Title: Hojan v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-5 
____________ 
 
GERHARD HOJAN, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-2422 
____________ 
 
GERHARD HOJAN,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[September 3, 2015] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Gerhard Hojan appeals an order of the circuit court summarily denying his 
motion to vacate his conviction and sentence of death.  In addition, Hojan petitions 
 
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this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), 
(9), Fla. Const. 
 
Hojan raises six claims on appeal, and we affirm the circuit court’s summary 
denial of relief.  Even though we conclude that there was no trial court error that 
deprived Hojan of a fair trial, we find it necessary to address the unusual procedure 
employed for jury selection in Hojan’s trial.  Additionally, we reject Hojan’s 
claims pertaining to ineffectiveness of appellate counsel and deny the petition for 
writ of habeas corpus. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The underlying facts are taken from this Court’s opinion on direct appeal: 
Gerhard Hojan was charged with armed robbery, armed kidnapping, 
attempted murder, and murder arising out of the events of Monday, 
March 11, 2002.  The evidence presented at Hojan’s trial established 
that at approximately 4 a.m., Hojan and Jimmy Mickel entered the 
Waffle House where the victims, Barbara Nunn, Christina De La 
Rosa, and Willy Absolu worked.  Hojan and Mickel had eaten at that 
Waffle House on several prior occasions, and the victims recognized 
and knew Hojan and Mickel.  Mickel had also previously worked at 
that Waffle House.  Additionally, Nunn knew Mickel and Hojan from 
attending a club where Mickel and Hojan worked and where they had 
previously admitted Nunn for free.   
After eating breakfast, Mickel exited the Waffle House.  He 
returned with a pair of bolt cutters and went toward the employee 
section of the restaurant.  Hojan produced a handgun and ordered 
Nunn, De La Rosa, and Absolu into the back of the kitchen, where he 
directed them into a small freezer and shut them inside.  While Mickel 
cut the locks to various cash stores, Hojan returned to the freezer a 
total of three times.  First, Hojan returned and demanded that the 
victims give him any cell phones they had.  Next, he returned and 
demanded their money.  Finally, he returned and ordered the victims 
 
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to turn around and kneel on the floor.  Nunn protested and tried to 
persuade Hojan not to kill them, but Hojan nevertheless shot each of 
the victims. . . .  
Nunn survived and awoke later with Absolu’s legs on top of her 
body.  She crawled out of the freezer and went next door to a gas 
station.  There, with the help of the night attendant, she called 911 and 
subsequently her mother and sister. . . .  Prior to her helicopter flight, 
Nunn gave law enforcement officers a taped statement, in which she 
identified Mickel and Hojan as being involved. . . .  
Hojan was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for 
the death of Absolu and De La Rosa; one count of attempted first-
degree premeditated murder as to Nunn; one count of attempted first-
degree felony murder as to Nunn; three counts of armed kidnapping; 
and two counts of armed robbery.  The jury recommended death by a 
vote of nine to three, and the trial court followed that recommendation 
and imposed two death sentences for the murders of Absolu and De 
La Rosa.  In sentencing Hojan to death, the trial court found six 
aggravators, one statutory mitigator, and two nonstatutory 
mitigators. . . .  
On appeal, Hojan raises five claims.  He argues that (1) the 
surviving victim’s statement to an officer at the scene was not an 
excited utterance; (2) the trial court improperly treated Hojan’s waiver 
of the opportunity to present mitigating evidence in the penalty phase 
as a waiver of his opportunity to present motions challenging the 
death penalty; (3) his confession should have been suppressed; (4) 
Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional; and (5) the trial 
court committed error under Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 
1993), and Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2001).  We 
independently assess the sufficiency of the evidence and the 
proportionality of Hojan’s sentence.  We find no error under Hojan’s 
five asserted claims, find that sufficient evidence exists, and conclude 
that the death sentence is proportional.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
trial court’s order sentencing Hojan to death.   
Hojan v. State (Hojan I), 3 So. 3d 1204, 1207-09 (Fla. 2009) (citation omitted) 
(footnote omitted).   
 
 
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On November 19, 2010, Hojan filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment of 
Convictions and Sentences with Special Request for Leave to Amend.  The 
sentencing court treated Hojan’s filing as an initial motion pursuant to Florida Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 3.851 in which he raised nine claims for relief.1   
The circuit court entered an order that summarily denied all of Hojan’s 
claims for postconviction relief.  This appeal followed, wherein Hojan raises six 
claims.2    
                                          
 
 
1.  In his rule 3.851 motion, Hojan raised the following claims: (1) section 
119.19, Florida Statutes, and rule 3.852 are unconstitutional facially and as applied 
to him; (2) the one-year time limit established by rule 3.851 for filing a motion for 
postconviction relief violates his rights to due process and equal protection under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 
2 of the Florida Constitution; (3) trial counsel was allegedly ineffective during the 
guilt phase; (4) the trial court erred by permitting the State to present Williams rule 
evidence consisting of testimony from two witnesses attesting that they had seen 
Hojan in the past few months with a gun similar to the murder weapon; (5) trial 
counsel was allegedly ineffective for failing to adequately advise Hojan about the 
risks of waiving mitigation evidence during the penalty phase; (6) Bar rule 4-
3.5(d)(4) burdens Hojan’s exercise of fundamental constitutional rights—including 
the right to due process; (7) newly discovered evidence is available to show that 
the forensic science used to convict and sentence Hojan was unreliable and invalid; 
(8) Florida’s lethal injection protocol is both facially unconstitutional and 
unconstitutional as applied to Hojan’s case; and (9) Florida’s death penalty scheme 
is unconstitutional because it violates the principles of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 
2.  In the present appeal, Hojan raises the following claims: (1) The circuit 
court erred in failing to grant an evidentiary hearing on the issue that Hojan’s 
convictions are unreliable; (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for 
failing to adequately advise Hojan about waiving mitigation evidence during the 
penalty phase; (3) the circuit court abused its discretion in denying access to 
records held by certain state agencies pertaining to Hojan’s case; (4) there is newly 
 
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ANALYSIS 
Standard of Review 
We have previously established that: 
“A defendant is normally entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a 
postconviction motion ‘unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the 
case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, or (2) 
the motion or particular claim is legally insufficient.’ ”  Valentine v. 
State, 98 So. 3d 44, 54 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Franqui v. State, 
59 So. 3d 82, 95 (Fla. 2011)).  An evidentiary hearing must be held on 
an initial 3.851 motion whenever the movant makes a facially 
sufficient claim that requires factual determination.  See Amendments 
to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.851, 3.852, & 3.993, 772 So. 2d 488, 491 
n.2 (Fla. 2000).  “[T]o the extent there is any question as to whether a 
rule 3.851 movant has made a facially sufficient claim requiring a 
factual determination, the Court will presume that an evidentiary 
hearing is required.”  Walker v. State, 88 So. 3d 128, 135 (Fla. 2012).  
However, merely conclusory allegations are not sufficient—the 
defendant bears the burden of “establishing a ‘prima facie case based 
on a legally valid claim.’ ” Valentine, 98 So. 3d at 54 (quoting 
Franqui, 59 So. 3d at 96).   
“To uphold the trial court’s summary denial of claims raised in 
an initial postconviction motion, the record must conclusively 
demonstrate that the defendant is not entitled to relief.”  Everett v. 
State, 54 So. 3d 464, 485 (Fla. 2010).  When reviewing the circuit 
court’s summary denial of an initial rule 3.851 motion, we will accept 
the movant’s factual allegations as true and will affirm the ruling only 
if the filings show that the movant has failed to state a facially 
sufficient claim, there is no issue of material fact to be determined, the 
claim should have been brought on direct appeal, or the claim is 
positively refuted by the record.  See Walker, 88 So. 3d at 135. 
                                          
 
discovered evidence establishing that the forensic science used to convict and 
sentence Hojan was unreliable and invalid; (5) the Bar rule that prohibits his 
lawyers from interviewing jurors to determine if there was any constitutional error 
present, unduly burdens his exercise of his rights; and (6) Florida’s lethal injection 
protocol and procedures violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
 
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Finally, “[b]ecause a court’s decision whether to grant an evidentiary 
hearing on a rule 3.851 motion is ultimately based on written 
materials before the court, its ruling is tantamount to a pure question 
of law, subject to de novo review.”  Seibert v. State, 64 So. 3d 67, 75 
(Fla. 2010) (citing State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 (Fla. 2003) 
(holding that pure questions of law that are discernable from the 
record are subject to de novo review)). 
Barnes v. State, 124 So. 3d 904, 911 (Fla. 2013).  For the reasons that follow, we 
affirm the circuit court’s order summarily denying Hojan’s motion for 
postconviction relief.   
Merits 
Trial Court Error 
Hojan raises four subclaims pertaining to alleged trial court error: (1) failure 
to subject certain analysis of forensic evidence introduced by the State’s expert 
witness to a Frye3 hearing; (2) failure to inquire into whether Hojan knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda4 rights; (3) failure to recognize 
that Hojan was entitled to relief under the Vienna Convention;5 and (4) failure to 
disallow the jury selection process as unorthodox and unconstitutional.   
                                          
 
 
3.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).   
 
4.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
5.  Hojan specifically identifies Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations. 
 
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In light of the record before us, we determine that the circuit court properly 
determined that Hojan was not entitled to relief.  Hojan’s claims of error are 
insufficiently pleaded and without merit.  Notwithstanding the absence of trial 
court error, we specifically comment below about the jury selection procedure in 
this case.   
Jury Selection Procedure 
Hojan’s allegation that his defense attorney and the prosecuting attorney 
colluded to select the jury at a time when he was not present and participating with 
his defense team initially caused us great concern.  It is a well-settled proposition 
of law that a criminal defendant has a right to be present at every critical stage of 
his or her trial.  Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 351 (“Criminal defendants have a due 
process right to be physically present in all critical stages of trial, including the 
examination of prospective jurors.”).   
The record before us reflects that Hojan was present during the voir dire of 
the entire venire that took place in open court, on the record, and before the 
presiding judge.  In addition, Hojan was present for all of the cause challenges of 
the potential jurors and the trial court’s corresponding rulings on the record.  After 
reviewing the record before us, we find that the procedure employed in the 
selection of Hojan’s jury, while unusual, did not violate his rights to due process 
under the law.   
 
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The peculiar aspect of the jury selection process occurred when counsel for 
the parties agreed, sometime after the close of the trial proceedings for the day 
prior to the intervening weekend, to forego the exercise of any peremptory 
challenges to any of the remaining venirepersons.  At that time, off the record and 
when Hojan and the presiding judge were not present, the attorneys agreed on 
twelve jurors and four alternate jurors.  On the following Monday, counsel 
informed the trial court, on the record, that they had mutually agreed to the jury 
and the alternates by way of that out-of-court jury selection procedure.  The trial 
court granted defense counsel approximately forty-five minutes to confer with 
Hojan about the stated jury selection procedure.  Afterward, the trial judge 
conducted an extensive colloquy with Hojan to ensure that he agreed to the jury 
and ratified the jury selection procedure that his defense counsel had engaged in 
with the prosecution.   
THE COURT:  Mr. Hojan, the individuals whose names I’ve called 
out -- you’ve been sitting here since we started picking this jury last 
Tuesday; is that correct?  
MR. HOJAN:  Yes, sir.  
THE COURT:  And you had an opportunity Tuesday and Wednesday -- 
even though we dismissed the panel that were here Tuesday and 
Wednesday until we started again in the afternoon -- you’ve been here 
participating with your lawyers through every stage of the jury selection 
process; correct?  
MR. HOJAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  And you’ve consulted with your lawyers as it relates 
to the challenges for cause that were raised by the Defense?  
MR. HOJAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  
 
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THE COURT:  And you’re aware that as of today we have twenty-seven 
individuals that have not been stricken for cause?  
MR. HOJAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  
 . . . . 
THE COURT:  And of course you were here during all of the questioning 
with those individuals; correct?  
MR. HOJAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  Is that an acceptable group of individuals to try your 
case?  
MR. HOJAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  
 . . . . 
THE COURT:  And they’re acceptable to you; correct?  
MR. HOJAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  Now, you understand in the process of selecting a 
jury, in addition to challenges for cause, both the State and the 
Defense have what we call preemptory challenges, which you can 
utilize to strike individuals from the panel?  
MR. HOJAN:  Yes, sir.  
THE COURT:  Your side has ten and the State has ten for a total of 
twenty.  
MR. HOJAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  You understand that effectively we have not gone through 
the process of actually exercising strikes?  
MR. HOJAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  
 . . . . 
THE COURT:  So, effectively, without the exercise of preemptory 
strikes, effectively both sides were striking certain individuals to get 
us to the twelve primary, four alternates.  
MR. HOJAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  And these individuals are acceptable to you to try the 
case?  
MR. HOJAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  Are you under the influence of any alcohol or drugs?  
MR. HOJAN:  No, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  Do you need additional time or wish additional time with 
your lawyers to consult with them on this matter?  
MR. HOJAN:  No, Your Honor.  
 
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THE COURT:  And, in fact, you have had an opportunity, at this 
point it’s more like forty-five minutes, to sit, talk with your lawyers, 
to go through this process?  
MR. HOJAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  And [you] understand the jury and the selection of the 
jury has to be acceptable to you?  
MR. HOJAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  This is your case.  
MR. HOJAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  And you’ve involved yourself and participated in this 
selection process; correct?  
MR. HOJAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  And again, they are acceptable?  
MR. HOJAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  
 
The record shows that there was no critical stage of Hojan’s trial for which 
he was not present.  All of the venirepersons who were not previously dismissed by 
the trial court for cause by the close of proceedings on the preceding Friday, in 
fact, returned to participate in the next day’s trial court proceedings.  Because there 
is no record evidence that any of the venirepersons were excluded by the out-of-
court jury selection procedure and all were present in court until after the trial court 
had formally excused them, we are satisfied that Hojan was not deprived of his 
right to due process by being involuntarily absent from a critical stage in his trial.  
Because Hojan ratified the jury selection procedure after-the-fact, the circuit court 
did not err in summarily denying relief as to this subclaim.  See Muhammad, 782 
So. 2d at 352 (“This Court held that no error occurs when the defendant is 
represented by counsel who waives the presence of the defendant and the 
 
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defendant later ratifies the action of counsel.”) (citing State v. Melendez, 244 So. 
2d 137, 139 (Fla. 1971)); see also Kormondy v. State, 983 So. 2d 418, 429 (Fla. 
2007) (citing Amazon v. State, 487 So. 2d 8, 11 (Fla. 1986)).  Further, because the 
circuit court found that the postconviction record conclusively shows neither party 
exercised any of its peremptory challenges, the circuit court properly concluded 
that Hojan was not entitled to any relief because he was not involuntarily absent 
during such a critical stage of his trial.  See Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 352.   
 
Notwithstanding the absence of trial court error in the jury selection of 
Hojan’s trial, we strongly caution members of The Florida Bar that counsel should 
refrain from engaging in any off-the-record agreements about the selection of the 
jury in a criminal trial.  We especially emphasize this caution in capital murder 
cases where the defendant is subject to the ultimate and immutable sentence of 
death.  There is no reason for counsel to engage in any trial procedure that gives 
even an impression—be it ever so slight—that an impropriety has occurred or that 
the defendant may have been deprived of a fair trial.  We will be inflexible and 
intolerant of any actual violations of defendants’ rights as a result of “creative” 
procedures used during the critical stages of criminal trials. 
We expect and charge the lawyers and judges of this state that every stage of 
the criminal trial of any person shall be conducted on the record so that the 
reviewing courts will have the benefit of the clearest and most complete record 
 
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from which to evaluate the propriety of the trial proceedings.  We put all on notice 
that we will be ever vigilant to fulfill our role as the oversight body of Florida’s 
Judicial Branch in ensuring that every person is afforded a fair trial and that the 
proper administration of justice is scrupulously maintained.   
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 
 
The circuit court reasonably concluded that the issue of Hojan’s waiver of 
his right to present mitigation evidence was procedurally barred because that issue 
was fully addressed during his direct appeal.  See Hojan I, 3 So. 3d at 1217.  Thus, 
we find no error in the circuit court’s summary denial concerning this claim. 
In addition, the circuit court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing to 
address Hojan’s subclaim that trial counsel failed to ensure that he had a competent 
mental health evaluation for purposes of preparing mitigation evidence in 
accordance with the requirements of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84 (1985).  
This subclaim is procedurally barred because Hojan failed to raise the issue on 
direct appeal.  See Floyd v. State, 18 So. 3d 432, 456 (Fla. 2009) (citing Marshall 
v. State, 854 So. 2d 1235, 1248 (Fla. 2003)).  Furthermore, the circuit court 
properly concluded that this subclaim lacked merit because, as it found, there are 
numerous places in the record showing that Hojan refused to cooperate with trial 
counsel in the preparation of mitigation evidence to be presented during the 
Spencer hearing.   
 
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Similarly, the circuit court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing to 
address Hojan’s subclaim that trial counsel was deficient in adequately advising 
Hojan about the reality of being sentenced to death row.  The record demonstrates 
that trial counsel and the trial court repeatedly discussed with Hojan the 
consequences of waiving mitigation during the penalty phase and, subsequently, 
during the Spencer6 hearing.  Moreover, the record shows that Hojan signed a 
notarized document attesting that he instructed his defense team to cease any 
investigation of mitigating circumstances in his case.  In that notarized document, 
Hojan also acknowledged that without presenting mitigation evidence he was more 
likely to be sentenced to death.  Therefore, the record conclusively shows that 
Hojan was not entitled to relief because he cannot establish the deficiency prong 
under the Strickland analysis.7  See Barnes, 124 So. 3d at 911; Power v. State, 886 
                                          
 
 
6.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
7.  Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in order for a 
defendant to obtain relief based on an allegation of ineffectiveness of trial counsel:  
the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer 
that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent 
performance under prevailing professional standards.  Second, the 
clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to 
have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that 
confidence in the outcome is undermined. 
Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1045 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Maxwell v. 
Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)). 
 
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So. 2d 952, 959-61 (Fla. 2004) (stating that this Court will not overrule the trial 
court’s conclusion that counsel’s performance was not deficient when the record 
demonstrates that the defendant interfered with trial counsel’s ability to obtain and 
present mitigating evidence).   
The circuit court properly concluded that Hojan’s trial counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to explain the lethal injection protocol and the risks 
associated with the use of pentobarbital.  Specifically, the circuit court reasonably 
relied on Peede v. State, 955 So. 2d 480, 502-03 (Fla. 2007), in concluding that 
trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for not anticipating a then-future change 
in the lethal injection protocol.  Thus, we find no error occurred. 
 
Moreover, the record shows that Hojan’s argument in the circuit court was 
conclusory and, therefore, insufficiently pleaded.  The expectation that counsel 
could speculate about a change in the lethal injection protocol and provide sound 
legal advice to Hojan was unreasonable.  Seeing that there was insufficient record 
evidence for Hojan to establish the deficiency prong under the Strickland analysis, 
the circuit court’s summary denial of an evidentiary hearing to address this 
subclaim was appropriate.  See Barnes, 124 So. 3d at 911.   
The circuit court further concluded that Hojan was not prejudiced 
concerning the aforementioned subclaims in light of the six aggravating 
circumstances found in Hojan’s case.  See Hojan I, 3 So. 3d at 1208 (“The 
 
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aggravators found were: (1) Hojan committed a prior capital felony—the 
contemporaneous murders and attempted murder; (2) Hojan committed the 
murders in the course of an armed kidnapping; (3) the murders were committed to 
avoid arrest; (4) the murders were committed for financial gain; (5) the murders 
were heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (6) the murders were cold, 
calculated, and premeditated (CCP).”).  The circuit court further noted that even in 
the absence of a mitigation case, the trial court found one statutory mitigating 
circumstance—no significant prior criminal history.  However, as the circuit court 
observed, Hojan was only able to articulate that he could offer proof that supported 
two non-statutory mitigating circumstances—a history of parental abandonment 
and neglect, and evidence of child abuse and head trauma.  Thus, the circuit court’s 
conclusion that Hojan could not establish the prejudice prong concerning his 
allegation that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him about the 
consequences of waiving mitigation during the penalty phase is based on 
conclusive record evidence.  Therefore, the circuit court did not err in summarily 
denying Hojan’s subclaims.   
Access to Files and Other Public Records 
 
The record before us shows that the circuit court did not err in concluding 
that Hojan’s public records request was facially insufficient.  As presented in this 
appeal, the public records requests do not specify: (1) the purpose for which Hojan 
 
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needs them, or (2) how he would use the public records to collaterally attack his 
convictions or sentences.  Moreover, Hojan merely alleges that his defense counsel 
satisfied the requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 “to obtain 
the requested additional public records” and that “the records sought are relevant to 
[his] postconviction claims.”  In addition, to the extent Hojan raised facial and as 
applied constitutional challenges concerning sections 27.7081 and 119.19, Florida 
Statutes, and rule 3.852 in the postconviction proceeding, these constitutional 
challenges are waived because Hojan did not raise them in the present appeal.  See 
Rose v. State, 985 So. 2d 500, 509 (Fla. 2008) (“Rose has merely stated a 
conclusion and referred to arguments made below.  Thus, we consider the issue 
waived for appellate review.”); see also Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 357 (Fla. 
2004) (“[T]he substantive issue underlying Hodges’ claim is procedurally barred 
because Hodges could have but did not raise the argument on appeal.”  (citing 
Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So. 2d 1253, 1256 (Fla. 1995)).   
Newly Discovered Evidence  
 
The record shows that in denying an evidentiary hearing on Hojan’s claim 
that the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 2009 report, entitled “Strengthening 
Forensice Science in the United States: A Path Forward” (“2009 NAS Report”), 
pertaining to forensic science constitutes newly discovered evidence, the circuit 
court reasonably relied on the requirements established in our prior decisions.  See 
 
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Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 318, 325 (Fla. 2007) (“First, the evidence must not 
have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it 
must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by 
the use of diligence.  Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such 
nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”); Johnston v. State, 
27 So. 3d 11, 20-21 (Fla. 2010) (“As we explain below, we agree with the 
postconviction court that the [2009 NAS Report] presented by Johnston does not 
constitute newly discovered evidence. . . .  The report cited by Johnston does not 
meet the test for newly discovered evidence. . .”).  In light of its application of our 
precedent, we find that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the 2009 
NAS Report does not constitute newly discovered evidence that could affect the 
outcome of Hojan’s trial.   
Post-trial Juror Interviews 
 
The circuit court provided three reasons why it rejected Hojan’s claim that 
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4)8 unconstitutionally denies him the 
                                          
 
 
8.  Bar rule 4-3.5(d)(4) states that a lawyer shall not: 
after dismissal of the jury in a case with which the lawyer is 
connected, initiate communication with or cause another to initiate 
communication with any juror regarding the trial except to determine 
whether the verdict may be subject to legal challenge; provided, a 
lawyer may not interview jurors for this purpose unless the lawyer has 
reason to believe that grounds for such challenge may exist; and 
provided further, before conducting any such interview the lawyer 
 
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opportunity to fully explore possible misconduct and biases of the jury for 
purposes of demonstrating the unfairness of the trial.  First, relying on Troy v. 
State, 57 So. 3d 828 (Fla. 2011), the circuit court concluded that the claim was 
procedurally barred because it should have been addressed on direct appeal.  
Second, the present claim has been repeatedly analyzed and rejected by this Court.  
See, e.g., id. at 841; Sweet v. Moore, 822 So. 2d 1269, 1274 (Fla. 2002); Johnson 
v. State, 804 So. 2d 1218, 1225 (Fla. 2001).  Third, Hojan neither alleged that he 
filed a motion requesting permission to interview any juror nor alleged any specific 
juror misconduct.  We agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that Hojan’s claim 
was an attempted fishing expedition in the guise of a constitutional challenge to 
Bar rule 4-3.5(d)(4); these type of fishing expeditions are prohibited under existing 
Florida law.  See Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 2d 909, 920 (Fla. 2000) (rejecting the 
defendant’s claim relating to his inability to interview jurors because it amounted 
to a request to “conduct ‘fishing expedition’ interviews with the jurors after a 
                                          
 
must file in the cause a notice of intention to interview setting forth 
the name of the juror or jurors to be interviewed.  A copy of the notice 
must be delivered to the trial judge and opposing counsel a reasonable 
time before such interview.  The provisions of this rule do not prohibit 
a lawyer from communicating with members of the venire or jurors in 
the course of official proceedings or as authorized by court rule or 
written order of the court.   
R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-3.5(d)(4). 
 
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guilty verdict is returned”).  Thus, the circuit court properly summarily denied this 
claim.   
Florida’s Lethal Injection Protocol 
 
In light of our decisions in Valle9 and Lightbourne,10 the circuit court 
correctly rejected Hojan’s claim that this state’s current lethal injection protocol 
violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the 
administration of the drugs is procedurally inadequate.  As the circuit court aptly 
points out, this specific Eighth Amendment challenge has previously been raised 
by other defendants and rejected by this Court.  See, e.g., Tompkins v. State, 994 
So. 2d 1072, 1080-82 (Fla. 2008); Power v. State, 992 So. 2d 218, 220-21 (Fla. 
2008); Woodel v. State, 985 So. 2d 524, 533-34 (Fla. 2008); Schwab v. State, 969 
So. 2d 318 (Fla. 2007).  Furthermore, Hojan has not presented any compelling 
reason why we should reconsider our position on this matter.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the circuit court did not err in summarily denying Hojan any relief as 
to this claim. 
HABEAS CORPUS 
Standard of Review 
                                          
 
 
9.  Valle v State, 70 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2011).  
 
10.  Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2007). 
 
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It is well-settled that 
[c]laims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are 
appropriately presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  See 
Freeman, 761 So. 2d [1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000)].  Consistent with the 
Strickland standard, to grant habeas relief based on ineffectiveness of 
appellate counsel, this Court must determine first, whether the alleged 
omissions are of such magnitude as to constitute a serious error or 
substantial deficiency falling measurably outside the range of 
professionally acceptable performance and, second, whether the 
deficiency in performance compromised the appellate process to such 
a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the result.  
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986); see also Lynch 
v. State, 2 So. 3d 47, 84-85 (Fla. 2008); Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1069.  
In raising such a claim, “[t]he defendant has the burden of alleging a 
specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.”  Freeman, 761 So. 2d 
at 1069; see also Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 1981). 
Jackson v. State, 127 So. 3d 447, 476 (Fla. 2013).   
Merits 
Hojan alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective during his direct 
appeal for failing to raise three issues that would have warranted a reversal of the 
judgments of guilt or the sentences imposed: (1) that Hojan was involuntarily 
absent from the jury selection, which is a critical stage of the trial proceedings; (2)   
that the trial court erred in admitting remote prior bad acts that were unduly 
prejudicial; and (3) how the Fourth District’s decision in Jimmy Mickel’s direct 
appeal should have impacted the review of the trial court’s finding of the cold, 
calculated, and premeditated (CCP) aggravating circumstance and this Court’s 
 
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proportionality analysis.  We find that each of these would have been meritless had 
they been raised.  We therefore do not find appellate counsel ineffective. 
Involuntary Absence of the Defendant 
As we previously discussed, the record is clear about the fact that Hojan 
subsequently ratified the jury selection procedure that was employed during his 
trial.  Therefore, we do not find any reason that trial counsel acted unreasonably by 
not doing anything to preserve this sub-issue at trial for subsequent review on 
direct appeal.  See Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 352.  Accordingly, had appellate 
counsel chosen to raise the issue of Hojan’s absence when the jury was selected on 
direct appeal, such a claim would have been rejected as unpreserved and meritless.  
See Stephens v. State, 975 So. 2d 405, 426 (Fla. 2007) (“[A]ppellate counsel 
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise this claim on direct appeal because 
even if he had done so, this Court would have declined to address the merits of the 
claim.” (citing Lukehart v. State, 776 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 2000))). 
Impermissible Admission of Bad Act Evidence 
Even though the prior bad acts subclaim was not raised on direct appeal, 
appellate counsel’s failure to do so does not constitute ineffectiveness.  The rule 
governing the admissibility of evidence related to other crimes, wrongs, or acts that 
was established in Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959), has been codified 
in section 90.404, Florida Statutes: 
 
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Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible 
when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not 
limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is 
inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad 
character or propensity. 
§ 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). 
The circuit court’s order denying Hojan’s rule 3.851 motion drew the 
following notable conclusion:  
[T]he testimony of witnesses Kendrick and Burkhardt, which 
established that [Hojan] possessed a gun similar to the one used to 
shoot the victims in this case, does not fall within the Williams 
rule. . . .  The testimony was properly admitted to show that [Hojan] 
possessed the same type of weapon [as used in these crimes] . . . 
especially since [Hojan] did not want to stipulate that he possessed the 
murder weapon. 
Order at 23-24.   
Based on the record before us, we independently conclude that because the 
testimonial evidence challenged by Hojan is not the kind of evidence that violates 
the Williams rule, appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for not raising a 
meritless challenge pertaining to this subclaim during Hojan’s direct appeal.  See 
Stephens, 975 So. 2d at 426. 
Failure to Consider the Decision in Former Codefendant’s Case 
Hojan alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that 
Hojan’s codefendant substantially dominated him.  To support his claim, Hojan 
 
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cites the following excerpt from Mickel v. State, 929 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2006): 
The judge, after reviewing the [pre-sentencing investigation report], 
hearing comments from the victim’s families, considering the 
evidence at Mickel’s trial, and considering the state’s 
recommendation, stated: 
There is no question having sat through both Mr. Hojan’s 
trial and your trial that you were the mastermind behind 
this entire thing.  You manipulated Mr. Hojan.  He was 
there, he did your bidding, and the three times that he left 
that freezer and went back to your location, there was no 
question what was going on at that point.  You were 
telling him, no witnesses, no witnesses, no witnesses, and 
he went back and he went forth, and he went back, and 
he pulled the trigger and that pull of the trigger was a 
cold, calculated, premeditated act that was precipitated 
by your direction.  No question about that. 
The court sentenced Mickel to five consecutive life sentences. 
Id. at 1195-96.  Hojan thus argues that our decision in Mickel lends clear support 
for a conclusion that Mickel substantially dominated Hojan during the entire 
criminal episode that resulted in Hojan’s convictions and sentences.  We disagree. 
In Lawrence v. State, 846 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 2003), we considered the claim 
that the trial court abused its discretion by not recognizing there was sufficient 
evidence for finding the substantial domination mitigating circumstance.  
Lawrence, 846 So. 2d at 448-50.   
We, however, do not find support in the record for Lawrence’s 
contentions.  There was no evidence presented or proffered indicating 
how Rodgers’ record influenced Lawrence’s behavior in the instant 
crime.  While Lawrence argued to the trial court that the time 
 
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Lawrence and Rodgers spent together in a mental hospital suggested 
that Lawrence knew the substance of Rodgers’ record, no evidence 
was presented or proffered to further this assertion.  The mere 
possibility that Lawrence might have been able to establish this 
foundation through his own testimony does not create a constitutional 
infirmity.  See State v. Raydo, 713 So. 2d 996, 1000 (Fla. 1998).  
Moreover, if the trial court erred in excluding Rodgers’ record, that 
error was harmless given the extensive evidence in the record 
regarding Rodgers’ history with Lawrence.  See State v. DiGuilio, 491 
So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986). 
Regarding the trial court’s finding that the substantial 
domination mitigator was not established by the evidence, we find 
that there is competent, substantial evidence to support the trial 
court’s finding. 
Id. at 449.   
Here, Hojan attempts to establish that appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to raise the issue that is premised on the trial judge’s characterization of his 
former codefendant Jimmy Mickel as the “mastermind” to substantiate his 
substantial domination subclaim.  However, the record in Hojan’s case is more 
reminiscent of that which was found in Lawrence—namely, Hojan’s conclusory 
claim only points to a “mere possibility” that the trial judge’s denomination of 
Mickel as the mastermind “establish[es] [a] constitutional infirmity.”  See id.  In 
such light, it is unclear how Hojan’s claim constitutes a fully developed issue that 
appellate counsel reasonably could have raised during his direct appeal.  Thus, 
appellate counsel was not ineffective as to this subclaim.  See Floyd, 18 So. 3d at 
458 (“This Court has held that ‘[i]f a legal issue “would in all probability have 
been found to be without merit” had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the 
 
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failure of appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not render appellate 
counsel’s performance ineffective.’ ”) (quoting Rutherford, 774 So. 2d 643); 
Stephens, 975 So. 2d at 426 (same proposition).   
CONCLUSION 
 
Because the record conclusively shows that Hojan is not entitled to relief, we 
affirm the circuit court’s order that summarily denied his rule 3.851 motion.  And, 
finding no serious omission or overt act upon which the claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel can be based, we deny Hojan’s petition for writ of 
habeas corpus. 
 
It is so ordered.   
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,  
Paul Lawrence Backman, Judge - Case No. 062002CF005900B88810 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Todd 
Gerald Scher, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, and 
Jessica Leigh Houston, Staff Attorney, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, 
Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
 
 
- 26 - 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Lisa-Marie Krause 
Lerner, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Respondent