Title: TIMOTHY WILLIAM DODS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

TIMOTHY WILLIAM DODS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 133240 P.3d 1208Case Number: No. S-09-0118Decided: 10/06/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

TIMOTHY 
WILLIAM DODS,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

R. 
Michael Vang, of Fleener & Vang LLC, Laramie, WY

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. 
Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

HILL, 
J. delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., files a specially concurring 
opinion.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference. 

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Timothy Dods 
appeals the denial of a motion to suppress evidence.  Dods claims on appeal that a single 
instance of crossing a fog line does not create articulable suspicion to warrant 
a stop of his vehicle.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Dods' single 
issue is as follows:

 
 
Did 
the arresting officer possess sufficient facts to stop [Dods], and ultimately 
was there probable cause to search and seize [Dods] pursuant to Article 1 
Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On May 26, 
2008, State Trooper Karl Germain noticed a blue minivan traveling eastbound on 
Interstate 80 west of Laramie, Wyoming.  
Trooper Germain observed the minivan's passenger side tires cross the 
white fog line by approximately eight inches for about five seconds/several 
hundred yards.  The trooper, who was 
traveling westbound, crossed the median, pursued the minivan, and initiated a 
traffic stop.  Upon contacting Dods, 
the trooper smelled raw marijuana coming from the vehicle.  Eventually, a search of the vehicle 
produced approximately 60 pounds of marijuana.

 
 
[¶4]      Dods was charged 
with one count of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and one count 
of felony possession of marijuana.  
He filed a motion to suppress, which the district court denied, finding 
that the trooper was authorized to initiate the stop.  Dods subsequently entered a conditional 
plea of guilty to the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, 
and this appeal followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

 
[¶5]      In reviewing a 
trial court's decision after a motion to suppress, we have 
stated:

 
 
In 
reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not 
interfere with the trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous.  We view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination because 
the trial court has an opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary 
inferences, deductions, and conclusions.  The constitutionality of a particular 
search is a question of law that we review de novo. 

 
 

Latta 
v. State, 
2009 WY 35, ¶ 10, 202 P.3d 1069, 1071 (Wyo. 2009) (citation 
omitted).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      Dods contends 
that crossing a fog line one time, ostensibly in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-5-209(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2009), does not create articulable suspicion 
enough to stop a driver.  
Conversely, the State argues that the stop was justified and that 
crossing a fog line once is adequate cause to stop a 
vehicle.

 
 
[¶7]      Regarding the 
Fourth Amendment, we have stated:

 
 
The 
Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  A routine 
traffic stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
"even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention 
quite brief."  Damato v. 
State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d 700, 704 (Wyo. 2003 (quoting 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979)).  Because a traffic stop 
is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest, the 
reasonableness of such stops is analyzed under the two-part test articulated in 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 
(1968): (1) whether the initial stop was justified; and (2) whether the 
officer's actions during the detention were "reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first instance."  Damato, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d  at 
705.

Garvin 
v. State, 
2007 WY 190, ¶ 13, 172 P.3d 725, 728-29, (Wyo. 2007).

 
 

 Lovato v. State, 
2010 WY 38, ¶ 12, 228 P.3d 55, 58 (Wyo. 2010).

 
 

[¶8]      An investigatory 
stop represents a seizure that "implicates the Fourth Amendment, requiring the 
presence of specific, articulable facts and rational inferences giving rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a 
crime."  Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 637 (Wyo. 2000).  Reasonable 
suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause and requires a fact-centered 
inquiry based on the "totality of the circumstances."  Fender v. State, 2003 WY 96, ¶ 13, 74 P.3d 1220, 
1225 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶9]      Dods was stopped 
for an alleged violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-209 (LexisNexis 2009), 
which provides in relevant part:

 
 
§ 31-5-209.  Driving on roadways laned for 
traffic.

(a)  Whenever 
any roadway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanes for 
traffic the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall 
apply:

(i)  A 
vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane 
and shall not be moved from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that 
the movement can be made with safety[.]

 
 
Dods 
does not dispute that he crossed the fog line; he does, however, argue that 
doing so does not create the articulable suspicion needed to stop a 
vehicle.  He submits that the 
statute does not demand perfection out of drivers inasmuch as it includes the 
language "as nearly as practicable."

 
 
[¶10]   Abundant precedent exists on both 
sides of this issue.  Although this 
particular issue has never been addressed, this Court has before emphasized the 
importance of maintaining a single lane of travel.  In Norman v. State, 747 P.2d 520 (Wyo. 
1987), this Court upheld a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol 
where the reason for the initial detention had been 
challenged:

 
 
Evidence 
introduced by appellant, in the form of the arrest report, shows facts 
demonstrating the requisite probable cause for Officer McGrath to stop appellant 
initially for a traffic violation.  Appellant was stopped for driving in more 
than one lane of traffic on a four-lane city street in violation of § 
31-5-209(a)(i)[.]

 
 

Norman, 
747 P.2d  at 
523.

 
 
[¶11]   We have also discussed 
unintentional drifting into the passing lane of a roadway:

 
 
The 
fact that Campbell was looking for antelope at the time of the accident 
hardly excuses his negligence in drifting or turning into the passing lane under 
the circumstances of this case. Campbell argues that the accident would not have 
occurred if only Hymas had alerted him to the fact that he was being passed by 
sounding his horn.  This may be 
true, but the fact remains that Campbell was negligent in entering the passing 
lane without using due care.  
marker1fn0In 
[Checker Yellow Cab Co. v. Shiflett, 351 P.2d 660 (Wyo. 1960)] we held 
that "it was made the duty of the truck when changing its driving lane to make 
certain that this might be done with safety." 351 P.2d  at 664. While we premised 
that conclusion where a city ordinance was involved, a factual circumstance not 
present here, we nevertheless note that we are here concerned with a state 
statute which is virtually identical to the city ordinance. Section 
31-5-209(a)(i), W.S.1977, requires that a vehicle "be driven as nearly as 
practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until 
the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with 
safety." [Emphasis in 
original.]

 
 

Campbell 
v. W. S. Hatch Co., 622 P.2d 944, 947-48 (Wyo. 
1981).

 
 
[¶12]   The Kansas Supreme Court has also 
had the opportunity to consider this same issue.  Recently, in State v. Marx, 215 P.3d 601 (Kan. 2009), the 
Kansas Supreme Court interpreted the comparable Kansas statute single-lane rule 
as requiring "more than an incidental and minimal lane breach." Id., at 612.  The court concluded no reasonable 
suspicion existed where the deputy observed a vehicle momentarily cross the fog 
line, overcorrect, and subsequently cross the center line.  As a result, Marx held that to 
establish reasonable suspicion, "a detaining officer must articulate something 
more than an observation of one instance of a momentary lane breach." 
Id.  Marx rejected the notion 
that every intrusion upon a lane's marker lines gives rise to reasonable 
suspicion, but also stopped short of holding that a single swerve can never 
amount to reasonable suspicion.  
Rather, the Marx court held that under the circumstances, and 
given the record's complete silence as to the driving conditions and how far the 
vehicle crossed over marker lines, the state had failed to carry its burden of 
establishing that the deputy had a reasonable suspicion of a violation of K.S.A. 
§ 8-1522(a).  Id., at 
613; see also United 
States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1198 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The use of 
the phrase as nearly as practicable' in [Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1522(a)] precludes 
. . . absolute standards, and requires a fact-specific inquiry to assess whether 
an officer has probable cause to believe a violation has occurred.").

 
 
[¶13]   The Tenth Circuit has discussed 
this issue repeatedly.  Notably, in 
United States v. 
Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 1996), an 
officer stopped a truck after it "briefly crossed into the right shoulder 
emergency lane" where "[t]he road was winding, the terrain mountainous and the 
weather condition was windy." Id., at 978.  The Tenth Circuit held that the stop was 
unreasonable in light of the Utah statute's qualification that vehicles remain 
in a single lane only "as nearly as practical."  The court reasoned that under the 
particular weather and road conditions present on that occasion, "any vehicle 
could be subject to an isolated incident of moving into the right shoulder of 
the roadway, without giving rise to a suspicion of criminal activity."  Id.

 
 
[¶14]   Subsequent to the court's decision 
in Gregory, the Tenth 
Circuit has emphasized that Gregory does not "stand[] for the 
proposition that a single instance of drifting onto the shoulder can never be a 
violation of a traffic statute[.]"  
United States v. Cline, 349 F.3d 1276, 1287 (10th Cir. 
2003) (italics omitted).  Rather, a 
court must analyze objectively all the surrounding facts and circumstances to 
determine whether an officer had reasonable suspicion that a violation of the 
statute had occurred.  
Ozbirn, 189 F.3d  at 1198.  
For instance, in Ozbirn the court held that the traffic stop was 
reasonable where no "adverse physical conditions existed" and the driver of a 
motor home passed over onto the shoulder "twice within a quarter mile." 
Id.  The same conclusion was reached in 
United States v. Zabalza, 
346 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th 
Cir. 2003), where an officer observed the vehicle cross the center line 
twice, and in Cline, 349 F.3d  at 1287 where an officer observed the truck swerve onto the shoulder of the 
road nearly hitting a bridge abutment.  
In addition, in United States v. Alvarado, 430 F.3d 1305 (10th Cir. 2005), 
where an officer stopped a vehicle after it "cross[ed] about a foot over the 
right fog line" in a flat area of the interstate on a clear day with no wind, 
the court found the traffic stop was reasonable.  Id., at 1306-07 (internal quotations 
omitted).  In Alvarado, the 
court stated:

 
 
[W]e 
have already rejected the argument that the "as nearly as practical" 
qualification in § 
[41-6a-710(1)] requires the conclusion, as a matter of law, that a 
single instance of crossing over the fog line can never violate the statute. 
Rather, as previously discussed, we understand it to require 
a fact-specific inquiry into the particular circumstances present during the 
incident in question in order to determine whether the driver could reasonably 
be expected to maintain a straight course at that time in that vehicle on that 
roadway.

 
 

Alvarado, 430 F.3d  at 1309.

 
 
[¶15]   According to the Tenth 
Circuit:

 
 
Because 
of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-710(1)(a)'s "as nearly as practical" language, "a 
vehicle may weave slightly without violating the law if there are adverse 
conditions (high winds, sharp curves, damaged pavement)."  United States v. Vazquez, 555 F.3d 923, 928 (10th Cir. 
2009).  "But absent such conditions, 
when police officers observe a vehicle depart from a lane, they have reasonable 
suspicion to stop the vehicle." Id.

 
 

United 
States v. Phu Say Tang, 
332 Fed. Appx. 446, 451-452 (10th Cir. Utah 2009).  The 
Tenth Circuit has also held that one abrupt swerve across the fog line lasting 
"about two seconds on the shoulder" is sufficient grounds for a stop.  United States v. Pulido-Vasquez, 311 
Fed. Appx. 140, 142, 144 (10th Cir. Kan. 
2009).

 
 
[¶16]   We are in agreement with the Tenth 
Circuit's approach that a single instance of crossing the fog line can indeed be 
a violation of a "single lane of travel" statute.  Cline, 349 F.3d  at 1287.  We also agree with the assessment that a 
court must examine all of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether 
there is a justification for the stop.  
Keeping those principles in mind and after a thorough review of the case 
law and an extensive review of the record in this case, we are compelled to 
agree with the district court that Trooper Germain's stop of Dods was 
warranted.  In its decision letter, 
the district court compared this case to another it had recently decided where a 
car had merely traveled on, and not over, the white dotted dividing 
line rather than, as in this case, crossing the fog line and staying there for 
several hundred yards.  As a result 
of that comparison, the court had "no qualms" in concluding that Dods violated 
§ 31-5-209, and that the trooper was authorized to initiate the traffic 
stop.  Under adverse weather and/or 
road conditions, any vehicle could be subject to an isolated incident of moving 
into the right shoulder of the roadway, without giving rise to a suspicion of 
criminal activity.  Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 at 978.  We keep in mind that Gregory, 
however, does not create a "bright-line rule" of what conduct constitutes a 
violation of this type of statute, but rather "highlight[s] the need to analyze 
objectively all the surrounding facts 
and circumstances" to 
determine whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to make the stop.  Ozbirn, 189 F.3d  at 1198 (emphasis 
added).  Based upon such a 
fact-sensitive analysis, one or two deviations from a lane may or may not 
constitute a violation, depending on the circumstances.  While it might not be reasonable to 
expect a driver to avoid even the slightest deviation from a lane over an 
extended distance, it may be reasonable to expect drivers to avoid a 
sudden, significant deviation from the lane or a sudden, over-compensating 
return back, absent physical obstacles, mechanical difficulty, or other 
uncontrollable circumstances.  State v. Woodruff, 403 N.J. Super. 620, 629, 959 A.2d 1233, 
1239 (Law Div. 2008).

 
 
[¶17]   Dods' argument is generally that 
perfection cannot be expected out of drivers, and that following a "perfect 
vector" down the highway is an unreasonable expectation.  We agree with him on this point.  However, under the particular facts and 
circumstances of this case, we are not persuaded by Dods' argument on the 
whole.  He fails to point to any 
objective factor that might have made it impractical for him to remain in his 
lane.  Our review of the record 
shows that the weather cannot be deemed a factor in Dods' drift.  Furthermore, Dods was driving on a 
stretch of interstate that could only be described as straight and flat.  It could be that an isolated incident of 
a vehicle crossing into the emergency lane of a roadway is not a violation of 
Wyoming law.  A single lane 
deviation, however, that in this case was eight inches over the fog line for 
approximately 550 feet, is egregious enough to rise to the level of reasonable 
articulable suspicion.  Given the 
length and distance of Dods' drift, the deviation over the fog line was great 
enough that it warranted being stopped although the weather conditions were not 
ideal on that particular day.1

 
 
[¶18]   Under the language of our own 
statute, when an officer merely observes someone drive a vehicle outside the 
marked lane, he does not automatically have probable cause to stop that person 
for a traffic violation.  The use of 
the phrase "as nearly as practicable" in the statute precludes such absolute 
standards and requires a fact-specific inquiry to assess whether an officer has 
probable cause to believe that a violation has occurred.  The facts in this case warrant the 
conclusion that Dods' one-time lane deviation, the fact that it was extensive, 
both in time and distance, constitutes a violation of Wyoming law, and thus 
warrants the invasion of Dods' Fourth Amendment rights.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶19]   Taking into account the totality of 
circumstances, we affirm the district court's decision denying Dods' motion to 
suppress.

  

VOIGT, 
Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 
[¶20]   I concur in the result reached in 
the majority opinion because I believe that, if the Trooper saw what he says he 
saw, then he was justified in making the traffic stop.2  I write separately, however, to point 
out a couple of conceptual difficulties.  
First is the question of whether a traffic stop must be justified by 
probable cause or by the lower reasonable suspicion standard.  Our law is not at all clear in that 
regard.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-2-103(a) (LexisNexis 2009) provides that a "citation may issue as a charging 
document for any misdemeanor which the issuing officer has probable cause to 
believe was committed by the person to whom the citation was issued."  W.R.Cr.P. 3(b)(3) contains similar 
language.  In Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶¶ 24-28, 
146 P.3d 492, 499-501 (Wyo. 2006), and in Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 12, 64 P.3d 700, 706 (Wyo. 2003), we held that an officer's observation of a traffic 
violation gave rise to probable cause so as to justify a traffic stop.  And in Norman v. State, 747 P.2d 520, 523 (Wyo. 
1987), we noted that the evidence revealed "facts demonstrating the requisite 
probable cause for" a traffic stop based upon the very statute at issue in this 
case.  At the same time, however, we 
have said several times that traffic stops are analyzed under the lesser 
reasonable suspicion standard.  See, e.g., Lovato v. State, 2010 WY 38, 
¶ 13, 228 P.3d 55, 58 (Wyo. 2010); Garvin 
v. State, 2007 WY 190, ¶ 13, 172 P.3d 725, 728-29 (Wyo. 2007); Fender v. State, 2003 WY 96, ¶ 13, 74 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Wyo. 2003); and Damato, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d  at 
704-05.

 
 
[¶21]   I raise this issue because the 
cases cited in the majority opinion, as well as the majority opinion itself, do 
not seem to come down clearly on one side or the other on this question.  Furthermore, the cited cases, plus cases 
such as McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071 (Wyo. 1999); Wilson v. State, 
874 P.2d 215 (Wyo. 1994); and Keehn v. 
Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112 (Wyo. 1992), suggest that the distinction 
between a traffic stop based upon an observed traffic violationthe stop being 
made for the purpose of issuing a citationand a traffic stop based upon 
reasonable suspicion that some crime may have been committedthe stop being made 
for the purpose of investigating that possible crime, traffic or otherwisehas 
been blurred.3

 
 
[¶22]   Of even more concern to me, 
however, is the fact that this is one bizarre statute.  Apparently, it is not a crime if one 
violates the statute a little bit, but it is a crime if one violates the statute 
somewhat more than a little bit.  If 
you stay in your lane, you have not violated the statute, but if you go out of 
your lane, you may have violated the 
statute.  In the context of the 
present case, if the appellant's conduct may or may not have provided the 
officer with reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to believe that the 
appellant violated the statute, how on earth is the appellant supposed to have 
notice, before the fact, that his conduct will violate the statute?

 
 
[¶23]   We said the following in Fertig:

 
 
            
We also find the rationale of Whren [v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996)] persuasive in that we are not in a position 
to identify which traffic laws should be enforced and which violations should be 
disregarded by law enforcement.  Violations of the traffic code provide an 
objective standard by which to judge the reasonableness of a traffic stop 
seizure because an observed violation provides probable cause for a traffic stop 
seizure.

 
 

Fertig, 
2006 WY 148, ¶ 27, 146 P.3d  at 501 (citing Whren, 517 U.S.  at 818-19, 116 S.Ct. at 
1776-77) (emphasis added).  The 
point is that a traffic code provision, like any criminal law, is supposed to 
describe the conduct that is prohibited.  
Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-209 (LexisNexis 2009), however, the trial 
judge at some later point in time tells both the defendant and the officer 
whether the observed conduct even provided reasonable suspicion and/or probable 
cause that the statute was violated.  
How can a stop be justified by an observed "violation" where the officer 
does not know whether what he has observed is a violation?

 
 
[¶24]   This is not simply an evidentiary 
issue.  It is an issue involving the 
clarity of a criminal statute.  
Compare the "single lane" statute with, for instance, the traffic-control 
device statute, the latter being found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-402(a) 
(LexisNexis 2009):

 
 
(a)  The driver of any vehicle shall obey the 
instructions of any official traffic-control device applicable thereto placed or 
held in accordance with this act . . . .

 
 
Under 
§ 31-5-402(a), if a driver fails to stop at a stop sign, both the driver and the 
officer observing that failure know that the driver has violated the 
statute.  The officer has the 
requisite reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to stop the vehicle and to 
issue the driver a citation for running the stop sign, and the driver cannot 
defend by claiming that he only ran the stop sign a little bit.  Furthermore, the trial judge cannot 
declare that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to 
make the traffic stop because the driver only violated the statute a little 
bit.  Given a particular set of 
evidentiary factsthe driver ran the stop signdifferent  judges should not be allowed to declare 
differently whether that conduct justified a traffic stop.4  But under § 31-5-209(a), that is 
precisely the case.  Both the 
citizenry and law enforcement require more guidance than 
that.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 
1Trooper Germain 
testified that the weather was "overcast, rainy, I believe a little bit of snow 
mixed in there, and some wind."

 
 

2I am not entirely 
comfortable with that statement because, as the majority points out in a 
footnote, quoting the Trooper, the weather was "overcast, rainy, I believe a 
little bit of snow mixed in there, and some wind."  Could that not have made it 
"impracticable" to keep the vehicle entirely within a single lane, and would 
that not mean that the driver had not violated the statute?  See United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 978 (10th Cir. 1996).  It would 
seem, though, that the question of impracticability should, in most cases, be an 
evidentiary issue at trial, rather than a factor determinative of justification 
for the traffic stop. 

 
 

3If a traffic stop can be 
made based only upon reasonable suspicion, but the issuance of a citation 
requires probable cause, every reasonable-suspicion traffic stop requires 
further investigation for the development of probable cause.  That makes no sense in the context of 
the observed violation of a section of the traffic code because no further 
investigation is necessary before issuance of a citation.

 

4There are three circuit 
court judges in Cheyenne.  Under the 
"as nearly as practicable" language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-209(a), Judge A 
could impose a standard whereby reasonable suspicion/probable cause exists where 
the officer observes a vehicle cross the fog line for 300 feet, Judge B could 
impose a standard whereby reasonable suspicion/probable cause exists only if the 
officer observes a vehicle cross the fog line for at least 500 feet, and Judge C 
could impose a standard whereby reasonable suspicion/probable cause exists only 
if the officer observes a vehicle cross the fog line more than once, with the 
tires being at least eight inches across the line.  More significant, of course, is the fact 
that a particular defendant might or might not be guilty of violating the 
statute, depending upon which standard was being imposed.  Ludicrous.