Title: Ex Parte Ellington

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

580 So. 2d 1367 (1990)
Ex parte William Eric ELLINGTON.
(Re William Eric Ellington v. State).
89-363.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 28, 1990.
Rehearing Denied April 19, 1991.
*1368 Jerry S. Barclay, Huntsville, for petitioner.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Mary Elizabeth Culberson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.
ADAMS, Justice.
We granted certiorari review in this case to address Ellington's argument that the trial court erred in refusing to strike a juror for cause. We reverse and remand.
William Eric Ellington was convicted of rape in the first degree and was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that one of the members of the jury venire admitted that the fact that her husband worked for the police department, coupled with the fact that two detectives from the department would be testifying in the trial, would affect her ability to fairly judge the issues at trial. The following is the entire exchange between Ellington's attorney and the potential juror:
Following the voir dire, Ellington's attorney requested that Ms. Bryant be stricken for cause:
In regard to this issue, the Court of Criminal Appeals simply stated, "[W]e have carefully examined the remaining issues raised by appellant and find no merit in them. We deem further discussion unnecessary." Ellington v. State, 580 So. 2d 1365 (Ala. Cr.App.1989) (on return to remand).
In Knop v. McCain, 561 So. 2d 229 (Ala. 1989), this Court stated as follows:
Knop v. McCain, 561 So. 2d 229, 232 (Ala. 1989). See, also, Wood v. Woodham, 561 So. 2d 224 (Ala.1989).
In the present case, there was only a limited exchange between the attorney and Ms. Bryant; however, that exchange does indicate probable prejudice on her part. She indicated that her husband was on the police force and that she knew at least one of the detectives who was to testify at the trial. These things, she stated, would affect her ability to hear the case. The trial judge had the opportunity to question her further to see if, despite her biases, she could listen to the facts and apply the law to them. The judge did not do so and, instead, simply denied the motion to strike Ms. Bryant for cause. Because the evidence before us does indicate probable prejudice and thus an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to strike for cause, we are compelled to reverse the judgment and remand this case with instructions to order a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, ALMON, SHORES, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., concurs specially.
KENNEDY, J., dissents.
MADDOX, Justice (concurring specially).
When the juror stated that her ability to hear the case would be affected, the defendant had met his burden of showing that the juror was probably prejudiced. There is no showing in this record of any evidence that modifies, in any way, that juror's statement.
I cannot agree that this case is like Wood v. Woodham, 561 So. 2d 224 (Ala.1989). The holding there is wrong, and I regret that Knop v. McCain, 561 So. 2d 229 (Ala. 1989), is cited in the same paragraph with Woodham, because the two cases are so factually different.