Title: LaFaso v. Patrissi

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

LAFASO_V_PATRISSI.91-581; 161 Vt. 46; 633 A.2d 695

[Filed 24-Sep-1993]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-581


 Matthew LaFaso, et al                        Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Washington Superior Court

 Joseph Patrissi, Commissioner,               December Term, 1992
 Department of Corrections


 Alan W. Cheever, J.

 E.M. Allen, Defender General, and Jeffrey Dworkin, Prisoners' Rights
   Office, Montpelier, for plaintiffs-appellees

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Thomas J. Rushford,
   Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.    Plaintiffs, an inmate of the Vermont prison system who
 was sanctioned for disciplinary violations and the class he represents,
 prevailed in their claims to the Washington Superior Court that the Vermont
 Department of Corrections (DOC) (1) failed to adopt regulations on prison
 discipline in accord with the requirements of the Vermont Administrative
 Procedures Act; (2) denied meritorious good time credits for minor rules
 infractions in violation of statute; and (3) applied too low an evidentiary
 standard in prison disciplinary hearings.  Defendant, Commissioner of
 Corrections, appeals from the latter holding.  Plaintiffs appeal the court's
 refusal to award retroactive class relief and to place a higher evidentiary
 burden on the Commissioner in disciplinary hearings.  We affirm.

 

      The lead plaintiff in this case is Matthew LaFaso, who was disciplined
 in February for a minor rules infraction.  His suit was subsequently
 certified a class action on behalf of all past, present and future inmates
 subject to DOC Policies 1021 and 973, and the "some evidence" rule at prison
 disciplinary hearings.(FN1) Plaintiffs claimed that DOC is required to comply
 with the rulemaking procedures of the Vermont Administrative Procedures Act
 (APA), 3 V.S.A. {{ 801-849, in promulgating its rules and regulations.  They
 alleged that DOC failed to comply with the APA when it established Policies
 1021 and 973, the rules that cover inmate discipline, and that those rules
 are therefore ineffective.  Plaintiffs also claimed that DOC's denial of
 meritorious "good time" to inmates found to have committed minor
 disciplinary infractions contravenes 28 V.S.A. { 853(a), which limits this
 sanction to cases of "serious breach of the rules."  Finally, plaintiffs
 challenged the validity of the "some evidence" standard under which DOC
 determined whether inmates committed disciplinary infractions, arguing that
 it violates due process.
       In a series of three orders, the superior court ruled in favor of
 plaintiffs on each of the issues.  On the last issue, the court held that
 the "some evidence" standard violates due process and that a "preponderance
 of the evidence" standard is required at prison disciplinary hearings.
 Defendant has appealed only this latter decision.  Plaintiffs agree with the
 decision as a matter of federal law but argue that the Vermont Constitution

 

 requires that the infractions be proved by "clear and convincing" evidence.
      Following these rulings, plaintiffs sought either full or partial
 retroactive relief, including expungement of disciplinary convictions
 against class members based on Policy 1021 or the "some evidence" standard,
 and the award of meritorious "good time" denied under Policy 973.  The court
 found that retroactivity would produce substantial inequity by placing
 "severe and destructive" burdens on DOC, and consequently denied all
 retroactive relief.  Plaintiffs appeal this conclusion and a number of the
 findings supporting it.
                                     I.
      We address first the evidentiary standard necessary to satisfy due
 process in prison disciplinary proceedings.  Policy 1021 sets forth a
 detailed procedure for disciplining inmates for rules infractions, derived
 in part from statute.  DOC Policy 1021; see also 28 V.S.A. { 852
 (authorizing disciplinary committee and hearing procedures).  The process
 starts with a disciplinary report and charge brought by the reporting
 officer.  If a major rules violation is charged, the matter goes to a
 hearing officer for hearing.  The hearing officer is an employee of DOC
 appointed for that purpose by the Superintendent of the institution or the
 DOC district manager.  Also appointed is a hearing assistant, to aid the
 inmate to present his or her case, and a presenting officer to present the
 case supporting the violation.  The issue here involves the burden of proof
 placed on DOC to prove the charge.  The rule specifies that "[i]n order to
 determine if the inmate is guilty, the Hearing Officer need only find some
 evidence in the record that supports that finding."  DOC Policy 1021, {
 IV(E)(8)(i)(5).

 

       The trial court determined that the rule denied plaintiffs due process
 because it did not require that the hearing officer find guilt based on a
 preponderance of the evidence.  It is clear that the rule allows, the
 hearing officer to impose discipline even if the officer concludes that it
 is more probable than not that the inmate did not violate the rules, as long
 as there is some evidence of a violation.  Defendant claims that the trial
 court erred because the United States Supreme Court has already held, in
 Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst. v. Hill,