Title: Le Doux v. Martinez

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

254 P.2d 685 (1953) 57 N.M. 86 LE DOUX et ux. v. MARTINEZ et al. No. 5537. Supreme Court of New Mexico. March 12, 1953. *686 Harry L. Bigbee and Donnan Stephenson, Santa Fe, for appellants. F.A. Catron and Thomas B. Catron III, Santa Fe, for appellee. COMPTON, Justice. We are called on to construe our wrongful death statute, Sec. 24-104, New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1941 Comp., as amended Ch. 125, Sec. 1, L. 1947. The part material to a decision, reads: On August 9, 1951, Pete Sanchez took his nephew Anthony Joe LeDoux, a child of the age of two years and eight months, for a motor ride in his truck. Shortly thereafter, Sanchez returned the child and parked in the four hundred block on San Francisco Street, across from the LeDoux residence, the truck facing east on the south side of San Francisco Street, the LeDoux apartments being on the north side. In crossing the street to his home, the child was run over and killed by a taxicab owned by appellee, Joe Martinez, doing business as City Cab Company, and operated by his agent Jose Victor Chavez. The complaint advances three theories for a recovery. Appellants allege that the death of the child resulted from the negligence and unskillfulness of appellee's driver in the operation of the cab; that appellee was negligent in employing a young and inexperienced driver in the operation of the business; and the negligence of appellee generally as a proximate cause of the injuries. The latter charges, however, are abandoned. The wrongful death statute is now the basis for recovery. Issue was joined by a general denial. As a first separate defense, appellee pleaded the contributory negligence of appellants as a direct and proximate cause of the injuries to and the death of the child, in permitting the child on the street at the time and place of the accident. As a second separate defense, appellee pleaded the contributory negligence of the child as a direct and proximate cause of the injuries resulting in its death. The cause was tried to the jury, which returned its verdict in *687 favor of appellee. To test the correctness of the action of the court, the cause is brought here for review. The trial court instructed the jury on imputed negligence, as follows: The point is made by appellants that the contributory negligence of Pete Sanchez was not an issue. The contention has merit. There was no basis for the instruction. The pleadings as framed limit the issue of contributory negligence to appellants and the child. Further: See Couch's Adm'r. v. Black, 301 Ky. 24, 190 S.W.2d 681; Hartley v. A.I. Rodd Lumber Co., 282 Mich. 652, 276 N.W. 712; Gentry v. Betty Lou Bakeries, 171 Tenn. 20, 100 S.W.2d 230; Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Mitchell, Tex.Civ.App., 104 S.W.2d 652. Moreover, the imputation of contributory negligence is an affirmative defense and must be specifically pleaded. Campagna v. Market Street Ry. Co., 24 Cal. 2d 304, 149 P.2d 281. It is our conclusion that the instruction presented a false issue, one substantially different from that alleged, and was, therefore, erroneous. The refusal of the court to instruct as to the standard of care required of the cab driver, is assigned as error. It is undisputed that San Francisco Street in the area where the injury occurred, was in a residential district. The street was only twenty-two feet wide and the sidewalks about three feet wide. The cab driver knew these facts, and that children frequently played therein. As to the degree of care to be exercised under such circumstances, appellants tendered the following instructions: At 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 40, we find the rule stated: We think the court erred in refusing the tendered instructions. Ordinary, reasonable, or due care under the circumstances is always the standard of care required. Archuleta v. Jacobs, 43 N.M. 425, 94 P.2d 706. Litigants are entitled to an instruction on every theory of the case which has support in the evidence. Such was the office of the tendered instructions. Our own cases are in accord. Archuleta v. Jacobs, supra; McMullen v. Ursuline Order of Sisters, 56 N.M. 570, 246 P.2d 1052. Appellants argue that contributory negligence in any event cannot be urged as a defense to an action brought under the wrongful death statute, and rely upon the Missouri decisions, as our statute was taken from that state. As we read the decisions they do not lend support to appellants. The Missouri Statute provides for specific defenses, among which is the negligence of the deceased. Nevertheless, that court has repeatedly held that contributory negligence generally is a defense to an action thereunder. Hafner v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197 Mo. 196, 94 S.W. 291; Porter v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 199 Mo. 82, 97 S.W. 880. But in Herrell v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 324 Mo. 38, 23 S.W.2d 102, 104, 69 A.L.R. 470, it was held that the contributory negligence of one parent, where both sued for the death of an unmarried minor, is not a defense under the act. The court said: "Such defenses would seem obvious without being mentioned in the statute; the fact that they were designated seems to indicate that the lawmakers intended them to be preclusive; and there can be no question as to their power to so limit the defenses as to exclude that of contributory negligence." The latter case obviously was grounded on the fact that contributory negligence as a defense had been excluded. In adopting the statute our lawmakers omitted any reference as to defenses which might be interposed and such omission would seem to *689 manifest a legislative intent to admit all common law defenses. Appellants say the court erred in refusing to instruct on the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance. This would be true but for the age of the child. In Floeck v. Hoover, 52 N.M. 193, 195 P.2d 86, 87, in a discussion of the doctrine, we said: The doctrine has no function to perform unless the injured party is chargeable with negligence which will preclude a recovery in the absence of the doctrine, 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, Sec. 217, and a child of the age of the deceased is conclusively presumed not guilty of contributory negligence. Nelson v. Arrowhead Freight Lines, 99 Utah 129, 104 P.2d 225. We notice the further point that the jury in answer to special interrogatories found appellee free of negligence and unskillfulness, but in view of the objectionable instruction, and the court's refusal to give the instructions requested, the finding was unwarranted and cannot stand. Other questions are argued but they are considered without merit or are disposed of by the conclusion reached. The judgment will be reversed with direction to the trial court to proceed in a manner not inconsistent herewith, and it is so ordered. SADLER, C.J., and McGHEE, COORS and LUJAN, JJ., concur.