Title: Tillery v. West Side Canal, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Tillery v. West Side Canal, Inc.1986 WY 125719 P.2d 1384Case Number: 85-110Decided: 06/02/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Clarence E. TILLERY and Alice Faye Tillery, Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

WEST SIDE CANAL, INC., 
Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from District Court,CarbonCounty, Robert A. Hill, 
J

Jack Gage, 
Cheyenne, for appellants.

Robert M. 
Shively, Casper, 
for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROONEY*, BROWN, CARDINE and URBIGKIT, 
JJ.

* Retired November 30, 
1985. 

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The question raised in 
this case is whether owners of an irrigation canal are subject to a standard of 
reasonable care under the circumstances or some higher standard in determining 
liability for damages resulting from the failure of a headgate on the canal. The 
district court held that the standard to be applied was that of negligence, that 
is, ordinary care under the circumstances. The district court then concluded 
that the owners of the canal were not negligent, and it entered a judgment in 
their favor in an action brought by landowners for damages which were caused to 
their lands when a headgate on the canal failed. The negligence standard is the 
applicable standard, and the judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.

[¶2.]     The landowners have 
appealed from the judgment of the district court, and they submit this statement 
of the issue presented by the case:

"The issue presented for 
review in this case is simple and straightforward. The question is whether or 
not the trial court correctly interpreted W.S. 41-3-317 (1977) et seq., which 
was enacted as Chapter 120 of the Wyoming Session Laws of 
1977."

[¶3.]     The appellee, owner of 
the West SideCanal, states the issue in 
this way:

"Appellee believes that 
the issue presented for review by this case is whether or not the standard of 
conduct by which the liability of irrigation canal owners for property damage is 
determined is that of a reasonable and prudent man similarly situated, or is a 
standard more onerous, such as `strict liability'."

[¶4.]     Clarence and Faye 
Tillery are the owners of a ranch situated along the Little Snake River in the 
southern part of CarbonCounty. The West Side Canal, Inc. owns and 
operates the West 
SideCanal 
which runs across a portion of the Tillery property. The headgate for the 
West 
SideCanal by which water is 
diverted from the Little Snake River is located on the Tillery ranch. That 
headgate was constructed of concrete and reinforced with large boulders and 
earth fill. Between the Little Snake River and the headgate several stands of 
six-inch drill pipe were driven into the earth to protect the 
headgate.

[¶5.]     The winter of 1983-1984 
created a record snowpack in the mountains above the Tillery ranch. After a long 
and cold spring the weather warmed considerably in May of 1984, and this caused 
a rapid melting of the snowpack. Prior to that time the highest recorded 
stream-flow on the Little Snake River was 9,600 c.f.s. in 1920. This occurred 
prior to the construction of the headgate in 1939. On May 15, 1984, the Little 
Snake River was carrying 10,480 c.f.s., and in the morning hours of May 16, a 
reservoir situated above the West 
SideCanal 
headgate failed, adding to the flow in the already flooded river. The 
stream-flow following the failure of the reservoir was 14,000 c.f.s. The force 
of this water tore out the West SideCanal 
headgate, and the water coursing down the canal then flooded and damaged the 
Tillery ranch.

[¶6.]     The Tillerys brought 
this action against West Side Canal, Inc. to recover for the damages to their 
property. They advanced theories of negligence and of strict liability. The 
trial court found that the complaint and the evidence were presented on a 
negligence theory, but the Tillerys' contention that strict liability should be 
the rule also was addressed. The trial court even permitted the Tillerys to 
amend their complaint after judgment. That amendment alleges that the standard 
of care applicable to West Side Canal, Inc., is that of strict liability, but 
the factors which are set forth to invoke strict liability are negligent design, 
construction, maintenance, and so forth. The trial court held that the standard 
to be applied to the action was that of due care.

[¶7.]     In its findings the 
trial court concluded that the proximate cause of the headgate failure was the 
unforeseeable flood caused by the record snowpack, the unseasonable thawing and 
the early high water as augmented by the failure of the reservoir. The trial 
court determined that the magnitude of the flood could not have been foreseen 
reasonably and that West Side Canal, Inc., was not negligent because it had used 
reasonable care in the maintenance and operation of its ditch and headgate. The 
court then entered a judgment in favor of West Side Canal, Inc., with respect to 
the Tillerys' claim for damages. It is from that determination of the trial 
court that the Tillerys appeal.

[¶8.]     In Wyoming negligence 
historically has been the standard for determining liability of ditch owners for 
damages. In 1905 this court held:

"The well settled rule is 
that the owner of an irrigating ditch is bound to exercise reasonable care and 
skill to prevent injury to other persons from such ditch, and he will be liable 
for all damages occurring to others as a result of his negligence or 
unskillfulness in constructing, maintaining, or operating the ditch. * *" Howell 
v. Big Horn Colonization Company, 14 Wyo. 14, 36-37, 81 P. 785, 790 
(1905).

This rule has 
been followed consistently. Pine Creek Canal No. 1 v. Stadler, Wyo., 685 P.2d 13 
(1984); Taylor Ditch Company, Inc. v. Carey, 
Wyo., 520 P.2d 218 (1974); Redland v. Tharp, Wyo., 498 P.2d 1240 
(1972); Jacoby v. Town of City of Gillette, 62 Wyo. 487, 174 P.2d 505 (1946), reh. denied 62 
Wyo. 487, 177 P.2d 204 (1947).

[¶9.]     The rule of these cases 
was developed against a statutory treatment of the question which could have 
produced a different rule. Prior to 1977, § 17-190, W.S. 1957, provided that 
"[e]very ditch company * * * shall be required to keep the banks of their ditch 
or ditches in good condition, so that the water shall not be allowed to escape 
from the same * * *." Section 41-217, W.S. 1957, stated: "The owner or owners of 
any ditch for irrigation, or other purposes, shall carefully maintain the 
embankments thereof so that the water of such ditch may not flood or damage the 
premises of others." These statutes and the cases relating to the liability of 
ditch owners were relied upon in this court's decision in Wheatland Irrigation 
District v. McGuire, Wyo., 537 P.2d 1128 (1975).

[¶10.]  Because the failure of a reservoir was 
involved in Wheatland Irrigation District v. McGuire, supra, the specific 
statutory provision to be applied was § 41-46, W.S. 1957, which provided in 
pertinent part that reservoir owners "shall be liable for all damage arising 
from leakage or overflow." Comparing the strong language of this statutory 
provision pertaining to reservoir owners with similar strong language of the 
statutes relating to ditch owners, the court concluded that since the statutes 
pertaining to ditches did not make the ditch owner an insurer, the language of § 
41-46, W.S. 1957, did not make the reservoir owner an insurer. The court then 
held, in Wheatland Irrigation District v. McGuire, supra, that the statute 
pertaining to reservoir owners simply reaffirmed the doctrine of Rylands v. 
Fletcher, LR 3 HL 330 (1868), as it had evolved including its exceptions. 
Absolute liability would be imposed with respect to reservoir owners only if the 
occurrence was not within the penumbra of some applicable 
exception.

[¶11.]  Following the decision in Wheatland 
Irrigation District v. McGuire, supra, the legislature amended a substantial 
portion of Title 41, Chapter 3, Article 3, W.S. 1977, entitled "Reservoirs." 
These statutory revisions dealt primarily with the duties of state officers with 
respect to approving plans, inspecting, and making emergency repairs on 
reservoirs. Section 41-3-316, W.S. 1977, provides, with respect to these duties, 
that the state shall not be liable for any dereliction. The section immediately 
following provides:

"Nothing in this act 
shall be construed to relieve an owner or owners of any reservoir, dam or 
diversion system of any legal duties, obligations or liabilities incident to 
their ownership or operation of or any damages resulting from leakage or 
overflow of water or for floods resulting from the failure or rupture of the 
fill or structure for such works." § 41-3-317, W.S. 1977

 

Earlier in § 
41-3-307(a)(v), W.S. 1977, diversion system is defined:

"(a) As used in this act 
unless the context otherwise requires:

* * * * * 
*

"(v) `Diversion system' 
means any canal, ditch or pipeline with a carrying capacity in excess of fifty 
(50) cubic feet of water per second of time;"

[¶12.]  The record discloses that the West 
SideCanal has a maximum capacity of 250 c.f.s. 
and is a diversion system within the statute. Relying upon these statutory 
provisions the Tillerys argue that the standard of care with respect to owners 
and operators of ditches has been adjusted by the legislature. We do not 
discover any indication that the legislature intended to adjust the standard set 
forth in the cases cited previously by enacting this statute. We note first that 
the statute speaks only to an intention not to relieve an owner or owners of a 
diversion system of any legal duties, obligations or liabilities incident to 
their ownership or operation of or any damage resulting from leakage or overflow 
of water or for floods resulting from the failure or rupture of the fill or 
structure for such works. The statute is not couched in terms of imposing a 
liability. Furthermore, § 41-5-101, W.S. 1977, carries forward the language 
previously found in § 41-217, W.S. 1957. Adoption of the Tillerys' theory would 
result in holding, in effect, that the enactment of § 41-3-317, W.S. 1977, 
operated to repeal § 41-5-101, W.S. 1977, by implication.

[¶13.]  We hold instead that the language upon 
which the Tillerys rely had only the effect of maintaining the liability of 
reservoir owners as defined in Wheatland Irrigation District v. McGuire, supra, 
and ditch owners as defined in Pine Creek Canal No. 1 v. Stadler, supra, Taylor 
Ditch Company, Inc. v. Carey, supra, Jacoby v. Town of City of Gillette, supra, 
and Howell v. Big Horn Colonization Company, supra. In those cases the concept 
of Rylands v. Fletcher, supra, as a standard for liability for ditch owners was 
rejected. The rationale was that in the arid west a ditch is not an unnatural 
use of the land, but is customary, and thus that the first prerequisite of 
Rylands v. Fletcher, supra, is not present. The thrust of these cases is that 
the "standard of conduct for a ditch or canal owner is that of a reasonable, 
prudent ditch owner." Pine Creek Canal No. 1 v. Stadler, supra, 685 P.2d  at 
17.

[¶14.]  The district court properly applied the 
standard of negligence in deciding this case. The Tillerys do not argue that the 
evidence demonstrates any negligence on the part of West Side Canal, Inc. Their 
argument that § 41-3-317, W.S. 1977, changed the standard of liability for ditch 
owners and operators does not hold water.

[¶15.]  The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.

URBIGKIT, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶16.]  Disposition of this case invokes 
consideration of three relevant statutes and the comprehensive analysis and 
determination of Wyoming law as afforded by Wheatland Irrigation District v. 
McGuire, Wyo., 537 P.2d 1128 (1975).

[¶17.]  Those statutes are:

(1) "Nothing in this act 
shall be construed to relieve an owner or owners of any reservoir, dam or 
diversion system of any legal duties, obligations or liabilities incident to 
their ownership or operation of or any damages resulting from the leakage or 
overflow of water or for floods resulting from the failure or rupture of the 
fill or structure for such works." Section 41-3-317, W.S. 
1977.

(2) "(a) As used in this 
act unless the context otherwise requires:

* * * * * 
*

"(v) `Diversion system' 
means any canal, ditch or pipeline with a carrying capacity in excess of fifty 
(50) cubic feet of water per second of time; * *." Section 41-3-307, W.S. 1977, 
Cum.Supp. 1985.

(Both enacted by 
Ch. 120, S.L. of Wyoming 1977.) 

(3) "The owner 
or owners of any ditch for irrigation, or other purposes, shall carefully 
maintain the embankments thereof so that the water of such ditch may not flood 
or damage the premises of others." Section 41-5-101, W.S. 1977, derived from 
territorial legislation in 1876.

Also involved is 
the earlier reservoir liability statute, § 41-46, W.S. 1957, repealed by Ch. 
120, S.L. of Wyoming 1977 which enacted § 41-3-317, W.S. 
1977.

[¶18.]  I would submit that the court now clearly 
misunderstands or misinterprets the legislative intent as incorporated in the 
1977 legislation.

[¶19.]  Contendedly, at least, the legislature in 
recodification and amendatory legislation always considers the course of prior 
litigative conclusion when involved in the subject of proposed 
legislation.

[¶20.]  Consequently, when the legislature came 
to consider the 1977 statute, it had the text of § 41-46, W.S. 1957, as defined 
by Wheatland Irrigation District v. McGuire, supra, wherein the 
absolute-liability phraseology was tempered by the exceptions provided by the 
case construction as determining that differing from an ordinary negligence 
status the burden of the defendant facility owner upon water escape was an 
affirmative defense:

"`The defendant can 
excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's default 
or perhaps that the escape was a consequence of vis major or the act of God.'" 
537 P.2d  at 1133, quoting from McDonald, The Rule in Rylands vs. Fletcher and 
its Limitations, 57 Am.L.Rev. 549, 554.

[¶21.]  The present decision of this court 
implicates question about the intent of the legislature to retain the law of 
Wheatland Irrigation as the rule in the dam-water-escape cases, which result is 
demonstrably contrary to legislative intent.

[¶22.]  Having clouded the liability rules 
derived from § 41-46, W.S. 1957, as enunciated by Wheatland Irrigation, the 
court then goes further to deny plain language which was intended by the 
legislature to bring the diversion systems into the ambient of the 
dam-failure-liability status. This second mistake follows by further analysis 
from the first erroneous construction of the statute. The legislature seems to 
have a continuing problem with judicial interpretation in water cases. See my 
dissent to denial of rehearing in State, Board of Land Commissioners v. Lonesome 
Fox Corporation, Wyo., 714 P.2d 783, 784 (1986).

[¶23.]  The court by the decision disregards the 
phraseology and intent of § 41-3-317, from the legislative enactment which 
defined diversion systems to be included in the reservoir or dam classification 
for liability purposes in order to afford the differentiation from the smaller 
ditch of under 50 cubic feet per second capacity. There is no question in this 
case that the facility involved in the damage to plaintiff was a defined 
diversion system and would consequently come within the coverage of § 
41-3-317.

[¶24.]  The court thus misinterprets the 
legislative intent and thereby retains the diversion system under case law 
relating to ditches rather than major diversion systems as the differentiation 
was clearly intended by the 1977 enactment, Ch. 120, S.L. of Wyoming 
1977.

[¶25.]  The substantive difference is the 
question of burden of proof, wherein as to the dam the owner has the affirmative 
burden in order to establish a defense in a strict-liability mode for the 
defense as contrasted with the standard applied to ditches, now last found in 
Pine Creek Canal No. 1 v. Stadler, Wyo., 685 P.2d 13 (1984), which case 
enunciates the rule of liability as the burden for plaintiff with a case status 
comparable to the normal negligence proceedings.

[¶26.]  The confusion of theory by the court in 
this case will occasion serious future problems in the analysis and resolution 
of litigation involving either a dam break or a diversion system 
failure.

[¶27.]  I concur in result with the court, 
however, by accepting the determination of the trial court that the damage 
devolved from an act of God by virtue of the historically high snowpack for the 
area and the consequent flooding which resulted as an uncontrolled event of 
nature.

[¶28.]  I would hold that defendants met their 
burden of proof for the demonstration of the affirmative defense, pursuant to 
the teachings and critera of Wheatland Irrigation District v. McGuire, 
supra.