Title: BOX L CORPORATION v. TETON COUNTY, WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BOX L CORPORATION v. TETON COUNTY, WYOMING2004 WY 7592 P.3d 811Case Number: 03-153Decided: 06/29/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

BOX 
L CORPORATION, a Wyoming

corporation, 
RUSSELL LUCAS and

JIM 
LUCAS, d/b/a LAZY DOUBLE A

RANCH,

 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

TETON 
COUNTY, WYOMING, by the

BOARD 
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

OF 
TETON COUNTY, consisting of JOLYNN

COONCE, 
BOB SHERVIN, BILL

PADDLEFORD, 
SANDY SHUPTRINE and

ANDY 
SCHWARTZ; and GROS VENTRE

UTILITY 
COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation,

 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

 

Representing 
Appellants:

 

            
William L. Miller of Miller & Fasse, P.C., Riverton, 
Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee Board of County Commissioners of Teton County:

 

            
James L. Radda, Deputy County Attorney, Jackson, 
Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee Gros Ventre Utility Company:

 

            
Christopher H. Hawks of Christopher Hawks, P.C., Jackson, 
Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

  
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Servient 
estate owners brought a declaratory judgment action challenging a county's 
agreement with a utility company for use of a public road easement.  The servient estate owners now appeal 
the district court's order granting the county and the utility company judgment 
on the pleadings.  We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

1.         
May the grantee of a public road easement convey to another the right to 
use the right-of-way?

 

 2.         
May a public road easement be used for purposes other than road 
travel?

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶2]      We recently 
reiterated our standard of review of a judgment on the pleadings in Rodriguez 
v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, ¶ 4, 50 P.3d 323, 325 (Wyo. 2002):

 

            
W.R.C.P. 12(c) provides, in part, for motions for judgment on the 
pleadings:

 

"Motion 
for judgment on the pleadings.--After the pleadings are closed but within 
such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the 
pleadings."

 

            
We have a well-established standard for application of this 
rule:

 

            
"A defendant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings if the undisputed 
facts appearing in the pleadings, supplemented by any facts of which the 
district court may take judicial notice, establish that no relief can be granted 
. . ..  A judgment on the pleadings 
is appropriate if all material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings 
and only questions of law remain."

 

Greeves 
v. Rosenbaum, 
965 P.2d 669, 671 (Wyo.1998) (citing Johnson v. Griffin, 922 P.2d 860, 
861-62 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 971, 117 S. Ct. 402, 136 L. Ed. 2d 316 
(1996)).  Our review is akin to 
consideration of a motion to dismiss under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Greeves, 965 P.2d  at 672.  We consider the allegations of the 
complaint to be true, and view them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.  
Id.

 

FACTS1

 

[¶3]      This 
controversy concerns the Spring Gulch Road, in Teton County, Wyoming.  In 1975, Phillip W. Lucas (Lucas) 
granted to Teton County (the County) a Right of Way Easement for that portion of 
the Spring Gulch Road crossing his lands.  
The purpose of the easement was "to lay out, construct, inspect, operate 
and maintain a road for the use of the public . . .."  Lucas granted the easement for a nominal 
fee, as a good citizen and neighbor.

 

[¶4]      In 1981, Clifford 
P. Hansen, Martha C. Hansen, Peter B. Mead, Mary H. Mead, and Spring Creek Ranch 
Company (collectively Hansen/Mead) granted to the County a Spring Gulch Road 
Easement and Agreement for that portion of the Spring Gulch Road crossing their 
properties.  The purpose of the 
easement was "to lay out, construct, operate and maintain a road thereon for the 
use of the public and for the placement of utilities . . .."  The easement was to be perpetual and was 
to "inure to the benefit of the parties, their respective heirs, personal 
representatives, successors and assigns."  
The easement was granted for a nominal fee, as good citizens and 
neighbors.

 

[¶5]      In 1987, Box L 
Ranch (Box L) granted to the county and its successors and assigns, an Easement 
for that portion of the Spring Gulch Road crossing its lands.  The purpose of the easement was "to lay 
out, construct, inspect, operate and maintain a road for the use of the public . 
. .."  Box L granted the easement 
for a nominal fee, as a good citizen and neighbor.2

 

[¶6]      In 2002, the 
County and Gros Ventre Utility Company (Gros Ventre) entered into a Spring Gulch 
Road Right-of-Way Use Agreement (the Use Agreement).  The purpose of the Use Agreement is to 
allow Gros Ventre, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Jackson Hole Golf & 
Tennis Club, Inc., to construct "an eight (8) inch waste water interceptor line 
or main and appurtenant structures specifically including manholes for the 
purpose of connecting the current and proposed development at Jackson Hole Golf 
and Tennis Club, Teton Shadows, and possibly other adjacent development to the 
Town of Jackson Waste Water Collection and Treatment System."  Gros Ventre is to pay the County 
$280,000.00 for the right to use the right-of-way.

 

[¶7]      The appellants 
are the current owners of the servient estates in the Lucas and Box L 
Easements.3  Their complaint sought from the district 
court a declaration that the County did not have the right to convey to Gros 
Ventre the right to use the right-of-way covered by the easements, and also 
sought an order enjoining the County from transferring any interest in the 
easements to any non-public entity or for any non-public 
use.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      In their Joint 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the County and Gros Ventre first noted 
that Gros Ventre is a public utility,4 and then presented three arguments 
supporting the legality of the Use Agreement:  (1) the easements are assignable by 
their very terms; (2) commercial easements in gross are freely assignable; and 
(3) the proposed sewer line does not exceed the scope of the public road 
easements.  The appellants' traverse 
to the motion contended in response that: (1) pursuant to Public Service 
Commission v. Formal Complaint of WWZ Co., 641 P.2d 183, 187 (Wyo. 
1982), 
Gros Ventre, as a private sewage disposal company, is not a public utility; (2) 
the easements do not contain express assignment provisions; (3) the intent of 
the parties to the easements was limited to a roadway; (4) easements in gross 
are not freely assignable; (5) the proposed sewer line is not for the benefit of 
the public; and (6) the County cannot transfer an easement upon an 
easement.  The parties make the same 
arguments on appeal.5

 

[¶9]      The district 
court issued its decision letter on September 3, 2002, granting judgment on the 
pleadings to the County and Gros Ventre on two grounds:  (1) commercial easements in gross are 
alienable; and (2) public road easements may be used for other purposes, 
including sewer lines.  The district 
court added that, the appellants having conceded that the County could install a 
sewer line, it should make no difference that this sewer line was being 
installed by a private company.  
Finally, the district court noted that it did not appear the appellants 
were injured by the project.

 

[¶10]   Discussion of the specific issues 
of this case best takes place in the context of the general law of 
easements.  An easement is "an 
interest in land which entitles the easement holder to a limited use or 
enjoyment over another person's property.'"  Hasvold v. Park County School Dist. 
No. 6, 2002 WY 65, ¶ 13, 45 P.3d 635, 638 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 504 (Wyo. 1994)).  We attempt to ascertain the intent of 
the parties to an easement first from its language, and we resort to extrinsic 
evidence only if we find that language ambiguous.  Hasvold, 2002 WY 65, ¶ 13, 45 P.3d  at 638.  Of particular pertinence to the 
present case is the distinction between an appurtenant easement and an easement 
in gross:

 

            
""An easement is appurtenant to the land when the easement is created to 
benefit and does benefit the possessor of the land in his use of the 
land."'  Weber v. Johnston Fuel 
Liners, Inc., 519 P.2d 972, 975 (Wyo.1974) (quoting Restatement of 
Property § 453, at 2914 (1944)).  
In contrast, "[a]n easement is in gross when it is not created to 
benefit or when it does not benefit the possessor of any tract of land in his 
use of it as such possessor."'  
Id. (quoting Restatement of Property, supra, § 454, at 
2917).  An easement will not be 
presumed to be in gross when it can fairly be construed to be appurtenant.  Id."

 

Hasvold, 
2002 WY 65, ¶ 14, 45 P.3d at 638 (quoting R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow 
Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 586 (Wyo. 1999)).  The parties concur that the Lucas and 
Box L easements are easements in gross.

 

[¶11]   Generally, the law favors the free 
alienability of property interests.  
63C Am.Jur.2d Property § 35 at 103 (1997).  This public policy has been articulated 
as follows:

 

"Property 
interests are, in general, alienable.  
If a particular property interest is not alienable, this result must be 
due to some policy against the alienability of such an interest.  The policy of the law has been, in 
general, in favor of a high degree of alienability of property interests.  This policy arises from a belief that 
the social interest is promoted by the greater utilization of the subject matter 
of property resulting from the freedom of alienation of interests in 
it."

 

Thar 
v. Edwin N. Moran Revocable Trust, 905 P.2d 413, 415 (Wyo. 1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Restatement of the Law of Property § 489, cmt. a (1944)).  See also Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d 620, 635 (Wyo. 1983) (Thomas, J., specially concurring); 
Hartnett v. Jones, 629 P.2d 1357, 1361 (Wyo. 1981); 
and McGinnis v. McGinnis, 391 P.2d 927, 933 (Wyo. 1964).

 

[¶12]   This general rule of free 
alienability, however, has limited application to easements.  An appurtenant easement is tied to the 
dominant estate, is conveyed with a conveyance of that estate, and cannot be 
conveyed independently thereof.  
Voss v. Albany County Com'rs, 2003 WY 94, ¶ 28, 74 P.3d 714, 723 
(Wyo. 2003); 
Baker v. Pike, 2002 WY 34, ¶ 14, 41 P.3d 537, 542 (Wyo. 2002); 
Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 519 P.2d 972, 976-77 (Wyo. 
1974); 
25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 103 (1996).  Traditionally, easements in gross, 
having no dominant estate to which to be attached, were considered personal to 
their holder and, as such, non-assignable.  
25 Am.Jur.2d, supra, at § 102; 
Alan David Hegi, Note, The Easement in Gross Revisited:  Transferability and Divisibility Since 
1945, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 109, 113 (1986).  A distinction has developed, however, 
between commercial easements in gross and noncommercial easements in gross, the 
former, but not the latter, being found by many courts to be assignable.  Hegi, supra, 39 Vand. L. Rev. at 
117-18.  See, for example, Champaign Nat. Bank 
v. Illinois Power Co., 125 Ill.App.3d 424, 80 Ill.Dec. 670, 465 N.E.2d 1016, 
1021 (1984); 
Mumaugh v. Diamond Lake Area Cable TV Co., 183 Mich.App. 597, 456 N.W.2d 425, 430 (1990); 
Kansas City Area Transp. Authority v. Ashley, 485 S.W.2d 641, 645 
(Mo.App. 1972); 
Sunset Lake Water Service Dist. v. Remington, 45 Or.App. 973, 609 P.2d 896, 899 (1980); 
and Johnson v. Higley, 989 P.2d 61, 66-67 (Utah App. 1999), cert. 
denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 2000).  This court has not previously decided 
whether commercial easements in gross are freely assignable.  Thar, 905 P.2d  at 414.

 

[¶13]   The application of this distinction 
between commercial and noncommercial easements in gross to public easements was 
discussed in Hegi, supra, 39 Vand. L. Rev. at 118-19 (footnotes omitted 
and emphasis in original):

 

Courts 
readily acknowledge the distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
easements in gross when evaluating whether to permit the transfer of public 
commercial easements in gross.  
Public commercial easements include those held by governmental units and 
public utilities.  In addition to 
the policy that traditionally supports the transferability of commercial 
easement interests, the courts have noted another reason for justifying the free 
transferability of public commercial easements in gross:  the benefit that the easement provides 
inures to the entire community, rather than to one individual or business.  In Champaign National Bank v. 
Illinois Power Co., [465 N.E.2d at 1017-18] for example, the court rejected 
plaintiff's attempt to thwart the transfer of a right of way easement in gross 
to defendant power company for the construction of power lines.  Stating that "commercial easements in 
gross are alienable, especially when the easements are for utility 
purposes," the court upheld the transfer, finding that it served the public's 
interest.

 

[¶14]   One of the facts contested in the 
present appeal is whether Gros Ventre is a public utility.  This issue, however, was not raised in 
the pleadings, and was not addressed by the district court in its decision 
letter or order.  While both sides 
have briefed and vigorously argued the matter, and while Gros Ventre asks this 
Court to take judicial notice of its purported status as a public utility, we 
decline to address the question because this is the review of a judgment granted 
on the pleadings.

 

[¶15]   It is at this point that we must 
detour from the assessment of this case as presented by the parties.  The question is not simply whether a 
public commercial easement in gross may be assigned to an entity such as Gros 
Ventre.  To begin with, there is a 
question of whether the Use Agreement is actually in the nature of an 
assignment.  "An assignment is an 
act or expression of intention by which one person causes to transfer, set over 
or vest in another a right of property or an interest therein."  Matter of Boyd's Estate, 606 P.2d 1243, 1246 (Wyo. 1980).  In turn, a transfer contemplates a 
conveyance from one person to another or the passage of something from one 
person to another.  
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1253 (10th ed. 
1999).  Here, the County has simply allowed Gros 
Ventre to use a public easement; this was not an assignment of the easement from 
one entity to another.

 

[¶16]   This situation may be more akin to 
what has been described as the "divisibility" of an easement, in contrast to its 
"assignability:"

 

            
The courts' and legislatures' recognition that easements in gross are 
transferable raises a related questionthe divisibility of easements in 
gross.  Divisibility differs from 
transferability because the original holder of the easement grants only a 
portion of his rights to another while retaining the remainder of his original 
rights for his own use.  
Divisibility, however, cannot arise as an issue unless courts first 
recognize transferability.  If a 
court does not permit the transfer of an easement in gross as a whole, a court 
clearly will not permit a partial transfer of the 
easement.

 

Hegi, 
supra, 39 Vand. L. Rev. at 128 (footnote omitted).  See also Salvaty v. Falcon Cable 
Television, 165 Cal. App. 3d 798, 212 Cal. Rptr. 31, 35 (1985).  As a general rule, courts have allowed 
the division of an easement where such has not increased the burden on the 
servient estate.  Hegi, 
supra, 39 Vand. L. Rev. at 128-34.

 

[¶17]   In a roundabout fashion, and 
without yet having determined the first issue, this leads us to the second 
issue, which is whether a public road easement may be used for purposes other 
than road travel.  We answered this 
question affirmatively in State v. Homar, 798 P.2d 824, 826 (Wyo. 
1990):

 

            
The rights of the easement holder in another's land are determined by the 
purpose and character of the easement.  
Bard Ranch Co. v. Weber, 557 P.2d 722, 731 (Wyo.1976).  The manner in which the easement is used 
does not become frozen at the time of grant.  Id.  An easement for a road or a highway 
does not limit its use to the movement of vehicles.  Uses related to traffic movement are 
within the scope of the easement.  
The grant of a public road easement embraces every reasonable method of 
travel over, under and along the right-of-way.  Herold v. Hughes, 141 W.Va. 182, 
90 S.E.2d 451, 458 (1955).  Thus, 
the running of power and telephone lines above the ground and pipelines 
underneath do not increase the burden on the servient estate and are permissible 
uses.  E.g., Bentel v. County of 
Bannock, 104 Idaho 130, 656 P.2d 1383 (1983); Fisher v. Golden Valley 
Elec. Ass'n, Inc., 658 P.2d 127 (Alaska1983).  See W.S. 1-26-813.[6]  
The reason underlying this policy is that the services and products these 
conveyances provide may change from earlier times when they were provided by 
messengers and freight wagons.  
Change was contemplated and must be accommodated in an advancing 
society.  Thus, overhead 
transmission lines and underground pipelines are simply technologically advanced 
adaptations of traditional highway uses.  
Fisher, 658 P.2d  at 129.

 

[¶18]   The district court relied upon 
Homar and upon the Bentel case cited in Homar in reaching 
its decision in this case.  We also 
find Bentel particularly instructive because it holds not only that a 
public road easement may be used for an underground sewer line, but also that 
such right is not defeated solely because the sewer line is to be constructed by 
a private entity:

 

Plaintiffs 
next argue that the county was without authority to grant permission to lay this 
particular pipeline within its easement because the pipeline is intended 
primarily for the benefit of, and will be owned by, the J.R. Simplot Co., a 
private corporation.  We 
disagree.  It is clear from the 
contract that the City of Pocatello will derive a direct and substantial benefit 
from construction of the pipeline, and that public benefit makes construction of 
the pipeline allowable within the scope of the county's public easement.  Even were this not so, the county is not 
precluded from believing that the pipeline is in the public interest.  The pipeline will directly produce local 
environmental benefits by reducing the amount of effluent discharged by Simplot 
into the Portneuf River.  Not only 
does common sense lead us to recognize this as beneficial, but we note that both 
Congress and our state legislature have found such reductions in effluent 
discharge to be in the public interest.  
. . .  Furthermore, there is 
a presumption that the governing body's grant of use of a public easement is in 
the public interest.  . . .  This Court has recognized in other 
contexts that the fact that a private party may reap a special benefit from 
governmental action does not of itself militate against recognizing that the 
public interest is being served.

 

Bentel 
v. Bannock County, 104 
Idaho 130, 656 P.2d 1383, 1387-88 (1983).

 

[¶19]   The court in Bentel, 656 P.2d  at 1388, cited the following cases as being in agreement with the 
above statement of law:  City of 
Phoenix v. Phoenix Civic Auditorium & Convention Center Ass'n, Inc., 99 
Ariz. 270, 408 P.2d 818, 823 (1965); 
McTaggart v. Montana Power Co., 184 Mont. 329, 602 P.2d 992, 996 
(1979); 
Town of Steilacoom v. Thompson, 69 Wash. 2d 705, 419 P.2d 989, 992 
(1966); 
and State ex rel. York v. Board of Com'rs of Walla Walla County, 28 Wash. 2d 891, 184 P.2d 577, 583 (1947).  The first three cited cases do contain 
similar conclusions, although in the eminent domain context.  The fourth cited case is a public 
easement case and, although much of its discussion is based in statutory 
construction, we find its analysis compelling:

 

            
Normally, the interest acquired by the public is but an easement.  . . .  But whatever the nature of the interest 
may be, it is held in trust for the public, and the primary purpose for which 
highways and streets are established and maintained is "for the convenience of 
public travel."  . . 
.

 

            
In addition to this primary purpose, however, there are numerous other 
purposes for which the public ways may be used, such as for watermains, gas 
pipes, telephone and telegraph lines, etc.  
These are termed secondary uses and are subordinate to, and permissible 
only when not inconsistent with, the primary object of the highways.  . . .

 

            
. . .

 

            
There is no contention that [the statute at issue] is unconstitutional, 
but it is asserted by the appellants that the franchise with which we are here 
concerned does not meet the terms of the statute.  The point urged by them is that, as a 
matter of law, a franchise issued to a private corporation not intending to 
serve the general public cannot be "for the public interest."  They insist that "public interest" is 
"public use," and no more.

 

. 
. .

 

            
We are of the further opinion that it cannot be held, as a matter of law, 
that a co-operative association engaged in the business of generating, 
purchasing, acquiring, selling, and distributing electric power for the benefit 
of its members is not acting for the public interest.  . . .

 

            
. . .

 

            
I.  The fact that highways 
are dedicated to public use implies that they must be maintained primarily as 
public ways; and "* * * these public ways must be kept free from obstructions, 
nuisances, or unreasonable encroachments which destroy, in whole or in part, or 
materially impair, their use as public thoroughfares."  . . .

 

            
II.  Subject to this primary 
use, highways may be put to any of the numerous incidental uses suitable to 
public thoroughfares . . ..  The 
public easement "* * * includes every reasonable means for the transmission of 
intelligence, the conveyance of persons, and the transportation of commodities 
which the advance of civilization may render suitable for a highway."  . . .

 

"The 
restrictions upon its use are only such as are calculated to secure to the 
general public the largest practicable benefit from the enjoyment of the 
easement, and the inconveniences must be submitted to [by abutting owners] when 
they are only such as are incident to a reasonable use under impartial 
regulations."

 

State 
ex rel. York, 184 P.2d  at 581-84 (quoting 4 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 1437 
(2nd ed.); McCullough v. Interstate Power 
& Light Co., 163 Wash. 147, 300 P. 165, 166 (1931); and Omaha & 
Council Bluffs St. Ry. Co. v. City of Omaha, 114 Neb. 483, 208 N.W. 123, 124 
(1926)).

 

[¶20]   It must be remembered that every 
member of the public has the right to use a public easement for its intended 
purposes, and that public road easements, unless otherwise restricted, include 
the secondary rights described herein.  
The grantee of a public road easement must, in granting special use of 
the easement for a particular purpose, protect the general public's use of the 
easement and must ensure that the public interest is served by the special 
use.  That does not mean that the 
special use must be available to all of the public or that there can be no 
private benefit from the special use.

 

[¶21]   The Use Agreement entered into 
between the County and Gros Ventre contains the following 
provision:

 

8.  Public benefit.  The parties have undertaken extensive 
studies and reviews of the benefits of the Jackson Hole Golf and Tennis Club 
development being serviced by the Town of Jackson for its waster [sic] 
water treatment needs.  The parties 
have determined and agreed after consultation with and written recommendations 
from the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality to the effect that waste 
water treatment needs of the development are best met by connection to the Town 
of Jackson Waste Water Treatment Plant, that it is in the best interests of the 
Jackson Hole Golf and Tennis Club development and the environment and health and 
safety of county residents that provisions be made for the connection as in this 
agreement set forth.

 

[¶22]   It is not our job to second-guess 
the County as to this determination and there is nothing contained within the 
pleadings that even suggests the statement is erroneous.  We conclude that the Use Agreement is in 
the public's interest, that it fits within the scope and purpose of the Lucas 
and Box L easements, and that Teton County was within its rights to enter into 
the agreement.

 

[¶23]   We hold that the right to use a 
public road easement, whether or not such easement is considered to be a 
commercial easement in gross, is transferable and divisible, so long as the 
transfer or division is in the public interest, and so long as the burden on the 
servient estate is not thereby increased.7  This right is not dependent upon 
specific language in the easement grant allowing such assignment or division, 
but is, as a matter of law, part of the purpose of a public road easement.  Not presently at issue is the question 
of whether this right may be defeated by specific language to the contrary 
contained in an easement grant.

 

[¶24]   We further hold that a proposed use 
of a public easement may be in the public interest despite the fact that a 
private entity intends to construct the project and despite the fact that a 
private entity may reap some benefit from the project.  Similarly, a proposed use of a public 
road easement does not have to be intended to serve all the members of the 
general public to be in the public interest and to fit within the purpose of a 
public road easement.

 

[¶25]   The order of the district court is 
affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1Because this appeal is from a 
judgment on the pleadings, we are compelled to mention an anomaly in the 
record.  Apparently, the appellants 
filed two motions to amend their complaint, the second of which was 
granted.  That motion does not 
appear in the record, and neither does an amended complaint.  The parties have stipulated for purposes 
of this appeal that the clerk of the district court transmitted to this Court a 
reformulated version of the original complaint, which is the document upon which 
we have based our review.

 

  2At this point, we must mention 
another anomaly in the record.  
Attached to the complaint, but not mentioned therein or anywhere else in 
these proceedings, is a fourth easement, this one dated in 1979 and being from 
Roderick P. Lucas and Box L Ranch, Inc., to the County.  Entitled Right of Way Easement, it is 
identical in form to the easement granted by Phillip W. Lucas in 1975, although 
it does not appear to concern the same property.  The parties have not explained or even 
mentioned this easement, and we will not speculate as to its 
effect.

 

  3Bradford Mead, as personal 
representative of the estate of Mary H. Mead, was a plaintiff below, but did not 
join in the appeal.

 

  4Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-101(a)(vi) 
(LexisNexis 2003) states, in part:

 

"Public 
utility" means and includes every person that owns, operates, leases, controls 
or has power to operate, lease or control:

 

. 
. .

 

(E)        Any 
plant, property or facility for the supply, storage, distribution or furnishing 
to or for the public of water for manufacturing, municipal, agriculture or 
domestic uses, except and excluding any such plant, property or facility owned 
by a municipality[.]

  5Because the district court's 
decision as to the Hansen/Mead easement was not appealed, and because no 
argument has been raised concerning the 1979 Roderick P. Lucas easement, we will 
concern ourselves only with the 1975 Lucas easement and the 1987 Box L 
easement.

 

  6Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-813 
(LexisNexis 2003) states, in part:

 

Corporations 
authorized to do business in this state for the purpose of constructing, 
maintaining and operating a public utility may set their fixtures and facilities 
along, across or under any of the public roads, streets and waters of this state 
in such manner as not to inconvenience the public in their use.

 

  7For two reasons, we do not choose 
simply to state that we hereby adopt Restatement of Property § 489 at 
3040 (1944) ("Easements in gross, if of a commercial 
character, are alienable property interests.").  First, Restatement of Property 
Third (2000) has significantly restructured its 
approach to this area of the law, and this restructured law has not been 
addressed in the present case.  And 
second, the present case is limited to the particular aspects of a public road 
easement.