Title: State v. Tonge

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 119,543 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JOSEPH CHARLES TONGE JR., 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
Once an appellate court finds the district court imposed an illegal sentence, the 
court is limited to remanding on that issue with directions for the district court to impose 
a legal sentence. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed September 13, 
2019. Appeal from Pottawatomie District Court; JEFFREY R. ELDER, judge. Opinion filed March 19, 
2021. Judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Judgment of the district 
court is reversed and the case is remanded with directions.  
 
Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the briefs for appellant.  
 
Steven J. Obermeier, assistant solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the 
briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
STANDRIDGE, J.:  Joseph Charles Tonge Jr. challenged the legality of his sentence 
for the first time on appeal. After finding the sentencing court used an incorrect criminal 
history score, the Court of Appeals vacated his sentence and remanded to the district 
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court for resentencing. Although the parties did not ask the panel to do so, it also found 
the plea agreement was negotiated based on the parties' mutual mistake; so, it reformed 
the plea agreement on remand to eliminate the agreed-upon sentencing recommendations 
of the parties. On review, we conclude the panel did not have the requisite authority to 
reform the plea agreement. Once the panel found the sentence imposed was illegal, it was 
limited to remanding on that issue with directions for the district court to impose a legal 
sentence.  
 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 
The State filed charges against Tonge for aggravated robbery, aggravated battery, 
burglary of a motor vehicle, felony theft, and misdemeanor theft. Tonge entered into a 
plea agreement with the State. In exchange for Tonge's no contest plea to the aggravated 
robbery count, the State agreed to dismiss all the remaining charges and to recommend a 
durational departure. The parties expected Tonge's criminal history score would be an A, 
which carries a sentencing range of 221 to 247 months for his crime of conviction. But 
the State agreed to recommend a durational departure to 180 months. The State also 
agreed that Tonge would be free to argue for a durational departure to 120 months, but he 
would not be allowed to file a dispositional departure motion. Consistent with the parties' 
agreement, Tonge pled no contest at the plea hearing, the district court accepted the plea, 
and the court adjudged Tonge guilty of aggravated robbery.  
 
 
As expected, the presentence investigation (PSI) report calculated Tonge's 
criminal history score to be an A. In calculating this score, the PSI deemed two pre-1993 
burglary convictions as person felonies. Tonge never objected to his criminal history 
score as set forth in the PSI report.  
 
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Before sentencing, Tonge filed a motion for durational departure from the 221-
month to 247-month presumptive prison sentence range to either a 180-month or a 120-
month prison sentence as the plea agreement contemplated. To support his departure 
request, he maintained he had accepted responsibility for his involvement in the case, the 
State did not have to take the matter to a costly trial, he played a minor role in the 
offense, he was not a safety threat to society, and many of his more serious prior offenses 
occurred more than 15 years before.  
 
At the sentencing hearing, the district court acknowledged Tonge's criminal 
history score of A, granted Tonge's departure motion, and imposed a 180-month prison 
sentence as the State recommended. The district court found substantial and compelling 
reasons to depart because the reduced sentence (1) was consistent with the parties' 
agreement and (2) would spare the victim, who was traumatized and humiliated by the 
crimes, from the need to testify at trial. The court specifically noted that it did not find 
substantial and compelling reasons to further depart to a 120-month sentence.  
 
Tonge timely appealed his sentence. Relevant to the issue presented on review, he 
claimed for the first time on appeal that the district court erred by scoring his two pre-
1993 Kansas burglary convictions as person felonies for purposes of calculating his 
criminal history score. Relying on State v. Dickey, 301 Kan. 1018, 350 P.3d 1054 (2015), 
Tonge submitted that the sentencing court was prohibited from classifying his prior 
burglary convictions as person offenses unless it found that the prior burglaries involved 
a dwelling. Because the pre-1993 burglary statute under which he was convicted did not 
include a dwelling element, Tonge claimed the sentencing court improperly classified his 
pre-1993 burglary convictions as person offenses by unlawfully making a factual finding 
that went beyond identifying the statutory elements.  
 
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The State's brief on appeal did not address the merits of Tonge's illegal sentence 
argument. Instead, the State argued Tonge could not raise the issue for the first time on 
appeal. But in the event the panel decided to consider the issue, the State asked the panel 
to require on remand that the parties be bound by their original sentence 
recommendations or, in the alternative, that the State be permitted to set aside the plea 
agreement entirely.  
 
The panel reached the issue on the merits and found (1) the sentencing court 
improperly classified Tonge's pre-1993 burglary convictions as person offenses, which 
resulted in an illegal sentence; (2) Tonge's correct criminal history score was a C, which 
carries a sentencing range of 96 to 107 months; and (3) it was necessary to vacate 
Tonge's sentence and remand the matter to the district court for resentencing.  
 
In the final paragraph of the opinion, the panel rejected the State's request to set 
aside the plea agreement before remanding the matter for resentencing. Citing State v. 
Bradford, 299 Kan. 288, 323 P.3d 168 (2014), the panel noted that a motion to correct an 
illegal sentence cannot serve as the means to reverse a conviction. The panel also rejected 
the State's request to require that the parties be bound by their original sentence 
recommendations on remand. Instead, without prompting or suggestion from either party, 
the panel nullified the sentencing recommendation portion of the plea agreement, finding 
it was the product of a mutual mistake. The panel explained that the departure 
recommendations down to 180 or 120 months were based on the presumptive sentence 
for an offender with a criminal history score of A but that those recommendations would 
actually be an increase from the presumptive sentence for an offender with a criminal 
history score of C. In light of its nullification decision, the panel held the parties would be 
free on remand to argue for a correct presumptive sentence. See State v. Tonge, No. 
119,543, 2019 WL 4383304, at *6 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion). 
 
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After the opinion was filed, the State asked the panel to clarify that part of the 
remand order nullifying the departure portion of the plea agreement. Specifically, the 
State inquired whether the panel's order allowed it to seek an upward departure to 180 
months on remand—the term it originally agreed to recommend in the plea agreement. If 
it did not, the State then asked the court to reconsider the order.  
 
The Court of Appeals issued an order of clarification and explained: 
 
"For the reasons set out in the opinion, the panel intended to convey that on remand the 
State and Tonge would be free to argue for any lawful sentence, including upward or 
downward departures, notwithstanding the limitations on sentencing recommendations to 
the district court contained in their plea agreement. Both the State and Tonge agreed to 
those recommendations based on a mutual mistake as to his criminal history. 
 
"On remand, the State and Tonge may argue to the district court for any lawful 
sentence."  
 
Tonge timely filed a petition for review following the panel's clarification order. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Tonge claims the Court of Appeals exceeded the scope of its authority when it 
reformed the parties' plea agreement as part of its remand order. We agree. 
 
Tonge originally argued on appeal that his sentence was illegal because his two 
pre-1993 burglary convictions were improperly scored as person felonies. Because it was 
illegal, Tonge asked the panel to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. The 
panel decided this issue in Tonge's favor, vacated the sentence, and remanded for 
resentencing. The panel also reformed the parties' plea agreement as part of its remand 
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order. But once the panel deemed the sentence illegal, it only had the authority to remand 
the case on that issue and to direct the district court to impose a legal sentence. As we 
also held today in State v. Dunn, 313 Kan. ___, Syl.  (No. 119,866, this day decided), a 
decision on the merits of any collateral issues related to an illegal sentence is advisory.   
 
Because the panel lacked the requisite authority to reform the plea agreement after 
finding the sentence imposed was illegal, that portion of the panel's order on remand is 
reversed. We affirm that part of the panel's decision to the extent it ordered remand to the 
district court for resentencing with directions to impose a legal sentence.  
 
 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.