Title: Sandborn v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Sandborn v. State1987 WY 41735 P.2d 435Case Number: 86-226Decided: 04/10/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
Michael 
J. SANDBORN, Appellant (Appellant/Defendant)

 
 
v.

 
 
The 
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Appellee/Plaintiff)

 
 
State 
Public Defender Program: Leonard Munker, State Public Defender, and Julie D. 
Naylor, Appellate Counsel; Wyoming Defender Aid Program: Gerald M. 
Gallivan, Director, and Michelle R. Whetsel, Student Intern, for 
Appellant.

 
 
A. G. 
McClintock, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Terry L. Armitage, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee. 

 
 
Brown, 
C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ. 

 
 
MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Michael 
Sandborn was convicted in county court of driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, in violation of § 31-5-233, 
W.S.1977, and operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver's license, 
in violation of § 31-7-106, W.S.1977. He was 
fined $525 plus costs and sentenced to 30 days in jail. The sentence was 
suspended, and appellant was placed on probation for a period of six 
months.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant asks this 
Court to consider the following issues:

 
 
"I. 
Whether or not the warrantless arrest of appellant in his home for a 
misdemeanor, absent exigent circumstances, violates appellant's Fourth Amendment 
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

 
 
"II. 
Whether or not the warrantless arrest of appellant in his home, for a 
misdemeanor, violates W.S. § 7-2-103 'Arrests 
Without Warrants.'"

 
 

[¶4.]     On December 21, 1985, 
at approximately 2:30 a.m., Deputy Michael Ashlock of the SheridanCounty sheriff's office received a report of an 
accident involving property damage at a residence located in Story, Wyoming. Upon his arrival at the scene 
approximately 30 minutes later, Deputy Ashlock observed an unoccupied pickup 
truck in the ditch off the right side of the road. Its front end was smashed 
into the fence. The deputy questioned Louis Galloway, the owner of the property 
and the individual who reported the accident. On the basis of the information 
obtained from Galloway and a vehicle registration check, Deputy Ashlock drove to 
appellant's home just east of the Galloway 
property. There, he met appellant's wife who was leaving to go talk to 
Galloway. Deputy Ashlock accompanied 
appellant's wife back to the Galloway residence 
where she and Galloway discussed the damaged fence. Deputy Ashlock then drove 
her back to her house. At this point, he asked her for permission to enter the 
house and talk to appellant. Appellant's wife consented and led the deputy to 
the room where appellant was sleeping. Deputy Ashlock awakened appellant and, 
after observing and questioning him, placed him under arrest. Appellant was 
taken to the SheridanCounty sheriff's office where he submitted 
to a breathalyzer test.

 
 

[¶5.]     On January 14, 1986, 
prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress the results of the 
breathalyzer test. A hearing was held on the motion on February 14, 1986, at 
which time appellant argued that Deputy Ashlock's nighttime warrantless entry 
into his home violated the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable 
searches and seizures and, consequently, any evidence obtained therefrom must be 
suppressed. Following the testimony of witnesses and argument of counsel, the 
county court informed the parties that the determinative issue was whether 
Deputy Ashlock had consent to enter appellant's home. The court took the matter 
under advisement in order to consider Welsh v. Wisconsin, infra, the 
authority relied upon by appellant in support of his claim that the entry was 
unlawful. On March 19, 1986, apparently having found Welsh v. Wisconsin 
unsupportive of appellant's claim, the county court denied appellant's motion to 
suppress.

 
 

[¶6.]     The case was tried 
before the county court on June 11, 1986, and appellant was found guilty and 
sentenced on both charges. Appellant appealed to the district court on June 13, 
1986. From the district court's order affirming the county court's judgment, 
appellant now appeals to this Court.

 
 
I

 
 

[¶7.]     In his first argument 
before this Court, appellant claims that his arrest violated the Fourth 
Amendment in that exigent circumstances did not exist justifying a nighttime 
warrantless entry into his home. In support of his claim, appellant cites 
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732 
(1984), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless nighttime entry into a 
person's home absent exigent circumstances. Appellant's reliance on Welsh v. 
Wisconsin is misplaced. In that case, there was no determination by the 
trial court as to whether the police obtained consent to enter the suspect's 
home. The United States Supreme Court assumed that there was no valid consent to 
enter merely for the purposes of deciding the question of exigent circumstances. 
However, upon finding that exigent circumstances did not exist justifying the 
warrantless nighttime entry, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the state 
court for determination of whether the arrest was justified on the basis that 
the police validly obtained consent to enter the defendant's home. Thus, the 
rule established in Welsh v. Wisconsin is applicable only where the 
police enter a person's home without a warrant or without 
consent.

 
 

[¶8.]     Because we hold in the 
present case that Deputy Ashlock validly obtained consent to enter appellant's 
home, we find it unnecessary to address the question of whether exigent 
circumstances existed justifying the entry.

 
 

[¶9.]     The test for 
determining whether consent to enter was validly obtained is well 
established.

 
 
"The 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require [the state to] demonstrate that the 
consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, 
express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from 
all the circumstances * * * *." Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973).

 
 
In the 
present case, Deputy Ashlock gave the following uncontradicted testimony at the 
suppression hearing:

 
 
"Q Did 
you have any conversation with [Mrs. Sandborn] on the way down to the Sandborn 
residence?

"A When 
we were returning to the Sandborn residence?

"Q 
Yes.

"A Yes. 
I asked her if I could get permission to enter the house, and she said that 
wouldn't be a problem, and I asked her if Mr. Sandborn went to sleep, and she 
said that she thought yes, that he was asleep, and I asked if he would be a 
problem in waking up, and she stated that she did not think so and that she 
would help me.

"Q Did 
you tell her what you planned on doing if you were allowed to go 
in?

"A Yes. 
That was all explained in front of her and Mr. Galloway at Mr. Galloway's 
residence about signing the citation for DWI, that I would have to observe him 
myself under conditions like this before I could do 
anything.

"Q Did 
you then return to the Sandborn residence?

"A Yes, 
sir.

"Q And 
upon your arrival there, what did Mrs. Sandborn do?

"A She 
invited me in after I asked if I could enter the house, and we went in through 
the front door into the living room and then to our left, which there is a 
bedroom in that section of the house where we found Mr. Sandborn in bed 
asleep.

"Q And 
after that time--when she opened the door to the house, did she stand aside and 
let you go in first or did she go in first?

"A She 
went in, held the door and then I entered in, and she shut the door behind me 
and then we went to the bedroom."

 
 

[¶10.]  Thus, Deputy Ashlock's uncontroverted 
testimony demonstrates that:

 
 
1. He 
asked appellant's wife for permission to enter the house and talk to 
appellant;

2. 
Appellant's wife was informed by Deputy Ashlock prior to giving her consent that 
appellant would be arrested if he appeared to be intoxicated; 
and

3. 
Appellant's wife gave Deputy Ashlock permission to enter and led him to the room 
where appellant was sleeping.

 
 
There 
was no showing that Deputy Ashlock used or threatened to use force to gain entry 
into the home. Nor was there any evidence indicating that Deputy Ashlock coerced 
appellant's wife into allowing him to enter the house to talk to appellant. 
Finally, there was no evidence presented that appellant's wife indicated in any 
way that she was reluctant to allow Deputy Ashlock to enter her home to question 
appellant. Having considered the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the 
county court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress on the ground that 
Deputy Ashlock validly obtained consent to enter appellant's 
home.

 
 
II

 
 

[¶11.]  Appellant's second and final claim on 
appeal is that his arrest violates § 7-2-103(a), 
W.S.1977. That subsection provides as follows:

 
 
"(a) A 
peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant and detain him until a legal 
warrant can be obtained when:

 
 
"(i) Any 
criminal offense is being committed in his presence by the person to be 
arrested; or

"(ii) He 
has reasonable grounds to believe that a felony, as defined by section 6-2 [§ 
6-10-101] of the statutes has been committed and he has reasonable grounds for 
believing that the person to be arrested has committed it; 
or

"(iii) A 
misdemeanor, as defined by section 6-2 [§ 6-10-101] of the statutes has in fact 
been committed and the peace officer has reasonable grounds for believing that 
the person to be arrested has committed it and has reasonable grounds for 
believing that the person:

"(A) 
Will not be apprehended unless immediately arrested; or

"(B) May 
cause injury to himself or others or damage to property unless immediately 
arrested; or

"(C) May 
destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of such 
misdemeanor."

 
 

[¶12.]  In reliance upon that provision, 
appellant argues that his arrest is invalid because the offense, driving while 
intoxicated, was not committed in Deputy Ashlock's presence and because there 
was no showing that Deputy Ashlock had reasonable grounds for believing that, 
unless immediately arrested, appellant would not be apprehended, might cause 
injury to himself or others or damage to property, or might destroy or conceal 
evidence of the offense.

 
 

[¶13.]  Appellant's argument fails to consider 
§ 31-5-1204(a), W.S.1977, which 
provides:

 
 
"(a) The 
authority of a police officer to make an arrest is the same as upon an arrest 
for a felony when the officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
that the person arrested has committed any of the following offenses and the 
manner of making arrests shall be as in misdemeanor cases:

 
 
"(i) 
Negligent homicide or homicide by vehicle;

"(ii) 
Driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or any substance as prohibited by W.S. 31-5-233;

"(iii) 
Failure to stop, failure to give information or failure to render reasonable 
assistance, in the event of an accident resulting in death or personal injuries 
as prescribed in W.S. 31-5-1101 and 31-5-1103;

"(iv) 
Failure to stop or give information in the event of an accident resulting in 
damage to a vehicle or other property as prescribed in W.S. 31-5-1102 through 
31-5-1104;

"(v) 
Reckless driving;

"(vi) 
Racing on the highway; or

"(vii) 
Willfully fleeing from or attempting to elude a police 
officer."

 
 

[¶14.]  This provision clearly authorizes a 
police officer to arrest a person for the offenses described therein on the same 
grounds as those which authorize him to make felony arrests. This Court 
articulated the grounds for felony arrests long ago when we 
stated:

 
 
"[A] 
peace officer may arrest without a warrant, one whom he has reasonable or 
probable grounds to suspect of having committed [a] felony." State v. George, 32 
Wyo. 223, 245, 
231 P. 683 (1924).

 
 

[¶15.]  The constitutionality of the felony 
arrest rule enunciated above was settled in United 
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598, reh. denied 424 U.S. 979, 96 S. Ct. 1488, 47 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1976), wherein the Supreme Court 
held that the Fourth Amendment permits a duly authorized law enforcement officer 
to make a warrantless arrest for a felony, even though he has adequate 
opportunity to procure a warrant, if he has reasonable grounds to believe a 
felony has been committed and the person to be arrested committed 
it.

 
 

[¶16.]  Since State v. George, the felony 
arrest rule has, in many cases, been extended to apply to misdemeanors. As one 
court stated:

 
 
"Under 
[federal constitutional standards], no distinction exists between felony and 
misdemeanor in respect to probable cause and good faith belief. Where an arrest 
is made by an officer for a misdemeanor committed out of his presence, probable 
cause therefor may be established by the possession of knowledge and facts 
justifying the belief on the part of one of reasonable prudence that the person 
arrested [committed] the crime charged." Diamond 
v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432, 440 (S.D. 
Geo. 1975).

 
 

[¶17.]  Applying this rationale, many states have 
abandoned the common-law rule that a warrant is required for a misdemeanor 
arrest unless the offense occurred in the arresting officer's presence. 1 LaFave 
& Israel, Crim.Proc. § 3.5 (1984). In its place, some of these states have 
statutorily authorized warrantless arrests for misdemeanors where there is 
reasonable cause to believe the person to be arrested committed a misdemeanor. 
Id.

 
 

[¶18.]  In accordance with this trend, Wyoming 
enacted § 31-5-1204(a), which authorizes a 
police officer to arrest a person for any of the seven offenses described 
therein without first obtaining an arrest warrant where he has reasonable 
grounds to believe the offense has been committed and the person to be arrested 
committed it. Thus, Deputy Ashlock was authorized to arrest appellant if he had 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that appellant was driving while 
under the influence of alcohol, whether or not the offense was committed in his 
presence and whether or not he had reasonable grounds for believing that, unless 
immediately arrested, appellant would not be apprehended, might cause injury to 
himself or others or damage to property, or might destroy or conceal evidence of 
the offense.

 
 

[¶19.]  The question then becomes whether Deputy 
Ashlock had reasonable grounds to believe that appellant was driving or in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. In 
determining whether reasonable grounds exist for a warrantless arrest, a court 
must use

 
 
"a 
standard of reasonableness, viewed with practicality and applied with good 
sense. Furthermore, a court must consider the facts and circumstances known to 
the officer which would lead a reasonably cautious and prudent man to believe 
that the person to be arrested has committed a crime." Vrooman v. State, 
Wyo., 642 P.2d 782, 784 (1982) (citation omitted).

 
 
In the 
present case, the evidence presented at trial showed that Deputy Ashlock arrived 
at the scene after receiving a citizen's report of an accident involving damage 
to property. Deputy Ashlock saw a truck which was off the road in the ditch and 
smashed into the fence. Upon questioning Galloway, the deputy learned that the driver looked like 
appellant, that the driver had walked to appellant's house, and that the driver 
appeared to be intoxicated. A vehicle registration check revealed that the 
vehicle belonged to appellant's wife. Upon arriving at appellant's house to 
investigate further, Deputy Ashlock met appellant's wife on her way to talk to 
Mr. Galloway about the damage to his property. Later, Deputy Ashlock asked 
appellant's wife for permission to enter and speak with appellant. Appellant's 
wife gave him permission to enter the house and led him to the room where 
appellant was sleeping. When Deputy Ashlock began questioning appellant, he 
observed that appellant's eyes were very bloodshot, that appellant smelled of 
alcohol, and that appellant had some difficulty speaking clearly and standing. 
Applying a standard of reasonableness, practicality, and good sense, as we are 
required to do, id., we hold that the facts and circumstances are such as to 
warrant a reasonably cautious and prudent man to believe that appellant was 
driving or in actual control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol.

 
 

[¶20.]  Affirmed.