Title: Bridge v. Eisenman Transport, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Bridge v. Eisenman Transport, Inc.1987 WY 126742 P.2d 768Case Number: 86-290Decided: 09/17/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the 
Matter of the Injury To: HarleyBRIDGE, Appellant 
(Employee-Claimant)

 
 
v.

 
 
EISENMAN 
TRANSPORT, INC., Appellee (Employer), William E. KING, (Employer), v. The STATE 
of Wyoming, ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee (Objector-Defendant)

 
 
Richard 
S. Dumbrill, Jones, Dumbrill & Hansen, for Appellant.

 
 
Randal 
R. Arp, Morgan, Brorby, Price & Roberts, for Appellee 
Eisenman.

 
 
A. G. 
McClintock, Attorney General; Josephine T. Porter, Assistant Attorney General; 
and Patrick J. Crank, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Wyoming. 

 
 
Before 
Brown, C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit and Macy, JJ. 

 
 
THOMAS, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1.]     The threshold question 
met in this case is whether this court should consider a claim of 
unconstitutionality, addressed to a provision in the Wyoming worker's 
compensation law, which was not made in the district court. The employee urges 
that we should and then attacks the provision as violative of the due process 
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 2 and Art. 10, 
§ 4 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming. The trial court applied the statute 
which is claimed to be unconstitutional and denied the award of any benefits to 
the employee. We conclude that the constitutional question is not properly 
before this court, and we affirm the order of the trial 
court.

 
 
[¶2.]     HarleyBridge sets forth the issues in his Brief 
of Appellant as follows:

 
 
"1. Is § 
27-12-603(b), Wyoming Statutes, 1977 violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States of America which guarantees that no state shall deprive any person 
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction equal protection of the law?

 
 
"2. Is § 
27-12-603(b), Wyoming Statutes, 1977 violative of Article 1, § 2 of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming in that it improperly classifies types of 
heart attacks in a manner which violates the worker's right to equal protection 
of the law?

 
 
"3. Is § 
27-12-603(b), Wyoming Statutes, 1977 violative of Article 10, § 4 of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming which mandates that 'The legislature shall 
provide by law for the accumulation and maintenance of a fund or funds out of 
which shall be paid compensation as may be fixed by law according to proper 
classification to each person in such employment . . . .'?  (Emphasis 
supplied)."

 
 
There 
are two briefs on behalf of appellees. Eisenman Transport, Inc. says these are 
the issues:

 
 
"I. 
Whether the record presents substantial evidence from which, viewed in a light 
most favorable to the employer, the district court could have denied worker's 
compensation benefits to claimant-employee pursuant to W.S. § 27-12-603(b) 
(1977).

 
 
"II. 
Whether claimant-employee is entitled to raise a constitutional argument for the 
first time on appeal, and if so, whether W.S. § 27-12-603(b) (1977) is 
constitutional."

 
 
The 
State of Wyoming, Worker's Compensation Division, 
focuses on only one issue, which is:

 
 
"Does 
Section 27-12-603(b), W.S.1977, constitute a denial of the equal protection 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming?"

 
 
[¶3.]     While Bridge, who was 
employed as a truck driver, was "tarping down" a load of bentonite at the 
Federal Bentonite plant in WestonCounty, he suffered an acute myocardial 
infarction. He was transported to CampbellCountyMemorialHospital for treatment. He filed claims 
naming Eisenman Transport, Inc. and William E. King as employers. Eisenman 
Transport, Inc. claimed that it was a contract carrier and that King was 
actually the employer, but the trial court held that they would be jointly and 
severally liable for any benefits that might accrue as a result of the worker's 
compensation claim filed by Bridge. The case could not be heard until some ten 
months after the incident, and an order then was filed denying benefits pursuant 
to the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.

 
 
[¶4.]     The statute which 
Bridge asserts is unconstitutional was § 27-12-603(b), W.S.1977 (1983 
Replacement), which provided:

 
 
"Benefits 
for employment-related coronary conditions except those directly and solely 
caused by an injury or disease are not payable unless the employee establishes 
by competent medical authority that there is a direct causal connection between 
the condition under which the work was performed and the cardiac condition, and 
then only if the causative exertion occurs during the actual period of 
employment stress clearly unusual to, or abnormal for, employees in that 
particular employment, and further that the acute symptoms of the cardiac 
condition are clearly manifested not later than four (4) hours after the alleged 
causative exertion."

 
 
As 
Bridge correctly points out in his brief, this statute has been applied in a 
number of cases with different results. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. Van Buskirk, Wyo., 721 P.2d 570 (1986); Creek v. Town of Hulett, Wyo., 657 P.2d 353 (1983); Yost v. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division, Wyo., 654 P.2d 137 
(1982); Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. Schwilke, Wyo., 649 P.2d 218 (1982); Jim's Water Service v. Eayrs, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1346 (1979); Claim of McCarley, 
Wyo., 590 P.2d 1333 (1979).

 
 
[¶5.]     The essence of Bridge's 
argument of unconstitutionality is that the requirement that the causative 
exertion occurred during an actual period of employment stress clearly unusual 
to, or abnormal for, employees in that particular employment results in an 
improper classification which differentiates those who do work that is unusual 
to, or abnormal for, employees from those employees who do not do such work. 
This is the claim upon which the violation of the equal protection clause of the 
state and federal constitutions is premised. Bridge then buttresses his 
contention with the assertion that the statute also violates the requirement in 
Art. 10 § 4 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming which requires a "proper 
classification." Bridge rounds out the argument by pointing to the divergent 
results in Wyoming cases and asserting that only because 
the requirement for a "proper classification" has been ignored and the 
classification structured by the statute is not reasonable have the inconsistent 
decisions been forthcoming.

 
 
[¶6.]     Bridge's sophisticated 
arguments are intriguing, but he did not present them to the district court. On 
the contrary, Bridge relied upon the statute which he asserts to be 
unconstitutional and argued to the district court that his evidence satisfied 
the statutory requirements.

 
 
[¶7.]     Our rule is clear that, 
with very limited exceptions, we do not consider the asserted 
unconstitutionality of a statute if that question has not been presented in the 
trial court. Nickelson v. People, Wyo., 607 P.2d 904 (1980); Knudson v. Hilzer, 
Wyo., 551 P.2d 680 (1976); In re 
Shreve, Wyo., 432 P.2d 271 (1967); 
State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 279, I.A.F.F. v. 
Kingham, Wyo., 420 P.2d 254 (1966); 
Sorenson v. School District No. 28, in Big Horn 
County, Wyo., 418 P.2d 1004 (1966). 
We are more loath to consider such a question in those instances in which the 
party attacking the statute relied upon it in presenting a position to the trial 
court. SeeState ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 279, I.A.F.F. v. 
Kingham, 
supra.

 
 
[¶8.]     We are not insensitive 
to the argument that the asserted constitutional defect has contributed to 
apparently inconsistent results in cases involving coronary problems. The 
district court suggested that in its comments from the bench. A careful analysis 
of the decisions of this court involving the specific statutory provision in 
question and its correct application by the trial courts will disclose that this 
court consistently has treated as a question of fact the issue of whether the 
"causative exertion occurs during the actual period of employment stress clearly 
unusual to, or abnormal for, employees in that particular employment." Section 
27-12-603(b), W.S.1977 (1983 Replacement). In those instances in which the 
district court found that to be true from the evidence and in which the other 
requirements of the statute were found to be present, an award of benefits has 
been affirmed because sufficient evidence supported that factual determination. 
In those instances in which the district court found as a fact that the period 
of employment stress was not unusual to, or abnormal for, employees in that 
particular employment, a denial of benefits has been upheld. The trial courts of 
this state have not had undue difficulty in applying the statutory provision, 
and we are satisfied that it manifests an appropriate legislative 
intent.

 
 
[¶9.]     The trial court in this 
case made appropriate findings of fact contrary to the claim of the appellant. 
The evidence supports those findings. The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.