Title: State v. Deal

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

#27185-a-LSW  
 
2015 S.D. 51 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
 
 
 
v. 
 
DAVID DEAL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* * * * 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
 CLAY COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
 
THE HONORABLE CHERYLE W. GERING 
Judge 
 
* * * * 
 
MARTY J. JACKLEY 
Attorney General 
 
BETHANY L. ERICKSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
Attorneys for plaintiff  
 
and appellee. 
 
 
A. JASON RUMPCA of 
Peterson, Stuart, Rumpca  
  & Rasmussen, Prof., LLC 
Beresford, South Dakota 
Attorneys for defendant  
 
and appellant.  
 
 
* * * * 
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS  
ON APRIL 20, 2015  
 
 
 
OPINION FILED 06/24/15 
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WILBUR, Justice 
[¶1.]  
David Deal was convicted of first-degree rape and sexual contact with 
a child under the age of 16.  Deal alleges that the circuit court committed reversible 
error when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal and his motion to 
suppress statements in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).  We affirm. 
Background 
[¶2.]  
In August of 2013, Deal hosted a hog roast at his cabin outside of 
Vermillion, South Dakota.  L.S.S. attended the hog roast with his daughter L.S., age 
seven at the time, and her younger sister N.S.  L.S.S. was going through a 
separation with his wife, A.S., at the time.  During the weeks following the hog 
roast, L.S. began exhibiting changes in her behavior.  A.S. received phone calls “a 
couple times a week” from L.S.’s first-grade teacher regarding her behavior.  Her 
teacher mentioned that L.S. was becoming more aggressive and demanded 
attention at school.  Previously, when L.S. was in kindergarten, A.S. never “had an 
issue” or “had to talk to the teacher” about L.S.   
[¶3.]  
On November 26, 2013, L.S. got in trouble at school.  L.S. explained to 
A.S. that nothing happened and that she was fine.  Later that evening, A.S. told her 
boyfriend, R.E., that children can act out after being molested.  R.E. asked A.S. if 
she would like him to talk with L.S., and she said, “[Y]ou can give it a try.”  He 
asked L.S. if her classmates were being mean to her or if any adults were 
mistreating her.  He then asked her if any person had given her a “bad hug.”  She 
answered “yes.”  He asked her who gave her a “bad hug,” and she said “Dave.”  R.E. 
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informed A.S. what L.S. shared with him about David Deal.  In a subsequent 
conversation, L.S. told A.S. that Deal put his hand down her pants and digitally 
penetrated her.  A.S. immediately called law enforcement and reported the incident.  
A.S. then called Deal and confronted him about the allegation.  Deal denied 
touching L.S. 
[¶4.]  
The next day on November 27, 2013, Chief Deputy Jerami West met 
with A.S. and L.S. at the Child Advocacy Center in Sioux City, Iowa.  L.S. 
underwent a forensic interview where she described the incident to the interviewer.  
L.S. stated that on the night of the incident, everyone was sitting around a fire pit 
outside of Deal’s cabin.  She went inside the cabin by herself to use the bathroom.  
On her way to the bathroom, Deal grabbed her and put his hand down her pants 
and touched her genital area.  She told him to stop and he refused.  L.S. then hit 
him on his back or stomach and ran into the bathroom and shut the door.  She said 
Deal knocked on the door and shouted, “[O]pen this door.”  She described the 
bathroom door as having a “lock that you twist.”  At trial, Deal presented 
photographs of the sliding bathroom door and L.S. acknowledged that there was no 
lock on the sliding door.        
[¶5.]  
Law enforcement officers unsuccessfully attempted to contact Deal 
over the course of the next few days.  On the following Monday, December 2, 2013, 
officers learned that Deal had not shown up to work.  The officers were told that 
this was unusual.  Based on this information, law enforcement officers performed a 
welfare check at Deal’s home, but he was not there.  The next morning, Deal was 
found at the bottom of the river bluff near a park in Vermillion.  He was found alive, 
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lying in the snow with his face swollen and his left eye nearly swollen shut, bruises 
and scrapes on his body, and superficial cuts to both wrists.  He was missing his cell 
phone, one of his shoes, his driver’s license, and his glasses.  Deal was transferred to 
the Intensive Care Unit at Avera Hospital in Sioux Falls for treatment of his 
injuries.   
[¶6.]  
While Deal was being treated at the hospital, law enforcement 
executed a search warrant of his home to investigate what happened to him and to 
attempt to discover any evidence of a crime or struggle that would explain Deal’s 
condition.  Inside the house, law enforcement officers found evidence that suggested 
Deal attempted suicide.  Near Deal’s bathtub, which was half full of water, was a 
box cutter, assorted razor blades, a sock filled with broken glass, two empty bottles 
of Tylenol, a bottle of whiskey, a can of air duster, and a laptop computer displaying 
a family picture.  The State presented this evidence to the jury along with a jury 
instruction stating that an attempt to commit suicide can be considered as tending 
to prove Deal’s consciousness of guilt.    
[¶7.]  
On December 13, 2013, a Clay County Grand Jury indicted Deal on the 
charge of first-degree rape in violation of SDCL 22-22-1(1).  That same day, Avera 
Hospital released Deal.  West traveled to Deal’s home that afternoon and knocked 
on his front door.  West and Deal talked for a short while on the front porch.  
Noticing that Deal was cold and shaking, West suggested they continue the 
discussion in his patrol car where it was warmer.  West sat in the driver’s seat and 
Deal sat in the front passenger seat for the remainder of the interview.  The 
conversation continued in the patrol car.  There was no indication that the patrol 
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car was locked.  The dash camera in the patrol car recorded the conversation, but 
because the camera was pointed in the opposite direction, the camera only recorded 
audio of the conversation.  West testified at trial as to Deal’s demeanor during the 
conversation. 
[¶8.]  
West’s initial questions focused on Deal’s well-being, his treatment at 
the hospital, and his recollection of the circumstances leading to his hospitalization.  
After these initial questions, West stated that he was “changing gears” and 
proceeded to read Deal each of his Miranda rights.  Deal acknowledged his 
understanding of each right.  West then asked Deal if he wished to waive these 
rights.  Deal paused and did not answer immediately.  He eventually said, “Well, I 
don’t know, I guess I don’t really know what we are talking about.”  West again 
inquired if Deal wished to talk, to which Deal responded, “I guess so.”   
[¶9.]  
West questioned Deal about the items found in his home that 
according to West, tended to suggest an attempted suicide.  Eventually, West told 
Deal that he thought the reason Deal attempted suicide was because of the phone 
call Deal received from A.S. about L.S.  West then questioned Deal about the rape.  
Deal made no verbal admissions to sexual contact or rape.  At trial, West testified 
about Deal’s physical response, including tearing up, shaking, and nervousness in 
response to these questions.  After the interview, West placed Deal under arrest.  
West was aware of Deal’s indictment on the charge of rape and had a warrant in 
hand to arrest Deal for that offense at the time of the interview. 
[¶10.]  
Deal filed a motion to suppress all statements, confessions, or 
admissions that he made to West on December 13, 2013.  Deal also moved to 
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suppress all evidence gathered as a result of the questioning, including his 
demeanor and body language observed by West.  Deal contended that the 
statements, confessions, and admissions were elicited from him while he was “in 
custody pursuant to an interrogation when [he] did not knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily waive his Miranda rights to remain silent or to request the assistance of 
an attorney.”  The circuit court denied the motion.  At trial, Deal asked the court to 
enter judgment of acquittal.  The court also denied this motion.  On May 13, 2014, a 
jury found Deal guilty of first-degree rape in violation of SDCL 22-22-1(1) and 
sexual contact with a child under the age of 16 in violation of SDCL 22-22-7.  The 
court sentenced Deal to the South Dakota State Penitentiary.  The court entered 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the court’s denial of Deal’s 
motion to suppress statements.  Deal appeals and raises the following two issues for 
our review: 
1. 
Whether the circuit court erred when it denied Deal’s 
motion to suppress statements in violation of Miranda. 
 
2. 
Whether the circuit court erred when it denied Deal’s 
motion for judgment of acquittal. 
 
Analysis 
[¶11.] 
1. 
Whether the circuit court erred when it denied Deal’s 
motion to suppress statements in violation of Miranda. 
 
[¶12.]  
Deal contends that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress.  He asserts that he was in custody at the time of his interview, he did not 
voluntarily waive his Miranda rights, and West’s observations were testimonial.  
However, the circuit court concluded that West was not required to read Deal his 
Miranda warnings because “a reasonable person in [Deal’s] situation would feel at 
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liberty to leave” and, therefore, he was not in custody.  Furthermore, the circuit 
court found that even assuming Deal was in custody, he voluntarily waived his 
Miranda rights because he “understood his rights and engaged in a course of 
conduct reflecting a desire to give up those rights.”  Finally, the court concluded, 
“even if Miranda is applicable in this case,” West’s “observations of tearing up, 
shaking, and other physical evidence of nervousness are non-testimonial and not 
subject to Miranda analysis[.].” 
[¶13.]  
“Police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to 
everyone whom they question.”  State v. Aesoph, 2002 S.D. 71, ¶ 17, 647 N.W.2d 
743, 751 (quoting State v. Thompson, 1997 S.D. 15, ¶ 23, 560 N.W.2d 535, 540).  
Although “interviews with law enforcement will naturally have coercive pressures,” 
State v. Johnson, 2015 S.D. 7, ¶ 15, 860 N.W.2d 235, 242, Miranda warnings are 
required “only when a suspect interrogated by the police is ‘in custody.’”  Thompson 
v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 102, 116 S. Ct. 457, 460, 133 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1995).   
Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will 
have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the 
police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may 
ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime.  But 
police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings 
to everyone whom they question.  Nor is the requirement of 
warning to be imposed simply because the questioning takes 
place in the station house, or because the questioned person is 
one whom the police suspect.  Miranda warnings are required 
only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s 
freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’ 
 
Thompson, 1997 S.D. 15, ¶ 23, 560 N.W.2d at 540 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 
429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct. 711, 714, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1977)).  We adhere to the 
two-part test stated in the United States Supreme Court decision Thompson “to 
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determine whether an individual is in custody at the time of questioning[.]”  State v. 
Walth, 2011 S.D. 77, ¶ 12, 806 N.W.2d 623, 626.  “[F]irst, what were the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those 
circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to 
terminate the interrogation and leave.”  Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112, 116 S. Ct. at 
465 (footnote omitted).  “Once the scene is set and the players’ lines and actions are 
reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: 
was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree 
associated with a formal arrest.”  Id. (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 
1125, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also McDonough v. Weber, 2015 S.D. 1, ¶ 25, 859 
N.W.2d 26, 38. 
[¶14.]  
We review a circuit court’s factual determination regarding the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation “under the clearly erroneous 
standard.”  State v. Bowker, 2008 S.D. 61, ¶ 27, 754 N.W.2d 56, 65 (citing Aesoph, 
2002 S.D. 71, ¶ 12, 647 N.W.2d at 750).  But the application of the factual 
determination to the second part of the test of “whether a reasonable person under 
those circumstances would consider themselves to be in custody is a question of law” 
reviewed de novo.  Walth, 2011 S.D. 77, ¶ 13, 806 N.W.2d at 626 (quoting Bowker, 
2008 S.D. 61, ¶ 27, 754 N.W.2d at 65).  “The ultimate determination, therefore, 
presents a mixed question of law and fact qualifying for independent review.”  
Bowker, 2008 S.D. 61, ¶ 27, 754 N.W.2d at 65 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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[¶15.]  
Here, West began questioning Deal on the front porch of Deal’s home.  
We have recognized that “‘[c]ourts are much less likely to find the circumstances 
custodial when the interrogation occurs in familiar or at least neutral 
surroundings,’ such as the suspect’s home.”  State v. Herting, 2000 S.D. 12, ¶ 14, 
604 N.W.2d 863, 867 (quoting United States v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th 
Cir. 1998)).  West observed that Deal was cold and shivering.  At trial, the State 
introduced evidence indicating that there was snow on the ground.  The record also 
reflects that West was aware that Deal had been released that day from the 
hospital, where he received treatment for his extensive injuries.  West testified that 
he asked Deal “if he wanted to go sit in [the patrol] car . . . where he could be 
warm.”  The patrol car was positioned on the street in front of Deal’s home.  Deal 
agreed and sat in the front passenger seat while West sat in the driver’s seat of the 
patrol car.         
[¶16.]  
Deal argues that a reasonable person in his position would have 
understood that he was in custody.  First, he contends that West did not inform him 
at the time of the interview that the questioning was voluntary.  Second, he 
assumed that the patrol car was locked and, as a result, he did not feel free to leave.  
Third, he did not feel free to leave because West had told him at the hospital that he 
needed to talk to him about his “registration.”  Fourth, Deal argues that West 
strong-armed him into entering the patrol car and used deceptive tactics that 
misled Deal about the matter to be discussed when questioning him.  Fifth, Deal 
alleges that the atmosphere of the interview was “police dominated.”  Finally, Deal 
states that he was ultimately arrested at the conclusion of the questioning. 
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[¶17.]  
We point out, however, that “the initial determination of custody 
depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective 
views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”  
Thompson, 1997 S.D. 15, ¶ 25, 560 N.W.2d at 540 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 
511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1994)).  “[T]he only 
relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have 
understood his situation.”  State v. Gesinger, 1997 S.D. 6, ¶ 18, 559 N.W.2d 549, 552 
(quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L. Ed. 
2d 317 (1984)).  Thus, whether Deal subjectively believed that the doors of the 
patrol car were locked is not relevant to this determination.  Instead, the question is 
whether a reasonable person would have understood that he was not free to leave. 
[¶18.]  
We are not convinced that the objective circumstances surrounding 
Deal’s interrogation were such that a reasonable person would have felt he or she 
was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.  The interview began in 
a familiar location, on Deal’s front porch, and after it appeared to West that Deal 
was cold and shivering, transitioned to the chief deputy’s patrol car parked on the 
street in front of Deal’s home.  A reasonable person under similar circumstances 
would understand that West’s decision to continue the interview in his patrol car 
was not part of a coercive tactic to restrict his freedom to leave.  Moreover, at no 
point during the interview did West indicate to Deal that he was not free to leave 
the patrol car nor did West restrain Deal’s ability to leave.  Our review of the 
objective circumstances surrounding the questioning of Deal indicates he was “not 
so deprived of his freedom as to be ‘in custody’ for Miranda purposes.”  Thompson, 
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1997 S.D. 15, ¶ 26, 560 N.W.2d at 541.  Therefore, the circuit court did not err in 
ruling that Deal was not in custody at the time of the interview. 
[¶19.] 
2. 
Whether the circuit court erred when it denied Deal’s 
motion for judgment of acquittal. 
 
[¶20.]  
Next, Deal argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to 
sustain his convictions of first-degree rape in violation of SDCL 22-22-1(1) and 
sexual contact with a child under the age of 16 in violation of SDCL 22-22-7.  We 
review whether the State provided sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction de 
novo.  State v. Hauge, 2013 S.D. 26, ¶ 12, 829 N.W.2d 145, 149.  “The question is 
whether ‘there is evidence in the record which, if believed by the fact finder, is 
sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  State v. Beck, 
2010 S.D. 52, ¶ 7, 785 N.W.2d 288, 292 (quoting State v. Carter, 2009 S.D. 65, ¶ 44, 
771 N.W.2d 329, 342).  “Claims of insufficient evidence are ‘viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict.’”  State v. Morgan, 2012 S.D. 87, ¶ 10, 824 N.W.2d 98, 100 
(quoting Beck, 2010 S.D. 52, ¶ 7, 785 N.W.2d at 292).  “We will not resolve conflicts 
in the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or reevaluate the weight of the 
evidence.”  State v. Hayes, 2014 S.D. 72, ¶ 39, 855 N.W.2d 668, 680 (quoting Hauge, 
2013 S.D. 26, ¶ 12, 829 N.W.2d at 149).  Therefore, “a guilty verdict will not be set 
aside if the State’s evidence and all favorable inferences that can be drawn 
therefrom support a rational theory of guilt.”  State v. Johnson, 2009 S.D. 67, ¶ 10, 
771 N.W.2d 360, 365 (quoting State v. Mulligan, 2007 S.D. 67, ¶ 7, 736 N.W.2d 808, 
813). 
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First-Degree Rape 
[¶21.]  
First-degree rape occurs when the defendant commits an “act of sexual 
penetration” with a victim “less than thirteen years of age[.]”  SDCL 22-22-1(1).  It 
is undisputed that L.S. was less than thirteen years of age at the time.  At trial and 
during her interview with the Child Advocacy Center, L.S. stated that Deal grabbed 
her on her way to the restroom at his cabin.  She said that he put his hand down 
her pants and underwear and digitally penetrated her.  She told him to stop and 
that it hurt.  Other witnesses, including A.S., R.E., and West, corroborated L.S.’s 
statements regarding the act of sexual penetration.  The State also presented 
evidence that Deal attempted to commit suicide after A.S. called him and 
confronted him about his conduct with L.S., which tends to prove Deal’s 
consciousness of guilt.   
[¶22.]  
Deal argues, however, that due to two inconsistencies in L.S.’s 
testimony, the evidence was not “sufficient to support a verdict of guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  First, Deal argues “[t]here was no evidence to corroborate the 
story that L.S. and A.S. told about being physically damaged by the sexual assault 
to the point where blood was left on the toilet seat days after the alleged assault 
occurred.”  Second, Deal alleges that “L.S.’s story of getting away and locking the 
door behind her is not possibly true” because, “when presented with photos of the 
sliding bathroom door, L.S. acknowledged that there was no lock on the sliding door 
she claimed to have locked.”  Our standard of review, however, “does not permit us 
to ‘resolve conflicts in testimony, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or weigh 
evidence.’”  State v. McKinney, 2005 S.D. 73, ¶ 27, 699 N.W.2d 471, 480 (quoting 
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State v. Hage, 532 N.W.2d 406, 410-11 (S.D. 1995)).  “When there is a conflict in 
witness testimony, it is the function of the trier of fact to ‘resolve the factual 
conflicts, weigh credibility, and sort out the truth.’”  LeGrand v. Weber, 2014 S.D. 
71, ¶ 36, 855 N.W.2d 121, 131 (quoting State v. Guthmiller, 2014 S.D. 7, ¶ 27, 843 
N.W.2d 364, 372) (emphasis added).  The jury listened to testimony and was 
presented with evidence of these inconsistencies.  Nevertheless, after resolving the 
factual conflicts and weighing credibility, the jury found Deal guilty of the charged 
offense.  Because this Court defers to the circuit court based on its ability to observe 
the witnesses, we decline to “substitute our judgment as to the weight and 
credibility” of this evidence.  See Hubbard v. City of Pierre, 2010 S.D. 55, ¶ 27, 784 
N.W.2d 499, 511.  When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, we 
conclude that sufficient evidence in the record existed to support a rational theory of 
guilt of first-degree rape. 
Sexual Contact 
[¶23.]  
Sexual contact with a child under the age of 16 occurs when the 
defendant is “sixteen years of age or older” and “knowingly engages in sexual 
contact with another person, other than that person’s spouse if the other person is 
under the age of sixteen years[.]”  SDCL 22-22-7.  This Court has previously said 
that “the offenses of rape and sexual contact are mutually exclusive.”  State v. 
Brammer, 304 N.W.2d 111, 114 (S.D. 1981); see also State v. Buchhold, 2007 S.D. 
15, ¶¶ 19-26, 727 N.W.2d 816, 821-23.  Likewise, SDCL 22-22-7.1 provides, “As used 
in this chapter, the term, sexual contact, means any touching, not amounting to 
rape . . . .”  (Emphasis added.)  Accordingly, a defendant may not be convicted of 
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both rape in violation of SDCL 22-22-1 and sexual contact in violation of SDCL 22-
22-7 from conduct arising out of only one act.  See Brammer, 304 N.W.2d at 114.   
[¶24.]  
Here, a review of the record demonstrates that the jury may have 
found that Deal committed an act of sexual contact in addition to the act that 
constituted rape.  L.S. stated in her forensic interview at the Child Advocacy Center 
that Deal touched her at least two separate times.  She said that he digitally 
penetrated her by grabbing her and putting his hand down her pants.  She then 
said: “I was trying to run because I didn’t want him to do anything else, but he 
grabbed me.  Then he touched me again.”  Later in the interview, she said, “He 
started to do it one time, then he did it again and he did it even harder.  And I 
couldn’t get him to stop that time.”  At trial, the forensic interviewer at the Child 
Advocacy Center, Sherrie Schweder, testified about this interview and corroborated 
L.S.’s statements.  The jury viewed the video of the forensic interview at trial.  We 
conclude that there was sufficient evidence in the record, when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdict, to support a finding by the jury that Deal 
knowingly engaged in an act of sexual contact with L.S independent of the act 
constituting rape. 
[¶25.]  
We affirm. 
[¶26.]  
GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and ZINTER, SEVERSON, and KERN, 
Justices, concur.