Title: Ex parte A & B Transport, Inc., and James Allemang. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Henry Graben, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Una J. Graben, deceased v. A & B Transport, Inc., and James Allemang)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 12/28/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1060310
_________________________
Ex parte A & B Transport, Inc., and James Allemang
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Henry Graben, individually and as personal
representative of the estate of Una J. Graben, deceased
v.
A & B Transport, Inc., and James Allemang)
(Calhoun Circuit Court, CV-01-804)
MURDOCK, Justice.
A & B Transport, Inc., a Louisiana corporation, and
James Allemang petition this Court for a writ of mandamus
1060310
The April 2002 order that placed Legion in receivership
1
appointed the insurance commissioner of Pennsylvania as
Legion's "Rehabilitator," and it directed the Rehabilitator
"to take immediate possession of [Legion's] property, business
and affairs ... and to take such action as the nature of this
case and the interests of the policyholders, creditors, or the
public may require."  The order also states, in part: 
"No judgment, order or arbitration award against
Legion or an insured of Legion entered after the
2
directing the Calhoun Circuit Court to vacate its order
granting relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
and to enter an order denying such relief.  We grant the
petition and issue the writ.
In November 1999, a vehicle occupied by Henry Graben and
his wife, Una J. Graben, collided with a tractor-trailer rig
operated by Allemang, an employee of A & B.  Una died as a
result of the collision; Henry was injured.  In November 2000,
Henry, both in his individual capacity and in his capacity as
the personal representative of Una's estate, filed an action
in the Calhoun Circuit Court against A & B and Allemang based
on the alleged wrongful death of Una and his personal
injuries.  
A & B and Allemang were insured by Legion Insurance
Company, which was placed in receivership in Pennsylvania in
April 2002.   In October 2002, on the date scheduled for the
1
1060310
date of filing of the Petition for Rehabilitation
and no judgment, order or arbitration award against
Legion or an insured of Legion entered at any time
by default or collusion need be considered as
evidence of liability or quantum of damages by the
Rehabilitator."
3
trial of Henry's action, Henry, A & B, and Allemang entered
into a settlement agreement on the record.  The transcript of
the settlement-agreement colloquy reflects that a judgment
would be entered against A & B and Allemang for $750,000, but
that "[e]nforcement of the judgment [would] be limited
specifically to the insurance carriers that could have
applicable coverage and/or the guarantee funds that may have
applicable coverage."  The coverage limits under Legion's
insurance policies insuring A & B and Allemang exceeded the
amount of the judgment.  The transcript of the settlement-
agreement colloquy also reflects the following discussion
between Shane Oncale, the attorney representing A & B and
Allemang; Henry's counsel; and the trial court:
"[Shane Oncale]: ...  In addition I will say for
the record that Legion Insurance and their third
party administrator have objected vigorously to any
sort of consent judgment to be entered, but I'm here
and I represent A & B Transport, and A & B Transport
1060310
In Henry's appellate brief, he admits that at the time
2
of the settlement discussions "Legion ... had essentially
withdrawn from providing any meaningful defense for" A & B and
Allemang and that A & B and Allemang "were obviously concerned
about the fact that Legion's ongoing financial problems had
prejudiced the defense of the case."
4
wishes to protect its interests and protect itself
against future exposure on this claim.[ ]
2
"....
"[Henry's counsel]: Judge, just for the record
too, I'd like the record to reflect that it is
[Henry's] understanding that the insurance carrier,
Legion Insurance, who insures all the defendants in
the case and also had the excess coverage, has been
ordered into liquidation according to what has been
represented to us, and they have that, you know, on
appeal, and that is a factor in entering into our
decision in entering into the settlement.
"[Shane Oncale]:  Sure.  Let me make sure this
is clear.  I think there's been a liquidation order
entered that is being challenged and there's a
hearing on that in about three weeks on a stay that
was technically in effect until December 30.  I
don't think it's correct to say it's on appeal.  I
want to make sure that's clear.  It would be the
same as if you entered an order and someone entered
a motion for a new trial, for example.
"THE COURT: But the order is being contested in
some manner?
"[Shane Oncale]: Correct.
"THE COURT: Okay.  All right."
On December 20, 2002, the trial court entered a "Consent
Decree"; that order states:
1060310
5
"The above referenced case came before this
Honorable Court for trial on October 21, 2002.  At
that time, the parties engaged in significant
negotiations that resulted in an agreement that a
compromise judgment of $750,000 be entered in favor
of [Henry] ... and against the defendants [A & B
and Allemang].  As an express condition of this
compromise 
judgment, 
[Henry] 
agreed 
to 
limit
execution and enforcement of the judgment to any and
all applicable policies of insurance and/or any and
all available funds from the applicable Guarantee
[Fund] 
Associations. [Henry] agree[s] to hold
harmless [A & B and Allemang] against any attempts
to collect against their personal or corporate
assets and further release them from any and all
claims associated with the automobile accident in
question.  The defendants make no representation as
to the collectability of the judgment and all risks
associated with the collectability of the judgment
herein entered falls upon [Henry].
"Consistent with the agreement of the parties,
it is, therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
"A.
That [Henry] ... recover the sum of
Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars
($750,000) from the defendants [A & B
and Allemang].
"B.
That the recovery by [Henry] ... be
expressly limited to any and all
insurance proceeds and/or any and all
funds available under any and all
applicable 
Guarantee 
Fund 
Associations
and are expressly prohibited from any
collection attempts against the assets
of [A & B and Allemang]...."
In July 2003, Legion was declared insolvent.  Thereafter,
Henry filed a proof of loss with the Louisiana Insurance
1060310
The materials before us reveal that A & B was a Louisiana
3
corporation; it does not otherwise address the relationship
between Legion and LIGA upon which LIGA's alleged liability is
based. 
6
Guaranty Association ("LIGA"),  which allegedly provided
3
coverage for Henry's claims against Legion.  If Henry's claims
qualified as covered claims, Henry apparently would have been
entitled to $150,000 per claim, or a total of $300,000, less
a small deductible.  LIGA refused to pay Henry's claims.
In June 2004, Henry filed a motion in the trial court to
enforce the consent judgment against LIGA.  In August 2004,
the trial court entered an order stating that the consent
judgment was binding on LIGA and that Henry could "pursue all
remedies available to collect the judgment."  LIGA filed a
motion to quash the August 2004 order, claiming that LIGA was
not a party to Henry's action that had resulted in the consent
judgment, that it was not served with process in connection
with the action, and that it had had no opportunity to be
heard concerning the alleged settlement.  In October 2004, the
trial court entered an order setting aside its August 2004
order, with leave for Henry to serve LIGA with process and
subsequently to request that the court readdress the issue of
LIGA's liability.  
1060310
Section 27-23-1 states:
4
"As to every contract of insurance made between
an insurer and any insured by which such insured is
insured against loss or damage on account of the
bodily injury or death by accident of any person for
which loss or damage such insured is responsible,
whenever a loss occurs on account of a casualty
covered by such contract of insurance, the liability
of the insurer shall become absolute and the payment
of the loss shall not depend upon the satisfaction
by the insured of a final judgment against him for
loss, or damage or death occasioned by the casualty.
No such contract of insurance shall be cancelled or
annulled by any agreement between the insurer and
the insured after the insured has become responsible
for such loss or damage, and any such cancellation
or annulment shall be void."
According to Henry's appellate brief, his "direct action"
against LIGA has been stayed pending this Court's resolution
of the present mandamus petition.
7
On November 16, 2004, Henry apparently filed a separate
action directly against LIGA in the Calhoun Circuit Court.
In June 2006, Henry filed a Rule 60(b)(6), Ala.
R. Civ. P., motion in his action against A & B and Allemang,
seeking relief from the trial court's December 20, 2002,
consent judgment.  Among other things, Henry asserted as
follows in his Rule 60(b)(6) motion:
"5.  On November 16, 2004, [Henry] filed a
Complaint against LIGA, and [A & B and Allemang] in
this suit, under Alabama's direct action statute,
Ala. Code [1975,] § 27-23-1.[ ]  (In the Circuit
4
1060310
Based on the materials before us, it appears that Carey's
5
deposition took place on November 30, 2005.
8
Court of Calhoun County, Alabama, Civil Action
No. 04-1011).
"6.  LIGA has vigorously defended the collateral
suit, raising a number of defenses to enforcement of
the Consent Decree, chief among these the fact that
A & B and Allemang consented to entry of the Consent
Decree without permission of Legion, and therefore
breached the policy at issue.
"7.  In the course of discovery, it has come to
light that between the time the Consent Decree was
read into the record (October 21), and the time it
was actually entered as a judgment (December 20),
Legion officials authorized attorney Shane Oncale to
settle 
this 
cause 
for 
$300,000.00, 
with 
the
provision that [Henry] would have to wait out
Legion's ongoing problems before seeking payment.
According to an e-mail from Oncale, dated Friday,
November 22, 2002:
"'... [I]n order to avoid further
litigation of the issue and to protect
Legion's exposure, Tom [Carey, an insurance
adjuster for Legion,] has authorized a post
judgment settlement in the amount of 300K.'
"8.  At no time between the date of the e-mail
(November 22) and the date the Consent Decree was
entered was [Henry] made aware that Legion was
prepared to settle this case.  In fact, [Henry] did
not become aware of this fact until the deposition
of Legion adjuster Tom Carey, taken in late 2005.[ ]
5
Had [Henry] been aware that Legion offered to
indemnify its insureds in return for entry of a
judgment of $300,000.00, [Henry] would have readily
accepted same, in light of the fact that the
coverage issues which have dogged this case for
years would have evaporated.
1060310
9
"9.  Rule 60(b)(6) allows a party to be relieved
from a judgment more than four (4) months after the
judgment has been entered in cases involving
exceptional circumstances which implicate equitable
grounds for allowing the moving party relief.  Shipe
v. Shipe, 477 So. 2d 430, 432 (Ala. [Civ.] App.
1985) (citation omitted).
"10.  If ever a circumstance cried out for the
steady hand of equity, the present one certainly
qualifies.  Henry Graben lost his wife in a terrible
accident, as well as suffering his own personal
injuries.  Through no fault of his own, his effort
to obtain justice has been stymied by the fact that
the tortfeasors secured liability and umbrella
insurance with the same mediocre company, which
subsequently went belly up.  In an effort to protect
Mr. Graben's chances at any future recovery,
[Henry's] counsel agreed to a Consent Decree which
would at least allow for the opportunity to pursue
relief at a later stage.  However, unbeknownst to
anyone, a month before the Consent Decree was made
final Legion was in fact willing to settle this
claim for a fair and reasonable amount.  The fact
that [Henry] was not aware that Legion was willing
to settle this case on behalf of its insureds was an
incidence of severe prejudice that can only be
corrected by setting aside the Consent Decree and
allowing this case to proceed." 
 
(References to exhibits omitted.) 
A & B and Allemang filed a response to Henry's
Rule 60(b)(6) motion, asserting (1) that Henry's motion was
"not adequately supported," "lack[ed] a factual basis,"
"contain[ed] misstatements of facts," and "[was] not supported
by affidavit or other testimony," and (2) that Henry's motion
1060310
10
was untimely.  In support of the former assertion, A & B and
Allemang noted that Henry had filed no affidavit to support
his assertion that he was not "made aware that Legion was
prepared to settle [the] case" for $300,000.  Also, A & B and
Allemang filed an affidavit from Oncale in which he stated:
"Contrary to the assertions contained in [Henry's] motion,
Legion's offer to modify the $750,000.00 Consent Decree to a
$300,000.00 Consent Decree was offered to [Henry] before the
Consent Decree was entered by the Court."  A & B and Allemang
also filed a document reflecting November 22, 2002, e-mails
between Oncale and representatives from Legion concerning the
$300,000 settlement offer; Oncale's time-entry records, which
reflect that he had settlement discussions with Henry's
attorneys after the October 2002 settlement proceedings and
after Legion discussed the $300,000 settlement offer with him
but before the entry of the consent judgment; and a copy of a
letter dated December 12, 2002, from Oncale to Shane
Gustafson, an employee of Ward North America who apparently
was connected with Legion's settlement of the claim,
concerning the rejection by Henry's attorneys of the $300,000
settlement offer.  
1060310
11
A portion of a November 22, 2002, e-mail transmission
from Oncale to Gustafson states:
"Ok, Tom [Carey] is clear that there is no exposure
to the insureds under the current 750K judgment and
that there may exist valid contractual and legal
defenses that could be raised by Legion against any
collection attempts by [Henry].  Nonetheless, in
order to avoid further litigation of the issue and
to protect Legion's exposure, Tom has authorized a
post judgment settlement in the amount of 300K.
This settlement would benefit [Henry] by removing
Legion's contractual and legal defenses against
collection.  The settlement benefits Legion by
limiting its exposure and by curtailing the need for
further litigation on the contractual and legal
defenses.  The settlement benefits the insured
because it wipes out the outstanding judgment that
would otherwise attach to their credit.  I will
present the offer, take it or leave it, to [Henry]
and try hard to sell it because it obviously is to
everyone's benefit.  I will report when I hear
something."
 
Oncale's time records include the following entry for
December 3, 2002: "Meeting with [Henry's attorneys] to discuss
offer of settlement made by Legion and the benefits to all
parties in the acceptance of such an agreement."  They also
include 
the 
following 
entry 
for 
December 
5, 
2002:
"Correspondence to Mr. Gustafson and Mr. Carey reporting on
rejection of offer by [Henry] and our strategy."  An entry of
December 10, 2002, states: "Correspondence to Mr. Gustafson
1060310
12
regarding rejection of our offer of settlement and contact
with State Farm on underinsured motorist claim."
The December 12, 2002, letter from Oncale to Gustafson
states:
"This letter will confirm that I have now had an
opportunity to meet with [Henry's attorneys]....
Despite my urgings to the contrary, they have
refused to take our settlement offer in the amount
of $300,000.  Instead, they intend to go forward
with the attempted enforcement of the Consent
Judgment entered in the amount of $750,000.
"To this end, I have now also been contacted by
t h e  
a t t o r n e y s  
r e p r e s e n t i n g  
t h e
uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier for Henry.
...  It appears that [Henry] has now made a claim
back against his own insurance carrier for the
anticipated 
shortfall 
between 
the 
$300,000
collectible from the [LIGA] and the $750,000
judgment. ...
"Based on my conversations with [Henry's]
attorneys, it seems likely that they will simply
wait for a liquidation order to be entered rather
than file an appearance ... in the rehabilitation
case seeking to enforce the judgment.  Regardless,
it does not appear that our efforts to resolve this
case by negotiated settlement will be fruitful.
[Henry] will now risk the defenses available to both
Legion and [LIGA] should Legion ultimately go into
liquidation.  Apparently, they do not feel the
defenses are very viable.
"Regardless, [Henry's] rejection of our post-
judgment settlement offer brings our handling of
this case to a conclusion."
1060310
13
Also, in support of their assertion that Henry's motion
was untimely, A & B and Allemang noted that even if Henry did
not learn of the $300,000 settlement offer until Carey's
deposition in late 2005, he nonetheless waited over six months
after he allegedly learned of the $300,000 offer to file his
Rule 60(b) motion.
In October 2006, the trial court entered an order, which
had been prepared by Henry's counsel.  That order states, in
part: 
"[Henry's attorneys] have stated that they have no
recollection of whether Legion's offer to settle for
$300,000 was ever communicated to them.  Attorney
Shane Oncale, who represented A & B and James
Allemang 
in 
the 
initial 
suit, 
has 
presented
circumstantial evidence that he apprised [Henry's]
counsel of Legion's settlement offer, in the form of
correspondence from Oncale to the Legion adjuster,
and time sheets indicating that Oncale met with [one
of Henry's attorneys] at or around this time.
However, Oncale has also informed the Court that he
has no recollection of such a meeting, and there is
no correspondence from Oncale to [Henry's attorneys]
that would confirm same."
The order also notes that Rule 60(b)(6) relief is not
appropriate where the exceptional circumstances warranting
relief are those covered by another part of Rule 60(b), namely
the grounds described in Rule 60(b)(1) through 60(b)(5).  The
1060310
A & B and Allemang did not argue to the trial court that
6
relief under Rule 60(b)(6) was inappropriate because some
other provision of Rule 60(b) applied.  On appeal, they make
14
order concluded that the grounds described in Rule 60(b)(3)
through 60(b)(5) were inapplicable.  It further concluded:
"Rule 60(b)(1) allows a party four months to
seek relief from judgment based on 'mistake,
inadvertence, 
surprise, 
or 
excusable 
neglect.'
Mistake is that prong of 60(b)(1) that could be
applied to this action.  However, under these facts,
the Court finds that there was no mistake that led
to entry of the judgment.  At the time the judgment
was entered, the parties put to paper their
understanding or the terms of the judgment.  Neither
party disputes the same.  Neither party claims that
they 
did 
not 
understand, 
or 
had 
a 
mistaken
understanding as to the terms of the judgment.
Simply put, there was no 'mistake' that caused the
judgment to be entered.  Consequently, 60(b)(1) does
not bar [Henry's] motion.
"Rule 60(b)(2) is the newly discovered evidence
ground for relief which also must be asserted within
four months from the entry of judgment.  Like the
mistake 
exception 
discussed 
above, 
a 
cursory
examination of the facts implicates newly discovered
evidence in the form of the allegedly previously
unknown $300,000.00 settlement offer as the basis of
[Henry's] 
motion. 
 
A 
closer 
reading 
though,
indicates that [Henry] has not asserted discovery of
the $300,000.00 offer as a ground for relief from
the judgment, but as factual evidence related to the
parties understanding of and relation to the events
giving rise to the judgment.  The Court cannot say
that 
[Henry] 
has 
definitively 
argued 
newly
discovered evidence as a sole and independent ground
for 
relief 
from 
the 
judgment. 
 
Therefore,
plaintiff's 
motion 
is 
not 
encompassed 
by
Rule 60(b)(2)."6
1060310
a one-sentence argument, without citing any authority, that
Henry's motion "should have been a Rule 60(b)(2) motion for
newly discovered evidence" if "he did not become aware of the
$300,000 offer until November 30, 2005, at the deposition of
Legion adjuster Tom Carey," and, consequently, that "such
motion must have been made not more than four months after the
proceeding."  We therefore do not address this issue.
15
  
The 
order 
then 
concluded 
that 
the 
facts 
reflected
"'exceptional circumstances' that cast a pall over the
judgment and implicate this Court's power and duty in equity
to see that justice is done."  The order granted Henry's
motion to set aside the consent judgment and required the
court clerk to return the case to the active docket.
Standard of Review
A & B and Allemang seek relief from the October 2006
order by way of the writ of mandamus. 
"'Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ,
to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.'"
Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So. 2d 307, 309-10 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499
(Ala. 1995)).  A petition for the writ of mandamus is a proper
1060310
16
method for attacking the grant of a Rule 60(b) motion.  See
Ex parte Baker, 459 So. 2d 873 (Ala. 1984). 
Rule 60(b) states:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may relieve a party or a party's legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons:  (1) mistake,
inadvertence, 
surprise, 
or 
excusable 
neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment.  The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and
for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than four (4)
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken."   
As this Court stated in Ex parte Baker:
"Without question, a movant must both allege and
prove one of the grounds set forth in Rule 60 in
order to be granted relief under that rule.
Moreover, because Rule 60(b) relief is extraordinary
relief, 
a 
movant 
has 
the 
burden 
of 
proving
extraordinary circumstances and/or extreme hardship
or injustice sufficient to entitle him to relief
under Rule 60(b)(6).  And, while the decision of
whether to grant or deny the motion is within the
sound discretion of the trial judge, that discretion
is not unbridled."
1060310
A more fundamental issue than that discussed in the text
7
would be whether an insurer or an insured has an underlying
duty to a plaintiff to communicate a settlement offer (1) that
the insurer and insured have discussed among themselves and/or
(2) that the insurer or the insured has decided it is willing
to make to the plaintiff.  The petitioners in this case make
no argument to this Court in that regard, however, and our
opinion therefore does not address this issue.   
17
459 So. 2d at 876 (citations omitted); see also Wood v. Wade,
853 So. 2d 909, 913 (Ala. 2002) ("Rule 60(b)(6) is an extreme
remedy and relief under Rule 60(b)(6) will be granted only 'in
unique situations where a party can show exceptional
circumstances sufficient to entitle him to relief.'" (quoting
Nowlin v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 475 So. 2d 469, 471 (Ala.
1985))).  Where the party seeking Rule 60(b)(6) relief fails
to allege and prove the grounds justifying that relief, the
trial court exceeds its discretion by granting the motion.
Ex parte Baker, 459 So. 2d at 876. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence
A & B and Allemang argue that Henry's "motion lacked any
factual support for his contentions regarding the $300,000
offer," and, therefore, that the trial court exceeded its
discretion when it granted Henry's Rule 60(b)(6) motion.   In
7
part, A & B and Allemang note that Henry's 
1060310
18
"attorneys have not provided any affidavits to
support their contention that the offer was not
made, likely because they cannot affirmatively state
the $300,000 offer of judgment was not made; they
simply do not remember one way or another.  Not
remembering if an offer was made is entirely
different than knowing that an offer was not made."
By contrast, A & B and Allemang note that their "attorney does
recall such conversations and has evidentiary support for his
position that the offer was indeed made, including affidavits,
billing records and email correspondence between the parties'
attorneys. [Henry] has made no effort to repudiate this
evidentiary support."
Before discussing A & B and Allemang's argument, we first
note that where there are disputed issues of fact to be
resolved and the trial court has received ore tenus evidence,
the ore tenus rule is applicable to our review of a ruling on
a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. See Shipe v. Shipe, 477 So. 2d 430,
432 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985).  In the present case, however, the
material "facts," as hereinafter discussed, were not in
dispute, and the trial court did not receive ore tenus
evidence.  Thus, the trial court's order setting aside the
consent judgment is subject to de novo review.  Beavers v.
County of Walker, 645 So. 2d 1365, 1373 (Ala. 1994)
1060310
19
("[B]ecause the underlying facts are not disputed and this
appeal focuses on the application of the law to those facts,
there can be no presumption of correctness accorded to the
trial court's ruling, and this Court must review that
application of the law de novo.").  
The materials before us do not reflect that Henry made
any evidentiary submission in support of his Rule 60(b)(6)
motion; they reflect only that his attorneys stated to the
trial court that "they have no recollection of whether
Legion's offer to settle for $300,000 was ever communicated to
them."  A & B and Allemang, by contrast, submitted two
affidavits from Oncale and written materials in support of
their argument that Oncale discussed the $300,000 settlement
with Henry's attorneys before the consent judgment was
entered.  In one affidavit, Oncale stated, in part, that he
remembered 
"vividly having a telephone conference with [Henry's
attorneys] attempting to explain the fact that
Legion was willing to make the $300,000 settlement
offer, but could not pay any money.  [One of
Henry's attorneys] responded by stating, 'Why should
I take a $300,000 judgment when I already have a
$750,000 judgment?'  I responded by saying 'Legion
is certain that you will never be able to collect
more 
than 
the 
$300,000.' 
[Henry's 
attorney]
responded by stating 'my research shows that I can
1060310
Henry ultimately recovered $35,000 in uninsured-motorist
8
insurance proceeds.
20
collect the $300,000 judgment against the Guarantee
Association and still collect underinsured motorist
benefits.'  Within days of this discussion I was in
fact contacted by State Farm inquiring about the
judgment, settlement discussions and the demand made
for payment by [Henry]."8
Henry offered no testimony or other evidence to contradict
Oncale's assertion that this telephone conversation occurred.
Oncale also asserted that the materials submitted with
his affidavits, including, in part, the e-mail correspondence
between him and Gustafson, his billing records, and his
December 12, 2002, letter to Gustafson, supported his
recollection that the $300,000 offer was communicated to
Henry's attorneys.  Oncale stated further that his billing
records reflected that he had a meeting with Henry's attorneys
on December 3, 2002, to discuss the settlement.  It is true
that the October 2006 order by the trial court states that
Oncale informed the court that he had "no recollection of such
a meeting."  It is also true that the materials before us do
not include "correspondence from Oncale to [Henry's attorneys]
that would confirm" that a meeting occurred.  (Emphasis
added.)  Even if Oncale had no recollection as to the
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21
occurrence of a meeting, his billing records and the
December 12, 2002, letter to Gustafson constitute affirmative
evidence that a meeting did occur.  There is no suggestion
that any of the materials A & B and Allemang submitted in
opposition to Henry's motion were falsified or inaccurate. 
Aside from the issue whether a face-to-face meeting
occurred, however, there is nothing in the materials before us
to support the conclusion that Oncale did not properly
remember that he had communicated the $300,000 offer to
Henry's attorneys.  The materials before us contain undisputed
evidence that Oncale did communicate the $300,000 offer to
Henry's attorneys.  
Again, according to the October 2006 order, Henry's
attorneys only "stated that they have no recollection of
whether Legion's offer to settle for $300,000 was ever
communicated to them" –- this is not a denial that Oncale
communicated the offer to them or evidence indicating that
Oncale failed to communicate the offer to them.  In fact,
Henry states in his appellate brief that his attorneys 
"have no recollection of this offer ever being
conveyed to them, but the evidence produced by
petitioners certainly suggests that the offer was
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22
made at some time before the consent decree was
entered as a final judgment. 
"After 
learning 
of 
the 
presence 
of 
the
$300,000.00 offer and not recalling the fact that
the offer had ever been brought to their attention,
counsel for [Henry] filed a Rule 60(b)(6) Motion for
Relief from Judgment, arguing that equity demanded
that the consent decree be set aside so that the
parties could start fresh."
(Henry's brief pp. 6-7.)  Henry's appellate brief further
states: "[I]n light of defendants' evidentiary showing,
[Henry] concede[s] that it is more likely than not that [his
attorneys] did have knowledge of the offer before the consent
decree was entered."  (Henry's brief p. 13 at n.9.)  
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Henry failed to
meet his "burden of proving extraordinary circumstances and/or
extreme hardship or injustice sufficient to entitle him to
relief under Rule 60(b)(6)."  Ex parte Baker, 459 So. 2d at
876.  All Henry proved, if anything, was that his attorneys
could not recall whether they received notice of the $300,000
settlement offer.  Absent evidence that would support a
finding that Henry did not receive the offer, he could not
prove that he would be entitled to relief pursuant to
Rule 60(b)(6) (assuming, without deciding, that such relief
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23
would be proper if the $300,000 offer was not communicated to
Henry’s attorneys).  See note 7, supra.
Finally, Henry argues in his appellate brief that, even
if the $300,000 offer was communicated to his attorneys, he
should still be entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6)
because "the parties were in a difficult situation" concerning
settlement 
in 
light 
of the rehabilitation proceedings
regarding Legion.  In other words, Henry argues that he should
be allowed to set aside the $750,000 settlement offer he
accepted because of the difficult financial circumstance
confronting the parties in 2002 and because he has been unable
to enforce that settlement so as to obtain the monetary result
he desired (apparently being under the impression that LIGA
will then make some more definite and acceptable settlement
offer).  It is well settled, however, that "'Rule 60(b)(6)
[cannot] be used "for the purpose of relieving a party from
the free, calculated, and deliberate choices he has made."'"
See Ex parte Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 So. 2d 279, 285 (Ala.
1998) (quoting Chambers County Comm'rs v. Walker, 459 So. 2d
861, 866 (Ala. 1984), quoting in turn 11 C. Wright &
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A & B and Allemang also contend that the trial court
9
should have denied Henry's Rule 60(b)(6) motion (1) because it
was untimely filed and (2) because of the application of the
doctrine of laches.  Because of our disposition of this
petition as discussed above, we pretermit any discussion of
these additional grounds. 
24
A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2864, at 214-15
(1973)).  
9
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, A & B and Allemang's petition
for the writ of mandamus is due to be and is hereby granted.
The trial court is directed to vacate its order granting
Henry's Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion and to enter an
order denying the motion.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and Parker,
JJ., concur.  
Cobb, C.J., concurs in the result.