Title: Gilbert v. N.C. State Bar

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

WILLIE D. GILBERT, II  v. THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR
No. 41PA07
FILED: 20 MARCH 2009
1.
Appeal and Error–appealability–prosecution of attorney enjoined–protection
of bar and public–substantial right
An immediate appeal could be taken from an injunction prohibiting disciplinary
prosecution of an attorney before the Disciplinary Hearing Commission, despite its interlocutory
nature, where it affected the State Bar’s substantial right to carry out its duties to protect the bar
and the public. 
2.
Malicious Prosecution–notice–vindictive prosecution in civil case–reviewed
as malicious prosecution
Plaintiff’s complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for vindictive prosecution by the
State Bar could have been dismissed because vindictive prosecution is limited to criminal cases. 
However, North Carolina is a notice pleading state, the import of the complaint is unmistakable,
and defendant responded as if plaintiff had pleaded malicious prosecution. The matter is
reviewed as alleging malicious prosecution.
3.
Jurisdiction–subject matter–42 U.S.C. § 1983–pleading defect
Defendant’s argument that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
hear plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action because defendant’s disciplinary prosecution of plaintiff
was still pending identifies a pleading defect in plaintiff’s procedural due process claim rather
than implicating a defect in the trial court’s jurisdiction. 
4.
Civil Rights–due process–repeated disciplinary hearings by State Bar
Plaintiff did not allege a due process violation for which relief might be granted
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where his allegation concerned malicious prosecution in repeated
disciplinary actions against him by the State Bar.  Any right plaintiff has to be free of malicious
prosecution does not arise from substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and postdeprivation remedies adequately safeguard plaintiff’s right to procedural due process.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON dissenting.
Justice HUDSON dissenting.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of
a unanimous, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, 180
N.C. App. 690, 639 S.E.2d 143 (2006), dismissing defendant’s
appeal from a judgment entered on 12 September 2005 by Judge
Milton F. Fitch, Jr. in Superior Court, Wilson County.  Heard in
the Supreme Court 11 December 2007.
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Michaux & Michaux, P.A., by Eric C. Michaux, for
plaintiff-appellee.
North Carolina State Bar, by Katherine E. Jean,
Counsel, and David R. Johnson and A. Root Edmonson,
Deputy Counsel, for defendant-appellant.  
EDMUNDS, Justice.
In this case, plaintiff Willie Gilbert, a licensed
attorney, alleges that defendant North Carolina State Bar acted
vindictively when it filed sequential actions against him.  The
questions before this Court are whether plaintiff’s complaint
properly presents a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation
of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and whether the trial court’s
permanent injunction of defendant’s administrative action was
proper.  As to the first question, we conclude that plaintiff
failed to state a § 1983 claim because (1) substantive due
process does not provide an individual right to be free from
either vindictive or malicious prosecution of an administrative
action, and (2) a plaintiff’s right to procedural due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated by the tortious
conduct of a state actor until and unless the State fails to
provide an adequate remedy.  As to the second question, because
plaintiff must allow the State an opportunity to remedy the
alleged deprivation of a protected right before he can state a
viable § 1983 claim based on an alleged violation of his right to
procedural due process, the trial court should not have imposed a
permanent injunction.  We vacate the decision of the Court of
Appeals dismissing defendant’s appeal and remand to that court
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for further remand to Superior Court, Wilson County, with
instructions to dissolve the permanent injunction, dismiss
plaintiff’s substantive due process claim with prejudice, and
dismiss plaintiff’s procedural due process claim without
prejudice.
Between February 2000 and September 2003, defendant
filed three complaints against plaintiff.  Two were
administrative actions (Gilbert I and Gilbert III) that were
brought before defendant’s Disciplinary Hearing Commission (DHC),
while the third was a civil action (Gilbert II) brought in
District Court, Wake County, to recover money paid to one of
plaintiff’s clients by defendant’s Client Security Fund (CSF). 
Defendant filed Gilbert I on 15 February 2000, alleging that
plaintiff violated numerous provisions of the Revised Rules of
Professional Conduct (RRPC) during his representation of three
clients between 1997 and 1999.  After a four-day hearing held on
17-18 July 2000 and 18-19 September 2000, the DHC entered an
Order of Discipline concluding that plaintiff had violated Rules
1.5, 1.7, 1.15-2(h), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g) of the
RRPC.  The DHC suspended plaintiff’s license to practice law for
five years, but stayed the last three years of the suspension
upon enumerated conditions.  The North Carolina Court of Appeals
affirmed the DHC Order of Discipline, N.C. State Bar v. Gilbert,
151 N.C. App. 299, 566 S.E.2d 685, 2002 N.C. App. LEXIS 782
(2002) (unpublished), and this Court affirmed the Court of
Appeals in a per curiam opinion, 357 N.C. 502, 586 S.E.2d 89
(2003).
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Defendant filed Gilbert II on or about 18 April 2002,
seeking reimbursement on behalf of the CSF for $4,627.43 that had
been paid by the CSF to one of plaintiff’s clients.  Following a
bench trial held on 7-8 January 2004, the trial court awarded
defendant the double damages allowed by N.C.G.S. § 84-13, for a
total of $9,254.86 plus interest.  On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in part and vacated
in part, remanding the matter for additional findings as to
plaintiff’s affirmative defenses.  N.C. State Bar v. Gilbert, 176
N.C. App. 408, 626 S.E.2d 877, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 574 (2006)
(unpublished).  On remand, the trial court again entered judgment
in favor of defendant.  On appeal after remand, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in part and vacated
in part, remanding for recalculation of interest pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 24-5(b).  Gilbert v. N.C. State Bar, 363 N.C. App.
___, 663 S.E.2d 1 (2008).
Defendant filed Gilbert III on 12 September 2003,
alleging that plaintiff misappropriated funds from his trust
account and failed to pay client funds promptly to third parties. 
The transactions at issue identified by defendant in its
Gilbert III complaint occurred in April 1998.
While Gilbert III was pending before the DHC, plaintiff
filed the instant action in Superior Court, Wilson County,
alleging, in part, that defendant was vindictively prosecuting
the Gilbert III administrative action.  Specifically, plaintiff
alleged violations of both his substantive and his procedural due
process rights.  Plaintiff further alleged that the conduct at
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1 “Any attorney admitted to practice law in this State is
subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the [State Bar]
Council . . . .”  N.C.G.S. § 84-28(a) (2007).  “The Council is
vested, as an agency of the State, with the authority to . . .
investigate and prosecute matters of professional
misconduct . . . .”  Id. § 84-23(a) (2007).  The DHC has
jurisdiction to “hold hearings in discipline . . . matters, make
findings of fact and conclusions of law after these hearings,
enter orders necessary to carry out the duties delegated to it by
the Council, and tax the costs to an attorney who is
disciplined.”  Id. § 84-28.1(b) (2007).
2 The original civil jurisdiction of the superior court
division of North Carolina is set forth, in part, by N.C.G.S.
§ 7A-245(a)(4), which provides:  “The superior court division is
the proper division without regard to the amount in controversy,
for the trial of civil actions where the principal relief prayed
is . . . [t]he enforcement or declaration of any claim of
constitutional right.”  N.C.G.S. § 7A-245(a)(4) (2007).
issue in Gilbert III was known or should have been known to
defendant before Gilbert I was heard by the DHC.  Plaintiff
sought injunctive and monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Article I of the North Carolina State Constitution.
On 9 April 2004, the trial court granted plaintiff an
ex parte temporary restraining order, enjoining defendant from
proceeding with further prosecution of Gilbert III.  At the
subsequent hearing on plaintiff’s motion for preliminary
injunction, defendant argued that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to enjoin a disciplinary action that was pending
before the DHC.1  Plaintiff responded that the DHC is not
authorized to rule on the constitutional questions he raised and
that superior court is an appropriate forum in which to bring a
claim under § 1983.2  After considering arguments, the trial
court granted plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on 3 August
2004, and plaintiff moved for summary judgment on 13 October
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2004.  The trial court treated defendant’s motion as one for
summary judgment and, after hearing argument, expressed its
concern.
THE COURT: . . . . [I]t smacks –- to me,
it smacks in the face of fairness when you
have a man that you take a period of time,
you go in and you find three people, you
prosecute him on those three, and there were
six people there at the same time, and
instead of prosecuting him on six and doing
whatever you want to do to him, you choose to
do three of them, have a time of suspension
to run, and then come back when that time of
suspension runs and says, oh, yes, I got
three more that I didn’t prosecute you on so
I want to now prosecute you on those matters. 
And that, right or wrong, in my mind is where
I have the problem, because –- and that’s why
I used the terms that the State Bar knew or
should have known, having done the
investigation of the trust account, that
those violations were there.
The trial court entered an order on 12 September 2005 granting
plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of
liability for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process.  The trial court’s order permanently enjoined defendant
from prosecuting Gilbert III and expressly retained jurisdiction
over the matter for the purposes of enforcing the injunction,
determining compensatory damages, and awarding attorneys’ fees.
Defendant appealed.  The Court of Appeals concluded
that defendant had appealed from an interlocutory order not
affecting a substantial right and dismissed defendant’s appeal. 
Gilbert v. N.C. State Bar, 180 N.C. App. 690, 639 S.E.2d 143,
2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 2574 (2006) (unpublished).  This Court
allowed defendant’s petition for discretionary review as to two
issues:  (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred by dismissing
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defendant’s appeal as interlocutory, and (2) whether the superior
court had jurisdiction to enjoin permanently defendant’s
prosecution of plaintiff in an administrative disciplinary
proceeding before the DHC.
[1] We begin with defendant’s first issue.  Defendant
acknowledged in its brief to the Court of Appeals that the trial
court’s order “may be considered interlocutory,” and the Court of
Appeals so held.  Gilbert, 180 N.C. App. 690, 639 S.E.2d 143,
2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 2467, at *7.  Defendant argues that the
order nevertheless may be appealed immediately because it affects
a substantial right.  See N.C.G.S. §§ 1-277(a), 7A-27(d)(1)
(2007).
A substantial right is “a legal right affecting or
involving a matter of substance as distinguished from matters of
form:  a right materially affecting those interests which [one]
is entitled to have preserved and protected by law:  a material
right.”  Oestreicher v. Am. Nat’l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118,
130, 225 S.E.2d 797, 805 (1976) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).  We consider whether a right is substantial on a
case-by-case basis.  “It is usually necessary to resolve the
question in each case by considering the particular facts of that
case and the procedural context in which the order from which
appeal is sought was entered.”  Waters v. Qualified Pers., Inc.,
294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978).
Plaintiff argues that this interlocutory appeal does
not affect a substantial right.  The Court of Appeals agreed with
plaintiff, citing precedent from that court for the proposition
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that an order of a trial court allowing a party’s motion for
summary judgment as to liability while retaining jurisdiction
over the issue of damages, does not affect a substantial right. 
Gilbert, 180 N.C. App. 690, 639 S.E.2d 143, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS
2467, at *8.  In so doing, the Court of Appeals reasoned that
“the most [defendant] will suffer from being denied an immediate
appeal is a trial on the issue of damages.”  Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Although we express no opinion as to the merits of
defendant’s Gilbert III complaint, we note that the trial court
order from which defendant appeals includes a permanent
injunction enjoining defendant from prosecuting Gilbert III. 
Ordinarily, “[a] permanent or perpetual injunction issues as a
final judgment which settles the rights of the parties, after the
determination of all issues raised.”  Union Carbide Corp. v.
Davis, 253 N.C. 324, 328, 116 S.E.2d 792, 794-95 (1960) (quoting
Galloway v. Stone, 208 N.C. 739, 740, 182 S.E. 333, 333 (1935));
Tomlinson v. Cranor, 209 N.C. 688, 692, 184 S.E. 554, 556-57
(1936) (holding that the trial court erred in issuing a permanent
injunction, which was a final judgment, because issues of
material fact should have been determined by the jury).  Thus,
the permanent injunction issued by the trial court in this case
is a remedy that forever prohibits defendant from prosecuting
Gilbert III.  In contrast, no such immediately enforceable remedy
issues when a trial court merely enters partial summary judgment
in a plaintiff’s favor on the question of liability, as in the
cases relied on by the Court of Appeals. 
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We conclude that defendant’s right to investigate and
prosecute allegations of attorney misconduct is substantial.  The
State Bar is an agency of the State of North Carolina.  N.C.G.S.
§ 84-15 (2007).  Prior to the incorporation of the North Carolina
State Bar in 1933, see id., the bar lacked legal autonomy and was
not allowed to regulate itself.  See Thomas W. Davis, President,
N.C. Bar Ass’n, The Bar, Its Duties and Burdens, Address Before
the North Carolina Bar Association (July 5, 1921), in Proceedings
of the Twenty-Third Annual Session of the North Carolina Bar
Association, 1921, at 6-20.  As Chief Justice Stacy noted when he
administered the oath of office to the first Bar Council after
incorporation:
 
The Legislature, in its wisdom, has provided
for the incorporation of the State Bar.  It
has vested in the Council of that Bar, which
you are, the authority and the power to
administer the act.  It may interest you to
know that the Legislature has repealed all of
the statutes relating to disbarment in the
State, and has vested in you the
responsibility of making rules and
regulations, and administering those rules
and regulations relating to the admission and
to the discipline and to the disbarment of
members of the Bar of this State.
Edwin C. Bryson, The North Carolina State Bar, 1933-1950, 30 N.C.
St. Bar Q. 8, 12 (1983); see also Baker v. Varser, 240 N.C. 260,
267, 82 S.E.2d 90, 95-96 (1954) (The General Assembly created the
State Bar “to enable the bar to render more effective service in
improving the administration of justice, particularly in dealing
with the problem of . . . discipl[in]ing and disbarring attorneys
at law.”).  Thus, the power of the bar to police itself is both a
privilege and a responsibility.
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Defendant’s action in conducting this, or any other
investigation, is undertaken pursuant to statute for the benefit
of both the legal profession and the citizens of North Carolina. 
When defendant is prevented from carrying out these duties, the
bar as well as the public may be at risk.  Accordingly, we
conclude that defendant’s right to carry out these statutory
duties is substantial.
Next, we must determine whether defendant’s substantial
right may be lost or prejudiced if the interlocutory order is not
considered on appeal.  Goldston v. Am. Motors Corp., 326 N.C.
723, 726, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990) (“[T]he deprivation of that
substantial right must potentially work injury to [defendant] if
not corrected before appeal from final judgment.”).  The mere
fact that a defendant has been enjoined does not constitute such
an injury.  However, because the trial court’s permanent
injunction may prevent defendant from executing its statutory
duties while plaintiff pursues an improperly pleaded action, an
injury arises.  See, e.g., Freeland v. Greene, 33 N.C. App. 537,
540, 235 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1977) (“The continuance of the
injunction in effect and the denial of the motion to dismiss in
this case do adversely affect important rights of [defendant
North Carolina Board of Transportation] in connection with the
performance by [it] of duties imposed by [statute].  We therefore
consider this appeal.”).  In addition, execution of the bar’s
responsibility to protect the public requires that the bar have
the ability timely to respond to allegations of wrongdoing and
timely to act where those allegations prove true.  As this case
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3 In two of the three United States Circuit Court cases
cited in Justice Timmons-Goodson’s dissent, the doctrine of
vindictive prosecution is characterized as an affirmative
defense.  Nat’l Eng’g & Contracting Co. v. Herman, 181 F.3d 715
(6th Cir. 1999); United States v. One 1985 Mercedes, 915 F.2d 415
(9th Cir. 1990).  The Courts issuing these decisions neither
reviewed § 1983 actions nor found a vindictive prosecution of an
administrative action that violated the defendant’s right to
substantive due process.  Although, in Futernick, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit listed elements
that may comprise a claim for vindictive prosecution of an
administrative proceeding, it did so in a footnote to that
opinion, which reviewed a plaintiff’s selective prosecution
claim.  Futernick v. Sumpter, 78 F.3d 1051 (6th Cir. 1996),
abrogated in part by Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,
145 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (2000) (per curiam).  In the intervening ten
years, the Sixth Circuit has considered only one other case, also
cited by the dissent, in which vindictive prosecution was raised
as a defense to an administrative proceeding.  Nat’l Eng’g &
Contracting Co., 181 F.3d 715.  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit
opinion cited by the dissent was decided in 1990.  One 1985
Mercedes, 915 F.2d 415.  The analysis undertaken by the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits in these isolated decisions has not been adopted
illustrates, a trial and subsequent appeal can consume years,
leaving the public vulnerable.  Accordingly, we conclude that
defendant suffers the risk of injury if this interlocutory order
is not considered.  This interlocutory appeal is not barred.
[2] We now consider defendant’s second issue. 
Plaintiff alleges that defendant prosecuted Gilbert III
vindictively, as punishment both for his zealous defense of
Gilbert I and II and for exercising his right to appeal the final
judgments entered in those actions.  Plaintiff further alleges
that defendant’s vindictive prosecution of Gilbert III, an
administrative proceeding, gives rise to an independent cause of
action under § 1983 for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment
right to substantive and procedural due process.  However,
vindictive prosecution is a doctrine recognized in the context of
criminal cases only.3  In addressing vindictive prosecution, the
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by any other United States Circuit Court or by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
4 See Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 104 L. Ed. 2d 865
(1989) (considering a criminal defendant’s direct criminal appeal
and holding that no presumption of vindictiveness arises when
defendant’s first sentence was based upon a guilty plea and the
second sentence follows trial); United States v. Goodwin, 457
U.S. 368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1982) (considering a criminal
defendant’s direct criminal appeal and holding that a defendant
is not entitled to a presumption of vindictiveness arising from
reindictment on more serious charges after he refused to plead
guilty and demanded a jury trial); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978) (considering a criminal
defendant’s appeal from issuance of writ of habeas corpus and
holding that due process is not violated by a defendant’s
reindictment on more serious charges following an accused’s
refusal to accept a plea bargain); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412
U.S. 17, 36 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1973) (considering a criminal
defendant’s appeal from denial of writ of habeas corpus and
holding that due process is not violated by a jury’s
recommendation of a higher sentence on retrial); and Colten v.
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 32 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1972) (considering the
defendant’s direct appeal from criminal conviction and holding
that due process is not violated by a two-tiered criminal system
that provides for trial de novo).
Supreme Court of the United States has considered two issues: 
(1) It has limited the ability of a judge to impose a more
lengthy sentence upon a defendant who successfully appealed,
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969),
and (2) it has held that, in a two-tier prosecutorial system such
as we have in North Carolina, a prosecutor may not substitute a
more serious charge when a defendant seeks a trial de novo on
appeal from a lesser charge, Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 40
L. Ed. 2d 628 (1974).  Subsequent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court have declined to expand the holdings of Pearce and
Blackledge.4  The Supreme Court of the United States has never
applied the theory of vindictive prosecution to a civil action or
an administrative proceeding.
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We find no contrary cases in North Carolina.  As a
result, because the theory of vindictive prosecution is limited
to criminal cases, we conclude that plaintiff proceeded on an
inapplicable theory and that plaintiff’s complaint could be
dismissed on this ground alone.  Nevertheless, North Carolina is
a notice pleading state, the import of plaintiff’s complaint is
unmistakable, and defendant responded as if plaintiff had pleaded
a recognized cause of action, such as malicious prosecution. 
Malicious prosecution is a theory applicable to criminal, civil,
and administrative proceedings that have been instituted with
malice and without probable cause.  See, e.g., Carver v. Lykes,
262 N.C. 345, 352, 137 S.E.2d 139, 145 (1964) (“[O]ne who
instigates or procures investigatory proceedings against another
before an administrative board which has the power to suspend or
revoke that other’s license to do business or practice his
profession, is liable for the resulting damage if (1) the
proceeding was instituted maliciously; (2) without probable
cause; and (3) has terminated in favor of the person against whom
it was initiated.”).  It is designed to discourage and remedy the
type of prosecutorial misconduct alleged by plaintiff in this
case and is consistent with the “bad faith prosecution” language
used in the trial court’s order.  Accordingly, we will review
plaintiff’s complaint as alleging malicious prosecution.
[3] At the outset, we note that defendant argues that,
because Gilbert III was still pending before the DHC when
plaintiff filed his superior court action, the superior court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s § 1983
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action.  However, defendant’s argument does not implicate the
trial court’s jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s § 1983 claim,
which is established by N.C.G.S. § 7A-245(a)(4).  As explained
below, defendant’s argument actually identifies a pleading defect
in plaintiff’s procedural due process claim.  This is not the
first time parties mistakenly have identified lack of subject
matter jurisdiction as a basis for dismissal of a § 1983 action
when, in fact, the actual ground supported by their argument was
failure to state a claim for violation of a party’s due process
rights.  In Snuggs v. Stanly County Department of Public Health,
this Court reviewed a trial court’s determination that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction and subsequent dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.  310 N.C. 739, 314 S.E.2d 528 (1984)
(per curiam).  Observing that the plaintiffs had failed to allege
that remedies provided by the State were inadequate, we
“elect[ed] to treat the defendants’ [Rule 12(b)(1)] motions as
motions brought under Rule 12(b)(6),” id. at 740, 314 S.E.2d at
529, and remanded the matter to superior court “for the entry of
orders under Rule 12(b)(6) dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” id.
at 741, 314 S.E.2d at 529.  Following this precedent, we now
consider whether plaintiff has alleged a due process violation
for which relief may be granted under § 1983.
[4] When Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it
conferred upon injured plaintiffs a federal remedy for violations
of federal constitutional rights committed by state actors. 
E.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139, 101 L. Ed. 2d 123, 138
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(1988).  Section 1983 claims may be litigated in either state or
federal court.  Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 358, 110 L. Ed. 2d
332, 342 (1990).  Section 1983 provides in part:
  Every person who, under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State
. . . subjects . . . any citizen of
the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  Liability imposed under § 1983 is
expressly conditioned upon deprivation of a federal
constitutional right and is distinct from liability arising from
commission of a common-law tort.  Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
697-701, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 411-14 (1976) (explaining that an
ordinary common-law tort claim is not transformed into a § 1983
procedural due process claim simply because the tort is committed
by a state actor).  Thus, tortious conduct by a state actor may
be redressed through a § 1983 action only when it infringes a
federal constitutional right.  Such tortious conduct is commonly
said to give rise to a “constitutional tort.”  See, e.g., Michael
K. Cantwell, Constitutional Torts and the Due Process Clause,
4 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 317, 320 (1995); James J. Park,
The Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 393, 395-96 (2003).
No definitive test exists for determining whether
conduct that establishes the common-law tort of malicious
prosecution also violates a federal constitutional right.  See
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5 Compare Kjellsen v. Mills, 517 F.3d 1232, 1237-38 (11th
Cir. 2008) (identifying the elements of a § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim as co-extensive with the elements of the common
law tort), and Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir.
2007) (listing the elements of a § 1983 malicious prosecution
claim as the elements of the common-law tort plus “deprivation of
liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence
of a legal proceeding”), and Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128,
136 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that the elements of a § 1983
malicious prosecution claim are the elements of the common-law
tort plus “post-arraignment seizure”), and Nieves v. McSweeney,
241 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2001) (supposing that a § 1983
plaintiff must allege the common-law elements of malicious
prosecution and “deprivation of a federally-protected right”),
and Poppell v. City of San Diego, 149 F.3d 951, 961-62 (9th Cir.
1998) (requiring a plaintiff to establish the common-law tort
elements of malicious prosecution in addition to deprivation of a
constitutional right), with Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444
F.3d 725, 750 (6th Cir. 2006) (recharacterizing a plaintiff’s
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claim “as the right under the Fourth
Amendment to be free from continued detention without probable
cause” and undertaking Fourth Amendment analysis), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1114, 166 L. Ed. 2d 707 (2007), and Pierce v. Gilchrist,
359 F.3d 1279, 1290 (10th Cir. 2004) (“rejecting the view that a
plaintiff does not state a claim actionable under § 1983 unless
he satisfies the requirements of an analogous common law tort”),
and Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 945 (5th Cir. 2003)
(summarizing the rules of its sister circuit courts, concluding
that reference to the common-law tort of malicious prosecution
“invites confusion,” and considering instead whether the alleged
conduct “run[s] afoul of explicit constitutional protection”),
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 808, 160 L. Ed. 2d 10 (2004), and Newsome
v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 749-50 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that the
elements of the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution, if
the constitutional tort exists at all, do not “depend on state
generally 1 Steven H. Steinglass, Section 1983 Litigation in
State Courts § 3:2, at 3-3 (2001) (noting that “[m]any of the
most difficult questions confronting courts and litigants in
§ 1983 litigation concern the definition of the underlying
constitutional rights, and whether and when conduct that gives
rise to state tort actions is also a constitutional violation
actionable under § 1983”).  United States circuit courts disagree
over whether the common-law elements of malicious prosecution are
also essential components of a constitutional tort.5 
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law”), and Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 260-62 (4th Cir.
2000) (explaining that the common-law elements of a malicious
prosecution claim are relevant to a § 1983 malicious prosecution
claim only to the extent that they are analogous to a Fourth
Amendment violation), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1130, 148 L. Ed. 2d
797 (2001).  See also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 270 n.4,
127 L. Ed. 2d 114, 121 n.4 (1994) (plurality) (acknowledging an
“embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion” about “the extent to
which a claim of malicious prosecution is actionable under
§ 1983” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Nevertheless, all circuits agree that a plaintiff must show that
the alleged malicious prosecution infringes a constitutional
right in order to invoke § 1983.  Most frequently, the federal
constitutional provisions cited in § 1983 claims based upon
malicious prosecution are the First and Fourth Amendments and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g.,
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274-75, 127 L. Ed. 2d 114, 124
(1994) (plurality) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment, not
substantive due process, addresses deprivations of liberty
resulting from criminal prosecution); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 481-87, 14 L. Ed. 2d 22, 25-29 (1965) (considering a
§ 1983 action in which the plaintiffs alleged criminal
prosecution undertaken for the purpose of silencing speech
protected under the First Amendment); Awabdy v. City of Adelanto,
368 F.3d 1062, 1068-70 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the
plaintiff stated a claim under § 1983 by alleging prosecution
undertaken for the purpose of depriving him of his First
Amendment right to freedom of speech and Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection).  In § 1983 actions, the United States
Supreme Court consistently distinguishes the protections
conferred by the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the
-18-
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, from the
protection supplied by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  E.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536, 68
L. Ed. 2d 420, 429 (1981) (reasoning that a plaintiff’s § 1983
procedural due process claim “differ[ed] from the claims which
were before [the Court] in Monroe v. Pape, [365 U.S. 167,
5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961)], which involved violations of the Fourth
Amendment, and the claims presented in Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97 [50 L. Ed. 2d 251] (1976), which involved alleged
violations of the Eighth Amendment”), overruled in part on other
grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662
(1986); see also Edward Valves, Inc. v. Wake Cty., 343 N.C. 426,
434, 471 S.E.2d 342, 347 (1996) (“State remedies are only
relevant when a Section 1983 action is brought for a violation of
procedural due process.” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1112, 136 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1997).
Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim is based upon
allegations in his complaint that defendant violated both
plaintiff’s substantive due process rights and his procedural due
process rights.  As to plaintiff’s substantive due process claim,
in Albright v. Oliver, a plurality of Justices of the United
States Supreme Court observed that “[t]he protections of
substantive due process have for the most part been accorded to
matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right
to bodily integrity.”  510 U.S. at 272, 127 L. Ed. 2d at 122. 
Accordingly, the Court held that the plaintiff failed to state a
§ 1983 claim when he alleged that Illinois authorities violated
-19-
his Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process by
prosecuting criminal charges against him without probable cause. 
Id. at 268-69, 127 L. Ed. 2d at 120-21.  In so holding, the
plurality explained that the Fourth Amendment was drafted to
address “deprivations of liberty that go hand in hand with
criminal prosecutions.”  Id. at 274, 127 L. Ed. 2d at 124.  As a
result, “with its scarce and open-ended guideposts,” id. at 275,
127 L. Ed. 2d at 124 (internal quotation marks omitted),
“substantive due process may not furnish the constitutional peg
on which to hang such a ‘tort,’” id. at 271 n.4, 127 L. Ed. 2d at
122 n.4.  In light of the lack of “guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking,” and the United States Supreme Court’s reluctance
to expand the boundaries of substantive due process protection,
see Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 117
L. Ed. 2d 261, 273 (1992), we hold that any right plaintiff has
to be free of malicious prosecution, including a claim based upon
the allegedly malicious prosecution of a civil or administrative
matter, does not arise from substantive due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Turning to plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, we
observe that, with few exceptions, United States circuit courts
have considered the question of whether malicious prosecution
infringes on a party’s procedural due process rights only in
criminal cases, and then only in dicta.  See, e.g., Pierce v.
Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1299 (10th Cir. 2004); Nieves v.
McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2001).  We have found no
holding that malicious initiation of a civil administrative
-20-
proceeding, by itself, inflicts an injury giving rise to a
constitutional tort.  However, the Second and Tenth Circuit
Courts of Appeals have each published one opinion reviewing a
§ 1983 claim in which a plaintiff alleged that malicious filing
of an administrative action violated his or her right to
procedural due process.
In Washington v. County of Rockland, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the plaintiff
correction officers’ claims that a county sheriff maliciously
filed unjustified disciplinary charges against them in a civil
administrative proceeding.  373 F.3d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 2004). 
Citing Albright v. Oliver, the Court held that a § 1983 action
based upon an allegation that the defendant had initiated a
malicious prosecution “may not be premised on a civil
administrative proceeding” absent a violation of Fourth Amendment
rights.  Id. at 313, 315-17.
In Becker v. Kroll, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit considered a plaintiff medical doctor’s
claim that Utah’s Medicaid Fraud Control Unit maliciously filed
unjustified civil and criminal charges against her.  494 F.3d
904, 909 (10th Cir. 2007).  Construing the plaintiff’s complaint
liberally, the Court acknowledged that the plaintiff alleged
“some injuries resulting from the filing of criminal charges
against her that are outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s
substantive and procedural protections,” id. at 918, such as
infringement upon her “liberty interest in being free from
unwarranted investigation and prosecution without probable cause”
-21-
6 While many of the cases cited in the following portion of
this opinion make undifferentiated reference to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we understand these opinions
address procedural due process.
and “a property interest in the integrity of her medical and
billing records,” id. at 919.  The Court stated, but did not
hold, that “[t]hese injuries might be cognizable as due process
violations through a gap in constitutional protection created by
Albright’s limitation of § 1983 malicious prosecution claims to
those based on the Fourth Amendment,” id. at 918, but then
disposed of the plaintiff’s appeal on alternative grounds. 
In light of Albright v. Oliver and the apparent
uncertainty among United States circuit courts over the extent to
which § 1983 supports an action when a plaintiff claims
procedural due process violations based on malicious prosecution,
including a claim based on prosecution of a civil or
administrative action, we express no opinion whether defendant’s
conduct infringes a “life, liberty, or property interest” that is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Such a holding would be
essential to the success of plaintiff’s claim because “the
Fourteenth Amendment does not require a remedy when there has
been no ‘deprivation’ of a protected interest.”  Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348, 88 L. Ed. 2d 677, 683 (1986). 
Instead, we resolve this issue on an alternative, but settled,
legal ground.6
Even if this Court accepts plaintiff’s argument that
defendant’s allegedly malicious prosecution of Gilbert III
affects a constitutionally protected “life, liberty, or property
-22-
interest,” plaintiff must clear the higher hurdle of showing
deprivation of his constitutional rights without due process of
law.  “Nothing in [the Fourteenth] Amendment protects against all
deprivations of life, liberty, or property by the State”; rather,
“[t]he Fourteenth Amendment protects only against deprivations
‘without due process of law.’”  Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537, 68
L. Ed. 2d at 430 (citation omitted).  When a plaintiff is
deprived of a constitutionally protected interest by the
unauthorized, tortious conduct of a state actor, statutory and
common-law postdeprivation remedies can provide the process that
is due.  Id. at 541-44, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 432-34 (stating and
applying the rule to a plaintiff’s § 1983 procedural due process
claim alleging deprivation of personal property); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-33, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393, 405-08 (1984)
(applying the rule stated in Parratt to unauthorized, intentional
deprivations of property); see also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S.
113, 131-32, 108 L. Ed. 2d 100, 117-18 (1990) (extending the rule
stated in Parratt to deprivations of liberty).  In those cases, a
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation “is not
complete until and unless” the State “refuses to provide a
suitable postdeprivation remedy.”  Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533, 82
L. Ed. 2d at 407-08; accord Edward Valves, 343 N.C. at 434, 471
S.E.2d at 347 (contrasting the importance of available state
remedies in “a Section 1983 action . . . brought for violation of
procedural due process” with their inapplicability in “a Section
1983 action based on a violation of a substantive constitutional
right”).
-23-
The United States Supreme Court considers the existence
of common-law tort actions, postdeprivation hearings, and other
“procedural safeguards built into the statutory or administrative
procedure of effecting the deprivation,” when evaluating the
adequacy of a State’s postdeprivation remedies.  Zinermon, 494
U.S. at 126, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 114.  A plaintiff who has access to
an adequate postdeprivation remedy does not sustain a
constitutional injury under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and cannot state a claim for relief on that
basis under § 1983.  Parratt, 451 U.S. 527, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420.
Malicious prosecution of an administrative action is a
common-law tort in North Carolina.  Carver, 262 N.C. at 351-52,
137 S.E.2d at 145 (stating the elements of the tort). 
Availability of a common-law tort action, standing alone, is an
adequate postdeprivation remedy, even when successful litigation
of the tort does not result in all the relief to which a
plaintiff would be entitled under § 1983.  E.g., Hudson, 468 U.S.
at 535, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 408; Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544, 68
L. Ed. 2d at 434.  Ancillary safeguards that protect the
procedural due process rights of an attorney before the DHC
include the ability to file motions and participate in a
contested hearing before that tribunal; the right to be
represented by counsel; the ability to petition the North
Carolina Court of Appeals for prerogative writs, including
prohibition; appeal of right to that court; and the ability to
petition the trial division to stay an order of discipline
pending resolution of an appeal.  N.C.G.S. § 84-28(d1), (h)
-24-
(2007); id. § 84-30 (2007); N.C. R. App. P. 22; 27 NCAC 1B .0114
(June 2008).  Because these postdeprivation remedies adequately
safeguard plaintiff’s right to procedural due process, we
conclude that plaintiff has failed to state a procedural due
process claim for which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
 This holding does not mean that plaintiff cannot
pursue a properly pleaded § 1983 action, nor does it mean that
such an action cannot be filed until the conclusion of
defendant’s administrative action against plaintiff.  A properly
pleaded § 1983 action may proceed in parallel with an
administrative action before a regulatory body.  Nevertheless, in
the case at bar, plaintiff sought to have defendant’s actions
enjoined on the grounds that it was acting maliciously and had
violated his procedural due process rights.  The elements of a
tort action alleging malicious prosecution of an administrative
proceeding are:  “(1) the proceeding was instituted maliciously;
(2) without probable cause; and (3) has terminated in favor of
the person against whom it was initiated.”  Carver, 262 N.C. at
351-52, 137 S.E.2d at 144-45.  Plaintiff’s evidence at the
hearing on the parties’ summary judgment motions not only failed
to forecast that plaintiff could establish these elements, it
demonstrated that plaintiff could not establish them. 
Accordingly, no injunction was justified.
For the reasons stated above, the dismissal entered by
the Court of Appeals is vacated.  However, while the DHC and the
Superior Court of North Carolina have concurrent jurisdiction
over attorney discipline matters, N.C. State Bar v. Randolph, 325
-25-
N.C. 699, 701, 386 S.E.2d 185, 186 (1989) (per curiam), the
superior court division has original subject matter jurisdiction
over constitutional claims, N.C.G.S. § 7A-245(a)(4) (2007). 
Accordingly, this matter is remanded to the Court of Appeals for
further remand to Superior Court, Wilson County, with
instructions to dissolve the permanent injunction, dismiss
plaintiff’s § 1983 substantive due process claim with prejudice,
and dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 procedural due process claim
without prejudice.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON, dissenting.
Because I conclude that plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged a § 1983 claim for vindictive prosecution to survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, I respectfully dissent.  
At the outset, I note that the only two questions
presented by defendant’s petition for discretionary review and
allowed by the Court read as follows: 
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing
the State Bar’s appeal of the injunction of
Wilson County Superior Court as
interlocutory?
2. Did the Superior Court of Wilson County
have jurisdiction to permanently enjoin the
State Bar’s prosecution of an attorney
disciplinary proceeding before the
Disciplinary Hearing Commission?
  
The majority answers the question regarding the interlocutory
nature of the appeal in the affirmative and explains that, while
interlocutory, the appeal affects a substantial right that will
be irreversibly injured or lost if not immediately appealed.  The
majority answers the question regarding the superior court’s
subject matter jurisdiction affirmatively.  Thus, the inquiry
should end.  
However, the majority proceeds to discuss the failure
of plaintiff to state a claim.  That discussion is not necessary
to answer the question regarding jurisdiction presented by the
petition for discretionary review.  Indeed, the majority has
improperly expanded the scope of this appeal and ruled on a
constitutional question in advance of the necessity of deciding
it.  In doing so, the majority fails to exercise the judicial
restraint that we have so often proclaimed.  At the heart of the
-27-
majority’s decision to reach the question is the concern that a
ruling allowing plaintiff to pursue in the courts his § 1983
claim would permit attorneys to circumvent attorney disciplinary
proceedings and obtain favorable treatment in their home
districts.  I am not persuaded, as we entrust our superior court
judges with the ability to fairly adjudicate many weighty issues,
including capital cases.  Moreover, the instant case involves
unique facts and procedural history not likely to arise in other
disciplinary proceedings.
 Interlocutory Appeal
The majority concludes that defendant’s interlocutory
appeal implicates defendant’s substantial right to execute its
statutory duties, and that this right may be lost or prejudiced
if appeal is not immediately taken.  I disagree.  To be sure,
defendant has statutory duties to promulgate and enforce the
rules of professional conduct, duties of significant importance
to the protection of the public and the legal profession. 
N.C.G.S. § 84-23 (2007).  Assuming that defendant’s expeditious
prosecution of Gilbert III implicates this substantial right, it
is defendant’s conduct, and not the interlocutory order in the
instant case, that has unnecessarily delayed the prosecution of
Gilbert III.  It is a cardinal principle that a party may not
avail itself of any error created by the party itself.  See,
e.g., id., § 15A-1443(c) (2007) (“A defendant is not prejudiced .
. . by error resulting from his own conduct.”).  
In the instant case, defendant generated the complaint
on 12 September 2003, despite having access to all of the
underlying information at least three years earlier.  Although
-28-
defendant had all the requisite information available to it prior
to the institution of Gilbert I, defendant chose to proceed
against plaintiff in piecemeal fashion, such that the instant
proceeding is the seventh one to be litigated in various forums
across the state.  Thus, I find unpersuasive defendant’s argument
that immediate review of the trial court’s interlocutory order is
necessary in order to prevent the delayed prosecution of Gilbert
III.
Moreover, defendant has failed to show that the delayed
prosecution of Gilbert III pending the trial court’s resolution
of the instant case could result in irreversible injury or loss
of its substantial right absent immediate review.  Goldston v.
Am. Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 726, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990). 
Indeed, defendant cannot make such a showing.  As defendant’s own
delay in filing the complaint in Gilbert III for approximately
three years indicates, defendant is unlikely to suffer a loss or
irreversible injury merely due to the passage of time.
While conceding that an injunction is not an
irreversible injury, the majority concludes that, because
plaintiff has failed to properly plead his § 1983 claims,
defendant should not be made to await a final judgement.  This
reasoning incorrectly focuses on the merits of plaintiff’s
underlying action instead of the possible injury to or loss of
defendant’s substantial rights.  Yet the strength of defendant’s
appeal on the merits does not dictate whether defendant may
immediately appeal from an interlocutory order.  As we have
repeatedly held, the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss
will not entitle the defendant to immediate appeal of an
-29-
interlocutory order, regardless of the merits of the motion to
dismiss.  E.g., N.C. Consumers Power, Inc. v. Duke Power Co., 285
N.C. 434, 437-38, 206 S.E.2d 178, 181 (1974); Cox v. Cox, 246
N.C. 528, 531, 98 S.E.2d 879, 883 (1957).  Consequently,
defendant is not entitled to immediate review of the trial
court’s order, and this interlocutory appeal should be dismissed.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The only substantive issue for which we allowed
discretionary review in this case was whether the superior court
had subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s § 1983 claim
during the pendency of Gilbert III in the DHC.  After recognizing
that the superior court has subject matter jurisdiction in this
case, the majority inexplicably proceeds to transform defendant’s
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction into a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  In so doing, the
majority unnecessarily expands the scope of this appeal.  As the
majority has addressed the issue, however, I do so as well, and I
conclude that plaintiff’s complaint adequately states a § 1983
claim for deprivation of substantive due process based upon
allegations of vindictive prosecution by defendant.
Vindictive Prosecution
On review of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6), we examine 
“whether, as a matter of law, the allegations
of the complaint, treated as true, are
sufficient to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted under some legal theory. In
ruling upon such a motion, the complaint is
to be liberally construed, and the trial
court should not dismiss the complaint unless
it appears beyond doubt that [the] plaintiff
could prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.”
-30-
Shepard v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 361 N.C. 137, 139, 638 S.E.2d 197,
199 (2006) (quoting Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 111-12, 489
S.E.2d 880, 888 (1997) (alteration in original)).  
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, the plaintiff
must allege (1) the deprivation of a right under the federal
constitution or statute (2) by a person acting under color of
state law.  West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 101 L. Ed. 2d 40,
48-49 (1988).  A vindictive prosecution is one that is designed
to punish an individual for exercising statutory or
constitutional rights to appeal or seek collateral relief in a
prior proceeding.  It is well-established that vindictive
prosecution violates due process.  See, e.g., United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 73 L. Ed. 2d 74, 80 (1982);
Bordenkircher v Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 610
(1978); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628,
635 (1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724, 23 L.
Ed. 2d 656, 668 (1969).
The majority incorrectly concludes that substantive due
process does not protect individuals from vindictive prosecutions
of administrative matters.  Neither the Supreme Court of the
United States nor any other federal court has issued such a
holding.  To the contrary, federal courts have applied the
doctrine to administrative and regulatory proceedings.  See,
e.g., Nat’l Eng’g & Contr’g Co. v. Herman, 181 F.3d 715, 722-23
(6th Cir.) (stating the elements of vindictive prosecution, which
petitioner asserted as a defense to administrative proceedings by
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission for
-31-
violations of OSHA regulations), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1045, 145
L. Ed. 2d 481 (1999); Futernick v. Sumpter Twp., 78 F.3d 1051,
1056 n.7 (6th Cir.) (describing the elements of vindictive
prosecution in the context of a regulatory proceeding), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 928, 136 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1996), overruled on
other grounds by, Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,
564, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060, 1063 (per curiam) (2000); United States
v. One 1985 Mercedes, 917 F.2d 415, 420 (9th Cir.) (stating that
vindictive prosecution claims may raise due process and equal
protection issues in civil forfeiture cases).  Indeed, this Court
would be the first high court in the nation to conclude that the
rule against vindictive prosecution does not apply to
administrative proceedings.  The only limitation that the Supreme
Court of the United States has placed upon the doctrine has been
the refusal to apply a presumption of vindictiveness in all
cases.  See, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799, 104 L.
Ed. 2d 865, 872 (1989); Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384, 73 L. Ed. 2d at
87.  Even in such cases, however, the proponent may establish
actual vindictiveness through objective evidence.  Goodwin, 457
U.S. at 384, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 87.
The import of the rule against vindictive prosecution
is that the State may not punish an individual for the exercise
of his statutory or constitutional rights.  Thus, the central
question in determining whether the rule applies to this case is
whether attorney disbarment is punishment in the constitutional
sense.  The answer to this question is well-established in
Supreme Court precedent: “[d]isbarment, designed to protect the
public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer.”  In re
-32-
Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550, 20 L. Ed. 2d 117, 122 (1968)
(citations omitted).  Consequently, attorneys in such proceedings
are entitled to certain constitutional protections.  See, e.g.,
id., 390 U.S. at 550, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 122 (holding that attorney
disbarment proceedings are quasi-criminal and that attorneys are
entitled to procedural due process); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S.
511, 516, 17 L. Ed. 2d 574, 578 (1967) (holding that attorneys
are entitled to the privilege against self-incrimination because
“[t]he threat of disbarment and the loss of professional
standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful
forms of compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish the privilege”). 
Because attorney disbarment amounts to punishment in the
constitutional sense, I conclude that the vindictive prosecution
of attorney disbarment proceedings implicates due process,
notwithstanding the State’s labeling of such proceedings as
“administrative.”  The question then becomes whether plaintiff
has alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to state a claim
for vindictive prosecution.
Turning to the pleadings in the instant case,
plaintiff’s alleges, inter alia, the following:  
By attempting through Gilbert III
to secure a disciplinary sanction . . . and
by doing so in apparent bad faith and as part
of a continuing effort to menace and
intimidate the Plaintiff, and to exact a
price for the Plaintiff’s having exercised
his statutory and constitutional rights to
defend himself zealously against, and to seek
appellate review . . . the State Bar has
engaged, and is continuing to engage, in a
vindictive prosecution of the Plaintiff in
violation of the United States and North
Carolina constitutions.
. . . .
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          By attempting through Gilbert III
to secure a disciplinary sanction . . . and
by doing so on the basis of intentional
misrepresentations of fact, in apparent bad
faith, and as part of a continuing effort to
menace and intimidate the Plaintiff, and to
exact a price for the Plaintiff’s having
exercised his statutory and constitutional
rights to defend himself zealously against,
and to seek appellate review . . . the State
Bar has deprived the Plaintiff of his right
to substantive due process.
In support of these assertions, plaintiff alleges that
defendant knowingly made false allegations in the underlying
grievance in Gilbert III and notified plaintiff’s attorney of its
intent to deal with plaintiff in such a way as to discourage
other attorneys from similarly obtaining writs of supersedeas. 
Plaintiff also alleges that Gilbert III is the latest in a series
of “sharp practices” against plaintiff that include the
following:  (1) circumventing the procedures for instituting
attorney disciplinary hearings; (2) deterring an attorney witness
from testifying for plaintiff in Gilbert I by filing a grievance
and issuing a subpoena for that attorney’s trust account records
days before the hearing; (3) attempting to impeach another
defense witness in Gilbert I by suggesting that the witness was
convicted of crimes, which defendant knew to be untrue; (4)
knowingly making material misrepresentations of fact to this
Court in oral arguments in Gilbert I; and (5) filing a grievance
in Gilbert III that contained knowing misrepresentations of fact.
Treating the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint as
true, as is required on review of a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges a
deprivation of substantive due process.  Plaintiff clearly had
-34-
7 An attorney who is a party to a disciplinary proceeding
has a statutory right to seek appellate review of the DHC’s final
order in the Court of Appeals.  N.C.G.S. § 84-28(h).  The
attorney may also appeal from any decision of the Court of
Appeals in which there is a dissent.  Id., § 7A-30(2) (2007).  As
part of the appellate process, the attorney may obtain writs of
supersedeas to stay the execution or enforcement of any judgment
or order, including those of the DHC.  N.C. R. App. P. 23.
statutory rights to seek appellate review and obtain writs of
prohibition from the DHC’s disciplinary order in Gilbert I.7 
Plaintiff alleges that defendant instituted Gilbert III to punish
him for having exercised these statutory rights in a prior
disciplinary proceeding.  The law is well-established that the
State may not prosecute an individual for exercising his
statutory or constitutional rights to appeal or seek collateral
relief.  Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 80.  Such
conduct by the State would amount to a deprivation of substantive
due process.  Id.  Plaintiff has adequately alleged a claim for
relief under § 1983.  In concluding that plaintiff’s complaint
contains sufficient allegations to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, I express no opinion as
to whether there is merit to plaintiff’s claim.  I conclude only
that having sufficiently alleged a § 1983 claim, the attorney in
this case is entitled to his day in court, as the countless
attorneys of our state routinely assist the public in doing.
Having abandoned judicial restraint, the majority not
only expands the scope of this appeal but also incorrectly
analyzes plaintiff’s complaint as one for malicious prosecution. 
In his complaint, plaintiff seeks relief for vindictive
prosecution only and makes no mention of either the cause or
elements of malicious prosecution.  The essence of a malicious
-35-
prosecution is the institution of legal proceedings with malice
and without probable cause.  See Best v. Duke Univ., 337 N.C.
742, 749, 448 S.E.2d 506, 510 (1994); Greer v. Skyway Broad. Co.,
256 N.C. 382, 389, 124 S.E.2d 98, 103 (1962).  The gravamen of
plaintiff’s complaint is that defendant instituted Gilbert III to
punish him for exercising his statutory rights to appeal and
obtain the writs of supersedeas, not that defendant lacked
probable cause and that Gilbert I or II terminated in his favor. 
I find no basis in the record for the majority’s treatment of
plaintiff’s complaint as one for malicious prosecution. 
In sum, because the interlocutory order in the instant
case does not affect a substantial right that may be lost or
irreversibly injured absent immediate review, I would affirm the
decision of the Court of Appeals to dismiss the instant appeal. 
Assuming arguendo that the merits of defendant’s appeal are
properly before this Court, I conclude that the trial court
correctly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss because (1) the
superior court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s §
1983 actions and (2) plaintiff adequately alleged a deprivation
of substantive due process.  I therefore respectfully dissent.
No. 41PA07 - Gilbert v. North Carolina State Bar
Justice HUDSON dissenting.
Because I conclude that the North Carolina State Bar
has failed to show that this interlocutory appeal adversely
affects a substantial right, I would hold that the Court of
Appeals correctly dismissed defendant’s appeal and that
discretionary review was improvidently allowed.  Therefore I
respectfully dissent.
Without citing authority, the majority concludes that
“defendant’s right to carry out its duties to investigate and
[discipline lawyers] is substantial.”  The majority then
acknowledges that the mere fact that defendant has been enjoined
is not deprivation of a substantial right, but nonetheless
concludes that “because the trial court’s permanent injunction
may prevent defendant from executing its statutory duties while
plaintiff pursues an improperly pleaded action, an injury
arises.”  
The only authority in support of this latter
proposition is a citation to a 1977 opinion from the Court of
Appeals concerning an injunction against the North Carolina Board
of Transportation, barring it from removing a billboard owned by
the plaintiff.  Freeland v. Greene, 33 N.C. App. 537, 540, 235
S.E.2d 852, 854 (1977).  While the Court of Appeals there stated
that it was considering the Board’s interlocutory appeal of the
injunction because it “adversely affect[ed] important rights in
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connection with the performance by them of [statutory] duties,”
it provided no explanation. As such the Freeland opinion, which
is not binding on this Court, gives little guidance on the
analysis of this issue.  The court’s holding then rested on the
conclusion that “plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, [such that] this action should have been dismissed.” 
Id. at 544, 235 S.E.2d at 856.  
Here the Court of Appeals has described the substantial
right at stake as defendant’s ability to “promulgate[] rules of
professional conduct to protect the public from unethical
behavior by attorneys. . . .[,] conduct hearings and impose
penalties in disciplinary matters.”  As noted by the court in its
decision below, “defendant fails to articulate how delaying its
appeal until the case is resolved will jeopardize its ability to
enforce the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Nor does defendant
identify any circumstance making review of the particular claim,
which alleges that plaintiff mishandled $290 in 1998, of such
urgency that the appeal cannot be delayed,” until the issue of
damages has been determined.  Gilbert v. N.C. State Bar, 180 N.C.
App. 690, 639 S.E.2d 143, 2006 WL 3718000, at *3 (2006)
(unpublished).  
Likewise, my review finds no stated explanation of how
the trial court’s order enjoins defendant’s ability to discharge
its statutory duties in general, as opposed to pursuing its
specific complaint against plaintiff.  Neither does the trial
court’s order contain any broad prohibition against defendant
carrying out its statutory duties.  Instead, the trial court
enjoined defendant from continuing its prosecution of plaintiff
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in one specific action to recover $290 in client funds allegedly
misused by plaintiff.  In so ordering, the trial court found
defendant’s pursuit of that action to be “but the latest in a
series of unremitting, increasingly disturbing, and, ultimately,
unlawful acts and practices that have been designed and intended
by the State Bar to . . . punish and retaliate against the
Plaintiff . . . and otherwise harass, menace and intimidate the
Plaintiff.”
For those reasons, as well as a number of other fact-
specific bases discussed in its seventy-seven page order, the
trial court granted summary judgment to plaintiff on his claims
for vindictive prosecution and violations of his rights to
substantive and procedural due process, as related only to the
most recent action brought by defendant against him.  In
addition, the trial court permanently enjoined defendant from
“prosecuting or proceeding further with the prosecution of the
claims and charges asserted in the case” and from publishing in
any form “the past, present, or future pendency of the
disciplinary action,” specified by file number, against
plaintiff.  This language very precisely targets and enjoins only
defendant’s actions against plaintiff and in no way impedes or
restricts its ability to discharge its general statutory duties.
More importantly, defendant has failed to articulate
what injury will result from any deprivation of a substantial
right, if it is not corrected now, prior to final judgment as to
all claims and controversies between the parties.  See, e.g.,
Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 162, 522 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1999)
(“‘Essentially a two-part test has developed--the right itself
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must be substantial and the deprivation of that substantial right
must potentially work injury . . . if not corrected before appeal
from final judgment.’” (quoting Goldston v. Am. Motors Corp., 326
N.C. 723, 726, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990) (alteration in
original))); Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361-62, 57
S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950) (“A final judgment is one which disposes
of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be
judicially determined between them in the trial court.”
(citations omitted)); see also Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint
Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 380, 444 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1994) (“It
is not the duty of this Court to construct arguments for or find
support for appellant's right to appeal from an interlocutory 
order; instead, the appellant has the burden of showing this
Court that the order deprives the appellant of a substantial
right which would be jeopardized absent a review prior to a final
determination on the merits.” (citations omitted)). 
It is also noteworthy that the trial judge here
explicitly declined to certify this interlocutory appeal for our
immediate review pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure.  See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b)
(2007); Gilbert, 2006 WL 3718000, at *2 (“The defendant asked the
court to certify the case for immediate appellate review, and the
trial court expressly denied this request . . . .”). 
Furthermore, this is not a case in which the order has deprived
the appellant of one of its substantive legal claims.  See, e.g.,
Charles Vernon Floyd, Jr. & Sons, Inc. v. Cape Fear Farm Credit,
ACA, 350 N.C. 47, 49, 51, 510 S.E.2d 156, 158, 159 (1999)
(holding that the trial court’s election-of-remedies order
-40-
“involved the merits and affected the judgment” because it
“deprived [the] plaintiffs of one of their claims”), overruled in
part on other grounds by Dep’t of Transp. v. Rowe, 351 N.C. 172,
176, 521 S.E.2d 707, 710 (1999).  Defendant could still raise its
issues pertaining to the trial court’s order after the hearing on
damages.  Finally, defendant does not face the possibility here
of inconsistent verdicts or outcomes at trial.  See, e.g., Green
v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 608, 290 S.E.2d 593, 596 (1982)
(allowing an interlocutory appeal due to “the possibility that a
party will be prejudiced by different juries in separate trials
rendering inconsistent verdicts on the same factual issue.”).  
Instead, the sole effect of our dismissing this appeal
as interlocutory--beyond defendant perhaps having to wait for any
recovery--would be simply to delay a determination of the
substantive merits of defendant’s arguments until appeal after
entry of an order on damages.  Simple delay does not amount to a
deprivation or impairment of a substantial right; rather,
preventing such delays underpins our general reluctance to hear
interlocutory appeals.  See Veazey, 231 N.C. at 363, 57 S.E.2d at
382 (“There is no more effective way to procrastinate the
administration of justice than that of bringing cases to an
appellate court piecemeal through the medium of successive
appeals from intermediate orders.”); State ex rel. Edmisten v.
Fayetteville St. Christian Sch., 299 N.C. 351, 358, 261 S.E.2d
908, 913 (“The statutes and rules governing appellate review are
more than procedural niceties.  They are designed to streamline
the judicial process, to forestall delay rather than engender
it.”), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 807, 66 L. Ed. 2d 11 (1980). 
-41-
Such a holding would also be consistent with past decisions of
this Court.  See, e.g., id. at 355, 261 S.E.2d at 911 (dismissing
as interlocutory an appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss
and the grant of a preliminary injunction in part because the
denial of a motion to dismiss “merely serves to continue the
action then pending.  No final judgment is involved, and the
disappointed movant is generally not deprived of any substantial
right which cannot be protected by timely appeal from the trial
court’s ultimate disposition of the entire controversy on its
merits.”).
The majority’s holding here goes beyond our long-
standing jurisprudence describing the types of substantial
rights, and possible impairment of those rights, that justify
appellate review of an interlocutory order.  The course it sets
potentially opens floodgates that should remain closed.  As such,
I respectfully dissent.