Title: Powell v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
AKUA POWELL,   
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 352, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0803026578 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: October 2, 2009 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: October 20, 2009 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 20th day of October 2009, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
brief pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to 
withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Akua Powell, was found guilty by a 
Superior Court jury of 11 counts of Robbery in the First Degree, 11 counts 
of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, 2 counts of 
Offensive Touching, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, and Wearing a 
Disguise During the Commission of a Felony.  He was sentenced to a total 
of 66 years of Level V incarceration, to be followed by probation.  This is 
Powell’s direct appeal from his convictions and sentences.   
 
2 
 
(2) 
Powell’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims 
that arguably could support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its 
own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without 
an adversary presentation.1 
 
(3) 
Powell’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and 
complete examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  
By letter, Powell’s counsel informed Powell of the provisions of Rule 26(c) 
and provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying 
brief and the complete trial transcript.  Powell also was informed of his right 
to supplement his attorney’s presentation.  Powell responded with a brief 
that raises four issues for this Court’s consideration.  The State has 
responded to the position taken by Powell’s counsel as well as the issues 
raised by Powell and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
3 
 
(4) 
Powell raises four issues for this Court’s consideration that may 
fairly be summarized as follows.  He claims that a) the prosecutor engaged 
in misconduct that prejudiced his case by intentionally tampering with the 
physical evidence at trial; b) the Superior Court abused its discretion by 
permitting the prosecutor to tamper with the evidence, by admitting 
irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, and by admitting certain records into 
evidence that the State had failed to produce in discovery; and c) his separate 
robbery and weapon convictions constitute a double jeopardy violation. 
 
(5) 
The evidence at trial established that, in the early morning of 
Friday, February 22, 2008, twelve individuals who had gathered for their 
regularly scheduled poker game at Wild Quail Country Club in Dover, 
Delaware, were robbed by three armed men wearing ski masks and gloves.  
All of the victims testified that, as they were sitting at the poker table, the 
gunmen suddenly entered the room yelling threats and ordered them to lie on 
the floor.  Two of the victims were hit in the head with a pistol.  The gunmen 
ordered the victims to put pillow cases over their heads.  One of the victims 
had a ski mask, rather than a pillow case, placed over his head. 
 
(6) 
The gunmen put the money lying on the poker table into 
another pillow case and told the victims to empty out their pockets.  The 
gunmen then tied up the victims’ hands.  The gunmen verbally threatened 
 
4 
and held their weapons to the heads of several of the victims, who testified 
that they feared for their lives.  At least two victims testified that they heard 
one of the other cardplayers, Hyunjin Kim, a Delaware state trooper, tell the 
gunmen to calm down.  
 
(7) 
After the gunmen had fled, some of the victims managed to free 
themselves and then freed the others.  As they started to telephone the police 
for help, Kim explained that, as a police officer, he would be in trouble if his 
superiors learned that he had bet money in a poker game.  He left before the 
police got there.   
 
(8) 
When the police arrived, they took everyone’s statements.  No 
one mentioned that Kim had been present at the card game.  The police also 
collected the pillowcases, the ski mask and other evidence.  Because the 
pillowcases were a distinctive red color and made of a distinctive fabric, the 
police were able to pinpoint the store where they had been purchased---a 
Wal-Mart in Camden, Delaware.  When the police reviewed the store 
videotapes from several days prior to the robbery, they were able to identify 
Kim’s vehicle in the parking lot and Kim himself.   
 
(9) 
Armed with that evidence, the police were able to secure a 
search warrant of Kim’s car and residence.  During their search, they 
discovered a Wal-Mart receipt, a black ski mask, and the remains of several 
 
5 
sets of car keys, cell phones and wallets, among other things.  Kim was 
arrested.  After accepting the State’s plea offer, Kim admitted to being the 
mastermind of the robbery and explained in detail how he had concocted his 
plan.  Two co-conspirators, Tim Longstreth and Manny Gonzalez, also 
accepted plea offers and supplied the State with additional information about 
how Kim’s plan had been carried out.              
 
(10) At trial, Kim testified about how he had planned the robbery.  
He first solicited an old friend from Philadelphia named Jeffrey Powell to 
help him, who, in turn, introduced Kim to his two younger brothers, Addae 
and Akua Powell.  Kim also solicited Tim Longstreth, his friend from New 
Jersey, to assist in carrying out the robbery.  Longstreth, in turn, asked his 
friend, Manny Gonzalez, to join in the plot.  Kim assured the participants 
that the poker players would be easy to rob and that they would be reluctant 
to report the crime to the police because of their involvement in illegal 
gambling.        
 
(11) During cross-examination, Delaware State Police Sergeant 
Michael Wheeler, an evidence technician, testified about the black ski mask 
that had been seized when the police executed the search warrant at Kim’s 
residence.  Sergeant Wheeler acknowledged that he had seen a hair fiber on 
the mask after it was brought in.  He stated that he believed the hair was 
 
6 
about three quarters of an inch long and was shaped like a “U.”  Sergeant 
Wheeler also stated that he saw a hair on the ski mask that had been 
collected by the police at the crime scene.  No DNA analysis had been 
performed on either of the hair fibers.  Following Sergeant Wheeler’s 
testimony, one of the prosecutors handled the ski mask that had been 
collected at Kim’s residence.  It was later discovered that, as a result of the 
prosecutor’s handling of the ski mask, the hair fiber was lost.  The 
prosecutor acknowledged his error.  The next day, the judge read into the 
record a stipulation between the State and the defense that the lost hair was 
inconsistent with Powell’s hair type.          
 
 
(12) Powell’s first claim is that the prosecutor engaged in 
misconduct that prejudiced his case by intentionally tampering with the ski 
mask, which caused the hair to be lost.  According to Powell, a DNA 
analysis of the hair would have “exonerated” him.  Delaware law requires 
the State to preserve evidence that is material to a defendant’s guilt or 
innocence.2  The remedy for the State’s failure to preserve potentially 
exculpatory evidence is a missing evidence instruction.3  The lost hair fiber 
at issue here would not have served to completely exonerate Powell, even if 
                                                 
2 Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956, 959-60 (Del. 1992); Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d 744, 751-
52 (Del. 1983). 
3 Lunnon v. State, 710 A.2d 197, 199-200 (Del. 1998). 
 
7 
DNA testing had eliminated Powell as the source of the hair. Nevertheless, 
the prosecutor agreed to enter into a stipulation, which was read into the 
record by the judge and referred to in the jury instructions, that provided 
Powell with the maximum evidentiary benefit he could have derived from 
the lost evidence.  In the absence of any indication that the prosecutor 
intentionally tampered with the evidence and in the absence of any 
indication of prejudice to Powell, we conclude that Powell’s first claim is 
without merit.      
 
(13) Powell’s second claim is that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion in three respects---first, by permitting the prosecutor to tamper 
with the ski mask; second, by admitting certain clothing into evidence that 
was irrelevant and prejudicial; and, third, by admitting cell phone records 
into evidence that the State had failed to produce in discovery.  As to 
Powell’s first allegation, there is no evidence in the record that the Superior 
Court sanctioned any tampering with the evidence introduced at trial.   
 
(14) Powell’s second allegation of abuse of discretion involves the 
admission into evidence of three black knit caps and a pair of black pants 
found during the search of the Powells’ Philadelphia residence.  Because 
Longstreth testified that the Powells were wearing black pants on the night 
of the robbery, Gonzalez testified that Longstreth was wearing a black 
 
8 
winter hat on the night of the robbery, and Kim testified that the Powells 
were wearing dark clothing on the night of the robbery, there is no question 
that the evidence was relevant.4  Moreover, we conclude that the Superior 
Court acted within its discretion in admitting it.5     
 
(15) Powell’s third allegation of an abuse of discretion is that the 
Superior Court improperly permitted evidence of a cell phone call to Kim by 
Addae Powell approximately four hours prior to the robbery to be admitted 
into evidence in spite of the fact that the State did not provide Addae 
Powell’s cell phone records or Kim’s caller ID information to the defense 
until the first day of trial.  Even when the State commits a discovery 
violation, the Superior Court has discretion, in determining what sanction to 
impose, to permit the disputed evidence to be admitted.6  The phone records 
at issue here established only a connection between Kim and Addae Powell, 
not the defendant.  As such, the admission of the records resulted in limited, 
if any, prejudice to the defendant.  We, therefore, conclude that the Superior 
Court acted within its discretion in admitting the evidence.7  Based upon all 
of the above, we conclude that Powell’s various claims of abuse of 
discretion on the part of the Superior Court are without merit.               
                                                 
4 Del. R. Evid. 402. 
5 Del. R. Evid. 403.  
6 Snowden v. State, 677 A.2d 33, 39 (Del. 1996). 
7 Id. 
 
9 
 
(16) Powell’s third, and final, claim is that his separate robbery and 
weapon convictions constitute a double jeopardy violation.  Specifically, 
Powell argues that his 11 convictions of Possession of a Firearm During the 
Commission of a Felony must merge into his 11 convictions of Robbery in 
the First Degree.  Under Delaware law, a defendant may be separately 
charged, convicted and sentenced for both Robbery in the First Degree and 
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.8  This Court 
has concluded that there is a clear legislative intent to separately punish the 
two offenses and, for that reason, they are not subject to merger.9  We, 
therefore, conclude that Powell’s third claim also is without merit.   
 
(17) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Powell’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issues.  We also are satisfied that Powell’s counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly determined that 
Powell could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Washington v. State, 836 A.2d 485, 490-91 (Del. 2003); Lecompte v. State, 516 A.2d 
898, 902-04 (Del. 1986). 
9 Graham v. State, Del. Supr., No. 240, 2003, Steele, J. (Mar. 19, 2004). 
 
10 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice