Title: State v. Hamilton

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Hamilton, Appellant. 
[Cite as State v. Hamilton (1996),          Ohio St.3d            .] 
Criminal procedure -- Postconviction remedies -- Prosecutor’s 
participation in a hearing on an application to seal the record of a 
conviction is not limited to issues specified by prosecutor in 
written objection filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.32(B). 
A prosecutor’s participation in a hearing on an application to seal the record of 
 
a conviction is not limited to issues specified by the prosecutor in a 
 
written objection filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.32(B). 
 
(No. 95-172 -- Submitted March 5, 1996 -- Decided June 26, 1996.) 
 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 14525. 
 
In February 1990, a Montgomery County jury convicted David Hamilton 
of theft.  The court sentenced Hamilton to a one-year prison term, which was 
suspended, and placed him on probation with the requirement that he make 
restitution and perform community service. Hamilton received a termination of 
his probation upon fulfilling each of its conditions.  
 
2
 
After waiting the required three years from his discharge, Hamilton 
applied to the sentencing court to have the record of his conviction sealed 
pursuant to R.C. 2953.32.  
 
Without filing an objection to Hamilton’s application as permitted by 
R.C. 2953.32(B), an assistant prosecuting attorney appeared at the 
expungement hearing and cross-examined Hamilton regarding his employment 
and his qualifications and licensure in law and accounting.   The prosecutor 
urged the court to deny Hamilton’s application based on Hamilton’s possibility 
of obtaining a position with fiduciary responsibilities.  
 
The court denied Hamilton’s application, finding that the legitimate 
needs of the government outweigh Hamilton’s need to have the record sealed.  
Specifically, the court noted that “should the defendant re-apply to practice law 
and or become an accountant, the public’s need to know about his criminal 
record is a relevant, legitimate governmental need under the statute.”  
 
Hamilton appealed and the Second District Court of Appeals affirmed 
the trial court’s order.  The appellate court concluded that R.C. 2953.32(B) 
 
3
does not require the prosecutor to file objections to a defendant’s application 
for expungement of a conviction prior to the hearing as a prerequisite to 
participating in the expungement hearing.  Instead, the court interpreted R.C. 
2953.32(B) to permit the prosecuting attorney to file written objections prior to 
trial either in lieu of or in addition to participating at the hearing.  
 
The court of appeals certified a conflict with the decision of the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth District in State v. Stiff (June 21, 1990), Scioto App. 
No. 1804, unreported,  regarding the following issue: 
 
“Whether a trial court errs in denying a defendant’s motion to seal the 
records of his conviction on the basis of objections made by the prosecutor at 
the hearing on the motion which were not specified by the prosecutor prior to 
the hearing, because the prosecutor is limited by R.C. 2953.32(B) to objections 
specified prior to the hearing on the motion.”1   
 
The cause is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict 
exists. 
_________________ 
 
4
 
Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and M. 
Catherine Koontz, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Thomas P. Randolph for appellant . 
                                
 
Cook, J.  The narrow question properly certified to this court involves 
the statutory interpretation of R.C. 2953.32(B).  In the present case, because 
there was no written objection filed by the prosecutor with the court prior to the 
hearing, Hamilton argues that it was error for the trial court to consider the 
facts elicited and arguments presented by the prosecutor at the hearing.  To the 
contrary, we adjudge that R.C. 2953.32(B) does not require the filing of a 
written objection as a prerequisite to a prosecutor’s participation in the 
expungement hearing.  Rather, as an alternative to appearing at the 
expungement hearing, the statute permits a prosecutor to contest an 
expungement by written objection.  Accordingly, we affirm the appellate 
court’s judgment.    
I 
 
5
 
R.C. 2953.32(B) states in pertinent part: 
 
“Upon the filing of an application under this section, the court shall set a 
date for a hearing and shall notify the prosecutor for the case of the hearing on 
the application.  The prosecutor may object to the granting of the application by 
filing an objection with the court prior to the date set for the hearing.  The 
prosecutor shall specify in the objection the reasons he believes justify a denial 
of the application.” 
 
Hamilton’s reading of R.C. 2953.32(B), and the interpretation of that 
provision advanced by the Fourth District Court of Appeals in Stiff, supra, 
would limit the prosecutor’s participation at an expungement hearing to those 
facts and arguments set forth in a written objection, filed prior to the date of the 
hearing. 
 
At the outset of this discussion, we note that R.C. 2953.32 does not 
contain language expressly forbidding participation by the prosecuting attorney 
at the expungement hearing in the absence of a filed written objection.  Instead, 
Hamilton suggests that such a result should be implied from that portion of 
 
6
R.C. 2953.32(B) allowing the prosecutor to object to an expungement by filing 
a written objection, prior to the date of the expungement hearing, and R.C. 
2953.32(C)(1)(d), which requires a court to consider the reasons against 
granting the application specified in the prosecutor’s objection.   The primary 
rationale advanced by Hamilton and the Stiff court to support their 
interpretation is that the filing of such a written objection is intended to give 
the applicant notice of the state’s basis for opposing the application and the 
opportunity to prepare a response thereto.  
 
Given, however, that the language of the statute fails to prescribe any 
number of days in advance of the hearing for filing of such objection or to 
mandate service of the objections on the applicant, Hamilton’s reliance on 
notice and an opportunity to prepare a response lacks support in the statutory 
structure.2  By filing written objections on the eve of a scheduled hearing, a 
prosecutor has filed “prior to the date set for hearing” and yet afforded the 
applicant no time to prepare a response. 
 
7
 
Moreover, the procedure outlined for an expungement hearing requires 
the court to direct a probation official “to make inquiries and written reports” 
regarding information relevant to its inquiry. R.C. 2953.32(B).  The statute 
imposes no duty on such probation officials or the court to disclose this 
information prior to the expungement hearing.  Permissible use of this 
information without advance notice to an applicant belies Hamilton’s rationale. 
 A probation official who is charged with the duty of making inquiries related 
to the hearing has the ability to produce information as damning to the 
applicant as that which the prosecutor can provide.  It logically follows that if 
the purpose of the “written objection” language in R.C. 2953.32(B) is to 
require a prosecutor to give advanced notice of specific information that could 
be used to justify an expungement denial, similar requirements would apply to 
all sources of  information possibly adverse to the applicant.  In the absence of 
such requirements, we deduce that advance notice to a defendant is not the 
purpose of the written objection language of R.C. 2953.32(B). 
II 
 
8
 
We also conclude that advance notice of a prosecutor’s objection is not 
constitutionally required.  “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. 
Brewer (1972), 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494.  
Neither the United States Constitution nor the Ohio Constitution endows one 
convicted of a crime with a substantive right to have the record of a conviction 
expunged. Bird v. Summit Cty. (C.A.6, 1984), 730 F.2d 442, 444.  Instead, 
expungement is an act of grace created by the state. Compare Escoe v. Zerbst 
(1935), 295 U.S. 490, 55 S.Ct. 818, 79 L.Ed. 1566.3   Moreover, the 
government possesses a substantial interest in ensuring that expungement is 
granted only to those who are eligible.  Expungement is accomplished by 
eliminating 
the 
general 
public’s 
access 
to 
conviction 
information.  
Accordingly, expungement should be granted only when an applicant meets all 
the requirements for eligibility set forth in R.C. 2953.32.   
 
As opposed to the adversary posture of a guilt determination, an 
expungement hearing provides the court with the opportunity to review matters 
 
9
of record and to make largely subjective determinations regarding whether the 
applicant is rehabilitated and whether the government’s interest in maintaining 
the record outweighs the applicant’s interest in having the record sealed.  The 
court is permitted to gather information relevant to these inquires from the 
applicant, the prosecutor, and through independent court investigation 
conducted with the aid of probation officials. 
 
It is apparent from a study of R.C. 2953.32 that the essential purpose of 
an expungement hearing is to provide a reviewing court with all relevant 
information bearing on an applicant’s eligibility for expungement.  Advocacy 
is subordinated to information gathering.  As stated, expungement hearings are 
not structured on the adversary model.  As such, an expungement applicant is 
not entitled to the same type of notice that is afforded one who is accused of a 
crime, let alone a greater degree of notice as Hamilton now suggests. Compare 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex (1979), 442 U.S. 1, 
15 - 16, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2108, 60 L.Ed.2d 668, 680-681; State v. Sellards 
(1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 169, 171, 17 OBR 410, 411-412, 478 N.E.2d 781, 784.  
 
10
Accordingly, the process due an applicant for expungement does not include 
advanced notice of the specific issues and facts underlying a prosecutor’s 
objection or even notice that the state opposes the sealing of the record. 
 
We approve, instead, the interpretation advanced by the state and 
adopted by the court of appeals in this case.  Under R.C. 2953.32(B), the 
prosecutor is permitted to file an objection to the application with the court.  If 
an objection is filed, and specifies reasons allegedly justifying denial of the 
application, the court is required to consider the prosecutor’s objections 
regardless of whether the prosecutor appears at the hearing. R.C. 
2953.32(C)(1)(d).  The purpose of requiring specificity in the written objection 
filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.32(B), therefore, is to provide the court with the 
state’s rationale for opposing the application and not to limit the introduction 
of  relevant information, which the prosecutor possesses or may come to 
possess, that is not contained in a written objection. 
CONCLUSION 
 
11
   
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we hold that a prosecutor’s 
participation in a hearing on an application to seal the record of a conviction is 
not limited to issues specified by the prosecutor in a written objection filed 
pursuant to R.C. 2953.32(B). 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
DOUGLAS, M.L. RESNICK and RESNICK, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY and Pfeifer, JJ., dissent. 
 
MELVIN L. RESNICK, J., of the Sixth Appellate District, sitting for 
WRIGHT, J. 
 
1. Hamilton additionally moved the appellate court to certify a conflict on the 
issue of whether the public’s “need to know” is a legitimate governmental 
concern for the purposes of R.C. 2953.32(C)(1)(e).  In his motion, Hamilton 
asserted that the appellate court’s holding was in conflict with the judgment of 
the Third District Court of Appeals in State v. Mastin (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 
 
12
814, 615 N.E.2d 1084.  The court of appeals below denied certification on that 
issue, holding that “[a]ny conflict is not on the rule of law applied but on the 
facts.”   Hamilton did not file a jurisdictional memorandum with this court to 
accept the “public interest” issue on the basis of a discretionary appeal.  
Accordingly, our review is limited to the single issue properly before this court 
on certification of a conflict. S.Ct.Prac.R. IV(2)(C).  
2. See, e.g., R.C. 4303.271, which requires the legislative authority of a 
municipal corporation, board of township trustees, or the board of county 
commissioners of the county in which a liquor permit premises is located to file 
specific objections to the renewal of a liquor permit thirty days prior to the 
expiration of a liquor permit, and which expressly limits the renewal hearing to 
those issues specifically set forth in the objection; R.C. 3319.16, which requires 
a board of education’s treasurer to furnish a teacher with written notice of the 
grounds supporting the board’s intention to terminate the teacher’s contract ten 
days prior to any formal action with respect to such termination; R.C. 2945.58 
and Crim. R. 12.1, which require a defendant to file and serve upon the 
 
13
prosecutor any notice of alibi that he intends to offer in his defense three days 
and seven days prior to trial respectively; and R.C. 2967.12, which requires the 
Adult Parole Authority to send to the prosecuting attorney at least three weeks 
before it recommends any pardon or commutation of sentence, or grants any 
parole, notice of pendency of the pardon, commutation, or parole. 
3. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1760, 36 
L.Ed.2d 656, 662, fn. 4,  the United States Supreme Court commented that after 
Morrissey v. Brewer (1972), 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, it is 
clear that a probationer can no longer be denied due process with respect to 
revocation of probation in reliance on the dictum in Escoe that probation is an 
“act of grace.”  However, neither Gagnon nor Morrissey questioned the 
character of probation as an “act of grace” extended by the state as opposed to 
a fundamental right existing independently under the Due Process Clause.   
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J., dissenting.   I 
respectfully dissent.  In my opinion, R.C. 2953.32 
requires a prosecutor who intends to object to the 
filing of an application to expunge a criminal record 
 
14
to file such objections with the trial court prior to 
the hearing date.  Since the prosecutor did not 
comply with this procedure and since the trial court 
mistakenly relied upon oral objections as the basis 
for denying appellant’s application, I would reverse 
the judgment of the court of appeals and remand for a 
new hearing. 
 
According to R.C. 2953.32(B):  “The prosecutor 
may object to the granting of the application [for 
expungement] by filing an objection with the court 
prior to the date set for the hearing.  The 
prosecutor shall specify in the objection the reasons 
he believes justify a denial of the application.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
The majority construes this statute to mean that 
a prosecutor can either appear at the expungement 
hearing to contest the application to seal the 
criminal record or, in the alternative, can file 
 
15
written objections.  Contrary to the majority’s 
interpretation, I believe the clear language of R.C. 
2953.32(B) 
sets 
forth 
a 
single 
procedure 
for 
objecting to an application to seal a criminal 
record.  The statute plainly states that a prosecutor 
who objects to the application must do so “prior to 
the date set for the hearing.”  Therefore, the 
wording 
of 
the 
statute 
does 
not 
support 
the 
majority’s holding that a prosecutor may object for 
the first time at the expungement hearing. 
 
Consequently, I would follow the decision of 
State v. Stiff (June 21, 1990), Scioto App. No. 1804, 
unreported, which was certified as being in conflict 
with the appellate decision in this case, and which 
held 
that 
the 
language 
of 
R.C. 
2953.32(B) 
is 
mandatory 
and 
requires 
that 
objections 
to 
an 
application to seal a criminal record be made before 
the hearing. 
 
16
 
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals and remand for a new hearing. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.