Title: Khalifa v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Afaf N. Khalifa v. State of Maryland, No. 133, September Term, 2003.
[Criminal Procedure – Territorial Jurisdiction, held; the State had territorial jurisdiction to
prosecute Petitioner for detaining a child outside of the State of Maryland because the
intentional deprivation of lawful custody, an essential element of the offenses charged,
occurred in Maryland.]
[Criminal Procedure – Constitutional Law – Ex Post Facto Clause, held; Petitioner’s
convictions and sentences for conspiracy and child detention do not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clauses of the United States Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights because the
offenses continued when and after applicable statutory amendments became effective.]  
[Criminal Law – M erger; held, the convictions for child detention, child abduction, and
conspiracy do not merge under the required evidence test or the rule of lenity.  The
conviction for accessory to detain a child outside of this State, however, merges into the
conviction for accessory to detain a child outside of the United States.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 133
September Term, 2003
AFAF N. KHALIFA
v
 
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:    August 3, 2004
1
Former Section 9-305 of the Family Law Article (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.) stated:
If a child is under the age of 16 years, a relative who knows that
another person is the lawful custodian of the child may not:
(1) abduct, take, or carry away the child from the lawful
custodian to a place outside of this State;
(2) having acquired lawful possession of the child, detain
the child outside of this State for more than 48 hours after the
lawful custodian demands that the child be returned;
(3) harbor or hide the child outside of this State knowing
that possession of the child was obtained by another relative in
violation of this section; or
(4) act as an accessory to an act prohibited by this
section.
2
Amended Section 9-305 of the Family Law Article (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2002
Supp.) states:
(a) In general. – If a child is under the age of 16 years, a relative
who knows that another person is the lawful custodian of the
child may not:
(1) abduct, take, or carry away the child from the lawful
custodian to a place in another state;
(2) having acquired lawful possession of the child, detain
the child in another state for more than 48 hours after the lawful
custodian demands that the child be returned;
(3) harbor or hide the child in another state knowing that
possession of the child was obtained by another relative in
violation of this section; or 
(4) act as an accessory to an act prohibited by this
section.
(b) Additional restrictions. – If a child is under the age of 16
years, a relative who knows that another person is the lawful
We granted Afaf N. Khalifa’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review her multiple
convictions and sentences of incarceration for violating former Maryland Code, Section 9-
305 of the Family Law Article (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.) 1 as well as the current, amended
version of that statute, Section 9-305 of the Family Law Article (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2002
Supp.).2  The convictions arose from Khalifa’s role in the abduction and detention of her
custodian of the child may not:
(1) abduct, take or carry away the child from the lawful
custodian to a place that is outside of the United States or a
territory of the United States or the District of Columbia or the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico;
(2) having acquired lawful possession of the child, detain
the child in a place that is outside the United States or a territory
of the United States or the District of Columbia or the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico for more than 48 hours after the
lawful custodian demands that the child be returned;
(3) harbor or hide the child in a place that is outside of
the United States or a territory of the United States or the
District of Columbia or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
knowing that possession of the child was obtained by another
relative in violation of this section; or
(4) act as an accessory to an act prohibited by this
section.
-2-
grandson, Adam Shannon, who was born in the United States and now resides in Egypt,
thousands of miles away from his father and lawful custodian, M ichael Shannon.  Khalifa
challenges her convictions and sentences on three grounds: (1) courts in the State of
Maryland lacked territorial jurisdiction to hear the prosecution of certain counts against her;
(2) her convictions and sentences violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States
Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights; and (3) her multiple sentences are
“constitutionally defective” because the indictment charged the same offense in multiple
counts.  
I. Background
Khalifa (hereinafter “Petitioner”) and her adult daughter, Nermeen Khalifa Shannon
(hereinafter “Nermeen”), are citizens of Egypt, where Nermeen was raised and educated.  In
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1989, upon reaching the age of 21, Nermeen moved to the United States and settled in
Maryland.  In July of 1995, while living in Maryland, Nermeen met Michael Shannon, and,
on March 3, 1996, the two were married and took up residence in Millersville in Anne
Arundel County.
On February 9, 1997, Nermeen gave birth to their first son, Adam Shannon.  Nermeen
and Michael separated in January of 2000, and Nermeen moved to an apartment in Baltimore
County.  As a result of attempts to reconcile several months later, their second child, Jason
Shannon, was born on January 10, 2001.  Nermeen and Michael’s reconciliation attempts
ended in February of 2001.
On February 27, 2001, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County issued a “Consent
Order” granting to Michael “legal and primary physical care and custody” of Adam.  Under
the order, Nermeen was afforded 
visitation with Adam, including up to three non-consecutive
weeks of unsupervised visitation during the months of June, July, and August.  The order
also granted to Nermeen “legal and primary physical care and custody” of Jason, with whom
Michael had “reasonable rights of visitation.”
On August 18, 2001, Petitioner arrived in the United States from Egypt and stayed at
Nermeen’s Baltimore County apartment.  Petitioner, who allegedly had a copy of the custody
order, asked Michael if Nermeen’s week of unsupervised visitation with Adam could
correspond with Petitioner’s visit to the United States.  Petitioner explained to Michael that
she wanted to take Nermeen, Adam, and Jason to New York to visit a relative, Waeil El
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Bayar, whose wife had recently given birth.  Michael agreed, with the specific condition that
Adam and Jason return to Maryland on Sunday, August 26.  According to Michael, Petitioner
promised to return the children to Nermeen’s apartment by 6:00 p.m., Sunday, August 26.
Nermeen’s neighbor and babysitter, Christa Mayo, stated that she last babysat
Nermeen’s children on Thursday, August 23, 2001.  Nermeen had told Christa that she no
longer needed babysitting services because she was moving to Egypt with the financial and
logistical support of Petitioner.  Nermeen explained to Christa that the move was a secret
because “[t]hey had an upcoming court case regarding custody [and] that she wanted to leave
before that and no one was to know that they were going.”  About a month earlier, at
Nermeen’s request, Christa had taken Adam to have his passport photograph taken.
On August 23 and for a short time on August 24, Christa saw a moving truck outside
of Nermeen’s apartment, and she observed Petitioner “directing the movers” as they walked
in and out of the apartment.  According to Christa, Petitioner seemed “very dominant” and
“in control,” and, when she was with her daughter, Petitioner appeared “in charge.”  Another
of Nermeen’s neighbors, Lynda Leight, who observed Petitioner on August 24, noted that
Petitioner “seemed to be very forceful” and “dominant” in the way she interacted with
Nermeen.  The property manager, Michael Nabors, observed the moving truck outside of
Nermeen’s apartment on August 24 and had a similar impression of Petitioner, recalling that
she “was telling the [movers] what they should and shouldn’t be doing in the truck.”
When Christa encountered Nermeen outside of her apartment on August 24, Nermeen
-5-
gave Christa her apartment keys to return to the rental office after Christa had taken whatever
she wanted of the items left behind in Nermeen’s apartment.
Petitioner, Nermeen, Adam, and Jason arrived at El Bayar’s house in New York on
Friday, August 24.  According to El Bayar, after spending one night at his house, his visitors,
on August 25, traveled to the airport in a rented car and, using airline tickets that El Bayar
had purchased for them at Nermeen’s request several days earlier, flew to Egypt.
Before leaving Maryland, Nermeen provided Michael with three telephone numbers
to reach her and the children while they were in New York.  On August 24, Michael called
New York and spoke with Petitioner, Nermeen, and Adam.  Michael called New York again
on August 25 and spoke with Nermeen and Adam.  On August 26, however, the day Michael
expected the children to return to Maryland, Michael was unable to reach Nermeen and the
children at any of the telephone numbers he was provided.
At around 4:00 p.m. that day, Michael drove to Nermeen’s apartment and found that
it “had been cleaned out.”  He noticed that the “major furniture,” the boys’ clothes, the
entertainment center, and the television were missing.  Michael immediately called the
police, who described him as “extremely distraught” and “nearly hysterical.”
On Tuesday, August 28, Michael called Petitioner’s residence in Cairo, Egypt, and
Petitioner answered the phone.  Petitioner informed Michael that Adam and Jason were with
her and that Nermeen was elsewhere in Egypt under a doctor’s care.  Petitioner initially did
not allow Michael to speak with Adam.  When Michael specifically requested the return of
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the children, Petitioner refused and stated that they would be back in a couple of weeks.
Petitioner, according to Michael, explained that she had not told Michael of the children’s
travel to Egypt because, had he known, he would have stopped them or had them arrested.
Later that day, Michael again called Petitioner’s number in Egypt and was able to speak to
Adam.  Although Michael has spoken with Adam by phone consistently, Michael has not
seen his oldest son since Adam left the United States.
While Adam and Jason have lived in Egypt, officials from the United States Embassy
there have conducted three “welfare and whereabouts” visits of the boys at Petitioner’s
residence in Cairo.  During the first visit on October 2, 2001, Petitioner, her husband,
Nermeen, Adam, and Jason were present.  On February 27, 2002, when the embassy officials
conducted the second visit, the children were accompanied by Nermeen and her sister.  On
the third visit, which took place on August 7, 2002, Nermeen was with her children and, this
time, joined by her sister and niece.  During all of the visits, the children appeared to the
embassy officials to be living at Petitioner’s home in Cairo.
In the evening of August 28, 2001, the District Court of Maryland sitting in Anne
Arundel County issued a warrant for the arrest of Petitioner and charged her with child
abduction and accessory to child abduction of Adam in violation of Section 9-305 of the
Family Law Article (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.).  The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County,
on August 29, 2001, ordered Nermeen to “immediately return” Adam “to the care and
custody of Michael Shannon.”  On September 11, 2001, the circuit court granted the “sole
3
The fifteen counts alleged in the indictment were:
Count 1:
August 2001, abduct a child outside of this State.
Count 2:
August through September 2001, detain a child
outside of this State.
Count 3:
August through September 2001, harbor child
outside of this State.
Count 4:
August 2001, accessory to abduct a child outside
of this State.
Count 5:
August 2001 through September 2001, accessory
-7-
legal and physical care and custody” of Jason to Michael and ordered Nermeen to
“immediately return” him to his father.
Petitioner was arrested in May of 2002, when she returned to the United States with
her husband to visit their property in San Diego, California.  In August of 2002, the State of
Maryland issued a revised criminal indictment, charging Petitioner with fifteen counts – ten
counts of violating Maryland Code, Section 9-305 of the Family Law Article and five counts
of conspiracy to violate that statute.  All of the counts related to Petitioner’s role in the
alleged abduction, detention, and harboring of Adam.  Because amendments to Section 9-305
and the related penalty provisions of Section 9-307 became effective on October 1, 2001, the
State charged Petitioner in separate counts for conduct occurring before and after that date.
In particular, of the ten Counts alleging violations of Section 9-305, Counts 1 through 6
charged Petitioner for conduct occurring between August and September of 2001.  Counts
11 through 13, alleging conspiracy, also charged Petitioner for conduct that took place
between August and September of 2001.  The balance of the charges (Counts 7 though 10
and Counts 14 through 15) alleged that Petitioner committed offenses after October 2001.3
(footnote continued)
to detain a child outside of this State.
Count 6:
August 2001 through September 2001, accessory
to harbor a child outside of this State.
Count 7:
October 2001 through May 2002, detain a child
outside of the United States.
Count 8:
October 2001 through M ay 2002, harbor a child
outside of the United States.
Count 9:
October 2001 through May 2002, accessory to
harbor a child outside of the United States.
Count 10:
October 2001 through May 2002, accessory to
harbor a child outside of the United States.
Count 11:
August 2001, conspire to commit child abduction
outside of this State
Count 12:
August 2001 through September 2001, conspire to
commit detaining a child outside of this State.
Count 13:
August 2001 through September 2001, conspire to
commit harboring of a child outside of this State.
Count 14:
October 2001 through May 2002, conspire to
commit detaining a child outside of the United
States.
Count 15:
October 2001 through May 2002, conspire to
commit harboring a child outside of the United
States.
-8-
After waiving her right to jury trial, Petitioner was tried in the Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel County before the Honorable Nancy Davis-Loomis.  Judge Davis-Loomis presided
over the four-day trial and, on January 21, 2003, found Petitioner guilty on ten counts and
rendered the following verdicts:
Count 3:
August 2001 through September 2001, harbor
child outside of this State – Guilty
Count 4:
August 2001 through September 2001, accessory to abduct child
outside of this State – Guilty
Count 5:
August 2001 through September 2001, accessory
to detain child outside of this State – Guilty.
-9-
Count 8:
October 2001 through May 2002, harbor child
outside of the United States – Guilty.
Count 9:
October 2001 through May 2002, accessory to
detain child outside of the United States – Guilty.
Count 11:
August 2001, conspire to commit child abduction
outside of this State – Guilty.
Count 12:
August 2001 through September 2001, conspire to
commit detaining child outside of this State –
Guilty.
Count 13:
August 2001 through September 2001 conspire to
commit harboring child outside of this State –
Guilty.
Count 14:
October 2001 through May 2002, conspire to
commit detaining child outside of the United
States – Guilty.
Count 15:
October 2001 through May 2002, conspire to
commit harboring child outside of the United
States – Guilty.
For purposes of sentencing, Judge Davis-Loomis merged Count 3 into Count 5, Count
8 into Count 9, Count 13 into Count 12, and Count 15 into Count 14.  She imposed a $15,000
fine and a total of ten years of imprisonment, divided among the various counts as follows:
one year of imprisonment on Count 4 (accessory to child abduction outside this State); one
year consecutive on Count 5 (accessory to detain a child outside of this State); three years
consecutive on Count 9 (accessory to detain a child outside of the United States); one year
consecutive on Count 11 (conspiracy to abduct); one year consecutive on Count 12
(conspiracy to detain outside this State); and three years consecutive on Count 14 (conspiracy
to detain outside of the United States).  A three-judge sentence review panel decreased
Petitioner’s fine to $5,000 and, by ordering her sentences of imprisonment to run
concurrently instead of consecutively, limited the total prison sentence to three years. 
-10-
The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, merged all of the conspiracy
counts but otherwise affirmed Petitioner’s remaining convictions and sentences.  The court
held that Anne Arundel County had territorial jurisdiction to prosecute the alleged harboring
and detention of Adam because those acts “deprived Michael in Maryland of custody of his
son, which was an essential element of the crimes of harboring and detaining a child.”  The
court further held that Petitioner’s convictions under the “new” Section 9-305 did not violate
the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution and the Maryland Declaration
of Rights.  Petitioner’s offenses, in the court’s view, were “continuing in nature and
punishable ‘day by day.’” According to the court, if the Petitioner had detained Adam outside
of the United States after October 1, 2001, the effective date of the statute, she violated the
provisions of that statute, and “the State could prosecute her accordingly.”
With respect to
Petitioner’s claim that the indictment was multiplicative, the Court of Special Appeals
decided against merging her sentences for accessory to abduction, accessory to detain outside
of Maryland, and accessory to detain outside the United States.  As the court reasoned,
“[a]bduction differs from detention in that it includes the element of taking, and the two
detention charges differ from one another in their requisite place of detention.”  The court
also decided, however, upon the State’s concession, that all of the sentences for conspiracy
do merge, recognizing that “only one sentence can be imposed for a single common law
conspiracy no matter how many criminal acts the conspirators have agreed to commit.”  The
court held that, because “the offense carrying the lesser maximum penalty merges into the
4
The Court of Special Appeals also rejected Petitioner’s claim that the trial court
abused its discretion in excluding certain evidence from the trial.  Those evidentiary issues
are not before us.
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offense carrying the greater penalty,” the one-year sentences under Counts 11 and 12 merged
into Count 14, which carried a three-year sentence.4
As a result of the all of the proceedings below, Petitioner had convictions with
concurrent sentences on four counts: one year of imprisonment on Count 4 (accessory to
child abduction outside of this State); one year on Count 5 (accessory to detain a child
outside of this State); three years on Count 9 (accessory to detain a child outside of the
United States); and three years on Count 14 (conspiracy to detain a child outside of the
United States).  Contesting the constitutionality and lawfulness of these convictions and
sentences, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted, Khalifa v.
State, 380 Md. 230, 844 A.2d 427 (2004), to address the following three questions:
1.
What is the territorial jurisdiction for a violation of Md.
Code Ann. Family Law Art. §9-305 with respect to the
crimes of detaining and/or harboring a child outside of
the State of Maryland?
2.
What impact does the ex post facto clause have on the
legislative changes to Md. Code Ann. Family Law Art.
§9-305 and its increase penalties?
3.
What impact do the doctrines of constitutional double
jeopardy, the common law doctrine of merger, and the
rule of lenity have on Md. Code Ann. Family Law Art.
§9-305?
For reasons discussed below, we hold that the State had territorial jurisdiction to prosecute
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Petitioner for detaining a child outside of the State of Maryland and that Petitioner’s
convictions and sentences do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States
Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights.  We further hold that, except for  Count
5 (accessory to detain a child outside of this State), which merges into Count 9 (accessory
to detain a child outside of the United States) for purposes of sentencing, no further
modifications to Petitioner’s sentences are necessary because, under the required evidence
test, the offenses of accessory to child abduction, accessory to child detention, and conspiracy
to commit child detention contain distinct elements.  
II. Standard of Review
A trial judge is vested with very broad discretion when sentencing a criminal
defendant, so long as the sentence is based upon findings consistent with the jury’s verdict.
See Triggs v. State, 2004 WL 1335845, at *6 (Md. 2004) (citing Jackson v. State, 364 Md.
192, 199, 772 A.2d 273, 277 (2001)); see also Blakely v. Washington, 2004 WL 1402697,
at *6 (U.S. 2004).  Ordinarily, we review the judge’s sentencing judgment on three
recognized grounds: “(1) whether the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or
violates other constitutional requirements; (2) whether the sentencing judge was motivated
by ill will, prejudice or other impermissible considerations; and (3) whether the sentence is
within statutory limits.”  Triggs, 2004 WL 1335845, at *6 (quoting Gary v. State, 341 Md.
513, 516, 671 A.2d 495, 496 (1996)).  
In this case, Petitioner claims her multiple sentences  are violations of the Ex Post
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Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights as well
as a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.  As we
explained in Harris v. State, 303 Md. 685, 496 A.2d 1074 (1985):
When a claim is based upon a violation of a constitutional right
it is our obligation to make an independent constitutional
appraisal from the entire record.  But this Court is not a finder
of facts; we do not judge the credibility of the witnesses nor do
we initially weigh the evidence to determine the facts underlying
the constitutional claim.  It is the function of the trial court to
ascertain the circumstances on which the constitutional claim is
based.  So, in making our independent appraisal, we accept the
findings of the trial judge as to what are the underlying facts
unless he is clearly in error.  We then re-weigh the facts as
accepted in order to determine the ultimate mixed question of
law and fact, namely, was there a violation of a constitutional
right as claimed.
 
Id. at 697-98, 496 A.2d at 1080 (internal citations omitted); see also Glover v. State, 368 Md.
211, 221, 792 A.2d 1160, 1166 (2002) (citing Rowe v. State, 363 Md. 424, 432, 769 A.2d
879, 883 (2001)); Crosby v. State, 366 Md. 518, 526, 784 A.2d 1102, 1106 (2001).
Therefore, with respect to Petitioner’s constitutional claims, although we do not engage in
de novo fact-finding, our application of the law to the facts is de novo.  See Cartnail v. State,
359 Md. 272, 282-83, 753 A.2d 519, 525 (2000) (stating that, with regard to a Fourth
Amendment question, “this Court makes an independent determination of whether the State
has violated an individual’s constitutional rights by applying the law to the facts”).
Territorial jurisdiction is a factual issue for the trier of fact.  Butler v. State, 353 Md.
67, 79-80, 724 A.2d 657, 663 (1999) (holding that “when evidence exists that the crime may
-14-
have been committed outside Maryland’s territorial jurisdiction and a defendant disputes the
territorial jurisdiction of the Maryland courts to try him or her, the issue of where the crime
was committed is fact-dependent and thus for the trier of fact”).  When the issue is in dispute,
the State has the burden to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the crime was committed
within the geographic limits of Maryland.  Id. at 83-84, 724 A.2d at 665. Consequently,
because the issue of territorial jurisdiction is factual and the trial judge acted as the trier of
fact in this case, we defer to her determination of territorial jurisdiction unless it is “clearly
erroneous.”  See Smallwood v. State, 343 Md. 97, 104, 680 A.2d 512, 515 (1996) (stating
that, “[t]o evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence in a non-jury trial,” “we will not set aside
the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous”) (citing Wilson v. State,
319 Md. 530, 535, 573 A.2d 831, 833-34 (1990)). 
III. Discussion
A. Section 9-305 of the Family Law Article
The State charged Petitioner with committing violations of Section 9-305 before and
after its amendments became effective on October 1, 2001.  Before October of 2001, Section
9-305 of the Family Law Article prohibited participation in the abduction, detention, or
harboring of a child “outside of this State.”  The former statute provided:
If a child is under the age of 16 years, a relative who knows that
another person is the lawful custodian of the child may not:
(1) abduct, take, or carry away the child from the lawful
custodian to a place outside of this State;
(2) having acquired lawful possession of the child, detain the
child outside of this State for more than 48 hours after the lawful
custodian demands that the child be returned;
5
Prior to October 1, 2001, Section 9-307(c) stated:
If the child is out of the custody of the lawful custodian for more
than 30 days, a person who violates any provision of § 9-305 of
this subtitle is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject to
a fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 1
year, or both.
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(3) harbor or hide the child outside of this State knowing that
possession of the child was obtained by another relative in
violation of this section; or
(4) act as an accessory to an act prohibited by this section.
Section 9-305 of the Family Law Article (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.).  A violation of this statute
carried a maximum penalty of one year of imprisonment and a $1,000 fine.  Section 9-307(c)
of the Family Law Article (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.).5
 The amendments effective on October 1, 2001 split Section 9-305 into subsections
(a) and (b), which established new territorial elements.  Subsection (a) addresses the
prohibited conduct (abduction, detention, harboring, and acting as an accessory) resulting in
the child entering or being held “in another state.”  Subsection (b) prohibits that conduct
when the child is taken or kept “outside of the United States.” After the amendments, the
statute reads:  
(a) In general. – If a child is under the age of 16 years, a relative
who knows that another person is the lawful custodian of the
child may not:
(1) abduct, take, or carry away the child from the lawful
custodian to a place in another state;
(2) having acquired lawful possession of the child, detain
the child in another state for more than 48 hours after the lawful
custodian demands that the child be returned;
(3) harbor or hide the child in another state knowing that
possession of the child was obtained by another relative in
-16-
violation of this section; or 
(4) act as an accessory to an act prohibited by this
section.
(b) Additional restrictions. – If a child is under the age of 16
years, a relative who knows that another person is the lawful
custodian of the child may not:
(1) abduct, take, or carry away the child from the lawful
custodian to a place that is outside of the United States or a
territory of the United States or the District of Columbia or the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico;
(2) having acquired lawful possession of the child, detain
the child in a place that is outside the United States or a territory
of the United States or the District of Columbia or the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico for more than 48 hours after the
lawful custodian demands that the child be returned;
(3) harbor or hide the child in a place that is outside of
the United States or a territory of the United States or the
District of Columbia or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
knowing that possession of the child was obtained by another
relative in violation of this section; or
(4) act as an accessory to an act prohibited by this
section.
Section 9-305 of the Family Law Article (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2002 Supp.).
The primary significance of the change to Section 9-305 is revealed in the penalty
provisions of Section 9-307, which also changed on October 1, 2001.  Although the
maximum penalty for violating Section 9-305(a) (“in another state”) remained one year of
imprisonment with a $1,000 fine, due to the amendment, the maximum penalty for violating
Section 9-305(b) (“outside of the United States”) is three years of imprisonment with a
$5,000 fine.  Section 9-307(d) of the Family Law Article (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2002
6
Section 9-307(d) of the Family Law Article currently states: “A person who violates
any provision of § 9-305(b) of this subtitle is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject
to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or both.”
-17-
Supp.).6
B. Territorial Jurisdiction
We first dispose of Petitioner’s claim that the State lacked territorial jurisdiction to
prosecute Counts 8, 9, 14, and 15, all of which alleged that Petitioner violated Section 9-305
after October 1, 2001.  Petitioner points out that she was in Egypt, “a sovereign foreign
nation,” by October 1, 2001, when she committed the acts that allegedly constituted
harboring, detention, and conspiracy.  She argues that she cannot be convicted in Maryland
for a crime committed outside the borders of the State. 
The State responds that it had jurisdiction to prosecute Petitioner because her conduct,
which resulted in depriving Michael Shannon of the lawful custody of his son, had its effect
in Maryland.  The State contends that the result of Petitioner’s conduct “forms an essential
ingredient” of the offenses charged and, therefore, without the deprivation of lawful custody
in Maryland, “there simply would be no crime.”
We have stated that “it is well-settled in Maryland that a court must have territorial
jurisdiction over a criminal defendant to exercise its jurisdiction, or power, over that
defendant.”  State v. Butler, 353 Md. at 78, 724 A.2d at 662.  The general rule under common
law is that a state has territorial jurisdiction over a defendant when the crime is committed
within the State’s “territorial limits.”  State v. Cain, 360 Md. 205, 212, 757 A.2d 142, 145
-18-
(2000); Pennington v. State, 308 Md. 727, 730, 521 A.2d 1216, 1217 (1987); see also Wright
v. State, 339 Md. 399, 404, 663 A.2d 590, 592 (1995).  Therefore, ordinarily, “[a] person
cannot be convicted here for crimes committed in another state.”  West v. State, 369 Md. 150,
158, 797 A.2d 1278, 1282 (2002) (quoting Butler, 353 Md. at 72-73, 724 A.2d at 660
(quoting Bowen v. State, 206 Md. 368, 375, 111 A.2d 844, 847 (1955)); Cain, 360 Md. at
214-15, 757 A.2d at 146-47.
In describing the concept of territorial jurisdiction where different elements of a crime
have occurred in different states, we have explained:
The common law rule concerning territorial jurisdiction, which
is adhered to in Maryland, does not permit prosecution of an
offense in every jurisdiction in which any element of the offense
takes place.  Instead, the common law rule generally focuses on
one element, which is deemed “essential” or “key” or “vital” or
the “gravamen” of the offense, and the offense may be
prosecuted only in a jurisdiction where that essential or key
element takes place.
West, 369 Md. at 158-59, 797 A.2d at 1283; see Wright, 339 Md. at 404, 663 A.2d at 592
(stating that the traditional rule of territorial jurisdiction is that “a state will exercise
jurisdiction over a crime only if some conduct or effect constituting a part of that crime was
committed within the state”).  Thus, we have held that Maryland does not have territorial
jurisdiction as to the crimes of first degree rape and first degree sexual offense, unless “the
specifically proscribed harmful physical contact” (the key or essential element of those
offenses) took place in Maryland.  West, 369 Md at 162, 797 A.2d at 1285.
Nonetheless, “under certain circumstances, the defendant’s presence is not required
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in a court’s territorial jurisdiction if . . . the intended result or an essential element of his or
her crime lies in Maryland.”  Butler, 353 Md. at 74, 724 A.2d at 660.  Regarding the offense
of obstruction of justice, for example, territorial jurisdiction lies in this State even when “all
of the affirmative acts were committed”  outside of Maryland because “[t]he gravamen of the
crime [is] the intended result in Maryland.”  Pennington, 308 Md. at 733,735, 521 A.2d at
1219, 1220; see also West, 369 Md. at 161, 797 A.2d at 1284.  
In Trindle v. State, 326 Md. 25, 602 A.2d 1232 (1992), we expounded on these
principles as they applied to former Section 9-305 of the Family Law Article, the same
statute at issue in this case.  Trindle’s ex-wife, Alexa Matthai, lived in Kent County with their
children.  Trindle picked up the children in Wilmington, Delaware for a scheduled period of
visitation to be spent in Pennsylvania.  Id. at 28, 724 A.2d at 1233. Unbeknownst to Matthai,
who was the children’s lawful custodian, Trindle and his new wife, Sharon Marcus, took the
children and traveled to Amman, Jordan, where the children were kept without Matthai’s
consent.  Id. at 28-29, 724 A.2d at 1233-34.  When Trindle and Marcus returned to the
United States after having been deported from Jordan, they were tried and convicted in the
Circuit Court for Kent County for child abduction in violation of former Section 9-305 of the
Family Law Article.  Id. at 30, 724 A.2d at 1234.  Although Trindle’s appeal was rendered
moot when he died prior to his case being argued, Marcus argued on appeal that the Circuit
Court did not have territorial jurisdiction to hear her prosecution, because none of her
conduct took place in Maryland.  Id.
We disagreed, holding instead that the Maryland court had territorial jurisdiction over
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the child abduction charge against Marcus.  We explained:
Marcus’s conduct . . . consisted of knowingly secreting and
harboring Matthai’s children with the intent to deprive Matthai
of the custody, care and control of those children.  It is clear that
the intended result of that conduct, i.e. depriving Matthai of
custody, forms an essential ingredient of her offense and had its
effect in Kent County, Maryland, although the acts which
produced that result took place outside of this State.
Id. at 32, 724 A.2d at 1235.  We also reviewed the law of territorial jurisdiction in other
states and were persuaded by those courts that embraced the view that “child abduction or
custody interference prosecutions can be heard in the state where the parental custody has
been deprived by acts or omissions which occurred outside the state.”  Id. at 36, 724 A.2d at
1237.
The case before us does not differ materially from the circumstances in Trindle.   Like
the appellant in Trindle, Petitioner intended to deprive a parent of lawful custody in the State
of Maryland.  Although her involvement in the conspiracy, detention, and harboring may
have taken place well beyond the borders of this State, the intended consequences of those
acts reached Maryland, where Michael was deprived of the lawful custody of his son.  As we
recognized in Trindle, the intentional deprivation of lawful custody “forms an essential
ingredient” of the crimes prohibited under Section 9-305.  
Furthermore, the bases for territorial jurisdiction in the present case are more cogent
than in Trindle, where the child’s abduction began in Delaware.  Unlike Trindle, Petitioner’s
initial criminal acts (the child abduction and conspiracy), which facilitated the detention and
harboring of Adam in Egypt, occurred in Maryland.  For these reasons, the Circuit Court for
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Anne Arundel County had territorial jurisdiction over the prosecution of Petitioner’s charges.
C. Ex Post Facto Clause
Petitioner maintains that the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Maryland
Constitutions bar her prosecution under the amended Section 9-305.  The Ex Post Facto
Clause, Petitioner argues, prohibits her prosecution under the amended statute inasmuch as
her crimes were committed and completed before the effective date of the statutory
amendments.
The State contends that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not bar Petitioner’s convictions
under the amended “new” Section 9-305.  The State claims that Petitioner was prosecuted
for conduct occurring after the effective date of the amended statute and, therefore, the
increased penalties were properly applied.  That is, the State argues, Petitioner’s conduct
constituted continuing offenses that were punishable day to day and, when Petitioner failed
to return the children after the “new” Section 9-305 became effective, she exposed herself
to prosecution under the amended statute.
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States provides in part that “[n]o
State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law . . . .”  Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights, in more specific terms, also prohibits the passage of ex post facto laws: “That
retrospective Laws, punishing acts committed before the existence of such Laws, and by
them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust and incompatible with liberty; wherefore,
no ex post facto Law ought to be made; nor any retrospective oath or restriction be imposed,
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or required.”  The Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution and Maryland
Declaration of Rights have been viewed generally to have the “same meaning” and are thus
to be construed in pari materia.  Evans v. State, 2004 WL 1635610, *___; Watkins v. Dept.
of Public Safety, 377 Md. 34, 48, 831 A.2d 1079, 1087 (2003); Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125,
136-37, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994) (citing Booth v. State, 327 Md. 142, 169 n.9, 608 A.2d
162, 175 n.9, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 988, 113 S.Ct. 500, 121 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992)).
By enacting the Ex Post Facto Clause, “the Framers sought to assure that legislative
Acts give fair warning of their effect . . . .”  Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28, 101 S.Ct.
960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17, 23 (1981).  As the Supreme Court has explained recently, “the [Ex
Post Facto] Clause protects liberty by preventing governments from enacting statutes with
‘manifestly unjust and oppressive’ retroactive effects.”  Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607,
__, 123 S.Ct. 2446, 2449, 156 L.Ed.2d 544, __ (2003) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798)).  Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder v. Bull, regarded by the
Stogner Court as “an authoritative account on the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause,”
enumerated the types of laws that contravene the ex post facto proscription:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of
the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and
punishes such action.  2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than
the law annexed to the crime, when committed.  4th. Every law
that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.
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Id. at __, 123 S.Ct. at 2450, 156 L.Ed.2d at __ (quoting Calder, 390-91, 1 L.Ed. at 648)
(internal emphasis omitted); see also Evans, 2004 WL 1635610, *____; Lomax v. Warden,
Md. Correctional Training Ctr., 356 Md. 569, 576, 741 A.2d 476, 480 (1999).  
In accordance with these principles, “[t]wo critical elements must be present for a
criminal or penal law to be ex post facto:  it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to
events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it.”
Frost, 336 Md. at 136, 647 A.2d at 112 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29, 101 S.Ct. at 964,
67 L.Ed.2d at 23). 
The amended Section 9-305, on its face, certainly does not contain either of these
elements.  As applied to Petitioner as well, the “new” Section 9-305 gave “fair warning” of
its effect and, therefore, cannot be considered “manifestly unjust and oppressive.”  The
“new” provisions were not applied to any conduct that Petitioner engaged in before the
amendments became effective.  Rather, as the indictment expressly states, Petitioner was
charged, and later convicted, under the “new” Section 9-305 for violations occurring from
October 2001 through May 2002 – after the statute’s effective date.  All conduct that the
State alleged occurred before the October 1 effective date was charged under the “old”
Section 9-305 and subject to the corresponding penalties under the “old” Section 9-307.
Petitioner’s argument that her criminal acts were completed prior to October 1, 2001
is unavailing.  Petitioner was convicted under the “new” statute on Count 9 (accessory to
detain a child outside of the United States) and on Count 14 (conspiracy to detain a child
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outside of the United States).  Although both of the crimes underlying these counts began
before October 1, they are nonetheless continuing offenses that did not cease prior to that
date.  Consequently, as we explain, Petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated when
the State charged her and the trial court convicted and sentenced her under the amended
provisions of Sections 9-305 and 9-307.
As our colleagues on the Court of Special Appeals have noted, a continuing offense
is a “transaction or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse . . . no matter how long in
time it may occupy . . . .  It is an offense which continues day by day.”  Beatty v. State, 56
Md. App. 627, 635, 468 A.2d 663, 667 (1983) (citing Wharton’s Criminal Law, 14th ed. §
59).  We have stated that “[o]rdinarily, a continuing offense is marked by a continuing duty
in the defendant to do an act which he fails to do.  The offense continues as long as the duty
persists, and there is a failure to perform that duty.”  Duncan v. State, 282 Md. 385, 390, 384
A.2d 456, 459 (1978).  A “continuing offense” also has been described as generally “one that
involves a prolonged course of conduct.”  United States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 281
(2d Cir. 1995).  The California Supreme Court explained the concept of a “continuing
offense” as follows:
Most crimes are instantaneous since they are committed as soon
as every element is satisfied.  Some crimes, however, are not
terminated by a single act or circumstance but are committed as
long as the proscribed conduct continues.  Each day brings “a
renewal of the original crime or the repeated commission of new
offenses.”  The distinction is critical because it determines the
application of many legal principles such as the statute of
limitations period, venue, jurisdiction, sentencing, double
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jeopardy, and, as here, the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Wright v. Superior Court, 936 P.2d 101, 103 (Cal. 1997)(citing Toussie v. United States, 397
U.S. 112, 119, 90 S.Ct. 858, 862, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970).
The application of new statutes to continuing offenses ordinarily presents no ex post
facto concerns if the charged criminal conduct continued beyond the law’s effective date.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated, “the Ex Post Facto
clause is not violated by application of a statute to an enterprise that began prior to, but
continued after, the effective date of [the statute].”  United States v. Harris, 79 F.3d 223, 229
(2d Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479, 485 (7th Cir. 1992) (“It is
well settled that the ex post facto clause is not applicable to offenses which began before the
effective date of a statute and continue thereafter.”); People v. Grant, 973 P.2d 72, 77 (Cal.
1999) (“Where an offense is of a continuing nature, and the conduct continues after the
enactment of a statute, that statute may be applied without violating the ex post facto
prohibition.”) (quoting People v. Palacios, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 318, 320 (1997)).
Whether a particular crime constitutes a continuing offense is primarily a question of
statutory interpretation.  Wright, 936 P.2d at 104 (citing Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115, 90 S.Ct.
at 860, 25 L.Ed.2d at 161).  Although the express statutory language may provide an answer,
equally important to the determination is whether “the nature of the crime involved is such
that [the Legislature] must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one.”
Id.   The concept of “continuing offense” has embraced  such crimes as embezzlement, State
-26-
v. Thang, 246 N.W. 891 (Minn. 1933), bigamy, Cox v. State, 23 So. 806 (Ala. 1898),
nuisance, State v. Dry Fork R. Co., 40 S.E. 447 (W. Va. 1901), and the repeated failure to
pay taxes, United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2001). Courts also have
determined that “continuing offenses” include failing to register as a sex offender, Arizona
v. Helmer, 53 P.3d 1153, 1155 (Ariz. App. 2002), and being a deported alien found in the
United States, United States v. Ramirez-Valencia, 202 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2000).  We
have held that the crime of failing to pay child support is a continuing offense.  State v.
James, 203 Md. 113, 119, 100 A.2d 12, 14 (1953).
The crime of conspiracy is perhaps the classic example of a “continuing offense.”  See
e.g., United States v. Hersh, 297 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Terzado-
Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1124 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Since conspiracy is a continuous crime, a
statute increasing the penalty for a conspiracy beginning before the date of enactment but
continuing afterwards does not violate the ex post facto clause.”); United States v. Duncan,
42 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[A]ccording to our precedents, continuing offenses such as
conspiracy and bank fraud do not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause if the criminal
offenses continue after the relevant statute becomes effective.”); United States v. Baresh, 790
F.2d 392, 404 (5 th Cir. 1986) (“[B]ecause conspiracy is a continuing crime, a statute
increasing the penalty for a conspiracy beginning before the date of enactment but continuing
afterwards does not offend the [Ex Post Facto Clause].”); United States v. Campanale, 518
F.2d 352, 365 (9th Cir. 1975) (“It is well established that a statute increasing a penalty with
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respect to a criminal conspiracy which commenced prior to, but was continued beyond the
effective date of the statute, is not ex post facto as to that crime.”). 
Likewise, the crime of detaining a child under Section 9-305 constitutes a continuing
offense.  Although the statutory language does not expressly describe the crime as such,
detention is, by its very nature, continuous.  Words in a statute are generally given their
“natural and usual meaning.”  Holbrook v. State, 364 Md. 354, 364, 772 A.2d 1240, 1246
(2001); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 435, 535 A.2d 485, 489 (1988) (stating that “words in
a statute are generally given their common and ordinary meaning”).  Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “detention” as “[t]he act or fact of holding a person in custody; confinement or
compulsory delay.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 459 (7th ed. 1999).  This definition describes
continuous conduct in the sense that the detention “achieves no finality” until the victim is
released or dies.  See United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 409, 78 S.Ct. 875, 878, 2 L.Ed.2d
873, 877 (1958); cf. State v. Stouffer, 352 Md. 97, 116, 721 A.2d 207, 217 (1998) (describing
kidnapping as a “continuing crime, remaining in effect until the hostage is safely released”).
The crime carries on at least until the offender takes action to return the child to the care of
the lawful custodian or the child achieves the age of majority.
The court in People v. Caruso, 504 N.E.2d 1339 (Ill. App. 1987) reached a similar
conclusion.  In that case, the defendant, Caruso, was charged with the statutory offenses of
child abduction and unlawful restraint involving his two children.  Id. at 1340.  Caruso
argued before the appellate court that the Ex Post Facto Clause barred the child abduction
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count because the abduction occurred in 1977, before the child abduction statute was enacted
in 1978 and subsequently amended in 1984.  Id. at 1340-41.  The court, however, accepted
the State’s argument that “the offense of child abduction, as charged in the indictments at
issue here, is for the detention of the children, a continuing act, and is therefore not based on
the initial taking before the child abduction statute was enacted.”  Id. at 1340.  The court
explained:
Defendant is not being prosecuted for the abduction or detention
of the children prior to the enactment of the statute.  He is
charged with detaining the children on December 24, 1984, a
date after enactment of the child abduction statute and after the
effective date of the 1984 amendment to this statute.  Although
the detention of the children also occurred before the enactment
of the law, the statute was alleged to be violated by the
continued detention of the children after passage of the statute.
Id. at 1341. Based on this reasoning, the court concluded that “neither the statute as amended
nor the indictments apply to events occurring before the enactment of the statute, and the law
is not facially or as applied violative of the ex post facto provisions of the United States or
Illinois constitutions.”  Id.; see also People v. Westman, __ N.W.2d __, __ (Mich. App. 2004)
(relying on an unpublished appellate opinion in which the court held that there was no ex post
facto violation where parental kidnapping continued after the effective date of the amended
statute).
The charges against Petitioner under the “new” Section 9-305 alleged conduct
committed after the effective date of the statute.  The amended law, therefore, only “operates
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solely with respect to subsequent conduct” and does not “change[] the legal consequences
of acts completed before its effective date.”  Wright, 936 P.2d at 107 (citation omitted).  The
detention and conspiracy continued through and after the amended Sections 9-305 and 9-307
became effective.  Petitioner’s crimes, for purposes of prosecution, terminated only after she
was taken into custody.  By assisting in the criminal efforts to confine Adam after October
1, 2001, Petitioner violated the new statute, and, hence, her convictions under the amended
statute do not offend the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution and
Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
D. Multiplicity
Challenging her multiple sentences, Petitioner invokes the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the United States Constitution and the common-law rule of merger.  She claims that the
indictment impermissibly charged the same offense in multiple counts when, in her view,
“there can be but one violation” and “but one sentence for a violation of [Section] 9-305.”
She maintains further that the legislative intent is ambiguous as to whether Section 9-305
permits multiple punishment and, therefore, under the rule of lenity, she should have received
a single sentence of no more than one year imprisonment for a single violation of the statute.
In response, the State argues that the indictment was not multiplicative because it
charged Petitioner with committing separate and distinct types of conduct prohibited by
Section 9-305.  According to the State, the convictions should not merge for purposes of
sentencing because each offense for which Petitioner was convicted contains a distinct
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element that the others do not.  Therefore, under the State’s position, Petitioner was properly
convicted of violating the “new” Sections 9-305(b), for which the trial judge properly
imposed a three-year sentence.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is applicable to the
States, provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”  Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2063,
23 L.Ed.2d 707, 716 (1969); State v. Boozer, 304 Md. 98, 101, 497 A.2d 1129, 1130 (1985).
The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids multiple convictions and sentences for the same offense.
Holbrook, 364 Md. at 369, 772 A.2d at 1248; Nightingale v. State, 312 Md. 699, 702, 542
A.2d 373, 374 (1988); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 431, 535 A.2d 485, 487 (1988); Boozer,
304 Md. at 101, 497 A.2d at 1130.  Under the common-law rule of merger as well, when
offenses merge, “separate sentences are normally precluded.”  Lancaster v. State, 332 Md.
385, 392, 631 A.2d 453, 457 (1993); see White v. State, 318 Md. 740, 743, 569 A.2d 1271,
1273 (1990).  Offenses merge and separate sentences are prohibited when, for instance, a
defendant is convicted of two offenses based on the same act or acts and one offense is a
lesser-included offense of the other.  Lancaster, 332 Md. at 391, 631 A.2d at 456.
“Under ‘both federal double jeopardy principles and Maryland merger law, the test
for determining the identity of offenses is the required evidence test.’” Nightingale, 312 Md.
at 703, 542 A.2d at 374; see, e.g., Holbrook, 364 Md. at 369-70, 772 A.2d at 1249 (“[U]nder
Maryland common law, the required evidence test is the appropriate ‘test for determining
7
As we observed in Holbrook, 364 Md. at 369 n.9, 772 A.2d at 1249 n.9 and
Lancaster, 332 Md. at 393, 631 A.2d at 457, the required evidence test is also known as the
“Blockburger” test, see Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed.
306 (1932), the “same evidence” test, see Dixon v. State, 364 Md. 209, 236-37, 772 A.2d
283, 299 (2001), the “elements” test, see Hagans v. State, 316 Md. 429, 449-50, 559 A.2d
792, 801-02 (1989), and the “same elements” test, see United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688,
696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2856, 125 L.Ed.2d 556, 568 (1993).
-31-
whether the different statutory or common law offenses, growing out of the same transaction,
are to merge and be treated as the same offense for double jeopardy purposes.”); Dixon v.
State, 364 Md. 209, 236, 772 A.2d 283, 299 (2001); Lancaster, 332 Md. at 391, 393 n.8, 631
A.2d at 456, 457 n.8 (“In addition to being the normal standard for determining merger of
offenses under Maryland common law, the required evidence test is also the usual test for
determining when two separate offenses . . . shall be deemed the same for purposes of the
prohibition against double jeopardy.”); Monoker, 321 Md. 214, 219, 582 A.2d 525, 527
(1990); White, 318 Md. at 743, 569 A.2d at 1272.7
Writing for this Court in Lancaster, Judge Eldridge provided a thorough explanation
of the required evidence test:
The required evidence test focuses upon the elements of each
offense; if all of the elements of one offense are included in the
other offense, so that only the latter offense contains a distinct
element or distinct elements, the former merges into the latter.
Snowden v. State, supra, 321 Md. at 617, 583 A.2d at 1059,
quoting State v. Jenkins, 307 Md. 501, 517, 515 A.2d 465, 473
(1986).  Stated another way, the required evidence is that which
is minimally necessary to secure a conviction for each . . .
offense.  If each offense requires proof of a fact which the other
does not, or in other words, if each offense contains an element
which the other does not, there is no merger under the required
evidence test even though both offenses are based upon the
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same act or acts.  But, where only one offense requires proof of
an additional fact, so that all elements of one offense are present
in the other, and where both offenses are based on the same act
or acts . . . merger follows.  Williams v. State, supra, 323 Md. at
317-318, 593 A.2d at 673, quoting in part Thomas v. State, 277
Md. 257, 267, 353 A.2d 240, 246-47 (1976).
332 Md. at 391-92, 631 A.2d at 456-57 (internal quotations marks omitted).  The required
evidence test is the “threshold” test and, if it is met, merger follows as a matter of course.
Id. at 394, 631 A.2d at 458.
If, however, the required evidence test is not fulfilled because the offenses in question
have distinct or separate elements, we move to a separate inquiry: whether the principle of
statutory construction known as the rule of lenity requires merger.  Holbrook, 364 Md. at
373, 772 A.2d at 1251.  The rule of lenity allows us to avoid “interpret[ting] a . . . criminal
statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation
can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended.”  Id. (quoting
Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 222, 582 A.2d 525, 529 (1990)).  As it is a principle of
statutory construction, the rule of lenity applies where both offenses are statutory in nature
or where one offense is statutory and the other is a derivative of common law.  Monoker, 321
Md. at 223, 582 A.2d at 529.  Judge Cole, on behalf of the Court in Monoker v. State,
explained the operation of the rule of lenity succinctly:
Even though two offenses do not merge under the required
evidence test, there are nevertheless times when the offenses
will not be punished separately.  Two crimes created by
legislative enactment may not be punished separately if the
legislature intended the offenses to be punished by one sentence.
8
We recognize that the question of merger may also turn on other considerations, such
as “historical treatment, judicial decisions which generally hold that offenses merge, and
fairness.”  McGrath v. State, 356 Md. 20, 25, 736 A.2d 1067, 1069 (1999) (quoting Miles,
349 Md. at 221, 707 A.2d at 844).  Conversely, even when one offense is included in another,
“the offenses still may not merge under some circumstances where the General Assembly has
‘specifically or expressly authorized multiple punishments.’” Miles, 349 Md. at 220, 707
A.2d at 844 (quoting Lancaster, 332 Md. at 394, 631 A.2d at 458).  Petitioner relies only on
the required evidence test and the rule of lenity to challenge her multiple sentences, so our
analysis focuses on these two standards.
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. . . [I]f we are unsure of the legislative intent in punishing
offenses as a single merged crime or as distinct offenses, we in
effect, give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and hold that
the crimes do merge.
321 Md. at 222, 582 A.2d at 529.  When offenses merge under the rule of lenity, “the offense
carrying the lesser maximum penalty ordinarily merges into the offense carrying the greater
maximum penalty.” Miles v. State, 349 Md. 215, 229, 707 A.2d 841, 848 (1998).
Petitioner was sentenced for convictions on four counts: Count 4 (accessory to child
abduction), Count 5 (accessory to child detention outside of this State), Count 9 (accessory
to child detention outside of the United States), and Count 14 (conspiracy to child detention
outside of the United States).  We must determine, therefore, under the required evidence test
and the rule of lenity, whether any of these offenses constitute the same offense and must be
merged.8
The elements of the crimes of child abduction and child detention are not the same
under Section 9-305.   Child abduction under the “old” and “new” Sections 9-305 has the
following elements: (1) a child under 16 years of age; (2) a relative who is not the lawful
custodian of the child; (3) the relative knows that he or she is not the lawful custodian; (4)
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the relative abducts, takes, or carries away the child from the lawful custodian; (5) to a place
outside this State.  Child detention, on the other hand, requires:  (1) a child under 16 years
of age; (2) a relative who is not the lawful custodian of the child; (3) the relative knows that
he or she is not the lawful custodian; (4) the non-custodial relative acquires lawful possession
of the child; (5) the custodian demands the child’s return; (6) the non-custodial relative
detains the child; (7) the detention lasts for 48 hours after the demand was made; and (8) the
detention occurs outside of this State.  Although both offenses of child abduction and child
detention share elements 1 through 3 as well as the territorial elements (outside of this State),
child detention does not require any abduction, taking or carrying away.  The offense of child
abduction, on the other hand, does not require lawful possession, a return demand, detention,
and 48-hour lapse of time.  These two offenses possess several distinct elements; therefore,
they do not merge under the required evidence test.
Nor do the abduction and detention convictions merge under the rule of lenity.  Under
Section 9-305, the legislature unambiguously set out under different subsections several
separate categories of prohibited conduct, including child abduction and detention.  Child
abduction and detention describe two completely different acts: one involving the initial
taking of the child and the other involving the child’s confinement after the lawful custodian
has made a demand for the child’s return.  The mere fact that, in this case, an abduction
preceded the eventual detention of Adam does not suggest that the legislature intended the
two crimes to be punished together.  Rather, we believe that the General Assembly meant
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child abduction and child detention to constitute separately punishable offenses.
Turning to the conspiracy count, we note that a substantive offense is generally
distinct from the crime of conspiracy to commit the offense.  See Grandison v. State, 305
Md. 685, 759, 506 A.2d 580, 617 (1986); accord Apostoledes v. State, 323 Md. 456, 461-63,
593 A.2d 1117, 1120-21 (1991); Cooper v. State, 128 Md. App. 257, 271, 737 A.2d 613, 620
(1999) (citing Townes v. State, 314 Md. 71, 75, 548 A.2d 832, 834 (1988)).  We have
summarized the elements of a conspiracy as follows:
A criminal conspiracy consists of the combination of two or
more persons to accomplish some unlawful purpose, or to
accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means.  The essence
of a criminal conspiracy is an unlawful agreement.  The
agreement need not be formal or spoken, provided there is a
meeting of the minds reflecting a unity of purpose and design.
In Maryland, the crime is complete when the unlawful
agreement is reached, and no overt act in furtherance of the
agreement need be shown.  
Townes, 314 Md. at 75, 548 A.2d at 834.  
In Grandison, we rejected the argument that a charge of conspiracy to murder should
merge with a charge of murder based on the defendant’s role as an accessory before the fact.
305 Md. at 759, 506 A.2d at 617.  Explaining the distinct elements of the conspiracy and the
completed crime, we stated:
It is clear that the substantive crime of murder is distinct from
the crime of conspiracy to commit murder.  The argument is
made here, however, that since Grandison’s murder conviction
was based on his being an accessory before the fact, his
conviction for conspiracy to murder and the murder conviction
should merge.  What Grandison overlooks simply is that
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accessoryship is not a substantive crime but merely the
mechanism by which culpability for the substantive crime is
incurred.  A completed crime is a necessary element.  With
conspiracy to murder, on the other hand, once the agreement to
murder has been made, the crime is complete without any
further action.  In short, each of these crimes requires an element
distinct from the other.  Conspiracy to murder requires an
agreement, while murder, regardless of whether one is convicted
as an accessory or a principal, requires the completed crime.
Thus it is apparent that the conspiracy to murder is a separate
and distinct crime from the substantive crime itself.
Id.
The same distinctions apply with respect to the crimes of conspiracy to detain a child
and accessory to detain a child.  At the moment when one unlawfully agrees to detain a child
in violation of Section 9-305, the continuing crime of conspiracy has been committed.  No
further action is necessary.  For one to act as an accessory to the continuing offense of child
detention, though, no unlawful agreement is required, but the child must have been detained
for at least 48 hours after the custodial parent demanded the child’s return.  In other words,
unlike for a conviction of conspiracy, the crime of accessory to child detention requires
actual detention of a child that violates the provisions of Section 9-305.  Because of the
distinct elements of the two crimes, it is clear that the legislature intended Petitioner’s
conspiracy to be punished as well as her role in the actual detention.  Additionally, we have
identified no statutory ambiguity that would compel the merger of the conspiracy and child
detention counts.  The two offenses, consequently, do not merge.
As for the two child detention counts spanning different time periods, we reach a
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different conclusion.  When Section 9-305 was amended on October 1, 2001, the Legislature
altered only the territorial element of the offense of child detention.  Pre-amendment Section
9-305 criminalized the act of child detention “outside of this State.”  After October 1, 2001,
Section 9-305(a) prohibited child detention in “another state,” while Section 9-305(b)
prohibited such conduct “outside of the United States.”  Petitioner was convicted and
sentenced separately for detaining Adam from August through September of 2001 “outside
of this State” and for detaining Adam from October of 2001 through May of 2002 “outside
of the United States.”
An application of the required evidence test demonstrates that child detention outside
of this State is a lesser included offense of child detention outside of the United States.  First
of all, the child detention, although it continued day by day, was not separately punishable
daily, unless, quite possibly, some intervening event occurred.  As Petitioner continually
assisted in confining Adam to her residence in Egypt, she did not commit a new offense each
day but rather a single offense that continued throughout the duration of that detention.  In
proving that single offense, the State had the burden to prove the territorial element of
“outside of the United States” to show a violation of the “new” Section 9-305.  To prove the
charge that Petitioner violated the “old” Section 9-305, the State had to prove detention
“outside of this State.”  Proving detention outside of the United States, however, also
necessarily requires proving detention “outside of this State.”  Thus, under the circumstances
in this case, Petitioner could not have committed child detention outside of the United States
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without having also committed child detention outside of this State.  Because all of the
elements of Count 5 (child detention outside of this State) are included in the offense charged
under Count 9 (child detention outside of the United States), the former merges into the
latter.  See Lancaster, 332 Md. at 401, 631 A.2d at 461 (holding that two offenses merged
because proof of one necessarily required proof of the other); Snowden v. State, 321 Md. 612,
617, 583 A.2d 1056, 1059 (1991).
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND
REVERSED IN PART. CASE REMANDED
TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
WITH DIRECTIONS TO VACATE THE
SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY
ON THE CONVICTION OF ACCESSORY
TO CHILD DETENTION OUTSIDE OF
THIS STATE AND TO AFFIRM THE
REMAINING CONVICTIONS OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL
COUNTY. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE PAID BY PETITIONER.