Title: Roberts v. Bruns

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

387 N.W.2d 140 (1986) Kristine D. ROBERTS, Plaintiff, Nancy A. Roberts, Appellant, v. Dale BRUNS, Beverly Bruns and Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., Appellees, Willow Run Country Club, Inc., Defendant. No. 84-1993. Supreme Court of Iowa. May 21, 1986. Rehearing Denied June 13, 1986. *141 Timothy M. Sweet, Reinbeck, for appellant. C.A. Frerichs, Waterloo, for appellees Dale Bruns and Beverly Bruns. Frank A. Comito and George S. Eichhorn, Des Moines, for appellee Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc. Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and UHLENHOPP, McGIVERIN, CARTER, and LAVORATO, JJ. CARTER, Justice. The appellant in this proceeding is Nancy A. Roberts, one of the plaintiffs in the district court. Nancy A. Roberts is the mother of Kristine D. Roberts, the other plaintiff in the action. Kristine was the victim of a hit-and-run accident on June 19, 1981, in which a motorcycle she was operating was allegedly struck by an automobile driven by appellee, Dale Bruns, one of the defendants in the action. The petition of Kristine and Nancy alleges that Bruns and the other defendants participated in a scheme whereby the identity of Bruns as the person causing injury and disability to Kristine was concealed from the plaintiffs and from law enforcement officials for more than two years. Kristine seeks to recover actual and punitive damages from defendants for injuries sustained in the June 19, 1981 accident and from the conspiracy to cover up Bruns involvement therein. Nancy seeks recovery for the infliction of severe emotional distress which she claims was visited upon her from the conspiracy to cover up the incident.[1] In addition to her claims against Bruns and those persons and entities allegedly conspiring with him in concealing his involvement in the accident, Nancy sought to recover for emotional distress against defendant, Willow Run Country Club, Inc. (Willow Run), on the ground that it had served Bruns alcoholic beverages to the point where he became intoxicated immediately prior to the collision in which Kristine was injured. She claims this act by Willow Run caused her severe emotional distress. Willow Run filed a motion to dismiss Nancy's emotional distress claims on the ground that she was not present at the time and place of the injuries sustained by Kristine and was therefore not entitled to recover for emotional distress as a "bystander" under our holding in Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981). This motion to dismiss was granted by the district court. Following the court's ruling, the other defendants filed motions for summary judgment with respect to Nancy's emotional distress claims against them incorporating by reference the grounds of Willow Run's motion to dismiss. In resistance to the motions for summary judgment, Nancy A. Roberts filed the affidavits of herself and her daughter, Kristine. Nancy's affidavit recites the following facts: Kristine's affidavit sets forth the following facts: During late August and in September, 1983, our attorney investigated Mr. Bruns' involvement in the accident and the coverup of his involvement by others employed at the Petersen Seed Division of Pioneer. We learned that criminal *143 charges were being filed against Mr. Bruns for leaving the scene of the accident and failing to report the accident, and that the County Attorney's office would attempt to extradite Mr. Bruns for trial on those criminal charges. We then discussed with our attorney where suit should be brought, and we decided that we should bring the lawsuit in Iowa. The district court granted the motions for summary judgment, and, in so doing, recited the following reasons: Nancy has appealed from this order of the district court granting defendants' summary judgment motions. Nancy urges on appeal that the allegations of her petition state a claim for infliction of emotional distress caused by actionable omissions of the defendants occurring subsequent to the June 19, 1981 accident. She contends that the district court therefore erred in only considering Bruns' conduct on that date for purposes of determining the applicability of the "bystander" requirement of Barnhill. In response to this argument, the defendants urge that, in our recent decision in H.L.O. v. Hossle, 381 N.W.2d 641, 644-45 (Iowa 1986), we determined that policies derived in negligence cases such as Barnhill and Oberreuter v. Orion Industries, 342 N.W.2d 492, 494 (Iowa 1984) have application in cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the latter case, we applied section 46(2)(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) which states that, "[w]here such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress ... to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time." Nancy contends that she satisfies the requirement of being "present at the time," in the present case because defendants' torts (failure to report a personal injury accident and conspiracy to obstruct justice) were continuing in nature, had a continuing impact on Kristine, and Nancy maintained a "percipient presence" during much of her daughter's ordeal. In support of her contentions, she cites Ochoa v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985) where recovery was permitted to a mother who witnessed the effect of the ongoing failure of juvenile detention authorities to give her son adequate medical treatment. Although Nancy's claims are appealing, we believe that the district court was correct in concluding her petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for mental suffering or emotional distress caused by defendants' conduct. The issue presented is one of legal causation, i.e., whether the policy of the law will extend responsibility to those consequences which have in fact been produced by a particular event. Schreckengast v. Hammermills, Inc., 369 N.W.2d 809, 810 n. 2 (Iowa 1985). It is simply too difficult to separate the continuing consequences of defendants' tort from the continuing effects of Kristine's lingering injuries in order to predicate a claim on the former which is clearly not allowable by reason of the latter. The Ochoa decision is distinguishable. The parent of the juvenile in that case was *144 present with and had access to her son within the correctional institution which was denying him adequate medical care during a material portion of the time involved. Officials of the correctional facility were cognizant of her presence and concern. In the present case, there is no indication that the defendants were cognizant of either Nancy's presence or concern, circumstances which have traditionally been considered to be essential elements of third-party claims for emotional distress. See W. Prosser & W.P. Keeton, Law of Torts § 12, at 65-66 (5th ed. 1984). We have considered all claims and arguments presented and conclude that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed. AFFIRMED. [1] Nancy also sought recovery for loss of services and companionship of her daughter. These claims were dismissed by the district court on the ground that recovery for such items is limited by Iowa R.Civ.P. 8 which does not permit such recovery in regard to an adult child. No appeal was taken from that determination, and we therefore give the issue no consideration in this opinion.