Title: JOE KOBIELUSZ v. WILLARD V. WILSON and WILSON HEREFORDS, A Wyoming Corporation

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOE KOBIELUSZ v. WILLARD V. WILSON and WILSON HEREFORDS, A Wyoming Corporation1985 WY 72701 P.2d 559Case Number: 84-94Decided: 06/12/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOE KOBIELUSZ, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

WILLARD V. WILSON AND 
WILSON HEREFORDS, A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, Hot SpringsCounty, Gary P. Hartman, 
J.

 
 
Harry E. 
Leimback, Casper, for appellant.

William S. Bon 
of Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, Casper, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This was an action to 
recover damages for personal injuries brought by Joe Kobielusz, appellant, 
against Willard Wilson and Wilson Herefords, a Wyoming corporation. From a summary judgment 
in favor of Wilson, Kobielusz 
appeals.

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

[¶3.]     The sole question 
presented for our determination is whether there was a genuine issue of material 
fact as would prevent entry of summary judgment.

[¶4.]     Joe Kobielusz owned and 
lived upon a tract of land adjoining and immediately south of the Wilson 
Herefords Ranch near Thermopolis, Wyoming. On May 7, 1980, Mrs. Kobielusz 
observed from a window of their home a fire burning onto their property from the 
north. Joe Kobielusz rushed to fight the fire, which, when he arrived, was 
burning his pasture, pump house and power pole. Joe Kobielusz and a neighbor, 
Gordon Legerski, put out the fire. In the course of fighting and putting out the 
fire, Joe Kobielusz suffered burn injuries to his feet for which recovery of 
damages is sought in this action.

[¶5.]     Summary judgment is a 
useful tool for disposing of litigation in which there are no real issues or 
questions of fact that ought to be determined in a trial. Larsen v. Roberts, Wyo., 676 P.2d 1046 
(1984). It is, however, a drastic remedy which, when granted, deprives a 
litigant of a right to trial. It, therefore, ought to be utilized with caution 
and restraint. Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield of Wyoming, Wyo., 609 P.2d 984 (1980); Keller v. Anderson, Wyo., 
554 P.2d 1253 (1976). Negligence cases usually involve mixed questions of law 
and fact concerning the existence of a duty, the standard of care required of a 
reasonable person, and proximate cause and are ordinarily not susceptible to 
summary adjudication. Keller v. Anderson, supra; Gilliland v. Steinhoefel, Wyo., 521 P.2d 1350 
(1974).

[¶6.]     We have before us the 
same material as was before the trial court; and, on appeal, our duty is the 
same as that court in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate. In 
making this determination, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and give to that party the 
benefit of all favorable inferences that might be drawn therefrom. Schepps v. Howe, Wyo., 
665 P.2d 504 (1983). Although we have held inferences contrary to direct 
testimony may not ordinarily support a finding, Blackmore v. Davis Oil 
Company, Wyo., 671 P.2d 334 (1983); Forbes Company v. MacNeel, Wyo., 382 P.2d 56 (1963), that determination usually depends upon the quality of evidence 
creating the inference and the direct testimony. A party moving for summary 
judgment carries the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact; and, if upon the record there is doubt as to the existence of 
issues of material fact, that doubt must be resolved against the party carrying 
the burden. Western Surety Company v. 
Town of Evansville, Wyo., 
675 P.2d 258 (1984).

[¶7.]     The evidence in this 
case is in the form of affidavits and depositions and, when viewed in a light 
most favorable to appellant, establishes that in the early part of May of each 
year it had been the practice of Wilson to clear irrigation ditches by setting 
fire to and burning the weeds in the ditches. One of these ditches ran toward 
appellant's property. Erwin Stoffers, an employee of Wilson Herefords Ranch at 
the time of this incident, stated in his affidavit:

"2. That on or about May 
7, 1980, I observed Willard Wilson in the area where a fire was burning 
approximately three hundred yards north of the Joe Kobielusz property line. At 
that time the fire was burning on the north side of a road running across the 
Wilson Herefords property.

"3. Then shortly after 
the day that I seen the fire burning along the roadway, I visited with Mr. Joe 
Kobielusz and he advised me that he had been injured in attempting to put out a 
fire that had reached his property from the Wilson property."

[¶8.]     The road crossing 
Wilson's 
property from his barns and buildings to the railroad tracks is a private road. 
A witness, Gordon Legerski, in his deposition, stated:

"Mr. Wilson has got a 
road that goes up over the railroad track, I think, right down from his barns 
and you couldn't, I couldn't see beyond that and I didn't know if it started 
down below that. But there is a road that goes up to the tracks where he goes 
over the tracks. And from there to our place why it was burned 
there."

In the spring of 
1981, Joe Kobielusz and Wilson were out together and burned weeds in the area of 
the drain ditch and railroad tracks. It was not windy. They had everything under 
control, and encountered no problems.

[¶9.]     Mr. Wilson stated in 
his deposition that in May 1982:

"[W]e did have employees 
that was burning an irrigation ditch within our property and the railroad 
property.

* * * * * 
*

"That was in '82. And 
they did try to control it and I'm the one that brought the attention. It 
happened during the noon hour. Wind did come up.

* * * * * 
*

"Everyone was at dinner 
and gone so, you know, the men were, so that's the reason they 
left."

This fire also 
spread to the south and east onto the property of Joe 
Kobielusz.

[¶10.]  Both Joe Kobielusz and Gordon Legerski 
testified in their depositions about a conversation with Erwin Stoffers 
concerning the fire on May 7, 1980. Stoffers was an employee of Wilson at the time. The 
conversation occurred shortly after the fire. Gordon Legerski stated that 
Stoffers

"* * * said that he 
thought the fire was started on Willard's property, or up along the right-of-way 
there [b]ecause they were burning their ditches along the edge of the pasture * 
* *."

After being told 
not to speculate, the witness stated:

"As far as I know it 
started on Willard's property, according to Ed."

Joe Kobielusz 
testified in his deposition as follows:

"Q. Now why do you think 
Mr. Wilson started that fire?

"A. One of his hired men 
told me he did.

"Q. And who is 
that?

"A. Erv 
Stoffers.

* * * * * 
*

"A. Well he just said by 
God, Joe, I hate to see you laid up like this. And I asked him, I says well, I 
wonder who started that fire there. And he told me Wilson 
did.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. Did he say he had 
anything to do with it, that is Stoffers?

"A. No, he was riding a 
tractor around there someplace, doing something on the tractor, he said. And he seen him start it." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶11.]  Appellee Wilson states his position to 
be:

"[T]he evidence relied 
upon by the plaintiff to create an issue was either, inadmissible hearsay, 
speculation or at best, merely raised inferences which would not stand against 
affirmative and uncontradicted testimony to the contrary."

The affirmative 
and uncontradicted testimony to which appellees refer are the affidavits of 
Willard Wilson and employees of Wilson Herefords in which they state that they 
did not start the fire of May 7, 1980. First, the statements of Stoffers are not 
inadmissible hearsay as appellees claim. Rule 801(d)(2)(D), W.R.E., 
provides:

"(d) A statement is not 
hearsay if:

* * * * * 
*

"(2) The statement is 
offered against a party and is * * * (D) a statement by his agent or servant 
concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during 
the existence of the relationship * * *."

Such statement 
is not hearsay because its admission does not depend upon trustworthiness nor 
necessity but upon a basic philosophy of the adversary system that whatever a 
party to an action says or does should be receivable in evidence against him. 4 
Louiselle and Mueller, Federal Evidence § 411 at 59. At the time the fire of May 
7, 1980, occurred, Erwin Stoffers was employed as a ranchhand by Wilson. On the day this 
incident occurred he had been feeding livestock. Ranchhands employed by 
Wilson cleared 
irrigation ditches by burning weeds and irrigated crops through those ditches. 
Thus, the statements made by Erwin Stoffers to Joe Kobielusz and Gordon Legerski 
were statements by an agent or servant of Wilson concerning a matter within the scope of 
his agency or employment and made during the existence of the relationship. 
Unless excludable for some other reason, it would appear at least at this stage 
of the proceedings that the statements by Stoffers to Kobielusz and Legerski are 
admissible in evidence.

[¶12.]  Appellees, nevertheless, contend that the 
effect of all of the evidence, including these statements, is to create an 
inference only that Wilson started the fire of 
May 7, 1980; they further contend that this inference is, for purposes of 
summary judgment, overcome by the direct statement of Wilson that he did not 
start the fire. Thus, appellees state that

"[e]ven assuming that a 
reasonable inference in the plaintiff's favor might be drawn from the facts 
presented, under well established Wyoming law, such inferences disappear in the 
face of the unequivocal statements contained in the affidavits * * 
*."

They cite Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, supra, 
which quoted from Forbes Company v. 
MacNeel, supra, 382 P.2d  at 57, for this proposition, this court 
stating:

"Inferences contrary to 
direct testimony are not ordinarily sufficient to support a 
finding."

[¶13.]  An inference is said to 
be:

"[A] process of reasoning 
by which a fact or proposition sought to be established is deduced as a logical 
consequence from other facts, or a state of facts, already proved or admitted. * 
* *

"In law, the term has 
generally been defined as meaning a conclusion, a deduction, that which is 
inferred * * *." 43 C.J.S. Inference at 703.

It is said 
that:

"All evidence must 
involve an inference from some fact for the proposition to be 
proved.

* * * * * 
*

"A reasonable inference 
is as truly evidence as the matter on which it is based, and is not a mere 
presumption or guess; appropriate inferences from proved facts are not a low 
order of evidence, but are just as valid as evidence as statements of 
eye-witnesses and are to be weighed by the jury along with the other evidence 
before it and may be strong enough to outweigh positive and direct oral 
statements. Whether or not they should be permitted to overcome positive and 
direct testimony depends, in every case, on the relative strength of the one or 
the other." 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1044.

[¶14.]  Forbes Company v. MacNeel, supra, holds 
that ordinarily inferences are overcome by direct evidence. Ordinarily that 
proposition is correct. But, it is not always so for common sense and good 
judgment tell us otherwise. For example, suppose an automobile is rear-ended by 
a following vehicle. The driver whose vehicle was struck did not see and cannot 
identify by direct evidence the driver of the car that hit him. However, if 
there was just one person in the following vehicle and that person exited the 
vehicle immediately after the collision, it might be inferred that that person 
was the driver of the following vehicle at the time of the collision. Now, if 
the person exiting the following vehicle denied categorically that he was the 
driver, would that direct evidence overcome the inference that he was the driver 
as a matter of law? Surely it would be bad law for us to say that was 
so.

[¶15.]  We have heretofore 
said:

"Direct evidence 
ordinarily consists of witnesses testifying directly of their own knowledge as 
to the ultimate facts sought to be proved. * * * `Circumstantial evidence is the 
proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the mind arrives at the 
conclusion that the main fact sought to be established in fact 
existed.'

* * * * * 
*

"Circumstantial evidence 
is not necessarily inferior to direct evidence. In some instances it may be 
stronger and more persuasive. * * * Circumstances, when taken together and 
considered in their totality together with all reasonable inferences that may be 
drawn therefrom, may be subject to different interpretations; but, that is for 
the jury." Murray v. State, Wyo., 671 P.2d 320, 328 
(1983).

[¶16.]  In this case the evidence before the 
court on summary judgment established a practice of cleaning irrigation ditches 
by burning weeds around May of each year. Appellant's evidence was that 
Wilson burned 
weeds, and it was undisputed that he burned weeds in May of 1982 that resulted 
in a fire substantially similar to the one that occurred in May of 1980 when 
appellant was injured. An employee of Wilson, 
shortly after the May 7, 1980 fire informed appellant that the fire had started 
on Wilson's property and at one point advised him 
that he had seen Wilson start the fire. True, Wilson denied starting the 
fire, as did all of the persons employed by him at the time. It is also true 
that Stoffers in his deposition testified differently from his affidavit filed 
in this case and differently from what Kobielusz and Legerski claim he said to 
them. This differing testimony and evidence merely created conflicts which could 
not be resolved on summary judgment.

[¶17.]  In passing, we note that there was also 
evidence when viewed in a light most favorable to appellant that would have 
established that the fire started on Wilson's property, that Wilson was in the 
area at the time and should have known of it, that his employee Stoffers knew of 
the fire, and that neither of them made any effort to control the fire or assure 
that it did not spread to the property of another. Appellant, citing the Town of Douglas v. Nielsen, Wyo., 409 P.2d 240 (1965), contends that these facts give rise to a duty on the part of 
the landowner to control the fire and prevent its spread to the lands of others. 
Appellees object that this is a new matter not presented to the trial court at 
the argument on summary judgment. The arguments were not reported and we are 
unable to say from the record what occurred.

[¶18.]  We do not know whether or not the facts, 
when developed, will establish the duty for which appellant contends. We need 
not decide that question here for in this case there were disputed questions of 
material fact which preclude the entry of summary judgment. Reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶19.]  I concur in the result of this case 
because it does seem to me that the circumstances do create fact questions with 
respect to the liability of Wilson for permitting a fire which initiated on 
his property to escape and go onto the property owned by Kobielusz. As I 
understand this record there is information from which one could conclude that 
Wilson either 
knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the existence 
of the fire. There then would appear to be factual questions with respect to a 
breach of a duty on the part of Wilson to contain the 
fire.

[¶20.]  I cannot join in the full scope of the 
majority opinion in this case, because I have doubts that the statements made by 
Stoffers would be admissible hearsay pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(D) of the 
Wyoming Rules of Evidence. It does not seem to me that this statement was made 
by Stoffers, admittedly Wilson's agent or servant, about a matter within the 
scope of Stoffers' agency or employment. Examples of situations in which the 
employee's statements were found to be properly admissible are recited in Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival and Research 
Center, Inc., 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1978). I would require the proponent of 
such a statement for purposes of summary judgment to establish that the matter 
about which the statement is made was within the scope of the agency or 
employment of the declarant. I do not perceive this record as being adequate for 
that purpose.