Title: COATES v. ANDERSON

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

COATES v. ANDERSON2004 WY 1184 P.3d 953Case Number: 03-84Decided: 02/19/2004
October Term, A.D. 2003

 
 

JUSTIN 
P. COATES, RACHEL L.

COATES, 
and RAK HOLMES COATES,

a 
minor, by and through his next friend,

JUSTIN 
P. COATES,

 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

RON 
ANDERSON, as successor trustee of

DIXIE 
ANDERSON TRUST,

 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

James 
K. Lubing of James K. Lubing Law Office, Jackson, WY.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

James 
E. Phillips and Geoffrey J. Phillips of James E. Phillips, P.C., Evanston, 
WY.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

   LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      In 
this action, appellants Justin P. Coates, Rachel L. Coates, and Rak Holmes 
Coates, a minor, appeal the partial summary judgment entered by the district 
court in favor of appellee Ron Anderson, as successor trustee of the Dixie 
Anderson Trust (Trust).1  Appellants assert the district court 
erred in ruling that Ron Anderson, individually, was acting as an independent 
contractor when he parked a tractor in an allegedly negligent manner which 
caused an accident resulting in appellants' injuries.  Appellants further contend the district 
court erred when it found Ron Anderson was not acting as the successor trustee 
of the Trust when the accident occurred.  
We affirm. 

 

 

 

[¶2]      Appellants set 
forth the following issues on appeal:

 

1.  Did the 
district court err in finding that no genuine issues of material fact existed 
and in ruling as a matter of law that Dixie Anderson as Trustee of the Dixie 
Anderson Trust was not vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of Ron 
Anderson?

 

2.  Did 
the district court err in refusing to find that a genuine issue of material fact 
existed as to whether, under the terms of the Illa Dixie Anderson Trust 
Agreement, Dixie Anderson had failed to serve as Trustee so that Ron Anderson 
had become successor Trustee of the Dixie Anderson Trust?

 

 

 

[¶3]      On February 8, 
2000, around 6:30 p.m., Rachel L. Coates was driving on Wyoming State Highway 
237 in Lincoln County, Wyoming, with passengers Justin P. Coates, her husband, 
and Rak Holmes Coates, her son, when their vehicle collided with a parked 
tractor owned by Ron Anderson. This accident caused appellants to incur 
substantial injuries.  Subsequently 
appellants filed a complaint against Ron Anderson, individually, but then later 
amended their complaint to also include the Trust.  The amended complaint alleged that the 
Trust was vicariously liable for appellants' damages because Ron Anderson was 
acting as an agent of the Trust under the doctrine of respondeat superior or, 
alternatively, under a de facto partnership with the Trust.  

 

[¶4]      After discovery 
was conducted, the Trust filed a motion for summary judgment that was opposed by 
appellants.  The district court 
granted this motion stating:

 

Viewing the 
evidence most favorably to the Plaintiff[s], the Court finds no evidence which 
would create an inference to support the Plaintiff[s'] respondeat superior claim 
that the Defendant, Ron Anderson, was acting on behalf of Dixie Anderson or the 
Trust as trustee or manager or that Ron Anderson was a partner with Dixie 
Anderson or the Trust when the collision occurred involving Mr. Anderson's 
tractor and the Plaintiffs' vehicle.

 

            
The undisputed facts are that Defendant's mother, Dixie Anderson as 
trustee, allowed him to use the trust property as part of his ranching operation 
and received, in return, care taken of the property and sporadic payment 
depending on the crops.  There is no 
evidence of Mrs. Anderson exercising control over the Defendant Ron Anderson's 
conduct of the operations, or of her assuming duties with respect to safety or 
of them having an employment contract.  
Mr. Anderson's payment to Mrs. Anderson for the use of the land and 
taking care of the property is more like a lease or license than a partnership 
because there is no showing of an agreement to share profits and losses.  Mr. Anderson was driving the tractor for 
his own purposes of feeding his livestock and had parked it on the highway where 
the collision occurred.

 

This appeal 
followed. 

 

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶5]      We recently 
reiterated our long-standing standard of review in summary judgment cases in 
Polo Ranch Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 15, ¶8, 61 P.3d 1255, ¶8  (Wyo. 2003) (citing Amoco Prod. Co. 
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 154,  ¶10, 55 P.3d 1246, ¶10 (Wyo. 2002) and 
Bevan v. Fix, 2002 WY 43, ¶13, 42 P.3d 1013, ¶13 (Wyo. 
2002)):

 

            
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, reveals that no genuine issues of material 
fact exist and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Worley v. Wyoming Bottling 
Co., Inc., 1 P.3d 615, 620 (Wyo. 2000); Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc., 
947 P.2d 273, 275 (Wyo. 1997); Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 934 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Wyo. 1997); W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A fact is material if it establishes or 
refutes an essential element of a claim or defense.  Tidwell v. HOM, Inc., 896 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Wyo. 1995).  In 
evaluating summary judgment, we apply the same standards as the trial court, 
without affording any defer­ence to the trial court's decisions on issues of 
law.  Wilder v. Cody Country 
Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 216 (Wyo. 1994).

 

We 
may uphold the grant of summary judgment upon any proper legal ground finding 
support in the record.  Polo 
Ranch Co., at ¶8; Bevan, at ¶26.

 

            
Little mystery remains concerning our willingness to affirm summary 
judgments, provided there is no genuine issue of material fact and the law 
clearly entitles the moving party to prevail.  Martin v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 894 P.2d 618, 620 (Wyo. 1995).  
. . . 

 

            
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie 
case for summary judgment. Thereafter, the party opposing summary judgment 
becomes obliged to marshal specific facts, as contrasted with general or 
conclusory allegations, which establish a genuine issue of material fact.  Tidwell v. HOM, Inc., 896 P.2d 1322, 
1324-25 (Wyo. 1995).  

 

A 
material fact has been defined as one having some legal significance, that is, 
under the law applicable to a given case, it would control in some way the legal 
relations of the parties; as one upon which the outcome of litigation depends in 
whole or in part; as one on which the controversy may be determined; as one 
which will affect the result or outcome of the case depending upon its 
resolution; and one which constitutes a part of the plaintiff's cause of action 
or of the defendant's defense. 

 

Mize 
v. North Big Horn Hosp. Dist., 
931 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Johnson v. Soulis, 542 P.2d 867, 871-72 
(Wyo. 1975) (footnotes omitted)).

 

 

 

Independent 
Contractor

 

[¶6]      Initially, 
appellants 
argue the Trust did not establish the lack of genuine issues of material fact as 
to whether an independent contractor relationship existed between Ron Anderson 
and the Trust.  Citing our holding 
in Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034, 1042-43 (Wyo. 
1978) as authority, appellants contend that the Trust failed to present 
sufficient evidence proving that 1) the Trust did not have the right to control 
the details of Ron Anderson's work, and 2) the Trust did not retain the right to 
terminate Ron Anderson without incurring liability.  Therefore, appellants assert that the 
district court incorrectly granted summary judgment in favor of the Trust. 

 

[¶7]      In Natural Gas 
Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Wyo. 1994), this court clearly 
adopted the general proposition set forth in the Restatement, Second, Torts 
§ 409 (1965), that an employer of an independent contractor is not liable 
for physical harm to another caused by an act or omission of the contractor or 
his servants.  See also Hill v. 
Pacific Power & Light Co., 765 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Wyo. 1988); 
Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1176 (Wyo. 
1989); Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890, 898 (Wyo. 1986); 
Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., 713 P.2d 160, 164-67 (Wyo. 1986); and 41 
Am.Jur.2d, Independent Contractors § 24 (1968).  Thus, with respect to vicarious 
liability, the controlling question is whether or not Ron Anderson was an 
independent contractor of the Trust.  
See Stephenson, at 1176; Noonan, at 165.  We stated in Noonan, at 166 
(quoting Simpson v. Home Petroleum Corp., 770 F.2d 499, 506-7 (5th Cir. 1985)):

 

[T]he 
existence of a master-servant relationship is a necessary part of the 
plaintiff's case when recovery is sought on a respondeat superior theory, and in 
that regard "the essential inquiry is whether or not the employer has the 
contract right to control the opposite contracting party in the details of the 
work to be performed." [Citation.]  
Such a right to control is a prerequisite of the master-servant 
relationship.  Conversely, the 
absence of such a right of control is a prerequisite of an independent 
contractor relationship.  
Master-servant and independent contractor are thus opposite sides of the 
same coin; one cannot be both at the same time with respect to the same 
activity; the one necessarily negatives the other, each depending on opposite 
answers to the same right of control inquiry.

 

[¶8]      In determining 
whether an independent contractor relationship exists, this court has recognized 
two primary areas for consideration.  
The premier consideration is whether the employer has the right to 
control the details of the work wherein liability is sought to be 
established.  Ordinarily this is a 
question of fact for the jury but becomes one of law when only one inference can 
be drawn.  Combined Ins., at 
1042; Noonan, at 165-67.  

 

            
In addition to the right of control, another test (or perhaps an indicia 
of the right-of-control test) is said to be whether the right to terminate the 
employment is retained and can be exercised without incurring liability.  In Fox Park Timber Company v. 
Baker, [84 P.2d 736 (Wyo. 1938)], and repeated in Brubaker v. Glenrock 
Lodge [Int'l Order of Odd Fellows, 526 P.2d 52 (Wyo. 1974)], we 
said:

 

. . . 
Another test is whether either of the parties possesses the right to terminate 
the services at will without incurring liability to the other, this embracing, 
of course, the right of the employer at any time to discharge the party 
performing the work, an affirmative answer establishing the status of master and 
servant.

 

Combined 
Ins., 
at 1042-43.

 

[¶9]      The evidence 
reviewed by the district court was that contained within the affidavit and 
deposition testimony of Dixie Anderson and the deposition testimony of Ron 
Anderson.  This testimony 
established that, in 1997, the Trust was established and acreage with a house 
and approximately 300 acres of ranch land were deeded to the Trust.  Dixie Anderson was appointed as the 
trustee for the Trust.  Dixie 
Anderson's five children, including Ron Anderson, were named beneficiaries of 
the Trust and were to share equally in the Trust property after Dixie Anderson's 
death.  At the time of the accident, 
Dixie Anderson lived by herself and worked part time for a meat packing 
plant.  She also received social 
security.  Further, the Trust owned 
no livestock and did not utilize the Trust property for income production 
purposes.  

 

[¶10]   From the time of his father's 
death, Ron Anderson, under an oral agreement, helped his mother Dixie Anderson 
with the ranch land as a "caretaker."  
This work entailed primarily the fixing of fences, minor repairs, tearing 
down structures, some irrigation work, and generally looking out for the 
security of the land.  In performing 
these tasks, Ron Anderson used his own tools.  Ron Anderson was not paid by the Trust 
for his services nor did the Trust instruct him on safety or control his 
activities.  Rather, Ron Anderson 
acted independently and ran his own cattle on the ranch land.  From time to time, Ron Anderson paid the 
Trust for feed and hay depending on the hay yield on the ranch land.  

 

[¶11]   The tractor involved in the 
accident was the sole property of Ron Anderson.  The accident did not occur on Trust 
property.  At the time of the 
accident, Ron Anderson was tending to his own business affairs regarding his 
cattle.  The Trust was not involved 
with Ron Anderson's cattle business and did not share in any profits made on his 
cattle operation.  Finally, Dixie 
Anderson testified that the Trust did not have any employees. 

 

[¶12]   Given this testimony, the Trust met 
its burden of proof that, at a minimum, an independent contractor relationship 
existed between Ron Anderson and the Trust. The burden then shifted to 
appellants to present the district court with established facts refuting the 
Trust's initial summary judgment showing.  
However, appellants did not submit any facts to the district court 
showing that the Trust retained control over Ron Anderson concerning the work he 
performed for the Trust.  
Appellants, therefore, failed to refute the Trust's summary judgment 
showing, and no genuine issue of material fact existed making summary judgment 
in favor of the Trust proper. 

 

[¶13]   Appellants merely argue that the 
true issue is not whether the Trust actually exhibited control over Ron 
Anderson, but whether the Trust could have exhibited control over him.  Thus, appellants proffer that all the 
Trust was able to establish was that the Trust never exercised control over Ron 
Anderson's activities, not that the Trust did not have any such right.  However, we recognized long ago in 
Stockwell v. Morris, 22 P.2d 189, 194 (Wyo. 1933):

 

            
In this view, then, that the right of control of the physical 
movementsthe automobileis the decisive inquiry, it becomes important what the 
record discloses in that regard. The evidence shows that the Maytag Company 
furnished Morris no rules or regulations to govern him in the performance of the 
work but that the means and manner thereof was left to him. That, perhaps, does 
not definitely show that the right of control was not in the company.  The fact that the company did not 
exercise control does not show that it did not have the right of control, though 
it may be some evidence thereof.  It 
has been held that in the absence of a stipulation the existence or nonexistence 
of the right must be determined by reasonable inferences shown by the 
evidence.  Press Pub. Co. v. Acc. 
Comm., 190 Cal. 114, 210 P. 820; May v. Farrell, 94 Cal. App. 703, 
271 P. 789.  Among the points 
frequently taken into consideration is the fact of the right of discharge. 14 
R.C.L. 72.  But we take it that that 
right exists in the vast majority of cases of the character under consideration. 
And it has been said that it is not, by the later cases, considered any decisive 
test.  Leech v. Timber 
Company, [297 P. 203 (Wash. 1931)].  
In the case just cited the court said that "there is no evidence showing 
nor evidence from which it may be reasonably inferred that appellant had any 
control or supervision of Jones in the operation of the car or the manner in 
which delivery of the tools was to be effected," and therefore held Jones to be 
an independent contractor.  In 
General Exchange Ins. Co. v. Findlay, 219 Ala. 193, 121 So. 710, the 
court seems to hold that unless an express reservation of the right of control 
may be inferred from the evidence, none can be held to exist.  And in McCarthy v. Souther, [137 A. 445 (N.H. 1927)], in which there was no evidence as to the right of control, 
the New Hampshire court holds that the mere fact that the service performed by a 
salesman is in the furtherance of the employer's business is not enough, and 
that when no right of control may be implied from the situation, and none has 
been expressly reserved, the mere fact that the relationship is of agency or 
service is not enough to subject the employer to liability. 

 

We 
find no reason to depart from this well expressed legal analysis of Justice 
Blume, especially in this case where the undisputed facts establish that 1) the 
tractor was personally owned by Ron Anderson, 2) Ron Anderson was tending to his 
business concerning his cattle at the time of the accident, and 3) no 
employer/employee relationship can be shown to exist between the Trust and Ron 
Anderson.  There is no evidence 
showing nor evidence from which it may be reasonably inferred that the Trust 
could have controlled or supervised Ron Anderson in the operation of the tractor 
or the manner in which he performed services for the Trust.  Accordingly, it was proper as a matter 
of law for the district court to conclude that Ron Anderson was an independent 
contractor.  Unless an express 
reservation of the right of control may be inferred from the evidence, none can 
be held to exist. 

 

[¶14]   Appellants further argue that the 
Trust did not satisfactorily establish the existence of any contract or the 
terms of that contract defining the relationship between Ron Anderson and the 
Trust. Accordingly, appellants contend that it is impossible for the district 
court to have been able to characterize whether Ron Anderson was acting as an 
independent contractor or employee of the Trust.  Appellants wrongfully conclude that only 
a written contract can provide evidence of the relationship between the Trust 
and Ron Anderson.  Obviously, such 
is not the case.  Indeed, this court 
has often utilized both the terms of a contract, whether written or oral, and 
other evidence of the control exercised to determine the relationship that 
existed between parties. As stated in Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 
at 1184-85:

 

            
Our first area of inquiry would ordinarily be to the written contract 
between NGP and TWS.  Although the 
contract is not conclusive evidence of the status of the relationship between 
parties, it is a strong indication of the association intended.  See Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 165.   In this case, however, no written 
contract exists. Duane Winkler testified that NGP does not normally enter into 
written agreements with workover companies, and did not enter into a written 
contract with TWS.  We, therefore, 
must look to the record to determine whether NGP controlled, or had a right to 
control, TWS' performance sufficient to establish a duty to TWS' (an independent 
contractor's) employees.  

 

In 
a like manner, because there was no written contract in this case, it became 
necessary for the district court to look at the undisputed evidence to determine 
whether the Trust controlled or had the right to control Ron Anderson's 
performance of services for the Trust. 

 

Agency

 

[¶15]   Appellants very summarily proffer 
that the evidence presented creates a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether Ron Anderson was acting as an agent of the Trust at the time of the 
accident.  We do not find 
appellants' argument persuasive.  
The undisputed evidence established that Ron Anderson acted as an 
independent contractor for the Trust.  
At the time of the accident, Dixie Anderson was the appointed trustee for 
the Trust and in such capacity was the sole person responsible for any formal 
actions taken by the Trust.  
Moreover, the tractor involved in the accident was the sole property of 
Ron Anderson and, at the time of the accident, Ron Anderson was tending his own 
business affairs regarding his cattle.  
Therefore, the undisputed facts establish that Ron Anderson was not 
acting as an agent for the Trust when the accident 
occurred.

 

[¶16]   Similarly, no de facto partnership 
existed between the Trust and Ron Anderson.  As recognized by the district court, the 
evidence presented established that Ron 
Anderson's sporadic payments to the Trust for the use of the land and taking 
care of the Trust property is more like a lease or license than a partnership 
because there is no showing of an agreement to share profits and losses. 
The 
Trust was not involved with Ron Anderson's cattle business and did not share in 
any profits made on his cattle operation.  

 

Successor 
Trustee

 

[¶17]   Appellants briefly contend that 
genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether Dixie Anderson had failed 
to serve as trustee of the Trust, so that Ron Anderson had become successor 
trustee of the Trust and was acting in such official capacity at the time of the 
accident.  Again, we find this 
argument unpersuasive.  The only 
evidence before the district court established that, in 1997, the Trust was 
established by Dixie Anderson, and acreage with a house and approximately 300 
acres of ranch land were deeded to the Trust.  Dixie Anderson was then appointed as the 
trustee for the Trust.  Dixie 
Anderson's five children, including Ron Anderson, were named beneficiaries of 
the Trust and were to share equally in the Trust property after Dixie Anderson's 
death.  

 

[¶18]   At the time of the accident, Dixie 
Anderson was the appointed trustee of the Trust and in such capacity was the 
sole person responsible for any formal actions taken by the Trust.  As trustee of the Trust, Dixie Anderson 
had the power to "hold, manage, invest and reinvest the trust estate."  She also had the express powers to 
retain, sell, transfer, exchange, convert or otherwise dispose of, invest and 
reinvest, insure or not insure, lease, possess, manage, develop, subdivide, 
control, partition, mortgage, or otherwise deal with any and all property held 
within the Trust.  Indeed, the Trust 
gave Dixie Anderson, as trustee, the power to make repairs, replacements and 
improvements, structural or otherwise, or abandon the property of the Trust if 
deemed to be worthless or not of sufficient value to warrant keeping or 
protecting it.  These powers further 
included the right to fail to pay taxes, water rents, assessments, repairs, 
maintenance and upkeep on the Trust property and to even convey the property for 
nominal consideration or without any consideration.  Thus, Dixie Anderson, as the appointed 
trustee of the Trust, had broadly enumerated powers to administer the Trust 
within her discretion.  Furthermore, 
the Trust iterated that in the event that Dixie Anderson, as the appointed 
trustee of the Trust, resigned or failed to serve for any reason, Ron Anderson 
would be appointed successor trustee of the Trust.  For such purposes, failure to serve 
included, without limitation, death or incapacity.  

 

[¶19]   Appellants failed to marshal 
any specific facts, as contrasted with general or conclusory allegations, to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact which established that Dixie Anderson, as 
trustee of the Trust, failed to serve in such capacity requiring Ron Anderson to 
be appointed a successor trustee at the time that the accident occurred.  Appellants merely proffer accusations of 
Dixie Anderson's failure to properly act as trustee for the Trust with no basis 
in fact and then summarily conclude that Ron Anderson therefore must be assumed 
to have succeeded his mother as trustee of the Trust.  Such allegations alone are insufficient 
to raise a material question of fact. 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶20]   For those reasons indicated above, 
we hold that no material questions of fact existed in this case and that the 
Trust, as a matter of law, was entitled to summary judgment.  We, therefore, affirm the district 
court's ruling granting summary judgment in favor of the Trust.

 

FOOTNOTES

1On 
April 26, 2003, during this appeal, Dixie Anderson died.  Ron Anderson, as successor trustee of 
the Trust, was substituted as a party in this case.