Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Simonelli

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Simonelli, 113 Ohio St.3d 215, 2007-Ohio-1535.] 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. SIMONELLI. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Simonelli,  
113 Ohio St.3d 215, 2007-Ohio-1535.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Engaging in conduct involving fraud, deceit, 
dishonesty, or misrepresentation — Neglecting entrusted legal matter — 
Sharing a legal fee with a nonlawyer — One-year suspension, with six 
months stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2006-1190 — Submitted December 13, 2006 — Decided April 18, 2007.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 04-072. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Mark Michael Simonelli of Willoughby, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0065965, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1996. 
{¶ 2} On December 6, 2004, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a 
complaint charging respondent with multiple violations of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility.  Respondent filed an answer to the complaint, and a 
panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline held a hearing 
on the complaint in March 2006.  The panel then prepared written findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a recommendation, all of which the board adopted. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 3} Relator agreed to withdraw Counts II, IV, and V of the complaint 
before the hearing.  We now consider the evidence presented in support of the 
remaining allegations in the complaint. 
Count I 
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{¶ 4} Beginning in the summer of 2002, respondent accepted client 
referrals from WJW Enterprises, an organization that purported to assist persons 
trying to keep their homes after foreclosure proceedings had been filed against 
them.  Some of the clients referred by WJW to respondent were in need of advice 
and representation on bankruptcy matters.  Respondent generally charged each 
bankruptcy client $600 for his services, plus court costs. 
{¶ 5} In September 2002, respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
petition in the bankruptcy court on behalf of his client Barbara Fletcher, who had 
been referred to him by WJW.  Respondent spoke with Fletcher briefly one time 
by telephone before he filed the bankruptcy petition, but they never met in person.  
A runner from respondent’s office met with Fletcher at a restaurant so that 
Fletcher could sign several papers before the bankruptcy filing, but no one 
explained the documents to Fletcher, and she testified at the disciplinary hearing 
that she had no idea what the documents were. 
{¶ 6} The month after respondent filed Fletcher’s bankruptcy petition, 
another person from respondent’s office met Fletcher at a restaurant so that she 
could sign another document.  No one explained the document to Fletcher or 
discussed respondent’s legal fees with her. 
{¶ 7} Respondent did not meet or speak with Fletcher before the 
November 2002 meeting of creditors in her bankruptcy case, and he did not tell 
her that he would be sending a different attorney to the meeting.  Fletcher testified 
that the other attorney did not know anything about the case. 
{¶ 8} In a signed statement on Fletcher’s bankruptcy petition, respondent 
told the bankruptcy court that he had explained to his client the different types of 
relief available to her under federal bankruptcy laws, but Fletcher testified at the 
disciplinary hearing that neither respondent nor anyone from his law firm had 
provided any such explanation to her. 
January Term, 2007 
3 
{¶ 9} In another signed statement filed by respondent in Fletcher’s 
bankruptcy case, he stated that he had “not shared or agreed to share with any 
other entity * * * any compensation” in connection with Fletcher’s case.  In 
another filing in the case, respondent stated that Fletcher had paid him $600 for 
his services, but respondent’s $600 legal fee was paid by WJW rather than by 
Fletcher directly.  The president of WJW was James Warsing, who was not an 
attorney licensed to practice law in Ohio. 
{¶ 10} After examining these actions, the board found that respondent had 
violated the following Disciplinary Rules: DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from 
engaging 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation), 3-102(A) (prohibiting a lawyer from sharing legal fees with a 
nonlawyer), and 6-101(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from neglecting an entrusted 
legal matter). 
Count III 
{¶ 11} In October 2002, respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition 
in the bankruptcy court on behalf of his client Amy Wolf, who had been referred 
to him by WJW. 
{¶ 12} In a signed statement on Wolf’s bankruptcy petition, respondent 
told the bankruptcy court that he had explained to his client the different types of 
relief available to her under federal bankruptcy laws, but Wolf testified at the 
disciplinary hearing that respondent never spoke with her at any time during the 
representation, and Wolf never spoke with anyone from respondent’s law office 
before respondent filed the bankruptcy petition for her. 
{¶ 13} In another filing in Wolf’s bankruptcy case, respondent stated that 
Wolf had paid him $600 for his services.  Wolf testified at the disciplinary 
hearing that she never paid respondent any money but instead paid $800 to WJW.  
WJW then paid respondent $600 for his work on the Wolf matter.  The president 
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of WJW was James Warsing, who was not an attorney licensed to practice law in 
Ohio. 
{¶ 14} After examining these actions, the board found that respondent had 
violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and 3-102(A). 
Count VI 
{¶ 15} In December 2002, respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
petition in the bankruptcy court on behalf of his clients Timothy and Sharon 
Haines, who had been referred to him by WJW.  Sharon Haines testified at the 
disciplinary hearing that respondent never spoke with her at any time during the 
representation. 
{¶ 16} A runner from respondent’s office met with Sharon Haines at a 
restaurant so that she could sign several papers before the bankruptcy filing, but 
Sharon could not recall for certain whether anyone from respondent’s law firm 
had explained the documents to her before she signed them. 
{¶ 17} In January 2003, the bankruptcy trustee moved to dismiss the 
Haineses’ case because they had not filed a Chapter 13 plan.  Respondent never 
discussed the trustee’s motion with the Haineses, and the bankruptcy court 
granted the trustee’s motion. 
{¶ 18} After examining these actions, the board found that respondent had 
violated DR 6-101(A)(3). 
Respondent’s Objections to the Board’s Findings 
{¶ 19} We have reviewed the board’s report and have also considered the 
written and oral arguments presented by the parties in response to that report.  We 
find that respondent violated all of the provisions as described above. 
{¶ 20} Respondent identifies certain testimony from the disciplinary 
hearing that conflicts with the testimony and other evidence on which the panel 
and the board relied in reaching the findings of misconduct noted above.  The 
record supports the panel and the board’s findings, however, and “[u]nless the 
January Term, 2007 
5 
record weighs heavily against a hearing panel’s findings, we defer to the panel’s 
credibility determinations, inasmuch as the panel members saw and heard the 
witnesses firsthand.”  Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 164, 
2006-Ohio-550, 842 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 24.  See, also, Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Zingarelli (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 210, 220-221, 729 N.E.2d 1167 (rejecting an 
attorney’s objections following a disciplinary hearing because “it was the panel 
members, and not this court, who had the opportunity to evaluate the character 
and demeanor of the witnesses”).  Because we find ample evidence in the record 
to support the panel and the board’s findings, we adopt those findings ourselves. 
{¶ 21} Respondent argues as well that he did not violate the DR 3-102(A) 
ban on the sharing of legal fees with a nonlawyer.  Barbara Fletcher and Amy 
Wolf did, however, pay respondent’s legal fees to WJW Enterprises rather than to 
respondent himself, and WJW’s president was not a lawyer licensed in Ohio.  
WJW kept some of the money that the clients had paid, and then passed some of it 
along to respondent. 
{¶ 22} We agree with the board that this conduct violated DR 3-102(A).  
We reached a similar conclusion last year involving a different lawyer whose 
clients had likewise “paid WJW for [the lawyer’s] services.”  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Stranke, 110 Ohio St.3d 247, 2006-Ohio-4357, 852 N.E.2d 1202, ¶ 5.  
The prohibition against sharing legal fees with nonlawyers benefits the public by 
(1) limiting the possibility that a nonlawyer will interfere with the exercise of a 
lawyer’s professional judgment in representing a client and (2) ensuring that the 
total fee paid by the client is not unreasonably high.  ABA Comm. on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 356 (1988).  The prohibition also limits 
the possibility that a nonlawyer will be motivated to engage in the improper 
solicitation of business for a lawyer. 
{¶ 23} We also reject respondent’s arguments on the DR 6-101(A)(3) 
(neglect) charges.  By failing to meet with Barbara Fletcher during his 
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representation of her, by failing to explain bankruptcy documents to Fletcher 
before she signed them, and by sending an unprepared attorney to a bankruptcy 
court hearing in Fletcher’s case, respondent failed to show proper care for his 
client’s legal needs.  Respondent’s actions – which he likewise displayed during 
his representation of the Haineses – fell below the objective standards of 
reasonable diligence and dedication that we expect of attorneys.  See, e.g., 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Flanagan (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 381, 674 N.E.2d 681 
(“We expect that even in a high-volume practice where an assistant might prepare 
some forms, an attorney * * * would at least interview and counsel his clients 
before a course of action was chosen and the documents drafted.  We also expect 
that he would appear at the meeting of creditors as an advocate for his clients”).  
An attorney’s neglect of a client’s legal matters undermines public confidence in 
the legal profession and may prejudice the client’s interests.  We agree with the 
board’s findings on the neglect charges in this case. 
{¶ 24} Finally, we reject respondent’s argument that relator failed to 
prove the DR 1-102(A)(4) (dishonesty) charges involving Barbara Fletcher and 
Amy Wolf.  Respondent signed statements in his bankruptcy-court filings 
indicating that he had explained to his clients their options under the bankruptcy 
code.  Yet Wolf testified that respondent had never spoken to her, and Fletcher 
testified that respondent did not explain the different bankruptcy chapters to her or 
help her understand the differences among them.  Sufficient evidence in the 
record therefore supports the board’s findings that respondent misrepresented his 
actions to the bankruptcy court by signing the statements in the two cases. 
Sanction 
{¶ 25} In recommending a sanction for respondent’s misconduct, the 
board considered the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Section 10 of the 
Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before 
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  
January Term, 2007 
7 
Mitigating factors cited by the board included respondent’s lack of any prior 
disciplinary violations, the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, respondent’s 
full and free disclosure of his actions and his cooperative attitude toward the 
disciplinary process, the imposition of other penalties or sanctions, and five letters 
vouching for respondent’s good character or reputation.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(a), (b), (d), (e), and (f). 
{¶ 26} The board also noted several aggravating factors: a pattern of 
misconduct, multiple offenses, a refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of 
the conduct, and harm caused to vulnerable victims.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(c), (d), (g), and (h). 
{¶ 27} Relator recommended that respondent be suspended from the 
practice of law for six months.  The panel instead recommended that respondent 
be suspended for one year, with six months stayed on specified conditions.  The 
board adopted the panel’s recommendation as its own. 
{¶ 28} We agree with the board’s recommended sanction.  Last year, we 
imposed a six-month suspension on an attorney who had likewise shared fees with 
the WJW bankruptcy counseling firm and had similarly stated on clients’ 
bankruptcy petitions that he had “advised his clients of the different types of 
bankruptcy prior to filing,” when in fact he had not done so.  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Stranke, 110 Ohio St.3d 247, 2006-Ohio-4357, 852 N.E.2d 1202, ¶ 5.  
That attorney had also neglected his clients by failing to attend creditors’ 
meetings and failing to respond to motions to dismiss.  Id. at ¶ 6.  When we 
imposed a six-month suspension for that attorney’s violations of the same three 
Disciplinary Rules that are at issue in this case (as well as one other rule involving 
that attorney’s unlicensed practice of law in the bankruptcy court), we noted just 
one aggravating factor (for the commission of multiple offenses) and also noted 
that the attorney had signed a consent-to-discipline agreement.  Id. at ¶ 2, 9-11. 
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{¶ 29} In this case, although the facts and the misconduct are very similar, 
we agree with the board that a more severe sanction is warranted in light of 
respondent’s insistence that he has done nothing wrong.  We explained in the 
Stranke case that the kinds of actions at issue in this case are unacceptable for an 
attorney, and yet respondent has maintained that he should not be disciplined.  We 
trust that a longer suspension than we imposed in Stranke will prompt respondent 
to refocus his efforts on the duties of loyalty and diligence owed to clients, as well 
as his obligation to offer respect and candor to courts and other tribunals. 
{¶ 30} In addition, although respondent contends that at most a public 
reprimand or a stayed suspension is warranted, we have explained that a 
“violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) ordinarily calls for the actual suspension of an 
attorney’s license.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Beeler, 105 Ohio St.3d 188, 2005-
Ohio-1143, 824 N.E.2d 78, ¶ 44.  We see no reason to deviate in this case from 
that presumptive sanction, particularly in light of the pattern of misconduct 
involving multiple clients. 
{¶ 31} Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of 
law in Ohio for one year, with the final six months of the suspension stayed, 
provided that respondent (1) commit no further misconduct during the suspension 
period and (2) allow an attorney appointed by relator to monitor his law-office 
management practices and his compliance with the rules governing the 
professional conduct of attorneys in Ohio during the stayed portion of the 
suspension.  If respondent violates either of these conditions, the stay will be 
lifted, and respondent will serve the entire term as a period of actual suspension.  
Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PETREE, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2007 
9 
 
CHARLES R. PETREE, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, was assigned to sit 
for RESNICK, J., whose term ended on January 1, 2007. 
 
CUPP, J., whose term began on January 2, 2007, did not participate in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Stacy Solochek 
Beckman, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Gallagher Sharp and Timothy T. Brick, for respondent. 
______________________