Title: Peterson v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Elijah Peterson v. State of Maryland, No. 14, September Term 2019.  Opinion by Hotten, 
J.  
 
CRIMINAL LAW – POST-CONVICTION RELIEF – UNIFORM POST-
CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT – The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
(“UPPA”), codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7-101 (“Crim. Proc.”), 
states that the UPPA applies to a person “confined under sentence of imprisonment; or [ ] 
on parole or probation.”  The Court of Appeals held that Mr. Peterson, who was found 
guilty but not criminally responsible, was not eligible for post-conviction relief under the 
UPPA, based on the plain language of the Act.  Although the Act is remedial in nature and 
construed liberally, the plain language of the Act only applies to an individual convicted in 
Maryland who is imprisoned or on parole or probation. 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – POST-CONVICTION RELIEF – WRIT OF ERROR CORAM 
NOBIS – “The essential nature of the writ of coram nobis is that it is an ‘extraordinary 
remedy’ justified only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.”  
Hyman v. State, 463 Md. 656, 671, 208 A.3d 807, 815-16 (2019) (emphasis omitted).  The 
Court of Appeals held that coram nobis relief is available only to those who sufficiently 
plead the following five elements: (1) the grounds challenging a conviction are based on 
constitutional, jurisdictional, or fundamental grounds, (2) the burden to rebut the 
“presumption of regularity” is overcome, (3) the petitioner has suffered or is facing 
significant lingering collateral consequences from the conviction, (4) no other common law 
or statutory remedy is available, and (5) the issue is not being relitigated in the coram nobis 
proceeding.  Mr. Peterson was unable to show that he suffered significant collateral 
consequences that would afford him relief through a writ of error coram nobis. 
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS – NOT CRIMINALLY 
RESPONSIBLE – Maryland’s habeas corpus statute, codified at MD. CODE ANN., 
COURTS & JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS § 3-702(a) (“Cts. & Jud. Proc.”), states that any “person 
committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his lawful liberty within the State for 
any alleged offense or under any color or pretense or any person in his behalf, may petition 
for the writ of habeas corpus[.]”  Defendants found guilty but not criminally responsible 
may be eligible for habeas corpus relief.   
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
Case No. CT070616X 
Argued: October 8, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 14 
 
September Term, 2019 
 
__________________________________ 
 
ELIJAH PETERSON  
v. 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
__________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
Booth, 
Greene, Clayton, Jr. (Senior Judge, 
Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Hotten, J. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed: March 31, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
Suzanne Johnson
2020-03-31 
12:42-04:00
Section 3-110 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“Crim. Proc.”) provides 
defendants the opportunity to plead “not criminally responsible” to a criminal charge.  The 
General Assembly enacted §§ 3-101–123 to outline the process for such a plea.  When a 
defendant is found guilty but “not criminally responsible” (“NCR”), the defendant is 
committed to the Maryland Department of Health (“the Department”) for inpatient care or 
treatment.1  A court may thereafter authorize “conditional release” for a defendant with 
specified conditions recommended by the Department, and if the defendant violates those 
conditions, the defendant may be re-confined to an appropriate facility chosen by the 
Department.  The instant case addresses whether defendants found guilty, but not 
criminally responsible, may seek post-conviction relief through the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act, a writ of error coram nobis, or a writ of habeas corpus. 
Petitioner, Elijah Peterson (“Mr. Peterson”), seeks review of a ruling by the Circuit 
Court for Prince George’s County that denied both Mr. Peterson’s request for post-
conviction relief under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (“UPPA”) and his 
Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed.  We 
granted certiorari to answer the following three questions: 
1. Is post[-]conviction relief available to a person who has been 
convicted of a crime, found not to be criminally responsible, and is 
either committed to a psychiatric hospital or on conditional release? 
 
2. Is coram nobis relief available to a person who has been convicted of 
a crime, found to be not criminally responsible, and is either 
committed to a psychiatric hospital or on conditional release? 
                                              
1 At the time of Mr. Peterson’s commitment in 2007, the Department was known as 
the Department of Mental Health and Hygiene.  It was renamed the Department of Health 
in July 2017.  Chapter 214, Laws of Maryland 2017. 
 
2 
 
 
3. Did the [Court of Special Appeals] err in holding that [Mr. Peterson], 
who was convicted of a crime and found not to be criminally 
responsible and was on conditional release, was not eligible to 
collaterally challenge his convictions by either a post[-]conviction 
petition or a petition for writ of coram nobis? 
 
For reasons discussed below, we affirm the well-reasoned analysis of the Court of Special 
Appeals on the questions presented.  However, given the Court’s recent decision in Sabisch 
v. Moyer, a circuit court, upon receipt of an appropriate filing, could render a determination 
regarding whether Maryland’s habeas corpus statute is implicated with respect to Mr. 
Peterson. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Factual Background 
 
In March 2007, Mr. Peterson, while walking down the middle of the road on 
Marlboro Pike in Prince George’s County, pointed what appeared to be, a rifle at a police 
vehicle as it passed.  He was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of auto 
theft, one count of attempted theft over $500, one count of unauthorized use of a motor 
vehicle, one count of attempted armed carjacking, two counts of first-degree assault, and 
two counts of second-degree assault.  Mr. Peterson entered a plea of not guilty, but through 
counsel, proceeded to a bench trial on an agreed statement of facts.  The bench trial 
consisted of the following colloquy: 
 
[THE STATE]: Your Honor, had this matter gone to trial, the State would 
have put on evidence that on March 6, 2007, members of the Washington 
Area Vehicle Enforcement Team were working in the area of Marlboro Pike 
and Brooks Drive.  Corporal Stakes and Corporal Aponte of the Prince 
George’s County Police Department were driving west on Marlboro Pike 
when they observed the Defendant, Mr. [ ] Peterson, . . . entering the roadway 
 
3 
 
with what they believed to be a silver rifle, held with both hands, raised at 
shoulder level with his head tucked downward, pointing the perceived 
weapon at an oncoming vehicle.  The county cruiser was in the slow lane and 
the first vehicle was in the fast lane.  The driver of the first vehicle slammed 
on its brakes and swerved in front of their vehicle to avoid [Mr. Peterson], 
who appeared to be pointing a silver rifle at that particular car. 
 
 
Mr. Peterson was still in the roadway, still advancing forward, pointing the 
apparent rifle at Corporal Aponte, who was driving a 1987 brown Chevrolet 
truck.  Corpora[l] Aponte recognized the silver weapon and . . . [he] stopped 
his vehicle because he believed that [Mr. Peterson] was attempting to carjack 
both the Corporal and the other motorist.  At that time Corporal Aponte got 
out of his vehicle and confronted [Mr. Peterson].  He gave Mr. Peterson 
verbal commands to drop the weapon and get on the ground and placed him 
under arrest without incident. 
 
 
Further investigation revealed that what they believed to be a silver rifle[] 
was, in fact, a silver caulk gun[] and all events occurred in Prince George’s 
County, Maryland. 
 
THE COURT: Was the caulk gun loaded? 
 
 
[MR. PETERSON]: No. 
 
 
THE COURT: It wasn’t loaded. Okay. 
 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, those are the allegations.  We believe 
it’s a true statement of facts as to what occurred on that particular date. 
 
 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, that being the case, the Court finds him guilty of 
the offenses. 
 
* * * 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: What is supported [by the facts] would be second 
degree assault of both police officers. 
 
THE COURT: I find him guilty of that. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But the other charges, the auto theft, there was no 
auto theft. 
 
THE COURT: How about – okay. 
 
4 
 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right. They stopped. 
 
THE COURT: All right. I find him not guilty of the other counts, then. And 
I also find him not criminally responsible based upon the report from 
Springfield. 
 
 
Overall, the circuit court found Mr. Peterson guilty of two counts of second-degree 
assault, and determined that he was NCR because he lacked substantial capacity to either 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
law.  See Crim. Proc. § 3-109(a).2  Thereafter, the circuit court ordered Mr. Peterson to be 
civilly committed to the Department for inpatient treatment.  The court never asked Mr. 
Peterson whether he was pleading guilty or not guilty.  The court never advised Mr. 
Peterson that he had a right to a jury trial or asked whether he was waiving that right.   
On December 5, 2007, the circuit court ordered Mr. Peterson to be conditionally 
released from the Department for a period of five years, subject to conditions that included 
mandatory mental health and substance abuse treatment.  Mr. Peterson was also required 
to comply with recommendations from his mental health treatment provider and either 
reside on hospital grounds or in other housing approved by the Department. 3  He was 
                                              
2 Crim. Proc. § 3-109(a) states: “A defendant is not criminally responsible for 
criminal conduct if, at the time of that conduct, the defendant, because of a mental disorder 
or mental retardation, lacks substantial capacity to: 
(1) appreciate the criminality of that conduct; or 
(2) conform that conduct to the requirements of law.” 
 
3 Mr. Peterson was ordered to comply with the following types of recommendations 
given by his mental health provider: 
A. Type and frequency of treatment interventions;  
(continued . . .) 
 
 
5 
 
required to voluntarily admit himself to a psychiatric facility as requested by his mental 
health provider.  Mr. Peterson could not own, possess, or use a firearm of any kind or take 
illicit drugs, use alcohol, or abuse prescription drugs.  Between 2008 and 2013, the circuit 
court issued Mr. Peterson multiple orders for conditional release, in which the circuit court 
placed similar conditions on Mr. Peterson as the original order in December 2007.  In 
March 2013, the circuit court maintained the previously imposed conditions, but also 
required Mr. Peterson to refrain from initiating contact with the victim of his crime. 
Procedural Background 
 
1. Circuit Court Proceedings 
On July 24, 2012, during conditional release, Mr. Peterson filed a pro se petition for 
post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (“UPPA”).4  After 
securing counsel, Mr. Peterson filed a Supplemental Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, 
which asserted (1) Mr. Peterson’s NCR plea was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea 
                                              
(. . . continued) 
 
B. Participation in other programs such as a day program, family therapy, 
marriage counseling, alcohol and substance abuse treatment, vocational 
rehabilitation, and job counseling;  
C. Taking prescribed psychiatric medication and submitting to such laboratory 
tests, as the prescriber of the psychiatric medication shall deem necessary to 
monitor the blood levels and the effectiveness of the medication; 
D. Applying for inpatient psychiatric treatment. 
E. Employment. 
F. Travel outside of the State of Maryland.  (parenthetical omitted).  
 
4 Crim. Proc. § 7-103 states: “(a) For each trial or sentence, a person may file only 
one petition for relief under this title.  (b) Unless extraordinary cause is shown, a petition 
under this subtitle may not be filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed.” 
 
6 
 
and was invalid because the record failed to demonstrate that he understood the nature of 
the charges and (2) Mr. Peterson’s original counsel was ineffective because he did not 
inform Mr. Peterson of the consequences of pleading NCR. 
On June 11, 2013, the circuit court conducted a hearing regarding Mr. Peterson’s 
post-conviction request.  On November 15, 2013, the court denied Mr. Peterson’s request 
for post-conviction relief and held that Mr. Peterson was neither “confined” nor on 
“probation or parole,” for purposes of the UPPA. 
On January 10, 2014, while committed, Mr. Peterson filed a Petition for Writ of 
Error Coram Nobis and requested a hearing to vacate the 2007 NCR judgment.  After a 
hearing, the circuit court found that Mr. Peterson’s commitment to the Department was a 
direct consequence of his NCR plea, and, therefore, not a collateral consequence.  The 
court denied Mr. Peterson’s request for coram nobis relief.  Mr. Peterson’s subsequent 
motion for reconsideration was also denied because the court determined that Mr. Peterson 
was never “convicted” and that he failed to demonstrate significant collateral 
consequences. 
Mr. Peterson timely appealed both the denial of his respective petitions for post-
conviction claim and his coram nobis relief to the Court of Special Appeals. 
2. The Court of Special Appeals Proceedings 
The Court of Special Appeals initially reviewed the history of the NCR plea to 
ascertain whether a defendant who enters such a plea, is eligible for post-conviction or 
coram nobis relief.  Peterson v. State, 2019 WL 328416 at *3-5 (2019).  The Court of 
Special Appeals held that the 
 
7 
 
NCR statutory scheme recognizes that ‘no valid purpose would be furthered 
by holding the [NCR defendant] accountable for his acts.  [NCR] is a 
recognition that none of the theories which underlie our criminal law—
prevention, restraint, rehabilitation, deterrence, education, and retribution—
are furthered by punishing’ those found to be NCR. 
 
Id. at *5 (quoting State v. Garnett, 172 Md. App. 558, 564, 916 A.2d 393, 396 (2007)).  
Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals determined that a defendant convicted of a 
crime and subsequently found NCR was not subject to criminal punishment.  Id.  The Court 
held that commitment for those found NCR and the restrictions associated with conditional 
release were intended to protect the public and the patient, not to punish.  Id. (quoting 
Harrison-Solomon v. State, 442 Md. 254, 286-87, 112 A.3d 408, 428 (2015)). 
In addressing the UPPA, the Court of Special Appeals held that “[Mr. Peterson] 
satisfie[d] the [UPPA] requirement of being ‘a person convicted in any court in the State,’ 
because he was found guilty of two counts of second degree assault.”  Id. at *6.  The Court 
then analyzed the following UPPA requirements: “(1) confined under sentence of 
imprisonment; or (2) on parole or probation.”  Crim. Proc. § 7-101.  Although the Court 
held that Mr. Peterson satisfied the conviction component, it also held that conditional 
release was not the equivalent of being on parole or probation as required by the UPPA for 
two reasons: (1) parole and probation are unambiguous and defined by Black’s Law 
Dictionary and (2) the General Assembly did not intend to include conditional release when 
it expressly codified parole and probation.  Id. at *6-7.  The Court determined that parole 
and probation are criminal sanctions, whereas conditional release from civil commitment 
is not.  Id. at *6.  Therefore, “[a]n NCR defendant on conditional release does not satisfy 
the requirement of the UPPA that the defendant be ‘on parole or probation.’  To interpret 
 
8 
 
the UPPA otherwise . . . would expand the UPPA beyond its clear scope.”  Id. at *7.  The 
Court also addressed confinement under the UPPA, indicating that confinement refers to 
defendants subject to criminal sanctions, not civil confinement.  Id. 
Regarding the coram nobis issue, the Court outlined the factors relied on in Jones 
v. State, 445 Md. 324, 126 A.2d 1162 (2015) and Anderson v. Dep’t of Health and Mental 
Hygiene, 310 Md. 217, 528 A.2d 904 (1987), to adjudicate the instant case.  Relying on 
these cases, the Court of Special Appeals held Mr. Peterson’s “commitment and 
conditional release are a direct consequence of his conviction and subsequent NCR 
finding[,]” not merely a consequence of the NCR finding alone.  Id. at *8.  Since Mr. 
Peterson’s commitment was not a collateral consequence of the conviction, the Court of 
Special Appeals concluded that he was not entitled to coram nobis relief.  Id. 
Mr. Peterson timely appealed to this Court, and we granted certiorari. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review interpretations and applications of Maryland constitutional, statutory, or 
case law, under a de novo standard of review to establish “whether the trial court’s 
conclusions are ‘legally correct.’”  Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535, 907 A.2d 175, 184 
(2006).  This Court “will not disturb the factual findings of the post-conviction court unless 
they are clearly erroneous.”  Arrington v. State, 411 Md. 524, 551, 983 A.2d 1071, 1086 
(2009).  When reviewing a lower court’s grant or denial of a coram nobis petition, we apply 
an “abuse of discretion” standard of review.  State v. Rich, 454 Md. 448, 471, 164 A.3d 
355, 368-69 (2017). 
 
 
9 
 
DISCUSSION 
A. In a criminal case, the court may declare the defendant NCR after a guilty 
finding, generating different consequences from those only found guilty. 
 
A defendant is NCR “if, at the time of that conduct, the defendant, because of a 
mental disorder or mental retardation, lacks substantial capacity to: (1) appreciate the 
criminality of that conduct; or (2) conform that conduct to the requirements of law.”  Crim. 
Proc. § 3-109(a).  The defendant has the burden of proof on this issue by a preponderance 
of the evidence.  Crim. Proc. § 3-110(b).5 
After the court finds the defendant NCR, “the court shall order the defendant 
committed to the facility that the Health Department designates for institutional inpatient 
care or treatment.”  Crim. Proc. § 3-112(b).  The defendant may be discharged “from 
commitment only if that person would not be a danger, as a result of mental disorder or 
mental retardation, to self or to the person or property of others if discharged.”  Crim. Proc. 
§ 3-114(b).  The defendant may be “eligible for conditional release from commitment only 
if that person would not be a danger, as a result of mental disorder or mental retardation, 
to self or to the person or property of others if released from confinement with conditions 
imposed by the court.”  Crim. Proc. § 3-114(c).  Before the court can release the defendant 
from civil confinement, with or without conditions, the court must determine whether the 
defendant is dangerous.  For conditional release, the court considers the defendant’s 
dangerousness within the context of the proposed conditions.  Hawkes v. State, 433 Md. 
                                              
5 Crim. Proc. § 3-110(b) states: “The defendant has the burden to establish, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the defense of not criminally responsible.”   
 
10 
 
105, 133, 70 A.3d 308, 325 (2013).  If the defendant violates the terms of conditional 
release, the defendant may be re-confined to a designated facility.  See Crim. Proc. § 3-
121(i)(1).  Finally, a defendant who has been civilly confined may apply for release, and 
the trier of fact shall decide whether the defendant must remain in confinement, may be 
conditionally released, or may be discharged from commitment.  Crim. Proc. § 3-119. 
In the case at bar, Mr. Peterson was civilly confined and conditionally released 
several times. 
B. The UPPA’s plain language does not support expanding post-conviction relief to 
those found NCR. 
 
The jurisdiction of the UPPA extends to “a person convicted in any court in the 
State who is: (1) confined under sentence of imprisonment; or (2) on parole or probation.”  
Crim. Proc. § 7-101.  Mr. Peterson was on conditional release when he filed his petition 
for post-conviction relief.  This Court must decide whether the UPPA is available to one 
civilly confined or on conditional release. 
1. Principles of statutory interpretation. 
Our primary goals in the interpretation of a statute are to ascertain the General 
Assembly’s desired purpose and goals and remedy the issue addressed in the legislation.  
Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 172, 935 A.2d 699, 708 (2007). 
As [we have] explained, to determine [the General Assembly’s] purpose or 
policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and 
ordinary meaning.  We do so on the tacit theory that the General Assembly 
is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.  When the 
statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language 
to determine the General Assembly’s intent.  If the words of the statute, 
construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and 
unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute 
 
11 
 
as it is written.  In addition, we neither add nor delete words to a clear and 
unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words that the 
General Assembly used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an 
attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning.  If there is no ambiguity in 
the language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or 
circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends. 
 
If the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, then courts consider not 
only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect 
in light of the setting, the objectives, and the purpose of the enactment under 
consideration.  We have said that there is an ambiguity within a statute when 
there exist[s] two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute.  
When a statute can be interpreted in more than one way, [our job] is to resolve 
that ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, using all the resources and 
tools of statutory construction at our disposal. 
 
Bellard v. State, 452 Md. 467, 481, 157 A.3d 272, 280 (2017).  Moreover, we will avoid 
an absurd interpretation and interpret the plain language within the context in which it 
appears.  Id. at 482, 157 A.3d at 280. 
In the case at bar, we must define the following words as they are used in the UPPA: 
“convicted,” “parole,” and “probation.”  Mr. Peterson argues that “convicted,” “parole,” 
and “probation” are ambiguous and that the Court of Special Appeals should have 
considered the statutory scheme and legislative history to comport with the General 
Assembly’s intent.  Mr. Peterson contends that we should avoid construing the UPPA to 
exclude defendants found NCR to avoid constitutional issues, because no other collateral 
remedy exists.  The State counters, indicating that the plain language of the UPPA limits 
its application to incarcerated defendants or those on parole or probation and that the plain 
language conveys the intent of the General Assembly.  The State argues that civil 
commitment and conditional release are not equivalent to incarceration or parole and 
 
12 
 
probation.  The State asserts that no constitutional issues arise, even if we exclude 
defendants found NCR from relief under the UPPA. 
Upon review, we determine that “convicted,” “parole,” and “probation” are 
unambiguous and apply the plain meaning of the words.6  We explain. 
2. Under the plain language of the UPPA, the General Assembly excluded 
conditional release from its application. 
 
The Court of Special Appeals applied a plain meaning analysis to “parole” and 
“probation.”  We agree with, apply, and restate the reasoning of the Court of Special 
Appeals. 
“Parole” is “a conditional release from confinement granted by the [Maryland 
Parole] Commission to an inmate.”  MD. CODE ANN., CORRECTIONAL SERVICES § 7-101(i).  
“Probation” is “[a] court-imposed criminal sentence that, subject to stated conditions, 
releases a convicted person into the community instead of sending the criminal to jail or 
prison[.]”  Probation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  A probationer must 
routinely check in with a probation officer during the probationary term.  Neither this Court 
                                              
6 Neither party argues that Mr. Peterson was not convicted.  A “conviction” has both 
a “general and popular” meaning and a “legal and technical” meaning.  See Myers v. State, 
303 Md. 639, 642-43, 496 A.2d 312, 313-14 (1985) (holding that conviction in its “general 
and popular sense” means “the establishment of guilt prior to, and independent of, the 
judgment of the court[,]” and in its “legal and technical sense[,]” means “the final judgment 
and sentence rendered by a court pursuant to a verdict or plea of guilty”).  No matter which 
definition we employ, Mr. Peterson, in the instant case, was convicted as envisioned by the 
UPPA.  The circuit court’s judgment satisfies the legal definition, and Mr. Peterson’s NCR 
plea prior to the circuit court judgment satisfies the general definition.  See also Treece v. 
State, 313 Md. 665, 676, 547 A.2d 1054, 1059-60 (1988) (holding that “the defendant who 
‘successfully’ pleads [NCR] is subject to the stigma of a criminal conviction, although 
[they] may not be subject to all of the consequences that would otherwise flow therefrom”). 
 
13 
 
nor the General Assembly have interpreted either word to mean anything other than the 
two systems defined.  Moreover, this Court has consistently held that the UPPA’s 
application extends only to those incarcerated or on parole or probation.  In McMannis v. 
State, which was relied upon by both parties, we held that UPPA’s predecessor statute, 
previously codified at MD. CODE, Art. 27 § 645A, extends only to those incarcerated or on 
parole or probation, meaning it does not extend beyond the plain language.  See 311 Md. 
534, 536 A.2d 652 (1988).  Consistent with our precedent and the ordinary definitions, the 
plain meaning of “parole” and “probation” are unambiguous. 
The UPPA specifically grants relief to those on “parole or probation.”  Crim. Proc. 
§ 7-101.  The General Assembly did not extend the UPPA to the “functional equivalents” 
of parole and probation, as Mr. Peterson urges us to do.  As stated, “the General Assembly 
is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.”  Bellard, 452 Md. at 481, 
157 A.3d at 280.  The General Assembly was aware of what terms and relief it adopted 
under the UPPA.  If the General Assembly wanted to include conditional release in the 
UPPA, it would have done so.  Furthermore, the General Assembly excluded the phrasing 
“functional equivalents” from the UPPA.  The plain language of the UPPA reveals the 
General Assembly’s intent—to provide relief for defendants incarcerated or serving a term 
of parole or probation. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the General Assembly intended to include the “functional 
equivalent” of parole or probation, conditional release would still not qualify, because it is 
not a criminal sanction. 
 
14 
 
Probation is a punishment.  Although [this Court has] called probation ‘a 
matter of grace’ and effectively clemency, its fundamental nature is different 
from the treatment of people found not criminally responsible.  Commitment 
of those found not criminally responsible and the restrictions of conditional 
release are not designed to punish, but rather to protect the public from the 
patient and the patient from [themselves].  If the patient is unlikely to 
represent a risk to others or [themselves], [Crim. Proc.] § 3-114 mandates 
that the patient be discharged if a court renders affirmatively such a holding.  
Although the State supervision could be indefinite potentially, it could also 
be relatively brief.  Unlike someone subject to probation, there is no longer 
a determined time for which the patient will be subject to judicial oversight, 
absent an outright discharge. 
 
Harrison-Solomon, 442 Md. at 286-87, 112 A.3d at 428 (internal citations omitted).  
Although we have held that conditional release and probation are “similar superficially,” 
they are not functionally equivalent because “of [their] disparate foundational purposes.”  
Id. at 285, 112 A.3d at 427.  Conditional release restricts freedom and liberty.  However, 
its limitations on liberty differ from the limitations created by parole and probation.  Since 
conditional release is fundamentally different from parole and probation, it cannot be 
considered the “functional equivalent” of either parole or probation. 
 
Accordingly, Mr. Peterson does not satisfy the UPPA’s second requirement of being 
on parole or probation. 
3. The UPPA does not provide relief for defendants found to be NCR who have 
been civilly confined. 
 
The UPPA also grants relief to people “confined under sentence of imprisonment,” 
but it does not provide relief for those civilly committed.  Crim. Proc. § 7-101.  Just as with 
“parole or probation,” the General Assembly did not include “functional equivalent” with 
the phrase “confined under sentence of imprisonment.”  Defendants civilly committed are 
not entitled to relief under the UPPA because the General Assembly excluded civil 
 
15 
 
commitment and the phrasing “functional equivalent” from the explicit language of the 
UPPA. 
Even if the General Assembly intended to include the “functional equivalent” of 
“confined to sentence of imprisonment[,]” defendants who have been civilly committed 
are not included because civil confinement is fundamentally different from imprisonment.  
A defendant convicted of a crime and subsequently found NCR is not held accountable for 
his or her criminal actions because “none of the theories which underlie our criminal law—
prevention, restraint, rehabilitation, deterrence, education, and retribution—are furthered 
by punishing those found to be NCR.”  Peterson, 2019 WL 328416 at *5.  Because of this, 
a NCR defendant is not, and cannot be, subjected to criminal punishment.  Pouncey v. 
State, 297 Md. 264, 269-70, 465 A.2d 475, 478 (1983).  A defendant found NCR is civilly 
committed to an inpatient facility, designated by the Department, for an indeterminate 
amount of time.  Civil confinement subjects NCR defendants to different conditions than 
those defendants confined by prison sentences.  However, civil commitment is designed to 
protect, not punish.  Harrison-Solomon, 442 Md. at 286-87, 112 A.3d at 428.7  As such, 
civil commitment is not a criminal sanction. 
                                              
7 In Harrison-Solomon, the defendant plead guilty to two counts of second-degree 
assault and the circuit court found him not criminally responsible.  Thereafter, the court 
committed him to the Department for inpatient treatment.  Harrison-Solomon, 442 Md. at 
260, 112 A.3d at 412.  After his initial commitment, and several times thereafter, the 
defendant was conditionally released.  Among those conditions, the court ordered him to: 
 
(1) reside with his mother; (2) receive and follow the treatment advice of a 
specified psychiatrist; (3) attend a semester of high school and thereafter 
remain involved with meaningful daytime activities approved by his 
(continued . . .) 
 
16 
 
On the other hand, a defendant who is only found guilty, rather than both guilty and 
NCR, can be punished for his or her crimes and imprisoned because imprisoning these 
defendants fulfills our criminal justice purposes.  Pouncey, 297 Md. at 269-70, 465 A.2d 
at 478.  Criminal confinement is a criminal sanction, designed to punish, not protect.  
Harrison-Solomon, 442 Md. at 286-87, 112 A.3d at 428.  A criminal sentence has a pre-
determined duration and, as stated, subjects individuals to conditions dissimilar to the 
conditions NCR defendants face.  See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980).  
By definition, imprisonment is a criminal sanction.  Thus, even if the General Assembly 
intended to include the “functional equivalent” of “confined under sentence of 
imprisonment” in the UPPA’s jurisdiction, civil commitment is fundamentally different 
from criminal confinement and not its “functional equivalent.” 
In sum, the UPPA’s jurisdiction does not extend to those civilly committed because 
the plain language omits this language and these defendants.  The General Assembly 
intended to exclude these defendants because “the General Assembly is presumed to have 
meant what it said and said what it meant.”  Bellard, 452 Md. at 481, 157 A.3d at 280.  
Moreover, civil and criminal confinement are fundamentally different.  Because Mr. 
                                              
(. . .continued) 
 
therapist; (4) refrain from using illegal drugs or alcohol and submit to urine  
testing; and (5) notify and receive approval of his therapist before taking 
certain actions, such as changing his place of residence, employment, or 
marital status. 
 
Id. at 260-61, 112 A.3d at 412.  The court ordered each of these unique conditions to protect 
the public from the defendant and the defendant from himself rather than to punish the 
defendant for his criminal acts by issuing a term of imprisonment or parole or probation. 
 
17 
 
Peterson falls outside of the class eligible for relief under the UPPA, he is not entitled to 
relief under the UPPA.  The Court of Special Appeals did not err in coming to this 
conclusion. 
C. Coram nobis relief is only available to those who suffer significant collateral 
consequences. 
 
A writ of error coram nobis is a form of Maryland common law relief that requires 
a petitioner to satisfy certain qualifying elements.  A petitioner is entitled to coram nobis 
relief only if: 
(1) the petitioner challenges a conviction based on constitutional, 
jurisdictional[,] or fundamental grounds, whether factual or legal; (2) the 
petitioner rebuts the presumption of regularity [that] attaches to the criminal 
case; (3) the petitioner fac[es] significant collateral consequences from the 
conviction; (4) the issue as to the alleged error has not been waived or finally 
litigated in a prior proceeding, [absent] intervening changes in the applicable 
law; and (5) the petitioner is not entitled to another statutory or common law 
remedy (for example, the petitioner cannot be incarcerated in a State prison 
or on parole or probation, as the petitioner likely could then petition for post-
conviction relief). 
 
Jones, 445 Md. at 338, 126 A.2d at 1170 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (emphasis added).  In the case at bar, the most determinative element is element 
3: whether Mr. Peterson suffered significant collateral consequences as a result of his NCR 
plea.  We hold that Mr. Peterson did not suffer significant collateral consequences.  We 
explain. 
Within the context of coram nobis relief, “conviction” is used to “identify a person 
eligible for relief under the petition as one who, inter alia, is facing significant collateral 
consequences because of having been found guilty of a criminal offense. . . . The critical 
issue is whether the finding of guilt did or will in fact cause significant collateral 
 
18 
 
consequences to the person petitioning for coram nobis relief.”  Abrams v. State, 176 Md. 
App. 600, 616-17, 933 A.2d 887, 897 (2007).8  In Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 760 A.2d 647 
(2000), we clearly established that the significant collateral consequences must arise from 
the conviction. 
A direct consequence of a conviction is one where the result has “a definite, 
immediate[,] and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment.”  
Yoswick v. State, 347 Md. 228, 240, 700 A.2d 251, 256 (1997) (citing Cuthrell v. Director, 
Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973)).  A collateral consequence is one 
excluded from the court’s judgment and is not a “definite, practical consequence” of the 
conviction.  Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1366.  Civil commitment is a direct consequence of a 
finding of guilty and subsequent finding of NCR.  Specifically, 
[a defendant’s] confinement in a state mental institution is a direct 
consequence of adjudications at [their] criminal trial that [they were] guilty 
of committing a crime but insane at the time of the crime.  The commitment 
is not simply a consequence of the insanity finding, as a person, whether sane 
or insane, may not be committed for an offense of which he has been 
acquitted.  In such event, the accused . . . walks out of the courtroom a free 
man.  Instead, the commitment to the mental hospital is the ‘disposition’ 
portion of the judgment in the criminal case, which is composed of the verdict 
that [they] committed the criminal act charged and the disposition of [them], 
as a final judgment. 
 
Anderson, 310 Md. at 224-25, 528 A.2d at 908 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
                                              
8 Although this was a Court of Special Appeals opinion, we adopted this view in 
Rivera v. State, 409 Md. 176, 973 A.2d 218 (2009). 
 
19 
 
In Anderson, the defendant was charged with first degree murder but, after a trial, 
was found “not guilty by reason of insanity.”  310 Md. at 219, 528 A.2d at 905.  Because 
of this finding, the circuit court ordered the defendant be evaluated to determine whether 
he should be civilly committed rather than criminally sanctioned.  Id.  Based on the 
evaluation, the circuit court civilly committed the defendant to a mental institution.  Id.  
Similar to the defendant in Anderson, Mr. Peterson was immediately committed to a mental 
health facility, based on the circuit court’s NCR finding, rather than confined to a term of 
imprisonment.  He was later conditionally released.  Thereafter, he was re-confined and 
conditionally released on several occasions.  Just as the defendant in Anderson, Mr. 
Peterson’s initial and subsequent civil commitments were direct consequences of his 
conviction and finding of NCR. 
In sum, Mr. Peterson’s initial commitment, conditional release, and re-
commitments were direct consequences of his conviction and finding of NCR, as 
contemplated by our decision in Anderson.  Accordingly, Mr. Peterson is not entitled to 
coram nobis relief, and the Court of Special Appeals did not err in concluding as such. 
D. Under Sabisch, habeas corpus relief may be available to a defendant found NCR. 
 
We have not previously decided whether habeas corpus relief is available to a 
defendant found NCR.  Although Mr. Peterson did not seek, nor did the Court of Special 
Appeals address, habeas corpus relief, given our holding in Sabisch v. Moyer, 466 Md. 
327, 220 A.3d 272 (2019), a circuit court could determine that such relief may be available 
to defendants who are not “physically restrained,” but are found NCR. 
 
20 
 
The United States Supreme Court has held confinement, whether civil or criminal, 
is a significant deprivation of liberty.  See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 83 S. Ct. 
373 (1963).9  In light of the circumstances relative to Mr. Peterson and our opinion in 
Sabisch, those found NCR may be eligible for habeas corpus relief. 
The Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“Cts. & Jud. Proc.”) 
provides the following: 
A person committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his lawful liberty 
within the State for an alleged offense or under any color or pretense or any 
person in his behalf, may petition for the writ of habeas corpus to the end 
that the cause of the commitment, detainer, confinement, or restraint may be 
inquired into. 
 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-702(a). 
The Maryland Constitution authorizes habeas corpus relief and reflects that “[t]he 
General Assembly shall pass no Law suspending the privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus.”  MD. CONST. Art. III, § 55.  We need not go through the entire interpretation of 
Maryland’s habeas corpus relief as we did in Sabisch.  Ultimately, in Sabisch, we 
overturned prior cases requiring “physical restraint” and held that a petitioner only needs 
to be “committed, detained, confined, or restrained from lawful liberty within the State” to 
be eligible.  Sabisch, 466 Md. at 331, 220 A.3d at 274 (citing Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-702(a)).  
                                              
9 See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1809 (1979) (“This 
Court repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); O’Connor v. 
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2496 (1975) (“There can be no doubt that 
involuntary commitment to a mental hospital, like involuntary confinement of an 
individual for any reason, is a deprivation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish 
without due process of law.”). 
 
 
21 
 
We defined “commit,” “detain,” “confine,” and “restrain” in Sabisch.  We held “commit,” 
“detain,” and “confine,” imply physical force or physical constraint.  Sabisch, 466 Md. at 
367, 220 A.3d at 295.10  “Restrain,” on the other hand, is not limited to physical restraint 
but includes broader restrictions on a person’s liberty. 
As stated supra, civil commitment is designed to protect the public rather than 
punish the offender.  However, this does not alter the fact that civil commitment falls 
squarely within the plain language of our habeas corpus statute.  “Commitment” is defined 
as “[t]he act of confining a person in a prison, mental hospital, or other institution; 
esp[ecially] the sending of a person to jail, by warrant or order, for crime, contempt or 
contumacy[.]”  Commitment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  A defendant 
found NCR is immediately “committed to [a] facility that the Health Department 
designates for institutional inpatient care or treatment.”  Crim. Proc. § 3-112(b).  In other 
words, the defendant is civilly committed.11  Civil commitment is a significant deprivation 
of liberty and deserves constitutional protection.  See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425, 99 S. Ct. 
at 1809.  Therefore, civil commitment deserves consideration of constitutional and 
statutory remedies when warranted by the circumstances presented. 
                                              
10 Although we held that “physical restraint” was no longer required under our 
habeas statute, we nonetheless determined that, under the facts of the case, Mr. Sabisch 
did not suffer significant restraint in Maryland and was therefore not eligible for habeas 
corpus relief.  Sabisch, 466 Md. at 378, 220 A.3d at 302. 
 
11 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “civil commitment” as “[a] court-ordered 
commitment of a person who is ill, incompetent, drug addicted, or the like[.]”  Civil 
Commitment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 
22 
 
Defendants on conditional release may be eligible for habeas corpus relief.  
Conditional release is a “therapeutic release of a mentally ill individual from a psychiatric 
hospital as part of a continuing course of treatment.”  Bergstein v. State, 322 Md. 506, 516, 
588 A.2d 779, 784 (1991) (footnote omitted).  A court can grant conditional release to a 
defendant found NCR if it finds the defendant is not a danger to other people, themselves, 
or property.  Crim. Proc. § 3-114(c).  As expressed supra, we have held that a court must 
consider the defendant’s “dangerousness” within the context of the conditions imposed on 
the defendant.  Hawkes, 433 Md. at 133, 70 A.3d at 325.  Therefore, inherent in a 
conditional release order are conditions that the defendant must adhere to; in other words, 
conditional release may deprive a defendant of a certain level of liberty.  These conditions 
may deprive the defendant of engaging in conduct he or she otherwise would engage in 
and may require the defendant to engage in conduct he or she otherwise would not engage 
in.  If a defendant violates the terms of conditional release, the court can revoke the 
conditional release and re-commit the defendant. 12  Accordingly, the conditional release 
order may deprive the defendant of significant liberty interests. 
                                              
12 Furthermore, a violation of conditional release can lead to re-commitment (in 
other words, civil commitment), which as stated, falls squarely into the plain language 
deserving of habeas corpus relief.  If a defendant violates the conditions of conditional 
release, the State’s Attorney determines if there is a factual basis for the complaint that the 
defendant has violated their conditional release.  Crim. Proc. § 3-121(a).  The State’s 
Attorney then must notify the Department and file a petition with the court.  The court 
decides if there is probable cause to believe that the defendant has violated their conditional 
release.  Crim. Proc. § 3-121(d) & (e).  If the court finds probable cause, the court issues a 
hospital warrant and the defendant will be transferred to a facility designated by the 
Department.  Crim. Proc. § 3-121(e). 
 
23 
 
As the United States Supreme Court has held, confinement of any kind, whether 
civil or criminal, is a significant deprivation of liberty.  Specifically, within the context of 
civil confinement, the United States Supreme Court, in Addington, 441 U.S. at 425, 99 S.  
Ct. at 1809, “repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes 
a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”  “[I]nvoluntary 
commitment to a mental hospital, like involuntary confinement of an individual for any 
reason, is a deprivation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish without due process 
of law.”  O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 580, 95 S. Ct. at 2496. 
In Sabisch, we held that determining whether a condition of probation is a 
significant deprivation of liberty requires a case-by-case analysis, and we choose to apply 
a similar case-by-case analysis to conditions placed on defendants during his or her 
conditional release.  466 Md. at 327, 220 A.3d at 272.  Mr. Peterson was required to adhere 
to several restrictions to maintain his conditional release.  Mr. Peterson was required to 
attend mandatory mental health treatment and substance abuse treatment appointments.  He 
was ordered to live on hospital grounds or in housing approved by the Department.  He 
was also expected to comply with any recommendations from his mental health provider 
regarding: (1) the type and frequency of his treatments; (2) his participation in other 
programs, including, but not limited to, family therapy, day programs, and job counseling; 
(3) psychiatric medication and testing; (4) applying for inpatient treatment; (5) his 
employment; and (6) traveling outside of Maryland. 
Given our holding in Sabisch that physical custody may no longer be required when 
considering a petition seeking habeas corpus relief, a circuit court could determine whether 
 
24 
 
Mr. Peterson is entitled to habeas corpus relief, upon receipt of an appropriate filing.  
Indeed, the State conceded at oral argument that if physical restraint were not a requirement 
under the habeas corpus statute, Mr. Peterson may be entitled to such relief. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, we hold that Mr. Peterson, who was found guilty but not criminally 
responsible, was not eligible for relief under the plain language of the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act.  We also hold that Mr. Peterson was not entitled to relief 
through a writ of error coram nobis because he did not suffer significant collateral 
consequences.  Rather, Mr. Peterson’s initial commitment, conditional release, and re-
commitments were direct consequences of his conviction and finding of NCR.  However, 
in light of the Court’s decision in Sabisch, the circuit court may determine whether Mr. 
Peterson is entitled to habeas corpus relief, upon receipt of an appropriately filed petition.  
We affirm the judgment the Court of Special Appeals. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED.  
COSTS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
PETITIONER.