Title: In re Marriage of Peters-Farrell

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 97898-Agenda 12-January 2005.
In re MARRIAGE OF JENNIFER PETERS-FARRELL, Appellee, 							and THOMAS PETERS-FARRELL, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 3, 2005.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	The following question was certified pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308) from the circuit court of Cook County
to our appellate court:
			"Are requests for pharmaceutical records from [a]
pharmacy protected under the Illinois Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities [Confidentiality] Act?"
	The appellate court answered this question in the affirmative. 345
Ill. App. 3d 603. We granted leave to appeal from the appellate
court's judgment. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). For the following reasons, we
vacate the judgment of the appellate court and dismiss this appeal as
moot.

I. BACKGROUND
	Jennifer Peters-Farrell filed a petition for dissolution of her
marriage to Thomas Peters-Farrell. During the course of the
proceedings, Thomas served subpoenas on three pharmacies seeking
Jennifer's prescription records, including the "name of the medication,
what the medication is used to treat, dosage, how often refilled, copy
of prescription and any other related records."
	Jennifer moved to quash the subpoenas. In her motion, Jennifer
asserted the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities
Confidentiality Act (Confidentiality Act) (740 ILCS 110/1 et seq.
(West 2000)) prohibited disclosure of her prescription records without
a court order and the subpoenas constituted an attempt to circumvent
her privilege under the Act. The circuit court denied Jennifer's motion
to quash the subpoenas, but certified the question noted above to the
appellate court.
	The appellate court allowed the interlocutory appeal pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). 345 Ill. App. 3d 603.
In answering the certified question, the appellate court held a
pharmacy's records of prescriptions issued to mental health recipients
are protected from disclosure under the Confidentiality Act. 345 Ill.
App. 3d at 608. The appellate court filed its opinion on December 31,
2003.
	We granted Thomas' petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a)). Jennifer subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting the trial court had entered
a judgment of dissolution of marriage that resolved all issues between
the parties. Jennifer asserted the parties filed a joint motion on
December 30, 2003, notifying the appellate court of the entry of the
judgment. Jennifer attached a copy of the joint motion filed in the
appellate court to her motion to dismiss this appeal. In the joint
motion, the parties stated "it has become commonplace for attorneys
in not only domestic relations cases but personal injury cases to issue
subpoenas for pharmaceutical records as a discovery tool without
affording any privacy to the party whose records have been
subpoenaed." The parties acknowledged that the appeal was rendered
moot by the judgment, but nonetheless urged the appellate court to
decide the certified question because it involved an important public
interest. The parties further asserted this was a matter of first
impression.
	In his response to the motion to dismiss, Thomas noted Jennifer
had previously agreed in the joint motion to the appellate court that
the certified question should be addressed under the public interest
exception to the mootness doctrine. Thomas urged this court to
decide the certified question under the public interest exception.
	This court denied Jennifer's motion to dismiss the appeal. We
allowed the National Association of Chain Drug Stores, Inc., and the
Illinois Department of Professional Regulation to file amicus curiae
briefs in support of Thomas. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.

II. ANALYSIS
	We granted leave to appeal in this case to determine whether the
Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2000)) prohibits
pharmacists from unauthorized disclosure of pharmaceutical records
related to mental health or developmental disability services. In
reviewing the record, however, we must conclude the appeal was
rendered moot by entry of the judgment of dissolution and the petition
for leave to appeal was improvidently granted.
	An appeal is moot if no actual controversy exists or if events have
occurred that make it impossible for the reviewing court to grant the
complaining party effectual relief. People v. Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d 430,
435 (2004); In re Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d 148, 156 (2003). The
mootness doctrine stems from the concern that parties to a resolved
dispute lack a sufficient personal stake in the outcome to assure the
adversarial relationship that " ' "sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
*** questions." ' " In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 255 (1989),
quoting People ex rel. Black v. Dukes, 96 Ill. 2d 273, 276-77 (1983),
quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 678, 82 S. Ct. 691, 703 (1962). The existence of a real dispute is not a mere
technicality but, rather, is a prerequisite to the exercise of this court's
jurisdiction. In re Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 365 (1999).
	We cannot grant Jennifer any effectual relief in this case because
the judgment of dissolution resolved all issues, including her challenge
to the subpoenas that sought disclosure of her prescription records.
Therefore, this case is clearly moot.
	Nonetheless, in his response to the motion to dismiss the appeal,
Thomas urged this court to consider the certified question under the
public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Thomas did not
contend this case should be reviewed under the mootness exception
for cases involving an event of a short duration that is " 'capable of
repetition, yet evading review.' " See In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998), quoting In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d  at 258.
	The public interest exception is applicable only if there is a clear
showing that: (1) the question is of a substantial public nature; (2) an
authoritative determination is needed for future guidance; and (3) the
circumstances are likely to recur. In re J.B., 204 Ill. 2d 382, 387
(2003); Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d  at 365. The exception is narrowly
construed and requires a clear showing of each criterion. In re India
B., 202 Ill. 2d 522, 543 (2002); Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d  at 365.
	Here, there is no conflicting case law on the issue of whether
pharmacists are prohibited from unauthorized disclosure of
pharmaceutical records under the Confidentiality Act. This court has
declined to apply the public interest exception when there are no
conflicting precedents requiring an authoritative resolution. See J.B.,
204 Ill. 2d at 387-88; India B., 202 Ill. 2d  at 543; Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d  at 365-66. In this matter, an authoritative determination is not
necessary. Therefore, the public interest exception is not applicable
because at least one of the elements of the exception is absent.
	We also note there are critical deficiencies in the record that
impose an additional obstacle to meaningful review of the certified
question. The record, filed after the petition for leave to appeal was
allowed, does not contain any information that would indicate these
prescription records were related to mental health or developmental
disability services as required to invoke the protections of the
Confidentiality Act. See 740 ILCS 110/2, 3(a) (West 2000). The
record before us relevant to the certified question consists of the
subpoenas served by Thomas, Jennifer's motion to quash the
subpoenas, and the trial court order denying the motion to quash.
These filings contain only general statements and descriptions.
Nowhere in the record is there any indication of the type of
medication prescribed or the condition the medication was prescribed
to treat. Further, there is no report of proceedings of the hearing on
the motion to quash or any other proceeding to provide these critical
facts. Simply put, the prescriptions and the condition they were
intended to treat are not part of the record. We note this information
may be received and reviewed by the court in camera to prevent any
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. However, in
order to address adequately this important issue, the record must
clearly show the information sought is of the type that may be subject
to regulation under the Confidentiality Act. Review is not warranted
where, as here, the record does not contain sufficient facts to allow us
to address the issue.
	Finally, we note the appellate court filed its opinion after the
judgment of dissolution was entered in the circuit court. The appellate
opinion did not address the mootness issue. We conclude the appellate
court should have dismissed the appeal as moot upon being notified
judgment had been entered in the circuit court because there is no
applicable exception to the mootness doctrine to allow review of the
certified question. Accordingly, the appellate court's judgment is
vacated.
III. CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we conclude this appeal is moot and
the petition for leave to appeal was improvidently granted. We vacate
the judgment of the appellate court and dismiss this appeal as moot.

Appellate court judgment vacated;
appeal dismissed.