Title: Haverstick v. Banet

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

370 N.E.2d 341 (1977)
Frances HAVERSTICK and Mary Ellen Schlater, Appellants (Plaintiffs below),
v.
Bernard BANET, Executor of the Estate of Connie Schroeer, Helen Huffman, Rose Kahoe, Nora Banet, Bernard Banet, Ruby Banet, Norma Crow, Clara Coyle, Judy Dorn, and Phyllis Fuller, Appellees (Defendants below).
No. 1277S813.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
December 15, 1977.
Rehearing Denied March 3, 1978.
David B. Hughes, Hughes & Hughes, Indianapolis, for appellants.
*342 Arch N. Bobbitt, Ruckelshaus, Bobbitt & O'Connor, Indianapolis, for appellees.
PRENTICE, Justice.
Plaintiffs (Appellants) are before this Court on petition to transfer, seeking review of an opinion by the Court of Appeals found at 349 N.E.2d 282. It is their position that the ruling precedent followed by the Court and holding that, in a will contest, only the personal representative is entitled to waive the decedent's physician-patient privilege is erroneous. The appeal arose out of an action commenced pursuant to Ind. Code § 29-1-7-17 (1971) to contest the will of Connie Schroeer. Plaintiffs, the heirs of the decedent, are alleging that at the time of the purported execution of her will, Connie Schroeer was of unsound mind and acting under undue influence.
In a trial by jury it was found that the written instrument in question was the will of Connie Schroeer. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court which entered judgment upon the verdict of the jury. The issues as presented by the plaintiffs are:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit the plaintiffs, as heirs of the deceased patient, to waive the physician-patient privilege over the objections of the executor, in an action to contest the will.
(2) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give certain instructions tendered by the plaintiffs and designated Nos. 4, 7, 10, and 11.
The principle issue as set forth by the plaintiffs in their petition is whether this Court should abolish the "Indiana Rule" which provides that only the personal representative can waive the decedent's physician-patient privilege in a will contest. The Indiana law in this area has remained fairly consistent and clear on the subject since the physician-patient privilege was first enacted by statute, the current version of which reads at Ind. Code § 34-1-14-5 (1973):
While the statute speaks specifically to matters which fall within the scope of the privilege, it is silent as to the issues of waiver and as to any effects resulting from the patient's death. In these areas, the extensions and limitations have come about through the judicial process.
In Morris v. Morris (1889), 119 Ind. 341, 21 N.E. 918, this Court dealt with the issue of who could waive the physician-patient privilege after the patient's death. In deciding that the legal representative of the decedent had the right to waive the privilege, the Court stated at p. 344, 21 N.E. at p. 919:
Although the court provided that the privilege could be waived by the personal representative of the decedent, no specific mention was made of the heirs' rights to do so.
In Towles v. McCurdy (1904), 163 Ind. 12, 71 N.E. 129, this Court was faced with precisely the same issue as that presented by the plaintiffs today. In Towles, the children of the decedent, one of whom was the sole legatee and devisee, were involved in an action to contest the will. In defining the rationale behind prohibiting waiver of the privilege by the heirs, while at the same time allowing waiver by the personal representative, the Court stated at p. 15, 71 N.E. at p. 130:
The obvious reasons mentioned by the court were never fully explained in Towles or in any of the later cases which followed this approach. Stayner v. Nye (1949), 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E.2d 496; Studabaker v. Faylor (1912), 52 Ind. App. 171, 98 N.E. 318. Among the states which have decided cases under statutes substantially similar to the one in question, Indiana is the only state to have adopted the above approach. See Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 393 (1964).
Although the purpose behind the adoption of the privilege statute is fairly clear in that it is meant to promote and protect the confidential relationship between a patient and his physician, Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wiler (1884), 100 Ind. 92; Masonic Mutual Benefit Ass'n. v. Beck (1881), 77 Ind. 203, the policy behind the waiver rule is much more difficult to comprehend. The defendants would suggest that the personal representative is the only person who stands in the place of the deceased and therefore he is the only one who inherits from the deceased the right to waive the privilege. Further, defendants contend that the personal representative, as executor of the will, has the duty to use such privilege to maintain and uphold the will, such duty resting solely in him.
Courts in other jurisdictions as well as renowned writers in this area, have recognized certain flaws in such reasoning. As to the claim that the personal representative is the only person who stands in the place of the decedent, J. Wigmore, Law of Evidence § 2391 (McNaughton rev. 1961) states:
Plaintiffs contend that it would be unjust and inequitable to allow the personal representative to have the sole discretion as to waiver of the privilege, especially where as here, he is also the largest specific legatee under the instrument in question. They suggest that it is unfair and absurd to permit the personal representative to offer the physician's testimony in the event that it should prove beneficial to his position, and to withhold it if it is detrimental. In support of their position, plaintiffs cite several cases from other jurisdictions which have ruled on the same issues presented here.
In Winters v. Winters (1887), 102 Iowa 53, 71 N.W. 184, the decedent's brother and only heir filed objections to the will which was offered for probate by the widow as named executrix. Remarking on the Indiana decisions which addressed this same issue, the Iowa court stated at p. 185:
The heirs of the decedent brought action to contest the will naming their sister executrix in In Re Koenig's Estate (1956), 247 Minn. 580, 78 N.W.2d 364. In adopting the Winters rationale, the Minnesota court commented on the nature of the interests involved in stating at p. 369:
One of the more recent cases to have ruled on the waiver of the physician-patient privilege in a will contest is Lembke v. Unke, (N.D. 1969), 171 N.W.2d 837. The North Dakota court chose to reject the Indiana rule and to adopt an approach which would concentrate to a greater extent on the successful development of the truth in stating at p. 847:
In light of the rationale set forth in the above cases, representing the apparent weight of authority, it would appear that the better reasoned approach would be to allow the heirs of the decedent, as well as the personal representative, to waive the decedent's physician-patient privilege in a will contest. In so doing, a full disclosure of all of the relevant facts in issue will more likely be achieved. To the extent that our prior decisions hereinbefore mentioned are in conflict, they are expressly overruled.
The second issue, pertaining to the plaintiffs' tendered instructions, was effectively discussed by Judge Lybrook, who wrote for the Court of Appeals at p. 284:
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for transfer is granted; the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the cause is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
GIVAN, C.J., and HUNTER and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.
DeBRULER, J., dissents with opinion.
DeBRULER, Justice, dissenting.
Under the present law the strict confidentiality of information acquired by a physician while treating or attending a patient is preserved in effect after the patient's death. The Masonic Mutual Benefit Association v. Beck (1881), 77 Ind. 203. After the death of the patient the restriction prevents the physician from testifying as to the patient's testamentary capacity so long as anyone who may be said to stand in the place of the testator desires that it be maintained. Towles v. McCurdy (1904), 163 Ind. 12, 71 N.E. 129. It is proper and right to repose this authority in such persons because they have the same interest in nondisclosure after his death that decedent had prior to his death. I would maintain the present law which provides that so long as a person who may reasonably be said to stand in the place of decedent after his death stands up and asks the court to maintain the cloak of privacy, that request should be honored and no other.
There are in addition, I perceive, additional ancillary benefits which flow from maintaining the present law. The present law, by restricting the right to waive the privilege, maximizes and preserves to a high degree the benefits which the General Assembly sought to afford society by enacting the doctor-patient privilege statute, and giving that privilege effect after death of the patient. The present law also acts as a deterrent to those who would procure medical attention for the decedent during his last illness for the purpose of gaining medical information about his condition with the intent of later using that information to either attack or defend the written will. The loss of that deterrent effect is likely to result in intolerable invasions of the decedent's privacy during his last illness.