Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Thomas O. Mulligan

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2015 WI 96 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP2742-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Thomas O. Mulligan, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Thomas O. Mulligan, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MULLIGAN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
October 8, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, J.J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 96
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP2742-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Thomas O. Mulligan, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Thomas O. Mulligan, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
OCT 8, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Thomas O. Mulligan appeals a 
report filed by Referee Robert E. Kinney, concluding that 
Attorney 
Mulligan 
engaged 
in 
professional 
misconduct 
and 
recommending that this court suspend his license to practice law 
in Wisconsin for a period of 18 months, order Attorney Mulligan 
to make restitution to a client, and impose full costs, which 
total $17,720.02 as of May 12, 2015.  Attorney Mulligan asserts 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
2 
 
that his admitted ethical violations are de minimus and do not 
warrant restitution, license suspension, or full costs. 
¶2 
Having 
considered 
the 
referee's 
report 
and 
the 
parties' briefs and oral argument on appeal, we conclude that 
the referee's relevant findings of fact are supported by 
satisfactory 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
and 
we 
accept 
his 
conclusion that Attorney Mulligan committed the eight counts of 
misconduct alleged in the Office of Lawyer Regulation's (OLR) 
complaint.  We conclude, however, that Attorney Mulligan's 
misconduct warrants a nine-month suspension of his license to 
practice law in this state, and we direct Attorney Mulligan to 
attend a trust account seminar and, upon reinstatement, to 
submit to trust account monitoring.  We decline to order 
restitution to R.W. for the reasons stated herein.  Finally, we 
impose the full costs of this proceeding on Attorney Mulligan. 
¶3 
Attorney Mulligan was licensed to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1985.  He lives and practices in Spooner, 
Wisconsin, where he is a general practitioner.  
¶4 
Attorney Mulligan has previously been disciplined for 
misconduct.  In 1997, Attorney Mulligan received a private 
reprimand for failing to properly communicate with his client, 
failing to return a client's file, failing to refund unearned 
fees 
upon 
termination 
of 
representation, 
and 
failing 
to 
communicate the basis or rate of his fee within a reasonable 
time after commencing the representation.  Private Reprimand 
No. 1997-25.  In 2005, Attorney Mulligan received a private 
reprimand for failing to timely refund an advanced payment of a 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
3 
 
fee that had not been earned.  Private Reprimand No. 2005-10.  
In 2009, Attorney Mulligan received a public reprimand for 
failing to consult with his client regarding his intent to 
proceed with an appeal without obtaining trial transcripts and 
failing to consult with his client regarding his decision to 
seek 
only 
de 
novo 
review 
of 
a 
contract. 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Attorney Mulligan, 2009 WI 12, 
315 Wis. 2d 605, 759 N.W.2d 766.   
¶5 
The OLR filed the complaint giving rise to this 
proceeding on December 12, 2013, alleging eights counts of 
professional misconduct committed in two client matters and 
trust account anomalies.  Attorney Mulligan retained counsel and 
filed an answer.  Referee Kinney was appointed.  The parties 
filed a comprehensive stipulation of facts.  The referee 
conducted a one-day hearing in July 2014, and both parties filed 
post-hearing 
briefs 
and 
proposed 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law.  The referee issued his report and 
recommendation on October 24, 2014. This appeal followed.  The 
court heard oral argument on April 22, 2015.   
¶6 
When reviewing a referee's report and recommendation, 
we affirm the referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 
2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We review the 
referee's conclusions of law de novo.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Alia, 2006 WI 12, ¶39, 288 Wis.2d 299, 
709 N.W.2d 399. 
 
We 
determine 
the 
appropriate 
level 
of 
discipline to impose given the particular facts of each case, 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
4 
 
independent of the referee's recommendation, but benefitting 
from it.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 
2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
R.W. Matter   
¶7 
Attorney Mulligan does not contest that he committed 
the misconduct alleged in connection with his representation of 
R.W. but deems the infractions de minimus.  The facts will be 
summarized because the admitted misconduct is relevant to our 
assessment of appropriate discipline and because the referee's 
evaluation of this matter will require some discussion when we 
assess discipline.  
¶8 
R.W. was a teen with drug and alcohol issues who faced 
81 
criminal 
charges 
in 
Washburn 
and 
Burnett 
Counties, 
consolidated into one Washburn County case filed on January 8, 
2008. 
 
In 
July 
2008, 
Attorney 
Mulligan 
assumed 
R.W.'s 
representation.  No fee agreement was executed.  At the 
beginning of Attorney Mulligan's representation, R.W.'s father 
gave Attorney Mulligan a $5,000 check.  This initial $5,000 
payment was deposited into Attorney Mulligan's business account 
rather than his trust account.   
¶9 
The district attorney sought forfeiture of R.W.'s 
entire $10,000 bond for bail jumping, but eventually agreed to 
release $5,000 to Attorney Mulligan's trust account in return 
for a $5,000 forfeiture to Washburn County.  The Washburn County 
Clerk of Court issued a $5,000 check to Attorney Mulligan's 
trust account; it was deposited on January 13, 2009.  Attorney 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
5 
 
Mulligan and R.W. agreed that Attorney Mulligan was to deposit 
$500 from the $5,000 refund into R.W.'s county jail account.   
¶10 On January 14, 2009, Attorney Mulligan transferred the 
$5,000 in refunded bail money from his trust account to his 
business account.  Two weeks later, on January 29, 2009, 
Attorney Mulligan mailed a $500 check to R.W.'s county jail 
account.  R.W. later requested an accounting.  No accounting was 
provided until R.W. threatened to file a grievance.  
¶11 The OLR's complaint alleged that "[b]y accepting 
$5,000 to represent [R.W.] in numerous criminal matters, and 
failing to enter into a written fee agreement with [R.W.] or 
[his father], [Attorney] Mulligan violated [Supreme Court Rule 
(SCR)] 20:1.5(b)(1) and (2)"1 (Count One).   
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) and (2) provide: 
(1) The scope of the representation and the basis 
or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client 
will be responsible shall be communicated to the 
client in writing, before or within a reasonable time 
after commencing the representation, except when the 
lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on 
the same basis or rate as in the past.  If it is 
reasonably 
foreseeable 
that 
the 
total 
cost 
of 
representation to the client, including attorney's 
fees, will be $1000 or less, the communication may be 
oral or in writing. Any changes in the basis or rate 
of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated in 
writing to the client.  
(2) If the total cost of representation to the 
client, including attorney's fees, is more than $1000, 
the purpose and effect of any retainer or advance fee 
that is paid to the lawyer shall be communicated in 
writing. 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
6 
 
¶12 The complaint alleged further that "[b]y failing to 
deposit the initial $5,000 advanced fee payment into his trust 
account, without providing the written notices required under 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m) or otherwise indicating a proper basis or 
intent to utilize the alternative advanced fee placement 
measures stated in SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m), [Attorney] Mulligan 
violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(4)"2 (Count Two).   
¶13 The complaint alleged further that "[b]y withdrawing 
$5,000 bail return money from his trust account and promptly 
transferring the funds into his general account, when $500 of 
that amount belonged to [R.W.], pursuant to a written agreement, 
[Attorney] Mulligan violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(l)"3 (Count Three).  
¶14 Again, Attorney Mulligan does not contest these 
charges and we accept the referee's conclusion that Attorney 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) provides: 
Except as provided in par. (4m), unearned fees 
and advanced payments of fees shall be held in trust 
until earned by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant to 
sub. (g).  Funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for 
payment of costs shall be held in trust until the 
costs are incurred. 
3 SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) provides: 
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 
3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in 
connection with a representation.  All funds of 
clients and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm 
in connection with a representation shall be deposited 
in one or more identifiable trust accounts. 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
7 
 
Mulligan committed the misconduct, as alleged, in connection 
with the matter of R.W. 
A.B. Matter 
¶15 Attorney Mulligan does not contest the misconduct 
alleged in connection with his representation of A.B. but deems 
the infractions de minimus.   
¶16 In September 2009, A.B. hired Attorney Mulligan to 
represent her in a divorce.  The parties executed a fee 
agreement dated September 23, 2009.  A.B. gave Attorney Mulligan 
$1,750 
on 
September 
24, 
2009, 
as 
an 
advanced 
fee 
in 
contemplation of future legal services.   
¶17 Attorney Mulligan did not place the advanced fee into 
his trust account; the fee agreement did not contain the notices 
required under SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m) that would allow for the 
placement of the advanced fee into an account other than 
Attorney Mulligan's trust account.   
¶18 The OLR's complaint alleged that "[b]y failing to 
deposit [A.B.'s] advanced fee payment into his trust account 
without 
providing 
the 
written 
notices 
required 
under 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m) or otherwise indicating a proper basis or 
intent to utilize the alternative advanced fee placement 
measures stated in SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m), [Attorney] Mulligan 
violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(4)" (Count Four).   
¶19 Again, Attorney Mulligan does not contest this charge 
and we accept the referee's conclusion that he committed the 
misconduct as alleged. 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
8 
 
Trust Account Anomalies 
¶20 Attorney Mulligan does not dispute that he violated 
certain trust account rules.  He does dispute that he committed 
misconduct in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c),4 as alleged in Count 
Six of the OLR's complaint. 
¶21 During the OLR's investigation, the OLR discovered 
systemic trust account anomalies.  On December 1, 2011, the OLR 
sent Attorney Mulligan a letter requesting copies of his trust 
account records for the years 2008 through 2011, inclusive.  
Attorney Mulligan provided the requested copies but did not 
provide client ledgers or monthly reconciliation statements 
because he did not maintain them.  Attorney Mulligan's check 
stubs did not show a running balance, did not show the source 
for all deposits, and did not consistently show the identity of 
the client for whom funds were deposited or disbursed.  
¶22 The 
OLR 
reconstructed 
Attorney 
Mulligan's 
trust 
account and, according to the complaint, between December 17, 
2007 and December 31, 2011, Attorney Mulligan and his wife, the 
only authorized signatories to the trust account, deposited 
personal funds totaling $45,380.57 into the trust account.  
During the same period, Attorney Mulligan disbursed $54,869.01 
from the trust account for personal obligations, including 
income 
taxes, 
property 
taxes, 
and 
attorney 
fees. 
The 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
9 
 
disbursements from Attorney Mulligan's trust account included 
some 
$6,593 
in 
cash 
withdrawals, 
which 
are 
specifically 
prohibited by SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)a. 
¶23 The opening balance of Attorney Mulligan's trust 
account in December 2007 was $2,774.88.  Assuming some of these 
funds 
may 
have 
belonged 
to 
Attorney 
Mulligan, 
between 
December 17, 2007 and December 31, 2011, Attorney Mulligan 
disbursed from his trust account at least $6,313.56 and as much 
as $9,088.44 more for personal matters than he had on deposit 
during this time period.   
¶24 The OLR's complaint alleged that "[b]y depositing 
$45,380.57 of personal funds into his trust account between 
December 17, 2007 and December 31, 2011, thereby commingling 
personal funds with trust account funds, [Attorney] Mulligan 
violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(3)"5 (Count Five).  
¶25 The complaint alleged further:  
By disbursing from his trust account, and by 
allowing his wife to make disbursements from his trust 
account, totaling at least $6,713.56 and as much as 
$9,488.446 more for personal matters than he had on 
                                                 
5 SCR 20:1.15(b)(3) provides that "[n]o funds belonging to 
the lawyer or law firm, except funds reasonably sufficient to 
pay monthly account service charges, may be deposited or 
retained in a trust account." 
6 It was later confirmed by an OLR investigator that the 
figures used in the complaint ($6,713.56 and $9,488.44) were 
incorrect.  The referee subsequently also used these figures in 
parts of his report.  It is undisputed that this is a 
typographical error on the referee's part.  The correct numbers 
are $6,313.56 and $9,088.44.   
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
10 
 
deposit between December 17, 2007 and December 31, 
2011, [Attorney] Mulligan failed to hold in trust and 
converted a net total of between $6,713.56 and 
$9,488.44 of client or third party funds for his 
personal use; and by disbursing funds for personal 
matters on numerous occasions when he did not have 
sufficient personal funds on deposit in the trust 
account 
to 
cover 
such 
disbursements, 
[Attorney] 
Mulligan violated [] SCR 20:1.15(b)(1), and current 
SCR 20:8.4(c) [(Count Six)]. 
¶26 The complaint alleged further that "[b]y failing to 
maintain a complete transaction register, subsidiary client 
ledgers, 
and 
monthly 
reconciliation 
statements, 
[Attorney] 
Mulligan violated the trust account record keeping requirements 
of SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)"7 (Count Seven).   
                                                 
7 SCR 20:1.15(f)(1) provides: 
Complete records of a trust account that is a 
draft account shall include a transaction register; 
individual client ledgers for IOLTA accounts and other 
pooled trust accounts; a ledger for account fees and 
charges, if law firm funds are held in the account 
pursuant to sub. (b)(3); deposit records; disbursement 
records; 
monthly 
statements; 
and 
reconciliation 
reports, subject to all of the following: 
a. 
Transaction 
register. 
 
The 
transaction 
register shall contain a chronological record of all 
account transactions, and shall include all of the 
following: 
1. the date, source, and amount of all deposits; 
2. the date, check or transaction number, payee 
and amount of all disbursements, whether by check, 
wire transfer, or other means; 
3. the date and amount of every other deposit or 
deduction of whatever nature; 
4. the identity of the client for whom funds were 
deposited or disbursed; and 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
11 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
5. 
the 
balance 
in 
the 
account 
after 
each 
transaction. 
b. Individual client ledgers.  A subsidiary 
ledger shall be maintained for each client or 3rd 
party for whom the lawyer receives trust funds that 
are deposited in an IOLTA account or any other pooled 
trust account.  The lawyer shall record each receipt 
and disbursement of a client's or 3rd party's funds 
and the balance following each transaction.  A lawyer 
shall not disburse funds from an IOLTA account or any 
pooled trust account that would create a negative 
balance with respect to any individual client or 
matter. 
c. Ledger for account fees and charges.  A 
subsidiary ledger shall be maintained for funds of the 
lawyer deposited in the trust account to accommodate 
monthly service charges.  Each deposit and expenditure 
of the lawyer's funds in the account and the balance 
following each transaction shall be identified in the 
ledger. 
d. Deposit records.  Deposit slips shall identify 
the name of the lawyer or law firm, and the name of 
the account.  The deposit slip shall identify the 
amount of each deposit item, the client or matter 
associated with each deposit item, and the date of the 
deposit.  The lawyer shall maintain a copy or 
duplicate of each deposit slip.  All deposits shall be 
made intact.  No cash, or other form of disbursement, 
shall be deducted from a deposit.  Deposits of wired 
funds shall be documented in the account's monthly 
statement. 
e. Disbursement records. 
1. Checks.  Checks shall be pre-printed and pre-
numbered.  The name and address of the lawyer or law 
firm, and the name of the account shall be printed in 
the upper left corner of the check.  Trust account 
checks shall include the words "Client Account," or 
"Trust Account," or words of similar import in the 
account name.  Each check disbursed from the trust 
account shall identify the client matter and the 
reason for the disbursement on the memo line. 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
12 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
2. Canceled checks.  Canceled checks shall be 
obtained from the financial institution.  Imaged 
checks may be substituted for canceled checks. 
3. Imaged checks.  Imaged checks shall be 
acceptable if they provide both the front and reverse 
of the check and comply with the requirements of this 
paragraph.  The information contained on the reverse 
side 
of 
the 
imaged 
checks 
shall 
include 
any 
endorsement signatures or stamps, account numbers, and 
transaction dates that appear on the original.  Imaged 
checks shall be of sufficient size to be readable 
without magnification and as close as possible to the 
size of the original check. 
4. Wire transfers.  Wire transfers shall be 
documented by a written withdrawal authorization or 
other documentation, such as a monthly statement of 
the account that indicates the date of the transfer, 
the payee, and the amount. 
f. Monthly statement.  The monthly statement 
provided to the lawyer or law firm by the financial 
institution shall identify the name and address of the 
lawyer or law firm and the name of the account. 
g. Reconciliation reports.  For each trust 
account, the lawyer shall prepare and retain a printed 
reconciliation report on a regular and periodic basis 
not less frequently than every 30 days.  Each 
reconciliation report shall show all of the following 
balances and verify that they are identical: 
1. the balance that appears in the transaction 
register as of the reporting date; 
2. the total of all subsidiary ledger balances 
for IOLTA accounts and other pooled trust accounts, 
determined by listing and totaling the balances in the 
individual client ledgers and the ledger for account 
fees and charges, as of the reporting date; and 
3. the adjusted balance, determined by adding 
outstanding deposits and other credits to the balance 
in the financial institution's monthly statement and 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
13 
 
¶27 Finally, the complaint alleged that "[b]y making the 
cash disbursements totaling $6,593.00 from the trust account, 
[Attorney] Mulligan violated SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)a."8 (Count Eight).   
¶28 Attorney Mulligan does not contest the violations 
alleged in Counts Five, Seven, and Eight, and we accept the 
referee's conclusion that Attorney Mulligan committed this 
misconduct, as alleged.  However, Attorney Mulligan challenges 
the referee's conclusion that he violated SCR 20:8.4(c) (Count 
Six).   
¶29 Attorney Mulligan asserts that his conduct did not 
involve dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and thus 
did not violate SCR 20:8.4(c).  Attorney Mulligan argues that:  
(1) there is no evidence of any intentional cover up of personal 
expenditures; (2) "no clients complained that they did not 
receive funds they were entitled to from Attorney Mulligan;" 
(3) "OLR provided no specific evidence regarding the conversion 
of any particular client funds;" and (4) Attorney Mulligan 
personally engaged in a good faith effort to always ensure that 
sufficient personal funds were available for payment of personal 
expenses from the trust account.  Attorney Mulligan seeks to 
distinguish his conduct from cases in which this court has ruled 
that a lawyer violated SCR 20:8.4(c).  See, e.g., In re 
                                                                                                                                                             
subtracting outstanding checks and other deductions 
from the balance in the monthly statement. 
8 SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)a. provides that "[n]o disbursement of 
cash shall be made from a trust account or from a deposit to a 
trust account, and no check shall be made payable to 'Cash.'" 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
14 
 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶15, 
248 Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718 (lawyer set in motion the 
fraudulent conduct in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c)); see also 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Usow, 214 Wis. 2d 596, 
600-01, 571 N.W.2d 162 (1997) (attorney submitted accounting 
that "contained duplicative, speculative and inflated charges" 
due to carelessness, neglect, and his failure to properly 
supervise office staff). 
¶30 A lawyer must hold the property of others with the 
care 
required 
of 
a 
professional 
fiduciary. 
 
SCR 20:1.15 
(Wisconsin Comment).  A finding of wrongful intent is not 
necessary to prove a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  A violation of 
SCR 20:8.4(c) can be based on an attorney's "carelessness and 
neglect."  See, 
e.g., Carroll, 
248 Wis. 2d 662; Usow, 
214 Wis. 2d 596.  Similarly, an attorney's claim of good faith 
does not preclude a determination of misconduct in violation of 
SCR 20:8.4(c).  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Edgar, 230 Wis. 2d 205, 601 N.W.2d 284 (1999).  
¶31 The referee was not convinced by Attorney Mulligan's 
reasoning that he did not commit misconduct in violation of 
SCR 20:8.4(c) because "no clients complained that they did not 
receive funds they were entitled to from Attorney Mulligan."  At 
the evidentiary hearing, Attorney Mulligan was questioned 
extensively about specific "unaccounted-for" balances on various 
client 
accounts. 
 
Attorney 
Mulligan 
asserted 
that 
the 
"unaccounted-for" balances existing at year-end were fees earned 
by him.  The OLR trust account investigator was asked about the 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
15 
 
client ledger, noting that many of those client ledgers result 
in a zero balance.   
Q  Just based on those numbers, is it true that there 
was ample unaccounted for client funds in trust to 
cover 
the 
personal 
expenditure 
overage 
by 
Mr. Mulligan?  
A  Yes.  
¶32 The referee was troubled by a bookkeeping strategy 
that basically deemed anything left over as "fees."  The 
evidence supports the referee's findings that Attorney Mulligan 
not only comingled his own money with client funds, but also 
used client funds for his own purposes.  The referee explained 
it well: 
It may well be, once again giving [Attorney Mulligan] 
the benefit of the doubt, that [Attorney] Mulligan did 
not know whose funds he was withdrawing. The record 
clearly shows, however, that the money he withdrew was 
not all his own.  It is not seriously contested that 
he withdrew more money than the personal money he 
deposited.  It is not necessary for the OLR to prove 
whose money he withdrew on any given day.  We know the 
list of possibilities.  . . . .  That [Attorney 
Mulligan] permitted this situation to exist is a sad 
state of affairs, and it is one for which he is 
answerable in this proceeding.  
(Emphasis added.)  The referee explained why this is wrong:   
The problem is that "inadequate trust account records" 
are themselves a form of wrongdoing.  The seriousness 
of such wrongdoing is highlighted by the facts of this 
case.  Under the circumstances, to the extent there is 
any lack of clarity, it is entirely the responsibility 
of [Attorney Mulligan].  
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
16 
 
¶33 Comingling funds is not a trivial or technical rule 
violation.  The Law of Lawyering, Third Addition, Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr., 2014 Supplement, at 19-9, states:   
In most jurisdictions, disciplinary authorities 
treat violations of the rule against commingling trust 
funds 
and 
personal 
funds 
extremely 
seriously.  
. . . even where the client or third party suffers no 
loss, harsh sanctions usually follow as a prophylactic 
warning that comingling cannot be tolerated.  
¶34 Attorney Mulligan's assertion that the OLR failed to 
show 
"specific 
evidence 
regarding 
the 
conversion 
of 
any 
particular client funds" is unavailing particularly where, as 
here, Attorney Mulligan's inability to produce the trust account 
records required by the rules of professional responsibility is 
part of the reason it is now difficult to discern "with 
specificity" which client funds kept Attorney Mulligan's trust 
account 
afloat. 
 
In 
In 
re 
Trust 
Estate 
of 
Martin, 
39 Wis. 2d 437, 441-42, 159 N.W.2d 660 (1968), we explained:  
A trustee is not handling his own funds but funds of 
others and he must always be able to make a full 
accounting of his stewardship. When a trustee's 
accounts are not clear and accurate, all presumptions 
are against him and the obscurities and doubts are to 
be taken adversely against him.  
¶35 This rationale applies in the attorney regulatory 
context.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Weigel, 
2012 WI 124, ¶41, 345 Wis. 2d 7, 823 N.W.2d 798.  Here, the 
record reflects that between December 2007 and December 2011, 
Attorney Mulligan deposited over $45,000 of personal funds into 
his trust account and withdrew at least $6,313.56 and as much as 
$9,088.44 more for personal expenditures than he deposited for 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
17 
 
personal expenses during that period of time.  The OLR trust 
account investigator testified:   
We were able to determine that based upon the running 
balance in the account, it appeared on several 
occasions the balance of Mr. Mulligan's personal 
account went negative when he made disbursements. 
Therefore, he must have used other funds, other client 
or third-party funds, that were deposited in the 
account in order to cover those disbursements.  
¶36 Conversion has been described as: 
[T]he unauthorized use of a client's funds for the 
lawyer's own purpose. It includes temporary use, and 
it extends to use that does not result in personal 
gain or benefit to the lawyer. Paying one client out 
of money due another, keeping an unearned advance fee, 
holding on to unused escrow funds, and applying client 
funds to the client's bill are all examples of 
conversion. 
Weigel, 345 Wis. 2d 7, ¶41 (quoting ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on 
Professional Conduct § 45:503 (2007)).  Thus, the fact that the 
OLR has not identified "specific" examples of conversion does 
not 
preclude 
a 
determination 
that 
a 
lawyer 
engaged 
in 
conversion, constituting misconduct. 
¶37 Attorney Mulligan clearly believes that because he 
sought to ensure that sufficient personal funds were available 
to avoid overdraft, this excuses his trust account violations. 
The record evidence, however, demonstrates that by extensive 
commingling of personal and client monies, Attorney Mulligan 
misrepresented the balance of client funds in his trust account 
at any given point in time.  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance 
Comm'n of Md. v. Glenn, 671 A.2d 463, 487 (Md. Ct. App. 1996) 
(rejecting a lawyer's claim that his own deposits into a trust 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
18 
 
account cured any trust account violation, observing that "a 
trust account is a trust account, not one dependent on 
discretionary 
infusions 
of 
money 
from 
another 
source").  
Attorney Mulligan's trust account so inextricably comingled 
client and personal funds that it is impossible to know which or 
whose funds were being used at any particular time.  The record 
here supports the referee's findings and conclusions that the 
trust account anomalies at issue rose to the level of misconduct 
under SCR 20:8.4(c).   
¶38 We turn to the question of appropriate discipline.  
The referee recommends an 18-month suspension together with 
$7,500 in restitution to R.W. and full costs.  Attorney Mulligan 
appeals, objecting to restitution and full costs, and asserting 
that a reprimand should suffice for what he maintains is de 
minimus misconduct.   
¶39 In assessing a proper sanction, we consider the 
following factors:  (1) the seriousness, nature, and extent of 
the misconduct; (2) the level of discipline needed to protect 
the public, the courts, and the legal system from repetition of 
the attorney's misconduct; (3) the need to impress upon the 
attorney the seriousness of the misconduct; and (4) the need to 
deter other attorneys from committing similar misconduct.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis, 2011 WI 3, ¶39, 
331 Wis. 2d 19, 793 N.W.2d 884.  In addition, we follow the 
concept 
of 
progressive 
discipline. 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Brandt, 2012 WI 8, ¶21, 338 Wis. 2d 524, 808 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
19 
 
N.W.2d 687; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nussberger, 
2006 WI 111, ¶27, 296 Wis. 2d 47, 719 N.W.2d 501.   
¶40 The referee recommends that Attorney Mulligan be 
ordered to pay $7,500 in restitution to R.W. as reimbursement 
for unearned fees.  The OLR did not seek restitution in the 
complaint or during the disciplinary litigation, stating that it 
"could not ascertain a reasonable amount to be refunded."  
Nothing precludes a referee from making or this court from 
accepting a sua sponte recommendation regarding restitution.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Din, 2015 WI 4, 
360 Wis. 2d 274, 858 N.W.2d 654 (referee overruled parties' 
stipulation 
to 
restitution 
totaling 
$13,250, 
instead 
recommending $14,250 total restitution, and we adopted the 
referee's recommendation).  We are not persuaded that Attorney 
Mulligan 
lacked 
a 
sufficient 
opportunity 
to 
address 
the 
referee's findings and recommendation regarding restitution.  
Attorney Mulligan appealed the report and has argued his case 
extensively in his appellate briefs and at oral argument.   
¶41 The 
referee's 
recommendation 
was 
based 
on 
the 
referee's review, primarily, of two exhibits Attorney Mulligan 
offered at the evidentiary hearing:  Exhibit D, an itemization 
of Attorney Mulligan's work performed for R.W.; and Exhibit E, 
24 pages of printouts documenting court activity in R.W.'s 
criminal cases from the Wisconsin Court System Circuit Court 
Access (WCCA) website.  Attorney Mulligan presented this 
evidence in support of his theory that, although he failed to 
provide a fee agreement, R.W. received the legal services he 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
20 
 
paid for; Attorney Mulligan maintains that the $9,500 fee he 
received from R.W. was reasonable.  
¶42 The referee's assessment of this itemization is 
scathing.  He deemed the itemization a faulty, error-riddled 
document generated after the fact; indeed, he refers to it as a 
"fabrication" and opined that several of the itemized events 
either did not take place or could not have taken the time the 
itemization asserts.   
¶43 We conclude, however, that the evidence fails to 
support a $7,500 restitution order.  We agree with the OLR's 
original assessment that this record does not permit us to 
ascertain a reasonable amount, if any, to be refunded, and we 
decline to impose restitution in this matter.   
¶44 Attorney Mulligan expresses concern about what he 
perceives 
to 
be 
extraneous 
investigation, 
findings, 
and 
conclusions in the referee's report.  As noted, the report does 
contain an extensive and largely negative characterization of 
Attorney Mulligan's professional efforts on behalf of R.W. 
Attorney 
Mulligan 
contends 
that 
the 
referee's 
commentary 
pertaining to the fee itemization, his review of WCCA records, 
and his post-hearing review of Attorney Mulligan's trust account 
records were improper.    
¶45 While the referee pursued this inquiry with unusual 
zeal, we need not explore whether his efforts transcend 
propriety.  The referee is the ultimate arbiter of the facts and 
credibility of witnesses.  His observations inform our review 
and we discern no reason to deem his findings clearly erroneous.  
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
21 
 
The 
findings 
are 
germane, 
primarily, 
to 
the 
referee's 
restitution recommendation, which we have declined to adopt.  We 
are mindful, moreover, that the OLR did not allege a lack of 
competent representation under SCR 20:1.1 or a lack of diligence 
under SCR 20:1.3.  The discipline we impose today is based on 
the eight counts of misconduct alleged in the OLR complaint. 
¶46 We agree with Attorney Mulligan that the disciplinary 
cases cited by the OLR generally reflect more egregious 
misconduct than occurred here and thus provide limited guidance.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Evans, 2000 WI 124, 
239 Wis. 2d 279, 618 N.W.2d 873 (lawyer with disciplinary 
history suspended for two years, for conversion of client funds, 
failure 
to 
provide 
the 
client 
with 
an 
accounting, 
and 
misrepresentations to cover her inability to pay the balance); 
Edgar, 230 Wis. 2d 205 (lawyer suspended for two years for 
conversion 
of 
$11,000 
from 
an 
escrow 
account, 
misrepresentations, and failure to maintain required records).  
¶47 However, Attorney Mulligan's effort to characterize 
his misconduct as trivial is similarly unpersuasive.  The record 
demonstrates that between 2007 and 2011, Attorney Mulligan 
failed to properly maintain trust account records, deposited 
personal money into his trust account, disbursed money from his 
trust account for personal expenses, and regularly deposited 
client funds into his business account.  Attorney Mulligan's 
actions are not mere "technical deficiencies."  The record 
before us also reveals a persistent pattern of failure to abide 
by the requirements of our rules of professional conduct.  
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
22 
 
¶48 We 
find 
useful 
guidance 
in 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Schuster, 2006 WI 21, 289 Wis. 2d 23, 
710 N.W.2d 458, where a lawyer was suspended for nine months for 
significant and pervasive trust account violations, including 
comingling of personal and trust accounts.  Upon consideration 
of the relevant facts and misconduct, we conclude that a nine-
month suspension of Attorney Mulligan's license to practice law 
is appropriate and warranted by the facts and by the principle 
of progressive discipline. 
¶49 As in Schuster, some conditions are appropriate to 
foster 
Attorney 
Mulligan's 
compliance 
with 
trust 
account 
requirements.  We direct him to attend an OLR trust account 
seminar and, following reinstatement, Attorney Mulligan shall 
submit to OLR trust account monitoring for a period of three 
years, or until such time as the OLR moves this court for an 
order ending monitoring. 
¶50 Finally, we consider Attorney Mulligan's repeated 
objections to the costs of this proceeding.  Attorney Mulligan 
argues that some of the counts in the OLR's complaint are 
technicalities and some are duplicative, that he cooperated in 
the proceedings, and that the referee engaged extraneous and 
irrelevant findings.  The court's general policy is that, upon a 
finding of misconduct, it is appropriate to impose all costs, 
including the expenses of counsel for the OLR, upon the 
respondent.  We perceive nothing in this record to justify 
deviating from our usual policy of imposing full costs.  We 
decline to reduce costs on the theory that the referee 
No. 
2013AP2742-D   
 
23 
 
scrutinized evidence too closely.  We assess the full costs of 
this proceeding against Attorney Mulligan. 
¶51 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Thomas O. Mulligan 
to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of nine 
months days, effective November 7, 2015. 
¶52 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Thomas O. Mulligan shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are 
$17,720.02. 
¶53 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Thomas O. Mulligan shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶54 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as a condition of any 
reinstatement of his license to practice law in Wisconsin, 
Thomas O. Mulligan shall attend and successfully complete an 
Office of Lawyer Regulation trust account seminar and shall pay 
the related participation fees. 
¶55 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, upon reinstatement of his 
license to practice law, Thomas O. Mulligan's trust account 
shall be subject to monitoring by the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation for three years or until further order of this court. 
¶56 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.29(4)(c). 
¶57 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., and ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, 
J., did not participate. 
No.  2013AP2742-D.ssa 
 
 
1 
 
¶58 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  OLR sought 
a two-year suspension.  The referee recommended an 18-month 
suspension.  After a contested proceeding, the court imposes a 
nine-month suspension for repeated significant violations of 
trust accounting rules (not merely "technical" violations).  
¶59 This is Attorney Mulligan's fourth brush with OLR.  In 
1997, Attorney Mulligan received a private reprimand.  In 2005, 
he received a private reprimand.  In 2009, he received a public 
reprimand. 
¶60 Attorney James T. Runyon also violated substantive 
trust 
accounting 
rules. 
 
OLR 
v 
Runyon, 
2015 
WI 
95, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  He has had two prior brushes 
with OLR.  In 1988, his license was suspended for one year.  In 
2006, he received a private reprimand.     
¶61 I 
have 
difficulty 
reconciling 
the 
significantly 
different levels of discipline imposed in these two trust 
accounting cases. 
 
No.  2013AP2742-D.ssa 
 
 
 
 
1