Title: City of North Las Vegas v. Warburton

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

127 Nev, Advance Opinion GZ
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Appellant, FILED

MALLORY WARBURTON,
ou PARE ae

CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS, | No, 55502

Appeal from a district court order granting a petition for
judicial review in a workers’ compensation action. Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County; Linda Marie Bell, Judge.

Affirmed,

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, and Daniel L. Schwartz and Marla

R. Frederick, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Law Office of James R. Cox and James R, Cox, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.

BEFORE SAITTA, C.J., HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

In this appeal, we must determine, for the purpose of
awarding workers’ compensation benefits, the proper calculation of the
average monthly wage of an injured employee who claims to have changed
jobs as of the day of the employee’s industrial accident. NAC 616C.444

bases the calculation of the average monthly wage for such an employee on

 

 
os

 

 

payroll information regarding the employee's primary job at the time of
the accident. Although the administrative appeals officer in this case
failed to make any specific findings regarding respondent Mallory
Warburton’s primary job at the time of her accident, we conclude that
substantial evidence supports the district court's determination that
Warburton’s primary job at the time of the accident was that of pool
manager, Thus, the appeals officer's conclusion that Warburton’s average
monthly wage had to be calculated based on the rate of pay of a water
safety instructor is not supported by substantial evidence, and we affirm
the district court's order granting judicial review and reversing the
appeals officer's decision,
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Warburton started working for appellant City of North Las
‘Vegas (the City) in 2005 as a lifeguard and eventually became a water
safety instructor. In 2006, she was promoted to manager of one of the
City’s pools. Although she expected to make $12 an hour because of the
promotion, she was only paid $10 an hour while her promotion was being
processed. Despite this fact, Warburton’s timecard reflected that she was
a pool manager; she oversaw the staffing, cleanliness, and safety of the
pool she was supervising; and she had keys to open and close the pool.
Additionally, other City employees testified that Warburton was their
manager.

During Warburton’s employment with the City, the pools in
North Las Vegas sustained damage from break-ins and vandalism. In an

"The City admits in its opening brief that Warburton was in the
process of being promoted to pool manager.

 
 

attempt to reduce the problem, Warburton’s supervisor asked her and
other City employees to check on the pools when they were nearby. After
picking up her paycheck and additional work uniforms at another City
pool, Warburton was driving in the direction of her pool when another
driver crossed into her lane of traffic going the wrong direction and struck
Warburton head-on. Warburton suffered numerous injuries, one of which
resulted in the amputation of her foot at the ankle. She then filed a
workers’ compensation claim,

After it was determined that Warburton's injuries arose out of

and in the course of her employment with the City,? the City started

 

“The City separately appealed the district court's denial of its
petition for judicial review of an administrative appeals officer's finding
that, because Warburton's injuries arose out of and in the course of her
employment with the City, Warburton was entitled to workors’
‘compensation benefits. After concluding that the appeals officer's
determination was supported by substantial evidence, this court affirmed
the district court's denial of the City’s petition. See City of North Las
‘Vegas v. Warburton, Docket No. 55883 (Order of Affirmance, Sept. 29,
2011).

One of the City’s arguments on appeal in this case is that the
district court erred by allowing Warburton to rely on the litigation
regarding whether her injuries arose out of and in the course of her
‘employment to prove that she was a pool manager. Warburton, however,
argues that issue preclusion should apply, and, thus, she should be
considered a pool manager for purposes of this appeal. We conclude that
Warburton’s argument is without merit because whether she was a pool
manager was not an issue that was “actually and necessarily litigated.”
See In_re Sandoval, 126 Nev. __, __, 232 P.3d 422, 423-24 (2010)
(quoting Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1055, 194 P.3d
709, 713 (2008). Therefore, issue preclusion is not applicable. However,
we note that the transcripts from the administrative hearing on whether
Warburton's injuries arose out of and in the course her employment make
continued on next page ..

 

 
paying workers’ compensation benefits to Warburton. ‘To determine the
benefits that Warburton was entitled to, the City used the rate of $10 an
hour to calculate her average monthly wage, which was the rate of pay she
was receiving at the time of the accident as a water safety instructor. The
amount of her benefits did not reflect her recent promotion to pool
manager, Warburton administratively appealed the City’s determination

of her benefits, and the hearing officer instructed the City to redetermine

 

her benefits using the $12-an-hour rate of pay for a pool manager. ‘The
City appealed, and the appeals officer reversed the hearing officer, finding
that Warburton’s benefits should be based on the $10-an-hour rate of pay
she was actually receiving at the time of the accident, Warburton
petitioned the district court for judicial review. ‘The district court granted
the petition and reversed the appeals officer's decision. ‘The district court
concluded that, as the hearing officer had found, Warburton had been
promoted to pool manager at the time of the accident, and her benefits
should be determined using the higher rate of pay of $12 an hour. The
City appeals the district court's order.
DISCUSSION

‘The dispute in this case concerns the method of calculating the
average monthly wage for the purpose of determining workers’
compensation benefits for an employee who has been promoted but is

injured before receiving the wage increase associated with the promotion.

= continued

up a majority of the record for this appeal, and, therefore, the factual
findings for this case are largely based on those transcripts.

 

 
‘The City contends that the applicable provisions of the Nevada
Administrative Code require the determination of Warburton's workers’
compensation benefits to be based on the rate of pay she was actually
earning as a water safety instructor at the time of the accident ($10 an
hour). Warburton maintains that her benefits should be determined using
the rate of pay for her primary job at the time of the accident, that of a
pool manager ($12 an hour), even though she had not yet received the

wage increase associated with her promotion. Resolving this dispute

requires us to interpret various provisions of the Nevada Administrative
Code.

The standard for reviewing petitions for judicial review of

 

it is for the district
court. City of Reno v. Bldg. & Constr, Trades, 127 Nev. _, _, 251 P.3d
718, 721 (2011). Like the district court, we review an administrative
appeals officer
interpretation, de novo. Star Ins. Co, v, Neighbors, 122 Nev. 773, 776, 188
P.8d_ 507, 509-10 (2006). We review an administrative agency's factual
findings “for clear error or an arbitrary abuse of discretion” and will only

determination of questions of law, including statutory

 

overturn those findings if they are not supported by substantial evidence.
Day v, Washoe County Sch, Dist, 121 Nev. 387, 389, 116 P.3d 68, 69
(2005) (quoting Construction Indus. v. Chalue, 119 Nev. 348, 352, 74 P.3d
595, 597 (2003)). Ifthe agency fails to make a necessary finding of fact, we
“may imply the necessary factual finding[],” so long as the agency's
“conclusion itself’ provides a proper basis for the implied finding. See
State, Dep't of Commerce v, Soeller, 98 Nev. 579, 586, 656 P.2d 224, 228

 

(1982). We do not give any deference to the district court decision when

 

 
   

reviewing an order regarding a petition for judicial review. City of Reno,
127 Nev. at __, 251 P.3d at 721

“When the text of a statute is plain and unambiguous, (we]
should ... not go beyond that meaning.” Star Ins, Co,, 122 Nev. at 776,

138 P.3d at 510. When interpreting multiple provisions, we must read the

 

provisions in harmony, unless it is clear the Legislature intended
otherwise. City Council of Reno v, Reno Newspapers, 105 Nev. 886, 892,
784 P.2d 974, 978 (1989). These rules of statutory construction also apply
to administrative regulations. Silver State Elec. v. State, Dep't of Tax.,
123 Nev. 80, 85, 157 P.3d 710, 713 (2007).

Ordinarily, an injured employee's average monthly wage, used
to determine the amount of the employee's workers’ compensation
benefits, is calculated by averaging a 12-week history of past earnings.
NAC 616C.435(1); NRS 616C.420. But, if a 12-week history is not
available, the employe

 

average monthly wage can be calculated by using
a 4-week history. NAC 616C.435(4). If a 4-week history is not available,
then “average earnings must be projected using the rate of pay on the date
of the accident and the projected working schedule.” NAC 616C.435(6).
However, pursuant to NAC 616C.435(7)(a), if the previously discussed

methods of determining a period of earnings
cannot be applied reasonably and fairly, an
average monthly wage must be calculated by
[using] ... [t]he sum which reasonably represents
the average monthly wage of the injured employee
as defined in NAC 616C.420 to 616C.447,
inclusive, at the time his injury . . . occurs.

Here, Warburton had been promoted to pool manager and was
performing the duties required by that job when her injury occurred,
However, the City had not yet increased her pay to reflect the promotion,
and a dispute exists as to Warburton's primary job as of the date of the

 
accident. The appeals officer made no finding as to Warburton's primary
job and based her determination of benefits on the average monthly wage
calculated from the 12-week history as set forth in NAC 616C.435(1). We
conclude that this calculation does not “reasonably and fairly” determine
the amount of Warburton’s workers’ compensation benefits.

NAC 616C.441(1) provides that “[tJhe earnings of [the] injured
employee on the date on which [the] accident occurs will be used to
calculate the average monthly wage.” However, NAC 616C.444, which
provides for the calculation of the average monthly wage for an injured
‘employee who has changed jobs as of the time of the accident, states, in
pertinent part:

‘The average monthly wage of an employee who
permanently or temporarily changes to a job with
different duties, rate of pay, or hours of
employment, must be calculated using only
information concerning payroll which relates to
his primary job at the time of the accident.

(Emphasis added.) Because NAC 616C.444 governs the more specific
method for calculating workers’ compensation benefits when an employee
has changed jobs, we conclude that NAC 616C.444 is the controlling
regulation here. See State, Tax Comm'n v. American Home Shield, 127
Nev. _, __, 264 P.3d 601, 605 (2011) (“A specific statute controls over a
general statute.”).

Reading NAC 616C.444 in harmony with NAC 6160.435(7),
we conclude that these administrative code provisions are plain and
unambiguous, When an employee changed jobs at or before the time the

‘employee ws

 

injured such that no 12-week or 4-week history of past
finding of
“primary job at the time of the accident” in order to

‘earnings is available for the new job, NAC 616C.444 requir

 

the employe

 

 

 
calculate the employee's average monthly wage. (Emphasis added.) In
this case, the appeals officer found that Warburton knew that she was
going to be promoted to pool manager and earn $12 an hour, but concluded
that Warburton’s wage had to be based on what she was earning at the
time of the accident. The appeals officer did not make a specific finding
regarding Warburton’s primary job at the time of the accident and,
therefore, failed to correctly apply NAC 616C.444.

On Warburton’s petition for judicial review, the district court,
however, concluded that there was ample evidence in the record
demonstrating that Warburton’s primary job was that of pool manager
because she was performing all the duties of a pool manager, had been
given keys to the pool, and other employees viewed her as their manager.
officer failed to make the “necessary factual finding! |"
with respect to Warburton's primary job at the time of the accident, the

While the appeal

   

appeals officer did find that Warburton viewed herself as a pool manager
and knew that she was going to make $12 an hour, but at the time of the
accident, Warburton was only making $10 an hour. See Soeller, 98 Nev.
at 586, 656 P.2d at 228, We may imply from these findings that the
appeals officer would have found that Warburton’ primary job at the time
of the accident was that of a pool manager. See id. Thus, because we
determine that the appeals officer would have concluded that Warburton's
primary job at the time of the accident was that of a pool manager, we
affirm the district court's order granting Warburton's petition for judicial
review, reversing the appeals officer and affirming the hearing officer's

 

or
decision that Warburton's workers’ compensation benefits must be

determined using an average monthly wage calculation at the $12-an-hour

 

rate of pay.
thestoce
Hardesty
We concur:
Ci ae
Saitta

Parraguirre