Title: Commonwealth v. Curran

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12293 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EDWARD CURRAN. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     September 6, 2017. - January 12, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Practice, Civil, Sex offender.  Evidence, Sex 
offender, Expert opinion, Competency, Insanity.  
Incompetent Person, Commitment.  Witness, Expert. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 3, 2015. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to admit expert testimony with regard to 
criminal responsibility was heard by Richard T. Tucker, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Judd J. Carhart, J., in the Appeals Court.  
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the 
case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Marcia T. Kovner for the defendant. 
 
Ellyn H. Lazar-Moore, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  General Laws c. 123A, § 15, allows incompetent 
persons who are unable to stand trial for qualifying sex 
2 
 
offenses to be deemed sexually dangerous based on the commission 
of those offenses.  In 2008, we held that this proceeding did 
not violate due process or equal protection because of the 
rights the Legislature explicitly included in the statute to 
"protect an incompetent defendant's ability to defend himself 
against the allegations of crime and, thus, minimize the 
likelihood of a mistake."  Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 
Mass. 366, 375 (2008).  Those protections encompass "all rights 
available to criminal defendants at criminal trials, other than 
the right not to be tried while incompetent," G. L. c. 123A, 
§ 15, including the retention of experts, the right to present 
evidence in defense of the charges, and "the right to a 
determination of the commission of the criminal acts made beyond 
a reasonable doubt."  Burgess, supra. 
 
Here, the defendant sought to introduce at a hearing on the 
Commonwealth's G. L. c. 123A, § 15, petition expert testimony 
that he was not criminally responsible.  Interpreting the 
statutory language "whether the person did commit the act or 
acts charged" to mean that he should determine only whether the 
acts were committed, not whether the defendant was guilty of the 
acts, the judge denied the motion and allowed the Commonwealth's 
motion to preclude the testimony.  We conclude that the right of 
an incompetent defendant to raise defenses in a proceeding 
pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 15, includes that of a lack of 
3 
 
criminal responsibility.  Therefore, the denial of the motion to 
admit expert testimony, and the allowance of the Commonwealth's 
motion to preclude that testimony, must be reversed. 
 
1.  Facts.  The following facts are uncontested for the 
purposes of this interlocutory appeal.  While in a residential 
treatment program for mental illness, the defendant approached a 
female nurse who was attempting to administer medication; said, 
"Look what I have for you"; and grabbed his genitals over his 
clothing.  He then used his body to push her against the 
counter, placed his leg between her legs, and reached his hand 
under her shirt and touched her breasts.  The nurse called for 
help, and the defendant backed away as other staff members came 
to assist her. 
 
The defendant was charged with indecent assault and battery 
on a person age fourteen or older, G. L. c. 265, § 13H, a 
qualifying sex offense under G. L. c. 123A, § 1.  He was found 
incompetent to stand trial; pursuant to G. L. c. 123, §§ 15 and 
16 (f), the charge was dismissed and the defendant was committed 
to Bridgewater State Hospital.  The Commonwealth then filed a 
petition under G. L. c. 123A, § 12, to have the defendant 
committed as a sexually dangerous person.  A Superior Court 
judge ordered another competency hearing and found that the 
defendant still was not competent, so the process moved forward 
under G. L. c. 123A, § 15. 
4 
 
 
A second Superior Court judge concluded that there was 
probable cause to believe that the defendant was a sexually 
dangerous person.  At a hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 15, 
before that judge, the defendant sought to present expert 
evidence regarding criminal responsibility; the Commonwealth 
filed a motion to preclude such evidence.  The judge ruled that 
expert testimony concerning a lack of criminal responsibility is 
not admissible in a hearing on a petition pursuant to G. L. 
c. 123A, § 15, because it is not relevant to a factual 
determination whether the acts indeed had been committed.  The 
defendant filed an application for an interlocutory appeal in 
the Appeals Court.  A single justice of the Appeals Court 
allowed the application, and we transferred the case to this 
court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  When a person is convicted of a qualifying 
sex offense or adjudicated delinquent or a youthful offender by 
reason of a qualifying sex offense, the district attorney or 
Attorney General may file a petition alleging that the person is 
sexually dangerous.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 12.  If a person is 
charged with a qualifying sex offense but found incompetent to 
stand trial, however, that person also may be subject to 
classification as sexually dangerous, notwithstanding the 
absence of a conviction.  See G. L. c. 123A, §§ 12, 15. 
5 
 
 
In the latter case, a judge in the court where the petition 
is filed first determines whether there is probable cause to 
believe that the incompetent person is sexually dangerous.  See 
G. L. c. 123A, § 12.  Following that finding and temporary civil 
commitment of the defendant, a judge conducts a hearing pursuant 
to G. L. c. 123A, § 15,1 at which the judge hears evidence and 
determines "whether the person did commit the act or acts 
                     
 
1 General Laws c. 123A, § 15, provides, in its entirety: 
 
"If a person who has been charged with a sex offense 
has been found incompetent to stand trial and his 
commitment is sought and probable cause has been determined 
to exist pursuant to [G. L. c. 123A, § 12], the court, 
without a jury, shall hear evidence and determine whether 
the person did commit the act or acts charged.  The hearing 
on the issue of whether the person did commit the act or 
acts charged shall comply with all procedures specified in 
[G. L. c. 123A, § 14], except with respect to trial by 
jury.  The rules of evidence applicable in criminal cases 
shall apply and all rights available to criminal defendants 
at criminal trials, other than the right not to be tried 
while incompetent, shall apply.  After hearing evidence the 
court shall make specific findings relative to whether the 
person did commit the act or acts charged; the extent to 
which the cause of the person's incompetence to stand trial 
affected the outcome of the hearing, including its effect 
on the person's ability to consult with and assist counsel 
and to testify on his own behalf; the extent to which the 
evidence could be reconstructed without the assistance of 
the person; and the strength of the prosecution's case.  If 
the court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person 
did commit the act or acts charged, the court shall enter a 
final order, subject to appeal by the person named in the 
petition and the court may proceed to consider whether the 
person is a sexually dangerous person according to the 
procedures set forth in [G. L. c. 123A, §§ 13-14].  Any 
determination made under this section shall not be 
admissible in any subsequent criminal proceeding." 
6 
 
charged."  The statute explicitly provides that, with the 
exception of trial by jury, the procedures set forth in G. L. 
c. 123A, § 14, apply to this judicial determination, that all 
rules of evidence are applicable, and that "all rights available 
to criminal defendants at criminal trials, other than the right 
not to be tried while incompetent, shall apply."  See G. L. 
c. 123A, § 15.  If an individual is found to have committed the 
act or acts charged, the judge may proceed to consider under 
G. L. c. 123A, §§ 13 and 14, whether the individual is a 
sexually dangerous person. 
 
In Burgess, 450 Mass. at 375, we concluded that the 
provisions of G. L. c. 123A, § 15, do not violate due process 
because the Legislature explicitly provided to incompetent 
defendants statutory rights sufficient "to guard against the 
erroneous potential deprivation of the defendant's liberty" and 
to "protect an incompetent defendant's ability to defend himself 
against the allegations of crime and, thus, minimize the 
likelihood of a mistake."  These rights include, inter alia, the 
retention of experts, the right to present evidence in defense 
of the charges, and "the right to a determination of the 
commission of the criminal acts made beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Burgess, supra.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 15.  
 
The Commonwealth argues, in effect, that the statute's 
instructions to "determine whether the person did commit the act 
7 
 
or acts charged" refer solely to the conduct and not to the 
person's intent or criminal responsibility.2  At argument before 
us, the Commonwealth emphasized that the Legislature chose the 
word "act," rather than "offense" or "crime." 
 
"Our primary duty in interpreting a statute is 'to 
effectuate the intent of the Legislature in enacting it.'"  
Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737 (2014), quoting Water 
Dep't of Fairhaven v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 
740, 744 (2010).  "Ordinarily, where the language of a statute 
is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative 
intent."  Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 444 (2008).  
That said, "[w]e will not adopt a literal construction of a 
statute if the consequences of such construction are absurd or 
unreasonable."  Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 
                     
 
2 The parties additionally addressed the question whether, 
and for how long, the Commonwealth may civilly commit an 
incompetent defendant who has been found to lack criminal 
responsibility following a hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, 
§ 15.  According to the defendant, such an individual would be 
subject to civil commitment "under the mental health 
statute[s]."  See G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8, 16.  Civil commitment 
under those statutes, the defendant maintains, would "address 
both the defendant's mental illness and also the public safety."  
The Commonwealth urges the court not to reach the question, 
because the issue is not ripe.  Where the case is before us on 
an appeal from orders on motions in limine, and the judge has 
yet to make a determination whether the defendant lacks criminal 
responsibility, we agree that the matter is not yet ripe.  We 
strongly urge the Legislature to address the question of the 
appropriate course where a defendant has been found in a 
proceeding under G. L. c. 123A, § 15, to lack criminal 
responsibility. 
8 
 
Mass. 326, 336 (1982).  See Black's Law Dictionary 11-12 (10th 
ed. 2014) (defining "absurdity" as "being grossly unreasonable" 
and "[a]n interpretation that would lead to an unconscionable 
result, esp. one that . . . the drafters could not have 
intended").  "Where the words of the statute are ambiguous, we 
strive to make it an effectual piece of legislation in harmony 
with common sense and sound reason and consistent with 
legislative intent" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 302 (2014). 
 
In Burgess, 450 Mass. at 374, we observed that "the 
Legislature has provided that [a hearing pursuant to G. L. 
c. 123A, § 15, shall] proceed much the same as a criminal trial, 
and that it include many rights to which a criminal defendant is 
constitutionally entitled.  The Legislature also chose to import 
to a [G. L. c. 123A, § 15,] hearing the familiar 'beyond a 
reasonable doubt' standard."  The Legislature's intent, 
therefore, was to substitute this hearing for the criminal trial 
that an incompetent person did not have before proceeding to a 
determination whether the person is sexually dangerous.  Our 
holding in Burgess that the statute does not violate due process 
relied on the provision of "adequate procedures to guard against 
the erroneous potential deprivation of the defendant's liberty"; 
refusing to allow defendants to claim lack of criminal 
9 
 
responsibility threatens the constitutionality of the statute by 
removing an important protection.  Id. at 375. 
 
The Legislature did not, as the Commonwealth argues, 
restrict the ability of an incompetent defendant to raise all 
available defenses.  Rather, the Legislature intended, as it 
broadly stated, to provide "all rights available to criminal 
defendants at criminal trials, other than the right not to be 
tried while incompetent."  See G. L. c. 123A, § 15.  
Importantly, these rights include the right to raise defenses, 
such as intoxication, consent, diminished capacity, accident, 
and lack of criminal responsibility.  We are not persuaded, as 
the Commonwealth suggests, that a lack of criminal 
responsibility is different from other defenses that could be 
raised at a hearing under G. L. c. 123A, § 15.3 
                     
 
3 The concurrence is correct that a G. L. c. 123A, § 15, 
hearing is civil, not criminal, in nature, and that we said in 
Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 366, 374 (2008), that 
"constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants do not 
necessarily apply" at such hearings.  Immediately thereafter in 
the next paragraph, however, we clarified that "even though the 
hearing is civil in nature, . . . the Legislature has provided 
that it proceed much the same as a criminal trial, and that it 
include many rights to which a criminal defendant is 
constitutionally entitled."  The statute is clear that those 
rights include all rights afforded a criminal defendant except 
the right not to be tried while incompetent and the right to a 
jury trial.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 15.  Among these rights are 
the assistance of counsel, the retention of experts, cross-
examination of adverse witnesses, the right to present evidence 
in defense, the right to appeal from the final determination, 
the right to have the hearing conducted according to the rules 
 
10 
 
 
The Commonwealth also focuses on our conclusion in 
Commonwealth v. Nieves, 446 Mass. 583, 590 n.6 (2006), that a 
judge should "make the predicate factual determinations 
regarding the actions that would ordinarily constitute a crime."  
Those predicate factual determinations include proof of each of 
the elements of the charged sex offense.  Here, the defendant 
was charged with indecent assault and battery on a person age 
fourteen or older; the elements of that offense include an 
intent to engage in the touching and a lack of justification or 
excuse.  Commonwealth v. Marzilli, 457 Mass. 64, 67 (2010).  In 
order to prove that the defendant committed the act or acts 
charged, it therefore would be necessary to demonstrate that the 
defendant possessed the requisite intent and did not have any 
                                                                  
of evidence applicable in criminal cases, and the right to a 
determination of the commission of the criminal acts beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Burgess, supra at 374-375.   
 
We have emphasized the critical rights at stake in a 
sexually dangerous person proceeding, and the necessity of due 
process protections where a defendant's liberty interest is at 
stake and he faces confinement for a period of up to life.  See 
id.  We also have emphasized that G. L. c. 123A, § 15, satisfies 
due process requirements specifically because it "protect[s] an 
incompetent defendant's ability to defend himself against the 
allegations of crime."  Burgess, supra at 375.  As noted, those 
protections include, among other things, all defenses.  The due 
process protections recognized in Burgess, supra, would be 
significantly diminished if, as the concurrence maintains, 
evidence of a lack of criminal responsibility were admissible, 
if at all, within a judge's discretion, and then only to 
"provide the judge a better understanding of the respondent's 
actions and mental condition," post at    , rather than, as the 
statute makes clear, serving as a defense. 
11 
 
justification or excuse for the touching; the defendant likewise 
could present evidence negating those elements. 
 
Furthermore, reading the statute to mean only the conduct 
charged would result in absurd consequences.  A person deemed 
competent to stand trial could be found not guilty by reason of 
insanity at trial, and the Commonwealth would be unable to 
designate that individual a sexually dangerous person, but an 
incompetent person charged with a sex offense, on virtually 
identical facts, would not be able to present evidence of a lack 
of criminal responsibility at a hearing under G. L. c. 123A, 
§ 15, and could be deemed sexually dangerous.  The Legislature 
could not have intended such disparate results for the same 
offense. 
 
We therefore conclude that G. L. c. 123A, § 15, allows 
incompetent defendants to raise any defenses that they could 
raise in a criminal trial, including that of a lack of criminal 
responsibility. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The orders denying the defendant's motion 
to admit expert testimony and allowing the Commonwealth's motion 
to preclude that testimony are reversed, and the matter is 
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J. (concurring, with whom Cypher, J., joins).  I 
have a very different understanding of the scope and purpose of 
a G. L. c. 123A, § 15, hearing.  General Laws, c. 123A, involves 
civil, not criminal, proceedings intended to determine sexual 
dangerousness, not whether the respondent would have been 
convicted of a crime.  More specifically, § 15 consists of a 
preliminary determination whether a person who has been found 
incompetent to stand trial "did commit the act or acts charged," 
not whether that person, if he or she had been competent to 
stand trial, would have been convicted of a crime for engaging 
in such actions or found not guilty by reason of insanity.  See 
G. L. c. 123A, § 15.  If a person subject to a § 15 hearing is 
found to have committed the act or acts charged, the court will 
then proceed to determine whether he or she suffers from a 
mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes him or her 
likely to engage in sexual offenses if not confined to a secure 
facility.  See G. L. c. 123A, §§ 1, 13, 14.  All of these 
determinations are designed to identify sexual dangerousness, 
not prove whether the respondent would have been either 
convicted of a crime or found not criminally responsible for the 
acts committed.  This distinction defines and circumscribes the 
evidence admissible in the sexually dangerous person (SDP) 
proceedings in general, and § 15 in particular.  Although I 
ultimately agree that the respondent is not precluded from 
2 
 
 
presenting evidence of a lack of criminal responsibility, as it 
provides the judge a fuller picture of the respondent's actions 
and over-all mental health, and may even simplify the § 15 
inquiry, the judge has wide discretion to limit such evidence, 
as it is not directly relevant to the determinations at issue in 
the SDP process. 
 
We have repeatedly emphasized the fundamental difference 
between criminal punishment and civil commitment of a sexually 
dangerous person, stating that a "G. L. c. 123A proceeding is 
neither criminal nor penal in nature, but is a civil proceeding 
to which constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants do 
not necessarily apply."  Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 366, 
374 (2008).  We have likewise stressed that the purpose of G. L. 
c. 123A is not to punish individuals, but to "protect the public 
from sexually dangerous persons, and to provide them treatment, 
and rehabilitation."  Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 500 
(2000).  These fundamental distinctions inform our reading of 
§ 15. 
Ordinarily, criminal justice and civil commitment 
procedures are separate and distinct, and their relationship is 
relatively straightforward.  A defendant is convicted of a 
sexual offense in a criminal trial and sentenced; six months 
before the defendant's release, the district attorney and 
Attorney General are notified, and if either finds the defendant 
3 
 
 
likely to be an SDP, either can petition the court to initiate 
SDP proceedings.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 12.  See also Bruno, 432 
Mass. at 495.  The Legislature astutely recognized, however, 
that some persons who may be sexually dangerous may also have 
been found incompetent to stand trial in their criminal case.  
The Legislature therefore designed § 15 to address this specific 
problem. 
 
General Laws c. 123A, § 15, begins by stating: 
 
"If a person who has been charged with a sexual 
offense has been found incompetent to stand trial and his 
commitment is sought and probable cause has been determined 
to exist [that the person is sexually dangerous], the 
court, without a jury, shall hear evidence and determine 
whether the person did commit the act or acts charged." 
 
The text is carefully written.  When referring to the criminal 
process in which the defendant has been found incompetent, it 
uses the word "offense."  Id.  But when it sets out the 
objective of a § 15 hearing, the statute makes no reference to 
the word "crime" or "offense," but rather refers only to the 
"act or acts" charged.  Id.  The next sentence of the statute 
then indicates that the "hearing on the issue of whether the 
person did commit the act or acts charged shall comply with all 
procedures specified in [G. L. c. 123A, §] 14, except with 
respect to trial by jury."  Id.  Again the Legislature uses the 
phrase "act or acts."  The consistent use of the word "act," and 
not "crime" or "offense," throughout § 15 is significant and 
4 
 
 
done for a specific purpose.  See Hartford Ins. Co. v. Hertz 
Corp., 410 Mass. 279, 283 (1991) ("As a general rule, when the 
Legislature has employed specific language in one part of a 
statute, but not in another part which deals with the same 
topic, the earlier language should not be implied where it is 
not present").  The Legislature did not intend for § 15 to be 
the equivalent of, or a substitute for, a criminal trial. 
 
In our prior cases, we have also expressly recognized the 
Legislature's focus on the acts themselves, not whether the 
respondent would have been convicted of a crime for engaging in 
the acts.  As we have previously explained, in a § 15 hearing, 
"the judge may make the predicate factual determinations 
regarding the actions that would ordinarily constitute a crime" 
(emphasis added).  Commonwealth v. Nieves, 446 Mass. 583, 590 
n.6 (2006).  If the Legislature had intended for § 15 hearings 
to determine whether the person satisfied all of the elements of 
the crime, thereby transforming the SDP proceedings into the 
criminal case that could not take place due to the defendant's 
incompetence, it would have simply said so. 
Although any comparison between the elements to be proved 
in a criminal case and the SDP process should be approached with 
caution, the repeated references to "act or acts" in § 15 is 
most aptly aligned with the actus reus element of a crime.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 433 Mass. 722, 725 (2001) ("A fundamental 
5 
 
 
tenet of criminal law is that culpability requires a showing 
that the prohibited conduct [actus reus] was committed with the 
concomitant mental state [mens rea] prescribed for the 
offense").  The mens rea element is not the subject of the § 15 
inquiry, as evidenced by the specific language utilized by the 
Legislature.  See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 435 Mass. 527, 530 
(2001) ("Where the statutory language is clear, courts apply the 
plain and ordinary meaning of that language").1  Finally, the 
subsequent inquiry to evaluate whether the person has a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder that renders him or her 
                     
 
1 The Legislature knows precisely how to craft an 
incompetency hearing designed to examine the different elements 
of a criminal offense, rather than solely the acts underlying 
that offense.  For example, when an incompetent defendant has 
been committed under G. L. c. 123, he or she may request an 
opportunity for a hearing under G. L. c. 123, § 17 (b), to 
determine whether there is "a lack of substantial evidence to 
support a conviction" of the offense for which the defendant has 
been indicted, warranting the dismissal of the indictment.  
Unlike the language in G. L. c. 123A, § 15, which repeatedly 
uses the phrase "act or acts," the language in G. L. c. 123, 
§ 17 (b), refers to "charges," "conviction," and "indictment."  
It also provides the incompetent person with the opportunity to 
"establish a defense of not guilty to the charges pending."  Id.  
Yet even this more traditional inquiry into the elements of a 
criminal offense expressly excludes "the defense of not guilty 
by reason of mental illness or mental defect."  Id.  In sum, the 
Legislature knows precisely how to define which elements of a 
criminal offense it wants examined in incompetency hearings and 
carefully limited the inquiry under G. L. c. 123A, § 15, to 
whether the individual committed the "act or acts charged," not 
whether the defendant can establish a legal defense to criminal 
conviction as it did under G. L. c. 123, § 17 (b).  G. L. c. 
123A, § 15.  Under neither provision is not guilty by reason of 
mental illness or mental defect a defense.  See id.; G. L. 
c. 123, 17 (b). 
6 
 
 
sexually dangerous could not be more different from the proof 
required to satisfy the McHoul standard.  Compare G. L. c. 123A, 
§ 1 (defining SDP to include person who has been "charged with a 
sexual offense and was determined to be incompetent to stand 
trial and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality 
disorder which makes such person likely to engage in sexual 
offenses if not confined to a secure facility"), and 
Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 546-547 (1967) (defendant 
will not be held criminally responsible if, at time of 
underlying conduct, defendant "lack[ed] substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law," 
due to mental disease or defect). 
 
None of this is to suggest that the proof and procedures 
required to establish whether the person did commit the act or 
acts charged are anything less than rigorous, or that the 
respondent cannot present all relevant evidence to provide a 
full understanding of his or her actions or mental health.  
Proof of alibi, mistaken identity, or consent, which could 
affect a determination whether the person actually committed the 
prohibited conduct, is of course highly relevant.  The 
respondent may also choose, for example, not to contest that he 
or she committed the act or acts charged in the § 15 hearing, 
but to provide an explanation that, at the time, he or she 
7 
 
 
lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her 
conduct to the requirements of the law.  Although not a defense 
in the SDP process, it does provide the judge a better 
understanding of the respondent's actions and mental condition 
and may even simplify the § 15 hearing.  Such an approach also 
allows the respondent, if he or she so chooses, to proceed in 
the SDP process as he or she intends to proceed in the criminal 
process. 
Allowing the respondent to introduce such evidence is 
consistent with the comprehensive process designed by the 
Legislature.  The statute provides that the "hearing on the 
issue of whether the person did commit the act or acts charged 
shall [also] comply with all procedures specified in [§] 14, 
except with respect to trial by jury."  G. L. c. 123A, § 15.  
Those include the right to counsel and the right to retain 
experts or professionals to perform an examination.  See G. L. 
c. 123A, § 14.  "The Legislature also chose to import to a § 15 
hearing the familiar 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard."  
Burgess, 450 Mass. at 374.  Moreover, the "rules of evidence 
applicable in criminal cases shall apply and all rights 
available to criminal defendants at criminal trials, other than 
the right not to be tried while incompetent, shall apply."  
G. L. c. 123A, § 15.  None of these proof or procedural 
8 
 
 
requirements changes the fundamental purpose of a § 15 hearing:  
to determine whether the respondent "did commit the act or acts 
charged."  Id.  Nor does it transform a preliminary step in a 
civil commitment proceeding regarding sexual dangerousness into 
a criminal case requiring proof of all of the elements necessary 
to establish criminal liability.  Indeed, § 15 concludes by 
reiterating that a § 15 hearing is not designed to determine 
criminal liability, stating that "[a]ny determination made under 
this section shall not be admissible in any subsequent criminal 
proceeding."  Id.  But these protections do caution against any 
unnecessary limitation on the evidence the respondent may choose 
to present. 
 
In sum, the Legislature has proposed a thoughtful solution 
to the very difficult problem presented by a person who is 
incompetent to stand trial, but may still be sexually dangerous.  
As we have previously held, "it is beyond question that the 
Legislature has a compelling interest in protecting the public 
from sexually dangerous persons.  That interest is not 
diminished when that person happens to be incompetent to stand 
trial."  Burgess, 450 Mass. at 376.  This is no less true when 
the individual might conceivably be not guilty by reason of 
insanity.  Indeed, an incompetent person who did commit the act 
or acts charged and meets the mental abnormality or personality 
disorder requirements of sexual dangerousness, but who lacks 
9 
 
 
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or 
her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements 
of law, may be particularly likely to engage in future sexual 
offenses if not confined to a secure facility.  The Legislature 
recognized this possibility and drafted the SDP statute 
accordingly.  Section 15 does not bar the introduction of such 
evidence, but it also does not make such evidence a defense to 
being found to have committed the act or acts charged.