Title: Bristol v. Schwolow

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

170 A.2d 639 (1961) Paul BRISTOL v. Charles J. SCHWOLOW. No. 1206. Supreme Court of Vermont. Windsor. May 2, 1961. Parker & Ainsworth, Springfield, for plaintiff. No appearance, for defendant. Before HULBURD, C. J., and HOLDEN, SHANGRAW, BARNEY and SMITH, JJ. BARNEY, Justice. This suit was commenced in regular form by service of process and timely appearance by both sides. On July 11, 1960, judgment for $300 in favor of the plaintiff was entered by Windsor County Court in response to a motion setting forth the following: Nothing by way of proceedings for establishing the facts of this controversy as between the parties now before us has ever been held. The defendant therefore protests that judgment was awarded against him without hearing or opportunity to present evidence when he was not in default and had not agreed to the facts. His position is sustained by the record. The failure to accord the defendant his constitutional right to be heard requires that we vacate as unsupported this judgment order. This we now do. Coupled with his exceptions to the rendition of the judgment the defendant *641 brings here the issue of disqualifying bias based on the denial of a motion to that effect made below. The request to have the presiding judge disqualify himself was grounded on this same entry of judgment without hearing, asserting among other things, that it was an abuse of discretion so arbitrary as to amount to a demonstration of bias, prejudice and prejudgment. Unfortunately, the plaintiff, in whose favor the court below ruled, has not seen fit to appear in this Court to defend by argument or brief either the judgment entry or the propriety of the proceedings. Such a default in no way limits the inherent authority of this Court to examine and review for propriety judicial actions called into question. In the case at hand the facts reveal the defendant's motion for disqualification to be ill-founded. Neither the plaintiff's motion for judgment nor the defendant's presentation make mention of one circumstance disclosed by the docket entries which suggests the reasoning behind the granting of the motion for judgment previously quoted. As its content indicates, it had been preceded by a similar motion and affirmative ruling later stricken. The docket entries provide more details. Following the granting of this plaintiff's first motion for judgment on February 4, 1958, the docket entries for 1958 are as follows: A certified copy of the docket entries in Schwolow v. Morrill, docket number 2668, have been incorporated in the file of the present case. On September 5, 1958, we find the entry, "Exceptions waived and judgment affirmed." This is followed by a stipulated entry of February 25, 1959, stating, "Judgment satisfied." Although incorrect in law, it is apparent there was room for a conclusion that when the appeal was not prosecuted and it was stipulated that judgment was satisfied, the parties reverted to their situation where defendant had, as indicated, waived all exceptions to the judgment order. Although such an attitude fails to take into account the conditional nature of the original waiver and the full effect of the striking of the judgment entry, it does not reach the status of judicial bias. In this light the issues raised by the exceptions to the motion for disqualification do not turn on wilful partisanship but rather on a misapprehension of the effect of a jury decision on issues common to persons not parties in that proceeding. The circumstances do disclose on the part of the trier a disposition to accept as determinative the special jury verdict in a matter foreign to the present adjudication. Inasmuch as that disposition has been shown to be present previously, whatever may be the situation henceforth, due regard for the preservation of the impartiality of the tribunal suggests that this presiding judge, as a matter of discretion, disqualify himself should this matter come before him again. Ricci v. Bove's Adm'r, 116 Vt. 406, 413, 78 A.2d 13. The judgment in favor of the plaintiff is set aside and the cause is remanded, with costs to the defendant.