Title: In Re Hansen's Estate

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

66 Wn.2d 166 (1965) 401 P.2d 866 In the Matter of the Estate of CASPER HANSEN, Deceased. DAVID SEVERSON et al., Appellants, v. FRANCES B. OBERG, Respondent.[*] No. 37315. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. May 6, 1965. Joseph D. Holmes, for appellants. Earl A. Phillips, for respondent. HAMILTON, J. On August 29, 1962, Casper Hansen, a widower, died at the age of 82 years. He left no child or children surviving. On April 30, 1962, two days after his wife's death, he made a will leaving all of his property to Robert B. Erickson, who he denominated as the son of a deceased stepdaughter. On July 2, 1962, Mr. Hansen executed another will revoking all previous wills and leaving his property to a neighbor lady, who had been engaged by Robert Erickson's father on July 1, 1962, to keep house and care for Mr. Hansen pending his moving into a nursing home. The will of July 2, 1962, was duly admitted to probate on September 6, 1962. Appellants, nephews of Mr. Hansen, instituted this action contesting the validity of the will admitted to probate.[1] They alleged Mr. Hansen lacked testamentary capacity and had been unduly influenced to execute the contested will. The executrix and beneficiary of the estate, the neighbor lady, denied appellants' allegations and the matter came on for trial before the court sitting without a jury. At the conclusion of appellants' evidence, the trial judge sustained a challenge to the sufficiency thereof and entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree dismissing the action and affirming the will of July 2, 1962. This appeal followed. *168 In his oral decision, sustaining the challenge, the trial judge said, inter alia: Thereafter, the trial judge entered the following findings of fact, upon which he predicated his conclusion that appellants had failed to sustain their burden of proof: Based upon these findings and the attendant conclusion of law, the decree of dismissal recites, inter alia: Appellants have assigned error to finding of fact No. 5, the concommitant conclusion of law and to the decree. [1] The rule applicable to this appeal is set forth in In re Youngkin's Estate, 48 Wn.2d 432, 434, 294 P.2d 426 (1956), as follows: As in In re Youngkin's Estate, supra, we are satisfied from our review of the trial judge's oral decision, his findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree that, despite language in the findings which might indicate the contrary, the trial judge did in fact weigh the evidence produced by appellants and determine that such evidence did not prove a cause of action. Thus, we accept the pertinent findings of fact as verities, unless they be without substantial support in the evidence or the evidence preponderates against them. With the foregoing principle in mind, we have carefully reviewed the evidence presented by appellants in the light of the rules relative to will contests upon the grounds of testamentary incapacity and undue influence. For a concise and complete collection of the pertinent rules, see Dean v. Jordan, 194 Wash. 661, 79 P.2d 331 (1938). Repeating them here would serve no useful purpose. Appellants did not testify or otherwise reveal their acquaintanceship, association or affiliation with Mr. Hansen, thus there is no evidence in the record that decedent even knew them or had any reason to consider them as likely objects of his bounty. Likewise, appellants did not present in anywise the testimony of the beneficiary of the will of April 30, 1962, or of his father, who had been the business confidant and advisor of Mr. Hansen until he proposed that Mr. Hansen enter a nursing home and secured the interim housekeeping services of the neighbor lady. Thus, again, the record does no more than hint at the cause of disagreement or disenchantment, if any, between Mr. Hansen and his former benefactor or beneficiary. The witnesses called by appellants consisted mainly of friends, neighbors, and business acquaintances who had on various occasions talked with and observed Mr. Hansen *171 between the date of his wife's death on April 28, 1962, and his death on August 29, 1962. The gist of their testimony was that Mr. Hansen, who was ordinarily of a gruff nature, appeared to be greatly depressed by the death of his wife and thereafter lost interest in his former friends and in his surroundings. They pointed to instances of memory lapses, expressions of distrust of the housekeeper, and confusion relative to some business transactions. From these they opined that Mr. Hansen had prior to July 2, 1962, become senile and testamentarily incompetent. At the same time, however, appellants' evidence revealed that Mr. Hansen had, in fact, executed before witnesses the wills of April 30 and July 2, 1962; had successfully served as executor of his wife's estate between April 28 and June 26, 1962; had, in May, 1962, deposited for collection an outstanding real-estate contract with a savings and loan agency and, with the assistance of Mr. Erickson, Sr., and at the direction of the manager of the agency, executed a replacement deed in connection with the contract; had made deposits in and withdrawals from his savings account; and had appeared in court on June 26, 1962, with the attorney for the estate, in connection with his petition for an award in lieu of homestead from his wife's estate. Against the background of the evidence as presented to the trial court, we cannot find that such evidence preponderates against the pertinent finding of testamentary capacity, or that such a finding is without substantial evidentiary support. [2] The fact that one is aged, eccentric, and occasionally forgetful or confused does not render such person incompetent to make a will. In re Larsen's Estate, 191 Wash. 257, 71 P.2d 47 (1937). We turn then to the question of undue influence. In this respect, appellants' evidence indicates that the Ericksons had proposed to Mr. Hansen that he leave his home and enter a nursing home. Seemingly, Mr. Hansen agreed with the suggestion, however, at the last minute he balked, whereupon the Ericksons, on June 30, 1962, secured the services of the neighbor lady as a housekeeper pending *172 their proposed move of Mr. Hansen to nursing facilities. On July 1, 1962, the neighbor lady undertook performance of her duties, and on that date Mr. Hansen informed the Ericksons he no longer desired their assistance. On July 2, 1962, Mr. Hansen executed the will in question, by which he revoked his will of April 30, 1962, in which he had devised and bequeathed his property to Robert B. Erickson. The statement of facts is devoid of any word of evidence as to the terms of employment of the housekeeper, how well she was known to the Ericksons or to Mr. Hansen, how and in what manner she exercised or exerted any influence over Mr. Hansen on July 1 and 2 or at any time prior thereto, and where, when, and who (other than the witnesses to the will) was present at the time the will in question was discussed, drafted and executed. The only circumstances revealed by the record, upon which appellants rely as indicating undue influence, consist essentially of the fact that Mr. Hansen substituted the housekeeper as his beneficiary; that he, and other witnesses testifying, subsequently expressed some question as to the housekeeper's motives; that he appeared on occasions to be confused; and that he ignored or forgot former friends. These circumstances, however, at best, give rise to no more than a mere suspicion of undue influence on the part of the housekeeper. They are as consistent with a theory that the will in question was the spontaneous, voluntary, and possibly spiteful act of Mr. Hansen, as with appellants' theory that the housekeeper exerted such an influence over Mr. Hansen, on July 1 and 2, 1962, as to overcome his freedom of choice and judgment. [3] Mere suspicion, even when accompanied by opportunity and motive, is insufficient to raise a substantial inference of undue influence. In re Patterson's Estate, 68 Wash. 377, 123 Pac. 515 (1912); In re Bradley's Estate, 187 Wash. 221, 59 P.2d 1129 (1936). Neither will mere suspicion, unaccompanied by evidentially supported implicating circumstances, give rise to a presumption of undue influence sufficient in strength to require rebuttal evidence. *173 The trial court did not err in finding the evidence insufficient to support a finding of undue influence. The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. ROSELLINI, C.J., FINLEY, WEAVER, and OTT, JJ., concur. [*] Reported in 401 P.2d 866. [1] Any question which might exist or bear upon the extent of the pecuniary interest which would qualify appellants as authorized contestants of the will has not been raised either in the trial court or in this court. RCW 11.24.010. In re O'Brien's Estate, 13 Wn.2d 581, 126 P.2d 47 (1942).