Title: In re Adoption of Luc

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12719 
 
ADOPTION OF LUC.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 6, 2019. - February 13, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Adoption, Care and protection, Dispensing with parent's consent.  
Parent and Child, Care and protection of minor, Adoption, 
Dispensing with parent's consent to adoption.  Minor, Care 
and protection, Adoption.  Evidence, Hearsay, Report of 
licensed social worker, Opinion, Public documents.  
Practice, Civil, Care and protection proceeding, Adoption, 
Hearsay. 
 
 
 
 
Petition filed in the Suffolk County Division of the 
Juvenile Court Department on September 23, 2013. 
 
 
The case was heard by Peter M. Coyne, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Sherrie Krasner (Sarah Unger also present) for the mother. 
 
Brian Pariser for Department of Children and Families. 
 
Justin D. Cohen for the child. 
 
Andrew L. Cohen, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
                     
 
1 A pseudonym. 
2 
 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In this case, the Department of Children and 
Families (DCF) filed a petition under G. L. c. 119, § 24, 
alleging that the child, whom we shall call Luc, and his half-
sister, whom we shall call Olivia, were in need of care and 
protection.2  During the trial, Stephen McMorrow, one of the DCF 
social workers who managed the mother's case, testified on 
direct examination but died before the mother had the 
opportunity to cross-examine him.  The Juvenile Court judge then 
struck McMorrow's testimony but, over the mother's objection, 
admitted in evidence McMorrow's DCF reports and dictation notes.  
After trial, pursuant to G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c), the judge found 
that the mother was unfit, that Luc was in need of care and 
protection, and that termination of the mother's parental rights 
was in the best interests of Luc.3  The judge then issued a 
decree terminating the mother's parental rights to Luc.4 
                     
 
2 Olivia is not a party to this appeal.  At trial, the 
mother stipulated to her parental unavailability with respect to 
Olivia; the Juvenile Court judge then granted Olivia's father, 
who is not Luc's father, permanent custody and dismissed Olivia 
from the petition. 
 
 
3 The judge also found the "unknown/unnamed" father unfit 
and terminated his parental rights to Luc.  Luc's mother was 
unmarried when Luc was born.  Luc's father was not identified in 
the care and protection petition, and no one who identified 
himself as the father participated in the proceedings. 
 
4 The judge also dispensed with Luc's parents' need to 
consent to Luc's adoption. 
3 
 
 
The mother appealed from the judge's decision and decree, 
and the Appeals Court affirmed.  See Adoption of Luc, 94 Mass. 
App. Ct. 565, 566 (2018).  We granted the mother's application 
for further appellate review.  The mother alleges that (1) the 
judge improperly admitted in evidence McMorrow's DCF reports and 
dictation notes, as well as inadmissible second-level hearsay 
and improper opinion evidence contained therein; and (2) the 
judge's findings of fact were insufficient to establish the 
mother's unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.  On 
September 12, 2019, we issued an order affirming the judge's 
decision and decree.  This opinion states the reasons for that 
order.  We conclude that even without the challenged evidence, 
there was enough proof to support the judge's decree and 
decision, and therefore, we affirm.5 
 
McMorrow's death raised numerous evidentiary issues 
regarding the admission of documentary evidence in care and 
protection cases.  While we need not reach those issues to 
resolve this case, we recognize that the rules of evidence as 
applied in this area of law are hardly a model of clarity.  As 
such, we take this opportunity to try to disentangle several 
important evidentiary principles, specifically with regard to 
hearsay.  See Care & Protection of Benjamin, 403 Mass. 24, 27 
                     
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services. 
4 
 
n.5 (1988) ("It is most important to the integrity of the 
process and for the protection of the rights of the parties that 
the rules of evidence be followed in all adjudicatory stages of 
care and protection proceedings . . ." [citation omitted]).6 
 
Background.  We briefly describe how a care and protection 
case is initiated, followed by a summary of the judge's 
undisputed factual findings, reserving some findings for our 
discussion. 
 
When a statutorily mandated reporter has reasonable cause 
to believe that a child is suffering from abuse or neglect, the 
mandated reporter must report such an allegation to DCF 
immediately, pursuant to G. L. c. 119, §§ 1, 51A (51A report).7  
Upon receipt of a 51A report, DCF must immediately screen the 
report to determine whether the reported allegation meets the 
applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.  See 110 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 4.21 (2009).8  Once a 51A report is "screened in," 
                     
6 The issues discussed and rules announced in this opinion 
apply to all proceedings within a care and protection case, 
including termination of parental rights trials and hearings 
regarding permanent plans for the child. 
 
 
7 A nonmandated reporter may also file a report under this 
section.  See G. L. c. 119, § 51A (f). 
 
 
8 The report may be "screened out" where the alleged 
perpetrator is not the child's caretaker, the allegation is 
outdated, or there are "demonstrably unreliable or 
counterproductive multiple reports."  110 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 4.21 (2009). 
5 
 
DCF is required to investigate the allegation and make a written 
determination whether the allegation is supported (51B report).  
See G. L. c. 119, § 51B; 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.21.  If the 
allegation is supported, DCF must offer "appropriate services" 
to the family of any child whom it has reasonable cause to 
believe is suffering from abuse or neglect "to prevent further 
injury to the child, to safeguard his welfare, and to preserve 
and stabilize family life whenever possible."  G. L. c. 119, 
§ 51B (g).  "If the family declines or is unable to accept or to 
participate in the offered services, [DCF] or any person may 
file a care and protection petition under [§] 24."  Id.  See 
G. L. c. 119, § 24.  Moreover, if DCF has reasonable cause to 
believe a child is in immediate danger from abuse or neglect and 
that removal is necessary to protect the child from such abuse 
or neglect, DCF "shall take the child into immediate temporary 
custody[,] . . . shall make a written report stating the reasons 
for such a removal and shall file a care and protection case 
under [§] 24 on the next court day."  G. L. c. 119, § 51B (e).  
See G. L. c. 119, § 24. 
 
In this case, the undisputed evidence showed that the 
mother had a history of mental illness, including bipolar 
disorder and depression, for which she had been previously 
hospitalized.  The mother informed the court investigator that, 
against medical advice, she had not taken medication to treat 
6 
 
her mental illness and that she did not need counseling.  The 
mother also testified that she had no recollection of receiving 
mental health treatment in 2012, the year Luc was born.  The 
mother also has an extensive history with DCF.  At the time of 
trial, the mother had nine children and did not have custody of 
any of them.9 
 
Luc was born on November 8, 2012.  The following month, a 
nonmandated reporter filed a 51A report, alleging that the 
mother was neglecting Luc and Olivia.  A DCF investigation 
conducted pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51B, supported the 
allegation.  In January of 2013, DCF assigned Alba Mora as the 
ongoing social worker for the family.  Mora spoke with the 
mother several times about participating in mental health 
services and engaging Luc in early intervention services due to 
Luc's cognitive, social, and motor skills deficits.10  After 
several months elapsed, the mother complied, but her follow-up 
                     
 
9 As to her oldest two children, the mother surrendered her 
parental rights and the children were subsequently adopted.  The 
mother claimed that she was "tricked into a closed adoption," an 
explanation the judge did not credit. 
 
 
10 Early intervention is a Massachusetts government program 
that provides children who are under three years old and are 
born with developmental delays with programming to address such 
delays at no out-of-pocket cost to the family.  See About 
Massachusetts Early Intervention (EI), https://www.mass.gov/info 
-details/about-massachusetts-early-intervention-ei [https:// 
perma.cc/AR3G-5VUZ]. 
7 
 
with early intervention was inconsistent.11  Following an 
altercation between the mother and an early intervention 
provider, the early intervention visits were moved from the 
mother's home to the early intervention office, located nearby.  
An early intervention provider recommended that Luc have weekly 
visits, but the mother only agreed to one visit per month. 
On September 23, 2013 (petition date), DCF filed a care and 
protection petition alleging that the mother neglected Luc and 
Olivia (petition).  The court granted DCF emergency temporary 
custody of both Luc, who was then ten months old, and Olivia, 
who was almost three years old.  DCF asserted that Luc and 
Olivia were in need of care of protection for the following 
reasons:  (1) Luc's lack of participation in early intervention 
services and Olivia's lack of attendance at day care; (2) the 
mother lost custody of her five older children due to her 
untreated bipolar disorder; and (3) the mother's "lack of 
consistent mental health treatment and her lengthy history of 
similar concerns." 
 
Following the initiation of the care and protection case, 
DCF drafted a service plan for the mother, with the goal of 
reunification.  The plan required the mother, among other 
things, to engage in mental health and substance use disorder 
                     
11 The mother offered several reasons for her failure to 
bring Luc to the visits, which the trial judge did not credit. 
8 
 
services and individual therapy; provide DCF with urine screens; 
undergo a psychological evaluation; and attend supervised visits 
with Luc.12  The mother failed to comply consistently with the 
plan.  The mother did not engage in mental health or substance 
use disorder treatments for several months, and once engaged, 
the mother neither took the recommended medication nor 
consistently attended individual therapy sessions.  In addition, 
the mother failed to complete all the required urine screens.  
At least four of the urine screens she did complete were 
positive for substances for which the mother did not have a 
valid prescription.  Moreover, one of the mother's children, 
born after the petition date, tested positive for cocaine at 
birth.  The mother also failed to provide DCF with a 
psychological evaluation, and she did not consistently attend 
visits with Luc. 
Approximately seven months after the petition date, on 
April 15, 2014, DCF changed its goal from reunification to 
adoption.  On August 6, 2014, DCF transferred Luc's case to 
McMorrow.  The mother's inconsistent compliance with the service 
plan continued throughout the pendency of the care and 
protection case, during which time she also gave birth to two 
additional children. 
                     
 
12 The mother's assigned tasks remained the same throughout 
the pendency of the care and protection case. 
9 
 
 
The hearings on the merits of Luc's care and protection 
case began on October 5, 2015, about two years after the 
petition date.  After a trial that took place on eleven 
nonconsecutive days and spanned over thirteen months, the judge 
found that the mother was unfit, that Luc was in need of care 
and protection, and that it was in the best interests of Luc to 
terminate the mother's parental rights.  Based on those 
findings, the judge then terminated the mother's parental 
rights.13 
 
Discussion.  To terminate parental rights to a child, the 
judge must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the 
parent is unfit and that the child's "best interests will be 
served by terminating the legal relation between parent and 
child."  Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 (2011).  We give 
substantial deference to the judge's findings of fact and 
decision, and will only reverse "where the findings of fact are 
                     
 
13 We recognize the substantial caseloads Juvenile Court 
judges must navigate; the challenges of coordinating the 
schedules of counsel and witnesses; the difficulty of scheduling 
consecutive days of trial in some, if not most, sessions; and 
how delays, such as the ones experienced in this case, are 
sometimes unavoidable.  It goes without saying that such delays 
have a significant impact on all the parties, including, most 
importantly, the children.  The Juvenile Court has already 
undertaken significant steps to expedite the resolution of child 
dependency cases, namely, through its Statewide launch of the 
Pathways differentiated case-flow management initiative.  See 
Annual Report on the State of the Massachusetts Court System:  
Fiscal Year 2019, at 28 (2019). 
10 
 
clearly erroneous or where there is a clear error of law or 
abuse of discretion."  Id. 
 
1.  Unfitness determination.  The mother argues that the 
judge's findings did not establish her unfitness by clear and 
convincing evidence.  We disagree.  The evidence was compelling 
and more than satisfied the standard for unfitness, even without 
the challenged hearsay evidence. 
 
a.  Stale evidence.  The mother argues that the judge 
improperly admitted and relied upon stale evidence regarding the 
mother's care of her other children to underpin twenty-four 
findings of fact.  When assessing parental fitness, a judge must 
exercise great caution in considering how parents care for their 
other children, including the varied circumstances surrounding 
parents' unique relationships with each child.  See Adoption of 
Mary, 414 Mass. 705, 711 (1993) ("Parental unfitness must be 
determined by taking into consideration a parent's character, 
temperament, conduct, and capacity to provide for the child in 
the same context with the child's particular needs, affections, 
and age").  Where a parent has had prior involvement with DCF, 
the judge also recognizes any steps that a parent has since 
taken to improve his or her parenting abilities.  Nevertheless, 
a judge may rely upon a parent's past conduct with regard to 
older children to support a finding of current unfitness as to a 
different child, so long as that evidence is not the sole basis 
11 
 
for the judge's unfitness determination.  See Adoption of Don, 
435 Mass. 158, 166 (2001), quoting Adoption of George, 27 Mass. 
App. Ct. 265, 268 (1989) ("Prior history . . . has prognostic 
value"); Adoption of Larry, 434 Mass. 456, 469 (2001); Adoption 
of Paula, 420 Mass. 716, 729 (1995). 
 
Here, the contested findings of fact were not stale.  We 
note that several of the contested findings pertained to the 
mother's treatment of (1) Olivia, who was named in the same 
petition as Luc; and (2) Luc's younger siblings, who were the 
subjects of a different care and protection petition while Luc's 
case was pending.  The concerns regarding the mother's ability 
to care for Olivia and Luc arose prior to the petition date, and 
the concerns as to the mother's younger children arose after the 
petition date, thus after DCF removed Luc from the mother's 
custody, but still during the pendency of Luc's case.14 
 
As to the mother's older children, the judge properly found 
and relied upon the mother's ongoing pattern of untreated mental 
health and substance use disorders, parental neglect, and 
                     
14 For example, the mother simultaneously did not engage Luc 
in early intervention services and did not bring Olivia to day 
care consistently, which the mother acknowledged that DCF 
required.  This pattern continued after the petition date, when 
the mother failed to bring one of her younger children to day 
care consistently, failed to engage him in early intervention 
services, and missed his scheduled doctor's appointments.  The 
mother justified the day care absences explaining, "It's up to 
me if I want my child to go to day care." 
12 
 
failure to utilize services in making his determination of 
parental unfitness.15  See Adoption of Don, 435 Mass. at 166, 
quoting Adoption of George, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 268 ("[The 
mother's] history shows failures to follow through with therapy 
and other forms of assistance of her children and for herself"); 
Adoption of Carla, 416 Mass. 510, 517 n.7 (1993).  The mother's 
failure to engage her other children consistently in early 
intervention services is particularly notable here, where Luc 
had cognitive, social, and motor skills deficits.  See Adoption 
of Mary, 414 Mass. at 711.  After DCF removed Luc from the 
mother's custody, Luc attended consistent early intervention 
visits and made significant improvements. 
 
The mother also argues that the judge erred by omitting any 
findings concerning the mother's present relationship with Luc 
and, in particular, that the judge omitted mention of the 
mother's visits or interactions with Luc during the pendency of 
the trial.  This is incorrect.  The judge properly focused on 
the mother's current fitness and made several findings based on 
the mother's trial testimony as to her visits and interactions 
with Luc since the petition date.  The mother acknowledged that 
                     
 
15 That is not to say that the past is prologue or even that 
history often rhymes.  Ultimately, the issue is how fit this 
parent is to raise this child.  There is always the possibility 
of redemption, and each adjudication must be resolved on its own 
merit.  Nevertheless, it would defy logic here not to consider 
the mother's ability to care for her other eight children. 
13 
 
beginning in May of 2015, she was responsible for requesting 
visits with Luc, yet those visits remained inconsistent.  For 
example, in October of 2015, the mother did not request a visit 
with Luc until October 23, and as of January 18, 2017, the 
mother had yet to request a visit with Luc for that month.16  The 
mother explained, "I have a lot going on and will get there when 
I can get there."  There was no error. 
 
b.  Mental health challenges and substance use disorder.  
The mother next argues that the judge's findings did not 
establish a sufficient nexus between her mental health 
challenges and her ability to provide for Luc, or between her 
substance use disorder and her ability to provide for him.  We 
disagree. 
 
"Mental disorder is relevant only to the extent that it 
affects the parents' capacity to assume parental responsibility, 
and ability to deal with a child's special needs" (emphasis 
added).  Adoption of Frederick, 405 Mass. 1, 9 (1989).17  Here, 
                     
16 Between September of 2013 and August of 2014, the 
mother's average number of visits decreased from twice monthly 
to monthly.  The trial judge did not make any findings of fact 
as to whether the mother requested to visit Luc between October 
23, 2015, and January of 2017. 
 
 
17 Countless children have thrived while in the care of 
parents facing mental health challenges.  Here, the concern for 
the child is not that the mother has mental health challenges, 
but that those challenges remained largely unaddressed, and even 
unacknowledged, to Luc's severe detriment. 
14 
 
the mother was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and failed to 
recognize the need for or to engage consistently in treatment.  
Mora testified that the mother reported an inability to get out 
of bed and a fear of leaving her home.  The mother later told a 
court investigator that she experienced both the manic and 
depressive stages of her bipolar disorder, but she repeatedly 
denied the need for therapy and medication.18  Moreover, during 
the pendency of the care and protection case, the mother did not 
provide DCF with a psychological evaluation. 
 
In addition to mental health concerns, evidence of alcohol 
or drug use is relevant to, but not dispositive of, "a parent's 
willingness, competence, and availability to provide care."  
Care & Protection of Frank, 409 Mass. 492, 494 (1991).  
Treatment "does not always work the first or even the second 
time, [and] relapse should not be cause for giving up on" an 
individual experiencing substance use disorder (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Eldred, 480 Mass. 90, 99 (2018).  
Just as we should not criminalize addiction, see id., parental 
rights should not be terminated only because the parent has a 
substance use disorder.  However, the parent's willingness to 
engage in treatment is an important consideration in an 
                     
 
18 Even after DCF initiated this case, the mother still 
refused to obtain mental health treatment.  She was similarly 
not engaged in services when two of her older children were the 
subjects of different care and protection cases. 
15 
 
unfitness determination where the substance dependence inhibits 
the parent's ability to provide minimally acceptable care of the 
child.  See Adoption of Elena, 446 Mass. 24, 33-34 (2006), 
citing G. L. c. 210, § 3. 
 
Here, the mother acknowledged her history of substance use 
during trial.  The mother regularly failed to complete the 
required urine screens, and several of the urine screens that 
she did complete tested positive for cocaine.  One of Luc's 
younger siblings also tested positive for cocaine at birth.  
Despite these concerns, the mother consistently failed to 
recognize the need for or engage in substance use disorder 
treatment.19 
 
In sum, the mother's unwillingness to adhere to DCF's 
service plan, which required her to obtain treatment for her 
mental health challenges and substance use disorder, is 
"relevant to the determination of unfitness."  See Petitions of 
the Dep't of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 
399 Mass. 279, 289 (1987).  We conclude that the judge did not 
abuse his discretion or commit a clear error of law in 
determining that the mother was unfit. 
                     
 
19 For example, to explain why she did not go to the 
required Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, the mother stated, "I 
don't want anyone telling me how to run my life." 
16 
 
 
2.  Inadmissible second-level hearsay and improper opinion 
evidence.  The mother argues that the judge erred by admitting 
in evidence and relying on inadmissible second-level hearsay and 
improper opinion evidence in his decision.20  Specifically, the 
mother contends that McMorrow's DCF reports and dictation notes 
improperly formed the basis for thirty-one findings of fact and 
that the judge's reliance upon those findings prejudiced her.21 
 
We need not decide whether the judge erred in admitting 
McMorrow's documents because, even assuming error, there was no 
resulting prejudice.  The judge relied on the contested evidence 
to support only thirty-one of 181 findings of fact.  These 
thirty-one findings were not essential to the judge's decision, 
as they were largely cumulative of the mother's and the other 
social workers' testimony, and the court investigator reports, 
                     
 
20 Hearsay is defined as an out-of-court statement offered 
to establish the truth of the words contained in the statement.  
See Commonwealth v. Caruso, 476 Mass. 275, 295 n.15 (2017); 
Mass. G. Evid. § 801(c) (2019).  Moreover, this type of out-of-
court statement may contain a "second level" of hearsay, or 
"hearsay within hearsay."  See Mass. G. Evid. § 805. 
 
 
21 The mother makes a passing argument as to four findings 
of fact, contending that the judge improperly considered 
statements within two 51B reports for their truth as to the 
mother's bipolar disorder diagnosis, experience of manic 
episodes, and hospitalizations.  However, those findings could 
not have been prejudicial, where they were merely cumulative, as 
the mother reported the evidence underlying those findings to 
court investigators, who included them in their separately, 
statutorily admissible reports. 
17 
 
which are "part of the record" pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 24.22  
The mother does not challenge the judge's admission of the court 
investigator reports on appeal.23  Accordingly, even excising the 
thirty-one contested findings of fact, there was ample support, 
under the clear and convincing evidence standard, for the 
judge's decree terminating the mother's parental rights to Luc.24 
 
3.  Admission of documents in care and protection cases.  
Our decision to affirm the judge's decree based upon the 
sufficiency of indisputably admissible evidence dispenses with 
                     
 
22 In her reply brief, the mother argues that the judge's 
admission of McMorrow's documents was not harmless because as a 
result of the admission, the mother had to testify on her own 
behalf to rebut the adverse allegations asserted in McMorrow's 
documents.  She alleges that, if McMorrow's documents had been 
excluded, she would not have needed to testify and then the 
judge would not have been able to rely on her testimony.  The 
mother fails to cite any legal authority for this argument; 
thus, we decline to address it. 
 
 
23 The mother also argues that the judge erred in allowing 
McMorrow's supervisor, Melissa Thibodeau, to testify as to the 
contents of McMorrow's dictation notes and DCF reports.  Even 
assuming the mother is correct, Thibodeau's testimony 
contributed to eight findings of fact, only four of which were 
based solely on Thibodeau's testimony.  Without these findings, 
the judge's determination is still more than adequately 
supported.  There was no prejudice. 
 
24 The mother also argues that the judge violated her due 
process rights by admitting McMorrow's documents as declarations 
of a deceased person under G. L. c. 233, § 65.  Incidentally, 
this argument refers to an alternative basis for admission 
offered by the Appeals Court in this case, not the trial judge.  
See Adoption of Luc, 94 Mass. App. Ct. at 567-569.  Given our 
conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial 
judge's determination even without McMorrow's contested 
documents, we need not address this argument. 
18 
 
the need to address the mother's challenges to the admission of 
McMorrow's DCF reports and dictation notes specifically.  
Nonetheless, we take the opportunity presented to clarify 
certain rules governing the admissibility of hearsay evidence in 
the context of care and protection cases with regard to two 
categories of documents filed in those cases25: (a) court 
investigator reports under G. L. c. 119, § 24;26 and (b) DCF-
created documents, which include (i) DCF-authored reports under 
G. L. c. 119, § 21A (DCF reports), and (ii) official records in 
care and protection cases (official DCF records).27 
 
a.  Court investigator reports under G. L. c. 119, § 24.28  
Upon the initiation of a care and protection case, "the court 
                     
 
25 In clarifying these evidentiary principles, we note that 
nothing we assert today changes the law of evidence for any 
hearsay exception, whether it be first- or second-level hearsay, 
aside from those we explicitly modify in this opinion.  
Moreover, nothing we assert today limits the applicability of 
other statutory or common-law hearsay exceptions in care and 
protection cases. 
 
26 The admission of court investigator reports is not at 
issue in this case, and although we discuss court investigator 
reports as a point of reference, nothing in this opinion alters 
the admissibility criteria for such reports. 
 
 
27 The Massachusetts Guide to Evidence articulates an 
"official/public records and reports" exception to the rule 
against hearsay.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 803(8); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 1115(b).  Our case law uses "official records" and "public 
records" interchangeably when discussing such records.  For 
consistency, we use the term "official records." 
 
 
28 General Laws c. 119, § 24, states, in relevant part:  
"Upon the issuance of the precept and order of notice, the court 
19 
 
shall appoint a person qualified under [§] 21A to investigate 
the conditions affecting the child and to make a report under 
oath to the court."  G. L. c. 119, § 24.29  See Custody of 
Michel, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 266 (1990) ("When a judge 
appoints an investigator under G. L. c. 119, § 24, it signifies 
the judge's expectation that the licensed social worker has the 
training and specialized knowledge which will enable the social 
worker to make and report acute observations about the 
interactions of family members . . .").  Pursuant to the 
statutory hearsay exception declared in G. L. c. 119, § 24, 
court investigator reports are a "part of the record."  See Care 
& Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. 567, 573 & n.5 (2005), citing 
Custody of Jennifer, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 241, 245 (1988).  See 
also Rule 14(C) of the Juvenile Court Rules for the Care and 
Protection of Children (2018).  "There can, therefore, be no 
objection in general to the receipt and use of such reports in 
arriving at decisions in care and protection proceedings."  Care 
                     
shall appoint a person qualified under [§] 21A to investigate 
the conditions affecting the child and to make a report under 
oath to the court, which shall be attached to the petition and 
be a part of the record." 
 
 
29 Court investigator reports must be filed within sixty 
days after the court investigator's appointment, unless 
otherwise ordered.  See Juvenile Court Standing Order 2-18 
(2018) (time standards). 
20 
 
& Protection of Zita, 455 Mass. 272, 281 (2009), quoting Custody 
of Michel, supra at 265. 
 
Second-level hearsay contained within court investigator 
reports should be "limited to factual information collected from 
identified sources."  Custody of Tracy, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 481, 
487 (1991).  See Juvenile Court Department, Guidelines for Court 
Investigation Reports, at 1, 3-4 (reissued Nov. 1, 2013).  In 
addition, our case law has long held that such hearsay is 
admissible where the opposing party has "an opportunity to 
refute the investigator and the investigator's sources through 
cross-examination and other means."  Custody of Michel, 28 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 266.  See Adoption of Paula, 420 Mass. at 724; Care 
& Protection of Rebecca, 419 Mass. 67, 83 (1994); Adoption of 
Carla, 416 Mass. at 514.  For opposing parties to have that 
opportunity, the court investigator report must identify the 
sources of such second-level hearsay statements.  See Custody of 
Tracy, supra at 486-487.  See also Adoption of Sean, 36 Mass. 
App. Ct. 261, 263-264 (1994); Note to Rule 14 of the Juvenile 
Court Rules for the Care and Protection of Children.  If the 
source of a challenged statement is not already present in 
court, the burden to subpoena that source rests with the party 
challenging the statement's admission.  See Adoption of Paula, 
supra at 726; Care & Protection of Leo, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 
242-243 (1995). 
21 
 
b.  DCF-created documents.  i.  DCF reports under G. L. 
c. 119, § 21A.  In relevant part, G. L. c. 119, § 21A, states: 
"Evidence in proceedings under [§§] 21 to 51H, inclusive, 
shall be admissible according to the rules of the common 
law and the General Laws and may include reports to the 
court by any person who has made an investigation of the 
facts relating to the welfare of the child and is qualified 
as an expert according to the rules of the common law or by 
statute or is an agent of the department or of an approved 
charitable corporation or agency substantially engaged in 
the foster care or protection of children.  Such person may 
file with the court in a proceeding under said [§§] 21 to 
51H, inclusive, a full report of all facts obtained as a 
result of such investigation.  The person reporting may be 
called as a witness by any party for examination as to the 
statements made in the report.  Such examination shall be 
conducted as though it were on cross-examination." 
 
Section 21A governs the admission of evidence in care and 
protection cases30 and permits the admission of a separate type 
of report prepared and introduced in evidence by DCF.  See G. L. 
c. 119, § 21A; Care & Protection of Zita, 455 Mass. at 280-281 
(distinguishing DCF reports from court investigator reports).  
See also Rule 10 of the Juvenile Court Rules for the Care and 
Protection of Children (2018) ("[DCF] shall file a written 
report with the court each time the case is before a judge for 
hearing or report"); Goldstein, The Care and Protection Report:  
Some Evidentiary and Due Process Issues, 1 Mass. Fam. L.J. 69, 
                     
30 General Laws c. 119, § 21A, also outlines the 
qualifications for court investigators.  Our jurisprudence has, 
at times, conflated the admission of independent court 
investigator reports under G. L. c. 119, § 24 (not at issue in 
Luc's case), with the admission of DCF reports under G. L. 
c. 119, § 21A (the subject of asserted trial error here). 
22 
 
71 (1984) (DCF "progress reports" admissible under G. L. c. 119, 
§ 21A).  Cf. Rule 11 of the Juvenile Court Rules for the Care 
and Protection of Children (2018) (investigator's report in care 
and protection cases). 
ii.  Official DCF records.  Official DCF records are 
records created by DCF employees in the course of their official 
duties that any party in a care and protection case may seek to 
admit in evidence.  To date, our courts have identified several 
types of DCF documents as official records.  See Adoption of 
Querida, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 771, 778 (2019) (51B reports); 
Adoption of Vidal, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 916, 916-917 (2002) 
(private entity's written assessment performed under contract 
with DCF); Adoption of George, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 272-274 
(service plans, case reviews, and foster care reviews).  See 
also Mass. G. Evid. § 1115(b)(2) (same and DCF action plans, 
affidavits, family assessments, and dictation notes). 
iii.  Admissibility criteria for DCF-created documents.  A 
parent's "fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and 
management of their children" is axiomatic.  L.B. v. Chief 
Justice of the Probate & Family Court Dep't, 474 Mass. 231, 237 
(2016), quoting Matter of Hilary, 450 Mass. 491, 496 (2008).  
"Due process concerns and fundamental fairness require that a 
parent have an opportunity effectively to rebut adverse 
allegations concerning child-rearing capabilities, especially in 
23 
 
a proceeding that can terminate all legal parental rights."  
Adoption of Mary, 414 Mass. at 710.31  By providing a parent with 
the opportunity to effectively cross-examine the court 
investigator and the investigator's sources, the admissibility 
criteria for second-level hearsay contained within court 
investigator reports balance the "importance of providing needed 
information to the court" with fairness and due process 
concerns.  Custody of Tracy, 31 Mass. App. Ct. at 484, 486.  See 
Duro v. Duro, 392 Mass. 574, 580 n.9 (1984) ("Our decisions 
permitting judges to rely on the reports of court-appointed 
investigators despite their hearsay nature are linked to the 
opportunity of affected parties to refute incorrect information 
contained in such reports").  See also Care & Protection of Leo, 
38 Mass. App. Ct. at 241-242 (cross-examination of court 
investigator and their sources provides sufficient opportunity 
to rebut statements contained in court investigator report); 
Custody of Michel, 28 Mass. App. Ct. at 266. 
 
In the context of care and protection cases, we see no 
reason why the criteria for admitting second-level hearsay 
contained within independent, court-ordered reports written by 
                     
 
31 The opportunity to rebut such evidence, however, does not 
bestow upon parents "the full panoply of constitutional rights 
afforded criminal defendants" (citation omitted).  See Care & 
Protection of M.C., 479 Mass. 246, 256 (2018), S.C., 483 Mass. 
444 (2019). 
24 
 
court investigators under § 24 should be stricter than the 
criteria for admitting hearsay contained within DCF-created 
documents.  Interpreting our evidentiary rules to permit a more 
lenient admissibility standard for DCF-created documents, 
especially since DCF is a party to the case, would contradict 
the fundamental protections our law bestows upon a parent's 
relationship to their child.  Accordingly, we now announce the 
following criteria for the admission of first- and second-level 
hearsay in DCF reports under G. L. c. 119, § 21A, and official 
DCF records in care and protection cases, where that hearsay 
does not satisfy another common-law or statutory exception.32  
See G. L. c. 119, § 21A.33  Under what we will refer to as the 
Luc criteria, first- and second-level hearsay contained within 
DCF reports and official DCF records is admissible for 
statements of primary fact,34 so long as the hearsay source is 
                     
32 Again, nothing we declare today has an impact on the 
admissibility of court investigator reports. 
 
 
33 We note that in addition to the due process 
considerations, what we refer to as the Luc criteria are 
supported by the language of G. L. c. 119, § 21A, and our 
interpretation thereof.  Section 21A permits the admission, 
subject to our common law and statutes, of a DCF-created report 
containing facts obtained as a result of an investigation into 
the welfare of the child, so long as the author of the report is 
available for cross-examination.  See Care & Protection of Zita, 
455 Mass. at 280, citing Care & Protection of Bruce, 44 Mass. 
App. Ct. 758, 765-766 (1998). 
 
 
34 Statements of primary fact are observations, rather than 
opinions, made by an individual with personal knowledge, for 
25 
 
specifically identified in the document35 and is available for 
cross-examination, should the party challenging the evidence 
request to do so.  If the source is not already present in 
                     
example, statements made by a witness present to hear and 
observe that "there was screaming or beating" or there was "no 
food or clean diapers in the house."  Custody of Michel, 28 
Mass. App. Ct. at 267. 
 
 
Several examples from McMorrow's dictation notes provide 
additional guidance about both admissible statements of primary 
fact and inadmissible opinions or judgments.  Statements of 
primary fact in the notes included the following:  "[t]he visit 
was scheduled for noon however [the mother] did not answer the 
door or phone"; "[the mother] plays with both children and reads 
to them, brings them to the bathroom, changes [the child's] 
diaper"; and "on [the child's] arrival [the mother] immediately 
turns the television on to children's programming to entertain 
him, and spends time speaking to me."  Improper opinion or 
judgments included the following:  "[the mother] seems 
challenged to accommodate" the children with high energy levels; 
and "[the child] is unaffected [by his visit with the mother 
ending]." 
 
 
Like admissible lay opinion testimony, statements of 
primary fact may include "words of summary description."  Kane 
v. Fields Corner Grille, Inc., 341 Mass. 640, 647 (1961) (within 
judge's discretion to permit witness to describe party's actions 
as "boisterous" and "in an arrogant manner").  See Peterson v. 
Foley, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 348, 351 (2010) (lay witness who 
directly observes moving car may testify as to its estimated 
speed); Mass. G. Evid. § 701.  However, summary description may 
not include judgment or opinion evidence that is not "rationally 
based on the witness's perception" or that fails to otherwise 
satisfy the criteria for admissible lay opinion.  Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 701.  See Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 544 (2013) 
(lay witness may opine as to defendant's intoxication, but not 
as to whether defendant's alcohol consumption diminished his or 
her ability to operate motor vehicle safely). 
 
 
35 Identification requires that the court investigator 
report contain the source's full name.  For example, "day care 
provider" alone would be insufficient. 
26 
 
court, the party challenging the evidence may subpoena him or 
her.36  And once again, the hearsay need not meet the Luc 
criteria if it satisfies another, preexisting hearsay 
exception.37 
                     
 
36 It is important to note that the Luc criteria are 
distinct from the traditional official records exception, which 
permits the admission of a record of primary fact, made by a 
public official in the performance of his or her official duty, 
to prove the existence of that fact regardless of whether the 
public official is available for cross-examination.  See Mass. 
G. Evid. § 803(8)(A).  Unlike traditional official records, 
official DCF records are created by a party to the case. 
 
Moreover, up to this point, courts in a number of our care 
and protection cases have applied a different version of the 
official records exception.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 1115(b)(2) 
note.  Compare Mass. G. Evid. § 803(8)(A).  In those cases, the 
courts referred to and applied the "official records exception," 
sometimes even quoting the language in Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 803(8)(A), while applying criteria distinct from the 
traditional official records exception.  In one example, the 
court considered whether the author of the official record was 
available for cross-examination.  In contrast, under the 
traditional official records exception, the availability of the 
out-of-court source is immaterial.  See Adoption of Vidal, 56 
Mass. App. Ct. at 916-917 (private entity's assessment performed 
under contract with DCF admissible as official record, noting 
author of report was available to testify and mother had 
opportunity to cross-examine and rebut).  Cf. United States v. 
Phoeun Lang, 672 F.3d 17, 23-24 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 566 
U.S. 1041 (2012) (primary purpose of traditional official 
records exception to avoid need for public officials' 
testimony); Mass. G. Evid. § 803. 
 
 
37 The Luc criteria only apply to the admission of DCF 
reports and official DCF records in care and protection cases.  
The traditional official records exception to the rule against 
hearsay is still available for other records that qualify under 
the exception, which the parties in care and protection cases 
may seek to admit.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 803(8)(A). 
 
27 
 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we issued an order 
on September 12, 2019, affirming the judge's decision and 
decree.  In sum, the judge did not err in terminating the 
mother's parental rights to the child. 
 
First- and second-level hearsay in DCF reports and official 
DCF records that does not fall within an already existing 
common-law or statutory hearsay exception is admissible for 
statements of primary fact, so long as the hearsay source is 
specifically identified in the report and is available for 
cross-examination, should the party challenging the evidence 
request to do so.  If the source is not already present in 
court, the party challenging the evidence may subpoena him or 
her. 
                     
To the extent the Appeals Court in Adoption of George 
appeared to create a second-level hearsay exception for 
statements made by mandated reporters contained within official 
DCF records, that aspect of the decision was dicta.  See 
Adoption of George, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 274-275.  There is no 
such second-level hearsay exception unless the Luc criteria are 
satisfied.