Title: State v. Tribble

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Tribble (2003-073); 179 Vt. 235; 892 A.2d 232

2005 VT 132

[Filed 30-Dec-2005]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2005 VT 132

                                No. 2003-073


  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit

  Dennis P. Tribble	                         November Term, 2004


  Alan W. Cook, J.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant Attorney
    General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Allison N. Fulcher of Martin & Associates, Barre, for Defendant-Appellant.


  PRESENT:  Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ., and 
            Allen, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

       ¶  1.  SKOGLUND, J.   Defendant challenges his conviction for
  first-degree murder following a jury trial, claiming that the trial court
  erred by (1) finding defendant competent to stand trial, (2) permitting
  defendant's attorney to withdraw before jury selection, (3) allowing the
  trial to proceed in the absence of defendant, and (4) granting the State's
  objections to the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report.  We reverse.
   
       ¶  2.  This case presents the unusual circumstance of a criminal
  trial of an unrepresented defendant who chose not to attend his trial-in
  other words, a trial with nobody sitting at the defense table to defend
  against the charges.  The trial court, in the process of ultimately
  concluding that defendant validly surrendered his right to be present and
  to be represented by a court-appointed attorney, was forced to pick its way
  through a quagmire created by defendant's repeated insistence that he could
  not work with the attorneys appointed by the court to represent him.  The
  court's task was complicated further by defendant's apparent struggle with
  mental health issues, both at the time of the offense and during the
  pendency of the action.  As a result, the court took pains to evaluate and
  re-evaluate defendant's competence to stand trial, and to supply defendant
  with three different sets of appointed attorneys-all established,
  experienced, and highly competent members of Vermont's bar.  As the trial
  date approached, the court made clear to defendant that his failure or
  refusal to work with his third court-appointed attorney would leave him
  exactly two options-proceed to trial on schedule with an attorney he
  retained on his own or proceed without an attorney. 

       ¶  3.  Despite its exemplary diligence and patience, however, the
  trial court had one additional means at its disposal to test the validity
  of defendant's waiver of his right to counsel-conducting an on-the-record
  inquiry along the lines we described in State v. Merrill, 155 Vt. 422,
  425-26, 584 A.2d 1129, 1131 (1990).  Because the record does not reveal
  that such a colloquy between the court and defendant took place, we reverse
  the conviction.
   
       ¶  4.  Before we turn to the validity of defendant's waiver of
  counsel, in Section I we affirm the court's conclusion that defendant was
  competent to stand trial and/or waive any of his rights.  The trial court
  ordered an initial evaluation and a follow-up when defendant sought to
  remove his third attorney, and held a competency hearing immediately prior
  to trial.  The record that emerged from these proceedings supports the
  court's finding that defendant was competent.  Next, in Section II, we
  explain our reversal of the court's ruling that defendant validly waived
  his right to counsel. (FN1)

                  I.  Defendant's Competency to Stand Trial

       ¶  5.  The district court addressed defendant's competency at multiple
  junctures between the arraignment in late September 2000 and the trial in
  September 2002.  The issue first arose at a status conference on November
  20, 2000, when the State requested that any mental health issues be dealt
  with early in the case.  The court noted that there was a "serious issue"
  that defendant may have committed the crime "under some kind of delusions
  of a psychiatric nature," and agreed to revisit the issue of an evaluation. 
  At the next status conference, on December 18, 2000, the court ordered an
  evaluation for competency and sanity.  

       ¶  6.  Dr. Robert Linder conducted the evaluation and rendered a
  report dated January 29, 2001, concluding that "[a]n opinion that Dennis
  Tribble is mentally competent to stand trial for the alleged offense would
  find support."  Dr. Linder continued:

    [Defendant] has a good understanding of the charge.  He is able to
    assess the accuracy of that charge through his knowledge of the
    elements needed to show his guilt.  He is aware that his attorneys
    are representing him and that the State's Attorney will prosecute
    him.  He has some ideas about his possible defenses and realizes
    whom the state and his lawyers might call at trial to prove their
    cases.  He is aware that the judge will make the decision about
    his fate.  In a trial, he knows that a jury will stand in judgment
    and determine if he is guilty or not guilty.  He was able to
    understand the plea bargaining process.  He would be able to
    attend in court, to testify relevantly and to assist in
    cross-examination.

  Neither party asked the court for a ruling on competency at the hearing on
  February 12, 2001, although the court and counsel briefly discussed the
  report in the context of a potential insanity defense. 

       ¶  7.  Over a year later, after defendant requested that his third set
  of attorneys be dismissed, the court ordered a second competency evaluation
  during a July 2, 2002 telephone conference.  The court wanted Dr. Linder to
  do a "last-minute check . . . to see if there was anything new which had
  developed or come about that would cause me to conclude that [defendant]
  might not be competent to waive counsel."  Dr. Linder performed the
  evaluation, and, in his July 25, 2002 report, Dr. Linder determined that
  "[w]hile [defendant] demonstrates paranoia regarding events that led up to
  the shooting, his appreciation of the court process remains intact and has
  not been incorporated in any similar persecutory ideas."  Dr. Linder also
  recognized that because defendant's "personality is defined by a pervasive
  distrust and suspiciousness of others," he "may well" continue to
  experience difficulty working with new defense counsel.  Notwithstanding
  the above, he concluded that defendant was mentally competent to stand
  trial.  After receiving Dr. Linder's report, the court found defendant
  competent. 
   
       ¶  8.  On September 16, 2002, one day before jury selection was
  slated to begin, the court held a hearing in response to a defense motion
  to determine competency.  Dr. Albert Drukteinis, whom defense counsel had
  requested to perform an evaluation of defendant, opined that defendant was
  not competent to stand trial "because I don't think he's able to work with
  his attorney through the whole process of trial."  Specifically, Dr.
  Drukteinis testified that defendant suffered from a delusional disorder
  that made it impossible for him to cooperate with his lawyers.  He
  testified that defendant's failure to cooperate with his attorneys resulted
  not from his desire to be "obstructionistic," but "because he believes that
  the wrong path is being followed under his defense."  On cross-examination,
  and in his written report, Dr. Drukteinis acknowledged that defendant
  understood the charge and possible punishment, the role of the attorneys,
  judge, witnesses, and jury, the plea bargaining process, and his right not
  to be compelled to testify.  Echoing Dr. Linder, he recognized that
  defendant had, at least "[i]n a token way," agreed to pursue an insanity
  defense.  And finally, Dr. Drukteinis agreed that a competent professional
  psychiatrist could disagree with his diagnosis of a delusional disorder and
  therefore find defendant competent. 

       ¶  9.  Dr. Linder testified for the State.  Consistent with his two
  reports, he testified that defendant remained competent to stand trial.  He
  acknowledged that defendant's paranoid personality disorder made it
  difficult for him to cooperate with his attorneys, but that this challenge
  was "not one in my view that can't be achieved."  Dr. Linder also testified
  that defendant's unwillingness to pursue an insanity defense was not
  necessarily a product of his disorder because, in Dr. Linder's view,
  defendant did not have a strong insanity defense.  The court ruled that
  defendant was competent to stand trial, finding Dr. Linder's analysis more
  persuasive than Dr. Drukteinis's. 
   
       ¶  10.  We will not overturn a trial court's competency determination
  if it is supported by the court's findings, and if the findings in turn are
  supported by credible evidence and are not clearly erroneous.  State v.
  Marku, 2004 VT 31, ¶ 19, 176 Vt. 607,