Title: In Re: Tyler D., Alexander A., and Nevaeh D.

State: west-virginia

Issuer: West Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA January 2003 Term FILED RELEASED February 19, 2003 __________ February 20, 2003 RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA No. 30908 SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA __________ IN RE: TYLER D., ALEXANDER A., AND NEVAEH D. __________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Circuit Court of Mineral County Honorable Andrew N. Frye, Judge Civil Action Nos. 01-JA-23, 01-JA-24 and 01-JA-25 REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS __________________________________________________________________ Submitted: January 14, 2003 Filed: February 19, 2003 Darrell V. McGraw, Esq. Attorney General Charleston, West Virginia and C. Carter Williams, Esq. Assistant Attorney General Petersburg, West Virginia Attorneys for WVDH&HR William R. Kuykendall, Esq. Keyser, West Virginia Guardian ad Litem Max H. White, Esq. Keyser, West Virginia Attorney for Amanda D. The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. “Parental rights may be terminated where there is clear and convincing evidencethattheinfantchildhassuffered extensive physical abuse while in the custody of his or her parents, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse can be substantially corrected because the perpetrator oftheabusehasnotbeenidentifiedand the parents, even in the face of knowledge of the abuse, have taken no action to identify the abuser.” Syllabus Point 3, In re Jeffrey R.L., 190 W.Va. 24, 435 S.E.2d 162 (1993). 2. “‘W.Va.Code, 49-1-3(a) (1984), in part, defines an abused child to includeonewhoseparentknowingly allows another person to commit the abuse. Under this standard,terminationofparental rights is usually upheld only where the parent takes no action inthefaceofknowledgeoftheabuseoractuallyaidsorprotects the abusing parent.’ Syl. Pt. 3, In re Betty J.W., 179 W.Va. 605, 371 S.E.2d 326 (1988).” Syllabus Point 3, West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources ex rel. Wright v. Doris S., 197 W.Va. 489, 475 S.E.2d 865 (1996). 3. “‘Termination of parental rights of a parent of an abused child is authorizedunderW.Va.Code,49-6-1to 49-6-10, as amended, where such parent contends nonparticipation in the acts giving rise to the termination petition but there is clear and convincing evidence that such nonparticipating parent knowingly took no action to prevent or stopsuchactstoprotectthechild. Furthermore, termination of parental rights of a parent of anabusedchildisauthorizedunderW.Va.Code, 49-6-1 to 49-6-10, as amended, where such i nonparticipating parent supports the other parent's version as to how a child's injuries occurred, butthereisclearandconvincingevidencethatsuchversionis inconsistent with the medical evidence.’ Syl.Pt.2,InreScottieD., 185W.Va.191,406S.E.2d214 (1991).” Syllabus Point 5, West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources ex rel. Wright v. Doris S., 197 W.Va. 489, 475 S.E.2d 865 (1996). 4. “‘Termination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the statutoryprovisioncoveringthedispositionofneglectedchildren,W.Va.Code,49-6-5 [1977] maybeemployedwithout the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found thatthereisnoreasonablelikelihoodunder W.Va.Code, 49-6-5(b) [1977] that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.’ Syllabus Point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980).” Syllabus Point 4, In the Matter of Jonathan P., 182W.Va.302, 387 S.E.2d 537 (1989). 5. “Although parents have substantial rights that must be protected, the primary goal in cases involving abuse and neglect,asinallfamilylawmatters,mustbe the health and welfare of the children.” Syllabus Point 3,InreKatieS., 198S.E.2d79,479 S.E.2d 589 (1996). 6. “Whenparentalrightsareterminatedduetoneglect or abuse, the circuit court may nevertheless in appropriate cases consider whether continued visitation or other contact with the abusing parent is in the best interest of the child. Among other things, the circuitcourtshouldconsiderwhetheracloseemotionalbondhasbeenestablishedbetween parent and child and the child'swishes,ifheor she is of appropriate maturity to make such ii request. The evidence must indicate that such visitation or continued contact would not be detrimentaltothechild'swellbeingandwouldbein the child's best interest.” Syllabus Point 5, In re Christina L., 194 W.Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995). 7. “Thereisaclearlegislative directive that guardians ad litem and counsel forbothsidesbegivenanopportunitytoadvocate for their clients in child abuse or neglect proceedings. West Virginia Code § 49-6-5(a) (1995) states that the circuit court shall give both the petitioner and respondents an opportunity to be heard when proceeding to the dispositionofthecase. This right must be understood to mean that the circuit court may not imposeunreasonablelimitationsuponthefunctionofguardians ad litem in representing their clientsinaccordwiththetraditionsoftheadversarialfact-findingprocess.” Syllabus Point 3, State ex rel. Amy M. v. Kaufman, 196 W.Va. 251, 470 S.E.2d 205 (1996). iii Per Curiam: ThisabuseandneglectcaseisbeforethisCourt upon appeal of a final order of theCircuitCourtofMineralCountyentered on July 1, 2002. Pursuant to that order, the abuse andneglectpetition brought against the appellee and respondentbelow,AmandaD.,1with regardtoherthreechildren, Tyler D., Alexander A., and Nevaeh D., was dismissed, and custody of the children was returned to Amanda D.2 In this appeal, the appellants, the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (hereinafter “DHHR”) and the children’s guardian ad litem, contend that the circuit courterredbydismissingtheabuseandneglect petition and returning custody of the children to Amanda D. They further assert that the circuit court erred by not terminating Amanda D.’s parental rights. After carefully reviewing the petition for appeal, the entire record, and the briefsandargumentofcounsel,weagreewiththeappellants. Thus, for the reasons set forth below,the final orderofthecircuitcourtisreversed,andthiscaseisremandedtothe circuit court with directions as set forth herein. 1Wefollowourtraditionalpractice in cases involving sensitive facts and use initials to identify the parties rather than their full names. See In the Matter of Jonathan P., 182 W.Va. 302, 303 n.1, 387 S.E.2d 537, 538 n.1 (1989). 2Asdiscussedherein, Thomas L., the biological father of Tyler D., and Joseph A.,thebiologicalfatherofAlexanderA.andNevaehD., were also named as respondents, but thepetitioncontainednoallegationsthateither one abused or neglected the children. Thomas L. and Joseph A. are not parties in this appeal. 1 I. FACTS In October 2000, the DHHR began receiving reports of physical abuse and neglectofTylerD.,bornon October 2,1997,andAlexanderA.,bornonMay15,1999. The children were in the physical custody of their mother, Amanda D., who at that time was allegedlylivingwithherboyfriend,JeffW. On January 26, 2001, Amanda D. gave birth to a third child, Nevaeh D. InFebruary2001,theDHHRreceivedanother referral regarding the children containingallegationsof neglect and lack ofsupervision. In particular, it was reported that whileAmandaD.was sleeping, Tyler D. dropped a box of cereal on a gas stove burner which had been left on forheatingpurposesandafireensued. It was also reported that Jeff W. had a tendency to act aggressively toward the children. InMarch2001,anotherreferralindicated that the children were inadequately clothed,had poor housing, and lacked supervision. A month later, it was reported that Tyler D. had a burn mark on hisarmfromacigarette,scratchesonhisstomach,abruisedeye,and a burn on his buttocks. When asked about his eye, Tyler D. said that Jeff W. had hurt him. Following another referral just a few weeks later, Tyler D. stated that Jeff W. had hit him again. This time, Tyler D. had a bruise over his left eye. 2 The DHHR investigated and substantiated these referrals. In April 2001, the DHHR referred Amanda D. to Action Youth Care (hereinafter “AYC”) for services. A referral to a speech therapist was also made for Tyler D. Amanda D. did not keep the initial appointmentsmadeforherwithAYC,butwheninformedbyDHHRthatherattendance was mandatory, she attended a June 5, 2001 meeting. At that meeting, Amanda D. reported that Jeff W.nolongerlivedwithher. However, it was later determined that this information was not true. Additional referrals were made to the DHHR on June 12 and 14, 2001. On June 21, 2001, the DHHR went to the family’s residence to complete its investigation. At that time, TylerD.hadasmallopenburnor blister injury. He indicated that Jeff W. had burned him with alight. Amanda D. maintained that a lamp fell on Tyler causing the burn. Tyler also stated that JeffW.threwhimonthe floor and against the walls. Amanda D. initially claimed that Jeff W. nolongerlivedwithherandthechildren,butlateradmittedthathe stayed thereforthemost part. WhentheDHHRarrivedat the home on June 21, 2001, all three children were dirty with hair stuck to their necks and smelled of a strong odor. In addition, there was an odor ofurineintheboys’bedrooms. Amanda D. was unable to produce immunization records for thechildrenandwas unsure when Nevaeh D., who appeared to be sick, had last been to a doctor. 3 At the same time, the DHHR learned that an AYC worker had recently observed Jeff W. take Tyler D. to the back of the trailer to the shower after he soiled his pants. The childcould be heard crying. After checking on Tyler D., Amanda D. reported that Jeff W. had placed Tyler D. in a cold shower. She said she turned on warm water for him. Basedonalltheabove,the DHHR sought emergency custody of the children on June 21, 2001. On June 27, 2001, the DHHR filed a lengthy abuse and neglect petition naming Amanda D. as a respondent. Tyler D.’s father, Thomas L., was also named as a respondent along with JosephA.,thefather of Alexander A. and Nevaeh D. However, the petitioncontained no allegations against Thomas L. or Joseph A. At the preliminary hearing, Jeff W. was also named as a respondent. After they were removed from the home, the children were examined by a pediatrician. Tyler D. was also examined by an ophthalmologist because of his eye injury. It wasdetermined that Tyler D. had sustained a blood clot in his left eye which was likely caused by blunt trauma. Subsequently, Tyler D. underwent surgery to have the blood clot removed from his eye.3 3Documents filed in this appeal indicate that Tyler D. is now blind in his left eye. 4 During the adjudicatory hearing on August 17, 2001, Amanda D. stipulated to variousallegationsofneglectcontainedinthepetition. She requested and was granted a post­ adjudicatory improvement period. The court took no action with regard to Jeff W. although hewasnotedonthecomprehensivetreatmentplan. Upon receipt of a favorable home study, the circuit court placed Tyler D. in the custody of his father,Thomas L., who was living in Kentucky. The other two children remained in foster care. Soon after he began living with this father, Tyler D. started counseling with Hank Mayfield, a licensed psychotherapist. Amanda D. was granted extended visitation with Tyler D. The visits were to take place in Maryland at the home of David D., Tyler D.’s maternal grandfather. After one of his weekend visits at David D.’s home, Tyler D. disclosed to Mr. Mayfield that he had been sexually abused by his grandfather. Mr. Mayfield reported this disclosure to the authorities and visitation in David D.’s home was stopped immediately. As the case progressed, Jeff W. reported that he no longer had a relationship with Amanda D. and was not living with her and the children. He filed a motion seeking to be dismissed from the case. The motion was granted on March 19, 2002, based on Jeff W.’s representations that he had ended his relationship with Amanda D. and her children. Subsequently, the DHHR requested a disposition hearing. The DHHR recommended that Amanda D.’s parental rights be terminated. The children’s case plan prepared by the DHHR stated: 5 Although stipulations were presented at the August 17, 2001adjudicatory hearing, almost three months later Cindy Hay [Amanda D.’s counselor] wrote that Amanda would like to know what she did that was neglectful. Two states, Maryland and Kentucky, have both found that Tyler was sexually abused by Amanda’sfatherDavid[D.]. In order for Amanda to remedy the problemofabuseand/orneglect,shemust first acknowledge that abuse and/or neglect has occurred. Amanda has not done this. In theabsenceofrecognitionby Amanda that abuse and/or neglect hasoccurred,the children remain at risk and it would be unsafe to returnthechildrentotheirmother. For the above-stated reasons, the[DHHR]recommendsthatthe parental rights of Amanda . . . [D.] to [her children] be terminated. The disposition hearing was held over the course oftwodays. Mr. Mayfield testified regarding the sexual abuse Tyler D. reported. He indicated that once the visitations inDavidD.’shouseweresuspended,Tyler’sinteractions with his peers and females improved “ahundred percent.” Sarah W., a cousin of Amanda D., testified that Amanda D. asked her to lieabout Thomas L. by testifying that she was his mistress and that he had tried to run over her with a van. She stated that Amanda D. had also instructed her to file false criminal charges against Thomas L. 4 Sarah W. further indicated that Jeff W. was still a part of Amanda D.’s life andthatshehadseenhimhitTylerD.ononeoccasioninthepresence of Amanda D. Margaret Brown, a service coordinator for the West Virginia Birth to Three Program also testified. She hadassessedAlexA.’slackofspeechdevelopment. Ms. Brown testified that Alex A.’s delays werenotcausedbyageneticdisorder,but instead were attributable to risk factors. Finally, 4Sarah W. stated that Amanda D. was able to force her to tell these lies about Thomas L. because Amanda D. was the payee on her social security checks. 6 child protective service workers from Maryland and Kentucky testified with regard to the sexual abuse reported by Tyler D. They, like Mr. Mayfield, testified that Tyler’s reports of sexual abuse by his grandfather were credible. Atthecloseoftheevidence,thecourtfoundthat there was no evidence to show thatAmandaD.hadnotcompliedwiththeimprovement period, nor was there any evidence to show why it was not in the best interests of the children to be returned to their mother. Consequently,thecourtdismissed the abuse and neglect petition and ordered the children to be returned to their mother’s custody. The final order was entered on July 1, 2002, and this appeal followed. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW In Syllabus Point 1 of In the Interest of: Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996), this Court set forth the standard of review for abuse and neglect cases: Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de novo review,whenanaction,suchas an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether suchchildisabusedorneglected. These findings shall not be set asideby a reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearlyerroneouswhen,althoughthereisevidence to support the finding,thereviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the 7 definiteandfirmconvictionthatamistakehasbeen committed. However,areviewingcourtmaynotoverturn a finding simply because it would have decidedthecasedifferently,and it must affirm a finding if the circuit court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety. With this standard in mind, we now consider whether the circuit court erred in this case. III. DISCUSSION A. Jurisdiction Attheoutset,wemustaddress this Court’s jurisdiction in thiscase. Pursuant toW.Va.Code§58-5-1(1998),“[a]partytoacivilactionmayappealtothesupreme court of appeals from a final judgment of any circuit court[.]” As noted above, the DHHR and the guardian ad litem are appealing from a final circuit court order, and thus, this Court has appellate jurisdiction in this case. However, shortly after the circuit court entered its July 1, 2002 final order, Amanda D. moved to Maryland with the children. Consequently, in this appeal,Amanda D. has asserted that this Court no longer has jurisdiction because she and her children are not presently residents of this State. In addition, this Court was advised on January 13,2003,bytheguardianadliteminthiscase,thatTylerD.,Alexander A., and Nevaeh D. are nowinthelegalcustodyoftheAlleghenyCountyDepartment of Social Services of the State 8 ofMarylandbasedon alleged abuse and neglect of the children by Amanda D. Thus, the initial issue we must resolve is whether this Court should render an opinion in this case. When more than one state becomes involved in determining the custody of a child,theUniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, codified at W.Va. Code §§ 48-20-101 to -404 (2001) (hereinafter “UCCJA”), applies along with the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994) (hereinafter “PKPA”). In West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources ex rel. Hisman v. Angela D., 203 W.Va. 335, 342, 507 S.E.2d 698, 705 (1998), this Court recognized that the definition of “custody proceeding”withintheUCCJA expressly includes abuse and neglect proceedings. This Court furtherdeterminedthat“‘thePKPA is applicable to all interstate custody proceedings affecting a prior custody award by a different State, including [abuse,] neglect and dependency proceedings.’” Id., quoting In re Van Kooten, 126 N.C.App. 764, 769, 487 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1997). Pursuant to W.Va. Code § 48-20-206(a) ( 2001): (a) Except as otherwise provided in section 20-204 [§ 48-20- 204],5acourt of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under this article if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding,aproceedingconcerningthecustody of the child has 5W.Va.Code§48-20-204(2001) addresses temporary emergency jurisdiction whereachildispresentinthisstate and has been abandoned or is subjected or threatened with mistreatment or abuse. 9 been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this chapter, unless the proceeding has been terminatedorisstayed by the court of the other state because a court of this state is a more convenient forum under 20-207 [§ 48-20-207].6 (Footnotes added). However, in Syllabus Point 6 of Angela D., this Court explained that: “Notwithstanding their intent to require states adopting the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act to recognize custody decreesenteredbysisterstates, the Act's drafters in no uncertain termsprovidedjurisdictionto boththeoriginal‘custodycourt’ andothercourtstodetermine whether modification of the initial custody decree is in the best interest of the child.” Syl. Pt. 2,In re Brandon L.E., 183 W.Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515 (1990). In this case, we believe the best interests of the children require this Court to address the merits of this appeal. Given the errors made by the circuit court in this case, we feelthatwewould be remiss if we didnotdoso. With that said, this Court recognizes that at this juncture there appears to be litigation involving these children currently ongoing in Maryland. Therefore, this Court has determined that upon remand, and pursuant to the provisions oftheUCCJA,thecircuitcourtshouldimmediatelycontacttheCircuitCourt of Allegheny County, Maryland. Based on documents filed with this Court, the Maryland Court appearstobeconductingproceedingsconcerningcustody of these children. The Maryland Court needs to be aware of the proceedings that have occurred in West Virginia and this Court’sdecisionassetforthherein. In this fashion, the Circuit Court of Mineral County, West 6This Court is unaware of any stay of the proceedings in Maryland. 10 Virginia,andtheCircuit Court of Allegheny County, Maryland, can determine the appropriate forumforaddressingthefutureofthesechildrenconsistent with the laws of this State and the laws of the State of Maryland. While it now appears that Maryland is presently the proper forum, in the event that Maryland defers jurisdiction to this State, the circuit court should proceed to enter an order terminating Amanda D.’s parental rights, develop a permanency plan forthechildren,anddeterminewhetherAmandaD.should be afforded continued visitation with her children as set forth below. B. Findings of Abuse and Neglect Havingresolvedthejurisdictionissue,wenowturnto the assignments of error raised by the DHHR and the guardian ad litem. They first contend that the circuit court’s findings and conclusions were contrary to the evidence. In the final order, the circuit court stated: 6. The State of West Virginia has failed to show by clear and convincingevidence that the minor children were abused and/or neglected. 7. The State has also failed to show why placing T.D., A.A., and N.D. under the custody of Amanda [D.] was not in the best interests of the children. . . . 9. Allegations in petition to support termination of Amanda [D.’s] parental rights are unsubstantiated and unfounded. 10. The minor children herein were not abused and/or neglected by Respondent Amanda [D.] 11 The DHHR and the guardian ad litem firmly assert that the court’s finding that there was no evidencethatthechildrenwereabusedandneglectedis clearly erroneous given the stipulations made by Amanda D. during the adjudicatory hearing in this case. We agree. On August 17, 2001, Amanda D. signed a document stipulating to the allegations oflackofsupervision, poor living conditions, and not paying enough attention to the children. Shefurtherstipulatedthattherewereoccasionswhenthechildrenwereuncleanand had an odor due tohavingnowaterinthehomeandthatTylerD.’s clothing was too small for him. Basedonthesestipulations,thecircuitcourtenteredan order on September 10, 2001, finding thatAmandaD.neglectedTyler D., Alexander A., and Nevaeh D. However, the court’s final order entered on July 1, 2002, states that there was no evidence that the children were neglected. The court clearly erred in that regard. Inaddition,webelievethatthecircuitcourterredbyfindingthattherewas no evidence that the children had been abused. Contrary to the findings of the circuit court, there wasclearandconvincingevidencethatTylerD. was physically abused. Specifically, there was evidence that Tyler D. was hit in the faceandasaresult,sufferedabloodclot in his left eye which required surgery. Tyler D.’s physician indicated that Tyler’s eye injury was caused by “blunttrauma.” Tyler D. also reported that Jeff W. had burned him with a light and threw him on the floor. 12 Furthermore, there was clear and convincing evidence that Tyler D. was sexually abused. While there was no physical evidence, three witnesses testified that Tyler D’s reports of sexual abuse were credible. In particular, Mr. Mayfield, Tyler’s psychotherapist, testified that he believed that Tyler was telling the truth about being sexually abused based upon the language he used,the consistencyinhisstatements,andthedetailsheprovided. Likewise, BeverlyGreen,achildprotectiveservices investigator with the Allegheny County Department ofSocialServicesinMaryland,testifiedthattheconsistencyinTyler’s statements about the sexual abuse indicated that he was being truthful. Finally, Glenda Razo, a case manager for childabuseandneglect in Fort Knox,Kentucky, testifiedthatTyler’sallegationsofsexual abuse were credible. All three witnesses indicated that they have considerable experience in dealing with sexually abused children. This evidence cannot simply be ignored. Although there was no evidence that Alexander A. and Nevaeh D. were physically or sexually abused, they must be considered abused children because they resided in the home where the abuse of Tyler D. occurred. As this Court explained in Syllabus Point 2 ofIn re Christina L.,194 W.Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995): Where there is clear and convincing evidence that a child has sufferedphysicaland/orsexualabusewhileinthecustody of his orherparent(s),guardian,orcustodian,another child residing in thehomewhentheabusetookplacewhoisnot a direct victim of thephysicaland/orsexual abusebutisatriskofbeingabusedis an abused child under W.Va.Code, 49-1-3(a) (1994). 13 Thus,givenalloftheabove,wefindthatthecircuitcourterredbyconcludingthattherewas no clear and convincing evidence that these children were abused and neglected. C. Termination of Parental Rights TheDHHRand the guardian ad litem further contend that the circuit court erred by not terminating Amanda D.’s parental rights. The DHHR and the guardian ad litem acknowledge that there were no allegations that AmandaD.directlyabused or injured her children. However, they assert that the evidentiary record establishes a classic case of failure toprotect by a parent. In other words, they contend that Amanda D.’s refusal to acknowledge thatTylerD.wasphysicallyandsexuallyabusedputshimandhissiblingsatriskforfurther abuse, and thus, warrants the termination of Amanda D.’s parental rights. In Syllabus Point 3 of In re Jeffrey R.L.,190 W.Va.24, 435 S.E.2d 162 (1993), this Court held that: Parental rights may be terminated where there is clear and convincingevidencethatthe infant child has suffered extensive physical abuse while in the custody of his or her parents, and thereisnoreasonablelikelihoodthatthe conditions of abuse can be substantially corrected because the perpetrator of the abuse has not been identified and the parents, even in the face of knowledge of the abuse, have taken no action to identify the abuser. 14 As this Court explained in Syllabus Point 3 of West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources ex rel. Wright v. Doris S., 197 W.Va. 489, 475 S.E.2d 865 (1996): “W.Va.Code,49-1-3(a)(1984), in part, defines an abused child to include one whose parent knowingly allows another person to commit the abuse. Under this standard, termination of parental rightsisusuallyupheldonlywheretheparenttakesnoactionin the face of knowledge of the abuse or actually aids or protects the abusing parent.” Syl. Pt. 3,In re BettyJ.W., 179 W.Va.605,371 S.E.2d 326 (1988). Moreover, “Terminationofparentalrights ofaparentofanabusedchildis authorized under W.Va.Code, 49-6-1 to 49-6-10, as amended, wheresuchparentcontendsnonparticipationinthe acts giving risetotheterminationpetitionbutthereisclearandconvincing evidence that such nonparticipating parent knowingly took no action to prevent or stop such acts to protect the child. Furthermore, termination of parental rights of a parent of an abusedchildisauthorizedunderW.Va.Code, 49-6-1 to 49-6-10, as amended, where such nonparticipating parent supports the other parent's version as to how a child's injuries occurred, but there is clear and convincing evidence that such version is inconsistent with the medical evidence.” Syl. Pt. 2, In re Scottie D., 185 W.Va. 191, 406 S.E.2d 214 (1991). Syllabus Point 5, Doris S. Inthiscase,AmandaD.hascontinuouslyandpersistently denied that Tyler was physically and sexually abused. When speaking with her case workers, Amanda D. was adamant inherdenialsofabuseofTylerD.bothbyherfather and her boyfriend. She also denied that sheneglectedthechildrenafterearlierstipulatingtothatfact. During the disposition hearing, Amanda D. was asked whether she believed that her father, David D., had sexually abused Tyler. 15 Shereplied, “Let’s not say that I do and I do not, I guess anything is possible.” Amanda D. then said, “I’ve never had any concerns about not letting them [my children] around my father.” AmandaD.wasalso questioned about the allegation that Jeff W. had physically abused her children. She testified as follows: Q. Do you believe that Jeff [W.] was ever physically abusive to your children? A. No. I do not, -- Q. Was he ever physically abusive to you? A. No. Q. Okay, are you aware, from Doctor [sic] Mayfield’s testimony, that Tyler has said that Mr. [W.] was abusive to him? A. I believe that its [sic] possible, and, it could have happened, but I’ve never witnessed it. WhileAmandaD.testifiedatthedisposition hearing that she no longer had a relationship with Jeff W., she had previously made the same statement to her case workers, but then later admittedthatJeffW.stilllivedwithher. At one point, Amanda D. asked Sarah W. to pose as JeffW.’sgirlfriendatamultidisciplinary treatmentteammeeting in an effort to convince the DHHRthatshenolonger had a relationship with Jeff W. At the disposition hearing, Sarah W. testified that she had seen Amanda D. with Jeff W. during the week before the disposition hearing.7 Amanda D.’s false testimony and her solicitation of perjured testimony, as well as her recruitment of Sarah W. in the scheme to mislead and defraud the court regarding her relationshipwithJeffW.isinandofitselfcompelling evidenceofabuseandneglect. It was 7Duringthisappeal,this Court was advised by the parties that Amanda D. married Jeff W. two weeks after the circuit court entered its final order in this case. 16 acontemptibleschemedesigned to obstruct and obfuscate so as to allow continued exposure of her vulnerable, helpless children to serious physical abuse at the hands of Jeff W. Having reviewed the entire record, it is obvious to this Court that Amanda D. has neveracknowledged that her children were physically and sexually abused. Although Amanda D.participatedintheimprovementperiod granted to her following the adjudicatory hearing, shecontinuedtodisbelieveherson’sreportsofphysicalabusebyJeff W. and sexual abuse by DavidD. Furthermore, despite the stipulations she made at the adjudicatory hearing, Amanda D.neveracknowledged thatsheneglectedherchildren. Three months after she made those stipulations she was asking her counselor “what she did that was neglectful.” In Doris S., supra, 197 W.Va. at 498, 475 S.E.2d at 874, this Court explained that: [I]n order to remedy the abuse and/or neglect problem, the problem must first be acknowledged. Failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem, i.e., the truth of the basic allegation pertaining to the alleged abuse and neglect or the perpetrator of saidabuseandneglect, results in making the problem untreatable andinmakinganimprovement period an exercise in futility at the child’s expense. GivenAmandaD.’srefusaltoacknowledge that her children have been abused and neglected, webelievethatthereisnoreasonablelikelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected. In Syllabus Point 4 of In the Matter of Jonathan P., 182 W.Va. 302, 387 S.E.2d 537 (1989), this Court held that: 17 “Terminationofparentalrights,themostdrasticremedy under the statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, W.Va.Code, 49-6-5 [1977] may be employed without theuseofintervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under W.Va. Code, 49-6-5(b) [1977] that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.” Syllabus Point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980). “Althoughparentshavesubstantialrights that must be protected, the primary goalincasesinvolvingabuseandneglect,asinallfamilylawmatters,mustbethehealth and welfare of the children.” Syllabus Point 3, In re Katie S., 198 S.E.2d 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996). If we were to affirm the circuit court’s decision in this case, the health and welfare ofTylerD.,AlexanderA.,andNevaehD.would be inseriousjeopardy. Amanda D. has not demonstrated any ability or even willingness to protect her children from further abuse. Furthermore, her ability to correct the conditions of neglect in which the children were found isclearlyinserious doubt. This is especially true considering the facts that have come to light since the circuit court entered its final order. Notwithstanding this Court’s findings in this opinion, to be absolutely fair to the trialjudge,giventheevidenceavailableatthetimeofthe disposition hearing, the court’s initial effortstoreunitethesechildrenwithAmandaD.werereasonable and fair. There is certainly a strong impetus in our law to keep families together if at all possible. At the time the trial judgereturnedthechildrentoAmandaD.,hecouldnothaveanticipatedthatTyler D. would 18 losesightinhiseye,norcouldhehaveknownthat Amanda D. would marry Jeff W. In fact, AmandaD.hadindicatedthatshenolongerhadarelationshipwithJeffW.,andhehadbeen dismissedfrom the case based on his representations that he had ended his relationship with Amanda D. and her children. Moreover, Amanda D. did satisfy the requirements of her improvement period. Simply put, the trial judge was faced with a difficult set of facts at the conclusion of the evidence in the disposition hearing. Nevertheless, we are compelled to reversethefinalorderofthecircuitcourtandremand this case with instructions to enter an order terminating the parental rights of Amanda D. Uponremand,the circuit court is further instructed to enter a permanency plan forthechildren. Based upon the record, it appears to this Court that the appropriate placement forTylerD.iswithhisfather,ThomasL. Unfortunately, the record is unclear with regard to theappropriateplacementforAlexanderA.andNevaeh D. While the case was pending below, therewasaneffortmadetodeterminewhetherAlexanderandNevaehcouldbeplacedwith their paternal grandmother, Connie A. At Connie A.’s request, her home study was never completed,andthechildrenremainedinfostercare. Upon remand, the circuit court should explore the possibility of placing Alexander A. and Nevaeh D. with Connie A.8 8Documents filed in this appeal state that after the children were removed from their mother’s custody in Maryland, the Allegheny Department of Social Services recommended that Alexander A. and Nevaeh D. be placed in the custody of Connie A. and that Tyler D. be placed in the custody of his father, Thomas L. 19 Finally, the court should also consider whether it is in the children’s best interests to have continued visitation with their mother. This Court has held that: Whenparentalrightsareterminated due to neglect or abuse, the circuit court may nevertheless in appropriate cases consider whether continued visitation or other contact with the abusing parentisinthebestinterest of the child. Among other things, the circuitcourtshould consider whether a close emotional bond has beenestablishedbetweenparent and child and the child's wishes, ifheorsheisofappropriatematurityto make such request. The evidencemust indicate that such visitation or continued contact would not be detrimental to the child's well being and would be in the child's best intere Syllabus Point 5, Christina L., supra. Although there was some testimony during the disposition hearing suggesting that it would not be in the children’s best interests to have continued contact with their mother, we do not believe that this evidence was fully developed. Accordingly, upon remand, the circuit court should hear argument from all parties on this issue, and take additional evidence if necessary, before determining whether continued visitation or other contact with Amanda D. is in the best interests of the children. D. Excluded Testimony While we have already determined that the final order in this case must be reversed, we, nonetheless, are compelled to address one final assignment of error raised by theDHHRandtheguardianadlitem. The alleged error concerns the circuit court’s refusal to allowCathyVibostak,the child protectiveservicesworkerwhofiledtheabuseandneglect petitioninthiscase,totestifyduringthedispositionhearing. The transcript of the disposition proceedingsshowsthat theState,onbehalfoftheDHHR,attemptedtocallMs.Vibostakto 20 testify during the second day of the hearing. The State had indicated to the court earlier that it had rested its case except for presenting thetestimonyofGlendaRazowho was going to testifybyphone from Fort Knox, Kentucky. While waiting for Ms. Razo to become available, theStateattemptedtocallMs.Vibostaktotestify. Although Ms. Vibostak had been listed as apotentialwitnessfortheState,thecourtrefusedtoallowhertotestify because the State had resteditscaseexceptforMs.Razo’s testimony. Thereafter, the guardian ad litem attempted to call Ms. Vibostak to testify. Counsel on behalf of Amanda D. objected, stating that the guardian ad litem had failed to provide a witness list. The circuit court sustained the objection and Ms. Vibostak was not permitted to testify. Pursuant to Rule 30 of the Rules for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, the parties must providealistofwitnessesatleastfivedayspriorto the disposition hearing.9 It appears that the guardian did not do so in this case. However, this Court has long since held thatthebestinterestsofthechildrenareparamountin abuse and neglect cases. To that end, 9Rule30oftheRulesofProcedureforChild Abuse and Neglect Proceedings states: Atleastfive (5) judicial dayspriortothedispositionhearing,eachpartyshall provide the other parties, persons entitled to notice and the opportunity to be heard, and the court a list of possible witnesses, with a brief summary of the testimonytobepresentedatthedispositionhearing,and a listofissuesoflaw andfact.Parties shall have a continuing obligation to update information until the time of the disposition hearing. 21 thechildrenareentitledtoeffectiverepresentationthroughaguardianat litem. In Syllabus Point 3 of State ex rel. Amy M. v. Kaufman, 196 W.Va. 251, 470 S.E.2d 205 (1996), this Court explained that: There is a clear legislative directive that guardians ad litem and counsel for both sides be given an opportunity to advocate for their clients in child abuse or neglect proceedings. West Virginia Code § 49-6-5(a) (1995) states that the circuit court shall give both the petitioner and respondents an opportunity to be heard when proceeding to the disposition of the case. This right must be understood to mean that the circuit court may not impose unreasonable limitations upon the function of guardians ad litem in representing their clients in accord with the traditions of the adversarial fact-finding process. Whiletheguardianad litem in this case should have provided a list of witnesses heintendedtocalltotestifyatthedisposition hearing,we believe the circuitcourtimposed an unreasonable limitation upon his representation of the children in this matter by not allowinghimtopresentMs.Vibostak’stestimony. A guardian ad litem is certainly required tocomplywiththeRules for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, and he or she should make everyefforttofulfilltheroleofguardianad litemasdefinedbythisCourtin InreJeffreyR.L., supra. However, a mere procedural technicality does not take precedence over the best interestsofthechildren. In this instance, Ms. Vibostak was listed as a witness by the State, and thus,allpartieshadnotice of her testimony. The circuit court clearly erred by not allowing the guardian ad litem to present Ms. Vibostak’s testimony. 22 IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the final order of the Circuit Court ofMineralCountyenteredonJuly1,2002,is reversed. This case is hereby remanded to the circuitcourtwithdirectionstoimmediately contact the Circuit Court of Allegheny County, Maryland,toascertainthestatusoftheproceedingsconcerningthechildrenin Maryland; to advisethatcourt of this opinion; and to determine the proper forum for addressing the future ofthesechildren. If the Maryland court defers jurisdiction to this State, the circuit court is directed to enter an order terminating the parental rights of Amanda D. to her children, Tyler D.,AlexanderA.,andNevaehD.; developapermanencyplanforthechildren; and determine whether Amanda D. should be afforded continued visitation with her children. Reversed and remanded with directions. 23