Title: Joseph Mullen v. Douglas J. Walczak

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 75 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-0129 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Joseph Mullen and Estate of Renee K. Petit, by 
Joseph Mullen, Special Administrator,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Douglas J. Walczak, ABC Insurance Company, 
Daniel Wheeler, DEF Insurance Company and Primax 
Recoveries Company,  
 
Defendants, 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 254 
Reported at:  257 Wis. 2d 928, 653 N.W.2d 529 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 1, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 8, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Lincoln   
 
JUDGE: 
J.M. Nolan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by D. James Weis and Habush Habush & Rottier, S.C., Rhinelander, 
and oral argument by D. James Weis. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by John A. 
Kramer, Michael J. Roman, and Zalewski, Klinner & Kramer, LLP, 
Wausau, and oral argument by John A. Kramer. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, 
III, Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial 
Lawyers. 
2003 WI 75 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-0129   
(L.C. No. 
99-CV-95) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Joseph Mullen and Estate of Renee K.  
Petit, by Joseph Mullen, Special  
Administrator,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Douglas J. Walczak, ABC Insurance  
Company, Daniel Wheeler, DEF Insurance  
Company and Primax Recoveries Company,  
 
          Defendants, 
 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JULY 1, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
WILLIAM 
A. 
BABLITCH, 
J.   Joseph 
Mullen 
(Mullen) 
petitions this court for review of a court of appeals' decision, 
which held that Mullen's claim for emotional distress, resulting 
solely from witnessing the death of his wife, should be paid out 
of his wife's "per person" liability limit under their American 
No.  02-0129 
   
 
2 
 
Family insurance policy.  Mullen v. Walczak, 2002 WI App 254, 
257 Wis. 2d 928, 653 N.W.2d 529.  We agree.  Based on the 
parties' stipulation that Mullen's claim for emotional distress 
is solely the result of witnessing his wife's death and on the 
plain language of the American Family insurance policy, we 
conclude that Mullen's claim must be compensated out of his 
wife's "per person" liability limit.  Accordingly, we uphold the 
decision of the court of appeals.    
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶2 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  On May 31, 1996, 
Mullen and his wife, Renee Petit (Petit), were involved in an 
automobile accident that was caused by Douglas Walczak, an 
uninsured motorist.  Petit died in the accident, and Mullen 
suffered serious physical injuries.  Mullen witnessed the death 
of his wife at the scene.     
 
¶3 
In 1999, Mullen commenced an action both personally, 
and as the administrator of Petit's estate, for the wrongful 
death of Petit and Mullen's personal injuries.  Mullen sought to 
recover under their automobile insurance policy issued by 
American Family, which provided uninsured motorists coverage.  
Mullen sued for: (1) the wrongful death of Petit; (2) his own 
physical injuries; and (3) the emotional distress he suffered as 
the result of witnessing Petit's death.  Only the emotional 
distress injury is at issue in this case.      
¶4 
Under the American Family policy, the "Limits of 
Liability" for uninsured motorists coverage provided that the 
"limit for 'each person' is the maximum for all damages 
No.  02-0129 
   
 
3 
 
sustained by all persons as the result of bodily injury to one 
person in any one accident."  The policy provided uninsured 
motorist limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per 
accident.   
¶5 
Mullen and American Family settled the wrongful death 
claim arising out of Petit's death for $100,000, thereby 
exhausting Petit's "per person" liability limit.  Mullen and 
American Family also stipulated that Mullen's claim for his 
physical injuries totaled $50,000.  Additionally, Mullen and 
American Family stipulated that Mullen "sustained and continues 
to suffer from emotional distress that resulted solely from 
witnessing his wife's death."  (Emphasis added.)   
¶6 
Based on the stipulation, American Family refused to 
cover Mullen's emotional injuries resulting from his wife's 
death.  American Family filed a motion for summary judgment, 
arguing that since Mullen's emotional distress arose from his 
wife's death, those damages would have to be paid out of Petit's 
"per person" limit, which had already been exhausted by the 
wrongful death settlement.  Mullen responded that his emotional 
injuries were part of his own bodily injuries, and were thus 
payable out of his own "per person" limit, of which $50,000 
remained.  
¶7 
The circuit court for Lincoln County, Judge J. Michael 
Nolan presiding, agreed with American Family and granted its 
motion for summary judgment.  The circuit court concluded that 
Mullen's damages for his emotional distress, as a result of 
witnessing his wife's death, was subject to Petit's "each 
No.  02-0129 
   
 
4 
 
person" limit since Mullen's emotional distress was the result 
of Petit's bodily injuries, citing Estate of Gocha v. Shimon, 
215 Wis. 2d 586, 573 N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1997).  Mullen filed a 
motion for reconsideration, which was denied.  
¶8 
Mullen 
appealed 
and 
argued 
that 
Gocha 
was 
not 
applicable because that case involved "bystander" claims of 
family members.  Unlike the facts in Gocha, Mullen emphasized 
that he was involved in the accident with his wife, and was 
physically injured as a result.  Mullen contended that since 
there were two physically injured persons in the accident, two 
"per person" liability limits should be available.  Mullen 
asserted that all damages sustained by him were his own bodily 
injuries in the accident.  As such, he claimed that these 
injuries should be properly compensated from his "per person" 
limit.         
¶9 
The court of appeals disagreed.  After surveying the 
case law and reviewing the decision in Gocha, the court of 
appeals stated that "but for the death of his wife, Mullen would 
not have an emotional distress claim based on witnessing her 
death."  Mullen, 257 Wis. 2d 928, ¶9.  The court concluded, 
"[t]he parties settled Mullen's claim for his physical injuries 
and any emotional distress that arose from them for $50,000.  
The only claim at issue is Mullen's distress from witnessing his 
wife's death.  Under the policy, that damage is subject to her 
'each person' limit."  Id., ¶12.   
¶10 Mullen petitioned this court for review, which was 
granted on December 10, 2002.   
No.  02-0129 
   
 
5 
 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
¶11 A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo using 
the same methodology as the circuit court.  Ahrens v. Town of 
Fulton, 2002 WI 29, ¶15, 251 Wis. 2d 135, 641 N.W.2d 423.  
Summary 
judgment 
shall 
be 
granted 
"if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled 
to 
judgment 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
law."  
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2001-02).   
¶12 The interpretation of an insurance contract is a 
question of law that this court reviews de novo.  Danbeck v. Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI 91, ¶10, 245 Wis. 2d 186, 629 
N.W.2d 150.  An insurance policy is construed to give effect to 
the intent of the parties, as expressed by the language of the 
policy itself, which is interpreted as a reasonable person in 
the position of the insured would understand it.  Garriguenc v. 
Love, 67 Wis. 2d 130, 134-35, 226 N.W.2d 414 (1975).  The words 
of an insurance policy are given their common and ordinary 
meaning.  Henderson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 59 
Wis. 2d 451, 457-59, 208 N.W.2d 423 (1973).  "When a policy is 
clear and unambiguous on its face, the terms of that policy 
should not be rewritten by construction to bind an insurer to a 
risk it never contemplated or was willing to cover, and for 
which it was never paid."  Gonzalez v. City of Franklin, 137 
Wis. 2d 109, 122, 403 N.W.2d 747 (1987) (citing Limpert v. 
Smith, 56 Wis. 2d 632, 640, 203 N.W.2d 29 (1973)).   
No.  02-0129 
   
 
6 
 
¶13 Applying these standards of review, we address whether 
Mullen's claim for emotional distress, solely as the result of 
witnessing his wife's death, must be paid out of his wife's "per 
person" uninsured motorists liability limit.      
ANALYSIS 
¶14 Mullen argues that his claim for emotional distress 
should be covered by his "each person" limit because all of his 
injuries, both physical and emotional, from whatever source, 
should be covered by his "per person" limit.  Mullen also argues 
that Gocha does not control the outcome of this case because it 
dealt with "bystander" claims that are not present in this case.  
Mullen maintains that because he suffered a physical injury, he 
is entitled to collect for all the damages he sustained in the 
accident, including the emotional distress he suffered from 
witnessing his wife's death.            
¶15 In Gocha, the court of appeals addressed whether the 
"each person" or "each accident" liability limit applied to 
emotional distress claims of family members who witnessed an 
accident involving Kyle Gocha.  Gocha, 215 Wis. 2d at 589.  Kyle 
was fatally injured while riding his bicycle when he was struck 
by an automobile.  Id.  The plaintiffs were four members of 
Kyle's family——none of whom were involved in the accident or 
physically injured.  Id.  The insurance policy in the case had 
"limits of liability" language similar to the American Family 
policy in this case, with limits of $100,000 for "each person" 
and $300,000 for "each accident."  Id.  The insurance company 
paid $100,000 to the Gochas for Kyle's death pursuant to the 
No.  02-0129 
   
 
7 
 
"each person" liability limit.  Id. at 590.  The Gochas 
contended that their emotional distress claims from witnessing 
Kyle's death entitled them to an additional $200,000 under the 
"each accident" limit.  The Gochas argued that the "emotional 
injuries suffered by family members who witness the death of 
another family member are a separate and independent direct 
action entitling the emotionally injured family members to 
liability coverage under the 'each accident' limit of $300,000 
and not the 'each person' limit of $100,000."  Id. at 588.   
¶16 The court of appeals disagreed with the Gochas, 
reasoning that: 
The bodily injury to Kyle includes all injury and 
damages to others resulting from Kyle’s bodily injury.  
But for the bodily injury to Kyle, the Gochas would 
not have suffered any emotional injuries.  Their 
injuries are the natural and probable consequence of 
witnessing the accident that killed Kyle.   
Id. at 592-93 (emphasis in original).  Consequently, the court 
in Gocha held that the emotional distress claims of Kyle's 
family members were only compensable out of Kyle's "per person" 
limit because their emotional distress resulted from Kyle's 
injuries.  Id. at 594.  In other words, "[t]he injuries suffered 
by the Gochas [arose] out of Kyle’s bodily injury, not their 
own."  Id. at 593.  
¶17 In this case, the court of appeals analogized between 
the claims of the family members in Gocha and Mullen's claim:  
The focus of our decision in Gocha was that, but for 
Kyle’s bodily injuries, the family members would not 
have suffered emotional distress and, under the terms 
of the policy, that distress was compensable only from 
No.  02-0129 
   
 
8 
 
the "each person" limit.  Similarly, but for the death 
of his wife, Mullen would not have an emotional 
distress claim based on witnessing her death.  That he 
suffered his own injuries is irrelevant to the issue 
of how the policy covers claims that result from 
bodily injury to another person. 
Mullen, 257 Wis. 2d 928, ¶9 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).   
¶18 Mullen argues that the court of appeals erred in 
relying on Gocha since he was not a "bystander" in the auto 
accident that killed his wife.  Furthermore, Mullen argues that 
"bodily injury" should be interpreted as including emotional 
distress, as well as physical injuries (citing Doyle v. Engelke, 
219 Wis. 2d 277, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998)).   
¶19 We agree with Mullen that he was not a "bystander," as 
that term is used in Gocha, since he was physically injured in 
the accident in which Petit was killed.  We also agree with 
Mullen that bodily injury may include emotional distress.  
Doyle, 219 Wis. 2d at 288.  However, even though we agree with 
Mullen on these points, they are not dispositive for determining 
whose "per person" limit applies to Mullen's claim for emotional 
distress, resulting solely from witnessing the death of his 
wife.  Rather, we must look to the relevant policy language and 
apply the limits of liability as provided in the policy.          
¶20 Under the American Family policy, the limits of 
liability for the uninsured motorists coverage provided that 
"[t]he limit for 'each person' is the maximum for all damages 
sustained by all persons as the result of bodily injury to one 
person in any one accident."  Thus in this case, Petit's "each 
person" limit includes all damages sustained by all persons as 
No.  02-0129 
   
 
9 
 
the result of her bodily injury in the accident.  Although 
Mullen suffered physical injuries in the accident, he stipulated 
that his claim for emotional distress was solely from witnessing 
his wife's death.  In other words, the stipulation established 
that Mullen's emotional distress was the result of his wife's 
death.   
¶21 As previously noted, we acknowledge that Mullen was 
not a bystander; however, since the only claim at issue is 
Mullen's emotional distress from witnessing his wife's death, we 
find the reasoning in bystander cases instructive.  In a case 
involving a husband's claim for the loss of his wife's services 
and her medical expenses, this court reasoned: 
While it is true that Herbert Bulman sustained damages 
by reason of the injury to his wife, quite separate 
and distinct in nature from those sustained by the 
wife, the insurance contract under which he seeks 
recovery includes his damages in those to which the 
limit of $5,000 applies. The measure of his recovery 
is not governed by the fact that his separate damages 
arose out of the same accident, but by the fact that 
they arose out of the same bodily injury.              
Bulman v. Bulman, 271 Wis. 286, 291, 73 N.W.2d 599 (1955).  In 
another bystander case, the court of appeals stated: 
How the law defines particular claims is immaterial. 
At issue is how the policy treats them, which is 
determined by the language of the policy.  That is, 
the language of the policy controls which limits apply 
because whether a claim is derivative does not affect 
the applicable limits.  Here, as shown below, the 
policy language ties the Krumms' claims to the "each 
person" limit. 
 . . . . 
No.  02-0129 
   
 
10 
 
The policy here limits the recovery for all claims 
arising out of the injury of one person.  Although 
those claims, such as emotional distress, may be 
independent and non-derivative and constitute "bodily 
injury," they arise out of the injury one person 
sustained. 
Here, Kyle sustained the injuries. But for Kyle's 
injuries, the rest of the Krumms would not have 
injuries or claims.  Therefore, the "each person" 
limit applies and limits the Krumms' total recovery 
under the settlement agreement to $50,000.     
Kosieradzki v. Mathys, 2002 WI App 191, ¶¶10, 13-14, 256 
Wis. 2d 839, 649 N.W.2d 717 (citation omitted).  Finally, as the 
court of appeals declared in Gocha, "[t]hat the Gochas have 
suffered Bowen-type emotional injuries is not really contested; 
it however begs the real controversy [at issue].  What is at 
issue here is whether State Farm's policy limits the Gochas' 
otherwise compensable injuries.  We conclude that it does."  
Gocha, 215 Wis. 2d at 591.   
¶22 In 
this 
case, 
even 
though 
Mullen 
was 
himself 
physically injured, his claim for emotional distress resulted 
from his wife's injury.  Under the terms of the policy, any 
damages sustained by all persons as the result of Petit's death 
are covered by her "per person" limit.  Consequently, the 
emotional distress suffered by Mullen, solely as the result of 
witnessing his wife's death, must be compensated out of her "per 
person" limit, not Mullen's.     
¶23 We note that our holding relies on the stipulation 
between Mullen and American Family, which stated that Mullen's 
claim for emotional distress "resulted solely from witnessing 
his wife's death." (Emphasis added.)  We have previously held 
No.  02-0129 
   
 
11 
 
that it may be impossible to separate damages for emotional 
distress that stem from different sources.  Redepenning v. Dore, 
56 Wis. 2d 129, 143, 201 N.W.2d 580 (1972).  In Redepenning, a 
mother sought recovery for injuries she sustained in an 
automobile accident.  Her daughter died in the accident, and the 
mother's claims included one for emotional distress.  In 
upholding a jury's damage award, we determined that the mother's 
emotional distress was caused both by her own physical injuries 
as well as witnessing her daughter's death.  Id.  Ultimately, we 
concluded that it was impossible to adequately separate the two.  
Id.  In contrast, the court of appeals aptly pointed out a 
crucial distinction present in this case: "While the Redepenning 
court did note [that] it could not separate the causes of the 
mother's emotional distress, Mullen and American Family were 
able to do it in this case."  Mullen, 257 Wis. 2d 928, ¶12.   
¶24 In sum, we conclude that Mullen's claim for emotional 
distress, resulting solely from witnessing the death of his 
wife, must be compensated out of his wife's "per person" 
liability limit based on the terms of the insurance policy.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.    
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  02-0129 
   
 
 
 
1