Title: In re G.T.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re G.T.  (96-610); 170 Vt. 507; 758 A.2d 301

[Filed 19-May-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 96-610

In re G.T., Juvenile	                     Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
                                             Windham Family Court

                                             September Term, 1997

Theresa S. DiMauro, J.

       Robert M. Fisher, Windham County Deputy State's Attorney, Brattleboro,
  for Plaintiff-Appellee.

       Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate
  Attorney, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Gibson, J.,
          Specially Assigned

       DOOLEY, J.  G.T. appeals from a family court order adjudicating him to
  be a delinquent  child because he is guilty of statutory rape, that is, he
  engaged in a sexual act with a person under the  age of sixteen years, in
  violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3252(a)(3).  At the time of the alleged offense,
  G.T.  was fourteen years of age.  He contends that, as a person within the
  protection of the statutory rape  statute, he cannot be charged with
  violating the statute.  We agree and reverse.

       The trial court's findings are not contested on appeal.  G.T. lived
  across the street from M.N.,  a twelve-year-old girl.  The two had been
  friends, but had never had sexual contact with each other  prior to the
  incident in question.  One night in October 1995, while G.T. and M.N. 

 

  were watching a television movie in M.N.'s house, G.T. began kissing M.N.
  on the mouth. G.T. then  pulled M.N.'s legs out straight, pulled her shorts
  down, pulled his pants down, and got on top of her.   He continued kissing
  her with his hands on her shoulders.  M.N., who had never previously had 
  intercourse, felt what she believed was G.T.'s penis in her vagina.  G.T.
  asked if it hurt, but did not  stop when M.N. said it hurt.  Although she
  was not afraid of him, M.N. was not sure what G.T.  would have done if she
  had pushed him off of her.

       G.T.'s actions were interrupted when M.N.'s mother and boyfriend
  unexpectedly returned to  the house.  They saw G.T. scramble up off M.N.,
  but did not observe sexual contact.  They ordered  G.T. out of the house. 
  M.N. began crying and ran upstairs.  She revealed to her mother what had 
  occurred.

       On these facts, the State alleged that G.T. had committed statutory
  rape and, therefore, had  engaged in a delinquent act.  Based upon the
  above facts, the family court adjudicated G.T. a  delinquent child, and
  this appeal followed. Some context is necessary to frame the issue before
  us.  A "delinquent child" is a child  between the ages of ten and sixteen
  who has committed a delinquent act.  See 33 V.S.A.  § 5502(a)(1), (4).  A
  "delinquent act" is defined, in relevant part, as "an act designated a
  crime under  the laws of this state."  Id. § 5502(a)(3).  The question we
  must address is whether the family court  properly found that G.T.
  committed a crime, specifically the crime of statutory rape.

       The crime of statutory rape is defined in 13 V.S.A. § 3252(a)(3) as
  follows:

            (a) A person who engages in a sexual act with another
       person and

            . . .

            (3) The other person is under the age of 16, except
       where the persons  are married to each other and the sexual
       act is consensual;

            . . .

 

       shall be imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or fined
       not more than $10,000.00, or  both.

  G.T. argues that the juxtaposition of the word "person" in the two parts of
  the statute shows that the  Legislature intended that the perpetrator be a
  person of sixteen years of age or older.  Although G.T.  recognizes that
  the plain meaning of the term might not contain that limitation, he argues
  that the  context does require such a limitation.

       G.T. also stresses that we have held that statutory rape is a strict
  liability offense, see State v.  Searles, 159 Vt. 525, 528-29, 621 A.2d 1281, 1283 (1993), for which the only elements are the age  of the "victim"
  and the presence of a sexual act, see State v. Barlow, 160 Vt. 527, 530,