Title: Stueart v. Arkansas State Police Comm'n

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Thomas B. STUEART v. ARKANSAS STATE POLICE
COMMISSION

96-1129                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered June 9, 1997


1.   Administrative law & procedure -- appellee State Police Commission failed
     to follow its own rules -- unlawful-procedure standard of review. -- By
     affirming appellant's termination in the face of an admitted
     failure to follow the Department's stated policy, appellee
     State Police Commission failed to follow its own rules; this
     failure distinguished the appeal from a typical appeal from an
     exercise of judgment by an administrative agency in which the
     appellate standard of review is limited to a determination
     whether the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious or
     whether its findings were unsupported by the record; instead,
     the appellate court was concerned with whether appellee
     Commission's decision was based upon unlawful procedure.

2.   Administrative law & procedure -- unlawful procedure defined -- agency
     bound by its own regulations. -- A procedure is "unlawful" when an
     agency fails to follow that which it has prescribed; an agency
     is bound by its own regulations; the fact that a regulation as
     written does not provide the agency a quick way to reach a
     desired result does not authorize it to ignore the regulation;
     the decision of an administrative agency may be reversed if
     the substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced
     because the administrative findings are made upon unlawful
     procedure.
3.   Constitutional law -- drug testing -- procedure must satisfy reasonableness
     requirements. -- Although the United States Supreme Court has
     definitively approved drug testing, even when conducted
     without a reasonable suspicion that the subject is "using,"
     the Court has said that the collection and testing procedure
     must satisfy reasonableness requirements in order to protect
     the employee's constitutional rights.

4.   Constitutional law -- drug testing -- determining reasonableness --
     instructive guidelines. -- For a drug test to be reasonable, it
     must be reasonably related to the objectives of the test "as
     actually conducted"; the supreme court set forth instructive
     guidelines for determining whether a methodology of drug
     testing meets the reasonableness requirement: in determining
     whether the searches "as actually conducted" were reasonable,
     the methodology of the searches must be examined in relation
     to the goals of the drug-testing methods; if the testing is
     not conducted in ways in which there is absolute confidence in
     the reliability of the results, then the purposes of testing
     are not secured; treating someone for drug abuse who is not a
     drug user is counterproductive, as is disciplining someone who
     is not a drug user; it is critical that testing procedures be
     accurate and reliable.

5.   Constitutional law -- drug testing -- appellant had substantial rights
     placed at risk -- appellee Commission's failure to follow its own rules
     deprived appellant of rights that procedure was designed to protect. --
     Appellant clearly had substantial rights that were placed at
     risk by the screening for drugs; not only did he have a right
     to standards of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and
     under the Due Process Clause, but he also had a substantial
     interest in continued employment; adherence to the procedure
     adopted by the agency to ensure absolute confidence in the
     reliability of the results was essential to protect these
     substantial interests; in affirming appellant's dismissal,
     however, appellee Commission ignored its own requirement that
     the results be confirmed by a medical review officer; this
     failure to follow its own rules deprived appellant of the
     rights that the procedure was designed to protect.

6.   Administrative law & procedure -- appellant deprived of opportunity for
     expert to provide other explanation for positive result -- breach could not
     be cured with affidavits and testimony. -- Appellant was deprived of
     the opportunity for an expert to determine whether there might
     have been another explanation besides marijuan use for the
     positive result in his drug screening; unlike flaws in the
     chain of custody, this breach could not be cured with
     affidavits and testimony.

7.   Administrative law & procedure -- appellee Commission's failure to follow
     its own rules required reversal of decision to terminate appellant --
     supreme court directed reinstatement -- reversed and remanded. -- The
     supreme court held that appellee Commission's failure to
     follow its own rules prejudiced the same substantial rights
     that the rules were promulgated to protect and that this
     failure required reversal of appellee's decision to terminate
     appellant; the court directed that appellant be reinstated and
     restored to the benefits of his employment, with appropriate
     consideration given to set-offs from earnings and benefits
     that he may have received, and reversed and remanded to the
     trial court with instructions to remand to appellee Commission
     for further consistent action.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; Chris Piazza, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     Benny M. Tucker, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Rick D. Hogan, Deputy Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Ray Thornton, Justice.
     Appellant Officer Thomas B. Stueart was terminated from the
Arkansas State Police after he tested positive for marijuana use
during a random drug screening pursuant to the Department's Drug
Free Workplace Policy.  He appealed his termination to the Arkansas
State Police Commission, which upheld it.  The Pulaski County
Circuit Court affirmed on appeal.  Stueart argued to the
Commission, as he does to this court, that certain required
procedures set forth in the Drug Free Workplace Policy were omitted
and that this prejudiced substantial rights.  This point is well
taken, and establishes reversible error.  We hold that because the
Commission ignored its own rules in affirming Stueart's
termination, its decision was based upon unlawful procedure.  Ark.
Code Ann.  25-15-212(h)(3) (Repl. 1996).  Accordingly, we reverse.
     Pursuant to the Drug Free Workplace Act of 1988, the Arkansas
State Police adopted a Drug Free Workplace Policy by General Order
No. 104.  The stated purpose of the order was to establish "the
policies and procedures of the Arkansas State Police governing
alcohol or drug testing of employees" and to prohibit "alcohol or
drug abuse or drug misuse by employees, either on or off duty."  
     The policy sets out specific steps to be taken in the chain of
custody to ensure the reliability of the testing and to prevent
tampering.  A Drug Custody and Control form is used to properly
document each step of the testing process.  This required
documentation is to show who received the samples, who opened them,
and who tested them.  The employee is required to sign the form at
the time he is tested to confirm that he is the donor of the
sample, that he has not altered it in any way, that the bottle was
sealed in his presence with a tamper-proof seal, and that the
information provided on the form and on the label affixed to the
specimen is correct.  
     At the end of the testing, the laboratory is required to
submit any positive results to the authorized Medical Review
Officer for confirmation of results.  The Medical Review Officer is
defined in the policy as "[a] licensed physician or designated
person who reviews all positive drug test results to determine
whether or not such results were due to the tested employee's
proper use of a prescribed medication."  The policy states, "A
positive test result shall only be reported when both the initial
and confirmatory tests have been completed and the positive result
is not adequately explained to the satisfaction of the Medical
Review Officer by consultation with the employee or the employee's
physician."  [Emphasis in original.]
     At the hearing, both sides agreed that the chain of custody
was flawed because the forms were not filled out correctly by the
persons in the chain.  However, there was testimony at the hearing
that established who received the specimen at each point, who
opened it, that it remained sealed until received by the testing
facility, and who tested it.  The specimen was taken from Stueart
at his home in Ashdown.  The officer in charge of collecting the
specimen took it to his home and put it in the refrigerator
overnight.  He then delivered it to another officer, who delivered
it to yet another officer at a designated point on the highway, and
that officer took it to Baptist Medical Center in Arkadelphia.  The
specimen was taken by courier the next day to Baptist Medical
Center in Little Rock, the testing facility, where it was tested.
     While Stueart did not sign the donor certification on the
form, he testified that he gave a specimen to the officer as
established by the testimony at the administrative hearing. 
However, the fatal flaw was that the final steps in the procedure
were omitted entirely.  These requirements are, as stated in the
policy:
(1) that any positive results be submitted to
the authorized Medical Review Officer for
confirmation of results; and (2) that a
positive test shall only be reported when both
the initial and confirmatory tests have been
completed and the positive result is not
adequately explained to the satisfaction of
the Medical Review Officer by consultation
with the employee or the employee's physician.
[Emphasis in original.]
     It was undisputed that these steps were omitted.  Dr. Don
Cashman, supervisor of the toxicology lab at Baptist Medical
Center, testified on cross-examination as follows:
Q. What did you do when you saw that the
results of this test were positive?
A. We sent those results to the Arkansas State
Police.
. . .
Q. You have reviewed the policy.  Now have you
come to an opinion that you did not follow the
policy?
A. It's correct, yeah.  Our process did not
follow their policy.
. . .
Q. The last page of the drug policy, number 5,
it says, "Submit any positive results to the
authorized Medical Review Officer for
confirmation of results."  Was that done?
A. No.
Q. And the bottom part, it says in 6a, "A
positive test result shall only be reported
when both initial and confirmatory results
have been completed and the positive result is
not adequately explained to the satisfaction
of the Medical Review Officer by consultation
with the employee or the employee's
physician."  Was that done?
A. There [sic] results were not submitted to a
medical review officer.
Q. So 6a was not done, either; is that
correct?
A. That's correct.
By affirming Stueart's termination in the face of an admitted
failure to follow the Department's stated policy, the Commission
failed to follow its own rules.  This failure distinguishes this
appeal from a typical appeal from an exercise of judgment by an
administrative agency in which our standard of review is limited to
a determination of whether the agency's action is arbitrary and
capricious, or whether its findings are unsupported by the record. 
See, e.g., Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Kistler, 320 Ark. 501,