Title: WILLIAM C. MOTLEY v. PLATTE COUNTY WYOMING; PLATTE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; and STEVE KEIGLEY, SHERIFF OF PLATTE COUNTY, in his official capacity

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WILLIAM C. MOTLEY v. PLATTE COUNTY WYOMING; PLATTE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; and STEVE KEIGLEY, SHERIFF OF PLATTE COUNTY,in his official capacity2009 WY 147220 P.3d 518Case Number: No. S-08-0171Decided: 12/03/2009
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
WILLIAM 
C. MOTLEY,

Appellant(Plaintiff),v.PLATTE 
COUNTY, WYOMING; PLATTE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; and STEVE KEIGLEY, SHERIFF 
OF PLATTE COUNTY, WYOMING, in his official capacity, 1

Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Platte County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

H. 
Michael Bennett of H. Michael Bennett, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming 

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Thomas W. Rumpke, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; Richard Rideout, Law Offices of Richard Rideout, P.C., 
Cheyenne, Wyoming 

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 
GOLDEN, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, C.J., files a specially concurring 
opinion; BURKE, J., files a dissenting opinion in which KITE, J., 
joins.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]    William C. Motley worked for 
the Platte County Sheriff's Department as a deputy sheriff.  In November 2006, Motley filed a 
complaint against Platte County, Wyoming, the Platte County Sheriff's 
Department, and Sheriff Steve Keigley "in his official capacity" (hereinafter 
"the County") alleging he was suspended and later terminated from his job 
without cause and without notice and opportunity for a hearing in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-611 (LexisNexis 2009).2  The district court determined that the 
provisions of § 18-3-611 did not apply to Motley and granted summary judgment in 
favor of the County.  Motley seeks 
review of the district court's decision.

 

[¶2]    Our resolution of this appeal 
is controlled by our decision in Beaulieu 
v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, 86 P.3d 863 (Wyo. 2004) (Beaulieu II).  In Beaulieu II, we held that the failure of 
the complaint in a governmental claim's action to allege compliance with both 
the statutory filing requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 and the 
constitutional signature and certification requirements of Wyo. Const. Art. 16, 
§ 7 precludes the district court from acquiring subject matter jurisdiction over 
the claim.  Id., ¶¶ 10-15, 86 P.3d  at 866-69.  We have regularly upheld the strictness 
of that rule over the intervening years.  
See McCann v. City of Cody, 2009 WY 86, ¶¶ 
7-8, 210 P.3d 1078, 1081-82 (Wyo. 2009) (and cases cited therein).  Stare decisis dictates adherence to the 
Beaulieu II rule in this 
case.

 
 
[¶3]    In his complaint, Motley 
asserts only that:

 
 
Plaintiff 
has filed a claim with Platte County, Wyoming, pursuant to W.S. § 1-39-113(b) on 
13 November 2006.  No action has 
been taken as of the date of filing this action.  

Although 
this provision indicates compliance with statutory requirements, the complaint 
does not mention the state constitution, let alone contain an averment that 
Motley complied with the signature and certification requirements of Art. 16, § 
7.  Because Motley's complaint fails 
to allege the requisite constitutional compliance, under Beaulieu II the district court never 
acquired subject matter jurisdiction over the action.  McCann, ¶ 8, 210 P.3d  at 1082; Gose v. City of Douglas, 2008 WY 126, ¶¶ 
17-18, 193 P.3d 1159, 1163-64 (Wyo. 2008).  
It follows that this Court, having no better jurisdiction than the 
district court, is without jurisdiction to consider Motley's appeal.3  McCann, ¶ 8, 210 P.3d  at 1082; Wooster v. Carbon County School Dist. No. 
1, 2005 WY 47, ¶ 22, 109 P.3d 893, 900 (Wyo. 2005).  We therefore dismiss the 
appeal.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 
[¶4]    I concur in the majority 
opinion, writing separately in response to the dissenting opinion, only to say 
that W.R.C.P. 8(a)(1) requires a civil complaint to contain "a short and plain 
statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends."  A Wyoming district court's jurisdiction 
over a governmental claim depends upon the plaintiff's compliance with Art. 16, 
§ 7 of the Wyoming Constitution, and the plaintiff's compliance with the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-101 et seq. (LexisNexis 2009).  McCann v. City of Cody, 2009 WY 86, 210 P.3d 1078 (Wyo. 2009), the cases cited therein, and the majority opinion in the 
instant case, merely require the pleader to state the few facts that reveal 
compliance with the constitutional provision and the 
statute.

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice, dissenting, with whom KITE, Justice, 
joins.

[¶5]    I respectfully dissent for 
the same three reasons identified in the dissent in McCann, ¶ 9, 210 P.3d  at 1082.  First, the allegations of the complaint, 
when reviewed as required by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, and our 
jurisprudence interpreting those rules, sufficiently allege the jurisdictional 
prerequisites.  Second, if the 
complaint is inadequate, Mr. Motley should be provided the opportunity to amend 
the complaint.  Third, if the 
judicially created pleading requirements lead to the conclusion that this 
complaint is legally insufficient and plaintiff is not permitted to amend it, 
those requirements should be eliminated.  
Because the majority's decision in this case rests upon the doctrine of 
stare decisis, I also dissent because 
that doctrine, properly applied, does not support the result reached in this 
case.  

 
 
[¶6]    This Court has always shown 
due deference to the doctrine of stare 
decisis, but, it has also always recognized that stare decisis should not be applied 
blindly and rigidly.  "[W]hen 
governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, this Court has never 
felt constrained to follow precedent.  
Stare decisis is not an 
inexorable command; rather, it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical 
formula of adherence to the latest decision."  Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1354 (Wyo. 
1992) (Golden, J., concurring) (internal citations and some punctuation 
omitted).

 
 
[¶7]    It is perhaps ironic that stare decisis, a doctrine intended to 
promote "the orderly development of the law," provides the legal foundation for 
the majority's decision.  Our 
precedent relating to pleading requirements in the governmental claims context 
was once described as a legal "mine field."  Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 773 (Wyo. 1993) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).  The description is apt.  

 
 
[¶8]    Stare decisis is intended to promote the 
"evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles."  Cook, 841 P.2d  at 1354.  Instead of consistency and 
predictability, this Court has presented governmental claimants with a moving 
target of pleading requirements that must be satisfied to avoid dismissal on 
jurisdictional grounds.  We have 
properly recognized that "subject matter jurisdiction can be neither created nor 
destroyed by judicial fiat" and that "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is 
determined in constitutional conventions and in legislative halls, not in 
courtrooms."  Wooster v. Carbon County School Dist. No. 
1, 2005 WY 47, ¶¶ 20, 21, 109 P.3d 893, 899, 900 (Wyo. 2005).  In the governmental claims pleading 
context, however, we have ignored those precepts and judicially created rules 
restricting subject matter jurisdiction.  

 
 
[¶9]    The Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act was enacted in 1979.  It 
does not contain any jurisdictional pleading requirements.  As it relates to subject matter 
jurisdiction, the act merely states:  "Original and exclusive jurisdiction for 
any claim under this act shall be in the district courts of Wyoming."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-117(a) 
(LexisNexis 2009).  In 1983, this 
Court imposed its first subject matter jurisdiction pleading requirement.  Board of Trustees v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410 
(Wyo. 1983).  In that case, 
Rosemarie Bell obtained a default judgment against the University of Wyoming 
Board of Trustees in the amount of $1,886.30 based upon a claim of wrongful 
discharge from her employment with the board.  This Court overturned the judgment 
holding that the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction because 
the complaint did not contain an allegation that Ms. Bell had filed the 
necessary governmental claim.  Id. at 415. The Court provided no 
authority for the proposition that a judicially created pleading rule could 
deprive the district court of jurisdiction granted by 
statute.

 
 
[¶10]  Ten years later, in Amrein, this Court tacked on a new 
"jurisdictional" pleading requirement.  
In Amrein, the plaintiff's 
complaint alleged the filing of the requisite governmental claim.  This Court, however, found the complaint 
"jurisdictionally" deficient because it failed to allege the date of the filing of the requisite 
claim:  

 
 
In 
this instance, Amrein alleged the filing of the claim, but we expand upon the 
rule articulated in Bell and now hold that, in order to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the district court, such an allegation must encompass a 
statement of the date the claim was filed to demonstrate the filing of the claim 
within two years of the date of the "alleged act, error or omission" or, 
alternatively, the statutory ground for the late discovery of the "alleged act, 
error or omission."  Since Amrein 
failed to make this allegation, the complaint was subject to dismissal for 
failure to allege the jurisdiction of the court with 
specificity.

 
 

Id., 
851 P.2d  at 771.

 
 
[¶11]  In 2004, in Beaulieu II, this Court added two more 
"jurisdictional" pleading hurdles:  

 
 
Heretofore, 
we have limited the application of that rule, when determining the presence or 
absence of subject matter jurisdiction, to the statutory requirements; that is, 
we have required only that the complaint allege the filing of the claim and the 
date of such filing. We now hold, however, that the complaint must also allege 
compliance with the signature and certification requirements of the state 
constitution. 

 
 

Id., 
¶ 14, 86 P.3d  at 868.

 
 
The 
addition of the jurisdictional pleading requirements relating to compliance with 
the state constitution was directly at odds with our prior precedent.  In 1990, in Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 958 (Wyo. 1990), this Court specifically held that the constitutional 
signature and certification requirements are not 
jurisdictional:

 
 
The 
State . . . contends that an omission of the correct certification results in a 
failure of subject matter jurisdiction, and the issue can be raised at any 
time in the proceeding. We do not agree with this contention. The failure 
to verify or certify as the constitution now reads is nothing more than a defect 
or an irregularity that is not jurisdictional.

 
 
In 
Beaulieu II, the Court cleared that 
precedential barrier by overturning Martinez.  "We now believe that Martinez was wrongly decided and that it 
must be overruled."  Beaulieu, ¶ 13, 86 P.3d  at 868.  

 
 
[¶12]  The Beaulieu II decision had immediate and 
dire consequences for a claimant in at least one lawsuit that was pending at the 
time that Beaulieu II was 
decided.  See Wooster, 109 P.3d 893.  In Wooster, litigation had been commenced 
in 2002.  The State did not 
initially assert any defense to the validity of the governmental claim filed by 
Mr. Wooster.  One day after 
Beaulieu II was decided, and only 45 days before trial, the defendant 
governmental entity filed a motion seeking dismissal on jurisdictional grounds 
because the claim had not complied with the constitutional signature and 
certification requirements.  When 
the Wooster litigation was initiated, 
our precedent as set forth in Martinez, clearly and unequivocally held 
that failure to raise such a defense resulted in waiver of that defense.  Had the defense been timely asserted, 
Mr. Wooster would have had ample time to file a compliant claim.  Because the defense was raised so late, 
the two-year time period for filing the claim had expired.  The district court reluctantly granted 
the motion.  This Court, in a 3-2 
decision, affirmed the dismissal.  
See Wooster, 109 P.3d 893.

 
 
[¶13]  Two additional observations regarding Beaulieu II are warranted.  First, Beaulieu II was a "claims" case, not a 
"pleading" case.  Mr. Beaulieu's 
complaint was dismissed because his "claim" was deficient.  Second, in announcing the new pleading 
requirements, this Court gave no indication that the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not apply in determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied those 
requirements.  It wasn't until 2008 
in Gose that this Court first applied 
those pleading requirements in a manner that conflicted with the Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure.

 
 
[¶14]  In Gose, the specific question presented 
was "whether the Goses' complaint adequately alleged compliance with 
requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7."  
Id., ¶ 17, 193 P.3d  at 
1163.  In their complaint, the Goses 
alleged: 

 
 
[d]emand 
pursuant to Wyoming Statute Section 1-39-113 was delivered lawfully to the City 
of Douglas, Wyoming by the original letter attached as Exhibit "4" which is 
dated March 8, 2007, it having been delivered to the City of Douglas, Wyoming. 

 
 

Id., 
¶ 18, 193 P.3d  at 1164.  

 
 
[¶15]  This Court found that notice of claim met 
the constitutional requirements:  
"[T]here is little question that the Goses' notice of claim met the 
constitutional signature requirements.  
The claim was signed and witnessed before a notary public, under penalty 
of perjury."  Id., ¶ 16, 193 P.3d  at 1163.  We determined, however, that the 
complaint failed to satisfy the Beaulieu 
II pleading requirements.  It is 
at this point in our jurisprudence, that the conflict between the Beaulieu II pleading requirements and 
the requirements of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure should have 
surfaced.  It did not.  Application of those rules to Beaulieu II was never discussed.  The lack of discussion is perhaps best 
explained by the result reached in that case.  The Goses were not deprived of their day 
in court.  Instead, we remanded to 
the district court with instructions that the district court enter an order of 
dismissal without prejudice and that the "dismissal order should establish for 
the Goses a reasonable time within which to file a new complaint."  Gose, ¶ 21, 193 P.3d  at 1165.4

 
 
[¶16]  Earlier this year, this Court entered its 
decision in McCann.  It was undisputed that Ms. McCann had 
filed a claim that satisfied the statutory and constitutional requirements.  In her complaint, Ms. McCann 
alleged:

That 
the administrative prerequisites for the filing of this claim have been met 
inasmuch as the plaintiff's Verified Notice of Claim was served upon the City of 
Cody, Wyoming at the office of it's [sic] business manager on December 26, 2006 
to which there has been no response.

In 
a 3-2 decision, this Court affirmed the dismissal of Ms. McCann's governmental 
claim litigation solely on the basis that Ms. McCann had failed to satisfy the 
Beaulieu II pleading 
requirements.  Unlike the Goses, 
however, Ms. McCann was not provided "a reasonable time within which to file a 
new complaint."  The dissent noted 
the conflict between strict application of the Beaulieu II pleading requirements and 
the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.  
The majority opinion did not address or resolve that 
conflict.

 
 
[¶17]  McCann is the first case in which a 
litigant lost the right to have a case determined on the merits solely on the 
basis that the complaint failed to meet the judicially created pleading 
requirements announced in Beaulieu 
II.  Left unanswered in McCann and Beaulieu II are questions relating to 
the applicability of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure to governmental claims 
litigation.  There is no reason why 
the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure should not apply to governmental claims 
litigation.5

 
 
[¶18]  This is a civil action.  The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 
"govern procedure in all courts of record in the State of Wyoming, in all 
actions, suits or proceedings of a civil nature."  W.R.C.P. 1.  The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 
specifically state that "No technical forms of pleading . . . are 
required."  W.R.C.P. 8(e)(1).  We have previously elaborated on that 
rule: "Rule 8(e)(1) makes it clear that technical forms of pleading no longer 
have a place in our practice."  Guggenmos v. Tom Searl-Frank McCue, 
Inc., 481 P.2d 48, 51 (Wyo. 1971).  
It is impossible to view the pleading requirements announced in Beaulieu II, and enforced in McCann, as anything other than 
"technical pleading requirements."  
Our decisions in Gose and McCann directly conflict with the clear 
and unambiguous language of Rule 8(e)(1) and our precedent interpreting it.6  

 
 
[¶19]  In this case, the validity of Mr. 
Motley's governmental claim has never been at issue.  Initially, defendants challenged the 
district court's subject matter jurisdiction by asserting that the complaint 
failed to allege the date on which the claim had been filed.  Mr. Motley responded by seeking leave to 
file an amended complaint.  The 
district court granted the motion and an amended complaint was filed.  The defendants answered and discovery 
ensued.  Eventually, defendants 
sought summary judgment and the district court granted the motion.  This appeal followed.  The question of subject matter 
jurisdiction was not raised by appellees.  
Now, more than two years after the amended complaint was filed, this 
Court, sua sponte, finds the 
complaint fatally defective.  Our 
system of justice is simply not meant to work this way.

 
 
[¶20]  As we recognized more than a century 
ago:  

 
 
[I]f 
[a former decision of the court] appears to be radically unsound, and subserves 
no useful purpose, but on the contrary establishes a hardship which is not 
within the manifest contemplation of the law, and, moreover, if no injurious 
results will be likely to follow a reversal, no principle of stare decisis interferes with a 
reconsideration of the principle involved, and a reversal of the doctrine 
formerly announced.

 

Kelley 
v. Rhoads, 
7 Wyo. 237, 271, 51 P. 593, 602 (1898).  
If we utilize this approach in applying stare decisis, it is readily apparent 
that the judicially created pleading rules relating to governmental claims 
should either be eliminated or applied in accordance with the Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  As they are being 
applied, they conflict with the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, are at odds 
with the intended purpose of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, and constitute 
an over-reaching by the judicial branch.  
They do not have an "evenhanded" impact.  Application of the rules imposes a 
hardship that falls solely and very harshly on claimants.  Governmental defendants, on the other 
hand, receive a windfall and are able to avoid liability "on a 
technicality."  Abrogation of the 
judicially created pleading rules will cause no hardship to anyone.  This appeal should be determined on the 
merits.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1This appeal was received by this Court under an improper caption.  The caption on the notice of appeal, in 
conformance with the caption on the final order of the district court, was 
"William C. Motley, Plaintiff, vs. Platte County, Wyoming, et al., 
Defendants."  This Court ultimately 
amended the caption sua sponte to the caption above.  The captioning problems could easily 
have been avoided had the district court's final order, and later the notice of 
appeal, properly identified the parties to this action.  We remind judges and counsel that usage 
of "et al." in the caption of a final order, as done in this case, violates Rule 
58(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, which mandates that the "names of 
all parties . . . be set out in the caption of all final orders, judgments and 
decrees."

 
 

2§ 18-3-611 provides in pertinent part:

 
 
(a) This section applies to sworn nonprobationary, full-time deputies of 
a sheriff's department which employs at least twenty (20) sworn, full-time 
deputies. . . . 

(b)  A deputy sheriff shall 
not be discharged from employment, reduced in rank or suspended without pay 
except for cause and after notice and opportunity for a hearing.  The hearing and any appeal shall be 
conducted in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.  The 
hearing shall be closed unless both the sheriff and the deputy involved agree 
otherwise.

(c)  A deputy sheriff accused 
of a matter for which the sheriff may discharge him may be suspended with pay 
for a reasonable length of time necessary to investigate and take final action 
on the matter, provided the deputy shall not be discharged in any final action 
without the opportunity for a hearing. 

 
 

3We are mindful that the parties did not raise the issue of 
jurisdiction.  However, this Court 
has a duty to consider jurisdictional questions whether or not they are raised 
by the parties.  Plymale v. Donnelly, 2006 WY 3, ¶ 4, 125 P.3d 1022, 1023 (Wyo. 2006); Robbins v. 
South Cheyenne Water & Sewage Dist., 792 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Wyo. 
1990).

 
 

4At 
the time the Gose decision was 
entered, the time for the Goses to file a complaint that satisfied the Beaulieu II pleading mandates had 
expired.

 
 

5The 
language of the WGCA specifically mandates application of the Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure to governmental claims litigation.  The act provides that "[c]laims under 
this act which are not covered by insurance may be settled as provided by W.S. 
1-41-106 or 1-42-204."  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-39-115(d).  Those statutes 
relate to the State Self-Insurance Program (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-41-101  
1-41-111) and the Local Government Insurance Program (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
1-42-201  1-42-206).  Both provide 
that "Any person or party adversely affected in compromising or settling a claim 
shall pursue his remedy in district court pursuant to the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure."  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-41-106(c) and 
1-42-204(b). 

 
 

6See 
McCann 
for further discussion of the conflict between the judicially created pleading 
requirements and W.R.C.P. 9 and 15.  
McCann, ¶¶ 11-20, 210 P.3d  at 
1082-86 (Burke, J., dissenting).