"(b) the condition is one 
of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or 
should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm 
to such children, and

"(c) the children because 
of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in 
intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, 
and

"(d) the utility to the 
possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger 
are slight as compared with the risk to children involved, 
and

"(e) the possessor fails 
to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the 
children."

2 The affidavit stated in 
part:

"2. The meter pit cover 
was manufactured by Huntley Tool & Machine Co., Seattle, Washington for the Boeing Company on a 
proprietary basis. It was most likely for an aerospace application and not 
appropriate as a water meter pit cover.

"3. The cover is made of 
cast steel and weighs approximately 80 pounds.

"4. A standard meter pit 
cover weighs approximately 30 pounds.

"5. The cover opens to 
approximately 21° past top dead center at its fully opened 
position.

"6. From its fully opened 
position, only about 16 pounds are necessary to cause it to 
close.

"7. When it closes from 
top dead center, it will slam shut with at least 400 pounds effective 
force.

"8. The means to latch 
the cover closed is a square nut on a 5/8-11 UNC threaded clevis. This would be 
inconvenient, if not difficult, for a meter reader to operate and is not 
standard. It was most likely not 
latched shut after routine meter readings.

"9. Meter pit covers are 
commonly specified by the water district. Boulder, Colorado, provides them to customers. 
Denver, Colorado, requires one of several approved types, one of 
which was in the adjacent lot in South 
Cheyenne.

"10. The Defendant's 
meter pit cover was, in my opinion, totally inappropriate for its use and 
unreasonably dangerous." (Emphasis in original.)

3 Rule 703, F.R.E., 
provides:

"The facts or data in the 
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those 
perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence."