Title: Chapman v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WARREN CHAPMAN, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 544, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID No. 9905015253 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 3, 2007 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: July 3, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 3rd day of July 2007, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a),1 it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Warren Chapman, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s September 5, 2006 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
                                                 
1 The appellant also filed a motion for stay and remand on the ground that the Superior 
Court failed to address his argument that his postconviction motion is not time-barred 
because there was a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, 
reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.  
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
 
2
Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.2  We agree and AFFIRM.   
 
(2) 
In February 2000, Chapman was found guilty by a Superior 
Court jury of six counts of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree, 
two counts of Attempted Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree, 
one count of Rape in the First Degree, one count of Attempted Rape in the 
First Degree, four counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second Degree, 
and one count of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child.  He was sentenced to 
139 years of Level V incarceration, plus a life sentence.  This Court affirmed 
Chapman’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal.3 
 
(3) 
Chapman originally moved for postconviction relief on 
February 7, 2005.  He filed an amended motion on June 27, 2005.  Trial 
counsel filed an affidavit in response to the motion and the State filed an 
answer.  When Chapman attempted to amend his motion again, the Superior 
Court denied his request.  Chapman then moved to voluntarily dismiss his 
postconviction motion.  The Superior Court granted his request on January 
31, 2006.   
 
(4) 
On March 3, 2006, Chapman filed a new postconviction 
motion.  In the motion, Chapman’s sole claim was that his counsel provided 
                                                 
2 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
3 Chapman v. State, Del. Supr., No. 311, 2000, Holland, J. (Feb. 13, 2002).   
 
3
ineffective assistance.  In a report dated April 12, 2006, the Superior Court 
Commissioner recommended that Chapman’s motion be dismissed as time-
barred.4  On May 22, 2006, Chapman filed an “Appeal from 
Commissioner’s Findings of Fact and Recommendations” in which he 
argued that, under the doctrine of equitable tolling, his ineffectiveness 
claims were not time-barred.  At the end of Chapman’s “Appeal,” he stated 
the following:  “In the event this Court fails to find equitable tolling . . . , 
Defendant asserts and invokes Superior Court Cr. R. 61(i) (5) . . . .”  On 
September 5, 2006, the Superior Court adopted the Commissioner’s report 
and recommendation.5 
 
(5) 
In this appeal, Chapman claims that, under the doctrine of 
equitable tolling, his postconviction motion is not time-barred.  He contends 
that the time he spent on his motion for the appointment of counsel, the time 
the Superior Court spent considering his motion for the appointment of 
counsel, the time spent by this Court in connection with his appeal from the 
Superior Court’s denial of his request for counsel, and the time during which 
he alleges his legal materials were misplaced by correctional officials should 
all be subtracted from the mandatory three-year period for the filing of his 
                                                 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (1). 
5 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a) (5). 
 
4
postconviction motion.6  Chapman also contends that, should this Court not 
accept his equitable tolling argument, the facts he has presented in support of 
his equitable tolling argument are sufficient to support a finding of a 
constitutional violation under Rule 61(i) (5). 
 
(6) 
The doctrine of equitable tolling is inapplicable to a motion for 
postconviction relief.  Superior Court Criminal Rule 45(b) (2) expressly 
provides that the Superior Court “may not extend the time for taking any 
action” under Rule 61(i) (1).7  Chapman’s attempt to overcome the time bar 
of Rule 61(i) (1) by asserting a miscarriage of justice also fails.  The facts he 
asserts in support of his equitable tolling argument simply do not rise to the 
level of “a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, 
reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of 
conviction.”8  Finally, Chapman is correct that the Superior Court did not 
expressly address his argument of a constitutional violation that would 
overcome the time bar.  That omission is without any effect, however, since 
the argument has no merit.     
 
(7) 
It is manifest on the face of Chapman’s opening brief that this 
appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled 
                                                 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (1). 
7 See Smallwood v. State, Del. Supr., No. 473, 2006, Steele, C.J. (Feb. 13, 2007). 
8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
 
5
by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is 
implicated, there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme 
Court 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The 
judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Because there is no merit to Chapman’s claim of a constitutional violation, his motion 
for stay and remand is hereby denied.