Title: Shinn v. Bd of Co Comm Clearwater Co

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 40436 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPROVAL OF 
VARIANCE ZV2011-2. 
_______________________________________ 
EDWARD L. SHINN and DONILEE E. 
SHINN, husband and wife, 
 
       Petitioners-Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF CLEARWATER COUNTY, IDAHO, 
 
       Respondent. 
_______________________________________ 
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Coeur d’Alene, April 2014 Term 
 
2014 Opinion No. 56 
 
Filed: June 17, 2014 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Clearwater County.  Hon. Michael J. Griffin, District Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded.  
 
Jones, Brower and Callery, PLLC, Lewiston, for appellants. Karin R. Seubert 
argued. 
 
E. Clayne Tyler, Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney, Orofino, argued for 
respondent.  
_____________________ 
 
J. JONES, Justice. 
 
This appeal is from a decision of the district court affirming the approval of a subdivision 
by the Board of County Commissioners of Clearwater County (“Board”). In approving the 
subdivision, the Board approved three variances granted by the Clearwater County Planning and 
Zoning Commission (“Commission”) with respect to the road providing access to the 
subdivision. A portion of the access road crossed over land owned by Edward and Donilee 
Shinn, who opposed the variances and petitioned the district court for judicial review. The 
Shinns appealed the district court’s decision to this Court.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
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Edward and Carole Galloway own a 99.82-acre parcel of land in Clearwater County, 
which they purchased in 1985 (“Galloway parcel”). The Galloway parcel is zoned F-1, which is 
designated as a low-density residential district. The nearest county road, Middle Road, provides 
access to the Galloway parcel via an easement over land owned by Edward and Donilee Shinn, 
and Don Ingle, who is not a party to this action. In 1998, the Galloways secured the easement 
from the Shinns’ predecessor in interest. The easement reads: 
FURTHERMORE, in consideration of One Dollar ($1.00) and other good and 
valuable consideration, H.L. Ogden, Robert J. Brock and Elaine Brock, husband 
and wife, and Harold Johnson and Sophia Johnson, husband and wife, grant to 
Edward J. Galloway and Carole K. Galloway, husband and wife, a perpetual non-
exclusive easement thirty (30’) feet in width for ingress and egress to the county 
road and Section 17, Township 37 N., Range 1 E.B.M. . . ., a perpetual non-
exclusive easement fifteen feet (15’) in width across the easterly fifteen feet (15’) 
of the E1/2 of the NE1/4 of Section 17 for ingress and egress to the easterly 
extremity of the easement for ingress and egress granted above. . . . [As well as] a 
perpetual non-exclusive easement fifteen feet (15’) in width for ingress and egress 
across the westerly fifteen feet (15’) of the NW1/4 of Section 16 for ingress and 
egress to the extremity of the first easement for ingress and egress granted above 
to Edward J. Galloway and Carole K. Galloway, husband and wife, together with 
a perpetual thirty foot (30’) easement for utilities across the westerly thirty feet 
(30’) of the NW1/4 of Section 16. . . . This Grant of Easements is binding upon 
and inures to the benefit of the heirs, assigns, and successors of the parties hereto, 
and the easement for ingress and egress shall not be deemed a public right-of-
way. 
Notably, there has been no judicial adjudication of the Shinns’ or the Galloways’ respective 
rights and obligations under the terms of the easement.  
 
On May 23, 2006, the Galloways filed an application with the Commission, requesting its 
approval to subdivide their parcel into ten separate parcels, ranging from between six and twelve 
acres in size. During the review process, it became clear that the proposed subdivision, called the 
South Fork Estates, would not comply with the access provisions of the Clearwater County 
Subdivision Ordinance (“CCSO”). Article IV of the CCSO makes it the “responsibility of the 
subdivision developer to provide an access road from the nearest Federal, State or County road 
or highway to the subdivision site,” and requires that access roads to a proposed subdivision have 
a sixty-foot right-of-way, have a minimum finished width of twenty-four feet, and be dedicated 
to public use.   
 
On January 11, 2011, the Galloways filed an application for three variances from Article 
IV of the CCSO. Those variances would allow for the access road to (1) have a thirty-foot right-
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of-way; (2) have an eighteen-foot finished width with a fifteen-foot finished width at the 
property line (referred to as the “bottleneck”); and (3) be a private, as opposed to public, road. A 
public hearing was held on March 21, 2011. At the hearing, Mr. Galloway provided supporting 
testimony, while several others—but not the Shinns—provided opposing testimony, and the 
Idaho Department of Lands proffered neutral testimony. The Commission approved each of the 
three variance requests in its April 4, 2011 decision (“Commission’s First Decision”).  
 
On March 25, 2011, the Shinns timely appealed the Commission’s First Decision to the 
Board. They stated the following as grounds for their appeal: 
No facts or testimony were presented which would authorize the issuances (sic) of 
a variance under the terms and conditions of the Clearwater County Subdivision 
Ordinance. Further, that the easement which the Galloways propose to use for 
easement for ingress and egress for parties other than Mr. [a]nd Mrs. Galloway. 
Finally, that it is not appropriate for a variance to be granted from the requirement 
that access to the subdivision be dedicated for public use. 
The Board held a hearing on May 23, 2011, before ultimately reversing the Commission’s 
approval of the three variances in its decision dated July 29, 2011 (“Board’s First Decision”). 
The Board found the Commission’s determination that the Galloways would suffer undue 
hardship if the variances were not approved—a requirement under CCSO Art. VIII—was not 
supported by substantial evidence. The Board emphasized that there was no testimony as to the 
issue of undue hardship, and thus, it had “no choice but to reverse the decision of the 
Commission with regard to” that issue.  
 
The Board also briefly addressed the Shinns’ argument that the easement would preclude 
anyone besides the Galloways from using the access road for ingress and egress. With regard to 
that contention, the Board stated: 
The Board, upon review of the record, tentatively finds that the bare language of 
the easement itself does not prohibit subdivision of the property. The Board does 
not intend to look behind the bare language, nor to attempt to determine the 
historical intent of the original parties to the grant and receipt of the easement, but 
limits its review to the bare language of the document, which appears clear and 
unambiguous.  
Sufficient evidence was entered at the Commission level to support the finding 
that the easement is legally adequate to allow subdivision. It is felt that the proper 
forum for challenging the intent and scope of an easement of this nature is 
through the Courts rather than the Board. 
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The Galloways’ application was then remanded to the Commission for further public hearing and 
so that the Commission could “review and identify whether or not there is undue hardship as 
required by the county ordinance.” On August 15, 2011, the Commission held another public 
hearing. In its decision dated September 6, 2011, (“Commission’s Second Decision”) the 
Commission concluded that undue hardship had been demonstrated, noting:  
Requiring the applicant to comply with the strict enforcement of the ordinance 
requirements along with the additional costs involved would be unreasonable and 
would create an undue hardship on the applicant not justified when an eighteen 
(18) foot wide road built on the granted thirty (30) foot wide easement along with 
a fifteen (15) foot gate at the property line has been deemed adequate and safe to 
provide access to this proposed low density rural subdivision. 
The Commission once again approved all three variances, and the Shinns again appealed to the 
Board on August 31, 2011. The Board heard the appeal on October 24, 2011, affirmed the 
Commission’s approval of the variances on November 7, 2011, and entered a written decision to 
that effect on November 21, 2011 (“Board’s Second Decision”). In its Second Decision, the 
Board found that (1) “sufficient evidence was presented to justify the Commission’s findings[;]” 
(2) the Commission did not abuse its discretion; and (3) the easement appears to allow for 
development, provided that the variance is granted to allow the access road to remain private. 
With regard to this third conclusion, the Board noted that “[t]his is not meant nor is to be 
construed as a finding based upon a disputed hearing as to the intent of the parties to the 
easement itself, but is to be construed as a finding solely for agency planning and zoning 
purposes.” On December 19, 2011, the Board entered its final decision approving the South Fork 
Estates Subdivision, based on its prior approval of the three variances at issue (“Decision 
Approving the Subdivision”).  
 
The Shinns subsequently filed a petition for judicial review with the district court. The 
district court heard oral arguments on August 28, 2012, before entering its Findings and 
Conclusions and Judgment on September 11, 2012 (“Order”), in which it upheld the Board’s 
decision on the grounds that the Shinns “have not shown that the variances would prejudice any 
substantial right of theirs.” The Shinns filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.  
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. 
Whether the Board erred in approving the subdivision with its three road 
variances. 
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2. 
Whether the district court erred in concluding that the Board’s action did not 
prejudice the Shinns’ substantial rights. 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
 
The standard of review is well-settled:  
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows an affected person to seek 
judicial review of an approval or denial of a land use application, as provided for 
in the Idaho Administrative Procedural Act (IDAPA). For purposes of judicial 
review of LLUPA decisions, a local agency making a land use decision, such as 
the Board of Commissioners, is treated as a government agency under IDAPA.  
In a subsequent appeal from a district court’s decision in which the district court 
was acting in its appellate capacity under the Administrative Procedure Act ..., the 
Supreme Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court’s 
decision. As to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, this Court will not 
substitute its judgment for that of the zoning agency. . . . 
Finally, planning and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong presumption of 
validity; this includes the board’s application and interpretation of their own 
zoning ordinances.  
Cowan v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Fremont Cnty., 143 Idaho 501, 508, 148 P.3d 1247, 1254 (2006) 
(internal citations omitted).  
 
The applicable statutory framework for reviewing agency action is found in I.C. § 67-
5279. Pursuant to section 67-5279(3): 
 [T]he court shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency’s 
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:  
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;  
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;  
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;  
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or  
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
I.C. § 67-5279(3). Section 67-5279(4) lays out an additional requirement: “agency action shall be 
affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.” I.C. § 67-5279(4). 
Thus, “[t]he party attacking a zoning board’s action must first illustrate that the board erred in a 
manner specified [in Section 67-5279(3)] and must then show that a substantial right of the party 
has been prejudiced.” Cowan, 143 Idaho at 508, 148 P.3d at 1254. Because this is an appeal from 
the district court, the Court reviews that decision “as a matter of procedure.” Jasso v. Camas 
County, 151 Idaho 790, 793, 264 P.3d 897, 900 (2011). 
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B. The Board erred when it failed to make the approval of the Galloways’ application 
expressly contingent upon judicial resolution of the access issue. 
During oral argument before this Court, Shinns’ counsel made a compelling point, citing 
to our holding in Jasso v. Camas County. After noting the guidance we provided for subdivision 
access issues of the nature involved both there and here, counsel pointed out that it is not the 
Shinns who are seeking to expand the usage of the easement across their property. Rather, it is 
the owners of the easement, the dominant estate holders, who seek to expand the scope of the 
easement for their benefit in developing their property. As a condition of obtaining approval of 
its subdivision, the developer is required under Art. IV § D.1 of the CCSO “to provide an access 
road from the nearest . . . County road . . . to the subdivision site.” This is just another condition 
that a subdivider must fulfill in order to gain approval of its subdivision. 
While the Board recognized that it was not the proper entity to determine the scope of the 
easement and while it noted that a court of law would need to determine the issue of whether the 
easement would support the usage contemplated by the subdivision, it outright approved the road 
variances for the subdivision with the recommendation that the Shinns pursue the matter in a 
declaratory judgment action in a court of law. In effect, this required the Shinns to go to court to 
prove that the Galloways did not have the right to use the easement to the extent necessary to 
support their subdivision. This approach seems to put the shoe on the wrong foot, as we strongly 
hinted in Jasso.  
Jasso arose out of a petition for judicial review of the Camas County Board of 
Commissioners’ decision to approve a preliminary subdivision plat. Jasso, 151 Idaho at 792, 264 
P.3d at 899. Jasso presented similar facts to those found here: (1) a developer submitted an 
application to develop a subdivision; (2) the access road, Fricke Creek Road, was not a public 
road, but connected the proposed subdivision site to a public road via an easement over property 
owned by the Appellants; (3) the applicable subdivision ordinance required that subdivisions 
have access to a public road; and (4) the Appellants contended that the easement was private, and 
could not permit subdivision access. Id. Eventually, the Camas County Board conditionally 
approved the preliminary subdivision plat. Id. at 793, 264 P.3d at 900. The district court 
reversed, holding that the Camas County Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. Id. On 
appeal from the district court, this Court considered whether the Camas County Board of 
Commissioners’ findings of fact and conclusions of law failed to satisfy certain statutory 
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requirements. Id. at 794, 264 P.3d at 901. We affirmed the district court’s decision, which had 
vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded the matter to the Board. Id., at 797, 264 P.3d at 904. 
The Court went on to give the following guidance: 
B. Interpretation of the Subdivision Ordinance 
Although not necessary to our decision today, we provide the following guidance 
on remand as to the provisions of the Subdivision Ordinance relevant to the 
parties’ dispute. 
 
1. If a land use application is submitted and proper access to the land is 
disputed, the decision-maker should make the application’s approval 
expressly contingent upon judicial resolution of the access issue. 
 
The parties dispute whether a “road and utility easement for ingress and egress” is 
sufficient in scope to permit public access to the proposed subdivision. The Board 
correctly determined that it lacks jurisdiction to determine the easement’s nature 
and scope, as questions of property ownership must be resolved by a district 
court. Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 133 Idaho 833, 842, 993 P.2d 
596, 605 (1999). Since article V, § B(1) of the Subdivision Ordinance requires 
that subdivisions with five or more lots have access to a public street or road, the 
Board may not approve the subdivision application until such access is certain. 
Thus, the Board may condition approval of the subdivision application upon a 
district court’s entry of declaratory or final judgment that the easement provides 
the subdivision with the necessary access to a public road. See McFadden v. Sein, 
139 Idaho 921, 923, 88 P.3d 740, 742 (2004) (affirming district court’s judgment 
as to easement’s scope after county commissioners made approval of conditional 
use permit expressly contingent upon judicial resolution of scope of the 
easement). 
Id. at 797, 264 P.3d at 904. 
 
While the foregoing guidance was not necessary to our decision in Jasso, we consider it 
to be necessary here. Thus, we hold that if a land use application is submitted and proper access 
to the land is not certain, the decision-maker must make the application’s approval expressly 
contingent upon judicial resolution of the access issue. This holding is consistent with notions of 
fairness, finality, and judicial efficiency. At the county level, the Shinns were left trying to prove 
a negative—that the proposed subdivision did not have access as required by CCSO. But it is the 
Galloways who have the burden to show that each requirement under the CCSO, which includes 
appropriate access to the proposed subdivision, is satisfied. Therefore, the burden is on the 
Galloways to establish, through a declaratory action in district court, that the easement allows for 
subdivision access consistent with the CCSO requirements. The Board acted arbitrarily in 
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approving the subdivision without proof of proper access to Middle Road and we therefore 
vacate its action and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
C. Guidance on remand. 
Although we do not rule upon it here, an issue arose during oral argument before the 
Court that must be considered upon remand. That is, whether the CCSO, or perhaps some other 
ordinance of Clearwater County, even allows the types of variances sought here.  
As noted above, the road requirements are specified in Art. IV of the CCSO. Article VIII 
contains the CCSO’s variance provisions. It states: 
SECTION A. PURPOSE 
The Commission may grant, as a result of unique circumstances such as 
topographical-physical limitations or a planned unit development, a variance, as 
herein defined, from the provisions of this Ordinance on a finding that undue 
hardship results from the strict compliance with specific provisions of 
requirements of this Ordinance or that the application of such requirements or 
provision is impracticable. (02-25-1985) 
SECTION B. FINDINGS 
No variance, as herein defined, shall be favorably acted upon by the Commission 
unless there is a finding, as a result of a public hearing, that all of the following 
exist: (02-25-1985) 
1. That there are such special circumstances or conditions affecting the 
property that the strict application of the provisions of this Ordinance 
would clearly be impracticable or unreasonable and cause an undue 
hardship; in such cases, the developer shall first state his reasons in 
writing as to the specific provisions or requirements involved. 
2. That strict compliance with the requirements of the Ordinance would 
result in extraordinary topography, or such other conditions would 
result in inhibiting the achievement of the objectives of the Ordinance. 
(08-17-1981) 
3. That the granting of the specified variance would not be detrimental to 
the public welfare or injurious to other property in the area in which 
the property is situated. 
4. That such variance will not violate the provisions of the IDAHO 
CODE. 
5. That such variance will not have the effect of nullifying the interest 
and purpose of this Ordinance and the Comprehensive Plan. 
SECTION C. GENERAL 
The Commission shall consider the following: (08-17-1981) 
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1. Administrative appeals where it is alleged that an error has been made 
by the Administrator; (08-17-1981) 
2. Variances from the terms of this Ordinance; (08-17-1981) 
3. Requests for hearings from affected persons. (08-17-1981) 
(emphasis supplied). The CCSO’s definition of “variance” does not appear to be contained in the 
record. 
 
During oral argument, Justice Eismann inquired of counsel for both parties as to whether 
the definition of variance included the type of road variances at issue in this case. Justice 
Eismann recited the definition in Art. II § B of the CCSO to the Board’s counsel: “A 
modification of the requirements of this Ordinance as to, lot size, lot coverage, width, front 
yards, rear yards, setbacks, parking spaces, height of a building or other ordinance provisions 
affecting the size or shape of a structure or the size of the lots.”1 Justice Eismann then inquired 
as to what authority the Board had for granting variances from the road requirements, when the 
CCSO’s definition of “variance” did not appear to include the type of variations sought here. 
Counsel for the Board indicated that the authority might exist in the Zoning Ordinance but that 
does not appear to be the case.2 
 
Thus, on remand it will be necessary for the parties to address the authority of the 
Commission or Board to grant an exception or variance to the road requirements in Art. IV of the 
CCSO.  
D. Whether the Shinns’ substantial rights were prejudiced by the Board’s decision 
must be determined on remand.  
The district court did not consider the issues raised by the Shinns regarding the approval 
of the variances, focusing rather on whether the Shinns’ substantial rights were prejudiced by the 
Board’s decision and holding that they had not been. The Board did not address this issue in its 
Second Decision, although it touched upon it in its First Decision―“For the purposes of this 
appeal to the Board, due to the access road at issue being an easement which crosses the Shinn’s 
(sic) property and accesses neighboring property, the Board finds the Shinns to have a substantial 
                                                 
1 The codified version of the CCSO indicates that this definition of “variance” became effective on 08-25-1985, the 
same effective date as Sections A and B of Article VIII.  
2 The definition of variance in the Clearwater County Zoning Ordinance, Art. II § 202, reads: “A modification of the 
requirements of the Ordinance as to lot size, lot coverage, width, setbacks, parking space, height of a building or 
other Ordinance provisions affecting the size or shape or a structure of the size of the lots.” Idaho Code section 67-
6516 provides a similar definition of “variance.” 
10 
 
right which may be prejudiced and thus have standing to appeal.” This statement seems to 
conflate the issue of standing with the issue of prejudice to a substantial right. There does not 
appear to be any consideration of prejudice to a substantial right in the remaining proceedings by 
either the Commission or the Board. Arguably, granting approval of a subdivision without 
having determined the adequacy of the access road could prejudice the substantial rights of the 
servient estate owner upon which the road is located, but it would appear premature to make any 
such determination until such time as the scope of the easement has been definitively determined 
in a declaratory judgment action. Because of our decision to reverse and remand, any 
consideration of the issue of prejudice to substantial rights is clearly unripe for determination.  
V. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We reverse the district court’s decision, vacate the Board’s action, and remand the case 
for further proceedings. Costs on appeal are awarded to the Shinns. 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices EISMANN, W. JONES, and HORTON 
CONCUR.