Title: Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13122 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  AVERYK CARRASQUILLO. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 8, 2021. - February 7, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
  Privacy.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, 
Privacy.  Search and Seizure, Expectation of privacy.  
Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 18, 2017, and August 16, 2018. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Diane 
C. Freniere, J., and a conditional plea was accepted by Jeffrey 
A. Locke, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Suzanne Renaud for the defendant. 
Ian MacLean, Assistant District Attorney (Caitlin 
Fitzgerald, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
Sara E. Silva, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In this case we confront the novel question 
2 
 
whether the defendant had a constitutionally protected 
expectation of privacy in social media content that he shared, 
albeit unknowingly, with an undercover police officer. 
 
After accepting a "friend" request from the officer, the 
defendant published a video recording to his social media 
account that featured an individual seen from the chest down 
holding what appeared to be a firearm.  The undercover officer 
made his own recording of the posting, which later was used in 
criminal proceedings against the defendant.  A Superior Court 
judge denied the defendant's motion to suppress the recording as 
the fruit of an unconstitutional search, and the defendant 
appealed.  We transferred the matter to this court on our own 
motion. 
 
Among other arguments, the defendant suggests that because 
his account on this particular social media platform was 
designated as "private," he had an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in its contents.  The Commonwealth 
contends that the act of posting any content to a social media 
account de facto eliminates any reasonable expectation of 
privacy in that content.  Given the rapidly evolving role of 
social media in society, and the relative novelty of the 
technology at issue, we decline both the defendant's and the 
Commonwealth's requests that we adopt their proffered bright-
line rules.  Rather, as with other questions of a reasonable 
3 
 
expectation of privacy, each case must be resolved by carefully 
considering the totality of the circumstances, bearing in mind 
the privacy interests that the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights were designed to protect. 
In the circumstances here, we conclude that the defendant 
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content 
that he shared with the undercover officer, and thus that no 
search in the constitutional sense occurred.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.1 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Snapchat.  In order to analyze the 
particular circumstances in this case, where the defendant's 
arguments rely upon properties of the specific technology 
employed, some understanding of Snapchat, the social media 
application the defendant used to publish the video recordings 
at issue, is necessary.  Snapchat allows users to share text, 
photographs, and video recordings, collectively known as 
"snaps."  See B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 175 
n.1 (3d Cir. 2020), aff'd, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021).  Snaps may be 
shared either as "direct snaps" or as "stories."  See Note, 
#NoFilter:  A Critical Look at Physicians Sharing Patient 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in support 
of the defendant. 
4 
 
Information on  Health L. Rev. 325, 329 
(2019).  Direct snaps are sent directly to another user's inbox, 
remain visible for ten seconds or less after they are opened, 
and can be viewed only once.  See Magill, Discovering Snapchat:  
How Will Snapchat and Similar Self-Destructing Social Media 
Applications Affect Relevance and Spoliation Under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure?, 9 Charleston L. Rev. 365, 372-373 
(2015) (Magill).  Stories, on the other hand, by default are 
shared with a larger audience, remain visible for up to twenty-
four hours, and can be continuously replayed.  Id. at 374.  
Either type of snap can be preserved if the recipient takes a 
screenshot2 or otherwise records the content by some other 
technology external to Snapchat.  Id. at 373. 
 
Snapchat accounts can be configured as either "public" or 
"private."  See J.E. Grenig & W.C. Gleisner, III, eDiscovery and 
Digital Evidence § 3:39 (Nov. 2021 update).  When users 
initially create a Snapchat account, by default it is private, 
and the user must explicitly choose to make it public.  See 
Ceres, How to Use Snapchat:  Critical Tips for New Users, Wired, 
Oct. 2, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/how-to-use-snapchat-
filters-stories-stickers [https://perma.cc/NW6F-NKK3]. 
 
 
2 "A 'screenshot' is a recorded image of the visible items 
displayed on a computer monitor [or cell phone screen]."  
TrueBeginnings, LLC v. Spark Network Servs., Inc., 631 F. Supp. 
2d 849, 851 n.1 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
5 
 
 
Stories posted to public accounts are visible to all 
members of the public, whereas stories posted to private 
accounts by default are visible only to individuals that the 
user chooses to add as "friends."3  Id.4  A user can add friends 
in one of three ways:  "(1) by allowing Snapchat to access his 
or her phone's address book and add users who have registered 
using that contact information; (2) by manually inputting his or 
her friends' usernames; or (3) by approving other users who have 
requested to add the user."  Magill, 9 Charleston L. Rev. 
at 371. 
 
b.  Factual background.  We summarize the facts as found by 
the motion judge, "supplemented by evidence in the record that 
is uncontroverted and that was implicitly credited by the judge" 
(citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Leslie, 477 Mass. 48, 
 
 
3 Social media "friends" are part of one another's social 
media network and are able to interact with each other 
electronically.  See S.J. Drucker & G. Gumpert, Regulating 
Convergence 73 (2010).  Friends are able to view each other's 
private content and directly interact via the social media 
application.  See In re A.G., 58 Cal. App. 5th 647, 651 (2020). 
 
4 Even where an account is private, a user may opt to make 
particular stories available to the public.  Hamburger, 
Snapchat's Next Big Thing:  'Stories' That Don't Just Disappear, 
The Verge, Oct. 3, 2013, https://www.theverge.com/2013/10/3 
/4791934/snapchats-next-big-thing-stories-that-dont-just-
disappear [https://perma.cc/TVU5-5XTG].  Users also can further 
restrict their private stories so that the stories are visible 
only to specific friends.  Nield, How to Control the Privacy of 
Your  20, 2019, https://www.wired 
.com/story/facebook-instagram-twitter-posts-private 
[https://perma.cc/93RE-W7LZ]. 
6 
 
49 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 531 
(2016).  Sometime in April of 2017, Boston police Officer Joseph 
Connolly sent a friend request to a private5 Snapchat account 
belonging to the username "Frio Fresh."  Connolly sent the 
request from an "undercover" account that he created to aid in 
his investigations; the username for that account was a 
pseudonym chosen at "random," without regard for anyone Connolly 
"thought [he] might be following."  The "profile picture"6 
associated with the account was a default picture assigned by 
 
5 Although the judge did not expressly conclude that the 
defendant's account was private, the evidence the judge credited 
established as much.  "Appellate courts may supplement a judge's 
finding of facts if the evidence is uncontroverted and 
undisputed and where the judge explicitly or implicitly credited 
the witness's testimony."  Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 
334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008).  Here, Connolly's 
"uncontroverted and undisputed" testimony, which the judge 
explicitly credited, established that Connolly was unable to 
view the defendant's postings until the defendant accepted his 
friend request.  Had the defendant's account been public, 
Connolly would have been able to view the content without the 
need for the defendant to accept a friend request.  See J.E. 
Grenig & W.C. Gleisner, III, eDiscovery and Digital Evidence 
§ 3:39 (Nov. 2021 update).  The conclusion that the defendant's 
account in fact was private is not inconsistent with the judge's 
finding that the defendant was unaware of his privacy settings.  
See note 14 and part 2.c, infra. 
 
 
6 A profile picture is an image that is associated with and 
used to identify a particular social media user's account.  See 
Griffith, Understanding and Authenticating Evidence from Social 
Networking Sites, 7 Wash. J. L. Tech. & Arts 209, 212, 217 
(2012).  A user's profile picture generally accompanies any 
content that he or she posts.  See The Katiroll Co. vs. Kati 
Roll & Platters, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 10-3620 (GEB) (D.N.J. 
Aug. 3, 2011). 
7 
 
Snapchat. 
 
Once Frio Fresh accepted Connolly's friend request, 
Connolly was able to view stories posted to that account and 
would have been able to receive any direct snaps sent to him.  
After viewing multiple video recordings, Connolly came to 
believe that the Frio Fresh account belonged to the defendant.  
Connolly was familiar with the defendant through his work with 
the youth violence strike force and knew that the defendant was 
prohibited from carrying a firearm due to prior criminal 
convictions. 
On May 10, 2017, Connolly viewed a story on the Frio Fresh 
account7 that depicted an individual from the chest down wearing 
distinctive clothing and displaying what appeared to be a silver 
revolver.  Approximately thirty minutes later, Connolly viewed 
another story on the account that showed the defendant inside 
what Connolly recognized as a weightlifting gym in the 
Dorchester section of Boston.  Using a separate device, Connolly 
made a recording of the first story but was unable to record the 
second before it was deleted.  He then notified other members of 
the youth violence strike force of his discovery, and officers 
established surveillance near the gym.  Shortly thereafter, 
officers saw the defendant in that area, wearing the same 
 
7 At the evidentiary hearing, the defendant conceded that he 
owned the Frio Fresh account. 
8 
 
distinctive clothing as the individual in the Snapchat 
recordings.  They pursued and eventually seized the defendant, 
recovering a revolver from his right pants pocket.  The 
defendant was arrested and charged with multiple firearms 
offenses.8 
Arguing that Connolly's actions effectuated an 
unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 
art. 14, the defendant sought to suppress the video recordings 
and all evidence derived from them.9  At an evidentiary hearing 
on the motion to suppress, both Connolly and the defendant 
testified.  The motion judge concluded that the defendant had 
not established that he had had a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the video recordings.  She also decided that, even if 
the defendant had had a subjective expectation of privacy in 
those recordings, such an expectation would not have been 
reasonable.  Accordingly, the judge concluded that no search in 
the constitutional sense occurred, and denied the defendant's 
motion.  The defendant subsequently entered into a conditional 
 
8 The defendant was indicted on charges of possession of a 
firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), as a 
subsequent offender; carrying a loaded firearm without a 
license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); and carrying ammunition without 
a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h) (1). 
 
9 The defendant also moved to suppress the recovered 
revolver as the fruit of an unconstitutional seizure.  This 
motion was denied, a decision that the defendant does not 
challenge on appeal. 
9 
 
plea arrangement, reserving his right to pursue an appeal from 
the denial of his motion to suppress.10 
c.  Privacy interests.  The Fourth Amendment and art. 14 
guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable searches.  
Commonwealth v. Almonor, 482 Mass. 35, 40 (2019).  In 
interpreting these constitutional protections, we bear in mind 
"the circumstances under which [they were] framed, the causes 
leading to [their] adoption, the imperfections hoped to be 
remedied, and the ends designed to be accomplished."  Jenkins v. 
Chief Justice of the Dist. Court Dep't, 416 Mass. 221, 229 
(1993), quoting General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of 
Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 158 (1935).  See United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405-406 (2012) (considering historical 
purpose of Fourth Amendment in determining whether search 
occurred).  As society continues to change in the face of 
evolving technologies, we seek to assure the same level of 
privacy against government intrusion that existed when the 
Fourth Amendment and art. 14 were adopted.  See Commonwealth v. 
McCarthy, 484 Mass. 493, 498 (2020). 
Given the substantial differences between the physical 
world in which our constitutions were adopted and the electronic 
 
10 Under the terms of the agreement, the defendant pleaded 
guilty to possession of a firearm without a license, as a 
subsequent offender, and carrying a loaded firearm without a 
license, and the prosecutor dismissed the remaining charge. 
10 
 
world that we now navigate, this task is delicate and at times 
fraught.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 420 (Alito, J., concurring) 
("it is almost impossible to think of late-18th-century 
situations that are analogous to" electronic surveillance); 
Commonwealth v. Mora, 485 Mass. 360, 374 (2020) (same).  We also 
are mindful that we cannot know the ways in which technology 
inevitably will change in years to come, and we do not wish to 
"embarrass the future" by adopting bright-line rules or drawing 
analogies that might prove ill fitting for the technology of 
tomorrow.  See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 
292, 300 (1944).  Therefore, in undertaking an analysis 
involving purported electronic searches, we avoid mechanical 
applications of canons designed for the physical world, and 
begin by returning to the founding-era principles that have 
informed Fourth Amendment and art. 14 jurisprudence for over two 
centuries.  See, e.g., McCarthy, 484 Mass. at 498-500 (analyzing 
Fourth Amendment and art. 14 protections in light of "the 
underlying purposes of both art. 14 and the Fourth Amendment"). 
Although the word "privacy" does not appear in either the 
Federal Constitution or our State Constitution, the drafters of 
both documents undoubtedly held special regard for individual 
privacy.  See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) 
(Fourth Amendment drafters sought to preserve "the privacies of 
life"); Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 69-70 (1987) 
11 
 
(drafters of art. 14 sought to protect "the right to be let 
alone").  Concerns over privacy, particularly privacy in 
communications, were "reflected in virtually every complaint 
levied by the colonists against King George III," and 
precipitated the American Revolution.  See F.S. Lane, American 
Privacy:  The 400-Year History of Our Most Contested Right 3 
(2009). 
The founders' deep concern for maintaining privacy against 
governmental intrusion eventually was enshrined in the Fourth 
Amendment and art. 14.  See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 
391, 400 (1976) ("The Framers addressed the subject of personal 
privacy directly in the Fourth Amendment"); Commonwealth v. 
Sbordone, 424 Mass. 802, 810 (1997) (art. 14 was "intended to 
protect individual privacy interests").  Both provisions protect 
against governmental intrusion so that individuals may "forge 
the private connections and freely exchange the ideas that form 
the bedrock of a civil society."  Mora, 485 Mass. at 371.  See 
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967) (intrusions into 
individual privacy have been considered "subversive of all the 
comforts of society" since the late Eighteenth Century); Lane, 
supra at 16 ("the evident concern for preserving autonomy and 
freedom [in the Constitution] was the functional equivalent of 
protecting personal privacy").  To this end, the Fourth 
Amendment and art. 14 serve the important functions of ensuring 
12 
 
conversational and associational privacy. 
Conversational privacy protects private conversations from 
unreasonable government surveillance.  See United States v. 
United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 
297, 313 (1972); Blood, 400 Mass. at 69 ("the right to bring 
thoughts and emotions forth from the self in company with others 
doing likewise" is protected by art. 14).  Conversational 
privacy serves not only the Fourth Amendment's and art. 14's 
interests in "secur[ing] the privacies of life against arbitrary 
power," McCarthy, 484 Mass. at 498, quoting Almonor, 482 Mass. 
at 53 (Lenk, J., concurring), but also the interests protected 
by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of rights in enabling 
and guarding free speech, see First Amendment (protecting 
"freedom of speech"); art. 16 ("The right of free speech shall 
not be abridged").  See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 
(2001).  Indeed, "[i]n a democratic society privacy of 
communication is essential if citizens are to think and act 
creatively and constructively."  Id., quoting President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 202 (1967) (President's 
Commission).  The erosion of conversational privacy therefore 
risks imposing a "seriously inhibiting effect upon the 
willingness to voice critical and constructive ideas."  
13 
 
Bartnicki, supra, quoting President's Commission, supra. 
Relatedly, associational privacy protects the ability to 
develop and maintain personal relationships.  See Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-618 (1984) ("choices to 
enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships 
must be secured against undue intrusion by the State"); Blood, 
400 Mass. at 69 ("the right to be known to others and to know 
them, and thus to be whole as a free member of a free society" 
is protected by art. 14).  Given the "vital relationship between 
freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations," 
associational privacy is necessary in order for the associations 
protected by the First Amendment and art. 19 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to flourish.  See First 
Amendment (protecting freedom of association); art. 19 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (protecting peaceable right 
to assemble).  See also National Ass'n for the Advancement of 
Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958); Society of 
Jesus of New England v. Commonwealth, 441 Mass. 662, 675 (2004), 
quoting Attorney Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 380, cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 970 (1982) ("The right to freedom of 
association [under art. 19] necessarily encompasses the right to 
'privacy in one's associations' . . .").  Associational privacy 
"safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity" 
by relating to and engaging with others.  Roberts, supra at 618-
14 
 
619.  Protection of associational privacy also plays a crucial 
role in maintaining a democracy; for instance, it enables 
individuals to amplify their voices by joining with like-minded 
others, and encourages civic participation by reducing isolation 
without fear of government interference or reprisal.  See 
Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association:  Political Profiling, 
Surveillance and the Privacy of Groups, 46 Ariz. L. Rev. 621, 
639 (2004).  Accordingly, both the Federal and State 
Constitutions "must afford the formation and preservation of 
certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial 
measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the 
State."  Roberts, supra at 618.  See Blood, supra. 
Government surveillance of social media, for instance, 
implicates conversational and associational privacy because of 
the increasingly important role that social media plays in human 
connection and interaction in the Commonwealth and around the 
world.  For many, social media is an indispensable feature of 
social life through which they develop and nourish deeply 
personal and meaningful relationships.11  For better or worse, 
 
11 See Bargh & McKenna, The Internet and Social Life, 55 
Ann. Rev. Psych. 573, 581 (2004) ("on-line relationships are 
highly similar to those developed in person, in terms of their 
breadth, depth, and quality"); Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal 
Privacy:  Why the Third Party Doctrine Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. 
L. Rev. 1, 6 (2013) ("Social scientists and psychologists alike 
have recognized that [online] relationships can have the same 
 
15 
 
the momentous joys, profound sorrows, and minutiae of everyday 
life that previously would have been discussed with friends in 
the privacy of each others' homes now generally are shared 
electronically using social media connections.12  Government 
surveillance of this activity therefore risks chilling the 
conversational and associational privacy rights that the Fourth 
Amendment and art. 14 seek to protect.  See Jones, 565 U.S. 
at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("Awareness that the 
government may be watching chills associational and expressive 
 
qualitative structure as traditional face-to-face 
relationships").  See also Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 Iowa 
L. Rev. 1137, 1151 (2009) ("[Social media] provides users with a 
forum in which they can craft social identities, forge 
reciprocal relationships, and accumulate social capital"); 
Lenhart, Smith, Anderson, Duggan, & Perrin, Pew Research Center, 
Teens, Technology & Friendships, at 53 (Aug. 6, 2015), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/9 
/2015/08/Teens-and-Friendships-FINAL2.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/CWF5-HSJC] ("Given the thorough integration of social 
media . . . , it is no surprise that these sites play an 
important role in the establishment of friendships and the 
everyday back and forth of peer relationships"). 
 
12 See Keller, Social Media and Interpersonal Communication, 
13 Soc. Work Today, no. 3, May/June 2013, at 10 ("studies have 
shown that people actually are becoming more social and more 
interactive with others, but the style of that communication has 
changed so that we're not meeting face-to-face as often as we 
used to," but rather interacting online); Madden, Lenhart, 
Cortesi, Gasser, Duggan, Smith, & Beaton, Pew Research Center, 
Teens, Social Media, and Privacy, at 30 (May 21, 2013), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-
content/uploads/sites/9/2013/05/PIP_TeensSocialMediaandPrivacy_P
DF.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z52-82ZK] ("the act of sharing certain 
kinds of personal information on social media profiles has 
become much more common" [footnote omitted]). 
16 
 
freedoms"); Bedi, Social Networks, Government Surveillance, and 
the Fourth Amendment Mosaic Theory, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1809, 1851 
(2014) ("Allowing [government monitoring of an individual] could 
deter an individual from exercising [his or] her rights to 
engage in various associational activities -- whether they are 
social, professional, political, or religious -- for fear the 
government may be watching").  Accordingly, the constitutional 
solicitude for conversational and associational privacy extends 
to the realm of social media. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant maintains that Connolly's 
conduct in viewing and recording the Snapchat stories 
constituted an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment and art. 14.  He argues that each of the judge's 
findings about his subjective expectations of privacy was error 
unsupported by the record, and that he did retain a subjective 
expectation of privacy in his Snapchat video recordings.  The 
defendant also argues that, with respect to an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the court should adopt the 
reasoning of United States v. Chavez, 423 F. Supp. 3d 194, 203-
205 (W.D.N.C. 2019), and hold that where a social media account 
has been set up as "private," its owner per se enjoys a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in content posted to that 
17 
 
account.13  We review the defendant's claims under "the more 
stringent standards of art. 14, with the understanding that, if 
these standards are met, so too are those of the Fourth 
Amendment."  Garcia v. Commonwealth, 486 Mass. 341, 349 (2020), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Tapia, 463 Mass. 721, 729 n.16 (2012). 
 
a.  Standard of review.  "In reviewing a decision on a 
motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of 
fact absent clear error but conduct an independent review of 
[the] ultimate findings and conclusions of law" (quotations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Ramos, 470 Mass. 740, 742 (2015), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Colon, 449 Mass. 207, 214, cert. denied, 
552 U.S. 1079 (2007).  "A finding is clearly erroneous only 
when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
 
13 In the alternative, the defendant argues that even if we 
conclude there was no reasonable expectation of privacy, a 
search occurred under the trespass test.  Under that test, a 
search occurs when "the government obtains information by 
physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area."  
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 481 Mass. 710, 715, cert. denied, 140 
S. Ct. 247 (2019), quoting Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 
306, 309 (2015) (per curiam).  We recognize that the United 
States Supreme Court has held that the trespass test does not 
apply to "cases that do not involve physical contact, such as 
those that involve the transmission of electronic signals," 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012), and 
accordingly consider the defendant's argument under the more 
protective provisions of art. 14, see Commonwealth v. One 1985 
Ford Thunderbird Auto., 416 Mass. 603, 607 (1993).  Even if we 
were to conclude that art. 14 does extend to electronic 
trespasses (a result we do not reach), the defendant could not 
satisfy the trespass test, because he consented to the officer's 
presence. 
18 
 
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed" (quotations 
omitted).  Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 424 Mass. 
501, 509 (1997), quoting Building Inspector of Lancaster v. 
Sanderson, 372 Mass. 157, 160 (1977).  With respect to 
conclusions of law, "[o]ur duty is to make an independent 
determination of the correctness of the judge's application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found."  Commonwealth 
v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616, 619 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Mercado, 422 Mass. 367, 369 (1996). 
 
b.  Whether a search occurred.  To be entitled to the 
protections against government searches under art. 14, an 
individual must demonstrate that the challenged government 
conduct amounted to a search in the constitutional sense.  
Commonwealth v. Porter P., 456 Mass. 254, 259 (2010).  Under the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test, "the government performs 
a search when it intrudes on a 'subjective expectation of 
privacy . . . that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.'"  Garcia, 486 Mass. at 350, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Odgren, 483 Mass. 41, 58 (2019).  Thus, "a defendant must prove 
both a subjective and an objective expectation of privacy."  
Commonwealth v. Delgado-Rivera, 487 Mass. 551, 556 (2021), cert. 
denied, U.S. Supreme Ct., No. 21-6546 (2022). 
 
In evaluating the existence of a subjective expectation of 
19 
 
privacy, a reviewing court considers "whether the individual, by 
his [or her] conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of 
privacy."  Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000).  See 
Mora, 485 Mass. at 366-367 (employing same standard to evaluate 
subjective expectation of privacy under art. 14).  To have a 
subjective expectation of privacy, one must perceive or 
otherwise genuinely believe that the object of the alleged 
search is private.  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 481 Mass. 710, 721, 
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 247 (2019).  See Commonwealth v. 
Molina, 459 Mass. 819, 830 (2011) (Botsford, J., dissenting), 
citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("An 
expectation of privacy signifies a person's anticipation, 
belief, or understanding that he may preserve a particular place 
as private").  See also Black's Law Dictionary 1723 (11th ed. 
2019) (defining "subjective" as "[b]ased on an individual's 
perceptions, feelings, or intentions").  Thus, the inquiry turns 
in part on what an individual knows; that is, whether the 
individual was subjectively aware of the presence or absence of 
protections in place to preserve his or her privacy.  See, e.g., 
McCarthy, 484 Mass. at 497 n.5 (subjective expectation of 
privacy existed where defendant chose to "meet his codefendant 
in a quiet residential area").  Compare Odgren, 483 Mass. at 57-
58 (no subjective expectation of privacy in telephone calls made 
from prison where defendant had "effective notice that his 
20 
 
calls . . . were subject to monitoring and recording"); Matter 
of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 454 Mass. 685, 688-689 (2009) (no 
subjective expectation of privacy in telephone calls from prison 
where inmates were on notice that calls were recorded). 
As to whether there was an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy, "[w]hat is reasonable depends upon all 
of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the 
nature of the search or seizure itself."  Delgado-Rivera, 487 
Mass. at 560, quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 
U.S. 531, 537 (1985).  Relevant factors in this determination 
include, inter alia, the precautions the individual took to 
protect his or her privacy; the character of the item searched; 
and the nature of the government intrusion.  See Delgado-Rivera, 
supra; Commonwealth v. Krisco Corp., 421 Mass. 37, 42 (1995).  
While occasionally one factor may weigh so heavily that it 
offsets any contrary factors, ordinarily no individual factor is 
determinative.  Porter P., 456 Mass. at 259. 
c.  Application.  In deciding that the defendant in this 
case had not demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy in 
his Snapchat video recordings, the judge relied upon her finding 
that the defendant was not "entirely aware of what his privacy 
settings were."  At the evidentiary hearing, the defendant 
testified inconsistently about those settings, initially 
asserting that he knew his account was private, then explaining 
21 
 
that some of his prior stories had been posted so that everyone 
could see them, but that the video recordings at issue had been 
posted privately, and also stating that he was "not too sure" 
what his privacy settings were.  The judge concluded that the 
defendant's "testimony on this point did not persuade" her, 
given his inconsistent statements about those settings. 
In addition, notwithstanding the defendant's testimony that 
he would only accept as friends people that he knew, the judge 
observed that she could not "reconcile this testimony with that 
of [Connolly] who testified that he picked a user name that was 
not real, and that the image associated with the undercover 
account was a default assigned by [S]napchat"; thus, if the 
defendant had any policy with respect to those whom he permitted 
to become Snapchat friends, he did not follow his own policy in 
accepting Connolly's friend request.  The judge also determined 
that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the video recordings he posted on Snapchat because 
"[t]he nature of [S]napchat is sharing videos with other people, 
and even if the defendant only sent it to the people he says 
were following him, one hundred people by the defendant's own 
estimation, that was not . . . a reasonable preservation of his 
privacy in the video." 
i.  Subjective expectation of privacy.  The defendant 
argues that, even if he was unaware of his privacy settings, we 
22 
 
nonetheless should infer that he had a subjective expectation of 
privacy by adopting the approach taken in Chavez, 423 F. Supp. 
3d at 203-205.  In that case, the United States District Court 
for the Western District of North Carolina determined that a 
defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the content 
of his social media because his social media account was set to 
be private rather than public.  Id.  The defendant asserts that, 
similarly, he enjoyed a subjective expectation of privacy in his 
video recordings because he maintained a private Snapchat 
account. 
 
The defendant in Chavez, 423 F. Supp. 3d at 203-205, 
undisputedly was aware of the privacy settings applicable to his 
account.  He stated unequivocally that his social media account 
was private, and also explained to the judge why he chose those 
particular settings.  Id. at 202 ("At the hearing, Defendant 
testified that he implemented [restricted access to his social 
media content] because there was some content that he did not 
want 'a member of the general public . . . who was not a [social 
media] Friend' to see").  Although the fact that the settings 
were private was part of the judge's analysis, the judge did not 
base his conclusion solely on the account's actual privacy 
settings, but, rather, also relied on the defendant's awareness 
of those settings and the deliberate choices he made in setting 
them. 
23 
 
 
Here, by contrast, the judge found, and the record 
supports, that the defendant was unaware of his privacy 
settings.14  While we at times have inferred a subjective 
expectation of privacy where an individual purposefully engaged 
in conduct aimed at ensuring privacy, see Mora, 485 Mass. at 366 
(recognizing that "we have sometimes inferred an expectation of 
 
 
14 The defendant contends that the judge's finding that he 
did not demonstrate an awareness of his privacy settings was 
clearly erroneous and not supported by the record.  We do not 
agree.  The defendant did testify that he set up the account so 
that only friends could see its content.  He also testified that 
he intentionally had posted some or all of his stories as public 
so that everyone could see them ("I had [my account] private, 
but yes, I think -- I believe I probably did at the time had it 
so everybody could watch my Snap").  In response to the 
question, "And is that the way that you had your account set up, 
so that everyone see your Snaps?" however, the defendant 
testified, "I'm not too sure.  I don't remember." 
 
 
Although one plausible reading of the defendant's uncertain 
or somewhat varying responses is that he was confused by the 
questions but did know that his account was private, an equally 
plausible reading is that he was not sure which privacy settings 
applied to his account.  "Where there are two permissible views 
of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be 
clearly erroneous."  Commonwealth v. Carr, 458 Mass. 295, 303 
(2010), quoting Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 424 
Mass. 501, 510 (1997).  See Commonwealth v. Colon, 449 Mass. 
207, 215, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1079 (2007), S.C., 479 Mass. 
1032 (2018) (judge's finding was not clearly erroneous where 
defendant's testimony was contradictory).  In addition, given 
the irreconcilable testimony by Connolly and the defendant, 
which the judge emphasized, the record supports her conclusion 
that, if indeed he had such a policy, the defendant did not 
follow his asserted policy of only accepting friend requests 
from people that he already knew.  See Commonwealth v. 
Yesilciman, 406 Mass. 736, 743 (1990), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Spagnolo, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 516, 517-518 (1984) ("a judge's 
resolution of . . . conflicting testimony invariably will be 
accepted"). 
24 
 
privacy"); McCarthy, 484 Mass. at 497 n.5 ("We infer from the 
undisputed record . . . that the defendant manifested a 
subjective expectation of privacy in his location by choosing to 
meet his codefendant in a quiet residential area"), we are 
unable to do so where an individual was unaware of these 
protections.  Therefore, the defendant did not satisfy his 
burden of demonstrating a subjective expectation of privacy. 
 
ii.  Objective expectation of privacy.  To determine 
whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable, we consider the 
totality of the circumstances in the particular situation.  
Relevant factors in that analysis include whether the individual 
took ordinary precautions to protect his or her privacy, the 
character of the object searched, and the nature of the 
government intrusion.  See Commonwealth v. Welch, 487 Mass. 425, 
433 (2021); Commonwealth v. Berry, 420 Mass. 95, 106 n.9 (1995). 
With respect to ordinary protective measures, we consider 
any protective measures an individual instituted to ensure that 
the object of the search remained within the individual's 
control, such that he or she could limit its exposure to others.  
See Delgado-Rivera, 487 Mass. at 561.  In evaluating the 
character of the object searched, we analyze whether a defendant 
"controlled access to [the object] as well as whether [it] was 
freely accessible to others."  Krisco Corp., 421 Mass. at 42.  
As to the nature of the government intrusion, we consider the 
25 
 
manner in which the government obtained the information sought 
to be suppressed.  Almonor, 482 Mass. at 42 n.11 ("the nature of 
the challenged governmental conduct -- i.e., what the government 
does -- has always been relevant to whether such conduct 
implicates reasonable expectations of privacy").  Critical to 
this analysis is "whether the person conducting the surveillance 
was entitled to be where he [or she] was," Commonwealth v. 
Panetti, 406 Mass. 230, 232 (1989), including whether the 
government obtained "express or implied authorization" to be 
there, Almonor, supra at 43. 
As the defendant points out, some protective measures were 
in place with respect to his Snapchat account that could support 
a reasonable expectation of privacy.  The defendant operated a 
private account under a pseudonym (Frio Fresh), and friends 
(possible recipients) had to be added deliberately.15  And, 
notably, particular features of Snapchat, including the 
ephemeral direct snaps and the one-day stories, preserve a 
certain level of privacy by design.16  These features allowed the 
 
15 The defendant testified that "Frio Fresh" was a "random" 
name, and not a nickname by which he was known; the Commonwealth 
did not dispute this assertion. 
 
16 See Olson, Delete by Default:  Why More Snapchat-Like 
Messaging Is on Its Way, Forbes, Nov. 22, 2013, https://www 
.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2013/11/22/delete-by-default-why-
more-snapchat-like-messaging-is-on-its-way/?sh=2ca147566f31 
[https://perma.cc/8DZ7-8L2U] (Snapchat is inspired by "[a] 
 
26 
 
defendant to retain a certain level of control over the content 
he posted, which gave rise to some level of privacy. 
 
While the defendant's stories were less ephemeral than his 
direct snaps, he retained a greater level of control over them 
than he would have over an ordinary text message, because the 
stories were only temporarily available to the intended 
recipient and were more difficult to disburse to others.  By 
posting the video recordings to a Snapchat story, the defendant 
necessarily ensured that the recordings would be deleted twenty-
four hours later.  See Magill, 9 Charleston L. Rev. at 374.  
Compare Delgado-Rivera, 487 Mass. at 561 n.7 (recognizing 
possibility that "ephemeral messaging" could present situation 
different from sending of text messages in that case).  In 
addition, the defendant retained the ability to delete the 
recordings manually even before their automatic twenty-four hour 
expiration.17 
Furthermore, the Snapchat stories were not as easily 
"disbursable by the intended recipient" as a text message.  See 
Delgado-Rivera, 487 Mass. at 561.  To disburse a Snapchat story, 
a recipient would have to decide to do so during the relatively 
 
craving for privacy," and it is designed so that "the sender is 
always in control"). 
 
17 For instance, Connolly testified that he believed the 
defendant deleted one of his stories shortly after posting it, 
thus preventing Connolly from recording the story. 
27 
 
brief period before the video recording was deleted, a timeline 
that is not applicable to those seeking to preserve a delivered 
text message or letter, and would have to use some external 
process other than Snapchat to make and store the copy before 
sending it onward.  Thus, if a text message is akin to a letter, 
a Snapchat story is akin to a letter written in disappearing 
ink.  In this way, too, the defendant retained a level of 
control over his stories.18  In sum, the defendant's relative 
level of control over the video recordings, combined with his 
other protective measures, weighs in favor of his argument that 
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the posted 
stories. 
 
The circumstances here thus are in contrast to the 
situation in Delgado-Rivera, 487 Mass. at 560, 564, where we 
concluded that a defendant had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his sent text messages, which police recovered from 
the intended recipient's device.  Much like letters, those text 
messages became "beyond the control of the sender" once they 
 
18 Had the defendant sent the video recordings as direct 
snaps, as opposed to stories, he would have retained even more 
control over the content, because the content would have 
disappeared in no more than ten seconds after the recipient 
opened the message, thus making it even less likely that the 
content would be recorded or shared with others.  See Magill, 
Discovering Snapchat:  How Will Snapchat and Similar Self-
Destructing Social Media Applications Affect Relevance and 
Spoliation Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 9 
Charleston L. Rev. 365, 372-373 (2015). 
28 
 
were delivered, because they were "lastingly available to" and 
"instantaneously disbursable by the intended recipient."  Id. 
at 561.  We reasoned that the defendant's "necessary 
relinquishment of control" over the messages at issue was 
"determinative with respect to whether [he] had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the delivered text messages."  Id. 
at 560. 
 
Without question, in this case the defendant's Snapchat 
stories were posted so as to be "[viewed] routinely by others," 
namely, his approximately one hundred Snapchat friends (citation 
omitted).  See Krisco Corp., 421 Mass. at 42.  Nonetheless, that 
the defendant electronically shared his stories with others 
itself is not determinative in these circumstances.  Although we 
have held that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in certain types of records they voluntarily conveyed 
to third parties, see, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
742-743 (1979) (telephone call logs conveyed to telephone 
company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976) 
(bank records provided to bank employees); Commonwealth v. 
Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, 178, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1007 (1998) 
(telephone billing records conveyed to telephone company); 
Commonwealth v. Cote, 407 Mass. 827, 835-836 (1990) (telephone 
answering service message records), we have declined to extend 
this reasoning to a number of broader circumstances, see 
29 
 
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 251 (2014), S.C., 470 
Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 (2015) (cell phone user retains 
reasonable expectation of privacy in cell site location 
information [CSLI] conveyed to cell phone companies because such 
information is "substantively different from the types of 
information and records contemplated by Smith and Miller").  
Given the constitutional regard for conversational and 
associational privacy, the types of information and records 
contemplated by Smith, supra, and Miller, supra, as well as 
Vinnie, supra, and Cote, supra, also are categorically different 
from social media conversations in a constitutionally 
significant way. 
 
We recognize that a majority of courts to have considered 
the issue of the expectation of privacy in social media content 
have relied exclusively upon the third-party doctrine, and have 
concluded that, as the Commonwealth argues, once any content is 
posted on social media, no reasonable expectation of privacy 
remains.19  We continue to be of the view, however, that a 
 
 
19 See Palmieri v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 3d 191, 210 
(D.D.C. 2014), aff'd, 896 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Chaney v. 
Fayette County Pub. Sch. Dist., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1315-1317 
(N.D. Ga. 2013); R.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 
894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1142 (D. Minn. 2012); United States v. 
Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); People v. 
Pride, 31 Cal. App. 5th 133, 141 (2019); Everett v. State, 186 
A.3d 1224, 1229 (Del. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1299 
(2019). 
30 
 
categorical rule that individuals do not maintain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information provided to third parties 
through electronic sources is "ill suited to the digital age, in 
which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves 
to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks" 
(citation omitted).  See Augustine, 467 Mass. at 252 n.35, 
quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
Compare Chavez, 423 F. Supp. at 205 ("In sum, Defendant 
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in his non-public 
Facebook content that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.  As such, Defendant's legitimate expectation of 
privacy is protected by the Fourth Amendment").  Consequently, 
although an individual's choice to share social media content 
with others diminishes the individual's privacy interests, it 
does not per se defeat them.  See Carpenter v. United States, 
138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018), quoting Riley v. California, 573 
U.S. 373, 392 (2014) ("the fact of 'diminished privacy interests 
does not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture 
entirely'").  See also Commonwealth v. Feliz, 481 Mass. 689, 701 
(2019), S.C., 486 Mass. 510 (2020), citing Carpenter, supra. 
 
Nonetheless, the defendant's privacy interest in this case 
was substantially diminished because, despite his asserted 
policy of restricting such access, he did not adequately 
"control[] access" to his Snapchat account.  See Krisco Corp., 
31 
 
421 Mass. at 42.  Rather, he appears to have permitted unknown 
individuals to gain access to his content.  See id.  For 
instance, Connolly was granted access to the defendant's content 
using a nondescript username that the defendant did not 
recognize and a default image that evidently was not Connolly's 
photograph.  By accepting Connolly's friend request in those 
circumstances, the defendant demonstrated that he did not make 
"reasonable efforts to corroborate the claims of" those seeking 
access to his account.  See Commonwealth v. D'Onofrio, 396 Mass. 
711, 717 (1986) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in club 
open only to members and guests where owners did not 
"corroborate the claims of guest status made by persons seeking 
admission to the club"). 
Once the possibility of an undercover officer being able to 
view virtually all of the defendant's Snapchat content 
materialized, the defendant's privacy interest was further 
diminished.   See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Price, 408 Mass. 668, 
672-673 (1990) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
videotaped interaction with undercover police officer posing as 
drug buyer).  See also Commonwealth v. DiToro, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 
191, 197 (2001) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
contents of bag voluntarily displayed to undercover officer); 
Commonwealth v. Collado, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 464, 469 (1997), 
S.C., 426 Mass. 675 (1998) (no reasonable expectation of privacy 
32 
 
in communications with undercover officer where there was no 
indication that defendant and officer were "trusted friends").  
Otherwise put, there is no constitutional remedy for "a 
wrongdoer's [mistaken] belief that a person to whom he 
voluntarily confides his wrongdoing" is not a government agent.20  
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). 
The nature of the government intrusion in this case further 
counsels against a determination that the defendant retained an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his video 
recordings, because the asserted government intrusion took place 
with the defendant's permission.21  This stands in contrast to 
 
20 We do not suggest that an individual who unknowingly 
accepts a friend request from an undercover officer necessarily 
loses any reasonable expectation of privacy in the individual's 
Snapchat content.  If, for example, a police officer had gained 
access to an individual's account by masquerading as a close 
friend or family member, the result might be different.  Given 
the difficulty of determining an individual's true identity over 
the Internet, it could be that such a misrepresentation would be 
such that a defendant did not actually assume the risk of 
providing access to an undercover agent. 
 
21 We note that what the defendant chose to reveal by 
posting his stories did not include the information that 
Snapchat technology, like other Internet applications, includes 
for its own purposes in every snap or story, but that is not 
immediately visible to a Snapchat user.  See Montie vs. 
Crossfire, LLC, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 19-cv-10455 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 
30, 2020).  Such information, known as metadata, attaches to 
electronic objects such as text messages, photographs, and video 
recordings, and describes how, when, and by whom the item "was 
collected, created, accessed, or modified and how it is 
formatted."  Williams v. Sprint/United Mgt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 
646 (D. Kan. 2005).  For example, the metadata that attaches to 
 
33 
 
our conclusion that "pinging"22 a cell phone violated a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in part because pings are 
"initiated and effectively controlled by the police . . . 
without any express or implied authorization or other 
involvement by the individual cell phone user."  Almonor, 482 
Mass. at 43.  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (reasonable 
expectation of privacy in CSLI because "a cell phone logs a 
cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any 
affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up"); 
Augustine, 467 Mass. at 249-251, 255 (reasonable expectation of 
 
Snapchat content can reveal the sender's location, device 
address, and mobile telephone number.  See Bungert, Do It for 
the Snap:  Different Methods of Authenticating Snapchat Evidence 
for Criminal Prosecutions, 2021 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol'y 121, 
135 (2021); Levinson-Waldman, Government Access to and 
Manipulation of Social Media:  Legal and Policy Challenges, 61 
Howard L.J. 523, 554 n.166 (2018).  While invisible within 
Snapchat, metadata can be extracted from Snapchat content using 
other applications.  Helget v. Hays, 300 F.R.D. 496, 500 (D. 
Kan. 2014).  Although such information is not at issue here, we 
recognize the difference between information that is 
purposefully revealed by the user of an electronic device and 
that unknown information that is created or shared through 
technological processes absent any input by the user, the latter 
of which we have excluded from the analysis of a decision to 
share information with a third party.  See Commonwealth v. 
Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 251 (2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 
(2015). 
 
22 "Pinging" is the process of causing a cell phone to 
"transmit its global positioning system (GPS) coordinates to the 
[cellular service] provider," which then can be provided to 
police to assist in locating the individual in possession of 
that device.  Commonwealth v. Almonor, 482 Mass. 35, 36 & n.1 
(2019). 
34 
 
privacy in CSLI because CSLI is "purely a function and product 
of cellular telephone technology" that is conveyed to cellular 
service provider without any action or consent by user). 
Here, the challenged recordings "effectively [had been] 
controlled by [the defendant]" and were made accessible to the 
undercover officer only with the defendant's "express or implied 
authorization."  Almonor, 482 Mass. at 43.  Indeed, Connolly was 
able to view the defendant's stories precisely because the 
defendant gave him the necessary permissions to do so.  That the 
defendant not only did not exercise control to exclude a user 
whose name he did not recognize, but also affirmatively gave 
Connolly the required permissions to view posted content, weighs 
against a conclusion that the defendant retained a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his Snapchat stories. 
The defendant maintains that his "permission" should not be 
considered valid, given that it was obtained via a ruse.  That 
Connolly did not reveal his true identity to the defendant, 
however, does not vitiate the permission the defendant extended 
to him.  See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 300, 303 (rejecting argument 
that informant's "failure to disclose his role as a government 
informer vitiated the consent that the [defendant] gave to 
[him]"); Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 406 Mass. 180, 182 (1989) 
("It makes no difference that the defendant's consent to police 
entry was obtained by a ruse").  See also 4 W.R. LaFave, Search 
35 
 
and Seizure § 8.2(m) (6th ed. 2021) ("consent is not vitiated 
merely because it would not have been given but for the 
nondisclosure . . . of the other person's identity as a police 
officer or police agent").  Indeed, to hold otherwise would 
require police officers to "identify themselves as [such] when 
they investigate criminal activity," thus rendering "virtually 
all undercover work" unconstitutional.  United States v. Butler, 
405 Fed. Appx. 652, 656 (3d Cir. 2010).  This we decline to do.  
See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 421 Mass. 686, 692 (1996) 
("undercover police work is a legitimate investigative 
technique"). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion to  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  suppress affirmed.