Title: Morse v. Murphy

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 89-456

                            NOVEMBER TERM, 1990


Stephen F. Morse and Robert       }          APPEALED FROM:
R. Cote and Joyce E. Morse        }
                                  }
     v.                           }          Caledonia Superior Court
                                  }
                                  }
Michael J. Murphy                 }
                                  }          DOCKET NO. S113-88Cac


             In the above entitled cause the Clerk will enter:

     Appellant's motion to reargue is denied; however, a modified version 
the the Court's decision will be issued.








                                   BY THE COURT:




                                   Ernest W. Gibson III, Associate Justice


                                   John A. Dooley, Associate Justice


                                   James L. Morse, Associate Justice

[x] Publish
                                   Louis P. Peck, Associate Justice (Ret.),
[ ] Do Not Publish                 Specially Assigned


                                   Stephen B. Martin, Superior Judge
                                   Specially Assigned




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                                ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 89-456

                            NOVEMBER TERM, 1990


Stephen F. Morse and Robert       }          APPEALED FROM:
R. Cote and Joyce E. Morse        }
                                  }
     v.                           }          Caledonia Superior Court
                                  }
                                  }
Michael J. Murphy                 }
                                  }          DOCKET NO. S113-88Cac


             In the above entitled cause the Clerk will enter:

     The controversy in this case focuses on the width of a right-of-way
held by plaintiffs across property owned by defendant in the town of
Lyndon.  Defendant appeals from the trial court's judgment holding that the
plaintiffs' right-of-way is fifty feet wide.  We affirm.

     The record facts are simple.  In 1974, adjoining landowners, Morse and
Bailey, exchanged deeds the purpose of which was to create rights-of-way
over their respective properties.  The rights-of-way connected and formed
one continuous road.

     The Morse to Bailey deed dated July 8, 1974, conveyed "a fifty foot
wide strip of land" on which Bailey was to build a road and over which Morse
reserved a right-of-way.  Four months later, Bailey deeded to Morse "the
right to cross and recross a certain parcel of land over an existing road-
way," but did not mention the width of the right-of-way or the parcel of
land.  Both deeds, however, contemplated that the strips of land over which
the rights-of-way pass might be conveyed by Bailey to the Town of Lyndon
"as a public highway."

     Thus, the parties created a road over a strip of land the fee to which
remained in Bailey.  The strip of land (the sum of the two strips of land
described in the two deeds) might be deeded to the town at some indeter-
minate time in the future.

     Holding that the deeds created an ambiguity as to the width of the
right-of-way in dispute, the trial court allowed Bailey to testify that the
parties intended to exchange rights-of-way fifty feet wide "so a substantial
road could be put in."  Whether, as a matter of law, there was an ambiguity
is debatable.  Even absent Bailey's testimony, the facts and circumstances
support a conclusion that all of the right-of-way was intended to be fifty
feet wide.

     The deed to Bailey described the strip of land conveyed as fifty feet
wide.  It anticipated that this strip of land might be conveyed to Lyndon.
The deed from Bailey described the right-of-way without mentioning its
width, but stated that the underlying "strip of land" may be conveyed to
Lyndon.  If Lyndon were to be conveyed a fifty-foot-wide strip for part of
the road it is reasonable to assume that it would receive fifty feet for the
other part.  The right-of-way for public highways is ordinarily three rods
(fifty feet) wide.  19 V.S.A. {  702.  Therefore, a conclusion that Morse
and Bailey intended to create a road that was to be over a fifty-foot right-
of-way in part and then funnel down to a narrower right-of-way is an
irrational and strained view of the deeds.

     If, on the other hand, an ambiguity was present, the court properly
relied on extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions to resolve it.  See
Fassler v. Okemo Mountain, Inc., 148 Vt. 538, 541,