Title: Akers v. Floyd County Fiscal Court

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

556 S.W.2d 146 (1977) Everett AKERS et al., Appellants, v. FLOYD COUNTY FISCAL COURT et al., Appellees. Supreme Court of Kentucky. September 16, 1977. *147 J. K. Wells, Wells, Porter & Schmitt, Paintsville, for appellants. Jarvis Allen, James R. Allen, Prestonsburg, for appellees. STERNBERG, Justice. The Fiscal Court of Floyd County, Kentucky, adopted a resolution which divided the county into multi-cable television districts. It proposes to sell a 15-year franchise in each district for the exclusive right and privilege of operating a cable television station therein. The pertinent portions of the resolution read as follows: Be it therefore resolved: Prior to the division of the county into cable television districts, the appellants and appellees Herman Porter, Hubert Bartley, Bertha Cole, Fred Fraley, John Campbell, James E. Allen, Fred F. Bailey, Lowell Conley and Paul Gearheart each operated a cable television station in Floyd County, Kentucky. As laid out by the fiscal court, the districts are of such shapes and areas that the service of appellants would extend into more than one district. Appellants filed suit in the Floyd Circuit Court challenging the constitutionality of the resolution and they sought to enjoin the sale and issuance of the proposed franchises. The right of the fiscal court to adopt a resolution dividing the county into cable television districts is not challenged by any of the parties. Ky.Const. § 164; KRS 67.080; and City of Owensboro v. Top Vision Cable Co. of Ky., Ky., 487 S.W.2d 283 (1972). As lifted from appellants' brief, the issues are: May appellants enjoin the enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional resolution? CR 65.01 provides that injunctive relief may be granted under stated terms and conditions. In their complaint, appellants challenge the constitutionality of the resolution and further aver that they will suffer great and irreparable injury and have no adequate remedy at law. Pursuant to appellants' motion, a restraining order was issued ex parte. In due time appellees filed a motion to dissolve the restraining order. Appellants responded with a motion for a temporary injunction. After a hearing on these and other motions by the Honorable Reed D. Anderson, Special Judge designate, a temporary injunction was issued. Upon consideration of the case in chief, the trial judge dissolved the temporary injunction and dismissed the action. In 42 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, it is stated as follows: Injunctive processes of law are available to be invoked in an action challenging the constitutionality of a legislative act and of the carrying out or enforcement of its provisions. The appellants plead sufficient facts which, if sustained by the record, would entitle them to injunctive relief. Injunctive relief is ancillary to the main issue. The main issue is whether the resolution is constitutional. It goes without saying that a person who is injured or prejudiced by an unconstitutional law can complain of it. Kohler v. Benckart, Ky., 252 S.W.2d 854 (1952); Second Street Properties, Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 709 (1969). And if the resolution is unconstitutional, then, and in *150 that event, the rights of the appellants may be protected by permanent injunction. Appellants complain that the resolution will so restrict their operations that their income will be inadequate to finance their investment and furnish them a profit on their investment. We accede to the proposition that the right to earn a livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, nowhere is it suggested that there is a constitutional right or a statutory right which suggests that the ordinary occupations of life are not subject to reasonable regulations, nor is there any guarantee that the occupations will be financially profitable. The appellants have not been singled out or dealt with differently by the resolution than any other person coming within its provisions. We are not persuaded that the ordinance deprives the appellants of the right to earn a livelihood. Further, appellants argue that the resolution is unconstitutional in that it is an exercise of police power to promote private industry. In support thereof, they charge that the fiscal court proposes to grant exclusive and monopolistic franchises which impinge on and completely fence in their cable television systems. If the districts in which the appellants operate are circumscribed by other districts, it is only by reason of the location, and there has been no challenge made to the manner in which the topographical location of the districts was made. The rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission require all CATV Systems to have a franchise from the local authorities by 1977 before they can be qualified to remain in operation. It is imperative, therefore, for the continued operation of cable television that the companies be franchised. There is no showing made by the appellants that any cable operator in Floyd County, Kentucky, will be promoted or benefited in any manner different than himself. This court will not inquire into the motives of the legislative body, but will only concern itself with the validity of the regulations. Section (2) of the resolution provides: To the extent that only the highest and best bidder in each district will be awarded a franchise for that district, this will be a monopoly in that operator and in each operator in each district. The fiscal court has determined that such a method of operation will be for the best interest of the community. Since this is a legislative matter on which the fiscal court is authorized to act, we are not convinced that its action was not conducive to the welfare of the citizens of Floyd County or was an exercise of its police power to promote private industry, even though some persons may have a financial gain and others a financial loss. Section (5) of the resolution provides: This section has, for its avowed purpose, the prevention of a monopoly, which is well and good. If it does so, it does so at the sacrifice of the specially trained and know-how of the persons best equipped to furnish cable television service, to wit: owners or operators of CATV Systems. It is not questioned *151 that the fiscal court has the right to make reasonable classifications relating to cable television service. It must not, however, do so arbitrarily. Ky.Const. § 2. There must be some reasonable relationship between the regulation and the avowed purpose to be accomplished. Moreover, the resolution must tend toward the accomplishment or promotion of public safety, health, peace, good order, or morals. Schoo v. Rose, Ky., 270 S.W.2d 940 (1954). In Stites v. Norton, 125 Ky. 672, 101 S.W. 1189 (1907), we considered a situation similar to the one which is now confronting us. The Board of Public Works of the City of Louisville, Kentucky, proposed to sell at public sale a franchise or privilege for the distribution and selling of electricity. A citizen and taxpayer of the City of Louisville brought an action seeking to enjoin the Board from carrying out its plan to advertise and sell a franchise. Primary attack was made on the section of the ordinance providing that "* * * the board of public works shall not accept or consider any bid made directly or indirectly by the Louisville Lighting Company, or persons acting in the interest of said corporation." The lower court adjudged that section of the ordinance valid. The Court of Appeals affirmed; and in doing so, said: In the case at bar there has been no showing made that the prohibition of a bid by appellants or other cable television operators was for the just or lawful purpose of enabling the fiscal court to secure to the citizens their rights under the Constitution. Rather, it is made to appear that there is no rational, legal reason for prohibiting the present owners or operators of cable television service from bidding on franchises in areas other than those in which they operate. The appellants charge that Section (6) of the resolution provides for the taking of private property for public purposes without due process of law. Section (6) provides: In their brief the appellants state that, "The ordinance in this case provides for the arbitrary purchase by the successful bidder, of any existing CATV cable in his franchise area, at a price to be fixed by three appraisers, one appointed by the owner, one by the successful bidder and the third by the Fiscal Court." The trial judge, in his conclusions of law, determined, "There is no requirement in Section (6) of the resolution that any operator sell his equipment, but if such operator chooses to sell to the successful bidder, then such bidder would have to purchase according to such Section before he could have a Franchise. There is no taking of private property for private use without due process and no denial of any vested rights of plaintiffs." Counsel for appellants places a different interpretation on this section than did the trial judge, and, as a matter of fact, than does this court. It is the duty of this court to construe legislative acts, which, daily, we do. The question before this court, and the only question to which we direct our attention insofar as Section (6) of the resolution is concerned, is whether the former owner is forced to sell his system to the successful bidder. To construe this section as making it obligatory on the former owner to sell could raise serious constitutional *152 questions. We construe Section (6) to mean that the former owner may sell his system, but is not forced to do so, and that the new franchise owner must buy the system if the former owner desires to sell it. We find there is no taking for any purpose, much less a taking of private property for a public purpose. As no objection is made from the standpoint of the successful bidder, who may be forced to purchase the system, we do not reach the question of whether that particular requirement is valid. Appellees argue that the proper manner for challenging the resolution was by an appeal to the circuit court from the action of the fiscal court. It is unnecessary that we indulge ourselves with this issue. The record discloses that at no time did the appellees raise or argue this question in the circuit court. In Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Rushing, Ky., 456 S.W.2d 816 (1969), we stated: Since this issue was not presented to the circuit court, we cannot consider it on this appeal. Heucker v. Clifton, Ky., 500 S.W.2d 398 (1973). The judgment is reversed insofar as it holds Section (5) of the resolution to be constitutional. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.