Title: Brathwaite v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

Brathwaite v.  State, 1999 WL 1090581 (Del.  Supr.).  
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
KEVIN C. BRATHWAITE,
§
§
No. 169, 2003
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
Court Below--Superior Court 
§
of the State of Delaware, in and
v.
§
for New Castle County in Cr. 
§
A. Nos. IN96-11-1973-1978, 
 STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
1980-1987, 1989-1193. 
§
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Def. ID No. 9510007098
Submitted: March 24, 2006
Decided:
July 10, 2006
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices.
O R D E R
This 10  day of July, 2006, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, the
th
Superior Court’s decision on remand, the parties’ supplemental memoranda,
and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
In 1998, a Superior Court jury convicted the appellant, Kevin C.
Brathwaite, of multiple counts of unlawful sexual intercourse and related sexual
assaults.  The Superior Court sentenced Brathwaite to several consecutive life
sentences.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed.1
Counsel did not address the claim in post-hearing memoranda filed in the Superior
3
Court.
2
(2)
In 1999, Brathwaite filed a motion for a new trial  based on newly
discovered evidence.  Brathwaite also raised a related claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
(3)
The Superior Court appointed Jerome Capone, Esquire, to
represent Brathwaite.  Capone supplemented the motion for a new trial with a
claim that the Superior Court had violated Brathwaite’s constitutional right to
represent himself.
(4)
By decision dated March 17, 2003, the Superior Court denied the
motion for a new trial, holding that Brathwaite had not met the standards for
newly discovered evidence or  ineffective assistance of counsel.  The decision
did not mention the alleged violation of Brathwaite’s constitutional right of
self-representation.3
(5)
Brathwaite appealed the Superior Court’s decision and was
granted leave to proceed  pro se.  Because the Superior Court had not addressed
Brathwaite’s self-representation claim, this Court remanded, instructing the trial
court to decide whether Brathwaite was denied the right  to self-representation.
By decision dated December 7, 2005, the Superior Court ruled that: 
Stigars v. State, 674 A.2d 477, 479 (Del. 1996).
4
See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 47 (2006) (governing motions and pro se applications).
5
3
Mr. Brathwaite’s right of self-representation was not
denied by the Court.  Simply put, it was not properly
presented to the Court in the first instance and the
Court declined to consider the same.  Mr. Brathwaite
knew of that rejection as well as why, and did not
choose to assert or pursue that right as required by
the rules of this Court and/or the applicable law.
We review the Superior Court’s decision de novo.4
(7)
Brathwaite was indicted in 1996.  On March 3, 1997, Brathwaite
filed a motion  requesting “permission to exercise his constitutional right to
proceed pro se.”  In his motion, Brathwaite complained that his rights were
being violated, and that his efforts to bring several important issues to the
court’s attention were being ignored.  Brathwaite stated that he would be more
effective than his attorney, if allowed to represent himself.
 
(8)
By memorandum dated March 7, 1997, the Superior Court referred
Brathwaite’s motion to his counsel, David Facciolo, Esquire, for “appropriate
action.”  The March 7 referral memorandum advised: 
Super Ct. Crim. R. 47 provides that “[t]he Court will
not consider pro se applications by defendants who
are represented by counsel unless the defendant has
been granted permission to participate with counsel
in the defense.”  Such permission has not been
granted in this case.5
We reject the State’s arguments that Brathwaite’s motion to proceed pro se was
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equivocal on its face, and that it was  “clarified” by his subsequent motion to participate with
counsel in the defense.  The record establishes that Brathwaite understood the court’s referral
memorandum to require that he obtain permission to participate with counsel before he could
seek permission to proceed pro se.
United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 129 (3d Cir. 2002) cert. denied, 537 U.S.
7
1062 (2002).
4
The Superior Court sent a copy of the referral memorandum to Brathwaite.
(9)
Apparently in response to the court’s memorandum,  Brathwaite
filed a “Motion to Participate with Counsel in the Defense” on March 21, 1997.
The Superior Court referred that  motion to Facciolo, as well.  The Superior
Court docket sheet does not reflect that any action was taken with respect to
either motion.
(10)
On December 3, 1997, Facciolo filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel.  By order dated December 15, 1997, the Superior Court granted the
motion and appointed Thomas Foley, Esquire, to represent Brathwaite.  Foley
represented Brathwaite through trial and on direct appeal.
(11)
In this appeal, Brathwaite claims that the Superior Court violated
his right of self-representation when the court refused to consider his request
to proceed pro se. 6
(12)
The right to counsel,  embodied in the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, has as its corollary the right to proceed pro se.  In
7
Stigars v. State, 674 A.2d 477, 479 (Del. 1996).
8
Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 198-99 (Del. 1980).
9
See In re Haskins, 551 A.2d 65, 66 (Del. 1988) (holding that a defendant does not
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have a right to hybrid representation) (citing Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 197-99 (Del.
1980)).
Stigars v. State, 674 A.2d 477, 479 (Del. 1996).
11
Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 800 (3d Cir. 2000).
12
5
Delaware, the right to proceed pro se is specifically guaranteed by Article I,
Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution.8
(13)
The right to counsel and the right to proceed pro se are mutually
exclusive.   A defendant has no constitutional right  to combine the two.   In
9
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Delaware, contrary to what was suggested by the Superior Court’s referral
memorandum in this case, a defendant seeking to assert the right to proceed pro
se should not do so by seeking permission to participate with counsel in the
defense.  A motion to proceed pro se is properly “perfected” when filed with
the court.
(14)
Before a defendant can exercise the right to proceed pro se, a court
must determine that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily surrendered
the concomitant right to counsel.   A defendant may waive the right to self-
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representation after asserting it.   Waiver may be established by a defendant’s
12
See Wilson v. Walker, 204 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that defendant’s
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failure to renew request to proceed pro se constituted abandonment of the request and waiver
of the issue) cert. denied, 531 U.S. 892 (2000); United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 668-
69 (7  Cir. 2000) cert. denied, 534 U.S. 829 (2001) (finding waiver when court inadvertently
th
neglected to rule on a request to proceed pro se and defendant failed to reassert the request).
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failure to reassert the request, if it would not be futile to do so.  
( 1 5 )
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Brathwaite contends that he was foreclosed from renewing his motion to
proceed pro se by Facciolo, who told him in May 1997 that the motion had
been denied and that he “should not bring it up again or the judge would get
mad.” 
(16) The trial court discounted Brathwaite’s contention for several
reasons. First, Foley stated that Brathwaite seemed pleased to have Foley
representing him.  Second, Brathwaite admitted that he never told Foley that he
was interested in proceeding  pro se.  Third,  the court asked Brathwaite on at
least one occasion whether he was satisfied with Foley’s representation and
Brathwaite indicated that he was.
(17)
In short, the record reflects that Brathwaite never renewed his
request to proceed pro se despite having the opportunity to do so – either
privately with his new counsel, or in open court when questioned about Foley’s
representation.  Under  these circumstances, the only plausible explanation for
See Cain v. Peters, 972 F.2d 748, 750 (7  Cir. 1992) (stating that “defendants
14
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forfeit self-representation by remaining silent at critical junctures before or during trial”)
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 930 (1993). 
Blankenship v. State, 447 A.2d 428, 433 (Del. 1982).
15
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Brathwaite’s conduct is that he waived the right to proceed pro se in favor of
exercising his constitutional right to counsel. 14
(20)
We next consider Brathwaite’s appeal from the denial of his
motion for a new trial.  The Court reviews the denial of a motion for a new trial
for an abuse of discretion.15
(21)
After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs, we find it
manifest that the judgment of the Superior Court should be affirmed on the
basis of the well-reasoned decision dated March 17, 2003.  In that decision, the
Superior Court applied the proper legal standard and concluded that Brathwaite
failed to satisfy any of the requirements for receiving a new trial on the basis
of newly discovered evidence.  The Superior Court also correctly applied the
settled standard governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  Although
Brathwaite now contends that he was not claiming that his counsel was
ineffective, his motion expressly states that, “counsel’s performance fell below
the professional standard in not calling witnesses and putting on the only viable
Motion for a New Trial, ¶ 4.
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defense available....”   Thus, we reject Brathwaite’s attempt to delete his
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ineffective assistance of counsel claims from consideration on appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the
Superior Court are AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice