Title: Murry v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Murry v. State1986 WY 18713 P.2d 202Case Number: 5458Decided: 01/23/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
CHARLES WILLIAM MURRY, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v. 

 
 
THE 
STATE OFWYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). No. 5458

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Terrence L. 
O'Brien, J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Wyoming Public Defender 
Program: Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Appellate 
Counsel, Cheyenne, and H. Clay Whitlow, Denver, Colo.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

A.G. McClintock, Atty. 
Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., John Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Michael A. Blonigen, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Cheyenne.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
BROWN, CARDINE, ROONEY (Ret.), and RAPER (Ret.), JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Charles Murry 
was convicted of first degree murder by a CampbellCounty jury. On appeal he raises seven 
issues as follows:

 
 
"Whether the defendant's 
attorney at trial was so incompetent as to deny him the effective assistance of 
counsel guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the 
State of Wyoming.

 
 
"Whether there is 
sufficient evidence of premeditation by the defendant for the trial judge to 
submit to the jury the charge of first degree murder.

 
 
"Whether the evidence of 
premeditation was so lacking and the evidence of provocation and heat of passion 
so strong as to require this Court to reduce the conviction to manslaughter or, 
at least, second degree murder.

 
 
"Whether the trial court 
committed reversible error in denying defendant's motion for change of 
venue.

 
 
"Whether the comments of 
the prosecuting attorney in closing argument, in violation of the express 
instructions of the Court, warranted a mistrial.

 
 
"Whether the trial judge 
committed reversible error by permitting the prosecutor to inquire of defendant 
on cross examination concerning a prior felony 
conviction."

 
 

[¶2.]     The state consolidated 
and rephrased the issues thusly:

 
 
"I

 
 
"Did the jury act 
properly in convicting the appellant of first-degree murder rather than 
manslaughter?

 
 
"II

 
 
"Did the trial judge err 
in refusing appellant's motion for a change in venue?

 
 
"III

 
 
"Did the prosecutor's 
comments during closing argument mandate reversal?

 
 
"IV

 
 
"Did the trial court err 
in allowing appellant to be cross-examined on his previous conviction for 
possession of a forged instrument?

 
 
"V

 
 
"Was appellant provided 
with reasonably effective counsel during this trial?"

 
 

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

 
 

[¶4.]     In the early evening of 
August 11, 1980, appellant Charles Murry and his wife Shirley went into the 
Watering Hole # 3 Bar near Gillette, Wyoming, to await a telephone call and visit a 
friend, Craig Bernatchy, who was bartending. They waited about an hour, then 
left, returning around 8:30 p.m. They joined Floyd "Fats" Carter and others at 
the bar and began drinking. "Fats" apparently took a liking to the feather in 
appellant's hat and began to harass him about it, first asking if he could buy 
the feather and then saying he might just take it. As the evening wore on and 
the consumption of alcohol increased, the conversation focused primarily on the 
fact that appellant, who is black, was married to a white woman. "Fats" Carter 
and others joined in casting racial slurs and obscenities at appellant. 
Appellant did not stand mute.

 
 

[¶5.]     About midnight, having 
failed to receive the expected telephone call, Murry decided to go home. As he 
and his wife were leaving he stopped at the end of the bar near the place where 
John Carter (brother of "Fats" Carter) was sitting. The two men exchanged a few 
words but the conversation ended when John Carter struck appellant on the nose 
and appellant fell to the floor. After being hit, appellant immediately left the 
bar, followed by his wife. Appellant went to his van parked in the vicinity of 
the bar, obtained a shotgun, and went back to the bar where he stuck his head 
inside the door and said to John Carter, Come on out, cowboy, I'll take care of 
you (or words to that effect). Mrs. Murry then asked Craig Bernatchy to go 
outside and try to calm her husband down before anything serious happened. Craig 
Bernatchy and Leroy Hibbs went outside. Within two to three minutes Craig 
Bernatchy lay dead from a shot fired by appellant.

 
 

[¶6.]     Following the shooting 
Leroy Hibbs approached appellant and told him he could not leave because he had 
just shot Craig Bernatchy. Appellant replied: "No, I didn't shoot Craig." The 
fatal weapon was surrendered to Leroy Hibbs who restrained Murry until the 
police arrived. At trial appellant testified that he did not remember firing the 
gun; he told the police after the shooting that Bernatchy had grabbed the gun 
and it had gone off accidentally.

 
 

[¶7.]     Appellant was tried by 
a jury in district court on November 17 and 18, 1980, and convicted of first 
degree murder. He appeals the judgment and sentence dated December 5, 1980.1

 
 
I

 
 

[¶8.]     In the first issue 
appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and 
malice; that the evidence demonstrated instead that he acted because of 
provocation, and therefore manslaughter was the only proper verdict. The state 
prosecuted appellant on the theory of transferred intent. As applied to 
homicide, transferred intent exists when an actor intends to kill one person but 
kills another instead. The actor is held to the same degree of culpability as if 
he had killed the intended victim. "The intent is transferred to the person 
whose death has been caused, or as sometimes expressed, the malice or intent 
follows the bullet." Gladden v. 
State, 20 Md. App. 492, 316 A.2d 319, aff'd 
273 Md. 383, 330 A.2d 176 (1974); Brown v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 601, 292 S.E.2d 319 
(1982). See also, 40 Am.Jur.2d Homicide § 11, pp. 302-303 (1968); 21 Am.Jur.2d 
Criminal Law § 131, p. 265 (1981); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 36, p. 124 (1961). 
The theory of transferred intent allows malice, premeditation, and intent to be 
demonstrated even though someone other than the intended victim is killed. State v. Hamilton, 89 N.M. 746, 557 P.2d 1095 (1976).

 
 

[¶9.]     The doctrine of 
transferred intent is not of recent origin. The Queen v. Saunders & Archer, 2 
Plowden 473, 75 Eng.Rep. 706 (K.B. 1576). It applies to all degrees of homicide, 
Henderson v. State, 264 Ind. 334, 343 N.E.2d 776 (1976), and is applicable even though the actual death is accidental 
or unintentional. State v. Hall, W. 
Va., 328 S.E.2d 206 (1985). The circumstances in this case illustrate a classic example 
of transferred intent. Here appellant killed Craig Bernatchy when he intended to 
kill John Carter.

 
 

[¶10.]  The statute in effect at the time of the 
offense and under which appellant was charged reads in pertinent 
part:

 
 
"Whoever purposely and 
with premeditated malice * * * kills any human being * * * is guilty of 
murder in the first degree." (Emphasis added.) § 6-4-101(a), W.S. 1977.2

 
 
The necessary elements of 
the crime of murder in the first degree are:

 
 
1. The crime occurred 
within the county of ____ on or about the date of ____; and 

 
 
2. The defendant killed a 
human being; and

 
 
3. The defendant acted 
purposely; and

 
 
4. With premeditation; 
and

 
 
5. With 
malice.

 
 
WPJIC, § 
7.102.

 
 

[¶11.]  At the time appellant was charged, second 
degree murder was defined in § 6-4-104, W.S. 1977, as:

 
 
"Whoever purposely and 
maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being, is guilty of 
murder in the second degree * * *."3

 
 
The necessary elements of 
the crime of murder in the second degree are:

 
 
1. The crime occurred 
within the county of ____ on or about the date of ____; 
and

 
 
2. The defendant killed a 
human being; and

 
 
3. The defendant acted 
purposely; and

 
 
4. With 
malice.

 
 
WPJIC, § 
7.402.

 
 

[¶12.]  At the time appellant was charged, 
voluntary manslaughter was defined in § 6-4-107, W.S. 1977 
as:

 
 
"Whoever unlawfully kills 
any human being without malice, expressed or implied, * * * voluntarily, upon a 
sudden heat of passion, * * * is guilty of manslaughter * * *."4

 
 
The necessary elements of 
the crime of voluntary manslaughter are:

 
 
1. The crime occurred 
within the county of ____ on or about the date of ____; 
and

 
 
2. The defendant killed a 
human being; and

 
 
3. The defendant acted 
voluntarily

 
 
4. Upon a sudden heat of 
passion.

 
 
WPJIC, § 
7.502.

 
 

[¶13.]  The difference between first and second 
degree murder is that first degree murder requires proof of premeditation; 
second degree murder does not. The critical difference between second degree 
murder and voluntary manslaughter is that in second degree murder it must be 
proved that the accused acted purposely with malice, while in a manslaughter 
charge it must be proved that the accused acted voluntarily, and upon a sudden 
heat of passion.

 
 

[¶14.]  Appellant contends that there was 
insufficient evidence of premeditation and malice and that the crime he 
committed was manslaughter rather than either first or second degree murder. The 
standard to test the sufficiency of the evidence is not unique, and we recently 
reiterated it in Simmons v. State, 
Wyo., 687 P.2d 255, 257 (1984):

 
 
"* * * We test the 
sufficiency of the evidence on appeal by examining and accepting as true the 
evidence of the prosecution, leaving out of consideration entirely the evidence 
of the defendant in conflict therewith; we give every favorable inference which 
may reasonably and fairly be drawn to the evidence of the prosecution. In other 
words, it is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt for us, but whether it is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable 
inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the jury when the 
evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the state. 
[Citations.]"

 
 

[¶15.]  
Premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from the circumstances 
surrounding the killing. Goodman v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 400 (1977), (rev'd 
on other grounds). All evidence, direct and circumstantial, must be considered. 
It is for the jury to decide if the evidence presented establishes malice and 
premeditation. Goodman v. State, supra; and Buckles v. State, 
Wyo., 500 P.2d 518, 
cert. denied 409 U.S. 1026, 93 S. Ct. 475, 34 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1972). "The word `premeditated' when used in 
reference to first-degree murder, implies an interval, however brief, between 
the formation of the intent or design and the commission of the act." Collins v. State, 
Wyo., 589 P.2d 1283, 1292 (1979). 
Premeditation need not have existed for any given length of time before the act, 
it being sufficient that it existed at the time of the act; and the intent and 
the act may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts. Sandoval v. People, 
117 Colo. 588, 192 P.2d 423 (1948). See 
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 29, p. 98 (1961).

 
 

[¶16.]  
Evidence which the jury was entitled to believe, tending to show 
premeditation and malice, is reflected in the record here. There was an 
altercation in the bar which resulted in appellant grabbing John Carter and in 
turn receiving a blow from Carter. There was testimony that Carter tried to 
avoid trouble with Murry. After the confrontation with Carter, appellant left 
the bar, followed by his wife, and got a shotgun from his vehicle. Appellant's 
wife stepped back into the bar and said Murry had a gun. Appellant stuck his 
head through the door to the bar and said, "I'm ready for you, you (expletive 
deleted)." At Mrs. Murry's request, Bernatchy, accompanied by Leroy Hibbs, went 
outside to try to pacify appellant. Appellant resisted the efforts of his wife, 
Hibbs and the deceased to get the gun away from him. Within the two or three 
minutes after appellant left the bar, Hibbs saw appellant shoot Craig Bernatchy, 
who was standing five or six feet away with his hands in the air.

 
 

[¶17.]  
Malice may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly 
manner, together with all the other facts and circumstances surrounding the use 
of a weapon. Leitel 
v. State, Wyo., 579 P.2d 421 (1978). The jury 
was entitled to determine that the use of the shotgun by appellant, together 
with the other circumstances surrounding its use, exhibited malice. Likewise, 
the jury was entitled to conclude that the element of premeditation was 
satisfied considering that appellant went from the bar to his vehicle and 
obtained a shotgun, and that he returned to the bar and called John Carter out 
of the bar. There was a minimum of two or three minutes to deliberate before 
appellant fired the gun.

 
 

[¶18.]  
In Simmons v. 
State, supra, at 258, we said:

 
 
"In 
actuality, appellant's argument goes more to the credibility of the witnesses 
than to the sufficiency of the evidence. He would have us believe the testimony 
of appellant and his witnesses over that of the witnesses presented by the 
State. We have consistently held that the question of credibility of witnesses 
rests with the trier of fact, [Citations] and this determination will not be 
disturbed on appeal. [Citation.] There is no rule of law that we are aware of 
that says that a fact finder must believe or disbelieve anyone. In fact, the 
trier of fact is free to accept all, part or none of the evidence offered by a 
witness. [Citations.]"

 
 

[¶19.]  
What we said in Simmons is applicable here. There was sufficient evidence 
of premeditation and malice to support a verdict of first degree murder.

 
 
II

 
 

[¶20.]  
Appellant makes a perfunctory argument that his motions for a change of 
venue were erroneously denied. He says that most of the jurors were acquainted 
with either the prosecutor, some key prosecution witnesses, the deceased, or in 
some cases, several of them.

 
 

[¶21.]  
Were it not for the serious nature of this case we would dismiss 
appellant's change of venue argument because it is not supported by cogent 
authority or compelling argument. Britton v. State, Wyo., 643 P.2d 935 (1982). We know 
of no rule of law that mandates that a prospective juror be excused just because 
he knows a party, a witness or some other principal in the trial. If there were 
such a rule, a change of venue would be required in virtually every case in 
Wyoming.

 
 

[¶22.]  
As a general rule, a prosecution is to be conducted in the county where 
the offense is alleged to have been committed. Rule 21, Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. In exceptional cases it may be necessary to grant a change of venue. 
Rule 23(a), W.R. Cr.P., provides: 

 
 
"For 
prejudice in the county. - The court upon motion of the defendant made at least 
15 days prior to the date set for trial, shall transfer the proceeding as to him 
to another county, whether or not such county is specified in the defendant's 
motion, if the court is satisfied that there exists within the county where the 
prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the defendant that he cannot 
obtain a fair and impartial trial in that county." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶23.]  
It is the burden of the defendant to show prejudice so great that a fair 
trial cannot be obtained, Collins v. State, supra, and the defendant must show 
actual prejudice in the minds of jurors. Wilcox v. State, Wyo., 670 P.2d 1116, 1119 (1983). 
Because of this, the motion for a change of venue cannot be logically passed on 
until the extent of prejudice, if any, is determined upon voir dire examination. 
Moss v. state, 
supra. "* * * The ultimate test of the propriety of a change of venue is what is 
revealed in voir dire of the jury panel. * * *" Shaffer v. State, 
Wyo., 640 P.2d 88, 103, 31 
A.L.R.4th 166 (1982). The judge's ruling on venue is subject to review only for 
an abuse of discretion. Murray v. State, 
Wyo., 671 P.2d 320, 326 
(1983); Jackson v. State, 
Wyo., 522 P.2d 1356, cert. 
denied 419 U.S. 1055, 95 S. Ct. 637, 42 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1974); Mares v. 
State, Wyo., 500 P.2d 530, 535 (1972).

 
 

[¶24.]  
We have adopted a two-pronged test for determining whether a change of 
venue should be granted because of pre-trial publicity. First, the nature and 
extent of the publicity must be considered; second, the difficulty or ease in 
selecting a jury must be considered along with the amount of prejudice which 
actually appears during voir dire examination. Murray v. State, 
supra. Each of these elements must be considered in order to determine whether 
the court abused its discretion in denying the change of venue.

 
 

[¶25.]  
It is to be expected that most of the jury panel will have heard about a 
sensational case, but there is no requirement that a juror be ignorant of the 
facts and issues involved in a case. Wilcox v. State, supra. The totality of the 
circumstances must indicate the presence of improper prejudice. Weddle v. State, 
Wyo., 621 P.2d 231 (1980). The 
question focuses on whether a fair jury was ultimately selected. Shaffer v. State, 
supra. We recently reaffirmed these basic principles in Pote v. State, 
Wyo., 695 P.2d 617 (1985).

 
 

[¶26.]  
In this case a motion for change of venue was made on two occasions. On 
September 22, 1980, a motion was filed based upon a claim that pre-trial 
publicity and the lack of racial minorities in CampbellCounty made selection of an 
impartial jury impossible. That motion was denied on October 15, 1980. At that 
hearing no showing of pretrial publicity was made. The motion was renewed and 
again no attempt was made to show the extent of pretrial publicity. The motion 
was not renewed at trial.

 
 

[¶27.]  
The voir dire transcript does not reveal any great difficulty in 
selecting a jury. In fact, the defense exercised only three of its thirteen 
peremptory challenges. Some knowledge about the nature of the case on the part 
of the jury was shown but no prejudice was exhibited on voir dire. There is no 
evidence to justify the contention that publicity created an unfair bias. The 
court did not err in denying a change of venue.

 
 
III

 
 

[¶28.]  
Before trial the court granted a motion in limine and ordered "that both 
counsel not use hypothetical examples of homicide or examples from the acts in 
another case." In summation at trial the prosecutor said:

 
 
"As 
to what happened in that bar that night, I'll tell you where the manslaughter 
would have fit if it would have happened, and that would have been if Leroy 
Hibbs had killed the Defendant -."

 
 

[¶29.]  
At this juncture defense counsel interrupted and requested a bench 
conference. The record does not reveal what transpired at the bench. However, 
when state's counsel continued, he said: 

 
 
"Had 
Leroy Hibbs committed this act, then he'd probably be charged with manslaughter 
and he'd probably be convicted of it, but, you know, Leroy Hibbs - he was the 
ordinary and reasonable person in even a worse situation than this Defendant, 
and he never killed anybody. The Defendant did. The Defendant is guilty of 
murder, not manslaughter."

 
 

[¶30.]  
Appellant made no further objection nor did he move for a mistrial. After 
the judgment and sentence appellant made a motion for a new trial based on the 
statement made by state's counsel in summation. The motion was denied after the 
trial court found "that there was no prejudicial effect from the actions of the 
prosecutor."

 
 

[¶31.]  
The denial of a motion for new trial will not be disturbed on appeal 
absent an abuse of discretion. Siegert v. State, Wyo., 634 P.2d 323 (1981). 
Appellant strains mightily to conclude the statement made by the prosecutor 
"inflamed the jury." The statement was an innocuous isolated comment which 
cannot logically be read as an attempt to inflame the jury. An isolated comment 
by a prosecutor will not ordinarily result in declaring a mistrial or granting a 
new trial. Appellant's unsupported conclusion that the comment was confusing and 
inflammatory is not supported by the record.

 
 
IV

 
 

[¶32.]  
Appellant's penultimate assignment of error is that the trial court erred 
in allowing the state to cross-examine him regarding a prior conviction of a 
felony. Rule 609(a), Wyoming Rules of Evidence, is applicable here:

 
 
"(a) 
General rule. - For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited 
from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if 
the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one (1) year 
under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to 
the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment."

 
 

[¶33.]  
Appellant contends that the testimony as to his prior conviction did not 
have any probative value and was used by the prosecutor to show that he was a 
"criminal-type individual."

 
 

[¶34.]  
In voir dire examination, outside the presence of the jury, appellant 
testified that he had been convicted of possession of a forged instrument, which 
was a felony. He further testified that this crime was punishable by 
"imprisonment in excess of one (1) year." We must determine if this testimony 
was probative, and if so, whether its admission into evidence was prohibited by 
Rule 403, W.R.E..

 
 

[¶35.]  
In his trial testimony appellant projected himself as a patient, tolerant 
and peaceful man who went out of his way to avoid confrontation. To rebut this 
evidence, the prosecutor elicited answers from appellant on cross-examination to 
the effect that he knew that he was not entitled to have in his possession a 
firearm because he was a convicted felon. We believe that the evidence produced 
by the state on cross-examination was probative in that it tended to show that 
the appellant was not the peaceful man that he presented himself to be. The 
evidence was, therefore, both probative and relevant.

 
 

[¶36.]  
Even if the evidence is probative and relevant it must still pass the 
test of Rule 403, W.R.E., which provides:

 
 
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

 
 

[¶37.]  
A determination by the trial court that the probative value of proposed 
evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, confusion 
or misleading to the jury is given considerable deference. We will not overturn 
the trial court's determination on that issue unless his ruling was clearly 
erroneous. In Apodaca v. State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 1023, 1027 (1981), 
we said:

 
 
"When appellant claims the testimony was unduly prejudical 
under Rule 403, W.R.E., he must demonstrate that the evidence had little or no 
probative value and that it was extremely inflammatory or introduced for the 
purpose of inflaming the jury. * * *"

 
 

[¶38.]  
Here, evidence that appellant was a convicted felon was prejudicial in a 
measure. However, appellant made no showing that such evidence "had little or no 
probative value," nor has he shown that the evidence was "extremely inflammatory 
or introduced for the purpose of inflaming the jury." To the contrary, the trial 
court found the evidence to be probative and we agree. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in allowing evidence of a prior felony.

 
 
V

 
 

[¶39.]  
The final issue raised on appeal is that appellant did not have effective 
assistance of counsel at the trial. Appellate counsel have the luxury of a trial 
transcript, access to a law library, and most of all, several months to reflect 
on what trial counsel should have done at trial. Trial counsel does not enjoy 
these luxuries. He has multiple problems during trial and usually only minutes, 
and sometimes seconds, to decide what to do. It has been said many times that 
"hindsight is always 20/20."

 
 

[¶40.]  
Appellant contends that his trial counsel was deficient in that he 1) 
mismanaged voir dire of the jury, 2) failed to produce evidence in support of a 
change of venue motion, 3) failed to move for a mistrial, and 4) did not offer a 
jury instruction on provocation. Appellant ingeniously argues some of his issues 
in the alternative. He contends that the evidence mandated a change of venue and 
if not, it was trial counsel's fault that there was not more evidence 
presented.

 
 

[¶41.]  
Recently in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, ___, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063-2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692-698 (1984), the United States Supreme Court 
had occasion to address the ineffectiveness of counsel problem, and wisely 
said:

 
 
"* * 
* [T]he court has recognized that `the right to counsel is the right to the 
effective assistance of counsel.' * * *

 
 
"* * 
* The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
"A 
convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to 
require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, 
the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant 
makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence 
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
"Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's 
assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a 
court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude 
that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. [Citation.] A 
fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances 
of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's 
perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the 
evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct 
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the 
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.' [Citation.] There 
are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the 
best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same 
way. [Citation.]

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
"* * 
* [T]he court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have 
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise 
of reasonable professional judgment."

 
 

[¶42.]  
Standards regarding effectiveness of counsel, so far as we have addressed 
the problem, are in accord with Strickland, supra. In Hoskovek v. State, 
Wyo., 629 P.2d 1366, 1367 (1981), 
we said:

 
 
"* * 
* The standard which we have established to determine whether or not the 
assistance of counsel is effective is one of `reasonableness.' Is the assistance 
rendered by counsel that which would reasonably be rendered by a reasonably 
competent attorney under the facts and circumstances of the case? If it is, it 
is effective. If it is not, it is inefffective. [Citations.] The burden rests 
upon appellant to establish the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance inasmuch 
as there is a presumption that counsel is competent and that he performed his 
duty. [Citation.]"

 
 
With 
the standards of 
Strickland and Hoskovek in mind we now apply those principles to the 
case before us.

 
 

[¶43.]  
Appellant contends that trial counsel should have made a more in depth 
voir dire examination of the jury panel, especially to probe for racial 
prejudice. In some states voir dire examination of the jury panel lasts for 
weeks, even months, but in other areas voir dire is completed, even in serious 
criminal cases, in less than an hour. We know of no study that shows that a 
lengthy examination results in a more acceptable jury panel. In the case here 
two members of the jury panel implicity indicated that they had strong feelings 
about interracial marriages. We do not know what these opinions were, but assume 
the jurors were opposed to such marriages. These two jurors were examined by the 
court at the bench, but the colloquy was not recorded. One juror was excused; 
the other remained on the jury. We must assume that the juror who remained on 
the panel satisfied the court that she could be a fair and impartial juror in 
this case. No contention to the contrary is made.

 
 

[¶44.]  
Voir dire revealed that some members of the panel knew witnesses, the 
prosecutors and other principles in the case. Appellant does not contend that 
the jurors who knew some witnesses and the jurors who had opinions about 
interracial marriages should have been disqualified for cause; rather, he 
contends they should have been removed on peremptory challenges. Defense counsel 
did in fact have unused peremptory challenges.

 
 

[¶45.]  
The record reveals that the trial attorney for appellant spent about four 
times as much time in voir dire examination as did the state. We point this out 
only to demonstrate that trial counsel was not an uninterested participant as 
appellant implies. A probe for racial prejudice was made on voir dire without 
revealing anything negative except what we indicated before. Further focus on 
racial bias might tend to be counterproductive and emphasize a non-issue. Close 
questioning about a juror's acquaintance with witnesses did not reveal any 
prejudice and the panel said they could reach a fair verdict. Before a 
peremptory challenge is made there should be some rational basis to believe that 
a challenged juror's replacement would be more suitable. A blind challenge could 
just as easily result in an inferior replacement. Counsel should not exercise 
peremptory challenges just because he has them. 

 
 

[¶46.]  
Selecting a jury is not an exact science. The feeling a lawyer has for 
the case and the jury panel is a strong factor in his determination whether or 
not to exercise peremptory challenges. Counsel's judgment must be given 
considerable deference. Strickland v. Washington, supra. Appellate counsel 
and appellate courts do not have the benefit of the same trial climate enjoyed 
by the trial counsel. Therefore, we are reluctant to second-guess them on the 
exercise of peremptory challenges. We must defer to counsel's judgment unless it 
clearly appears that he was inept.

 
 

[¶47.]  
In this case we cannot say that defense counsel was ineffective because 
he did not use all his peremptory challenges. Indeed, we would be blindly 
second-guessing him if we indulged in such conjecture.

 
 

[¶48.]  
Appellant faults trial counsel for not marshalling evidence that would 
require a change of venue. Appellant's complaint is premised on the assumption 
that such evidence was available. However, he does not allude to any such 
evidence. In his argument appellant mentions newspaper articles, but neglects to 
give us any hint as to the content of those articles. Appellant's entire 
argument is based on the assumption that out there some place was evidence to 
support a change of venue, and trial counsel was ineffective because he did not 
discover it. Appellant has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate 
ineffectiveness of counsel.

 
 

[¶49.]  
Appellant argues that trial counsel should have made a motion for a 
mistrial because of a statement made by the prosecutor in summation. We 
indicated in Part III that the comment was isolated, innocuous and harmless, and 
therefore not a basis for granting a new trial. It is highly unlikely that the 
judge would have granted a mistrial.

 
 

[¶50.]  
Appellant contends that trial counsel should have requested an 
instruction on provocation which arguably would have strengthened his argument 
that voluntary manslaughter was the crime committed rather than murder. The jury 
was instructed on the elements of the lesser included offense of manslaughter. 
One of the elements of manslaughter is sudden heat of passion. In his closing 
argument trial counsel argued provocation at considerable length. He reasoned 
that provocation induced "rage" in appellant, or in the terms of the statute, 
"heat of passion." Appellant does not contend that anything more could have been 
argued in support of a manslaughter finding if a provocation instruction had 
been given. We believe that under the circumstances of this case a provocation 
instruction would have added little, if anything, to appellant's theory of 
defense.

 
 

[¶51.]  
Appellant cites cases from the United States Supreme Court and from the 
State of Wyoming. These cases discuss 
generally a defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel. They also 
discuss standards. However, when appellant refers to specific areas in which he 
contends counsel was ineffective he cites no cases nor authority supporting such 
ineffectiveness claim.

 
 

[¶52.]  
We cannot say that appellant did not receive reasonably effective 
assistance from counsel, nor has it been shown that counsel's representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Furthermore, appellant has 
failed to rebut the strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance 
and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 
judgment.

 
 

[¶53.]  
We have carefully considered all errors urged by appellant and find no 
reversible error.

 
 

[¶54.]  
Affirmed.

 
 

1 
Appellant failed to file a timely notice of appeal and the appeal was dismissed. 
Murry v. State, 
Wyo., 631 P.2d 26 (1981). On 
February 13, 1985, appellant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this 
court seeking to have his appeal reinstated based on the United States Supreme 
Court decision in 
Evitts v. Lucey, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 830, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1985). The 
petition was granted and the appeal was reinstated.

 
 

2 
This statute has been renumbered and revised, and is now § 6-2-101, W.S. 1977, 
(June 1983 Replacement).

 
 

3 
This statute has been renumbered and is now § 6-2-104, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement).

 
 

4 
This statute has been renumbered and revised, and is now § 6-2-105, W.S. 1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1985).

 
 

CARDINE, 
Justice, dissenting.

 
 

[¶55.]  
The majority opinion of this court recognizes that the first degree 
murder conviction of Charles Murry cannot be upheld unless the doctrine of 
"transferred intent" applies. Thus, the court, in its opinion, states:

 
 
"The 
circumstances in this case illustrate a classic example of transferred intent. 
Here appellant killed Craig Bernatchy when he intended to kill John Carter."1

 
 
The 
problem with this statement is that there is simply no evidence at all that 
appellant, Charles Murry, intended to kill John Carter when the gun fired. It is 
suggested that when he was informed that he had just shot Craig Bernatchy and 
replied, "No, I didn't shoot Craig," it was an admission that he thought he had 
shot John Carter. But appellant's testimony in context was that he did not 
remember shooting the gun and, therefore, did not think he had shot Craig or 
anyone else. Thus, Charles Murry testified:

 
 
"Q. 
Did you run to the van?

 
 
"A. 
Evidently, I did.

 
 
"Q. 
What happened next?

 
 
"A. 
The next thing I knew Leroy was telling me that I had shot Craig.

 
 
"Q. 
Do you remember fighting with your wife?

 
 
"A. 
No, I don't.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
"Q. 
Well, do you remember pushing your wife away onto the ground and running around 
the van?

 
 
"A. 
No, I don't. I remember running into Leroy. The next thing I remember I ran into 
Leroy.

 
 
"Q. 
Okay. Do you remember shooting that gun?

 
 
"A. 
No, I don't.

 
 
"Q. 
The next thing you remember you ran into Leroy?

 
 
"A. 
Yes, I did.

 
 
"Q. 
What happened?

 
 
"A. 
Well, when I ran into Leroy - Leroy was standing there. He told me I had shot 
Craig and I told him, no, I hadn't and he said, yes, you did and he said Craig's 
laying down there on the ground, and I gave Leroy the shotgun and he threw it 
away."

 
 
The 
court notes the excessive drinking by all participants which may explain 
appellant's lack of recall. This court, in its opinion, also notes that the 
police officers said that appellant, immediately after the shooting, stated that 
Craig Bernatchy grabbed the gun and it discharged. Neither appellant's testimony 
that he did not recall shooting the gun nor his alleged statement that the gun 
discharged when Bernatchy grabbed it is evidence that he thought he was shooting 
at Carter. Finally, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that Craig Bernatchy 
and Leroy Hibbs went outside at Mrs. Murry's request to calm down her husband. 
Mrs. Murry, Bernatchy, and Hibbs were outside with appellant for two or three 
minutes before the shooting occurred. The only fair inference from these facts 
is that appellant knew who was present outside the bar; surely it cannot be 
inferred from these facts that appellant believed John Carter was present at 
that time.

 
 

[¶56.]  
In a California case similar to this 
case, the defendant, Mrs. Steward, after premeditating and deliberating, stabbed 
her roommate, Mrs. Hosford. Although the knife struck home, Mrs. Hosford escaped 
the premises with non-fatal wounds. When the police investigated the next day, 
they found the defendant's daughter, Carol, stabbed to death in her bed. The 
court held that neither the defendant's intent nor her premeditation could be 
transferred from Mrs. Hosford to Carol under the doctrine of transferred intent. 
This was because there was no evidence that the defendant intended Mrs. Hosford 
as the victim when she stabbed Carol. The intent and premeditation could have 
been transferred, according to the court, only if "appellant had lunged at Mrs. 
Hosford with the knife and had stabbed Carol inadvertently when Mrs. Hosford 
stepped aside, * * * but * * * the record is barren of such evidence." The court 
affirmed Mrs. Steward's conviction of first degree murder only because there was 
sufficient independent evidence showing that Mrs. Steward intentionally stabbed 
her daughter with premeditation. People v. Steward, 156 Cal. App. 2d 177, 318 P.2d 806 
(1957).

 
 

[¶57.]  
The jury should not have been instructed on the doctrine of transferred 
intent. "An instruction should not be given if it is not reasonably supported by 
the evidence, or if it is not based on some theory logically derived from some 
part of the evidence." Patterson v. State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 1049, 1050 (1984). 
Without utilizing the doctrine of "transferred intent," there is simply no 
evidence that appellant shot and killed his friend, Craig Bernatchy, with 
premeditated malice. The killing may have been accidental or in a sudden heat of 
passion which would be manslaughter. We should, therefore, reduce or set aside 
appellant's conviction unless we can conclude that the jury based its verdict on 
evidence of premeditation unrelated to the theory of transferred intent.

 
 
PREMEDITATION

 
 

[¶58.]  
The only other basis for finding that appellant premeditated Bernatchy's 
death is so poorly supported by the evidence that it cannot save this 
conviction. This is especially true if a correct legal definition of 
premeditation is applied to the facts of this case.

 
 

[¶59.]  
Premeditation is defined negatively by the court in the majority opinion 
as a thought process that does not involve a set period of time. The court seems 
to be saying that a defendant can premeditate instantaneously, in the same time 
that it takes him to form the intent to act. The problem with this approach is 
that it leads courts and juries to the conclusion that premeditation is nothing 
more than intent. This, in turn, blurs the distinction between first and second 
degree murder, a distinction the legislature has based entirely on the 
difference between premeditation and intent.2

 
 

[¶60.]  
"[T]he classical and traditional Wyoming statutory first degree 
murder language and its meaning [are] fairly well settled." T. Lauer, Goodbye 
3-Card Monte: The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982, 19 
Land & Water L.Rev. 107, 121 (1984).

 
 
"`It 
requires that there should be time and opportunity for deliberate thought, and 
that after the mind has conceived the thought of taking life, the thought is 
meditated upon and a deliberate determination formed to do the act. This being 
done, it makes no difference how soon afterwards the fatal resolve is carried 
into execution. There need be no specific period of time between the formation 
of the intention in the mind to kill and the killing so long as there was some 
time for deliberation.'" Cloman v. State, Wyo., 574 P.2d 410, 418 (1978), citing State v. 
Riggle, 76 Wyo. 1, 298 P.2d 349, 367 
(1956).

 
 
It 
is clear from our statement in Cloman that the key aspect of "premeditated 
malice" is not the absence of time as the majority suggests, but instead the 
opportunity for deliberative thought.3 Without this 
opportunity for deliberation, there can be no premeditated malice and no first 
degree murder.

 
 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE OF PREMEDITATION

 
 

[¶61.]  
Generally, three categories of evidence can show premeditation:

 
 
"(1) 
facts about how and what the defendant did prior to the actual killing which 
show he was engaged in activity directed toward the killing, that is, planning 
activity; (2) facts about the defendant's prior relationship and conduct with 
the victim from which motive may be inferred; and (3) facts about the nature of 
the killing from which it may be inferred that the manner of killing was so 
particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed 
according to a preconceived design." W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra at 564.

 
 

[¶62.]  
The uncontroverted facts of this case say to me that under instructions 
correctly stating the law, appellant's conviction would have been for the crime 
of manslaughter, i.e. a killing upon a sudden heat of passion or involuntarily 
in the commission of some unlawful act.4

 
 

[¶63.]  
The uncontroverted facts follow: Appellant is a black man married to a 
white woman. Gillette, Wyoming is in a major area of oil 
drilling and production activity. Many of its residents are oil rig hands, 
roughnecks, drillers, tool pushers, or employed in related occupations. The 
evening that this incident occurred, appellant, a musician, was at the Watering 
Hole # 3 Bar in Gillette awaiting a telephone call and visiting his friend, 
Craig Bernatchy, who was bartending. "Fats" Carter noticed appellant because he 
was "black" and because he had a "plume" in his hat and testified:

 
 
"Q. 
So, what did you do when you noticed these things?

 
 
"A. 
Oh, I don't know - I decided I'd have his plume, I guess."

 
 
The 
cocktail waitress stated:

 
 
"I 
heard * * * John D. [Carter] calling Chuck [Murry] a f____king nigger."

 
 
Appellant's wife, Shirley Ann Murry, testified:

 
 
"They wanted the feather in his hat. He said you can't have 
my feather; I told you the next time I play Deadwood I'll get you one. They said 
you're lying. Chuck said, yes, I will.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
"They said what is it with you mother-f____king niggers and 
your white feathers and your white broads. Then, I looked up and Chuck turned 
around, and he said she isn't a broad; that's my wife, and he said why don't you 
just leave us alone.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
"Q. 
Now, you and Chuck are leaving. What happened then? 

 
 
"A. 
* * * Chuck stuck out his hand like he wanted to shake hands with Carter and he 
said, hey, man, no hard feelings; I'll still get you a feather. About that time, 
J.D. took a punch at him and hit him and Chuck fell and almost knocked me over * 
* *.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
"His 
mouth was bleeding. I handed him his glasses and he put them on. He said 
nobody's hitting me.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
"He 
kept saying nobody does that, nobody does that. He was looking at me but he 
wasn't seeing me, and I got scared."

 
 
Appellant, Charles Murry, testified:

 
 
"Q. 
Okay. You try to avoid confrontations along that issue [regarding his race]?

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
"A. 
I learned that you accept it and just throw things off. Certain things you hear 
and some you don't hear, you just look over them.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
"Q. 
Do you recall anything else that happened with John Carter?

 
 
"A. 
Well, when I was leaving - that's after Craig [Bernatchy] and I got through 
talking. Craig had called me in the liquor department and I was coming out, John 
D. was standing in the hallway and I was coming by, and he said you get away 
from me, you dirty nigger, I don't like f____king niggers. I said, hey, man, I 
don't either and I walked on by. He just kept it up. 

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
"Q. 
Now, what happened?

 
 
"A. 
You know, when I was leaving and I was talking with Jeff LeBeau - I was talking 
to Jeff and Carter cut in, and I told him, hey, man, it's all over - you know, 
I'm leaving - you know, just like that. He said something else and I turned 
around and told him, man, it's over with - which I've done so many times before 
- and that's when he sucker-punched me.

 
 
"Q. 
Where did you get hit?

 
 
"A. 
In the nose."

 
 

[¶64.]  
The manner in which the shooting occurred does not imply premeditation. 
Appellant was extremely drunk and upset. He had been the subject of extreme 
abuse and racial slurs. His actions thereafter were irrational. According to 
Leroy Hibbs, the only eyewitness to the event, appellant struggled with his wife 
and pushed her to the ground just prior to the shooting. While I agree that 
premeditation is usually a jury question, in this case I do not believe the 
evidence, under proper instructions on the law and taken in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, could establish premeditation beyond a reasonable 
doubt. It is quite likely that the jury improperly applied the doctrine of 
transferred intent to reach its decision that appellant premeditated the killing 
of Craig Bernatchy.

 
 
RELIEF FOR APPELLANT

 
 

[¶65.]  
When the element of premeditation has not been proven by the State beyond 
a reasonable doubt, reversal of the conviction is not always required. We can 
sometimes reduce the conviction to second degree murder or manslaughter without 
a new trial. Goodman 
v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 400, 414 (1977). 
Such a remedy would not be proper in this case, however, because it is likely 
that the jury relied upon the doctrine of transferred intent to conclude that 
the shooting was intentional. Transfer of the intent element was no more 
justified in this case than was transfer of the premeditation element. It is 
impossible to tell if the jury reached its general verdict by transferring the 
intent to shoot Carter to intent to shoot Bernatchy. If the "transferred intent" 
instruction had not been given to the jury, I would propose that we reduce 
appellant's conviction to manslaughter. Having given this instruction, however, 
I am convinced that appellant's conviction should be reversed and his case 
remanded for a new trial so the jury can, under proper instructions of law, pass 
upon the premeditation and intent issues without the smokescreen created by the 
transferred intent rule.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 The 
classic case of transferred intent involves "bad aim." For example, "where A 
aims at B with a murderous intent to kill, but because of a bad aim he hits and 
kills C, A is uniformly held guilty of the murder of C. And if A aims at B with 
a first-degree-murder state of mind, he commits first degree murder as to C, by 
the majority view." W. 
LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law, 252 (1972).

2 At 
the time appellant was charged, first degree murder was defined by § 6-4-101(a), 
W.S. 1977 as a purposeful homicide undertaken with premeditated malice. Second 
degree murder was a purposeful and malicious homicide but without premeditation. 
Section 6-4-104, W.S. 1977.

 
 
"It 
is often said that premeditation and deliberation require only a `brief moment 
of thought' or a `matter of seconds,' and convictions for first degree murder 
have frequently been affirmed where such short periods of time were involved. 
The better view, however, is that to `speak of premeditation and deliberation 
which are instantaneous, or which take no appreciable time, * * * destroys the 
statutory distinction between first and second degree murder,' and * * * this 
view is growing in popularity." (Footnotes omitted.) W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law, 563 
(1972). See also People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959, 975 (1964); State v. Shirley, 60 Wn.2d 277, 373 P.2d 777 
(1962).

 
 

3

"Those who first employed [the word premeditated] in this 
type of first-degree murder statute undoubtedly had in mind a malicious scheme 
thought out well in advance of the fatal act itself. And unless we are willing 
to ignore the plain meaning of words we are forced to recognize that a fatal act 
might be intentional and yet entirely too hasty to be deliberate and 
premeditated. The notion that a fully-formed intent is always deliberate and 
premeditated, no matter how short the time between the first thought of the 
matter and the execution of the plan, is preposterous. And yet some of the 
courts have taken just such a position. * * * In line with this suggestion it 
has been said that one may be guilty of murder in the first degree although the 
intent to commit such homicide is `formed by the accused immediately before the 
act is actually committed,' or `at the very moment the fatal shot was 
fired.'

 
 
"The 
sound interpretation of such a statute is that a killing is deliberate and 
premeditated if, and only if, it results from real and substantial reflection. 
It is not sufficient that the idea be fully formed and acted upon; it must be 
pondered over and weighed in the mind." R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law, 
131-132 (3rd ed. 1982).

 
 
See 
also W. LaFave and A. Scott, supra at 563-564; People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959, 976 (1964), citing People v. Thomas, 
25 Cal. 2d 880, 156 P.2d 7 (1945) ("`The true test is not the duration of time as 
much as it is the extent of the reflection.'" (Emphasis added.))

 
 

4 The 
manslaughter statute in effect at the time of this incident, § 6-4-107, W.S. 
1977, provided:

 
 
"Whoever unlawfully kills any human being without malice, 
expressed or implied, either voluntarily, upon a sudden heat of passion, or 
involuntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful act, except as provided in 
W.S. 31-5-1117, or by any culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, is guilty 
of manslaughter, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than 
twenty (20) years."