Title: Kevin Ray Adkins v. State of Arkansas

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS:

a, CRO6-1082
KEVIN RAY ADKINS, plan Dever Otte 4, 2007
APPELLANT, | ny APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF BENTON COUNTY,

ARKANSAS, NO. CR-04-988-1 and
CR-05-1587-1, HONORABLE TOM
KEITH, CIRCUIT JUDGE

vs.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE,

1

 

TOM GLAZE, Associate Justice

Appellant Kevin Adkins was convicted by a Benton County jury of aggravated assault
‘on a correctional facility employee, possession of marijuana, and flute to register as 2 sex
offender. The jury recommended sentences of fiteen years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine
for the falure-to-register conviction; fifteen years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for

aggravated asaul

 

'30 years in prison and a $5,000 fine forthe possession convietion. ‘The
trial court then sentenced Adkins to fifteen years for failure to register and thirty years for
possession of marijuana, to run concurrently; the court also suspended imposition of sentence
forthe aggravated-assault conviction for fiffcen years and ordered payment ofa $10,000 fine.

On appeal, Adkins does not challenge his conviction for aggravated assault on an
‘employee of a correctional facility. Instead, he argues that the tial court 1) should have
granted his directed-verdiet motion on the filure-to-register charge; 2) erred in allowing
certain testimony during the sentencing phase of the trial; and 3) erred in allowing testimony
about the sate of Adkins’ clothing at the time of his initial encounter with police.

CRO6-1082
In his first point on appeal, Adkins argues that the State filed to prove that he
possessed a culpable mental state and thus filed to meet its burden of proving all of the
clements of the crime of filing to register as a sex offender under Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-
901 et sq. (Repl. 2003). For that reason, he urges thatthe tral court erred in denying his
mation for directed verdict.

‘We treat a motion for directed verdict asa challenge tothe sufficiency of the evidence.
So Sta 45 Ak. 77,238 8:.34 373 200; Cine Sa, 356 ok 2416.9
‘712 (2004). This court has repeatedly held that in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence, we view the evidence ina light most fivorable to the State and consider only
the evidence that supports the verdict. Stone v. State, 348 Ark. 661, 74 S.W.3d 591 (2002).
‘We affirm a conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence
is that which is of sufficient force and character that it wll, with reasonable certainty, compel
4 conclusion one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id

‘Adkins angues on appeal that the State filed to prove that he violated the requirements
of the Sex Offender Registration Act because it did not establish that he possessed the
requisite mental state atthe time of the alleged offense. Under the Act, a person who has
been adjudicated guilty of a sex offense has a duty to register as a sex offender using a
registration form prepared by the Arkansas Crime Information Center. See Atk. Code Ann.
§ 12-12-906 (Repl. 2003 & Supp. 2005); Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-907 (Repl. 2003). The

failure to register under the act was, atthe time of Adkins’s arrest, a Class D felony. Ark

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Code Ann. § 12-12-904(a)(1) (Repl. 2003)." Adkins does not deny that he was a sex offender
who was required to register under the Act; rather, he urges thatthe Actis not strict lability
offense, and the State was therefore required to prove that he acted with a culpable mental
state
With some exceptions, when a statute defining an offense does not specifically
Aelineate a culpable mental state, “a culpable mental state is nonetheless required and is
‘established only ifa person acts purposely, knowingly, or recklessly.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-
203(b) (Repl. 2006). Those exceptions are found in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-204 (Repl. 2006),
‘which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(6) A person does not commit an offense unless he or she acts with a
culpable mental state with respect to each element of the offense that requires
a culpable mental state,
(© However, a culpable mental state is not required if
(2) An of defined by a statte nota pat ofthe Arkansas Crinsnal Code
leat indicates a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state requirement
forthe offense or for any element of the offense,
(Emphasis added)
In the instant case, the Sex Offender Registration Act is not a part of the Arkansas
Criminal Code: rather, it is located in Title 12 of the Code, which deals with “Law

Enforcement, Emergency Management, and Military Affits.” Thus, under § 5-2-204(c)(2),

4 culpable mental state is not required if the offense “clearly indicates 4 legislative intent to

" Act 1743 of 2006 amended the classification of the offense to a Class C felony.
‘See Ark, Code Ann, § 12-12-904(a)(1)(A)() (Supp. 2006).

3 CRO6-1082
dispense with any culpable mental state requirement forthe offense of for any clement of the
offense."

‘Adkins argues that the Acti silent 2s to the requirement ofa culpable mental state, and
he relies on three cases — State v. Setzer, 302 Ark, 593, 791 S.W.2d 365 (1990); Yorum v.
‘State, 325 Ark, 180, 925 S.W.2d 385 (1996); and McDougal v. State, 324 Ark. 354, 922
'.W.24 325 (1996) — in support of his argument that this court should “graft” a mental-state
requirement onto § 12-12-904, However, in each of those three cases, the crimes of which
the defendants were accused were found in the Arkansas Criminal Code. Here, the erime of
falling to register as a sex offender is not a part of the Criminal Code, and accordingly,
‘Adkins’ reliance on these case as examples of instances in which this court will graft a mens
rea requirement into a erime is inapposite.

More akin to the instant case is Stivers v, Sate, 354 Ark. 140, 118 S.W.3d 558 (2003),
in which this court found a strict-liability offense in a violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 27-53-
101 (Supp. 2003), which requires the driver ofa vehicle involved in an accident resulting in
injury to return to and remain at the scene ofthe accident. In Stiven, the defendant had asked
the trial court to give a jury instruction that would have required the jury to find that the
State had to prove that Stivers knew the accident victim had been injured and purposely ued
to.top his vehicle atthe scene of the accident. Stivers, 354 Ark. at 144, 118 S.W.3d at 560-61
(emphasis in original). The trial court refised to give the requested instruction, and on
appeal, Stivers argued that the tial court was statutorily required to graft a mens rea

requirement onto § 27-53-101. Id, 118 $.W.3d at 561.

+ CRO6-1082
This court rejected his argument, however, noting that the “language of the statute
itself docs not explicitly enunciate any particular mental state,” but rather stated that the diver
of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to any person “shall
immediately top the vehicle atthe scene of the accident.” Id, at 145-46, 118 S.W.3d at 562-
63. Our court concluded that “[tJhis mandatory language is a clear indication that the

accident-causing driver's mental state is irrelevant.” Id. at 146, 118 S.W.3d at 562,

 

In addition, the Stivers court noted that other statutes contained within the “Accidents”
and “Accident Reports” chapters of Title 27 of the Arkansas code clearly set out the required
‘mental states necessary before a person could be penalized for violating those statues. Id. For
‘example, the court cited Ark. Code Ann, §27-53-201(b) (Supp. 2001), which provided that,
“(for wilful refusal to comply [with other asiociated statutes), the commissioner shall revoke
the driver’ license ... ofthe person so convicted.” 1d. Our court then concluded as follows:

Clearly, when the General Assembly desires to incorporate 2 mens rea element

into the statutes governing trafic accidents, it can and, as seen in § 27-53-

201(6), has done so. Hire, the legislature clearly intended to dispense with any

intent requirement in § 27-53-101. Therefore, the trial court did not err in

<eclning to engraft an element of intent into the statute, or in refusing Stivers's
proffered instruction.

 

ia.

In Stivers, there was.a clear legislative intent to dispense with any mens rea requ

 

ment.
‘Here, unless there is a clear legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state
requirement forthe offense of falling to register a a sex offender, “a culpable mental state is

nonetheless required and is established only if a person acts purposely, knowingly, or

CRO6-1082

 
recklessly” under § 5-2-203(b), because the Sex Offender Registration Act does not prescribe
‘culpable mental state. Accordingly, we must examine the Act itself,

‘As mentioned above, a person is “guilty of a Clas (D] felony who . . fils to register
or verify registration 2s required under this subchapter.” § 12-12-904(a)(1). The portions of
the statute that set out an offender's duty to register are found in Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-
906, which provides as follows:

(2(1)(A) At the time of adjudication of guilt, the sentencing court shal

‘enter on the judgment and commitment or judgment and disposition form

‘whether or not the offender is required to register as a sex offender and shall

indicate whether the offense is an aggravated sexual offense under § 12-12-903,

(B) The Department of Correction shall ensure that a sex offender

received for incarceration completes the sex offender registration form prepared
by the Director of the Arkansas Crime Information Center pursuant to § 12

12-908.

(0)@) Immediately prior to the release of a sex offender... , the
Department of Correction . . . shall update the registration file of the sex
offender who is to be released

‘Atk, Code Ann. § 12-12-906 (Supp. 2005).?

Further subsections of the Act provide that, when registering or updating the
registration fle of a sex offender, the Department of Correction is required to inform the
offender of the duty to submit to assessment and to register and obtain the information
required for registration, Ark, Code Ann. § 12-12-906(c)(1)(A)(i); inform the offender of the

need to advise the ACIC of any changes of address, § 12-12-906(c)(1)(A)(i); inform the

# As mentioned above, the Act was amended in 2006 and now incorporates several
new provisions; however, because the new language was not in effect at the time of
‘Adkins's arrest, they do not apply to his situation,

6 CRO6-1082
offender of the need to register in another state ifthe offender moves out of Arkansas, § 12-
12-906(¢)(1}(A)Gii); obtain fingerprints and a DNA sample, § 12-12-906(€)(1)(A)(iw) ~ (v)s
and require the sex offender to complete the entire registration process, “including, but not
limited to, requiring the sex offender to read and sign a form stating that the duty of the sex
‘offender to register under this subchapter has been explained.” § 12-12-906(€)(1)(A)(vi.

Reading these provisions as a whole with the rest of the Act certainly indicates a
legislative intent to place the burden of knowing the gravity of the situation, as well as the
‘mandatory nature of the registration scheme, on the sex offender. As in Stivers, supra,
although the General Assembly did not specifically spell out an intention to dispense with a
scienter requirement, itis obvious that the registration requirements are mandatory, and that
failure co comply with those duties isa strict Habilty offense

Moreover, in Kellar v. Fayetteville Police Department, 339 Ark. 274, 5 S.W.3d 402
(1999), this cour stated that “no sienteris indicated in Arkansas's Act, and we conclude the
offender’ filure to register alone is sufficient to trigger the Act’ provisions.” Kelle, 339 Ark.
3¢ 285, 5 S.W,3d at 409, Kellarwas concerned with whether the Act violated the ex pest fato
provisions of the United States and Arkansas Constitutions. In making that determination,
this court had to consider whether the Act was punitive in nature, or was merely regulatory
To that end, the Kellar court examined the seven factors set out in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
‘Martinez, 372,US. 144 (1963). Among those seven factors was whether the sanction imposed

by the Act (the “sanction” in this case being the registration requirement itself) “comes into

a CRO6-1082
phy only on a finding of scienter” Kellar, 339 Ark. at 282, 5 SW.3d at 407, Our court
discussed the scenter factor as follows:

‘The third factor in Kennedy concerns the scenter element. States have
taken at least two approaches with this factor. Some recognize that scienter
“comes into play when the offender is adjudicated guilty of the underlying
offense.” Colle [v. Site] 710 So, 2d [1000,] 1010 [(Fla. App. 1998)]; see also
[State v.] Manning, 532 N.W.2d [244,] 247-48 [(Minn. App. 1995)] (because
the registration requirement s dependent upon the conviction of an underlying
crime, there will necessarily be a finding of scentey). Other states hold that there
no element of scenter inherent in the registration statute, stating rather that the
‘affender need only be released into the community to trigger the provisions of these
statutes.” [State v.] Cook, (83 Ohio St. 34 404,] 700 N.E.2d [570,] 573; [People
| Logan, 705 N.E.2d [152,] 159 [(Il. 1998)]. In our case, no sinter is indicated
in Arkansas's Ac, and we condude the offender's are to register alone is sufcent to
trigger the As provisions. Accordingly, we hold this facor is not indicative of @
punitive fe.

 

Kellar, 339 Ark. at 285, § S.W.3d at 408-09 (emphasis added).

‘Combining these statements from Kellar with an analysis ofthe entie statutory scheme,
‘we conclude that itis clear tha failure to register i a strict lability offense. Because the State
proved that Adkins was required to register but filed to do so, and because it was not
required to prove that he filed to do so with any particular culpable mental state, the trial
court did not err in denying Adkins’s motion for directed verdict,

In his second argument on appeal, Adkins contends that the trial court erred by
“allowing irrelevant highly prejudicial hearsay testimony during the sentencing phase” of
‘Adkins’ tial A trial court's decision to admit evidence in the penalty phase of a trial is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 76 S.W.3d 825 (2002).

Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-97-103 (Repl. 2006), certain evidence is admissible at

 

CRO6-1082
sentencing that would not have been admisible at the guilt phase of the trial. Craufordv.
‘State, 362 Ack, 301, 208 S,W.3d 146 (2005). Section 16-97-103 provides in pertinent part

Evidence relevant to sentencing by either the court or jury may include,
Dut is not limited to, the following

(6) Relevant character evidence}

(© Evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The criteria
for departure from the sentencing standards may serve as examples of this type
of evidence;

(7) Evidence relevant to guilt presented in the frst stage:

{© Evidence held inadmissible in the fist stage may be resubmitted for
consideration in the second state ifthe basis for exclusion did not apply to
sentencing; and

(9) Rebutal evidence,

‘While evidence introduced during the sentencing phase may include evidence deseribed in
this section, the list is not exhaustive. Crawford v. State, supra. However, the admissibility of
proofin the penalty phase ofa jury trial is governed by the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. Hill
1, State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 1994), The Hill court alo noted that the State should
not be precluded from introducing relevant evidence at a sentencing proceeding. Id. at 415,
887 S.W.2d at 278 (emphasis added)

‘Adkins argues thatthe testimony of three sentencing witnesses — Nancy Large, Kathy
Taylor, and Corporal Keith Foster of the Rogers Police Department — constituted
inadmisible hearsay evidence. Hearsay is defined by the Arkansas Rules of Evidence as a

stement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,

 

offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ark. R. Evid. 801. Even if
hearsay is deemed relevant and admissible under one of the hearsay exceptions, see Ark. R.

Evid. 803 & 804, it may nonetheless still be excluded under Ark. R. Evid, 403 “if its

 

CRO6-1082,
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfir prejudice, confision of the
issue, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.”

‘As mentioned above, the challenged testimony came from Nancy Large and Kathy
Taylor during the sentencing phase of Adkins's trial. Both women testified generally that they
had seen Adkins “acting suspiciously” in the neighborhood park on the day of his intial
contact with police. Large stated that her daughter came home from the park and said that
there was “a man down there that was watching her” and who “kept her from going on the
slide and freaked her out.” Large aso testified that she approached the man, who tuned out
to be Adkins, and asked him ifhe gd a problem. She stated that she asked Adkins why he
‘was talking to her daughter, and Adkins replied that he had asked the girl her name and that
hhe knew a gil who lived down the street ffom a few years ago,

‘Taylor stated that her daughter was also playing in the park that day; when Taylor
‘went to the park, she saw a man sitting on the play equipment, and she gathered up her
children and brought them home. Later, Taylor had a conversation with Large about the man
in the park, and she called the police to report it.

Officer Foster testified that he came to bein the park because he had gotten a call rom
dispatch regarding a “suspicious incident of a person talking to kids in the park.” Upon
arriving at the park, Foster saw Adkins, who was the only person in the park, and conffonted

him, Adkins told Foster that he had asked a little git] her name because he thought he

=10- ‘CRO6-1082
recognized her. On cross-examination, Foster acknowledged that Adkins had said he was
sorry if he caused any alarm, and that he had seemed sincere in that statement.

During the guilt phase of Adkinss trial, the trial court had deemed Large and Taylor's
testimony inadmissible; however, during sentencing, the court allowed the testimony,
informing the jury that the women's testimony was not being offered for the truth of the
‘matter asserted, but instead to explain why Large and Taylor may have subsequently called
the police. Regarding Foster’s testimony, the court found that he could “testify 2s to what
hhe saw, heard, or experienced. He can’t testify 2s to what other people said to him.”

‘On appeal, Adkins argues that the testimony of Large, Taylor, and Officer Foster was
inadmissible hearsay that was not relevant for purposes of sentencing under Ark. Code Ann.
{§16-97-103. He contends thatthe State introduced the testimony in an effort to inflame the
_jurors by suggesting that he was engaged in improper conduct for which he was not charged
and had no real bearing on the issues in the ease.

‘The State responds by asserting thatthe trial court correctly found that the statements
were not hearsay, because they were not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted
This contention is correct; the trial court specifically instructed the jury that Large and
‘Taylor’ testimony was only to be considered to show why the women called the police.

However, even ifthe testimony was not hearsay, we must still determine whether it
‘was admissible under Rule 403 — that is, whether its probative value was substantially
‘outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, We conclude that this testimony was not

unduly prejudicial. In Crawford v. State, supra, this court held that evidence of subsequent

ote CRO6-1082
drug offenses, introduced during the sentencing phase of Crawford's tial for possession of
drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture, was relevant character evidence, Noting that
character evidence that might not be admissible at the guilt phase could, under Ark. Code
‘Ann. § 16-97-103(5), be admissible at sentencing, this court determined that evidence of
Crawford's subsequent drug activity provided proof of his character and was relevant to the
jury's determination of an appropriate punishment, Crawford, 362 Ark. at 306, 208 S.W.34
at 149, Similarly, we conclude that Large and Taylor’ testimony went to Adkins's character,
and we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting it.

Finally, Adkins challenges the trial court's decision to allow Officer Tom Helmich, of
the Rogers Police Department, to testify that Adkins’s pants were unbuttoned and unzipped
atthe time of his arest, Adkins maintains that this evidence was irrelevant to the ise of
Whether he was guily of the crimes of filure to register asa sex offender and possession of
marijuana

[At trial, Officer Helmich testified that, on August 12, 2005, he and a police trainee
‘were driving through the Maple Grove Park when they saw two men sitting on a park bench.
[Helmich and the other officer drove back by several other times, and the two men were still
there, which “seemed odd” in light of some complaints of “some activity in the park.”
[Helmich stated that he recognized Adkins and knew him to be a sex offender; Helmich also
testified that he knew there “had been some issues with him filing to register.” Helmich
then contacted Adkins and also had dispatch check for any warrants on him for the

registration issue.

2 CRO6-1082,
At this point, Adkins objected and argued to the trial court that Helmich was going
to testify that he saw Adkins’ pants unbuttoned and unzipped, and that this testimony would
be irrelevant and prejudicial. However, the court overruled Adkins’s objection, and Helmich
then proceeded to testify that, as he approached Adkins and Adkins stood up, Helmich
noticed something bulging on the sides in front of him and wanted to make sure it wasn'ta
‘weapon. Helmich asked what it was, and Adkins replied that it was just his pants; Adkins
lifted his shiet and revealed that his pants were unbuttoned and unzipped. Helmich was
concemed as to why Adkins's pants were open, and Adkins said that his pants were too tight,
so he unbuttoned them. Helmich also asked if Adkins had anything illegal on him, to which,
‘Adkins said he did not. Helmich then searched Adkins and discovered a marijuana cigarette
in his pocket.

(On appeal, Adkins argues that this testimony was unduly prejudicial because it
“suggest[ed) he was engaged in improper sexual conduct for which he was not charged, and
hhad no real bearing on the ultimate issues in the case.” However, Adkins cured any potential
prejudice when he cross-examined Helmich. On that cross-examination, Helmich stated that
although Adkins’ pants were unbuttoned, he did not observe Adkins “doing anything sexual”
with the other man on the bench, and he did not observe “any activity . .. that was of a

sexual nature” or see Adkins “doing anything sexual to himself” Helmich stated that,

 

{w]hen he stood up, his pants were unbuttoned, and his explanation was they were too tight;

the was sitting down and he had them unbuttoned."

13 (CRO6-1082
Moreover, as the State suggests, the appearance of Adkins’s clothing was relevant to
‘why Helmich searched him in the frst place. As mentioned above, Helmich noticed a bulge
in Adkins's clothing and wanted to make sure Adkins was not carrying a weapon. Because
‘Adkins’s appearance was part of the reason Helmich decided to search him, the state of his

‘clothing was arguably relevant to the issue at hand.

ae CRO6-1082