Title: State v. Merchant

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Merchant  (2000-417); 173 Vt. 249; 790 A.2d 386

[Filed 21-Dec-2001]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 2000-417

State of Vermont                               Supreme Court

                                               On Appeal from
   v.                                          District Court of Vermont,
                                               Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit

David Lawrence Merchant	                       June Term, 2001 

Theresa S. DiMauro, J.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant
  Attorney General,     Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robert Appel, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Deputy Defender
  General, Montpelier, for   Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, and Johnson, JJ., and Cook,
  D.J., Specially Assigned

       AMESTOY, C.J., Defendant pled guilty to felony lewd and lascivious
  conduct and violation  of conditions of release.  He appeals the Windsor
  District Court's denial of his motion for a mental  health screening and
  motion for a competency evaluation arguing that the court was required to
  order  a mental health screening at defense counsel's request pursuant to
  13 V.S.A. § 4815(d), and that the  court should have ordered a competency
  evaluation because there was reason to believe the  defendant may have been
  incompetent.  Defendant further appeals the trial court's denial of his 
  motion to withdraw the plea and finally argues the trial court violated
  defendant's  federal and constitutional rights against self-incrimination
  by forcing him to testify about the  underlying crime.  We affirm.

 

       On December 11, 1998, defendant was charged with felony lewd and
  lascivious conduct for  kissing and touching the breast of an elderly
  patient in the nursing home where he was working as an  x-ray technician. 
  Defendant was subsequently charged with one count of violation of
  conditions of  release for moving to New Hampshire without notifying his
  probation officer.  On April 6, 2000,  defendant entered into a plea
  agreement, pursuant to which he pled guilty to felony lewd and  lascivious
  conduct and to the violation of conditions of release.  The prosecution
  agreed to  recommend no more than three to five years to serve; defendant
  was free to argue for less.  The trial  court accepted the plea following a
  Rule 11 hearing, at which defendant admitted to the violations  and waived
  his right to a trial.

       On June 29, 2000, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea,
  claiming that at the time of  the Rule 11 hearing he did not have
  sufficient present ability to make a voluntary plea.  Defendant  also filed
  a motion for a competency evaluation pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 4814(a)(2). 
  The motions  were heard on August 22, 2000, at which time defendant also
  filed a third motion for a mental health  screening pursuant to 13 V.S.A. §
  4815(d).

       Defendant testified at the hearing that he had gone into a state of
  "shock" following his  arrival at the courthouse on April 6, 2000, when he
  learned that the State had refused to reduce the  felony charge of lewd and
  lascivious conduct to a misdemeanor charge, and that his options were to 
  plead guilty to the felony charge and to the violation of conditions of
  release, or to go to trial as  scheduled.  Defendant testified that, as a
  result of this "shock," he had no recollection of discussing  the plea
  agreement with, or obtaining advice from, his attorney.  Defendant also
  testified that he  "sometimes" goes into shock "when there is an affront or
  an assault meant to cause serious harm to  him."  When this occurs,
  according to defendant, he is "robotic," or like an "automaton," and it 

 

  interferes with his ability to comprehend information and to make
  decisions.  He explained that he  pled guilty out of panic and his need to
  escape from the courtroom.  In addition, defendant testified  that while in
  this psychological state, he is able to sign his name, drive a car and do
  "all kinds of  things."

       Defendant acknowledged that he had kept his tendency to go into shock,
  and the fact that he  did go into shock on April 6, hidden from his
  attorney.  Defendant further stated that he recalled the  hearing on April
  6, who the judge and the prosecutor were, and that he changed his plea.  In
  addition,  he recalled that on that day he went to the Windsor police
  station to sign in as required by his  conditions of release, that in the
  afternoon he saw his employer and spoke with him about the court 
  proceedings, and that he drove 30 miles back to his home without
  difficulty.  He further recalls  calling his girlfriend and expressing
  disbelief over the court proceedings and the fact that the state  had not
  offered to reduce the charge.

       Defendant also testified at the hearing that he had attended group
  therapy sessions for stress  management with Dr. John Corson for
  approximately five months before the hearing and met with  Dr. Corson
  individually one month before the hearing.  He testified that Dr. Corson
  would support  his claim of temporary incompetency at the plea hearing. 
  Dr. Corson did not testify at the hearing,  and defendant has not submitted
  any report from Dr. Corson.  However, according to representations  made by
  the attorneys in the case, Dr. Corson had concluded that there was a
  possibility that the  defendant acted out some form of "symbolic
  suicide"when he entered his plea.  The record indicates  that Dr. Corson's
  opinion was based on defendant's recollection of the plea hearing.  

 

       As part of his pre-sentencing investigation (PSI), defendant underwent
  a psycho-sexual  evaluation, which included extensive psychological
  testing.  Defendant rejects the results of the  psychological tests, the
  psycho-sexual report, and its conclusions.

       At the August 22 hearing, the trial court denied the motion for a
  mental health screening and  for a competency evaluation.  Three days later
  the court issued its written opinion.  The court found  defendant's
  testimony to be "self-serving" and "not credible."  In its written opinion,
  the court noted  that defendant had participated fully in the Rule 11
  colloquy on his change of plea and had failed to  present substantial
  credible evidence to support his claim that he was incompetent when he
  entered  his plea.  Without such evidence, the court concluded, defendant
  had not shown a "fair and just  reason" to allow him to withdraw his plea.

       On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred (1) in
  declining to order both the mental  health screening and the competency
  evaluation; (2) in ruling that he had not shown a fair and just  reason for
  withdrawing his plea; and (3) in violating his federal and state
  constitutional rights against  self-incrimination by forcing him to testify
  about the underlying crime during the plea withdrawal hearing.

                                      I.

       Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
  his motion for a mental  health screening, arguing that once defense
  counsel raised the issue of competency and requested the  screening,
  pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 4815(d), the court is required to grant it.  He
  further claims that   due process and Vermont law require that a competency
  evaluation be ordered where there is reason  to believe the defendant may
  be incompetent.  Finally, he asserts that the trial court based its denial 
  of these motions upon the erroneous conclusion that the plea entry
  constituted a final judgment and 

 

  that it had no obligation to grant mental health screenings and competency
  evaluations after final  judgment.  

       We first note that defendant is correct in asserting that the entry of
  judgment after sentencing  constitutes final judgment, not the entry of the
  plea. (FN1)  In addition, an evaluation for competency  may be ordered at
  any time, "before, during or after trial, and before final judgment." Id. §
  4814(a).   Therefore, the trial court was not precluded from ordering a
  competency evaluation before final  judgment.  However, contrary to
  defendant's claim, it was not required to do so.

       Defendant argues that a mental health screening is required once
  defense counsel requests  one, and bases this assertion on the mandatory
  term "shall" in the statute.  The statute reads:

            Upon the making of a motion for examination, the court
       shall order  a mental health screening to be completed by a
       designated mental  health professional while the defendant is
       still at the court.

  Id. § 4815(d) (emphasis added).

       Although this subsection contains mandatory language, read as a whole,
  13 V.S.A § 4815  does not require the court to order an initial mental
  health screening in order to decide the issue of  competency.  See id. 
  "The determination of whether statutory language is mandatory or directory
  is  one of legislative intent."  In re Mullestein, 148 Vt. 170, 174,