Title: Buscher v. Doning.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

IBRARY

+++ FOR PUBLICATION

 

WEST'S HAWAFT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HaWAI'IEI

 

  

aqaw4

ESTHER J. BUSCHER, Plaintiff-Appellee,

9:01 HY |L~ MiP LOO

DUANE S. BONING? COMMERCE INSURANCE CO. +
AVIS RENT-A-CAR SYSTEM, INC., Defendants-Appellants,

and
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Defendant-Appellee,

and

CRANFORD & CO.7 JOHN DOES 1-5; JANE DOES 1-5; DOE

CORPORATIONS 1-57 ROE NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS 1-5
‘and ROE GOVERNNENTAL ENTITIES 1-5, Defendants

 

and

DUANE S. BONING; COMMERCE INSURANCE CO.
and AVIS RENT-A-CAR SYSTEM, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants,

STANFORD H. MASUI, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.

No. 27232

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO, 99-0220K)

Jone 7, 2007

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBR, AND DUFFY, JJ.
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OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J
This workers’ compensation case srose from a 1996 motor
vehicle collision between vehicles operated by Plaintiff-Appellee
Esther J. Buscher and Defendant-Appellant and Third-Party
Plaintiff-Appellant Duane S. Boning. At the time of the
collision, Buscher was driving within the course and scope of her
employment with Defendant-Appellee State of Hawai'i. Buscher
made a clain for workers’ compensation benefits to the State and
sued Boning in Civil Ne. 97-237K, Buscher and Boning agreed to

settle the case for Boning’s policy limits of $125,000.00, and

 

 

the case was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the
parties. Soon thereafter, however, an issue arose with respect
to whether the Employer State consented to the alleged settlement
between Buscher and Boning as required by Hawai's Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 386-8 (1993), and Buscher filed the instant
lawsuit, Civil No, 99-0220K

Boning and Defendants-Appellents and Third-Party
Plaintiffs-Appeilants Commerce Insurance Co. (hereinafter,
Commerce] and Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc. [hereinafter, Avis,
and collectively with Boning and Commerce, Defendants] appeal
from the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit's March 15, 2008

final judgnent,’ raising the following points of error on appeal:

 

‘The Honorable Ronald Ibarra presided over this matter
 

(2) the circuit court abused its discretion in granting Buscher's

September 24, 2001 motion to set aside the stipulation for
dismissal with prejudice of Civil No. 97-237K as to all claims
and parties [hereinafter, motion to set aside the stipulation];
(2) the circuit court erred in ruling in its February 11, 2002
Findings of facts, conclusions of law, and order thet the State
owed no duty te Boning to reasonably consent to the settlement
agreenent after the court previously found thet the State had
acted unreasonably and outrageously in withholding its consent;
(3) the circuit court erred by denying Defendants’ August 5, 2002
motion to enforce the settlenent agreement: (4) the circuit court
erred in dismissing Defendants’ third-party claim against Third-
Party Defendant Stanford #, Masui, Buscher’s attorney; (5) the
cirevit court erred in dismissing Defendants’ counterciain

against Suscher; (6) the circuit court erred in denying

 

Defendants’ October 12, 2000 motion for interpleader and

dismiseal; and (7) the circuit court abused its discretion in

 

granting Buscher’s motion for taxation of costs.

 

In reply, Buscher contends: (1) the circuit court did
not abuse its discretion in vacating the stipulated dismissal
between the parties because the settlement failed (2) the
settlenent between Euscher and Boning was either void or

voidable: (3) the circuit court did not err in refusing to

 
#** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

enforce the agreenent; (4) the State’s refusal to consent to
third-party settlement agreement was obstructive and
unreasonable; (5) adverse counsel owes no duty to defendants or
their attorneys in the course of representation of a party:

(6) the court's award of expenses to Buscher as the prevailing
party, and based on en offer of judgment, was reasonable; and
(7) Defendants’ fifth and sixth points of error should be deemed
waived pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP)

Rule 26(b) (7). Additionally, the State, in response to Boning’s

 

second point of error, replies that the circuit court correctly
rejected Boning’s cross-claim against the State for unreascnable
failure to consent. Based on the following, the circuit court's
March 15, 2005 final judgment is affirmed. In addition, we
vacate the circuit court’s June 1, 2005 order awarding costs and
remand this case to the circuit court with instructions that an
amended order be entered, awarding costs in the amount of
$20,002.82 in favor of Buscher.

1. BACKGROUND

A or et Laweuit, Civ.

 

on June 13, 1996, Buscher, while driving within the
course and scope of her employment with the State, was injured in
2 motor vehicle collision with @ vehicle driven by Boning.
Buscher nade a claim for workers’ compensation benefits to the
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State and also sued Boning in 1997 in Civil No. 97-237K. The
State did not intervene in that case, nor did it initiate its own
suit against Boning in connection with the motor vehicle
collision.

On July 8, 1999, Buscher accepted Defendants’ offer to
settle Civil No. 97-237K for $125,000.00. The State was advised
of the settlement by letter dated July 14, 1999. Boning’s
insurers, Conmerce and Avis, issued settlement checks totaling
$128,000.00, payable to Buscher and Masui, in July 1998. Such
checks, however, apparently were never delivered to Buscher or

Masui. Buscher and Boning, on numerous occasions, beth requested

 

written consent to the settlement from the State as required by

HRS § 386-8.7 Without receiving such consent, however, Euscher

 

HRS § 286-£, “Liability of third person,” provides in relevant part

 

cresting in sone person other than the employer oF another
enployee of the enployer acting in the course of his
fenploysent s legal liability to pay denages on account
thereof, the injured exployee or his Gependente (hereinafter
referred to collectively a8 the enployes) may claim

such thire person.

 

ie chapter and recover Ganages from

 

Ig the exployee conences an action against such thire
person he shall without delay give the employer written
Rotice of the action and the nase and location of the court
in which the getion ie Erousht ey personal service oF
registered nail. The exployer may, at any time before trial
onthe facts, join as party pleintife

 

 

No release or settlenent of env claim or action under

Teene inves

   
 

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signed @ release and settienent agreement, drafted by Boning, on
August 2, 1998. The settlement agreement did not require the
signature of a representative of the State, nor did it mention

anything about the State's consent. Buscher’s attorney, Masui,

 

4, .continved)

This section ic velig without the written consent of both

‘Scploverand-enolcvee, The entire enount of the eettlenent
Sfter deauctions for attorney's fees and costs at
hereinafter provices, if subject to the employer’ s ri
Feinborsenent for his compensation paynente uncer thie
Chapter and his expenses end costs of acticn.

 

ot

 

 

1f the sction Se prosecuted by the employee alcne, the

exployee shall be entitles to apply out of the amcunt of the
SSsgnent for denagee, or settlement in case the action ie
Cempromiced before jucsnent, the reasonable iitigetion
Sepenses incurrea in preparation end prosecution cf such

Son, together with's Fessonable attorney’s fee whice
all $e based solely open the services rendered by the
exployes's attorney in effecting recovery both fer the
benefit of the employee and the employer. After the payment
of such expenses and attorney's fee there shell be applied
cot ef the ancunt of the Judgment er settlement proceeds,
the amount of the employer's expenditere for compensation,
Jess nis shave of such expenses and attorney’s fee. 02
application of the employer, the court shail allow as >
fest Iien against the amount of the Judgment for damages cr
settlenent proceeds, the snount of the empioyer’s
‘expenditure. for compensation, leas his share of such
expenses and attorney's fee.

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

In the
the anount of
ef attorneys"

faxed by the cou

fent that the parties are unable to agree upen
sonable litigation expenses end the encunt
Under thie section then the same shell be

 

         

 

After reimbursenent for his compensation paysents the
exployer shall be relieved from the cbligetion to make
forther compensation payments to the enpioyee under this
Chapter op to the entire snount of the Balance of the
Settlenent of the Sudgeent, If satisfied, as the case nay
be, after deducting the cost and expenses, including
attorneys" fees

 

ie aaded.)

 
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signed his approval of the form and content of the release and
settlement agreement. Masui also signed a stipulation for
dismissal with prejudice as to all claims and parties in Civil
No. 97-237K. On August 9, 1999, Boning filed the signed
stipulation for dismissal with prejudice in the circuit court,
despite the fact that Buscher had not yet been paid the
settlement consideration and the State had not yet consented to
the settlement.

by letter dated October 18, 1999, the State informed
Buscher that it consented to the settlement conditioned upon:

(1) the deposit of $12,500.00 into an interest-be

 

‘ing account
until the amount of the workers’ compensation lien and/or any
amount of contribution for fees and costs was finally determined;
and (2) the State's reservation of its “rights, remedies, clains
or causes of action it may have against . . . Eoning with respect
to any workers compensation benefits provided by the State to
Mrs. Buscher « .
Perceiving the October 15, 1999 letter as the State’s

written consent, Masui requested that Defendants issue settlement
checks by letters dated October 18 and 27 and Novenber 5. Having
not received the checks, Masui, by letter dated Novenber 15,
1999, informed Defendants that he considered the settlement “void

for failure of your clients to meet their obligations.” In
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reply, by letter dated Novenber 16, 1999, Defendants’ counsel

stated:

 

Je be reminded that you personally assured me that
‘Coke care cf” the lien with Employer, Seate of
Deputy Attorney General] Ma. Schoen then
personally called me on Novenber s, 1999 and told me that
Employer wovla not consent to the cettienent you and T
Feached on behalf of cor respective clients

Therefore, we have not receives consent from the State as
yoo insist.

  

 

 

5. The Instant Laweus 02201
fon December 13, 1999, Buscher filed the instant,
lawsuit, Civil No. 99-0220K, which included the previously
dismissed personal injury lewevit 2s Count I as well as nunerous
other claims accusing Defendants of breaching the settlenent
agreement and the State of interfering with the agreement by
wrongfully withholding consent. In response, Defendants:
(2) cross-clained against the state for, inter alia, unreasonable
failure to consent to the settlenent, interference with a
contractual relationship, and negligent claims handling/necligent
failure to consent; (2) counterclaimed against Buscher for, inter
alig, abuse of process, breach of the settlement agreement, and
misrepresentation? and (3) filed a thiré-party complaint against
Masui alleging that he breached his duty to Defendants by failing
to obtain the required employer's consent, failing to exercise

reasonable care and diligence to obtain consent, and
 

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we:

 

misrepresenting to Defendants that he had obtained such consent,
thus causing excess litigation expenses.
1. Defendants’ motion to intexplead
On October 11, 2000, Defendants filed @ motion to:
6 deposit with the covrt $125,000.00,

 

(2) interplead
representing the settlenent proceeds of the first lawsuit; and
(2) dismiss Defendants. At 2 Nevenber 6, 2000 hearing, the court
orally denied the notion, ressoning thet there was still a
dispute as to whether or not there was @ settlement. An order
Genying the motion was entered on Decenber 4, 2000.

Defendants’ counterclaim against Buscher

   

on May 15, 2001, Defendants moved for partial summary

judgment on their counterclaim against Buscher as to Counts 7

 

(breach) and III (misrepresentation). By order dated July 6,
2001, the court found that the State “did not agree to the
settlement,” and that there was “no valid settlement under HRS

§ 386-8." The court, however, inexplicably granted Defendants’
motion. On July 22, 2002, Buscher filed @ motion for relief from
the judgnent or order on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence,
and/or to accomplish justice. By order dated September 13, 2002,
the court granted Buscher's notion and set aside its order

granting Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment.
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

on April 28, 2002, Buscher moved to dismiss Count I
(abuse of process) and Count III (misrepresentation) of the

counterclaim, arguing, inter alia, tha

found that there was no settlenent, Buscher cannot be said to

 

(2) because the court

have abused the legal process by pursuing her lawsuit against
Defendants; and (2) Defendants failed to state a claim for
misrepresentation because they did not allege that when Buscher
signed the settlenent agreenent, it was with the present intent
to make @ false representation. Following @ hearing on June 10,
2002, the court granted Buscher’s motion by order dated

August 19, 2002.

 

on October 31, 2002, Buscher filed a metion to dismiss
Count 11 of the counterclaim (breach), asserting that without
valid settlement agreement, there can be no breach. The court
granted Buscher’s motion on January 24, 2003. Judgnent was

entered in favor of Buscher on March 4, 2003.

3, Buscher’s motion to set aside the stipulation
dismissing Civil No. 97-237k with prejudice

In the meantime, on July 27, 2001, Buscher filed
notion to set aside the stipulation dismissing with prejudice
Civil No. 97-237K, requesting that the circuit court, pursuant to
Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 60(b), relieve
Buscher from the stipulation because the settlement agreement,

upon which she relied in executing the stipulation, was void or

20
 

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voidable. After an August 8, 2001 hearing, the court granted the

notion by order dated September 24, 2001.

 

4. Jury trial on Buscher’s personal injury ca
Jury trial conmenced on Buscher's personal injury case
against Boning on Septenber 11, 2001. ‘The jury returned a

verdict in favor of Buscher, and on November 7, 2002,, judgment

 

was entered in her favor in the amount of $275,000.00.

5. Bench trial on Defendants’ cross-claim against the
state

on February 11, 2002, after @ bench trial, the circuit

1 order,

 

court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of

which, inter alia, dismissed Defendants’ cross-claim

 

State. The court entered the following relevant findings:

48, [The statel’s #
ettlonent agreement mar unreasonable and the dire:
of a negligent review of Flaineiff Buecner'e worker’ ©
Conpensation and liability cleins by [the state]. Seid
Feview wae below the standard of care required of an
exployer in determining whether to consent to empleyee[s’)
Personal injury settlement agreements. (Trial testimony of
Richard K. Griffith, page 23, line 7-i8.)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

49, (The state)’s negligent claim handling, i.e.(,]
ite wrongful refusal to consent to Plaintiff Buscher' &
settlement agreement with Defendant Bening, was 8 legel
cause of Plaintiff Buscher’s enotional distress.

 

‘The court additionally entered the following pertinent

conclusions of law:

6, By choosing net to intervene in Plaintiff

Boscher’s suit ageinet Defendant Boning oF prosecute

claim ageinst then, [the State) chose to rely on Plai

Buscher’s prosecution of her case against Oefendant Boning
[the State]"s sole

Werker"s compensation

 

      

   
 

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10, (The State]’s October 15, 1999 letter Exhibit =
ao awr se not consent ae that term is used in (HRS §) 256-2
because it purports to reserve to the employer the Fight te
sue the tortfeasor, whereas the consent under (HRS §) 366-8
hheane the employer looks only t0 the settienent proceeds for
Teinbursenent of its worker's compensation lien claim end
gives up its right to sue the tortfeasor

 

 

 

 

12. the court finds that [the State] hed @ duty to
‘act reancnably to Flasnei## Borcher in evaluating the
Settlenent agreement in Angust 1989.

 

12. (The State} nad a duty not to unressonsbly
withhold ste coneent from Plaintife/Defendent soning
Tettlement agreement.

13, [The State) waived ite inmunity under (RS
chapter] €62, and none of the exceptions under [HRS §) €62-
18(4) apply to protect the state,

au
worker’ compen

 

fed upon [the State]’s conduct in handling the
the reasons given for

Seared articipation in the

, the court concludes that the

[Statel unsesconably reivsed te consent to the proposed

settlenent agreenent

  
 
 

   

The court ruled that, based on the State’s unreasonable refusal
to consent, Buscher had stated clains against the State for
negligent infliction of enotional distress, intentional
infliction of enotional distress, and intentional harm.
Nevertheless, the court ruled that “Buscher has not specifically
proven monetary damages nor has she proven any general damages as
a result of the enctional distress(,]" and dismissed Buscher’s
clains. Additionally, the court dismissed Defendants’ clains
against the State, reasoning thet “[w]ith respect to (the
State]'s negligent claim handling and its impact on Defendant

Boning, there is no duty which gives rise to @ cause of action
 

+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAP'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

for ‘unreasonable failure to consent,’ ‘negligent claim

 

handling{,]‘ [lor ‘negligent failure to consent.‘*

Defendants’ third-party complaint against Masui

 

on April 29, 2002, Masui filed a motion to disniss
Defendants’ third-party complaint against him. Maevi"s motion
was granted on August §, 2002 after a June 10, 2002 hearing.
Judgnent was entered in favor of Masui by order filed Novenber 7,
2002.

7, Pefendants’ motion to enforce the settlement

 

on August $, 2002, Defendants filed a motion to enforce
the settlement agreement, to order the State to consent to the
settlenent agreement, and for relief from the February 11, 200:
findings of fact, conclusions of lex, and order, After a hearing
on October 7, 2002, the circuit court denied the motion on
october 24, 2002.
8. Appeal, final judgment, and taxation of costs

on March 31, 2003, Defendants filed @ notice of appeal.
on April 3, 2003, Buscher filed @ notice of cross-appeal. on
Septenber 16, 2003, we filed an order dismissing the appeal and
cross-appeal, noting that the orders and uncertified judgments
were not reduced to a single jucgnent resolving all claims and

parties as required by HCP Rule 58 and Jenkins v. Cades Schutte

 
 

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Plening 6 Wricht, 7€ Hewai'l 115, 119-20, 869 P.2d 1334, 1338-39
(ag98).

on Noverber 19, 2003, Euscher filed a bill of costs in
the circuit court, and on Decenber 1, 2003, Defendants filed
objections thereto. On October 18, 2004, Buscher filed an
amended bill of costs, and on October 25, 2004, Defendants again
filed objections therete. On October 25, 2004, Buscher filed 2

motion for taxation of costs. Defendants and the State each

 

filed memoranda in opposition to Buscher’s motion on Novenber 10
and 12, 2004, respectively, A hearing was held on Novenber 29,
2004.

on March 18, 2008, final judgment was entered disposing
of a11 clains and parties in the case. Defendants filed their
notice of appeal on April 12, 2005. The circuit court granted
Buscher's October 25, 2004 motion for taxation of costs on
June 1, 2008.

11, STANDARDS OF REVIEW

RCP Rule 60 Motion to Set Aside Stipulation to Dismiss With
Exsiudice

“An appellate court reviews a circuit court's

 

determination of an BRCP Rule 60 motion for an abuse of
discretion.” Amantiad v. Odum, 90 Hawai'i 152, 158, 977 P.2d

160, 166 (1999) (citations mitted). “[A]n abuse of discretion

 

 

cccurs where the trial court has clearly exceeded the bounds of

 
‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

reason or disregarded rules cr principles of law or practice te
the substantial detriment of a party litigant.” Office of
Hawaiian Affaire v. State, 110 Hawe'{ 336, 361, 193 P.3¢ 767,
780 (2006) (quoting Ranger Ins. Co. v. Hinshaw, 103 Hawai'i 26,
30, 79 P.3d 118, 123 (2003)).

ion force Settlement Aoreenent

 

“A trial court's determination regarding the
enforceability of 2 settlement agreement is @ conclusion of law
reviewsble de nove.” Assocs. Fin, Serve. sai
Milo, 87 Hewai'i 12, 28, 960 P.26 1219, 1228 (1998) (citation
onitted).
c. Interpretation of

statutory interpretation is “a question of law
reviewable de novo.” State v. Levi, 102 Hawai'i 282, 265, 75
P.3d 1173, 2176 (2003) (quoting State v. Arcee, 64 Hawai'i 1, 10,

928 P.2d 843, 852 (1996)}. “When interpreting rules promulgated

 

by the court, principles of statutory construction apply.”
Kewamata Farms, Inc, v. United Aori Prods,, 86 Hawai"i 214, 255,
948 P.2d 1055, 1096 (1997) (quoting State v, Baron, 80 Hawai'i
107, 113, 905 P.2d 623, 619 (1995).
Db. Duty

“the existence of duty owed by the defendant to the

plaintiff , . . is entirely a question of law.” Knodie v
 

+2 FOR PUBLICATION I} 'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

 

Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 385, 742 P.2d 377, 363

(1987) (citations omitted).

Motion to Dismiss

atria} court's ruling on # motion to dismiss is
yevieved se nove. srenner ¥, City ¢ County of sonsiuly, 96
hawaii 136, 136, 28 F-3d 350, 394 (pp. 2001). The court
must sccest plaintsef"e aliegstione ae true anc view then sn
the Light most favorable to the pisintsté; dicnseesl se
proper only if Ire beyond doubt that the plaintiff
fen prove no set of fects in fuppert of his or her clair

t would entitie hin of her to relief.” Dunles v. baspen,
Hiewai's 26, 32, $24 P26 19€, 200 (1996), overruled en

c“Wawas'i, “162°Hewas $2,

105-02, 13 P38 46, D560 (200s) (citations omitted) .
however, "emotion seeking dismiteal cf a complaint te
transfcined' ite ¢ hemes Rulee of Civil Frocedure (ANCE)
Role £6 motion for summary Judgment when the circuit court
Consider matters cuteide the pleadings. Al ¥. AU, 63 Haw

 

   
  

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

Hos 212, Bee 26°95, “Soe Tbe)
Wong v. Cavetanc, 112 Hawai'i 462, 476, 143 P.3d 2, 18 (2006).
FB p for Summary Judon
Me review the circuit court's grant or cenisl of
guneary sudgnent de nave. Mavall
Grease “ution v. veka, Se waned 213, 201, 1 Pe a

     

4 for granting © notion for summary

 

[Slunmary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, sre
Denitesone cn file, together with the afficavste, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue es to any

rial fact and that the soving party is entitled to
Susgnent 2s a aster of lew. A fact ie material if
roof of that fact would have the effect of
tetablishing or refuting one of the essential elenents
of @ cause of action or defense assertes by the
parties. The evidence must be viewed in the 1ight
est favorable to the non-noving party. Jn othe:
Words, we must view all of the evidence and th
inferences draw therefrom in the Light nest: favorable
to the Party cpposing the notion.

 

 

 

 

Id, (citations and internal quotation marke onitted) .

con v. City an a 98 Hawai'i 233, 26
Frag se8, #8060 (2002) (eecone alteration in eriginal).

 

 

5, 4

x
*#* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

 

Kau v, City & County of Honolulu, 104 Hawai'i 468, 473-74, 92
P.3d 477, 482-83 (2004).
G. Taxation of Costs

“the avard of a taxable cost is within the discretion

of the [circuit] court and will not be disturbed absent a clear

 

abuse of discretion.” Hong v. Takeuchi, 68 Hawai'i 46, $2, 961
P.26 611, 617 (1998) (internal quotation marks end citation
omitted).

TIT. DISCUSSION

 

Euscher’s Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation to Diemis:

Defendants first allege that the circuit court abused

 

its discretion in setting aside the stipuletion to dismiss with

 

prejudice Civil No. $7-237K. Buscher responds that the court did
not abuse ite discretion because pursuant to HAS § 386-8, neither
the settlenent nor the stipulation was valid without the State's
written consent. We agree with Buscher.

1. The settlement agreement was not valid pursuant to the
plain meaning of HRS § 386-8.

 

HRS § 386-8 states, in relevant part, that “[nJo
release or settlement of any claim or action under this section
is valid without the written consent of both employer and

employee.” This plain and unambiguous language required thé

 

State to consent in writing to validate the settlement between
 

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Buscher and 5

 

ing. See Shimabuku v. Montoonery Elevator Co., 79
Hawai'i 382, 357, 903 P.2d 48, $3 (1995) ("[U]nder the clear
lahguage of HRS § 386-8, an injured employee, who has previously
received workers’ compensation benefits, may not dismiss a claim
against @ third-party tortfeascr without written consent of the
employer."). The circuit court correctly found, and Defendants
agree, that the State did not consent in writing.? Rather, ite
october 18, 1999 letter proposed an alternative “settlement,”
with which Boning did not agree, whereby the State purported to
reserve its right to sue Boning. Therefore, the State's

Coteber 15, 1999 letter did not constitute written consent to the
settlement as required by HAS § 386-8, and the settlement was not
valia.

2. The cirevit court did not abuse ite discretion in

setting aside the stipulation.

 

Defendants contend, however, that the stipulation to
dismiss with prejudice could not be set aside because: (1) it
was improper for the trial court to allow Buscher to make a
motion in an independent action after the initial case was
dismissed with prejudice; (2) Buscher did not have “clean hands”

° ar de Buscher's position that the State's Ceteber 25, 1999 letter
constituted valid written consent Fursuant to HRS € 366-8. In Buscher’s view,
S's 306-8 only requires that the employer consent to the settlement
agreenent? st oes no! i oyer agree to release si] claine

‘Boscher, however, dia not cross
ngly, this issue ie

   

 

  
 
 
 

 
   

(CIFIC REPORTER

because she breached the settlenent agreenent; (3) none of the
reasons enunerated in HRCP Rule 60(b) existed to support setting
aside the dismissal of Civil No. $7-237K; (4) Buscher’s motion to
set aside the dismissel was untinely and she did not exercise due
diligence insemuch ae two years passed between the dismissel of
Civil No. 97-237K and her motion: and (5) Buscher did not show
that she wee “injured and that circumstances beyond . . . her
control prevented timely action te protect [her] interest” as

required by Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir.

1998). These contentions are unavailing.
In Shimabuky v. Montacnery Elevator Cox, we addressed a

similar situation invelving en enployee’s workers’ compensation
and third-party claims. Therein, the plaintiffs, the injured
enployee and his wife, stipulated with the defendants to dismiss
all clains and settled their personal injury and loss of
consortium clains against the defendants without the consent of
the injured employee's employer. 79 Hawai'i at 354, 903 P.2d at
50, We held, purevant to HRS § 386-8, that without the

employer's consent, the stipulation to dismiss with prejudice was

 

invalid. Id. at 358, 903 P.2d at Likewise, the stipulation
to dismiss in the instant case was invalid because the State did
not consent thereto. Accordingly, the circuit court did not

abuse its discretion in setting aside the stipulation.

s
 

WEST'S HAWAT

 

FOR PUBLICATION

 

while Shimsbuky is dispositive on this issue, we will

proceed to address Defendants’ specific arguments.

 

HRCP Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part:

fon motion ane upon svch tems as are Just, the court say
relieve party or party's legal reprerentasive fron @
final judgnent, crder, or proceeding for the following
Feasone () the judgnent. hes been satisfieg,
Felessed, Or diecharged, ors prior judgnent upon which it
is besee nas been reverses or Stherwise vacates, cr it ie no
Longer equitable that the Judgnent should have prospective

application; or (€) any ether season sustifvine relief trom
the cperation of she iudanent:

 

The fetion shell be made
Sithin © reasonable tines). this rule dees net limit
‘the power'of a court to entertain an inderendent ection to
Felieve s party from 2 judgnent, order, er prececaing

   

(Emphases sdded.) According te the plain language of the rule, @
court can “entertain an independent action te relieve a party
fron @ judgment, order, or proceeding... .” As such,
Defendants’ first contention is without merit.

With respect to Defendants’ second contention, Buscher
could net have breached the settlenent agreement because, 3s
discussed in Section II.A.1, supra, there was no velid
settlenent agreenent to breach.‘

Defendants’ third assertion that none of the reasons
enunerated in HRCP Rule 60(b) existed to support setting acide
the dismissal of Civil No. 97-237K is also without nerit.

According to HRCP Rule 60(b), “the court may relieve a party

 

« authough Sefendents scnit thet the State oid not consent to the
settienent, Defendants contend that the settienent agreement was stil) valié
and enfercéatle as between Euscher and Boning. Me disagree, os discussed in
Seetion 131.8, dnixa

 

    

20
 

++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.

« from 2 final judgment, order, or proceeding for... (6)
anyother reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgnent." The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) has stated
that “Rule 60(b) (é) empowers the court in its discretion to
vacate @ judgment whenever that action is appropriate to
accomplish justice.” Inre Hane Ranch Co. Ltda, 3 Hew. App.
141, 147, 642 P.26 938, 942 (1982). The fact that the
settlement, upon which the stipulation to disnise was based, was
not valid constitutes an appropriate reason justifying relief,
and the circuit court did net abuse its discretion in so ruling.

Defendants’ fourth contention that Buscher did not
exercise due diligence and that her motion was untimely, is also
vnaveiling. HRCP Rule 60(b) (6) requires that the motion be made
“within @ reasonable time|.)” After the dismissal of Civil No.

97-237K, Buscher and Boning both attempted to get the State's

 

consent and argued their respective positions regarding the
effect of the State’s October 15, 1999 letter. Based on the
letters exchanged between the parties’ attorneys, it appears that
the parties realized that they had come to an impasse in
approximately Novenber 1999. One month later, Buscher filed the
instant lawsuit. Buscher filed her motion to set aside the
stipulation approximately one and one-half years later. Although

ultimately, nearly two years elapsed between the dismissal of
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

Civil No. 97-237K and Buscher’s motion to set aside the
Gisnissal, based on the circumstances of this case, it cannot be

Saié that the circuit court's ruling that such time period was

 

reasonable clearly exceeded the bounds of reason to Defendants’
substantial detrinent.*

Finally, in addition to the fact that this court is not
bound by Ninth Circuit precedent, Defendants’ citation to Lehnan

is unavailing. First, Defendants contend that Euscher was not

 

injured by the dismissal of Civil No. 97-237K. Contrarily,
inasmuch as the settlement agreenent was not valid, if the

circuit court had not set aside the dismissal of Civil No. 97-
237K, Buscher would have recovered nothing fron Defendants, who

aintained that they did not have to pay the $125,000.00

 

settlement consideration until Buscher procured the State's
consent to the settlement agreenent as required by HRS § 386-8.

Second, Defendants contend that Buscher did not show that

 

* Detendante’ reliance on Billingham Inv, Com. ¥, Kunio Yokovans
Tevet, @ Saw. Ape. 226, 757 P.2d 316 (1890), and BAM" 7
Hoenata, 77 aol ed, 663 7.20 €© (2994), 4p unavesiing. Uniske the
Exstent core, Dillinotam ceale with ¢ moticn for relief from Judgnent based on
mcr fue 6018) (1), which, by its terme, must be filed within one year after
the judgeent, order, oF proceeding wee entered of taken. Here, Buscher"s
‘Snot request relief Deced on HRCP Rule 6016) (1), (3), atl of
Discher’
eine
‘ise distingussheble from the instant case Because more
eee ane cne-hel! years clapeea between the entry cf the Gismiseal order
ane the tine vyehara filed hie WReP Rule €0 motion. 77 Hawsi's at 148, 862
Prag at 10. Moreover, unlike in this case, the circus roled
that such @ tine Selay wee ot reasonable; we affirmec, concluding that the
Court had not abused ite discretion in so ruling. 1d."

 

 

 

  
  
 

 

 

then

 

   

   

 
 

++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.

circumstances beyond her control prevented timely action to
protect her interests because, according to Defendants, it was
solely Euscher’s fault that she failed to get the State's
consent, thus thwarting consunmation of the settiement. To the
contrary, both parties attempted and failed to obtain the state's
consent to their settlement agreement. The fact that the state
unreasonably withheld its consent, a finding not challenged as a
point of error on appeal, was not within Buscher’s control.
Based on the extraordinary circumstances in this case,
which ultimately led to the invalidity of the settlement and

ipulation, it is clear that Defendants did not carry their

 

burden of establishing that the circuit court abused its

discretion in setting aside the stipulation to dismiss. See

 

1 162, 80 P.3d 974, 8

 

Ditto v. McCurdy, 103 Hawai'i 1 3 (2003)
("The burden of establishing abuse of discretion is on the
appellant, and a strong showing is required to establish it.”
(oueting Lepere v. United Pub, Workers, Local 646, 77 Hawai'i
471, 474, 887 P.2d 1029, 1032 (1995).)).

The Circuit Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Enforce the

oT ‘Rareenent.

 

Defendants also contend that the circuit court erred in

refusing to enforce the settlement agreement. Because, as

 

cussed in Section I11.A.1, supra, the settlement agreement was

not valid pursuant to HRS § 386-8, the circuit court did not err

 
 

'1 REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAW:

Nevertheless, Defendants contend that

 

in refusing to enforce
although the State did not consent to the settienent, the
settlenent agreenent was still valid and enforceable as between
Buscher and Boning. We disagree.

Defendants point to language in Buscher’s complaint in
which she adnitted that there was @ settlement agreement between
Boning and herself, arguing that such admissions are binding on
Buscher. Even assuming, axeuendo, tht Buscher believed the

settlement agreement was valid, this does not change the fact

 

thet HRS § 386-8 requires the State’s consent without which there

can be no valid settlement agreement. The agreenent between
Buscher and Boning cannet be read as enything other than 2
proposed settlement agreement, which never reached fruition
because of the State's failure to consent. Accordingly, the
circuit court did not err in denying Defendants’ motion to
enforce the settlement aoreenent

c. court Did Ni s
cross: ‘State:

As stated in Section I.B.$, supra, the circuit court
found that “(The State]’s negligent claim handling, i.e.(,) its
wrongful refusal to consent to Plaintiff Buscher’s settlement
agreement with Defendant Boning, was @ legal cause of Plaintiff
Euscher’s enctional distress.” The court therefore concluded
that Buscher stated 2 claim for negligent infliction of encticnal
 

WEST'S HAWAT

 

FOR PUBLICATION \D PACIFIC REPORTER

   

distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and

 

intentional harm. Defendants aver that because the court found
the foregoing, the court erred in also finding that Defendants
did not have clains against the Stete for “unreasonable failure
to consent” and “negligent clains handling.” the State replies
that the circuit court correctly rejected the cross-claim against

it because: (1) the plain statutory language of HRS § 386-8 does

 

not mandate that consent shell not be unreescnsbly withheld:
(2) the legislative history of the stetute indicates an intent to

protect the interests of the employer and the employee, but not

 

the tortfeasor: (3) the statutes and cases from cther
jurisdictions upon which Defendants rely sre irrelevant and
distinguishable; (4) common sense requires affirmance; (5) the
state hes epecificslly not waived its immunity for the clains
asserted: and (6) the State's conditional consent to the
settlement agreement was reasonable.
1, The State Tort Liability Act

As a threshold matter, we first address the state's
contention that it ie immune from suit based on the State Tort
Liability Act (STLA), HRS chapter 622. Generally, “la) sovereign
[s]tate 4s immune from suit for money damages, except where there

hes been @ ‘clear relinguishment’

 

£ immunity and the [s]tate has

nted to be sued.” Bush

 

con Watson, €1 Hawai'i 474, 461, 916

 
 

‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

   

P.2¢ 1130, 1137 (1996) (quoting Bele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73
Hew. 578, 605, 837 P.2d 1247, 1265 (1992)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The STLA provides thet “[t]he State hereby
waives its inmunity for liebility for the torts of its employees

and shell be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as

  

BRS § 662-2

 

a privete individual under like cizcunstences
(1993). Notwithstanding this general waiver, the STLA contains
numerous exceptions for which the State retains its sovereign
immunity. Here, the State contends that Defendants’ cross-claim
falle within HRS § 6€2-15(4) (1993), which states an exception

m arising out of . . . interference with contract

 

for “[alny c:
rights[.]"* Assuming, without deciding, that a claim for

interference with prospective business advantage’ or prospective

 

© we noted Sn i sue) Core v. 2 Andersen
that the requisite elenente ef intentionol oF tortious interte;
contractusl relations ere:

 

(2) & contract between the plaintiff and e thiré partys (2)
the Gefencant’s knowledge of the contract; (3) the
Gefendant’s intentions) inducenent of the third perty te
Breach the contract; |) tne ansence of justification on the
Gefendant’s part) (5) the subsequent breach of the contract
by the third party; and (6) denages te the plaintssr.

    

 

 

 

 

223 Hawad's 261, 267 n.17, 182 P.34 752, 148 n.17 (2007) (ettation® omitted)

in Kahala Reval Corps, we noted that the following elenents
constitute the tert cf intentional or torticus interference with prospective
Easiness or econenic advantage:

 

(2) the existence of a valid business relationenip or
prospective advantage or expectancy sufficiently definite,
Specific, ano capable of acceptance in the sense that there
iba reasonable probability of it maturing into a future
econcnie benefit to the plaintiff; (2) knowledge of the

Teont inved.

 

 

2
++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

contractual relations! fells within the aforementioned
exception,’ we nevertheless disagree that Defendants’ claims for

“unreasonable failure to consent” and “negligent cleims handling”

 

(continued)
Telaticnehip, advantege, or expectancy by the defendant; (3)
ecpurpeseful intent te interfere mith the relationship,
Scvartage, or cxpestency:, {¢] legal ceuestaon between the
Get of interference ond the impairment of the reletsonship,
Sevantage, or expectency: ane (5) actual damages:

 

 

de et 267 n.28, 181 F.3d at 748 n.18 (citation omittes)

+ Gn Kutcher v, Zimmerman, the 1CA noted thet “the tort of interference
with prospective contvactual relatiche is 2 sub-epecies of the erosaer tort of
Yherierence with prospective econcnie advantage. 67 Newel 364, 408 n.25,
S87 F.26 1076, 1087 5.25 (app. 1888). The ICA then held thet @ pleintift
Sileging the tort of interference with prospective contractual relations most
flese one prove the following:

 

 

 

 

 

(2) # prospective contractual relationship existed between
the pisintiff ano s thire party) (2) the Gefencant knew of
thie reletionshsps (3) the defendant intentionally
interferes with the plaintiff's prospective contract (4)
the defencant acted without proper justifications (§) the
SCiencant's interterence caused the third party to fail te
ESnsunnate the prospective contract with the plaintiff; and
(El the cetensant's interference causes danages to the
plaints

Ad, at 406, 108

 

 

 

(footnotes emitted) «

+ the 3CA, in Hutches, recognized that “the interests protected by [the
tort of interference with existing contractual relaticns] and by the tort of
[itentionel interference with prespective economic edventage have been viewed
as relatea{.J” 67 Hawal't 294, 405.35, 957 F.26 2076, 2087 1.15 (app.
{Se6). “west Jurisdictions appear to agree that the tort of interference with
prospective economic ecventage falls within the “interference with contract
Eights" exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Art
tecel-U,fhe Inc. 2, Unites States, 755 Fezd i151, 1158 (D-C. cir. 1885)
Tconpiling caves ond Pelding that the plaintiff's “clains for interference
wietterocpective sovantage are barred s¢ clains arising cut ef interference
vith contract rights”); Dunres v United States, 26¢ F.2d 140, 145-44 (30
Cizri(eoneluaing that the tort of interference with prospective advantage was
Stinpay en extension” of tne tort cf interference with contractual relations
and hos thus snclogable wehin the exception to the tert claime ect) (citation
SEEMSG) "Sere ceniec, 361 Us. £22 (1988). But see Colersdo Ins, Group,
nes. Gnited States, 216 F, Supp. 767, 793 (B. Core. 1963) CIA] mere
Lifigetion of interference with proepective sovantage should not be construed
fc neceesacily fall within the sestutery exception pertaining to interference
Wit’ Conteactuel rights.”

 

 

 
 

++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER“

constituted such an interference claim. It cannot be said that
the State improperly interfered with the alleged settlement
agreement because, pursuant to HRS § 386-8, the State was =
necessary party to such agreement. See Hell v. Burcer King
Corp., 912 F. Supp. 1509, 1837 (8.0. Fla. 1995) (holding that
because any prospective sale cf the restaurant required the
defendant's consent, defendant's refusal to consent did not give
rise to a claim for tortious interference). Cf. Ethyl Corp, v.
Balter, 386 Sc. 2d 1220, 1224 (Fla. App. 1980) (“[A] cause of
action for interference does nct exist against one who is himself
@ party to the contract allegedly interfered with"): Uptoun
Heiohts Assocs, Ltd, P’ship v, Seafirst Comp,, 691 F.2d 639, 647
(Or. 1995) (holding that a party to a contract could not be
Mable in tort for conduct which the party was entitled to do
under the contract, even if party has malevolent purpose): Fort
vancouv ced 147 F.2d $47, $54 (9th
Cir. 1984) (concluding that a “tort{] committed by persons
sustaining contract relations” does not constitute the tort of
interference with contract rights) (citing Nicholson v. United
States, 177 F.2d 768, 769 (Sth Cir. 1949)). We therefore held
that the interference with contract rights exception does not

apply to the instent case.
#* FOR PUBLICATION IN Wi

   

(T'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

The State does not owe Defendants an actionable duty.
Defendants next challenge the circuit court’s
conclusion that “[w]ith respect to [the State]’s negligent claim
handling and its impact on Defendant Boning, there is no duty
which gives rise to a cause of action for ‘unreasonable failure
to consent,’ ‘negligent claim handling[,]’ [Jor ‘negligent
failure to consent.’” The State responds that the circuit court
correctly determined that it does not owe an actionable duty to

Defendants. We agree with the State.

We have often stated:

 
  

    

fon upon one fer the benefit of the other =~ or, nore
+ shethes fect of the plaintiff which

ntities to legal protection at the
ie entirely a goestion of Lew

      

 

Knodle, 69 Haw. at 385, 742 P.2¢ at 383 (internal quotation
signals, ellipsis, and citations omitted). The state correctly
notes that the plain language of HRS § 386-8, supra note 2, does
not explicitly mandate thet an employer has a duty not to
unreasonably withhold consent. However, this is not dispositive
of whether @ duty exists here. Rather, in considering whether to
inpose @ duty on a defendant (here, the State) to be owed to @

plaintsff (here, Defendants) we have stated generally that:

2
 

‘OR PUBLICN’

 

IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

(W)e recognize that cuty se not escrosanct in itself, put
only an expression of the sun total of these considerations
Of Belicy which lead the law te say that the particul
Blalncitt is eneities to protection. legal duties ar

severable facts of noture, but merely conclusory
expressions that, in cases of particular type, lability
should be inpesed for danage dene. In determining wh
Srinct @ duty is owes, we must weigh the consideracior
Policy which favor the [plaintiffe’] recovery against those
Wich fever uniting the (defendante’] Lisbiisty- The
Goestion cf whether che ose # duty to ancther must be
Secided ch e cate-by-case Baris, Rowever, we are relsctent
fo inpose a new coty upon menbers of cur society withost ery
logicel, sound, and compelling reasons taking inte
ceneigerstion the octal and funan relaticnenipe ef ovr
society.

   

 

    

  

 

 

Blaix ving, 98 Howes‘ 247, 259-60, 21 F.3d 452, 464-€5 (2001)
(citations omitted).

b. Caselaw and statutes

Defendants cite to various caselaw and statutes, mainly
from other jurisdictions, to support their contention that we
should interpret HRS § 386-E as imposing @ duty on the employer,
in favor of the tortfeasor, not to unreasonably withheld consent
to the settlenent agreement. The State contends that the
statutes and cases upon which Defendants rely are irrelevant and

distinguishable. Again, we agree with the State.

  

cate

The only Hawai'i case cited by Defendants ss
Pacific Rent-All, Inc., in which we “[wleigh{ed) the policy
considerations underlying an insurer's right of subrogation
against those considerations supporting the finality of
settlement,” and held that “in the context of fire and casualty

insurance,” @ settlement egreement between an insured and @
 

+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

tortfeaccr does net bar an insurer's subrogation action. 90
hawai'i 315, 332, 978 P.26 753, 770 (1999). As Pacific Rent-A:
makes clear, HRS § 386-8 supports our holding in that case
because it statutorily preserves an employer's subrogation rights

from third-party settlement. See id. It is unclear, however, how

 

that case supports Defendants’ position that an enployer/insurer
has 9 duty not to vnresscnably refuse to consent to a settlement
agreement.%° Rather, the case seems to support the State's
position insofar as it enphasizes that an employer‘s subrogation
interest outweighs the tortfeasor’s interest in reaching @
settlement with an employee.

Defendants alse rely on Eckhardt v. Village Inn

 

Vicorpl, 626 P.2d BSS (Cole. 1992), in which the Colorado
Supreme Court held that an insurance carrier's refusal to approve
a settlenent between an injured employee and third-party
tortfeasor must be reasonable. In that case, Eckhardt, the
injured employee, received workers’ compensation benefits from
his employer, via the insurance carrier, after being injured in a
truck accident. Id. at @87. Eckhardt subsequently sued the

tortfeasor. Id. Realizing that a recovery in his third-party

 

© To the extent that Defendants are arguing thet Paci{ic Rent-Ai
sopperts their contention chat the settienent agreenent shosle be enforceable
af Between Buscher anc Bening, such argunent is without merit for the reascns
Set forth in Section 111.8, gunzg, 2nd Deccuse Zacific Rent-All wae decices
Sin the context of nd Casualty insurence,” and not HRS § 266-6.

 

 

 

  

 
 

PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HA\

 

REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

suit was unlikely, Eckhardt entered into settlement negotiations,
and the tortfeasor offered $12,500.00. Id, Eckharét sought the
carrier's approval, pursuant to @ Colorado statute requiring the
carrier's consent prior to settlement when the amount to be
recovered is less then the total compensation owed by the
carrier. Id, The carrier offered to approve a settlement in
which it would receive $7,000.00 and @ complete release from its
obligation to pay Eckhardt any future benefits related to his
claim. Id. After Eckherdt refused the offer, the carrier
refused to consent to any settlement not sufficient te indemnify
fully the carrier for its subrogated interest. Id, at 857-58.
Eckhardt nevertheless settled with the tortfeasor for $12,500.00.
Id, at €56. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the
administrative lew judge's conclusion that Eckhardt had forfeited
future benefits by settling the suit against the tortfeasor
without the carrier’s consent. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed, holding that “an insurance
carrier, which has been properly notified about a suit brought in
good faith by the injured enployee, has an ebligation to act
reasonably when an injured employee requests approval of a

settlement in such a suit.” Jd, The court reasoned that

 

imposing ne duty on the carrier te act reascnsbly when
retve: tous cettlenent offer would only work to
Gininsen the nomber of actions initiated by employers
Torttessors. The result would be
Contrary to the intent ona purposes of the Act and £0

    

22
‘+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT] REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

    

 

 

employers’ best interests because their carriers will net
Seteive eny reinbursenent from the third parties
Fesponsibie.

Id
‘The key fact that distinguishes Eckhardt from the

instant case ig that in that case, unlike here, the injured

 

employee, not the tortfeasor, brought suit against the
employer/carrier. In other words, Eckhardt stands for the
proposition thet the insurer owes a duty to the emplovee not to

unreasonably withhold consent. The Eckhardt Court's reasoning,

 

as set forth above, indicates that its holding promoted the

 

public policy interest of not discouraging employees from suing
tortfessors, thereby else ensuring that employers receive
reinbursemente from reeponsible tortfeasors. The court did not
mention sny public pelicy supporting the imposition of @ duty en
the enployer owed to the tortfessor. Therefore, Eckhardt does
not support Defendants’ position.

Defendants elso direct this court to several states
that permit an employee to seek court approval of the settlement
in lieu of obtaining the consent of the employer or carrier,”

and argue that because Hewai‘i does not have such a statute, we

 

 befendants cite to the states of Arkansas, Mel
anc tiew York, Tisted in 6 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larse!
‘Slupensaticn’ Law § 116.07 (5) (2000), se states that permit on enpleyee to
Geurt approval of the cettienent in' lieu of obtaining the consent of the
Gnployer or insurer.

  

achuserts, Nebrasks,

         

 
 

+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

should fashion a remedy for tortfeasors whose settlements ere
“held hostage” by unreasonable employers or insurers. We look to
HRS § 386-8 and its legislative history for guidance in
determining whether tortfeasors should be protected by imposing a
duty on employers, as Defendants contend.

c.  Lesislative history

The State aptly points out that the legislative history
of HRS § 386-8 indicates thet the statute's purpose is to protect
the interests of the employee end the employer. As stated in

Shimabuky v. Montoomery Elevator Co.:

HRS § 386-8 originated in 1915 a6
of the Laue of the Territory of Hawal't. Rowever, the
Siepositive paregraph of HAS § 3EE-E in the instant cose,
nich requires consent of Both employer and enployee before
Gy “release” or “settlenent” is valle, wes net adged until
$551 hen the House Leber Consittes arcnded Senate fil) 1
(6.8. 416) to sneiude tne paragraph. 1961 Maw. Sess. 1. Act
154, § 4409 et 225. The paragraph proposed by the House
Labor Connittee provices in Felevant pari

section § of Act 221

     

 

      

     

   
  

   

 

No release or settlement of any claim or action under
this section is valid without the written consent of
both enployer and employee. The entire amount of such
settlenent ie aubject to the employer's fli cleim for
Feinborsenent fer hse expensitures fer benefice onder
this chapter and his expenses and costs of acticn

 

 

 

In anending 5.8. 18, the House Leber Committee notes:

H.D.i anends 5.0.1 in accordance with suggestions of
the Department cf Labor ond the Inturance Industry £0

 

 

that the wording . . » provides # more equitable
Ealance ae betheen the Fights of the employer and the
employee.

ise. Stand. Conn. Rep. No. 722, in 1981 House Journal, at
595. Thus, the legisisture enacted HRS § 386-8 to give the
injured employee # right to cleim workere’ compensation
benefits and to proceed against s chize-party tortfeascr
without waiving his of her righte to either. Wee, Stand

 

 

  

 
'ST’S HAWA REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

FOR PUBLICATION IN W1

 

Comm. Rep. No. 722, in 1961 House Journal, at $79. However,
because the eaployér's right to reimbursement is often
Gepencent on the injured exployee’s actions, the legislature
Sspotes 8 provicion regiring the written consent of both
expleyer end enployee Before eny release of settlement if
value fefore, me mst construe the fourth paregreph of
HRS § 306-8 to give foll effect to the intent of the
legislature, hich sought to protect the Fights of both
enployees and employers:

  

 
 

 

79 Hawai'i at 357-58, 903 F.2d at

 

As Defendants admit in their reply brief to the State,
“[the consent requirement of [HRS] § 386-8 is supposed to
protect the employer and employee.” Indeed, it is clear that our
legislature intended the statute to protect the employer’s right
to reimbursement and the employee's right to claim workers’
compensation benefits and to file suit against the tortfeasor.

d. Conclusion

Stated simply, there is nothing in cur caselaw or in
the legislative history of HRS § 366-€ to support the imposition
of a duty on employers in favor of tortfeasors regarding consent
tos third-party settlement. Moreover, we do not believe it to
be prudent public policy to impose on employers such an
actionable duty. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in

ruling that the State did not owe Defendants an actionable duty

 

ctionable

Becevte ue hold that the Stete does not owe Defendants an
1 consent

coty in this cate, we need not discues whether the Staters conaitic
fo the proposed scttlenent agreenent wes Teascnable. Furthernore, as
Detensents pesnt cut, the circuit court's ruling that the State's refusal to
Consent was unressonable with respect co Fuscher stands unchallenged because
the Stave aid not appeal this ruling,

 

 

 

 

Ea
 

++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

and thus, did not err in dismissing Defendants’ cross-claim

against the State.

Dd. The ci xt Did Not Err in Dismissine Defendants’
Third-Party Claim Aoainst Masui.

Defendants also aver that the circuit court erred in
disniesing Defendants’ third-party claim against Masui, which
alleged “negligent handling of 2 settlement between his client
and (Defendants) resulting in damages to [Defendants] .”
Specifically, Defendants contend: (1) Masui’s motion to dismiss
was actually @ motion for sunmary judgment and should have been

treated as such; and (2) (a) Mesui owed Defendants = duty of care

 

pursuant to Blair v. Ing, 9 Hewai'i 247, 21 P.3é 452 (2001), and
(b) Masui’ failure to obtain the State’s consent breached this
Guty resulting in harm to Defendants. Regardless of whether
Masui's motion is reviewed as 2 motion to dismiss or @ notion for
summary judgment, based on the following, Defendants’ argunent

that Masui owed Defendants an actionable duty is without merit as

 

a matter of lew, and the circuit court did not err in dismissing
Defendants’ third-party claim against Masui.

As the ICA stated in Myers v, Cohen, “creation of a
Guty in favor of an adversary of the attorney's client would
create an unacceptable conflict of interest. Not only would the
adversary’s interests interfere with the client’s interests, the

attorney’s justifiable concern with being sued for negligence

3
 

|AWAT'T REPORTS AN!

 

\CIFIC REPORTER

 

would detrimentally interfere with the attorney-client

relationship.” 5 Haw. App. 232, 246, 687 P.2d 6, 16 (1984)

(quoting Friedman v, Dozore, 312 N.W.26 585, 591 (Mich. 1961)),
rev'd on other cfounds, €7 Haw. 389, 688 P.2d 1145 (1984).
Accord Rashid v. Albricht, 618 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (D. Nev.
1993) ("while the Court expects all counsel to conform with the

 

ethical guidelines, imposing an affirmative duty of care to an
adverse party in litigation would create an unaccepteble conflict

of interest.”); Clark v. Druckwan, 624 S.£.2d 864, 869 (W. Va.

2005) {collecting cases and stating that “courts which have

 

addressed the issue have uniformly found that an attorney does
not have a duty to @ third party, including an opposing party,
the breach of which would subject the attorney to liability”);
Garcia v. Rodev, Dickason, Sloan. Akin & Robb, P.A., 750 P.2d
116, 122 (N.M, 1988) (holding that attorney’s actions would not
Norton

MaHines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975) (stating

 

give rise to cause of action under theory of negligence):

that the plaintiff did not have cause of action against adverse
party's attorneys for simple negligence).

Nevertheless, Defendants cite Blair for the proposition
that “there can be a duty of care between an attorney and a non-
client either in negligence or contract actions.” Blaiz,

however, is distinguishable. Blair involved a legal malpractice

 
 

s+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

action brought by the beneficiaries of @ trust against the
attorney whe drafted the trust documents. Therein, we adopted
thé test set forth in Lucas v. Hamm, $€ Cal. 24 $83, 15 cal.
Rptr. €21, 364 P.2d €8 (1961), also @ malpractice action against
an attorney who drafted trust documents, to determine “whether to
impose @ duty upon attorneys to nen-client beneficiaries in the
ate clannine context.” Blaiz, 98 Hewai'i at 260, 21 P.3d at
465 (enphesis added). Inasmuch as this case clearly dees not

zr held that there

 

involve estate planning, the fact that Bl

 

could be @ duty of cere between an attorney and non-client

 

beneficiaries does not support Defendants’ assertion that Masui

owed an actionable duty of care to Defendants here. Indeed, as
we rade clear in Elaiz, “we emphasize that our holding today does
not create @ blanket duty of care to all non-client beneficiaries
in every case.” Id, at 261, 21 P.3d at 466.

ke therefore hold that Masui did not ewe Defendants an
actionable duty in the instant case such that Defendants could
assert # claim for relief sounding in negligence against hin, and

the circuit court did not err in so ruling."

1% pathough Defendants eppesr to frame their issue cn epreai in terme
negligence, they eiso assert at nuserous tines throughout their briefs that
fasts misrepresented to Defencants thet he had ostaines the State's consent.
Gniise s cloit for negligence, an stterney can be held liable for frevaslen
plerepresentation. "See Kanal Roval Corey, 113 Hawaii at 268-69, 151 F.3d at

lens stating that it 1s wel
perey for fraud); Matsuura
149, 362, 73 P-2¢ 667, 700 (2003) ("Under

 

      

 

    
  

   

 
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E. Countercleim Agsinst Buscher and Motion for Interpleader and
Dismissal

As their fifth and sixth points of error, Defendants

contend that the circuit court erred 41

 

(1) dismissing their

jer and dismissal “for the reasons stated in

 

motion for interple
the Motion for Interpleader and For Dismissal Filed October 12,
2000"; and (2) denying their counterclaim against Busther “for

the reasons stated in their Memoranda in Opposition to the

 

motions.” Buscher replies that these points of error should be
deemed waived pursuant to HRAP Rule 26(b) (7) because Defendants
fail to provide an argument, citations to authorities, statutes,
and parts of the record upon which they relied. Inasmuch as

Defendants indeed do not have @ corresponding argument section

 

for either their fifth or sixth points of error, and only direct
this court to look at previcusly filed memoranda, we deen these
points of error waived. See HRAP Rule 26(b) (7) (stating that an
opening brief should contain “[t)he argument, containing the

contentions of the appellant on the points presented and the

reasons therefor, with citetions to the authorities, statutes and

 

(continued)
|, » party 1s not inmune from lisbility for civil Garages besed vpon that
Lyte fraud engaged in during prior Litigation proceeainge.")? 2
Chuck, 1 Faw, App. 379, 383-84, 620 P.26 733, 736687 (2980) ("Ine rule of
That an attorney representing & client say be held personally liable to an
aoverse party cr @ chiro person who eustains injury as 2 result of sn
attorney's intentional tortious acte ie weil settled.” (Citations omitted.)
Betencants, however, concede in thei cpening brief thet "{iJn the instant
Cece, snere sre no allegations thet the agreenent Between (Bvecher) ane
Defendants wae procures by fraud.”

 

         

   

38
 

‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWALT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

 

parts of the record relied on. . . . Points not argued may be
deened waived"). If we were to accept Defendants’ previously
filed memoranda as Defendants’ argument in support of these
points of error, and thus, part of their opening brief,
Defendants would be in violation of HRAP Rule 28 (a), which states
that “an opening . . . brief shall not exceed 35 pages|.]”
Accordingly, Defendants’ fifth and sixth points of error are
waived.
F. The Cixcuit Court's award of Costs

Finally, Defendants contend that the circuit court
(1) lacked jurisdiction to enter an order granting Buscher’s
motion for taxation of costs, and in the alternative, (2) abused
its discretion in granting such costs.

1, The circuit court had jurisdiction to grant Buscher’s
motion for costs.

RAP Rule 4(2) (3) (2006), entitled “Tine to eppesl
affected by post-judgnent motions,” states:

If any party files a tinely motion . . . for attorney's fee
or coset, the tine for filing the notice of appesl se
Eetensed enti 30. cays after entry of an crder disposing of
the motion; provided, that the failure £0 dispose of any,
notion by order enteved upon the record within 90 days after
the cate the noticn wae filed shell constitute a denial of
the RotSen.

 

 

 

notion to strike Defendante! faret
fest Defendants’ fifth ano siach pointe of
ctor should be orened watved pursuant to ARAP Rule 26(b) (7). This court, on
Geteber 14,7005, grentes Buscher's motion to strike Defencante’ firet opening
Brief, but for faslure te comply with HRAP Rule 26(B) (8)

% gugcher prevsovely filed

opening erief, arguing, amber alia,

     

        

 

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This rule, effective Jenuary 1, 2000, supersedes the line of
cases standing for the proposition that the circuit court lacks
jurisdiction to evard costs after a notice of appeal is filed.
‘The rule provices that the court has 90 days to dispose of 2

postjudenent motion for costs, regardless of when the notice of

is filed. In the instant case, Buscher prematurely filed

 

opp
her motion for costs on Octcker 28, 2004, four and one-half
months prior to the entry of final judgment on March 15, 2005.
Although the rule does not address the situation in which =
motion for costs is prematurely filed prior to the entry of final
judgment, we will deem such motion filed immediately after the
judgment becomes final for the purpose of calculating the 90-day
period, As such, the court's June 1, 2008 order granting
Buscher's motion for costs is valid, and Defendants’ April 12,
2005 notice of appeal is deened to appeal this disposition. HRAP
Rule 4(b) (3).
2, The cixeuit court's avard of costs

a. HRCP Rule 6&

We first address Buscher’s contention that she is
entitled to costs under HRCP Rule 68 (2003), which provides, in
relevant part:

At any tine more than 10 days before the trisl begine,
ny party may serve upon any adverse party an offer of

Eettlenent oF an offer to allow juagnent to be taken 2
aither party for the money or property or to the effect
specified in the offer, with coste then accrued, vs An

 

   

 
 

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offer not accepted shall be ceened withdyenn and evicence
Sherect is net scniesible except in s proceeding te
Geternine coste, Lf the sudssent finally chteined by the
siferse ie not nore Zeversh : s

‘URL Day the costs incurred after the makina of the offer,
(Emphasis added.) Buscher filed two purported HACP Rule 68

   

 

offere of judgement -- one on January 31, 2001 and one on July 27,
2001 -- both in the amount ef $200,000.00. The judoment entered
against Boning after a jury trial was in the amount of
$278,000.00. Although this judoment was not more favorable te
Eoning than Buscher's offers, Buscher is not entitled to costs
under HRCP Rule €8 because her two offers did not constitute

valid Rule 68 offers inesmuch as they did not “fully and

completely decide the claim or clains toward which the offer(s)

 

Iwere) directed.” Kikuchi v. Brown, 110 Hawai'i 204, 209, 230
P.3é 1068, 1074 (App. 2006) (quoting Ass'n of Apt. owners of
Mailes Flue v. Mailes Resort Co., 100 Hawai'i 97, 120, $8 P.3d
608, 691 (2002) (quoting Crown Frops., Inc. v. Fin, Sec. Life
Ing. Co., 6 Haw. App. 105, 113, 712 P.2d $04, 520 (1988))).

Here, as discussed in Section 17.8, supra, @ settlenent would
not have been valid without the State’s consent pursuant to HRS §
286-8. Thus, had Boning accepted Buscher’s purported offer of
judgrent, it would not have fully and completely decided the
clains toward which the offer was directed because it lacked the
State's written consent. As such, Buscher’s offers were not
sufficient to qualify as HRCP Rule 68 offers of judgnent.

@
++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

b. HRCP Rule $4/d)

Buscher, however, is entitled to costs under HRCP Rule
S4(d), which provides that “costs shall be allowed as of course
to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs|.)"
“costs” are those properly avardable under HRS § 607-9 (1993),

which states:

ALL actual disbursenente, including bot not limite
te, intvactate travel expenses for witnesses

expenses for cepesition transeript originals and copies, and
cther incidental expences, including cep)

Gnerastace long distance telephone charge
sworn to by en attorney ora party, anc deenec resscnabie by
the court, may be silowed in taxation of corte.

   

   

 

 

We therefore now address each of Defendants’ challenges to the
circuit court's award of costs to Buscher.
(1) Messenger service:
Defendants first challenge the circuit court's award of

1,125.00 for what Buscher labeled “messenger services,” for

 

“redex” and “CitiExprese” charges. Defendants contend that
Buscher is not entitled to the award because she failed to
provide “any explanation for why express service was necessary or
reascnable. Moreover, there was no justification or support
provided for why [Buscher] is entitled to this. Messenger
service is an expensive luxury which would be unnecessary with
proper time managenent and scheduling to avoid the need for

express services.”
++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

“Because there is a presumption that the prevedling
party may be awarded its costs, the burden of showing that
particular cost request is unreasonable is more properly on the
adverse party.” Mong, @8 Hawai'i at 53, 961 P.2d at 616. Thus,
it was Defendants’ burden to show why the expenses were
unreasonable.

With respect to messenger services, the ICA in Kikuchi
held that such fees are generally not taxable costs. 110 Hawai'i
at 212-23, 130 P.3d at 1077-78. As the ICA explained therein,
“except in the rare circumstance where the need in particular
case is extraordinary in its volume or nature, the cost of this
fonction . . . is properly treated as overhead.” Ic. et 213, 130
F.3d at 1078, In this case, Buscher’s attorneys were on C'ahu,
while the case was being tried in the third cirevit (Kona
Division) on the islend cf Hawai'i. Buscher avers that the costs
requested were for delivery of various pleadings to the third
circuit court. Buscher provided itemized invoices detailing the
Gate and place of delivery, @ description of the documents
Gelivered (s.a., motions, menoranda, exhibits, subpoenas, etc.),
and the cost of each delivery, Despite having this detailed
information, Defendants do net provide any evidence that any
specific delivery costs were unnecessary or unreasonable. Thus,

while messenger services may generally not constitute @ taxable

“
 

#4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

cost, it would be reasonable for the circuit court to have
allewed @ portion of this cost for the expense of mailing the
numerous filings from O'ahu to Hawai'i. See HRS § 607-9 (“ALL
actual disbursements, including but not limited to, - . -
postage, sworn to by an attorney or a party, and deened
reasonable by the court, may be allowed in taxation of costs.”).
We further note that the circuit court reduced Buscher’s
requested messenger service costs from $2,606.88 to $1,125.00.
We therefore held that the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in ewarding Fuscher $1,125.00 of her requested costs.
(2) Expert services

Defendants next take issue with Buscher’s request for
$5,032.74 for “expert services,” correctly stating that expert
witness fees are generally not taxable as costs. See Canalez vw
Bob/s Appliance Serv, Ctr., Inc., 69 Hawai'i 292, 307, 972 P.26
295, 320 (1999) ("{T]his court has reaffirmed the proposition
that expert witness fees are normally not allowed.” (Citations
omitted.}}.% However, the court only awarded $352.02 for

“expert services,” apparently for Buscher’s request with respect

% pathoogh in Canglez we stated that “expert witness fees incurred
after the making of an offer of judgment, if deemed reasonable, are taxable in
the Court's diseretion se coste agsinet the offeree pursuant to HRCP Rule
bet, ]* €9 Hawei't at 308, 972 F.26 at 31, a8 discussed in Section TI1.F.2.
Haugy, Buscher's cffere were not sufficient to quelify ae ACP Bule 6€ offers
EF jedgnent. Ae such, uncer HRCF Rule 54(d), expert witness fees ere not
shiowed

 

 

      

“6
 

2+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

te Micro-Imaging-HI, Inc. (Kone Hespital), which appears to be 8
charge for @ microfilm copy of her nedical record as well as 2
$20.00 “research” charge. This cost, therefore, does not appear
to be an expert witness fee. Because Defendants only objected to
an evard of expert witness fees and do not specifically object to
this cost, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding it. See fiona, 68 Hawai'i at 53, 961 P.2d at 618
("Because there is @ presumption that the prevailing party may be

awarded its costs, the burden of showing that a particular cost

 

request is unreasonable is more properly on the adverse party.").

(2) Travel expenses

 

Fuscher requested $6,904.35 for travel expenses,

including airfare, rental car fees, lodging, expenses, and meals.

 

The circuit court evarded her costs in the ancunt of $6,593.04,
but did not explain the $311.31 reduction. In support of ner
airfare and rental car expenses, Buscher provided travel
itineraries detailing the date each cost was incurred, the matter
requiring travel (g.g., circuit court hearing re:
Motions/Settlenent Conference), airline flight departure and
arrival information, copies of airline coupons used with the
passenger's name, rental car charges, and credit card charges

showing payment of each expense. Despite having this detailed

“
   

OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

information, Defendants do not cbject to any specific travel

expense request; their objection, in its entirety, states:

 

There wes no setisfactery explanation for whe incurred these
see or specifically what they were for. The cost of
‘Toaging for witnesses wee not auerdea by the t3ii
court in the Harking cose and the sppellste court cored,
fee Haruine ve Theda, 18) Haw. 376, 989 Pele 766) (2976)

    

Contrary to Defendants’ implication, as stated above, “[blecause

2 presumption thet the prevailing party may be awarded

 

there 4
dts costs, the burden of showing that @ particular cost request
is unreasonable is more properly on the adverse party.” Wong, 87

Hawai'i at 53, 985 P.2d at 618 (rejecting non-moving party's

 

argument thet lower court abused its discretion because moving
party failed to explain way the costs were necessary). As we

held in wong:

(Wyhen costs are avardeble to # prevailing party uncer ERCP
Kole S419) and s particular taxable costs allowed by
featute oF precedent, then actuel eisburcenente for this
purpose sre presumptively resscnable. The saverse party he
The burden cf challenging the reasonableness of « particule
cost request. in the sosence of @ chellenge to ¢ particy

 

      

    

 

Feguert, st ie not an ebuse of discretion for the trial
court 10 suara the cost requested as presumptively
Feasonabl

 

Id, at 53-54, 961 P.2d at 616-19. With this in mind, we address

each of the categories in Buscher’s request for travel expenses.
Firet, airfare clearly falls within HRS § 607-9"s

“intrastate travel expenses” category, as do expenditures for

Mong, 88 Hawai'i at $4, 961 P.26

 

parking, rental car, and ¢

at 619.

 
   

IAWAT'I REPORTS.

 

25+ FOR PUBLICATIO’ PACIFIC REPORTER,

 

wes

on the other hand, “[mJeals are not texable costs. The
necessity for eating lunch is severable from and unrelated to the
Litigation.” Id. at 54-55, 961 P.2d at 619-20. After a careful
review of the record, it appears thet $466.23 of the costs
requested were for meals, which are not taxable costs according
to Wong. Id, Thus, this amount should be deducted from
Buscher’s award.

With respect to Buscher’s request for the cost of
lodging, we have stated that “[hjotel expenditures are reasonable
only if necessary due to the scheduling of court proceedings or
Gepositions. Hotel expenditures for the convenience of counsel
should not be allowed.” Id, at $4, 961 P.2d at 619. As stated
above, Defendants do not challenge @ particular request, but
merely cite to Harkins v. Ikeda, for the proposition that hotel
lodging for witnesses is not a taxable cost. Defendants,
however, do not point to anything in the record indicating that
the hotel lodging expense was for witnesses. Defendants also do

not argue that the hotel expenditures were otherwi:

 

unnecessary

or unreasonable. Thus, it is clear that Defendants fail to show

 

that the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding this

cost. See Int'] Bro, of Elec, Workers v. Hawaiian Tel., 68 Haw.
316, 322 n.7, 713 P.2d 943, 950 n.7 (1986) (“Counsel has no right

to cast upon the court the burden of searching through @
   

FOR PUBLICATIO’

 

WEST's HAW!

 

REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +

voluminous record to find the ground of an ebjection.” (Citation
onitted.)).

Absent any argument by Defendants objecting te any of
puscher’s specific travel expense entries, we conclude that

Buscher is entitled to an award of costs for travel expenses in

 

the amount of $6,438.12, which reflects a reduction of $466.23
for the cost of meals.
(4) Cour 2

The cirevit court evarded $4,487.96 for court reporter
fees, In support of her request, Buscher provided itemized
invoices describing the case name, the date of the deposition,
the names of the deponent and the court reporter, and the cost of
the deposition, Despite having this detailed infornation,
pefendants make only @ general cbjection that “there was no
explenation or support for why [Buscher] is entitled to these
costs. . . . [Buscher) failed to present any explanation in her

bill of costs to ageist the Court in determining whether the

 

depositions listed were reasonable or necessary.” This general

objection is substantially similar to the objection rejected in

Wong. 88 Hawai"i at $3, 961 P.2d at 61 (rejecting non-moving

 

party's argument that the moving party’s cost request contained
“no explanation as to why these depositions and/or costs they

incurred were necessary, . . . [the moving party's) failure to

 
WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

   

‘OR PUBLICATIO’

show why these depositions and/or costs they incurred were
necessary make it clear that it would be an abuse of discretion
for this court to tax them to [the adverse party]”). As set
forth above, “when costs are avardable to a prevailing party
under HRCP Rule 54(¢) end @ particular taxable cost is allowed by
statute or precedent, then actual disbursenents for this purpose
are presumptively reesonable. The adverse party hes the burden
of challenging the reasonableness of a particular cost request.”
Id. at 53-54, 961 P.2d at 618-19. HRS § 607-9 clearly allows
“expenses for deposition transcript originals and copies.”
Defendants do not indicate which of the depositions were
unreasonably obtained or unnecessary and therefore do not carry
their burden of showing that the circuit court abused its
discretion in avarding this cost. See Int’) Ero. of Elec.

P.2d at 950 n.

 

Horkers, 68 Hew. at 322.7, 7 We thus hold

 

that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
Buscher court reporter expenses.

Because Defendants do not specifically contest the

 

remainder of Buscher's request, such costs will be presumed

reasonable. See Blair v. Ing, 96 Hawai'i 327, 335, 3

192 (2002) ("No opposition was received regarding the

  

P.3d 184,

reasonableness of the costs. In the absence of cpposition, we

 

presume that the remaining costs were reasonable.”).
 

2+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

Accordingly, Buscher is entitled to costs in the amount of

$20,002.62, which reflects a reduction for meals from Buscher’s

 

travel expenses request.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the circuit court's March 15,
2005 final judgnent is affirmed. In addition, we vacate the
cireuit court's June 1, 2005 order awarding costs and remand this
case to the circuit court with instructions that an amended order
be entered, awarding costs in the amount of $20,002.82 in favor

of Buscher-

on the briefs:

John #. Price and
Amand J. We:

on for
defendants-appeliants and

third-party piaintifé:

sppellents Duane §. Boning, .
Connerce insurance Co., and Rl Lricar—
Nuc Oo cetonyomec

 

 

Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc.

Herbert R. Takahashi,
Danny J. Vasconellos,

and Rebecca L. Covert >
(of Takahashi, Mesui, ad
Vesconcelios & Covert):

Stanford H. Masui in Gon «Bote bo
Substitution after. 5/1/06,

for plointiff-appellee

Esther J. Buscher and

third-party defendant

appellee Stanford H. Masui

 

Dorothy Sellers and
Kimberly Tsunoto,

Deputy Attorneys General
for defendant-appellee

Stete of Hawai'i