Title: State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Tiffany Mills, Appellant.

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
) 
Opinion issued April 30, 2024 
 
) 
 
Respondent, 
) 
 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC100303 
 
) 
TIFFANY J. MILLS,  
) 
 
) 
 
Appellant. 
) 
  
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY 
The Honorable Kenneth R. Garrett III, Judge 
 
 
Tiffany Mills appeals her conviction for third-degree assault and armed criminal 
action.  She argues the circuit court erred in (1) failing to hold a jury-tried punishment 
stage, (2) excluding certain evidence during trial, and (3) failing to appoint counsel at her 
initial appearance before the court.  Finding no error, this Court affirms the circuit court’s 
judgment.1 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
Mills’ boyfriend (“Boyfriend”) became friends with a woman (“Victim”) at their 
mutual workplace.  One evening in April 2020, Boyfriend texted Victim asking for a ride 
                                              
1  Portions of this opinion are taken from the court of appeals’ opinion by Judge Alok 
Ahuja. 
 
2 
to pick up some food.  Boyfriend also texted Mills the same request.  Upon Boyfriend’s 
request, Victim and Mills each drove to and parked in front of Boyfriend’s house.  Victim’s 
son was in the backseat of her vehicle. 
 
When Victim arrived at Boyfriend’s house, Mills was already parked outside.  
Victim testified Mills got out of her car, approached Victim, asked who Victim was and 
what she was doing there, and accused Victim of sleeping with Boyfriend.  Boyfriend came 
out of the house briefly, then went back inside with Mills. 
 
Mills again exited the house and walked toward Victim’s car with something silver 
in her hand.  Victim told Mills not to key her car.  Mills walked toward the driver’s side of 
the car, and Victim stepped out of the driver’s seat.  Mills pushed Victim, and then Victim 
tried to hit Mills.  Victim hit Mills once and tried to grab Mills’ hair with her other hand.  
Mills grabbed Victim’s wrist, and Victim eventually realized Mills was stabbing her.  Mills 
stabbed Victim seven times. 
 
Boyfriend exited the house again, at which point Mills stopped and engaged with 
him.  Victim went back to her car.  Mills tried to hit Boyfriend a couple of times but did 
not make contact. 
 
Boyfriend testified Mills called him when she arrived.  While on the phone, Mills 
asked Boyfriend who Victim was, and Boyfriend told Mills to go back to her car because 
he would be right out.  Boyfriend heard scuffling and immediately ran outside while still 
on the phone with Mills.  Boyfriend saw Mills on her knees in front of Victim.  Victim was 
holding Mills with one hand and hitting her with the other.  Mills was fighting back. 
 
3 
 
Mills testified Victim attacked her first.  Mills did not know Victim but saw her 
arrive at Boyfriend’s house just after Mills arrived.  Mills was on the phone with Boyfriend 
and mentioned the other car to him as she walked toward his house.  After Boyfriend told 
Mills to go back to her car because he would be out soon, Mills walked in front of Victim’s 
car on the way back to her own and realized Victim was female.  Mills went back to 
Boyfriend’s house and asked him why another woman was there for him.  Boyfriend again 
told Mills to go back to her car and he would be there soon. 
 
Mills testified she went back outside, stopped in front of Victim’s car, and told 
Victim, “you can leave, b[****], he’s not going anywhere with you.”  Mills testified Victim 
put her car in drive and came toward her, causing Mills to jump into the grass.  Victim got 
out of the car, came around to the passenger side, and “started coming at” Mills.  Mills 
called the police.  Victim grabbed Mills by the hair and hit her in the face approximately 
10 to 15 times.  Mills was knocked to her knees and could not see because of a bleeding 
cut near her eye. 
 
Mills testified she had a knife clipped to her purse, which she grabbed during the 
fight.  As she tried to open the knife, she cut through the tendons of two of her fingers and 
could hold the knife only with her remaining three fingers.  Mills stabbed at Victim, though 
she did not know whether the knife made contact because it did not appear to slow Victim, 
as she continued to punch Mills in the face.  Mills testified Boyfriend eventually came out 
of the house and pulled Victim off of Mills.  Victim went to her car, and Mills began yelling 
at Boyfriend as the police arrived. 
 
4 
 
The police officers went to Boyfriend’s house in response to a report of a male and 
female fighting in the street or for a “domestic disturbance/robbery.”  When they arrived, 
they saw Boyfriend and Mills arguing and yelling in close proximity to each other.  Mills 
tried to hit Boyfriend, so the officers separated them and took their statements.  Mills told 
police she went to Boyfriend’s house, where another female arrived and started a fight with 
her.  Police did not observe any injury to Mills except the cut on her hand, which she said 
was self-inflicted.  Mills told police she pulled her knife out because she felt threatened but 
ultimately cut herself with it.  Neither Boyfriend nor Mills indicated anyone needed 
medical attention.  Mills left the scene. 
 
Victim stayed in her car while police were at the scene.  She texted Boyfriend that 
she had been stabbed but did not want to tell the police.  After the police left, Boyfriend 
drove Victim to the hospital.  She needed emergency surgery for the stab wounds to her 
stomach, arm, and back.  The surgeon testified at trial as to Victim’s injuries, which 
included a lacerated spleen, a partially collapsed lung, and significant blood loss. 
 
The state filed a complaint charging Mills with first-degree assault and armed 
criminal action.  A warrant issued for her arrest on May 9, 2020, and bond was set.  At 
Mills’ initial appearance on May 11, the circuit court referred the case to the public 
defender’s office for screening and scheduled a bond reduction hearing for May 18.  The 
docket entry for the May 11 appearance reflects that bond remained the same as previously 
set.  On May 14, a public defender entered an appearance on Mills’ behalf and filed a 
motion for bond reduction.  On May 18, the circuit court sustained Mills’ motion for bond 
reduction and released her on her own recognizance under house arrest. 
 
5 
 
Mills planned to assert self-defense at trial and call Victim’s sister-in-law (“Sister-
in-Law”) to testify about Victim’s reputation for violence.  Prior to trial, the state filed a 
motion to exclude Sister-in-Law’s testimony, arguing the testimony improperly consisted 
of specific acts of violence and Sister-in-Law was not competent to testify as to Victim’s 
reputation due to her lack of association with Victim for many years.  In response, Mills 
argued she planned to ask Sister-in-Law only about Victim’s general reputation and not 
any specific acts.  The circuit court overruled the state’s motion to exclude but held the 
state could voir dire Sister-in-Law before her testimony at trial and renew the motion 
thereafter.  
 
Trial commenced in April 2022.  During her opening statement, Mills told the jury 
Victim “has a reputation for being aggressive.”  The state objected to this comment.  The 
circuit court told Mills to “stay away” from that issue until it had an opportunity to decide 
whether such evidence would be admissible but did not sustain the objection, strike the 
statement, or otherwise instruct the jury to disregard it. 
 
The state called Boyfriend as a witness.  During direct examination, the prosecutor 
asked Boyfriend if he knew Victim to be an aggressive person.  Boyfriend answered, “Not 
really, no.” 
 
Later in trial, Mills indicated she would be calling Sister-in-Law to testify as to four 
specific bad acts either Sister-in-Law or Sister-in-Law’s husband witnessed Victim 
commit.  The state argued the specific acts were not admissible and only reputation 
evidence could be admitted to prove who the initial aggressor was.  In response, Mills 
 
6 
argued the state opened the door to evidence of specific bad acts by eliciting Boyfriend’s 
testimony that Victim did not have a reputation for violence. 
 
The circuit court then proceeded with Sister-in-Law’s voir dire.  The state asked 
Sister-in-Law about her knowledge of Victim’s reputation, and Sister-in-Law stated Victim 
had a reputation of being “a very violent person.”  The state then asked if Sister-in-Law 
had been personally involved with any violent altercations with Victim.  Sister-in-Law 
described several instances, some of which involved her personally and some did not.  First, 
Sister-in-Law described an incident during which she started a fight with Victim and beat 
her up.  Sister-in-Law stated she started the fight because Victim and her friends allegedly 
beat up her husband, Sister-in-Law’s brother.  Sister-in-Law recalled a second incident in 
which Victim “was in [Sister-in-Law’s] grandma’s face and yelling at her.”  Third, Sister-
in-Law testified about a time she was with Victim in a Walmart four years earlier, when 
Victim thought a person at a nearby register was looking at her.  Victim verbally confronted 
the person, though she did not get violent during the incident.  
 
Sister-in-Law testified about three other instances she heard about from other people 
in which Victim acted violently or aggressively.  She stated Victim assaulted her husband 
multiple times, causing the police to be called.  One of these incidents occurred outside 
Victim’s work, another occurred in a hotel, and the last involved Victim and Victim’s 
friends assaulting Victim’s husband (this was the incident noted above in which Sister-in-
Law started a fight with Victim). 
 
 
7 
 
The circuit court permitted Sister-in-Law to testify about the Walmart incident and 
the fight between Sister-in-Law and Victim.  As to the other instances, the court found the 
probative value would be substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of that 
testimony. 
 
The issue of self-defense was submitted to the jury.  The jury found Mills guilty of 
the lesser-included offense of third-degree assault and armed criminal action.  After the 
jury returned its verdict, Mills waived her right to jury sentencing pursuant to a sentencing 
agreement she reached with the state.  The following exchange occurred between Mills and 
the circuit court: 
THE COURT:  Ma’am, you have just been found guilty by a jury of your 
peers of the charges of assault in the third degree and armed criminal action.  
You have a right to be sentenced by the jury that has just found you guilty to 
these offenses.  And it’s my intention from reading instructions that it was 
your intention to have the jury sentence you at this time.  Do you still wish 
the jury to sentence you for these charges? 
 
MILLS:  No. 
 
THE COURT:  And you wish to waive that? 
 
MILLS:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  And you discussed this fully with your attorney? 
 
MILLS:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  And this is a knowing, voluntary waiver of your right to be 
sentenced by this jury? 
 
MILLS:  Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT:  And you understand you can’t change your mind thereafter 
as soon as I accept this waiver? 
 
 
8 
MILLS:  Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT:  And you fully discussed this decision with your lawyer? 
 
MILLS:  Uh-huh. 
 
THE COURT:  Is that a yes? 
 
MILLS:  Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT:  And you understand during this proceeding of your 
sentencing that you would have the opportunity to present any evidence that 
you wish in front of the jury and the jury would hear that evidence and then 
deliberate and arrive at a punishment based upon all the evidence in this case? 
 
MILLS:  Uh-huh. 
 
THE COURT:  Again, you wish to waive that? 
 
MILLS:  Yeah. 
 
 
At a subsequent sentencing hearing, the circuit court sentenced Mills to the sentence 
agreed to by both parties in the sentencing agreement – three years imprisonment on each 
offense, to run concurrently.  Mills appeals. 
Standard of Review 
 
Mills concedes she failed to preserve Points I (judge in lieu of jury sentencing) and 
III (lack of counsel at initial hearing) below.  Accordingly, she requests plain error review 
of these points.  Whether an unpreserved claim is statutory, constitutional, structural, or of 
some other origin, “Rule 30.20 is the exclusive means by which an appellant can seek 
review of any unpreserved claim of error and said claim … is evaluated by this Court’s 
plain error framework without exception.”  State v. Minor, 648 S.W.3d 721, 731 (Mo. banc 
 
9 
2022) (quotations omitted).  Moreover, “[p]lain error review is discretionary.”  Id. 
(quotations omitted). 
 
In conducting plain error review, the Court conducts a two-step process: 
The first step requires a determination of whether the claim of error facially 
establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or 
miscarriage of justice has resulted. All prejudicial error, however, is not plain 
error, and plain errors are those which are evident, obvious, and clear. If plain 
error is found, the court then must proceed to the second step and determine 
whether the claimed error resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
Id. (quotations omitted).  Moreover, “[t]o obtain a new trial on direct appeal based on a 
claim of plain error, the appellant must show the error was outcome determinative.”  Id. 
(quotations omitted).  
 
In Point II, Mills argues the circuit court erred in excluding evidence of previous 
instances of Victim’s violent behavior.  “The circuit court has broad discretion in admitting 
evidence at trial, and error will be found only for a clear abuse of this discretion.”  State v. 
Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 533 (Mo. banc 2020). 
This Court will find a circuit court abused its discretion only when a ruling 
is clearly against the logic and circumstances then before the court and is so 
arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack 
of careful consideration; if reasonable persons can differ about the propriety 
of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court 
abused its discretion. 
 
Id. (quotations omitted).  Moreover, “[t]his Court reviews the trial court for prejudice, not 
mere error, and will reverse only if the error was so prejudicial that it deprived the 
defendant of a fair trial.”  Id. at 533-34 (quotations omitted).  Trial court error is prejudicial 
 
10 
if “there is a reasonable probability that the trial court’s error affected the outcome of the 
trial.”  Id. at 534 (quotations omitted). 
Point I – Mills Waived Her Right to Jury Sentencing and Has Not Established the 
Circuit Court’s Decision to Assess Punishment Resulted in Manifest Injustice 
 
 
In Point I, Mills argues the circuit court plainly erred in failing to hold a jury-tried 
punishment stage because she did not make a written request prior to voir dire that the 
court, rather than the jury, assess her punishment, as subdivision (1) of section 557.036.4 
requires. 
 
Section 557.036.4 provides: 
A second stage of the trial shall not proceed and the court, and not the jury, 
shall assess punishment if: 
 
(1) The defendant requests in writing, prior to voir dire, that the court assess 
the punishment in case of a finding of guilt; or 
 
(2) The state pleads and proves the defendant is a prior offender, persistent 
offender, dangerous offender, or persistent misdemeanor offender as defined 
in section 558.016, or a persistent sexual offender or predatory sexual 
offender as defined in section 566.125. If the jury cannot agree on the 
punishment to be assessed, the court shall proceed as provided in subsection 
1 of this section. If, after due deliberation by the jury, the court finds the jury 
cannot agree on punishment, then the court may instruct the jury that if it 
cannot agree on punishment that the court will assess punishment. 
 
 
While there is no constitutional right to jury sentencing, a defendant does have such 
a right by operation of statute, as codified in section 557.036.  State v. Emery, 95 S.W.3d 
98, 102 (Mo. banc 2003).  This Court has been clear, however, that even if the procedures 
outlined in section 557.036 to obtain court-assessed punishment are not properly followed, 
a defendant, nonetheless, can waive the statutory right to jury sentencing when “he allow[s] 
 
11 
the judge to determine his sentence without raising his right to have the jury recommend a 
sentence.”  Id.  
 
While Emery was concerned with subdivision (2) of section 557.036.4, it is, 
nonetheless, persuasive here.  In Emery, the defendant argued the circuit court erroneously 
sentenced him because the state failed to plead and prove he was a prior or persistent 
offender under subdivision (2), a condition necessary to permit the court, rather than the 
jury, to assess punishment.  Id.  This Court rejected the defendant’s argument because he 
failed to raise the issue whatsoever and, instead, “chose to sit on his statutory right.”  Id. at 
103.  This Court held the defendant “waived his statutory right to a jury-recommended 
sentence” because he “allowed the judge to determine his sentence without raising his right 
to have the jury recommend a sentence.”  Id. at 102. 
 
Following Emery, the court of appeals rejected an argument involving subdivision 
(1) nearly identical to the one Mills presents here.  In State v. Weaver, the trial judge, not 
the jury, assessed punishment after the defendant orally requested as such after the 
prosecutor’s opening statement.  178 S.W.3d 545, 546 (Mo. App. 2005).  The court of 
appeals noted, “[l]ike in Emery, the trial court … did not follow the explicit guidelines of 
[section 557.036.4]” because “[t]he defendant’s request for the judge to determine his 
punishment was neither in writing nor prior to voir dire.”  Id. at 548.  
 
The court explained “[t]his, however, does not end the matter.”  Id. 
In spite of the trial court’s error, Weaver validly waived his right to jury 
sentencing when he requested the judge through his attorney to determine his 
punishment. In Emery, all that was required for the defendant to waive his 
right to jury sentencing was for him “to sit on his statutory right” and allow 
the judge to determine his sentence. 95 S.W.3d at 103. Here, not only did 
 
12 
Weaver choose not to invoke his right to jury sentencing, but he also 
affirmatively expressed to the court, on three separate occasions, his request 
for the judge to sentence him. There is absolutely no evidence that Weaver 
did not intelligently waive his right. Although the better practice, under these 
circumstances, would have been to conduct a hearing on the record with the 
defendant affirmatively waiving his statutory right, and such hearing being 
held prior to submission of the case, the failure to do so does not entitle 
Weaver to a reversal and remand. 
 
Id. 
 
Here, like in Weaver, the circuit court permitted Mills to waive jury sentencing at 
her own request.  The court even made a clear record that her waiver was knowing and 
voluntary and twice asked Mills whether she wished to waive her right to jury sentencing 
and whether she had discussed the decision with her attorney, going beyond what was held 
sufficient for waiver in both Emery and Weaver.  The record reflects that Mills requested 
the judge assess her punishment so she could take advantage of a sentencing agreement she 
reached with the state of three years on each count to run concurrently.  This agreement 
was advantageous for Mills because a three-year sentence for armed criminal action is the 
minimum sentence allowed under section 571.015.1.  
 
Like in Weaver, 
[Mills] fails to show under the plain error standard of review that manifest 
injustice has occurred. [Mills] urges this [C]ourt to reverse the trial court’s 
determination of h[er] sentence because the trial judge erroneously 
granted h[er] request to be sentenced by the court. Under the plain error 
standard, this [C]ourt cannot find that manifest injustice has taken place 
when [Mills] requested court sentencing and is merely unhappy with the 
result. 
 
Id.  
 
13 
 
Indeed, “[i]t is axiomatic that a defendant may not take advantage of self-invited 
error or error of his own making.”  State v. Bolden, 371 S.W.3d 802, 806 (Mo. banc 2012) 
(quotations omitted).  As such, “this Court will not use plain error to impose a sua sponte 
duty on the trial court to correct [a d]efendant’s invited errors.”  Id.  Point I is denied. 
Point II – the Circuit Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding 
Evidence of Specific Instances of Victim’s Violent Behavior 
 
 
Mills argues the circuit court erred in excluding evidence of specific instances of 
Victim’s violent behavior beyond the two instances it did admit.  Mills argues that, once 
the state elicited Boyfriend’s testimony that Victim did not have a reputation for violence, 
it opened the door for rebuttal testimony in the form of specific instances of Victim’s 
violent behavior.  This argument fails because the circuit court did not exclude Mills’ 
proffered evidence on the basis it constituted impermissible character evidence, but on the 
basis it was legally irrelevant.  Among other criteria, evidence must be legally relevant to 
be admissible.  C.f. Porter v. Toys ‘R’ Us-Del., Inc., 152 S.W.3d 310, 318 (Mo. App. 2004) 
(“Logically relevant evidence is not necessarily admissible; the evidence must also be 
legally relevant.”); Davis v. State, 653 S.W.3d 169, 174 (Mo. App. 2022).  “Evidence is 
legally relevant if its probative value outweighs the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness.” Davis, 
653 W.W.3d at 174 (quotation omitted).  Here, the circuit court determined Mills’ proffered 
evidence was inadmissible because its probative value was substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect, i.e., it was not legally relevant as required for admissibility.  Even if 
Mills’ argument is correct and her proffered evidence of specific instances of Victim’s 
 
14 
violent behavior was admissible character evidence, she fails to show how the evidence 
was not properly excluded because it was legally irrelevant.  Porter, 152 S.W.3d at 318; 
Davis, 653 S.W.3d at 174. 
Indeed, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Mills’ proffered 
evidence.  “The circuit court enjoys considerable discretion in the admission or exclusion 
of evidence,” and this Court reviews to determine “not … whether the evidence was 
admissible but … whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence.”  
Rhoden v. Mo. Delta Med. Ctr., 621 S.W.3d 469, 484 (Mo. banc 2021) (quotations 
omitted).  A circuit court’s evidentiary decision is reversed “only when there is a clear 
abuse of discretion[,]” which “occurs only if the circuit court’s ruling admitting or 
excluding evidence is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court 
and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack 
of careful, deliberate consideration.”  State v. Moore, 682 S.W.3d 436, 445 (Mo. App. 
2024) (quotations omitted).   
Mills sought to introduce testimony of Victim’s Sister-in-Law as to six separate 
incidents in which Victim acted violent or aggressive.  The circuit court conducted 
extensive voir dire of Sister-in-Law regarding the alleged instances of Victim’s violent 
behavior.  The circuit court also heard extensive argument from the state and Mills as to 
whether this evidence was relevant and otherwise admissible to show Victim acted in 
accordance with her character as the initial aggressor in the fight with Mills.  The state 
objected to three of the alleged incidents on the grounds Sister-in-Law did not have 
firsthand knowledge of the incidents, and to a fourth incident involving Victim arguing 
 
15 
with her grandmother in high school as irrelevant to whether she was the initial aggressor 
in the fight with Mills.  The State also objected to an incident involving Victim confronting 
a person in Walmart as irrelevant, but Mills responded by arguing it demonstrated Victim’s 
tendency to initiate confrontation.  Finally, Mills sought to introduce Sister-in-Law’s first-
hand account of a fight she had with Victim. 
Upon hearing the nature of the evidence and arguments pertaining to its relevance 
and potential admissibility as character evidence, the circuit court permitted Mills to 
introduce evidence of two specific instances of Victim’s violent or aggressive behavior 
while excluding evidence of the alleged instances Sister-in-Law had not witnessed first-
hand and the high school incident involving Sister-in-Law’s grandmother.  Assuming for 
the sake of argument that any of Victim’s alleged instances of violent behavior were 
admissible as character evidence, the circuit court acted within its discretion in limiting the 
extent of Sister-in-Law’s testimony so as to avoid “unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness.”  Davis, 653 
S.W.3d at 174.  The record in this case and the fact the circuit court permitted Mills to 
introduce evidence of two specific instances indicate the circuit court carefully and 
deliberately considered the issue.  Point II is denied. 
Point III – the Circuit Court Did Not Plainly Err in Failing  
to Appoint Counsel at Mills’ May 11 Appearance 
 
 
In her final point, Mills argues the circuit court plainly erred in failing to appoint 
counsel at her May 11 appearance, which Mills argues was both her initial appearance and 
a bail review hearing.  Embedded in Mills’ Point III are three distinct arguments this Court 
 
16 
addresses below: (1) whether Rule 31.02(a) requires the appointment of counsel at the 
initial appearance, and whether (2) an initial appearance or (3) a bail review hearing is a 
critical stage of the prosecution such that the presence of counsel is constitutionally 
required.  
 
State v. Woolery, No. SC100170, __ S.W.3d __ (Mo. banc Apr. 30, 2024), handed 
down this same day, addressed the first two questions posed by Mills’ Point III.  This Court 
held that Rule 31.02(a) does not guarantee the presence of counsel at an initial appearance 
because the rule expressly contemplates a defendant “may be without counsel upon [her] 
first appearance” and obligates the circuit court to appoint counsel only upon a showing of 
indigency.  Id. at 11-13.  Here, like in Woolery, no indigency showing or determination 
was made prior to or during Mills’ May 11 appearance.  The circuit court, therefore, had 
no duty to appoint counsel under Rule 31.02(a).  This Court further held in Woolery that 
an initial appearance is not a critical stage of a criminal prosecution triggering the 
constitutional right to counsel because, in Missouri, that proceeding does not involve “a 
trial-like confrontation” during which a lack of counsel “would impair defense on the 
merits.”  Id. at 14-15.  Woolery, however, did not address whether a pretrial release 
proceeding, which is sometimes referred to as a bail review or bond hearing, is a critical 
stage of a criminal prosecution.2  
                                              
2  It is unclear from the record whether the circuit court conducted a bail review hearing or 
considered Mills’ conditions of release in accordance with Rule 33.01 at the May 11 initial 
appearance.  The docket merely indicates bond remained as previously set in the warrant 
for Mills’ arrest.  Because the circuit court’s order entered following the May 11 initial 
appearance indicates conditions of release were set, however, presumably the circuit court 
 
17 
 
This Court holds a proceeding during which the circuit court considers or 
determines conditions for pretrial release – whether it is during an initial appearance, 
arraignment, or a separate bail review hearing under Rule 33.05 – is not a critical stage 
requiring the presence of counsel.  As this Court stated in Woolery, critical stages are 
defined as “proceedings between an individual and agents of the state, whether formal or 
informal, that amount to trial-like confrontations at which counsel would help the accused 
in coping with legal problems or meeting his adversary.”  Id. at 13-14 (quotations and 
alterations omitted).  “Critical stages are those pretrial procedures that would impair 
defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed without counsel.”  Id. at 14.  The 
consideration of pretrial release conditions is not such a stage. 
 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 
(1975), supports this holding.  In Gerstein, the Supreme Court held the Fourth Amendment 
probable cause determination required after a warrantless arrest is not a critical stage 
requiring the presence of counsel.  Id. at 122-23.  The Supreme Court explained the Fourth 
Amendment probable cause determination at issue has “limited function” and is of a 
“nonadversary character” because it “is addressed only to pretrial custody.”  Id.  The 
Supreme Court further explained that, unlike more formal proceedings, this proceeding 
does not require the accused to confront or cross-examine the state’s witnesses, nor would 
it have any bearing on whether the accused would be charged.  Id. at 123.  
                                              
considered conditions of release at this hearing.  This Court therefore addresses Mills’ 
argument. 
 
18 
 
Gerstein’s holding persuades this Court that a proceeding considering or 
determining conditions of pretrial release, likewise, is not a critical stage.  In Missouri, a 
pretrial release proceeding does not require the presentation, confrontation, or cross-
examination of witnesses.  Rather, these proceedings “shall be informal and rules of 
evidence need not apply.”  Rule 33.07(a).  Further, any given pretrial release proceeding 
does not permanently fix a defendant’s bail for the remainder of the proceedings, as “there 
is no one single bail hearing, and in any given criminal prosecution, there may be multiple 
bail hearings reviewing the conditions of release.”  Woolery, No. SC100170, __ S.W.3d at 
__, slip op. at 9.  
 
This Court acknowledges the significant impact pretrial detention may have on a 
defendant.  See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114, 123 (“Pretrial confinement may imperil the 
suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, … impair his family relationships[,]” and 
“affect to some extent the defendant’s ability to assist in preparation of his defense.”). 
These consequences, however, do not render a pretrial release proceeding a critical stage 
during which a defense on the merits is impaired if the accused is required to proceed 
without counsel.  Like the Fourth Amendment probable cause determination in Gerstein, a 
pretrial release proceeding in Missouri is not a critical stage. 
 
Because Mills’ May 11 appearance did not include a critical proceeding, the only 
way for Mills’ claim to succeed is if she suffered some recognizable prejudice from 
counsel’s absence.  Woolery, No. SC100170, __ S.W.3d at __, slip op. at 18.  Mills argues 
she would have been able to secure pretrial release at the May 11 appearance had counsel 
been present, rather than seven days later when she was eventually released on her own 
 
19 
recognizance under house arrest after counsel entered and filed a motion for bond reduction 
on May 14.  Mills fails to explain, however, how seven additional days of pretrial detention 
prejudiced her during trial, much less how this purported error was “outcome 
determinative” under the plain error standard of review.  Minor, 648 S.W.3d at 731.  Point 
III is denied.  
Conclusion 
 
Finding no error, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
______________________________ 
Robin Ransom, Judge 
 
 
All concur.