Title: SHANE CODY WALLACE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SHANE CODY WALLACE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 152221 P.3d 967Case Number: No. S-09-0060Decided: 12/14/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
SHANE 
CODY WALLACE,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and Kirk A. 
Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender 
Program

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Graham M. 
Smith, Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Shane Cody 
Wallace appeals the district court's finding that a deputy did not lack 
reasonable suspicion to detain him and his vehicle for a dog sniff.  Arguing only under the United States 
Constitution, Wallace contends that the deputy impermissibly expanded the scope 
of an otherwise lawful stop by requesting the narcotic detection dog.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Wallace states 
the single issue as follows:

 
 
Mr. 
Wallace's Fourth Amendment Rights were violated when law enforcement extended a 
traffic stop without reasonable suspicion.

 
 
The 
State posits the issue this way:

 
 
Thirteen 
minutes is not an unreasonable amount of time to write two traffic 
tickets.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On March 31, 
2008, just before midnight, Campbell County Deputy Sheriff Stinson observed that 
Wallace's vehicle had a broken taillight, and subsequently stopped the 
vehicle.  As he walked to the 
vehicle, Deputy Stinson also noticed that Wallace's rear window was obscured by 
snow.

 
 
[¶4]      The deputy 
contacted Wallace, who was "in a hurry to receive his ticket and leave."  In fact, Wallace requested that he be 
issued a ticket quickly so that he could be on his way.  After requesting the appropriate 
documents, Deputy Stinson returned to his car, contacted dispatch, and learned 
that both Wallace and his passenger had prior drug contacts.  Based on those circumstances, the deputy 
contacted his colleague, Deputy Spencer, and requested he bring his drug dog to 
the scene.  At that point, Deputy 
Stinson began writing Wallace a citation for the obscured rear window and a 
warning ticket for the broken taillight.

 
 
[¶5]      While Deputy 
Stinson wrote the citations, Deputy Spencer arrived with his drug dog.  Approximately seventeen minutes 
into the stop, the drug dog alerted during an exterior sniff of Wallace's 
vehicle.  A subsequent pat down 
search of Wallace produced marijuana.

 
 
[¶6]      After being taken 
into custody, Wallace was charged with one count of possession of marijuana and 
subsequently filed a motion to suppress.  
The district court denied the motion, finding that the deputy had 
reasonable suspicion to detain Wallace.  
The court listed two circumstances of reasonable suspicion upon which the 
deputy relied: 1) both occupants of the vehicle had histories of drug contacts, 
and 2) the driver of the vehicle appeared unnaturally anxious and/or nervous to 
receive his ticket(s) and be on his way.

 
 

[¶7]      Wallace entered a 
conditional guilty plea to the possession charge.  The district court sentenced him to two 
to four years, suspended in favor of five years of supervised probation.  This appeal followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶8]     We recently stated 
in Latta v. State,  2009 WY 35, ¶ 10, 202 P.3d 1069, 
1071 (Wyo. 2009):

 
 

            
In 
reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to 
suppress evidence, we do not interfere with the trial court's 
findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous. We view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination because the trial 
court has an opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess the credibility of 
the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, 
deductions, and conclusions. The constitutionality of a particular search is a 
question of law that we review de novo. Shaw v. State, 2009 WY 18, 
¶ 19, 201 P.3d 1108 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      Wallace claims on 
appeal that his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, was 
violated when Deputy Stinson unlawfully extended the scope and the duration of 
the initial traffic stop without having a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
a crime was occurring.  Wallace 
argues that the facts of his case do not support a finding of reasonable, 
articulable suspicion necessary to expand both the scope and the duration of the 
stop.

 
 
[¶10]   While Wallace focuses his argument 
on reasonable suspicion, the State centers its argument around a United States 
Supreme Court case, Illinois v. Caballes, 
543 U.S. 405, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2005), because, according to the State, the 
initial stop was not prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete 
the issuance of the citations and under Caballes, an exterior sniff of a vehicle 
by a drug dog does not constitute a search.  The State argues that because it took 
only thirteen minutes for the deputy to write two traffic citations, 
during which time the drug dog arrived and was deployed, the duration of the 
traffic stop was not unreasonably extended.  The State submits that this time period 
is within the typical length permitted.

 
 
[¶11]   It is a well-accepted tenet of our 
jurisprudence that we may sustain the decision of the lower tribunal on any 
basis found in the record.  Van 
Order v. State, 600 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Wyo. 1979).  Although the district court found 
reasonable suspicion in this case, and rather than address Wallace's argument 
regarding reasonable suspicion, we will affirm this case on the basis argued by 
the State  that the initial stop was not prolonged beyond the time reasonably 
required by the officer to write the citations, and that an exterior dog sniff 
does not constitute a search.  

 
 
[¶12]   The first clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that " the right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]" United States Const. amend. 
IV.  The protection against 
unreasonable seizures "extend[s] to brief investigatory stops of persons or 
vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest." United States v. Arvizu, 
534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S. Ct. 744, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2002).  Pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), a police officer may 
make a limited investigatory stop in the absence of probable cause if the 
officer has an articulable, reasonable 
suspicion, based upon the totality of the circumstances, that the 
suspect is involved in criminal activity.  
Under those same Terry 
principles, a court must determine whether the detention was reasonable by 
applying a two-part analysis.  
First, this Court considers whether the initial stop was justified, and 
secondly, we determine whether the officer's actions during the detention were 
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first instance." Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, 
¶ 9, 64 P.3d 700, 705 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 223 (Wyo. 1994)). 

 
 
[¶13]   Here, Wallace does not challenge 
the reasonableness of the initial stop.  
Regarding the initial stop, we have stated:

 
 
During 
a routine traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may request a driver's 
license, proof of insurance and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and 
issue a citation.  Campbell, ¶ 12, 97 P.3d  at 785; 
Damato, ¶ 13, 64 P.3d at 706 (citing Burgos-Seberos v. 
State, 969 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Wyo. 1998); United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1997)).  
Generally, the driver must be allowed to proceed on his way without 
further delay once the officer determines the driver has a valid driver's 
license and is entitled to operate the vehicle.  Damato, ¶ 13, 64 P.3d  at 
706; see also United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 945 (10th Cir. 1997); 
Barch, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d  at 832.  
In the absence of consent, an officer may expand the investigative 
detention beyond the purpose of the initial stop only if there exists an " 
objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion' that criminal activity has 
occurred or is occurring." Damato, ¶ 13, 64 P.3d  at 706 (quoting 
United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2001)).  

 
 

Garvin 
v. State, 
2007 WY 190, ¶ 14, 172 P.3d 725, 729 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶14]   This Court has also recognized 
that

 
 
[T]he 
basis for and the circumstances surrounding the stop, rather than an arbitrary 
time limit, govern a stop's permissible length. Hence, a stop's duration and 
whether it was unreasonably extended is analyzed in terms of the length 
necessary for 
its legitimate purpose. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 fn. 
8 (1998) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 
105 S. Ct. 1568, [685 - 87,] 470 U.S. 675, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 
[1574 - 76,] 470 U.S. 675, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 105 S. Ct. 1568, [614 - 16] 
(1985)). In assessing the scope of the intrusion, we must examine whether the 
police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or 
dispel their suspicions quickly and without undue delay in detaining a 
defendant. Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215 at 218, 223 -234 (Wyo. 1994) 
(quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 105 S. Ct. 1568, [685 - 87,] 470 U.S. 675, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 105 S. Ct. 1568, [1574 - 
76,] 470 U.S. 675, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 105 S. Ct. 1568, [614 - 16] 
(1985)).

 
 

Lindsay 
v. State, 
2005 WY 34, ¶ 19, 108 P.3d 852, 857 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶15]   A United States Supreme Court case 
is also relative to our analysis.  In Caballes, the Court held the Fourth Amendment 
does not require a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a 
drug-detection dog to sniff the outside of a vehicle during a legitimate traffic 
stop as long as the duration 
of the stop is not extended.  The 
Court concluded that a dog sniff of a car's exterior did not compromise a 
legitimate privacy interest and, therefore, was not a search.1  Id. 543 U.S.  at 407.  Said another way, the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit police from using a narcotics-detection dog 
during a lawful traffic stop, even in the complete absence of reasonable 
suspicion, so long as the canine sweep does not extend the length of the traffic 
stop.  Id. 543 U.S.  at 409-10.  The use of a drug sniffing dog does not 
enlarge the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation.

 
 
[¶16]   Here, Wallace does not dispute the 
validity of the initial stop and, typically, that leads us to the second prong 
of the analysis under Terry (i.e., 
were the officer's actions during the detention reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances that justified the interference in the first instance).  Damato, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d  at 
705.  However, in this case, we need 
not look beyond the initial stop because Wallace admits that it was lawful, and 
also because the record is clear that no improprieties occurred so as to violate 
Wallace's constitutional rights.  
The record shows precisely how many minutes Wallace had been detained 
before the drug dog alerted to drugs at the scene  just over seventeen minutes 
elapsed from the time Deputy Stinson stopped the vehicle until the dog alerted. 
 The district court was persuaded 
that the deputy did not drag his feet in order to allow for the canine unit to 
arrive.  In fact, the district court 
concluded that the brief period of detention lasted no longer than was necessary 
to achieve the purpose of the stop, inasmuch as the sniff was concluded before 
the deputy had finished issuing the citations.  We agree.

 
 
[¶17]   We have examined the record before 
us and find nothing to indicate that the duration of Wallace's detention was so 
prolonged as to be unjustified.  The 
deputy appears to have pursued his investigation in a conscientious and 
reasonable manner, while focusing on the matter at hand.  He made a radio transmission to 
dispatch, awaited information, and 
then contacted the canine unit.  His 
encounter with Wallace was focused, and he set out directly to complete the 
paperwork involved in issuing both a citation and a warning.  In fact, the entire encounter  from the 
initial stop to the dog's alert  lasted approximately seventeen minutes.  At the hearing on Wallace's Motion to Suppress, Deputy Stinson 
testified that it normally takes him 8-10 minutes to fill out a citation ticket, 
and at least 3-5 minutes to fill out a warning ticket.  Here, he had to issue both a citation 
and a warning.  Regarding the 
citation ticket, the deputy said, "It takes a while [to write a citation].  It is a pretty involved piece of paper 
if you get all your information on 
there.  It is a pretty lengthy 
document."  The purpose of the 
initial stop had not been completed before the canine unit arrived at the scene, 
and the dog sniff did not prolong the stop.  Deputy Stinson completed his radio 
communications and began to write out the two tickets.  He continued writing until the drug dog 
alerted to the vehicle.  Based on 
the deputy's estimation that it would normally take him a total of 11-15 minutes 
to fill out both a citation and a warning, it was reasonable for him to still be 
in the process of writing the tickets when the dog 
alerted.

 
 
[¶18]   Considering both the length of the 
continued detention and the investigative methods employed therein, we have 
determined that the duration 
of the extended 
detention was reasonable, and the use of the drug detection dog during the 
lawful detention did not violate any constitutionally protected right.  See Caballes, 
supra, 543 U.S. 405.  The dog sniff occurred while Wallace was 
being lawfully detained.  After the 
dog alerted to the presence of narcotics, the officers had probable cause to 
search the vehicle.  Consequently, 
the trial court did not err by denying Wallace's motion to suppress the 
evidence.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶19]   We affirm the district court's 
denial of Wallace's motion to suppress.  
We hold that the initial stop was not prolonged by the exterior dog 
sniff.  
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Prior to Caballes, in 
Morgan v. State, 2004 WY 95, ¶¶ 10-18, 95 P.3d 802, 805-08 (Wyo. 
2004), this Court also concluded that a dog sniff is not a search entitled to 
protection under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.