Title: Plaintiff v. Defendant

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:  December 18, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
____________________
1180252
____________________
Burt W. Newsome and Newsome Law, LLC
v.
Clark A. Cooper et al.
____________________
1180302
____________________
Burt W. Newsome and Newsome Law, LLC
v.
Balch & Bingham, LLP, et al.
Appeals from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-15-900190)
PER CURIAM.
Attorney Burt W. Newsome and his law practice Newsome Law, LLC
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Newsome plaintiffs"), sued
attorney Clark A. Cooper; Cooper's former law firm Balch & Bingham,
LLP ("Balch"); John W. Bullock; Claiborne Seier ("Seier"); and Don Gottier
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the defendants") in the Jefferson
Circuit Court, alleging that the defendants combined to have Newsome
arrested on a false charge with the intent of damaging his reputation and
law practice.  The trial court ultimately entered judgments in favor of the
defendants, while reserving jurisdiction to make a later award of attorney
fees and costs under the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act,  § 12-19-
270 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the ALAA").  After the Newsome plaintiffs
appealed the initial judgments against them, the trial court awarded
Balch, Bullock, Seier, and Gottier attorney fees and costs under the
ALAA.  The Newsome plaintiffs then filed another appeal seeking the
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reversal of those awards.  We now affirm the judgments challenged by the
Newsome plaintiffs in both appeals.
Facts and Procedural History
On December 19, 2012, Bullock went to his dentist's office in
Birmingham to have a crown reset.  The dentist's office shared a parking
lot with Newsome Law, and Bullock parked his vehicle in a parking space
near Newsome's vehicle.  As Bullock got out of his vehicle to go in for his
appointment, Newsome was leaving his office and approaching his own
vehicle.  
Approximately 11 months earlier, Newsome had similarly been
leaving his office when Alfred Seier ("Alfred") exited a vehicle parked near
his and confronted Newsome about collection efforts Newsome was taking
against Alfred's wife, who owed money to a bank that Newsome
represented.  During that confrontation, Alfred produced a handgun, but
Newsome was able to escape to his office unharmed.  Newsome later filed
a criminal complaint against Alfred for menacing, a violation of § 13A-6-
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23, Ala. Code 1975.1  Alfred's brother Seier, an attorney, later contacted
Newsome and attempted to convince him to drop the menacing charge
against Alfred, who had cancer and was in poor health, but Newsome
declined to do so.
Newsome states that Bullock's parking and the manner in which
Bullock exited his vehicle on December 19 was reminiscent of the incident
with Alfred earlier that year.  Feeling threatened, Newsome pulled out a
handgun as he approached Bullock and their vehicles and ordered Bullock
to return to his vehicle until Newsome entered his vehicle and left. 
Bullock did so.  Bullock later contacted law enforcement and swore out a
warrant against Newsome for menacing.
On May 2, 2013, Newsome was stopped by the police for speeding. 
After the police officer discovered that Newsome had an outstanding
warrant for his arrest, Newsome was taken into custody and was
1Section 13A-6-23(a) provides that "[a] person commits the crime of
menacing if, by physical action, he intentionally places or attempts to
place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury."
4
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transported to the Shelby County jail.   Newsome was released later that
day.
Two days later, Cooper learned about Newsome's arrest.  Like
Newsome, Cooper was an attorney who represented banks in creditors'
rights actions.  Cooper and Newsome, in fact, had several of the same
banks as clients, representing them in different matters, depending on the
nature and scope of the action.  As part of his practice, Cooper periodically
e-mailed his banking clients when he learned that another attorney had
filed an action on their behalf to ask if there was anything he could do to
get more business referred to Balch; Cooper had sent these e-mails to
some of his clients after learning of actions that Newsome had filed.  Upon
learning of Newsome's arrest, Cooper forwarded Newsome's mug shot to
a friend who was an executive at IberiaBank, which periodically referred
legal matters to both Cooper and Newsome, with a note wondering how
Newsome's arrest would affect his law license.  That IberiaBank executive
subsequently testified that he did not refer any cases to Newsome for the
next three weeks until they met and Newsome assured him that the
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menacing charge would have no effect on his ability to practice law. 
IberiaBank thereafter resumed referring cases to Newsome. 
Newsome's menacing charge was set for a November 12, 2013, trial
in the Shelby District Court.  During a pretrial conference that morning,
the State, with Bullock's consent, offered to continue the trial until April
1, 2014, and to then dismiss the charge at that time if Newsome had no
further arrests and paid the required court costs.  The "Dismissal and
Release" order ("the D&R order") memorializing the terms of their
agreement further provided:
"[Newsome] does hereby grant a full, complete and absolute
Release of all civil and criminal claims stemming directly or
indirectly from this case to the State of Alabama ... [and] to
any other complainants, witnesses, associations, corporations,
groups, organizations or persons in any way related to this
matter .... [Newsome] freely makes this release knowingly and
voluntarily.  In exchange for this release, this case will be
either dismissed immediately, or pursuant to conditions noted
above."
(Emphasis in original.)  The D&R order was signed by Bullock, the
assistant district attorney, Newsome, and Newsome's attorney.  On April
4, 2014, the district court dismissed the case against Newsome.
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On January 14, 2015, the Newsome plaintiffs sued Cooper, Balch,
Bullock, and Seier, alleging, as later amended, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, false imprisonment, the tort of outrage, defamation,
invasion of privacy, and multiple counts of conspiracy and intentional
interference with a business relationship.  The gist of their complaint was
that Cooper and Seier conspired with Bullock to stage a confrontation and
to set Newsome up to be arrested so that Cooper could then take
Newsome's clients on behalf of Balch and Seier could get revenge upon
Newsome for filing a menacing charge against Alfred.2
On February 13, 2015, Seier moved the trial court to dismiss the
Newsome plaintiffs' claims asserted against him, arguing that they had
no factual basis and that, in any event, the claims were barred by the
release clause in the D&R order because the claims were related to
Newsome's menacing case.  Six days later, Newsome petitioned the Shelby
Circuit Court to expunge the records relating to his menacing charge
under § 15-27-1, Ala. Code 1975.  Both the State and Bullock filed
2The Newsome plaintiffs' complaint did not offer a reason for
Bullock's participation in the alleged scheme.
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objections, and, following a hearing, Newsome's petition was denied. 
Newsome moved the court to reconsider, however, and, on September 10,
2015, the court granted his motion and entered an order ("the
expungement order") expunging the records relating to his menacing
charge.
While Newsome was pursuing expungement in the Shelby Circuit
Court, the Jefferson Circuit Court granted motions to dismiss filed by
Seier and Bullock and a summary-judgment motion filed by Cooper and
Balch.  But after the expungement order was entered by the Shelby
Circuit Court, the Newsome plaintiffs moved the Jefferson Circuit Court
to reconsider, arguing, among other things, that because the records of
Newsome's criminal case had been expunged, nothing from that case --
including the D&R order containing the release clause -- could be
produced or relied upon in the Newsome plaintiffs' civil case.  See § 15-27-
16(a), Ala. Code 1975 (explaining that the contents of an expunged file
generally cannot be revealed, used, or disclosed by an individual who
knows an expungement order has been issued).  In December 2015, the
Jefferson Circuit Court granted the Newsome plaintiffs' motion and
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vacated its judgments in favor of Cooper, Balch, Bullock, and Seier.  The
Newsome plaintiffs then continued to conduct discovery trying to uncover
a link between Cooper, Bullock, and Seier, all of whom denied that a
conspiracy existed or that they even knew each other.
Meanwhile, back in the Shelby Circuit Court, Bullock and Seier filed
requests to have the expungement order reversed based on Newsome's
breach of the release clause in the D&R order.  On June 8, 2016, the
Shelby Circuit Court granted their requests and reversed the
expungement order under § 15-27-17, Ala. Code 1975, explaining that
Newsome had obtained the expungement order under false pretenses
because he had not, in fact, fulfilled all the terms of the D&R order at the
time he sought expungement (this order is hereinafter referred to as "the
expungement-reversal order").3   The Shelby Circuit Court further
explained:
3Section 15-27-17 provides that, "[u]pon determination by the court
that a petition for expungement was filed under false pretenses and was
granted, the order of expungement shall be reversed and the criminal
history record shall be restored to reflect the original charges."
9
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"The movants are further free to utilize all records related to
[Newsome's] prosecution, plea and the case's disposition as
they may find appropriate and necessary.  The expungement
statute was enacted to provide a 'shield' to first-time and non-
violent offenders.  It was not intended to be a 'sword' for those
engaged in civil litigation over the same transaction made the
basis of their criminal offense, and the court will not construe
the statute as such."
Newsome then petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals to set aside the
expungement-reversal order, but, in a four-page order, the Court of
Criminal Appeals unanimously denied his request, stating:  "We find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding that the petition for
expungement was filed under false pretenses in contravention of the
agreement signed between the parties."  (No. CR-15-1223, September 20,
2017.)  Newsome followed that ruling by petitioning this Court for the
same relief; that petition was also denied.  (No. 1161155, April 27, 2018.)
The Newsome plaintiffs, meanwhile, continued with discovery in
their civil case against the defendants, eventually obtaining the telephone
records of Cooper, Bullock, and Seier.  Those records indicated that
Cooper, Bullock, and Seier had all received calls from telephone number
205-410-1494 on dates surrounding notable events in this case, including
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the date of Newsome and Bullock's confrontation in the parking lot, the
date of Newsome's arrest, the date Cooper sent the e-mail with Newsome's
mug shot to an IberiaBank executive, and the date the Newsome plaintiffs
filed their complaint initiating the underlying action.  Based on some
Internet searches, Newsome concluded that the telephone number 205-
410-1494 was assigned to 76-year-old Calera resident Don Gottier, and,
on June 30, 2017, the Newsome plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
naming Gottier as a defendant and asserting that he was the coordinator
of the alleged conspiracy that had targeted Newsome.  The Newsome
plaintiffs also asked the trial court enter a judgment declaring the D&R
order void and unenforceable.
Upon being served with the Newsome plaintiffs' complaint, Gottier
contacted the Calera Police Department and filed a report indicating that
he may be a victim of identity theft because he had been named a
defendant in a lawsuit alleging that the telephone number 205-410-1494
was assigned to him, but, he stated, he had never been assigned or
operated that telephone number.  During the course of its ensuing
investigation, the Calera Police Department subpoenaed records from
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Verizon Wireless, a cellular-telephone provider, and received information
indicating that the telephone number 205-410-1494 was not, in fact, a
working telephone number but was instead an internal routing number
controlled by Verizon Wireless that was used to connect calls originating
from outside the caller's home area.  A custodian of records for Verizon
Wireless subsequently confirmed that information in a deposition when
he testified that the telephone number 205-410-1494 had been used as a
routing number by Verizon Wireless since 2007 and that it was not
assigned to any individual customer.4 
Cooper, Balch, Bullock, and Seier thereafter filed new summary-
judgment motions with the trial court, and Gottier filed a motion to
dismiss.  The defendants supported their respective motions with evidence
indicating that, other than Cooper and Balch, they did not know each
other before the Newsome plaintiffs sued them and that there had been
no conspiracy to stage an incident that would result in Newsome's arrest. 
4The defendants have noted that this also explains why 205-410-
1494 is listed in telephone records only as the number originating a call;
there is no evidence anybody ever placed a call to 205-410-1494.
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The trial court held a hearing on those motions, during which it expressed
skepticism about the merits of the Newsome plaintiffs' claims, but, before
the trial court could issue a ruling, the Newsome plaintiffs moved the trial
judge to recuse herself, alleging bias.  Following another hearing, the trial
court denied the motion to recuse.  The Newsome plaintiffs then
petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial judge to
recuse herself.  That petition was denied.  (No. 1170844, August 8, 2018.)
On June 15, 2018, the trial court entered judgments in favor of the
defendants on all of the Newsome plaintiffs' claims, expressly reserving
the right to later enter an award of attorney fees and costs under the
ALAA.5   See SMM Gulf Coast, LLC v. Dade Capital Corp., [Ms. 1170743,
June 5, 2020] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2020) (explaining that a trial court
5Although the judgment entered in favor of Gottier purported to
grant his motion to dismiss, it noted that the trial court had reviewed all
the "evidence submitted."  When a trial court reviewing a motion to
dismiss considers evidence outside the pleadings, the motion is converted
into a summary-judgment motion.  Lifestar Response of Alabama, Inc. v.
Admiral Ins. Co., 17 So. 3d 200, 212-13 (Ala. 2009).  Accordingly, we treat
the judgment of dismissal entered by the trial court in favor of Gottier,
like the other judgments entered on June 15, 2018, as a summary
judgment.
13
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retains jurisdiction to enter a postjudgment award of attorney fees under
the ALAA only if it has expressly reserved jurisdiction to do so).  The
parties then filed briefs and evidence regarding the defendants' motions
for attorney fees and costs, which the trial court ultimately granted in the
following amounts:  $56,283 for Balch; $56,317 for Bullock; $78,341 for
Seier; and $1,250 for Gottier.  The Newsome plaintiffs appeal both the
underlying judgments (case no. 1180252) and the awards entered against
them under the ALAA (case no. 1180302).
Analysis
The Newsome plaintiffs make myriad arguments about how the trial
court allegedly erred and why the judgments entered in favor of the
defendants should be reversed.  Ultimately, however, it is unnecessary for
this Court to address all of those arguments.  For the reasons explained
below, we hold (1) that the trial judge did not exceed her discretion in
denying the Newsome plaintiffs' motion seeking her recusal; (2) that
Newsome is bound by the release clause in the D&R order; (3) that
summary judgment was proper on all claims asserted by Newsome Law,
and (4) that the circumstances of this case support the trial court's award
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of attorney fees and costs under the ALAA.  We pretermit discussion of all
other issues raised by the parties.
A.  The Newsome Plaintiffs' Seeking the Trial Judge's Recusal 
We first consider the Newsome plaintiffs' argument that the trial
judge should have recused herself and that her failure to do so requires
the reversal of the judgments she has entered.
1.  Standard of Review
"A trial judge's ruling on a motion to recuse is reviewed to determine
whether the judge exceeded his or her discretion."  Ex parte George, 962
So. 2d 789, 791 (Ala. 2006).  This Court has further explained that the
necessity for recusal will be evaluated in each case based on the totality
of the circumstances, id., and that, when an allegation of bias has been
made, recusal will be required only "where facts are shown which make
it reasonable for members of the public, or a party, or counsel opposed to
question the impartiality of the judge."  Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420
So. 2d 60, 61 (Ala. 1982).  
2.  Merits of the Newsome Plaintiffs' Recusal Argument
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The Newsome plaintiffs argue that the trial judge's impartiality can
reasonably be questioned because (1) she and her husband, a state
legislator, allegedly received $34,500 in campaign donations from "agents"
having some association with the defendants and (2) the trial judge has
made various rulings throughout the course of this case that have gone
against the Newsome plaintiffs.  We are not convinced by the Newsome
plaintiffs' arguments.
In their brief to this Court, the Newsome plaintiffs cite Ex parte
Duncan, 638 So. 2d 1332, 1334 (Ala. 1994), and In re Sheffield, 465 So. 2d
350, 357 (Ala. 1985), for the well established general principle that recusal
is appropriate when there is a reasonable basis for questioning a judge's
impartiality.  But they cite no authority to support their allegations that
the trial judge in this case did anything that would reasonably cause one
to question her impartiality and thus require her recusal.  In contrast, the
defendants have cited authority that supports the trial court's denial of
the motion to recuse.  With regard to the alleged campaign contributions,
Cooper and Balch note that one appellate judge has explained how
impractical it would be to require judges to recuse themselves in every
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case in which a party or attorney has supported the judge's campaign
because, in Alabama, judges are required to run for reelection and,
therefore,
"situations will arise in which an attorney associated with a
specific judge's campaign will have a case come before that
judge.  If we were to require recusal in such cases, we would be
opening Pandora's box leading to untold problems for probate
judges, district judges, circuit judges, and appellate judges, all
of whom must run for election to their judgeships and all of
whom have had numerous attorneys associated with their
campaigns."
Smith v. Alfa Fin. Corp., 762 So. 2d 843, 849 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (opinion
on application for rehearing) (Monroe, J., statement of nonrecusal),
reversed on other grounds by Ex parte Alfa Fin. Corp., 762 So. 2d 850
(Ala. 1999).  Cooper and Balch further note that in § 12-24-3, Ala. Code
1975, the Alabama Legislature specifically addressed the circumstances
in which campaign contributions might require a judge's recusal, but the
Newsome plaintiffs have failed to cite or make any argument invoking
that statute.6  And, with regard to the trial court's rulings against the
6Section 12-24-3 explains that there is a rebuttable presumption that
a judge should recuse himself or herself from a case when a party or a
party's attorney has made a campaign contribution that represents a
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Newsome plaintiffs on various issues raised during the pendency of this
case, Bullock notes that this Court has previously held that "[a]dverse
rulings during the course of proceedings are not by themselves sufficient
to establish bias and prejudice on the part of a judge."  Henderson v. G&G
Corp., 582 So. 2d 529, 530-31 (Ala. 1991).
Turning to the merits of the Newsome plaintiffs' recusal motion, we
are not convinced that, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a
reasonable basis to question the impartiality of the trial judge.  George,
962 So. 2d at 791.  Although the Newsome plaintiffs allege that agents of
the defendants have given $34,500 to the campaigns of the trial judge and
her state-legislator husband, the evidence does not support that
allegation.  First, the Newsome plaintiffs argue that $29,500 of campaign
significant portion of the judge's fundraising.  See Dupre v. Dupre, 233 So.
3d 357, 360 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) ("By its plain language, § 12–24–3(b)(2)
creates a rebuttable presumption that a circuit-court judge should recuse
himself or herself when a party, or his or her attorney, contributes 15% or
more of the total campaign contributions collected by the circuit-court
judge during an election cycle while the party, or his or her attorney, has
a case pending before the judge.").  The Newsome plaintiffs' brief does not
reveal or address the total campaign contributions received by the trial
judge in this case.
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contributions made by political action committees should be attributed to
Balch because Balch or its agents had made contributions to those
committees.  But Balch's general counsel provided unrefuted testimony
that, "once a contribution is made to a political action committee, that
political action committee has the authority and discretion as to which
candidates it decides to support with any funds contributed."7  
Next, the Newsome plaintiffs include in their $34,500 calculation a
$3,000 donation made by the law firm that employs Alfred's wife as a
paralegal.  It is borderline absurd, however, to suggest that a campaign
donation to the legislator spouse of a trial judge made by the employer of
the wife of the brother of one of five defendants would be a basis upon
which a person could reasonably conclude that the trial judge was biased
in favor of the defendants.  
7We further note that in Startley General Contractors, Inc. v. Water
Works Board of Birmingham, 294 So. 3d 742, 758 n.10 (Ala. 2019), this
Court reviewed a ruling on a motion to recuse made under 12-24-3 and
distinguished between donations to a campaign made by a political action
committee and those made by an individual.
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Finally, the Newsome plaintiffs note that the outside law firm that
Balch ultimately retained to represent it and Cooper in this action has
also donated $2,000 to the trial judge.  Again, however, we do not
conclude, and do not believe that any reasonable person would conclude,
that this campaign donation is a reasonable basis upon which to question
the impartiality of the trial judge.  As explained by the special writing in
Smith, 762 So. 2d at 849, judges in Alabama are required to campaign for
their positions.  As part of that process, attorneys will inevitably provide
financial support for candidates.  Indeed, Newsome acknowledged at the
hearing on the motion to recuse that he too has made campaign
contributions to judges before whom he practices.  Section 12-24-3
provides that there is a rebuttable presumption that a judge should recuse
himself or herself from a case when a party or a party's attorney has made
a campaign contribution that represents a significant portion of the
judge's fundraising, but the Newsome plaintiffs have not cited this statute
or demonstrated that any of the campaign donations they have identified
were of an amount sufficient to implicate § 12-24-3.
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We also expressly reject the Newsome plaintiffs' argument that the
fact that the trial judge has ruled against them on various issues
throughout the course of this litigation demonstrates a bias against them. 
Although the trial judge has ruled against the Newsome plaintiffs on some
issues, she has also issued rulings favorable to them.  Notably, in
December 2015, she vacated judgments she had previously issued
disposing of the Newsome plaintiffs' claims and allowed them to thereafter
conduct extensive discovery.  Considering the totality of the facts and
circumstances, no reasonable person could consider the trial judge's 
rulings and conclude that they were the product of bias and prejudice. The
trial judge did not exceed her discretion by denying the Newsome
plaintiffs' motion to recuse.
B.  The D&R Order
We next consider the Newsome plaintiffs' arguments concerning the
D&R order.  They argue, first, that it was reversible error for the trial
court to consider the D&R order or any other materials related to
Newsome's menacing case, because, they allege, the expungement-
reversal order was "counterfeit" and the expungement order was therefore
21
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still in effect and barred consideration of the D&R order.  They
additionally argue that, even if the trial court could consider the D&R
order, the release clause in that order is unenforceable and that the trial
court therefore erred to the extent it concluded that the release clause
barred the Newsome plaintiffs from pursuing civil claims against the
defendants stemming from Newsome's menacing arrest.  Neither of those
arguments has merit.
1.  Standard of Review
The Newsome plaintiffs are essentially arguing that the D&R order
is inadmissible as evidence in the underlying action.  This Court has
explained that we will reverse a trial court's decision to consider evidence
submitted in conjunction with a summary-judgment motion only if it is
established that the trial court exceeded its discretion in doing so. 
Swanstrom v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, Inc., 43 So. 3d 564, 574 (Ala. 2009). 
To the extent the Newsome plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in
holding that the release clause in the D&R order bars their claims, we
review that issue de novo.   See McDonald v. H&S Homes, L.L.C., 853 So.
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2d 920, 923 (Ala. 2003) (explaining that the interpretation of an
unambiguous provision is a question of law, which we review de novo).
2.  The Validity of the Expungement-Reversal Order
As explained in the statement of facts above, after Seier moved the
trial court to dismiss the Newsome plaintiffs' claims based on the release
clause in the D&R order, Newsome petitioned the Shelby Circuit Court to
expunge the records of his menacing charge.  Once Newsome successfully
obtained the expungement order, the Newsome plaintiffs argued to the
trial court that § 15-27-16(a), Ala. Code 1975, barred the defendants from
introducing the D&R order into evidence or from relying upon its release
clause.  But the Shelby Circuit Court later reversed the expungement
order after concluding that Newsome had obtained the expungement order
under false pretenses.  That prompted the trial court to allow the
defendants to submit evidence related to Newsome's menacing charge --
including the D&R order.  And the trial court relied upon the D&R order
when entering its judgments in favor of the defendants.8 Indeed, in
8We note that, although Bullock was the only defendant who signed
the D&R order, the language of its release clause is broad enough to
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granting Bullock's summary-judgment motion, the trial court expressly
held that "Newsome executed a valid and binding release."
The Newsome plaintiffs nonetheless argue that it was reversible
error for the trial court to consider the D&R order because, they allege,
the expungement-reversal order was "counterfeit" and the expungement
order -- and the concomitant prohibition on using any records related to
Newsome's menacing charge -- was therefore still in effect.  Although the
Newsome plaintiffs repeatedly use the term "counterfeit" to describe the
expungement-reversal order, they are not alleging that the judge's
signature on that order was forged; rather, they dispute the conclusions
set forth in the order, challenge the court's jurisdiction to enter the order,
and argue that the order has no effect because it was not entered into the
State Judicial Information System ("SJIS").  Newsome previously made
these arguments when he filed petitions with the Court of Criminal
encompass claims asserted against "organizations or persons in any way
related to the matter."  See discussion, infra.
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Appeals and this Court.9  Those petitions were denied.  The arguments
presented in those petitions are no more persuasive this time around.
As the Court of Criminal Appeals explained in its order denying
Newsome's petition, the Shelby Circuit Court had jurisdiction to consider
whether Newsome filed his petition for expungement under false
pretenses pursuant to § 15-27-17, which provides that an order of
expungement "shall be reversed" if the court determines that the petition
for expungement was filed under false pretenses.  The Court of Criminal
Appeals noted that, because § 15-27-17 provides no time frame in which
a motion to set aside an expungement order must be filed or in which a
ruling on such a motion must be made, the court had jurisdiction to
reverse the expungement order notwithstanding the fact that it did so
9Section 15-27-5(c), Ala. Code 1975, provides that the ruling of a
court on a request for expungement of a criminal record "shall be subject
to certiorari review." In Bell v. State, 217 So. 3d 962, 963 (Ala. Crim. App.
2016), the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that, because Rule 39, Ala.
R. App. P., only contemplates certiorari petitions filed with the Supreme
Court seeking review of a decision made by one of the intermediate
appellate courts, certiorari petitions seeking review of a ruling on a
request for expungement are governed by Rule 21(c), Ala. R. App. P.,
which applies to extraordinary writs other than writs of mandamus and
prohibition.
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more than 30 days after that order was entered.   In light of the evidence,
the Court of Criminal Appeals further concluded that it could "find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding that the petition for
expungement was filed under false pretenses in contravention of the
agreement signed by the parties."
After failing to obtain relief from the Court of Criminal Appeals,
Newsome petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari or, in the
alternative, a writ of mandamus, directing the Shelby Circuit Court to
vacate its order reversing the expungement order.  In an April 27, 2018,
order, we denied Newsome's petition but directed the Shelby Circuit Court
to enter the expungement-reversal order into the SJIS.  The Newsome
plaintiffs state that, despite this Court's April 2018 order, the Shelby
Circuit Court still has not entered the expungement-reversal order into
the SJIS.  Accordingly, they repeat their argument that the expungement-
reversal order is invalid because it is not in the SJIS.  
We reject that argument.  When this Court directed the Shelby
Circuit Court to enter the expungement-reversal order into the SJIS in
April 2018,  we implicitly held that that order was valid and that the
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evidence supported the court's exercising its discretion to reverse the
expungement order.  We expressly confirm that now.  The Newsome
plaintiffs' argument that the expungement-reversal order is "counterfeit"
and that the trial court therefore erred by allowing the defendants to
introduce the D&R order in this action is without merit.
3.  The Validity of the Release Clause in the D&R Order
The Newsome plaintiffs argue that, even if the trial court could
consider the D&R order,  the release clause in that order is unenforceable
because (1) the D&R order violates Alabama law against compounding; (2)
any legal effect the D&R order might have had ended once Newsome's
menacing case was officially dismissed five months later; (3) the release
clause constitutes a punishment not permitted by law; (4) the release
clause was obtained by fraud; and (5) the release clause is invalid under
federal law.  We consider these arguments in turn.
a.  Whether the D&R order violates Alabama law
prohibiting compounding
 
The Newsome plaintiffs first argue that, because the D&R order
provided that Newsome's menacing case would be dismissed if, among
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other things, he released "all civil and criminal claims stemming directly
or indirectly from this case," the D&R order violates § 13A-10-7(a), Ala.
Code 1975, which provides that "[a] person commits the crime of
compounding if he gives or offers to give, or accepts or agrees to accept,
any pecuniary benefit or other thing of value in consideration for ...
[re]efraining from seeking prosecution of a crime."  The Newsome
plaintiffs fail to acknowledge, however, that this Court expressly held that
"[r]elease-dismissal agreements are not invalid per se" in Gorman v.
Wood, 663 So. 2d 921, 922 (Ala. 1995), another case in which an individual
sought to file a lawsuit after signing a release in exchange for having his
criminal charges dismissed.  The Gorman Court explained:
"We have studied the general release in this case. The plaintiff
admits that he signed the release and that [his criminal cases]
... were dismissed when the release was signed.  When the
plaintiff signed the release, he was represented by an attorney,
who had drafted the release and who notarized the plaintiff's
signature.  The plaintiff does not allege that the release was
obtained by fraud.  The release is not ambiguous.  Therefore,
the plain and clear meaning of the terms of the release
document must be given effect."
Id. 
28
1180252, 1180302
Although Gorman did not directly address § 13A-10-7, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama addressed that
statute in Penn v. City of Montgomery, 273 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1237 (M.D.
Ala. 2003), and concluded that a prosecutor's decision to dismiss pending
criminal charges did not constitute "refraining from seeking prosecution
of a crime" as that term is used in § 13A-10-7(a) and that release-
dismissal agreements simply did not constitute "the kind of conduct which
the Alabama Code has said constitutes the crime of compounding."  The
Penn court further explained that this Court had effectively held as much
in Gorman though it did not expressly state its holding in those terms. 
273 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.10  The Newsome plaintiffs' argument -- that the
release clause in the D&R order has no effect because the order was void
under § 13A-10-7 -- is without merit.
b.  Whether the release clause was no longer binding
after Newsome's menacing case was dismissed
10The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the holding of Penn in Penn v. City of Montgomery, 381 F.3d
1059, 1062-63 (11th Cir. 2004), similarly concluding that § 13A-10-7 does
not bar release-dismissal agreements and noting that this Court had
implicitly recognized that fact in Gorman.
29
1180252, 1180302
 
The Newsome plaintiffs next argue that the D&R order was
essentially an interlocutory order that became unenforceable after a final
judgment was entered five months later dismissing Newsome's criminal
case.  In support of this argument, they cite multiple family-law cases for
the proposition that a settlement agreement that is merged into a final
judgment can no longer be enforced as a contract.  See, e.g., Turenne v.
Turenne, 884 So. 2d 844, 849 (Ala. 2003) (explaining that the appellant
had "no claim that can be enforced on a contract theory ... because the
settlement agreement was merged into the divorce judgment").  Thus,
they argue, the defendants cannot now enforce the release clause in the
D&R order because the D&R order was subsumed by the final judgment
dismissing Newsome's case.
The Newsome plaintiffs misread Turenne and the other cases upon
which they rely; to the extent those family-law cases apply, they do not
support the conclusion that the D&R order ceased being valid when
Newsome's case was dismissed.  In Turenne, this Court quoted the
following passage from Killen v. Akin, 519 So. 2d 926, 930 (Ala. 1988):
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" 'The question whether a separation agreement or a
property settlement is merged in the decree or survives as an
independent agreement depends upon the intention of the
parties and the court ....'  East v. East, 395 So. 2d 78 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1980), cert. denied, 395 So. 2d 82 (Ala. 1981).  If there is
an agreement between the parties and it is not merged or
superseded by the judgment of the court, it remains a contract
between the parties and may be enforced as any other
contract."
Thus, a settlement agreement is not always subsumed within the final
judgment; rather, it depends upon "the intention of the parties and the
court."  519 So. 2d at 930.  It is clear here that the parties to the D&R
order intended for it to survive as an independent agreement, most
notably because of the broad release clause contained in the order.  It
would be irrational to include a release clause that would no longer have
any effect once Newsome received the benefit of his bargain and the
criminal charge was dismissed, and we will not read the D&R order in a
manner that would be contrary to its terms and allow such a result.  The
Newsome plaintiffs are entitled to no relief on the basis of this argument.
c.  Whether the release clause imposed a punishment not
authorized by law
31
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The Newsome plaintiffs next argue that the release clause should
not be enforced because, they argue, it constitutes a punishment not
permitted by Alabama law.   In support of this argument, they cite § 15-
18-1(a), Ala. Code 1975, which provides that "[t]he only legal
punishments, besides removal from office and disqualification to hold
office, are fines, hard labor for the county, imprisonment in the county jail,
imprisonment in the penitentiary, which includes hard labor for the state,
and death."  Notably, the Newsome plaintiffs state, requiring a defendant
to release legal claims he or she may have is not a sentencing option under 
§ 15-18-1(a).
As explained above in our discussion of  § 13A-10-7 and Gorman,
release-dismissal agreements are permitted by Alabama law.  The
Newsome plaintiffs fail to recognize that a party voluntarily releasing
legal claims he or she may have in return for the dismissal of criminal
charges is not receiving a sentence of punishment that must comply with 
§ 15-18-1(a); rather, that party is making a decision to release those
claims so as to avoid entirely the possibility of a sentence including any
32
1180252, 1180302
of the punishment contemplated by § 15-18-1(a).  This argument therefore
fails.
d.  Whether the release clause is void because the D&R
order was obtained through fraud
In Gorman, this Court noted that there was no allegation in that
case that the release-dismissal agreement at issue had been obtained by
fraud.  663 So. 2d at 922.  In contrast, the Newsome plaintiffs have alleged
that the D&R order was the product of fraud, and they argue that "[a]
release obtained by fraud is void."  Taylor v. Dorough, 547 So. 2d 536, 540
(Ala. 1989).  They specifically point to their allegation that the defendants
concealed the "fact" that Newsome's parking-lot confrontation with
Bullock was planned and staged by them to set Newsome up for a false
charge of menacing.  They further represent that Newsome never would
have signed the D&R order and agreed to release any potential claims if
he had known of the defendants' alleged conspiracy.   
Although it is true that a release obtained by fraud is void, the
Newsome plaintiffs' argument fails because, despite the extensive
discovery that has been conducted, they have not identified substantial
33
1180252, 1180302
evidence supporting their allegation that the D&R order was obtained
through fraud.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Amberson, 905 So. 2d 811, 816 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2004) (affirming the summary judgment entered on one of the
plaintiff's claims because the plaintiff "did not present substantial
evidence supporting his claim of fraud in the inducement pertaining to the
release").  The defendants have consistently maintained throughout this
litigation that there was no conspiracy and that, apart from Cooper and
Balch, they did not even know one another before the Newsome plaintiffs
named them as defendants in this action; the evidence they submitted
with their summary-judgment motions supports this position.11  The
Newsome plaintiffs' only counter has been to claim that the defendants
are all linked by Gottier and the telephone number 205-410-1494.  But the
undisputed evidence has established that the telephone number 205-410-
1494 is not a working telephone number and that it is not assigned to or
11The Newsome plaintiffs assert that the defendants have "simply
ignored [their] claim for fraudulent concealment and have done nothing
to rebut [the Newsome plaintiffs'] prima facie case that the release is not
valid."  Newsome plaintiffs' brief, p. 78.  This assertion is disingenuous. 
The record is replete with instances of the defendants claiming that there
was no conspiracy that was fraudulently concealed from Newsome.
34
1180252, 1180302
operated by Gottier.  Simply put, no  fair-minded person in the exercise
of impartial judgment could reasonably infer -- based on the evidence
before the trial court as opposed to mere speculation and conjecture -- that
the defendants conspired to stage an altercation that would result in
Newsome's arrest.  See § 12-21-12, Ala. Code 1975; West v. Founders Life
Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989) (defining
substantial evidence).  Because the Newsome plaintiffs have not adduced
substantial evidence to support their allegation that the D&R order
containing the release was the product of fraud, we will not conclude that
the D&R order is unenforceable on that basis.
e.  Whether the release clause is void under federal law
Finally, the Newsome plaintiffs argue that this Court should apply
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Town of Newton
v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987), and conclude on that authority that the
release clause in the D&R order is invalid.  In Rumery, the plaintiff, who
had been arrested for tampering with a witness, executed a release-
dismissal agreement in which he agreed to release any claims against the
town employing the police officers who had arrested him, town officials,
35
1180252, 1180302
and his victim in exchange for the dismissal of the criminal charges he
faced.  In spite of that agreement, the plaintiff thereafter sued the town
and certain town officials alleging civil-rights violations under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, but his case was dismissed after the federal district court
concluded that his decision to execute the release had been voluntary,
deliberate, and informed.  The United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, however, adopting a
per se rule invalidating release-dismissal agreements.  The case was then
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which reversed the Court
of Appeals' judgment, explaining that, "although we agree that in some
cases these agreements may infringe important interests of the criminal
defendant and of society as a whole, we do not believe that the mere
possibility of harm to these interests calls for a per se rule."  480 U.S. at
392. The Court then considered (1) whether the release-dismissal
agreement was voluntary; (2) whether there was evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct; and (3) whether enforcement of the agreement would
adversely affect the relevant public interests.  Concluding that all of those
factors weighed in favor of enforcing the agreement, the Court ruled that
36
1180252, 1180302
the release-dismissal agreement was valid and that it required the
dismissal of the plaintiff's § 1983 action.
It is not clear why the Newsome plaintiffs believe it would benefit
their position if this Court adopts the holding in Rumery.  Like the
plaintiff in Rumery, Newsome, after receiving advice from counsel,
executed an agreement releasing his claims against the local municipality,
government officials, and the victim of his crime.  The D&R order
indicates on its face that Newsome voluntarily agreed to its terms. 
Moreover, there is no evidence, or even an allegation, of prosecutorial
misconduct, and enforcing the D&R order according to its terms would not
adversely affect any public interest.  In sum, nothing in Rumery supports
the Newsome plaintiffs' argument that the D&R order should not be
enforced.
4.  The Effect of the Release Clause in the D&R Order
Having established that the release clause in the D&R order is valid
and enforceable, we must next determine its effect.  By executing the D&R
order in his menacing case, Newsome granted "a full, complete and
absolute Release of all civil and criminal claims stemming directly or
37
1180252, 1180302
indirectly from this case ... to any other complainants, witnesses,
associations, corporations, groups, organizations or persons in any way
related to this matter."  (Emphasis in original.)  The theory of the
Newsome plaintiffs' case is that the defendants combined to stage the
parking-lot confrontation between Newsome and Bullock so that Newsome
would be arrested on a false charge.  All the claims asserted by Newsome
against the defendants -- malicious prosecution, abuse of process, false
imprisonment, the tort of outrage, defamation, invasion of privacy,
conspiracy, and intentional interference with a business relationship --
stem at least indirectly from his menacing case and are accordingly within
the scope of the release clause.
We further note that, although Bullock was the only one of the
defendants to sign the D&R order, the language of its release clause is
broad enough to encompass claims asserted against "organizations or
persons in any way related to this matter."  See also Conley v. Harry J.
Whelchel Co., 410 So. 2d 14, 15 (Ala. 1982) (explaining that the broad and
unambiguous terms of a release barred the plaintiffs from pursuing claims
against defendants who were not parties to the agreement containing the
38
1180252, 1180302
release).  Again, the entire theory of the Newsome plaintiffs' case is that
the defendants were all involved in the alleged conspiracy leading to his
menacing arrest.  The Newsome plaintiffs have not claimed that the
defendants are not "related to" Newsome's menacing case.  And they could
not credibly do so -- their alleged combined involvement is the essence of
this lawsuit.  In its orders entering summary judgments for the
defendants, the trial court cited the release clause only as a basis for the
judgment entered in favor of Bullock.  Nevertheless, "we will affirm a
summary judgment if that judgment is proper for any reason supported
by the record, even if the basis for our affirmance was not the basis of the
decision below."  DeFriece v. McCorquodale, 998 So. 2d 465, 470 (Ala.
2008).  The release clause in the D&R order barred Newsome from
pursuing any civil claims "stemming directly or indirectly" from his
menacing case against any "complainants, ... organizations or persons in
any way related to [that] matter."  This includes all the claims Newsome
has individually asserted against Cooper, Balch, Bullock, Seier, and
Gottier, and the judgments entered in favor of the defendants on those
claims were therefore proper. 
39
1180252, 1180302
C.  The Claims Asserted by Newsome Law
The materials filed by the Newsome plaintiffs throughout this action
generally treat the claims they have asserted as collective claims held by
both Newsome and Newsome Law.  Nevertheless, it is apparent that the
majority of those claims are personally held only by Newsome
individually.  The Newsome plaintiffs have cited no authority to this
Court, and the facts in the record would not support, any claim by
Newsome Law alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, false
imprisonment, the tort of outrage, defamation, or invasion of privacy.  But
the Newsome plaintiffs' complaint, as amended, does allege colorable
intentional-interference-with-a-business-relationship and conspiracy
claims against Cooper and Balch that might be held by Newsome Law. 
We therefore review de novo the summary judgment entered on those
claims.  SE Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Bank of Franklin, 280 So. 3d 1047,
1051 (Ala. 2019) ("This Court applies a de novo standard of review to a
summary judgment.").
 Newsome Law's intentional-interference claims are based on e-mails
that Cooper sent to their shared banking clients seeking to obtain more
40
1180252, 1180302
legal work from those clients for Cooper and Balch.  In White Sands
Group, L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 32 So. 3d 5, 14 (Ala. 2009), this Court
clarified that the tort of intentional interference with a business
relationship includes the following elements: "(1) the existence of a
protectible business relationship; (2) of which the defendant knew; (3) to
which the defendant was a stranger; (4) with which the defendant
intentionally interfered; and (5) damage."  But, even if these elements are
met, a defendant can avoid liability by proving the affirmative defense of
justification.  32 So. 3d at 13.  In entering the summary judgment for
Cooper and Balch, the trial court concluded that they had proven
justification as a matter of law:
"[The] claims for intentional interference against Cooper
fail, first and foremost, because of the competitor's privilege --
the affirmative defense known as justification.  Both Newsome
and Cooper are banking lawyers and Cooper was justified in
competing for the business of their ongoing clients,
IberiaBank, Renasant Bank, and Bryant Bank.  See Bama
Budweiser of Montgomery, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 611
So. 2d 238, 247 (Ala. 1992) ('[B]ona fide business competition
is a justification for intentional interference with a
competitor's business.'); Bridgeway Communications, Inc. v.
Trio Broadcasting, Inc., 562 So. 2d 222, 223 (Ala. 1990)
(holding that legitimate economic motives and bona fide
business competition qualify as justification for intentional
41
1180252, 1180302
interference with a competitor's business).  Cooper was a
competitor of Newsome's, represented the same banks as
Newsome, and was, thus, allowed to contact those clients. 
Justification is a complete defense to an intentional
interference claim."
The Newsome plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred because
justification is a question for the jury and, in any event, does not apply
when the defendant has acted improperly.  See White Sands Grp., 32 So.
3d at 18-19 (explaining that "[j]ustification is generally a jury question"
and that the nature of the defendant's conduct is paramount and noting
that, although competitors are not necessarily expected to be gentlemen,
there is no privilege when devious and improper means have been used). 
The Newsome plaintiffs state that Cooper's actions were outside the
bounds of lawful competition; we disagree.  First, as already explained,
the Newsome plaintiffs have produced nothing more than speculation to
support their theory that Cooper was part of a conspiracy involving
Bullock, Seier, and Gottier.  Second, although the Newsome plaintiffs
state that Cooper's e-mails to their shared banking clients cannot be
considered lawful competition because, the Newsome plaintiffs allege,
such solicitations are prohibited by the Alabama Rules of Professional
42
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Conduct, they are simply wrong in this regard.  Solicitations made to
current clients are not barred by Rule 7.3, Ala. R. Prof. Cond., which
regulates the solicitation of "prospective clients" but by its terms exempts
solicitations to parties with whom an attorney has a "current or prior
professional relationship."  See also Ala. State Bar Ethics Op. No. 2006-01,
June 21, 2006 ("Current and former clients are ... excluded from the
prohibition against direct solicitation.  Due to their previous or ongoing
interaction with the attorney, current or former clients will have a
sufficient basis upon which to judge whether to continue or reactivate a
professional relationship with a particular attorney.").  Moreover,
although Cooper forwarded news of Newsome's arrest and his mug shot
to a friend who was an executive at one of their shared banking clients, he
did not misrepresent any facts related to Newsome's arrest, and we do not
consider this to be the sort of devious and improper act that would defeat
a justification defense.  See White Sands Grp., 32 So. 3d at 19-20
(describing acts of misrepresentation and concealment that have defeated
justification defenses in other actions).
43
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Finally, by indicating that justification is generally a jury question, 
White Sands Group implicitly recognized that a summary judgment may
nonetheless be appropriate in instances where the party asserting that
affirmative defense carries its burden.  32 So. 3d at 20 (concluding that
the defendant "failed to carry its burden of showing that it is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law on its affirmative defense of justification"). 
This is such a case.  The Newsome plaintiffs have not put forth
substantial evidence indicating that Cooper acted improperly, and the
trial court therefore correctly held that the asserted intentional-
interference-with-business-relations claims should not be submitted to the
jury.12  And because Cooper and Balch were entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law on Newsome Law's intentional-interference claims, they
were also entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on Newsome Law's
conspiracy claims.  See Alabama Psych. Servs., P.C. v. Center for Eating
12To the extent Newsome may have personally asserted intentional-
interference claims against Cooper and Balch based on e-mails Cooper
sent to their shared clients that did not reference Newsome's menacing
arrest, summary judgment was properly entered in favor of Cooper and
Balch on the basis of justification even if those claims were not covered by
the release clause in the D&R order.
44
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Disorders, L.L.C., 148 So. 3d 708, 715 (Ala. 2014) (explaining that
conspiracy is not an independent cause of action and that, because "[the
plaintiff] did not prove its underlying cause of action (intentional
interference with business relations), [the defendants] also were entitled
to a [judgment as a matter of law] as to [the plaintiff's] conspiracy claim").
D.  The ALAA Awards
In accordance with the ALAA, the trial court awarded attorney fees
and costs to the defendants in the following amounts:  $56,283  for Balch;
$56,317 for Bullock; $78,341 for Seier; and $1,250 for Gottier.  The
Newsome plaintiffs argue that those awards should be reversed because,
they argue, "the trial court's erroneous reliance on the counterfeit
[expungement-reversal] order infected its ALAA findings and [the
Newsome plaintiffs'] legal arguments regarding the 'release' were made
in good faith."  Newsome plaintiffs' brief, p. 91.  For the reasons that
follow, the awards entered by the trial court are affirmed.
Section 12-19-272(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides that a trial court
"shall" award reasonable attorney fees and costs when an attorney or
party "has brought a civil action, or asserted a claim therein, ... that a
45
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court determines to be without substantial justification."  "[W]ithout
substantial justification" means that the action "is frivolous, groundless
in fact or in law, or vexatious, or interposed for any improper purpose,
including without limitation, to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation, as determined by the court."  §
12-19-271(1), Ala. Code 1975.  This Court has stated that "[t]he standard
of review for an award of attorney fees under the ALAA depends upon the
basis for the trial court's determination for the award."  McDorman v.
Moseley, [Ms. 1190819, September 18, 2020] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala.
2020).  We further explained:
"If a trial court finds that a claim or defense is without
substantial justification because it is groundless in law, that
determination will be reviewed de novo, without a
presumption of correctness.  Pacific Enters. Oil Co. (USA) v.
Howell Petroleum Corp., 614 So. 2d 409 (Ala. 1993).  If,
however, a trial court finds that a claim or defense is without
substantial justification using terms or phrases such as
'frivolous,' 'groundless in fact,' 'vexatious,' or 'interposed for
any improper purpose,' that determination will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous, without
supporting evidence, manifestly unjust, or against the great
weight of the evidence.  Id."
46
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Moseley, ___ So. 3d at ___.  The trial court expressly stated in its order
awarding Balch, Bullock, Seier, and Gottier attorney fees and costs that
the Newsome plaintiffs'  "claims were without substantial justification
because they were frivolous, groundless in fact, vexatious, or were
interposed for an improper purpose of harassment, delay, or abusing
discovery."  Accordingly, we will reverse the awards made by the trial
court only if the Newsome plaintiffs show that those awards were "clearly
erroneous, without supporting evidence, manifestly unjust, or against the
great weight of the evidence."  Id. 
The Newsome plaintiffs argue that the awards entered under the
ALAA must be reversed because, they say, the trial court erred by giving
effect to the expungement-reversal order and because, they say, their
arguments that the release was invalid were made in good faith.  We have
already explained above that the trial court did not err by relying upon
the expungement-reversal order.  Indeed, both the Court of Criminal
Appeals and this Court denied the petitions that Newsome brought
litigating this same point in September 2017 and April 2018, respectively,
and the orders denying those petitions should have put the Newsome
47
1180252, 1180302
plaintiffs on notice that their position lacked merit.  Nevertheless, the
Newsome plaintiffs continue to ignore those orders and maintain that the
expungement-reversal order was "counterfeit."  It was not.
The Newsome plaintiffs also state that their arguments that the
release clause in the D&R order was invalid were made in good faith and
that the trial court's judgments should be reversed to the extent that court
held otherwise.  We disagree.  Newsome is an attorney, and he executed
the one-page D&R order containing the release clause after consulting
with counsel.  That release clause is unambiguous.  Yet, instead of abiding
by the clear terms of the release clause, Newsome sought to suppress the
D&R order using the expungement statutes.  As the trial court explained:
"Newsome exhibited bad faith in attempting to have his
Shelby County arrest (the very arrest that resulted in his mug
shot being taken and began the debacle of this lawsuit)
expunged with the stated intent of using that expungement as
an offensive weapon against [the] defendants in this lawsuit. 
The court takes judicial notice of Newsome's misrepresentation
to the Circuit Court of Shelby County, whereby he claimed to
be in compliance with all terms of his deferred prosecution
agreement, including the release of all related civil claims. 
The court takes further judicial notice of the Shelby County
court's finding that Newsome made a 'false representation'
regarding his claims in this lawsuit constituting 'false
pretenses' under Alabama law.  This finding was affirmed by
48
1180252, 1180302
the Alabama Court of [Criminal] Appeals, and the Alabama
Supreme Court denied Newsome's petition for certiorari
review. [The Newsome] plaintiffs' attempt to unlawfully use
Alabama's expungement statute for the stated purposes of
attacking [the] defendants in this lawsuit is further evidence
of [the Newsome] plaintiffs' bad faith."
The Newsome plaintiffs cannot maintain that their arguments regarding
the release clause were made in good faith.
Moreover, although the Newsome plaintiffs focus their arguments
challenging the awards made under the ALAA on the expungement-
reversal order and the release clause, the trial court explained that it was
making those awards not just because of the Newsome plaintiffs'
questionable actions attempting to suppress the D&R order, but because
their entire lawsuit was groundless in fact:
"Although the court first granted [the] defendants
summary judgment early on in this case, [the Newsome]
plaintiffs asked for further opportunity to prove their claims. 
The court granted them that opportunity[;] however, [the
Newsome] plaintiffs have provided no further credible evidence
after conducting extensive discovery than they had in 2015
when they filed this action.  Defendants continuously
contended [the Newsome] plaintiffs' claims were fabricated,
outrageous, and entirely unsupported.
"....
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1180252, 1180302
"Despite [the] defendants' repeated assertions, including
sworn testimony, that they never knew each other before the
filing of this lawsuit, [the Newsome] plaintiffs refused to
voluntarily dismiss their conspiracy-related claims.  Further,
during the course of additional discovery, [the Newsome]
plaintiffs produced no admissible evidence of any kind
supporting their claims that these defendants knew each other
and conspired to commit any underlying act. [The Newsome]
plaintiffs could have dismissed the amended conspiracy claims
alleged against Cooper, Balch, and Gottier once it learned from
Verizon that the telephone number that [the Newsome]
plaintiffs thought was their lynchpin was only a routing
number.  However, they did not.
"...  Instead of reducing or dismissing invalid claims and
dismissing some or all of [the] defendants, [the Newsome]
plaintiffs ignored contrary evidence and made no effort at
dismissal or reduction.  Rather, [the Newsome] plaintiffs
continued to add invalid claims and a new party, Gottier, in
the face of clear evidence that their claims were frivolous."
Considering the facts of the case, we agree with the trial court that the
ALAA awards are supported by the evidence and appropriate under the
circumstances.  Those awards are therefore affirmed.
Conclusion
The Newsome plaintiffs sued the defendants asserting various
claims based on their allegation that the defendants combined together to
have Newsome arrested on a false menacing charge to damage his
50
1180252, 1180302
reputation and law practice.  But the Newsome plaintiffs failed to produce
substantial evidence supporting their claims even after conducting
extensive discovery;  the trial court therefore entered summary judgments
in favor of the defendants.  The trial court further awarded attorney fees
and costs because the Newsome plaintiffs had subjected the defendants to
almost three and a half years of litigation even though the asserted claims
were without substantial justification.  For the reasons explained herein,
the summary judgments entered by the trial court and its awards of
attorney fees are affirmed.
1180252 -- AFFIRMED.
1180302 -- AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Bryan, Mendheim, Stewart, and
Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Sellers, J., recuses himself.
51