Title: Zamir Garzon v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC06-2235 
_____________ 
 
ZAMIR GARZON, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC06-2290 
_____________ 
 
RAY C. BALTHAZAR, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[April 10, 2008] 
 
WELLS, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Garzon v. State, 939 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).  The 
district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decisions of the 
 
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First and Second District Courts of Appeal in Davis v. State, 922 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 
1st DCA 2006), Zeno v. State, 910 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), and Cabrera v. 
State, 890 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(4), Fla. Const.1 
 
In this case, we address the unobjected-to use of the “and/or” conjunctive 
phrase between the names of defendants in criminal jury instructions.  We hold 
that the use of “and/or” was error but that it was not fundamental error as to either 
defendant in these consolidated cases.  Accordingly, we approve Garzon. 
I.  FACTS 
 
The Fourth District described in detail the facts of this case.  See Garzon, 
939 So. 2d at 279-82.  On March 21, 2003, two individuals attempted to kidnap the 
Smith family‟s son.  On March 22, 2003, a home invasion occurred at the Smiths‟ 
house, while only the grandmother was there.  On June 4, 2003, a second home 
invasion occurred, this time while the mother, daughter, and a housekeeper were at 
home.  Only the crimes that occurred on June 4 were charged against the 
defendants in this case; however, evidence of the March offenses was introduced at 
trial as Williams2 rule evidence. 
                                          
 
 
1.  In this case, we review the consolidated appeals of Zamir Garzon and 
Ray Balthazar, who were tried together in a joint trial, and whose appeals were 
addressed in a single opinion by the Fourth District in Garzon. 
 
2.  Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959). 
 
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In the June 4 crimes, two individuals forced their way through the Smiths‟ 
front door as their housekeeper was coming in that same door.  These individuals, 
identified by members of the Smith family as Ray Balthazar and Charly Coles, 
then robbed the Smiths of several items.  During the home invasion, one of the 
perpetrators spoke on a cell phone, as if receiving instructions or guidance in 
executing the crimes.  As the Fourth District explained: 
The state‟s theory of the case was that Garzon directed the 
home invasion by his cell phone conversation with Balthazar.  Garzon 
had previous connections with the Smiths.  He had been in the 
Smiths‟ home numerous times, working for a man who had built the 
false wall safe.  The state presented evidence of a 39-minute cell 
phone call at the time of the home invasion; the call originated from 
Pompano Beach between Balthazar and a cell phone number 
identified with Garzon. 
Id. at 281. 
 
Balthazar, Coles, and Garzon were all tried before the same jury.  Each had 
separate defense counsel.  All three defendants were charged with the same seven 
crimes: criminal conspiracy, armed burglary of a dwelling, armed robbery, three 
counts of armed kidnapping, and extortion.  After a jury trial, Balthazar was 
convicted as charged on all counts, and Garzon and Coles were acquitted of 
extortion and convicted on all other counts.3 
                                          
 
 
3.  The extortion charge stemmed from a spontaneous threat that Balthazar 
made during the June 4 home invasion to burn the Smiths‟ daughter unless her 
mother gave him cash hidden in the house. 
 
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The judge provided the State and all defense counsel with a packet of 
instructions the day before the trial court instructed the jury.  The next day, the 
court asked if counsel had reviewed the instructions and whether they had any 
objections to the instructions as written.  The State and all defense counsel replied 
that they had no objections and that nothing in the instructions needed to be 
changed. 
The instructions given used “and/or” between the defendants‟ names for the 
seven counts.  For example, in instructing the jury on the elements of armed 
burglary, the trial court stated: 
To prove the crime of armed burglary of a dwelling, as charged 
in Count Two of the information, the State must prove the following 
three elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  Number one, Zamir 
Garzon and/or [Charly] Coles and/or Ray Balthazar entered or 
remained in a structure owned by or in the possession of Sandra 
Smith. 
Number two, Zamir Garzon and/or [Charly] Coles and/or Ray 
Balthazar did not have the permission or consent of Sandra Smith or 
anyone authorized to act for her to enter or remain in the structure at 
the time. 
Number three, at the time of entering or remaining in the 
structure, Zamir Garzon and/or [Charly] Coles and/or Ray Balthazar 
had a fully formed, conscious intent to commit the offense of grand 
theft and/or robbery in that structure. 
(Emphasis added.)  These instructions, along with the other instructions given to 
the jury, were also provided in written form and were permitted to be used by the 
jury during its deliberations. 
 
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In addition to charging the jury on the substantive crimes, the trial 
court gave a standard charge on principals.  This instruction read: 
If the defendant helped another person or persons commit or attempt 
to commit a crime, the defendant is a principal and must be treated as 
if he had done all the things the other person or persons did, if the 
defendant had a conscious intent that the criminal act be done and the 
defendant did some act or said some word which was intended to and 
which did incite, cause, encourage, assist or advise the other person or 
persons to actually commit or attempt to commit the crime.  To be a 
principal, the defendant does not have to be present when the crime is 
committed or attempted. 
The trial court also gave a multiple defendants instruction, which read: 
A separate crime is charged against each defendant in each 
count of the information.  The defendants have been tried together; 
however, the charges against each defendant and the evidence 
applicable to him must be considered separately.  A finding of guilty 
or not guilty as to one or some of the defendants must not affect your 
verdict as to any other defendants or other crimes charged. 
Lastly, each jury verdict form was individualized to each defendant and did not use 
the “and/or” language. 
 
All three defendants were convicted.  Garzon and Balthazar appealed to the 
Fourth District.4  On appeal, Garzon and Balthazar argued that the use of “and/or” 
allowed the jury to convict the defendants based on a codefendant committing 
some or all of the elements of the charged crimes.  Their theory was that the jury 
                                          
 
 
4.  Charly Coles was not a party in Garzon but was instead the appellant in 
Coles v. State, 941 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), which is now pending at this 
Court.  Coles v. State, No. SC06-2383 (Fla. notice invoking discretionary 
jurisdiction filed Dec. 4, 2006).  The district court affirmed Coles‟ conviction. 
 
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could have concluded that the State was only required to prove that Garzon “or” 
Balthazar “or” Coles committed the elements of the offenses and that if, for 
example, Balthazar committed all of the elements and Garzon committed none, the 
jury could still convict Garzon based on Balthazar‟s actions. 
If the law of principals applied, the jury could in fact convict Garzon based 
on Balthazar‟s actions, provided Garzon had a conscious intent that the criminal 
acts be done and that Garzon did or said something to aid or encourage those acts.  
See, e.g., Staten v. State, 519 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 1988) (“In order to be guilty as 
a principal for a crime physically committed by another, one must intend that the 
crime be committed and do some act to assist the other person in actually 
committing the crime.”).  Garzon and Balthazar argued on appeal to the Fourth 
District, however, that the jury could convict them based on the acts of another 
without ever finding that Balthazar and Garzon were principals.  Their theory was 
that this was possible because the elements in the instructions on Counts I through 
VII simply said “and/or,” not “and/or, if you conclude that the law of principals 
applies.” 
Conceding that they did not object to the instructions at trial, Garzon and 
Balthazar argued in the district court that the use of “and/or” was fundamental 
error.  The Fourth District rejected this argument.  Relying on our decision in State 
v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1991), the Fourth District concluded that the 
 
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use of “and/or” had not “reach[ed] down into the validity of the trial itself to the 
extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance 
of the alleged error.”  Garzon, 656 So. 2d at 282 (quoting Delva, 575 So. 2d at 
644-45).  Accordingly, the Fourth District concluded that the use of “and/or” was 
not fundamental error.  The court explained: 
This is not a case where the court failed to correctly instruct on 
an element of the crime over which there was a dispute.  All elements 
of all crimes were correctly charged.  What the “and/or” conjunctions 
placed in issue was whether one defendant could be held criminally 
liable for the conduct of a codefendant.  If the law of principals 
applies to a defendant‟s conduct, that defendant can properly be 
convicted for a codefendant‟s criminal acts.  Garzon could have been 
found guilty if either Coles or Balthazar committed a substantive 
crime and Garzon helped either man commit the crime within the 
meaning of the principals instruction. 
 
 
. . . . 
With respect to Garzon, everyone in the courtroom knew that 
the issue boiled down to whether the state had proven that he was the 
person to whom Balthazar spoke over the cell phone during the home 
invasion. 
Id. at 284 (citations omitted). 
In reaching its conclusion that no fundamental error occurred, the Fourth 
District considered the totality of the record at trial.  It noted that the prosecution 
had not argued for the use of the “and/or” instruction in an improper manner.  
Instead, the State emphasized the law of principals‟ proper role to the jury, using 
“the principals instruction as the centerpiece of its argument that Garzon was guilty 
of the crimes committed by his codefendants.”  Id.  Further, the Fourth District also 
 
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found empirical support for its conclusion that “and/or” had not confused the jury.  
The court explained: 
The jury‟s acquittal of Garzon on the extortion count 
demonstrates that it followed the law on principals and was not misled 
by the “and/or” conjunction in the extortion instruction.  The extortion 
charge was based on Balthazar‟s threat to use the stove to burn Jamie 
unless her mother led him to the cash hidden in the house.  There was 
no evidence that Balthazar cleared this threat with Garzon over the 
cell phone.  Although the jury found Balthazar guilty of extortion, it 
gave Garzon and Coles the benefit of reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 285. 
In sum, considering the use of “and/or” in light of the other jury instructions, 
the attorneys‟ arguments, and the circumstances at trial, the Fourth District held 
that the use of “and/or” was not fundamental error in this case.  In Davis, Cabrera, 
and Zeno, the First and Second Districts held that the use of the “and/or” 
instructions was fundamental error.  The issue presented to this Court on appeal is 
thus whether the use of “and/or” instructions together with the standard principals 
instruction was fundamental error. 
II.  THE APPLICABLE ANALYSIS 
We have consistently held that not all error in jury instructions is 
fundamental error.  “Instructions [to the jury] . . . are subject to the 
contemporaneous objection rule, and, absent an objection at trial, can be raised on 
appeal only if fundamental error occurred.”  Delva, 575 So. 2d at 644; see, e.g., 
State v. Weaver, 957 So. 2d 586, 588 (Fla. 2007); Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 
 
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370 (Fla. 2002).  “As we have noted, the sole exception to the contemporaneous 
objection requirement is fundamental error.”  Harrell v. State, 894 So. 2d 935, 941 
(Fla. 2005); see also Farina v. State, 937 So. 2d 612, 629 (Fla. 2006).  We have 
explained that for jury instructions to constitute fundamental error, the error must 
“reach down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty 
could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.”  Delva, 
575 So. 2d at 644-45 (quoting Brown v. State, 124 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1960)).  
Further, “„fundamental error occurs only when the omission is pertinent or material 
to what the jury must consider in order to convict.‟  Failing to instruct on an 
element of the crime over which the record reflects there was no dispute is not 
fundamental error . . . .”  Id. at 645 (citation omitted) (quoting Stewart v. State, 420 
So. 2d 862, 863 (Fla. 1982)).5 
                                          
 
 
5.  This Court has not previously applied these standards to the use of 
“and/or” as it was used in this case.  However, all five district courts in Florida 
have considered the use of “and/or” in analogous circumstances.  See Berdecia v. 
State, 971 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (use of “and/or”); Brown v. State, 967 
So. 2d 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (use of “and/or” with principal instructions); 
Santos v. State, 947 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (use of “and/or,” per curiam 
affirmed); Womack v. State, 942 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (use of “and/or” 
in written instructions, addressing nonfundamental error); Coles, 941 So. 2d 1288 
(codefendant to Garzon); Dempsey v. State, 939 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) 
(use of “and/or” in written instructions, addressing nonfundamental error); Davis, 
922 So. 2d 279 (use of “and/or” with principals instruction); Harris v. State, 937 
So. 2d 211 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (use of “and/or” with codefendants instruction); 
Martinez v. State, 933 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (use of “and/or” in 
underlying forcible felony instruction held not fundamental error because not used 
as to a disputed issue); Tolbert v. State, 922 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (use 
 
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III.  USE OF “AND/OR” IN THIS CASE 
The Fourth District concluded that use of “and/or” was not fundamental 
error.  We agree that the use of “and/or” in this case did not result in fundamental 
error.  See Farina v. State, 937 So. 2d 612, 629 (Fla. 2006) (“We have cautioned 
appellate courts to „exercise their discretion concerning fundamental error “very 
guardedly.”  [F]undamental error should be applied only in the rare cases where a 
jurisdictional error appears or where the interests of justice present a compelling 
demand for its application.‟”) (citation omitted) (quoting Ray v. State, 403 So. 2d 
                                                                                                                                        
of “and/or” found not fundamental error because codefendant acquitted of all 
charges); Pizzo v. State, 916 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (use of “and/or”), 
quashed on other grounds, 945 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 2006); Davis v. State, 895 So. 2d 
1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (use of “and/or”); Randolph v. State, 903 So. 2d 264 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (codefendant to Davis); Zeno v. State, 910 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2005) (use of “and/or” with principals instruction); Dorsett v. McRay, 901 
So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (failure to assert on appeal that use of “and/or” was 
fundamental error held ineffective assistance of appellate counsel); Lloyd v. 
Crosby, 917 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (codefendant to Dorsett); Cabrera, 
890 So. 2d 506 (use of “and/or” in conspiracy charges); Rios v. State, 905 So. 2d 
931 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (codefendant to Cabrera); Gaskin v. State, 869 So. 2d 646 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (use of “and/or” in burglary underlying intended offense 
options); Concepcion v. State, 857 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (use of “and” 
in oral instructions but “or” in written instructions), superseded on other grounds 
by § 893.101, Fla. Stat. (2007); Davis v. State, 804 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2001) (use of “and/or” in entrapment instruction); Bynes v. State, 798 So. 2d 49 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (codefendant to Davis); Williams v. State, 774 So. 2d 841 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (use of “or” with codefendant instruction); Bogdanon v. 
State, 763 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (use of “and/or” in sentence 
reclassification); Isom v. State, 619 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (use of 
“and/or” in listing a government informant as a possible conspirator held not 
fundamental error because not used as to a disputed issue); cf. Cochrane v. Fla. E. 
Coast Ry. Co., 145 So. 217 (Fla. 1932) (criticizing use of “and/or” in a civil 
petition because imprecise, but not holding it to be reversible error). 
 
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959, 960 (Fla. 1981)).  We likewise agree that this is not a case where the court 
failed to correctly instruct on an element of the crime over which there was a 
dispute, as in Delva and Reed.  Since this case does not present a Delva/Reed error, 
the Fourth District was correct in examining the totality of the record to determine 
if the “and/or” instruction met the exacting requirements of fundamental 
instruction error. 
In this case, the evidence demonstrated that there were three perpetrators of 
the crime.  Defendant Balthazar was clearly identified as one of those perpetrators.  
Evidence was introduced showing that Balthazar had a vehicle matching the 
description of that used in the attempted kidnapping of the Smiths‟ son.  Balthazar 
also commonly wore the same type of clothing as the perpetrators were identified 
as wearing (camouflage pants and a badge hanging around the neck).  The Smiths‟ 
son identified Balthazar, both in court and in a prior photographic lineup, as the 
individual who attempted to kidnap him.  Sandra Smith, the mother, also identified 
Balthazar in court as one of the home invaders and testified that he was not 
wearing a mask when he first entered the home.  She described his face as one that 
she would “never forget.”  The evidence also clearly established Balthazar‟s 
association with Coles and Garzon. 
Similarly, defendant Garzon was strongly linked to the crimes.  Several 
individuals, including multiple representatives of different cell phone companies, 
 
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testified extensively about numerous calls between phones identified with the 
codefendants.  As the Fourth District noted, the evidence showed that one such call 
between Balthazar and Garzon was made at the same time as the home invasion 
and lasted for the approximate duration of the home invasion: thirty-nine minutes.  
When this call was made, the phone identified with Balthazar was in the vicinity of 
the Smiths‟ house, as was the cell phone identified with Garzon.  Similarly, 
“[o]ther testimony indicated calls between Balthazar‟s phone and Garzon‟s phone 
during [a] time when Balthazar and Coles had followed Sandra and her daughter” 
prior to the June 4 home invasion.  Garzon, 939 So. 2d at 281.  Garzon also had 
personal knowledge of the layout of the Smiths‟ home, access to information about 
the false wall safe, and access to knowledge of certain aspects of the Smiths‟ 
personal lives, all of which was evidenced by the actions of the home invaders.  
Given this evidence, “everyone in the courtroom knew that the issue boiled down 
to whether the state had proven that [Garzon] was the person to whom Balthazar 
spoke over the cell phone during the home invasion.”  Id. at 284. 
Based on this evidence and the State‟s argument that Garzon was involved 
in the criminal scheme but not physically present at the home invasion, the jury 
was given a principals instruction.  This instruction explained to the jury the only 
method by which it could convict one defendant based on the acts of another 
defendant in this case.  The State emphasized the proper application of the law of 
 
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principals in its closing argument.  The prosecutor read the instruction to the jury 
and then explained how the law of principals applied.  See id. at 284-85.  Defense 
counsel also addressed the law of principals in closing arguments.  See id. at 285 
(“Garzon‟s attorney hammered home in closing that there was insufficient 
evidence to prove that he was the person on the other end of the phone during the 
crime.”).  This emphasis on the law of principals by the judge, the State, and 
defense counsel repeatedly communicated to the jury that it could not convict one 
defendant based on the other defendant‟s actions unless the requirements of the 
law of principals were met. 
Additionally, the other instructions given at trial properly framed the use of 
the “and/or” instruction.  The jury was given, for example, a multiple defendants 
instruction.  This instruction told the jury that separate counts were charged against 
each defendant and that “[a] finding of guilty or not guilty as to one or some of the 
defendants must not affect your verdict as to any other defendant or other crimes 
charged.”  This instruction clearly explained to the jury that its verdict as to one 
defendant should not affect its verdict as to another.  It reinforced that the jury was 
to consider each defendant individually. 
Further, the verdict forms focused on one defendant and one crime each.  
The jury therefore had before it individualized jury forms that further reinforced 
the individualized consideration each defendant was to receive.  Working in 
 
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tandem, the instructions and verdict forms strongly emphasized to the jury that 
each defendant was to receive an individualized consideration.  No party argued 
otherwise at trial, but instead, both sides argued for the proper application of the 
law of principals. 
We also note, as the Fourth District set forth in its opinion, that if the jury 
did in fact conclude that “and/or” meant that one defendant should be convicted 
based on the acts of the other defendant––even if the former defendant was not a 
principal––the acquittal of Garzon and Coles on the extortion count is anomalous.  
Balthazar was convicted of extortion, but Coles and Garzon were not.  If the jury 
believed it should convict a given defendant based solely on whether a codefendant 
committed the elements, it logically follows that the jury would have convicted 
Garzon and Coles of extortion because it found Balthazar guilty.  The jury did not, 
however; it convicted only Balthazar of extortion.  The Fourth District concluded 
that this result “demonstrate[d] that [the jury] followed the law on principals and 
was not misled by the „and/or‟ conjunction in the extortion instruction.”  Id. 
Finally, petitioners argue that we should reverse their convictions because 
they could have rested on an invalid legal basis, and since a general verdict was 
returned, we cannot know if this occurred.  This Court has previously reversed 
general verdicts that could have rested on an invalid legal basis.  See, e.g., 
Fitzpatrick v. State, 859 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2003); see also Yates v. United States, 
 
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354 U.S. 298 (1957).  However, we have not held that this possibility of jury error 
is fundamental error or that such a possibility attendant to use of “and/or” would 
require reversal.  In light of our analysis above and the fact that the parties did not 
object to the instructions in the trial court, we decline to hold either today. 
Though we do not find fundamental error in this case, we do conclude that 
the use of the “and/or” instructions was error.  We condemned the use of the 
phrase “and/or” over seventy years ago, and we reiterate that condemnation today.  
Cf. Cochrane v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 145 So. 217, 218 (Fla. 1932) (“In the 
matter of the use of the alternative, conjunctive phrase „and/or,‟ it is sufficient to 
say that we do not hold this to be reversible error, but we take our position with 
that distinguished company of lawyers who have condemned its use.”).  There are 
several other alternatives that courts may use, such as “As to each of the 
defendants, the State must prove the following elements: first, that the defendant 
[engaged in the element of the crime].”  (Emphasis not necessary in actual use.)  
Such options avoid the potential problems created by “and/or.” 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
We approve the decision of the Fourth District in Garzon and hold that the 
use of the “and/or” conjunctive phrase in this case was not fundamental error.  We 
disapprove Davis, Cabrera, and Zeno to the extent that they are inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
 
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It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Two Cases Consolidated: 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D04-4699 and 4D04-4705 
 
 
(Broward County) 
 
Samuel R. Halpern of the Law Firm of Samuel R. Halpern, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner Zamir Garzon 
 
John F. Cotrone of the Law Firm of John F. Cotrone, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner Ray C. Balthazar 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia A. Terenzio, 
Assistant Attorney General, Bureau Chief, and Mitchell A. Egber and Monique E. 
L‟Italien, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent