Title: BRUCE GILBERT V. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PARK COUNTY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BRUCE GILBERT V. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PARK COUNTY2010 WY 68Case Number: S-08-0202Decided: 05/26/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
BRUCE 
GILBERT,Appellant(Petitioner),v.BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF PARK 
COUNTY,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Dawn 
R. Scott and Laurence W. Stinson of Bonner Stinson, P.C., Cody, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. Scott. 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

James 
F. Davis and Bryan A. Skoric of the Park County Attorney's Office, Cody, 
Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Davis.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Bruce Gilbert, 
owner of a 21.85-acre parcel of property approximately one mile southeast of 
Meeteetse, Wyoming, seeks review of the decision of the Board of County 
Commissioners of Park County, which the district court affirmed, that denied his 
request for a land use variance after extended public hearings.  We affirm the Board's decision. 

 
 

STATEMENT 
OF THE ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      In Gilbert's 
principal brief, he presents these issues:

 
 
A.        Is 
BOCC Resolution No. 2006-5 unsupported by substantial evidence and/or arbitrary 
and capricious?

 
 
B.        Is 
BOCC Resolution No. 2007-72 unsupported by substantial evidence and/or arbitrary 
and capricious?

 
 
C.        Did 
the District Court set forth erroneous findings in its July 30, 2008 Decision 
Letter?

 
 
D.        Did 
the District Court err in finding that the public hearings were not a contested 
case proceeding?

 
 
The 
Board responds with this statement:

 
 
I.          
The Board's denial of Appellant's variance is supported by substantial 
evidence.

 
 
II.         
The Board properly redeliberated the issues as required by the district 
court and the Board's decision is not arbitrary and 
capricious.

 
 
III.        
Appellant failed to provide a transcript of the proceedings and therefore 
this Court can accept the findings of the district court as the basis for 
deciding the issues.

 
 
IV.       The 
district court's finding was correct where the district court stated that 
Gilbert could have appealed the planning coordinator's decision that he needed a 
variance.

 
 
V.        The 
district court did not err in finding that the proceedings before the Board were 
not held as contested case hearings.

 
 
Gilbert 
filed a reply brief asserting these matters:

 
 
A.        Does 
the lack of a transcript require this Court to accept the findings of the 
District Court as the sole basis for deciding the issues?

 
 
B.        Does 
an incomplete record at the administrative level continue to prejudice 
Appellant?

 
 
C.        Was 
the Board's decision to deny Gilbert's variance arbitrary and 
capricious?

 
 
D.        Did 
the District Court [err] in finding that Appellant could have appealed the 
planning coordinator's decision that he needed a variance?

 
 
E.        Did 
the District Court [err] in finding that the public hearings were not a 
contested case proceeding?

 
 
[¶3]      Before proceeding 
further, we must comment briefly on Gilbert's reply brief statement of the 
issues.  We observe that Issue C, 
whether the Board's decision to deny the variance request was arbitrary and 
capricious, repeats that same issue raised in Gilbert's principal brief and 
addressed in the Board's brief.  It 
is not, therefore, a new issue raised by the Board in its brief.  Similarly, Issue E, whether the district 
court erred in finding that the public hearings were not contested case 
hearings, repeats that same issue raised in Gilbert's principal brief and 
addressed in the Board's brief.  It 
is not, therefore, a new issue raised by the Board in its brief.  We remind counsel that a reply brief is 
limited to new issues and arguments raised by an appellee's brief; failure to 
comply with this requirement may subject counsel to sanctions under this Court's 
rules. W.R.A.P. 7.03.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      In 1985, under 
the then-existing Park County zoning regulations, the 21.85-acre parcel in 
question in this appeal was owned by Mr. and Mrs. William Spuhl (Spuhl) and was 
zoned light industrial/manufacturing by virtue of Land Use Change (LUC)-59.  In September 2000, the Board adopted a 
new and more comprehensive zoning resolution that superseded the Board's former 
method of establishing land use changes on a case-by-case basis.  The 2000 zoning resolution established 
zoning districts county-wide and identified uses that may occur within each 
zoning district.  That resolution 
also provided that the previous land use changes, such as LUC-59 allowing light 
industrial/manufacturing, would expire on September 1, 2005, if they had been 
abandoned, had become inactive, or had not been substantially advanced during 
the five-year period following September 2000.

 
 
[¶5]      On May 10, 2005, 
four months before the expiration of LUC-59, Spuhl sold the 21.85-acre parcel in 
question to Gilbert.  In July 2005, 
Park County's Planning and Zoning Coordinator Bo Bowman, having determined that 
the land use changes of approximately sixty property owners were set to expire 
on September 1, 2005, sent letters to those owners informing each owner of the 
approaching expiration date and of each owner's need to request a variance to 
extend the expiration date.  Gilbert 
received Bowman's letter and responded with a handwritten letter which Bowman 
received on August 4, 2005.  In 
Gilbert's letter he stated in pertinent part, "At the present time I do not know 
what is the best use of this parcel.  
I hope you will allow me to retain this zoning till I am able to 
determine its best use."  Gilbert 
submitted a $300.00 check as payment for a variance application.  At that time, Gilbert did not question 
Bowman's determination that the LUC-59 designation for Gilbert's 21.85-acre 
parcel qualified for expiration.  
The 2000 zoning resolution provides that persons can appeal any action of 
the Planning Coordinator to the Board.  
Park Cty. Zoning Resolution, Div. 4-300, Sections 4-305 and 4-310 (Sept. 
1, 2000).  Specifically, Section 
4-310 of the zoning resolution provides:

 
 
Any 
aggrieved person or any officer, department, or board of the County affected by 
any decision of the Planning Coordinator may appeal to the Board of County 
Commissioners.  Appeals shall be 
made within 10 days of notice of any action by filing with the Board's 
Administrative Assistant a written notice of appeal specifying the grounds for 
the appeal.  The Planning 
Coordinator shall immediately transmit to the Board the complete record of the 
action from which the appeal is taken.  

 
 
Gilbert 
did not appeal Bowman's decision that the LUC-59 designation for his 21.85-acre 
parcel was set to expire on September 1, 2005.

 
 
[¶6]      On October 18, 
2005, the Park County Planning and Zoning Commission held a public hearing after 
which it recommended to the Board that Gilbert's variance request be 
denied.  The Board subsequently held 
public hearings on November 15, 2005, and January 3, 2006, concerning Gilbert's 
variance request.  The Board held 
these hearings in accordance with the provisions of the 2000 zoning resolution 
addressing variance standards.  
Those standards are:

 
 
No 
variance from the strict application of any provision of this zoning resolution 
may be granted unless there are special circumstances or conditions which are 
peculiar to the land, building, or structure for which the variance is sought 
and do not apply generally to land or buildings in the neighborhood, and have 
not resulted from any act of the applicant subsequent to the adoption of this 
zoning resolution; the circumstances or conditions are such that the strict 
application of the provisions of the zoning resolution would deprive the 
applicant of the reasonable use of the land, building, or structure, the 
granting of the variance is necessary for the reasonable use thereof and the 
variance as granted is the minimum variance that will accomplish this purpose; 
and the granting of the variance is in harmony with the general purposes and 
intent of the zoning resolution and will not be injurious to properties in the 
vicinity or otherwise detrimental to the public welfare.  The Board shall make written findings on 
each of these considerations. 

 
 
Park 
Cty. Zoning Resolution, supra, 
Section 4-715.  Gilbert did not 
request that the Board's hearings be conducted as contested case "trial-type" 
proceedings under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101 through 115 
(LexisNexis 2009).  The Board's 
hearings were electronically recorded on audiocassette tapes, two tapes from the 
hearing on November 15, 2005, and one tape from the hearing on January 3, 
2006.  The latter tape contains only 
part of the hearing, as that tape was taped over by other Board proceedings 
unrelated to Gilbert.  Board minutes 
pertaining to the hearing were made.

 
 
[¶7]      At these 
hearings, the Board considered the recommendation of the Planning and Zoning 
Commission; Gilbert's comments concerning his justification for wanting the 
variance and concerning his position that a variance was unnecessary because 
Spuhl's business activities on the parcel established that the light 
industrial/manufacturing use had not been abandoned, had not become inactive, 
and had been substantially advanced; Spuhl's evidence offered on Gilbert's 
behalf; and written and oral comments from neighboring property owners.  The evidence and comment concerning 
Spuhl's use of the parcel was in conflict.  
The evidence in favor of Gilbert and Spuhl on this matter was that he had 
operated a gun-ordering, gun-cleaning, and gun and ammunition reloading business 
on the parcel; he had used a generator to supply electricity to the property; in 
Spuhl's opinion, it was known in the community that he operated his business on 
the parcel; and he produced a copy of his federal firearms license allowing him 
to deal in firearm sales.  However, 
Spuhl offered no business records to support his assertions and no one from the 
community testified in support of those assertions.  Written comments and oral statements 
from several neighboring property owners were received by the Board in 
opposition to Spuhl's claim that he had used the parcel as necessary under 
LUC-59.  A Mr. Long stated that no 
such business activity occurred; instead, Spuhl cared for his horses on the 
parcel and used the parcel as a private shooting range.  A Ms. Placzkowski stated she had not 
seen any business activity on the parcel as she passed by the parcel several 
times a day for the past two years.  
A Mr. Walter stated that the parcel is in a well-established residential 
area, that in his six years living near the parcel he had seen no evidence of a 
business operation, and that the only people he had seen on the parcel were the 
Spuhls when they stopped by to feed their horses.  The Planning and Zoning Coordinator 
stated that if the Board denied Gilbert's variance request, Gilbert could pursue 
numerous uses of the parcel, some by virtue of a simple zoning permit and some 
by virtue of a special use permit.  
In addition to the above-mentioned material, the Board received 
information from two of its members who had visited the parcel which indicated 
that the two small outbuildings on the parcel showed no indication they had been 
used for commercial purposes.

 
 
[¶8]      On January 17, 
2006, the Board adopted Resolution # 2006-5, denying the variance request, 
and stated findings and conclusions concerning the past use of the parcel and 
whether Gilbert's variance request met the zoning resolution criteria applicable 
to granting the variance.  On 
February 7, 2006, Gilbert filed with the district court a petition for review, 
requesting that the court remand the issue whether a variance was necessary 
because the record was incomplete.  
On June 14, 2007, the court remanded the matter to the Board, explaining 
that the court could not make a fully reasoned decision with an incomplete 
record and ordering the Board to not reopen the evidentiary record but to 
provide a record of the Board's deliberation in denying the variance 
request.  On remand, the Board again 
deliberated and adopted, on October 16, 2007, Resolution # 2007-72, which 
set forth findings and conclusions supporting the Board's decision to deny the 
variance request, and states as follows:

 
 

RESOLUTION 
# 2007-72

 
 

TITLE: 
REDELIBERATIONS ON ACTION DENYING VARIANCE TO BRUCE GILBERT REGARDING LAND 
USE CHANGE 59 ON A 21.85 ACRE+/- PARCEL DESCRIBED AS A PORTION OF THE SE1/4 OF 
SECTION 10, T48N, R100W.

 
 
            
WHEREAS, in October 1986, the 
Board of County Commissioners (Board) granted Land Use Change (LUC)-59 to allow 
light industrial development on a parcel of land approximately 21.85 acres in 
size described as a portion of the SE1/4 of Section 10, T48N, R100W; 
and

 
 
            
WHEREAS, the current owner of 
that parcel, Bruce Gilbert, applied for a variance to extend the expiration date 
of said LUC beyond September 1, 2005 as set forth in the Park County Zoning 
Resolution at Section 3-210(F)(1) & (6); and

 
 
            
WHEREAS, the Board held 
public hearings on said request for variance on November 15, 2005 and January 3, 
2006, and in addition to taking testimony at the public hearings, two of the 
three members of the Board made independent site visits to the parcel of land to 
view the circumstances on the ground; and

 
 
            
WHEREAS, on January 17, 2006 
the Board made its decision denying the variance and entered a resolution to 
that effect.  Mr. Gilbert thereafter 
appealed that decision to the Fifth Judicial District Court, Park County, 
Wyoming.  After briefing, that Court 
sent the matter back to the Board not for the purpose of developing new evidence 
and testimony but for the purpose of redeliberating and better stating their 
reasons for their decision; and

 
 
            
WHEREAS, on October 9, 2007, 
the Board as it existed on January 17, 2006, met and redeliberated the matter, 
adopted its earlier findings and conclusions, and made the following amended 
findings and conclusions:

 
 

Findings 
of Fact.

 
 
1.         
The Park County Planning Coordinator in July 2005 provided landowner 
Bruce Gilbert with notice that his undeveloped Land Use Change (LUC) Number 59 
was scheduled to expire on September 1, 2005 pursuant to Park County zoning 
regulations unless Mr. Gilbert applied for a variance to extend the expiration 
date.

 
 
2.         
Thereafter, Mr. Gilbert on July 13, 2005 requested a variance asking that 
his LUC expiration date be extended.

 
 
3.         
From information learned from site visits by Board members, only two 
relatively small outbuildings exist on the property and that these buildings do 
not show any indiciation that they have been utilized for commercial purposes to 
any meaningful extent.

 
 
4.         
Testimony from members of the public indicated that no commercial 
activity has occurred at the above-described location:

 
 

§  
Bobby 
Long testified that he knows the former property owner William Spuhl.  William Spuhl testified that he operated 
a gun cleaning/reloading type business on the property, however, Bobby Long 
testified that William Spuhl lived in Bobby Long's RV park in Meeteetse, Wyoming 
for approximately one year and that during that time William Spuhl only fed his 
private animals on the subject property.  
Mr. Long also owns property near the subject property and has not at any 
time seen any type of business activity on the property.  He testified that William Spuhl did do 
some firearms transactions out of the premises of a restaurant in Meeteetse but 
not on the property in question to his knowledge;

§  
Don 
Walter, who owns property near the subject property, submitted comments which 
state that he lived near the subject property for six years and did not see any 
kind of business operated on the subject property and that all he saw was 
William Spuhl feed his animals on the property;

§  
Pauline 
Placzowski testified that she has lived in the area of the subject property for 
approximately two years, drives by it every day, and has never seen any evidence 
of a business being operated on the property;

§  
Diane 
Chapman testified that she lives in the area of the subject property and that 
she was unaware of any business activity that was substantially advanced on the 
property.

 
 
5.         
Testimony at public hearings indicated that the buildings on the property 
are not served by electricity except for electricity generated by a portable 
generator.

 
 
6.         
The former owner testified and submitted an affidavit indicating he had 
operated a firearm/reloading type business on the property, however, he provided 
no receipts indicating the operation of the business or other documents 
supporting any business activity having occurred on the 
property.

 
 
7.         
The above-described property lies within the GR-M zoning district which 
allows for all uses listed in the Park County Zoning Resolution including the 
use he testified he had used the property assuming the property owner, Mr. 
Gilbert in this case, applies for and receives the proper 
permit.

 
 
8.         
The applicant and/or his predecessors in interest have had more than 19 
years since the LUC was granted to conduct the uses allowed by the LUC and that 
during that extensive length of time, based on the testimony and comments 
presented, no business has been substantially advanced on the subject property; 
and

 
 

            
THEREFORE, 
the Board concludes as follows:

 
 
1.         
In order to grant a variance the Board must make affirmative findings on 
all four of the following approval standards as set forth in the Park County 
Zoning Resolution Section 4-715:

 
 
            
a.         
Special circumstances exist which are peculiar to the land, building, or 
structure for which the variance is sought and which do not apply generally to 
land or buildings in the neighborhood, and have not resulted from any act of the 
applicant subsequent to the adoption of the zoning 
resolution;

            
b.         
The circumstances or conditions are such that the strict application of 
the provisions of the zoning resolution would deprive the applicant of the 
reasonable use of the land, building or structure;

            
c.         
The granting of the variance is necessary for the reasonable use of the 
land, building, or structure and the variance as granted is the minimum variance 
that will accomplished this purpose; and

            
d.         
The granting of the variance is in harmony with the general purposes and 
intent of the zoning resolution and will not be injurious to properties in the 
vicinity or otherwise detrimental to the public welfare; 
and

 
 
2.         
The burden of proof is on the applicant for a variance to show how the 
above approval standards can be met.  
Park County Zoning Resolution Section 4-710.

 
 
3.         
Regarding approval standard No. 1, based on the above findings, no 
special circumstances exist which are peculiar to the property and do not apply 
generally to other property in the neighborhood.  The Board listened to testimony 
regarding how the LUC had been substantially advanced by the alleged business 
activity on the property and considered such testimony in the context of whether 
special circumstances existed.  
Based on the testimony presented and the site visits by Board members, 
the Board concludes that the business purposes of the LUC have not been 
substantially advanced.  The 
Planning Coordinator made the same decision when he informed Mr. Gilbert that 
his undeveloped LUC was subject to expiration unless he sought a variance from 
the expiration date.  The Planning 
Coordinator's decision was not appealed but was nonetheless the proper 
decision.  For these reasons and for 
the reason that the applicant has failed to show how the approval standard can 
be met, the Board concludes that no special circumstances exist as set forth in 
approval standard number 1 above.

 
 
4.         
Regarding approval standard No. 2, the Board concludes that based on the 
above findings the circumstances in this case are not such that the strict 
application of the zoning resolution would deprive the applicant of the 
reasonable use of the property as this property can be developed for multiple 
uses as defined in the zoning resolution for the GR-M zoning classification to 
include uses alleged to have occurred on the property in the 
past.

 
 
5.         
Regarding approval standard No. 3, as set forth above, the denial of 
this variance will not deprive the applicant of the reasonable use of the 
property and therefore granting the variance is not necessary for the reasonable 
use of the property.

 
 
6.         
Regarding approval standard No. 4, the Board concludes that this 
standard is not applicable because the Board has herein denied the 
variance.  It is unnecessary to 
determine whether granting the variance is in harmony with the purposes and 
intent of the zoning resolution or whether granting the variance would be 
injurious to properties in the vicinity or to the general public.  Mr. Gilbert did not present evidence to 
show how this approval standard could be granted. 

 
 
            
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT 
RESOLVED that based on the foregoing, the Board, as it existed at the time 
of the initial decision, and after redeliberation, hereby adopts these 
redeliberated findings and conclusions and submits them to the 
Court.

 
 
            
ADOPTED by the Board of 
County Commissioners as existed on January 17, 2006, this 16th day of October, 2007.

 
 
[¶9]      Once more 
Gilbert's petition for review came before the district court and the parties 
filed supplemental briefs.  On May 
3, 2008, the district court and counsel discussed the question whether the 
Board's several public hearings were contested case "trial-type" proceedings 
under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act; and the court ordered briefing 
on that question.  After receiving 
that additional briefing and reviewing the Board's resolutions in light of the 
record, the district court issued its decision letter on July 30, 2008, 
explaining its affirmance of the Board's decision to deny Gilbert's variance 
request and explaining its decision that the Board's public hearings on 
Gilbert's variance request did not result in a de facto contested case 
"trial-type" proceeding, as argued by Gilbert, which would have required a 
verbatim record of those hearings. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107(p) (LexisNexis 
2009).  Gilbert timely sought this 
Court's review of the district court's order dated July 30, 2008, affirming the 
Board's decision.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
I.          
Standard of Review

 
 
[¶10]   The issues before the Court in this 
appeal require application of our standard for reviewing the actions of an 
administrative agency.  Recently we 
stated and explained that standard in Northfork Citizens for Responsible 
Development v. Board of Cty. Comm'rs of Park Cty, 2010 WY 41, ¶¶ 16-17, 228 P.3d 838, 844-45 (Wyo. 2010): 

 
 
That 
standard requires that we give no special deference to the decision of the 
district court, but consider the case as if it came directly from the agency. 
Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 
2008 WY 84, ¶ 9, 188 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 2008). The statutory limits of our 
review are set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 
2009):

 
 

(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
(i) 
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

 
 
(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 
 
(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

 
 
(B) 
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

 
 
(C) 
In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking 
statutory right;

 
 
(D) 
Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or

 
 
(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

 
 
In 
Dale, we noted that this 
statute actually contains several different standards of review, and that all 
are not applicable in any given instance. 2008 WY 84, ¶¶ 8-26, 188 P.3d  at 
557-62. We will not repeat that detailed analysis here. Rather, we will simply 
parse the statute and note that a reviewing court must set aside agency action 
where the agency: (1) acted arbitrarily; (2) acted capriciously; (3) acted 
contrary to law; (4) abused its discretion; (5) violated a constitution; (6) 
acted beyond its statutory authority; (7) failed to observe legally required 
procedures; or (8) made findings or reached conclusions unsupported by 
substantial evidence. We have defined "arbitrary and capricious" in the 
administrative agency review context as 
follows:

 
 
The 
arbitrary and capricious test requires the reviewing court to review the entire 
record to determine whether the agency reasonably could have made its finding 
and order based upon all the evidence before it. The arbitrary and capricious 
standard is more lenient and deferential to the agency than the substantial 
evidence standard because it requires only that there be a rational basis for 
the agency's decision.

Id. at ¶ 12, [188 P.3d] at 559 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In turn, we defined the 
substantial evidence test as follows:

 
 
"In 
reviewing findings of fact, we examine the entire record to determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support an agency's findings. If the agency's 
decision is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our 
judgment for that of the agency and must uphold the findings on appeal. 
Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept 
in support of the agency's conclusions. . . 
."

 Id. 
at ¶ 11, [188 P.3d] at 558 (quoting Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 
2002 WY 91, ¶ 12, 49 P.3d 163, 168 (Wyo. 2002)).

 
 

II.         
Overview of the Issues

 
 
[¶11]   Upon consideration of the parties' 
statements of the issues, we have separated them for purposes of review as 
procedural issues and substantive issues.  
The procedural issues are whether the Board's public hearings became de 
facto contested case "trial-type" proceedings; whether we have a sufficient 
administrative record for judicial review; and the effect, if any, of Gilbert's 
failure to appeal the Planning Coordinator's alleged decision in his July 2005 
letter to Gilbert that he needed to request a variance to extend the expiration 
date of the LUC-59 designation.  The 
substantive issues are whether the Board's decisions, contained in Resolution 
# 2007-72, that a variance was necessary and that the variance request was 
denied, are supported by substantial evidence and are not arbitrary and 
capricious.

 
 
III.        
Procedural Issues

 
 
A. 
       
Whether the Board's public hearings became a de facto contested case 
"trial-type" proceeding.

 
 
[¶12]   In his appellate briefing, Gilbert 
states that he has never claimed he was entitled to a contested case proceeding 
when the Board provided a public hearing to consider his variance request.  As defined in the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act, "contested case" means "a proceeding . . . in which legal rights, 
duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an 
agency after an opportunity for hearing . . . ."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2009).  Procedures in 
contested cases are set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107 (LexisNexis 2009) 
and include, inter alia, "the 
proceeding including all testimony shall be reported verbatim stenographically 
or by any other appropriate means determined by the agency . . . ."  § 16-3-107(p).  Gilbert has not proposed that his 
variance request is a legal right and has cited no authority for that 
proposition.  We observed in Snake River Venture v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 
Teton Cty., 616 P.2d 744, 751 (Wyo. 1980), there is no vested property right 
in a contemplated use of land subject to zoning.  Our research indicates that no person 
has a legal right to a variance and they are to be granted sparingly.  Whelan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of 
Norfolk, 722 N.E.2d 969, 970 (Mass. 2000).  A zoning variance is equitable in nature 
and subject to the rules of equity.  
Cooper Bros. Inv. Co. v. Ray, 
629 P.2d 796, 798 (Ok. Ct. App. 1981) (citing Twist v. Kay, 434 P.2d 180, 186 (Ok. 
1967)).  According to Gilbert's 
variance request, he did not know what use he wanted to make of his parcel and 
simply wanted an extension of the expiration date concerning LUC-59 to have time 
to consider that use.  He does not 
claim that he has a legal right to that extension.  Because the Board was not determining a 
legal right in its proceeding concerning Gilbert's variance request, it was not 
conducting a contested case hearing as defined in § 
16-3-101(b)(ii).

 
 
[¶13]   Although Gilbert acknowledges that 
he never claimed he was entitled to a contested case proceeding, and the Board 
notes that he never requested one, he contends that the Board's actions during 
its several public hearings on his variance request "functioned as a 
constructive contested case proceeding."  
He asserts that the proceedings became contentious at the second hearing 
and that by the fourth and final hearing the Board was questioning the validity 
of his evidence.  He maintains that 
the increasingly adversarial relationship between the Board and himself resulted 
in a de facto contested case proceeding.  
Because his variance request hearings resulted in a de facto contested 
case proceeding, he argues, the Board was required to provide a verbatim record; 
because no verbatim record was made, he concludes, the Board's decision denying 
his variance request must be reversed.  
Gilbert correctly observes that this Court has not addressed the issue of 
de facto contested case proceedings.

 
 
[¶14]   In his effort to persuade this 
Court to recognize this de facto contested case concept, he offers an Oregon 
court of appeals decision and decisions from the Supreme Court of Hawaii.  In Anderson v. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 
770 P.2d 947 (Or. Ct. App. 1989), the court reviewed an order of the medical 
examiners board revoking Anderson's license to practice medicine.  Id. at 948.  The board's order was based on 
Anderson's refusal to comply with a subpoena to attend an informal interview 
with the board; such refusal was grounds for revocation under Oregon statutory 
law.  Id.  Challenging this board's order, Anderson 
reasoned that the board had conducted a previous informal interview with her 
concerning the complaints about her practice methodologies; that the board's 
approach had become adversarial and had assumed the character of a contested 
case; and that the proceedings were on the verge of becoming disciplinary.  Id.  Under Oregon statutory law, disciplinary 
proceedings involving license suspension or revocation require contested case 
procedures.  Id. at n.1.  Rejecting Anderson's de facto contested 
case concept, the court explained that, because the investigatory informal 
interview never occurred, it could not conclude that the interview would have 
turned out to be a disciplinary proceeding requiring contested case procedures 
to protect Anderson's license to practice medicine.  Id. at 949.  The court observed that had the nature 
of the informal interview turned out to be a disciplinary proceeding with the 
board conducting a de facto contested case and issuing a reviewable disciplinary 
order, Anderson could have obtained redress by assigning error to the interview 
proceeding.  Id.  Gilbert states, without adequate 
explanation, that his situation is quite similar to Anderson's.  We fail to see the similarity.  Gilbert was requesting a variance as to 
which he had no vested property right; Anderson had a vested property right in 
her medical license which could be adversely affected by the medical examiners 
board's disciplinary action only after a statutorily required disciplinary 
proceeding to which contested case procedures attached.  Anderson is not authority for the broad 
proposition that a board's public hearings on a variance request, as to which 
there is no vested right, mutates into a de facto contested case proceeding when 
matters become contentious and adversarial with the board questioning the 
validity of the evidence offered by the party requesting a 
variance.

 
 
[¶15]   Gilbert next briefly points to In re Application of Hawaiian Electric 
Company, Inc., 535 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Haw. 1975), claiming the Supreme Court 
of Hawaii held that "a public hearing, conducted pursuant to public notice, is a 
contested case' within the meaning of HRS § 91-14" (which statute, Gilbert 
states, sets forth judicial review of contested cases).  Actually, Hawaiian Electric did not so hold, but a 
case cited in that opinion did, see East 
Diamond Head Ass'n v. Zoning Board, 479 P.2d 796, 799 (Haw. 1971) (without 
explanation, the court stated "[t]hat the public hearing was not a contested 
case' is without merit").  In East Diamond Head, the central issue was 
whether owners of land adjoining a parcel that had been issued a zoning variance 
to allow its use as a movie production location had standing to seek judicial 
review of the issuance of the variance following a public hearing in which the 
adjoining owners had participated but had not intervened.  Id. at 797-98.  The court held they were "persons 
aggrieved" by the zoning variance and, therefore, had standing to seek judicial 
review.  Id. at 798. The concept of a de facto 
contested case is nowhere to be found in the court's opinion.  Briefly returning to Hawaiian Electric, we note that it too 
is a standing case and not one involving a de facto contested case concept.  Hawaiian Electric filed an application 
for a rate increase with the public utilities commission.  The commission, after giving due notice, 
held contested case hearings on that application.  535 P.2d  at 1104.   A nonprofit corporation that used 
the utility's services and was concerned with environmental preservation and 
protection as well as an individual who subscribed to the utility's services 
sought but were denied intervention; however, they were granted participation 
status.  Id.  
In that capacity, they submitted proposed cross-examination questions 
for adverse witnesses, presented limited testimony, discussed the case with 
commission staff members, and submitted proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  Id.  
After the commission made its decision in favor of the utility's rate 
increase and the commission staff did not file an appeal, the nonprofit 
corporation and the individual subscriber claimed standing to seek judicial 
review of the commission decision.  
Id.  The court held they were aggrieved by the 
commission's action and granted them standing to appeal.  Id. at 1105-06.  Hawaiian Electric does not support 
Gilbert's position.

 
 
[¶16]   The final case that Gilbert relies 
on for the de facto contested case concept is Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal 
Venture, 881 P.2d 1210 (Haw. 1994).  
Without providing the factual and legal context of that case, Gilbert 
states the court there addressed the issue of public hearings becoming contested 
cases when they were adversarial in nature.  Gilbert's statement suggests that the 
court approved the concept of a de facto contested case when a public hearing 
becomes adversarial in nature.  Our 
review of the factual and legal context of that case causes us to conclude that 
such a suggestion is incorrect.  
Nowhere in the opinion in that case does the court mention, let alone 
discuss, the de facto concept.  Puna 
Geothermal Venture (PGV) applied to the Department of Health (DOH) for two 
authority-to-construct permits for a well field containing fourteen wells and a 
power plant.  Id. at 1212.  Under state law, DOH had discretionary 
authority to hold public hearings on PGV's application; however, several 
individuals requested contested case hearings and testified before DOH 
determined to grant or deny that request.  
Id.  After the attorney general's office 
informed DOH that there was no legal mandate to grant a contested case hearing, 
DOH denied the request and later granted PGV's application for the two 
permits.  Id.  Pele Defense Fund (PDF) appealed DOH's 
decision to grant PGV's permits in circuit court.  That court denied PGV's motion to 
dismiss the appeal.  Id.  at 1212-13.  PGV appealed to the supreme court for a 
determination whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to 
entertain PDF's appeal of DOH's decision granting PGV's permits.  Id. at 1213. The supreme court found the 
dispositive issue to be whether PGV's interest in obtaining an 
authority-to-construct permit constituted a property interest such that DOH's 
hearing was a contested case under applicable state law.  Id. at 1214.  The court agreed with PGV's assertion 
that a contested case is required when the agency denies PGV's proposed property 
use; and the court noted that, as a matter of constitutional due process, an 
agency hearing is also required where the issuance of a permit implicating an 
applicant's property rights adversely affects the constitutionally protected 
rights of other interested persons who have followed the agency's rules 
governing participation in contested cases.  Id.  Because DOH's public hearings involved 
PGV's effort to have its legal rights of land in which it held an interest 
declared over the objections of other landowners in the area, the court found 
those public hearings were contested cases.  Id.  The court next considered whether those 
individuals who had requested contested case hearings had followed DOH's rules 
in that regard.  Id. at 1215.  Finding they had, the court held the 
circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction in the case.  Id.  The court then turned to consider 
whether some of those individuals had shown they had standing to request review 
of DOH's decision.  Id.  The court found that several of the 
individuals who claimed PGV's proposed activities would cause potential harm of 
diminished property values, deterioration of air quality, odor nuisance, and 
possible physical injury had clearly demonstrated sufficient threatened injury 
in fact to establish standing.  Id. at 1216.  The final element of the court's 
analysis was whether those individuals were involved in or participated in a 
contested case.  Id.  The court concluded that certain 
individuals had contested before DOH whether PGV's permits should be issued and 
thereby had satisfied the requirement of adversary participation.  Id. at 1217.  Thus, those individuals who had 
demonstrated sufficient participation and potential injury were entitled to seek 
judicial review of DOH's decision.  
Id. at 1218.  In light of our review of Pele Defense Fund, we fail to see that 
it supports Gilbert's assertion of a de facto contested case concept.  We decline to recognize that concept in 
this case.

 
 

B.        
Whether a sufficient administrative record exists for purposes of 
judicial review.

 
 
[¶17]   As provided in W.R.A.P. 12.07(b), 
the record in a non-contested agency case, such as this one, "shall consist of 
the appropriate agency documents reflecting the agency action and its 
basis."  In an appeal of agency 
action, "the filing of the record . . . in the supreme court shall be as in 
civil cases pursuant to [W.R.A.P.] 1.01, 3, 7, and 8."  W.R.A.P. 12.11 (b).  Gilbert's designation reads as 
follows:

 
 
APPELLANT'S 
DESIGNATION OF RECORD

 
 
COMES 
NOW Appellant Bruce Gilbert, by and through his counsel, Bonner Stinson, P.C., 
and hereby files and submits his Designation of Record pursuant to W.R.A.P. § 
3.05(b), as follows in the case of Bruce Gilbert v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Park County; Supreme Court No. S-08-0202.

 
 
                                                                           
ITEM 
NO/PAGES

 
 
Resolution 
No. 2006-5                                                        
1-3

 
 
Staff 
Report to the Park County Planning 

& 
Zoning Commission                                                       
21

 
 
Email 
from Bo Bowman to Don Walter                            
19

 
 
Park 
County Planning & Zoning Memorandum, 

November 
9, 2005                                                               
31, 32

 
 
Notice 
of Public Hearing                                                    
33

 
 
Affidavit 
of William Spuhl                                                  
44, 45

 
 
Audiocassette 
Tape, November 15, 2005                                   
49, 50

 
 
Audiocassette 
Tape, December 6, 2005                          
51, 54

 
 
Audiocassette 
Tape, January 10, 2006                           
55

 
 
December 
6, 2005 County Commissioner Minutes      53, 
62

 
 
January 
3, 2006 County Commissioner Minutes          
71

 
 
January 
10, 2006 County Commissioner Minutes        
76

 
 
Park 
County BOCC Minutes, 10/09/07                            
80

 
 
Audio 
Recording, BCC Meeting, 10/09/07                      
83

 
 
Resolution 
2007-72                                                             
84-87

            

In 
Gilbert's supplemental designation, he repeats some of the above designations 
and adds the following:

 
 
            
Because review of an agency decision is "whole record review" (W.S. § 
16-3-114(c)), Gilbert submits that the Court should review the entire 
record.  The following designation 
pertains to the Administrative Record, pursuant to the Second Supplemental 
Index.  Specifically, Gilbert cites 
to the following:

 
 
                                                                           
ITEM 
NO/PAGES

 
 
Letter 
from Attorney Scott to BOCC                                  
39-40

 
 
Audiocassette 
Tape, January 3, 2006                              
51

 
 
 
 
The 
following designation pertains to the District Court Clerk 
Record.

 
 
                                                                           
ITEM 
NO/PAGES

 
 
Brief 
of Petitioner, Bruce Gilbert                           
0020-0039

 
 
Motion 
to Supplement the Record                                    
0040-0041

 
 
Order 
Allowing Supplementation of the Record 

and 
Allowing Supplementation of Petitioner's 

Opening 
Brief                       
                                    
0042-0043

 
 
Supplemental 
Brief of Petitioner, 

Bruce 
Gilbert                                                             
0046-0056

 
 
Supplemental 
Brief of Respondent                     
0119-0149

 
 
In 
addition, the Park County Clerk transmitted the following items listed on her 
several indices and they are in this record:

 
 


DATE

PAGE

TO

FROM

SUBJECT

01/17/06

1-3

 
 
 
 
RESOLUTION 
      2006-05

07/18/05

4

 
 
 
 
Application 
      fee  Receipt #5548

08/04/05

5-6

Bo 
      Bowman, Planning Coordinator

Bruce 
      Gilbert

Request 
      to keep zoning as is with application fee for variance to extend 
      LUC-59

08/09/05

7-10

 
 
 
 
Proof 
      of ownership: Warranty Deed 2005-319

 
 
11-12

 
 
 
 
Location 
      Maps

08/29/05

13

Meeteetse 
      Advisory Board

Bo 
      Bowman, Planning Coordinator

Information 
      about variance

08/29/05

14

Bruce 
      Gilbert

Bo 
      Bowman, Planning Coordinator

Response 
      to Variance request

08/30/05

15

 
 
 
 
Certified 
      mailing list to neighbors for P & Z Variance Request Public Hearing on 
      September 27, 2005

09/03/05

16

Bo 
      Bowman, Planning Coordinator

Don 
      & Julie Walter

Opposition 
      to extending the current zoning designation

09/09/05

17

 
 
 
 
Notice 
      of P & Z Public Hearing Postponement

09/12/05

18

Bo 
      Bowman, Planning Coordinator

Don 
      Wolfe

Opposition 
      to extending the current zoning designation

 
 
19

Don 
      Wolfe

Bo 
      Bowman, Planning Coordinator

Response 
      to email of 09/03/05

09/13/05

20

 
 
 
 
Notice 
      of P & Z Public Hearing for September 27, 
  2005

 
 
21-25

 
 
Bo 
      Bowman, Planning Coordinator

Staff 
      Report for October 18, 2005 P & Z Meeting

 
 
26

 
 
 
 
Park 
      County Land Use Classification: LIM

10/25/05

27

 
 
 
 
Certified 
      mailing list to neighbors for BCC Variance Request Public Hearing on 
      November 15, 2005

11/02/05

28

Bruce 
      Gilbert

Bo 
      Bowman, Planning Coordinator

Scheduling 
      information

11/02/05

29

Bo 
      Bowman, Planning Coordinator

Leon 
      & Pauline Placzkowski

Opposition 
      to allow extension date of LUC-59

11/08/05

30

Bo 
      Bowman, Planning Coordinator

Mike 
      May, Chairman Meeteetse Advisory Board 

Request 
      for meeting

11/09/05

31-32

BCC

Bo 
      Bowman, Planning Coordinator

Memo: 
      Information on variance

 
 
33

 
 
 
 
Notice 
      of BCC Public Hearing for November 15, 2005

11/15/05

34

 
 
 
 
P 
      & Z Resolution #2005-54

11/17/05

35-36

Bo 
      Bowman, Planning Coordinator

Bobby 
      Joe Long

Concerns 
      to be presented to BCC

11/17/05

37-38

Bo 
      Bowman, Planning Coordinator

Bobby 
      Joe Long

Additional 
      concerns to be presented to BCC

11/21/05

39-40

BCC

Dawn 
      Scott, Bonner Stinson, P.C.

Legal 
      issues

11/28/05

41

BCC

Bo 
      Bowman, Planning Coordinator

Memo: 
      Information on variance

12/08/05

42

 
 
 
 
Mailing 
      to neighbors for Reopened PH January 3, 2006 by regular 
      mail

12/27/05

43-45

BCC

Dawn 
      Scott, Bonner Stinson, P.C.

Affidavit 
      of William Spuhl

12/30/05

46

Bo 
      Bowman, Planning Coordinator

Don 
      & Julie Walter

Request 
      to deny extension of LUC-59

 
 
47

 
 
 
 
Copy 
      of ATF license for Bill Spuhl

 
 
48

 
 
 
 
Notice 
      of Reopening Public Hearing for January 3, 
2005

 
 
49

 
 
 
 
TAPE 
      1

 
 
50

 
 
 
 
TAPE 
      2

 
 
51

 
 
 
 
TAPE 
      3

 
 
52

 
 
 
 
Tape 
      4

 
 
53

 
 
 
 
Tape 
      5

 
 
54

 
 
 
 
Tape 
      6

 
 
55

 
 
 
 
Tape 
      7

12/06/05

56-66

 
 
 
 
BCC 
      minutes, 12/06/05

01/03/06

67-75

 
 
 
 
BCC 
      minutes, 1/03/06

01/10/06

76-79

 
 
 
 
BCC 
      minutes, 1/10/06

10/09/07

80-82

 
 
 
 
BCC 
      minutes, 10/09/07

 
 
83

 
 
 
 
Audio 
      recording, BCC meeting 10/09/07

10/16/07

84-87

 
 
 
 
BCC 
      Resolution 2007-72; 
redeliberations

 
 
[¶18]   Gilbert complains in his appellate 
briefing that the record before us is incomplete and insufficient for purposes 
of our review.  In particular, he 
points to one of the three audio cassette tapes, concerning the proceedings on 
January 3, 2006, and notes that it contains only part of that proceeding, the 
rest of the tape having been taped over by other board proceedings unrelated to 
him.  He also notes that no audio 
cassette tapes were submitted for the December 6, 2005, meeting and the January 
10, 2006, meeting at which the Board announced its decision.  He also criticizes the Board's minutes 
as being inaccurate in some respects and not informative.  He argues that such an insufficient 
record hampers any assessment of the reasonableness of the Board's action.  We note that if an appellant is 
concerned that no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing was made, 
or if a transcript is unavailable, then appellant may prepare a statement of the 
evidence or proceedings from the best available means including appellant's 
recollection.  W.R.A.P. 3.03.  While Gilbert did not pursue that 
opportunity, we observe that in his appellate briefing there are several 
instances in which his counsel inserts his recollection of the discussions of 
some board members.  We also observe 
that both counsel in their respective briefing have set out their statements of 
the case and statements of the facts with appropriate references to the record. 
 Having considered Gilbert's 
concerns and carefully reviewed the designated record, we are satisfied that we 
have a sufficient record consisting of the appropriate Board's documents 
relating to the Board's action and its basis for purposes of our judicial 
review.

 
 

C.        What 
is the effect of Gilbert's failure to appeal the Planning Coordinator's decision 
that Gilbert needed to request a variance.

 
 
[¶19]   Gilbert and the Board present 
argument on whether Gilbert needed to request a variance in the first 
place.  Gilbert maintains that at 
the first hearing before the Board on November 15, 2001, he indicated that a 
variance was unnecessary because he and his counsel had realized, shortly before 
that hearing, that Spuhl's business activities on the property had been 
substantially advanced so that the LUC-59 designation was not subject to 
expiration.  Gilbert offered to stop 
his presentation unless the Board wanted to hear how he could also satisfy the 
requirements for a variance.  The 
Board's chairperson told Gilbert that the Board did not know where it was going 
with that, so Gilbert should cover the variance requirements.  In response, Gilbert presented evidence 
and argument on both matters.  He 
asserts that his variance request and presentation was made in the spirit of 
caution and compliance, but not of necessity.  The Board, however, is of the view that 
whether a variance was required in the first place is essentially 
irrelevant.  It argues that Gilbert 
requested a variance, paid $300.00 for that application, and set into motion the 
procedure that the Board followed at the hearings.  The Board claims that the Planning 
Coordinator's July 2005 letter informing Gilbert that he needed to request a 
variance in order to extend the expiration of the LUC-59 designation constituted 
a decision and, therefore, Gilbert should have appealed that decision to the 
Board as provided in the provisions of the 2000 Zoning Resolution.  In response to that claim, Gilbert 
contends that the July 2005 letter was not a formal decision on whether Spuhl's 
business activities on the property had failed to substantially advance the 
LUC-59 designation.

 
 
[¶20]   The significance of the parties' 
argument on this issue is simply whether our judicial review should concern only 
the Board's decision that Gilbert failed to satisfy the variance standards or, 
instead, should also include whether a variance request was necessary at 
all.  From our reading of the 
Board's decision, Resolution # 2007-72, it is clear that both matters were 
before the Board, and, therefore, our judicial review shall include both 
matters.

 
 
IV.       Substantive 
Issues

 
 

A.        
Whether the Board's decisions, contained in Resolution # 2007-72, that a 
variance was necessary and that Gilbert had failed to show that the variance 
standards were met, are supported by substantial evidence.

 
 
[¶21]   Mindful of our substantial evidence 
test referred to earlier in this opinion, we have reviewed the entire record in 
this case and the Board's Resolution # 2007-72.  From that review, it is clear to this 
Court that the Board was presented with and considered conflicting evidence 
concerning both whether a variance was necessary and whether Gilbert had shown 
that the variance standards were met.  
The conflicting evidence, as well as the arguments based on that 
evidence, served both issues.  It is 
also clear that the Board's Resolution # 2007-72 effectively answered both 
issues.  The Board weighed the 
conflicting evidence and arguments and determined those issues adversely to 
Gilbert.  We have carefully 
considered Gilbert's appellate argument, but we are satisfied that the Board's 
decisions are supported by relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might 
accept in support of those decisions.  
We hold that the Board's Resolution # 2007-72 is supported by 
substantial evidence.

 
 
B.        
Whether the Board's decisions, contained in Resolution # 2007-72, 
that a variance was necessary and that Gilbert had failed to show that the 
variance standards were met, are arbitrary and 
capricious.

 
 
[¶22]   Mindful of our arbitrary and 
capricious test referred to earlier in this opinion, we have reviewed the entire 
record in this case and the Board's Resolution # 2007-72.  That test requires only that a rational 
basis exist for the agency's decisions.  
As we have previously noted, the Board was presented with conflicting 
evidence and argument on the issues before it.  No doubt there was room for two opinions 
to be derived from that conflict; however, an honest difference of opinion will 
not support a finding of arbitrariness and capriciousness.  Henderson v. City of Laramie, 457 P.2d 498, 502 (Wyo. 1969).  We have 
carefully considered Gilbert's appellate argument, but we are satisfied that the 
Board's decisions adverse to his positions on the issue were not in disregard of 
the facts and circumstances of the case.  
We hold that the Board's Resolution # 2007-72 was not an arbitrary or 
capricious action.

 
 
[¶23]   For all of the above and foregoing 
reasons, we affirm the Board's Resolution 
# 2007-72.