Title: Broderick v. Dairyland Ins. Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MARK BRODERICK v. DAIRYLAND INSURANCE COMPANY and JONATHAN SCHRACK2012 WY 22Case Number: S-11-0096Decided: 02/16/2012NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
MARK 
BRODERICK,Appellant (Plaintiff),v.DAIRYLAND INSURANCE 
COMPANY and JONATHAN SCHRACK,Appellees (Defendants).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County
The 
Honorable Catherine E. Wilking, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Stephen 
R. Winship of Winship & Winship, P.C., Casper, 
Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee Dairyland Insurance Company:
Richard 
G. Schneebeck & Amanda M. Good of Hirst Applegate, LLP, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Schneebeck.
 
Representing 
Appellee Jonathan Schrack:
Cameron 
S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, 
Wyoming.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      The appellant was 
physically injured as a result of an accident caused by an underinsured 
motorist.  Prior to the accident, 
the appellant purchased a Dairyland Insurance Company (Dairyland) policy through 
his insurance agent, Jonathan Schrack (Schrack).  Although the appellant requested “full 
coverage,” the policy did not include underinsured motorist coverage.  When the other driver’s insurance did 
not fully cover the appellant’s damages, the appellant sued Dairyland and 
Schrack, raising numerous theories as to why he should recover under the 
Dairyland policy.  The district 
court granted Dairyland’s and Schrack’s motions for summary judgment.  We affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Did the district 
court properly grant summary judgment in favor of Dairyland and 
Schrack?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      In May 2008, 
the appellant and his wife met with Schrack to purchase insurance for the 
appellant’s motorcycle.  Schrack 
served as an agent for Dairyland and other insurers.  The appellant purchased a Dairyland 
policy that included liability coverage and uninsured motorist coverage, both 
with limits of $100,000 per person, and $300,000 per accident, but did not 
include underinsured motorist coverage.  The policy defines an uninsured motor 
vehicle as follows:
 
An 
uninsured motor vehicle is a motor vehicle for which there is no bodily injury 
policy or liability bond available at the time of the motor vehicle accident 
with at least the minimum limits required by the financial responsibility law of 
the state in which your motorcycle is principally garaged.
 
An 
uninsured motor vehicle also includes a motor vehicle which has insurance 
available at the time of the motor vehicle accident but the company writing it 
becomes insolvent or denies coverage.
 
An 
uninsured motor vehicle is a hit-and-run motor vehicle that strikes you, or a 
motor vehicle you are occupying, if neither the driver nor the owner can be 
identified.[1]
 
Neither 
the Supplemental Declarations Page of the appellant’s policy nor the body of 
the policy itself made any mention of underinsured motorist coverage.  All parties acknowledge that neither the 
appellant nor his wife read the policy.
 
[¶4]      On July 11, 2008, 
the appellant was riding his motorcycle when another motorist ran a stop sign 
and collided with him, causing the appellant serious injury.  At the time of the accident the other 
motorist had the minimum bodily injury insurance required under Wyoming law 
($25,000 per person, $50,000 per accident).  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-9-405(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2011).  
With Dairyland’s consent, the appellant settled with the other motorist’s 
insurer for $25,000.  The 
appellant’s medical bills and lost wages exceeded that amount, however, and the 
following year he sought $75,000 from Dairyland, which amount represented his 
Dairyland policy limit less the amount received from the other motorist’s 
insurer.
 
[¶5]      After 
investigating the matter, Dairyland filed a declaratory judgment action in 
federal district court seeking a determination that it was not required to pay 
the appellant under the terms of the policy.  The action in state district court 
commenced following the federal court’s dismissal of Dairyland’s lawsuit.  Subsequently, Dairyland and Schrack 
filed separate motions for summary judgment.  Following a hearing on the motions, the 
district court granted Dairyland’s motion, finding that the uninsured motorist 
statutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-10-101 and 31-10-102 (LexisNexis 2011), are not 
ambiguous and do not require underinsured motorist coverage, that the policy 
sold to the appellant was not ambiguous and did not include underinsured 
motorist coverage, that reformation of the contract was not appropriate because 
there was no mutual mistake, that application of the promissory estoppel 
doctrine was not appropriate because there was no evidence to establish the 
“existence of a clear and definite promise between Dairyland and the 
[appellant]” or reasonable reliance on the part of the appellant, and that the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations was inapplicable because the policy was 
unambiguous in not including underinsured motorist coverage.  The district court also granted Schrack’s 
motion, finding that the appellant did not have a viable claim under the Wyoming 
Consumer Protection Act because of the failure to give statutory notice to 
Schrack, that promissory estoppel could not be applied because there can be no 
reasonable expectation of coverage where the appellant did not read the 
contract, and that the appellant could not rely upon the appellant’s apparent 
authority to bind Dairyland where the policy clearly provided to the 
contrary.  This appeal 
followed.
 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶6]      The standard of 
summary judgment review is well established by this Court.
 
Summary 
judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and 
the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law.  Eklund v. PRI Environmental, 
Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶ 10, 25 P.3d 511, [514-15] (Wyo. 2001); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of establishing 
or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense that has been 
asserted by the parties.  Williams Gas Processing-Wamsutter Co. 
v. Union Pacific Resources Co., 2001 WY 57, ¶ 11, 25 P.3d 1064, 
[1071] (Wyo. 2001).  We examine the 
record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the 
motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may 
fairly be drawn from the record.  Id.  We evaluate the propriety of a summary 
judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials as were 
employed and used by the lower court.  Scherer Constr., LLC v. Hedquist 
Constr., Inc., 2001 WY 23, 
¶ 15, 18 P.3d 645, [651] (Wyo. 2001).  We do not accord any deference to the 
district court’s decisions on issues of law.  Id.
 
Trabing 
v. Kinko’s, Inc., 
2002 WY 171, ¶ 8, 57 P.3d 1248, 1252 (Wyo. 2002).
 
[¶7]      Statutory 
construction is a matter of law that we review de novo.  State ex rel. Dep’t of Revenue v. Hanover 
Compression, LP, 2008 WY 138, ¶ 
8, 196 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2008).  
Likewise, both the question of whether a contract is ambiguous and the 
interpretation of an unambiguous contract are matters of law that we review de novo.  Wadi Petroleum, Inc. v. Ultra Res., 
Inc., 2003 WY 41, ¶ 10, 65 P.3d 703, 707 (Wyo. 2003).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶8]      The appellant 
argues that Wyoming’s Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage statutes (Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 31-10-101 and 31-10-102) are ambiguous.  
For that reason, he concludes the statutes should be “interpreted so as 
to not lead to the anomalous result that it would have been better for [the 
appellant] to be hit by a tortfeasor with no insurance at all.”  That argument suggests that this Court 
should read mandatory underinsured motorist coverage into the 
statute.
 
[¶9]      We read statutes 
for their apparent meaning:
 
We 
endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature’s intent. 
 We begin by making an inquiry 
respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to 
their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of 
the statute in pari materia.  When a statute is sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and 
do not resort to the rules of statutory construction.
 
Johnson 
v. Johnson (In re Estate of Johnson), 
2010 WY 63, ¶ 8, 231 P.3d 873, 877 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Loberg v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety 
& Comp. Div. (In re Loberg), 2004 WY 48, ¶ 5, 88 P.3d 1045, 1048 
(Wyo. 2004)).
 
[¶10]   The statute at issue is entitled 
“Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage.” The substantive part of the statute is found 
in the following section:
 
No 
policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily 
injury 
or death suffered by any natural person arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state 
with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this 
state unless coverage is provided therein 
or supplemental thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death as provided by 
W.S. § 31-9-102(a)(xi), under provisions approved by the insurance commissioner 
for the protection of persons insured 
thereunder or legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, 
including death resulting therefrom. . . .
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-10-101 (emphasis added).  
The plain meaning of this section is to require motor vehicle insurers to 
provide coverage for an insured who is injured in an automobile accident caused 
by an uninsured driver.  The statute makes no mention of 
underinsured motorist coverage and this Court has no authority to read such 
coverage into it.  Hanover Compression, 2008 WY 138, ¶ 8, 
196 P.3d  at 784 (“Moreover, we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a 
statute to matters that do not fall within its express provisions.”).  “In contrast to many states that have 
passed legislation on the subject, Wyoming statutes governing uninsured motorist 
coverage are silent as to the treatment of underinsured motorist 
coverage.”  Aaron v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
2001 WY 112, ¶ 11, 34 P.3d 929, 932 (Wyo. 2001) (emphasis in original).  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
echoed this interpretation: “In short, in contrast to its statutory mandate 
regarding uninsured motorist coverage, Wyoming has chosen to allow insurers to 
offer underinsured motorist coverage on whatever terms they see fit, or even not 
to offer such coverage at all.”  Winegeart v. Am. Alternative Ins. Corp., 
224 Fed. Appx. 807, 809 (10th Cir. 2007).  The statute is unambiguous to the extent 
that it does not compel the insured to obtain, or the insurer to provide, 
underinsured motorist coverage.
 
[¶11]   In addition to his statutory 
argument, the appellant contends that the uninsured motorist provisions of the 
Dairyland policy are ambiguous.  In 
considering this allegation, the district court correctly applied the following 
principles:
 
An 
insurance policy constitutes a contract between the insurer and the insured. 
 As with other types of contracts, 
our basic purpose in construing or interpreting an insurance contract is to 
determine the parties’ true intent.  We must determine intent, if possible, 
from the language used in the policy, viewing it in light of what the parties 
must reasonably have intended.  The 
nature of our inquiry depends upon how clearly the parties have memorialized 
their intent.  Where the contract is 
clear and unambiguous, our inquiry is limited to the four corners of the 
document.
 
State 
ex rel. Arnold v. Ommen, 
2009 WY 24, ¶ 37, 201 P.3d 1127, 1137 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Cathcart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 2005 WY 154, ¶ 18, 123 P.3d 579, 587-88 (Wyo. 2005)).  Furthermore, “[w]hen interpreting a 
contract, 'the contract as a whole should be considered, with each part being 
read in light of all other parts.’”  
Am. Nat’l Bank v. Sara, 2011 
WY 9, ¶ 11, 246 P.3d 294, 298 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting Dorr v. Wyo. Bd. of Certified Pub. 
Accountants, 2006 WY 144, ¶ 16, 146 P.3d 943, 953 (Wyo. 2006)).  The district court determined that, when 
looked at as a whole, the policy was not ambiguous.
 
[¶12]   The policy, like the statute, makes 
no mention of underinsured motorist coverage.  The “crucial part of the Policy,” 
according to the appellant, is “[t]his insurance covers bodily injury . . . 
which results from the injury caused by a motor vehicle accident and suffered by 
you.”  This language appears, 
however, under the heading “Uninsured Motorist Insurance” and, we cannot read 
more into this language than plainly appears.  The insurance policy purchased by the 
appellant is unambiguous in that it does not provide coverage for bodily injury 
incurred in an accident with an underinsured motorist.
 
[¶13]   The appellant argues that, despite 
his failure to read his insurance policy, summary judgment should not have been 
granted on his contract and tort claims.  
The appellant has interpreted the district court’s holding that his 
contract and tort claims are barred by his failure to read the contract as 
indicating that the appellant failed to mitigate damages.  This is an improper interpretation of 
the law and of the district court’s holding.  Dairyland correctly argues that this 
logic would be more applicable in a situation where the appellant read the 
policy and was aware that it did not provide certain coverage, and failed to do 
anything about it.
 
[¶14]   We have held that, in circumstances 
such as those presently before the Court, a failure to read one’s insurance 
contract presents an absolute bar to recovery under contract and tort 
claims.  W.N. McMurry Constr. Co. v. Cmty. First 
Ins., Inc., 2007 WY 96, ¶ 37, 160 P.3d 71, 83 (Wyo. 2007) (summary judgment 
appropriate where insured failed to read a policy that mistakenly excluded 
requested coverage).  This Court has 
more recently reiterated this rule:  “The law in Wyoming is that a policy 
holder has a duty to read his or her insurance policy.”  Cathcart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 2005 WY 154, ¶ 49, 123 P.3d 579, 596 (Wyo. 2005) (citing Small v. King, 915 P.2d 1192, 1194 (Wyo. 
1996) (“When 
purchasing insurance, a person has a duty to read the policy.  If the policy is unacceptable, the 
person may either reject the policy or renegotiate the contract with the 
insurer.”); Feather v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 872 P.2d 1177, 1181 
(Wyo. 1994) (summary judgment was appropriate where appellant failed to read 
renewal notices which clearly indicated that the automobile at issue was not 
listed as covered by the policy); Darlow v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 822 P.2d 820, 828–29 (Wyo. 1991)).  Moreover, 
we have held that the insured’s failure to read the policy is available as a 
defense both to the insurer and to the agent.  Cordero Mining Co. v. United States Fid. 
& Guar. Ins. Co., 2003 WY 48, ¶¶ 26, 30, 67 P.3d 616, 625-26 (Wyo. 
2003).
 
[¶15]   The appellant also argues that the 
district court should have reformed the policy.  “Reformation is an equitable remedy 
available in cases where a mistake in the drafting of the written contract makes 
the writing convey the intent or meaning of neither party to the contract.”  Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. W.N. McMurry 
Constr. Co., 2010 WY 57, ¶ 15, 230 P.3d 312, 320 (Wyo. 2010).  For reformation to be available there 
must be
 
clear 
and convincing evidence of the following elements: (1) a meeting of the minds—a 
mutual understanding between the parties—prior to the time a writing is entered 
into, (2) a written contract, or agreement, or deed (3) which does not conform 
to the understanding, by reason of mutual mistake.
 
Id. 
(quoting Hutchins v. Payless Auto Sales, 
Inc., 2002 WY 8, ¶ 19, 38 P.3d 1057, 1063 (Wyo. 2002)).  The district court concluded that there 
was no mutual mistake between the parties.  

 
[¶16]   We agree with the district 
court.  “The required mutuality of a 
mistake can only be found if the parties had identical intentions as to the 
material terms of the policy.”  Ohio Casualty, 2010 WY 57, ¶ 20, 230 P.3d  at 321.  Regardless of what 
coverage the appellant hoped to purchase, Dairyland did not offer underinsured 
motorist coverage, nor did it intend to offer such coverage to the 
appellant.  The appellant’s belief 
that the policy contained underinsured motorist coverage was a unilateral, 
rather than a mutual, mistake.
 
[¶17]   The appellant further argues that 
Schrack, as an agent of Dairyland, bound the insurer to any promises he made to 
the appellant.  While it is not 
clear from the record what promises may have been made to the appellant or 
inferred by him, it is clear that Schrack’s agency powers were limited.  
 
An 
agent has express actual authority to bind the principal when the principal, 
orally or in writing, specifically grants the agent the power to bind the 
principal.  Implied actual authority 
is established by the course of dealings between the parties and the 
circumstances surrounding the case.
 
Apparent 
authority is created when the principal holds the agent out as possessing the 
authority to bind the principal or when the principal allows the agent to claim 
such authority.  To bind the 
principal under a theory of apparent authority, a third party must establish 
personal knowledge of, and reliance on, the apparent authority of the 
agent.
 
Ohio 
Casualty, 
2010 WY 57, ¶ 39, 230 P.3d  at 326.
 
[¶18]   In Ohio Casualty, we found that the agent 
did not have the power to bind the principal or alter the terms of the contract 
with the third party insured because the following language was included in the 
contract: 
 
This 
policy contains all the agreements between you and us concerning the insurance 
afforded.  The first Named Insured 
shown in the Declarations is authorized to make changes in the terms of this 
policy with our consent.  This 
policy’s terms can be amended or waived only by endorsement issued by us and 
made a part of this policy.
 
2010 
WY 57, ¶ 42, 230 P.3d  at 328.  The 
contract between the appellant and Dairyland contained a very similar 
provision:
 
Changes 
In Your Policy
 
We’ll 
automatically give you the benefits 
of any extension or broadening of this policy if the change doesn’t require 
additional premium.
 
The 
only other way this policy can be changed is by policy 
endorsement.
 
(Emphasis 
in original.)  This section limits 
Schrack’s powers to bind Dairyland and establishes his inability to change the 
terms of the contract without Dairyland’s consent.  The district court properly denied the 
appellant’s request to reform the contract.  Schrack did not have actual authority to 
bind Dairyland to provide underinsured motorist coverage, and the appellant 
cannot rely upon the doctrine of apparent authority, where he failed to read the 
clear language of the policy establishing the contrary.  Id. at ¶¶ 42-43, at 
328.
 
[¶19]   The appellant also argues that 
summary judgment was not appropriate because the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
should have been applied.  
Promissory estoppel requires: 
 
(1)   [T]he existence of a clear and 
definite promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action by 
the promisee; (2) proof that the promisee acted to its detriment in reasonable 
reliance on the promise; and (3) a finding that injustice can be avoided only if 
the court enforces the promise.
 
Harper 
v. Fid. & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 
2010 WY 89, ¶ 26, 234 P.3d 1211, 1220 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting City of Powell v. Busboom, 2002 WY 58, ¶ 
8, 44 P.3d 63, 66 (Wyo. 2002)).  The 
district court found that there was no clear and definite promise made by 
Dairyland to the appellant.
 
[¶20]   As stated earlier, Schrack did not 
have the authority to bind Dairyland to terms beyond those in the policy or to 
alter those terms.  Regardless of 
what the appellant may have intended when he requested “full coverage,” the 
policy he obtained did not provide underinsured motorist protection.  There was no promise made to the 
appellant by Dairyland beyond what appeared in the terms of the policy.  Had the appellant read the policy, or 
even just the declarations page, he would have seen what coverage was provided 
and what coverage was not provided, and would have had the opportunity to 
renegotiate the terms of the policy or purchase a different policy.  “There can be no estoppel as a matter of 
law when the asserted reliance is not justifiable or reasonable under the 
circumstances of the case considered as a whole.”  Harper, 2010 WY 89, ¶ 27, 234 P.3d  at 
1220 (quoting Roth v. First Sec. Bank of 
Rock Springs, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93, 97 (Wyo. 1984)).  
 
[¶21]   The appellant argues further that 
the doctrine of reasonable expectations barred summary judgment.  For such a claim to be valid the 
appellant “must show the subject contract is ambiguous as to the provisions in 
dispute.”  Id. at ¶ 36, 234 P.3d  at 1222 (citing Ahrenholtz v. Time Ins. Co., 968 P.2d 946, 950 (Wyo. 1998)).  See also W.N. McMurry Constr., 2007 WY 
96, ¶ 21, 160 P.3d  at 78.  As we 
have stated above, see supra ¶ 12, 
the policy at issue, which policy the appellant did not read, unambiguously does 
not provide underinsured motorist coverage.  “A rule of construction that considers 
the reasonable expectations of the parties is of no assistance where the policy 
terms are clear and unambiguous.  We 
will not absolve the parties to an insurance policy from the duty to read the 
policy.”  St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Albany County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 763 P.2d 1255, 1263 (Wyo. 1988).  The appellant cannot claim that he had 
reasonable expectations of coverage that was not provided under an unambiguous 
policy that he did not read.
 
[¶22]   Finally, the appellant argues that 
the Wyoming Consumer Protection Act (the Act) provides a viable cause of action 
against Schrack and that the claim is not barred by his failure to provide 
notice of the alleged violation of the Act.  As recognized by the district court, 
this claim fails under the clear terms of the Act.  Generally, the Act is to be enforced by 
the attorney general.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 40-12-102(a)(vii) and 40-12-106 (LexisNexis 2011).  The Act does, however, provide private 
remedies in limited circumstances.  
“A person relying upon an uncured unlawful deceptive trade 
practice may bring an action under this act for the damages he has actually 
suffered as a consumer as a result of such unlawful deceptive trade 
practice.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
40-12-108(a) (LexisNexis 2011) (emphasis added).  An uncured unlawful deceptive trade 
practice is defined as an unlawful deceptive trade practice of which the 
consumer “has given notice to the alleged violator pursuant to W.S. § 40-12-109” 
and either no offer to cure has been made within 15 days or there has been no 
cure within a reasonable amount of time after the acceptance of the offer.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-12-102(a)(ix) 
(LexisNexis 2011).  Notice must be 
provided to the alleged violator within the earlier of one year from discovery 
or two years from the transaction.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-12-109 (LexisNexis 2011).
 
[¶23]   No notice was provided to Schrack 
of an alleged deceptive trade practice.  
The appellant argues that notice after the accident would have been 
futile because there could have been no cure—in other words, Schrack could not 
have added underinsured motorist coverage to the appellant’s policy after the 
accident.  Had the appellant read 
the policy, however, he could have notified Schrack prior to the accident that 
the policy did not provide underinsured motorist coverage, thereby providing the 
opportunity for negotiations for the addition of such coverage.  The district court concluded that the 
appellant had no valid cause of action for an uncured deceptive trade practice 
under the Act.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶24]   Wyoming’s uninsured motorist 
statutes unambiguously do not require insureds to obtain, or insurers to 
provide, underinsured motorist liability coverage.  The liability insurance policy the 
appellant obtained from Dairyland through Schrack unambiguously did not contain 
underinsured motorist coverage, and unambiguously disallowed changes in its 
terms except by policy endorsement. The appellant did not know these facts 
because he did not read the policy.  
The appellant’s failure to read the policy is available as a defense to 
both Dairyland and Schrack as to the appellant’s negligence and contract claims 
against them, and bars application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.  Further, the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations is not available to alter the unambiguous terms of a policy that 
the insured did not read.  Neither 
can the policy be reformed to provide underinsured motorist coverage, because 
there was no antecedent mutual agreement that such would be provided in the 
policy.  Schrack did not have actual 
authority to bind Dairyland to provide underinsured motorist coverage, and he 
did not have apparent authority to do so, given the unambiguous language of the 
policy to the contrary.  Finally, 
the appellant cannot pursue a private remedy for an uncured deceptive trade 
practice under the Wyoming Consumer Protection Act because the statutorily 
required notice of the alleged deceptive trade practice was not 
given.
 
[¶25]   We affirm.
FOOTNOTES
1The 
policy thus defines an “uninsured motorist” as a driver who does not have the 
minimum amount of liability coverage required by law.  The term is sometimes, however, defined 
as a “driver who has no liability insurance.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1671 (9th ed. 
2009).  This distinction makes no 
difference in the present case because the driver who caused the accident with 
the appellant met neither definition.  
An “underinsured motorist,” by contrast, is a “driver [who] does not have 
enough liability insurance to cover the damage.”  Id. at 1665.  The driver who caused the accident did 
meet that definition.