Title: Wall v. Marouk

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

WALL v. MAROUK2013 OK 36Case Number: 109005Decided: 06/04/2013IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

Timothy Wall, Appellant,v.John S. Marouk, D.O., 
Appellee.
CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY
Honorable Dana Kuehn, Trial Judge
¶0 Appellant challenges the constitutionality of 12 O.S. 2011 §19, which requires filing of an affidavit of 
merit in actions for professional negligence. We granted certiorari to address 
the constitutionality of this statute. We hold that it is a special law which 
violates the Okla. Const. art. 5, §46, and that it also creates an 
unconstitutional financial burden on access to the courts in violation of the 
Okla. Const. art. 2, §6. 
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
OVERRULED;REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
Glenn R. Beustring, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellant.S. Lance Freije, Brian 
Jack Goree, Bob Latham, Ambar Iqbal Malik, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellee.
KAUGER, J.: 
¶1 The dispositive issue presented is whether, in the aftermath of 
Zeier v. Zimmer, 2006 OK 98, 152 P.3d 861, the legislative amendment to 
12 O.S. 2011§191 , removed the unconstitutional infirmity from the 
requirement of an affidavit of merit in any civil action for professional 
negligence. An examination of the Okla. Const. art. 5, §462, art. 2, §63, 63 O.S. 2011 
§1-1708.1C, as well as prior 
case law, leads to the inevitable conclusion that it did not. We hold that it is 
a special law regulating the practice of law and that it places an impermissible 
financial burden on access to the courts.
FACTS
¶2 Appellant Timothy Wall (Patient) filed a petition for medical negligence 
against Dr. John S. Marouk, D.O. (Physician) on August 11, 2010. The patient 
alleged that the physician negligently cut the median nerve in his right arm 
during a carpal tunnel surgery, resulting in loss of feeling in his right 
fingers. The patient did not attach an affidavit of merit as required by 
12 O.S. 2011 §19. The physician filed a 
motion to dismiss on September 8, 2010, on the grounds that the patient failed 
to include the affidavit of merit. 
¶3 In response to the physician's motion to dismiss, the patient argued that 
12 O.S 2011 §19 was unconstitutional based on this court's holding in 
Zeier v. Zimmer. On December 9, 2010, the trial court entered a 
certified interlocutory order denying the physician's motion to dismiss, and 
giving the patient twenty days from the date of the order to file an affidavit 
of merit pursuant to 12 O.S 2011 §19 or face dismissal of the cause. On January 
3, 2011, the trial court entered an amended certified interlocutory order 
stating that 12 O.S. 2011 
§19 required an affidavit of merit finding the patient's arguments 
unpersuasive.4 On February 14, 2011, we granted the patient's Petition 
for Certiorari to Review a Certified Interlocutory Order and stayed proceedings 
in the trial court pending review on certiorari to consider the 
constitutionality of 12 O.S. 2011 §19. The cause was assigned to this office on 
February 28, 2013.
I.TITLE 12 O.S. 2011 §19 IS A SPECIAL LAW WHICH 
VIOLATESTHE OKLA. CONST., ART. 5, §46.
¶4 Title 12 O.S. 2011 
§19 essentially provides that in civil actions for professional negligence, 
the plaintiff must attach an expert's affidavit. It creates two classes, those 
who file a cause of action for negligence generally, and those who file a cause 
of action for professional negligence. The patient argues that §19 is 
unconstitutional because it violates the Okla. Const. art. 5, §46 prohibition on 
special laws. We agree. The Oklahoma Constitution is a unique document. Some of 
its provisions are unlike those in the constitutions of any other state, and 
some are more detailed and restrictive than those of other states. Section 46 is 
one of these provisions and it specifically prohibits the Legislature from 
enacting special laws dealing with twenty-eight subject areas.5 
¶5 A special law confers some right or imposes some duty on some but not all 
of the class of those who stand upon the same footing and same relation to the 
subject of the law.6 A law is special if it confers particular privileges or 
imposes peculiar disabilities or burdensome conditions in the exercise of a 
common right on a class of persons arbitrarily selected from the general body of 
those who stand in precisely the same relation to the subject of the law.7 Special laws apply to 
less than the whole of a class of persons, entities or things standing upon the 
same footing or in substantially the same situation or circumstances, and thus 
do not have a uniform operation.8 The shortcoming of a special law is that it does not 
embrace all the classes that it should naturally embrace, and that it creates 
preference and establishes inequality. It applies to persons, things, and places 
possessed of certain qualities or situations and excludes from its effect other 
not dissimilar persons, things, or places.9 
¶6 Here, the distillate of art. 5, §46 is that the Legislature shall not pass 
a special law regulating the practice of judicial proceedings before the courts 
or any other tribunal.10 This is precisely the situation we face. Title 
12 O.S. 2011 §19 creates a new subclass of 
tort victims and tortfeasors known as professional tort victims and tortfeasors. 
In doing so, it places an out of the ordinary enhanced burden on these subgroups 
to access the courts by requiring victims of professional misconduct to obtain 
expert review in the form of an affidavit of merit prior to proceeding, and it 
requires the victims of professional misconduct to pay the cost of expert 
review.11 It does establish an impermissible special law 
regulating the practice of judicial proceedings before the courts.
¶7 The prohibition against special laws is not new. Even before statehood and 
the adoption of the Oklahoma Constitution, special laws were not permissible. In 
Guthrie Daily Leader v. Cameron, 1895 OK 71, 42 P. 635, the Supreme Court of the 
Territory of Oklahoma held that: 
A statute relating to persons or things as a class is a general law. One 
relating to particular persons or things of a class is special. The number of 
persons upon whom the law shall have any direct effect may be very few, by 
reason of the subject to which it relates, but it must operate equally and 
uniformly upon all brought within the relations and circumstances for which it 
provides.
Shortly after statehood, we held in Chickasha Cotton Oil 
Co. v. Lamb & Tyner, 1911 OK 68, 114 P. 333, 333, that the Okla. Const. art. 5, §46 
prohibited the enactment of special or local laws upon any of the subjects named 
within it, except such local or special legislation upon subjects authorized by 
other provisions of the Okla. Constitution. 
¶8 It is undisputed that during the course of litigation the plaintiffs will 
be required to prove their case, as any other cause requires. They just do not 
have to provide expert testimony before it can be filed. After the Field Code 
was replaced by the Oklahoma Pleading Code of 1984, access to the district court 
was simplified and streamlined.12 It recognized that there was one form of action - a 
civil action which was applicable to all suits of a civil nature. 13 Further, it specified that a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader was entitled to relief was sufficient to 
constitute a pending claim.14 This form of notice pleading recognized that discovery, 
pretrial conferences, and summary judgments are more effective methods of 
performing the functions of disclosing the factual and legal issues in dispute, 
pretrial planning, and disposing of frivolous or unfounded claims and defenses 
which historically were performed by the pleadings.15 The requirement of an affidavit of merit before an 
action can proceed represents a step back from this more open pleading standard, 
and moreover, does not apply equally to all civil actions but only to a subset 
of the class--actions for professional negligence.
A.Title 12 O.S. 2011 §19 is functionally identical 
to the affidavitrequirement found unconstitutional in Zeier v. 
Zimmer, 2006 OK 98, 152 P.3d 861.
¶9 In Zeier v. Zimmer, 2006 OK 98, 152 P.3d 861, we held that a previous incarnation of 
the affidavit of merit requirement, found at 63 O.S. Supp. 2003 
§1-1708.1E was an 
unconstitutional special law.16 That law required an affidavit in any action for 
medical liability, whereas the current version of the requirement in §19 
requires the affidavit in actions for professional negligence.17 
¶10 Interestingly, 12 O.S. 2011 §19 does not define professional negligence in 
the context of the affidavit requirement, nor does any other section of Title 
12, the code of civil procedure.18 Professional negligence is defined only one place in 
the Oklahoma statutes. The definition is found in the Affordable Access to 
Health Care Act, the same Act that contained the original affidavit of merit 
provision we previously held unconstitutional in Zeier. Title 
63 O.S. 2011 
§1-1708.1C, the Definitions 
section of the Affordable Access to Health Care Act, defines professional 
negligence as:
5. "Professional negligence" means a negligent act or omission to act by a 
health care provider in the rendering of health care services, provided that 
such services are within the scope of services for which the health care 
provider is licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized to render by the laws 
of this state, and which are not within any restriction imposed by a hospital or 
the licensing agency of the health care provider…
The same section defines medical liability action as:
3. "Medical liability action" means any civil action involving, or 
contingent upon, personal injury or wrongful death brought against a health care 
provider based on professional negligence…
The medical affidavit requirement we previously found unconstitutional in 
Zeier was codified at §1-1708.1E, part of the very same Affordable Access to 
Health Care Act that contains these two definitions. It appears the Legislature 
re-enacted the affidavit requirement in a different title using the words 
professional negligence rather than medical liability but otherwise left the 
language essentially the same. But, the Legislature did not remove the two 
definitions from the Affordable Access to Health Care Act.
¶11 Codified at 63 O.S. 
Supp. 2003 §1-1708.1E, the 
original affidavit requirement provided in pertinent part:
A. 1. In any medical liability action, except as provided in 
subsection B of this section, the plaintiff shall attach to the petition an 
affidavit…
The language of the new affidavit requirement, codified at 12 O.S. 2011 §19 and which we examine today, provides in 
pertinent part:
A. 1. In any civil action for professional negligence, except as 
provided in subsection B of this section, the plaintiff shall attach to the 
petition an affidavit
Both the phrases medical liability action and professional negligence are 
defined at 63 O.S. 2011 
§1-1708.1C, as discussed above, 
but not in §19.
¶12 It is within the province of the legislative body to define words 
appearing in legislative acts, and where an act passed by the legislature 
embodies a definition, it is binding on the courts.19 Title 25 O.S. 2011 §2 provides:
Whenever the meaning of a word or phrase is defined in any statute, such 
definition is applicable to the same word or phrase wherever it occurs, except 
where contrary intention plainly appears.
When the provisions of a statute assign one meaning to a word or phrase, its 
definition will apply in every other instance in which the same word is found 
anywhere else in the statutory compilation.20 Section 19 does not contain a definition for 
professional negligence, but because professional negligence is defined in the 
Affordable Access to Health Care Act at 63 O.S. 2011 
§1-1708.1C, the definition that 
professional negligence means an act or omission by a health care provider 
rendering health care services is applicable to §19.
¶13 It has long been settled in this state that one cannot do indirectly what 
cannot be done directly.21 An examination of the definitions for medical liability 
action and professional negligence illustrates that they are intrinsically tied 
together. An action for professional negligence is a medical liability 
action insofar as 63 O.S. 2011 
§1-1708.1C is concerned. 
¶14 Even without the definition of professional negligence found at 
63 O.S. 2011 
§1-1708.1C there are problems 
with vagueness. If the Legislature did not intend professional negligence to 
mean "a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the 
rendering of health care services,"22 then what did they mean? Black's Law Dictionary defines 
professional as "[a] person who belongs to a learned profession or whose 
occupation requires of a high level of training and proficiency."23 Profession is further defined as:
A vocation requiring advanced education and training; esp., one of the three 
traditional learned professions-- law, medicine, and the ministry.24 
Does 
this mean that one is required to obtain an affidavit of merit pursuant to §19 
before filing suit against any doctor, lawyer or clergyman for negligence in 
performing their duties? Is professional in this context intended to be broader 
still? Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, entitled "Professions and 
Occupations," contains multiple subchapters that control the licensing and 
practice of what could be considered various professions in the State of 
Oklahoma. 

¶15 For example, 59 O.S. 2011 §15.1A, which provides 
definitions under the Oklahoma Accountancy Act, defines accountancy as "the 
profession or practice of accounting."25 Title 59 O.S. 2011§396.2, concerning funeral 
services, defines a funeral establishment partly as "any place where any person 
or persons shall hold forth and be engaged in the profession of undertaking or 
funeral directing."26 Title 59 also contains other chapters for: barbers, 
cosmetology, plumbers and plumbing contractors, foresters, sanitarians and 
environmental specialists, bail bondsmen, pawnbrokers, and many more. Title 
18 O.S. 2011 §803 provides definitions for 
the Professional Entity Act which governs the creation of professional 
corporations in Oklahoma. It includes a broad definition for professional 
service.27 
¶16 If the Legislature intended to apply the definition of professional 
negligence found in 63 O.S. 2011 
§1-1708.1C, then the affidavit 
requirement applies to the same subclass and set of actions as the provision we 
found unconstitutional as a special law in Zeier. If the Legislature 
intended to avoid the prohibition on special laws by leaving professional 
negligence undefined, they have caused more problems than they solved. The 
provision would, taken to the ultimate logical conclusion, require an affidavit 
for almost every cause of action.
B.
Because the current incarnation of the affidavit of merit 
provisioncodified at 12 O.S. 2011 §19 is functionally the same 
as the previousunconstitutional provision analyzed in Zeier, it is 
also unconstitutional. 
¶17 The affidavit of merit requirement contained within §19 still divides 
tort victims alleging negligence into two classes: those who pursue a cause of 
action for negligence generally and those who name professionals as defendants. 
It fails the test set forth in Zeier because an additional requirement is 
added to actions for professional negligence. Not only have we defined what a 
special law is since before statehood, we have reiterated repeatedly in 
Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, §17, 760 P.2d 816, and a long line of other cases, that the 
Okla. Const. art. 5, §46 is an absolute and unequivocal prohibition against 
special legislation in the listed subject areas, in this instance the regulation 
of judicial proceedings.28 
¶18 We held in City of Enid v. Public 
Employees Relations Bd., 2006 OK 16, ¶8,133 P.3d 281, that general laws must apply equally to 
all classes similarly situated, and apply to like conditions and subjects. We 
also noted, citing Reynolds, that civil actions may be classified into 
specific categories of tort actions of a similar nature for statute of 
limitation purposes, and that doing so would not, for similar and more 
commanding reasons, constitute a special or local law that would violate the 
strictures contained in §46.29 However, we recognized that Reynolds held that a 
statute carving out a special class of tort victims, those who suffered medical 
malpractice, for purposes of applying a special three year statute of 
limitations was a special law.30 Because this Court held in Zeier that the first 
incarnation of the medical affidavit requirement found at 63 O.S. Supp. 2003 
§1-1708.1E was an 
unconstitutional special law pursuant to the Okla. Const. art. 5, §46, it would 
be inconsistent to hold that the current iteration at §19, incorporating the 
same class of tort victims, definitions and requirements, is not. 
II.TITLE 12 O.S. 2011 §19 IS AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONALECONOMIC BURDEN ON ACCESS TO THE COURTSPURSUANT TO THE 
OKLA. CONST. ART. 2, §6.
¶19 The patient also alleges that 12 O.S. 2011 §19 creates an unconstitutional burden on 
access to the courts by requiring an affidavit of merit for any civil action for 
professional negligence.31 The Okla. Const. art. 2, §6 provides that:
The courts of justice of the State shall be open to every person, and speedy 
and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, 
property, or reputation; and right and justice shall be administered without 
sale, denial, delay, or prejudice.
¶20 In Barzellone v. Presley, 2005 OK 86, 126 P.3d 588, we examined the constitutionality of a 
$349 jury fee imposed by statute. We held that such fees are permissible, as 
long as they are reasonable, because the right of litigants to access the courts 
does not mean that they are entitled to do so at no cost.32 However, we were careful to qualify our decision, 
noting that:
This opinion should not be read as a rubber stamp for any decision the 
Legislature might make on the amount of fees levied in association with jury 
trials. The Oklahoma Constitution does not anticipate that litigants will be 
burdened with the entire bill for maintenance of the court system. Mehdipour 
v. State ex rel. Dept. of Corrections, 2004 OK 19, ¶20, 90 P.3d 546… The constitutional right to a jury trial 
is a personal right, Massey v. Farmers Ins. Group, 1992 OK 80, ¶16, 837 P.2d 880; Jenkins v. State, 
1912 OK CR 8, 120 P. 298, which the Legislature cannot waive, 
Massey v. Farmers Ins. Group, 1992 OK 80, ¶16, 837 P.2d 880, through creating a fiscal barrier so 
unreasonable as to eliminate the right itself. When comparing the jury fee 
charge with a jury proceeding utilizing 6 jurors, it would appear that the 
$349.00 fee charge approaches the barrier beyond which the charge could not 
survive constitutional scrutiny.33 
¶21 A year later, we revisited the issue in Zeier v. Zimmer, 
Inc., 2006 OK 
98, ¶19, 152 P.3d 861. There, we agreed with a patient that a statutorily created requirement 
for the payment of professional services as a prerequisite to filing a petition 
alleging medical negligence violated the guarantee of access to the courts.34 In Zeier, we calculated that the cost of 
obtaining a professional's opinion to support the affidavit of merit could range 
from $500.00 to $5,000.00. This was well above the $349.00 jury fee we examined 
and found valid in Barzellone.35 In Barzellone, we noted that the $349.00 jury 
fee was very close to crossing the line of being an unconstitutional burden on 
accessing the courts,36 and we held in Zeier that at a cost of $500.00 
to $5,000.00, an affidavit of merit would clearly cross beyond that line.37 
¶22 Barzellone and Zeier illustrate that while reasonable fees 
to defray the cost of litigation are not a violation of the right of citizens to 
access the courts, the costs associated with obtaining affidavits of merit go 
beyond the bounds of reasonableness we set in Barzellone. As such, they 
create an impermissible hurdle unconstitutionally restricting the right of 
citizens to access the courts in violation of art. 2, §6 of the Oklahoma 
Constitution.
¶23 We are not persuaded that, in and of itself, the Comprehensive Lawsuit 
Reform Act of 2009 indigency provision enacted in 12 O.S. 2011 §19(D) serves to fully remedy these ills.38 The requirements for an indigency exception are set out 
in 12 O.S. 2011 
§192.39 It requires a nonrefundable application fee of $40.00. 
Although it is considerably less than the cost of complying with the affidavit 
of merit provisions, $40.00 is still a hurdle to the indigent. The fact that the 
court may defer the fee if it determines that the person does not have the 
financial resources to pay at the time does not go far enough. Even so, the fee 
cannot be waived, only deferred to a later date.40 Access to the courts must be available to all comers 
through simple and direct means and the right must be administered in favor of 
justice rather than being bound by technicalities.41 Claimants may not have their fundamental right of court 
access withheld merely for nonpayment of some liability or conditioned coercive 
collection devices.42 
¶24 The Oklahoma Constitution does not anticipate that litigants will be 
burdened with the entire bill for maintenance of the court system.43 The Oklahoma courts were never intended to be 
self-funded, and the increasing degree to which they have become so is 
disturbing. Despite our holding in Fent v. State ex. rel. 
Dep't of Human Services, 2010 OK 2, 236 P.3d 61, the judicial department of government is 
burdened with collecting fees for thirty seven entities--only seven of which 
have a relationship to the third branch of government. The Okla. Const. art. 2, 
§6, guarantees the right of individuals to access the courts, and while 
litigation does not have to be free and entirely at the public expense, at the 
very least the provision means that justice cannot be for sale. The idea that 
money cannot be used as a bar to deny justice long predates the Oklahoma 
Constitution, and is one of the fundamental values of our legal system.44 
¶25 The Magna Carta, one of the oldest progenitors of American 
legal principles, states: "We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to 
any man, either justice or right."45 When the cost of obtaining an affidavit of merit in 
professional negligence actions is added to the already high and increasingly 
rising cost of using the court system to resolve disputes, the result is that a 
line is crossed, and litigation costs go from being merely a hurdle to being an 
unconstitutional burden on accessing the courts.46 

CONCLUSION

¶26 Pursuant to art. 2, §6 of the Oklahoma Constitution, access to the court 
system is a fundamental right. Likewise, the Okla. Const. art. 5, §46 
prohibition against special laws and the Okla. Const. art. 2, §6 are intertwined 
and serve the same ends. This is not new. It has been decided. This is the same 
issue we addressed in Zeier. Unless we ignore the Okla. Const. art. 2, §6 
and art. 5, §46, the Oklahoma statute defining professional negligence found at 
63 O.S. 2011 
§1-1708.1C, and overrule 
Zeier v. Zimmer, 2006 OK 98, 152 P.3d 861, there is but one result we can reach. 

¶27 Title 12 O.S. 2011 
§19 creates a monetary barrier to access the court system, and then applies 
that barrier only to a specific subclass of potential tort victims, those who 
are the victims of professional negligence. The result is a law that is 
unconstitutional both as a special law, and as an undue financial barrier on 
access to the courts. Although we express no opinion on the viability of the 
patient's claim, because we hold 12 O.S. 2011 §19 to be unconstitutional, an affidavit of 
merit is not required. Therefore, we need not address the patient's claim that 
his res ipsa loquitur argument would circumvent the requirements of 
12 O.S. 2011 §19. The district court's 
order requiring submission of an affidavit of merit is overruled, and this cause 
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
OVERRULED;REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
COLBERT, C.J., REIF, V.C.J., KAUGER, WATT, EDMONDSON, COMBS, GURICH, JJ., 
concur.
WINCHESTER and TAYLOR, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTES
1 At the time this cause 
was commenced, the 2011 code volumes had not yet been published. However, as 
there has been no change in §19 since its codification, this opinion refers to 
the 2011 statutes rather than the 2009 Supplement. Title 12 O.S. 2011 §19 provides:
A. 1. In any civil action for professional negligence, except as provided in 
subsection B of this section, the plaintiff shall attach to the petition an 
affidavit attesting that:
a. the plaintiff has consulted and reviewed the facts of the claim with a 
qualified expert,
b. the plaintiff has obtained a written opinion from a qualified expert that 
clearly identifies the plaintiff and includes the determination of the expert 
that, based upon a review of the available material including, but not limited 
to, applicable medical records, facts or other relevant material, a reasonable 
interpretation of the facts supports a finding that the acts or omissions of the 
defendant against whom the action is brought constituted professional 
negligence, and
c. on the basis of the review and consultation of the qualified expert, the 
plaintiff has concluded that the claim is meritorious and based on good 
cause.
2. If the civil action for professional negligence is filed:
a. without an affidavit being attached to the petition, as required in 
paragraph 1 of this subsection, and
b. no extension of time is subsequently granted by the court, pursuant to 
subsection B of this section,
the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, dismiss the action without 
prejudice to its refiling.
3. The written opinion from the qualified expert shall state the acts or 
omissions of the defendant or defendants that the expert then believes 
constituted professional negligence and shall include reasons explaining why the 
acts or omissions constituted professional negligence. The written opinion from 
the qualified expert shall not be admissible at trial for any purpose nor shall 
any inquiry be permitted with regard to the written opinion for any purpose 
either in discovery or at trial.
B. 1. The court may, upon application of the plaintiff for good cause shown, 
grant the plaintiff an extension of time, not exceeding ninety (90) days after 
the date the petition is filed, except for good cause shown, to file in the 
action an affidavit attesting that the plaintiff has obtained a written opinion 
from a qualified expert as described in paragraph 1 of subsection A of this 
section.
2. If on the expiration of an extension period described in paragraph 1 of 
this subsection, the plaintiff has failed to file in the action an affidavit as 
described above, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, unless good 
cause is shown for such failure, dismiss the action without prejudice to its 
refiling. If good cause is shown, the resulting extension shall in no event 
exceed sixty (60) days.
C. 1. Upon written request of any defendant in a civil action for 
professional negligence, the plaintiff shall, within ten (10) business days 
after receipt of such request, provide the defendant with:
a. a copy of the written opinion of a qualified expert mentioned in an 
affidavit filed pursuant to subsection A or B of this section, and
b. an authorization from the plaintiff in a form that complies with 
applicable state and federal laws, including the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996, for the release of any and all medical records 
related to the plaintiff for a period commencing five (5) years prior to the 
incident that is at issue in the civil action for professional negligence.
2. If the plaintiff fails to comply with paragraph 1 of this subsection, the 
court shall, upon motion of the defendant, unless good cause is shown for such 
failure, dismiss the action without prejudice to its refiling.
D. A plaintiff in a civil action for professional negligence may claim an 
exemption to the provisions of this section based on indigency pursuant to the 
qualification rules established as set forth in Section 4 of this act.
(Internal citations omitted).
2 Okla. Const. art. 5, §46 provides:
§ 46. Local and special laws on certain subjects prohibited
The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, 
pass any local or special law authorizing:
The creation, extension, or impairing of liens;
Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards, or school 
districts;
Changing the names of persons or places;
Authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, or maintaining of roads, 
highways, streets, or alleys;
Relating to ferries or bridges, or incorporating ferry or bridge companies, 
except for the erection of bridges crossing streams which form boundaries 
between this and any other state;
Vacating roads, town plats, streets, or alleys;
Relating to cemeteries, graveyards, or public grounds not owned by the 
State;
Authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children;
Locating or changing county seats;
Incorporating cities, towns, or villages, or changing their charters;
For the opening and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the places 
of voting;
Granting divorces;
Creating offices, or prescribing the powers and duties of officers, in 
counties, cities, towns, election or school districts;
Changing the law of descent or succession;
Regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence 
in judicial proceedings or inquiry before the courts, justices of the peace, 
sheriffs, commissioners, arbitrators, or other tribunals, or providing or 
changing the methods for the collection of debts, or the enforcement of 
judgments or prescribing the effect of judicial sales of real estate;
Regulating the fees, or extending the powers and duties of aldermen, justices 
of the peace, or constables;
Regulating the management of public schools, the building or repairing of 
school houses, and the raising of money for such purposes;
Fixing the rate of interest;
Affecting the estates of minors, or persons under disability;
Remitting fines, penalties and forfeitures, and refunding moneys legally paid 
into the treasury;
Exempting property from taxation;
Declaring any named person of age;
Extending the time for the assessment or collection of taxes, or otherwise 
relieving any assessor or collector of taxes from due performance of his 
official duties, or his securities from liability;
Giving effect to informal or invalid wills or deeds;
Summoning or impaneling grand or petit juries;
For limitation of civil or criminal actions;
For incorporating railroads or other works of internal improvements;
Providing for change of venue in civil and criminal cases. (Emphasis 
added).
3 The Okla. Const. art 2, §6 provides:
§ 6. Courts of justice open--Remedies for wrongs--Sale, denial or 
delay
The courts of justice of the State shall be open to every person, and speedy 
and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, 
property, or reputation; and right and justice shall be administered without 
sale, denial, delay, or prejudice.
4 The patient filed a Petition in Error on Certified 
Interlocutory order with this Court on December 14, 2010, in response to three 
minute orders issued by the trial court on December 7, 2010. On December 16, 
2010, this Court ordered the patient to show cause why his appeal should not be 
dismissed for lack of an appealable order. On December 17, 2010, the physician 
filed a motion to dismiss arguing lack of an appealable order, and the patient 
responded on December 30, 2010.
On January 4, 2011, this Court entered an order acknowledging the filing of 
the district court's Amended Certified Interlocutory Order on January 3, 2011. 
We directed the patient to file a supplemental petition for certiorari - 
certified interlocutory order no later than January 18, 2011. The patient filed 
his Amended Petition for Certiorari Certified Interlocutory Order, as well as a 
Motion to Retain, on January 11, 2011. This Court's grant of certiorari has 
rendered moot the patient's pending motion to retain.
5 Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, §17, 760 P.2d 816.
6 Oklahoma City v. Griffin, 
1965 OK 76, ¶8, 403 P.2d 463.
7 Oklahoma City v. Griffin, see note 
6, supra at ¶3 (quoting Serve Yourself Gas, etc., 
Ass'n v. Brock, 39 Cal. 2d 813, 820, 249 P.2d 545).
8 Fenimore v. State ex rel. 
Com'rs of Land Office, 200 Okla. 400, 402, 194 P.2d 852, 854 (Okla. 1948).
9 Barrett v. Bd. of Com'rs 
of Tulsa County, 185 Okla. 111, 90 P.2d 442, 446 (Okla. 1939).
10 Okla. Const. art. 5, §46 provides in pertinent 
part:
The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, 
pass any local or special law authorizing: …. 
Regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence 
in judicial proceedings or inquiry before the courts, justices of the peace, 
sheriffs, commissioners, arbitrators, or other tribunals, or providing or 
changing the methods for the collection of debts, or the enforcement of 
judgments or prescribing the effect of judicial sales of real estate; …
11 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §19, see note 1, supra. 
12 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §2001.
13 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §2002 provides:
There shall be one form of action to be known as "civil action".
14 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §2008 provides in pertinent 
part:
A. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether 
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall 
contain:
1. A short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief; and
2. A demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. 
Every pleading demanding relief for damages in money in excess of the amount 
required for diversity jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1332 of Title 28 of the 
United States Code shall, without demanding any specific amount of money, set 
forth only that the amount sought as damages is in excess of the amount required 
for diversity jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1332 of Title 28 of the United 
States Code, except in actions sounding in contract. Every pleading demanding 
relief for damages in money in an amount that is required for diversity 
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1332 of Title 28 of the United States Code or 
less shall specify the amount of such damages sought to be recovered. Relief in 
the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
15 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §2008, Committee Comment to 
Section 2008.
16 Zeier v. Zimmer was decided by this Court 
8 to 1, with all members of the current Court who were on the Court when 
Zeier was decided concurring or concurring in result. Title 
63 O.S. Supp. 2003 
§1-1708.1E (repealed by Okla. 
Sess. Laws 2009, c. 228, §87) provided:
A. 1. In any medical liability action, except as provided in subsection B of 
this section, the plaintiff shall attach to the petition an affidavit attesting 
that:
a. the plaintiff has consulted and reviewed the facts of the claim with a 
qualified expert,
b. the plaintiff has obtained a written opinion from a qualified expert that 
clearly identifies the plaintiff and includes the expert's determination that, 
based upon a review of the available medical records, facts or other relevant 
material, a reasonable interpretation of the facts supports a finding that the 
acts or omissions of the health care provider against whom the action is brought 
constituted professional negligence, and
c. on the basis of the qualified expert's review and consideration, the 
plaintiff has concluded that the claim is meritorious and based on good 
cause.
2. If a medical liability action is filed:
a. without an affidavit being attached to the petition, as required in 
paragraph 1 of the subsection, and
b. no extension of time is subsequently granted by the court, pursuant to 
subsection B of this section, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, 
dismiss the action without prejudice to its refiling.
3. The written opinion from the qualified expert shall state the acts or 
omissions of the defendant(s) that the expert then believes constituted 
professional negligence and shall include reasons explaining why the acts or 
omissions constituted professional negligence. The written opinion from the 
qualified expert shall not be admissible at trial for any purpose nor shall any 
inquiry be permitted with regard to the written opinion for any purpose either 
in discovery or at trial.
B. 1. The court may, upon application of the plaintiff for good cause shown, 
grant the plaintiff an extension of time, not exceeding ninety (90) days after 
the date the petition is filed, except for good cause shown, to file in the 
action an affidavit attesting that the plaintiff has obtained a written opinion 
from a qualified expert as described in paragraph 1 of subsection A of this 
section.
2. If on the expiration of an extension period described in paragraph 1 of 
this subsection, the plaintiff has failed to file in the action an affidavit as 
described above, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, unless good 
cause is shown for such failure, dismiss the action without prejudice to its 
refiling.
C. 1. Upon written request of any defendant in a medical liability action, 
the plaintiff shall, within ten (10) business days after receipt of such 
request, provide the defendant with:
a. a copy of the written opinion of a qualified expert mentioned in an 
affidavit filed pursuant to subsection A or B of this section, and
b. an authorization from the plaintiff in a form that complies with 
applicable state and federal laws, including the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996, for the release of any and all medical records 
related to the plaintiff for a period commencing five (5) years prior to the 
incident that is at issue in the medical liability action.
2. If the plaintiff fails to comply with paragraph 1 of this subsection, the 
court shall, upon motion of the defendant, unless good cause is shown for such 
failure, dismiss the action without prejudice to the refilling.
17 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §19 provides in pertinent part:
A. 1. In any civil action for professional negligence, except as provided in 
subsection B of this section, the plaintiff shall attach to the petition an 
affidavit…
18Title 12 O.S. 2011 §19.
19 Oliver v. City of Tulsa, 
1982 OK 121, ¶19, 654 P.2d 607; 654 P.2d 607; Traxler v. State, 98 Okla. 
Cr. 231, 251 P.2d 815.
20 McClure v. ConocoPhillips Co., 
2006 OK 42, ¶13, 142 P.3d 390; Fraternal Order 
of Police, Lodge 108 v. City of 
Ardmore, 2002 OK 
19, ¶14, 44 P.3d 569; Stone v. Hodges, 1967 OK 214, ¶6, 435 P.2d 165.
21 Perry Water, Light & 
Ice Co. v. City of Perry, 29 Okla. 593, 120 P. 582, 588 (Okla. 1911); 
Superior Mfg. Co. v. School Dist. No. 
63, Kiowa County, 28 Okla. 293, 114 P. 328, 330 (Okla. 1910).
22 Title 63 O.S. 2011 
§1-1708.1C.3.
23 Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), 
professional.
24 Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), profession. 
25 Title 59 O.S. 15.1A(1) provides:
1. "Accountancy" means the profession or practice of accounting.
26 Title 59 O.S. 2011 §396.2(3) provides:
3. "Funeral establishment" means a place of business used in the care and 
preparation for burial, commercial embalming, or transportation of dead human 
remains, or any place where any person or persons shall hold forth and be 
engaged in the profession of undertaking or funeral directing.
27 Title 18 O.S. 2011 §803(6) provides:
6. "Professional service" means the personal service rendered by:
a. a physician, surgeon or doctor of medicine pursuant to a license under 
Sections 481 through 524 of Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any 
subsequent laws regulating the practice of medicine,
b. an osteopathic physician or surgeon pursuant to a license under Sections 
620 through 645 of Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent laws 
regulating the practice of osteopathy,
c. a chiropractic physician pursuant to a license under Sections 161.1 
through 161.20 of Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent laws 
regulating the practice of chiropractic,
d. a podiatric physician pursuant to a license under Sections 135.1 through 
160.2 of Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent laws regulating 
the practice of podiatric medicine,
e. an optometrist pursuant to a license under Sections 581 through 606 of 
Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent laws regulating the 
practice of optometry,
f. a veterinarian pursuant to a license under Sections 698.1 through 698.30b 
of Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent laws regulating the 
practice of veterinary medicine,
g. an architect pursuant to a license under Sections 46.1 through 46.41 of 
Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent laws regulating the 
practice of architecture,
h. an attorney pursuant to his authority to practice law granted by the 
Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma,
i. a dentist pursuant to a license under Sections 328.1 through 328.53 of 
Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent laws regulating the 
practice of dentistry,
j. a certified public accountant or a public accountant pursuant to his or 
her authority to practice accounting underSections 15.1 through 15.38 of Title 
59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent laws regulating the practice of 
public accountancy,
k. a psychologist pursuant to a license under Sections 1351 through 1376 of 
Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent laws regulating the 
practice of psychology,
l. a physical therapist pursuant to a license under Sections 887.1 through 
887.18 of Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent laws regulating 
the practice of physical therapy,
m. a registered nurse pursuant to a license under Sections 567.1 through 
567.19 of Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any other subsequent laws 
regulating the practice of nursing,
n. a professional engineer pursuant to a license under Sections 475.1 through 
475.22a of Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent laws relating 
to the practice of engineering,
o. a land surveyor pursuant to a license under Sections 475.1 through 475. 
22a of Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent laws relating to 
the practice of land surveying,
p. an occupational therapist pursuant to Sections 888.1 through 888.15 of 
Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes and any subsequent law regulating the practice 
of occupational therapy,
q. a speech pathologist or speech therapist pursuant to Sections 1601 through 
1622 of Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent law regulating the 
practice of speech pathology,
r. an audiologist pursuant to Sections 1601 through 1622 of Title 59 of the 
Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent law regulating the practice of 
audiology,
s. a registered pharmacist pursuant to Sections 353 through 366 of Title 59 
of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent law regulating the practice of 
pharmacy,
t. a licensed perfusionist pursuant to Sections 2051 through 2071 of Title 59 
of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent laws regulating the practice of 
perfusionists,
u. a licensed professional counselor pursuant to Sections 1901 through 1920 
of Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent law regulating the 
practice of professional counseling,
v. a licensed marital and family therapist pursuant to Sections 1925.1 
through 1925.18 of Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent law 
regulating the practice of marital and family therapy,
w. a dietitian licensed pursuant to Sections 1721 through 1739 of Title 59 of 
the Oklahoma Statutes and any subsequent laws regulating the practice of 
dietitians,
x. a social worker licensed pursuant to Sections 1250 through 1273 of Title 
59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent laws regulating the practice of 
social work,
y. a licensed alcohol and drug counselor pursuant to Sections 1870 through 
1885 of Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent laws regulating 
the practice of alcohol and drug counseling, or
z. a licensed behavioral practitioner pursuant to Sections 1930 through 
1949.1 of Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any subsequent laws regulating 
the practice of behavioral health services…
28 Reynolds, see note 5, supra at ¶21; Maule 
v. Indep. School Dist. No. 9, 
1985 OK 110, ¶12, 714 P.2d 199; 
City of Tulsa v. McIntosh, 1930 OK 71, ¶11-12, 284 P. 875; Union School Dist. No. 1 v. Foster 
Lumber Co., 1930 OK 
50, ¶7, 286 P. 774; Bradford v. Cole, 1923 OK 571, ¶4, 217 P. 470.
29 City of Enid v. Public 
Employees Relations Bd., 2006 OK 16, ¶9,133 P.3d 281 (citing Reynolds, see note 5, supra 
at ¶18.
30 Reynolds, see note 5, supra at ¶¶18-21.
31 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §19, see note 1, supra.
32 Barzellone v. Presley, 2005 OK 86, ¶24, 126 P.3d 588.
33 Barzellone v. Presley, see note 32, supra 
at ¶39.
34 Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 
2006 OK 98, ¶32, 152 P.3d 861. The affidavit of merit provision in 
Zeier, was found at 63 O.S. 
Supp. 2003 §1-1708.1E 
(repealed by Okla. Sess. Laws 2009, c. 228, §87) , see note 16, supra.
35 Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., see note 
34, supra at ¶28.
36 Barzellone v. Presley, see note 32, supra 
at ¶39.
37 Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., see note 
34, supra at ¶32.
In Zeier we also outlined several of the ills that are a direct result 
of a statutorily-mandated affidavit of merit provision of the kind at issue 
here. We held:
Although statutory schemes similar to Oklahoma's Health Care Act do help 
screen out meritless suits, the additional certification costs have produced a 
substantial and disproportionate reduction in the number of claims filed by 
low-income plaintiffs. The affidavit of merit provisions front-load litigation 
costs and result in the creation of cottage industries of firms offering 
affidavits from physicians for a price. They also prevent meritorious medical 
malpractice actions from being filed. The affidavits of merit requirement 
obligates plaintiffs to engage in extensive pre-trial discovery to obtain the 
facts necessary for an expert to render an opinion resulting in most medical 
malpractice causes being settled out of court during discovery. Rather than 
reducing the problems associated with malpractice litigation, these provisions 
have resulted in the dismissal of legitimately injured plaintiffs' claims based 
solely on procedural, rather than substantive, grounds. (Internal citations 
omitted.)
38 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §19(D) provides:
D. A plaintiff in a civil action for professional negligence may claim an 
exemption to the provisions of this section based on indigency pursuant to the 
qualification rules established as set forth in Section 4 of this act.
The statute found unconstitutional in Zeier contained no such 
exemption provision.
39 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §192 provides:
A. When a plaintiff requests an indigency exemption from providing an 
affidavit of merit in a civil action for professional negligence pursuant to 
Section 2 of this act, such person shall submit an appropriate application to 
the court clerk, on a form created by the Administrative Director of the Courts, 
which shall state that the application is signed under oath and under the 
penalty of perjury and that a false statement may be prosecuted as such. A 
nonrefundable application fee of Forty Dollars ($40.00) shall be paid to the 
court clerk at the time the application is submitted, and no application shall 
be accepted without payment of the fee; except that the court may, based upon 
the financial information submitted, defer all or part of the fee if the court 
determines that the person does not have the financial resources to pay the fee 
at time of application. Any fees collected pursuant to this subsection shall be 
retained by the court clerk, deposited in the Court Clerk's Revolving Fund, and 
reported quarterly to the Administrative Office of the Courts.
B. 1. The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules governing the determination of 
indigency pursuant to the provisions of Section 22 of this act. The initial 
determination of indigency shall be made by the Chief Judge of the Judicial 
District or a designee thereof, based on the plaintiff's application and the 
rules provided herein.
2. Upon promulgation of the rules required by law, the determination of 
indigency shall be subject to review by the Presiding Judge of the Judicial 
Administrative District. (Internal citations omitted).
40 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §192(A), see note 39, 
supra.
41 Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., see note 
34, supra at ¶26; Woody v. State ex. rel. Dept. 
of Corrections, 1992 OK 45, ¶10, 833 P.2d 257.
42 Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., see note 
34, supra at ¶26. 
43 Barzellone v. Presley, see note 32, supra 
at ¶39; Mehdipour v. State ex rel. Dep't 
of Corrections, 2004 OK 19, ¶20, 90 P.3d 546.
44 See In Re Lee, 1917 OK 458, 168 P. 53.
45 In Re Lee, see note 44, supra at 9 
(quoting The Magna Carta, Ch. 39, 1215).
46 We are not alone in finding the requirement of an 
affidavit of merit unconstitutional. In Putman v. Wenatchee 
Valley Medical Center, P.S., 216 P.3d 374, 376-77 
(Wash. 2009), the Washington Supreme Court found that Washington's certificate 
of merit requirement unduly burdened the rights of the State's citizens to 
access the courts, and was therefore unconstitutional. In Putman, the 
court noted that the right to access the courts included the right of discovery 
authorized by the civil rules, a right interfered with by requiring a 
certificate of merit prior to discovery.
However, other states such as Georgia have found affidavit of merit 
requirements constitutional. In Walker v. Cromartie, 696 S.E.2d 654 (Ga. 2010), the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld an affidavit of merit 
requirement that applied generally to actions for professional negligence, not 
just those involving medical professionals. The court found that the requirement 
was not a special law merely because indigent defendants may not be able to 
afford the fees associated with obtaining an expert affidavit, holding that it 
applied uniformly to any person or entity bringing a lawsuit for professional 
negligence. However, the court did not address whether the requirement was a 
special law because it created subclasses of tort claims and victims. Further, 
Georgia's constitutional prohibition on special laws is not as extensive as 
Oklahoma's. Its uniformity clause provides:
Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout this state 
and no local or special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has 
been made by an existing general law, except that the General Assembly may by 
general law authorize local governments by local ordinance or resolution to 
exercise police powers which do not conflict with general laws.
Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV(a).

WINCHESTER, J., dissenting:
¶1 I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree that 12 O.S.2011, § 19 is unconstitutional as a 
special law. The majority opinion asserts that this statute "creates a new 
subclass of tort victims and tortfeasors known as professional tort victims and 
tortfeasors." Oklahoma's case law already recognizes such a "subclass" of tort 
law, and that is "malpractice." The rule where medical malpractice against a 
physician is alleged, whether it is for failure to properly diagnose or treat a 
patient, is that the physician's negligence must ordinarily be established by 
expert testimony. Smith v. Hines, 2011 OK 51, ¶ 14, 261 P.3d 1129, 1133; Harder v. F.C. Clinton, 
Inc., 1997 OK 
137, ¶ 14, n. 30, 948 P.2d 298, 305, n. 30; Benson v. Tkach, 
2001 OK CIV APP 100, ¶ 10, 30 P.3d 402, 404. The statute merely requires an 
affidavit at the time of filing. Is it reasonable to require expert testimony in 
a malpractice case, but forbid the legislature from requiring that an expert 
submit an affidavit at the front end of a lawsuit? I do not believe it is.
¶2 The difference between a standard negligence case and professional 
malpractice is recognized even in the business law books studied by 
undergraduates and MBA students.
"If an individual has knowledge or skill superior to that of an ordinary 
person, the individual's conduct must be consistent with that status. 
Professionals--including physicians, dentists, architects, engineers, 
accountants, and lawyers, among others--are required to have a standard minimum 
level of special knowledge and ability. Therefore, in determining what 
constitutes reasonable care in the case of professionals, the law takes their 
training and expertise into account. Thus, an accountant's conduct is judged not 
by the reasonable person standard, but by the reasonable accountant standard." 
Kenneth W. Clarkson, Roger LeRoy Miller & Frank B. Cross, Business Law 
Text and Cases 139 (12th ed. 2012).
¶3 Georgia's statute requiring an affidavit is not identical to Oklahoma's 
statute. However, the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Georgia is pertinent to 
the construction of Oklahoma's statute. Georgia's statute also requires an 
affidavit from an expert to be filed with the complaint for professional 
negligence. Its supreme court recognized that the statute itself did not impose 
a cost or fee for filing an expert affidavit. Neither does § 19. In addressing a 
due process argument, Georgia's court observed: "The 'costs' appellants object 
to are created by private actors, not any state actor. Since no state actor has 
exacted the harm of which appellants complain, the statute does not violate the 
right to due process." Walker v. Cromartie, 287 Ga. 511, 512, 696 S.E.2d 654, 656 (2010). If this Court reasons that the legislature's requirement of an 
expert affidavit is financially burdensome, is it somehow less burdensome to 
require an expert to testify to the negligence of the defendant during the trial 
stage? Case law requires such expert testimony. Surely it is clear that the cost 
of an expert affidavit is less than the cost of actual expert testimony, both of 
which are presently required, one by the legislature and the other by this 
Court.
¶4 The majority protests that court costs have reached the tipping point and 
can go no higher. The legislature has provided, through the statute, for a 
simple exemption that may be signed by plaintiffs to express to the court their 
inability to pay for the § 19 affidavit. The Supreme Court is very liberal and 
experienced in allowing indigent petitions. I see no reason for this Court to 
fail to recognize an indigent affidavit for professional negligence cases. 
¶5 Accordingly, I dissent.

TAYLOR, J., dissenting:
¶1 Even though I concurred in result in Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 
2006 OK 98, 152 P.3d 861, I must respectfully dissent from today's 
pronouncement. There are two major differences in the statute which this Court 
found unconstitutional in Zeier and in title 12, section 19 of the 2011 
Oklahoma Statutes which is before us today. First, section 19 is not limited to 
medical negligence as was the provision in Zeier but includes all 
professional negligence. 12 O.S.2011, § 19(A)(1). Second, it 
provides for an indigency exemption to the certificate of merit requirement. 
Id. § 19(D). 
¶2 In Zeier, this Court struck down section 1-1708.1E of the 
Affordable Access to Health Care Act, 63 O.S.Supp. 2003, § 
1-1708.1E, which required a 
certificate of merit only in medical malpractice actions. The Legislature 
responded to Zeier by enacting title 12, section 19 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes, which expanded the certificate of merit requirement to all 
professional negligence. Now section 19 is under attack in this appeal as a 
special law in violation of article 5, section 46 of the Oklahoma 
Constitution.
¶3 In construing section 19, this Court is guided by the overarching 
principle that every statute is presumed constitutional and will be upheld until 
its constitutional invalidity is clearly shown. Wilson v. Fallin, 
2011 OK 76, ¶ 21, 262 P.3d 741, 748. Further, this Court is to presume 
that the Legislature has not done a vain and useless act. Surety Bail 
Bondsmen of Okla., Inc. v. Insurance Comm'r, 2010 OK 73, ¶ 26, 243 P.3d 1177, 1185. Following these principles leads to 
the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend the term "professional 
negligence" to have the identical meaning as "medical liability." Rather, 
consistent with these principles, section 19 must be construed as expanding the 
class to which the certificate of merit requirement applies to include all 
negligence actions against any professional. Further, this Court itself has 
taken a more expansive approach by using the term "professional negligence" in 
reference to actions against lawyers, Leak-Gilbert v. Fahle, 
2002 OK 66, 55 P.3d 1054; realtors, Rice v. Patterson, 
1993 OK 103, 857 P.2d 71; and engineers, Samuel Robert Noble 
Foundation, Inc. v. Vick, 1992 OK 140, 840 P.2d 619. 
¶4 It would certainly have been a vain and useless act for the Legislature to 
enact a statutory provision that this Court had determined to be 
unconstitutional only three years earlier. By expanding the class of torts 
requiring a certificate of merit to professional negligence, the Legislature 
remedies the concerns this Court expressed in Zeier regarding section 
1-1708.1E of the Affordable Access to Health Care Act. I would find that title 
12, section 19 of the Oklahoma Statutes does not offend article 5, section 46 of 
the Oklahoma Constitution.
¶5 I would likewise find that section 19 does not offend article 2, section 6 
of the Oklahoma Constitution. The impediment that this Court found to the cost 
of procuring an expert's opinion before trial, the Legislature addressed in 
title 12, section 19(D) by providing for an indigency exemption and leaving the 
Judicial Branch with authority to define indigency. See 20 O.S.2011, § 56. Title 12, section 192 
imposes a nonrefundable application fee of $40.00 on a plaintiff seeking an 
indigency exemption but this fee can be deferred. If the $40 fee is a 
constitutional impediment, then striking only the $40.00 fee for the indigency 
exemption as violative of article 2, section 6, rather than striking down the 
certificate of merit requirement, gives the appropriate measure of deference to 
the Legislature. There are other procedures in place to address any impediment 
of access to the courts: this Court could define indigency in such a manner as 
to alleviate any monetary obstruction that the certificate of merit requirement 
creates.
¶6 In deference to the Legislature and the rules of statutory construction, I 
would construe title 12, section 19 in a way to find that it does not violate 
article 5, section 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution. I would also exercise this 
Court's power in as narrow a swath as possible rather than the most 
extensive.