Title: Elia v. Hertrich Family of Automobile Dealerships, Inc.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ASHLEY N. (REECE) ELIA, 
§ 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff-Below, 
§ 
No. 162, 2014 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
 
 
  
§ 
 
 
v.  
§ 
Court Below: 
 
 
§ 
Superior Court of the State  
HERTRICH FAMILY OF 
§ 
of Delaware in and for Kent 
AUTOMOBILE DEALERSHIPS, INC., § 
County 
D/B/A/ HERTRICH’S CAPITOL 
§ 
A corporation of the State of Delaware 
§  
C.A. No. K13C-06-036RBY 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
Defendant-Below, 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  October 22, 2014 
Decided:  October 23, 2014   
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, RIDGELY and VALIHURA, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
This 23rd day of October 2014, the Court, after hearing oral argument 
and upon consideration of the record in this case, has concluded that the 
order of the Superior Court should be affirmed.  The only issue in this appeal 
is whether the Superior Court was correct in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim 
because there was a binding arbitration agreement that required the plaintiff 
to arbitrate all of her claims.  We find no error in the Superior Court’s 
decision.  In so ruling, we do not hold that it cannot be a breach of warranty 
 
1
if an automobile dealer sells a customer a vehicle that is supposed to operate 
in four-wheel drive when it in fact does not.  We affirm because the 
description in the sales contract of that specific feature does not fit within the 
more specific definition of a “written warranty” under the Magnuson Moss 
Warranty Act.1 
Moreover, although the Superior Court was not clear as to which 
contract governed the rights of the parties, when fairly read, the Superior 
Court was referring to the third sales contract that the plaintiff signed on 
September 23, 2010, and under which the parties proceeded.2  Irrespective of 
whether the defendant actually signed that version of the contract, the 
complaint itself indicates that the parties proceeded under it, and a party who 
signs a contract may be bound by it even when the other party does not sign 
                                              
1 The Magnuson Moss Warranty Act defines a “written warranty” as “(A) any written 
affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the sale of a consumer 
product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the material or 
workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect free or 
will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time or (B) any 
undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product to 
refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with respect to such product in the 
event that such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking, which 
written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes part of the basis of the bargain 
between a supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of such product.”  
15 U.S.C.A. § 2301.  In other words, we find that the statement in the sales contract that 
the vehicle had four-wheel drive would be a warranty under the Uniform Commercial 
Code and general contract law.  See U.C.C. § 2-313.  But the statement is not a “written 
warranty” under the more specific definition in the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, which 
requires that the seller promise certain things that the dealer here did not promise.  
2 See Elia v. Hertrich Family of Automobile Dealerships, 2013 WL 6606054, at *1 (Del. 
Super. Dec. 13, 2013) (“On September 23, 2010, Plaintiff returned to the Dealership to 
sign new papers for the purchase of the Automobile at the higher interest rate, including a 
new RISC at the 13.59% annual interest rate.”).  
 
2
it, especially when both parties continue to enjoy the benefit of their 
bargain.3  In any event, the arbitration clause in the second and third sales 
contracts were identical to the one in the first, which was signed by both 
parties, and therefore, the Superior Court made no error of law in finding 
that the plaintiff was bound to arbitrate.    
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the order of 
the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
 
 
 
                                              
3 “In general, any writing signed by one party and orally assented to by the other will 
bind both parties, subject of course to the Statute of Frauds.  Indeed, any written contract, 
though signed by only one party, will bind the other if he or she accepts the writing.”  
2 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 6:44 (4th ed. 2003).  In this case, the dealership’s 
acceptance can be implied because it accepted the plaintiff’s payment and allowed her to 
possess the car.  See also 7 BRUNER & O’CONNOR CONSTRUCTION LAW § 21:46 (2014) 
(“The failure of a party to sign its contract, as long as consent is otherwise established, 
will not relieve it of its obligation to arbitrate.”).