Title: Manitowoc County v. Samuel J. H.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 68 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP665   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the mental commitment 
of Samuel J. H.: 
 
Manitowoc County, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Samuel J. H., 
          Respondent-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 26, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Manitowoc   
 
JUDGE: 
Jerome L. Fox   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs by Donald 
T. Lang, assistant state public defender, and oral argument by 
Donald T. Lang.   
 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief by Ryan 
O’Rourke, assistant corporation counsel, and Manitowoc County, 
and oral argument by Ryan O’Rourke. 
 
  
 
 
2013 WI 68
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP665   
(L.C. No. 
2003ME63) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the mental commitment of 
Samuel J.H.: 
 
 
 
Manitowoc County, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Samuel J.H., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Manitowoc County Circuit Court, 
Jerome L. Fox, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This appeal is before 
the court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2011-12).1  On May 31, 2011, Samuel J.H. 
(Samuel) was committed to the care and custody of the Manitowoc 
County Human Services Department (the Department).  Samuel was 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2012AP665   
 
2 
 
initially placed in outpatient care.  On September 22, 2011, the 
Department transferred Samuel to an inpatient facility because 
of erratic and delusional behavior.     
¶2 
Samuel petitioned the Manitowoc County Circuit Court 
for a review of his transfer, arguing that he was entitled to a 
hearing within ten days of his transfer to the inpatient 
facility under Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e) and under Fond du Lac 
Cnty. v. Elizabeth M.P., 2003 WI App 232, 267 Wis. 2d 739, 672 
N.W.2d 88.  He also petitioned for a transfer back to outpatient 
status, arguing that was the proper remedy for failure to hold 
the review hearing within ten days of his transfer.  The circuit 
court held a hearing on Samuel's petitions, and it denied 
Samuel's petition to transfer back to outpatient status.  The 
circuit court concluded that a patient is entitled to a hearing 
within ten days of his transfer to a more restrictive placement 
under § 51.35(1)(e)3. only when the transfer is based on a 
violation of treatment conditions.  The court denied Samuel's 
petition to transfer, finding that his transfer to the inpatient 
facility was not based on a violation of his treatment 
conditions, but rather was based on reasonable medical and 
clinical judgment.   
¶3 
Samuel appealed, and the court of appeals certified 
the 
case 
to 
this 
court 
to 
clarify 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.35(1)(e) requires a hearing within ten days for all 
transfers to a more restrictive placement.  The court of appeals 
stated that language in Elizabeth M.P.——that "[t]ransfers 
pursuant to § 51.35(1)(e) require a hearing within ten days"——is 
No. 2012AP665   
 
3 
 
arguably contrary to a plain interpretation of the statute, 
which differentiates between transfers made for reasonable 
medical 
and 
clinical 
judgment 
under 
§ 51.35(1)(e)1., 
and 
transfers made for "an alleged violation of a condition of a 
transfer to less restrictive treatment" under § 51.35(1)(e)2.-3.  
Elizabeth M.P., 267 Wis. 2d 739, ¶26.  However, the court of 
appeals was without power to overrule, modify, or withdraw 
language from Elizabeth M.P. 
¶4 
We granted the court of appeals' certification and now 
affirm the order of the circuit court. 
¶5 
We hold that Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e) does not require 
a hearing to be conducted within ten days of a transfer when the 
transfer is based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment 
under § 51.35(1)(e)1.  We withdraw any language from Elizabeth 
M.P. to the contrary.2  We further hold that a hearing must be 
                                                 
2 Because two statements in the Elizabeth M.P. decision are 
contrary to the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e), 
stare decisis does not require that we adhere to that precedent.  
Thus, we withdraw the following language from Elizabeth M.P.: 
"Transfers pursuant to § 51.35(1)(e) require a hearing within 
ten 
days," 
267 
Wis. 2d 739, 
¶26, 
and 
"Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 51.35(1)(e) mandates that a patient transferred to a more 
restrictive environment receive a hearing within ten days of 
said transfer," id., ¶28.   
No. 2012AP665   
 
4 
 
conducted within ten days of a transfer when (1) the transfer 
"results in a greater restriction of personal freedom for the 
patient for a period of more than 5 days" or is "from outpatient 
to inpatient status for a period of more than 5 days" and (2) 
the transfer is based on "an alleged violation of a condition of 
a transfer to less restrictive treatment" under § 51.35(1)(e)2.-
3. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶6 
On May 31, 2011, Samuel was committed to the care and 
custody of the Department.3  Samuel was initially placed at an 
outpatient facility, Newport Group Home in Manitowoc, Wisconsin.  
On September 22, 2011, the Department transferred Samuel from an 
outpatient to an inpatient facility.  The transfer form stated 
the reason for the transfer: 
                                                                                                                                                             
Specifically, the doctrine of stare decisis applies to 
published court of appeals opinions and requires this court "to 
follow court of appeals precedent unless a compelling reason 
exists to overrule it."  Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶21, 
274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405 (citing State v. Douangmala, 
2002 WI 62, ¶42, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1).  See also Wis. 
Stat. § 752.41(2) (published court of appeals opinions "have 
statewide precedential effect").  Here, a compelling reason 
exists to withdraw the language in Elizabeth M.P. that directly 
conflicts with the plain language of the statute.  In so doing, 
we are not acting contrary to the principle of stare decisis 
because stare decisis does not require us "to adhere to 
interpretations of statutes that are objectively wrong."  Wenke, 
274 Wis. 2d 220, ¶21 (citing Douangmala, 253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶42).  
The portions of Elizabeth M.P. that do not comport with the 
plain language of Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e) are withdrawn because 
they are objectively wrong. 
3 The record in this appeal does not contain documents 
relating to Samuel's underlying mental health commitment.   
No. 2012AP665   
 
5 
 
Samuel 
has 
been 
presenting 
as 
increasingly 
delusional.  Today he was 'chanting' and then punched 
his wall and door, putting a hole in the door.  Samuel 
is the subject of a Mental Health Commitment and is 
being transferred inpatient.  Samuel is presenting as 
delusional.  His thoughts are confused and he is 
agitated.  He repeatedly stated he put a hole in the 
door because 'someone was shot down and should be 
taken care of.'  Sam states he is at [Holy Family 
Medical Center] because he is a 'person of interest.'  
On September 22, 2011, Samuel was transferred to Nicolet 
Psychiatric Center, and he was subsequently transferred to 
Trempealeau County Health Care Center, both of which are 
inpatient facilities. 
¶7 
On 
September 
22, 
2011, 
the 
same 
day 
he 
was 
transferred, Samuel was provided with a form entitled "Written 
Notice 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.35(1)(e)1. Rights." 
 
The 
form 
reflected that Samuel was being transferred from outpatient to 
inpatient status.  The form stated that the Department must 
inform Samuel orally and in writing of his rights under 
§ 51.35(1)(e)1.  The form listed those rights: "[t]he right to 
contact an attorney and a member of Subject's immediate family," 
"[t]he right to have counsel provided at public expense . . . if 
Subject is a child or is indigent," and "the right to petition a 
court in the county in which the patient is located or the 
committing court for a review of the transfer."  A Department 
employee signed the form and thus certified that she read Samuel 
his rights and provided him a written copy of the form at the 
time of transfer.  The form contained contact information for 
the Manitowoc County Public Defender's office. 
No. 2012AP665   
 
6 
 
¶8 
On November 7, 2011, Samuel wrote Judge Jerome L. Fox 
of the Manitowoc County Circuit Court a letter that stated "I am 
disturbed that my outpatient status was changed to inpatient 
without due procedure."  On November 14, 2011, the judge sent a 
copy of Samuel's letter to the Manitowoc County Corporation 
Counsel office.  The judge's cover letter to the County stated 
that "I assume this triggers a hearing under § 51.35(1)(e)."   
¶9 
On November 15, 2011, Assistant Corporation Counsel 
Ryan O'Rourke responded to the judge in a letter.  Manitowoc 
County took the position that Samuel was entitled to a review 
hearing by the circuit court because Samuel's transfer was for 
reasonable medical and clinical judgment under Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.35(1)(e)1., 
but 
that 
he 
was 
not 
entitled 
to 
an 
administrative hearing within ten days of the transfer because 
he was not transferred for a violation of treatment conditions 
under § 51.35(1)(e)2.-3.   
¶10 The Department referred the matter to the Manitowoc 
County Public Defender's office.  On November 22, 2011, the 
Manitowoc County Public Defender's office appointed attorney 
Jewel Scharenbroch to represent Samuel.  On November 30, 2011, 
Samuel, by his attorney, filed a petition for review of his 
transfer and a petition to transfer from inpatient to outpatient 
treatment for failure to hold a timely review hearing.  Samuel 
argued that under Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e) and Elizabeth M.P., a 
patient is entitled to a review hearing within ten days of the 
transfer when the transfer results in more restrictive placement 
and lasts for more than five days, regardless of the reason for 
No. 2012AP665   
 
7 
 
transfer.  Samuel argued that according to Elizabeth M.P., 
because he did not receive a hearing within ten days of his 
transfer 
under 
§ 51.35(1)(e)3., 
he 
must 
be 
returned 
to 
outpatient status.  267 Wis. 2d 739, ¶28.   
¶11 On December 19, 2011, the Manitowoc County Circuit 
Court, Judge Jerome L. Fox, held a hearing on Samuel's 
petitions.  At the hearing, the court heard testimony from 
Samuel and from Lori Fure, Samuel's social worker.  Fure 
testified that Samuel was transferred because he had become 
"increasingly psychotic and his behavior had become out of 
control."  She testified that "[h]is medication had been 
increased and yet he continued to become more psychotic and more 
out of control to the point where he was totally delusional and 
punching holes in the wall."  She further stated that the group 
home could no longer handle Samuel.  Based on her experience as 
a social worker and her understanding of Samuel's case, Fure 
testified that inpatient care was the least restrictive level of 
treatment appropriate for Samuel at that time.   
¶12 Fure denied that Samuel was transferred because of 
violations of his treatment conditions.  Fure testified that 
Samuel was subject to treatment conditions while he was placed 
in outpatient care, including, inter alia, "[r]efrain from 
consuming alcoholic beverages" and "[r]efrain from any acts, 
attempts, or threats to harm myself or others."  Fure testified 
that Samuel had consumed alcohol a couple of days prior to his 
transfer, but "that's not a reason to transfer somebody."  
Further, though Samuel had made vaguely threatening statements, 
No. 2012AP665   
 
8 
 
Fure testified that Samuel had not been transferred because of 
an act or a threat to harm himself or others.   
¶13 Samuel also testified.  His attorney asked him why he 
punched the door, and Samuel responded that "[o]ne plane of 
reality was shot down in my——my real world, and when the two 
worlds met up, I could tell that I wanted to make it concrete 
and meet up with my mental state of affairs."   
¶14 The court found that the reason for Samuel's transfer 
was his delusional behavior, not for a violation of his 
treatment 
conditions. 
 
The 
court 
interpreted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.35(1)(e) as requiring a hearing within ten days only when a 
transfer is made for a violation of treatment conditions, not 
when a transfer is made for reasonable medical and clinical 
judgment.  However, the circuit court concluded that language in 
Elizabeth M.P. could be interpreted as requiring a hearing 
within ten days regardless of whether the subject is being 
transferred for reasonable medical and judgment or for a 
violation of treatment conditions.  267 Wis. 2d 739, ¶26 
("Transfers pursuant to § 51.35(1)(e) require a hearing within 
ten days.").  The circuit court noted, however, that other 
language in Elizabeth M.P. in fact differentiated the two types 
of transfers.  The circuit court suggested that Elizabeth M.P.'s 
statement——requiring a hearing within ten days for all transfers 
under 
§ 51.35(1)(e)——related to its discussion of whether 
hearings under § 51.35(1)(e)3. were mandatory or permissive.  
See id., ¶¶20-25.  In other words, the statement in Elizabeth 
No. 2012AP665   
 
9 
 
M.P. could be read as "a hearing under (1)(e)3. is mandatory, 
not permissive."   
¶15 The circuit court concluded that it was not necessary 
to hold a hearing within ten days for Samuel, since his transfer 
was based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment rather 
than a violation of a treatment condition.  As Samuel was not 
entitled to a hearing within ten days, the circuit court denied 
his petition for a transfer from inpatient to outpatient care.  
The circuit court concluded that inpatient care was the least 
restrictive placement appropriate for Samuel.   
¶16 On March 27, 2012, Samuel filed a notice of appeal 
from the circuit court's order.  On September 5, 2012, the court 
of appeals certified the question of whether Elizabeth M.P.'s 
statement——requiring a hearing within ten days for transfers 
made under Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)——is contrary to the plain 
language of the statute.  The court of appeals noted that the 
inconsistency in Elizabeth M.P. was apparent, but that it was 
powerless to address the inconsistency.  See Cook v. Cook, 208 
Wis. 2d 166, 189-90, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (holding that the 
court of appeals may not overrule, modify, or withdraw language 
from its prior published decisions).   
¶17 On November 14, 2012, we accepted the court of 
appeals' certification.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 The question presented in this case is whether Wis. 
Stat. § 51.35(1)(e) mandates a hearing within ten days for all 
transferred patients, including those transferred for reasonable 
No. 2012AP665   
 
10 
 
medical and clinical judgment under § 51.35(1)(e)1., or whether 
the mandate applies only to those transferred due to a violation 
of 
treatment 
conditions 
under 
§ 51.35(1)(e)2.-5. 
 
The 
interpretation and application of § 51.35 present questions of 
law that we review de novo while benefitting from the analyses 
of the court of appeals and circuit court.  See State v. 
Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶37, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238; 
Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2012 WI 26, ¶24, 339 
Wis. 2d 125, 810 N.W.2d 465.  The circuit court made factual 
findings about the reason for Samuel's transfer, and "[w]e 
uphold a circuit court's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous."  Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 
Inc., 2009 WI 74, ¶34, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶19 We hold that Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e) does not require 
a hearing to be conducted within ten days of a transfer when the 
transfer is based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment 
under § 51.35(1)(e)1.  We withdraw any language from Elizabeth 
M.P. to the contrary.  We further hold that a hearing must be 
conducted within ten days of a transfer when (1) the transfer 
"results in a greater restriction of personal freedom for the 
patient for a period of more than 5 days" or is "from outpatient 
to inpatient status for a period of more than 5 days" and (2) 
the transfer is based on "an alleged violation of a condition of 
a transfer to less restrictive treatment" under § 51.35(1)(e)2.-
3. 
No. 2012AP665   
 
11 
 
¶20 "'[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect.'"  Heritage Farms, 339 
Wis. 2d 125, ¶26 (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for 
Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110). 
 
Statutory 
interpretation 
"'begins 
with 
the 
language of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is 
plain, 
we 
ordinarily 
stop 
the 
inquiry.'" 
 
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 
236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  "Statutory language is given 
its 
common, 
ordinary, 
and 
accepted 
meaning, 
except 
that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional 
meaning." 
 
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  Statutory language is interpreted in context, 
and it must be understood in relation to surrounding language 
and surrounding statutes.  Id., ¶46.  Courts interpret statutes 
"to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id.  When statutory 
interpretation yields a plain meaning, extrinsic sources need 
not be consulted, "although legislative history is sometimes 
consulted to confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation."  
Id., ¶¶46, 51. 
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.35(1), which governs the transfer 
of patients and residents, states in relevant part: 
(a) Subject to pars. (b), (d), and (dm), the 
department or the county department under s. 51.42 or 
51.437 may transfer any patient or resident who is 
committed to it, or who is admitted to a treatment 
facility under its supervision or operating under an 
agreement with it, between treatment facilities or 
No. 2012AP665   
 
12 
 
from a treatment facility into the community if the 
transfer is consistent with reasonable medical and 
clinical judgment, consistent with s. 51.22(5), and, 
if the transfer results in a greater restriction of 
personal freedom for the patient or resident, in 
accordance with par. (e). 
. . . . 
(e)1. Whenever any transfer between different 
treatment facilities results in a greater restriction 
of personal freedom for the patient and whenever the 
patient is transferred from outpatient to inpatient 
status, the department or the county department 
specified under par. (a) shall inform the patient both 
orally and in writing of his or her right to contact 
an attorney and a member of his or her immediate 
family, the right to have counsel provided at public 
expense, as provided under s. 51.60, and the right to 
petition a court in the county in which the patient is 
located or the committing court for a review of the 
transfer. 
2. In addition to the rights and requirements 
specified in subd. 1., within 24 hours after any 
transfer which results in a greater restriction of 
personal freedom for the patient for a period of more 
than 5 days or any transfer from outpatient to 
inpatient status for a period of more than 5 days and 
if the transfer is due to an alleged violation of a 
condition of a transfer to less restrictive treatment, 
the department or the county department specified 
under par. (a) shall ensure that the patient is 
provided a written statement of the reasons for the 
transfer and the facts supporting the transfer and 
oral and written notice of all of the following: 
a. The requirements and rights under subds. 
3. to 5. 
b. The patient's right to counsel. 
c. The patient's right to have counsel 
provided at public expense, as provided under s. 
51.60. 
d. The rights of the patient's counsel to 
investigate the facts specified in the written 
No. 2012AP665   
 
13 
 
statement of reasons for the transfer, to consult 
with the patient prior to the patient's waiving a 
hearing under subd. 3., to represent the patient 
at all proceedings on issues relating to the 
transfer, and to take any legal steps necessary 
to challenge the transfer. 
3. Within 10 days after the transfer specified in 
subd. 2., a hearing shall be held on whether the form 
of treatment resulting from the transfer is least 
restrictive 
of 
the 
patient's 
personal 
liberty, 
consistent with the treatment needs of the patient, 
and on whether the patient violated a condition of a 
transfer to less restrictive treatment that resulted 
in a transfer under subd. 2.  The hearing shall be 
held before a hearing officer designated by the 
director of the facility to which the patient has been 
transferred.  The hearing officer may not be a person 
who has had direct responsibility for making treatment 
decisions for or providing treatment to the subject 
individual.  The patient may appear at the hearing, 
either personally or by counsel, and may present and 
cross-examine 
witnesses 
and 
present 
documentary 
evidence.  The hearing may be waived by the patient 
only after consultation with counsel.  Any waiver made 
shall be in writing and witnessed by the patient's 
counsel. 
Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(a), (e) (emphasis added). 
¶22 Samuel argues that all transfers under Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.35(1)(e) require a review hearing within ten days of the 
transfer.  He points to language in Elizabeth M.P. that 
"[t]ransfers pursuant to § 51.35(1)(e) require a hearing within 
ten days."  267 Wis. 2d 739, ¶26.  Samuel argues that this 
interpretation reinforces the policy that a patient who is the 
subject of a mental health commitment has a right to the least 
restrictive placement necessary to address his or her mental 
health issues.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 51.001(2) ("To protect 
personal liberties, no person who can be treated adequately 
No. 2012AP665   
 
14 
 
outside of a hospital, institution or other inpatient facility 
may be involuntarily treated in such a facility.").  Samuel also 
points out that if the two types of transfers are subject to 
different procedures, the reason for transfer can be manipulated 
to avoid a hearing within ten days.  Finally, Samuel points to 
case law holding that statutory time limits in civil commitment 
proceedings are strictly enforced, and failure to comply with 
time limits deprives a court of jurisdiction over the person who 
is the subject of the proceedings.   
¶23 Manitowoc County argues that the plain language of the 
statute requires a hearing within ten days only when the 
transfer is based on a violation of a treatment condition.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)2.-3. (stating that "if the transfer is 
due to an alleged violation of a condition of a transfer to less 
restrictive treatment" a hearing shall be held "[w]ithin 10 days 
after the transfer").  The County further argues that if there 
must be a hearing within ten days for all transfers under 
§ 51.35(1)(e), that interpretation would effectively eliminate 
transfers for reasonable medical and clinical judgment.  The 
subdivision that sets out the Department's burden of proof at 
the hearing within ten days requires it to prove that there was 
a violation of a treatment condition: "[t]he department seeking 
the transfer has the burden of proving . . . that the patient 
violated a condition of a transfer to less restrictive treatment 
that resulted in a transfer under subd. 2."  § 51.35(1)(e)4.  
Additionally, the County argues that the statements at the end 
of Elizabeth M.P.——requiring a hearing within ten days for all 
No. 2012AP665   
 
15 
 
transfers 
under 
§ 51.35(1)(e)——are 
contrary 
to 
the 
plain 
language of the statute and contrary to the reasoning of the 
opinion itself.  See Elizabeth M.P., 267 Wis. 2d 739, ¶17 
("However, § 51.35(1)(e)1 and (1)(e)2 seem to indicate different 
forms of transfers. . . . [S]ubdivision 2 exists to further 
protect the rights of those whose transfer" is due to a 
violation of a treatment condition).  Finally, the County states 
that though Samuel makes compelling policy arguments, those 
arguments should be made to the legislature because policy 
arguments cannot overcome the plain language of § 51.35(1)(e).   
¶24 We conclude that the plain language of the statute 
does not make the hearing within ten days of a transfer under 
Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)3. applicable to transfers based on 
reasonable medical and clinical judgment under § 51.35(1)(e)1.  
Several reasons support our interpretation.  First, subdivisions 
(1)(e)1. and (1)(e)2. provide different rights and procedures 
depending 
on 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
transfer. 
 
Subdivision 
(1)(e)1. provides 
rights4 
for 
patients 
transferred 
for 
"reasonable medical and clinical judgment," see § 51.35(1)(a), 
when the transfer "results in a greater restriction of personal 
freedom for the patient" or when the transfer is "from 
                                                 
4 Under Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)1., the department must 
inform the patient of the right to contact an attorney and a 
member of his or her immediate family, the right to have an 
attorney provided at public expense under Wis. Stat. § 51.60, 
and "the right to petition a court in the county in which the 
patient is located or the committing court for a review of the 
transfer." 
No. 2012AP665   
 
16 
 
outpatient to inpatient status," collectively discussed as a 
more restrictive transfer.  Subdivision (1)(e)2. provides rights5 
"[i]n addition to the rights and requirements specified in subd. 
1." when a more restrictive transfer lasts "for a period of more 
than 5 days" and is "due to an alleged violation of a condition 
of a transfer to less restrictive treatment."  Thus, the 
legislature differentiated between the two types of transfers by 
providing additional protections to a patient when a more 
restrictive transfer lasts for longer than five days and results 
from an alleged violation of a treatment condition.6   
¶25 Second, consistent with the differentiation in rights 
under subdivisions (1)(e)1. and (1)(e)2., the procedures for the 
hearing within ten days of a transfer under subdivision (1)(e)3. 
are made applicable only to more restrictive transfers under 
                                                 
5 Under Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)2., the department must 
provide the patient with "a written statement of the reasons for 
the transfer and the facts supporting the transfer."  The 
department must also provide oral and written notice of the 
hearing procedures under subdivisions (1)(e)3.-5., the rights to 
counsel provided at public expense under Wis. Stat. § 51.60, and 
the rights of the patient's counsel in representing the patient 
throughout the review of the patient's transfer.    
6 Under both Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)1. and (1)(e)2., the 
patient has the "right to have counsel provided at public 
expense, as provided under s. 51.60."  Section 51.60, governing 
appointment of counsel, provides that for adults "[i]n any 
situation under this chapter in which an adult individual has a 
right to be represented by counsel, the individual shall be 
referred as soon as practicable to the state public defender, 
who shall appoint counsel for the individual under s. 977.08 
without 
a 
determination 
of 
indigency." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.60(1)(a).  The individual may waive counsel if the waiver 
is knowing and voluntary.  § 51.60(1)(b). 
No. 2012AP665   
 
17 
 
(1)(e)2.——those lasting longer than five days and resulting from 
an alleged violation of a treatment condition.  Subdivision 
(1)(e)3. states, in relevant part: "Within 10 days after the 
transfer specified in subd. 2., a hearing shall be held 
on . . . whether the patient violated a condition of a transfer 
to less restrictive treatment that resulted in a transfer under 
subd. 2." (Emphasis added.)  It would be contrary to the plain 
language of the statute to interpret subdivision (1)(e)3. as 
providing a hearing within ten days for transfers made for 
reasonable medical and clinical judgment.  The plain language 
applies the transfer review hearing within ten days, as set 
forth in subdivisions (1)(e)3.-5., only to transfers under 
(1)(e)2.——those resulting in a more restrictive placement that 
last for more than five days and that are a result of an alleged 
violation of a condition of treatment.    
¶26 Third, we are persuaded by the County's argument that 
Samuel's interpretation of the statute leads to an absurd result 
because his interpretation could effectively eliminate the 
County's ability to transfer a patient for reasonable medical 
and clinical judgment, or could put the County in the untenable 
position of being required to allege and prove that the transfer 
was due to a violation of a treatment condition even if the 
transfer was only for reasonable medical and clinical judgment.  
A transfer based upon reasonable medical and clinical judgment 
can differ from a transfer based upon a violation of a treatment 
condition.  Under the statute, when the County transfers a 
patient based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment, the 
No. 2012AP665   
 
18 
 
County need not prove that the patient violated a treatment 
condition, but it does need to prove that the transfer was based 
on reasonable medical and clinical judgment.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.35(1)(a), (1)(e)1.  In fact, the statute specifically 
allows for transfers that are "consistent with reasonable 
medical and clinical judgment."  Id.  On the other hand, 
§ 51.35(1)(e)4., the subdivision that requires a hearing within 
ten days for certain transfers, requires that the "department 
seeking the transfer has the burden of proving . . . that the 
patient violated a condition of a transfer to less restrictive 
treatment that resulted in a transfer under subd. 2."  Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.35(1)(e)4. (emphasis 
added). 
 
If 
we 
interpret 
§ 51.35(1)(e) as requiring a hearing within ten days for all 
transfers, not just those that are for a violation of a 
treatment condition, the County would be required to prove a 
violation of a treatment condition, even if the transfer was 
based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment.  The County 
should not be asked to falsify its reasons for transfer.  Thus, 
it is absurd to interpret the statute to provide for a hearing 
within ten days for all transfers under § 51.35(1)(e) and to 
require the County to prove a violation of a treatment condition 
regardless of the reason for transfer.  We must interpret 
statutory language reasonably, "to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.   
¶27 The legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 51.35 confirms 
our plain language interpretation.  Id., ¶51 (stating that 
"legislative history is sometimes consulted to confirm or verify 
No. 2012AP665   
 
19 
 
a plain-meaning interpretation").  A prior version of the 
statute did not address transfers due to alleged violations of 
treatment conditions.  See Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e) (1985-86).  
In 1987, the legislature amended § 51.35(1)(e): 
Note: The repeal and recreation of s. 51.35(1)(e) by 
this bill creates procedural rights in addition to 
those in current law for persons who are transferred 
between facilities or from outpatient to inpatient 
status and applies these rights to patients who, due 
to an alleged violation of a condition of a transfer 
to less restrictive treatment: (1) are transferred to 
a more restrictive facility for longer than 5 days; or 
(2) or transferred from outpatient to inpatient status 
for more than 5 days.  
See 1987 Wis. Act 366, § 14 (emphasis added).  One of the newly 
created procedural rights in 1987 Wis. Act 366 was a right to an 
administrative hearing within ten days of the more restrictive 
transfer.  Id.  The legislative note to 1987 Wis. Act 366 
reinforces that the hearing within ten days was meant to be 
applicable only to more restrictive transfers resulting from an 
alleged violation of a treatment condition.   
¶28 Considering 
our 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.35(1)(e), we next turn to consider whether Elizabeth M.P. 
comports with our interpretation.  In that case, Elizabeth was 
the subject of a mental health commitment, was initially treated 
at an inpatient facility, and in March 2002, was transferred to 
an outpatient facility.  Elizabeth M.P., 267 Wis. 2d 739, ¶¶2-3.  
On May 28, 2002, a notice was filed to transfer Elizabeth from 
outpatient to inpatient care under § 51.35(1).  Id., ¶3.  An 
No. 2012AP665   
 
20 
 
affidavit from Fond du Lac's corporation counsel gave the 
reasons for Elizabeth's transfer: 
An affidavit by the corporation counsel for Fond 
du Lac county, attached to this notice, indicated that 
since Elizabeth's outpatient placement she had refused 
to take her court-ordered medication, had become 
delusional, argumentative and aggressive, and had 
failed 
to 
take 
her 
psychotropic 
medication 
as 
prescribed. 
The 
affidavit 
further 
indicated 
that 
Elizabeth's 
mental 
condition 
had 
substantially 
deteriorated, that she was unable to meet the demands 
of everyday life, and that she had violated conditions 
of her commitment 'in that she has failed to comply 
with recommended treatment.'  
Id., ¶4.  Elizabeth filed a motion for immediate release from 
inpatient treatment, arguing that she was entitled to and did 
not receive a hearing within ten days under Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.35(1)(e)3.  Id., ¶7.  The circuit court concluded that 
Elizabeth's transfer was made pursuant to subdivision (1)(e)1., 
not subdivisions (1)(e)2.-3., and she was therefore not entitled 
to a hearing within ten days.  Id.  The circuit court 
subsequently 
conducted 
a 
transfer 
review 
hearing 
under 
§ 51.35(1)(e)1. and approved of the transfer, "finding that the 
least restrictive environment consistent with Elizabeth's needs 
was inpatient status."  Id., ¶9.  Elizabeth appealed the circuit 
court's approval of her transfer.  Id. 
¶29 The court of appeals reviewed "whether the circuit 
court had jurisdiction to transfer Elizabeth to inpatient status 
when judicial review of the County's decision to transfer her 
was not held within ten days as required by Wis. Stat. 
No. 2012AP665   
 
21 
 
§ 51.35(1)(e)3."  Id., ¶10.  The court of appeals interpreted 
§ 51.35(1)(e):  
[Subdivisions] 
51.35(1)(e)1 
and 
(1)(e)2 
seem 
to 
indicate different forms of transfers. The provisions 
suggest that while only one transfer provision and its 
various subdivisions all serve to protect the rights 
of patients, subdivision 2 exists to further protect 
the rights of those whose transfer 'results in a 
greater restriction of personal freedom for the 
patient for a period of more than 5 days or any 
transfer from outpatient to inpatient status for a 
period of more than 5 days' where the transfer 'is due 
to an alleged violation of a condition of a transfer 
to less restrictive treatment.' 
Id., 
¶17 
(quoting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.35(1)(e)2.) 
(footnote 
omitted).  The court concluded that Elizabeth's transfer had 
been pursuant to subdivision (1)(e)2. because "the document 
affecting her transfer relates the rights that are enumerated in 
§ 51.35(1)(e)3 to 5," including a right to a review hearing 
within ten days of her transfer.  Id., ¶18.  Further, one of the 
reasons for her transfer was her alleged failure to take court-
ordered medications as her treatment conditions required.  Id., 
¶19.   
¶30 The court then considered whether a hearing within ten 
days under Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)3. is mandatory or directory.  
Id., ¶20.  The court concluded that a hearing within ten days 
under § 51.35(1)(e)3. is mandatory.  Id., ¶25.  In other words, 
there is no discretion in holding a hearing under subdivision 
(1)(e)3. because the statute requires that "'a hearing shall be 
held.'"  Id., ¶21.   
No. 2012AP665   
 
22 
 
¶31 However, the court of appeals, in its concluding 
paragraphs, 
broadly 
stated 
that 
"[t]ransfers 
pursuant 
to 
§ 51.35(1)(e) require a hearing within ten days."  Id., ¶26; see 
also id., ¶28.  The court did not clearly differentiate between 
the two types of transfers when it reached its conclusions.   
¶32 The 
statements 
in 
the 
concluding 
paragraphs 
of 
Elizabeth M.P. do not comport with the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 51.35(1)(e).  Moreover, the concluding paragraphs are 
not consistent with the underlying analysis of the Elizabeth 
M.P. decision, wherein the court of appeals did distinguish 
between transfers under subdivisions (1)(e)1. and (1)(e)3.  See 
id., ¶17 ("However, § 51.35(1)(e)1 and (1)(e)2 seem to indicate 
different forms of transfers. . . . [S]ubdivision 2 exists to 
further protect the rights of those whose transfer" is due to a 
violation of a treatment condition).  As a result, we withdraw 
any language in Elizabeth M.P. that is contrary to our 
conclusion that § 51.35(1)(e) does not require a hearing to be 
conducted within ten days of a transfer when the transfer is 
based 
on 
reasonable 
medical 
and 
clinical 
judgment 
under 
§ 51.35(1)(e)1. 
¶33 Applying 
our 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.35(1)(e) to the facts of this case, we conclude that Samuel 
was not entitled to a hearing within ten days of his transfer 
under subdivision (1)(e)3. because his transfer was based on 
reasonable medical and clinical judgment, not a violation of a 
treatment condition.  Samuel's social worker testified that he 
had become "increasingly psychotic and his behavior had become 
No. 2012AP665   
 
23 
 
out of control."  The transfer form stated that "Samuel is 
presenting as delusional.  His thoughts are confused and he is 
agitated.  He repeatedly stated he put a hole in the door 
because 'someone was shot down and should be taken care of.'"  
The circuit court was not clearly erroneous in finding that 
Samuel had been transferred based on reasonable medical and 
clinical judgment.  See Phelps, 319 Wis. 2d 1, ¶34, (stating 
that we uphold a circuit court's factual findings unless they 
are clearly erroneous).  We therefore affirm the circuit court's 
denial of Samuel's petition to transfer and conclude that he was 
not entitled to a hearing within ten days of his transfer under 
§ 51.35(1)(e)3. because his transfer was based on reasonable 
medical and clinical judgment.7   
                                                 
7 A patient who is transferred under subdivision (1)(e)1.——a 
transfer for reasonable medical and clinical judgment that 
results in a more restrictive placement——is entitled to the 
rights as set forth in that subdivision, including "the right to 
petition a court in the county in which the patient is located 
or the committing court for a review of the transfer."  Samuel 
received a review of his transfer in front of the Manitowoc 
County Circuit Court, which upheld the transfer because it 
concluded that inpatient placement was the least restrictive 
treatment appropriate for Samuel's needs.  Samuel does not 
challenge that portion of the circuit court's order. 
No. 2012AP665   
 
24 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶34 We hold that Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e) does not require 
a hearing to be conducted within ten days of a transfer when the 
transfer is based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment 
under § 51.35(1)(e)1.  We withdraw any language from Elizabeth 
M.P. to the contrary.  We further hold that a hearing must be 
conducted within ten days of a transfer when (1) the transfer 
"results in a greater restriction of personal freedom for the 
patient for a period of more than 5 days" or is "from outpatient 
to inpatient status for a period of more than 5 days" and (2) 
the transfer is based on "an alleged violation of a condition of 
a transfer to less restrictive treatment" under § 51.35(1)(e)2.-
3. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Though it may be better practice to hold a hearing within 
ten 
days 
for 
all 
patients 
transferred 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.35(1)(e), the statute does not mandate that procedure for 
transfers based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment 
under § 51.35(1)(e)1.  At oral argument, Manitowoc County stated 
that after Samuel's case, it had in fact been conducting a 
hearing within ten days for all patients transferred under 
§ 51.35(1)(e), which had not resulted in a great burden on the 
County.  As the plain language of § 51.35(1)(e) does not require 
a 
hearing 
within 
ten 
days 
for 
patients 
transferred 
for 
reasonable medical and clinical judgment under subdivision 
(1)(e)1., arguments to change the procedure should properly be 
made to the legislature.   
No.  2012AP665.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶35 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).1  I agree 
with the majority opinion and Manitowoc County that the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)1. and § 51.35(1)(e)2. 
provides different procedures, depending on the grounds stated 
for the patient's transfer.  But interpreting these provisions 
literally, as the majority opinion does, without examining them 
in the context of Chapter 51 and without considering the 
policies 
and 
procedures 
the 
legislature 
has 
explicitly 
established in Chapter 51 violates the majority opinion's stated 
rules of statutory interpretation requiring it to interpret a 
statute reasonably to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.   
¶36 I write not only to disagree with the majority 
opinion's statutory interpretation, but also as importantly, to 
commend Manitowoc County.  When the County discovered what 
happened in the present case, it reviewed its practices.  As a 
result of its self-examination, Manitowoc County is working with 
the entities across the State in which patients from Manitowoc 
County reside.  The County has adopted procedures that follow 
the statutes, adhere to legislative policies, and protect 
patients' 
statutory 
liberty rights and interests, without 
increasing costs.  Hats off to Manitowoc County! 
I 
¶37 In the present case, Samuel J.H. was transferred on 
September 22, 2011, from outpatient status in Manitowoc County 
                                                 
1 I concur because I would not, in the present case, turn 
the clock back and give Samuel J.H. the ten-day hearing at this 
time.  He was afforded judicial review on the merits of his 
transfer and his inpatient placement has been upheld.  
No.  2012AP665.ssa 
 
2 
 
to inpatient status in an inpatient facility in Green Bay, 
Wisconsin, about 40 miles away.  Samuel J.H. stayed in Green Bay 
four days and on September 26, 2011, was transferred to the 
Trempealeau County Health Care Center in Whitehall, Wisconsin, 
about 215 miles from Green Bay.   
¶38 On the day that Samuel J.H. was transferred from 
Manitowoc to Green Bay, he was provided with a piece of paper 
informing him that he had the following rights: 
1. 
The right to contact a lawyer and a member of his 
family; 
2. 
The right to have counsel provided at public expense 
"if indigent;" and 
3. 
The right to petition a court in the county in which 
he is located or the committing court for review of 
the transfer.   
¶39 This piece of paper was apparently intended to satisfy 
Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)1. and § 51.60(1)(a).  I do not think it 
does.  At a minimum, the form Samuel J.H. was given seems to 
conflict with Wis. Stat. § 51.60(1)(a) with regard to the 
appointment of counsel.  The form seems to indicate Samuel J.H. 
is entitled to counsel at public expense only if he is indigent, 
but 
§ 51.60(1)(a) 
explicitly 
requires 
no 
such 
indigency 
determination.2   
                                                 
2 Section § 51.60(1)(a), the section specifically referenced 
in § 51.35, explicitly states that the state public defender 
shall appoint counsel for any adult who has a right to be 
represented by counsel without a determination of indigency. 
No.  2012AP665.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶40 Furthermore, Wisconsin Stat. § 51.60 requires that a 
patient "be referred as soon as practicable to the state public 
defender . . . ." 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 51.60 
is 
entitled 
"Appointment of Counsel" and reads, in pertinent part: 
(1) 
Adults. (a) In any situation under this chapter 
in which an adult individual has a right to be 
represented by counsel, the individual shall be 
referred as soon as practicable to the state 
public defender, who shall appoint counsel for 
the 
individual 
under 
s. 
977.08 
without 
a 
determination of indigency (emphasis added). 
¶41 Samuel J.H. was not referred to the State Public 
Defender as soon as practicable.3  Indeed, the State Public 
                                                                                                                                                             
In contrast, the form given to Samuel J.H. states the right 
to counsel as follows:  "The right to have counsel provided at 
public expense, as provided under s. 967.06 and ch. 977, if 
Subject is a child or is indigent. . . ." 
A patient who receives and reads this form could easily be 
confused regarding the right to counsel and at whose expense 
counsel will be provided. 
At the bottom of the form, the following Note appears: 
In Manitowoc County, the Public Defender can be 
reached as follows: 
 
State of Wisconsin Public Defender 
933 South Eighth Street, Suite 102 
Manitowoc, WI 54220 
(920) 683-4690 
3 At oral argument, Assistant Corporation Counsel Ryan 
O'Rourke touched on the interpretation of the word "refer."  He 
explained that in Manitowoc County, transferred patients are now 
"referred to the public defender's office and then [corporation 
counsel] leave[s] it in [the public defender's] hands as to make 
the decision on whether someone needs to be appointed.  At least 
[we] notify [the public defender] and make them aware of it, and 
then that agency is responsible for making their own decision as 
to whether they're statutorily obligated to appoint counsel." 
No.  2012AP665.ssa 
 
4 
 
Defender was not informed of Samuel J.H.'s transfer until Samuel 
J.H. himself wrote a letter to Manitowoc County Circuit Court 
Judge Jerome Fox in November 2011.  Judge Fox then informed the 
Manitowoc County Corporation Counsel of Samuel J.H.'s letter, 
and corporation counsel then referred the matter to the State 
Public Defender.  Majority op., ¶¶8-10. 
¶42 Thus, nearly two months passed between Samuel J.H.'s 
transfer to inpatient status and his referral to a public 
defender.  But for Samuel J.H.'s own action in sending a letter 
to the Manitowoc County Circuit Court, he may never have had 
counsel appointed and may never have had a hearing.  The initial 
failure of the County to refer Samuel J.H.'s transfer to the 
State Public Defender and the County's placing the onus on 
Samuel J.H. to obtain counsel (and advise his family) do not 
comport with Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)1. or § 51.60.  The purpose 
of the statutes and the legislative policy have been skirted in 
the present case by the majority opinion and the rights of the 
mentally ill have been diluted.  
¶43 The legislature has declared that any person in need 
of care must have "access to the least restrictive treatment" 
appropriate for his or her needs and that in order "to protect 
personal liberties, no person who can be treated adequately 
                                                                                                                                                             
Oral Argument at 51:17-52:35, Manitowoc County v. Samuel J.H., 
2012AP665, 
available 
at 
http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?
evhdid=7191 (last visited June 28, 2013). 
No.  2012AP665.ssa 
 
5 
 
outside of a hospital, institution or other inpatient facility 
may be involuntarily treated in such a facility."4   
¶44 The 
majority 
opinion 
does 
not 
facilitate 
least 
restrictive 
treatment 
and 
does 
not 
comport 
with 
the 
legislature's balancing the personal liberty interests of the 
individual and the protection of the individual and the public.5  
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.001, "Legislative Policy," reads as 
follows: 
(1) It is the policy of the state to assure the 
provision of a full range of treatment and 
rehabilitation services in the state for all 
mental disorders and developmental disabilities 
and for mental illness, alcoholism and other drug 
abuse.  There shall be a unified system of 
prevention of such conditions and provision of 
services which will assure all people in need of 
care access to the least restrictive treatment 
alternative 
appropriate 
to 
their 
needs, 
and 
movement through all treatment components to 
assure continuity of care, within the limits of 
available state and federal funds and of county 
funds required to be appropriated to match state 
funds. 
(2) To protect personal liberties, no person who can 
be treated adequately outside of a hospital, 
institution or other inpatient facility may be 
involuntarily 
treated 
in 
such 
a 
facility 
(emphasis added). 
5 The court has recognized that "[c]urrent mental health 
statutes reflect a balance between treating mental illness and 
protecting the individual and society from danger on the one 
hand, 
and 
personal 
liberty 
of 
the 
individual 
on 
the 
other. . . . Hence, from the first section of [Chapter 51], we 
see the tension between the role of the government to provide 
caring treatment (sometimes involuntarily and, if necessary, by 
force) and the personal liberty of the individual."  Outagamie 
County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶43, 58, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___. 
No.  2012AP665.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶45 Samuel J.H. has committed no crime.  The State is 
providing him treatment because he has a mental illness.  If the 
State is to restrain those with a mental illness, it must guard 
their liberty interests scrupulously.  The legislature has 
explicitly adopted this policy and accorded the individual the 
services of the State Public Defender.    
¶46 The majority opinion has wandered off the clearly 
marked legislative course mandating the protection of the basic 
liberty interests of the mentally ill.   
¶47 The majority opinion does not guard the liberty 
interests of the mentally ill scrupulously. 
¶48 The 
majority 
opinion 
fails 
to 
harmonize 
§ 51.35(1)(e)1. and § 51.35(1)(e)2. and interpret the provisions 
in the context of the expressed legislative policy and the 
procedural safeguards.  The majority opinion severely undermines 
a patient's statutory procedural rights, including the patient's 
statutory right to government-paid counsel.  In failing to 
interpret and apply the statutes in a manner that makes sense 
and respects the legislative purpose and policy, the majority 
opinion allows manipulation of the rights of the mentally ill.6  
                                                 
6 The transferring entity determines what kind of hearing 
the patient gets by the way it fills out the transfer form.  
Samuel J.H. questions whether the entity should be able to 
decide not only on the transfer but also on the hearing rights 
of the patient.   
No.  2012AP665.ssa 
 
7 
 
Statutes must not be interpreted and applied in such a manner as 
to permit manipulation of the procedural rights of the mentally 
ill 
or 
to 
render 
statutory 
provisions 
meaningless 
or 
superfluous. 
¶49 The 
result 
the 
majority 
opinion 
reaches 
is 
unreasonable in light of the text of the statute, the rights 
statutorily granted Samuel J.H., and the explicit legislative 
policy.      
II 
¶50 To ensure the rights of patients and compliance with 
the statutes, counties should follow Manitowoc's lead.    
¶51 Manitowoc County Corporation Counsel explained at oral 
argument that subsequent to Samuel J.H.'s case, the County 
realized that Wis. Stat. § 51.35 was not well implemented.  The 
County then worked with the various entities in which Chapter 51 
patients reside and created and is following a standard written 
policy.  The County now gives notice to the State Public 
                                                                                                                                                             
Many patients, including Samuel J.H., probably could be 
classified 
under 
either 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.35(1)(e)1. 
or 
§ 51.35(1)(e)2. or both statutory provisions.  Samuel J.H.'s 
social worker testified that he had violated two conditions of 
his outpatient treatment, but she asserted that he was not 
transferred because of these violations of his treatment 
conditions.  Majority op., ¶12.  Thus, the transferring entity 
often, if not always, has an opportunity to decide between 
whether the patient is transferred for "medical and clinical" 
reasons or a "violation of conditions."  
The 
majority 
opinion 
provides 
a 
blueprint 
for 
how 
authorities can fill out transfer papers to ensure that a 
patient does not receive a ten-day hearing.  Unfortunately, the 
majority opinion may render the ten-day hearing and the 
procedural protections in § 51.35(1)(e)2.-5. relics of the past. 
No.  2012AP665.ssa 
 
8 
 
Defender immediately when a patient is being transferred.  A 
ten-day hearing is ordinarily held.  Assistant Corporation 
Counsel Ryan O'Rourke noted that providing a ten-day hearing in 
every transfer is not a significant burden.7  Corporation counsel 
stated that the new effort does not require substantially more 
time or effort,8 and in the end, ensures that the process is 
                                                 
7 Oral Argument at 40:30-40:45, Manitowoc County v. Samuel 
J.H., 
2012AP665, 
available 
at  
http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?
evhdid=7191 (last visited June 28, 2013). 
8 At oral argument, Assistant Corporation Counsel O'Rourke 
explained that some facilities in which Chapter 51 patients 
reside did not know how to appoint a hearing officer, indicating 
that the facilities may not be familiar with the statutory 
requirements of hearings.  This revelation is cause for concern, 
yet the majority opinion remains oblivious to the practice.  The 
Manitowoc County Corporation Counsel is assisting the facilities 
with which it works. 
Assistant Corporation Counsel O'Rourke advised the court as 
follows: 
[T]he biggest problem with Samuel J.H.'s case that I 
have with how it happened was that counsel wasn't 
appointed right away.  And the statute doesn't require 
us to, the statute simply requires that we notify him 
of his right to counsel and provide him the contact 
information, but we as a county have taken it upon 
ourselves to, regardless of the reason for transfer, 
our office is notified immediately, which wasn't 
always happening.  Probate is notified immediately, 
which wasn't always happening, whether we think a 
hearing's necessary or not, and the public defender is 
notified through probate and an attorney is appointed 
immediately, so that we're not having this delay that 
we had in Samuel's case where it was a month and a 
half before he requested the hearing.  Under the 
statute do I think we have to do that?  No, but I 
believe it's better procedure. 
No.  2012AP665.ssa 
 
9 
 
fair.  As Corporation Counsel explained, "[I]t's the more 
legally conservative approach to take to protect the transfer."9   
¶52 Because the majority opinion's interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 51.35 and 51.60 has wandered off the clearly marked 
legislative course of protecting the basic liberty interests of 
the mentally ill and leads to an absurd and unreasonable result, 
I cannot join the majority opinion.  A reasonable and harmonious 
reading of §§ 51.35 and 51.60 leads to the conclusion that all 
patients with outpatient status transferred to inpatient status 
are referred to counsel and granted a hearing within ten days to 
determine whether the form of treatment resulting from the 
transfer is the least restrictive alternative and consistent 
with the treatment needs of the patient.   
¶53 A measure of a society is how it treats its weakest 
members.  The legislature has incorporated this ethos into the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Oral Argument at 34:23-35:18, Manitowoc County v. Samuel J.H., 
2012AP665, 
available 
at 
http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?
evhdid=7191 (last visited June 28, 2013). 
9 Assistant Corporation Counsel O'Rourke said in full: 
Subsequent to Samuel J.H., and not that this has any 
effect on Samuel's case, but procedurally what we've 
done as a county is it became clear to me we needed a 
standard written set of policies to follow, we 
implemented 
those, 
we 
are 
holding 
the 
hearing 
regardless of the reason for transfer now, simply 
because I believe it's the more legally conservative 
approach to take to protect the transfer. 
Oral Argument at 33:48-34:15, Manitowoc County v. Samuel J.H., 
2012AP665, 
available 
at 
http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?
evhdid=7191 (last visited June 28, 2013). 
No.  2012AP665.ssa 
 
10 
 
statutes, and this court should interpret the statutes to 
achieve the clearly stated legislative policy and purpose.  The 
majority opinion does not. 
¶54 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
 
No.  2012AP665.ssa 
 
1