Title: Smith v. Ensley

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Smith v. Ensley1988 WY 62752 P.2d 1374Case Number: 87-217Decided: 04/21/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
RON 
SMITH AND SANDRA SMITH, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

GORDON ENSLEY, LES 
TANNER, AND NEOSHO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., A WYOMING FOR PROFIT CORPORATION, 
APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from theDistrictCourtofNiobaraCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

Philip P. 
Whynott, Cheyenne, for appellants.

J.N. Murdock of 
Reeves & Murdock, Casper, for appellees.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ. 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is a worker's 
injury tort case involving summary judgment granted to the co-employees of the 
injured employee on alleged culpable negligence, and to the employer on 
constitutional and statutory-immunity bases. Appellants, employee and his wife, 
claiming loss of consortium, raise the issues:

"SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED AGAINST THE APPELLANTS BECAUSE THE MATERIAL FACTS 
CONCERNING CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE WERE AT ISSUE AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT 
HAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR THE APPELLEES AS A MATTER OF LAW."

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant Ron Smith was 
injured on the evening of January 25, 1984, while performing maintenance work on 
a large rock crusher at the quarry site operated by Neosho Construction Company, 
Inc. (Neosho) in Niobrara County, Wyoming. The 
rock crusher, one of only two in the United States, consists of a pitman 
and a feeder. Basically, the pitman involves two plates or jaws that converge to 
crush the rock once the feeder "feeds" the opening through a chute above the 
plates. When the machine is not operating, a rectangular opening is left between 
the plates with a lip off one side of the opening but not the other. Because of 
the abrasive nature and hardness of rock, the plates would fatigue and sometimes 
crack, therefore requiring "hard surfacing" (lines of welding) as a preventative 
measure to be done on a nightly basis to maintain the machine and the chute. To 
accomplish the hard surfacing, the crusher is turned off, a piece of angle iron 
placed across the opening for support, and a wooden plywood platform is placed 
on top of the iron, upon which workers stand to weld.

[¶4.]     On the night of the 
injury, Smith and another worker were assigned this task, but found that the 
angle iron at the machine was not available as it had fallen through the plates 
and had been bent up in machine operation and was unusable. Approximately 
one-eighth of a mile away, at the operation shop, other pieces of angle iron 
could have been obtained for use. Unfortunately, for reasons of inconvenience, 
the two employees decided against going that short distance for the replacement 
support, and elected to rest the unsupported platform across the opening, 
without the underlying bar for support. When another worker stepped onto the 
platform with Smith to begin the welding, it collapsed from the weight and 
dropped Smith down the machine to ground level. As a result of this fall, Smith 
was severely injured and now has a residual back injury.

[¶5.]     Smith and his wife 
Sandra sued Ensley, the night superintendent, and Tanner, the night maintenance 
foreman, claiming co-employee culpable negligence,1 and Neosho by allegation of employer work-site negligence.2

[¶6.]     The employer, Neosho, 
was granted summary judgment based upon the affidavit of the director of the 
Worker's Compensation Division of the State of Wyoming attesting to the fact that Neosho was not delinquent in fund contributions. 
Subsequently, Ensley and Tanner were granted summary judgment by rejection of 
any factual basis for the culpable-negligence claims. From that dispository 
summary judgment, this appeal followed.

[¶7.]     The standards to be 
followed concerning the review of summary judgment are well established in the 
six-stage analysis in Cordova v. Gosar, Wyo., 719 P.2d 625, 634 (1986). See also 
Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., supra; Matter of Estate of Obra, Wyo., 749 P.2d 272 
(1988); Williams v. Blount, 
Wyo., 741 P.2d 595, 596 (1987). The 
six stages are:

"1. Legal sufficiency of 
the complaint.

"2. Procedural 
sufficiency of the motion for summary judgment and attached affidavits and 
deposition material.

"3. Substantive 
sufficiency of the affidavits to initially support the 
motion.

"4. Procedural 
sufficiency of responsive affidavits.

"5. Substantive legal 
issue disposition.

"6. Substantive 
sufficiency of responsive affidavits." Matter of Estate of Obra, supra, 749 P.2d  
at 274, quoting from Davenport v. Epperly, Wyo., 744 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1987), and 
Cordova v. Gosar, supra, 719 P.2d  at 634.

[¶8.]     In determining the 
propriety of any summary judgment, this court examines the record in the light 
most favorable to the respondent, giving him all inferences which can properly 
and reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., supra; Cordova 
v. Gosar, supra, 719 P.2d  at 640; Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., 
Wyo., 685 P.2d 25 (1984).

[¶9.]     This case involves a 
stage six analysis - substantive sufficiency of responsive affidavits - since 
Ensley and Tanner initially adequately supported their nonliability summary 
judgment with motion affidavits stating that both believed that the use of the 
work platform in conjunction with the angle-iron support was a safe and required 
process. Smith, in response, offered the depositions of all the parties, 
plaintiffs' answers to interrogatories propounded by defendants, and the 
affidavit of Schooley "Stu" Wilcoxon as an expert on mine safety and training to 
rebut the lack of genuine material fact of culpable 
negligence.

[¶10.]  In Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 622 P.2d 1349, 1362 (1981), this court 
first defined culpable negligence as "willful and serious misconduct." We were 
called upon in Bryant v. Hornbuckle, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1132, 1136 (1986) to more fully 
refine the concept by citing Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 34 (5th ed. 
1984):

"In order to prove that 
an actor has engaged in willful misconduct, one must demonstrate that he acted 
with a state of mind that approaches intent to do harm."

For further 
recent discussions of culpable negligence, see Kilburn Tire v. Meredith, Wyo., 
743 P.2d 874, 877 (1987); Pace v. Hadley, Wyo., 742 P.2d 1283, 1285 (1987); 
Stundon v. Sterling, Wyo., 736 P.2d 317, 318 (1987); and Bettencourt v. Pride 
Well Service, Inc., Wyo., 735 P.2d 722, 729 (1987).

[¶11.]  After our review of the entire record, 
giving respondent every favorable and reasonable inference from the material, it 
is still abundantly clear that there is no evidence of culpable negligence. 
Further, the Wilcoxon affidavit, upon which appellants strongly rely, is wholly 
conclusory and lacks specific facts, and therefore it does not meet the burden 
of showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to culpable 
negligence. See Matter of Estate of Obra, supra, 749 P.2d  at 274; Stundon v. 
Sterling, supra, 
736 P.2d  at 318; Cordova v. Gosar, supra, 719 P.2d  at 636.

[¶12.]  Culpability cannot be assessed against 
the supervisor or co-employee from the injured employee's negligence in 
self-protection on disregard of work standards in the absence of defendants' 
actual knowledge or opportunity to correct by supervision. Stundon v. Sterling, supra. Plaintiff 
failed in response to summary judgment to demonstrate facts in regard to either 
knowledge or opportunity to require correction which could establish a viable 
issue addressing a basis for their liability. Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, 
Inc., supra. The record is devoid of evidence that this accident would have 
occurred if the bar had been used. Likewise, the defendant co-employees had no 
part in the injured employee's decision to gamble against usage and forego 
securing another bar as a foundation support for his work platform. 
Consequently, it was proper for the trial court to grant summary judgment to the 
co-employees. Bryant v. Hornbuckle, supra.

[¶13.]  It is unclear from the issues as framed 
by appellants whether the summary judgment granted to Neosho, the employer, is being appealed, since nothing in 
appellant's brief pertains to that aspect of the summary judgment 
order.

"* * * It is not enough 
in presenting an appeal in this court to identify a potential issue, but, at a 
minimum, the appellant should make some attempt to relate the law to the facts. 
Elder v. Jones, Wyo., 608 P.2d 654, 660 (1980)." Hance v. 
Straatsma, Wyo., 721 P.2d 575, 577 
(1986).

Since the issue 
is supported by no argument or authority, we decline to address the matter. Kipp 
v. Brown, Wyo., 750 P.2d 1338 (1988); Jones Land and Livestock Co. v. Federal 
Land Bank of Omaha, Wyo., 733 P.2d 258, 265 (1987); Trout v. Wyoming Oil & 
Gas Conservation Commission, Wyo., 721 P.2d 1047, 1053 (1986); Hance v. 
Straatsma, supra, 721 P.2d  at 577; Pelagatti v. Cohen, Pa.Super, 536 A.2d 1337, 
1341 (1987). Obviously, if there is worker's compensation coverage in effect, 
the employee cannot sue the employer for negligence contendably arising from an 
employment-related injury. Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., Wyo., 687 P.2d 885 
(1984).

[¶14.]  Since the record is devoid of any 
evidence of culpable negligence, we find that summary judgment in favor of the 
co-employees was appropriate. The propriety of the summary judgment granted to 
the employer, not addressed in brief, will not be further addressed in denied 
appeal.

[¶15.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The present statutory 
scheme does not allow co-employees' suits for culpable negligence. However, the 
governing provision in the Worker's Compensation Act are the ones in force at 
the time of the injury. Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., Wyo., 752 P.2d 1366, n. 3 (1988); Swasso v. State ex rel. 
Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 751 P.2d 887 (1988); State ex rel. Director, Worker's Compensation Division v. Tallman, Wyo., 589 P.2d 835 (1979). Consequently, § 
27-12-103(a), W.S. 1977 provided:

"The rights and remedies 
provided in this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] for an employee and his 
dependents for injuries incurred in extra hazardous employments are in lieu of 
all other rights and remedies against any employer making contributions required 
by this act, or his employees acting within the scope of their employment unless 
the employees are culpably negligent, but do not supersede any rights and 
remedies available to an employee and his dependents against any other 
person."

2 Neosho was sued in a complaint alleging lack of employer 
immunity due to failure to comply with the Worker's Compensation statutes. Facts 
to justify this allegation are not to be found in the 
record.