Title: PEOPLE OF MI V PAUL E MCDANIEL

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED NOVEMBER 4, 2003 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 122922 
PAUL E. McDANIEL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
PER CURIAM 
This case requires us to determine whether a police 
laboratory report is admissible, notwithstanding that it is 
hearsay, to prove the identity of a seized substance. 
The 
Court of Appeals held that the report was admissible under 
the public records exception to the hearsay rule, MRE 
803(8), and affirmed defendant’s conviction on one count of 
delivery 
of 
less 
than 
fifty 
grams 
of 
heroin, 
MCL 
333.7401(2)(a)(iv).1  We reverse the judgment of the Court 
1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued December 3,
2002 (Docket No. 234028). 
 
 
 
of Appeals, vacate defendant’s conviction, and remand the 
case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
I 
Defendant was charged with selling a packet of heroin 
to an undercover police officer. 
The contents of the 
packet were analyzed by a chemist who was a police officer 
and who prepared a report indicating that the packet 
contained heroin. 
However, at trial, the chemist who 
performed the analysis did not testify because he had 
retired. 
In his place, the prosecution presented Steven 
Gyure, a police department chemist who had worked in the 
department's laboratory for thirty-one years. 
He had no 
personal knowledge of what occurred during the test of the 
contents of the packet. 
Gyure’s testimony, over defense 
counsel’s objection, was that there had never been a 
misidentification of a substance during his years working 
for the department. 
The court found the foundation 
sufficient and admitted the report into evidence under MRE 
803(8). 
A jury convicted defendant as charged. His only issue 
on appeal was that, in the absence of the testimony of the 
chemist who conducted the analysis, the report constituted 
hearsay 
and 
was 
inadmissible 
under 
MRE 
802. 
The 
2  
 
                                                 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
prosecution argued that the evidence was admissible under 
MRE 803(6) and (8), the business records and public records 
exceptions to the hearsay rule.2  In a divided decision, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis that the report was 
2 Those exceptions read as follows: 
The following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness: 
* * * 
(6) Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. A
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in
any form, of acts, transactions, occurrences, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near 
the time by, or from information transmitted by, a
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was
the regular practice of that business activity to make
the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation,
all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or
other qualified witness, or by certification that 
complies with a rule promulgated by the supreme court
or a statute permitting certification, unless the 
source of information or the method or circumstances 
of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
The 
term “business” as used in this paragraph includes
business, 
institution, 
association, 
profession,
occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not
conducted for profit. 
* * * 
(8) Public Records and Reports. Records, reports,
statements, or data compilations, in any form, of
public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the
activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which
matters there was a duty to report, excluding,
however, in criminal cases matters observed by police
officers and other law enforcement personnel, and 
subject to the limitations of MCL 257.264; MSA 9.2324.
3 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
admissible as a public record under MRE 803(8). 
The Court 
declined to rule on the report’s admissibility under MRE 
803(6). The defendant has sought leave to appeal. 
II 
The decision whether to admit evidence is within the 
trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed absent 
an abuse of that discretion. 
However, where, as here, the 
decision involves a preliminary question of law, which is 
whether a rule of evidence precludes admissibility, the 
question is reviewed de novo. 
People v Lukity, 460 Mich 
484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). 
III 
The laboratory report at issue is, without question, 
hearsay. MRE 801(c).3  As such, pursuant to MRE 802, it is 
not admissible unless it fits within at least one category 
of the allowable exceptions outlined in MRE 803 and 804. 
Admissibility was sought under MRE 803(8), which states 
that even though violative of hearsay rules, public records 
of “matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law” are 
admissible, but that reports containing matters observed by 
police officers in criminal cases are not.4 
3 “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” 
4 We note that hearsay that is admissible under MRE 803
4 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
MRE 803(8) has been construed by the Court of Appeals 
in People v Stacy, 193 Mich App 19; 484 NW2d 675 (1992). 
There, 
following 
the 
interpretation 
of 
the 
federal 
counterpart to our rule, FRE 803(8), the Stacy Court held 
that the exclusion of hearsay observations by police 
officers was intended to apply only to observations made at 
the scene of the crime or while investigating a crime. The 
import of that holding is that MRE 803(8) allows admission 
of routine police reports, even though they are hearsay, if 
those reports are made in a setting that is not adversarial 
to the defendant. 
We do not deal with such a situation 
here. 
The report at issue, prepared by a police officer, 
was adversarial. It was destined to establish the identity 
of the substance—an element of the crime for which 
defendant was charged under MCL 333.7401. 
People v Mass, 
464 Mich 615, 625-626; 628 NW2d 540 (2001). 
Thus, the 
Court of Appeals erred in applying Stacy. 
Because the 
report helped establish an element of the crime by use of 
hearsay observations made by police officers investigating 
the crime, the report cannot be admitted under MRE 803(8). 
Further, the error cannot be harmless because this was the 
does not depend on the unavailability of the declarant.
Thus, whether the chemist was available to testify is
irrelevant to our analysis. 
5 
 
 
only evidence that established an element of the crime for 
which defendant was charged. 
Defendant argues, also, that the laboratory report 
could not have been admitted under MRE 803(6), the business 
records exception. 
Although the Court of Appeals did not 
address that issue because it found the report admissible 
under MRE 803(8), we find that a remand for consideration 
of it is unnecessary. The hearsay exception in MRE 803(6) 
is based on the inherent trustworthiness of business 
records. 
That trustworthiness is undermined when the 
records are prepared in anticipation of litigation. Palmer 
v Hoffman, 318 US 109, 113-114; 63 S Ct 477; 87 L Ed 2d 645 
(1943); Solomon v Shuell, 435 Mich 104, 120-121, 130, 132; 
457 NW2d 669 (1990). 
Hence, the police laboratory report 
is inadmissible hearsay because “the source of information 
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack 
of trustworthiness.” MRE 803(6). 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, vacate defendant’s conviction, and remand to the 
trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
6