Title: State v. Leardee D.Jenkins

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEARDEE D. JENKINS, Defendant-Respondent. Argued September 28, 2004 Decided December 16, 2004 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 365 N.J. Super. 18 (2003). Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Linda Mehling, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, a distraught juror advised the trial court during a break in deliberations that she could not follow the court s instructions on the law and render a verdict based on the evidence free of passion, prejudice, bias, or sympathy. The juror explained that she was a black woman, that defendant reminded her of her own children, and that she could not see another young black man going to jail for something really stupid. For those reasons, she stated that she could not convict defendant under any circumstances. After a lengthy colloquy with the juror, the court declared that she was unable to continue pursuant to R. 1:8-2(d)(1), and replaced her with an alternate juror. Twenty-three minutes later, the reconstituted jury found defendant guilty of the crimes charged. The Appellate Division reversed defendant s convictions on the ground that, absent physical illness, the juror s emotional inability to follow the court s instructions did not constitute a valid basis for discharge. We disagree. The juror s admission that her emotional state rendered her unable to abide by her oath and to follow the law was a sufficient basis for her removal from the jury under R. 1:8-2(d)(1). We hold, however, that replacing the discharged juror with an alternate was not a permissible option because the jury s deliberations had proceeded so far towards completion that a reconstituted jury would not have been capable of considering defendant s guilt or innocence anew, as required by our case law. We, therefore, affirm the reversal of defendant s convictions and order a new trial. [R. 1:8-2(d)(1) (emphasis added).] The Rule delicately balances two important goals: judicial economy and the right to a fair jury trial. See State v. Phillips, 322 N.J. Super. 429, 436 (App. Div. 1999). Declaring a mistrial imposes enormous costs on our judicial system, from the expenditure of precious resources in a retrial to the continued disruption in the lives of witnesses and parties seeking closure. Any court that has presided over days or weeks of testimony must experience a sense of futility at the prospect of aborting a trial in the jury deliberation stage. R. 1:8-2(d)(1) and our case law delineate the circumstances in which juror substitution will not undermine the sanctity of the jury s deliberative process. Death and illness are distinct conditions personal to a juror. R. 1:8-2(d)(1). Having an alternate substitute for a juror who has died or is ill does not pose a threat to the integrity or independence of the deliberative process. On the other hand, the inability to continue standard is necessarily vague because it is impossible to catalogue the myriad circumstances personal to a deliberating juror that may warrant her removal and substitution. We have restrictively interpreted the phrase inability to continue in R. 1:8-2(d)(1) to protect a defendant s right to a fair jury trial, forbidding juror substitution when a deliberating juror s removal is in any way related to the deliberative process. See State v. Williams, 171 N.J. 151, 163 (2002). A deliberating juror may not be discharged and replaced with an alternate unless the record adequately establish[es] that the juror suffers from an inability to function that is personal and unrelated to the juror s interaction with the other jury members. State v. Hightower, 146 N.J. 239, 254 (1996) (quoting State v. Valenzuela, 136 N.J. 458, 472-73 (1994)). A juror cannot be removed merely because she is taking a position at odds with other jurors views. State v. Paige, 256 N.J. Super. 362, 380-81 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 17 (1992). A juror has the unassailable right to see the evidence in her own way and to reach her own conclusions, regardless of how overwhelming the evidence or how illogical her view may appear to other jurors. If a court suspects that the problems with the juror are due to interactions with other jurors, the court should instruct the jury to resume deliberations. Hightower, supra, 164 N.J. at 254 (quoting Valenzuela, supra, 136 N.J. at 472-73). Courts have sanctioned the removal and replacement of deliberating jurors under the inability to continue standard in a variety of different circumstances. See, e.g., Williams, supra, 171 N.J. at 167, 171 (permitting removal and replacement of deliberating juror who complained of financial hardship); State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 401, 406-07 (1978) (upholding removal of deliberating juror who asked to be dismissed because his nervous and emotional condition was affecting his judgment and he did not think he could render a fair verdict ); State v. Holloway, 288 N.J. Super. 390, 404 (App. Div. 1996) (affirming removal of deliberating juror whose conversation with a relative patently influenced [her] and who, as such, disregarded the court s unambiguous admonitions ); State v. Trent, 157 N.J. Super. 231, 235, 240 (App. Div. 1978) (allowing removal of deliberating juror who was nervous, too emotional, and suffering from headache and nausea because defendant reminded her of her son), rev d on other grounds, 79 N.J. 251 (1979). Nevertheless, we have cautioned judges that after deliberations have begun, juror substitution should be invoked only as a last resort. Hightower, supra, 146 N.J. at 254; see also Valenzuela, supra, 136 N.J. at 468. We offered that admonition because juror substitution poses a clear potential for prejudicing the integrity of the jury s deliberative process . . . . Hightower, supra, 146 N.J. at 254. Inasmuch as the essence of jury deliberations is a collective sharing of views, reconstituting a jury in the midst of deliberations can destroy the mutuality of those deliberations. Williams, supra, 171 N.J. at 163 (citing State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 349 (1987)). To illustrate the difference between proper and improper juror discharge, we compare two cases. In a factual scenario remarkably similar to the present one, the Appellate Division in Trent, supra, affirmed the substitution of a juror with an exclusively personal condition that impeded her ability to continue as a deliberating juror. 157 N.J. Super. at 240. In Trent, supra, after six hours of deliberations, a juror sent out a note that she was getting sick. Id. at 235. In an exchange with the court, the juror stated, every time I see [the defendant] sitting there I can picture my son sitting there. Id. at 236. The juror explained that she had a headache, want[ed] to spit up, and just [felt] too emotional. Id. at 235. The Appellate Division upheld the trial court s removal and substitution of the troubled juror on the ground that the juror was unable to continue under R. 1:8-2(d)(1). Id. at 240. The appellate panel found that the juror s disabling distress . . . engendered by her identification of defendant with her own son incapacitated her just as if she had been incapacitated by an illness totally unrelated to the trial. Ibid. The panel did not perceive that the juror bias in Trent, supra, was of a type that had the capacity to taint or infect the jury. Ibid. On the other hand, Valenzuela, supra, presents a case in which juror substitution was inappropriate. 136 N.J. at 472. In Valenzuela, supra, we concluded that the trial court committed reversible error by discharging a deliberating juror for reasons related to her interaction with other jurors. Id. at 472-73. In that case, the trial court received a note from the jury that one of its members did not want to continue as a juror. Id. at 462. The court then engaged in a colloquy with the reluctant juror. Id. at 462-65. The juror stated that the other jurors were ganging up on her and discounting her opinion. Id. at 462, 464. The juror explained that although her colleagues considered her a hindrance to reaching a final verdict, she could follow the court s instructions and apply the evidence to the law. Id. at 464. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the juror was unable to function in the jury room. Id. at 470. In rendering its decision, the court referred to one jury note stating that the juror did not understand the process, changed her vote every 10 seconds, and was very confused and not capable of expressing herself. Id. at 464, 466. The court also found that based on its observations the juror was somewhat, bizarre and not of overly acute intelligence. Id. at 466. We held that the court abused its discretion in discharging the juror because the record strongly suggested that the juror s problems related not only to personal circumstances but also to factors arising from the juror s interaction with the other jurors . . . . Id. at 473. In this case, defendant does not claim, and nothing in the record suggests, that juror number nine was discharged because of her interaction with other jurors. The lengthy colloquy makes it abundantly clear that juror number nine decided that she was unable to follow the law. Juror number nine, in a highly emotional state, told the court and counsel that as a black woman with children defendant s age she could not make a decision to put [defendant] in jail. She explained that she could not see another young black man going to jail for something really stupid. The juror expressed embarrassment over her unexpected emotional response to defendant s plight, stating that she was so captive to her feelings that she could not obey her sworn oath and follow the court s instructions on the law. Unlike the juror in Valenzuela, supra, the juror in this case did not feel pressured by the other members of the jury. To the contrary, she suggested that her view of the evidence was no different from the other jurors . She admitted, however, that she could not decide the case based on the evidence fairly, impartially, and without sympathy, and that she was prepared to disregard her own findings of fact based on an overpowering bias toward defendant. A juror who would decide a case based solely on a defendant s race violates her oath. A juror who would decide a case based solely on a personal identification or revulsion with a defendant, without regard to the evidence, also violates her oath. A juror, as in this case, who announces that she cannot obey her oath, follow the law, and render fair and impartial justice cannot remain on the jury. To rule otherwise would be to yield to a notion that is anathema to our scheme of justice that a juror, judging the fate of a defendant, can be a law unto herself. We hold that a juror who expressly states that she cannot be impartial or that she is controlled by an irrepressible bias, and therefore will not be controlled by the law, is unable to continue as a juror for purposes of R. 1:8-2(d)(1), and must be removed from a jury. No juror has the right to disregard a court s instructions, that is, to engage in nullification. We know that in the secrecy of the jury room, jurors have the power to nullify the law by acquitting a defendant despite overwhelming evidence of guilt. We acknowledge that reality, not because we approve of such a practice, but because it is beyond our control. As Chief Justice Wilentz stated in State v. Ragland, [t]he power of the jury to acquit despite not only overwhelming proof of guilt but despite the jury s belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, in guilt, is not one of the precious attributes of the right to trial by jury. It is nothing more than a power. By virtue of the finality of a verdict of acquittal, the jury simply has the power to nullify the law by acquitting those believed by the jury to be guilty. We believe that the exercise of that power, while unavoidable, is undesirable and that judicial attempts to strengthen the power of nullification are not only contrary to settled practice in this state, but unwise both as a matter of governmental policy and as a matter of sound administration of criminal justice. [ 105 N.J. 189, 204-05 (1986).] See also State v. Banko, N.J. , (2004) (slip op. at 16). Public confidence in our jury trial system requires that verdicts be based upon an honest consideration of the evidence and not upon prejudice or sympathy. Panko v. Flintkote Co., 7 N.J. 55, 62 (1951); see also State v. Levitt, 36 N.J. 266, 270 (1961) ( The parties to the action are entitled to have each of the jurors who hears the case impartial, unprejudiced and free from improper influences. (quoting Wright v. Bernstein, 23 N.J. 284, 294-295 (1957))). When a juror, either before or after the commencement of deliberations, comes before a court and states that she will not abide by her oath and the law, that court is not powerless to act. In such a case, the court must remove the juror and determine whether the circumstances permit substitution with an alternate. In support of our conclusion, we note that other jurisdictions have recognized the inappropriateness of allowing a juror to deliberate when she has announced her unwillingness to follow the law. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 21 P.3d 1209, 1213 (Ca. 2001) (holding that trial court did not abuse discretion by removing juror from deliberations who felt duty-bound to object to charge of statutory rape and who stated that he would not follow his oath); McKenna v. State, 618 P.2d 348, 349 (Nev. 1980) (holding that juror who will not weigh and consider all the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence for the purpose of doing equal and exact justice . . . should not be allowed to decide the case ). In addition, the United States Supreme Court has long held that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102, 15 S. Ct. 273, 293, 39 L. Ed. 343, 361 (1895). The Sparf Court concluded that, [u]nder any other system, the courts, although established in order to declare the law, would for every practical purpose be eliminated from our system of government as instrumentalities devised for the protection equally of society and of individuals in their essential rights. Sparf, supra, 156 U.S. at 102-03, 15 S. Ct. at 293, 39 L. Ed. at 361. We reject the Appellate Division s view in this case that, absent a physical illness, juror number nine should not have been dismissed under the inability to continue standard. Illness is but one reason for removal and substitution of a juror under R. 1:8-2(d)(1). To construe the words other inability to continue to require a physical ailment or disability would render those words superfluous to the Rule. We adopt a broader interpretation with sensible limits. We conclude that juror number nine s expressed refusal to abide by her sworn oath to follow the law due to her emotional identification with defendant rendered her unable to continue serving as a juror. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEARDEE D. JENKINS, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED December 16, 2004 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Albin CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY As you know, Juror # _____ has been excused from the jury. An alternate juror has been selected to take (his/her) place. Because of this change in your jury, you must set aside and disregard all of your past deliberations and begin your deliberations again, just as if you were now entering the jury room for the first time directly after listening to my charge. In beginning your deliberations again, you must eliminate any impact that Juror # _____ may have had on your deliberations, and consider the evidence in the context of full and complete deliberations with the new member of your jury. [ Model Jury Charges (Criminal), Alternate Juror Empaneled After Deliberations Have Begun (1979).] [Model Jury Charges (Civil), Alternate Juror Empaneled After Deliberations Have Begun (1993).]