Title: Egan v. Butler

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: All the Justices 
 
JOSEPH EGAN, SR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 141365 
 
   JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.
 
                                    June 4, 2015 
DAVID BUTLER 
 
ABILENE MOTOR EXPRESS CO. 
 
v.  Record No. 141372 
 
DAVID BUTLER 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Margaret P. Spencer, Judge 
 
In these appeals we consider whether evidence of work 
history and quality of past job performance is probative of 
future lost income damages, and whether the evidence introduced 
at trial was sufficient to subject a corporate employer to 
punitive damages liability. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
David Lamont Butler worked as a diesel mechanic at Abilene 
Motor Express Company, where Joseph F. Egan, Sr., was Butler's 
supervisor.  After working at Abilene for three months, Butler 
was fired by Egan for unsatisfactory job performance.  Although 
the circumstances of that termination are subject to differing 
accounts by the parties, the situation was undisputedly heated. 
The same day that Butler was fired, Egan swore out a 
misdemeanor assault and battery complaint against Butler for 
events that allegedly occurred immediately after Butler's 
 
2 
termination.  The following day, Egan told other Abilene 
employees that Butler had pushed Egan and that Butler had cut 
or stabbed Egan.  The misdemeanor assault and battery charge 
was dismissed with prejudice several months later. 
Based on these circumstances, Butler filed a complaint 
against Egan and Abilene alleging one count of malicious 
prosecution and one count of defamation.  Under both claims 
Butler sought compensatory damages, including future lost 
income, and punitive damages. 
Butler's claims went to a jury trial.  After hearing 
witness testimony and considering the evidence, the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Butler.  On the malicious 
prosecution claim, the jury awarded Butler $250,000 in 
compensatory damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages against 
Egan and $200,000 in punitive damages against Abilene.  In 
compliance with Code § 8.01-38.1, the circuit court reduced the 
punitive damages award against Egan to $38,850 and the punitive 
damages award against Abilene to $155,600.  On the defamation 
claim, the jury awarded Butler $200,000 in compensatory 
damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages against Egan and 
$150,000 in punitive damages against Abilene.  In compliance 
with Code § 8.01-38.1, the circuit court reduced the punitive 
damages award against Egan to $38,850 and the punitive damages 
award against Abilene to $116,700.  Apart from reducing the 
 
3 
punitive damages awards, the circuit court entered final 
judgment on the jury's verdicts against Egan and Abilene. 
Egan and Abilene separately filed timely appeals with this 
Court. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. 
Future Lost Income 
Egan's assignment of error 1 and Abilene's assignment of 
error 1 are identical, and read: 
The trial court erred when it (1) excluded evidence of 
Butler's past employment history and (2) when it 
excluded evidence of the quality of Butler's job 
performance 
1. 
Standard of Review 
"We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude 
evidence using an abuse of discretion standard and, on appeal, 
will not disturb a trial court's decision to [exclude] evidence 
absent a finding of abuse of that discretion."  Harman v. 
Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 288 Va. 88, 92, 758 S.E.2d 515, 520 
(2014) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations 
omitted).  "In a civil case, the erroneous exclusion of 
evidence is reversible error when the record fails to show 
plainly that the excluded evidence could not have affected the 
verdict."  Barkley v. Wallace, 267 Va. 369, 374, 595 S.E.2d 
271, 274 (2004). 
 
 
4 
2. 
The Excluded Evidence Is Probative Of Future Lost Income 
At trial, the circuit court denied entry of evidence 
pertaining to Butler's work history on the basis that it was 
irrelevant to determining Butler's future lost income.  The 
circuit court also denied entry of evidence pertaining to the 
quality of Butler's past job performance.  This was error. 
"In order to form a reliable basis for a calculation of 
future lost income or loss of earning capacity, such evidence 
must be grounded upon facts specific to the individual whose 
loss is being calculated."  Bulala v. Boyd, 239 Va. 218, 233, 
389 S.E.2d 670, 677 (1990).  "Although mathematical precision 
is not required, the plaintiff must furnish evidence of 
sufficient facts or circumstances to permit at least an 
intelligent and probable estimate of [such] damages."  Id. at 
232-33, 389 S.E.2d at 677 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
To this end, we have held that an expert's opinion about 
future lost income or future lost earning capacity is 
inadmissible when such testimony fails to consider the 
plaintiff's work history.  E.g., Vasquez v. Mabini, 269 Va. 
155, 160-61, 606 S.E.2d 809, 811-12 (2005); Greater Richmond 
Transit Co. v. Wilkerson, 242 Va. 65, 71-72, 406 S.E.2d 28, 33 
(1991).  The inverse of the principle expressed in these cases 
applies here:  that is, a plaintiff's work history and quality 
 
5 
of past job performance is admissible evidence probative of the 
plaintiff's claimed damages in the form of future lost income 
or future lost earning capacity.  See Virginia Rule of Evidence 
2:401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact in issue more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence."); 
Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:402 ("All relevant evidence is 
admissible, except as otherwise provided by . . . statute, 
Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, or other evidentiary 
principles."); Breeden v. Roberts, 258 Va. 411, 416, 518 S.E.2d 
834, 837 (1999). 
This is the very type of evidence Egan and Abilene sought 
to introduce but which the circuit court excluded as 
irrelevant.  Specifically, the court excluded evidence of 
Butler's work history from 1999 to 2010, including proof 
relating to his employers, employment dates, pay rates, and 
reasons for leaving the job.  The court also excluded evidence 
of the quality of Butler's past job performance.  In each 
instance, the court held that evidence of past work had no 
bearing on future income.  Utilizing this incorrect legal 
standard to bar admission of relevant evidence was an abuse of 
discretion.  Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 212-13, 738 
S.E.2d 847, 861-62 (2013). 
 
 
6 
3. 
The Error Is Not Harmless 
Reversal is required because this excluded evidence, 
probative of Butler's future lost income, could have affected 
the verdict.  Barkley, 267 Va. at 374, 595 S.E.2d at 274.  Two 
principles arising from related circumstances, in which we 
addressed the issue of speculative future lost income, 
underscore this point. 
First, we have held that expert testimony regarding future 
lost income is too speculative to go to the jury when the 
expert's opinion is based upon too scant of a work history.  
Compare Cassady v. Martin, 220 Va. 1093, 1095-96, 1100, 266 
S.E.2d 104, 104-05, 108 (1980) (8 weeks of work history 
insufficient to make 21 year old decedent's 44 years of future 
lost income not speculative), with Clark v. Chapman, 238 Va. 
655, 665-67, 385 S.E.2d 885, 891-92 (1989) (6 weeks of work 
history, in addition to a minimal and intermittent string of 
jobs, sufficient to make 41 year old plaintiff's 11 years of 
future lost income not speculative). 
Second, in the context of remedying wrongful termination 
pursuant to the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act, Code  
§ 8.01-216.1 et seq., we have observed that "the longer the 
period over which front pay is requested, the more speculative 
a front pay award becomes."  Lewis v. City of Alexandria, 287 
Va. 474, 483 n.7, 756 S.E.2d 465, 471 n.7 (2014). 
 
7 
Directed to the circumstances of this case, these 
principles establish that a jury award for future lost income 
damages must be predicated upon evidence sufficiently 
establishing the plaintiff's work history and continuing 
ability to work absent the wrongful actions of the defendant, 
so that such an award is not impermissibly speculative.  
Further, the degree of evidence required to remove the award 
from the realm of impermissible speculation corresponds to the 
amount of time the future lost income damages cover.  That is, 
the longer the timeframe of future lost income claimed, the 
more significant the evidentiary basis required to support such 
an award. 
At trial, Butler did not call an expert witness to testify 
as to damages, but testified on his own behalf as a fact 
witness.  Butler claimed approximately 23 years of lost future 
income totaling $137,842.  Butler based this claim upon the 
difference between his $18 per hour wage at Abilene and his 
lower hourly wage with a subsequent employer – a difference 
totaling approximately $6,000 per year – and multiplied that 
figure by the approximately 23 years until when Butler planned 
to retire at age 65.1  Accordingly, by excluding the very 
                     
 
1 Though not material to our analysis, we note that Butler 
testified at trial that he was 43 years of age, about to turn 
44, suggesting a projected work life to age 65 of less than 23 
years. 
 
8 
evidence that Egan and Abilene sought to introduce, the circuit 
court made this future lost income claim more speculative than 
if such evidence had been admitted.  When the record shows that 
excluded evidence would have made an award less speculative, 
such evidence could have affected the verdict so as to require 
reversal.  Barkley, 267 Va. at 374, 595 S.E.2d at 274. 
We decline to affirm, as Butler argues, under the "right 
result for the wrong reason" doctrine.  Under that doctrine, 
"however erroneous may be the reasons of the court for its 
judgment upon the face of the judgment itself, if the judgment 
be right, it will not be disturbed on account of the reasons."  
Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 572, 579, 701 S.E.2d 431, 435 
(2010) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations 
omitted).  Butler makes two arguments for such affirmance, and 
we disagree with both. 
First, Butler argues that the excluded evidence is more 
prejudicial than probative, as it "make[s] Butler out to be 
unreliable, when he [is] not."  However, if that is what the 
evidence shows, then that is simply the nature of the evidence.  
The excluded evidence remains highly probative to establish the 
amount of Butler's future lost income.  "Evidence that is 
highly probative invariably will be prejudicial to the 
[opposing party]."  United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 
833 (4th Cir. 1998).  Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:403(a) only 
 
9 
authorizes the trial court to exclude relevant evidence when 
the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice.  Any prejudice in the form of the jury's 
perception of Butler's future employment prospects, arising 
from this excluded evidence which tends to more accurately 
establish Butler's future lost income, is not unfair prejudice 
such that its admission could properly be barred under Virginia 
Rule of Evidence 2:403(a). 
Second, Butler argues that the substance of the excluded 
evidence is duplicative of other evidence admitted into the 
record, by way of exhibits or witness testimony, which the jury 
was already entitled to consider.  However, upon review of the 
record, we find that the excluded evidence is sufficiently 
different in kind and degree with such admitted evidence so 
that its admission would not be barred under Virginia Rule of 
Evidence 2:403(b) as needlessly cumulative. 
B. 
Punitive Damages Liability 
Abilene's assignment of error 3 reads: 
The trial court erred when it denied Abilene's Motion 
to Strike the Punitive Damages Claims – and 
instructing the jury on punitive damages – as to 
Abilene. There was no evidence that Abilene had 
authorized or ratified Egan's actions in filing the 
criminal charges against Butler or the statements Egan 
made, and Butler never even pled any ratification or 
authorization. 
 
 
10 
1. 
Standard Of Review 
When reviewing a circuit court's decision on a motion to 
strike, we must "review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party."  Kiddell v. Labowitz, 284 
Va. 611, 629, 733 S.E.2d 622, 632 (2012).  That is, the non-
moving party must be given "the benefit of all substantial 
conflict in the evidence, and all fair inferences that may be 
drawn therefrom."  Hadeed v. Medic-24, Ltd., 237 Va. 277, 281, 
377 S.E.2d 589, 590 (1989) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
The object of our review depends upon the circuit court's 
treatment of the motion to strike.  Where, as here, the circuit 
court denied the motion to strike, we must review the evidence 
to determine if that action was in error because either "it is 
conclusively apparent that [the] plaintiff has proven no cause 
of action against [the] defendant," or "it plainly appears that 
the [circuit] court would be compelled to set aside any verdict 
found for the plaintiff as being without evidence to support 
it."  Blue Ridge Serv. Corp. v. Saxon Shoes, Inc., 271 Va. 206, 
218, 624 S.E.2d 55, 62 (2006) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
To the extent we determine what type of evidence must be 
presented, as an initial matter, to subject an employer to the 
possibility of punitive damages liability for the actions of an 
 
11 
employee is a question of law we review de novo.  Cf. Shevlin 
Smith v. McLaughlin, __ Va. __, __, 769 S.E.2d 7, 17 (2015) 
("Whether a factual issue constitutes a prima facie element of 
a claim . . . is a question of law reviewed de novo."). 
2. 
Punitive Damages Liability Against A Corporate Employer 
The circuit court denied Abilene's motion to strike 
Butler's claims for punitive damages against Abilene.  This was 
error. 
A corporate employer may be liable for the compensatory 
damages caused by the acts of its employees when such actions 
are done "in the scope of [the employee's] employment and which 
grow out of an act connected with the employment."  
Oberbroeckling v. Lyle, 234 Va. 373, 381-82, 362 S.E.2d 682, 
687 (1987).  The analysis for determining whether a corporate 
employer may be liable for punitive damages, however, is 
different. 
"A principal, . . . though of course liable to make 
compensation for the injury done by his agent, within the scope 
of his employment, cannot be held for . . . punitive damages, 
merely by reason of wanton, oppressive[,] or malicious intent 
on the part of the agent."  Hogg v. Plant, 145 Va. 175, 180, 
133 S.E. 759, 760 (1926) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Consequently, "punitive damages cannot be awarded 
against a master or principal for the wrongful act of his 
 
12 
servant or agent in which he did not participate, and which he 
did not authorize or ratify."  Id. at 181, 133 S.E. at 761.  
Alternatively stated, punitive damages may be awarded against a 
corporate employer only if either (1) that employer 
participated in the wrongful acts giving rise to the punitive 
damages, or (2) that employer authorized or ratified the 
wrongful acts giving rise to the punitive damages.2  Hewes v. 
Doddridge, 40 Va. (1 Rob.) 143 (1842) (monographic note) 
(citing Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 
(1893)).  The evidence at trial failed to establish that 
Abilene either engaged in, or authorized or ratified, Egan's 
alleged wrongful conduct. 
a. 
Punitive Damages Liability When The Corporate Employer 
Participated In The Wrongful Acts 
Although our case law establishes that an employer is 
subject to punitive damages liability if it participates in the 
wrongful acts, we have not gone further to address how to 
determine whether a corporate employer itself is acting for 
                     
 
2 Butler argues that Abilene waived and conceded this issue 
by failing to object to, and by stipulating to, the fact that 
Egan was operating within the scope of Abilene's employment 
when he engaged in the wrongful acts giving rise to the 
punitive damages awards.  This, of course, is important for 
purposes of establishing Abilene's vicarious liability for 
compensatory damages.  But the fact that Egan was acting within 
the scope of his employment is not dispositive as to Abilene's 
liability for punitive damages.  Butler ignores this 
distinction, but once made, Butler's arguments of waiver and 
concession are meritless. 
 
13 
purposes of punitive damages liability.  Instead, we have 
repeatedly focused only on the separate avenue of establishing 
an employer's punitive damages liability by ascertaining 
whether a corporate employer authorized or ratified an 
employee's wrongful conduct.  See, e.g., Freeman v. Sproles, 
204 Va. 353, 358, 131 S.E.2d 410, 414 (1963); W. T. Grant Co. 
v. Owens, 149 Va. 906, 913, 141 S.E. 860, 862-63 (1928). 
Butler argues that any action of any employee taken on 
behalf of a corporate employer is necessarily the action of the 
corporate employer.  After all, Butler continues, a corporate 
employer such as Abilene "can only act through agents" such as 
Egan.  Bardach Iron & Steel Co. v. Charleston Port Terminals, 
143 Va. 656, 672, 129 S.E. 687, 692 (1925).  Consequently, 
Butler contends that any employee's action is the corporate 
employer's action for purposes of punitive damages liability.  
We hold that this position is inconsistent with established 
Virginia law, as it would render obsolete establishing a 
corporate employer's punitive damages liability by way of 
proving the employer's authorization or ratification of an 
employee's wrongful conduct. 
Instead, to subject a corporate employer to punitive 
damages liability on the basis that the corporate employer 
itself committed the wrongful acts, the employee who committed 
the wrongful acts must be in a sufficiently high position in 
 
14 
the employer's corporate structure.  Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 909 ("Punitive damages can properly be awarded against 
a master or other principal because of an act by an agent if 
. . . (c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and 
was acting in the scope of employment."); see also, e.g., 
Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 163 (Utah 1991); 
Sweet v. Roy, 801 A.2d 694, 713-14 (Vt. 2002). 
We hold that this standard applies in Virginia.  The 
question then becomes, how high a position in the corporate 
ranks is sufficient to make the actions of an employee the 
actions of the corporate employer?  This is a fact-sensitive 
question, dependent upon the power, role, and independence of 
the employee relative to the nature and structure of the 
corporate employer.  See Bardach, 143 Va. at 672, 129 S.E. at 
692 ("[When an agent] is a permanent employee or officer of the 
company, the question as to the authority and power of such a 
representative should be left to the jury, unless the evidence 
shows that this authority on the occasion in question was 
necessarily limited."); see also White v. Ultramar, Inc., 981 
P.2d 944, 954 (Cal. 1999) ("[S]upervisors who have broad 
discretionary powers and exercise substantial discretion 
authority in the corporation could be managing agents.  
Conversely, supervisors who have no discretionary authority 
over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy would 
 
15 
not be considered managing agents even though they may have the 
ability to hire or fire other employees."); Chavarria v. 
Fleetwood Retail Corp. of N.M., 143 P.3d 717, 725 (N.M. 2006) 
("An employee has managerial capacity if he or she has the 
discretion or authority to speak and act independently of 
higher corporate authority." (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)).  We therefore decline to create a bright-
line rule, and instead supply the facts of this case for future 
guidance. 
The record shows that Egan had been working at Abilene for 
four and a half years, and was the Director of Maintenance.  As 
Director of Maintenance, Egan "did the hiring and firing and 
scheduling work.  [He] was in charge of [Abilene's] entire 
fleet as far as maintenance, purchasing."  This is the totality 
of evidence establishing Egan's position within Abilene's 
corporate structure.  As a matter of law, this limited evidence 
is insufficient to establish whether Egan was in a sufficiently 
high position within Abilene's business structure so that 
employee Egan's actions were actually the corporate employer 
Abilene's actions for purposes of punitive damages liability. 
Butler makes additional arguments for why Abilene itself 
committed the alleged acts of malicious prosecution and 
defamation.  We remain unpersuaded. 
 
16 
First, Butler points to the fact that the dismissal of 
Egan's criminal complaint against Butler was accompanied by 
Butler's agreement to stay off of Abilene's property for an 
extended period of time.  Butler argues that this establishes 
that Abilene "benefitted" from the criminal action, and thus 
Abilene was "involve[d] in the criminal case."  Butler also 
points to the fact that it was Abilene's president, Keith 
Jones, who notified Butler that a warrant had been issued for 
Butler's arrest.  However, the fact that an aspect of the 
criminal action related to Abilene's property, without further 
evidence of Abilene's alleged involvement with the criminal 
action, does not establish that Abilene itself engaged in 
malicious prosecution or defamation.  Similarly, the fact that 
Abilene's president was aware of the existence of a warrant 
does not establish that Abilene itself engaged in malicious 
prosecution or defamation. 
Second, Butler points to the fact that various videotapes 
which should have recorded the areas of Abilene's property 
where Butler's termination and any subsequent altercation 
occurred remained in possession of Abilene and were accessible 
by Abilene's president.  But mere possession of such videotapes 
does not establish that Abilene itself engaged in malicious 
prosecution or defamation. 
 
17 
Seeking to bolster his point, Butler repeats his argument 
from trial that these tapes were destroyed or altered, because 
either the video does not show certain locations that should 
have been recorded, or the video of what is recorded is missing 
events that actually occurred.  Even accepting as true the 
premise that someone destroyed or altered the relevant 
videotapes, the record here fails to establish that such party 
was Abilene.  Such evidence alone does not establish that 
Abilene destroyed or altered the tapes, and this evidence does 
not establish that Abilene itself engaged in malicious 
prosecution or defamation. 
Third, Butler argues that because Abilene knew that the 
unaltered videotapes exonerated Butler, but did nothing to stop 
Egan's malicious prosecution or Egan's defamation, Abilene was 
therefore sufficiently involved with the malicious prosecution 
and defamation so that Abilene engaged in such wrongful 
conduct.  However, accepting as true that the record is 
sufficient to warrant an inference that Abilene was aware of 
the substance of the unaltered videotapes, the record does not 
establish that Abilene itself engaged in malicious prosecution 
or defamation.  It may be – but we need not establish for 
purposes of Virginia law – that the "person who places before a 
prosecuting officer information upon which criminal proceedings 
are begun" has "an obligation to disclose" the discovery of 
 
18 
"additional information casting doubt upon the accused's 
guilt."  Clarke v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 298 F.2d 346, 348 
(4th Cir. 1962) (establishing such a rule for federal courts in 
Virginia while recognizing that "there appear to be no Virginia 
cases specifically [on] point").  But such a duty would apply 
only to Egan, who filed the misdemeanor complaint against 
Butler, and whose actions are not those of Abilene.  And we 
have never held that a third party, such as Abilene, who fails 
to disseminate truth to counteract the false defamation 
published by another, such as Egan, will be considered to have 
engaged in another's defamatory act. 
For these reasons, at the time of Abilene's motion to 
strike, it plainly appears that the circuit court would have 
been compelled to set aside, as being without evidence to 
support it, any punitive damages verdict found for Butler 
against Abilene based on the theory that Egan's actions were 
actually the actions of Abilene.  Blue Ridge, 271 Va. at 218, 
624 S.E.2d at 62. 
b. 
Punitive Damages Liability When The Corporate Employer 
Authorized Or Ratified The Wrongful Acts 
Butler did not plead, and failed to introduce any evidence 
at trial to prove, that Abilene authorized or ratified Egan's 
alleged actions of malicious prosecution and defamation.  For 
these reasons, at the time of Abilene's motion to strike, it 
 
19 
plainly appears that the circuit court would have been 
compelled to set aside, as being without evidence to support 
it, any punitive damages verdict found for Butler against 
Abilene based on the theory that Egan's actions were authorized 
or ratified by Abilene.  Id. 
C. 
Proceedings On Remand 
In light of these errors,3 Egan and Abilene request a new 
trial upon remand.  Determining the nature of the proceedings 
upon remand is informed by our actions on appeal, which in turn 
are guided by assignments of error.  Accordingly, the analysis 
starts with the parties' assignments of error. 
Rule 5:17(c)(1) requires an appellant to assign error to a 
"ruling[] below."  Only "sufficient" assignments of error are 
recognized by this Court.  Rule 5:17(c)(1)(iii).  "A litigant's 
failure to include any sufficient assignments of error in a 
petition for appeal can deprive this Court of active 
                     
 
3 We do not address Egan's and Abilene's identical 
assignments of error 2, regarding whether Butler's future lost 
income awards were too speculative.  Egan and Abilene failed to 
adequately brief this issue, and it is waived.  Muhammad v. 
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 478, 619 S.E.2d 16, 31 (2005). 
 
We do not address Egan's assignment of error 3 and 
Abilene's assignment of error 4, regarding whether the 
compensatory damage verdicts were duplicative; Egan's 
assignment of error 4 and Abilene's assignment of error 6, 
regarding whether the verdicts should have been set aside; and 
Abilene's assignment of error 5, regarding whether the punitive 
damages awarded against an employer can exceed the punitive 
damages awarded against an employee.  Our holdings on appeal 
render it unnecessary to resolve these issues.  Jimenez v. 
Corr, 288 Va. 395, 404, 764 S.E.2d 115, 118 (2014). 
 
20 
jurisdiction to consider the appeal."  Amin v. County of 
Henrico, 286 Va. 231, 236, 749 S.E.2d 169, 171 (2013) (emphasis 
added).  However, so long as an assignment of error is 
sufficient, this Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal. 
A sufficient assignment of error puts before this Court an 
"alleged error" committed by the court below.  Rule 5:17(c)(1).  
That alleged error defines the focus of what this Court can 
address on appeal.  See, e.g., Sarafin v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 
320, 323 n.1, 764 S.E.2d 71, 73 n.1 (2014).  After all, "when a 
party fails to assign error to a particular holding by the 
circuit court, that holding becomes the law of the case and is 
binding on appeal."  Maine v. Adams, 277 Va. 230, 242, 672 
S.E.2d 862, 869 (2009).  Thus, for example, Egan's and 
Abilene's assignments of error 1 put before this Court the 
circuit court's action of excluding evidence, and Abilene's 
assignment of error 3 put before this Court the circuit court's 
action of denying a motion to strike.  By way of these 
assignments of error, we have authority to address whether 
those actions were in error and, because they were, to reverse 
the circuit court's actions. 
Once we identify and reverse actions taken in error, and 
remand is required, we must ascertain the appropriate nature of 
such remand proceedings.  The nature of remand proceedings may 
be governed either by statute or by this Court's holding of 
 
21 
error on appeal; or, in the absence of such sources mandating a 
specific form of proceedings, the lower court retains 
discretion to resolve outstanding issues in the manner it sees 
fit.  Bailey v. Loudoun Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 288 Va. 159, 
181-82, 762 S.E.2d 763, 774 (2014).  When the nature of remand 
proceedings is governed by our holding of error on appeal, we 
must determine what portions of the lower court proceedings 
were affected by such error.  And it is those proceedings, 
tainted by error, which must be accomplished anew upon remand.  
See, e.g., Velocity Express Mid-Atlantic v. Hugen, 266 Va. 188, 
203, 585 S.E.2d 557, 566 (2003) (error in allowing a 
prejudicial closing argument to a jury in a non-bifurcated 
trial typically requires remand of a new trial on all issues, 
but specific circumstances of the case required only a new 
trial on damages); Rawle v. McIlhenny, 163 Va. 735, 747-50, 177 
S.E. 214, 220-21 (1934) (discussing how an appeal should be 
resolved in five different scenarios of when a plaintiff 
challenges the sufficiency of a verdict on an appeal). 
In this case, remand proceedings are governed by our 
holdings of error on appeal.  Pursuant to Abilene's assignment 
of error 3, we hold that the circuit court erred in denying 
Abilene's motion to strike Butler's claims for punitive damages 
against Abilene.  Any issues falling within the scope of that 
motion to strike are subject to final judgment.  See Isle of 
 
22 
Wight Cnty. v. Nogiec, 281 Va. 140, 156, 704 S.E.2d 83, 91 
(2011); Blue Ridge, 271 Va. at 219, 624 S.E.2d at 62.  Thus, 
Abilene is not subject to punitive damages on remand, and 
Butler is foreclosed from presenting evidence to establish 
Abilene's punitive damages liability. 
Pursuant to Egan's and Abilene's assignments of error 1, 
we hold that the circuit court erred in excluding evidence 
probative of Butler's future lost income.  The nature of the 
circuit court's action, embodied in the assignment of error, is 
not itself confined to a specific segment of the trial.  Contra 
Baker v. Carrington, 138 Va. 22, 23-25, 120 S.E. 856, 856-57 
(1924) (plaintiff assigned error to lower court's striking 
words from a jury instruction relating to punitive damages, and 
thus the error affected only damages rather than liability).  
Instead, the nature of our holding of error on appeal is 
confined to a specific segment of the trial. 
The circuit court's action of excluding certain evidence 
was error because such evidence was probative of Butler's 
future lost income.  The issue of future lost income is an 
issue relating to a plaintiff's compensatory damages.  See, 
e.g., Lewis-Gale Med. Ctr., LLC v. Alldredge, 282 Va. 141, 147, 
710 S.E.2d 716, 719 (2011).  Thus, our holding of error on 
appeal necessitates a new trial as to Butler's compensatory 
 
23 
damages upon remand.  Egan and Abilene, however, argue that the 
reach of remand proceedings should go further.  We disagree. 
First, Egan and Abilene argue that our holding also 
impacts issues of liability as this excluded evidence may have 
affected the jury's assessment of Butler's credibility.  Egan 
and Abilene contend that, contrary to this excluded evidence, 
Butler claimed at trial that he had been a well-regarded truck 
mechanic before Egan damaged his reputation.  Thus, as Butler 
testified regarding Egan's and Abilene's liability, improperly 
excluded evidence impacting the credibility of a liability 
witness is an error that may have affected the jury's 
determination of liability.  Ryan v. Maryland Casualty Co., 173 
Va. 57, 62-63, 3 S.E.2d 416, 418-19 (1939). 
We cannot endorse Egan's and Abilene's position because we 
cannot reach the issue of whether this evidence relates to 
Butler's credibility.  This issue was never argued before the 
circuit court as a basis to allow admission of the evidence.  
Therefore, basic rules of appellate procedure prevent us from 
reaching this particular issue.  Rule 5:25; Morgen Indus., Inc. 
v. Vaughan, 252 Va. 60, 67-68, 471 S.E.2d 489, 493 (1996); 
Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 414, 374 S.E.2d 46, 52 
(1988).  We will not circumvent these rules to address an 
otherwise waived issue simply because we have found that the 
 
24 
circuit court's action to which the issue relates was error on 
another basis. 
Second, we note that Abilene observed during oral 
arguments that any retrial of compensatory damages necessarily 
requires a retrial of punitive damages because "an award of 
compensatory damages is an indispensable predicate for an award 
of punitive damages, except in actions for libel and slander."  
Syed v. ZH Techs., Inc., 280 Va. 58, 74-75, 694 S.E.2d 625, 634 
(2010) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration 
omitted).  It is true that we will vacate a punitive damages 
award predicated upon a vacated compensatory damages award if 
such relief falls within the scope of an assignment of error 
and is adequately argued on appeal.  See, e.g., Murray v. 
Hadid, 238 Va. 722, 732, 385 S.E.2d 898, 905 (1989).  But we 
need not address whether Abilene's assignment of error 1 
compels a retrial of punitive damages as against Abilene 
because, as we have held, Abilene's assignment of error 3 
removes that issue from retrial.  Moreover, we do not address 
whether Egan's assignment of error 1 compels a retrial of 
punitive damages as against Egan because Egan waived the issue 
at oral argument by conceding that he was "not contesting" the 
punitive damages awards, and that the punitive damages awards 
did not fall within the scope of his assignments of error. 
 
 
25 
III. CONCLUSION 
The circuit court erred in excluding evidence probative of 
Butler's future lost income.  That error may have affected the 
jury's determination of Egan's and Abilene's compensatory 
damages.  We therefore will reverse that portion of the circuit 
court's judgment and remand for a new trial on compensatory 
damages against Egan and Abilene. 
The circuit court also erred in denying Abilene's motion 
to strike Butler's punitive damages claims.  We therefore will 
reverse that portion of the circuit court's judgment and enter 
final judgment in favor of Abilene regarding Butler's punitive 
damages claims.  Abilene's punitive damages liability is not 
subject to retrial. 
Our holdings do not disturb the circuit court's affirmance 
of the jury's finding of Egan's and Abilene's liability.  Our 
holdings do not disturb the circuit court's entry of the 
punitive damages awards against Egan.  These issues are not 
subject to retrial on remand. 
Reversed and remanded in part, 
and final judgment in part.