Title: Baker v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Wesley Eugene Baker v. State of Maryland
No. 14, September Term, 2004
Headnote:
The constitutionality of the weighing provision of Md. Code (1957, 1987
Repl. Vol., 1991 Cum.Supp.), § 413(h), is not at issue where the sentencing
authority finds that no mitigating circumstances exist. In capital murder cases,
§ 413(h) only applies when the sentencing judge or jury finds that one or more
mitigating circumstances exist. Here, the jury found beyond a reasonable
doubt that petitioner murdered the victim during the commission of a robbery.
Subsequently, applying the correct standards as to each type of factor
(aggravating or mitigating), the sentencing entity found that the robbery was
an aggravating factor and found that no mitigating factors existed.
Accordingly, no balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors occurred, or
could have occurred.  
Circuit Court for Harfo rd Coun ty
Case # 92C0088
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 14
September Term, 2004
Wesley Eugene Baker
v.
State of Maryland
Bell, C. J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Bell, C.J., Raker and Greene, JJ., concur
                  
Filed: October 8, 2004
1We find no need to once again extensively discuss the facts concerning Baker’s act
of murdering Mrs. Tyson and the aftermath of that crime, as the murder and the
circumstances regarding Baker’s subsequent arrest and trial were thoroughly discussed in
Baker I, Baker II and Baker III.
2Maryland Rule 4-345, which Baker relied upon in that earlier motion and now relies
(continued...)
The appeal now before us is petitioner’s fourth before this Court concerning his 1992
conviction and subsequent sentence of death in the Circuit Court for Harford County for the
June 6, 1991 murder of Jane Tyson.1  See Baker v. State, 332 Md. 542, 632 A.2d 783 (1993),
cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1078, 14 S.Ct. 1664, 128 L.Ed.2d 380 (1994) (“Baker I”) (direct
appeal); Baker v. State, 367 Md. 648, 790 A.2d 629 (2002), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1050, 122
S.Ct. 1814, 152 L.Ed.2d 817 (2002) (“Baker II”) (application for leave to appeal denials of
motion for new sentencing based on newly discovered evidence and motion to correct illegal
sentence based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435
(2000));  Baker v. State, 377 Md. 567, 833 A.2d 1070 (2003), cert. denied,       U.S.      , 124
S.Ct. 1673, 158 L.Ed.2d 370 (2004) (“Baker III”) (application for leave to appeal denials
of motions to quash sentence and execution of warrant on ground that sentencing judge had
changed residence to a county where he failed to satisfy residency requirement of State
constitution).    
The prior appeal that bears the most relation to the present one, Baker II, was the
result of Baker filing two motions in the Circuit Court for Harford County, one of the
motions, entitled “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence and/or for New Sentencing Based
Upon Mistake and Irregularity,”2 addressing the applicability of Apprendi to the Maryland
2(...continued)
on in the appeal presently before us, states in relevant part:
“Rule 4-345.  Sentencing — Revisory power of court.
(a) Illegal sentence.  The court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time.
(b) Modification or reduction — Time for.  The court has revisory
power and control  over a sentence upon a motion filed within 90 days after
its imposition (1) in the District Court, if an appeal has not been perfected, and
(2) in a circuit court, whether or not an appeal has been filed.  Thereafter, the
court has revisory power and control over the sentence in case of fraud,
mistake, or irregularity, or as provided in section (e) of this Rule.” 
3We addressed the Ring issue in Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 835 A.2d 1105 (2003),
and held that Ring’s holding did not invalidate the Maryland Death Penalty statute, see
discussion infra.
4A “Motion for Reconsideration and Request for a Hearing” was denied by the circuit
court on January 9, 2004.
-2-
death penalty law.  This Court granted Baker’s Application for Leave to Appeal and, on
February 7, 2002, denied relief on the Apprendi claim.  A petition for Writ of Certiorari was
denied by the United States Supreme Court on May 6, 2002.  Baker v. Maryland, 535 U.S.
1050, 122 S.Ct. 1814, 152 L.Ed.2d 817 (2002).    
On October 22, 2003, Baker filed in the Circuit Court for Harford County a “Motion
to Correct Illegal Sentence and For New Sentencing Based Upon Mistake or Irregularity.”
The motion argued that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), overruled, sub silentio, this Court’s
decision in Baker II.3  On December 19, 2003, the circuit court denied the Motion to Correct
Illegal/Irregular Sentence.4  Baker thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court on
January 14, 2004.               
-3-
Baker presents the following questions for our review:
“1.
Whether Maryland’s Death Penalty Statute is now unconstitutional on
its face or as applied because it allows a sentence of death to be
imposed if the State proves only that the aggravating factors outweigh
any mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence?
2.
Because the Maryland Death [Penalty] Statute requires a sentence of
death upon a finding that aggravation outweighs mitigation by a
preponderance of the evidence, does it operate to deprive [Baker] of
his life and liberty contrary to the law of the land and in violation of his
Due Process Rights under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights?
3.
Was [Baker’s] waiver of jury sentencing involuntary because [Baker]
misunderstood and was not advised as to the burden of proof
governing the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances?”
[Alterations added.] 
We hold that Baker’s challenge to the preponderance of the evidence standard that
is used when weighing aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances during
the sentencing proceeding in death penalty cases is not a proper issue in this case.  The
circuit court found that no mitigating circumstances existed.  Therefore there was no
balancing and an improper standard or any standard could not have been applied.  Because
no mitigating circumstances were found by the circuit court, there was no weighing of the
aggravating and mitigating factors prior to Baker receiving a sentence of death.  A weighing
of factors never played a role in Baker’s sentencing.
We also hold again that, for the reasons that we recently stated in Oken v. State, 378
Md. 179, 835 A.2d 1105 (2003) (“Oken IV”), Maryland’s use of a preponderance of the
evidence standard in the weighing of aggravating against mitigating factors, even if we were
-4-
to assume that such a weighing occurred before Baker’s sentencing in this case, is not
unconstitutional and does not invalidate the State’s capital punishment law.  Because the
capital punishment law is not unconstitutional as alleged, we do not need to once again
consider the question of whether Baker’s waiver of jury sentencing was involuntary, a claim
which we previously rejected in Baker II.
II. Discussion
Petitioner argues that he should have been more fully advised of the balancing
process employed in the sentencing proceeding in death penalty cases before he made his
decision to select a sentencing before a judge.  As stated, the issue of voluntariness was
already discussed extensively in Baker v. State, 367 Md. 648, 790 A.2d 629 (2002) (“Baker
II”), where we stated that “[a]fter an examination of the waiver colloquy between the trial
court and Baker . . . and considering the totality of the circumstances, we hold that Baker
made a knowing and voluntary waiver [of his right to jury sentencing].”  Id. at 691, 790
A.2d at 654 (alteration added).  That colloquy included advice to petitioner by the trial judge
that “‘[t]o be considered, there must be proof of the existence of any of these [mitigating]
circumstances by preponderance of the evidence.  This burden exists whether the sentencer
is the Court or the jury.’”  Id. at 659, 790 A.2d at 635 (alteration added).  This was the
correct advice on the burden in respect to establishing mitigating factors.
Although that previous appeal  was brought because of an Apprendi-based contention
that “the aggravating circumstances must outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a
-5-
reasonable doubt in compliance with Apprendi,” we held that Apprendi did not apply and
that the sentencing judge’s remarks that  “if mitigating factors ‘outweighed’ aggravating
factors, the sentence could not be death” was the functional equivalent of explaining the
preponderance standard to Baker.  Id. at 690-93, 790 A.2d at 654-56.  Because today we
reaffirm our holding in Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 835 A.2d 1105 (2003), that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Ring does not invalidate the Maryland capital punishment law’s use of
a preponderance of the evidence standard when weighing aggravating factors against
mitigating factors in a sentencing proceeding.  The holding regarding the voluntariness of
Baker’s waiver of jury sentencing in Baker II continues to be controlling and we need not
address it further.  Again, we hold that Baker’s selection of sentencing by the court was
intelligently and voluntarily made.
There is also no issue properly extant in this case as to what balancing standard
should be used when weighing aggravating factors against mitigating factors, under either
the federal or State constitutions, where there is no finding by either the court or the jury
that at least one mitigating factor exists.  Because Baker, after being correctly advised of the
applicable standards, voluntarily elected to waive his right to jury sentencing and chose
instead sentencing by the court, Baker was bound, as to the issue as raised in this appeal, by
the court’s decision as to whether any mitigating factors had been shown by Baker to exist.
The “balancing” of factors plays no part in the initial determination by the sentencing entity
as to whether any mitigating factors exist.  When no mitigating factors are found balancing
5At the time of Baker’s murder of Jane Tyson, Md. Code (1957, 1987 Repl. Vol.,
1991 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 413(d) provided, in pertinent part:
“(d) Consideration of aggravating circumstances. — In determining
the sentence, the court or jury, as the case may be, shall first consider whether,
beyond a reasonable doubt, any of the following aggravating circumstances
exist:
. . .
(10) The defendant committed the murder while committing or
attempting to commit a robbery, arson, rape or sexual offense in the first
degree.”
6At the time of Baker’s murder of Jane Tyson, Md. Code (1957, 1987 Repl. Vol.,
1991 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 413(g) explained what constituted a mitigating circumstance
for use in sentencing:
“(g) Consideration of mitigating circumstances. — If the court or jury
finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or more of these aggravating
circumstances exist, it shall then consider whether, based upon a
preponderance of the evidence, any of the following mitigating circumstances
exist:
(1) The defendant has not previously (i) been found guilty of a crime
of violence; (ii) entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charge of a
(continued...)
-6-
is a non sequitur.  The judge presiding over the trial in the circuit court and the subsequent
sentencing proceeding, Judge Cypert O. Whitfill, explained in extensive detail his
sentencing decision, explaining in each instance why there was no statutory mitigator,
including so-called “catch all” mitigators:
“The aggravating circumstances of which notice was given by the State
was that the Defendant committed the murder while committing, or attempting
to commit, robbery, arson, rape in the first degree and sexual offense in the
first degree.[5]  I find it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant
committed this murder while attempting to commit robbery, based upon the
verdict of the jury, as well as upon my own review of the evidence.  So, the
aggravating circumstance relied upon by the State is proven.
“As to the mitigating circumstances,[6] number one, is a finding that
6(...continued)
crime of violence; or (iii) had a judgment of probation on stay of entry of
judgment entered on a charge of a crime of violence.  As used in this
paragraph, ‘crime of violence’ means abduction, arson, escape, kidnapping,
manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter, mayhem, murder, 
robbery, or
rape or sexual offense in the first or second degree, or an attempt to commit
any of these offenses, or the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony
or another crime of violence.
(2) The victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or
consented to the act which caused the victim’s death.
(3) The defendant acted under substantial duress, domination or
provocation of another person, but not so substantial as to constitute a
complete defense to the prosecution.
(4) The murder was committed while the capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental
incapacity, mental disorder or emotional disturbance.
(5) The youthful age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(6) The act of the defendant was not the sole proximate cause of the
victim’s death.
(7) It is unlikely that the defendant will engage in further criminal
activity that would constitute a continuing threat to society.
(8) Any other facts which the jury or the court specifically sets forth in
writing that it finds as mitigating circumstances in the case.” 
-7-
where the Defendant has not previously been found guilty of a crime of
violence, entered a plea of guilty or Nolo contendere to a crime of violence,
or been granted probation on a stay of judgment pursuant to a change of a
crime of violence, not only do I find by a preponderance of the evidence that
such facts do not exist, but the evidence shows that the Defendant has been
convicted and served substantial time upon a charge of Armed Robbery,
which is a crime of violence within the definition of that mitigator.  So, I find
that does not exist by a preponderance of the evidence.
“The second mitigating factor is the victim was a participant in the
Defendant’s conduct or consented to the act which caused the victim’s death.
I find by a preponderance of the evidence this circumstance does not exist.
The victim was, in no way, a participant or consenting in any way to the
Defendant’s conduct.
“Number three; the Defendant acted under substantial duress,
-8-
domination, or provocation of another person, even though not so substantial
as to constitute a complete defense to the prosecution.  I find by a
preponderance of the evidence that that circumstance does not exist.
“The murder was committed while the capacity of the Defendant to
appreciate his criminality of his conduct or to conform to his or her conduct
to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental
incapacity, mental disorder, or emotional disturbance.  The only evidence I
have of the Defendant’s mental capacity or emotional status is the Presentence
Investigation Report, but, certainly, that report finds nothing to suggest in any
way that the Defendant was impaired.  So, I find by a preponderance of the
evidence that circumstance does not exist.
“Number five, the Defendant was of a youthful age at the time of the
crime.  I find by a preponderance of the evidence that circumstance does not
exist.  His chronological age and his experience all place him in the category
he was not of a youthful age.
“Number six, the acts of the Defendant were not the sole proximate
cause of the victim’s death.  I find by a preponderance of the evidence that
circumstance does not exist.  Jane Tyson died because of a bullet wound from
a gun placed to her head.  That was placed there by the Defendant, and he is
the person that pulled the trigger.
“Number seven; it is unlikely that the Defendant will engage in further
criminal activity that would constitute a continuing threat to society.  I find by
a preponderance of the evidence that that circumstance does not exist, and I
will comment upon that.
“I did have evidence of Dr. Johnson stating his opinion that lifers –
nine out of ten lifers – make the adjustment and do not violate the rules of the
institution, and, therefore, are not a threat to either the inmates or guards.  Dr.
Johnson’s statistics proved together those serving anywhere from twenty years
or more on to people on life without parole, and there is no break out of the
separating the people that are there on life without parole from the other so-
called lifers.  Dr. Johnson did acknowledge those who were on life without
parole having a more difficult time in adjusting than those that have some
possibility of parole.
“Dr. Johnson had very little information about this Defendant,
specifically, other than his institutional records from prior incarcerations.  I
acknowledge that those records did not show violence, involving acts of
violence, while in the institution, and that he did not have a great number of
violations.
“Past conduct is one of the indicators of future conduct, and we have
the Defendant’s conduct that, in fact, has placed him here at this point.  That
-9-
is, the murder of Jane Tyson.  When I look at the manner in which this was
carried out and the circumstances under which it was carried out, it causes me
grave concern as to the threat that Mr. Baker poses to society.  He had served
a substantial incarceration for Armed Robbery.  He has made a decision to
commit another Armed Robbery.
“I think he can know that if he committed, or was caught and convicted
of, another Armed Robbery, he would be serving a very substantial period of
time, and I think the decision was made that eliminated the witness was the
preferable way to go.  He would up the ante, take his chances on a murder
charge, opposed to just the Armed Robbery charge.  So, I think he is willing
to up the stakes to achieve what he wants.
“My observation of Mr. Baker is he showed very little emotion
throughout this trial, and, in fact, the most emotion that I have seen Mr. Baker
display is when there was disagreement between him and counsel over
whether or not certain evidence should be presented.  So, when being crossed,
he showed more emotion than he did when displaying the pictures of the body
of Jane Tyson.  It indicated to me when crossed there can be a problem.
. . .
“So, I find reason number seven on the verdict sheet does not exist.
. . .
“So that my finding is that none of the mitigating factors have been
proven by a preponderance of the evidence.  I, quite frankly, cannot think of
other factors that would cause me to make a finding that there is some other
mitigation.
“Having found that the Defendant is guilty of First Degree Murder, that
the Notice of Attempt to Seek Death has been given, that the aggravating
circumstances included in the Notice [have] been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt and to a moral certainty, and that no mitigation has been proven, the
sentence required by law is one of death.” [Alteration added.] [Emphasis
added.] [Footnote added.] 
As can be seen from Judge Whitfill’s thorough explanation, nothing that Baker was
able to present to the circuit court evidenced a mitigating factor that needed to be weighed
against an aggravating factor by the court before the making of its decision as to whether a
sentence of death was proper.  Under Md. Code (1957, 1987 Repl. Vol, 1991 Cum. Supp.),
7We cite to the 1987 replacement volume with the 1991 cumulative supplement
because that was the volume in effect at the time of the murder.
8The weighing statute presently exists as Md. Code (2002, 2004 Supp.), § 2-303(i)
of the Criminal Law Article, which states:
“(i) Findings; documentation of decision. — (1) If the court or jury
finds that one or more of the mitigating circumstances under subsection (h) of
this section exists, it shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence
whether the aggravating circumstances under subsection (g) of this section
outweigh the mitigating circumstances.
(2) If the court or jury finds that the aggravating circumstances:
(i) outweigh the mitigating circumstances, a death sentence shall
be imposed; or
(ii) do not outweigh the mitigating circumstances, a death
sentence shall not be imposed.
(3) If the determination is by a jury, a decision to impose a death
sentence must be unanimous and shall be signed by the jury foreperson.
(4) A court or jury shall put its determination in writing and shall state
specifically:
(i) each aggravating circumstance found;
(ii) each mitigating circumstance found;
(iii) whether any aggravating circumstances found under
subsection (g) of this section outweigh the mitigating circumstances found
under subsection (h) of this section;
(continued...)
-10-
Art 27,  § 413(h),7 the finding of at least one mitigating factor by a preponderance of the
evidence was required before any weighing of aggravating against mitigating factors could
occur.  The statute stated:
“(h) Weighing mitigating and aggravating circumstances. — (1) If the
court or jury finds that one or more of these mitigating circumstances exist,
it shall determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the mitigating
circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
(2) If it finds that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the
aggravating circumstances, the sentence shall be death.
(3) If it finds that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the
aggravating circumstances, a sentence of death shall not be imposed.” 8
8(...continued)
(iv) whether the aggravating circumstances found under
subsection (g) of this section do not outweigh the mitigating circumstances
found under subsection (h) of this section; and
(v) the sentence determined under subsection (g)(2) of this
section or paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection.”
9The same factor that served as an aggravating factor was an element that must have
been proven in order for the jury to convict.  Accordingly, that particular factor, dressed in
different clothes, was twice proven.
-11-
[Emphasis added.]
In the case sub judice, the circuit court specifically stated that it did not find, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that any mitigating circumstances existed.  Therefore,
Baker’s contention that the preponderance of the evidence standard used in the weighing of
aggravating factors against mitigating circumstances under the statute is unconstitutional is
inappropriate due to the simple fact that the circuit court found no mitigating factors to exist.
See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990) (U.S.
Supreme Court holding that it is not unconstitutional for a state to require the death penalty
when the sentencer has found one or more aggravating circumstances and no mitigating
factors).  Therefore, there was no reason for a weighing of factors under § 413(h).  There
was nothing to weigh against the aggravating factor, a factor that was established beyond
a reasonable doubt.9  Maryland Rule 4-343 instructs the sentencing authority  that, where
one or more aggravating circumstances has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and no
mitigating circumstances exist, the sentence shall be death.  
Baker points to the following comments made by Judge Whitfill, also made during
-12-
the sentencing decision, to claim that mitigating factors were found to exist by the circuit
court, but an accurate reading of Judge Whitfill’s remarks shows Baker’s assertion to be
incorrect:
“I will assume, for the moment, that the mitigation as listed in number
seven, if I had found that to exist, that a weighing process would have been
required.  So, under the assumption that someone might feel that Dr.
Johnson’s testimony should have been accepted as proving mitigation, I will
review the weighing factors that I would have gone through had I found that
to exist.
“The issue as to whether or not aggravating circumstances outweigh
mitigation, I think, is [as] basic a principle as we can state for our community,
is that people should be able to go shopping without fear that they will be
killed for their wallet or their purse.
“Jane Tyson presented absolutely no threat to the Defendant, except the
possibility that she could identify him and testify against him for stealing her
purse.  She was a small woman.  She had no capacity to hurt him.  She had
two children in tow.  She couldn’t leave those children even to pursue him.
So that this was as helpless a victim as could possibly have existed.
“The Defendant’s act of killing her can only be of simply no regard for
life, or because he felt that eliminating the witness was in his best interests.
“Jane Tyson was killed in the presence of her grandchildren, who were
children of tender years.  As I have indicated previously, the maximum
amount a defendant can reasonably expect to recover from such a theft is a
few hundred dollars, at most.
“And a willingness to take a gun, place it to someone’s head, and carry
it out such as this offense, the fact that the Defendant had served previous
time for Armed Robbery, knew the consequences, had time to contemplate the
consequences of that, I feel that the aggravating circumstances of this case and
circumstances under it that would outweigh any mitigation . . . if I were to
make a finding that a mitigator existed.” [Alteration added.] [Emphasis
added.]  
As can plainly be seen from Judge Whitfill’s comments, he only discussed the
weighing of the aggravating factor against a mitigating factor to explain to Baker that his
decision to sentence him to death would have been no different had the mitigating factor
-13-
been proven to exist by a preponderance of the evidence.  The fact that Judge Whitfill was
hypothesizing is made unmistakably clear by the language used by the judge such as “If I
were to assume” and “if I were to make a finding that a mitigator existed.”  Petitioner cannot
successfully challenge an “assumed” weighing process that never had any bearing on the
circuit court’s decision to sentence Baker to death.  Under the statutory sentencing procedure
in cases involving a possible sentence of death, there is no reason for a court or jury to
balance aggravating factors against mitigating factors where no mitigating factors have been
shown to exist by a preponderance of the evidence.  In fact, under such circumstances, it is
impossible for balancing to occur.
Even assuming arguendo that the circuit court did engage in a weighing of
aggravating against mitigating factors prior to sentencing Baker to death, and that this
weighing was followed in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence standard of
§ 413(h), we would hold that Baker’s challenge to the preponderance of the evidence
standard in such sentencing deliberations remains unpersuasive.   
In one of Baker’s previous appeals to this court, Baker v. State, 367 Md. 648, 790
A.2d 629 (2002) (“Baker II”), this Court was presented with the question of whether the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct.
2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), made “‘Maryland’s death penalty statute . . . unconstitutional
because it provides that a sentence of death may be imposed if the State proves only that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of
-14-
the evidence.’” Baker II, 367 Md. at 676, 790 A.2d at 645.  We held that it did not, finding
specifically that Apprendi did not apply to the Maryland capital sentencing scheme.  This
conclusion was based on this Court’s finding that, unlike the defendant in Apprendi, Baker
could not be said to have had his penalty enhanced beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum.  As we stated in Baker II:
“[u]pon the State proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the elements of first
degree murder, including any aggravating circumstances that make the
defendant eligible for the death penalty, the statutory maximum penalty is
death; this maximum statutory sentence of the death penalty cannot logically
and possibly be enhanced, whether by a judge or jury.  Death simply is not an
enhancement of death.”
Baker II, 367 Md. at 679, 790 A.2d at 647.  Notwithstanding our holding in Baker II,
however, Baker in this appeal contends that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), a decision by the
Supreme Court that clarified certain ambiguous aspects of its earlier Apprendi decision,
effectively overruled this Court’s decision in Baker II and makes the statutory
“preponderance of the evidence” test, which is used in weighing aggravating and mitigating
factors in the sentencing proceeding, unconstitutional. 
Baker’s claim that Ring has made the use of a preponderance of the evidence test
when weighing aggravating and mitigating factors unconstitutional has already been
addressed by this Court.  In Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 835 A.2d 1105 (2003) (“Oken IV”),
Oken, who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death, presented to this Court the
10In all, four questions were presented to this Court by Oken in that particular appeal,
Oken’s fourth before this Court.  See Oken IV, 378 Md. at 183, 835 A.2d at 1107.  Our
opinion only addressed this first question presented, however, “[b]ecause . . . we find that
Ring bears no adverse implications for the Maryland death penalty statute, we do not reach
[Oken’s] other issues.”  Id. at 186, 835 A.2d at 1109 (alteration added).
-15-
following question,10 virtually identical to that brought by Baker in the appeal now before
us:
“I.
Whether, in light of Ring v. Arizona, this Court should overrule
Borchardt v. State[, 367 Md. 91, 786 A.2d 631 (2001),] and hold that
the Maryland death penalty statute is unconstitutional on its face
because it provides that a sentence of death may be imposed if the State
proves only that the aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating
factors by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Oken IV, 378 Md. at 185, 835 A.2d at 1108 (alteration added).
Additionally, the appeal in the case sub judice also bears a striking similarity to that
brought by Oken in that, like Baker, Oken’s appeal directly followed an earlier appeal in
which he had argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi invalidated the
preponderance of the evidence test as it related to the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating factors in the sentencing proceeding.  Oken v. State, 367 Md. 191, 786 A.2d 691
(2001) (“Oken III”).  We did not agree with Oken’s Apprendi-based contention in that case,
finding, based on our earlier decision in Borchardt, which we found to be controlling, “that
Apprendi does not serve to invalidate the Maryland death penalty law-that, whether good
policy or bad, the legislative judgment to establish preponderance as the standard for
weighing aggravating factors against mitigating factors does not constitute a violation of due
11As with Baker in this present appeal, Oken’s 2003 appeal originated from the filing
of a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence and/or Motion for New Sentencing Based Upon
Mistake or Irregularity.”  Oken IV, 378 Md. at 184, 835 A.2d at 1107-08.  Oken, in that
appeal, claimed “that his death sentence . . . is illegal and irregular, as those terms are used
in Maryland Rule 4-345, because Maryland’s death penalty statute unconstitutionally
provides for the imposition of the death sentence if the sentencing authority determines, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating
circumstances.”  Id. at 184-85, 835 A.2d 1108 (footnote omitted).
-16-
process of law.”  Oken III, 367 Md. at 197-98, 786 A.2d 694.
As stated, Oken, in 2003, brought a fourth appeal before this Court, this time based
on the contention that “Borchardt has been overruled by Ring and, therefore, the Circuit
Court judge erred when he declined to invalidate[11] Oken’s sentence of death.”  Oken IV,
378 Md. at 185, 835 A.2d at 1108 (footnote added).  As with his earlier Apprendi-based
argument for invalidating the Maryland death penalty law, we found that Oken’s argument
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Ring invalidated the death penalty law, specifically the
use of a preponderance of the evidence standard for weighing aggravating factors against
mitigating factors, was without merit.  See also Miller v. State, 380 Md. 1, 20-21, 843 A.2d
803, 815 (2004) (stating that, “[a]s expressed . . . in Oken . . . Apprendi and Ring do not
render the preponderance standard, applied only to the judgmental weighing process and not
to any fact actually deducible from evidence, unconstitutional.”)  
Assuming arguendo that the circuit court did balance aggravating and mitigating
factors prior to sentencing, our holding in Oken IV controls and would be dispositive in this
12Baker admits as much in his brief before this Court, stating the only possible attack
that he can avail himself of in respect to the Oken IV decision and its controlling effect on
his appeal is that Oken IV “was wrongly decided and should be overruled.”  We decline to
overrule Oken IV.
-17-
case.12  Because, on the basis of Oken IV, we reject Baker’s first contention, we need not
further address any of his other arguments. 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR HARFORD COUNTY
AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY
PETITIONER.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
No. 14
September Term, 2004
Wesley Eugene Baker
v.
State of Maryland
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Concurring opinion by Raker, J., 
which  Bell, C.J. and Greene, J., join.
 
Filed:    October 8, 2004
Raker, J., concurring, in which Bell, C.J., and Greene, J., join:
I would affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Harford County denying Baker’s
Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.  Baker’s sentence is neither a mistake nor irregular under
Md. Rule 4-345.
Baker claims that he was denied due process under the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  He relies on Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002) and Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000).  Ring and Apprendi are
not implicated in Baker’s case because the weighing standard of aggravating circumstances
versus mitigating circumstances of  the Maryland death penalty statute was never triggered.
Judge Whitfill, the sentencing authority in Baker’s case, found no mitigators had been
proven.  Accordingly, there was nothing to weigh in determining the appropriate sentence
to be imposed; under the Maryland statutory scheme, the required sentence was death.  He
is entitled to no relief on this ground.  See Baker v. State, 367 Md. 648, 790 A.2d 629
(2002), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1050, 122 S. Ct. 1815, 152 L. Ed. 2d 817 (2002).
Baker’s claim that his waiver of jury sentencing was not knowing or voluntary and
was therefore ineffective is meritless also.  Judge Whitfill carefully explained Baker’s rights
to him and his waiver was effective.
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Greene have authorized me to state that they join in this
concurring opinion.