Title: In the Matter of James A. Breslin, Jr., An Attorney at Law.

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). STEIN, J., writing for a majority of the Court. This is an attorney disciplinary matter. Respondent, James A. Breslin, Jr., of Lyndhurst, was admitted to the bar in New Jersey in 1968. He served as a judge of the Lyndhurst Municipal Court from 1978 until January 14, 2002, when he tendered, and the Supreme Court accepted, his resignation from that office. That resignation followed a Presentment filed by the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC) recommending that the Supreme Court institute proceedings to remove respondent from his judicial office. Pursuant to that Presentment, the Supreme Court convened a three-judge panel, which ultimately recommended respondent's removal from office. The ACJC's findings and the Panel's findings had been based on respondent's treatment of a bribe attempt. Although different factual versions of the attempt were offered by various witnesses, the record indicated essentially that sometime in mid to late October 1996, respondent's former client, Joseph Ciardella of Toms River, visited respondent at his Lyndhurst office and delivered to him a manilla envelope. According to respondent, Ciardella told him that the envelope contained his son's resume and/or application to the Police Department, which he asked respondent to give to the Lyndhurst Police Commissioner, Paul Haggerty. On ultimate inspection of the envelope, which according to respondent occurred several days later, respondent discovered not only the resume but also two bank envelopes together containing $10,000. The timing and nature of respondent's actions thereafter also formed the basis of the various charges filed against him. Specifically, on discovery of the envelopes, which respondent believed contained money, respondent did not immediately communicate with any law enforcement authorities. Rather, when he next met Haggerty, whom he saw on a regular and frequent basis, he posed to him a hypothetical question, essentially asking what he would do if someone gave him money and asked for a favor. Respondent did not at that time become any more specific and did not identify Ciardella as the person seeking the favor. According to respondent, Haggerty reacted angrily to the suggestion and told respondent that he did not wish to discuss it any further. Respondent dropped the subject, not wishing to involve Haggerty any further. Shortly thereafter, when respondent next spoke or met with Haggerty, the conversation was resumed, this time respondent disclosing some details to Haggerty about the identity of the client and the contents of the envelope. During the course of the conversation, it was decided that the bribe attempt should be communicated to the acting police chief, James Tobin, who had been temporarily assigned to that position by the Attorney General, there having been a dispute between Haggerty and the outgoing police chief as to whom should be appointed to the position on a permanent basis. Although the timing is in dispute, the matter ultimately was reported by Haggerty to Tobin, who in turn informed the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office. Ultimately, the matter was investigated by the Prosecutor's office with respondent's cooperation and Ciardella was convicted of the third degree offense of gift to a public official, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:27-6b. As noted, this matter was originated as a Presentment filed by the ACJC recommending that the Supreme Court institute proceeding to remove respondent from his judicial office. The ACJC's recommendation was based on its finding that respondent had failed to report a bribe attempt to law enforcement authorities, in violation of Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The ACJC further found that respondent's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice, contrary to Rule 2:15-8. Pursuant to the ACJC's Presentment, the Supreme Court convened a three-judge panel that conducted two days of evidentiary hearings, and also received in evidence essentially the same exhibits that had been offered in the ACJC proceeding. The Panel found beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent's failure to promptly report the bribe attempt to law enforcement officials violated Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct as well as Rule 2:15-8(a)(6) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute). The Panel made additional findings that the manner in which respondent reported the bribe attempt to Paul Hagerty, his close personal friend of thirty years and the Lyndhurst Police Commissioner, also violated those same Canons. The Panel recommended respondent's removal from office. Respondent subsequently tendered his resignation, which the Court accepted by Order dated January 14, 2002. Based on the Supreme Court's Order, the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) filed with the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB), a motion for reciprocal discipline pursuant to Rule 1:20-14, seeking respondent's disbarment on the basis of alleged violations of various Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs), including RPC 1.2 (d) (counseling or assisting a client in conduct the lawyer knows is illegal, criminal, or fraudulent...); RPC 4.1 (a)(2) (knowingly failing to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client); and RPC 8.4(c),(d), and (e) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and stating or implying an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official). Those alleged violations had not been the subject of either the ACJC's or the three-judge Panel's determinations. A majority of the DRB concluded that respondent's conduct violated RPC 8.4(c) and (d), but did not specify that aspect of his conduct on which it relied to establish those violations. Four members of the DRB recommended that respondent be disbarred for his violations of RPC 8.4(c) and (d). Three members recommended that he be suspended for three years, and one dissenting member did not believe that the record clearly and convincingly established violations of RPC 8.4(c) and (d). Rather, that member believed that the record established only that respondent violated RPC 1.2(c) by failing to advise his client on the limitations on his conduct for which he believed respondent should reprimanded. The matter is before the Supreme Court pursuant to R. 1:20-16(a). HELD: The record in this attorney disciplinary case does not clearly and convincingly establish that James A. Breslin, Jr. participated in a bribery scheme, and thus the Disciplinary Review Board's recommendation that he be disbarred for his violations of RPC 8.4(c) and (d) based on that alleged participation must be rejected; Breslin's conduct however violated RPC 1.2(e), for which he is censured. 1. Notwithstanding that the Rules of Court provide for reciprocal discipline of attorneys based on judicial discipline and state that the judicial discipline proceedings shall be conclusive on the conduct on which the discipline was based in any subsequent disciplinary proceeding, fairness to respondent compels the Court to focus on the evidence in the record, and not on the findings of the three-judge panel, as those findings were based on violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and not on the RPC violations on which the DRB based its recommendation for disbarment. (p. 7) 2. The significant difference in the specific quality of the conduct required to sustain the RPC violations, as compared with the more generalized standard implicated by the Canons and the related Rules, require the Court to conduct a de novo reexamination of the underlying record, as it does in other attorney disciplinary matters in which the initial hearing is held before a district ethics committee. (pp. 7-8) 3. The three-judge panel focused on the more general language of the Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct that implicate the public confidence in the judiciary, and not on whether clear and convincing evidence supported a finding of respondent's complicity in the bribery. (pp. 60-61) 4. No evidence in the record directly supports the Panel's finding (on which the DRB apparently relied) that respondent was sounding out Haggerty's willingness to accept a bribe, although that might be one inference. The record cannot fairly be read to provide clear and convincing evidence that respondent indeed was testing the waters to determine if his friend was interested in a bribe. (pp. 61-63) 5. Respondent's participation in a bribery scheme was not established by clear and convincing evidence and the DRB's disbarment recommendation based on its determination that respondent violated RPC 8.4(c) and (d) must be rejected. (pp. 63-66) 6. Although most lawyers, in circumstances similar to those of respondent, would be expected immediately to convey the relevant information to the County Prosecutor's office, RPC 1.6 did not impose on respondent, as a lawyer, a duty to report Ciardella's bribery attempt to the proper authorities. (pp. 66-67) 7. The record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated RPC 1.2(e), which required him to advise his client, who expected assistance not permitted by the Rules, of the limitations on respondent's conduct. (p. 68) Respondent is CENSURED for his violation of RPC 1.2(e). JUSTICE LaVECCHIA has filed a separate dissenting opinion in which CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICE COLEMAN join. Justice LaVecchia believed that the majority's view of the facts placed too much of a strain on credibility and that its disposition would jeopardize the public's trust in the integrity of the members of the legal profession, emphasizing specifically the three-judge panel's finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that respondent acted in a manner prejudicial to the administration of justice, and that that conduct brought his judicial office into disrepute. JUSTICES LONG and VERNIERO, and JUDGE KING, temporarily assigned, join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA has filed a separate dissenting opinion in which CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICE COLEMAN join. IN THE MATTER OF JAMES A. BRESLIN, JR., An Attorney at Law. _____________________ Argued September 24, 2001 -- Reargued February 25, 2002 -- Decided March 28, 2002 On an Order to show cause why respondent should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined. Richard J. Engelhardt, Assistant Ethics Counsel, argued the cause on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics. Michael P. Ambrosio argued the cause for respondent. The opinion of the Court was delivered by STEIN, J. For a lawyer, a judgment of disbarment is the ultimate professional sanction. Because in New Jersey disbarment invariably is permanent, a disbarred lawyer cannot ever again expect to practice his chosen profession. The enormity of that consequence has caused the members of this Court to treat disbarment matters with exceptional care and meticulous scrutiny. I Respondent, James A. Breslin, Jr., a member of this State's bar since 1968 and the judge of the Lyndhurst Municipal Court since 1978, had an unblemished ethics record prior to these proceedings. The matter before us originated as a Presentment filed by this Court's Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC), after a hearing, in which the ACJC by a 6-3 vote recommended that this Court institute proceedings to remove Respondent from his judicial office. The ACJC majority found by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent's failure to report a bribe attempt to law enforcement authorities violated Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 1 provides: 1. A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should personally observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective. Canon 2 entitled A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and The Appearance of Impropriety in all Activities provides in part: A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The ACJC also found by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice, contrary to Rule 2:15-8(a)(6), which provides: 2:15-8. Initial Review By Committee (a) The Committee shall review any written statement, criticism or grievance that is directed to the Committee and that contains allegations to the effect that a judge of the Superior Court, Surrogate's Court, Tax Court or Municipal Court is guilty of: II Notwithstanding that our Rules of Court provide for reciprocal discipline of attorneys based on judicial discipline, R. 1:20-14(c), and state that the [judicial discipline] proceedings shall be conclusive of the conduct on which the discipline was based in any subsequent disciplinary proceeding, fairness to Respondent compels us to focus on the evidence in the record, not on the findings of the three-judge Panel. That Panel's findings were based on violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Canons 1 and 2A), and on Rule 2:15- 8(a)(6) (describing conduct prejudicial to administration of justice that brings judicial office in disrepute), not on the RPC violations on which the DRB based its recommendation for disbarment. We note that the standards governing judicial behavior, on which the three-judge Panel relied to sustain its findings, are generalized principles that attempt to define appropriate judicial conduct. Cf. Canon 2 ( A judge . . . should act . . . in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. ) Although the Panel applied a reasonable doubt standard of proof, the generalized criteria that controlled its determination did not require precise and specific findings of fact. In comparison, the finding by the DRB majority that Respondent engage[d] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation is a more precise and specific determination than that reached by the Panel. The significant difference in the specific quality of the conduct required to sustain the RPC violations, as compared with the more generalized standard implicated by the Canons and the related Rules, require this Court to conduct a painstaking de novo reexamination of the underlying record, just as it does in other attorney disciplinary matters in which the initial hearing is held before a District Ethics Committee. A. Testimony of Respondent In addition to Respondent's live testimony before the three- judge Panel, two exhibits were admitted, one containing a summary of an interview of Respondent, and the other containing a verbatim transcript of Respondent's testimony at a deposition conducted by ACJC staff members. 1. Exhibit C-1 in evidence before the hearing panel was Investigator Randazzise's report of her interview of Respondent on December 26, 1996. The material portion of that report read as follows: Mr. Breslin stated that in the latter half of October 1996, Joseph Ciardella of Toms River, New Jersey, a former legal client, came to his law office located at 296 Ridge Road, Lyndhurst, N.J. (201-939-8760). At that time he gave him a manila envelope. Mr. Ciardella told him that the envelope contained his son's resume for the Lyndhurst Police Department. Mr. Breslin stated that Mr. Ciardella asked him to give the resume to the Lyndhurst Police Commissioner, Paul Haggerty. Mr. Breslin stated that Mr. Ciardella had stopped in at his office around lunchtime, without an appointment. Mr. Breslin stated that he was on his way to court in Hackensack, so he took the envelope, put it either on his desk or next to his desk and left for court. He stated that when he returned to his office, he looked in the envelope, found the resume, and two bank envelopes that contained money. Mr. Breslin stated that neither the large manila envelope nor the two bank envelopes had been sealed. He stated that he went to Paul Haggerty to speak to him about this matter. Mr. Breslin stated that Mr. Haggerty's reaction to his matter was that, given the current political climate in Lyndhurst, someone was out to get him. Mr. Breslin stated that Mr. Haggerty did not want the manila envelope and stated that he was going to the Prosecutor's Office. Mr. Breslin retained the manila envelope, resume and the two bank envelopes containing $10,000 in U.S. Currency. He stated that during the time that he was in possession of these items he left them in his desk in his locked office. decision, stated: We elect not to rely substantively on the statements of Ciardella regarding his conversations with respondent that are contained in either the electronically recorded January 5, 1997 conversation between Ciardella and Haggerty (Exhibits C-3b and c) or in the statements Ciardella gave to the police (Exhibit C-6). We make this election for three reasons: 1. Ciardella's apparent inability to testify before the panel due to a mental impairment caused by recent stroke; 2. the consequent inability of respondent to cross-examine Ciardella; and 3. a consequent lack of opportunity to assess Ciardella's credibility.) B. Testimony of Paul Haggerty 1. Exhibit C-2 is the statement of Paul Haggerty on January 2, 1997, taken in response to questioning by Sgt. Randazzise, Special Investigations Squad, Bergen County Prosecutor's Office. Q. Do you know a James Breslin? A. Yes. Q. How do you know James Breslin? A. I've known James Breslin for goodly number of years as a close personal friend, sports enthusiast. We have gone to many, many basketball games, football games. Q. Does Mr. Breslin hold any position in the Municipal Government of Lyndhurst? A. Yes. Q. What is that? A. Its Town Magistrate, has been for a goodly number of years. Q. His professional occupation? A. He is an attorney. Q. Does he also practice law in the Town of Lyndhurst? A. Yes, he does. Q. Do you have a close, personal relationship with Mr. Breslin? A. Yes, I do. Q. Do you socialize with Mr. Breslin? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FLOOD: Q. Mr. Haggerty, how long have you known James Breslin? A. I've, just to venture a guess, I'd say a quarter century. Q. Are you familiar with his reputation in the Lyndhurst community for honesty and integrity? A. Yes, sir. Q. Please tell the judges on this panel what that reputation is. A. The name Breslin in our town, your Honors, is synonymous with the finest names in Bergen County. Never has there been anything but wonderful things said about the Breslins. Q. Let's focus on Jim Breslin. I want you to focus on what you know about Jim Breslin's reputation. A. Jim Breslin. As a judge and magistrate, he has been known as fair and honorable and yet stern as anyone ever. He's probably been the longest serving judge in the 40 plus years that I've lived in Lyndhurst, longest serving by far. The policemen with whom he has to work ever so closely, when called out on arraignments at all times of the day and night, hold Mr. Breslin in the utmost respect. Everybody in town just reveres him for being fair, quiet, a very quiet individual, keeps to himself, loves his sports, loves his golf, talk to you about sports until the crows _ Q. Mr. Haggerty, have you ever known James Breslin to be untruthful to you? A. Absolutely never. Q. Have you ever known James Breslin to do anything dishonest with respect to any of your dealings with him? A. Never. Q. Have you ever known of Judge Breslin to do anything dishonest as far as any other members of the community are concerned? A. Absolutely not. Q. Now, you stated when you were testifying on direct Q. Mr. Tobin, when you took over as the acting chief, was there any announcement as to how long it was anticipated you would serve as the acting chief? A. No. Q. So it was up in the air. Correct? A. Yes. Q. It could have been for a week, could have been for two weeks, could have been for a month. Correct? A. Yes. Q. And it actually turned out to be approximately twelve or thirteen months? A. I honestly thought it would be much shorter than it turned out to be. Q. And you expected that it would be a very short period of time that you would serve as the acting chief. Correct? A. Yes. Q. And you were basically there because there was some controversy in determining who should be appointed the new chief from the ranks of the Lyndhurst Police Department. A. I was there because of a complex situation where two officers were both appointed as in command of the department, in writing, which must have caused confusion to the officers. And when this was reported to the Attorney General's Office, they instructed the Prosecutor to take it over, take over the department. Q. Were you aware that there were some very strong feelings in Lyndhurst in terms of certain camps were in favor of one candidate for the police, to be police chief, and other camps were in favor of someone else? III The DRB's disbarment recommendation is based on its determination that Respondent violated RPC 8.4(c) and (d) in that he engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, and engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Although no such finding was made by the three-judge Panel, leaving to this Court the ultimate determination whether such RPC violations have been established by clear and convincing evidence, an examination of the Panel's findings reveals that the Panel focused almost exclusively on whether Respondent's conduct in not reporting the bribe attempt violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. Preliminarily, we note an apparent inconsistency between the Panel's refusal to rely on any statements made by Ciardella to investigators or during his electronically recorded conversation with Haggerty _ in view of Ciardella's unavailability for cross- examination _ and the Panel's finding that Ciardella, and not Respondent, was credible in describing the meeting with Respondent on October 17, 1996. Notwithstanding Respondent's uncontradicted testimony that Ciardella came to his office without an appointment, handed him an envelope, and asked him to give it to the Commissioner, the Panel's opinion states as follows: Ciardella and Respondent, on that Thursday, conversed generally regarding the contents of the manila envelope and Ciardella's purpose in presenting the envelope to Respondent. We find Ciardella would not have accumulated such a large amount of money and traveled all the way from Toms River without (1) explaining to Respondent at least generally the contents of the envelope; (2) explaining his intent and purpose in making the delivery to Respondent; and (3) receiving assurances from Respondent that he would pass the manila envelope and its contents to Haggerty. In sum, Ciardella chose Respondent to be the intermediary and delivered the money and application with some explanation _ an explanation that made Respondent at least generally aware, at that time, of the bribery and its goal. In making these findings, we find implausible Respondent's testimony that the conversation lasted no more than one and one- half minutes and entailed only, Here's an application for the police department. Give it to the Commissioner. At the same time, we elect not to rely substantively on the statements of Ciardella regarding his conversations with Respondent that are contained in either the electronically recorded January 5, 1997, conversation between Ciardella and Haggerty or in the statement Ciardella gave to the police. (Emphasis added). Because the Panel declined to rely on Ciardella's statements about his encounter with Respondent in view of his unavailability for cross-examination, its conclusion that Ciardella's version is more credible than Respondent's is troubling. Perhaps the Panel inferred that Ciardella's version is the more likely of the two, as a matter of common experience, but such an inference would not support a factual finding by clear and convincing evidence if, as the Panel states, it gave no substantive effect to Ciardella's testimony or statement. After summarizing the relevant facts, the three-judge Panel observed that three facets of Respondent's conduct must be addressed: (1) his acceptance of the manila envelope and knowledge of the bribe plan without promptly and independently notifying law enforcement officials; (2) his propounding of a hypothetical question to Haggerty; (3) his abdication to Haggerty of the responsibility to report the bribe plan to Acting Chief Tobin. Concerning the first and third aspects of Respondent's conduct, the Panel found that his failure to report the bribe directly to law enforcement officials other than Haggerty violated Canon 1 (noting that a judge should personally observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved) and Canon 2A (noting that judges should act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary) of the Code of Judiciary Conduct. Concerning Respondent's conduct of propounding a hypothetical question to Haggerty about the bribe, the Panel found that this was conduct whereby a reasonably objective member of the public could conclude Respondent was testing the waters to determine whether Ciardella's plan could come to fruition, a testing that either implicated a hope of being able to share in one of the two small envelopes of money or, at the very least, a willingness to act as intermediary in the transmission of the bribe money to Haggerty. We find, under either scenario, a reasonably objective member of the public could conclude that Respondent became an accomplice in Ciardella's plan. Accordingly, the Panel found that because a reasonably objective member of the public could have concluded that Respondent was trying to determine Haggerty's receptivity to a bribe, his conduct violated that aspect of Canon 2A that [states that] a judge should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Two aspects of the Panel's determination on that issue are significant. First, the Panel did not find that Respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, the elements of an RPC 8.4(c) violation, but rather that a reasonably objective member of the public could so conclude. It is far from hairsplitting to observe that the Panel focused on the more general language of the Canons that implicate public confidence in the judiciary, and not on whether clear and convincing evidence supported a finding of Respondent's complicity in the bribery. Second, no evidence in the record directly supports the Panel's finding _ on which the DRB apparently relied _ that Respondent was sounding out Haggerty's willingness to accept a bribe. That might be one of several plausible inferences that could be derived from the various evidentiary accounts of their conversation. However, both of the participants in the single, isolated conversation at LaCibeles Restaurant that could have implicated Respondent in the bribe plot firmly rejected any such suggestion. Respondent testified that he framed the question hypothetically in an attempt to protect his friend of twenty-five years standing. As he testified at his May 6, 1998 ACJC deposition: Because I didn't . . . I didn't want to get him involved, if I didn't have to. Because the guy's approaching us, even though he's telling me to give it to the Commissioner, I'm saying well why should I get him involved. I mean just deal with it myself here, rather than getting him involved, if I didn't have to. Similarly, when Haggerty testified before the Panel, he flatly rejected the suggestion that Respondent was testing the waters to see if he would accept a bribe. Q. Now, when Judge Breslin came to the restaurant and told you about the application he had received from a client, did you think he was trying to bribe you or see if you were willing to accept any money to give some guy's son a job on the Lyndhurst Police Department? A. Absolutely not, because he knows me and has known me for a quarter of a century or more, he knows me better. No, absolutely not. He was looking for: What are we going to do about this? Q. Just so there's no misunderstanding with this panel, do you think there was any chance at all that Breslin was trying to see if you would take the money? A. Absolutely not. Q. Now, what do you think Breslin was attempting to do the first time he spoke to you at that restaurant? A. Looking for help, or maybe _ I don't know. Looking for help, tip me off, what are we going to do about this crazy situation? Q. Now, you cut him off before he gave any more details. Correct? Accordingly, after a painstaking review of the entire record we are unable to conclude that Respondent's participation in a bribery scheme was established by clear and convincing evidence. We therefore reject the DRB's disbarment recommendation based on its determination that Respondent violated RPC 8.4 (c) and (d) in that he engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. We also are in agreement with the DRB's dissenting member that, notwithstanding the three-judge Panel's reference to RPC 1.6, Respondent was not required, in his capacity as a member of the bar, to report Ciardella's bribe attempt to the proper authorities. RPC 1.6 provides in pertinent part: (a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraphs (b) and (c). (b) A lawyer shall reveal such information to the proper authorities, as soon as, and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary, to prevent the client: (1) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another; (2) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon a tribunal. Accordingly, pursuant to RPC 1.6 a lawyer must reveal to proper authorities information reasonably believed necessary to prevent a client from committing an illegal or fraudulent act likely to result in death, substantial bodily harm, substantial injury to another's financial interest or property, or likely to result in perpetuating a fraud on a tribunal. Because none of the conditions triggering mandatory notification of proper authorities was present here, we conclude that Respondent, as an attorney, had no affirmative obligation to report the bribe attempt. Nevertheless, we would expect that most lawyers, in circumstances similar to those of Respondent, immediately would convey the relevant information to the County Prosecutor's office. That said, we fully agree with the three-judge panel's conclusion that Respondent, in his judicial capacity, erred grievously in failing to report the bribe attempt immediately to law enforcement officials and that that failure constituted a violation of the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct cited by the Panel. For that serious infraction Respondent considered himself compelled to resign from his position as Judge of the Lyndhurst Municipal Court that he had held since 1978. Although no such finding was made by the DRB majority, we also are persuaded that the record establishes by clear and convincing evidence a violation of RPC 1.2(e), which provides: (e) When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law, the lawyer shall advise the client of the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct. However, in our view Respondent's failure to inform Ciardella explicitly of his refusal to participate in Ciardella's illegal scheme is understandable in view of the joint decision by Respondent and Haggerty to inform Acting Chief Tobin of the bribe attempt. In that context, a direct confrontation with Ciardella might have frustrated the subsequent efforts by the County Prosecutor's office to obtain evidence of Ciardella's criminal objectives. In imposing discipline, our purpose always has focused on the protection of the public, and not on the punishment of lawyers. In re Pajerowski, 156 N.J. 509, 521 (1998). The determination of appropriate discipline in this matter is difficult because the Disciplinary Review Board, in whom we entrust substantial responsibility in lawyer-disciplinary cases, has by a narrow margin recommended Respondent's disbarment. Because we are persuaded that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence of Respondent's participation in a bribe attempt, that recommendation clearly is not appropriate. Nor is the three-year suspension recommended by the DRB minority appropriate, that recommendation having been based on the same substantive determination made by the majority. We conclude that the most serious violations established in this record by clear and convincing evidence are those found by the three-judge hearing panel, involving violations of Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Rule 2:15-8(6) that proscribes conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. For those violations, based primarily on Respondent's failure as a member of the judiciary to report promptly the bribe attempt, Respondent has been compelled to resign his judicial office. We regard that as severe and appropriate discipline for the violations found by the three- judge panel. In our view, the remaining violation of RPC 1.2(e) that is established by clear and convincing evidence warrants discipline less severe than suspension. Accordingly, Respondent is hereby censured for that violation. Respondent shall reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate costs. So ordered. IN THE MATTER OF JAMES A. BRESLIN, JR., An Attorney at Law. _____________________ LaVECCHIA, J., dissenting. This case requires the Court to consider whether respondent, James A. Breslin, Jr., having been found beyond a reasonable doubt to have engaged in conduct warranting his removal from the bench, should continue nonetheless to be a member of the bar. Because I find the majority's view of the facts of this case to place too much of a strain upon credibility, and because I believe that the majority's disposition will jeopardize the public's trust in the integrity of the members of the legal profession, I respectfully dissent. I would disbar respondent. Both the hearing panel in the judicial removal action and the DRB in this attorney disciplinary proceeding duly noted that respondent provided a voluntary sworn statement to the Bergen County prosecutor's investigator and that respondent was not charged with any criminal conduct. Ciardella was charged with the second-degree offense of bribery of a public official, and ultimately pled guilty to violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:27-6b (third degree offense of a gift to a public official). He was fined $10,000. Bribery is one of the more serious offenses an attorney can commit. In re Callahan, 70 N.J. 178, 184 (1976). A judge's participation in any aspect of a bribery scheme is inexcusable. We hold that a judge who accepts a bribe must be removed from office. There can be no exceptions whatsoever. One might argue that there might conceivably be some bribery case somewhere with mitigating circumstances sufficient to justify discipline other than removal. That case will have to be argued elsewhere. In New Jersey nothing other than removal will do, no matter what the circumstances. Even if the attorney offender does not act for personal greed or financial gain, and the mitigating factors [are] substantial, [the Court has] found that the only appropriate discipline for bribery of a public official [is] disbarment. In re Jones, 131 N.J. 505, 513 (1993); In re Hughes, supra, 90 N.J. at 36-37 (1982) (stating that although it is unlikely that the attorney will repeat the misconduct, certain acts by attorneys so impugn the integrity of the legal system that disbarment is the only appropriate means to restore public confidence in it. Bribery . . . is surely one of those cases . . . . No sanction short of disbarment will suffice . . . . ). NO. D-203 IN THE MATTER OF JAMES A. BRESLIN, JR., An Attorney at Law. Decided March 28, 2002 Order returnable September 24, 2001 Opinion by Justice Stein Dissenting Opinion by Justice LaV ecchia