Title: Koo v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-2347 
____________ 
 
LENNART S. KOO,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[February 11, 2016] 
 
PERRY, J. 
 
Lennart Koo seeks review of the decision of the First District Court of 
Appeal in Koo v. State, 149 So. 3d 693 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), on the ground that it 
expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal 
and this Court on a question of law.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), 
Fla. Const. 
FACTS 
 
Koo was convicted of burglary with a firearm after he removed a BB gun, an 
AK-47, a .22 caliber rifle, a .38 pistol, and a .44 Magnum revolver from Dr. 
Mohammed Saleh’s storage unit.  Koo later returned the .38 pistol, the AK-47, and 
 
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the .44 Magnum revolver.  Dr. Saleh testified at trial that Koo did not have 
permission to enter the storage unit without him.   
 
After Koo’s trial, but before his sentencing, Dr. Saleh wrote a letter to the 
trial court purporting to add context to the incident and provide a possible motive 
for Koo’s action.  Koo filed a motion for new trial arguing that the letter qualified 
as newly discovered evidence.  The trial court conducted a hearing and then denied 
the motion, finding that the letter did not qualify as newly discovered evidence 
because nothing in the letter was a recantation of Dr. Saleh’s trial testimony.  Koo 
received a minimum mandatory sentence of ten years. 
 
Koo appealed to the First District Court of Appeal which affirmed the trial 
court’s order stating, “any evidence in the victim’s letter was known to the parties, 
and as such . . . did not qualify as newly discovered evidence.”  Koo, 149 So. 3d at 
695.  Furthermore, the First District held that the letter was not material because it 
did not contain evidence that disproved one of the elements of burglary with a 
firearm.  Id.  Koo moved for rehearing and rehearing en banc, which the district 
court denied, stating “our decision is consistent with any existing precedent[,]” 
because “[t]he letter does not contradict the victim’s trial testimony, and it does not 
provide any information that would tend to rebut any of the elements of the 
convicted crime.”  Koo v. State, 162 So. 3d 156, 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). 
 
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DISCUSSION 
 
The issue in this case is whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
finding that a post-trial, pre-sentencing letter written by the victim, purporting to 
offer a possible explanation for the defendant’s actions, did not constitute a 
recantation and denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial without an 
evidentiary hearing to determine the letter’s credibility.  Because the letter did not 
recant any material trial testimony, meaning that no evidence supporting any 
element of the crime was undermined by the statements in the letter, the trial court 
correctly denied the motion for new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing.  
However, the trial court improperly found that the letter could not constitute newly 
discovered evidence because the information was known to the defendant at trial. 
A motion for new trial may be granted if “[n]ew and material evidence, 
which, if introduced at the trial would probably have changed the verdict . . . , and 
which the defendant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and 
produced at the trial, has been discovered.”  Boyd v. State, 910 So. 2d 167, 178 
(Fla. 2005) (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.600(a)(3)).  If a witness recants trial 
testimony, that may be considered newly discovered evidence.  See, e.g., Stephens 
v. State, 829 So. 2d 945, 945-46 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).  “[A] recantation is not 
precluded from being considered newly discovered evidence simply because the 
defendant knew, as reflected by what the defendant claimed the facts to be, that the 
 
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recanting witness was not telling the truth at the time of the trial or because the 
defendant took the stand to testify contrary to the witness.”  Archer v. State, 934 
So. 2d 1187, 1994 (Fla. 2006). 
Based on this standard, if the information in Dr. Saleh’s letter had 
constituted a recantation of his trial testimony, the trial court should have held an 
evidentiary hearing, even if Koo knew that Dr. Saleh’s trial testimony was false.  
However, the lower court correctly determined that the information in Dr. Saleh’s 
letter did not constitute a recantation of his trial testimony.  Instead, Dr. Saleh 
gives equivocal explanations for Koo’s actions.  Although Koo’s defense at trial 
was that he felt it was necessary to take Dr. Saleh’s weapons to protect himself, 
and argues that Dr. Saleh’s letter supports this theory of defense, no such statement 
is made in the letter. 
 
Dr. Saleh’s testimony at trial was brief.  The entirety of his testimony on 
direct examination was as follows: 
Q:  Last November did you have a storage unit at the Atlantic 
Boulevard U-Haul storage unit? 
A:  I did. 
Q:  And what did you put in that storage unit? 
A:  I had a lot of clothing.  Before, your Honor, for quite a 
while, I had some clothing and merchandise that I ordered from 
China. 
Q:  Did you put guns in that storage unit? 
A:  Yes, sir. 
Q:  On November 14th, did you and the defendant, Mr. Lennart 
Koo, put guns in that storage unit? 
A:  You know I love you, man, but I have to go with the truth. 
 
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 . . . . 
Q:  Last November 14th? 
A:  Yes, sir. 
Q:  Was Mr. Koo allowed to go in that storage unit without 
you? 
A:  No, sir. 
Q:  And did Mr. Koo take guns out of that storage unit? 
A:  Yes, sir. 
 . . . . 
Q:  Dr. Saleh, is this an AK-47? 
A:  Yes, sir. 
Q:  Is this your AK-47? 
A:  I believe it is. 
Q:  Is this the AK-47 that was in the storage unit? 
A:  Yeah, I remember the scratch on it. 
On cross-examination, Dr. Saleh testified that he had known Koo for 
approximately five years, and that Koo had worked for him for the last two to three 
years, “off and on.”  Dr. Saleh testified that he was notified on November 15, 
2011, that his storage unit was missing a lock but did not visit the unit until 
January 7, 2012.  Dr. Saleh testified that he received a phone call from Koo’s 
mother on November 16, and met with her and Koo on November 17 where Koo 
returned the AK-47 and a handgun. 
Q:  In fact, Mr. Koo, as your employee, had the authority to go 
to these different properties, which you owned, correct? 
A:  No.  He may – I may send him on an errand, but nobody 
gave him the permission to go to the room, break in and steal my gun. 
Q:  And, in fact, you actually provided Mr. Koo with keys to all 
of these properties that you owned? 
A:  No. 
Q:  He had a keyring which had keys to your vehicles? 
A:  No.  He stole keys, stole a lot of things.  No, we didn’t trust 
him very much. 
 
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 . . . . 
Q:  So even though you allegedly knew that this person had 
stolen a keyring to properties you owned you kept him as an 
employee? 
A:  He was not an employee.  He was doing some independent 
contract[ing], if you wish, but he was not formally employed.  We 
were trying to help him out. 
 
In his letter to the trial judge after Koo was convicted and before he was 
sentenced, Dr. Saleh wrote that Koo “had keys to every dwelling” and could have 
taken something more valuable.  Koo argues that this is a recantation of Dr. 
Saleh’s trial testimony that Koo did not have access to all of Dr. Saleh’s properties.  
However, this statement does not contradict Dr. Saleh’s testimony that Koo had 
stolen a keyring.  His acknowledgment in his letter that Koo had keys to his 
dwellings is not materially different from his testimony at trial because neither Dr. 
Saleh’s letter nor trial testimony stated that Koo had authority to have those keys.  
Nothing else in Dr. Saleh’s letter can be characterized as contradicting or 
contrasting any of this testimony at trial.  For example, his statement in the letter, 
“I miss [Koo] very much and I am devastated that he was convicted to serve a 
minimum ten years in prison.  He does not deserve that . . . .” is consistent with his 
testimony at trial that he loved Koo like a brother, but was compelled to tell the 
truth.  Dr. Saleh’s post-trial letter appears to be an attempt to provide an 
explanation for Koo’s actions, but is consistent with his trial testimony:  
I suddenly remembered that [Koo’s] “intent” may have been 
motivated by something more benign than what has transpired during 
 
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the trial . . . .  The only explanation for [Koo] to remove the guns from 
the storage room, may have been his desire to protect me from my 
own self.  I believe he may have felt that leaving the guns in the 
storage room was not enough, because I could still have had access to 
them.  Of course, I would never harm my wife or anybody else . . . .   
Dr. Saleh does not state in the letter that Koo had permission to enter the storage 
unit, that Koo was asked to move the guns, or that he had given Koo a reason to 
feel imminent danger. 
In Archer, we explained: 
It is correct that not all recantations will be considered newly 
discovered evidence.  See, e.g., Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 313 
(Fla. 1996) (finding defendant’s reliance on Court’s traditional 
treatment of recantations as newly discovered evidence misplaced 
because defendant’s situation was not the typical case where a witness 
suddenly recanted his or her trial testimony years after the fact).  A 
recantation will not be considered newly discovered evidence where 
the recantation offers nothing new or where the recantation is offered 
by an untrustworthy individual who gave inconsistent statements all 
along.  Jones, 678 So. 2d at 312-13 (finding that recantation “simply 
offers nothing new” because the witness had already been impeached 
at trial with a prior sworn statement which was consistent with the 
recantation); Walton v. State, 847 So. 2d 438, 454-55 (Fla. 2003) 
(finding that recantation was “simply a new version of the events from 
a witness/participant who has presented multiple stories since the time 
of the occurrence of the events themselves”); Smith v. State, 400 So. 
2d 956 (Fla. 1981) (finding that recantation testimony was cumulative 
to the evidence introduced at trial because both court and counsel 
were aware that prior to trial the recanting witness had confessed to 
the crime and said that defendant was not involved). 
However, in this case, the postconviction court erred when it 
rejected the claim based on what the postconviction court concluded 
was Archer’s knowledge of Bonifay’s testimony at the time of the 
trial.  We find that a recantation is not precluded from being 
considered newly discovered evidence simply because the defendant 
knew, as reflected by what the defendant claimed the facts to be, that 
 
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the recanting witness was not telling the truth at the time of the trial or 
because the defendant took the stand to testify contrary to the witness. 
See Burns v. State, 858 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Lee v. 
State, 677 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).  The appropriate question 
was whether Archer was or should have been aware of the existence 
of evidence that would demonstrate that Bonifay’s testimony was 
false. 
Archer, 934 So. 2d at 1194.  In addition to other claims, Archer claimed that a 
witness against him had recanted his trial testimony.  The trial court held that the 
recantation was not newly discovered evidence because Archer knew at the time of 
trial that Bonifay was lying.  We affirmed, but rejected the postconviction court’s 
rationale.  Nevertheless, we agreed with the postconviction court’s determination 
that Bonifay’s testimony was not credible.  Id. at 1196 (noting that recantations are 
“exceedingly unreliable”) (citing Armstrong v. State, 642 So. 2d 730, 735 (Fla. 
1994); Johnson v. State, 769 So. 2d 990, 998 (Fla. 2000)). 
 
Likewise, in the instant case, the trial court and First District improperly 
determined that Dr. Saleh’s letter did not qualify as newly discovered evidence 
because “any evidence in the victim’s letter was known to the parties. . . . ”  Koo, 
149 So. 3d at 695.  However, unlike Archer, there was no recantation to consider 
and both courts correctly determined that the unsworn letter did not qualify as 
newly discovered evidence because nothing in the letter recanted Dr. Saleh’s trial 
testimony.   “As stated by Judge Roberts, the unsworn letter by the victim did not 
 
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involve a recantation.”  Koo, 149 So. 3d at 696 (Wolf, J., concurring).  Thus, there 
was “nothing new” offered by the letter. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Koo’s motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing 
although the trial court and First District misstated the appropriate standard for 
determining whether a recantation constitutes newly discovered evidence. 
 
We decline to reach Koo’s second issue on appeal because it was “not 
properly preserved for appellate review and [does] not constitute fundamental 
error.”  Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277, 295-96 (Fla. 2009). 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the result of the First District Court of 
Appeal, but quash the portion of the decision that states “any evidence in the 
victim’s letter was known to the parties, and as such . . . did not qualify as newly 
discovered evidence,”  Koo, 149 So. 3d at 695, because this is an incorrect 
statement of law. 
 
It is so ordered.   
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.  
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result.  
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
 
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PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur in the majority’s decision explaining that the letter from Dr. Saleh, 
the victim in this case, did constitute newly discovered evidence.  I dissent to the 
extent that the majority denies that the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing regarding Dr. Saleh’s recantation because—according to the majority—
“the letter did not recant any material trial testimony.”  Majority op. at 3.   
 
The majority’s statement that an evidentiary hearing is not required because 
“the letter did not recant any material trial testimony” is overly broad and ignores 
the reality that the statements in the letter could constitute impeachment of the key 
prosecution witness.  See Brooks v. State, 175 So. 3d 205, 231 (Fla. 2015) 
(evaluating weight of newly discovered evidence includes factoring whether it 
constitutes impeachment or goes to the merits of the case).   
Only when the recantation is “inherently incredible or obviously immaterial 
to the verdict and sentence” is an evidentiary hearing not required.  Davis v. State, 
26 So. 3d 519, 526 (Fla. 2009) (emphasis added).  In fact, in Stephens v. State, 829 
So. 2d 945, 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), the First District recognized and properly 
applied the “inherently incredible or obviously immaterial” standard in remanding 
for an evidentiary hearing to consider a state witness’s affidavit.   
Evidentiary hearings are of critical importance.  As this Court recognized in 
McLin v. State, 827 So. 2d 948, 954-57 (Fla. 2002), only through evidentiary 
 
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hearings can the credibility of the witness’s testimony be evaluated.  See also 
Nordelo v. State, 93 So. 3d 178, 185 (Fla. 2012) (finding witness’s recantation, 
unless inherently incredible or obviously immaterial to verdict, requires 
evidentiary hearing); Harris v. State, 128 So. 3d 44, 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) 
(requiring evidentiary hearing to resolve claims of newly discovered evidence, 
especially when resolution of those claims necessarily requires the trial court to 
make credibility determinations); Cammarano v. State, 602 So. 2d 1369, 1371 (Fla. 
5th DCA 1992) (determining that recantation of testimony by key prosecution 
witness requires evidentiary hearing to determine whether verdict likely would 
have been different had witness either not testified or had the testimony at trial 
been recanted).   
The majority additionally fails to acknowledge that a recantation can be 
material even if it would only impeach a witness’s testimony.  In this case, Dr. 
Saleh was the key prosecution witness.  At trial, although he stated that he loved 
Koo as a brother, Dr. Saleh depicted Koo as not even an employee, but rather an 
“independent contractor,” in contrast to Koo’s testimony that he was Dr. Saleh’s 
“right hand man,” with whom he shared a close relationship.   
The post-trial letter contains admissions that were not part of his trial 
testimony that the jury heard: Dr. Saleh writes that he “suddenly remembered” that 
Koo’s intent “may have been motivated by something more benign than what [] 
 
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transpired during the trial,” because he spent long hours talking and venting his 
frustrations with Koo and “told [Koo] to make sure I did not do something that I 
might regret.”  In contrast, at trial, what the jury heard from Dr. Saleh was that “we 
didn’t trust [Koo] very much,” and that “nobody gave [Koo] the permission to go 
to the room, break in and steal my gun.”   
The statements made in the post-trial letter speak directly to Koo’s consent 
defense and the intent element.  Based primarily on Dr. Saleh’s trial testimony, the 
jury convicted the defendant of burglary with a firearm that triggered a mandatory 
ten-year sentence.  As Judge Makar states in dissent: “The jury could not have 
convicted Koo without Dr. Saleh’s testimony, which it apparently found credible.”  
Koo v. State, 149 So. 3d 693, 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (Makar, J., dissenting).  As 
Judge Makar further elaborates: 
Dr. Saleh’s recantation letter may be credible, at least as to the 
portions related to Koo’s consent and necessity defenses, which are 
material to the verdict.  Under these circumstances, when the State’s 
star witness recants a material portion of his testimony that goes to 
two key defenses in an exceptionally close case in which the jury 
expressed reservations (if not remorse) about its verdict—beseeching 
the trial judge to be lenient on the defendant—it was an abuse of 
discretion not to at least hold a hearing on the matter.  Koo’s request 
for a hearing is an exceptionally modest one given his liberty interest 
is at stake; his freedom for the next ten years has been taken away 
based on the disavowed testimony of Dr. Saleh, a person that even the 
trial judge had difficulty believing.  A remand for an evidentiary 
hearing under Stephens is necessitated; whether a new trial is 
warranted would depend upon the results of that hearing.  Koo is 
entitled to this minimal degree of due process before the State can 
take away a decade of his life. 
 
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Id. at 698-99 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
I agree with the reasoning in Judge Makar’s dissent.  Impeachment of the 
key prosecution witness, Dr. Saleh, could have been the difference between a 
conviction and a not guilty verdict.  The sole basis for the conviction is the 
testimony of Dr. Saleh, the main accuser, and his credibility is key.  Whether his 
letter would show that he simply suffers from “buyer’s remorse” or that it would 
materially impeach his credibility is a matter that should have been heard at an 
evidentiary hearing.  If the victim testifies at an evidentiary hearing, his credibility 
can be evaluated so that a factual determination can be made of the materiality of 
his new testimony in light of his prior testimony.  Because Dr. Saleh’s letter was 
not “inherently incredible or obviously immaterial to the verdict,” an evidentiary 
hearing should have been held in this case.   
Accordingly, I would remand for an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised 
by Dr. Saleh’s statements.  
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D12-4866 
 
 
(Duval County) 
 
Daniel Gray Thomas of the Law Office of D. Gray Thomas, P.A., Jacksonville, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
 
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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and 
Matthew V. Pavese, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent