Title: Reeves v. State

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

419 So. 2d 217 (1982)
James Robert REEVES, Jr.
v.
STATE of Alabama.
81-282.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 27, 1982.
M. A. Marsal and George L. Simons, Mobile, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Bill North, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
SHORES, Justice.
The defendant, James Robert Reeves, Jr., a juvenile, appeals from an order transferring his case from the juvenile division to the criminal division of Mobile County Circuit Court. He contends that the order of the juvenile division does not comply with Ala.Code 1975, § 12-15-34. We reverse and remand.
On November 3, 1981, the state filed a motion with the juvenile division to transfer Reeves to the criminal division to be tried as an adult on a charge of murder. On December 8, 1981, after a hearing, the juvenile division issued an order to transfer. Reeves perfected his appeal of that order to this Court on December 17, 1981. The juvenile division issued an order on January 15, 1982, amending nunc pro tunc the order of December 8, 1981. Reeves attacks the validity of both orders.
Section 12-15-34(d), Ala.Code 1975, requires a juvenile court to consider evidence of six specific (and other relevant) factors in determining whether a transfer motion should be granted. The statute mandates that the court order reflect consideration of those specific factors, and "set forth the basis for the order with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966). Those factors which the court must consider are:
In the present case, the order of the juvenile division, dated December 8, 1981, does not meet the standards set out in § 12-15-34. That order reads as follows:
There is no statement or finding in this order of the trial court to show that it considered those specific factors in § 12-15-34(d). We have previously held that a transfer order containing a restatement of the factors set out in the statute, and thereby indicating that each was considered by the court, is valid. Brown v. State, 353 So. 2d 1384 (Ala.1977). Here, however, there is no such recitation. Thus, it falls short of the statutory requirements. Although it notes that the charge is a serious crime and expresses the opinion that the defendant cannot be properly disciplined in the juvenile system, the statute requires that it go further and consider the other factors enumerated. The nature of the crime and the child's response to any treatment or discipline efforts are but two of the six mandatory factors to be considered in granting a transfer order. The legislation compels consideration of each of the six factors and that the transfer order reflect consideration thereof. McKinney v. State, 404 So. 2d 639 (Ala.1981); Young v. State, 387 So. 2d 825 (Ala.1980). For an example of a transfer order which comports with the statutory mandate, see Gulledge v. State [MS. August 27, 1982], 419 So. 2d 219 (Ala. 1982); Mayne v. State, 416 So. 2d 741 (Ala. 1982); and Bragg v. State, 416 So. 2d 715 (Ala.1982).
Reeves also attacks the validity of the order nunc pro tunc of January 15, 1982. The trial court attempted to amend its original transfer order with an order nunc pro tunc, which addressed each of the six required factors found in § 12-15-34(d). Reeves contends that the amended order of January 15 is invalid on the grounds that: (1) The trial court cannot cure judicial error by amending its order nunc pro tunc; and (2) the trial court no longer had jurisdiction over the original transfer order once Reeves had perfected his appeal to this Court. Either of these grounds, alone, is sufficient to invalidate the order.
Clearly, consideration of the six statutory factors in its original transfer order is a judicial function and not a clerical one. *219 As such, an amendment nunc pro tunc is impermissible to remedy the defect. Alabama Hide and Tallow Company v. Pincheon, 282 Ala. 404, 211 So. 2d 896 (1968).
Secondly, after an appeal is taken, the trial court may proceed only in matters "which are entirely collateral to that part of the case which is taken up (by the appeal) but it can do nothing in respect to any matter or question which is involved in the appeal, and which may be adjudged by the appellate court." Osborn v. Riley, 331 So. 2d 268, 271 (Ala.1976), quoting from Barran v. Roden, 263 Ala. 305, 82 So. 2d 398 (1955).
For the reasons stated, we reverse and remand for a new hearing on the state's motion to transfer.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C. J., and MADDOX, JONES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.