Title: Sykes v. Lincoln County School Dist. No. 1 & 2

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Sykes v. Lincoln County School Dist. No. 1 & 21988 WY 133763 P.2d 1263Case Number: 88-78Decided: 11/07/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHN THOMAS SYKES, A 
MINOR; JOHN E. SYKES AND VIVIAN SYKES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIENDS AND 
GUARDIANS OF JOHN THOMAS SYKES, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

LINCOLN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NO. 1 & 2; TETON SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1; SUBLETTECOUNTYSCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 1; SWEETWATERCOUNTYSCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 1 & 2; UINTA COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NO. 1; UINTACOUNTYSCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 4; UINTACOUNTYSCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 6, 
APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, TetonCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

Roy A. Jacobson, 
Jr. and Sharon M. Rose of Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose, P.C., 
Kemmerer, for 
appellants.

Kathryn A. 
Jenkins of Kline, Buck & Asay, Cheyenne, for appellee Lincoln County School Dist. 
No. 1.

William H. 
Twichell of Mason, Twichell & Graham, P.C., Pinedale, for appellee Sublette County School Dist. 
No. 1.

Paul B. Godfrey 
and Raymond W. Martin of Godfrey, Sundahl & Jorgenson, Cheyenne, for appellees Lincoln County School Dist. 
No. 2, Teton School Dist. No. 1, Sweetwater County School Dist. Nos. 1 & 2, 
Uinta County School Dist. Nos. 1, 4 and 6.

Carol Gonnella, 
Jackson, for amicus curiae, Region V Bd. of Co-op. 
Educational Services.

Nelson L. Hayes 
and Michael P. Zaccheo of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, for amicus curiae, 
Boces.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS and MACY, JJ., 
ROONEY, Ret. J., and LEHMAN, District Judge.

ROONEY, Retired 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellants appeal from 
the denial of their motion for a partial summary judgment against appellees 
School Districts on the issue of the existence of vicarious liability on the 
part of such appellees, and from the grant of such appellees' motion for summary 
judgment on the same issue.1 The motions acknowledged the 
non-existence of a genuine issue of material fact relative to such 
issue.

[¶2.]     We affirm. 

[¶3.]     Appellant John Thomas 
Sykes is a minor child who suffers from physical and mental handicaps. He and 
his family reside within the boundaries of appellee Uinta County School District 
No. 4. Such School District entered into a special education residential 
services agreement with Region V Board of Cooperative Educational Services 
(hereinafter referred to as "BOCES"), wherein BOCES agreed to provide for the 
education of appellant John Thomas Sykes and to render related services, 
including room and board.2 Pursuant to such agreement, he was 
placed at the C Bar V Ranch facility owned and operated by BOCES. On November 2, 
1985, a staff member of BOCES was bathing appellant John Thomas Sykes when the 
staff member was called to the telephone. Either appellant John Thomas Sykes or 
another student turned on the hot water in the bathtub, and appellant John 
Thomas Sykes was severely burned.

[¶4.]     BOCES was established 
by appellees School Districts pursuant to the Board of Cooperative Educational 
Services Act, W.S. 21-20-101, et seq. W.S. 21-20-102 states the purpose of the 
act is

"to provide a method 
whereby school districts and community college districts or any combination may 
work together and cooperate to provide educational services, including but not 
limited to vocational-technical education, adult education and services for 
exceptional children, when the services can be more effectively provided through 
a cooperative effort."

[¶5.]     The act authorizes the 
establishment of a board of cooperative services by an agreement between the 
boards of trustees of two or more school districts. The members of the boards of 
trustees of the participating school districts elect, from among their members, 
the members of the board of cooperative educational services, with each board of 
trustees being entitled to at least one member on the board of cooperative 
educational services.

[¶6.]     In its orders denying 
appellants' motion for partial summary judgment and granting appellees' motions 
for summary judgment, the district court recited in part:

"The Court examined the 
file, the pleadings, reviewed the briefs, heard oral argument, and finds as 
follows:

"1. The plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is based, in general, on the contention that 
the defendant Boces is a cooperative organization, statutorily authorized, in 
which all member school districts are jointly and severally liable, and each 
member school district is jointly and severally liable for any actionable tort 
liability up to the limits authorized by the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act.

"2. The Motion of 
Defendant School Districts for Summary Judgment is based on the contention that 
the School Districts have no separate and independent liability under the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act for the action of Boces and/or its employees; 
that any alleged negligence of Boces cannot be vicariously imputed to the 
Defendant School Districts under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act; and that 
Boces is an independent governmental entity from the standpoint of liability 
under the Governmental Claims Act.

* * * * * 
*

"The Court 
determined:

"1. That the Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be denied;

"2. That Boces is an 
independent and separate governmental entity; that the employees of Boces are 
not employees of the Defendant School Districts; that vicarious liability of 
Boces employees and/or of Boces can not be imputed to the Defendant School 
Districts; that plaintiffs allege no act or omission of the Defendant School 
Districts which are set forth as exceptions in the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act; and the Defendant School Districts' Motions for Summary Judgment should be 
granted * * *."

[¶7.]     For the purposes of 
this appeal, it is immaterial whether or not BOCES is a partnership, a joint 
venture or a cooperative association of school districts as argued by 
appellants. The important determination is whether or not BOCES is a 
"governmental entity," as found by the district court. This, because the waiver 
of immunity for torts contained in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, W.S. 
1-39-101, et seq., applies to "[a] 
governmental entity and its 
public employees while acting within the scope of duties * * *." W.S. 1-39-104 
(emphasis added). The term is defined in W.S. 1-39-103:

"(a) As used in this 
act:

"(i) `Governmental 
entity' means the state, University of Wyoming or any local 
government;

"(ii) `Local government' 
means cities and towns, counties, school districts, joint powers boards, airport 
boards, public corporations, community college districts, special districts and 
their governing bodies, all political subdivisions of the state, and their 
agencies, instrumentalities and institutions; * * *."

[¶8.]     School districts are 
there specifically designated. The "agencies, instrumentalities and 
institutions" of school districts are stated to be "governmental entities" for 
the purpose of the act. BOCES is both an agency of appellees School Districts 
and an instrumentality of them. Therefore, BOCES is a "governmental entity" for 
the purposes of the act.

[¶9.]     BOCES acts, and agrees 
to act, on behalf of the appellees School Districts in furnishing educational 
services to handicapped children of the districts. BOCES is subject to ultimate 
control of appellees School Districts inasmuch as the membership of its board of 
cooperative services consists of school board members from appellees School 
Districts.

"Agency is the fiduciary 
relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to 
another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and 
consent by the other so to act."

Restatement of 
Agency 2d, § 1(1) at 7 (1958). Accordingly, BOCES is an agency of appellees 
School Districts.

[¶10.]  BOCES serves the appellees School 
Districts as a means to an end, i.e., to provide education to handicapped 
students of such school districts. It is an instrument by which that legally 
mandated function of appellees School Districts is achieved. It is an auxiliary 
agency of appellees for that purpose.

[¶11.]  Instrumentality is defined 
as:

"something by which an 
end is achieved * * * something that serves as an intermediary or agent through 
which one or more functions of a controlling force are carried out * * 
*."

Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary, p. 1172 (1971). It is also defined 
as:

"A condition of being an 
instrument; a subordinate or auxiliary agency; agency of anything as a means to 
an end; anything used as a means or agency; that which is instrumental; the 
quality or condition of being instrumental."

44 C.J.S. 
Instrumentality, p. 422 (1945) (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, BOCES is an 
instrumentality of appellees School Districts.

[¶12.]  The determination that BOCES is an agency 
and instrumentality of appellees School Districts is no more than that of the 
often-quoted rule which states that words of a statute are to be given their 
plain and ordinary meaning. E.g. McArtor v. State, 699 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1985); Hurst v. State, 
698 P.2d 1130 (Wyo. 1985); Ward v. Board of 
Commissioners of JohnsonCounty, 36 Wyo. 460, 256 P. 1039 
(1927).

[¶13.]  Appellants' argument is generally in 
accord with the conclusion that BOCES is an agent and instrumentality of 
appelleesSchool Districts, but it 
does not recognize that the statutory definition of this relationship makes 
BOCES a "governmental entity."3 

[¶14.]  Since the waiver of immunity in the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is for torts by public employees of the governmental 
entity (W.S. 1-39-104), appellees School Districts are properly vicariously 
subject to this action only if the alleged tort (negligence) was that of one or 
more of their employees. There is no 
contention in the record that appellees School Districts are vicariously liable 
on that basis.

[¶15.]  In the First Claim for Relief of 
appellants' Second Amended Complaint (designated Count I), captioned "Negligence 
of Defendant BOCES; C Bar V Ranches, Inc.; Chris Christiansen; Liability of 
Defendant Member Districts"; appellants allege various acts of negligence on the 
part of the first three defendants listed in such caption. They then allege in 
paragraph 35:

"Defendant Member 
Districts are each liable for the tort liability of Defendant BOCES herein, on 
the basis of partnership law as BOCES was, at all times material herein, a joint 
venture composed of member school districts."

In such 
complaint, C Bar V Ranches, Inc. is alleged to be a Wyoming non-profit corporation. Chris 
Christiansen is alleged to have been the administrator and/or executive director 
of C Bar V Ranches, Inc.

[¶16.]  None of the other defendants, subject to 
other claims for relief, are alleged to be employees of appellees School 
Districts. To the contrary, their employment is alleged to be otherwise, e.g., 
three individual defendants, one of whom was called to the telephone while 
bathing appellant, John Thomas Sykes, are alleged to have been "acting within 
the scope of their employment with Region 
V BOCES as `Cottage Parents'"; one defendant is alleged to have been 
"maintenance supervisor of C Bar V Ranches"; and one defendant is alleged to 
have been "employed by the State of Wyoming Department of Health 
and Social Services." (Emphasis added.)

[¶17.]  The record is void of any contention that 
a tort was committed against appellants by any employee of appellees School 
Districts except the contention that such could result from a relationship 
between the School Districts and BOCES, assuming BOCES to be a non-governmental 
entity.

[¶18.]  Since BOCES was, and is, a "governmental 
entity" for the purposes of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, the district 
court properly found:

"that the employees of 
Boces are not employees of the Defendant School Districts; that vicarious 
liability of Boces employees and/or of Boces can not be imputed to the Defendant 
School Districts; * * *."

[¶19.]  AFFIRMED.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

1 The action was brought 
against Region V Board of Cooperative Educational Services and several other 
parties in addition to appellees, and the district court found that there was no 
just cause for delay on this appeal and that an immediate appeal could be taken 
by appellants "under Rule 54(b)."

2 W.S. 21-14-101 
provides:

"Each and every child of 
school age in the state of Wyoming having a mental, physical or 
psychological handicap or social maladjustment which impairs learning, shall be 
entitled to and shall receive a free and appropriate education in accordance 
with his capabilities."

3 Appellants desire to 
establish BOCES as a "co-operative organization, joint venture and/or 
partnership by and between the above-referenced school districts and is an 
extension of each such individual school district" (allegation ¶ 4, Second 
Amended Complaint), and "not a separate legal entity whose interests are 
separate and distinct from the individual school districts that comprise the 
organization and, therefore, each district is an indispensable part and is 
jointly liable for the torts of Region V. BOCES." (Argument at p. 20 of 
appellants' brief.) This desire is premised on the recognition that the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act places a monetary limit on damages resulting from the 
waiver of immunity. W.S. 1-39-118. Appellants desire the limit to apply 
separately to BOCES and each appellee school district.