Title: In re termination of the parental rights of Jane & John Doe

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO  
Docket Nos. 38534, 38536, 38567 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION 
OF THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF JOHN 
(2011-03) DOE. 
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & 
WELFARE, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent on Appeal, 
 
and 
 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM, 
 
          Respondent on Appeal, 
 
v. 
 
JOHN (2011-03) DOE, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant, 
 
and 
 
JANE DOE and JOHN DOE I, 
 
          Respondents. 
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Supreme Court Docket No. 38534 
 
 
Boise, June 2011 Term 
 
2011 Opinion No. 90 
 
Filed:  August 8, 2011 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk  
IN THE MATTER OF THE PARENTAL 
TERMINATION OF JANE (2011-04) DOE. 
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & 
WELFARE,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
and 
 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM, 
 
          Respondent on Appeal, 
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Supreme Court Docket No. 38536 
 
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v. 
 
JANE (2011-04) DOE, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant, 
 
and 
 
JOHN DOE and JOHN DOE I, 
 
          Respondents. 
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IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION 
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF JANE (2011-
06) DOE. 
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & 
WELFARE, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent on Appeal, 
 
and 
 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM, 
 
          Respondent on Appeal, 
v. 
 
JANE (2011-06) DOE, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant, 
 
and 
 
JOHN DOE and JOHN DOE I, 
 
          Respondents. 
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   Supreme Court Docket No. 38567 
    
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Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 
Falls County.  Hon. R. Barry Wood, Senior District Judge. 
Trial court’s findings of fact and order terminating parental rights, affirmed.  
Williams Law Office, Ctd., Twin Falls for appellant John (2011-03) Doe. 
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Twin Falls County Public Defender’s Office, Twin Falls for appellants Jane 
(2011-04) Doe and Jane (2011-06) Doe.  Marilyn Paul, Deputy Public Defender 
argued.  
Jamie A. LaMure, Kimberly, argued for Guardian Ad Litem. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent Idaho 
Department of Health & Welfare.  James T. Baird, Deputy Attorney General 
argued.  
__________________________________ 
BURDICK, Chief Justice  
Jane Doe and John Doe appeal the trial court’s February 3, 2011 Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order (hereinafter “Feb. 3, 2011 Order”) terminating Jane Doe’s 
parental rights to her four children (T.S., S.S., A.H. and S.H.) and John Doe’s parental rights to 
his two children (T.S. and S.S.) on the grounds of neglect and the best interest of the children.  
We affirm.   
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
S.S. and T.S. were born to Jane Doe and John Doe in 2003 and 2006 respectively.  Jane 
Doe and John Doe lived together for a total of approximately eleven months.  They never 
married.  Eventually their relationship ended, and Jane Doe began a relationship with John Doe 
II.  John Doe has two other children, who are not Jane Doe’s children and were not involved in 
the termination proceedings at issue here.  John Doe went to prison on June 21, 2007, for writing 
checks with insufficient funds.  He topped out his sentence on May 6, 2010. 
On August 14, 2008, Detective Mittlestadt from the Twin Falls Police Department visited 
the residence of Jane Doe and John Doe II in response to a referral from the Idaho Department of 
Health and Welfare (the Department) concerning possible child abuse and marijuana sales.  At 
the residence, marijuana was being smoked in the presence of S.S. and T.S.  Jane Doe and John 
Doe II were arrested for injury to children and marijuana possession.  S.S. and T.S. were 
declared to be in imminent danger and were taken into State custody. 
Both on the day of their arrest and at the adjudicatory hearing held on August 21, 2008, 
Jane Doe and John Doe II stipulated to an unstable home environment, and S.S. and T.S. were 
placed in the legal custody of the Department.  On May 28, 2009, S.S. and T.S. returned to the 
home of Jane Doe and John Doe II for an extended home visit.  A.H. was born to Jane Doe and 
John Doe II in 2009.  On October 16, 2009, when the Department discovered that the home was 
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filthy, cluttered and smelled of urine, S.S. and T.S. were placed in foster care due to an unstable 
home environment, and A.H. was declared to be in imminent danger.   
On May 20, 2010, the Department filed a petition to terminate the parental rights to S.S., 
T.S., and A.H.  The petition alleged that Jane Doe, John Doe and John Doe II neglected the 
children, failed to address substance abuse issues and home sanitation problems, failed to 
maintain adequate income, failed to demonstrate that they could keep the children safe, and had 
been hostile and uncooperative to the Department’s service providers.  The petition also alleged 
that termination would be in the best interest of the children, because Jane Doe, John Doe and 
John Doe II can barely support themselves, and adoptive parents can provide a more financially 
and emotionally stable home environment for the children.  
S.H. was born to Jane Doe and John Doe II in 2010.  On June 16, 2010, S.H. was 
declared to be in imminent danger, and a Child Protective Act (CPA) petition was filed.  On June 
17, 2010, S.H. was found to come within the CPA’s protection, but S.H. was ordered to be 
returned to Jane Doe and John Doe II on an extended home visit.  However, on July 7, 2010, 
S.H. was removed from the home based upon unsanitary conditions.  On July 29, 2010, the trial 
court entered an order adopting a renewed case plan involving all four children and the three 
parents.  On July 30, 2010, the Department filed a petition to terminate Jane Doe and John Doe 
II’s parental rights in S.H. on the same grounds that it petitioned to terminate their rights in the 
three older children.  The two termination cases were consolidated.   
On February 3, 2011, the trial court issued its decision terminating the parental rights of 
Jane Doe and John Doe II in all four children, and terminating John Doe’s parental rights in S.S. 
and T.S.  The trial court ruled that the State established by clear and convincing evidence that the 
children were individually and collectively neglected by their parents and that termination was in 
the children’s best interests.   
Jane Doe and John Doe appealed to this Court.  John Doe II did not appeal. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We recently set forth the relevant standard of review in Idaho Department of Health & 
Welfare v. Doe: 
Grounds for termination of parental rights must be shown by clear and 
convincing evidence because each parent has a fundamental liberty interest in 
maintaining a relationship with his or her child.  Clear and convincing evidence is 
generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is 
highly probable or reasonably certain.  On appeal, this Court will not disturb the 
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magistrate court's decision to terminate parental rights if there is substantial, 
competent evidence in the record to support the decision.  Substantial, competent 
evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.  This Court is required to conduct an independent review of 
the magistrate court record, but must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the magistrate court's judgment because the magistrate court has the opportunity 
to observe witnesses' demeanor, to assess their credibility, to detect prejudice or 
motive and to judge the character of the parties. 
150 Idaho 36,    , 244 P.3d 180, 185 (2010) (quotations and citations omitted).  
III. ANALYSIS 
A court may grant an order terminating parental rights where it finds that (1) termination 
is in the best interests of the child and (2) one of the statutory conditions for termination exists.  
Idaho Code § 16-2005(1).  Neglect is one of the statutory conditions for termination.  Idaho Code 
§ 16-2005(1)(b).  The trial court found that each parent neglected his or her children and that 
termination was in each child’s best interest.   
Idaho Code § 16-2002(3) defines “neglected” as: 
(a) Conduct as defined in section 16-1602(25), Idaho Code; or  
(b) The parent(s) has failed to comply with the court's orders in a child protective 
act case or the case plan, and reunification of the child with his or her parent(s) 
has not occurred within the time standards set forth in section 16-1629(9), Idaho 
Code. 
Idaho Code § 16-1602(25)(a) provides that “neglected” means a child: “Who is without 
proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for 
his well-being because of the conduct or omission of his parents, guardian or other custodian or 
their neglect or refusal to provide them”.  
Idaho Code § 16-1602(25)(b) provides that “neglected” means a child: “Whose parents, 
guardian or other custodian are unable to discharge their responsibilities to and for the child and, 
as a result of such inability, the child lacks the parental care necessary for his health, safety or 
well-being”. 
Both Jane Doe and John Doe argue that there was not substantial and competent evidence 
to support the trial court’s findings of neglect.  Jane Doe raises numerous other issues on appeal.   
A. John Doe. 
The trial court found that John Doe neglected S.S. and T.S., both of whom have special 
needs, concluding that John Doe “is barely able to provide for himself” and that termination is in 
both his and the children’s best interests.   
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John Doe argues that the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights in both S.S. 
and T.S. was not supported by substantial and competent evidence.  Specifically, John Doe 
argues that he did not neglect the children based on the following: (1) before his incarceration, he 
had both telephone and physical contact with them; (2) while in prison, he arranged for telephone 
visits with them and made positive steps on his case plan; and (3) after his incarceration, he 
immediately contacted the Department, arranged for visitation, and completed most of his case 
plan despite facing significant difficulties.  John Doe does not challenge the best interests of the 
children prong of the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights.   
In reaching its decision, the trial court noted that John Doe completed some of the 
requirements of his case plan: taking parenting classes, obtaining a substance abuse evaluation in 
2007, and regularly attending supervised visits with the children after his release from prison.  
However, the trial court found that, even though John Doe received services under a case plan 
for two years and had been out of prison for over seven months on the date of the trial, John Doe 
“utterly and completely failed to complete the two primary requirements of his case plan”: (1) 
providing a safe and stable home environment; and (2) providing a legal source of income for his 
family.  John Doe admitted at trial that he does not have a suitable home environment for his 
children and that he has no money or job.  Since his release from prison on May 6, 2010, he has 
“bounced between friends” for his living arrangements, and he has worked only one day and has 
lived off of support from friends, food banks, food stamps and clothing vouchers.  He says his 
future plan is to return to his mother’s property in Mississippi, purchase a trailer home for the 
property and work for $8.50 per hour on a water-well drilling rig with his brother. 
In Doe v. Department of Health and Welfare, this Court upheld the trial court’s decision 
to terminate parental rights where two of the primary factors upon which the trial court found 
neglect as defined in I.C. § 16-2005(b) were the parents’ unfavorable living arrangements and 
employment situation.  141 Idaho 511, 513–16, 112 P.3d 799, 801–04 (2005).  Similarly, in this 
case, John Doe admits that he does not have suitable living arrangements and employment.    
 
In addition to John Doe’s failure to establish a suitable residence and obtain adequate 
employment, John Doe has a criminal history, including convictions for misdemeanor injury to a 
child, misdemeanor assault, lack of vehicle insurance, and felony writing checks with 
insufficient funds.  John Doe also has multiple convictions for driving without privileges, 
including one since his release from prison.  He has no driver’s license, and his driving privileges 
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are suspended.  He has not been paying child support for S.S. and T.S., nor has he been paying 
child support for his two other children.  He has not yet obtained a GED.  While he was initially 
sentenced to probation for the felony insufficient funds conviction, he violated his probation for 
drinking alcohol on the job.  He failed his programming under the retained jurisdiction program.  
He was denied parole, because as he explained, “he would rather do his time than the 
programming.”    
Despite John Doe’s efforts to maintain some contact with his children and despite some 
progress on his case plan, we hold that the trial court had substantial and competent evidence to 
find that John Doe neglected S.S. and T.S. under I.C. § 16-1602(25)(a) and (b) and I.C. § 16-
2002(3)(b).   
John Doe argues that his case is similar to Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 53 P.3d 341 
(2002).  In Doe v. State, the district court affirmed the trial court’s decision to terminate the 
father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment and neglect where the father was 
incarcerated on the child’s date of birth, failed his rider program, never met his child, and never 
provided child support.  Id. at 759–61, 53 P.3d at 342–44.  This Court held that the finding of 
neglect and abandonment was not supported by substantial and competent evidence, finding that 
the Department trivialized the father’s efforts to have a relationship with his son, which were 
significant in light of the reality of the father’s “situation” (being incarcerated from birth through 
a significant portion of the child’s life up to the time of the termination), and that the Department 
did “little or nothing to assist in” the father’s efforts.  Id. at 762, 53 P.3d at 345.  This Court 
remanded the case for consideration of the evidence already presented as well as evidence of 
Doe’s conduct since his release from the penitentiary, stating: “The record stops short of 
evidence as to [the father’s] conduct since his release.  If he has taken no steps to establish a 
parental relationship since his release that evidence may be considered . . . .”  
The case at hand is distinguishable.  John Doe was not incarcerated when his children 
were born, yet he did little at that time to provide parental care.  While incarcerated, John Doe 
had phone visits with his children, but he failed to take advantage of work opportunities which 
could have allowed him to help provide for his children.  John Doe received assistance from the 
Department in working on his case plan.   Most significantly, there is evidence in the record of 
the steps John Doe has and has not taken since his release from prison, including his failure to 
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establish suitable living arrangements, his failure to obtain adequate employment and his 
conviction for driving without privileges. 
Finally, John Doe claims that since his release from prison he has faced logistical 
difficulties which prevented him from discharging his parental duties.  However, John Doe fails 
to point to neglect cases where logistical difficulties were deemed to excuse a parent from 
discharging their parental duties.  John Doe relies on Doe v. Doe, 150 Idaho 46, 244 P.3d 190 
(2010).  In Doe v. Doe, this Court held that the trial court’s finding that the father abandoned his 
child based upon the failure to maintain a normal parental relationship without just cause was not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence, because the record showed that the father had 
just cause based upon the fact that he did not have the time, money or requisite permission from 
the military to regularly visit his son.  Id. at    , 244 P.3d at 195–96.  Doe v. Doe is inapplicable to 
the case at hand because it concerns the just cause defense to abandonment; there is no just cause 
defense for neglect.   
B. Jane Doe. 
Jane Doe raises 13 issues on appeal.  We find that the following four issues, each of 
which is addressed below, cover all issues Jane Doe properly raises on appeal: (1) whether the 
trial court’s finding that Jane Doe neglected the three older children is supported by substantial 
and competent evidence; (2) whether the Department was authorized to petition for the 
termination of Jane Doe’s parental rights in her youngest child and whether the court had 
jurisdiction over that petition; (3) whether the trial court’s finding that Jane Doe neglected her 
youngest child is supported by substantial and competent evidence; and (4) whether the trial 
court erred in terminating Jane Doe’s parental rights where the Department allegedly failed to 
inform her of her status as someone with a disability and allegedly failed to fairly assist her 
toward reunification with her children.1 
                                                 
1Four issues raised by Jane Doe fail to meet the requirements of Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6), which provides: 
“The argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the 
reasons therefor, with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and the record relied upon.”  See 
also Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 374, 234 P.3d 696, 698 (2010) (we will not consider an issue which is not 
supported by cogent argument and authority).  First, Jane Doe asserts that her equal protection rights were violated 
because she has been subjected to a preemptive filing of the termination petition as to the youngest child, and she is 
unaware of anyone else being subjected to such a filing.  She cites no authority other than referencing the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and makes no further argument.  Second, Jane Doe restates the same 
equal protection issue.  Third, Jane Doe asserts that her rights to uniform court procedure were violated.  Jane Doe 
cites no authority other than Article V, Section 26 of the Idaho Constitution, and makes no argument on this issue.  
Fourth, Jane Doe argues that two of her assigned caseworkers engaged in actions which were unfairly adverse to her 
interest while she attempted to complete her case plans.  According to Jane Doe, the caseworkers lacked a 
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1. The trial court’s finding that Jane Doe neglected her three oldest children is supported 
by substantial and competent evidence. 
The trial court terminated Jane Doe’s parental rights on the grounds of neglect and the 
best interests of the children upon concluding that while Jane Doe “was very pleasant to IDHW 
workers, and seemed to genuinely care about the children, [she] would simply never follow 
through with the responsibilities involving the children.”  (Emphasis in the original).  The trial 
court continued, “[Jane Doe] is barely able to provide for herself . . . let alone multiple children”.   
The trial court found that Jane Doe “has not consistently provided or been able to provide 
an adequate safe and stable home environment for any of her children” while the children have 
been in her custody and in the Department’s legal custody.  S.S. and T.S. were first removed 
from the home when a police officer found marijuana being smoked in Jane Doe’s home in their 
presence.  On more than one occasion, the children were removed from the home on the basis of 
its filth.  The trial court also found that despite the effort and services provided by both the 
Department and the drug court, Jane Doe “still has insufficient resources and/or abilities to care 
for any of her children—financial, residential, emotional or otherwise”, noting that there was “no 
. . . direct evidence of resources available to Jane Doe other than her nominal income from her 
meager employment.”  Additionally, the trial court found that following the adjudicatory hearing 
in the first child protective petition, Jane Doe was provided with many services, including in-
home parenting training, and while she showed some learning, the home was quite dirty and 
cluttered on certain occasions, she missed scheduled visits with the children and left others early, 
she failed to bring appropriate things like snacks and activities to the scheduled supervised visits, 
she had to be reminded what to do to complete the case plan, and she did not pay support.   
The trial court found that Jane Doe failed to satisfactorily complete her case plan  during 
the approximately two-year period that caseworker Fuller oversaw the case by: (1) failing to 
verify her weekly attendance at Narcotics Anonymous meetings; (2) never consistently 
maintaining a safe, stable, drug-free home; (3) failing to maintain financial stability for her and 
                                                                                                                                                             
commitment to reunify her with her children, which was supposed to be brought about by the case plans, and one of 
the caseworkers instructed John Doe to file for custody of his children, pitting him against her.  She also argues that 
the Department used her visitation periods to unfairly glean negative information that may have been determinative 
of her case, and one of the case workers did not notify Jane Doe that the caseworker had already found that Jane Doe 
failed the case plan and that the caseworker had already pursued termination by internally filing a Report of 
Investigation for Termination.  While Jane Doe thoroughly cites the record to identify these allegedly unfair acts and 
omissions of the Department and its workers, she cites to no authority in support of her argument that the trial court 
erred in terminating her rights when these acts and omissions allegedly occurred. 
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her family; (4) failing to regularly attend therapy sessions; (5) failing to complete her substance 
abuse treatment; (6) failing to follow through with the recommendations from the assessments of 
S.S. and T.S. concerning their special needs; and (7) failing to demonstrate adequate parenting 
skills to keep her children safe.  The trial court also found that Jane Doe failed the drug court 
based on six problems with her participation.   
Jane Doe argues that she demonstrated her willingness and ability to care for her 
children.  While admitting that she did not fully complete her case plan, she argues that she 
substantially completed a number of the requirements and that the two caseworkers involved in 
her cases testified that they believed she could possibly complete her case plans.  She admits that 
she failed to submit verification of attending Narcotics Anonymous meetings and did not 
complete her substance abuse treatment program, but she argues that the fact that she tested 
negative for drugs during the two CPA cases overcomes these failures.  As to the trial court’s 
finding that she is unable to support herself, as well as any children, financially, Jane Doe argues 
that she was pregnant during much of time of the first CPA case, suffers mental illness, gained 
part-time employment in September 2010, and has increased the part-time hours she works.  As 
to the trial court’s finding that she is unable to care for her two eldest children, who suffer severe 
behavioral and development problems respectively, Jane Doe argues that she has demonstrated 
her ability to care for them by taking actions such as enrolling them in Head Start.  She also 
argues that the trial court focused on limited instances concerning the cleanliness of her home 
without giving enough credit to her for the home’s safety. 
We recently upheld a termination on the grounds of neglect in Department of Health and 
Welfare v. John Doe (2011-2), 2011 WL 2682907, at *11 (Idaho July 12, 2011), in which the 
relevant facts were similar to the facts in this case.  In John Doe (2011-2), we held that the 
failure to complete a case plan is relevant to finding neglect under I.C. §16-2002(3)(a) (based 
upon the definitions of neglect in I.C. § 16-1602(25)(a) and/or (b)) and is not limited to a finding 
of neglect under I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b).  Id. at *8–10.  We upheld the termination where:  
Although [Father] has completed several of the required evaluations, he has not 
demonstrated a commitment to completing parenting classes for children with 
behavior disorders, or to completing substance abuse treatment classes.  Father 
has also failed to demonstrate an ability to provide stable income and employment 
to provide for his family. 
Id. at *11.   
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Similarly, in the case at hand, Jane Doe failed to fully comply with her case plan and 
failed to demonstrate an ability to provide stable income and employment to provide for her 
family.  Additionally, she has failed to find suitable housing for her children.  Ultimately, Jane 
Doe seems to be asking this Court to reweigh evidence upon which the trial court based its 
decision to terminate her parental rights in her three older children.  However, it is well 
established that: 
On appeal, the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence to determine if it 
was clear and convincing.  Rather, “where a trial court has noted explicitly and 
applied a clear and convincing standard, an appellate court will not disturb the 
trial court's findings unless they are not supported by substantial and competent 
evidence.”   State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 534, 535, 164 P.3d 814, 815 (2007). 
Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 149 Idaho 207, 210, 233 P.3d 138, 141 (2010).  The trial 
court explicitly noted and applied the clear and convincing standard, and the trial court’s findings 
are supported by the substantial and competent evidence set forth above.  We therefore affirm the 
trial court in terminating Jane Doe’s parental rights in her three older children on the ground of 
neglect as defined in I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) and I.C. § 16-16205(a) and (b).   
Jane Doe also argues that the trial court improperly relied upon the fact that she chose not 
to testify in reaching its decision to terminate her parental rights.  In the Feb. 3, 2011 Order, the 
trial court began his discussion concerning Jane Doe as follows: 
[Jane Doe] did not testify at the trial, and as such, the Court has no competent 
evidence of her future plans.  Additionally, much of the evidence presented by the 
State regarding [Jane Doe’s] failure to adequately complete her case plan and that 
[she] neglected each of her four children, remains uncontradicted. 
In concluding this portion of the Feb. 3, 2011 Order, the trial court stated: 
Because [Jane Doe] did not testify at the termination trial, and because there was 
no other direct evidence of resources available to [Jane Doe] other than her 
nominal income from her meager employment, there is no competent evidence 
upon which this Court could find that [Jane Doe] can care for herself, let alone 
any one of her children or any combination of her children. 
 
Jane Doe relies on Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe I, 2011 WL 667969 
(Idaho, Feb. 25, 2011), in which we noted that it is permissible to draw negative inferences in a 
civil trial against a person who chooses not to testify.  Id. at *10 (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 
425 U.S. 308, 318–19, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 1557–58, 47 L.Ed.2d 810, 821–22 (1976)).  In Doe I, we 
held that where there was no direct evidence concerning the mother’s abuse, neglect or 
abandonment of her children, “any inferences that could have been drawn from [the mother’s] 
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invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights were not enough to support a finding that it would be 
contrary to the children's welfare to be placed in her care.”  Id.  The case at hand differs from 
Doe I.  Upon reviewing the Feb. 3, 2011 Order, it does not appear that the trial court based his 
decision on any negative inferences drawn from Jane Doe’s decision not to testify; rather, he 
references Jane Doe’s decision not to testify merely to point out that there is little evidence to 
contradict the evidence put forth by the Department.  And as already set forth, the Department’s 
evidence is substantial and competent.   
2. The Department was authorized to petition for the termination of Jane Doe’s parental 
rights in her youngest child, and the court had jurisdiction to consider the petition. 
Jane Doe argues that it was premature for the Department to file a petition for the 
termination of her parental rights in her youngest child S.H, because she was not given a 
reasonable chance to complete the case plan.  According to Jane Doe, “the Department wished to 
simply go through the motions of preparing a case plan, with no intention of it allowing for the 
constitutionally and statutorily required reunification.”  She argues that under these 
circumstances, the Department is not authorized to petition for termination, the court does not 
have jurisdiction, and her due process rights have been violated. 
The Department’s authority to petition for the termination of parental rights is set forth in 
both the CPA (chapter 16, title 16, Idaho Code) and the termination statute (chapter 20, title 16, 
Idaho Code).  Pursuant to the termination statute, a “petition may be filed by . . . [a]n authorized 
agency”.  I.C. § 16-2004.  “Authorized agency” is defined as including “the department”, which 
is in turn defined as “the department of health and welfare.”  Idaho Code § 16-2002(9) and (10).  
Idaho Code § 16-2003 grants courts exclusive jurisdiction over termination actions where the 
court has jurisdiction over the child under the CPA.  Thus, pursuant to the termination statute, 
the Department is generally authorized to petition for the termination of parental rights, and the 
court has jurisdiction over such a termination proceeding as long as it has jurisdiction over the 
child under the CPA.   
Under the CPA: “If the child has been placed in the legal custody of the department or 
under its protective supervision pursuant to section 16-1619, Idaho Code, the department may 
petition the court for termination of the parent and child relationship  in accordance with chapter 
20, title 16, Idaho Code.”  Idaho Code § 16-1624.  After a CPA petition has been filed, the court 
must set an adjudicatory hearing to be held within thirty days, and if a preponderance of the 
evidence at the adjudicatory hearing shows that the child comes within the court’s jurisdiction 
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under the CPA, then the court must place the child in either the legal custody of the Department 
or under its protective supervision.  Idaho Code § 16-1619.  If the court choses to place the child 
in legal custody of the Department, it must make additional written findings as provided in I.C. § 
16-1619(6); however, if the court chooses instead to place the child under the protective 
supervision of the Department, it need do no more than find jurisdiction under the CPA.  Thus, 
under the authority granted by the CPA, the Department is authorized to petition for termination 
if the court has jurisdiction over the child under the CPA.   
Idaho Code § 16-1603 grants courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all proceedings 
under the CPA “concerning any child living or found within the state: (a) Who is neglected, 
abused or abandoned by his parents, guardian or other legal custodian, or who is homeless; or (b) 
Whose parents or other legal custodian fails to provide a stable home environment.”  In the case 
at hand, S.H. was found to be within the court’s jurisdiction under the CPA at the adjudicatory 
hearing based upon an unstable home environment and was placed in the legal custody of the 
Department.  On appeal, Jane Doe does not challenge the trial court’s finding of jurisdiction over 
S.H. at the adjudicatory hearing.  This jurisdiction is the trial court’s basis for jurisdiction in 
these termination proceedings; therefore, we hold that the Department had the authority to pursue 
the termination of Jane Doe’s rights in her youngest child, and the court had jurisdiction over the 
petition. 
Jane Doe also argues that both due process and the Idaho Code require the Department to 
make reasonable efforts at reunification before a court can terminate parental rights.  Jane Doe 
argues that in a case like this where there is a case plan under the CPA, the parent must be given 
a sufficient chance to complete the case plan before termination is pursued in order for the 
Department to fulfill its obligatory efforts to reunite the parent and child.  Jane Doe relies on the 
purpose section of the termination statute, which provides in relevant part:  
(1) The purpose of this chapter is to:  
. . . 
(b) Provide permanency for children who are under the jurisdiction of the 
court through the child protective act, chapter 16, title 16, Idaho Code, 
where the court has found the existence of aggravated circumstances or 
that reasonable efforts to return the child to his or her home have failed. 
Idaho Code § 16-2001.  Relatedly, the policy provision of the CPA notes the importance of 
family unity.  Idaho Code § 16-1601.   
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Both the termination statute and the CPA seek to balance aims that are sometimes in 
conflict—such as the best interests of the child and family unity.  While the purpose provision of 
the termination statute suggests that the termination statute addresses only those cases where the 
court has found either aggravated circumstances or the failure of reasonable efforts to return the 
child, the purpose provision in the termination statute is not a source of specific substantive 
criteria for termination, and while the purpose and policy provisions may shed some light on the 
statutes, the specific provisions govern.  As already explained, I.C. § 16-1624 explicitly 
authorizes the Department to file a petition to terminate parental rights after a court has placed 
the child in either the legal custody of the Department or under its protective supervision upon 
concluding the adjudicatory hearing pursuant to I.C. § 16-1619.  Upon conclusion of the 
adjudicatory hearing in this case, the trial court found that it had jurisdiction and placed S.H. in 
the legal custody of the Department.  Thus, at this point, the Department was authorized to 
petition for termination.  And, whether the Department had enough admissible evidence to 
support the clear and convincing standard for termination was not at issue at this moment in 
time; this issue was left to the trial process, affording Jane Doe the requisite due process 
protections. 
 
Jane Doe also relies on the time standard under the definition of neglect in I.C. § 16-
2002(3)(b), which provides that neglect means: “The parent(s) has failed to comply with the 
court's orders in a child protective act case or the case plan, and reunification of the child with 
his or her parent(s) has not occurred within the time standards set forth in section 16-1629(9), 
Idaho Code.”  Idaho Code § 16-1629(9) provides that “[t]here shall be a rebuttable presumption 
that if a child is placed in the custody of the department and was also placed in out of the home 
care for a period not less than fifteen (15) out of the last twenty-two (22) months from the date 
the child entered shelter care, the department shall initiate a petition for termination of parental 
rights.”   
Idaho Code § 16-2002(3)(b) sets forth one of three definitions of neglect, each of which 
definitions are independent bases upon which a parent’s rights may be terminated.  As set forth 
in the next section (infra Part B.3), we affirm the trial court’s termination of Jane Doe’s parental 
rights in her youngest child based on neglect as defined in both I.C. § 16-1602(25)(a) and (b), not 
as defined in I.C. §16-2002(3)(b).  Therefore, the time standard referenced in I.C. § 16-
15 
2002(3)(b) has no bearing on this decision, and the definitions of neglect in I.C. § 16-1602(25)(a) 
and (b) do not contain a time standard.   
3. There is substantial and competent evidence in support of the trial court’s finding that 
Jane Doe neglected her youngest child. 
The trial court ruled that the Department is entitled to rely upon the course of conduct of 
the parents involving the three older children to support terminating the parents’ rights in S.H., 
the youngest child.  Jane Doe acknowledges that evidence concerning the other three children 
can be considered by the trial court, but she contends that this evidence alone cannot suffice to 
support the termination of her rights in another child—S.H.  Jane Doe argues that the trial court’s 
decision to terminate her rights in S.H. was based upon the evidence concerning the three older 
children in violation of her due process rights. 
First, the trial court did not base his decision solely upon evidence from the other CPA 
case involving the three older children.  S.H. was initially removed from his home after an in-
home risk assessment by a Department caseworker found animal feces, a strong odor of urine 
and general filth and clutter at Jane Doe’s home three days after S.H.’s birth.  These conditions 
were a continuation of Jane Doe’s habits which led the Department to act with respect to the 
three older children approximately one year prior.  S.H. returned to Jane Doe’s home on an 
extended home visit, but less than one month later, S.H. was again removed from her home 
based upon unsanitary conditions.  While Jane Doe finally obtained marginal employment in 
September of 2010, the trial court found that her part-time job was “clearly insufficient to 
support any child or combination of children.”  The trial court also noted that Jane Doe and John 
Doe II recently lost the last family residence they occupied together and that Jane Doe moved in 
the late summer of 2010 into a friend’s residence, which her own sister testified was not safe or 
suitable for children.  At the time of the termination trial, Jane Doe lived in an apartment with 
both her biological father and her stepfather, which was also deemed to be an unsuitable home 
for a child.   
Second, nothing prohibits basing a decision to terminate on conduct related to the other 
CPA case, as long as that evidence suffices to show that Jane Doe neglected S.H.  “Neglected” is 
defined in I.C. §16-1602(25), in relevant part, as a child: 
(a) Who is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or 
other care or control necessary for his well-being because of the conduct or 
omission of his parents, guardian or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to 
provide them . . . ; or  
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(b) Whose parents, guardian or other custodian are unable to discharge their 
responsibilities to and for the child and, as a result of such inability, the child 
lacks the parental care necessary for his health, safety or well-being . . . . 
Evidence that Jane Doe merely is involved in another CPA proceeding involving other children 
might not be highly probative as to whether the child in the present case has been neglected.  
However, specific evidence from another CPA proceeding concerning Jane Doe’s ability at 
present to provide parental care and control may be probative of neglect as defined in I.C. § 16-
16025(a) or (b), particularly in a situation like this where the facts of the case involving the three 
other children overlap temporally with the case involving S.H.   
We hold that the trial court’s finding that Jane Doe neglected S.H. under I.C. § 16-
1602(25)(a) and (b) is supported by substantial and competent evidence based upon both the 
evidence directly concerning Jane Doe’s parenting of S.H., set forth earlier in this section, as 
well as the evidence concerning her ability to parent her three older children, set forth in supra 
Part III.B.1. 
Jane Doe also argues that by allowing the State to rely on the evidence concerning the 
case of the three older children, the trial court impermissibly put the burden on her to prove that 
she is capable to parent her youngest child.  Jane Doe fails to recognize the difference between 
putting the burden of proof on the wrong party and finding that the party with the burden of 
proof met its burden.  The trial court found, based upon the evidence concerning the three other 
children and the evidence directly concerning S.H., that the Department met its burden to prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that Jane Doe neglected S.H.  After the Department made such 
a showing, it was Jane Doe’s burden to come forward with contradictory evidence, and as 
explained earlier, there was virtually no contradictory evidence in the record.  Supra Part III.B.1. 
Jane Doe next draws this Court’s attention to Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. 
Doe II, where this Court held that there need not be a showing of actual harm or the risk of harm 
in order to terminate parental rights on the ground of neglect.  150 Idaho 36, 42, 244 P.3d 180, 
186 (2010).  Jane Doe correctly points out that Doe II was decided based on neglect as defined 
pursuant to I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b); whereas, here, Jane Doe neglected S.H. as defined in I.C. § 16-
1602(25)(a) or (b).  Due to this distinguishing feature, Jane Doe suggests that holding of Doe II 
does not apply.  However, in Doe II, this Court reached its decision based on the fact that the 
language of I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) “does not require the court to make a finding of actual harm or 
a risk of harm before finding neglect.”  150 Idaho at 42, 244 P.3d at 186.  Similarly, neither I.C. 
17 
§ 16-1602(25)(a) nor (b) require the court to making a finding of actual harm or risk of harm; 
these provisions define a “neglected” child, in short,  as a child who either is without proper 
parental care and control or has no parents who are able to discharge their parental 
responsibilities. 
Finally, Jane Doe argues that her fundamental right to parent S.H. is violated by 
terminating her rights in S.H. shortly after S.H. was born, because she has not been given a 
chance to demonstrate her ability to provide S.H. the necessary parental care.  While Jane Doe 
has a fundamental right to parent her child, Idaho’s termination statute does not violate that 
fundamental right.  In order to terminate parental rights based on neglect, the trial court must find 
that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that the parent neglected her child 
and that termination is in the child’s best interest.  Id. at 42, 244 P.3d at 186.  This standard 
suffices.  Generally, it may be more difficult for the Department to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that a parent neglected her child as defined in I.C. § 16-1602(25)(a) or (b) 
when the child is very young; however, so long as the Department meets that burden, the 
parent’s due process rights have not been violated.   
4. The trial court did not err in terminating Jane Doe’s rights where the Department 
and/or its caseworkers failed to notify her that she was disabled under applicable law. 
Jane Doe asserts that she was unfairly disadvantaged in both CPA cases because the 
Department lacked any procedure for determining whether she was disabled, which allegedly 
made it more difficult for her to complete her case plans.  In February 2009, Jane Doe was 
evaluated by a clinical psychologist, who diagnosed her with Bipolar I Disease and generalized 
anxiety disorder.  According to Jane Doe, she was never notified of any change in her status 
under Idaho law as the result of her evaluation, and the Department did not treat her as it should 
have treated her given her status as a disabled person. 
Under the CPA, Idaho Code § 16-1619 provides: “At the adjudicatory hearing, parents or 
guardians with disabilities shall have the right to introduce admissible evidence regarding how 
use of adaptive equipment or supportive services may enable the parent or guardian to carry out 
the responsibilities of parenting the child by addressing the reason for the removal of the child.”  
Under the termination statute, Idaho Code § 20-2005(6) provides in relevant part: “If the parent 
has a disability, as defined in this chapter, the parent shall have the right to provide evidence to 
the court regarding the manner in which the use of adaptive equipment or supportive services 
will enable the parent to carry out the responsibilities of parenting the child.”  “Disability” is 
18 
defined under Idaho Code §16-1602(14) as, in relevant part, “any mental or physical impairment 
which substantially limits one (1) or more major life activity of the individual including, but not 
limited to, self-care, manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, learning or working, or a 
record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.”   
Neither the CPA nor the termination statute imposes a requirement on the Department to 
notify Jane Doe of her status as a disabled person.  As a disabled person, Jane Doe is statutorily 
granted a right to put forth evidence during the adjudicatory hearing and the termination 
proceedings regarding the manner in which adaptive equipment or supportive services would 
assist her in discharging her parental responsibilities.  Jane Doe does not argue that the trial court 
denied her this right.  She had the opportunity to put forth evidence of adaptive equipment or 
supportive services which could assist her in providing proper parental care despite her 
disabilities.  Jane Doe does not point to any such evidence which was put forth but which the 
trial court failed to consider in finding neglect, and we do not see any indication that the trial 
court treated her unfairly due to her disability.  Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the trial court’s order terminating John Doe’s and Jane Doe’s parental rights.   
Justices J. JONES, W. JONES, HORTON and TROUT, Pro Tem, CONCUR.