Title: State v. Lisimba L. Love

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 116 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2255 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Lisimba L. Love,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 27, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Franke   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Kathleen S. Donius and Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Kathleen S. Donius. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2005 WI 116
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2255  
(L.C. No. 
99CF5150) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Lisimba L. Love, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   Lisimba Love seeks review 
of a court of appeals summary disposition1 that affirmed the 
circuit court's order denying Love's postconviction motion 
requesting 
a 
new 
trial 
on 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
postconviction counsel and newly discovered evidence grounds. 
¶2 
Love argues that he presented sufficient material 
facts for a reviewing court to meaningfully assess his claims.  
                                                 
1 State v. Love, No. 2003AP2255, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. 
App. May 12, 2004). 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
2 
 
Further, he contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on both claims.  We agree.  Although Love's motion does 
not allege sufficient facts that, on their face, would be 
admissible at the hearing, the motion papers allege sufficient 
material objective factual assertions that, if true, entitle him 
to relief.  Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals' decision 
and remand this case to the circuit court for an evidentiary 
hearing on both of his claims to determine whether Love is 
entitled to a new trial.2 
I 
¶3 
On September 28, 1999, shortly after midnight, Glenn 
Robinson, a Milwaukee Bucks professional basketball player, left 
Junior's Sports Bar in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  Fifteen or twenty 
feet away from the exit, he was accosted by two men and robbed.  
The following evidence was presented at Love's trial. 
¶4 
Robinson arrived alone at Junior's Sports Bar between 
10:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. and stayed there for an hour and a 
half.  While there, he conversed with three women:  Tawanda 
Knox, Yolanda Corley, and Latasha Robinson.3  Corley called a 
friend of hers, Calvin Wilson,4 who stated he knew Robinson.  
                                                 
2 We do not determine that Love is entitled to a new trial 
either because counsel was ineffective or because the defendant 
has presented newly discovered evidence.  We merely conclude 
that Love has raised sufficient facts that would warrant an 
evidentiary hearing on each claim.  
3 Latasha Robinson is not related to Glenn Robinson.  For 
clarity, she will be referred to as "Latasha." 
4 Calvin's last name of "Wilson" was taken from a police 
report contained in the record. 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
3 
 
Corley handed the telephone to Robinson, who briefly spoke with 
Wilson.   
¶5 
Knox left the bar shortly before Corley and Latasha.  
As Knox left she saw a man in the doorway of the bar she 
believed to be "Poppa," a nickname by which she knew Love.  Knox 
lived across the street from Love and worked in a hair salon 
owned by Love's sister-in-law.  Knox testified that she said, 
"What's up, Poppa?" as she exited the bar.  Knox could not 
remember if the person said anything back to her.  Upon cross-
examination, Knox testified that she was not 100 percent certain 
that it was Love she saw.  
¶6 
After leaving the bar, Knox went to the vehicle she 
and her friends had arrived in and sat inside for approximately 
two minutes.  She saw Robinson standing near his car, which was 
roughly three parking spaces away.  Corley and Latasha then 
entered the car in which Knox was sitting. 
¶7 
Knox saw Robinson put his hands in the air like he was 
removing something from around his neck.  As Latasha began to 
drive the vehicle away, Knox noticed Robinson backing up with 
his hands facing out and she said, "Oh my god, he's getting 
robbed."  Knox could not, however, see the face of the assailant 
in front of Robinson.  The car then drove off without Knox 
observing the rest of the robbery.  Knox immediately called 
Junior's Sports Bar from Latasha's cell phone to report the 
robbery.  Knox agreed that at that time she thought Love was 
involved in the robbery. 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
4 
 
¶8 
While Robinson was being robbed, the send button on 
Latasha's 
cell 
phone 
was 
inadvertently 
pressed, 
and 
the 
telephone dialed the telephone number of Wilson.  Knox, Corley, 
and Latasha's conversation in the car during and immediately 
after the robbery was recorded on Wilson's voicemail.  The tape 
contained 
conflicting statements from 
the 
women 
regarding 
whether anyone saw "Poppa" and if so where.  The State played 
this tape at trial. 
¶9 
Robinson left the bar with Mike Williams, a friend of 
Corley's, shortly after Knox.  Williams gave Robinson Corley's 
number, after which Robinson approached his vehicle that was 
parked approximately 15 to 20 feet from the exit of the bar.  
Robinson noticed another vehicle parked directly in front of his 
car.  Robinson was about to disarm the alarm on his vehicle when 
a man approached him from what Robinson assumed was the vehicle 
in front of his.  The man approached with a silver handgun and 
told Robinson to, "Break yourself."  Robinson understood this to 
mean that he was being robbed.  Robinson handed over his keys, 
telephone, and wallet and tried to hand over his necklace but 
his assailant snatched it from his neck.  Robinson backed away 
from the man with the gun and approached the rear of his 
vehicle.  Another man stepped around the back of the vehicle and 
told Robinson not to run.  After Robinson gave the men his 
earring, the two men ran to the car parked in front of 
Robinson's vehicle and left.   
¶10 Robinson then went into Junior's Sports Bar where he 
called the police to report the robbery.  When the police 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
5 
 
arrived, Robinson told them that the gunman was "around six two, 
170 pounds and with a mini-afro, dark complected."  Robinson 
described the other assailant as "around six one around the same 
weight 170, 180, and dark complexion."  Robinson also estimated 
both assailants were no more than 29 or 30 years old.5  Robinson 
did not identify any scars or facial hair as being present on 
either attacker.  Robinson later testified that each man had 
been about an arm's length away from him and that he focused on 
the robbers' faces and staring at the gun.  The whole incident 
took about two minutes.   
¶11 Two days after the robbery, Robinson was given several 
photo arrays.  Robinson did not identify anyone as the 
assailants.  These arrays did not include a picture of Love or 
Effrim Moss, the person later charged as a co-conspirator to the 
robbery. 
¶12 A few days after the robbery, Robinson was contacted 
by Wilson, who told Robinson that 
he had 
the recorded 
conversation between Knox, Latasha, and Corley on his cell phone 
                                                 
5 The parties also stipulated that if Officer Alex Lopez 
were called to testify, he would state that the descriptions of 
the suspects given to him by Glenn Robinson were as follows: 
Suspect number 1.  Black male.  Six foot one inch, 170 
pounds, 20 years of age, skinny, dark skinned with a 
mini-afro wearing unknown clothing and armed with a 
silver semi-automatic pistol.  Suspect number 2, black 
male, 6 foot 2 inches, 180 pounds, 20 years of age, 
skinny, dark skinned and wearing unknown clothing. 
 
 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
6 
 
voicemail 
regarding 
the 
robbery. 
 
Robinson 
recorded 
the 
conversation on audiotape and gave it to the police.   
¶13 One week after the robbery, Robinson was shown four 
photo arrays.  In the third set, Robinson indicated that he was 
80-85 percent sure that Love's picture was that of the gunman.  
Robinson agreed that the picture featured a man with lighter 
complexion than he remembered.  Robinson later identified Love 
at a line-up, and, at trial, Robinson said he was 100 percent 
sure that his identification of Love as the gunman was correct.  
Robinson also identified Love at the preliminary hearing and 
trial.   
¶14 At the time of the incident, Love had a long wide scar 
on his right cheek, short hair, and had a beard and mustache.  
Love's arrest detention report, which was filled out by the 
arresting officer, indicated that Love has medium complexion, 
weighed 245 pounds, and had a heavy build.6  Love also testified 
he was 26 years old. 
¶15 Love presented an alibi defense.  Love testified that 
he was not at the bar that night and had never gone to Junior's 
Sports Bar.  Love stated that he had been picking up his friend 
Rochelle Adams' mother the night of the robbery. 
¶16 Rochelle testified that Love often accompanied her 
when she picked up her mother and remembered Love being with her 
on September 27, 1999, in particular because she had spent the 
                                                 
6 Apparently, a suspect's weight is usually estimated by 
either what the suspect tells the arresting officer or by the 
officer's observations. 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
7 
 
whole day with him.  Marilyn Adams, Rochelle's mother, testified 
that Love occasionally accompanied her daughter while picking 
her up from work, but did not remember the night of September 
27, 1999, in particular.   
¶17 Mary Jones also testified on behalf of Love.  Jones 
testified that on the night of the robbery she spoke with a man 
named "Dee" at Junior's Sports Bar, who, after seeing Robinson 
at a table behind them, stated that, he was going to rob 
Robinson.  Jones testified that she left the bar shortly after 
Robinson and saw Robinson being robbed.  Jones testified she 
observed Dee with what appeared to be a gun and saw Dee and 
another man approach Robinson from behind.  At seeing this, 
Jones testified she ran, but saw Robinson take off a necklace.  
Jones said that "Dee" was a black male with dark complexion, 
approximately 26 to 27 years of age, five foot seven inches, 180 
pounds with a medium build, and was clean-shaven. 
¶18 Detective 
Scott 
LaFleur of 
the Milwaukee 
Police 
Department testified in rebuttal.  He stated that Jones had many 
contradictions between her testimony and her statement to 
police.  LaFleur stated that Jones told police the robbery was 
on a Saturday night, not the Monday night it occurred.  LaFleur 
also noted that she told police she was so close behind Robinson 
upon leaving she caught the door before it shut after he passed 
through.  The videotape surveillance of the doorway does not 
show anyone leaving directly behind Robinson.  Jones also stated 
that the attackers came from behind and had a black gun while 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
8 
 
Robinson testified that they came from the front and behind and 
had a silver gun. 
¶19 Love was found guilty of armed robbery as party to a 
crime.  The jury was unable to reach a verdict on Moss, and he 
was later acquitted.  The circuit court for Milwaukee County, 
Honorable Bonnie L. Gordon, sentenced Love to 44 years in 
prison.   
¶20 Love's postconviction counsel filed two motions, one 
requesting 
sentencing 
modification, 
the 
other 
alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims stemmed from Love's trial counsel's failure to 
object to the prosecutor's (1) reference to the preliminary 
examination during the trial and closing arguments; and (2) 
invitation to the jurors to turn down the lights and time 
themselves for two minutes during their deliberations.  See 
State v. Love, No. 2001AP817, unpublished slip. op., ¶6 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2001).  The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 
Honorable Bonnie L. Gordon, denied these motions, and the court 
of appeals affirmed.  Id., ¶1. 
¶21 On May 6, 2003, Love, pro se, filed a motion for post-
conviction relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2001-02)7 requesting 
a new trial on two grounds.  First, Love requested a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence.  Love included an affidavit 
from Christopher Hawley, who claimed to have met another inmate, 
                                                 
7 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted.   
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
9 
 
Floyd Lindell Smith, Jr., while at Green Bay Correctional 
Institution.  Hawley averred that Smith admitted to robbing 
Robinson and shared in-depth details regarding the incident.8  
Love also submitted a booking photograph of Smith taken one week 
after the Robinson robbery.  Smith had been arrested for 
carrying a concealed weapon, and his picture is that of a male 
with a dark complexion, 22 years old, weighing 170 pounds with a 
mini-afro. 
¶22 Second, Love also argued that his postconviction 
counsel was ineffective for failing to allege that his trial 
counsel 
was 
ineffective 
for 
failing 
to 
investigate 
an 
exculpatory witness.  As support, Love provided a police report 
that was prepared on January 7, 2000, which was three days 
before Love's trial was to begin, that noted that Love's mother 
received a telephone call from the Milwaukee County Jail on 
November 22, 1999.  The caller identified himself as Jerees 
Veasley and claimed to have knowledge of who actually robbed 
Robinson.  Love alleged in his motion that trial counsel did not 
attempt to contact Veasley nor investigate the claim.  Love also 
alleged that since Robinson's identification was the sole piece 
of evidence linking Love 
to the 
scene, 
the 
failure to 
investigate this exculpatory witness, or at least a witness that 
inculpated another, was deficient and prejudicial. 
¶23 On July 2, 2003, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court 
Honorable John Franke, denied Love's motion.  With regard to 
                                                 
8 The affidavit does not describe these in-depth details. 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
10 
 
Love's newly discovered evidence claim, the circuit court 
concluded that the Hawley affidavit was not evidence that 
warranted an evidentiary hearing.  The circuit court determined 
that the affidavit "merely attributes comments to another 
inmate, one Floyd Lindell Smith, Jr., which, if sworn to by Mr. 
Smith in somewhat more detail, might qualify as other newly 
discovered evidence."9  
¶24 With 
regard to 
Love's ineffective 
assistance of 
counsel claim, the circuit court concluded that Love failed to 
offer any evidence that counsel did not investigate the alleged 
telephone 
call 
his 
mother 
received 
from 
Jerees 
Veasley.  
Further, the circuit court determined that Love failed to 
demonstrate how any investigation would have benefited his case.  
The circuit court asked, "Who is Mr. Veasley?  Did he know what 
he was talking about?  Does he lead us to any admissible 
evidence 
helpful 
to 
the 
defense?" 
 
Because 
of 
these 
deficiencies, the circuit court denied Love's motion. 
¶25 Love, pro se, appealed.  The court of appeals 
summarily affirmed the circuit court's order.  State v. Love, 
No. 2003AP2255, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. May 12, 2004).  
Love, pro se, petitioned this court for review.  After review 
was granted, Love was appointed counsel. 
 
 
                                                 
9 The bulk of the circuit court's analysis centered on 
Knox's subsequent recantation and whether that constituted new 
evidence.  This argument, however, is not before us. 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
11 
 
II 
¶26 Our standard of review was set forth in State v. 
Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433, as 
follows:   
Whether 
a 
defendant's 
postconviction 
motion 
alleges sufficient facts to entitle the defendant to a 
hearing for the relief requested is a mixed standard 
of review.  First, we determine whether the motion on 
its face alleges sufficient material facts that, if 
true, would entitle the defendant to relief. This is a 
question of law that we review de novo. [State v.] 
Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d [303,] 309-10 [682 N.W.2d 433 
(1996)]. If the motion raises such facts, the circuit 
court must hold an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 310; 
Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 497, 195 N.W.2d 629 
(1972).  However, if the motion does not raise facts 
sufficient to entitle the movant to relief, or 
presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not 
entitled 
to 
relief, 
the 
circuit 
court 
has 
the 
discretion to grant or deny a hearing.  Bentley, 201 
Wis. 2d at 310-11; Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 497-98. We 
require the circuit court "to form its independent 
judgment after a review of the record and pleadings 
and to support its decision by written opinion."  
Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 498.  See Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 
at 318-19 (quoting the same).  We review a circuit 
court's discretionary decisions under the deferential 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  In re the 
Commitment of Franklin, 2004 WI 38, ¶6, 270 Wis. 2d 
271, 677 N.W.2d 276; Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311. 
III 
¶27 In Allen, this court held that a postconviction motion 
must contain an historical basis setting forth material facts 
that allows the reviewing court to meaningfully assess the 
defendant's claims.  Id., ¶¶18, 21-22.  This court contrasted 
mere conclusory allegations from assertions of those material 
facts, id., ¶¶21, 29, which the court defined as "[a] fact that 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
12 
 
is significant or essential to the issue or matter at hand."  
Id., ¶22.  This court proposed that a postconviction motion will 
be sufficient if it alleges within the four corners of the 
document itself "the five 'w's' and one 'h'; that is, who, what, 
where, when, why, and how."  Id., ¶23.  The following 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
postconviction 
motion 
hypothetical was offered as a model for presenting sufficient 
facts to warrant an evidentiary hearing: 
The defendant alleges she was deprived effective 
assistance of counsel because her trial counsel failed 
to call as a witness, Bill Johnson, whose testimony 
would support the defendant's testimony that she was 
dining and going to the movies with her boyfriend at 
10:00 p.m. on the night of June 1, 2002, when Sally's 
Hair Salon was burglarized. 
The 
defendant 
told 
trial 
counsel 
that 
her 
neighbor, Bill Johnson, entered a restaurant around 
7:00 p.m. while the defendant and her boyfriend were 
dining, and that on the way to be seated, Mr. Johnson 
stopped at defendant's table and talked with the 
couple.  The defendant told trial counsel that 
following dinner she and her boyfriend saw Mr. Johnson 
at the movie theater while they waited in line to buy 
tickets for a 9:15 p.m. movie.  The defendant informed 
her trial counsel that three movies were scheduled to 
start between 9:00 p.m. and 9:15 p.m., the time during 
which the defendant and her boyfriend were in the 
theater lobby and saw Mr. Johnson.  The defendant 
further alleges that she gave trial counsel her 
receipt from the restaurant. 
This failure to call Mr. Johnson as a witness was 
deficient and prejudicial to the defendant as there is 
a reasonable probability that she would not have been 
convicted of stealing hair products from Sally's Hair 
Salon had Mr. Johnson testified. 
Id., ¶24. 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
13 
 
¶28 This court in Allen indicated this showing warranted 
an evidentiary hearing because it "contains sufficient material 
facts——i.e., the name of the witness (who), the reason the 
witness is important (why, how), and facts that can be proven 
(what, where, when)."  Id. 
¶29 Love contends his postconviction motion satisfies 
Allen's proposal that a postconviction motion allege "the five 
'w's' and one 'h;' that is, who, what, where, when, why, and 
how."  Id., ¶23.  He asserts that he has submitted material 
facts as opposed to conclusory allegations that would allow the 
reviewing court to meaningfully assess each of his claims.  See 
id., ¶21 (citing Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 314).  Further, Love 
argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on both his 
newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims.  We agree.10 
A 
¶30 "To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, the defendant must show that counsel's actions or 
                                                 
10 We note that Love filed his postconviction motion pro se 
and while incarcerated.  As this court stated in State ex rel. 
Terry v. Traeger, 60 Wis. 2d 490, 496, 211 N.W.2d 4 (1973): 
We recognize that the confinement of the prisoner 
and 
the 
necessary reasonable regulations 
of the 
prison, in addition to the fact that many prisoners 
are 'unlettered' and most are indigent, make it 
difficult for a prisoner to obtain legal assistance or 
to know and observe jurisdictional and procedural 
requirements in submitting his grievances to a court.  
Accordingly, we must follow a liberal policy in 
judging the sufficiency of pro se complaints filed by 
unlettered and indigent prisoners. 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
14 
 
inaction 
constituted 
deficient 
performance 
and 
that 
the 
deficiency caused him prejudice."  State v. Brunette, 220 Wis. 
2d 431, 445, 583 N.W.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1998)(citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  To prove constitutional 
deficiency, the defendant must establish that counsel's conduct 
falls 
below 
an 
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonableness.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶19, 
264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305.  To prove constitutional 
prejudice, the defendant must show that "'there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.'"  Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶20 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  The focus of the inquiry 
is not on the outcome of the trial, but on "'the reliability of 
the proceedings.'"  Id.  (quoting State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 
628, 642, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985)).   
¶31 Regarding ineffective assistance of postconviction 
counsel, Love asserted the following in his postconviction 
motion:11 
 
 
                                                 
11 The court of appeals has concluded that an ineffective 
assistance of postconviction counsel claim is not barred by 
State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 
(1994).  State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 
556 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1996). 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
15 
 
FACTS REVIEW 
The facts in support of the alleged error(s) 
 . . . upon which this Motion is based up the follow 
facts herein as follows: 
1.) On 1/7/2000 at the Home of Ms. Dorothy Love, as 
indicated in the supplement Report that was taken by 
Det. Hargrove on Pg. (3) during the interview Mrs. 
Love stated that on 11/22/99, she received a telephone 
call, from a person who identified himself as "Jerees 
Veasley" who was incarcerated at the Milwaukee County 
Jail.  Jerees Veasley called ms. Love and stated to 
Ms. Love that, "they got the wrong Man on the Glen 
Robinson" case, and I know who did it.  Ms. Love 
stated that she did mention this to Mr. Love's 
Attorney and that she knows about Mr. Jerees Veasley.  
(See. Report attached hereto as exhibit. (B)12 
2.) Trial counsel "Ann Bowe" failed to investigate the 
facts that "Jerees Veasley" actually knows who robbed 
Mr. Glen Robinson. 
3.) 
Trial 
counsel 
"Ann 
Bowe" 
failed 
to 
submit 
(Exhibit. B) into evidence and failed to interview 
"Jerees Veasley" and call him as a Witness on the 
behalf of the Defendant, which would have further 
proved that the Defendant did not commit this crime.  
Trail  counsel knew of the police report attached as 
(Exhibit-B.) 
. . . .  
                                                 
12 Exhibit B to the postconviction motion was a police 
report dated January 7, 2000, that stated: 
Also during the interview Mrs. LOVE stated that on 
11/22/99, she received a telephone call, unknown time 
from a person who identified himself as Jerees 
VEASLEY, who was incarcerated at the County Jail.  
VEASLEY called and stated to Mrs. LOVE that "They got 
the wrong man on the ROBINSON case, I know who did 
it."  Mrs. LOVE stated that she did mention this to 
[Love's] attorney and that they know about Mr. 
VEASLEY. 
 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
16 
 
ISSUE A.1 
Postconviction 
Counsel 
was 
Ineffective 
in 
violation 
of 
Defendant's 
Sixth 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendment Constitutional Rights as guaranteed by the 
Wis. and U.S. Constitution for failing to bring a 
Postconviction Motion before the trial court alleging 
that defendant's trial counsel "Ann Bowe" rendered 
Ineffective Assistance for failing to Investigate and 
Submit evidence indicating that someone else other 
than the defendant had committed this crime. 
. . . .   
ARGUMENT 
In the case at Bar, the Defendant will prove that 
trial counsel rendered "Ineffective Assistance" in the 
following respects and that Postconviction Counsel was 
Ineffective for failing to allege the error's of the 
trial counsel. 
As demonstrated in the facts upon which defendant's 
Motion is based, trial counsel was aware of the police 
report and statement of "Jerees Veasley" attached to 
this Motion as (Exhibit-B-), which states that "Jerees 
Veasley" knows who Robbed Mr. Glen Robinson and that 
the Defendant was not that person and has been wrongly 
accused. 
Trial counsel failed to investigate by contacting 
"Jerees Veasley" for purpose of calling him as a 
Witness on the behalf of the Defendant which would 
have served as exculpatory evidence in the Defendant's 
favor and further proved his innocence. 
. . . .  
BUT FOR COUNSEL'S UNPROFESSIONAL ERROR'S THE RESULTS 
WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT 
The defendant was convicted based solely on the 
victim's Identification testimony.  There was no 
additional evidence linking the Defendant to the crime 
such as video camera, weapon's, and or fingerprints or 
confession, etc. 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
17 
 
Furthermore, the victim's initial description of the 
assailant 
was 
extremely 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
description of the defendant.  Whereas, the victim 
described 
both 
assailants 
as 
being 
"Dark 
Skin 
Complexioned", 170 to 180 Pounds, Skinny,.    
. . . .   
However, the defendant's actual description is 6'1 and 
245 Pounds and with a heavey Built, Brown Eye's and 
Black hair and a medimum Brown Complexion.  See. 
Trans. 96-97: 23-25.  In addition the defendant has a 
very outstanding huge large scare on the "Right" side 
of his face that without question any person looking 
at the Defendant could not miss such an outstanding 
physical impression upon his face. 
In 
addition, 
police 
reports 
indicate 
that 
. . . ["]Jerees Veasley" either witnessed the crime 
and/or also had knowledge of the real culprits and had 
trial counsel thoroughly investigated and presented 
such 
exculpatory evidence 
there 
is a 
reasonable 
likelihood that the results of the trial would have 
been different.  Therefore the Defendant has suffered 
Prejudice as a result of trial counsel's failure to 
investigate 
and 
prepare 
an 
adequate 
defense.  
Postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to 
allege these error's committed by defendant's trial 
counsel.  (Emphasis in original.)   
1 
¶32 We conclude the motion contains material facts to 
meaningfully assess the merits of Love's ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim.   
¶33 First, as to the "who" prong, the motion indicates the 
name of the key witness that was not investigated was Jerees 
Veasley.   
¶34 Second, as to the "why" and "how" prongs, the motion 
indicates the reason the witness is important is because 
Veasley's 
exculpatory 
statements 
were 
critical 
to 
Love's 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
18 
 
defense, as the crux of the State's case was the reliability of 
Robinson's identification, an identification Love contends was 
mistaken.  Love mentions the discrepancies between his physical 
characteristics and the description Robinson gave to police 
shortly after the incident.  Love also claims that his trial 
counsel knew of Veasley's information, but did not investigate 
his assertions that he knows who committed the crime.13  Thus, 
Love argues, his trial counsel was deficient and that he was 
prejudiced, as Veasley's statements undermine the confidence in 
the outcome. 
¶35 Third, as to the "what," "where," and "when" prongs, 
the motion indicates that the facts that can be proven are that 
on January 7, 2000, Veasley called Love's mother and said that 
the police arrested the wrong person in the Robinson murder.  
That is, Veasley offered exculpatory evidence by saying Love is 
not 
the 
perpetrator. 
 
Although 
the 
source 
of 
Veasley's 
information or the manner of its acquisition is not explicit, it 
implied that he either had personal knowledge of the real 
assailant or otherwise learned material information. 
¶36 The State seizes upon this last point, arguing that 
because Love does not establish how Veasley claims to know what 
he knows, the motion is deficient.  However, a movant need only 
                                                 
13 The State does not dispute that pursuant to the ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice, trial counsel is obligated to 
investigate information in police reports.  See ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice, The Defense Function, § 4-4.1 (3d ed. 
1993); see also State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶37, 264 Wis. 2d 
571, 665 N.W.2d 305. 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
19 
 
provide sufficient "objective factual assertions."  See Bentley, 
201 Wis. 2d at 313; cf. Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶30.  That is, a 
movant need not demonstrate theories of admissibility for every 
factual assertion he or she seeks to introduce.14   
¶37 It is clear that Love asserts that Veasley has 
knowledge 
that 
can 
exculpate 
Love. 
 
Whether 
Veasley's 
information is ultimately admissible, however, is not a matter 
to be decided from the face of the motion papers.  Accepting the 
statements as true, which we must,15 the question is whether 
there are sufficient objective material factual assertions that 
would entitle Love to relief.   
¶38 The State also contends that there are no facts to 
support Love's contention that his trial counsel did not 
investigate Veasley's assertions.  On the contrary, Love asserts 
that trial counsel failed to investigate the facts that Veasley 
actually knew who robbed Robinson and that it was not Love, 
failed to interview Veasley, and failed to call Veasley as a 
witness on Love's behalf.  He further asserts that trial counsel 
was "ineffective" for failure to properly investigate and for 
failure to introduce known exculpatory evidence.  These factual 
allegations and legal assertions, if true, are adequate to allow 
the reviewing court to meaningfully assess his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.   
                                                 
14 It is, of course, to the movant's advantage to do so. 
15 It is not proper to entertain imagination or supposition 
to gauge the veracity of the factual allegations.  They must be 
accepted as true.  Compare Prosser, J., dissenting, ¶84. 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
20 
 
2 
¶39 We further conclude that Love's postconviction motion 
sets forth sufficient material factual assertions that entitle 
him to a hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.   
¶40 As to deficient performance, the State does not 
dispute that pursuant to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 
trial counsel is obligated to investigate information in police 
reports.  See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense 
Function, § 4-4.1 (3d ed. 1993); see also Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 
571, ¶37. 
¶41 As to prejudice, although the State champions the 
strength of its case against Love, assuming the facts in Love's 
motion papers to be true, our confidence in the outcome would be 
undermined.  The only person who identified Love as the 
perpetrator was the victim, Robinson, but there are concerns 
surrounding his identification based 
on numerous physical 
irreconcilabilities.  As noted above, Robinson testified that he 
initially told the police that the gunman was "around six two, 
170 pounds and with a mini-afro, dark complected," whereas Love 
was estimated at 245 pounds with a heavy build and a medium 
complexion.  Moreover, there are also inconsistencies between 
his testimony concerning what he told the police and his actual 
police statement, which indicated that the person he identified 
as Love was six foot one inch, 170 pounds, 20 years of age, 
skinny, and dark skinned with a mini-afro.  In addition to the 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
21 
 
weight, age,16 and skin color discrepancies, Robinson failed to 
notice the scar on Love's face.       
¶42 Veasley may have admissible information as to whom the 
real perpetrator was, however, we cannot determine how Veasley's 
testimony would measure against the credibility of Robinson's 
identifications. 
 
The 
general 
rule 
is 
that 
credibility 
determinations are resolved by live testimony.  See Honeycrest 
Farms, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 169 Wis. 2d 596, 604, 486 
N.W.2d 539 (Ct. App. 1992).  Assuming Veasley's testimony is 
true, however, that testimony would undermine our confidence in 
the outcome.  Thus, because Love's motion on its face alleges 
sufficient material facts that, if true, would entitle the 
defendant to relief, Love is entitled to a hearing.17 
B 
¶43 To prevail on a claim for newly discovered evidence, a 
defendant must first prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
"(1) the evidence was discovered after conviction; (2) the 
defendant was not negligent in seeking evidence; (3) the 
evidence is material to an issue in the case; and (4) the 
evidence is not merely cumulative."  State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 
                                                 
16 Love was 26 years of age. 
17 We fail to see how the cost associated with and the 
nature of the hearing have any bearing on Love's right and 
opportunity to be heard as well as his access to the courts.  
Contra Prosser, J., dissenting, ¶86. 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
22 
 
119, ¶161, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (quoting State v. 
McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 473, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997)).18  
¶44 If the defendant makes this showing, then "the circuit 
court must determine whether a reasonable probability exists 
that a different result would be reached in a trial."  Id.  The 
reasonable probability determination does not have to be 
established by clear and convincing evidence, as it contains its 
own burden of proof.  A reasonable probability of a different 
outcome exists if "there is a reasonable probability that a 
jury, looking at both the [old evidence] and the [new evidence], 
would have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt."  
McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 474. 
                                                 
18 The court of appeals has determined that due process may 
require granting a new trial on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 after the time for filing 
postverdict motions has passed.  State v. Bembeneck, 140 Wis. 2d 
248, 252, 409 N.W.2d 432 (Ct. App. 1987).  Citing Herrera v. 
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993), the State claims that 
Bembeneck should be overruled.  In Herrera, the Supreme Court 
held that a death-row defendant's claim of actual innocence 
based on newly discovered evidence by itself does not state a 
basis for federal habeas corpus relief.   
We conclude that the court of appeals in Bembeneck properly 
analyzed Wisconsin's postconviction statute.  It would be 
illogical to close the court's doors to a defendant who has 
newly discovered evidence, evidence that by definition creates a 
reasonable probability that a different verdict would be reached 
at a new trial.  Due process and its guarantee of fundamental 
fairness ensure that a defendant at least have access to the 
courts and an opportunity to be heard where newly discovered 
evidence creates a reasonable probability that a different 
result would be reached at a new trial, as long as the newly 
discovered evidence meets the minimum criteria set forth above. 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
23 
 
¶45 Regarding his newly discovered evidence claim, Love 
asserted the following in his motion: 
FACTS REVIEW 
. . . .   
6.) . . .  
On January 30th 2003, Defendant love received a 
Sworn Affidavit from an Inmate known as Christopher 
Hawley while incarcerated together at North Fork 
Correctional Facility.  Christopher Hawley states 
under Oath in his affidavit that he was incarcerated 
at Green Bay Correctional Facility with another Inmate 
known by the name of: Floyd Lindell Smith Jr. and that 
he heard as well as conversed with this party of 
several occasion's about this crime and that he in 
fact use to "Brag" to the general population that it 
was he of whom done and committed this Robbery against 
Mr. Glen Robinson.  See. (Exhibit-I).19 
                                                 
19 Attached as "Exhibit-I" is Hawley's affidavit, which 
states in relevant part: 
1.) That Mr. Love's situation was brought to my 
attention shortly after I arrived here in North Fork 
Correctional Facility on:  July 25th 2002. 
2.) That I was placed on the same POD-Living Unit as 
Mr. Love which is and was A-North and that I happen to 
hear or Overhear Mr. Love discussing his case with one 
of the Inst. Inmate Para Legals at this Facility. 
3.) That I was originally transferred here to NFCF 
from Green Bay Correctional Inst and while there and 
upon my arrival there and being placed and Housed in 
the South Cell Hall. 
4.) That further after reflecting upon what was spoke 
upon and knowing some details about the matter from 
Green Bay Correctional Facility.  I introduced myself 
to Mr. Love and formally explained what I had been 
personally told relative to his direct case overall 
while at Green Bay Correctional Inst around another 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
24 
 
 
The 
Defendant 
was 
not 
aware 
or 
had 
prior 
knowledge 
of 
the 
facts 
which 
are 
stated 
in 
 . . . Christopher 
Hawley's 
Affidavit[] 
and 
Statement[]. 
 
The Defendant upon questioning told Det. Allen, 
that he had nothing to do with the Robbery which 
happened to the victim Mr. Glen Robinson on 9/28/99. 
. . . .   
ARGUMENT FOR REVIEW 
1.) EVIDENCE DISCOVERED AFTER TRIAL 
. . . .  
On January 30th 2003 the defendant received a Sworn 
Affidavit from an Inmate known as Christopher Hawley, 
who states Under Oath that he was incarcerated at 
Green Bay Correctional Institution with another Inmate 
by the name of Floyd Lindell Smith Jr. and that on 
several occasion's that he and Mr. Smith discussed 
matters of what and how Mr. Smith has committed this 
crime and that Mr. Smith was very braggative of what 
                                                                                                                                                             
Inmate and several other's of whom where present at 
the time. 
5.) Further, that a Party or Inmate by the name of Mr. 
FLOYD LINDELL SMITH JR. of whom was like myself at the 
time incarcerated at Green Bay Correctional Facility 
and located within the South Cell Hall and we were a 
few Cells away from each other. 
6.) Further on several occasion's while discussing 
legal elements of my own Conviction and my Criminal 
case, myself and Mr. Smith engaged and embarked upon 
several 
conversations 
relative 
to 
the 
criminal 
elements of his past and as well as my own and the 
matter of Mr. Glen Robinson came into discussion many 
times. 
7.) Further, Mr. Smith Jr. on several other occasion's 
disclosed to me indepth details concerning what and 
how he had done and committed this Offense and that it 
was just too Bad that the weight of the matter had 
fell upon Mr. Love in such a manner. 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
25 
 
and how he had done this crime in effect at that point 
and time and all of this concerning this issue of Mr. 
Glen Robinson being Robbed at that appointed time.  
See. Exhibit. (1).  The dates on the above mentioned 
Affidavits clearly demonstrates that this evidence was 
discovered after the trial. 
2.) DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN SEEKING SUCH 
EVIDENCE AND NOW MAKING COURT AWARE 
. . . .  
Furthermore, the Defendant was totally unaware of the 
fact that Mr. Floyd Lindell Smith Jr. admitted to 
committing this crime to Inmate Christopher Hawley.  
Had not . . . Inmate Christopher Hawley voluntarily 
came forward with such evidence, the Defendant would 
not be in possession of this Newly Discovered Evidence 
because these facts were not known to him at the time 
prior to his conviction of this offense. 
3.) EVIDENCE IS MATERIAL TO THIS ISSUE 
 . . . [T]here is a very strong possibility that 
someone other than the Defendant actually done and or 
committed the offense. . . .  
The Sworn Affidavit of Christopher Hawley is material 
to this issue because it further corroborates the 
facts that someone other than the defendant done or 
committed this offense and further the material issue 
in this case is the identification. 
4.) THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE IS NOT MERELY 
CUMULATIVE TO EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL. 
The 
Newly 
Discovered 
Evidence 
is 
based 
on 
the . . . Affidavit of Mr. Christopher Hawley who 
Witnessed Mr. Floyd Lindell Smith Jr. confessing to 
him and other's that he was the party of whom 
committed this offense as relative to the Mr. Glen 
Robinson the victim of whom was Robbed at Gun point in 
this case at Bar and that Mr. Floyd Lindell Smith Jr. 
did in fact make these outstanding statements in the 
presence of other's as well as to Mr. Hawley directly 
and while they were jointly confined at Green Bay 
Correctional Institution. 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
26 
 
This evidence was not known to the defendant at the 
time of his trial because such evidence was not known 
to the defendant prior to his conviction therefore 
this evidence is not merely cumulative to evidence 
that was presented at trial. 
. . . .  
6.) REASONABLE PROBABILITY EXIST OF DIFFERENT RESULTS 
IN A NEW TRIAL 
The Defendant asserts that in light of the Newly 
Discovered Evidence there is a reasonable probability 
that a different result may be produced if the 
Defendant is Granted a New trial. 
As the record demonstrates, the only evidence linking 
the Defendant to the alledged crime supposedly is that 
the Jury relied upon in finding the Defendant guilty 
is the victim's identification testimony 
of the 
defendant and the testimony of Towanda Knoxs which 
consisted of placing the defendant at the scene of the 
crime. 
These Newly Discovered facts combined with the fact 
that 
the 
victim's 
initial 
description 
of 
the 
assailants describing both as being "Dark Complexion" 
and 
170-180 
Pounds 
is 
very 
different 
from 
the 
defendant actaul description wheres the defendant's 
actual skin tone is and would be "Medimum Complexion" 
and at 245 Pounds.  During the photo Array the victim 
wasn't a 100% sure that the Defendant was the party of 
whom committed this crime. 
During the entire commission of the crime, the victim 
ststes that he was staring straight at the Barrel of 
the Gun.  See Trans. Pg. (35), which puts into 
question the degree of attention the victim was able 
to focus on the assailants face.  While staring at the 
Barrel of the Gun the victim stated that he saw his 
life flash in front of his Eye's.  See. Trans. Pg. 
(32) and further stated that it was a very traumatic 
experience. See. Trans. Pg. (32). 
. . . .  
In this case at Bar the victim describing the 
Defendant as being "Dark Complexion" 170-180 Pounds, 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
27 
 
althrough Defendant is Medimum complexion and 245 
Pounds renders this identification unreliable point 
blank.  . . . 
During the Photo Array the victim wasn't a 100% sure 
that the Defendant was the party of whom had or held a 
Gun on him.  See. Trans. Pg. (8).   . . .  
The defendant Mr. Love has an Outstanding loud Scar on 
the Right side of his face that would be impossible 
for anyone not to notice or plainly see if viewing or 
looking directly at him and or even as Mr. Robinson 
indicate's that he was looking down the barrel of the 
Gun and the State nor Mr. Robinson never mentioned at 
any point that they noted such an outstanding mark 
upon the defendant's face. 
The Defendant points out these identification factors 
to 
the 
Court 
which 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
identification is purely and substantially flawed, 
erroneous, 
and 
unreliable 
and 
in 
itself 
casts 
reasonable 
doubt 
and 
taking 
into 
consideration 
defendant's Newly Discovered Evidence, a reasonable 
probability exist that the results may have been 
different if the defendant is in fact duly Granted a 
New trial. 
¶46 Love also submitted a booking photograph of Smith 
taken just one week after Robinson was robbed.20  The photo shows 
that Smith is a male of darker complexion with a mini-afro.  The 
physical description also lists Smith's weight at 165 pounds, 
and Smith appears to be skinny.21   
1 
¶47 We conclude that Love's motion contains sufficient 
material facts that allow a reviewing court to meaningfully 
                                                 
20 Smith's 
arrest 
apparently 
stemmed 
from 
carrying 
a 
concealed weapon.   
21 Love's booking photograph also depicts a person of stocky 
appearance. 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
28 
 
assess his newly discovered evidence claim.  First, as to the 
"who" prong, the motion indicates the name of the newly 
discovered witness is "Christopher Hawley."   
¶48 Secondly, as to the "why" and "how" prongs, the motion 
indicates that the reason Hawley is important is because another 
person, Floyd Lindell Smith Jr., told Hawley that he committed 
the crime.  As Love went into at great length in his motion, 
only one person saw the perpetrator of the robbery:  Robinson.  
However, Robinson's depiction of the perpetrator does not 
necessarily align with Love's physical description, and may more 
accurately line up with Smith's.  As noted above, Robinson 
initially testified that he told the police that the gunman was 
"around six two, 170 pounds and with a mini-afro, dark 
complected."  Robinson gave a different description of the 
gunman to the police.  We have already referred to the age, 
weight, and skin color discrepancies between Robinson's police 
statement and Love's physical appearance.  Love avers in his 
motion that in a case that turned entirely on the reliability of 
Robinson's eyewitness identification of Love, a different result 
may have occurred at a trial had the evidence about Smith and 
his statements to Hawley been admitted at trial. 
¶49 Third, as to the "what," "where," and "when" prongs, 
the motion indicates that the facts that can be proven are that 
while Hawley was incarcerated in the Green Bay Correctional 
Facility, Smith bragged on numerous occasions to Hawley about 
how he committed the crime, including giving in-depth details 
about its commission.   
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
29 
 
¶50 The 
State 
argues 
that 
the 
Hawley 
affidavit 
is 
insufficient to make a valid claim for newly discovered evidence 
because Love has not established the admissibility of Hawley's 
statements.22  Specifically, the State claims Love cannot 
establish Hawley's statements fit the statement against interest 
exception to the hearsay rule.  See Wis. Stat. § 980.045(4); 
State v. Guerard, 2004 WI 895, ¶24, 273 Wis. 2d 250, 682 N.W.2d 
12.23  However, as we noted above, a movant need not demonstrate 
the admissibility of the facts asserted in the postconviction 
motion, but rather must show sufficient objective material 
factual assertions that, if true, would warrant the movant to 
relief.   
2 
¶51 We also conclude that Love's postconviction motion 
sets forth sufficient material facts that entitle him to a 
hearing on his newly discovered evidence claim.  The State does 
                                                 
22 Specifically, the State claims that Love cannot show that 
Smith's statements to Hawley are statements against penal 
interests.  Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4); State v. Guerard, 2004 WI 
85, 273 Wis. 2d 250, 682 N.W.2d 12. 
23 In Guerard, 273 Wis. 2d 250, ¶24, this court held that a 
statement is admissible under Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4), if: 
1) the statement when made tended to expose the 
declarant to criminal liability; and 2) the statement 
is corroborated by evidence that is sufficient to 
enable a reasonable person to conclude, in light of 
all the facts and circumstances, that the statement 
could be true. 
Id. 
 
Of 
course, 
the 
proponent 
must 
also 
establish 
unavailability.   
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
30 
 
not dispute that the evidence was discovered after conviction; 
that the defendant was not negligent in seeking evidence; the 
evidence is material to an issue in the case; and that the 
evidence is not merely cumulative.  See McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 
473.   
¶52 The State argues that the evidence does not create a 
reasonable probability that a different result would be reached 
at trial.  See id.  The State maintains that a reasonable 
probability requires an outcome determinative showing.  See 
State v. Avery, 213 Wis. 2d 228, 240-41, 570 N.W.2d 573 (Ct. 
App. 1997).   
¶53 Love disagrees, claiming that a reasonable probability 
occurs where confidence in the outcome is undermined.  See 
McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 490 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 
667, 682 (1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1984).   
¶54 We 
do 
not 
decide 
this 
debate 
here, 
as 
Love's 
postconviction motion meets the higher outcome determinative 
test.  Love's postconviction motion indicates that Hawley would 
testify that Love was not the assailant.  Hawley will testify 
that Smith (or if Love can get Smith to testify, then it would 
be Smith's testimony that he) committed this crime.  Whether 
that testimony is ultimately admissible is not relevant for our 
purposes here.  Whether that testimony is credible is not 
relevant for our purposes here.  It must be accepted as true. 
¶55 If it is true, then the evidence against Love amounts 
to Robinson's identification against another's assertion that 
No. 
2003AP2255   
 
31 
 
Smith committed the crime.  Thus, viewing the new evidence, 
particularly in light of the identification discrepancies, there 
is a reasonable probability that a jury, looking at both, would 
have a reasonable doubt as to Love's guilt.  Therefore, Love's 
motion entitles him to an evidentiary hearing. 
IV 
¶56 In sum, we conclude Love has presented sufficient 
material facts for a reviewing court to meaningfully assess his 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel and newly 
discovered evidence claims.  Further, we conclude that Love is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on both claims.  Although 
Love's motion does not allege sufficient facts that, on their 
face, would be admissible at the hearing, the motion papers 
allege sufficient material objective factual assertions that, if 
true, entitle him to relief.  Therefore, we reverse the court of 
appeals' decision and remand this case to the circuit court for 
an evidentiary hearing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
1 
 
 
¶57 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  Preventing the 
conviction of an innocent person is one of the central tenets of 
our criminal justice system.  The United States Constitution and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
provide 
a 
panoply 
of 
rights, 
including the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, the 
right to trial by an impartial jury, and the presumption of 
innocence, to assure fairness to defendants and minimize error 
in the adjudication of guilt. 
¶58 After a defendant's trial and appeal rights have been 
exhausted, 
however, 
our 
system 
must 
become 
attentive 
to 
finality,24 and to the significant costs in time and money of 
never-ending challenges to the defendant's conviction.25  Public 
resources are limited.  When resources are squandered in the 
rehashing of nonmeritorious claims, the risk of error and injury 
to future defendants increases accordingly.26 
¶59 This case implicates the requirements that a defendant 
must satisfy after conviction before forcing a court to conduct 
a post-appeal evidentiary hearing.  I dissent because the 
majority 
opinion 
significantly 
reduces 
the 
requirements 
necessary to engage the system in this manner. 
                                                 
24 See State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶11, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 
682 N.W.2d 433 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989); 
State v. Lo, 2003 WI 107, ¶75, 264 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 756). 
25 See State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 
N.W.2d 157 (1994). 
26 See State v. Velez, 224 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 589 N.W.2d 9 
(1999) ("we conserve scarce judicial resources by eliminating 
unnecessary evidentiary hearings"). 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
2 
 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
¶60 On September 28, 1999, at least two robbers ambushed 
former Milwaukee Bucks basketball star Glenn Robinson outside 
Junior's Sports Bar on North Green Bay Avenue in Milwaukee.  
After blocking Robinson's vehicle with their car, the men 
confronted Robinson and held him at gunpoint until they had 
stolen an estimated $40,000 in valuables, including a Rolex 
watch and bracelet, necklace, diamond earring, keys, cell phone, 
cash, and wallet.  Robinson testified that he was deeply shaken 
by the incident because he was afraid that he was going to be 
gunned down in a tavern parking lot. 
 
¶61 Two days after the robbery, police showed Robinson 
several photo arrays.  He did not identify anyone.  One week 
after the robbery, however, as he was looking through a number 
of additional photo arrays, Robinson identified a photograph of 
Lisimba Love.  Robinson subsequently picked Love out of a lineup 
and identified him again at a preliminary examination and at 
trial.   
¶62 Love turned out to be the same person whom Tawanda 
Knox said she saw, spoke to, and received an answer from at 
Junior's, moments before the robbery.  Knox knew Love personally 
because she lived across the street from him, and she worked at 
a hair salon where Love went to get his hair cut.  Love's 
sister-in-law owned the salon.  Love also proved to be a 
habitual offender who was on parole at the time of the incident 
for homicide by negligent use of a motor vehicle.   
¶63 Love lived at a North 37th Street address in Milwaukee 
with his mother, Dorothy, and other family members.  The same 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
3 
 
address was used by Love's brothers Jeffrey, Litwain, and 
Khalif, all of whom had extensive criminal records.  At Love's 
sentencing hearing, Assistant District Attorney Terry Magowan 
commented on Love's family, observing that two of his brothers 
were then in prison.  Magowan said: 
[T]here was a little bit of an outburst [at the time 
of the Love jury verdict] by one member of his 
family . . . Khalif Love, his younger brother . . .  I 
myself have prosecuted Mr. Khalif Love twice for 
shooting cases. . . .  [I]t's a family that kind of 
functions on fear and intimidation. 
 
. . . .  
[G]etting back to Khalif Love, the cases against him, 
and I know two other prosecutors in the office who 
have had cases against him, they all get dismissed 
because 
witnesses 
don't 
show 
up. 
 
I 
remember 
one . . . witness was a son of a cop and the cop 
called me and said I'm not letting my son testify 
against the Loves.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶64 Addressing Love's character at sentencing, Magowan 
emphasized the vehicular homicide.  In November 1993 Love drove 
through a stop sign on North 37th Street at a very high rate of 
speed, striking a car and killing a woman in the car.  He and 
his passenger fled the scene.  Love later claimed that he did 
not know that he had hit a car or injured anyone, but Love's 
passenger told police that he had been instructed to lie about 
the nature of his injuries.  Magowan asserted that Love had 
shown no remorse for his role in the homicide.   
¶65 These facts from the record tell us a little more 
about the man who is demanding an evidentiary hearing on his 
largely unsupported claims.  It must be remembered that Love no 
longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
4 
 
ANALYSIS 
I 
 
¶66 There is evidence in the record that the defendant has 
asked people to lie for him in the past, and that he and his 
family function "on fear and intimidation."  It should thus be 
no surprise that his motion to the court contains witness 
recantations.  The majority opinion implies that a circuit court 
may not consider such factors in evaluating the strength of a 
defendant's post-conviction motion for an evidentiary hearing.  
I disagree. 
 
¶67 In Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 195 N.W.2d 629 
(1972), the court set down a test for an evidentiary hearing to 
withdraw a guilty plea after judgment and sentencing.  The court 
discussed federal cases and summarized the law to the effect 
that, where a motion is made after judgment and sentencing to 
correct a manifest injustice, "it is within the discretion of 
the trial court whether or not to grant a hearing on the 
motion."  Id. at 496.  After quoting from United States v. 
Tivis, 302 F. Supp. 581, 583 (N.D. Tex. 1969), id., the court 
said: 
We here determine that if a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea after judgment and sentence alleges facts 
which, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief, 
the court must hold an evidentiary hearing.  However, 
if the defendant fails to allege sufficient facts in 
his motion to raise a question of fact, or presents 
only conclusionary allegations, or if the record 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not 
entitled to relief, the trial court may in the 
exercise of its legal discretion deny the motion 
without a hearing.  It is incumbent upon the trial 
court to form its independent judgment after a review 
of the record and pleadings. 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
5 
 
Id. at 497-98 (emphasis added). 
 
¶68 In State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 
(1996), the court was asked to review a defendant's request to 
withdraw his guilty pleas based on the alleged ineffective 
assistance of his trial counsel.  The court turned to Nelson and 
restated part of the above-quoted test.  The court declared: "If 
the motion on its face alleges facts which would entitle the 
defendant to relief, the circuit court has no discretion and 
must hold an evidentiary hearing."  201 Wis. 2d at 310.  
"However, if the motion fails to allege sufficient facts, the 
circuit court has the discretion to deny a postconviction motion 
without a hearing based on any of the three factors enumerated 
in Nelson."  Id. at 310-11. 
 
¶69 In retrospect, the Bentley case has created problems 
for several reasons.  First, both the court of appeals27 and this 
court severed an important part of the Nelson test, namely, "It 
is incumbent upon the trial court to form an independent 
judgment after a review of the record and pleadings. . . . "  
See Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 498.   
¶70 Second, because the court eliminated the circuit 
court's "independent judgment," it was able to say, "[w]hether a 
motion alleges facts which, if true, would entitle defendant to 
relief is a question of law that we review de novo."  Bentley, 
201 Wis. 2d at 310.  The court seemed to be impressed with 
Bentley's argument that a de novo standard of review was 
appropriate "because the circuit court is in no better position 
                                                 
27 See 
State 
v. 
Bentley, 
195 
Wis. 2d 580, 
587, 
536 
N.W.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1995). 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
6 
 
than an appellate court to determine whether the motion was 
legally sufficient to require a hearing . . . .  [T]he de novo 
standard . . . is entirely consistent with this court's prior 
cases which have applied a de novo standard of review when 
interpreting documents."  Id. at 309 (summarizing Bentley's 
argument) (emphasis added).  This formulation effectively blocks 
the circuit court from considering the credibility of a written 
claim or digging into the court record. 
¶71 Third, the court in Bentley accepted the sufficiency 
of Bentley's assertions that his counsel's performance was 
deficient, but it rejected his claim that "he entered his guilty 
pleas only because he was informed" incorrectly by his attorney 
about parole eligibility.  The court complained that Bentley 
"never explains how or why the difference between a minimum 
parole eligibility date of 11 years, 5 months and 13 years, 4 
months would have affected his decision to plead guilty."  Id. 
at 316-17. 
¶72 On 
this 
third 
point, 
the 
Bentley 
decision 
is 
instinctively understandable.  Upon reflection, however, it is 
not obvious why the court is able to say that Bentley's claim 
that he entered his guilty plea only because he was misinformed 
by his attorney, is not an allegation of fact which, if true, 
would entitle him to relief.  In addition, Bentley does not 
explain how a circuit judge knows when "sufficient facts" have 
been pled so that the court "has no discretion and must hold an 
evidentiary hearing."  See Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 310. 
¶73 The manifest inconsistency in Bentley is that it 
adheres to the Nelson principle that a motion may be denied by a 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
7 
 
circuit court without a hearing "if the record conclusively 
demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief" but 
does not explain how the court may scrutinize the record if it 
is supposed to make a judgment on the face of the motion.  
Moreover, Bentley strips the circuit court of any deference when 
the circuit court determines that an allegation is "conclusory" 
and needs more facts, because the sufficiency of the motion is 
reviewed de novo.  Too often, the natural response of frustrated 
circuit judges will be to schedule evidentiary hearings simply 
to avoid being second-guessed on appeal. 
¶74 Last term in State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, 274 
Wis. 2d 379, 683 N.W.2d 14, this court made a stab at clarifying 
the defendant's burden in a motion for a post-conviction 
hearing, saying: "Bentley-type allegations will often depend on 
facts outside the record.  To ask the court to examine facts 
outside the record in an evidentiary hearing requires a 
particularized 
motion with 
sufficient 
supporting 
facts to 
warrant the undertaking."  Id., ¶61.  Then we added: 
In Bangert28-type cases, the defendant has the initial 
burden of showing the basis for a hearing; but if he 
succeeds, the burden shifts to the state to show by 
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's 
plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
entered. 
 
In Bentley-type cases, the defendant has the 
burden of making a prima facie case for an evidentiary 
hearing, and if he succeeds, he still has the burden 
of proving all the elements of the alleged error, such 
as deficient performance and prejudice.  The defendant 
must prove the linkage between his plea and the 
                                                 
28 State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
8 
 
purported defect.  The defendant's proof must add up 
to manifest injustice. 
 
Consequently, the requisite specificity required 
for establishing a prima facie case mirrors the 
defendant's ultimate burden of proof. 
Id., ¶¶62-64 (internal citation omitted). 
 
¶75 In a Bentley-type case, the defendant retains the 
burden of proof.  Therefore, the defendant should be required to 
justify an evidentiary hearing by alleging what he expects to 
prove.  He cannot stand on conclusory allegations, hoping to 
supplement them at the hearing, because the hearing is not 
intended as a fishing expedition.  The defendant should plead a 
reasonably full statement of the facts in dispute so that both 
parties can prepare and litigate the real issues efficiently and 
the evidentiary hearing will serve as more than a discovery 
device.29 
II 
¶76 This brings us to the present proceeding.  Love's 
first claim is that he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel at trial and the effective assistance of counsel on 
appeal.  Love alleges that Ann T. Bowe, his trial attorney, was 
"Incompetent/Ineffective as Counsel" in part because she "failed 
to investigate the facts that 'Jerees Veasley' actually knows 
who robbed Mr. Glen Robinson."  Love alleges that his appellate 
counsel, Mark Rosen, was ineffective for failing to point out 
that Love's trial attorney was ineffective with respect to 
investigating Veasley. 
                                                 
29 Velez, 224 Wis. 2d at 12. 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
9 
 
¶77 The Veasley matter is grounded in a police report 
dated January 7, 2000, several days before Love's trial.  The 
report was prepared by Detective Charles Hargrove who wrote in 
part:  
 
On Friday, 1/7/2000, at approximately 10:53AM I, 
Det. HARGROVE was conducting follow-up on the above 
case.  This follow-up consisted of interviewing alibi 
witnesses for [Lisimba] LOVE, B/M, DOB: 3/16/73, of 
2818 N. 37th St. 
 
At the above stated date and time I, Det. 
HARGROVE, did in fact, respond to 2818 N. 37th St.  
Upon my arrival at that location, I met with [Lisimba] 
LOVE'S mother, one Dorothy LOVE . . . who resides at 
that location . . .  
 
. . . .  
 
Also during the interview Mrs. LOVE stated that 
on 11/22/99, she received a telephone call, unknown 
time from a person who identified himself as Jerees 
VEASLEY, who was incarcerated at the County Jail.  
VEASLEY called and stated to Mrs. LOVE that "They got 
the wrong man on the ROBINSON case, I know who did 
it."  Mrs. LOVE stated that she did mention this to 
[Lisimba's] attorney and that they know about Mr. 
VEASLEY. 
¶78 This police report was available before trial.  Love 
acknowledged that he had read the police reports.  Consequently, 
he must have known about Jerees Veasley before trial and 
realized that Veasley did not testify at trial.  Love's 
conviction was appealed.  He also filed a post-conviction motion 
challenging the effectiveness of his trial counsel.   
¶79 Against this background, Love's second ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim against Ann Bowe is barred by State 
v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), 
which holds that any claim that could have been raised on direct 
appeal or in a previous Wis. Stat. § 974.06 post-conviction 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
10 
 
motion is barred from being raised in a subsequent § 974.06 
post-conviction 
motion, 
absent 
a 
sufficient 
reason. 
 
No 
"sufficient reason" has ever been shown why this claim was not 
raised earlier, and in my view, it is clearly barred. 
¶80 Setting aside Escalona, additional facts show why 
Love's ineffective assistance claim should not be accepted at 
face value——why resort to facts in the record demonstrates that 
the motion is insufficient. 
¶81 On November 22, 1999, Jerees Veasley was allegedly 
incarcerated at the Milwaukee County Jail.  Lisimba Love was 
also incarcerated at that time awaiting trial.  Love and Veasley 
may have been incarcerated in the same facility, may have 
crossed paths, or may have known each other previously.  We are 
left to speculate about the relationship because Love does not 
explain whether the two men know each other.  Logically, there 
must have been some reason why Jerees Veasley called Love's 
mother at her home instead of some person in authority. 
¶82 Love's trial attorney, Ann Bowe, was no stranger to 
Love.  She had represented him in the vehicular homicide case in 
1993.  Early on, Bowe decided to pursue an alibi defense in the 
Robinson case, and she notified the district attorney of that 
strategy, naming alibi witnesses including Love's mother.  At 
trial, Bowe produced witness Mary Jones, who attributed the 
robbery to someone named "Dee." 
¶83 The quoted police report indicates that Dorothy Love 
advised Love's attorney about Jerees Veasley and was told "that 
they know about Mr. Veasley." 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
11 
 
¶84 Considering the defendant's alibi defense, it is hard 
to imagine that Attorney Bowe would not have contacted a man 
claiming to know the real perpetrator.  It is even harder to 
imagine that Love's post-conviction attorney, Mark Rosen, who 
unsuccessfully accused Bowe of ineffective assistance of counsel 
on other grounds, would not have added the ground that Bowe 
never interviewed Jerees Veasley if Rosen thought for a minute 
that Bowe never interviewed Veasley. 
¶85 Love's lengthy motion for post-conviction relief is 
supplemented with several affidavits, but there is no affidavit 
from Jerees Veasley saying he was not interviewed by Ann Bowe, 
and no affidavit from Ann Bowe acknowledging that she never 
interviewed Jerees Veasley.  Indeed, although Love testified at 
trial that he had read all the police reports, there is no 
affidavit from him stating that he discussed Veasley with Bowe, 
asked her whether she was pursuing that lead, or inquired why 
Veasley did not testify at trial.  Love provides nothing except 
a conclusory assertion that Bowe did not investigate this 
potential witness. 
¶86 Love's assertion that Ann Bowe failed to seek out and 
interview Jerees Veasley is so improbable that Love ought to be 
required to do more than make a bald assertion that his attorney 
was derelict.  After all, at the time he made the motion, Love 
was in Oklahoma and would have had to be brought back to 
Wisconsin.  Wherever he is now, he will still have to be 
escorted 
to 
a 
Milwaukee 
courtroom 
at 
county 
expense 
to 
participate in the hearing.  He will have to have an attorney, 
at state expense.  Ann Bowe will have to be in court.  Jerees 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
12 
 
Veasley will probably have to be in court.  An assistant 
district attorney will have to prepare for the hearing and spend 
time in court.  And the court itself will have to schedule and 
conduct the hearing and convene all necessary court personnel.  
Love will have the burden of going forward, producing evidence, 
and persuading the court at a hearing, and he should be required 
to tell the court what he expects to prove before he is given 
that hearing. 
¶87 This court should insist on more detail before it 
affords an evidentiary hearing in response to Love's unsupported 
assertion that Ann Bowe did not investigate Veasley's story.  It 
would not have been difficult for Love to obtain and submit more 
information.  He could have written a "Dear Ann" letter, asking 
his former attorney to confirm that she never interviewed 
Veasley.  Instead, he sent 26 letters asserting his innocence to 
everyone from the Commissioner of the National Basketball 
Association to the sports investigative person at the Gary Post-
Tribune.  He could have enlisted his mother to ask Veasley to 
submit a sworn affidavit revealing the alleged perpetrator of 
the robbery or simply asserting that he never spoke with Ann 
Bowe or anyone representing her.  There is no indication that 
any of this was attempted.  Thus, the majority's favorable 
ruling on Love's ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
seriously dilutes the sufficiency requirements of a post-
conviction motion for an evidentiary hearing. 
¶88 I agree with the majority's statement of the standard 
of review.30  Majority op., ¶26 (quoting State v. Allen, 2004 WI 
                                                 
30 Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9, states: 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
13 
 
106, ¶9, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433).  The Allen court's 
subsequent reference to "the five 'w's' and the one 'h;' that 
is, who, what, where, when, why, and how,"  Allen, 274 
Wis. 2d 568, ¶23, was intended to assist a defendant in alleging 
sufficient material facts to entitle the defendant to relief.   
¶89 It must be acknowledged, however, that statements with 
the five "w's" and the one "h" may not be sufficient in 
themselves to justify a hearing, if they are presented as 
statements of ultimate fact in a conclusory manner without any 
supporting detail. 
¶90 To illustrate the problem, consider again the Bentley 
case in which the defendant contended that he entered guilty 
pleas 
after 
his 
counsel 
erroneously 
gave 
him 
incorrect 
                                                                                                                                                             
Whether 
a 
defendant's 
postconviction 
motion 
alleges 
sufficient facts to entitle the defendant to a hearing for the 
relief requested is a mixed standard of review.  First, we 
determine whether the motion on its face alleges sufficient 
material facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant to 
relief.  This is a question of law that we review de novo.  
[State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d [303,] 309-10 [682 N.W.2d 433 
(1996)].  If the motion raises such facts, the circuit court 
must hold an evidentiary hearing.  Id. at 310; Nelson v. State, 
54 Wis. 2d 489, 497, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972).  However, if the 
motion (1) does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the movant 
to relief, (2) or presents only conclusory allegations, or (3) 
if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is 
not entitled to relief, the circuit court has the discretion to 
grant or deny a hearing.  Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 310-11; 
Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 497-98.  We require the circuit court "to 
form its independent judgment after a review of the record and 
pleadings and to support its decision by written opinion."  
Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 498.  See Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 318-19 
(quoting the same).  We review a circuit court's discretionary 
decisions under the deferential erroneous exercise of discretion 
standard.  In re the Commitment of Franklin, 2004 WI 38, ¶6, 270 
Wis. 2d 271, 677 N.W.2d 276; Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311. 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
14 
 
information on his eligibility for parole.  His unsuccessful 
post-conviction motion stated in part: 
4. 
Defendant will testify that he entered his guilty 
pleas only because he was informed by his trial 
attorney, Alan Olshan, that the parole eligibility 
date for first degree intentional homicide would be 11 
years and 5 months. 
. . . .  
6. 
Defendant's attorney, Alan Olshan, will testify 
that he told defendant he would try to get parole 
eligibility set under the "old law," which would 
result in parole eligibility of 11 years, 4 months. 
7. 
The minimum parole eligibility, if a court does 
not set a parole eligibility date, is approximately 13 
years and 4 months. . . .  Neither the court nor the 
parole board can adjust a parole eligibility date 
below the minimum of approximately 13 years and 4 
months. . . .  
8. 
Nothing in either the plea questionnaire or the 
plea 
colloquy 
disabused 
defendant 
of 
the 
misunderstanding of parole eligibility. 
Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 315. 
 
¶91 Summarizing 
these 
allegations, 
Attorney 
Olshan 
discussed a plea with Bentley before the plea hearing.  He gave 
Bentley specific information about parole eligibility.  Bentley 
claimed that Olshan told him a person convicted of first-degree 
intentional homicide is eligible for parole in 11 years, 5 
months.  If this statement were true, the information was 
incorrect by almost two years.  Attorney Olshan admitted that he 
talked to Bentley but said he promised only to try to get parole 
eligibility in 11 years, 4 months under "old law."  This, too, 
was incorrect because the court could not adjust parole 
eligibility downward from 13 years, 4 months.  Bentley was 
misinformed by his attorney about parole eligibility, and this 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
15 
 
allegedly influenced his pleas because Bentley asserts that he 
entered guilty pleas only because of what he was told by his 
attorney. 
 
¶92 Under today's majority opinion, Bentley probably met 
the who, what, where, when, why, and how test.  Certainly, he 
asserted what he would testify to at a hearing and what Attorney 
Olshan would testify to.  He claimed injury from relying on 
specific defective information.  He alleged much more than Love 
alleged.  Why would Bentley's motion fail under today's majority 
opinion? 
¶93 The majority seems oblivious to two transcendent 
principles: First, "[t]he nature and specificity of the required 
supporting facts will necessarily differ from case to case."  
Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 314.  Second, "conclusory allegations" 
are not sufficient.  Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9. 
¶94 If we focus on Veasley as the "who" in this case, we 
are told nothing about him.  We are told nothing about how he 
got his information.  We are told nothing about what he would 
say at an evidentiary hearing at which Love would have the 
burden of proof.  Even Dorothy Love's statement about her 
conversation with Veasley is unsworn hearsay. 
¶95 If we focus on Ann Bowe as the "who," there is nothing 
to support the conclusion that she did not investigate Veasley 
except the fact that Veasley was not called as a witness.  
Failure to call Veasley as a witness does not support an 
inference that Bowe never interviewed him or didn't have a good 
reason not to interview him.  After all, Dorothy Love admits 
that when she mentioned Veasley to Love's attorney, she was told 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
16 
 
"they know about Mr. Veasley."  The fact that Veasley was not 
called as a witness may be a sign that he lacked credibility, or 
that his testimony would have been in direct conflict with the 
testimony of Mary Jones, or that Attorney Bowe had some other 
strategic reason for not calling him.  If Bowe already knew 
"about Mr. Veasley," she must have gained this information from 
her own investigation or because someone like Love or Veasley or 
the district attorney told her.  The assertion that she never 
investigated Veasley is simply a conclusory allegation that Love 
has not supported with additional facts. 
¶96 For the reasons stated, I conclude that the defendant 
failed to allege sufficient facts on his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing 
as a matter of right.  Without supporting facts, it is hard to 
believe that Ann Bowe did not investigate Veasley.  In any 
event, without knowing what Veasley would say, there is little 
justification for a hearing.  I further conclude that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
denying Love's request for an evidentiary hearing. 
III 
¶97 Love presents a second reason for the court to hold an 
evidentiary hearing——newly discovered evidence consisting of a 
sworn affidavit from Christopher Hawley, a fellow prisoner at a 
corrections facility in Oklahoma.  Hawley swore that when he was 
an inmate at the Green Bay Correctional Institution, he was 
housed with a prisoner named Floyd Lindell Smith, Jr., who 
"disclosed to me [in depth] details concerning what and how he 
had done and committed this Offense [the Glenn Robinson robbery] 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
17 
 
and that it was just too Bad that the weight of the matter had 
fell upon Mr. Love in such a manner."  Hawley added that he was 
willing to take a polygraph test, and he invited the district 
attorney's office to contact him for additional information.  
¶98 In my view, this "new" evidence is not as easy to 
dismiss as the Jerees Veasley statement.  Although Hawley does 
not give details of what Floyd Lindell Smith, Jr. said to him, 
he nonetheless swears that a named individual confessed to 
committing the crime of which the defendant was convicted.  
Undoubtedly, Hawley could testify at a trial against Smith on 
the basis of Smith's admissions. 
¶99 Nonetheless, there are some troubling elements to the 
newly discovered evidence.  First, the affidavit does not give 
details of the crime, including who else was involved, who was 
driving, whose car they were using, and what the robbers did 
with the valuables.  Second, the affidavit does not exclude the 
participation of Lisimba Love in the robbery.  Third, the 
affidavit misspells the name of Glenn Robinson as "Glen" 
Robinson, in exactly the same way that Love himself routinely 
misspells Robinson's name.  Fourth, having discussed the matter 
with Love, Hawley could have obtained any "in depth details" he 
has of the robbery from Love himself. 
¶100 The majority opinion fails to disclose that Floyd 
Lindell Smith, Jr. is the cousin of Lisimba Love.  This fact is 
part of Love's own submission.  The fact that Floyd Lindell 
Smith, Jr. was arrested on October 6, 1999, for carrying a 
concealed weapon is also part of the record.  Significantly, 
Smith told authorities that he lived at 2818 North 37th Street, 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
18 
 
Milwaukee (which is Love's own address), when he was arrested a 
few days after the robbery.  Put bluntly, Lisimba Love was not 
forthright in his motion to the court because he did not 
acknowledge that the two men were living in the same house at 
the time of the robbery, and neither the defendant nor the 
majority acknowledges the possibility that Floyd Lindell Smith, 
Jr. learned details of the robbery directly from Lisimba Love or 
the possibility that Smith committed the robbery with Love. 
¶101 In my view, the circuit court should have followed up 
on the information in the Hawley affidavit, notwithstanding its 
hearsay quality.  Why?  In sentencing Love, Circuit Judge Bonnie 
Gordon broached the possibility that three people were involved 
in the Robinson robbery.  In her interview with Milwaukee 
police, Mary Jones stated that "Dee" was present at Junior's Bar 
with three other men.  Effrim Z. Moss, Love's co-defendant who 
was found not guilty of the robbery, was also a Love relative.  
The Robinson robbery could have been a "family" enterprise.  
Against this background, there is a real possibility that Floyd 
Lindell Smith, Jr. has actual knowledge of the robbery, whether 
or not he participated in it, and whether or not Love 
participated in it. 
¶102 The circuit court could have issued an order to show 
cause 
to 
the 
district 
attorney's 
office, 
asking 
why 
an 
evidentiary hearing should not be held on Hawley's affidavit.  
This would have permitted the district attorney's office to 
conduct an investigation that included conversations with Hawley 
and Smith before a decision was made on a hearing. 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
19 
 
¶103 The majority doesn't wait for such preliminaries.  It 
orders an evidentiary hearing on the Hawley affidavit without 
coming to grips with what is likely to happen.  How will Love 
meet his burden of proof at the hearing?  What will happen if 
Smith asserts his right to remain silent?  There needs to be 
preparatory effort before the court holds a hearing.  Because 
the majority disagrees and seriously dilutes the sufficiency 
requirements 
for 
post-conviction 
evidentiary 
hearings, 
I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶104 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this opinion. 
 
 
 
No.  2003AP2255.dtp 
 
 
1