Title: Campbell v. City of Gardendale

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: September 4, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 SPECIAL TERM, 2020
_________________________
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_________________________
Jay Campbell, on behalf of himself and a certified class of
other persons similarly situated
v.
City of Gardendale, Alabama; Jefferson County, Alabama; and
J.T. Smallwood, in his official capacity as Tax Collector of
Jefferson County, Alabama
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-18-900762)
SHAW, Justice.
The plaintiff below, Jay Campbell, on behalf of himself
and a certified class of "other persons similarly situated,"
appeals from a summary judgment on claims challenging the
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constitutionality of two municipal taxes adopted in 2013 by
the City of Gardendale ("Gardendale") in connection with
Gardendale's planned creation of a municipal school system. 
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Because Gardendale, which is located in Jefferson County
("the 
County"), 
lacks 
a 
municipal 
school 
system, 
public-school
students 
residing 
in 
Gardendale have 
attended 
schools 
operated
by the Jefferson County Board of Education ("the County Board
of Education").  "A racial desegregation order issued in 1971
still governs the Jefferson County Board of Education in
Alabama."  Stout v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 882 F.3d 988,
991 (11th Cir. 2018).  Residents of the County pay an ad
valorem tax ("the county school tax"), imposed pursuant to
Amendment No. 82, Ala. Const. 1901 (codified as Local
Amendments, Jefferson County, § 14, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off.
Recomp.)) ("Local Amendment 14"),1 which is discussed in depth
below.  All proceeds of the county school tax are remitted
1According to Gardendale, "Local Amendment 14 authorized
only 5 mills but later amendments ... increased the millage
[to the current] rate [of] 8.8." 
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directly to the County Board of Education for education-
related purposes.  
In or around 2012, Gardendale undertook steps toward
establishing a municipal school system.  Stout, 882 F.3d at
991, 997.  In connection with this, plans were made for the
creation of a separate school board and for the levying of
municipal taxes to support the proposed municipal school
system.  Id. at 998.  In 2013, Gardendale's City Council
adopted Ordinance No. 2013-11, approving, for the tax year
beginning October 1, 2013, the collection of a five-mill ad
valorem tax.2  Ordinance No. 2013-11 was titled "[An]
Ordinance Establishing the Levy of a 5-Mill Ad Valorem Tax on
All Property in the City of Gardendale for Public School
Purposes" and stated that the resulting proceeds "shall be
used for public school purposes."  Also in 2013, the citizens
of Gardendale later ratified by referendum vote "an additional
5-mill ad valorem tax ... for public school purposes"  (the
2As demonstrated by their filings below, the parties
appear to agree that, under Ala. Const. 1901, Art. XI, §§ 216
and 216.04, a municipality may levy up to a 5-mill general ad
valorem tax for any lawful municipal purpose by city-council
action alone; the levy amount may be increased to up to 12.5
mills by a vote of all qualified electors in the municipality.
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foregoing taxes are hereinafter collectively referred to as
"the Gardendale school taxes").  The Gardendale City Council
next appointed the members of an inaugural board of education
("the Gardendale Board of Education"), which then selected a
superintendent.
After protracted litigation in federal court challenging
Gardendale's ongoing plans as being in violation of a prior
federal desegregation order, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit released its opinion in
Stout, supra.  The court held that Gardendale failed to comply
with precedent requiring the proposal and defense of "a
secession plan that will not impede the desegregation efforts
of the school district subject to an ongoing desegregation
order."  882 F.3d at 1013.  While acknowledging the
possibility that Gardendale might, "for permissible purposes
in the future, satisf[y] its burden to develop a secession
plan that will not impede the desegregation efforts of the
Jefferson County Board [of Education]," the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that Gardendale's present plan did not clear the
requisite legal hurdles.  Id. at 1016.  Therefore, the court
remanded the matter with instructions that the federal
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district court deny Gardendale's attempt to withdraw from the
County Board of Education school system to form a municipal
school system.  Id. at 1017.
Subsequently, Campbell, a Gardendale resident, filed a
complaint  against Gardendale; the County; and J.T. Smallwood,
the County's tax collector, seeking class-based relief on
behalf of himself and all other similarly situated Gardendale
taxpayers.  Campbell alleged that, despite representations
that the proceeds generated by the Gardendale school taxes had
been set aside for application to school-formation efforts,
those proceeds had, instead, been applied toward "(1) paying
school administrators to supervise a non-existent school
system, and (2) funding lawyers to prosecute" the 
unsuccessful
effort to form the new municipal school system.  He further
alleged that the Gardendale school taxes themselves were, for
various reasons, illegal.  Relevant to the present appeal,
Campbell argued that Local Amendment 14 forbade the
simultaneous collection of both the county school tax and any
"special additional tax" like the Gardendale school taxes. 
Campbell sought various forms of relief, including, but not
limited to, a judgment declaring the Gardendale school taxes
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illegal, injunctive relief, and an order distributing the
proceeds collected from the Gardendale school taxes to class
members.
In lieu of an answer, Gardendale filed, pursuant to Rules
12(b)(6) and 56, Ala. R. Civ. P., a motion seeking, on various
grounds, to dismiss Campbell's complaint.  Specifically,
Gardendale argued that Campbell failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted and that his action reflected a
third identical attempt at class-based relief filed by
Campbell's counsel of record.  It explained that those prior
actions had allegedly been dismissed on the ground that,
because Gardendale then did not have a legally recognized
school system, "the case was not ripe for adjudication." 
Relying 
on 
those 
prior 
dismissals, 
Gardendale's 
motion 
invoked
principles of "issue preclusion."  
Gardendale also argued that, because it had no school
system, the Gardendale school taxes were not implicated by
Local Amendment 14 and that Campbell cited no precedent for
the proposition that the Gardendale school taxes and the
county school tax were mutually exclusive.  
Gardendale further
maintained that it levied and is collecting standard municipal
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ad valorem taxes, the proceeds of which could be used in
Gardendale's discretion to fund the County Board of Education
schools 
located 
within 
Gardendale's 
municipal 
limits
regardless of whether Gardendale operated its own municipal
school system.  Based on the foregoing and its accompanying
exhibits,3 
Gardendale sought dismissal of 
Campbell's complaint
in its entirety or a summary judgment in its favor on the
claims included in the complaint.
Thereafter, the County filed its own motion to dismiss
incorporating Gardendale's motion as to the purported
preclusive effect of the prior litigation and the absence of
any change in circumstances since those dismissals.  The
County further argued that Campbell had failed to name in his
complaint the County Board of Education, which, it alleged,
was the recipient of all proceeds of the county school tax
and, given Campbell's claims for monetary relief, was a
necessary party as defined by Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P. 
3Gardendale's exhibits included, among other items, a
prior class-action complaint filed against Gardendale in the
Jefferson Circuit Court, case no. CV-2017-900254, alleging
similar claims to those included in Campbell's complaint and
the order issued by the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing
that case. 
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Smallwood also filed a separate motion noting that Campbell's
complaint failed to allege that Smallwood did not properly
perform his official duties and did not request any particular
form of relief against him.  Smallwood therefore maintained
that Campbell's complaint failed to state a claim against him.
In his response in opposition to the motions to dismiss,
Campbell argued, among other things, that the decision in
Stout and Gardendale's failure to appeal that ruling "legally
precluded [Gardendale] from having a school district and
operating schools" –- a preclusion that, according to
Campbell,  rendered the Gardendale school taxes illegal and
led to the underlying litigation.4  Campbell also maintained
that Gardendale could not continue to collect the Gardendale
school taxes for the purpose of funding a school system that,
he argued, it could not legally operate.  Alternatively,
Campbell contended that, even if the Gardendale school taxes
were lawful, the county school tax had been illegal since the
imposition of the Gardendale school taxes under a theory that
4Campbell's 
pleadings 
below 
further 
suggest 
that
Gardendale "announced publicly that [it] was not going to seek
to operate schools."
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the illegality of "double taxation" prevents collection of
either one or the other.    
After a hearing, the trial court initially denied the
motions to dismiss and ordered the defendants to answer
Campbell's 
complaint. 
 
Thereafter, 
proceedings 
ensued
regarding the class-certification process and Campbell's
request for injunctive relief.  In addition, Campbell filed
his own "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for Summary
Judgment" on essentially the same grounds he had cited in
opposition to the defendants' earlier motions. 
Following further filings and related proceedings in this
Court,5 the trial court entered an order holding that the
prior litigation cited by Gardendale and the County had no
preclusive effect on the instant action.  Thereafter, the
parties stipulated to the propriety of class certification.
After the trial court's entry of a class-certification
order, it entered a "Final Order" denying Campbell's pending
5Gardendale filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in
this Court, which this Court denied.  Ex parte City of
Gardendale (No. 1171214, Dec. 14, 2018), 291 So. 3d 1161 (Ala.
2018) (table).
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motion for a judgment on the pleadings or for a summary
judgment, which stated, in part:
"Nothing in 
Local 
Amendment 14 
prevents the 
City
of Gardendale from levying a municipal ad valorem
tax.  Plaintiffs really do not make this contention,
instead arguing that Gardendale's decision to levy
the 10-mill ad valorem taxes earmarked for public
educational purposes may not operate alongside [the]
County's levy of the 8.8 mill [county school] tax.
"The court agrees with the defendants that the
restriction on special or additional municipal
school tax, as found in Local Amendment 14, pertains
to any such taxes levied by [the] County for the
benefit of a school district found therein.  Local
Amendment 14 does not address municipal ad valorem
taxes levied pursuant to Ala. Const., Art. XI,
Sections 216, et seq.  Rather, Local Amendment 14
serves to limit a municipal public school district
from benefiting from [the] County levy within the
district of more than 8.8 mills (absent some other
grant of authority within the Alabama Constitution).
"Because Gardendale's municipal ad valorem levy
is not a 'special or additional tax' for municipal
public school purposes within the meaning of Local
Amendment 14, such taxes are here declared to be
lawfully levied and collected. Further, the court
declares that [the] County's school district tax of
8.8 mills is also being lawfully levied and
collected in the Gardendale municipal limits.
"Plaintiffs' 
Motion 
for 
Judgment 
on 
the
Pleadings or for Summary Judgment ... is accordingly
denied.  Further, the court sua sponte reconsiders
its prior order that had denied the defendants'
motions to dismiss or in the alternative for summary
judgment....  That order is vacated, and the court
now grants summary judgment in favor of the
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defendants on all claims of the plaintiffs, for the
reasons discussed above."
Campbell appeals.
Standard of Review6
"'"This Court's review of a summary
judgment is de novo. Williams v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So. 2d 72, 74
(Ala. 2003). We apply the same standard of
review 
as 
the 
trial 
court 
applied.
Specifically, 
we 
must 
determine 
whether 
the
movant has made a prima facie showing that
no genuine issue of material fact exists
and that the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c),
Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949,
952-53 (Ala. 2004). In making such a
determination, we must review the evidence
in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756,
758 (Ala. 1986). Once the movant makes a
prima facie showing that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, the burden
then shifts to the nonmovant to produce
'substantial evidence' as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass
v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538
6Because the trial court's order specifically provided
that it considered filings of the parties other than and/or in
addition to Campbell's complaint, we treat the order as a
summary judgment in the defendants' favor.  See Rule 12(b),
Ala. R. Civ. P. ("If, on a motion ... to dismiss for failure
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, [Ala.
R. Civ. P.].").
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So. 2d 794, 797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code
1975, § 12-21-12. '[S]ubstantial evidence
is evidence of such weight and quality that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial 
judgment 
can 
reasonably 
infer 
the
existence of the fact sought to be proved.'
West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of Fla.,
547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)."'
"Prince v. Poole, 935 So. 2d 431, 442 (Ala. 2006)
(quoting Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d
1035, 1038-39 (Ala. 2004))."
Brown v. W.P. Media, Inc., 17 So. 3d 1167, 1169 (Ala. 2009).
Discussion
Local Amendment 14 provides, in pertinent part:
"Jefferson county shall have power to levy and
collect an additional tax ... for public school
purposes ...; provided that in any incorporated
municipality where special or additional taxes are
being levied and collected for public school
purposes, including the servicing of debts incurred
for public schools, the additional tax herein
provided for shall be reduced by the amount of such
special or additional municipal public school taxes
in the corporate limits where such special or
additional municipal public school taxes are being
levied and collected ...."
(Emphasis added.)  Local Amendment 14 thus provides for the
county school tax, but when a municipality has "special or
additional taxes ... for public school purposes," the county
school tax is reduced by the extent of those taxes.  
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Campbell identifies the "core legal issue" in this case
as "whether [the] Gardendale [s]chool [t]axes are 'special or
additional municipal taxes which are being levied and
collected for public school purposes' in Local Amendment 14's
parlance."  Campbell's brief at p. 13.  Because, according to
him, Local Amendment 14 prohibits "double taxation," either
the county school tax or the Gardendale school taxes must
"yield" to the other.  Campbell argues that because Gardendale
was not actually operating a school system and its students
were instead attending schools operated by the County Board of
Education, it would be "absurd" to suggest that the county
school tax would be reduced by operation of Local Amendment
14.  Thus, in order to invalidate the "double taxation," which
Campbell maintains is the goal of Local Amendment 14, he
asserts that the Gardendale school taxes must be invalidated.
Gardendale, however, 
maintains that 
the 
Gardendale school
taxes were imposed pursuant to the authority of § 11-51-1,
Ala. Code 1975,7 which, it says, provides for the levy of
7Section 11-51-1 provides, in pertinent part:
"After October 1 of each year, cities and towns
may levy taxes upon property and all subjects of
taxation liable therefor at a rate not in excess of
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property taxes by a municipality "for any lawful municipal
purposes."  Gardendale's brief at p. 6.  More specifically, it
contends that the mere earmarking of the resulting proceeds
for public-school purposes does not convert such taxes into a
"municipal public school tax" as described in Local Amendment
14, which, it continues, "refers to municipal school district
taxes 
... 
for 
existing 
municipal 
school 
districts." 
Gardendale's brief at p. 7.  Gardendale also counters that
"special" or "additional municipal public school taxes" may 
be
levied only in a municipal school-tax district that has a
public-school system, which Gardendale does not.  
"'The Constitution is a document of the people. Words or
terms used in that document must be given their ordinary
meaning common to understanding at the time of its adoption by
the people.'"  Opinion of the Justices No. 376, 825 So. 2d
109, 114 (Ala. 2002) (quoting McGee v. Borom, 341 So. 2d 141,
143 (Ala. 1976)).  In applying our constitution, this Court
the constitutional limit upon assessments to be made
by the city or town clerk or other person designated
by the council or other governing body, such
assessment to be made on the state assessment in the
manner provided by the Constitution of the state or
in the manner hereinafter authorized by law."
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"adhere[s] to the plain meaning of the text."  Jefferson Cty.
v. Weissman, 69 So. 3d 827, 834 (Ala. 2011).  If we must
construe a provision of the Constitution, "we are, if
possible, to give the instrument such construction as will
carry out the intention of the framers, and make it reasonable
rather than absurd."  State ex rel. Covington v. Thompson, 142
Ala. 98, 107, 38 So. 679, 682 (1905).
According to Local Amendment 14, the type of municipal
taxes that reduce the county school tax are "special or
additional taxes ... levied and collected for public school
purposes."  Campbell focuses his legal argument on whether the
Gardendale school taxes are "special or additional taxes" but
appears to presume that they are "collected for public school
purposes."  This latter phrase, however, is key.  Broadly
viewed, this phrase could refer to the collection of taxes to
fund a future school system, i.e., "public school purposes"
refers to any purpose connected to public education in any
way, including taxes to create a school system.  Under this
reading, the county school tax and funding to the County Board
of Education is reduced even though no municipal schools are
built or operating, no separation of the municipal system from
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the County Board of Education has occurred,8 and municipal
public-school students are still attending the county
schools.9
A more narrow reading of the phrase "collected for public
school purposes" is that it refers to the actual operation of
a municipal school system.  In that scenario, under Local
Amendment 14, the municipal taxes would be paying for the
actual operation of municipal schools by a municipal school
board instead of the County Board of Education, and the county
school tax is accordingly reduced.  Applying that reading in
the instant case, the county school tax would continue to be
collected in full while the County Board of Education still
operated the schools in Gardendale.  Only when the Gardendale
8See, e.g., § 16-8-20, Ala. Code 1975 (providing a process
for a city board of education to take control of annexed
portions of territory controlled by a county board of
education, including the requirement that the county board of
education retain supervision and control of the affected
schools until a separation agreement is reached).  According
to Gardendale, prior municipal school districts separating
from the County Board of Education entered into such
separation agreements.  It further asserts that it has never
entered into a separation agreement with the County Board of
Education.  
9If such a reading is, as Campbell suggests, absurd, then
the rules of constitutional interpretation counsel that the
reading should not be applied.  State v. Thompson, supra.
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Board of Education actually started operating schools and the
County Board no longer needed to expend funds on schools it
operated in Gardendale would the county school tax be reduced
in accord with the amount collected through the Gardendale
school taxes.10 
In any event, under either reading of Local Amendment 14
-- and we do not select one reading today because, as
explained below, it is unnecessary -- when a municipal tax is
one as described in Local Amendment 14, the effect is clearly
provided by Local Amendment 14: the county school tax is
reduced by the amount of the municipal tax.
10This second reading -- that "public school purposes"
refers to the operation of schools -- is supported by the text
of Local Amendment 14.  Specifically, it gives as an example
of the municipal taxes that reduce the county school tax as
those that are "servicing of debts incurred for public
schools," and, in another portion of the amendment not quoted
above, provides that tax funds arising from within a
municipality actually operating schools shall be expended by
the municipal authority over those schools:  
"So long as the public schools in any incorporated
municipality are operated separately from those of
Jefferson county, the funds arising from such
additional 
tax 
on 
taxable 
property 
in 
such
municipality shall be expended only by the board of
education or other authority charged with the
operation of the public schools in such municipality
and only for the benefit of the public schools
therein." 
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Under Campbell's theory of the case, the purpose of Local
Amendment 14 is to prevent "double taxation," it must operate
to invalidate any taxes that violate that principle, the only
taxes that may be invalidated in this case without an absurd
result are the Gardendale school taxes, and, thus, those taxes
must be rendered invalid.  We disagree.  Local Amendment 14 by
its terms is not a scheme to regulate, restrict, or prohibit
any or all taxation -- county-wide or municipal -- related to
school purposes.  Its language simply provides for the levy of
one tax -- the county school tax -- to support schools in
Jefferson 
County 
with 
an 
exception and 
corresponding reduction
of the tax in municipalities within the county if certain
municipal school taxes exist.  If such municipal taxes are not
actually being used for school purposes, and instead the
county school tax is still levied in full and the County Board
of Education still continues to operate the schools in that
municipality, nothing in the language in Local Amendment 14
and no authority provided by the parties indicate that the
municipal taxes are rendered invalid by operation of Local
Amendment 14.  Instead, the result that is actually prescribed
by the amendment, if applicable, would be that the county
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school tax is reduced.11  Nothing in Local Amendment 14
requires that municipal taxes be rendered invalid because the
amendment itself calls for a different result.  Further,
Campbell has not demonstrated that Local Amendment 14
expresses a policy preference against "double taxation" that
must be enforced in this case by invaliding municipal taxes
that Local Amendment 14 does not regulate; instead, the
amendment is limited to governing only the county school tax. 
Thus, we need not determine whether the Gardendale school
taxes are "special or additional taxes" being levied and
collected for public-school purposes, which is extensively
briefed by the parties, because, even if they are, they are
not, as Campbell argues, rendered invalid solely by operation
of Local Amendment 14.  Whether the Gardendale school taxes
are invalid under other theories -- for example, they were
ostensibly enacted or earmarked to fund a school system but
are not being used for that purpose -- was heavily litigated
in the trial court, but such theories are not raised and
advanced on appeal and are not before this Court.  Thus, they
11According to Campbell, in the 2017 election to
reauthorize the county school tax, Gardendale was excluded,
suggesting that the county school tax is no longer being
collected in Gardendale. 
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are waived for purposes of this appeal.  Tucker v.
Cullman-Jefferson Ctys. Gas Dist., 864 So. 2d 317, 319 (Ala.
2003).
Conclusion   
Campbell has not demonstrated that the Gardendale school
taxes are rendered invalid by operation of Local Amendment 14. 
We therefore pretermit discussion of the alternate arguments
for affirmance presented by Jefferson County and Smallwood. 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.  
AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, Stewart,
and Mitchell, JJ., concur.  
Sellers, J., concurs in the result.
20