Title: Verschoor v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Verschoor v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co1995 WY 197907 P.2d 1293Case Number: 94-282Decided: 12/08/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Chad VERSCHOOR and Kelly 
L. Verschoor, 

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

MOUNTAIN WEST FARM BUREAU 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 

a Wyoming corporation, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from The District 
Court, Park County, Hunter Patrick, J.

C. Edward 
Webster, II, Cody, for appellants.

George E. 
Powers, Jr. and Kay Lynn Bestol of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, Cheyenne, 
for appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR, and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Injured on the 
job, a contract ranch hand rejected costly medical care until his employer's 
insurance agent promised that treatment and rehabilitation would be covered. 
When the ranch hand's recovery was cut short by the insurance company's refusal 
to exceed the coverage limits of the employer's policy, he sued the insurance 
company, alleging promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation. Finding 
material issues of fact on both counts, we reverse the district court's summary 
judgment and remand for trial on the merits.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellants, Chad 
and Kelly Verschoor, submit the following issues:

Issue No. 
I

The lower court erred, as 
a matter of law, in finding that the doctrine of promissory estoppel did not 
apply in this instance.

Issue No. 
II

Summary Judgment was 
improper on Appellants' claim of promissory estoppel for the reason that 
material questions of fact existed as to each of the elements 
thereof.

Issue No. 
III

The District Court 
applied an improper standard in finding no material questions of fact existed 
with respect to Appellants' claim of negligent 
misrepresentation.

Issue No. 
IV

Questions of material 
fact exist as to all of the elements of negligent misrepresentation, which 
questions of fact preclude entry of Summary Judgment.

Issue No. 
V

Appellants' claim for 
loss of consortium is valid under the facts of this case and Summary Judgment 
should not have been granted.

Issue No. 
VI

Questions of material 
fact exist as to whether Appellee is liable to the Appellants for punitive 
damages because of Appellee's willful and wanton 
misconduct.

[¶3]      Appellee, 
Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Mountain West), states the 
following issues:

1.         May 
promissory estoppel be used to create insurance coverage when the promisee has 
not forfeited any advantage?

2.         Did 
the district court properly award summary judgment on the issue of promissory 
estoppel when no reasonable person could find that an unambiguous promise was 
made, that any statement made was calculated to induce reliance, that Plaintiffs 
relied on any statements of Defendant, that any such reliance was reasonable, 
that Plaintiffs suffered a detriment, or that the equities would support 
enforcement of any alleged promise?

3.         Did 
the district court properly award summary judgment on the issue of negligent 
misrepresentation when no reasonable person could find that a misrepresentation 
was made, that the Defendant intended that Plaintiffs rely on any 
misrepresentations of Defendant, that any such reliance was reasonable or 
justifiable, or that Plaintiffs relied to their detriment?

4.         Did 
the district court properly award summary judgment on the loss of consortium 
claim when only pecuniary damages are available for the spouse's underlying 
claims?

5.         Did 
the district court properly award summary judgment on the claim for punitive 
damages when Plaintiffs presented no evidence whatsoever of willful, wanton, or 
outrageous conduct by Defendant?

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      To support his 
wife and two young children, Chad Verschoor (Chad) went to work in April, 1991 
for the Risinger Ranch near Cody, Wyoming. The ranch was managed by corporate 
minority owners Dennis and Sue Shore (the Shores), who hired Chad at a rate of 
$5.00 per hour to do general ranch work and odd jobs. A few days after starting 
work, Chad injured his knee on the job by jumping from the back of a slowly 
moving truck while feeding cattle.

[¶5]      Without savings 
or insurance of his own, and having been told by the Shores that the ranch's 
insurance would not cover him, Chad initially decided against the anterior 
ligament reconstructive surgery and twelve months of rehabilitation which had 
been recommended following examination by an orthopedic surgeon. After getting a 
message from Sue Shore that the ranch may, after all, have insurance coverage 
for him, Chad contacted Mountain West's agent in Cody, Frank Young (Young). Chad 
told Young the nature of the injury, the type of surgery that was recommended, 
the length of rehabilitation required, and the name of the physician in Cody who 
recommended that regimen. According to Chad, Young's response was pretty 
clear:

[Frank Young] says, "Get 
your operation done." He says, "Just send me your bills and we'll pay for your 
operation and your rehabilitation."

So I called Dr. Biles and 
I set up the appointment for my operation.

Young 
acknowledged the conversation, but was unable to recall many details. Young 
admitted telling Chad to bring the bills in, but denied promising to pay them. 
Following the conversation, Chad went ahead with the 
surgery.

[¶6]      Later, as he 
began rehabilitation, Chad discovered that Mountain West's largesse was not 
without limits. The insurance company paid $5,000.00 toward the cost of his 
surgery, telling Chad that the $5,000.00 was the limit on medical coverage under 
the insurance policy carried by the ranch. Thus cut off, Chad was unable to get 
proper and timely rehabilitation for his injured knee.

[¶7]      Chad and his 
wife, Kelly, filed suit against the ranch and Mountain West alleging, as to the 
latter, claims for negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, bad faith, 
and Kelly's loss of consortium. The district court permitted an amendment of the 
complaint to add the Shores as defendants and delete the bad faith claim. The 
amended complaint also added an allegation that Mountain West's negligent 
misrepresentation was undertaken willfully and intentionally, praying for 
punitive damages from Mountain West.

[¶8]      Following 
extensive discovery, summary judgment was entered in favor of Sue Shore. Partial 
summary judgments were entered in favor of Dennis Shore and the ranch on the 
issue of punitive damages. Chad and Kelly subsequently settled their remaining 
claims with Dennis Shore and the ranch.

[¶9]      Finding no 
evidence of willful or wanton misconduct by Mountain West, the district court 
dismissed Chad's claim for punitive damages. Finding that neither promissory 
estoppel nor negligent misrepresentation would support Kelly's loss of 
consortium claim, the district court dismissed that claim also. Chad's claim 
against Mountain West for promissory estoppel was dismissed as a matter of law, 
and his negligent misrepresentation claim was dismissed as entailing no question 
of material fact - a finding the district court attributed to Chad's 
"inconsistent and varied" accounts of what the Mountain West agent, Young, had 
told him.

III. 
DISCUSSION

A. SCOPE AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶10]   Contrary to their generally poor 
appellate reputation, summary judgments are desirable tools for eliminating 
trials when only questions of law are truly at issue, piercing formal 
allegations to reach the merits where no material issue of fact is found. 
W.R.C.P. 56(c); Bryant v. Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Wyo. 1986). An issue 
of fact is material if it has the capacity to establish or refute an essential 
element of a claim or defense thereto. Tidwell v. HOM, Inc., 896 P.2d 1322, 1324 
(Wyo. 1995).

[¶11]   Without deference to the district 
court's determinations, we examine the record in a light most flattering to the 
party opposing summary judgment, affording that party the benefit of all 
favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record. Adkins v. 
Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 130 (Wyo. 1995). This contemplates a procedure whereby the 
moving party establishes a prima facie case for summary judgment, obliging the 
opposing party to marshal admissible evidence, as opposed to general or 
conclusory allegations, to establish genuine issues of material fact. Hanna v. 
Cloud 9, Inc., 889 P.2d 529, 534 (Wyo. 1995). Competent, admissible evidence is 
required because the salutary value of summary judgments would seldom find 
vindication if trial could be forced on naked assertions that issues of material 
fact exist. Johnson v. Soulis, 542 P.2d 867, 871 (Wyo. 
1975).

B. PROMISSORY 
ESTOPPEL

[¶12]   Chad's case hinges upon the promise 
of Mountain West's agent that the insurance company would pay for Chad's surgery 
and rehabilitation if Chad would forward his bills. The palliative effect of 
such a promise, made on behalf of an insurance carrier, is not subject to 
reasonable dispute among any in Wyoming who have suffered serious injury or 
illness. The legal effect of such a promise may be to create a contract, 
notwithstanding the absence of consideration or a writing, even in those cases 
where the statute of frauds would, otherwise, apply. B & W Glass, Inc. v. 
Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 829 P.2d 809, 815 (Wyo. 1992). Such apparent magic 
actually has august roots in contract law: 

A promise which the 
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of 
the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance 
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The 
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice 
requires.

Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981) The resultant promissory estoppel prevents 
denial of insurance coverage where injustice would otherwise result. Doctors' 
Co. v. Insurance Corp. of America, 864 P.2d 1018, 1029 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶13]   Mountain West suggests that no 
agreement was possible because Young was not, technically speaking, endowed with 
the capacity to make any promises regarding coverage. This argument is clearly 
untimely, not having been raised before the district court. In fact, Mountain 
West characterized Young as their "local insurance agent" in Cody in submissions 
to the district court. Mountain West's failure to place Young's agency at issue 
before the district court obviated any need for Chad to adduce evidence on the 
issue to avoid summary judgment. Lavoie v. Safecare Health Service, Inc., 840 P.2d 239, 248 (Wyo. 1992). Besides, the existence of agency and the scope of an 
agent's authority are questions of fact for a jury. Cargill, Inc. v. Mountain 
Cement Co., 891 P.2d 57, 62 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶14]   The district court rejected 
promissory estoppel in this case finding, as a matter of law, that the theory 
would not apply "to create coverage which is not found within the contract of 
insurance." Were he seeking coverage under an insurance contract he held with 
Mountain West, Chad agrees that the district court's holding would be proper. 
Estoppel and waiver will not operate to create additional coverage in an 
existing contract of insurance. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Albany 
County School Dist. No. 1, 763 P.2d 1255, 1261 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting 16 Appleman, 
Insurance Law and Practice, 629-30 (1944)); Sowers v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Ins. 
Co., 359 P.2d 488, 493 (Wyo. 1961); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Petsch, 261 F.2d 331, 335 (10th Cir. 1958).

[¶15]   However, no retreat from St. Paul 
Fire and Marine Ins. Co. and Sowers is required to make room for the possibility 
that Young's promises to Chad resulted in the formation of an entirely new 
contract of insurance, not under a theory of equitable estoppel but by virtue of 
promissory estoppel. See White v. Continental General Ins. Co., 831 F. Supp. 1545, 1559 n. 16 (D.Wyo. 1993). Our ruling does not purport to gloss the terms 
of the insurance contract between the ranch and Mountain West. Rather, we hold 
that Chad may collect upon Mountain West's promise to him to pay for his surgery 
and rehabilitation, provided he can make his case for that promise to a jury of 
his peers. Doctors' Co., 864 P.2d  at 1029-30.

[¶16]   We have clearly identified the 
elements necessary to a claim (or defense) of promissory estoppel in 
Wyoming:

"(1) a clear and definite 
agreement; (2) proof that the party urging the doctrine acted to its detriment 
in reasonable reliance on the agreement; and (3) a finding that the equities 
support the enforcement of the agreement."

Lavoie, 840 P.2d  
at 249 (quoting Inter-Mountain Threading, Inc. v. Baker Hughes Tubular Services, 
Inc., 812 P.2d 555, 559 (Wyo. 1991)). Elements one and two are questions for the 
fact finder. Michie v. Board of Trustees of Carbon County School Dist. No. 1, 
847 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶17]   Mountain West suggests that 
reasonable minds could not differ on the failure of their agent's statements to 
be "clear and unambiguous in their terms," Inter-Mountain Threading, Inc., 812 P.2d  at 559, despite their agent's inability to recall much about the 
conversation and the absence of any other evidence to contradict Chad. Of 
course, exactly what Young's authority was, as well as what he did or did not 
promise to Chad on behalf of Mountain West, are questions of fact for a 
jury.

[¶18]   On the second element, Mountain 
West argues that Chad, having benefitted from surgery, cannot demonstrate 
detriment from his reliance upon Mountain West's promise. The refusal of 
the providers to start Chad on rehabilitation without assurance of payment makes 
detriment a question of fact. Even without delayed rehabilitation, realization 
of some benefit does not, as a matter of law, overcome pecuniary 
detriment. Doctors' Co., 864 P.2d  at 1029-30. See also Hunter v. Farmers Ins. 
Group, 554 P.2d 1239, 1243 (Wyo. 1976) and Townes v. Jerome L. Howe, Inc., 852 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Mo. App. 1993) (incurring medical expenses under belief of 
coverage constitutes detriment).

[¶19]   The question of Chad's detriment 
may also be critical to the third element of promissory estoppel which questions 
whether Mountain West's promise should be enforced to avoid an injustice. 
Whether the equities of the situation demand enforcement of the promise 
is a question of law for the district court to resolve. Lavoie, 840 P.2d  at 
251.

[¶20]   When, as here, a jury trial has 
been requested, the "fact dependent" nature of the first two elements of 
promissory estoppel precludes summary disposition on the basis of the third 
element where material questions of fact have been identified. W.R.C.P. 38; 
Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 999 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (8th Cir. 
1993). A court's equitable authority to limit recovery as a matter of law is 
broad, but not absolute. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 
1992).

C. NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION

[¶21]   Chad claims he was damaged by the 
failure of Mountain West's agent to inform him of the limit on medical payments 
under the ranch's insurance policy, asserting that the agent's silence thereon 
amounted to negligent misrepresentation. Mountain West responds that everyone 
knows insurance policies have limits and their agent was under no duty to speak. 
At first blush, establishment of a prima facie case for negligent 
misrepresentation would appear to be simple compared to the relative 
complexities associated with establishing promissory 
estoppel:

The elements of a 
negligent misrepresentation claim are generally recognized to be as follows: 
False information supplied in the course of one's business for the guidance of 
others in their business, failure to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or 
relating the information, and pecuniary loss resulting from justifiable reliance 
thereon. Restatement of Torts (Second) § 552, p. 126 
(1977).

Duffy v. Brown, 
708 P.2d 433, 437 (Wyo. 1985). Davis v. Davis, 855 P.2d 342, 348-49 (Wyo. 1993) 
instructs us upon the fallacy of assuming ease of proof on such a claim. 
Mountain West adds that Duffy requires proof of negligent misrepresentation to 
be by clear and convincing evidence, justifying the district court's finding 
that "a possible misunderstanding but not an actual misrepresentation" could not 
meet such a heightened standard of proof.

[¶22]   Duffy treats fraudulent 
misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation conjunctively, perhaps 
permitting the incorrect conclusion that because fraudulent misrepresentation 
"must be established by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence," negligent 
misrepresentation might also be subject to that heightened standard of proof. 
Duffy, 708 P.2d  at 437. Recognizing similarities, Judge Brimmer notes the 
"fundamental difference" that "actual intent" is requisite to fraudulent 
misrepresentation, while only a "`fail[ure] to exercise reasonable care'" is 
necessary for negligent misrepresentation. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. 
v. University of Wyoming Research Corp., 850 F. Supp. 1509, 1525 (D.Wyo. 1994), 
aff'd, 52 F.3d 901 (10th Cir. 1995) (hereinafter Char Fuels) (quoting Duffy, 708 P.2d  at 437; Husman, Inc. v. Triton Coal Co., 809 P.2d 796, 801 (Wyo. 1991); and 
Matter of Reed's Estate, 566 P.2d 587, 590-91 (Wyo. 
1977)).

[¶23]   The distinguishing elements of 
fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation "are the state of 
mind of the person who supplied the information and the standard of proof that 
must be met by the plaintiff." Browne v. Maxfield, 663 F. Supp. 1193, 1202 
(E.D.Pa. 1987). A Wyoming plaintiff must prove negligent misrepresentation by a 
preponderance of the evidence, not unlike any other plaintiff in any other 
action sounding in negligence. Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167, 180 (Wyo. 1981); 
Northwest States Utilities Co. v. Ashton, 51 Wyo. 168, 182, 65 P.2d 235, 238 
(1937); W.P.C.J.I., No. 3.01. 

[¶24]   Summary judgment on negligent 
misrepresentation is predicated upon the district court's finding that the 
"descriptions of the insurance agent's alleged statements contained in [Chad's] 
deposition are inconsistent and varied[.]" Neither the district court nor 
Mountain West refers us to the statements alleged to be inconsistent or at 
variance from Chad's basic description of his conversation with 
Young:

[Frank Young] says, "Get 
your operation done." He says, "Just send me your bills and we'll pay for your 
operation and your rehabilitation."

A jury could 
conclude that, based upon receipt of the foregoing directive, Chad would proceed 
with his surgery and rehabilitation, secure in reasonable expectation of full 
coverage. Souran v. Travelers Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 1497, 1503-05 (11th Cir. 
1993).

[¶25]   Mountain West disputes 
Chad's version of his conversation with Young. "[W]hen a disputed fact, if 
proven, would establish or refute an essential element of the cause of action" 
summary judgment is improper. Brown v. Avery, 850 P.2d 612, 615 (Wyo. 1993). The 
weight given that statement, as opposed to conflicting testimony from Chad, like 
Chad's credibility itself, is a matter for the jury. Wilder v. Cody Country 
Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 216 (Wyo. 1994). Having distinguished fraud 
cases from this, we find the fraud cases relied upon by Mountain West to be, 
generally speaking, inapposite. See, e.g., McKenney v. Pacific First Federal 
Sav. Bank of Tacoma, Wash., 887 P.2d 927, 929 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶26]   On Young's duty to inform Chad of 
the limits on the ranch policy, Chad asserts: "Even when a party is under no 
duty to speak regarding a matter, if he does speak, he must speak the truth and 
make a full and fair disclosure." Twing v. Schott, 80 Wyo. 100, 114, 338 P.2d 839, 843 (1959). Having relied so heavily upon fraud cases, Mountain West takes 
the interesting tack of suggesting that Twing, as a fraud case, is inapposite. 
Pleased by that belated glimmer of recognition, we nonetheless believe that 
Twing applies in the context of negligent misrepresentation. Even the cases 
distinguishing fraudulent from negligent misrepresentation recognize that the 
causes share much more than their distinctions: intent and burden of proof. 
Browne, 663 F. Supp.  at 1202. Surely, misrepresentations are as central to 
either cause as their appellations suggest. Char Fuels, 850 F. Supp.  at 
1525.

[¶27]   Mountain West's duty, however, is 
not simply that of the Good Samaritan. Judge Cardozo states: "Constantly the 
bounds of duty are enlarged by knowledge of a prospective use." Glanzer v. 
Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922). Cardozo's 
echo:

Rather, one who relies 
upon information in connection with a commercial transaction may reasonably 
expect to hold the maker to a duty of care only in circumstances in which the 
maker was manifestly aware of the use to which the information was to be put and 
intended to supply it for that purpose.

Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 552 cmt. a (1977).

[¶28]   The absence of privity between 
Mountain West and Chad is inoffensive to the negligent misrepresentation claim. 
When several South Dakota farmers approached an insurance agent, only to be told 
they did not qualify for federal crop insurance, for which they were indeed 
eligible, the court recognized their claims, notwithstanding the absence of 
privity. Aesoph v. Kusser, 498 N.W.2d 654, 656-57 (S.D. 1993). Discounting the 
need for a formal relationship, the South Dakota Supreme Court held, rather, 
that the relationship of the parties:

"must be such that in 
morals and good conscience the one has the right to rely upon the other for 
information, and the other giving the information to give it with 
care."

Id. (quoting 
Littau v. Midwest Commodities, Inc., 316 N.W.2d 639, 644 (S.D. 
1982)).

[¶29]   Finally, Mountain West points to a 
lack of evidence that Young, on behalf of Mountain West, had any intention of 
inducing Chad to rely upon his statement of coverage. Such intention is not an 
element of negligent misrepresentation, which requires only that the defendant 
"`failed to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or relating the information.'" 
Char Fuels, 850 F. Supp.  at 1525 (quoting Duffy, 708 P.2d at 437). What such 
"reasonable care" may be is suggested by cases which hold that insurance 
companies who incorrectly verify coverage via telephone calls from third-party 
health care providers are liable for negligent misrepresentation. See, e.g., St. 
Joseph's Hosp. and Medical Center v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 154 Ariz. 307, 742 P.2d 808, 817 (1987) (also reinstated jury verdict on promissory estoppel 
theory, sub nom, "estoppel in pais") and Hermann Hosp. v. National Standard Ins. 
Co., 776 S.W.2d 249, 253-54 (Tex. App. 1989).

[¶30]   The factual dispute in this case is 
whether Young made the statements attributed to him by Chad. If Chad can carry 
his burden on that issue, a reasonable jury could find in his favor on negligent 
misrepresentation.

D. LOSS OF 
CONSORTIUM

[¶31]   Chad's wife, Kelly, claims damages 
for loss of Chad's consortium, derivative of Chad's complaints alleging 
promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation. Our resuscitation of Chad's 
causes of action does not bode as well for Kelly's claims.

[¶32]   Although the district court is 
vested with broad discretion in fashioning relief for promissory estoppel, the 
action sounds primarily in contract rather than tort. Tremblay v. Reid, 700 P.2d 391, 395 n. 1 (Wyo. 1985). "A promise binding under [Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, supra, at § 90] is a contract[.]" Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
supra, § 90 at 244 cmt. d.

[¶33]   Writing for this court, Justice 
Brown made it clear that loss of consortium is derivative of actions sounding in 
tort, and contemplates underlying liability to the spouse for tortious bodily 
harm, inter alia. Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1369 (Wyo. 1986) (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, at § 693). Here, no tortious harm is 
alleged to have been inflicted upon Chad by Mountain West. Damages for loss of 
consortium are unavailable when the spouse's direct injuries are merely 
pecuniary. Browne, 663 F. Supp.  at 1207. Kelly's claim cannot be supported by 
Chad's complaint alleging promissory estoppel.

[¶34]   To the extent Kelly's claim is 
derivative of Chad's claim for negligent misrepresentation, she is similarly 
foreclosed:

The damages recoverable 
for a negligent misrepresentation are those necessary to compensate the 
plaintiff for pecuniary loss to him [sic] of which the misrepresentation is the 
legal cause * * *.

Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, supra, at § 552B(1).

E. PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES

[¶35]   Chad dismissed his bad faith claim 
against Mountain West early on, while clumsily amending his negligent 
misrepresentation claim to say that Mountain West, "through its agent Young 
negligently, willfully and intentionally, misrepresented" that Chad's surgery 
and rehabilitation would be covered. Mountain West avers that this non-sequitur 
was belatedly added because punitive damages are "usually proper only in cases 
where wanton and willful misconduct is alleged." Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 191 (Wyo. 1979). We do not favor alteration of a position to suit the 
interests of a case. Gray v. Fitzhugh, 576 P.2d 88, 91 (Wyo. 
1978).

[¶36]   Wanton and willful conduct "must be 
more than mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement or confusion, and 
more than mere thoughtlessness or inadventure, or simple inattention." 
Danculovich, 593 P.2d  at 191. Whether or not Young's inability to remember his 
conversation with Chad is self-serving, it is virtually impossible to associate 
with Chad's description of the conversation the "`element of outrage'" requisite 
to an award of punitive damages. Mayflower Restaurant Co. v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Wyo. 1987) (quoting Weaver, 715 P.2d at 
1369-70).

[¶37]   Nothing in Chad's pleadings or the 
factual materials he presented supported the charge that Young's 
misrepresentation was wanton or wilful. Since Mountain West challenged the 
allegation, Chad was obliged to respond with sufficient admissible evidence to 
create a genuine issue of fact. Hanna, 889 P.2d  at 534. In the absence thereof, 
we hold that summary judgment in favor of Mountain West shall be upheld as to 
allegations of willful and wanton conduct and the dependent prayer for punitive 
damages. McClellan v. Britain, 826 P.2d 245, 247 (Wyo. 
1992).

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶38]   With his ability to support a wife 
and two young children hanging in the balance, an injured young man was advised 
by those who employed him at the time of his injury to contact their insurance 
agent. Sufficient admissible evidence has been adduced to make the content of 
the young man's conversation with his employer's insurance agent, as well as his 
reliance thereon and the reasonable nature of that reliance, issues of fact to 
be resolved by a jury.

[¶39]   Partial summary judgment in favor 
of Mountain West is affirmed as to Kelly Verschoor's claims for loss of 
consortium and Chad Verschoor's claim for punitive damages. The causes of action 
for promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation were preserved 
sufficiently to merit submission to a jury. The district court's judgment as to 
those two counts is reversed and remanded for trial on their 
merits.