Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Proctor

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Proctor, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-684.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-684 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. PROCTOR. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Proctor, Slip Opinion No.  
2012-Ohio-684.] 
Attorney misconduct, including knowingly or recklessly making false statements 
concerning the integrity of a judicial officer—Six-month suspension. 
(No. 2011-0295—Submitted September 6, 2011—Decided February 23, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-059. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Philip Lucas Proctor of Newark, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0041956, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1989. 
{¶ 2} In a complaint filed on August 17, 2009, relator, disciplinary 
counsel, alleged that Proctor had violated multiple provisions of the Ohio Rules of 
Professional Conduct and the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar 
in Ohio by making allegations of impropriety against his opposing counsel and 
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the trial judge either while knowing the allegations to be false or with reckless 
disregard of their truth or falsity. 
{¶ 3} The parties submitted stipulated exhibits and findings of fact in 
which Proctor admitted that he had engaged in undignified or discourteous 
conduct that was degrading to a tribunal, had made statements concerning the 
qualifications or integrity of a judicial officer either while knowing them to be 
false or with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity, and had failed to maintain 
a respectful attitude toward the courts.  Relator withdrew three alleged rule 
violations, and the parties agreed that a six-month stayed suspension was the 
appropriate sanction for Proctor’s misconduct. 
{¶ 4} The panel and board adopted many of the parties’ stipulated findings 
of fact and all of the stipulated findings of misconduct.  Although they adopted 
the stipulated mitigating factors, they also found that several aggravating factors 
were present.  Citing those aggravating factors and Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 N.E.2d 425, the panel and 
board recommend that Proctor serve an actual six-month suspension from the 
practice of law in Ohio. 
{¶ 5} Proctor objects to the board’s findings of fact and recommended 
sanction, arguing that the two motions to dismiss that he filed should have been 
considered by the entire board and granted, and that Gardner does not mandate 
the imposition of an actual suspension under the facts of this case.  We overrule 
Proctor’s objections and adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct and its 
recommended sanction. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 6} In 2002, Proctor filed a lawsuit on behalf of Julie Peterman in the 
Delaware County Court of Common Pleas.  Proctor withdrew as counsel in 2003, 
and the following month, Peterman dismissed the action without prejudice.  
Thereafter, counsel for the defendants in that action moved the court for attorney 
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fees.  Judge W. Duncan Whitney granted the motion in 2005 and ordered Proctor 
and Peterman, jointly and severally, to pay the defendants $31,995.90.  Proctor 
paid approximately $26,000 of that judgment. 
{¶ 7} Proctor moved the court to vacate the judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 
60(B), and the trial judge recused himself and transferred the case to Judge 
Everett Krueger, who overruled the motion.  Proctor’s request for findings of fact 
and conclusions of law was denied.  In a supplemental request regarding his 
motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law filed on October 18, 2007, 
Proctor alleged that Judge Whitney harbored a bias against him and had engaged 
in ex parte communications with opposing counsel in the case and then had “gone 
to great effort to cover this up and/or deny that these things happened.”  Proctor 
reiterated these accusations in his appellate brief when he challenged the denial of 
his motion to vacate and for relief from judgment.  At the time Proctor made these 
allegations, he did not have a reasonable belief that they were true, and therefore, 
in this case, he has stipulated that the allegations were recklessly made. 
{¶ 8} Based upon these findings, the panel and board found that Proctor 
had violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(6) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 
undignified or discourteous conduct that is degrading to a tribunal) and 8.2(a) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly or recklessly making false statements 
concerning the integrity of a judicial officer) and Gov.Bar R. IV(2) (requiring a 
lawyer to maintain a respectful attitude toward the courts). 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 9} In recommending a sanction, the panel and board considered the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Section 10 of the Rules and 
Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  See Stark 
Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 
818, ¶ 16. 
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{¶ 10} The parties have stipulated to the following mitigating factors:  
Proctor does not have a prior disciplinary record, he fully and freely disclosed 
information and cooperated with the disciplinary proceedings, and he paid 
$26,000 pursuant to the judgment for attorney fees in the underlying litigation.  
See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (d), and (f).  They also stipulated that the 
appropriate sanction for Proctor’s misconduct is a six-month stayed suspension. 
{¶ 11} The board adopted the parties’ stipulations regarding mitigation, 
but pointed out that Proctor’s $26,000 sanction was the impetus for, rather than 
the result of, the conduct charged in this case.  It also found that Proctor’s pattern 
of misconduct involving multiple offenses and his continued claims that he had a 
reasonable belief to support the allegations he had made against Judge Whitney, 
despite his stipulations to the contrary, were aggravating factors.  See BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c), (d), and (g).  Citing these aggravating factors, and the six-
month actual suspension we imposed for comparable misconduct in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 N.E.2d 425, the 
board concluded that a six-month actual suspension was the appropriate sanction 
for Proctor’s misconduct. 
Proctor’s Objections 
{¶ 12} Proctor objects to the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, as 
well as its recommended sanction.  In his first objection, he argues that the full 
board should have considered his two motions to dismiss relator’s complaint after 
they were overruled by the panel chair.  In his first motion to dismiss, Proctor 
argued that he should not be punished for the allegations he made against Judge 
Whitney, because Prof.Cond.R. 8.3 and 3.3 required him to report potential 
judicial misconduct to an appropriate authority.  He renews this argument in his 
second objection and urges us to adopt the judgmental-immunity doctrine to 
protect him from the consequences of what he claims was required reporting of 
judicial misconduct.  And in his second motion to dismiss, Proctor argued that 
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because he had consulted with an assistant disciplinary counsel prior to making 
the allegations against Judge Whitney, relator’s continued prosecution of the 
complaint violated his right to due process.  Proctor renews this argument in his 
third objection. 
{¶ 13} At his disciplinary hearing and again at oral argument, Proctor 
denied having any intent to disavow the stipulations he entered in this case.  
Indeed, during oral argument, Proctor’s counsel admitted that the single issue 
before this court is the board’s rejection of the stipulated sanction of a six-month 
stayed suspension in favor of a six-month actual suspension.  Therefore, we 
decline to address Proctor’s first three objections to the board’s report, which 
would require this court to disregard Proctor’s stipulations of fact and misconduct 
and consider whether he had a reasonable belief that the statements in his 
supplemental request regarding his motion for findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and in his appellate brief were true.  Furthermore, we adopt the board’s 
findings of fact and misconduct, which are based upon the parties’ stipulations 
and are amply supported by the record. 
{¶ 14} In his fourth objection, Proctor argues that his conduct is less 
egregious than that of Gardner and that this court should therefore reject the 
board’s recommendation of an actual suspension from the practice of law in favor 
of the parties’ stipulated sanction of a six-month stayed suspension. 
{¶ 15} In Gardner, we recognized that ethical rules prohibiting false 
statements impugning the integrity of judges are necessary “ ‘to preserve public 
confidence in the fairness and impartiality of our system of justice.’ ”  Gardner, 
99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 N.E.2d 425, ¶ 29, quoting Standing 
Commt. on Discipline of the United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of 
California v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1437 (9th Cir.1995).  To further that 
compelling interest, we adopted an objective standard to determine whether a 
lawyer’s statement about a judicial officer was made with knowledge of or in 
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reckless disregard of its falsity, and therefore held that “an attorney may be 
sanctioned for making accusations of judicial impropriety that a reasonable 
attorney would believe are false.” Gardner at ¶ 31. 
{¶ 16} Gardner’s misconduct consisted of a diatribe in a motion for 
reconsideration filed with the appellate court that had affirmed his client’s 
criminal conviction.  Gardner at ¶ 3.  In that document, Gardner made reckless 
and unfounded accusations that the court was biased and corrupt.  Id. at ¶ 33-34.  
Gardner had no record of prior discipline, apologized for the manner in which he 
had expressed his frustration with the appellate court’s ruling, and acknowledged 
that his motion was neither appropriate nor professional.  Id. at ¶ 11. 
{¶ 17} The parties recommended that Gardner be publicly reprimanded for 
his misconduct, and the panel adopted that recommendation.  Id. at ¶ 12.  The 
board, however, citing Gardner’s “ ‘outrageous behavior toward a tribunal,’ ” 
recommended a six-month stayed suspension.  Id.  But, stating that “[u]nfounded 
attacks against the integrity of the judiciary require an actual suspension from the 
practice of law,” we imposed a six-month actual suspension from the practice of 
law.  Id. at ¶ 36. 
{¶ 18} We have similarly held that attorneys who engage in a course of 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, will be actually 
suspended from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 191, 658 N.E.2d 237 
(1995).  But we have treated our pronouncement in Fowerbaugh as a presumptive 
sanction and have not hesitated to impose lesser sanctions in the presence of 
significant mitigating evidence.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Carroll, 106 
Ohio St.3d 84, 2005-Ohio-3805, 831 N.E.2d 1000, ¶ 13; Dayton Bar Assn. v. 
Kinney, 89 Ohio St.3d 77, 728 N.E.2d 1052 ( 2000).  And despite our 
proclamation that “[u]nfounded attacks against the integrity of the judiciary 
require an actual suspension from the practice of law,” Gardner at ¶ 36, we have 
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previously imposed lesser sanctions for attorneys who have knowingly or 
recklessly impugned the integrity of the judiciary when sufficient mitigating 
factors are present.  See, e.g., Akron Bar Assn. v. DiCato, 130 Ohio t.3d 394, 
2011-Ohio-5796, 958 N.E.2d 938 (six-month stayed suspension imposed on an 
attorney who made a false statement impugning the integrity of a judge during a 
telephone conversation with the judge’s bailiff, when mitigating factors included 
the absence of a prior disciplinary record and cooperation with the disciplinary 
investigation, as well as the attorney’s apology and guilty plea to related contempt 
charges). 
{¶ 19} In this case, however, the board found that the two aggravating 
factors—Proctor’s making recklessly false statements impugning the integrity of a 
judicial officer in at least two court filings and his refusal to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of his conduct, as demonstrated by his repeated efforts to 
undermine his own stipulations with claims that he had reason to believe that the 
allegations were true—outweighed the mitigating factors.  We agree and find that 
Proctor’s conduct is comparable to that of Gardner and more serious than that of 
DiCato.  Therefore, we adopt the board’s recommended sanction of a six-month 
suspension from the practice of law. 
{¶ 20} Accordingly, Philip Lucas Proctor is suspended from the practice 
of law in Ohio for six months.  Costs are taxed to Proctor. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents and would impose a 12-month stayed 
suspension. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Stacy Solochek 
Beckman, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
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James S. Adray, for respondent. 
______________________