Title: Matter of BJB

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of BJB1995 WY 2888 P.2d 216Case Number: C-94-1, C-94-2Decided: 01/11/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

 

In the Matter of BJB, a/k/a BBC, a Minor. (Two 
Cases).

 BDR, 
Appellant (Respondent), 

v.

 BEB and 
PJB, Appellees (Petitioners). 

 

BEB and PJB, Appellants 
(Petitioners),

 v.

 BDR, 
Appellee (Respondent). 

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Converse County, Dan Spangler, J.

 

Joe R. Wilmetti, Casper, for BDR.

J. Patrick Hand of Hand 
& Campbell, P.C., Douglas, and Peter J. Feeney, Casper, for BEB and PJB.

Lawrence E. Middaugh, 
Casper, Guardian ad 
Litem.

 

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* 
and MACY, JJ., and McEWAN, D.J., Retired.

* Retired July 6, 1994.

 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      In these appeals, 
we are tasked with reiterating, for the trial court and the parties, direction 
that we already have articulated in connection with the efforts of BEB and PJB 
(the Bs) to adopt a young child without the consent of BDR, the natural father. 
The case first came before this court in Matter of Adoption of BBC, 831 P.2d 197 
(Wyo. 1992) (BBC I), in which this court reversed an order terminating BDR's 
parental rights and decreeing adoption in favor of the Bs. We held the Bs had 
failed to demonstrate BDR had not evidenced an interest in, and responsibility 
for, the child within thirty days after receiving notice of the pending birth or 
birth of the child, although the trial court found this feature of WYO. STAT. § 
1-22-108(c) (1988) had been established. The case was remanded for a timely 
hearing before the trial court "to determine what is now in the best interest 
and welfare of BBC pertaining to his temporary care, custody, and control, as 
well as what are the father's rights and support obligations in connection 
therewith." About a year later, the case was again before this court in Matter 
of Adoption of BBC, 849 P.2d 769 (Wyo. 1993) (BBC II), in which this court 
reversed those parts of the district court's order granting guardianship to the 
Bs, denying visitation rights to BDR, and removing BDR's support obligations. We 
held the district court had failed to comply with the court's opinion and 
mandate in the prior case. We now have before us an appeal from an order which 
provided the Bs were granted full guardianship of BBC; BDR was denied rights of 
visitation; BDR was freed from any obligation to furnish support; the little boy 
was to be known by a name selected by the Bs; and a letter of guardianship was 
to issue. Because of the delay in resolution, we regret we must, again, reverse 
and remand with specific direction to the district court.

[¶2]      In the appeal of 
BDR, he articulates these issues in his Brief of Appellant 
BDR:

1. Did the Trial Court err in denying Appellant's 
challenge for cause?

2. Did the Trial Court err in denying Appellant's 
peremptory challenge?

3. Does the jurisdiction of a District Judge who has 
been assigned to preside on a matter in a judicial district other than the one 
to which he is appointed by reason of the recusal of the Judge of that district, 
cease upon completion of that particular matter or does it carry over after 
appeal and reversal?

4. Did the District Court substantially comply with 
the previous mandate of the Supreme Court?

5. Was there any substantial evidence to support the 
ruling of the District Court?

6. Did the District Court err in ordering a change of 
name for BBC?

7. Did the Appellant receive a fair and impartial 
trial?

In the Brief of Appellees 
(Petitioners) BEB and PJB, the issues are stated in this 
way:

1. Whether or not the hearing held by the District 
Court substantially complies with the previous mandates of the Wyoming Supreme 
Court, and is supported by substantial evidence, and allowed Appellant a fair 
and impartial hearing?

2. Whether or not the District Court Order 
constitutes a name change for "Baby Boy Clark", or simply provided for a 
designation for him to be known as or referred to as "Braden Jess Boner", rather 
than "Baby Boy Clark"?

3. Whether or not Appellant had a right to a jury 
trial in the issues of this matter, and even if so, if that issue has been 
waived or abandoned by Appellant on appeal?

4. Whether or not the Trial Court acted properly and 
within its authority and jurisdiction in denying Appellants challenge for cause, 
peremptory challenge, and in continuing to preside over this 
matter?

[¶3]      In the Brief of 
Appellants (Petitioners) BEB and PJB, the following issues are 
asserted:

1. Did the Trial Court err in ruling that the Wyoming 
Supreme Court has foreclosed the issue of adoption in this 
case?

2. Is the evidence contained in the records 
sufficient to have allowed Petitioners' motion to amend the pleadings to conform 
to the evidence, and grant adoption in this case?

In the Brief of Appellee 
BDR, no separate statement of the issues is set forth.

[¶4]      The underlying 
facts are articulated adequately in the prior opinions of this court. For the 
reader to whom the case may be novel, it suffices to state the Bs, acting upon 
the consent of the mother of the baby boy, sought his adoption. BDR, the father, 
appeared and objected to the petition for the adoption. The parties did not 
dispute BDR's paternity and, in the first hearing, the district court terminated 
BDR's parental rights and ordered adoption based upon a finding under WYO. STAT. 
§ 1-22-108(c) that BDR had not evidenced an interest in, and a responsibility 
for, the child within thirty days after receiving notice of the birth or pending 
birth of the child. As previously indicated, this court ruled the record did not 
support that determination, and the case was remanded for further proceedings to 
address the best interest and welfare of BBC, with respect to his temporary 
care, custody, and control and the father's rights and support obligations. The 
thrust of that first decision was to refer the parties to WYO. STAT. § 1-22-110 
(1988).

[¶5]      The district 
court tried again and, in the second appeal, we were constrained to conclude it 
had not accommodated to the mandate in the prior case. We reversed an order 
granting guardianship to the Bs, denying visitation rights to BDR, and removing 
any support obligations from BDR. We there said:

We remand to the district court and order the 
district court to: (1) maintain the status quo, concerning BBC's temporary 
care[,] custody and control, as it existed before the district court's June 29, 
1992 order; (2) grant all parties leave to amend the pleadings and proper amount 
of time to answer opposing pleadings; and (3) after all the pleadings are filed, 
hold an evidentiary hearing to 
determine, based on the circumstances as they exist today, the best interest of 
BBC and BDR's rights and duties.

BBC II, 849 P.2d  at 774 
(emphasis added).

[¶6]      We now are 
confronted with an appeal from an order by the district court which was 
substantially similar to the prior order and essentially added only the 
provision BBC would now be known by a name bestowed upon him by the Bs. It is 
clear this order was entered after a truncated hearing held by the district 
court in which a local rule in vogue in the Seventh Judicial District was 
invoked in the Eighth Judicial District. Testimony by witnesses was limited to 
the testimony of the parties and one expert on each side. Apparently, for 
purposes of applying the rule, the mother of BBC was treated as a party. In the 
course of dialogue between the court and the parties, the trial court expressed 
the opinion that the Supreme Court had ruled an adoption could not be achieved 
in this case.

[¶7]      In BBC I, this 
court ruled the adoption could not be granted pursuant to the provisions of WYO. 
STAT. § 1-22-108 because the requisite finding upon which the court relied was 
not supported in the record. This court did not foreclose proceedings conducted 
in light of WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108, but the manner in which this ruling was 
addressed by the parties and the trial court demonstrates an abandonment of any 
effort to proceed under that provision in the statutes, and we conclude the law 
of this case now is that an adoption cannot be ordered relying only upon the 
provisions of WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108. See Matter of Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984 
(Wyo. 1986).

[¶8]      We are puzzled, 
however, by the conclusion that this court has foreclosed the adoption of BBC. 
While the parties and the trial court apparently have taken cognizance of WYO. 
STAT. § 1-22-110, the truncated hearing held by the district court was 
completely inadequate to permit the parties to debate the issue of whether 
adoption could be ordered under that statute. The Bs did not bring any current 
evidence addressing any of the grounds justifying adoption without consent under 
that statute, but relied upon the prior record. BDR was not allowed to present 
evidence that would be relevant to any of those issues.

[¶9]      We acknowledge 
resolution of an adoption under WYO. STAT. § 1-22-110 is difficult in light of 
the proceedings in this case. In re Adoption of Female Child X, 537 P.2d 719 
(Wyo. 1975). BDR initially was not advised of the birth of the child and had 
difficulty finding out what had become of the child. Subsequently, he was 
foreclosed from contact with the child and, by judicial fiat, was excused from 
support. Nevertheless, the adoption code of the State of Wyoming is found in 
WYO. STAT. §§ 1-22-101 to -116 (1988) and, as we stated clearly and forcefully 
in BBC I, 831 P.2d  at 200, quoting from prior Wyoming 
cases:

[A]doption statutes are strictly construed when the 
proceeding is against a non-consenting parent and every reasonable intendment is 
made in favor of that parent's claims.

Matter of Adoption of Voss, 
550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976) (citations omitted).

Such strict construction is mandated by the fact that 
parental rights are fundamental rights.

Matter of Adoption of CCT, 
640 P.2d 73, 75 (Wyo. 1982) (emphasis added).

[¶10]   This court, as indicated, has 
concluded not only that parental rights are fundamental rights, but they are of 
constitutional magnitude. Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 1984); DS v. Dept. of 
Pub. Assistance & Social Services, 607 P.2d 911 (Wyo. 1980). See Nulle v. 
Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 1990), and 
the cases cited therein. When addressing fundamental rights of constitutional 
magnitude, the court must accommodate to the keenest spirit of procedural due 
process. That is the suggestion this court endeavored to communicate in BBC I 
and BBC II but, apparently, the message was not received.

[¶11]   We have not dealt at length with 
each issue articulated by the parties, but those issues have been substantially 
resolved or will be resolved by the district court in connection with the remand 
and new hearing. In some instances, the resolution is obvious. We reverse the 
order entered in this case on November 5, 1993, and we remand it to the district 
court of the Eighth Judicial District. We are committed to the earliest possible 
resolution of this case; neither the parties nor the child should be suspended 
in the judicial equivalent of outer space any longer.

[¶12]   The court is instructed that one of 
the judges of the Eighth Judicial District, both of whom have assumed the bench 
subsequent to the initiation of these proceedings, should now handle this case 
unless recused or appropriately challenged. Under no circumstances should it be 
reassigned to the judge who has heretofore handled the matter. We reiterate the 
suggestion in BBC II that the parties should be afforded an opportunity to 
expand in any appropriate way they choose upon the pleadings they have presented 
to formulate the issues in this case, although this court's impression is that 
those issues are relatively clearly defined. A full and complete hearing shall 
be held by the court in which the parties should have the broadest possible 
opportunity to offer relevant evidence addressing the issues which the court 
must necessarily determine in an adoption proceeding. Because the appropriate 
hearing must be held at this time, instead of when it should have been held, the 
court needs to satisfy itself with respect to the current, as well as the 
historical, relevant facts.

[¶13]   We acknowledge we have remanded to 
the district court a case that well could tax the wisdom of Solomon. 
Nevertheless, BBC, the Bs, and BDR all are entitled to some definitive 
resolution of this case. It is legally and morally inappropriate to leave it 
simply in the status of a guardianship that attempts to imitate an adoption, but 
affords to none of those involved the certainty of the rights that attach or are 
lost pursuant to a legal adoption.

 

CARDINE, 
J., Retired, filed a dissenting opinion.

CARDINE, 
Justice, Retired, dissenting.

 

[¶14]   This case is a sad illustration of 
much of what is wrong with today's justice delivery system. Justice delayed is 
justice denied - slow justice is no justice. If nothing else is learned from 
this case, we at least ought to recognize the need to assign these type cases to 
a fast track disposition and so provide by court rule if 
necessary.

[¶15]   Baby Boy BBC was born August 18, 
1990, and delivered by the unwed natural mother to the custody of BEB and PJB 
(hereinafter the Bs) with her consent to adoption of BBC. BDR, the natural 
father living apart from the mother, learned of the birth of BBC, refused his 
consent to adoption, appeared at a hearing, resisted the Bs efforts to adopt, 
and continues that resistance now through a third district court hearing and a 
third appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court. What should be 
done?

[¶16]   I would hold that the Bs proceeded 
in good faith. They wanted to adopt. There was an unwed mother who offered her 
baby with consent to adopt. BDR, the father, refused to consent. The Bs assessed 
their prospects for adoption as they existed at that time: that is, what were 
the prospects for adopting with a consenting mother, a single man claimed to be 
the natural father who was said to be an oil field hand, alleged unstable, 
drinking, apparently angry at mother (girl-friend) who had terminated their 
relationship. The Bs proceeded with the adoption hearing on these facts, 
prepared then to accept a win-or-lose decision. If the case had then been 
finally disposed of with victory to either party, the result, while unhappy for 
the loser, would have been acceptable to society.

[¶17]   But here we are with a little boy 
who is in his fourth year of life with the Bs, the only parents he has ever 
known. Surely it is not in his best interests that he be torn from these people 
and placed forever with those who are now strangers. What devastation, what 
trauma, for a four year old. If all that is left for determination is the best 
interests of the child, the Bs must prevail.

[¶18]   Finally, the problem I have with 
this case is that every time we see it (now for a third time) it is a different 
case. There are more motions, amended pleadings, new issues, new evidence, new 
testimony, hearings, briefs and arguments. BDR is now married, maintains a home 
with his wife and children, alleges employment and stability. A party should not 
gain advantage, or be put at a disadvantage, by delay and passage of time. I 
would hold that the facts as they existed at the time of the first hearing are 
the determinative facts. Thus, the Bs should not benefit because Baby Boy BBC 
has been in their custody for four plus years, and BDR should not benefit 
because of his claimed change in life style and bettered situation. If 
additional evidence is taken, it should be confined to those facts and the time 
frame before the first hearing, not to what has occurred since that time. 
Accordingly,

[¶19]   I dissent.