Title: In re J.D.B

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 190A09   
FILED: 11 DECEMBER 2009
IN THE MATTER OF J.D.B.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the
decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C.
App. ___, 674 S.E.2d 795 (2009), affirming an order entered on 16
October 2007, nunc pro tunc, 13 December 2005, by Judge Joseph
Moody Buckner in District Court, Orange County.  Heard in the
Supreme Court on 10 September 2009.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by LaToya B. Powell,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Lisa Skinner Lefler for juvenile-appellant.
S. Hannah Demeritt, Barbara Fedders, and Mark Dorosin
for the University of North Carolina School of Law
Center for Civil Rights, University of North Carolina
School of Law Juvenile Justice Clinic, Office of the
Juvenile Defender, and Advocates for Children’s
Services, Legal Aid of North Carolina, amici curiae.
NEWBY, Justice.
This case presents the issue of whether a juvenile who
made incriminating revelations to law enforcement officers was in
police custody such that the officers should have afforded him
the protections of N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a), which codifies and
expands for the juvenile context the safeguards set forth in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d
694 (1966).  Because we hold that the Court of Appeals properly
concluded that the juvenile was not in custody when he
incriminated himself, we affirm the decision of that court.
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Two juvenile petitions were filed against the juvenile
J.D.B. on 19 October 2005, each alleging one count of breaking
and entering and one count of larceny.  On 1 December 2005,
counsel for J.D.B. filed a motion to suppress certain statements
and evidence.  After a hearing, the trial court entered an order
denying the motion to suppress on 13 December 2005.  The trial
court did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law at that
time.  In a transcript of admission filed on 24 January 2006,
J.D.B. admitted to all four counts alleged in the juvenile
petitions of 19 October 2005, but renewed his objection to the
denial of his motion to suppress.  Also on 24 January 2006, the
trial court entered an order adjudicating J.D.B. delinquent. 
J.D.B. appealed, inter alia, the denial of his motion to
suppress.
The Court of Appeals remanded in pertinent part “to
allow the trial court to make the findings of fact necessary to
support its determination that [J.D.B.] was not in custody at the
time he was questioned.”  In re J.B., 183 N.C. App. 299, 644
S.E.2d 270, 2007 WL 1412457, at *5 (2007) (unpublished).  On
remand, the trial court entered an order on 16 October 2007 in
which it made findings of fact and conclusions of law in support
of its denial of J.D.B.’s motion to suppress.  The trial court
found as follows:
1.
On September 24, 2005, [two homes in
Chapel Hill] were broken into and
various items were stolen, including
jewelry [and] a digital camera.
2.
[J.D.B.], at the time 13 years old, was
interviewed by police on the same day as
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the break-ins after he was seen behind a
residence in the same neighborhood.
3.
It was later that the police were
informed that [J.D.B.] had been seen in
possession of a digital camera at
school, which camera turned out to be
the camera stolen [on September 24,
2005].
4.
Investigator Joseph DiCostanzo of the
Chapel Hill Police Department was
assigned the investigation and went to
the juvenile’s school to speak with him.
5.
[J.D.B.] is in the seventh grade and
enrolled in special education classes.
6.
[J.D.B.] was escorted from his class and
into a conference room to be
interviewed.  Present in the room were
Investigator DiCostanzo, Assistant
Principal David Lyons, a school resource
officer and an intern.  The door was
closed, but not locked.
7.
[J.D.B.] was not administered Miranda
warning[s] and was not offered the
opportunity to speak to a parent or
guardian prior to the commencement of
questioning.  Additionally, no parent or
guardian was contacted prior to
[J.D.B.]’s removal from class.
8.
Investigator DiCostanzo asked [J.D.B.]
if he would agree to answer questions
about recent break-ins.  [J.D.B.]
consented.
9.
[J.D.B.] stated that he had been in the
neighborhood looking for work mowing
lawns and initially denied any criminal
activity.
10.
Mr. Lyons then encouraged [J.D.B.] to
“do the right thing” and tell the truth.
11.
The investigator questioned him further
and confronted him with the fact that
the camera had been found.
12.
Upon [J.D.B.]’s inquiry as to whether he
would still be in trouble if he gave the
items back, the investigator responded
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that it would be helpful, but that the
matter was still going to court and that
he may have to seek a secure custody
order.
13.
[J.D.B.] then confessed to entering the
houses and taking certain items together
with another juvenile.
14.
The investigator informed [J.D.B.] that
he did not have to speak with him and
that he was free to leave.  He asked him
if [he] understood that he was not under
arrest and did not have to talk with the
investigator.
15.
[J.D.B.] indicated by nodding “yes” that
he understood that he did not have to
talk to the officer and that he was free
to leave.  He continued to provide more
details regarding where certain items
could be located.
16.
[J.D.B.] wrote a statement regarding his
involvement in the crime.
17.
The bell rang signaling the end of the
day and [J.D.B.] was allowed to leave to
catch his bus home.
18.
The interview lasted from 30 to 45
minutes.
19.
The investigator had informed [J.D.B.]
that he would see him later and would be
speaking to his grandmother and aunt.
20.
Investigator DiCostanzo and Officer
Hunter went to the home of [J.D.B.], but
found no one home.  When [J.D.B.]
arrived, he told the officers they could
look around and he would show them where
the jewelry was located.
21.
Investigator DiCostanzo informed
[J.D.B.] that he needed to obtain a
search warrant and left Officer Hunter
to wait outside [J.D.B.]’s home.
22.
While awaiting the search warrant,
[J.D.B.] brought a ring to the officer
from inside the home.
-5-
23.
Upon the investigator’s return with the
warrant, [J.D.B.] entered the home with
the officers and handed them several
stolen items and led the investigator to
where other items could be found on the
roof of a gas station down the road. 
During the entire time that the officers
were at his residence and travelling
with him to the BP station, no parent or
guardian was contacted or advised of the
situation.  [J.D.B.] was not advised of
his Miranda warnings or told he had the
right to speak to or have a parent or
guardian present.
24.
Investigator DiCostanzo left his card
and a copy of the search warrant at
[J.D.B.]’s residence.
25.
All of [J.D.B.]’s responses to the
officer’s questions were appropriately
responsive, indicating that he was
capable of understanding the fact that
he did not have to answer questions.
26.
All of [J.D.B.]’s responses to counsel
during the suppression hearing were
appropriately responsive.
J.D.B. again appealed the denial of his motion to
suppress.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court, concluding that “J.D.B. was not in custody during
his interactions with officers.”  In re J.D.B., ___ N.C. App.
___, ___, 674 S.E.2d 795, 800 (2009).  J.D.B. then appealed as of
right to this Court on the basis of the dissenting opinion in the
Court of Appeals, which would have held that J.D.B. was in
custody when he incriminated himself to police officers.  Id. at
___, 674 S.E.2d at 801 (Beasley, J., dissenting).  The dissenting
judge opined, “[T]hat J.D.B. was a middle school aged child is
certainly among the circumstances relevant to” whether J.D.B. was
in custody.  Id. at ___, 674 S.E.2d at 802 (citing State v.
Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 339-40, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (2001)).
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We begin our review by noting that the trial court’s
findings of fact are uncontested and therefore, binding on this
Court.  E.g., Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d
729, 731 (1991) (citations omitted).  Our consideration is
limited to de novo review of the trial court’s conclusions of
law.  State v. Wilkerson, 363 N.C. 382, 430, 683 S.E.2d 174, 203
(2009) (citing State v. Hyatt, 355 N.C. 642, 653, 566 S.E.2d 61,
69 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1133, 123 S. Ct. 916, 154 L.
Ed. 2d 823 (2003)).
J.D.B. argues that he was in police custody when he
incriminated himself and thus, that his rights were violated when
he was interrogated without proper warnings under Miranda and
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a).  The United States Supreme Court held in
Miranda
that when an individual is taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the
authorities in any significant way and is
subjected to questioning, the [Fifth
Amendment] privilege against
self-incrimination is jeopardized. . . . 
[The individual] must be warned prior to any
questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will
be appointed for him prior to any questioning
if he so desires.
384 U.S. at 478-79, 86 S. Ct. at 1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726
(emphasis added).  For the juvenile setting, our General Statutes
codify and enhance the protections required under Miranda:
(a) Any juvenile in custody must be
advised prior to questioning:
(1)
That the juvenile has a right
to remain silent; 
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(2)
That any statement the
juvenile does make can be and
may be used against the
juvenile; 
(3)
That the juvenile has a right
to have a parent, guardian, or
custodian present during
questioning; and 
(4)
That the juvenile has a right
to consult with an attorney
and that one will be appointed
for the juvenile if the
juvenile is not represented
and wants representation.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a) (2007) (emphasis added).
The protections of Miranda and section 7B-2101(a) apply
only to custodial interrogations by law enforcement.  “‘[I]n
determining whether a suspect [is] in custody, an appellate court
must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation;
but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest
or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated
with a formal arrest.’”  Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338, 543 S.E.2d at
827 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Gaines, 345
N.C. 647, 662, 483 S.E.2d 396, 405, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900,
118 S. Ct. 248, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997)).  This inquiry requires
application of “an objective test as to whether a reasonable
person in the position of the defendant would believe himself to
be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of
action in some significant way.”  State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565,
577, 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992) (citations omitted).  Notably,
the inquiry as to “‘whether there was a formal arrest or a
restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a
-8-
formal arrest,’” Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338, 543 S.E.2d at 827
(quoting Gaines, 345 N.C. at 662, 483 S.E.2d at 405), is not
equivalent to the broader “free to leave” test that “has long
been used for determining, under the Fourth Amendment, whether a
person has been seized,” id. at 339, 543 S.E.2d at 828 (emphasis
added) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554,
100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509 (1980)). 
“Circumstances supporting an objective showing that one is ‘in
custody’ might include a police officer standing guard at the
door, locked doors or application of handcuffs.”  Id. at 339, 543
S.E.2d at 828.
The uniquely structured nature of the school
environment inherently deprives students of some freedom of
action.  However, the typical restrictions of the school setting
apply to all students and do not constitute a “significant”
deprivation of freedom of action under the test set forth in
Greene.  332 N.C. at 577, 422 S.E.2d at 737.  For a student in
the school setting to be deemed in custody, law enforcement must
subject the student to “‘restraint on freedom of movement’” that
goes well beyond the limitations that are characteristic of the
school environment in general.  Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338, 543
S.E.2d at 827 (quoting Gaines, 345 N.C. at 662, 483 S.E.2d at
405).
In the instant case, J.D.B. was escorted from class to
a conference room, where Investigator DiCostanzo was present
along with an assistant principal, one of the assistant
principal’s interns, and the school resource officer.  The school
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resource officer’s minimal participation in the questioning of
J.D.B. did not render that questioning custodial in nature.  See
In re W.R., 363 N.C. 244, 248, 675 S.E.2d 342, 344 (2009)
(stating in circumstances similar to those in the instant case: 
“[W]e are not prepared . . . to conclude that the presence and
participation of the school resource officer . . . rendered the
questioning of respondent juvenile a ‘custodial interrogation,’
requiring Miranda warnings and the protections of N.C.G.S. § 7B-
2101.”).  Moreover, there is no indication in the trial court’s
findings that J.D.B. was restrained in any way or that anyone
stood guard at the conference room door.  “The door was closed,
but not locked.”  By asking J.D.B. “if he would agree to answer
questions about recent break-ins,” Investigator DiCostanzo
indicated that J.D.B. was not required to do so.  Investigator
DiCostanzo began his questions only after J.D.B. said he was
willing to answer.  After J.D.B. “initially denied any criminal
activity,” Investigator DiCostanzo informed J.D.B. that the
stolen digital camera had been recovered.  J.D.B. then asked
“whether he would still be in trouble if he gave the items back,”
and Investigator DiCostanzo responded that, although the matter
was “going to court” regardless, J.D.B.’s cooperation “would be
helpful.”  It was then that J.D.B. “confessed to entering the
houses and taking certain items together with another juvenile.” 
Upon objective consideration of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding J.D.B.’s confession, we determine that there were not
sufficient “indicia of formal arrest” to justify a conclusion
that J.D.B. “had been formally arrested or had had his freedom of
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movement restrained to the degree associated with a formal
arrest.”  Id. (citing Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338-40, 543 S.E.2d at
827-28).
Immediately following J.D.B.’s initial confession,
Investigator DiCostanzo “informed [J.D.B.] that he did not have
to speak with him and that he was free to leave.  He asked him if
[he] understood that he was not under arrest and did not have to
talk with the investigator,” and J.D.B. “indicated by nodding
‘yes’ that he understood.”  After J.D.B. acknowledged that he
understood he was not under arrest and was free to leave, J.D.B.
continued to provide information about the break-ins and “wrote a
statement regarding his involvement in the crime.”  After the
interview, which “lasted from 30 to 45 minutes,” J.D.B. left the
conference room without hindrance.  See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct. 711, 714, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714, 719 (1977)
(per curiam) (in which the Supreme Court of the United States
determined that a suspect was not in custody when his freedom to
leave the police station to which he had come voluntarily was not
“restricted in any way” and the suspect “did in fact leave the
police station without hindrance”).  Later that same day,
Investigator DiCostanzo and another police officer accompanied
J.D.B. as he willingly located and surrendered numerous stolen
items.  The trial court’s findings of fact with respect to this
later encounter (numbered 19-24) contain insufficient indicia of
“‘restraint on [J.D.B.’s] freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest’” to support a conclusion that
J.D.B. was in police custody.  Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338, 543
-11-
S.E.2d at 827 (quoting Gaines, 345 N.C. at 662, 483 S.E.2d at
405).
J.D.B. argues, as did the dissenting judge in the Court
of Appeals, that the inquiry into whether he was in custody
should take into consideration J.D.B.’s age and his status as a
special education student.  This Court has not accounted for such
matters in conducting the proper custody inquiry in the past.  In
the recent case of In re W.R., for example, we considered whether
the questioning of a fourteen-year-old juvenile was custodial in
nature.  363 N.C. at 246-48, 675 S.E.2d at 343-44.  In reversing
the Court of Appeals’ holding that the juvenile was in custody,
we applied the objective “reasonable person” standard, id. at
248, 675 S.E.2d at 344 (citing Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338-40, 543
S.E.2d at 827-28), and at no point did we consider the juvenile’s
age.
We reiterate that the custody inquiry is “an objective
test as to whether a reasonable person in the position of the
defendant would believe himself to be in custody or that he had
been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way.” 
Greene, 332 N.C. at 577, 422 S.E.2d at 737 (citations omitted). 
While “[w]e have consistently held that a defendant’s subnormal
mental capacity is a factor to be considered when determining
whether a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights has been
made,” State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 8, 305 S.E.2d 685, 690
(1983) (emphasis added) (citations omitted), subjective mental
characteristics are not relevant regarding whether “a reasonable
person” would believe he had been placed under the equivalent of
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 We are aware that Alvarado is not binding on this Court
1
because the Supreme Court of the United States merely held in
that case that “[t]he state court considered the proper factors
and reached a reasonable conclusion” and, thus, that an
application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1) should not have been granted.  541 U.S. at 669, 124 S.
Ct. at 2152, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 954.  We nonetheless consider
Alvarado persuasive.
a formal arrest, Greene, 332 N.C. at 577, 422 S.E.2d at 737
(emphasis added).  This Court adheres to the view that “the
custody inquiry states an objective rule designed to give clear
guidance to the police, while consideration of a suspect’s
individual characteristics--including his age--could be viewed as
creating a subjective inquiry.”  Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.
652, 668, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2151-52, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938, 954 (2004)
(citing Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495-96, 97 S. Ct. at 714, 50 L.
Ed. 2d at 719).    Under the circumstances of the case sub
1
judice, we decline to extend the test for custody to include
consideration of the age and academic standing of an individual
subjected to questioning by police.
Because we conclude that J.D.B. was not in custody when
he incriminated himself to the police, we hold that he was not
entitled to the protections of N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a) and Miranda
v. Arizona.  The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the
trial court’s denial of J.D.B.’s motion to suppress.  Therefore,
the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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Justice BRADY dissenting.
The issue in this case is whether J.D.B., a thirteen- year
old special education student at Smith Middle School in Chapel
Hill, North Carolina, was significantly deprived of his freedom
of movement and thus entitled to the protections of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and N.C.G.S. § 7B-
2101(a) before being interrogated by law enforcement officers and
school officials in a closed conference room of the middle
school.  The majority’s conclusion stands in stark contrast to
our State’s public policy of aiding, supporting, and protecting
juveniles.  The manner in which school officials and law
enforcement interrogated J.D.B. more resembles hunters carefully
and selectively targeting their prey than a fair juvenile
investigation consistent with our General Statutes.  Because I
believe the Juvenile Code affords heightened protections against
self-incrimination to juveniles, especially in the restrictive
environment of a public middle school, I respectfully dissent.
Tension has long existed between the interests of law
enforcement in conducting efficient criminal investigations and
the individual’s constitutional right against self-incrimination. 
Throughout American history the “incommunicado” nature of police
investigations has led to the use of physical violence and
psychological coercion to elicit criminal confessions.  See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1966).  In response to
these abuses, the Supreme Court of the United States decision in 
Miranda v. Arizona unequivocally established that law enforcement
officers must administer specific warnings “to protect an
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individual’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in
the inherently compelling context of custodial interrogations by
police officers.”  State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543
S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. 436).  The North
Carolina General Assembly has taken additional steps to protect a
juvenile’s right against self-incrimination in the North Carolina
Juvenile Code, which provides that before custodial questioning,
a juvenile must be advised: 
(1)
That [he] has the right to remain silent;
(2) That any statement [he] does make can be and
may be used against [him]; 
(3) That [he] has a right to have a parent,
guardian, or custodian present during
questioning; and
(4) That [he] has a right to consult with an
attorney and that one will be appointed for
[him] if [he] is not represented and wants
representation. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a) (2007).  
An individual is entitled to Miranda warnings and the
protections of N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101 when it is apparent from the
“totality of the circumstances” that there is a “formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a
formal arrest.”  State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 399-400, 597
S.E.2d 724, 738 (2004) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1156 (2005).  The primary
inquiry is “‘whether a reasonable person in defendant’s position,
under the totality of the circumstances, would have believed that
he was under arrest or was restrained in his movement to the
degree associated with a formal arrest.’”  State v. Barden, 356
N.C. 316, 337, 572 S.E.2d 108, 123 (2002) (emphasis added)
-15-
  N.C.G.S. § 7A-595 formerly governed juvenile
2
interrogations and its provisions are nearly identical to the
current N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101.  See N.C.G.S. § 7A-595 (1986).
(quoting Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 339-40, 543 S.E.2d at 828), cert.
denied, 538 U.S. 1040 (2003). 
Ultimately, the analysis in the instant case hinges upon
whether defendant’s age should be taken into consideration under
the reasonable person standard when analyzing the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation.  The majority contends that
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004), should persuade this
Court to not consider the age of the subject under the reasonable
person standard.  In Alvarado, the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled that “[t]he Miranda custody inquiry is an objective
test,” id. at 667, and because “consideration of a suspect’s
individual characteristics--including his age--could be viewed as
creating a subjective inquiry,” id. at 668, age was irrelevant to
a reasonable person’s belief in a Miranda custody analysis.  Id. 
Alvarado is not controlling in an analysis of N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101. 
 See State v. Smith, 317 N.C. 100, 106, 343 S.E.2d 518, 521
(1986) (“In resolving [issues under N.C.G.S. § 7A-595] . . .
cases decided under the fifth and sixth amendments to the United
States Constitution are not controlling . . . .”) overruled in
part on other grounds by Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 340, 543 S.E.2d at
828.  When analyzing N.C.G.S. § 7A-595, the predecessor provision
of the Juvenile Code governing juvenile interrogations, this
Court has found it appropriate to consider the subject’s age
under the reasonable person standard of the Miranda “in custody”
analysis.   In State v. Smith this Court considered whether a
2
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sixteen year old was subjected to a  custodial interrogation
under N.C.G.S. § 7A-595.  Id. at 102-08, 343 S.E.2d at 519-22. 
After considering the totality of the circumstances, including
the length of the questioning and the constant presence of armed
law enforcement officers, this Court determined that a person of
“defendant’s age and experience” would have believed he was in
custody.  Id. at 105, 343 S.E.2d at 520.  Thus, the age of the
defendant was a key consideration in determining whether a
reasonable juvenile would have believed he was “in custody” under
N.C.G.S. § 7A-595.  
By failing to consider age, the majority’s reasonable person
standard is too rigid to apply to provisions of the Juvenile
Code.  It is logical that age should be considered as part of the
reasonable person standard in a custody analysis under N.C.G.S. §
7B-2101.  The many noble goals of the Juvenile Code include
“protect[ing] the constitutional rights of juveniles” and their
families and “provid[ing] uniform procedures that assure fairness
and equity.”  N.C.G.S. § 7B-1500(4) (2007).  The entire Code was
created to ensure unique services for juveniles because of the
special circumstances inherent in their youth; to ignore age when
interpreting any section of the Juvenile Code defies common sense
and the very purpose of the Code.  
Furthermore, a defendant’s age is often considered
throughout our jurisprudence and General Statutes.  For example,
under civil common law, there is a rebuttable presumption that
juveniles between the ages of seven and fourteen are incapable of
contributory negligence, and children under seven are
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“conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory
negligence.”  See Welch v. Jenkins, 271 N.C. 138, 142, 155 S.E.2d
763, 766 (1967) (citations omitted).  In the criminal context,
those under the age of six cannot be charged with a crime.  See
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1501(7) (2007).  In North Carolina we have a
separate juvenile court for youthful offenders; jurisdiction can
be transferred to a superior court only if the juvenile is at
least thirteen years old when the alleged felony was committed,
if the juvenile has received proper notice and a hearing, and
probable cause has been found.  Id. § 7B-2200 (2007). 
Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled
that the Eighth Amendment forbids imposition of the death penalty
on offenders under the age of eighteen when their crimes were
committed.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).  The
rationale behind these laws is practical and just.  The
perceptions, cognitive abilities, and moral development of
juveniles are different from those of adults; thus, the law
rightly takes this into account when dealing with juvenile
offenders.  The majority’s failure to consider J.D.B’s juvenile
status in its reasonable person standard runs contrary to our
established juvenile jurisprudence.
Furthermore, the arguments for excluding consideration of
age under the reasonable person standard outlined in Alvarado are
not present in the instant case.  Alvarado’s rationale for
excluding age from a custody inquiry was to “give clear guidance
to the police,” 541 U.S. at 668, so that law enforcement officers
are not forced to “anticipat[e] the frailties or idiosyncra[s]ies
-18-
of every person whom they question,” id. at 667 (quoting Berkemer
v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 n.35 (1984) (alterations in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Here, the
difficulty of guessing defendant’s age is nonexistent. 
Investigator DiCostanzo sought out J.D.B. at a middle school,
where he knew J.D.B. was a seventh-grade student.  All seventh
graders are juveniles, roughly between the ages of twelve and
fourteen, and as Investigator DiCostanzo testified, he was able
to obtain J.D.B.’s exact age from school records.  Therefore,
defendant’s “frailty”--his youth--was evident from the very
location Investigator DiCostanzo selected to conduct the
interrogation.  Additionally, Investigator DiCostanzo was a
juvenile investigator with the Chapel Hill Police Department,
specially trained in dealing with juveniles and educated in laws
concerning their rights.  The Chapel Hill Police Department
Policy Manual explicitly states:
Even if the juvenile is not in custody, it is good
practice to have him sign a Miranda Rights waiver
form before issuing a statement.  If the juvenile
does not sign a waiver, the officer must document
that the juvenile is told that he is not under
arrest and free to leave at any time, and that he
agreed to talk.
Chapel Hill Police Dep’t, Policy Manual No. 2-12 (Juvenile
Response), at 4 (Dec. 15, 2006 (revised)) (emphasis added).  In
order to protect J.D.B.’s rights and fulfill the purpose of the
Juvenile Code, Investigator DiCostanzo should have read J.D.B.
his rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101 before soliciting any
statement, just as the Chapel Hill Police Department Policy
Manual advises.  
-19-
Because consideration of a subject’s youth is particularly
pertinent in analyzing any provision of the Juvenile Code,
especially when doing so creates no undue burden on law
enforcement officers, the proper inquiry in the instant case when
determining whether defendant was in custody for the purposes of
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101 should be whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable juvenile in defendant’s position
would have believed he was under formal arrest or was restrained
in his movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. 
The majority concludes that there were not sufficient “indicia of
formal arrest” to conclude that J.D.B. was in custody because the
findings of fact do not indicate that J.D.B. was physically
restrained or that the conference room door was guarded or
locked.  While it is true that handcuffs were never applied to
J.D.B. and the closed door of the room where he was detained was
not locked, this does not mean he was not restrained.  The
majority’s analysis ignores the Court’s obligation to consider
the totality of the circumstances and “the unique facts
surrounding each incriminating statement.”  Garcia, 358 N.C. at
399, 597 S.E.2d at 738 (citations omitted).  An examination of
the totality of the circumstances leads to the conclusion that a
reasonable juvenile in J.D.B.’s position would have believed he
was restrained in his movement to the degree associated with a
formal arrest.  
First, the location of the interrogation must be considered. 
In any planned interrogation, law enforcement carefully chooses
the location before questioning begins.  The gold standard in
-20-
enhanced interrogation preparation and training, utilized by both
the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, is the Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence
Collector Operations.  The Manual states:
When conducting . . . operations, the location of
the questioning will have psychological effects on
the source.  The questioning location should be
chosen and set up to correspond to the effect that
the [officer] wants to project and his planned
approach techniques.  For example, meeting in a
social type situation such as a restaurant may
place the source at ease.  Meeting in an apartment
projects informality while meeting in an office
projects more formality.  Meeting at the source’s
home normally places him at a psychological
advantage, while meeting in the [officer’s] work
area gives the [officer] a psychological edge.
 
U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence
Collector Operations para. 7-12 (Sept. 6, 2006).  As a trained
investigator would know, the location of the interrogation in the
instant case certainly would have a psychological effect on a
reasonable person in J.D.B.’s position.  A middle school is a
restrictive environment.  Unlike a university campus, where
people may freely come and go, middle school students are not
free to leave the campus without permission, and visitors to the
school, including parents and guardians of students, must upon
arrival report their presence and receive permission to be at the
facility.   Moreover, students at middle schools are instructed
to obey the requests and directives of adults.  The Student
Handbook at Smith Middle School, where J.D.B. attended, instructs
students to “[f]ollow directions of all teachers/adults the first
time they are given,” “[s]top moving when an adult addresses”
them, and “[w]alk away only after the adult has dismissed” them.  
-21-
Law enforcement in the instant case took advantage of the
middle school’s restrictive environment and its psychological
effect by choosing to interrogate J.D.B. there, instead of at his
home or in any other public, more neutral location.  Certainly,
if the larceny J.D.B. was suspected of committing had occurred on
school grounds, law enforcement might understandably investigate
suspects there, at the scene of the crime.  However, the larceny
in question occurred in a residential subdivision, not on the
school campus.  Law enforcement investigators could have first
attempted to question J.D.B. at his residence.  Instead, the
school was selected as the interrogation site, a location where
any reasonable juvenile in J.D.B.’s position would not only be at
a psychological disadvantage, but where he would be defenseless,
without the protection of a parent or guardian.  It is troubling
that in the instant case a public middle school, which should be
an environment where children feel safe and protected, became a
place where a law enforcement investigator claimed a tactical
advantage over a juvenile.
Not only was J.D.B., or any reasonable juvenile in his
position, at a disadvantage because of the location of the
interrogation, but also by the manner in which it was conducted. 
J.D.B. was sitting in a classroom with his peers when the class
was suddenly interrupted by Officer Gurley, Smith Middle School’s
resource officer.  Officer Gurley removed J.D.B. from the
classroom and escorted him to a school conference room.  J.D.B.
could have been asked by his teacher or any other school official
to report to the conference room; instead, he was escorted by a
-22-
  Additionally, amici argue that refusal to follow an order
3
given by a school official can ultimately lead to criminal
charges under N.C.G.S. § 14-288.4, which provides that a person
who willfully engages in disorderly conduct by “[d]isrupt[ing],
disturb[ing] or interfer[ing] with the teaching of students . . .
or disturb[ing] the peace, order or discipline at any . . .
educational institution” is “guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.” 
N.C.G.S. § 14-288.4(a)(6) (2007).  Under N.C.G.S. § 115C-378
(2007) parents can also be prosecuted for violating the
Compulsory Attendance Law if their children fail to attend
school.  
uniformed, armed police officer.  The only logical reason for
Officer Gurley to escort J.D.B. was to restrain his freedom of
movement; J.D.B. had no choice but to comply with his removal
from the classroom and Officer Gurley’s instructions to walk to
the conference room.  If J.D.B. had refused to accompany Officer
Gurley he likely would have faced disciplinary action from the
school.   Therefore, J.D.B.’s freedom of movement was restricted
3
from the moment he was removed from his classroom by Officer
Gurley.  
When J.D.B. arrived at the conference room, he was met by
three other authoritative adults:  Mr. Lyons, the school
assistant principal; Mr. Benson, an intern with the school; and
Investigator DiCostanzo of the Chapel Hill Police Department. 
J.B.D. was directed to take a seat at a conference table and the
door to the office was closed.  Investigator DiCostanzo was not
in uniform, but dressed in a suit jacket and tie, and he
introduced himself to J.D.B. as a juvenile investigator.  That a
special investigator from the police department, dressed in
business attire, was making a special trip to the school would
alert any reasonable middle school student that something serious
was taking place, something more than a casual conversation about
-23-
joining the Police Athletic League or participating in the Youth
Partnership for Crime Prevention.  
With these facts alone, there is enough evidence to conclude
that a reasonable juvenile in J.D.B.’s position would have
believed he was restrained in his movement to the degree
associated with a formal arrest.  The majority states that “[f]or
a student in the school setting to be deemed in custody, law
enforcement must subject the student to ‘restraint on freedom of
movement’ that goes well beyond the limitations that are
characteristic of the school environment in general.”  If removal
from a middle school classroom and being physically escorted by a
uniformed, armed police officer to a closed conference room
inhabited by four authoritative adults does not qualify as
procedures that go well beyond the “typical restrictions” of a
“school environment in general,” it is hard to imagine any set of
circumstances that the majority would label as a sufficient
restraint on movement.  
At this point in the interrogation, as noted above, the
Chapel Hill Police Department Policy Manual instructs that before
any questioning began, Investigator DiCostanzo should have
informed J.D.B. of his rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101.  Had
Investigator DiCostanzo simply followed the Manual, this case
likely would not be before us.  Instead, Investigator DiCostanzo
immediately began the interrogation.  J.D.B. was never told he
was free to leave or that he was entitled to have a parent,
guardian, or attorney present.  When Investigator DiCostanzo
began questioning J.D.B. about the larceny, J.D.B. denied any
-24-
  A juvenile held under a secure custody order is entitled
4
to far fewer protections than an adult taken into custody.  Once
an adult defendant is taken into police custody he is required to
be brought before a magistrate for a hearing “without unnecessary
delay” pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-501 (2007).  At this
appearance, the magistrate must release the defendant in
accordance with Article 26 of Chapter 15A, or commit the
defendant to a detention facility pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 
15A-521, pending further proceedings in the case.  Id. § 15A-
511(e) (2007).  After appearing before a magistrate, an adult
criminal defendant must be brought before a district court judge
for an initial appearance within 96 hours of being taken into
custody to determine the sufficiency of the charges against the
defendant and to inform the defendant of his rights, including
the right against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. 
Id. §§ 15A-601 to 604 (2007).  The district court judge is also
required to review the defendant’s eligibility for release
pursuant to Article 26 Chapter 15A, and to schedule a probable
cause hearing for the defendant, unless the right to such hearing
is waived.  Id. §§ 15A-605 to 606 (2007).  Further, if a grand
jury returns a bill of indictment “as not a true bill, the
presiding judge must immediately examine the case records to
determine if the defendant is in custody or subject to bail or
conditions of pretrial release.”  Id. § 15A-629 (2007).  Unlike
these procedures afforded to adult defendants, which ensure
involvement.  Yet, Assistant Principal Lyons urged J.D.B. to “do
the right thing” and tell the truth.  Investigator DiCostanzo
continued to pressure J.D.B. to talk by confronting him with
information that a stolen camera had been found.  Still, at this
point no one had advised J.D.B. of his rights.  When J.D.B.
inquired of Investigator DiCostanzo what would happen if the
stolen items were returned, Investigator DiCostanzo replied that
it would be helpful, but the matter would still have to go to
court.  Next, Investigator DiCostanzo informed J.D.B. that he
might be forced to obtain a secure custody order for J.D.B.
unless it was apparent that J.D.B. was not going to steal again. 
Investigator DiCostanzo explained to J.D.B. that a secure custody
order would give law enforcement the right to hold J.D.B. in
juvenile detention.   To a reasonable person in J.D.B.’s
4
-25-
hearings for pretrial release are held immediately, juveniles who
are held under secure custody orders can be detained for up to
five calendar days before receiving a hearing on the merits to
determine the need for continued custody.  See id. § 7B-1906
(2007).  
position, this remark certainly qualifies as an indicium of
formal arrest.  Moreover, Investigator DiCostanzo’s statement was
nothing short of a veiled threat that J.D.B. would be physically
detained unless he confessed.  At this point, J.D.B. had already
denied any involvement in the larceny, yet he was not permitted
to leave; rather, he was encouraged to “do the right thing” and
threatened with juvenile detention.  A reasonable middle school
student in J.D.B.’s position, after being physically escorted by
a uniformed, armed officer to a closed conference room with four
authoritative adults, would have considered himself to be
physically restrained to the point of formal arrest.  Moreover,
under school policy, J.D.B. was not free to leave until he was
dismissed by an adult.  Furthermore, Investigator DiCostanzo, a
special juvenile investigator with the Chapel Hill Police
Department, threatened to hold J.D.B. in juvenile detention
unless he divulged all his knowledge of the larceny.  The
totality of these circumstances leads to no other conclusion than
that J.D.B. was “in custody.” 
Not surprisingly, after Investigator DiCostanzo’s threat of
a secure custody order, J.D.B. made incriminating statements
linking him to the larceny.  When J.D.B. made these statements he
had not been advised of his rights.  Investigator DiCostanzo’s
subsequent statements informing J.D.B. that he did not have to
answer any questions and that he was free to leave are therefore
-26-
irrelevant to this analysis.  What these statements in fact do is
exhibit crafty and highly questionable investigative tactics. 
Investigator DiCostanzo’s warning was too little, too late, after
J.D.B.’s constitutional rights had been circumvented.  
The Standards Manual of the Law Enforcement Agency
Accreditation Program states: “When dealing with juveniles, law
enforcement officers should always make use of the least coercive
among reasonable alternatives, consistent with preserving public
safety, order, and individual liberty.”  Comm’n on Accreditation
for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., Standards for Law Enforcement
Agencies ch. 44 (Juvenile Operations), at 44-1 (4th ed. Jan.
1999).  The actions of law enforcement in the instant case are
inconsistent with these standards and evince a disregard for the
protection of juvenile rights.  It is disheartening and alarming
that today’s majority opinion condones the highly coercive
actions of law enforcement in the instant case, which will only
encourage law enforcement to disregard the provisions and
procedures of N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101 in the future.  Even radical
Muslims suspected of terrorism are afforded broader
constitutional protections than the majority wishes to give
juveniles in J.D.B.’s position.  Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, __
U.S.__, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (holding that alien enemy
combatants detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, are entitled to certain constitutional privileges).  The
overriding goal of North Carolina’s Juvenile Code is to protect
the constitutional rights and best interests of juveniles and
their families.  Today’s majority opinion is inconsistent with
-27-
this goal.  I would hold that because a reasonable person in
J.D.B.’s position was in custody for the purposes of N.C.G.S. §
7B-2101, our state laws entitled J.D.B. to be informed of his
rights before the interrogation began.  Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent.  
-28-
Justice HUDSON dissenting.
Because I believe the trial court’s conclusions of law
reflect an incorrect application of the law to the facts found, I
respectfully dissent.  “The determination of whether an
interrogation is conducted while a person is in custody involves
reaching a conclusion of law.  While this conclusion may rest
upon factual findings, it is a legal conclusion, fully
reviewable, and not a finding of fact.”  State v. Greene, 332
N.C. 565, 577, 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992) (citation omitted).  
Accordingly, . . . we review the trial court’s
conclusions of law for legal accuracy and to ensure
that those conclusions reflect[] a correct application
of [law] to the facts found.  In doing so, this Court
must look first to the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation and second to the effect those
circumstances would have on a reasonable person.
State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 391, 597 S.E.2d 724, 733 (2004)
(second and third alterations in original) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1156,
161 L. Ed. 2d 122 (2005).
“In Miranda, the Supreme Court defined ‘custodial
interrogation’ as ‘questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’” 
State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 337, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001)
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694,
706 (1966)).  “[I]n determining whether a suspect [is] in
custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is
-29-
whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”  State
v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662, 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997). 
“The test for determining whether a person is in custody is an
objective test as to whether a reasonable person in the position
of the defendant would believe himself to be in custody or that
he had been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant
way.”  Greene, 332 N.C. at 577, 422 S.E.2d at 737 (citations
omitted).
Here, the trial court determined that J.D.B. was not
subjected to custodial interrogation when he was questioned at
Smith Middle School.  In doing so, the trial court made the
following pertinent conclusions of law, which were challenged on
appeal:
1.
[J.D.B.] was not in custody when he was
brought to the conference room to speak to .
. . [I]nvestigator [DiCostanzo].
2.
The mere presence of . . . [I]nvestigator
[DiCostanzo] and the school resource officer
did not convert the meeting into a custodial
interrogation.
3.
[J.D.B.] was informed that he was free to
leave and that he did not have to answer any
questions, but chose to stay and volunteer
more information.
In my view, the trial court’s uncontested and binding findings of
fact pertaining to the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation lead to the conclusion that “a reasonable person in
the position of the defendant would [have] believe[d] himself to
be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of
-30-
action in some significant way.”  Id.  As such, I would hold
that:  (1) J.D.B was subjected to custodial interrogation at
Smith Middle School; (2) J.D.B. should have been Mirandized and
provided the enhanced protections for juveniles contained in
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101; and (3) as a result, the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress.  Therefore, I respectfully
dissent.
According to the majority, because the school environment
“inherently deprives students of some freedom of action,” for a
juvenile “to be deemed in custody,” the restraint that law
enforcement imposes on the juvenile’s freedom of action or
movement while questioning the juvenile at school must go “well
beyond the limitations that are characteristic of the school
environment in general.”  I disagree with this reasoning,
primarily because of its potential to seriously undermine the
enhanced protections afforded to juveniles by the North Carolina
General Assembly, for example, as in N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101.  See In
re T.E.F., 359 N.C. 570, 575, 614 S.E.2d 296, 299 (2005) (“Our
courts have consistently recognized that ‘[t]he [S]tate has a
greater duty to protect the rights of a respondent in a juvenile
proceeding than in a criminal prosecution.’” (alterations in
original) (citations omitted)); In re Vinson, 298 N.C. 640, 652,
260 S.E.2d 591, 599 (1979) (stating this Court’s intent “to
carefully balance the State’s police power interest in preserving
order and its parens patriae interest in a delinquent child’s
welfare with the child’s constitutional right to due process”). 
I fear that the majority here actually affords juveniles less
-31-
protection when questioned by law enforcement officers at school,
as compared to elsewhere.  In my opinion, in the school
environment, where juveniles are faced with a variety of negative
consequences – including potential criminal charges – for
refusing to comply with the requests or commands of authority
figures, the circumstances are inherently more coercive and
require more, not less, careful protection of the rights of the
juvenile.
The decision to interview a student at school
could be made to take advantage of the student’s
minority [age].  Questioning the student at school, the
officer not only takes advantage of the student’s
compulsory presence at school and the background norm
of submission to authority, but also chooses to
interact with the student at a time when the student
will not be in the presence of a parent, the figure
most likely to have the inclination or ability to
either arrange for the presence of counsel or to advise
the youth to refuse to answer the officer’s questions.
Paul Holland, Schooling Miranda: Policing Interrogation in the
Twenty-First Century Schoolhouse, 52 Loy. L. Rev. 39, 85 n.175
(2006) [hereinafter Holland, Schooling Miranda].  I am
particularly concerned about creating an incentive for an
investigating police officer to enter a middle school to question
a juvenile about crimes that may have occurred away from school
grounds and to take advantage of the more restrictive school
atmosphere without providing the protections of N.C.G.S. § 7B-
2101.  I am also concerned about the potential disruption of the
learning atmosphere in the school, especially, but not
exclusively, for the affected juvenile if this practice became
widespread.
-32-
Even under the majority’s analysis, though, I believe the
record here establishes that the restraint on J.D.B.’s freedom of
action or movement went “well beyond the limitations that are
characteristic of the school environment in general” and thus,
subjected J.D.B to “custodial interrogation.”  The school
resource officer, who was a uniformed police officer, came to
thirteen-year-old J.D.B.’s classroom, removed him from class, and
“escorted” him to a conference room where two school officials
and Investigator DiCostanzo were waiting for him.  No effort was
made to contact J.D.B.’s parent or guardian before his removal
from class or his questioning.  For the entire interrogation,
which lasted thirty to forty-five minutes, J.D.B. was isolated in
a closed-door conference room in the presence of four authority
figures, including two law enforcement officers.  Contrary to the
trial court’s conclusion of law, Investigator DiCostanzo, an
outside police officer, was not merely present.  Rather, it
appears that he directed and controlled the interrogation
process, which was designed to determine J.D.B.’s role in
nonviolent crimes alleged to have occurred outside of school
grounds and for which he was a suspect.  Despite J.D.B.’s
repeated denials of any involvement in the criminal activity,
Investigator DiCostanzo continued to question him.  At some point
during Investigator DiCostanzo’s questioning, Assistant Principal
David Lyons encouraged J.D.B. to “‘do the right thing’ and tell
the truth.”  Thereafter, Officer DiCostanzo continued to question
J.D.B., confronted him with the stolen camera, and indicated that
others had seen the camera in J.D.B’s possession.  Then, J.D.B.
-33-
made his first incriminating statement, asking if “he would still
be in trouble if he gave the items back,” also indicating that
J.D.B. believed he was currently “in trouble.”  Investigator
DiCostanzo responded that either way “the matter was still going
to court” and that he might “have to seek a secure custody
order,” explaining to J.D.B. that such an order confines a
juvenile to a detention center until his court date.  After this
sequence of events, J.D.B. confessed.  I would conclude that
considering all of the above circumstances, “a reasonable person
in [J.D.B.’s] position . . . would [have] believe[d] himself to
be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of
action in some significant way” by the time Investigator
DiCostanzo confronted J.D.B. with the stolen camera.  Greene, 332
N.C. at 577, 422 S.E.2d at 737.
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the majority emphasizes
that:  (1) Investigator DiCostanzo told J.D.B. that he was free
to leave, asked him if he understood that he was not under arrest
and did not have to speak to him, and that J.D.B. nodded his head
indicating he understood; and (2) J.D.B. was not subjected to
severe or direct physical restraint, such as an officer standing
guard at the door.  However, Investigator DiCostanzo did not
inform J.D.B. that he was free to leave and not under arrest
until after J.D.B. had incriminated himself in response to the
interrogation, without having been informed of his Miranda and
juvenile statutory rights.  I would conclude that this process
violated both Miranda and N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101 (a) and (b) and that
the motion to suppress should have been allowed.  See N.C.G.S. §
-34-
7B-2101 (2007); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604, 159 L.
Ed. 2d 643, 650 (2004) (plurality) (stating that “midstream
recitation of [Miranda] warnings after interrogation and unwarned
confession” does “not effectively comply with Miranda’s
constitutional requirement”); see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a)(3)
(stating that a juvenile who is in custody “must [also] be
advised prior to questioning” of his “right to have a parent,
guardian, or custodian present during questioning”); id. § 7B-
2101(b) (stating that for juveniles, such as J.D.B., who are
“less than 14 years of age, no in-custody admission or confession
resulting from interrogation may be admitted into evidence unless
the confession or admission was made in the presence of the
juvenile’s parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney”).
With regard to stronger indicia of physical control, such as
handcuffs or an officer standing guard at the door, this Court
has never held that one or more of these indicia must be present
to support a determination that an individual is in custody.  In
fact, in Buchanan this Court stated:  “Circumstances supporting
an objective showing that one is ‘in custody’ might[, not must,]
include a police officer standing guard at the door, locked doors
or application of handcuffs.”  353 N.C. at 339, 543 S.E.2d at 828
(emphasis added).  Thus, the absence of such forms of restraint,
while a relevant consideration in this inquiry, is not
dispositive.  Furthermore, “[United States Supreme Court] cases
establish that, even if the police do not tell a suspect he is
under arrest, do not handcuff him, do not lock him in a cell, and
do not threaten him, he may nonetheless . . . be in custody for
-35-
Miranda purposes.”  Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 675,
158 L. Ed. 2d 938, 958-59 (2004) (Breyer, Stevens, Souter &
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (citing Stansbury v. California, 511
U.S. 318, 325-26, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293, 300-01 (1994) (per curiam);
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 335
(1984)).  Here, law enforcement questioned a thirteen-year-old
seventh-grader about nonviolent offenses while he was at school,
in a closed room, and in the presence of four authority figures,
all adults.  Taken with the sequence of events in the
interrogation itself, I conclude that J.D.B. was subjected to a
custodial interrogation. 
As support for its determination that J.D.B. was not
subjected to custodial interrogation, the majority cites our
recent opinion in In re W.R., 363 N.C. 244, 675 S.E.2d 342
(2009).  However, that case is both procedurally and factually
distinguishable from this one and is of limited to no
precedential value in resolving the custody issue here.
In In re W.R., unlike here, the juvenile failed to make a
motion to suppress or to object when his incriminatory statements
were offered into evidence, and the juvenile did not assert at
the trial level that his incriminatory statements were obtained
in violation of either the Fifth Amendment or N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101. 
Id. at 247, 675 S.E.2d at 344.  As a result, this Court’s review
was for plain error.  Id.  In addition, because “no evidence was
presented and no findings were made as to . . . the school
resource officer’s actual participation in the questioning of
W.R.[,] . . . the custodial or noncustodial nature of the
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interrogation[,] . . . . [or] whether the statements were freely
and voluntarily made,” this Court stated:
After careful review, we are not prepared based on
the limited record before this Court to conclude that
the presence and participation of the school resource
officer at the request of school administrators
conducting the investigation rendered the questioning
of respondent juvenile a “custodial interrogation,”
requiring Miranda warnings and the protections of
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101.
363 N.C. at 248, 675 S.E.2d at 344.  In other words, the record
pertaining to law enforcement’s role in W.R.’s interrogation was
insufficient for this Court to make a determination that the
interrogation was custodial.
Also numerous important facts bearing on the custody issue
distinguish In re W.R. from this case.  There, unlike here:  (1)
the assistant principal and the principal, not a law enforcement
officer, took the juvenile out of class and “escorted” him to the
principal’s office after a concerned parent called the school and
stated that the juvenile had possessed a knife at school and on
the school bus the previous day; (2) both school administrators
questioned the juvenile about the alleged “in school” incident
and not about crimes alleged to have occurred outside of school
grounds; (3) the school resource officer apparently was not
present at the start of questioning and left the room at various
points; (4) no outside police officer participated; and (5)
school administrators, not law enforcement, controlled the
questioning.  Id. at 246, 675 S.E.2d at 343.
In further contrast to the majority, I believe J.D.B.’s age,
thirteen, (and his status as a middle school student) are
relevant considerations in determining “whether a reasonable
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 J.D.B. also argues, and the dissent in the Court of
5
Appeals appears to suggest, that J.D.B.’s enrollment in “special
education classes” is a relevant factor to consider in conducting
the custody analysis.  See In re J.D.B., __ N.C. App. __, __, 674
S.E.2d 795, 802 (2009) (Beasley, J., dissenting).  Because the
record is silent as to the nature and extent of J.D.B.’s academic
status and whether Investigator DiCostanzo knew or reasonably
could have known about it, I have not considered J.D.B.’s status
as a special education student.
 In In re R.H., a panel of the Court of Appeals determined
6
that the trial court did not err in denying the juvenile’s motion
to suppress his confession because the juvenile was not in
custody.  In re R.H., 171 N.C. App. 514, 615 S.E.2d 738, 2005
N.C. App. LEXIS 1309 (2005) (unpublished).  There, the juvenile
was questioned by an outside law enforcement officer at school
regarding a purported crime away from school grounds.  2005 N.C.
App. LEXIS 1309, at *2.  Even though that case was unpublished,
the differences between how the officer approached his
questioning of the juvenile there and here are striking.  There,
before questioning the juvenile, the officer obtained permission
from the fourteen-year-old’s mother to talk to him at school and
explained to him that “he was not under arrest,” that he “could
person in the position of the defendant would [have] believe[d]
himself to be in custody or that he had been deprived of his
freedom of action in some significant way.”  Greene, 332 N.C. at
577, 422 S.E.2d at 737.   In support of its conclusion that a
5
juvenile’s age should not be considered as part of the custody
analysis, the majority: (1) states that this Court has not
previously considered an individual’s age in conducting the
custody inquiry, citing In re W.R. in support; and (2) relies on
language from Yarborough v. Alvarado, which states that an
“argument [exists] that the custody inquiry states an objective
rule designed to give clear guidance to the police, while
consideration of a suspect’s individual characteristics—including
his age—could be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry.”  541
U.S. at 668, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 954 (majority) (citation omitted). 
I do not find this reasoning persuasive here.   The dissent in
6
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leave and return to class at any time and that regardless of what
[the] juvenile told him that day, he would not arrest [him].” 
Id., at *4.  By contrast with what happened here, I believe the
approach taken by the officer in that case can be squared with
Miranda and the enhanced statutory protections for juveniles.
the Court of Appeals correctly noted that not considering age
“would lead to the absurd result that, when required to determine
whether a ‘reasonable person in the defendant’s situation’ would
consider himself in custody, courts would apply exactly the same
analysis, regardless of whether the individual was eight or
thirty-eight years old.”  In re J.D.B., __ N.C. App. at __, 674
S.E.2d. at 802 (2009) (Beasley, J. dissenting) (citation
omitted).
Neither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court has
held squarely that age can never be relevant to the custody
inquiry.  Nor did we conduct a custody analysis in In re W.R.
without considering the juvenile’s age.  Rather, as noted above,
this Court simply determined that the record on appeal regarding
the role of law enforcement in questioning the juvenile was
insufficient on the custody issue.  The majority concedes that
Alvarado is not binding authority on this Court.  Furthermore,
while the Supreme Court there held that the state court’s failure
to consider the defendant’s age (seventeen) was reasonable in
considering custody under Miranda, I conclude that the matter is
very different when the interrogation is conducted in school. As
Justice O’Connor stated in her concurring opinion in Alvarado,
“There may be cases in which a suspect’s age will be relevant to
the ‘custody’ inquiry under Miranda.”  541 U.S. at 669, 158 L.
Ed. 2d at 954-55 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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I share the view expressed by Justice Breyer in his dissenting
opinion, that a juvenile’s youth “is not a special quality, but
rather a widely shared characteristic that generates commonsense
conclusions about behavior and perception.”  Id. at 674, 158 L.
Ed. 2d at 958 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
It is clear from the enhanced protections given to 
juveniles that our General Assembly considers age very important
under state law, especially when the juvenile is under fourteen,
like J.D.B.  “To focus on the circumstance of age in a case like
this does not complicate the ‘in custody’ inquiry.”  Id. at 674-
75 , 158 L. Ed. 2d at 958 (citation omitted).
Outside officers conducting interviews at schools are
likely doing so only when they are looking for a
specific student and thus are likely to already know
the student’s age.  Even if they do not, these officers
rely on school staff to assist them in establishing
contact with the student.  These staff members, of
course, have access to the student’s records, which
will include the age.  Seen in this context, courts
considering the age of the suspect are not imposing an
extra burden of intuition or information on officers
but are instead seeing the interrogation in its full
context, as it is likely seen by those involved.
Holland, Schooling Miranda 85 (footnote omitted).  Here,
Investigator DiCostanzo specifically testified that he had been
informed by school administrators that J.D.B. was thirteen years
old before questioning him.
In sum, I would hold that, under all these circumstances,
including his age, J.D.B. was in custody while being questioned
at Smith Middle School; consequently, his constitutional and
juvenile statutory rights were violated due to law enforcement’s
failure to Mirandize him or to comply with N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101 and
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the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in this dissenting opinion.