Title: Commonwealth v. Sharma

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13035 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SUNIL SHARMA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 5, 2021. - August 3, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Parole.  Imprisonment, Parole.  Constitutional Law, 
Sentence.  Due Process of Law, Sentence.  Practice, 
Criminal, Parole, Sentence.  Regulation.  Statute, 
Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 25, 1996. 
 
 
A motion to vacate sentences, filed on November 4, 2019, 
was considered by Christine M. Roach, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Emma Quinn-Judge for the defendant. 
 
Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Rebecca Rose, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & 
others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
CYPHER, J.  On April 16, 1996, the defendant, Sunil Sharma, 
who was seventeen years old at the time,1 shot and killed the 
victim at a restaurant in the Chinatown section of Boston.  The 
defendant also shot and injured two other individuals.  On April 
28, 1999, the defendant pleaded guilty to murder in the second 
degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1; two counts of armed assault with 
intent to murder, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); and one count of 
illegal possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  He was 
sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole for 
the murder conviction, and two sentences of from seven to ten 
years for the assaults to run concurrent to each other but 
consecutive to the life sentence.2 
The defendant was paroled from his life sentence for murder 
on June 11, 2019, to serve his sentences on the remaining 
charges, pursuant to 120 Code Mass. Regs. § 200.08 (2017) 
(§ 200.08).  He then moved to vacate the remaining sentences and 
for resentencing pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  The motion was denied by a 
 
1 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that he 
was sixteen years old at the time of the shooting.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, the judge found the evidence that the 
defendant was seventeen, rather than sixteen, more credible and 
denied the motion. 
 
2 The defendant also received a sentence of from one year to 
one year and one day for illegal possession of a firearm to run 
concurrently with his sentence on the first assault charge. 
3 
 
Superior Court judge (motion judge), and the defendant appealed.  
Because § 200.08 distinguishes parole for life sentences from 
other sentences and is therefore invalid, see Dinkins v. 
Massachusetts Parole Bd., 486 Mass. 605, 610-614 (2021), and the 
defendant already has served the aggregate minimum of his 
sentences, we conclude that the defendant is entitled 
immediately to a parole hearing. 
In regard to the legality of the defendant's sentences, we 
conclude that the motion judge failed to consider the specific 
circumstances and unique characteristics of the defendant as a 
juvenile.  Accordingly, we remand for a hearing to consider 
whether the defendant's sentences comport with art. 26 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and, if necessary, 
resentencing.3 
Background.  At the plea hearing, the defendant admitted to 
the following facts.  On April 16, 1996, Kyung Shin, the victim, 
was eating dinner with friends at a restaurant in the Chinatown 
section of Boston.  Two of the victim's friends, Rick Lee and 
Tuan Nguyen, were planning to meet the defendant and two of his 
friends at the restaurant that evening. 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services, Juvenile Law Center, and 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
4 
 
The defendant and his friends arrived at the restaurant 
around 8:30 P.M.  Lee and one of the defendant's friends began 
to argue.  During the argument, the defendant went outside to 
get a gun he had hidden under a car.  The defendant brought the 
gun into the restaurant and fired the gun five times at Lee and 
Nguyen.  Nguyen was shot in the hand and groin; Lee was shot in 
the back; and the victim, who was sitting behind Lee, was shot 
in the chest.  The victim died from the piercing of her heart 
and lung by a bullet.  The defendant and his friends fled from 
the restaurant. 
The defendant was arrested a few months later in Detroit, 
Michigan, and was returned to Boston, where he confessed to the 
shooting.  The defendant also took police to retrieve the murder 
weapon that he had thrown into a river in the East Boston 
neighborhood of Boston.4 
On November 4, 2019, the defendant filed the motion at 
issue in this case for relief from unlawful confinement under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a) (rule 30 [a]).  The Commonwealth filed 
an opposition to the motion.  On March 9, 2020, the motion judge 
denied the motion without a hearing, and the defendant filed a 
timely notice of appeal.  We granted the defendant's application 
for direct appellate review. 
 
4 Ballistics testing established that the gun recovered from 
the river in East Boston was consistent with the murder weapon. 
5 
 
Discussion.  1.  Parole eligibility.  We first address the 
defendant's parole eligibility in light of our decision in 
Dinkins, 486 Mass. at 610-611.  General Laws c. 127, § 130, 
provides that once an inmate is granted parole, he or she "shall 
be allowed to go upon parole outside prison walls and inclosure 
upon such terms and conditions as the parole board shall 
prescribe."  General Laws c. 127, § 133, requires the parole 
board to establish a single parole eligibility date when an 
inmate is serving two or more consecutive sentences.  "Once an 
inmate has served the minimum term of his or her sentence, the 
inmate may be eligible for parole.  See G. L. c. 127, § 133."  
Dinkins, supra at 609.  When an inmate receives two or more 
consecutive sentences, the inmate's "parole eligibility date is 
calculated by aggregating the minimum parole eligibility dates 
for each component sentence and using the latest date as the 
parole eligibility date -- a process often referred to as 
'aggregation' or the 'aggregation rule.'"  Id.  See 120 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 200.08(2). 
In Dinkins, supra at 610-611, we held that 120 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 200.08(3)(c) (§ 200.08[3][c]), which creates an 
exception to the aggregation rule resulting in multiple parole 
eligibility dates for individuals with sentences consecutive to 
a life sentence, contravenes the plain meaning of G. L. c. 127, 
§§ 130 and 133, and therefore is invalid.  Section 200.08(3)(c) 
6 
 
provides:  "A sentence for a crime committed . . . which is 
ordered to run consecutive to a life sentence shall not be 
aggregated with the life sentence for purposes of calculating 
parole eligibility on the consecutive sentence."  We concluded, 
however, that inmates are entitled to a single parole 
eligibility date, even if one of their sentences is a life term.  
Dinkins, supra at 615-616.  We recognized that to hold otherwise 
would result in inmates being paroled and released into 
confinement.  Id. at 615. 
Our decision in Dinkins, 486 Mass. at 615, was based in 
large part on the fact that the statutory purpose of parole is 
to determine whether a prisoner is rehabilitated and can be 
released without again breaking the law.  See Henschel v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 368 Mass. 130, 136 (1975).  To 
require more than one parole hearing "would make little sense, 
be wasteful of the board's limited time and resources, and 
create additional burdens on the inmates seeking parole."  
Dinkins, supra.  Accordingly, the parole eligibility date for an 
inmate serving consecutive sentences should instead be 
calculated by aggregating the minimum parole eligibility dates 
for each sentence.  Id. 
The same regulation at issue in Dinkins resulted in the 
defendant in this case being paroled into prison.  Under 
§ 200.08(3)(c), the defendant became eligible for parole on his 
7 
 
life sentence in 2011, but not eligible for parole on his 
nonhomicide sentences until seven years after he was paroled on 
his life sentence.  On June 11, 2019, following his second 
parole hearing, the defendant was paroled from his life sentence 
after twenty-two years of incarceration to serve his on-and-
after nonhomicide sentences.  At that time, the parole 
determination only applied to his life sentence, despite the 
fact that the parole board (board) formed "the unanimous opinion 
that [the defendant] is rehabilitated and, therefore, merits 
parole at this time." 
Applying our holding in Dinkins, 486 Mass. at 606, that the 
regulation at issue is "contrary to the plain terms of the 
statutory framework governing parole and thus is invalid," we 
conclude that the defendant is entitled immediately to a parole 
hearing.  The defendant already has served the aggregate minimum 
of his sentences, twenty-two years.  Provided nothing has 
changed since the defendant's last parole hearing, he should be 
parole eligible immediately. 
2.  Legality of the sentence.  Although we conclude that 
the defendant is entitled to an immediate parole hearing, we 
separately analyze the legality of the defendant's sentence. 
a.  Standard of review.  We review the judge's denial of a 
rule 30 (a) motion for abuse of discretion or error of law.  
Commonwealth v. Perez, 480 Mass. 562, 567 (2018) (Perez II).  
8 
 
When reviewing claims of constitutional error, we accept the 
judge's factual findings absent clear error but independently 
review the application of constitutional principles.  Id. at 
567-568. 
b.  Proportionality.  The defendant argues that his 
consecutive sentences for homicide and nonhomicide offenses are 
unconstitutionally disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and art. 26.  We resolve this 
issue under art. 26, which affords a defendant greater 
protections than the Eighth Amendment.  See Diatchenko v. 
District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 668 
(2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12, 27 (2015).  "The touchstone of art. 
26's proscription against cruel or unusual punishment . . . [is] 
proportionality."  Commonwealth v. Concepcion, 487 Mass. 77, 86 
(2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677 (2017) 
(Perez I).  "The essence of proportionality is that punishment 
for crime should be graduated and proportioned to both the 
offender and the offense" (citation and quotation omitted).  
Perez I, supra at 683.  "To reach the level of cruel and 
unusual, the punishment must be so disproportionate to the crime 
that it 'shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions 
of human dignity.'"  Commonwealth v. LaPlante, 482 Mass. 399, 
403 (2019), quoting Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 495, 
497 (1981).  Because the Legislature has broad discretion in 
9 
 
prescribing penalties for criminal offenses, the defendant has 
the burden of proving disproportionality.  Cepulonis, supra. 
We apply a three-pronged proportionality analysis.  "To 
determine whether a sentence is disproportionate requires (1) an 
'inquiry into the nature of the offense and the offender in 
light of the degree of harm to society,' (2) 'a comparison 
between the sentence imposed here and punishments prescribed for 
the commission of more serious crimes in the Commonwealth,' and 
(3) 'a comparison of the challenged penalty with the penalties 
prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions."  
Concepcion, 487 Mass. at 86, quoting Cepulonis, 384 Mass. at 
497-498.  See Perez I, 477 Mass. at 684 (applying Cepulonis to 
juvenile sentencing).  For juvenile offenders, this analysis is 
"supplemented with the greater weight given to a juvenile 
defendant's age."  Perez I, supra. 
The defendant argues that his aggregate sentences are 
disproportionate as applied because of the circumstances of his 
youth and his characteristics as a juvenile offender.  The 
Commonwealth responds that the defendant's sentences are 
proportionate despite the unique considerations given to 
juveniles because the record suggests that the defendant was 
not, in fact, capable of rehabilitation within fifteen years.  
We agree with the defendant that the motion judge failed to 
consider the mitigating circumstances of the defendant's youth 
10 
 
and his rehabilitation in recent years and remand for a fact-
intensive proportionality analysis under Cepulonis. 
For a sentence to be permissible under art. 26, the nature 
of the offense and the offender must be proportionate to the 
punishment.  See Perez I, 477 Mass. at 683; Cepulonis, 384 Mass. 
at 497.  "Disproportionality is not, however, an abstract 
inquiry."  Perez I, supra at 684.  Instead, the proportionality 
analysis requires specific consideration of the characteristics 
of a juvenile offender.  "[T]he constitutionality of the 
defendant's sentence, including the aggregate term to be served 
before parole eligibility, is to be evaluated in light of the 
particular facts presented."  LaPlante, 482 Mass. at 403. 
In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012), the United 
States Supreme Court concluded that we must consider a 
juvenile's unique capacity for rehabilitation, his or her social 
vulnerability to negative influences and pressures, and his or 
her biologically limited maturity and development.  See id. 
("three significant gaps between juveniles and adults" relevant 
to juvenile sentencing); Perez II, 480 Mass. at 573 (applying 
Miller principles).  In Perez I, 477 Mass. at 685, we reasoned 
that "[b]ecause of those characteristics, imposition of an 
aggregate sentence . . . -- with parole eligibility exceeding 
that available to a juvenile defendant convicted of murder -- 
while perhaps within the range of a judge's discretion, may 
11 
 
satisfy the first prong of the disproportionality test only if 
the factors described in Miller, supra at 477-478, are 
considered by the sentencing judge." 
The same is true of the imposition of the aggregate 
sentence here.  The first prong of the disproportionality test 
requires consideration of "the unique characteristics of 
juvenile offenders, including their 'diminished culpability and 
greater prospects for reform.'"  Perez I, 477 Mass. at 684, 
quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.  We must consider the actual 
juvenile offender as a first step before comparing the offense, 
the offender, and the punishment.  See Cepulonis, 384 Mass. at 
497 ("The first prong of the disproportionality test requires 
inquiry into the 'nature of the offense and the offender in 
light of the degree of harm to society'"). 
In LaPlante, 482 Mass. at 406, we concluded that the 
resentencing judge properly conducted a fact-intensive 
proportionality analysis under Cepulonis and Miller.  
Ultimately, a period of forty-five years of incarceration before 
parole eligibility was proportional to both the offender and the 
offense where the defendant was convicted of three counts of 
murder in the first degree.  See id.  The resentencing judge 
properly concluded that "the evidence submitted at the hearing 
did not reflect that at the time of the murders he displayed the 
'hallmark features' of a juvenile, that is, immaturity, 
12 
 
impetuosity and failure to appreciate risks and consequences."  
Id.  The judge also considered the defendant's family and home 
environment and found it to be "relatively unremarkable."  Id.  
Finally, the judge considered testimony about the defendant's 
psychological state.  Id.  After a thorough consideration of the 
offender himself and the circumstances of his youth, the judge 
concluded that the defendant's prognosis for rehabilitation was 
"guarded."  Id. 
Unlike in LaPlante, the judge in this case made no findings 
of fact in denying the defendant's rule 30 (a) motion.  The 
judge indicated only that she denied the defendant's motion for 
"the reasons stated by the Commonwealth in its opposition" and 
that "defendant's sentences pursuant to his plea remain lawful 
under Miller and Diatchenko."  The judge did not consider the 
unique characteristics of the defendant as a juvenile offender. 
Moreover, consideration of the Miller factors includes 
consideration of the "'possibility of rehabilitation' -- as well 
as an assessment of the defendant's postsentencing conduct."  
LaPlante, 482 Mass. at 404.  In granting the defendant parole on 
his life sentence, the parole board found that he "has not had a 
violent disciplinary report in over [ten] years."  The board 
credited the defendant's testimony that he "has matured and 
. . . has been able to engage in additional programming" while 
incarcerated.  Most significantly, the board formed "the 
13 
 
unanimous opinion that [the defendant] is rehabilitated and, 
therefore, merits parole at this time.  Because the judge did 
not factor the considerations of the first prong into her 
decision, we need not discuss the second and third prongs.5  See 
Cepulonis, 384 Mass. at 497-498.  Accordingly, we remand for a 
fact-intensive proportionality analysis, including consideration 
under the three prongs of Cepulonis.6 
c.  Presumptive disproportionality.  The defendant argues 
that his sentences are presumptively disproportionate under 
Diatchenko, 466 Mass. at 658-659, because his aggregate 
sentences caused him to be punished more severely than a 
juvenile convicted of murder in the first degree at the time of 
his conviction.  The Commonwealth counters that the defendant's 
sentences are not presumptively disproportionate because Miller 
and Diatchenko only require a juvenile offender to be granted a 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release, which the defendant 
 
5 We do, however, address the second prong infra, in 
relation to the defendant's argument that his sentence is 
presumptively disproportionate. 
 
6 Because we remand for the judge to consider the mitigating 
circumstances of the defendant's youth, we do not address the 
defendant's argument that he is entitled to resentencing because 
the sentencing judge, exercising discretion, could not have 
foreseen the impact of constitutional changes and scientific 
developments in the juvenile sentencing landscape.  Nor do we 
address the defendant's argument that he should be granted a new 
sentencing hearing based on newly discovered evidence concerning 
the cognitive characteristics of juveniles. 
14 
 
was afforded.  We decline to establish a bright-line rule that 
the aggregate sentence for a juvenile convicted of murder in the 
second degree and nonhomicide offenses presumptively is 
disproportionate if it exceeds the punishment for a juvenile 
convicted of murder in the first degree. 
"The second prong of the disproportionality analysis 
involves a comparison between the sentence imposed here and 
punishments prescribed for the commission of more serious crimes 
in the Commonwealth."  Cepulonis, 384 Mass. at 498.  We have 
held that juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes cannot be 
treated more harshly than juveniles convicted of murder except 
in extraordinary circumstances.  See Commonwealth v. Lutskov, 
480 Mass. 575, 583-584 (2018) (Miller hearing required prior to 
imposition of twenty-year sentence for nonhomicide offense); 
Perez I, 477 Mass. at 686-687 (Miller hearing required prior to 
imposition of consecutive sentences totaling twenty-seven and 
one-half years for nonhomicide offenses). 
The defendant's argument that he was punished more severely 
for murder in the second degree than he would have been if 
convicted of murder in the first degree, however, is flawed.  
The defendant received a sentence of life with parole after 
fifteen years for murder in the second degree.  His sentence for 
murder in the second degree, standing alone, is the same as the 
sentence any juvenile would have received for murder in the 
15 
 
first or second degree after Diatchenko, 466 Mass. at 673.  See 
Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 58 (2015).  Sentencing 
juveniles convicted of murder in the second degree to the same 
penalty as juveniles convicted of murder in the first degree is 
not so disproportionate as to violate art. 26.  Id.  The 
remaining length of the defendant's sentence results from his 
commission of additional crimes.  The defendant was convicted 
not only of killing one person, but also of intending to kill 
two others.  Therefore, it is not accurate to say that his 
punishment for murder in the second degree is more severe than 
the punishment for murder in the first degree.  Rather, the 
punishment for committing multiple crimes, including one count 
of murder in the second degree, is more severe than the 
punishment for committing murder in the first degree. 
In Perez I, 477 Mass. at 683, 686, we considered 
"proportionality in [the] nonmurder context for juvenile 
defendants" and concluded that the defendant's sentence for 
nonhomicide offenses, which exceeded the sentence for a juvenile 
convicted of murder, was presumptively disproportionate under 
art. 26.  There, the defendant's aggregate sentence for 
nonmurder crimes required him to serve twenty-seven and one-half 
years before being eligible for parole.  Id. at 681.  We 
concluded that a Miller hearing was required before imposing 
such a sentence for nonhomicide crimes.  Id. at 688.  Our 
16 
 
reasoning was rooted in the notion that juvenile "defendants who 
do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken 
are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of 
punishment than are murderers."  Id. at 685, quoting Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010). 
Today we conclude that an aggregate sentence for a juvenile 
convicted of murder in the second degree and nonhomicide 
offenses that is more severe, as to parole eligibility, than the 
maximum penalty for a juvenile convicted of murder in the first 
degree is not presumptively disproportionate under art. 26.  The 
disparity between murder in the first and second degrees is not 
comparable to the disparity between homicide and nonhomicide 
offenses.  "Although [murder in the second degree] does not 
include acts of deliberate premeditation or extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, murder in the second degree is an intentional crime 
involving the killing of another person; the severity of the 
offense, even when committed by a juvenile offender, goes 
without saying."  Okoro, 471 Mass. at 58. 
The defendant relies on Commonwealth v. Costa, 472 Mass. 
139 (2015), to support his argument that his sentence 
presumptively is disproportionate.  The facts here are 
distinguishable from those in Costa.  There, we ordered a Miller 
hearing to resentence a juvenile serving two consecutive life 
terms for committing two murders in the first degree.  Id. at 
17 
 
149.  Our holding rested on the notion that when the juvenile 
was first sentenced, he was given two consecutive terms of life 
without parole, and any punishment consecutive to life without 
parole sentence is "somewhat symbolic."  Id. at 144.  After 
Diatchenko, the juvenile's second life sentence suddenly had 
practical consequences:  it would make him ineligible for parole 
for an additional fifteen years.  Id.  Because of this material 
change in circumstance, resentencing was warranted.  Here, the 
defendant was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole 
in the first instance.  The sentencing judge was aware that 
ordering a consecutive sentence would lengthen his 
incarceration.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Wiggins, 477 Mass. 732, 748 
(2017) (applying Costa because "the sentencing judge likely 
believed that the defendant would never be eligible for parole 
on his murder conviction").  Although we remand for 
consideration of the Miller factors under the first prong, we 
decline to conclude that the defendant's sentence presumptively 
is disproportionate under the second prong.  See Cepulonis, 384 
Mass. at 498. 
Conclusion.  Because § 200.08 is invalid, we order that the 
defendant receive a parole hearing immediately.  We vacate the 
denial of the defendant's rule 30 (a) motion and remand to the 
Superior Court for a hearing pursuant to Cepulonis and, if 
necessary, for resentencing. 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.