Title: State v. Wesson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Wesson, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4575.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-4575 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. WESSON, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Wesson, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4575.] 
R.C. 2945.06—When a person charged with a capital offense waives a jury, the 
panel hearing the case shall be composed of three judges, two of whom 
shall be designated by the presiding judge or chief justice of the common 
pleas court, and if no one holds either position, then they shall be 
designated by the chief justice of the Supreme Court—Conviction for 
committing aggravated murder while under detention reversed—
Conviction for committing aggravated murder during the course of an 
aggravated robbery affirmed—Death penalty affirmed. 
(No. 2009-0739—Submitted June 11, 2013—Decided October 23, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County, 
No. 2008-03-0710. 
____________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
When a person charged with a capital offense waives a jury, the panel hearing the 
case shall be composed of three judges, two of whom shall be designated 
by the presiding judge or chief justice of the common pleas court, and if 
no one holds either position, then they shall be designated by the chief 
justice of the Supreme Court.  (State v. Eley, 77 Ohio St.3d 174, 672 
N.E.2d 640 (1996), clarified.) 
____________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} Hersie R. Wesson appeals from a judgment of a three-judge panel 
that convicted him of two counts of aggravated murder with death penalty 
specifications in connection with the death of Emil Varhola, two counts of 
attempted murder in connection with the stabbing of Mary Varhola, two counts of 
aggravated robbery, and one count each of having a weapon while under a 
disability and tampering with evidence.  The court merged allied offenses, 
imposed capital punishment for the aggravated murder of Emil Varhola while 
committing an aggravated robbery, and sentenced Wesson to an aggregate term of 
26 years’ imprisonment for the noncapital offenses. 
{¶ 2} Count Three, aggravated murder, and one specification associated 
with Count Two, the other aggravated murder charge, required proof that Wesson 
was under detention at the time of the murder; but because the original sentencing 
entry that imposed postrelease control on Wesson placing him under detention is 
void, we reverse the convictions for Count Three, the specifications related to that 
count, and Specification One related to Count Two. 
{¶ 3} However, we affirm the remaining convictions, including the 
aggravated murder conviction related to Count Two and its death penalty 
specification, the imposition of capital punishment, and the consecutive aggregate 
sentence of 26 years as imposed by the three-judge panel. 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 4} On February 25, 2008, Wesson’s girlfriend, Mildrian Ford, filed a 
police report against him following a dispute.  Because Wesson was serving a 
three-year term of postrelease control following his release from prison in 2007, 
Ford also notified his parole officer, Julie Clark, of the incident.  Clark, together 
with another parole officer and members of Akron’s fugitive task force, began 
searching for Wesson. 
{¶ 5} That evening, Wesson went to the home of 81-year-old Emil 
Varhola and his 77-year-old wife, Mary, who lived near Ford and knew him from 
the neighborhood.  Wesson sometimes talked to Emil, who occasionally gave him 
money or hired him to do odd jobs.  Wesson knocked on their door and asked if 
he could come inside while he waited for Ford’s bus to arrive, and they 
accommodated him.  Emil, who used a portable oxygen tank to breathe, offered 
Wesson coffee, and the two sat together at the kitchen table.  Mary returned to the 
living room. 
{¶ 6} Mary then heard a whistling sound coming from the kitchen.  When 
she returned to the kitchen, she saw Emil lying on the floor in a pool of blood 
with the whistling sound coming from his windpipe and Wesson rifling through 
Emil’s pockets.  Mary confronted him, and he admitted that he killed Emil, and 
then he attacked her.  He demanded “the gun,” explaining that he needed it to kill 
his girlfriend.  Mary refused to tell him where Emil kept his handgun, even as 
Wesson beat and stabbed her.  According to Mary, he stopped assaulting her only 
when he thought she was dead. 
{¶ 7} Wesson fled the home, taking a rifle and the cup from which he had 
drunk and throwing them in a bush in the front yard.  He also took Mary’s jewelry 
and Emil’s wallet containing approximately $800. 
{¶ 8} When he left, Mary contacted her son, Paul, who called 9-1-1 to 
report the incident.  When officers arrived, they found Emil dead in the kitchen 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
and Mary hardly able to stand or speak, but she was able to show police where 
Emil kept his pistol, in a hollowed-out book in the living room.  She had multiple 
stab wounds on her chest and upper abdomen, bruises, and lacerations on her 
hands and fingers.  Her right cheek had a large gash in it with the skin peeled 
back, exposing bone.  Emergency personnel transported Mary to the hospital, 
where she lost consciousness and remained unconscious and on a respirator for 
more than a month before awaking. 
{¶ 9} Officers found blood pooled on the kitchen floor, splattered on the 
curtains, smeared on the refrigerator, and splashed on the dining room wall and 
carpet.  They noted other signs of a struggle, including objects strewn about and a 
set of dentures on the floor. The gun cabinet stood open, and one long gun 
appeared to be missing.  Investigators did not find any weapon near Emil’s body. 
{¶ 10} Police followed a trail of bloody footprints leading to a bush in the 
front yard of the home, where they discovered Emil’s long gun and the cup.  They 
subsequently located Emil’s wallet—which had no money in it—under the porch 
of a home several blocks away. 
{¶ 11} Based on Mary’s statements, the police began to look for Wesson.  
With Ford’s assistance, officers located him at the Akron home of Christopher 
Conley, his cousin, in the early morning hours of February 26, 2008.  On a dresser 
in the room where the police found Wesson, they discovered a straight-edged 
steak knife with what appeared to be dried blood on it.  When they arrested 
Wesson, they observed blood-soaked bandages on his hands and what appeared to 
be blood on his sneakers and pants and on a jacket found in the room. 
{¶ 12} At the police station, Wesson waived his Miranda rights, and two 
detectives interviewed him.  He admitted stabbing Emil and Mary, but claimed 
that he acted in self-defense.  He related that he and Mary had an ongoing sexual 
relationship and that Emil usually watched, but on this occasion he became upset 
watching them have unprotected sex on the kitchen floor.  According to Wesson, 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
Emil threatened him with a long gun and attacked him with a knife, but Wesson 
was able to disarm and stab Emil.  Then, he claimed, he stabbed Mary after she 
hit him on the head with her cane.  Based on Wesson’s assertion that he had 
engaged in intercourse with Mary, investigators had the hospital perform a rape-
kit examination on her, but samples tested negative for semen. 
{¶ 13} An autopsy revealed that Emil had been stabbed eight times—four 
times in the torso, once in the neck, and three times in the back—and it revealed 
defensive wounds on his hands.  Dorothy Dean, a deputy medical examiner for 
the Summit County Medical Examiner’s Office, concluded that the stab wounds 
in Emil’s neck and torso caused his death, and she testified that Emil’s injuries 
could have been caused by the knife seized at the time of Wesson’s arrest. 
{¶ 14} A grand jury indicted Wesson for three counts of aggravated 
murder:  aggravated murder with prior calculation and design, R.C. 2903.01(A); 
aggravated murder while committing aggravated robbery, R.C. 2903.01(B); and 
aggravated murder while under detention, R.C. 2903.01(D).  Each count carried 
three capital specifications:  aggravated murder while under detention, R.C. 
2929.04(A)(4)(b); aggravated murder as “part of a course of conduct involving 
the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons by the offender,” 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(5); and aggravated murder while committing aggravated 
robbery, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  The indictment also charged Wesson with three 
counts of attempted aggravated murder, two counts of attempted murder, three 
counts of aggravated robbery, one count of having weapons while under a 
disability, and one count of tampering with evidence. 
{¶ 15} Wesson pled not guilty to all charges, waived his right to trial by 
jury, and elected to be tried by a three-judge panel.  Notably, he did not object 
when the judge presiding over the trial appointed the other two members of the 
three-judge panel. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
{¶ 16} Prior to trial, Wesson moved to suppress his statement to police, 
alleging that his intoxication at the time of questioning rendered his Miranda 
waiver invalid, that the warnings had not been properly given, and that police had 
coerced his statement.  The court found, however, that he knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily had waived his constitutional rights.  Also, the state 
filed a motion in limine to exclude an audio recording that Wesson made 
retracting his statements to police; the trial court granted that motion and excluded 
the recording as hearsay. 
{¶ 17} At trial, the state argued that Wesson came to the Varholas home 
looking for a gun to kill his girlfriend and then murdered Emil and attempted to 
murder Mary.  In contrast, the defense presented a theory of a friendly encounter 
that turned bad, stating that the Varholas had invited Wesson into their home so 
he would not have to wait for a bus in the cold, but that Emil began to behave 
erratically, and Wesson, who knew that Emil owned guns, thought Emil had 
threatened him.  Thus, the defense asserted that Wesson stabbed Emil in self-
defense and assaulted Mary only when she attacked him with her cane. 
{¶ 18} At the close of the state’s case, the panel acquitted Wesson of 
aggravated murder with prior calculation and design. 
{¶ 19} In Wesson’s case-in-chief, the defense called a single witness, 
Akron Police Detective Joseph Urbank, who testified that he had interviewed a 
woman named Linda Fields about her observations of Wesson on February 25, 
the date of the murder.  Fields died before trial, and by agreement of the parties, 
the defense played an audio recording of Urbank’s interview with her.  On the 
recording, she claimed that Wesson was at his cousin’s residence, where she had 
been staying, from 5:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. on February 25.  He left around 8:00 
p.m. and did not return until 10:00 p.m.  At that time, he had fresh cuts on his 
hands and she gave him bandages for the cuts.  Fields also told Urbank that she 
had left the knife on the bedroom dresser earlier that afternoon. 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
{¶ 20} Following its deliberation on the case, the three-judge panel 
returned guilty verdicts on the remaining two counts of aggravated murder and on 
all three specifications for each count.  In addition, the panel found Wesson guilty 
of two counts of attempted murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count 
of having a weapon while under a disability, and one count of tampering with 
evidence.  The trial court merged the two aggravated murder convictions, the two 
attempted murder convictions, and the two aggravated robbery convictions.  The 
state then elected to have Wesson sentenced for aggravated murder while 
committing aggravated robbery. 
{¶ 21} After the sentencing hearing, the three-judge panel unanimously 
found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors 
beyond a reasonable doubt and sentenced Wesson to death for aggravated murder 
and to an aggregate term of 26 years in prison for the other convictions. 
{¶ 22} On direct appeal to this court, Wesson presents 12 propositions of 
law. 
Law and Analysis 
The Indictment 
{¶ 23} In proposition of law I, Wesson argues that his due process rights 
were violated because the indictment did not state the requisite mens rea for 
aggravated robbery in Count Two, which charged aggravated murder during the 
course of an aggravated robbery, R.C. 2903.01(B), Counts Seven and Thirteen, 
which charged aggravated robbery, R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and (3), or the felony-
murder specifications in Counts Two and Three that list aggravated robbery as the 
basis for the felony-murder specification, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  But because he did 
not raise these objections at trial, Wesson has waived error.  State v. Horner, 126 
Ohio St.3d 466, 2010-Ohio-3830, 935 N.E.2d 26, ¶ 46 (“failure to timely object to 
a defect in an indictment constitutes a waiver of the error”).  Thus, we conduct a 
plain-error analysis. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
{¶ 24} Article I, Section 10, of the Ohio Constitution guarantees that “no 
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous, crime, unless 
on presentment or indictment of a grand jury.”  As we recently explained in 
Horner, 
 
[t]he purpose of a grand jury indictment has always been to 
give notice to the accused: “[A] criminal offense must be charged 
with reasonable certainty in the indictment so as to apprise the 
defendant of that which he may expect to meet and be required to 
answer; so that the court and jury may know what they are to try, 
and the court may determine without unreasonable difficulty what 
evidence is admissible.” 
 
Id. at ¶ 10, quoting Horton v. State, 85 Ohio St. 13, 19, 96 N.E. 797 (1911).  Thus, 
we have recognized that even when an indictment fails to charge the mens rea of 
the offense, it is not defective as long as it “tracks the language of the criminal 
statute describing the offense,” because that suffices to “provide[] the defendant 
with adequate notice of the charges against him.”  Id. at ¶ 45. 
{¶ 25} In this case, Count Two of the indictment states:   
 
 
[The grand jurors find that] HERSIE R. WESSON * * * 
did commit the crime of AGGRAVATED MURDER in that he 
did purposely cause the death of Emil Varhola, while committing 
or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after 
committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery, in 
violation of section 2903.01(B) of the Revised Code * * *. 
 
(Capitalization and boldface sic.) 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
{¶ 26} Count Two identifies the mens rea for aggravated felony murder as 
purposefully.  See State v. Fry, 125 Ohio St.3d 163, 2010-Ohio-1017, 926 N.E.2d 
1239, ¶ 40.  It is unnecessary for this count to charge the elements of the predicate 
offense—aggravated robbery—because “it is the predicate offense itself and not 
the elements of the predicate offense that is an essential element of the charged 
offense.”   State v. Buehner, 110 Ohio St.3d 403, 2006-Ohio-4707, 853 N.E.2d 
1162, ¶ 12.  However, Wesson contends that the indictment for this count is 
defective because it names the predicate offense—aggravated robbery—without 
citing the Revised Code section for that offense.  Yet he cites no authority for this 
proposition; moreover, the indictment charged aggravated robbery in Counts 
Seven and Thirteen, and those counts do cite the code section.  Thus, “[r]eading 
the felony-murder counts in pari materia with the related felony counts provided 
ample notification of the elements of the underlying felonies * * * that the state 
had to prove.”  State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 
836, ¶ 29.  The indictment therefore provided sufficient notice of the predicate 
offense charged in Count Two. 
{¶ 27} Wesson also claims that the felony-murder specifications attached 
to Counts Two and Three alleging that Wesson was the principal offender of an 
aggravated murder while committing aggravated robbery should have charged the 
mental state of recklessness.  However,  as we explained in Fry, capital 
specifications provided in R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) “do[] not include a mens rea 
component.”  Id. at ¶ 51.  Thus, this indictment is not defective. 
{¶ 28} Regarding Count Seven, Wesson asserts that the indictment did not 
include the reckless mens rea for aggravated robbery, R.C. 2911.01(A)(1).  Count 
Seven of the indictment states: 
 
[The grand jurors find that] HERSIE R. WESSON * * * 
did commit the crime of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY in that he 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
did, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in 
section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately 
after the attempt or offense, have a deadly weapon, to wit:  a knife, 
on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control 
and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate that the 
offender possesses it, or use it, in violation of Section 
2911.01(A)(1) of the Revised Code * * *. 
 
(Capitalization and boldface sic.) 
{¶ 29} Recklessness is not an element of the charged offense.  R.C. 
2911.01(A)(1) applies only to persons “attempting or committing a theft offense, 
as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code,” and incorporates the mens rea 
of the  underlying theft offense.  Horner, 126 Ohio St.3d 466, 2010-Ohio-3830, 
935 N.E.2d 26, at ¶ 49; see also Buehner, 110 Ohio St.3d 403, 2006-Ohio-4707, 
853 N.E.2d 1162, at ¶ 10-12.  And as we explained in State v. Lester, 123 Ohio 
St.3d 396, 2009-Ohio-4225, 916 N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 32-33, the mens rea of 
recklessness does not apply to the element of displaying, brandishing, indicating 
possession of, or using a deadly weapon, because the General Assembly imposed 
strict liability as to that element, and therefore “the state is not required to charge 
a mens rea for this element of the crime of aggravated robbery under R.C. 
2911.01(A)(1).”  In any case, because the indictment tracks the language of the 
criminal statute describing the offense, it provides adequate notice of the charges.  
Horner at ¶ 45. 
{¶ 30} Wesson raises a similar objection to Count Thirteen of the 
indictment, which states: 
 
[The grand jurors find that] HERSIE R. WESSON * * * 
did commit the crime of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY in that he 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
did, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in 
section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately 
after the attempt or offense, recklessly inflict, or attempt to inflict, 
serious physical harm on another, to wit: Emil Varhola and/or 
Mary Varhola, in violation of Section 2911.01(A)(3) of the Ohio 
Revised Code * * *. 
 
(Capitalization and boldface sic; italics added for emphasis.] 
{¶ 31} As discussed with regard to Count Seven, R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) 
applies only to persons “attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in 
section 2913.01 of the Revised Code,” and R.C. 2911.01 thereby incorporates the 
mens rea of the underlying theft offense.  But as to the element involving physical 
harm, Count Thirteen of the indictment tracks the language of the statute, and in 
any case, it identifies recklessness as the requisite mens rea. 
{¶ 32} Hence, Wesson has failed to demonstrate plain error, and we 
therefore overrule this proposition of law. 
Miranda Waiver 
{¶ 33} Proposition of law V argues that Wesson did not validly waive his 
rights in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and therefore his motion to suppress his statement to the 
police should have been granted.  Wesson received Miranda warnings and orally 
waived each Miranda right before making a statement to police.  He nonetheless 
claims that “the combination of the lack of sleep, the alcohol, the coercive nature 
of the setting and defendant’s lack of education combined to render [his] waiver 
invalid.” 
{¶ 34} When a suspect is questioned in a custodial setting, the Fifth 
Amendment requires that he receive Miranda warnings to protect against 
compelled self-incrimination.  Miranda at 478-479.  A suspect may then 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to make a statement.  Id. 
at 479.  If a defendant later challenges a confession as involuntary, the state must 
prove a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver by a preponderance of 
evidence.  See id. at 475; Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-169, 107 S.Ct. 
515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). 
{¶ 35} To determine whether a valid waiver occurred, we “consider the 
totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior criminal 
experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; 
the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat 
or inducement.”  State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976), 
paragraph two of the syllabus; see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285, 
111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).  We have held that a waiver is not 
involuntary unless there is evidence of police coercion, such as physical abuse, 
threats, or deprivation of food, medical treatment, or sleep.  State v. Cooey, 46 
Ohio St.3d 20, 28, 544 N.E.2d 895 (1989). 
{¶ 36} At the suppression hearing, the trial court heard testimony from an 
expert witness called by the defense, Dr. Robert Bellotto Jr., who used the 
Widmark Method to estimate Wesson’s blood-alcohol level at the time of his 
statement based on information given to him by the defense.  Some of the factors 
he considered included height, weight, age, gender, amount and type of alcohol 
and food consumed, alcohol-elimination rate, and history of alcohol use.  Bellotto 
stated that a 50-year-old male chronic alcoholic who is five feet, seven inches tall 
and weighs 147 pounds, who consumed a large bottle of Mogen David wine (18 
percent alcohol) and six to eight beers (5.5 percent alcohol) between early 
afternoon and 11:00 p.m., and who slept from approximately 11:15 p.m. to 3:15 
a.m. would have a blood-alcohol level of .17 grams per deciliter at 4:00 a.m.  But 
he conceded that he did not know how much alcohol or food Wesson had actually 
consumed on February 25 or Wesson’s alcohol-elimination rate. 
January Term, 2013 
13 
 
{¶ 37} During his testimony at the suppression hearing, Wesson claimed 
that he drank a “fifth” of Mogen David wine and a considerable amount of beer 
throughout the day on February 25, but that he did not drink any alcohol between 
11:00 p.m. that evening, when he went to bed, and 4:00 a.m. the next morning, 
when police questioned him.  He further claimed to have been intoxicated and 
falling from his chair during the interrogation. 
{¶ 38} In response, the state presented testimony from four law 
enforcement officers who interacted with Wesson on the morning of February 26, 
2008, each of whom testified that he did not observe any signs of intoxication or 
smell alcohol on his breath, and the three officers Wesson spoke to that morning 
testified that they did not detect any slurring of his speech.  Wesson had had no 
trouble sitting upright or walking, and he responded appropriately to the questions 
asked.  The officers who had questioned Wesson denied that he had fallen out of 
his seat during the interview.  The state also presented the testimony of Steve 
Perch, a toxicologist from the Summit County Medical Examiner’s Office, who 
questioned Bellotto’s finding and stated that it would not be possible to correctly 
estimate Wesson’s blood-alcohol level without knowing his elimination rate, his 
food consumption that day, or his typical alcohol consumption. 
{¶ 39} The court denied the motion to suppress and found “the detectives’ 
testimony credible and supported by the recording of [Wesson’s] interview.”  
After considering all the circumstances, the court determined that Wesson “made 
a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights, and that 
his statement to police was voluntarily made.” 
{¶ 40} As we explained in State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-
Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, “[a]ppellate review of a motion to suppress presents a 
mixed question of law and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial 
court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to 
resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.”  Id. at ¶ 8.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
And we also stated: “[A]n appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of 
fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.  * * * Accepting these 
facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without 
deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the 
applicable legal standard.”  Id. 
{¶ 41} Wesson argues that his intoxication, lack of sleep, and lack of 
education, in addition to the coercive nature of the interview setting, rendered the 
waiver of his constitutional rights invalid.  Here, however, the trial court finding 
that Wesson validly waived his Miranda rights is supported by competent and 
credible evidence, consisting of the testimony of the four police officers and the 
audio recording of Wesson’s statement.  Wesson’s claim of a limited education 
may evidence “low mental aptitude,” but that alone does not demonstrate 
involuntariness.  State v. Hill, 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 318, 595 N.E.2d 884 (1992), 
citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473.  Notably, 
Wesson’s prior criminal record shows familiarity with the criminal process, and 
he himself recited the Miranda warnings at the suppression hearing.  This record 
does not support his allegation of police coercion, as neither the audio recording 
of the statement nor the testimony from the suppression hearing indicate any 
physical abuse, threats, or efforts to deprive Wesson of food, medical treatment, 
or sleep.  The actions of detectives in seating him in a fixed chair and handcuffing 
him to a steel table in an interrogation room while they questioned him for less 
than one hour do not amount to police coercion.  See McCall v. Dutton, 863 F.2d 
454 (6th Cir.1988) (no coercion when officers handcuffed a defendant and placed 
him on the ground, then numerous armed officers surrounded and yelled at him); 
State v. Brewer, 48 Ohio St.3d 50, 58, 549 N.E.2d 491 (1990) (“find[ing] nothing 
improper in the ‘length, intensity, and frequency’ of the questioning” when there 
was no evidence of deprivation or mistreatment and “the actual interview took up 
only about three hours”). 
January Term, 2013 
15 
 
{¶ 42} Based on the totality of the circumstances presented here, Wesson 
validly waived his Miranda rights, and we reject this proposition of law. 
Selection of the Three-Judge Panel 
{¶ 43} In proposition of law IV, Wesson argues that the trial court violated 
R.C. 2945.06 and his due process rights because Judge Teodosio, the judge 
assigned to hear Wesson’s criminal trial, selected the other two judges who served 
on the three-judge panel that adjudicated his guilt and imposed sentence. 
{¶ 44} R.C. 2945.06 provides the procedure for appointing judges when 
the accused in a death penalty case waives the right to trial by jury: 
 
[The accused] shall be tried by a court to be composed of three 
judges, consisting of the judge presiding at the time in the trial of 
criminal cases and two other judges to be designated by the 
presiding judge or chief justice of that court, and in case there is 
neither a presiding judge nor a chief justice, by the chief justice of 
the supreme court. 
 
{¶ 45} Wesson waived his right to a jury trial and elected to have the case 
tried to a three-judge panel.  After reviewing our decision in State v. Eley, 77 
Ohio St.3d 174, 672 N.E.2d 640 (1996), Judge Teodosio concluded that as the 
judge presiding over the case, he had the authority to designate the other judges to 
serve on the panel.  Wesson executed an amended written waiver, consenting to 
be tried by a panel “consisting of Judge Thomas A. Teodosio, presiding at this 
time, and two other judges to be designated pursuant to law.”  Judge Teodosio 
then appointed Judges Brenda Burnham Unruh and Robert M. Gippin to the panel 
and docketed a journal entry confirming that the court had constituted the panel as 
“selected and approved by counsel for Defendant.”  Wesson never objected to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
Judge Teodosio’s decision to appoint the panel nor sought to withdraw the jury 
waiver. 
{¶ 46} The term “presiding judge,” as used in R.C. 2945.06, does not refer 
to the judge to whom a capital case has been assigned, but rather refers to the 
presiding judge of the common pleas court.  The statute requires the court to be 
composed of three judges: the judge presiding at the time in the case and two 
others to be designated by the presiding judge or chief justice of the common 
pleas court, and when there is neither, then by the chief justice of the Supreme 
Court.1  If the General Assembly had intended to allow the judge assigned to 
preside over a capital murder trial to appoint the other two judges of the three-
judge panel, then there would be no need to designate the chief justice of the 
Supreme Court to appoint the judges when there is neither a presiding judge nor a 
chief justice of the common pleas court, because there would always be a judge 
presiding over the capital case.  Thus, the term “presiding judge,” as used in R.C. 
2945.06, does not refer to the judge presiding over the assigned capital case.  
Instead, it refers to the judge who serves as the presiding judge over a multiple 
judge common pleas court. 
{¶ 47} We realize that the trial court here reviewed and relied on our 
statement in Eley, paraphrasing R.C. 2945.06 as “provid[ing] that the three-judge 
panel is to be composed of three judges: the judge presiding at the time in the trial 
of criminal cases and two judges to be designated by that judge or by the 
presiding judge or chief justice of that court.”  Id. at 184.  However, that language 
is dicta, as Eley presented no question regarding the authority to appoint members 
of the three-judge panel, and it is inconsistent with the plain meaning of R.C. 
                                                 
1 Ohio law provided for common pleas courts to select a chief justice of the court until 1995.  See 
Sub.H.B. No. 151, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2177 (an act “to repeal section 2301.04 of the Revised 
Code to eliminate the authority of a court of common pleas with more than two judges to 
designate one of their number as the chief justice of the court”).  The current Ohio Rules of 
Superintendence provide for common pleas courts to select a presiding judge, not a chief justice of 
the court.  Sup.R. 3. 
January Term, 2013 
17 
 
2945.06.  We disavow our statement in Eley that the judge presiding over the 
capital case may designate the other two judges, and we clarify that when a 
person charged with a capital offense waives a jury, the panel hearing the case 
shall be composed of three judges, two of whom shall be designated by the 
presiding judge or the chief justice of the common pleas court, and if no one holds 
either position, then they shall be designated by the chief justice of the Supreme 
Court. 
{¶ 48} Accordingly, the judge presiding over Wesson’s trial, who was 
neither the presiding judge nor the chief justice of the Summit County Common 
Pleas Court, lacked authority to designate the other two members of the panel. 
{¶ 49} We have held that trial courts must strictly comply with R.C. 
2945.06 and convene a three-judge panel when the accused in a capital case 
waives a jury.  See State v. Pless, 74 Ohio St.3d 333, 658 N.E.2d 766 (1996), 
paragraph one of the syllabus (holding that the jury-waiver requirements in R.C. 
2945.05 must be strictly observed); Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-
Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 14 (requiring strict compliance with statutory 
procedures for three-judge panels).  Further, in Pratts, we noted that strict 
compliance with the mandate for a three-judge panel may not be voluntarily 
waived and the failure to strictly comply with the mandate is always reversible 
error on direct appeal.  Id. at ¶ 32. 
{¶ 50} However, we have never held that error in the selection of the 
three-judge panel is per se reversible error nor that such an error could not be 
waived.  Rather, we have recognized that not every trial court error in applying 
R.C. 2945.06 is automatically reversible error.  In State v. Turner, 105 Ohio St.3d 
331, 2005-Ohio-1938, 826 N.E.2d 266, for example, we considered the 
requirement that the three-judge panel “examine the witnesses” to determine the 
accused’s guilt.  There, the court had failed to comply with R.C. 2945.06, 
admitting evidence through agreed stipulations of facts rather than through live 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
testimony, but we declined to hold that the error was reversible.  Quoting our 
prior decision in State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 393, 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987), 
we explained:  
 
“Agreements, waivers and stipulations made by the 
accused, or by the accused's counsel in his presence, during the 
course of a criminal trial are binding and enforceable. * * * 
Although R.C. 2945.06 requires the court to ‘examine the 
witnesses’ in determining whether the accused is guilty of 
aggravated murder, we find that appellant was bound by the 
agreed-upon procedure wherein the state would proffer a statement 
of facts in lieu of witnesses or other evidence.” 
 
Turner at ¶ 41. 
{¶ 51} Here, Wesson accepted the court’s method of appointing the 
members of the three-judge panel.  He executed an amended jury waiver in open 
court immediately after Judge Teodosio explained that he would designate the 
members of the panel, and the journal entry confirmed that the court had 
constituted the panel as “selected and approved by counsel for Defendant.”  And 
because Wesson never objected to the procedure followed by Judge Teodosio to 
select the panel members nor objected to the panel members, he has forfeited all 
but plain error. 
{¶ 52} Reversal for plain error “is warranted only if the outcome of the 
trial clearly would have been different absent the error.”  State v. Hill, 92 Ohio 
St.3d 191, 203, 749 N.E.2d 274 (2001).  But here, Wesson makes no argument—
and therefore does not demonstrate—that the appointment of different members to 
the three-judge panel would have changed the outcome of the proceeding.  
Further, both of the panelists served as members of the Summit County Court of 
January Term, 2013 
19 
 
Common Pleas.  Nothing suggests that either was ineligible or unqualified to hear 
the case. 
{¶ 53} Because Wesson fails to demonstrate plain error, this proposition 
of law is not well taken. 
Right to Present a Complete Defense 
{¶ 54} Proposition of law III asserts that the trial court violated Wesson’s 
due process rights when it refused to admit a recording of his retraction of the 
statement he made to police on the day of his arrest. 
{¶ 55} When confronted by detectives, Wesson initially claimed that he 
and Mary had a sexual relationship, that Emil regularly watched them engage in 
intercourse, and that he and Mary were having sex when Emil became angry and 
threatened him with a gun and a knife.  He further stated that in response to the 
threat, he stabbed Emil, and because Mary struck him with her cane, he also 
stabbed her. 
{¶ 56} Prior to trial, defense counsel notified the court that Wesson 
“repudiates the statement made by him on the day of his arrest to Detective 
Harrah” and submitted an audio recording of the repudiation, asserting that the 
tape “call[ed] into question the admissibility of his arrest day statement” by 
proving that it was “untrustworthy and unreliable.” 
{¶ 57} The state moved to exclude the repudiation recording from trial, 
arguing that it constituted inadmissible hearsay.  The trial court excluded the 
recording, concluding that Evid.R. 801(D)(2) does not permit a party to offer his 
own out-of-court statement as an admission by a party opponent. 
{¶ 58} Wesson concedes that the Rules of Evidence bar admission of his 
repudiation.  See State v. Cunningham, 105 Ohio St.3d 197, 2004-Ohio-7007, 824 
N.E.2d 504, ¶ 105 (“A party may not introduce his own statement under Evid.R. 
801(D)(2)(a)”); In re Coy, 67 Ohio St.3d 215, 218, 616 N.E.2d 1105 (1993).  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
However, he asserts that applying the hearsay rule in these circumstances 
deprived him of the constitutional right to present a defense. 
{¶ 59} “[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ”  Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 
690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986), quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 
U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984).  However,  “[a] 
defendant’s right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is 
subject to reasonable restriction.”  United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 
118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998).  And states have a legitimate interest in 
ensuring that triers of fact are presented with reliable evidence and have “broad 
latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal 
trials” to further that goal.  Scheffer at 308, 309.  Such “rules do not abridge an 
accused’s right to present a defense so long as they are not ‘arbitrary’ or 
‘disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve’ ” and if they do not 
“infringe[] upon a weighty interest of the accused.”  Id. at 308, quoting Rock v. 
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56, 58, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987). 
{¶ 60} Ohio’s rule excluding hearsay statements offered by a party to 
advance that party’s own interests is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate.  The 
general rule excluding hearsay, “which has long been recognized and respected by 
virtually every State,” traditionally excludes “[o]ut-of-court statements * * * 
because they lack the conventional indicia of reliability: they are usually not made 
under oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker with the solemnity of 
his statements; the declarant’s word is not subject to cross-examination; and he is 
not available in order that his demeanor and credibility may be assessed” by the 
trier of fact.  Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 
L.Ed.2d 297, citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 
L.Ed.2d 489 (1970).  This rule is “based on experience and grounded in the notion 
that untrustworthy evidence should not be presented to the triers of fact,” id., and 
January Term, 2013 
21 
 
therefore, excluding self-serving hearsay statements that are not subject to cross-
examination or made under circumstances ensuring their reliability is neither 
arbitrary nor disproportionate to the purposes the rule is designed to serve. 
{¶ 61} In this case, Wesson has failed to demonstrate that applying the 
hearsay rule to his statement “infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused.”  
Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413.  Although he asserts 
that excluding his repudiation undermined his ability to combat the prejudicial 
effect of his statement to police, he does not explain how it impaired his ability to 
offer any particular defense.  Moreover, he could have repudiated his statement to 
police at trial, if he were willing to do so under oath and subject himself to cross-
examination, but he chose not to do so, and he is precluded from introducing his 
own inadmissible hearsay repudiation as a substitute for that testimony. 
{¶ 62} For these reasons, this proposition is not well taken. 
Conviction for Committing Aggravated Murder While Under Detention 
{¶ 63} Proposition of law II asserts that Wesson’s conviction for 
committing aggravated murder while under detention and his convictions for the 
specifications charging that he committed aggravated murder while under 
detention are invalid because the sentence imposing the postrelease control that 
caused him to be under detention is void. 
{¶ 64} At trial, the state proved that Wesson had been convicted in 2003 
of burglary, violating a protection order, criminal damaging or endangering, and 
domestic violence.  Pursuant to R.C. 2967.28(B)(2), Wesson’s conviction for 
burglary, a second-degree felony, required the trial court to impose a prison 
sentence and a mandatory three-year term of postrelease control, but the trial 
court mistakenly sentenced him to a three-year discretionary term of postrelease 
control to be served at the discretion of the Adult Parole Authority.  In May 2007, 
the Adult Parole Authority released him from prison subject to a three-year term 
of postrelease control. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
{¶ 65} Within a year of his release, Wesson murdered Emil, and the state 
charged him with committing aggravated murder while under detention.  Relying 
on the 2003 sentencing entry and Wesson’s postrelease-control order, the three-
judge panel found Wesson guilty of committing aggravated murder while under 
detention (Count Three) and of two specifications for committing aggravated 
murder while under detention (Specification One to Count Two and Specification 
One to Count Three). 
{¶ 66} In State v. Billiter, 134 Ohio St.3d 103, 2012-Ohio-5144, 980 N.E.2d 
960, we concluded that an offender could not be convicted of escape when his term 
of postrelease control was void.  In that case,  Billiter had been convicted of 
aggravated burglary and domestic violence and sentenced to imprisonment and 
postrelease control in 1998.  After he served his prison term and the Adult Parole 
Authority placed him on postrelease control, Billiter violated the terms of his 
release, and he subsequently pled guilty to escape in 2004.  He did not appeal, but 
in 2010, he filed a motion to vacate the escape conviction, seeking to invalidate his 
2004 guilty plea because his 1998 postrelease-control sentence was void.  The trial 
court denied the motion and the court of appeals affirmed. 
{¶ 67} Reversing the appellate court, we held that Billiter’s 1998 sentence 
was void because it imposed an incorrect term of postrelease control, that “[t]he 
trial court’s incorrect sentence for postrelease control in 1998 was insufficient to 
confer authority upon the Adult Parole Authority to impose up to three years of 
postrelease control on Billiter,” id. at ¶ 12, and that he “[was] not barred by res 
judicata from arguing that his plea [to the escape charge] is void,” id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 68} Here, Wesson’s 2003 sentence failed to impose a mandatory three-
year term of postrelease control, and so that part of the 2003 sentence is void.  See 
R.C. 2967.28(B)(2); Billiter at ¶ 12; State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-
Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 26.  Accordingly, pursuant to Billiter, we reverse 
the conviction for (1) Count Three, (2) the specifications to Count Three, and (3) 
January Term, 2013 
23 
 
the specification to Count Two that Wesson committed aggravated murder while 
under detention.  For the reasons explained in our independent sentencing 
evaluation below, Wesson’s sentence of death for Count Two is unaffected by this 
disposition. 
Allied Offenses 
{¶ 69} Proposition of law VI contends that aggravated robbery (Count 
Seven) and tampering with evidence (Count Ten) are allied offenses of similar 
import because both involved Wesson’s carrying a gun and a cup out of the 
Varholas’ house and discarding them in the bushes in the front of the house.  
According to Wesson, his “animus for taking the items from the house was the 
same as the animus for making these items unavailable to the prosecution.”   The 
trial court sentenced Wesson to nine years for the robbery conviction and four 
years for tampering with evidence, to be served consecutively. 
{¶ 70} R.C. 2941.25(A) states:  “Where the same conduct by defendant 
can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the 
indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the 
defendant may be convicted of only one.”  But pursuant to R.C. 2941.25(B), 
“where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or similar kind 
committed separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or 
information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be 
convicted of all of them.”  Thus, as we explained in State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio 
St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, “[w]hen determining whether two 
offenses are allied offenses of similar import subject to merger under R.C. 
2941.25, the conduct of the accused must be considered.”  Id. at the syllabus. 
{¶ 71} Wesson’s allied offenses claim fails because the same conduct is not 
the basis of both convictions.  Wesson tampered with evidence when he removed 
the cup and the long gun from the Varhola home and concealed them in the bushes.  
He committed other conduct supporting the aggravated robbery conviction when he 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
stole Emil’s wallet and Mary’s jewelry.  Notably, the trial court referred to the 
stolen wallet when discussing the aggravating circumstance of the aggravated 
robbery in its sentencing opinion. 
{¶ 72} Because the aggravated robbery and the tampering with evidence 
involve separate conduct and different property, they are not allied offenses and 
Wesson can be separately sentenced on each conviction. We therefore reject this 
proposition of law. 
Victim-Impact Statements 
{¶ 73} In proposition of law VII, Wesson claims that his Eighth 
Amendment rights were violated by the introduction of four victim-impact 
statements that were given before the trial court issued its sentencing opinion. 
{¶ 74} The Eighth Amendment does not bar the admission of victim-
impact evidence.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 
L.Ed.2d 720 (1991).  Rather, as the court explained in Payne, each “[s]tate may 
legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of [a] 
murder on the victim’s family is relevant to the [fact-finder’s] decision as to 
whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.”  Id.  And in State v. Smith, 
97 Ohio St.3d 367, 2002-Ohio-6659, 780 N.E.2d 221, we held: “Victim-impact 
evidence is permitted where it elicits the effect that the victim’s death has had on 
family members. * * * However, victim-impact evidence that expresses an 
opinion as to the appropriate sentence to be imposed is inappropriate.”  Id. at ¶ 65. 
{¶ 75} In this case, Paul Varhola’s statement reflected on his father’s 
military service and character, the heinous nature of the crime, and the impact that 
his mother’s injuries had on the family.  His wife explained the impact of the 
crime on her family, described Wesson as having taken advantage of Emil’s 
friendship and generosity, and expressed her wish that Wesson be sentenced to 
death so he could not hurt anyone else.  The victims’ nephew, Dennis Woods, 
explained how Emil’s murder and Mary’s injuries had affected their family, 
January Term, 2013 
25 
 
neighbors, and friends.  Woods called Wesson a liar, “a menace to society,” “a 
pathetic coward with no respect for human life,” and among “the worst scum of 
any society” because he “prey[s] on the weak and the defenseless.” Woods said 
that it had been proved “beyond a shadow of a doubt that justice can only be 
served if Hersie R. Wesson is sentenced to death.”  And in a recorded statement, 
Mary described Wesson as a liar who took advantage of her husband, explained 
how the crime had ruined her finances and home, and expressed her wish that the 
court sentence Wesson to death. 
{¶ 76} The foregoing demonstrates that the trial court improperly 
permitted statements about punishment for the crime, specifically, statements 
recommending that capital punishment be imposed; however, these statements 
were presented to a three-judge panel, not a jury, and we have recognized that 
when an improper victim-impact statement is conveyed only to judges, “it is not 
reversible error unless there is some indication that the judge actually considered 
it in sentencing the defendant to death.”  State v. Franklin, 97 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-
Ohio-5304, 776 N.E.2d 26, ¶ 88. 
{¶ 77} Nothing in this record suggests that the panel relied on the victim-
impact statements in reaching its sentencing decision, and Wesson admits that the 
sentencing opinion does not refer to the victim-impact statements.  See State v. 
Goodwin, 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 343, 703 N.E.2d 1251 (1999) (finding no improper 
influence where the judge heard an improper victim-impact statement but the 
sentencing opinion did not refer to the statement); State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 
460, 489, 739 N.E.2d 749 (2001) (holding that no reversible error occurred where 
the court did not refer to the “improper sentencing recommendation either orally 
at sentencing or in the court’s written sentencing opinion”).  Notably, here, the 
victim-impact statements were presented to the court only after the panel had 
decided to impose a death sentence and had announced that it “unanimously finds 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the 
Defendant was found guilty of committing outweighed the mitigating factors.” 
{¶ 78} Wesson asserts that because the panel was authorized to change its 
sentencing decision after hearing the victim-impact statements, it may have been 
improperly influenced by the statements into maintaining its original decision.  
This speculation does not show improper influence, and Wesson points to nothing 
demonstrating that the statements affected the decision to impose capital 
punishment.  Thus, as we explained in State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-
Ohio-3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, when there is no indication that the trial court 
considered the victim-impact statements in arriving at its sentencing decision, 
“ ‘[t]his court will presume that a trial court considered only the relevant, 
material, and competent evidence in arriving at its judgment.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 148, 
quoting State v. Myers, 97 Ohio St.3d 335, 2002-Ohio-6658, 780 N.E.2d 186, 
¶ 131. 
{¶ 79} Therefore, this proposition lacks merit. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
{¶ 80} In proposition of law VIII, Wesson claims ineffective assistance of 
counsel during the guilt phase of the trial.  He identifies five instances of 
allegedly deficient performance, each of which recasts one of his substantive 
propositions of law as an ineffective-assistance claim.  He also makes a blanket 
claim that counsel rendered deficient performance with respect to “arguments 
addressed elsewhere in [his] brief.” 
{¶ 81} To establish his claim, Wesson bears the burden to demonstrate 
that counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” 
as determined by “prevailing professional norms” and to demonstrate “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).  When performing this 
January Term, 2013 
27 
 
analysis, courts “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Id. at 689. 
{¶ 82} Three of Wesson’s ineffective assistance claims may be denied for 
the same reasons that we rejected the errors asserted in propositions I, VI, and 
VII.2  Counsel did not perform deficiently (1) by “fail[ing] to object to the 
improper indictment which did not include the mens rea for Aggravated 
Robbery,” because the indictment was not defective; (2) by failing to request 
merger of the aggravated robbery and tampering counts, because they were based 
on different conduct; or (3) by failing to object to victim-impact statements, 
because Wesson suffered no prejudice and there is no indication the court relied 
on these statements in imposing sentence. 
{¶ 83} Wesson also asserts ineffective assistance because counsel failed to 
object to Judge Teodosio’s appointment of the three-judge panel.  We have 
clarified that as the judge presiding over the trial, Judge Teodosio should not have 
appointed the other members of the panel.  Nonetheless, Wesson fails to 
demonstrate any reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to object, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.  Strickland at 694.  
Nothing in the record or Wesson’s brief indicates that different judges would have 
been appointed or that had different judges had been appointed, the outcome of 
the trial would have been different. 
{¶ 84} Wesson’s claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance by not 
contesting the state’s proof that he committed the murder while under detention is 
mooted by our resolution of proposition of law II. 
{¶ 85} For the foregoing reasons, we reject this proposition of law. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Wesson’s blanket claim of deficient performance based on “arguments addressed elsewhere in 
[his] brief” can be rejected for similar reasons.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
 
Cumulative Error 
{¶ 86} In proposition of law IX, Wesson raises cumulative error.  
According to Wesson, the trial court deprived him of a fair trial due to a 
combination of errors that violated the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
{¶ 87} The cumulative error doctrine provides that “a conviction will be 
reversed when the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of a 
fair trial even though each of the numerous instances of trial-court error does not 
individually constitute cause for reversal.”  State v. Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 
2012-Ohio-2577, 971 N.E.2d 865, ¶ 223, citing State v. DeMarco, 31 Ohio St.3d 
191, 509 N.E.2d 1256 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 88} Here, Wesson cannot point to “multiple instances of harmless 
error.”  State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 656 N.E.2d 623 (1995).  Nor does 
Wesson explain how the alleged errors collectively deprived him of a fair trial, 
and as we explained in State v. Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416, 2006-Ohio-4853, 854 
N.E.2d 150, “it is not enough simply to intone the phrase ‘cumulative error.’ ”  Id. 
at ¶ 197. 
{¶ 89} Accordingly, this proposition of law is overruled. 
Settled Issues 
{¶ 90} In propositions X, XI, and XII, Wesson presents 12 constitutional 
challenges to Ohio’s capital punishment scheme.  We summarily reject these 
claims, as we have done in prior decisions.  See, e.g., Fry, 125 Ohio St.3d 163, 
2010-Ohio-1017, 926 N.E.2d 1239, at ¶ 215-216; State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 
404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 381-383; State v. Carter, 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 
607-608, 734 N.E.2d 345 (2000).  As we explained in State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio 
St.3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264 (1984), paragraph one of the syllabus, “Ohio’s 
statutory framework for imposition of capital punishment, as adopted by the 
General Assembly effective October 19, 1981, and in the context of the arguments 
January Term, 2013 
29 
 
raised herein, does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution or any provision of the Ohio Constitution.” 
{¶ 91} Wesson also argues that Ohio’s death penalty statutes violate 
international law and treaties and therefore offend the Supremacy Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution.  However, we have “rejected the argument that Ohio’s death 
penalty statutes are in violation of treaties to which the United States is a 
signatory, and thus offend[ ] the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution.”  State v. Bey, 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 502, 709 N.E.2d 484 (1999). 
{¶ 92} These propositions of law are overruled. 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCING EVALUATION 
{¶ 93} Because we affirm Wesson’s conviction for aggravated felony 
murder, R.C. 2903.01(B), we are required to independently review the sentence of 
death imposed by the trial court.  R.C. 2929.05(A).  In doing so, we must 
determine whether the evidence supports the trial court’s finding of aggravating 
circumstances, whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
factors, and whether Wesson’s death sentence is proportionate to those affirmed 
in similar cases.  Id. 
Aggravating Circumstances 
{¶ 94} The court convicted Wesson of specifications alleging that he (1) 
murdered Emil Varhola as “part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful 
killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons by the offender,”  R.C. 
2929.04(A)(5), and (2) was “the principal offender in the commission of the 
aggravated murder” and committed that murder while “committing, attempting to 
commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit * * * 
aggravated robbery,”  R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  The evidence at trial supports the  
finding of both aggravating circumstances. 
{¶ 95} First, the evidence establishes that Wesson’s murder of Emil and 
attempted murder of Mary were purposeful and part of a single course of conduct.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
 
See R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).  Wesson used the same knife to stab both victims, and 
the attacks were linked in time and place.  See State v. Sapp, 105 Ohio St.3d 104, 
2004-Ohio-7008, 822 N.E.2d 1239, ¶ 52 (factors such as time, location, and 
murder weapon can establish the factual link proving a course of conduct).  The 
evidence also supports the conclusion that Wesson acted purposefully.  He 
stabbed Emil eight times, inflicting two fatal wounds, and when Mary discovered 
Wesson standing over her husband’s body, he stabbed her several times in the 
chest and upper abdomen.  According to Mary’s testimony, Wesson stopped 
attacking her only when she pretended to be dead.  The evidence supports the trial 
court finding that Wesson is guilty of the specification set forth in R.C. 
2929.04(A)(5). 
{¶ 96} Second, the evidence also proves that Wesson committed the crime 
as the principal offender and murdered Emil in the course of committing 
aggravated robbery.  See R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  Wesson acted alone and took a 
gun, a cup, Emil’s wallet, and Mary’s jewelry from the home when he left.  This 
evidence supports the trial court finding that Wesson is guilty of the specification 
set forth in R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). 
{¶ 97} The trial court also found Wesson guilty of a third specification, 
committing the offense while under detention as a result of a prior conviction 
pursuant to  R.C. 2929.04(A)(4)(b).  We reverse that finding of guilt based on the 
improper imposition of postrelease control in 2003.  We further conclude that the 
trial court erred by considering that specification as an aggravating circumstance.  
However, we cure that error by excluding that specification from our independent 
review of Wesson’s sentence.  State v. Davis, 76 Ohio St.3d 107, 115, 666 N.E.2d 
1099 (1996) (affirming death sentence after reversing a conviction for an 
attempted-rape specification and “independently reweigh[ing] the remaining 
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating factors”); see Clemons v. 
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990); Stringer 
January Term, 2013 
31 
 
v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 230-231, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992).  In 
accord with the foregoing authority, we exclude this third specification—that 
Wesson committed the offense while under detention as a result of a prior 
conviction—from our independent sentencing evaluation. 
Mitigating Evidence 
{¶ 98} We are further required to determine whether the aggravating 
circumstances of which Wesson has been convicted—excluding the commission 
of the offense while under detention—outweigh the mitigating factors in this case 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  In doing so, we consider whether there is anything 
mitigating about the “nature and circumstances of the offense, [or] the history, 
character, and background of the offender.”  R.C. 2929.04(B).  In addition, we 
consider the specific mitigating factors set forth in R.C. 2929.04(B):  (B)(1) 
(victim inducement), (B)(2) (duress, coercion, or strong provocation), (B)(3) 
(mental disease or defect), (B)(4) (youth of the offender), (B)(5) (lack of a 
significant criminal record), (B)(6) (accomplice only), and (B)(7) (any other 
relevant factors). 
{¶ 99} During the penalty phase of the trial, defense counsel argued that 
two of the statutory mitigating factors are present in this case.  One, a claim that 
Wesson has a mental condition affecting his ability to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law.  See R.C. 2929.04(B)(3).  Two, a variety of other factors 
relevant to whether Wesson should receive a death sentence pursuant to the 
catchall mitigation provision contained in R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  In support, 
Wesson presented two mitigation witnesses and made an unsworn statement in 
open court. 
{¶ 100} Wesson’s older sister, Yvette Wesson, testified about Wesson’s 
family background and his formative years.  She testified that he has two full 
siblings, several half-siblings, children, and many grandchildren, and that he has 
the support of his family. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
 
{¶ 101} His mother, Barbara Wesson, worked multiple jobs and often 
relied on family, friends, and neighbors to help out during Wesson’s youth.  The 
family moved frequently, living in various homes in the Cleveland and Detroit 
areas.  The Wessons’ house burned down when Wesson was five years old, and 
the family moved in with Wesson’s paternal grandmother.  The children were 
later separated and lived with different family members for a while before their 
mother was able to care for them again.  The Children’s Services Board 
periodically monitored the family throughout Wesson’s youth. 
{¶ 102} Yvette considered herself his primary caregiver for the first five 
or six years of his life.  She recalled an incident when her mother and 
grandmother wanted to go out but lacked a babysitter, so they locked the children 
in the closet with a baby bottle filled with milk and gin (for Wesson, then an 
infant) and a bottle of beer (for Yvette, then two and one-half years old).  When 
Wesson drank the bottle, he passed out and Yvette thought he had died. 
{¶ 103} Wesson’s parents were both alcoholics, and Barbara drank alcohol 
during her pregnancies.  His father, Hersie Wesson Sr., turned violent when 
drunk, regularly beating the children with instruments like razor straps, bed slats, 
electric cords, belts, and switches.  His father gave him a particularly hard time, 
telling Wesson that he did not have his father’s blood—Wesson had received a 
blood transfusion at birth—and regularly belittling and beating him for stuttering. 
{¶ 104} His father moved out of the family home when Wesson was five 
or six years old, and his mother hired a babysitter to care for the children while 
she worked.  She also began dating a violent man named Marino.  The babysitter 
mistreated Wesson, and Marino regularly beat Barbara in front of him—one time 
severely enough to cause a miscarriage.  Another time, the children watched 
Marino tie their mother up, put her in the bathtub, and beat her. 
{¶ 105} During his preteen years, Wesson lived with his maternal 
grandmother, Evelyn Williams, in Akron, Ohio.  Williams, a functional alcoholic, 
January Term, 2013 
33 
 
regularly beat him with her cane, but her brother, Eugene, intervened to protect 
him from abuse.  Yvette described Eugene as the children’s “savior.” 
{¶ 106} Yvette also testified that Wesson suffered several head injuries.  
As an infant, he fell down the stairs and “cracked his head open,” but he received 
no treatment.  As a teenager, he suffered injuries to the back of his head when he 
was beaten during a robbery.  And later in life, Wesson’s younger brother 
smashed a 30 to 40 pound lead-glass basket over his head. 
{¶ 107} Yvette noted that until February 2008, Wesson had complied with 
his parole and worked with her in a bakery. 
{¶ 108} Dr. Jeffrey Smalldon, a clinical and forensic psychologist, 
evaluated Wesson.  He discussed Wesson’s family background and his “chaotic” 
childhood, noting that Wesson moved frequently—often between relatives’ 
homes—and received minimal supervision as a child.  Children mocked Wesson 
at school, especially for his lifelong stuttering problem, and he quit school after 
seventh grade, spending a lot of his adolescence in the juvenile system. 
{¶ 109} Smalldon testified that Wesson told him he “had a bad childhood” 
but Smalldon noted that Wesson did not dwell on his parents’ alcoholism or his 
own physical abuse.  Wesson’s father physically abused him and ridiculed him for 
stuttering, and he once pointed a gun at Wesson.  And Wesson regularly 
witnessed acts of violence as a child, which included observing the shooting death 
of his father’s girlfriend.  Smalldon opined that these experiences led Wesson to 
see physical violence as an acceptable way to resolve conflicts and contributed to 
his sense of vulnerability. 
{¶ 110} Smalldon also noted that Wesson had suffered serious head 
injuries.  As a teenager, police officers hit the back of Wesson’s head with the 
butt of a gun.  Years later, Wesson’s brother hit him over the head with a glass 
vase, and though he lost consciousness, he received no medical treatment.  
Wesson also reported falling from a tree as an adult and striking his head.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
 
Smalldon testified that even relatively mild head injuries can be associated with 
impulsivity and poor judgment, but he could not corroborate the injuries Wesson 
reported 
with 
either 
hospital 
records 
or 
results 
from 
independent 
neuropsychological testing. 
{¶ 111} In addition, Smalldon administered a range of tests during his 
evaluation of Wesson, who cooperated with most tests and appeared motivated to 
do well and anxious to be deemed mentally fit and motivated.  On the Wide-
Range Achievement Test, Wesson functioned at a third-grade level for word 
recognition, a sixth-grade level in spelling, and a second-grade level in arithmetic.  
Wesson’s performance on a standardized IQ test yielded an estimated full-scale 
IQ of 76.  On the Trail Making Test, Wesson scored in the normal range for visual 
scanning and speed, but badly faltered on the part of the test that required mental 
flexibility, which might indicate brain impairment.  He demonstrated deficits on 
the Aphasia Screening Test, which might also indicate impaired brain functioning.  
However, Wesson performed well on the Rey’s 15-item Visual Memory Test, a 
screening mechanism for assessing the subject’s motivation to give his best effort, 
and did reasonably well on the Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test, a test designed 
to assess brain impairment. 
{¶ 112} Wesson completed two self-report symptom checklists, both of 
which indicated clinically significant symptoms of depression, anxiety, and 
feelings of inadequacy and low self-worth.  Wesson had also been diagnosed with 
major depression in 2007, when he lost his job and his criminal background 
impeded his finding new work. 
{¶ 113} According to Smalldon, Wesson fathered five children by three 
different women.  His adult relationships with women were fraught with conflict 
and alcohol issues.  He stated that Wesson seemed to have become frantic 
whenever he thought he was going to be rejected and abandoned by a woman, 
largely due to feelings of inadequacy and self-doubt. 
January Term, 2013 
35 
 
{¶ 114} Wesson began drinking at an early age, abused alcohol regularly 
as an adult, engaged in episodes of binge drinking, and was diagnosed with 
alcohol dependence in 2008.  Smalldon opined that prenatal alcohol exposure may 
have caused Wesson to suffer deficits such as an inability to assess the 
consequences of his behavior, an inability to respond appropriately to subtle 
social cues, and weak language skills. 
{¶ 115} Smalldon diagnosed Wesson with (1) depressive disorder (not 
otherwise specified), (2) borderline intellectual functioning, (3) alcohol 
dependence, and (4) a personality disorder with passive-aggressive, narcissistic, 
and antisocial features.  According to Smalldon, these aspects of Wesson’s 
personality make him impulsive and likely to overreact to perceived slights. 
{¶ 116} Smalldon opined that Wesson’s limited intellectual ability, 
struggles at school, difficulty with stuttering, and lack of support at home may 
have rendered him unable to successfully adapt to the circumstances of his 
childhood and adolescence.  He also indicated that Wesson’s limited intellectual 
ability, personality, history of depression, and alcohol exposure may have 
compromised his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.  
Nonetheless, Smalldon testified that he believed that Wesson had understood the 
criminality of his behavior.  And on cross-examination, he acknowledged that 
most people with issues similar to Wesson’s do not commit crimes and that 
Wesson had received mental health treatment while in the juvenile justice system 
and while on parole as an adult. 
{¶ 117} In an unsworn statement, Wesson expressed his fondness for the 
Varholas.  He had visited with Emil Varhola approximately 12 times in the yard 
outside the Varhola home and had been in the home once before.  He stated that 
on that occasion, Emil came to the door holding a handgun, but he put it in his 
pocket when he recognized Wesson. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
 
{¶ 118} Wesson said he did not intend to rob or hurt the Varholas when he 
went to their house on February 25, 2008.  Rather, he knocked on the their door 
around 6:40 p.m., to ask if he could wait there for his girlfriend’s bus to arrive at 
7:43 p.m.  He claimed the Varholas let him in and offered him food, coffee, and 
beer.  Emil showed Wesson his guns, taking a long gun out of the living-room 
gun cabinet and handing it to Wesson. 
{¶ 119} Wesson said that he went upstairs to use the restroom, and when 
he returned, he saw Mary watching television in the living room and Emil in the 
kitchen.  According to Wesson, Emil then made a comment about his wife’s 
chest, and when Wesson said he did not like the comment,  Emil stood up, 
grabbed a knife, and walked toward him.  Wesson claimed that he took the knife 
from Emil and stepped back, but when he saw Emil reach into his pocket, he 
thought Emil might be reaching for the handgun Emil sometimes carried.  Wesson 
then “reacted to that threat” and stabbed him. 
{¶ 120} After Emil fell to the ground, Wesson felt Emil’s pockets and 
realized he did not have a gun.  He then panicked, asking Mary, “Where is the 
gun?”  When Mary hit Wesson with her cane, he “turned on her,” but he stopped 
the attack when Mary begged him not to kill her. 
{¶ 121} Wesson spoke about his having respect for his elders and admitted 
that “maybe [he] reacted too quickly.”  He also expressed sorrow for his actions, 
saying that he believed the Varholas were nice people, but he then immediately 
stated, “Once I feel my life is threatened, I’m going to react,”  explaining that 
after the childhood he had had, he “will never let anyone ever hurt [him] again.” 
And ultimately, Wesson failed to accept responsibility for his crimes, blaming 
Emil by claiming that he would not be on trial and Emil “wouldn’t be up in 
heaven with God right now” if Emil had not reached into his pocket. 
{¶ 122} Wesson insisted that he did not need to rob or kill anyone for 
money or a gun.  According to Wesson, he was not pressed for money and he 
January Term, 2013 
37 
 
could easily have secured a gun from friends on the east side.  Wesson admitted 
that he took the gun and cup from the house because he knew the gun had his 
fingerprints on it. 
{¶ 123} Wesson acknowledged the love and support of his family 
members, and he concluded his statement by telling the panel that he does not use 
crack, dresses nicely, is polite, and is sorry. 
Weighing 
{¶ 124} We now assign weight to Wesson’s mitigating evidence and 
determine whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
{¶ 125} As an initial matter, we find nothing mitigating in the nature and 
circumstances of the offense.  R.C. 2929.04(B).  Wesson murdered an 81-year-old 
man and attempted to murder his 77-year-old wife in their own home.  The 
victims had befriended Wesson and extended him hospitality, even on the day of 
the murder.  No evidence supports Wesson’s unsworn claim that Emil threatened 
him with a knife or a gun.  At most, Wesson knew that Emil owned guns, 
including a handgun, but far from posing a legitimate threat to Wesson, these 
victims had serious medical problems and limited mobility, and he responded to a 
perceived threat by stabbing the Varholas repeatedly with a knife. 
{¶ 126} We find that five of the statutorily enumerated mitigating factors 
do not apply.  We give no weight to Wesson’s unsworn and unbelievable claims 
that Emil and Mary induced, facilitated, or provoked the crime.  See R.C. 
2929.04(B)(1) and (B)(2).  An offender’s youth is a mitigating factor pursuant to 
R.C. 2929.04(B)(4), but Wesson was 50 years old at the time of the crime.  And 
Wesson cannot point to a lack of significant criminal history, see R.C. 
2929.04(B)(5), or other offenders who participated in the crime, see R.C. 
2929.04(B)(6). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
 
{¶ 127} We give limited weight to evidence Wesson presented to show 
that a mental disease or defect affected his ability to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law. See R.C. 2929.04(B)(3).  Dr. Smalldon testified that 
Wesson’s ability to conform his conduct to the law may have been compromised 
at the time of the murder based on (1) his limited intellectual ability, (2) his 
personality disorder with passive aggressive, narcissistic, and antisocial features, 
(3) his history of depression, and (4) his  history with alcohol.  But neither long-
term depression nor Wesson’s personality disorder meet the requirements for a 
“mental disease or defect” under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3).  See Bey, 85 Ohio St.3d at 
507-508, 709 N.E.2d 484 (finding no mental disease or defect where defendant 
suffered from long-term depression and a serious personality disorder with 
antisocial and paranoid features); State v. Fox, 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 192, 631 
N.E.2d 124 (1994) (finding no mental disease or defect after defendant 
established a personality disorder).  Accordingly, Smalldon’s opinion deserves 
only limited weight under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3). 
{¶ 128} This evidence is also relevant to the catchall mitigation provision 
contained in R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), and when it is viewed alongside other mitigating 
evidence presented by Wesson, we find that he has presented mitigating evidence 
that is entitled to significant weight pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). 
{¶ 129} Wesson presented evidence of a long history of contact with 
alcohol.  Prenatal alcohol exposure may have affected his ability to assess the 
consequences of his behavior, his ability to respond appropriately to social cues, 
and his language skills.  In addition, Wesson consumed alcohol at a young age, 
was alcohol dependent, and engaged in bouts of binge drinking.  However, 
Wesson did not present evidence of alcohol impairment at the time of the murder, 
though he claimed that he had been impaired the next day, when he spoke to 
police. 
January Term, 2013 
39 
 
{¶ 130} Wesson has limited intellectual ability and may have suffered 
brain impairment caused by head injuries.  He has a low IQ and tested at 
elementary school level in arithmetic, word recognition, and spelling.  Smalldon 
testified that Wesson’s low performance on certain tests could indicate brain 
impairment, although he could not confirm it. 
{¶ 131} Further, according to Smalldon, Wesson struggles with 
depression, has significant feelings of inadequacy and low self-worth, and is 
prone to overreacting, caused in part by his unstable childhood.  As a young child, 
his older sister regularly cared for him, and he was shuttled between various 
relatives.  His alcoholic father physically abused him, and Wesson witnessed 
serious violence in the home.  Wesson also had a severe stutter, and his own 
father and peers mocked him. 
{¶ 132} This evidence is tempered, however, by testimony that relatives 
and friends helped the family during his childhood.  In fact, he still enjoys the 
love and support of numerous family members, and some of them were present in 
the courtroom at sentencing. 
{¶ 133} Considering all of this evidence, we conclude that Wesson’s 
background, history with alcohol, and mental difficulties are mitigating pursuant 
to R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) and entitled to significant weight. 
{¶ 134} Nonetheless, the weight of Wesson’s mitigation evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the weight of the aggravating circumstances in this 
case.  After full consideration of the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating 
factors, we conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proportionality 
{¶ 135} Finally, we conclude that the death penalty is appropriate and 
proportionate compared to death sentences affirmed in other robbery-murder 
cases. See  Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31 (elderly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
 
victim murdered in home robbery); State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-
Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 836 (one murder and one attempted murder in home 
robbery); State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997) (one 
murder and one attempted murder in separate armed robberies).  It is also 
proportionate to death sentences upheld for other course-of-conduct murders. 
State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14, 2006-Ohio-5084, 854 N.E.2d 1038 (one 
murder and two attempted murders); Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 
823 N.E.2d 836 (one murder and one attempted murder). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 136} Accordingly, we reverse Wesson’s conviction for of aggravated 
murder in Count Three, the specifications related to that count, and the 
specification to Count Two alleging that he committed the murder while under 
detention.  However, we affirm the remaining convictions, the imposition of 
capital punishment on Count Two, and the imposition of consecutive terms of 
imprisonment on the noncapital offense convictions. 
Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, ACTING C.J., and VUKOVICH and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. 
FRENCH, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
LANZINGER, J., dissents. 
O’NEILL, J., dissents without opinion. 
JOSEPH J. VUKOVICH, J., of the Seventh Appellate District, sitting for 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
____________________ 
FRENCH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 137} I join the majority in all but the part of its decision vacating 
Wesson’s conviction and specifications for aggravated murder while under 
detention.  On this point, I agree with Justice Lanzinger; Wesson’s 2003 sentence 
January Term, 2013 
41 
 
was not void, and he committed the murder while under postrelease control.  In all 
other respects, I concur. 
____________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 138} I respectfully dissent.  For the reasons expressed in my opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part in State v. Billiter, 134 Ohio St.3d 103, 
2012-Ohio-5144, 980 N.E.2d 960, I would not find void any portion of Wesson’s 
2003 sentence.  As the mistake was solely in the court’s exercise of jurisdiction in 
imposing postrelease control (imposing three years of discretionary, rather than 
three years of mandatory, postrelease control), the sentence was merely voidable.  
Since the error was not raised on appeal within 30 days, res judicata applies and 
Wesson remained under the supervision of the Adult Parole Authority. 
{¶ 139} I also dissent from the majority’s judgment affirming the 
remaining capital convictions.  I would vacate the convictions and remand the 
case to the trial court for the proper selection of a three-judge panel in this case as 
precedent demands.  Although it acknowledges the requirement of strict 
compliance with R.C. 2945.05 and 2945.06 when a defendant waives a jury in a 
capital case, the majority nonetheless declares that Wesson forfeited the right to 
challenge the way that the three-judge panel was selected because he assented to 
the procedure followed by Judge Teodosio in appointing the members of the 
panel.  This holding is inconsistent with our decisions in State v. Parker, 95 Ohio 
St.3d 524, 2002-Ohio-2833, 769 N.E.2d 846; State v. Filiaggi, 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 
239, 714 N.E.2d 867 (1999); State v. Pless, 74 Ohio St.3d 333, 658 N.E.2d 766 
(1996); and Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 
992. 
{¶ 140} In Parker, the defendant in a capital case waived his right to a 
trial by jury, waived his right to a three-judge panel, and pled guilty to aggravated 
murder.  Id. at ¶ 2.  We affirmed the court of appeals’ decision to vacate the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
 
conviction, holding that the defendant could not waive the right to a three-judge 
panel.  Id. at ¶ 11.  In Filiaggi, the defendant had waived his right to a trial by 
jury.  Id. at 238.  The three-judge panel entered convictions only on the 
aggravated-murder charge and specifications, and the presiding judge decided the 
noncapital charges.  Id. at 239.  We reversed the judgment and remanded the case 
for the three-judge panel to render verdicts on the noncapital charges, holding that 
because we have consistently required strict compliance with R.C. 2945.06, “the 
presiding judge did not have sole authority to enter a verdict on the noncapital 
charges.”  Id. at 240.  Here, Wesson executed a jury waiver, consenting to be tried 
by a panel “consisting of Judge Thomas A. Teodosio, presiding at this time, and 
two other judges to be designated pursuant to law.”  (Emphasis added.)  Wesson 
thus did not waive his rights under R.C. 2945.06 to the following of the proper 
procedure in selecting his three-judge panel.  Parker and Filiaggi would not allow 
him to do so in any event. 
{¶ 141} Furthermore, the majority’s opinion in this case is yet another 
example of the inconsistent holdings of this court in cases in which the trial court 
judge acted contrary to a statutory mandate.  The majority reverses Wesson’s 
conviction for aggravated murder while under detention and for the corresponding 
specification on Count Two due to a postrelease-control error.  So on the one 
hand, the majority collaterally declares a portion of Wesson’s 2003 sentence void 
because the trial judge imposed three years of discretionary rather than mandatory 
postrelease control.  Then on the other hand, although the trial judge did not have 
authority to appoint the other two judges of the three-judge panel in this capital 
case, the majority affirms Wesson’s remaining capital convictions.  Apparently, a 
postrelease-control error is more important than a procedural error in a capital 
case.  I cannot agree with this inconsistency.  I would hold that any error in the 
court’s exercise of jurisdiction is voidable rather than void. 
{¶ 142} As we held in Pratts, 
January Term, 2013 
43 
 
 
[t]he failure of a court to convene a three-judge panel, as 
required by R.C. 2945.06, does not constitute a lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction that renders the trial court’s judgment void ab 
initio and subject to collateral attack in habeas corpus.  It 
constitutes an error in the court’s exercise of jurisdiction that must 
be raised on direct appeal. 
 
(Emphases added.)  102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, at 
syllabus. 
{¶ 143} Wesson raised this error on direct appeal.  I would therefore 
vacate the convictions and remand the case for a new trial in accordance with the 
mandatory capital procedures within R.C. 2945.06.  Because I would not hold any 
portion of the 2003 sentence to be void, Wesson would still be eligible to be 
convicted of Count Three and the specification to Count Two for aggravated 
murder while under detention. 
____________________ 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Richard 
S. Kasay, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
David L. Doughten and George C. Pappas, for appellant. 
_________________________