Title: Houghton v. Franscell

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Houghton v. Franscell1994 WY 26870 P.2d 1050Case Number: 93-142Decided: 03/14/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jack 
F. HOUGHTON, in his capacity as Chief Executive Officer of

 Campbell County Hospital District, doing 
business as

 Campbell County Memorial Hospital and 
Campbell County Hospital District, 

Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

Ronald 
FRANSCELL and News-Record, Inc., d/b/a The Gillette 
News-Record,

 Appellees (Plaintiffs).

Appeal 
from the District Court, Campbell County, Dan R. Price, II, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellants:

Thomas 
E. Lubnau II and Daniel B. Bailey, Lubnau and Bailey, Gillette.

Representing 
Appellee:

Michael 
J. Krampner, Casper.

Richard 
Rideout, Herschler, Freudenthal, Salzburg, Bonds & Rideout, P.C., Cheyenne, 
amici curiae, for Campbell County Med. Soc.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      This appeal 
concerns the interpretation of WYO. STAT. § 16-4-203(d)(vii) (1990) which 
withdraws from public inspection "[h]ospital records relating to medical 
administration, medical staff, personnel, medical care and other medical 
information, whether on individual persons or groups, or whether of a general or 
specific classification." At issue is a so-called physician recruitment contract 
between the hospital district, through its governing board, and a private health 
care provider, which contains information of the financial inducements paid by 
the district to the health care provider to induce the latter to relocate to the 
district's geographical area. We must decide whether such a contract is a 
hospital record exempt from public inspection under WYO. STAT. § 
16-4-203(d).

[¶2]      The district 
court held as a matter of law that physician recruitment contracts are not 
included within those exempt hospital records and ordered disclosure of the 
contracts. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant 
Campbell County Hospital District presents the following issue for 
review:

Does 
the exception to the Wyoming Public Records Act contained in Wyoming Statute § 
16-4-203(d)(vii) include physician recruitment contracts?

[¶4]      Appellee, the 
Gillette News-Record, rephrases the issue as:

Are 
contracts guaranteeing a minimum income, as well as other financial incentives, 
between a public hospital district and a doctor, exempt from disclosure under 
Wyoming Public Records Act Section 16-4-203(d)(vii)?

FACTS

[¶5]      On October 22, 
1992, appellee Gillette News-Record requested from appellant Campbell County 
Hospital District access to any and all records concerning guarantees of income 
made to physician locating in Gillette, specifically the physician recruitment 
contract entered into with Dr. Michael Darnell. The parties agree that the 
pertinent information sought, in the form of the physician recruitment contract, 
includes guarantees of income and other financial benefits to specific 
physicians and the physicians' obligations in return. The hospital district 
refused to disclose the records, contending the physician recruitment contracts 
were hospital records exempt from disclosure under WYO. STAT. § 
16-4-203(d)(vii).

[¶6]      Appellee filed a 
Petition and Complaint for Access to Records in district court on January 
25, 1993. Trial was held on April 14, 1993, and the district court entered its 
judgment and order on April 22, 1993. The district court held the physician 
recruitment contract did not constitute a hospital record exempt from disclosure 
under WYO. STAT. § 16-4-203(d)(vii) and ordered the hospital district to 
disclose the contract to appellee. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I

[¶7]      The Wyoming 
Public Records Act, WYO. STAT. § 16-4-201 et seq. (1990), permits any 
person to access public records. WYO. STAT. § 16-4-202(a) provides in part: "All 
public records shall be open for inspection by any person at reasonable times, 
except as provided in this act or as otherwise provided by law * * 
*."

[¶8]      The object of the 
public records act is disclosure, not secrecy, and we therefore interpret the 
act liberally in favor of disclosure, construing all exemptions narrowly. 
Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785, 793, 794 
(Wyo. 1983); and Laramie River Conservation Council v. Dinger, 567 P.2d 731, 733 (Wyo. 1977). Legislation requiring disclosure of information is 
considered remedial, and

[r]emedial 
statutes are liberally construed to suppress the evil and advance the remedy. 
The policy that a remedial statute should be liberally construed in order to 
effectuate the remedial purpose for which it was enacted is firmly 
established.

NORMAN 
J. SINGER, 3 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.01 at 147 (5th Ed. 1992). 
See also, Heltzel v. Thomas, 516 N.E.2d 103, 106 (Ind. App. 1987). The remedial 
purpose of the public records act is to permit access to public records unless 
disclosure would inflict irreparable harm contrary to protected 
rights.

The 
courts, legislature, administrative agencies, and the state, county and 
municipal governments should be ever mindful that theirs is public business and 
the public has a right to know how its servants are conducting its business. * * 
* The citizenry must be permitted to hear and see what public officers and their 
employees say and do whenever the imparting of this knowledge does not run 
contrary to the rights of those otherwise protected in a way that would result 
in disclosure having the effect of inflicting such irreparable harm as is 
recognized at law.

Sheridan 
Newspapers, 
660 P.2d  at 791.

[¶9]      Maintaining an 
open and accountable government is particularly important with respect to the 
expenditure of public funds. Record-Times v. Town of Wheatland, Etc., 650 P.2d 297, 300 (Wyo. 1982). "Where a public interest is affected, an 
interpretation is preferred which favors the public." NORMAN J. SINGER, 2B 
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 56.01 at 303 (5th Ed. 1992). In this 
instance, the public interest affected is the public's right to access 
information concerning the expenditure of public funds to enhance the quality of 
a community's health care. In Sheridan Newspapers this court confirmed the 
public's interest in disclosure and the presumption favoring that 
interest.

[T]he 
language of the statute imposes a legislative presumption which says that, where 
public records are involved, the denial of inspection is contrary to the public 
policy, the public interest and the competing interests of those 
involved.

Sheridan 
Newspapers, 
660 P.2d  at 796.

[¶10]   This court has also recognized that 
the freedom-of-the-press and due process provisions of the Federal and Wyoming 
constitutions guarantee a person's right to access public records, and absent a 
compelling state interest, the state may not exclude an entire class of records 
from public inspection. Sheridan Newspapers, 660 P.2d  at 794 (citing 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 2692, 33 L. Ed. 2d 626 
(1972); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 2809, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1974); also citing WYO.CONST. art. 1 §§ 6, 20 and U.S. 
CONST. amend. I, XIV). See also Record-Times, 650 P.2d  at 301 n. 4 
(citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 
449 U.S. 894, 101 S. Ct. 259, 66 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1980); Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 61 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1979)). We stated 
in Sheridan Newspapers that

[t]he 
legislature does indeed have authority to promulgate and has imposed such 
statutory restraints upon the news-gathering business as will best serve the 
public good. These restraints may not, however, unlawfully deny the people's 
right to be kept informed. A restriction having this effect would run the risk 
of a First or Fourteenth Amendment violation.

Sheridan 
Newspapers, 
660 P.2d  at 795.

[¶11]   It is in light of the legislative 
presumption of openness, and in keeping with the constitutional right of access 
to public records that we interpret the exemption to disclosure provided by WYO. 
STAT. § 16-4-203(d)(vii).

II

[¶12]   WYO. STAT. § 16-4-203 exempts 
certain records from disclosure under the act. This appeal requires that we 
interpret the exemption found at WYO. STAT. § 16-4-203(d)(vii). That provision 
reads:

(d) 
The custodian shall deny the right of inspection of the following records, 
unless otherwise provided by law:

(vii) 
Hospital records relating to medical administration, medical staff, personnel, 
medical care and other medical information, whether on individual persons or 
groups, or whether of a general or specific classification.

[¶13]   This court has stated that "the 
initial step in arriving at a correct interpretation * * * is an inquiry 
respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to 
their arrangement and connection." Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyoming 
Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting 
Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). A statute "must 
be construed as a whole in order to ascertain its intent and general purpose and 
also the meaning of each part." Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1042 (quoting Ross 
v. Trustees of Univ. of Wyoming, 31 Wyo. 464, 489, 228 P. 642, 651 (1924)). 
This court gives effect to every word, clause and sentence, construing all 
components of a statute in pari materia. Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1042. We 
presume that the legislature enacts statutes "with full knowledge of the 
existing condition of the law and with reference to it." Parker, 845 P.2d  
at 1044 (quoting Civic Ass'n of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 57 Wyo. 
213, 238, 116 P.2d 236, 245 (1941)).

[¶14]   When we interpret a statute, 
reading it as a whole, we must determine whether the language of the statute is 
plain and unambiguous. A "statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that 
reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistence and 
predictability." Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1043 (quoting Allied-Signal, Inc. 
v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 1991)). A 
statute is ambiguous if "its meaning is uncertain, doubtful, or if a single term 
can fairly be said to mean different things." Moncrief v. Wyoming State Bd. 
of Equalization, 856 P.2d 440, 443 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Amoco Production 
Co. v. State, 751 P.2d 379, 381 (Wyo. 1988)).

[¶15]   If the language of the statute is 
plain and unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning and need not consult the 
numerous rules of statutory construction. W.A.R.M. v. Bonds, 866 P.2d 1291, 1294 
(Wyo. 1994); Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1043. However, while a determination that the 
meaning is not subject to varying interpretations will usually end our inquiry, 
we may resort to extrinsic aids of interpretation, such as legislative history 
and rules of construction, to confirm our determination. Parker, 845 P.2d  at 
1045. To determine the legislative intent in enacting a statute, or a provision 
thereof, we have said

the 
court * * * must look to the mischief the act was intended to cure, the 
historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, 
the conditions of the law and all other prior and contemporaneous facts and 
circumstances that would enable the court intelligently to determine the 
intention of the lawmaking body.

Parker, 
845 P.2d  at 1044 (quoting Carter v. Thompson Realty Co., 58 Wyo. 279, 
291, 131 P.2d 297, 299 (1942)).

III

[¶16]   Appellant hospital district asserts 
that the language of the exemption is plain and unambiguous and excludes from 
public inspection, among other records, all hospital or hospital district 
records relating to medical staff. Appellant contends that a physician 
recruitment contract is a contract between the hospital and a member of the 
hospital staff and thus constitutes a hospital record relating to medical 
staff.

[¶17]   Appellee newspaper agrees that the 
language is plain and unambiguous, but contends that the exemption does not 
include hospital district records and excludes from public inspection only 
hospital records relating to medical information concerning specific patients. 
Appellee argues that hospital records are not the same as hospital district 
records, physicians entering into the agreements with the hospital district are 
not members of the hospital staff and, when read in conjunction with the other 
exemptions, hospital records cannot include contracts to spend public 
funds.

[¶18]   Having carefully reviewed the 
language of WYO. STAT. § 16-4-203(d)(vii) and considered the competing 
arguments, we hold the language is plain and unambiguous, and we agree with 
appellee's construction, although we do not limit the exemption to medical 
information only1.

[¶19]   In determining the types of records 
exempted from disclosure by 16-4-203(d)(vii), we initially consider the ordinary 
meaning of hospital record. A record is defined as "a body of 
known or recorded facts regarding something or someone." Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary 984 (9th ed. 1988). Webster's defines a 
hospital as "an institution where the sick or injured are given medical 
or surgical care." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 583 (9th ed. 
1988).2 We thus conclude that the ordinary 
meaning of hospital record is a body of information developed or maintained by a 
hospital concerning its day-to-day business of providing medical or surgical 
care to the sick or injured.3

[¶20]   Having ascertained the ordinary 
definition of hospital record, we must next determine what constitutes a 
hospital record relating to medical administration or medical staff. We have 
reviewed the hospital records exemption in conjunction with the other exemptions 
found under WYO. STAT. § 16-4-203(d), and the statute sets forth ten 
classifications of information withdrawn from public inspection. The common 
thread running through these ten classifications is personal information 
instinct with a privacy interest.

[¶21]   Our review of the public records 
statutes of all the states and the District of Columbia suggests that protection 
of privacy interests is generally the focus of hospital/medical record 
exemptions. We found only one state whose public records statute uses language 
similar to Wyoming's in exempting hospital records from public access. 
See MD.STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-616(j) (1993). The majority of other 
jurisdictions specifically limits the exemption to one of the following 
categories of records: medical records concerning a patient, hospital/medical 
records where disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, or 
a more general exemption of all records whose disclosure would constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of privacy.4

[¶22]   Georgia is among the states which 
exempts from public inspection medical records the disclosure of which would 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. See GA. CODE ANN. § 
40-2703(c)(1) (Harrison Supp. 1993). The Supreme Court of Georgia has defined an 
unwarranted invasion of privacy, for purposes of exemption under the Georgia 
Open Records Act, as

unwarranted 
publicity, unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, or 
the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public had no legitimate 
concern.

Richmond 
County. Hosp. Auth. v. S.E. Newspapers Corp., 
252 Ga. 19, 311 S.E.2d 806, 807 (1984) (citations omitted). In that case, the 
Georgia court held that the Richmond County Hospital Authority was properly 
ordered to disclose the names and salaries of those persons employed by the 
Authority who earn $28,000 or more per year. The court determined that the 
public had a legitimate interest in the operation of the hospital and the 
salaries paid, and that revealing the names and salaries did not constitute an 
invasion of privacy as defined above. Richmond, 311 S.E.2d  at 
807.

[¶23]   We adopt Georgia's definition of 
invasion of privacy for purposes of exempting records from disclosure under the 
public records act. As we noted earlier, an open and accountable government is 
particularly important with respect to the expenditure of public funds. Members 
of the public have a legitimate interest in the operation of the county hospital 
and in the amount the community is spending to attract health care providers. 
Balanced against this interest, we conclude that disclosure of financial 
agreements between a county and a physician is not an unwarranted invasion of 
privacy, and such financial agreements are not the type of record the 
legislature sought to shield from inspection when it exempted hospital records 
from disclosure.

[¶24]   We find this conclusion supported 
by the fact that there is no hint in any of the ten withdrawal classifications 
concerning the expenditure of public funds. In fact, in that particular respect, 
WYO. STAT. § 16-4-203(d)(iii) contains language in the last sentence expressly 
stating that information of the terms and conditions of public employment is not 
considered part of a personnel file and, therefore, shall not be withdrawn from 
public inspection.5 One of the usual terms of a public 
employment document is the amount of public monies that will be paid by the 
public body to the public employee for services rendered. Thus, information of 
the expenditure of public funds in that employment context is expressly 
available for public inspection. It is but a short step, it seems to us, from 
the expenditure of public funds for employment purposes to the expenditure of 
public funds to induce a health care provider to relocate to a community so that 
he or she may offer and provide, for private remuneration in addition to the 
initial public financial inducement, his or her health care services to private 
patients.

[¶25]   From this close analogy, we are 
comfortable in holding that the legislature intended that information regarding 
the amount of financial inducement paid by a public body to a health care 
provider to relocate to a Wyoming community be available to public inspection. 
Given the overriding public interest in the full disclosure of information of 
expenditure of public funds, any legislative restriction on the disclosure of 
such public information must be expressly textual. (See cases in which we have 
held that the legislative intent to waive sovereign immunity, and legislative 
intent in the area of tax imposition, must be expressly textual. Wyoming 
Mining Ass'n. v. State, 748 P.2d 718, 721 (Wyo. 1988); Retail Clerks 
Local 187 v. Univ. of Wyoming, 531 P.2d 884, 886 (Wyo. 1975); Kelsey v. 
Taft, 72 Wyo. 210, 219-20, 263 P.2d 135, 137-38 (1953)).

[¶26]   Although we are not presented with 
a constitutional challenge to the hospital records exemption, we reiterate that 
a constitutional right to access public records does exist and, absent a 
compelling state interest, that right cannot be denied. A review of the language 
prefacing the hospital records exemption demonstrates the legislature did not 
intend to create an exemption which would deny the public its constitutional 
right of access. That language provides "[t]he custodian shall deny the right of 
inspection * * * unless otherwise provided by law." WYO. STAT. § 
16-4-203(d).

[¶27]   We find it highly unlikely the 
legislature intended to create a blanket exemption for all records developed or 
retained by the hospital in the ordinary course of its business. An exemption 
insulating from public review all the records of a public entity probably would 
not pass constitutional muster, and as noted above, the legislature did not 
intend to deny the public a right of access otherwise provided by 
law.

[¶28]   We hold that a body of information, 
held by an institution where the sick or injured are given medical or surgical 
care, recording the amount of public funds and benefits expended by a public 
entity to induce a private health care provider to relocate to a Wyoming 
community where that private health care provider will thereafter offer his or 
her health care services to private patients, is not a hospital record relating 
to medical administration, medical staff, personnel, medical care and other 
medical information as set forth in WYO. STAT. § 16-4-203(d)(vii).

CONCLUSION

[¶29]   We would do well to remember the 
wisdom eloquently expressed by the two most influential founders of our country. 
Thomas Jefferson wrote:

[T]he 
good sense of the people will always be found to be the best army. They may be 
led astray for a moment, but will soon correct themselves. The people are the 
only censors of their governors; and even their errors will tend to keep these 
to the true principles of their institution. To Punish these errors too severely 
would be to suppress the only safeguard of the public liberty. The way to 
prevent these irregular interpositions of the people, is to give them full 
information of their affairs through the channel of the public papers, and to 
contrive that those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people. The 
basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object 
should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should 
have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I 
should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter. But I should mean that every 
man should receive those papers, and be capable of reading them * * *. Cherish, 
therefore, the spirit of our people, and keep alive their attention. Do not be 
too severe upon their errors, but reclaim them by enlightening them.

Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel Edward Carrington (January 16, 1787) in THE 
LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON at 411-12 (Adrienne Koch & 
William Peden eds., 1972).

[¶30]   Thirty-five years later, James 
Madison forcefully observed:

A 
Popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it is 
but a Prologue to a Farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever 
govern ignorance; and the people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm 
themselves with the power which knowledge gives.

Letter 
from James Madison to W.T. Barry (August 4, 1822) in THE COMPLETE MADISON at 377 
(Padover ed. 1953), as quoted in John J. Watkins, Access to Public 
Records Under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 37 ARK.L.REV. 742, 
839 n. 434 (1984).

[¶31]   WYO. STAT. § 16-4-203(d)(vii) 
exempts from disclosure under the Public Records Act only those records the 
disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. We 
affirm the district court's decision ordering disclosure of the physician 
recruitment contract.

Footnotes

1 
Our research in this case led us to a Wyoming Attorney General Opinion. The 
opinion related to the applicability of the hospital records exemption to 
information concerning compensation of hospital administrators and employees. 
The opinion reached the conclusion that the exemption applied only to medical 
information. We note, however, that the legislature subsequently removed the 
comma following the term "medical care" so that the current version of the 
exemption reads "medical care and other medical information," as opposed to 
"medical care, and other medical information." We thus conclude that the 
legislature intended to clarify that the exemption is not limited to medical 
information only. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 73 (1973).

2 
The term is similarly defined in several Wyoming statutes. WYO. STAT. § 
35-2-403(b)(i) (Supp. 1989) defines hospital as

any 
institution, place, building or agency in which any accommodation is maintained, 
furnished or offered for the hospitalization of the sick or injured or care of 
any person requiring or receiving chronic or convalescent care, and includes 
public health centers, community mental health centers and other types of 
hospitals and centers, including but not limited to general, tuberculosis, 
mental and chronic disease hospitals, and also medical facilities, and related 
facilities.

Hospital 
is again defined at WYO. STAT. § 35-2-605(a)(ix) (Supp. 1991) as

[an] 
establishment with [an] organized medical staff, with permanent facilities that 
include inpatient beds, and with medical services, including physician services 
and continuous nursing services, to provide diagnosis, treatment and continuity 
of care for patients.

See 
also 
WYO. STAT. § 35-2-901(a)(xiii) (Supp. 1989).

3 
A review of the definition of hospital records provided in other state statutes 
confirms this definition. For example, Mississippi defines hospital 
record:

"Hospital 
records" shall mean, without restriction, those medical histories, records, 
reports, summaries, diagnoses and prognoses, records of treatment and medication 
ordered and given, notes, entries, X-rays and other written or graphic data 
prepared, kept, made or maintained in hospitals that pertain to hospital 
confinements or hospital services rendered to patients admitted to hospitals or 
receiving emergency room or outpatient care. * * * Such records shall not, 
however, include ordinary business records pertaining to patients' accounts or 
the administration of the institution.

MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 41-9-61(b) (1993).

Tennessee 
defines hospital record at TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-302(5) (1992 & 
Supp. 1993):

(A) 
"Hospital records" means those medical histories, records, reports, summaries, 
diagnoses, prognoses, records of treatment and medication ordered and given, 
entries, X rays, radiology interpretations, and other written or graphic data 
prepared, kept, made or maintained in hospitals that pertain to hospital 
confinements or hospital services rendered to patients admitted to hospitals or 
receiving emergency room or outpatient care.

* 
* * * * *

(C) 
Such records shall not, however, include ordinary business records pertaining to 
patients' accounts or the administration of the institution * * *.

4 
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(2) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 
1993); CAL.GOV'T CODE § 6254(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 1-19(b)(2) (1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(d)(1) (1991); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 40-2703(c)(1) (Harrison Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-3 (Burns 
1987 & Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-221(3), (30) (1993); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 4.1801(13)(1) (Callaghan 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712.05(2) 
(1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:5 (1990 & Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 
192.525 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-504(a)(1) (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
63-2-302 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 317(b)(7) (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 42.17.310 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-4 
(1993).

5 
WYO. STAT. § 16-4-203(d)(iii) reads, in relevant part:

Employment 
contracts, working agreements or other documents setting forth the terms and 
conditions of employment of public officials and employees are not considered 
part of a personnel file and shall be available for public 
inspection.