Title: State v. Henley

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 67 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP697-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Dimitri Henley, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE 
COURT’S JULY 21, 2010 DECISION 
 
 
ORDER FILED: 
July 12, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J., BRADLEY, J. and CROOKS, J 
dissent (Opinion filed; combined authorship).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011 WI 67
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2008AP697-CR 
(L.C. No. 
1998CF486) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Dimitri Henley, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
MOTION for reconsideration.  Reconsideration denied.  
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Dimitri Henley characterizes his most 
recent motion to this court as a motion for reconsideration of 
the court's July 21, 2010 decision,1 which concluded that in 
circumstances such as Henley presented, circuit court judges 
lack the authority to grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice and also denied his request of this court for a new 
trial in the interest of justice.  Henley contends that by 
denying him a new trial and by providing no court procedures for 
                                                 
1 State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 N.W.2d 
350.   
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
2 
 
reviewing Justice Roggensack's decision not to recuse,2 this 
court has denied his right to due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.3   
¶2 
We conclude as follows:  (1) Henley's motion for 
reconsideration meets none of the criteria for granting a motion 
for reconsideration and is therefore denied; (2) determining 
whether to recuse is the sole responsibility of the individual 
justice for whom disqualification from participation is sought; 
(3) a majority of this court does not have the power to 
disqualify a judicial peer from performing the constitutional 
functions of a Wisconsin Supreme Court justice on a case-by-case 
basis; and (4) Henley has received due process.   
I.  DISCUSSION 
¶3 
Henley styles his pending motion as a motion for 
reconsideration of the court's opinion issued July 21, 2010 that 
denied him a new trial.4  Internal Operating Procedures (IOP) 
II.J. provides the basis on which reconsideration may be 
granted: 
A change of decision on reconsideration will ensue 
only when the court has overlooked controlling legal 
precedent or important policy considerations or has 
                                                 
2 Henley initially moved Justice Roggensack to recuse 
herself from the review of his case, citing Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(e) and (g) (2007-08), as well as SCR 60:04(4).  
Justice Roggensack denied his motion November 25, 2009.  State 
v. Henley, 2010 WI 12, 322 Wis. 2d 1, 778 N.W.2d 853.  
3 The right to due process of law is also protected by 
Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.   
4 State v. Henley, 328 Wis. 2d 544. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
3 
 
overlooked 
or 
misconstrued 
a 
controlling 
or 
significant fact appearing in the record.   
¶4 
Henley cites no controlling legal precedent, important 
policy consideration or controlling or significant fact of 
record that the court's July 21, 2010 opinion overlooked in 
deciding that a new trial was not warranted.  Accordingly, his 
motion for reconsideration meets none of the criteria for 
granting reconsideration and therefore, it is denied.  
¶5 
Furthermore, it appears that Henley is attempting to 
obtain reconsideration of the court's May 24, 2010 decision that 
did not grant his motion to remove Justice Roggensack from 
participation.5  He contends that his right to due process was 
violated because Justice Roggensack's participation created an 
appearance of partiality, as explained in Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).  
Henley cites no authority under which he may bring a motion for 
reconsideration of the court's decision not to disqualify 
Justice Roggensack.  
¶6 
His assertion assumes that four justices of this court 
have the power to remove a fellow justice from participating in 
pending matters on a case-by-case basis.  This court has not 
squarely addressed the institutional question of whether four 
justices of this court have the power, on a case-by-case basis, 
                                                 
5 The dissenting opinion of the combined authorship of Chief 
Justice 
Abrahamson, 
Justice 
Bradley 
and 
Justice 
Crooks 
(hereinafter Abrahamson dissent) notes that Henley is not 
seeking reconsideration of the court's decision on the merits of 
whether Henley should be afforded a new trial.  Abrahamson 
dissent, ¶41.   
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
4 
 
to prevent a judicial peer from participating in a pending 
matter.  Given Henley's motion, and the repetitive nature of 
motions addressed to the court that request removal of justices 
from pending proceedings,6 we address this institutional question 
now.7   
¶7 
The reader should not be misled by the dissenting 
opinion's attempts to characterize our decision as a ruling on 
whether Justice Roggensack ought to have been disqualified from 
participation in Henley's case.  Henley's motion to the court to 
disqualify Justice Roggensack was not granted, and we see no 
reason to take it up again.  Accordingly, the dissent repeatedly 
mischaracterizes what we decide in this opinion.8   
¶8 
The 
question decided herein is an institutional 
question, i.e., whether recusal may be forced upon a fellow 
justice on a case-by-case basis by his or her judicial peers.  
                                                 
6 A motion to disqualify a justice on a case-by-case basis 
has become the motion de jour, as litigants attempt to 
manipulate the decisions of this court by disqualifying justices 
whom they think may decide against the position a litigant 
takes.  Between April 2009 and April 2010, 12 motions requested 
the court to disqualify a justice from participating in a 
pending case.  In that one year period, more motions to 
disqualify a justice from a pending case were filed than the 
total of such motions in the preceding 10 years. 
7 The dissent avoids the per curiam's legal conclusion that 
a majority of the court does not have the institutional power to 
disqualify a sitting justice on a case-by-case basis.  For 
example, the Abrahamson dissent attempts to shift the reader's 
focus with a number of irrelevant, rhetorical questions.  
Abrahamson dissent, ¶60.   
8 Abrahamson dissent, ¶¶45-49, 51-56. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
5 
 
This question implicates constitutional functions:  that of the 
court as an institution and those of individual justices as 
constitutional 
officers. 
 
Accordingly, 
we 
determine 
the 
institutional question of whether the court has the power9 to 
prevent a justice from participating in pending proceedings, on 
a case-by-case basis.   
¶9 
Our decision on whether the court has the power to 
disqualify a judicial peer on a case-by-case basis does not 
affect one particular justice more than any other justice.  By 
participating in this decision, no justice is sitting as a judge 
of his or her own cause.  Rather, each justice, whether a part 
of the majority opinion or writing in dissent, participated in 
deciding this question.  Full participation is appropriate 
because the resolution of this question affects the court as an 
institution, for which each justice has an equal role in 
judicial decision making, and it affects the function of each 
justice as an independent constitutional officer.  Accordingly, 
all justices are affected equally by our determination of the 
scope of the court's power in this regard.  See State v. Allen, 
2010 WI 10, ¶206, 322 Wis. 2d 372, 778 N.W.2d 863 (Roggensack, 
J.).  
¶10 Although 
motions 
to 
disqualify 
a 
justice 
from 
participating in a particular case have increased dramatically 
                                                 
9 The court may act when a quorum of four members of the 
court participate, Wis. Const. art. VII, § 4, cl. 1, and a 
majority votes to act.   
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
6 
 
since the United States Supreme Court decided Caperton,10 we have 
reviewed 
and 
decided 
challenges 
to 
individual 
justices' 
participation in particular cases prior to Caperton.  On 
occasion, a motion to disqualify a justice has been brought 
before the justice participated in a pending matter, and on 
occasion, 
such 
a 
motion 
has 
been 
brought 
after 
that 
participation has occurred.   
¶11 Furthermore, the issue presented in Caperton is not 
new to this state.  Nearly two decades ago, in In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crosetto, 160 Wis. 2d 581, 466 
N.W.2d 879 (1991), this court decided that when presented with a 
motion for disqualification based on due process grounds, each 
justice must decide for himself or herself whether his or her 
disqualification was required.  In Crosetto, the motion to 
disqualify came before the court had decided the pending matter.  
Crosetto alleged that each justice had a disqualifying personal 
interest in Crosetto's disciplinary proceeding because Crosetto 
had leveled personal criticisms against each justice on other 
occasions.  Id. at 584.  Crosetto based his motion on the 
appearance of partiality, citing the due process clauses of the 
federal and state constitutions, and on Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2) 
(1989-90), just as Henley has here.  Id. at 583.   
¶12 The court denied Crosetto's disqualification motion.  
In so doing, six justices of the court did not convene to decide 
whether 
the 
seventh 
justice 
should 
be 
prevented 
from 
                                                 
10 See supra note 6 above.   
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
7 
 
participating in Crosetto's motion.  Instead, each justice, 
individually, decided Crosetto's motion.  Each justice concluded 
for himself or herself that he or she was impartial and that his 
or 
her 
participation 
did 
not 
create 
the 
appearance 
of 
partiality.11  Id. at 584.  The court explained: 
 
The members of this court, individually, have 
determined 
that none has a significant personal 
interest 
in 
the 
outcome 
of 
this 
disciplinary 
proceeding such as would require our disqualification.  
Each is satisfied that his or her impartiality in this 
proceeding is unimpaired and, further, that our acting 
in this matter does not create the appearance of a 
lack of impartiality.   
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶13 Crosetto's allegation that an appearance of partiality 
was sufficient to cause a denial of his right to due process 
under the federal and state constitutions is very similar to the 
motion that Henley brings before the court.  Both motions were 
based on an underlying allegation falling within the parameters 
of Wis. Stat. § 757.19 (1989-90); both Crosetto's motion and 
Henley's motion alleged a due process violation based on the 
appearance of partiality; both motions were decided by the 
                                                 
11 Chief Justice Abrahamson served on the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court when In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crosetto, 160 
Wis. 2d 581, 466 N.W.2d 879 (1991), was decided.  She decided 
for herself that she was not partial and that her participation 
in Crosetto's case did not create the appearance of partiality.  
Id. at 584.  The Abrahamson dissenting opinion asserts that a 
justice's participation in such a decision that denies a motion 
to disqualify that justice is "unprecedented in this court."  
Abrahamson dissent, ¶49.  This assertion is not correct.  All 
justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court participated in the 
motion to disqualify in Crosetto, including Chief Justice 
Abrahamson who now writes in dissent.    
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
8 
 
individual justice for whom disqualification was sought; and 
both Crosetto and Henley were provided due process by the 
decisions that the justices individually made.   
¶14 In Donohoo v. Action Wisconsin, Inc., 2008 WI 110, 
¶¶1-2, 314 Wis. 2d 510, 754 N.W.2d 480, the disqualification 
claim was made after the court had decided the pending case.  
Donohoo's motion for reconsideration contended that Justice 
Butler should not have participated because he had received 
contributions to his election campaign from members of Action 
Wisconsin's board and from its attorney while Action Wisconsin's 
case was pending before this court.  Id., ¶25.  We explained the 
court's level of review when a party moves for disqualification 
of a justice in a pending case: 
"Appellate 
review 
of 
[a 
justice's] 
subjective 
determination is limited to establishing whether the 
judge made a determination requiring disqualification.  
[Stated 
otherwise] 
[t]he 
reviewing 
court 
must 
objectively decide if the judge went through the 
required 
exercise 
of 
making 
a 
subjective 
determination."   
Id., ¶24 (quoting State v. Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d 654, 663-64, 546 
N.W.2d 115 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).   
¶15 The decisions on the merits of the motions to 
disqualify in Donohoo and Crosetto were made first and last by 
the individual justice for whom disqualification was sought.  
They are consistent with this court's past treatment of motions 
to disqualify justices from pending cases.  See City of Edgerton 
v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 190 Wis. 2d 510, 521-22, 527 N.W.2d 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
9 
 
305 (1995) (concluding that Justice Geske's declaration in open 
court that she would be impartial despite the type of industry 
that employed a family member demonstrated that she, herself, 
made the determination required); State v. Am. TV & Appliance of 
Madison, Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 175, 183, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989) 
(concluding that because Justice Bablitch decided for himself 
that he could be impartial, that decision was sufficient in 
regard to deciding a motion alleging that the prior decision of 
the court was void due to Justice Bablitch's participation).   
¶16 In each of the cases where the disqualification of a 
justice has been addressed, except one, the justice for whom 
disqualification was sought made the first and final decision on 
the merits of the disqualification motion.  The exception 
occurred in Case v. Hoffman, 100 Wis. 314, 75 N.W. 945 (1898).   
¶17 In Case, reconsideration of the court's decision was 
premised on the allegation that Justice Newman should not have 
participated in determining the merits of the case.  When the 
motion was decided, Justice Newman was dead and previous to his 
death, he had not ruled on the motion.  Id. at 354.  Therefore, 
there was no way for Justice Newman to make the first and last 
decision on the motion.  Accordingly, Case is not relevant to 
the question of whether the court has the power to disqualify a 
justice on a case-by-case basis.  
¶18 Our review of the power of the court vis-à-vis an 
individual justice begins with Article VII of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Article VII establishes the functions of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court as an institution.  Article VII also 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
10 
 
describes 
the 
functions 
of 
an 
individual 
justice 
as 
a 
constitutional officer.  Therefore, we must interpret the scope 
of the court's power in a manner that is consistent with both 
functions as prescribed in the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶19 Under Article VII, the functions of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court include superintending authority over all courts 
(Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(1)); appellate jurisdiction over all 
courts (Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(2)); and hearing of original 
actions and proceedings (Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(2)).  The 
court also has those implied or inherent powers "essential" to 
carrying out its constitutionally designated functions.  State 
v. Cannon, 199 Wis. 401, 402, 226 N.W. 385 (1929).   
¶20 The supreme court performs its functions in the 
administration of justice.  In so doing, the court "has an 
inherent power to adopt those statewide measures which are 
absolutely essential to the due administration of justice in the 
state."  In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 518, 235 N.W.2d 409 
(1975) (emphasis added).   
¶21 The court's superintending function may be exercised 
through disciplinary proceedings brought for cause or disability 
under the statewide Code of Judicial Conduct (Judicial Code).12  
It is through the Judicial Code that the court may exercise its 
power over an individual supreme court justice.  Wis. Const. 
                                                 
12 The Code of Judicial Conduct is contained in ch. 60 of 
the Supreme Court Rules.  It was formerly referred to as the 
Code of Judicial Ethics. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
11 
 
art. VII, § 11; In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d at 516-17; see also 
Cannon, 199 Wis. at 402. 
¶22 The Judicial Code provides justices with notice of 
conduct that is prohibited and with procedural due process in 
the adjudication of all claimed violations of the Judicial 
Code's provisions.  See, e.g., In re Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Laatsch, 2007 WI 20, 299 Wis. 2d 144, 727 
N.W.2d 488; SCR ch. 60.  Accordingly, when the power of the 
court is brought to bear against a justice or judge pursuant to 
the Judicial Code, it is exercised pursuant to standards of 
conduct that are uniform throughout the state, with notice of 
the violation and an opportunity to be heard.  The court's 
supervisory power is not exercised at the request of a party who 
seeks disqualification of a justice from a pending proceeding.  
¶23 Furthermore, while employing the Judicial Code is a 
part of the supervisory function of the supreme court,13 the 
court's power to discipline judges and justices arises in 
Article VII of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The Judicial Code 
provides no authority to the supreme court to disqualify a 
justice from participating in a particular case when that 
justice has considered and decided a motion to disqualify him or 
                                                 
13 The supervisory function of the supreme court also 
embodies the authority to regulate the practice of law in 
Wisconsin, Sands v. Menard, Inc., 2010 WI 96, ¶51, 328 Wis. 2d 
647, 787 N.W.2d 384, and the authority to control the course of 
litigation in the circuit courts, State ex rel. Fourth National 
Bank of Philadelphia v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 613, 79 N.W. 1081 
(1899).     
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
12 
 
her.  See Donohoo, 314 Wis. 2d 510, ¶¶24-25; City of Edgerton, 
190 Wis. 2d at 521-22; Am. TV, 151 Wis. 2d at 183; Crosetto, 160 
Wis. 2d at 584.  Rather, through its supervisory function, the 
court has established a Judicial Code that employs statewide, 
uniform criteria for the exercise of judicial functions in all 
cases.   
¶24 In regard to limiting an individual Wisconsin Supreme 
Court justice's constitutional authority to act, Article VII of 
the Wisconsin Constitution also establishes the circumstances 
under which a justice can be prevented from exercising his or 
her judicial functions.  It provides that a justice may be 
removed from office only through impeachment (Wis. Const. art. 
VII, § 1); pursuant to a disciplinary proceeding brought before 
the supreme court for cause or disability (Wis. Const. art. VII, 
§ 11); and by address of both houses of the legislature (Wis. 
Const. art. VII, § 13).  The voters may also recall a justice 
(Wis. Const. art. XIII, § 12).14   
¶25 As we have explained, aside from actions brought under 
the Judicial Code, "[t]he only constitutional authority" to 
remove a justice rests with the legislature, by impeachment or 
address, see In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d at 535, or the voters by 
recall.  Accordingly, we conclude that this court does not have 
                                                 
14 Of course, defeat in an election (Wis. Const. art. VII, 
§ 4(1), § 9; Wis. Const. art. XIII, § 12) and a legislatively 
imposed mandatory retirement age (Wis. Const. art. VII, § 24(2)) 
also would terminate a justice's right to exercise judicial 
functions.   
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
13 
 
the power to remove a justice from participating in an 
individual proceeding, on a case-by-case basis.   
¶26 Our conclusion explaining the scope of power that this 
court may exercise over a judicial peer is consistent with the 
court's past decisions on motions to disqualify a justice.  It 
also is reflected in the court's IOP.  The IOP directs that 
motions to disqualify a justice are to be decided solely by the 
justice at whom the motion is directed.  IOP II.L.1. provides: 
Recusal or Disqualification of Justices.  A 
justice may recuse himself or herself under any 
circumstances sufficient to require such action.  The 
grounds for disqualification of a justice are set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 757.19.  The decision of a 
justice to recuse or disqualify himself or herself is 
that of the justice alone.   
(Emphasis added.) 
¶27 In addition, the court's IOP mirrors the way in which 
the United States Supreme Court addresses motions to disqualify 
a Supreme Court Justice.  When a motion is made to disqualify a 
Justice of the Supreme Court, one of three things happens:  (1) 
the Justice for whom disqualification is sought decides the 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
14 
 
motion individually,15 (2) the entire Supreme Court, including 
the Justice for whom disqualification is sought, issues a one 
sentence 
denial 
of 
the 
motion 
for 
disqualification,16 
or 
infrequently, (3) the entire Supreme Court issues a one sentence 
denial of the motion for disqualification, with a notation that 
one of the Justices for whom recusal was sought did not 
participate.17   
¶28 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has never 
held that a majority of that Court has the power to disqualify 
                                                 
15 For example, in Cheney v. United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004), Justice 
Scalia, individually, decided the Sierra Club's motion to 
disqualify him.  See also Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 
U.S. 1301 (2000) (Justice Rehnquist denied the motion for his 
disqualification.); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 1301 (1980) 
(Justice Rehnquist denied the motion to disqualify him.); Laird 
v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 901 (1972) (Justice Rehnquist denied the 
motion to disqualify him.); Gravel v. United States, 409 U.S. 
902 (1972) (Justice Rehnquist denied the motion for his own 
disqualification.); and Guy v. United States, 409 U.S. 896 
(1972) (Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist individually denied the 
disqualification motions that were directed to each Justice.).  
16 In Ernest v. United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of Alabama, 474 U.S. 1016 (1985), the Court, including 
Justice Powell, issued a one sentence denial of the motion to 
disqualify Justice Powell; in Kerpelman v. Attorney Grievance 
Commission of Maryland, 450 U.S. 970 (1981), the Court, 
including Justice Burger, summarily denied the motion to 
disqualify Justice Burger; in Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 
409 U.S. 1029 (1972) the Court, including Justices Powell and 
Rehnquist, denied motions to disqualify Justice Powell and 
Justice Rehnquist in a one sentence statement. 
17 In Wilson v. Dellums, 438 U.S. 916 (1978), recusal was 
sought for both Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist.  In a 
one sentence statement, the court denied the motion.  Justice 
Rehnquist took no part in the decision, but Justice Blackmun did 
participate.  Id.    
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
15 
 
another Justice, i.e., a judicial peer, from participating in a 
pending proceeding because the Justice at whom the motion is 
directed is not impartial or that there is the appearance that 
the Justice is not impartial.18  Significantly, the United States 
Supreme Court has not changed its own procedures on recusal 
subsequent to its decision in Caperton. 
¶29 Little has been written about the institutional power 
of a majority of the Supreme Court relative to a motion to 
disqualify a fellow Justice.  However, Justice Robert Jackson 
took issue with motions to disqualify an individual Justice that 
were addressed to the court as a whole and therefore, appeared 
to seek disqualification of a judicial peer by the vote of a 
majority of the court.  In Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 
6167, United Mine Workers of America, 325 U.S. 897 (1945), he 
explained his concern:  "In my opinion the complaint is one 
which cannot properly be addressed to the Court as a whole and 
for that reason I concur in denying it."  Id. at 897 (Jackson, 
J., concurring).  He reasoned that "[t]here is no authority 
known to me under which a majority of this Court has power under 
                                                 
18 There have been occasions when a Justice's health has 
impacted on court work.  For example, in 1975 Justice William O. 
Douglas suffered a serious stroke that left him severely 
compromised.  Seven of the remaining Justices decided not to 
assign Justice Douglas any more opinions to write.  However, 
Justice Douglas was not disqualified from further participation 
in pending cases.  See David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on 
the U.S. Supreme Court:  The Historical Case for a 28th 
Amendment, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 995 (2000).  
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
16 
 
any circumstances to exclude one of its duly commissioned 
Justices from sitting or voting in any case."  Id.   
¶30 More recently, in a 2004 interview, Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg explained that the decision about whether a Supreme 
Court Justice will be disqualified from participating in a 
proceeding is always made by the individual Justice at whom the 
motion to disqualify is directed.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An Open 
Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 
1033, 1039 (2004).  
¶31 For more than 150 years, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
has provided due process to movants seeking disqualification of 
a justice in a pending proceeding by consistently following the 
practice of the United States Supreme Court in like motions and 
in regard to challenges to court decisions based on allegations 
that a particular justice should not have participated.  As 
explained above, the court's past practice for addressing 
motions to disqualify a justice from a particular proceeding is 
firmly grounded in and required by the Wisconsin Constitution, 
which sets out the functions of the court and the ways in which 
performance of the duties of a justice may be limited.  Due 
process is provided in all cases by the justice at whom the 
motion to disqualify is directed.  Crosetto, 160 Wis. 2d at 584.  
Henley received due process in the same manner here as Chief 
Justice Abrahamson provided due process to Crosetto when 
Crosetto moved for Chief Justice Abrahamson's disqualification.   
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
17 
 
¶32 Henley also ties his due process allegation to 
Caperton.  However, Caperton has nothing to do with Henley's 
pending motion.   
¶33 First, as the United States Supreme Court repeatedly 
said in its decision in Caperton, that decision is based on 
extraordinary and extreme facts.19  Caperton, 556 U.S. at ___, 
129 S. Ct. at 2256, 2262, 2265.  No extraordinary or extreme 
facts are related to Henley's motion.  Second, Caperton 
addressed due process concerns in the context of a judicial 
election where extraordinarily large expenditures were made to 
elect a particular justice who then decided the case in which 
the contributor held a vested interest.  Id. at 2265.  Henley's 
motion 
is 
not 
based 
on 
extraordinary 
judicial 
election 
contributions made by a party with a then pending case.  Third, 
Caperton did not decide whether a majority of the West Virginia 
court had the power to disqualify a judicial peer.  Rather, in 
Caperton, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the actions 
of a state court justice and concluded that the justice, 
himself, did not apply the correct standard to the motion to 
recuse when he decided it.  Id. at 2265.  
                                                 
19 In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. __, 
129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), a party directly influenced a justice's 
election to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 
through extraordinarily large expenditures when that party's 
case was pending and it was reasonably foreseeable that the 
pending case would come before the newly elected justice.  Id. 
at 2264-65. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
18 
 
¶34 The Supreme Court reinforced the focus of Caperton's 
holding in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 
U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), when it explained, "Caperton 
held that a judge was required to recuse himself" based on the 
timing of the extraordinary judicial campaign contributions that 
were made.  Id. at 910 (emphasis added).  Caperton cannot be 
read to support Henley's assertion that a majority of this court 
has the power to remove a judicial peer from participating in a 
pending case.  
¶35 In addition, were Caperton expanded to support the 
disqualification of a justice on facts less extreme and 
egregious than those on which the Caperton decision was based, a 
party could attempt to affect the outcome of his case by filing 
disqualification motions against certain justices and not 
against other justices.  See Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶260 
(Ziegler, J., concurring).  
¶36 Furthermore, four justices forcing a fellow justice 
off a pending case will not increase the public's perception 
that the court is an impartial decision maker.  Rather, the 
specter of four justices preventing another justice from 
participating will just as likely be seen by the public as a 
biased act of four justices who view a pending issue differently 
from the justice whom they disqualified.  
¶37 Finally, removal of a justice from participating in an 
individual case negatively impacts judicial independence.  This 
is so because motions for disqualification are not made in 
regard to a justice that the movant believes will decide the 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
19 
 
pending case in the movant's favor.  Rather, they are made to 
exert pressure on a justice the movant believes will not decide 
the case as the movant wants it to be decided, or in motions 
after decision in order to cancel a justice's participation from 
a decision under which the movant did not prevail.  See Donohoo, 
314 Wis. 2d 510, ¶¶1-2 (moving to disqualify Justice Butler, who 
decided against Donohoo); Jackson v. Benson, 2002 WI 14, ¶2 & 
n.2, 
249 
Wis. 2d 
681, 
639 
N.W.2d 
545 
(seeking 
the 
disqualification of Justice Wilcox, who had participated in the 
majority decision against Jackson); City of Edgerton, 190 
Wis. 2d at 515-16 (requesting the disqualification of Justice 
Geske, who had participated in the majority decision); and Am. 
TV, 151 Wis. 2d at 177 (moving to disqualify Justice Bablitch, 
who had participated in the majority decision that decided 
against the State).   
¶38 Henley's assumption that a majority of this court has 
the power to disqualify a judicial peer who has denied a motion 
to withdraw from a pending matter is without legal foundation.  
The constitutional functions of the court as an institution are 
set out in the Wisconsin Constitution, as are the ways in which 
a justice's constitutional functions may be limited.  Henley's 
assumption is inconsistent with those constitutional provisions.   
II.  CONCLUSION 
¶39 Accordingly, we conclude as follows:  (1) Henley's 
motion for reconsideration meets none of the criteria for 
granting a motion for reconsideration and is therefore denied; 
(2) determining whether to recuse is the sole responsibility of 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
20 
 
the 
individual 
justice 
for 
whom 
disqualification 
from 
participation is sought; (3) a majority of this court does not 
have the power to disqualify a judicial peer from performing the 
constitutional functions of a Wisconsin Supreme Court justice on 
a case-by-case basis; and (4) Henley has received due process.   
¶40 The motion for reconsideration is denied without 
costs. 
 
 
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶41 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., 
and N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  The per curiam 
correctly observes that Henley's motion for reconsideration is 
in essence a motion pursuing the disqualification of Justice 
Patience D. Roggensack.  The motion asserts that the court's 
decision in State v. Henley1 violates the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
because: 
(A) 
Our court has failed to provide any process for 
judicial review of Justice Roggensack's decision not 
to recuse herself.2 
(B) 
Justice Patience D. Roggensack has inappropriately 
participated in the Henley decision. 
                                                 
1 State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 
N.W.2d 350. 
The words "recusal" and "disqualification" are effectively 
synonymous and are often used interchangeably, as we use them 
here.  Some distinguish between the two words, using "recusal" 
to refer to a judge's decision to stand down voluntarily and 
"disqualification" 
to 
refer 
to 
the 
statutorily 
or 
constitutionally mandated removal of a judge on the request of a 
moving party.  See State v. Allen, 2010 WI 10, ¶9 n.1, 322 
Wis. 2d 372, 778 N.W.2d 863.     
2 See McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 
232-34 (1934) ("[T]he Federal Constitution prohibits state 
courts of general jurisdiction from refusing [to enforce a 
federal right] solely because the suit is brought under federal 
law. . . . A state may not discriminate against rights arising 
under 
federal 
laws."). 
 
See 
also 
Terry 
v. 
Kolski, 
78 
Wis. 2d 475, 482, 254 N.W.2d 704 (1977); State v. Allen, 2010 WI 
10, ¶¶46-47, 322 Wis. 2d 372, 778 N.W.2d 863 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
Bradley, J., & Crooks, J., lead opinion). 
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶42 Henley's motion thus asks the court to rule on the 
legality of Justice Roggensack's participation in deciding this 
case.3 
                                                 
3 Here is the history of Henley's motions to recuse Justice 
Roggensack.  Henley initially addressed a motion only to Justice 
Roggensack to recuse herself on the basis of Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(e) (the justice had previously handled the action or 
proceeding at issue while judge of an inferior court) and 
(2)(g), (subjective bias) and SCR 60:04(4) (Code of Judicial 
Conduct). Henley claimed that Justice Roggensack should not be 
sitting on his case because she sat on the "same case" when she 
was a judge on the court of appeals.   
Justice Roggensack denied the motion, concluding that she 
is not precluded from participation in the present case under 
Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(e) and (g) or SCR 60.04(4).  For the 
memorandum decision, see State v. Henley, 2010 WI 12, 322 
Wis. 2d 1, 778 N.W.2d 853.  
Henley then addressed a motion to the court to disqualify 
Justice Roggensack on the basis of Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(e) and 
(2)(g).  The court ordered the State of Wisconsin to respond to 
Henley's motion and memorandum in an unpublished order dated 
Feb. 8, 2010, which is attached for reference.  Justice 
Roggensack did not participate in this Feb. 8, 2010, order.   
The court then issued the attached unpublished order dated 
May 24, 2010, addressing Henley's motion addressed to the court.  
Justice Roggensack did not participate in this May 24, 2010, 
order.  The order stated, among other things, that the justices 
divided 3-3 and that "[n]o four justices have agreed to grant 
Henley's motion to the court to disqualify Justice Roggensack on 
grounds of Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(e)."  See May 24, 2010, order 
attached hereto. 
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶43 Yet it is Justice Roggensack who provides the fourth, 
and deciding, vote for the unauthored per curiam denying 
Henley's motion to disqualify Justice Roggensack.         
¶44 Justice Roggensack joins three colleagues, Justices 
David T. Prosser, Annette K. Ziegler, and Michael J. Gableman, 
to make four to rule on the motion to disqualify Justice 
Roggensack.  Thus Justice Roggensack participates in a matter 
reviewing her own conduct.  Without her vote there is no "per 
curiam," no "by the court."  Without her vote there is no 
decision by the court. 
¶45 Justice 
Roggensack 
fails 
to 
respect 
a 
bedrock 
principle of law that predates the American justice system by 
more than a century——"no man is allowed to be a judge of his own 
                                                                                                                                                             
In the May 24, 2010, court order, Justice David T. Prosser, 
Justice Annette K. Ziegler, and Justice Michael J. Gableman 
concluded that the court does not have the power to disqualify a 
fellow justice, referring to the writings of Justices Prosser, 
Roggensack, and Ziegler in State v. Allen, 2010 WI 10, 322 
Wis. 2d 372, 778 N.W.2d 863.  Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice 
Ann Walsh Bradley, and Justice N. Patrick Crooks also referred 
to their separate writing in State v. Allen, concluding that it 
appears the court has the power (jurisdiction) to disqualify a 
justice and that this court has exercised its jurisdiction to 
decide disqualification motions against individual justices 
under § 757.19(2). 
In the motion presently before the court, Henley again asks 
the court to disqualify Justice Roggensack from participating in 
his case.  This motion offers new reasons to disqualify Justice 
Roggensack based on the reasoning in the court's opinion 
deciding the merits of Henley's case. 
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
cause"4——a 
principle 
recently 
repeated 
by 
Justice 
Anthony 
Kennedy, writing for a majority of the United States Supreme 
Court in the Caperton case.5     
 ¶46 That Justice Roggensack participates in this motion 
for reconsideration is not a due process or ethical calculation 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Justice Scalia's reference to "the 
wisdom of the ancient maxim 'aliquis non debet esse Judex in 
propria causa'——no man ought to be a judge of his own cause," in 
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 329 
n.* (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Dr. Bonham's Case, 
77 Eng. Rep. 638, 646, 652 (C.P. 1610)); and Ex parte Ah Oi, 13 
Haw. 534, 1901 WL 1300, *14 (1901) (Galbraith, J., dissenting) 
("'No man shall be a judge in his own cause' is a maxim that is 
ancient in use and of universal application in Anglo-Saxon 
communities."). 
See also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955): 
To this end no man can be a judge in his own case and 
no man is permitted to try cases where he has an 
interest in the outcome.  That interest cannot be 
defined 
with 
precision. 
 
Circumstances 
and 
relationships must be considered.  This Court has 
said, however, that 'Every procedure which would offer 
a possible temptation to the average man as a 
judge . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear, and 
true between the State and the accused denies the 
latter due process of law.'  Tumey v. State of Ohio, 
273 U.S. 510, 532, 47 S. Ct. 437, 444, 71 L. Ed. 749.  
Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by 
judges who have no actual bias and who would do their 
very best to weigh the scales of justice equally 
between contending parties.  But to perform its high 
function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the 
appearance of justice.' Offutt v. United States, 348 
U.S. 11, 14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 13.    
5 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 
(2009) (reversing a judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia on the grounds that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was 
violated when a justice in the majority participated in the case 
when objective standards required recusal). 
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
but a mathematical one:  one vote plus three votes equals an 
attempt to achieve a majority.6 
¶47 The 
per 
curiam 
attempts 
to 
obfuscate 
Justice 
Roggensack's being the judge of her own cause by saying that she 
can participate because "all justices are affected equally by 
[the] determination of the scope of the court's power in this 
regard."  Per curiam op., ¶9 (emphasis added).  This attempt to 
obfuscate is not persuasive.  Henley's motion focuses on one 
justice, Justice Roggensack.   
¶48 It was Justice Roggensack's participation in a related 
case while she was a judge of the court of appeals that has 
stimulated the two recusal motions in Henley's case. It is 
Justice Roggensack who disqualified herself from the court's 
                                                 
See Justice Crooks' separate writing in State v. Allen, 
2010 WI 10, ¶190, 322 Wis. 2d 372, 778 N.W.2d 863, commending 
Justice Gableman on withdrawing from the Allen decision, which 
involved 
a 
disqualification 
motion 
addressed 
to 
Justice 
Gableman. 
In Wisconsin, if a justice should have been disqualified 
from considering the case and nevertheless participates, the 
decision is void.  State v. Am. TV & Appliance of Madison, Inc., 
151 Wis. 2d 175, 179, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989). 
6 The defendant's same due process arguments about the 
court's decision apply to the court's denial of his motion for 
reconsideration:   
(A) Justice Roggensack has inappropriately participated in 
the denial of Henley's motion for reconsideration. 
(B) The per curiam decision explicitly declares that no  
process exists in this court to review a single justice's 
decision not to recuse herself on due process grounds short of 
removal from office through constitutional means or judicial 
discipline.  Per curiam, ¶¶24-25. 
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
decisions on Henley's first recusal motion.  It is Justice 
Roggensack who now decides that she can participate in deciding 
Henley's second motion to disqualify her; this second motion is 
the motion addressed in the per curiam.  It is Justice 
Roggensack's refusal to disqualify herself in the Henley case 
that is challenged——no one else's.  It is Justice Roggensack who 
is immediately and directly affected by Henley's recusal 
motions.  
¶49 A justice's participation in a motion addressed to the 
court challenging that justice's refusal to disqualify is 
unprecedented in this court.  In every case in which a motion 
has been addressed to the court seeking review of a justice's 
participation in a case, the challenged justice has not 
participated in deciding the motion.7  
¶50 Over the years, several justices, including most 
recently 
Justice 
Ziegler 
and 
Justice 
Gableman, 
did 
not 
participate in the court's decisions on motions seeking court 
review of their decisions to participate in cases.8  Why is this 
                                                 
7 In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crosetto, 160 
Wis. 2d 581, 466 N.W.2d 879 (1991), upon which the per curiam 
relies, no motion was addressed to the court.  For a discussion 
of In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crosetto, 160 Wis. 2d  
581, 466 N.W.2d 879 (1991), and a full reprint of In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crosetto, see State v. Allen, 
322 Wis. 2d 372 at ¶10 n.2, Appendix A. 
8 See Krier v. Vilione, Nos. 2006AP1573 & 2006AP2290 
(motions 
filed 
challenging Justices Ziegler and Gableman; 
neither justice participated in court order ruling on motion.)  
See the unpublished court orders in the following cases, in 
which the challenged justice did not participate in the court's 
order about disqualifying the justice:   
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
case different from all other cases addressing recusal of a 
justice?     
¶51 The answer, of course, is that this per curiam is not 
different.  We need go no further for an illustration of the 
axiom that a justice does not participate in the court's 
decisions on motions seeking court review of that justice's  
decision 
to 
participate 
than 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
not 
                                                                                                                                                             
State v. Carter, No. 2006AP1811-CR, unpublished order (Wis. 
S. Ct. Mar. 1, 2010) (Justice Gableman not participating) 
State v. Cross, No. 2009AP3-CR, unpublished order (Wis. S. 
Ct. Nov. 11, 2009) (Justice Gableman not participating)  
State v. Dearborn, No. 2007AP1894-CR, unpublished order 
(Wis. S. Ct. Mar. 1, 2010) (Justice Gableman not participating) 
State v. Jones, No. 2008AP2342-CR, unpublished order (Wis. 
S. Ct. Dec. 16, 2009) (Justice Gableman not participating) 
State v. Littlejohn, No. 2007AP900-CR, unpublished order 
(Wis. S. Ct. Mar. 1, 2010) (Justice Gableman not participating) 
State v. McGuire, No. 2007AP2711-CR, unpublished order 
(Wis. S. Ct. Oct. 2, 2009) (Justice Gableman not participating) 
State v. Sveum, No. 2008AP658-CR, unpublished order (Wis. 
S. Ct. Dec. 21, 2009) (Justice Gableman not participating) 
See the following cases in which the challenged justice did 
not participate in the court's decision determining the validity 
of a decision in which the challenged justice participated:  
State v. American TV, 151 Wis. 2d 175, 443 N.W.2d 662 
(1989) (Justice Bablitch not participating) 
City of Edgerton v. Gen. Cas. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 510, 527 
N.W.2d 305 (1995) (Justice Geske not participating)  
Jackson v. Benson, 2002 WI 14, 249 Wis. 2d 281, 639 
N.W.2d 545 (Justice Wilcox not participating) 
Donohoo v. Action Wis., Inc., 2008 WI 110, 314 Wis. 2d 510, 
754 N.W.2d 480 (Justice Butler not participating) 
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
participating in two orders of this court relating to the 
court's consideration of Henley's prior motion seeking court 
review  of Justice Roggensack's decision to participate in the 
Henley case.9    
¶52 Justice Roggensack did not participate in the Feb. 8, 
2010, order ordering briefs on the issue of Justice Roggensack's 
disqualification.10  The order is attached.   
¶53 Justice Roggensack did not participate in the May 24, 
2010, order in which Justices Prosser, Ziegler, and Gableman 
declared 
the 
court 
had 
no 
power 
to 
disqualify 
Justice 
Roggensack.11  The order is attached. 
¶54 Moreover, Justice Roggensack, without explanation, 
withdraws from participation in an unpublished order dismissing 
Yasmine Clark's motion to file an amicus brief to reconsider the 
Henley opinion, even though Justice Roggensack previously 
participated in granting Ms. Clark's motion to file the amicus 
brief.12      
¶55 Acting inconsistently in deciding various issues in 
the Henley case, Justice Roggensack now participates in this per 
                                                 
9 See note 3 above.   
10 See note 3 above. 
11 See note 3 above. 
12 See unpublished order in State v. Henley, of even date as 
this per curiam, dismissing Yasmine Clark's motion to reconsider 
the Henley opinion.  Previously Justice Roggensack participated 
in granting Yasmine Clark's motion for leave to file a non-party 
brief.  See State v. Henley, No. 2008AP697, unpublished order  
(Wis. S. Ct. Dec. 8, 2010).    
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
curiam decision that addresses a motion to reconsider the Henley 
case.   
¶56 Justice Roggensack's inconsistent conduct in sometimes 
disqualifying herself in the Henley case, and other times not, 
conflicts not only with accepted practice in this court but also 
with Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedure II.L.1., which 
provides in part:  "When a justice recuses or disqualifies 
himself or herself, the justice takes no further part in the 
court's consideration of the matter."13   
¶57 We turn now to the writings of Justice Roggensack and 
three colleagues.  Four justices, Justices Prosser, Roggensack, 
Ziegler, and Gableman, writing as a per curiam, reach the 
following conclusions:  
(A) This court does not "have the power to disqualify a 
judicial peer from performing the constitutional functions 
of a Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice on a case by case 
basis."14  
                                                 
13 For a discussion asserting that due process should be 
extended so that once a judge has recused himself or herself, 
the judge may no longer affect the case, see S. Matthew Cook, 
Note, Extending the Due Process Clause to Prevent a Previously 
Recused Judge from Later Attempting to Affect the Case from 
Which He was Recused, 1997 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 423.  
14 Per 
curiam 
opinion 
joined 
by 
Justices 
Prosser, 
Roggensack, Ziegler, and Gableman, ¶¶2, 25, 39.  
As we stated in our writing in State v. Allen, 2010 WI 10, 
322 Wis. 2d 372, 778 N.W.2d 863, on the basis of our own 
research we concluded that the court had the power to disqualify 
a judicial peer, but we asked for briefs and oral argument on 
this issue. 
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
(B) "Henley has received due process."15 
¶58 Justices Patience D. Roggensack, David T. Prosser, 
Annette K. Ziegler, and Michael J. Gableman decide that the 
court has no power to disqualify Justice Roggensack.  They reach 
this decision without the benefit of briefs or oral argument.  
The court has never had the benefit of briefs or oral argument 
on this issue in any case.  Thus the court deviates from the 
traditional adversarial system, the foundation of our legal 
system and jurisprudence. 
¶59 The 
per 
curiam 
joined 
by 
these 
four 
justices 
essentially treats the due process claim challenging the 
participation of a justice as nonjusticiable but then, in an 
inconsistent shift, decides the due process issue.16  Thus 
Justice Roggensack participates in deciding the constitutional 
validity of her participation in the Henley case.  Her 
participation is no longer limited to deciding the scope of the 
court's power to disqualify a judge.  Justice Roggensack is a 
judge of her own cause.    
¶60 Will 
Justices 
Prosser, 
Roggensack, 
Ziegler 
and 
Gableman comment on all recusal motions challenging a justice, 
thus rendering an advisory opinion even though they insist they 
                                                 
15 Per 
curiam 
opinion 
joined 
by 
Justices 
Prosser, 
Roggensack, Ziegler, and Gableman, ¶¶2, 32-35, 39.   
16 As Justice Crooks wrote in Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶188,  
"[t]he writings by Justices Roggensack and Prosser, thus, 
essentially treat the due process claim as nonjusticiable."   
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
lack the power to disqualify a justice? 17  Or will they comment 
on only those recusal motions in which they can hold in favor of 
the challenged justice?   And are they going to continue to 
comment on the grounds raised for disqualification without 
briefs or oral argument, as they do in the present case?  
¶61 We three disagree with the conclusions that our four 
colleagues reach.  The allegations in the motion and the 
conclusions in the per curiam are sufficient to justify briefs, 
oral argument, and full consideration.  This motion should have 
been handled in an open, transparent, comprehensive manner.  
¶62 In support of their conclusions, the four justices 
joining the per curiam substantially rely on and repeat much of 
Justice Roggensack's authored writing in State v. Allen, 2010 WI 
10, 322 Wis. 2d 372, 778 N.W.2d 863, in which Justices Prosser 
and Ziegler both joined and wrote separately.  Justice Gableman 
withdrew from participation in Allen, which involved the 
defendant's challenge to Justice Gableman's participation.    
¶63 We three wrote at great length in Allen, covering 87 
printed pages in the Wisconsin Reporter.  In addition, Justice 
Crooks wrote a six-page separate opinion.  We concluded in Allen 
on the basis of our research (although we sought briefs) that 
the court not only had jurisdiction (power) to decide the 
                                                 
17 Compare Justice Prosser's separate writing in Allen, 322 
Wis. 2d 372, ¶250, suggesting solutions such as personal and 
collective persuasion of a colleague who refuses to withdraw, 
delay of a case, or involvement of the Judicial Commission, with 
his position in the order in State v. Henley (attached) 
suggesting an advisory opinion. 
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
disqualification of a justice, but also had the constitutional 
responsibility to decide the issue.18   
¶64 In Allen, we wrote on all the topics addressed in the 
per curiam, including the court's jurisdiction to disqualify a 
justice or a judge; all the cases the per curiam cites; the 
subjective and objective grounds of disqualification under Wis. 
                                                 
18 For a proposed resolution before the American Bar 
Association recommending that state supreme courts clearly 
articulate 
procedures 
for 
judicial 
disqualification 
determinations, including prompt review by another judge or 
tribunal, or as otherwise provided by law or rule of court, of 
denials of requests to disqualify a judge, see: 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 
RESOLUTION 
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges 
states to establish clearly articulated procedures 
for: 
A. Judicial disqualification determinations; and 
B. Prompt review by another judge or tribunal, or as 
otherwise provided by law or rule of court, of denials 
of requests to disqualify a judge. 
 . . .  
FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Standing Committee on 
Ethics 
and 
Professional 
Responsibility 
and 
the 
Standing Committee on Professional Discipline should 
proceed on an expedited basis to consider what 
amendments, if any, should be made to the ABA Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct or to the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct to provide necessary additional 
guidance to the states on disclosure requirements and 
standards for judicial disqualification. 
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
Stat. § 757.19(2); this court's prior cases deciding the due 
process and statutory rights of a litigant when a challenged 
justice or a judge participated in a matter; the recusal 
practices of the United States Supreme Court and supreme courts 
of other states; the Caperton decision; and due process 
standards of disqualification. 
¶65 For ease of reference we include pinpoint citations to 
our analysis in Allen of cases discussed in the per curiam 
decision: 
 
Caperton v. A.T Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. 
Ct. 2252 (2009):  See Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶88-98, 
passim. 
 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crosetto, 160 
Wis. 2d  581, 466 N.W.2d 879 (1991):  See Allen, 322 
Wis. 2d 372, ¶10 n.2, Appendix A. 
 
Donohoo v. Action Wisconsin, Inc., 2008 WI 110, 314 
Wis. 2d 510, 754 N.W.2d 480:  See Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, 
¶42. 
 
State v. Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d 654, 546 N.W.2d 115 (1996):  
See Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶86 n.54, 98 n.68. 
 
City of Edgerton v. General Cas. Co. of Wis., 190 Wis. 2d 
510,  527 N.W.2d 305 (1995):  See Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, 
¶¶76, 165. 
 
State v. American TV & Appliance of Madison, Inc., 151 
Wis. 2d 175, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989):  See Allen, 322 
Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶41, Appendix A. 
 
Case v. Hoffman, 100 Wis. 314, 74 N.W. 220 (1898):  See 
Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶39-40, 73. 
 
State v. Cannon, 199 Wis. 401, 226 N.W. 385 (1929):  See 
Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶83. 
 
In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1976):  See 
Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶48, 53, 81. 
 
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
Jackson v. Benson, 2002 WI 14, 249 Wis. 2d 681, 639 
N.W.2d 545:  See Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶41 n.15. 
 
Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 
541 U.S. 913 (2004):  See Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶60, 
152-54. 
 
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2000):  
See Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶149 n.18. 
 
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 1301 (1980):  See Allen, 322 
Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶59 n.37, 151 n.20. 
 
Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 901 (1972):  See Allen, 322 
Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶59 n.37, 151 n.20, 153 n.23. 
 
Gravel v. United States, 409 U.S. 902 (1972):  See Allen, 
322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶59 n.37, 151 n.20. 
 
Guy v. United States, 409 U.S. 896 (1972):  See Allen, 322 
Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶59 n.37, 151 n.20. 
 
Ernest v. U.S. Attorney for S. Dist. of Alabama, 474 U.S. 
1016 (1985):  See Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶58 n.36, 150 
n.19. 
 
Kerpelman v. Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md., 450 U.S. 970 
(1981):  See Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶58 n.36, 150 n.19. 
 
Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 409 U.S. 1029 (1972):  
See Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶58 n.36, 150 n.19. 
 
Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 897 
(1945):  See Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶61, 140-48.   
¶66 We have reviewed our Allen writings.  We shall not 
rewrite our writings in Allen or attempt to summarize them.  We 
stand by our Allen writings.  We incorporate them in full into 
this dissent. 
¶67 For the reasons set forth, we dissent from the denial 
of Henley's motion for reconsideration.  
 
 
 
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
 
 
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No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
 
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
 
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
No.  2008AP697-CR.ssa 
 
1