Title: Ferguson v. Olmsted

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

451 P.2d 746 (1969) David FERGUSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. Charles D. OLMSTED, Executor of Estate of Marguerite M. Ferguson, Deceased, Defendant in Error. No. 22291. Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department. March 17, 1969. Philip A. Rouse and Raymond J. Turner, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Zarlengo, Zarlengo, Seavy & Mulligan, V. C. Seavy, Jr., Denver, for defendant in error. *747 MOORE[*], Justice. We will refer to the parties by name or as they appeared in the trial court where David Ferguson was plaintiff and Charles D. Olmstead as executor of the Estate of Marguerite M. Ferguson was defendant. For a complete understanding of the controversy now presented for determination, we direct attention to the opinion of this court in Olmstead v. District Court, 157 Colo. 326, 403 P.2d 442. In that case this court held that Robert P. Fullerton, who purported to rule upon David Ferguson's Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order at a time when his term of office as a judge of the district court had expired, had no authority to hear and determine that motion and his ruling therefore was a nullity. Thereafter the motion of Ferguson was resubmitted to the district court and all the relief prayed for by Ferguson was denied. In a divorce action filed by plaintiff against his wife Marguerite, a decree of divorce was entered in his favor on September 3, 1963. Matters pertaining to division of property, alimony and support money for children were reserved for further hearing. On April 16, 1964, the Honorable Robert P. Fullerton, then a judge of the district court, entered an order captioned "Property Settlement, Support, and Alimony Decree." This decree contained provisions for alimony, support money and payment of debts, which are not material at this time. With respect to the matters now material, the April 16, 1964, decree provided that: This decree became final on April 16, 1964, and no appellate proceedings were ever directed thereto. On September 5, 1964, the divorced wife died, and four days thereafter plaintiff filed *748 the aforementioned Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order. He also filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, and a motion for custody of the two minor children originally awarded to Mrs. Ferguson. The motion for change of custody was granted on December 7, 1964. The motion for relief from the judgment entered on division of property was based on the provisions of R.C.P.Colo. 60(b), which provides that the court may relieve a party from a final judgment for the reason, among others, that, The thrust of plaintiff's motion is that at the time it was filed, It is also argued that the trial court was without jurisdiction to order the plaintiff to maintain or replace insurance policies in which his children or his wife were named beneficiaries; and that the court acted without jurisdiction in ordering plaintiff to pay $45,000 for creation of a trust fund. Prior to the date of the hearing on plaintiff's motion, briefs were filed and plaintiff's attorney asserted that the evidence which he intended to offer would show: At the hearing the trial court heard extended arguments of counsel, and at the conclusion thereof entered a written decree in which it was stated that the court, This question is answered in the affirmative. We direct attention to the fact that in the instant case there was no agreement between the parties concerning the settlement of property rights between them. No contractual rights were presented to the court for inclusion in the decree. In this connection Menor v. Menor, 154 Colo. 475, 391 P.2d 473, is applicable. From that opinion we quote: It is also clear that the trial court in the absence of agreement between the parties to the divorce action could not, over the objection of the wife, order that her share in the property division be impressed with a trust. United States National Bank of Denver v. Bartges, 120 Colo. 317, 210 P.2d 600. However, the plaintiff is in no position to complain about this provision. The person aggrieved by the order was Mrs. Ferguson. It was made perfectly clear that the corpus of the trust belonged to her as her share of the property division. The decree provided that in the event of her death, "* * * the corpus and undistributed income shall become a part of defendant's estate." This question is answered in the negative. In McDonald v. McDonald, 150 Colo. 492, 374 P.2d 690, in a comparable situation this court stated, inter alia: The decree entered by the trial court on April 16, 1964 resulted in the creation of vested rights in Mrs. Ferguson. No writ of error was directed to that decree. In McDonald v. McDonald, supra, we find the following apt language: The judgment is reversed in so far as it purports to require the maintenance of insurance policies, and otherwise is affirmed. PRINGLE, HODGES and GROVES, JJ., concur. [*] Retired Supreme Court Justice sitting under assignment by the Chief Justice under provisions of Article VI, Section 5(3) of the Constitution of Colorado.