Title: State ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Services, Inc. v. Industrial Commission

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-
8024.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-8024 
THE STATE EX REL OHIO PRESBYTERIAN RETIREMENT SERVICES, INC., 
APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Indus. 
Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8024.] 
Workers’ compensation—Industrial Commission does not have authority to award 
an injured worker permanent-partial-disability compensation under R.C. 
4123.57(A) when the worker has been previously found to be permanently 
totally disabled under R.C. 4123.58 in the same claim. 
(No. 2015-1074—Submitted May 3, 2016—Decided December 8, 2016.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 14AP-624,  
2015-Ohio-2122. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellee Sherry L. Redwine was receiving permanent-total-disability 
benefits based solely on the psychological condition in her workers’ compensation 
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claim.  She subsequently applied for permanent-partial-disability benefits based 
upon the physical conditions in the same claim. 
{¶ 2} Appellee Industrial Commission determined that an injured worker is 
not barred from receiving compensation for permanent partial disability for a 
condition or conditions in a claim that formed no part of the basis for a prior finding 
of permanent total disability in the same claim.  Redwine’s employer, appellant, 
Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Services, Inc. (“OPRS”), filed a complaint in the 
Tenth District Court of Appeals seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the 
commission to vacate its order.  The court of appeals denied the writ. 
{¶ 3} We hold that the commission has no authority to award an injured 
worker permanent-partial-disability compensation under R.C. 4123.57(A) when the 
worker has been previously found to be permanently totally disabled under R.C. 
4123.58 in the same claim, even when the new finding is based on a condition or 
conditions in the claim that formed no part of the basis for the prior finding of 
permanent total disability.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and grant OPRS’s request for a writ of mandamus. 
I. Background 
{¶ 4} On August 13, 2003, Sherry Redwine was injured at work.  She filed 
a workers’ compensation claim that was allowed for the following conditions:  
lumbosacral strain, radiculopathy right lower extremity, aggravation of pre-existing 
degenerative disc disease, depression, and ruptured disc at L4-5 with free disc 
fragment. 
{¶ 5} Redwine applied for permanent-total-disability compensation.  The 
commission concluded that Redwine was unable to perform any sustained 
remunerative employment due solely to the medical impairment caused by the 
allowed psychological condition in her claim and awarded her benefits beginning 
July 12, 2010, to continue until her death.  The commission relied on the medical 
reports of Roberto Madrigal, Ph.D., Thomas W. Heitkemper, Ph.D., and Michael 
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E. Miller, M.D.  Because the decision was based exclusively on a medical 
condition, the commission was not required to consider any nonmedical disability 
factors. 
{¶ 6} In August 2013, Redwine applied for permanent-partial-disability 
compensation.  She conceded that she was not entitled to permanent-partial-
disability benefits for her psychological condition (for which she had been granted 
permanent-total-disability compensation), but she maintained that she was entitled 
to this award based on the physical conditions allowed in her claim. 
{¶ 7} A district hearing officer denied her application based on a lack of 
statutory authority for concurrent awards under R.C. 4123.57(A) and 4123.58.  In 
addition, the hearing officer noted that the physical and psychological conditions 
were the result of the same workplace injury and under State ex rel. Murray v. 
Indus. Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 473, 588 N.E.2d 855 (1992), a claimant is precluded 
from receiving simultaneous benefits for permanent partial disability and 
permanent total disability for the same injury. 
{¶ 8} On reconsideration, a staff hearing officer concluded that a claimant 
is not barred from concurrent compensation for permanent partial disability if it is 
based on conditions that were not the basis for the prior finding of permanent total 
disability in the same claim.  The hearing officer relied in part on the commission’s 
analysis of the same issue in claim No. 02-354357 involving a different injured 
worker.  In that case, the commission determined that the analysis of concurrent 
awards focuses on an injured worker’s allowed medical conditions, not the injury 
or claim, citing State ex rel. Missik v. Youngstown, 65 Ohio St.3d 189, 602 N.E.2d 
633 (1992), and State ex rel. Hoskins v. Indus. Comm., 87 Ohio St.3d 560, 722 
N.E.2d 66 (2000). 
{¶ 9} OPRS filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, alleging that there 
was no statutory authority for the commission’s order and therefore it was not 
supported by some evidence.  A magistrate determined that the writ should be 
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denied.  The magistrate relied on State ex rel. Mosley v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. 
Franklin No. 13AP-127, 2014-Ohio-1710, and concluded that because the 
psychological condition formed the basis for the permanent-total-disability award, 
Redwine’s physical conditions could be the basis of permanent-partial-disability 
compensation.  The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s decision and denied 
the writ. 
{¶ 10} This matter is before the court on the direct appeal of OPRS. 
II. Analysis 
{¶ 11} OPRS seeks an extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the 
commission to vacate its decision of July 24, 2014, in which the commission 
concluded that an injured worker is not barred from receiving compensation for 
permanent partial disability for a condition or conditions in a claim that were not a 
basis for a prior finding of permanent total disability in the same claim.  According 
to OPRS, the commission’s decision was an abuse of discretion because there is no 
statutory authority for concurrent payment of permanent-partial-disability and 
permanent-total-disability compensation in the same claim. 
{¶ 12} A mandatory writ may issue against the commission if it has 
incorrectly interpreted Ohio law.  State ex rel. Gassmann v. Indus. Comm., 41 Ohio 
St.2d 64, 65, 322 N.E.2d 660 (1975).  The issue before us is whether the 
commission’s decision to consider Redwine’s application for permanent-partial-
disability benefits, after she was previously awarded compensation for permanent 
total disability in the same claim, was supported by the law.  We find that it was 
not. 
A.  Statutory authority is absent  
{¶ 13} Compensation rights for injured workers are limited to those 
conferred by statute.  Westenberger v. Indus. Comm., 135 Ohio St. 211, 213, 20 
N.E.2d 252 (1939).  R.C. 4123.54 provides that with certain exceptions, every 
employee who is injured in the course of employment is entitled to receive 
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compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury and such medical services 
as are provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act. 
{¶ 14} There are two types of compensation at issue in this case.  
Compensation for permanent partial disability is authorized by R.C. 4123.57(A) for 
“the percentage of the employee’s permanent disability * * * based upon that 
condition of the employee resulting from the injury or occupational disease and 
causing permanent impairment.”  It is intended to compensate injured claimants 
who can still work.  State ex rel. Kaska v. Indus. Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 743, 746, 
591 N.E.2d 235 (1992). 
{¶ 15} Compensation for vocational permanent total disability is authorized 
by R.C. 4123.58(A) when “the allowed conditions either alone or with nonmedical 
disability factors render the claimant unable to do sustained remunerative work.”  
State ex rel. Miller v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 418, 2002-Ohio-6664, 780 
N.E.2d 268, ¶ 8.  The purpose of permanent-total-disability benefits is “to 
compensate an injured worker for impairment of earning capacity.”  Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(1). 
{¶ 16} In certain limited instances, the General Assembly has provided for 
payment of concurrent awards.  For instance, R.C. 4123.57(C) authorizes 
compensation for partial impairment in addition to temporary-total-disability 
compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.56, and R.C. 4123.58(E) authorizes 
compensation for permanent total disability in addition to scheduled loss benefits 
under R.C. 4123.57(B).  However, neither R.C. 4123.57 nor 4123.58 expressly 
authorizes concurrent payment of permanent-partial-disability and permanent-
total-disability compensation.  The conspicuous absence of any reference to 
concurrent payment of benefits in the statute “evinces a legislative intent to prohibit 
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simultaneous receipt of these benefits.”  Murray, 63 Ohio St.3d at 475, 588 N.E.2d 
855.1   
{¶ 17} The court of appeals in this case justified its decision based on R.C. 
4123.95, which mandates a liberal construction of the pertinent statutes in favor of 
injured workers.  OPRS, citing Armstrong v. John R. Jurgensen Co., 136 Ohio St.3d 
58, 2013-Ohio-2237, 990 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 13, and State ex rel. Williams v. Colasurd, 
71 Ohio St.3d 642, 644, 646 N.E.2d 830 (1995), argues that R.C. 4123.95 does not 
allow a court to read into a statute something that cannot reasonably be implied 
from the statute’s language.  We agree.  R.C. 4123.95 does not authorize courts to 
alter the meaning of unambiguous statutory language.  Armstrong, ¶ 13.  Thus, the 
court of appeals could not read into either R.C. 4123.57 or 4123.58 authority to 
award concurrent permanent-partial-disability and permanent-total-disability 
compensation. 
B.  Case law does not support concurrent benefits in the same claim 
{¶ 18} OPRS also argued that case law does not support concurrent awards 
of permanent-total-disability and permanent-partial-disability compensation in the 
same claim. 
{¶ 19} This court has sanctioned payment of concurrent permanent-partial-
disability and permanent-total-disability compensation in limited circumstances.  In 
State ex rel. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm., 62 Ohio St.2d 147, 404 
N.E.2d 141 (1980), the claimant had been found to be permanently and totally 
disabled as a result of coal miner’s pneumoconiosis.  He had filed a separate claim 
for a work-related low-back injury and had been awarded permanent-partial-
                                                 
1 Murray construed a version of R.C. 4123.57 in effect prior to 1986.  In 1986, the statute was 
amended to eliminate temporary-partial-disability compensation and to limit a claimant’s filing of 
an application for permanent-partial-disability compensation from after the “latest period of total 
disability” to the “latest period of payments [for temporary total disability],” a change most likely 
intended to reflect the statute’s elimination of temporary partial disability.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 307, 
141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 767.   
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disability compensation.  The court held that the claimant was entitled to 
permanent-partial-disability compensation for the back injury even though he was 
already receiving permanent-total-disability benefits as a result of coal miner’s 
pneumoconiosis in a different claim.  Id. at 149.  The court reasoned that this was 
consistent with the philosophy underlying the different types of compensation—an 
award for permanent and total disability is generally aimed at compensating for 
impairment of earning capacity, while benefits for partial disability are more akin 
to damages for work-related injuries.  Id., citing State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. 
Indus. Comm, 42 Ohio St.2d 278, 282, 328 N.E.2d 387 (1975). 
{¶ 20} In State ex rel. Litten v. Indus. Comm., 65 Ohio St.3d 178, 602 
N.E.2d 624 (1992), we agreed, following Consolidation Coal, that the claimant was 
eligible to pursue permanent-partial-disability compensation for his foot injury 
while receiving permanent-total-disability compensation for medical conditions 
involving the wrist, back, and shoulder in a different claim. 
{¶ 21} Likewise, in Missik, 65 Ohio St.3d 189, 602 N.E.2d 633, we held 
that an award of permanent-total-disability compensation based on the injured 
worker’s back injury in one claim did not bar eligibility for permanent-partial-
disability compensation for a neck and shoulder injury in a different claim. 
{¶ 22} In other cases, we disapproved concurrent or overlapping 
compensation in the same claim.  Murray, 63 Ohio St.3d 473, 588 N.E.2d 855, 
decided consolidated cases, each involving a claimant who had been declared 
permanently and totally disabled as a result of workplace injury not specifically 
identified in the opinion.  Each claimant later applied for permanent-partial-
disability compensation for the same injury.  Murray holds that a claimant may not 
concurrently receive compensation for permanent partial disability and permanent 
total disability for the same injury.  The court noted that any statutory “[r]eference 
to concurrent payment of [permanent-partial-disability] and [permanent-total-
disability] benefits is conspicuously absent.”  Id. at 475. 
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{¶ 23} In Hoskins, 87 Ohio St.3d 560, 722 N.E.2d 66, the claimant was 
receiving permanent-partial-disability compensation for a work-related injury (not 
identified in the opinion), and the commission later granted permanent-total-
disability compensation in the same claim.  There was a period during which the 
payment of the two awards overlapped.  Citing Murray, we held that a claimant 
could not receive both types of compensation for the same conditions at the same 
time, regardless of the sequence of payment. 
{¶ 24} The interchangeable use of the terms “injury,” “body part,” and 
“condition,” without additional clarification, has resulted in the inconsistent 
application of the law.  Murray, 63 Ohio St.3d 473, 588 N.E.2d 855, considered 
concurrent awards for the same “injury” within the context of one claim.  The court 
did not identify the injury, so we may infer that the court intended to include all 
allowed conditions by its use of the word “injury.”  Hoskins focused on the 
sequence of the concurrent payments for the same injury (also not identified) within 
one claim.  We concluded that it was inappropriate for the two types of benefits to 
overlap in the same claim. 
{¶ 25} To clarify any perceived inconsistencies in our prior cases, we 
reiterate that for purposes of workers’ compensation, an “injury” is “any injury, 
whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, 
received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.”2  
R.C. 4123.01(C).  A work-related injury is the occurrence that triggers the filing of 
a report with the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation to open a claim. 
{¶ 26} Once the claim is approved, the injured worker is entitled to receive 
compensation and benefits for only the allowed medical condition or conditions set 
forth in the claim.  Ward v. Kroger Co., 106 Ohio St.3d 35, 2005-Ohio-3560, 830 
N.E.2d 1155, ¶ 10.  The allowed conditions are narrowly defined medical diagnoses 
                                                 
2 A claim may also be initiated as a result of an occupational disease or accidental death that occurred 
in the course of employment.  Because this claim does not involve either, we address only injuries. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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supported by medical documentation.  Multiple allowed conditions may be 
associated with a particular body part.  In addition, a psychiatric condition must 
arise from a work-related injury or occupational disease to be an allowed condition 
that is compensable.  R.C. 4123.01(C)(1). 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 27} There is no authority for the commission to award an injured worker 
permanent-partial-disability compensation under R.C. 4123.57(A) when there has 
been a prior award of permanent-total-disability compensation under R.C. 4123.58 
in the same claim.  The commission abused its discretion when it decided to 
consider Redwine’s application for permanent-partial-disability compensation in 
the same claim in which she was already receiving permanent-total-disability 
compensation.  Thus, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals denying 
OPRS’s complaint for a writ of mandamus. 
{¶ 28} Our opinion today is consistent with the overall purpose of Ohio’s 
workers’ compensation system, which is to provide to workers compensation for 
loss sustained on account of a workplace injury.  Armstrong, 136 Ohio St.3d 58, 
2013-Ohio-2237, 990 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 9.  Our conclusion is also reinforced by the 
purpose of permanent-total-disability compensation—to compensate for the 
impairment of earning capacity.  These are lifetime benefits paid to an injured 
worker for “the inability to perform sustained remunerative employment due to the 
allowed conditions in the claim.”  Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(1).  It logically 
follows that a claimant who is receiving permanent-total-disability compensation 
is ineligible for concurrent permanent-partial-disability compensation based on a 
different condition in the same claim. 
{¶ 29} OPRS demonstrated a clear right to the relief requested and a clear 
legal duty on the part of the commission to provide the relief.  State ex rel. Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 117 Ohio St.3d 480, 2008-Ohio-1593, 884 N.E.2d 
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1075, ¶ 9.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and grant a 
writ of mandamus. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., 
concur. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O’NEILL, J. 
_________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 30} The majority opinion correctly points out that this court has 
sanctioned payment of concurrent permanent-partial-disability and permanent-
total-disability benefits for various injured claimants in the past.  Majority opinion 
at ¶ 19.  The reason concurrent payment of these benefits is sometimes necessary 
is that the purpose of permanent-total-disability compensation (to compensate for 
impairment of earnings capacity) is different from the purpose of permanent-
partial-disability compensation (to compensate for work-related injuries).  State ex 
rel. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm., 62 Ohio St.2d 147, 149, 404 N.E.2d 
141 (1980), citing State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 42 Ohio St.2d 
278, 282, 328 N.E.2d 387 (1975). 
{¶ 31} In this case, the claimant received an award of permanent-total-
disability benefits because her psychological condition makes it impossible for her 
to perform sustained remunerative employment.  She also sought compensation for 
work-related physical injuries.  The staff hearing officer concluded that the injuries 
were not the basis for the award of permanent-total-disability benefits and awarded 
concurrent permanent-partial-disability benefits based on the claimant’s physical 
injuries. 
{¶ 32} The court of appeals affirmed the award of concurrent benefits.  
Today, this court reverses the court of appeals, stating that the commission does not 
January Term, 2016 
 
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have statutory authority to award concurrent benefits, even though nothing in the 
statutory scheme specifically prohibits granting concurrent benefits. 
{¶ 33} I acknowledge that the statutory scheme also does not specifically 
allow concurrent benefits.  Unlike the majority, I do not assume that that means 
concurrent benefits are prohibited.  Instead, I read the statutory scheme liberally in 
favor of the injured claimant, as required by R.C. 4123.95. 
{¶ 34} If the public policy of this state, as evidenced by the enactments of 
the General Assembly, does not countenance the award of concurrent benefits, the 
General Assembly could easily amend the statutory scheme.  But even though 
concurrent benefits have been awarded in the past, as noted in the majority opinion, 
the General Assembly has not evinced its desire to prohibit concurrent benefits.  
Therefore, I would allow concurrent benefits in this case. 
{¶ 35} I would affirm the court of appeals.  I dissent. 
 
O’NEILL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Rosemary D. Welsh, for 
appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Andrew Alatis, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
Robert A. Muehleisen, for appellee Sherry L. Redwine. 
Philip J. Fulton Law Office, Philip J. Fulton and Chelsea J. Fulton, for amici 
curiae Ohio Association of Claimants’ Council and Ohio Association for Justice. 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Robert A. Minor, for amicus 
curiae Ohio Self-Insurers Association. 
Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin and Michael J. Hickey, for 
amicus curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce. 
_________________