Title: Hill v. Berry

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

441 S.E.2d 6 (1994)
Soloman M. HILL
v.
Okey K. BERRY.
Record No. 930221.

Supreme Court of Virginia.
February 25, 1994.
Ray P. Lupold, III, Hopewell (James A. McCauley, Marks & Harrison, on brief), for appellant.
R. Temple Mayo, Richmond (W.F. Drewry Gallalee, Williams, Mullen, Christian & Dobbins, on brief), for appellee.
Present: All the Justices.
HASSELL, Justice.
In this appeal, we decide whether a litigant exercised his peremptory strikes to exclude African-Americans from the jury in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution and the rule pronounced in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), extended to civil actions in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S. Ct. 2077, 114 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1991), and applied in Faison v. Hudson, 243 Va. 397, 417 S.E.2d 305 (1992).
Soloman M. Hill filed his motion for judgment against Okey K. Berry. Hill alleged that he was injured as a result of Berry's negligent operation of an automobile.
Thirteen veniremen qualified for the venire. Ten were Caucasians and three were African-Americans. Berry exercised his peremptory strikes to remove all the African-Americans from the venire.
After the jury was sworn, Hill's counsel informed the court that he desired to make a motion outside the presence of the jury. The jury retired, and Hill objected to Berry's use of his peremptory strikes to remove the African-Americans from the venire. Hill argued that Berry's counsel removed the veniremen because of their race. Counsel for Berry denied that he had exercised his peremptory strikes because of any racial motivation.
*7 The court requested that counsel for Berry state the reasons he had removed the veniremen. Berry's counsel responded:
The trial court overruled Hill's objection. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Berry, and we awarded Hill an appeal from the trial court's judgment confirming the verdict.
Hill, relying upon Batson, Edmonson, and Faison, argues that Berry removed the African-Americans from the venire because of their race. Berry argues, however, that Hill waived his objection because his Batson motion was made after the jury was sworn. Furthermore, Berry argues that even if Hill's motion was timely, Berry's peremptory strikes were exercised for racially neutral reasons. We agree with Hill.
Applying former Code § 8-202, we have held that any objection to the impaneling of jurors must be made before the jury is sworn or the objection is deemed waived. Oyler, Admr. v. Ramsey, 211 Va. 564, 565, 179 S.E.2d 904, 905 (1971). Former Code § 8-202 stated, in relevant part:
In 1977, the General Assembly enacted Code § 8.01-352, that, among other things, permits a litigant to make an objection relating to the impaneling of jurors after the jury has been sworn with leave of court. Code § 8.01-352 states, in relevant part:
(Emphasis added). The revisers' note to Code § 8.01-352 is instructive here:
Our review of the record reveals that the trial court implicitly granted Hill leave of court to make his motion challenging the impaneling of jurors after the jury was sworn. The court permitted Hill to make his motion, which the court subsequently considered on its merits and denied. Therefore, we hold that Hill's motion was not waived.
We now consider whether counsel for Berry articulated a racially neutral reason for removing the African-Americans from the venire. The Supreme Court held in Batson that the equal protection clause does not permit a prosecutor to exercise a peremptory *8 strike to remove a prospective juror solely on account of the prospective juror's race. 476 U.S.  at 89, 106 S. Ct.  at 1719. In Edmonson, the Supreme Court extended the Batson rule to civil cases. 500 U.S. at ___, 111 S. Ct.  at 2080.
In Batson, the Supreme Court articulated the test that we must apply here:
476 U.S.  at 96-97, 106 S. Ct.  at 1722-24 (citations omitted). See Faison, 243 Va. at 401-02, 417 S.E.2d  at 307-08.
Here, Hill established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, and the burden shifted to counsel for Berry to present a racially neutral explanation for removing the African-American veniremen. For purposes of our resolution of this appeal, we need only consider the reasons counsel for Berry advanced for removing Angela D. Stewart, one of the three African-Americans. Ms. Stewart's occupation is not identified on the trial court's jury list. Her occupation is described as "unknown." Counsel for Berry did not ask any questions of Ms. Stewart or any other member of the venire regarding their respective occupations. Counsel for Berry admitted at the bar of this Court that he did not know Ms. Stewart's occupation and her occupation could not have been "a valid reason" to remove her from the venire. We also observe that counsel for Berry did not remove Caucasian members of the venire whose occupations were described as unknown.
The remaining reasons offered by Berry's counsel for removing Ms. Stewart, "just intuitive reasons, the way people look, theyjust a sense," simply fail to satisfy Berry's burden of producing a racially neutral reason for removing her from the venire. We hold that counsel for Berry failed to provide a racially neutral reason for removing Ms. Stewart from the venire and, therefore, the trial court erred in denying Hill's motion. We do not consider Berry's reasons for removing the other African-Americans from the venire because permitting the improper removal of any one venireman constitutes reversible error. See Faison, 243 Va. at 402-03, 417 S.E.2d  at 308.
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
[*]  Former Code § 8-202 was the precursor to former Code § 8-208.27. Former Code § 8-208.27 stated in relevant part:

No irregularity in any list or lists of jurors made by the clerk from names drawn from the jury box, in the drawing, summoning, returning or impaneling of jurors or in copying or signing or failing to sign the list shall be cause for summoning a new panel or for setting aside a verdict or granting a new trial, unless objection thereto specifically pointing out such irregularities was made before the jury was sworn.