Title: Stevens v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JONATHAN STEVENS, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 437, 2009 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr. I.D. No. 0808022374  
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§      
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  June 2, 2010 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  July 22, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Nicole M. Walker, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Paul R. Wallace, Esquire (argued), and John Williams, Esquire, 
Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
2
 
The defendant-appellant, Jonathan Stevens (“Stevens”), was indicted 
for Robbery in the First Degree and six other related offenses.  Following a 
jury trial in the Superior Court, Stevens was convicted of all counts in the 
indictment except for Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the 
Commission of a Felony.  Stevens was declared to be a habitual offender 
and sentenced to be incarcerated for a total of fifty-eight years, thirty-five of 
which are mandatory. 
 
In this direct appeal, Stevens argues that:  “the State was erroneously 
permitted to present to the jury Detective Robert Roswell’s (“Detective 
Roswell”) irrelevant and unduly prejudicial opinion that Stevens was 
involved in other robberies; opinion as to the credibility of the State’s key 
witnesses; characterization of the evidence; and misstatement of the 
evidence.”  The detective’s statements were contained within a DVD of his 
interrogation of the juvenile co-defendant, Jeffrey Boyd (“Boyd”).  The 
redacted DVD was introduced into evidence by the State, as prior statements 
of Boyd, under title 11, section 3507 of the Delaware Code. 
 
This appeal is part of a trilogy of cases that were consolidated for oral 
argument en Banc because they all involved recurring problems with regard 
 
 
3
to the admission of evidence under section 3507.1  The issue in Stevens’ 
appeal relates to the proper redaction of third-party statements from a 
witness interview or interrogation before it can be admitted into evidence 
under section 3507.  In this opinion, we review our prior precedents and 
provide additional guidance regarding the redaction of third-party comments 
that must be made as a condition precedent to admissibility under section 
3507.  In Stevens’ appeal, we conclude that, under a plain error standard of 
review, the Superior Court’s judgments of conviction must be affirmed.   
Statement of Facts 
 
On the evening of August 1, 2008, Tamara Stratton (“Stratton”), 
Stevens, and seventeen-year old Boyd left the residence of Stratton’s aunt, 
and rode together to where Stratton lived.  During this trip, Stevens asked to 
borrow Stratton’s pickup truck in order to go to a hotel to see someone.  
Stratton was dropped off at her home in Dover a little before 10 p.m. that 
evening.  Stevens and Boyd left in her truck. 
 
Later that evening, Xiu Zhang (“Zhang”) was working as a cook at the 
China King restaurant in Dover when two black men wearing disguises on 
their faces rushed in through the restaurant’s back door.  According to 
                                          
 
 
1 See Woodlin v. State, ___ A.2d ___ (Del. 2010); Blake v. State, ___ A.2d ___ (Del. 
2010). 
 
 
4
Zhang, the shorter of the two intruders was armed with a knife, while the 
other man appeared to have a gun.  As Zhang attempted to flee out the front 
door, he was chased by the person with the knife.  The pursuer hit Zhang 
with his fists and a chair.  While Zhang was being assaulted, he saw the 
other intruder take the store’s cash register drawer.  
 
After attacking Zhang and seizing the register drawer with $700 in 
cash, the two robbers ran out the back door and fled southward.  Chairs, a 
door, and the store computer for the China King were all damaged during 
the robbery.  Zhang was treated for his injuries at Kent General Hospital.  
Photographs of the injuries were introduced as evidence at Stevens’ trial. 
After Stratton read a newspaper article about the robbery at the China 
King restaurant, she telephoned the Dover Police Department on August 14, 
2008.  She told the police that on August 1, 2008, at around 10:00 p.m., she 
lent her pick-up truck to Stevens, a friend of hers. They were at her aunt’s 
house when Stevens told her that he needed to go to a hotel to see someone.  
Stevens and his friend “Jeffrey” then drove Stratton home and departed in 
her truck. 
 
Stratton also told police that later that same night she received a call 
from Stevens, who told her that her truck had ran out of gas and that he 
needed her to “come pick them up.”  She went to Governor’s Avenue, where 
 
 
5
the truck was parked.  When Stratton arrived at the Governor’s Avenue 
location, she saw Stevens and Boyd behind an apartment building.   
At Stevens’ trial, Stratton testified that “They were setting fire to 
papers and what appeared to me to be a cash register.”  When asked at trial if 
Stevens said anything to her, she replied:  “At the time I really didn’t get any 
response besides everything is okay, everything is okay, basically proceed; 
go get your truck; you don’t know anything.”  On cross-examination at trial, 
Stratton clarified her testimony about what Stevens and Boyd were burning, 
by explaining that the two men were not attempting to burn an entire cash 
register, but the “drawer to a cash register.”  Stratton testified that she called 
the police because she was afraid her truck would be linked to the robbery.   
 
After speaking with Stratton, the police put together a line up which 
included Stevens’ photograph.  The line up was shown to Zhang, who was 
not able to identify the assailant.  In separate photo lineups, however, 
Stratton identified Stevens and Boyd as the persons who borrowed her truck 
and whom she saw burning a cash register. 
 
Dover Police Detective Roswell obtained warrants for the arrest of 
Stevens and Boyd, and on August 22, 2008, he took the juvenile suspect, 
Boyd, into custody.  Boyd and his mother were transported to the Dover 
Police station where Boyd was interviewed by Detective Roswell in the 
 
 
6
presence of his mother.  Boyd waived his Miranda rights and the interview 
was recorded on a DVD.   
 
During his recorded police interview on August 22, 2008, Boyd told 
Detective Roswell where he and Stevens had left the cash register drawer.  
Detective Roswell went to 34 South Governor’s Avenue and located the 
black cash register drawer near the garage where Boyd said it was located.  
Although Boyd was arrested for the China King robbery on August 22, 
2008, the Dover Police were not able to locate Stevens until October 2, 
2008.   
Stevens did not give a statement to police.  Nor did he testify at trial.  
The record reflects that the defense rested at Stevens’ trial without 
presenting any evidence. 
Section 3507 Requires Redactions 
 
Title 11, section 3507 of the Delaware Code provides: 
(a) 
In a criminal prosecution, the voluntary out-of-court prior 
statement of a witness who is present and subject to cross-
examination may be used as affirmative evidence with 
substantive independent testimonial value. 
 
(b) 
The rule in subsection (a) of this section shall apply 
regardless of whether the witness’ in-court testimony is 
consistent with the prior statement or not.  The rule shall 
likewise apply with or without a showing of surprise by the 
introducing party. 
 
 
 
7
The only evidence that is admissible under section 3507 is “the voluntary 
out-of-court statement of a witness who is present and subject to cross-
examination.”2  This statute must be construed narrowly in order to preserve 
“a defendant’s constitutional rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
providing testimonial evidence.”3  Accordingly, interrogations that contain 
both the witness’ statements and inadmissible statements by third parties 
must be redacted.  For example, a police officer’s personal opinion is 
generally not admissible evidence at trial and, therefore, may not be 
admitted as part of a witness’ statement under section 3507.4 Similarly, an 
expert witness may not opine on the credibility of a witness generally5 and, 
therefore, such opinions are equally inadmissible as part of a section 3507 
statement.6 
At the time of Stevens’ trial, the legal standard requiring the redaction 
of a police officer’s opinions and comments was well established.  More 
than a decade ago, this Court held that an officer’s personal belief is “not 
admissible evidence at trial” and emphasized the importance of redacting 
                                          
 
 
2 Morgan v. State, 922 A.2d 395, 399 (Del. 2007) (quoting Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 3507 
(2007)). 
3 Hassan-El v. State, 911 A.2d 385, 396 (Del. 2006). 
4 Holtzman v. State, 1998 WL 666722, at *4 (Del. July 27, 1998). 
5 Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 275 (Del. 1987); Powell v. State, 527 A.2d 276, 279-80 
(Del. 1987). 
6 Waterman v. State, 956 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Del. 2008). 
 
 
8
such third-party opinions from interrogations before a witness statement 
under section 3507 is admitted into evidence.7  A few years ago, this Court 
issued two decisions applying that legal principle in the context of third-
party comments contained in statements offered into evidence under section 
3507.8  More recently, we addressed that issue again in Waterman v. State9 
and Miles v. State.10   
Because it is the actual statement of a witness that is admissible into 
evidence under section 3507, we have recognized that it is best for those 
actual words to be in writing or recorded.11  In Hassan-El v. State, we noted 
that if the witness statement is from an exchange with a third party, the best 
way to present section 3507 evidence is by a redacted recorded statement of 
only the declarant’s words.12  In Miles, we acknowledged that some 
questions or comments by third parties are not prejudicial and need to be 
included for either purposes of continuity or ease of understanding.13  Such 
innocuous types of third party statements need not be redacted.14  
Conversely, in Miles, we held that if a third party “conveys a view (through 
                                          
 
 
7 Holtzman v. State, 1998 WL 666722, at *4. 
8 See Miller v. State, 893 A.2d 937, 951 (Del. 2006); Hassan-El v. State, 911 A.2d at 396. 
9 Waterman v. State, 956 A.2d at 1264. 
10 Miles v. State, 2009 WL 4114385, at *2 (Del. Nov. 23, 2009). 
11 Morgan v. State, 922 A.2d at 399. 
12 Hassan-El v. State, 911 A.2d at 398.  
13 Miles v. State, 2009 WL 4114385, at *3. 
14 Id. 
 
 
9
comment or gesture) about the strength of the State’s or the defendant’s 
case, the credibility of the witness/defendant, or any disputed facts, then that 
comment must be redacted at the request of the defendant.”15  We have also 
held that the non-exclusive list of inadmissible prejudicial third-party 
comments includes references to criminal or other prior bad acts.16 
In Miles, we also stated that “the process of redacting [a third party 
exchange should not] interfere with the trial, since it is a matter that can and 
should be resolved before the trial begins.”17  Therefore, at some reasonable 
time before trial, the State must provide defense counsel with the entire 
recorded exchange between a witness and a third party, together with a copy 
of its proposed redacted version of that recording that it intends to introduce 
under section 3507.  If the parties cannot reach a stipulated agreement on the 
admissibility of the redacted recording and defense counsel has any 
objections or requests for additional redactions, they should be presented to 
the trial judge by filing a timely motion in limine. 
Once again, we hold that any substantive comments of a third party 
embedded in a section 3507 statement are inadmissible under section 3507 
because they are not prior statements of the witness.  In that context, any 
                                          
 
 
15 Id.   
16 Miller v. State, 893 A.2d at 951. 
17 Miles v. State, 2009 WL 4114385, at *3. 
 
 
10
alleged technical or contextual difficulties for the State in redacting 
inadmissible third-party comments are not relevant factors to be 
considered.18  For example, in Miller v. State, the State argued that it did not 
redact a police officer’s reference to an unrelated criminal act because the 
“jury needed to see the whole video to understand the full context of the 
questioning.”19  We described that argument as “specious” and 
“embarrassingly lacking in substance.”20  We held that the prosecutor should 
have stipulated to redacting the portion of the videotape where the police 
officer made reference to a criminal act (using marijuana) and that the trial 
judge should never have had to confront the question of whether that portion 
of the video should have been redacted after it had already been played for 
the jury.21   
 Boyd’s Section 3507 Statement 
 
At Stevens’ trial, co-defendant Boyd admitted that on January 21, 
2009, he pled guilty to three charges involving the China King robbery:  
Robbery in the First Degree; Possession of a Firearm During the 
Commission of a Felony; and Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  When 
                                          
 
 
18 Miles v. State, 2009 WL 4114385. 
19 Miller v. State, 893 A.2d at 951 n.49. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 951. 
 
 
11
Boyd testified at Stevens’ May 2009 jury trial, he was serving a six year 
prison sentence for these convictions.  Boyd testified as a prosecution 
witness on the second day of Stevens’ jury trial.   
 
Boyd’s direct trial testimony was interrupted by the State in order to 
summon Detective Roswell as a witness to lay the foundation for admission 
under section 3507 of Boyd’s prior out-of-court statement to Detective 
Roswell.22  Detective Roswell identified a DVD copy of his August 22, 2008 
interview of Boyd.  After defense counsel for Stevens advised that he had no 
cross-examination questions for Detective Roswell, the trial judge granted 
the State’s request to play the DVD of Boyd’s 2008 out-of-court statement.   
The trial judge asked the prosecutor about “the approximate length of 
the tape.” The prosecutor replied that “the whole statement lasted a little 
over an hour, but it’s been somewhat edited.”  The edited or redacted version 
to be played for Stevens’ jury was 45 to 50 minutes.  The State began 
playing the Boyd DVD statement at 10:39 a.m.   
Approximately thirty-five minutes later, the DVD was stopped at 
11:14 a.m.—the point where a portion of Boyd’s interrogation which was 
played for the jury contained Detective Roswell’s opinion that Stevens and 
Boyd engaged in “some other robberies:” 
                                          
 
 
22 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 3507 (2007).  
 
 
12
Detective: I think you guys have done some other ones.  I 
think he’s brought you along for some other ones.  
Some other robberies in particular.  I want to give 
you an opportunity to tell me about that.  What 
else he’s done in particular – Jonathan.  Ok? 
 
 
I’m actually pretty sure you guys have done some 
more stuff. 
 
Boyd: 
Oh nah, to be honest with you, I haven’t. 
 
Detective: What else has he done? 
 
Boyd: 
Only thing I know about is when he had the truck. 
 
 
When this portion of the interrogation was played for the jury, 
Stevens’ defense counsel objected on the basis that the dialogue was 
irrelevant.  The trial judge conducted a sidebar conference to consider the 
defense objection.  Both the trial judge and the prosecutor agreed that 
Detective Roswell’s opinion was irrelevant.  Nevertheless, the prosecutor 
argued that because Boyd denied being involved in any other robberies, the 
statement by Detective Roswell was not prejudicial.  The trial judge rejected 
that argument and suggested that a curative instruction was appropriate. 
 
In response to that suggested ruling by the trial judge, the prosecutor 
represented that the only information he wanted from the rest of the 
interrogation by Detective Roswell was that Stevens had a knife in the truck 
and that Boyd said, “I was not going to do it, but just thought I might as 
well.”  The prosecutor stated, “[e]verything after that is an attempt to see if 
 
 
13
there is anything else that they have done, and that’s all out.”  The 
prosecutor also told the court that he redacted Boyd’s assertion that he was 
aware that Stevens was involved in an incident where he had a gun and weed 
in his truck.   
Based on the prosecutor’s representations, Stevens’ defense counsel 
indicated that “[s]ince [the prosecutor] is saying that that’s been redacted, 
that’s fine.”  Stevens’ trial attorney withdrew his objection and indicated that 
a curative jury instruction by the trial judge would not be necessary.  At the 
end of the sidebar conference, the trial judge asked defense counsel, “Are 
you okay with what’s left?” and Stevens’ attorney replied, “Yes.”  At 11:18 
a.m., the remainder of Boyd’s redacted statement was played for Stevens’ 
jury.  When the DVD was completed, Boyd’s direct examination at trial 
continued, followed by cross-examination by Stevens’ attorney. 
 
On appeal, Stevens argues that the Superior Court committed plain 
error when it failed to issue a curative instruction or declare a mistrial, 
because remaining portions of the DVD statement of Boyd heard by the jury 
contained improper statements by the interviewing police officer.  Stevens 
contends that unredacted parts of Boyd’s DVD statement contain Detective 
Roswell’s “opinion that Stevens was involved in other robberies; opinion as 
 
 
14
to the credibility of the State’s key witnesses; characterization of the 
evidence; and misstatement of the evidence.”   
 
The record reflects at Stevens’ jury trial there was no defense request 
for curative instructions, for the trial judge to declare a mistrial, or for 
further redactions in Boyd’s recorded statements in the DVD that was played 
for the jury.  Since the issues raised by Stevens on appeal were not presented 
to the trial judge, these objections may be reviewed only for plain error.23  
“Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be 
so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and 
integrity of the trial process.”24  In demonstrating that an unobjected to error 
is prejudicial, the burden of persuasion is on the defendant.25 
 
To this Court, Stevens argues that Detective Roswell’s opinions and 
comments were not only irrelevant but were highly prejudicial.  Stevens 
asserts that the prosecutor’s argument that there was no prejudice because 
Boyd denied involvement in other crimes is without merit.  Stevens makes 
that assertion because Boyd never denied that Stevens was involved in any 
                                          
 
 
23 Supr. Ct. R. 8; D.R.E. 103(d); Morgan v. State, 962 A.2d 248, 254 (Del. 2008); Flamer 
v. State, 953 A.2d 130, 133 (Del. 2008); Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006); 
Keyser v. State, 893 A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 2006).   
24 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (citation omitted); see also 
Morgan v. State, 962 A.2d at 254; Keyser v. State, 893 A.2d at 959. 
25 See Wright v. State, 2009 WL 2634895, at *4 (Del. Aug. 28, 2009); Morgan v. State, 
962 A.2d at 254. 
 
 
15
other robberies and the jury was permitted to hear that Stevens was involved 
in a prior incident involving a truck.  Thus, Stevens contends, the jury 
“could conclude that he committed a robbery involving a truck and the only 
thing the prosecutor could have hoped for by failing to redact this portion of 
the video is that the jury would consider the police officer’s suggestion as 
true and view [Stevens] in a bad light.”26 
 
According to Stevens, permitting the jury to hear the improper 
remarks and questions by Detective Roswell violated the limitations on the 
admission of prior our-of-court statements of a trial witness under title 11, 
section 3507 as interpreted by this Court in Hassan-El v. State,27 and other 
decisions.28  Stevens argues that it is apparent from the face of the record 
that the trial judge’s failure either to issue a curative instruction or declare a 
mistrial based on the admission of Detective Roswell’s opinion statements, 
was plain error.  The plain error standard of appellate review is predicated 
upon a defense counsel’s failure to object to the admission of improper 
evidence through oversight.29   
                                          
 
 
26 See Miller v. State, 893 A.2d 937, 951 n.49 (Del. 2006). 
27 Hassan-El v. State, 911 A.2d 385, 396 (Del. 2006).  
28 See Miller v. State, 893 A.2d at 951; Miles v. State, 2009 WL 4114385, at *2 (Del. 
Nov. 23, 2009); Morgan v. State, 922 A.2d 395, 399-400 (Del. 2007). 
29 Wright v. State, 2009 WL 2634895, at *4. 
 
 
16
In Stevens’ case, the record reflects that his trial attorney initially 
objected to the admission of Detective Roswell’s personal opinion 
embedded in the 3507 statement.  After the sidebar conference, however, 
counsel withdrew that objection, never moved for a mistrial and specifically 
declined the trial judge’s offer to give a curative instruction.  Consequently, 
there was no oversight by Stevens’ defense attorney. 
Stevens also asserts that the remaining portion of the interrogation 
played for the jury included the following inadmissible statement by 
Detective Roswell, which was admitted without objection: 
You haven’t been with him on anything else?  Here’s the thing, 
now’s the time to let me know about it because the way things 
work with cases and what not, we can get everything over and 
done with today.  What you don’t need to have happen is take 
care of this today then the next thing you know, couple weeks 
from now, something else pops up. 
 
Stevens opening brief then makes the following argument: 
The record in our case reveals that the trial court was aware of 
the inadmissibility of at least one set of comments by the officer 
– those expressing his opinion that Stevens was engaged in 
other robberies.  The record also reveals that, despite defense 
counsel’s initial objection and the prosecutor’s representation, 
further inadmissible comments about other robberies were 
presented to the jury.  Yet, the trial judge did nothing.   
 
Stevens’ appellate assertions of plain error disregard his trial 
attorney’s initial decision not to move for a mistrial and not to accept the 
trial judge’s offer of a curative instruction, and counsel’s subsequent failure 
 
 
17
to object to the later statements by Detective Roswell.  Those actions 
preclude plain error review.  We hold that Stevens’ trial attorney’s initial 
decision not to move for a mistrial or to accept the trial judge’s offer of a 
curative jury instruction, and counsel’s failure to object to Detective 
Roswell’s subsequent statements, all preclude any review for plain error in 
this direct appeal. 
 
Our prior precedents indicate that Detective Roswell’s reference to 
other robberies, although not subject to review for plain error, was 
nevertheless inadmissible as part of Boyd’s section 3507 statement.  The 
record does not reflect why Stevens’ trial counsel did not accept the trial 
judge’s offer of a curative instruction and/or move for a mistrial, especially 
since Stevens was on trial for allegedly committing a robbery.  The propriety 
of that trial strategy can be analyzed when the record is more developed if 
Stevens elects to file a Rule 6130 motion for post-conviction relief. 
In Stevens’ case, the State should have redacted the objectionable 
comments sua sponte.31  When he discovered that that had not been done, 
the defense attorney should have filed a motion in limine to exclude them.  
As we observed in Miller, the trial judge should not have been confronted 
                                          
 
 
30 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61. 
31 Miller v. State, 893 A.2d at 951. 
 
 
18
with the inadmissible prejudicial comments by a third party, especially as in 
this case, after the videotape had already been played before the jury.32   
In Miller, we concluded that the prosecutor’s failure to redact the 
police officer’s inadmissible reference to prior criminal acts created the risk 
that the defendant’s conviction would be overturned and, since its 
inadmissibility was so clear, resulted in an unnecessary expenditure of 
judicial, prosecutorial and defense resources.33  Nevertheless, the same 
impropriety was repeated in Stevens’ case.  With the guidance provided by 
this opinion, it should not happen again. 
Conclusion 
 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
 
 
 
                                          
 
 
32 Miller v. State, 893 A.2d at 951. 
33 Id. at 951-52; see also id. at 951 n.51.