Title: People v. Ramirez

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JUAN VILLA RAMIREZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S099844 
 
Kern County Superior Court 
SC076259A 
 
 
August 25, 2022 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Kruger, 
Groban, Jenkins, and Guerrero concurred. 
 
Justice Groban filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Liu 
concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
S099844 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
Juan Villa Ramirez1 was convicted of a variety of crimes 
on three separate occasions.  Those sets of convictions were as 
follows:  1. Robbery of Leonel Paredes, kidnapping during the 
commission of carjacking and for purposes of ransom, during 
which Paredes was exposed to a substantial likelihood of death, 
and three enhancements for personal firearm use;2  2. Robbery 
and kidnapping during the commission of carjacking of Juan 
Carlos Ramirez;3  3. Carjacking, kidnapping with intent to 
commit robbery, and first degree murder of Chad Yarbrough, 
with special circumstances for killing during kidnapping and 
carjacking, and three personal firearm use enhancements.4 
 
1  
We adopt defendant’s name as it appears in the trial court 
below and in defendant’s briefing before us.  We note, however, 
that defendant’s name appears as Juan de Dios Ramírez Villa 
in litigation before the International Court of Justice.  (Case 
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.) 
2004 Judgment, I.C.J. 12, 25 (Mar. 31) [litigant #20].)  We mean 
no disrespect by adopting the name used in his briefing.  
2  
Penal Code sections 212.5, subdivision (c), 209.5, 209, 
subdivision (a), and 12022.5, subdivision (a).  All statutory 
references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated. 
3  
Sections 212.5, subdivision (c) and 209.5.  Defendant was 
acquitted of a separate count of carjacking.  (§ 215, subd. (a).)   
4  
Sections 215, subdivision (a), 209, subdivision (b)(1), 187, 
subdivision (a), 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(B) and (L), 12022.5, 
subdivision (a).   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
 
In addition to these offenses, separate counts charging 
methamphetamine possession and possession of a firearm under 
the influence of that drug5 were bifurcated.  Following the 
capital trial a separate jury convicted defendant of the drug 
offenses, but acquitted him on the weapons allegation.  The jury 
returned a verdict of death for the murder and that sentence 
was imposed.  In addition, the court imposed consecutive 
sentences of life without the possibility of parole for the Paredes 
kidnapping for ransom; two terms of life with the possibility of 
parole for the kidnappings of Ramirez and Yarbrough; and a 
total consecutive determinate term of 21 years.  Additional 
determinate terms and orders were imposed and are not 
challenged in this appeal.  Sentences on all counts except the 
murder were stayed pending appeal.   
We affirm the judgment.   
 I.  FACTS 
A. Guilt Phase 
1. Prosecution Evidence 
a. Crimes Against Paredes 
Late on October 4, 1997, Paredes parked his car near his 
apartment in Lamont and was approached by three men.  
Defendant placed a shotgun on his chest, Efrain Garza pointed 
a revolver, and the third man held a knife below his ear.  
Defendant demanded Paredes’s car keys, saying he would be 
hurt if he did not cooperate.  Duct tape was placed over his eyes 
and mouth, and used to secure his hands and feet.  Garza took 
 
5  
Health and Safety Code sections 11370.1, subdivision (a), 
11550, subdivision (e). 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
 
his keys and wallet.6  Paredes was ordered to lie in the back seat 
of his car and was held at knifepoint as the car drove off.  
Paredes could tell from the voices around him that defendant 
was the driver.   
After driving for about 15 minutes, Paredes was moved to 
the trunk.  After another 10 or 15 minutes, the car was parked 
in a garage.  Paredes remained locked in the trunk for four to 
five hours while the men tried to negotiate a $500 ransom from 
Paredes’s cousin and uncle.  During that time, the trunk was 
occasionally opened.  Paredes was hit in the face, held with a 
shotgun to his neck, and forced to talk to his uncle on the phone.  
At some point, the abductors drove to another location with 
Paredes still in the trunk.  The abductors left in a second car, 
warning Paredes not to call the police or his family would be 
harmed.  Paredes managed to remove the tape, open the trunk, 
call his uncle, and report the incident to police.7  One latent 
fingerprint was lifted from the trunk lid of Paredes’s car.  It did 
not match defendant.  
b. Crimes Against Juan Carlos Ramirez 
On October 14, 1997, defendant was at Efrain Garza’s 
house in Lamont, along with Garza, Hector Valenzuela, Freddy 
De La Rosa, Daniel Quintana, and defendant’s cousin, Carlos 
Rosales.  Juan Carlos8 arrived at the house next door to 
 
6  
Garza was initially a codefendant, but his case was 
severed from that of the defendant.   
7  
Evidence concerning Paredes’s identification of defendant 
is discussed in further detail post at part II.B.5.   
8  
Defendant and the victim Ramirez are, apparently, not 
related but share the same last name.  To avoid confusion, we 
refer to the victim by his given name. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
 
purchase drugs from someone named “Shannon.”  Valenzuela 
and De La Rosa approached him and Valenzuela demanded a 
ride at gunpoint.  Valenzuela got into the cab of Juan Carlos’s 
truck while De La Rosa got in the back.  Juan Carlos drove about 
a half mile to a field, where Valenzuela and De La Rosa took 
personal belongings, including his watch, necklace, and a charm 
with “Juan” engraved on it.   
The three men got back in the truck and De La Rosa drove.  
Near Shannon’s house, De La Rosa hit a parked car and told 
Juan Carlos to drive.  The other four individuals who had been 
at Garza’s house were walking down the street, and De La Rosa 
called out to them to get in the truck.  Those men were 
defendant, Garza, Quintana, and Rosales.  
Valenzuela pointed a pistol at Juan Carlos and told him to 
drive to an orchard.  Upon arrival Valenzuela then ordered Juan 
Carlos out of the truck.  Defendant, Valenzuela, De La Rosa, and 
Garza got out also.  They demanded money, but Juan Carlos 
denied having any.  When a search of his wallet proved 
otherwise, the men beat him.  Defendant asked for the gun so 
he could kill him.  Defendant said he was the devil, and that if 
Juan Carlos said anything, defendant would cut off parts of his 
body and shove them in his mouth.  Defendant took the victim’s 
belt and struck him on the back with it.  The beating continued, 
after which defendant bound the victim with rope.  After the 
men left in his truck, Juan Carlos untied himself, walked to a 
friend’s house, and called the police.  
Rosales was called by the prosecution and corroborated 
much of the victim’s testimony.  He admitted that he and the 
others got into the truck at De La Rosa’s invitation.  Valenzuela 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
 
had a gun.9  At the orchard, Rosales stayed in the truck with 
Quintana, while the others got out.  Garza pulled out a pistol-
grip 12-gauge firearm.  Valenzuela took some money, a belt, and 
jewelry.  Valenzuela was angry because Juan Carlos had lied 
about having no money.  Valenzuela and Garza both hit Juan 
Carlos with their guns, and defendant, along with De La Rosa 
and Garza, beat him.  Juan Carlos was then dragged toward the 
orchard and tied up.  At the time of trial Rosales’s memory for 
detail was unclear.  He had testified at the preliminary hearing 
that defendant beat Juan Carolos with a belt and later bound 
the victim with rope defendant took from the truck.   
Quintana also testified for the prosecution.  He said that 
everyone who got out of the truck at the orchard beat Juan 
Carlos.  Although Quintana had said in an interview that 
defendant was the first to hit the victim, his recollection at trial 
was that they all assaulted him at the same time.  After the 
beating, defendant got a rope from the truck and bound the 
victim.  Quintana believed that defendant was the oldest of the 
six perpetrators, and that he and Garza were the leaders of the 
group.  
The attackers left Juan Carlos in the orchard then drove 
to a park where Valenzuela divided the stolen money.  Each man 
received about $10.  Valenzuela kept the necklace, but gave the 
charm with “Juan” engraved on it to defendant.   
After dividing up Juan Carlos’s property, the group 
stopped at a food truck.  Afterward, defendant, along with 
Rosales and Quintana, went first to Rosales’s house then on to 
 
9  
On cross-examination, Rosales testified that the first time 
he saw the gun in Valenzuela’s hand was when Valenzuela got 
out of the truck at the orchard.  
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
 
Quintana’s, where Garza and Willie Santiago met them.  
Defendant had been using methamphetamine all day and began 
drinking at Quintana’s.     
c. Murder of Chad Yarbrough10 
The murder occurred on the same day as the Juan Carlos 
crimes.  It arose against the backdrop of conflict between groups 
who lived in two communities outside Bakersfield:  the city of 
Arvin and unincorporated Lamont.  While defendant and his 
associates were at Quintana’s, defendant cleaned a Tec-9 
handgun, loaded it, and wrapped it in a shirt.11  About two hours 
later, Garza said he saw Chad’s truck.  As described more fully 
below, there had been animosity between defendant’s family 
and Chad.  Defendant and Garza went outside and approached 
the truck.  Rosales testified he heard the sound of a gun cocking 
and saw Chad’s younger brother get out of the truck.  After 
Garza got in on the passenger side and defendant got behind the 
wheel, the truck drove off.   
In October 1997, Chad and Brent went to Arvin High 
School.  Chad was a senior and Brent a freshman.  Chad would 
drive them to and from school in his white truck.  On October 
14, the brothers went to football practice, and visited Chad’s 
girlfriend, Carolina Castro.  Brent described what transpired as 
Chad drove away from Castro’s home.  Two Hispanic men 
confronted them in the middle of the road.  When they waived 
Chad down he stopped and rolled down his window.  The men 
 
10  
Chad and his younger brother, Brent, share a last name.  
To avoid confusion, we will refer to them by their given names.  
11  
Rosales had seen defendant with the gun before and had 
seen Garza shoot it.  When he fired it once or twice, the gun 
jammed.   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
 
talked like they knew each other, but Brent did not hear what 
they said.   
Defendant said his name was Loco.  The other man pulled 
out a gun and ordered both brothers to get out of the truck, but 
defendant told Chad to stay put.  Chad said, “I’m Cool,” or words 
to the effect that everything was okay.  The other man told Brent 
to sit on the curb.  Both men got in the truck with Chad between 
them.  Defendant was driving.  A large man approached and told 
Brent to stay on the curb and say nothing.  A second man stood 
nearby.  Brent sat on the curb for 30 to 45 minutes, until the 
men left.  He then ran to Castro’s house and told her to call the 
police because his brother had been kidnapped.  
The same evening, the Yarbrough family searched for 
Chad.  At around 1:30 a.m., his uncle found Chad’s body in a 
field.  He wore only his underwear.  Black electrical tape covered 
his eyes and part of his nose; shoelaces bound his hands behind 
his back.  Autopsy surgeon Donna Brown discovered three fatal 
gunshot wounds to the head.  Dr. Brown opined that if the 
weapon had been fully automatic, the entry wounds would have 
been closer together and all on the same side of the head.  The 
absence of stippling meant the weapon was at least two feet 
away when it was fired.  Chad’s body had scratches and 
irritation on his knees, chest, right arm, and lower leg.  One of 
his fingers was swollen.  The imprint of gravel indicated he had 
collapsed to his knees at some point.  
Investigators found three spent bullets, three cartridge 
casings, and three live rounds at the crime scene.  The casings 
and the spent bullets had been fired from the same gun, and the 
three live rounds had been ejected from that gun as well.  Based 
on the location of the spent bullets and casings, criminalist 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
 
Gregory Laskowski opined that (1) the shooter was moving 
while firing, and (2) the shooting was inconsistent with fire from 
a fully automatic weapon.   
Evidence about defendant’s activities before and after the 
murder was presented.  Rosales recounted how defendant and 
Garza approached the truck, ordered Brent out, and drove off 
with Chad sitting between them.  Defendant’s cousin, Isabel 
Garcia, initially told police that she saw defendant and Gabriel 
Flores in Chad’s truck that night.  Her attention was drawn to 
the truck because defendant waved and yelled to her from the 
passenger seat.  She drew investigators a diagram to show 
where the encounter happened.  At trial, she disavowed her 
statement.  Thirteen-year-old Joamy Garza was staying at a 
house of someone called Chepa, where runaway girls stayed and 
young men visited.  At trial, she recalled that two people she 
knew as Baby and Loco came to the house in a white truck.  She 
told police that she went cruising with the two men.  She 
subsequently identified defendant in a photographic lineup, but 
would not sign it.   
Chad’s truck was found in a Bakersfield garage.  It 
appeared the stereo had been removed, and the truck bore red 
primer paint.  Salvador Saldivar, who pleaded guilty to 
receiving a stolen truck, testified that he went to Chepa’s house 
late on October 14 or early on October 15, 1997, to pick up a 
white truck.  He drove to a garage where he painted the truck 
red.  He did not recall talking to young men about the truck, and 
did not recall identifying anyone.  Deputy Moore testified that 
Saldivar admitted to him that he saw a man named Baby with 
the truck, and that Baby said the truck was stolen.  Baby was 
with another man named Loco.  Saldivar identified defendant as 
Loco when shown a photographic lineup.  
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
 
Ten months later on July 19, 1998, Kern County Sheriff’s 
Sergeants Rosemary Wahl and Glenn Johnson interviewed 
defendant in El Paso, Texas.  Defendant claimed no involvement 
in the abduction and murder and denied using drugs in October 
1997.  He admitted he joined a Lamont gang as a young teen, 
but left the gang around 1995.   
On July 24, 1998, defendant was interviewed again in 
Bakersfield.  He told Wahl and Johnson that when he was 
partying at Quintana’s house, he was not waiting for Chad to 
come by.  He was planning to leave because he was “already on 
the run for jumping bail.”  He said he was using 
methamphetamine and hashish at Quintana’s.  He admitted 
stopping Chad and asking if he knew who defendant was.  Chad 
repeatedly said he did not and finally started to get out of his 
truck, but defendant pushed him back in.  He and Garza made 
Brent get out and defendant drove away.  He first stopped near 
a gas station where he “slapped the bitch.”  Asked why he did 
so, defendant said, “I was telling him it wasn’t a game to be 
playing around with gangbangers . . . .”  
Then they drove to the field and got out of the truck.  
Garza told Chad to remove his shoes and bound his hands with 
black tape.  Planning to leave Chad in the field and take his 
truck, they promised him he would not be harmed.  They made 
him disrobe, to embarrass him and force him to walk home in 
that condition.   
Defendant had the unloaded gun with him; Garza went to 
the truck to get the clip.  Defendant’s intent was to scare Chad 
because of an incident involving defendant’s cousin, Rosales, 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
 
and because Chad “was banging for Arvin.”12  Chad was sitting 
on the ground as defendant inserted the clip.  Defendant did not 
know there was a round in the chamber, and as he was trying to 
put the clip in, he pressed the trigger and discharged the 
weapon.  Because it was dark, he did not know where Chad had 
been hit.   
He and Garza drove off, throwing Chad’s clothes out the 
window on the way.  They gave the truck to “some guys” who 
were at “some pad.”  They partied there for two or three hours, 
hitchhiked to Santa Clarita, and threw the gun away near 
Pyramid Lake.  They parted ways in Santa Clarita, and 
defendant fled to Mexico.  He did not learn that Chad had died 
until five or six months later.  
The officers also asked defendant about the crimes against 
Juan Carlos.  He said that “they had jumped me like a couple 
[of] days before that.”  He recounted, “we were at Baby’s 
[Garza’s] house” when Juan Carlos parked across the street.  
“He was in the pickup saying some shit I guess that’s what the 
neighbors told us and then we took the truck from him and took 
off and we dumped him out in the fields and left him.”   
Deputy Sheriff Robert Contreras, a liaison officer with the 
Gang Suppression Unit, identified two local street gangs:  
Lamont 13 and Weedpatch 13.  The Mexican Mafia uses the 
number 13, which stands for the letter M, and is also associated 
 
12  
As described below, the defense presented evidence of a 
conflict involving Carlos Rosales and an incident during which 
brothers Jose and Freddy Gomez, along with Chad, threw 
sandbags and other items at Rosales’s house and car.  After 
defendant said in his interview that Chad was “banging for 
Arvin,” he described the incident and referred to the Gomez 
brothers as “Arvin [B]oys.” 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
 
with the southern part of California.  Lamont 13 has two 
subsets:  Varrio Chico Lamont (VCL) and Lamont Familia 
Sureños (LFS).  He testified that defendant, De La Rosa, 
Quintana, Garza, Valenzuela, Rosales, and Flores belong to LFS 
and that Santiago belonged to VCL.  He identified photographs 
of defendant’s tattoos, including “LFS,” “13,” “Lamont,” and 
“Sur.”  He testified that LFS initiated new gang members at 
Myrtle Avenue School.  Contreras had seen defendant and 
others at the school.  Garza had apparently just been initiated.  
The court instructed the jury this gang evidence was admitted 
solely for purposes of identification, motive, or intent.   
2. Defense Evidence 
Defendant offered an alibi for the evening Paredes was 
kidnapped.  In October 1997, Ashley Medina was dating 
defendant’s cousin, Rosales.  Medina testified that on October 4, 
1997, the evening of the Paredes kidnapping, she had been at 
the Kern County Fair, arriving home around 8:30 p.m.  Around 
9:00 p.m., Rosales and defendant came over.  They talked and 
watched movies, then defendant fell asleep.  Medina and 
Rosales retired about 2:00 a.m.; Rosales and defendant left her 
house between 12:30 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. the next day.  To 
Medina’s knowledge, defendant did not leave the house before 
that time.  Rosales also testified that defendant spent the night 
at Medina’s.   
Defendant challenged Paredes’s identification of his 
assailants.  Efrain Garza’s brother, Jesus, testified about a 
conversation with Paredes’s cousin, Rosalio.  Rosalio related 
that Paredes said he was unsure of Garza’s identification.  
Dr. Scott Fraser, an eyewitness identification expert, 
testified about factors that can affect identification accuracy.  He 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
 
explained that if there was a light source behind an approaching 
assailant, as occurred in the kidnapping of Paredes, the 
accuracy of the victim’s identification could be reduced.  The 
greater the number of individuals involved, the less accurate the 
recognition of a single person.  The presence of a weapon reduces 
accuracy because it distracts the witness and causes stress.   
As to Chad’s murder, the defense presented evidence of an 
incident in September 1997.  Chad and brothers Jose and 
Freddy Gomez were friends.  One day, as Jose was driving down 
a road in Lamont, a car in which Carlos Rosales was riding 
pulled up.  Jose was told to pull over.  When he did so the other 
car blocked him in.  Gabriel Flores (Gooney) ran up and swung 
a knife at Jose.  Around midnight that night, Chad drove Jose 
and Freddy to Carlos Rosales’s house in Lamont.  Chad and Jose 
each picked up a sandbag and threw it at a car in the driveway.  
Rosales’s mother, Maria Villa, came outside and Jose asked in a 
respectful voice whether Rosales was there.  Told he was not, 
Jose asked her to tell Rosales that Jose had stopped by.  Jose 
denied doing or saying anything else before leaving, but his 
brother Freddy testified that Jose told Ms. Villa to inform 
Rosales that he was “going to kick his ass.”  
Maria Villa is Rosales’s mother and defendant’s aunt.  She 
awoke to the noise of the men hitting her car with sandbags.  
She did not know any of them, but subsequently learned Chad’s 
name from television reports.  One of them said Rosales had 
fought with him and cut his arm.  Chad said he was looking for 
Rosales and was told he was not at home.  Chad shouted for 
Rosales to come outside.  He tried to push Villa, but she stepped 
back.  During these events, Villa’s nieces, ages 11 and 12, and 
her infant grandson, were in the house, and the girls were 
frightened.  Villa wrote down part of the license plate, which 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
 
included “CYA.”  Chad’s truck had a personalized license plate:  
CYARBRO.   
Defendant was in jail at the time of the Rosales incident, 
but was released a week or two before Chad was killed.  Maria 
Villa’s son, Alejandro Saenz, told him about the incident, 
including the attempt to shove Ms. Villa.  Saenz also told 
defendant about the license plate and asked him to find out who 
had come to the house that night.  Saenz further testified, “All 
of us were raised together”; defendant “got really upset” when 
he was told about the incident.  Before October 14, defendant 
told Saenz he knew whose truck had come to Villa’s house, and 
defendant “said that it was taken care of.”  
Defendant testified.  He denied any part of the Paredes 
kidnapping, admitted he assaulted Juan Carlos, and admitted 
he shot Chad but did so by accident.   
Defendant lived in Lamont until 1995, and attended Arvin 
High School for about a year and a half.  While there, Arvinas 
gang members would jump him, making him fear for his safety.  
In late 1994, someone shot at his house while his mother was 
there, and someone threw a Molotov cocktail at the home.  He 
thought the Arvin Boys were responsible.13  
After leaving Lamont, defendant lived in Phoenix for two 
years with his fiancée and their two children.  He attended a 
design school and junior college.  In May or June 1997, his 
fiancée left him and he lost his job as a forklift operator.  In 
 
13  
Quintana, who was 16 years old in 1997, lived in Lamont 
and was bused to Arvin High School.  He and others who were 
bused to Arvin had trouble there just because they were from 
Lamont.  
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
 
addition, tumors on his tongue and neck caused severe 
headaches, unrelieved by over-the-counter medications.14  
In June 1997, defendant purchased a Tec-9 firearm 
altered to be fully automatic.  After a three- or four-round burst, 
the gun would jam, and a shell would have to be ejected.  When 
he returned to Lamont in August 1997, he left the gun in 
Arizona.  Sometime later, an ex-roommate brought the gun to 
Visalia.  
Defendant was arrested in August 1997 for possession of 
methamphetamine and spent 30 days in jail.  After his release 
on bail, his cousin, Alex Saenz, told him that people in a white 
truck had gone to his aunt’s house creating the disturbance 
described above.  Defendant told Saenz something had to be 
done about the attack and retrieved the Tec-9 gun.   
Defendant was experiencing pain from his tumors and was 
depressed because he had lost his fiancée, home, children, and 
job.  He took drugs and was high most of the time, staying awake 
for two or three days using methamphetamine.  He came to 
believe that Chad and the Gomez brothers attacked his aunt’s 
house.  He testified that the three ran around with the Arvin 
Boys.  Based on his experience, he thought if nothing was done 
about their attack, his aunt might be harmed.  
Defendant denied abducting Leonel Paredes.  On October 
4, he went with his cousin, Carlos Rosales, to the home of Ashley 
Medina, arriving between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m., and staying there 
until 1:00 or 2:00 p.m. on October 5.  
 
14  
As described below, defendant had vascular tumors on his 
tongue and neck. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
 
As to the attack on Juan Carlos, defendant testified he was 
at Garza’s house with Garza, Rosales, Quintana, De La Rosa, 
and Valenzuela.  Over the preceding two days he had been 
consuming methamphetamine, phencyclidine (PCP), and 
alcohol. 
 
That 
morning 
he 
consumed 
marijuana, 
methamphetamine, and two 40-ounce bottles of Cobra malt 
liquor.  A truck drove up to Shannon Brown’s house next door.  
Valenzuela and De La Rosa got in the truck, which drove away.  
Fifteen or 20 minutes later, the truck returned and hit a car in 
front of the neighbor’s house.  De La Rosa told Juan Carlos to 
settle the damage by telling Shannon to keep the money he owed 
Juan Carlos for drugs.  Then they told defendant, Quintana, 
Rosales, and Garza to get in the back of the truck.  Defendant 
did not know where they were going or that Valenzuela and De 
La Rosa had abducted Juan Carlos.  He thought he was 
“[g]etting a ride somewhere.”  
In the truck, defendant told De La Rosa that Rosales 
wanted to be dropped off.  De La Rosa told him they were going 
to take care of “something” and did not respond when asked 
what the something was.  They stopped on a canal bank and 
defendant tried to find out what they were doing.  De La Rosa 
said that Juan Carlos had beaten up his sister.  Angered by this 
revelation, defendant hit Juan Carlos two or three times.  He 
and Valenzuela bound Juan Carlos, but did nothing else to him.  
After they drove back to town, Valenzuela gave him $20 and a 
medallion with “Juan” etched on it, and told him to give $10 to 
Rosales.  
Defendant went to Quintana’s house later in the afternoon 
and ingested alcohol and narcotics.  He had his Tec-9 with him.  
People in the house played with the gun, inserting and ejecting 
the clip.  At some point, someone said:  “There’s that guy.”  He 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
 
did not know what they meant, but walked outside and saw a 
truck drive by.  He and Garza, who had the Tec-9, approached 
the truck.  Defendant spoke to Chad who said he did not know 
defendant.  Chad opened the door and defendant got into the 
driver’s seat.  At Garza’s direction, Brent got out of the truck 
and Garza entered it.  Defendant wanted to scare and embarrass 
Chad, get him to admit what he had done, and protect his aunt.  
He did not intend to hurt Chad.  Defendant was drunk and high, 
slurring his words, and unable to think straight.  
While they drove around, Garza told Chad to take his 
clothes off.  Defendant had heard that the Gomez brothers were 
Arvin Boys, and told Chad he should not be hanging around with 
gangbangers.  Chad admitted trying to run down Rosales, but 
denied being part of the incident at his aunt’s house.  His 
demeanor upset defendant, who said they would not hurt Chad 
and would leave his truck where he could find it.  
Defendant was still drunk and high, and had difficulty 
thinking.  At some point they stopped in a field.  Garza secured 
Chad’s hands, while defendant paced, trying to decide what to 
do.  He tried to scare Chad with the gun but Chad would not 
admit the confrontation with his aunt.  Defendant asked Garza 
to get the clip from the truck.   
Still intending to frighten Chad, he began to load the clip 
into the weapon.  In the process the gun fired.  He was not 
aiming the gun, and did not know there was a round in the 
chamber.  Chad fell to the ground and did not move.  Defendant 
was confused, unsure what to do, and did not think there was 
anything he could do for Chad.  He drove the truck to 
Bakersfield and walked to his aunt’s house, as Garza left in the 
truck.  Defendant denied driving around with Joamy Garza.  He 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
 
stayed at his aunt’s house until morning, sitting by a window 
and smoking “dope.”  He was panicked and hallucinating, seeing 
officers everywhere.  He and Garza hitchhiked to Los Angeles, 
and defendant threw the gun away en route.  
Pathologist Barry Silverman opined that Chad’s wounds 
were 
inflicted 
instantaneously 
by 
automatic 
gunfire.  
Considering where the spent casings and spent bullets were 
found, Dr. Silverman concluded that Chad’s head could not have 
been on the ground when he was hit.  
Criminalist Ronald Helson, testified that a Tec-9 may be 
modified to be fully automatic.  He thought Chad’s wounds were 
consistent with automatic weapons fire.  The shooter would have 
to have been an expert marksman to have fired single shots 
causing equidistant head wounds.  A semi-automatic weapon 
modified to be automatic no longer functions as designed.  The 
magazine spring may not have sufficient tension to load rounds 
in the chamber as quickly as rounds are fired, which could cause 
the gun to jam.  
Dr. Stephen Estner diagnosed defendant with multiple 
hemangiomas, or “vascular tumors that grow from and feed into 
arteries and veins in certain parts of the body.”  Defendant had 
a tumor on his tongue and a mass in his right neck.  Dr. Estner 
expressed concern that jugular vein pressure would cause 
deoxygenated blood to back up in the right brain, causing pain 
and affecting brain function.  In addition, tumors in his throat 
pressed on both the internal jugular vein and carotid artery.  
Dr. 
David 
Bearman 
testified 
that 
defendant’s 
hemangioma caused pain and decreased blood flow to the brain.  
Dr. Bearman also opined that defendant suffered from 
depression; sleep deprivation; polysubstance abuse; and acute 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
 
stress disorder along with posttraumatic stress.  The combined 
impact of drug use and sleep deprivation would affect judgment, 
coordination, and perception.  
Clinical psychologist Francisco Gomez met with defendant 
three times over seven hours.  He also interviewed defendant’s 
mother and older brother, and reviewed school records along 
with other documents.  Based on cognitive and intelligence tests, 
he diagnosed defendant with low level chronic depression and 
polysubstance abuse, which he employed to cope with his 
depression.  Defendant experienced multiple stressors from 
June to November 1997, including a drug arrest, and the loss of 
his fiancée, job, and apartment.  These factors exacerbated his 
depression, increasing his drug use.  The drugs compromised his 
decision making.  
Professor Jose Lopez testified about criminal street gangs.  
He identified Arvina gang graffiti five blocks from defendant’s 
mother’s house, which was in Lamont gang territory.  Conflict 
between the Arvin and Lamont communities dated back to 1958, 
when a high school was established in Arvin and students from 
Lamont were bused there.  There were active gang members in 
Arvin and Lamont in 1997, but Dr. Lopez opined that defendant 
was not among them.  He based his conclusion on the fact that 
LFS was defunct as of 1994 or 1995, and defendant, who was 21 
years old in 1997, was associating with 15-year-olds.  Lopez 
concluded that Chad’s killing was not gang related.  In his view, 
machismo culture would put pressure on a man to avenge an 
attack in the middle of the night by a rival group.   
3. Prosecution Rebuttal  
Neuroradiologist Matthew Lotysch described the highly 
redundant system of arteries and veins that carry blood to and 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
 
from the brain.  He disagreed with Dr. Estner’s opinions that 
the hemangiomas would affect vessels in defendant’s neck and 
impede blood drainage from the brain.  He also testified that 
defendant’s hemangiomas did not in any way compromise his 
ability to breathe.  He saw no physical evidence in this case or 
in his experience that such masses impair blood supply to the 
brain when a person’s blood pressure is elevated due to stress or 
drug use.  The withdrawal phase from methamphetamine is 
itself accompanied by chronic headaches.  He agreed, however, 
hemangiomas could put pressure on nerves, causing discomfort. 
Criminalist Gregory Laskowski reviewed Dr. Silverman’s 
testimony and concluded that Silverman lacked knowledge of 
ballistics.  He testified that the pattern in which the bullet 
casings dispersed suggested the shooter moved while firing.  He 
asserted that Mr. Helson’s testimony did not consider where the 
bullet slugs were found, and without that information, no valid 
opinion could be given as to whether the shots were fired by an 
automatic or semiautomatic weapon.  
Sergeant Rosemary Wahl interviewed Maria Villa on 
October 30, 1997.  Wahl asked whether the men who came to 
her house had threatened her or tried to harm her.  Villa 
responded that they did not.  
B. Penalty Phase 
1. Prosecution Evidence 
Defendant was arrested on August 22, 1997, in a 
Bakersfield apartment.  He was found in a bedroom with 
methamphetamine and a loaded handgun nearby.  He admitted 
the drugs and weapon were his.   
Evidence was also presented about the murder of Javier 
Ibarra in March 1995.  Alma Mosqueda testified she was at 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
 
home with Ibarra and Christina Ramirez.  Defendant’s brother, 
Cipriano Ramirez, called her to ask if he could come over and 
“take care of business.”  Because Cipriano and Ibarra had fought 
about Christina in the past, Mosqueda suspected something bad 
was going to happen.  Five or ten minutes later, as Mosqueda 
was walking the couple through the parking lot, Cipriano, 
Gabriel Flores, and defendant arrived and blocked Ibarra’s car.  
At Cipriano’s direction the women went back inside.  Mosqueda 
looked back and saw Ibarra spread his hands out like he was 
calling somebody out to fight.  She could not see the parking lot 
from her apartment, but heard four or five shots, a pause, and 
then one final shot.  She ran out to find Ibarra face down on the 
grass with a fatal gunshot wound in the back of his head.  The 
car in which the three men arrived was leaving.   
Testimony varied as to defendant’s attire the night Ibarra 
was killed.  Jesse Ibarra, the victim’s brother, testified that 
when he visited Mosqueda the next morning, she said defendant 
had been wearing a white hat.15  Mosqueda testified, however, 
that she did not remember that conversation.  She also testified 
that Gabriel Flores was wearing a white hat when the three men 
confronted Ibarra.  About two days after the killing Sheriff’s 
Deputy Daniel Fuqua arrested defendant wearing a white 
baseball cap.  Gerardo Soto, defendant’s uncle, testified that the 
evening Ibarra was killed, defendant was wearing a cap but it 
was not white.  He told Deputy Contreras the night of the 
shooting that defendant was wearing a dark Pendleton shirt and 
a blue baseball cap.  
 
15  
As noted below, the defense presented evidence that the 
shooter was wearing a white cap. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
 
Chad’s girlfriend, brother and mother gave victim impact 
testimony.  Almost daily Chad and Castro discussed their hopes 
for the future.  Chad wanted to play college football, then become 
a physical education teacher and coach.  The couple had planned 
to marry and picked names for their future children.   
Brent did not return to school for many weeks after the 
murder and his grades dropped.  He had trouble sleeping and 
still experienced nightmares.  He went nowhere alone for fear 
that something would happen to him.  He blamed himself, in 
part, for his brother’s death, feeling he should have done 
something to prevent it.   
Chad’s mother, Cheryl Yarbrough, had three children:  
Melissa, Chad, and Brent.  The family had been quite close, 
doing everything together.  After Chad died, the family seldom 
dined together and gave up family trips.  Melissa moved from 
the house and everyone kept to themselves.  They all attended 
counseling.  Ms. Yarbrough described her son as caring, 
compassionate, and fun-loving.  He loved to joke with his 
mother.   
2. Defense Evidence 
Defendant also presented evidence about the Ibarra 
killing.  Ysela Nunez saw the crime from her second-story 
window.  A car drove up and three men approached a group of 
two “girls” and a man.  The girls walked away, and the men 
fought briefly.  Two of the attackers jumped back, and the third 
man shot the man who had been with the girls.  The shooter 
wore a white hat; black pants; and a Pendleton shirt, checkered 
in black, white, and grey.  The second man wore coveralls, and 
the third man wore blue jeans and a blue shirt.  Nunez did not 
recognize defendant in court.   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
 
Defendant’s mother and grandmother described his 
childhood.  He was born in Guadalupe, Chihuahua, Mexico, 
where his parents worked in the fields.  The family was very 
poor, and sometimes went without food.  His father was an 
alcoholic who was violent toward his wife and children.  After 
the parents separated, Angelita moved with her five children to 
Bakersfield.  Defendant was about one year old at that time, 
sickly and thin.  They lived in a three-bedroom house with about 
15 to 20 others.  They moved to Lamont after an uncle was killed 
in the house.  Defendant’s mother worked in the fields eight to 
nine hours a day, six days a week, for 11 years to support her 
children.  Lorenzo, the oldest son, was rough with the younger 
children and would beat them.  When defendant was a child, he 
had a tumor on his tongue that grew larger over time.  When 
defendant was nine years old, he worked cleaning yards and 
delivering newspapers, giving his earnings to his mother.  
In high school, students called defendant “stupid from 
Lamont.”  His mother intervened but school staff were not 
helpful.  Items, including a Molotov cocktail, were occasionally 
thrown through their windows.  Defendant began using drugs 
at about age 14.   
Other relatives testified about the scarcity of food and the 
older brother’s abuse.  His uncle would sometimes hit defendant 
in the head, then say how tough he was.  Relatives testified the 
defendant loved his two daughters and wrote letters to them.   
The parties stipulated that if Chad’s girlfriend were called 
as a witness, she would testify that she and Chad once drove by 
Carlos Rosales’s home.  Chad said he and the Gomez brothers 
had once gone to the house where Chad and “Luis” dented 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
 
Carlos’s car.16  She saw the car but did not see any damage.  
Chad told her they tried unsuccessfully to break a window with 
a rock.   
Dr. Stephen Estner returned in the penalty phase and 
testified that defendant’s hemangiomas pressed on more nerves 
in the neck than Dr. Lotysch recognized.  In addition to cranial 
nerves described by Dr. Lotysch, the vagus nerve travels from 
the brain to the gastrointestinal system and also branches off to 
the heart, controlling its rate and rhythm.  Pressure in the area 
could affect the respiratory system and mental function.  The 
pressure would vary with the size of the mass.  While he 
generally agreed with Dr. Lotysch’s testimony, he thought 
headaches, lightheadedness, and facial swelling were caused by 
obstruction of some vascular structures.  Methamphetamine 
use, along with fear and anger, could cause enlargement of the 
mass by raising defendant’s blood pressure.  The enlargement 
also causes difficulty speaking, and when a person has difficulty 
speaking, he might take action rather than use words.  Other 
physiological effects can also occur due to the obstruction of 
blood flowing in and out of the brain.  
Dr. Francisco Gomez, Jr., who previously testified that 
defendant suffered from chronic depression, testified about risk 
factors for depression in an impoverished Hispanic community.  
These include physical abuse and “severe neglect, poverty, low 
socioeconomic status, [and] culturative stress.”  Clinical 
depression affects “social functioning — how you see the world, 
how you act, how you behave, how you perceive things.”  
Exposure to violence is a high-risk factor for depression.  Very 
 
16  
Jose Gomez’s middle name was Luis.  
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
 
young children can be affected by these environmental factors.  
Stimulants like methamphetamine provide some relief from 
depressed feelings.   
Dr. Jose Lopez also returned to testify about gang culture.  
When parents are absent, children may be “subjected to street 
socialization,” which functions like a “surrogate parent.”  In the 
Latino family, there is emphasis on the male image.  Older 
siblings do not have the authority of a parent, and may use 
violence to discipline younger children.  Respect is very 
important in Latino and gang culture.  No value attaches to 
walking away from a fight.  If a female relative is treated 
discourteously, a manly reaction involving aggression is 
required.  
The parties stipulated that the defendant received no drug 
or gang counseling when out of custody and had not joined a 
prison gang following his arrest.  
C. Bifurcated Trial on Counts 10 and 11  
A new jury was empaneled to hear evidence on count 10, 
unlawful possession of methamphetamine while armed with a 
loaded gun (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)); and count 
11, possession of a loaded gun while under the influence of that 
drug (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (e)).  The testimony 
was substantially similar to that introduced at the penalty 
phase, recounting defendant’s arrest in an apartment with 
methamphetamine and a loaded handgun.  When arrested, 
defendant admitted both items were his.  He showed signs of 
drug use which was confirmed by urine test.   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Pretrial Issues 
1. Motion To Disqualify the Prosecutor’s Office  
Defendant moved to disqualify the Kern County District 
Attorney’s Office on two grounds:  (1) prosecutors had adopted 
inconsistent theories about who was the shooter in the Javier 
Ibarra murder; and (2) Chad’s aunt, Diana Yarbrough, was a 
supervising clerk for the Kern County Municipal Court, with a 
close relationship to the District Attorney’s Office.  The motion 
was denied and defendant urges the ruling was an abuse of 
discretion.  No error appears.   
Under section 1424, subdivision (a)(1), a motion to 
disqualify the district attorney “may not be granted unless the 
evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would 
render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.”  
This court has interpreted that standard to mean “ ‘the 
circumstances of a case evidence a reasonable possibility that 
the DA’s office may not exercise its discretionary function in an 
evenhanded manner,’ ” making it unlikely the defendant will 
receive fair treatment “ ‘during all portions of the criminal 
proceedings.’ ”  (People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 592 
(Eubanks), quoting People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 148 
(Conner).)  Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating a 
conflict of that nature.  (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 706, 709.)  We review the superior court’s factual 
findings for substantial evidence, then determine whether those 
facts demonstrate the court abused its discretion in denying the 
motion.  (Id. at pp. 711–712.)  An erroneous denial is state law 
error reviewed for prejudice under the Watson standard.  (People 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
 
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson); People v. Vasquez 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 47, 66–70 (Vasquez).)   
Defendant’s motion was litigated based on declarations 
and exhibits.  Transcripts showed that, in the separate trials of 
Gabriel Flores and Cipriano Ramirez, the Kern County District 
Attorney’s Office argued Flores personally shot Ibarra and that 
Cipriano was an aider and abettor.   
Each man was convicted of murder.  Significantly, Flores’s 
jury rejected an allegation that he personally used a firearm. 
In support of the motion to disqualify, defense counsel 
declared his belief that, in the penalty phase, the prosecutor 
would argue defendant shot Ibarra, relying on testimony of 
Cipriano Ramirez to that effect, which the prosecutor in the 
Cipriano trial had disavowed as false.  Defendant argued that 
these circumstances demonstrated a conflict of interests because 
the prosecutor in this case (1) was motivated by personal and 
emotional bias against defendant; (2) was representing 
conflicting interests; and (3) had adopted a strategy that would 
require the defense to call several members of the district 
attorney’s office as witnesses to rebut the allegation that 
defendant was the shooter. 
As for the victim’s aunt, Diana Yarbrough, defense counsel 
declared that she “is a supervising clerk in the [Kern County] 
Municipal Court” with an office in the same building as the 
district attorney’s.  Counsel alleged “upon information and 
belief” that the close working relationship between the two 
offices “has compromised the impartiality of the Office of the 
District Attorney in this matter.” 
In opposition, the People stated their intent, during the 
penalty phase, to present evidence of defendant’s involvement 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
 
in the Ibarra murder for which his brother Cipriano, and friend, 
Gabriel Flores, had both been convicted.  The People 
acknowledged that defendant’s “degree of actual involvement 
differs depending on which witnesses statements (including his 
own brother) one chooses to believe.  He clearly has culpability 
as a co-principal in that crime by all accounts.  [¶]  The People 
intend to present all of the evidence of defendant’s involvement, 
and let the jury decide what to believe as to his degree of 
culpability.”  The People relied upon People v. Watts (1999) 76 
Cal.App.4th 1250 to urge that they could permissibly “argue 
inconsistent and even mutually exclusive theories in separate 
trials of co-defendants so long as the evidence was subject to 
different interpretations or had changed.”  They argued that the 
former prosecutors were not appropriate witnesses because 
“their subjective personal theories of their respective cases are 
irrelevant and inadmissible.”  They represented that, in the 
event a conflict arose from presenting inconsistent theories, “we 
won’t put on Cipriano’s testimony [from his own trial].  We will 
just go with the theory on aiding and abetting, which certainly 
is not inconsistent with either of the theories of those prior 
prosecutions.” 
As to Diana Yarbrough, the People declared that she “has 
never worked for the District Attorney’s Office.  She has no 
closer relationship to the District Attorney’s Office than any 
other court employee.  [¶]  Her office is not within the District 
Attorneys’ Office nor even on the same floor of the building.  As 
a ‘supervising’ clerk she does not even have daily contact with 
deputy district attorneys in the courtroom.  [¶]  Her only 
interaction on this case has been as a member of the victim’s 
family and not as a court employee.”  
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 
the defense failed to carry its burden.     
Defendant’s allegation of inconsistent theories did not 
establish a conflict of interests sufficient to warrant recusal of 
the district attorney’s office.  The prosecutor relied on legal 
authority to urge that he could argue defendant shot Ibarra so 
long as the evidence was subject to different interpretations.  
The argument did not demonstrate a lack of integrity or 
impartiality warranting recusal.  The remedy for the 
prosecutor’s misapprehension, if any, was to restrict the People 
to arguing, as they had in previous trials, that defendant was an 
aider and abettor, making him equally guilty.  We discuss in 
detail below defendant’s separate claim that the prosecutor 
deprived him of a fair penalty phase verdict by presenting 
inconsistent theories of guilt in separate trials.  (Pt. II.C.1., 
post.)  Here, it suffices to note that the prosecutor did not 
ultimately introduce Cipriano’s prior testimony identifying 
defendant as the shooter.  Defense counsel conceded below that 
the prosecutor’s agreement not to present such evidence would 
alleviate the alleged conflict.  This record fails to establish that 
the prosecutor acted in such an uneven manner as to make it 
unlikely that defendant would receive a fair trial.  (Eubanks, 
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 592.)   
The court’s ruling as to Diana Yarbrough was, likewise, 
well within its discretion.  A personal relationship between the 
victim or a defendant and the district attorney’s office may 
require disqualification, particularly where there is evidence 
that 
the 
relationship 
has 
influenced 
the 
prosecutor’s 
discretionary decisions.  (See, e.g. Vasquez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 
pp. 52, 57; Conner, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 148–149.)  Here, 
however, Ms. Yarbrough did not work for the district attorney’s 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
 
office, did not share space with that office, and did not have daily 
contact with deputy district attorneys in the courtroom.  The 
fact that the victim’s aunt was a county court employee, without 
more, did not warrant the “serious step” of recusing the entire 
district attorney’s office.  (People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 
1142, 1156.)  
2. Change of Venue 
Defendant contends that conducting his trial in Kern 
County violated his statutory right to a change of venue (§ 1033, 
subd. (a)) and his constitutional right to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution.  He argues that pervasive media 
coverage of the crimes, false rumors, and the victim’s popularity 
in the community raised a reasonable likelihood that 12 
impartial jurors could not be impaneled.  He fails to persuade. 
a. Governing Principles 
On a defendant’s motion, the court must order a change of 
venue when a reasonable likelihood appears “that a fair and 
impartial trial cannot be had in the county.”  (§ 1033, subd. (a); 
see People v. Famalaro (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1, 21.)  This 
requirement was adopted in response to a series of Supreme 
Court cases in the 1960’s recognizing that media publicity about 
a criminal trial could, in some circumstances, deprive the 
defendant of due process.  (People v. Peterson (2020) 10 Cal.5th 
409, 438 (Peterson).)  Courts must weigh five factors in 
evaluating this claim:  “the nature and gravity of the offense, 
the nature and extent of the news coverage, the size of the 
community, the status of the defendant in the community, and 
the popularity and prominence of the victim.”  (People v. Harris 
(1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 948; accord, Peterson, at p. 439.) 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
 
On appeal, a defendant “must show both error and 
prejudice, that is, that it was not reasonably likely the defendant 
could receive a fair trial at the time of the motion, and that it is 
reasonably likely he did not in fact receive a fair trial.”  (People 
v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 837 (Rountree).)  “[I]n rare 
and ‘exceptional cases,’ a defendant may show circumstances so 
‘ “extraordinary” ’ that a court may assume no fair trial could be 
had.”  (Peterson, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 439, quoting People v. 
Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1216 (Prince).)  The United States 
Supreme Court has occasionally found such a showing adequate 
in cases where media coverage “manifestly tainted a criminal 
prosecution” and resulted in “ ‘kangaroo court proceedings.’ ”  
(Skilling v. United States (2010) 561 U.S. 358, 379 (Skilling).)  
But the high court has made clear that the assumption “attends 
only the extreme case.”  (Id. at p. 381.)   
“[W]e accept the trial court’s factual findings where 
supported by substantial evidence, but we review independently 
the court’s ultimate determination whether it was reasonably 
likely the defendant could receive a fair trial in the county.”  
(Rountree, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 837.)  
b. Proceedings Below 
Defendant moved for a change of venue in May 2000, two 
and a half years after the crimes occurred.  Materials provided 
in support included transcripts of television broadcasts and 
excerpts from newspaper coverage.  In addition, Dr. Edward 
Bronson, a professor of political science at California State 
University, Chico, testified about the media coverage and a 
survey conducted in January 2000 to assess coverage impact.  
Defendant and Garza were originally charged together, but the 
cases were ultimately severed.  Dr. Bronson’s analysis included 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
31 
 
potential jurors’ views of both defendants.  He did not always 
disaggregate the information as to views about each defendant 
when calculating his statistics.  Based on his research, training, 
and experience, Dr. Bronson opined there was a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury panel would be affected by pretrial 
publicity and that no remedy other than a change of venue 
would be adequate. 
Dr. Bronson testified that 225 articles were published 
about the case in the Bakersfield Californian, the Lamont 
Reporter, and the Arvin Tiller.  Of those articles, 133 were from 
1997, 72 from 1998, 19 from 1999 and one from 2000.  There 
were 97 articles on the front page of the paper; 30 more were on 
the front page of an interior section.  Coverage included 24 
letters to the editor and three editorials.  Dr. Bronson 
characterized this level of media coverage as “very high.”   
Dr. Bronson described several kinds of prejudice.  
Inflammatory publicity is of the greatest concern, followed by 
inadmissible or inaccurate reporting, and coverage reflecting a 
presumption of guilt.  He noted approximately 20 references to 
an execution-style slaying, emphasizing the brutality of 
shooting a kneeling victim in the head.  References to torture 
were later discounted.  Other details included Chad’s fear, being 
forced to disrobe, having tape over his eyes, and being on his 
knees.  Defendant reportedly admitted intending to humiliate 
the victim in retaliation for an act of disrespect against a 
relative.  The media also made numerous references to 
carjackings and gang activities.  Dr. Bronson could not 
determine whether 
the reporting 
was inadmissible or 
inaccurate.  As to a presumption of guilt, reports noted that 
defendant had confessed and fled to Mexico, and that 
codefendant Garza, whose case had not yet been severed, had 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
32 
 
refused to take a lie detector test.  Reports related that 
defendant said the gun discharged accidentally and that he did 
not intend to kill the victim.  But these statements would be 
followed by an observation that Chad was shot three times.   
Bronson considered a change of venue was warranted 
because of the gravity of the crime and the pursuit of a death 
penalty.  Letter writers expressed the view that even more 
extreme penalties should be imposed.  One writer opined that 
defendant’s arms should be cut off so he could never pull a 
trigger again.  Dr. Bronson found no mitigating content in the 
media he reviewed.   
Some coverage described defendant and Garza as 
Hispanic.  Some stories discussed a theory that Chad was killed 
because he was dating a Hispanic classmate.  Others addressed 
contentions that the case received greater resources because the 
victim was White.  Most of the stories, however, did not include 
a racial slant.  Other negative details included references to 
gangs, defendant’s criminal history, and his being armed and 
dangerous.  Bronson listed as a positive factor that defendant 
and Garza were not described as outsiders to the community.  
As to victim status, Chad was the high school football 
captain.  His jersey number appeared in thousands of places, 
including the football fields at Arvin and Bakersfield High 
Schools, armbands, cheerleaders’ uniforms, and plaques.  There 
was a shrine and multiple memorials, including one attended by 
4,200 people.  A candlelight vigil was conducted on his 18th 
birthday.  He was honored at his high school’s homecoming and 
numerous fundraisers were held to raise money for scholarships 
in his name.  Many contributed to a reward fund that grew to 
$15,000. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
33 
 
Dr. Bronson testified that Kern County was the 14th most 
populous of California’s 58 counties, with a population of 
648,400.  News coverage reflected that Chad’s death shocked, 
saddened, and galvanized people throughout the county.  Dr. 
Bronson opined that the response was similar to that common 
in a small community. 
Dr. Bronson also discussed electronic media, although he 
gave it less emphasis because it is harder to track and tends to 
have a lesser impact than print media.  He observed generally 
that “there was a massive amount of coverage.  There were far 
more broadcasts than there were news articles; that the 
material largely tracked what was in the newspapers; that . . . 
the coverage was — as with the newspapers, . . . heavier in the 
earlier period and then dwindled later on.”  
 A survey of Kern County residents conducted in January 
2000, about a year before jury selection began, revealed the 
following:  approximately 82 percent of the 403 jury-eligible 
respondents recognized the case; 53.6 percent of eligible 
participants thought the two defendants were definitely or 
probably guilty; 52.9 percent favored the death penalty after 
conviction; 41.9 percent had heard the defendants were gang 
members; 14.9 percent had heard that a defendant had 
confessed to the murder; 61.2 percent did not know whether it 
was defendant or Garza who had confessed; 52.3 percent had 
heard that Chad was tortured; 32.8 percent had heard that both 
defendants had criminal records that included carjacking and 
murder charges.  Finally, focusing on the details of gang 
membership, torture, confession, and criminal record, almost 75 
percent had heard one or more of those facts, 44 percent knew 
two or more, 21.6 percent knew three or more, and 5 percent 
knew all four.  Of those who were aware of all four specifics, 100 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
34 
 
percent thought the defendants were guilty and 81 percent 
thought they deserved the death penalty.  Lesser degrees of 
awareness gave rise to less belief in guilt and favor for the death 
penalty, but the numbers remained high.17  The survey did not 
ask if participants could put aside their knowledge of the case 
and beliefs about guilt and punishment to decide the case solely 
on the evidence introduced in court.   
The court denied the motion.  It found that defendant had 
not met his burden to show a reasonable likelihood that an 
impartial jury could not be empaneled.  In particular, it 
expressed concern that Dr. Bronson’s survey did not reflect 
whether those surveyed had fixed opinions that could not be set 
aside.  The court added that the motion could be renewed, 
presumably at the end of jury selection.  Defendant’s petition for 
writ of mandate was denied by the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal. 
Four hundred and fifty jury panelists were called; 199 
were dismissed for hardship and 166 were excused for cause, 
leaving 85 panelists from which to select the jurors and 
alternates.18  
 
17  
Of those who recognized three specifics, 83.6 percent 
thought they were guilty and 71 percent thought they deserved 
the death penalty.  Of those who recognized two specifics, 74.7 
percent thought they were guilty and 56 percent thought they 
deserved the death penalty.  Of those who recognized one 
specific, 64.8 percent thought they were guilty and 45 percent 
thought they deserved the death penalty.   
18  
In some of our own jury selection cases, and those of the 
United States Supreme Court, the terminology used can 
potentially cause confusion.  Those called to a courtroom for jury 
 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
35 
 
Defendant renewed his motion for a change of venue on 
January 5, 2001, at the completion of the for-cause excusals.  
The renewed motion was based on publicity since the previous 
motion and on an analysis of the juror questionnaires.  Dr. 
Bronson was recalled.  He identified 19 new articles since the 
last change of venue motion.  They contained references to the 
victim having been bound and killed “execution style” with three 
shots to the head.  The articles stated that defendant was the 
decisionmaker and fired the fatal shots.  They mentioned 
defendant’s inculpatory and exculpatory statements.  There was 
discussion of defendant’s gang involvement and his flight to 
Mexico.  The articles also reported that defendant faced charges 
for two other carjackings.   
Some articles mentioned that football players touched 
Chad’s memorial plaque before taking the field; a Sheriff’s 
bicycle patrol had been established from a memorial fund; and 
a quote from one citizen that “Chad will never be forgotten.”   
Jury questionnaires revealed that 79 percent of panelists 
recognized the case, and 11 percent knew the victim or his 
family; 16 percent had attended the victim’s funeral or a 
memorial, or knew someone who had done so; only 2 percent 
knew the defendant or his family; 18 percent said they could not 
be fair and impartial if street gangs were involved in the case; 
14 percent believed they could not be fair due to the nature of 
 
selection are prospective jurors, or members of a jury panel.  
However, some jury panel members are occasionally referred to 
as “jurors,” once they are called forward for voir dire, even if they 
are never sworn in as trial jurors.  To avoid confusion we refer 
to prospective jurors as panelists and use the term “juror” only 
to describe someone actually sworn to serve in that capacity.   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
36 
 
the charges; 19 percent had formed an opinion on guilt that they 
could not set aside.   
Dr. Bronson reviewed the voir dire of the first 75 of the 251 
panelists who remained after hardship excusals.  He considered 
the sample representative.  He did not know the age, race or 
residence of those questioned.  Nor did he focus attention 
specifically on the 85 panelists who remained after challenges 
for cause.  Dr. Bronson opined that panelists are not always 
completely forthcoming about bias in voir dire, although he 
acknowledged that this was less of a concern during individual, 
or Hovey¸ voir dire,19 that was used in this case.  In his view the 
court’s questioning was not always thorough enough.  He cited 
examples of leading questions asking whether a panelist would 
“do your duty” and “follow the law” that suggested the panelists 
should respond favorably.  In addition, 31 of the 75 panelists 
were not asked about their familiarity with the case.  Of the 
remaining 44 people who were asked, 41 (93 percent) were 
aware of some facts; 15 percent of the group were excused based 
on their representations that they could not be fair and 
impartial.   
Dr. Bronson acknowledged that of the 85 panelists 
remaining after challenges for cause, approximately one quarter 
had heard nothing about the case.  He also agreed that all of the 
39 panelists who stated that they could not be fair because of 
pretrial publicity were excused for cause.  Nonetheless, he 
continued to maintain that the selection process did not remedy 
 
19  
In a Hovey voir dire (Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 
Cal.3d 1) each prospective juror is questioned outside the 
presence of any others. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
37 
 
the effect of pretrial publicity, and that defendant could not 
receive a fair trial in Kern County.   
The trial court again denied the motion.  Relying on its 
firsthand observation of the panelists and their demeanor, the 
court concluded that defendant had failed to demonstrate a 
reasonable likelihood that the panelists had such fixed opinions 
that a fair and impartial trial could not be conducted.   
During jury selection defendant used all of his peremptory 
challenges allotted to the selection of the panel and alternates.  
His request for additional peremptory challenges was denied 
and he expressed dissatisfaction with the jury empaneled to try 
the case.   
c. Pretrial Motions 
Defendant has failed to demonstrate error in the denial of 
his motions to change venue. 
As to the nature of the offense, “ ‘every capital case 
presents a serious charge.  This factor adds weight to a motion 
for change of venue, but is not dispositive.’ ”  (People v. Smith 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 18, 40.)  This case was not particularly 
aggravated in comparison to other capital murders; it did not 
involve multiple murders or violent sex acts, for example.  That 
the victim was bound and shot in the head at close range are 
gruesome facts, but do not approach the sensational nature of 
other cases in which we have upheld the denial of venue 
motions.  (See, e.g., Smith, at pp. 23–24, 40 [defendant and 
accomplices hit victim multiple times with blunt objects, forced 
the victim to cut her own wrist with a razor, forced her to hold 
her wrists over a fire pit, poured whiskey on her wounds, 
wrapped a garbage bag around her head, and then bludgeoned 
her to death with a metal bar]; People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
38 
 
Cal.4th 1082, 1096–1097, 1125 (Zambrano) [defendant shot the 
victim then decapitated and dismembered the body with an ax 
and saw].) 
Defendant places great emphasis on the pretrial publicity 
factor.  There were 244 articles in the three local papers over a 
five-year period.  Articles reported that the victim was bound 
and killed execution style, and that defendant admitted the 
shooting but claimed it was accidental.  The newspapers 
mentioned carjacking and gang activities.  But media coverage 
“ ‘is not biased or inflammatory simply because it recounts the 
inherently disturbing circumstances of the case.’ ”  (People v. 
Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1048.)  The use of descriptions like 
“ ‘execution-style murders,’ ‘ “brutal,” “cold-blooded,” “evil,” 
“horrible,” or “horrific” ’ [are] not by themselves necessarily 
prejudicial when they appear[] in generally factual and 
noninflammatory reporting.”  (People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 
542, 570 (Scully).)  The coverage here was similar to that in 
Scully where we upheld the denial of a change of venue motion.  
There newspapers discussed a “ ‘cold-blooded’ ” or “ ‘execution-
style’ ” murder and described the defendant as “a parolee, 
violent felon, career criminal, or reputed member of the Aryan 
Brotherhood.”  (Id. at p. 569.)  Nonetheless, those articles also 
referred to the defendant as “ ‘suspected’ ” or “ ‘accused’ ” of 
“ ‘allegedly’ ” shooting the victim, and were “generally factual, 
fair, and not inflammatory.”  (Ibid.)  Similarly, the reporting in 
this case was “essentially factual, not sensationalized” 
(Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1126), and presented 
defendant’s assertion that the shooting was accidental.   
Moreover, the impact of pretrial publicity may be 
mitigated as time elapses between coverage and jury selection.  
(People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 525 (Proctor); see, e.g., 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
39 
 
Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 568, 570–571 [publicity largely 
abated two weeks after the killing]; People v. Jennings (1991) 53 
Cal.3d 334, 361 [publicity 11 months before trial]; People v. 
Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1130 [lapse of five months]; 
People v. Welch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 106, 113–114 [news reports 
ending about a month before trial].)  Here, 205 articles were 
published between 1997 and 1998, over two years before 
defendant’s trial.  Only 19 articles were published in 1999, with 
20 articles published in 2000 and 2001.  The press coverage here 
had abated in the months preceding jury selection, and the trial 
was held in Bakersfield, a larger community approximately 20 
miles away from Arvin, where the victim lived.  (See Proctor, at 
p. 525.)  These circumstances greatly mitigated the effect of 
pretrial publicity.   
Defendant relies on the results of the 2000 survey of Kern 
County residents to argue that recollection of the case remained 
high despite the passage of time.  Approximately 82 percent (329 
of 403) of jury-eligible respondents recognized the case; 53.6 
percent thought the two defendants were definitely or probably 
guilty; 41.9 percent had heard the defendants were gang 
members; 14.9 percent had heard that a defendant had admitted 
the killing; and 32.8 percent had heard that both defendants had 
prior criminal records that included carjacking and murder 
charges.  But the fact that many jurors recall a case does not 
equate to the type of extreme press coverage that manifestly 
taints a criminal prosecution.  The degree of exposure was 
comparable to that in Proctor, where 80 percent of those 
surveyed had heard of the case and 31 percent had formed an 
opinion as to the defendant’s guilt.  There, based on the passage 
of time and the location of the trial in a larger community, we 
held that a change of venue due to pretrial publicity was not 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
40 
 
strongly indicated.  (Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 524−526, 
and cases cited; accord Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 570–571, 
and cases cited.)  “Almost inevitably even those qualified for 
potential service by a court may have had some prior exposure 
to the case, but ‘[p]rominence does not necessarily produce 
prejudice, and juror impartiality, we have reiterated, does not 
require ignorance.’ ”  (Peterson, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 441, 
quoting Skilling, supra, 561 U.S. at p. 381.)  The answer is to 
“rigorously vet potential jurors to screen out those tainted and 
irrevocably biased by pretrial publicity, to find 12, plus 
alternates, who can decide only on the evidence admitted at 
trial.”  (Peterson, at p. 441.)  
As for community size, at the time of defendant’s trial 
Kern County was the 14th largest in California, with a 
population of 648,400.  The trial was held in Bakersfield, the 
county seat and the largest city in the county.  (California State 
Association 
of 
Counties, 
Kern 
County 
 [as of 
Aug. 22, 2022]; Statistical Atlas, Population of Kern County, 
California  [as of Aug. 25, 2022].  All Internet citations 
in this opinion are archived by year, docket number and case 
number at .)  In a 
populous urban area, a major crime is less likely to remain 
imbedded in the public consciousness.  (People v. Coleman (1989) 
48 Cal.3d 112, 134; People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 178 
(Balderas).)  We have upheld the denial of motions for change of 
venue in Kern County and other, smaller counties.  (See, e.g., 
Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 574 [Sonoma County, population 
approximately 421,500]; People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 
280–283 
[Stanislaus 
County, 
population 
approximately 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
41 
 
370,000]; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 905 [Kern 
County].)  The size of this community militates against a venue 
change.   
As to defendant’s community status, he was not an 
outsider.  Although born in Mexico, he moved to Kern County as 
an infant and lived there most of his life.  According to Bronson, 
several articles described defendant as Hispanic without any 
contextual relevance, which he deemed to be “unprofessional.”  
However, he did not note any overtly inflammatory terms 
designed to spark ethnic prejudice.  (See Prince, supra, 40 
Cal.4th at p. 1214.)  Defendant emphasizes that media reports 
portrayed him as a gang member.  But evidence of that 
involvement would be part of the trial evidence, including 
defendant’s own admissions to law enforcement.  Any prejudice 
stemming from defendant’s status as a gang member would be 
a potential factor wherever the case was tried.  (Scully, supra, 
11 Cal.5th at p. 575; Prince, at p. 1214.)  Chad’s death did spark 
local action.  Law enforcement announced plans to crack down 
on gang activity.  A “Call to Action” meeting and various 
fundraisers were held to combat gang violence, and a reward 
was offered for information leading to the arrest and conviction 
of the suspect at large.  A few letters to the editor described the 
suspects as “evil,” and “self-centered gang members.”  But we 
cannot say that these circumstances reflected “ ‘ “unusual local 
hostility . . . such that a change of venue would likely produce a 
less biased panel.” ’ ”  (Scully, at p. 575, original italics, quoting 
People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 449 (Panah); see also 
Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 179.)   
As for the victim’s prominence, Chad was well-known and 
well-liked in his hometown, particularly among his peers.  
Memorial attendance and the ongoing local tributes were 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
42 
 
significant.  But he did not appear to have particular 
prominence outside of this small town and the local football 
community.  Certainly jurors from anywhere might sympathize 
with the fact that a popular and successful young man met an 
untimely death.  In Proctor, we did not find a change of venue 
indicated where the victim was a well-known and well-liked 
member of the small community who worked in the school 
system for 20 years and had “ ‘taught everyone’s kids.’ ”  
(Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 526.)  And in People v. Rices 
(2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, we upheld the denial of a change of venue 
where the victims “were members of the close-knit Chaldean 
community” and “that community, understandably, grieved 
heavily over its loss,” but the community “constituted only a 
small portion of the large overall population in the East County 
district” from which the jurors were chosen.  (Id. at pp. 72–73.)   
The above factors do not weigh strongly in favor of a 
change of venue for a trial that was conducted in a larger city 
with jurors drawn countywide. 
Most significantly, a review of the voir dire demonstrates 
no reasonable likelihood that defendant did not, in fact, receive 
a fair trial from the jurors actually seated.  The profile of 10 of 
the 12 seated jurors is discussed in greater detail below in 
connection with defendant’s challenge to the court’s ruling on 
challenges for cause.  (See pt. II.A.4., post.)  In brief, 11 of the 12 
had been exposed to some pretrial publicity.  However, that fact, 
standing alone, “does not necessarily require a change of venue.  
[Citation.]  ‘ “It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his [or her] 
impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the 
evidence presented in court.” ’ ”  (Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 
448.)  In Prince, we affirmed the denial of a venue change even 
though “a high percentage of the [panelists] and 12 of the 13 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
43 
 
jurors who actually served at trial . . . had been exposed to the 
publicity . . . .”  (Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1215.)  We noted 
the responses to the questionnaires and voir dire “did not 
disclose any prejudgment or emotional bias” and “displayed only 
a vague recollection of past news coverage.”  (Ibid.)  The 
panelists asserted that “the publicity would not prevent them 
from serving as unbiased jurors.”  (Ibid.) 
Likewise, here most of the jurors had heard only the basic 
facts that would be presented at trial, and many remembered 
very little due to the passage of time.  (See pt. II.A.4., post.)20  
And all of the seated jurors stated that their exposure to pretrial 
publicity would not affect their ability to be fair and impartial.  
While a “juror’s assurances that he [or she] is equal to this task 
cannot be dispositive of the accused’s rights” (Murphy v. Florida 
(1975) 421 U.S. 794, 800), defendant here “offers no sound basis 
to believe the jurors’ assurances in this case were insincere” 
(Peterson, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 442).   
As discussed below, the court and the parties carefully 
vetted the seated jurors and the court made specific findings 
based on the jurors’ answers and demeanor.  We have repeatedly 
declined to find prejudice under similar circumstances.  (See 
Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 573–574; Proctor, supra, 4 
Cal.4th at p. 527, and cases cited.)  “When pretrial publicity is 
at issue, ‘primary reliance on the judgment of the trial court 
makes [especially] good sense’ because the judge ‘sits in the 
locale where the publicity is said to have had its effect’ and may 
base her evaluation on her ‘own perception of the depth and 
 
20  
Seated Juror No. 7’s purported emotional reaction to the 
fact that Brent stood in for his late brother as homecoming king 
is discussed in further detail below.  (Pt. II.A.4.f., post.) 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
44 
 
extent of news stories that might influence a juror’ 
[Citation.] . . .  [¶] Reviewing courts are properly resistant to 
second-guessing the trial judge’s estimation of a [panelist’s] 
impartiality, for that judge’s appraisal is ordinarily influenced 
by a host of factors impossible to capture fully in the record — 
among them, the [panelist’s] inflection, sincerity, demeanor, 
candor, body language, and apprehension of duty.  [Citation.]  In 
contrast to the cold transcript received by the appellate court, 
the in-the-moment voir dire affords the trial court a more 
intimate and immediate basis for assessing a venire member’s 
fitness for jury service.”  (Skilling, supra, 561 U.S. at pp. 386–
387.)  That the jury acquitted on one count of carjacking is 
another indication that the jurors were not unduly swayed by 
emotion, and considered each allegation separately.  (See id. at 
pp. 394–396; People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 831.)  The 
record demonstrates that defendant was tried by 12 impartial 
jurors.  
We further reject defendant’s claim that the pretrial 
publicity in this case was so pervasive and damaging that 
prejudice must be presumed rather than shown.  (See generally 
Mu’Min v. Virginia (1991) 500 U.S. 415, 429; People v. Avila 
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 496, 509–513 (Avila); Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th 
at pp. 1216–1218.)  Such a presumption “attends only the 
extreme case.”  (Skilling, supra, 561 U.S. at p. 381 [pervasive 
publicity from the Enron scandal did not require that prejudice 
be presumed].)  The examples cited in Skilling are illustrative:   
Rideau v. Louisiana (1963) 373 U.S. 723 involved a 
murder trial in a small community.  Three times shortly before 
trial, a local television station broadcasted a video of the 
defendant “in jail, flanked by the sheriff and two state troopers, 
admitting in detail the commission of the robbery, kidnapping, 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
45 
 
and murder, in response to leading questions by the sheriff.”  
(Id. at p. 725.)  Over a third of the community had watched at 
least one of the televised confessions, as had three of the actual 
jurors.  (Id. at pp. 724–725.)  In finding a presumption of 
prejudice, the court observed that the trial amounted to 
“kangaroo court proceedings” in which “the people of Calcasieu 
Parish saw and heard, not once but three times, a ‘trial’ of 
Rideau in a jail, presided over by a sheriff, where there was no 
lawyer to advise Rideau of his right to stand mute.”  (Id. at pp. 
726–727.) 
The Skilling court also discussed Estes v. Texas (1965) 381 
U.S. 532, which it described as follows:  “extensive publicity 
before trial swelled into excessive exposure during preliminary 
court proceedings as reporters and television crews overran the 
courtroom and ‘bombard[ed] . . . the community with the sights 
and sounds of’ the pretrial hearing. The media’s overzealous 
reporting efforts . . . ‘led to considerable disruption’ and denied 
the ‘judicial serenity and calm to which [Billie Sol Estes] was 
entitled.’ ”  (Skilling, supra, 561 U.S. at pp. 379−380.)   
Finally, the Skilling court looked to Sheppard v. Maxwell 
(1966) 384 U.S. 333.  There the defendant “was accused of 
bludgeoning his pregnant wife to death.  ‘[B]edlam reigned at 
the courthouse during the trial and newsmen took over 
practically the entire courtroom,’ thrusting jurors ‘into the role 
of celebrities.’ [Citation.]  Pretrial media coverage, which [the 
court] characterized as ‘months [of] virulent publicity about 
Sheppard and the murder,’ did not alone deny due process . . . . 
[Citation.]  But Sheppard’s case involved more than heated 
reporting pretrial:  [The court] upset the murder conviction 
because a ‘carnival atmosphere’ pervaded the trial [citation].”  
(Skilling, supra, 561 U.S. at p. 380.) 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
46 
 
This was not such an “extreme case.”  (Skilling, supra, 561 
U.S. at p. 381.)  There was no media circus surrounding the trial 
and no broadcast of a videotaped confession.  Although the press 
reported that defendant had admitted shooting Chad, it also 
reported his exculpatory statement that the gun discharged 
accidentally.  Of course, these same facts were admitted at trial.  
The volume of pretrial publicity alone did not give rise to a 
presumption of prejudice.  “ ‘[P]retrial publicity — even 
pervasive, adverse publicity — does not inevitably lead to an 
unfair trial.’ ”  (Id. at p. 384.)  This is particularly true given the 
passage of three years between the crime and the beginning of 
trial.  (See Avila, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 510.)  The high court 
has “rightly set a high bar for allegations of juror prejudice due 
to pretrial publicity.  [Citations.]  News coverage of civil and 
criminal trials of public interest conveys to society at large how 
our justice system operates.  And it is a premise of that system 
that jurors will set aside their preconceptions when they enter 
the courtroom and decide cases based on the evidence 
presented.”  (Skilling, at p. 399, fn. 34.)  Here there was a three-
year gap between the crimes and trial, and the facts are 
substantially different from the cases to which the defense 
points.  No presumption of prejudice is warranted on these facts. 
d. Renewed Motions 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying several 
motions for a change of venue prompted by developments during 
jury selection and the trial itself.  He fails to persuade.   
i.  Panelist M.D. 
On January 17, 2001, during the selection of alternates, 
Panelist M.D. reported that she had just learned her brother 
worked with the victim’s sister.  M.D.’s brother had commented 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
47 
 
that he had to rearrange the sister’s schedule so that she could 
attend the trial.  M.D. told her brother that she could not talk 
about the case.  She was not acquainted with Chad’s sister or 
even aware of her name.  She stated that this brief conversation 
with her brother would not affect her ability to be fair and 
impartial.  Defendant challenged the panelist for cause, moved 
for a mistrial, and renewed the motion for change of venue.  He 
argued that it was “absolutely unfair and prejudicial . . . to be 
put through . . . this type of a jury pool, with jurors that we know 
have close connections with this family, are one person away 
from this family, going to affect them for the rest of their lives.”  
Defendant objected that “[w]e have to waste a peremptory on 
people like this, when, if we were in the situation where we had 
a jury that could be fair and impartial, and didn’t prejudge guilt, 
we can — there would be totally different considerations, in 
exercising challenges.”  The court found, based on the panelist’s 
answers and demeanor, that she could perform her duties, and 
denied defendant’s motions.   
The voir dire of M.D. does not bear out defendant’s 
argument that the panel was “saturated” with people closely 
associated with the Yarbrough family.  M.D. did not personally 
know the victim or his sister.  The panelist’s brother worked at 
the same chain store as Chad’s sister, but the record did not 
establish a close relationship.  The panelist conscientiously 
avoided any discussion of the case with her brother and the trial 
court found that she could be fair and impartial. 
ii.  Circus Atmosphere 
On January 31, 2001, defendant objected that the 
presence of family members in the courtroom was creating a 
“circus atmosphere.”  He described that 20 to 25 members of the 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
48 
 
Yarbrough family had broken into “loud and raucous laughter” 
when Brad testified about his underpants.  Several members of 
the jury followed suit.  He also commented that, twice that day 
during breaks in the trial, the family members were “gathered 
outside the courtroom . . . visiting in loud voices and seemingly 
very happy about the progress of affairs, with jurors sitting a 
few feet away . . . .”  Defendant suggested there had been 
favoritism shown towards the victim’s family, citing as examples 
a sign on the courtroom door saying, “Yarbrough case,” and a 
uniformed bailiff having commiserated with the Yarbrough 
family in the hallway.  The bailiff was questioned and said that 
he had asked the family how they were holding up during the 
trial.  The interaction lasted about five minutes.  The trial court 
denied defendant’s motion for mistrial.  It observed:  “I don’t find 
there’s been a circus atmosphere.  I deny that there’s been any 
inappropriate behavior by the jurors or people in the audience 
section.  [¶]  I don’t agree with that characterization . . . that 
people were laughing in a loud and raucous manner.  Certainly, 
I could hear laughter.  But I don’t feel it was inappropriate.”  The 
court admonished the bailiff not to speak with the family 
members.   
This record does not bear out defendant’s assertion that a 
circus atmosphere permeated the case.  Family members have a 
right to attend a public trial and may well have done so 
regardless of the venue.  The family’s audible laughter over a 
discrete aspect of testimony did not undermine courtroom 
decorum.  The court specifically found that the laughter was not 
disruptive and saw no need to admonish the audience at the 
time.  The bailiff’s interaction with the family in the hallway 
was an isolated incident for which he was admonished.  A sign 
identifying the trial by the victim’s last name, rather than 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
49 
 
defendant’s, is somewhat unusual.  But as the prosecutor 
observed below, this was likely done for practical reasons to 
assist witnesses and court-watchers, rather than as an overt act 
of favoritism.  These circumstances are a far cry from Sheppard 
v. Maxwell, supra, 384 U.S. 333, where “bedlam reigned at the 
courthouse during the trial and newsmen took over practically 
the entire courtroom,” causing “frequent confusion and 
disruption” (id. at p. 355) and thrusting jurors “into the role of 
celebrities” (id. at p. 353).   
iii.  Juror No. 11             
On February 5, 2001, Juror No. 11 had lunch with her 
father.  He asked her if she was getting bored with the case.  
When she said no, he replied, “[W]hat’s taking them so long?  
They know he did it.”  She responded that she could not discuss 
the case.  After the juror reported the incident, defendant moved 
for a mistrial and renewed his change of venue motion.  The 
court questioned Juror No. 11 and several other jurors who were 
also aware of the incident.  The court declined to dismiss Juror 
No. 11, grant a mistrial, or revisit its venue ruling.   
Defendant contends that Juror No. 11 was “subject to 
improper influence by her father who expressed a forceful 
opinion, in public, about the guilt of the defendant,” and 
“appeared hostile” to defense counsel when questioned about the 
incident.  These arguments are more properly addressed to 
defendant’s claim of juror misconduct.  That claim, and a fuller 
discussion of the relevant record, appears post at part II.B.1.  
Here, it is enough to note that this isolated incident between the 
juror and her father does not evidence a pervasive and damaging 
bias held by the seated jurors that would warrant a change of 
venue.   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
50 
 
iv.  Diana Yarbrough   
On February 9, 2001, defense counsel reported that the 
previous day he had encountered the victim’s aunt, Diana 
Yarbrough, when appearing before a different judge, in another 
courtroom, in connection with defendant’s funding requests.  
Ms. Yarbrough, a supervising clerk in the municipal court, had 
regularly attended defendant’s trial.  Defense counsel argued it 
was “inappropriate” for Ms. Yarbrough to be supervising the 
clerk in a department that handled matters related to this case 
and moved for a change of venue, a mistrial, and dismissal.  Ms. 
Yarbrough testified about the incident.  She generally 
supervised the clerk in the other courtroom, but had made 
arrangements for another supervisor to oversee issues arising 
from defendant’s proceedings there.  She entered that 
department during a recess and spoke for about one minute with 
the clerk about an unrelated juvenile matter.  She heard nothing 
about defendant’s case and reviewed no records related to it.  
The trial court denied defendant’s motions.  The court noted that 
Ms. Yarbrough did not supervise the clerk assigned to the trial 
courtroom, and found no evidence that she had seen or discussed 
any information regarding the case.   
Ms. Yarbrough’s status as an employee of the Kern County 
Superior Court did not warrant a change of venue.  She was 
effectively walled off from defendant’s trial and had no 
confidential information about it.  Her brief presence on an 
unrelated juvenile case in a different department did not 
undermine confidence in the fairness of these proceedings. 
3. Correctional Officers in Jury Pool 
Defendant contends the denial of his motion to dismiss all 
correctional officers from the jury pool violated his right to an 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
51 
 
impartial jury.  He argues that “[I]t was clear from the 
testimony of the numerous correctional officers called as 
prospective jurors that the local correctional facilities were 
centers of interest and concern about this case; that it was a 
major topic of discussion during the process of jury selection; 
and that many correctional officers held opinions or expressed 
notions that were premature, unfounded, and false.”  The claim 
fails.   
Panelist S.L. was a correctional officer and gang 
investigator 
for 
the 
Department 
of 
Corrections 
and 
Rehabilitation.  Defendant challenged him for cause arguing 
that he had special knowledge about gangs and had heard a 
rumor at work that the victim’s penis was severed and placed in 
his mouth.  Counsel argued:  “This is a CDC officer.  He’s not 
one of the defendant’s peers.  There’s a potential here that he 
will substitute his expertise for the evidence in this case.  He 
indicated that.  [¶]  The problem with this case and having this 
case in Kern County keeps resurfacing, because the burden 
keeps shifting to the defendant to disprove rumors.  We don’t 
know all the rumors that these people have heard.  [¶]  This 
[juror] heard some of the more horrendous rumors, which now 
we are going to have to disprove and possibly show autopsy 
pictures we have agreed to stipulate to keep out, and now I have 
to show the fact this victim’s genitals are intact.  [¶]  The juror 
himself is in an adversarial position with gangs automatically 
because of his job.  He would be in an adversarial position to 
potential defense witnesses and to this defendant if he was a 
juror.”     
The court denied the challenge for cause against 
correctional officers as a group and against panelist S.L. in 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
52 
 
particular.21  As for the blanket challenge, the court observed 
that “the Legislature, in their wisdom, had not excluded 
correctional officers from the prospective jury pool.  It’s the 
legislative intent that correctional officers be allowed to be on 
criminal juries.”  Defendant renewed his blanket challenge 
during the subsequent voir dire of another correctional officer, 
Panelist S.W.  The renewed motion was denied.  
Defendant argues that, under the unique facts of this case, 
all correctional officers in the jury pool were unfit to serve 
because the case was “a chief subject of concern and speculation 
in the numerous correctional institutions of Kern County, and 
. . . falsities, presumptions of guilt, and poisonous rumors were 
part of daily talk in public areas of these institutions.”  The court 
acted within its discretion.  We addressed a similar claim in 
People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641 (Ledesma).)  There, the 
defendant argued that the panelist’s “employment as a 
corrections officer in the county jail system where defendant was 
housed constituted ‘implied bias’ — a presumption of bias that 
could not be overcome by a finding that he could be fair and 
impartial.”  (Id. at pp. 669–670.)  We noted that, under 
California law, “a juror may be excused for ‘implied bias’ only for 
one of the reasons listed in Code of Civil Procedure section 229, 
‘and for no other.’ ”  (Id. at p. 670.)22  If the facts do not establish 
 
21  
The court’s ruling with respect to the attributes of this 
particular panelist is discussed post at part II.A.5.a.iv. 
22  
Code of Civil Procedure section 229 provides for dismissal 
of a panelist or seated juror because of:  (1) consanguinity or 
affinity to a party, witness or victim; (2) certain family, 
confidential, or business relationships; (3) participation in 
another action or trial involving the same parties or cause of 
 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
53 
 
one of the grounds for implied bias listed in that statute, a 
panelist may be excused for “[a]ctual bias” if the court finds that 
the panelist harbors a state of mind that would prevent 
impartiality.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 225, subd. (b)(1)(C); Ledesma, 
at p. 670.)  We rejected Ledesma’s claim, concluding:  “None of 
the statutory grounds for a finding of implied bias is present in 
this case, and the trial court concluded that [the panelist] was 
not actually biased.”  (Ledesma, at p. 670.)  The same is true 
here.   
Defendant’s assertion about panelists’ exposure to case 
information among correctional officers was explored on a case-
by-case basis.  Three of the panelists defendant identifies:  S.L., 
S.W., and M.T., did not serve on the jury.  Those people could 
not possibly have affected the fairness of defendant’s trial.  
(People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 921 (Black); People v. 
Yeoman (2013) 31 Cal.4th 93, 114 (Yeoman).)     
The challenges against Seated Juror Nos. 6, 8, and 12 are 
discussed in further detail below.  As to the venue claim, we note 
that these jurors had some general knowledge about the case 
from the news media.  None of the information they recounted 
was inaccurate, and none was acquired from their employment 
in the prison system.  This voir dire record disproves defendant’s 
expansive claim that “falsities, presumptions of guilt, and 
 
action or being a party to the action pending before the court; (4) 
an interest in the outcome of the action; (5) an unqualified 
opinion on the merits of the action founded on knowledge of its 
material facts; (6) a state of mind evincing enmity against, or 
bias towards, either party; or (7) in a capital case, a 
conscientious opinion that would preclude the juror from finding 
the defendant guilty.  Correctional officers, as a class, do not 
automatically fall under any of these categories. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
54 
 
poisonous rumors” about the case were so prevalent in the 
correctional institutions of Kern County that anyone who 
worked there was automatically disqualified from service. The 
defense presented no independent proof on this broad assertion.  
The trial court properly denied defendant’s blanket challenge.      
4. Biased Jury 
Defendant contends the trial court repeatedly and 
erroneously denied for cause challenges, resulting in a biased 
jury.  Of the 48 panelists he identifies, 26 were removed by 
defense peremptory challenges.  After the defense exhausted its 
peremptories, 10 panelists whom defendant unsuccessfully 
challenged sat on the jury and two others were seated as 
alternates.23   
As a preliminary matter, the People argue that the claim 
is forfeited.  To preserve a claim of error in the denial of a 
challenge for cause, the defendant must exhaust his peremptory 
challenges, declare his dissatisfaction with the jury as finally 
constituted, and request additional challenges.  (Black, supra, 
58 Cal.4th at p. 918.)   
Defendant did not forfeit the claim as to the seated jurors.  
He exhausted his allotted peremptory challenges and requested 
more.  The court denied his request and deemed his objection to 
be continuing.  Defendant did not immediately express his 
dissatisfaction with the jury as sworn.  However, shortly 
thereafter, he moved for a mistrial on the ground that his 
 
23  
The relevant jurors are Jurors Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 
11, 12 and Alternate Jurors Nos. 1 and 5.  Original Juror No. 12 
was excused during trial and replaced by Alternate Juror No. 3.  
References to Juror No. 12 are to this seated alternate.   
 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
55 
 
challenges for cause had been improperly denied, resulting in a 
biased jury.  The motion was considered and denied.  Although 
this timing was not ideal, the mistrial motion was specific and 
timely enough to allow the trial court to take corrective action.  
At the time of the motion the court was engaged in the selection 
of alternates and the jury pool had not been discharged.  
Accordingly, defendant sufficiently preserved the claim of error.  
(See People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 801 (Peoples).)  
Defendant failed, however, to preserve his objection with 
respect to the alternate jurors.  While defendant exhausted his 
allotted peremptory challenges and requested more, he did not 
express dissatisfaction with the ultimate composition of the 
alternate group.  His challenge to the alternates is therefore 
forfeited.  (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 186–187 
(Mills).)  
In any event, defendant’s challenge fails on the merits.  
Under both state and federal Constitutions, a criminal 
defendant is guaranteed the right to be tried by an impartial 
jury.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.)  
To prevail on a claim that the court erroneously denied a 
challenge for cause, “defendant must demonstrate that the 
court’s rulings affected his right to a fair and impartial jury.”  
(Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 114.)  
Defendant cannot make that showing as to the panelists 
he dismissed peremptorily because none of those panelists sat 
on his jury.  (Black, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 921; Yeoman, supra, 
31 Cal.4th at p. 114.)  The same is true of Alternate Jurors Nos. 
1 and 5 who were sworn but never called to serve.  (Mills, supra, 
48 Cal.4th at p. 186.)  Because there was no possible prejudice, 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
56 
 
we need not consider the correctness of the trial court’s ruling 
respecting those jurors.  (Yeoman, at p. 114.)   
We find no error in the court’s denial of defendant’s 
challenges for cause as to jurors who ultimately adjudicated his 
case.  “A party may challenge a prospective juror for actual bias, 
defined as a state of mind that would prevent that person from 
acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial 
rights of any party.”  (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 
488.)  “The trial court is in the best position to determine the 
[juror’s] true state of mind because it has observed firsthand 
[that person’s] demeanor and verbal responses.  [Citations.]  
Thus, ‘ “ ‘[o]n review of a trial court’s ruling, if the [juror’s] 
statements 
are 
equivocal 
or 
conflicting, 
that 
court’s 
determination of the person’s state of mind is binding.’ ” ’ ”  
(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 895 (Clark).)  “If there is 
no inconsistency, the reviewing court will uphold the court’s 
ruling if substantial evidence supports it.”  (Hillhouse, at p. 488.)   
Defendant’s challenges for cause focused primarily on 
jurors’ knowledge of the case and exposure to pretrial publicity.  
Qualified jurors “need not be totally ignorant of the facts and 
issues involved.”  (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 807 
(Cooper).)  “ ‘To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived 
notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, 
is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a [juror’s] impartiality 
would be to establish an impossible standard.’ ”  (Murphy v. 
Florida, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 800.)  “ ‘ “It is sufficient if the 
juror[s] can lay aside [their] impression[s] or opinion[s] and 
render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” ’ ”  
(Cooper, at p. 807.)   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
57 
 
Some seated jurors were also challenged by defendant 
based on their death penalty views.  “ ‘To achieve the 
constitutional imperative of impartiality, the law permits a 
[juror] to be challenged for cause only if his or her views in favor 
of 
or 
against 
capital 
punishment 
‘would 
“prevent 
or 
substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a 
juror” ’ in accordance with the court’s instructions and the 
juror’s oath.”  (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 741 (Blair), 
quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt).)  A 
juror’s bias in favor of or against the death penalty need not be 
proven with “ ‘ “unmistakable clarity.  [Citations.]  Rather, it is 
sufficient that the trial judge is left with the definite impression 
that a [juror] would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply 
the law . . . .” ’ ”  (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 497–498 
(Abilez).)  Under this standard, a juror is properly excluded in a 
capital case if he or she is unable to follow the trial court’s 
instructions and “conscientiously consider all of the sentencing 
alternatives.”  (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 340.)   
a. Juror No. 1 
Juror No. 1 wrote in her questionnaire that she did not 
know the victim or any of his family.  She had heard about the 
case and seen some related photographs but “remember[ed] very 
little” because “it was some time ago.”  She had formed no 
opinion about defendant’s guilt or innocence.  Neither her 
knowledge of the case nor the nature of the charges would affect 
her ability to be fair and impartial.  During voir dire Juror No. 
1 explained that she had heard coworkers talking about the case 
when it occurred but did not recall what was said.  She recalled 
news reports that the victim had been shot and that a suspect 
was arrested in another state.  She was aware that the victim 
went to Arvin High School and played football.  She did not 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
58 
 
recognize defendant by name or appearance.  She explained.  “I 
don’t hear much about the case.  I don’t watch the news a lot, 
and I don’t read the paper.”   
The juror stated that, based on media accounts, she 
believed the victim was “murdered.”  When asked if she could 
put that belief aside, she agreed that she could “if there’s 
evidence that I feel that he was not murdered.  I can’t just go by 
what the media says, because I know it’s not fact.”  The 
prosecutor explained the burden of proof in a criminal trial, and 
the juror agreed that “[i]f I feel that it wasn’t proved, there was 
not enough evidence, then I would have to say, yeah, the person 
is not guilty,” “[r]egardless” of what she had heard in the media.  
She affirmed that she could decide the case based solely on the 
evidence and from no other source.  The trial court denied 
defendant’s challenge for cause.   
Defendant’s argument that Juror No. 1 prejudged the case 
fails.  She knew very little about the case and said that she could 
set aside what she had heard to base her verdict on the trial 
evidence.  She stated repeatedly in her questionnaire that she 
could be fair and impartial.  None of her answers during voir 
dire cast doubt on that representation.  Although she initially 
described the crime as a murder, she readily accepted the 
prosecutor’s explanation of the burden of proof.  The court 
specifically relied on the juror’s in-court demeanor in denying 
the challenge.  Its ruling was fairly supported by the record. 
Defendant also argues that Juror No. 1 should have been 
excused based on information she disclosed to the court after the 
jury was sworn but before evidence was presented.  The juror 
informed the court that she owned two rental properties in 
Lamont and went there monthly to collect the rent.  She was 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
59 
 
concerned that she or her property might be the subject of gang 
retaliation if she served as a juror.  When asked to elaborate, 
the juror said that she did not visit Lamont often and did not 
know people there.  She did not recognize anyone on the witness 
list.  After being shown a map of Lamont, the juror indicated 
that one of her properties was next door to Garza’s house, and 
another was close to the parking lot from where Leonel Paredes 
was kidnapped.  The court cautioned the juror that it would be 
inappropriate for her to visit these locations in order to 
“investigate the case.”  It further informed her that retaliation 
was “rare,” and that the court was not aware of any cases of such 
retaliation in Kern County in the past 13 years.  The court asked 
the juror if she could “find someone . . . who could travel out 
there just to avoid your having to do that” and to let the court 
know the next court day “if you have made those arrangements,” 
because “if you can’t make those arrangements then I want to 
talk further about it.”  The juror indicated that she would find 
someone to collect her rents while she served as a juror on the 
case.  Asked if she was satisfied she could perform her duties, 
the juror answered affirmatively based on the court’s 
assurances.  She did not presently feel that she was in danger, 
although she continued to have “concerns.”  She promised she 
would speak up if at any time during the trial she became fearful 
or was otherwise unable to perform her duties.   
Defendant’s request to remove the juror was denied.  The 
court noted that the juror was diligent in reporting her 
connection to the area, and honest about expressing her concern, 
which was not unusual in a case of this type.  The court was 
“satisfied, having observed her demeanor, the manner in which 
she answered the questions, that she can perform her duties” 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
60 
 
and was also satisfied that she would inform the court if she had 
any further doubts about her ability to serve as a juror. 
The next session, the court addressed Juror No. 1 and 
asked if she had anything to add regarding the issue she had 
raised earlier.  The juror responded, “No.”       
Section 1089 provides for the discharge of a juror at any 
time the juror “is found to be unable to perform his or her duty.”  
Here, Juror No. 1 expressed some concern about gang 
retaliation.  But she had not been threatened and was not 
closely associated with the neighborhoods where the crime took 
place.  She was satisfied by the court’s representation that 
retaliation against jurors was rare, and she agreed to revisit the 
subject if her fears prevented her from performing her duties.  
When the court revisited the subject, she expressed no such 
concern at that time, or any time thereafter.  The juror’s 
“responses to the trial court’s examination revealed no bias, and 
the trial court found none.”  (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 
5 Cal.5th 442, 485.)  Defendant offers no sound basis to believe 
the juror’s assurances were insincere.  (Peterson, supra, 10 
Cal.5th at p. 442.)  We defer to the trial court’s credibility 
determinations, which are supported by substantial evidence.  
(People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 100; People v. Harris 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1304.)   
b. Juror No. 2  
Juror No. 2 wrote in her questionnaire that she did not 
know the defendant, the victim, or their families.  She had 
“briefly” “glanced at or heard portions” of reports about the case 
but recalled “no specifics” other than the “nature” of the crime 
and a photograph of the victim.  She had also heard others 
talking about the case.  Her exposure to this information would 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
61 
 
not affect her ability to be a fair and impartial juror.  She had 
no preformed opinion about defendant’s guilt.   
During voir dire Juror No. 2 explained that she had 
overheard a “brief” conversation between two mothers 
expressing sympathy for the victim’s mother.  She had heard on 
the news that the victim “was a football player, and he was 
found murdered and there was a truck involved.  But that’s 
about all as far as details.  I never really took interest in 
learning more.”  She recalled hearing on the news that the 
perpetrators were Hispanic, and the crime was possibly gang 
related.  Although the newspapers described the killing as a 
“murder,” Juror No. 2 “didn’t really form any opinion.  I just 
knew a young man was dead, and the newspaper declared it to 
be a murder.”  She affirmed that she could set aside what she 
had heard in the news media and would not prejudge the case.  
The trial court denied defendant’s challenge for cause.   
Defendant argues that Juror No. 2 “was close to this case, 
and not forthcoming about what she knew, or what she 
thought.”  He claims she minimized her knowledge of the case 
when “[i]n truth, she knew plenty of details about the crime.  
She revealed them in between repeated statements that she 
didn’t really know anything.”  The record does not support this 
overstatement.  Juror No. 2 was not “close to this case.”  She 
knew a few basic details, as would almost anyone who had any 
media exposure, and she readily disclosed them when asked.  
She consistently maintained that she had not prejudged the case 
and that she could disregard pretrial publicity and base her 
decision on the evidence.  The record supports the trial court’s 
determination that she could be fair and impartial.   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
62 
 
c. Juror No. 3  
Juror No. 3’s questionnaire recounted that he did not 
know the defendant, the victim, or their families.  He had not 
read about the case in the newspapers or heard about it on 
television; nor had he spoken to anyone about it.  He had not 
formed an opinion about defendant’s guilt and affirmed he could 
be fair and impartial.  During voir dire, Juror No. 3 clarified that 
he had seen “a few brief” news reports about the case, and that 
his wife had discussed the case with him.  He recalled that there 
was a carjacking and that police had recovered a truck 
associated with the crimes.  He knew that a young man had been 
shot and that a suspect had been arrested in another state.  He 
disagreed with defense counsel’s characterization that he had 
learned “an awful lot about this case” from discussions with his 
wife.  The juror explained that his wife mentioned the crime to 
him but he was getting ready to go out and “wasn’t . . . really 
paying too much attention to what she was saying.”  He 
expressed no doubt that he could set aside what he had heard 
about the case and base his verdict solely on the evidence 
presented in court.   
The juror had received a subpoena from the district 
attorney’s office to appear at a court date involving child 
support.  He had not spoken with anyone in the district 
attorney’s office about settling the case.  When asked by the 
defense if he would “want to help out the D.A. in order to get 
favorable treatment from the D.A. on that case,” the juror 
responded, “No,” and observed, “That’s [two] totally different” 
things.  He was certain that the proceeding would not affect his 
ability to be fair and impartial.  The trial court denied 
defendant’s challenge for cause.   
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
63 
 
Defendant again maintains that Juror No. 3 “had learned 
quite a bit about this case” and was “slow to reveal” that 
information.  He notes, without further elaboration, that the 
juror indicated in his questionnaire that he favored the death 
penalty for deliberate murder except in rare cases, and that the 
juror had a pending child support matter.  This record does not 
support a challenge for cause.  The juror’s voir dire revealed very 
little familiarity with the case and he affirmed that he would 
base his verdict solely on the evidence.  The trial court probed 
the juror about his views on the death penalty.  The juror 
affirmed that he was “very open-minded” on the topic and could 
impose either death or life without the possibility of parole 
(LWOP) depending on the evidence.  He explicitly denounced the 
philosophy of an “eye for an eye,” explaining, “if a person was 
found guilty for taking somebody else’s life, I don’t see that it 
would, in my beliefs, I don’t see that it’s right to take that 
person’s life, just because he took somebody else’s life, 
depending on the situation, or the crime that was committed, I 
should say.”   
As for the pending child support matter, the juror 
voluntarily disclosed that fact on his questionnaire, and, when 
questioned, was emphatic that it would not affect his service.  
Defendant “offers no sound basis to believe the juror[’s] 
assurances in this case were insincere.”  (Peterson, supra, 10 
Cal.5th at p. 442.)  On the contrary, the juror seemed perplexed 
by defense counsel’s suggestion that he might try to curry favor 
with the prosecutor, responding, “that’s [two] totally different” 
things.  The trial court implicitly credited the juror’s 
representations and denied the challenge “considering all the 
circumstances.”  Its determination is fairly supported by the 
record.   
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
64 
 
d.  Juror No. 4  
Juror No. 4 was the Dean of Students at Highland High 
School and was acquainted with members of the Kern High 
School District Police Department.  She indicated in her 
questionnaire that she did not know defendant, the victim, or 
their families.  She had heard about the case on television but 
did not recall the specifics.  She was not aware of how the victim 
died.  She had not formed an opinion about defendant’s guilt, 
and her media exposure would not affect her ability to be fair 
and impartial.  During voir dire, the juror elaborated that she 
had heard discussions about memorials for the victim at Arvin 
High School.  She was not personally involved in any such 
discussions, and observed that such memorials “can get out of 
hand and disrupt school activity” because it “keeps the students 
in turmoil.”  She stated that she was “somewhere between” 
favoring the death penalty for deliberate murder and believing 
that it should only be used in rare cases.  She would keep an 
open mind between the two punishments.  The trial court denied 
defendant’s challenge for cause.   
Defendant argues that his challenge for cause should have 
been granted.  He offers no analysis in support of this assertion 
other than to repeat some of the details summarized above.  
Juror No. 4 knew very little about the case and she was open to 
both penalties.  The trial court’s ruling was fairly supported by 
the record.        
e. Juror No. 6   
Juror No. 6 worked as a correctional counselor at Wasco 
State Prison.  Her job required her to evaluate an inmate’s 
history, medical and psychiatric status, and criminal behavior.  
She had many friends who were parole agents, correctional 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
65 
 
officers, and correctional counselors.  She would not give the 
testimony of these people greater weight.   
She checked the box “Yes,” to the question:  “If evidence in 
this case shows the involvement of a ‘street gang,’ is there 
anything about that which would prevent you from being a fair 
and impartial juror?”  She wrote, “Street gangs are generally 
crime-oriented.”  During voir dire she explained that she had 
previously worked with gang members as a parole agent.  Based 
on that experience she believed that street gangs were formed 
for the purpose of committing crimes.  She had not worked 
directly with gang members for at least eight years, and had no 
special knowledge or experience with gangs in Arvin or Lamont.  
She did not claim to have any gang expertise.  She did not 
believe that gang members are incorrigible and knew of 
members who had turned their lives around.  The juror affirmed 
that she could “set aside any experiences, any training, any 
views or opinions [she had] about street gangs or individuals 
and not let them influence [her] in this case[.]”  She explained, 
“I have given it a lot of thought.  And in some ways I think, 
because of my background, I can be more objective maybe than 
the average person.  I really do feel I can be objective.”   
The juror also checked the box “Yes” to the question:  “Is 
there anything about the use or possession of firearms that 
would prevent you from being a fair and impartial juror?”  She 
wrote:  “If carried by other than law enforcement, the carrier 
often has criminal intent.”  During voir dire she explained that 
she felt gun possession resulted in escalated encounters that 
might not otherwise be lethal.  If a person intentionally 
purchased a weapon to commit a crime, she would consider that 
indicative of criminal intent.  She would be less likely to focus 
on gun possession if a spontaneous event took place that 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
66 
 
prompted a person to take defensive steps.  She believed that 
accidental shootings were common.  The juror was a gun owner 
herself and grew up around firearms.  She described herself as 
“very unbiased . . . about weapon possession.”   
Juror No. 6 disclosed during voir dire that she had some 
familiarity with the case.  She had heard the victim was 
kidnapped and killed, and that his body was found in a field.  
She recalled fundraisers held for the victim’s family.  She knew 
nothing about the suspects or how the victim died.  Her exposure 
to pretrial publicity would not affect her ability to be fair and 
impartial.  She had not formed an opinion about defendant’s 
guilt.  She affirmed that she could be completely fair to both 
sides.   
Regarding 
punishment, 
the 
juror 
stated 
in 
her 
questionnaire a preference for the death penalty for deliberate 
murder.  She explained, “If the murder was intentional, the 
death penalty is fair and just.”  “I’m in agreement with it in 
certain clear-cut, premeditated cases.”  Nonetheless, she felt 
that life in prison without the possibility of parole “is acceptable 
in some cases with extenuating circumstances.”  She confirmed 
that she was open minded about the penalty to be imposed and 
would give honest consideration to both outcomes.  Specifically, 
she would consider mitigating circumstances as well as the 
defendant’s intent in assessing an appropriate punishment.  She 
explained, “I worked in Child Protective Services for eight years 
before going to the Department of Corrections.  So it’s easy to 
see how a childhood affects adulthood.”  Defendant’s challenge 
for cause was denied.              
Defendant argues that the juror should have been excused 
because “[c]orrectional facilities in Kern County were full of 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
67 
 
prejudicial talk about this case, including poisonous false 
rumors and prejudicial beliefs.”  Aside from Panelist S.L.’s 
observations (see pt. II.A.3., ante), this allegation was largely 
unsubstantiated.  Moreover, Juror No. 6 had heard no such talk.  
She was unfamiliar with the facts of the crime and was unaware 
of how the victim had died.  Defendant also urges, without 
further analysis, that the juror should have been excused based 
on her opinions about gangs, gun possession, and the death 
penalty.  The trial court probed all of these topics.  The juror felt 
that her exposure to gang members would enhance her 
objectivity.  She believed that accidental shootings were 
common, which was in line with the defense theory of the case.  
And she said she could be fair and openminded about 
punishment, citing her service with Child Protective Services as 
providing insight into the deleterious effects of childhood 
trauma.  The trial court’s denial of the challenge for cause was 
fairly supported by the record.   
f. Juror No. 7  
 Juror No. 7 disclosed in her questionnaire that she had 
learned about the case through the newspapers and television, 
and that she had discussed it with others.  This pretrial 
exposure would not affect her ability to be fair and impartial.  
The juror elaborated during voir dire.  She was aware that a 
young man was carjacked and fatally shot in Arvin and that his 
body was found by a family member.  She recalled that the 
suspects had painted the victim’s truck.  She knew that the 
victim played high school football and that his brother had stood 
in for him as homecoming king.  She had not prejudged 
defendant’s guilt and could disregard this information to base 
her verdict solely on the evidence.  She was open to the 
possibility “that the death of Chad Yarbrough was an accident, 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
68 
 
as opposed to an intentional murder.”  The trial court denied 
defendant’s challenge for cause.   
Defendant argues that Juror No. 7 “had an extraordinary 
amount of knowledge about this case.”  The record does not 
support this characterization.  The juror had no personal 
connection to the case and was unfamiliar with the victim, the 
defendant, and their families.  Her knowledge of the 
circumstances surrounding the crime was typical of someone 
who had been exposed to media coverage and hardly 
“extraordinary.”  Qualified jurors “need not be totally ignorant 
of the facts and issues involved.”  (Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 
807.)  The juror confirmed that she could disregard the 
information she had heard in the media and base her verdict on 
the evidence presented.   
Defendant also claims that Juror No. 7 “became upset” 
during voir dire.  He cites defense counsel’s observation that the 
juror “got upset when you talked about the brother taking over 
[as] homecoming king.”  His reliance on this offhand remark is 
unpersuasive.  Counsel did not elaborate on the juror’s 
demeanor or challenge her specifically on this basis.  In any 
event, a juror’s emotional reaction, while relevant, is not 
automatically disqualifying.  (See generally Adams v. Texas 
(1980) 448 U.S. 38, 50; Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 897.)  When 
defense counsel asked the juror about her response, she 
confirmed that she could set aside her knowledge of the 
circumstances and focus only on the evidence presented.  She 
said that what she knew about the crime would not affect her 
penalty determination.  The trial court was in the best position 
to assess the juror’s demeanor and the credibility of her 
representations.  
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
69 
 
Defendant also criticizes the trial court for limiting 
defense counsel’s voir dire of this juror.  Specifically, the court 
sustained an objection to the following question:  “if the jury 
came to the conclusion that it was a first degree accidental 
murder during a kidnapping or carjacking, do you have any 
predeterminations as to what the sentence should be?”  (Italics 
added.)  The court explained that it would allow defense counsel 
to probe the jurors’ thoughts about possibilities like accident or 
self-defense, but that referring to a verdict of “first degree 
accidental murder” was misleading.   
The trial court has considerable discretion to place 
reasonable limits on voir dire, including the process of death 
qualification.  (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 990.)  
“ ‘[A]s we have said on many occasions, “[d]efendant ha[s] no 
right to ask specific questions that invite[] [panelists] to 
prejudge the penalty issue based on a summary of the 
aggravating and mitigating evidence [citation], to educate the 
jury as to the facts of the case [citation], or to instruct the jury 
in matters of law [citation].” [Citations.]’  [Citation.]  [¶]  
‘Nevertheless, voir dire cannot be so abstract that it fails to 
identify those jurors whose death penalty views would prevent 
or substantially impair their performance . . . .’  [T]he defense 
cannot be categorically denied the opportunity to inform jurors 
of case-specific factors that could invariably cause an otherwise 
reasonable and death-qualified juror to vote for death regardless 
of the strength of the mitigating evidence.”  (People v. Tate 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 657–658.)   
No error appears.  Defense counsel had significant leeway 
to probe the topic of penalty.  He asked the juror if she was open 
to the possibility that the victim’s death was an accident, and 
she affirmed that she was.  He then asked, if the jury returned 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
70 
 
a verdict of “murder [in the] first degree with kidnapping or 
carjacking,” whether the juror’s knowledge about the case from 
pretrial publicity would influence her penalty decision.  The 
juror said it would not.  Counsel asked if the juror would equally 
consider death and LWOP as punishments, and the juror said 
she would.  Counsel then asked what punishment the juror 
would feel was appropriate for first degree murder during a 
kidnapping or carjacking.  She responded that she “would have 
to hear all the details before [she] would be able to give any 
opinion on that.”  She affirmed that she would be willing to 
listen to evidence of circumstances in mitigation, including the 
defendant’s background, before she made up her mind about 
penalty.  This voir dire was ample.  The trial court acted within 
its broad discretion to curtail counsel’s implication that there 
could be of a verdict of “first degree accidental murder.”  There 
is no such offense in the California legal lexicon.24 
g. Juror No. 8   
Juror No. 8 was a correctional officer at North Kern State 
Prison.  During voir dire, he explained that his job would not 
cause him to be prejudiced against defendant.  He treats the 
inmates he works with as human beings and does not pass 
judgment on them because they are incarcerated.   
The juror had read two newspaper articles about the crime 
at the time it was committed, and a third article about 
 
24  
An 
unintentional 
murder 
committed 
during 
the 
commission of certain felonies may quality as murder in the first 
degree, under the felony murder doctrine.  However, defense 
counsel did not mention felony murder, but instead referred to 
the nonexistent crime of “first degree accidental murder.”  
(Italics added.)     
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
71 
 
defendant being captured trying to cross the border.  He could 
“[d]efinitely” set aside his knowledge of the case from outside 
sources and not consider it in reaching a verdict.  Although he 
had checked a questionnaire box stating that he had an opinion 
about defendant’s guilt, he clarified that he did not in fact hold 
such an opinion.  His only opinion was that defendant was 
innocent until proved guilty.   
The juror stated in his questionnaire that he believed the 
death penalty was appropriate for deliberate murder.  He felt 
that LWOP sentences were not enforced because “our appeal 
system has opened many doors to life without parole.”  He 
checked boxes on the questionnaire indicating that he was open 
to both penalties and would listen to all of the evidence before 
making a decision.  The court probed these responses during voir 
dire.  It told the juror that “it’s going to be your duty to assume 
that any sentence that’s selected by the jury will be carried out 
ultimately, whether it be the death penalty or [LWOP].”  The 
juror explained that, during his employment, he had seen 
inmates with LWOP sentences who “are gone [from custody].  
One has to assume that they have either died or they were 
released from prison.  And it’s an assumption, your Honor.  It’s 
not a fact.”  The juror confirmed that he could set aside that 
assumption and accept that the sentence would be carried out.  
The court emphasized that it would be improper for the juror to 
return a sentence of death instead of LWOP simply because the 
juror was concerned that defendant might be released from 
custody.  The juror agreed.  He had “[n]o doubt” that he could 
have an open mind about penalty and base his decision on the 
evidence presented at trial.   
In response to questions by defense counsel, the juror 
stated that he did not believe the death penalty should be 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
72 
 
imposed for every first degree murder committed during a 
kidnapping or carjacking.  He favored the death penalty for an 
intentional murder committed while “lying in wait.”  When 
asked by the court if he could set that view aside and base his 
penalty decision on the evidence presented, the juror responded, 
“I believe I could.  I really do.  Because, as I said, I stress very 
strongly that, in my type of job, I try very hard not to be 
judgmental.  And I think I could.”  He reiterated, “I’m satisfied 
that I could be very fair.”  He would consider the circumstances 
of defendant’s background in making a penalty determination, 
and could return a verdict of LWOP if the mitigating 
circumstances warranted it.  The court denied defendant’s 
challenge for cause.   
Defendant argues that the juror’s penalty views 
warranted disqualification.  Not so.  The juror stated repeatedly 
that he would consider all penalty options and could return an 
LWOP sentence if warranted by the facts of the case.  Giving 
deference to the trial court, which had the opportunity to 
observe and listen to the juror, the court’s ruling is fairly 
supported by substantial evidence in the record.  (People v. Holt 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 651.)    
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in 
limiting 
counsel’s 
questioning 
about 
circumstances 
in 
mitigation.  Specifically, counsel asked whether the juror would 
consider defendant’s upbringing.  He gave as an example:  “If 
evidence is presented at the penalty phase, for example, that the 
defendant had some type of abused childhood or some problems 
in childhood . . . .”  The court interjected, and directed counsel to 
“stay with the general nature of the juror’s duties to consider 
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation and address it more 
generally, please.”  Defense counsel then asked more generally, 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
73 
 
“Are there circumstances regarding the defendant’s background 
that you would not consider in mitigation?”  The juror replied, 
“I don’t know I think probably what you are trying to say is that 
if someone has some problems as a child and that is the cause of 
a violent crime later on in his lifetime should that be considered.  
Is that what you are saying?”  When counsel responded, “Yes,” 
the juror said, “In some cases, yes, very much so” and confirmed 
that he was “open to considering that evidence.”   
Death qualification voir dire “ ‘must not be so abstract that 
it fails to identify those jurors whose death penalty views would 
prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties 
as jurors in the case being tried’ and ‘it must not be so specific 
that it requires the prospective jurors to prejudge the penalty 
issue based on a summary of the mitigating and aggravating 
evidence likely to be presented.’  [Citation.]  In striking this 
balance, the trial court may not categorically deny the defense 
an opportunity to inform prospective jurors of case-specific 
factors that could invariably cause them to vote for death.”  
(People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 425–426 (Nieves).)  Here, 
notwithstanding the trial court’s admonishment, the juror 
ventured back into the area of childhood circumstances and 
affirmed that he believed them to be a significant factor in 
mitigation.  The topic was adequately covered.   
h. Juror No. 10  
Juror No. 10 worked for Kern County as a physician’s 
assistant.  She did not know any of the listed witnesses, but was 
acquainted with people in the Bakersfield Police Department, 
the county Sheriff’s Department, and doctors from the Kern 
Medical Center.  The people she mentioned by name were not 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
74 
 
called as witnesses in the case.  She also knew the court 
interpreter.   
Juror No. 10 indicated in her questionnaire that she had 
read about the case in the paper and heard others talking about 
it.  She did not recall specifics and any such information would 
not affect her ability to be fair and impartial.   
The juror indicated in her questionnaire that “[w]hile [she 
was] somewhat in favor of the death penalty, [she did] not 
believe it should be used as a punishment for most murder cases, 
even where a life has been taken deliberately.”  She believed 
that each case is different and that the penalty depends on the 
individual facts of the crime.  Although the juror is Catholic, she 
disagrees with her church’s position against the death penalty.  
She confirmed during voir dire that she would consider 
circumstances in mitigation and keep an open mind about both 
penalties. 
 
Defense 
counsel 
and 
the 
prosecutor 
both 
unsuccessfully challenged the juror for cause.   
Defendant claims error.  He repeats some of the details set 
forth above but offers no analysis as to why the record shows the 
juror could not be fair and impartial.  Defendant observes that 
the prosecutor joined in the challenge.  But the prosecutor’s 
concern was that the juror would not be able to vote for death 
given her religious beliefs.  That view does not demonstrate a 
bias against defendant.  In any event, the juror emphasized that 
she would keep an open mind about penalty and base her 
decision on the facts of the case.  The trial court’s denial of the 
challenge for cause was fairly supported by the record.                   
i. Juror No. 11  
Juror No. 11 worked as a postal clerk.  Her son was a Kern 
County Sheriff’s Deputy.  She knew two people on the potential 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
75 
 
witness list:  Jill Johnson was the daughter of her friends from 
church, and Steve Urner was her son’s partner in the sheriff’s 
department.  She affirmed that she would not view these 
people’s testimony more favorably because of her relationship 
with them.  Ultimately neither of them testified.   
The juror indicated in her questionnaire that the 
involvement of street gangs in the case would not affect her 
ability to be fair and impartial.  Asked how she felt about street 
gangs, she wrote, “They scare me.”  She was not asked to 
expound on this comment.           
The juror stated in her questionnaire that she had seen 
newspaper and television accounts of the case at the time of the 
crimes but did not recall any details.  During voir dire she 
elaborated that she remembered the crime involved “teen-agers, 
somebody was killed, it was out in Arvin . . . .”  Her exposure to 
pretrial publicity would not affect her ability to be fair and 
impartial.   
Asked on the questionnaire to circle the response that best 
corresponded to her view on the death penalty, the juror circled 
the following:  “The death penalty should be imposed in every 
case where someone deliberately takes another human being’s 
life.”  Asked if LWOP was an appropriate punishment for first 
degree murder, she wrote, “I’m not sure — it would depend on 
the circumstances.”  During voir dire the juror again stated that 
she believed death was the appropriate penalty for homicide in 
the course of kidnapping or carjacking.  When asked if she would 
automatically vote for death under those circumstances, she 
clarified:  “Oh no.  When I was circling that, in my mind — and 
it was very confusing, the whole questionnaire, I think. [¶] . . . 
[¶] But when I was getting down to that, I was thinking, okay, 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
76 
 
this is, when you break the law, this is the penalty.  That’s what 
I was thinking.”  She confirmed that she would keep “a 
completely open mind” between the two available penalties and 
base her decision on the evidence presented at trial.  The 
prosecutor sought further clarification, asking, “If you are 
saying, as you seem to indicate, that you would have an open 
mind, can you see yourself considering life without parole even 
though someone murdered somebody?”  The juror responded, “I 
guess, yes.”  She continued:  “Yes.  Because, to me, it was very 
confusing on the answers of the questions.”  She affirmed that 
she could impose a sentence of LWOP for a murder committed 
during a carjacking or kidnapping, and that she would “have an 
open mind” about penalty.  The trial court then asked if the juror 
was “satisfied that you can set aside any personal views or 
opinions you have about the death penalty and follow the law 
and keep an open mind as to the two possible penalties that 
might be imposed here?”  The juror responded, “Yes.”  When 
asked if she had “any doubt about that?” the juror replied, “No.”   
Defense counsel questioned further.  He observed that 
when the juror said she could vote for LWOP, she “did not sound 
certain in your answer, and you rolled your eyes to the top of 
your head.”  The juror apologized, saying, “It’s just very 
confusing.”  She again confirmed that she felt death was the 
appropriate penalty for a killing during a kidnapping or 
carjacking.  The trial court denied defendant’s challenge for 
cause.   
Defendant argues that the juror’s preference for the death 
penalty warranted her excusal.  But the juror explained that she 
found the questionnaire confusing.  She clarified that her 
understanding was that the death penalty was the punishment 
provided by law.  After being told that she could choose between 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
77 
 
death and LWOP, the juror confirmed that she could keep an 
open mind about penalty and make her decision based on the 
evidence.  No more is required of a juror, even one who expresses 
a preference for death.  (Rountree, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 843; 
People v. McKinzie (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1302, 1343–1345.)   
Defendant argues that the juror contradicted herself 
immediately thereafter by restating that she felt death was the 
appropriate penalty for a killing during a kidnapping or 
carjacking.  Variations are not surprising, however, when a 
juror is “less than consistent in her answers.  ‘In many cases, a 
[juror’s] responses to questions on voir dire will be halting, 
equivocal, or even conflicting.  Given the juror’s probable 
unfamiliarity with the complexity of the law, coupled with the 
stress and anxiety of being a [panelist] in a capital case, such 
equivocation should be expected.  Under such circumstances, we 
defer to the trial court’s evaluation of [the] . . . juror’s state of 
mind, and such evaluation is binding on appellate courts.’ ”  
(People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 15–16, quoting People v. 
Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1094.)  The trial court’s finding 
that Juror No. 11 could conscientiously consider all of the 
sentencing alternatives is fairly supported by the record.25 
j. Juror No. 12   
Juror No. 12 (previously Alternate Juror No. 3), worked at 
Wasco State Prison as a personal services supervisor.  Her ex-
husband was a Kern County Sheriff’s Deputy and one of her sons 
was a correctional officer.  She had learned about the case in 
news articles and television reports, and had seen related 
 
25  
Defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to 
discharge Juror No. 11 for asserted bias revealed during the 
trial is discussed post at part II.B.1. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
78 
 
photographs.  Specifically, she had heard that the victim was 
bound and shot in the back of the head, “execution style” after 
his truck was stolen.  Her exposure to pretrial publicity would 
not affect her ability to be fair and impartial, and she would base 
her decision solely on the evidence presented in court.  Defense 
counsel noted that she had used the word “hope” in connection 
with these statements and asked if she was concerned about her 
ability to do that.  The juror replied, “I would try to the best that 
I could, to do what I needed to do.”   
The juror was familiar with several persons on the witness 
list, including Greg Justice, John Soliz, Glenn Johnson, Robert 
Castaneda, Stan Moseley, and Patty Poeschel.  Robert 
Castaneda was a friend; the others were people she had met “a 
long time ago” and no longer knew, had worked briefly with, or 
recognized the name but did not know personally.  She 
confirmed during voir dire that she could set aside her 
affiliations with the witnesses and judge them by the same 
standard as anyone else.  Only two of the people mentioned, 
Glenn Johnson and Stan Moseley, actually testified.  Regarding 
Glenn Johnson the juror wrote:  “met him a long time ago — 
don’t know him now but see him on TV news.”  Regarding Stan 
Moseley, the juror wrote:  “don’t know [him] — but have heard 
name, either through ex-husband or TV or paper.”   
The juror indicated in her questionnaire that her views on 
the death penalty were best reflected by the following 
statement:  “While I favor the death penalty, I do believe there 
are rare cases where the death penalty should not be imposed 
even if someone has deliberately taken another human being’s 
life.”  She also wrote that “I often wonder how it will affect my 
life should I choose to return a death penalty verdict.”  Asked if 
LWOP was an appropriate sentence for first degree murder, she 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
79 
 
wrote:  “It would depend on the circumstances related to the 
murder.”  During voir dire the juror stated that she generally 
felt the death penalty was a “good idea” but that she had “mixed 
feelings” about it.  Specifically, she felt that “I don’t have a right 
to put my beliefs on somebody else about how I would feel as to 
whether they should be put to death or not.”   
The jury questionnaire asked:  “At this point, before you 
have heard the evidence, do you believe you are open minded 
about what the penalty should be?” Juror No. 12 wrote, “No.”  
During voir dire, the juror stated that she had misunderstood 
the question.  She affirmed that she had not predetermined 
penalty and could be open minded.  This clarification was 
consistent with another answer on her questionnaire, where she 
answered, “Yes” to the question:  “If you were a juror at a penalty 
phase, would you be able to listen to all the evidence, as well as 
the judge’s instructions on the law, and give an honest 
consideration to both death and life without parole before 
reaching a decision?”  When asked by defense counsel what she 
felt was the appropriate penalty for first degree murder, she 
replied, “I don’t have an opinion right now.”  Defendant’s 
challenge for cause was denied.   
Defendant argues that the juror should have been excused 
for cause because of her familiarity with the facts of the case 
through news media.  As noted above, total ignorance is not 
required for juror qualification.  (Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 
807.)  The juror had no concern that she could put aside what 
she had heard and fairly and impartially judge the evidence 
presented at trial.  The trial court credited the juror’s 
representation, taking into account her answers and demeanor.  
Its ruling was fairly supported by the record. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
80 
 
Defendant also argues that the juror’s views on the death 
penalty warranted her excusal.  But the juror was not a 
particularly strong death penalty proponent.  Although she 
supported capital punishment in principle, she expressed 
hesitation 
about 
personally 
returning 
such 
a 
verdict.  
Ultimately, she was quite clear that she could keep an open 
mind about both penalties, and that she would base her decision 
on the facts of the case.  Again, the trial court credited this 
representation, taking into account the juror’s answers and her 
demeanor.  Its ruling was fairly supported by the record.   
For the reasons discussed above, the trial court did not err 
in denying defendant’s challenges for cause as to any of the 
seated jurors.  Because no incompetent juror was forced upon 
defendant, his claim of error fails.  (Black, supra, 58 Cal.4th at 
pp. 920–922.)  
5. Judicial Misconduct  
In addition to challenging the for-cause rulings discussed 
above, defendant claims that the court’s “overbearing, leading, 
and directive voir dire, and refusal to remove biased jurors” 
amounted to judicial misconduct.  He maintains that the court 
“refused to accept prospective jurors’ plain indications of bias or 
prejudgment,” and used leading and suggestive questions “to 
press until a juror said that he or she would do their duty.”  He 
further contends the court was “hypersensitive, quick to 
threaten defense counsel, and unwilling to acknowledge error.”  
The court’s conduct, he claims, evidenced actual bias in violation 
of his state and federal constitutional rights.   
These arguments were unsuccessfully raised in a motion 
for mistrial, and reasserted in a motion to disqualify the trial 
judge for bias.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1.)  Another judge was 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
81 
 
assigned to rule on the disqualification motion.  That jurist 
considered written motions and reviewed approximately 6,700 
pages of voir dire record.  He subsequently found that the trial 
judge was “very thorough in his voir dire of the jurors” and was 
“very deliberate” in his effort to assure the jurors could fairly 
and impartially judge the case.  He found no evidence that “the 
trial judge was anything but fair and impartial to both sides.”  
He further observed that “[i]t is obvious from the record the trial 
judge exhibited great tolerance, patience and judicial restraint 
with the defense counsel’s conduct which bordered on insolence.”  
He concluded:  “the trial judge exercised patience and judicial 
restraint in dealing with the many attacks alleging bias and 
prejudice on the record of the trial court.  It is also very apparent 
that the trial judge carefully ruled on all objections and 
conducted extensive voir dire to assure both the defendant and 
the prosecution were to receive a fair trial.  The court finds that 
trial judge was neither bias[ed] nor prejudiced against the 
defendant nor his counsel.  The court further finds the 
defendant’s allegation that he cannot receive a fair trial is 
unfounded.”   
a. Questioning of Panelists 
“Trial courts must of course ‘be evenhanded in their 
questions to [panelists] . . . and should inquire into the jurors’ 
attitudes both for and against the death penalty to determine 
whether these views will impair their ability to serve as jurors.’  
[Citation.]  But the court has ‘broad discretion over the number 
and nature of questions about the death penalty.’ ”  (Mills, 
supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 189.)  “We trust our trial courts 
understand and appreciate the importance of the voir dire 
procedure and the need to be ‘evenhanded’ in questioning 
[panelists] in a capital case.  [Citation.]  We assume the trial 
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82 
 
court formulated its questions based on the individual 
characteristics of each juror, including the juror’s questionnaire 
answers and in-court demeanor.  To second-guess these choices 
would encourage the trial court to engage in substantially the 
same questioning of all [panelists] irrespective of their 
individual circumstance, something we have declined to do.”  
(Id. at p. 190.) 
Here, defendant complains, not that the court asked too 
few questions (see Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 189), but instead 
that it asked too many, effectively rehabilitating jurors who 
showed obvious bias.  We have reviewed the record of voir dire, 
with particular attention to the jurors identified by defendant in 
support of his argument.  We conclude the court did not commit 
misconduct or demonstrate actual bias against defendant.  
Nothing in the record suggests the trial court lacked 
impartiality during voir dire. 
i. Panelist J.D.  
Defendant cites the voir dire of Panelist J.D. as an 
example.  J.D. worked as a correctional officer.  When asked if 
there was any reason he could not be fair, J.D. explained:  “I 
work in a setting where I deal with convicted felons on a daily 
basis.  And I have done that for 16 years.  And it’s hard to be in 
that environment and not become a little bit callused in the way 
I view certain things.”  The court asked if the panelist’s feeling 
was related to this particular case or to criminal trials in 
general.  J.D. replied, “I don’t know anything about this case.  I 
think it would be in any case.  I would probably tend to look more 
on a negative way of looking at it.  To be honest, it would 
probably be harder for me to believe in innocence than guilt.  I 
have been trained in my job they are guilty, and that’s kind of 
hard not to look at after 16 years.  And I could try to be fair, and 
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I really would.  But I have thought about it since I was here last, 
and, honestly, inside, I have become a little bit cynical in my job.  
And I think that would affect me.”   
The court stated that it wanted to explore this topic and 
cautioned that it was “not trying to change any views or opinions 
that you have.”  The court explained that all panelists come to 
the courtroom with feelings, opinions, and biases.  The question 
was whether J.D. could honestly assure the court that he could 
set those views aside and not let them influence his verdict.  The 
panelist affirmed that he sets aside his biases every day at work 
“[b]ecause I have to be fair at all times.  It’s something that I 
have been trained to do for a long time.  I think I can do it, and 
I would sure give it a try.  I would do the best I could.”  The court 
then asked if J.D. thought he could decide the case based solely 
on the evidence and the law.  The panelist responded, “I would 
definitely try my hardest.  Honestly, I would have a hard time.  
But I would be willing to make the effort to put it aside.”   
The court then observed, “I’m not trying to put you in an 
impossible situation here, where you really, you know, have a 
serious doubt as to whether you can perform your duties.”  The 
court asked whether J.D.’s doubt was hypothetical and based on 
potential human frailties, or if the panelist actually had a 
reasonable doubt about his ability to perform his duties.  J.D. 
replied, “I believe I can do it, because I’m sitting here, being as 
honest as I can with you, and that’s putting it aside in itself.”  
The court continued to probe, asking if J.D. was truly satisfied 
he could perform his duties “[b]ecause if you have some doubt 
about it, I want you to tell me.”  J.D. replied, “I do have a doubt 
about it.  It would be a daily thing that I have to deal with.”  The 
court then asked if it would be difficult or impossible task.  J.D. 
replied, “I don’t think it would be difficult or impossible.  I think 
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it would be reasonable.  I would expect every juror to be able to 
do it to an extent, and I believe I could do it to that extent that 
you are asking.”   
The court asked, “Are you feeling pressured in any way to 
give me the right answers here?”  J.D. responded, “No.  No, I’m 
not.”  The court repeated that it needed the panelist’s “honest 
response” and that he should not be embarrassed to share his 
feelings or be concerned that the court would be upset with him.  
J.D. replied, “I can perform my duties.”  The court asked 
whether the panelist had any doubt, and J.D. replied, “There’s 
a little doubt.”  The court asked J.D. to explain, and he replied, 
“[I]t’s just daily situations I have had to face every day.  My 
whole attitude has gone to the cynical side of life.  It’s kind of 
sad to say, but, in being fair here, I would make the effort to 
keep it centered best I can.  [¶] . . . [¶]  But I do have doubts.”  
The court asked again if the panelist had “reasonable doubt, 
meaning that it’s not likely that you are going to be able to 
perform your duties here.”  J.D. replied, “I don’t feel that it 
would be unreasonable for me to do it or too difficult.  I could do 
this.”   
The court received J.D.’s assurance three more times that 
he could perform his duties.  The court then said that if the 
panelist became aware of a bias during the trial, he would need 
to disclose that and the court did not “want to set us up for that.  
In other words, we certainly want to find out now the likelihood 
of your being able to perform your duties.  Because you 
understand if we excuse jurors in the middle of a trial that 
creates other problems.”  J.D. then volunteered that he had shot 
three inmates a few days before and “it’s staying with me.  It’s 
like I’m kind of angry about having to be placed in that situation.  
So when I’m sitting here and I see things that I have dealt with 
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or attitudes that I have dealt with, it’s those angers.”  The court 
then asked, “Because of the scenario you just described where 
things can happen at work that then can be disturbing, sounds 
like you are concerned that could happen during the trial.”  J.D. 
agreed.  Upon stipulation of both parties, the panelist was 
excused.   
After the panelist’s excusal, defense counsel objected to 
the manner of questioning, asserting that the trial court had 
confronted J.D. and pressured him to say he could follow the 
law.  The court stated for the record that “I am going to be as 
even handed as I’m capable of being in asking jurors these 
questions.  And if a juror expresses a bias, I am always going to 
have to try to have them bring up honestly what that bias is and 
then go to the next step and explain what their duties are.  And 
it’s necessary to explain what their duties are in order for them 
to answer the questions.  [¶]  It’s the jurors’ duty to set aside 
bias if they are able to, and they have to tell the Court honestly 
if they can or can’t set that aside.  And that’s whether it’s a bias 
that favors the prosecution or favors the defense.  And I’m going 
to go through that process with each juror.”   
The court did not abuse its discretion while questioning 
J.D.  The court encouraged the panelist to answer honestly; 
emphasized that it was not trying to change J.D.’s views or 
pressure him; and told him not to be embarrassed or concerned 
about the court’s reaction.  The court conscientiously probed 
whether the panelist’s uncertainty about his ability to abide by 
the presumption of innocence was theoretical or actual.  In doing 
so, the court did not attempt to lead the panelist to the “right” 
response.  Rather, the court refused several times to accept at 
face value J.D.’s representation that he could be fair, and 
instead asked questions designed to test the accuracy and depth 
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of that response.  The court did not simply stop questioning 
when J.D. said he could be fair, as it might have done were it 
seeking an answer unfavorable to the defense.  Indeed, it was 
the court’s thorough questioning that ultimately led to the 
panelist’s removal.  When J.D. disclosed his recent experience 
with a shooting, the court promptly excused him for cause with 
the agreement of both parties.  This record reveals no bias in the 
court’s manner of questioning or its ruling on the panelist’s 
qualifications to serve.   
ii. Panelist G.K.  
Defendant also looks to the voir dire of Panelist G.K.  He 
formerly served as a sergeant and police officer in the Army.  His 
daughter was a police officer.  He expressed the opinion that 
gang members are accused of considerable criminal activity.  
The court observed that defendant had not been charged with a 
gang crime and that it would be improper to convict him of 
murder and related allegations simply because a street gang 
was involved.  The panelist affirmed that he could set aside his 
opinions and base his decision on the evidence.  Asked if it would 
be difficult, G.K. replied, “I think we — you know, we say set 
aside, but we really can’t take away 55 years of background, 
where I come from, where we all come from.  I think so, yes.  I 
would do the best I could.  [¶]  But you can’t take away where 
you come from, what you’ve been through.  Life’s experiences, I 
guess is good.”  The court agreed that all jurors bring their life 
experiences to the task, but cautioned that G.K. must be willing 
to set aside feelings like bias and anger.  The panelist 
acknowledged that he would try to set his feelings aside and 
follow the law.  He commented, “I think I would be guided more 
by the facts than emotion” and that “I don’t think I would have 
any trouble with setting the emotions to the side.”   
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When asked if he could evaluate the testimony of all 
witnesses using the same standard, G.K. replied, “[M]y gut 
feeling is I would tend to give more credence to testimony from 
a police officer.”  The court noted that it was common for people 
to respect police officers but said that it would be the juror’s 
responsibility to evaluate each witness based on that person’s 
credibility and ability to recall, rather than a belief about law 
enforcement officers in general.  G.K. indicated that he 
understood and agreed, stating, “I have no problems.  I think 
I — I could do that, yes.”  He qualified, however, that “for me, it 
would be tough to do that, to be honest.”  G.K. commented that 
it was “tough” to have “[n]o opinion” on things.  The court agreed 
that “we ask jurors to do some tough things” and emphasized 
“there’s no right or wrong answer here.  [¶]  Any time you have 
a doubt about something, you let me know.”  “I want you to be 
honest about that, and tell me if you don’t think you can perform 
your duty, as I described it.”  G.K. responded that he would have 
“some problems” giving every witness the same level of 
credibility.  The court then asked the panelist if he could 
conceive that a police officer might be dishonest or mistaken in 
the officer’s observations or recollection.  G.K. replied, “Yes.”  He 
affirmed that he could look at each witness individually without 
generalizing about that person’s occupation, although it would 
be “[t]ough to do.”  The court then asked, “If it’s so tough that 
it’s creating a question in your mind as to whether you can 
perform your duty, then you need to let me know.  [¶]  If it’s 
tough, but you can do it, I need to know that too.”  G.K. replied, 
“I guess I could do it.  [¶]  I know I can do it.”  The court asked 
the panelist if he was “satisfied honestly in [his] mind” that he 
could perform his duty, or if he had “a reasonable doubt” about 
it, and urged the juror to “look[] within” himself.  Again, G.K. 
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replied, “I can — I feel or — I can do it.  That’s how I feel about 
it.”   
Defense counsel pursued the topic in voir dire, asking the 
panelist if he was “not at all certain that [he] would not let this 
favoritism toward police officers” affect him.  G.K. said that was 
“stronger language than how I really feel,” and that “I don’t 
think I would lean that heavily towards law enforcement.”  He 
expressed his belief that officers are not always truthful, and 
cited the Los Angeles police as an example.  All things being 
equal, G.K. would tend to believe a police officer, but he would 
be alert for a feeling that there was “something that’s not coming 
out” or that’s “not quite right.”   
Out of the presence of the panelist, defense counsel 
objected to the manner of questioning, asserting that the trial 
court had pressured G.K. to say he could be fair in assessing the 
credibility of police officers.  The court denied a challenge for 
cause.   
No misconduct appears.  Panelists may often arrive at 
court with preconceptions or leanings.  The question is whether 
they can set those feelings aside and impartially consider the 
evidence.  They may have only a vague understanding of a 
juror’s role or the precise meaning of legal terms and 
expectations.  Often they will not have spent much time probing 
their own thinking in the context of its impact on potential jury 
service.  These realities highlight the important role of voir dire 
by both court and advocates.  The process is designed to uncover 
panelists’ honest and thoughtful estimation of their own ability 
to be fair.  Sometimes those attitudes are apparent, at other 
times open and patient dialogue is needed.  Such an approach 
helps ensure that advocates base their excusal decisions on an 
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individual assessment, rather than their own preconceptions.  It 
also helps to ensure meaningful appellate review. 
Here the court properly reminded G.K. that police officers 
are human beings who may be untruthful, inaccurate, or 
forgetful, just like any witness.  The panelist agreed with this 
assessment, and the court credited his statements based on his 
demeanor.  The record reveals neither error nor bias.                
iii. Panelists G.M. and D.K.    
Two other panelists, G.M. and D.K., were the subject of a 
motion for mistrial after the trial court failed to excuse them for 
cause.  Defendant argues that the trial court spent an inordinate 
amount of time trying to rehabilitate these death leaning 
panelists.  On the contrary, the voir dire was entirely proper. 
After the trial court explained the process of the guilt and 
penalty phases, G.M. indicated that he “[c]ertainly” had an open 
mind as to penalty.  Asked by defense counsel what the 
appropriate penalty would be for first degree murder, G.M. 
replied, “I believe, the way the law is written, it’s the death 
penalty.”  He affirmed his belief that the law would require him 
to impose a death sentence for first degree murder and stated 
that he agreed with that punishment.  The prosecutor then 
clarified that “even when special circumstances are found to be 
true, the death penalty is not automatic.”  G.M. affirmed that he 
could follow the law, consider mitigating circumstances such as 
the defendant’s background and psychological status, and keep 
an open mind about both penalties.  He stated that he had “no 
problem” with either LWOP or the death penalty.   
The court then asked about a particular questionnaire 
answer in which G.M.  indicated that he would always vote for 
the death penalty for a premeditated murder.  The court said, 
“I’m not trying to change your answer.  I want to make sure you 
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understand what the law provides.  [¶]  The law provides, if the 
jury has found the defendant guilty of this willful, deliberate, 
premeditated murder and it goes to the penalty phase, the jury 
must keep an open mind now to consider which penalty should 
be returned by the jury, either the penalty [of] life in prison 
without the possibility of parole or the death penalty.”  G.M. 
again stated that he believed in the death penalty for 
premeditated murder.  The court asked if the panelist was 
stating what he understood the law to be, and G.M. said, “I 
believe so.  That’s my understanding.  There again, I’m not a 
student of the law.”  The court stated that the panelist’s 
understanding was incorrect, and explained, “The law doesn’t 
provide for a death penalty automatically in that situation or 
any situation.”  G.M. indicated he understood.  The court then 
said, “I’m not trying to change your mind.  And you tell me 
honestly how you feel.”  G.M. replied, “I had always understood 
it to be the death penalty applies to a premeditated murder.  So 
that’s why I wrote what I wrote.”  The panelist confirmed that 
he would not automatically vote for death in any given 
circumstance, and that he believed “the facts will tell me which 
direction to go.”  The court then asked G.M., “So do you think 
this is just a matter of clarifying what your understanding of the 
law was?”  He responded, “Yes, absolutely.  Because I was 
obviously — I was wrong.”  Asked if he would have any difficulty 
following the law as the court instructed him, G.M. responded, 
“No, none whatsoever.”   
Defense counsel then asked the panelist if he would 
consider the defendant’s childhood in determining punishment, 
and G.M. replied, “No.”  The court explained that the law 
provides for the consideration of mitigating circumstances such 
as the defendant’s background in selecting the appropriate 
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penalty and asked if the panelist had a predisposition that 
would prevent him from considering such evidence.  G.M. 
affirmed that he would “go by what the law states” and that he 
would “have to hear the whole story.”  The prosecutor requested 
additional voir dire, prompting G.M. to apologize.  The court 
responded, “don’t apologize, sir, because there’s no right or 
wrong answers.  And I appreciate you feel you are kind of on the 
hot seat, but we need to be able to explore your thoughts and the 
reasons for [them].  Bear with us, please.  It’s kind of a difficult 
process, but we want your honest responses.”  The prosecutor 
then asked if G.M. was open to considering mitigating factors, 
including the defendant’s childhood.  He replied, “Yes, I believe 
I can be open-minded.”  The trial court denied defendant’s 
challenge for cause.   
No misconduct appears.  The court’s thorough voir dire 
exposed G.M.’s misunderstanding that the penalty of death 
automatically applied to a first degree murder.  When the law 
was clarified, G.M. confirmed that he could consider all relevant 
evidence and keep an open mind about penalty.  The court was 
careful to reassure the panelist three times there were no right 
answers, and that he should give his honest opinion.  This 
questioning does not demonstrate bias.                  
The court asked D.K. if she could keep an open mind about 
the penalties of LWOP and death without leaning in favor of one 
or the other.  She affirmed that she could.  When asked what 
she felt about an LWOP sentence for the crime of first degree 
murder, she replied, “I don’t agree with it” and “I feel like if 
somebody takes somebody’s life and they are proven guilty that 
they should die too.”  The court thanked the panelist for her 
honest opinion and asked if she could keep an open mind until 
she had heard all of the evidence, including mitigating 
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circumstances such as the defendant’s background and 
childhood.  D.K. said it was a “hard question to answer if you 
don’t know what the evidence is or you haven’t heard anything 
about it.  [¶] . . . [¶]  I mean, I wouldn’t go one way or the other 
without hearing everything, but that’s a hard question to 
answer.”  The court acknowledged it was a hard question and 
encouraged D.K. to do her best to answer honestly.  The court 
observed that “[s]ome jurors feel so strongly about the death 
penalty one way or the other that they honestly cannot perform 
their duties, and that’s okay too.  It doesn’t mean you are a bad 
person or that we are going to punish you in some way.”  D.K. 
responded that she would “[j]ust equally weigh the evidence, 
whichever opinion I come up with or conclusion.”  Asked if she 
could give equal weight to both penalties for first degree murder, 
she replied, “Well, of course, depending on the evidence.”   
During voir dire by defense counsel, the panelist stated 
her opinion that a “bad childhood” does not justify murder.  
Asked to describe what circumstances she felt would justify an 
LWOP sentence for first degree murder, D.K. said, “Not hearing 
anything about this, I don’t know.  I couldn’t answer that 
question.”  Asked what the appropriate penalty should be for a 
deliberate murder, she answered, “Death.”  But immediately 
thereafter, D.K. qualified that “[i]t would depend on what the 
extenuating circumstances would be.”  She observed that it 
would be very hard to make a decision to end someone’s life.  She 
confirmed that she had not formed an opinion of what the 
penalty should be and was open to a penalty of LWOP for first 
degree murder.  She could set her personal feelings aside and 
consider all of the evidence in the penalty phase before 
determining a verdict.  She clarified that “what was asked of me 
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is do I believe in the death penalty.  Yes, I do, but not for all 
cases.”  Defendant’s challenge for cause was denied.   
No misconduct appears.  The trial court allowed ample 
voir dire by both parties to probe the panelist’s views on the 
death penalty.  Ultimately, the court credited D.K.’s responses 
based on her demeanor in court.  The record supports the court’s 
determination that the panelist could fairly and impartially 
determine punishment.  The fact that the court ruled against a 
defense challenge does not, standing alone, evidence a bias. 
In addition to the panelists discussed above, our review of 
the voir dire reflects that the court spent a considerable amount 
of time questioning jurors whose answers initially suggested 
they would be unable to impose a verdict of death, and 
ultimately denied the prosecutor’s challenges for cause to 
several of those jurors.  Panelist C.G., for example, indicated in 
response to the questionnaire that he was strongly opposed to 
the death penalty except in rare cases, and that his views would 
affect his ability to follow the law.  When asked by the court if 
he could keep an open mind as to penalty, the juror responded, 
“No, if it’s the death penalty, I’d go the other way,” and “I just 
don’t believe in it.”  The court then told the panelist, “[T]hat’s 
your personal view” but asked if he could set that view aside and 
follow the law, which required him to keep an open mind as to 
both penalties.  The panelist confirmed he could keep an open 
mind.  The court then reviewed other answers on the panelist’s 
questionnaire that suggested he would not consider a verdict of 
death.  When asked, the panelist affirmed that he could keep an 
open mind because “I’ve got to go along with, you know, with the 
law.”  On questioning by the prosecutor, the panelist stated that 
he was opposed to the death penalty for religious reasons.  The 
prosecutor then asked, “Is there any murder case where you 
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would vote for the death penalty?” to which the panelist 
responded, “Not that I know of.”  The panelist indicated that, if 
selected, he would consider the evidence and discuss penalty 
with the other jurors.  The prosecutor questioned, “Can you keep 
an open mind[] to giving the death penalty?” to which the 
panelist replied, “I don’t think so.”  The court followed up, asking 
the panelist if he had such strong feelings against the death 
penalty that he would always vote against it, no matter the 
evidence.  The panelist responded, “Yes, sir.”  The court asked 
the panelist to explain.  The panelist stated that he did not 
personally believe in the death penalty.  However, he would 
listen to the evidence and discuss the case with the other jurors, 
and could ultimately keep an open mind as to penalty.  The court 
denied the prosecutor’s challenge for cause observing, “I 
appreciate that the juror has given some conflicting or 
ambiguous answers, but I’m satisfied in the totality, that this 
juror did understand the Court’s questions, and counsel’s 
questions, to the extent that they are relevant to the ultimate 
issues, as to whether he could perform his duties, and again, I’m 
making every effort that I can to be consistent, and just as I have 
advised counsel, that jurors that have strong personal views, in 
either direction, whether they have strong views that the death 
penalty should be imposed in every murder case, or that the 
death penalty should never be imposed, for any murder, that’s 
not the end of the story, I’m going to examine then whether the 
juror can honestly set those views aside and perform their duty 
as a juror.  I’m making every effort to be neutral on this subject.”  
Questioning of panelists G.G., L.M., and E.H. was similar, with 
the court denying the prosecutor’s challenges for cause to these 
panelists.  This record reflects the court’s balanced approach to 
voir dire.   
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iv. Panelists M.T., K.D., E.W., C.H., and S.L.  
Defendant identifies five panelists, M.T., K.D., E.W., C.H., 
and S.L., who initially survived challenges for cause but were 
later excused when they disclosed biases that would affect their 
ability to serve.  He argues that the voir dire of these panelists 
shows that the court overreached to qualify them, only to have 
them reveal later that they could not be fair.  The record does 
not support this assertion.   
First, the court did not find any juror qualified until it was 
satisfied that the juror’s views had been completely examined.  
More fundamentally, jury selection is an ongoing process.  
Jurors may have no idea what kind of case they may be called 
upon to judge when they report for service.  Often when they 
learn the case to which they have been assigned is a capital one, 
they wrestle with weighty considerations to which they may not 
have previously devoted much thought.  Even when all panelists 
have been passed for cause, the court may ask, before swearing 
the panel, whether anyone in the box has any question about 
their ability to be fair and impartial to both sides if called upon 
to judge the facts, or to decide upon the appropriate verdict 
under the law, should that decision become necessary.  It is also 
not unknown for jurors, who honestly believed they were up to 
the task, to report, even during trial, that they now doubt their 
ability to be fair and impartial.  We turn to the panelists to 
which defendant refers. 
Each of these panelists was individually questioned on 
voir dire, and then called to the jury box approximately a month 
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later for the final selection process.26  At that time, each panelist 
was again asked if there was “any reason” why he or she should 
not be on the jury.  Each panelist brought up a concern not 
previously disclosed.   
Panelist M.T., who worked for the Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation as a vocational instructor, stated 
during the initial voir dire that his employment would not affect 
his ability to be fair, observing “I feel like I don’t judge [the 
inmates].  [¶]  Actually, I don’t even get involved in their cases.  
[¶]  I’m just there to educate them.”  However, when M.T. was 
called to the jury box for the final selection process, he raised a 
concern that he could not be fair due to his place of employment.  
The court noted that the panelist had not previously revealed 
that sentiment, and M.T. replied, “I have been giving it a lot of 
thought.”  He was dismissed by stipulation of both parties.   
Panelist K.D. worked for the railroad and initially 
mentioned no conflicts arising from his job.  However, when he 
was called to the jury box approximately a month later, he 
expressed concerns that he could not be fair.  He recounted that, 
at his work, a group of people from Arvin had been discussing 
the case.  They knew Chad’s father and said he was having a 
hard time and wanted revenge on those responsible for his son’s 
death.  K.D. did not participate in the conversation but was 
concerned that he would not be able to avoid such talk if he 
worked during the trial.  The court inquired whether K.D. 
actually planned to work during the trial, and he indicated that 
 
26  
This approach is reflective of Hovey voir dire in which all 
eligible jurors are questioned, but peremptory challenges are 
not exercised until that questioning of all panelists has been 
completed. 
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he would be seeking weekend shifts.  After the panelist stated a 
concern about his ability to be fair, the trial court excused him.   
Panelist E.W. disclosed in the initial voir dire that his 
son’s girlfriend had previously dated the victim, and that the 
couple visited the Yarbroughs at home shortly after the victim’s 
death.  E.W.’s son said that the victim’s bedroom was “like a 
shrine.”  The girlfriend had discussed the victim’s death with 
E.W., but he did not recall the specifics of the conversation other 
than that the victim was partially clothed and his hands bound 
behind his back.  The panelist himself had never met the 
Yarbrough family.  The visit of his son and his girlfriend would 
not affect his ability to be fair and impartial.  When asked if he 
felt he had “some kind of a bond with the Yarbrough family” or 
would have a bias because of those relationships, E.W. 
responded, “No,” and explained, “I think whoever killed Chad 
Yarbrough should be punished, whether it’s this guy or 
somebody else.  Yes, I’d listen to the evidence and decide from 
that.”  E.W. was “satisfied that [he was] completely fair and 
impartial to both sides.”   
Approximately a month later E.W. returned to the jury 
box.  He responded, “Yes,” when asked if there was any reason 
he could not be completely fair to both sides.  He stated that, 
since the time of his initial voir dire and now, he had come to 
believe he could not be impartial, citing his son’s relationship 
with the victim’s former girlfriend.  The court asked E.W. if he 
had “further thoughts about the subject of being fair,” and E.W. 
replied that he had.  When asked what his “honest feeling” was, 
E.W. said, “I’m leaning way too far for guilty.”  Upon stipulation 
of both parties, the court dismissed the panelist.   
Panelist C.H. worked in Arvin as an elementary school 
teacher.  Two of her coworkers, whom she had known for about 
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10 years, were friendly with the victim and attended his funeral.  
The court inquired whether the panelist’s relationship with 
these coworkers would affect her ability to be fair and impartial, 
and she replied, “I don’t think it would affect that at all,” and 
affirmed she could be completely fair to both sides.  The court 
then asked C.H. to imagine how she would feel if her coworkers 
were critical of the jury’s verdict in the case.  C.H. observed that 
her coworkers were professional people and doubted that they 
would question her.  But if they did, she would not consider the 
verdict her sole responsibility but rather the collective decision 
of 12 jurors.  She suspected that she “would probably just say 
that I really am not supposed to talk about it, and that would be 
the end of it.”  The court emphasized the importance of deciding 
the case independently and without outside pressures like 
criticism or support.  C.H. responded, “I understand now what 
you’re saying.  I don’t think that would happen.”   
Asked about her knowledge of the case, C.H. stated that 
she had heard in the media that the victim was carjacked, tied 
up, and shot in the head.  She described it as a “horrible crime.”  
She also heard a coworker say that the victim’s mother was 
taking his death “very hard” and needed sleeping pills to be able 
to rest.  When questioned by defense counsel, C.H. confirmed 
her belief that the victim’s death was not accidental.  Counsel 
then asked, “So you assume, without hearing any evidence at all 
in this trial, that Chad Yarbrough’s death was an intentional 
first degree murder?”  The panelist replied, “Yes.”  Asked if there 
was anything she could do to change that opinion, C.H. 
answered, “There’s nothing.  No.”  But when the prosecutor 
clarified that she was required to put aside her outside 
knowledge and base her decision on the evidence presented at 
trial, C.H. confirmed that she could do that, stating:  “Yes, I 
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could be fair and open-minded as to whether or not a murder 
has been committed.”  The court then questioned C.H. again:  “I 
want you to be honest with us, because this is not a situation 
where you’re being pressured to either be on this jury or not be 
on this jury.”  “Can you really put out of your mind your opinion 
that Chad Yarbrough was murdered, and keep an open mind to 
listening to the evidence here in the courtroom, which may be 
entirely different from what you’ve heard about or read about 
previously?”  C.H. responded, “Yes.”  The court then asked, “Do 
you understand how important that is?”  Again, C.H. responded, 
“Yes.”  Finally, the court asked, “You’re satisfied that you can do 
it?”  C.H. once again answered, “Yes.”   
Approximately one month later, C.H. was called to the 
jury box as an alternate.  Asked if she had concerns about 
serving, she replied, “Yes.”  Without further voir dire, both 
parties stipulated to her excusal.   
Panelist S.L. worked as a correctional officer and 
institutional 
gang 
investigator 
for 
the 
Department 
of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation.  He was familiar with a Mexican 
Mafia prison gang operating in the Arvin area but had not 
interacted with gang members outside the prison setting.  S.L. 
expressed no doubt that he could set aside his specialized 
knowledge and not act as a “surprise expert.”  The panelist had 
heard about the case in the news media and from coworkers.  He 
had heard that the victim was carjacked and shot in the head at 
close range while kneeling.  He understood that the victim was 
killed over a “disrespect issue,” and that his penis was severed 
and put in his mouth.  When asked if he would be surprised that 
these rumors were false, S.L. responded, “No.”  He indicated 
that he could disregard what he had heard and base his decision 
on the facts presented at trial.   
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About a week later, S.L. asked to speak to the court.  He 
said that he would lose about $400 if jury duty interfered with 
his ability to attend a mandatory job training.  The loss would 
be a financial hardship.  He also suspected based on defendant’s 
name that his gang unit was asked to investigate matters 
related to this case.  He understood that “there was a telephone 
call from an associate of the defendant, that spoke to somebody 
on the outside about this case.”  He was not personally involved 
in the investigation and did not attempt to confirm this 
information.  Defendant renewed his challenge for cause, which 
the trial court granted. 
We find no judicial misconduct with respect to the 
questioning of any of these panelists.  The court allowed ample 
voir dire and received multiple assurances of impartiality from 
each of them.  After reflection, and/or changed circumstances, 
each raised concerns not previously expressed.  The fact that 
they disclosed new information or reconsidered their views 
about things in no way suggests the court’s initial questioning 
was overbearing.  Once the court received the new information, 
it dismissed each of the panelists without attempting to 
rehabilitate them.  No judicial bias appears. 
v. Panelist N.C.  
Defendant complains that the court’s manner of 
questioning was so overbearing that it brought Panelist N.C. to 
tears.  N.C. was a 19-year-old, part-time student who worked in 
a grocery store.  At one point in the voir dire, the panelist began 
to cry.  The court asked if she needed a break or a glass of water, 
but N.C. indicated that she was okay.  When asked if she felt 
uncomfortable, N.C. explained, “Yeah.  [¶]  I’m just — I’ve never 
done this before.  I don’t know what to do.”  The court 
emphasized that it did not want N.C. to feel “under any 
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unnecessary pressure” and that it was “okay to be nervous.”  It 
then asked, “Was there something that I was doing that caused 
you to become upset this afternoon and cry this afternoon in 
court?”  N.C. responded, “It’s just that I’ve never done this, and 
I’m not sure about the questioning.  I’m not used to thinking 
about this.”  The court then emphasized that “I hope you don’t 
think I’m trying to pick on you or make you feel embarrassed,” 
to which the panelist replied, “No.”  Voir dire continued without 
incident and the trial court ultimately excused N.C. for cause.  
The court explained that it was concerned about her display of 
emotion and that she “was not giving a lot of independent 
thought to her answers, but was rather tending to agree with 
whoever was asking her the questions, and that she was having 
a difficult time comprehending the subject matter, and that she 
was basically becoming confused by the process.”  The 
prosecutor opined that the court had a “brusk” manner and 
spoke loudly when it told the panelists to explain their answers:  
“That’s the way it comes across to myself, defense counsel, and 
I think to the jurors.”  He opined, “I don’t think it’s offensive, in 
any way, but I can see how it can be misconstrued by the juror.”  
The court responded, “I appreciate constructive criticism from 
counsel.  [¶]  If I’m becoming brusk, and if I’m not aware of it, 
then I appreciate counsel respectfully suggesting that I consider 
my tone, and I do have a loud voice, in general —”   
The record suggests that this young panelist was 
overwhelmed by the process of voir dire and being questioned 
before strangers in an unfamiliar setting using somewhat 
arcane procedures.  Participating in such a process can be 
stressful and unsettling.  Different people respond differently to 
these circumstances.  A review of the record shows this to be an 
aberration, however.  The other panelists readily answered the 
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court’s questions and participated fully and honestly in voir dire.  
Although we cannot discern tone from the cold record, later 
observations by both the parties and the court on the record 
indicate that the court was generally even in its tone.  That this 
youthful and inexperienced panelist was overwhelmed is 
unfortunate, but it does not demonstrate judicial bias against 
defendant or his counsel or a failure of the voir dire process as a 
whole. 
Finally, defendant complains that the trial court 
impermissibly limited counsel’s voir dire, preventing counsel 
from probing the panelists’ views on what circumstances might 
support a verdict of less than death.  A review of the voir dire 
record as a whole, with particular emphasis on the panelists 
discussed above, belies this claim.  The court conducted 
thorough voir dire of all panelists on the topic of the death 
penalty.  It allowed defense counsel considerable leeway to 
follow up and did not enforce any specific time limit on 
questioning.   
In summary, a review of the entire voir dire, and 
particularly the panelists identified by the defendant, shows 
that the court conscientiously conducted a thorough voir dire 
and conscientiously probed areas that might reveal bias.  The 
court’s inquiry, in turn, prompted honest and thorough 
responses by the panelists.  
b. Treatment of Defense Counsel 
Defendant also criticizes the court’s demeanor towards 
counsel, arguing that the court was hypersensitive, quick to 
threaten, and unwilling to acknowledge error.  “ ‘Although the 
trial court has both the duty and the discretion to control the 
conduct of the trial [citation], the court “commits misconduct if 
it persistently makes discourteous and disparaging remarks to 
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defense counsel so as to discredit the defense or create the 
impression it is allying itself with the prosecution” [citation].  
Nevertheless, “[i]t is well within [a trial court’s] discretion to 
rebuke an attorney, sometimes harshly, when that attorney 
asks inappropriate questions, ignores the court’s instructions, or 
otherwise engages in improper or delaying behavior.” ’ ”  (People 
v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 768 (Woodruff).)  As for 
allegations of actual bias, the “ ‘controlling principle’ ” rests on 
a “ ‘general concept of interests’ that may prevent adjudicators 
from remaining ‘ “disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of 
those accused,” ’ ” such as “bias toward [the] defendant or a 
group to which she belonged,” “past controversy between the 
judge and [the] defendant, pecuniary interests, or other 
‘influence at issue.’ ”  (Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 499.)     
Defendant cites the voir dire of panelist T.B. as an 
example supporting his claim of misconduct and bias.  The court 
asked this panelist:  “If the evidence and law required it, could 
you return a verdict for the death penalty?”  T.B. responded, 
“Yes.”  The court then asked, “If the evidence and law required 
it, could you return a verdict for life without parole?”  T.B. again 
responded, “Yes.”  Defense counsel objected to the court’s 
question on the ground that “the law never requires death.”  The 
objection was overruled.  Both parties passed for cause.  Defense 
counsel then objected, in T.B.’s presence, that the panelist had 
been “misinformed about the law.”  T.B. was asked to leave the 
courtroom, after which defense counsel said that the court had 
improperly asked the panelist “if he could find the death 
penalty, if the law required it.”  He observed that “[t]he law 
never requires the death penalty.”  The court countered that 
counsel had misquoted the court; the question asked about 
returning a verdict of death “if the evidence and law required it.”  
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(Italics added.)  Defense counsel and the court debated whether 
there was a material difference between referring to what the 
law requires and what the evidence and law requires.  The court 
commented:  “Mr. Bryan, do you understand what the Court told 
the juror.  I said if the evidence and the law require it.  That’s 
standard language in asking jurors if they can follow the 
evidence, follow the law, return a fair verdict.”  The court noted 
that it had asked the same question respecting both death and 
LWOP, and that the panelist would understand that “he would 
have to consider either verdict, and return the verdict that was 
proper under the evidence and the law.  That was the point I 
was making.”   
Courts should take care not to suggest to the jury that a 
death verdict would ever be “required.”  (See People v. Medina 
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 781 [jury’s role is to determine whether a 
death verdict is “ ‘warranted’ ”]; People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 
Cal.3d 635, 654 [jury must determine whether death is the 
“ ‘appropriate’ ” penalty].)  T.B. was questioned separately from 
other panelists and ultimately did not serve.  There is no concern 
that a sitting juror was misled about the law.  Moreover, the 
court changed its approach to that question with subsequent 
panelists.  For example, in the next voir dire session, the court 
asked a panelist who ultimately served as Juror No. 4:  “Could 
you listen to all the evidence both during the first phase, which 
we call the guilt phase on the murder charge, and, if we got into 
the penalty phase, also listen to any evidence in that penalty 
phase?  It might include evidence regarding the defendant 
personally, perhaps his background, his life.  And some of the 
evidence might be argued to be circumstances in mitigation, 
which might cause the jury to find that the appropriate penalty 
would be life in prison without parole.  Other evidence might 
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support circumstances in aggravation, which might cause the 
jury to decide that the appropriate penalty would be the death 
penalty.  [¶]  Can you keep an open mind to consider what 
weight to give, if any, to all of that evidence, all of those 
circumstances, and in that way decide which penalty the jury 
should return with?”  (Italics added.)  Subsequent questioning 
was similar.  (See, e.g., reference to the “appropriate” penalty; 
reference to circumstances that “might cause a jury to lean 
toward a death penalty” and a decision about “what penalty 
would be appropriate”; reference to “whether the proper penalty 
should be the death penalty or life in prison without parole”; 
reference to “evidence [that] would support circumstances in 
mitigation . . . and that might cause the jury to lean toward a 
penalty of life in prison without parole” and “evidence [that] 
might support circumstances in aggravation, which might cause 
the jury to lean toward a verdict of death penalty” and asking 
the juror to “keep an open mind as to which of those two possible 
penalties it would return.”)  The record demonstrates that the 
court, responding to defense counsel’s objection, modified its 
phrasing of the questions.  Its response was neither hostile nor 
inflexible.     
As for defendant’s criticism of the trial court’s demeanor, 
a review of the voir dire indicates that the trial court took a firm 
but diplomatic approach with both parties in an attempt to rein 
in inappropriate conduct and maintain an atmosphere of 
decorum.  The following example is illustrative.  Outside of the 
presence of the panelists, defense counsel objected “strenuously” 
to the court’s questioning.  The court instructed counsel to avoid 
such inflammatory and disrespectful language.  Counsel 
retorted:  “Strenuously is a very proper adverb in our lexicon, 
and that’s the word I’ve chosen to use.”  The court observed:  “I’m 
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telling you that you have been using words like strenuously but 
then going beyond that, like accusing me of badgering jurors.  
And that’s the kind of language I think is inflammatory, Mr. 
Bryan.  And it’s unnecessary, and it creates an unnecessary tone 
in this courtroom.  And I’m not accusing [you of] intentionally 
being disrespectful.  But if you continue to use that kind of 
language, it suggests to me that you are going to get into that 
area, and I want to avoid that.  [¶]  Do you understand my 
concern?”  Defense counsel retorted, “I understand your words, 
your Honor.  And I understand — I certainly understand what 
you have said, yes.”  The court responded, “Then let’s all 
maintain an atmosphere of respect for each other.  [¶]  If you 
object, state your objection.  Put it on the record.  I’ll consider it, 
and then I’ll rule on it.  But I’m not impressed by language that 
is unduly exaggerated or inflammatory.  That’s not going to 
make me more likely to grant motions or sustain objections.  You 
state your objection.  You do it in a professional manner.  You 
can be a forceful advocate, but you don’t have to do it by using 
language that’s unnecessary.”  The court took the same 
approach with the prosecutor.  At one point outside of the 
presence of any panelist, the prosecutor objected to defendant’s 
argument, stating, “[T]hat’s the most outrageous thing I have 
ever heard” and calling the argument “ridiculous.”  The court 
cautioned the prosecutor to “keep your voice calm when you 
express your objection.”  The court continued:  “I’m going to 
remind Mr. Barton I appreciate all of you have strong feelings 
about certain issues and you want to state your points forcefully.  
But the Court is not impressed [by] any language that’s not 
necessary.  And I understand the nature of your objection.  [¶]  
You are going to make your points with me, Mr. Barton, in a 
manner without using words like ridiculous.  Because I don’t 
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want [defense counsel] to think that’s giving you an advantage 
by using that kind of language.  I don’t want them to use that 
type of language either.  Let’s use logic and reason and 
advocacy.”   
Defendant maintains that the court threatened to 
“pursue” counsel for making false characterizations on the 
record.  In one exchange outside the presence of any panelists, 
defense counsel accused the court of “intimidat[ing]” one of the 
panelists by speaking in a loud tone.  The court responded that 
counsel should be “very careful” in making such an allegation 
“because I don’t take that as an allegation to make lightly.”  The 
court observed that “we all have our good days and bad days.  [¶]  
But I think I’m having a pretty good day in terms of being fairly 
neutral and not overly loud with jurors today, Mr. Bryan.  [¶]  
And I specifically don’t recall having any sharpness to my voice 
or raising my voice unduly with” panelist G.K.  The court then 
invited defense counsel to give a specific example, and to be 
“very careful when you give your response, because if you’re 
making an allegation without some good faith basis, I may have 
to pursue that.”  Counsel clarified that his objection was to the 
repetitive nature of the questioning, and acknowledged that “I 
agree with the Court, by the way, the Court’s tone of voice has 
been very low all day today.  [¶]  I agree with that.”  There was 
nothing improper in this exchange.  The trial court had an 
obligation to make a record regarding counsel’s allegation that 
the court had raised its voice, because the “tone” of voir dire 
would not be reflected on the printed transcript.  When the court 
challenged counsel’s assertion, defense counsel admitted he had 
overstated his case as to the court’s demeanor.    
In another exchange outside of the presence of any 
panelists, defense counsel argued that the court’s voir dire of 
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prospective panelists and its rulings on motions demonstrated 
the court had “a bias towards the prosecution,” had “prejudged” 
the guilt phase and the venue motion, and that there was “a 
serious miscarriage of justice going on in this courtroom.”  When 
asked for more specifics, defense counsel opted to reserve and 
renew the motion at a later time.  The court then observed, “I 
appreciate counsel are going to be aggressive advocates for your 
sides.  [¶]  But once again, I caution counsel that to the extent 
that you make representations about what the record is, if you 
feel that this Court is engaging in some activity which is to be 
construed as unfair, then I ask you to please be careful and have 
a good faith basis for making those types of challenges.  Because, 
again, they can be certainly proper, if you think there’s a good 
faith basis for it.  But if you don’t have a good faith basis for it, 
there can be subsequent proceedings, including State Bar 
proceedings, if counsel are engaging in tactics that are not good 
faith.  [¶]  I’m not suggesting that’s [what] happened.  [¶]  It’s 
just that we don’t lightly accuse either counsel or courts of being 
biased or unfair without good faith.  [[¶]  If there is lack of good 
faith, there can be implications.  [¶]  I’m not saying that as a 
threat.  I’m asking counsel to have a basis for making those 
kinds of accusations.”  Counsel retorted that he should not have 
to “worr[y] about my livelihood, my license,” and that “I’m going 
to do my job, and if the Court sends me to jail, that’s fine.”  The 
court reassured counsel that “I have not threatened to send you 
to jail nor to refer you to the State Bar.”   
Defendant observes that, despite these assurances, the 
court did, at some point, file a complaint against defense counsel 
Bryan with the State Bar.  Counsel became aware of the 
complaint months after the trial ended, when he received a 
letter from the State Bar informing him that the investigation 
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had been completed and no disciplinary action would be taken.  
The record does not reflect that the complaint was filed during 
the course of the trial.  In any event, the mere act of referring 
an attorney to the State Bar for investigation, without more, 
does not demonstrate actual bias.  And, significantly, Bryan was 
unaware of the pending referral while the trial was ongoing, so 
it could not have adversely affected his performance.  Defendant 
cites to defense counsel’s statements during a hearing on the 
motion for new trial that he was, in fact, intimidated by the 
court’s suggestion that it might take disciplinary action against 
him.  But counsel did not urge that his performance was 
adversely affected.  Instead, he argued that defendant was 
entitled to a trial “that was free from so much acrimony.”  A 
review of the record shows that counsel provided vigorous 
advocacy throughout, and appeared more emboldened than 
cowed by the trial court’s repeated requests for moderation and 
civility.      
In summary, the record as a whole demonstrates that the 
court made every effort to be fair to both sides and to maintain 
civility and decorum.  Although “a few of the court’s comments 
to defense counsel were more pointed, the comments did not rise 
to the level of ‘an unconstitutional display of judicial bias,’ but 
instead amounted to correct rulings occasionally accompanied 
by [frustration] at defense counsel’s argumentative . . . and 
improper remarks.”  (Woodruff, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 768.)  
“Such instances of friction . . . ‘are virtually inevitable in a long 
trial.’ ”  (Id. at p. 770.)  They in no way resemble the type of 
disparaging and pervasive remarks that we have found to be 
reversible misconduct.  (See, e.g., Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 
pp. 477–485, 505–507; People v. Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, 
1233–1243.)  Moreover, we have refused to find misconduct 
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“when the record does not demonstrate how [the court’s 
comments] might have influenced the jury or otherwise affected 
the trial.”  (Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 496.)  None of the 
examples defendant cites took place in front of any panelists or 
sworn jurors.  Indeed, the trial court took great pains not to 
expose the jurors to such disagreements.  “The isolated 
comments [defendant has identified] in a lengthy trial in which 
the 
court 
exhibited 
some 
impatience 
with 
counsel’s 
argumentative comments and questions do not demonstrate 
misconduct or bias, much less misconduct that was ‘so 
prejudicial that it deprived defendant of “ ‘a fair, as opposed to 
a perfect, trial.’ ” ’ ”  (Woodruff, at p. 772.) 
The record reflects that this was a hard-fought and 
thoroughly litigated trial.  Advocates, of course, have a 
responsibility to urge their positions forcefully and forthrightly.  
Friction can result, however, in the heat of the moment.  As 
some of the excerpts quoted or described here reveal, at times 
counsel were far from cordial with each other or the judge.  A 
trial court presiding over contentious litigation has an 
obligation to ensure that zealous advocacy does not devolve into 
ad hominem attack and that the jury is not influenced by a 
hostile courtroom atmosphere.  A complete review of this record 
shows that the court’s intervention was directed at both counsel 
and appropriately focused on maintaining professionalism and 
courtesy. 
6. Witherspoon/Witt Error  
Defendant contends the trial court’s dismissal of Panelist 
K.G. violated the principles of Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 
U.S. 510 and Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412.  We find no error. 
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As noted, “To achieve the constitutional imperative of 
impartiality, the law permits a [panelist] to be challenged for 
cause only if his or her views in favor of or against capital 
punishment ‘would “prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his [or her] duties as a juror” ’ in accordance with 
the court’s instructions and the juror’s oath.”  (Blair, supra, 36 
Cal.4th at p. 741, quoting Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.)  A 
panelist’s bias in favor of or against the death penalty need not 
be proven with “ ‘ ”unmistakable clarity.  [Citations.]  Rather, it 
is sufficient that the trial judge is left with the definite 
impression that a [panelist] would be unable to faithfully and 
impartially apply the law in the case before the juror.” ’ ”  
(Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 497–498,)   
Panelist K.G. indicated in her questionnaire that she felt 
LWOP was the appropriate punishment in a murder case.  She 
wrote, “Yes” to the question, “Would the nature of the 
punishment affect your ability as a juror to follow the law?”  
Asked to mark the answer that best corresponds to her views on 
the death penalty, K.G. circled:  “While I am somewhat opposed 
to the death penalty, I do believe there are cases where a death 
sentence should be imposed for a deliberate murder.”  She also 
wrote, “I have mixed feelings about it.”  She did not have any 
religious or moral views that would make it impossible for her 
to return a verdict of death.  She indicated that she could set 
aside her personal views about the death penalty and reach a 
verdict in accordance with the law and evidence.  Her feelings 
were not so strong that she would automatically vote against the 
death penalty regardless of the evidence.  She was open minded 
and would give consideration to both penalties based on the 
evidence presented at trial.   
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The court and parties probed these answers during voir 
dire.  Asked by the court if she could consider both LWOP and 
death as possible penalties, K.G. replied, “I’m not sure.”  She 
explained, “[I]n my opinion, if they show remorse, then I mean I 
don’t think they should be sentenced to death.”  When asked if 
she could keep an open mind and consider all the circumstances, 
K.G. responded, “I don’t think I’d have an open mind.  I mean, I 
don’t think I could have any part in sentencing somebody to 
that — to death.”  Asked if the prosecution proved a murder in 
connection with kidnapping and carjacking whether she could 
return a verdict of death, K.G. said, “Well, if the evidence was 
there, I believe I could.”  She affirmed that “if I had all the 
evidence, I would have an open mind about it.”  The court then 
asked if the panelist was “satisfied, then, that you do have an 
open mind to consider the two possible penalties at a penalty 
phase, either death or life without parole?”  K.G. replied, “Yes.”   
The prosecutor probed:  “I’m a little bit confused.  You told 
the Judge that you could have no part in sentencing somebody 
to death.  Is that correct?”  K.G. responded affirmatively.  The 
prosecutor then asked, “Is that how you feel?  You wouldn’t want 
to be responsible for sentencing somebody to death?”  She 
replied, “I think it would weigh heavy on me, knowing that I had 
apart [sic] in it.”  When asked what type of “rare” circumstances 
K.G. felt would warrant death, she said, “[I]f they showed no 
remorse for what they did and they were like, you know, they 
just really didn’t care about it, then I think they should be 
sentenced to death.”  The prosecutor then asked K.G. if she could 
“search your soul” and “look inside yourself and say okay, I 
wouldn’t be leaning towards life without parole going into that 
penalty phase?  Can you say that?”  The panelist replied, “No.”  
He then said, “[C]an you say honestly that even if you felt 
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somebody didn’t have remorse, and — you sit in this courtroom, 
you’d be looking at the defendant every day, you actually have 
the ability to say I vote for the death penalty.  You can’t do that, 
can you?”  The panelist replied, “No.”   
Defense counsel attempted to rehabilitate K.G., asking, 
“[Y]ou would follow the law in this case and do what the Judge 
instructed you, wouldn’t you?” to which she replied, “Yes.”  He 
asked if she felt this was a “cold-blooded calculated murder and 
the man deserved to die, you could vote for the death penalty, 
couldn’t you?”  Again, K.G. replied, “Yes.”   
The trial court then addressed K.G. again, asking, “What 
is your honest feeling about your ability to keep an open mind 
and come out here and sit down and look at all of us, and either 
say yes, I voted for the death penalty or yes, I voted for life 
without parole, could you do that and look at every one and say 
yes, I voted for the death penalty?”  She answered, “No.”  When 
asked to explain her prior answer to defense counsel, she 
replied, “[G]osh I don’t think I could. [¶] . . . [¶]  [e]xplain it.  I 
just know that I wouldn’t be able to come out here and — I don’t 
think I could have any part in somebody going to — sentenced 
to death.”   
The court granted the prosecutor’s challenge for cause, 
observing that K.G. “had mixed feelings about this, was very 
apprehensive.”  It found “under the circumstances, including the 
demeanor of the [panelist], that she was clearly equivocal in her 
responses, and that she would be unable to carry out the duties 
that she would be required to, that her views on capital 
punishment would prevent or substantially impair her ability to 
be neutral and follow the Court’s instructions.”   
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
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The record supports the trial court’s ruling.  K.G. 
expressed concern that she could not return a sentence of death, 
stating that she was not sure, that she had mixed feelings, and 
that the decision would weigh heavily on her.  She did believe 
that she could follow the law and the court’s instructions.  
Nonetheless, when asked directly if she could impose a sentence 
of death, she thrice stated that she could not.  The trial court 
and the parties engaged K.G. in extensive voir dire.  As a result, 
the court was “in the unique position of assessing demeanor, 
tone, and credibility firsthand — factors of ‘critical importance 
in assessing the attitude and qualifications of [panelists].’ ”  
(People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 21.)  “[W]e defer as we 
must to the trial court’s evaluation of the [panelist’s] demeanor, 
which the court expressly stated it had carefully observed, 
together with her responses.  The trial court was entitled to 
credit [the panelist’s] statement that she would not consider 
death as a potential penalty in this proceeding.”  (People v. 
Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 734 (Lynch); see also People v. 
Nunez and Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1, 25 [panelist’s conflicting 
responses supported a challenge for cause].)   
Defendant argues that K.G. said she could impose the 
death penalty in rare circumstances, such as when the crime 
was cold-blooded and the defendant had no remorse.  But the 
prosecutor inquired on that topic, and the panelist ultimately 
stated that she could not impose a death sentence even under 
these circumstances.  “[T]he mere theoretical possibility that a 
[panelist] might be able to reach a verdict of death in some case 
does not necessarily render the dismissal” erroneous.  (People v. 
Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 432; accord People v. Beck and 
Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 607–608.)  While K.G. allowed there 
might be some theoretical possibility she could impose a 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
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115 
 
sentence of death, her comments made clear it was not a 
realistic possibility.  The court was “left with the definite 
impression that she was substantially impaired, and that 
determination is supported by substantial evidence.”  (Beck and 
Cruz, at p. 608.) 
Defendant also objects that the trial court engaged in one-
sided voir dire designed to disqualify K.G.  Not so.  The panelist’s 
answers were conflicting.  The trial court’s voir dire was neutral 
and aimed at clarifying her responses.  To that end, the court 
focused appropriately on whether K.G. could set aside her 
personal views and base a decision on the law and evidence.   
Defendant complains that the court unfairly asked the 
panelist if she could “look at all of us” in the courtroom and 
announce a verdict of death.  But we have found such questions 
proper, explaining that they are “an acceptable means of 
impressing upon each [panelist] that the verdict of death would 
affect a real person who would be in the courtroom at that time, 
and sought to elicit whether, under these circumstances, the 
[panelist] nevertheless would be able to vote for death.”  (People 
v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 853; accord, Lynch, supra, 50 
Cal.4th at p. 734.)  The “predicate of the question was sound” 
because “[j]urors must be prepared to affirm their verdicts.”  
(People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1235.) 
The trial court acted within its discretion in excluding K.G 
for cause.     
7. Wheeler/Batson Error  
Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s peremptory 
challenges to one Black and three Hispanic panelists violated 
People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler) and Batson v. 
Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79.  The trial court found defendant 
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116 
 
failed to make a prima facie case with respect to all four 
panelists and did not require the prosecutor to explain the 
challenges.  Although the issue is close, upon independently 
reviewing the record we find there was no prima facie showing.   
On January 17, 2001, defendant brought a Wheeler motion 
following the prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge 
against T.B., a Black man.  The trial court denied the motion.  
Defendant renewed his motion following the excusal of three 
additional 
panelists 
with 
Hispanic 
surnames 
and/or 
appearance:  J.B. and T.D. were women; F.R., a man.  Again, the 
motions were denied.   
During a break in the proceedings, the trial court 
expanded the record in this regard.  The court confirmed that 
T.B. was Black, and that T.D. and F.R. appeared to be Hispanic.  
It indicated that J.B. appeared to be White and questioned 
whether her surname was Hispanic.  The prosecutor agreed that 
the panelist appeared to be White, while defense counsel opined 
she was a “mix of Hispanic and Filipino” with a Hispanic 
surname.  The court concluded that “[s]he had the appearance 
of a [W]hite female, and I have categorized her as such.”  To 
ensure 
complete 
review 
we 
will 
accept 
defendant’s 
characterization of panelist J.B. as Hispanic for purposes of our 
analysis.  “We have held that Spanish surnames may identify 
Hispanic individuals, who are members of a cognizable class for 
purposes of Batson/Wheeler motions.  (People v. Trevino (1985) 
39 Cal.3d 667, 686, disapproved on other grounds in People v. 
Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194.)  ‘Where . . . no one knows at the 
time of challenge whether a particular individual who has a 
Spanish surname is Hispanic, a showing that [panelists] are 
being excluded on the basis of surname alone’ may nonetheless 
constitute a prima facie case of impermissible strikes based on 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
117 
 
association with a cognizable group.  (People v. Trevino, at p. 
686.)  ‘Although the correlation between surname and group 
membership is not exact, such precision is unnecessary.’  (Ibid.)”  
(People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1156, fn. 2.)      
In ruling on the motion, the court stated that it had 
“considered” the Wheeler line of cases along with all relevant 
circumstances, which included the ethnic and racial background 
of others in the box, other panelists remaining, and the 
circumstances of those who had been excused.  It ultimately 
concluded:  “I don’t find a prima facie case.”  The prosecutor 
accordingly declined to state any reasons for excusing the 
challenged panelists.27   
The jury as sworn contained three Hispanics and nine 
Whites.  The five alternates included two Whites and three 
Hispanics.  As noted, original Juror No. 12, a White woman, was 
excused during trial and replaced by Alternate Juror No. 3, a 
Hispanic woman.  Thus, the final composition included four 
jurors of Hispanic descent.        
We recently summarized the governing principles in 
People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719 
(Holmes, McClain and Newborn):   
“ ‘ “Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit any 
advocate’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective 
jurors based on race.” ’  (People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 
1210.)  ‘ “Doing so violates both the equal protection clause of 
the United States Constitution and the right to trial by a jury 
 
27  
Defendant brought Wheeler challenges to three additional 
Hispanic panelists dismissed by the prosecutor, T.G., R.F. and 
alternate B.D.  The motions were denied and defendant does not 
challenge the court’s ruling as to these panelists on appeal.   
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
118 
 
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community 
under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution.” ’  (Id. 
at p. 1211.)  The law also recognizes ‘ “a rebuttable presumption 
that a peremptory challenge is being exercised properly, and the 
burden is on the opposing party to demonstrate impermissible 
discrimination.”  [Citation.]  “A three-step procedure applies at 
trial when a defendant alleges discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges.  First, the defendant must make a prima facie 
showing that the prosecution exercised a challenge based on 
impermissible criteria.  Second, if the trial court finds a prima 
facie case, then the prosecution must offer nondiscriminatory 
reasons for the challenge.  Third, the trial court must determine 
whether the prosecution’s offered justification is credible and 
whether, in light of all relevant circumstances, the defendant 
has shown purposeful race discrimination.  [Citation.]  ‘The 
ultimate burden of persuasion regarding [discriminatory] 
motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the [defendant].’ ” ’ 
(Ibid.)”  (Holmes, McClain and Newborn, supra, 12 Cal.5th at 
pp. 759–760.)   
“When this jury was selected in [2001], there was some 
confusion as to the nature of the required prima facie showing.  
In People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1318, we held:  ‘to 
state a prima facie case, the objector must show that it is more 
likely than not the . . . challenges . . . were based on 
impermissible group bias.’  The United States Supreme Court 
subsequently disapproved the ‘more likely than not’ formulation 
as setting too high a threshold.  Instead, it explained that 
Batson’s first step is satisfied if the objector produces sufficient 
evidence to support an inference that discrimination occurred.  
(Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 170.)  For cases tried 
before Johnson v. California, we have ‘adopted a mode of 
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analysis under which, rather than accord the usual deference to 
the trial court’s no-prima-facie case determination, we “review 
the record independently to determine whether the record 
supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a [panelist] 
on 
a 
prohibited 
discriminatory 
basis.” ’ 
 
(People 
v. 
Rhoades[ (2019)] 8 Cal.5th [393,] 428−429.)  We apply that 
analytical 
approach 
here 
and 
consider 
‘ “all 
relevant 
circumstances” ’ in doing so.  (Id. at p. 429.)”  (Holmes, McClain 
and Newborn, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 760.) 
“Though proof of a prima facie case may be made from any 
information in the record available to the trial court, we have 
mentioned ‘certain types of evidence that will be relevant for 
this purpose.  Thus the party may show that his opponent has 
struck most or all of the members of the identified group from 
the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of his 
peremptories against the group.  He may also demonstrate that 
the [panelists] in question share only this one characteristic — 
their membership in the group — and that in all other respects 
they are as heterogeneous as the community as a whole.  Next, 
the showing may be supplemented when appropriate by such 
circumstances as the failure of his opponent to engage these 
same [panelists] in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to 
ask them any questions at all.  Lastly, . . . the defendant need 
not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a 
violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and 
especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the 
group to which the majority of the remaining [panelists] belong, 
these facts may also be called to the court’s attention.’  (Wheeler, 
supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280–281, fn. omitted; see also Batson [v. 
Kentucky], supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 96–97 [in assessing a prima 
facie case, the trial court should consider ‘all relevant 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
120 
 
circumstances,’ including ‘a “pattern” of strikes against black 
[panelists] and ‘the prosecutor’s questions and statements 
during voir dire examination’]; [citations].)”  (People v. Bell 
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 597.) 
Exercising our independent review on appeal, we conclude 
the defense failed to make the required prima facie showing.   
The only Black panelist excused by the prosecutor was 
T.B.  Beyond the fairly extensive questioning of the court and 
defense counsel, the prosecutor did not engage T.B. in additional 
voir dire, and ultimately, there were no Black jurors or 
alternates.  But neither the defendant nor the victims were 
Black, lessening concerns that the prosecutor had an improper 
motive for excluding this particular group.  (People v. O’Malley 
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 980 (O’Malley).)  Moreover, the record 
does not disclose the number of Black panelists in the jury panel, 
or whether some Blacks were excused by the defense or by the 
court for hardship or cause.  Defendant offers no substantive 
discussion of T.B.’s questionnaire or voir dire responses.  On this 
record, no prima facie case was made out respecting this 
panelist.   
As for the prosecutor’s excusal of Hispanic jurors, we note 
that defendant shared the same ethnicity, while the victim was 
White.  “ ‘[R]acial identity between the defendant and the 
excused person,’ or between the victim and the majority of 
remaining jurors, raises heightened concerns about whether the 
prosecutor’s challenge[s] [were] racially motivated.”  (O’Malley, 
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 980.)   
Reviewing the 85 panelists who remained after excusals 
for hardship or cause, 17 had Hispanic surnames.  Thus, 
Hispanic surnamed panelists composed 20 percent of the 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
121 
 
available panelists.  Ordinarily, both sides would have an equal 
number of peremptories:  20 each in a capital case.  (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 231, subd. (a).)  However, in this case, the court allotted 
six additional peremptories to the defense and one additional 
peremptory to the prosecutor after the parties raised objections 
to the court’s rulings on Witherspoon/Witt qualifications.  As a 
result, the prosecutor had 21 peremptories for the jury and an 
additional five for the alternates; the defense had 26 
peremptories for the jury and an additional five for the 
alternates.  In selecting jurors and alternates the prosecutor 
excused a total of eight Hispanic panelists, or roughly 30 percent 
of his 26 allotted challenges.  The prosecutor exhausted all 21 
challenges to the main panel; he accepted the alternates with 
three challenges remaining.  The defense peremptorily 
challenged two Hispanic panelists.  As noted, four Hispanics sat 
on the final panel, and another two served as alternates.  One 
Hispanic panelist was left in the pool when the jury was sworn. 
Our independent review of the prosecutor’s pattern of 
strikes reveals a disparity early in the selection process.  When 
peremptory challenges began, there were two Hispanic panelists 
seated in the box:  D.M. and T.D.  The prosecutor first struck 
D.M. and used his second challenge to strike a non-Hispanic.  He 
then made a series of strikes against Hispanic panelists:  C.A., 
T.D., F.R., and J.B., and he challenged T.B., the only Black 
panelist.  When J.B. was struck, eight Hispanics had entered 
the box.  Defendant had struck one (G.M.), and the prosecutor 
had struck five.  The defense brought Wheeler motions after the 
challenges to T.B., T.D., F.R., and J.B.  When the court denied 
defendant’s Wheeler motion challenging the excusal of J.B., the 
prosecutor had used five of seven peremptories (71.4 percent) to 
strike five of the eight Hispanic panelists who had entered the 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
122 
 
box (62.5 percent).  These rates were disproportionate to the 
percentage of Hispanic prospective jurors in the venire (20 
percent) and to the percentage of Hispanics among those who 
had entered the box at that time (eight out of 28, or 28.6 
percent).  Numerical strike and elimination rates, considered 
alone, reflect a notable disparity.  (See, e.g., People v. Sanchez 
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 439 [prosecutor’s use of four of ten 
peremptories (40 percent) to challenge four of six Hispanic 
jurors (66 percent) “might suggest a discriminatory purpose”].) 
However, in conducting our independent review, we 
consider “ ‘all relevant circumstances.’ ”  (People v. Rhoades, 
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 429 (Rhoades).)  Other factors in this 
record ultimately persuade us that the prosecutor’s challenges 
did not give rise to an inference of discrimination. 
Of the panelists defendant challenges on appeal, the 
prosecutor did not question J.B., and excused her at the first 
opportunity.  The prosecutor engaged T.D. in voir dire and 
accepted four panels that contained her before excusing her.  
The prosecutor engaged F.R. in voir dire.  Although the 
prosecutor excused him at the first opportunity, the prosecutor 
had earlier opposed defendant’s challenge for cause to F.R.  
These circumstances suggest that some reason other than 
ethnicity ultimately prompted the prosecutor to excuse T.D. and 
F.R.  (See People v. Battle (2021) 11 Cal.5th 749, 777 (Battle).)   
Between the peremptory challenges to C.A. and T.B., the 
prosecutor accepted a panel with two Hispanics three times, and 
once accepted a panel with three Hispanics.  (See Holmes, 
McClain and Newborn, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 764; People v. 
Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 508; People v. Sanchez, supra, 63 
Cal.4th at p. 439.)  In the end, the prosecutor used eight of the 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
123 
 
23 strikes he exercised (34.8 percent) to remove eight of the 16 
Hispanic panelists (50 percent) who entered the box.  The 
prosecutor’s final strike rate was therefore less disproportionate 
than earlier in the peremptory challenge process.  While the 
inference to be drawn from this statistic may be lessened 
somewhat by the fact that the prosecutor’s strike rate improved 
after defendant’s Wheeler motions, it is nonetheless a relevant 
consideration.  (Holmes, McClain and Newborn, at pp. 763–764; 
Battle, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 777; People v. Johnson, supra, 8 
Cal.5th at p. 507.)  The circumstances here stand in contrast to 
those in Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, where the 
prosecutor made a “late-stage decision to accept a [single] black 
panel member,” (id. at p. 250), here, the ultimate Hispanic 
participation on the jury was 33 percent of voting jurors (four of 
12), a figure 13 percentage points greater than their 
representation among those Hispanic panelists available for 
selection (see Holmes, McClain and Newborn, at p. 762; Battle, 
at p. 777).  Considered in totality, these factors counter any 
inference of discrimination that the pattern of the prosecutor’s 
strikes against Hispanic panelists earlier in the selection 
process might otherwise imply. 
Defendant offers no analysis of the individual panelists or 
their questionnaire and voir dire responses.  He asserts without 
elaboration that the trial court failed to adequately inquire into 
his motion or to provide a sincere and reasoned explanation for 
its rulings.  His characterization ignores the trial court’s 
observation that it took into account the ethnic and racial 
characteristics of the jurors in the box, the remaining panelists, 
and the circumstances of the jurors excused.  In any event, 
because we have independently reviewed the record, we need 
not comment further on defendant’s assertion.   
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
124 
 
We have taken into account the pattern of strikes and 
passes to the panel, the final jury composition, and the 
defendant’s general assertions in support of his claim.  Because 
we have concluded that defendant failed to raise an inference of 
discrimination, we have not hypothesized as to any permissible 
reasons that may have been the basis for the prosecutor’s 
challenges.  (See Holmes, McClain and Newborn, supra, 12 
Cal.5th at pp. 765–766; People v. Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 
510, fn. 7.)  On this record, defendant’s assertions of error fail.  
B. Guilt Phase Issues 
1. Juror Misconduct  
Defendant 
asserts 
that 
Juror 
No. 
11 
committed 
misconduct by discussing the case with her father during the 
trial and then mentioning the conversation to other jurors.  The 
trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to remove the 
juror on this basis.   
On February 5, 2001, during the trial, Juror No. 11 
reported that her father had asked her during lunch if she was 
getting bored with the case.  When she said no, he replied, 
“[W]hat’s taking them so long[?]  They know he did it.”  She 
responded that she could not discuss the case.  Her father was 
hard of hearing and spoke in a loud voice that others around 
them could hear.  Juror No. 11 did not see any other jurors in 
the vicinity at the time.  She stated that her father’s views would 
not affect her own.   
The court brought in the entire jury and asked if any 
members or alternates had overheard Juror No. 11 discussing 
an incident during lunch.  Juror Nos. 2, 4, 6, 9, and Alternate 
Juror No. 2 replied affirmatively.  Juror Nos. 2, 6, 9, and 
Alternate Juror No. 2 said that Juror No. 11 had told them she 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
125 
 
had lunch with her father and he said something inappropriate 
but did not give specifics.  Juror No. 4 said that he overheard 
Juror No. 11 say she would probably be kicked off the jury, but 
nothing else.  The trial court declined to dismiss the juror.  The 
court found it noteworthy that the juror brought the incident to 
the court’s attention herself, an indication she was aware of and 
trying to comply with her duties.   
“ ‘An accused has a constitutional right to a trial by an 
impartial jury. [Citations.]  An impartial jury is one in which no 
member has been improperly influenced [citations] and every 
member is “ ‘capable and willing to decide the case solely on the 
evidence before it’ ” [citations].’  [Citation.]  [¶]  [W]e first 
determine whether misconduct actually occurred.  [Citation.]  
Misconduct ‘raises a presumption of prejudice “[which] the 
prosecution must rebut . . . by demonstrating ‘there is no 
substantial likelihood that any juror was improperly influenced 
to the defendant’s detriment.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Hensley (2014) 59 
Cal.4th 788, 824.)   
“[A] juror’s inadvertent receipt of information that [has] 
not been presented in court falls within the general category of 
‘juror misconduct.’ ”  (People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 
579.)  Such inadvertent exposure, “even if not ‘misconduct’ in the 
pejorative sense, may require . . . examination for probable 
prejudice” (In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 295), because 
it “poses the risk that one or more jurors may be influenced by 
material that the defendant has had no opportunity to confront, 
cross-examine, or rebut” (Nesler, at p. 579).  We conclude that 
the father’s unsolicited comment to Juror No. 11 about 
defendant’s guilt was misconduct that must be assessed for 
prejudice.   
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
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Juror bias “can appear in two different ways.”  (In re 
Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 653.)  “First, we will find bias if 
the extraneous material, judged objectively, is inherently and 
substantially likely to have influenced the juror.”  (Ibid.)  
Second, “even if the extraneous information was not so 
prejudicial, in and of itself, as to cause ‘inherent’ bias under the 
first test,” we consider the totality of the circumstances “to 
determine objectively whether a substantial likelihood of actual 
bias nonetheless arose.”  (Id. at p. 654.)   
People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269 (Danks), presents 
similar facts.  There a juror encountered her pastor, who was 
aware she was serving as a juror in the defendant’s case.  The 
juror’s husband suggested she and the pastor discuss some bible 
passages she had read, but she responded she did not need to 
discuss anything.  The pastor then said he understood she had 
read several scripture verses.  The juror affirmed she had, and 
that they gave her comfort.  The pastor commented that she had 
chosen good scriptures, and then jokingly said if he were a juror, 
he would impose the death penalty on the defendant.  (Id. at pp. 
298–301, 306.)  We found the encounter constituted misconduct, 
but was not prejudicial.  The pastor’s “gratuitous personal view” 
was not “inherently and substantially likely to have influenced” 
the juror in light of the extraordinary penalty phase evidence.  
(Id. at p. 307.)  Additionally, the juror did not solicit the pastor’s 
views and did not engage in further conversation about them.  
Nor did she repeat her pastor’s views to the other jurors.  (Ibid.)      
Likewise, here, Juror No. 11’s father offered an unsolicited 
and gratuitous opinion about defendant’s guilt.  The juror did 
not inquire into the basis for her father’s opinion or discuss any 
trial evidence with him.  She simply responded that she could 
not discuss the case.  The juror then commented to other jurors 
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that she had an incident with her father that she needed to 
report to the court.  She did not convey to the other jurors the 
substance of her father’s comment, and she promptly reported 
and confirmed to the court that the comment would not affect 
her.  These circumstances, “judged objectively, were not 
inherently and substantially likely to have influenced, i.e., 
biased,” Juror No. 11, and “the surrounding circumstances fail 
to demonstrate actual bias.”  (Danks, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 
307.)       
2. Admission of Gang Evidence  
Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial 
error by admitting the testimony of a gang expert about 
defendant’s membership in the LFS gang.  He contends the 
evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, and that its 
erroneous admission violated his due process right to a fair trial.  
He also claims the expert’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay 
under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). 
Defendant was not charged with a gang enhancement.  
Before trial, he filed a motion to exclude evidence of his gang 
membership as irrelevant to any issue in the trial and highly 
prejudicial.  The People opposed the motion.  They argued that 
defendant’s gang association with others who committed the 
crime was relevant to prove his identity as one of the 
perpetrators in the crimes against Paredes.  The People further 
argued that defendant’s gang membership established a motive 
for the crimes.  The People proposed to leave out the gang 
evidence if defendant would stipulate to his presence during the 
Paredes and Juan Carlos carjackings.  No such stipulation was 
forthcoming.  The court admitted the evidence as “relevant . . . 
to the issues of identification, as well as issues of motive and 
intent, with respect to the charges pending against the 
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128 
 
defendant,” and found the probative value of the evidence was 
not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  (Evid. 
Code, § 352.)   
As set forth in further detail below, Deputy Contreras 
testified about gangs in Lamont and offered his opinion about 
defendant’s gang membership in LFS.  He identified several 
other persons as members of LFS or VCL based on their 
admissions or other gang indicia:  Freddy “Shadow” De La Rosa, 
Daniel “Bonkers” Quintana, Efrain “Baby” Garza, Hector 
Valenzuela, Carlos Rosales, Gabriel Flores, and Willie Santiago.   
On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited that there 
is a street gang in Arvin called the “Arvinas.”  LFS and VCL 
have rival gangs in Arvin.  The witness acknowledged that 
sometimes people associate with gang members without 
actually having been “jumped in,” either because they are 
personal friends of the members or because they are seeking 
protection from rival gangs.  The field contacts that were made 
with defendant regarding his gang associations occurred when 
he was 14 or 15 years old.   
The trial court admonished the jury as follows:  “[T]o the 
extent that this witness is being offered as an expert witness on 
the subject of street gangs, his testimony related to street gangs 
is going to be admitted at this time for the limited purpose of 
being circumstantial evidence on the subjects of identification, 
motive, or intent.  And it’s limited to those areas — 
identification, motive, and intent.  [¶]  Keep in mind those 
limitations as you listen to this testimony.”   
a. Relevance and Evidence Code Section 352 
“We have recognized that admission of evidence of a 
criminal defendant’s gang membership creates a risk the jury 
will improperly infer the defendant has a criminal disposition” 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
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and may have a highly inflammatory impact.  (People v. 
Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 193.)  Nonetheless, “evidence of 
gang membership is often relevant to, and admissible regarding, 
the charged offense. Evidence of the defendant’s gang 
affiliation — including evidence of the gang’s territory, 
membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal 
enterprises, rivalries, and the like — can help prove identity, 
motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of applying force 
or fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the charged crime.”  
(People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049 (Hernandez).)  
Such evidence is admissible even when a gang enhancement is 
not charged, provided the probative value of the evidence is not 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  (Williams, at 
p. 193.)  A court’s admissibility ruling is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  (People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 922–923 
(Champion).)   
Here, defendant’s gang membership was relevant and 
admissible to bolster Paredes’s identification of defendant as one 
of his assailants.  Proof that defendant and Efrain “Baby” Garza 
were members of the same gang “formed a significant 
evidentiary link in the chain of proof tying them to the crimes in 
this case.”  (Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 921.)  Paredes 
identified defendant and Garza as two of the people who 
kidnapped him.  Defendant was also identified along with Garza 
and several other LFS members28 in the kidnapping and robbery 
of Juan Carlos.  There was evidence that defendant and Garza 
kidnapped and killed Chad.   
 
28  
Valenzuela, De La Rosa, Rosales, and Quintana. 
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Defendant challenged his identification in the Paredes 
crimes.  He presented an expert witness who testified that 
lighting and stress can affect the reliability of an eyewitness 
identification.  He also presented two alibi witnesses who 
testified that defendant was at Ashley Medina’s home the night 
that Paredes was assaulted.  Finally, defendant himself testified 
and denied involvement in the Paredes kidnapping.   
In Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th 879, we found gang 
evidence admissible to bolster witness identification under 
similar circumstances, explaining:  “[E]vidence that defendants 
were members of the same gang as other persons involved in the 
commission of the crimes in this case fortified the testimony of 
the persons who identified defendants as participants in the 
murders.  Thus, evidence of defendants’ gang membership 
tended ‘logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference’ to 
establish their identities as perpetrators of those offenses, and 
the trial court did not abuse its ‘broad discretion’ [citation] when 
it determined that the evidence of gang membership was 
relevant.”  (Id. at p. 922.)   
In addition, long before trial, defendant himself injected 
the subject of gang affiliation as a motive for both Chad’s 
behavior and his own.  In his statement to police, defendant said 
that he confronted Chad, asking repeatedly if Chad knew who 
defendant was.  After abducting Chad, defendant “slapped the 
bitch,” and told him that “it wasn’t a game to be playing around 
with gangbangers . . . .”  Defendant told the officers that he 
intended to scare Chad because of a conflict with defendant’s 
cousin and because Chad “was banging for Arvin.”  Defendant 
described the incident at the Rosales house, and referred to Jose 
and Freddy Gomez as “Arvin [B]oys.”  At trial, defendant elicited 
testimony that there was a violent rivalry between Lamont 13 
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131 
 
and the Arvinas.  Carlos Rosales had seen Chad associating with 
Arvinas gang members.   
We have held that introduction of gang evidence is proper 
where the defendant himself identifies gang affiliation as a 
motive.  In Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th 1040, the defendant 
“identified himself as a gang member and attempted to use that 
status in demanding money from the victim.”  (Id. at p. 1051.)  
We reasoned that testimony by a gang expert “helped the jury 
understand the significance of Hernandez’s announcement of 
his gang affiliation, which was relevant to motive and the use of 
fear.”  (Ibid.)  And evidence of an alliance between two gangs 
“served to explain why Hernandez and Fuentes were acting 
together in the commission of this crime, thus buttressing such 
guilt issues as motive and intent.”  (Ibid.)  Likewise here, 
defendant’s gang affiliation provided context for his own 
explanation of why he confronted Chad and supplied a motive 
for the crimes. 
Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that the probative value of such evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 352.)  The gang evidence was fairly brief.  Deputy Contreras 
testified to the existence of LFS, described defendant’s tattoos, 
and opined that he and several others were members of the 
gang.  He did not discuss gang culture in general or describe any 
criminal activity committed by the gang.  Although the evidence 
was admitted in part to prove motive, Contreras did not offer an 
opinion on that point.  The jury was instructed on the limited 
use of the evidence to prove defendant’s identity, motive, and 
intent.  And defendant was able to use the evidence to his 
advantage by suggesting that Chad associated with the Arvinas 
gang and had sparked the confrontation by targeting 
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132 
 
defendant’s cousin and the latter’s mother.  The evidence tended 
to place the popular high school student in a less than favorable 
light.  The rulings were not improper.   
For the same reasons, we reject defendant’s claim that 
admission of gang evidence rendered his trial “fundamentally 
unfair” in violation of his constitutional right to due process.  
“Application of the ordinary rules of evidence generally does not 
impermissibly infringe on a capital defendant’s constitutional 
rights.”  (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1035 (Kraft); 
accord, Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1229.)  Defendant fails to 
persuade that the circumstances here constitute an exception to 
that general rule. 
b. Hearsay and Confrontation Clause Claims 
In a letter filed before oral argument, defendant identifies 
Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 665 as new authority relevant to his 
claim that the trial court erroneously admitted the gang expert’s 
testimony.  We find no prejudicial error.   
In Sanchez, the defendant was convicted of drug and 
firearm offenses with attached gang enhancements (§ 186.22, 
subd. (b)(1)) and the substantive offense of active gang 
participation (§ 186.22, subd. (a)).  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 
at p. 671, fn. 1.)  On appeal, he argued that the gang expert was 
erroneously permitted to testify about five prior contacts 
Sanchez had with police which were recounted in police reports 
and other sources but were not personally known to the expert.  
(Id. at pp. 672–673.)  The expert recounted the particulars of the 
police contacts to explain the basis of his opinion that Sanchez 
was a gang member and committed the charged offenses for the 
gang’s benefit.  (Id. at p. 673.)  The jury was instructed that the 
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133 
 
testimony was not admitted for its truth but only to explain the 
basis for the expert’s opinion.  (Id. at p. 684.) 
Sanchez affirmed that expert witnesses “can rely on 
background information accepted in their field of expertise 
under the traditional latitude given by the Evidence Code.  They 
can rely on information within their personal knowledge, and 
they can give an opinion based on a hypothetical including case-
specific facts that are properly proven.  They may also rely on 
nontestimonial hearsay properly admitted under a statutory 
hearsay exception.”  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 685; see 
also id. at pp. 677, 683–685.)  But Sanchez held an expert may 
not relate case-specific, out-of-court statements, including 
multiple level hearsay, about which the expert has no personal 
knowledge, as a basis for the expert’s opinion.  Because the jury 
must consider such statements for their truth in order to 
properly evaluate the expert’s opinion, they are inadmissible 
unless they fall within a statutory hearsay exception or are 
proved by other competent evidence.  (Id. at pp. 670, 675–676, 
679, 686.) 
Sanchez further recognized that admission of case-specific 
statements for their truth will violate the Sixth Amendment’s 
confrontation clause if the statements are testimonial hearsay 
as the high court defines that term, unless the declarant is 
unavailable to testify and the defendant had a previous 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness or forfeited the right 
by the defendant’s own wrongdoing.  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 
at p. 680; Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 61–62, 68 
(Crawford); Giles v. California (2008) 554 U.S. 353, 357–373.)  
Finally, Sanchez explained:  “Once we recognize that the 
jury must consider expert basis testimony for its truth in order 
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134 
 
to evaluate the expert’s opinion, hearsay and confrontation 
problems cannot be avoided by giving a limiting instruction that 
such testimony should not be considered for its truth.”  
(Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 684.) 
We consider deputy Contreras’s testimony here29 in light 
of the principles articulated in Sanchez.  
First, the deputy provided several details about gang 
activity in Lamont, including:  (1) Lamont has a street gang, 
Lamont 13, which has two subsets, LFS and VCL; (2) Contreras 
has had regular contact with gang members in Lamont; (3) gang 
members in Lamont use signs to identify themselves and 
regularly congregate at Myrtle Avenue school; (4) 13 stands for 
the letter “M,” the 13th letter of the alphabet; (5) the Mexican 
Mafia identifies with the letter “M,” the number 13, and 
Southern California; (6) “Sureño” and Sur are Spanish words 
meaning southern and south; (7) persons do not necessarily need 
to be formally initiated or “jumped into” a gang to be gang 
members, committing crimes for the benefit of the gang will 
suffice; (8) tattoos can signify gang membership or affiliation; 
(9) the gang will not allow someone who is not a member to use 
“LFS” as a tattoo, or to write those letters, nor was the witness 
aware of instances of nongang members getting gang tattoos.  
Under Sanchez, this was permissible expert background 
testimony.  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 676, 685, 698.)  
“[G]eneral testimony about a gang’s behavior, history, territory, 
 
29  
We examine the testimony elicited by the prosecutor.  
Additional details about gang activities were elicited by the 
defense on cross-examination, but that testimony cannot form 
the basis for a claim of error based on hearsay or the Sixth 
Amendment.  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 680, fn. 6.)      
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
135 
 
and general operations is usually admissible.  [Citation.]  The 
same is true of the gang’s name, symbols, and colors.  All this 
background information can be admitted through an expert’s 
testimony, even if hearsay, if there is evidence that it is 
considered reliable and accurate by experts on the gang.”  
(People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 838 (Valencia).)   
Second, Contreras answered “Yes” to the following 
hypothetical question:  “So if somebody left the State for a period 
of time, came back, committed three carjackings and a murder 
with other fellow gang members of that same Lamont gang, 
would it be your opinion at the time they were committing those, 
that they were still members of the Lamont gang?”  This 
testimony, too, was permissible.  Gang experts “can give an 
opinion based on a hypothetical including case-specific facts that 
are properly proven.”  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 685.)  
Here, there was properly admitted evidence30 as to each of the 
facts included in the hypothetical question.   
Third, the witness opined that various people were gang 
members or associates, and stated the bases for his opinion.  As 
to Rosales and Flores, the witness relied on photographs and a 
posterboard found in Rosales’s home, all of which the witness 
authenticated.  The posterboard had various references to 
“Lamont,” “Familia,” Sureños,” and the numbers “1” and “3.”  It 
also contained a roster of names entitled “LFS XIII Boys.”  There 
were pictures depicting Rosales and Flores together, with Flores 
forming the letters LFS with his arms and hands.  The deputy’s 
testimony about photographs depicting gang indicia and hand 
signs that the deputy was able to authenticate was a permissible 
 
30  
Admissibility of evidence of each participant’s gang 
membership is discussed immediately below. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
136 
 
basis for his opinion that Rosales and Flores were LFS members.  
(Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 677.)     
As to defendant, Contreras relied on a photograph seized 
from Rosales’s house which showed defendant with several 
people throwing gang signs, and photographs of defendant’s 
tattoos, including a “1” and a “3” on the back of his arms, “LFS” 
and the number “13” on his shoulder, a wide brimmed Mexican 
hat with the word “Lamont” on it, and the word “Sur.”  Because 
the witness was able to authenticate these photographs, they 
were a permissible basis for his opinion that defendant was an 
LFS associate.  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 677.)  Notably, 
there was ample independent evidence of defendant’s gang 
association as well.  Both Rosales and Quintana testified from 
personal knowledge that defendant associated with LFS.  In his 
statement to officers Wahl and Johnson, defendant admitted 
membership in a Lamont gang but claimed to have left the gang 
around 1995.  And defendant’s own gang expert opined that 
defendant was an LFS gang member based on his tattoos, 
although the expert believed that the gang was defunct by 1995 
and that Chad’s death was not gang related.   
Finally, Contreras opined that De La Rosa, Garza, 
Quintana, and Valenzuela were LFS gang members, and that 
Santiago was a VCL gang member.  Over defense objection, he 
testified that De La Rosa, Garza, and Quintana had personally 
admitted gang membership to him.  He testified he was familiar 
with Santiago and Valenzuela and that they “claim[ed]” 
membership in the gangs, but he did not otherwise explain the 
basis for his knowledge.  The testimony was admitted on the 
theory that the speaker’s out-of-court admissions formed the 
basis for the expert’s opinion and were not admitted for the truth 
of the matter asserted.  No hearsay exception was proffered.  
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
137 
 
(See People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 822–823.)  This 
failure constitutes state law error.  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 
at pp. 674–676, 685–686; see Valencia, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 
839–840.) 
The record is insufficiently developed to determine 
whether the recounted hearsay statements admitting gang 
membership were testimonial, and therefore also violated the 
Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause.  (Crawford, supra, 541 
U.S. at pp. 62, 68.)  Contreras testified generally that he obtains 
intelligence from what gang members tell him, from reading 
police reports, and from field interview cards documenting 
police contacts on the streets.  He did not specifically describe 
the circumstances under which these admissions were made to 
himself or others.   
We need not resolve whether admission of this testimony 
was state law error only, or also violated the confrontation 
clause, because it was harmless under either standard.  
(Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; Chapman v. California 
(1967) 386 U.S. 18; see People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 
310 (Navarro).)  There was compelling, independently 
admissible evidence that De La Rosa, Garza, Quintana, 
Valenzuela, and Santiago were gang members.   
Contreras personally took photographs of Garza’s and 
Quintana’s gang tattoos, which he authenticated at trial.   
Quintana testified at trial and admitted that he associated 
with LFS and had an LFS tattoo.  He testified from personal 
knowledge that Rosales, Valenzuela, and Garza were LFS gang 
members, and that Santiago and De La Rosa were members of 
VCL.  Defendant’s cousin, Rosales, also testified from personal 
knowledge that Valenzuela, Garza, Quintana, and De La Rosa, 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
138 
 
all claimed Lamont affiliation and had gang tattoos, and that 
Santiago claimed VCL.  Santiago testified and admitted his 
membership in the VCL gang.   
Finally, no gang enhancement or substantive gang offense 
was charged in this case.  The gang evidence was admitted for 
the limited purpose of proving defendant’s identity, motive, and 
intent.  (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)  The jury was so 
instructed.   
Given the substantial independent evidence that the 
persons at issue, including defendant, were gang members, and 
the limited purpose for which this evidence was admitted, the 
erroneous admission of hearsay evidence to support Deputy 
Contreras’s opinion that various men were gang members was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
3. Admission of Defendant’s Statement  
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted 
his statement to Sergeants Glenn Johnson and Rosemary Wahl 
on July 24, 1998.  He argues that he did not validly waive his 
Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436) and 
that his statement was involuntary.  Defendant’s statement was 
properly admitted. 
a. Proceedings Below 
The following evidence was adduced at a hearing on the 
statement’s admissibility.  Sergeants Johnson and Wahl first 
interviewed defendant on July 19, 1998, at a jail in El Paso, 
Texas.  After being read his Miranda rights, defendant said he 
understood them and was willing to speak with the officers.  
During the interview, defendant consistently and repeatedly 
denied any involvement in Paredes’s carjacking and Chad’s 
murder.  He claimed to be living in Arizona or New Mexico 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
139 
 
around the time of the crimes.  The officers made clear that they 
thought he was lying.  At the conclusion of the interview, the 
officers told defendant that they would let him “rethink 
everything” while they left the room to complete paperwork and 
that he could choose to talk to them again before they left Texas.  
Defendant responded, “I don’t have nothing else to say to you 
guys.”  There was no further questioning at that time.   
The officers returned five days later, on July 24, 1998, to 
extradite defendant to California.  Sergeant Johnson gave 
defendant a complete Miranda advisement while they drove to 
the airport in the event that defendant initiated a conversation 
about the charges.  Defendant indicated that he understood his 
rights.  The trip to California took approximately eight hours, 
and the officers bought defendant a meal during the journey.  
They did not question him about the crimes during this period, 
and he did not invoke his right to silence or an attorney.   
At the California station house, defendant asked Sergeant 
Wahl what would happen with the charges and she alerted 
Sergeant Johnson.  Johnson in turn reminded defendant of the 
previous Miranda admonition but did not reread the admonition 
from a printed source.  Specifically, he stated:  “Okay, like I said 
it’s uh, you know I’m gonna, before we get there I’m gonna 
remind you that the rights I read to you uh in the car when we 
picked you up (inaudible).  You have the right to have an 
attorney and you have a right to have an attorney present before 
and during questioning, one will be appointed by the court.  If 
you can’t afford one and anything you say can and will be used 
against you in a court of law.  I don’t have the card in front of 
me uh but I was reminding you of those rights.  Having those 
rights in mind do you wish to tell us about it now?”  Defendant 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
140 
 
replied, “Yeah.”  He then admitted his involvement in the 
murder as described above.   
The trial court found the July 24 statement admissible.31  
It found that defendant was properly advised of his Miranda 
rights on July 19 and voluntarily waived them.  The court found 
that defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent at the 
end of that interview and that his statement was more 
reasonably understood to mean that he had nothing more to say 
to the officers at the time.  The court found that Sergeant 
Johnson advised defendant of his Miranda rights on July 24 on 
the way to the airport and that defendant voluntarily waived 
those rights.  Finally, it found that there were no promises of 
leniency or coercive statements made during any of the 
interviews and that his statements were voluntary.   
The trial court subsequently allowed defendant to reopen 
the hearing so that defendant could testify.  Defendant 
recounted that, after he spoke to Sergeants Johnson and Wahl 
on July 19, 1998, he was photographed in the hallway of the El 
Paso police station.  Two El Paso detectives commented to him 
that he “should rat out whoever did it” so that he “wouldn’t go 
down for something that [he] didn’t do.”  A few days later, 
defendant was taken before a judge for extradition proceedings.  
In an elevator, he told the officer who had transported him that 
he wanted an attorney, but no attorney was appointed for him 
at that time.  On the way back to jail, the officer encouraged 
defendant to “take a deal that they offered me and just rat out 
whoever was doing it.”  Defendant further testified that on the 
car trip to the airport, Sergeant Johnson began reciting the 
 
31  
The People did not seek to admit the July 19 statement. 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
141 
 
Miranda rights to defendant.  But the officer got lost while 
driving and did not finish the advisement.   
The prosecution called several witnesses to rebut 
defendant’s testimony.  On July 19, 1998, Officer Jose Luis 
Gomez of the El Paso Police Department received defendant 
from federal authorities and brought him to the county jail.  He 
advised defendant of his Miranda rights but did not interrogate 
him.  Defendant did not request an attorney.  Approximately 
three hours later, Officer Gomez took defendant before a 
magistrate for arraignment.  Defendant was again advised of his 
rights to an attorney and did not request one. 
Detectives Carlos Ortega and David Samaniego of the El 
Paso Police Department transported defendant to and from the 
interview with Sergeants Johnson and Wahl on July 19, 1998.  
The distance was approximately three to five miles each way.  
After the interview, Ortega had defendant sign a consent form 
to search his property and Samaniego took pictures of 
defendant’s tattoos.  Neither detective gave defendant Miranda 
warnings or questioned him about the case.  Defendant did not 
request an attorney.   
Detective Edward Provencio of the El Paso Police 
Department escorted defendant downstairs to meet with Judge 
Edward Marquez regarding extradition.  The detective advised 
defendant that he was wanted on out-of-state charges and 
described the extradition process.  He did not read defendant his 
Miranda rights and defendant did not request an attorney.  
Defendant signed a waiver of extradition before the judge.   
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court again denied 
the motion to exclude defendant’s statement:  “[W]eighing all 
the evidence, I do not find that the defendant’s Miranda rights 
were violated, that he was not denied his right to remain silent, 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
142 
 
he’s not denied his right to have counsel present during 
interrogation, within the meaning of Miranda.”   
b. Invocation of the Right to Silence 
Defendant does not challenge his initial waiver of 
Miranda rights on July 19.  He argues, however, that he 
asserted his right to silence at the end of the interview when he 
commented, “I don’t have nothing else to say to you guys.”  He 
claims that the officers violated the rule in Edwards v. Arizona 
(1981) 451 U.S. 477 (Edwards), when, five days later, they 
questioned him about the crimes despite his earlier invocation 
of Miranda rights.  The claim fails. 
When a suspect knowingly and intelligently waives the 
Miranda rights, “law enforcement may interrogate, but if at any 
point in the interview [the suspect] invokes the right to remain 
silent or the right to counsel, ‘the interrogation must cease.’ ”  
(People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 947 (Martinez).)  Once 
the suspect has invoked, “a valid waiver of that right cannot be 
established by showing only that he responded to further police-
initiated custodial interrogation . . . . [There is to be no] further 
interrogation by the authorities . . . unless the accused himself 
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations 
with the police.”  (Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484–485; 
accord, People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 384.)  “In the 
absence of such a bright-line prohibition, the authorities 
through ‘badger[ing]’ or ‘overreaching’ — explicit or subtle, 
deliberate or unintentional — might otherwise wear down the 
accused 
and 
persuade 
him 
to 
incriminate 
himself 
notwithstanding his earlier request [to remain silent or] for 
counsel’s assistance.”  (Smith v. Illinois (1984) 469 U.S. 91, 98.) 
A defendant who has waived the Miranda rights must 
make a “clear assertion” of the right to silence or counsel before 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
143 
 
officers are required to cease questioning.  (Davis v. United 
States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 460; accord, People v. Williams 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 427.)  “The applicability of the ‘ “rigid” 
prophylactic rule’ of Edwards requires courts to ‘determine 
whether the accused actually invoked his right[s] . . . .’ ”  (Davis, 
at p. 458.)  Ambiguous or equivocal references to an attorney or 
the right to silence do not require cessation of questioning.  (Id. 
at pp. 458–459; Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 947–949.)  
Whether the defendant made an invocation is analyzed from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer (Berghuis v. Thompkins 
(2010) 560 U.S. 370, 381), and takes into consideration the 
context of the statement (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 
417 (Flores)).  If “a reasonable officer in light of the 
circumstances would have understood only that the suspect 
might be invoking the right,” then the officer need not cease all 
questioning immediately.  (Davis, at p. 459.)   
Defendant did not clearly and unequivocally invoke his 
right to silence at the end of the July 19 interview.  After being 
advised of and waiving his rights, defendant willingly 
participated in a long interview with the officers.  He repeatedly 
denied any involvement in Chad’s murder and claimed not to 
have been in California at the time.  The officers repeatedly 
accused defendant of lying in light of numerous eyewitnesses 
who saw defendant enter Chad’s truck before the shooting.  
Defendant remained steadfast in his denials and did not 
complain of the absence of an attorney, or interpose a request 
for one.  Eventually, the officers told defendant that they would 
let him “rethink everything” while they left the room and filled 
out paperwork and that he could choose to talk to them again 
before they left Texas.  Defendant responded, “I don’t have 
nothing else to say to you guys.”  Viewed in context, a reasonable 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
144 
 
officer would have understood defendant’s statement to mean 
that he had nothing to add to his claims of innocence, not that 
he was invoking his right to silence. 
We have rejected defendants’ claims of a clear and 
unequivocal invocation under similar circumstances.  In 
Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th 911, the defendant received a 
Miranda advisement and indicated he was willing to speak with 
the officer.  He was questioned about an assault and denied any 
involvement.  The officer confronted the defendant with 
inconsistencies in his story and then asked him why the victim 
would falsely accuse him.  The defendant responded, “ ‘That’s all 
I can tell you.’ ”  (Id. at p. 944.)  We concluded that the officer 
reasonably understood defendant’s statement to mean “ ‘[t]hat’s 
all the information he had for me,’ ” rather than that defendant 
was invoking his right to silence  (Id. at p. 950.)  The following 
day officers interviewed the defendant again.  They “confronted 
him with inconsistencies in his version of events, told him to 
think it over, announced that they were taking a break, and 
[began] to leave the room.”  (Id. at p. 951.)  Defendant stated, “ ‘I 
don’t want to talk anymore right now.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Based on the 
context, we again concluded that the defendant had not clearly 
invoked his right to silence.  (Ibid.)  Similarly, in In re Joe R. 
(1980) 27 Cal.3d 496, we concluded that the defendant’s 
statement, “ ‘ “That’s all I have got to say,” ’ ” was not an 
invocation.  (Id. at p. 515.)  The defendant made the comment 
immediately after the officer confronted him with adverse 
evidence and challenged his veracity.  (Id. at p. 516.)  In that 
context, we concluded it was not unreasonable for the court to 
conclude defendant was conveying, “That’s my story, and I’ll 
stick with it.”  (Ibid.)   
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
145 
 
Defendant’s statement here, “I don’t have nothing else to 
say to you guys,” was made in a similar context.  Defendant had 
repeatedly denied involvement in the crimes, the officers had 
accused him of lying, and they had invited him to “rethink 
everything.”  His response could reasonably be construed as an 
affirmation of his statements and a declaration that he had 
nothing more to add, rather than an assertion of the right to 
silence. 
c. Validity of Miranda Waiver on July 24        
Defendant argues that he did not make a knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights before 
the July 24 interview.  We reject the claim. 
The governing principles are well established.  “Before 
subjecting suspects to custodial interrogation, the police must 
inform them of their Miranda rights and obtain a waiver that is 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  [Citation.]  The test for 
validity is as follows.  ‘First, the relinquishment of the right 
must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product 
of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, 
coercion, or deception.  Second, the waiver must have been made 
with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being 
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.  
Only if the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation” reveals both an uncoerced choice and the 
requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude 
that the Miranda rights have been waived.’  [Citation.]  The 
prosecution must demonstrate the validity of a suspect’s waiver 
by a preponderance of the evidence.”  (People v. Molano (2019) 7 
Cal.5th 620, 648, fn. omitted (Molano).)     
Here, defendant was advised of his Miranda rights twice 
before making his initial statement on July 19.  Officer Gomez 
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of the El Paso Police Department gave the Miranda advisements 
when he took him to the county jail, and the right to counsel was 
reiterated at the arraignment.  Sergeants Johnson and Wahl 
read defendant his Miranda rights before interviewing him.  
Defendant stated that he understood those rights and agreed to 
speak with the officers.   
Five days later, on July 24, defendant was again advised 
of his rights on the way to the airport.  Although the 
conversation was not recorded, both officers testified that 
defendant was given a complete Miranda advisement and he 
indicated that he understood his rights.  Defendant was not 
questioned at that time.   
Eight hours later, at the police station, after defendant 
inquired about what would happen with his charges, the officers 
spent several minutes encouraging defendant to tell them the 
truth about his involvement in the murder.  Defendant 
responded, “Okay, I guess I’ll talk to you then.”  Sergeant 
Johnson then “remind[ed] [defendant of] the rights I read you 
uh in the car when we picked you up (inaudible).”  He repeated 
that defendant had the right to an appointed attorney and that 
any statements could be used against him, but did not mention 
the right to silence.  He then said, “I don’t have the card in front 
of me uh but I was reminding you of those rights.  Having those 
right in mind do you wish to tell us about it now?”  Defendant 
replied, “Yeah.”   
Although the advisement at the police station on July 24 
was incomplete, we have held that “readvisement is 
unnecessary where the subsequent interrogation is ‘reasonably 
contemporaneous’ with the prior knowing and intelligent 
waiver.  [Citations]  The courts examine the totality of the 
circumstances, including the amount of time that has passed 
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since the waiver, any change in the identity of the interrogator 
or the location of the interview, any official reminder of the prior 
advisement, the suspect’s sophistication or past experience with 
law enforcement, and any indicia that he subjectively 
understands and waives his rights.”  (People v. Mickle (1991) 54 
Cal.3d 140, 170 (Mickle).)   
Here, on July 19 defendant received two complete sets of 
Miranda warnings and waived his rights.  He received another 
complete admonishment on July 24, approximately eight hours 
before the interview in question.  During the July 24 interview, 
the officers reminded defendant of the prior advisement.  Under 
similar circumstances, where the defendant was “read his 
Miranda rights the night before and on at least four prior 
occasions,” we concluded that “the record fails to support any 
inference that defendant was unaware of his rights and the 
significance of his waiver.”  (Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 
950.)  Similarly, we held that readvisement was unnecessary 
when the “interview occurred only 36 hours after defendant had 
twice received and twice waived his Miranda rights.”  (Mickle, 
supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 171.)     
Significantly, defendant does not claim that he was 
inadequately admonished or that he did not understand his 
rights.  He instead argues that he never waived those rights 
during the July 24 interview.  The record belies this claim.  After 
reminding defendant of the earlier advisement in the car, which 
included all of defendant’s rights, Sergeant Johnson asked 
defendant, “Having those right in mind do you wish to tell us 
about it now?”  Defendant replied, “Yeah.”  His waiver was 
express.       
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d. Voluntariness of the July 24 Statement 
Defendant perfunctorily asserts that “[t]he extended 
period in which [he] was subject to the deputies’ control . . . 
together with their insistence that he cooperate and their 
suggestions of benefits that might flow from his cooperation . . . 
show that [his] confession was not made of his own free will.”  
The trial court rejected this claim, concluding that there was no 
coercive conduct, no promises of leniency, and no threats.   
“In determining whether the prosecution met its burden 
of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that 
defendant’s confession was voluntary, we consider the totality of 
the circumstances.  [Citation.]  ‘[N]o single factor is dispositive.  
[Citation.]  The question is whether the statement is the product 
of an “ ‘essentially free and unconstrained choice’ ” or whether 
the defendant’s “ ‘will has been overborne and his capacity for 
self-determination critically impaired’ ” by coercion.’ ”  (Flores, 
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 426.) 
Defendant testified pretrial that, while he was being 
photographed on July 19, the El Paso detectives encouraged him 
to “rat out whoever did it” so that he “wouldn’t go down for 
something that [he] didn’t do.”  He asserted that, a few days 
later, a transporting officer encouraged him to “take a deal that 
they offered me and just rat out whoever was doing it.”  But the 
officers in question testified at the hearing and denied making 
any such statements.  The trial court implicitly credited their 
testimony in denying defendant’s motion.   
As for the conduct of Sergeants Johnson and Wahl, 
defendant was in their custody for eight hours while traveling 
from Texas to California.  During that time, they provided him 
with a meal and made no attempt to interrogate him.  Once at 
the police station, after defendant asked about the charges, 
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Johnson and Wahl urged him to explain his role in the shooting 
and said that his truthfulness might have an impact on 
sentencing.  Sergeant Wahl said:  “[W]hat you tell us may be the 
difference though.  Like he said you know cold blooded 
calculated murder or something . . . just went wrong.”  Sergeant 
Johnson observed, “[T]he person who didn’t pull the trigger is 
going to be equally guilty to a certain extent but sometimes the 
truth may make a difference.  I don’t know.  It may not.”  
Sergeant Wahl then commented that “it’s gonna make a 
difference with you I think, with the way you feel inside, cause 
I know it’s bothering you.  I know that.”  Defendant replied, “Uh 
huh.”  Sergeant Johnson then invited defendant to “make an 
adult decision” and “start doing something right for a change 
and what’s right is the truth.”  Shortly thereafter, defendant 
responded, “Okay, I guess I’ll talk to you then.”   
An officer’s statements urging a suspect to tell the truth 
and pointing out the benefits that might naturally flow from a 
truthful and honest confession do not render a statement 
involuntary.  (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 305–306 
(Krebs).)  The officers’ comments here were of that tenor.  They 
observed that defendant and Garza were equally guilty of 
murder, but that being truthful about who pulled the trigger 
might assist defendant at sentencing.  At the same time they 
reminded him that any statements he made could be used 
against him and that the truth might not make a difference in 
the outcome.  The sergeants then focused on the emotional 
benefit defendant would derive by taking responsibility for his 
actions.  They allowed defendant to “tell it in your own words,” 
commenting that “[w]e won’t ask any questions or stop you.”  
Defendant provided a narrative confession admitting that he 
confronted Chad in the street, that he and Garza kidnapped him 
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at gunpoint, and that he accidentally shot Chad in a field.  
Under the totality of the circumstances, the prosecution met its 
burden to establish voluntariness.  
e. Asserted Violation of the Vienna Convention 
Defendant also moved to exclude his July 24 statement on 
the ground that police did not advise him in a timely manner of 
his right to have the Mexican Consulate notified of his arrest, in 
violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, April 14, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77 (Vienna Convention).  
The motion was denied, as was defendant’s related new trial 
motion.  He urges this court to defer consideration of this claim 
while he investigates evidence of prejudice in a habeas corpus 
proceeding.  To the extent defendant claims in this appeal that 
he was prejudiced by the Vienna Convention violation, he has 
not established prejudice on this record.      
i. Proceedings Below   
The following facts were stipulated to at the hearing:  (1) 
defendant is a Mexican citizen; (2) the Mexican consulates in 
Fresno and El Paso were available and willing to help any 
Mexican national requesting their assistance; (3) from the time 
of defendant’s arrest in El Paso through the time he made his 
two statements, no law enforcement officer advised him of his 
consular rights; (4) defendant did not request contact with the 
Mexican consulate at any time before his attorney, Bryan, 
became involved in the case; and (5) since that time, defendant 
had been actively receiving consular assistance.  Defense 
counsel offered no additional testimony from defendant on this 
topic.   
Citing then-recent authority from the Ninth Circuit (U.S. 
v. Lombera-Camorlinga (9th Cir. 2000) 206 F.3d 882), the trial 
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court denied the motion, concluding that “suppression of 
statements is not one of the remedies available if the Court finds 
a violation of the Vienna Convention, Article 36.”   
Defendant reasserted his claim in motions for new trial 
and to modify the death judgment, arguing that the improperly 
admitted confession entitled him to one of those remedies.  The 
Mexican Consulate wrote in support of the motions.  Both 
motions were denied.  
ii.  Legal Background 
In 1969, the United States ratified the Vienna Convention.  
(Vienna Convention, supra, 21 U.S.T. at p. 79.)  Article 36, 
paragraph 1(b), provides that law enforcement officials “shall 
inform” arrested foreign nationals “without delay” of their right 
to have their consulate notified of their arrest, and if a national 
so requests, “shall, without delay, inform the consular post” that 
the national has been arrested.  (Vienna Convention, supra, art. 
36, par. 1(b), at p. 101.)  Article 36 does not provide for a judicial 
remedy.  Instead, paragraph 2 provides that “[t]he rights 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in 
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State” 
provided that “said laws and regulations must enable full effect 
to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under 
this Article are intended.”  (Id., par. 2, at p. 101.)       
“California implemented the Convention’s requirements 
in section 834c.”  (People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 845 
(Leon).)  That statute requires law enforcement officials to 
advise a “known or suspected foreign national” of the right to 
communicate with an official from the consulate if that person 
is arrested or detained for more than two hours.  (§ 834c, subd. 
(a)(1).)  The statute “does not specify a remedy for violations” 
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(People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 164 (Suarez)), and, 
notably,  is inapplicable to defendant in any event because it was 
not effective until 2000, over a year after defendant’s arrest 
(ibid.).   
Defendant is among a group of Mexican nationals whose 
cases were reviewed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico 
v. U.S.), supra, 2004 I.C.J. at page 25.  We summarized that 
litigation in People v. Mendoza (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686 (Mendoza):  
“On January 9, 2003, the Government of Mexico initiated 
proceedings in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against 
the United States, alleging violations of the Vienna Convention 
in the cases of defendant and 53 other Mexican nationals who 
had been sentenced to death in state criminal proceedings in the 
United States.”  (Id. at p. 709.)  “The ICJ held that the United 
States had breached article 36, paragraph 1(b) of the Vienna 
Convention in the cases of 51 of the Mexican nationals, 
including defendant, by failing ‘to inform detained Mexican 
nationals of their rights under that paragraph’ and ‘to notify the 
Mexican consular post of the detention.’  [Citation.]  The ICJ 
further held that in 49 cases, including defendant’s, the United 
States had breached its obligation under article 36, paragraph 
1(a), ‘to enable Mexican consular officers to communicate with 
and have access to their nationals, as well as its obligation under 
paragraph 1(c) of that Article regarding the right of consular 
officers to visit their detained nationals.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 709–710.)  
Like Mendoza, defendant here is also among those for whom the 
ICJ found a violation of the rights to notification and access.   
As to remedy, the ICJ denied Mexico’s request to annul the 
convictions and sentences of the named individuals, “but held 
United States courts must provide review and reconsideration 
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of the convictions and sentences ‘with a view to ascertaining 
whether . . . the violation . . . caused actual prejudice to the 
defendant . . . .’ ”  (Mendoza, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 710.) 
Subsequently, the high court held that ICJ’s judgment in 
Avena is not directly enforceable as domestic law in state court 
and that its provisions did not preempt application of state 
limitations on filing successive habeas petitions.  (Medellin v. 
Texas (2008) 552 U.S. 491, 504–511.)  The court reached the 
same conclusion with respect to President George W. Bush’s 
February 28, 2005 memorandum stating that “the United States 
would ‘discharge its international obligations’ under Avena ‘by 
having State courts give effect to the decision.’ ”  (Medellin, at p. 
498.)  “[T]he non-self-executing character of a treaty constrains 
the President’s ability to comply with treaty commitments by 
unilaterally making the treaty binding on domestic courts.”  (Id. 
at p. 530.)  Accordingly, the president’s memorandum was not a 
binding rule that preempts contrary state law.  (Id. at pp. 525–
530.)        
iii. Analysis   
In the trial court, defendant sought to exclude his 
statements to police as a remedy for a violation of his rights 
under the Vienna Convention.  “We have assumed, without 
deciding, that Article 36 gives foreign nationals individual, 
enforceable rights.”  (Leon, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 846.)  Even so, 
it is well established that the “failure to notify a suspect of his 
or her consular rights does not, in itself, render a confession 
inadmissible.”  (People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 756.)  As 
the high court explained in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon (2006) 
548 U.S. 331 (Sanchez-Llamas):  “The few cases in which we 
have suppressed evidence for statutory violations do not help 
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Sanchez-Llamas.  In those cases, the excluded evidence arose 
directly out of statutory violations that implicated important 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment interest . . . .  [¶]  The violation of 
the right to consular notification, in contrast, is at best remotely 
connected to the gathering of evidence.  Article 36 has nothing 
whatsoever to do with searches or interrogations.  Indeed, 
Article 36 does not guarantee defendants any assistance at all.  
The provision secures only a right of foreign nationals to have 
their consulate informed of their arrest or detention — not to 
have their consulate intervene, or to have law enforcement 
authorities cease their investigation pending any such notice or 
intervention.  In most circumstances, there is likely to be little 
connection between an Article 36 violation and evidence or 
statements obtained by police.”  (Id. at pp. 348–349.)  In 
addition, “[t]he failure to inform a defendant of his Article 36 
rights is unlikely, with any frequency, to produce unreliable 
confessions.  And unlike the search-and-seizure context — 
where the need to obtain valuable evidence may tempt 
authorities to transgress Fourth Amendment limitations — 
police win little, if any, practical advantage from violating 
Article 36.  Suppression would be a vastly disproportionate 
remedy for an Article 36 violation.”  (Id. at p. 349.)      
The Sanchez-Llamas court also emphasized that “other 
constitutional and statutory requirements effectively protect 
the interests served . . . by Article 36.  A foreign national 
detained on suspicion of crime, like anyone else in our country, 
enjoys under our system the protections of the Due Process 
Clause.  Among other things, he is entitled to an attorney, and 
is protected against compelled self-incrimination.  [Citation.]  
Article 36 adds little to these ‘legal options,’ and we think it 
unnecessary to apply the exclusionary rule where other 
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constitutional and statutory protections — many of them 
already enforced by the exclusionary rule — safeguard the same 
interests Sanchez-Llamas claims are advanced by Article 36.”  
(Sanchez-Llamas, supra, 548 U.S. at p. 350.)   
We have already considered and rejected defendant’s 
claim that his statement was taken in violation of his Miranda 
rights.  There is no independent remedy of exclusion for failing 
to notify him of his consular rights under the Vienna 
Convention.   
“A consular notification claim may be raised as part of a 
broader challenge to the voluntariness of a confession.”  (Leon, 
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 846, citing Sanchez-Llamas, supra, 548 
U.S, at p. 350.)  Defendant did challenge his statement as 
involuntary, but not on any basis related to consular rights.  
Although defendant testified at the suppression hearing, he 
never claimed that he would have remained silent or requested 
an attorney had he been advised of his right to consular 
notification.  It is also notable that defendant came to this 
country as an infant, was educated here, and is fluent in both 
written and spoken English.  Defendant has not established a 
relation between his lack of consular notice and his confessions. 
Finally, on this record, we see no evidence of trial 
prejudice from the Vienna Convention violation.  Sanchez-
Llamas observed that if a defendant “raises an Article 36 
violation at trial, a court can make appropriate accommodations 
to ensure that the defendant secures, to the extent possible, the 
benefits of consular assistance.”  (Sanchez-Llamas, supra, 548 
U.S. at p. 350.)  Defense counsel represented below that he had 
made contact with the Fresno Consulate of the government of 
the Republic of Mexico in the summer of 2000, several months 
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before jury selection began on December 4, 2000.  According to 
counsel, “They have been involved ever since,” and they “ha[ve] 
been helpful in this case in other areas” by “expend[ing] time 
and effort in assisting their National, Juan Ramirez.”         
Defendant asserts that he is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing to examine whether the lack of consular notification 
was prejudicial.  (See Sanchez-Llamas, supra, 548 U.S. at p. 
350.)  He quotes this court’s observation that “prejudice based 
on facts outside of the record is a matter for a habeas corpus 
petition.”  (Mendoza, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 711.)  This is true, 
and we do not foreclose defendant from developing such 
evidence.  But to the extent defendant claims on appeal that he 
suffered prejudice as a result of the Vienna Convention 
violation, he has not established it on this record.       
4. Admission of Carlos Rosales’s Statement  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting a 
recorded statement of his cousin, Rosales, made to police on 
January 2, 1998.  Rosales testified as a prosecution witness.  The 
court admitted his statement on the prosecutor’s motion to rebut 
defense counsel’s allegations through cross-examination that 
officers pressured Rosales into making the statement.  
Defendant contends that the evidence was inadmissible 
hearsay, that it was not probative on any issue, and that it was 
unduly prejudicial.  He further contends that the statement 
referenced uncharged criminal conduct that was not admissible 
as a circumstance in aggravation under section 190.3.  He claims 
the evidentiary error violated his rights to due process, counsel, 
confrontation, and fair trial under the state and federal 
constitutions.  There was no error. 
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Rosales was implicated in the robbery of Juan Carlos.  He 
agreed to plead guilty to one count of robbery and testify 
truthfully at defendant’s trial.  Because Rosales’s prior 
statement was offered by the prosecutor in response to defense 
counsel’s cross-examination of the witness, we recite that 
testimony here in some detail.   
At trial, Rosales described the Juan Carlos crimes and 
implicated defendant in them.  Rosales testified he, along with 
defendant, Valenzuela, Garza, Quintana, and De La Rosa, got 
into the victim’s truck.  The victim drove to an orchard as 
Valenzuela held him at gunpoint.  Rosales and Quintana stayed 
in the truck; the others took Juan Carlos into the field.  Both 
Garza and Valenzuela hit the victim with guns and the latter 
took his money, belt, and neck chain.  Then everyone in the 
group descended on the victim in a “big rumble,” hitting him as 
he laid on the ground, screaming and crying.  The men bound 
the victim with a rope and there was talk about shooting him.  
Ultimately, they took the truck and left Juan Carlos in the field.  
Valenzuela split the money among all six of them.           
Rosales also testified that, on the night of Chad’s murder, 
defendant was cleaning and loading a gun.  Later, defendant 
and Garza approached Chad’s truck and Rosales heard a gun 
being cocked.  Garza and defendant got into the truck with Chad 
between them and the truck left.   
On 
cross-examination, 
defense 
counsel 
inquired 
extensively about Rosales’s statement given to police on October 
22, 1997, during which he denied knowing anything about the 
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abduction and murder.32  Rosales testified that the arresting 
officers, Contreras and Studer, threw him against the wall 
repeatedly and ignored his request for counsel.  Various officers 
threatened that he would be tried as an adult and sentenced to 
life in prison and that he would be “burn[ed] . . . to the cross.”  
They pressured him to identify who was at Quintana’s house 
that evening.  They commented that Rosales had a motive to kill 
Chad because of the earlier confrontation at his mother’s house.   
Defense counsel also cross-examined Rosales about his 
statement on January 2, 1998.  By that time, Rosales had 
entered into a plea agreement that required his testimony 
against defendant and Garza.  Rosales testified that he was 
“under a lot of pressure” and “stress” at the time he gave the 
statement.  Counsel asked Rosales if he was “pressured at any 
time by law enforcement or the Office of the District Attorney to 
testify that [he] saw [defendant] tie up Juan Carlos?”  Rosales 
testified, “I could have.  Because the detectives are questioning 
you.  They are at you and at you and at you.  Trick questions.  
 
32  
The prosecutor objected on hearsay grounds to several of 
defense counsel’s questions.  Defense counsel responded that the 
questioning went to the witness’s state of mind and to provide 
context under Evidence Code section 356.  He urged that the 
prosecutor “went into great detail about [Rosales’s] deal with the 
Kern County District Attorney’s Office and how he’s got a deal 
to tell the truth, and he’s telling the truth now.  [¶]  And I’m 
entitled to go into all the events that led up to that deal, 
including the beating of a minor, threats that were given to a 
minor, and the fact that this minor was looking at life 
imprisonment as an adult, in terms of signing that deal.”  “It 
starts with the statement of October 22, where he was beaten, 
he was denied an attorney, and he was threatened on tape.”  
Defense counsel was allowed to pursue the line of questioning.   
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And, I mean, it’s kind of hard.  And you are already — it’s kind 
of hard.”   
In response to this questioning, the prosecutor moved to 
introduce the entire January 2 interview under Evidence Code 
section 356, commenting:  “they have attacked it to such a 
degree that they have got the witness saying he was asked trick 
questions, repeatedly saying he was pressured.  I think the 
entire tone of the interview is now relevant . . . .”  Defense 
counsel objected to the playing of the recording in its entirety, 
arguing that the officers had asserted things in the interview 
that were hearsay, speculative, and highly prejudicial.  The 
prosecutor responded that defense counsel “would like to have it 
both ways; that is, make insinuations as to what was done being 
improper, yet not play the actual evidence of what occurred, so 
the jury could hear for themselves in the tone and manner of 
questioning and make their own determination of whether it 
was proper.  He repeatedly insinuated and characterized it as 
pressuring.  I don’t think there’s anything pressuring when you 
listen to the tape.”  The prosecutor also indicated that the 
January 2 interview impeached several statements that defense 
counsel had proffered from the October 22 interview, and that 
Rosales had testified the January 2 interview was the “truthful 
version.”  He requested an admonishment to the jury that the 
recording would be admitted for the limited purpose of placing 
Rosales’s testimony in context and as evidence of the tone of the 
interrogation.   
The court admitted the recording, finding it to be relevant 
and not unduly prejudicial.  Before playing the recording, the 
court admonished the jury that “this evidence is not being 
admitted for the truth of what . . .  [the] detectives are saying.  
[¶]  It is not offered for the truth of what they’re saying.  [¶]  
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Anything that they said to the witness is limited to explain this 
witness’s answer, his state of mind, his subsequent conduct.  [¶]  
So don’t consider the detective’s statement for the truth of what 
was stated.”   
Defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on the admission 
of the recording was denied.   
The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
recording.  (See People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 264.)  
Evidence of an out-of-court statement may be admitted for the 
nonhearsay purpose of showing its effect on the listener so long 
as that effect is relevant to an issue in dispute.  (People v. Montes 
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 863 (Montes); People v. Hill (1992) 3 
Cal.4th 959, 987.)  It is also admissible under Evidence Code 
section 356 where necessary to provide context.  That section 
provides:  “Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or 
writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same 
subject may be inquired into by an adverse party . . . and when 
a detached act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in 
evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, or writing 
which is necessary to make it understood may also be given in 
evidence.”  In applying the rule, “ ‘courts do not draw narrow 
lines around the exact subject of inquiry.’ ”  (People v. Zapien 
(1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 959.) 
In People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, we upheld the 
admission of a recording in its entirety to rebut defense counsel’s 
implication on cross-examination, that the officer had “ ‘spoon-
fed’ ” details of the crimes to the witness during the interview.  
(Id. at p. 599.)  We concluded that Evidence Code section 356 
authorized admission “ ‘to prevent the use of selected aspects of 
a conversation, act, declaration, or writing, so as to create a 
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misleading impression on the subjects addressed.’ ”  (Id. at p. 
600, quoting People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 156.) 
Likewise here, the court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that defense counsel opened the door to evidence of 
the statement by putting Rosales’s state of mind at issue.  He 
was cross-examined extensively about the statement and 
testified that, during the interview, he was under “pressure” and 
“stress.”  The officers were “at [him] and at [him] and at [him],” 
asked “[t]rick questions,” and threatened and abused him.  The 
court acted within its discretion to allow the prosecutor to rebut 
this testimony by introducing the whole interview to reveal the 
officers’ tone and manner of questioning.  Indeed, the recording, 
which we have reviewed, was quite probative on that score.  The 
officers were respectful and spoke in measured tones throughout 
the interview.  Rosales was read his Miranda rights, indicated 
that he understood them, and expressly waived them.  
Significantly, his counsel was present during the entire 
interview.  The officers began by asking for a narrative 
description of the crimes against Juan Carlos and Chad.  
Rosales gave a detailed account with minimal interruption.  The 
officers then asked questions to clarify and fill in details.  They 
did not ask leading questions, badger Rosales, or accuse him of 
lying.  At one point Sergeant Wahl asked Rosales whether he 
and others talked about what to say to Brent, who was left 
sitting on the curb.  When Rosales said he did not remember, 
the sergeant replied, “Think hard because I, I know about that 
discussion.”  The comment was hardly overbearing.  She also 
asked Rosales why he did not tell officers what he had seen when 
he was interviewed on October 22.  Rosales explained that he 
feared retaliation from the other participants.  He did not 
mention being frightened or intimidated by the interviewing 
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officers.  Rosales’s explanation of his state of mind tended to 
impeach his cross-examination testimony that he was 
intimidated by the officers.  The court did not err in concluding 
that the whole of the interview was probative to show that 
Rosales was not pressured or coerced into making the January 
2 statement. 
Defendant argues that the recording was irrelevant 
because the allegations of coercion involved the October 22 
interview and the “recording made in January 1998 is [not] 
relevant to dispel charges of coercion that took place in mid-
October 1997.”  But defense counsel elicited testimony about 
coercive conduct during both interviews.  Defense counsel was 
allowed to inquire about the circumstances in the October 22 
interview, which he asserted were coercive.33  By the same 
token, it was within the court’s discretion to allow the prosecutor 
to demonstrate that the January 2 interview, which the witness 
subsequently testified was truthful, was not coerced. 
The court likewise did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that the probative value of the evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  It 
legitimately concluded that playing the recording in its entirety 
was an appropriate and effective way to rebut Rosales’s 
testimony that he was pressured and tricked by the officers.  
And the tape, while lengthy, was not highly prejudicial.  
Defendant claims that the interview was filled with hearsay and 
speculative assertions.  Yet, the details Rosales provided in his 
January 2 statement about the crimes against Juan Carlos and 
 
33  
Indeed, defense counsel at one point observed that he 
himself might seek to play the entire tape of the October 22 
interview for context.  Ultimately, he did not make that request. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
163 
 
Chad were largely the same as his trial testimony and based 
upon his own knowledge.  Rosales was subject to extensive cross-
examination, so those details did not go untested.  In addition, 
the trial court instructed that the officers’ questions were not 
evidence but could only be used to explain Rosales’s answers, his 
state of mind, and his subsequent conduct.      
Defendant also argues that the tape included prejudicial 
evidence of a prior burglary he committed that was not 
admissible as a circumstance in aggravation under section 
190.3.  The assertion is exaggerated.  At one point, Rosales 
recounted that defendant had tried to visit his children in order 
to give them clothing and a bracelet, but that their mother was 
opposed to it and called security.  According to Rosales, “they 
tried to say that he was trying to break in the house.”  But 
Rosales understood that the mother had invited defendant to 
the house so that she could “set him up.”  The jury was not 
reasonably likely to interpret this statement as evidence of an 
uncharged burglary.  Indeed, the actual statement reflected that 
defendant had innocent motives and was himself the victim of 
vindictiveness.  Tellingly, defense counsel did not pursue the 
prosecutor’s suggestion that the jury be admonished not to 
consider the incident as a circumstance in aggravation.  Such an 
instruction could have drawn greater attention to the otherwise 
ambiguous incident.   
We reject defendant’s claims that the evidence violated his 
rights to due process, counsel, and confrontation.  Initially, the 
People assert defendant forfeited these issues by failing to lodge 
a timely objection below.  Not so.  Defendant specifically raised 
a confrontation claim in his unsuccessful mistrial motion.  The 
motion identified the asserted error at a time when the court 
could have taken corrective action.  (See Peoples, supra, 62 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
164 
 
Cal.4th at p. 801.)  Defendant also objected to the recording on 
Evidence Code section 352 grounds, which preserves a claim 
that admission of the evidence rendered the trial fundamentally 
unfair.  (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433–439.)  
Finally, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim need not be 
preserved by objection.         
Nonetheless, defendant’s claims fail on the merits.  He was 
not deprived of his right to confrontation because Rosales 
testified and was subject to cross-examination.  (People v. Clark, 
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 601.)  The court did not place any limits 
on defense counsel’s cross-examination of the witness, nor did it 
impinge upon his rendering of assistance.  The statement, 
properly admitted under the rules of evidence, did not deprive 
defendant of a fundamentally fair trial.  (Kraft, supra, 23 
Cal.4th at p. 1035.)       
5. Sufficiency of the Evidence in Support of the 
Crimes Against Leonel Paredes and Juan Carlos 
Ramirez  
At the close of the prosecution’s case, defendant moved for 
dismissal of the charges relating to the Paredes and Juan Carlos 
crimes.  (§ 1118.1.)  The motion was denied.  The standard 
applied at both the trial and appellate level is whether each 
element of the charges is supported by substantial evidence.  
(People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 307.)  “ ‘In reviewing a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not determine 
the facts ourselves.  Rather, we “examine the whole record in the 
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it 
discloses substantial evidence — evidence that is reasonable, 
credible and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact 
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
[Citations.]  We presume in support of the judgment the 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
165 
 
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from 
the evidence.  [Citation.] [¶] The same standard of review 
applies to cases in which the prosecution relies primarily on 
circumstantial evidence and to special circumstance allegations.  
[Citation.]  “[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s 
findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the 
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a 
contrary finding.”  [Citation.]  We do not reweigh evidence or 
reevaluate a witness’s credibility.’ ”  (People v. Houston (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215.)  
a. Kidnapping, Carjacking, and Robbery of 
Paredes (Counts 7, 8, and 9) 
Defendant 
contends 
Paredes’s 
identification 
was 
unreliable.  “Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the 
testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.  [Citation.]  
Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or 
inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient 
to support a conviction.”  (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 
1149, 1181; see Evid. Code, § 411.)  Paredes’s testimony was 
neither.   
Sheriff’s Deputy James Ashley interviewed Paredes on 
October 5, the same day he escaped from his attackers.  Ashley 
described Paredes as being “rather upset and emotional, some 
signs of visible shaking, some sense of being tired.”  Paredes 
described three men involved in his abduction.  The man with 
the knife was Hispanic, about 5 feet 8 inches tall, 175 pounds, 
with brown hair and brown eyes, and a thin mustache.  That 
man demanded his keys and drove his car.  He recalled the 
second man was Hispanic, had a small rifle or shotgun, and got 
into the back seat with Paredes.  That man wore a nylon 
stocking over his face when they were in the garage, but not 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
166 
 
when he first confronted Paredes.  He described the third man 
as Hispanic.34  Deputy Robert Contreras, who subsequently 
interviewed Paredes, recalled his statement that he thought he 
knew one of the men and may have gone to high school with him.   
After speaking with officers, Paredes told his cousin, 
Rosalio, that he thought he might know one of the people 
involved in the crime.  Paredes had seen the person in Lamont 
and believed that he was acquainted with Rosalio.  Rosalio 
showed Paredes photographs of his friends, and Paredes 
recognized Efrain Garza.  Rosalio did not recall showing a photo 
of Garza, but testified that he told Paredes he knew Efrain 
Garza.  Rosalio denied showing Paredes any photographs of 
defendant, and said Paredes did not ask him about defendant.   
After Chad was killed on October 14, Rosalio made a 
connection between the two crimes, and told Paredes that the 
people involved in the murder case were probably involved in 
his own kidnapping.  Rosalio also testified that he probably gave 
Paredes defendant’s name and nickname.  
During a second interview conducted by Deputies 
Contreras and Justice on October 21, Paredes said one of the 
attackers was Little Loco, whom he identified as defendant.  
 
34  
Paredes testified that he had difficulty talking to Deputy 
Ashley, who was English-speaking, and that Ashley’s report 
contained factual errors.  At trial, Ashley’s testimony regarding 
Paredes’s statement varied from Paredes’s own description at 
trial.  Paredes further testified that a couple of weeks after he 
spoke to Ashley, he corrected some of the errors when he spoke 
to Deputy Justice, who spoke Spanish.  Paredes confirmed that 
on two previous occasions, he testified that he saw the two men 
who held firearms, that the person with the revolver was Garza, 
and that the person with the shotgun-like weapon was 
defendant.   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
167 
 
Defendant held a shotgun on him while the other two men taped 
him up.  Paredes also provided the name Efrain Garza, known 
as Baby.  He told the deputies Garza’s name was given to him 
by a friend, but he would not reveal who the friend was.   
During the October 21 interview, Paredes identified 
defendant in a six-person photographic lineup.  At trial, Paredes 
identified defendant in court as the person who held the shotgun 
during the carjacking.  He explained that he had an opportunity 
to see defendant’s face for 30 to 45 seconds when defendant 
initially approached him in the parking lot.  The evidence 
supports the jury’s finding that defendant was one of the 
perpetrators.  
Defendant argues that Paredes’s identification was 
unreliable for several reasons:  Paredes did not identify 
defendant or pick him out of a lineup the day after the 
kidnapping.35  Paredes’s later identification on October 21 was 
tainted by the fact that Paredes’s cousin, Rosalio, gave Paredes 
defendant’s name and nickname and said defendant was the 
likely perpetrator.  Paredes saw defendant on television as a 
suspect in the killing, and Deputy Contreras told Paredes 
defendant’s name before showing him a photographic lineup. 
All of these facts were presented to the jury.  Defendant 
cross-examined Paredes at length about his identification, and 
presented an identification expert who described the possible 
inaccuracies of eyewitness testimony and the factors that can 
affect an identification.  Ultimately, it was for the jury to decide 
what weight to give Paredes’s identification in light of 
 
35  
According to Deputy Ashley, he did not show Paredes a 
photographic lineup at that time. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
168 
 
defendant’s claims.  (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 
1206.)   
Defendant 
argues 
that 
the 
above-referenced 
circumstances so tainted Paredes’s in-court identification that 
the trial court should have excluded this testimony, and, 
without it, there was insufficient evidence to support the 
verdict.  His argument misses the mark. 
First, “[i]n contending that the evidence was insufficient 
to support his convictions, defendant misunderstands the effect 
of a finding of [evidentiary] error.  Evidence erroneously 
admitted is properly considered in weighing the sufficiency of 
evidence to support a conviction, notwithstanding its erroneous 
admission.”  (Navarro, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 311, citing People 
v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1296–1297.) 
Second, the circumstances he cites generally go to the 
weight and not the admissibility of the witness’s testimony.  
(People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 585 (Elliott); People v. 
Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1256 (Virgil).)   
Third, his challenge to the reliability of Paredes’s 
identification is overstated.  Although some of Deputy 
Contreras’s testimony was unclear as to whether the deputies 
suggested defendant as a suspect, Contreras ultimately 
confirmed that neither he nor Justice suggested defendant’s 
name or moniker to Paredes.  Rosalio testified that he made a 
connection between the crimes against his cousin and the 
killing.  He then told Paredes that the same people were 
probably involved in his kidnapping, and he gave Paredes 
defendant’s name and nickname.  He never told Paredes to pick 
out defendant or to lie.  Finally, according to Paredes, Rosalio 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
169 
 
did not provide him defendant’s name, and Paredes did not see 
defendant’s photograph on television. 
The inconsistencies in the cousins’ recollections were for 
the jury to resolve.  They do not, in any event, establish that 
Paredes’s identification of defendant was unreliable.  The fact 
that Rosalio may have told Paredes that he thought defendant 
was also involved in his kidnapping does not render Paredes’s 
identification physically impossible or inherently improbable.  
(Elliott, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 585.)  In short, Paredes’s 
testimony provided substantial evidence of defendant’s guilt. 
b. Robbery of Juan Carlos Ramirez and 
Kidnapping During the Commission of a 
Carjacking (Counts 4 and 6) 36  
Defendant argues the kidnapping of Juan Carlos 
“happened before [defendant] knew anything about what was 
happening, and that he and the three others who jumped in the 
back of the truck at the invitation of Hector Valenzuela and 
 
36  
Section 209.5, subdivision (a) provides:  “Any person who, 
during the commission of a carjacking and in order to facilitate 
the commission of the carjacking, kidnaps another person who 
is not a principal in the commission of the carjacking shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the 
possibility of parole.”  Subdivision (b) provides:  “This section 
shall only apply if the movement of the victim is beyond that 
merely incidental to the commission of the carjacking, the victim 
is moved a substantial distance from the vicinity of the 
carjacking, and the movement of the victim increases the risk of 
harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in 
the crime of carjacking itself.” 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
170 
 
Freddie De La Rosa were essentially clueless as to what had 
happened until arriving at the field.”37  He fails to persuade.     
Juan Carlos testified that Valenzuela and De La Rosa 
approached him while he sat in his truck.  After Valenzuela 
pointed a gun at him and demanded a ride, the two men then 
got into the truck.  Juan Carlos drove to a field where they 
robbed him.  De La Rosa drove the truck about a half of a mile 
and got into an accident, so he directed Juan Carlos to drive to 
where his friends, including defendant, were waiting.  When De 
La Rosa called to his friends, defendant and three others 
climbed into the back.  This evidence supported the jury’s 
finding that Valenzuela and De La Rosa had committed a 
kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking.  A 
kidnapping “continues until . . . the kidnapper releases or 
otherwise disposes of the victim and has reached a place of 
temporary safety.”  (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 
1159 (Barnett).)  Accordingly, the kidnapping was ongoing when 
defendant entered the truck.   
An aider and abettor’s intent to facilitate the crime must 
be formed before or during the commission of the offense.  
(People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1039–1040.)  Here, the 
evidence supported the jury’s finding that defendant harbored 
the specific intent to aid and abet the kidnapping of Juan Carlos 
to facilitate the carjacking.  Defendant spent time with 
Valenzuela and De La Rosa moments before the crime began.  
When the two men returned with Juan Carlos still in the truck, 
 
37  
Defendant also asserts there is insufficient evidence to 
support count 5, the charge of carjacking Juan Carlos Ramirez.  
Defendant was acquitted of that charge.  
 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
171 
 
Rosales could see Valenzuela pointing a gun at the victim.  The 
jury could reasonably infer that defendant could see the gun as 
well.  Valenzuela continued to hold a gun on Juan Carlos and 
directed him to drive to an orchard about five minutes away.  
There, defendant, along with Valenzuela, De La Rosa, and 
Garza beat Juan Carlos and stole from him.  Defendant also tied 
him up and expressed a desire to shoot him.  Defendant and the 
others drove off in Juan Carlos’s truck and divided the victim’s 
property among them.  The circumstances surrounding 
defendant’s entry into the truck and defendant’s subsequent 
conduct supported an inference that, while the crime was 
ongoing (Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1159), defendant 
formed the specific intent to aid and abet in the kidnapping in 
order to facilitate a carjacking.     
Although the jury acquitted defendant of carjacking, there 
is no requirement of consistency among verdicts on separate 
charges so long as substantial evidence supports the offenses 
convicted upon.  (Harris v. Rivera (1981) 454 U.S. 339, 345; 
People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 860–861; § 954 [“An 
acquittal of one or more counts shall not be deemed an acquittal 
of any other count”].)  “The law generally accepts inconsistent 
verdicts as an occasionally inevitable, if not entirely satisfying, 
consequence of a criminal justice system that gives defendants 
the benefit of a reasonable doubt as to guilt, and juries the power 
to acquit whatever the evidence.”  (Palmer, at p. 860.)  
As to the second degree robbery (§ 212.5, subd. (c)),38 
defendant urges the evidence showed that Valenzuela and De 
 
38  
Section 212.5 specifies the kinds of robbery that are of the 
first degree, and provides that all other kinds of robbery are of 
 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
172 
 
La Rosa took property from the victim and later gave defendant 
a chain or pendant.  He also states that there is evidence that 
he struck and assaulted Juan Carlos after being told the victim 
had attacked De La Rosa’s sister.  From these facts, he 
concludes, “This evidence might sustain convictions for 
receiving stolen property and felony assault, but it does not 
support the crimes for which he was convicted.”  To the contrary, 
defendant’s active participation in the assault on Juan Carlos 
while property was taken, his departure in Juan Carlos’s truck 
after tying him up, and his accepting the gold charm as part of 
his “take,” amply supports the jury’s robbery verdict.     
6. Prosecutorial Misconduct  
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed multiple 
acts of misconduct rendering his trial fundamentally unfair.  
Most of the challenges fail; the remaining did not result in 
prejudice. 
“Prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal when it ‘so 
infect[s] a trial with unfairness [as to] create a denial of due 
process.  [Citations.]  Conduct by a prosecutor that does not 
reach that level nevertheless constitutes misconduct under state 
law, but only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible 
methods to persuade the court or jury.’ ”  (People v. Armstrong 
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, 795, quoting People v. Watkins (2012) 55 
Cal.4th 999, 1031.)  “We review the trial court’s rulings on 
prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion.”  (Peoples, 
 
the second degree.  Section 211 defines robbery as “the felonious 
taking of personal property in the possession of another, from 
his person or immediate presence, and against his will, 
accomplished by means of force or fear.”   
 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
173 
 
supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 792–793; accord, People v. Dworak 
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 881, 910; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 
155, 213.)   
a. Manner of Preserving Objections  
As a threshold matter, defendant contends that the trial 
court prevented defense counsel from lodging timely objections 
to misconduct and deprived defendant of an effective remedy by 
delaying rulings.  Not so.  The trial court has broad discretion to 
control the conduct of a criminal trial (§ 1044; People v. Bryant, 
Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 386), including the 
manner and timing of objections (see People v. Fudge, supra, 7 
Cal.4th at p. 1108).  The court may require that an objection be 
made at a sidebar to “efficiently dispose of matters outside the 
hearing of jurors or testifying witnesses.”  (Virgil, supra, 51 
Cal.4th at p. 1237.)  
Here, during the cross-examination of defense witness Dr. 
Gomez, defense counsel lodged an objection to one of the 
prosecutor’s questions on the grounds of “prosecutorial 
misconduct.”  Later, out of the presence of the jury, the 
prosecutor objected to defense counsel’s characterization of his 
conduct in front of the jury.  The trial court responded, “I will 
admonish in the future, if there is a motion based on 
prosecutorial misconduct, you can ask for a side bar.  [¶]  This is 
not a motion to state in the presence of the jury, because it does 
have a prejudicial effect if the Court denies it.”  During a later 
hearing on a motion for mistrial, defense counsel observed that 
he had been “ordered by the Court not to put prosecutorial 
misconduct on the record” in front of the jury.  The trial court 
clarified its ruling:  “The Court will confirm that the practice 
that I asked counsel throughout the case to follow is to state the 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
174 
 
legal basis for an objection on the record, without having 
speaking objections.  [¶]  I’ve always allowed counsel to state the 
legal basis for any objection, but I did in response to Mr. Barton’s 
argument about prosecutorial misconduct, I did agree that that 
is an objection that could be preserved by stating it for the record 
and then arguing it outside the presence of the jury.  [¶]  What 
I have not done is made some blanket order that defense counsel 
cannot ask for side bars, and in fact, we have had numerous side 
bars at the request of defense counsel, and a number of those 
side bars addressed either the subject of a motion for mistrial or 
an objection based upon prosecutorial misconduct.  [¶]  I 
appreciate that not every time that you make a motion do you 
ask for a side bar.  [¶]  And again consistent with whatever 
experienced judges do, we don’t just have side bars for every 
objection.  [¶]  It becomes very disruptive to do so.  [¶]  That’s 
why we frequently allow counsel to reserve a motion, have the 
court rule on an objection, and then counsel can reserve a 
motion, whether it be for mistrial or prosecutorial misconduct.  
[¶]  And unfortunately at the end of the day on Friday, we had 
no time, based on the court’s schedule, to argue the matters.  [¶]  
There’s no prejudice to now arguing them and if there’s a need 
to admonish the jury, make any curative admonitions or 
instructions, we can still do that and avoid prejudice.  [¶]  I don’t 
find there is any delay that is going to inure to the prejudice of 
the defendant, by taking up the matter now.”   
The defense made repeated motions for mistrial alleging 
prosecutorial misconduct.  While such misconduct may well give 
rise to a mistrial, it is seldom a free-standing evidentiary 
objection.  The more appropriate legal grounds to assert during 
questioning 
include 
objections 
that 
questions 
are 
argumentative; call for speculation, hearsay or irrelevant 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
175 
 
matter; or assume facts not in evidence.  If the objection is 
overruled, the claim of error is preserved.  If the objection is 
sustained, the defense may move for a mistrial, asserting 
misconduct and requesting other sanctions.  Such requests are 
commonly made outside the jury’s presence.   
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting this 
procedure to preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct.  
Defense counsel was permitted to lodge a contemporaneous 
evidentiary objection and to state the basis on the record.  He 
could argue motions at side bar or during a recess outside of the 
jury’s presence.  He was simply not allowed to make the 
accusation of “prosecutorial misconduct” in the jury’s presence.  
This limitation was well within the court’s discretion to prevent 
a suggestion of prejudice or disallow argumentative objections.  
And, as discussed in further detail below, it did not render 
defense counsel ineffective.  Each of the instances of misconduct 
defendant asserts on appeal was timely and effectively 
litigated.39   
b. Questioning of Daniel Quintana  
During cross-examination of prosecution witness Daniel 
Quintana, defense counsel elicited testimony about the rivalry 
among local residents.  Quintana was bused from Lamont to a 
 
39  
Defendant perfunctorily asserts that the court’s ruling on 
the timing of objections “appears unprecedented” and created 
“the appearance, if not the reality, of prejudgment.  These 
preconceptions are those of a biased tribunal.”  Defendant’s 
argument, which we choose not to characterize further, is 
unsupported by analysis, citation to authority, or courtroom 
experience.  We decline to consider it.  (People v. Stanley (1995) 
10 Cal.4th 764, 793; Maral v. City of Live Oak (2013) 221 
Cal.App.4th 975, 984–985.)   
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
176 
 
school in Arvin.  He said that he had problems with the Arvin 
students, and that his friend and neighbor, Carlos Rosales, was 
threatened by the “Arvinas” every day he went to class.  
Quintana was aware of the incident at Rosales’s home.  On 
redirect, the prosecutor asked Quintana if he “[took] a Tec-9 and 
ever [shot] anybody from Arvin three times in the back of the 
head because of that?”  Before the witness could answer, defense 
counsel asserted prosecutorial misconduct, moved to strike the 
question, and moved for a mistrial.  The court immediately took 
up the objection outside the jury’s presence.  The prosecutor 
explained that he asked the question “[b]ecause the defense is 
putting forth the theory, through this witness, that a justifiable 
explanation for the defendant’s actions is because he’s from 
Lamont, and he had had hard times with Arvina kids and he 
was somehow upset about what happened at the aunt’s house.”  
Defense counsel responded that the prosecutor had not 
accurately represented the defense theory of the case and that 
the question was designed to inflame the jury.  The court 
sustained 
the 
defense 
objection 
to 
the 
question 
as 
“argumentative” and denied the motion for mistrial.  The court 
admonished the jurors that it had sustained an objection, the 
jurors were to disregard the question, and the attorneys’ 
questions are not evidence.   
“An argumentative question is a speech to the jury 
masquerading as a question. . . .  Often it is apparent that the 
questioner does not even expect an answer. . . .  An 
argumentative question that essentially talks past the witness, 
and makes an argument to the jury, is improper because it does 
not seek to elicit relevant, competent testimony . . . .”  (People v. 
Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 384 (Chatman).)  The trial court 
acted within its discretion to find the question argumentative.  
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
177 
 
But the question, while ruled improper, did not introduce 
inflammatory facts to the jury.  The jury was informed during 
opening statement of the prosecutor’s theory that defendant had 
shot Chad three times in the head in retaliation for an act of 
disrespect.  Substantial evidence, which included the details in 
the question, supported that theory.  Moreover, the court 
sustained an objection.  Its admonition informed the panel that 
the question was ruled improper and should be ignored.  Any 
prejudice was cured.  (Id. at p. 385; Peoples, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 
p. 794; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 943 
(Pinholster).)   
c. Reference to Chinese-manufactured 
Ammunition  
During the testimony of prosecution witness Lieutenant 
Tom Hodgson, the prosecutor showed the witness photographs 
and asked if they showed the ammunition found in the Arizona 
apartment of defendant’s brother.  Defense counsel objected to 
the question as irrelevant and argued at sidebar that “these 
highly prejudicial photographs and items seized have no 
relation to the defendant whatsoever.”  Counsel noted that some 
of the ammunition was not nine millimeter and would not fit the 
murder weapon.  The prosecutor observed that defendant 
admitted having brought the murder weapon from Arizona but 
noted, in any event, that he had not asked for that particular 
photograph to be admitted into evidence.  On cross-examination, 
the witness clarified that the ammunition in question would not 
fit into the murder weapon.  He described it as “Chinese made” 
7.62-millimeter bottleneck rounds.   
Defense counsel later moved for a mistrial based on the 
reference to one photograph in particular, People’s 185, which 
was displayed on a 32-inch television screen.  The photograph 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
178 
 
showed an open box and multiple rounds of ammunition.  The 
prosecutor conceded that the 7.62 rounds shown there were only 
relevant to counts 10 and 11, which had been bifurcated.  He 
observed that the image in question was on the screen for about 
15 to 20 seconds, argued that the brief display did not result in 
prejudice, and observed that the jury could be instructed to 
disregard the photograph.  The court denied the mistrial motion.  
It found the prosecutor erred by referring to the rounds, relevant 
only to bifurcated counts, but that he did not act in bad faith and 
that defendant suffered no prejudice.  It ruled that People’s 185 
and 189 would not be admitted into evidence and ordered the 
prosecutor to make no further reference to this ammunition.   
“A court should grant mistrial ‘ “only when a party’s 
chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably 
damaged.” ’  [Citation.]  This generally occurs when ‘ “ ‘ “the 
court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by 
admonition or instruction.” ’ ” ’  [Citation.]  We review the trial 
court’s refusal to grant a mistrial for abuse of discretion.”  
(People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 581.)  While the court 
appropriately found that the prosecutor erroneously displayed 
the challenged evidence, no prejudice appears.  The picture was 
only briefly displayed.  The jury was aware that the ammunition 
was seized from the brother’s residence and did not fit the 
murder weapon.   
d. Cross-examination of Defense Witness Stan 
Mosley  
Defendant 
contends 
that 
the 
prosecutor’s 
cross-
examination of private investigator Stan Mosley about the 
circumstances under which he left his prior employment 
amounted to misconduct.  The claim fails. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
179 
 
Mosley worked for the Bakersfield Police Department for 
16 years, and then as a private investigator for 10.  He testified 
for the defense concerning code words used to refer to quantities 
of narcotics.  The testimony was proffered to support defendant’s 
theory that Juan Carlos had driven to the carjacking location to 
participate in a narcotics transaction.  During voir dire of the 
witness’s qualifications, Mosley testified about his undercover 
narcotics work as a police officer.  On cross-examination, the 
prosecutor asked the witness if he had left the department 
“under accusation of dishonesty.”  Defense counsel objected on 
the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct and moved for a 
mistrial.  At sidebar, the prosecutor represented that Mosley 
was investigated and found to possess property from some of the 
cases he had worked on.  Mosley resigned and no theft charges 
were filed.  The prosecutor offered to call the internal affairs 
investigators and produce their reports.  He asserted that the 
incident “goes to the issue of credibility.”  The court ruled that 
the prosecutor could inquire about the witness resigning from 
the police department, but excluded any reference to theft of 
property or pending charges.  (See Evid. Code, § 352.)  The court 
denied the motion for mistrial.  In the jury’s presence, the court 
sustained the defense objection and admonished the jury that 
the question was not evidence.   
The general rule is that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 
statute, all relevant evidence is admissible.”  (Evid. Code, § 351.)  
The court held the fact of Mosley’s resignation was relevant to 
credibility.  It excluded the prosecutor’s proffered additional 
evidence, not as irrelevant, but as unduly prejudicial and time 
consuming.  It rejected the misconduct claim.  That conclusion 
was within its discretion.  “A witness may be impeached with 
any prior conduct involving moral turpitude whether or not it 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
180 
 
resulted in a felony conviction, subject to the trial court’s 
exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352.”  (Clark, 
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 931.)  The alleged theft was a crime of 
moral turpitude, relevant to credibility.  (Id. at p. 932).  The 
prosecutor had a good faith basis for the question (see Krebs, 
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 340), based on internal affairs reports.  In 
any event, the objection was partially sustained and the jury 
admonished, thus minimizing any tangential prejudice to 
defendant.  (Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 943.)  Mosley’s 
testimony was on a minor point, involving Juan Carlos’s reason 
for being in the area.  It did not relate to defendant’s subsequent 
conduct.   
e. Cross-examination of Defendant   
Defendant contends that the prosecutor lacked a good 
faith basis for cross-examining him about whether he had 
purchased ammunition and multiple “guns,” his animosity 
towards Arvinas, his involvement with drugs, and his theft of 
money.  “The permissible scope of cross-examination of a 
defendant is generally broad.”  (Chatman, supra, 38 Cal.4th at 
p. 382.)  The prosecutor’s questions were permissible.   
Regarding 
the 
guns 
and 
ammunition, 
defendant 
references the following exchange:  
“Q.: So you went to Arizona and you said you weren’t 
acting like a gang member there, were you? 
“A.: No. 
“Q.: But you were using marijuana and buying guns, 
correct? 
“A.: Bought one gun. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
181 
 
“[Defense Counsel] MR. GARDINA: Objection, would like 
to reserve a motion at this time, your Honor. 
“THE COURT: You may. 
“Q.: And the ammunition that was in the gun when you 
shot Chad and the S&B ammunition, that was ammunition that 
was brought in the gun from Arizona, correct? 
“A.: The one in the clip, yes.  I didn’t bring it from Arizona.  
When I got it from Visalia, that’s the ammunition that was in it. 
“Q.: When you bought the gun, did you buy ammunition? 
“A.: It had some in the clip. 
“Q.: You didn’t buy the boxes that we saw, that were 
taken? 
“MR. GARDINA: Objection, argumentative. 
“THE COURT: Overruled. 
“MR. GARDINA: We’re going to reserve a motion at this 
time, your Honor. 
“THE COURT: You may. 
“MR. GARDINA: Thank you. 
“BY MR. BARTON: 
“Q.: Specifically, I’m talking about the S&B ammunition 
that was in the gun — remember — you were here for all the 
testimony of Mr. Laskowski, right? 
“A.: Yes. 
“Q.: And Mr. Hodgson? 
“A.: Yes. 
“Q.: And the testimony that the rounds that killed Chad 
had the S&B on them, correct? 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
182 
 
“A.: Yes. 
“Q.: And the rounds that were seized from your brother’s 
apartment had the same base marks, correct? 
“A.: Yeah. 
“Q.: Is that the same ammunition that you would shoot 
with when you were back in Arizona? 
“A.: No, I didn’t buy that ammunition. 
“Q.: So there was ammunition that you used in Arizona, 
that it’s your testimony now was in the gun when you bought it, 
period? 
“A.: Yes.  There was some in it. 
“Q.: Do you know what kind it was? 
“A.: No.  I didn’t look. 
“Q.: Well, was there only a few rounds or was it a full clip 
or what? 
“A.: It was a full clip.”   
Out of the jury’s presence, the trial court heard and denied 
a motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct.  As for 
the reference to “guns,” the court found that the prosecutor “did 
not phrase the question as clearly as it could be phrased” but 
observed that the question was generically referring to “what 
gang members do,” and defendant responded that he had 
purchased one gun.  The court found no prejudice from this 
exchange.  It admonished the prosecutor not to refer to “guns” 
in the plural.  The court did not interpret the prosecutor’s 
questioning to refer directly to the Chinese ammunition and 
noted that there was no image displayed when the prosecutor 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
183 
 
asked these questions.  The court found that the prosecutor had 
not violated any previous court orders.   
To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the 
defendant must show “a reasonable likelihood the jury 
construed the remarks in an objectionable fashion.”  (People v. 
Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 568; accord, People v. Potts (2019) 6 
Cal.5th 1012, 1036.)  “In conducting this inquiry, we ‘do not 
lightly infer’ that the jury drew the most damaging rather than 
the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.”  
(People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 970.)  The trial court was 
within its discretion to conclude that the jury was not 
reasonably likely to construe the prosecutor’s reference to “guns” 
in the most damaging light.  The prosecutor’s question was 
prefaced by an observation about what gang members generally 
do, and did not explicitly accuse defendant of having purchased 
multiple guns.  Defendant immediately and unequivocally 
responded that he had purchased only one gun.  The prosecutor 
accepted this answer and did not ask about any other weapons 
defendant may have purchased.  The trial court was likewise 
within its discretion to conclude that the prosecutor’s 
questioning did not suggest a reference to the 7.62-millimeter 
Chinese ammunition.  The prosecutor asked defendant if he had 
bought “the boxes” of ammunition that were seized, but 
immediately clarified that he was referring to “the S&B 
ammunition.”  This questioning did not amount to misconduct.         
As for defendant’s animosity towards Arvinas, the 
prosecutor asked defendant “if an Arvina was caught in Lamont 
after dark by himself, and you and other Lamont 13 gang 
members caught him, he would be in trouble, wouldn’t he?”  
Defendant responded, “If somebody else caught him, maybe.”  
The prosecutor then asked, “You’ve never caused any harm to 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
184 
 
any Arvina 13 member?”  Defense counsel objected as “improper 
impeachment,” and reserved a motion for mistrial.  The trial 
court sustained the objection and defendant did not answer.  It 
later denied a mistrial motion based on prosecutorial 
misconduct.   
Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s question was 
asked without a good faith belief that defendant had actually 
harmed an Arvina gang member.  He cites an earlier comment 
by the prosecutor in which he claims the prosecutor 
acknowledged having no such evidence.  This assertion 
mischaracterizes the record.  The prosecutor did acknowledge 
that he had no evidence defendant had engaged in gang activity 
in Arvin or had contacts with Arvin police.  But the prosecutor’s 
question was focused on what defendant had done or would do 
with respect to gang members who entered his Lamont territory.  
The prosecutor had introduced competent evidence that 
defendant was a Lamont 13 gang member.  It was defendant 
who raised the specter of animosities between Lamont 13 and 
Arvinas.  He testified at length on direct examination about 
Arvinas targeting him and his friends because he was from 
Lamont.  He claimed that the Arvin Boys had thrown a Molotov 
cocktail and shot at his mother’s house.  He further volunteered 
that he had kidnapped Chad at gunpoint because he was an 
Arvina associate who, along with two other Arvina gang 
members, had threatened defendant’s aunt.  As the prosecutor 
observed, defendant’s testimony suggested that he was an 
innocent victim wrongly targeted by Arvinas, when in fact there 
was an ongoing violent rivalry that put both sides at risk.  The 
prosecutor’s follow-up question about whether defendant posed 
a threat to Arvinas or had ever harmed Arvinas fell within the 
broad scope of permissible cross-examination, and defendant 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
185 
 
has not shown it was asked in bad faith.  Defendant’s objection 
to the question was sustained in any event.      
Next, defendant claims the prosecutor asked a series of 
questions designed to denigrate his character by suggesting he 
furnished drugs to young women, made bail using drug money, 
and was fired for drug use.  For example, the prosecutor asked 
defendant “when you were arrested in 1997, specifically August 
22, 1997, that wasn’t for just possessing drugs.  That was for 
furnishing them as well to the girls whose apartment you were 
in?”  Defendant denied furnishing drugs.  The trial court had 
specifically ruled that defendant could be impeached with this 
incident and defense counsel did not lodge a contemporaneous 
objection to this question.  At the later motion for mistrial, 
counsel argued that the prosecutor did not have a good faith 
belief defendant actually furnished drugs, and cited a report by 
a defense investigator he had received “that morning,” after the 
prosecutor’s cross-examination.  The report stated that one of 
the girls (Cary Mesa) claimed to have told the prosecutor that 
defendant did not in fact furnish drugs.  The prosecutor 
countered that he had relied on a police report in which Mesa 
and another girl (Denise Suorez) stated defendant had 
furnished drugs.  He had not personally spoken to Mesa and had 
no knowledge of her supposed recantation at the time of his 
cross-examination.  The trial court found that the prosecutor’s 
question was in line with its ruling on impeachment and denied 
a motion for mistrial.  The conclusion was not an abuse of 
discretion.  The prosecutor appeared to act in good faith in 
asking defendant about his felony conduct, given the trial court’s 
ruling and a police report supporting the line of inquiry.  The 
prosecutor was not informed about Mesa’s asserted recantation 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
186 
 
and could have relied on the statement from Suorez in any 
event. 
The prosecutor also asked defendant if he had lost his job 
because of drug use.  Defendant replied, “No.”  Defense counsel 
moved for a mistrial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct.  
The prosecutor claimed to rely on defendant’s own testimony 
that he had lost his job and that he was using drugs at the time.  
The prosecutor was given no discovery surrounding these issues.  
The most direct way to determine if defendant lost his job due 
to drug use was to ask him.  The court ruled the question was 
permissible and denied the mistrial motion.  A close review of 
the record, however, does not support the prosecutor’s assertion.  
Defendant testified about his drug use after losing his job in 
Arizona and returning to California.  Nonetheless, there was no 
prejudice from this question.  Defendant denied that he lost his 
job because of drug use and the prosecutor did not explore the 
issue further.  Moreover, it was defendant who raised the issue 
by testifying that he went on a two-week drug spree before the 
murder, during which time he was using large quantities of 
marijuana, methamphetamine, PCP, and alcohol.  Defendant 
claimed to be drunk and high when he killed Chad.  Given this 
expansive testimony, defendant could hardly have been 
prejudiced by the prosecutor’s suggestion that drug use may 
have caused him to lose his job. 
Finally, the prosecutor asked the unemployed defendant 
who 
had 
paid 
his 
bail 
on 
an 
unrelated 
charge 
of 
methamphetamine possession.  Defendant replied, “My brother 
did.”  Defense counsel’s objection to the question on relevance 
grounds was overruled, and he moved for a mistrial.  Counsel 
did not further argue the point outside the jury’s presence.  On 
appeal, defendant argues that the prosecutor’s question 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
187 
 
impermissibly suggested defendant was “making bail with drug 
money.”  The trial court acted within its discretion in denying 
defendant’s assertion of misconduct.  Defendant made clear that 
he did not pay the bail himself.  The prosecutor did not ask 
defendant if he knew where the money came from.  It is not 
reasonably likely that the jury inferred from the prosecutor’s 
single question that the bail somehow came from drug money. 
f. Request To Have Beatriz Garza Subject To 
Recall as a Witness  
At the guilt phase, the prosecutor called Efrain Garza’s 
mother, Beatriz, to testify about events at her home on the day 
of the shooting.  At the end of her testimony, the prosecutor 
asked that the witness be subject to recall.  The court asked if 
the prosecutor had a specific date in mind, to which he 
responded, “It would be penalty.  Just subject to recall.  I have 
her information.”  Defense counsel reserved a motion for 
mistrial.  Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel 
argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct by referring 
to the penalty phase “as a certainty.”  The prosecutor responded 
that he had been addressing the court’s inquiry about when 
Beatriz would be needed, and because he did not have a specific 
date, he referenced the penalty phase.  The court denied the 
motion, observing, “I don’t think the jury assumes that means 
now that there will be, in fact, a penalty phase that [the 
prosecutor] was somehow conveying that.  It’s just a matter of 
the contingency, and I don’t find there’s been prejudice.”  
Defendant opines that the prosecutor never intended to recall 
Beatriz and that he was simply trying to “backhandly inform[] 
the jury of the inevitability of a penalty phase.”  The record 
provides no support for this bald assertion.  The trial court was 
well within its discretion to reject it.  The jury was aware from 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
188 
 
the beginning of voir dire of the potential for a penalty phase.  
Nothing in the prosecutor’s statement suggested a penalty 
phase was inevitable.  No misconduct appears. 
7. Impeachment of Defendant with Misdemeanor 
Conduct  
Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct during cross-examination by asking him about the 
facts underlying an incident of vehicle theft and evading arrest 
in 1994.  He argues that the question violated the trial court’s 
ruling excluding such evidence as impeachment.  Alternatively, 
he maintains, if the question was permitted, the trial court’s 
ruling was erroneous.  We reject both claims. 
Before trial, the prosecutor moved to permit use of facts 
underlying defendant’s 1994 misdemeanor conviction for 
automobile theft/joyriding (Veh. Code, § 10851) as impeachment 
if defendant chose to testify.  (See People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 
Cal.4th 284, 292, 295–296.)  Defendant opposed the motion on 
the ground that the crime was not one of moral turpitude 
because there was no evidence of intent to steal, and that its 
similarity to the carjacking charges made it unduly prejudicial.  
(Evid. Code, § 352.)  The trial court tentatively excluded the 
evidence on the ground that there was insufficient evidence from 
which the jury could conclude that defendant intended to steal 
the car, but indicated that the prosecutor could revisit the issue.  
The prosecutor stated he would research whether evading the 
police constituted a crime of moral turpitude.   
Two and a half months later, immediately before 
defendant testified, the parties revisited the issue.  The 
prosecutor sought to clarify the court’s previous ruling and 
stated a recollection that the court had allowed him to “impeach 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
189 
 
[defendant] with the fact that he had the misdemeanor conduct, 
not a conviction but misdemeanor conduct of auto theft . . . .”  
After discussing a different incident involving a weapon, the 
prosecutor again represented that the court had tentatively 
admitted the conduct underlying the auto theft subject to an 
Evidence Code section 352 analysis.  Defense counsel did not 
object to that representation, and the trial court stated, “That’s 
consistent with my notes, because I did have a concern under 
352.  The issue came up if we let in the auto theft is it going to 
be prejudicial in light of the charges in this case and what 
weight would that have.  And, again, I did indicate it was a 
tentative, and I would wait and hear what other moral turpitude 
conduct there was.”  Ultimately, the court ruled the “auto-
related conduct, what we have described as auto theft or 
joyriding” was admissible for impeachment.   
On direct examination, defendant admitted that he had a 
misdemeanor conviction for “joyriding.”  On cross-examination, 
the prosecutor asked, “The other incidents that you stated to 
counsel [that] you were involved in, I think he referred to it as a 
joyriding.  That’s when you were in a stolen car fleeing from the 
police that flipped and ejected people, right?”  Defense counsel 
objected that the question was “improper impeachment.”  The 
objection was overruled, and defendant replied, “Yes.”   
Defense counsel later brought a motion for mistrial based 
on this questioning.  At that time he argued, “It’s my 
recollection, and I could be wrong, but my recollection on the 
prior motion was that this was a misdemeanor, no contest plea 
to joyriding.  [¶]  The prosecution did not have evidence that the 
defendant knew the car was stolen.  [¶]  There was discussion 
about the flight from the police, but it’s my recollection that that 
would be excluded.  [¶]  We would object to that coming in at 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
190 
 
all.”  The prosecutor countered that the underlying conduct was 
relevant for impeachment given that defendant only suffered a 
misdemeanor conviction.  The trial court denied the motion and 
confirmed its ruling:  “[I]n performing my balancing under 
[Evidence Code section] 352, I did decide it was appropriate to 
admit evidence of the conduct of the defendant, related to both 
the . . . allegations of furnishing drugs . . . and also conduct of 
the defendant being involved in conduct related to a stolen 
automobile.”  “So I’m not going to find that the People have 
inappropriately asked questions related to those subjects.”       
We reject defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct.  
Defendant has not shown that the prosecutor intentionally 
misled the court as to the scope of its prior tentative ruling.  The 
court confirmed the ruling after reviewing its own notes.  
Ultimately, the court revisited the issue and ruled that the 
conduct admissible for impeachment.  The prosecutor’s question 
was therefore within the scope of the court’s ultimate ruling.  It 
is clear that, in the end, the court considered the question anew 
as it had indicated it would do.   
We likewise reject defendant’s claim that the evidence was 
erroneously admitted.  The trial court’s determination that the 
evidence was proper impeachment is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  (Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 705; see People v. 
Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 295−297 [as to the proper scope 
and the evidentiary basis for such evidence]; Simons, Cal. Evid. 
Manual (2022) § 3:58, pp. 310–312.)  Even if, as the court 
initially concluded, there was no evidence of intent to steal, 
defendant’s act of intentionally evading police with willful and 
wonton disregard for the safety of others was a crime of moral 
turpitude.  (People v. Dewey (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 216, 220–222 
[violation of Veh. Code, § 2800.1]; accord, People v. Gutierrez 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
191 
 
(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 85, 91 [violation of Veh. Code, § 2800.2].)  
The police report showed that defendant was driving a stolen 
car and attempted to evade police at speeds of 80–100 miles per 
hour.  He crashed the vehicle, knocked down a utility pole, and 
injured one of the passengers.  That conduct posed a risk of 
danger to others and suggested a willingness to evade lawful 
process.  (Dewey, at p. 222; cf. People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 
991, 1009–1010.)  The court did not err in concluding that the 
conduct 
underlying 
defendant’s 
misdemeanor 
conviction 
evinced moral turpitude.   
Nor did the court abuse its discretion in admitting the 
incident after an Evidence Code section 352 objection.  
Defendant argues that the 1994 incident was unduly prejudicial 
because of its similarity to the charged crimes of carjacking.  
“ ‘Although the similarity between the prior convictions and the 
charged offenses is a factor for the court to consider when 
balancing probative value against prejudice, it is not 
dispositive.’ ”  (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 722.)  
As a general matter, there is quite a broad gap between 
misdemeanor joy riding and felonious carjacking.  Here, there 
were significant differences between the 1994 misdemeanor 
incident and the charged crimes.  In the 1994 incident, there 
was no evidence that defendant was involved in the initial theft 
of the car or that he used any force against the car’s owner.  The 
charged crimes involved carjackings at gunpoint, followed by 
assaults and murder.  It was well within the court’s discretion 
to conclude that the 1994 incident was not so similar or 
prejudicial as to warrant its exclusion.   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
192 
 
C. Penalty Phase Issues 
1. Prosecutor’s Inconsistent Theories Regarding the 
Shooter of Javier Ibarra  
The prosecutor introduced evidence of defendant’s 
involvement in the uncharged murder of Javier Ibarra as a 
circumstance in aggravation.  The evidence showed that 
defendant, his brother Cipriano, and Gabriel Flores confronted 
Ibarra and that one of the three fatally shot him.  The shooter’s 
identity turned on witnesses’ descriptions of the clothing the 
three men wore.  The prosecutor argued, based on inferences 
from the evidence, that defendant was the shooter.   
Before defendant’s trial, Flores and Cipriano were each 
separately tried for Ibarra’s murder.  During those trials, the 
Kern County District Attorney’s office took the position that 
Flores was the shooter.  Flores and Cipriano were each convicted 
of murder.  Flores’s jury found not true an allegation that he had 
personally used a firearm.   
Citing In re Sakarias (2005) 35 Cal.4th 140 (Sakarias), 
defendant argues that the prosecution’s use of inconsistent 
theories about the shooter’s identity violated due process under 
the United States Constitution.  He further contends that the 
trial court’s refusal to allow him to inform the jury of the 
prosecution’s inconsistent theories violated his rights to present 
a defense and to a reliable penalty determination.  On this 
record, we find no error.  The evidence was ambiguous as to the 
shooter’s identity.  There is no evidence before us that the 
prosecutor deliberately manipulated the trial evidence to 
present a false picture of defendant’s guilt.  The fact that the 
prosecution had interpreted the evidence differently in separate 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
193 
 
trials was not information that defendant was entitled to 
present in his case.     
a. Proceedings Below 
Because defendant’s claim of error turns on the good or 
bad faith actions of the prosecutor, we set forth the proceedings 
in some detail. 
Before the penalty phase, the prosecutor filed a motion in 
limine to admit evidence of defendant’s involvement in the 1995 
murder of Javier Ibarra as a circumstance in aggravation.40  The 
prosecutor had argued during defendant’s pretrial recusal 
motion that he should be allowed to prove defendant’s guilt of 
Ibarra’s murder on any theory supported by the evidence, 
including direct perpetrator, aider and abettor, or coconspirator.  
Defendant argued that the uncharged crime should be excluded 
as lacking substantial evidence of his guilt under any theory.  
The trial court ruled the People could introduce evidence of 
defendant’s involvement in the Ibarra murder as a circumstance 
in aggravation under theories of “aider and abettor or 
princip[al].”  It denied defendant’s request to introduce evidence 
that the prosecution had presented inconsistent theories in the 
Flores and Cipriano trials.   
In conjunction with the earlier motion to disqualify, 
defendant proffered transcripts of closing arguments made by 
prosecutors in the Flores and Cipriano trials.  The Flores 
prosecutor argued that Flores shot Ibarra:  “Alma Mosqueda 
said the white hat was on Gabriel Flores.  [Ysela] Nunez . . . says 
the white hat was the triggerman.”  “We have evidence that 
Flores is the triggerman based on the information that came on 
 
40  
Section 190.3, factor (b). 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
194 
 
the stand.”  The prosecutor dismissed the defense theory that 
Juan Ramirez was the shooter because he was arrested two days 
after the murder wearing a white hat:  “Two days later.  So 
what?  [¶]  . . . I am sure some of you have white hats, a lot of 
people have white hats.  So what does that mean?  He was 
wearing it the night of the murder?  No. . . . Got no bearing on 
the night of the murder.”  Alternatively, if Flores was not the 
shooter, the prosecutor argued that he was guilty as aider and 
abettor based on his participation in the assault on Ibarra that 
preceded the shooting.   
The prosecutor in Cipriano’s trial conceded Cipriano was 
not the shooter, arguing he was liable for murder as either a 
coconspirator or aider and abettor.  According to that analysis, 
Cipriano and defendant attacked Ibarra together, then stepped 
aside, giving Flores an opportunity to shoot him.  Cipriano 
testified on his own behalf and admitted being present, but 
claimed that he had gone there simply to escort Ibarra from the 
premises.  A fight ensued, and he was surprised by the shooting.  
He claimed that defendant, not Flores, was the shooter.  The 
prosecutor argued that this testimony was self-serving, as was 
his initial statement to police giving a false alibi and reporting 
his vehicle stolen.  As for Cipriano’s testimony that defendant 
was the shooter, the prosecutor argued this was just another 
fabrication “to blame it on an individual who has not been 
arrested or located yet in this case,[41] and I submit to you that, 
once again, . . . Cipriano Ramirez[] is trying to do that which he 
believes will get him out of trouble.”   
 
41  
Defendant was a fugitive in Mexico at the time of 
Cipriano’s trial. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
195 
 
At the penalty phase in this case, the prosecutor called the 
following witnesses, in order, to testify about Ibarra’s murder:  
Alma Mosqueda, Deputy Contreras, Sergeant Fuqua, Detective 
Allan Hall, Gerardo Soto, and Jesse Ibarra.   
Mosqueda testified on direct examination that Ibarra was 
at her apartment when Cipriano called and asked if “they could 
come over and take care of business.”  Cipriano arrived shortly 
thereafter with defendant and Flores.  Mosqueda and Ibarra 
were outside.  Mosqueda recognized all three men.  Cipriano told 
Mosqueda to go back into her apartment.  As she did so, she saw 
Ibarra approach the three men with his arms outstretched as if 
inviting them to fight.  Ibarra was unarmed.  Shortly thereafter, 
Mosqueda heard shots and saw Ibarra lying on the ground.  That 
evening, Mosqueda told investigating officers that Cipriano was 
wearing mechanics coveralls.  She was subsequently asked by 
investigators what the other two men were wearing, but she 
could not remember.  She did not recall if she described one of 
the suspects as wearing a cap.42  Nor did she recall telling Jesse 
Ibarra that one of the suspects was wearing a white hat.   
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Mosqueda if 
she presently recalled that Flores was wearing a white hat on 
the night of the shooting.  She replied, “In my memory . . . [h]e 
was wearing a white hat.”  She reported this fact to District 
Attorney Investigator Kevin Clerico about a year and a half 
after the shooting.  She also reported to Clerico that the other 
two men (Cipriano and defendant) were not wearing hats.  
Asked if she was telling the truth at that time, she responded, 
 
42  
The evidence was that the shooter wore a white baseball 
cap.  At times the witnesses and attorneys use the words “cap” 
and “hat” interchangeably.   
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
196 
 
“To my belief, yes.”  Counsel again asked, “Mr. Flores is the [one] 
that had the white cap, right?” to which Mosqueda replied, “To 
my memory, yes.”  Counsel then asked Mosqueda about her 
prior court testimony on four occasions between 1997 and 1998.  
She confirmed that, on each occasion, she identified Flores as 
wearing a white cap.  Counsel further inquired, “And you have 
never testified in any of those hearings that anybody else was 
wearing a white cap, have you?” to which Mosqueda answered, 
“No.”        
Deputy Contreras testified on direct examination that he 
responded to the scene and found Ibarra dead.  At that time, 
Mosqueda did not provide a description of the suspects’ clothing.  
On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited the fact that 
Ysela Nunez was identified as a witness to the shooting.  
Sergeant Daniel Fuqua testified on direct examination 
that, two days after the shooting, he arrested defendant and 
seized a white baseball cap with “Lamont” written on it.  On the 
prosecutor’s motion, the cap was admitted into evidence. 
Detective Hall testified on direct examination that he 
interviewed Mosqueda on the night of Ibarra’s murder.  She 
identified two suspects, defendant and Cipriano.  She said one 
man was wearing overalls, the other a cap.  She did not identify 
Flores or say that he was wearing a cap.  The detective 
interviewed defendant after his arrest.  Defendant denied being 
at the apartment complex the day Ibarra was shot.  He admitted 
that on the night of the shooting he was wearing a “mustard-
colored Lamont cap.”  He also said that Cipriano and Flores do 
not wear caps.   
Defendant’s uncle, Gerardo Soto, testified on direct 
examination that he saw defendant on the night of the murder.  
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
197 
 
Defendant was wearing a dark Pendleton shirt and a dark 
baseball cap.  The witness has never seen defendant wearing a 
white hat.  On cross-examination, the witness verified that, 
shortly after the shooting, he told an officer that defendant was 
wearing a blue cap on the night of the shooting.  He was telling 
the truth, and his memory of the event was better at that time.  
Soto confirmed that white caps with the word “Lamont” on them 
are very common and popular.       
The victim’s brother, Jesse Ibarra, testified on direct 
examination that he spoke to Mosqueda the day after the 
shooting.  She told him defendant was involved and had been 
wearing a white “Lamont” cap.    
Cipriano and Flores were both called by the prosecutor, 
and both invoked their right not to testify at defendant’s trial.  
The prosecutor did not offer Cipriano’s prior testimony 
identifying defendant as the shooter.   
In various discussions between the court and counsel, the 
prosecutor observed that he had called Deputy Contreras, 
Detective Hall, and Jesse Ibarra to rebut Mosqueda’s testimony 
elicited on cross-examination that Flores wore the white cap.  He 
further observed, “nobody could predict how the evidence was 
going to come out” but that “the evidence is out.”  He argued, “I 
also recall the Court saying that if the evidence came in that it 
was just as likely it was the defendant [who shot Ibarra], then I 
could argue that.”  The court observed, “To the extent there’s a 
conflict in the evidence, the jury is going to resolve that, if there’s 
substantial evidence.” 
The following day, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on 
the basis of prosecutorial misconduct.  He argued that the 
prosecutor had violated the trial court’s ruling by introducing 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
198 
 
evidence that defendant shot Ibarra, and that the prosecutor’s 
pursuit of this theory had deprived defendant of a fair trial.  The 
motion was denied, with the court making the following 
observation:  “I am certain that I have never ruled that the 
People could not seek to prove that the defendant . . . was the 
shooter in the Ibarra incident. [¶] . . . That’s been a theory Mr. 
Barton has asserted from the beginning.  And Mr. Barton is not 
estopped or precluded from arguing that if there’s evidence to 
support it.” 
Immediately thereafter, defendant called Ysela Nunez to 
testify.  She saw the shooting from her second story window but 
could not identify any participants.  She described the shooter 
as wearing black pants, a white hat, and a Pendleton shirt 
checkered in black, white, and grey.  
Before penalty phase argument, defendant renewed his 
motion for mistrial.  Defense counsel expressed in open court 
that he had transported Nunez from Texas to testify as a defense 
witness.43  He had made a tactical decision to elicit testimony 
from Nunez that the shooter wore a white hat so that he could 
argue Flores was the shooter and defendant was only a minor 
participant.  Counsel renewed his argument that the prosecutor 
had violated the trial court’s ruling by introducing evidence that 
defendant shot Ibarra.  Again the motion was denied, with an 
explicit ruling by the court that it had not precluded the 
prosecutor from presenting evidence that defendant shot Ibarra.  
The court observed, “the People are entitled to pursue the truth, 
just as the defense is entitled to pursue the truth, and I’m 
 
43  
Defense counsel sought and obtained fees for this purpose. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
199 
 
specifically going to find that the People did not violate my 
ruling.”   
During the penalty phase closing argument, the 
prosecutor argued that “the evidence points strongly to the fact 
that the defendant was the shooter” of Ibarra.  He further 
contended that defendant “purposefully cho[se] to kill Chad just 
like he chose to kill Javier Ibarra, and not on accident.”      
b. No Due Process Violation Appears on This 
Record 
The prosecutor has broad discretion to prosecute a 
defendant for a particular crime so long as there is probable 
cause to believe that the defendant is guilty and the prosecution 
is not motivated by vindictiveness or invidious discrimination.  
(People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 477.)  Moreover, as a 
general matter, the law does not require consistency in results 
between different criminal defendants in different prosecutions.  
(Standefer v. United States (1980) 447 U.S. 10, 12–13, 22–26; 
People v. Superior Court (Sparks) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 1, 8–22.)   
In Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th 140, a habeas proceeding, 
this court found a due process violation where the prosecutor 
adopted inconsistent and irreconcilable factual theories in 
separate trials and manipulated the available evidence to the 
detriment of each defendant.  In that case, Sakarias and Waidla 
broke into the victim’s house and attacked her with a knife and 
a hatchet.  The victim was bludgeoned in the head five times.  
She was also stabbed in the chest four times and sustained three 
chopping wounds to the head.  One of the chopping wounds 
occurred before death and penetrated the victim’s skull.  The 
other two were inflicted around the time of death or thereafter.  
(Id. at p. 146.)  At some point during the assault, the victim was 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
200 
 
dragged down the hall to a bedroom where she was later found 
dead.  (Ibid.)  Sakarias admitted the stabbings and that later, at 
Waidla’s direction, he struck the victim’s head twice with the 
hatchet after she was moved to the bedroom.  Waidla admitted 
inflicting a single bludgeoning blow with the hatchet at the 
outset of the attack.  (Ibid.)  Thus, the evidence suggested that 
Waidla struck the first and fatal chopping blow, while Sakarias 
inflicted the other two chopping blows peri- or postmortem.  (Id. 
at p. 147.)  
In each of the separate trials, “the prosecutor attributed 
the three hatchet-edge blows to each defendant in turn in order 
to establish an aggravating circumstance of the crime [citation] 
on the basis of which the jury was urged to sentence each 
defendant to death.”  (Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 160.)  
The prosecutor “manipulat[ed] the evidence” in each trial to 
support this result.  (Id. at p. 162.)  In Waidla’s trial, the 
prosecutor introduced Waidla’s admission that he had wielded 
the hatchet during the initial attack.  The prosecutor did not 
introduce Sakarias’s statement, as an admission against 
interest, that he had inflicted the two chopping wounds in the 
bedroom.  The prosecutor also presented evidence from the 
medical examiner opining that an abrasion on the victim’s lower 
back, caused by her being dragged to the bedroom, was 
sustained postmortem.  This could indicate that the initial blow, 
preceding the dragging, was fatal.  In Sakarias’s trial, the 
prosecution introduced Sakarias’s statement and omitted the 
medical examiner’s opinion about the lower back abrasion.  As 
a result, “no evidence was before Sakarias’s jury that [the 
victim] was dead by the time Sakarias, as he admitted, struck 
her with the hatchet in the bedroom.”  (Id. at p. 148.)  The 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
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201 
 
prosecutor then argued that Sakarias delivered all three hatchet 
blows, including the fatal one, in the bedroom.  (Ibid.)     
The referee presiding over the evidentiary hearing made 
several factual findings which were supported by substantial 
evidence.  (Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 150–154.)  
Specifically, the referee found that the prosecutor’s use of 
divergent factual theories “ ‘was an intentional strategic 
decision designed to fit the evidence [the prosecutor] presented 
at the successive trials, to meet the proffered defense theories, 
and to maximize the portrayal of each defendant’s culpability.’ ”  
(Id. at p. 150.)  The referee also concluded that the prosecutor in 
Sakarias’s trial “ ‘deliberately refrained from asking [the 
medical examiner] about the postmortem abrasion on [the 
victim’s] back.  He did so to tailor his evidentiary presentation 
to his changed theory of the hatchet wounds.  The most likely 
explanation of that abrasion would have been inconsistent with 
the factual theory of the killing he presented in Sakarias’[s] 
trial.’ ”  (Id. at p. 151.)    
We concluded that the prosecutor’s deliberate and “bad 
faith” manipulation of the evidence to obtain a death judgement 
against each defendant violated due process.  (Sakarias, supra, 
35 Cal.4th at pp. 160, 162.)  “[F]undamental fairness does not 
permit the People, without a good faith justification, to attribute 
to two defendants, in separate trials, a criminal act only one 
defendant could have committed.  By doing so, the state 
necessarily urges conviction or an increase in culpability in one 
of the cases on a false factual basis, a result inconsistent with 
the goal of the criminal trial as a search for truth.  At least 
where, as in Sakarias’s case, the change in theories between the 
two trials is achieved partly through deliberate manipulation of 
the evidence put before the jury, the use of such inconsistent and 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
202 
 
irreconcilable theories impermissibly undermines the reliability 
of the convictions or sentences thereby obtained.”  (Id. at pp. 
155–156, italics added.) 
This case differs from Sakarias in several crucial respects.  
First, none of the defendants charged with Ibarra’s murder was 
“necessarily convicted or sentenced . . . on a false factual basis.”  
(Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 164.)  In Flores’s trial, the jury 
rejected the prosecutor’s theory that Flores was the shooter 
when it did not find true an allegation that Flores personally 
used a firearm.  In Cipriano’s trial, the prosecutor conceded 
Cipriano was not the shooter and argued that he was liable for 
murder as a coconspirator and an aider and abettor.  The 
prosecutor briefly argued that Flores shot Ibarra based on 
Mosqueda’s testimony and questioned the veracity of Cipriano’s 
claim that his brother was the shooter.  However, it was 
unnecessary for the prosecutor to take a firm position on the 
shooter’s identity or for the jury to make a finding in that 
respect.  The jury was simply asked to find Cipriano guilty for 
aiding and abetting the shooter, whomever that may have been.  
It follows that the state has not “necessarily convicted or 
sentenced a person on a false factual basis” (id. at p. 164), when 
the supposed factual inconsistency was either rejected by the 
earlier jury (as in Flores’s trial) or was immaterial to its verdict 
(as in Cipriano’s trial). 
Second, in Sakarias the evidence pointed clearly to Waidla 
as having inflicted the fatal chopping blow.  The referee 
specifically found that the prosecutor had strong reason to 
believe the victim was dead when she was dragged from the 
living room to the bedroom.  (Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 
p. 150.)  We therefore found it unnecessary to consider “what 
result obtains when the likely truth of the prosecutor’s 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
203 
 
inconsistent theories cannot be determined” because the 
evidence is “ambiguous or inconclusive.”  (Id. at p. 164; see also 
id. at pp. 164–165, fn. 8.)  Here, by contrast, the record before us 
does not point clearly to the truth of one theory and the falsity 
of the other.  (Id. at p. 156.)  Mosqueda did testify that Flores 
was wearing a white cap.  But the jury in Flores’s case refused 
to find he personally used a weapon based on that same 
testimony.  And the victim’s brother, Jesse Ibarra, testified that, 
on the day after the shooting, Mosqueda said defendant was 
involved and had been wearing a white cap.  Two days after the 
shooting, Sergeant Daniel Fuqua arrested defendant and seized 
a white baseball cap.  Defendant admitted to Detective Hall that 
on the night of the shooting he was wearing a “mustard-colored 
Lamont cap.”  He also said that Cipriano and Flores do not wear 
caps.  Cipriano likewise testified at his separate trial that 
defendant was the shooter.  Although Cipriano ultimately 
refused to testify at defendant’s trial and his prior testimony 
was not admitted, the existence of this evidence suggests that 
the prosecutor did not act in bad faith by pursuing a theory that 
defendant shot Ibarra.     
While not binding precedent, federal circuit courts have 
held that uncertainty in the evidence justifies the prosecutor’s 
use of alternate theories in separate cases.  (See, e.g., U.S. v. 
Paul (8th Cir. 2000) 217 F.3d 989, 998–999 [“When it cannot be 
determined which of two defendants’ guns caused a fatal wound 
and either defendant could have been convicted under either 
theory, the prosecution’s argument at both trials that the 
defendant on trial pulled the trigger is not factually 
inconsistent”]; Parker v. Singletary (11th Cir. 1992) 974 F.2d 
1562, 1578.)  The ambiguity in the evidence and the posture of 
the separate trials suggest that the prosecutor did not act in bad 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
204 
 
faith here.  As Justice Werdegar, the author of Sakarias, 
observed in a later case:  “Although arguing inconsistent 
theories of culpability can be prosecutorial misconduct if 
pursued in bad faith [citation], such as when the change in 
theories is based on a ‘deliberate manipulation of the evidence’ 
[citation], no such bad faith is suggested here.  Because the 
evidence suggests there was only one shooter, when Glover’s 
jury in his trial failed to sustain the alleged firearm use 
enhancement the People could fairly conclude — and argue to 
defendant’s jury — that defendant was the shooter.”  (People v. 
Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 951 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.), 
quoting Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 156.)   
Third, central to Sakarias’s holding was the fact that the 
prosecutor modified the evidence he presented in the separate 
trials to support his inconsistent theories of guilt.  We found this 
“manipulation of the evidence for the purpose of pursuing 
inconsistent theories establishe[d] the prosecutor’s bad faith.”  
(Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 162.)  The record before us 
does not support a similar finding here.  On the contrary, it was 
defense counsel, not the prosecutor, who elicited the critical 
evidence of who wore the white cap in an attempt to portray 
Flores as the shooter.   
During direct examination of Mosqueda, the prosecutor 
asked whether, in the days after the shooting, she had identified 
anyone as wearing a white cap.  Mosqueda could not recall 
making such a statement to police or to Jesse Ibarra.  On cross-
examination, defense counsel asked Mosqueda directly if Flores 
was wearing a white cap when he came to her house on the night 
of the shooting.  Mosqueda testified that he was, and that she 
had told a district attorney investigator that fact about a year 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
205 
 
and a half after the shooting.  She also affirmed that she had 
testified consistently to that fact four times in court.   
The prosecutor then sought to impeach Mosqueda’s 
testimony elicited by the defense.  He called Detective Hall and 
Jesse Ibarra to testify that, shortly after the shooting, Mosqueda 
had told them that defendant, not Flores, was wearing the white 
cap.  It was also after Mosqueda’s testimony on cross-
examination that the prosecutor called Sergeant Fuqua and 
Detective Hall to testify that defendant was arrested two days 
after the shooting with a white baseball cap, and that defendant 
stated at the time that Cipriano and Flores do not wear caps.  
Significantly, the prosecutor did not seek to introduce any 
evidence directly establishing that defendant was the shooter.  
It was defendant, not the prosecutor, who called Ysela Nunez to 
testify.44  She was the only person who could identify the shooter 
as having worn a white cap.  Defendant called Nunez as a 
defense witness after the close of the prosecution’s penalty case, 
even in the face of the trial court’s clarification that it would not 
preclude the prosecutor from arguing that defendant was the 
shooter if there was evidence to support it.  Defense counsel 
stated in open court that he made a tactical decision to elicit this 
evidence so that he could argue Flores shot Ibarra and 
defendant was only a minor participant.  In addition, the 
prosecutor did not move to admit Cipriano’s prior testimony that 
 
44  
In his opening statement, the prosecutor anticipated that 
Nunez would be called as a witness and summarized her 
expected testimony.  Because the prosecutor did not call her as 
a witness, it appears he was summarizing anticipated defense 
testimony.  Defense counsel summarized this expected 
testimony in his opening statement as well.    
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
206 
 
defendant was the shooter after Cipriano invoked his Fifth 
Amendment privilege at defendant’s trial.   
Defendant appears to concede these points in his briefing 
before us.  He observes:  “After much procedural jousting, it 
seemed that the prosecutor had withdrawn this aim [to prove 
that defendant was the shooter], as well as its desire to present 
Cipriano’s testimony, and settled for the presentation of 
evidence showing at the most that [defendant] was guilty of 
being an aider and abettor to that crime or a conspirator with 
the target crime of murder.”  Defendant observes that the 
prosecutor “revert[ed] to his original goal” in questioning 
witnesses who testified after Mosqueda identified Flores as 
wearing the white cap.       
In short, the record before us suggests the prosecutor 
introduced known impeachment evidence to counter a theory of 
third-party culpability first introduced by the defense that was 
contrary to the jury’s finding in the Flores case.  Once defendant 
elected to offer evidence as to the shooter’s identity, the 
prosecutor was not obligated to sit idly by and eschew fair 
inferences from the evidence that defendant fired the shots.45  
 
45  
Defendant perfunctorily asserts that the trial court 
“dece[ived]” defense counsel by initially limiting the prosecutor’s 
theories of liability to aiding and abetting or principal in a 
battery.  He urges the court inexplicably changed its ruling, 
demonstrating judicial bias.  In fact, the trial court rejected 
defense counsel’s view of the record and explained that it had 
not limited the prosecutor to an aiding and abetting theory of 
liability.  Beyond its unsupported assertion, the defense points 
to nothing in the record indicating to the contrary.  In any event, 
“ ‘ “ ‘[a] trial court’s numerous rulings against a party — even 
when erroneous — do not establish a charge of judicial bias, 
 
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This sequence of events, without more, does not suggest bad 
faith or “deliberate manipulation” of the evidence by the 
prosecutor.  (Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 156.)  
Defendant cites Bradshaw v. Stumpf (2005) 545 U.S. 175 
in support of his due process claim.  As he acknowledges, the 
court there held that the prosecutor’s inconsistent positions 
about the identity of a shooter in separate proceedings did not 
invalidate Stumpf’s guilty plea because “the precise identity of 
the triggerman was immaterial to Stumpf’s conviction for 
aggravated murder.”  (Id. at p. 187.)  Defendant observes, 
however, that the court remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit 
to evaluate whether the prosecutor’s inconsistent arguments 
required reversal of the death sentence.  In doing so, the court 
observed, “The prosecutor’s use of allegedly inconsistent 
theories may have a more direct effect on Stumpf’s sentence . . . 
for it is at least arguable that the sentencing panel’s conclusion 
about Stumpf’s principal role in the offense was material to its 
sentencing determination.”  (Ibid.)  But it ultimately 
“express[ed] no opinion on whether the prosecutor’s actions [in 
arguing inconsistent theories about who shot the victim] 
amounted to a due process violation.”  (Ibid.)  Accordingly, he 
reaches too far in urging the case supports his due process 
argument here. 
In rejecting defendant’s due process claim, we have drawn 
certain inferences from the appellate record and, in particular, 
the timing of the presentation of evidence.  We note, however, 
that the court and the parties did not have the benefit of our 
 
especially when they are subject to review.’ ” ’ ”  (Nieves, supra, 
11 Cal.5th at p. 485; accord, People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 
622, 731–732.)      
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
208 
 
decision in Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th 140 when they litigated 
this issue below.  Sakarias clarified that the prosecutor’s good 
or bad faith, his manipulation of evidence, his discovery of 
significant new evidence, and the truth or falsity of the 
prosecutor’s theory, all play a role in assessing whether a due 
process violation occurred.  Nothing we say here precludes 
defendant from developing extra-record evidence bearing on 
these factors in support of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  
(People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 635–636; see People 
v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1130.) 
Defendant further argues that the trial court deprived him 
of the right to present a defense and due process when it refused 
to allow him to present evidence of the prosecution’s 
inconsistent theories.  He fails to persuade.  “ ‘Evidence’ means 
testimony, writings, material objects, or other things presented 
to the senses that are offered to prove the existence or 
nonexistence of a fact.”  (Evid. Code, § 140.)  Juries are 
instructed that statements by the attorneys are not evidence.  
(CALCRIM Nos. 104, 222.)  Here, the prosecutors in the 
Cipriano and Flores trials made assertions about what the 
evidence showed, argued credibility of certain witnesses, and 
invited each jury to draw its own inferences from the evidence.  
The trial court correctly ruled that the arguments made by 
advocates were not relevant evidence for this jury to consider.  
The court never prevented the defense from introducing 
competent evidence that Flores shot Ibarra or from arguing that 
theory to the jury.  Indeed, the defense did both. 
Finally, defendant claims that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by arguing inferences unsupported by the evidence.  
But the evidence did support an inference that defendant wore 
the white cap and shot Javier Ibarra.  Jesse Ibarra testified that 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
209 
 
Mosqueda told him as much the day after the shooting.  The day 
after that, an officer found defendant in possession of a white 
cap.  During a subsequent interview with police, defendant 
admitted to wearing a “mustard-colored Lamont cap” on the 
night of the shooting.  The trial court specifically found that the 
prosecutor did not run afoul of the court’s ruling by urging that 
defendant was the shooter.  No misconduct appears.  
2. Sufficiency of Evidence of Defendant’s Participation 
in Crimes Against Javier Ibarra  
Defendant contends that evidence of the crimes against 
Ibarra should have been excluded because it was insufficient to 
support a finding that defendant personally shot Ibarra or 
engaged in a conspiracy to kill him.  The claim lacks merit. 
“ ‘ “[A] trial court’s decision to admit ‘other crimes’ 
evidence at the penalty phase is reviewed for abuse of discretion, 
and no abuse of discretion will be found where, in fact, the 
evidence in question was legally sufficient.” ’ ”  (People v. Tully 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1027.)   
Discretion was not abused here.  There was evidence that 
defendant was wearing a white cap when he shot Ibarra.  
Alternatively, there was evidence that Cipriano, defendant, and 
Flores together arrived to “take care of business” with Ibarra, 
that defendant and Cipriano assaulted Ibarra in a coordinated 
attack, and that the two brothers jumped back suddenly, 
allowing Flores to shoot him.  Either scenario supported a 
finding of liability for murder as a direct perpetrator or an aider 
and abettor.  And even if the jury did not believe defendant shot 
Ibarra or intended to aid and abet his murder, there was 
sufficient evidence that he and Cipriano committed a battery.  
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210 
 
Evidence of such an attack would qualify as an unadjudicated 
crime under section 190.3, factor (b).   
Defendant’s argument that the evidence was inadmissible 
because it did not support a finding that defendant was the 
actual shooter or conspirator sets the bar too high.  Section 190.3 
provides that evidence of the use, attempt, or threat of force or 
violence “may be presented” and “shall be admitted.”  (§ 190.3.)  
“[W]e have consistently upheld admission of conduct amounting 
to 
a 
misdemeanor 
battery 
as 
a 
circumstance 
in 
aggravation . . . .”  (People v. Delgado (2017) 2 Cal.5th 544, 583 
(Delgado), and cases cited.)  The jury was instructed to consider 
whether defendant committed “Murder or Battery.”  No theory 
of conspiracy was presented to the jury.  It was for the jury to 
decide what crimes, if any, defendant committed.  (Id. at p. 588.)             
3. Admission of Cipriano Ramirez’s Out-of-court 
Statements  
During the penalty phase, the prosecutor elicited evidence 
of Cipriano’s incriminating out-of-court statement made 
immediately before Ibarra’s murder.  Mosqueda testified that 
Cipriano had called her and asked if “we” could come over and 
“take care of business.”  Jesse Ibarra testified that Mosqueda 
gave a similar account to him immediately after the murder, 
stating that Cipriano had told her “we are coming over to take 
care of business.”  Defense counsel’s objections that the 
questions called for hearsay and violated Aranda/Bruton46 were 
overruled.  His later motions to strike the statements and for a 
mistrial were denied.   
 
46  
People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 (Aranda); Bruton v. 
United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 (Bruton). 
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211 
 
Defendant contends that the rulings violated his right to 
confrontation and compulsory process under the federal and 
state Constitutions and his federal constitutional right to due 
process.  He does not independently challenge the admission of 
evidence under state hearsay rules.  We find no error. 
The Sixth Amendment bars the admission of testimonial 
hearsay from a witness who did not appear at trial, unless the 
witness was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a 
previous opportunity for cross-examination.  (Crawford, supra, 
541 U.S. at pp. 51, 53–54.)  The high court has made clear that 
the Sixth Amendment is concerned only with those hearsay 
statements that qualify as “testimonial.”  (Whorton v. Bockting 
(2007) 549 U.S. 406, 419–420; Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 
U.S. 813, 824 (Davis).)  “[T]he Confrontation Clause has no 
application to [nontestimonial] statements and therefore 
permits their admission even if they lack indicia of reliability.”  
(Whorton, at p. 420.)   
The high court has yet to state definitively just what facts 
conclusively demonstrate that particular hearsay qualifies as 
testimonial.  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 687.)  However, it 
has never held a hearsay statement to be testimonial unless it 
was sufficiently formal and made by or to a government agent 
during the course of a criminal investigation, for the primary 
purpose of preserving evidence for trial.  (Id. at pp. 687–689; 
Simons, Cal. Evid. Manual, supra, §§ 2:115–2:123, pp. 230–250.) 
Cipriano’s 
“casual 
remark” 
to 
Mosqueda, 
“an 
acquaintance,” (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at 51) during a phone 
call to her apartment, satisfies none, let alone all, of these 
criteria.  As a result they were “unquestionably nontestimonial.”  
(People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 129 (Cortez) [uncle’s 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
212 
 
statement to his nephew in his nephew’s apartment]; accord, 
Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 825 [statements made from one 
prisoner to another are nontestimonial].)   
Citing Bruton, supra, 391 U.S. 123, and Aranda, supra, 63 
Cal.2d 518,47 defendant argues that a different result must 
obtain for extrajudicial statements of a codefendant that 
implicate the defendant in the commission of a crime.  This is 
because such statements are “devastating to the defendant” and 
“their credibility is inevitably suspect.”  (Bruton, at p. 136.)  “The 
unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded when 
the alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify and cannot be 
tested on cross-examination.”  (Ibid.)   
Defendant’s reliance on Bruton is misplaced.  “The 
Aranda/Bruton rule addresses the situation in which ‘an out-of-
court confession of one defendant . . . incriminates not only that 
defendant but another defendant jointly charged.’ ”  (People v. 
Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 537 (Brown), quoting People v. 
Fletcher, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 455.)  “ ‘The United States 
Supreme Court has held that, because jurors cannot be expected 
to ignore one defendant’s confession that is “powerfully 
incriminating” as to a second defendant when determining the 
latter’s guilt[, even when instructed to do so], admission of such 
a confession at a joint trial generally violates the confrontation 
rights of the nondeclarant.’ ”  (Brown, at p. 537, quoting 
Fletcher, at p. 455.)  Further, Bruton “involved a nontestifying 
codefendant’s hearsay statement that did not qualify for 
 
47  
To the extent Aranda stated a broader rule of exclusion 
than required under the federal Constitution, its holding was 
abrogated by the “truth-in-evidence” provision of Proposition 8.  
(People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 465.)    
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
213 
 
admission against the defendant under any hearsay exception 
and that was ‘clearly inadmissible against [the defendant] under 
traditional rules of evidence.’ ”  (Cortez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 
129, quoting Bruton, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 128, fn. 3.) 
Flores and Cipriano were separately tried for Ibarra’s 
murder.  Defendant was not formally charged with Ibarra’s 
murder, and he stood trial alone for the charged offenses here.  
The Aranda/Bruton rule has no application to a defendant who 
is separately tried and convicted.  (Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 
p. 537.)  The question is simply the admissibility of the out-of-
court statement.  (Cortez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 129.)  As 
explained, the Sixth Amendment did not bar the use of 
Cipriano’s 
nontestimonial 
statement 
to 
Mosqueda, 
and 
defendant fails to argue that the statement was inadmissible 
under statutory hearsay rules.  Moreover, Cipriano’s statement 
was not facially incriminating of defendant.  (Richardson v. 
Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200, 208.)  It did not name defendant or 
refer to him directly, and Cipriano’s reference to “tak[ing] care 
of business” was not obviously incriminating, either directly or 
by inference.  (Montes, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 867.)  Bruton has 
no application in this context.     
Defendant contends that Bruton states a rule of exclusion 
grounded in principles of due process that is broader than the 
reach of the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause.  He cites 
no authority, other than Bruton itself, to support this claim.  But 
the holding in Bruton sounds in the Sixth Amendment.  (Bruton, 
supra, 391 U.S. at pp. 126, 128, 136–137.)  Accordingly, 
numerous courts have considered and rejected the argument.  
(People v. Almeda (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 346, 361–363; People v. 
Washington (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 19, 26–31; People v. Arceo 
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 556, 570–575; see also U.S. v. Figueroa-
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
214 
 
Cartagena (1st Cir. 2010) 612 F.3d 69, 85; U.S. v. Berrios (3d 
Cir. 2012) 676 F.3d 118, 128; U.S. v. Dargan (4th Cir. 2013) 738 
F.3d 643, 651; U.S. v. Vasquez (5th Cir. 2014) 766 F.3d 373, 378–
379; U.S. v. Johnson (6th Cir. 2009) 581 F.3d 320, 325–326; 
U.S. v. Dale (8th Cir. 2010) 614 F.3d 942, 958–959; U.S. v. Clark 
(10th Cir. 2013) 717 F.3d 790, 813–817.)     
Ultimately, we need not weigh in on the matter.  Bruton, 
whatever its constitutional basis, is inapplicable here.  There 
was no joint trial and Cipriano’s statements were not facially 
incriminating of defendant.     
4. Admission of Unadjudicated Criminal Activity 
Involving a Firearm  
Defendant challenges the admission of penalty phase 
evidence concerning an unadjudicated incident where he was 
found in possession of methamphetamine and a loaded 
firearm.48  We find no error.   
Bakersfield Police Officer Michael Coronado testified that 
he arrested defendant on August 22, 1997, in a Bakersfield 
apartment.  Coronado was admitted by one of the tenants.  She 
and the other woman inside told the officer that they were the 
only people there.  However, when the officer went upstairs to a 
bedroom, he found defendant kneeling down, with his hands 
under the bed.  About six inches from defendant was an open 
purse, and inside the purse was a pistol with a round in the 
chamber.  There was methamphetamine on a nearby dresser.  
 
48  
Defendant was separately charged with violations of 
Health and Safety Code sections 11370.1, subdivision (a) and 
11550, subdivision (e) based on this incident.  The charges were 
bifurcated and tried separately after the penalty phase verdict 
was returned.   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
215 
 
Coronado arrested defendant.  In a later statement, defendant 
admitted that the methamphetamine and the gun were his.  He 
said he had the gun for protection because he was traveling 
frequently between Arizona and California.  When he heard 
police at the door to the apartment, he hid the gun so it would 
not be found on his person.  Defendant was cooperative during 
his arrest.  Defendant’s urine sample reflected use of 
methamphetamine.   
Section 190.3, factor (b) authorizes the admission of 
“criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or 
attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied 
threat to use force or violence.”  We review the trial court’s 
decision to admit factor (b) evidence for abuse of discretion.  
(Delgado, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 582.)  Based on the prosecutor’s 
offer of proof, the court reasoned that the loaded firearm was in 
close proximity to both defendant and the drugs, and that 
defendant was aware of its presence, thus supporting an 
inference that the firearm was “available for the defendant to 
put to immediate use, to aid in the drug possession.”   
No abuse of discretion appears.  “[I]llegal possession of 
potentially dangerous weapons may ‘show[] an implied intention 
to put the weapons to unlawful use,’ rendering the evidence 
admissible pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b).”  (People v. 
Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 777 (Dykes) [possession of a loaded 
handgun while under arrest], quoting People v. Michaels (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 486, 535–536 [possession of double-edged dagger, 
various knives, and a concealed handgun]; accord, People v. 
Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 631 [possession of several 
sawed-off rifles and silencers]; People v. Garceau (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 140, 203 [possession of weapons including a machine 
gun, a silencer, and handguns].)   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
216 
 
Defendant argues these cases are distinguishable because 
they involved illegal weapons possession, while here defendant’s 
gun possession was legal and posed no threat to the officer.  To 
the contrary, it is unlawful to be armed with a loaded, operable 
firearm while in possession of methamphetamine.  (Health & 
Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a).)  Defendant was convicted of that 
offense in a bifurcated trial involving this same incident.  
Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that defendant’s possession of a loaded gun, which 
was available for immediate use, posed a threat to the officer.  
The two women in the apartment tried to conceal defendant’s 
whereabouts.  When the officer entered the bedroom, he found 
drugs in view and defendant crouching behind a bed, with his 
hands out of sight.  The officer drew his gun and ordered 
defendant to raise his hands.  Although defendant complied 
without incident, he was certainly in a position to wield his gun 
against the officer had the officer not acted quickly.  To the 
extent there was an innocent explanation for defendant’s 
possession of the firearm, the jury was free to consider it, “but 
such inferences do not render the evidence inadmissible per se.”  
(People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 589.)           
Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th 731 is similar.  There the 
defendant was lawfully detained by a police officer.  Without 
being prompted to do so, the defendant removed a hat and gloves 
and placed them on the roof of the officer’s patrol car.  The officer 
examined the gloves and found a loaded and cocked handgun.  
We upheld admission of this incident under section 190.3, factor 
(b) even though the defendant made no attempt to use or display 
the weapon.  We reasoned that “the jury legitimately could infer 
an implied threat of violence from all the circumstances, 
including the ‘criminal character of defendant’s possession’ 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
217 
 
[citations], the concealment of the loaded and cocked weapon in 
a manner that rendered it available for instant, surprise use, 
and defendant’s use of a similar firearm in committing the 
present offense.”  (Id. at p. 777.)  Those factors are likewise 
present here:  defendant’s possession of the gun and drugs was 
unlawful; he concealed the weapon in a purse within reach; and 
he used a handgun to kill Chad.  Admission of the evidence was 
proper.         
5. Prosecution’s Rebuttal Evidence  
Defendant indicated a desire to introduce mitigation 
evidence.  He argues the court erroneously indicated it would 
permit the prosecution to offer rebuttal evidence that was 
speculative, inconclusive, and inflammatory.  He urges that the 
court’s indication caused him to forgo that mitigating evidence, 
rather than risk opening the door to rebuttal.  He argues that, 
as a result, he was denied due process and the right to a reliable 
penalty determination.  There was no error.  
Defendant’s claim involves two incidents:  (1) the proffered 
testimony of correctional officer Toody Clites about an incident 
involving defendant and other inmates at the Lerdo County jail, 
and (2) proffered evidence that defendant had been stopped in a 
vehicle after a drive-by shooting in rival gang territory and that 
shell casings matching those found at the shooting scene were 
recovered from the vehicle. 
During an in limine hearing, Clites recounted an inmate 
conversation she heard through an intercom system.  Inmates 
Sterns, Ruiz, and Castro were saying that guards searched their 
cells and seized shanks.  They discussed the need to fashion 
more weapons.  Sterns commented, “I’m going down, man, for a 
long fucking time.  So I ain’t hesitating on getting the fuck out 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
218 
 
of here or taking officers out.”  Ruiz commented, “[T]he next time 
those fuckers toss my place, it’s fucking on.  I’m going to take 
those fuckers out, too.”  Castro commented, “No worry, Loco.  It’s 
on, and I’m with you.”  Defendant was not present during these 
conversations.  Shortly thereafter, defendant was allowed to 
leave his cell and went upstairs to speak with Sterns.  Sterns 
told defendant about the discussions described.  The two 
discussed informants, shanks, and officers and made a plan to 
produce additional shanks.  Sterns commented that the next 
time they were harassed or searched by the officers, “[I]t was 
going to be on,” to which defendant responded, “[C]ount me in.”  
Defendant then spoke to Ruiz, who commented that he was “sick 
and tired” of the shanks being seized.  Ruiz said, “[I]t’s fucking 
on, Loco,” and defendant again replied, “[C]ount me in.”     
The trial court initially ruled this incident inadmissible as 
section 190.3, factor (b) evidence in aggravation, but deferred 
ruling on whether it might be admissible to rebut defendant’s 
evidence in mitigation.  Defendant proffered, as evidence of 
mitigation, his good behavior while incarcerated at Camp 
Owens as a juvenile, including that he was a peacemaker, got 
along with all races and ethnic groups, and followed direction.  
The court tentatively ruled that “if the defense present[s] 
evidence as to the defendant’s conduct while housed at Camp 
Owens, if it is offered as a predictor of his future behavior, then 
the People would be entitled to admit evidence of the Lerdo 
shank incident . . . as rebuttal to that.”  The court gave, as an 
example, testimony that defendant was “well behaved, and 
complied with all the rules.”  By contrast, the court observed 
that general testimony from people who had contact with 
defendant at Camp Owen and opined that he had no animosity 
towards people of other races or ethnic backgrounds would not 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
219 
 
open the door to rebuttal with the Lerdo incident.  Ultimately, 
defendant did not introduce evidence of his behavior at Camp 
Owens, and the prosecutor did not introduce evidence of the 
Lerdo jail incident.             
As to the second instance, defendant proffered evidence 
that he had been shot at on one occasion and “jumped” by a 
group on another occasion.  The assailants were unknown.  The 
prosecutor proffered rebuttal evidence that defendant had been 
stopped in a vehicle shortly after a drive-by shooting in rival 
gang territory.  A search of the vehicle recovered .22-caliber 
casings on the rear passenger floorboard that matched the 
casings found at the shooting scene.  The court ruled that the 
drive-by shooting incident was relevant to rebut defendant’s 
proffered evidence showing that he was the innocent victim of 
violent activity by “showing that the defendant may engage in 
violent activity, himself, which would invite retaliation.”  
Ultimately, defendant did not introduce evidence that he was 
the victim of violent attacks and the prosecutor did not introduce 
evidence of defendant’s involvement in a drive-by shooting.  
“The scope of rebuttal lies within the trial court’s 
discretion.”  (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 409.)  
“[A] defendant who introduces good character evidence widens 
the scope of the bad character evidence that may be introduced 
in rebuttal.”  (People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 237.)  “ ‘[T]he 
scope of rebuttal must be specific, and evidence presented or 
argued as rebuttal must relate directly to a particular incident 
or character trait defendant offers in his own behalf,’ but once a 
defendant ‘place[s] his general character in issue, the prosecutor 
[is] entitled to rebut with evidence or argument suggesting a 
more balanced picture of his personality.’ ”  (Carpenter, at pp. 
408−409.)  “The theory for permitting such rebuttal evidence 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
220 
 
and argument is not that it proves a statutory aggravating 
factor, but that it undermines defendant’s claim that his good 
character weighs in favor of mercy.  Accordingly, the prosecutor, 
when making such a rebuttal effort, is not bound by the listed 
aggravating factors or by his statutory pretrial notice of 
aggravating evidence.”  (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 
730, 791.)  
The court did not err in finding the rebuttal evidence 
admissible to counter defendant’s proposed mitigation.  These 
incidents related directly to particular character traits 
defendant proposed to prove.  Defendant’s participation in 
conversations with other inmates about producing shanks and 
resisting cell searches by the officers tended to rebut defendant’s 
proffered evidence of his good behavior while incarcerated at 
Camp Owens as a juvenile.  With respect to this incident, the 
court made clear that defendant could introduce more general 
character evidence that defendant had not exhibited racial or 
ethnic animosity while incarcerated at Camp Owens without 
opening the door to the Lerdo incident.  Defendant elected not 
to do so.  Defendant’s presence in a car along with the weapon 
used in a recent drive-by shooting tended to rebut defendant’s 
proffered evidence that he had been an unfortunate victim of 
gang attacks.  In the words of the trial court, this evidence 
tended to show that defendant had “engage[d] in violent activity, 
himself, which would invite retaliation.”   
Defendant protests that evidence in the Lerdo incident 
was speculative and inconclusive because he did not actually 
engage in attacks on custodial officers and no shanks were 
discovered in his possession.  But the fact that officers were 
successful in monitoring the inmates and interrupting their 
plans before they could be carried out does not minimize the 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
221 
 
potential threat.  Defendant’s discussion of these topics and 
affirmance, “count me in,” was relevant rebuttal.  Defendant 
argues that the drive-by shooting incident was similarly 
speculative and inconclusive because it involved “an unnamed 
house [and] an unnamed victim.”  But defendant offers no cause 
to believe that the prosecution witness, Kern County Deputy 
Sheriff Chavez, would be unable to substantiate these details 
based on his investigation of the crime.  The reason he never did 
so was because defendant elected not to present his mitigating 
evidence, thus obviating the need for rebuttal.  The prosecutor’s 
offer of proof was sufficient to support the trial court’s indicated 
ruling to admit the evidence in rebuttal.          
6. Exclusion of Mitigating Evidence Regarding Events 
Before Defendant’s Birth  
Defendant claims that the trial court acted in an arbitrary, 
capricious, and prejudicial manner by excluding evidence in 
mitigation regarding events that transpired before his own 
birth.  The assertion fails.  
“At the penalty phase a defendant must be permitted to 
offer any relevant potentially mitigating evidence, i.e., evidence 
relevant to the circumstances of the offense or the defendant’s 
character and record.”  (In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 814 
(Gay); see § 190.3; Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302, 317.)  
“The ‘background of the defendant’s family is material if, and to 
the extent that, it relates to the background of defendant 
himself.’  [Citation.]  The ‘background of the defendant’s family 
is of no consequence in and of itself.’ ”  (People v. McDowell 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 434, italics added.)  The court has broad 
discretion to determine the relevance of evidence proffered to 
demonstrate defendant’s character.  (People v. Souza (2012) 54 
Cal.4th 90, 137.)            
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
222 
 
Defendant’s claim of error involves the testimony of four 
penalty phase witnesses:  defendant’s material grandmother, 
Esperanza Villa;49 his mother, Angelita; his maternal aunt, 
Maria; and his maternal aunt, Olivia Soto.   
Esperanza testified that defendant was born in small 
adobe home in Mexico.  The family was poor and resources were 
scarce.  Defendant’s father “drank a lot.”  Angelita eventually 
left the marriage and moved to the United States when 
defendant was a sickly one year old.  Defense counsel asked 
Esperanza if she had observed how defendant’s father treated 
his wife when they were living together in Mexico.  The 
prosecutor’s relevance objection was sustained as to “the period 
prior to the birth of the defendant.”  At a sidebar, defense 
counsel explained that defendant’s older brother, Lorenzo, was 
present during that period and observed his father abusing his 
mother.  According to counsel, Lorenzo “became the man of the 
house and was very abusive towards the younger boys, 
particularly the Defendant . . . .”  He argued that this evidence 
was relevant to show “why Lorenzo was the way he was.”  The 
court ruled:  “The question is why is Juan the way he is.  And if 
Lorenzo was abusive, then you can put in evidence of Lorenzo’s 
abuse.”  Before the jury, Esperanza testified that she had moved 
to the United States before defendant was born and did not have 
first-hand knowledge of the relationship between defendant’s 
parents thereafter.  Esperanza did recount that Angelita wrote 
to her once and described an incident where her husband pushed 
 
49  
Because several witnesses have overlapping family names 
we refer to those witnesses by their given names to avoid 
confusion.   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
223 
 
her into a piece of furniture while she was pregnant, injuring 
her abdomen.   
Angelita testified that defendant’s father was a violent 
alcoholic.  He spent the family’s money on liquor at times leaving 
the family without food.  When defense counsel asked Angelita 
if defendant’s father was “violent with you when he was 
drinking,” the trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection to 
questions about conduct before defendant’s birth.  When counsel 
reframed the question for the period after defendant’s birth, 
Angelita testified, “He was always violent when he drank.”  He 
was violent toward both her and the children.  Angelita said that 
defendant was sick and malnourished as a baby.  From the time 
defendant’s brother, Lorenzo, was seven years old, he had to 
watch the younger children while Angelita worked in the fields 
for $2.25 an hour.  Lorenzo told Angelita that he regularly “beat” 
the children when they were under his care.  The other children 
also reported to her that Lorenzo would “hit” defendant to “tr[y] 
to straighten [him] out.”  Angelita described the conduct as 
corrective and confirmed that defendant never had visible 
injuries or had to go to the hospital.  She opined that “the reason 
for all of this is that [defendant] never had his father with him.” 
Maria testified that she knew defendant’s parents.  When 
asked if she “remember[ed] anything” about defendant’s father, 
the court sustained an objection to limit testimony to the 
relevant time period after defendant’s birth.  Maria testified 
that it was “common knowledge” in the family that defendant’s 
father was a violent drinker.  Angelita left Mexico with her five 
children to escape his abuse.  When she arrived in the United 
States, she had nothing, “not even clothes for the children.”  
Defendant was ill and malnourished.  At 18 months he could not 
crawl.  She opined that “Lorenzo has always had his father’s 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
224 
 
character, very violent.”  He would hit defendant, and defendant 
preferred to stay at Maria’s house to avoid the violence.     
Olivia testified that Lorenzo “used to hit [defendant] a lot.”  
Olivia would interfere so that defendant would not be badly 
hurt.  She considered defendant to have been “abused” by 
Lorenzo.  When the prosecutor attempted to impeach Olivia 
with a prior statement given to his investigator, she explained 
that, if she previously said that Lorenzo had not abused 
defendant, she misunderstood the investigator’s question.       
The trial court’s limitation to evidence occurring after 
defendant’s birth was not an abuse of discretion.  As the trial 
court observed, defendant’s father’s earlier behavior was not 
relevant to show its effect on defendant’s development.  
However, the witnesses were allowed to testify that the father 
was violent toward defendant, his mother and siblings, and that 
his abuse caused financial instability, ultimately forcing the 
family to flee to the United States.  Testimony established that 
defendant was ill and malnourished as a child, and that his 
oldest brother, Lorenzo, was left in charge of the children while 
his mother worked in the fields.  During that time, Lorenzo beat 
defendant for discipline.  This testimony painted a very clear 
picture of the father’s behavior, and the consequences inflicted 
on the entire family.  Defendant was not denied the opportunity 
to offer relevant potentially mitigating evidence of his character.   
Defendant argues that his “inability to present evidence 
about what happened to Lorenzo before [defendant was born] in 
1976 deprived him of the opportunity to corroborate evidence 
that the prosecutor contested regarding [his] abuse as a child at 
the hands of Lorenzo and thus make more credible the 
testimony of the family about what happened to him as a child.”  
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
225 
 
He fails to persuade.  It was undisputed that Lorenzo was 
violent towards defendant.  Angelita, Maria, and Olivia all 
testified consistently on that point.  The prosecutor attempted 
through cross-examination to question the severity of the 
violence.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that Lorenzo’s own exposure to violence before 
defendant’s birth was at most tangential and speculative on that 
point.   
Defendant relies on Gay, supra, 19 Cal.4th 771 for the 
proposition that “a family history remarkable for extensive drug 
abuse in multiple generations and various branches of the 
family” is relevant mitigation evidence.  (Id. at p. 805.)  His 
reliance is misplaced.  Gay involved evidence that defendant 
suffered from a major affective disorder and psychoactive 
substance abuse, both of which had a genetic component that 
also manifested in Gay’s family members.  (Id. at pp. 804–805.)  
No similar evidence of genetic disposition was proffered here.     
7. Evidence and Instruction Regarding the Impact of 
Execution on Defendant’s Family  
Over defendant’s objection, the trial court told the jury:  
“Sympathy for the family of the defendant is not a matter that 
you can consider in mitigation.  Evidence, if any, of the impact 
of an execution on family members should be disregarded unless 
it illuminates some positive quality of the defendant’s 
background or character.”  (CALJIC No. 8.85.)  The court did not 
otherwise limit defendant’s introduction of mitigating evidence 
on this topic.   
Citing Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808 (Payne), 
defendant argues that the court’s instruction prevented the jury 
from understanding defendant’s uniqueness as a human being 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
226 
 
and upset the balance between the penalty evidence available to 
the defendant and the state.  Just as the prosecutor was allowed 
to present evidence of the impact of the victim’s death on his 
family and friends, defendant argues he should have been 
allowed to present evidence of the pain and loss his execution 
would cause his family.  The court’s instruction, he claims, 
violated his constitutional rights to due process, equal 
protection, and a reliable penalty determination. 
People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165 rejected these 
same arguments based on the identical instruction given here:  
“Established precedent is to the contrary.  ‘The impact of a 
defendant’s execution on his or her family may not be considered 
by the jury in mitigation.  (People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 
334, 366–367; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1000; 
People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 454–456 . . . .)’  (People v. 
Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 601.)  ‘[N]othing in the federal 
Constitution requires a different result (Ochoa, at p. 456) and 
defendant identifies no reason to reconsider our conclusion.’  
(Bennett, at p. 602.)”  (Williams, at p. 197.) 
Defendant asserts that our precedent, particularly People 
v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353 (Ochoa), conflicts with the later 
decision in Payne, supra, 501 U.S. 808.  We rejected that claim 
in People v. Bennett, supra, 45 Cal.4th at page 602 (Bennett):  
“Defendant argues the high court’s decision contains an implicit 
recognition capital defendants have the right to introduce 
execution-impact evidence.  To the contrary, the high court made 
clear, consistent with Ochoa, that a defendant must be allowed 
to 
introduce 
mitigating 
evidence 
‘concerning 
his 
own 
circumstances.’  (Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 822, italics added.)  
As we have explained, execution-impact evidence is irrelevant 
under section 190.3 because it does not concern a defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
227 
 
own circumstances but rather asks the jury to spare defendant’s 
life based on the effect his or her execution would have on his or 
her family.  (Ochoa, . . . at p. 456.)  We further concluded that 
nothing in the federal Constitution requires a different result 
(Ochoa, at p. 456) and defendant identifies no reason to 
reconsider our conclusion.” 
Finally, defendant argues that execution-impact evidence 
is admissible under section 190.3, which permits introduction of 
“any matter relevant to . . . mitigation . . . .”  (§ 190.3.)  Not so.  
As we observed in Bennett, supra, 45 Cal.4th at page 602:  “We 
rejected this construction in Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at page 
456, and we see no reason to revisit the issue.  Defendant’s 
argument rests on the use of the word ‘mitigation’ in statutes 
governing determinate sentencing (§ 1170) and probation (§ 
1203).  Neither statute is analogous to section 190.3.  Unlike 
those statutes, section 190.3 identifies examples of matters 
relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence including, but 
not limited to, the ‘circumstances of the present offense, any 
prior felony conviction . . . , and the defendant’s character, 
background, history, mental condition and physical condition.’  
We concluded that, ‘[i]n this context, what is ultimately relevant 
is a defendant’s background and character — not the distress of 
his or her family.’  (Ochoa, . . . at p. 456, italics added.)”   
The court did not limit mitigation evidence related to 
defendant’s background or character.  And, notably, the court’s 
instruction allowed the jury to consider the impact defendant’s 
execution would have on his relationships with family to the 
extent it “illuminates some positive quality of the defendant’s 
background or character.”  Defendant presented evidence that 
he had a loving relationship with his two young daughters who 
visited him regularly while he was in custody.  Defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
228 
 
mother, Angelita, testified that defendant was “very endearing 
with” her and always remembered her birthdays and holidays.  
The court’s instruction did not preclude the jury from 
considering these positive aspects of defendant’s character.   
8. Refusal To Give a Lingering Doubt Instruction  
Defendant argues that the trial court’s rejection of his 
requested lingering doubt instructions50 denied him his 
constitutional right to present a defense under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  Defendant acknowledges we have 
repeatedly held otherwise.  (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 
306, 346; People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 708 (Boyce), and 
cases cited.)     
The concept of lingering doubt is adequately covered by 
CALJIC No. 8.85, factor (k).  (Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 
708–709.)  As given here, that instruction informed the jury that 
 
50  
The requested instructions read:   
“Each of you may consider as a mitigating factor any 
lingering or residual doubt that you may have as to whether the 
defendant intentionally killed the victim.  Lingering or residual 
doubt is defined as doubt concerning proof that remains after 
you have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
“The adjudication of guilt is not infallible and any 
lingering doubts you entertain on the question of guilt may be 
considered by you in determining the appropriate penalty, 
including the possibility that some time in the future, facts may 
come to light that have not yet been discovered.  [¶]  A lingering 
doubt is defined as any doubt, however slight, which is not 
sufficient to create in the minds of the jurors a reasonable 
doubt.”   
Other requested instructions specifically described the 
concept of lingering doubt as a factor in mitigation and related 
the concept of lingering doubt to the carjacking and kidnapping 
special circumstance findings.   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
229 
 
it may consider “any other circumstance which extenuates the 
gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the 
crime, and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s 
character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a 
sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense 
for which he is on trial.”  The trial court also gave defendant’s 
special instruction that “[y]our consideration of mitigating 
factors is not limited to those that have been given you” and 
“[y]ou may also consider any other facts relating to the 
circumstance of the case or to the character and background of 
the defendant as a reason for not imposing the sentence of 
death.”  Counsel was permitted to argue that lingering doubt is 
a mitigating circumstance, and he did so.  “In light of the . . . 
instructions and counsel’s argument, the concept was well 
covered.”  (Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 709.)   
Defendant relies on People v. Gay (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1195, 
but that case is distinguishable.  There, in a penalty retrial, the 
trial court instructed that a prior jury had found defendant 
guilty of murdering the victim by personal use of a firearm, and 
that it had been “ ‘conclusively proved by the jury in the first 
case that this defendant did, in fact, shoot and kill Officer Verna’ 
and that the jury was to ‘disregard any statements . . . and . . . 
any evidence to the contrary during the trial.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1198.)  
We concluded that the trial court’s explicit directive negated its 
later instruction on lingering doubt, as evidenced by the jury’s 
confusion on that subject expressed during deliberations.  (Id. at 
pp. 1225–1226.)  There was “ ‘no way of knowing which of the 
two irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied in reaching 
their verdict.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1226, quoting Francis v. Franklin 
(1985) 471 U.S. 307, 322.)  By contrast, no irreconcilable 
lingering doubt instructions were given here.  Defendant points 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
230 
 
to nothing in the record demonstrating that the jury was left 
with the incorrect impression that it could not consider lingering 
doubt as a circumstance in mitigation. 
9. Intracase Proportionality Review 
The imposition of a death sentence is subject to “intracase” 
review to determine whether the penalty is disproportionate to 
a defendant’s personal culpability.  (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 
Cal.4th 408, 476 (Mincey).)  “ ‘To determine whether a sentence 
is cruel or unusual as applied to a particular defendant, a 
reviewing court must examine the circumstances of the offense, 
including its motive, the extent of the defendant’s involvement 
in the crime, the manner in which the crime was committed, and 
the consequences of the defendant’s acts.  The court must also 
consider the personal characteristics of the defendant, including 
age, prior criminality, and mental capabilities.’ ”  (Virgil, supra, 
51 Cal.4th at p. 1287.) 
Defendant does not highlight anything related to his 
background or circumstances to support his claim that a death 
sentence is disproportionate here.  Instead he compares his 
sentence to the one imposed on Garza, who was allowed to plead 
guilty to murder in exchange for a life sentence.  The outcome of 
Garza’s case is not a relevant consideration.  “Evidence of the 
disposition of a codefendant’s case, as opposed to evidence of the 
codefendant’s complicity and involvement in the offense, is not 
relevant to the decision at the penalty phase, which is based on 
the character and record of the individual defendant and the 
circumstances of the offense.”  (Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 
476; accord, Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 744.)  This is 
particularly true where the disposition of the codefendant’s case 
was based on plea negotiations.  “ ‘The exercise of prosecutorial 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
231 
 
discretion in obtaining evidence and making charging decisions 
is not pertinent to a review of a capital sentence.’ ”  (People v. 
Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 458.)   
The uncontradicted evidence was that defendant, not 
Garza, shot and killed Chad.  The murder was the culmination 
of a series of violent crimes defendant committed over the span 
of several days that included the kidnapping and robbery of 
Juan Carlos and Paredes.  (See Virgil, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 
1287.)  The jury was within its authority to conclude that the 
circumstances of the crime and defendant’s personal history 
justify a death sentence.  (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 
83, 158 (Crittenden).)     
10. Cumulative Error  
Defendant urges prejudice by the cumulative effect of 
error in the guilt and penalty phases, particularly the impact of 
errors on the penalty determination.  We have found five errors 
during the trial:  Juror No. 11’s inadvertent exposure to her 
father’s opinion that defendant was guilty; the gang expert’s 
recitation of hearsay evidence to support his opinion that 
various persons were gang members; the prosecutor’s question 
posed to Daniel Quintana, which the court ruled argumentative; 
the prosecutor’s question to defendant about whether he had 
lost his job because of drug use; and the prosecutor’s brief 
display of a photograph of Chinese-manufactured ammunition.  
As explained above, none of these errors, considered 
individually, was prejudicial.  The errors considered together do 
not support a different conclusion.   
11.  Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Law 
Defendant raises a number of familiar legal challenges to 
California’s death penalty statute.  He acknowledges that we 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
232 
 
have previously rejected all of these claims, but presents them 
again to urge reconsideration and preserve the issues for federal 
review.  We adhere to our settled precedents, which hold: 
“Section 190.2 adequately narrows the category of death-
eligible defendants and is not impermissibly overbroad under 
the requirements of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  [Citations.]  
The various special circumstances are not unduly numerous or 
expansive.”  (People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 488 
(Winbush).)   
Capital sentencing is “an inherently moral and normative 
function, and not a factual one amenable to burden of proof 
calculations.”  (Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 489.)  For this 
reason, California’s death penalty scheme does not violate the 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for failing to 
require written findings (Molano, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 678); 
unanimous findings as to the existence of aggravating factors or 
unadjudicated criminal activity (People v. Capers (2019) 7 
Cal.5th 989, 1013–1014 (Capers)); or findings beyond a 
reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist,51 that 
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, or that death 
is the appropriate penalty (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 
213–214 (Fayed); Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 350).  These 
conclusions are not altered by Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 
U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, or Hurst v. 
 
51  
California does require that section 190.3, factors (b) and 
(c) evidence be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  This is, 
however, an evidentiary rule.  It is not constitutionally 
mandated.  (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 589; 
People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 97–98.)   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
233 
 
Florida (2016) 577 U.S. 92.  (Rhoades, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 455; 
Capers, at pp. 1013–1014.)   
Section 190.3, factor (a), which permits aggravation based 
on the circumstances of the crime, does not result in arbitrary 
and capricious imposition of the death penalty in violation of the 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.  (Rhoades, 
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 455; Capers, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1013.)  
The federal Constitution does not require intercase 
proportionality review (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 955; 
Rhoades, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 455–456), or “ ‘disparate 
sentence review’ ”  (Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 157). 
The laws providing different procedures for capital and 
noncapital defendants do not violate equal protection.  (Fayed, 
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 214; Rhoades, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 456.)      
California’s capital sentencing scheme does not violate the 
Eighth Amendment.  (People v. Beck and Cruz, supra, 8 Cal.5th 
at p. 670; Molano, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 679.) 
“ ‘The death penalty as applied in this state is not 
rendered unconstitutional through operation of international 
law and treaties,’ ” including the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man, and the International Convention 
Against All Forms of Racial Discrimination.  (People v. Jackson 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 373; accord, Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at 
pp. 189–190; People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1130.)  
As we have explained, “Although the United States is a 
signatory [to the ICCPR], it signed the treaty on the express 
condition ‘[t]hat the United States reserves the right, subject to 
its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
234 
 
any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under 
existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital 
punishment . . . .’ ”  (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 403–
404.)  We have repeatedly rejected reliance on statistical studies 
purporting to show racial disparities in various aspects of the 
capital system to demonstrate that capital punishment itself 
violates international law and norms.  (Suarez, at pp. 189–190, 
and cases cited.)   
D. Refusal To Dismiss Counts 10 and 11 in the Interest of 
Justice 
Defendant 
was 
charged 
with 
possession 
of 
methamphetamine while armed with a firearm (Health & Saf. 
Code, § 11370.1, subd (a); count 10) and possession of a loaded, 
operable 
firearm 
while 
under 
the 
influence 
of 
methamphetamine (id., § 11550, subd. (e)(1); count 11).  At 
defendant’s request, counts 10 and 11 were bifurcated.  After the 
penalty phase concluded, another jury was convened to try these 
counts.  It found the defendant guilty of count 10 and not guilty 
of count 11.  
Defendant argues that the court erred in denying his 
motion to dismiss these counts in the interest of justice after the 
jury returned a death verdict.  (§ 1385).  The court’s ruling is 
subject to review for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Superior 
Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 530 (Romero).)   
Defendant’s motion was based on “judicial economy.”  He 
argued that “[t]here is simply no justification for another trial 
where there is no benefit to the court, public interest or 
prosecution.  The cost of another Ramirez trial is prohibitive and 
would constitute undue consumption of scarce judicial resources 
and an unjustifiable and unacceptable expenditures of taxpayer 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
235 
 
monies.”  The People countered that a trial would take at most 
two days, and that the People had an interest in obtaining 
verdicts on these counts as potential aggravating factors under 
section 190.3, factor (c) (prior felony convictions) in the event of 
a retrial of the penalty phase.  The trial court found that the 
trial of counts 10 and 11 would not be unduly time consuming 
and denied the motion.   
No abuse of discretion appears.  As we explained in 
Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497:  “ ‘the language of [section 1385], 
‘in furtherance of justice,’ requires consideration both of the 
constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of society 
represented by the People, in determining whether there should 
be a dismissal.  [Citations.]”  [Citations.]  At the very least, the 
reason for dismissal must be “that which would motivate a 
reasonable judge.”  [Citations.]’  [Citation.]  ‘Courts have 
recognized that society, represented by the People, has a 
legitimate interest in “the fair prosecution of crimes properly 
alleged.”  [Citation.]  “ ‘[A] dismissal which arbitrarily cuts [off] 
those rights without a showing of detriment to the defendant is 
an abuse of discretion.’ ” ’ ”  (Id. at pp. 530–531.) 
“From these general principles it follows that a court 
abuses its discretion if it dismisses a case, or strikes a 
sentencing 
allegation, 
solely 
‘to 
accommodate 
judicial 
convenience or because of court congestion.’ ”  (Romero, supra, 13 
Cal.4th at p. 531, italics added; accord, People v. Clancey (2013) 
56 Cal.4th 562, 581; People v. Hernandez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 512, 
525; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 159.)  Here, the 
only reason defendant proffered to dismiss the charges was to 
avoid burdening judicial resources.  That consideration was 
inappropriate and the trial court properly rejected it. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
236 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgment.           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
S099844 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Groban 
 
After arguing in two separate trials over a span of three 
years that defendant Juan Villa Ramirez did not shoot Javier 
Ibarra and that his co-perpetrator, Gabriel Flores, did, the 
prosecution changed its theory.  During the penalty phase of 
Ramirez’s death trial in this case, the prosecution contended the 
evidence showed that Ramirez personally shot Ibarra and 
pointed to this previous killing as evidence of Ramirez’s 
dangerousness and lack of capacity for rehabilitation.  I agree 
with the majority that the evidence before us in this direct 
appeal does not demonstrate the prosecution changed its theory 
in bad faith.  I also agree that Ramirez’s contentions are better 
addressed on habeas corpus, where he can seek the opportunity 
to discover and present additional evidence of the prosecution’s 
intent.  I write to emphasize that the prosecution’s turnabout 
warrants additional scrutiny.   
I. 
At the penalty phase of Ramirez’s trial, the prosecutor 
introduced evidence that Ramirez was involved in the murder of 
Ibarra, with which he had not been charged.  As the majority 
notes, Ramirez’s brother Cipriano and another co-perpetrator, 
Flores, had been charged with and convicted of the Ibarra 
murder in two separate trials, each of which concluded before 
Ramirez’s trial began.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 191.)  At the close 
of Flores’s trial, the prosecution argued that Flores shot Ibarra 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Groban, J., concurring 
2 
and that the defense’s theory that Ramirez was the shooter was 
unsupported.  (Id. at p. 193.)  At the close of Cipriano’s trial, the 
prosecution argued that Flores shot Ibarra and characterized 
Cipriano’s testimony that Ramirez was the shooter as fabricated 
and self-serving, accusing him of falsely pinning Ibarra’s killing 
on Ramirez, who at the time had “not been arrested or located.”  
(Id. at p. 194; see id. at p. 193.) 
Approximately three years later, during the closing 
arguments in the penalty phase of this case, the prosecution 
offered a different theory of who shot Ibarra.  In urging the jury 
to sentence Ramirez to death, the prosecutor argued:  “[T]he 
evidence points strongly to the fact that [Ramirez] was the 
shooter” of Ibarra.  The prosecutor urged the jury to “give 
extreme weight” to this fact.  He argued the evidence showed the 
Ibarra murder was prearranged and Ramirez was not 
intoxicated when he committed it, as he claimed to have been at 
the time of the murder of Chad Yarborough, the victim in this 
case.  He also argued that the Ibarra killing was intentional, and 
on this basis urged the jury to infer that Ramirez’s killing of 
Yarborough likewise “wasn’t some random chance thing.  It was 
[Ramirez] purposefully choosing to kill Chad just like he chose 
to kill Javier Ibarra, and not on accident.”  The prosecutor 
further pointed to Ramirez’s killing of Ibarra as evidence of 
Ramirez’s dangerousness and lack of capacity for rehabilitation, 
despite his young age at the time of the Yarborough murder.  
The prosecution observed that Ramirez had “done so much evil 
in such a short time,” and asked the jury:  “[D]o we really want 
to see how much he can do given more time?”  The record does 
not disclose why the prosecution changed its theory. 
 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Groban, J., concurring 
3 
II. 
 
Our leading case on inconsistent prosecutorial theories is 
In re Sakarias (2005) 35 Cal.4th 140 (Sakarias II).  As the 
majority explains, in Sakarias II we held, on habeas corpus, that 
the prosecutor violated the due process rights of a capital 
defendant by “intentionally and without good faith justification 
arguing inconsistent and irreconcilable factual theories” in his 
trial and that of his co-perpetrator and attributing to each 
defendant “culpable acts that could have been committed by 
only one person.”  (Id. at p. 145.)  We reasoned that “the People’s 
use of irreconcilable theories of guilt or culpability, unjustified 
by a good faith justification for the inconsistency, is 
fundamentally unfair, for it necessarily creates the potential 
for — and, where prejudicial, actually achieves — a false 
conviction or increased punishment on a false factual basis for 
one of the accuseds.”  (Id. at pp. 159–160.)  We further observed 
that in the death penalty context, “[t]he prejudice question is . . . 
a complex one, involving two questions as to each petitioner and 
each culpability-increasing act inconsistently attributed to 
petitioners: for each petitioner we must ask, first, whether the 
People’s attribution of the act to the petitioner is, according to 
all the available evidence, probably false or probably true, and, 
second, whether any probably false attribution of a culpability-
increasing act to the petitioner could reasonably have affected 
the penalty verdict.”  (Id. at p. 164.)  Because we could not 
“conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutorial 
argument . . . played no role in the penalty decision,” we 
reversed Sakarias’s penalty.  (Id. at p. 166.)   
Our decision in Sakarias II was issued in response to 
Sakarias’s habeas corpus petition.  Previously, on direct appeal, 
Sakarias had claimed that the prosecution’s inconsistent 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Groban, J., concurring 
4 
arguments about which co-perpetrator struck the fatal blow 
violated due process protections.  (People v. Sakarias (2000) 
22 Cal.4th 596, 632–637 (Sakarias I).)  We had observed at that 
time that “under any view of the proper constitutional limits, 
the [due process] issue is better decided on a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus than on direct appeal.”  (Id. at p. 635.)  In the 
record on direct appeal, there was no evidence of “any factual 
explanations the trial prosecutor may have for any material 
inconsistencies we might find by comparing the transcripts of 
the two trials” or “of other extra-record evidence of the 
prosecutor’s state of mind.”  (Ibid.)  The record did not disclose 
whether the prosecutor “made a knowingly false argument,” 
(ibid.) or whether “significant new evidence surfaced . . . or 
other events occurred such that the prosecutor, at the time of 
defendant’s trial, neither knew nor had reason to know his 
argument was false” (id. at p. 636).  We determined that “the 
questions of which of two conflicting factual theories is true, or 
which the prosecutor believed or should have believed was true” 
were better litigated “in a habeas corpus proceeding.”  (Ibid.) 
As the majority notes, when the Sakarias case returned to 
us on habeas corpus, we appointed a referee to hear evidence 
and make factual findings concerning the prosecutor’s 
knowledge, beliefs, and intent in choosing to advance 
inconsistent theories of who struck the fatal blow in the separate 
trials of Sakarias and his co-perpetrator and in choosing the 
evidence to present in each case.  (Sakarias II, supra, 35 Cal.4th 
at p. 150.)  The referee heard testimony from the prosecutor and 
from the former head of the branch of the district attorney’s 
office in which the prosecutor had worked and admitted and 
reviewed evidence and transcripts from the two trials.  (Ibid.)  
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Groban, J., concurring 
5 
Our decision to reverse Sakarias’s death sentence was based on 
the referee’s findings.  (Id. at pp. 149–150, 160–165.) 
III. 
This case is in a similar posture to Sakarias I.  Like 
Sakarias I, this is a direct appeal and we do not have before us 
factual findings about the prosecutor’s knowledge, belief, and 
intent in deciding to argue for the first time at the penalty phase 
in this case that Ramirez, not Flores, shot Ibarra.  In short, we 
really do not know why the prosecution changed its theory.  As 
the majority observes, Ramirez is free to pursue a writ of habeas 
corpus to try to demonstrate the prosecutor acted in bad faith to 
Ramirez’s prejudice.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 207.) 
The majority also correctly reasons that, at least in its 
current posture, this case is distinguishable from Sakarias II.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 201–206.)  Despite the prosecution’s 
arguments in the Flores and Cipriano cases that Flores was the 
shooter, neither verdict rested on a finding that Flores was the 
shooter.  Indeed, the jury’s “not true” finding on the 
prosecution’s allegation that Flores personally used a firearm 
suggests the jury did not consider it true beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Flores shot Ibarra.  Moreover, because the record 
before us does not clearly show whether Flores or Ramirez was 
the shooter, we cannot determine whether Ramirez was 
“necessarily . . . sentenced . . . on a false factual basis.”  
(Sakarias II, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 164.)1  Finally, as the 
 
1 In Sakarias II, we observed that the level of certainty as to 
whether the defendant was convicted on a false factual basis 
might be relevant to the prejudice inquiry on habeas corpus, but 
we expressly reserved for another day the question “what result 
 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Groban, J., concurring 
6 
majority observes, there is no indication on the record before us 
that the prosecutor manipulated the evidence in Ramirez’s trial 
for the purpose of securing a judgment of death.  (See id. at 
p. 162 [citing to deliberate manipulation of evidence to pursue 
inconsistent theories as evidence of bad faith].)  As the majority 
points out, the record supports an inference that the prosecutor 
introduced evidence that Ramirez shot Ibarra to counter defense 
evidence that the shooter was Flores.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 206.) 
For purposes of this direct appeal, this is sufficient to deny 
relief.  But it does not fully answer the question why, in the 
space of less than three years, this same District Attorney’s 
office went from arguing that Ramirez’s co-perpetrators’ 
contentions that Ramirez shot Ibarra were unsupported and 
self-serving to arguing that the evidence showed Ramirez was 
the shooter.  As we observed in Sakarias II, “A criminal 
prosecutor’s function ‘is not merely to prosecute crimes, but also 
to make certain that the truth is honored to the fullest extent 
possible during the course of the criminal prosecution and 
trial.’ ”  (Sakarias II, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 159.)  When the 
government, through its prosecutors, takes “a formal position 
inconsistent with the guilt or culpability of at least one convicted 
defendant” it “cast[s] doubt on the factual basis for the 
conviction.”  (Id. at p. 158.)  Unless the prosecution has a good 
faith basis for its change in theories, we risk “ ‘reduc[ing] 
criminal trials to mere gamesmanship and rob[bing] them of 
 
obtains when the likely truth of the prosecutor’s inconsistent 
theories cannot be determined.”  (Sakarias II, supra, 35 Cal.4th 
at p. 164.)   
 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Groban, J., concurring 
7 
their supposed purpose of a search for truth.’ ”  (Id. at p. 159; cf. 
Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3.3(a) [attorneys have duty of candor 
toward tribunal]; id. rule 3.8, com. [1] [“A prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an 
advocate”].)  
The prosecution’s use of inconsistent theories in the 
separate trials of alleged co-perpetrators raises particular 
concerns in the capital context.  At the penalty phase of a capital 
trial, the jury has the “power and discretion . . . to decide the 
appropriate penalty for the particular offense and offender 
under all the relevant circumstances.”  (People v. Rodriguez 
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 779; see Pen. Code, § 190.3.)  The jury’s 
decision whether to sentence a person to death or to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole “is inherently moral and 
normative, not factual.”  (Rodriguez, at p. 779.)  “It is not simply 
a finding of facts which resolves the penalty decision, ‘ “but . . . 
the jury’s moral assessment of those facts as they reflect on 
whether defendant should be put to death . . . .” ’ ” (People v. 
Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 540.)  In Bradshaw v. Stumpf 
(2005) 545 U.S. 175 the high court acknowledged that a 
prosecutor’s use of inconsistent theories “may have a more direct 
effect” on a death sentence than it does on a guilty verdict.  (Id. 
at p. 187.)  Having reversed the grant of relief as to the 
defendant’s guilt due to lack of prejudice, the high court 
remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the 
prosecutor’s use of inconsistent theories was prejudicial with 
respect to sentencing.  (Id. at pp. 186–187.)  As Justice Souter 
pointed out in his concurring opinion, the court’s decision to 
remand on penalty reflected an acknowledgement of “ ‘[t]he 
heightened need for reliability in capital cases,’ ” which “ ‘only 
underscores the gravity’ ” of  the “ ‘serious questions . . . raised 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Groban, J., concurring 
8 
when the sovereign itself takes inconsistent positions in two 
separate criminal proceedings against two of its citizens.’ ”  (Id. 
at p. 189 (conc. opn. of Souter, J.).)  We similarly have 
acknowledged that “[a]t least where the punishment involved is 
death, due process is . . . offended by the People’s inconsistent 
and irreconcilable attribution of culpability-increasing acts” to 
different defendants.  (Sakarias II, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 160.)   
Relying on these principles, Ramirez argues that the 
reduced culpability of a person who is not the actual shooter 
could have been material to the jury’s choice of sentence in his 
case.  I agree.  A capital jury may well conclude that someone 
who personally killed before deserves greater punishment than 
someone who had aided and abetted a killing.  In this case the 
prosecutor pointed to Ramirez’s personal shooting of Ibarra to 
dispel any lingering doubt about whether Ramirez intentionally 
shot Yarborough and as evidence of his dangerousness and lack 
of capacity for rehabilitation, despite his drug problems and his 
young age.  (See Pen. Code, § 190.3, subds. (a), (k), (i).)  The 
prosecutor urged the jury to “give extreme weight” to the fact 
that Ramirez had killed before.  He emphasized Ramirez 
“personally chose to kill Chad, just like he chose to kill Javier 
Ibarra” and pointed to Ramirez’s killing of Ibarra as evidence of 
his propensity to “evil.”   
In sum, I agree with the majority that the record in this 
case does not show the prosecution acted in bad faith when it 
changed its theory and argued for the first time at the penalty 
phase of Ramirez’s trial that Ramirez personally shot Ibarra.  
On this record, we simply do not know why the prosecution 
changed its theory.  The fact that the Flores jury did not find 
true beyond a reasonable doubt that Flores personally used a 
firearm helps explain why the prosecution would want to try a 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Groban, J., concurring 
9 
different theory at Ramirez’s trial.  Similarly, the fact that the 
defense in the penalty trial first argued to the jury that Ramirez 
was not the shooter helps explain why the prosecution may have 
wanted to rebut that theory.  Though these facts help explain 
why the prosecution may have switched theories, they do not 
fully resolve “the questions of which of two conflicting factual 
theories is true, or which the prosecutor believed or should have 
believed was true.”  (Sakarias I, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 636.)  We 
simply need more information to determine whether the 
prosecutor acted “without good faith justification” in changing 
its theory to argue that Ramirez shot Ibarra.  (Sakarias II, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 145.)   
There is nothing in this record that demonstrates the 
prosecution acted in bad faith.  But when the same district 
attorney’s office has argued in two trials that one co-perpetrator 
personally killed a murder victim and then argues three years 
later that a different co-perpetrator personally killed the victim, 
scrutiny is warranted.  In Sakarias II, the referee made factual 
findings after a comprehensive hearing that included sworn 
testimony from the prosecutor and from the former head of the 
district branch.  We have no such record here.  But the question 
whether the prosecution had a good faith basis for arguing 
irreconcilable theories of who shot Ibarra deserves an answer.  
Our decision on direct appeal in Sakarias I makes clear that a 
habeas corpus petition is the appropriate way to seek that 
answer.  (Sakarias I, at p. 635.) 
 
 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Groban, J., concurring 
10 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
I Concur: 
LIU, J. 
  
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Ramirez 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S099844 
Date Filed:  August 25, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Kern 
Judge:  Kenneth C. Twisselman II 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Snedeker, Smith & Short, Lisa R. Short and Michael R. Snedeker for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant 
Attorney General, Sean M. McCoy and Leanne Le Mon, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Michael R. Snedeker 
Snedeker, Smith & Short 
2800 North Lombard Street, PMB 710 
Portland, OR 97217-6234 
(503) 234-3584 
 
Sean M. McCoy 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 210-7752