Title: Ottawa Cty. Bd. Commrs. v. Marblehead

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF OTTAWA COUNTY, APPELLANT, v. VILLAGE 
OF MARBLEHEAD ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Ottawa Cty. Bd. Commrs. v. Marblehead (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 43.] 
Counties — Municipal corporations — County water supply systems — R.C. 
6103.04 is constitutional — R.C. 6103.04 does not substantially interfere 
with a municipality’s power to own and operate a water supply system. 
(No. 98-1061 — Submitted March 30, 1999 — Decided July 7, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ottawa County, No. OT-97- 031. 
 
This case stems from a dispute between the Board of County Commissioners 
of Ottawa County (“the Board”) and the village of Marblehead (“Marblehead”), 
regarding which entity has the right to provide water service to residents of county 
land that was recently annexed by Marblehead. 
 
The dispute began when the Board’s plan for a county-wide water supply 
system collided with Marblehead’s plan to sell excess municipal water to residents 
within the disputed area before it was annexed.  The Board sought to enjoin 
Marblehead from expanding its water service beyond its municipal boundaries.  
Because the Board’s power to regulate sewer districts and Marblehead’s authority 
to construct water service outside its municipal boundaries were of equal dignity, 
the trial court applied a balancing test to weigh the interests of the two entities and 
concluded that the Board had rights paramount to those of Marblehead.  The Board 
obtained a declaratory judgment that Marblehead was without authority to extend 
water service into the disputed area.  The court of appeals affirmed based upon the 
facts of the case. 
 
Within days of the court of appeals’ decision, the residents within the 
disputed area filed their petition with the Board seeking annexation to Marblehead.  
Before responding to the petition, the Board passed several resolutions:  (1) a 
resolution of necessity declaring its intention to provide water service to the 
 
 
2
residents within the disputed area as well as to other areas of the county; (2) a 
resolution approving detailed plans, specifications, estimates of cost, water rates 
and charges, and assessment policy; and (3) a resolution determining to proceed 
with the construction of water system improvements within the county.  Thereafter, 
the Board declined to approve the pending petition for annexation. 
 
County property owners objected to the Board’s resolutions  regarding the 
water supply system and filed an appeal to the probate court.  The probate court 
found that the county water supply system was necessary for the public health, 
convenience, and welfare; that the boundaries of the assessment district were 
reasonable; and that the tentative assessments were, for the most part, reasonable.  
The court of appeals affirmed. 
 
Meanwhile, the residents who filed the petition for annexation sought review 
of the Board’s resolution declining to approve the petition at the court of common 
pleas.  The common pleas court determined that the Board had acted arbitrarily and 
unreasonably in denying the annexation petition and accordingly reversed the 
Board’s refusal to accept the annexation petition. 
 
After the annexation petition was accepted, Marblehead prepared its own 
plans to provide water service to the residents within the disputed area.  The Board 
sought, through an action for declaratory judgment, a temporary restraining order, 
and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, to enjoin Marblehead from 
extending its water supply system into the disputed area and from engaging in any 
conduct that would interfere with the Board’s ability to issue bonds for 
improvements within the disputed area.  The Board asked the trial court to declare 
that R.C. 6103.04 gives it continuing authority within the disputed area to complete 
the water supply system that was already approved and adopted at the time of 
annexation.  Marblehead counterclaimed.  Marblehead sought to enjoin the Board 
from constructing a water supply system within the disputed area without 
 
 
3
Marblehead’s prior approval.  Marblehead also sought a declaration that R.C. 
6103.04 is unconstitutional because it conflicts with Section 4, Article XVIII of the 
Ohio Constitution, which Marblehead argued confers absolute authority on a 
municipality to construct and maintain a water supply system within its borders 
and to contract for water service for its residents. 
 
The trial court found that Marblehead has the exclusive right to provide 
water service within the disputed area, that R.C. 6103.01 et seq. is unconstitutional 
to the extent it interferes with Marblehead’s exclusive right, and that the Board 
does not have the authority to construct a water supply system within Marblehead 
without Marblehead’s approval.  The court of appeals affirmed. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, L.L.P., Orla E. Collier III, N. 
Victor Goodman and James F. DeLeone, for appellant. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Joseph A. Brunetto, for 
appellees. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J.  Although Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution grants  
municipalities the exclusive authority to provide their residents with utility 
services, a statute that limits the municipality’s power is not unconstitutional if the 
purpose of the statute is an exercise of the state’s police powers and is not a 
substantial infringement upon the municipality’s authority.  Because R.C. 6103.04 
satisfies these requirements, it is not unconstitutional. 
 
The Ohio Constitution authorizes a municipality to provide water service to 
its residents to the exclusion of other providers.  See Lucas v. Lucas Local School 
Dist. (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 13, 2 OBR 501, 442 N.E.2d 449.  Under Section 4, 
 
 
4
Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, “[a]ny municipality may acquire, construct, 
own, lease and operate within or without its corporate limits, any public utility the 
product or service of which is or is to be supplied to the municipality or its 
inhabitants, and may contract with others for any such product or service.  The 
acquisition of any such public utility may be by condemnation or otherwise, and a 
municipality may acquire thereby the use of, or full title to, the property and 
franchise of any company or person supplying to the municipality or its inhabitants 
the service or product of any such utility.”  This constitutional provision is part of 
the municipal home-rule amendments that were proposed to remove “all legitimate 
questions as to the authority of municipalities to undertake and carry on essential 
municipal activities.”  2 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention 
of the State of Ohio (1913), at 1433. 
 
But, according to Marblehead, the statute at issue, R.C. 6103.04, permits a 
county sewer district to exercise jurisdiction for water-works purposes within the 
annexed territory of a municipality in violation of Section 4, Article XVIII of the 
Ohio Constitution.  R.C. 6103.04 provides statutory authority to enable an 
established county sewer district to complete an  existing county water service 
project when territory within the project area acquires municipality status through 
annexation during the pendency of the county project.  R.C. 6103.04 provides: 
 
“Whenever any portion of a sewer district is * * * annexed to a municipal 
corporation, the area so * * * annexed shall remain under the jurisdiction of the 
board of county commissioners for water-works purposes until any water supply or 
water-works improvements for said area for which detailed plans have been 
prepared and the resolutions declaring the necessity thereof has [sic] been adopted 
by the board have been completed or until said board has abandoned such projects.  
Such * * * annexation of any part of a district shall not interfere with or render 
illegal any issue of bonds or certificate of indebtedness made by the board * * * to 
 
 
5
provide payment for the cost of construction and maintenance of any water 
improvements within such area, or with any assessments levied or to be levied 
upon the property within such area to provide for the payment of the cost of 
construction and maintenance.” 
 
R.C. 6103.04 appears to contravene the constitutional authority of a 
municipality to provide public utility service.  And that right is not generally 
subject to statutory restriction.  Lucas, 2 Ohio St.3d 13, 2 OBR 501, 442 N.E.2d 
449; Columbus v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 427, 12 O.O.3d 361, 
390 N.E.2d 1201.  But a statute enacted to promote the health, safety, and welfare 
of the public can override the municipality’s authority if the statute does not 
substantially interfere with the municipality’s constitutionally granted power.  See, 
e.g., Columbus v. Teater (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 253, 260-261, 7 O.O.3d 410, 414, 
374 N.E.2d 154, 159; Canton v. Whitman (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 62, 68, 73 O.O.2d 
285, 289, 337 N.E.2d 766, 771 (“An exercise of the police power necessarily 
occasions some interference with other rights, but that exercise is valid if it bears a 
real and substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals or general 
welfare, and if it is not unreasonable or arbitrary.”). 
 
In determining that R.C. 6103.04 is constitutional, we proceed from the 
fundamental precept that Ohio statutes are entitled to a strong presumption of 
constitutionality and must, in questionable cases, be construed to be constitutional 
if possible.  State ex rel. Jackman v. Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga Cty. 
(1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 159, 161, 38 O.O.2d 404, 405-406, 224 N.E.2d 906, 908-909; 
State v. Renalist, Inc. (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 276, 10 O.O.3d 408, 383 N.E.2d 892.  
In addition, we note that in Columbus v. Pub. Util. Comm., 58 Ohio St.2d at 432, 
12 O.O.3d at 364, 390 N.E.2d at 1204, this court explained that a spectrum of 
relations exists between the state and its municipalities: 
 
 
6
 
“Where the state enacts a statute promoting a valid and substantial interest in 
the public health, safety, morals or welfare; where the statute’s impact upon the 
municipal utilities is incidental and limited; and where the statute is not an attempt 
to restrict municipal power to operate utilities, the statute will be upheld.  
Conversely, * * * where the purpose of a statute is to control or restrict municipal 
utilities, the statute must yield.  The majority of cases, however, * * * fall between 
these extremes.”  In those cases, the court must “ ‘balance the rights of the state 
against those of the municipality and endeavor to protect the respective interests of 
each.’ ”  Id. at 433, 12 O.O.3d at 364, 390 N.E.2d at 1204, quoting Teater, 53 Ohio 
St.2d at 261, 7 O.O.3d at 414, 374 N.E.2d at 160. 
 
R.C. 6103.04 falls between the extremes.  Accordingly, we balance the 
interests of the Board against those of Marblehead.  We recognize that the state has 
a substantial interest in ensuring that Ohio residents have a safe and adequate water 
supply.  In fact, this court has held that a board’s power to regulate sewer districts 
in the interest of public health and welfare constitutes a valid exercise of state 
police powers.  Delaware Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Columbus (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 
179, 180-181, 26 OBR 154, 155, 497 N.E.2d 1112, 1113-1114.  R.C. 6103.04 
ensures stability of financing for county water service projects even in the face of 
changing governmental entities. 
 
Having concluded that R.C. 6103.04 is a valid exercise of state police 
powers, we next review whether the legislative intent of the statute was to 
generally restrict a municipality’s authority to provide utility service to its 
residents.  By the expressly limited scope, we discern that the General Assembly 
intended R.C. 6103.04 to permit completion of pending county water service 
projects through protection of financing arrangements that would otherwise be 
affected by intervening annexations. 
 
 
7
 
The challenged statute’s impact on a municipality’s authority to operate 
utilities is limited.  R.C. 6103.04 restricts the Board’s statutory jurisdiction within 
the municipality to that period of time when “any water supply or water-works 
improvements for said area * * * have been completed or until said board has 
abandoned such projects.”    And this limited jurisdiction is only triggered by an 
intervening set of circumstances that warrant such practical considerations; 
considerations generally encompassed within the concept of police powers, 
including preservation of public resources. 
 
R.C. 6103.04 does not substantially interfere with a municipality’s power to 
own and operate a water supply system. 
 
For all of these reasons, we conclude that Marblehead has not overcome the 
strong presumption that R.C. 6103.04 is constitutional.  R.C. 6103.04 only 
permissibly infringes on a municipality’s authority.  It is an exercise of police 
powers and does not substantially infringe upon a municipality’s power to operate 
utilities. 
 
Because we reverse the court of appeals’ decision regarding the 
constitutionality of R.C. 6103.04, we need not reach its decision regarding R.C. 
6103.26.  The court of appeals premised its R.C. 6103.26 discussion on the 
unconstitutionality of R.C. 6103.04. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
YOUNG, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, Acting C.J., SPELLACY and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent. 
 
FREDERICK N. YOUNG, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for 
MOYER, C.J. 
 
LEO M. SPELLACY, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, J. 
__________________ 
 
 
8
 
DOUGLAS, ACTING C.J., dissenting.  I dissent from the judgment and 
opinion of the majority.  The majority, in rapid fashion, has abridged the express 
grant of power provided to municipalities in this state by Section 4, Article XVIII 
of the Ohio Constitution.  Specifically, the majority holds that “[a]lthough Article 
XVIII of the Ohio Constitution grants municipalities the exclusive authority to 
provide their residents with utility services, a statute that limits the municipality’s 
power is not unconstitutional if the purpose of the statute is an exercise of the 
state’s police powers and is not a substantial infringement upon the municipality’s 
authority.”  (Emphasis added.)  To that end, the majority holds that “[b]ecause 
R.C. 6103.04 satisfies these requirements, it is not unconstitutional.” 
 
In reaching these conclusions, the majority relies primarily on Lucas v. 
Lucas Local School Dist. (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 13, 2 OBR 501, 442 N.E.2d 449; 
Columbus v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 427, 12 O.O.3d 361, 390 
N.E.2d 1201; Columbus v. Teater (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 253, 7 O.O.3d 410, 374 
N.E.2d 154; and Canton v. Whitman (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 62, 73 O.O.2d 285, 337 
N.E.2d 766.  However, these cases, along with the “clear, specific and self-
executing” powers enumerated in Section 4, Article XVIII, see In re Complaint of 
Residents of Struthers (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 227, 543 N.E.2d 794, paragraph one 
of the syllabus, do not support the conclusions reached by the majority.  
Accordingly, because the majority has failed to properly interpret and apply the 
law in this area, and because the majority has effectively renounced the clear grant 
of constitutional authority provided to municipalities in Section 4, Article XVIII, I 
must dissent.  Indeed, today’s short-sighted holding will only further exacerbate 
the problems associated with the establishment, servicing, and control of utility 
services within land annexed by a municipality. 
 
Section 4, Article XVIII provides: 
 
 
9
 
“Any municipality may acquire, construct, own, lease and operate within or 
without its corporate limits, any public utility the product or service of which is or 
is to be supplied to the municipality or its inhabitants, and may contract with 
others for any such product or service.  The acquisition of any such public utility 
may be by condemnation or otherwise, and a municipality may acquire thereby the 
use of, or full title to, the property and franchise of any company or person 
supplying to the municipality or its inhabitants the service or product of any such 
utility.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The language of Section 4, Article XVIII is unmistakable.  Until today, the 
clear language of Section 4 meant that a municipality could, without restriction, 
“acquire, construct, own, lease and operate within or without its corporate limits, 
any public utility the product or service of which is or is to be supplied to the 
municipality or its inhabitants.”  However, these plain words, as approved by the 
sovereign people of this state in 1912, apparently no longer mean what they say. 
 
This court has held consistently that rights afforded by Section 4, Article 
XVIII are not subject to statutory restriction or to commission review or control.  
See, e.g., Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 
521, 530, 668 N.E.2d 889, 895-896 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting), citing Link v. Pub. 
Util. Comm. (1921), 102 Ohio St. 336, 131 N.E. 796, paragraph two of the 
syllabus; In re Complaint of Residents of Struthers, supra, paragraphs one and 
three of the syllabus; Lucas, supra; Columbus v. Pub. Util. Comm., supra; and 
Columbus v. Ohio Power Siting Comm. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 435, 12 O.O.3d 365, 
390 N.E.2d 1208.  See, also, Pfau v. Cincinnati (1943), 142 Ohio St. 101, 26 O.O. 
284, 50 N.E.2d 172; and Swank v. Shiloh (1957), 166 Ohio St. 415, 2 O.O.2d 401, 
143 N.E.2d 586, paragraph one of the syllabus (“The power to acquire, construct, 
own or lease and to operate a utility, the product of which is to be supplied to a 
municipality or its inhabitants, is derived from Section 4, Article XVIII of the 
 
 
10
Constitution, and the General Assembly is without authority to impose restrictions 
or limitations upon that power.”). 
 
Specifically, in Lucas, 2 Ohio St.3d at 14, 2 OBR at 502, 442 N.E.2d at 450, 
we stated that Section 4, Article XVIII “is clearly a grant of power and not a 
limitation of authority,” and that “the obvious purpose of this section is to provide 
the municipalities with the comprehensive authority to deal with public utilities.”  
Id., 2 Ohio St.3d at 14, 2 OBR at 502, 442 N.E.2d at 450, fn. 1.  Additionally, we 
also noted that “the first cases interpreting this provision described the municipal 
powers over utilities as ‘plenary,’“ and that “[t]he Home Rule Amendments, 
Section 4 included, are examples of the people taking a governmental function 
from one body and placing it under the auspices of another.”  Id., 2 Ohio St.3d at 
14, 2 OBR at 502, 442 N.E.2d at 450.  Hence, “municipalities were awarded 
jurisdiction over public utilities which formerly rested in the domain of the General 
Assembly.”  Id.  Therefore, we expressly held in Lucas, at paragraph one of the 
syllabus, that “[c]ontracting for public utility services is exclusively a municipal 
function under Section 4, Article XVIII, of the Ohio Constitution.” (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Citing Lucas, the majority states that “[t]he Ohio Constitution authorizes a 
municipality to provide water service to its residents to the exclusion of other 
providers.”  (Emphasis added.)  “Exclusion” is defined as “[d]enial of entry or 
admittance.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (6 Ed.Rev.1990) 563.  Moreover, 
“exclusive” is defined as “[a]ppertaining to the subject alone, not including, 
admitting, or pertaining to any others.”  Id. at 564.  Thus, it would seem to follow 
that, since Marblehead has the absolute authority “to provide” water services to its 
inhabitants to the “exclusion” of all other entities, any restriction or limitation 
placed on Marblehead in this regard runs afoul of Section 4, Article XVIII. 
 
R.C. 6103.04 provides: 
 
 
11
 
“Whenever any portion of a sewer district is incorporated as a municipal 
corporation or annexed to a municipal corporation, the area so incorporated or 
annexed shall remain under the jurisdiction of the board of county commissioners 
for water-works purposes until any water supply or water-works improvements for 
said area for which detailed plans have been prepared and the resolutions declaring 
the necessity thereof has [sic] been adopted by the board have been completed or 
until said board has abandoned such projects.  Such incorporation or annexation of 
any part of a district shall not interfere with or render illegal any issue of bonds or 
certificate of indebtedness made by the board in accordance with sections 6103.02 
to 6103.30, inclusive, of the Revised Code, to provide payment for the cost of 
construction and maintenance of any water improvements within such area, or with 
any assessments levied or to be levied upon the property within such area to 
provide for the payment of the cost of construction and maintenance.” 
 
R.C. 6103.04 sets forth that whenever any portion of a county sewer district 
is annexed to a municipality, the area annexed shall remain under the jurisdiction 
of the board of county commissioners for waterworks purposes until the projects, 
for which detailed plans have been prepared and resolutions declaring the necessity 
thereof have been adopted, have been completed or abandoned by the board.  
According to the majority, Marblehead can be enjoined from establishing a water 
supply system for its residents because R.C. 6103.04 is a legitimate exercise of the 
state’s police powers and because the statute does not “substantially interfere” 
with, and “only permissibly infringes” upon, the exclusive authority afforded to 
municipalities in Section 4, Article XVIII.  In reaching these conclusions, and, 
specifically, the conclusion that the board’s rights under R.C. 6103.04 are 
paramount to the explicit constitutional power afforded to Marblehead under 
Section 4, Article XVIII, the majority relies upon Teater and Whitman, supra. 
 
 
12
 
Without question, certain legislative acts “of statewide concern,” which do 
not impair constitutional grants of authority contained in Section 4, Article XVIII, 
are valid.  Lucas, 2 Ohio St.3d at 15, 2 OBR at 503, 442 N.E.2d at 451.  Clearly, 
Teater and Whitman involved such matters.  However, Teater and Whitman do not 
support the conclusions reached by the majority and both cases are easily 
distinguishable from the case at bar. 
 
In Whitman, we held that the state may require a municipality to fluoridate 
an already existing municipally owned and operated water supply system and that 
the statute in question, which required a certain level of fluoridation, was a valid 
exercise of the state police power.  Specifically, we determined that the statute 
requiring fluoridation of water was permissible because the regulation was a matter 
of statewide concern (prevention and control of dental caries), and, more 
importantly, because the regulation did not limit the ownership or operation of a 
municipal waterworks.  Id., 44 Ohio St.2d at 68, 73 O.O.2d at 289, 337 N.E.2d at 
771 (“The ownership and operation of a municipal waterworks is not limited by a 
state requirement that fluorides be added to the water in the interest of the public 
health  * * *. The state, in fact, supplies the equipment necessary to add the 
fluorides.  * * * Fluoridation is plainly a matter involving the public health; there is 
no indication that it unreasonably restricts, limits, or otherwise interferes with the 
operation of a municipal utility.”).  However, the case before us is clearly different.  
The majority has extinguished, indefinitely, Marblehead’s exclusive right to 
establish and provide water services to its residents.  Moreover, the operation and 
ownership of water services within the area annexed by Marblehead is not a matter 
of statewide concern.  Thus, the majority misapprehends Whitman by using 
Whitman to elevate, herein, the purely local interests of appellant board over the 
express constitutional authority of Marblehead to own and operate a public utility 
within its municipal limits. 
 
 
13
 
The majority attempts to soften its holding by asserting that R.C. 6103.04 is 
only a “limited” restriction.  The majority states that R.C. 6103.04 “restricts the 
Board’s statutory jurisdiction within the municipality to that period of time when 
‘any water supply or water-works improvements for said area  * * * have been 
completed or until said board has abandoned such projects.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  
“Period of time” is, of course, not defined by the majority.  In any event, any 
limitation on a municipality’s authority to provide water services to its residents 
violates Section 4, Article XVIII.  Indeed, this court’s holding in Whitman was 
never intended to “represent a retreat from the strong home rule principles” that the 
General Assembly may not limit the power of a municipality to own or operate a 
public utility without violating Section 4, Article XVIII.  See Columbus v. Pub. 
Util. Comm., 58 Ohio St.2d at 432, 12 O.O.3d at 364, 390 N.E.2d at 1204, relying 
on McCann v. Defiance (1958), 167 Ohio St. 313, 4 O.O.2d 369, 148 N.E.2d 221.  
Accordingly, Whitman does not support the position of the majority, and any 
reliance by the majority on Whitman in reaching its holding is simply wrong. 
 
Likewise, Teater also lends no support to the holding rendered by the 
majority.  In Teater, the city of Columbus instituted a program for the construction, 
operation, and maintenance of a new water supply reservoir located outside its 
corporate limits on Big Darby Creek.  The location of the reservoir was also to be 
within the area proposed by the Director of Natural Resources as a “scenic river 
area.”  The director’s authority to designate the area as a protected “scenic area” 
was in accordance with a state statute adopted pursuant to Section 36, Article II of 
the Ohio Constitution.  The effect of such a designation was to prohibit channel 
modification of the watercourse.  The city challenged the constitutionality of the 
statute, urging, among other things, that it violated Section 4, Article XVIII. 
 
In finding the statute constitutional, this court recognized that the area in 
question was located outside the city’s corporate limits and that the statute at issue 
 
 
14
concerned matters of statewide import, namely, the conservation and preservation 
of natural resources.  Specifically, in Teater, 53 Ohio St.2d at 261, 7 O.O.3d at 
414, 374 N.E.2d at 159-160, the court held: 
 
“The authority enjoyed by municipalities under Article XVIII cannot be 
extinguished by the General Assembly.  Nevertheless, under appropriate facts, the 
power possessed by the General Assembly under Section 36 of Article II can 
override the interest of a city in constructing water supply impoundments located 
outside its corporate limits.  Ultimately, the judiciary must determine the facts in 
such controversies, balance the rights of the state against those of the municipality 
and endeavor to protect the respective interests of each.  In such instances, the 
outcome of the constitutional argument involved will depend upon the facts and 
circumstances of the case.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Clearly, Teater does not support the holding of the majority.  In Teater, the 
court indicated that state police powers are not presumptively paramount to home 
rule authority conferred upon municipalities by Article XVIII.  Rather, state police 
powers and home rule powers are “equal in dignity,” see Teater, 53 Ohio St.2d at 
257, 7 O.O.3d at 412, 374 N.E.2d at 157, only if the statute is of statewide concern, 
and the statute and the application of the home rule provision establishing a public 
utility conflict outside the municipal limits.  The significant “extra-territorial 
effect,” which would have resulted from the city’s proposed water supply 
reservoir, was material to the holding in Teater.  See Columbus v. Pub. Util. 
Comm., 58 Ohio St.2d at 433, 12 O.O.3d at 364, 390 N.E.2d at 1205; and 
Columbus v. Ohio Power Siting Comm., 58 Ohio St.2d at 439, 12 O.O.3d at 368, 
390 N.E.2d at 1211.  Thus, unlike the situation in Teater, here Marblehead is not 
attempting to establish a water service system outside its boundaries.  In this 
regard, the equal dignity language and balancing test derived from Teater are not 
applicable to the present case. 
 
 
15
 
Until today, this court has consistently protected the rights of a municipality 
to own and operate a public utility for the purpose of supplying the service or 
product to its residents.  See, e.g., McCann (statute that requires municipalities to 
furnish water to noninhabitants and also limits the price which the municipality 
may charge for such water is unconstitutional and is void); Columbus v. Pub. Util. 
Comm. (statute that requires municipally owned and operated electric light 
companies to offer their customers specified billing options violates Section 4, 
Article XVIII); and Columbus v. Ohio Power Siting Comm. (statute that authorizes 
a commission to evaluate and determine a municipality’s need for, and the public 
service and convenience of, a proposed municipal utility is unconstitutional).  
Importantly, “ ‘[l]egislation enacted by the state pursuant to the police power, in 
relation to the public health, is valid as applied to the municipal operation of a 
public utility under Section 4, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, where such 
legislation does not interfere with the ownership or operation of the utility.’ ”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Columbus v. Ohio Power Siting Comm., 58 Ohio St.2d at 440, 12 
O.O.3d at 368-369, 390 N.E.2d at 1212, quoting Whitman, paragraph three of the 
syllabus. 
 
The law in Ohio is clear.  Marblehead has the exclusive right to provide 
water service to its residents.  The majority’s decision, reversing the judgment of 
the court of appeals and enjoining Marblehead from extending its water supply 
system into the annexed area, is just plain wrong.  Accordingly, I must dissent. 
 
SPELLACY and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
opinion.