Title: Garrison v. Deschutes County

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  June 21, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

GARY GARRISON
and HEATHER GARRISON,
Petitioners on Review,
	v.
DESCHUTES COUNTY,
	Respondent on Review.
(CC 96-CV-0397-ST; CA A101360; SC S46886)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted November 3, 2000.
	W. Eugene Hallman, Pendleton, argued the cause and filed the
brief for petitioners on review.  With him on the brief was Brant
M. Medonich, Bend.
	Gregory P. Lynch, Bend, argued the cause and filed the brief
for respondent on review.  With him on the brief were Stanley D.
Austin and Hurley, Lynch & Re, P.C., Bend.
	Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, filed a brief for amicus curiae
Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
	GILLETTE, J.	
	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
	Durham, J., dissented and filed an opinion.
	*Appeal from Deschutes County Circuit Court, A. Michael Adler, Judge. 162 Or App 160, 986 P2d 62 (1999).
   **Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case; De Muniz and Balmer, JJ., did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case.
	GILLETTE, J.
	This personal injury case requires us to examine the
scope of the immunity from liability that the Oregon Tort Claims
Act (OTCA) grants to certain kinds of discretionary decisions of
a public body.  The case arose when plaintiff Gary Garrison (1) was
injured when he fell from a raised concrete slab onto a lower
slab at a Deschutes County (county) refuse transfer station. 
Plaintiffs brought the present action against the county,
alleging three specifications of negligence.  The county moved
for summary judgment, asserting that, by virtue of ORS
30.265(3)(c), (2) it was immune from liability for the acts that
plaintiffs alleged.  The trial court agreed.  On plaintiffs'
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that:  (1) the
doctrine of qualified immunity protected the exercise of
discretion by county employees in designing the transfer station;
and (2) the county's failure to warn plaintiffs of the obvious
danger of falling off the higher slab did not expose plaintiffs
to a greater risk of harm than if they had been warned.  Garrison
v. Deschutes County, 162 Or App 160, 986 P2d 62 (1999).  We
allowed plaintiffs' petition for review and now affirm.
	Because this case comes to us on review of a grant of
summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences
that may be drawn from them in favor of plaintiffs, the nonmoving
parties.  Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or 453,
455, 31 P3d 421 (2001).  Summary judgment is appropriate if there
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  ORCP 47 C.  The parties
accept the following recitation of the facts by the Court of
Appeals:
		"Gary Garrison was severely injured in a fall at
the Fryrear transfer station, which is owned and
operated by Deschutes County.  The transfer station was
designed and built using 'Z-wall construction,' which
consists of a concrete upper slab with a 14.5-foot
retaining wall that drops to a concrete lower slab. 
The design allows persons using the transfer station to
back their vehicles onto the upper slab and dump their
garbage into semi-truck trailers that have been placed
on the lower slab.  There is a seven-inch railroad tie
at the edge of the upper slab that serves as a barrier
to warn drivers not to back their vehicles any further. 
At the time of Garrison's fall, there were no other
barriers or fences on the upper slab, and there were no
signs warning users of the danger of falling from the
upper to the lower one.
		"The design and operating method of the transfer
station were chosen and implemented by Larry Rice, the
public works director for Deschutes County, and Al
Driver, the director of solid waste operations for the
county.  The design engineer was Tom Blust, who worked
under the supervision of Dave Horning.  The Deschutes
County Board of Commissioners had delegated the design
and operation decisions for the transfer station to
Rice and Driver.  In the process of adopting the design
for the transfer station, Rice and Driver considered
other design options, including installing a fence,
railing or other barrier at the edge of the upper slab,
and other operating systems, including having patrons
dump their refuse on the upper slab so that it later
could be pushed off the slab and into the trailers
below by transfer station employees, but determined
that those options presented their own safety problems
as well as economic disadvantages.
		"On the day that Garrison was injured, he and his
wife had driven to the transfer station in their pickup
with a load of refuse.  Both had been to the transfer
station before and, as at those earlier times, Garrison
backed the pickup up to the railroad tie barrier and
lowered the tailgate.  When the tailgate was lowered,
it protruded out over the edge of the upper slab.  Both
Garrison and his wife were aware of the distance of the
drop from the upper to the lower slab and had discussed
the importance of being careful so as not to fall. 
Garrison stood in the back of the pickup and threw the
refuse over the edge and into the trailer below.  When
he was finished, he grabbed a lumber rail on the back
of the pickup and attempted to swing out onto the
pavement of the upper slab.  In doing so, he fell to
the pavement of the lower slab, suffering severe
injuries to his face, head, arms and chest."
162 Or App at 162-63.
		Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged that the county
was negligent "[i]n failing to maintain a premises which is
reasonably safe from dangers which were known or, in the exercise
of reasonable care, should have been known to defendant by
placing fences, barriers, or other protective devices next to the
wall to prevent individuals from falling," and "[i]n failing to
protect invitees from unreasonably dangerous conditions on the
premises which were known to the defendant or, in the exercise of
reasonable care, should have been known to the defendant by
posting signs or other warning devices warning of the immediate
drop off."  
		The county, relying on ORS 30.265(3)(c), moved for
summary judgment.  It contended that, although plaintiffs had
couched their first specification of negligence in terms of the
county's faulty maintenance (i.e., operation) of the refuse
station, the gravamen of the complaint lay in the station's
allegedly faulty design; that is, the underlying basis for the
allegation of negligence was the county's alleged failure to
design the platform to include a railing or other barrier,
thereby making the facility inherently dangerous to people
dumping refuse there.  The county contended that it was immune
from liability for that type of claim under the doctrine of
discretionary immunity.  The county submitted affidavits
establishing that it had delegated its authority for the design
and implementation of the transfer station to the county director
of solid waste operations, Driver, and to the county public works
director, Rice, who then had complete decision-making authority
to act.  
		The county further asserted that, as part of the design
process, Driver and Rice had debated competing considerations
such as the relative safety of the premises with and without the
platform, the added maintenance and resulting cost of adding a
fence, railing, or other barrier to the platform, as well as
whether adding a fence, railing, or other barrier would make the
platform more difficult or more dangerous to use.  According to
Driver's affidavit, after debating those matters, they determined
that a fence, railing, or other barrier would be more of a hazard
than a help.  Among other reasons for reaching that conclusion,
they believed that refuse could become entangled in the barrier,
creating a risk for patrons or employees attempting to untangle
it; that refuse that was prevented from falling over the edge by
the barrier could create a slip hazard; that many people would
have trouble lifting their refuse over a barrier; and that a
railing might give people a false sense of security, possibly
resulting in a higher risk of accident.  According to Driver's
affidavit, some of the same concerns also led them to conclude
that placing a fence, railing, or other barrier at the edge of
the platform substantially would increase the county's cost to
operate the facility because more personnel would be required to
keep the area free of debris.  In the end, they concluded that
placing a railroad tie at the edge of the platform was necessary
to ensure that no one backed a vehicle beyond where it was safe,
but they rejected all other types of barriers to protect against
falls.  
		The county contended that the foregoing decision-making
process resulted in precisely the type of policy choice to which
immunity under ORS 30.265(3)(c) attaches and that it was
immaterial that, in hindsight, some might argue that a different
design would have prevented plaintiffs' injuries in the present
case.  As for the allegation concerning the county's failure to
warn plaintiffs of the danger presented by the platform, the
county contended that the danger was not concealed and that
plaintiffs admitted in their depositions that they were well
aware of the danger, having dumped refuse there before.   
		Plaintiffs responded to the summary judgment motion by
asserting that they had retained an expert who would testify at
trial that the design of the transfer station was unreasonably
dangerous.  In addition, they argued that applicable Oregon
workplace safety rules would have prohibited any county employees
from working near the edge of the platform without fall
protection.  Plaintiffs acknowledged that those safety rules did
not protect invitees to the premises expressly, but contended
that the rules nonetheless set the standard of care in the
present case.  Finally, plaintiffs asserted that the decision to
design the transfer station without a fence, railing, or other
barrier was not a policy decision entitled to immunity because
(they claimed) the decision was made by "lower level employees"
and because "no precautions of any kind were taken,"
notwithstanding that statutory or common law required that some
precautions be taken.  Plaintiffs offered no evidence to refute
either the Rice or the Driver affidavits. 
		Respecting the second allegation of negligence, based
on failure to warn, plaintiffs contended that the county had a
duty to warn of any known dangerous condition on its land and had
failed to do so.  
		The trial court granted the county's motion for summary
judgment.  In explaining its ruling on the first specification of
negligence, the court noted that this was not a case in which the
county failed to consider safety at all.  The court stated that,
whatever the applicable standard of care might be, and whatever
plaintiffs' expert might say about the inherently dangerous
design of the facility, it was clear from Driver's affidavit that
he chose the design of the facility after careful consideration
of various safety concerns raised by different design options,
including those that plaintiffs favored.  The court concluded
that "[i]t's precisely this type of governmental decision that is
appropriate for discretionary immunity, even if it's a dangerous
design and even if it is negligent."  
		The trial court also rejected plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claim, based on what the court termed a "lack of causation." 
The court observed that the danger was open and obvious and, in
light of plaintiffs' deposition testimony that they were well
aware of the risk, the failure to warn did not expose them to any
greater risk of harm than would have been present had they been
warned.  Accordingly, the court concluded that there was no
genuine issue of fact or evidence in the record from which a
reasonable juror could have found that there was a causal link of
any kind between the failure to warn and the accident that befell
Garrison.  
		Before the court issued its ruling granting the
county's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs filed a second
amended complaint, which added a third specification of
negligence.  In that amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that
the county was negligent in adopting an operating plan for the
transfer station that required patrons to back a vehicle up to
the edge of platform to dump refuse.  The county moved for
summary judgment on that claim as well, arguing that that design
decision, like the one underlying the first specification of
negligence, also was entitled to immunity, for the same reasons
set out in its earlier brief.  Plaintiffs responded by
incorporating by reference their earlier arguments and by
attaching, in whole, transcripts of the depositions of Driver and
the county design engineer, Blust.  Plaintiffs, however, did not
make any particular argument based on those deposition
transcripts nor did they point the court to any particular
passage in those documents that would have supported their
arguments.  The trial court allowed the county's motion and
dismissed the second amended complaint.  
		On plaintiffs' subsequent appeal, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the circuit court did not err in granting summary
judgment.  As to plaintiffs' claims that the transfer station was
unsafe because of the lack of a barrier at the edge of the
platform and because it required people to back up to the edge to
dump refuse, the Court of Appeals determined that ORS
30.265(3)(c) protected the county's decision-making process from
liability in designing the site.  Garrison, 162 Or App at 167. 
As for plaintiffs' claim that the county was liable for its
failure to warn of the danger of the drop-off, the Court of
Appeals agreed that the danger was an obvious one, that
plaintiffs were fully aware of the danger, and, consequently,
that the absence of a warning did not expose plaintiffs to any
greater risk of harm than if they had been warned.  Id. at 168-69.  As noted, we allowed plaintiffs' petition for review.
Plaintiffs' first and third specifications of
negligence, concerning the county's allegedly negligent design of
the transfer station, (3) invoke the general common-law
responsibility of all persons to avoid conduct that creates a
specific risk of injury to others, as well as the special duties
that a possessor of land owes to business invitees.  In similar
cases involving private landowners and occupiers, this court
typically begins by examining the claims to determine whether the
property owner's alleged conduct was unreasonable in the
circumstances and created a foreseeable, unreasonable risk of
harm to the plaintiff.  See Fuhrer v. Gearhart By The Sea, Inc.,
306 Or 434, 438, 760 P2d 874 (1988) (illustrating proposition). 
A private landowner or occupier of land in a position similar to
the county's would be required to take care to protect patrons on
the premises from injuries resulting from known, dangerous
conditions on the premises or, at least, to warn them of the
danger.  Woolston v. Wells, 297 Or 548, 557-58, 687 P2d 144
(1984).
Because this case arises out of a grant of summary
judgment to the county, we assume that plaintiffs would be able
to produce evidence at trial that the county, if it had been a
private entity, would have been required to exercise care to
protect plaintiffs from accidently falling over the edge of the
platform while dumping refuse.  We assume also that plaintiffs
could produce evidence that the county was negligent in deciding
not to install a barrier to protect patrons from falling over the
edge of the platform and in designing the platform in a way that
required patrons to back their vehicles up to the edge of the
platform to dump refuse. (4)  In other words, we assume that the
county, were it a private party, could have been found liable to
plaintiffs for their injuries.  
		The county is not a private entity, however.  The
question before the court, therefore, is whether the fact that
the refuse station is not privately owned and operated alters the
analysis.  The answer to that question lies in the applicability
of the OTCA, ORS 30.260 et seq., which provides that public
bodies generally are liable for their torts, except in certain
limited circumstances.  
		In this case, the county has asserted throughout that
one of those circumstances pertains here.  It contends that it is
entitled to "discretionary function" immunity under ORS
30.265(3)(c), which we again set out here for the convenience of
the reader.  That subsection provides, in part:  
		"Every public body and its officers, employees and
agents acting within the scope of their employment or
duties * * * are immune from liability for:
		"* * * * *
		"(c) Any claim based upon the performance of or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty, whether or not the discretion is
abused."
	By its terms, ORS 30.265(3)(c) confers immunity on the
county, as a public body, from liability for the negligent
performance or nonperformance of a "discretionary function or
duty."  The OTCA does not define that phrase.  However, the
statute's meaning and scope have been fleshed out through years
of litigation.  For example, this court has discussed the meaning
of the term "discretion" in ORS 30.265(3)(c) on several
occasions.  In McBride v. Magnuson, 282 Or 433, 437, 578 P2d 1259
(1978), the court stated that conduct is "discretionary" in the
sense that immunity attaches to its negligent performance if the
decision is the result of a choice among competing policy
considerations, made at the appropriate level of government:
	"[I]nsofar as an official action involves both the
determination of facts and simple cause-and-effect
relationships and also the assessment of costs and
benefits, the evaluation of relative effectiveness and
risks, and a choice among competing goals and
priorities, an official has 'discretion' to the extent
that he has been delegated responsibility for the
latter kind of value judgment."
This court also has stated that ORS 30.265(3)(c) extends immunity
"to decisions involving the making of policy, but not to routine
decisions made by employees in the course of their day-to-day
activities, even though the decision involves a choice among two
or more courses of action."  Lowrimore v. Dimmitt, 310 Or 291,
296, 797 P2d 1027 (1990).  
	Notwithstanding the foregoing, the court has stated
that the "discretionary immunity" doctrine does not immunize a
decision not to exercise care at all, if action of some kind is
required:
	"A public body that owes a particular duty of care * * * has wide policy discretion in choosing the means
by which to carry out that duty. * * * The range of
permissible choices does not, however, include the
choice of not exercising care."
Mosley v. Portland School Dist. No. 1J, 315 Or 85, 92, 843 P2d
415 (1992) (citations omitted).  In other words, the decision
whether to protect the public by taking preventive measures, or
by warning of a danger, if legally required, is not
discretionary; however, the government's choice of means for
fulfilling that requirement may be discretionary.  See also
Hawkins v. City of La Grande, 315 Or 57, 65, 843 P2d 400 (1992);
Little v. Wimmer, 303 Or 580, 588-89, 739 P2d 564 (1987); Miller
v. Grants Pass Irrigation, 297 Or 312, 320, 686 P2d 324 (1984)
(all to same effect).
	Moreover, only those decisions that are made by
officials in a position of authority are immune from liability. 
As this court stated in Mosley, "[n]ormally, a choice within the
permissible range, in order to qualify for immunity, is one that
has been made by a supervisor or policy-making body."  315 Or at
92.  However, in assessing whether, in a particular case, a
decision was made by the kinds of decision-makers to whom the
statutory immunity was intended to extend, the emphasis properly
is on the nature of the decision-making, not necessarily the
level of office.  "Although policy discretion is more likely to
be found at or near the level of political responsibility, it is
not simply a matter of the defendant's office but of the scope
and nature of the choices delegated to him."  McBride, 282 Or at
438 (emphasis added); see also Bradford v. Davis, 290 Or 855,
865, 626 P2d 1376 (1981) ("The question of immunity is * * *
whether the defendant had been delegated responsibility for a
policy judgment and exercised such responsibility in the act or
omission alleged to constitute the tort.").
	In McBride, this court noted that an official has
discretion to the extent that such an official has been delegated
the duty to make a value judgment of the variety discussed above. 
282 Or at 437.  For example, in Mosley, the court held that a
high school principal's decisions about the number and location
of security personnel within a high school were "responsibilities
entrusted by the school board and the superintendent to the
school principal, who was the responsible policy-making official
within the school."  315 Or at 92.
	With the foregoing standards in mind, we turn to the
facts of the present case to evaluate whether the decision to
build and maintain the refuse transfer station without erecting
barriers at the edge of the platform that might prevent people
from falling and the decision to design the station so as to
require people using the facility to back a vehicle onto the
platform to dump refuse were decisions that involved the making
of policy by people who had been delegated the authority to make
that type of policy judgment.  
	We begin by observing that plaintiffs have not argued
that the design and construction of a refuse transfer station is
a "routine decision[] made by employees in the course of their
day-to-day activities."  Moreover, Driver's affidavit, which is
undisputed, demonstrates that he and Rice, in the course of
selecting a design for the transfer station, made various
decisions that were of a type that this court previously has
considered to be "discretionary" or "the making of policy":  They
considered various design options for the station; they evaluated
the relative effectiveness, safety and risks, as well as the
relative costs and benefits, of constructing the station with and
without the platform; they also considered the added maintenance
and resulting cost of adding a fence, railing, or other barrier
to the platform, as well as whether adding a fence, railing, or
other barrier would make the platform more difficult or more
dangerous to use.  In the end, they concluded that the design
that they ultimately chose -- a platform that required users to
back a vehicle up to dump refuse, with no barrier other than the
railroad tie to protect users from falling -- was the safest,
least expensive, and easiest to use.  Thus, in selecting the
final design under those criteria, Rice and Driver exercised the
kind of discretion that ORS 30.265(3)(c) protects -- a protection
that extends to the county's operation of the refuse transfer
station in accordance with that design.  
	Plaintiffs have attempted to characterize that final
design decision differently.  They contend that the county had a
duty to protect the public and that the county did not satisfy
that duty merely by "considering" public safety and then deciding
that safety measures would not be adopted, whether due to
expense, inconvenience, or some other reason.  In effect,
plaintiffs assert that the county owed a duty of care to the
public that used the refuse transfer station and simply chose not
to exercise care.  Under this court's decision in Mosley, they
contend, that choice was not within the permissible range of
options available to the county and, therefore, was not entitled
to immunity.  
	Plaintiffs' argument is premised on a
mischaracterization of the undisputed facts.  According to
Driver's affidavit, Driver and Rice actively considered the
relative risks and benefits of including in the final design just
the sort of fall protection devices that plaintiffs contend are
required to protect the public.  For various reasons, Driver and
Rice concluded that protective barriers actually would make the
platform less safe.  We assume for purposes of this opinion that
that conclusion might have been both wrong and negligently
reached.  Nonetheless, the uncontroverted evidence of that
thinking process establishes conclusively that this is not a case
in which the decision-makers simply disregarded their duty to
protect the public.  On the contrary, with their decision, even
if it was flawed, they exercised their discretion and chose to
protect the public in a particular way.  Plaintiffs wish to argue
that the county should have done something more, or something
different, but that argument is the kind of second-guessing that
is defeated by immunity under ORS 30.265(3)(c).  
	Plaintiffs also argue that the decisions that Rice and
Driver made cannot qualify as discretionary ones because Rice and
Driver are not the kinds of decision-makers to whom statutory
immunity is intended to extend.  They characterize Rice and
Driver as "low-level ministerial employees" whose decisions
cannot be accorded protection under ORS 30.265(3)(c), because
they were not at or near a "level of political responsibility." 
They maintain that the Court of Appeals, in ruling to the
contrary, broadly expanded the discretionary immunity doctrine to
include decisions made by "low-level functionar[ies]." 
	Plaintiffs have offered no evidence to support those
contentions.  On the contrary, they conceded that the county
commission delegated the responsibility for designing and
constructing the transfer station to Rice, the public works
director, and Driver, the director of solid waste operations. 
Moreover, they have not disputed that the county commission was
the county's highest decision-making body or that the commission
had the authority to delegate that duty to Rice and Driver,
although the decision was one that the commission could have made
itself.  In short, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the
safety design of the transfer station was the result of a
discretionary policy judgment, made by individuals who had been
delegated the authority to make that judgment.
Finally, and although plaintiffs asserted on summary
judgment that they had an expert who would testify that the
design for the transfer station that Rice and Driver selected was
"unreasonably dangerous," such evidence indicates only an abuse
of discretion. (5)  It follows that, on the record before it, the
trial court properly granted summary judgment to the county
respecting plaintiffs' first and third specifications of
negligence. (6)
	Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that
the county also was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs'
allegation that it failed to protect plaintiffs, as invitees,
from an unreasonably dangerous condition "by posting signs or
other warning devices warning of the immediate drop off," because
that dangerous condition was obvious and the lack of any warning
did not cause plaintiffs any injury.  The Court of Appeals
stated:
	"The issue is not whether plaintiffs were comparatively
negligent, which is indeed a jury question, but,
rather, whether the presence of a warning would have
had any additional effect on plaintiffs' knowledge of
the risk.  In other words:  Was there a causal link
between the absence of a warning and Gary Garrison's
injuries?  If, on the summary judgment record, the
trial court were able to conclude that the absence of a
warning sign was not the cause of Garrison's injuries,
then it would be appropriate for it to decide the issue
as a matter of law."
162 Or App at 168.  We agree with that reasoning.
	Plaintiffs argue that Woolston stands for the
proposition that even obvious hazards must be considered within a
scheme of comparative fault.  The court there stated:
	"Each party is held to the same standard of care with
respect to common law negligence.  Negligence is
conduct falling below the standard established for the
protection of others, or oneself, against unreasonable
risk of harm.  The standard of care is measured by what
a reasonable person of ordinary prudence would, or
would not, do in the same or similar circumstances. 
	* * * 
		"In general, it is the duty of the possessor of
land to make the premises reasonably safe for the
invitee's visit.  The possessor must exercise the
standard of care above stated to discover conditions of
the premises that create an unreasonable risk of harm
to the invitee.  The possessor must exercise that
standard of care either to eliminate the condition
creating that risk or to warn any foreseeable invitee
of the risk so as to enable the invitee to avoid the
harm.
		"The invitee is required to exercise that same
standard of care in avoiding harm from a condition of
the premises of which he knows, or, in the exercise of
that standard of care, of which he should know.
		"Instructions to the jury should be framed in
terms of that standard of care.  The jury will thereby
be enabled to determine whether any given party is at
fault and if both are at fault to compare that fault as
the statute commands.  In determining and comparing
fault, the jury must necessarily consider the
obviousness of danger and the ease or difficulty with
which harm to the plaintiff from that danger could be
avoided by either party."
297 Or at 557-58 (citation omitted).
		Plaintiffs contend that the Court of Appeals' holding
is inconsistent with the foregoing directive.  They assert that
the Court of Appeals effectively held, as a matter of law, that
there is no "causal link" when the invitee confronts a known or
obvious danger.  They contend that that ruling violates Oregon's
comparative negligence statute.  
		Plaintiffs misunderstand the Court of Appeals' holding. 
The Court of Appeals did not make the kind of broad ruling that
plaintiffs describe.  Instead, the court concluded that, on the
undisputed evidence in this case, there was no causal link
between the county's failure to warn and the injuries that befell
plaintiffs.  That conclusion is well supported by the evidence
that plaintiffs were fully aware of the danger presented by the
drop-off and the lack of a barrier at the edge of the platform.  
		In the present case, the evidence on summary judgment
establishes that the county's failure to warn did not expose
plaintiffs to any greater risk of harm than if they had been
warned.  Plaintiffs testified at length at their depositions that
they had used the transfer station before, that they knew of and
always had been concerned about the drop-off and the lack of a
protective barrier at the edge of the platform, and that they had
discussed the importance of being careful not to fall.  Given
that testimony, no reasonable juror could find that a warning
would have made a difference.  The Court of Appeals was correct
in so holding.  
		The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.
	DURHAM, J., dissenting.
	For the reasons stated below, I believe that the majority
misapplies the statutory immunity for the performance of a
"discretionary function or duty" set out in ORS 30.265(3)(c).
	I begin with the pertinent statutes.  ORS 30.265(1) makes
every public body subject to an action for damages for its
employees' torts, "whether arising out of a governmental or
proprietary function."  The scope of that statute extends to
defendant's operation of a refuse transfer site for the benefit
of the citizens of Deschutes County.
	ORS 30.265(1) is subject to certain exceptions.  The issue
in this case is whether defendant is immune from tort liability
to plaintiffs by reason of the exception described in ORS
30.265(3)(c):
		"Every public body and its officers, employees and
agents acting within the scope of their employment or
duties, or while operating a motor vehicle in a
ridesharing arrangement authorized under ORS 276.598,
are immune from liability for:
		"* * * * *
		"(c) Any claim based upon the performance of or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty, whether or not the discretion is
abused."
	Plaintiffs contend that, on the date of the accident,
defendant invited the public to use its refuse facility and that
plaintiffs were business invitees at the time of the accident. 
According to plaintiffs, defendant knew that the large concrete
garbage pit on the premises created an unreasonably dangerous
condition due to the lack of any fall protection device, but
failed to use reasonable care to eliminate the risk of injury to
invitees or to warn of the danger.
	Plaintiffs' claim invokes the legal duty owed by a land
occupier to business invitees.  This court summarized that duty
in Woolston v. Wells, 297 Or 548, 557-58, 687 P2d 144 (1984):
		"In general, it is the duty of the possessor of
land to make the premises reasonably safe for the
invitee's visit.  The possessor must exercise the
standard of care above stated to discover conditions of
the premises that create an unreasonable risk of harm
to the invitee.  The possessor must exercise that
standard of care either to eliminate the condition
creating that risk or to warn any foreseeable invitee
of the risk so as to enable the invitee to avoid the
harm."
	As the majority notes, because this case comes to us on
review of a grant of summary judgment, we must assume the
plaintiffs can produce expert testimony and other evidence,
supporting the claims in their amended complaint and affidavits. 
Characterized in terms of the duty described in Woolston, the
amended complaint and affidavits assert that defendant either
failed to exercise reasonable care to discover the unreasonable
risk of harm to invitees posed by the absence of any fall
protection device at the edge of the refuse pit or, having
discovered that dangerous condition, failed to use reasonable
care either to eliminate the risk (such as by adding a suitable
handrail) or to warn a foreseeable invitee of the risk.
Defendant's duty to business invitees, as described in
Woolston, is not a "discretionary function or duty," to use the
terms of ORS 30.265(3)(c). (7)  Rather, defendant's duty, as
summarized in Woolston, is nondiscretionary.  That is, the law
has made a policy choice, for defendant as well as all other land
owners and occupiers who invite customers to enter their
property, that mandates compliance with the legal duty described
in Woolston.  As this court explained in Miller v. Grants Pass
Irr. Dist, 297 Or 312, 686 P2d 324 (1984), a public body may have
discretion in choosing how it will satisfy its duty to the public
but it has no discretion to choose not to fulfill its legal duty:
		"If there is a legal duty to protect the public by
warning of a danger or by taking preventing measures,
or both, the choice of means may be discretionary, but
the decision whether or not to do so at all is, by
definition, not discretionary.
		"This is so whether the duty derives from
statutory or from common law.  * * *  The law itself
has made that much of a policy choice.  When different
precautions might satisfy this duty, however, the
choice of which one to use may be discretionary."
Id. at 320.
	Defendant does not dispute plaintiffs' proposition that
the edge of the refuse pit was a known dangerous condition that
obligated defendant to carry out the legal duty set out in
Woolston.  However, in evaluating defendant's choice of responses
to the risks of harm posed by the public's foreseeable uses of
the refuse pit, we must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
	The evidence discloses that defendant's agents
identified at least two distinct, predictable risks of harm from
the condition of the refuse pit and its foreseeable uses by the
public.  The first was the risk that the cars or trucks of
customers might roll into the pit.  The second was the risk that
customers working near the pit, either in vehicles or on the
concrete work surface, might fall into the pit.  Each of those
distinct risks carried the potential for grave injury or death to
defendant's customers.
	Responding to its duty under Woolston, defendant's
agents addressed the first of those risks by affixing a railroad
tie to the concrete surface a short distance from the edge of the
refuse pit.  The railroad tie functioned as a wheel bumper to
inhibit or prevent vehicles from rolling into the pit.  Defendant
makes no argument that defendant designed the wheel bumper as a
device to protect people against the risk of falling into the
pit.  
	Defendant's agents also considered the second risk,
discussed above, that customers working in the area might fall
into the pit.  That risk of injury is precisely the risk that
plaintiff Gary Garrison encountered and that produced the injury
that gives rise to plaintiffs' claim.  Defendant's agents,
however, decided to take no action to protect customers from
falling into the pit or to post a warning of the danger.  They
made that choice after considering such factors as the safety of
the public and defendant's employees, the overall efficiency of
the operation, and budgetary constraints.
	The court must assume that plaintiffs would produce
evidence to establish that defendant's agents' choice to erect no
fall protection device at the edge of the pit created an
unreasonably dangerous risk of injury to customers working at
that location.  The question is whether ORS 30.265(3)(c) renders
defendant immune from liability because, in the face of the
specific and affirmative legal duty set out in Woolston,
defendant's agents considered the cost of compliance and other
relevant policy criteria, but chose to take no action to carry
out the legal duty.
	The passage from Miller, quoted above, confirms that a
public body has no discretion to decide whether to satisfy a
legal duty imposed by Oregon common law.  Defendant simply is
incorrect in arguing (1) that the range of its permissible
discretionary choices included the choice to do nothing to comply
with the duty stated in Woolston, or (2) that its consideration
of policy-related criteria, coupled with a choice to take no
precautions against the risk of falls at the edge of the pit,
qualifies under Miller as a choice of means to satisfy the duty
described in Woolston.
	This court's cases refute defendant's argument.  In 
Fazzolari v. Portland School District No. 1J, 303 Or 1, 734 P2d
1326 (1987), the court considered a school district's alleged
negligence in failing to provide adequate security while student
were on school grounds, and said:
		"We think that a school principal's failure to
take any precautions whatever, if that was
unreasonable, is not an exercise of policy discretion  
* * *, though a school board's choice between
expenditures on security personnel or other types of
safeguards might be."
Id. at 22 n 20 (citing Miller).
	In Mosely v. Portland School District No 1J, 315 Or 85,
843 P2d 415 (1992), this court, citing Fazzolari, underscored the
distinction between making a choice among various means that will
satisfy the public body's duty to the public and making a
"choice" not to fulfill a duty imposed by law:
		"A public body that owes a particular duty of care
(such as that owed by a school district to its students
who are required to be on school premises during school
hours) has wide policy discretion in choosing the means
by which to carry out that duty.  * * *  The range of
permissible choices does not, however, include the
choice of not exercising care.  * * *"
Id. at 92 (citations omitted).
	Finally, in Miller, the court considered and rejected
defendant's argument that, because choosing among different means
to satisfy a legal duty involves elements of policy, a "choice"
by a public body not to satisfy its legal duty to the public also
is a discretionary function:
		"ORS 30.265(3)(c) provides immunity against '[a]ny
claim based upon the performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty.' 
A claimant might argue that when safety precautions of
some kind are obligatory, the function or duty simply
is not discretionary and ORS 30.265(3)(c) does not
apply.  But this would mean that even when a precaution
is chosen, negligence in making that choice, that is to
say, in the performance of the function, is no more
immune than failure to perform it altogether.  A
defendant, in turn, might argue that as long as the
choice among different precautions involves significant
elements of policy, taking into consideration competing
values, consequences, and priorities, the function is
discretionary, and total disregard of the duty is as
immune as failure to perform it before the injury has
occurred.
	"The concept of a 'discretionary function or duty' is
notoriously obscure and difficult, but we do not
believe the legislature intended either of these
extreme results.  One extreme would swallow up the
concept of discretion by holding a public body liable
whenever it is found not to have actually satisfied its
tort duty.  The other extreme would put a premium on
ignoring the duty and simply failing to exercise the
function of choosing among safety measures.  The
dilemma posed by the statute is not inescapable. 
Rather, we conclude that the line runs between the
extremes.  The line runs between deciding whether to
take precautions, a duty which under the circumstances
of a particular case may not be discretionary, and
deciding what precautions to take, which may or may not
involve discretionary policy issues.  That question, in
turn, depends on the kind of examination set out in
Stevenson v. State of Oregon[, 290 Or 3, 619 P2d 247
(1980),] and the other decisions cited above." 
297 Or at 320-21 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
	The underscored passages from Miller, quoted above,
confirm that the legislature chose not to immunize a public
body's decision to ignore a duty imposed by law to adopt safety
measures to protect the public.  The majority correctly describes
Miller as a case in which the public body "'wholly disregard[ed]
and declin[ed] to consider whatever duty it had under tort law.'" 
Garrison v. Deschutes County, ___ Or ____, ____ n 6 (slip op at
19 n 6) (quoting Miller, 297 Or at 321).  The majority then
attempts to distinguish Miller by describing this case as one in
which the public body did exercise care, and that defendant's
agents believed that their "choice" demonstrated "a higher level
of safety, i.e., greater care, than plaintiffs' approach."  Id.
	For several reasons, the majority's attempt to analyze
and apply Miller falls well short of the mark.  Miller pointed
out that the public body in that case had failed even to consider
what its duty might be under tort law.  The court relied on that
circumstance to conclude that a court cannot say that a public
body has reached an immune decision regarding governmental policy
if it has not even considered its legal duty under the
circumstances.  But the court in Miller did not hold that the
converse is true, i.e., that a public body is entitled to
immunity merely for considering what its legal duty might be
under the circumstances.  The passages from Miller, quoted above,
confirm that the court rejected that view as an extreme one that
the legislature did not intend.
	More puzzling is the majority's effort to portray
defendant's conduct as an "exercise [of] care" that defendant's
agents believed to be more safe than what plaintiffs sought.  Id. 
The assertion that defendant did exercise care in designing the
refuse pit contradicts the majority's assumption that defendant's
decision to forego any fall protection devices "might have been
both wrong and negligently reached."  Id. at ___ (slip op at 17). 
Moreover, because the case is before the court on summary
judgment, we must construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs.  In view of the contention of
plaintiffs' expert witness that the design of the refuse pit was
unreasonably dangerous, the majority's conclusion that defendant
exercised care is both irrelevant and impermissible.  Lastly, the
mere belief of defendant's agents in the greater safety of their
design is irrelevant.  Plaintiffs rely on defendant's failure to
take any precautions to eliminate the known risk that customers
might fall into the refuse pit -- a nondiscretionary legal duty
imposed by Oregon law.  See Woolston, 297 Or at 557-58
(describing legal duty).  While the confidence displayed by
defendant's agents is understandable, it does not justify
immunizing defendant for failing to adopt any precautions against
a known risk of injury from falls, in accordance with Oregon law.
	This is not a case in which defendant made a choice to
use a device to protect against falls, but the device simply
failed to function.  Rather, defendant seeks discretionary
immunity for its decision not to use any protection against the
risk of falling, i.e., choosing not to use reasonable care to
"eliminate the condition creating that risk or to warn any
foreseeable invitee of the risk so as to enable the invitee to
avoid the harm."  Id. at 558.  Defendant's argument, carried to
its logical conclusion, would immunize a public body's decision
to disregard its nondiscretionary legal duty, simply because the
public body believed that its policy reasons for avoiding its
legal duty were superior to the policy reasons that supported
creation of the legal duty in the first instance.  The
legislature did not intend that construction of ORS 30.265(3)(c).
	Because defendant has not demonstrated that it is
entitled to immunity from liability at this stage of the
proceeding, the trial court should have denied defendant's motion
for summary judgment.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.


1. 	Plaintiffs are Gary Garrison, who seeks damages for his
own injuries, and Heather Garrison, his wife, who seeks damages
for loss of consortium.

2. 	ORS 30.265(3) provides, in part:
		"Every public body and its officers, employees and
agents acting within the scope of their employment or
duties * * * are immune from liability for:
		"* * * * *
		"(c) Any claim based upon the performance of or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty, whether or not the discretion is
abused."
3. 	As noted, plaintiffs' first specification does not
allege negligence in the design of the refuse transfer station.
Instead, the specification charges negligence in "failing to
maintain" a facility with barriers to protect patrons from
falling over the edge of the platform.  We agree with the county,
however, that the gravamen of that allegation is that the
county's alleged failure to design the platform in a way that
included protective barriers (other than the railroad tie that
prevented vehicles form backing up too far) made the platform
unreasonably dangerous. 

4. 	Plaintiffs attached an affidavit to their response to
the county's summary judgment motion attesting to the fact that
they had retained an expert qualified to testify at trial "to
admissible facts or opinions creating a question of fact" with
regard to each of the three allegations contained in plaintiffs'
second amended complaint.  We view that affidavit broadly and
give plaintiffs the benefit of all favorable inferences. 
Accordingly, with regard to plaintiffs' first and third
specifications of negligence, we assume that plaintiffs' expert
would testify at trial that the county was negligent in
maintaining (or designing) a premises that had no barrier or
device other than the railroad tie to prevent people from falling
and in designing a transfer station that required people to back
their vehicles up to the edge of a platform to dump refuse.  

5. 	We agree with the following statement by the Court of
Appeals:
	"That [expert] testimony would go not to the question
of whether defendant's decision took safety into
account but, rather, would go to the question of the
quality of the decision.  Again, that is precisely what
immunity is designed to address.  If governmental
bodies always made perfect choices, then there would
never be a need to invoke immunity."
Garrison, 162 Or App at 167-68.

6. 	The dissent's contrary view is based on a misreading of
our cases, particularly Miller.  In Miller, the evidence in the
summary judgment stage suggested that the irrigation district had
"wholly disregard[ed] and declin[ed] to consider whatever duty it
had under tort law."  297 Or at 321.  This case, as we have
shown, is one in which the public body did consider its duty. 
Indeed, Rice and Driver believed that their choice represented a
higher level of safety, i.e., greater care, than plaintiffs'
approach.

7. 	In his concurring opinion in Miller v. Grants Pass Irr.
Dist., 297 Or 312, 323-24, 686 P2d 324 (1984), Justice Lent
opined that the notion of a "discretionary duty," which the text
of ORS 30.265(3)(c) embraces, is a contradiction in terms that
detracts from a principled statutory analysis.  He did, however,
offer the following explanation, with which I agree, regarding
the concepts of discretion and legal duty in the application of
ORS 30.265(3)(c):
		"I do have trouble envisioning a discretionary
duty.  ORS 30.265(1), speaking generally, makes the
state or a local public body liable for its torts.  In
order for there to be a tort the actor must breach some
duty imposed by law, that is, by legislative enactment
(statute, rule, regulation, charter, ordinance, etc.)
or the common law.  The duty must be identified and
proclaimed to exist by a court, as a matter of law, not
fact.  A duty either exists or it does not.  The law
either commands someone to act, or refrain from acting,
or it does not.
		"In this case, the Irrigation District chose to
build and operate a dam.  Having done so, it should be
held to the same duty as would any person, natural or
corporate, have in the operation of a dam and the
impoundment of water, to protect those on the water
from an unreasonable risk of harm arising from the
District's activities in this respect.  If legislation
or the common law imposes a duty on a dam operator in
these circumstances, there is nothing 'discretionary'
about the existence of the duty, nor can it be
described by that adjective.
		"There may be, and probably is, room for
discretion in choosing the manner of performance, both
for a private person or a public agency, but the duty
must be performed and the standard of care required by
the duty must be achieved.
		"To sum up, a discretionary function is one
concerning which the governmental agency involved has
power to make a choice among valid alternatives, but if
there is a duty imposed by law there is no choice but
to obey.  If there is no duty, to which adherence is
required, then the agency is concerned with a function
rather than a duty.  I really don't know what a
discretionary duty looks like."