Title: In re Wrongful Conviction of Baumgarner

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 125,552

In the Matter of the Wrongful Conviction of
DAMEON BAUMGARNER.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

‘When a claimant is wrongfully convicted ofa felony crime and sentenced to jail
time under K.$.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6603(g)—which permits a sentencing court to impose
up to 60 days "imprisonment" in county jail as a condition of probation in felony cases—
the claimant is “imprisoned! forthe purposes of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1A).

  

Appeal fom Sumner Diset Cour; GATEN T. Woo, judge. Oral argument held May 15,2023. Opinion
‘led October 20,2023, Reversed and remanded with direction.

‘Larry G. Miche, of Kennedy Berkey of Salina, argued the cans and was onthe brie for appellant.

Kurtis K Ward, essen solckor genera, argued the ease, and Kris W: Kobach atomey general, was
wits bm on the bie fr apple.

‘The opinion of the court was delivered by

STEGALL, J: Dameon Baumgarer was convicted of unlawfully possessing a
firearm and sentenced to a 10-month prison term, which was suspended in lieu of a 60-
day sentence in county jail and 18 months of probation. After he was released from jail,
the Court of Appeals reversed his conviction and vacated his sentence. Baumgamer then
sought compensation, alleging a wrongful conviction under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004.
il recovery, Baiimgamer first must establish that he was

 

To be eligible for such a ci
"convicted of a felony crime and subsequently imprisoned." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-
5004(6)(1KA).
‘The district court dismissed Baumgamer's claim, reasoning that Baumgamer had
not been "imprisoned" since he was not confined in a facility operated by the Kansas
Department of Corrections (KDOC). Today we reverse the decision of the district court

  

and conclude that Baumgamer was "imprisoned! for the purposes of the wrongful
conviction compensation statute because his sentence was controlled by K.S.A. 2022
Supp. 21-6603(g), which contemplates 60 days “imprisonment” in a county jail as a
condition of probation in felony cases.

Facts

‘A jury convicted Baumgamer of one count of unlawful possession of a firearm
under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6301 (a)(13), which prohibits the possession of firearm "by
4 person who is or has been a mentally ill person subject to involuntary commitment for
care and treatment.” As supporting evidence, the State introduced a 2015 district court
order adjudicating Baumgamer to be a mentally ill person.

‘The sentencing court imposed a 10-month prison term, which was suspended in
lieu of a 60-day sentence in county j

 

and 18 months of probation. Baumgamer also
received 12 months of postrelease supervision. The conviction was also a violation of his

 

probation in a prior case, which resulted in Baumgamer serving an additional,
consecutive six-month jail term. In total, Baumgarner spent approximately eight months
in the Sumner County Jail.

 

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed his conviction and vacated his sentence
after finding the 2015 court order insufficient to prove Baumgarer is or has been a
‘mentally il person subject to involuntary commitment, State v. Baumgarner, 59 Kan.
‘App. 2d 330, 340-42, 481 P.3d 170 (2021). Baumgamer then initiated the current civil
action under K.S.A, 2022 Supp, 60-5004(a)-(c)(1), which provides that a "person
convicted and subsequently imprisoned" for a crime they did not commit “may bring an
action in the district court seeking damages from the state" ifthe claimant can establish,

 

by a preponderance of the evidence:

(A) The claimant was convicted ofa felony erime and subsequently imprisoned

"(B) the claimant's judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated and either the
or on retrial the claimant was found tobe not guilt

 

charges were dis

 

*(©) the claimant didnot commit the erime or crimes for which the claimant was
‘convicted and was not an accessory or accomplice tothe acts that were the basis of the
‘conviction and resulted in a reversal or vacation ofthe judgment of conviction, dismissal
‘of the charges or finding of not guilty on retrial; and

 

(©) the claimant did not commit or suboen perjury, fabricate evidence, or bythe
claimant's own conduct cause or bring about the conviction, Neither a conf
‘admission later found tobe false ora guilty plea shall constitute commiting or suborning

 

perjury, fabricating evidence or causing or bringing about the conviction under this
subsection.”

 

‘arguing that because Baumgarner was confined in a
county jail rather than a facility run by the KDOC, he was never “imprisoned.” The
district court agreed, determining that the use of the term "imprisoned! in K.S.A. 2022
Supp. 60-5004 referred only to imprisonment ina state correctional institution, As such,
the court granted the State's motion to dismiss because Baumgarner was never physically
placed in the custody of the KDOC.

Baumgamer timely filed a direct appeal of the district court's decision to this court.
See K.$.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004(1) ("The decision of the district court may be appealed
directly tothe supreme court pursuant to the code of civil procedute.”").
DISCUSSION

‘We exercise unlimited review in determin

 

ng whether a district court erred by
‘granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, We likewise exercise unlimited
review in evaluating the district courts interpretation of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004, as it
requires interpretation of a statute, In re M.M, 312 Kan, 872, 873-74, 482 P.3d 583,
021).

‘The partes advance two distinc interpretations of the word "imprisoned" as itis
used in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(A). The State argues a technical definit
“imprisoned” requir

 

nof

 

 

ig confinement in a facility operated by the KDOC, while
Baumgamer relies on a broader ordinary meaning definition of the word that could
include any kind of confinement. But we do not need to engage the parties’ arguments
because the plain language of the statute governing Baumgamer’s sentence explicitly tells
us that Baumgarer was indeed "imprisoned! as a matter of law.

K.S.A, 2022 Supp. 21-6603(g) permits a defendant to receive up to 60 days
"imprisonment" in a county jail as a condition of probation in felony cases. That statute
defines "probation" as "a procedure under which a defendant, convicted of a crime, is
released by the court after imposition of sentence, without imprisonment except as
provided in felony cases ....In felony cases, the court may include confinement in a
‘county ail not to exceed 60 days." (Emphases added.) K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6603(8).

This statutory language plainly shows that time served in « county jail as @
‘exactly what
‘happened to Baumgamer, and we therefore conclude Baumgamer was “imprisoned” as a
matter of law during his 60 days in the Sumner County Jail. Given this, he meets the
threshold requirement in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(A) that the claimant must
have been "convicted of a felony crime and subsequently imprisoned."

 

condi

 

‘of probation in felony cases constitutes "imprisonment." Thi

 

4
‘The parties also argue over Baumgamer’sstatus—imprisoned or not imprisoned—
during the additional six months he served in the county j
of his probation in a prior case. The lower court relied on the same rationale described
above to rule Baumgarner was not imprisoned for those six months either. Here again,
‘we need not consider the precise legal ruling made by the district court—i.e., that
Baumgamer was not "imprisoned" during the six-month probation revocation term
because he was only confined in jail. Whereas above, we reversed the district court on
slightly different grounds, in this instance, we find the district court's conclusion was

   

as a result of the revocation

correct, but for the wrong reason. Because even if the felony conviction was a "but-for"
cause of the probation revocation, the time served (whether imprisoned or not) cannot be
said to have been time served on the underlying wrongful conviction. Given this, the
‘maximum amount of time for which Baumgarner could potentially recover under the
‘wrongful conviction compensation statute is for the 60 days he was imprisoned in the
county jail as a condition of the felony probation.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.