Title: Colling v. Hjelle

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

125 N.W.2d 453 (1963) Maurice COLLING, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Walter R. HJELLE, as State Highway Commissioner of the State of North Dakota and W. W. Ferguson, as Director of the Safety Responsibility Division for State Highway Commissioner, Respondents and Appellants. No. 8088. Supreme Court of North Dakota. December 19, 1963. Rehearing Denied January 10, 1964. *454 Rausch & Chapman, Bismarck, for petitioner and respondent. Helgi Johanneson, Atty. Gen., and Jon R. Kerian, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Bismarck, for respondents and appellants. MORRIS, Chief Justice. This is an appeal by the State Highway Commissioner and the director of the Safety Responsibility Division from an order of the District Court of Burleigh County reversing an order of the State Highway Commissioner which revoked motor vehicle operator's license number 22231, issued to Maurice Colling. The order of the district court also restored the license to Colling. In revoking the license, the State Highway Commissioner purported to act pursuant to Chapter 39-20, NDCC, as amended by Chapter 269, Session Laws N.D.1961. Upon the revocation of his driver's license, Colling requested and was granted a hearing before the Commissioner pursuant to Section 39-20-05, NDCC. Colling then petitioned the district court for a review of the adverse determination of the State Highway Commission pursuant to Section 39-20-06, ND CC. Under that section the district court is required to determine the matter upon the record made before the Commissioner, and no additional evidence may be heard. At the hearing in the district court the only evidence presented was a transcript of the testimony of patrolman Templeton of the Bismarck Police Department. We summarize his testimony. On December 22, 1962, at about two o'clock a. m., the patrolman observed Colling driving west on Highway 10 in Bismarck, and approaching the Memorial Bridge which spans the Missouri River between Bismarck in Burleigh County and the adjacent county of Morton. The speed limit at the point of observation was 25 miles per hour and Colling was driving about double that limit. The patrolman followed Colling across the bridge into the adjacent county of Morton, where he was apprehended by the officer. The patrolman asked Colling to get out of his car and walk back to the patrolman's car. He was weaving and staggering, and there was a strong *455 smell of alcohol about him. On demand he showed the patrolman his driver's license. They sat in the patrolman's car and the patrolman told Colling that he was under arrest for driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic liquor. The patrolman drove Colling to the Bismarck police station, and there he asked him to take a "drunkometer" test, which Colling refused to do. Thereafter the patrolman filled out an affidavit to the effect that Colling had been arrested and had refused to submit to the test, which affidavit he mailed to the Safety Responsibility Division of the Highway Department. The patrolman also testified that at a subsequent hearing on the matter "Mr. Colling was found not guilty." He also testified that as Colling drove across the bridge his car was weaving and almost hit the right side of the bridge twice as he went across. The patrolman had no warrant of arrest. The controlling issue in this case is whether Colling at the time he was asked to take the "drunkometer" test was under arrest as that term is used in Chapter 39-20, NDCC, as amended. Section 1 of that Chapter (39-20-01, NDCC) provides: The trial court expressed the view that the arrest, being made without a warrant, could only legally be made for an offense committed in the presence of the officer and that the acquittal establishes that no offense was committed in the presence of the arresting officer and therefore no legal arrest could be made without a warrant. On the other hand, the Commissioner contends that regardless of the acquittal, the arrest was legal because the facts are such that the patrolman had reasonable grounds to believe that Colling was driving his motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and that in any event the acquittal is not conclusive in this proceeding and is not binding on the Commissioner. The authority of an officer to make an arrest without a warrant is derived from statutes and varies in different states because of different statutory provisions. Our statute is Section 29-06-15, NDCC, and provides: Paragraph 5 of the above-quoted section refers to Section 29-06-15.1, NDCC, which in turn provides that: Section 29-06-16, NDCC, authorizes a peace officer at night to arrest a person for a public offense without a warrant if the offense was committed or attempted in his presence, or This is the only statutory provision that we have been able to find that authorizes and therefore legalizes an arrest though it afterwards appears that the crime for which the arrest was made was not committed, and that authorization is specifically restricted to felonies. It has been suggested that the legislature in the enactment of Chapter 39-20, NDCC (known as the Implied Consent Law), intended to vest law enforcement officers with broader powers of arrest than those applicable to other misdemeanors. However, the examination of legislative journals and a comparison of the bill originally introduced with the law as finally enacted establishes the contrary. Section 1, of Chapter 39-20, ND CC, was introduced in the 1959 session of the legislature as Senate Bill No. 142. The first section of the original bill read as follows: The original bill was amended during passage in several material respects. Particularly revealing as to legislative intent was an amendment proposed by the senate judiciary committee to Journal of the Senate of the 36th Legislative Assembly of the State of North Dakota, page 456. By adopting this amendment the legislature required that an arrest be made before the officer was empowered to direct the administration of a chemical test. It rejected and struck out the provision that the test could be directed by an officer "having reasonable grounds to believe" the person had been driving a motor vehicle upon the highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. We also believe that the legislature had in mind that if the arrest was made without a warrant it must be for the commission of the offense in the presence of the arresting officer and that such commission of the offense was a basic prerequisite to the right to require the person whom the officer had apprehended to take the chemical test prescribed by the statute and upon refusal to do so to suffer the penalty of being deprived of his license to drive a motor vehicle upon the public highway. The arrest without a warrant to be *457 effective must be a lawful arrest as prescribed by statute and not one made because the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person apprehended had committed the offense of driving while intoxicated. The importance of the lawfulness of the arrest is emphasized by the fact that the arrest not only affects the revocation of the operator's license, but extends to the admissibility of the refusal to submit to the test or tests as evidence in other cases under Section 39-20-03, which provides: Section 39-20-11 makes the provisions of the chapter applicable to prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances prohibiting the driving or control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The latter section was not in the original bill as introduced. It was added by amendment during passage. In 5 Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, Section 32, it is said: We find in Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure (Anderson), Section 1597, In support of this statement the author cites State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E.2d 100. In Restatement of the Law, Torts, Section 119, under Illustration o, it is said: The law with respect to the legality of arrests is sometimes confused with the law pertaining to malicious prosecution where a different rule applies. The different rules are well illustrated in Muniz v. Mehlman, 327 Mass. 353, 99 N.E.2d 37, which involved a count for false arrest or imprisonment and a count for malicious prosecution. The distinction between the rules applicable to the two counts is pointed out in a note at the bottom of page 359, 327 Massachusetts, page 41, 99 N.E.2d, which says: In 5 Am.Jur.2d, Arrests, Section 41, Muniz v. Mehlman, supra, is cited in support of the following statement: In Commonwealth v. Robey, Ky., 337 S.W.2d 34, it is said: However, in United States v. Sykes, 6 Cir., 305 F.2d 172, the Federal court, while conceding the rule in Kentucky with respect to the inadmissibility of the evidence after acquittal which establishes the invalidity of the arrest, holds that in the absence of an acquittal the question of validity of the arrest is one for the Federal courts to decide upon the basis of the evidence therein produced. In Edgin v. Talley, 169 Ark. 662, 276 S.W. 591, 42 A.L.R. 1194, it is said: The seeming divergence of authority indicated by the above quotation from American Jurisprudence is mainly found among the cases dealing with the liability for damages growing out of actions for false arrest and false imprisonment, but here the question is not one of damages but one of determining the intention of the legislature as indicated by the amendments to the original bill during the course of enactment. The duty of the legislature was at least two-fold: to provide reasonable protection and safety for persons legitimately using the public highways from hazardous driving by others, and to safeguard the rights of persons to whom the state had granted the personal and valuable right of operating vehicles from unwarranted forfeitures of their licenses. Recent cases have emphasized the importance of protecting the latter right. In State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 95 N.W.2d 6, it is said: To the same effect see Bechler v. Parsekian, 36 N.J. 242, 176 A.2d 470; Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N.Y. 435, 103 N.E.2d 728. The importance of the guilt of a person apprehended and upon whom a demand was made to take the test or tests for intoxication prescribed by Chapter 39-20, NDCC, must have been apparent to the legislature from the very terms of the law that was being enacted, for it was amended to provide that a test could be administered only after placing the person under arrest. No law authorized an officer to make the arrest upon suspicion or reasonable or probable cause. The arrest could be made without a warrant only for an offense committed in the presence of the officer. The refusal to take the test if he was lawfully arrested for an offense committed in the presence of the officer subjected the licensee to mandatory revocation of his operator's license for six months. The law, further, made proof of refusal admissible in any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of the acts which he was alleged to have committed while driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle upon the highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor provided that he had testified in the action. His refusal was also made admissible in any prosecution for the violation of a municipal ordinance prohibiting the driving or control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. In this case, at the time the hearing was held Maurice Colling had been acquitted of the charge for which he was placed under arrest. The officer had no warrant. The crime charged was one for which a lawful arrest could be made only if committed in the presence of the officer. The acquittal established that the crime charged had not been committed either in the presence of the officer or otherwise. That determination was made by a court. It could neither be reversed nor ignored in a hearing before an administrative official who conducted the hearing, presented the evidence, questioned the witness, and made the quasi-judicial determination that resulted in the order revoking the operator's license. We agree with the trial court that the order of revocation issued by the State Highway Commissioner was properly reversed. The order of the district court is affirmed. STRUTZ, TEIGEN and BURKE, JJ., concur. ERICKSTAD, Judge (dissenting). In an attempt to reduce the holocaust on our highways, part of which is due to *460 the driver who has imbibed too freely of intoxicating liquor, the so-called "Implied Consent Act" was enacted by our legislature in 1959. The first section of said act is now contained in Section 39-20-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, which reads as follows: Under this section, all who operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of our state are deemed to have given consent to a chemical test of their blood, breath, saliva or urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of their blood. Consent is deemed given "subject to the provisions of this chapter." The reference to "chapter" is to Chapter 39-20 of the North Dakota Century Code. At the time of petitioner Colling's arrest, said chapter contained twelve sections. The reference to "the provisions of this chapter," therefore, included the provisions of other sections of the chapter as well as the provisions of Section 39-20-01 of the North Dakota Century Code. When the legislature amended the afore described section prior to its adoption upon recommendation of the Senate Judiciary Committee to require that the test be administered only after placing the person under arrest and informing him that he is or will be charged with the offense of driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle upon the public highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the legislature intended to protect the driver of a vehicle from the irritation and inconvenience of submitting to chemical tests which might be required at the mere whim of a law enforcement officer. By requiring the officer to place the person under arrest and by requiring him to inform the arrested person of the specific offense with which he was or would be charged, the officer was required to exercise such judgment as would protect him from liability in the event that he were for this arrest subsequently sued for false arrest. This amendment merely clarified the fact that an arrest must be made. It did not change the basis for the arrest and the right to request the person to take the test. This is indicated by Section 39-20-04 of the North Dakota Century Code, the pertinent part of which reads as follows: This section definitely ties the arrest in with "reasonable grounds to believe." It *461 obviously means that the highway commissioner is required to revoke the driver's license or permit of a person if he receives a sworn report of a law enforcement officer that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and that, upon this basis, he arrested the person, asked him to take the test, and received a refusal. It is interesting to note that the words "arrested person" were a part of the bill as it was originally introduced and that no change was made in the language of this section after the amendment was made to Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 142, which is Section 39-20-01 of the North Dakota Century Code. It should be further noted that no inference can be drawn from this section, which establishes the basis for a revocation of the driver's license or permit, that the revocation or decision to revoke shall be held in abeyance until the person has been either convicted or acquitted of the criminal offense charged. The scope of the administrative hearing available to the person whose license has been revoked for failing to take a test required by the act is set forth in Section 39-20-05 of the North Dakota Century Code. The part material to this opinion reads as follows: In providing for the scope of the hearing, the legislature did not require the reviewing officer to conduct a trial of the person for the criminal offense charged, but it did require the reviewing authority to determine whether the law enforcement officer "had reasonable grounds to believe the person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle upon the public highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor." The record of the hearing clearly shows that the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe that Colling, in the presence of the officer, had been driving a vehicle upon the public highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Concededly, the hearing officer was also to decide whether the driver had or had not been arrested. The finding that the driver, Colling, had been arrested is amply supported by the record. The arrest, which was without a warrantand in almost all of these cases, arrests must, of necessity, be without warrantswas made by a law enforcement officer who had reasonable grounds to believe that the person arrested had, in his presence, committed the crime charged. The third and last matter to be considered at the hearing was whether the driver had been asked to submit to the test or tests and had refused to submit thereto. That Colling was asked to take the test and refused is not denied. Further proof that the legislature intended that the arrest required be upon "reasonable grounds to believe" is the fact that the original section of the original bill providing for the scope of the hearing required that the hearing cover the same three issues in the same order as they are contained today in Section 39-20-05 of the North Dakota Century Code. The State of New York was one of the first states to pass an implied consent law. Its first act, Chapter 854 of the Laws of *462 New York for 1953,[*] did not contain a requirement that the person be first placed under arrest, that the report of the officer to the Commission be sworn, and that the person have a hearing prior to the revocation of his driver's license. These short-comings were pointed out in the case of Schutt v. MacDuff, Supreme Court, Special Term, Orange County, Jan. 2, 1954, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116. Possibly as a result of this case, the legislature of the State of New York amended the law to read as follows: Following the enactment of the amended version of the law, the case of Combes v. Kelly, Supreme Court, Equity Term, Niagara County, was decided in 1956, 2 Misc. 2d 491, 152 N.Y.S.2d 934. That case involved an arrest without a warrant. We quote from said opinion a part thereof, to indicate how the court considered the argument that an acquittal made the original arrest illegal. Although the Court of Appeals of New York has apparently not ruled on this question specifically, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York has rendered a decision from which it could be inferred that it would support the decision of Combes v. Kelly, supra. Although the court does not indicate in what manner the arrest was made, the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in passing upon its implied consent law, which contained a requirement that a person be placed under arrest before being asked to submit to a chemical test to determine the amount of alcoholic content in his body fluid, found, "[t]he fact of acquittal of a criminal charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic liquor does not have any bearing upon a proceeding before the director for the revocation of a driver's license under the provisions of law separate and distinct from criminal statutes." Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75, at 81, 88 A.L.R.2d 1055. *464 The majority opinion in the instant case, in rejecting the idea that the legislature intended in the implied consent law that an arrest could be made without a warrant where the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the offense had been committed in his presence, relies heavily on Section 29-06-15 of the North Dakota Century Code. This appears to be the first occasion for this court to interpret Subsection 1 of said section, which reads as follows: Other states with similar provisions have considered this matter with varying results. The opinion of the majority of our court in the instant case is supported by the appellate courts of a number of states. The Federal courts and perhaps a greater number of the state courts hold to the contrary. In a Minnesota case decided in 1958, wherein a peace officer sought to recover damages as the result of an assault and battery alleged to have been committed upon him when he attempted to arrest a person without a warrant, that court said: The Minnesota court was apparently interpreting Section 629.34, Subsection (1), of the Minnesota Statutes, which is very similar to Subsection 1 of Section 29-06-15 of the North Dakota Century Code. *465 A Federal court case which is cited by state courts to support the holding that a person may be arrested without a warrant for the commission of a misdemeanor when the law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds or probable cause to believe that the offense was committed in his presence is the case of Garske v. United States, 8 Cir., 1 F.2d 620. At pages 622 and 623 of said opinion, the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, had this to say: The said court cites many other cases supporting this rule. The aforesaid opinion, Garske v. United States, rendered in 1924, is referred to in a footnote to a case decided in 1961 by the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. In the 1961 case entitled United States v. Murphy, 290 F.2d 573, at page 575, the court said: The case of State v. Twitchell, Wash., 378 P.2d 444, rendered in 1963, is interesting from another point of view. In that case, the sheriff was prosecuted for willful neglect of duty in permitting prostitution to be carried on in his jurisdiction without making complaints or arrests. At page 448 of said case, the Washington court said: As the aforesaid case involves what the State of Washington terms a gross misdemeanor, it may not be strictly in point. The court did, however, cite as authority the case of Sennett v. Zimmerman, 50 Wash. 2d 649, 314 P.2d 414, which involved a mere "misdemeanor" in which the same rule was applied. The Washington court, in Sennett v. Zimmerman, supra, after citing the case of Garske v. United States, supra, said: Another case which supports the view that a law enforcement officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a public offense when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the offense has been committed in his presence, is the following: Cave v. Cooley, 48 N.M. 478, 152 P.2d 886. Part of this decision reads as follows: It is my sincere conviction that the majority opinion ignores the obvious implications of important sections of the implied consent law which support the rule that an arrest may be made without a warrant where the law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the offense therein specified has been committed in his presence. In so doing, the Court has not merely prevented the law from being an effective aid in reducing traffic injuries and deaths, but it has also invited all motorists to sue honest, conscientious law enforcement officials for false arrest, where the officials have made a reasonable mistake in the course of doing their duty. The interpretation placed on our implied consent law and on our general law of arrest by the majority of our court also gives those officials who may be lax in enforcement of the laws or who may be tempted to be corrupt an excuse for not doing their duty. Our general law of arrest, as it relates to a misdemeanor, permits a police officer, without a warrant, to arrest a person for a public offense committed in the officer's presence. Whether the arrest is legal should depend upon whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the offense had been committed in his presence by the person arrested and should not depend upon whether the person was subsequently convicted or acquitted of the charge for which he was arrested. "The reasonable grounds" or, as stated by some courts, "the probable cause" which will justify an arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant must be a judgment based upon the officer's personal knowledge acquired at the time through the senses or inferences properly to be drawn from the testimony of the senses. In this case, the record would amply support a finding that the police officer who arrested Mr. Colling had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Colling had, in the presence of the officer, been driving a motor vehicle upon a public highway of the State of North Dakota while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. This belief or judgment was based on personal knowledge acquired at the time through his *468 senses. As the arrest without a warrant was therefore legal and as all other provisions of the implied consent law were complied with, the State Highway Commissioner acted within his authority in revoking the petitioner's driver's license. For the reasons stated herein, applying both to our implied consent law and our general law of arrest, I would reverse the order of the district court and affirm the order of the State Highway Commissioner. [*] Now Vehicle and Traffic Law, McKinney's Consol.Laws, c. 71, § 1194.