Title: State v. Maganis. ICA Opinion, filed 9/8/2005 [pdf], 109 Haw. 89. S.Ct. Order Granting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 10/18/2005 [pdf], 109 Haw. 32.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAW LIGaAnt
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T

 

000-

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant,
SHANELLE MAGANIS, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellee,
and

LEANNE H. CAMBRA, also known as Leanne H. Adams, Defendant.

wo. 25478 »
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEAUS = =
(CR. NO. 021-1667) : 3

 

aad

NOVEMBER 23, 2005

  

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBR, aND DUFe#! JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.

on October 18, 2002, the Circuit Court of the First
Circuit, the Honorable Reynaldo D. Graulty presiding, granted the
motion of Petitioner/Defendant~Appellee Shanelle Maganis to
dismiss Count II of the Amended Complaint, finding that there vas
no probable cause to arrest Maganis for Unauthorized Control of a

Propelled Vehicle (UCPV) in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes

 

(HRS) § 708-836 (Supp. 2001).! On September 8, 2005, the

HRS § 708-836 provides in relevant part: “A person commits the
offense of unauthorized control of 2 propelled vehicle if the person
Intentionally of knowingly exerts unauthorized control over another's
propelled vehicle sy operating the vehicle without the owner's consent or by
Changing the identity of the vehicle withour the omner’s consent.

 
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Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) issued a published opinion
reversing the circuit court, concluding that probable cause
existed. State v. Maganis, No. 25478 (2005 WL 2160077) (Haw.
App. September 8, 2005) [hereinafter, ICA’s Opinion]. Maganis
subsequently applied for a writ of certiorari to review the ICA's
opinion.

We granted Maganis’s application for a writ of
certiorari for the sole purpose of addressing her contention that
the ICA misstated the probable cause standard for arrest in this
jurisdiction, and thus erroneously concluded that probable cause
existed. With respect to her initial contention, we agree with
Maganis: the “watered down” version of the probable cause
standard as set forth by the ICA is contrary to this
jurisdiction’s viable and controlling precedents, and we reject
it. See infra, Section ITI.A, Nevertheless, applying the
correct standard to the record presented, we concur with the
ICA's conclusion that Sergeant Yomes had probable cause to arrest
Maganis, and thus agree that the circuit court erred in granting
Maganis’s motion to dismiss.

T. BACKGROUND
A. Statement of Facts.

‘The essentially undisputed facts, as stated by the ICA,

are as follows:

At about 9:30 in the morning on July 28, 2002, Honolulu
Police Department (HPO) Sergeant Davie Yones (Sergeant

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Youes) was on patrol in the Salt Lake area. As Sergeant
Yores drove past a residence on Ala Lehua street, he saw a
Block Acura Cer parked in the driveway with its front. facing
the street. befendant-Appellee Shanelie Maganis (Maganis or
Defendant) was in the passenger seat and Leanne Canbre
(Cenbra) was in the driver's seat Sergeant Yenes continued
on his patrol toa nearby district park, then cireled back
fo Als Lehua Street and drove past the Sane residence.
Sergeant ones saw Canbra step out of the Acura appearing to
Gry ner hair with s towel valle Maganis resained in the car.
Sergeant Yones decided to “run” the front license plate
Runber to see 4f the Acura was stolen because “certain
Street characters” with prior arrests were kown to frequent
the residence where the Acura was parked.

 

 

 

A short tine later, Sergeant Yones learned through HPD
Gispateh that the Acurs hea been reported stolen. He
Feturned to the Als Iehua street residence and parked his
Ear, blocking the Acura. After requesting assistance from
nearby unite, Sergeant Yones located Maganis end Cenbra, who
Were now eitting cn chairs behind the Acura, officers
Fesponded to the scene snd Sergeant Yores nad them detain
Hagens and Canbra, Both women were cooperative.

 

 

 

Sergeant Yomes proceeded to question Dale Nojima (Nojina) ,
who hed. Just emerged from the house. Sergeant Yones asked
Nojima if he knew the two woman. Nojina stated that he knew
fone of then, identifying Naganis as the wosan he knew.)
Nojine stated that earlier that morning he saw the other
woman, Canbra, reversing the Acura into his driveway,

 

 

Sergeant Yones noticed that efforts had been made to change
the car's identity. The front license plate, which had be
[Ssued to the Acurs, was aifferent fron the rear plate.
Sergeant Yones found the license plate matching the front
plate on the flocrboare of the front passenger seat. He
Biso discovered that the ignition was “punched,” in that the
area “where you put your key to stare the ignition” was
Ganaged. Sefgeant Yones subsequently arrested Canbra and
waganis

 

 

 

Maganis waived her constitutional rights later that evening
Sra denied driving the Acura. But the following day, after
felting « polygraph examination and again waiving her
Fights) Magents gave 2 tapecrecorded statement in which
Maganis admitted that she and Canbra took turns driving the
eure, knowing thet it had been stolen. Maganis denied any
Sovolvenent in stealing the car or in changing the rear
ilcense plate.

 

 

 

2 Although the circuit court did not enter any express written findings
with respect to Sergeant Yones’¢ testimony regarding his conversation with
Nojine prior to arresting Maganis and Cambra, as the record indicates and the
Teh notes, Sergeant Youee testified that Nojima told hin that Nojima was
acquainted with Maganis, but not Cabra

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B. Procedural

Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellant State of Hawai'i
(hereinafter, the prosecution] charged Maganis with one count of
UCPV in violation of HRS § 708-836. Maganis moved to dismiss on
the ground that Sergeant Yones did not have probable cause to
arrest her for UCPV. On October 18, 2002, the circuit court
granted Maganis’s Motion to Dismiss, finding that Sergeant Yomes
lacked probable cause, and that Maganis’s confession must be
suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. The prosecution
appealed, and the ICA reversed, concluding that Sergeant Yomes
had probable cause to arrest Maganis for UCPV and that Maganis’s
post-arrest confession was thus admissible. We granted Maganis's
Application for Writ of Certiorari, and we now affirm the ICA’s
opinion in part and vacate in part.

31, STANDARD OF REVIEW

“(T]he determination whether probable cause to arrest
exists . . . is reviewed under @ de nove standard on appeal.”
State v, Kaleohano, 99 Hawas'i 370, 375, 56 P.3d 138, 143 (2002)
(citing State v. Navas, @1 Hawai" 213, 123, 913 P.2d 39, 49
(2996).

IT. piscussion

Maganis asserts: (1) the ICA’s novel characterization

of probable cause diminishes the probable cause standard to

nothing more than the standard for reasonable suspicion; and
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(2) Sergeant Yones did not have probable cause to arrest Maganis
for UCPV. We hold that although the ICA improperly stated the
probable cause standard, it reached the correct result in
concluding that Sergeant Yones had probable cause to arrest
Maganis.

A. The ICA Erred In Characterizing the Probeble Cause Standard.

In describing the probable cause standard, the ICA made

‘the following statement: “The probable cause standard . . . is
less demanding than . . . proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.” This statement improperly characterizes the probable

cause determination as set forth by this court, and we therefore
reject it.

‘This court, in describing the probable cause

 

determination, has stated: “Probable cause exists when the facts
and circumstances within one’s knowledge and of which one has
reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves

to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an

 

offense has been committed. This requires more than a mere
suspicion put less than a certainty." Carlisle ex rel, State v,
Yen Thousand Four Hundred Forty-Seven Dollars in U.S. Currency
$10,487.00), 104 Hawai'i 323, 331, 89 P.34 823, 831 (2004)

(quoting State v. Detrov, 102 Hawai'i 13, 18, 72 P.3d 485, 490
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(2003)) (emphasis added).’ This standard has two components.
‘The first sentence describes the standard for determining the
presence of probable cause. The second sentence describes the
quantum of proof necessary to satisfy the standard.
1, The boundaries--mere suspicion and certainty.

We have stated that probable cause requires “more than
2 mere suspicion but less than a certainty.” $10,447.00, 104
Hawai'i at 331, 89 P.3d at 831 (quoting Detroy, 102 Hawai'i at 18,
72 P.3d at 490); see also State v. Brighter, 63 Haw. 95, 101, 621
P.2d 374, 379 (1980) (stating that probable cause “requires more
than a mere suspicion but less than a certainty”); State we
Texeira, $0 Haw. 138, 142, 433 P.24 593, 597 (1967) (“It is clear
that the term probable cause, according to its usual acceptation,
means less than evidence which would justify condemnation.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.)). “Certainty,” of course, is

 

considerably greater than a mere preponderance of the evidence,
which means that the existence of a fact is more likely than not.

This court’s formulation of the quantum of proof nece:

 

ry to
stablish probable cause is thus more demanding than that

suggested by the ICA, which would lower the bar for the presence

 

> Soe alae HRS § 803-5(b) (1993) {*{A] police officer has probable
cause to sake an arrest when the facts and circumstances within the officer's
knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information are
sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the
belief that a crine has been or is being conmitted.”)-

 

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of probable cause to less than a preponderance of the evidence as
@ per se matter.

The ICA, in support of its formulation, cites to the
plurality opinion in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983),
which states that probable cause “does not demand any showing
that [a belief that a crime has been committed] be correct or
more likely true than false.“ While it is helpful to look at
United States Supreme Court precedent when interpreting a
provision of the Hawai'i Constitution that is parallel to the
federal constitution,* this ‘court has emphasized that “federal
decisions do not . . . prevent this court from extending greater
protection in interpreting the state constitution where we
determine it to be appropriate.” Texeira, 50 Haw. at 142, 433
P.2d at 597, This court has also repeatedly insisted that “as
the ultimate judicial tribunal with final, unreviewable authority
to interpret and enforce the Hawai'i Constitution, we are free to
give broader protection under the Hawai"i Constitution than that

given by the federal constitution.” State v, Wallace, 80 Hawai'i

 

The ICA also cites to State w Mitchell, 482 N.W.24 36¢ (itis
to support its formulation. ‘The Suprene Court of Wisconsin stated that
SieJneve must be more than a possibility or suspicion that defendant conitted
fan offense, but the evidence need fot reach the level of proof beyond a

Teasonable doubt or even that gullt is more Likely than not.” Jd. at 367~%
Mitchell, however, 1s not controlling authority and we decline to-fellow it.

 

 

 

   

5 Probable cause is required for all arrests and searches under the

afequards of the fourth anendment to the United States Constitution and
eeigie'Y section ) of the Hawai'i Constitution. State v. Navag, 61 Hawai'd
15, isles 913 P.2a 39, €1-42 (2996)

 
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382, 398, 910 P.2d 695, 711 n.14 (1996) (quoting State v. Hoey,
77 Hawai'i 17, 36, 881 P.24 504, 523 (1994)). Thus, because this
court's interpretation of probable cause affords more expansive
protection under the Hawai'i Constitution, to the extent that the
plurality holding in Brown is in conflict with this
interpretation, we reject it.

‘The ICA also cites Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235
(1983), for the proposition that the probable cause standard is
less demanding than the preponderance of the evidence standard.
‘The ICA, however, misinterprets Gates. The Gates Court said that
“[f]inely-tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt
or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials,
have no place” in the probable cause decision. 462 U.S. at 235.
Contrary to the ICA’s characterization, this statement does not
imply that probable cause is less demanding than proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. Rather, it merely states that
probable cause is a Jess finely-tuned standard, Gates,
therefore, does not address the requisite quantum of proof in the
establishment of probable cause; rather, it addresses how the
probable cause determination should be made, which will be
discussed next.

2. Determining probable cause.
We have long held that the standard for determining

probable cause is a practical and nontechnical concept, which
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involves a balancing of the citizens’ right to be free from
unreasonable interference with privacy and from unfounded charges
of crime, and the needs of the community to be protected by law
enforcement:

[t]he Long-prevailing standards on probable cause:

«seek to safeguard citizens from rash and
Ungeasonable interferences with privacy and from
Unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to
Give fair leeway for enforcing the lew in the
Eonmunity’s protection. Because many situations
Shien confront officers in the course of
Gxecuting their duties are more or less
Ssbiguovs, room aust be slloved for some
Bistakes on their part. But the mistakes must
Be those of reasonable men, acting on facts
Teading sensibly to their conclusions of
probabiiity. The rule of probable cause is a
Eractical, nontechnical concaption affording the
Best conpronise that has been found for
Scconnossting these often opposing interests.
Requiring nore would unduly Ramper, lew
enforcenent. To allow less would be co Leave
Taweabiing citizens at the nercy of the
officers’ whim of ceprice,

State v. Delmondo, $4 Haw. 952, 555, 512 P.2d 551, 553 (1973)

(quoting Brinegar v, United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
See also State v, Texeira, $0 Haw. 138, 143, 433 P.2d 593, 597

(2967) ("the rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical
conception affording the best compromise that has been found for
accommodating these often opposing interests.”).

We believe that the probable cause standard of
requiring “more than a mere suspicion but less than a certainty”
provides the flexibility necessary in determining probable cause,
and preserves the necessary balance between the competing

interests of law-abiding citizens and law enforcement. The ICA's

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attempt to “water down” the probable cause standard would
unreasonably disturb this balance. We expressly reject the ICA's
formulation, and reconfirm that probable cause for arrest
requires more than a mere suspicion, but less than a certainty.
Accordingly, we vacate Section III.A. of the ICA’s Opinion to the
extent that it improperly narrows the probable cause standard as
expressed by this court.

B. The ICA Properly Concluded That the Circuit Court Erred in

Although the ICA improperly expressed the probable
cause standard, we hold that it correctly concluded that Sergeant
Yomes had probable cause to arrest Maganis for UCPV as a
principal or as an accomplice to Canbra.

A person can commit the UCPV offense as a principal by
“intentionally or knowingly . . . operating the vehicle without
the owner's consent or by changing the identity of the vehicle
without the owners consent” pursuant to HRS § 708-636, or as an
accomplice, pursuant to HRS $ 702-221 (2) (ce) (1993). An
accomplice is defined to include a person, who, “{wlith the

Antention of promoting or facilitating the commission of the

 

+ HRS § 702-221 states, in relevant part;

 

(2) A person As Legally accountable for the conduct of
another person when!

ici He is an accomplice of such other person in the
Commission of the offense

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offense, . . . [a}ids or agrees or attempts to aid the other
person in planning or committing it[.]" RS § 702-222(1) (b).”
The ICA correctly concluded that Sergeant Yones had
probable cause to believe Maganis participated in the offense of
UCPV as either a principal or an accomplice. Sergeant Yones
found that the ignition was damaged and the rear license plate
which had been removed and replaced with a different plate, was
Located on the floor of the front passenger seat where Maganis
had been sitting. Assuming, arquendo, thet this evidence did not

establish probable cause to arrest Maganis for the offense of

 

UCPV as a principal, we hold that Sergeant Yomes nevertheless had

probable cause to believe Maganis was an accomplice becau:

 

a
the plate and ignition were located in such places that would
suggest Maganis knew the vehicle was stolen; and (2) Maganis and
cambra were parked at a house, the owner of which knew Maganis,

but not Cambra, suggesting that Maganis assisted in the decision

 

> HRS § 702-222 states, in its entirety:

§ 702-222 Liability for conduct of another;
complicity. A person ‘s an accomplice of snother person in
fhe commission of an offense if:
Tl) Rich the intention of promoting or facilitating
fhe commission of the sffense, the person:
a) Solicits the other person to commit it; or
(B) Aids or agrees or attempts to ai the
other person in planning or committing ity
(e) Having 2 legal duty to prevent the
Commissicn ef the offense, fails to make
Feasonable effort so to do; oF
(2) The person's conduct 1s expressly declared by
Ite Eo establish the person's complicity.

 

 

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to park at the house, thereby aiding or attempting to aid
Cambra’s commission of a UCPV violation. ‘This evidence, when
viewed as a whole, is sufficient to provide more than a mere
suspicion (albeit less than @ certainty) to a person of
reasonable caution that Maganis committed the offense of UCPV
either as a principal or as an accomplice.

In finding that there vas probable cause for arrest
under the facts of this case, we do not condone a HPD policy
testified to by Sergeant Yomes that it was HPD's “policy that
everyone in the [stolen] vehicle gets arrested for [UCPV].” Such
a policy is plainly contrary to the requirement that probable
cause must exist to make an arrest. To the extent that the ICA
relied upon the “common enterprise” rationale of Maryland vw.
Beingle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), to circumvent the requirenents of
probable cause, we reject such reliance, as “common enterprise”
is not substitute for the mandate in our jurisdiction that
probable cause based on specific “facts leading sensibly to their
conclusions of probability(,]” State v. Delmondo, 54 Haw. 552,
555, 512 P.2d $51, $53 (1973) (quoting Brineaar v. United states,
338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949), must be established in each case.

For the reasons set forth above, we agree with the ICA
that Sergeant Yomes had probable cause to arrest Maganis for UCPV

either as a principal or an accomplice, and Maganis’s post-arrest

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confession was therefore adnissible. Accordingly, the cizcuit
court erred in granting Maganis’s motion to disniss.
Tv. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we vacate Section IITA. of the
XcA’s opinion to the extent that it mischaracterizes the probable
cause standard as expressly approved by this court, and affirm
the ICK’# opinion in all other respects. Accordingly, we renand
tnis case to the elzcuit court for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
Brian A. costa, Jom
(ot Conta. ¢ Delacy, LLtC)
{Gt petitioner /defendane~

appellee Shanelle Maganis Heater nen

on the writ

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