Title: People v. Hardin

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 99696-Agenda 14-September 2005.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 							
TOMMY O. HARDIN, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 1, 2005.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendant, Tommy O. Hardin, was represented at trial by an
assistant public defender. He was represented in postconviction
proceedings by another assistant public defender. His postconviction
attorney argued that his trial attorney was ineffective. The sole issue
in this case is whether the simple fact that both attorneys were
employed by the Du Page County public defender's office necessitated
an inquiry by the circuit court of Du Page County into a potential
conflict of interest. The appellate court refused to remand for such an
inquiry and affirmed the dismissal of the defendant's postconviction
petition. 353 Ill. App. 3d 522. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
	On May 5, 1997, the defendant was indicted on five counts of
aggravated criminal sexual abuse. See 720 ILCS 5/12-16(d) (West
1996). The trial court appointed the Du Page County public
defender's office to represent the defendant. Assistant Public Defender
Jameson Kunz was assigned the defendant's case.
	The defendant's complaints with Kunz's representation began
almost immediately. At an October 6, 1997, court date, the defendant
reported that Kunz had made "unethical and uncalled for" statements.
According to the defendant, Kunz said his job was to "sell me out,"
which led the defendant to "look bad on the whole public defender
system." The trial court found that the defendant's accusation was not
credible. The court told the defendant that it was Public Defender
Stephen Baker's decision which attorney would represent him, and the
court indicated that it had not heard anything to discredit Kunz's
work. The defendant replied, "I respectfully do not want him as my
attorney. I have told him to his face that he was fired. I don't think he
is going to represent me. And I do not have faith in him due to the fact
of what was said in our conversations, period." The trial court stated
that Kunz was experienced and competent, but that the defendant had
the option of representing himself. The court refused to direct the
public defender to reassign the case, and it declined to appoint private
counsel. The defendant then warned, "Your honor, it's just that I feel
it will be a conflict due to the fact that I will be filing with the
disciplinary commission." The trial court told the defendant that it
would reconsider its decision if he filed a disciplinary complaint and
such a conflict arose.
	At a September 17, 1998, court date, the defendant asked the
trial court to dismiss and replace Kunz. The trial court stated that
"there has been nothing to indicate to me that he is incompetent or
ineffective in his representation of you. If you are having some type of
personality difficulties, that is something that I will not get involved
in, and that is something that you have to direct to Mr. Baker." The
court requested that the defendant put his complaints in writing, so
Kunz could understand them and relay them to Baker. On September
23, 1998, when the trial court asked if the defendant was continuing
to ask for the dismissal of the public defender, the defendant clarified,
"This particular one." The defendant then submitted to the court a
handwritten letter, which specified 16 reasons why Kunz was
ineffective:
			"1. He has made statements in the past that it is his job to
sell me out.
			2. He has tride [sic] to have a pre ple [sic] report ordered
and he knew I was aposed [sic].
			3. He knows that I have said that I will not plead out this
case, but he has tried to get me to plead out.
			4. He has state [sic] that if I bring thease [sic] points up to
you that I will be found incopated [sic] for tril [sic].
			5. Jami has told me that I have no say in what gose [sic]
on this case.
			6. I have told him on severol [sic] accounts that this is
taking to [sic] long.
			7. He has asked for some continuances so he could do
somthing [sic] but never did it.
			8. I have object [sic] to some of the continuances that he
and the State have agreed to and even on record and for
example and I was over ruled by you your Honer [sic].
			9. Jami has made threats that if I cause him problemes
[sic] that I will get more time.
			10. Jami has kept me in the dark on most things.
			11. When I asked him to file things he has refused.
			12. On some motions that he has filed he wasn't prepared
to argure [sic] the motion but the State was.
			13. He has been doing the States [sic] job for example
when I objected to this last contunence [sic] he did not
argure [sic] for me but agreed with the State and argued for
them.
			14. I'm intitled [sic] to counsle [sic] that has my best
intrsed [sic] in minde [sic] but I don't example I was served
withe [sic] the wornt [sic] in the I.D.O.C. at Centrale [sic] on
or around March 8th 1997 and Jami knew this. But the police
officers came and got me on April 25th 1997 my indictment
did not come till May 2nd 1997 whe [sic] the police officers
came and got me it should never have happend [sic] my
rights to the right of due process for the state to find probable
cause with in the alotted [sic] amount of time give [sic] by
law 30 days I told him about this he blew it off.
			15. I've asked for a compleat [sic] copy of the transcripts
so that I might use and find the ones that would prove my
points in the past but Jami has said he will decide what
transcripts that I will get.
			Under Artacol [sic] 1 Secten [sic] 8 of the Illinois State
Constitution
			16. I have tried to get Jami to file a motion to supress [sic]
evedens [sic] he refuse. I my self [sic] asked Judge Dockery
who denide [sic] it."
The court scheduled a hearing on the defendant's allegations.
	At an October 5, 1998, court date, Kunz stated that he had
discussed this list with Baker, and that Baker saw no basis in the
defendant's charges to reassign the case. The trial court agreed,
stating:
			"Most of these items, to be perfectly honest, are very
vague, and some of them are certainly matters of strategy or
legal tactics which do fall within the province of the attorney
***. *** [M]ost *** are items that appear to be some type
of a personality conflict between the two individuals ***.
And as I indicated to [the defendant] several times, the Court
is not going to become involved in any type of issues of
personality conflict. My concern is whether there has been
ineffective representation by Mr. Kunz of the defendant, and
I find nothing raised in these points to show that."
The court continued the case to allow the defendant time to decide
whether to continue with the public defender, to retain a private
attorney, or to represent himself.
	The next day, the defendant chose none of the above. He could
not afford to retain a private attorney, and he explained that he was
not qualified to represent himself. He then stated that he "will not
work with [Kunz] in any way, shape or form" and that "what he says,
he does not say for me. He does not do for me." The defendant
informed the court that he had obtained forms to file a disciplinary
complaint against Kunz and added, "I think he will be so prejudiced
and retaliate." The trial court found no basis for a disciplinary
complaint, stating that the defendant's threat of filing one was merely
an attempt to circumvent the court's order denying his motion to
substitute counsel. The court reiterated that Kunz would remain as
defense counsel until the defendant chose to represent himself.
	The defendant continued to be uncooperative, and Kunz
expressed to the trial court his concern about the defendant,
questioning whether his obstinacy was a conscious decision or a result
of a mental-health problem. On November 6, 1998, the trial court held
a sua sponte fitness hearing and found the defendant unfit for trial.
The defendant disagreed with this finding. On July 22, 1999, the trial
court found the defendant was fit for trial. The defendant then claimed
that Kunz had disclosed confidential medical and psychological
reports to a doctor whom Kunz had contacted as a possible mitigation
witness. The defendant stated that he could not trust Kunz and again
asked the court to dismiss and replace him. The court refused to do
so.
	On December 2, 1999, the defendant again voiced his displeasure
with Kunz's representation, stating to the court, "For your
information, your Honor, I am filing a lawsuit against [Kunz] for
incompetency, and I want to get rid of him." The court responded,
"Well, you can file whatever suits you want." The court gave the
defendant the choice to continue with Kunz as his attorney or to
represent himself. This exchange followed:
			"THE COURT: If you file a lawsuit against [Kunz], the
case law is clear-I have numerous times indicated that [Kunz]
would represent you, and unless the Public Defender's office
changes that-simply filing an ARDC complaint or any type of
lawsuit does not-
			THE DEFENDANT: I am telling you he is not going to
represent me.
			THE COURT: Then you are going to represent yourself.
			THE DEFENDANT: I am not qualified and neither is he.
			THE COURT: The issue is, you are either going to
represent yourself or he is going to represent you.
			THE DEFENDANT: This is what the situation boils down
to, I am being blackmailed into pleading guilty-
			THE COURT: No, you are not."
	The case proceeded to a jury trial. A jury convicted the defendant
on all five counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and the trial
court sentenced him to concurrent 22-year terms of imprisonment.
The defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. See People
v. Hardin, No. 2-00-0441 (2001) (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23).
	On April 9, 2002, the defendant filed a pro se petition under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West
2002). The defendant alleged that Kunz was ineffective for two
reasons: he failed "to include" evidence of unnamed witnesses'
psychological records, and he breached client confidentiality. The
defendant requested postconviction counsel, and the trial court
appointed the Du Page County public defender's office to represent
the defendant. Ricky Holman was assigned the defendant's case.
	At a July 8, 2002, court date, Holman informed the trial court
that the defendant's foremost request was to be represented by an
attorney outside of the public defender's office. The court denied that
request. On November 26, 2002, Holman filed an amended petition
for the defendant in which he fleshed out the defendant's ineffective
assistance of counsel claims and added additional claims. The
amended petition alleged that the defendant was denied effective
assistance of counsel because Kunz failed to cross-examine two
witnesses at trial regarding their psychological histories; failed to
introduce the psychological histories of two witnesses who gave
victim impact statements at the sentencing hearing; and failed to cross-examine those witnesses at the sentencing hearing. The amended
petition further alleged that the trial court erred in refusing to allow
Kunz to cross-examine the alleged victims regarding their
psychological histories and because it found the defendant unfit. The
petition further alleged that Kunz violated the attorney-client privilege
when he gave medical records to a Du Page County jail psychologist
and, finally, that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties
clause. Holman filed a Rule 651(c) certificate along with the amended
petition, stating that he had consulted with the defendant about
putative violations of his constitutional rights, examined the record
and transcripts, and made necessary amendments to the defendant's
pro se petition. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c).
	On November 26, 2002, the trial court found that the amended
petition stated the gist of a constitutional claim and ordered the State
to file a response. On December 20, 2002, the State filed a motion to
dismiss this petition. At a January 28, 2003, court date, Holman
informed the court that he had received two letters from the
defendant. According to Holman, the defendant "distrusts the [public
defender's] office immensely, and he's displeased, and [I] thought I'd
bring it up once again." On February 28, 2003, the trial court received
a letter from the defendant:
			"The reason that I am writing this letter is to make a
formail [sic] complaint against the Public Defenders Office.
I had requested that I be appointed counsle [sic] out side
[sic] of the Public Defenders Office due to the conflict of
interest. I was then appointed the Public Defenders Office
who then appointed Ricky M. Holman to represent me. This
letter is to inform you that he has failed to represent me
properly I was told that I would receve [sic] copies of every
thing filed and ordered. I have not receved [sic] anything nor
has he kept me informed of anything. I have only receved
[sic] 1 phone call in June 2002 and 1 letter telling me that I
will be in open court to hear the aguments [sic]. I don't know
whats [sic] going on at all. I wish to be present in court to
deal with this problem. I can not have some one [sic]
represent me who dose [sic] not keep me informed or has
[sic] my best intrust [sic] in mind. So I ask the court to
appoint counsle [sic] outside the Public Defenders Office due
to the conflict of interest. I would also like to file for a
reduction of time if at all possable [sic]."
	The trial court acknowledged that it had received this letter, and
Holman informed the court that he had recently updated the defendant
on the case. The court observed that the defendant "apparently just
wants more communication." Holman repeated, "[E]very time I
communicate with him he does not want the public defender to
represent him. I'm just making that again as a matter of record."
	On April 11, 2003, at the hearing on the State's motion to
dismiss, Holman addressed some inconsistencies among arguments in
the amended petition. Holman explained that the petition was drafted
as directed by the defendant:
			 "Knowing his background ahead of time, psychological
background, and knowing that he does not want the public
defender's office to represent him, either at this stage of the
proceedings or at trial stage, *** I followed through with his
request and filed each and every paragraph as he insisted that
they be brought before the Court. I'd respectfully ask that the
Court look at each paragraph individually as it rules on the
State's motion to dismiss."
The court granted the State's motion and dismissed the amended
petition. 
	On appeal, the defendant did not address the merits of his
petition; he simply argued that the trial court erred by failing to inquire
into whether a conflict of interest arose when Holman attacked Kunz's
effectiveness. The appellate court affirmed. 353 Ill. App. 3d 522. The
appellate court initially reviewed People v. Banks, 121 Ill. 2d 36
(1987), where this court stated that a trial court should conduct a
case-by-case inquiry into a potential conflict of interest. The defendant
argued that the trial court should have made this inquiry when it
appointed the public defender's office to represent him in
postconviction proceedings. The appellate court disagreed, stating
that the dispositions of the consolidated cases in Banks showed that
a trial court inquiry is not required. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 526. 
	The appellate court then relied on People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1 (1988), and held "a trial court's duty to investigate arises only if, at
an early stage in the proceedings, a defendant presents facts
suggesting a conflict that goes beyond the problem of one public
defender having to attack another." 353 Ill. App 3d at 527. The
appellate court found that the defendant's conflict of interest
allegation did not trigger this duty. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 528. Though
the defendant did use the phrase "conflict of interest" in his letter
during postconviction proceedings, he failed to provide any details
regarding this putative conflict of interest, other than the fact that his
postconviction attorney worked in the same office as his trial attorney.
353 Ill. App. 3d at 528. The appellate court concluded that Holman's
handling of the petition does not suggest that he shied away from
pursuing the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 353 Ill. App. 3d
at 528. The defendant's assertion that Holman was not communicating
with him did not show a conflict of interest, but rather the defendant's
"unrealistic expectations." 353 Ill. App. 3d at 528.
	We granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.
2d R. 315(a).
ANALYSIS
	The defendant raises a single issue: whether the trial court should
have conducted an inquiry to ensure that there was no conflict of
interest between his postconviction public defender and his trial public
defender. The defendant essentially claims that Holman may have had
a conflict of interest stemming solely from his employment in the same
public defender's office as Kunz, and thus that Holman provided
ineffective assistance of counsel. See People v. Titone, 151 Ill. 2d 19,
32 (1992) (treating a conflict of interest argument as an ineffective
assistance argument). On this legal question, our review is de novo.
People v. Morales, 209 Ill. 2d 340, 345 (2004).
	The right to effective assistance of trial counsel comes from the
sixth amendment and includes the correlative right to conflict-free
representation. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 67 L. Ed. 2d 220, 230, 101 S. Ct. 1097, 1103 (1981); People v. Washington,
101 Ill. 2d 104, 109-10 (1984). There is no corresponding
constitutional right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel.
See People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555, 567 (2003). The right to
assistance of counsel in postconviction proceedings is a matter of
legislative grace, and a defendant is guaranteed only the level of
assistance provided by the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. See People
v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, 204 (2004). We have labeled that level
"reasonable" assistance. See People v. McNeal, 194 Ill. 2d 135, 142
(2000).
	However, when a defendant's appointed postconviction attorney
is called upon to assert that the defendant's appointed trial attorney
was ineffective, the distinction between constitutional and statutory
rights makes no difference. If postconviction counsel is appointed to
mold the defendant's allegations into legally cognizable shapes (see
People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 365 (1990)), that counsel must be
as conflict-free as trial counsel. See generally People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 472 (2003) ("Just as no servant can serve two masters, no
attorney can represent conflicting interests"). The right to reasonable
assistance of postconviction counsel includes the correlative right to
conflict-free representation. See Banks, 121 Ill. 2d 36 (considering, in
two consolidated cases, whether appointed postconviction attorneys
had conflicts based on their claims of ineffective assistance of
appointed trial attorneys). Obviously, like the constitutional right, the
statutory right does not include the right to representation by counsel
of the defendant's choosing, or by counsel with whom the defendant
has an amicable rapport. Cf. People v. DeRossett, 262 Ill. App. 3d
541, 544 (1994), citing People v. Cox, 22 Ill. 2d 534 (1961); People
v. Ogurek, 356 Ill. App. 3d 429, 433 (2005). We turn to the merits.
	 In People v. Smith, 37 Ill. 2d 622, 623-24 (1967), we held that
a per se conflict of interest exists when one public defender must
question the effectiveness of another public defender in the same
office. Twenty years later, we overruled Smith in Banks, 121 Ill. 2d 36. There, we stated that "it is not clear *** that where an assistant
public defender asserts the incompetency of another assistant, the
reputation of the whole office is negatively impacted." Banks, 121 Ill. 2d  at 43. Arguably, when one public defender aggressively pursues an
ineffective assistance claim against another public defender, the
integrity of that office is bolstered. Banks, 121 Ill. 2d  at 43. We
refused to assume that a public defender would place office loyalty
ahead of a client's interests. Banks, 121 Ill. 2d  at 43. Thus, "where an
assistant public defender asserts that another assistant from the same
office has rendered ineffective assistance, a case-by-case inquiry
should be conducted to determine whether any circumstances peculiar
to the case indicate the presence of an actual conflict of interest ***."
Banks, 121 Ill. 2d  at 44.
	The defendant labels this rule "straightforward, clear and
unequivocal." According to the defendant, when his postconviction
public defender, Holman, levied ineffective assistance claims against
his trial public defender, Kunz, the trial court was required to conduct
an inquiry into a possible conflict of interest. The defendant, in effect,
reads Banks to mandate a sua sponte investigation by the trial court
of a possible conflict. We do not believe that Banks is that broad. If
Banks provides that no per se conflict of interest exists when one
public defender argues that another public defender in the same office
was ineffective, it cannot mean the trial court always must open an
inquiry into a potential conflict. 
	Shortly after we decided Banks, we created a framework for
analyzing conflict of interest cases in Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1. Spreitzer
noted a dichotomy between per se conflicts-conflicts created by
defense counsel's prior or current association with either the
prosecution or the victim-and a second class of alleged conflicts.
Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d  at 16-17. If the defendant shows a per se conflict
of interest, he need not show prejudice resulting from that conflict in
order to obtain relief. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d  at 15. If the defendant
does not show a per se conflict of interest, the analysis depends upon
when he raised the issue. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d  at 17-18. Here,
Spreitzer noted another dichotomy: 
			"If counsel brings the potential conflict to the attention of
the trial court at an early stage, a duty devolves upon the trial
court to either appoint separate counsel or to take adequate
steps to ascertain whether the risk of conflict was too remote
to warrant separate counsel. (Holloway v. Arkansas (1978),
435 U.S. 475, 484, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426, 434, 98 S. Ct. 1173,
1178.) If such steps are not taken, the fact of a 'potential or
possible conflict may deprive the defendant of the guaranteed
assistance of counsel.' (Emphasis in original.) (People v.
Jones (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 21, 28.) While this rule is not per se
***, reversal of a conviction under this rule does not require
a showing that the attorney's actual performance was in any
way affected by the purported conflict. In this sense, reversal
for the trial court's failure to alleviate possible or potential
conflicts does not require a showing of 'specific prejudice.'
Holloway, 435 U.S.  at 487, 55 L. Ed. 2d  at 436, 98 S. Ct.  at
1180.
			However, if the trial court is not apprised of the potential
conflict, then reversal of the conviction will only be had upon
a showing that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected' counsel's performance. [Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333, 348, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1719
(1980).] What this means is that the defendant must point to
some specific defect in his counsel's strategy, tactics, or
decision making attributable to the conflict. *** [T]he
defendant is never required to prove that his attorney's
deficiencies did not constitute harmless error. He is not
required, in other words, to prove that the conflict
contributed to his conviction." Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d  at 18-19.
	Spreitzer swallowed the Banks rule. The trial court must take
adequate steps-i.e., conduct "a case-by-case inquiry" per Banks-to
determine whether the risk of a conflict colored the defendant's
representation, but only when the potential conflict is brought to
court's attention. Bare allegations of a conflict are not enough. See
People v. Williams, 139 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1990). "In the absence of an
evidentiary record of conflict, one should not be created based on
mere speculation." Banks, 121 Ill. 2d  at 46-47 (Clark, C.J., specially
concurring, joined by Ward, Ryan, and Miller, JJ.). The appellate
court here held that "a trial court's duty to investigate arises only if,
at an early stage in the proceedings, a defendant presents facts
suggesting a conflict that goes beyond the problem of one public
defender having to attack another." 353 Ill. App. 3d at 527; accord
People v. Jones, 210 Ill. App. 3d 375, 378 (1991) (holding that the
defendant must provide facts to establish what the conflict was). We
agree with the appellate court, but caution that the pleading threshold
is low.
	In the context of a potential conflict between two public
defenders, the conflict issue will normally be raised by the defendant.
Consequently, the defendant needs only to present the gist of such a
conflict. Cf. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244 (2001), citing
People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). The defendant must
sketch, in limited detail, a picture of how the working relationship
between the public defenders created an appearance of impropriety.
See People v. Moore, 338 Ill. App. 3d 11, 16 (2003). Relevant factors
include whether the two public defenders were trial partners in the
defendant's case (see People v. Claybourn, 221 Ill. App. 3d 1071
(1991); People v. Vaughn, 200 Ill. App. 3d 765 (1990)); whether they
were in hierarchical positions where one supervised or was supervised
by the other (see People v. Munson, 265 Ill. App. 3d 765 (1994);
People v. Levesque, 256 Ill. App. 3d 639 (1993)); or whether the size,
structure, and organization of the office in which they worked affected
the closeness of any supervision (see People v. Blakes, 131 Ill. App.
3d 1004 (1985); People v. South, 70 Ill. App. 3d 245 (1979)).
	Vaughn illustrates that the burden placed upon the defendant in
this regard is not heavy. In Vaughn, the defendant was represented by
a public defender named Viola Rouse. The defendant pleaded guilty
to aggravated criminal sexual assault, but a month later filed a pro se
motion to withdraw his plea, alleging that Rouse was ineffective when
she counseled him to plead guilty. The trial court appointed another
public defender named Steve Helis to represent him on this motion.
The defendant requested a Chicago Bar Association lawyer, noting
that Rouse and Helis were " 'working together.' " Vaughn, 200 Ill.
App. 3d at 768. The trial court denied this request.
	The appellate court remanded for an inquiry into a potential
conflict springing from the working relationship between the two
public defenders. Vaughn, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 770. The court stated
that "defendant's expressed fear of representation by attorney Helis
because he and Rouse were 'working together,' however inarticulate,
was sufficient, without further factual substantiation by defendant ***
to require further inquiry by the trial court as to whether a potential
conflict of interest existed." Vaughn, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 769.
	Here, the defendant did not raise a conflict of interest issue in his
pro se postconviction petition, but he alluded to a conflict of interest
in his February 28, 2003, letter to the trial court. The defendant stated
that he asked the trial court to appoint him an attorney from outside
the public defender's office "due to the conflict of interest." In this
letter the defendant charged that Holman failed to represent him
properly in that Holman allegedly did not send him copies of unnamed
documents and did not keep him informed of postconviction
proceedings.
	It is unclear when the defendant made this prior request for
private counsel to remedy a conflict of interest, and what conflict the
defendant was raising. The defendant made several requests for
private counsel before trial, and even threatened to file a disciplinary
complaint against Kunz in order to manufacture a conflict that he
hoped would force the court to appoint an attorney outside the public
defender's office. Later, he instructed Holman to press his request for
private counsel. Assuming that the defendant was referring to a
potential conflict between Holman and Kunz, the trial court made a
cursory, but sufficient, inquiry. The court noted that it had received
the defendant's letter and that the defendant complained about a
"communication breakdown" with Holman. Holman assured the court
that he had given the defendant a complete update on the
postconviction proceedings and a copy of the State's answer to the
amended petition. Because there was no other information to relay to
the defendant, the court added, "Okay and he apparently just wants
more communication. There's no requirement."
	If Holman had been covering for Kunz, the defendant presumably
would have complained about Holman's failure to attack Kunz. The
defendant points to nothing in the record to warrant an inquiry into
Holman's diligence. In effect, the defendant asks us to order the trial
court to act as his advocate, investigating a nebulous conflict of
interest. Holman's work in the postconviction proceedings was
beyond reproach. His Rule 651(c) certificate indicates that he
consulted with the defendant and reviewed the record before
amending the defendant's pro se petition. He refashioned the
defendant's vague constitutional claims into claims that the trial court
advanced through the summary dismissal stage. Further, he went to
extraordinary lengths to assuage the defendant's distrust of the public
defender's office by consulting with the defendant on these claims and
even how to phrase them. He raised the defendant's desire for private
counsel at numerous court dates, and he zealously argued against the
State's motion to dismiss. Tellingly, the defendant does not argue
before us that the trial court erred in dismissing his amended petition,
nor does he argue that Holman was ineffective. In the absence of some
gist of a conflict of interest, we refuse to sanction a fishing expedition
to allow the defendant to cloud Holman's performance.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons that we have stated, we affirm the judgment of
the appellate court.
Affirmed.