Title: State v. Doe

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Doe, 101 Ohio St.3d 170, 2004-Ohio-705.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v.  DOE; LEWIS, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Doe, 101 Ohio St.3d 170, 2004-Ohio-705.] 
Attorneys at law — Privileged communications — R.C. 2317.02(A), applied — 
In the event of the death of a client, R.C. 2317.02(A) authorizes the 
surviving spouse of that client to waive the attorney-client privilege 
protecting communications between the deceased spouse and attorneys 
who had represented that deceased spouse — Attorney of a deceased 
client may not assert attorney-client privilege to justify refusal to answer 
questions of a grand jury where the surviving spouse of the attorney’s 
client has waived the privilege in conformity with R.C. 2317.02(A). 
(No. 2002-1666 — Submitted October 22, 2003, at the Clinton County Session — 
Decided March 3, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 19408, 
2002-Ohio-4966. 
____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  In the event of the death of a client, R.C. 2317.02(A) authorizes the surviving 
spouse of that client to waive the attorney-client privilege protecting 
communications between the deceased spouse and attorneys who had 
represented that deceased spouse. 
2.  The attorney of a deceased client may not assert attorney-client privilege to 
justify refusal to answer questions of a grand jury where the surviving 
spouse of the attorney’s client has waived the privilege in conformity with 
R.C. 2317.02(A), and the attorney has been ordered to testify by a court. 
____________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶1} 
This appeal concerns contempt proceedings brought against 
attorney Beth Goldstein Lewis, appellant.  Lewis, citing attorney-client privilege 
and the advice of counsel, refused to answer written interrogatories propounded to 
her by a Montgomery County grand jury, even after having been ordered to do so 
by the Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County. 
{¶2} 
Lewis had represented Jan Marie Franks in prior criminal matters.  
Franks died on December 30, 2001.  In order to encourage Lewis to provide 
information concerning Franks in connection with a criminal investigation, the 
police obtained an affidavit from Franks’s surviving husband, Shane Nolan 
Franks.  In that affidavit, Shane expressly consented, pursuant to R.C. 
2317.02(A), to the disclosure of all communications made to Lewis by Jan Franks 
as client and to disclosure of any advice given to Franks by Lewis. 
{¶3} 
The state thereafter issued a subpoena requiring Lewis to appear 
before the grand jury.  Lewis appeared but refused to answer 18 of 20 written 
interrogatories submitted to her.  Pursuant to R.C. 2317.02(A), the state then 
moved that the court of common pleas acknowledge the validity of the waiver 
executed by Shane Nolan Franks as the surviving spouse of Jan Marie Franks, “so 
that attorneys for her may be relieved of the limitations upon testimony as to 
communications that would have been privileged pursuant to R.C. 2317.02(A) or 
otherwise.” 
{¶4} 
Following an ex parte hearing on the state’s motion, the court 
found that Shane Nolan Franks was the surviving spouse of Jan Franks at the time 
of her death.  It concluded that his waiver of her attorney-client privilege was 
valid pursuant to R.C. 2317.02(A) and declared that attorneys who had 
represented her could testify regarding communications made between Jan Franks 
and her attorneys.  Lewis nevertheless refused to answer the grand jury 
interrogatories. 
January Term, 2004 
3 
{¶5} 
In a separate entry filed the same day, the court ordered Lewis to 
answer the written grand jury interrogatories.  Lewis, aware of the entry of the 
court, again appeared before the grand jury and again refused to answer its 
questions. 
{¶6} 
The following day the court held a hearing, pursuant to R.C. 
2939.15.1  Counsel for both the state and Lewis attended the hearing, which was 
closed to the public.  Lewis was given an opportunity to present any evidence she 
might have challenging the court’s factual conclusion that Shane Franks was the 
surviving spouse of Jan Franks at the time of her death, but proffered none.  After 
hearing the arguments of counsel, the court found Lewis in contempt of court.  It 
ordered her confined to the county jail unless she purged herself of the contempt 
by answering the questions of the grand jury by noon of the following day.  Lewis 
appealed from that order, and the same day the Court of Appeals for Montgomery 
County, with the agreement of the state, stayed the judgment of the trial court 
finding Lewis in contempt, pending disposition of the appeal. 
{¶7} 
The court of appeals affirmed the holding of the trial court finding 
Lewis in contempt.  It determined that R.C. 2317.02(A) authorized a court to 
compel an attorney to testify once the attorney-client privilege had been waived.  
The court of appeals further held that R.C. 2317.02(A) gave the same legal status 
to waiver of the attorney-client privilege by the surviving spouse as waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege by the client.  Accordingly, the waiver of the attorney-
client privilege by Shane Nolan Franks, coupled with the grand jury subpoena 
issued to Lewis, required her to testify regarding attorney-client communications 
made during her previous representation of Franks by Lewis. 
                                                 
1.  R.C. 2939.15 provides: “If the court of common pleas determines that a witness before a grand 
jury is required to answer an interrogatory and such witness persists in his refusal, he shall be 
brought before the court, which shall proceed in a like manner as if such witness had been 
interrogated and refused to answer in open court.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
{¶8} 
The cause is before this court upon the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal.  We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
{¶9} 
Resolution of this appeal depends on interpretation of R.C. 
2317.02.  It provides: 
{¶10} “The following persons shall not testify in certain respects: 
{¶11} “(A) An attorney, concerning a communication made to the 
attorney by a client in that relation or the attorney’s advice to a client, except that 
the attorney may testify by express consent of the client or, if the client is 
deceased, by the express consent of the surviving spouse or the executor or 
administrator of the estate of the deceased client * * *.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶12} Lewis correctly asserts that R.C. 2317.02(A) provides that an 
attorney may testify where a surviving spouse consents to it.  She contends that 
use of the permissive word “may” indicates that an attorney may choose to testify 
or may refuse to testify, in the attorney’s discretion, after a surviving spouse 
waives the attorney-client privilege. 
{¶13} The state counters that R.C. 2317.02(A) does not give an attorney 
the discretion to disregard a valid waiver of attorney-client privilege made by the 
surviving spouse of a deceased client.  It argues that the word “may” is used in the 
statute, as opposed to the word “shall,” because the attorney of a deceased client 
may never be called to testify, or her testimony may not be relevant, or it may be 
inadmissible for other reasons.  The state adamantly denies that the use of the 
word “may” in the statute vests an attorney with the final authority to determine 
whether attorney-client communications will be disclosed where a client has died. 
{¶14} We are persuaded by the state’s arguments and conclude that the 
court of appeals correctly interpreted R.C. 2317.02(A).  It is axiomatic that the 
admissibility of evidence in a judicial proceeding is determined by a trial court in 
the sound exercise of its discretion.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Van Dyke v. Public 
Emp. Retirement Bd., 99 Ohio St.3d 430, 2003-Ohio-4123, 793 N.E.2d 438, ¶ 43.  
January Term, 2004 
5 
R.C. 2317.02(A) provides that an attorney may testify by the express consent of 
the surviving spouse as opposed to mandating that an attorney shall testify by the 
express consent of the surviving spouse, in deference to the trial court’s well-
established role as the arbiter of the admission of evidence. 
{¶15} The attorney-client privilege belongs solely to the client—not the 
attorney.  Lightbody v. Rust (2000), 137 Ohio App.3d 658, 739 N.E.2d 840.  In 
the event of the death of a client, R.C. 2317.02(A) entitles the surviving spouse of 
that client to waive the privilege on behalf of the deceased client.  Ultimately, 
however, determination of whether an attorney must testify in judicial 
proceedings as to confidences received during representation of a deceased client 
lies with the court—not the attorney. 
{¶16} Lewis contends that she knows better than Shane Franks whether 
Jan Franks would have wanted Lewis to disclose a communication Jan Franks 
made to her.  Whether this is true is irrelevant.  The General Assembly made that 
policy decision.  R.C. 2317.02(A) vests authority to waive the attorney-client 
privilege in a surviving spouse, and not in an attorney.  Shane Franks was the 
surviving spouse of Jan Franks and waived her privilege.  Lewis had no legal 
justification to refuse to answer the questions of the grand jury in derogation of 
the order of the trial court to do so. 
{¶17} Nor do we accept the argument that Lewis is ethically barred from 
answering the grand jury’s interrogatories.  While an attorney  should preserve the 
confidences and secrets of his client, that obligation “does not preclude a lawyer 
from revealing information when his client consents after full disclosure, when 
necessary to perform his professional employment, when permitted by a 
Disciplinary Rule, or when required by law.”  (Emphasis added.)  EC 4-2. 
{¶18} Accordingly, DR 4-101 provides: 
{¶19} “(C) A lawyer may reveal: 
{¶20} “ * * * 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
{¶21} “(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary 
Rules or required by law or court order.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶22} We hold that in the event of the death of a client, R.C. 2317.02(A) 
authorizes the surviving spouse of that client to waive the attorney-client privilege 
protecting communications between the deceased spouse and attorneys who had 
represented that deceased spouse.  Moreover, we hold that the attorney of a 
deceased client may not assert attorney-client privilege to justify refusal to answer 
questions of a grand jury where the surviving spouse of the attorney’s client has 
waived the privilege in conformity with R.C. 2317.02(A) and the attorney has 
been ordered to testify by a court. 
{¶23} The trial court did not err in finding Lewis in contempt.  The 
judgment of the court of appeals is therefore affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur separately. 
__________________ 
 
Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring. 
{¶24} I agree with the majority opinion.  I write only to clarify my stance 
on the status of the contempt order against Lewis.  The majority concludes by 
stating, “The trial court did not err in finding Lewis in contempt.  The judgment 
of the court of appeals is therefore affirmed.”  While I agree that our judgment 
technically affirms that Lewis was in contempt of the trial court’s order 
compelling her to testify, the assertion of attorney-client privilege under these 
unique circumstances was an issue of first impression in this state.  Consequently, 
unless Lewis continues to refuse to testify despite our ruling, I believe that no 
sanctions should be imposed on her.  Therefore, I concur. 
January Term, 2004 
7 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur in the 
foregoing concurring opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Carley J. Ingram, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Sirkin, Pinales, Mezibov & Schwartz, L.L.P., Martin S. Pinales, John P 
Feldmeier and Jarrod M. Mohler; Bieser, Greer & Landis, L.L. P., and David C. 
Greer; and Steve Keller, Federal Public Defender, for appellant. 
 
Richard A. Magnus, urging reversal for amici curiae National Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
Maumee Valley Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, and Greater Cincinnati 
Criminal Defense Lawyers Association. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole,  State Solicitor, Stephen P. 
Carney, Senior Deputy Solicitor, Diane Richards Brey, Deputy Solicitor, and 
Elizabeth Luper Schuster, Assistant Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
Attorney General of Ohio. 
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