Title: Bighorn Desert etc. v. Verjil

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 7/24/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
BIGHORN-DESERT VIEW WATER  
) 
AGENCY, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and 
) 
 
Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S127535 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/2 E033515 
KARI VERJIL, as Registrar of Voters, etc., 
) 
 
) 
San Bernardino County 
 
Defendant and Cross-defendant; ) 
Super. Ct. No. SCV 097005 
 
 
) 
E. W. KELLEY, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Party in Interest, Cross- 
) 
 
complainant and Appellant. 
) 
____________________________________ ) 
 
In November 1996, California voters adopted Proposition 218, which 
added articles XIII C and XIII D to the California Constitution.  In Richmond v. 
Shasta Community Services Dist. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 409 (Richmond), we construed 
article XIII D as it applies to fees that a local public water district charged for 
making new service connections to its domestic water delivery system.  We 
concluded that those connection charges were not “assessments” or “property-
related fees or charges” within the meaning of article XIII D.  (Richmond, supra, 
at pp. 425, 428.) 
Here, we consider a related issue, one that involves section 3 of article XIII 
C, which provides that “the initiative power shall not be prohibited or otherwise 
 
2 
limited in matters of reducing or repealing any local tax, assessment, fee or 
charge.”  Does this provision grant local voters authority to adopt an initiative 
measure that would reduce a local public water district’s charges for delivering 
domestic water to existing customers and that also would require voter 
preapproval for any future increase in those charges or for the imposition of any 
new charge? 
As explained below, we conclude that section 3 of article XIII C grants 
local voters a right to use the initiative power to reduce the rate that a public water 
district charges for domestic water.  We also conclude, however, that this new 
constitutional provision does not grant local voters a right to impose a voter-
approval requirement on all future adjustments of water delivery charges, and that 
the proposed initiative at issue here was properly withheld from the ballot because 
it included a provision to impose such a requirement. 
I 
In 1969, the California Legislature formed the Bighorn-Desert View Water 
Agency (Agency) as a special district under the Bighorn Mountains Water Agency 
Law.1  (Stats. 1969, ch. 1175, p. 2273 et seq.)  The Agency provides domestic 
water service to residents in a roughly 42-square-mile area north of Yucca Valley 
in San Bernardino County. 
E. W. Kelley is a resident of San Bernardino County and the proponent of a 
local initiative measure to reduce the Agency’s water rate and other charges.  
Kelley’s initiative proposed to reduce the Agency’s water rate from $4.00 to $2.00 
                                              
1  
The Agency was formed under the name Bighorn Mountains Water Agency 
and acquired its current name after consolidation in 1989 with Desert View Water 
District.  (See Wat. Code, §§ 33300-33306; Stats. 1989, ch. 570, § 3, p. 1878, 73B 
West’s Ann. Wat.--Appen. (1995 ed.) ch. 112, p. 189.) 
 
3 
per 100-cubic-foot billing unit,2 to reduce the “non-cap recovery charge” from 
$4.65 to $2.50 per month, and to reduce the “MWA pipeline charge” from $13.62 
to $11.50 per month.  The initiative also would have required the Agency to obtain 
voter approval before increasing any existing water rate, fee, or charge, or 
imposing any new water rate, fee, or charge. 
Kelley succeeded in qualifying the initiative for the ballot.  On October 24, 
2002, Sharon Beringson, as the Interim Registrar of Voters for San Bernardino 
County, certified the initiative, and the next day by letter she informed the Agency 
of its duty under Elections Code section 9310 to either adopt the initiative or 
submit it to the voters at a special election.  The Agency did neither, however.  
Instead, on November 20, 2002, it filed a complaint for declaratory relief in the 
superior court naming Beringson as the defendant and Kelley as the real party in 
interest. 
In the complaint, the Agency asked the court to declare the initiative 
impermissible under California law, and beyond the power of the Agency’s 
electorate to enact, because it would interfere with the statutory responsibility of 
the Agency’s board of directors to set the water rate high enough to cover its costs.  
(See Stats. 1969, ch. 1175, § 25, pp. 2285-2286, 72 B. West’s Ann. Wat.--Appen., 
supra, ch. 112, p. 203 [“The board of directors, so far as practicable, shall fix such 
rate or rates for water in the agency . . . as will result in revenues which will pay 
the operating expenses of the agency, . . . provide for repairs and depreciation of 
works, provide a reasonable surplus for improvements, extensions, and 
                                              
2  
Although the Agency’s water rate was $4.00 per 100-cubic-foot billing unit 
when the initiative was circulated for signatures, it was scheduled to be reduced to 
$2.30 per billing unit in June 2003.  Thus, one could argue, as Kelley has, that the 
actual reduction proposed by the initiative was not from $4.00 to $2.00, but from 
$2.30 to $2.00 per billing unit.  We need not resolve this dispute. 
 
4 
enlargements, pay the interest on any bonded debt, and provide a sinking or other 
fund for the payment of the principal of such debt as it may become due.”].) 
Kelley answered the complaint and filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings and a cross-petition for writ of mandate seeking to compel the Agency 
to either adopt the initiative as an ordinance or submit it to the voters at a special 
election.  Asserting that the Agency was challenging the legality of the proposed 
initiative both on its face (insofar as it asserted that its board of directors had the 
exclusive power to set the agency’s water rates and charges) and as applied 
(insofar as it asserted that the particular rates and charges that the initiative would 
set would leave the Agency with insufficient net revenues), Kelly argued that the 
as-applied challenge could not be raised before the election and that the facial 
challenge failed because the initiative was authorized and protected by section 3 of 
article XIII C of the California Constitution.  In its opposition to Kelley’s motion 
for judgment on the pleadings, the Agency argued, essentially, that it was raising 
only a facial challenge to the proposed initiative. 
At the hearing on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the parties 
agreed that the only issue was the validity of the initiative on its face, that the facts 
relevant to that issue were undisputed, and that the issue could be decided as a 
matter of law.  The trial court, declaring that voters in the area served by the 
Agency lacked power to affect its water rates and fees and charges, denied 
Kelley’s motion and cross-petition and entered a judgment of declaratory relief for 
the Agency. 
Kelley appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeal, arguing that his 
initiative was authorized by article XIII C, section 3 of the California Constitution.  
The Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court’s ruling, and Kelley petitioned 
this court for review.  We granted review and then transferred the case back to the 
 
5 
Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its decision and to reconsider the issues 
in light of Richmond, supra, 32 Cal.4th 409. 
The Court of Appeal again found in favor of the Agency, holding that 
article XIII C did not authorize Kelley’s initiative because the initiative did not 
deal with special or general taxes, which the Court of Appeal held to be the only 
subject matter article XIII C covers.  The court held that the Agency’s rate, fees, 
and charges were not subject to Proposition 218, and thus could not be reduced by 
voter initiative.  Kelley again petitioned this court for review, which we again 
granted. 
II 
Article XIII C of the California Constitution is entitled Voter Approval for 
Local Tax Levies.  Section 1 of article XIII C defines the terms “ ‘[g]eneral tax,’ ” 
“ ‘[s]pecial tax,’ ” “ ‘[l]ocal government,’ ” and “ ‘[s]pecial district.’ ”  Section 2 
of article XIII C provides, in subdivision (b), that “[n]o local government may 
impose, extend, or increase any general tax unless and until that tax is submitted to 
the electorate and approved by a majority vote,” and it provides, in subdivision 
(d), that “[n]o local government may impose, extend, or increase any special tax 
unless and until that tax is submitted to the electorate and approved by a two-
thirds vote.”  Section 3, the provision at issue here, states:  “Initiative Power for 
Local Taxes, Assessments, Fees and Charges.  Notwithstanding any other 
provision of this Constitution, including, but not limited to, Sections 8 and 9 of 
Article II, the initiative power shall not be prohibited or otherwise limited in 
matters of reducing or repealing any local tax, assessment, fee or charge.  The 
power of initiative to affect local taxes, assessments, fees and charges shall be 
applicable to all local governments and neither the Legislature nor any local 
 
6 
government charter shall impose a signature requirement higher than that 
applicable to statewide statutory initiatives.”3  (Italics added.) 
With a single sentence, the Court of Appeal rejected Kelley’s reliance on 
article XIII C as authority for the proposed initiative.  The Court of Appeal stated:  
“Article XIII C governs special and general taxes, which are not at issue here.”  
Kelley argues that this statement is erroneous because section 3 of article XIII C is 
not limited to special and general taxes, but applies by it terms to “any local tax, 
assessment, fee or charge.” 
When interpreting a provision of our state Constitution, our aim is “to 
determine and effectuate the intent of those who enacted the constitutional 
provision at issue.”  (Richmond, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 418.)  When, as here, the 
voters enacted the provision, their intent governs.  (Delaney v. Superior Court 
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798.)  To determine the voters’ intent, “we begin by 
examining the constitutional text, giving the words their ordinary meanings.”  
(Richmond, supra, at p. 418.) 
Article XIII C, section 3 of the California Constitution expressly states that 
the initiative power cannot be limited or prohibited when an initiative proposes to 
reduce or repeal “any local tax, assessment, fee or charge.”  In construing a 
constitutional or statutory provision, “ ‘ “[i]f possible, significance should be 
given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the 
legislative purpose.” ’ ”  (DuBois v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 
                                              
3  
In section 9 of article II, the state Constitution defines “referendum” as “the 
power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes except . . . 
statutes providing for tax levies . . . .”  (Cal. Const., art. II, § 9, subd. (a), italics 
added.)  Under this definition, tax measures are exempt from referendum.  (See 
Rossi v. Brown (1995) 9 Cal.4th 688, 697.)  But the state Constitution imposes no 
similar limitation on the initiative.  (See id. at pp. 699-705.) 
 
7 
382, 388.)  If possible, therefore, we must give significance to the words 
“assessment, fee or charge” in article XIII C, section 3, as meaning something 
other than “local tax.”  Accordingly, it would appear that article XIII C, section 3, 
is not limited to local special and general taxes but applies also to assessments, 
fees, and charges. 
In the ballot pamphlet for the election at which Proposition 218 (which 
included both article XIII C and article XIII D) was adopted, the Legislative 
Analyst gave this description of how Proposition 218 would affect initiative 
powers:  “The measure states that Californians have the power to repeal or reduce 
any local tax, assessment, or fee through the initiative process.”  (Ballot Pamp., 
Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996), analysis of Prop. 218 by Legis. Analyst, p. 74.)  Thus, 
the Legislative Analyst appears to have also read section 3 of article XIII C as 
applying to fees as well as to special and general taxes and so described it to the 
voters who enacted it.  (See People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 243-244 
[argument and analyses in official ballot pamphlet may be consulted to determine 
voters’ understanding and intent].) 
Because the Agency offers no argument in support of the Court of Appeal’s 
assertion that article XIII C applies only to special and general taxes, and not to 
fees, we will not belabor the point.  We conclude that article XIII, section 3, 
applies to assessments, fees, and charges and not just to special and general taxes. 
Are the amounts that the Agency bills its customers for the delivery of 
domestic water properly characterized as fees or charges within the meaning of 
those words in article XIII C, section 3?  Although article XIII C contains 
definitions of the terms “general tax” and “special tax” (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, 
§ 1, subds. (a), (d)), it does not define the terms “fee” or “charge.”  Article XIII D, 
which was enacted together with article XIII C as part of Proposition 218, does 
contain a definition of those terms.  According to that definition, “ ‘[f]ee’ or 
 
8 
‘charge’ means any levy other than an ad valorem tax, a special tax, or an 
assessment, imposed by an agency upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident 
of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property related 
service.”  (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (e).)  It is unclear, however, whether 
that definition governs the meaning of the terms “fee” and “charge” in article XIII 
C, section 3. 
Section 2 of article XIII D of the state Constitution, which contains 
definitions for various terms, including “fee” and “charge,” begins with the words, 
“As used in this article.”  (Italics added.)  Therefore, although the definitions in 
section 2 of article XIII D govern the meaning of the defined terms in article XIII 
D (see People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1277; Richmond, supra, 32 
Cal.4th at p. 423), those definitions do not necessarily apply outside of article XIII 
D and, in particular, in article XIII C.  On the other hand, when a word has been 
used in different parts of a single enactment, courts normally infer that the word 
was intended to have the same meaning throughout.  (People v. Roberge (2003) 29 
Cal.4th 979, 987.)  Because article XIII C and article XIII D were enacted together 
by Proposition 218, it seems unlikely that the terms “fee” and “charge” were 
meant to carry entirely different meanings in those two articles, although some 
variation in meaning is possible.4 
We considered a related question in Richmond, supra, 32 Cal.4th 409.  At 
issue there was whether a water service connection fee was a fee or charge within 
                                              
4  
Because article XIII D provides a single definition that includes both “fee” 
and “charge,” those terms appear to be synonymous in both article XIII D and 
article XIII C.  This is an exception to the normal rule of construction that each 
word in a constitutional or statutory provision is assumed to have independent 
significance.  (DuBois v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 388.)  
We use the terms interchangeably in this opinion. 
 
9 
the meaning of article XIII D’s definition of the terms “fee” and “charge” as “any 
levy other than an ad valorem tax, a special tax, or an assessment, imposed by an 
agency upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership, 
including a user fee or charge for a property related service.”  (Cal. Const., art. 
XIII D, § 2, subd. (e), italics added; see Richmond, supra, at p. 415.)  Of relevance 
here, we stated: 
“In the ballot pamphlet for the election at which article XIII D was adopted, 
the Legislative Analyst stated that ‘[f]ees for water, sewer, and refuse collection 
service probably meet the measure’s definition of property-related fee.’  (Ballot 
Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996), analysis of Prop. 218 by Legis. Analyst, p. 73.)  
The Legislative Analyst apparently concluded that water service has a direct 
relationship to property ownership, and thus is a property-related service within 
the meaning of article XIII D because water is indispensable to most uses of real 
property; because water is provided through pipes that are physically connected to 
the property; and because a water provider may, by recording a certificate, obtain 
a lien on the property for the amount of any delinquent service charges (see Gov. 
Code, §§ 61621, 61621.3). . . .  
“Several provisions of article XIII D tend to confirm the Legislative 
Analyst’s conclusion that charges for utility services such as electricity and water 
should be understood as charges imposed ‘as an incident of property ownership.’  
For example, subdivision (b) of section 3 provides that ‘fees for the provision of 
electrical or gas service shall not be deemed charges or fees imposed as an 
incident of property ownership’ under article XIII D.  Under the rule of 
construction that the expression of some things in a statute implies the exclusion 
of other things not expressed (In re Bryce C. (1995) 12 Cal.4th 226, 231), the 
expression that electrical and gas service charges are not within the category of 
property-related fees implies that similar charges for other utility services, such as 
 
10 
water and sewer, are property-related fees subject to the restrictions of article 
XIII D. 
“This implication is reinforced by subdivision (c) of article XIII D, section 
6, which expressly excludes ‘fees or charges for sewer, water, and refuse 
collection services’ from the voter approval requirements that article XIII D 
imposes on property-related fees and charges.  Because article XIII D does not 
include similar express exemptions from the other requirements that it imposes on 
property-related fee[s] and charges, the implication is strong that fees for water, 
sewer, and refuse collection services are subject to those other requirements.  (See 
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Roseville (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 637, 
645 [reaching the same conclusion].) 
“Thus, we agree that water service fees, being fees for property-related 
services, may be fees or charges within the meaning of article XIII D.  But we do 
not agree that all water service charges are necessarily subject to the restrictions 
that article XIII D imposes on fees and charges.  Rather, we conclude that a water 
service fee is a fee or charge under article XIII D if, but only if, it is imposed 
‘upon a person as an incident of property ownership.’  (Art. XIII D, § 2, subd. 
(e).)”  (Richmond, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 426-427.) 
For purposes of identifying fees and charges under California Constitution 
article XIII D, we drew a distinction between water service connection charges 
and charges for ongoing water delivery.  We explained:  “A fee for ongoing water 
service through an existing connection is imposed ‘as an incident of property 
ownership’ because it requires nothing other than normal ownership and use of 
property.  But a fee for making a new connection to the system is not imposed ‘as 
an incident of property ownership’ because it results from the owner’s voluntary 
decision to apply for the connection.”  (Richmond, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 427.) 
 
11 
Comparing the provisions of article XIII C and article XIII D, it appears to 
us that the words “fee” and “charge,” which appear in both articles, may well have 
been intended to have a narrower, more restrictive meaning in article XIII D.  The 
title of article XIII D is Assessment and Property-Related Fee Reform (italics 
added) and section 6 of article XIII D, which imposes restrictions on fees, is titled 
Property Related Fees and Charges (italics added).  Consistent with these 
references to “property-related” fees, article XIII D’s definition of “fee” requires 
that it be imposed “upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property 
ownership.”  (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (e).)  By comparison, the words 
“property related” do not appear anywhere in article XIII C, nor does anything in 
the text of article XIII C suggest that it is limited to levies imposed on real 
property or on persons as an incident of property ownership.  Thus, the terms 
“fee” and “charge” in section 3 of article XIII C may not be subject to the 
“property-related” qualification that was at issue in Richmond, supra, 32 Cal.4th 
409.  At the same time, any levy that qualifies as a property-related fee or charge 
under article XIII D must also qualify as a “fee” or “charge” under article XIII C, 
section 3.  Nothing in the text of article XIII C, or in the ballot pamphlet for the 
November 1996 general election at which it was adopted, suggests an intent to 
exclude property-related fees and charges from the reach of section 3 of article 
XIII C, or to impose any separate or additional restriction on the meaning of “fee” 
or “charge” as used in article XIII C. 
Thus, it is possible that California Constitution article XIII C’s grant of 
initiative power extends to some fees that, because they are not property related, 
are not fees within the meaning of article XIII D.  But we perceive no basis for 
excluding from article XIII C’s authorization any of the fees subject to article XIII 
D.  The absence of a restrictive definition of “fee” or “charge” in article XIII C 
suggests that those terms include all levies that are ordinarily understood to be fees 
 
12 
or charges, including all of the property-related fees and charges subject to article 
XIII D. 
For present purposes, it is unnecessary to arrive at an exact definition of the 
terms “fee” and “charge” as used in article XIII C.  It is sufficient to conclude that 
a public water agency’s charges for ongoing water delivery, which are fees and 
charges within the meaning of article XIII D (Richmond, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 
pp. 426-427), are also fees within the meaning of section 3 of article XIII C.  
Therefore, section 3 of article XIII C establishes that the initiative power “shall not 
be prohibited or otherwise limited in matters of reducing or repealing” a public 
agency’s water delivery charges.  In other words, this constitutional provision 
expressly authorizes initiative measures like Kelley’s insofar as they seek to 
reduce or repeal a public agency’s water rates and other water delivery charges. 
The Agency urges us to draw a distinction between water delivery charges 
that are “consumption based” (calculated according to the quantity of water 
delivered) and charges that are imposed regardless of water usage.  Under this 
proposed distinction, the Agency’s water rate, which is a charge per 100 cubic feet 
of water, is a consumption-based charge, while its “non-cap recovery charge” and 
“MWA Pipeline charge” (both of which the Agency imposes in a fixed amount per 
month per customer) are not.  The Agency argues that consumption-based water 
charges are not fees or charges within the meaning of article XIII D because they 
are not imposed “as an incident of property ownership” (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, 
§ 2, subd. (e)), but instead as a result of the voluntary decisions of each water 
customer as to how much water to use.  We are not persuaded. 
Article XIII D defines “fee” or “charge” as “including a user fee or charge  
for a property related service.”  (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (e), italics 
added.)  The word “including” is “ ‘ordinarily a term of enlargement.’ ”  (Hassan 
v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 717.)  As we explained 
 
13 
in Richmond, supra, 32 Cal.4th 409, domestic water delivery through a pipeline is 
a property-related service within the meaning of this definition.  (Id. at pp. 426-
427.)  Accordingly, once a property owner or resident has paid the connection 
charges and has become a customer of a public water agency, all charges for water 
delivery incurred thereafter are charges for a property-related service, whether the 
charge is calculated on the basis of consumption or is imposed as a fixed monthly 
fee.5  Consumption-based water delivery charges also fall within the definition of 
user fees, which are “amounts charged to a person using a service where the 
amount of the charge is generally related to the value of the services provided.”  
(Utility Audit Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 950, 957.)  
Because it is imposed for the property-related service of water delivery, the 
Agency’s water rate, as well as its fixed monthly charges, are fees or charges 
within the meaning of article XIII D, and thus, for the reasons we have explained, 
they are also fees or charges within the meaning of section 3 of article XIII C.  
Under the constitutional grant of power in section 3 of article XIII C, the initiative 
may be used to reduce each of those water delivery charges. 
The Agency also argues that even if its water rate and other water delivery 
charges are fees or charges within the meaning of section 3 of article XIII C of the 
California Constitution, Kelley’s initiative is nonetheless invalid because the 
Legislature has granted the Agency’s governing board exclusive authority to set 
the Agency’s rate and other charges.  (See DeVita v. County of Napa (1995) 9 
Cal.4th 763, 775-777 [discussing exclusive delegation]; Committee of Seven 
Thousand v. Superior Court (1988) 45 Cal.3d 491, 511 [same].)  The Legislature 
                                              
5  
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 85 
Cal.App.4th 79, which was decided before Richmond, supra, 32 Cal.4th 409, is 
disapproved insofar as it is inconsistent with this conclusion. 
 
14 
is bound by the state Constitution, however, and the evident purpose of article XIII 
C is to extend the local initiative power to fees and charges imposed by local 
public agencies.  We need not determine whether the Legislature intended to 
preclude the use of the initiative to reduce the Agency’s fees because even if it did 
so intend, the Legislature’s authority in enacting the statutes under which the 
Agency operates must in this instance yield to constitutional command. 
To this point we have considered only the portions of Kelley’s initiative 
that would reduce the Agency’s water delivery charges.  Kelley’s initiative 
measure would do more than roll back the Agency’s water rate and other charges, 
however.  It would also require the Agency’s board of directors to obtain voter 
approval before increasing any existing rate or charge or imposing any new rate or 
charge.  Nothing in section 3 of California Constitution article XIII C authorizes 
initiative measures that impose voter-approval requirements for future increases in 
fees or charges. 
Arguing to the contrary, Kelley points to the reference in section 3 of article 
XIII C to “[t]he power of initiative to affect local taxes, assessments, fees and 
charges.”  (Italics added.)  He asserts that by imposing a voter-approval 
requirement on future increases in water delivery charges, his initiative would 
“affect” those charges and therefore is within the constitutional grant of initiative 
power.  We disagree.  The entire sentence reads:  “The power of initiative to affect 
local taxes, assessments, fees and charges shall be applicable to all local 
governments and neither the Legislature nor any local government charter shall 
impose a signature requirement higher than that applicable to statewide statutory 
initiatives.”  (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 3.)  The evident purpose of this sentence is 
not to define how the initiative may be used to impact fees and charges, but 
instead to specify that the initiative power extends to charges imposed by all local 
public agencies and that the signature requirement applied to statewide initiatives 
 
15 
may not be exceeded.  The scope of the initiative power is set by the previous 
sentence, stating that “the initiative power shall not be prohibited or otherwise 
limited in matters of reducing or repealing any local tax, assessment, fee or 
charge.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  Thus, analysis of the text of section 3 of article 
XIII C supports the conclusion that the initiative power granted by that section 
extends only to “reducing or repealing” taxes, assessments, fees, and charges. 
That the voters who enacted Proposition 218 did not intend to authorize 
initiative measures imposing voter-approval requirements on future water delivery 
charge increases is confirmed by an examination of section 6 of California 
Constitution article XIII D.  Related provisions “should be read together and 
construed in a manner that gives effect to each, yet does not lead to disharmony 
with the others.”  (City of Huntington Beach v. Board of Administration (1992) 4 
Cal.4th 462, 468; see also Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 248; 
Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 476; DeVita v. County of Napa, 
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 778; Pacific Southwest Realty Co. v. County of Los Angeles 
(1991) 1 Cal.4th 155, 167.)  Article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (c), says that 
“[e]xcept for fees or charges for sewer, water, and refuse collection services, no 
property related fee or charge shall be imposed or increased unless and until that 
fee or charge is submitted and approved by a majority vote of the property owners 
of the property subject to the fee or charge or, at the option of the agency, by a 
two-thirds vote of the electorate residing in the affected area.”  (Italics added.)  
Thus, article XIII D expressly exempts water service charges from the voter-
approval requirement that it imposes on all other fees and charges. 
At least as to fees and charges that are property related, section 6 of 
California Constitution article XIII D would appear to embody the electorate’s 
intent as to when voter-approval should be required, or not required, before 
existing fees may be increased or new fees imposed, and the electorate chose not 
 
16 
to impose a voter-approval requirement for increases in water service charges.  
Although this provision does not expressly prohibit local initiatives that would 
impose such a requirement, neither does it authorize them.  The provisions of 
article XIII C support a similar conclusion.  Although section 2 of article XIII C 
imposes voter-approval requirements for general taxes and for special taxes, 
nothing in article XIII C imposes a voter-approval requirement for fees or charges. 
Kelley has asserted no authority other than section 3 of California 
Constitution article XIII C for the portion of his initiative that would require voter 
approval before any future increase in water delivery charges, and we have 
concluded that article XIII C does not authorize that provision.  Kelley apparently 
concedes that in the absence of the authority granted by section 3 of article XIII C, 
the exclusive delegation rule (DeVita v. County of Napa, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 
775-777; Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 
511) bars initiative measures that infringe on the power of the Agency’s governing 
board to set its water delivery rate and charges.  Accordingly, we agree with the 
Court of Appeal that Kelley’s initiative is invalid insofar as it seeks to impose a 
voter-approval requirement on future actions by the Agency’s board of directors to 
increase the existing water rate and other charges or to impose new charges. 
To some extent, this portion of the initiative is superfluous, because under 
Elections Code section 93236 voter approval is required before a local district’s 
governing board may amend an ordinance adopted by initiative, unless the 
                                              
6  
That section reads:  “No ordinance proposed by initiative petition and 
adopted either by the district board without submission to the voters or adopted by 
the voters shall be repealed or amended except by a vote of the people, unless 
provision is otherwise made in the original ordinance.  In all other respects, an 
ordinance proposed by initiative petition and adopted shall have the same force 
and effect as any ordinance adopted by the board.”  (Elec. Code, § 9323.) 
 
17 
ordinance provides otherwise.  (See DeVita v. County of Napa, supra, 9 Cal.4th at 
p. 788 [discussing similar statute for county ordinance]; Mobilepark West 
Homeowners Assn. v. Escondido Mobilepark West (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 32, 40-
41 [discussing similar statute for city ordinance].)  Therefore, if the voters were to 
approve an initiative lowering the Agency’s water rate or other charge, the 
Agency’s governing board would need voter approval before it could change the 
rate or charge that had been set by initiative.  The Agency’s governing board 
would not need voter approval, however, to increase a charge that was not affected 
by initiative or to impose an entirely new charge. 
We have concluded that under section 3 of California Constitution article 
XIII C, local voters by initiative may reduce a public agency’s water rate and other 
delivery charges, but also that section 3 of article XIII C does not authorize an 
initiative to impose a requirement of voter preapproval for future rate increases or 
new charges for water delivery.  In other words, by exercising the initiative power 
voters may decrease a public water agency’s fees and charges for water service, 
but the agency’s governing board may then raise other fees or impose new fees 
without prior voter approval.  Although this power-sharing arrangement has the 
potential for conflict, we must presume that both sides will act reasonably and in 
good faith, and that the political process will eventually lead to compromises that 
are mutually acceptable and both financially and legally sound.  (See DeVita v. 
County of Napa, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 792-793 [“We should not presume . . . that 
the electorate will fail to do the legally proper thing.”].)  We presume local voters 
will give appropriate consideration and deference to a governing board’s 
judgments about the rate structure needed to ensure a public water agency’s fiscal 
solvency, and we assume the board, whose members are elected (see Stats. 1969, 
ch. 1175, § 5, p. 2274, 72B West’s Ann. Wat.--Appen., supra, ch. 112, p. 190), 
will give appropriate consideration and deference to the voters’ expressed wishes 
 
18 
for affordable water service.  The notice and hearing requirements of subdivision 
(a) of section 6 of California Constitution article XIII D7 will facilitate 
communications between a public water agency’s board and its customers, and the 
substantive restrictions on property-related charges in subdivision (b) of the same 
section8 should allay customers’ concerns that the agency’s water delivery charges 
are excessive. 
                                              
7  
“(a) Procedures for New or Increased Fees and Charges.  An agency shall 
follow the procedures pursuant to this section in imposing or increasing any fee or 
charge as defined pursuant to this article, including, but not limited to, the 
following: 
 
“(1)  The parcels upon which a fee or charge is proposed for imposition 
shall be identified.  The amount of the fee or charge proposed to be imposed upon 
each parcel shall be calculated.  The agency shall provide written notice by mail of 
the proposed fee or charge to the record owner of each identified parcel upon 
which the fee or charge is proposed for imposition, the amount of the fee or charge 
proposed to be imposed upon each, the basis upon which the amount of the 
proposed fee or charge was calculated, the reason for the fee or charge, together 
with the date, time, and location of a public hearing on the proposed fee or charge. 
 
“(2) The agency shall conduct a public hearing upon the proposed fee or 
charge not less than 45 days after mailing the notice of the proposed fee or charge 
to the record owners of each identified parcel upon which the fee or charge is 
proposed for imposition.  At the public hearing, the agency shall consider all 
protests against the proposed fee or charge.  If written protests against the 
proposed fee or charge are presented by a majority of owners of the identified 
parcels, the agency shall not impose the fee or charge.”  (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, 
§ 6, subd. (a).) 
8  
“(b) Requirements for Existing, New or Increased Fees and Charges.  A fee 
or charge shall not be extended, imposed, or increased by any agency unless it 
meets all of the following requirements: 
 
“(1) Revenues derived from the fee or charge shall not exceed the funds 
required to provide the property related service. 
 
“(2) Revenues derived from the fee or charge shall not be used for any 
purpose other than that for which the fee or charge was imposed. 
 
“(3) The amount of a fee or charge imposed upon any parcel or person as 
an incident of property ownership shall not exceed the proportional cost of the 
service attributable to the parcel. 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
19 
In holding that section 3 of article XIII C of the state Constitution 
authorizes initiative measures that reduce public agency water service charges, we 
are not holding that the authorized initiative power is free of all limitations.  In 
particular, we are not determining whether the electorate’s initiative power is 
subject to the statutory provision requiring that water service charges be set at a 
level that “will pay the operating expenses of the agency, . . . provide for repairs 
and depreciation of works, provide a reasonable surplus for improvements, 
extensions, and enlargements, pay the interest on any bonded debt, and provide a 
sinking or other fund for the payment of the principal of such debt as it may 
become due.”  (Stats. 1969, ch. 1175, § 25, p. 2286, 72B West’s Ann. Wat.--
Appen., supra, ch. 112, p. 203.)  That issue is not currently before us. 
III 
We have concluded that Kelley’s initiative is invalid insofar as it seeks to 
require voter approval before the Agency’s governing board may increase water 
service charges or impose new charges.  When a significant part of a proposed 
initiative measure is invalid, the measure may not be submitted to the voters.  
(American Federation of Labor v. Eu (1984) 36 Cal.3d 687, 715-716; City and 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
 
“(4) No fee or charge may be imposed for a service unless that service is 
actually used by, or immediately available to, the owner of the property in 
question.  Fees or charges based on potential or future use of a service are not 
permitted.  Standby charges, whether characterized as charges or assessments, 
shall be classified as assessments and shall not be imposed without compliance 
with Section 4. 
 
“(5) No fee or charge may be imposed for general governmental services 
including, but not limited to, police, fire, ambulance or library services, where the 
service is available to the public at large in substantially the same manner as it is 
to property owners.”  (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (b).) 
 
20 
County of San Francisco v. Patterson (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 95, 105-106.)  
Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that the initiative could not be 
placed on the ballot, and it properly granted judgment for the Agency, and the 
Court of Appeal correctly affirmed the trial court’s judgment, although its 
reasoning differed substantially from the reasoning we use here. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 120 Cal.App.4th 890 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S127535 
Date Filed: July 24, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: Tara Reilly 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Sweeney, Davidian, Green & Grant, Eric Grant and James F. Sweeney for Real Party in Interest, Cross-
complainant and Appellant. 
 
Nick Bulaich as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest, Cross-complainant and Appellant. 
 
Trevor A. Grimm, Jonathan M. Coupal and Timothy A. Bittle for Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest, Cross-complainant and Appellant. 
 
Harold Griffith as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest, Cross-complainant and Appellant. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Lagerlof, Senecal, Bradley, Gosney & Kruse, Timothy J. Gosner and James D. Ciampa for Plaintiff, Cross-
defendant and Respondent. 
 
McCormick, Kidman & Behrens, Janet Morningstar; David S. Hentschke; Colantuono & Levin, Michael 
G. Colantuono; Alisa Renee Fong; Ruth Sorensen; and Jennifer B. Henning for Association of California 
Water Agencies, League of California Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent. 
 
No appearance for Defendant and Cross-defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Eric Grant 
Sweeney, Davidian, Greene & Grant 
8001 Folsom Boulevard, Suite 100 
Sacramento, CA  95826 
(916) 388-0833 
 
James D. Ciampa 
Lagerlof, Senecal, Bradley,Gosney & Kruse 
301 North Lake Avenue, 10th Floor 
Pasadena, CA  91101-4108 
(626) 793-9400 
 
Janet Morningstar 
McCormick, Kidman & Behrens 
1048 Irvine Avenue, #407 
Newport Beach, CA  92660-4602 
(949) 274-0972