Title: LONNIE LESSARD V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LONNIE LESSARD V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 89158 P.3d 698Case Number: 05-295Decided: 05/24/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
LONNIE 
LESSARD,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

P. Craig 
Silva of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Director, 
Geoffrey L. Gunnerson, Student Director, and Jenny Staeben, Student Intern, of 
the Prosecution Assistance Program.  
Argument by Mr. Gunnerson.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE,  JJ., and BROOKS, 
D.J.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Lonnie 
Lessard appeals his convictions for burglary, first degree sexual assault, and 
attempted first degree sexual assault.  
He asserts error in the admission of evidence which he claims constituted 
improper comments on his right to remain silent.  Lessard also faults the district court 
for not severing the criminal charges against him and accuses defense counsel of 
providing constitutionally ineffective assistance.  We affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Lessard presents 
the following issues for our review:

 
 
A.        The 
prosecution elicited testimony from two witnesses and admitted a transcribed 
statement of Lonnie Lessard which commented on Mr. Lessard's right to remain 
silent and violated his Fifth Amendment rights under the United States 
Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution, Art. 1, § 11.

 
 
B.        The 
trial court abused its discretion when it did not sever the two sexual assault 
offenses against [SH] and [SG], denying Lonnie Lessard his right to a fair 
trial.

 
 
C.        
Lonnie Lessard was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel by trial counsel's deficient performance in defense of 
Appellant.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      During the early 
morning hours of June 9, 2004, Lessard left his residence, driving a light blue 
Dodge minivan belonging to his girlfriend, Anna Mae Johnson.  He drove to the residence of SH1 and entered her home through a 
kitchen window.  SH was awakened by 
the sound of the Venetian blinds hitting the window and a loud "thud."  SH went to investigate the noise and saw 
Lessard standing in her kitchen next to the refrigerator.  When she asked him why he was in her 
home, he responded, "I'm going to rape you.  I'm going to rape you hard."  As she turned to run, Lessard grabbed 
her around the neck and covered her mouth.  
He then dragged her down the hallway to the bedroom, removed her clothes, 
and sexually assaulted her.

 

[¶4]      After the 
assault, Lessard left SH's presence momentarily to use the bathroom.  SH seized upon that opportunity and 
escaped the confines of her home, wearing only a short, flannel-type jacket she 
found hanging by the front door.  
Once outside, she ran directly to the home of her neighbor and friend, 
Helen Markland, who lived across the street.  After learning what had happened, Ms. 
Markland called 911.  While talking 
to the 911 operator, Ms. Markland stepped outside and noticed the minivan 
Lessard had been driving for the last several months parked by SH's residence.2  Shortly thereafter, she saw the minivan 
leave the area.  Ms. Markland 
attempted to follow the van, but lost it a few blocks away.  

 
 
[¶5]      Within minutes of 
the 911 call, deputies from the Laramie County Sheriff's Department arrived at 
the scene.  During the ensuing 
investigation, the deputies found Lessard's cell phone, which was under some 
spilled dog food on the kitchen floor, and one of his shoes, which was lying 
next to SH's bed.  They also 
discovered that the clothing SH was wearing before the assault, as well as an 
afghan she kept by her bed, were missing.  
A description of the missing items was relayed to the deputies searching 
for Lessard.  

 
 
[¶6]      In an effort to 
locate Lessard, Deputies Mark Slovik and Terry Camery went to the residence of 
SG, Lessard's estranged wife.3 Upon arrival at SG's residence, 
Deputies Slovik and Camery found the minivan that Lessard had been driving.  The deputies felt the tires and hood of 
the minivan and discovered they were still warm.  They also noticed that the keys were 
still in the ignition and that there were some clothes in the van.  

 
 
[¶7]      The deputies 
knocked on the door of the residence and Lessard responded, wearing only gray 
sweatpants.  As Lessard described 
his activities that night, the deputies observed SG shaking her head in the 
negative to his statements.  The 
deputies asked Lessard to accompany them to the Sheriff's Office for a formal 
interview.  Lessard ultimately 
agreed to do so, but said he wanted to get dressed before going with them.  Lessard, however, could not locate any 
of his clothing in the residence and eventually told the deputies that his 
clothes were in the van.  Deputy 
Slovik and Deputy Susan Sports, who had just arrived at the residence, then 
escorted Lessard to the van to retrieve his clothing.  

 
 
[¶8]      While they were 
outside, SG reported to Deputy Camery that she was awakened by Lessard covering 
her mouth and pulling her hair.  
Lessard was naked and demanding that she lay quietly in bed and do as he 
instructed.  According to SG, 
Lessard told her that he was there to rape her and he then climbed on top of 
her.  She stated that Lessard had 
been attempting to force her to perform oral sex on him when the deputies 
knocked on her door. 

 
 
[¶9]      After Lessard 
returned with his clothes, Deputy Camery confirmed his willingness to accompany 
the deputies to the Sheriff's Office.  
As he prepared to go, Lessard stated, "arrest me."  When Deputy Camery responded that he was 
not under arrest and that they merely wanted to speak with him, Lessard stated, 
"Arrest me, I'm a sex offender."  At 
this point, Deputy Sports informed Deputy Camery that she saw both an afghan and 
clothes matching those described by SH and a shoe that matched the one collected 
at SH's residence inside the van.  
Deputy Camery then placed Lessard under arrest.  

 
 
[¶10]   Lessard was later interviewed by 
Detective Linda Gesell.  During that 
interview, Lessard denied being at SH's house.  He also gave conflicting accounts as to 
his activities that morning and how he obtained possession of SH's afghan and 
clothes.  The interview concluded 
when Lessard demanded the help of an attorney in obtaining a DNA test. 

 
 
[¶11]   The State charged Lessard with five 
felonies arising out the incidents on June 9: burglary of SH's residence (Count 
I), a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a) (LexisNexis 2005); two counts of 
first degree sexual assault against SH (Counts II and III), a violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005); attempted first degree sexual 
assault as to SH (Count IV), a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-301(a) 
(LexisNexis 2005) and 6-2-302(a)(i); and attempted first degree sexual assault 
as to SG (Count V), a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-301(a) and 
6-2-302(a)(i).  Prior to trial, 
Lessard filed several motions, including a motion in limine to exclude evidence 
of his prior convictions, a motion to sever the sexual assault cases, and two 
motions to suppress his statements to law enforcement.  After hearing, the district court denied 
the motion to sever and the motions to suppress, but granted in part the motion 
in limine involving his prior criminal record.  

 
 
[¶12]   Lessard's jury trial began on 
December 7 and concluded on December 9, with a verdict of guilty on Counts I, 
II, III, and V.  Before sentencing, 
Lessard sought a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel and newly discovered evidence.  
After hearing, during which Lessard was represented by new counsel, the 
district court denied Lessard's new trial motions, concluding that Lessard had 
not met his burden of proving that the proffered evidence could not have been 
produced at trial and that trial counsel had provided deficient assistance.  

 
 
[¶13]   The district court sentenced 
Lessard to prison terms of 6 to 10 years on Count I, 12 to 28 years on Counts II 
and III, and 15 to 30 years on Count V.  
The district court ordered Counts II and III to run concurrent to each 
other, but consecutive to Count I, and Count V to run consecutive to Counts II 
and III.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
Comments 
on right to silence

 
 
[¶14]   Lessard points to excerpts from the 
testimony of two prosecution witnesses, SG and Detective Gesell, and a 
transcript of his post-arrest statement to Detective Gesell that was introduced 
at trial, and asserts that they constituted improper comments on his 
constitutional right to remain silent.  
Lessard did not object to the alleged improper comments at trial.  Therefore, we must review his claim 
under the plain error standard, which requires Lessard to show in the record an 
error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law resulting in 
material prejudice to a substantial right.  
Abeyta v. State, 2003 WY 136, 
¶ 10, 78 P.3d 664, 667 (Wyo. 2003); Spinner v. State, 2003 WY 106, ¶ 13, 75 P.3d 1016, 1019 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶15]   Art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming 
Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be compelled to testify against 
himself in any criminal case."  In 
Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 390 
(Wyo. 1995), 
we held that an individual's "constitutional right to silence exists at all 
times  before arrest, at arrest, and after arrest; before a Miranda warning and after it"  and is 
self-executing.  We also held that a 
prosecutor's failure to respect the constitutional right of the defendant not to 
have his silence called to the attention of the jury will result in reversal of 
the defendant's conviction.  
Id.  A "comment" on a defendant's exercise of 
his right to silence occurs when the prosecutor uses the silence to the state's 
advantage either as substantive evidence of guilt or to suggest to the jury that 
the silence was an admission of guilt.  
Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 
45, ¶¶ 39-40, 43 P.3d 80, 96-97 (Wyo. 2002); Shipman v. State, 2001 WY 11, ¶ 24, 17 P.3d 34, 39 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶16]   In analyzing right-to-silence 
claims, we consider the "entire context in which the statements were made" and 
we will "not take sentences and phrases out of context."  Spinner, ¶ 19, 75 P.3d  at 1024 (quoting 
Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 373 
(Wyo. 2000)).  We also consider 
"whether the prosecutor asked improper questions, whether he emphasized or 
followed up on the silence issue, and whether he attempted to exploit the issue 
in any way."  Id.  (quoting Lancaster, ¶ 39, 
43 P.3d at 96).

 
 
[¶17]   Lessard first complains about the 
following exchange during the prosecutor's examination of 
SG:

 
 
[Prosecutor]   Were you present when they asked 
[Lessard] if he was willing to come down and talk with 
them?

 
 
[SG]    Yes, I 
was.

 
 
[Prosecutor]   Was he agreeable with 
that?

 
 
[SG]    No.

 
 
[Prosecutor]   Did he at some point agree to 
go?

 
 
[SG]    No.  They asked several times if he would 
just come down and talk to them. 

 
 
[¶18]   Considering this testimony in 
proper context, we do not find that it amounts to an improper comment of 
Lessard's right to silence.  It 
appears that the prosecutor elicited this testimony to reconstruct Lessard's 
behavior during his initial encounter with law enforcement at SG's 
residence.  SG's testimony drew 
attention only to Lessard's reluctance to leave SG alone with the deputies; it 
did not indicate that Lessard did not want to talk to the deputies.  In fact, the jury heard testimony 
indicating Lessard's willingness to talk to the deputies about his whereabouts 
and activities that morning.  At no 
point did the prosecutor attempt to exploit SG's testimony to imply that Lessard 
was unwilling to talk to the deputies.

 
 
[¶19]   Lessard next asserts error in the 
following testimony by Detective Gesell:

 
 
[Prosecutor]   At any time did [Lessard] make a 
complaint to you about his physical mobility and inability to climb in and out 
of a window, for example?

 
 
[Gesell]           
No.

 
 
[Prosecutor]   At any time did he make any kind of 
physical complaint whatsoever, like my back hurts, my necks [sic] hurts, 
anything like that?

 
 
[Gesell]           
No. 

 
 
[¶20]   Obviously, the prosecutor's inquiry 
was not an impermissible comment on Lessard's right to silence.  Lessard did not exercise his right to 
remain silent but, instead, chose to answer the detective's questions concerning 
the victims' allegations and his activities that morning.  The prosecutor merely asked Detective 
Gesell if Lessard had mentioned back or neck problems when she informed him that 
he had been accused of entering SH's residence by climbing through a 
window.  Detective Gesell's response 
indicated only that Lessard had not complained of such problems during the 
entire interview.  The clear intent 
of the prosecutor's inquiry was to address Lessard's trial defense that back and 
neck problems made it impossible for him to have climbed through the window at 
SH's residence.  In drawing 
attention to this omission, the prosecutor was not suggesting that the jury make 
the prohibited inference that Lessard remained silent because he was afraid of 
betraying his guilt.  Rather, the 
prosecutor suggested only that it would have been natural for Lessard to mention 
that he had back problems, since they would have prevented him from committing 
the crime.

 
 
[¶21]   Lessard lastly complains about the 
admission of the transcript of his post-arrest statement to Detective Gesell 
that contained a request for counsel.  
We disagree that the transcribed statement constituted an improper 
comment on Lessard's right to remain silent.  The challenged portion focused on 
Lessard's request to have a DNA test, which he believed would exculpate him in 
the crimes involving SH.  In the 
statement, Lessard said, "I want it done right now, tonight and right now I want 
to see an attorney.  Because I want 
to get this done."  The context of 
his request for counsel indicates that Lessard wanted an attorney in an attempt 
to force Detective Gesell to conduct a DNA test, not to protect his right to 
silence or hide his guilt.  We find 
nothing in the record indicating the prosecutor used that statement for the 
prohibited inference of guilt from silence.

 
 
[¶22]   We hold that Lessard has not 
demonstrated a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law with respect 
to any of the challenged evidence.  
The evidence did not constitute an impermissible comment on Lessard's 
right to remain silent.  We find no 
plain error.

 
 

Denial 
of motion to sever

 
 
[¶23]   Lessard contends that the district 
court erred in denying his motion to sever the sexual assault charge involving 
SG from the sexual assault charges involving SH.  He claims the charges were fundamentally 
different and that the failure to sever them prejudiced his right to a fair 
trial.  We 
disagree.

 
 
[¶24]   The denial of a motion for 
severance is generally within the sound discretion of the district court and 
will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion.  Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 723 
(Wyo. 1999); Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1198 
(Wyo. 
1997).  A court does not abuse its 
discretion unless it acts in a manner that exceeds the bounds of reason under 
the circumstances.  Bell v. State, 994 P.2d 947, 955 (Wyo. 
2000).  An abuse of discretion 
occurs when joinder of separate charges deprived the defendant of a fair 
trial.  Mitchell, 982 P.2d  at 723; Black v. State, 869 P.2d 1137, 1139 
(Wyo. 
1994).

 
 
[¶25]   W.R.Cr.P. 8(a) specifically permits 
joinder of multiple offenses in a single information or indictment if the 
offenses charged "are of the same or similar character, are based on the same 
act or transaction, or are based on two or more acts or transactions connected 
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan."  We have stated:

 
 
As a 
general rule, joinder of offenses is proper absent compelling reasons for 
severance.  Bell v. State, 994 P.2d 947, 955 (Wyo. 
2000) (citing Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 247 (Wyo. 1984)).  "Joint trials serve the public interest 
by expediting the administration of justice, reducing docket congestion, 
conserving judicial time as well as that of jurors along with avoiding the 
recall of witnesses to duplicate their performances."  [Id.] (quoting Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1335 
(Wyo. 
1977)).  Any prejudice caused by the 
joinder is weighed against the judicial economies created by joinder.  [Id.] (citing Dorador v. State, 768 P.2d 1049, 1052 
(Wyo. 1989); Lee v. State, 653 P.2d 1388 (Wyo. 
1982)).

 
 

Duke v. 
State, 2004 
WY 120, ¶ 42, 99 P.3d 928, 945 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1062, 125 S. Ct. 2513, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (2005).

 
 
[¶26]   Upon review of the record, we find 
that the sexual assault offenses were similar in character and so related as to 
constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.  Although the criminal acts occurred at 
different locations and against different victims, the nature and circumstances 
surrounding the commission of those offenses were almost identical.  Lessard knew both victims.  In each instance, Lessard entered the 
home of the victim under the cover of darkness, told the victim he was there to 
rape her, subdued her by force and demanded that she perform oral sex upon 
him.  Given the facts in this case, 
we have no trouble concluding that the offenses were properly joined as 
permitted by W.R.Cr.P. 8(a).

 
 
[¶27]   Lessard argues that, even if the 
charges were properly joined under W.R.Cr.P. 8(a), separate trials should have 
been held as to each victim because of the prejudicial risks a single trial 
posed to him.  Lessard insists he 
was prejudiced by the single trial because of the cumulative nature of the 
evidence and the jury's inability to separate the evidence in reaching a verdict 
with respect to each charge.

 
 
[¶28]   W.R.Cr.P. 14 allows the trial court 
to order separate trials if the defendant is prejudiced by the joinder of 
offenses.  This Court has 
articulated a two-part test for determining whether joinder prejudiced a 
defendant:

 
 
The 
first is whether the evidence relating to the similar offenses charged would be 
admissible in a separate trial of each offense.  Tabor [v. State], 616 P.2d [1282,] 1284 
[(Wyo. 
1980)].  If the evidence would be 
admissible, there is no prejudice.  
If the evidence would not be admissible in separate trials, the trial 
court should then determine whether the evidence of each crime is "simple and 
distinct."  Drew v. United 
States, 331 F.2d 85, 91 (D.C.Cir. 
1964).  Stated differently, the 
second consideration is whether the evidence relating to the separate offenses 
would be so complicated that the jury could not reasonably be expected to 
separate them and evaluate the evidence properly and individually on each 
separate charge.  Pote v. State, 695 P.2d 617 (Wyo. 
1985).

 
 

Duke, ¶ 43, 
99 P.3d  at 945 (citing Dorador v. 
State, 768 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Wyo. 1989)).

 
 
[¶29]   We agree with the State that the 
evidence concerning both victims would have been admissible in separate trials 
under W.R.E. 404(b) to show motive, course of conduct or to show a common plan 
or scheme.  Even if we were to find 
the evidence inadmissible, the facts of this case were uncomplicated and 
relatively easy to understand.  The 
district court carefully defined in clear and understandable language each crime 
charged and the proof required for a finding of guilt.  The district court also specifically 
instructed the jury that it had to give separate consideration to each count, 
and the evidence pertaining to it, and that its finding on one count was not to 
control its verdict as to any of the other charged crimes.  There is no indication in the record 
that the jury disregarded the district court's instructions or that it was 
unable to separate the evidence in support of one crime from the evidence in 
support of the other charged crimes.  
In fact, the jury acquitted Lessard on Count IV.  Under the circumstances, we cannot 
conclude that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to sever the 
criminal charges.

 
 
Ineffective 
assistance of counsel

 
 
[¶30]   In his last contention of error, 
Lessard claims he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.  In analyzing 
ineffectiveness claims, we have stated:

 
 
When 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.  Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 796 
(Wyo. 1995); Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 1266-67 
(Wyo. 1995); Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 
(Wyo. 1994); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 
(Wyo. 
1986).  The reviewing court should 
indulge a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made 
all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 
judgment.  Herdt, [891 P.2d] 
at 796; Starr, [888 P.2d] at 1266; Arner, [872 P.2d] at 104; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

 
 
Under 
the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and Frias, an 
appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the 
record that counsel's performance was deficient and that prejudice 
resulted.  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Starr, 
[888 P.2d] at 1266; King v. State, 
810 P.2d 119, 125 (Wyo. 1991) (Cardine, J., 
dissenting); Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628, 629 (Wyo. 1986); Frias, 722 P.2d  at 145.  In other words, to warrant reversal on a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that 
his counsel failed to "render such assistance as would have been offered by a 
reasonably competent attorney" and that "counsel's deficiency prejudiced the 
defense of the case."  Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 
(Wyo. 
1990).  "The benchmark for judging 
any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on 
as having produced a just result."  
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2064.

 
 

Asch 
[v. 
State, 2003 WY 18,] 
¶ 11[, 62 P.3d 945, 950 (Wyo. 2003)] (quoting Becker v. State, 2002 WY 126, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d 94, [99] (Wyo. 2002); Reyna v. 
State, 2001 WY 105, ¶ 19, 33 P.3d 1129, [1134-35] (Wyo. 2001); Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶ 6, 18 P.3d 1164, [1168] (Wyo. 2001); Grainey v. 
State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Wyo. 2000)).  The burden of proving that counsel was 
ineffective rests entirely on an appellant.  [Id.] (citing Barkell v. State, 2002 WY 153, ¶ 10, 55 P.3d 1239, [1242] (Wyo. 2002)).  To 
satisfy his burden, an appellant must provide more than mere speculation or 
equivocal inferences.  Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, ¶ 37, 76 P.3d 323, [337] (Wyo. 2003) (citing Barkell, ¶ 13[, 55 P.3d at 
1243]).

 
 

Duke, ¶ 36, 
99 P.3d  at 943; see also   Martinez v. State, 
2006 WY 20, ¶ 23, 128 P.3d 652, 662-63 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶31]   Lessard has set forth six claims of 
alleged ineffectiveness, namely: (1) trial counsel told the jury he was a prior 
sex offender; (2) trial counsel did not examine all the photos that were part of 
discovery; (3) trial counsel failed to object to everything he could have at 
trial; (4) trial counsel failed to timely submit jury instructions and 
erroneously requested an intoxication instruction; (5) trial counsel did not 
submit the telephone records of Anna Mae Johnson; and (6) trial counsel and his 
subsequent counsel at the post-trial motion hearing did not introduce the 
medical testimony of Dr. Wright.4  

 
 
[¶32]   Lessard has failed to support his 
various ineffectiveness claims with a cogent legal analysis.  Although he gives a detailed description 
of the challenged acts and omissions, he fails to explain how counsel's acts or 
omissions fell below that of a reasonably competent attorney.  He presents no argument that counsel's 
alleged acts or omissions did not represent professionally sound strategy under 
the circumstances.  Lessard's 
argument seems to be simply that the case against him was weak and counsel's 
alleged errors in representation, because of the outcome, were obviously 
prejudicial.  This argument is 
insufficient to satisfy Lessard's burden of overcoming our strong presumption 
that counsel rendered adequate assistance.  
Lessard has not convinced us that his counsel's conduct so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that his trial cannot be relied 
upon as having produced a just result.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶33]   We affirm Lessard's convictions in 
all respects.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Lessard and 
SH had known each other for several years and were intimately involved until SH 
terminated the relationship in July 2002.  

 
 

2Since 2001, 
Lessard had been doing maintenance work for Ms. Markland at the mobile home park 
she managed and wherein she and SH resided.  

 
 

3SG and 
Lessard were divorced in July 2004.

 

4Dr. Wright examined 
Lessard for back problems a little over one month after trial.  Although no evidence of that examination 
was introduced in the proceedings below, a report allegedly produced by the 
doctor is included in the record on appeal.  The report indicates some mild spinal 
spondylosis in the mid and low back and a more severe spinal spondylosis in his 
neck.