Title: State v. Agard. ICA s.d.o., filed 08/15/2006 [pdf], 111 Haw.204. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 01/08/2007 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAW LIBRARY

 

*#4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

‘o00-==

 

 

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appell

  
   

No. 27219

oats

CERTIORARI 70 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPI
(HPD TRAFFIC NO. 5775863M0)

JANUARY 23, 2007

MOON, C.J, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.

Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai'i
(Petitioner) filed an application for writ of certiorari® on

Decenber 12, 2006, requesting that this court review the

 

 

+ Pursuant to Hawai'i Revised statutes (HRS) § 602-59 (Supp. 2006),
@ party may appeal the decision of the intermediate appellate court ithe 1¢8)
‘Sas, HRS § 602-

only by an application to this court for a writ of certioreri:
59(a).” In determining whether to accept or reject the application’ for weit of

certiorari, this court reviews the ICh decision for

 

(2) Grave errors of law of of facts or
(2) Gbvicus inconsistencies in the decision of the [ICA]

with that of the supreme court, federal deckelons, or
ite own decision,
land the magnitude of such errors or inconsistencies
dictating tne need for further appeal.

The grant or denial of a petition for certiorarl se
‘Sag HRS §602-59(0)

 

HRS § 602-59()
Giscretlonary with this court
 

FOR PUBLICATION IM WEST’ HAMAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#*

 

August 15, 2006 Summary Disposition Order (S00) of the
Intermediate Court of Appeals (the ICA),? reversing the

January 21, 2005 judgment of the district court of the first
circuit (the court)? adjudging Respondent /Defendant-Appellant
Louis Kruse Agard IV (Respondent) guilty of Reckless Driving,
Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291-2 (Supp. 2006).‘ Respondent
filed his response to Petitioner's application on December 27,
206.

We hold that (1) the reckless state of mind definition
under HRS § 702-206(3) (1993) applies to the reckless driving
statute, HRS § 281-2; (2) in determining whether an identified
risk is substantial and unjustifiable under HRS § 702-206(3), the
nature and degree of the risk disregarded by the actor, the
nature and purpose of his conduct, and the circumstances known to
him in acting must be weighed; (3) in this case a reckless state
of mind can be inferred from the cizcunstances to conclude that
there was conscious avareness of a substantial and unjustifiable

risk to the safety of others and property on the part of

 

‘Te Summary Disposition Order was issued by Chief Judge Janes S.

Burns, and Associate Judges Daniel R. Foley and Alexa W. Ful

 

 

     

» The Honorable Michael Marr presided.
animal, porltyf 22172 entitied, “Reckiens driving of vehicle or riding of
Whoever operates any vehicle or rides any eninal
‘or feckless riaing

 

ofan aninel, as appropriate, and shall be fined not more
Than €1, 000 or imprisoned not more than thirty days, oF
both,

(emphases added. )
‘S++FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTE!

 

Respondent; and (4) deference must be given to the trier of fact
with respect to questions of credibility and weight of the
evidence. Therefore, there was substantial evidence for the
court to find Respondent guilty of reckless driving in violation
of HRS § 291-2. Because the ICA reversed the court's judgment,
the ICA's August 15, 2006 SO is reversed, and the court’s
January 21, 2005 judgment is affirmed.
I

‘The relevant procedural history obtained from the

application is as follows.

‘on Decenber 21, 2004, [Respondent] was . . . charged
sey oporating a Vebicie Reckless Dissegerd of the safety
Of Fersons or Property in violation of [HRS] § 291-2... «
Following a bench trial, Respondent. was found
guilty(.] - . + "[Slentence was stayed pending ppeal
Respondent . .\. appealed)... on February 18,
2005. “On appeal, Respondent.» clain{ed) insufficiency
of the evidence {on the ground) ‘that the evidence .
failed to prove beyond « reasonable doubt that [Respondent]
acted with... "the requisite reckless state of mindi-]”

 

 

 

In its August 15, 2006 SD0, the ICA described the
circumstances giving rise to the charge as follows:

on uly 18, 2004, after midnight on the 8-3 Freeway,
[Respondent] drove eastbound through the tunnels toward
Kili Highway exit, he was “lasered” by 2 police
5 going 60 miles per hour {(mph)) in a 55 (mph)
Zone, changed lanes to pass other vehicles, turned on the
Likelixe Highway exit, swerved in front of the police
officer's vehicle, turned on the Kahekill Highway exit,
exited Kanekili Highway, van through @ stop sign, swerved
Into-an oncoming lene, and finally stopped at @ residence.

 

    

 

 

00 at 1.

At trial Respondent “denied driving . . . the morning
of July 18, 2004, and stated that the car was either in his yard
during the incident or in the possession of one of his family

(members) or friends, all of whom denied responsibility for the
‘**0FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**#

incident.” According to the court, however, it found
“unbelievable [the] testimony of [Respondent] and defense
witness, Kenneth Friedman(,)" and that Petitioner “had proved its
case beyond a reasonable doubt and found [Respondent] guilty of
reckless driving."* Nevertheless, the ICA concluded that

(Petitioner) failed its burden of proving that, considering
the nature and purpose of his conduct and the clreunstances
known to him, (Respondent) ‘consciously disregarded a
substantial snd unjustifiable risk that one or more persons
would be injured and/or that property would be danaged.and
the disregara of this risk involved a gross deviation from
the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would
observe in the sane situation.

 

 

 

S00 at 3. It therefore reversed Respondent's January 21, 2005
judgment of conviction.
nm.

In its application, Petitioner poses the following
question: “whether the ICA erred in concluding that the combined
actions of speeding at €0 [mph] in a 55 mph zone, multiple unsafe
lane changes, failure to stop for a pursuing police vehicle,
cutting off a motor vehicle by swerving directly in front of it
and disregarding a stop sign was insufficient evidence to support
a conviction for reckless driving?” (Capitalization omitted.)
Petitioner argues that the ICA erred in answering the question in
the affirmative.

In response, Respondent argues that “while the evidence

showed that [Respondent] committed various non-criminal traffic

 

+ petitioner points out that “Respondent's defense did not dispute
that (Petitioner's) evidence was sufficient to prove reckless driving, but
that he had not been the driver of the vehicle.”

4
‘s*4f0R PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#*
infractions, [Petitioner] failed to adduce facts establishing

that [Respondent] drove his vehicle with the requisite criminal
state of mind of ‘reckless./* Specifically, Respondent argues
that (1) “[t]he record shows that while [Respondent's] violation
of various traffic offenses may have posed some degree of risk of
harm to others, it cannot be concluded that there was a
substantial risk to the safety of others,” and (2) “[a]ssuming
that there was some evidence that [Respondent's] operation of his
vehicle presented a substantial risk to persons or property,
under the circumstances of this case, it cannot be concluded that
there was sufficient evidence that [Respondent] was subjectively
aware of such a risk, and thus, acted in conscious disregard of
the risk.”

qt.

In pertinent part, HRS § 291-2 states that “[wJhoever
operates any vehicle . . . recklessly in disregard of the safety
of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving... .”
“Recklessly” is not defined in the statute. In their Opening and
Answering Briefs respectively, Respondent and Petitioner resort
to HRS § 702-206(3) entitled, “Definitions of states of mind,

which states in relevant part:

 

(2), Auperson acts recklessly with respect to his
conduct uh sieves isi" ang
that the person's conduct is of =
specified natur
ii oat
considering the nature and purpose of the person's condict
and the circumstances. known £0. him,

the disreaard of the
Hise involves 2 gross deviation éroa the standard of conduct
Shat_a Jawcabicing cerson would observe in the sane

 

‘situation
‘*0f0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*##

 

(Emphases added.) HRS § 701-102(3) (1993), entitled, “All
offenses defined by statute; applicability to offenses committed
after the effective date,” states, “The provisions of chapters
701 through 706 of the Code are applicable to offenses defined by
other statutes, unless the Code otherwise provides.” (Emphasis
added.) Because HRS § 702-206(3) is @ provision included within
HRS chapters 701 and 706, and the Code does not provide
otherwise, the state of mind definition in HRS § 702-206(3)
applies to HRS § 291-2. See State v. Kupihea, 98 Hawai'i 196,
201 n.8, 46 P.3d 498, 503 n.8 (2002) (concluding that, based on
HRS § 701-102(3), “the provisions of the [Code], such as HRS $$
702-202 and -204 [(1993)], are applicable to HRS § 329-43.5
[(1993)]," a statute not part of the Code).

Petitioner also cites to the Commentary on HRS § 702-

206 which states in relevant part:

 

Recklessness in subsection (3) deals not with the

conscious object of conduct or the relative certainty of

Conduct but Father with disregard of certain probabilities.
it

 

gees without saying thet the conscious disregard of every
Esk of harm to a protected social interest should not, in
every instance, be sufficient to impose penal liability for
an untoward eventuality. Precision in defining which risks
the penal law will not et a defendant Sgnore i2 impossible.
Following the leed of the Model Penal Code, the Code has
labeled the relevant risks as “aubstantial’ and
unjustifiable” end in subsection (3) (a) states the factors
which ought to be considered in determining whether the
Glsregard of the risk should be condenned.” The Reporter to
the Model Penal Code has stated the issue concisely:

 

‘The draft requires, however, that the risk thu:
consciously disregarded by the actor be “substantial”
and “unjustifiable”; even substantial risks may be
Greated without recklessness when the actor seeks to
Serve a proper purpose, as when a surgeon performs on
‘Operation which he knows is very Likely to be fatal
But Feasonebly thinks the patient has no other, safer
chance. Accordingly, to aid the ultimate
determination, the draft points expressly to the

 

 

 

 
‘seePOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAMAI' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#*

 

factors to be weighed in judgment: the nature and
deares of the Pew diereaarded by the actor, the

DSRS tices been to hin thastings
(Quoting Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 4, comments at 125
(1955) (emphases added) ).
Ww.
It should be noted initially that “[tJhe test on appeal
in reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence is whether,
when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, substantial evidence exists to support the

conclusion of the trier of fact.” State v. Bui, 104 Hawai'i 462,
467, 92 P.3d 471, 476 (2004) (citing State v. Pone, 78 Hawai'i

262, 265, 892 P.24 455, 458 (1995)). “Substantial evidence”
neans “‘credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and
probative value to enable person of reasonable caution to reach
a conclusion.’" Id, (quoting State v, Silva, 75 Haw. 419, 432,
864 P.2d 583, 590 (1993) (internal ellipses, brackets, and
citations omitted)).

Furthermore, “appellate courts will give due deference
to the right of the trier of fact ‘to determine credibility,
weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the
evidence adduced.’” In re Doe, 107 Hawai'i 12, 19, 108 P.34 96,
973 (2005) (quoting State v, Lubong, 77 Hawai'i 429, 432, 686
P.2d 766, 769 (App. 1994) (citation omitted). As to a
defendant's state of mind, this court has said, “Given the

difficulty of proving the requisite state of mind by direct
 

‘*+00R PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER!
evidence in criminal cases, proof by circumstantial evidence and

reasonable inferences arising from circumstances surrounding the
defendant’s conduct is sufficient.” State v. Eastman, 81 Hawai't
131, 141, 913 P.2d 57, 67 (1996) (citation omitted).

 

Although Petitioner cites to other reported reckless
driving cases, such cases revolve around the specific facts in
those cases. Here, according to Petitioner,

[eJhere [was] . . . speeding (25 miles over the posted speed
Limit, multiple unsafe lane changes, swerving into an
enconing Lane of traffic, refusal to stop for s police
Sfticer, cutting in front of other venicles, passing on the
Fight, . «. (and) running a step sign.

 

 

 

Honolulu Police Officer Michael. R. Krekel (Officer Krekel)

testified that on July 18, 2004, while performing traffic

 

enforcement outside the H-3 eastbound tunnel, he used an

ultralight laser to detect Respondent traveling at 80 mph, twenty

 

five miles over the posted speed limit. Thereafter, Office:
Krekel stated that he followed Respondent and testified to the
following:

(OFFICER KREKEL]: (Inaudible) right here. Lasered
the vehicle here. I'm right bere in front (inaudible) gates
surround. I'g0t in my vehicle. I followed the vehicle, AE
this time the vehicle was halfway between the (inaudible)
tunnel and the (inaudible!

The vehicle, still in the lect
ais, nsraed ver inte the right lane and then crossed back
‘Suer Between two vehicles, And as it cot past the second
Sehicie here: it peraed back into the right Lane ust past
‘he inaudible tunnel.

 

Temas unable to pace the speed of the vehicle. Tt
just (inaudible) Ssually past these venicles, continued on
in the rignt lane. I didn't catch up to the venicle until
just prior to the Likelike off-ramp.” I was approximately
four far lengths behind the venicle. At this point Fight
here, you see, what I do is vhen I laser (inaudible) tunnel
Tistop veniclés in a sate location to ene shoulder here just
Prior to the (inaudible). Just prior to this (snaudibie)
Fight nere I turned on my lights and siren.

 

 

 
‘se+F0R PUELICATION IN WEST'S EAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#+

of

 

irivizioner’s comset] @ And during the cours
this following the defendant did you at any tine see the
Sefendant turn on his blinker when he changed lanes to
(inaudible)?

 

{OFFICER KREKEL] A navdibie.)
go “ina what happened ater?
ond the vehicle ane
i ite appesred to

eck In his rear view sirror which it somewhat common on the
freeway because you're not going to hear a siren traveling
25°or ts ce a higher speed.” (Inaudible) a sires. Actually
ere (sic) the siren and (inaudible)

* -_. Laporoached the car on the richt side of

‘the vehicle, and’ ve finaudibiel the vebtele past [evel
Even though Thad sy lights, ny directional signal on, the
Care (inaudible) right lane, it's unsafe for any other

person standing on the other side, person on the Fight side.
Uf they're this side here of the retainer wall, (inaudible)

 

A” "1. , mis is where 1 put on my lights and
aizen,” And as'wo came onto this -* to Likelike Highway to
fhe left lane 1 again hit ay Lights and siren.” While {was

Apchis position the vehicle then came around this sshicle,
ist use the only vehicle It sadsed in front of us, cane

‘inte_the-tarciaht lane, and then actually cut off. suervad
‘lone inctrent of wes.

 

gq tye stated that you weren't successful in
Unauateie) ?

Re Yeah. wasnt w= T wasn't ~
toot pha wor efi, for 100k at YOUE spesdonater to see how
ast you were driving?

RS "Nos f wasn’t because I actually had the initial

 

violation. Normally what you do in a case Like this, un,
Since that's normally what T sudible) is to cbserve
Yiclations. but proBable cause was already met here and
heres here. but St this point right here my main concern 4s
(inaidible) step actually here that he was going to pull
over at this point. And then 2s he got into this lane right
here, it was 5 (mph). I didn't (inaudible) -

 

 

A” fie cut off nie vehicle here and then merasd inte

A” ” The vehicle just continued on here. 1 had to
catch up with the vehicle. Swing by (inaudible) here.
Was not able to {inaudible}.

 

©.” " Dig you have to speed up to catch up with the
Respondent]?
"Yes. As he turned around his vehicle to me,

it's (Inauetble}

Q How about during the course of the (inaudible)
tunnel and Likelike off-ramp? Did you find you had to speed
Up to catch up with the [Respondent]?
‘*9f0R PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*##

 

A _. Thad to speed up to get to this point
(inaudible), and then as he got into this lane right here,
it's 45 (mph) here, but 1 didn’t (inaudible).

(Q Wnat happenes?,

Ae got out of his vehicle here and then merged
into the Lefe-vurn lane on Kehekili off-ramp.

A” "Gh, the vehicie just continued on here. Then
again T wae undble to catch op to the vehicle «|

0" iat happened after the Kehekill off-ramp?

:

ST nee
‘don't remember the vehicle sitting there braking fora very
feng times That's when

Started runhing the plate of the vehicle.

A” mot that point { — vou bnew, J wae thinking,
well. gaxbe tnie-ian'e a drunk driver, May thie daa stolen

andibli “P

Fan the plates. I didh’t get a feedback from the police
Gispatch untii this point Up here Before he cane cut of this
private lane right ners

‘and the Feport came back, um ~~ the dispatcher said it
ues registered to an Agard, and She gave this street right
here Kahulukia. And when { came up here, I saw the numbers
Ga the side, the numbers on the aide of the house sight
here. S01’ knew that would be (inaudible) residenc

 

 

A da Lit ny blue Lights, again (inaudible. it.
wn right here te stop this venieie: Um the vehicle then

Kha iiob sah. swerved into the oncoming Jane here, and cane
‘Sut at a nlah rate of speed. Actually it turns then scraped
sx tuned to the lett (inaudible

O Dia you 8a use at the
amt

D And what happened after the turn?

x event jt wae

T Tost sight of
the vehicle as it pulied into this private lane. There's 2
house here. As I turned right here, I saw the brake 11
cone, and i saw the vehicle stop Fight in the carport a
essentially right here.

   

(Q You say you lost sight of the vehicle?
AR — T'lost signe of the vehicle fora few seconds.

© And when you caught up with the vehicle, was it
®_As T caught up with the vehicle, it was the sane

as this. there were several other vehicles’ that were
parked.” The bead iights were still on in the vehicle, and
the river was still seated in the driver's seat.

 

A” " Gn, right then and there 1 gave a -- T looked
I put on my fis0d lights, overhead lights.” And also there's
2 house right here, so 1 turned on my side lights right here
for safety. .

 

 

10
‘S+APOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS**

 

‘K.stood ciaht outside the open door {of py

sehicie) and) in! for auite-a fon sinutes I micht have been
inbetween (inaudible), As _(Reapondent) exited the vehicle.
SRGESER door he suited the vehicle: ie came around to"

sop-auite a few tines.
2" So was your Light on, your Lights on?
K Uh, "yess The Back ones are. What I do is

 

(inaudible) heavy metal Lights are flashing (inaudible)
Bnd I (inaudible) right here because 1 have flood Lights on.

 

 

 

a Did the food Lights provide you with sufficient
Lights to see =

2.” ” iipen the (Respondent) was in his car did you get
a look at him?

B Yes, T aid.

@ __And'when the (Respondent) exited his car did you
get a look at nim then?

x" Nes, 1 did.

2nd’ approxinately how far avay were you from the

Respondent}?

A Uh, approximately 25 fect
Q When you called Gut to che [Respondent], what
dig [Respondent] do?

“Nothing. He just closed his door. He walked
straight over here kind of like a carport area, covered
Fight here. He walked up to the front door. there were
Lignte in the house. We then opened the door. T called out

Police. Stop. Police. Stop. Police

   

© Were you walking towards him when you sald thet

 

‘A I wag walking, yee. T was right here. 0h, the
individual entered the house, closed the door. Officer Moy
pulled up. “I saw his headlights and his cruise lights.
Eng, why i ran up to the door, knocked on the door, and 1
was there for approximately five minutes tapping on the
indow and the door. And the lights were still out.

o'” “All right. So vou were calling out to tne

 

defendant and sold nin to ston?
a Yes
Q All right. Did he took at you?
° ‘didn't respond 2
A Me
Q — Were you able to see his face?
@ Dia’ you nave a
R Yes, T did. He was staring at the house, fis

body was very rigid, and his eyes appeared very glassy. And
he was, like, staring st the house, walked straight from his
Cars ie Just walked ina straight Line (inaudible) -

 

Q 'Ang then what happened when the (Respondent)
‘entered nie home?
A” T knocked on the door. No one came out. My

sergeont, my supervisor, cane to the scene.

n
‘S447OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**#

A" 2. . 1 was instructed by ay supervisor Sergeant
Dowkin to cite for reckless =~ after I advised him, to cite
for reckless driving and so insurance.

 

(Bmphases added.) Petitioner asserts that Respondent “exhibited
consciousness of his guilt by his refusal to stop, when (the

o}fficer . . . pursued him with sirens blaring and lights

flashing.”
vr.
In his Opening Brief on appeal, Respondent asserted
that to be convicted of reckless driving, his conduct must have
created “a high probability” of the prescribed harm.

By definition, the degree of risk of harm posed by the actor
ast arise to’ aubstantial righ, such that disregard of the
Fisk anounts toa gross deviation from the orginary standard
Gf care. Evidence based serely upon speculation, or which
establishes the possibility that the harm sought to be
Prevented would occur, does not suffice as proof of a
Substantial risk, Gvidence of a substantial risk requires
proof chat the actor's conduct erestes 2 high probability.

Ehat such harm would occur

 

(Emphases in original.) To support his argument, Respondent

cites Commonwealth v, Bullick, &30 A.2d 998 (Pi

2003), in which the Pennsylvania Superior Court considered the

Super. Ct.

 

state of mind requisite to conviction of reckless driving in

   

willful or wanton disregard of safety of persons or property”
synonymous with the definition of recklessness based on
“conscious disregard of substantial and unjustifiable risk.” Id.

at 1002. In that case, it was determined

 

thet the uns Len necessary to support the offense of reckle;
Griving iss eatiresene shat (the driver) drove sn suche sasner
That there existed » substantial risk that injury woald renal
Hem hls deivingy tier, a high peabebiiity that & motor vehicle
“ident would result fren driving in that manner, chat be wae
‘Stare of that risk and yer continved to drive in such a manner, Sn

 

   

 

12
[FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

essence, callovsly disregarding the risk he was creating by his
town reckless driving

 

Id. at 1003.

Respondent maintained that, “[w]hile the record shows
that (Respondent’s] driving may have posed some degree of risk of
harm to others, it cannot be concluded that there was a high

probability of such a risk.” He, however, summarizes the

 

circumstances surrounding his alleged conduct as follow:

officer Krekel's testimony in the light most favorable to
fellewing

 

 

Felevant conditions
exiting the tunnel. 2) Traffic was very iight. When
Géticer Krekel #irct cited Respondent], his was the
Vehicle inthe left lane of the freeway. Officer Ki

Gcccribed' [Respondent] passing Less then half a dozen cther

     

Sutomobiles.
ea Tins ak

‘Lines_iuice to bass other vehicles, (51 Respondent swerved
‘into-an “ensoning 1anev-at high speed, end (6) Respondent)
Sisteaarded two efop sions.

(Emphasis added.) Respondent argues that:

The circumstances described by Officer Krekel -- the
very light traffic and the early morning hour, show that
although [Respondent] committed # number [of] traffic
Infractions,

 

there was no evidence that any othex persons
ved bi e Ofticer Kreker tostified
Efst Inespondent] execored quick lane changes to pass other
Vehicles traveling in the same direction. However, there is
hho evidence that these maneuvers in any way impeded or
Thterrupted the forward movement of the other cars. There
ie no evigence that (Respondent) drove too close to the
‘other cars, oF cut them off, or caused then to brake or
Swerve. There is no evidence that (Respondent's) driving in
any way impacted the other vehicles on the road.

ne tame is true of the other instances of lane
changes on the Kahekils [H)ighvay and disregarding the stop

 

 

 

Signs, Where there are no other vehicles or persons in the
Area. such consust dose not creste 2 substantial risk, or
bich‘Grobebilicy. of harm or intury.

(Emphases added.)

The standard of a “high probability” of risk of an
accident is not contained in HRS § 291-2 and, thus, is not

binding in this jurisdiction, Nevertheless, the definition of

3
‘*47OR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAKAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*:

reckless conduct as set forth in HRS § 702-206 is similar. In
that regard, the “reckless” standard is not to be
indiscriminately applied, for “the conscious disregard of every
risk of harm to @ protected social interest should not, in every
instance, be sufficient to impose penal liability for an untoward
eventuality.” Commentary on HRS § 702-206. The probable
Likelihood of an accident paradigm, however, is embodied in the
requirement under HRS § 702-206(3) that the culpable risk is one
that must be “substantial and unjustifiable.” In assessing
whether an identified risk meets these criteria, the Commentary
on HRS § 702-206 “points expressly to the factors to be weighed
in judgment: the nature and degree of the risk disregarded by
the actor, the nature and purpose of his conduct and the
circunstances known to him in acting.” (Citation omitted.)
Hence, the “substantial and unjustifiable” standard is
essentially equivalent to the high probability standard and the
governing statute establishes the factors to be applied in
arriving at the relevant conclusion.

vit.

The circumstances surrounding Respondent's alleged
conduct indicate that Officer Krekel observed Respondent
traveling at 80 mph in a $5 mph zone, that Respondent passed
about six other vehicles, changed lanes twice to pass the other
Vehicles, swerved into an oncoming lane at a high speed, and
disregarded two stop signs. On the face of it Respondent's own
rendition of his conduct emphasized above, indicates evidence of

4
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**+

 

acts which, taken together, would enable a reasonably cautious
person to believe the safety of other persons and property then
on the highway was put at “substantial and unjustifiable risk.”
HRS § 702-206(3). Thus, taking the evidence in the strongest
Light for the Petitioner, the evidence was of sufficient quality
and probity to enable a reasonably cautious person to conclude
that Respondent disregarded the safety of persons or property,
Bul, 104 Hawai'i at 467, 92 P.3d at 476 (citations omitted), and
that such circumstances, Eastman, 61 Hawai'i at 141, 913 P.2d at
67, reasonably demonstrate that Respondent's disregard of the

risk to oth

 

was conscious and “involve[é) a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a law abiding person would
observe in the same situation," HRS § 702-206(3) (4). Moreover,
deference must be given to the court, which was the trier of
fact, with respect to questions of credibility and weight of the
evidence. In re Doe, 107 Hawai'i at 19, 108 P.3d at 973. In
reversing the court it does not appear that the ICA applied the

foregoing governing standards.

[As to the reckless component of the charge, Petitioner contends,

Se Ligtle doubt that a Law abiding person would
gnize thet possible repercussions of traveling at 60 mph

 

he high ent should [Ret
‘Similarly, such @ citizen could
Sscertein that

 

hanain i

Yebicle (Gr any vehicle’ while simJtansously excesdina the
[need Linit would eoteil-e sarkedly higher risk of accident
Biiniury, Such actions singly, but certainly in
Etmbinatign involve a gross deviation from the standard of
Gare that 2 normal law abiding person would observe in the
Sone situation:

8 added.)

 

15
 

vitr.
Therefore, the August 15, 2006 SDO of the ICA is

reversed and the January 21, 2005 judgment of the court is

of times. s
Anne K. Clarkin, Deputy :
Prosecuting Atcorney, heca flor nse
City « county of Honolulu,

Petitioner/Plaintift-
Appellee State of Hawas"t =
Deborah L. Kim, Deputy ere
Public Defender, on

the response for Vanen «rds re
Respondent /Defendant~

Appellant Louis Kruse
Agard IV.

16