Title: Dominish v. Nationwide Ins. Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Dominish v. Nationwide Ins. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4102.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-4102 
DOMINISH, APPELLEE, v. NATIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Dominish v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4102.] 
Insurer can enforce limitation-of-action clause in its insurance contract because 
clause is unambiguous and insurer did not admit liability or hold out a 
reasonable hope of adjustment. 
(No. 2010-1431 — Submitted June 7, 2011 — Decided August 23, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lake County, No. 2009-L-116,  
2010-Ohio-3048. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} The issue in this case is whether Nationwide Insurance Company 
can enforce the limitation-of-action clause contained in its insurance contract.  For 
the reasons that follow, we conclude that it can. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
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{¶ 2} On July 28, 2006, a storm caused a tree to fall and damage a house 
owned by appellee, Dennis J. Dominish.1  Dominish submitted a claim to his 
insurance company, appellant, Nationwide Insurance Company.  Nationwide 
investigated, assessed damaged, and twice issued a check to Dominish in the 
amount of $6,741.96.  Both times that Dominish received a check, he wrote the 
word “void” on it and returned it to Nationwide, deeming the amount insufficient 
to cover the damage to his home. 
{¶ 3} On July 25, 2008, almost two years after the tree fell, Dominish filed 
suit against Nationwide.  Nationwide argued that the lawsuit was barred by a 
clause in the insurance contract that states: 
{¶ 4} “Suit Against Us.  No action can be brought against us unless there 
has been full compliance with the policy provisions.  Any action must be started 
within one year after the date of loss or damage.”  (Boldface sic.) 
{¶ 5} The trial court agreed and granted Nationwide’s motion for 
summary judgment.  Dominish appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, 
concluding that the policy language was ambiguous and that in any event, 
Nationwide, by its actions, had waived its right to enforce the one-year limitation 
clause. 
{¶ 6} We accepted Nationwide’s discretionary appeal.  127 Ohio St.3d 
1444, 937 N.E.2d 1035 (Proposition of Law No. I accepted); 127 Ohio St.3d 
1480, 938 N.E.2d 1040 (on reconsideration, Proposition of Law No. II also 
accepted). 
Analysis 
Ambiguity 
{¶ 7} This court has long adhered to the principle that ambiguous 
language in an insurance contract is construed against the insurance company.  
                                                 
1 Dominish died on December 17, 2010, while this appeal was pending in this court. 
January Term, 2011 
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See, e.g., Faruque v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 34, 508 
N.E.2d 949, syllabus (“Language of a contract of insurance reasonably 
susceptible of more than one meaning will be construed liberally in favor of the 
insured and strictly against the insurer”).  Even though most words in the English 
language have multiple meanings, ambiguity should not be created where it does 
not exist. 
{¶ 8} In isolation, any word or phrase in the contested policy language 
may be ambiguous.  When considered as a whole, however, the provision is 
unambiguous.  That the word “start” is not commonly used to indicate the 
commencement of a lawsuit does not mean that it refers to something else when it 
is used in a provision entitled “Suit Against Us.”  Similarly, though the word 
“action” can refer to virtually anything done by a person, there is no reason to 
think it refers to anything other than a lawsuit when used as part of a two-sentence 
provision entitled “Suit Against Us.”  The fact that the two sentences could have 
been written more clearly, and they could have, does not mean that they are 
ambiguous.  “[T]here are limitations in the English language with respect to being 
both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us that although the 
prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, they are set 
out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can 
sufficiently understand and comply with.”  United States Civ. Serv. Comm. v. 
Natl. Assn. of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO (1973), 413 U.S. 548, 578-579, 93 S.Ct. 
2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (referring to prohibitions set forth in a federal statute).  The 
policy states in language clear enough to be plainly understood that any lawsuit 
by an insured against Nationwide must be commenced within one year of the loss 
or damage sustained.  We conclude that the policy language is not ambiguous. 
Waiver 
{¶ 9} In Hounshell v. Am. States Ins. Co. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 427, 21 
O.O.3d 267, 424 N.E.2d 311, syllabus, we stated that “[a]n insurance company 
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may be held to have waived a limitation of action clause in a fire insurance policy 
by acts or declarations which evidence a recognition of liability, or acts or 
declarations which hold out a reasonable hope of adjustment and which acts or 
declarations occasion the delay by the insured in filing an action on the insurance 
contract until after the period of limitation has expired.”  This holding is 
sufficiently clear that we have not had occasion to revisit it in the intervening 30 
years.  The holding states a two-part test to determine whether an insurance 
company has waived a contractual limitation-of-action clause.  We do not 
consider the test to be the exclusive way to determine whether an insurance 
company has waived its right to enforce a limitation-of-action clause, but it is one 
way. 
{¶ 10} To be deemed to have waived its right to enforce a limitation-of-
action clause pursuant to our holding in Hounshell, an insurance company must 
have either recognized liability or held out a reasonable hope of adjustment and 
by doing so, induced the insured to delay filing a lawsuit until after the 
contractual period of limitation had expired.  We conclude that Nationwide did 
not recognize liability for the disputed portion of the damage or hold out a hope of 
an adjustment to include compensation for that portion of the damage. 
{¶ 11} Nationwide clearly stated that it was not liable beyond the amount 
of the check that it twice proffered to Dominish.  In a letter dated September 6, 
2006, Nationwide stated, “You will receive or have received, a partial denial 
letter, indicating the roof damage is NOT part of the covered loss, nor is any 
damage to personal property, nor is there any covered cause of loss for any mold 
related issues.  All of these issues are discussed in the partial denial letter.”  
(Capitalization sic.) 
{¶ 12} In the partial-denial letter, also dated September 6, 2006, 
Nationwide wrote, “The purpose of this letter is to advise you that Nationwide 
Mutual Fire Insurance Company has decided, based upon the investigation into 
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the circumstances surrounding a claim made by you, that there is no coverage for 
certain aspects of your storm related claim under the Nationwide Homeowner 
policy.  In particular, there is no coverage available for your roof or any damage 
to contents of your home or any resultant mold formed as a result of your loss.  
There is coverage available for the resultant interior damage to your home.  I will 
contact you to make final arrangements and payment regarding the interior 
damage.”  The letter contained the following caption in capital letters:  PARTIAL 
DENIAL OF COVERAGE.  Enclosed with the letter was a check payable to 
Dominish in the amount of $6,741.96, which Dominish wrote “void” on and then 
returned to Nationwide. 
{¶ 13} The letter discussed various other issues and certain provisions of 
the insurance policy and stated:  
{¶ 14} “Finally, I wish to point out that the policy states on page E2 that 
any suit you wish to file against Nationwide as a result of this claim must be done 
so within one year, per the following condition: 
{¶ 15} “ ‘Suit Against Us.  No action can be brought unless there has been 
full compliance with the policy provisions.  Any action must be started within one 
year after the date of loss or damage.’ ” 
{¶ 16} In Hounshell, we stated that “[w]here there is a specific denial of 
liability upon the policy, either totally or in part, there would generally be no 
waiver occasioned by an offer of settlement.”  Id., 67 Ohio St.2d at 433, 21 
O.O.3d 267, 424 N.E.2d 311.  The facts are quite clear:  Nationwide admitted 
partial liability, offered a check to cover that liability, and denied further liability.  
These actions take it outside the syllabus law and holding of Hounshell and 
Agricultural Ins. Co. of Watertown, N.Y. v. Iglehart (Okla.1963), 386 P.2d 145, 
146, on which Hounshell relied.  In Iglehart, the insurance company was deemed 
to have waived its limitation provision because it had “admitted liability to 
plaintiff, but never made payment to him on his claim” and there had been 
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“intermittent negotiations for settlement of the claim.”  Id.  In this case, 
Nationwide made payment and did not engage in further negotiations after issuing 
the partial denial of benefits. 
{¶ 17} After viewing the record in a light most favorable to Dominish, 
which we must do when reviewing a case that was decided on summary 
judgment, we conclude that Nationwide offered to pay for the part of the claim it 
deemed itself to be liable for, that it denied all other claims, that it had a 
limitation-of-action clause in its policy, that it informed Dominish of the clause, 
that it asserted the clause at every possible instance, and that Dominish was not 
induced to forbear filing suit by anything that Nationwide did.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that Nationwide did not waive its right to enforce the limitation-of-
action clause. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 18} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the 
trial court’s grant of summary judgment. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, 
CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Svete & McGee Co., L.P.A., and David A. McGee, for appellee. 
Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews and Ralph F. Dublikar, for 
appellant. 
_____________________