Title: People v. Harvey

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket Nos. 89106, 89760, 90278 cons.-Agenda 4-January 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
DERRICK 
HARVEY, Appellant.-THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF ILLINOIS, 
Appellee, v. NOAH BAREFIELD, Appellant.-THE
PEOPLE OF THE 
STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. MAURICE
G. LYONS, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 24, 20004. 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	The primary issue in these three consolidated cases concerns the
trial courts' use of the mere-fact method of impeachment. The
defendants, Derrick Harvey, Noah Barefield, and Maurice G. Lyons,
were separately convicted of various crimes. All three defendants
appealed, challenging the trial court's use of mere-fact impeachment
as violating this court's holdings in People v. Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d 450
(1999), and People v. Cox, 195 Ill. 2d 378 (2001).
	The First District of the appellate court affirmed Harvey's
conviction, finding he had waived the issue. Harvey, No. 1-99-0637
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The Fourth
District of the appellate court affirmed Barefield's conviction, finding
he requested the trial court use mere-fact impeachment. Barefield,
No. 4-98-0838 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
Likewise, the Fourth District affirmed Lyons' conviction, finding he
agreed to the trial court's use of mere-fact impeachment. Lyons, 315
Ill. App. 3d 959.
	We allowed the defendants leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315)
primarily to determine whether the trial court's use of mere-fact
impeachment amounted to plain error in any of the cases. We affirm
the appellate court decision in Harvey, No. 1-99-0637 (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand the appellate court's judgment in Barefield, No.
4-98-0838 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), with
directions to vacate Barefield's four convictions for unlawful
possession of a motor vehicle. Lastly, we affirm the appellate court
decision in Lyons, 315 Ill. App. 3d 959.


I. BACKGROUND
A. People v. Harvey
	Harvey was charged, in part, with two counts of first degree
murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 9-1, now 720 ILCS 5/9-1
(West 2000)) and two counts of aggravated kidnapping (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1991, ch. 38, par. 10-2, now 720 ILCS 5/10-2 (West 2000)) as a
result of the disappearance and deaths of Stanton Burch and Michael
Purham. The evidence at trial established Harvey was a member of the
Unknown Vice Lords street gang. At the time of the events at issue,
the gang had recently split into two opposing groups and were battling
for control of drug trafficking.
	On September 12, 1993, Willie Lloyd, one of the group leaders,
allegedly stole money and drugs from a street dealer working for
Tyrone Williams, the leader of the other faction. The next day, Eunice
Clark, a member of Williams' faction, was selling drugs on a street
corner when she was approached by Burch and Purham, members of
Lloyd's faction. According to Clark, Burch and Purham told her the
corner was now controlled by Lloyd. Soon thereafter, Artiss Thigpen,
a member of Williams' faction, and two other individuals arrived at
the corner by car, armed with guns. Harvey and 10 to 15 armed
individuals then arrived at the corner on foot. Clark stated the armed
individuals placed Burch and Purham in the vehicle and drove away.
	Police Officer Robert Schaefer testified that on the following
evening, September 14, 1993, he and another officer arrested Harvey
after observing him in the front passenger seat of a car with a shotgun
between his legs. At the police station Harvey informed Detective
Kristin Kato that he could show the officers where the bodies of
Burch and Purham were located. Harvey led four officers to the
victims' bodies and upon returning to the police station Harvey gave
a signed, handwritten statement detailing his involvement in the
murders.
	Harvey's statement corroborated the information given by Clark.
He further described his membership in the Unknown Vice Lords, his
role as a drug dealer, the controversy within the gang about who was
allowed to sell drugs at the corner, and Lloyd's attack on one of
Williams' street dealers. Harvey also described the events surrounding
the murders of Burch and Purham. Harvey stated he believed he shot
one of the victims in the leg.
	At trial, however, Harvey repudiated his statement, claiming the
statement was coerced and false. Harvey claimed he was struck by
Detective Kato prior to giving his statement and that Detective Kato
promised him he would be released if he gave a statement. Harvey
testified he was not involved in the shootings.
	Following the close of evidence, the State tendered a jury
instruction pertaining to evidence of defendant's prior conviction. See
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.13 (3d ed. 1992).
Defense counsel objected and the following colloquy took place:
			"MR. STANTON [Assistant Public Defender]: We object
to that based on the fact the State *** rested its case in
rebuttal after we rested our case-in-chief and at that point in
time the State did not put in any conviction of the defendant
so for that purpose we are objecting.
			THE COURT: Objection is overruled. [The jury
instruction] will be given since I am allowing the State to
reopen their case for the purpose of entering two exhibits
which [will] be read to the jury. People's 12 given over
objection.
			MR. STANTON: So the record is clear we're objecting to
Your Honor allowing the State to do that.
			THE COURT: Okay. As to each of the certified copies of
conviction looking at what the underlying offenses [were]
*** that defendant was convicted for on an earlier occasion,
weighing the probative effect that would be to the jury and
taking into account any possible prejudice that might inure
given the testimony of the defendant that he was in fact and
did engage in the selling of drugs I'll allow for the purposes
of rebuttal the introduction of those exhibits which *** tell
the jury about two prior convictions of the defendant which
were for drug related offenses.
			However, I'm going to limit the State, as I've already told
them, to telling the jury that the defendant was convicted of
a felony offense and the date that the conviction was given.
That would be the nature that they'll be allowed to present
those exhibits to the jury."
	In the presence of the jury, the State then made the following
comment:
			"In rebuttal, Your Honor, the State would stipulate as
follows: That on the date of June 1st of 1992, the defendant
was convicted of a felony offense. And on the date of June
4th of 1992, the defendant was convicted of another felony
offense."
	The jury acquitted Harvey of both first degree murder counts and
convicted him of both aggravated kidnapping counts. Harvey filed a
posttrial motion arguing, in part, that the trial court erred in allowing
the State to introduce evidence of Harvey's prior felony convictions
after the State's case. Harvey's posttrial motion was denied and he
was sentenced to two concurrent 30-year terms of imprisonment.
	The appellate court affirmed, finding the State agreed to defense
counsel's offer to stipulate defendant was convicted of two felonies
without disclosing the nature of the crimes. The appellate court
reasoned it was only in hindsight that defendant asserted his counsel's
strategy was defective and the State should have been allowed to
reveal the true nature of his crimes.
	Harvey now appeals, arguing he did not stipulate or agree to the
use of mere-fact impeachment. According to Harvey, the trial court's
sua sponte decision to use mere-fact impeachment was reversible
error.

B. People v. Barefield
	Barefield was charged with four counts of unlawful possession of
four stolen motor vehicles (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 1996)) and
one count of aggravated possession of stolen motor vehicles (625
ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(1) (West 1996)), relating to the same four motor
vehicles.
	Prior to trial, Barefield's counsel presented an oral motion in
limine to preclude the State from introducing evidence of his prior
felony conviction for burglary to a motor vehicle. In the alternative,
Barefield requested that the mere-fact method of impeachment be
used to inform the jury only that Barefield had a prior conviction and
the year of that conviction. The State agreed to the mere-fact method
of impeachment.
	The trial court granted Barefield's request to use mere-fact
impeachment. Barefield testified during direct examination that he had
a prior felony conviction from "a couple of years ago." He further
testified he had no knowledge any of the automobiles were stolen, and
he denied possessing any of the stolen automobiles.
	The jury found Barefield guilty of all five offenses. The trial court
sentenced Barefield to 15 years in prison for the aggravated
possession count and four 7-year prison terms for each of the simple
possession counts, all to run concurrently. Barefield filed a posttrial
motion but did not contest the trial court ruling on his motion in
limine.
	On appeal, Barefield argued the trial court erred by using the
mere-fact impeachment method. He further argued his four
convictions for simple possession should be vacated as carved from
the same physical acts that formed the basis of the aggravated
possession conviction.
	The appellate court found Barefield had waived both issues. As
to the mere-fact impeachment issue, the appellate court held Barefield
induced the error and, in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt,
the error was harmless. The appellate court further held Barefield's
convictions did not violate the one-act, one-crime rule of People v.
King, 66 Ill. 2d 551 (1977). The appellate court reasoned that, unlike
the simple possession counts, the aggravated possession count
required proof of possession within a certain time period. The
appellate court further reasoned the two statutes at issue specifically
provide that each individual offense shall not include the offense set
forth in the other provision.
	The dissent disagreed that Barefield had induced the error
concerning mere-fact impeachment, but concurred that defendant had
not been prejudiced by the error because the trial court had balanced
the prejudicial effect of the convictions against their probative value.
The dissent also determined that the four simple possession
convictions were subsumed by the aggravated possession conviction
and should be vacated.
	Barefield appeals, essentially renewing the arguments he made
before the appellate court.

C. People v. Lyons
	Lyons was charged with vehicular invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11.1
(West 1996)), aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(8) (West
1996)), intimidation (720 ILCS 5/12-6(a)(1) (West 1996)), and
unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3 (West 1996)).
	The alleged victim, Melissa McMullen, testified as follows. On
August 9, 1998, at approximately 2:30 a.m., she left work and drove
to a nearby grocery store. She parked in the fire lane and entered the
store. Upon leaving the store, she opened her driver's side car door.
Lyons approached her and pushed her into the vehicle. According to
McMullen, she had never seen Lyons before.
	McMullen testified that Lyons held her down inside the vehicle
and threatened to kill her if she did not remain silent. He then
repeatedly asked for her car keys. McMullen flashed the headlights
and honked the horn in an effort to attract the attention of a taxi driver
in the parking lot. Lyons attempted to stop her from signaling for help
and again threatened to hurt or kill her.
	According to McMullen, Lyons demanded that she give him her
purse and attempted to pull it from her neck. When she told him she
had no money, Lyons said he just wanted a ride. Lyons forced
McMullen into the driver's seat and he moved into the passenger's
seat. He told McMullen to drive away. After pulling out of the store
parking lot, McMullen stopped in front of a passing police car. She
then exited the vehicle and ran toward the police car.
	Police Officer Fred Martin testified that, on the morning of the
incident, he was responding to a call from his dispatcher concerning
a possible domestic battery in the grocery store parking lot. Upon
arriving at the location, he saw an automobile cross the median and
stop near his patrol car. McMullen quickly exited the vehicle and
shouted, "Oh, my God, I'm so glad you came by. This guy pushed me
in my car and made me drive away." McMullen then entered the patrol
car.
	Officer Martin testified McMullen appeared frightened and she
spoke quickly. He noticed she had abrasions and scratches on her
neck, shoulder, and arm. Based on her reaction and statements,
Officer Martin believed she did not know Lyons. After speaking
further with McMullen, Martin approached Lyons and asked if he
knew McMullen's name. Defendant told Officer Martin her name was
"Amy," but was unable to provide her last name.
	Police Officer Brian Brown questioned Lyons about the incident.
Lyons told Brown he and McMullen were boyfriend and girlfriend and
they had gotten into an argument at the grocery store. Lyons denied
hitting McMullen. Officer Brown testified Lyons was unable to tell
him McMullen's name.
	Michael Lusher, a taxi driver, testified he was in his taxi in the
grocery store parking lot at the time of the incident. According to
Lusher, he saw Lyons holding open the door of a car parked in the fire
lane. Lusher testified Lyons was hitting and pushing a woman into the
car. Each time the woman attempted to exit the car, Lyons pushed her
back in. Lusher testified he also heard a car horn honking and the
woman yelling for help.
	Lyons testified he knew McMullen prior to the incident in
question. He stated they had first met in January of 1998 at his uncle's
house. On that occasion, Lyons claimed to have sold McMullen a half
gram of cocaine. According to Lyons, McMullen had called him on
several other occasions to arrange cocaine purchases and they
completed the drug transactions in several different parking lots.
	Prior to trial, Lyons indicated he intended to present evidence to
corroborate his claim that he and McMullen had engaged in drug
transactions in the past. The evidence would have included the
testimony of at least one other individual who had also allegedly sold
drugs to McMullen in parking lots on previous occasions. The trial
court granted the State's motion in limine to exclude this evidence,
finding the evidence was collateral to the issues in this case.
	During his trial testimony, Lyons stated McMullen had
telephoned him and asked whether he had any cocaine to sell her.
Lyons informed McMullen he did not, but said he would call her if he
was able to obtain some. At approximately 2:30 the next morning,
Lyons telephoned McMullen and told her he had some cocaine. He
instructed her to meet him at the grocery store if she wanted to buy
some. Lyons' uncle then drove him to the grocery store.
	According to Lyons, when he arrived at the store, he went inside
to telephone a taxi cab. He then exited the store, returned to his
uncle's car, and waited. Approximately 15 minutes later, Lyons went
inside the store to phone the taxi company again. As Lyons returned
to the parking lot, he observed McMullen drive up.
	According to Lyons, when McMullen exited her vehicle, he
approached her and told her to get back in the vehicle. Lyons got in
the passenger's seat. McMullen told him she wished to purchase a half
gram of cocaine. Lyons told McMullen that the cocaine was cut into
larger portions. Lyons told McMullen he would sell her a larger
portion at a reduced rate of $150. Upon hearing this information,
McMullen entered the grocery store and stayed for approximately one
minute. When she returned, he gave her the cocaine, and she gave him
$85. Lyons inquired about the remainder of the money, and McMullen
said she would pay him the next day. Lyons testified he then returned
the $85 to McMullen and a struggle ensued over the cocaine.
According to Lyons, he was trying to grab her hand when the taxi
driver came into the parking lot. McMullen was yelling, and Lyons
was cursing at her. Lyons claimed he blew the car horn to alert the
taxi driver he wanted the cab.
	Lyons testified he told McMullen he believed the taxi driver had
called police. As a result, McMullen and Lyons decided to tell the
police they were boyfriend and girlfriend and were just having an
argument. As part of the story, Lyons would call McMullen "Ashley"
and she would call him "Dee." After McMullen stopped in front of the
patrol car, Lyons told the officers their agreed-upon story.
	Lyons also testified he had been convicted of two felony offenses
in 1989 as well as two felony offenses in 1993. Prior to testifying,
Lyons made an oral motion in limine to preclude evidence of his prior
convictions as detailed by the following colloquy:
			"MR. LAWRENCE [assistant public defender]: I'd like to
make an oral motion in limine before my client testifies. It's
regarding my client's prior record. It's my understanding that
my client has a burglary charge and a theft *** charge from
1989 *** he also has two aggravated battery convictions
from 1993. ***
			*** I would ask that [these convictions] not be allowed
for impeachment because I believe the prejudice would
certainly outweigh any benefit that they would bring to the
case.
			THE COURT: Let me stop you.
			MR. LAWRENCE: My client is charged with aggravated
battery.
			THE COURT: I do the Steigmann rule.
			MR. LAWRENCE: Just a felony.
			THE COURT: There would be four felonies reported to
the jury. I mean maybe I should have told you that before.
But I didn't know if you still wanted to object. I mean ... if
you don't do that, I'm not sure that the weighing process is
even necessary if they qualify under Montgomery because
*** the jury doesn't know what they are.
			MR. LAWRENCE: All right.
			THE COURT: I mean I appreciate you still want to have
it out, but if they just know that he has four felonies, how
does the prejudicial value outweigh the probative value ***
when they don't know what they are?
		MR. LAWRENCE: Okay. I didn't realize that you
allowed us to do it that way, which is fine."
	The remainder of the evidence presented at trial included the
testimony of a grocery store employee. He testified that on the
morning of the incident Lyons entered the store twice to telephone a
taxi company.
	Following the close of evidence, the jury convicted Lyons of all
charged offenses. The trial court sentenced him to a 10-year term of
imprisonment.
	Lyons appealed, arguing, in part, that the trial court erred in using
mere-fact impeachment and in granting the State's motion in limine
concerning evidence of McMullen's prior drug purchases. The
appellate court affirmed, holding that Lyons, "through his counsel,
explicitly agreed to the court's use of the mere-fact impeachment
method in this case *** [and therefore] he cannot now complain about
the court's decision to use the precise method he agreed to at trial."
Lyons, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 965. As to the evidence excluded by the
State's motion in limine, the appellate majority reasoned that
"[w]hether McMullen had previously purchased drugs from other
individuals in various parking lots was wholly irrelevant to the
underlying issues in this case." Lyons, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 963.
	Without commenting on the mere-fact issue, the dissenting justice
concluded that the trial court improperly granted the State's motion
in limine. In particular, the dissent reasoned:
			"[E]vidence that McMullen may have been engaged in a
drug purchase at the time of the incident is clearly relevant to
the issues of the case and is not a mere contradiction of her
in-court statement. Defendant did not commit the offense of
vehicular invasion if he entered McMullen's vehicle with her
permission to sell her drugs. ***
* * *
			*** The evidence complained of should have been
admitted to show McMullen's [possible] motive in accusing
[Lyons], that motive being that she did not want to admit that
she was engaged in a drug purchase." Lyons, 315 Ill. App. 3d
at 966-68 (Cook, P.J., dissenting).
	Lyons appeals, contending the trial court committed reversible
error in employing mere-fact impeachment and in granting the State's
motion in limine.

II. ANALYSIS
	The primary issue presented in these consolidated appeals
concerns the trial court's use of mere-fact impeachment. Under the
mere-fact method of impeachment, the jury is informed of the fact that
the witness committed a past crime, not the precise offense. People v.
Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d 450, 457 (1999). This court expressly rejected
the mere-fact method of impeachment in two recent cases: Atkinson,
186 Ill. 2d 450, and People v. Cox, 195 Ill. 2d 378 (2001). The
rationale behind our rejection of the mere-fact method was lucidly set
out in Atkinson:
		"Under the mere-fact approach, the jury hears direct proof
that the accused has been convicted of a felony, the exact
nature of which is excluded from the jury. This bare
announcement unavoidably invites jury speculation about the
nature of the prior crime. There is a potential danger that the
jury would speculate that the defendant was previously
convicted of a more serious crime. Consequently, the
mere-fact approach may result in unfair prejudice to the
defendant arising from jury speculation as to the nature of the
prior unnamed crime." Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d  at 459.
	There is no danger of such speculation when a trial court uses the
balancing test for impeachment of a witness through the use of prior
convictions that was first adopted by this court in People v.
Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510 (1971). Under Montgomery, evidence of
a prior conviction is admissible for impeachment purposes if: (1) the
witness' crime was punishable by death or imprisonment for more than
one year, or the crime involved dishonesty or false statement
regardless of the punishment; (2) the witness' conviction or release
from confinement, whichever date is later, occurred less than 10 years
from the date of trial; and (3) the danger of unfair prejudice does not
substantially outweigh the probative value of the conviction.
Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d  at 516. As we stated in Atkinson,
		"the possibility of resulting prejudice to the defendant from
revealing the nature of the prior conviction is controlled by
the judicial balancing test set forth in the third prong of
Montgomery. Under that test, if prejudice to the defendant
substantially outweighs the probative value of admitting the
impeachment evidence, the prior conviction must be
excluded." Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d  at 459.
Accordingly, we directed that "trial courts should not consider the
mere-fact method of impeachment" (Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 461) and
the trial court commits error by using the mere-fact approach
(Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 457-58).
	More recently, in Cox, this court reiterated its position on the use
of mere-fact impeachment. We stated:
			"The State attempts to limit our holding in Atkinson. ***
In Atkinson, however, we held that 'trial courts should not
consider the mere-fact method of impeachment.' [Citation.]
We find no suggestion in this unequivocal language that a
trial court's discretion encompasses mere-fact impeachment.
Additionally, the State contends Atkinson only governs cases
in which a trial court declined to consider a defendant's
request for mere-fact impeachment. Again, we see no such
limitation.
			Admitting the mere fact of the defendant's prior felony
convictions was error." (Emphasis omitted.) Cox, 195 Ill. 2d 
at 386-87.
	There is no question the trial court in each of these three
consolidated cases committed error by employing mere-fact
impeachment. See Cox, 195 Ill. 2d  at 386 (Atkinson applies
retroactively to all cases pending at the time the opinion was
announced by this court). Nonetheless, as argued by the State and
determined by the appellate court panels, none of the defendants
properly preserved the issue for review. In each case, however, the
defendant's complicity in this trial error varied. In Harvey, defense
counsel failed to object to the use of the mere-fact method of
impeachment. In Barefield, defense counsel requested use of the
mere-fact method. In Lyons, defense counsel agreed to the use of the
mere-fact method. The factual distinction between a defendant's
failure to bring an error to the attention of the trial court, as in
Harvey, and a defendant's active participation in the direction of the
proceedings, as in Barefield and Lyons, carries with it a legal
significance.
	A defendant's failure to object at trial and to raise the issue in a
post-trial motion operates as a waiver of the right to raise the issue as
a ground for reversal on review. People v. Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d 195,
209 (1990). The plain error rule (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)) provides a
" ' "narrow and limited exception" ' " (People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 100 (1992), quoting People v. Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d 83, 94 (1986),
quoting People v. Pastorino, 91 Ill. 2d 178, 188 (1982) and is applied
as a means of ameliorating the harshness of strict application of the
waiver rule (People v. Godsey, 74 Ill. 2d 64, 72 (1978)).
	This court has acknowledged, however, that a defendant's
invitation or agreement to the procedure later challenged on appeal
"goes beyond mere waiver." People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 227
(2001). Indeed, Illinois courts sometimes refer to the issue as one of
estoppel. See, e.g., People v. Burage, 23 Ill. 2d 280, 283 (1961);
People v. Sparks, 314 Ill. App. 3d 268, 272 (2000); People v.
Satterfield, 195 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1100-01 (1990); People v. Reed,
51 Ill. App. 3d 479, 482 (1977). That is, "[u]nder the doctrine of
invited error, an accused may not request to proceed in one manner
and then later contend on appeal that the course of action was in
error." People v. Carter, 208 Ill. 2d 309, 319 (2003), citing
Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d at 227-28; People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228,
240-41 (2000); People v. Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d 195, 199 (1992). To
permit a defendant to use the exact ruling or action procured in the
trial court as a vehicle for reversal on appeal "would offend all notions
of fair play" (Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d at 227), and "encourage
defendants to become duplicitous" (Sparks, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 272)).	Illinois courts have applied the invited error doctrine in numerous
cases to bar a defendant from claiming error in the admission of
improper evidence where the admission was procured or invited by
the defendant. E.g., People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 114 (2001);
People v. Payne, 98 Ill. 2d 45, 49-50 (1983); People v. Abdullah, 336
Ill. App. 3d 940, 950 (2002); People v. Bridges, 273 Ill. App. 3d 773,
779 (1995). In similar fashion, our appellate court has held that a
defendant cannot claim, on appeal, that the use of mere-fact
impeachment was error where the defendant requested or agreed to
its use in the trial court. People v. Davis, 319 Ill. App. 3d 572, 574
(2001); People v. Williams, 317 Ill. App. 3d 945, 950 (2000); Sparks,
314 Ill. App. 3d at 272-73. We noted this same rule with regard to
mere-fact impeachment in Cox, where we stated:
			"We do not reach the question of whether a defendant can
challenge an Atkinson violation when he requests or agrees
to improper mere-fact impeachment. We note, however, 'an
accused may not ask the trial court to proceed in a certain
manner and then contend in a court of review that the order
which he obtained was in error.' People v. Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d 195, 199 (1992); accord People v. Payne, 98 Ill. 2d 45, 50
(1983) (a defendant who invites or acquiesces to the
admission of improper evidence cannot complain)." Cox, 195 Ill. 2d  at 387 n.2.
	As stated above, Barefield requested and Lyons agreed to mere-fact impeachment. Accordingly, neither defendant may now raise on
appeal the error that they invited in the trial court. See People v.
Smith, 71 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (1978) (neither rule 615(a) nor Rule 451(c)
covers the situation where a defendant complains about a tendered
instruction); accord Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d  at 227-28.
	Nevertheless, in regard to Harvey, pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)), this court may review an
argument not properly preserved if plain error has occurred. People
v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 225-26 (2000). The plain error rule
allows a reviewing court to consider a trial error not properly
preserved when "(1) the evidence in a criminal case is closely balanced
or (2) where the error is so fundamental and of such magnitude that
the accused was denied a right to a fair trial." People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 293 (1995); 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). In Harvey, we will address
each of these inquiries, and then address the remaining issues raised
in the Barefield and Lyons appeals.

A. People v. Harvey: plain error
	Considering the first prong of the plain error rule, we have
examined the record and find that the evidence admitted in Harvey's
case cannot reasonably be regarded as closely balanced. There was
extensive testimony from Eunice Clark, who provided background on
the conflict between the rival factions of the Unknown Vice Lords.
Clark also stated she observed Harvey, along with several other
individuals at the scene, place the victims in a vehicle and drive away.
According to Clark, the victims and assailants were members of
opposing factions. In addition to this direct identification evidence,
there was compelling testimony by police officers who detailed the
circumstances behind their taking Harvey into custody and his later
leading them to the bodies of the victims. This overwhelming evidence
was corroborated by Harvey's pretrial statement. Harvey's later
recantation of his pretrial statement did not make the evidence of his
guilt any less convincing. Thus, this prong of the plain error rule is not
satisfied by the evidence presented in People v. Harvey.
	The second prong of the plain error rule is invoked only in those
exceptional circumstances where, despite the absence of objection,
application of the rule is necessary to preserve the integrity and
reputation of the judicial process. People v. Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d 195,
210 (1990). Here, the error is not of such a character that the second
prong of the plain error rule must be invoked to preserve the integrity
and reputation of the judicial process. While it is true that we
admonished our circuit courts in both Atkinson and Cox, and now
again in this case, that mere-fact impeachment is not to be employed,
we have never indicated that its use requires the reversal of a
subsequent conviction.(1) To the contrary, in Cox we only concluded
that a reversal was necessary after examining the other admitted
evidence in that case. We note that "Rule 615(a) does not operate in
the nature of a general saving clause preserving for review all errors
affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to
the attention of the trial court." People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16
(1978).
	In sum, the facts do not amount to an "exceptional circumstance"
so as to warrant reversal under the second prong of the plain error
rule notwithstanding our extreme disapproval of the trial court's use
of mere-fact impeachment. The plain error rule, therefore, may not be
invoked in this case. Accordingly, Harvey is barred by his procedural
default from raising the error as a ground for reversal.

B. People v. Barefield: One act, one crime
	Barefield also contends that his convictions and sentence in this
case violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine of People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977). Barefield argues that the four convictions for
unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle should be vacated
because the convictions are predicated on the same acts that formed
the basis for the aggravated possession offense. Initially, we note that
defendant raised this argument for the first time on appeal and, as the
appellate court correctly noted, the issue is waived. See People v.
Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). However, as noted previously,
plain errors affecting substantial rights may be reviewed on appeal.
134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); People v. Hicks, 181 Ill. 2d 541, 544-45 (1998).
Unlike the mere-fact impeachment issue, an alleged one-act, one-crime violation and the potential for a surplus conviction and sentence
affects the integrity of the judicial process, thus satisfying the second
prong of the plain error rule. See People v. Flynn, 341 Ill. App. 3d
813, 829 (2003); People v. Pearson, 331 Ill. App. 3d 312, 321(2002);
and People v. Moshier, 312 Ill. App. 3d 879, 881 (2000). The plain
error rule allows the review of a waived error if either of the two
prongs are satisfied. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d  at 293; 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).
Since the second prong is met here, we need not discuss the first, and,
despite Barefield's waiver, we will address his argument.
	In King, this court held that a criminal defendant may not be
convicted of multiple offenses when those offenses are all based on
precisely the same physical act. King, 66 Ill. 2d  at 566. We reaffirmed
and clarified the King rule in People v. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183
(1996), where we noted that there are two steps to a King analysis.
Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 186.
	First, the court ascertains whether the defendant's conduct
consisted of a single physical act or separate acts. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 186. "Multiple convictions are improper if they are based on
precisely the same physical act." Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 186. If the
court determines that the defendant committed multiple acts, the court
moves on to the second step and determines whether any of the other
offenses are lesser-included offenses. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 186. If
any of the offenses are lesser-included offenses, then, under King,
multiple convictions are improper. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 186. If
none of the offenses are lesser-included offenses, then multiple
convictions may be entered. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 186.
	Therefore, we must first determine whether Barefield's conduct
consisted of separate acts or a single physical act. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 186. Defendant was charged with four counts of unlawful
possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West
1996)) for possessing four separate vehicles within one year, and with
one count of aggravated possession of all four stolen motor vehicles
(625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(1) (West 1996)). Under King, the definition
of an "act" is "any overt or outward manifestation which will support
a different offense." King, 66 Ill. 2d  at 566.
	Applying King to the present case, we conclude that the unlawful
possession of a stolen motor vehicle offenses and the aggravated
possession offense were based on the same physical act. While
aggravated possession requires proof of an additional element, namely
that the defendant possessed three or more stolen vehicles at the same
time or within a one-year period, this is not a separate act of the
defendant. This is merely an element of an additional offense that can
be established by defendant's overlapping acts of possession.
	The dissenting justice in the appellate court correctly stated:
	"The majority justifies its failure to comply with the King 'one
act, one crime' rule, because 'in this case, the two offenses
cannot be based on precisely the same act because the aggravated
possession requires the unlawful possession of multiple stolen
vehicles during a period of time.' [Citation.] I disagree. What
difference does it make that simple unlawful possession does not
require that the possession continue for any particular period of
time? When defendant possessed these vehicles during the period
of one year, he thereby committed aggravated possession, and
that same possession is relied upon by the State in the four counts
of simple possession. This is not a case where the State can show
simple possession at a different time than during the one-year
period in which it has shown aggravated possession. This case
accordingly falls within the 'same physical act' test of King."
People v. Barefield, No. 4-98-0838 (2000) (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23) (Cook, P.J., dissenting).
	In short, the State found defendant to be in possession of four
stolen motor vehicles and was able to carve distinct charges out of
these same possessions-an aggravated charge based on his possession
of this number of vehicles within a one-year period and simple
possession charges for each vehicle. The time that passed was not an
overt or outward manifestation of defendant. It was an external factor
that allowed the state to charge defendant with a separate offense. By
analogy, assume that the legislature enacts a new type of aggravated
possession of a stolen motor vehicle, making the simple possession
charge "aggravated" if a blue vehicle is stolen. If a defendant commits
the one act of possessing a stolen blue vehicle, the State could charge
him with both simple possession and aggravated possession. The color
of the car, however, would not be an overt or outward manifestation
by the defendant. It would be an external factor allowing the State to
charge a different offense. If the defendant was convicted of both
offenses, however, the simple possession would have to be vacated
because it would be based on precisely the same physical act as the
aggravated possession.
	Because Barefield's unlawful possession counts are predicated on
the same set of acts as his aggravated possession count, we need not
and do not reach the second step of King to determine whether the
unlawful possession count is a lesser-included offense of the
aggravated possession count. "Multiple convictions are improper if
they are based on precisely the same physical act[s]." Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 186. Accordingly, Barefield's four convictions for unlawful
possession of a stolen motor vehicle constituted plain error and must
be vacated.

C. People v. Lyons: motion in limine 
Finally, we turn to the motion in limine in Lyons' case. Lyons
sought to call a certain witness who would testify that he had sold
drugs to McMullen in store parking lots on many occasions. The State
moved in limine to bar such evidence.
	Generally, evidentiary motions, such as motions in limine, are
directed to the trial court's discretion, and reviewing courts will not
disturb a trial court's evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion.
People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 78-79 (1998). Relevant evidence is
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
than it would be without the evidence. People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 329 (1995). A trial court may reject offered evidence on grounds
of irrelevancy if it has little probative value due to its remoteness,
uncertainty, or possibly unfair prejudicial nature. People v. Ward, 101 Ill. 2d 443, 455 (1984).
	Lyons maintains the trial court abused its discretion because the
excluded evidence would have shown that McMullen had purchased
drugs from other individuals in various parking lots in the past.
Specifically, defendant contends the evidence was relevant to impeach
McMullen's version of the event and was probative of a possible
motive for McMullen to lie about the incident.
	Here, the trial court concluded that Lyons could testify that he
had sold McMullen drugs on previous occasions, as such testimony
could relate to motive or familiarity between the two witnesses, but
that Lyons would not be allowed to impeach McMullen with
corroborative evidence from other individuals that they had sold drugs
to McMullen in the past. The trial court reasoned that evidence of
McMullen's prior drug purchases from other individuals was not
relevant to the crimes charged and presented a collateral issue.
	We agree with the trial court and the appellate court that the
excluded evidence did not bear on the determinative issues in the case.
Moreover, Lyons was not precluded from testifying that he had sold
drugs to McMullen in the past, thus establishing familiarity and
challenging McMullen's claim that she did not know Lyons.
Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion
by granting the State's motion in limine.

III. CONCLUSION
	For the reasons expressed above, we hold that the trial court
erred in each of these three consolidated cases by using mere-fact
impeachment. Nevertheless, the trial court's improper use of mere-fact
impeachment did not rise to the level of plain error in defendant
Harvey's case and was invited by defendants Barefield and Lyons.
We, therefore, affirm the appellate court's judgment in Harvey, No.
1-99-0637 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We
further conclude that Barefield's multiple convictions and concurrent
sentences violate the King one-act, one-crime rule. We therefore
affirm in part and reverse in part the judgments of the circuit and
appellate courts in Barefield, No. 4-98-0838 (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23), and remand the cause to the circuit
court with directions that it vacate Barefield's four convictions for
unlawful possession of a motor vehicle. Lastly, because the trial court
did not err by excluding evidence in Lyons, 315 Ill. App. 3d 959, we
affirm the appellate court's judgment in that case as well.
No. 89106-Affirmed.
No. 89760-Judgments affirmed
in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded with directions.
No. 90278-Affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW, specially concurring:
	I am in agreement with the conclusion of the majority that the
multiple convictions and concurrent sentences imposed by the circuit
court upon defendant Barefield violate the one-act, one-crime rule
established by this court in People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551 (1977).
Accordingly, it is appropriate for this court to remand Barefield's
cause to the circuit court with directions that it vacate Barefield's four
convictions for unlawful possession of a motor vehicle.
	I am also in agreement with the majority that in the cause of
defendant Lyons, the circuit court did not err in granting the State's
motion in limine to exclude evidence that the victim had allegedly
engaged in prior drug purchases.
	I also agree with the result of the majority opinion that the use of
the mere-fact method of impeachment by the circuit court in each of
these three consolidated cases did not constitute plain error. However,
I arrive at this conclusion on a basis different from that of the
majority. I continue to adhere to my previously enunciated position
that it should be within the wide discretion traditionally afforded the
circuit court to permit the use of mere-fact impeachment if the court
determines that it is the more appropriate impeachment method. For
the reasons more fully stated in the dissenting opinion in People v.
Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d 450, 464 (1999) (Rathje, J., dissenting, joined by
McMorrow, J.), and my separate opinion in People v. Cox, 195 Ill. 2d 378, 392 (2001) (McMorrow, J., dissenting), it remains my belief that
Atkinson, which held that, as a matter of law, it is always improper to
use the mere-fact approach to impeach a testifying defendant,
"unwarrantedly departed from our traditional jurisprudence by
'remov[ing] from the trial court the discretion to determine whether
or to what extent evidence is admissible.' " Cox, 195 Ill. 2d  at 393
(McMorrow J., dissenting), quoting Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d  at 472
(Rathje, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, J.). 
	JUSTICE RARICK joins in this special concurrence.
 



1.             As admitted by the defendants here, the mere-fact method is often favored by defendants 
who would rather the jury not be informed of the particular nature of their prior convictions.