Title: Witham Family Ltd. P'ship v. Town of Bar Harbor

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2011 ME 104 
Docket: 
Han-11-67 
Argued: 
September 15, 2011 
Decided: 
November 1, 2011 
  
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, 
JJ. 
 
 
WITHAM FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
 
v.  
 
TOWN OF BAR HARBOR et al. 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
 
[¶1]  The Witham Family Limited Partnership (the Partnership) appeals from 
a judgment of the Superior Court (Hancock County, Cuddy, J.) dismissing its 
complaint against the Town of Bar Harbor and North South Corporation.  In its 
complaint, filed pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B, the Partnership challenged two 
decisions of the Town’s Zoning Board of Appeals in connection with North 
South’s application to construct a hotel.  The Partnership contends that the court 
erred in dismissing its Rule 80B complaint for lack of standing.  We agree and 
vacate the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  In 2009, North South applied to the Bar Harbor Planning Board for a 
permit to construct a hotel on property abutting Partnership land.  Attorney 
 
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Edmond Bearor, on behalf of the Partnership, opposed the application during 
public hearings before the Planning Board.  In March of 2010, the Planning Board 
denied North South’s application on the single ground that it exceeded applicable 
ordinance height limitations; the Planning Board found that the proposed hotel 
complied with ordinance requirements in all other respects.  See Bar Harbor, Me., 
Land Use Code § 125-21.G (May 2, 2005).    
A. 
North South’s Appeal 
[¶3]  North South appealed the Planning Board’s denial to the Bar Harbor 
Board of Appeals.1  See Bar Harbor, Me., Land Use Code § 125-103 (Nov. 7, 
2006).  The Board of Appeals conducted two public hearings on North South’s 
appeal in April of 2010; Bearor attended both hearings.  The Board of Appeals 
invited Bearor to “participate as an appellee,” noting that Bearor had “participated 
thoroughly before the planning board as an opponent to this project.”  Bearor 
declined by noting that he felt he “would be able to participate adequately as a 
member of the public”; Bearor made a five-minute statement along with other 
members of the public, but never explicitly stated that he was there on behalf of the 
Partnership.  
                                               
 
1  The Board of Appeals conducts an appellate review of a Planning Board decision.  Bar Harbor, Me., 
Land Use Code § 125-103(D)(1)(a) (Nov. 7, 2006).   
 
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[¶4]  By decision dated April 22, 2010, the Board of Appeals concluded that 
the Planning Board misinterpreted the ordinance provision relating to height 
requirements, reversed the Planning Board’s denial, and remanded the matter to the 
Planning Board with instructions to issue North South’s requested permit; the 
Planning Board issued the permit on May 19, 2010. 
B. 
Partnership’s Appeal 
[¶5]  Between the first and second hearings on North South’s appeal, the 
Partnership, through Bearor, filed its own appeal challenging that portion of the 
Planning Board’s decision finding that North South’s proposed project did 
conform to other criteria for obtaining a permit, namely the parking and street 
width requirements.  The Board of Appeals precluded the Partnership from 
discussing the height issue in its appeal because that issue had been fully 
considered in the context of North South’s appeal.  The Board of Appeals affirmed 
the Planning Board’s decision with regard to the Partnership’s appeal.   
C. 
Rule 80B Appeal 
[¶6]  The Partnership then filed a Rule 80B complaint in the Superior Court 
challenging the Board of Appeals’s decisions in both North South’s appeal and in 
the Partnership’s appeal.  On North South’s motion, the court dismissed the 
complaint on the ground that the Partnership lacked standing to seek Rule 80B 
review of either Board of Appeals decision.  The Partnership timely appeals. 
 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶7]  Standing to pursue a Rule 80B appeal from a board of appeals decision 
is governed by 30-A M.R.S. § 2691(3)(G) (2010): “Any party may take an appeal, 
within 45 days of the date of the vote on the original decision, to Superior Court 
from any order, relief or denial in accordance with the Maine Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 80B.”  See Norris Family Assocs., LLC v. Town of Phippsburg, 
2005 ME 102, ¶ 9, 879 A.2d 1007.  A “party” within the meaning of section 
2691(3)(G) is defined as one who (1) has “appeared before the board of appeals,” 
and (2) is “able to demonstrate a particularized injury as a result of the board’s 
action.”  Sahl v. Town of York, 2000 ME 180, ¶ 8, 760 A.2d 266 (quotation marks 
omitted).  A party’s standing to pursue a Rule 80B appeal is a matter of law we 
review de novo.  Friends of Lincoln Lakes v. Town of Lincoln, 2010 ME 78, ¶ 8, 2 
A.3d 284. 
A. 
North South’s Appeal 
[¶8]  The court determined that the Partnership’s failure to oppose North 
South’s appeal as party/appellee, and notwithstanding the Partnership’s opposition 
as a member of the public, stripped the Partnership of standing to seek Rule 80B 
review.  We disagree.   
[¶9]  We have interpreted “party” within the meaning of section 2691 to 
include anyone who meets the two-part test of appearance and particularized 
 
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injury.  Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Town of Otis, 1998 ME 214, ¶ 7, 716 A.2d 1023.  
We have also expressly distinguished a “party” with standing to appeal a municipal 
decision from a “party” pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure.  Pride’s Corner 
Concerned Citizens Ass’n v. Westbrook Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 398 A.2d 415, 417 
(Me. 1979); see also Consumers for Affordable Health Care, Inc. v. Superintendent 
of Ins., 2002 ME 158, ¶¶ 16-17, 809 A.2d 1233; Superintendent of Ins. v. Att’y 
Gen., 558 A.2d 1197, 1200-01 (Me. 1989).  In short, we have “refused to define 
party in the 80B settings as a legal term of art, as the term is used in [the rules of 
procedure] because proceedings before a Board of Appeals are far less formal than 
a judiciary proceeding.”  Norris Family Assocs., 2005 ME 102, ¶ 16, 879 A.2d 
1007 (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  “To superimpose a formal 
structure of appearance, withdrawal and substitution of parties upon an otherwise 
open proceeding seems purposeless and unrealistic” as well as contrary to 
legislative intent.  Pride’s Corner Concerned Citizens, 398 A.2d at 417-18. 
[¶10]  The only disputed issue with regard to North South’s appeal is 
therefore whether the Partnership “appeared” before the Board of Appeals as 
section 2691 contemplates.2  “Appearance,” for Rule 80B standing purposes, has 
                                               
 
2  North South does not dispute the Partnership’s particularized injury as an abutter in the context of 
North South’s appeal to the Board of Appeals; the Partnership raised issues regarding traffic and parking 
before the Board of Appeals.  See Singal v. City of Bangor, 440 A.2d 1048, 1051 (Me. 1982) (discussing 
particularized injury in the form of “traffic congestion, noise, danger of fire and depreciation of 
surrounding property values”).  
 
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been expansively interpreted to refer to any “participation”—formal or informal, 
whether personally or through an attorney3—in the municipal proceedings by, for 
example, “voic[ing] . . . concerns for traffic, noise and aesthetics,” or “express[ing] 
opposition” at a municipal hearing; no formal appearance is necessary.4  Friends of 
Lincoln Lakes, 2010 ME 78, ¶ 12, 2 A.3d 284; Rowe v. City of S. Portland, 
1999 ME 81, ¶¶ 3-4, 730 A.2d 673; Norris Family Assocs., 2005 ME 102, ¶ 16, 
879 A.2d 1007; Wells v. Portland Yacht Club, 2001 ME 20, ¶ 4, 771 A.2d 371; 
Cushing v. Smith, 457 A.2d 816, 822 n.9 (Me. 1983); Harrington v. Inhabitants of 
Town of Kennebunk, 459 A.2d 557, 560 (Me. 1983).  Cf. Jaeger v. Sheehy, 
551 A.2d 841, 842 (Me. 1988) (holding that “prehearing conversations with a 
member of the board” are insufficient for purposes of standing). 
[¶11]  North South concedes that Bearor represented the Partnership during 
the Planning Board proceedings, but argues that Bearor’s failure to specifically 
announce before the Board of Appeals that he was speaking on behalf of the 
Partnership, as opposed to for himself personally, combined with the fact that no 
one else purported to speak on behalf of the Partnership, establishes that the 
Partnership failed to participate in any manner before the Board of Appeals.   
                                               
 
3 North South’s additional contention—that Bearor’s appearance as both a member of the public and 
on behalf of the Partnership is barred by judicial estoppel—is not persuasive. 
 
4  Participation before the Board of Appeals may be unnecessary when a person is deemed an 
“essential party” pursuant to an applicable statute.  See Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Town of Otis, 1998 ME 
214, ¶ 8, 716 A.2d 1023.   
 
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[¶12]  We considered a similar question in Norris Family Associates, in 
which an attorney representing an abutting landowner stated during the Board of 
Appeals hearings that he represented “the Norrises.”  2005 ME 102, ¶ 3, 879 A.2d 
1007.  The Norris property was, in fact, owned by several individuals, including 
one Philip Jermain.  Id. ¶ 2.  Later, the developer claimed Jermain lacked standing 
to seek Rule 80B relief because the attorney did not purport to represent Jermain 
during the proceedings and Jermain himself did not appear.  Id. ¶ 6.  We disagreed, 
stating that, “[a]lthough the parties’ participation would have been more certain 
had [the attorney] specifically stated that he was appearing on behalf of all of the 
owners of the Norris lot, it can fairly be inferred that he appeared on behalf of all 
of the owners.”  Id. ¶ 17. 
[¶13]  That Bearor attended and spoke in opposition during the Board of 
Appeals hearings on behalf of the Partnership may be also inferred from the 
record: Bearor had been representing the Partnership through an entire year of 
Planning Board proceedings; at the hearing before the Board of Appeals, he was 
asked if he wanted to be given party status based on that very participation before 
the Planning Board; and North South’s counsel stated during the Board of Appeals 
hearings that she was “more than happy to have Attorney Bearor join [her] at the 
table if he feels it’s prudent to do so and if he wishes to do so.”   North South’s 
reliance on the portion of the ordinance that states, “At any hearing a party may be 
 
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represented by an agent or attorney . . . ” is unfounded; that provision does not 
require an attorney to formally announce his representation at any particular time 
or with any particular language.  Bar Harbor, Me., Land Use Code 
§ 125-103(D)(1)(h) (Nov. 7, 2006).  Because the Partnership both appeared before 
the Board of Appeals and will suffer a particularized injury by the Board of 
Appeals’s decision, we conclude that the Partnership has standing to challenge the 
Board of Appeals’s decision in North South’s appeal pursuant to section 2691. 
B. 
Partnership’s Appeal 
[¶14]  The court also determined that the Partnership’s appeal challenged 
only the reasoning of the Planning Board’s decision rather than its ultimate 
conclusion to deny the permit, and that such dissatisfaction with the reasoning of 
the Planning Board’s decision does not constitute the particularized injury 
necessary for standing to seek Rule 80B review of that decision.5 
 
[¶15]  “[P]articularized injury occurs when a judgment or order adversely 
and directly affects a party’s property, pecuniary, or personal rights.”  Friends of 
Lincoln Lakes, 2010 ME 78, ¶ 14, 2 A.3d 284 (quotation marks omitted).  When 
the appealing party is an abutting landowner, the requirements to establish this 
element of aggrievement are “minimal”; an abutter need only assert a “reasonable 
allegation of a potential for particularized injury . . . to establish the real 
                                               
 
5  There is no dispute that the Partnership “appeared” before the Board of Appeals in its own appeal. 
 
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controversy required for adjudication in a court.”  Sahl, 2000 ME 180, ¶ 8, 
760 A.2d 266 (quotation marks omitted); see Fryeburg Water Co. v. Town 
of  Fryeburg, 2006 ME 31, ¶ 12, 893 A.2d 618 (requiring an abutter to show only 
“a relatively minor adverse consequence” (quotation marks omitted)).   
[¶16]  As the Superior Court noted, the general rule is that “a party is not 
aggrieved by a judgment granting the relief requested in his pleadings.”  Sevigny v. 
Home Builders Ass’n of Me., Inc., 429 A.2d 197, 201 (Me. 1981).  There is an 
exception, however, when “an essential finding on which the judgment is based 
might otherwise prejudice the party through the use of collateral estoppel in the 
future proceeding.”  Great Cove Boat Club v. Bureau of Pub. Lands, 672 A.2d 91, 
92 n.1 (Me. 1996) (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  In Great Cove, 
for example, the trial court’s finding of a constructive easement would bind the 
parties in future litigation.  Id.  In Sevigny, a party challenged a judgment that, 
although facially in its favor, foreclosed it from litigating whether or not a 
particular contract was formed.  429 A.2d at 201-02.  In Boston & Maine 
Corporation v. State Tax Assessor, we considered the Tax Assessor’s appeal in 
which a summary judgment ostensibly had been issued in the Tax Assessor’s favor 
because the language of the judgment affected the manner of calculating a tax 
credit in all future matters.  2005 ME 114, ¶ 7 & n.3, 884 A.2d 1165.   
 
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[¶17]  Just as in Sevigny, Great Cove, and Boston & Maine, continuing 
adverse collateral consequences to the Partnership would result from its failure to 
challenge the basis of the Planning Board’s denial of North South’s permit.6  
Although the Planning Board did initially deny North South’s application, had 
North South’s subsequent appeal to the Board of Appeals been successful and had 
the Planning Board been ordered to issue the requested permit, collateral estoppel 
would have barred the Partnership from challenging the bases on which the permit 
was granted.  This series of events was, in fact, precisely what happened in North 
South’s appeal; by the time the Partnership’s appeal was considered, the Board of 
Appeals had already ordered the Planning Board to issue North South’s requested 
permit.   
[¶18]  Our decision in Brooks v. Town of North Berwick, 1998 ME 146, 
712 A.2d 1050, is distinguishable.  In Brooks, the Board of Appeals vacated a 
decision of the local code enforcement officer (CEO) on the ground that the CEO 
acted without authority.  1998 ME 146, ¶ 10, 712 A.2d 1050.  Brooks had argued 
that the decision should be vacated on the alternative ground that the property in 
question was not grandfathered.  Id.  We held that dissatisfaction with the Planning 
Board’s rationale was not a sufficient “particularized injury” to confer standing for 
                                               
 
6  North South’s contention that the Partnership could, and should, have raised any bases to challenge 
the Planning Board’s decision in the context of North South’s appeal is belied by the Board of Appeals’s 
own decision.  It noted that it would consider only those bases on which the Planning Board had denied 
the requested permit. 
 
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appellate review.  Id.  In Brooks, however, there was no lasting impact on the 
appellant from the rationale of the Planning Board; the invalidation of the CEO’s 
decision left no further possibility for litigation given that the unsuccessful party 
had not appealed.  Here, in contrast, North South’s pending—and ultimately 
successful—appeal created a continuing opportunity for injury to the Partnership, 
which is all that is necessary to confer standing.  
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded to the Superior 
Court for further proceedings. 
_______________________________ 
 
On the briefs: 
 
John C. Bannon, Esq., and John B. Shumadine, Esq., Murray, 
Plumb & Murray, Portland, for appellant The Witham Family 
Limited Partnership 
 
William B. Devoe, Esq., P. Andrew Hamilton, Esq., and 
Jonathan A. Pottle, Esq., Eaton Peabody, Bangor, for appellee 
North-South Corp.  
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
John C. Bannon, Esq., for appellant Witham Family Limited 
Partnership 
 
 
William B. Devoe, Esq., for appellee North-South Corp.  
 
 
Hancock County Superior Court docket no. AP-2010-007 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY