Title: State v. Bolio

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-206


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

 Pamela E. Bolio                              June Term, 1992



 Edward J. Cashman, J.

 William Sorrell, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall
    Johnson, Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellee

 Kurt M. Hughes of Wool, Murdoch & Hughes, Burlington, and Charles S. Martin
    of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellant



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      GIBSON, J.    Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault (13 V.S.A.
 { 1024(a)(2)) and appeals on grounds that the trial court should have given
 the jury an instruction on simple assault under 13 V.S.A. { 1023(a)(1).  We
 reverse.
      The basic facts are not in dispute.  Defendant was charged with
 shooting Todd Gorton, after receiving a telephone call from her husband
 David Bolio, then incarcerated at the Chittenden Correctional Center, that
 Gorton, with whom defendant was then living, had sexually abused the
 Bolios' son.  Defendant testified that upon receiving this report, she
 became extremely distraught, began crying, and was confused, angry, and
 scared.  She obtained a .22-caliber pistol from a neighbor and confronted
 Gorton.  Defendant testified about the meeting as follows:
           Q. What did he [Gorton] say?

           A. He just said: "I'm out of here.  You're crazy.  I
           didn't touch him."  And we argued a little bit.  And he
           just -- He laughed at me.  He just -- I said -- I kept
           saying: "Did you?  How could you do that?"  He threw his
           arms up and goes:  "Yeah.  So I did.  What are you going
           to do, shoot me?"  And I -- and I did.  I heard the shot
           and I -- he fell down.  I looked at him, and I turned
           around, and I walked away.

           A clinical psychologist testified as to the diminished capacity of
   defendant, who has been sexually abused by her stepfather as a child, was
   physically abused by her spouses, and has a history of personal drug and
   alcohol abuse.  The witness diagnosed defendant as having an "adjustment
   reaction disorder," which she defined as "someone reacting to something
   terrible that has happened."  She ascribed numerous factors to defendant's
   state of mind at the time of the offense, including feelings of failure in
   protecting her children, guilt over Gorton's abuse of her son, anger over
   betrayal by Gorton, anger and confusion about not learning sooner of the
   abuse, failure to deal with her own past sexual victimization, the
   unavailability of drugs and alcohol, which she had decided to give up, and
   familiarity with and easy access to firearms.
        Based on the proffered evidence of diminished capacity, defendant
   requested an instruction of simple assault as a lesser-included offense.
   The trial court declined, stating that "I just don't see recklessness as a
   lesser-included offense of specific intent.  It's just entirely different;
   entirely different conduct, entirely different thought processes."  The
   court did instruct the jury, however, on the definition of "recklessness."
   Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, and the present appeal
   followed.
        The sole issue on appeal is the trial court's refusal to instruct the
   jury on the elements of simple assault as a lesser-included offense of
   aggravated assault under 13 V.S.A. { 1024(a)(2).  A defendant is entitled to
   jury instructions on a lesser offense than that which is charged if the
   elements of the lesser offense must necessarily be included in the greater
   offense.  State v. Bourn, 139 Vt. 14, 15-16,