Title: P. v. Davis

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 7/21/05 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S012945 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
County of Los Angeles 
STANLEY BERNARD DAVIS, 
) 
Super. Ct. No. A093076 
 
) 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
A jury convicted defendant Stanley Bernard Davis of the first degree 
murders of Michelle Boyd and Brian Harris.  (Pen. Code § 187; further 
undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.)  As to each murder, the 
jury found true the special circumstance allegations of murder during the 
commission of a robbery and murder during the commission of kidnapping for 
robbery.  (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(i) & (ii), as added by initiative, Prop. 7, 
§ 4 at the Nov. 7, 1978 Gen. Elec.)  The jury also found true a special 
circumstance allegation of multiple murder.  (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(3).)  The 
jury further found defendant guilty of the robbery (§ 211) and kidnapping for 
robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)) of Boyd and Harris, grand theft auto (§ 487, subd. (3))1 
and arson of Harris’s automobile (§ 451, subd. (d)) all committed in 1985, and the 
                                              
1  
Section 487, former subdivision (3), is now section 487, subdivision (d)(1). 
 
2 
1984 robbery (§ 211) and kidnapping for robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)) of David 
Kingsmill.  As to the murders, robberies, and kidnappings of Boyd and Harris, and 
the theft of Harris’s car, the jury found for each offense that defendant was armed 
with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)) and that he personally used a firearm 
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).  With respect to the robbery and kidnapping of Kingsmill, 
the jury found for each offense that a principal was armed with a firearm.  
(§ 12022, subd. (a).) 
 
At the penalty phase, the jury returned verdicts of death for the Boyd and 
Harris murders.  The trial court denied defendant’s automatic motion to modify 
the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and imposed death sentences for those counts.  The 
court imposed terms of imprisonment for the other counts, but it stayed them 
pending imposition of the death penalty.   
 
This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We vacate the conviction for 
the robbery of Boyd, but otherwise affirm the judgment. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A jury convicted defendant of the 1985 kidnapping, robbery, and first 
degree murders of college students Michelle Boyd and Brian Harris.  Three other 
men—DeAndre Brown, Damon Redmond and Donald Bennett—were involved in 
the crimes.  Brown was the prosecution’s primary witness; he admitted being 
present at the murder scene and purchasing the murder weapon, an Uzi semi-
automatic pistol.  Brown testified that he, defendant, Redmond, and Bennett drove 
from South Central Los Angeles to Westwood, where they commandeered 
Harris’s car, with students Boyd and Harris inside, because they needed a car to 
carry out a planned robbery.  Brown testified that after driving to an isolated 
location, defendant took Boyd and Harris out into a field and shot them.  The 
prosecution also introduced incriminating statements defendant made, which the 
police tape-recorded while defendant was in jail with Redmond and Bennett.  A 
 
3 
year before the Boyd and Harris murders, defendant kidnapped and robbed David 
Kingsmill, also in Westwood.     
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution’s case 
a.  Kingsmill kidnapping and robbery 
In 1984, David Kingsmill was a student at the University of California at 
Los Angeles, in Westwood.  On May 27, about 11:00 p.m., as Kingsmill was 
getting out of his new black Volkswagen Rabbit, he felt a gun at his neck and 
heard someone tell him to turn around and get back in the car.  Kingsmill did so.  
Defendant and two other African-American men got in after him.  One of the men 
told Kingsmill to drive where he was told.  Ultimately, Kingsmill stopped 
somewhere on Sepulveda Boulevard and gave the three men his wallet, money, 
and credit cards.  He then complied with their demand to get out of the car and 
take off his pants and underwear.  The three men left, taking Kingsmill’s clothes.  
Four days later, deputy sheriffs stopped defendant in South Central Los Angeles 
while he was driving with DeAndre Brown in a new black Volkswagen Rabbit.  
With respect to this incident, defendant pleaded guilty to one misdemeanor count 
of unlawfully taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851) for which he served a two-
month jail sentence.   
b.  Boyd and Harris murders 
Testifying under a grant of immunity, DeAndre Brown gave the following 
account of the murders.  In September 1985, defendant was living with his friend 
Brian Wright at the house of Wright’s grandmother in South Central Los Angeles.  
On September 26, defendant and Wright were arrested.  Defendant was able to 
post bail but Wright was not.  A few days later, defendant told Brown about a plan 
to drive to Barstow, San Bernardino County, and rob a liquor store to get money to 
post Wright’s bail.  Brown agreed to take part in the planned robbery. 
 
4 
A few days later, on September 30, around 7:00 p.m., Brown and Damon 
Redmond met up with defendant and Donald Bennett, who was driving a truck.  
The four discussed the planned Barstow robbery.  They decided to drive to 
Westwood to get a car because Bennett did not want to use his truck in the 
robbery.  The group had with them a nine-millimeter Uzi semi-automatic pistol 
and a .38-caliber handgun.  The four arrived in Westwood around 9:00 p.m.  They 
split up and went looking for a car to steal.  Brown and Redmond saw a man and a 
woman in a beige or rust-colored Honda and told defendant about the car.  
Defendant and Redmond went to investigate.  When they returned to Bennett’s 
truck, Redmond was driving the Honda, with defendant in the back seat.  At 
Bennett’s instruction, Brown grabbed the Uzi, which was loaded, from the back of 
the truck.  When Brown approached the Honda, he saw victim Michelle Boyd in 
the back seat next to defendant, with her head in his lap.  Brown also got in the 
back seat.  Bennett took the front passenger seat.   
Redmond drove a short distance, then stopped to let Bennett drive.  Bennett 
drove near a high school.  It was around midnight and the area was “pitch black,” 
with no lights or houses around.  Defendant signaled Bennett to stop the car.  
Defendant, Redmond, and Brown got out, taking Boyd with them.  Brown handed 
defendant the Uzi.  Brown saw defendant take Boyd out into a field but then lost 
sight of them.  Brown then heard thumping from inside the Honda’s trunk and a 
voice yelling “let me out.”  When defendant returned to the car, Redmond opened 
the trunk hood and Brian Harris emerged holding his hands over his eyes.  Harris 
said he could not see and would not look.  Defendant, still holding the Uzi, told 
Harris, “I’m going to take you to your girl.”  He and Redmond then walked Harris 
out into the field.  Brown saw Redmond walking back toward the car and then saw 
a flash of light in the field.  A second flash followed, after which defendant 
 
5 
returned to the car.  When Brown asked defendant what he had done, defendant 
said he had “killed ’em” because he did not want any witnesses.   
Defendant, Brown, Bennett, and Redmond then drove away, with Bennett 
at the wheel, planning to drive northeast from Los Angeles to Barstow to rob the 
liquor store.  Brown fell asleep.  He awoke to defendant’s yelling at Bennett 
because they had ended up in Bakersfield, in Kern County, north of Los Angeles, 
about 130 miles from Barstow.  Eventually the group drove to Barstow and arrived 
at the liquor store they planned to rob.  Brown went in to check out the store, but 
came back and reported that there were people inside and it “wasn’t cool.”  The 
four then headed back to Los Angeles, arriving about 6:00 or 7:00 a.m. on October 
1.  
Brown got out at a bus stop a few miles from his home.  He took the Uzi 
with him, hidden in a brown briefcase he had found in victim Harris’s car.  He 
stored the gun and the briefcase in his bedroom.   
Later that morning, Brown saw defendant, Redmond, and Bennett near 
their homes in South Central Los Angeles.  Redmond had burns on his face and 
hands, received when he had poured gasoline on victim Harris’s Honda and lit it.  
Either Bennett or defendant handed Brown the .38-caliber handgun, which he left 
in Redmond’s house.  Either Redmond or defendant gave Brown a wire ring.  
Redmond kept another ring, which looked like a high school class ring with a 
stone.  Brown still had the wire ring in his bedroom when he was arrested; later he 
gave it to his girlfriend.  (Victim Boyd always wore a small gold twisted wire ring 
and a high school senior class ring; after the murders, there were no rings on her 
body.)   
c.  The arrests and interrogations 
On October 1, 1985, about 8:30 a.m., James Shubsda arrived at the auto 
store where he worked in South Central Los Angeles.  He noticed a brownish-
 
6 
colored Honda parked in the alley behind the store.  About 15 minutes later, 
Shubsda heard an explosion.  He ran into the alley, saw the Honda on fire, and 
called the fire department.  Arson Investigator Derek Chew of the City of Los 
Angeles Fire Department examined the Honda and determined that someone had 
poured gasoline inside it and set it on fire.  Victim Harris’s wallet was in the trunk 
of the car.  The police found only one fingerprint on the car; it belonged to 
Redmond.   
The police looked up Redmond’s known associates and found, among 
others, Brown and defendant, whom they discovered had been involved in the 
1984 kidnapping and robbery of college student David Kingsmill.  They 
determined that Kingsmill’s car had been taken only a few blocks from where 
college students Boyd and Harris were last seen in Westwood, and that Brown, 
Redmond, and defendant all lived within 12 blocks of where Harris’s Honda had 
been abandoned in South Central Los Angeles.  Brown, Redmond, and defendant 
thus became suspects in the disappearance of Boyd and Harris.   
Officer David Evans of the Los Angeles Police Department was the 
investigating officer on the Boyd and Harris murders.  He arrested Redmond 
around 6:00 a.m. on Sunday, October 6, 1985.  Redmond had burns on his face 
and hands.  Other officers arrested Brown about the same time.  A search of 
Brown’s bedroom turned up a brown briefcase with an Uzi and a loaded magazine 
inside.   
Later that day, Officer Evans and Detective Richard DeAnda questioned 
Brown and Redmond at the West Los Angeles police station.  Brown admitted 
involvement in the kidnappings of Boyd and Harris and also implicated defendant, 
Redmond, and Bennett.  Brown said that defendant had shot and killed both 
victims.  Brown then led the police to the bodies of Harris and Boyd, in a field 
 
7 
near a high school on Mulholland Drive.  Searches of the field turned up two shell 
casings.   
Still later that Sunday, October 6, 1985, Officer Evans and Detective 
DeAnda questioned Redmond, who admitted being present at the murder scene.  
That afternoon, defendant surrendered and was taken to the West Los Angeles 
station.  Bennett was arrested on October 8.  During questioning, he admitted 
being present at the murder scene.   
d.  The jailhouse conversations 
At trial, the prosecution introduced excerpts of incriminating statements by 
defendant that police had tape-recorded during conversations that defendant had 
with Redmond and Bennett while the three were being held at the West Los 
Angeles station before they were charged.   
e.  Other trial evidence 
The parties stipulated that both Harris and Boyd died of single gunshot 
wounds to the head.  A pathologist from the Los Angeles County Chief Medical 
Examiner Coroner’s Office recovered a bullet from Harris’s head.   
A firearms expert test-fired the Uzi recovered from Brown’s bedroom and 
compared the resulting bullets and shell casings with the bullet removed from 
Harris’s head and the casings found at the murder scene.  In his opinion, the 
casings and bullets were fired from that Uzi.   
2.  Defense case 
The defense tried to undermine Brown’s credibility and to inculpate him as 
the shooter of Boyd and Harris.  Los Angeles Police Department Detective Hugh 
Wilton, whom the defense called as a witness, testified that he had found the 
briefcase containing the Uzi and a loaded magazine in Brown’s bedroom.  To 
discredit Brown’s testimony that the crime scene was “pitch black,” two witnesses 
 
8 
testified that nearby streetlights were working on the night of the murders, and the 
parties stipulated that the moon was nearly full that night.   
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution’s evidence in aggravation 
Much of the prosecution’s aggravating evidence was presented by 
stipulation of the parties, including these facts:  Defendant was born on March 19, 
1962, making him 23 years old at the time of the murders in 1985.  In 1980, he 
pled guilty to unrelated felony charges of grand theft auto and assault with a 
deadly weapon in which the victim sustained three stab wounds.  As a result of 
those convictions, defendant was incarcerated for most of the period between May 
29, 1980, and April 10, 1983.  When defendant committed the assault, he was on 
probation for the grand theft auto conviction, and at the time of the Boyd and 
Harris murders in this case, he was on probation based on his unlawfully taking 
the car of college student Kingsmill in 1984.   
In 1981, when defendant was a ward at the California Youth Authority at 
Chino, he threw hot water on a counselor.  In 1982, when defendant was an inmate 
at Soledad State Prison, he pushed a correctional officer through a doorway.   
2.  Defense evidence in mitigation  
Several friends and family members testified about defendant’s difficult 
childhood and adolescence.  Shortly after defendant’s birth, his mother, Della 
Moore, relinquished him to another woman, Ruby Orr.  When Orr later married 
Joe Davis, the two raised defendant as their own son together with their two 
younger sons, Delano and Antoine.  Orr abused defendant both physically and 
psychologically.  She hit defendant with her fist and various items including 
switches, paddles, ironing cords, and a baseball bat.  She verbally denigrated 
defendant and forced him to take care of the younger brothers, whom she favored.  
Orr and Davis had a violent relationship.  Orr once shot Davis and once stabbed 
 
9 
him.  When defendant was a teenager, Davis and Orr divorced.  Orr then held late 
night gambling parties in her house.  When defendant was 18 or 19 years old, he 
learned that Orr was not his birth mother.   
Clinical Psychologist Adrienne Davis, not related to defendant, testified 
about her psychological evaluation of defendant.  Defendant scored in the 
borderline range on intelligence tests, between low average intellectual function 
and mild mental retardation.  He scored at the fourth grade level in reading and 
math.  Personality tests indicated that defendant had emotional and psychological 
problems, particularly with trusting and relating to other people, consistent with 
his history of physical and emotional abuse and exposure to family violence.  On 
neuropsychological tests, defendant had difficulty with certain tasks, including 
problem solving.  Davis described defendant generally as feeling isolated, 
inadequate, alienated, angry, frustrated, and confused.  As the result of being 
incarcerated for most of his adult life, defendant lacked the necessary skills to 
cope with life outside of prison.  He probably would function better in a closed 
environment.   
3.  Prosecution’s rebuttal 
Defendant’s younger brother, Antoine Davis, who was 17 years old at the 
time of trial, denied that Orr had ever hit defendant with a baseball bat.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Jailhouse Taping 
Defendant contends that the tape-recording by the police of his 
conversations with Bennett and Redmond while the three were housed near each 
other in holding cells at the West Los Angeles police station violated his rights 
under the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution requiring reversal.  We 
disagree.  
 
10 
1.  Facts 
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the tape recordings and 
transcripts of his jailhouse conversations with Redmond and Bennett, citing the 
Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution and former section 2600 as 
construed in this court’s decision in DeLancie v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 
865 (DeLancie).  At the hearing on the suppression motion, Detective DeAnda 
testified that after the police arrested and interviewed defendant, Redmond and 
Bennett, the three were placed in separate but adjacent cells in an isolated holding 
area for felony suspects in the West Los Angeles police station.2  A solid wall and 
a steel door separated defendant, Redmond and Bennett from the rest of the 
facility.   
Detective DeAnda testified that he had monitored and taped the three 
suspects’ jailhouse conversations to ascertain whether they were threatening the 
safety of DeAndre Brown, who was cooperating with the police investigation.  
Former Deputy District Attorney Richard Neidorf (who, at the time of the hearing, 
was a Los Angeles Municipal Court Judge) gave a different account of the reason 
for the taping.  The parties agreed to the admission of Neidorf’s declaration as his 
stipulated testimony.  It states:  “Before any arrests were made[,] I was at the West 
L.A. police station preparing arrest and search warrants.  I arrived at 
approximately 9 p.m. on a Saturday and stayed past midnight.  [¶]  I suggested to 
Los Angeles Police Department officers, a lieutenant for sure and possibly 
Detective DeAnda to eavesdrop the jail, after the suspects were apprehended.  I 
told them not to put any informants in the cell nor to put any undercover police 
                                              
2   
Other evidence in the record suggests that after questioning defendant, the 
police took him to the Van Nuys police station, but brought him back to West Los 
Angeles some time before the taping.   
 
11 
officers in the cell.  Just to let the defendants freely talk among themselves.  [¶]  
When I suggested the eavesdropping I told the officers the reason was to gather 
information.  My concern in gathering information was to decide which of the 
perpetrators to seek death against in that Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 
Cal.3d 131,3 was the law at the time and who [sic] to charge 12022.5, personal use 
of a firearm and exculpatory evidence regarding . . . Beamon-type [People v. 
Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625] evidence or any evidence regarding factual 
innocence.  [¶]  At this time the warrants had not been signed yet and therefore no 
suspects had been arrested.”   
The trial court denied defendant’s suppression motion.  It found that the 
taping had a dual purpose: first, to gather evidence against the defendants, and 
second, to obtain information regarding the safety of Brown.  The trial court 
explained:  “A conscious decision was reached by the officer to tape-record and 
monitor the conversations of these defendants.  And it was based on a reasonable 
suspicion that there might be conversations pertaining to the crime for which they 
had been arrested.  [¶]  And let’s face it.  It’s clear to me that the original purpose 
in deciding to tape-record or monitor was to secure evidence to prosecute . . . .  
[¶]  And, finally, I’m forced to the conclusion or come to the conclusion that . . . 
                                              
3  
Our decision in Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131 (Carlos) 
held that the felony-murder special circumstance of the 1978 death penalty law 
required proof of intent to kill regardless of whether the defendant was the actual 
killer or an accomplice.  Later, we overruled Carlos in People v. Anderson (1987) 
43 Cal.3d 1104.  There, we concluded that intent to kill is not an element of the 
felony-murder special circumstance, but when the defendant is an aider and abetter 
rather than the actual killer, intent to kill must be proved.  (Id. at p. 1147.)  
Thereafter, we held that Carlos applies when, as in this case, the crime was 
committed after Carlos but before Anderson.  (See People v. Osband (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 622, 679; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 44-45.)   
 
12 
the reasonable protection of the public was involved ultimately before the taping 
began.  [¶]  Before this taping began, a secondary consideration arose in the mind 
of the officer, and that was the protection of Brown. . . .  [¶]  And when it comes to 
protecting Brown — and I think it was very reasonable to expect that Brown 
would be in danger here — there’s nothing better than knowing what these people 
are planning. . . .  [¶]  There was bona fide interest in information pertaining to the 
safety of Brown prior to the commencement of the taping.” 
2.  Discussion 
In several cases we have rejected defendants’ Fourth Amendment 
challenges to the admission of evidence obtained by tape-recording conversations 
in jail.  (See People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1183-1184 [conversation 
between a defendant and family members in a jail visiting room]; People v. Hines 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1043 [conversation between a defendant and another 
suspect in a jail holding cell before they were charged]; Donaldson v. Superior 
Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 24, 28-30 [conversation between a defendant and his 
brother in a police station interview room].)  Those cases relied on Lanza v. New 
York (1962) 370 U.S. 139, in which the United States Supreme Court concluded 
that Fourth Amendment protections do not apply inside a jail because a jail 
“shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a 
hotel room” and “[i]n prison, official surveillance has traditionally been the order 
of the day.”  (Lanza, supra, 370 U.S. at p. 143.)  
Defendant contends that Lanza was long ago superseded by other United 
States Supreme Court decisions.  He notes that a few years after Lanza, the high 
court held in Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 351 (Katz), that the 
Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places,” and thus he asserts that the 
location of a tape-recorded conversation (whether in a jail cell or not) should not 
be dispositive of whether it enjoys Fourth Amendment protection.  Rather, 
 
13 
according to defendant, the appropriate test is the one set out in Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion in Katz, asking whether the subject of the taping had an actual, 
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.  (Katz, 
supra, at p. 361 (conc. opn. of Harlan, J.).)  Defendant notes that the high court 
applied that test in a jail context in Bell v. Wolfish (1979) 441 U.S. 520 (Bell).  In 
Bell, the high court assumed, without deciding, that pretrial detainees retain an 
expectation of privacy, albeit a diminished one.  The court concluded, however, 
that cell searches did not violate the Fourth Amendment if they were reasonably 
related to legitimate institutional security needs.  (Bell, supra, at pp. 556-557.)  
Five years after Bell, the high court decided Hudson v. Palmer (1984) 468 U.S. 
517 (Hudson); it holds that convicted prisoners have no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in their cells, and thus no Fourth Amendment protection from cell 
searches.4  (Hudson, supra, at pp. 522-530.)   
Defendant here argues that under the reasoning of Bell and Hudson, persons 
who are in custody and have not yet been convicted have privacy interests that the 
Fourth Amendment protects from intrusion absent a legitimate institutional 
security interest.  According to defendant, he had an expectation of privacy that 
precluded recording his conversations for reasons other than jail security.  He 
relies on the fact that at the time of the taping he had not been charged with any 
crime.  He thus reasons that his expectation of privacy in the jail cell was at least  
equal to that of the pretrial detainees in Bell, supra, 441 U.S. at pages 556-557, 
and greater than that of the convicted prisoners in Hudson, supra, 468 U.S. at 
                                              
4   
The parties also cite Block v. Rutherford (1984) 468 U.S. 576, decided on 
the same day as Hudson.  Block involved only a due process challenge to certain 
jail security practices and therefore is not particularly helpful in analyzing 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.   
 
14 
pages 522-530.  He further asserts that no legitimate security reasons existed here 
based on the stipulated testimony of former Deputy District Attorney Neidorf that 
he had ordered the taping “to gather information.”  We are not persuaded.   
Preliminarily, we note that various federal and state appellate courts have 
disagreed with regard to whether the high court’s decision in Hudson that 
convicted prisoners lack any expectation of privacy in their cells applies with 
equal force to persons who are still facing trial.  One line of cases, beginning with 
United States v. Cohen (2d Cir. 1986) 796 F.2d 20, holds that persons being held 
before trial retain a limited expectation of privacy that protects them from searches 
conducted for other than legitimate security reasons.  (See United States v. 
Friedman (2d Cir. 2002) 300 F.3d 111, 123; United States v. Willoughby (2d Cir. 
1988) 860 F.2d 15, 20-22 [intercepted conversations admissible where taping was 
a justifiable security measure]; Cohen, supra, at p. 24 [warrantless cell search 
solely to obtain information for prosecution violated Fourth Amendment]; Rogers 
v. State (Fla. 2001) 783 So.2d 980, 990-992 [same]; McCoy v. State 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1994) 639 So.2d 163, 167 [same]; State v. Henderson (Ga. 
1999) 517 S.E.2d 61, 62-64 [same]; Lowe v. State (Ga.Ct.App. 1992) 416 S.E.2d 
750, 752 [same]; State v. Neely (Neb. 1990) 462 N.W.2d 105, 112 [Hudson 
inapplicable to search of pretrial detainee’s luggage held in jail’s locked 
inventory]; State v. Jackson (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1999) 729 A.2d 55, 63-65 
[evidence suppressed where security concern was merely a pretext for an 
evidence-gathering search]; see also United States v. Hearst (9th Cir. 1977) 563 
F.2d 1331, 1345; see generally 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure (3d ed. 1996) 
§ 10.9(d), pp. 754-755.)  We cited Cohen in People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 
181, in rejecting a claim that a jail cell search violated the detainee’s Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.   
 
15 
Another line of cases, however, construes Hudson as validating any 
jailhouse search, regardless of its purpose, and as applying to persons incarcerated 
before trial as well as to convicted prisoners.  (See State v. Apelt (Ariz. 1993) 861 
P.2d 634, 649; State v. O’Rourke (Me. 2001) 792 A.2d 262, 265-267; People v. 
Phillips (Mich.Ct.App. 1996) 555 N.W.2d 742, 743-744; State v. Wiley (N.C. 
2002) 565 S.E.2d 22, 32-33; State v. Martin (N.C. 1988) 367 S.E.2d 618, 620-622 
[Hudson’s reasoning equally applicable to pretrial detainees in jails]; Soria v. State 
(Tex.Crim.App. 1996) 933 S.W.2d 46, 60 [same]; see also People v. Von Villas 
(1993) 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 212-216 [pretrial detainee had no expectation of 
privacy in conversation with wife in jail visiting room]; United States v. Van 
Poyck (9th Cir. 1996) 77 F.3d 285, 290-291 [pretrial detainee had no expectation 
of privacy in phone calls from jail].)   
We agree with this latter line of cases that persons held pretrial in a jail—as 
defendant was when the police recorded his conversations with Redmond and 
Bennett—have no expectation of privacy for the following reasons.  First, 
Hudson’s rationale, that jail security requires “close and continued surveillance of 
inmates and their cells” (see Hudson, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 527), extends to anyone 
being held in a jail.  Indeed, in Bell the high court recognized that pretrial 
detainees pose similar—if not the same—security concerns as convicted prisoners.  
(See Bell, supra, 441 U.S. at pp. 546-547, fn. 28 [“[t]here is no basis for 
concluding that pretrial detainees pose any lesser security risk than convicted 
inmates”].)  As Justice O’Connor has suggested, it is “[t]he fact of arrest and 
incarceration [that] abates all legitimate Fourth Amendment privacy and 
possessory interests in personal effects [citations] and therefore all searches and 
seizures of the contents of an inmate’s cell are reasonable.”  (Hudson, supra, 468 
U.S. at p. 538 (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.), italics added.) 
 
16 
Second, Hudson applies to jailhouse searches regardless of the purpose of 
the search.  (See Hudson, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 529-530 [rejecting claim that 
search violated Fourth Amendment because it was designed solely to harass].)   
Third, although Hudson involved the physical search of a cell, its rationale 
extends as well to eavesdropping.  Lanza and Katz were eavesdropping cases, yet 
the United States Supreme Court drew on those cases in Hudson.  (See Hudson, 
supra, 468 U.S. at p. 525 [applying Katz expectation of privacy test in cell search 
context]; see also Bell, supra, 441 U.S. at pp. 556-557 [citing Lanza in cell search 
context].)   
As a separate reason supporting his claim that the tape recording violated 
his Fourth Amendment rights, defendant points out that it took place in 1985, 
when, he argues, California law provided persons incarcerated in this state with a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  Defendant relies on former section 2600 as 
construed in this court’s 1982 decision in DeLancie, supra, 31 Cal.3d 865.   
Under former section 2600, state prison inmates could “be deprived of such 
rights, and only such rights, as . . . necessary . . . to provide for the reasonable 
security of the institution . . . and for the reasonable protection of the public.”  
(Stats. 1975, ch. 1175, § 3, p. 2897.)  DeLancie held that former section 2600 
protected pretrial detainees as well as prison inmates and precluded the recording 
of a pretrial detainee’s conversations with visitors and other detainees for reasons 
other than jail security or protection of the public.  (DeLancie, supra, 31 Cal.3d at 
p. 876.)5  Because former section 2600 as construed in DeLancie was the 
                                              
5  
In 1994, the Legislature amended section 2600 to read as it presently does 
that prison inmates may “be deprived of such rights . . . as [are] reasonably related 
to legitimate penological interests.”  That amendment, we held in People v. Loyd 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 997, restored the pre-DeLancie state of the law, allowing law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
17 
controlling law when the officers recorded defendant’s conversations in jail, he 
asserts that he must have had an expectation of privacy in his jail cell that society 
was “prepared to recognize as reasonable.”  (See People v. Ayala (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 225, 255 [reasonable expectation is one that has “ ‘ “a source outside of 
the Fourth Amendment” ’ ”].)   
We disagree.  We have already concluded that under Hudson, supra, 468 
U.S. 517, pretrial detainees can have no legitimate expectation that their jailhouse 
conversations will not be monitored or recorded.  DeLancie, which was decided 
before Hudson, distinguishes permissible searches from impermissible ones based 
on the purpose of the search: security searches are permissible, while investigatory 
searches are not.  Hudson, however, does not recognize that distinction.  Rather, as 
we have explained, under Hudson the purpose of a search has no bearing on the 
question whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists.  (See Hudson, supra, 
468 U.S. at pp. 529-530.)  In other words, if a pretrial detainee can reasonably 
expect that his cell may be monitored or searched for security reasons, then he 
cannot reasonably expect any privacy.  It is the fact that an intrusion may occur, 
not the reason for the intrusion, that vitiates the expectation of privacy.  
Accordingly, although under DeLancie defendant reasonably could have expected 
that the police and prosecution would not violate state law by monitoring his 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page) 
 
enforcement officers, after the effective date of the amendment, “to monitor and 
record unprivileged [jailhouse] communications . . . to gather evidence of crime.”  
(Id. at p. 1010; see also Thompson v. Department of Corrections (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
117, 120.) 
 
18 
conversations for investigatory reasons, that expectation was basically irrelevant to 
the Fourth Amendment question.    
Moreover, even were we to conclude that defendant retained some 
legitimate expectation of privacy in jail that protected him from a warrantless tape-
recording of his conversations absent a legitimate security interest, here, the 
officers conducted the tape-recording in part, as the trial court found, to further 
just such an interest—the protection of DeAndre Brown, who was providing 
evidence against defendant. 
When considering a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion, “we view 
the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, deferring to those 
express or implied findings of fact supported by substantial evidence.”  (People v. 
Jenkins (2001) 22 Cal.4th 900, 969; see also People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 
155, 182; People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301.)  We independently 
review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts.  (People v. Jenkins, 
supra, at p. 969; People v. Alvarez, supra, at p. 182.) 
Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that a legitimate 
security interest—protecting Brown—justified the jailhouse recording.  Detective 
DeAnda testified at defendant’s suppression hearing to the following facts:  the 
purpose of the tape-recording was to determine whether defendant or his co-
suspects were threatening Brown’s safety; Brown had told DeAnda that Brown 
feared for his safety because he saw defendant shoot the two victims;6 and Brown 
                                              
6  
Defendant contends that in none of Brown’s tape-recorded conversations 
with police does he express fear for his own safety.  DeAnda testified, however, 
that he had conversations with Brown that were not taped.  Moreover, DeAnda’s 
concern for Brown’s safety could have been based on considerations independent 
of what Brown told him.  Accordingly, the lack of a tape-recorded expression of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
19 
said that defendant was a member of the East Coast Crips gang.  Moreover, at the 
time of the taping, Brown was a potential prosecution witness against defendant in 
a capital murder case.  It thus was reasonable for Detective DeAnda to believe 
that, even if Brown was jailed separately from defendant, defendant’s friends 
might retaliate against Brown for informing on defendant.  DeAnda’s testimony 
amply supports the trial court’s conclusion that the police had a bona fide concern 
for Brown’s safety, which justified the taping.   
Defendant raises several other contentions.  For example, he argues that the 
safety concern expressed by the police was a pretext developed to justify an 
otherwise illegal taping; that Detective DeAnda’s subjective concern for Brown’s 
safety was insufficient to justify the tape recording absent articulable facts 
providing a basis for such a concern; that the police helped to create the danger to 
Brown by revealing Brown’s cooperation to defendant and by housing Brown 
separately from defendant, Redmond, and Bennett; and that the taping was 
improper because it was not “routine.”  We have examined each of these 
contentions and determined that none has merit. 
B. Defendant’s Absence from Pretrial Hearing on Tape Excerpts 
Defendant contends that his right to due process under the federal 
Constitution, as well as his state constitutional and statutory rights, were violated 
when the trial court failed to ensure his presence at a May 16, 1989 pretrial 
hearing regarding admissibility of the jailhouse tape.    
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page) 
 
fear by Brown does not undermine the trial court’s conclusion that a bona fide 
security concern justified the taping.   
 
20 
Although defense counsel had earlier indicated that defendant would be 
present at the hearing, counsel stated at the start of the hearing that defendant was 
aware of the purpose of the hearing but had decided to “waive his presence.”  At 
the hearing, the trial court and counsel reviewed each of the 51 tape excerpts that 
the prosecution sought to have admitted into evidence, in order to reach an 
agreement as to the words being spoken so that a transcript of the tape could be 
prepared.  Defense counsel and the prosecutor then argued the admissibility of the 
excerpts, and the trial court ruled that 49 of the excerpts would be admitted.  The 
taped excerpts were presented at trial together with the agreed-upon transcript of 
the conversations on the tape.     
Defendant now makes the following assertions:  (1) his absence from the 
hearing violated his constitutional and statutory rights (see Kentucky v. Stincer 
(1987) 482 U.S. 730, 745; Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 105-106; 
People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 717; see also §§ 977, subd. (b)(1), 1043); 
(2) defense counsel’s purported waiver of defendant’s presence was ineffective; 
and (3) conducting the hearing in defendant’s absence resulted in the admission at 
trial of highly prejudicial portions of the jailhouse tape.  The Attorney General 
counters that defendant, through counsel, validly waived his federal constitutional 
right to presence at the hearing, and that although defendant’s purported waiver of 
his state statutory right to be present was ineffective, his presence was not 
statutorily required and any state law error was harmless.    
We conclude that this claim fails because defendant suffered no prejudice. 
We have summarized the federal law governing a defendant’s presence at 
trial as follows:  “ ‘A criminal defendant’s right to be personally present at trial is 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution 
. . . .  [Citations.]  A defendant, however, “does not have a right to be present at 
every hearing held in the course of a trial.”  [Citation.]  A defendant’s presence is 
 
21 
required if it “bears a reasonable and substantial relation to his full opportunity to 
defend against the charges.”  [Citation.]’ ”  (People v. Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th at 
pp. 716-717; see People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 742.)  The standard 
under sections 977 and 1043 is similar.  “ ‘[T]he accused is not entitled to be 
personally present during proceedings which bear no reasonable, substantial 
relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him . . . .  [Citation.]’  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 74; People v. Waidla, supra, 
22 Cal.4th at p. 742.)  
Here, defendant had both a statutory and a constitutional right to be present 
at the May 16, 1989, hearing during which the contents of the jailhouse tape were 
discussed and agreed upon.  Because defendant was personally present at the 
police station lockup when the tapes were made, he could have assisted his 
attorneys in deciphering the tape — both by identifying who was speaking in each 
passage, and by determining what was being said.  The tape, in turn, was the sole 
evidence that corroborated DeAndre Brown’s testimony that defendant was 
present during the kidnappings and robberies and personally shot both victims.  
Even the prosecutor agreed that defendant should be present at this hearing.   
Accordingly, defendant’s presence bore a reasonable and substantial relationship 
to his ability to defend the charges against him. 
Nor did defendant validly waive his right to be present under state or 
federal law.  Section 977, subdivision (b)(1), states that in felony prosecutions “the 
accused shall be present” at certain proceedings not relevant here, and “at all other 
proceedings unless he or she shall, with leave of court, execute in open court a 
written waiver of his or her right to be personally present, as provided by 
paragraph (2).”  (Italics added.)  Section 977, subdivision (b)(2) further provides 
“[t]he accused may execute a written waiver of his or her right to be personally 
present, approved by his or her counsel, and the waiver shall be filed with the 
 
22 
court.”  Finally, section 1043 provides that a felony defendant “shall be personally 
present at the trial,” (id., subd. (a)), but that the trial may continue in the 
defendant’s absence if (1) the defendant persists in disruptive behavior after being 
warned (id., subd. (b)(1)); (2) the defendant in a noncapital case is voluntarily 
absent (id., subd. (b)(2)); or (3) the defendant waives his right to be present 
pursuant to section 977 (id., subd. (d)).  “[W]hen read together, sections 977 and 
1043 permit a capital defendant to be absent from the courtroom only on two 
occasions:  (1) when he has been removed by the court for disruptive behavior 
under section 1043, subdivision (b)(1), and (2) when he voluntarily waives his 
rights pursuant to section 977, subdivision (b)(1).”  (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 1164, 1210.)  Here, there is no claim that defendant’s disruptive behavior 
allowed the court to conduct the May 16, 1989 hearing in his absence, and no 
evidence that defendant executed a written waiver of his presence at that hearing.  
Accordingly, the trial court erred under sections 977 and 1043 by conducting the 
proceeding in defendant’s absence.   
Similarly, there was no valid waiver of defendant’s constitutional right to 
presence.  As with other constitutional rights, a capital defendant may waive his 
right to presence at trial, as long as his waiver is voluntary, knowing and 
intelligent under the standard set forth in Johnston v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 
464.  (See People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 62 [defendant’s written 
waiver of his right to be present at his sentence reduction hearing did not validly 
waive his right to be present at his sentencing, because “defendant’s waiver form 
cannot reasonably be construed to embrace a knowing and intelligent waiver of his 
presence at the time of sentence”( italics added)]; see also People v. Price (1991) 1 
Cal.4th 324, 405; People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1238-1240; People v. 
Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1026.)  In each of these cases, however, it was the 
defendant himself who waived his presence; in contrast, in this case, defendant’s 
 
23 
counsel purported to waive his presence for him.  It does not appear that we have 
addressed the question whether defense counsel may waive the defendant’s 
presence.  Some federal cases that have addressed this issue have held that defense 
counsel may do so, but only if there is evidence that defendant consented to the 
waiver.  (E.g., Carter v. Sowders (6th Cir. 1993) 5 F.3d 975, 981-982; Larson v. 
Tansy (10th Cir. 1990) 911 F.2d 392, 396-397; but see United States v. Gordon 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) 829 F.2d 119, 125-126 [personal on-the-record waiver of 
presence right required].)  At a minimum, there must be some evidence that 
defendant understood the right he was waiving and the consequences of doing so.  
(See United States v. Nichols (2d Cir. 1995) 56 F.3d 403, 416-417.)7 
Here, there is scant evidence of consent, and even less evidence that 
defendant understood the right he was waiving and the consequences of his 
waiver.  All the record shows is that defense counsel represented to the court that 
counsel had discussed the hearing with defendant and that defendant would waive 
his presence.  There is no evidence that defense counsel informed defendant of his 
right to attend the hearing; nor is there evidence that defendant understood that by 
absenting himself from the hearing he would be unable to contribute to the 
discussion of the contents of the tape recording.  Accordingly, we cannot conclude 
that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to presence at the 
hearing.    
                                              
7  
Relying on United States v. Gagnon (1985) 470 U.S. 522, the Attorney 
General argues that defendant validly waived his federal constitutional right to be 
present at the hearing by “his absence from the proceeding, which he knew was to 
take place and that he had a right to attend.”  Gagnon interprets Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, rule 43 (18 U.S.C.) and is inapplicable here. 
 
24 
We turn now to the question of prejudice.  Under the federal Constitution, 
error pertaining to a defendant’s presence is evaluated under the harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 
18, 23.  (People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 62; see Campbell v. Rice (9th 
Cir., May 20, 2005, No. 99-17311) ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 1189650, *4-5.)  Error 
under sections 977 and 1043 is state law error only, and therefore is reversible 
only if “ ‘it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing 
party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’  (People v. Watson 
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)”  (People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1211; see 
also People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 738-739.)  Defendant asserts that 
had he been present at the May 16, 1989 hearing, he could have assisted his 
attorney in deciphering the tape recording and filling in many of the portions of 
the transcript that were marked “unintelligible.”  He further asserts that some of 
the most prejudicial excerpts (such as excerpt 9, in which he admits to having had 
a chance to “get some nuts off,” indicating he could have raped victim Boyd), 
would have been deemed irrelevant and inadmissible.   
We disagree.  First, defendant’s attorneys had access to the tape and the 
proposed transcript before the May 16, 1989 hearing.  Thus, they had ample 
opportunity to discuss the contents with defendant and to seek his assistance in 
deciphering the recorded conversation.  Assuming they did so, defendant’s 
presence at the hearing would have added little to his attorneys’ ability to argue 
the admissibility of the excerpts.  Further, the trial court’s rulings at the May 16, 
1989 hearing were without prejudice to later arguments that the transcript was 
inaccurate or that certain portions were not admissible.  Thus, it appears that 
defendant’s counsel could have consulted with him after the hearing, and could 
have brought to the court’s attention at a later time any possible contributions or 
corrections that defendant might have made. 
 
25 
But even assuming defendant and his counsel had no opportunity to review 
the tape and transcript either before or after the hearing, there is no way on this 
record to determine, had defendant been present at the hearing:  (1) whether he 
could have filled in the “unintelligible” portions of the tape and transcript;8 
(2) whether the prosecutor would have agreed to defendant’s interpretation; and 
(3) had defendant’s interpretation been agreed to, whether the resulting transcript 
of the tape recording would have been less prejudicial to defendant than the 
transcript used at trial.  Because we do not know what defendant would have said 
about the unintelligible portions on the tape, it seems equally reasonable to assume 
that his clarifications would have done nothing to make the tape less incriminating 
or perhaps made it even more incriminating.   
Second, although the transcript contains numerous passages marked 
“unintelligible,” the vast majority of the crucial passages that linked defendant to 
the shooting were intelligible.  As explained below at pages 30-31 and 43-44, 
these unblemished passages sufficed to establish defendant’s identity as the 
shooter and provided all the legal corroboration necessary for the jury to credit 
Brown’s testimony.  
Defendant also contends that had he been present at the hearing he could 
have assisted his attorneys in identifying the voices on the tape.  But as explained 
below at pages 42-43, the jury could have identified the voices by analyzing what 
was said without relying on Brown’s voice identifications.  Defendant’s 
contribution to the voice identification effort, assuming he would have been 
                                              
8   
It is doubtful that defendant would have waived his Fifth Amendment right 
not to incriminate himself by testifying at the hearing regarding the contents of the 
tape.  Presumably, defendant’s contribution to the discussion at the hearing would 
have been made through his attorneys. 
 
26 
willing to provide it, would not have changed the words that were on the tape or 
the jury’s ability independently to analyze those words.   
For all of these reasons, we conclude that defendant’s absence from the 
May 16, 1989 hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Chapman v. 
California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 23.)  It follows that it is not “ ‘reasonably 
probable’ ” that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached had 
he been present.  (People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1211.)      
 
C.  Admission of Hearsay Statements of Redmond and Bennett on  
      Tape Excerpts 
 
1.  Admissibility of hearsay on the tape excerpts  
The prosecution offered into evidence 51 separate excerpts of the taped 
jailhouse conversations.  Defendant challenged each excerpt as inadmissible 
hearsay (Evid. Code, § 1200) and asked the trial court to consider each excerpt 
separately to determine whether it fell within any hearsay exception.  The court 
declined to do so.  The court did exclude two excerpts, but it admitted the 
remaining 49 either as statements of defendant, as adoptive admissions, or as 
providing context to defendant’s statements.  The court also ruled that the 
probative value of the excerpts outweighed any prejudicial effect.  (See Evid. 
Code, § 352.) 
At trial, the tape recording (designated People’s Exhibit 31) and a transcript 
(designated People’s Exhibit 32) of the 49 excerpts were both admitted into 
evidence.  Brown identified each of the speakers on the tape, and testified that the 
initials DR for Damon Redmond, DB for Donald Bennett, and SD for defendant 
appearing on the transcript identified the person who, in Brown’s opinion, was the 
speaker in each passage.  The court told the jury that except where the transcript 
indicated “unintelligible” or had words in parentheses, the parties agreed to the 
 
27 
words on the tape but did not agree as to who said what; that the initials on the 
transcript reflected only Brown’s opinion as to who was speaking; and that 
ultimately it was for the jury to decide what words were said, who said them, and 
what relevance those words had to the case.   
Defendant now contends that 16 of the excerpts admitted into evidence 
contain hearsay statements by either Bennett or Redmond.  He faults the trial court 
for declining to consider separately the admissibility of each tape excerpt, and for 
its giving of inadequate jury instructions on adoptive admissions, which together, 
he asserts, resulted in jury consideration of prejudicial hearsay statements by 
Redmond and Bennett, in violation of state and federal law.  We disagree.  
2.  Legal principles 
Hearsay is “evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness 
while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter 
stated.”  (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).)  Hearsay is not admissible unless it 
qualifies under some exception to the hearsay rule.  Two hearsay exceptions are 
relevant here.  A defendant’s own hearsay statements are admissible.  (See id., 
§ 1220; People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 898, fn. 5; People v. Carpenter 
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1049.)  A statement by someone other than the defendant 
is admissible as an adoptive admission if the defendant “with knowledge of the 
content thereof, has by words or other conduct manifested his adoption [of] or his 
belief in its truth.”  (Evid. Code, § 1221; see People v. Preston (1973) 9 Cal.3d 
308, 314 & fn. 3.) 
In determining whether a statement is admissible as an adoptive admission, 
a trial court must first decide whether there is evidence sufficient to sustain a 
finding that:  (a) the defendant heard and understood the statement under 
circumstances that normally would call for a response; and (b) by words or 
conduct, the defendant adopted the statement as true.  (Evid. Code, §§ 403, 1221; 
 
28 
People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1198; People v. Preston, supra, 9 Cal.3d 
at p. 314 & fn. 3.)  Generally, this requires separately examining each excerpt of 
the tape-recorded conversations.  (See Williamson v. United States (1994) 512 
U.S. 594, 599-602 [trial court erred in admitting a lengthy narrative as a statement 
against penal interest under Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 804(b)(3) (28 U.S.C.) 
on the ground that it was generally self-inculpatory; rather, the trial court should 
have examined each individual statement or remark within the longer narrative to 
determine whether it was inculpatory or exculpatory]; accord, People v. Lawley 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153.) 
Evidence of an out-of-court statement is also admissible if offered for a 
nonhearsay purpose—that is, for something other than the truth of the matter 
asserted—and the nonhearsay purpose is relevant to an issue in dispute.  (People v. 
Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 189; People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 
585.)  For example, an out-of-court statement is admissible if offered solely to 
give context to other admissible hearsay statements.  (People v. Turner, supra, 8 
Cal.4th at pp. 189-190.)   
Here, the excerpts of the recorded jailhouse conversations and the 
transcripts made of those recorded excerpts were evidence of statements made by 
someone “other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing” (Evid. Code, 
§ 1200, subd. (a))—in other words, out-of-court statements by defendant, 
Redmond, and Bennett.  Thus, statements on the tape qualified as hearsay to the 
extent the prosecution was offering those statements to prove the truth of the facts 
being asserted by the speaker.  These statements were inadmissible unless, as 
relevant here, they were defendant’s own statements, or they qualified as adoptive 
admissions of defendant, or they were offered for a nonhearsay purpose.   
 
29 
3.  Defense contentions 
Defendant argues here that seven of the excerpts of the recorded 
conversations were improperly admitted as adoptive admissions because 
defendant’s response to an assertion made by Redmond or Bennett was either 
unintelligible or indicated defendant did not hear or understand the assertion.  For 
example, in one exchange (excerpt 47 of People’s Exhibits 31 and 32) Bennett 
asks defendant, “You know what else I am wondering?” to which defendant 
responds “What?”  Bennett then states, “They found it in the case he had it in,” to 
which defendant answers “A what?”  We conclude that each of these excerpts, as 
well as the others to which defendant now objects, were properly admitted.  As 
explained on page 27, ante, a statement is admissible as an adoptive admission if 
“there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding” (Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (a)) 
that the defendant heard and understood the statement under circumstances calling 
for a response and by words or conduct adopted it as true.  That standard is amply 
met here.  For example, shortly after the exchange quoted above is the statement 
by defendant “if they did, oh man, why man?” indicating defendant both heard 
what Bennett said and understood it referred to the Uzi Brown had put in Harris’s 
briefcase.  Moreover, the trial court told the jurors to listen to the tape and decide 
for themselves what was being said and by whom.  Thus, it was up to the jury to 
decide what words defendant spoke and whether through his words or silence he 
adopted the comments by Redmond and Bennett.  In doing so, the jury could have 
considered numerous factors, such as tone of voice and inflection, that are not 
reflected in the transcript.   
Defendant also argues that portions of certain excerpts (1 and 11) were 
inadmissible because Redmond was recounting his conversations with police, 
conversations defendant could not have heard.  (See Evid. Code, § 1221 [adoptive 
admission requires that party have “knowledge of the content” of the declarant’s 
 
30 
statement].)  But these statements by Redmond not only recounted his 
conversations with police but also implicated defendant in the kidnapping and 
murder of Boyd and Harris.  For example, Redmond describes how the police 
asked him “12 times” whether he had seen defendant shoot the victims, to which 
defendant’s only reply was, “Oh man . . . 12 times.”  From this response, the jury 
reasonably could have concluded that by not denying that he had shot the victims, 
defendant had implicitly adopted the substance of Redmond’s statement that 
defendant was the shooter. 
Defendant further contends that the last line or paragraph of certain 
excerpts of the tape-recorded conversations (1, 4-6, 8-11, 14, 15, 37 and 41) 
should have been excluded because the speaker was someone other than defendant 
and there was no way to determine what defendant said or did in response.9  We 
disagree.  We have examined each of these statements and conclude they were 
either innocuous or nonprejudicial in the face of a damaging admission or adoptive 
admission by defendant earlier in the excerpt.  Moreover, although Brown had 
identified each of the speakers on the tape recording, it was ultimately for the jury 
to decide who was speaking.  In some instances, the jury may have concluded that 
the person making the last statement on the excerpt was not Redmond or Bennett 
but defendant.   
Even assuming some of the challenged excerpt portions should not have 
been admitted, defendant suffered no possible prejudice.  The trial court instructed 
the jury to consider statements by Redmond and Bennett only to the extent 
                                              
9  
For example, the final paragraph of the first excerpt quotes Redmond as 
stating that the police asked him whether he knew of any object that defendant had 
touched, and recounting his response as “I told them ‘no’ I can’t remember.”  The 
excerpt includes no reply by defendant.   
 
31 
defendant through his own comments or conduct had adopted those statements.  
We presume the jury followed this instruction.  (People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th 
at p. 190; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17.)   
Moreover, the jury reasonably could have concluded from defendant’s 
comments in other excerpts not challenged here that defendant had admitted being 
the shooter.  For example, defendant made the following statement referring to the 
police having learned the details of the crime from Brown:  “No mother fucker 
didn’t see me shoot no-mother-fuckin-body.  Tell you the truth, the mother fucker 
that told them that didn’t really see you know, they just heard, you know what I’m 
sayin’?”10  Although any inadmissible hearsay statements of Redmond and 
Bennett might have incrementally bolstered Brown’s credibility, it is not 
reasonably probable that their admission affected the verdict (People v. Watson 
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836) because they were inconsequential in light of the vast 
quantity of admissible, highly damaging evidence on the tape in the form of 
defendant’s own statements and adoptive admissions.   
Finally, defendant faults the trial court for failing to consider each excerpt 
individually in ruling on admissibility.  Rather, the court simply concluded that the 
“overall scene” was one in which defendant would have been expected to object, 
and that any statements that were not adoptive admissions were admissible to give 
context to defendant’s statements.  Even had the trial court individually considered 
                                              
10  
Defendant also made the following statements about what Brown had told 
the police:  “Yeah, but damn, what De De [Brown] done told them, that’s what’ 
goin’ to count.  That’s what goin’ to hurt right there.  Man, they told me, just like a 
picture.  ‘You asshole mother fucker.  You took the girl out first and bam, you 
shot the girl.  And then you took the dude out, then bam, then you shot the dude.’ ”  
“I wonder if he tell where he pass Stanley the gun, and Stanley shot them.” 
 
32 
each excerpt, however, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
trial would have been more favorable to defendant (People v. Watson, supra, 46 
Cal.2d at p. 836; see Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (b)) because, as we have concluded, 
all of the excerpts defendant challenges on appeal were properly admitted.  For the 
same reason, we reject defendant’s contention that admission of the tape excerpts 
without individual consideration violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
right to due process of law, his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses, and his Eighth Amendment right to reliability in the guilt and 
sentencing determinations.   
4.  Special Instruction A 
At a hearing on jury instructions, the trial court said it was disinclined to 
instruct on CALJIC No. 2.71.5 (adoptive admissions—silence, false or evasive 
reply to accusation) because there were no direct accusations made to defendant.  
In addition, defense counsel objected to CALJIC No. 2.71.5 on the ground that 
defendant’s silence in the face of accusatory statements was based on his Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent.  The court also said it would not give CALJIC 
No. 3.13 (accomplices may not corroborate one another) because cosuspects 
Redmond and Bennett did not testify. 
Ultimately, the court gave an alternative to CALJIC Nos. 2.71.5 and 3.13, 
entitled “Special Instruction A,” which provided:  “As to People’s Exhibit 31, the 
tape recording of conversations in the holding cell area of the West Los Angeles 
Station of the L.A.P.D., you are instructed as follows:  [¶]  Statements on that tape 
which you find beyond a reasonable doubt to have been spoken by the defendant 
may be considered by you to determine if they constitute an admission or 
admissions as previously defined in these instructions.  If you find that the 
defendant made any admissions, such admissions may be considered in 
determining whether the testimony of DeAndre Brown has been corroborated.  [¶]  
 
33 
Statements on that tape made by any person other than defendant may not, in and 
of themselves, be considered as possible corroboration of the testimony of 
DeAndre Brown.  Such statements may be considered by you only for the purpose 
of explaining what the defendant meant by any statements made by him and/or as 
a possible implied admission by the defendant.  Such statements may be 
considered by you for one or both of those purposes only if you find both of the 
following to be true beyond a reasonable doubt:  One, the defendant heard and 
understood the other [person’s] statement; and Two, the defendant expressly or 
impliedly indicated that the other [person’s] statement was true.  [¶]  Any implied 
admission by the defendant may be considered as possible corroboration of the 
testimony of DeAndre Brown.”   
Defendant now contends that the trial court had a duty to give CALJIC No. 
2.71.5 on its own initiative.  We disagree.  A trial court has no duty to so instruct 
the jury without a request from counsel.  (People v. Carter, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1197-1198.) 
Defendant further argues that Special Instruction A was defective in several 
respects.  Because defendant expressly agreed to this instruction, he is barred from 
challenging it on appeal under the doctrine of invited error.  (People v. Rodrigues 
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1135; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 830-831.)  
In any event, defendant’s attacks on the instruction lack merit. 
Contrary to defendant’s contention, Special Instruction A was not defective 
in failing to tell the jury that a statement made by defendant could not be an 
adoptive admission (or, in the court’s terminology, an “implied” admission) unless 
it responded to an accusation against him.  For the adoptive admission exception 
to the hearsay rule to apply, no “direct accusation in so many words” is necessary.  
(People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 852.)  Rather, it is enough that the 
evidence showed that the defendant participated in a private conversation in which 
 
34 
the crime was discussed and the circumstances offered him the opportunity to 
deny responsibility or otherwise dissociate himself from the crime, but that he did 
not do so.  (Ibid.)  Here, Special Instruction A informed the jury of these 
requirements by noting that defendant had to have “heard and understood” the 
declarant’s statement and “expressly or impliedly indicated its truth.”   
Defendant next contends that Special Instruction A failed to inform the jury 
that a defendant must have “knowledge of the content” of the declarant’s 
statement.  (See Evid. Code, § 1221.)  According to defendant, the knowledge 
requirement refers not just to knowledge of the words the declarant spoke, but 
more specifically to knowledge of the subject matter referred to in the declarant’s 
statements.  Even assuming the instruction did not convey that precise meaning, 
there was no prejudice to defendant.  The jury could not have concluded that, as 
the instruction stated, defendant “heard and understood” another’s statement and 
“expressly or impliedly indicated that the . . . statement was true” unless the jury 
also decided that defendant was familiar with the subject matter of the statement to 
which he impliedly assented.   
Defendant complains that Special Instruction A was inadequate because it 
lacked the admonition in CALJIC No. 2.71.5 that the declarant’s statements 
cannot be considered for their truth.  We disagree.  The instruction told the jury 
that statements of the speakers on the tape other than defendant could be 
considered only for the purpose of “explaining what the defendant meant by any 
statements made by him and/or as a possible implied admission.”  The instruction 
went on to explain that to conclude that any statement constituted an “implied” 
admission the jury had to “find both of the following to be true beyond a 
reasonable doubt:  One, the defendant heard and understood the other [person’s] 
statement; and Two, the defendant expressly or impliedly indicated that the other 
[person’s] statement was true.”  The trial court also instructed under CALJIC 
 
35 
No. 2.09 that the jury was to consider evidence only for the limited purpose for 
which it was admitted.  These instructions together advised the jury that the 
statements by Redmond and Bennett could be considered only insofar as they gave 
meaning to defendant’s own express or implied admissions.     
Further, we are not persuaded that Special Instruction A was deficient in 
not telling the jury that it must disregard any statements of others that it did not 
find that defendant adopted.  (Cf. CALJIC No. 2.71.5.)  This notion was implicit 
in the instruction’s admonition that the jury could consider statements of others 
only if it found “beyond a reasonable doubt” that “the defendant expressly or 
impliedly indicated that the other [person’s] statement was true.”  CALJIC 
No. 2.09, which told the jury to consider evidence only for the limited purpose for 
which it was admitted, reinforced this concept.  We presume the jury followed 
these instructions.  (People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 190; People v. Mickey, 
supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 689, fn. 17.)        
Finally, we note that the inclusion in Special Instruction A of a beyond a 
reasonable doubt requirement — that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant heard and understood another’s statement and expressly or impliedly 
indicated it was true — was substantially more favorable to defendant than the 
standard instruction on adoptive admissions, CALJIC 2.71.5.  We express no 
opinion, however, on whether such language was required.   
In sum, Special Instruction A adequately advised the jury of the 
requirements for finding adoptive admissions and of their proper use. 
D.  Accomplice Corroboration 
Section 1111 prohibits a conviction based “upon the testimony of an 
accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to 
connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.”  Defendant raises 
several contentions based on this provision.  Specifically, he focuses on 
 
36 
accomplice DeAndre Brown’s testimony, which at trial provided the primary 
evidence against defendant.  According to defendant, his convictions for two 
counts of capital murder, robbery, and kidnapping, as well as the arson and grand 
theft convictions and the robbery-murder and kidnapping-murder special 
circumstances, all must be set aside because erroneous and confusing jury 
instructions, misleading prosecutorial argument, and tainted evidence allowed the 
jury to convict defendant without understanding that Brown’s testimony had to be 
corroborated by independent evidence connecting defendant to the crimes.  
Defendant also asserts that the instructions did not properly inform the jury that 
statements by the other accomplices—Redmond and Bennett—could not be used 
to corroborate Brown’s testimony.  We reject these contentions. 
1.  Facts 
At the guilt phase of defendant’s trial, accomplice Brown testified, giving 
his firsthand account of the kidnappings and murders of Boyd and Harris.  The 
prosecution sought to corroborate Brown’s testimony with evidence of the 
recorded conversations in jail among defendant, Redmond, and Bennett.  At one 
point, the trial court discussed with the prosecutor and defense counsel the 
procedure for playing that tape.  Defense counsel objected to providing the jury 
with a copy of a transcript of the tape that included initials reflecting Brown’s 
identification of each speaker.  The trial court overruled this objection.   
Ultimately, the court admonished the jury:  “The attorneys have listened to 
the [] tape and followed it in the transcript, and have reached an agreement that 
certain words were said.  [¶]  This agreement does not cover who said them, it 
does not cover anything other than these are the words that the attorneys hear . . . 
[¶]  You will find that on the transcript, there are three sets of initials:  S.D., D.R., 
and D.B., standing respectively for the names Stanley Davis [defendant], Damon 
Redmond, Donald Bennett. . . .  [¶]  That merely indicates that Mr. Brown is going 
 
37 
to testify that, in his opinion, that statement that you hear is made by the person 
whose initials are indicated.  It does not amount to an agreement by the attorneys 
that in fact that is the person talking on the tape.  It’s merely a quick and short way 
of having you understand that that’s the voice identification made by Mr. Brown, 
and it has no other significance. . . .  [¶]  And I want to emphasize that the placing 
of the initials to the side of the statement indicates only one thing:  That it’s 
Mr. Brown’s opinion based on his experience with the individuals that that’s 
who’s talking. . . .  [¶]  You must understand that the agreement between the 
lawyers is only that these are the words being said.  They are not agreeing that 
these things pertain to this case.  Whether they do or not, that’s for you to decide.  
[¶]  More than that, what relevancy they have, if they do apply to this case, what 
weight is to be given to them, what significance, that’s for you to decide.  [¶]  
Also, you must understand that you are the final judges of what is said on this tape 
recording.  [¶]  This transcript has been prepared as an aid to following through, 
but it is not binding upon you.”   
The jury then heard the tape recording.  Thereafter, Brown testified that he 
was in the courtroom when the tape was played, that he had seen the transcript of 
the tape, and that the initials on the transcript accurately reflected who was 
speaking, except that he could not say for sure that the passages marked D.B. were 
actually spoken by Bennett.   
The trial court gave CALJIC Nos. 2.09 (evidence admitted for a limited 
purpose), 2.71 (admissions), 3.10 (definition of an accomplice), 3.11 (testimony of 
an accomplice must be corroborated by other evidence connecting defendant with 
the offense), 3.12 (sufficiency of evidence to corroborate an accomplice), 3.16 
(Brown an accomplice as a matter of law), 3.18 (accomplice testimony should be 
viewed with distrust).  The court also gave Special Instruction A, which told the 
jury to consider the recorded statements of the speakers other than defendant only 
 
38 
insofar as they explained defendant’s statements.  In addition, the court gave 
“Special Instruction B,” which read in pertinent part:  “The initials which appear 
in the left margin of People’s Exhibit [No.] 32 only represent De Andre Brown’s 
opinion as to the identity of the speaker . . . Counsel have not agreed as to the 
identity of any speaker on People’s Exhibit [No.] 31.  The identity of any speaker 
on People’s Exhibit [No.] 31 is for you to decide.”   
 
2.  Claim of instructional error -- use of Brown’s voice 
identifications 
Defendant contends that Special Instruction A was deficient in not telling 
the jury that, in determining whether statements on the tape corroborated Brown’s 
trial testimony describing the circumstances of the killings, it could not rely on the 
written initials on the transcript that Brown matched with voices on the tape.  We 
reject this contention.    
Section 1111 requires corroboration of accomplice testimony.  It provides:  
“A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be 
corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with 
the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely 
shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.  An accomplice 
is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense 
charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the 
accomplice is given.”  (Ibid.) 
The trial court instructed the jury that Brown was an accomplice as a matter 
of law.  Thus, for the jury to rely on Brown’s trial testimony about the 
circumstances of the robberies, kidnappings and murders of Boyd and Harris, it 
had to conclude that evidence independent of Brown’s testimony linked defendant 
to those crimes.  (§ 1111; People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1128-1130; 
People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 969.)  Such evidence could not come 
 
39 
from the other two accomplices, Redmond and Bennett (see People v. Tewksbury, 
supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 958), or from Brown himself (see People v. Andrews (1989) 
49 Cal.3d 200, 214).  Rather, under section 1111, there had to be evidence tending 
to connect defendant with the crimes “without aid or assistance from the testimony 
of” Brown, for instance, his testimony that the initialing on the tape transcript 
accurately reflected who was speaking.  (People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 
769.)  Such independent evidence “ ‘need not corroborate the accomplice as to 
every fact to which he testifies but is sufficient if it does not require interpretation 
and direction from the testimony of the accomplice yet tends to connect the 
defendant with the commission of the offense in such a way as reasonably may 
satisfy a jury that the accomplice is telling the truth . . . .’  [Citations.]”  (Id. at 
p. 769, italics added; see also People v. Rodrigues, supra, at p. 1128.) 
In this case, the only source of independent corroboration of Brown’s trial 
testimony was the jailhouse tape recording on which defendant, through his 
statements and adoptive admissions, implicated himself in the crimes.  Thus, the 
task for the jury was to determine, independently of Brown’s testimony, including 
his voice identifications, whether any statements by defendant on that tape linked 
him to the charged crimes.  Once the jury did so, it was free to rely on the whole 
of Brown’s testimony, including his identification of the other voices on the tape, 
in deciding the question of defendant’s guilt.  As we explain, the jury instructions 
adequately advised the jury.11   
                                              
11  
The underlying assumption of the trial court’s instructions to the jury on 
accomplice testimony seems to have been that the prosecution had to establish by 
evidence independent of the testimony of accomplice Brown that defendant was 
the actual shooter of the two victims and that he therefore entertained the intent to 
kill required to prove the felony-murder special circumstances under Carlos v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
40 
CALJIC No. 3.12, given here, told the jury that accomplice Brown’s 
testimony had to be corroborated by evidence which, “if believed, by itself and 
without any aid, interpretation or direction from” Brown, connected defendant to 
the crimes.  The instruction continued:  “In determining whether an accomplice 
has been corroborated, you must first assume the testimony of the accomplice has 
been removed from the case.  You must then determine whether there is any 
remaining evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of 
the crime.”  In addition, Special Instruction B specifically told the jury that the 
parties did not agree that the initials on the transcript corresponding to Brown’s 
voice identifications accurately reflected who was speaking, and that “the identity 
of any speaker” on the tape was a question for the jury.  Given these instructions, 
the jury would have understood that, before it could consider Brown’s trial 
testimony describing the circumstances of the crimes, it had to decide, without the 
aid of Brown’s voice identifications, that defendant’s statements on the tape 
connected him to those crimes.   
Defendant contends that the instructions failed to advise the jury adequately 
that it could not use Brown’s voice identifications to assist it in finding the 
independent corroboration that section 1111 requires.  Thus, he asserts the 
instructions did not preclude the jury from using evidence derived from 
accomplice Brown (his voice identifications) to aid it in finding the required 
corroboration.  Assuming for the sake of argument that defendant is not barred 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page) 
 
Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131.  We have never so held.  (See People v 
Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1177 [independent corroboration required only 
to prove the crimes underlying the felony-murder special circumstances].)   
 
41 
from raising this claim under the doctrine of invited error, because he expressly 
consented to Special Instruction A (see ante, p. 33; People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 
Cal.4th at p. 1135), the instructions were proper. 
As explained above, CALJIC No. 3.12 and Special Instruction B correctly 
explained to the jury that it had to disregard Brown’s testimony, including his 
voice identifications, before attempting to find statements by defendant on the 
jailhouse tape linking defendant to the crimes.  Thus, these instructions correctly 
told the jury how to find independent corroboration of Brown on the jailhouse 
tape.  Defendant posits that the jury might have concluded that Special Instruction 
A superseded the general instructions on accomplice testimony, including CALJIC 
No. 3.12.  Not so.  The trial court admonished the jury, under CALJIC No. 1.01, to 
view the instructions as a whole and not to “single out any particular sentence or 
any individual instruction and ignore the others.”  We presume the jury followed 
this instruction.  (People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 190; People v. Mickey, 
supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 689, fn. 17.)   
Defendant contends that the jury could not have followed the trial court’s 
instructions because the jailhouse tape—the only possible source of independent 
corroboration—was tainted by Brown’s voice identifications.  According to 
defendant, the jury would have relied on Brown’s voice identifications as reflected 
by the initials on the tape’s transcript in determining the identity of each speaker.  
We disagree.  We presume that the jury followed the court’s instruction to 
“assume the testimony of [Brown] has been removed from the case” before the 
jury itself decided upon the identity of each speaker on the tape and then 
determined that some of defendant’s comments provided independent 
corroboration for Brown’s trial testimony.   
Defendant suggests that the jury would not have understood that the 
testimony of Brown referred to in CALJIC No. 3.12 included the initials on the 
 
42 
transcript corresponding to Brown’s voice identifications.  But defense counsel in 
argument specifically told the jury to “draw a line through the initials” and 
“remove the initials from the transcript because that’s Brown.”  And the 
prosecutor argued “no one attacked Deandre Brown’s version of who the voices 
were, the legend on the tape.”  In light of these arguments, the jury would have 
understood that Brown’s testimony included his voice identifications and the 
initials on the transcript, and that these could not be considered when the jury 
determined who was speaking on the tape.     
Defendant also contends that comments by the prosecutor confused the jury 
about its obligation to consider corroborating evidence before considering 
Brown’s testimony.  For example, the prosecutor stated that Brown was the only 
“direct independent source of evidence in this case presented by a live witness to 
establish whose voices are on that tape,” and that “the most obvious person you 
call to identify the voices and to make use of that tape” was Brown.  We disagree.  
The prosecutor correctly told the jury that the corroborating evidence had to be 
independent of Brown’s testimony, and that the jury had to determine the 
identities of the speakers on the tape.  The prosecutor suggested that in light of 
Detective Evans’s and Detective DeAnda’s trial testimony that Redmond and 
Bennett had told them they were present at the murder scene, the jurors could 
logically deduce that the person who stated on the tape “I didn’t tell them” must 
have been defendant.  No comment by the prosecutor misled the jury.   
3.  Insufficiency of corroborating evidence  
Defendant contends that the corroborating evidence itself was insufficient 
to sustain his convictions for the murders, robberies, and kidnappings of Boyd and 
Harris and the special circumstances of robbery murder and kidnapping murder 
because the jury could not have found evidence linking defendant to the crimes 
independent of Brown’s testimony.  (See People v. Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d 
 
43 
1142, 1177 [when special circumstance requires proof of some other crime, that 
crime cannot be proved by the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice]; see 
also People v. Bowley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 855, 861-862 [corroborating evidence was 
insufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction where the value of the evidence 
rested entirely on the testimony of the accomplice].)  Had, for example, Brown’s 
testimony been necessary to identify the voices on the tape, the independent 
corroboration rule would not have been satisfied.  (See People v. Bowley, supra, 
59 Cal.2d at p. 862, fn. 6.)  But, as we have explained, that was not the case.  In 
addition to the methods the prosecutor outlined, there were a number of ways for 
the jury to identify the voices on the tape.  For example, as defense counsel 
suggested, in several excerpts (9, 26, 40) one speaker addresses another as “Stan.”  
From that comment, the jury could have concluded that the person who responded 
in these excerpts was defendant, Stanley Davis, and having thereby identified 
defendant’s voice, the jury could have determined when defendant was the speaker 
elsewhere on the tape.12 
                                              
12  
The following provided other ways in which the jury could have identified 
defendant’s voice independent of Brown’s testimony or the initials on the 
transcript identifying the speakers:  In excerpt 16 a voice says “the only reason 
why I got caught [was] because I turned myself in.”  The evidence at trial was that 
defendant was the only one of the four participants who had turned himself in to 
the police.  Accordingly, the jury could have concluded that the person making 
this statement was defendant.  In excerpt 18, the speaker recounts his conversation 
with police officers, quoting the officer as saying “ ‘mother fuckin’ Davis, you the 
one that gun down the victim and took his . . . GTI rabbit.’ ”   The jury could have 
concluded that the speaker was defendant.  Finally, Detective DeAnda testified 
that at one point during the taping he entered defendant’s cell and engaged in a 
conversation with him.  The jury could have determined that the other participant 
in the conversation, which became excerpt 42, was defendant. 
 
44 
Having listened to the tape, we conclude that defendant’s voice is 
identifiable and distinguishable from the voices of the other speakers.  Moreover, 
in several comments defendant makes (excerpts 9, 15, 16, 23, 24, 26, 27, 31, 34, 
38, 45, and 48) there are links to the charged crimes of murder, robbery, and 
kidnapping.  These comments thus sufficiently provide the legal corroboration that 
section 1111 requires.  Accordingly, substantial, independent evidence 
corroborates Brown’s trial testimony and supports defendant’s convictions as well 
as the findings on the special circumstances of murder in the course of a robbery 
and murder in the course of kidnapping for robbery.   
4.  Use of Redmond’s and Bennett’s statements 
Defendant contends that Special Instruction A did not adequately tell the 
jury that hearsay statements by accomplices Redmond and Bennett, both on and 
off the tape, could not be used to corroborate Brown’s trial testimony.  Defendant 
further contends that the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury that 
Redmond and Bennett were accomplices as a matter of law (CALJIC No. 3.16) 
and by declining to give CALJIC No. 3.13, which, as applicable here, provides:  
“The required corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice may not be 
supplied by the testimony of any or all of [his] accomplices, but must come from 
other evidence.”  The trial court refused to give these instructions as potentially 
confusing to the jury because Redmond and Bennett did not testify, and also 
because Redmond and Bennett lacked any motive to obtain a benefit from police 
when they made the statements recorded on the tape.  Defendant argues that 
without these CALJIC instructions, Special Instruction A improperly allowed the 
jury to use the hearsay statements of Redmond and Bennett on the tape to 
corroborate Brown and to corroborate each other.  We disagree. 
Section 1111 serves to ensure that a defendant will not be convicted solely 
upon the testimony of an accomplice because an accomplice is likely to have self-
 
45 
serving motives.  (People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1132; People v. 
Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 526.)  CALJIC No. 3.13 “acknowledges this danger 
in the context of multiple accomplices who may be motivated by self-interest to 
offer complementary but inaccurate testimony adverse to the defendant.”  (People 
v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)  That danger was not implicated here 
with respect to Bennett and Redmond, both of whose statements on the tape 
recording were not made to law enforcement officials in the hope of gaining 
leniency or immunity.  Rather, those statements were made to each other and to 
defendant in a conversation in a jail cell that all three apparently believed to be 
private.  (See People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1133; cf. People v. 
Belton, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 519, 525.)  In this context, there was no need to 
instruct the jury that Redmond and Bennett were accomplices whose statements 
could not be used to corroborate Brown.  (See People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 
Cal.4th at p. 1133 [CALJIC No. 3.13 unnecessary where accomplice’s utterance 
was made in defendant’s presence during the commission of the crimes for the 
reasonably apparent purpose of facilitating a robbery].)   
5.  Claim of federal constitutional error  
Defendant contends the trial court’s failure to correctly instruct the jury on 
section 1111’s accomplice corroboration requirement, together with misleading 
prosecutorial argument and tainted evidence, violated his right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution.  
He relies on Lee v. Illinois (1986) 476 U.S. 530, and Mason v. Scully (2d Cir. 
1994) 16 F.3d 38, cases involving prosecutorial use of a codefendant’s confession 
as substantive evidence against a defendant in violation of the confrontation 
clause.  Here, by contrast, there was no confrontation violation because the 
statements of Redmond and Bennett were not admitted as substantive evidence 
against defendant, but only to give meaning to defendant’s admissions on the tape.  
 
46 
(See Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 59, fn. 9 [hearsay statements 
not admitted for their truth do not violate the confrontation clause]; accord, People 
v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 190-191; People v. Preston, supra, 9 Cal.3d at 
pp. 315-316.)   
Further, because there was no violation of California law governing 
accomplice corroboration in this case, we need not decide whether any such 
violation would have infringed defendant’s federal due process rights on a theory 
that it denied him a state-created right.  (Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343.) 
Finally, defendant contends the trial court’s failure to ensure compliance 
with the accomplice corroboration rule violated his Eighth Amendment right to 
reliability in the death penalty determination.  Our conclusion that the trial court 
fully complied with the requirements of section 1111 defeats this argument.   
E.  Voice Identification Testimony By Police 
 
Defendant asserts that allowing Officer Evans and Detectives DeAnda and 
Charles Brown to testify about what occurred during police questioning of 
defendant, Redmond, and Bennett violated the hearsay rule and defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment rights as protected by Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 
(Miranda).  We disagree.   
1.  Facts 
Over defendant’s hearsay objection, the trial court allowed Officer Evans 
and Detective DeAnda to testify that, during interrogation, both Redmond and 
Bennett admitted being present at the murder scene.  The prosecution introduced 
this testimony to show that the voice on the tape saying “I didn’t tell them” 
belonged to defendant.  The court also permitted testimony by Detective Brown 
 
47 
that, when questioning defendant, Brown accused defendant of the 1984 
kidnapping of Kingsmill and the 1985 Boyd and Harris murders.13  With respect to 
Detective Brown’s testimony, defendant raised a Miranda objection and asserted 
that the testimony was more prejudicial than probative.  The trial court overruled 
these objections.14   
After Officer Evans and Detective DeAnda testified, but before Detective 
Brown did so, the trial court admonished the jury:  “Ladies and Gentlemen of the 
jury, I want to be very sure that you understand what is taking place here and what 
is not.  [¶]  As I understand it, the district attorney is attempting to show to you 
that the person who made the statement that is referred to on People’s 32, this 
transcript, excerpt 18 at page 9, they’re -- the district attorney’s going to argue to 
you that that excerpt is a statement made by Mr. Davis.  [¶]  And in attempting to 
establish that it was made by Mr. Davis, they’re going to show that the inner 
quotation in . . . the excerpt at 18 referred to an earlier conversation, that that was 
a conversation that [Detective] Brown had with Mr. Davis. . . .  [¶]  [Detective 
Brown is] going to tell you that he made a certain statement to Mr. Davis.  You’ll 
                                              
13  
Detective Charles Brown testified that during his interview with defendant 
on October 6, 1985, the detective had described the 1984 Kingsmill incident in 
these words:  “You walked up to some guy over there in Westwood and stuck a 
gun to his head and put him in his car, drove him down to South Central L.A., 
dropped him off and kept his car and got arrested.”  “Let me put it to you this way, 
Stanley, this one’s exactly like the other one except people got killed.”  Detective 
Brown then turned to the murders of Harris and Boyd:  “You were last seen with 
them.  You took the gun and you took the first one out in the bushes and you said 
you were just going to take their clothes, then you shot that one.  And then you 
came back and then you dragged the other one out of the car and you took him out 
there and you shot him.”   
14   
Earlier in the trial, the court had granted defendant’s motion to suppress his 
own statements to police on Miranda grounds.   
 
48 
be the ones to decide whether he did nor didn’t.  [¶]  If you find that he did make a 
certain statement, that statement is not to be considered by you for the truth of 
what Detective Brown said to Mr. Davis.  It’s merely to show that that statement 
was made to Mr. Davis and circumstantially the D.A.’s then going to argue that 
the person who spoke the excerpt 18 in referring to that statement must have been 
Mr. Davis because he’s the one that Detective Brown said he made that statement 
to.  [¶]  But again, I emphasize—and I can’t emphasize it too strongly that what, if 
anything, you find that Detective Brown said to Mr. Davis is not to be considered 
for the truth of its content.  The issue is whether he made that statement to Mr. 
Davis, and that’s the only purpose for which it’s being and any similar officer 
dealing with the transcript and my comments apply to [sic] the same fashion.”   
2.  Testimony of Detective DeAnda and Officer Evans 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to 
introduce inadmissible hearsay through the testimony of Detective DeAnda and 
Officer Evans about admissions by Redmond and Bennett that they had been 
present at the murder scene.  We disagree.   
Hearsay is “evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness 
while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter 
stated.”  (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a), italics added.)  Here, the trial court did not 
admit the police testimony for its truth—that is, that accomplices Redmond and 
Bennett were actually present at the crime scene—but only to show what Bennett 
and Redmond had said to the officers before the recording of the jailhouse tape.  
Thus, the police testimony was not hearsay.  For the same reason, it did not violate 
defendant’s rights under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the 
federal Constitution.  (Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, fn. 9; 
accord, People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 190-191; People v. Preston, 
supra, 9 Cal.3d at pp. 315-316.) 
 
49 
Defendant makes several other contentions about the testimony of 
Detective DeAnda and Officer Evans.  For instance, he contends that it was not 
probative of the identity of the speakers on the jailhouse tape, that any possible 
probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial effect of the testimony, that the 
prosecutor failed to use the least prejudicial means to identify the voices on the 
tape, and that the trial court erred in not giving on its own motion a limiting 
instruction that the jury could not consider for their truth the comments Redmond 
and Bennett made to the officers.  Because defendant failed to request such a 
limiting instruction, on appeal he may not complain of the lack of one.  (See 
People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 638.)  In any event, having considered 
each of these claims, we conclude that none has merit. 
Defendant further insists that the prosecutor misstated the evidence in 
closing argument when he said that accomplices Redmond and Bennett were “the 
only ones” who admitted being present at the murder scene, when no officer so 
testified.  Defendant adds that because during police questioning he had invoked 
his Miranda rights, no officer could testify to his statements that he had or had not 
been present at the murder scene.  For a prosecutor to misstate the evidence is 
prosecutorial misconduct.  (Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 182; 
People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 320.)  Here, however, defendant’s 
counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s statement.  Review on appeal is 
therefore barred unless an admonition would not have cured the harm.  (People v. 
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1000-1001; People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 
826, 858.)  Here, any harm could have been cured by an instruction to disregard 
the prosecutor’s comment in view of the lack of evidence.  Accordingly, defendant 
has forfeited this claim on appeal. 
Finally, defendant contends that his counsel’s failure to object to the 
prosecutor’s comment was ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth 
 
50 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  To prevail on such a claim, 
defendant must show both: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and 
(2) that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.  (Strickland v. 
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-694; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 
171, 216-218.)  To establish prejudice, defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  (See Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 
pp. 693-694; In re Cordero (1988) 46 Cal.3d 161, 180.)  A reasonable probability 
is “ ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ”  (In re 
Cordero, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 180, quoting Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 
U.S. at pp. 693-694.) 
Here, we need not address whether counsel’s performance was deficient, 
because we find no reasonable probability that, had counsel objected to the 
prosecutor’s statement, the result of the proceeding would have differed.  As we 
have explained, there were numerous methods for the jury to determine who was 
speaking on the tape.  The prosecutor’s invitation to infer that defendant had not 
admitted to police that he had been present at the murder scene was only one of 
those methods.  Even absent that method, we are confident that the jury could have 
identified the voices with sufficient precision to find statements of defendant that 
corroborated Brown.  Accordingly, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim fails.    
3.  Testimony of Detective Brown 
Defendant asserts the trial court erred in permitting Detective Brown to 
recount statements he had made to defendant during questioning after defendant’s 
invocation of his Miranda rights.  We are aware of no case—and defendant cites 
none—holding that Miranda requires suppression of police comments made to a 
defendant after the defendant invokes his own right to remain silent. 
 
51 
“Under the familiar requirements of Miranda, designed to assure protection 
of the federal Constitution’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
under ‘inherently coercive’ circumstances, a suspect may not be subjected to 
custodial interrogation unless he or she knowingly and intelligently has waived the 
right to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney, and to appointed counsel in 
the event the suspect is indigent.  [Citations.]  Once having invoked these rights, 
the accused ‘is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel 
has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with police.’ ”  (People v. Sims 
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 440, citing Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445, and 
Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485.)  The United States Supreme 
Court recently held that the failure to give a defendant Miranda warnings does not 
require suppression of physical evidence obtained as a result of the defendant’s 
unwarned but voluntary statements.  (United States v. Patane (2004) __ U.S. __ 
[124 S.Ct. 2620].)  Rather, potential violations of the self-incrimination clause 
“occur, if at all, only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence at 
trial.”  (Id. at p. ___ [124 S.Ct. at p. 2629], italics added.)  In context, the high 
court’s language makes clear that only the admission into evidence of statements 
of the defendant taken in violation of Miranda violates the self-incrimination 
clause.  No such violation occurred here. 
F.  Miranda Mistrial Motion 
Defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial 
on the grounds that certain excerpts (42 through 49) on the jailhouse tape and 
transcript that were introduced into evidence were obtained in violation of 
defendant’s rights under the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution.  
 
52 
1.  Facts 
When defendant was arrested on October 6, 1985, and taken to the West 
Los Angeles police station, the police advised him of his Miranda rights, which he 
refused to waive.  The police then placed him in a holding cell next to 
codefendants Bennett and Redmond and proceeded to record their conversations.  
During the taping, Detective DeAnda, who knew that no fingerprints had been 
found on the Uzi, entered defendant’s cell and looked directly at him.  The 
following conversation ensued:      
“Det. DeAnda:  
Well, you are going to court tomorrow my friend. 
“[Defendant]: 
So what will happen? 
“Det. DeAnda: 
Well we filed murder counts on you. 
“[Defendant]: 
How many? 
“Det. DeAnda: 
Two.  Special Circumstances. 
“[Defendant]: 
What’s that? 
“Det. DeAnda: 
. . .  Special Circumstances means that you can get life 
in prison without parole or the death penalty. 
“[Defendant]: 
Oh man. 
“Det. DeAnda: 
Alright remember that Uzi? 
“[Defendant]: 
Yeah. 
“Det. DeAnda: 
Think about that little fingerprint on it we’ll see ya 
(Jail door closes). 
“[Bennett]:  
Say what?  Is he talking about everybody? 
“[Defendant]: 
No man he talking about me.”   
After this exchange, defendant made additional incriminating remarks:  
“Now they trying to say the fingerprints on the Uzi is mine.  Man that’s what’s 
going to do the shit man.  I’m telling you man.”  “Man if that nigger De De 
 
53 
[Brown] don’t die, I am going to kick man.  The fingerprints on the Uzi is mine.  I 
know that mother fucker has been handled since I handled it.”   
After the jailhouse tape had been played for the jury, defendant moved to 
strike the exchange just quoted and the portion of the tape that followed it 
(excerpts 43-49).  He asserted that his comments on the tape were obtained in 
violation of Miranda.  When the trial court declined to grant the motion, defense 
counsel moved for a mistrial.  The trial court denied that motion, reasoning that 
the excerpts in question were not central to the prosecution’s case and did not 
violate Miranda.   
2.  Discussion 
Here defendant did not file a timely motion to exclude the challenged 
excerpts as violating his Miranda rights, but rather moved for a mistrial after the 
jury had already heard the excerpts.  Thus, in reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we 
use the deferential abuse of discretion standard.  (People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th 
at p. 428; People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 113.)  A trial court should grant 
a mistrial only if the defendant will suffer prejudice that is “ ‘ “incurable by 
admonition or instruction.” ’ ”  (People v. Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 713; 
People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1038.)  In making this assessment of 
incurable prejudice, a trial court has considerable discretion.  (People v. Hines, 
supra, at p. 1038.)   
On the facts here, there was no abuse of discretion.  As stated earlier, the 
high court’s decision in Miranda serves to protect a defendant’s Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.  (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445.)  
Suspects who invoke the rights to counsel and to remain silent may not be 
subjected to further interrogation until counsel is made available or “ ‘the accused 
himself initiates further communication.’ ”  (People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 
p. 440.)  These rules apply not only when the police engage in express questioning 
 
54 
of a suspect, but also when they undertake its “functional equivalent” (Rhode 
Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 300-301; see also Arizona v. Mauro (1987) 
481 U.S. 520, 526-527; People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 440), through 
“words or actions . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from the suspect.”  (Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, at p. 301, 
fns. omitted; see also Arizona v. Mauro, supra, at pp. 526-527; People v. Sims, 
supra, at p. 440.)  In deciding whether police conduct was “reasonably likely” to 
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect, we consider primarily the 
perceptions of the suspect rather than the intent of the police.  (Arizona v. Mauro, 
supra, at p. 527; Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, at p. 301.)  Because the dual 
elements of a police-dominated atmosphere and compulsion that result from the 
interaction of custody and official interrogation are absent when the defendant is 
unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer, however, Miranda is 
inapplicable when the defendant does not know that the person he is talking to is 
an agent of the police.  (See Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 296-300 
[Miranda warnings were not required when the police placed the defendant in a 
cell with an undercover agent who then elicited incriminating statements].)   
People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th 405, involved the functional equivalent of 
interrogation.  The defendant, who was arrested in Nevada for the murder of a 
pizza delivery person in California, invoked his Miranda rights.  Thereafter, as the 
officers were preparing to leave the jailhouse interview room, the defendant asked 
them about being extradited to California or to South Carolina, where he was 
wanted for additional crimes.  During that conversation, a police officer from 
California described the crime scene—a motel room—and suggested that the 
defendant had occupied that room and had lured the victim inside when he arrived 
to deliver a pizza.  This court concluded that those statements by the officer were 
the “functional equivalent” of interrogation because they indirectly accused the 
 
55 
defendant of the crime and thus were likely to induce him to incriminate himself.  
(People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 442-444; see also In re Albert R. (1980) 
112 Cal.App.3d 783, 793 [“blatantly and flagrantly accusatorial” statements by 
police are functional equivalent of interrogation]; United States v. Poole (9th Cir. 
1986) 794 F.2d 462, 466-467.)   
The situation here is quite similar.  As a preliminary matter, we conclude 
that Detective DeAnda directly engaged in interrogation when he asked defendant 
if he “remember[ed] that Uzi.”  That question, after defendant had invoked his 
Miranda rights, elicited defendant’s response, “Yeah,” in violation of his privilege 
against self-incrimination.  
Furthermore, when Detective DeAnda said, “Think about that little 
fingerprint on [the Uzi],” he implied that defendant’s fingerprint had been found 
on the Uzi, and thus indirectly accused defendant of personally shooting the 
victims.  As in Sims, this comment was likely to elicit an incriminating response 
and thus was the functional equivalent of interrogation.  (People v. Sims, supra, 5 
Cal.4th at pp. 442-444; see also Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 299 
[“psychological ploys” such as positing the guilt of the subject may be the 
functional equivalent of interrogation].)   
After the comment about the Uzi, Detective DeAnda left defendant’s jail 
cell.  Thereafter, defendant, unaware that police officers were listening to and 
recording his statements, said to his cellmates:  “The fingerprints on the Uzi is 
mine.  I know that mother fucker [the Uzi] has been handled since I handled it.”  
Under the circumstances, defendant “consider[ed] himself in the company of 
cellmates and not officers,” and the coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation 
was lacking.  (Illinois v. Perkins, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 296.)  Viewing the situation 
from defendant’s perspective (see Arizona v. Mauro, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 527; 
Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 301), when he made these statements 
 
56 
to his cellmates there was no longer a coercive, police-dominated atmosphere, and 
no official compulsion for him to speak.  Thus, the admission of defendant’s 
incriminating statements made after Detective DeAnda left the cell did not violate 
his rights under Miranda.  
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the only statement challenged here that was 
admitted in violation of Miranda was defendant’s affirmative response to 
Detective DeAnda’s question, “remember that Uzi?”  It was incriminating to the 
extent it conveyed to the jury that defendant knew that DeAnda was talking about 
the Uzi used in the murders of Boyd and Harris.  Given the many other damaging 
admissions defendant made on the tape recording, the error in admitting this very 
brief exchange was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Therefore, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial.     
G.  Multiple Prosecution of Kingsmill Offenses 
Tried together with this September 1985 double murder case was the May 
1984 robbery and kidnap for robbery of David Kingsmill.  In June 1984, defendant 
pled guilty to one misdemeanor count of unlawfully taking Kingsmill’s car.  (Veh. 
Code, § 10851.)  Defendant now contends that prosecuting him in this case for the 
robbery and kidnap for robbery of Kingsmill violated the prohibition on multiple 
prosecution under section 654 and Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 822 
(Kellett).   
1.  Facts 
During the preliminary hearing, and later in the superior court, defendant 
sought to enter a special plea of “a former judgment of conviction” to the counts 
involving Kingsmill based on section 654 and Kellett.  The trial court summarized 
the relevant facts:  “An individual by the name of David Kingsmill reported being 
kidnapped and robbed of his vehicle on May 27, 1984.  Subsequently on June 1st 
of 1984 the defendant was apprehended driving the stolen vehicle.  [¶]  The 
 
57 
District Attorney rejected any prosecution on the kidnapping-robbery at that time 
and referred the matter to the City Attorney’s office and a joyriding, 10851(a) of 
the Vehicle Code[15] and a receiving stolen property, 496 of the Penal Code, 
misdemeanors were filed against Mr. Davis.  [¶]  And he, as I understand it, 
entered a plea and received a sentence, 60 days in the county jail.  [¶]  At this time 
in this case the District Attorney’s office has filed in counts IX and X, the robbery 
of David Kingsmill on May 27th, 1984 and the kidnapping for robbery on that 
same date.  And on the principles of the Kellett case, the defense feels that the 
people are precluded at this time from pursuing these.”   
Defendant asserted that the newly charged offenses arose from the same 
act—the taking of Kingsmill’s car—for which he had already been convicted, and 
thus that multiple prosecution was barred.  The trial court disagreed:  “Kellett does 
not apply to a subsequent prosecution for an offense where . . . at the time of the 
earlier prosecution the People did not have and reasonably could not have obtained 
sufficient evidence” to overcome a motion for acquittal at the close of the 
prosecution’s case.  The court found that the People could not have prosecuted 
defendant earlier for the robbery and kidnapping because, at the time of 
defendant’s arrest in June 1984, Kingsmill was unable to identify any of his 
assailants and defendant did not admit his involvement in the robbery and 
kidnapping of Kingsmill until after he had served his jail sentence for the 
                                              
15  
In 1984, Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), provided in pertinent 
part:  “Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the 
consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either permanently or temporarily to 
deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, 
whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle . . . is guilty of a public offense 
. . . .”  (Stats. 1983, ch. 889, § 1, p. 3228.)  This provision is essentially the same 
today.     
 
58 
misdemeanor conviction of the unlawful taking of Kingsmill’s car.  The trial court 
concluded that when the prosecution later obtained adequate evidence to warrant 
convictions for the robbery and kidnapping of Kingsmill, it was entitled to 
prosecute defendant for those felony offenses, despite defendant’s earlier 
misdemeanor conviction for the unlawful taking of Kingsmill’s car.   
2.  Discussion16 
Section 654, subdivision (a), provides that when “[a]n act or omission . . . is 
punishable in different ways by different provisions of the law,” “[a]n acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same act or 
omission under any other.”  This provision thus bars multiple prosecutions for the 
same act or omission where the defendant has already been tried and acquitted, or 
convicted and sentenced.  (People v. Britt (2004) 32 Cal.4th 944, 950; Kellett v. 
Superior Court, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 825.)  This preclusion is primarily “a 
procedural safeguard against harassment.”  (Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 
Cal.2d 11, 21.)  
The leading case is our decision in Kellett.  There, the defendant, who 
earlier had pled guilty to a misdemeanor offense of exhibiting a firearm in a 
threatening manner (§ 417), was charged with a felony of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm (§ 12021).  Both charges arose out of the defendant’s 
arrest on a public sidewalk while holding a pistol.  We concluded that the second 
prosecution was barred:  “When, as here, the prosecution is or should be aware of 
more than one offense in which the same act or course of conduct plays a 
                                              
16  
Defendant concedes that neither the federal nor the state double jeopardy 
provisions (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15) barred the later 
prosecution.   
 
59 
significant part, all such offenses must be prosecuted in a single proceeding unless 
joinder is prohibited or severance permitted for good cause.  Failure to unite all 
such offenses will result in a bar to subsequent prosecution of any offense omitted 
if the initial proceedings culminate in either acquittal or conviction and sentence.”  
(Kellett, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 827, fn. omitted.)  We observed:  “Whether a 
course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one 
act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the 
actor.”  (Id. at pp. 824-825, citing Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d at 
p. 19.)    
We have recognized an exception to the multiple-prosecution bar where the 
prosecutor “is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because 
the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not 
been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence.”  (People v. Scott (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 1188, 1202; see Brown v. Ohio (1977) 432 U.S. 161, 169, fn. 7 [discussing 
analogous exception to federal double jeopardy bar].)  Thus, for example, section 
654 does not preclude prosecuting a defendant for the murder of a victim who dies 
only after an earlier prosecution for attempted murder.  (People v. Scott, supra, 15 
Cal.4th at pp. 1201-1203.)  Similarly, section 654 will not bar a later prosecution 
when the government, despite reasonable efforts, has been unable to discover the 
facts necessary to sustain a conviction on the more serious crime.  (See United 
States v. Stearns (9th Cir. 1983) 707 F.2d 391, 393.)  But this exception applies 
only when the government “acted with due diligence at the outset but was unable 
to discover the additional facts necessary to sustain the greater charge.”  (Ibid.)  
Whether the government exercised due diligence is a question of fact.  (Id. at 
p. 394.)  
The trial court here concluded that, notwithstanding reasonable efforts, the 
prosecution could not have proceeded on the kidnapping and robbery charges 
 
60 
earlier because neither victim Kingsmill nor anyone else could identify defendant.  
Substantial evidence supports this conclusion.  At the preliminary hearing in this 
case, Kingsmill testified that after the incident in May 1984, he doubted he could 
ever identify any of his assailants because he did not have a clear view of them.  
And at trial, Kingsmill mentioned that he viewed a photo lineup after his 
Volkswagen was recovered but could not identify anyone.  DeAndre Brown 
testified at defendant’s preliminary hearing that after defendant had served his 
time for the misdemeanor conviction of unlawfully taking Kingsmill’s 
Volkswagen, defendant admitted to him how he had come into possession of that 
car.  Kingsmill’s and Brown’s testimony amply supports the trial court’s 
conclusions that in June 1984 when defendant was arrested for taking Kingsmill’s 
car, neither Kingsmill nor any other known witness could have provided evidence 
to establish that defendant had kidnapped or robbed Kingsmill, and thus that 
section 654 did not bar the later prosecution.    
Finally, the policies underlying section 654—preventing harassment of the 
defendant and the waste of public resources through relitigation of issues (Kellett, 
supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 825-827)—would not be served here by holding that the 
kidnapping and robbery charges were barred.  Here, defendant’s interest in being 
free from the harassment of a second trial in relation to the 1984 Kingsmill 
incident was minimal given that he was already on trial for the much more serious 
charges arising from the 1985 murders in this case.  Further, the public’s interest 
in avoiding the waste of resources through relitigation was minimal given that 
defendant pled guilty to unlawfully taking Kingsmill’s car, thus dispensing with a 
need for a trial.  Balanced against these minimal interests was the public’s weighty 
interest in prosecuting and punishing defendant for the serious crimes of robbing 
and kidnapping Kingsmill.  (See Id. at p. 828; see also In re Dennis B. (1976) 18 
 
61 
Cal.3d 687, 696 [noting the “undeniable state interest in prosecuting serious 
misdemeanors and felonies”].)   
H.  Robbery of Michelle Boyd 
Defendant asserts that misleading prosecutorial argument and inadequate 
jury instructions violated his rights under state law and the federal Constitution.  
Thus, he contends, this court must set aside his convictions for the robbery and 
kidnap for robbery of Michelle Boyd, the special circumstance findings based on 
the robbery and kidnap for robbery of Boyd, and the felony-murder conviction 
based on the robbery of Boyd.  We agree that the robbery conviction must be set 
aside, but we otherwise reject these contentions.  
1.  Facts 
Defendant was charged with robbery and kidnapping for robbery of Boyd, 
as well as with the separate special-circumstances allegations that he killed Boyd 
in the course of robbing her and kidnapping her for the purpose of robbery.  The 
information did not specify what property defendant had allegedly taken from 
Boyd.  Defendant also was charged with the grand theft of the Honda, described as 
“a certain automobile then and there the personal property of” the other murder 
victim, Brian Harris.    
In closing argument relating to the Boyd robbery, the prosecutor argued 
that the property stolen could have been either the Honda or Boyd’s rings, one of 
which had been recovered from DeAndre Brown.  The prosecutor further argued 
that under the felony-murder rule, all the jury had to do was “find there was a 
robbery.”  He added that if the jury found that defendant had participated in a 
robbery involving any property “in Westwood that night,” that evidence would be 
sufficient under the felony-murder rule to convict defendant of the murder of 
Boyd.   
 
62 
The trial court instructed the jury under CALJIC Nos. 9.40 (defining 
robbery), 9.44 (when a robbery is still in progress), 9.54 (kidnapping to commit 
robbery) 8.81.17 (special circumstances—murder in commission of robbery), 8.10 
(murder defined), 8.20 (deliberate and premeditated murder) and 8.21 (first degree 
felony murder—robbery).   
2.  Robbery conviction 
Defendant challenges his conviction for the robbery of Boyd on three 
separate bases.  First, defendant contends that inadequate jury instructions and 
misleading prosecutorial argument led to his conviction under the “legally 
incorrect” theory that he robbed Boyd of the Honda car.  He contends that he 
could not properly have been convicted of the robbery of Boyd based on the 
Honda because Boyd was a “mere passenger” in that car, which Harris owned, and 
thus could not have had actual or constructive possession of it while Harris was in 
it.  (See People v. Hamilton (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1142 [suggesting that 
passenger who was sole occupant of a vehicle would have sufficient possessory 
interest to be a robbery victim]; see also People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 
1062-1063 [passenger in a car who lacks sufficient possessory interest in it to 
qualify as a robbery victim when the property taken is the car would qualify as a 
carjacking victim]; People v. Hill (2000) 23 Cal.4th 853, 861, fn. 5.)   
Second, defendant contends he was entitled to an instruction on theft 
(§ 484) as a lesser included offense of robbery with respect to the taking of Boyd’s 
rings because there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that 
defendant formed the intent to take the rings after he killed Boyd.  (See People v. 
Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154 [trial court must instruct the jury on its own 
initiative on all general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the 
evidence]; People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 871 [trial court’s obligation to 
instruct on its own initiative encompasses instructions on lesser included offenses 
 
63 
when there is evidence that, if accepted by the trier of fact, would absolve the 
defendant of guilt of the greater offense but not of the lesser].) 
Third, defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to give a 
unanimity instruction regarding the robbery charge involving victim Boyd.   
We need not address the first two of defendant’s contentions, for we find 
the third dispositive.  Defendant notes that the prosecution presented evidence of 
two distinct acts of robbery (the taking of the Honda from Boyd and Harris, and 
the taking of Boyd’s rings) but did not elect which of those two it was relying on 
to prove the robbery of Boyd.  In this situation, defendant asserts, the trial court 
had to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on which act constituted the 
robbery.17  (See People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 283; People v. Beardslee 
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 93 [“ ‘A unanimity instruction is required . . . if the jurors 
could . . . disagree which act a defendant committed and yet convict him of the 
crime charged’ ”]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 280-282.)   
The record does not reflect that defendant requested a unanimity 
instruction.  Absent such a request, a trial court should instruct on unanimity when 
the circumstances so warrant.  (People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1199; People 
v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 311, fn. 8.)  On the facts here, we conclude that 
                                              
17  
CALJIC No. 17.01 is the standard unanimity instruction.  As applicable 
here, it provides:  “The defendant is accused of having committed the crime of 
______ [in Count _____.]  The prosecution has introduced evidence for the 
purpose of showing that there is more than one [act] upon which a conviction [on 
Count _____] may be based.  Defendant may be found guilty if the proof shows 
beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] committed any one or more the [acts].  
However, in order to return a verdict of guilty [to Count _____], all jurors must 
agree that [he] committed the same [act] [or] [acts].  It is not necessary that the 
particular [act] agreed upon be stated in your verdict.” 
 
64 
defendant was entitled to a unanimity instruction.  The evidence disclosed two 
distinct takings:  the taking of Harris’s car from Boyd and Harris, and the taking of 
Boyd’s rings from her person.  Moreover, the prosecutor argued that the jury could 
rely on either theory to convict defendant of the robbery of Boyd.   
We further conclude that the omission of the unanimity instruction was 
prejudicial as to the robbery conviction because we cannot ascertain from the 
record whether some jurors found defendant guilty of robbery based on the taking 
of the rings while others relied solely on defendant’s taking of the Honda.  On the 
facts of this case, some jurors may have had a reasonable doubt as to whether 
Boyd was still alive when the intent to take her rings was formed while other 
jurors may have had a doubt about whether Boyd was in possession of Harris’s 
car.  Under these circumstances, the trial court’s failure to give the unanimity 
instruction was prejudicial.  (See People v. Diedrich, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 282-
283.)   
The Attorney General contends that we may affirm the robbery conviction 
despite the lack of a unanimity instruction because the taking of the Honda and the 
taking of the rings were so closely connected as to form one continuous 
transaction (see People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 284-285; People v. 
Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 100; People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 
875), and thus it would have been inconceivable for a juror to believe that 
defendant committed one robbery, but disbelieve he committed the other (see 
People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1199-1200; People v. Carrera, supra, 49 
Cal.3d at pp. 311-312).   
We are not persuaded.  In each of the cases the Attorney General relies on, 
we concluded that a unanimity instruction was not required (or, even if required, 
we found no prejudice) either because the defendant offered the same defense to 
both acts constituting the charged crime, so no juror could have believed 
 
65 
defendant committed one act but disbelieved that he committed the other, or 
because “there was no evidence . . . from which the jury could have found 
defendant was guilty of” the crime based on one act but not the other.  (People v. 
Carrera, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 311-312.)  The same cannot be said here.  As 
explained above, the potential defenses to the two acts of robbery were entirely 
different:  as to the car, the defense was that Boyd was not legally in possession of 
it; as to the rings, the defense was that its taking constituted only the lesser 
included crime of theft.   
Further, there was evidence from which the jury could have found 
defendant not guilty of the robbery of the rings.  The greater offense of robbery 
includes all of the elements of theft, with the additional element of a taking by 
force or fear.  (People v. Ramkeesoon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 346, 351.)  If the 
defendant does not harbor the intent to take property from the possessor at the time 
he applies force or fear, the taking is only a theft, not a robbery.  (Ibid.; People v. 
Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 54 (Green).)  Here, Brown testified that defendant and 
his friends intended to steal a car so they could drive to Barstow to rob a store.  
Although Brown testified that when defendant walked Boyd out into the field, 
Brown thought that defendant would remove the clothes she was wearing 
(presumably to hinder her escape, as defendant had done when he kidnapped 
Kingsmill in 1984), Brown did not testify that he believed defendant would take 
Boyd’s jewelry.  The police ultimately recovered Boyd’s wire ring from Brown’s 
girlfriend; never recovered was Boyd’s high school senior class ring, which was 
also missing from her body.  According to Brown, he received the wire ring from 
either Redmond or defendant on the morning after the killings, that is, on October 
1, 1985.  There was no evidence that the rings were taken from Boyd while she 
was still alive.  And there was no evidence regarding when defendant, or any of 
his accomplices, formed the intent to take Boyd’s rings.  On these facts, the jury 
 
66 
could have concluded that defendant formed the intent to steal Boyd’s rings after 
he killed her.  Such a finding would absolve defendant of guilt of robbery, because 
one cannot rob a dead person.  But these facts would support a theft conviction.  
 
Accordingly, there was evidence from which the jury could have found 
defendant guilty of robbery based on the car but not the rings.  The trial court’s 
failure to instruct on unanimity therefore was prejudicial, and we must set aside 
the conviction for the robbery of Boyd. 
3.  Robbery-murder special circumstance  
 
We find no basis, however, to set aside the robbery murder special 
circumstance as to victim Boyd.  Although we have assumed, without deciding, 
that the unanimity requirement applies to special circumstances (e.g., People v. 
Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 283-285 [rejecting, on the particular facts, a claim 
that the trial court was required to give a unanimity instruction as to the financial 
gain special circumstance]; People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 178 [rejecting 
claim that unanimity instruction actually given as to lewd and lascivious act 
special circumstance did not result in a valid unanimous verdict]), we have never 
so held.  To the contrary, in People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824, we 
concluded the trial court was not required to instruct the jury that it must 
unanimously agree which acts constituted the lying in wait underlying the charged 
lying-in-wait special circumstance.  Rather, as long as each juror was convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of lying in wait, as that 
special circumstance is defined by statute, unanimous agreement as to the theory 
of lying in wait was not required.  (Ibid.)      
 
Here, we need not decide whether jury unanimity as to the property taken 
during the robbery underlying the special circumstance was required, because any 
possible error in failing to instruct that the jury must unanimously agree on a 
theory of robbery was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to the 
 
67 
special circumstance.  That is because, as defendant concedes, the Boyd robbery-
murder special circumstance could have been found true based on the murder of 
Boyd during the robbery of the car from Harris.  For the felony-murder rule to 
apply, the murder victim need not be the target of the underlying felony (People v. 
Billa (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1070; People v. Welch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 106, 118-
119; People v. Johnson (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 653, 658), and we see no reason 
why a different rule should apply with regard to felony murder special 
circumstances.     
 
Defendant argues that this court cannot uphold the special circumstance on 
this theory because the jury was never instructed on it.  In support he cites Blakely 
v. Washington (2004) ___ U.S. ___ [124 S.Ct. 2531], Apprendi v. New Jersey 
(2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi), and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, for the 
rule that any fact that increases the maximum punishment a defendant is subjected 
to must be submitted to a jury and unanimously found true beyond a reasonable 
doubt.   
We disagree.  Apprendi and its progeny govern only the question of who, as 
between judge and jury, must decide the existence of the facts that increase the 
maximum punishment.  Here, Apprendi’s requirement is satisfied by our state law 
requiring the jury unanimously to agree that the murder occurred during the 
commission of a robbery.  We see nothing in Apprendi or Ring that requires the 
jury to agree unanimously as to which robbery the murder facilitated. 
Moreover, Apprendi error — that is, error in failing to submit a 
punishment-increasing factual issue to the jury — is subject to harmless error 
analysis under the beyond a reasonable doubt test of Chapman v. California, 
supra, 386 U.S. at page 23.  (People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 326-
328 [Chapman harmless error standard applies to Apprendi error in failing to 
instruct on element of sentencing enhancement].)  Indeed, even when jury 
 
68 
instructions completely omit an element of a crime, and therefore deprive the jury 
of the opportunity to make a finding on that element, a conviction may be upheld 
under Chapman where there is no “record . . . evidence that could rationally lead 
to a contrary finding” with respect to that element.  (Neder v. United States (1999) 
527 U.S. 1, 19; see also People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504-505.)   
Here, even assuming the jury should have been instructed on the theory that 
Boyd was killed during the robbery of the car from Harris, any error was harmless.  
The jury found true the robbery-murder special circumstance with respect to 
victim Harris — that is, that the murder of Harris was carried out during and to 
advance the commission of the robbery of the car from Harris (Green, supra, 27 
Cal.3d at pp. 60-61 (see post, at p. 73)) — and defendant killed Harris and Boyd at 
the same time.  There was no evidence that rationally could have led the jury to 
conclude that the murder of Boyd was not carried out during and to advance the 
commission of the robbery of Harris.  Accordingly, any error in the jury 
instructions related to the Boyd robbery count was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt with respect to the Boyd robbery murder special circumstance. 
 
4. Robbery murder 
Defendant contends we must set aside the murder conviction with respect 
to Boyd based on the felony-murder theory that the murder took place during a 
robbery.  Defendant asserts the conviction is invalid whether based on the robbery 
of Boyd’s rings or on the robbery of the Honda.  With respect to the rings, he 
points out that an intent to steal that arises after the infliction of the fatal wounds 
cannot support a felony-murder conviction.  (See People v. Morris (1988) 46 
Cal.3d 1, 23, fn. 9, disapproved on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 
Cal.4th 535, 543, fn. 5; accord, Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 54, fn. 44.)  And he 
argues that he could not properly have been convicted of robbing Boyd of the car 
because she did not own or possess it.  We disagree.  The flaw in the Boyd 
 
69 
robbery conviction does not require reversal of the felony-murder conviction.  As 
we have explained, for the felony-murder rule to apply, the murder victim need 
not be the target of the underlying felony.  (People v. Billa, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 
p. 1070; People v. Welch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 118-119.)  Here, defendant was 
properly convicted of robbing Harris of his car, and there was no evidence from 
which the jury rationally could have concluded that Boyd was not murdered 
during the perpetration of that robbery.  (See Neder v. United States, supra, 527 
U.S. at p. 19; People v. Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 504-505.)  Accordingly, 
there is no basis for disturbing defendant’s conviction for the murder of Boyd on a 
felony-murder theory.    
Moreover, the jury returned special verdicts unanimously finding defendant 
guilty of murder on two separate theories:  the willful, deliberate and premeditated 
murder of Boyd and the felony-murder of Boyd.  We have found no basis to 
invalidate the premeditated murder verdict.  Accordingly, the murder conviction 
stands.  (See People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 24.) 
5. Kidnapping for robbery 
Defendant argues that the kidnap for robbery conviction related to victim 
Boyd, “insofar as it is based upon the underlying robbery allegation,” must be 
reversed, along with the related special circumstance of murder during a kidnap 
for robbery.18  We disagree.  A defendant may be convicted of kidnapping for 
                                              
18    
The prosecution originally charged defendant with kidnapping murder 
special circumstances based on both simple kidnapping (§ 207) and kidnapping for 
robbery (§ 209).  After the jury retired to deliberate, the prosecution moved 
without objection to amend the kidnapping murder special circumstance 
allegations to delete the reference to simple kidnapping, so that each count alleged 
that the murders occurred during a kidnapping for robbery.  The trial court so 
amended the information.  It is not clear why the prosecution requested this 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
70 
robbery even if the robbery is not completed.  (People v. Beaumaster (1971) 17 
Cal.App.3d 996, 1007; People v. Zurica (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 25, 32; People v. 
Hernandez (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 128, 132.)  All that is required is that the 
defendant have the specific intent to commit a robbery at the time the kidnapping 
begins.  (See People v. Tribble (1971) 4 Cal.3d 826, 831-832; People v. Jones 
(1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 693, 717.)  Thus, no matter what property defendant 
intended to forcibly take from Boyd when he kidnapped her, he still committed a 
kidnapping for robbery.19  On this basis, we reject defendant’s contentions.  
I.  Other Special Circumstances Instructions 
Defendant claims a violation of his rights protected by state law and the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution in the trial court’s 
failure to instruct on the multiple-murder and kidnapping for robbery special 
circumstances.  We are not persuaded. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page) 
 
amendment, given that the statutory special circumstance applies to any 
kidnapping, not just kidnapping for robbery.  (See § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B).)   
19    
We note that the jury instructions here on kidnapping for robbery, requiring 
that the robbery and kidnapping victims be the same person, were substantially 
more favorable to defendant than the law required.  A defendant may be convicted 
under section 209, subdivision (b), even when the kidnapping victim is not the 
victim (or intended victim) of the robbery.  (People v. Laursen (1972) 8 Cal.3d 
192, 200, fn. 7; People v. Zurica, supra, 225 Cal.App.2d at p. 32.)  Thus, had the 
jury been so instructed, it could have convicted defendant of kidnapping Boyd for 
the purpose of robbing Harris of the Honda.    
 
71 
1.  Facts 
During the guilt phase trial, the trial court discussed jury instructions with 
counsel.  The court proposed that, instead of giving CALJIC No. 8.81.3,20 it would 
instruct the jury that it must decide whether defendant was the person who fired 
the bullet that killed each victim.  Then, if the jury found defendant guilty of the 
murders of Boyd and Harris, the multiple-murder special circumstance would be 
true as a matter of law.  Defendant’s counsel and the prosecutor agreed to this 
procedure.   
Thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury under CALJIC No. 8.80:  “If 
you find the defendant in this case guilty of murder of the first degree, you must 
then determine if one or more of the following special circumstances are true or 
not true:  1.  The defendant was the person who fired the bullet which killed the 
victim; 2.  The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the 
commission of robbery in violation of Penal Code Section 211; and 3.  The murder 
was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of kidnapping 
for robbery in violation of Penal Code Section 209(b).”  The court also gave 
CALJIC Nos. 9.40 (robbery), 9.54 (kidnapping to commit robbery), and 8.81.17 
(special circumstances—murder in commission of robbery).   
After instructing the jury, and out of the jury’s presence, the court stated on 
the record that the parties agreed “that with respect to the special circumstance 
allegation concerning multiple murder in counts 1 and 2, that the finding the jury 
                                              
20  
At the time of trial, former CALJIC No. 8.81.3 stated:  “To find the special 
circumstance, referred to in these instructions as multiple murder convictions, is 
true, it must be proved:  [¶]  [The] [A] defendant has in this case been convicted of 
at least one crime of murder of the first degree and one or more crimes of murder 
of the first or second degree.”  The instruction is nearly identical today. 
 
72 
is being asked to make is whether the defendant personally killed the victim in that 
count.  [¶]  And it has been agreed that if the jury finds the—that the defendant 
personally killed each of the victims and is found guilty of count—first degree 
murder in count 1 and count 2, that that is the legal equivalent of a finding that the 
allegation . . . concerning multiple murder is true.”   
2.  Multiple-murder special circumstance 
Defendant now contends that we must set aside the multiple-murder special 
circumstance because the trial court, under an agreement between the prosecutor 
and defense counsel, did not give CALJIC No. 8.81.3, which defines the multiple-
murder special circumstance, and therefore the jury made no finding on this 
special circumstance.  We disagree.  We note that California law provides for a 
jury finding on the truth of any special circumstance allegation (§ 190.4, subd. (a); 
People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 688) and that the federal Constitution’s 
Sixth Amendment requires a jury determination of any fact, other than the fact of a 
prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 
at pp. 476, 490).  Here, however, defendant stipulated that the trial court need not 
give CALJIC No. 8.81.3, so he is barred from challenging the court’s failure to 
give that instruction under the doctrine of invited error.  (See People v. Barton 
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 198.)  Moreover, defendant suffered no possible prejudice 
from the instruction, as explained below.  
We test trial court error in removing from jury consideration a required 
special circumstance finding under the beyond a reasonable doubt test of 
Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24.  (See People v. Sengpadychith, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 326-328; People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 689.)  
Under that test, an error is harmless only when, beyond a reasonable doubt, it did 
not contribute to the verdict.  (Chapman, supra, at p. 24.)  Here, under the 
instructions given, the jury necessarily found that defendant was the person who 
 
73 
fired the bullet which killed both victims, Harris and Boyd, and the jury returned 
special verdicts unanimously making that finding.  This finding, coupled with the 
jury’s guilty verdicts of first degree murder for the killings of Harris and Boyd, 
was sufficient to establish that defendant was in this case “convicted of more than 
one offense of murder in the first or second degree.”  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).)  
Accordingly, the challenged instructional error did not contribute to the verdict.   
3.  Special circumstance of kidnapping for robbery  
Defendant also asserts that we must set aside both of the kidnapping for 
robbery special circumstances for instructional error.  We disagree.  The trial court 
instructed the jury:  “If you find the defendant in this case guilty of murder in the 
first degree, you must then determine if one or more of the following special 
circumstances are true or not true:  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  3.  The murder was committed 
while the defendant was engaged in the commission of kidnapping for robbery in 
violation of Penal Code Section 209(b).”  The court further instructed the jury on 
the elements of kidnapping for robbery, including that defendant had the “specific 
intent to commit robbery . . . when the kidnapping commence[d].”   
Not submitted to the jury was the question whether the two murders were 
committed to advance an independent felonious purpose of kidnapping to commit 
robbery, or instead whether the kidnappings were merely incidental to the 
murders, a requirement derived from Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1.  Green states that 
the purpose of the felony-murder special circumstance is to single out defendants 
who “ ‘killed in cold blood in order to advance an independent felonious 
purpose.’ ”  (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 113, quoting Green, supra, 27 
Cal.3d at p. 61.)  This rule is now reflected in the second paragraph of CALJIC 
No. 8.81.17, which states (as relevant here) that in order to find a felony-murder 
special circumstance true, the jury must find that “[t]he murder was committed in 
order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime of [kidnapping] or to 
 
74 
facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid detection.  In other words, the special 
circumstance referred to in these instructions is not established if the [kidnapping] 
was merely incidental to the commission of the murder.”  Here, there was no 
request to instruct the jury on this clarifying language with respect to the special 
circumstance of kidnapping for robbery.21  Therefore, the trial court had to give 
the instruction without request only if some significant evidence would have 
allowed the jury to conclude that the kidnappings for robbery of Boyd and Harris 
were merely incidental to their murders.  (See People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th 
at pp. 113-114; People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 505; People v. Kimble 
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 499-503.)  There was no such evidence in this case. 
Brown testified that he, defendant, Redmond, and Bennett set out on the 
evening of September 30, 1985, in Bennett’s truck, intending to rob a liquor store 
in Barstow.  Because Bennett did not want to use his own truck in the robbery, the 
group decided to steal a car.  They drove to Westwood, where Redmond and 
Brown noticed a Honda automobile with a man (Harris) and a woman (Boyd) 
inside.  Defendant and Redmond left the truck but returned shortly thereafter in the 
Honda, with Boyd in the back seat and Harris in the trunk.  The four then drove 
the two victims to an isolated area.  Defendant and Redmond took Boyd and 
Harris into a field, and moments later Brown heard shots fired.  Defendant 
returned to the car and said he had killed Boyd and Harris because he did not want 
any witnesses.  Defendant, Brown, Redmond, and Bennett, using the Honda taken 
from the victims, then continued to their original destination, the liquor store in 
Barstow.   
                                              
21  
The trial court did give such an instruction with respect to the robbery 
murder special circumstance.   
 
75 
This evidence supports an inference that the purpose of the kidnappings of 
Boyd and Harris was to facilitate the taking of the Honda for use in the planned 
liquor store robbery, and that the murders were committed to eliminate the 
witnesses to the kidnappings and robberies.  The evidence that, about one and a 
half years earlier, defendant had kidnapped Kingsmill in order to take his car 
strengthened this inference.     
Defendant contends, however, that the evidence equally supports an 
inference that his intent from the outset of the kidnapping was to kill Boyd and 
Harris to eliminate witnesses to his robbery of the Honda.  According to 
defendant, the jury could have found that his intent when he kidnapped the victims 
was to rob them of their car and kill them.  If so, according to defendant, he 
committed a kidnapping during the commission of a murder for robbery, not a 
murder during the commission of a kidnapping for robbery.  In these 
circumstances, defendant asserts, he was entitled to an instruction based on Green, 
supra, 27 Cal.3d 1.  
We disagree.  In finding defendant guilty of kidnapping for robbery, the 
jury determined that he had the intent to rob victims Boyd and Harris when he 
kidnapped them, and therefore that the kidnappings served to facilitate the 
robberies.  Even assuming on the facts of this case that Green’s “independent 
felonious purpose” requirement to “provide a rational basis for distinguishing 
between those murderers who deserve to be considered for the death penalty and 
those who do not” (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 61, fn. omitted) would not be 
satisfied with respect to the special circumstances of kidnapping for robbery, the 
trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on defendant’s theory without a 
request.  
A trial court must instruct on its own initiative only on those principles of 
law “commonly or closely and openly” connected with the facts of the case.  
 
76 
(People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1047, italics added.)  Accordingly, the 
trial court here had to instruct on the independent felonious purpose principle of 
Green with respect to the kidnapping for robbery only if some significant evidence 
could have supported a finding that the kidnappings of Boyd and Harris were 
incidental to their murders.  (People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 113-114; 
People v. Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 505; People v. Kimble, supra, 44 
Cal.3d at pp. 499-503.)  There was no significant evidence to support such a 
finding.  Defendant did nothing to develop at trial his current theory that he 
formed the intent to kill Boyd and Harris before kidnapping them.  (See People v. 
Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 505.)  Thus, defendant’s theory of the case “was 
not one that the evidence would strongly illuminate and place before the trial 
court.”  (People v. Wade (1959) 53 Cal.2d 322, 335.)  To the contrary, defendant’s 
theory was “so far under the surface of the facts and theories apparently involved 
as to remain hidden from even the [defense] until the case reached this court on 
appeal.”  (Ibid.)  Under the circumstances, the trial court was not obligated to 
instruct the jury with the language from Green.   
Defendant argues that the failure so instruct violated his Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury determination of every fact that may increase the maximum 
punishment (see Blakely v. Washington, supra, 542 U.S. ___ [124 S.Ct. 2531]; 
Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466) and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process of law (People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 410; People v. Garcia 
(1984) 36 Cal.3d 539, 551).  We disagree.  The Green instruction merely clarifies 
the term “in the commission of” with regard to special circumstance allegations 
based on felony murder.  Here, clarification of that term was unnecessary because, 
as we have concluded, there was no evidence to support defendant’s theory that 
the kidnappings of Boyd and Harris were merely incidental to their murders.  
 
77 
Moreover, we see nothing in the high court’s Blakely and Apprendi decisions that 
would require such an instruction in the circumstances here. 
J.  Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty Statute 
Defendant argues that California’s death penalty statute violates his rights 
under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution 
and their state constitutional counterparts.  As he acknowledges, we have in the 
past rejected many of these same arguments.  Specifically, we have held that 
neither the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment nor the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the jury make 
unanimous separate findings as to the truth of aggravating evidence (People v. 
Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 593-594), or provide a statement of reasons for its 
penalty decision (ibid.), or find unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt that 
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances and that death is the 
appropriate punishment (ibid.; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 778-
779).  We find no reason to depart from these holdings. 
Defendant contends that because various provisions of state law require 
certain protections in other proceedings where the consequences are less serious 
than in a capital penalty trial (see §§ 1158 [jury must separately find whether 
defendant has suffered a prior conviction], 1158a [jury must separately find 
whether defendant was armed and/or used a firearm], 1163 [jury may be polled], 
1170, subd. (c) [court must state reasons for its determinate sentencing choice]), 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates these same 
protections in capital sentencing.  Not so. 
In People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1286-1288, we considered and 
rejected a similar argument, concluding that the 1978 death penalty statute did not 
violate equal protection because it does not allow for proportionality review 
similar to that provided to noncapital defendants under the determinate sentencing 
 
78 
law.  Also, applying similar reasoning, we concluded in People v. Danielson 
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, that California’s 1978 death penalty statute did not violate 
equal protection in allowing consideration of evidence of unadjudicated offenses 
and the circumstances of prior offenses involving force or violence.  (Id. at 
pp. 719-720, overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 
Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13.)  As we observed in Danielson, “capital case 
sentencing involves wholly different considerations than ordinary criminal 
sentencing.”  (Danielson, at p. 720.) 
Moreover, we have said that the jury’s task in assessing the appropriate 
penalty in a capital case is an “essentially normative” one in which the jury 
“applies its own moral standards to the aggravating and mitigating evidence.”  
(People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 192.)  Thus, the Legislature properly 
could conclude that imposing the strict requirements of the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard, jury unanimity, and a statement of reasons would be unsuited to 
capital sentencing.  (See People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1286.) 
 
Nor do the United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions interpreting the 
Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee (Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584; 
Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466) compel a different result.  (See People v. Griffin, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 594-595 [neither Apprendi nor Ring requires a written 
statement of reasons for the penalty decision or unanimous jury findings beyond a 
reasonable doubt on the existence of aggravating circumstances or that the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating]; see also People v. Prieto 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 262-265 [Ring does not require that jury unanimously find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that unadjudicated criminal acts involved force or 
violence; Ring imposes no new requirements on California’s penalty phase 
proceedings]; People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 452-454 [Apprendi does not 
 
79 
restrict the sentencing of California defendants who have been convicted of 
special circumstances murder].)  We decline to revisit those holdings here.   
 
Finally, because the federal Constitution does not require application of the 
reasonable doubt standard to the jury’s penalty determinations, trial counsel here 
was not deficient in not requesting such an instruction.  (See In re Robbins (1998) 
18 Cal.4th 770, 810 [failure to raise a meritless claim is not deficient 
performance].) 
K.  Cumulative Prejudice 
We have concluded that the Boyd robbery conviction must be vacated.  
Otherwise, we have found only two guilt phase errors (defendant’s absence from 
the May 16, 1989 pretrial hearing regarding admissibility of the jailhouse tape (see 
ante, pp. 19-26) and the Miranda violation in Detective DeAnda’s question to 
defendant “remember the Uzi?” (see ante, pp. 51-56)) and two special 
circumstances errors or potential errors (the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury 
that it must unanimously agree on a theory of robbery with respect to the Boyd 
robbery murder special circumstance (see ante, pp. 66-68), and the trial court’s 
failure to instruct the jury on the multiple murder special circumstance (see ante, 
pp. 72-73)).  None of these errors is prejudicial standing alone.  Defendant argues 
that even if no single error requires reversal of the guilt or penalty judgments, the 
cumulative effect of all the errors is sufficiently prejudicial to violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, 
warranting reversal.  (See Taylor v. Kentucky (1978) 436 U.S. 478, 487, fn. 15; 
Mak v. Blodgett (9th Cir. 1992) 970 F.2d 614, 622.)  We disagree. 
The cumulative effect of the guilt and special circumstances errors and 
potential errors does not warrant reversal of defendant’s convictions or the special 
circumstances findings.  The evidence amply supported these convictions and 
special circumstances and, for the reasons explained previously in relation to each 
 
80 
error, the evidentiary presentation would not have differed significantly in the 
absence of the errors.   
Nor does our reversal of the robbery conviction, in conjunction with the 
other errors and potential errors, warrant reversal of the penalty judgment.  The 
jury properly considered all of the evidence and was aware of the circumstances of 
the Boyd and Harris murders.  (See People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 
512; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 551.)  Even if the jury disagreed as to 
what property defendant intended to steal from Boyd (or even if the jury 
concluded that defendant formed the intent to steal Boyd’s rings after he killed 
her), and thus erroneously convicted him of the robbery of Boyd, it would not 
have given significant independent weight to the conviction for the robbery of 
Boyd as opposed to the circumstances of the offenses and the aggravating and 
mitigating evidence.  (See People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 512; People 
v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 551.)  The questions whether defendant robbed 
Boyd of the car or the rings, or whether he formed the intent to steal the rings 
before or after killing Boyd, were critical to the robbery conviction but likely 
insignificant to the penalty determination.  (People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th 
at p. 512.) 
 
Under these circumstances, the errors or potential errors, singly or in 
combination, were harmless under any applicable standard and did not render 
defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.  (See People v. Coffman (2004) 34 Cal.4th 
1, 128-129 [rejecting claim that cumulative errors rendered the defendant’s trial 
fundamentally unfair]; People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 512 [finding no 
reasonable possibility of a different result at the penalty phase absent errors].) 
 
81 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We vacate the robbery conviction with respect to victim Michelle Boyd.  
We affirm the judgment in all other respects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Davis 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S012945 
Date Filed: July 21, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Leslie W. Light 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Lynne S. Coffin and Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defenders, Jay Colangelo, Assistant State Public 
Defender, and Ellen J. Eggers, Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. 
Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Sharlene A. Honnaka and Lisa J. Brault, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Ellen J. Eggers 
Deputy State Public Defender 
801 K Street, Suite 1100 
Sacramento, CA  95814-3518 
(916) 322-2676 
 
Lisa J. Brault 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2284