Title: Lacombe v. City of Cheyenne

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Lacombe v. City of Cheyenne1987 WY 22733 P.2d 601Case Number: 86-51Decided: 03/02/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
LARRY J. LACOMBE, 
APPELLANT (APPELLANT-DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE CITY OF 
CHEYENNE, 
APPELLEE (APPELLEE-PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

 
 
James W. Gusea, Vines, 
Rideout, Gusea & White, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

 
 
Danny S. Wilde, Asst. 
City Atty., Cheyenne, for appellee.

 
 
Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

 
 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     At issue in this case 
is whether a stipulation setting forth the traditional plea bargaining practice 
in the Municipal Court of the City of Cheyenne is sufficient to afford standing 
to Larry J. LaCombe to challenge the constitutionality of § 31-5-233(h), W.S. 
1977, Nov. 1984 Replacement. The Municipal Court of the City of Cheyenne denied 
a motion for a declaratory judgment which challenged the constitutionality of 
the statute and found Larry J. LaCombe guilty of the offense of driving while 
under the influence of intoxicating beverages in violation of § 31-5-233, W.S. 
1977, as adopted by the City of Cheyenne Municipal Ordinance No. 28-2. An appeal 
was taken to the District Court of the First Judicial District in and for 
LaramieCounty, and the conviction 
was affirmed. We conclude that LaCombe does not enjoy standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of this statute on the premise that it violates the separation 
of powers doctrine, and we dismiss this appeal without addressing other 
contentions.

 
 

[¶2.]     In his brief Larry J. 
LaCombe asserts the following issues:

 
 
"I. Does Section 
31-5-233(h) W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1986) violate the separation of powers mandated 
by Article 2, Section 1 of the Wyoming Constitution?

 
 
"Argument 1: Appellant 
has standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 31-5-233(h) W.S. 1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1986).

 
 
"Argument 2: Section 
31-5-233(h) W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1986) violates the separation of powers 
mandated by Article 2 Section 1 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 
 
"Argument 3: The 
unconstitutionality of Section 31-5-233(h) W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1986) applies to 
prosecutions in municipal courts."

 
 
This appeal is defended 
by the City of Cheyenne which articulates the questions in 
this way:

 
 
"Issue I: Does Section 
31-5-233(h) W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1985) violate the separation of powers mandated 
by Article 7, Section 1, of the Wyoming Constitution?

 
 
"Argument I: Section 
31-5-233(h) W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1985) does not violate the separation of powers 
mandated by Article 2, Section 1, of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 
 
"Argument II: The issue 
of constitutionality of Section 31-5-233(h) W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1985) does not 
apply to prosecutions in municipal courts."

 
 

[¶3.]     On September 10, 1984, 
LaCombe was arrested by an officer of the Police Department of the City of 
Cheyenne and charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating 
beverages in violation of § 31-5-233, W.S. 1977, as adopted by the City of 
Cheyenne in Ordinance No. 28-2, and careless driving proscribed by § 28-184 of 
the ordinances of the City of Cheyenne. LaCombe pleaded not guilty to both 
charges, and the case was set for trial. LaCombe then filed a motion for 
declaratory judgment in which he asserted that the state statute which had been 
adopted by Ordinance No. 28-2 of the City of Cheyenne is unconstitutional. He contended that 
§ 31-5-233(h), W.S. 1977, inhibits the authority of the prosecuting attorney to 
enter into plea bargains which is an unconstitutional invasion by the 
legislative branch of government of the prerogatives of the executive branch in 
violation of Article 2, Section 1 of the Wyoming Constitution. Thereafter, 
briefs were filed on behalf of LaCombe and the City. In addition, a stipulation 
was made by the City of Cheyenne and LaCombe which provided in 
operative part as follows:

 
 
"1. The Defendant, Larry 
J. LaCombe, was arrested and charged with the offense of Driving While Under the 
Influence of alcohol contrary to W.S. 31-5-233 and Cheyenne Municipal Ordinance 
28-2.

 
 
"2. The record of the 
Defendant herein reflects no previous convictions for violations of said W.S. 
31-5-233 or Cheyenne Municipal Ordinance 28-2.

 
 
"3. Prior to the 
effective date of enrolled Act No. 30, 47th Legislature of the State of Wyoming, 
1984, Budget Session, the Defendant herein would have routinely been allowed to 
plead guilty to the charge of careless driving, pay a substantial fine and 
receive a suspended jail term conditioned upon no further alcohol related 
offenses for a period of one (1) year and in return therefore the charge of 
D.W.U.I. under W.S. 31-5-233 and Municipal Ordinance 28-2 would have been 
dismissed.

 
 
"4. As a result of the 
enactment of W.S. 31-5-233(h) the prosecuting attorney for the City of Cheyenne 
is prohibited from reducing or dismissing a charge of D.W.U.I. unless said 
attorney in open court moves or files a statement to reduce the charge or 
dismiss, with supporting facts, stating that there is insufficient evidence to 
sustain the charge.

 
 
"5. But for the enactment 
of said W.S. 31-5-233(h) the Defendant herein would have been allowed to enter 
into an agreement as discussed in paragraph 3 above and the charge of Driving 
While Under the Influence of alcohol contrary to W.S. 31-5-233 and Municipal 
Ordinance 28-2 would have been dismissed."

 
 

[¶4.]     After trial on the 
merits, the Municipal Court of the City of Cheyenne denied LaCombe's motion for 
declaratory judgment, found him guilty of both charges and fined him $240 plus 
$10 in court costs. LaCombe then appealed to the district court alleging error 
in the failure of the municipal court "to declare W.S. Section 31-5-233(h) 
unconstitutional as an impermissible intrusion by the Legislative branch of 
government into the scope of the Executive branch in violation of Article 2, 
Section 1 of the Constitution for the State of Wyoming." The district court 
decided the appeal by a letter to counsel in which that court affirmed the 
convictions. The district court ruled that the separation of powers doctrine 
does not extend to municipalities and furthermore that the city prosecutor was 
not an extension of the executive arm of the state. The district court concluded 
that the appellant had failed to meet his burden of proof to overcome the 
presumption of constitutionality accorded to the statute and affirmed his 
conviction.

 
 

[¶5.]     The decision of the 
district court was filed prior to the decision of this court in Gooden v. State, 
Wyo., 711 P.2d 405 (1985). We held in that case that the defendant did not have standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of § 31-5-233(h), W.S. 1977, because her 
argument that it inhibited prosecutorial discretion which infringed upon the 
separation of powers doctrine did not demonstrate an adverse impact upon her 
rights. LaCombe seeks to distinguish that case by focusing upon the comment in 
the opinion of the court to the effect that nothing appeared in the record or in 
the briefs to suggest that the prosecutor had any desire to enter into any plea 
bargain with Gooden. Pointing to the stipulation which is quoted above, LaCombe 
contends that he has provided the requisite factual basis for asserting 
infringement upon his rights by this statute.

 
 

[¶6.]     LaCombe's contention is 
not well taken. It simply ignores the point that this court went on to make in 
Gooden v. State, supra, to the effect that the law does not vest in any criminal 
defendant any right to a plea bargain. Our conclusion in Gooden v. State, supra, 
was that whether the statute was unconstitutional was a matter which Gooden 
could not raise because, lacking a right to a plea bargain, she had no personal 
stake in any unconstitutional infringement by the statute upon the discretion of 
the prosecutor.

 
 

[¶7.]     We conclude that 
LaCombe lacks standing to present the contention which he argues in his brief. 
Apparently the City of Cheyenne would like to have the constitutional 
matter resolved, because it chose to concede standing and argue the case on the 
merits. We do not permit parties to confer standing by agreement, and our 
decision is that this appeal must be dismissed.

 
 

[¶8.]     Because we dismiss for 
lack of standing by the appellant to present his claims, we have no occasion to 
consider the unconstitutionality of § 31-5-233(h), W.S. 1977, nor the claim that 
such unconstitutionality would have efficacy at the municipal government level. 
The appeal is dismissed.

 
 

URBIGKIT, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶9.]     I 
dissent.

 
 

[¶10.]  The majority say that because plea 
bargaining is within the discretion of the prosecutor, the defendant has no 
interest in the existence of that discretion. Sometimes an expressed corollary 
is actually an illogical assumption. By necessity and operational propriety, the 
established principle determines that prosecutorial discretion includes choice 
or denial of plea bargaining. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S. Ct. 837, 51 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1977); 
Johnson v. Mabry, 707 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds 467 U.S. 504, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1984). It does not follow that a defendant lacks a real interest in the 
availability of that discretion. Nor am I forced to conclude that either the 
legislature can constitutionally deny that discretion or the charged defendant 
lacks interest and consequent standing to make an equal-protection or 
due-process constitutional challenge to the legislative disembowelment of that 
discretion.

 
 

[¶11.]  The reasoning of the majority can be 
stated as effectuating one of the classical legal 
fallacies:

 
 
Prosecutors have 
plea-bargaining discretion; they may exercise that discretion unfavorably to me; 
therefore, I have no opportunity interest in their retention of the 
discretion.

 
 
I suggest the following 
reasoning:

 
 
Prosecutors have 
plea-bargaining discretion; they may exercise that discretion favorably to me; 
therefore, I have a specific opportunity interest in their retention of the 
discretion.

 
 

[¶12.]  The problem of the availability of plea 
bargaining is broader than constitutional tests of separation-of-powers 
legislation wherein the legislature may unintentionally ignore Art. 2 of the 
Wyoming 
Constitution. The availability of plea bargaining also touches upon the right to 
effective representation where that service is often most critical - in the 
discussion of the early-disposition plea-bargained 
settlement.

 
 
"* * * The plea bargain 
stage is a critical point in a criminal proceeding, at which an accused's sixth 
amendment right to competent counsel has attached." State v. Kraus, Iowa, 397 N.W.2d 671, 673 
(1986).

 
 

[¶13.]  The volume of critical review of plea 
bargaining is extensive in library critique, and was well recited by the 
majority and by Justice Douglas concurring in 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971):

 
 
"* * * The disposition of 
criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes 
loosely called `plea bargaining,' is an essential component of the 
administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If 
every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the 
Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and 
court facilities. "Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an 
essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons. It 
leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids 
much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement 
for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from 
those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on 
pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it 
enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they 
are ultimately imprisoned." 404 U.S.  at 260-261, 92 S. Ct.  at 498. 
"These `plea bargains' are important in the administration of justice both at 
the state and at the federal levels and, as The Chief Justice says, they serve 
an important role in the disposition of today's heavy calendars." 404 U.S.  at 264, 92 S. Ct.  at 499-500, 
Douglas, J., concurring.

 
 

[¶14.]  Despite the pathway pursued by this court 
first in Gooden v. State, Wyo., 711 P.2d 405 (1985), and in this case, I do not 
concur with the supposition that an accused lacks standing to present the 
constitutional issues involved in the criminal proceeding under the 
separation-of-powers criteria of Art. 2 of the Wyoming Constitution. This view is related to 
that stated in dissent to Duffy v. State, Wyo., 730 P.2d 754 (1986). There, I contend 
that the judiciary invaded the proper provinces of the legislative and executive 
branches of government. Here, the legislature may have unconstitutionally 
intruded upon judicial functions by attempting to regulate the prosecutor's 
discretion in the performance of his assigned governmental responsibility in the 
criminal process.

 
 

[¶15.]  I do not now presuppose what this court's 
decision should be were we to examine the plea-bargain prohibition enacted into 
§ 31-5-233(h), W.S. 1977 in light of constitutional constraints on legislative 
power. See Petition of Padget, Wyo., 
678 P.2d 870 (1984). However, under the facts of this case, I would find the 
defendant to have standing, based on his conviction, to obtain this court's 
consideration of this constitutional issue, pursuant to our responsibilities 
under Art. 2, and Art. 5, §§ 1 and 2 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 
 

[¶16.]  Rather than dismissing the appeal for 
lack of standing, I would consider the case on its merits, and would resolve the 
substantial issue of potential legislative incursion into the powers and 
responsibilities of the judicial branch of Wyoming 
government.