Title: People v. Henderson

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
LEVEL OMEGA HENDERSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S265172 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Seven 
B298366 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BA437882 
 
 
November 17, 2022 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Kruger, 
Groban, Jenkins, and Guerrero concurred.   
 
1 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
S265172 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
This case considers if and when a court may impose 
concurrent sentences in cases falling under the habitual 
criminal, or “Three Strikes,” sentencing scheme.  People v. 
Hendrix (1997) 16 Cal.4th 508, 512 (Hendrix) observed that 
scheme required imposition of consecutive sentences for 
multiple current felonies that were not “committed on the same 
occasion” or did not “aris[e] from the same set of operative facts.”  
(Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (c)(6); 1170.12, subd. (a)(6).)  It 
clarified, however, that a trial court retained discretion to 
impose concurrent terms for those felonies that were committed 
on the same occasion or arose from the same set of operative 
facts, even if the felonies qualified as serious or violent.  (See 
Hendrix, at pp. 513–514.)  The question here is whether 
Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 
(Proposition 36, the Reform Act, or the Act), changed the law 
and stripped sentencing courts of that discretion, thus 
abrogating the Hendrix rule.  We conclude the Reform Act did 
not have that effect.  Following Proposition 36, the court retains 
its Hendrix concurrent sentencing discretion, and the total 
sentence imposed for multiple current counts of serious or 
violent felonies must be ordered to run consecutively to the term 
imposed for offenses that do not qualify as serious or violent 
felonies.  We reverse the Court of Appeal’s contrary judgment 
and remand with directions to order a new sentencing hearing. 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
While working at an apartment complex in Los Angeles, 
William Aguilar saw defendant Level Omega Henderson and 
the manager, Daniel Tillett, trading blows in the courtyard.  
Aguilar called police when he saw defendant walk to his car and 
retrieve a gun.  Tillet and his girlfriend were standing in the 
courtyard when defendant returned holding the weapon.  He hit 
Tillet in the head with the gun butt and punched him with his 
other hand.  When the girlfriend began yelling, defendant 
pointed the gun at her and Aguilar.  Aguilar ran and flagged 
down a police car.  Officers saw defendant strike Tillett several 
times, run into a vacant apartment, then emerge a few minutes 
later, unarmed.  A handgun was recovered from an atrium 
directly below the apartment window.   
Defendant was charged with assault by means of force 
likely to produce great bodily injury, possession of a firearm by 
a felon, and two counts of assaulting Tillett and Aguilar with a 
semiautomatic firearm.1  The information also alleged 
defendant had suffered four prior strike and two prior serious 
felony convictions, and had served four prior prison terms.2  The 
 
1  
See Penal Code sections 245, subdivisions (a)(4), (b); 
29800, subdivision (a)(1).  The information also alleged that 
defendant had possessed a firearm after being convicted of a 
violent felony (Pen. Code, § 29900, subd. (a)(1)), but the court 
dismissed this count on the People’s motion.  Defendant was not 
charged with assaulting Tillet’s girlfriend.   
2  
See Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (a)(1), (b)–(i); 
1170.12; 667.5, subdivision (b).  Both the Three Strikes law and 
the prior serious felony enhancement statute share the same 
definition of what constitutes a prior serious felony conviction.  
(Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c); see Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. 
 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
jury convicted defendant as charged, and, in a bifurcated 
proceeding, the court found the prior conviction allegations to be 
true.  On defendant’s motion, the trial court struck all of the 
prior conviction allegations except for one prior strike and one 
prior serious felony conviction.  It sentenced defendant as a 
second striker (see Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (e)(1); 1170.12, subd. 
(c)(1)), imposing the upper term of nine years for one 
semiautomatic firearm assault, doubled to 18 years; a 
consecutive four-year term for the second assault (one third the 
midterm doubled); and five years for the prior serious felony 
conviction.  The total term imposed was 27 years.3  With respect 
to consecutive sentencing for the assaults on Aguilar and Tillett, 
the court said, “[T]he Three Strikes law requires that on serious 
or violent felonies, two or more, that they be sentenced 
consecutively.”   
On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erroneously 
believed it had no discretion to impose concurrent terms for the 
assaults on Aguilar and Tillett, even though they occurred on 
the same occasion.  (See Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (c)(6), 1170.12, 
subd. (a)(6).)  The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding the court 
lacked discretion to impose concurrent terms on multiple serious 
or violent felonies after passage of the Reform Act.  (See People 
 
(a)(4), (d)(1); 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).)  “[T]he trial court may use 
the prior convictions both under the Three Strikes law and as 
serious felony enhancements.”  (People v. Acosta (2002) 29 
Cal.4th 105, 139, fn. 4; see People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 
547, 554–560.)   
3  
The court stayed imposition of sentence on the other two 
counts as required under Penal Code section 654, subdivision 
(a).   
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
v. Henderson (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 612, 620–627 (Henderson).)  
We reverse.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Structure and Evolution of the Three Strikes 
Law and Clarification of Terms 
The Three Strikes law was “[e]nacted ‘to ensure longer 
prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit 
a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or 
violent felony offenses’ (Pen. Code, former § 667, subd. (b), as 
amended by Stats. 1994, ch. 12, § 1, pp. 71, 72), [and] ‘consists 
of two, nearly identical statutory schemes.’ ”  (People v. Conley 
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 652.)  In March 1994, the Legislature 
codified its version of the Three Strikes law by adding 
subdivisions (b) through (i) to Penal Code4 section 667.  A ballot 
initiative in November of the same year added a new provision, 
section 1170.12.  These two parallel enactments have reposed, 
somewhat cumbersomely, in the code since that time.5  
Proposition 36 made amendments to various provisions of both 
sections 667 and 1170.12.  However, the amendments did not 
treat the language regarding consecutive sentences in the same 
way.  This disparate amendatory treatment lies at the heart of 
the dispute here.   
Generally, the Three Strikes law “increases punishment 
for second strike defendants by doubling any determinate terms 
they otherwise would have received . . . .”  (People v. Sasser 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1, 11.)  Third strike offenders were made 
 
4  
Subsequent statutory references will be to the Penal Code.   
5  
For a more extended discussion of the history of the Three 
Strikes law, see People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 497, 504–506 (Romero).   
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
subject to an indeterminate life sentence for the current felony.  
(See Teal v. Superior Court (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 596.)   
The parsing of legislative and initiative language requires 
application of a variety of terms.  We pause at the outset to 
provide some context.  The Three Strikes law is a separate 
sentencing scheme.  As the court explained in Romero:  “The 
Three Strikes law, when applicable, takes the place of whatever 
law would otherwise determine a defendant’s sentence for the 
current offense.”  (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 524.)  The 
totality of the Three Strikes law is not found in a single free-
standing section of the Penal Code.  Instead, it has been 
implemented by the addition or amendment of various, often 
cross-referenced, provisions.   
The Three Strikes scheme comes into play when a 
defendant is charged with new felony offenses but has 
previously been convicted of designated serious or violent 
felonies.  Although these prior convictions are sometimes 
referred to as “strikes,” the Three Strikes law itself does not use 
that term, instead defining “serious” or “violent” felonies with 
specificity.6  Serious felonies are defined in section 1192.7, 
 
6  
Some of the legislative and initiative history, as well as 
cases interpreting the law, refer to “strikes,” but that term 
seldom appears in the Penal Code.  In the ballot materials 
regarding Proposition 36, the Legislative Analyst explained the 
distinctions between serious and violent felonies in the Three 
Strikes law:  “Existing law classifies some felonies as ‘violent’ or 
‘serious,’ or both.  Examples of felonies currently defined as 
violent include murder, robbery, and rape.  While almost all 
violent felonies are also considered serious, other felonies are 
defined only as serious, such as assault with intent to commit 
robbery.  Felonies that are not classified as violent or serious 
 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
subdivision (c), while the violent felony definition appears in 
section 667.5, subdivision (c).7  There is substantial overlap 
between the two defining lists.  (See Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th 
at p. 514.)  The previously suffered convictions that subject a 
defendant to the Three Strikes scheme are often referred to as 
prior convictions, and are distinguished from newly filed 
charges, referred to as current felonies.   
In order to constitute a “strike,” a prior conviction must 
qualify under the statutory definitions of a serious or violent 
felony.  Under the original Three Strikes provisions, a person 
who had been convicted of two prior strike offenses was subject 
to an indeterminate life sentence if later convicted of any new 
felony.  (See People v. Frierson (2017) 4 Cal.5th 225, 230.)  After 
passage of Proposition 36, however, the requirement of 
indeterminate life sentences for a defendant with two prior 
strikes does not apply to all current felonies.  Instead, a life term 
is only authorized when the new offense is also a serious or 
violent felony or when the defendant’s past or current offenses 
fall under provisions of amended sections 667 or 1170.12.8  In 
order to effect these changes, Proposition 36 added virtually 
identical language to sections 667 and 1170.12.  (See §§ 667, 
 
include grand theft (not involving a firearm) and possession of a 
controlled substance.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. 
(Nov. 6, 2012) analysis of Prop. 36 by Legis. Analyst, p. 48.) 
7  
Offenses are described in terms of the kind of crime and, 
in 
some 
cases, 
degree, 
circumstances 
of 
commission, 
characteristics of the victim, and other factors.   
8  
Those provisions include:  some current drug offenses and 
sex crimes; current crimes involving the arming with or use of a 
firearm, or the intent to inflict great bodily injury; or prior 
strikes for a subset of enumerated serious or violent felonies.   
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
subd. (e)(2)(C); 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C).)  A new indictment or 
information may include allegations charging both serious 
and/or violent felonies, as well as other felonies that do not 
qualify under those definitions.  Here, we will sometimes refer 
to prior convictions for serious or violent felonies as “strike 
priors” or “prior strike convictions.”  We sometimes refer to new 
felony charges that qualify as serious or violent felonies as 
“qualifying offenses.”   
The trial court here found, in a bifurcated phase of trial, 
that defendant had suffered four prior strike convictions.  If 
those true findings were allowed to stand, the Three Strikes 
scheme would have required indeterminate life sentences for 
each of the automatic weapon assaults on Aguilar and Tillett.  
(See §§ 667, subds. (d)(1), (e)(2)(A); 1170.12, subds. (b)(1), 
(c)(2)(A); 1192.7, subd. (c)(31).)  However, Romero clarified that 
a sentencing court has discretion to dismiss findings as to prior 
convictions, in furtherance of justice, under the authority of 
section 1385, subdivision (a).  (See Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at 
pp. 507–532.)  The result of such a dismissal is that a defendant 
with two or more strike priors and a conviction for a new 
qualifying offense may be removed from the strictures of the 
Three Strikes scheme altogether if all of his strike priors are 
dismissed, or he may be sentenced as a “second striker” if only 
one strike prior remains in connection with a newly charged 
qualifying offense.  The sentencing court here adopted the latter 
approach.   
Under both the determinate sentencing law (see § 1170) 
and the Three Strikes scheme, when a defendant stands newly 
convicted of multiple offenses, the court must generally decide 
whether sentences on each count will be ordered to run 
consecutively or concurrently to some or all of the others.  (See 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
§§ 1170, subd. (a); 1170.1, subd. (a); 1170.3; Cal. Rules of Court, 
rule 4.425; People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 850–851.)  
Here again, the Three Strikes scheme imposes restrictions on 
that sentencing choice.  (See §§ 667, subd. (c)(6), (7); 1170.12, 
subd. (a)(6), (7).)  It is the scope of that consecutive/concurrent 
restriction that is at issue here.  As the Romero court noted, both 
versions of the Three Strikes law were intended to “restrict 
courts’ discretion in sentencing repeat offenders. . . .  But to say 
the intent of a law was to restrict judicial discretion begs the 
question of how judicial discretion was to be restricted.  The 
answer to that question can be found only by examining the 
language of the act” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 528) or, 
here, the language of the Reform Act.   
B.  Hendrix, Consecutive Sentencing, and the 
Extent of Discretion 
When the Three Strikes scheme applies, sentences for 
current qualifying offenses must be ordered to run consecutively 
to each other if the current offenses occur on separate occasions 
and do not arise from the same set of operative facts.  (See 
§§ 667, subd. (c)(6); 1170.12, subd. (a)(6).)  People v. Lawrence 
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 219 explained that, for section 667, 
subdivision (c)(6) purposes, felonies are committed “on the same 
occasion” if they were committed within “close temporal and 
spacial proximity” of one another.  (Lawrence, at p. 233.)  
Offenses arise “from the same set of operative facts” when they 
“shar[e] common acts or criminal conduct that serves to 
establish the elements of the current felony offenses of which 
defendant stands convicted.”  (Ibid.)  Here, it is undisputed that 
the assaults on Tillis and Aguilar were committed “on the same 
occasion.”  To avoid unnecessary repetition, we will not always 
repeat the “same set of operative facts” formulation.  But the 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
“same occasion” analysis we employ here would apply equally 
when multiple felonies are committed under the “same set of 
operative facts.”   
To make these applications less abstract, consider a 
hypothetical defendant who has two prior strikes and is then 
convicted of robbing two stores, on two different days, as well as 
two separate and unrelated counts of auto theft.  The 
defendant’s current robberies are qualifying offenses and the 
prior strikes bring him under the Three Strikes scheme.  Using 
its authority under section 1385, subdivision (a), the court 
dismisses one strike.  (See Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529–
532.)  As a result, the defendant will be sentenced as a “second 
striker” rather than be subject to an indeterminate life term.  As 
we explain below, the two robbery sentences must be ordered to 
run consecutively to each other because they occurred on 
separate occasions.  A second question is whether the total 
consecutive robbery sentences must be ordered to run 
consecutively to the auto theft terms.   
Contrast that scenario with an alternative one.  The 
defendant has two prior strikes.  His charged offenses result in 
convictions for two separate felony auto thefts and two counts of 
robbery.  The robberies occurred when he went into a store, 
robbed the clerk and, on his way out, also robbed a patron.  The 
court dismisses one strike, so an indeterminate life term is not 
called for.  If the Hendrix rule continues to apply, the court 
would have discretion to order the robbery sentences to be 
served concurrently because they were committed on the same 
occasion.  Again, the question remains whether the total robbery 
sentences must run consecutively to the nonqualifying auto 
theft sentences.   
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
In evaluating the extent of consecutive sentencing 
discretion, Hendrix focused its attention on subdivision (c)(6) 
and (c)(7) of section 667, the legislative version of the Three 
Strikes law.  At the time, the initiative version, section 1170.12, 
subdivision (a)(6) and (a)(7), contained identical language on 
this topic, so a separate consideration was not needed.  As we 
explain in greater detail below, the Reform Act amended the 
relevant provisions of section 1170.12 dealing with consecutive 
sentencing but did not modify the corresponding provisions of 
section 667.  It is the significance of Proposition 36’s treatment 
of the separate legislative and initiative versions of the Three 
Strikes scheme that is in dispute.  We first discuss Hendrix, then 
consider whether the new language of the Reform Act abrogates 
the Hendrix rule.   
The question in Hendrix was whether, in sentencing a 
Three Strikes defendant, the court must always impose 
consecutive sentences for every current qualifying felony or 
whether it retained discretion to order some terms to run 
concurrently.  Hendrix looked to the language of section 667, 
subdivision (c)(6) and (c)(7) to resolve the question.  These 
provisions stated, as they do now, “(6) If there is a current 
conviction for more than one felony count not committed on the 
same occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative 
facts, the court shall sentence the defendant consecutively on 
each count pursuant to subdivision (e) [describing enhanced 
sentences called for under the Three Strikes scheme].  [¶]  (7) If 
there is a current conviction for more than one serious or violent 
felony as described in paragraph (6), the court shall impose the 
sentence for each conviction consecutive to the sentence for any 
other conviction for which the defendant may be consecutively 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
sentenced in the manner prescribed by law.”  (§ 667, subd. (c)(6)–
(7), italics added.) 
Hendrix explained that, by its terms, subdivision (c)(6) 
required the imposition of consecutive sentences for each 
current felony not committed on the same occasion and not 
arising from the same set of operative facts.  (See Hendrix, 
supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 512.)  Conversely, “[b]y implication, 
consecutive sentences are not mandatory under subdivision 
(c)(6) if the multiple current felony convictions are ‘committed 
on the same occasion’ or ‘aris[e] from the same set of operative 
facts.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 512–513.)  In those circumstances, the court 
has discretion to impose concurrent terms.   
Section 667, subdivision (c)(7), on the other hand, does not 
refer simply to a conviction for multiple felonies.  Instead, it 
specifically addresses multiple serious or violent felonies, i.e., 
qualifying felonies.  Under that provision, when a current 
sentence is imposed for qualifying felonies “as described in 
paragraph (6),” they must be ordered to run consecutively to the 
sentence for “any other conviction.”  (§ 667, subd. (c)(7).)  Some 
parsing is required here.  Under subdivision (c)(7), the 
qualifying felony “described in paragraph (6)” is one that 
occurred on a separate occasion and did not arise from the same 
set of operative facts.  A sentence for those qualifying felonies 
was required to run consecutively to “ ‘any other conviction.’ ”  
(Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 514.)   
The Hendrix holding itself provides only part of the 
resolution for this case.  Hendrix had approached four people 
sitting together at a shopping center, pointing a gun at them and 
demanding money.  Two victims complied and two said they had 
no money.  Hendrix was convicted of two counts of robbery and 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
two of attempted robbery, all with the use of a firearm.  All four 
substantive offenses were qualifying felonies.  Hendrix admitted 
three serious felony convictions, bringing him under the Three 
Strikes scheme, and was sentenced to four consecutive life 
terms, with additional determinate terms for enhancements.  
(See Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 510–511.)   
Because all the offenses at issue in Hendrix were 
committed against separate victims but on the same occasion, 
the question was whether the court had the discretion to order 
those sentences to run concurrently to each other.  The Hendrix 
court held that it did have that discretion based on the language 
of section 667, subdivision (c)(6) and (c)(7).  Hendrix explained 
that subdivision (c)(6) encompassed sentences imposed for all 
felonies, qualifying or not, but required consecutive sentencing 
only for felonies committed on separate occasions and not 
arising from the same set of operative facts.  Subdivision (c)(7) 
also imposed a consecutive sentencing mandate but only as to 
qualifying felonies.  Additionally, the reference in subdivision 
(c)(7) to serious or violent felonies “as described in 
paragraph (6)” incorporated the same occasion/operative facts 
limitation to the consecutive sentencing proviso for qualifying 
felonies.  (Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 513.)   
Thus, under Hendrix, if a Three Strikes defendant is 
convicted of current qualifying felonies that were not committed 
on the same occasion or under the same set of operative facts, 
the court is required to impose the serious or violent felony 
terms consecutive to each other and those terms must also be 
ordered to run consecutively to any other terms imposed for 
nonqualifying offenses as well.  (Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th at 
pp. 513–514.)  But in Hendrix, the serious or violent felonies 
were all committed on the same occasion.  As a result, the 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
consecutive sentencing mandate of subdivision (c)(7) did not 
apply and the court had discretion to impose sentences on those 
qualifying offenses either consecutively or concurrently to each 
other under subdivision (c)(6).  In Hendrix, there were no 
convictions for nonqualifying offenses.  However, its discussion 
of the import of subdivision (c)(7) clarified that a sentence for 
serious or violent felonies not committed on the same occasion 
must be ordered to run consecutively to any sentence imposed 
for nonqualifying convictions.  As we discuss, we apply the 
Hendrix analysis to our explication of the rule.   
C.  The Reform Act, Subsequent Cases, and 
Resolution Here 
The Reform Act was passed in 2012 as Proposition 36.  
Under its terms, and as relevant here, a defendant who has 
suffered prior strike convictions still falls under the Three 
Strikes scheme.  But if the current conviction is not for a serious 
or violent felony, the previously required indeterminate life 
term was replaced by a double-the-base-term sentence for the 
current felony, unless an exception applied.  (See discussion 
ante.)  This modification has a limitation, however.  Even if the 
current offense was not a serious or violent felony, an 
indeterminate life term is still required if either the current 
offense or one of the prior strike convictions is for an offense 
enumerated in the statutes.  (See §§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(i)–(iv); 
1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(i)–(iv).)  In addition, the Reform Act 
made changes to the Three Strikes law consistent with its stated 
intent to “[p]revent the early release of dangerous criminals who 
are currently being released early because jails and prisons are 
overcrowded with low-risk, non-violent inmates serving life 
sentences for petty crimes.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. 
Elec., supra, text of Prop. 36, § 1, par. 5, p. 105.)   
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
The Act made amendments to both sections 667 and 
1170.12 to achieve these purposes.  However, a court’s 
concurrent or consecutive sentencing authority was addressed 
differently for section 667, the legislative version, and 1170.12, 
the initiative version.  Section 667, subdivision (c)(6) and (c)(7) 
were not changed.  Thus, the analytical basis for the Hendrix 
rule was not affected.  Yet, the language of section 1170.12, 
subdivision (a)(6) and (a)(7), which previously had been identical 
to section 667, subdivision (c)(6) and (c)(7), was partially 
modified.  Section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6), pertaining to all 
current felonies, regardless of type, remained the same as its 
counterpart in the legislative version.  It continued to require 
consecutive sentencing for each new felony unless the current 
offenses were committed on the same occasion or arose from the 
same operative facts.   
However, as to the consecutive term requirement when 
the current offense is a serious or violent felony, section 1170.12, 
subdivision (a)(7) was amended.  It no longer refers to the 
preceding paragraph, subdivision (a)(6), which contains the 
same occasion/operative facts language.  Instead it now reads:  
“If there is a current conviction for more than one serious or 
violent felony as described in subdivision (b) [which defines 
those felonies], the court shall impose the sentence for each 
conviction consecutive to the sentence for any other conviction 
for which the defendant may be consecutively sentenced in the 
manner proscribed by law.”  (§ 1170.12, subd. (a)(7), italics 
added.)  As is apparent, the reference to the same 
occasion/operative fact exception “as described in paragraph (6)” 
was removed from section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(7).  The 
Attorney General argues that this omission reflects an intent to 
remove the Hendrix concurrent sentencing discretion.  The 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
Attorney General asserts that, after Proposition 36, when a 
defendant is sentenced under the Three Strikes scheme, all 
sentences for each qualifying felony must run consecutively to 
each other, regardless of whether those offenses were committed 
on the same occasion or arose from the same set of operative 
facts.   
Courts of Appeal have disagreed about the effect wrought 
by that amendment as it relates to a trial court’s concurrent 
sentencing discretion.  The Court of Appeal below held the 
change in language now forecloses that discretion and requires 
that all sentences for qualifying offenses must run consecutively 
regardless of whether they were committed on the same 
occasion or arose from the same operative facts.  It is this 
question we granted review to resolve.   
The first case to address the issue, People v. Torres (2018) 
23 Cal.App.5th 185 (Torres), concluded the discretion recognized 
in Hendrix survived the Reform Act’s amendments.  Three 
subsequent published Court of Appeal cases agreed with the 
Torres analysis, although with divided panels.  (See People v. 
Marcus (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 201, 211–214 (Marcus); People v. 
Gangl (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 58, 69–71 (Gangl); People v. 
Buchanan (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 385, 391–392 (Buchanan).)  
Dissenting opinions in these subsequent cases maintained that 
the change to section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(7) did signal an 
intent to remove that discretion, as the Attorney General argues 
here.  (See Marcus, at p. 215 (conc. & dis. opn. of Krause, J.); 
Gangl, at pp. 72–80 (conc. & dis. opn. of Krause, J.); Buchanan, 
at pp. 393–398 (conc. & dis. opn. of Needham, J.).)   
“ ‘In interpreting a voter initiative . . . , we apply the same 
principles that govern statutory construction.’  [Citation.]  
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
Where a law is adopted by the voters, ‘their intent governs.’  
[Citation.]  In determining that intent, ‘we turn first to the 
language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary 
meaning.’  [Citation.]  But the statutory language must also be 
construed in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall 
statutory scheme.  [Citation.]  We apply a presumption, as we 
similarly do with regard to the Legislature, that the voters, in 
adopting an initiative, did so being ‘aware of existing laws at the 
time the initiative was enacted.’ ” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 
Cal.5th 857, 879–880 (Buycks); see People v. Raybon (2021) 11 
Cal.5th 1056, 1065.)   
The Reform Act amended section 1170.12, subdivision 
(a)(7), replacing its prior reference to subdivision (a)(6), which 
set out the same occasion/operative facts proviso.  Instead, 
subdivision (a)(7) now refers, not to subdivision (a)(6), but to 
subdivision (b), which simply defines a serious or violent felony.  
The question is whether, by making that change, voters 
intended to abrogate the Hendrix rule as to the court’s 
concurrent sentencing discretion.  Nothing in the ballot 
materials speaks directly to voters’ intent on this topic.  In 
trying to discern the electorate’s intent, the various majority 
and dissenting opinions pointed to a variety of linguistic clues 
from which that intent might be gleaned.  The majority opinions 
observed that subdivision (a)(6) remained unchanged and 
encompassed all current felony convictions, whether qualifying 
or not.  As such, the amendment of subdivision (a)(7) made by 
the Reform Act only requires that the sentence imposed for 
qualifying felonies be ordered to run consecutively to the 
sentence imposed for nonqualifying felonies.  (See Marcus, 
supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 212–214; Gangl, supra, 42 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 69–70; Torres, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
p. 201.)  Conversely, the dissenting opinions concluded the 
amendment of subdivision (a)(7) swept more broadly.  It deleted 
the reference to subdivision (a)(6), which contained the same 
occasion/operative facts provisions.  As a result, they concluded 
the amendment reflected an intent that all qualifying current 
felonies be sentenced consecutively to each other, whether or not 
they were committed on the same occasion or arose from the 
same set of operative facts.  (See Gangl, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th 
at pp. 78–79 (conc. & dis. opn. of Krause, J.); Buchanan, supra, 
39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 394–395 (conc. & dis. opn. of Needham, 
J.).)   
The Attorney General argues that because the amended 
subdivision (a)(7) no longer refers to subdivision (a)(6), the 
foundation for the Hendrix rule no longer exists and its holding 
has been abrogated.  At the end of the day, the language of the 
initiative is simply unclear.  “When the language of a statute is 
ambiguous — that is, when the words of the statute are 
susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, given their 
usual and ordinary meaning and considered in the context of the 
statute as a whole — we consult other indicia of the 
Legislature’s [or electorate’s] intent, including such extrinsic 
aids as legislative history and public policy.  [Citations.]  If there 
is no ambiguity, ‘ “ ‘ “we presume the Legislature meant what it 
said and the plain meaning of the statute governs.” ’ ” ’ ”  (Union 
of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2019) 
7 Cal.5th 1171, 1184.)   
We conclude section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(7) is 
ambiguous with respect to whether it requires that multiple 
qualifying felonies must be sentenced consecutively to each 
other.  The ambiguity resides in the provision’s use of the term 
“conviction.”  “If there is a current conviction for more than one 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
serious or violent felony as described in subdivision (b), the court 
shall impose the sentence for each conviction consecutive to the 
sentence for any other conviction for which the defendant may 
be consecutively sentenced in the manner prescribed by law.”  
(§ 1170.12, subd. (a)(7), italics added.)  In suggesting the “plain 
language” of the provision now “ ‘require[d] the court to sentence 
multiple current serious or violent felonies consecutively, 
whether or not they occurred on the same occasion or out of the 
same set of operative facts’ ” (Henderson, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th 
at pp. 623, 624), the Court of Appeal below equated a 
“conviction” with an individual count or offense.  As such, “each 
conviction” for a qualifying felony must be imposed “consecutive 
to the sentence for any other conviction,” i.e., other qualifying 
felonies.  (§ 1170.12, subd. (a)(7); see also Gangl, supra, 42 
Cal.App.5th at p. 79 (conc. & dis. opn. of Krause, J.); Buchanan, 
supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 397 (conc. & dis. opn. of Needham, 
J.).)   
This interpretation would seem a plausible one consistent 
with the colloquial understanding that a “conviction” refers to a 
finding of guilt on a single count.  (Cf. § 15.)9  However, even 
before the Reform Act, section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6) and 
(a)(7) used the term “conviction” as a collective term describing 
multiple, relevant counts for which the defendant has been 
convicted.  Subdivision (a)(6) refers to “a current conviction for 
more than one felony count.”  (§ 1170.12, subd. (a)(6), italics 
added.)  Likewise, by stating its mandate applies to “a current 
 
9  
Section 15 defines a crime or public offense as “an act 
committed or omitted in violation of a law forbidding or 
commanding it, and to which is annexed, upon conviction, either 
of the following [enumerated] punishments . . . .”  (Italics 
added.)   
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
conviction for more than one serious or violent felony as 
described in subdivision (b)” (italics added), subdivision (a)(7) as 
amended continues to use “conviction” to refer collectively to a 
grouping of multiple offenses.  If “conviction” is so understood, 
section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(7)’s rule reads much differently:  
the court must impose sentence on “each conviction,” i.e., the 
group of current qualifying felonies, consecutively to “any other 
conviction,” that is to say the group of any nonqualifying 
offenses.  Such an interpretation would also seem plausible, 
especially in conjunction with the fact that subdivision (a)(6) 
employs the phrase “each count” in stating its consecutive 
sentencing rule, a phrase absent in subdivision (a)(7).   
In light of the statutory ambiguity, we look to the overall 
context of the initiative, take into account that it was adopted to 
reform an existing scheme, and look to the ballot materials as a 
tool to deduce voter intent.  (See People v. Arroyo (2016) 62 
Cal.4th 589, 593.)  The overarching stated intent of the Reform 
Act appears threefold:  1. To “[r]estore the Three Strikes law to 
the public’s original understanding by requiring life sentences 
only when a defendant’s current conviction is for a violent or 
serious crime” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, text 
of Prop. 36, § 1, p. 105); 2. to punish a current felony more 
harshly, but in cases where the current offense is not a serious 
or violent felony, to moderate that harsher penalty by requiring 
a multiplied base term, as opposed to an indeterminate life term, 
unless an exception applies; and 3. to ensure, by virtue of those 
exceptions, that particularly designated repeat offenders receive 
a life sentence, even if the current offense is not serious or 
dangerous felony.   
The debate over Proposition 36 did not feature a focus on 
the consecutive/concurrent discretion question.  As a result, it is 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
difficult to discern just what the electorate intended on this topic 
or whether they considered it at all.  One thing, however, is 
clear:  By passing the Reform Act, the electorate intended to 
mitigate some of the more stringent applications of the Three 
Strikes scheme while retaining rigorous penalties for those 
offenders whose criminal history reveals they remain a 
significant threat to public safety.  A new requirement of 
mandatory consecutive sentences in cases where it did not exist 
before would not be completely inconsistent with that goal but, 
as Romero pointed out, “to say the intent of a law was to restrict 
judicial discretion begs the question of how judicial discretion 
was to be restricted.”  (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 528.)   
We cannot say that the voters spoke with a clear voice on 
that topic, particularly when they took pains to make their 
intent much more manifest on other aspects of the reforms they 
adopted.  However, it is significant that the Reform Act did not 
alter the specific language granting a court’s discretion to 
impose consecutive sentences if, in its judgment, such a penalty 
was appropriate, even when current convictions were committed 
on the same occasion.  (See §§ 667, subd. (c)(6); 1170.12, subd. 
(a)(6).)  It is also notable that Proposition 36 specifically sets out 
when consecutive life sentences are still required for current 
felonies, even if those offenses do not qualify as serious or violent 
felonies.  (See §§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(B); 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(B)–
(C).)  These changes enacted in Proposition 36 reflected a 
recalibration of some of the more stringent Three Strikes 
requirements.  The voters intended to reduce penalties in many 
instances when the new felony was not serious or violent.  
However, they retained the harsher penalties when either the 
new, 
or 
previous, 
offenses 
were 
deemed 
particularly 
blameworthy.   
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
Had the drafters intended to change sentencing discretion 
in the same occasion/operative facts context, the drafters were 
clearly aware of how to make that intent clear.  We also presume 
that the voters were aware of the longstanding Hendrix rule 
when they passed Proposition 36.  “Proposition 36 neither refers 
to Hendrix nor states its express intent to overrule long-
standing Supreme Court precedent.”  (Marcus, supra, 45 
Cal.App.5th at p. 214.)  We “ ‘cannot presume that . . . the voters 
intended the initiative to effect a change in law that was not 
expressed or strongly implied in either the text of the initiative 
or the analyses and arguments in the official ballot pamphlet.’ ”  
(People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 364.)  In light of all 
these factors, we cannot discern a clear intent to withdraw 
discretion that has been recognized for a quarter century.   
D.  Arguments by the Attorney General and 
Dissenting Opinions 
The People’s arguments for a contrary resolution fail.  The 
Attorney General’s analysis would create an apparent conflict 
between section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6) and (a)(7) as 
amended.  Subdivision (a)(6), by implication, grants a court 
discretion to impose concurrent terms for any current felony 
committed on the same occasion.  But the Attorney General now 
argues that consecutive terms are mandatory under subdivision 
(a)(7) for any current qualifying felony whether or not they were 
committed on the same occasion.  Under the People’s 
interpretation, subdivision (a)(6) seemingly grants a court 
discretion that subdivision (a)(7) forbids.  (See Marcus, supra, 
45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 213–214; Torres, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 201.)   
The Court of Appeal below suggested that section 1170.12, 
subdivision (a)(6) and (a)(7) could be harmonized by recognizing 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
that subdivision (a)(6) sets out a general rule for all felonies, 
with subdivision (a)(7) providing an exception that abrogates 
that general discretionary authority.  (See Henderson, supra, 54 
Cal.App.5th at p. 626.)  The difficulty is that nothing in the 
language of these provisions supports an interpretation that 
section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6) specifies a “general” rule and 
subdivision (a)(7) an exception.  That interpretation would seem 
at odds with the structure of subdivision (a) generally.  As 
Marcus 
observed, 
under 
standard 
rules 
of 
statutory 
construction, we “read a statute, and its various subdivisions, as 
a cohesive whole.”  (Marcus, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 213–
214.)  Subdivision (a) provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other 
law, if a defendant has been convicted of a felony and it has been 
pled and proved that the defendant has one or more prior serious 
or violent felony convictions, as defined in subdivision b, the 
court shall adhere to each of the following.”  (§ 1170.12, subd. 
(a), italics added.)  The statute then lists various provisions to 
which the court must adhere.  These provisions forbid a grant of 
probation or diversion, require imposition of a prison sentence, 
limit prison conduct credits, ban consideration of the lapse of 
time between the strike and current offenses, and eliminate 
limits for consecutive sentences on subsequent convictions.  (See 
§ 1170.12, subd. (a)(1)–(a)(5).)  None of these individual 
subdivisions refer to any other or suggest that any states a 
“general” rule while some other provision states an exception.  
Indeed, by providing that the rules enumerated in subdivision 
(a) apply “[n]otwithstanding any other law,” the statutory 
scheme clearly requires that the Three Strikes framework takes 
precedence over any conflicting provision.  By contrast, when 
the Reform Act amended subdivision (a)(7), it did not use the 
formulation “notwithstanding subdivision (a)(6),” or any other 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
provision.  This omission strongly suggests that the drafters did 
not consider the two subdivisions to be in conflict or intended 
that they be so understood.   
As Marcus reasoned, “subdivision (a)(6) continues to apply 
to all felonies” (Marcus, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 214), and 
makes no reference to an exception.  Similarly, subdivision (a)(7) 
contains no language suggesting it would apply notwithstanding 
that subdivision (a)(6) would appear to support a contrary rule.  
“Had the voters disagreed with Hendrix’s conclusion and 
intended to reject its holding that subdivision (a)(6) applies to 
all felonies, the voters could have easily amended subdivision 
(a)(6) to explicitly refer only to nonserious and nonviolent 
felonies.  This [change] would effectively create two classes of 
crimes to which two different sentencing rules would apply:  
(1) nonviolent/nonserious felonies covered by subdivision (a)(6); 
and 
(2) serious/violent 
felonies 
covered 
exclusively 
by 
subdivision (a)(7).  The voters did not do so.”  (Marcus, at p. 214.)   
Following the Reform Act, the rules as to consecutive 
sentencing apply as follows.  When a strike defendant is 
convicted of any group of new felony offenses, the sentence 
imposed for each felony count must run consecutively to all the 
others not committed on the same occasion.  The court retains 
discretion to impose concurrent sentences for new offenses, 
whether qualifying felonies or not, that were committed on the 
same occasion. 
One further variation occurs when a defendant stands 
convicted of a group of new qualifying offenses along with 
nonqualifying offenses.  In that circumstance, new terms for all 
felonies 
committed 
on 
separate 
occasions 
must 
run 
consecutively to each other under section 1170.12, subdivision 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
(a)(6).  Additionally, under subdivision (a)(7), the total term for 
all qualifying offenses must run consecutively to the total term 
imposed for nonqualifying offenses.10   
We return, then, to the contrasting examples set out 
above.  (See ante, at p. 9.)  In the first example, a defendant with 
two prior strikes is newly convicted of robbing two stores on two 
different days, as well as two separate and unrelated counts of 
auto theft.  His current second degree robberies are qualifying 
offenses and the prior strikes bring him under the Three Strikes 
scheme.  Using its authority under section 1385, subdivision (a), 
the court dismisses one strike.  (See Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 
at pp. 529–532.)  Under the interpretation we adopt here, the 
court would sentence him on the first robbery to a base term 
chosen from the available determinate sentencing triad of two, 
three, or five years (§ 213, subd. (a)(2)), doubled because of the 
remaining strike prior.  The term for the second robbery would 
be one-third of the midterm, doubled, resulting in a two-year 
term.  (§ 1170.1, subd. (a).)  The two-year term must be ordered 
to run consecutively to the first because both offenses were 
committed on separate occasions and did not arise from the 
 
10  
The Attorney General argues, and the Court of Appeal 
here reasoned, that removing the court’s Hendrix concurrent 
sentencing authority is consistent with the Reform Act’s stated 
intent to punish more harshly those convicted of current serious 
or violent felonies.  (Henderson, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 627; 
see Buchanan, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 395–396 (conc. & 
dis. opn. of Needham, J.).)  However, as explained, under the 
interpretation we adopt here, those defendants with multiple 
qualifying felonies will be treated more harshly by virtue of the 
consecutive sentences that will still be required for both 
qualifying and nonqualifying felonies.  Proposition 36’s general 
statement of intent is thus given effect.   
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
same set of operative facts.  (§§ 667, subd. (c)(6); 1170.12, subd. 
(a)(6).)  The felony auto thefts are not qualifying offenses, but 
the court must also order the robbery sentences to be served 
consecutively to “any other conviction,” which would include 
terms imposed for the auto thefts.  (§ 1170.12, subd. (a)(7).)  The 
auto theft sentences called for by the standard determinate 
sentencing statutes can be ordered to run consecutively or 
concurrently to each other.  If the court chooses the upper term 
for the first robbery, it would order the defendant to serve a total 
of 12 years (10 years plus two years) for the two qualifying 
robberies consecutive to the combined sentence imposed for the 
auto thefts.   
In the second example, the defendant has two prior 
strikes.  His charged offenses result in convictions for two 
separate felony auto thefts and two counts of second degree 
robbery.  The robberies occurred when he went into a store, 
robbed the clerk and, on his way out, also robbed a patron.  The 
court dismisses one strike, and none of the exceptions in section 
1170.12 subdivision (c) apply, so an indeterminate life term is 
not called for.  Sentencing would progress as follows.  The term 
for the robbery of the clerk would be the base term chosen from 
the triad, then doubled.  The term for robbing the patron would 
be one-third of the midterm, doubled.  The two robberies are 
qualifying offenses, but they were committed on the same 
occasion.  As a result, under subdivision (a)(6), the court would 
have the discretion to order the sentence for each robbery to run 
either consecutively or concurrently to each other.  (Hendrix, 
supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 513–514.)  As in the prior example, the 
auto thefts would not be qualifying offenses, but whatever 
sentence is imposed for the qualifying robberies must be ordered 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
to run consecutively to the total term imposed for the auto 
thefts.   
In sum, we conclude that, after the Reform Act, a trial 
court retains the Hendrix concurrent sentencing discretion 
when sentencing on qualifying offenses committed on the same 
occasion or arising from the same set of operative facts.  Because 
the trial court’s comments at sentencing suggested it did not 
believe it had that discretion, we remand the matter for a new 
sentencing hearing.  (See Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 893–
895.)  At that hearing, the full resentencing rule, which “allows 
a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when 
resentencing a defendant” (People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 
415, 424–425), applies.  Further, because “ ‘a defendant should 
not be required to risk being given greater punishment . . . for 
the privilege of exercising his right to appeal’ ” (People v. Hanson 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 359, quoting People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 
277, 281), the court on remand may not impose an aggregate 
sentence greater than the one defendant initially received.   
 
 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed with 
directions to remand the matter to the superior court for a new 
sentencing hearing.   
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Henderson 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 54 Cal.App.5th 612 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S265172 
Date Filed:  November 17, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Fred N. Wapner 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Rudolph J. Alejo, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Blythe J. Leszkay, Kristen J. Inberg 
and Kimberley A. Donohue, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Rudolph J. Alejo 
Attorney at Law 
520 South Grand Avenue, Unit 400 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
(510) 842-5356 
 
Kimberley A. Donohue 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 210-6135