Title: Aleem v. Aleem

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Irfan Aleem v. Farah Aleem, No. 108, September Term 2007
HEADNOTE:  The Court declines to afford comity to the Pakistani talaq divorce.  The
alleged Pakistani marriage contract and the Pakistani statutes addressing the division of
property upon divorce conflict with the public policy of Maryland and the Maryland courts
will not afford comity to such contracts and foreign statutes. 
Circuit Court for Mo ntgomery C ounty
Case No.  30073-FL  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 108
September Term 2007
Irfan Aleem
v.
 
Farah Aleem
Bell, C. J.
                    *Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Eldridge, John C.
(retired, specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale R.
(retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed:   May 6, 2008
*Raker, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being
recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article
IV, Section 3A, she also participated in the
decision and adoption of this opinion.
1 Apparently, under Islamic law, where that Islamic law has been adopted as the
secular law of a jurisdiction, such as Pakistan, a husband has a virtual automatic right to
talaq,(i.e., to divorce his wife by acknowledging “I divorce thee” three times) but the wife
only has a right to talaq if it is in the written marriage agreement or if he otherwise delegates
that right to her.  In the present case the husband did not grant the wife the right to talaq.
While the nature of talaq is relevant to the issues here presented, the wife does not claim that
the husband “granted” her that right and accordingly that is not a factual issue in this case.
Our holding in this case only relates to instances where Islamic law, or parts thereof
such as talaq, is also the secular (civil) law of a country whose judgments we are urged to
accept under the doctrine of comity.  In other words, we address Islamic law only to the
extent it is also the civil law of a country.  The viability of Islamic law as a religious canon
is not intended to be affected.
Farah Aleem filed suit for a limited divorce from her husband, Irfan Aleem in the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County.  The husband thereafter filed an Answer and
Counterclaim.  He raised no jurisdictional objections.  Without, however, any advance
notification to the wife, and while the Montgomery County action was pending (between the
filing of the action for a limited divorce and the filing of the amended complaint for an
absolute divorce), the husband, a Muslim and a national of Pakistan, went to the Pakistan
Embassy in Washington, D.C., and performed talaq1 by executing a written document that
stated:
“Now this deed witnesses that I the said Irfan Aleem, do hereby divorce Farah
Aleem, daughter of Mahmood Mirza, by pronouncing upon her Divorce/ Talaq
three times irrevocably and by severing all connections of husband and wife
with her forever and for good.
“1. I Divorce thee Farah Aleem
“2. I Divorce thee Farah Aleem
“3. I Divorce thee Farah Aleem . . . .”
Petitioner posits that the performance by him of talaq under Islamic religious and secular
Pakistan law, and the existence of a “marriage contract,” deprived the Circuit Court for
2 The “marital property” as it would be defined under Maryland law included the
husband’s pension from World Bank valued at approximately one million dollars, real
property valued at $850,000, personal property valued at approximately $80,000, and two
or more vehicles. 
-2-
Montgomery County of jurisdiction to litigate the division of the parties’ marital property
situate in this country.2  
The trial court found that the marriage contract entered into on
the day of the parties’ marriage in Pakistan specifically did not provide for the division of
marital property and thus, for that reason alone, the agreement did not prohibit the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County from dividing the parties’ marital property under Maryland
law.  The Court of Special Appeals agreed and stated  “[t]hus, the Pakistani marriage contract
in the instant matter is not to be equated with a premarital or post-marital agreement that
validly relinquished, under Maryland law, rights in marital property.”  Aleem v. Aleem, 175
Md.App. 663, 681, 931 A.2d 1123, 1134 (2007).  The Court of Special Appeals further
stated:
“If the Pakistani marriage contract is silent, Pakistani law does not recognize
marital property.  If a premarital or post-marital agreement in Maryland is
silent with respect to marital property, those rights are recognized by Maryland
law. . . .  In other words, the ‘default’ under Pakistani law is that Wife has no
rights to property titled in Husband’s name, while the ‘default’ under Maryland
law is that the wife has marital property rights in property titled in the
husband’s name.  We hold that this conflict is so substantial that applying
Pakistani law in the instant matter would be contrary to Maryland public
policy.”
Id. at 681, 931 A.2d at 1134.
3 These questions raise broader issues than questions limited to the Pakistani marriage
contract. 
4 The spelling in this quote is exactly as it appears in the document.
-3-
Petitioner presents two questions3 for our review:
“1. [Did] the Court of Special Appeals disregard[] fundamental
principles of international comity and conflicts of laws in refusing to recognize
a Pakistani divorce because Pakistan and Maryland employ different ‘default
rules’ for the division of property between spouses[?]
“2. [Did] the Court of Special Appeals disregard[] fundamental
principles of international comity and conflicts of laws in concluding that
Pakistan lacked jurisdiction to dissolve the parties’ marriage because the
parties resided in Maryland on diplomatic visas[?]”
The Relevant Facts
The parties, both citizens of Pakistan, were married in Pakistan in 1980.  The marriage
was arranged by the families of the parties.  In accordance with Pakistani custom there was
a written agreement presented to the wife on the day of the wedding for her to sign.  At that
time she was 18 years old and her husband was 29 years old.  She had just graduated from
high school and he was a doctoral candidate at Oxford University in England.  The
agreement provided as follows:
 “TRUE TRANSLATION4
(URDU TO ENGLISH)
F O R M   N O.  2.
(See Rules : 8 & 10)
Under Rules : 8 & 10 of Muslim Family Laws
-4-
Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961)
F O R M
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE / CONTRACT
1.  Name of the Ward :      Saddar         Town/Union :
73
            Tehsil/       ATTESTED  
     Police Station :             Saddar          and District Karachi Where the marriage took place
2.  Name of the bridegroom & His father, with     
IRFAN ALEEM S/o DR. ABDUL ALEEM QURESHI,
     their respective residence :                        
3-B,South Circular Avenue,Defence Soceity,
                                                                       
Karachi.
3.
Age of the Bridegroom :                                 
29 years.
4.
Name of the Bride & her father, with their     
FARAH MIRZA D/o MEHMOOD MIRZA,
respective residence :                                 
A-100, Unit-3, Latifabad, Hyderabad.
                                   Not previously married     
5.  Whether the Bride is    Virgin, a Widow or a 
     Divorced Wife :                                           
VIRGIN
6. 
Age of the Bride :                                       
18 years.
7.  Name of the Vakil, if any, appointed by the
MUHAMMAD SULTAN MIRZA S/o MUHAMMAD AHMED MIRZA
Bride, his father’s name and his residence :   D-20, P.E.C.H.S., Karachi.
8.  Names of the Witnesses to the appointment
1) MUJAHID FAROOQI S/o MAZAHARUDDIN FAROOQI
  of Bride’s Vakil, with their father’s name,             
  B-20, Gizri Boulevard, Karachi.
   their residence and the relationship with the    
2) ZUBAIR HASAN RIZVI S/o NAWAB ABDUL QASIM
     Bride. 
   RIZVI, R-78, Block-5, F.B. Area, Mansoora,
                                      Karachi.
9.  Name of the Vakil, if any, appointed by the
    Bridegroom, his father’s name and his
/ / /
    residence :
10. Names of the Witness to the appointment
    of the Bridegroom’s Vakil with their father’s 
/ / /
    names and their residence :
11. Names of the Witnesses to the Marriage,
1)BASHIR AHMED S/o S.M. IBRAHIM, 21 Khayaban-
  their father’s names and their residence :       e-Mujahid, Defence Society, Karchi.
2) 
ABDUR 
RAZZAQ 
DEWAN 
S/o 
DAWOOD, 
No.6, 
Jinnah
Society, Shaheed-e-Millat Road, Karachi.
12. Date on which the marriage was solemnized :   July 16, 1980
5 While the dower was deferred at the time of the contract, it appears that when Irfan
Aleem attempted to divorce Farah Aleem, that a sum of $2,500 was mentioned as a “full and
final” settlement.  Under Islamic law as it is in the civil law of Pakistan, a man, upon
(continued...)
-5-
13. Amount of Dower :
Rs.51,000/-(Rupees Fifty One Thousand only)
14. How much of the Dower is Mu’ajjal (Prompt)
  and how much Mu’wajjal (Deferred) :
Deferred
15. Whether any portion of the dower was paid
     at the time of marriage, if so, how much: 
/ / /
16. Whether any property was given in lieu of the
    whole   or   any   part    of   the   dower,   with
      specification  of  the  same  and  its  valuation
/ / /
     agreed to between the parties :
17. Special conditions, if any :
/ / /
[This area contains 
                                                                                                                                               Seals and Stamps]
18. Whether the husband had delegated the powar  / / /
      of  divorce  to   the   Wife,  if   so  under  what 
      conditions :
19. Whether the husband’s right of divorce in any
      way curtailed :
/ / [partially obscured by seal]
20. Whether any  documents was drawn up at the 
      time   of   marriage   relating   to   dower   and 
      Maintenance, etc.,  if  so contents  thereof   :    
[obscured by seal]
21. Whether the bridegroom has any existing wife,
      and   if   so,  whether   he   has   secured   the    /[partially obscured by seal]
      Permission  of  Arbitration  Council  under  the
   Muslim Family  Ordinance,   1961 to  contract
      another Marriage :
22. Number   and   date  of   the   Communications
      conveying  to  the Bridegroom   the  permission   / / /
      of  the Arbitration Council  to  contract  another
      marriage :
23. Name, father’s name and address of the person 
      by whom the marriage was solemnized :
 SHAMSUL HASAN, Khateeb Masjid-e-
 Khizra, Saddar, Karachi.
24. Date of Registration of Marriage :                           July 19, 1980
25. Registration Fee Paid :                                           Paid.”
That agreement provided for a “dower” of  51,000 rupees5 the payment of which was
5(...continued)
marriage, can defer the payment of the “dower” (mahr in Urdu) but he cannot divorce the
wife by talaq unless he then pays the mahr to the wife.   In a pleading filed in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County by the husband, mahr, is explained as follows:
“Professor Esposito explains the function of dower (mahr) in a Muslim
marriage.  Dower can be used as a means of controlling the husband’s power
of divorce, since upon dissolution of the marriage he is requi[r]ed to pay the
total amount of the dower at once.  He goes on to state that the wife’s claim
for any unpaid portion of her dower is an unsecured debt which is due from
her husband. . . .  Dower is a major part of the husband’s financial
commitment to his wife.”
In the present case, the sum of $2,500 represents payment of the mahr to the wife.  It is the
husband’s position that payment of mahr of $2,500 is all that is due the wife, as opposed to
the one half of almost two million dollars that she might be entitled to under Maryland law
(It is unclear how the mahr would affect the position of the Pakistani courts in respect to
properties titled in both names.  The primary property focus in the present case is the
petitioner’s pension – which is titled only in the husband’s name.).  This stark discrepancy
highlights the difference in the public policies of this State and the public policies of Islamic
law, in the form adopted as the civil, secular law of countries such as Pakistan.
6 Apparently, under Pakistani law a “vakil” performs the function of a legal advisor
and often is a lawyer.
-6-
“deferred.”  There was no other express or implied waiver of any property rights of either
party.  During the presentation of the agreement, the wife was advised by her uncle who was
acting as a “vakil.”  There is no evidence in this case, however, that the wife’s uncle was a
lawyer.6  Under Pakistani law, unless the agreement provides otherwise, upon divorce all
property owned by the husband on the date of the divorce remains his property and “the wife
has [no] claim thereto.”  The opposite is also applicable.  The husband has no claim on the
property of the wife.  In other words, upon the dissolution of the marriage, the property
follows the possessor of its title.
Shortly after their marriage, the husband moved to England.  The wife joined him later
7 Due to the requirements of the World Bank’s pension program, claims for a division
of pension benefits based upon “marital property” status, are to be couched in terms of
“alimony.”  The requirements of the World Bank in that regard are not crucial to our
decision. 
-7-
and they resided there for four years while he completed his studies.  They then moved to the
United States and began to reside in Maryland while the husband worked at the World Bank.
They maintained a residence in this State for 20 years and resided here at the time the wife
filed for divorce and the husband went to the Pakistan Embassy and performed talaq.  The
parties have two children, both of whom were born in this country, are United States citizens,
and reside in this country.  The wife is now a resident of Maryland, and holds a green card
status.
The central issue in the present case concerns the wife’s attempt to have the husband’s
pension from the World Bank, which relates primarily to his work performed while he was
a resident of this country, declared to be “marital property” and to have other property
declared marital property and thus be entitled to half of that pension and property under
Maryland law.7
Discussion
More than a hundred years ago, the Supreme Court of the United States, in an
extensive discussion relating to the judgments of foreign countries, discussed the comity due
judgments of foreign countries and full faith and credit issues.  We include a comprehensive
discussion from that opinion, in order to place the issue in historical context.   In Hilton v.
-8-
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.Ed. 95 (1895), the Supreme Court of the United
States opined, as follows:
“International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense, –
including not only questions of right between nations, governed by what has
been appropriately called the ‘law of nations,’ but also questions arising under
what is usually called ‘private international law,’ or the ‘conflict of laws,’ and
concerning the rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one
nation, by reason of acts, private or public, done within the dominions of
another nation, –  is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice as often as such questions are presented in litigation
between man and man, duly submitted to their determination.
“The most certain guide, no doubt, for the decision of such questions
is a treaty or statute of this country.  But when, as is the case here, there is no
written law upon the subject, the duty still rests upon the judicial tribunals of
ascertaining and declaring what the law is, whenever it becomes necessary to
do so, in order to determine the rights of parties to suits regularly brought
before them.  In doing this, the courts must obtain such aid as they can from
judicial decisions, from the works of jurists and commentators, and from the
acts and usages of civilized nations.
“No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the
sovereignty from which its authority is derived.  The extent to which the law
of one nation, as put in force within its territory, whether by executive order,
by legislative act, or by judicial decree, shall be allowed to operate within the
dominion of another nation, depends upon what our greatest jurists have been
content to call ‘the comity of nations.’  Although the phrase has been often
criticized, no satisfactory substitute has been suggested.
“‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation,
on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.  But it is
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
. . . 
“A judgment affecting the status of persons, such as a decree
confirming or dissolving a marriage, is recognized as valid in every country,
unless contrary to the policy of its own law.
. . .
-9-
“The law upon this subject as understood in the United States at the
time of their separation from the mother country was clearly set forth by Chief
Justice Parsons, speaking for the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, in
1813, and by Mr. Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States, published in 1833.  Both those eminent jurists declared by the
law of England the general rule was that foreign judgments were only prima
facie evidence of the matter which they purported to decide; and that by the
common law, before the American Revolution, all the courts of the several
colonies and states were deemed foreign to each other, and consequently
judgments rendered by any one of them were considered as foreign judgments,
and their merits re-examinable in another colony, not only as to the jurisdiction
of the court which pronounced them, but also as to the merits of the
controversy, to the extent to which they were understood to be re-examinable
in England. . . .
“It was because of that condition of the law, as between the American
colonies and states, that the United States, at the very beginning of their
existence as a nation, ordained that full faith and credit should be given to the
judgments of one of the states of the Union in the courts of another of those
states.
“By the articles of confederation of 1777 (article 4, § 3), ‘full faith and
credit shall be given, in each of these states, to the records, acts and judicial
proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other state.’  By the
constitution of the United States (article 4, § 1), ‘full faith and credit shall be
given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every
other state . . . .
. . .
“The decisions of this court have clearly recognized that judgments of
a foreign [country] are prima facie evidence only, and that, but for these
constitutional and legislative provisions, judgments of a state of the Union,
when sued upon in another state, would have no greater effect.
. . .
“Chancellor Kent . . . [said]:  ‘No sovereign is obliged to execute,
within his dominion . . . he is at liberty, in his courts of justice, to examine into
the merits of such [foreign] judgment [for the effect to be given to foreign
judgments is altogether a matter of comity, in cases where it is not regulated
by treaty]. . . .’
. . .
“The reasonable, if not the necessary, conclusion appears to us to be
-10-
that judgments rendered in France, or in any other foreign country, by the laws
of which our own judgments are reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled
to full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are
prima facie evidence only of the justice of the plaintiffs’ claim.”  (Brackets in
original.) (Citations omitted.) (Some emphasis added.)
Hilton, 159 U.S. at 123-28, 16 S.Ct. at 143-68.
In Andes v. Versant Corp., 878 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1989), that court reiterated the
lack of applicability of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal constitution to
judgments from foreign countries, saying “The Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV §
1 of the Constitution of the United States does not apply to foreign judgments.”  The same
federal court of appeals in Jaffe v. Accredited Surety and Casualty Co., Inc., 294 F.3d 584
(4th Cir. 2002), opined as follows:
“Ruth Jaffe’s reliance on this argument seems to arise from her
confusion as to what is at issue in her case.  With respect to her claim, we must
determine the enforceability of the prior Florida judgment refusing to enforce
her Canadian default judgment, not the enforceability of the Canadian default
judgment itself.  Neither the full faith and credit statute, nor the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution, applies to judgments issued from foreign
countries.  Accordingly, while both federal and state courts in the United
States must give ‘full faith and credit’ to any judgment of a state court
empowered to enter the judgment, they need only  recognize the judgment of
a foreign court to the extent that this recognition comports with the principles
of judicial comity.
“For this reason, a state can refuse as Florida did, to recognize a foreign
judgment on the ground that it conflicts with the public policy of that state.”
(Citations omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)
Jaffe, 294 F.3d at 591-92. 
8 The reported opinion contains the different spellings of the husband’s name and
wife’s name throughout – without explanation.
9 The majority opinion in this case was never delivered to the reporters and is not
included in the bound volume. 
-11-
And see, Taveras v. Taveraz,8 477 F.3d 767, 781-83, (6th Cir. 2007) (“However, it is
well-settled that, unlike the recognition and enforcement of judgments due to sister states,
a foreign country’s judgments are not subject to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”(citations
omitted).)
Much earlier, Maryland had formulated the same concepts in the cases of Owings v.
Nicholson, 4 H. & J. 66 (1815),9 which involved a judgment in the courts of Martinique, and
in Gardner v. Lewis, 7 Gill 378 (1848), a case involving comity between states, but in which
we relied on the law of comity between nations.  In Gardner we stated as follows:
“The comity of nations, we are told, (see Story on Conflict of Laws, p. 38,) ‘is
derived altogether from the voluntary consent of the latter,’ (the State, within
whose territory it is attempted to make the law of another State obligatory,)
‘and it is inadmissible, when it is contrary to its known policy, or injurious to
its interests;’ and it is ‘only in the silence of any positive rule, affirming, or
denying, or restraining the operation of any foreign laws, the Courts of justice
presume the tacit adoption of them, by their own government; unless they are
repugnant to its policy or prejudicial to its interests.’  This also, he assures us:
‘A nation will not suffer its own subjects to evade the operation of its
fundamental policy, or laws; or to commit fraud in violation of them, by any
acts or contracts made with that design, in a foreign country; and it will judge
for itself, how far it will adopt, and how far it will reject, any such acts or
contracts.’”
Gardner, 7 Gill at 392. 
In a case somewhat similar to the case at bar, the situs of property of a wife was in
-12-
Maryland.   Maryland had enacted a law (pursuant to a constitutional mandate) that provided
that the property of a wife in Maryland was not liable for the debts of the husband.  The wife
and the husband moved to, and became domiciled in, Illinois.  That state had no comparable
law.  An action was brought to attach the wife’s property in Maryland for the debts of the
husband on the ground that the law of the parties’ domicile should control.  We rejected that
contention in Smith v. McAtee, 27 Md. 420 (1867), stating as follows:
“And although we find this right of the wife to her property, protected in this
State, by public policy, by statute and by decree of a Court of Equity, yet it was
earnestly contended by the learned counsel for the appellee, that a creditor of
the husband had a right to attach this fund in our courts of justice for the debt
of the husband, as by the laws of Illinois, where the husband and a wife
resided, the husband was entitled to all the personal property of the wife, and
that by virtue of this law of the domicil the fund was vested in the husband.
And he claimed this right to divest the wife of her property by the law of the
domicil, on the ground of comity.  In this case we cannot sanction such a right,
for it has been decided that comity is overruled by positive law, and that it is
only in the silence of any particular rule, affirming, denying or restraining the
operation of foreign laws, that courts of justice presume a tacit adoption of
them by their own government.  It is certainly competent for any State to adopt
laws to protect its own property as well as to regulate it, and ‘no State will
suffer the laws of another to interfere with her own, and in the conflict of laws,
when it must often be a matter of doubt, which shall prevail, the court which
decides, will prefer the laws of its own country to that of the stranger.’. . .  If
therefore our legislative enactment in regard to the property of the wife and the
laws of Illinois conflict, it cannot be made a question in our own courts which
shall prevail.  ‘Where there is no constitutional barrier, we are bound to
observe and enforce the statutory provisions of our own State.’”  (Citations
omitted.)
Smith, 27 Md. 420, 437-38.
Shortly after the decision in Hilton v. Guyot, supra, we conformed to its principles in
a case where the issue was whether the laws of Delaware or Maryland would control in
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respect to certain personal property.  Albeit in reference to comity between states, we
discussed it in Lowndes v. Cooch, 87 Md.  478, 39 A. 1045 (1898), as follows:
“The leading inquiry, therefore, which this appeal presents is, does the
law of Delaware or the law of Maryland control the disposition of the bank
stock in controversy here? . . .  ‘It [personal property] follows the law of the
person.  If he dies, it is not the law of the country in which the property is, but
the law of the country of which he was a subject, that will regulate the
succession.’ . . . 
“This doctrine, however firmly established, is nevertheless subject to
proper limitation to the effect that if a foreign law directly violates some
recognized principle of public policy, or some established standard of morality
prevailing in the forum exercising jurisdiction, the rules of comity will not
compel such forum to enforce the foreign law rather than its own, if to do so
would be hurtful or detrimental to the interest and welfare of its own citizens.”
(Emphasis added.)    
Lowndes, 87 Md. at  485-87, 39 A. at 1046.  We continued to recognize that emphasized
doctrine in our cases (albeit sometimes in respect to comity issues between the various states
of the United States instead of between Maryland and foreign countries.  The doctrine,
however, is the same in both instances).  See Castleman v. Templeman, 87 Md. 546, 552, 40
A. 275, 277 (1898) (“[W]e can see no reason why the receiver should not be permitted to sue
here . . . but through comity . . . when such suit does not injuriously affect the interests of the
citizens of the latter, or violate its policy or laws.”); Aluminum Co. v. Law, 157 Md. 641, 646,
147 A. 715, 717 (1929) (“As to judgments of courts of foreign countries, there is no
constitutional requirement of recognition.  It is a matter of comity.”).
Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561, 702 A.2d 230 (1997) (a “certified question”
case), is perhaps the most modern and seminal of our cases on comity between Maryland and
10 U.S. Const. amend. I.
-14-
foreign countries.  It did not involve issues of marital property or other domestic law issues,
but involved primarily the law of defamation and the constitutional guarantees of freedom
of speech.10  Telnikoff, however, did restate with clarity the issues that relate to comity and
their application generally.  As stated above, the case involved the difference between the
laws of libel of England and of Maryland.  An English citizen had obtained a judgment in the
courts of England based upon a libel occurring in England.  He sought to have the judgment
enforced in this country and Matusevitch brought an action to preclude the enforcement.  We
stated as follows:        
“Telnikoff argues that the English libel judgment is entitled to
recognition under principles of ‘comity.’  Matusevitch, on the other hand,
asserts that the English judgment is repugnant to the public policy of the
United States and Maryland and, therefore, should be denied recognition.
“The recognition of foreign judgments is governed by principles of
comity.
. . .
“(. . . ‘Although more than mere courtesy and accommodation, comity does not
achieve the force of an imperative or obligation.  Rather, it is a nation’s
expression of understanding which demonstrates due regard both to the
international duty and convenience and to the rights of persons protected by
its own laws’) . . . .
“Although foreign judgments are entitled to a degree of deference and
respect under the doctrine of comity, courts will nonetheless deny recognition
and enforcement to those foreign judgments which are inconsistent with the
public policies of the forum state. . . . 
“The justification for the public policy exception to the recognition of
foreign judgments as articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C.Cir.1984), as follows:
‘There are limitations to the application of comity. When the
11 We affirmed and adopted the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals in Wolff,
(continued...)
-15-
foreign act is inherently inconsistent with the policies underlying
comity, domestic recognition could tend either to legitimize the
aberration or to encourage retaliation, undercutting the
realization of the goals served by comity. No nation is under an
unremitting obligation to enforce foreign interests which are
fundamentally prejudicial to those of the domestic forum.  Thus,
from the earliest times, authorities have recognized that the
obligation of comity expires when the strong public policies of
the forum are vitiated by the foreign act.’
. . .
“In determining non-constitutional principles of law, courts often rely upon the
policies and requirements reflected in constitutional provisions. . . .
(‘Although [Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights] may not directly
apply to private employers, it nonetheless establishes a public policy in
Maryland that an individual should not be subjected to sex-based
discrimination).’”
Telnikoff, 347 Md. at 573-80, 702 A.2d at 236-39. 
The Court of Special Appeals, in Wolff v. Wolff, 40 Md. App. 168, 389 A.2d 413
(1978), noted as follows:
“‘The full faith and credit clause . . . does not apply to a divorce
obtained in a foreign country.  Courts of the United States are not required by
federal law to give full force and effect to a judgment granted in a foreign
nation.  On the other hand, judgments of courts of foreign countries are
recognized in the United States because of comity . . . .  This principle is
frequently applied in divorce cases . . . .  The principle of comity, however, has
several important exceptions and qualifications.  A decree of divorce will not
be recognized by comity where it was obtained by a procedure which denies
due process of law in the real sense of the term, or was obtained by fraud, or
where the divorce offends the public policy of the state in which recognition
is sought . . . .’” (Citations omitted.)
Wolff, 40 Md. App. at 177-78, 389 A.2d at 418.11
11(...continued)
supra, at Wolff v. Wolff, 285 Md. 185, 401 A.2d 479 (1979).
12  As stated by the Court of Special Appeals:
“The Pakistani law of divorce was succinctly described by the House
of Lords in In re Fatima, [1986] 2 W.L.R. 693, [1986] 2 All E.R. 32, [1986]
A.C. 527, 1996 WL 406815 (HL).  There, the entire court joined in the opinion
(‘speech’) of Lord Ackner, who said:
‘In Pakistan the law relating to divorce is the Islamic law
as modified by the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961.  In
traditional Islamic law the husband has the right unilaterally to
repudiate his wife, without showing cause and without recourse
to a court of law.  Such divorce is effected by the announcement
of the formula of repudiation, a talaq, and in traditional law a
divorce by talaq would take the simple form of the husband
announcing talaq three times.  The divorce then becomes
immediately effective and irrevocable.  Such a form of talaq has
been called “a bare talaq.” Although it is still effective in some
countries, for example, Dubai, section 7 of the Ordinance
provides:
“‘(1)  Any man who wishes to divorce his
wife shall, as soon as may be after the
pronouncement of talaq in any form whatsoever,
give the chairman notice in writing of his having
done so, and shall supply a copy thereof to the
wife.  (2) Whoever contravenes the provisions of
subsection (1)  shall be punishable with simple
(continued...)
-16-
The Maryland Legislature declared Maryland’s public policy in regard to property
acquired during a marriage, stating in the preamble to Chapter 794 of the Acts of 1978, that
“the property interests of the spouses should be adjusted fairly and equitably.”  And
furthermore, from the record in the present case, it appears that under Islamic law, which,
albeit with certain modifications, has been adopted as the law in Pakistan, only the husband
has an independent right to talaq, i.e., to use talaq to divorce his wife.12  The
12(...continued)
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one
year or with fine which may extend to 5,000
rupees or with both.  (3)  Save as provided in
subsection (5), a talaq unless revoked earlier,
expressly or otherwise, shall not be effective until
the expiration of 90 days from the day on which
notice under subsection (1) is delivered to the
chairman.  (4)  Within 30 days of the receipt of
notice under subsection (1), the chairman shall
constitute an arbitration council for the purpose of
bringing about a reconciliation between the
parties, and the arbitration council shall take all
steps necessary to bring about such reconciliation.
(5) If the wife be pregnant at the time talaq is
pronounced talaq shall not be effective until the
period mentioned in subsection (3) or the
pregnancy, whichever be later, ends. (6) Nothing
shall debar a wife whose marriage has been
terminated by talaq effective under this section
from remarrying the same husband, without an
intervening marriage with a third person, unless
such termination is for the third time so effective.’
‘“The chairman” refers to the chairman of the relevant
local union council in Pakistan.  Although he is required to
convene an arbitration council to attempt the reconciliation of
the parties, their attendance is not obligatory and the divorce
will become effective, unless the wife is pregnant, once 90 days
have elapsed from the date on which the chairman received
notice of the talaq.’
[1986] A.C. at 531-32.”  
Aleem v. Aleem, 175 Md.App. 663, 665-66, 931 A.2d 1123, 1124-25 (2007).
-17-
wife may only utilize talaq if the husband has given her that right in the contract of marriage.
In the case at bar, the wife was not granted the right of talaq by her husband.  It appears, also
from the record, that the husband may utilize talaq with no prior notice to the wife.  It is clear
as well, as we point out above, that, under Pakistani law, upon a divorce there is no equitable
13 Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra.
14 In a letter from respondent’s counsel to the Arbitration Council, respondent points
out that the husband’s performance of talaq was designed to circumvent Maryland law.  She
stated in relevant part as follows:
“Mr. Aleem is obligated to provide Ms. Aleem with both child support and
alimony pursuant to Order of Court.  Mr. Aleem, by seeking a divorce in
(continued...)
-18-
division of marital property, i.e., property acquired by the parties during the marriage, unless
the marriage “contract” so provides.
On November 7, 1972, the people of Maryland ratified the Equal Rights Amendment,
now found as Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  It provides “Equality of
rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex.”  Md. Const. Declaration
of Rights, art. 46.  Accordingly, in the first instance, the enforceability of a foreign talaq
divorce provision, such as that presented here, in the courts of Maryland, where only the
male, i.e., husband, has an independent right to utilize talaq and the wife may utilize it only
with the husband’s permission, is contrary to Maryland’s constitutional provisions13 and thus
is contrary to the “public policy” of Maryland.  Moreover, if we were to recognize the use
of talaq, controlled as it is by the husband, a wife, a resident of this State, would never be
able to consummate a divorce action filed by her in which she seeks a division of marital
property, because a husband who is a citizen of any country in which Islamic law, adopted
as the civil law, prevails could go to the embassy of that country and perform   talaq, and
divorce her (without prior notice to her) long before she would have any opportunity to fully
litigate, under Maryland law, the circumstances of the parties’ dissolution of their marriage.14
14(...continued)
Pakistan, is attempting to circumvent the laws of the state of Maryland, and
the Order of our Court, notwithstanding that he has submitted to the Court’s
jurisdiction, to this day has counsel here in Maryland, and has regularly sought
our Court’s relief.”
15 It is referred to by different names in the record before this Court.  We shall refer
to it as the “Council of Arbitration.”
-19-
Talaq lacks any significant “due process” for the wife, and its use moreover, directly
deprives the wife of the “due process” she is entitled to when she initiates divorce litigation
in this State.  The lack and deprivation of due process is itself contrary to this State’s public
policy. 
Petitioner directs the Court’s attention to the practice in Pakistan of having a Council
of Arbitration15 available to the wife.  That practice, however, only applies if the parties want
to reconcile and it addresses only that possibility. In a situation where both parties seek
divorce, as here, it has virtually no application.  Its function was explained at the trial level
by a letter from Muhammad Najeeb, Chairman of the Arbitration Council in the Clifton
Cantonment, Karachi, Pakistan, to the attorney for the wife, as follows:
“Please refer to your letter dated 15th Dec., 2003, on behalf of
your client[] M st. Farah Aleem, I may inform you that the marriage was
solemnized in Pakistan within the jurisdiction of this Union Council and that
both your client and Mr. Aleem are Pakistani citizens and therefore this Union
Council has jurisdiction in the matter.  We had sent notices to your client as
provided under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961.  The
purpose of notices is to ascertain whether both parties want to reconcile in
which case the divorce shal[l] not become final.  In case both parties or any
one of them does not want reconciliation, the divorce shall become final after
90 days of such notice. . . .  Mr. Aleem had responded in writing that he does
not want to reconcile but there is no intimation from your client [in] []spite of
16 The mahr, deferred in the marriage certificate, would not normally be classified
under Maryland law as marital property in any event, as it may not have been “acquired”
during the marriage.
17 Md. Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vo., 2007 Cum. Supp.) §§ 8-201, 8-202, 8-203, 8-
204, 2-205 of the Family Law Article; Md. Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.) § 8-206 et seq. of
the Family Law Article (describing property disposition in annulment and divorce).
18 The places in the “contract” where a division of property would normally appear
were simply left blank in the case at bar. 
-20-
the fact that your client has received the notice which will be presumed that
she does not want any reconciliation.  It may also be mentioned that function
of the Arbitration Council is only to see whether both husband and wife want
to reconcile and live again as husband and wife.”  (Bolding added.)
(Emphasis added.)
Additionally, as indicated above, Maryland has enacted a comprehensive statutory
scheme designed to effectuate a fair division of property acquired by the parties during the
time of their marriage, just as the pension at issue in this case was acquired.16  To accept
talaq and to accept the silence of the “contract” signed by the wife on the day of her marriage
in Pakistan, as a waiver of her rights to marital property acquired during the marriage, is, in
direct conflict with our public policy.  Additionally, the Pakistani statutes proffered by
petitioner as establishing that all of the property titled in his name, however and whenever
acquired, is his property free of any claim by the wife arising out of the marriage, are also in
direct conflict with the Maryland statutes17 governing those same issues.
Judge Rodowsky, for the Court of Special Appeals, stated, as indicated earlier:
“If the Pakistani marriage contract is silent,[18] Pakistani law does not recognize
marital property.  If a premarital or post-marital agreement in Maryland is
silent with respect to marital property, those rights are recognized by Maryland
-21-
law. . . .  In other words, the ‘default’ under Pakistani law is that Wife has no
rights to property titled in Husband’s name, while the ‘default’ under Maryland
law is that the wife has marital property rights in property titled in the
husband’s name.  We hold that this conflict is so substantial that applying
Pakistani law in the instant matter would be contrary to Maryland public
policy.”
Aleem, 175 Md.App. at 681, 931 A.2d at 1134.  We agree.  
The talaq divorce of countries applying Islamic law, unless substantially modified, is
contrary to the public policy of this state and we decline to give talaq, as it is presented in this
case, any comity.  The Pakistani statutes providing that property owned by the parties to a
marriage, follows title upon the dissolution of the marriage unless there are agreements
otherwise, conflicts with the laws of this State where, in the absence of valid agreements
otherwise or in the absence of waiver, marital property is subject to fair and equitable
division.  Thus the Pakistani statutes are wholly in conflict with the public policy of this State
as expressed in our statutes and we shall afford no comity to those Pakistani statutes. 
Additionally, a procedure that permits a man (and him only unless he agrees
otherwise) to evade a divorce action begun in this State by rushing to the embassy of a
country recognizing talaq and, without prior notice to the wife, perform “I divorce thee . . .”
three times and thus summarily terminate the marriage and deprive his wife of marital
property, confers insufficient due process to his wife.  Accordingly, for this additional reason
the courts of Maryland shall not recognize the talaq divorce performed here.
We answer no to each of petitioner’s questions. 
-22-
JUDGMENT 
AFFIRMED; 
COSTS
TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.