Title: Burenheide v. Wall

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

281 P.2d 1000 (1955) Henry J. BURENHEIDE and Elizabeth Burenheide, Plaintiffs in Error, v. L. F. WALL, Defendant in Error. No. 17387. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. April 4, 1955. *1001 Sandhouse & Sandhouse, Sterling, for plaintiffs in error. Kreager & Sublett, Sterling, for defendant in error. LINDSLEY, Justice. The parties appear in our Court in the same relative positions as in the trial court and we will herein refer to them as they there appeared. Plaintiffs brought suit on an instrument which reads as follows: "On Approval of title on or before 7 days sight. "First National "Name of Forwarding Bank. "Fleming, Colorado 6/2, 1952 "City State Date Defendant asserted as an affirmative defense that the instrument was delivered for the purchase of a mineral deed, in which instrument plaintiff, at the time of the transaction, had insisted upon certain reservations being inserted, and that there was an oral agreement made at that time that defendant's principal would have to approve the mineral deed before the note would be enforcible according to its terms. Defendant's counsel objected to testimony as to this affirmative defense, urging that the same was in violation of *1002 the parol evidence rule varying the terms of a written instrument. The court allowed the testimony to be introduced, and under the authority of McCaffrey v. Mitchell, 98 Colo. 467, 56 P.2d 926, 57 P.2d 900, properly did so as the parol evidence in question did not tend to vary the terms of the written instrument, but went to the very question of whether or not by agreement of the parties the instrument itself should be enforcible. In admitting the evidence the court did not err. See Bourke v. Van Keuren, 20 Colo. 95, 36 P. 882; McCaffrey v. Mitchell, supra; Hurlburt v. Dusenbery, 26 Colo. 240, 57 P. 860; and McGuire v. Luckenbach, Colo., 281 P.2d 997. In the instant case it is to be noted that the controversy is between the payee and payor, and, as we said in McCaffrey v. Mitchell, supra, 98 Colo. at page 473, 56 P.2d at page 929: Motions for directed verdict were interposed by defendant at the close of plaintiffs' case and at the close of the entire evidence, which motions were denied. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs. Later the court granted a motion non obstante veredicto and entered judgment for defendant. This raises the question whether or not, under Rule 50(b) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, the court was correct in granting the motion setting aside the verdict of the jury and entering judgment for defendant. Rule 50(b) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows: The wording of the motion for judgment non obstante veredicto is as follows: Counsel for plaintiffs urge that the court erred in granting this motion; that it is not within the court's duty or power to set aside a verdict if it is based upon conflicting evidence, a disagreement as to the weight of the evidence, or the preponderance or sufficiency thereof. A perusal of the record discloses that defendant testified that there was an oral agreement requiring the approval and acceptance by defendant's principal of the mineral deed; that it was denied by plaintiff Henry J. Burenheide on his examination in chief, but upon cross-examination *1003 the plaintiff Henry J. Burenheide was impeached by his deposition wherein he had admitted the oral agreement, and again on cross-examination he freely testified that there was such an agreement. Upon rebuttal said plaintiff again denied the existence of the same. It is interesting to note that plaintiff Henry J. Burenheide's direct testimony in other matters contained in the record was successfully impeached by defendant on cross-examination and by said plaintiff's deposition, which was admitted in evidence. The record also discloses that defendant sought a judgment non obstante veredicto and in the prayer of the motion for such judgment included a request for new trial, or had the court merely set aside the verdict and granted a new trial and not entered judgment for the defendant, no error would obtain upon the facts disclosed in the record. Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., is the same as Rule 50(b) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, and in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 61 S. Ct. 189, 85 L. Ed. 147, in Syl. 3, it is said: Thus it will become apparent that the action of the trial court in the instant case in ruling on the motion for judgment non obstante veredicto raised the same matters as the court would consider upon a motion for directed verdict. In the instant case the credibility of the plaintiff Henry J. Burenheide, plaintiffs' only witness testifying as to whether or not there was such an oral agreement; the fact that he had been impeached; the conflict in his testimony; all are questions of fact and not questions of law. If a trial court, in reviewing and examining the facts, is dissatisfied with the verdict because it is against the weight, sufficiency or preponderance of the evidence, it may, under certain limitations, set the same aside and grant a new trial so that the issues of fact may ultimately be determined. See Gossard v. Watson, 122 Colo. 271, 221 P.2d 353, in which our Court goes into great detail in distinguishing the duties of a court in granting a directed verdict or nonsuit, which is a final and legal determination of the controversy, or the discretionary power of the court to grant a new trial. In Singer v. Chitwood, 126 Colo. 173, 247 P.2d 905, the court, after a jury verdict, granted a directed verdict upon a motion praying therefor or a new trial filed under Rule 50(b). Our Court said, as recorded on page 178 of 126 Colo., on page 908 of 247 P.2d: And on page 179 of 126 Colo., on page 908 of 247 P.2d: "`If the judge had refused the judgment on directed verdict for defendant primarily asked, as we have *1004 held he should have done, he should then have considered the motion for new trial. According to all the federal cases he has discretion to grant a new trial before another jury if he thinks the verdict is wrong, though there be some evidence to support it, and his action is generally not subject to review on appeal. * * * New trials are not abridged or disfavored by the new rules. The judge may even grant one on his own initiative without a motion. Rule 59(d).'" In the instant case it is obvious the court in granting the motion non obstante veredicto passed upon the included question of the propriety of granting a new trial. Accordingly, it is our judgment that the action of the trial court in setting aside the verdict was correct, and is affirmed. Its action in entering judgment non obstante veredicto for defendant is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to grant a new trial.