Title: State v. Gause

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

112 Ariz. 296 (1975) 541 P.2d 396 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. William GAUSE, Appellant. No. 2099-2. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. October 14, 1975. Rehearing Denied November 18, 1975. Bruce E. Babbitt, Atty. Gen. by Grove M. Callison, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Rabinovitz, Minker, Hirsch & Dix, P.C. by Bernard I. Rabinovitz and Albert P. Dover, Tucson, for appellant. CAMERON, Chief Justice. This is an appeal from the denial of a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 1973. There is only one question before the court and that is: Is there a valid appeal? The facts necessary for a determination of this matter are as follows. Appellant, William Gause, was tried and convicted of the first degree murder, A.R.S. §§ 13-451 and 452, of his estranged wife, Mary Ellen Gause. We affirmed the judgment and conviction, 107 Ariz. 491, 489 P.2d 830 (1971). Appellant then filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure 1973 asking for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. After a hearing, the motion was denied by written order dated 21 June 1974. The order read as follows: Written notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals was filed 9 July 1974 and amended written notice of appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court was filed 11 July 1974. That notice read as follows: Rule 32.9 provides in part as follows: Appellant filed neither a petition for rehearing nor a petition for review, but rather, as we noted above, proceeded by direct appeal from the denial of his motion. Appellant admits that he has not complied with Rule 32.9, but presents no valid reason for his non-compliance. Post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure 1973 is a remedy separate and apart from the right to appeal. In pursuing post-conviction remedies, petitioner is limited to procedures set forth in the rule. Rule 32.9(a) specifically requires that the petitioner timely move the court for rehearing in order that the trial court have a last chance to correct any errors or omissions. This was not done. Upon denial of the motion for rehearing the petitioner may timely seek review in the appropriate appellate court as provided by Rule 32.9(c). This was not done. The purported appeal is dismissed. STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., HAYS and HOLOHAN, JJ., and EINO M. JACOBSON, Judge, Court of Appeals, concur. LORNA E. LOCKWOOD, J., did not participate in the determination of this matter and EINO M. JACOBSON, Judge, sat in her stead.