Title: Spencer v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
THOMAS SPENCER, JR., 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 563, 2013 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§ 
§  Cr. ID Nos. 0609004429 
§  and 0603019825 
§ 
§   
 
Submitted:   February 20, 2014 
  Decided:  March 25, 2014 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 25th day of March 2014, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief, the State’s motion to affirm, the parties’ supplemental memoranda, and the 
record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) The defendant-appellant, Thomas Spencer (“Spencer”), appeals from a 
Superior Court order dated September 26, 2013, which sentenced Spencer for his 
fourth violation of probation (“VOP”).  The Superior Court modified that order on 
September 30, 2014 to give Spencer credit for additional time served and to add a 
six-month transition period, pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4204(l), requiring Spencer to 
spend an additional six months at the Level IV VOP Center.  The State has filed a 
motion to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.  We asked for supplemental 
 
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memoranda concerning the propriety of the six-month transition period at the 
Level IV VOP Center.  Although we find no merit to the first three issues that 
Spencer has raised in his opening brief on appeal, we nonetheless hold that the 
Superior Court must correct its sentencing order to impose a six-month transition 
period that is less restrictive than the Level IV VOP Center. 
(2) The record reflects that Spencer pled guilty on November 15, 2006 in 
the Kent County Superior Court to one count of DUI (Fourth Offense).  The 
Superior Court sentenced him on January 10, 2007 to four years at Level V 
incarceration, to be suspended after serving two years in prison for six months at 
Level III probation.  On January 17, 2007, Spencer pled guilty to another count of 
DUI (Fourth Offense) and was sentenced by the Sussex County Superior Court to 
five years at Level V incarceration (with credit for six days served), to be 
suspended after serving nine months in prison for eighteen months at Level III 
probation.   
(3) On July 8, 2009, the cases were consolidated after Spencer was charged 
with violating probation.  On August 4, 2009, the Superior Court sentenced 
Spencer for his first VOP associated with his Sussex County DUI to four years at 
Level V, to be suspended upon successful completion of the Level V Key Program 
for Level IV Residential Drug Treatment, to be suspended upon successful 
completion of drug treatment for eighteen months at Level III probation.  On the 
 
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VOP associated with his Kent County DUI, the Superior Court sentenced Spencer 
to two years at Level V to be suspended entirely for eighteen months at Level III 
probation.  
(4) On September 23, 2011, the Superior Court sentenced Spencer for his 
second VOP.  On the Sussex County DUI, the Superior Court sentenced Spencer to 
two years and six months at Level V incarceration, with credit for twenty-seven 
days served, suspended for nine months at Level IV Home Confinement followed 
by fifteen months at Level III probation.  On his Kent County DUI, the Superior 
Court sentenced Spencer to two years at Level V suspended entirely for eighteen 
months at level III probation. 
(5) On July 17, 2012, the Superior Court found Spencer guilty of his third 
VOP.  The judge sentenced Spencer on his Sussex County DUI charge to two years 
at Level V incarceration, to be suspended after serving eighteen months and upon 
successful completion of the Key Program, with no further probation to follow.  
On the Kent County DUI charge, the Superior Court sentenced Spencer to two 
years at Level V incarceration, to be suspended entirely for one year at Level IV 
Residential Treatment, with the balance of the sentence to be suspended upon 
Spencer’s successful completion of treatment for one year at Level III Aftercare.  
Spencer appealed that sentence.  We affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.1 
                                                 
1 Spencer v. State, 2013 WL 434185 (Del. Feb. 4, 2013). 
 
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(6) On September 26, 2013, the Superior Court found Spencer guilty of his 
fourth VOP.  The Superior Court discharged Spencer as having served his Sussex 
County sentence and, on the Kent County charge, sentenced Spencer to two years 
at Level V incarceration (with credit for fourteen days served) with no probation to 
follow.  On September 30, 2013, the Superior Court issued a corrected sentencing 
order that gave Spencer more credit for time previously served and also added a 
six-month transition period pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4204(l), which required 
Spencer to serve an additional six months at the Level IV VOP Center.2  Spencer 
now appeals from this sentence. 
(7) Spencer raises four issues in his opening brief on appeal.  First, he 
contends his current sentence is illegal because his Kent County sentence was fully 
served in 2009 before he was ever charged with his first VOP.  Next, he contends 
that his fourth VOP sentence must be vacated because he was denied due process 
during his third VOP proceeding.  Similarly, Spencer contends that his third VOP 
sentence was illegal because it was ambiguous and internally contradictory.  
Finally, he asserts that the six-month transition period at Level IV in his fourth 
VOP sentence does not facilitate his transition back into society. 
                                                 
2 11 Del. C. § 4204(l) (2007).  Section 4204(l) requires a sentencing court to impose a six-month 
transition period at a lower level of supervision whenever a court sentences a defendant to a 
period of incarceration totaling one year or more. 
 
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(8) Spencer’s first three claims, which challenge his first and third VOP 
sentences, are not justiciable on this appeal from the Superior Court’s sentence for 
Spencer’s fourth VOP.3  Spencer had his opportunity to appeal from those 
proceedings, and in fact, did appeal (unsuccessfully) from his third VOP sentence.  
We will not consider these claims on this appeal. 
(9) Spencer’s remaining claim is that the Superior Court’s imposition of a 
six-month transition period at the Level IV VOP Center constituted abuse of 
discretion.  This claim has merit.  In imposing a sentence for a VOP, the trial court 
has discretion to impose the balance of the Level V time remaining to be served 
from the original sentence, or any lesser period of incarceration.4  Moreover, 
pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4204(l), for any prison sentence of one year or more, the 
sentencing court may exceed that maximum allowable period of Level V 
incarceration by imposing an additional six-month period of supervision at Level 
IV, III or II in order to facilitate the defendant’s transition back into society.5  
Section 4204(l) does not distinguish between the types of Level IV facilities to 
which a defendant may be sentenced.  Nonetheless, this Court and the Department 
of Justice have both recognized that the Level IV VOP Center is qualitatively 
                                                 
3 See Taylor v. State, 2013 WL 1489392 (Del. Apr. 10, 2013) (holding that a claim arising from a 
prior, appealable adjudication is not justiciable in a later VOP proceeding). 
4 Gamble v. State, 728 A.2d 1171, 1172 (Del. 1999). 
5 11 Del. C. § 4204(l). 
 
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different from, and far more restrictive than, other types of Level IV facilities. 6  
For that reason, a defendant who is sentenced to serve time at the Level IV VOP 
Center is entitled to Level V credit against his sentence.7 
(10) In this case, Spencer had one year, ten months and twenty days 
remaining to be served from his original Kent County sentence.  Thus, the Superior 
Court’s imposition of that maximum prison sentence followed by a six-month 
transition period at Level IV was legally proper.  Nonetheless, because the Level 
IV VOP Center is as restrictive as a Level V facility, we are constrained to find 
that the Superior Court’s imposition of the six-month transition period to be served 
at the Level IV VOP Center was an abuse of discretion.  Accordingly, we remand 
this case for correction of the transition portion of Spencer’s sentence. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that this matter is REMANDED to 
the Superior Court for correction of the six-month transition period of Spencer’s 
sentence to a facility less restrictive than the VOP Center.  In all other respects, the 
judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Justice 
                                                 
6 Anderson v. State, 2006 WL 3931460 (Del. Dec. 5, 2006). 
7 Id.