Title: GreenRoots, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13233 
 
GREENROOTS, INC.  vs.  ENERGY FACILITIES SITING BOARD & another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 7, 2022. - November 4, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Energy Facilities Siting Board.  Administrative Law, Decision, 
Record, Substantial evidence.  Public Utilities, Electric 
company.  Environment. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on March 17, 2021. 
 
The case was reported by Kafker, J. 
 
 
Joshua M. Daniels for the petitioner. 
Adam M. Ramos, Special Assistant Attorney General (Sara J. 
Stankus also present) for the respondent. 
David S. Rosenzweig (Catherine J. Keuthen & Cheryl A. 
Blaine also present) for the intervener. 
Anxhela Mile, Phelps Turner, & Heather Friedman, for 
Conservation Law Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
1 NSTAR Electric Company, doing business as Eversource 
Energy, intervener. 
2 
 
KAFKER, J.  GreenRoots, Inc. (GreenRoots), a nonprofit 
dedicated to improving the urban environment, challenges the 
approval by the Energy Facilities Siting Board (board) of a 
project change petition filed by NSTAR Electric Company, doing 
business as Eversource Energy (Eversource), that would move the 
boundaries of an electric substation 190 feet from the location 
previously approved.  GreenRoots argues that the board should 
have reopened its initial determination that the substation was 
needed.  GreenRoots also contends that the community was denied 
meaningful participation in the decision in violation of 
statutory and regulatory requirements and the Commonwealth's 
commitment to environmental justice.  Finally, GreenRoots argues 
that the substation's location puts it at risk from sea level 
rise due to climate change. 
 
We conclude that the board did not err in approving the 
project change.  We discern no error in the board's 
determination that GreenRoots did not satisfy the applicable 
legal standard for the reopening of a completed adjudicatory 
proceeding.  The board considered the new evidence GreenRoots 
submitted, and the board's determination, based in particular on 
location-specific needs, that the new evidence would not have a 
significant impact on its prior conclusion that there was a need 
for an additional substation in the load area for Chelsea and 
the East Boston neighborhood of Boston is entitled to deference.  
3 
 
The board also complied with the statutory and regulatory 
requirements regarding public participation and environmental 
justice.  Finally, the board's determination that Eversource 
reasonably addressed risks from future sea level rise, 
considering the forty-year design life of the substation 
equipment, is supported by substantial evidence.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the board's order.2 
1.  Background.  a.  Board's approval process.  Board 
approval is required before a utility can construct a new 
facility.  G. L. c. 164, § 69J.  The board reviews "the need 
for, cost of, and environmental impacts" of such facilities in 
order "to provide a reliable energy supply for the commonwealth 
with a minimum impact on the environment at the lowest possible 
cost."  G. L. c. 164, § 69H. 
 
As part of the approval procedures, anyone "substantially 
and specifically affected by the proceeding" may intervene as a 
party.  980 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.05(1) (2010).  In addition, the 
board must provide opportunities for public involvement.  G. L. 
c. 164, § 69J ("a public hearing shall be held in each locality 
in which a facility would be located").  Public comment hearings 
are held "in one or more of the affected cities or towns . . . 
as soon as practicable after the commencement of a proceeding."  
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Conservation Law Foundation. 
4 
 
980 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.04(5) (2010).  The board must also 
comply with environmental justice requirements.  In this case, 
the board was subject to the 2017 Environmental Justice Policy 
issued by the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental 
Affairs (EEA). 
b.  Procedural history.  On December 23, 2014, Eversource 
petitioned the board to build a substation at 338 East Eagle 
Street in East Boston (East Eagle Substation) and two 
transmission lines to connect the site to substations in Everett 
and Chelsea.  The project was intended to resolve reliability 
and capacity issues arising from the region's dependence on the 
Chelsea substation.3 
The board held a public comment hearing regarding the 
project at the Chelsea Senior Center on July 29, 2015.  
Subsequently, Channel Fish, a fish-processing company just east 
of the proposed site, intervened to contest the location of the 
substation.  GreenRoots did not intervene, as it was organized 
during the pendency of the proceeding.  Another environmental 
group, the Chelsea Collaborative, whose associate executive 
director would later become the executive director of 
 
3 The dependence on the Chelsea substation also created a 
risk of voltage falling below "minimum requirements" in some 
operating conditions. 
5 
 
GreenRoots, was given limited participant status,4 as were four 
East Boston residents, including several who would become 
members of GreenRoots.  As the review of the project continued, 
GreenRoots submitted written comments on the proposed decision.  
At the final hearing on November 30, 2017, the executive 
director of GreenRoots and two of its employees spoke.  The 
board issued its final decision on December 1, 2017, approving 
the project, but subject to a condition that the company "enter 
into discussions with the City of Boston" to "relocate the East 
Eagle Substation" to the other side of the parcel, away from 
Channel Fish.  The board extended the period for appeal until 
June 1, 2018, to allow Channel Fish and Eversource to negotiate 
over the location.  No one appealed. 
 
Pursuant to the condition, Eversource swapped its property 
on the east side of the parcel for the city's property on the 
west side.  The two sites were separated by 190 feet, and the 
new site is about sixty percent larger -- 27,389 square feet 
rather than 16,800 square feet.  The company filed a project 
change petition on November 15, 2018, regarding the new 
location. 
 
4 A limited participant may file a brief and file comments 
on a tentative decision, but cannot obtain judicial review of an 
order.  980 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.05(2) (2010).  See G. L. 
c. 164, § 69P (right to judicial review restricted to parties). 
6 
 
The board held a public comment hearing to receive feedback 
on the change at East Boston High School on February 5, 2019.  
On April 5, 2019, the presiding officer granted intervener 
status to GreenRoots.  In doing so, she limited the scope of the 
proceeding to "potential impacts of the proposed change" and 
other issues relating to the board's statutory mandate. 
On July 5, 2019, GreenRoots moved to "reopen or reconsider" 
the finding in the initial decision that the substation was 
needed, due to more recent regional projections showing lower 
peak electricity demand.  Later that month, the presiding 
officer denied the motion.  GreenRoots renewed its request for 
reopener in its briefing before the board and in comments on the 
board's tentative decision. 
As explained more fully infra, the board approved the 
change at a public meeting on February 22, 2021.  In the final 
decision, the board denied GreenRoots's motion to reopen. 
GreenRoots sought judicial review of the board's February 
2021 decision pursuant to G. L. c. 164, § 69P, and G. L. c. 25, 
§ 5.  A single justice allowed Eversource to intervene in the 
appeal and reserved and reported the case to the full court. 
2.  Discussion.  We will sustain the board's decision if it 
is constitutional, in accordance with the statute and applicable 
regulations, "supported by substantial evidence of record in the 
board's proceedings," and not "arbitrary, capricious or an abuse 
7 
 
of the board's discretion."  G. L. c. 164, § 69P.  In this 
inquiry, we "defer[] to the board's expertise and experience."  
Sudbury v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 487 Mass. 737, 747 
(2021), quoting Brockton Power Co. v. Energy Facilities Siting 
Bd., 469 Mass. 215, 223 (2014). 
GreenRoots makes three arguments in support of its 
contention that the board's order should be overruled.  First, 
it argues that the board abused its discretion by declining to 
reopen its 2017 determination that the project was needed.  
Second, it argues that the order is invalid because of the 
inadequacy of the board's public process, including subpar 
efforts to address environmental justice.  Third, GreenRoots 
argues that the board's determination that Eversource's plans 
adequately mitigate risk from sea level rise was unsupported by 
substantial evidence.  We address each in turn. 
a.  Declining to reopen need determination.  The board 
decided in 2017 that the substation was needed.  Recognizing 
that the determination of need was separate from the location-
change issue raised by the project change petition, the board 
considered the issues separately.  This was appropriate, as 
GreenRoots's challenge to the determination of need addressed an 
issue that had already been decided in a completed proceeding 
from which no appeal had been taken, while the project change 
8 
 
proceeding relating to substation site location presented both 
new legal issues and new evidence. 
Movants who seek to reopen a record after a final decision 
face a high bar on review.  Ordinarily, "absent compelling 
circumstances, the Department [of Public Utilities] will not 
reopen a proceeding after a final decision has been rendered."  
National Grid, D.P.U. 10-54A, at 13 (2011) (interlocutory order 
on motion to reopen record).  See Alliance to Protect Nantucket 
Sound, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Utils. (No. 2), 461 Mass. 190, 
195 (2011), quoting Covell v. Department of Social Servs., 42 
Mass. App. Ct. 427, 433 (1997), S.C., 439 Mass. 766 (2003) 
("agencies have inherent power to reopen their concluded 
proceedings in compelling situations as justice may require"). 
 
However, in this case, the board, in its discretion, 
applied a more lenient standard to GreenRoots's request to 
revisit the need determination, requiring GreenRoots only to 
show "good cause" to reopen the record.  980 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.09(1) (2010).  Expressly applicable only before the board 
issues a final decision, id., the "good cause" standard requires 
that new evidence "would be likely to have a significant impact 
on the board's decision."  Sudbury, 487 Mass. at 744. 
 
To support its request, GreenRoots offered a report from 
ISO New England, the regional transmission operator, showing 
declining peak loads in the region.  The board found that those 
9 
 
forecasts would "not likely have a significant impact" on its 
determination that the East Eagle Substation was necessary for 
reliable electricity in the area.  The board determined that 
Eversource's "more granular . . . substation-specific 
assessment" was more relevant to the question of substation need 
than the projected regional decline in peak loads.  GreenRoots 
also provided evidence that commercial development since the 
approval added less load than expected, but the board determined 
that it was not "substantially less than predicted." 
 
We discern no error here.  The evaluation of various data 
sources to determine need for energy facilities is squarely 
within the board's "expertise and experience," so we give it 
"great deference."  MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Department of 
Telecomm. & Energy, 435 Mass. 144, 150-151 (2001), quoting Stow 
Mun. Elec. Dep't v. Department of Pub. Utils., 426 Mass. 341, 
344 (1997).  In Sudbury, 487 Mass. at 745, we affirmed the 
board's decision to deny a reopener regarding the need for an 
approved transmission line based on updated forecast data, 
because the board considered the "materials . . . submitted by 
both parties" and determined that "the new data did not change 
the fact there was already a need for additional energy supply."  
In so doing, the court in Sudbury focused on the needs of the 
particular location at issue, rather than the whole region.  Id. 
at 748-749 ("existing transmission lines were insufficient to 
10 
 
provide the subarea with the necessary energy supply in the 
event of certain contingencies").  Likewise, here, the board 
considered the data and determined that they would not 
invalidate the previous finding that another substation was 
needed to serve local load, because the new data were regional 
in scope.5 
b.  Public engagement.  GreenRoots argues that deficiencies 
in the board's public engagement warrant setting aside the order 
as not founded on "substantially accurate and complete" 
information.  G. L. c. 164, § 69J.  It contends that the board 
did not comply with environmental justice principles and 
neglected to hold a hearing in East Boston in the first 
proceeding, which GreenRoots argues was mandated by the 
requirement to hold a hearing "in each locality in which a 
 
5 GreenRoots contends that it has been placed at a 
disadvantage in challenging local need because the most relevant 
forecasts were not made available to it.  The initial need 
determination was predicated on Eversource's independent 
forecast for the Chelsea substation, based on proprietary data.  
In the project change proceeding, Eversource did not provide 
GreenRoots with a forecast incorporating more recent peak load 
data.  However, GreenRoots did not file a motion to compel 
production of such updated forecasts -- nor did its requests for 
information to Eversource specifically seek Eversource's 
independent forecasts, but merely forecasts that incorporated 
newer ISO New England projections.  In these circumstances, we 
discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the board.  
Commercial Wharf E. Condominium Ass'n v. Department of Envtl. 
Protection, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 425, 433 (2018), quoting Zachs v. 
Department of Pub. Utils., 406 Mass. 217, 227 (1989) (where 
"discovery ruling is bound up with matters of agency procedure, 
'agencies have broad discretion'"). 
11 
 
facility would be located."  G. L. c. 164, § 69J.  We conclude 
that the board complied with the Commonwealth's environmental 
justice requirements and that the argument regarding the 
"locality" requirement was waived. 
i.  Environmental justice.  The change proceeding was 
governed by the 2017 Environmental Justice Policy issued by EEA.  
Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs, 
Environmental Justice Policy (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.mass 
.gov/doc/2017-environmental-justice-policy/download [https: 
//perma.cc/R3JH-SRYU] (EJ policy).  As explained in the EJ 
policy:  "Environmental justice is based on the principle that 
all people have a right to be protected from environmental 
hazards and to live in and enjoy a clean and healthful 
environment regardless of race, color, national origin, income, 
or English language proficiency."  Id. at 3.  Environmental 
justice is further defined as "the equal protection and 
meaningful involvement of all people and communities with 
respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of 
energy, climate change, and environmental laws, regulations, and 
policies and the equitable distribution of energy and 
environmental benefits and burdens."  Id.  The policy expressly 
applies to proceedings of the board.  Id. 
The EJ policy is based on a recognition that disadvantaged 
communities have historically borne disproportionate 
12 
 
environmental burdens of projects that benefit the entire 
Commonwealth.  Id. at 7.  In response to this history, the EJ 
policy establishes both general principles and more specific 
requirements that apply to projects that exceed certain 
thresholds. 
As to the specific requirements, agencies must provide 
"enhanced public participation" and "[e]nhanced analysis of 
impacts and mitigation" for a project (1) "that exceeds an 
Environmental Notification Form (ENF) threshold for air, solid 
and hazardous waste (other than remediation projects),[6] or 
wastewater and sewage sludge treatment and disposal"; and (2) 
where "[t]he project site is located within one mile of an 
[Environmental Justice (EJ)] Population (or in the case of 
projects exceeding an ENF threshold for air, within five miles 
of an EJ Population)."  Id. at 10.  An EJ Population is a 
neighborhood that meets one or more of the following criteria:  
 
6 The ENF thresholds are indicators that a project is likely 
to cause environmental damage because of its "nature, size or 
location" and thus requires further review under the 
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act.  301 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 11.03 (2021).  There is no threshold specifically applicable 
to electric substations (as there is for high-voltage 
transmission lines, generating facilities, and fuel pipelines), 
but a substation may exceed size- or location-based thresholds.  
For example, because the East Eagle Substation will be located 
within filled tidelands, it would have exceeded a threshold if 
the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) had found that 
it was not a water-dependent use.  301 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 11.03(3)(a)(5).  However, DEP found that the project was a 
water dependent use. 
13 
 
(i) the annual median household income of twenty-five percent of 
households is not more than sixty-five percent of the Statewide 
annual median; (ii) twenty-five percent or more of residents are 
racial or ethnic minorities; or (iii) twenty-five percent or 
more of households are English isolated (that is, they lack a 
member over fourteen years old with English language 
proficiency).  Id. at 3-4. 
Below the ENF thresholds, each agency is bound by "a 
general, but affirmative, requirement" to "promote environmental 
justice" in a manner consistent with its mission.  Brockton v. 
Energy Facilities Siting Bd. (No. 1), 469 Mass. 196, 204 n.17 
(2014) (quoting parallel provisions of previous EJ policy).  In 
particular, "all EEA agencies [including the board] shall 
establish an inclusive, robust public participation program for 
key agency actions that . . . affect EJ populations."  EJ 
policy, supra at 9.  As part of that robust public participation 
process, agencies must consider (but are not mandated to adopt) 
a number of strategies, including scheduling meetings at 
convenient times and places for "neighborhood stakeholders," 
translation of key documents, providing interpreters "at public 
meetings . . . upon request," outreach to "community-specific 
local media," and using "collaborative approaches to problem-
solving . . . to address public concerns."  Id. 
14 
 
In the instant case, EEA found that the neighborhood that 
includes the substation meets all three requirements for an EJ 
population.  However, it is undisputed that the project does not 
exceed an ENF threshold.  Therefore, the more general standard 
described above applies to the decision. 
We conclude that the board complied with the general 
environmental justice principles required by the policy.  The 
board offered significant opportunities for community 
participation.  It published notices in multiple languages in 
local media outlets.  In addition to the initial public comment 
hearing, the board heard public comments over four days as part 
of the hearing for final approval, at which it provided 
simultaneous translation in Spanish.  These hearings included 
evening hours to accommodate more participants.  The board also 
experimented with "collaborative approaches to problem solving":  
it required Eversource to hold focus groups regarding the 
aesthetic design of the substation and to negotiate a community 
benefits agreement with community groups.  Via the agreement, 
Eversource committed to fund improvements to a nearby park, a 
playground, and the Boys and Girls Club facility.  These results 
are consistent with the EJ policy, which calls on agencies to 
"increase access to open space and parks" and to engage in the 
15 
 
"cleanup and redevelopment of [b]rownfield sites" such as the 
East Eagle parcel.7  EJ policy, supra at 4, 7. 
GreenRoots argues that the board's translation efforts fell 
short, contending that interpretation at the evidentiary 
hearings was substandard, the Spanish translation of the 
tentative decision was delayed (leading to a shorter time period 
for Spanish speakers to submit written public comments), and 
dial-in participants on the first day of the final hearing, 
conducted over Zoom (an online video conferencing platform), 
could not access interpretation services.  Although the process 
could have been improved, it satisfied the general requirement 
set out in the order.8 
 
7 GreenRoots and amicus Conservation Law Foundation point to 
environmental justice defects in the initial proceeding as well.  
In the initial proceeding, the board determined that it was not 
bound by the EJ policy because the project did not exceed ENF 
thresholds.  This was incorrect, as the board was still bound by 
the "general" requirement.  Brockton, 469 Mass. at 204 n.17.  
However, despite this determination, the board implemented 
enhanced public participation procedures consistent with the 
policy, including notice in multiple languages and some 
translation services, although such procedures were less robust 
than those provided in the project change proceeding.  
Therefore, to the extent that these claims were not waived due 
to failure to appeal from the initial decision and are relevant 
to the denial of the request for reopener, we discern no basis 
to conclude that further enhanced public participation "would 
[have been] likely to have a significant impact" on the initial 
decision.  Sudbury, 487 Mass. at 744. 
 
8 We also note that this was the first time the board was 
asked for translation in an evidentiary hearing and the first 
time the board held a public meeting on Zoom. 
16 
 
ii.  Locality.  In the initial proceeding, the board held a 
public comment hearing in Chelsea, but not in East Boston.  
GreenRoots argues that this contravened the requirement to hold 
a public hearing "in each locality in which a facility would be 
located."  G. L. c. 164, § 69J.  In response, the board contends 
that the issue is not properly before the court because no 
appeal was taken from the initial decision, and that the 
locality requirement was satisfied by holding the hearing in 
Chelsea, which is close to East Boston. 
We conclude that the issue was waived.  See Conservation 
Comm'n of Falmouth v. Pacheco, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 737, 741 (2000) 
(failure to seek judicial review of agency order precludes 
litigation of claims).  No one appealed from the 2017 order on 
this or any other ground.9  Furthermore, the Chelsea hearing was 
located less than two miles from East Boston, and East Boston 
residents were notified of the hearing.10 
 
9 GreenRoots was not a party in the initial decision, but it 
could have petitioned to intervene to appeal.  See NSTAR 
Electric Co., EFSB 15-04, at 6 (2016) (ruling on petition to 
intervene; late-filed petitions to intervene are allowed if 
petitioner shows good cause). 
 
10 We note that the scope of the term "locality" is not 
self-evident.  See Black's Law Dictionary 1125 (11th ed. 2019) 
(defining "locality" as "[a] small area of a city, county, or 
state; vicinity; neighborhood; community").  We encourage the 
board to provide further clarification of its understanding of 
the meaning of "locality" by regulation or other guidance.  Cf. 
Citrix Sys., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 484 Mass. 87, 91 
n.9 (2020), quoting Smith v. Commissioner of Transitional 
17 
 
c.  Sea level rise.  In its order, the board "accept[ed] as 
reasonable" Eversource's decision to design the substation to be 
"resilient" to sea level rise through 2070.  The board 
determined that 2070 was a "reasonable planning horizon" because 
the equipment in the substation has a "40-year design life" and 
"because of increased uncertainty about electrical system needs 
and sea level trends further into the future."  In addition, the 
board required Eversource to periodically reevaluate "the 
necessity, appropriateness, and cost of implementing additional 
flood mitigation measures" in light of the most recent sea level 
rise projections.  Eversource was required to report its 
findings to the board every five years from the date the 
substation is put in operation. 
 
We discern no error in the board's analysis.  The board's 
adoption of a forty-year planning horizon based on the design 
life of substation equipment is reasonable, given the 
uncertainties in long-term predictions of sea level rise and 
electricity demand.  See Mederi, Inc. v. Salem, 488 Mass. 60, 67 
(2021), quoting Garrity v. Conservation Comm'n of Hingham, 462 
Mass. 779, 792 (2012) ("A decision is not arbitrary and 
capricious unless there is no ground which reasonable persons 
 
Assistance, 431 Mass. 638, 646 (2000) ("regulations are not to 
be declared void unless their provisions cannot by any 
reasonable construction be interpreted in harmony with the 
legislative mandate"). 
18 
 
might deem proper to support it" [quotation and alteration 
omitted]).  Cf. Bensenville v. Federal Aviation Admin., 457 F.3d 
52, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding agency's use of particular 
planning time frame reasonable where "predictions any further 
along would be of questionable reliability").  The five-year 
reviews that require updated analysis of flood mitigation 
measures further assure the reasonableness of the board's 
approach.  See id. ("The method that the [agency] chose, 
creating its models with the best information available when it 
began its analysis and then checking the assumptions of those 
models as new information became available, was a reasonable 
means of balancing those competing considerations . . ."). 
GreenRoots argues that the board's decision is not 
supported by substantial evidence because it should have used a 
planning horizon based on the sixty-year average age of 
Eversource's substations that are currently in use, rather than 
the forty-year design life of substation equipment.  We will not 
substitute our judgment for the board's on whether it is more 
appropriate to use average age of substations or the design life 
of equipment for long-term planning purposes.  This is the type 
of decision on which the board is entitled to deference due to 
its experience and expertise.  Alliance to Protect Nantucket 
Sound, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Utils. (No. 1), 461 Mass. 166, 
178 (2011) (Alliance I), quoting Cambridge v. Department of 
19 
 
Telecomm. & Energy, 449 Mass. 868, 875 (2007) (explaining that 
court defers to agency's "expertise in areas where the 
Legislature has delegated its decision making authority"). 
The board's forty-year planning horizon combined with 
ongoing reporting requirements is a reasonable approach to 
handling the uncertainty of climate change.  An agency's 
selection of an appropriate planning horizon hinges on technical 
determinations, which are entitled to deference.  Alliance I, 
461 Mass. at 178.  Thus, courts will not disturb agencies' 
reasonable decisions that are adequately explained based on the 
project proposed and the planning data available.  For example, 
courts have approved agencies' planning horizons where 
"predictions any further along would be of questionable 
reliability."  Bensenville, 457 F.3d at 71.  See National 
Audubon Soc'y v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 991 F.3d 
577, 585 (4th Cir. 2021).  This is not a case where the time 
frame selected by the agency fails to reasonably consider the 
project proposed and reliable projections.  See Northern Plains 
Resource Council, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067, 
1077-1079 (9th Cir. 2011) (five-year time frame was unreasonable 
where project would clearly not be completed within that time 
frame and agency had firm projections for next twenty years). 
Other courts have approved similar schemes with regard to 
sea level rise.  For example, in reviewing an agency's approval 
20 
 
of certain fisheries for a ten-year term, the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that the 
agency was required to consider "potential short-term impacts 
caused by sea-level rise" within the ten-year term, but approved 
the agency's determination that the long-term effects were "too 
indeterminate to yield clearly articulable conclusions," and 
required the agency to reevaluate its determinations by the end 
of the ten-year term.  Oceana, Inc. v. Pritzker, 125 F. Supp. 3d 
232, 250-252 (D.D.C. 2015).  See Markell, Emerging Legal and 
Institutional Responses to Sea-Level Rise in Florida and Beyond, 
42 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 25-26 (2016) (describing new Florida 
rules that require local governments to use at least ten-year 
planning horizon to evaluate impacts from sea level rise, but 
suggesting that longer time frame may be appropriate). 
 
In sum, the board's planning decisions are reasonable and 
supported by substantial evidence.  The board has carefully 
considered and balanced cost, reliability, and environmental 
concerns as required by the statute.  Cf. Sudbury, 487 Mass. at 
747. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons explained above, we affirm 
the decision of the board. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.