Title: Yamane v. Pohlson.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

= o00 ~

 

 

JOHN YAMANE, as Special Administrator of the
Estate of John Duong; HUNG DUONG, and DUC LAT,
Plaintiffe-Appellants,

ELIZABETH C. POHLSON, M.D., MITSUO HATTORI, M.D.,
MITSUO HATTORI, M.D., INC., and KAPI‘OLANI MEDICAL
SPECIALISTS, ‘Defendants-Appellees,
and

KAPI‘OLANI MEDICAL CENTER FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN;
JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants.

No. 27047

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO, 01-1-0940)

 

coe HY LZNAr

JUNE 27, 2006

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, JJ. ; AND
CIRCUIT JUDGE ALM, IN PLACE OF ACOBA, J., RECUSED
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.

‘The present appeal concerns the issue whether
plaintiffs-appellants John Yamane, as special administrator of
the Estate of John Duong (John), Hung Duong, and Duc Lai
(hereinafter, collectively, the plaintiffs] have complied with
Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 671, which established the

Medical Claims Conciliation Panel [hereinafter, the MCCP or the

 

aaws
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panel] to treview and render findings and advisory opinions on
the issues of liability and damages in medical tort [*] claims
against health care providers(,]* HRS § 671-11(a) (1993), prior
to filing their medical malpractice suit in court. sriefly
stated, twelve-year-old John was taken by his father, Duong, to
the emergency room at defendant Kapi'olani Medical Center for
Women and Children (hereinafter, the Medical Center] because he
was having difficulty breathing. It was determined that John had

@ large mediastinal mass (tumor) compressing hi

 

airway.
Following a surgical biopsy to determine the histology of the
tumor -- performed by defendant-appellee Elizabeth Pohlson, M.D.
(Dr. Pohlson), a self-employed pediatric surgeon, and defendant-
appellee Mitsuo Hattori, M.D. (Dr. Hattori), an anesthesiologist
~~ John passed away due to cardio respiratory arrest.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a medical tort claim before the
MCCP, naming, inter alia, the Medical Center and defendant-
appellee Kapi‘olani Medical Specialist (KMS), alleging that
John’s death was a result of the medical care and treatment
rendered by their employee-physicians, who were not specifically

named as defendant:

 

‘The plaintiffs also named Dr. Pohlson as a
respondent in the MCCP action, but did not name Kelly Woodruff,
M.D. (Dr. Woodruff), a specialist in pediatric
hematology/oncology and a former employee of KMS, who was

= HRS 5 671-1(2) (1993) defines “medical tort* to mean “professional
negligence, the rendering of professional service without informed consent, or
an error of omission in professional practice, by = health care provides,
witch proximately causes death, injury, or other damage to a patient-"

 

 

 

 
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—

Gnvolved in the pre-biopsy care and treatment of John. The
plaintiffs alleged that the health care providers’ faited to take
precautionary measures to shrink the tunor in order to provide
jnereased aizway protection prior to undertaking a biopsy.

men the plaintiffs ultimately filed their complaint in
ene cizeuit court, they did not name Dr. Woodruff as a defendant,
put alleged vicarious liabilitysgainst KMS for the acts and/or
of omissions of its employees. The Circuit Court of the First
circuit, the Honorable Bert I. Ayabe presiding, dismissed the
plaintiffs’ vicarious Liability claim against 1%S on the ground
that the plaintiffe were precluded from asserting such clais
because Dr. Noodruff was not named in the MCCP action and that,
tnerefore, the plaintiffs had not perfected a vicarious Liability
claim against INS as a condition precedent to bringing an action
in cireuit court. Consequently, the circuit court granted KMS’s
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Tn
accordance with Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule

sa(b) (2004), @ final judgment was entered with respect to KMS

—_—

 

> yas § 673-1(2) (1993) defines “health care provider" as va plyaician

ox surgenn ihenoed under chapter 453, a physician and surgeon, Licenses. yodey

og surgeon, Mepsaiatrist licensed under chapter 4602, a health care facility
peer 460) BCeion 3230-2, and the employees of any of then.*

 

5 ymce Rule $4(b) provides in pertinent parts

hen more than one claim for relief is presented in an

action” Ge when multiple parties are involv

 
 
  
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Sa

fon Decenber 20, 2004, and the plaintiffs now appeal from that
judgment .

On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the circuit court
erred in dismissing KMS because HRS chapter 671 does not require
the plaintiffs to nane KMS‘s employee, Dr. Woodruff, as a party
in the antecedent MCcP proceedings and that such requirement
would be contrary to vicarious liability law. The plaintiffs
also assert that the circuit court erred in dismissing «MS for
lack of jurisdiction inasmuch as KS waived its right to
challenge jurisdiction by not filing its motion prior to the
deadline for substantive motions.

Inasmuch as we conclude that the plaintiffs have
complied with the requirements of HRS chapter 671, we vacate the

circuit court’s December 20, 2004 final judgment and remand thie

 

case for further proceeding:
1. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Backsround
On August 8, 1998, John was admitted to the Medical
Center with complaints of coughing and difficulty breathing. A

chest x-ray and CT scan revealed a large anterior mediastinal

 

mags‘ (tumor) compressing or displacing John’s trachea (windpipe)

jhe mediastinun is the region between the pleural sace (double layers
of membrane that surround each lunge). Tt iv separated ints thr:
Conpartnents: The anterior mediastinum extends fron the sternum anteriorly to
the pericardium and brachiocephalic vessels posteriorly, ani contains tee
thymus gland, ‘the anterior mediastinal lymph nodes, and the internal manary
arteries and veine. i vs Principl ermal Me pat 1475" (14th
ea. 1958).

 

 

   

 

 
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and right main bronchus. John was placed in the Pediatric
Intensive Care Unit (PICU) for further evaluation and treatment.

on August 9, 1998, oncology and surgical consultations
were obtained from Dr. Woodruff and Dr. Pohlson. Following
several conferences with John’s family, a decision was made to
perform a surgical biopsy in order to obtain a pathological
Giagnosis and determine the type of cancer treatment to use.

on August 9, 1998 at 3:55 p.m., Dr. Pohlson, assisted
by Kimberly Moseley, M.D., (Dr. Moseley), performed the biopsy
surgery with Dr. Hattori providing anesthesia care. Although an
initial blood gas analysis revealed that John was severely
acidotic (excessive acid in the body fluids), John was
transferred out of the operating room to the PICU and placed
under the care of Paula Vanderford, M.D., (Dr. Vanderford), a
pediatric intensivist employed by KMS. A second blood gas
analysis indicated worsening acidosis and hypoxia (lack of
oxygen), and, at 7:45 p.m., John went into cardiopulmonary
arrest. Efforts to resuscitate him failed, and he was pronounced
dead at approximately 8:10 p.m. on August 9, 1998.
B. Procedural Backeround
‘The NCCP Procedure Generally

 

‘The NCCP (now codified in HRS chapter 671) is a
“comprehensive system of medical malpractice dispute resolution,”
Dubin v. Wakuzawa, 89 Hawai'i 188, 197, 970 P.2d 496, 505 (1999),

created because of a “crisis in the area of medical malpractice.”

 
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Tobosa v. Owens, 69 Haw. 305, 311, 741 P.2d 1280, 1285 (1987)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

‘Among other objectives, the legislature sought thereby to
“igltabilize the sedical malpractice insurance aituation by
reintroducing sose principles of predictability and
spreading of risk and "(Glecrease the coste of the legal
system and Improve the efficiency of its procedures to the
end that avards are nore rationally connected to the actual
Gamages.” Id... . The panele undoubtedly vere
established *to'eacourage early settlement of claims and to
Wieed out unneritorious claine.* lise, Stand. Comm. Rep. No
355; fn'1976 House Journal, at 1460+

    

Ad. at 311-12, 741 P.2d at 1285 (brackets in original);

nee alec Doe v. City & County of Honolulu, 93 Hawai'i 490, 497-
98, 6 P.3d 362, 369-70 (App. 2000).

In the context of the instant appeal, the following
provisions of HRS chapter 671 are relevant:

4 671-22 [(4993)1 Review by panel required; notte
presentation of clainas request for’ nore definite
Statement of thee a) Eefective July 1, 1996, any
person oF the person's’ representative claigiag chat’ a
edical tort has been conaitted shall submit a at

the claim to the [wcce) before a suit based

be commenced in any court of ehie State, cl

 

    

 

  

submited to the (NCCP) in writing. The claimant shall set
forth facts upon which the claim is based and shall incluge

ade who are then sown to the claimant. -

4 671-26 [(supp. 2005)) subsequent 1itigations
exclusive evidence.
je claim in an appropriate steers
MeSP] bear eth oft
Sr after the twelve-month period under section 673-18
{isupe. 2005)*} hae expired

 

% was § 671-18 provides that:

‘The filing of the claim with che (CCP) or with an approved
alternative dispute resolution provider shall toll any
Applicable statute of limitations, and any euch stature of
Limitations shall remain tolled until sixty days after the
date the decision of the panel or the notification of
completion from the approved alternative dispute resolution
provider is mailed of delivered to the parties. Ifa

 

 

 

(continued...)

 
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—_—_— SSS

No statement made in the course of the hearing of the
cee) shi Sple in evidence either as an
Adniseion, to impeach the credibility of a witness, or for
any other purpose in any trial of the action[.]

  

(Bold emphases in original.) (Underscored emphases added.)
During the MCCP process, the panel’ conducts an informal hearing
and, if no settlement is reached, issues a written advisory
decision, including a finding of damages, if any. HRS §5 671-13
and -15 (1993); see also lumv. Quesn’s Med. Ctr., 69 Haw. 419,
422, 744 P.24 1205, 1207 (1987) ("A reading of the provisions of
Chapter 671 suggests a scheme whereby the members of a [MCCP] can
share their knowledge and expertise in determining what
information and evidence are relevant and necessary in rendering

an advisory opinion.” (Footnote omitted.)).

 

‘The NCCP Proceedings in the Instant C

 

on August 7, 2000, the plaintiffs filed a medical tort
claim before the MCCP, pursuant to HRS § 671-12, against twelve

respondents as indicated in the table below:

*(. continued)
oa is ached ve month

e within a state.
ba ns he_clais

Gethie State. the panel or the approved alternative
Sfepuce resolution provider shall notity all parties in
weiting of this provision.

(emphasis added.)

« pursuant £0 HRS § 672-12(b) (1993), each panel is composed of one
person experienced in the personal injury clains settlement process, @
Pidenved sttorney experienced in trial practice, and a licensed physician or
surgeon,

  

 

 
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Description

 

 

the physician who performed the surgical blopsy

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

Carlos #. woreno-Cabral, | cardiothoracic eurgeon consulted during the
mo. biopsy
Dr. Hattori the anesthesiologist who assisted in
John’s care during the surgical Diopey
Miteus Hattori, m.0., | Dr. Hattori's medical practice
ae.
Dr. Vandertord 12 HNS-enployed pediatric int
fhe post-biopsy' care and tre:
Todd T. Kuwaye, W.D.  [a pediatric resident
Dr. Moseley, '@ surgical resident who assisted Dr. Pohison in
the surgical Biopsy
the Medical Center | the hospital where John was admitted for
evalvation and treatment
1 the physicians group wilch employed Dr.
Vanderfors

 

‘The State of Hawai'i aba | he institution which conducts the residency
university of Hawai'i Joh | training program
‘S. Burne school of

 

 

 

 

 

Medicine
Hawai'i Residency @ not for profit corporation which coordinated
Programs, nc. the residency training of Dre. Kovaye and
Noteley.
John Does 1-20; Jane Does | unidentified defendance
acto;

 

‘The plaintiffs alleged that the above respondents were negligent
in their treatment and care of John and that Dr. Pohlson and Dr.
Hattori failed to obtain informed consent from the plaintiffs
regarding the course of treatment. Specifically, the plaintiffs
alleged that KMS, under the doctrine of respondeat superior,” was
vicariously liable for the negligent acts and omissions of ite

employee-physicians who treated John.

Under the doctrine of reepondeat superior, an enployer ie held
vicariously Liable for the negligent acta of an employee coumitted while the
employee was acting within the scope of the employer's business. sae

Hoshijo-ex rel. white, 102 Hawal't 307, 319, 76 Prd $50, S62 (2003)

 

 

 

 
 

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a
on Septenber 12, 2000, KMS filed a request for a more

definite statement pursuant to HRS § 671-12(c) (1993)," seeking
an order from the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs
(occa) requiring the plaintiffs to name the specific employees of

MS whose care allegedly imposed vicarious liability, as well as

 

the treatment by each such enployee who was alleged to have
breached the standard of care. Although no order was issued by
the DCCA director with respect to KNS’s request, the record
reflects that the DCCA director, on September 21, 2000, entered
an order granting the Medical Center’s request (which it had
apparently filed) for ‘a more definite statement setting forth
‘all of the facts upon which [the plaintiffs] base(d their] claim
against (the Medical center].*

on septenber 29, 2000, the plaintiffs complied with the
ncca’a order and submitted a second claim letter with additional
factual information as to both the Medical Center and KMS, noting

that, in addition to Dr. Vanderford, who is an employee of KNS

 

+ section 671-12(¢) provides

If the statenent of the claim in the notice is 0
vague of anbiguous that any party receiving notice of the
vias cannot Feascnably be required to frame a written

Sean ca che party nay submit a written request to the
repens’ of commerce and consumer affaires for a nore
Girector Clatenent before filing the written response.»
Setimiee ctor may deny, grant, or modify the request at the
ee eee SSue discretion, without the necessity of &
sarerterfiehough the director may reach a decision after
Coasuleing wien the panel or the claimant.

mms § 671-6 (2993) further states that:

the director of comerce and consumer affairs shall be
Ts citibie for the inpleentation and adninistration of
TeiRone sper and hall adopt rules, in conformity with
ibipeer Bi, necessary for the purposes of this chapter.

 

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and was naned an individual respondent for her alleged negligence
in John's post-operative care, the plaintiffs also alleged
vicarious liability for the negligent acts of any and all other
¥O1S employees connected with John’s care treatment. In their

second claim letter, the plaintiffs also included the following

 

caveat

Please be informed that these further clarifications shall
Rot be construed to lime [the plaineiffe’] theories ot
Liability; and are subject to further modification based
upon additional information as it becomes available,

 

Thereafter, on October 3, 2000, the Medical Center filed ite
second request for a more definite statement, which was surmarily
denied.

On October 20, 2002, KMS’s counsel gent a letter to the
plaintiffs’ counsel, indicating that, because

[the plaintiffs) have not voiced criticions of any other

otS) “empioyea physicians | we assume that the claim

fs alleged negligence of only

Dr. Vandertord. Based on these assumptions, se have noe fe-

filed a Request for Nore Definite statement, but have
prepared and submitted cur Response co Claia.

 

In response, the plaintiffs’ counsel, in a letter dated Novenber
3, 2000, stated:

‘As you know, the MCCP process ‘e jurisdictional, and many of
Che facts are not clear yet because no depositions nave Lect
Eaken. Accordingly, you should not assine that the elaine
against Kus are *based upon the nesligen

Vanderford,” as you suggest (edi_in your
possible that any of the other respondents nay allege that
another (currently unidentified) respondent did something
below the standard of care, or my own expert might 20 opine,

 

 

Realistically, absent further developments or information,
Ehink HS and’ any other employees, agents, spparent ageact

1 and/or agents by estoppel of FMS oF any
other respondents’ connected with John Disng'a care and
treatment will be deened to be vicariously 1iable for their
Regligent acts and omissions.

 

 

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‘on October 22, 2000, the plaintiffs filed their MCCP
pre-hearing statement, reiterating their position chat,
= [g]espite knowledge that John had an extremely large mediastinal
nage with significant narrowing of the trachea, one or more of
gohn’s health care providers failed to take necessary precautions
against the risk of total airway obstruction. The pre-hearing
etatenent included, inter alia, facts relating to Dr. Woodruff’s
examination of John, her discussion with John’s parents, and her
perfornance of a bone marrow aspiration to determine whether the

‘tumor was cancerous.

In response, KMS stated in ite responsive pre-hearing

etatement that:

the onty claim of independent negligence asserted 8, to 145,
Fe ey eee renuered by Dr. vanderford who is alleged to
Felates co cenely monitored and treated (John’s) condition,
pave eg ige Ene Intubation attempts, resuscitation efforts
see een e plue." At the tine of the hearing, it will be
2nS the cCgord's position that she was not consulted, and
pr, YeMsger responaibiiity, with respect co the

had 0 lity of preoperative or intraoperative airvay’
advisability Reter the biopsy, when Jokn was returned to the
managenen ig in respiratory distress, Dr, Vanderford

PICU, Be y"aiiple incervertions to renedy the eituat ion:
attempeed Oot ner resuscitation efforts were unsuccessful ie
Toe eection of the quality of care rendered by Br.
Vanderford.

      

 

le Medical Center also filed its pre-hearing statement, wherein

 

it maintained that:

tm (the plaintifts’] discussion of the facts regarding the
7a, (ene Paeticient medical care provided to John (2, (the
allegediy i have not identified of named any specific person
cae el allegedly negligent employee, servant, or agent
ag being egical Center] (The plaintiffs) have not offered
of ene litic criticiens of the hursing or support staff at
{the Redical Center)

wa1-
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=

On January 24, 2001, the MCCP held a hearing on the

 

claims, At the hearing, Dr. Pohlgon testified,

 

jerting that she rejected the various treatments (i.e.,
radiation therapy and/or administration of corticosteroid
therapy) that could have shrunk the tunor on the basis of
warnings and recomendations she received fron Dr. Woodruff, who
insisted she go ahead with the surgical biopsy without fire
shrinking the tumor. The plaintiffs claimed that this was the
first time they were aware of Dr. Woodruft’s substantial
involvement in John's treatment.’

‘The next day, the plaintiffs’ counsel informed NS, via

a letter dated January 25, 2001, tha

 

le have no earlier notice of Dr. foodruff's alleged active
yole in the decision not to administer corticc

irradiation therapy to Jahn Duong?

hhas mot been available because it se not permitted in’ mece
Proceedings. “Therefore, Dr. Woodruff wae aot nased
individually as a {rJespondent in the NCEP ciaia”

 

 

aiscovery

 

However, based on the
testinony regarding thi
involvenent in

juned accuracy of Dr, Pohison’s MCCP
extent of Dr. Woodruft's active
e decision not to attempt to enrisk the

 

     

 

   

mediastinal mass pre-operatively, and by virtue of Ox.
Woodruft's status as an employes and/or ageat ostensible,
apparent or otherwise) of IMG... it ie Our position
hae 2 Ue) vicariousty itapie tor br. Noosrute’
tortious acts and/or omissions in this matter. ne wii ke
Proceeding on that basis, in part, in the Piret Ciecuie

 

Court action which will be filed shortly after receint of
the MccP’s decision.

On the same day, the NCCP issued its advisory opinion, finding no

actionable negligence. On March 8, 2001, the plaintiffs filed

| dhe plaintiffs further contend that their MOcP clain was filed two
faye prior to the expiration of the two-year period after John's death ace
ghus, Tit was too late to file a new medical fort claim naming Dre aeedas
indiviauatly."

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their rejection of the NCCP’s advisory opinion purs\
§ 671-16.
3. The Circuit Court Proceedings

on March 22, 2001, the plaintiffs commenced the instant
action in the circuit court, The complaint included three
counte, alleging negligence (Count 1), lack of informed consent
(count 12), and loss of @ chance of survival (Count ITI), naming
ae defendants Dr. Pohlson, Dr. Hattori, Mitsuo Hattori, M.D.»
tne.,% the Medical Center, and WIS [hereinafter collectively,
the defendants]. Like the MCCP claim letter, the plaintiffs’
complaint did not name Dr. Woodruff as a defendant, but, as
previously indicated, the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint =
claim for vicarious Mability against 11S.

thereafter, the defendants separately filed their
anawer to the complaint. On Decenber 23, 2002, the plaintiffs
gubmitted their pretrial statement. On February 21, 2003, the
defendants filed their responsive pretrial statenents, In its
responsive pretrial statement, ¥¥S admitted the following facts:

‘an employee of 13 performed an oncology consultation
coe ees sagust 9, 1998, end provided opinions and
SEcogmendatione regarding the treatment of Joba [1

 

an exployee of 11S performed a bon
on dota". on August 9, 1998, which
non-diagnostic.

narrow aspiration
‘Feported to be

 

Hereinafter, Dr. Hattori and Mitsuo Hattori, M.D., Inc. are
collectively referred £0 as Dr. Hattori.

 
 

che plaintiffs elected not to proceed against Dr Mos
cabrat, Dr 'kiuayer Hawalis Residency Programs, and the, John A. Bus
ceprals OF, Manl® gineitte sleo aid not name Dr. Vanderford saa defendant
of Medicine. Ter eragreanent that Dr. Vanderford is employed by TAS and acted
based on cOguaree and scope of employment while caring for John,

 

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jetween May 2, 2003 and May 10, 2004, the circuit court
granted various motions for summary judgment and partial summary
judgment, including substantive joinders, filed by the Medical
Center, Dr. Pohlson, Dr. Hattori, and KMS, which rulings are not
at issue in this appeal. As a result of these various rulings,

the following claims remained: (1) Counts I (informed consent)

 

and II (negligence) as to Dr. Pohlson and Dr. Hattori; and
(2) Count 11 (negligence) as to XMS." ‘Trial was scheduled for
October 25, 2004, and the circuit court ordered that all
substantive motions be filed by September 15, 2004.

One week before trial (on October 18, 2004), KMS moved
to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground that, inter
alia, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
review the plaintiffs’ clains inasmich as the plaintiffs failed
to name or criticize Dr. Woodruff in the underlying MCCP action
and, thus, did not “comply with HRS chapter 671, a’ condition
Precedent to any medical malpractice action." In the
alternative, KS argued that sunmary judgment should be granted
in its favor. on October 20, 2004, the plaintiffs filed their
opposition, wherein they maintained that (1) they had fully
satiofied the letter and spirit of HRS chapter 671 because KMS
was named as a party in the MCCP proceedings as well as in the

2» The plaintiffs also sought partial summary judgnent a8 to Count 12

ce
(lack of informed consent) againat Dr. Pohlaon and Dr. fattarl. ‘Gosetnt, he
cireuit court denied the plaintiffs’ motion

   

% Both Dr. fohlson and Dr. Kateri filed a statement of no position to
Ws" notion to dient

 

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co
underlying litigation and that (2) Dr. Woodruff was not

neceseary party to the MCCP claim for vicarious liability. The
plaintiffs further asserted that, because HIS filed its motion to
dismiss long after the deadline for substantive motions, which

expired on September 15, 2004, 1™S had waived and/or was estopped

from asserting the lack of jurisdiction.

 

A hearing on KMS‘s motion to dismiss was held on
october 21, 2004. Tt appears that the circuit court orally

granted X¥S’s motion inasmuch as, on October 25, 2004 (the

 

acheduled trial date), the plaintiffs filed their motion for
reconsideration of XMS’ dismissal or, in the alternative, for
HRcP 54(b) certification and/or leave to file interlocutory
appeal and for stay of proceedings pending appeal. On the same
day, the circuit court held a hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion
for reconsideration. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion,
but

ftound) that there {was] no just reason for delay. The
[Ge Marect (eal the entry of Judgnent . - . in accordance
Git (mcr) Hole S¢(b), and the matter will be stayed
Pending the reault of the appeal.

 

on October 29, 2004, the circuit court issued a written
order granting S's motion to dismiss, stating specifically that

[the pllainti¢fs failed te comply with (clhapter 671 of the
(isyPa (or) Woodrust  . . waa not named as a party in
qeiicee hearing. Therefore, (the pllaintitfe are precluded
EiSalbringing cheir elaine against Dr. Woodruff in this
Uivsule ad tthe pllaintitfs cannot sustain a vicarious
jlubility claim against ms.

Aelordingly, Kiss notion ie hereby granted as this
court Macks subject matter jurisdiction to hear (the
Piiaintifte’ claine against Dr. Woodruff.

 

 

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Therefore, the court dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ claims that
were premised on the alleged acts or omissions of Dr. Woodruff
and granted dismissal of all claims against KMS. on December 13,
2004, the circuit court filed its order denying the plaintiffs’
motion for reconsideration and granting their request for a HRCP
Rule 54(b) certification. Thereafter, a final judgment was
entered on December 20, 2004. on January 4, 2005, the plaintiffs
timely filed their notice of appeal.

TI. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Motion to Dismiss

A trial court's dienie
juriediction sa 8 qu

 

 
 

law, reviewsble de

 

aStates, 850 P-24 558, 360° (3th Cir.
2988) (.]_ Moreover, we adopt the view of the Minth Circuit
Court of appeais in Love ve United States. 871 Fad 1499

(sth cir. i989) +
Our review [of a motion to diamies for lack of subject
Batter jurisdiction] is based on the contents of the
Complaint, the allegations of which ve accepe as true
fand constiue in the light moat favorable to the
plaintife(e). “Dismissal is improper uniess “ie
appears beyond doubt that the plaintif? (sl can prove
no sat of facts in support of [their] claim wich
would entitied (thes) to relief."

Id. at 1491[.] However, "when considering a motica to

@iemiee pursuant to (MRCP) Rule 12(b) (1) the Teriel] court

As not restricted to the face of the pleadings. but may.

Feview any evidence, such as affidavit and testimony, to

vesolve factual disputes concerning the existence of

Jurisdiction. ucCarthy, #50 7.24 at 560 (citations

onitted) ; see algo SAC. wright & A. Milles. Federal

Eractice and Procedure § 1350, at 213" (1990).

Casumans v. ILWU, Local 142, 94 Hawai'i 330, 337, 13 P.3d 1235,
1242 (2000) (quoting Norrie v, Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 74 Haw.

235, 239-40, 842 P.2d 634, 637 (1992)) (some brackets in

 

 

 

original) (some citations omitted) .

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a

B. Stati werpretal

othe standard of review for statutory construction is
well-established. The interpretation of a statute is a question
of law which this court reviews de novo.” Liberty Mut. Fire Ing.
co. vs Dennison, 108 Hawai'i 380, 364, 120 P.3d 111, 1119 (2005)
(quoting Labrador v. Liberty Mut. Group, 103 Hawai'l 206, 212, 91
p.3a 386, 391 (2003)) (intexnal quotation marks omitted). In so
doing, this court mist adhere to the well-established rule of
statutory construction that the "foremost obligation is to
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature,
which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in
the statute iteelf." Gray v, Admin, Dir. of the Courts, 64
Hawai'i 136, 148, 932 P.24 580, 590 (1997) (citations omitted) .

TIT. DISCUSSION

As previously stated, the circuit court dismissed the
plaintiffs’ remaining claim of negligence against KMS, which was
premised on the actions or inactions of Dr. Woodruff, based upon
its lack of subject matter jurisdiction to review the plaintiffs’
claim in light of their failure to name or criticize Dr. Woodruff
in the underlying MCCP action. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue
that the order dismissing their claim against KMS mst be
reversed because, inter alia, the circuit court’s dismissal

tranforms the NCCP process from an advisory, informal forun

KEERC°ES weed out unmeritorious claims, to one with pleading

Geauizenents srricter than those of the judicial system.

Zhe dismissal sige runs contrary to all established

Frinciples of vicarious liability and is premised upon the

preeghon belie? hat a vicarious ability claim vagainst
“Claim against Dr. Woodruff.”

   

(iis) ie the sane

 

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SSS

‘The plaintiffs further maintain that, inasmuch as KMS brought its
motion to dismiss after the deadline for substantive motions and
on the eve of trial, KMS waived its rights to object to
jurisdiction. The plaintiffs, therefore, submit that the circuit
court erred in considering KMS's motion.

KMS, however, argues that the circuit court properly
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim against it when the plaintiffs
failed to comport with the jurisdictional requirements of HRS
chapter 671. KMS contends that the plaintiffs

pamed Or. Vanderford a8 the only XS employed physician at
the NCCP hearing, and thus, only Dr. Vanderfora'y alleged
negligence was put before the MCP Zor consideration: "As a
Feault, Dr. Woodruft's actions of inactions were not
considered by the panel and neither she nor INS) her
esployer, were afforded an opportunity to defend against any
claims based on her conduct in the ciroult court action

 

  

 

‘Thus, KMS submits that the plaintiffs frustrated the legislative

 

intent and policy of HRS chapter 671 by completely bypassing the
MCCP process with respect to Dr. Woodruff’s alleged acts or

omissions in the care and treatment of John.

 

‘The ultimate question in this appeal is whether it was
appropriate in the circumstances to dismiss the plaintiffs’ suit
against KMS on the ground that they failed to abide by the

pr

 

-quisites provided in HRS chapter 671 prior to commencing the
action in the circuit court on a claim of vicarious liability by
virtue of KMS’s employees’ alleged negligence in rendering
professional medical services. preliminarily, however, we

address whether KMS has waived its right to contest subject

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a

matter jurisdiction by failing to raise the issue prior to the
deadline for substantive motions.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

‘the plaintiffs argue that “the [c]ircuit [clourt is a
court of general jurisdiction, and a party can waive its claim
that the court lacks jurisdiction and be estopped from raising
the issue thereafter.” (Emphasis in original). In support of
their contention, the plaintiffs rely upon case law from
alifornia, Indiana, and Missouri. Particularly, the plaintiffs
quote the following from in xe Maxxiage of Neal, 699 $.W.24 92

(Mo. Ct. App. 1985)

where the subject matter of Litigation is within the general
Weettaietien of the trial court, the claim of want of
JeeSGiction by reason of the existence of exceptional or
Jweetei Siecumseances can be waived if not timely raised

 

Id. at 94 (citations omitted). However, existing Hawai'i
authority controls.

uRcP Rule 12(h) (3) (2004) provides that, “{wIhenever it
appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss
the action.” (Emphasis added.) Further, it ie well established
that “lack of subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived by
any party at any time." Chun v, Employees’ Ret. Sya., 73 Haw. 9,
14, 626 P.2d 260, 263 (1992) (citation omitted) ; see also
wathewson v. Aloha Airlines, Inc, 92 Hawai'i 57, 69, 919 P.24
969, 961 (1996). Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ contention and

reliance upon case law from other jurisdictions are unavailing

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Se

inasmuch as this court has held that the jurisdictional question
can never be waived by any party at any time and that *[sluch a
question is in order at any stage of the case[.J* In ze
Application of Rice, 68 Haw. 334, 335, 713 P.2a 426, 427 (1986) .
We, therefore, hold that the circuit court did not err in
considering XMS’s motion to dismiss." We now turn our attention
to the remaining issue in this appeal, i.e., whether the
plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of HRS chapter 671.
B. ance with ERS cha: 71

As previously stated, the plaintiffs alleged -- not in
the MCCP proceedings, but during the circuit court proceedings --
that KMS was vicariously liable for the negligence of ite
employee, Dr. Woodruff, for her failure to adviee Dr. Pohleon to
begin corticosteroid or radiation therapy prior to John’s biopsy.

As a result, the circuit court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction

 

M Although we recognize that subject matter jurisdiction may be raised
at any stage of the proceeding, we emphasize hare that our approal of ont
Gixcuit court's consideration of "S's motion should not be coast aves
condoning M5"s action in filing its motion on the eve of srial, asich sas
Clearly in direct violation of the court's expressed deadline for tiling
Substantive motions.

 

 

He further note that, during the hearing on X48's motion to dismiss, the
plaintiffs requested that the court sanction iS for violating che same!
ordered deadline, regardless whether the court granted or denied the cation,
At the hearing, ios maintained that the iseue of subject master jurssdietsoa
Gid not arise until the trial court’s rulings on motions in linine establioned
Chat the plaintiffs’ clains against KMS would be Tinited tot
omissions of Dr. Woodruff (and not Dr. vanderford). In rebutta:
Plaintiffs argued that KMS via an e-mail from che plaineifte
Gounsel, dated July 9, 2008, approximately two months prior to the septenkes
35, 2004 substantive motions deadline, that the plaintiffs’ Claims saeisec iS
would be premised solely on the acts or omissions of Dr. woolrass, genet, i
Gourt took the matter under advisement, including the sation te diearn
Although the court’s written order, dated October 25, 2004; granted g's
notion to dismiss, the order is silent with respect to the piaintitte” ora
Fequeat for sanctions.

    

 

  

 

 

 

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to entertain the plaintiff's theory of liability with respect fo
EMS.

It is well-established that the MCCP requirement of HRS
chapter 671 is a pre-condition to suit -- although determinations
of the panel have no preclusive effect on subsequent litigation:
see, e.c., Garcia v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 90 Hawai'i 425, 442,
978 P.24 862, 879 (1999) (holding that “the cireuit court did not
err in concluding that it had no subject matter jurisdiction as
result of Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the requirements of
urs § 671-12[,]* which mandated that such claims be first filed
with the NCCP prior to filing suit); ase also Humv. Dericka, 162
P.R.D. 628, 636 (D. Haw, 1995) ("While in Hawai'i state courts
the Mccp procedure is a prerequisite to suit, it does not
determine the outcome of a lawsuit in state court.").* As this
court has indicated, *[t]he procedures outlined [in HRS §§ 671-12
and -16] are juriedictional prerequisites to suit, and they wilt
be enforced.” Tobosa, 69 Haw. 314-25, 742 P.2d at 1286,

Here, the plaintiffs submitted a medical claim against
joi to the NCCP in a letter dated August 7, 2000, The letter
stated that the plaintiffs’ claims against XS were based on the

theory of xespondeat superior, alleging that KMS was vicarsousiy

—_—
indeed, URE § 671-16 provides in relevant part thats

no decision, conclusion, finding, or recosmendation of he
fe of damages

 
  
    

fa'an opesing #
£8 the court or juryl-]
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=

Liable for the negligent acts and omissions of its agents,
servants, and employees. 44S, however, argues that the
plaintiffs failed to comply with HRS chapter 671's requiremente
because they named “Dr. Vanderford as the only xMS employed
Physician at the MCP hearing[.]* We cannot agree inasmuch as
HRS § 671-12(a) requires only that a “claimant . . . set forth
facts upon which the claim is based and . . . include the nanes

of all parties against whom the claim is or may be made who are

 

nown to the claimant." (Emphasis added.) As previously
indicated, the plaintiffs did not discover Dr. Woodruff’ s
allegedly substantial, active involvement in making or
Participating in the decision to proceed with John’s biopsy
without first shrinking the tumor until the MCCP hearing via pr,
Pohlaon’

testimony. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs had named xs

   

as a respondent and had asserted a vicarious liability claim
against it. Nowhere in the statute does it require the
Plaintiffs to name ‘all known negligent health care providers,*

a8 KMS contends, with respect to their claim against KMS. Having

 

filed the requiaite MccP claim, participated in the required
hearing, and rejected the MCCP’s finding of no actionable
negligence, we believe the plaintitts have satisfied HRS chapter
671'8 statutory prerequisites for filing suit in circuit court.

¥O1S, however, contends that the plaintiffs frustrated
the legislative intent and policy of HRS chapter 671 by

completely bypassing the MCP process with respect to Dr.

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—

yoodruft’s alleged acts or omissions in the care and treatment of
John. We disagree. ‘The plaintiffs’ complaint did not include
any claim against Dr. Woodruff individually. As the plaintsffe
point out, it is well settled that @ vicarious liability claim
does not require that the agents or employees of the entity
ought to be held liable be naned as parties. “The employes is
not a necessary party to a suit against his employer under
respondeat superior. Hall_v. Nat'l Sexy. Indue.. Inc., 172
P.R.D. 157, 159 (B.D. Pa. 1997) (intexnal quotation marks and
brackets omitted) (quoting Risser v. Dist. of Columbia, 563 F.24
462, 469 0.39 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); see also Cheney v, Hailey, 686
p.2d 808, 812 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Kocsis v. Harrison, 543
N.w.2a 164, 168-69 (Neb. 1996); Trans Union Leasing Corp. vs
damilton, 600 P.2d 256, 256 (W.M. 1979); Vendrell_v. Sch. Dist
No. 26¢ Malheur County, 360 ?.24 262, 269 (Or. 1961). To hold,
aa the circuit court did, that the plaintiffs’ failure to comply
with HRS chapter 671 because Dr. Woodruff ‘was not named as a
party in the MCCP hearing” precludes the plaintiffs from
asserting a vicarious liability claim against KMS would run afoul
of the well-established doctrine of respondeat superior/vicarious
liability.

Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in

Gismissing the plaintiffs’ claim against KMS.

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IV. concn
Based on the foregoing, we vacate the First Circuit
Court's December 20, 2004 final judgment and remand this case for

further proceedings.

On the briefs: Yy i

James J. Bickerton and tm Boe certa a

Daniel A. Morris (of
Bickerton Saunders Dang Rasta cinema

& Sullivan), for

Plaintiffs-appeilante re cutyin.

Kenneth 8. Robbins,
Leighton M. Hara, and
Wendy M. Yamamoto (of
Robbins & Associates),
for defendant-appellee
Kapi‘olani Medical
Specialista

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