Title: Poole v. HENDERSON, BLACK AND GREENE

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

584 So. 2d 485 (1991)
Clifton W. POOLE, Jr.
v.
HENDERSON, BLACK AND GREENE, INC.
1900420.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 28, 1991.
Roy M. West of Manly and Manly, Birmingham, for appellant.
Allen C. Jones, Troy, for appellee.
STEAGALL, Justice.
The plaintiff, Clifton W. Poole, Jr., appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of Henderson, Black and Greene, Inc. (hereinafter "HBG"), in an action alleging breach of an employment contract.
In his complaint, Poole alleged that in September 1978 he entered into a contract with HBG wherein HBG agreed to employ him as vice president and controller until his retirement and to pay him 3% of its net profit for the duration of his employment. Poole alleged that HBG breached the agreement by refusing to pay him 3% of its profits for fiscal years 1983 through 1987. Poole also alleged that in June 1985 HBG reduced his salary, removed him from his position of vice president and controller, and guaranteed his new position for only six months, and that in response, he submitted his resignation.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, HBG submitted a letter from its president, S. Kenneth Hendricks, to Poole dated October 6, 1978. The letter, which was also signed by Poole, reads:
The trial court found that this letter constituted the agreement between Poole and HBG and the court held:
Poole contends that this letter is not a complete expression of the agreement and that parol evidence is admissible to clarify the agreement.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, HBG submitted the affidavit of Hendricks, who stated:
Poole argues that because HBG concedes that the contract was oral, the parol evidence rule does not bar further testimony as to the terms of the agreement.
This case was filed after June 11, 1987; accordingly, the "substantial evidence rule" applies to the ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12. Once a movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the nonmovant must present substantial evidence *487 in support of his position in order to defeat the summary judgment motion. Betts v. McDonald's Corp., 567 So. 2d 1252 (Ala.1990).
In Rime-Shatten Development Co. v. Birmingham Cable Communications, Inc., 569 So. 2d 332, 334-35 (Ala.1990), this Court stated:
In the instant case, the "acceptance letter," signed by both parties, is a written contract. All the oral discussions, negotiations, and agreements made prior to the written contract are merged into the final written agreement. The terms of the contract are unambiguous and, therefore, parol evidence is inadmissible. The language in the contract indicates that HBG agreed to employ Poole for one year from November 6, 1978. Poole has failed to present substantial evidence to rebut the prima facie showing by HBG that it did not breach the employment contract.
Poole also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to enforce its discovery orders. After the complaint was filed, Poole filed a request for production of documents under Rule 34, A.R.Civ.P., wherein he requested that HBG produce its financial statements for fiscal years 1984 through 1988. The trial court granted Poole's motion to compel the production of these financial statements, but entered the summary judgment prior to HBG's compliance with the order.
In Reeves v. Porter, 521 So. 2d 963, 965 (Ala.1988), this Court stated:
(Citations omitted.) Poole has not shown that the financial statements were crucial to his case. The trial court did not err in entering the summary judgment before the statements were produced.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, ADAMS and INGRAM, JJ., concur.