Title: Wheeler v. Woods

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Wheeler v. Woods1986 WY 160723 P.2d 1224Case Number: 86-18Decided: 08/12/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Lewis 
A. WHEELER, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Ronald D. WOODS, Debra 
Woods Lane, Dee Stadnik, and Key Real Estate Company, Ltd., Appellees 
(Defendants), Virgil L. Payne (Defendant).

Appeal from TheDistrictCourtofLaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

Don W. Riske, 
Cheyenne, for appellant.

Kay Snider 
Coffman, Cheyenne, for appellees Ronald D. Woods and 
Debra Woods Lane.

Bert T. 
Ahlstrom, Jr., Cheyenne, for appellees Dee Stadnik and Key Real 
Estate Co., Ltd.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE and MACY, 
JJ., and GUTHRIE, J., Retired.

GUTHRIE, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
the judgment of the district court dismissing the claim of appellant, Lewis A. 
Wheeler, against Ronald D. Woods, Debra Woods 
Lane, the Key Real Estate 
Company, Ltd., and Dee Stadnik. Appellant's claim against the defendants Ronald 
D. Woods and Debra Woods Lane rests in an asserted purchase contract covering 
a house in Cheyenne, which was owned by Woods and Lane, 
and upon which he claimed he had a binding purchase contract. The claims 
asserted against Key Real Estate Company, Ltd., and Dee Stadnik were based upon 
a claimed tortious interference with a contract relationship and willful breach 
of duty owed to him.

[¶2.]     The judgment will be 
affirmed.

[¶3.]     The transaction from 
which these claims arose began on December 18, 1983, when Virgil Payne submitted 
an offer to purchase the real property of Ronald Woods and Debra Woods 
Lane, 
which was located in Cheyenne. This offer was transmitted to Dee 
Stadnik, an employee of Key Real Estate Company, Ltd., (hereinafter Key) because 
the property was listed with her, and she was acting as agent for the sellers. 
Ruth Leypoldt, as Payne's agent, transmitted this to 
Stadnik.

[¶4.]     The offer was for the 
sum of $90,000 with two conditions included, i.e., that Payne could secure an 
F.H.A. loan in the sum of $64,500 and that he could sell his present home. It 
was contingent upon these conditions and was not to be binding unless and until 
they had been satisfied. The sellers did not accept this offer, but instead made 
a counteroffer, which among other things provided that, in the event the sellers 
received a more acceptable offer, Payne was to be notified. If (within 72 hours 
after receiving notice) Payne did not "remove the contingency involving the sale 
of his residence and proceed with [his] purchase," then the counteroffer would 
become "null and void."

[¶5.]     Thereafter on March 9, 
1984, appellant made an offer on the property in the sum of $80,000 with cash on 
closing. This offer was delivered to Stadnik by John White, Wheeler's agent. It 
required the acceptance of this offer by the sellers in writing on or before 
midnight March 11, 1984, to become binding. Stadnik was unable to advise Ronald 
D. Woods of this offer until the afternoon of March 11th. Woods advised her that 
he would accept the offer if the Payne contingencies were not removed. 
Debra Woods Lane was not advised of this offer until sometime on 
March 12, when two mailgrams were sent to Stadnik advising her that they would 
accept the offer but they, however, included a limitation as to the brokerage 
commission and the assumption of the existing mortgage. They were also 
conditioned upon the removal of the contingencies by Payne, who had 72 hours in 
which to do this.

[¶6.]     It was appellee Woods' 
intention to accept the Wheeler offer as a "back-up offer," apparently if Payne 
did not remove the contingencies or close the sale. These telegrams were 
received March 13th.

[¶7.]     It was then concluded 
by Stadnik and Dave Cameron, her managing broker, that there was no binding 
contract which had been made with Wheeler, and on March 15 Payne, the original 
offeree, negotiated a contract which provided for a much better net return to 
the owner. This sale was closed upon March 27, 1984. On March 13, Stadnik had 
advised White as appellant's agent that the property was then sold to Payne 
under the original purchase offer and agreement. On March 21, 1984, appellant 
gave notice by letter from his attorney, Don W. Riske, that he was prepared to 
close the sale upon his accepted offer and in conformity with the terms 
thereof.

[¶8.]     On March 27, both 
Cameron and Stadnik responded to this notice by letter apologizing for the 
misunderstanding and denying any deceit or intention to deceive. Appellant then 
brought suit against Payne, Ronald D. Woods, Debra Woods Lane, Dee Stadnik, and 
Key as defendants. Specific performance and conveyance of the premises was 
sought from Payne. This claim was dismissed during the proceedings, and 
appellant as plaintiff pursued his claim against Woods and Lane for damages for 
its breach, claiming to have an enforceable contract for the purchase of these 
lands. As to Key and Stadnik, damages were claimed for an alleged willful breach 
of duty and intentional interference with the contract rights of the plaintiff; 
the alleged failure of Key to properly supervise the activities of the defendant 
Stadnik; and a claim for penalty of three times the commission received pursuant 
to § 33-28-114, W.S. 1977, and the sum of $100,000 in punitive 
damages.

[¶9.]     In disposing of the 
claim against defendants Woods and Lane, the trial judge stated in his 
conclusions of law:

"1. That the plaintiff's 
offer to purchase dated 9 March 1984, was a written document which specifically 
provided for acceptance by the defendants by midnight March 11, 1984, and 
further specified acceptance by written signature thereon by the sellers; a 
telephone call to the Western Union to send a mailgram does not constitute an 
acceptance `in writing';

"2. A purported 
acceptance of a written offer to purchase, when the written offer to purchase 
specifies that the acceptance must be `on or before midnight of March 11, 1984,' 
is not such an acceptance as creates a binding contract when the `acceptance' 
was sent by mailgram telephoned to the Western Union on March 12th and received 
on March 13th;

* * * * * 
*

"4. The plaintiff's offer 
expired at midnight March 11th and thereafter there remained no offer open that 
could be accepted by the sellers."

THE CLAIMED 
CONTRACT

[¶10.]  We must first consider if there was an 
enforceable binding contract between Wheeler and Woods and Lane. It must be 
remembered that the offer upon which rests appellant's claim was made in the 
terms and upon the conditions satisfying Wheeler's wishes and desires. Although 
he knew of the shortness of the time that he was requiring for acceptance of the 
offer and must have known that his time limitation encompassed a weekend, and 
that time for acceptance fell upon a Sunday at the hour of midnight, he still 
inserted those conditions.

[¶11.]  Persons should be able to contract freely 
and upon such terms as they wish. No court should disregard the plain, obvious, 
and understandable words of any person to accomplish what they might personally 
believe to be proper. To do this is to deprive persons of their free right to 
contract, and appellant created his own time limitation for such acceptance. 

[¶12.]  It is apparent that if the time 
limitation is said to control in this case that any discussion of the effect of 
reliance upon the telegrams is not material. Admittedly they were sent sometime 
on Monday, March 12, at least some sixteen hours later than the acceptance 
deadline.

[¶13.]  When an appeal involves a simple question 
with a readily apparent answer, we do not perceive it to be a sin nor a 
violation of judicial propriety to allow it to retain that status and to make a 
simple and understandable disposal. The offer of appellant expired on midnight, 
March 11, 1984, upon his own terms. There was no written acceptance made by 
Woods and Lane prior to that time. Because of our view of this case, the 
question of the legal effect of the telegrams (mailgrams) is moot. Their 
sufficiency as an acceptance is not a matter required for disposal, and 
expressions thereon would be mere dicta.

[¶14.]  Twice in the past few years, this court 
has had occasion to consider the acceptance of an offer and the requirement that 
an acceptance be made in the terms therein expressed. In the case of Crockett v. 
Lowther, Wyo., 549 P.2d 303, 309 (1976), the court cited with approval and 
adopted the rule stated in Restatement, Contracts § 61, p. 67 (1932)1, as follows:

"`If an offer prescribes 
the place, time or manner of acceptance its term in this respect must be 
complied with in order to create a contract. * * *'" See authorities cited in 
Crockett v. Lowther, supra.

Crockett, supra, 
cites Trautwein v. Leavey, Wyo., 472 P.2d 776, 779 (1970), which also spoke to 
this question and cited 17 C.J.S. Contracts, § 51, p. 713, which reiterates the 
same rule as that from the Restatement appearing in Crockett. That case further 
includes a rather obvious but common sense statement which sets out a most 
compelling reason simply stated for enforcement of such limitations on an offer 
in the following fashion:

"If it could be said 
acceptance on the part of buyers would be good a day or two after the deadline 
of December 6, the same logic would dictate that acceptance a year or two after 
December 6 would be equally good. * * *" Trautwein v. Leavey, supra, at 
780.

[¶15.]  It would be possible to cite numerous 
texts and other decisions recognizing this rule. The case of Callender v. 
Kalscheuer, 289 Minn. 532, 184 N.W.2d 811, 812 (1971), states this rule as 
shortly, simply, and understandably as possible, when that court 
said:

"* * * If the time for 
acceptance of an offer is limited, as here, the limit is absolute and time is of 
the essence. [Citing authorities.] * * *" See also Morrison v. Rayen 
Investments, Inc., 97 Nev. 58, 624 P.2d 11 (1981); Houston Dairy, Inc., v. John 
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, 643 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 
1981).

[¶16.]  Appellant further in his appeal contends, 
if the acceptance to his offer was late and the first claimed contract is not 
enforceable, that the mailgrams (telegrams) constituted a counteroffer, which 
the owners-sellers accepted as evidenced by their conduct. This is a second shot 
and an afterthought by virtue of which appellant now seeks salvation. This 
theory was not asserted by plaintiff by way of pleadings, briefs, or argument. 
It did not appear in the suggested findings of fact and conclusions of law 
submitted to the court by appellant's attorney at the time judgment was entered. 
It was injected as a new issue at the time of the presentation of the Motion for 
New Trial. It was clearly not in the contemplation of appellant on March 21 when 
he demanded performance of the claimed contract arising from his offer, 
acceptance and receipt, and its alleged lawful acceptance and which we have 
heretofore held did not create an enforceable contract. If the court were at 
this time to recognize this claim, it would create a contract upon its own. It 
is hard to conceive of a "meeting of the minds" of which the claimant was 
unaware some ten days later, and, stranger still, that he should be a 
beneficiary of such an agreement of which he then had no present knowledge under 
the asserted claim.

[¶17.]  There are many cases in which this court 
has held that unless it involves a jurisdictional matter that the court should 
not consider on appeal questions which were not raised in the trial court. 
Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration Corp., Wyo., 665 P.2d 452, 462-463 (1983), and 
cases collected under 1 West's Wyoming Digest, Appeal & Error, keynumber 
169, at 49-51 (1985 Cum.Annual Pocket Part). Absent some most compelling reason 
an unsuccessful party should not in fairness to the trial court and particularly 
to the adverse party be heard to assert and have litigated on appeal some issue 
or theory which he has neglected to put forward before the conclusion of the 
trial and entry of a judgment.

[¶18.]  Appellant cannot relieve himself from the 
operation of the rule requiring presentation of the question to the trial court 
by raising it for the first time in his Motion for New Trial. It was not a 
proper subject for disposal by such motion.

"* * * a party may not 
seek a second trial on the basis of a theory not urged at the first trial." 
(Footnote omitted.) Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 
2805, p. 40 (1973). See also DeWitty v. Decker, Wyo., 383 P.2d 734, 739 
(1963).

[¶19.]  There is no reason to disturb the 
judgment in favor of Woods and Lane.

THE CLAIM AGAINST KEY 
REAL ESTATE COMPANY, LTD., AND STADNIK

[¶20.]  After the finding that there was no 
binding agreement between appellant and Ronald D. Woods and Debra Woods Lane, 
the property owners, the trial court dismissed the asserted claims against Key 
and Stadnik on the ground that he had no standing to pursue the remedy with 
which disposal we also agree.

[¶21.]  In pursuit of his hopes for reversal upon 
this phase of the case, appellant submits two queries to the court seeking an 
affirmative answer to either or both. They are herein set 
out:

"Whether the trial court 
erred in holding that Stadnik and Key did not breach any duties owed by them to 
appellant."

"Whether the appellant 
had standing to challenge appellees Key Real Estate and Dee Stadnik's handling 
of the purchase between Payne and Woods and Lane insofar as that handling 
constituted interference with prospective contractual 
relationships."

[¶22.]  Appellant bases his claim against these 
two defendants upon the fact that Stadnik advised his agent, White, that the 
property had been sold pursuant to the original Payne offer and that this was 
not true because in fact there was no such contract at the time this advice was 
given.

[¶23.]  In his brief appellant summarizes the 
basis of his claim against these defendants as follows:

"The affirmative and 
passive, negligent and intentional, misrepresentations of Stadnik and Key 
excluded Appellant from vying for the purchase of the Woods and Lane property. 
Appellant had a right to expect that Stadnik and Key would give him the same 
opportunities to purchase that property as they gave to Virgil 
Payne."

[¶24.]  Appellant makes his reliance upon Hagar 
v. Mobley, Wyo., 638 P.2d 127 (1981), from which he extracts the rule that there 
is a "* * * duty owed by real estate brokers and salesmen to third parties (such as Appellant herein) 
with whom they deal." (Emphasis added.) This distillation of the holding in that 
case simply does not follow. It does not cover a party in the position of the 
appellant herein. We will not stretch that holding beyond the question presented 
and decided in that case. He cannot rely upon his categorical assertion that 
this rule includes "such as appellant herein." Specifically that case is not 
authority creating a duty upon realtors or agents except as to purchasers. It 
does adopt that statutory standard as applicable to purchasers with whom they 
deal. That case recognizes a duty between the broker or licensed salesperson and 
a purchaser, no more, no less.

[¶25.]  The court held in the context of the 
question raised that the licensing statutes were applicable between the brokers 
and agents and purchasers specifically and so stated, when the court 
said:

"We adopt the legislative 
policy of § 33-28-111, W.S. 1977, as standards by which licensed brokers and 
salesmen may be held liable to purchasers." Id. at 137.

Since appellant 
is not a purchaser in this case but an unsuccessful bidder, he can find no 
comfort or support for his claim through Hagar v. Mobley, 
supra.

[¶26.]  Appellant cites no other authority in 
support of his claim that defendants Key and Stadnik had a duty which they 
violated in telling White that there was a binding contract between Payne and 
the owners before that contract was entered into. He emphasizes for the court 
the holding in Tennant v. Lawton, 26 Wn. App. 701, 615 P.2d 1305, 1309-1310 
(1980), which is cited with approval in Hagar v. Mobley, supra, insisting that 
that case implicitly holds that a broker or salesman must not misrepresent that 
information which "is pivotal to the transaction from the buyer's perspective." 
This is clearly applicable to Payne alone.

[¶27.]  Appellant does not cite any authority 
which would recognize such rights or any duty to an unsuccessful bidder whose 
earlier offer had not been accepted. It might appear that this proposition is 
more novel than logical.

[¶28.]  Appellant attacks the trial court's 
holding which held adversely to his asserted right of recovery for interference 
with his "prospective contract relationship." In this phase of his brief he 
cites Martin v. Wing, Wyo., 667 P.2d 1159 (1983), quite properly as holding that 
a valid contract is not always necessary to recover for such interference. The 
court is unable, however, to apply the holding in the Wing case to the instant 
situation, which is factually so completely different.

[¶29.]  In this case, appellant is an 
unsuccessful claimant under an asserted contract for the purchase of the 
premises which the court has held not viable. Appellant, however, claims by 
virtue of his position that he is entitled to some rather undefinable or 
indefinite right to vie for the purchase or the opportunity to purchase these 
lands from Payne, but he does not suggest what probable value those might 
have.

[¶30.]  If it were to be conceded arguendo that 
Stadnik and Key did have some duty which they intentionally breached by 
depriving the appellant herein of rights of "vying for the purchase" or the 
right to some opportunity to purchase the house from Payne, the result remains 
the same. We are puzzled what might be the measure of damages for such loss, as 
there is no evidence in this record upon which such an award could rest short of 
a crystal ball reading or astrological chart. It would necessarily involve 
complete speculation by the finder of fact which has been so often condemned. 
Krist v. Aetna Casualty and Surety, Wyo., 667 P.2d 665, 672 (1983), and cases 
cited therein. Erickson v. Magill, Wyo., 713 P.2d 1182 
(1986).

[¶31.]  Erickson v. Magill, supra, held that it 
was mandatory in order to recover for interference with contract relationships 
that all the necessary elements for such claim be proven. One of these elements 
is "resultant damage." Absent such element there could be no 
recovery.

[¶32.]  As a general rule there must be some real 
possibility of benefit. In W. Prosser and W. Keaton, The Law of Torts § 130, p. 
1006 (5th ed. 1984), the authors mention that in cases of this character 
recovery has been denied where there was "no sufficient degree of certainty that 
the plaintiff ever would have received the anticipated 
benefits."

CLAIMS FOR COSTS OF 
APPEAL

[¶33.]  Appellees herein have requested the court 
to determine that this is a frivolous appeal and without merit and ask for 
enforcement of penalties and costs thereunder. Were it not for the appeal upon 
the question of the existence of a valid contract between these parties, we 
would be so inclined to hold that this is a frivolous appeal. The court does not 
deem the authorities herein cited in support of this claim against Key and Dee 
Stadnik applicable. Appellant makes reliance upon statements out of context and 
without regard to the factual situations in the cases cited. It ill behooves any 
attorney shielded by the cloak of privilege to charge such persons with breaches 
of duty and misconduct while acting as a broker or an agent of the landowner. 
Such statements could damage them in their profession, occasion much worry, and 
require expenditures and time for defense of an appeal pursued without citation 
of cogent, applicable authority in support of his 
position.

[¶34.]  Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Now found in 
Restatement, Second, Contracts § 60, p. 147 (1981).