Title: Bailey v. County of Loudoun

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, and 
McClanahan, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
BRANDI BAILEY, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 131815 
 
   JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.
 
                                  September 12, 2014 
LOUDOUN COUNTY SHERIFF'S 
OFFICE, ET. AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 
Alfred D. Swersky, Judge Designate 
 
In this appeal we consider whether the Virginia Gap Pay 
Act, Code § 9.1-700 et seq., prohibits three employment 
practices adopted to avoid paying law-enforcement employees at 
least at a one and one-half overtime rate for hours of work 
accrued in "the gap:" that is, hours of work more than the 
employees' regularly scheduled work hours but less than the 
federally established maximum limit after which an overtime 
rate must be paid.  We also consider whether one such 
employment practice is prohibited by the law-enforcement 
employees' contractual employment rights. 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings 
The Loudoun County Sheriff's Office receives funds from 
Loudoun County, pursuant to a cooperative agreement, and from 
the Commonwealth.  To receive funds from Loudoun County, the 
Sheriff's Office agrees to be treated "as any other department" 
under Loudoun County's authority.  The consequences of this 
arrangement are significant.  The Sheriff acts both in his 
 
 
2 
county-affiliated capacity as a department head, and in his 
state-affiliated capacity as a constitutional officer.  Also, 
Loudoun County approves the Sheriff's Office's budget and 
retains authority to dictate the Sheriff's Office's policies 
regarding its deputies' salaries, benefits, and overtime. 
Loudoun County's Board of Supervisors, compelled by budget 
concerns, focused on limiting overtime compensation to reduce 
expenditures.  To address the Sheriff's Office's use of 
overtime, the Board required the Sheriff's Office to implement 
three employment practices to reduce the hours that would be 
considered overtime.  The Board also raised the number of hours 
constituting the deputies' regularly scheduled work hours. 
These actions prompted the litigation giving rise to this 
appeal.  The Sheriff's Office employed deputies who worked in 
the Adult Detention Center ("ADC Deputies") and deputies who 
worked on patrol ("Patrol Deputies").  The ADC Deputies and 
Patrol Deputies1 brought an action under the Multiple Claimant 
Litigation Act, Code §§ 8.01-267.1 through -267.9, against 
                     
 
1 The circuit court's October 17, 2012 consent order listed 
the Patrol Deputies as Ronald Beach, Wade Boyer, Aleksandra 
Kowalski, Brandi Bailey, Perry Bailey, Chad T. Braun, James 
Breeden, Joshua Colborn, Anthony Cooper, Shannon A. Warrick, 
Kevin F. Zaldua, Jamie D. Romba, Sarah A. Weaver, and James D. 
Spurlock, Jr. 
 
 
3 
Loudoun County,2 the Sheriff's Office, and Sheriff Michael L. 
Chapman.  The ADC Deputies alleged that the defendants violated 
both state and federal law by wrongfully calculating and 
underpaying overtime hours.  Both the ADC Deputies and the 
Patrol Deputies alleged that the defendants engaged in 
employment practices to avoid paying overtime in violation of 
state law and the deputies' employment contracts. 
After considering trial testimony and post-trial briefs, 
the circuit court issued a letter opinion resolving these 
claims.  The circuit court (1) denied all requested injunctive 
relief, (2) awarded the ADC Deputies judgment in the amount of 
$107,451.00 together with prejudgment interest from February 1, 
2011, and (3) denied the Patrol Deputies' claims and entered 
judgment in favor of the defendants on those claims.  After the 
court denied the Patrol Deputies' motion for reconsideration, 
it entered a final order memorializing its letter opinion and 
also awarding costs and attorneys' fees. 
The Patrol Deputies timely filed a petition for appeal 
with this Court.  We granted the following assignments of 
error, each of which identifies an allegedly impermissible 
employment practice brought before the circuit court at trial: 
                     
 
2 Loudoun County was dismissed from the suit before trial 
and is not a party to this appeal. 
 
 
4 
1. The Court wrongly held that the Sheriff did not 
violate Va. Code § 9.1-703 when he refused to pay 
[Patrol] Deputies overtime for all hours when the 
deput[ies were] in a "paid status," which violates the 
express language of [Code §] 9.1-703 and the policy 
created for the Sheriff by the County. 
2. The Court wrongly held that the Sheriff could 
refuse to credit hours at the overtime rate to 
[Patrol] Deputies as compensatory time for hours over 
80 and below 86 even though Va. Code § 9.1-701(A) 
expressly requires that the Sheriff do so. 
3. The Court wrongly held that the Sheriff's practice 
of "force-flexing" hours (where the Sheriff forced 
[Patrol] Deputies without notice to go home and not 
work regularly scheduled hours that would put them 
past the overtime threshold) did not violate Va. Code 
§ 9.1-703 and the Deputies' employment contracts. 
II. Discussion 
A. 
Standard of Review 
Whether a statute prohibits employment practices is a 
mixed question of law and fact.  See Smyth County Cmty. Hosp. 
v. Town of Marion, 259 Va. 328, 336, 527 S.E.2d 401, 405 
(2000).  "Therefore, while we give deference to the trial 
court's factual findings and view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party, we review the trial court's 
application of the law to those facts de novo."  PS Business 
Parks, L.P. v. Deutsch & Gilden, Inc., 287 Va. 410, 417, 758 
S.E.2d 508, 511 (2014) (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted). 
 
 
5 
We review issues of contract interpretation de novo.  
Schuiling v. Harris, 286 Va. 187, 192, 747 S.E.2d 833, 836 
(2013). 
B. 
The Statutory Context of This Appeal 
This appeal requires us to resolve issues of Virginia law.  
However, the relevant state law operates in tandem with federal 
law.  Because "we do not read statutes in isolation," and 
because "statutes dealing with a specific subject must be 
construed together in order to arrive at the object sought to 
be accomplished," we first review the relevant statutory law to 
place the issues in this appeal within their appropriate legal 
context.  Sheppard v. Junes, 287 Va. 397, 403, 756 S.E.2d 409, 
411 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
1. 
The Federal Fair Labor Standards Act 
The United States Congress enacted the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (the "FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., in 1938 
and has since amended it on several occasions. "The principal 
congressional purpose in enacting the [FLSA] was to protect all 
covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working 
hours."  Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 
U.S. 728, 739 (1981); see also 29 U.S.C. § 202(a).  To this 
end, "the FLSA obligates employers to compensate employees for 
hours in excess of 40 per week at a rate of [one and one-half] 
times the employees' regular wages."  Christopher v. SmithKline 
 
 
6 
Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. __, __, 132 S.Ct. 2156, 2162 (2012); 
see 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).  This 40-hour overtime requirement 
applies to "employers," which includes any "government of a 
State or political subdivision thereof," "any agency of . . . a 
State," and any "political subdivision of a State," as each of 
those entities are a "public agency."  29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), 
(x); 207(a). 
However, this 40-hour overtime requirement is not 
absolute.  For example, Congress provided numerous outright 
exemptions from the 40-hour overtime requirement.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 213(a), (b); see, e.g., Christopher, 567 U.S. at __, 132 
S.Ct. at 2158 (addressing the "outside salesman" exemption).  
But outright exemptions are not the only type of exception.  
The FLSA also establishes a "partial exemption" to the 40-hour 
overtime requirement for a "public agency" that is "engaged in 
. . . law enforcement activities."  29 U.S.C. § 207(k); Calvao 
v. Town of Framingham, 599 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2010).  A law-
enforcement public agency is still required to pay its 
employees at a one and one-half overtime rate for overtime 
hours, but the hours-to-days ratio establishing what 
constitutes overtime hours is different from the 40-hour 
overtime requirement.  Instead of the 40-hours-to-7-days ratio 
used to establish the general 40-hour overtime requirement, 29 
U.S.C. § 207(a), a law-enforcement public agency is subject to 
 
 
7 
a larger hours-to-days ratio if the public agency uses a work 
period between 7 and 28 days.  29 U.S.C. § 207(k).  Congress 
thus "set a higher threshold number of hours that [law-
enforcement employees] can work in a [28] day work period — or 
a proportional number of hours in a shorter work period of at 
least [7] days — before these employees become entitled to 
overtime compensation." Calvao, 599 F.3d at 13. 
The purpose of this partial exemption is well understood.  
"Congress incorporated [this] special provision[] concerning 
overtime pay for [law-enforcement employees] when it amended 
the FLSA in 1974 in order to take account of the special 
concerns of States and localities with respect to these 
positions."  Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 
U.S. 528, 554 n.17 (1985).  This partial exemption "eases the 
burden of the FLSA's overtime provisions on state and local 
employers two ways."  Calvao, 599 F.3d at 14.  It not only 
"provides for higher hours standards before requiring the 
payment of overtime," but it also "permits overtime hours to be 
computed over a workweek that may be longer than a forty-hour 
workweek and that the employer selects."  Id.; see also Avery 
v. City of Talladega, 24 F.3d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir. 1994) ("The 
work period concept was intended to ease the overtime burdens 
of certain public employers by allowing them to average their 
 
 
8 
employees' duty hours over the designated work period, from [7] 
to [28] days in length."). 
Congress established the following hours-to-days ratio for 
this partial exemption: 216 hours for a 28 day work period.  29 
U.S.C. § 207(k).  However, Congress empowered the Secretary of 
Labor to promulgate a lower hours-to-days ratio.  Id.; see also 
29 C.F.R. § 553.201(a) (noting that the FLSA "mandated" a study 
on this point).  And, in fact, the Secretary did promulgate a 
lower ratio for law-enforcement public agencies: 171 hours for 
a 28 day work period.  29 C.F.R. § 553.230(b).  Recognizing 
that this ratio applies to every work period between 7 and 28 
days, the Secretary provided a chart specifying how this ratio 
applies by listing the number of pre-overtime hours that may be 
worked in each work period before a one and one-half overtime 
rate must be paid.  See 29 C.F.R. § 553.230(c).  As relevant to 
this appeal, a 14 day work period has an 86 hour pre-overtime 
hour limit for law-enforcement employees.  29 C.F.R. 
§ 553.230(c). 
2. 
The Virginia Gap Pay Act 
The Virginia Gap Pay Act (the "Act"), Code § 9.1-700 et 
seq., was enacted in 2001.3  Although the Act originally applied 
                     
 
3 The Act was enacted as Chapter 10.1:3 of Title 2.1 of the 
Code, but upon repeal of that portion of Title 2.1, the Act was 
codified in Chapter 7 of Title 9.1.  2001 Acts chs. 768, 844. 
 
 
9 
only to public employers of fire protection employees, the 
General Assembly amended the Act in 2005 to apply to public 
employers of law-enforcement employees.4  See 2005 Acts ch. 732. 
It is clear that the General Assembly intended the Act to 
operate in conjunction with the FLSA.  The Act permits an 
employer to "adopt any work period to compute overtime 
compensation for . . . law-enforcement employees," so long as 
such a work period is "recurring and fixed" and "between [7] 
and 28 days."  Code § 9.1-702.  To this end, an employer of 
law-enforcement employees may seek the partial exemption to the 
40-hour overtime requirement established by 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) 
and specified in 29 C.F.R. § 553.203(b) and (c). 
More specifically, the Act is designed to solve a problem 
unaddressed by the FLSA.  The FLSA establishes a fixed number 
of pre-overtime hours that may be paid at a normal rate for any 
given work period.  However, an employer may establish a lower 
number of hours of work per work period that constitute the 
basis of the employee's salary or the employee's hourly 
compensation — that is, those hours which constitute the 
employee's regularly scheduled work hours.  See Code § 9.1-700.  
                     
 
4 As used in the Act, "[e]mployer" means "any political 
subdivision of the Commonwealth."  Code § 9.01-700.  Further, 
with respect to employers of law-enforcement employees, the Act 
applies only if such an employer employs 100 or more law-
enforcement employees.  Code §§ 9.1-701(C); 9.1-702; 9.1-703; 
9.1-704(C). 
 
 
10 
This is "the gap:" the difference between an employee's 
regularly scheduled work hours and the federal pre-overtime 
hours limit. 
The problem is that any hours of work accrued in the gap 
are "overtime," in the sense that those hours are work in 
excess of the hours used to determine the law-enforcement 
employee's regular pay, but federal law would not require a one 
and one-half overtime rate of pay for those hours because they 
do not exceed the pre-overtime hours established by 29 U.S.C. 
§ 207(k) and specified in 29 C.F.R. § 553.203(b) and (c).  To 
address this issue, the Act requires that: 
Employers shall pay . . . law-enforcement employees 
overtime compensation or leave, as under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(o), at a rate of 
not less than one and one-half times the employee's 
regular rate of pay for all hours of work between the 
statutory maximum permitted under 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) 
and the hours for which an employee receives his 
salary, or if paid on an hourly basis, the hours for 
which the employee receives hourly compensation. 
Code § 9.1-701(A).  As this statutory language is neither 
ambiguous nor absurd, we conclude that it means exactly what it 
says.  Sheppard, 287 Va. at 403, 756 S.E.2d at 411.  Thus, Code 
§ 9.1-701(A) requires an employer of law-enforcement employees 
to pay such employees, in the form of either overtime 
compensation or leave, at a rate of at least one and one-half 
times their normal pay rate, for all hours of work that occur 
within a work period and that accrue within the gap. 
 
 
11 
C. 
The Sheriff's Office's Employment Practices 
The Sheriff's Office established a 14 day work period for 
its Patrol Deputies as permitted by Code § 9.1-702.  Under 
federal law, the Sheriff's Office is not required to pay the 
Patrol Deputies a one and one-half overtime rate for hours 
worked in a 14 day work period until the Patrol Deputies accrue 
hours of work in excess of 86 hours.  29 U.S.C. § 207(k); 29 
C.F.R. § 553.203(b), (c).  But the Sheriff's Office established 
the Patrol Deputies' regularly scheduled work hours as 80.5 
hours per work period, and then in early 2011 changed the 
Patrol Deputies' regularly scheduled work hours to 84 hours per 
work period.5  Thus, for the Patrol Deputies, the gap between 
actual overtime and the federally-imposed overtime was any 
hours of work accrued between 80.5 and 86 hours in a 14 day 
work period before early 2011, and any hours of work accrued 
between 84 and 86 hours in a 14 day work period after early 
2011. 
Pursuant to Loudoun County's direction, the Sheriff's 
Office implemented three employment practices to reduce 
                     
 
5 Trial testimony indicated that the change in the Patrol 
Deputies' regularly scheduled work hours occurred in either 
January or February 2011.  The circuit court did not make a 
factual finding on this point.  Because this appeal focuses on 
liability and further determination from the circuit court as 
to damages is required, we need not determine when exactly the 
Sheriff's Office changed the Patrol Deputies' regularly 
scheduled work hours from 80.5 hours to 84 hours. 
 
 
12 
overtime payments to the Patrol Deputies.  We find that the Act 
prohibits two of these employment practices but permits the 
third practice.  To the extent hours of work actually accrue in 
the gap, notwithstanding creative accounting practices, those 
hours must be paid at least at a one and one-half overtime 
rate.  But the Act neither requires payment for hours of work 
never actually accrued in the gap, nor mandates that an 
employee work according to a specific work schedule. 
1. 
The "Debiting Leave" Scheme 
The "debiting leave" scheme is implicated when, within a 
single work period, a Patrol Deputy works overtime hours and 
takes sick leave.  Instead of acknowledging the accrual of both 
overtime hours and sick leave, the Sheriff's Office reduces and 
offsets the sick leave hours taken by the overtime hours 
worked.  Those offset sick leave hours are not "debited" from 
the Patrol Deputy's pool of accumulated sick leave, but instead 
remain on the books as sick leave not being taken.  The effect 
of this policy makes it appear as if the Patrol Deputy did not 
actually work some or all of his overtime hours in a work 
period, as the overtime hours which offset the sick leave hours 
simply look like regularly scheduled work hours in light of the 
sick leave hours not being acknowledged. 
As for the offset sick leave hours which are taken but not 
acknowledged, the Sheriff's Office does not outright refuse to 
 
 
13 
pay for such hours.  The Patrol Deputy can have those offset 
sick leave hours acknowledged in a subsequent work period, but 
only if such an acknowledgement would not put the Patrol Deputy 
over his regularly scheduled work hours for that subsequent 
work period.  In other words, when those offset sick leave 
hours are acknowledged and compensated in a subsequent work 
period, they are paid at the Patrol Deputy's normal rate of 
pay, rather than at a one and one-half overtime rate. 
We agree with the Patrol Deputies that the "debiting 
leave" scheme violates the Act.  The Act requires at least a 
one and one-half overtime rate of pay for "all hours of work" 
that accrue within the gap.  Code § 9.1-701(A).  The word "all" 
is an "unrestrictive modifier[]" that "is generally considered 
to apply without limitation."  Sussex Cmty. Servs. Ass'n v. 
Virginia Soc'y for Mentally Retarded Children, Inc., 251 Va. 
240, 243, 467 S.E.2d 468, 469 (1996).  The plain language of 
Code § 9.1-701(A) does not counsel for a limited understanding 
of "all."  Thus, if any "hours of work" accrue within the gap, 
they must be paid at least at a one and one-half overtime rate. 
"Hours of work" is a term of art that the General Assembly 
defined for purposes of the Act: "all hours that an employee 
works or is in a paid status during his regularly scheduled 
work hours shall be counted as hours of work."  Code § 9.1-703 
(emphasis added).  Sick leave hours are "hours" that are a 
 
 
14 
"paid status during [a Patrol Deputy's] regularly scheduled 
work hours" because those sick leave hours are paid hours, and 
are calculated as part of a Patrol Deputy's regularly scheduled 
work hours.  A Patrol Deputy's sick leave hours are therefore 
"hours of work." 
We hold that the Sheriff's Office was required to pay the 
Patrol Deputies' offset sick leave hours at least at a one and 
one-half overtime rate because those offset sick leave hours 
were "hours of work" actually taken, and therefore accrued, 
within the gap.  Code §§ 9.1-701(A); 9.1-703.  The Sheriff's 
Office's "debiting leave" scheme is an accounting technique 
that violated the Act because the Sheriff's Office paid such 
offset sick leave hours at a rate less than one and one-half 
times the Patrol Deputies' normal rate of pay. 
2. 
The "Exchange Hours" Scheme 
The "exchange hours" scheme is implicated when a Patrol 
Deputy works overtime hours during a particular work period.  
The Patrol Deputy has the option to voluntarily "exchange" his 
overtime hours which accrued in the gap for leave hours to be 
taken and paid at any later date.  However, when the exchanged 
overtime hours are paid out as leave, it is at a normal rate of 
pay rather than at a one and one-half overtime rate. 
We agree with the Patrol Deputies that the "exchange 
hours" scheme violates the Act.  As already stated, the Act 
 
 
15 
requires at least a one and one-half overtime rate of pay for 
"all hours of work" that accrue within the gap.  Code § 9.1-
701(A).  The term "hours of work" includes "all hours that an 
employee works."  Code § 9.1-703.  Because any hours actually 
worked during the gap are therefore "hours of work" that 
accrued within the gap, those hours must be paid out at least 
at a one and one-half overtime rate.  Code § 9.1-701(A). 
This is true even though the "exchange hours" scheme paid 
overtime hours in the form of leave rather than overtime 
compensation.  The Act specifically allows for hours of work 
accrued within the gap to be paid out as either "overtime 
compensation or leave."  Code § 9.1-701(A). 
The term "overtime compensation" in Code § 9.1-701(A) is 
undefined, and accordingly we give that term its "ordinary 
meaning, in light of the context in which [it is] used."  
Virginia Marine Res. Comm'n v. Chincoteague Inn, 287 Va. 371, 
384, 757 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The term "overtime compensation" refers to "extra wages paid 
for excess hours worked."  Black's Law Dictionary 1279 (10th 
ed. 2014).  This is the typical payment of overtime hours which 
compensates the employee for overtime hours as having been 
worked in the work period in which they accrue.  The exchanged 
overtime hours were not paid as overtime compensation. 
 
 
16 
The term "leave" in Code § 9.1-701(A) is defined by the 
reference to 29 U.S.C. § 207(o), which in turn governs 
"compensatory time off."  The term "compensatory time off" 
refers to "hours during which an employee is not working, which 
are not counted as hours worked during the applicable workweek 
or other work period for purposes of overtime compensation, and 
for which the employee is compensated at the employee's regular 
rate."  29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(7)(A).  It is clear that the 
exchanged overtime hours were categorized as "compensatory time 
off" under the "exchange hours" scheme.  When the exchanged 
overtime hours were subject to the "exchange hours" scheme, a 
Patrol Deputy would not work during such hours, the hours were 
not calculated as part of the Patrol Deputy's regularly 
scheduled hours and were not considered for purposes of 
overtime compensation, and the hours were compensated at a 
regular rate of pay.  See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(7)(A).  The 
"exchange hours" scheme therefore paid the exchanged overtime 
hours as leave, rather than as overtime compensation.  But the 
Act requires both forms of payment to be compensated at least 
at a one and one-half overtime rate.  Code § 9.1-701(A). 
We hold that, although the Sheriff's Office could 
permissibly pay overtime hours as leave rather than as overtime 
compensation, the Sheriff's Office was required to pay the 
Patrol Deputies' exchanged overtime hours at least at a one and 
 
 
17 
one-half overtime rate because those exchanged overtime hours 
were "hours of work" actually worked, and therefore accrued, 
within the gap.  Code §§ 9.1-701(A); 9.1-703.  The Sheriff's 
Office's "exchange hours" scheme violated the Act because the 
Sheriff's Office paid such exchanged overtime hours as leave at 
a rate less than one and one-half times the Patrol Deputies' 
normal rate of pay.6 
3. 
The "Force Flexing" Scheme 
The "force flexing" scheme is implemented when a Patrol 
Deputy accrues hours in addition to his regularly scheduled 
work hours such as through overtime work or a holiday.  Then, 
later in the same work period, to avoid paying overtime, the 
Sheriff's Office prohibits the Patrol Deputy from working his 
full scheduled shift and sends the Patrol Deputy home before 
the deputy can accrue sufficient hours to earn overtime. 
a. 
The Patrol Deputies' Statutory Challenge 
The Patrol Deputies make three statutory arguments as to 
why the "force flexing" scheme violates the Act.  None are 
                     
 
6 In opposing the Patrol Deputies' petition for appeal, the 
Sheriff's Office argued that we could not reach this issue 
because the "exchange time" scheme was not properly before the 
circuit court as it had not been alleged in the pleadings.  We 
disagree.  Count III of the amended complaint alleged as 
impermissible the Sheriff's Office use of "'flex-scheduling' 
procedures."  During opening arguments, the Patrol Deputies' 
counsel explained to the circuit court that Count III pertained 
to "three subcategories of flexible scheduling," including the 
"exchange time" scheme. 
 
 
18 
persuasive, and we agree with the Sheriff's Office that the 
"force flexing" scheme is permissible under the Act.  We note 
at the outset that the "force flexing" scheme does not 
implicate the problem the Act was enacted to address: hours of 
work being accrued within the gap, but paid out at less than a 
one and one-half overtime rate.  The "force flexing" scheme 
merely stops the Patrol Deputies from accruing more hours than 
the number of their regularly scheduled work hours in a work 
period. 
First, the Patrol Deputies argue that an employer cannot 
alter an employee's work schedule by not allowing that employee 
to work all of his "regularly scheduled work hours."  The 
General Assembly defines "[r]egularly scheduled work hours [as] 
those hours that are recurring and fixed within the work period 
and for which an employee receives a salary or hourly 
compensation."  Code § 9.1-700.  The Patrol Deputies attribute 
to the term "regularly scheduled work hours" an impact not 
borne out by the plain language of the Act.  The term 
"regularly scheduled work hours" operates to determine when an 
employee's hours qualify as "hours of work" for purposes of 
overtime under the Act.  Code § 9.1-703.  "Hours of work" 
constitute (1) all hours that an employee actually works, 
regardless of whether such hours are regularly scheduled or 
not, and (2) hours that the employee is in a paid status during 
 
 
19 
his regularly scheduled work hours, but not (3) hours that the 
employee is in a paid status during "on-call, extra duty 
assignments[,] or any other nonrecurring and nonfixed hours," 
as those hours are not regularly scheduled work hours.  Code 
§§ 9.1-700; 9.1-703.  Reading these provisions together, no 
basis exists to hold that the term "regularly scheduled work 
hours" restricts an employer's ability to alter a work schedule 
such that an employee does not work all of his or her regularly 
scheduled work hours in any given work period. 
Second, the Patrol Deputies argue that the Act's 
prohibition against an employer changing a work period "for 
purposes of denying overtime compensation to [law-enforcement] 
employees to which they may be entitled under subsection A of 
[Code] § 9.1-701," Code § 9.1-702, also prohibits an employer 
from changing the Patrol Deputies' work schedule within a work 
period for similar reasons.  This argument can be sustained 
only if we fundamentally redefine "work period."  A work period 
is merely a period of time "between [7] and 28 days" during 
which an employee's hours of work are calculated for overtime 
purposes.  Code § 9.1-702; see 29 U.S.C. § 207(a), (k).  
Although we liberally construe remedial statutes, this 
principle of construction does not permit us to deviate from 
plain and unambiguous statutory language.  Greenberg v. 
Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General of Va., 255 Va. 594, 600. 
 
 
20 
499 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1998).  We therefore disagree with the 
Patrol Deputies' definition of a "work period" as including the 
days and times an employee is scheduled to work his regularly 
scheduled work hours during a work period. 
Third, the Patrol Deputies invoke the purpose of the Act 
and argue that the Act was intended to prohibit employment 
practices, such as the "force flexing" scheme, whose "sole 
purpose [is] to perpetuate the pre-statutory wage scale."  
Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 41 (1944).  In 
light of the Act's specialized operation in conjunction with 
the FLSA, we do not ascribe such a broad purpose to the Act.  
In any event, "the General Assembly's intent is usually self-
evident from the statutory language" itself, and we find this 
principle to hold true with the Act.  Sheppard, 287 Va. at 403, 
756 S.E.2d at 411 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Had the 
General Assembly intended the Act to prohibit an employer from 
refusing to allow an employee to work his scheduled hours, when 
such a refusal only ensures that the employer would not pay 
overtime under the Act, it would have created a statutory 
provision clearly aimed at such a practice.  It did not.  We 
decline to interpret the Act to achieve that policy goal.  See 
Wood v. Board of Supervisors, 236 Va. 104, 115, 372 S.E.2d 611, 
618 (1988) ("[I]t is the responsibility of the legislature, not 
the judiciary, to formulate public policy, to strike the 
 
 
21 
appropriate balance between competing interests, and to devise 
standards for implementation."). 
We hold that the Sheriff's Office was neither required to 
pay hours of work that did not accrue within the gap at least 
at a one and one-half overtime rate, nor prohibited from 
altering a Patrol Deputy's work schedule within a work period.  
Code §§ 9.1-701(A); 9.1-702.  The Sheriff's Office's "force 
flexing" scheme did not violate the Act. 
b. 
The Patrol Deputies' Contract Challenge 
The Patrol Deputies contend that the Loudoun County Human 
Resources Handbook of Personnel Policies and Procedures (the 
"Human Resources Handbook") vested the Patrol Deputies with 
contractual rights as part of their employment with the 
Sheriff's Office, and that the "force flexing" scheme violated 
those rights.  "In Virginia, an employment relationship is 
presumed to be at-will, which means that the employment term 
extends for an indefinite period and may be terminated by the 
employer or employee for any reason upon reasonable notice."  
Cave Hill Corp. v. Hiers, 264 Va. 640, 645, 570 S.E.2d 790, 793 
(2002).  "Many of the provisions customarily included in an 
employee handbook are consistent with an at[-]will employment 
relationship such as policies regarding vacations, severance 
pay, or employee grievance procedures."  Progress Printing Co. 
v. Nichols, 244 Va. 337, 340, 421 S.E.2d 428, 430 (1992).  
 
 
22 
"Normally, the employer retains the right to alter these 
policies at any time, although rights which have already vested 
in the employee are enforceable for the period of time during 
which those rights existed."  Id. at 340-41, 421 S.E.2d at 430. 
We agree with the Sheriff's Office that the "force 
flexing" scheme did not violate the Patrol Deputies' 
contractual employment rights.  Reviewing the relevant 
provisions of the Human Resources Handbook makes this clear. 
Section 4.2.02 of the Human Resources Handbook, titled 
"Authorized Workweeks and Work Hours," reads: 
(B) Supervisors will schedule sufficient staff to 
provide services during County business hours or other 
designated service hours.  To ensure that sufficient 
staff are available to meet service needs, supervisors 
have the authority to temporarily or permanently 
adjust employees' work hours or locations, as long as 
the adjustment does not exceed the position's 
authorized workweek hours and a reasonable amount of 
time is afforded the employee to accommodate the 
adjustment. 
In relevant part, this provision prohibits an adjustment in a 
Patrol Deputy's work hours if no "reasonable amount of time" is 
provided "to accommodate the adjustment." 
 
The Patrol Deputies failed to show at trial that the 
"force flexing" scheme violated this prohibition.  The Patrol 
Deputies failed to present sufficient evidence that the "force 
flexing" scheme, as a general matter, involved unreasonable 
amounts of time for a Patrol Deputy to accommodate to a work 
 
 
23 
hours adjustment.  And the Patrol Deputies recounted only one 
specific instance of the "force flexing" scheme, when Deputy 
Anthony David Cooper was told upon arriving at work that he 
would "have to go home two hours after leaving roll call."  The 
circuit court did not err in finding that a two hour notice of 
being sent home early, although perhaps frustrating and 
inconvenient for the employee, is not a breach of contract by 
constituting an unreasonable amount of time for that employee 
to "accommodate" the truncated work shift. 
Section 4.2.03 of the Human Resources Handbook, titled 
"Flexible Scheduling," reads: 
(A) The County supports flexible scheduling 
arrangements when they can be accommodated as long as 
sufficient staff are available to meet service needs.  
Flexible scheduling of work hours is arranged between 
an employee and supervisor with the Department Head's 
approval[,] providing that: 
(1) employees continue to work their authorized number 
of hours during their normal pay workweek (Thursday 
through Wednesday); 
(2) each separate work period is structured below FLSA 
overtime levels; and 
(3) all of the department or program's business hours 
are covered adequately and the provision of services 
to the public is not adversely affected. 
In relevant part, this provision allows flexible scheduling of 
work hours when "arranged" between the employee and supervisor 
and with the "approval" of the department head. 
 
 
24 
The Patrol Deputies failed to show at trial that the 
"force flexing" scheme did not satisfy these requirements.  
Testimony established that the "force flexing" scheme involved 
a Patrol Deputy being told by his supervisor that his schedule 
was going to be shortened, and that such flexing of hours was 
done with the Sheriff's approval, who was the department head.  
Although such scheduling was mandatory, whereby a Patrol Deputy 
could not opt out of the altered work hours, the flexed 
schedule was nonetheless "arranged" between the Patrol Deputy 
and his supervisor and done with the "approval" of the Sheriff. 
We hold that the Human Resources Handbook did not prohibit 
the Sheriff's Office from altering the Patrol Deputies' work 
schedules in the manner testified to at trial.  The "force 
flexing" scheme did not violate the Patrol Deputies' 
contractual employment rights. 
D. 
Damages for the Sheriff's Office's Violations of the Act 
While preserving the sovereign immunity of the 
Commonwealth and any agency as defined in Code § 8.01-195.2, 
the General Assembly created a right of action for a law-
enforcement employee against "an employer who violates [the 
Act]."  Code §§ 9.1-704(A); 9.1-706.  If successful, the law-
enforcement employee is entitled to "an amount of double the 
amount of the unpaid compensation due," unless "the employer 
can prove that his violation was in good faith," in which case 
 
 
25 
the employer "shall be liable only for the amount of the unpaid 
compensation plus interest at the rate of eight percent per 
year, commencing on the date the compensation was due to the 
employee."  Code § 9.1-704(A).  If the law-enforcement employee 
prevails, he is also entitled to "attorneys' fees and costs to 
be paid by the employer."  Code § 9.1-704(B).  Finally, a law-
enforcement employee can recover unpaid compensation only for 
the two years prior to bringing suit, unless the employee can 
prove that "the violation [of the Act] is willful," in which 
case the employee can recover unpaid compensation for the three 
years prior to bringing suit.  Code § 9.1-705. 
On appeal, the parties dispute the amount of damages the 
Patrol Deputies should be awarded pursuant to the Sheriff's 
Office's violations of the Act.  These arguments are premature.  
With respect to the Patrol Deputies, the circuit court ruled 
only on the Sheriff's Office's liability.  Holding the 
Sheriff's Office not liable, the circuit court necessarily did 
not address damages, which is an issue logically and legally 
distinct from liability.  See Ford Motor Co. v. Bartholomew, 
224 Va. 421, 434, 297 S.E.2d 675, 681 (1982).  Because "we are 
a court of review, not of first view," the lower court must 
rule on this outstanding issue before we address the point.  
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005); see Rule 
5:25; see, e.g., Virginia Marine, 287 Va. at 390, 757 S.E.2d at 
 
 
26 
11.  We will therefore remand this case to the circuit court 
for a disposition expressly resolving the outstanding issue of 
the Patrol Deputies' damages.  Ash v. All Star Lawn & Pest 
Control, Inc., 256 Va. 520, 526, 506 S.E.2d 540, 543 (1998). 
In light of the parties' arguments before us, we make 
clear that it is unnecessary to mandate a particular form of 
proceedings on remand.  Although we will order a new trial on 
damages when the outstanding issue of damages remains to be 
decided by a jury, see, e.g., Stubbs v. Parker, 169 Va. 676, 
683, 192 S.E. 820, 822 (1938), we find no need for such action 
when, as here, the plaintiffs waived their right to a jury and 
evidence was presented to the court during a bench trial.  A 
circuit court, having heard evidence pertaining to damages 
while sitting as fact finder, can exercise its discretion to 
determine whether additional evidence is necessary in order to 
make a proper "determination of damages."7  Lower Chesapeake 
Assocs. v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 260 Va. 77, 81-82, 89, 532 
                     
7 Because the fact finder's ability to competently award 
damages has not been called into question, we need not decide 
whether our cases in which we remanded an appeal for a new jury 
trial on damages compels us to remand for a new bench trial on 
damages.  See, e.g., Velocity Express Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. 
Hugen, 266 Va. 188, 203, 585 S.E.2d 557, 566 (2003) (new trial 
on damages when an assigned error pertained to an aspect of the 
trial which prejudiced only the damages calculation); Spainhour 
v. B. Aubrey Huffman & Assocs., Ltd., 237 Va. 340, 345-47, 377 
S.E.2d 615, 619-20 (1989) (new trial on damages when the 
circuit court's error precluded the prejudiced party from 
presenting evidence pertaining to damages). 
 
 
27 
S.E.2d 325, 328, 332 (2000); see Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 258 
Va. 347, 361, 519 S.E.2d 602, 608 (1999) (recognizing that a 
circuit court has "inherent [judicial] authority to administer 
cases on its docket").  As the nature of the proceedings on 
remand is compelled neither by statute, see, e.g., PS Business 
Parks, 287 Va. at 420-22, 758 S.E.2d at 513-14, nor by our 
holding on appeal, we leave to the circuit court's sound 
discretion to take appropriate action to ensure that it is best 
able to resolve the outstanding issue of damages while sitting 
as fact finder. 
III. Conclusion 
For the aforementioned reasons, we hold that the "debiting 
leave" scheme and "exchange hours" scheme violated the Act.  We 
further hold that the "force flexing" scheme neither violated 
the Act nor violated the Patrol Deputies' contractual 
employment rights.  We will reverse the circuit court's 
judgment to the extent it held otherwise, and remand the case 
back to that court for further proceedings in accordance with 
this opinion. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
                                               and remanded.