Title: Oberson v. Shreeve

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Oberson v. Shreeve1983 WY 129672 P.2d 1294Case Number: 83-82Case Number: 83-82Decided: 12/12/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
TOMMY 
RAY OBERSON AND HARRY E. STRANGE, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

 
 
v.

 
 
CHARLES 
M. SHREEVE, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court, Lincoln County, John D. Troughton, 
J.

 
 
Robert 
L. Bath of Bath & Tyler, Rock Springs, for appellants.

 
 
Maxwell 
E. Osborn, Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

 
 
Before 
ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN 
and CARDINE, JJ.

 
 

ROONEY, 
Chief Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is a negligence 
action resulting from a motor vehicle collision. The district court, without a 
jury, found that both parties were negligent, and that their negligence was the 
proximate cause of the collision. The court attributed 70% negligence to 
plaintiffs-appellants' driver, which was imputed to appellants, and 30% 
negligence to the defendant-appellee. We affirm.

 
 

[¶2.]     The single issue on 
appeal, as worded by appellants, is as follows:

 
 
"[W]hether 
the trial court, in weighing the evidence and applying the law, erred in finding 
that the negligence of Appellants exceeded that of Appellee in proximately 
causing the accident between Appellants' semi-truck and trailer and Appellee's 
van and boat."

 
 

[¶3.]     The issue, then, is 
whether or not there was evidence to support the court's findings of fact 
pertaining to negligence.

 
 
"* 
* * [E]very favorable inference is to be given to the successful party. Upon 
appeal this court is required to resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor 
of the successful party. * * *" Barnette 
v. Doyle, Wyo., 622 P.2d 1349, 1355 (1981).

 
 

[¶4.]     Therefore, on 
appeal:

 
 
"* 
* * [W]e must assume the evidence in favor of the prevailing party as true and 
leave out of consideration the evidence in conflict therewith, giving to the 
evidence in favor of the prevailing party every favorable inference which may be 
reasonably and fairly drawn from it; and we are not to evaluate the evidence, 
rather we are to determine only if there was substantial evidence upon which the 
jury could arrive at its decision if it believed the evidence in favor of the 
prevailing party. Brasel and Sims 
Construction Co. v. Neuman Transit Co., Wyo., 378 P.2d 501 (1963); Fisher v. Robbins, 78 Wyo. 50, 319 P.2d 116 (1957); Ford Motor Company v. 
Arguello, supra [382 P.2d 886 (1963)]; Potts v. Brown, Wyo., 452 P.2d 975 
(1969)." Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532, 535 (1979).

 
 
Further, 
a "judgment will be affirmed on any legal ground appearing from the record." P & M Cattle Company v. Holler, 
Wyo., 559 P.2d 1019, 1024 (1977); Zitterkopf v. Roussalis, Wyo., 546 P.2d 436, 437 (1976).

 
 

[¶5.]     Testimony was received 
at the trial from the appellants' driver, Chester Gregory, the appellee, Charles 
Shreeve, Mr. and Mrs. Carson, who were following appellants' semi-truck and 
trailer in a pickup, and the investigating Highway Patrol Officer, Wayne 
Wright.

 
 

[¶6.]     The accident occurred 
on U.S. Highway 30, northwest of Kemmerer, during the daylight hours. Both the 
appellants' driver and the appellee were traveling in the northwest bound lane. 
Appellee and appellants' driver both pulled off onto the right shoulder at 
approximately the same time to check their maps, each to determine whether he 
had missed the turn to Bear Lake at Sage Junction. Appellee's vehicle was ahead 
of that of appellants. Appellants' driver re-entered the road first and as he 
approached appellee's van, appellee re-entered the road. Shortly thereafter, 
appellants' driver started to pass appellee, and the collision occurred when 
appellee made a left turn onto a service road. Appellee testified that he 
switched on his left turn signal when he re-entered the road, then he turned it 
off only to shortly thereafter turn it on again before making a left turn onto 
the service road. Before he had completed his turn, his van and boat were struck 
by appellants' semi-truck and trailer. Extensive injury was done to both 
vehicles.

 
 

[¶7.]     The trial court noted 
with reference to its choice in believing the testimony of Officer Wright and 
appellee, and in disregarding the testimony of the Carsons and appellants' 
driver:

 
 
"I 
intend to reject the testimony of the Carsons because of what this Officer read 
to me from his notes during this trial as well as the inconsistencies that I 
think are in the testimony of - or the inadequacies that are in the testimony of 
the Carsons."

 
 
Some 
of those "inadequacies" include the following: Mr. Carson testified that the 
surface of the roadway at the time of the accident was "stripped blacktop," 
while pictures taken of the accident scene reveal that the road was freshly 
graveled, tarred and regraveled, with no markings painted on it; Mr. Carson 
testified that the driver of the semi-truck did everything he could to avoid 
hitting the van, that he "veered off just prior to impact," but the skid marks 
on the road showed that the driver did not brake until after impact with the 
van, and the front wheels of the semi-truck had been locked into position at the 
time of impact, and they were pointing straight forward, which all indicates 
that the driver did not swerve or brake, in fact did absolutely nothing to avoid 
the collision; the Carsons testified that appellee turned left directly in front 
of the appellants' semi-truck, but the testimony of appellee, coupled with the 
origin of the skid marks and the areas of damage to the vehicles show that 
appellee was going fairly slowly, and had almost completed his turn before he 
was struck by the semi-truck, which indicates that he did not cut sharply in 
front of appellants' truck. Likewise, appellants' driver testified that before 
impact he cut his wheels to the left to avoid hitting the van, but the physical 
evidence does not bear this out, as noted above, and as adduced by photographs 
taken by Officer Wright. Further, Mr. Gregory testified that he hit a culvert, 
but the photographs, again taken by the highway patrolman, and the testimony of 
Officer Wright show that there was no culvert in this area. Appellants' driver 
admitted that he saw appellee's turn signal, but nevertheless tried to pass 
appellee on the left despite the signaled intention to turn to the left. The 
physical evidence reflected that appellee had almost completed his turn prior to 
the accident. With all of the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to 
appellee, and disregarding any evidence in conflict therewith, we find 
substantial evidence to support the findings of the trial court. It did not err 
in weighing the credible evidence and applying the law and reaching the 
conclusion that appellants' driver was more negligent than 
appellee.

 
 

[¶8.]     Appellants cite § 
31-5-209(a)(i), W.S. 1977, for the proposition that appellee breached the 
statutory duty to remain in his right hand lane of travel at a time appellants' 
driver was committed to passing appellee's vehicle. It 
reads:

 
 
"(i) 
A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane 
and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained 
that such movement can be made with safety."

 
 

[¶9.]     In Distad v. Cubin, Wyo., 633 P.2d 167, 175 
(1981), we said that we could adopt as a standard of conduct of a reasonable man 
the requirements of a legislative enactment, and we there applied provisions of 
the Restatement, Torts 2d, relative to the circumstances under which such should 
be applied. However, whether a violation of a statute is evidence of negligence 
or is negligence per se is not pertinent in this case inasmuch as the trial 
court did in fact find the appellee to be negligent (per se or otherwise), but 
it also found appellants' driver was more 
negligent. The court found that appellee was 30% negligent for making the 
left hand turn, but it found the appellants' driver was 70% negligent for 
failing to take note of appellee's left turn signal and anticipating appellee's 
left turn and for failing to take any evasive action whatsoever to avoid the 
collision. There was ample evidence to support this 
finding.

 
 

[¶10.]  Affirmed.