Title: Ricketts v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

686 So. 2d 1100 (1996)
Robert RICKETTS, individually and as father and next friend of Eric Ricketts, a minor
v.
NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.
1941267.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 14, 1996.
Rehearing Denied November 27, 1996.
*1101 Kenneth Ingram, Jr. of Morris, Haynes, Ingram & Hornsby, Alexander City, and Fred Wood of Green, Wood & Howell, Hamilton, for Appellant.
Morris W. Savage of Bankhead & Savage, Jasper, Crawford S. McGivaren, Jr. of Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas & O'Neal, Birmingham, for Appellee.
*1102 SHORES, Justice.
The plaintiff Robert Ricketts appeals from a judgment based on a directed verdict for the defendant Norfolk Southern Railway Company, in a personal injury action. We reverse and remand.
Ricketts's action is based on injuries to his son, Eric Ricketts, who, at age 14, was severely injured in a fall from the Railroad's Brushy Creek trestle in Marion County, Alabama. The Brushy Creek trestle is 187 feet high, with a span of 1230 feet; it is the fifth highest trestle on the Norfolk Southern line. It is of "open deck" construction, meaning that a person standing on the trestle can look between the railroad ties to the ground below. There are no rails or banisters on the side of the trestle. In 1988, Norfolk Southern purchased the railroad line extending from Centralia, Illinois, to Haleyville, Alabama, which includes the Brushy Creek trestle. Norfolk Southern has never conducted railroad operations along that portion of the line from Hackleburg south to Haleyville; the Brushy Creek trestle is located along that portion. In December 1992, the railroad petitioned the Interstate Commerce Commission for permission to abandon the line between Red Bay and Haleyville, including the Brushy Creek trestle.
On the afternoon of September 14, 1993, Eric Ricketts and two companions, Sam McGough and Bubba Branch, drove their four-wheel all-terrain vehicles ("ATVs") out onto the trestle. Because the ATVs would not fit flat on the trestle deck, the boys rode them with the left wheels perched on top of one rail. At a point where he was 160 feet above the ground, Eric's ATV got stuck. As he attempted to get his ATV loose, he fell from the trestle, sustaining severe injuries. Eric was in a coma for four months following the accident. He is now spastic and can do nothing to help care for himself. Expensive shots are needed each three months to keep his spasticity under control. He requires 24-hour supervised care and will require such care for the rest of his life.
On July 12, 1994, Robert Ricketts, as Eric's father and next friend, sued Southern Railway Company, T.A. Heilig, Howard Frye, and fictitiously named defendants. Eric's mother, Shirley Ricketts, was later added as a plaintiff. The Rickettses' complaint alleged liability based on negligence, wantonness, the principle stated in Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts, § 339 (1965), and the attractive nuisance theory. Norfolk Southern Railway Company (as successor in interest to Southern Railway Company) and defendants Heilig and Frye answered, denying that § 339 of the Restatement has any application in this case and pleading the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. The court entered a summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs' attractive nuisance claim.
On April 10, 1995, the trial began. The plaintiffs' case was concluded on April 17, 1996; at that time the plaintiffs dismissed defendants Heilig and Frye, with prejudice. Norfolk Southern then moved for a directed verdict. On April 19, 1995, Judge Bobby R. Aderholt granted Norfolk Southern's motion for a directed verdict, in open court:
On June 9, 1995, the trial judge issued the following order, which failed to make a more definite statement of findings:
The plaintiffs moved for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. Robert Ricketts appealed.
*1103 We must determine whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict on both the negligence and wantonness counts for the defendant Norfolk Southern Railway. We look first to the standard of review applicable in a case like this:
K.S. v. Carr, 618 So. 2d 707, 713 (Ala.1993).
The trial judge stated in his order that he had considered the criteria set out in Lyle v. Bouler, 547 So. 2d 506 (Ala.1989). In Lyle v. Bouler the question was whether a landowner may owe a duty of care to a trespassing minor over the age of 14. The trial court entered a summary judgment for the defendant in Lyle v. Bouler on the grounds that no duty was owed to trespassing minors over the age of 14. In reversing that summary judgment, this Court stated:
"Section 339 provides:
"Subsection (c) and the comment to § 339 provide guidance in determining when a child assumes responsibility for his injuries. The comment states that few jurisdictions still use arbitrary age limits because `in our present hazardous civilization some types of danger have become common, which an immature adolescent may reasonably not appreciate, although an adult may be expected to do so.'
Lyle v. Bouler, 547 So. 2d  at 507-08.
Judge Aderholt stated that, having considered the criteria set out in Lyle v. Bouler and the various elements of § 339 of the Restatement, he had concluded that under the facts of this case there could be no liability under § 339. We therefore must determine whether Judge Aderholt erred in so holding, and in determining that we consider the factors enumerated in Lyle v. Bouler.
Eric's mother testified that Eric was an average 14-year-old boy who made average grades and who at the time of his injury had just begun the 9th grade. Eric's mother described him as "all boy" who "did what he had to do to get by." There is no evidence that Eric knew that anyone had ever been injured from being on the trestle. In fact, there was evidence that he knew that persons had ridden across the trestle with apparent impunity. There was testimony that Eric knew that an uncle of his had ridden a motorcycle across the trestle.
Under § 339, "A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if (a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and (b) the condition is one that the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children." Norfolk Southern contends that it had no knowledge at the time of the accident that children were trespassing on the trestle. However, the testimony indicates that the Brushy Creek trestle has been a local attraction for years. A Boy Scout leader, Frank Herndon, testified that he had brought scouts from Aberdeen, Mississippi, to rappel from the trestle. John Thomas Adams, whose home is located within a mile of the trestle, testified that he knew of at least four ways to reach the trestle by vehicle, primarily by 4-wheel-drive vehicles. He himself had taken sightseers to it in his pickup truck. He has seen as many as 15 people on the trestle at one time. The chief of police of the Town of Bear Creek testified that in 1991 he had specifically informed the railroad's employees, including a railroad policeman, of the fact that men, women, and children were frequently on the trestle and suggested to them that it be barricaded. On July 4, 1993, approximately two months before Eric's fall, the crossties on the trestle were set afire by fireworks that were set off on the trestle. The fire was reported to Donald Benson, a track supervisor for Norfolk Southern, who that night attempted to put it out with water from his truck. As a result of the fire, 32 ties in a row on the trestle were burned out. Howard Frye, the railroad's bridge and building supervisor, made a written report of the damage made *1105 by the fire. In his testimony, he agreed that the trestle is dangerous. Thus, there was evidence from which a jury could conclude that the criteria of § 339(a) and (b) were met in this case.
We next look at § 339(c), which both sides suggest in their briefs is the crux of this case. In Hollis v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 667 So. 2d 727 (Ala.1995), this Court held that § 339(c) "makes a lack of knowledge of the risk and a lack of ability to appreciate that risk an element of a plaintiff's prima facie case." In affirming a summary judgment for the defendant railroad in Hollis, a case in which a 16-year-old was severely injured, this Court stated:
667 So. 2d  at 732. The evidence in Hollis was that the injured child, Dana Hollis, was a licensed automobile driver and had become a licensed motorcycle driver at age 14. He was injured when he fell off the edge of a railroad cut. His father testified that he had trusted his son's judgment and had allowed him latitude to make many of his own decisions. This Court concluded that the trial court properly entered the summary judgment for the railroad, because the evidence showed that Dana consciously recognized, understood, and appreciated the risk and the consequences of falling off the edge of the cut. This conclusion was based upon the testimony of both Dana and his father.
Eric cannot testify. However, Sam McGough, who was with Eric on the lead ATV, testified. Norfolk Southern cites a statement Sam made two days after the accident to a railway investigator who had been sent to McGough's home. At trial Sam McGough was questioned as follows:
Norfolk Southern emphasizes this statement as proof that Eric Ricketts fully understood and appreciated the risk of going onto the trestle. As Dean Prosser said in his article, Trespassing Children, 47 Cal. L.Rev. 427 (1959), "`appreciation' of the danger is what is required to bar recovery, rather than mere knowledge of the existence of the condition, or of some possible risk." Id. at 462. The question of a child's appreciation of danger is ordinarily one for the jury and not for the court. Patterson v. Palley Mfg. Co., 360 Pa. 259, 267, 61 A.2d 861, 865 (1948). As this Court has said:
Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878, 881 (Ala.1993). Thus, the question whether the criterion of § 339(c) was met was for the jury's determination.
Finally we consider § 339(d)"the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved"and § 339(e)"the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the children."
Norfolk Southern does not contend that it had placed any barricades or warning signs on the Brushy Creek trestle. As previously noted, several local residents testified concerning the number of visitors to the trestle. Mike Mauldin, who lives a mile from the trestle, testified that the trestle is a hangout for kids and there are two or three roads and several trails leading to it from county roads. In addition, Mauldin testified that he had seen dune buggies and motorcycles cross the trestle. He estimated that *1106 several times a month people stop at his home to ask for directions to the trestle. The Bear Creek police chief, in whose police jurisdiction the Brushy Creek trestle lies, testified not only that he had observed both adults and children on the trestle, but that in 1991 he had warned a group of Norfolk Southern employees, including a railroad policeman, that they had a problem with adults and children being on the trestle frequently.
The trial court directed a verdict both as to negligence and as to wantonness. In Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., supra, this Court explained that the duty set forth in § 339 may form the basis of a wantonness claim:
627 So. 2d  at 881-82. (Emphasis original; some emphasis omitted.) The trial court erred in entering the summary judgment as to the wantonness count, because there was evidence from which a jury could legitimately infer heightened knowledge.
Norfolk Southern argues that § 339 does not apply, because it contends, Eric Ricketts was engaged in an adult activity at the time of his fall and is therefore held to an adult standard of care. The railroad cites Gunnells v. Dethrage, 366 So. 2d 1104 (Ala. 1979), in which a minor fell asleep while operating an automobile on a public highway, struck a bridge abutment, and injured his minor passenger. This Court held the minor to the same standard as all other users of the highways. Id. The "adult activity" decisions have been used to hold minors liable for injuries sustained by others, as a result of the minor's adult activity. The rationale behind those decisions is that it would be unfair to the public to apply a double standard of care to drivers on public highways, one applicable to adults and another applicable to minors. The record does not reflect that Eric was engaged in an "adult activity" within the principle of these cases.
Norfolk Southern also contends that § 339 does not apply in cases involving falls, because, it says, all children recognize the dangers from falling. In McHugh v. Reading Co., 346 Pa. 266, 30 A.2d 122 (1943), and Arbogast v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n., 452 S.W.2d 81 (Mo.1970), the risk of falling was held to be an open and obvious danger to the child, and therefore § 339(c) was held not applicable. In Lyle v. Bouler, supra, a 16-year-old boy, holding a valid driver's license, *1107 drove with a friend to a clay pit that had not been used commercially for some years. They climbed up the sides of the pit to see which of the two could climb the highest. During one climb, the two came to a ledge and sat on it to rest. Several minutes later, the ledge collapsed and the two fell 15 feet to the bottom. This Court reversed a summary judgment for the defendant landowner in Lyle v. Bouler, reasserting our adherence to § 339, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). This was an obvious recognition that the ultimate question was not whether the child appreciated the danger of falling, but rather was whether the child had a full knowledge of and appreciation of the risk involved.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial court based on the directed verdict for the defendant on the negligence and wantonness counts, is due to be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
KENNEDY, COOK, and BUTTS, JJ., concur.
HOOPER, C.J., concurs specially.
MADDOX, and HOUSTON, JJ., dissent.
INGRAM, J., recused.
HOOPER, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with the majority opinion. However, I write because I believe this Court should be clear in the precedent we are setting. I do not believe a reversal in this case can be justified without overruling Hollis v. Southern Ry., 667 So. 2d 727 (Ala.1995). Hollis correctly states that this Court has adopted § 339, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), as the legal standard for imposing liability on a landowner for harm to children that have trespassed onto the landowner's property. Hollis correctly states that § 339(c) does not impose liability on a landowner for the landowner's not protecting children "against harm resulting from their own immature recklessness in the case of known and appreciated danger." 667 So. 2d  at 732 (quoting cmt. m).
The evidence in this case cannot support a finding that Eric Ricketts did not appreciate the danger he was facing. The danger of falling from a great height is obvious even to a normal 14-year-old. Eric Ricketts was a normal 14-year-old, and the record contains no evidence to support a finding that he did not fully appreciate the danger he was facing. This Court should openly state that it is modifying the Court's adoption of Restatement § 339(c) to include a limited duty of landowners to guard against children's harming themselves through their own immature recklessness. The duty would be limited by the other factors present in Restatement § 339(a),(b),(d), and (e).
This duty should be further limited to cases like the present one, where the landowner had knowledge that children had committed, and were likely to continue to commit, dangerous, immature acts on the property. Further, this duty is imposed only in cases where the landowner easily and with little burden could have eliminated the risk that children would harm themselves through immature, reckless acts that were related to the nature of the artificial condition upon the land. The reason for this duty is the known tendency of many children to carry out reckless acts and the fact that many of the harms resulting from these acts can be easily prevented at a very low cost.
Liability would be imposed only where the landowner does not have a valid affirmative defense. In this case, Norfolk Southern could easily have erected barricades and prevented this tragic event. The defendant claims that federal law prevented it from putting up the barricades. This is an issue the trial court needs to settle; however, the plaintiff should be allowed to fully present the evidence that contradicts the defendant's claim that Interstate Commerce Commission regulations prevented the barricading of the railroad.
The trial judge correctly followed the precedent set by Hollis, supra. However, this Court should openly state that by today's decision it is increasing the duty owed by landowners, so they may be placed on notice. The jury should decide whether liability is *1108 appropriate in this case. A clear standard will prevent needless litigation as to the duty of landowners in future cases of this type.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
I concur in Justice Houston's dissent. I write only in order to set out specifically why I cannot distinguish this case from the Court's recent decision in Hollis v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 667 So. 2d 727 (Ala.1995), and why I believe that case controls.
In Hollis, 16 year-old Dana Joseph Hollis was severely injured while trespassing on the property of Norfolk Southern Railway. His father, individually and in Dana's behalf, sued alleging that Norfolk Southern Railway had been negligent in failing "to install a fence and to place `no trespassing' signs around the area where Dana fell" and that the place where Dana fell was an attractive nuisance. 667 So. 2d  at 728. The specific facts of that case are as follows (as stated in this Court's opinion):
667 So. 2d  at 729-30.
Based on that set of facts, the trial court granted Norfolk Southern's motion for summary judgment. This Court affirmed, stating that its decision did not "turn" on Norfolk Southern's knowledge of other child trespassers, but "on Dana's knowledge of the risk and his concurrent ability to appreciate that risk." 667 So. 2d  at 731. It stated, "Section 339(c) [Restatement (Second) of Torts] makes a lack of knowledge of the risk and a lack of ability to appreciate that risk an element of a plaintiff's prima facie case." 667 So. 2d  at 731. The Court went on to state:
667 So. 2d  at 731.
The majority's opinion in the present case points out many examples of trespassing by other persons in the area where Eric Ricketts fell, but this Court pointed out in Hollis that the question of landowner liability in cases of this type does not "turn" on whether the defendant had knowledge of previous trespassers. The issue here, as in Hollis, is whether the child trespasser lacked a knowledge of the risk and/or lacked an ability to appreciate that risk.
*1110 The majority, quoting a 1959 California Law Review article, states that "`"appreciation" of the danger is what is required to bar recovery, rather than mere knowledge of the existence of the condition, or of some possible risk'" and that whether the child appreciated the danger is a question for the jury. 686 So. 2d  at 1105. Even if we applied that liberal test to the facts in this case, we would be required to reach the same result we reached in Hollis. Norfolk Southern presented evidence indicating that Eric appreciated the danger, but the plaintiffs, like the plaintiff in Hollis, presented no evidence that the injured child trespasser lacked knowledge of the risk or lacked an ability to appreciate the risk. Evidence of such a lack of knowledge or lack of ability to appreciate the risk is necessary for the plaintiff to present a prima facie case under Restatement § 339. 667 So. 2d  at 731.
Eric's mother testified that he was an average boy of 14 and that in school he made average grades. Eric was familiar with the bridge from which he fell. Furthermore, his companion on the day of the accident, Sam McGough, testified that before crossing the bridge Eric took off his helmet and said that if he fell off the bridge the helmet would not help him. This statement clearly shows that Eric appreciated the danger of falling off the bridge and injuring himself if he attempted to cross it. The plaintiffs presented no evidence to refute this evidence that Eric knew of, and appreciated, the risk that he could fall off the bridge. Consequently, the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving an essential element under Restatement § 339 that Eric lacked knowledge of, or lacked an ability to appreciate, the risk associated with his conduct. Thus, the trial judge properly directed a verdict for Norfolk Southern, based on the rule applied in Hollis.
With the issuance of this opinion, the legal community is now faced with two conflicting holdings by the state's highest Court that I believe cannot be reconciled. I believe the majority opinion in this case incorrectly applies the law.
HOUSTON, Justice (dissenting).
I concurred in Justice Almon's case of Hollis v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 667 So. 2d 727 (Ala.1995). I cannot distinguish this case from Hollis, but I can distinguish it from Motes v. Matthews, 497 So. 2d 1121 (Ala. 1986), a case that I authored. In Hollis, we noted that the plaintiff argued, as Mr. Ricketts argues in this case, that the minor's "appreciation of the risk" was a question of fact for the jury, but we held that "because the evidence shows without dispute that Dana in fact appreciated the risk, Norfolk Southern was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 667 So. 2d  at 732. There is evidence that Eric appreciated the risk; there is no evidence that he did not. "Section 339(c) [Restatement (Second) of Torts] makes a lack of knowledge of the risk and a lack of ability to appreciate that risk an element of a plaintiff's prima facie case." Hollis, 667 So. 2d  at 731.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court; therefore, I must dissent.
MADDOX, J., concurs.