Title: SHARON MULLER and JEFF MULLER V. JACKSON HOLE MOUNTAIN RESORT and STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SHARON MULLER and JEFF MULLER V. JACKSON HOLE MOUNTAIN RESORT and STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 100139 P.3d 1162Case Number: 05-207Decided: 08/11/2006N
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
SHARON 
MULLER and JEFF MULLER,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 

JACKSON 
HOLE 
MOUNTAIN RESORT,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant),

 
 
and

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Intervenor).

 
 
W.R.A.P. 
11, Certified Questions

from the 
United 
States Court of Appeals, Tenth 
Circuit

The 
Honorable Mary Beck Briscoe

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

William 
R. Fix and Jenna V. Mandraccia of William R. Fix, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Fix.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Carter 
H. Wilkinson and James K. Lubing of Lubing Law Office, Jackson, Wyoming, for 
Appellee Jackson Hole Mountain Resort.  
Argument by Mr. Lubing.  No 
appearance on behalf of Appellee State of Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, and BURKE, JJ., and ARNOLD, 
D.J.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      By order entered 
on September 20, 2005, this Court agreed to answer questions certified to us 
pursuant to W.R.A.P. 11, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit.  In that order we 
designated Sharon Muller and Jeff Muller (Muller or Mullers) as Appellants.  Jackson Hole  
Mountain Resort 
(Resort) is the Appellee.

 
 
THE 
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS

 
 
[¶2]      These are the 
questions we agreed to answer:

 
 
            
1.  Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(ii), Wyoming's 
Recreational Safety Act (RSA) "does not apply to a cause of action based upon 
the design or manufacture of sport or recreational equipment or products or 
safety equipment used incidental to or required by the sport or recreational 
opportunity."  The magistrate judge 
interpreted this provision as a product liability provision applying to design 
and manufacture claims.  Does the 
design and manufacture component of the statute apply to products and safety 
equipment or only sport and recreational equipment?  Does this exemption exclude the 
operation of a ski lift by a recreational provider from the protections of the 
RSA? 

 
 
[¶3]      Our general 
answer to this question is "No."  
However, to specifically answer the compound questions posed:  We conclude that the section at issue is 
not ambiguous and the Act does not apply to those items listed by it, i.e., the 
Act does not apply to the design or manufacture of sports equipment or products, 
or recreational equipment or products, or safety equipment, the use of which is 
incidental to the sport or recreational activity; and, "No," this statute does 
not exclude a ski lift operated by a recreational provider from the protections 
of the RSA.

 
 
            
2.  The RSA provides that "[a]ny person who takes part in any 
sport or recreational opportunity assumes the inherent risks in that sport or 
recreational opportunity, whether those risks are known or unknown, and is 
legally responsible for any and all damage, injury or death to himself or other 
persons or property that results from the inherent risks in that sport or 
recreational opportunity."  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123(a).  The RSA 
defines inherent risks as "those dangers or conditions which are characteristic 
of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of any sport or recreational 
opportunity."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-1-122(a)(i).  Are inherent risks 
of alpine skiing limited to skiing, can an injury that occurs while boarding the 
ski lift be an inherent risk of alpine skiing, and can the injury in this case 
be such an inherent risk?

 
 
[¶4]      Our answer to 
this question is also generally "No."  
However, to specifically answer the compound question posed:  The "inherent risks" of alpine skiing 
are not limited only to the act of skiing; an injury that occurs while boarding 
a ski lift may be an

"inherent 
risk" of skiing; and the injury in this case may be an "inherent risk" of 
skiing. 

 
 
            
3.  If not mooted by the answers to Questions 1 and 2, is the 
operator of a ski lift a common carrier, and if so, what standard of care is 
owed to those riding on a ski lift gondola?

 
 
[¶5]      Our answers above 
render this question moot.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶6]      We accept the 
"Procedural and Factual Background" set out in the Tenth Circuit's certification 
document:

 
 
            
The presiding United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Wyoming 
noted that "Ms. Muller was outfitted with ski equipment, she was wearing ski 
boots, and was attempting to board the Bridger Gondola at Jackson Hole Mountain 
Resort in order to ride to the top of the hill to begin her day of skiing.  While attempting to board the gondola, 
Sharon Muller's ski boot became caught under the exterior rack on the Bridger 
Gondola and she was allegedly dragged several feet, the result of which were 
painful injuries to her leg and knee."  
Appendix at 32.  Noting its 
finding on a special verdict form, following a trial with the magistrate judge 
presiding, the jury concluded that Muller's injuries resulted from an inherent 
risk of the recreational activity in which she was taking part.  The Mullers argued before the trial 
court and before this court on appeal that the RSA was not applicable to their 
case.

 
 
[¶7]      Because it 
became a focus of the argument before the court, we take note that while 
boarding the Bridger Gondola, skiers are not wearing their skis; rather, they 
are stowed on exterior racks affixed to the gondola.  We also discern from the briefs and from 
argument that no motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment was filed in 
this case.  It was contemplated from 
the outset that the "inherent risk" in question here was one for the jury to 
resolve.  The trial was held in 
Jackson.

 
 
The 
Statutes

 
 
[¶8]      We set out the 
statutes at issue in their entirety:

 
 
§ 
1-1-121. Recreation Safety Act; short title.

 
 
            
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Recreation Safety 
Act".

 
 
§ 
1-1-122. Definitions.

 
 
            
(a)  As used in this act:

(i)  "Inherent risk" with regard to any sport or 
recreational opportunity means those dangers or conditions which are 
characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of any sport or 
recreational opportunity [Emphasis added.];

(ii)  "Provider" 
means any person or governmental entity which for profit or otherwise, offers or 
conducts a sport or recreational opportunity.  This act does not apply to a cause of 
action based upon the design or manufacture of sport or recreational equipment 
or products or safety equipment used incidental to or required by the sport or 
recreational opportunity;

(iii)  "Sport 
or recreational opportunity" means commonly understood sporting activities 
including baseball, softball, football, soccer, basketball, swimming, hockey, 
dude ranching, nordic or alpine skiing, mountain climbing, river floating, 
hunting, fishing, backcountry trips, horseback riding and any other equine 
activity, snowmobiling and similar recreational 
opportunities;

                        
(iv)  "Equine activity" means:

(A)  Equine 
shows, fairs, competitions, performances or parades that involve any or all 
breeds of equines;

                                    
(B)  Any of the equine disciplines;

                        
(C)  Equine training or teaching activities, or 
both;

                                    
(D)  Boarding equines;

                        
(E)  Riding, inspecting or evaluating an equine belonging to 
another, whether or not the owner has received some monetary consideration or 
other thing of value for the use of the equine or is permitting a prospective 
purchaser of the equine to ride, inspect or evaluate the 
equine;

(F)  Rides, 
trips, hunts or other equine activities of any type however informal or 
impromptu;

(G)  Day 
use rental riding, riding associated with a dude ranch or riding associated with 
outfitted pack trips;  
and

(H)  Placing 
or replacing horseshoes on an equine.

                        
(v)  Repealed by Laws 1996, ch. 78, § 2.

            
(vi)  "This act" means W.S. 1-1-121 through 
1-1-123.

 
 
§ 
1-1-123.  Assumption of risk.

 
 
            
(a)  Any person who takes part in any sport or recreational 
opportunity assumes the inherent risks in that sport or recreational 
opportunity, whether those risks are known or unknown, and is legally 
responsible for any and all damage, injury or death to himself or other persons 
or property that results from the inherent risks in that sport or recreational 
opportunity.

            
(b)  A provider of any sport or recreational opportunity is not 
required to eliminate, alter or control the inherent risks within the particular 
sport or recreational opportunity.

            
(c)  Actions based upon negligence of the provider wherein the 
damage, injury or death is not the result of an inherent risk of the sport or 
recreational opportunity shall be preserved pursuant to W.S. 1-1-109.1

 
 

Wyo. Sta. 
Ann. §§ 1-1-121  1-1-123 (LexisNexis 2005).

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      Because we are 
answering certified questions from the United States Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and because our answers must rely on the very limited factual 
background provided in the Tenth Circuit's submission to us and the Joint 
Appendices submitted by the parties, our traditional standards of review are 
only tangentially of service.  
However, the principle source of our answers must come from the statutes 
at issue, and so our resolution of this matter must be guided by our well 
established principles of statutory construction:

 
 
In 
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 
legislature's intent.  All statutes 
must be construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given 
law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general 
purpose must be considered and construed in harmony.  Statutory construction is a question of 
law, so our standard of review is de novo.  
We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's 
intent.  We begin by making an 
inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of 
the statute in pari materia.  When a 
statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory 
construction.  We must not give a 
statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of 
another interpretation.  Moreover, 
we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to matters that do not 
fall within its express provisions.

 
 

Sponsel 
v. ParkCounty, 2006 
WY 6, ¶ 9, 126 P.3d 105, 108 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   
Question No. 1.

 
 
            
1.  Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(ii), Wyoming's 
Recreational Safety Act (RSA) "does not apply to a cause of action based upon 
the design or manufacture of sport or recreational equipment or products or 
safety equipment used incidental to or required by the sport or recreational 
opportunity."  The magistrate judge 
interpreted this provision as a product liability provision applying to design 
and manufacture claims.  Does the 
design and manufacture component of the statute apply to products and safety 
equipment or only sport and recreational equipment?   Does this exemption exclude the 
operation of a ski lift by a recreational provider from the protections of the 
RSA? 

 
 
[¶11]   As noted above, our general answer 
to this question is "No."  However, 
to specifically answer the compound questions posed:  We conclude that the section at issue is 
not ambiguous and does not apply to those items listed by it, i.e., it does not 
apply to the design or manufacture of sports equipment or products, or 
recreational equipment or products, or safety equipment, the use of which is 
incidental to the sport or recreational activity; and, "No," this statute does 
not exclude a ski lift operated by a recreational provider from the protections 
of the RSA.

 
 
[¶12]   Wyoming's statute provides that 
the:  "(i) Inherent risk' with 
regard to any sport or recreational opportunity means those dangers or 
conditions which are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of any 
sport or recreational opportunity[.]"  
In addition, it provides that:  
"Any person who takes part in any sport or recreational opportunity 
assumes the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity, whether 
those risks are known or unknown, and is legally responsible for any and all 
damage, injury or death to himself or other persons or property that results 
from the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity[,]" and that 
"[a] provider of any sport or recreational opportunity is not required to 
eliminate, alter or control the inherent risks within the particular sport or 
recreational opportunity."

 
 
[¶13]   What an "inherent risk" means in 
any given set of circumstances is a variable that the Wyoming Legislature 
included in the statute by design.  
The parties point us to the statutes of other states that are more 
specific in this regard.  See, e.g., 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-44-103 (3.5) (West 2005); and see Steven L. Nelson, 
Annotation, Cause of Action Against Ski 
Area Operator for Injury or Death Occurring on Ski Slope or Lift, 5 C.O.A.2d 
719 §22 (1994 and Supp. 2001); and Irving D. Gaines, Skiing Accident Litigation, 15 Am.Jur. 
Trials 147, esp. § 23 (1968 and Supp. 2005).  The Colorado statute includes a nonexclusive list 
of circumstances that meet the "inherent risk" test, and is also specific in 
stating that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit the 
liability of the ski area operator for injury caused by the use or operation of 
ski lifts."  § 33-44-103 
(3.5).

 
 
[¶14]   Under Wyoming's statutory construct, which is much broader than 
that of Colorado, such items as those included 
in Colorado's 
statute may, as a matter of law, be inherent risks of the recreational activity 
of skiing (in such cases a trial court may grant a motion to dismiss or a motion 
for summary judgment based on the RSA).  
Other items included in the list, and others that are not listed, and 
including the use or operation of ski lifts2 may, as a matter of  fact, be "inherent risks" although those 
questions must be decided by the fact finder based on the evidence 
presented.  See generally James H. 
Chalat, Liability of Ski Area Operator 
for Skiing Accident, 45 Am.Jur. POF3d 115, 150-51, § 17 (Broad judicial 
interpretation of inherent danger ski statutes as primary assumption of risk) 
(1998 and Supp. 2005); also see Catherine Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries and Inherent Risks: 
Wyoming's Recreational Safety Act  An Update, 33 Land & Water L. Rev. 
249 (1998); also see Halpern v. 
Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 566 (head note [9]) (Wyo. 1995); Dunbar v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort, 
392 F.3d 1145, 1148-53 (10th Cir. 2004) (injuries suffered by skier 
in a terrain park that offered the most difficult skiing opportunities, which 
instant skier wished to avoid and asked a Resort employee for direction in order 
to avoid it, not an "inherent risk" as a matter of law but, rather, a question 
for the jury); and Cooperman v. 
David, 214 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(loose saddle cinch an inherent risk of horseback riding as a matter of 
law).

 
 
[¶15]   Wyoming's "inherent risk" construct 
is, perhaps, best captured in these well chosen words from Chief Justice 
Benjamin Cardozo in the case, Murphy v. 
Steeplechase Amusement Company, Inc., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173, 174-75 
(N.Y. 1929):

 
 
            
Volenti non fit injuria.  One 
who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as 
they are obvious and necessary, just as a fencer accepts the risk of a thrust by 
his antagonist or a spectator at a ball game the chance of contact with the 
ball.  The antics of the clown are 
not the paces of the cloistered cleric.  
The rough and boisterous joke, the horseplay of the crowd, evokes its own 
guffaws, but they are not the pleasures of tranquility.  The plaintiff was not seeking a retreat 
for meditation.  Visitors were 
tumbling about the belt to the merriment of onlookers when he made his choice to 
join them.  He took the chance 
of  a like fate, with whatever 
damage to his body might ensue from such a fall.  The timorous may stay at 
home.

            
A different case would be here if the dangers inherent in the sport were 
obscure or unobserved, or so serious as to justify the belief that precautions 
of some kind must have been taken to avert them.  Nothing happened to the plaintiff except 
what common experience tells us may happen at any time as the consequence of a 
sudden fall.  Many a skater or a 
horseman can rehearse a tale of equal woe.  
A different case there would also be if the accidents had been so many as 
to show that the game in its inherent nature was too dangerous to be continued 
without change.  The president of 
the amusement company says that there had never been such an accident 
before.  A nurse employed at an 
emergency hospital maintained in connection with the park contradicts him to 
some extent.  She says that on other 
occasions she had attended patrons of the park who had been injured at the 
Flopper, how many she could not say.  
None, however, had been badly injured or had suffered broken bones [as 
did the plaintiff in this case].  
Such testimony is not enough to show that the game was a trap for the 
unwary, too perilous to be endured.  
According to the defendant's estimate, 250,000 visitors were at the 
Flopper in a year.  Some quota of 
accidents was to be looked for in so great a mass.  One might as well say that a skating 
rink should be abandoned because skaters sometimes fall.

 
 
Also see 
Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc., 
96 F. Supp. 786, 790-92 (D. Vt. 1951) (relying on and applying rule articulated 
in Murphy); and Bouchard v. Johnson, 555 N.W.2d 81, 86 
(N.D. 1996); and compare Sunday v. 
Stratton Corporation, 390 A.2d 398, 401 (Vt. 1978) (recognizing rule 
articulated in Murphy and Wright, but concluding that brush 
concealed by snow on a novice trail which had been carefully groomed to remove 
most natural obstacles, i.e., that it was like a fairway, completely flat and 
designed to achieve a perfect surface for skiing, was not an inherent risk of 
the sport (skier fell and suffered injury resulting in 
quadriplegia)).

 
 
[¶16]   In summary, we hold that under 
Wyoming's Recreational Safety Act a ski lift, 
such as the Bridger Gondola, may be an "inherent risk" of skiing, as inherent 
risk is defined in the Wyoming statute, and that the particular 
injury suffered in this case may be an inherent risk of skiing.  Our analysis in this regard is not 
affected by the circumstance that in some instances skiers may not be wearing 
skis while boarding a ski lift.

 
 
[¶17]   
Question No. 2

 
 
            
2.  The RSA provides that "[a]ny person who takes part in any 
sport or recreational opportunity assumes the inherent risks in that sport or 
recreational opportunity, whether those risks are known or unknown, and is 
legally responsible for any and all damage, injury or death to himself or other 
persons or property that results from the inherent risks in that sport or 
recreational opportunity."  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123(a).  The RSA 
defines inherent risks as "those dangers or conditions which are characteristic 
of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of any sport or recreational 
opportunity."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-1-122(a)(i).  Are inherent risks 
of alpine skiing limited to skiing, can an injury that occurs while boarding the 
ski lift be an inherent risk of alpine skiing, and can the injury in this case 
be such an inherent risk?

 
 
[¶18]   Our answer to this question is also 
generally "No."  However, to 
specifically answer the compound question posed:  The "inherent risks" of alpine skiing 
are not limited only to the act of skiing; an injury that occurs while boarding 
a ski lift may be an

inherent 
risk of skiing; and the injury in this case may be an "inherent risk" of skiing. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶19]   We conclude that the RSA is, in 
part, a products liability statute that is unambiguous on its face.  Further, the RSA does not necessarily 
exclude a ski lift from its protections.  
The inherent risks of skiing are not limited only to the act of skiing, 
and an injury suffered while boarding a ski lift (with skis stowed on the 
exterior of the lift) may be an inherent risk of skiing.  Finally, the incident described in the 
materials provided to this Court, for the purpose of resolving these questions, 
may be an inherent risk of skiing.

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 
(LexisNexis 2005) is Wyoming's comparative fault 
statute.

 
 

2See 
generally Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Liability for Injury or Death from Ski Lift, 
Ski Tow, or Similar Device, 95 A.L.R.3d 203 (1979 and Supp. 
2005).