Title: Trawick v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CHARLES TRAWICK,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 414, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0201012191 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: November 13, 2009 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: December 17, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 17th day of December 2009, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Charles Trawick, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s June 26, 2009 order adopting the report of the Superior 
Court Commissioner dated June 15, 2009, which recommended that 
Trawick’s motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 61 be denied.1  We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, 
we affirm. 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62. 
 
2 
 
(2) 
In September 2002, Trawick was found guilty by a Superior 
Court jury of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a 
Felony, Robbery in the First Degree, Aggravated Menacing, Possession of 
Destructive Weapons, two counts of Conspiracy in the Second Degree, 
Endangering the Welfare of a Child, and Possession of a Firearm During the 
Commission of a Felony.  Trawick was sentenced to life imprisonment as a 
habitual offender, plus a term of years.  His conviction was affirmed by this 
Court on direct appeal.2 
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for 
postconviction relief, Trawick advances a number of claims that may fairly 
be summarized as follows: a) the Superior Court’s declaration of his habitual 
offender status was flawed because the motion was not signed by the 
Attorney General and the Superior Court improperly delayed his sentencing 
in order to hear the testimony of a Baltimore City prosecutor regarding one 
of the predicate crimes; b) his constitutional rights under the Double 
Jeopardy clause were violated when he was convicted of three separate 
weapon violations; and c) his counsel provided ineffective assistance by 
failing to confirm the status of his prior convictions, prepare an adequate 
defense at trial, and raise the appropriate arguments on appeal. 
                                                 
2 Trawick v. State, 845 A.2d 505 (Del. 2004). 
 
3 
 
(4) 
Delaware law provides that the Superior Court first address the 
procedural requirements of Rule 61 before reviewing the merits of a 
postconviction motion.3  In this case, the record reflects that Trawick’s 
convictions became final in April 2004, when this Court issued the mandate 
after affirming his convictions on direct appeal.4  Under the version of Rule 
61(i)(1) then in effect, Trawick had three years in which to appeal his 
convictions.5  Trawick’s postconviction motion, which was filed in June 
2009, is, thus, clearly time-barred.   
 
(5) 
Moreover, because Trawick’s claim regarding his habitual 
offender status was raised and adjudicated previously in his direct appeal, it 
is procedurally barred.6  Likewise, because Trawick failed to raise his claim 
of a double jeopardy violation in his direct appeal, it is procedurally 
defaulted.7  Finally, because Trawick has failed to demonstrate any valid 
factual or legal basis for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel8 or his 
argument that the Superior Court should have disregarded the procedural 
                                                 
3 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(2). 
5 The rule was amended effective July 1, 2005, reducing the time limitation from three 
years to one year. 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).   
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).  
8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
 
4 
bars to his claims due to a violation of his rights or a miscarriage of justice,9 
we conclude that the judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed.    
 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Henry dupont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3), (4) and (5).