Title: FRANCINE CULLARI DESANCHEZ V DEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED SEPTEMBER 11, 2002  
FRANCINE CULLARI de SANCHEZ and  
STEVEN JASON, co-personal 
representatives of the estate of 
Thomas A. Baltus, deceased,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v  
No. 117298  
STATE OF MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN 
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
The plaintiffs’ decedent, an involuntary patient in a  
state psychiatric hospital, committed suicide in a hospital  
restroom.
 Plaintiffs, the personal representatives of  
decedent’s estate, filed a wrongful death suit, alleging that  
the overhead bar from which decedent hanged himself was a  
"dangerous or defective condition of a public building." If  
proved, that allegation would bring the plaintiffs’ claim  
 
 
 
  
  
within the public building exception to the defendant’s  
governmental immunity. MCL 691.1406 and 691.1407(1).  
The plaintiffs filed this Court of Claims lawsuit in  
1984.  On two previous occasions, the Court of Claims granted  
summary disposition to defendant, but those judgments were  
reversed or vacated on appeal.1  
In 1998, the Court of Claims once again granted summary  
disposition to defendant, upon the bases of governmental  
immunity and MCR 2.116(C)(10). 
The judge ruled that  
plaintiffs failed to establish a genuine issue of material  
fact about any "dangerous or defective condition."  
The Court of Appeals again reversed the grant of summary  
disposition.2
 Defendant’s appeal was held in abeyance for  
Brown v Genesee Co Bd of Comm’rs (After Remand), 464 Mich 430;  
628 NW2d 471 (2001).  We now reverse the Court of Appeals and  
reinstate the Court of Claims judgment.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
In 1983, Thomas Baltus attempted suicide by trying to  
drown himself.  After that failed attempt was discovered,  
Baltus was involuntarily committed to the Ypsilanti Regional  
Psychiatric Hospital.  Hospital personnel observed Baltus  
continuously for more than five days.  His behavior during  
1 Sub nom de Sanchez v Genoves-Andrews, 161 Mich App 245; 
410 NW2d 803 (1987), rem’d 430 Mich 894(1988), (On Remand) 179 
Mich App 661 (1989), and de Sanchez v Dep’t of Mental Health  
(After Remand), 455 Mich 83; 565 NW2d 358 (1997).  
2  de Sanchez v Dep’t of Mental Health, unpublished 
opinion per curiam, issued June 30, 2000 (Docket No. 214318).  
2  
 
 
 
that time persuaded them that continuous monitoring was no  
longer necessary and that periodic monitoring would be an  
adequate suicide precaution.  The next day, allowed to use the  
restroom unattended, Baltus hanged himself. He used a cloth  
belt, which he attached to an overhead bar that supported a  
partition between toilet stalls.  
The 
plaintiffs’ 
wrongful 
death 
complaint 
alleged 
that 
the  
support bar from which Baltus hanged himself constituted a  
"dangerous or defective condition of a public building," thus  
bringing the claim within the public building exception3 to  
governmental 
immunity.4
 
Defendant 
moved 
for 
summary  
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), contending that no  
genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether the  
3  
Governmental agencies have the obligation to 
repair and maintain public buildings under their 
control when open for use by members of the public. 
Governmental agencies are liable for bodily injury 
and property damage resulting from a dangerous or  
defective condition of a public building if the  
governmental agency had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the defect and, for a reasonable time 
after acquiring knowledge, failed to remedy the 
condition or to take action reasonably necessary to 
protect 
the 
public 
against 
the 
condition.  
Knowledge of the dangerous and defective condition  
of the public building and time to repair the same 
shall be conclusively presumed when such defect 
existed so as to be readily apparent to an ordinary 
observant person for a period of 90 days or longer 
before the injury took place. [MCL 691.1406  
(emphasis added).]  
4  
Except as otherwise provided in this act, a 
governmental agency is immune from tort liability 
if the governmental agency is engaged in the 
exercise or discharge of a governmental function. 
[MCL 691.1407.]  
3  
stall-partition support bar was a "defective condition."  The  
trial court agreed and granted summary disposition.  
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “plaintiffs  
presented evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact  
regarding whether the placement of a solid bar in the bathroom  
of the facility constituted a dangerous and defective  
condition . . . in light of the use for which the bathroom was  
specifically assigned, that is, for the use of potentially  
suicidal mentally ill patients.” Slip op at 4.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion  
for summary disposition.  A motion for summary disposition  
brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a  
claim.  After reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable  
to the nonmoving party, a trial court may grant summary  
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine  
issue concerning any material fact and the moving party is  
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v Globe Life  
Ins Co, 460 Mich 446; 597 NW2d 28 (1999); Hazle v Ford Motor  
Co, 464 Mich 456; 628 NW2d 515 (2001).  
III. ANALYSIS  
Resolution of the issue presented is controlled by  
Jackson v Detroit, 449 Mich 420; 537 NW2d 151 (1995).5  In  
5 
 We held an earlier appeal in the present case in 
abeyance for Jackson. 
That abeyance was resolved by our  
decision in de Sanchez v Dep't of Mental Health (After  
Remand), n 1 supra, in which we concluded that the defective 
condition issue was not then properly before us. Id. at 88.  
4  
  
 
Jackson, an inmate attempted to hang himself from the overhead  
bars of a police station holding cell. Jackson set forth what  
a plaintiff must prove in order to bring a case within the  
public building exception to governmental immunity:  
This Court [has] held that a five-part test 
determines whether the public building exception 
governs a particular case.  To fall within the  
narrow confines of the exception, a plaintiff must 
prove that 1) a governmental agency is involved, 2) 
the public building in question is open for use by 
members of the public, 3) a dangerous or defective  
condition of the public building itself exists, 4) 
the governmental agency had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the alleged defect, and 5) the  
governmental agency failed to remedy the alleged 
defective condition after a reasonable period of 
time. [Id. at 428, citing Hickey v Zezulka (On  
Resubmission), 439 Mich 408, 421;  487 NW2d 106  
(1992) (emphasis added).]  
The present appeal involves only the third part of that  
test:  whether the stall-partition support bar was a dangerous  
or defective condition of the hospital building. 
The  
plaintiffs argue that a defect existed because the restroom  
was intended for use by psychiatric patients, including  
suicidal patients, and the support bar could be put to fatal  
use by a suicidal patient.  However, the issue before us is  
not whether a suicide was foreseeable, but whether the  
restroom had a "dangerous or defective condition" as that term  
is used in MCL 691.1406.  
In 
Jackson, 
the 
plaintiff 
presented 
evidence 
that 
Detroit  
Police Department detainees had made more than one hundred  
similar suicide attempts during the previous five years, and  
that the officers responsible for the Jackson detainee knew  
5  
 
that he had attempted to hang himself in the same precinct  
station just one day earlier.  Jackson, supra at 423-425, 429,  
n 12.  Thus, the dangers to confined persons generally and to  
the individual plaintiff were far more obvious in Jackson than  
in the present case.  Nevertheless, Jackson held that the  
cell's overhead bars were not a "defective condition."6  
Evidence 
of 
foreseeability 
is 
not 
necessarily 
evidence 
of  
a defect.  As we said in our earlier decision in this very  
case, MCL 691.1407 confers broad immunity, and the building  
exception created by MCL 691.1406 is narrowly drawn.  
de Sanchez v Mental Health Dep’t, 455 Mich 83, 90; 565 NW2d  
358 (1997).  Whether the physical condition of a room is  
defective depends on the uses for which the room was  
specifically assigned.  Id. at 91. The present case involves  
a restroom used by mentally ill hospital patients, including  
patients who were suicidal.  There is no evidence that the  
support bar at issue defectively supported the toilet stall  
partition or that it posed any danger to psychiatric patients  
generally.  To paraphrase an observation made in Jackson,  
6 The dissent maintains that Jackson is distinguishable 
from the present case because “the building areas where the 
bars were installed were designed for significantly different 
uses.”  Slip op at 1.  However, scrutiny of the facts in this 
case reveals more similarities than differences. In Jackson, 
the holding cell at issue was designed for the general 
prisoner population, some of whom were suicidal. In this case, 
the bathroom was designed and used by “mentally ill patients, 
some of whom were suicidal.” (Emphasis added.) There is no  
evidence in the record suggesting that the bathroom was 
specifically designed for suicidal patients. 
Rather, 
similarly to Jackson, the restroom was designed for use by the 
general psychiatric population.  
6  
 
 
 
there was nothing wrong with the bathroom.  “There was,  
however, something tragically wrong with the decedent.”  
Jackson, supra at 428.  
One person’s self-destructive use of an otherwise benign  
stall-partition support bar does not transform that bar into  
a "defective condition."  In Jackson, we observed that the  
purpose of the public building exception is to promote the  
maintenance of safe public buildings, not safety in public  
buildings.  
“Thus, 
where proper supervision would have ‘offset  
any shortcomings in the configuration of the room,’ the public  
building exception does not apply.”  Id. at 428, quoting  
Hickey, supra at 422. 
We noted that plaintiff’s claim "is  
more closely related to safety in public buildings than it is  
to a defect in a public building." 
Jackson, supra at 429  
(emphasis added).  To illustrate that distinction, Jackson  
quoted again from Hickey.  
To suggest that any physical feature of a jail 
cell, otherwise benign, that can conceivably become 
part of a plan of one who is desperately driven to 
self destruction can become a 'dangerous or  
defective condition' under the public building 
exception statute, simply crosses the outer limits 
of any reasonable reading of the intent of that 
statute when considered in the context of its  
history, purpose, and wording. [Jackson, supra at  
429; Hickey, supra at 426.]  
Perhaps the present defendant could have designed the  
restroom without partition support bars.  It is also arguable  
that the defendant’s employees were too quick to decide that  
the plaintiffs’ decedent no longer required continuous  
individual observation.  But those "might haves" prove, at  
7  
 
 
 
 
most, only negligence.  Jackson, which is on point both  
legally and factually, precludes finding that a self­
destructive act transformed the otherwise benign stall­
partition support bar into a "defective condition."7  
For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the  
Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the Court of  
Claims. MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurs in the result only.  
7 This case was held in abeyance for Brown v Genessee Co  
Bd of Comm’rs (After Remand), 464 Mich 430; 628 NW2d 
471(2001). However, because we conclude that the stall­
partition support bar here did not constitute a “defective 
condition” within a public building, it is unnecessary to 
decide the applicability of Brown to the facts of this case.  
8  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
FRANCINE CULLARI deSANCHEZ and  
STEVEN JASON, copersonal 
representatives of the estate of 
Thomas A. Baltus, deceased,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
No. 117298  
STATE OF MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN 
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that this case  
is controlled by the holding in Jackson v Detroit, 449 Mich  
420; 537 NW2d 151 (1995).  Although both involve overhead bars  
from which a person hanged himself, a key difference is that  
the building areas where the bars were installed were  
designated for significantly different uses. In Jackson the  
overhead bar was in a prisoner holding cell designated for the  
general jail population.  In this case, the room was  
designated exclusively for the care and treatment of persons  
  
with 
mental 
diseases, 
including 
those 
with 
suicidal  
tendencies. It is the use to which the building area is put  
here that controls the determination whether a part of the  
building, such as an overhead bar, constitutes a dangerous and  
defective condition.  See Bush v Oscoda Area Schs, 405 Mich  
716, 730; 275 NW2d 268 (1979).  
In the Jackson case, despite the fact that jail officials  
had notice of the potential for suicide in their holding cell,  
the vast majority of prisoners held there were not suicidal.  
See Jackson, supra at 424. The situation is quite different  
in a mental hospital. The majority states that "the dangers  
to confined persons generally and to the individual plaintiff  
were far more obvious in Jackson than in the present case."  
Slip op at 6.  I believe a much more accurate statement is  
that the dangers were obvious in both cases, but far more  
likely to result in death in this case than in Jackson. And,  
in fact, that was the difference.  
The majority errs, also, in reasoning that the current  
case involves a question of safety in a public building and  
not an unsafe building, itself.  Plaintiffs' decedent had been  
involuntarily committed to the defendant's facility following  
an attempt to commit suicide.  The bathroom in which he later  
did commit suicide was used by patients who were like him,  
mentally ill. In light of the use made of the room where it  
2  
 
 
was 
installed, 
the 
overhead bar that plaintiff's decedent used  
to support the noose cannot be characterized as a "benign  
physical feature."  Rather, given the use, that rigid exposed  
overhead bar accessed for suicide had every potential for  
being a dangerous and defective condition of the building.  
The majority has neglected to consider adequately the  
purposes for which the building area was specifically used.  
It has ignored precedent holding that an overhead metal bar  
might present a "safety in a building" question in one place,  
but be a "dangerous and defective condition" in another.  
I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision reversing  
summary disposition in favor of defendant. Plaintiffs created  
a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the  
placement of a solid, accessible overhead bar in an area  
housing 
suicidal 
mentally 
ill 
patients 
constituted 
a 
dangerous  
and defective condition within MCL 691.1406.  
3