Title: Heritage Ins. Co. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Heritage Ins. Co. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 104 Ohio St.3d 513, 2004-Ohio-6766.] 
 
 
HERITAGE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE, ET AL., v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Heritage Ins. Co. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 104 Ohio St.3d 513, 
2004-Ohio- 6766.] 
Claims against the state – R.C. 2743.02(D) – Recovery by “claimant” to be 
reduced by certain amounts – Where state is  joint tortfeasor, subrogor of  
fellow tortfeasor seeking contribution from state is not “claimant” within 
meaning of R.C. 2743.02(D). 
(No. 2003-1351 — Submitted May 26, 2004 — Decided December 17, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 02AP-838, 2003-
Ohio-3111. 
_________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. 2743.02(D) is not applicable to a joint tortfeasor seeking contribution and 
indemnity from the state. 
_________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 1} This case arises out of a 1994 traffic accident that took the life of 
Thora Roweta Moore.  Moore died when her car collided with a pickup truck at 
the intersection of State Route 49 and U.S. Route 40 in Montgomery County.  
John R. Jurgensen Construction Company (“Jurgensen”) had contracted with the 
appellant, Ohio Department of Transportation (“ODOT”), to carry out 
improvements at that intersection in May 1993.  Moore’s estate sued Jurgensen 
and in February 1998 obtained a jury verdict of $750,000, which, once reduced by 
the 35 percent contributory negligence attributed to the decedent, amounted to 
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$487,500.  Appellee, Heritage Insurance Company (“Heritage”), was Jurgensen’s 
insurer and paid the judgment to Moore’s estate.  Jurgensen paid a $50,000 
deductible to Heritage pursuant to its insurance contract. 
{¶ 2} On January 13, 1999, Heritage and Jurgensen sued ODOT in the 
Ohio Court of Claims, alleging that ODOT was a joint tortfeasor with Jurgensen 
in the Moore accident.  They alleged that ODOT negligently oversaw the 
construction and failed to ensure motorists’ safety at the intersection, and that 
ODOT was liable for indemnity and contribution.  ODOT denied all liability.  On 
August 29, 2000, the court stayed the case pending a decision from this court, 
which was eventually reported as Community Ins. Co. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. 
(2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 376, 750 N.E.2d 573.  The court found that our decision in 
Community Ins.Co. might be dispositive of the issues in this case. 
{¶ 3} On May 15, 2002, ODOT moved for summary judgment.  The 
court granted the motion as to Heritage’s claims for contribution and 
indemnification on July 10, 2002, based on this court’s decision in Community 
Ins. Co.  The parties stipulated to the dismissal of Jurgensen’s claim on July 11, 
2002. 
{¶ 4} Heritage appealed, and the Franklin County Court of Appeals 
reversed the judgment of the Court of Claims.  The appellate court distinguished 
Community Ins. Co. and held that R.C. 2743.02(D) does not preclude a joint 
tortfeasor from bringing contribution and indemnity actions against the state. 
{¶ 5} The cause is before this court upon the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 6} The crux of this case is whether R.C. 2743.02(D), as interpreted by 
this court in Community Ins. Co., 92 Ohio St.3d 376, 750 N.E.2d 573, applies to a 
joint tortfeasor seeking contribution and indemnity against the state.  We agree 
January Term, 2004 
3 
with the appellate court that Community Ins. Co. is distinguishable and that R.C. 
2743.02(D) is inapplicable to Heritage in this case. 
{¶ 7} R.C. 2743.02(D) provides: 
{¶ 8} “Recoveries against the state shall be reduced by the aggregate of 
insurance proceeds, disability award, or other collateral recovery received by the 
claimant.” 
{¶ 9} In Community Ins. Co., this court applied R.C. 2743.02(D) to an 
insurer seeking subrogation against ODOT.  In that case, the underlying claim 
was filed by Rachelle Dronebarger, who suffered catastrophic injuries in a single-
car accident.  After the accident, Community Mutual Insurance Company 
(“Community”) paid medical and hospital expenses of over $245,000 pursuant to 
an employee health plan under which Dronebarger was insured.  Community 
sought subrogation from ODOT, which had been found liable to Dronebarger at 
trial.  This court held that Community was not entitled to recovery from the state.  
The lead opinion stated that Community was not a claimant separate and apart 
from Dronebarger.  Id., 92 Ohio St.3d at 378, 750 N.E.2d 573.  Rather, 
“Community stands in the place of Dronebarger in seeking recovery from the 
state, and has no greater right to recovery than would Dronebarger herself.” Id.  
Since R.C. 2743.02(D) applied to Dronebarger, it applied to Community as well: 
{¶ 10} “R.C. 2743.02(D) mandates that medical benefits Dronebarger 
received from Community must be deducted from the amount due her from the 
state. She could not transfer to Community, by way of subrogation, a right to 
recover damages representing incurred medical expenses that she herself did not 
possess pursuant to R.C. 2743.02(D).” 
{¶ 11} ODOT argues that Heritage is in the same position as Community.  
ODOT argues that any judgment for Jurgensen against ODOT would be offset by 
the insurance proceeds Jurgensen received from Heritage.  Since Jurgensen would 
have no claim against ODOT up to the level of its insurance proceeds, and since 
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Heritage stands in the shoes of Jurgensen in the subrogation action, Heritage 
would have no claim against ODOT for the payments Heritage made on behalf of 
Jurgensen. 
{¶ 12} However, Community Ins. Co. applies only if Jurgensen is 
characterized as a “claimant” under R.C. 2743.02(D).  In Community Ins. Co., the 
lead opinion traced Community’s subrogation claim back to its source, the 
claimant in the underlying action, Dronebarger.  Here, Heritage’s subrogation 
claim is traced back to Jurgensen.  The question is whether to view Jurgensen as a 
separate claimant in an action against ODOT, or as a joint tortfeasor asserting its 
right to contribution and indemnity from the other tortfeasor, ODOT, for 
payments it made to the claimant, Moore’s estate.  We agree with the appellate 
court that for purposes of R.C. 2743.02(D), Jurgensen should be considered not as 
a claimant but instead as a joint tortfeasor. 
{¶ 13} ODOT argues that anyone that makes a claim against the state is a 
“claimant” for purposes of R.C. 2743.02(D).  However, the lead opinion in 
Community Ins. Co. establishes that a party that raises a claim against the state is 
not necessarily a “claimant” pursuant to the statute.  Community had sought to 
establish itself as a claimant in Community Ins. Co., arguing that it was the 
claimant in its separate subrogation lawsuit against ODOT.  Since Community 
itself received no collateral benefits in its particular case, it argued that R.C. 
2743.02(D) did not apply to its claim against ODOT.  This court, however, found 
that Community’s role as subrogee defined its status for purposes of the statute. 
Id., 92 Ohio St.3d at 378, 750 N.E.2d 573.  Dronebarger, who was not a party in 
Community’s case against ODOT, was nevertheless considered the “claimant” for 
purposes of the statute.  Through subrogation, Community then stepped into her 
shoes and became subject, like her, to the limitations of R.C. 2743.02. 
{¶ 14} Here, as in Community Ins. Co., the fact that Jurgensen is a 
plaintiff in a lawsuit against ODOT does not necessarily make it a “claimant” for 
January Term, 2004 
5 
purposes of R.C. 2743.02(D).  Like Community’s subrogation claim, Jurgensen’s 
contribution and indemnity claims relate back to and arise out of the original 
injury claim.  Only through Moore’s estate’s claim does Jurgensen have a cause 
of action against ODOT.  Although Moore’s estate is not a literal party in this 
particular case, like Dronebarger in Community Ins. Co., the estate remains the 
putative “claimant” for purposes of the statute.  Jurgensen stands as a joint 
tortfeasor seeking recovery of the payments it made to the claimant.  This case is 
about the respective degrees of negligence of Jurgensen and ODOT as to Moore’s 
estate.  The entire case is viewed from the perspective of Moore’s estate as the 
claimant and focuses on how ODOT and Jurgensen bear responsibility for the 
estate’s claim.  Heritage, standing in the shoes of Jurgensen, is not seeking an 
amount that ODOT owes to Jurgensen, but an amount that ODOT would properly 
owe the estate.  This case derives from the estate’s underlying case, and the estate 
thus continues to hold the role of “claimant” under the statute.  Jurgensen remains 
a joint tortfeasor, unaffected by R.C. 2743.02(D). 
{¶ 15} Additionally, the appellate court points out the significance of the 
fact that Jurgensen’s claim is one that could have been brought 
contemporaneously with the claim of the estate: 
{¶ 16} “Had the case been tried in the Court of Claims and had both 
Jurgensen and the state been found liable, each party would have been 
individually liable for their own share and a contribution or indemnity action 
would not have been necessary.  In other words, Jurgensen, or its insurer 
Heritage, would be responsible for only its share and there would be no 
subrogation.” 
{¶ 17} We see no reason that a harshly different result should occur 
simply because the contribution and indemnity action is being tried separately.  
To find for ODOT here would essentially make one tortfeasor’s insurer liable for 
another joint tortfeasor’s part of a judgment.  The state would thus be immune 
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from liability to the extent of the joint tortfeasor’s insurance.  In no way does R.C. 
2743.02(D) require that result. 
{¶ 18} We therefore hold that R.C. 2743.02(D) is not applicable to a joint 
tortfeasor seeking contribution and indemnity from the state.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR 
and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
____________ 
Freund, Freeze & Arnold, Christopher W. Carrigg and Shaun A. Roberts, 
for appellee. 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, Stephen P. 
Carney, Senior Deputy Solicitor, and Velda K. Hofacker Carr, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellant. 
____________________