Title: State ex rel. Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Slip 
Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-626.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-626 
THE STATE EX REL. ELECTRONIC CLASSROOM OF TOMORROW v. CUYAHOGA 
COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow v. Cuyahoga 
Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-626.] 
Mandamus and prohibition — Writ of prohibition sought to prevent common 
pleas court and judges from enforcing a judgment — Writ of prohibition 
granted because trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed while appeal 
was pending in the court of appeals — Writ of mandamus sought to 
compel common pleas court judges to issue a stay of execution of 
judgment without bond pending appeal — Writ of mandamus granted 
because relator is a political subdivision. 
(No. 2010-1401 — Submitted January 4, 2011 — Decided February 16, 2011.) 
IN PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an action for a writ of prohibition to prevent respondents 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Judge Ronald Suster, and Judge 
James D. Sweeney from enforcing the judgment in favor of respondent 
Supportive Solutions Training Academy, L.L.C., against relator, Electronic 
Classroom of Tomorrow, issued in Supportive Solutions Training Academy, 
L.L.C. v. Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow, Cuyahoga Cty. C.P. case No. CV 
08 652873.  Relator also seeks a writ of mandamus to vacate the allegedly invalid 
portions of the judgment in the case and to compel the common pleas court judges 
to issue a stay of execution of the remaining judgment without bond pending 
appeal.  Because relator has established its entitlement to the requested 
extraordinary relief, we grant the writs. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} Relator, Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow (“ECOT”), is a 
community school established pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3314.  ECOT was the 
first Internet-based community school in Ohio and is currently the state’s largest 
community school.  Its operating revenues are derived almost exclusively from 
state and federal funds. 
{¶ 3} ECOT entered into a series of service agreements with respondent 
Supportive Solutions Training Academy, L.L.C. (“Supportive Solutions”) to take 
effect beginning in the 2007-2008 school year.  ECOT paid Supportive Solutions 
$107,110, which ECOT believed was all that was due under the agreements, but 
Supportive Solutions claimed that it was entitled to more.  Supportive Solutions 
went out of business and provided no further services to ECOT after December 
2009. 
{¶ 4} In March 2008, Supportive Solutions filed a suit for damages 
against ECOT and others in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.  The 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
case, which was designated Supportive Solutions Training Academy, L.L.C. v. 
Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow, Cuyahoga Cty. C.P. case No. CV 08 652873, 
included claims of breach of implied contract, misrepresentation, negligent 
misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, fraud, fraud in the 
inducement, respondeat superior, and defamation.  The case was originally 
assigned to Judge Ronald Suster.  ECOT and the other defendants filed an answer 
in which they did not raise the affirmative defense of political-subdivision 
immunity.  In December 2008, Supportive Solutions filed an amended complaint 
to raise a claim of tortious interference with business relations against a new 
defendant, Lucas County Educational Service Center (“Service  Center”).  In 
ECOT’s answer to the amended complaint, it again did not raise political-
subdivision immunity as an affirmative defense. 
{¶ 5} In January 2009, Service Center moved to dismiss Supportive 
Solutions’ claim against it based on, among other things, political-subdivision 
immunity.  Shortly thereafter, Service Center was dismissed from the case.  
Nearly a year later, in January 2010, ECOT raised for the first time the defense of 
political-subdivision immunity in its motion for partial summary judgment.  After 
Supportive Solutions claimed that ECOT had waived this affirmative defense by 
failing to raise it in the answer, ECOT filed a motion for leave to file an amended 
answer.  Judge Suster denied ECOT’s motion in an entry journalized in April 
2010.  Judge Suster also granted ECOT and the other defendants’ motion for 
partial summary judgment on the claims 
of 
fraud 
and 
intentional 
misrepresentation and ordered that the remaining claims be resolved at the 
scheduled trial. 
{¶ 6} ECOT and the other defendants appealed from the court’s decision 
denying their motion for leave to amend their answer to include the affirmative 
defense of political-subdivision immunity.  Supportive Solutions moved to stay 
the trial court case pending resolution of ECOT’s appeal.  In its motion, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
Supportive Solutions conceded that of the remaining causes of action against 
ECOT, the motion for leave to amend the answer “would have an impact on 
seven” of them.  The trial proceeded before Judge James D. Sweeney, who denied 
ECOT’s motion to limit the evidence to Supportive Solutions’ express-contract 
claims and any other matters that were not currently under the jurisdiction of the 
court of appeals. 
{¶ 7} On May 7, 2010, the jury returned a verdict for Supportive 
Solutions and against ECOT and the other defendants for $1,000,000 for breach 
of implied contract, $120,000 for negligent misrepresentation, and $86,400 for 
breach of express contract.  Judge Sweeney entered a judgment reflecting the jury 
verdict, granted Supportive Solutions prejudgment interest in the amount of 
$104,973.32, and denied ECOT’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict or for a new trial.  ECOT appealed from the judgment, and ECOT’s 
motion for stay of execution of the judgment was denied. 
{¶ 8} ECOT then filed a motion in the court of appeals for a stay of 
execution of the common pleas court’s judgment pending appeal, and Supportive 
Solutions filed a motion for a supersedeas bond.  On July 30, 2010, the court of 
appeals granted the stay but conditioned it on ECOT’s posting of a supersedeas 
bond in the amount of $1,210,000.  On the same day, the court of appeals 
dismissed ECOT’s earlier appeal from the common pleas court’s denial of its 
motion for leave to file an amended answer for lack of a final, appealable order. 
{¶ 9} On August 10, 2010, ECOT filed this action for extraordinary 
relief.  ECOT requests a writ of prohibition to prevent respondents, Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas, Judge Suster, and Judge Sweeney, from 
enforcing the allegedly invalid portion of its judgment in the underlying case, a 
writ of mandamus requiring the common pleas court and judges to vacate that 
portion of the judgment, and, insofar as any money judgment against ECOT 
remains, a writ of mandamus to compel the common pleas court and judges to 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
issue a stay of execution without bond pursuant to Civ.R. 62(C).  ECOT also 
named Supportive Solutions as a respondent but did not request any relief against 
it.  A few days later, ECOT filed a motion for an emergency stay of execution of 
the judgment.  On August 17, we granted ECOT’s motion and an alternative writ.  
126 Ohio St.3d 1536, 2010-Ohio-3840, 931 N.E.2d 1099.  On August 20, the 
court of appeals stayed its consideration of ECOT’s appeal and related appeals 
pending our disposition of this writ case.  The parties have submitted evidence 
and briefs in this case. 
{¶ 10} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the 
merits. 
Legal Analysis 
Jurisdiction of Trial Court Pending Appeal 
{¶ 11} “If a lower court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to 
proceed in a cause, prohibition and mandamus will issue to prevent any future 
unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior 
jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.”  State ex rel. Mayer v. Henson, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 12.  “Where jurisdiction is 
patently and unambiguously lacking, relators need not establish the lack of an 
adequate remedy at law because the availability of alternate remedies like appeal 
would be immaterial.”  State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 118 
Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 12} ECOT first requests a writ of prohibition to prevent the common 
pleas court and judges from enforcing the $1.2 million judgment against it and a 
writ of mandamus to vacate those portions of the judgment that it alleges are 
invalid because they were entered while ECOT’s appeal from the denial of its 
motion for leave to file an amended answer was pending. 
{¶ 13} “[W]e have consistently held that once an appeal is perfected, the 
trial court is divested of jurisdiction over matters that are inconsistent with the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
reviewing court’s jurisdiction to reverse, modify, or affirm the judgment.”  State 
ex rel. Rock v. School Emp. Retirement Bd., 96 Ohio St.3d 206, 2002-Ohio-3957, 
772 N.E.2d 1197, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 14} When ECOT appealed from Judge Suster’s denial of its motion for 
leave to file an amended answer to raise the affirmative defense of political-
subdivision immunity, the common pleas court and its judges lacked authority to 
proceed with the trial of any claims that might be subject to ECOT’s immunity 
defense because those claims were within the appellate court’s jurisdiction on 
review.  Those claims included all of Supportive Solutions’ claims against ECOT 
except the breach-of- written-contract claim.  In fact, in various motions filed by 
Supportive Solutions after ECOT filed its first appeal, Supportive Solutions 
acknowledged that most of the claims against ECOT should be stayed pending 
appeal.  Judge Sweeney, however, proceeded with the jury trial on all the pending 
claims, including those that could be affected by ECOT’s appeal, e.g., Supportive 
Solutions’ claims for breach of implied contract and for negligent 
misrepresentation. 
{¶ 15} It is true that the court of appeals has now dismissed ECOT’s 
appeal from the denial of its motion for leave to file an amended answer for lack 
of a final,  appealable order and that the jurisdictional bar of a pending appeal 
does not apply when the appeal is no longer pending.  See State ex rel. Everhart v. 
McIntosh, 115 Ohio St.3d 195, 2007-Ohio-4798, 874 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 12-13.  But 
the common pleas court acted while the appeal was pending by conducting a jury 
trial on the affected claims and entering judgment on the jury verdict; the court 
did not wait for the court of appeals to resolve the appeal before it proceeded. 
{¶ 16} Moreover, the mere fact that ECOT perfected the appeal from an 
order that the court of appeals ultimately determined not to be a final, appealable 
order did not confer authority on the trial court to proceed on those claims that 
could be affected while the appeal was pending.  “[T]he determination as to the 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
appropriateness of an appeal lies solely with the appellate court,” and a trial court 
judge’s opinion that the order appealed from is not a final, appealable order does 
not alter the fact that the filing of the notice of appeal divests the trial court of 
jurisdiction to proceed with the adjudication during the pendency of the appeal.  
In re S.J., 106 Ohio St.3d 11, 2005-Ohio-3215, 829 N.E.2d 1207, ¶ 10-11; see 
also In re Terrance P. (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 487, 489, 706 N.E.2d 801 (“the 
trial court does not have any jurisdiction to consider whether the person has 
validly invoked the jurisdiction of the appellate court”). 
{¶ 17} Furthermore, the common pleas court and judges’ reliance on the 
statement in Everhart, 115 Ohio St.3d 195, 2007-Ohio-4798, 874 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 
14, that “a premature notice of appeal under App.R. 4(C) does not divest the trial 
court of jurisdiction to proceed because the appeal has not yet been perfected,” is 
misplaced.  The quote refers to a notice of appeal filed “after the announcement of 
a decision, order, or sentence but before the entry of the judgment or order.”  Id.; 
see App.R. 4(C).  The appeal in Everhart was from an oral decision and not from 
a decision journalized on the record.  Everhart at ¶ 2, 4.  ECOT’s appeal was not 
from an oral decision but from a journalized order.  Nothing in Everhart overruled 
our decision in S.J. precluding a trial court from usurping a court of appeals’ 
exclusive authority to determine whether a journalized order that has been 
appealed constitutes a final, appealable order. 
{¶ 18} Therefore, consistent with longstanding precedent, the common 
pleas court and judges patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed 
on all the claims against ECOT that were affected by its appeal, i.e., all the claims 
except for breach of express contract.  By so holding, we need not address 
ECOT’s arguments that the order appealed from constitutes a final, appealable 
order.  Accordingly, ECOT is entitled to a writ of prohibition to prevent the 
common pleas court and judges from enforcing those portions of the judgment 
against it finding it liable for breach of implied contract and negligent 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
misrepresentation and assessing damages on those claims and to a writ of 
mandamus to compel the court and judges to vacate those portions of the 
judgment. 
Stay Pending Appeal 
{¶ 19} For the remaining portion of the judgment against ECOT relating 
to Supportive Solutions’ claim for breach of express contract, ECOT requests a 
writ of mandamus to compel the common pleas court and judges to stay execution 
of the judgment while the appeal is pending, without requiring it to post a bond.  
To be entitled to the writ, ECOT must establish a clear legal right to the stay 
without bond, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the common pleas 
court and judges to issue the stay without bond, and the lack of an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123 
Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 1215, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 20} Civ.R. 62(B) and (C) provide: 
{¶ 21} “(B) Stay upon appeal 
{¶ 22} “When an appeal is taken the appellant may obtain a stay of 
execution of a judgment or any proceedings to enforce a judgment by giving an 
adequate supersedeas bond.  The bond may be given at or after the time of filing 
the notice of appeal.  The stay is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved 
by the court. 
{¶ 23} “(C) Stay in favor of the government 
{¶ 24} “When an appeal is taken by this state or political subdivision, or 
administrative agency of either, or by any officer thereof acting in his 
representative capacity and the operation or enforcement of the judgment is 
stayed, no bond, obligation or other security shall be required from the 
appellant.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 25} The dispositive issue here is whether ECOT, a community school 
established pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3314, constitutes a political subdivision so as 
January Term, 2011 
9 
 
to be entitled under Civ.R. 62(B) and (C) to a stay pending its appeal without the 
posting of a supersedeas bond. 
{¶ 26} “A community school created under this chapter is a public school, 
independent of any school district, and is part of the state’s program of 
education.”  R.C. 3314.01(B).  “ ‘Community schools are independently governed 
public schools within an existing school district under R.C. Chapter 3314.’ ”  
State ex rel. Nation Bldg. Technical Academy v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 123 Ohio 
St.3d 35, 2009-Ohio-4084, 913 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 12, quoting Baldwin’s Ohio School 
Law (2008) 1265, Section 48:1.  And under R.C. 2744.01(F), a “political 
subdivision” for purposes of the governmental-immunity provisions of R.C. 
Chapter 2744 includes community schools.  See also R.C. 4117.01(B), which 
includes under the definition of a “public employer” for purposes of public-
employee collective bargaining any political subdivision of the state, including 
the “governing authority of a community school established under [R.C.] Chapter 
3314.” 
{¶ 27} Therefore, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit held, “[a]fter considering Ohio’s statutory and case law, as well as the 
substantive control that Ohio exerts on its community schools, it is apparent that 
community schools are political subdivisions of the state.”  Greater Hts. Academy 
v. Zelman (C.A.6, 2008), 522 F.3d 678, 680.  Consequently, ECOT is entitled to a 
stay of the judgment pending appeal without posting a supersedeas bond. 
{¶ 28} The mere fact that ECOT may not have timely raised political-
subdivision immunity as an affirmative defense during the course of the 
underlying proceeding does not mean that ECOT waived its entitlement to the 
stay without bond pending its appeal.  Nothing in Civ.R. 62 conditions the stay on 
whether the governmental entity or officer asserted an immunity defense by 
timely pleading it in the underlying case.  And respondents cite no pertinent 
precedent so holding.  ECOT claimed that it was a political subdivision and was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
thus entitled to the benefits of Civ.R. 62 when it requested that the common pleas 
court issue the stay.  And it has established that as a community school 
established under R.C. Chapter 3314, it is a political subdivision for purposes of 
Civ.R. 62. 
{¶ 29} Moreover, Civ.R. 62 patently and unambiguously imposes on the 
court of common pleas and its judges the duty to issue a stay without a 
supersedeas bond upon an appeal and request for stay by a political subdivision.  
In such a circumstance, the availability of alternative remedies such as a 
discretionary appeal from the court of appeals’ setting of a supersedeas bond is 
immaterial.  See Sapp, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 
15.  In addition, in these cases, we have never relegated political subdivisions or 
public officials to motions or actions in the court of appeals to seek the same 
relief of a stay pending appeal without bond.  See  Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 
100 Ohio St.3d 366, 2003-Ohio-6608, 800 N.E.2d 361; State Fire Marshal, 87 
Ohio St.3d 568, 722 N.E.2d 73; Ocasek, 54 Ohio St.2d 488, 8 O.O.3d 466, 377 
N.E.2d 792.  Thus, ECOT’s mandamus claim is not precluded by the possible 
availability of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of 
discretionary appeal from the court of appeals’ ruling. 
{¶ 30} Therefore, consistent with precedent, ECOT is entitled to a writ of 
mandamus to compel the common pleas court and its judges to stay the remaining 
portion of the judgment in the underlying civil case without requiring ECOT to 
post a supersedeas bond.  Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., State Fire Marshal, 
Ocasek. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 31} Based on the foregoing, ECOT has established its entitlement to a 
writ of prohibition to prevent the common pleas court, Judge Suster, and Judge 
Sweeney from enforcing the portions of the judgment in the underlying civil case 
that were subject to an appeal filed by ECOT from the denial of its motion for 
January Term, 2011 
11 
 
leave to amend its answer and a writ of mandamus ordering the common pleas 
court and judges to vacate those portions of the judgment.  ECOT is also entitled 
to a writ of mandamus to compel the common pleas court, Judge Suster, and 
Judge Sweeney to stay the portion of the judgment relating to the breach of 
express contract without requiring the posting of bond pending ECOT’s appeal of 
the judgment.  We also deny ECOT’s request for oral argument. 
Writs granted. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, 
CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers; and Demer & 
Marniella, L.L.C., John A. Demer, and James A. Marniella, for relator. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles 
E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents Cuyahoga County 
Court of Common Pleas, Judge Ronald Suster, and Judge James D. Sweeney. 
 
Ann Vaughn and Maureen Connors, for respondent Supportive Solutions 
Training Academy, L.L.C. 
______________________