Title: Bialach v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
RYSZARD S. BIALACH,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 418, 2000
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. No. IN98-04-0967 R1
§
§
Submitted: March 30, 2001
  Decided:     June 7, 2001
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.
Ryszard S. Bialach, pro se.
Loren C. Meyers, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington,
Delaware for appellee.
HOLLAND, Justice:
2
In 1998, the defendant-appellant, Ryszard S. Bialach was convicted
by a Superior Court jury of Robbery in the First Degree.  He was sentenced
to five years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after 2-½ years for 2-
½ years at Level IV, in turn to be suspended after six months for Level III
probation.  Bialach’s convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court
on direct appeal.1
Bialach then filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief with the
Superior Court pursuant to Criminal Rule 61.2  The Superior Court directed
Bialach’s trial attorney to file an affidavit in response to Bialach’s motion.
The Superior Court entered a final judgment that denied Bialach’s motion
for postconviction relief.  This is Bialach’s appeal from that final judgment.
Bialach has raised four contentions, three of which are related.  First,
he submits that the Superior Court abused its discretion in failing to address
the issue of a juror who allegedly slept during a portion of the trial.  Second,
he asserts that the prosecution engaged in misconduct by making false
statements about the allegedly sleeping juror and by failing to present the
appropriate documentation concerning the crime. Third, he contends that his
                                                          
1Bialach v. State, Del. Supr., 744 A.2d 983 (2000)(per curiam).  Bialach appealed
solely on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction.  He did
not raise the issue of the sleeping juror either at trial or on appeal.
2 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61.
3
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to keep him informed,
by not objecting to the alleged sleeping juror at trial and by not raising the
issue of the sleeping juror on appeal.  Finally, Bialach argues there was
insufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain his conviction for robbery.3
We have carefully considered each of these arguments.  We have
concluded that all of Bialach’s arguments are both without any record
support on the merits and procedurally barred.  Therefore, the judgment of
the Superior Court must be affirmed.
Sleeping Juror Contention
According to Bialach, one of the jurors slept through closing
arguments and jury instructions.  In support of that contention, Bialach
cites the following exchange between the attorneys and the trial judge, after
the instructions were given to the jury:
The Court:  Any exceptions to the charge?
[Defense Counsel]:  No exceptions, Judge.
[The State]:  Nothing, Your Honor.  I would only point out
that juror number ten was asleep through most of that, and
[defense counsel] put her to sleep and I assisted, and the only
person she listened to was the Court.
                                                          
3This claim is implicitly included within Bialach’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
4
The above-quoted exchange is the only substantive evidence cited by
Bialach in support of his claim that a juror slept through part of his trial.
As part of the postconviction proceeding that is now before this Court for
review, Bialach’s defense attorney at trial filed an affidavit with the
Superior Court.  It states that, to defense counsel’s knowledge, no juror
slept through any portion of the closing arguments or jury instructions.
The affidavit from Bialach’s trial attorney also avers that, had he noticed a
juror sleeping or being otherwise inattentive, he would have immediately
brought the matter to the trial judge’s attention for appropriate action.
In this case, the record reflects that the trial judge first heard any
comment about an alleged sleeping juror was when, in response to his
request for exceptions to the jury instructions, the prosecutor stated that
“juror number ten was asleep through most of that.”  The trial judge
determined the prosecutor’s remarks were, in essence, a comment about the
length of both attorneys’ closing arguments.  Although criminal trials are
generally no place for humor, understanding the prosecutor’s comment to be
facetious, the trial judge permitted the jury to retire and deliberate without
further inquiry.
5
Juror Claim Fails
A trial judge has wide discretion in deciding how to handle a sleeping
juror.4  In Bialach’s case, however, there is no evidence in the record that
any juror was ever asleep.  In denying Bialach’s motion for postconviction
relief, the Superior Court concluded that the remarks made by the prosecutor
at the end of trial were clearly understood by Bialach’s attorney and the trial
judge to be facetious rather than serious.5  The jurist who denied Bialach’s
motion for postconviction relief was uniquely qualified to make that
determination since he was also the judge who presided at trial.
Bialach’s claim alleging that a juror slept is based upon the United
States Constitution.  A reversal of his conviction is mandated if Bialach was
deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury.6  There
is no record evidence at all to support Bialach’s allegation that any juror was
                                                          
4Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 113-14, 127 (1987); United States v. Freitag,
7th Cir., 230 F.3d 1019, 1023 (2000); United States v. Springfield, 9th Cir., 829 F.2d
860, 864 (1987).
5 In Shayne, the Ninth Circuit refused to grant a new trial where a sleeping juror was one
of the various errors at trial alleged by the defendant-appellant.  Shayne v. United States,
9th Cir., 255 F.2d 739, 745 (1958).  The Court reasoned that, since the jury was under the
direct observation of the trial judge, some action would have taken by the trial judge sua
sponte if the juror had been asleep for a noticeable amount of time.   Id.
6United States v. Freitag, 230 F.3d at 1023; Miller v. Stagner, 9th Cir., 757 F.2d 988,
995 (1985).
6
asleep.  Accordingly, we find no violation of Bialach’s Sixth Amendment
rights.
We have also concluded that Bialach’s claim that the Superior Court
abused its discretion in failing to address the issue of an alleged sleeping
juror is procedurally barred because it was not raised at trial or on direct
appeal.7  Moreover, Bialach has failed to overcome the procedural bar by
showing either cause for relief from the procedural default and prejudice
from a violation of his rights8 or a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice
because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental
legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the
judgment of conviction.9  These procedural bars constitute an independent
state law basis for affirming the Superior Court’s judgment with regard to
Bialach’s unsubstantiated allegation of a sleeping juror.10
Prosecutorial Claim Time Barred
Bialach raises a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for the first time in
this collateral proceeding.11  This claim relies principally on his contention
                                                          
7Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
8Id.
9Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
10 Michigan v. Long,  463 U.S. 1062 (1983).
11Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
7
that the prosecutor misrepresented to the trial judge what he knew about the
alleged sleeping juror.  The United States Supreme Court has stated:
There is little doubt that postverdict investigation into juror
misconduct would in some instances lead to the invalidation of
verdicts reached after irresponsible or improper juror behavior.
It is not at all clear, however, that the jury system could survive
such efforts to perfect it.  Allegations of juror misconduct,
incompetency, or inattentiveness, raised for the first time days,
weeks, or months after the verdict, seriously disrupt the finality
of the process.12
The record reflects no evidence demonstrating that any of the prosecutor’s
conduct constituted a violation of Bialach’s  constitutional rights.13
Consequently, with regard to Bialach’s second contention, we hold that
Bialach has again failed to overcome the procedural bars of Superior Court
Criminal Rule 61.
Trial Attorney Effective
In an effort to overcome the procedural defaults that barred his first
two arguments, Bialach also claims that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance at trial and on appeal.  In order to prevail on his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, Bialach must show that his counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that,
but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability
                                                          
12 Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
13Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
8
that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.14  Although
not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is exacting and requires the
application of a “strong presumption that the representation was
professionally reasonable.”15
Bialach’s argument on appeal, alleging an ineffective assistance of
counsel, is based principally on the contention that his attorney should have
objected to the sleeping juror at trial and should have raised that claim on
appeal.  As noted earlier in this opinion, the affidavit filed by Bialach’s trial
counsel states that no juror slept through any portion of either the closing
arguments or the trial judge’s instructions to the jury.  In addition, Bialach’s
attorney asserts that, if a juror had been asleep, he would have brought that
situation to the trial judge’s attention immediately.  The record also indicates
that the trial judge had no knowledge of a sleeping juror and concluded that
the prosecutor’s remark was intended to be humorous.
Bialach has presented no evidence in support of his claim to
contradict the affidavit filed by his trial attorney or the recollection of the
trial judge.  In the absence of a sleeping juror, there was no action to be
taken by Bialach’s attorney.  Consequently, Bialach has failed to
                                                          
14Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
15Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 753 (1990).
9
demonstrate that his defense counsel’s conduct fell below reasonable
standards.
Robbery Evidence Sufficient
Bialach’s final claim is that there was insufficient evidence to sustain
his conviction for Robbery in the First Degree.  That issue was raised and
decided by this Court in his direct appeal.16  Therefore, that claim is
procedurally barred as formerly adjudicated.17  Moreover, once again,
Bialach has failed to demonstrate that a reconsideration of the claim is
warranted in the interest of justice.18
Conclusion
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
                                                          
16 Bialach v. State, Del. Supr., 744 A.2d 983 (2000)(per curiam).
17Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
18Id.