Title: Vermont v. Tetrault

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Tetrault (2011-068)
 
2012 VT 51
 
Filed 05-Jul-2012
ENTRY ORDER
 
2012 VT 51
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2011-068
 
FEBRUARY TERM, 2012
 
State of Vermont
}
APPEALED FROM:
 
}
 
 
}
 
     v.
}
Superior Court, Orange Unit, 
 
}
Criminal Division
 
}
 
Chase A. Tetrault
}
DOCKET NO. 187-4-10
  Oecr
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge: Harold E. Eaton, Jr.
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
Defendant Chase A. Tetrault and friends broke into a remote camp owned
by A.C. ("camp owner"), damaging appliances and personal items.  Defendant
pled guilty to one count of unlawful trespass and the State requested
restitution.  At the restitution hearing, defendant argued that camp owner
should be able to recover only the actual value of the damaged items at the
time of the trespass, not their replacement cost.  He also argued
restitution could not be had for items that were not damaged, but merely
used.  The trial judge disagreed, and awarded camp owner the full amount
of claimed damages.  On appeal, defendant raises the same two arguments,
along with a new argument that restitution is not appropriate at all in this
case, because the crime of unlawful trespass does not include an element of
destruction of property.  We affirm.
¶ 2.            
State troopers responded to a report of a break-in and theft at a remote
camp in Newbury.  The property owner reported that four guns had been
stolen, and he suspected the thieves were squatting at camp owner's neighboring
property.  The troopers confirmed with camp owner that he had not given
anyone permission to be at his camp, and then confronted one of the squatters
and discovered the four stolen guns.  A number of charges were brought
against at least three individuals, including defendant, who was initially
charged with burglary, grand larceny, and unlawful
trespass. 
¶ 3.            
Defendant and the State reached a plea agreement in which defendant
would plead guilty to unlawful trespass, 13 V.S.A. § 3507(a), (c), and serve a
sentence of zero to forty-one days in jail, with credit for time served. 
The State dropped the two remaining charges.  The plea agreement included
a requested restitution hearing, and was undertaken with mutual expectation of
this restitution claim. 
¶ 4.            
At the hearing, the only testimony came from camp owner.  Camp
owner provided a list of items for which he sought restitution: mattresses,
sheets, and blankets; pots, pans, silverware, and dishes; microwave and
toaster; water pump; throw rugs; locks; propane; and two days of labor.
 The trial court found these items totaled $1198.11, and can be roughly
divided into two groups: items that were actually damaged or destroyed, and items
that were merely used or soiled.
¶ 5.            
As to the items that were actually damaged or destroyed, camp owner
testified that the microwave and toaster were both rendered inoperable. 
He replaced them with comparable models from Wal-Mart for $69.96 and $29.97,
respectively.  A lock had been pried off his shed and thrown away, so he
purchased a new lock for $20.  The trespassers brought dogs that soiled
the throw rugs at the camp, so camp owner replaced them for $38.91, also from Wal-Mart.
 The squatters used up the propane at a cost of $60.  Finally,
the squatters had burned out the water pump and that had to be replaced at a
cost of $149.  Defendant agreed that these items were, in fact,
damaged, destroyed, or consumed, and that camp owner should be compensated for
his losses.  However, he argued that the proper measure of restitution for
these items was their actual value at the time of the loss, not their
replacement value. The court rejected this argument, noting that camp owner
replaced the destroyed items with inexpensive goods and that he had not been
"extravagant." 
¶ 6.            
Camp owner also testified as to the items that were merely used or
soiled.  He replaced three mattresses at a cost of $129 each.  Though
he conceded they were not actually damaged, because squatters slept in them, he
"wouldn't want to sleep in them again."  The same principle applied to the
sheets and blankets, replaced for $32.95 and $50.46, respectively.  He
testified that the squatters used his pots, pans, dishes, and silverware, and
that food was burned on to the pots and pans and left there for days, and he
"wouldn't want to use them again," though he again conceded they were not
fatally damaged.  He replaced the kitchenware from Wal-Mart at a total
cost of $129.90.  Defendant argued at the hearing that these items were
not damaged, and he should not have to pay for them.  He reasoned that
replacing these items amounted to a payment for emotional distress, which is
not permitted under our restitution laws.  See State v. Jarvis, 146
Vt. 636, 639, 509 A.2d 1005, 1006 (1986) ("Damages that are not readily
ascertainable, such as pain and suffering, emotional
trauma, loss of earning capacity, and wrongful death awards are not proper
subjects of restitution."). 
¶ 7.            
The court also rejected this argument, holding that the restitution
statute, 13 V.S.A. § 5301(4), does not require that the items be damaged,
but only requires a link between the loss and the offense; that is, the loss
must be "a direct result of the commission . . . of the crime." Even though
these items were not rendered unusable, they were used by the squatters, and
their actions deprived camp owner of their use.  The court therefore found
the losses were a direct result of the crime and awarded the full amount of
restitution sought.
¶ 8.            
Defendant now renews his arguments that the damaged items should have
been replaced at their actual value at the time of the trespass, and that the
merely soiled or used items should not have been replaced at all.
 Defendant also asks us to considerfor the first time on appealwhether
13 V.S.A. § 5301(4) precludes the State from seeking restitution in this
case because the crime of unlawful trespass does not contain an element of destruction
of property.  A person is guilty of unlawful trespass if he "enters a
building other than a residence, whose normal access is locked," without legal
authority or the consent of the person in lawful possession.  13 V.S.A. § 3705(a), (c).  He argues that, while
camp owner's property would not have been damaged but for the unlawful
trespass, the damages did not arise as a direct result of the criminal
conduct for which he was convicted. 
¶ 9.            
"Vermont law requires there to be a direct link between the loss for which restitution is ordered and the conduct for
which defendant has been convicted."  State v. LaFlam, 2008 VT 108,
¶ 17, 184 Vt. 629, 965 A.2d 519.  However,
we need not address the merits of this argument as defendant failed to argue at
the restitution hearing that unlawful trespass could not be the predicate
offense for an award of restitution for damages arising from his other actions
while engaging in the trespass.  See Barnett v. Town of Wolcott,
2009 VT 32, ¶ 7, 185 Vt. 627, 970 A.2d 1281 (arguments not raised below
are waived on appeal).  We note that defendant did raise this argument in
a motion to dismiss the restitution claim filed several weeks after the
restitution hearing.  However, since defendant, as noted earlier, had
advance notice of camp owner's specific restitution claim and did not object
before or during the restitution hearing, there is no reason to depart from the
rule that post-judgment motions are generally not sufficient to avoid a waiver. 
See State v. Saunders, 168 Vt. 60, 63, 716 A.2d 11, 14 (1998) (claims
raised for the first time in motion for new trial are not preserved
for appellate review); In re Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC, 2007
VT 103, ¶ 15, 182 Vt. 340, 939 A.2d 504 ("Although in certain circumstances
litigants may preserve issues in post-judgment motions,
they may not do so when those issues should have been
raised in earlier proceedings before the Board.").  
¶ 10.         Defendant
next argues that the court erred in ordering him to pay restitution for items
that were not actually damaged (i.e., the bedding and kitchenware), but simply
used.  We begin by noting that "[t]he trial court has discretion to
determine the proper amount of restitution."  State
v. Lewis, 167 Vt. 533, 540, 711 A.2d 669, 674 (1998).  The
restitution statute defines "victim" as "a person who sustains physical,
emotional or financial injury or death as a direct result of the
commission or attempted commission of a crime."  13 V.S.A. § 5301(4)
(emphasis added).  See State v. Forant, 168 Vt. 217, 222-23, 719 A.2d 399, 403 (1998) ("An order of restitution must relate directly to the
damage caused by the defendant's criminal act for which he was
convicted.").  We have previously upheld a restitution award for the value
of deer in a case in which the defendant drove his car through the gate of a
hunting preserve, allowing valuable red deer to escape.  State v.
Driscoll, 2008 VT 101, 184 Vt. 381, 964 A.2d 1172.
 In Driscoll, defendant pled nolo contendere to unlawful mischief,
a crime based on damage to property.  We were not asked in Driscoll
to determine whether the defendant's act of unlawful mischief (damaging the
gate) directly related to the landowner's loss of deer.  However, we held
that "[w]e have no difficulty affirming the court's determination that the deer
were missing and left the property as a result of defendant's damage to the
gate."  Id. ¶ 10.  In the
present case, without deciding categorically what types of damages are
appropriate for restitution following a conviction of unlawful trespass, we
conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining
that defendant's acts directly led to camp owner's financial injury.
¶ 11.         In
evaluating whether camp owner could receive compensation for the items that
were not actually damaged, the court found that camp owner's "mattresses had
been slept on, [his] sheets had been used, [defendants'] food had been left in
pots and pans."  Implicit in this statement is a finding of a disturbing
violation of personal privacy.  Mattresses and linens can be vectors for
disease and parasites.  Burned-on foodleft for days in this casecan
require extensive cleaning of cookware, a task made even more offensive due to
the unknown nature of its use by the trespassers.  Without knowing the
identity of the squatters or the precise activities they undertook while
illegally occupying his home, the court obviously found it reasonable for camp
owner to be uncomfortable using these personal items ever again.  Moreover,
the court found that camp owner's "measure of replacement value is very
reasonable," having purchased all the items at Wal-Mart.  The court was
well within its discretion to authorize camp owner to replace these items at a
relatively modest cost.
¶ 12.         Finally,
defendant argues that even if the court was correct in awarding restitution,
the proper measure of damages should have been the actual value of the items at
the time of the trespass, not their replacement cost.  He cites State
v. Ellis for the proposition that "[t]he purpose of restitution is to make
the victim whole, not to punish.  Nor is the purpose to give the victim a
windfall."  838 P.2d 1310, 1312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)
(citation omitted).  He also cites to our decision in State v. Curtis,
in which we held that an automobile damaged through a criminal act should be
valued at its so-called "blue book" fair market value for the purpose of
restitution.  140 Vt. 621, 622, 443 A.2d 454, 455
(1982).
¶ 13.         While
the value of a used microwave or toaster would be lower than the value of the
identical appliances in new condition, defendant's suggestion that the
replacement cost can be estimated by what the items might fetch at a yard sale
is pettifoggery.  While defendant is correct that fair market value is the
proper measure of damages for items with a readily ascertainable value, there
is no "blue book" for used toasters or microwaves.  A victim of a home
invasion should not have to visit local thrift stores or pore through the classifieds
to determine the value of a used blender.  It was hardly a windfall for
camp owner to replace items ruined by defendant and his friends' criminal
acts.  The court was well within its discretion in awarding camp owner
restitution in the amount sought.
Affirmed.  
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber, Chief
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Beth Robinson, Associate
  Justice