Title: Monk v. Ching

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

139.New. Advance Opinion |&

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DAVID MONK AS SPECIAL No. 82898,
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
OF SHARON MONK,

ve . FILED

HARRY CHING, M.D., AN

INDIVIDUAL; CHRISTOPHER We 96 WE
MCNICOLL, M.D., AN INDIVIDUAL; pus doce
AND ALLEN YOUNG, M.D., AN SEE “er
INDIVIDUAL, parC
Respondents.

Appeal from a district court order, certified as final under
NRCP 54(b), partially dismissing a medical malpractice action. Eighth
Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jessica K. Peterson, Judge.

Affirmed.

Hayes Wakayama Juan and Dale A. Hayes, Jeremy D. Holmes, Dale A.
Hayes, Jr., and Liane K. Wakayama, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, and Brigette E. Foley-Peak, Erin F.
Jordan, and 8. Brent Vogel, Las Vegas,
for Respondents.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, CADISH, PICKERING, and BELL, JJ.

23- Us/o

 
OPINION

By the Court, PICKERING, J.:

‘This is an appeal from a district court order, certified as final
under NRCP 54(b), partially dismissing a medical malpractice action for
failure to meet NRS 41A.071's affidavit-of-merit requirement as to three of
the named defendants. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Sharon Monk underwent surgery at University Medical Center
(UMC) to remove a malignant tumor at the base of her tongue. The surgical
wound became infected, and Sharon’s surgeon performed a second surgery

to place a skin graft. The infection worsened, and orders were given to pack

 

the wound with acetic gauze and then to place a wound vac. Months later,
it was discovered that the gauze had not been removed, causing Sharon's
ongoing pain and recurrent infections. Sharon passed away some months
after the gauze was removed.

David Monk, as special administrator of Sharon’s estate, sued
UMC and Sharon’s other healthcare providers. The complaint included as
defendants the three physicians who are respondents to this appeal, each of
whom allegedly participated in Sharon’s post-operative care while in UMC's
residency program. Monk supported the complaint with a declaration from
Nurse Jamescia Hambrick and her curriculum vitae (CV). Respondents
moved to dismiss the claims against them, arguing that Nurse Hambrick
failed to show she was qualified to opine to a physician's standard of care
and that her declaration failed to adequately identify the alleged negligence
or state her opinions to a reasonable degree of medical probability. After a

"We grant respondents’ unopposed motion to publish and issue this
opinion in place of our prior unpublished disposition. See NRAP 36().

 

 
le

hearing, the district court granted respondents’ motion, finding that “Nurse
Hambrick has not practiced as a physician and has never practiced in the
same or substantially similar type of practice” as respondents and that “as
‘a matter of law(,] Nurse Hambrick lacks the qualifications necessary to
satisfy NRS 414.071 as to” respondents.

Monk obtained an order under NRCP 54(b) permitting
immediate appeal of the district court's order dismissing respondents from
the case. On appeal, he argues that the district court erred in concluding
that the claims against respondents cannot be supported by an NRS
41A.071 affidavit produced by a nurse and that Nurse Hambrick’s
declaration otherwise satisfies NRS 41A.071's prelitigation requirements
for actions alleging professional negligence against physicians. He argues
alternatively that the affidavit requirement in NRS 41A.071 does not apply
because the complaint’s allegations fall under the res ipsa loquitur
exception for a “foreign substance . . . unintentionally left within the body
of a patient following surgery” in NRS 41A.100(1)(a)..

DISCUSSION

Our review is de novo, see Zohar v. Zbiegien, 130 Nev. 733, 737,
834 P.3d 402, 405 (2014) (reviewing de novo issues of statutory construction
pertaining to NRS 41A.071), and we affirm. NRS 41A.071(1) provides that
“filf an action for professional negligence is filed in the district court, the
district court shall dismiss the action” if it is filed without an affidavit that
“{slupports the allegations contained in the action.” Subsection 2 of NRS
41A.071 requires Nurse Hambrick, as the medical expert submitting the
affidavit in support of the complaint, to have practiced “in an area that is,
substantially similar to the type of practice engaged in at the time of the
alleged professional negligence.” Subsections 3 and 4 of NRS 41A.071
further provide that the supporting affidavit must “[iJdentifly] by name, or

 

 
describe] by conduct, each provider of health eare who is alleged to be
negligent,” and must “[sJet[ ] forth factually a specific act or acts of alleged
negligence separately as to each defendant in simple, concise and direct
terms.”

Here, Nurse Hambrick’s declaration and CV reflect that she has
training and experience in wound care and post-operative treatment. But
her declaration largely recites Sharon's surgical and post-surgical histories
and then broadly states that the “nursing/medical standard of care’
required the hospital to prevent infections in immunocompromised
patients, prevent surgical site infections, and place such patients in
isolation. Neither Nurse Hambrick’s declaration nor the complaint
adequately identifies the specific roles played by each individual
respondent. And notably absent from Nurse Hambrick’s declaration are the
relevant standards of care or any opinion as to how, or even whether, each
respondent breached that standard to a reasonable degree of medical
probability. Instead, the Hambrick declaration only avers that “[ijt is my
opinion stated to a reasonable degree of nursing certainty and /or probability
that the University Medical Center, Las Vegas and its nursing and physical
therapy staff providing care and wound care to Sharon Monk during her
admission August 22, 2018 through September 21, 2018 breached the
nursing standing of care” by (1) “failing to prevent infection” and (2) “failing
to remove gauze used to pack her neck wound causing recurrent infection.”

Monk characterizes the issue presented by this appeal as
whether a nurse is categorically barred from providing an affidavit against
a physician that will satisfy NRS 414.071. Compare Williams v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 518, 529, 262 P.3d 360, 367 (2011) (holding

that, while the nurse expert could testify at trial to disinfectant techniques,

 

 
he lacked the expertise to opine as to medical causation), with Borger v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 1021, 1028, 102 P.3d 600, 605 (2004)
(holding that NRS 41A.071 “does not require that the affiant practice in the
same area of medicine as the defendant; rather, it requires that the affiant
practice in an area ‘substantially similar’ to that in which the defendant
engaged” at the time of the alleged malpractice). But this case does not
require us to go so far. Even when read in conjunetion with the complaint,
see Zohar, 130 Nev. at 739, 334 P.3d at 406, the Hambrick declaration does
not sufficiently specify the acts of negligence as to each respondent, or
express an opinion as to the medical standard of care the respondent
breached. These failures defeat our ability to measure whether Nurse
Hambrick has substantially similar expertise to provide the NRS 41A.071
affidavit. See Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev.
1298, 1304, 148 P.3d 790, 794 (2006) (explaining that the affidavit
requirement was meant to ensure medical malpractice actions are reviewed
by an expert before the case is filed and that such cases are supported by
competent medical opinion). ‘The Hambrick declaration and complaint do
not satisfy the requirements of NRS 41A.071 as to the respondent
physicians,

Monk's alternative argument regarding res ipsa loquitur also
lacks merit. ‘The complaint and Hambrick declaration aver, and Monk
conceded at oral argument, that the gauze was intentionally placed as part,
of Sharon's post-operative wound care, not during surgery. NRS
41A.100(1)(a) creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence in medical
malpractice cases where “[a] foreign substance other than medication or a

prosthetic device was unintentionally left within the body of a patient

 

following surgery.’ The “more traditional res ipsa loquitur doctrine has

 

 
 

been replaced by NRS 414.100.” Born v. Eisenman, 114 Nev. 854, 859, 962,
P.24 1227, 1230 (1998). And, as our caselaw makes clear, the exception in
NRS 41A.100(1)(a) does not apply “where a foreign object was left in the
body during a procedure other than surgery.” Peck v. Zipf, 183 Nev. 890,
894.95, 407 P.3d 775, 779 (2017). Since the gauze was placed and left
during a procedure other than surgery, NRS 41A.100(1)(a) does not exempt
Monk’s claims against the respondent physicians from NRS 41A.071's
affidavit-of-merit requirement.

We therefore affirm.

Pi ;
Pickering

 

We concur:
—_Uu J.
Cadish

J.
Bell