Title: Poteat v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
REHEEM POTEAT, 
 
 
§  No. 94, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§    
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§   Cr. I.D. 0204003487 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  September 3, 2003 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  December 17, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, STEELE and 
JACOBS, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and 
REMANDED. 
 
 
Jerome M. Capone, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
 
The defendant-appellee, Raheem Poteat (“Poteat”), was convicted, 
following a jury trial in the Superior Court, of three counts of Robbery in the 
First Degree, three counts of Possession of a Firearm During the 
Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”) related to the robbery charges, three 
counts of Aggravated Menacing, and three counts of PFDCF related to the 
menacing charges.  At trial, Poteat requested that the menacing charges and 
the related PFDCF charges be merged with the robbery charges and the 
PFDCF charges related to the robbery.  The trial judge declined to merge the 
offenses.   
In this matter, Poteat appeals from his sentencing on the menacing and 
related firearm charges.  Poteat contends that the trial judge erred, as a 
matter of law, in ruling that the Aggravated Menacing and related firearm  
charges did not merge with the Robbery in the First Degree and related 
possession charges.  This error, argues Poteat, violated the principles of 
double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.   
 
We have concluded that Aggravated Menacing is a lesser-included 
offense of Robbery in the First Degree.  Accordingly, we hold that principles 
of double jeopardy bar the Superior Court from sentencing Poteat for both 
Robbery in the First Degree and Aggravated Menacing.  We further hold 
 
3
that, to the extent our opinion in State v. Amad1 is inconsistent with our 
holding today, it is overruled. 
Facts 
 
Near midnight on April 5, 2002, four masked gunman entered the 
Peddler’s Pit Stop liquor store in Newark.  They were the appellant, Raheem 
Poteat, Robert Benson, Chris Gray and Jamah Grosnevnor.  In the store at 
the time were the proprietors Ravindra Patel and his wife Duana, their five-
year old son, Mihir, and one customer, Larry Shuler.   
 
Upon entering the store, the four gunman—with their weapons 
drawn—split up.  Two went behind the counter where Mrs. Patel was 
standing.  One pointed a gun at her chest, the other at her head, telling her 
not to “do anything stupid.”  They then forced her to open the cash register 
and safe. 
 
The third and fourth gunmen went to the back of the store.  One 
gunman confronted Mr. Patel, while the other gunman confronted Mr. 
Shuler.  With a gun to his head, Mr. Patel was forced to lie on the floor 
while the robber went through his pockets.  Mr. Shuler, too, was forced to lie 
on the floor, gun to his head, while he was robbed of some cash in his 
pockets.   
                                                 
1 State v. Amad, 767 A.2d 806 (Del. Super. 1999), aff’d, 755 A.2d 386 (Del. 2000) 
(TABLE). 
 
4
 
The four men then fled from the store with the money they had stolen.  
A police officer was nearby, and the men were arrested just minutes after the 
robbery.  All were charged with numerous crimes, including three counts of 
Robbery in the First Degree, three counts of Possession of a Firearm During 
the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”) relating to the robbery charges, 
three counts of Aggravated Menacing, and three counts of PFDCF relating 
to the menacing charges. 
Motion at Trial 
 
Two men, Grosnevor and Gray pled guilty before trial.  Poteat and 
Benson were tried together.  During trial, the defense moved to dismiss the 
Aggravated Menacing charges, the three PFDCF charges relating to the 
Aggravated Menacing, and a charge of Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  
The defense argued that principles of double jeopardy required that these 
charges be merged with the three Robbery in the First Degree counts, the 
related PFDCF charges, and the Conspiracy charges related to the robbery.   
After hearing the arguments of both the prosecution and defense, the 
trial judge declined to make an immediate ruling.  The trial judge stated he 
would take the issue “under advisement” and would consider the defense’s 
request if the jury’s verdict rendered it necessary.  The judge also stated that 
the parties could submit post-trial memoranda on the issue. 
 
5
 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all of the robbery counts and 
all of the menacing counts.  The jury also returned guilty verdicts on all of 
the PFDCF charges accompanying the robbery and menacing charges.  
Neither party submitted any post-trial memoranda regarding the defense’s 
double jeopardy argument.  The trial judge implicitly denied the defense’s 
motion for merger of the robbery and menacing offenses when Poteat was 
sentenced on all of the convictions for all of the charges. 
Merger Issue Not Waived 
 
The State contends that Poteat waived his merger argument by failing 
to brief the double jeopardy issue after trial and before sentencing.  
Generally, an issue not properly preserved at trial is waived for purposes of 
appeal.2  In this case, however, Poteat’s motion to merge the offenses of 
Robbery in the First Degree and Aggravated Menacing on double jeopardy 
grounds was properly preserved.   
After Poteat’s argument had been fairly presented, the trial judge did 
not order post-trial supplemental memoranda to be filed.  Instead, the trial 
judge merely extended to counsel for both sides the opportunity to brief the 
issue if they so desired.  Under those circumstances, the fact that neither side 
filed post-trial memoranda at that stage does not mean Poteat waived the 
                                                 
2 Weedon v. State, 647 A.2d 1078, 1082 (Del. 1994). 
 
6
issue for purposes of appeal.  Accordingly, we hold that Poteat properly 
preserved his objection to the Superior Court’s failure to merge the 
menacing and robbery charges. 
Double Jeopardy Clause3 
 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 
three protections.  “It protects against a second prosecution for the same 
offense after acquittal.  It protects against a second prosecution for the same 
offense after conviction.  And it protects against multiple punishments for 
the same offense.”4  Poteat challenges his sentencing based on the third 
listed protection. 
 
The issue to be decided by this Court is whether the charges of 
Aggravated Menacing and PFDCF merge into the charge of Robbery in the 
First Degree.  This Court has previously noted that “the Double Jeopardy 
Clause has been described … as ‘both one of the least understood and, in 
recent years, one of the most frequently litigated provisions of the Bill of 
                                                 
3  The double jeopardy language of the Delaware Constitution is similar to the language 
in the United States Constitution.  See Del. Const. art. I, § 8; State v. Cook, 600 A.2d 352, 
354 n.3 (1991); White v. State, 576 A.2d 1322, 1324 n.3 (1990).  This Court has not yet 
been required to determine whether the federal and state double jeopardy provisions are 
identical in scope in all respects, and we do not address that issue today.  Therefore, this 
opinion is decided solely on the basis of Poteat’s argument pursuant to the Double 
Jeopardy Clause in the United States Constitution.   
4 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); see also State v. Cook, 600 A.2d 
352, 354 (1991). 
 
7
Rights.’”5  Chief Justice Rehnquist has stated: “[the United States Supreme 
Court] has done little to alleviate the confusion, and our opinions, including 
ones authored by me, are replete with mea culpa’s occasioned by shifts in 
assumptions and emphasis.”6  It now appears that this Court’s prior decision 
in Amad also contributed to that confusion. 
Multiple Punishments 
 
Generally, multiple punishments are “not imposed for two offenses 
arising out of the same occurrence unless each offense requires proof of a 
fact which the other does not.”7  This Court has previously noted that “[t]he 
assumption underlying [this rule] is that [the legislature] ordinarily does not 
intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes.  However, 
that rule of construction gives way in the face of clear legislative intent to 
the contrary.”8  Consequently, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, 
separate sentences are not permitted where the offenses are the same.9  
 
                                                 
5 State v. Cook, 600 A.2d at 354 (quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 699 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); see also White v. State, 576 A.2d 1332 (Del. 1990); 
LeCompte v. State, 516 A.2d 898 (Del. 1986). 
6 Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. at 699. 
7 LeCompte v. State, 516 A.2d 898, 900 (Del. 1986) (citing Whalen v. United States, 445 
U.S. 684, 691-92 (1980)). 
8 Id.; see also State v. Cook, 600 A.2d 352, 355 (Del. 1991). 
9 Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 367 (1983) (quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 
U.S. at 693). Alternatively, where the intent of the legislature to impose cumulative 
sentences is clear, multiple punishments are not barred.   State v. Cook, 600 A.2d at 355; 
LeCompte v. State, 516 A.2d at 901. 
 
8
Legislative Intent 
 
The question of whether Aggravated Menacing and the related 
PFDCF charge merge into Robbery in the First Degree is one of statutory 
construction and is, therefore, subject to de novo review.10  The question 
presented by a claim of double jeopardy that is based on multiple 
punishments is: did the General Assembly intend to impose more than one 
punishment for a single occurrence of criminal conduct?11  In seeking to 
ascertain legislative intent, we first look at the text of the applicable statute.12  
In this case, we must look at the text of several statutes.   
Title 11, Del. C. § 206 governs the prosecution of multiple criminal 
offenses arising out of the same occurrence.  Under that section, a defendant 
may not be convicted of more than one offense if “one offense is included in 
the other.”  An offense is “included in the other” if: 
(1) It is established by the proof of the same or less than all the 
facts required to establish the commission of the offense 
charged; or 
 
(2) It consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or to 
commit an offense otherwise included therein; or 
 
(3) It involves the same result but differs from the offense 
charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of 
                                                 
10 State Dept. of Labor v. Reynolds, 669 A.2d 90, 92 (Del. 1995).  
11 Stigars v. State, 674 A.2d 477, 481 (Del. 1996). 
12 Stigars v. State, 674 A.2d at 481; State Dept. of Labor v. Reynolds, 669 A.2d at 93. 
 
9
injury to the same person, property or public interest or a lesser 
kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.13 
 
Robbery in the First Degree is listed at Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 832.  
That statute reads, in relevant part: 
(a) A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when the 
person commits the crime of robbery in the second degree and 
when, in the course of the commission of the crime or of 
immediate flight therefrom, the person or another participant in 
the crime: 
 
(2) Displays what appears to be a deadly weapon;14 
 
Robbery in the Second Degree, which is incorporated by reference into the 
definition of Robbery in the First Degree, requires that “the person uses or 
threatens the immediate use of force upon another person….”15 
Aggravated menacing is codified at Title 11, Del. C. § 602(b).  That statute 
reads, in its entirety:  
(b) A person is guilty of aggravated menacing when by 
displaying what appears to be a deadly weapon that person 
intentionally places another person in fear of imminent physical 
injury. Aggravated menacing is a class E felony.16 
 
The issue presented by Poteat is whether the language for Aggravated 
Menacing – that a person must display “what appears to be a deadly weapon 
[with which] that person intentionally places another person in fear of 
                                                 
13 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 206(b) (2001). 
14 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 832 (2001). 
15 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 831 (2001). 
16 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 602(b) (2001). 
 
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imminent physical injury” – is so similar to the language for Robbery in the 
First Degree – requiring a defendant “use or threaten the immediate use of 
force upon another person” and “display what appears to be a deadly 
weapon” – that the General Assembly intended these crimes to be punished 
separately.   
The State contends that the issue of merger of Aggravated Menacing 
and Robbery in the First Degree is controlled by State v. Amad. 17  In that 
case, as in this case, the Superior Court also had to determine whether the 
General Assembly intended that two punishments be imposed for 
committing the crimes of Aggravated Menacing and Robbery in the First 
Degree during the same occurrence.  In Amad, the Superior Court applied 
the Blockburger test: does each offense require proof of a fact that the other 
does not?18  In Amad, the Superior Court concluded that the General 
Assembly intended for Aggravated Menacing and Robbery in the First 
Degree to be two separate and distinct offenses.19  This Court affirmed that 
conclusion.20   
 
In this case, in support of his double jeopardy argument, Poteat’s 
attorney relies upon the official Commentary to the Delaware Criminal 
                                                 
17 State v. Amad, 767 A.2d 806 (Del. Super. 1999). 
18  See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); Stigars v. State, 674 A.2d 
at 481-82. 
19 State v. Amad, 767 A.2d at 811. 
20 Amad v. State, 755 A.2d 386 (Del. 2000) (TABLE). 
 
11
Code of 1973 (“Commentary”).  We have concluded, and the State 
acknowledges, that the Commentary unambiguously reflects a legislative 
intention for the crime of Menacing to be a lesser-included offense of the 
crime of Robbery in the First Degree.  Unfortunately, when Amad was 
decided, that Commentary was not cited by any party in either the Superior 
Court or in this Court.   
This Court has previously stated that the Blockburger test “is only an 
aid to statutory construction.  It does not negate clearly expressed legislative 
intent and where … a better indicator of legislative intent is available, it does 
not apply.”21  In ascertaining legislative intent, courts are required to give 
great weight to an official commentary written by the drafters of the 
statute.22   A commentary “is even more persuasive if, as here, it was 
available to the legislature before a statute was enacted.”23   
The Commentary to section 206 specifically states, as an example of 
lesser-included offenses, that “attempted menacing and attempted 
robbery would be included under the crime of robbery, as would 
menacing itself….”24  The State acknowledges that Poteat’s argument, 
based upon the Commentary to section 206 is persuasive.  We agree that 
                                                 
21 Stigars v. State, 674 A.2d at 482 (citations omitted). 
22 Id. at 483. 
23 Id.  
24 Commentary on the Delaware Criminal Code of 1973 § 206. 
 
12
Commentary is the “better indicator of legislative intent.”  Accordingly, the 
Blockbuger analysis does not apply to the case sub judice.   
Since the Commentary’s promulgation, the crime of Aggravated 
Menacing has been added to the Delaware Criminal Code.  As it is currently 
defined, Aggravated Menacing is distinguished from the crime of Menacing 
only by the added condition that a defendant must display “what appears to 
be a deadly weapon” to the standard menacing language of “intentionally 
places another person in fear of imminent physical injury.”25  The additional 
requirement necessary for a crime to be elevated from Menacing to 
Aggravated Menacing, i.e. the display of what appears to be a deadly 
weapon, has no material impact on the Commentary’s analysis, as Robbery 
in the First Degree contains the same requirement.26   
The Commentary states that menacing is a lesser-included offense to 
robbery.  By so stating, the Commentary recognizes that “threatening the 
immediate use of force upon a person”–the language for Robbery in the 
Second Degree and an element of Robbery in the First Degree–is identical to 
“intentionally places another person in fear of imminent physical injury”—
the language for Menacing and an element of Aggravated Menacing.  
                                                 
25 Compare Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 602(a) (Menacing) with Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 
602(b) (Aggravated Menacing).  
26 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 832(a)(2). 
 
13
Aggravated Menacing requires only the additional element that the person 
“display[s] what appears to be a deadly weapon.”   
The additional element contained in Aggravated Menacing is the same 
as an additional element of Robbery in the First Degree.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the General Assembly intended for Aggravated Menacing to 
be a lesser-included offense of Robbery in the First Degree.  Therefore, we 
hold that the convictions for those separate crimes during the same 
occurrence must be merged.  Consequently, under the facts of this case, we 
hold that sentencing Poteat separately for each of those crimes violated the 
protection against double jeopardy that is provided by the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the crimes of Aggravated 
Menacing and the related PFDCF charges are merged with the crime of 
Robbery in the First Degree.  We further hold, that to the extent our decision 
in Amad conflicts with this opinion, it is overruled.27  Therefore, the 
judgments of the Superior Court are reversed.  This matter is remanded to 
the Superior Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
                                                 
27 State v. Amad, 767 A.2d 806 (Del. Super. 1999), aff’d, 755 A.2d 386 (Del. 2000) 
(TABLE).