Title: N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Paschal

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA13-750 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 4 February 2014 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Beaufort County 
No. 06 CRS 053372 
RONDELL LUVELL SANDERS 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 15 February 2013 by 
Judge Wayland J. Sermons, Jr. in Superior Court, Beaufort County.  
Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 November 2013. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
David L. Gore, for the State. 
 
W. Michael Spivey for Defendant. 
 
 
McGEE, Judge. 
 
 
Rondell Luvell Sanders (“Defendant”) appeals from his re-
sentencing for robbery with a dangerous weapon.  In an earlier 
appeal to this Court, Defendant asserted error in the prior record 
level 
determination, 
which 
included 
points 
based 
on 
the 
substantial similarity of Tennessee offenses to North Carolina 
offenses.  This Court remanded for resentencing because it appeared 
the trial court compared the punishments, rather than comparing 
the elements of the offenses.  State v. Sanders, ___ N.C. App. 
___, 736 S.E.2d 238 (2013). 
-2- 
I. Standard of Review 
 
The “question of whether a conviction under an out-of-state 
statute is substantially similar to an offense under North Carolina 
statutes is a question of law requiring de novo review on appeal.”  
State v. Fortney, 201 N.C. App. 662, 669, 687 S.E.2d 518, 524 
(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
II. Date of Prior Tennessee Offenses 
Defendant argues the trial court erred by assigning points 
for Tennessee convictions because the State did not prove the 
Tennessee statutes were unchanged from the versions under which 
Defendant was convicted.  We disagree. 
In State v. Burgess, ___ N.C. App. ___, 715 S.E.2d 867 (2011), 
this Court remanded for resentencing when the State presented the 
2008 versions of the out-of-state statutes and “presented no 
evidence that the statutes were unchanged from the 1993 and 1994 
versions under which [the] defendant had been convicted.”  Burgess, 
___ N.C. App. at ___, 715 S.E.2d at 870. 
In the present case, the State presented copies of judgments 
to the trial court showing Defendant was convicted in Tennessee of 
theft on 10 March 2009 and domestic assault on 6 January 2009. 
Defendant contends the judgments do not show the date of the 
offenses.  However, Defendant provides no support for his implied 
assertion that the date of each offense is necessary to determine 
-3- 
which version of the Tennessee criminal statute applied. 
It is true that, in North Carolina, the date of offense often 
determines which version of a criminal statute applies.  See, e.g., 
“An Act to Provide That If a Defendant Has Four or More Prior 
Larceny Convictions, A Subsequent Larceny Offense is a Felony,” 
2012 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 154 § 2 (“This act becomes effective 
December 1, 2012, and applies to offenses committed on or after 
that date.”); “An Act to Amend the Law Concerning Assaults on 
Governmental Officers and Employees and to Make It a Felony to 
Assault a Governmental Officer or Employee with a Deadly Weapon,” 
1991 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 525 § 3 (“This act becomes effective 
October 1, 1991, and applies to offenses committed on or after 
that date.  Prosecutions for offenses committed before the 
effective date of this act are not abated or affected by this 
act[.]”). 
However, because Defendant cites no Tennessee authority to 
show that statutory amendments in Tennessee operate in the same 
manner as the North Carolina amendments above, we must assume the 
State presented the correct versions of the Tennessee criminal 
statutes at issue.  Defendant has thus not demonstrated error on 
this basis. 
III. Substantial Similarity of Tennessee Offense of Theft to 
North Carolina Offense of Misdemeanor Larceny 
 
Defendant also argues the trial court erred in finding the 
-4- 
Tennessee offense of theft substantially similar to the North 
Carolina offense of misdemeanor larceny. 
If the State proves by the preponderance of 
the evidence that an offense classified as a 
misdemeanor in the other jurisdiction is 
substantially similar to an offense classified 
as a Class A1 or Class 1 misdemeanor in North 
Carolina, the conviction is treated as a Class 
A1 or Class 1 misdemeanor for assigning prior 
record level points. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(e) (2011).  “For each prior 
misdemeanor conviction as defined in this subsection, 1 point.”  
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(b)(5). 
“Determination of whether the out-of-state conviction is 
substantially similar to a North Carolina offense is a question of 
law involving comparison of the elements of the out-of-state 
offense to those of the North Carolina offense.”  Fortney, 201 
N.C. App. at 671, 687 S.E.2d at 525 (emphasis added); see also 
State v. Sanders, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 736 S.E.2d 238, 240 
(2013) (“the trial court must compare ‘the elements of the out-
of-state offense to those of the North Carolina offense”); State 
v. Wright, 210 N.C. App. 52, 71, 708 S.E.2d 112, 126 (2011). 
Although the case law is clear that the determination as to 
substantial similarity involves comparison of the elements of the 
offenses, the determination as to what exactly constitutes 
substantial similarity remains unclear.  While N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1340.14(e) “provides that either the State or the defendant may 
-5- 
prove that an offense for which the defendant was convicted in a 
foreign jurisdiction is substantially similar to a North Carolina 
offense, the statute does not give guidance as to how a trial court 
is to make such a determination.”  State v. Phillips, ___ N.C. 
App. ___, ___, 742 S.E.2d 338, 343 (2013) (citing State v. Hanton, 
175 N.C. App. 250, 623 S.E.2d 600 (2006)). 
Defendant cites State v. Amanns, 2 S.W.3d 241 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. 1999) for the elements of “theft of property.”  “In order to 
obtain a conviction for theft, the State must prove (1) the 
defendant knowingly obtained or exercised control over property; 
(2) the defendant did not have the owner’s effective consent; and 
(3) the defendant intended to deprive the owner of the property.”  
Amanns, 2 S.W.3d at 244-45. 
The only difference between the elements of the offenses that 
Defendant points out is that the Tennessee offense requires no 
showing of permanent deprivation.  Defendant asserts that, if a 
defendant simply “took a joyride on somebody’s horse, he would 
violate Tennessee’s theft statute.”  
However, it appears that the court in Amanns was merely giving 
a shortened recitation of the elements.  In a challenge to the 
sufficiency of evidence in an attempted theft case, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals of Tennessee considered whether the State showed 
the defendant “possessed the requisite intent to permanently 
-6- 
deprive each of the owners of their automobiles.”  State v. 
Roberts, 943 S.W.2d 403, 410 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (emphasis 
added), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ralph, 6 S.W.3d 251 
(Tenn. 1999).  Thus, courts in Tennessee have held that Tennessee’s 
theft statute requires an intention to permanently deprive the 
owner of property. 
Defendant’s 
contention 
that 
the 
offenses 
are 
not 
substantially similar on this basis is without merit.  The trial 
court did not err in concluding the Tennessee offense of theft and 
the North Carolina offense of larceny are substantially similar. 
IV. Substantial Similarity of Tennessee Offense of Domestic 
Assault to North Carolina Offense of Assault on a Female 
 
Defendant next argues the trial court erred in finding the 
Tennessee offense of domestic assault substantially similar to the 
North Carolina offense of assault on a female.  Defendant makes 
two contentions in support of his argument. 
A. Necessity of Reviewing Applicable Statutes 
First, Defendant contends “the State did not offer the 
Tennessee statute necessary to determine the elements of the 
offense.”  The State presented a copy of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-
111.  However, that statute refers to another statute which the 
State did not provide to the trial court, namely, Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 39-13-101. 
The Tennessee domestic assault statute reads: “A person 
-7- 
commits domestic assault who commits an assault as defined in § 39-
13-101 against a domestic abuse victim.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
13-111(b).  Both statutes are thus necessary to understanding the 
elements of the Tennessee offense of domestic assault.  The record 
contains no indication that the trial court considered both Tenn. 
Code Ann. §§ 39-13-111 and 39-13-101.  Defendant has shown error 
in the trial court’s determination under Fortney. 
B. Substantial Similarity 
Second, Defendant contends the offenses are not substantially 
similar because “the Tennessee statute is gender and age neutral 
in its definition of ‘domestic abuse victims.’”  The North Carolina 
offense of assault on a female is set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 14-33(c). 
[A]ny person who commits any assault, assault 
and battery, or affray is guilty of a Class A1 
misdemeanor if, in the course of the assault, 
assault and battery, or affray, he or 
she . . . [a]ssaults a female, he being a male 
person at least 18 years of age[.] 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c)(2) (2011). 
By contrast, the Tennessee offense of domestic assault is as 
follows: “A person commits domestic assault who commits an assault 
as defined in § 39-13-101 against a domestic abuse victim.”  Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 39-13-111(b).  “Domestic abuse victim” is defined as 
any person who falls within the following categories: 
(1) Adults or minors who are current or former 
-8- 
spouses; 
 
(2) Adults or minors who live together or who 
have lived together; 
 
(3) Adults or minors who are dating or who 
have dated or who have or had a sexual 
relationship, 
but 
does 
not 
include 
fraternization between two (2) individuals in 
a business or social context; 
 
(4) Adults or minors related by blood or 
adoption; 
 
(5) Adults or minors who are related or were 
formerly related by marriage; or 
 
(6) Adult or minor children of a person in a 
relationship that is described in subdivisions 
(a)(1)-(5). 
 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111(a). 
An examination of the elements reveals that the North Carolina 
offense of assault on a female and the Tennessee offense of 
domestic assault are not substantially similar, especially given 
that “the rule of lenity requires us to interpret [N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1340.14(e)] in favor of defendant.”  Phillips, ___ N.C. App. at 
___, 742 S.E.2d at 343 (quoting Hanton, 175 N.C. App. at 259, 623 
S.E.2d at 606). 
The Tennessee offense requires showing that the victim falls 
into one of six categories.  The categories describe particular 
relationships between the defendant and the victim.  By contrast, 
the North Carolina offense of assault on a female requires no 
showing as to a particular relationship between the defendant and 
-9- 
the victim. 
A second significant difference between the offenses is that 
the North Carolina offense requires the victim be female.  The 
Tennessee offense does not require the victim be female.  Based on 
these two significant differences, we must conclude the trial court 
erred in finding that the Tennessee offense of domestic assault 
was substantially similar to the North Carolina offense of assault 
on a female. 
The dissent analyzes the facts of the Tennessee offense to 
determine whether Defendant could be convicted of assault on a 
female in North Carolina.  As previously discussed, we are required 
to compare the elements of the Tennessee offense to the elements 
of the North Carolina offense.  “Determination of whether the out-
of-state conviction is substantially similar to a North Carolina 
offense is a question of law involving comparison of the elements 
of the out-of-state offense to those of the North Carolina 
offense.”  Fortney, 201 N.C. App. at 671, 687 S.E.2d at 525 
(emphasis added); see also Sanders, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 736 
S.E.2d at 240 (“the trial court must compare ‘the elements of the 
out-of-state offense to those of the North Carolina offense”); 
Wright, 210 N.C. App. at 71, 708 S.E.2d at 126.  The trial court 
erred in finding that the Tennessee offense of domestic assault 
was substantially similar to the North Carolina offense of assault 
-10- 
on a female. 
V. Conclusion 
 
Defendant has demonstrated no error in the trial court’s 
determination as to the Tennessee offense of theft.  However, 
Defendant has shown error in the trial court’s determination as to 
the Tennessee offense of domestic assault, and we remand for 
resentencing. 
Affirmed in part; remanded in part for resentencing. 
Judge STROUD concurs. 
Judge BRYANT concurs in part and dissents in part by separate 
opinion.
 
NO. COA13-750 
 
 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Filed:  4 February 2014 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
Beaufort County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 06 CRS 053372 
RONDELL LUVELL SANDERS 
 
 
BRYANT, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
The majority opinion remands for resentencing based on its 
determination that the trial court erred in finding that the 
Tennessee offense of domestic assault was substantially similar to 
the North Carolina offense of assault on a female.  Because I 
believe the trial court did not err in finding that the Tennessee 
offense of domestic assault is substantially similar to the North 
Carolina offense of assault on a female, I respectfully dissent 
from that portion of the majority opinion.  I concur in the 
remainder of the majority opinion. 
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(e) (2011), 
[i]f the State proves by the preponderance of 
the evidence that an offense classified as 
either a misdemeanor or a felony in the other 
jurisdiction is substantially similar to an 
offense in North Carolina that is classified 
as a Class I felony or higher, the conviction 
is treated as that class of felony for 
assigning prior record level points. 
 
-2- 
 
Here, the State presented the trial court with copies of Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 39-13-111 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c).  The majority 
opinion agrees with defendant’s argument that the trial court erred 
in finding that T.C.A. § 39-13-111 and N.C.G.S. § 14-33(c) are 
substantially similar.  This Court has held that in considering 
whether a statute from another state is substantially similar to 
a North Carolina statute “the requirement set forth in N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 15A-1340.14(e) is not that the statutory wording precisely 
match, but rather that the offense be ‘substantially similar.’”  
State v. Sapp, 190 N.C. App. 698, 713, 661 S.E.2d 304, 312 (2008).  
I find it inconceivable that this requirement of substantial 
similarity is meant to pose an insurmountable burden for the State, 
as each state is entitled to tailor its statutes as it sees fit.  
Accordingly, the State is required to prove merely by a 
preponderance of the evidence — not by the higher standards of by 
clear and convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt — that 
two statutes are substantially similar.  
North Carolina does not have a domestic assault statute. 
Rather, domestic assault in North Carolina is recognized as a form 
of assault, upon a female, by a male, under  N.C.G.S. § 14-33(c)1; 
                     
1 That N.C.G.S. § 14-33(c) is intended to address domestic assault 
is further demonstrated by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-534.1 (2011), 
“Crimes of 
domestic violence,” which establishes specific 
procedures for determining a defendant’s pretrial release  “[i]n 
-3- 
 
no other North Carolina statute is thus as suitably equivalent to 
T.C.A. § 39-13-111 in addressing the specific elements of an 
assault upon a female.  Furthermore, North Carolina has no 
statutory definition of assault, and assault is thus defined by 
the common law.  State v. Roberts, 270 N.C. 655, 658, 155 S.E.2d 
303, 305 (1967).  The majority agrees with defendant that because 
the State did not present the trial court with both T.C.A. § 39-
13-111 and the statute to which it refers, T.C.A. § 39-13-101, the 
State did not meet its burden of proving that T.C.A. § 39-13-111 
and N.C.G.S. § 14-33(c) are substantially similar.  An examination 
of T.C.A. § 39-13-111, “domestic assault,” reveals that it does 
indeed reference T.C.A. § 39-13-101, “assault.”  However, as the 
trial court examined the elements of assault in T.C.A. § 39-13-
111 in relation to the common law definition of assault, it was 
unnecessary that T.C.A. § 39-13-101 accompany T.C.A. § 39-13-111 
in order for the elements of assault in T.C.A. § 39-13-111 to be 
defined and considered by the trial court.  
As defined by the common law, an assault is an unauthorized 
touching which causes an offensive or harmful contact.  Such 
                     
all cases in which the defendant is charged with assault on, 
stalking, communicating a threat to, or committing a felony 
provided in Articles 7A, 8, 10, or 15 of Chapter 14 of the General 
Statutes upon a spouse or former spouse or a person with whom the 
defendant lives or has lived as if married . . . .” 
-4- 
 
contact can occur between two people of any age or gender.  See 
Roberts; see also State v. Hill, 6 N.C. App. 365, 369, 170 S.E.2d 
99, 102 (1969) (“Where in a prosecution for assault . . . the 
evidence tends to show assault on a female at least, it is not 
error to fail to submit the question of guilt of simple assault.”). 
In creating statutes which distinguish between types of assaults, 
like domestic assault, these distinctions assist with governmental 
goals such as identifying particular categories of offenders for 
sentencing purposes.  See State v. Gurganus, 39 N.C. App. 395, 
400, 250 S.E.2d 668, 672 (1979) (“[N.C.G.S. § 14-33] in its 
entirety provides a logical pattern protecting the citizens of 
North Carolina from acts of violence. Subsection (a) of the statute 
establishes the crimes of assault, assault and battery and affray. 
Subsection (b) and its subsections do not create additional or 
separate offenses. Instead, those subsections provide for 
differing punishments when the presence or absence of certain 
factors is established.”).   
The majority appears to accept defendant’s argument that 
T.C.A. § 39-13-111 is not substantially similar to N.C.G.S. § 14-
33(c) because T.C.A. § 39-13-111 is gender and age-neutral while 
N.C.G.S. § 14-33(c) specifically applies to a male over the age of 
18 assaulting a female.  I find defendant’s argument to lack merit, 
as the State of Tennessee could have chosen to charge defendant 
-5- 
 
under its general assault statute, § 39-13-101.  Instead, by 
charging defendant under the more specific statute for domestic 
abuse, the State of Tennessee pursued the more specific and 
relevant charge against defendant of committing assault upon a 
female with whom he was in a relationship.  Moreover, the State of 
Tennessee dismissed a charge of regular assault against defendant 
at the same time it pursued the domestic abuse charge against him.  
As such, the State of Tennessee demonstrated its intent to charge 
defendant according to the elements of the most applicable statute.  
Furthermore, an analysis of Tennessee case law indicates that the 
domestic abuse statute can and is applied specifically in 
situations where a male has assaulted a female with whom he had a 
relationship.  Compare State v. Anderson, No. W2011-00139-CCA-R3-
CD, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 707 (Sept. 5, 2012) (finding the 
male defendant guilty of domestic assault under T.C.A. § 39-13-
111 where he admitted to choking and hitting his estranged wife); 
State v. Boston, No. M2010-00919-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. 
LEXIS 779 (Oct. 18, 2011) (finding the male defendant guilty of 
domestic assault for hitting his ex-wife during a fight and guilty 
of aggravated assault for hitting his ex-wife’s male friend with 
a board); State v. Parham, No. W2009-02576-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 Tenn. 
Crim. App. LEXIS 1049 (Dec. 10, 2010) (finding the male defendant 
guilty of domestic assault for severely beating his ex-girlfriend 
-6- 
 
with a fireplace log), remanded on other grounds, No. W2011-01276-
CCA-R3-CD, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 788 (Sept. 26, 2012); State 
v. Terrell, No. M2006-01688-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 
135 (Jan. 30, 2008) (discussing how domestic abuse under T.C.A. § 
39-13-111 is a specific form of assault as defined in T.C.A. § 39-
13-101), with Fain v. State, No. M2009-01148-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 Tenn. 
Crim. App. LEXIS 212 (Mar. 9, 2010) (finding defendant-mother 
guilty of assault for beating her juvenile son); State v. Hall, 
No. W2008-01875-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 147 (Feb. 
18, 2010) (finding the male defendant guilty of assault for 
attacking the male victim with a frying pan); State v. Adkins, No. 
M2007-01728-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 994 (Dec. 4, 
2008) (finding the male defendant guilty of assault upon two police 
officers, one male and one female); State v. Elkins, 83 S.W.3d 706 
(2002) (finding the male defendant guilty of assault and aggravated 
sexual battery upon a juvenile girl).   
The record in the instant case offers additional evidence in 
support of the statutory elements necessary to convict defendant 
of assault upon a female: the judgment for domestic assault 
indicates that defendant was to have no contact with the victim, 
Ashley Blango, and to attend 24 domestic abuse counseling classes. 
Moreover, defendant’s criminal history record indicates that he 
has a neck tattoo which reads “Ashley.”  Although I acknowledge 
-7- 
 
defendant’s contention that “Ashley” is a unisex name, I find it 
inconceivable that this evidence — (1) a neck tattoo with the name 
“Ashley,” (2) a conviction for domestic assault, (3) a victim’s 
name of Ashley, (4) an order to attend domestic abuse counseling 
classes, and (5) an analysis of Tennessee case law showing how 
T.C.A. § 39-13-111 is specifically used for instances where a male 
has assaulted a female with whom he has a relationship — fails to 
meet the State’s burden of proving substantial similarity between 
the elements of the two relevant statutes by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  
Of further note here is that T.C.A. § 39-13-111 states that 
“[a] person commits domestic assault who commits an assault as 
defined in § 39-13-101 against a domestic abuse victim.”  As such, 
T.C.A. § 39-13-111 is clearly intended to be treated like an 
assault as defined under T.C.A. § 39-13-101; the distinction 
between these two statues is thus relevant only as to whether the 
assault occurred in a domestic situation or not.  See State v. 
Woosley, No. M2013-00578-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 
1045, at *15 (Nov. 26, 2013) (“Domestic assault is an "assault" 
committed against a "domestic abuse victim." T.C.A. § 39-13-111(b) 
(2010).  As charged in the indictment, an assault occurs when a 
person "[i]ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily 
injury to another[.]" Id. § 39-13-101(a)(1) (2010). A "domestic 
-8- 
 
abuse victim" is [also] defined to include "[a]dults . . . who are 
current or former spouses." Id. § 39-13-111(a)(1) (2010).”); see 
also T.C.A. § 39-13-111(a)(2) ("[D]omestic abuse victim  means . 
. . [a]dults . . . who live together or who have lived 
together[.]"); Id. § 39-13-101(a) (“A person commits assault who: 
(1) [i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury 
to another; (2) [i]ntentionally or knowingly causes another to 
reasonably fear imminent bodily injury; or (3) [i]ntentionally or 
knowingly causes physical contact with another and a reasonable 
person would regard the contact as extremely offensive or 
provocative.").  
I also note that the trial court took notice of the common 
law definition of assault as presented by the State.  This Court 
has recognized that in determining whether two statutes are 
substantially similar, the underlying purposes of the statutes 
must be examined to “avoid absurd or bizarre consequences.”  State 
v. Key, 180 N.C. App. 286, 294, 636 S.E.2d 816, 823 (2006) (holding 
that a Maryland theft statute was substantially similar to a North 
Carolina larceny statute because both statutes followed common-
law definitions of theft, taking, and asportation).  
Here, the underlying purpose of the statutes is clear: to 
protect females from assaults committed by males.  “In adopting 
G.S. 14-33, the General Assembly of North Carolina clearly sought 
-9- 
 
to prevent bodily injury to the citizens of the State arising from 
assaults, batteries and affrays.”  Gurganus, 39 N.C. App. at 400, 
250 S.E.2d at 672.  
In matters of statutory construction, the role 
of this court is to ascertain and give effect 
to the intent of the legislature.  Unless 
ambiguity 
requires 
resort 
elsewhere 
to 
ascertain 
legislative 
intent, 
judicial 
interpretation of a statute is restricted to 
the natural and ordinary meaning of the 
language used.  "Legislative enactments must 
be interpreted in their natural and ordinary 
sense without a forced construction to either 
limit or expand their meaning."  "Courts must 
construe 
statutes 
as 
a 
whole 
and 
in 
conjunction with their surrounding parts and 
their interpretation should be consistent with 
their legislative purposes."  The meaning of 
a statute is to be determined not from 
specific words in a single sentence or section 
but from the act in its entirety in light of 
the general purpose of the legislation; any 
interpretation should express the intent and 
purpose of the legislation.  "The cardinal 
rule 
of 
statutory 
construction 
is 
to 
effectuate legislative intent, with all rules 
of construction being [aids] to that end."  
 
State v. Cross, 93 S.W.3d 891, 894 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) 
(citations omitted).  A review of the elements of the Tennessee 
domestic assault statute supports a similar purpose as the North 
Carolina assault on a female statute — to protect females from 
assault by males.  Accordingly, upon de novo review of the trial 
court’s ruling after comparison of the elements of the relevant 
North Carolina and Tennessee assault statutes, I submit that the 
-10- 
 
State met its burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence 
that 
these 
statutes 
are 
substantially 
similar.  
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.