Title: ESTATE OF PELTOMAA

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 8 0 - 4 1 8 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 1 I N THE PUTTER OF THE ESTATE OF JACK LYLE PELTOMAA, D e c e a s e d . A p p e a l f r o m : D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r the C o u n t y of Silver Bow, T h e H o n o r a b l e A r n o l d O l s e n , Judge presiding. C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : F o r A p p e l l a n t : W. D. M u r r a y , Jr., B u t t e , Montana For R e s p o n d e n t : N e i l J. L y n c h , B u t t e , M o n t a n a S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s ; A p r i l 2 2 , 1 9 8 1 D e c i d e d : f l H 1 7 1 9 8 9 F i l e d ; 3UN 11 198ii Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal arises from an order of the Silver Bow County District Court, the Honorable Arnold Olsen presiding, wherein the court dismissed appellant's petition for formal intestacy proceedings, af ter finding that appellant was not the common-law wife of the deceased, Jack Lyle Peltomaa, and had no interest in his estate. Jack L. Peltomaa died intestate on June 11, 1979. Decedent's brother, respondent herein, filed an application for informal appointment of personal representative on August 1, 1979. On the same day, letters were issued appointing respondent personal representative. Upon learning of the application and appointment, appellant, Debbie Guardipee, on March 19, 1980, filed a petition for formal determination of intestacy, determination of heirs, for supervised administration, and appointment of personal representative. In filing the petition for formal proceedings, appellant sought to have her self determined to be the surviving common-law spouse and, therefore, heir and to have herself appointed personal representative under a supervised administration of the estate. Respondent filed objections to the petition and brought to the court's attention an agreement signed by both appellant and respondent. The agreement was dated June 15, 1979, and provided: ' I . . . in view of the renunciation by DEBBIE GARDIPEE [sic] [appellant] in the Estate of JACK1 E LYLE PELTOMAA, the PELTOMAA FAMILY conveys to DEBBIE GARDIPEE [sic] all of the household and personal property that may be in the possession of the PELTOMAA FAMILY because of the death of JACKIE LYLE PELTOMAA. "The PELTOMAA FAMILY will pay for any outstanding debts that DEBBIE GARDIPEE [sic] may have at the present time." After a hearing, the District Court denied all of appellant's contentions concerning her status as the surviving common-law spouse and dismissed her formal petition, granting respondent the right to continue an informal administration of the estate as personal representative. The main issue before this Court is whether the District Court erred in failing to find appellant the decedent's common-law wife. In this regard, appellant alleges that the existence of a marital relationship between her and the decedent is supported by the following evidence and testimony presented to the District Court during the hearing on the petition: (1) Appellant testified that she had lived with the decedent from February 1976 until his death and that she considered herself married to him. Appellant further testified that the decedent represented to others that appellant was his wife; that the decedent's aunt introduced her to some friends as Debbie Peltomaa; and that title to her car was in both appellant's and the decedent's name (the actual title was never produced at trial). (2) Respondent testified that various debts paid in behalf of appellant, in accordance with the June 15, 1979, agreement, represented monies owed by both appellant and the decedent. In particular, respondent testified that a Household Finance bill represented monies obtained by appellant and the decedent to pay for the purchase of a television and to pay for their moving expenses. Appellant a l s o p o i n t s t o testimony by respondent t h a t he and h i s f a m i l y have p a i d a p p e l l a n t $1,000, p a r t i a l l y o b t a i n e d from t h e s e l l i n g of t h e t r a i l e r decedent was l i v i n g i n a t t h e time of h i s d e a t h . ( A p p e l l a n t a d m i t t e d , however, t h a t t i t l e t o t h e t r a i l e r was i n d e c e d e n t ' s name, a l t h o u g h t h e r e n t e d space was i n both t h e i r names. Respondent contends t h e t i t l e was n o t i n a p p e l l a n t ' s name o r i n t h e d e c e d e n t ' s name. ) ( 3 ) A p e r i o d i c s t a t e m e n t from Mountain B e l l F e d e r a l C r e d i t Union was submitted i n d i c a t i n g payments made on a l o a n given t o a p p e l l a n t under t h e name Debbie K . Peltomaa. ( 4 ) A p p e l l a n t i n t r o d u c e d a h o s p i t a l b i l l d a t e d A p r i l 24, 1979, which lists a p p e l l a n t ' s name a s Mrs. Debbie K . ( G u a r d i p e e ) P e l t o m a a and which i n d i c a t e s t h a t J a c k L . Peltomaa is her husband. A p p e l l a n t contends t h e b i l l a l s o shows t h a t t h e decedent maintained a medical i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y on her a s h i s w i f e . (Upon examination of t h e b i l l , however, we should n o t e it merely lists Jack Peltomaa a s t h e " r e s p o n s i b l e p a r t y or n e x t of kin" and s t a t e s : "doesn' t know what kind" of i n s u r a n c e is a v a i l a b l e . There is no i n d i c a t i o n on t h e b i l l t h a t a p p e l l a n t was a c t u a l l y covered by an i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y a s t h e d e c e d e n t ' s w i f e . ) ( 5 ) A p p e l l a n t a l s o i n t r o d u c e d a 1978 f e d e r a l income t a x r e t u r n f i l e d j o i n t l y by decedent and a p p e l l a n t a s husband and w i f e . Respondent c l a i m s t h a t i n l i g h t of a l l t h e above e v i d e n c e , a p p e l l a n t h a s s t i l l f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e e x i s t e n c e of a common-law marriage. I n s u p p o r t of h i s p o s i t i o n , respondent contends t h a t h i s b r o t h e r never c o n s i d e r e d himself married and was merely l i v i n g w i t h a p p e l l a n t . Respondent f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t a p p e l l a n t o n l y r e p r e s e n t e d h e r s e l f a s Mrs. Peltomaa when it was t o her f i n a n c i a l b e n e f i t ( i . e . , i n borrowing money o r i n f i l i n g a j o i n t t a x r e t u r n ) and p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e o n l y testimony used i n s u p p o r t of a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i t i o n a r e her own s e l f - s e r v i n g s t a t e m e n t s . I f a p p e l l a n t had been l i v i n g w i t h t h e decedent a s husband and w i f e f o r over t h r e e y e a r s , why was s h e unable t o produce another w i t n e s s t o c o r r o b o r a t e her a l l e g a t i o n s ? Respondent a l s o n o t e s testimony t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t a p p e l l a n t was n o t l i v i n g w i t h t h e decedent a t t h e time of h i s d e a t h ; t h a t a f t e r being informed of d e c e d e n t ' s d e a t h , a p p e l l a n t i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p was a l r e a d y a t a n e n d ; t h a t a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e f u n e r a l arrangements and t h a t s h e signed t h e June 15 agreement, renouncing any i n t e r e s t i n d e c e d e n t ' s e s t a t e with t h e name Debbie Guardipee, n o t Debbie Peltomaa. To e s t a b l i s h a common-law m a r r i a g e it h a s been h e l d t h a t t h e proponent must prove: ". . . t h a t t h e p a r t i e s were c a p a b l e of c o n s e n t i n g t o t h e m a r r i a g e and t h e r e was mutual and p u b l i c assumption of t h e m a r i t a l r e l a t i o n . The m a r r i a g e must t a k e immediately and it cannot be c r e a t e d piecemeal. I t comes i n s t a n t l y i n t o being, or it does n o t come a t a l l ; and its p a r t i e s must e n t e r i n t o a c o u r s e of conduct t o e s t a b l i s h t h e i r r e p u t e a s hus- band and wife." I n Re McClelland ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 160, 164-165, 541 P.2d 780, 783. See a l s o M i l l e r v. Townsend Lumber Co. ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152 Mont. 210, 448 P.2d 148; E l l i o t v. I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board ( 1 9 3 6 ) , 1 0 1 Mont. 246, 53 P.2d 451. I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e testimony and evidence p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s m a t t e r , we n o t e t h a t t h e f a c t s used t o s u p p o r t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a common-law m a r r i a g e a r e mere i s o l a t e d i n s t a n c e s i n which a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e d l y r e p r e s e n t e d h e r s e l f a s d e c e d e n t ' s w i f e . The f a c t s f a i l t o show any s p e c i f i c agreement between a p p e l l a n t and t h e decedent concerning m a r r i a g e ; t h e y d o n o t e s t a b i s h a c o n t i n u o u s m a r i t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and a r e i n c o n f l i c t w i t h testimony p r e s e n t e d by respondent. T h i s Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y held t h a t t h e evidence p r e s e n t e d a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t must be viewed by us i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y . I f t h e r e is c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court, t h o s e f i n d i n g s w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d on a p p e a l . See Olson v. Westfork P r o p e r t i e s , I n c . ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 171 Mont. 154, 557 P.2d 821; C i t y of Missoula v. Rose ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164 Mont. 90, 519 P.2d 146. I n s o reviewing t h e proceedings of t h e lower c o u r t h e r e , w e f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a p p e l l a n t and t h e decedent never consummated, e i t h e r f o r m a l l y o r i n f o r m a l l y , a m a r i t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . A p p e l l a n t has r a i s e d a second i s s u e on a p p e a l i n c o n t e n d i n g t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was i n e r r o r f o r d i s m i s s i n g h e r p e t i t i o n f o r f o r m a l p r o c e e d i n g s . I n r e j e c t i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s argument, w e need o n l y n o t e t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s a l l e g e d i n t e r e s t i n t h e e s t a t e of t h e decedent is based s o l e l y on her c o n t e n t i o n t h a t s h e is a s u r v i v i n g s p o u s e . Having a l r e a d y d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t a n d decedent never consummated a m a r i t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , and i n f u r t h e r acknowledging t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p p e l l a n t ' s s i g n e d r e n u n c i a t i o n agreement, t h i s Court must a g r e e w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a p p e l l a n t has no i n t e r e s t i n t h e e s t a t e and f i n d t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n was p r o p e r l y dismissed. The order of dismissal as entered by the D i s t r i c t Court is affirmed. J u s t i c e We concur: