Title: Hannah v. Tennant

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

589 P.2d 1035 (1979) 92 N.M. 444 Raymond C. HANNAH and Vonnie B. Hannah, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Edward A. TENNANT and Josefina V. Tennant, Defendants-Appellants. No. 12170. Supreme Court of New Mexico. January 24, 1979. Coors, Singer & Broullire, Henry G. Coors, IV, Albuquerque, for plaintiffs-appellees. Johnson & Lanphere, John M. Kirk, Jr., Albuquerque, for defendants-appellants. FEDERICI, Justice. Raymond and Vonnie Hannah (appellees) are husband and wife. They brought this action against Edward and Josefina Tennant (appellants) seeking specific performance of an executory contract for the sale of a portion of appellees' community real property. *1036 A handwritten document, apparently considered by appellees to be a contract for the sale of certain real property in Albuquerque, was signed by both appellants, as buyers, and by appellee Vonnie Hannah, alone, as seller. Less than 72 hours after signing this document, appellants sent appellee Vonnie Hannah a letter in which they stated their intent to withdraw from the proposed real estate purchase. Appellees filed suit in the District Court of Bernalillo County asking for specific performance of the alleged contract. Appellants' answer included a third affirmative defense which is the only subject involved in this appeal. It stated: There is no indication in the record that a power of attorney from appellee Raymond Hannah to appellee Vonnie Hannah was ever executed or recorded. Prior to the trial, the court granted appellees' motion to strike appellants' third affirmative defense. Appellants applied for, and this Court granted, an order allowing an interlocutory appeal. The issue in this case is whether both spouses must sign a contract for the sale of community real property in order to meet the requirement of § 40-3-13, N.M.S.A. 1978 (formerly § 57-4A-7, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Supp. 1975)), that both spouses join in the contract to transfer, or whether the word "join" as used in the statute merely refers to a state of mind. Section 40-3-13 provides: Appellants argue that § 40-3-13 requires both spouses to sign a contract to convey community real property absent a validly executed and recorded power of attorney, and that the absence of one spouse's signature renders the contract in question void and of no effect if it is proved that the property in question is appellees' community property. Therefore, appellants argue, it was error for the trial court to strike their third affirmative defense. Appellees contend that the purpose of § 40-3-13 is to protect one spouse from an act of the other spouse conveying away community real property, and that the statute only requires that a spouse who does not sign be willing and able to join in a contract conveying community real property. Therefore, appellees argue, the trial court did not commit error in striking appellants' third affirmative defense. *1037 We believe that the intention expressed by the language of § 40-3-13 is clear: contracts to transfer an interest in community real property are void and of no effect unless signed by both husband and wife. All of the cases cited by appellees involved § 57-4-3, N.M.S.A. 1953, the predecessor of the present statute. That statute only required that both spouses join in the execution of deeds and mortgages involving community real property. The present statute, § 40-3-13, specifically includes contracts to transfer or convey community real property. We hold that under § 40-3-13 a contract for the sale of an interest in community real property, which has not been signed by both husband and wife, is unenforceable, void and of no effect, absent a validly executed and recorded power of attorney. The words "join in" used in the statute mean "sign." Marquez v. Marquez, 85 N.M. 470, 513 P.2d 713 (1973); McGrail v. Fields, 53 N.M. 158, 203 P.2d 1000 (1949); Jenkins v. Huntsinger, 46 N.M. 168, 125 P.2d 327 (1942). See also Gregg v. Owens, 37 Minn. 61, 33 N.W. 216 (1887). The order of the trial court striking appellants' third affirmative defense is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. IT IS SO ORDERED. SOSA, C.J., and PAYNE, J., concur.