Title: MARRIAGE OF KNUDSON

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-267 IN THE SUPRENE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF STANLEY M. KNUDSON, Petitioner and Appellant, VS . FRANCES ANNE KNUDSON, Respondent and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District, In and For the County of Hill. Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Berger, Anderson Law Firm, Billings, Montana For Respondent: John F. Iwen, Great Falls, Montana Submitted on briefs: December 4, 1980 Decided: E B 9 - lgtgf led : -pa?+ w Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Stanley Knudson and Frances Knudson obtained a decree of d i s s o l u t i o n i n t h e H i l l County D i s t r i c t Court on October 12, 1978. The husband appealed from t h e property s e t t l e m e n t provisions of t h e decree. The judgment was reversed i n p a r t and affirmed i n p a r t by t h i s Court. Knudson v. Knudson (1980) Mont. , 606 P.2d 130, 37 St.Rep. 147. Post-appeal motions were f i l e d by both p a r t i e s , and the husband now appeals from orders of the D i s t r i c t Court r e - q u i r i n g him t o pay i n t e r e s t from t h e d a t e of the decree and t o pay t h e wife a reasonable r e n t a l value f o r the r e a l property awarded t o her under the decree and disposing of t h e p a r t i e s 1 personal property. I n August 1978 t h e p a r t i e s obtained a divorce decree purporting t o d i v i d e t h e e s t a t e 60 percent t o the husband and 40 percent t o t h e wife. Under t h i s decree the wife w a s t o r e c e i v e t h e farmhouse and o u t buildings, valued a t $87,000, and $113,000 i n cash, payable $13,000 i n September 1978 and $6,000 annually t h e r e a f t e r . The wife moved t o amend t h i s decree, and i n October 1978 t h e D i s t r i c t Court granted her motion. The c o u r t found t h a t she was e n t i t l e d t o an addi- t i o n a l $20,000, representing her s h a r e of her husband's r a i l r o a d r e t i r e m e n t pension which had n o t been o r i g i n a l l y considered by the court. The husband appealed t o t h i s Court s o l e l y on t h e b a s i s of t h e i n c l u s i o n of t h e pension. W e reversed with regard t o the i n c l u s i o n of t h e pension and af- firmed t h e balance of t h e decree. See Knudson v. Knudson, supra. Both p a r t i e s then f i l e d post-appeal motions. The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t t h e wife was e n t i t l e d t o a reason- a b l e r e n t from t h e husband f o r t h e time he occupied t h e farmhouse awarded t o her. The c o u r t determined t h a t $6,000 was a f a i r r e n t f o r t h e period between October 1978 and A p r i l 1980. The c o u r t a l s o required the husband t o pay i n t e r e s t on the $13,000 payment which was due i n September 1978 and t h e $6,000 payment due i n September 1979. The D i s t r i c t Court a l s o reconsidered t h e property d i s t r i b u t i o n and purported t o equally d i v i d e c e r t a i n personal property n o t mentioned i n the o r i g i n a l decree. Stanley Knudson o f f e r s t h r e e i s s u e s f o r t h i s Court's review: 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n reconsidering d i s t r i - bution of personal property a f t e r the cause had been remanded by t h i s Court? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n i t s a c t u a l d i s t r i - bution of t h e personal property? Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n d i r e c t i n g Stanley Knudson t o pay t o h i s wife r e n t and i n t e r e s t d a t i n g from t h e c o u r t ' s decree? I n our r e s o l u t i o n of t h e f i r s t appeal of t h i s case, w e ruled: "The decree of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed except i n s o f a r as it awards t h e wife a share of t h e husband's r a i l r o a d r e t i r e m e n t pension. This cause is remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r amendment of judgment i n accordance with t h i s opinion." 606 P.2d a t 135, 37 St.Rep. a t 153. The husband contends i n t h i s appeal t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court is r e l i t i g a t i n g i s s u e s regarding t h e couple's personal property. H e argues t h a t t h e personal property disposed of by t h e D i s t r i c t Court had already been d i s t r i b u t e d and t h a t d i s t r i b u t i o n affirmed by t h i s Court i n Knudson v. Knudson, supra. W e do n o t agree. O n May 1 4 , 1980, the D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t , " [ t i h e i s s u e of t h e d i v i s i o n of personal property, mainly household furnishings, located a t t h e family residence and respon- d e n t ' s apartment, was n o t r a i s e d a t t h e o r i g i n a l proceedings o r disposed of by t h e c o u r t ' s decree. " This Court can f i n d no s p e c i f i c d i s t r i b u t i o n of property which w a s already disposed of by the f i r s t decree. To the e x t e n t t h e D i s t r i c t Court determined t h e p a r t i e s ' r i g h t s i n personal property previously unaccounted f o r , o r excluded from, the f i r s t decree, t h e husband's argument t h a t t h e judge was r e l i t i - g a t i n g t h e personal property d i s t r i b u t i o n i s unpersuasive. W e conclude t h a t t h e judge w a s merely completing h i s i n i t i a l t a s k of s e t t l i n g t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . I n view of the f a c t t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the household f u r n i s h i n g s was a continuation of t h e c o u r t ' s o r i g i n a l proceeding, w e a r e obliged t o r e s p e c t i t s judgment i n t h e absence of a r b i t r a r y a c t i o n o r t h e f a i l u r e t o employ conscious judgment. I n re Marriage of Jacobson (1979), Mont. , 600 P.2d 1183, 36 St.Rep. 1773, 1776. Nor do we accept husband's argument regarding t h e District Court' s imposition of r e n t . Husband maintains t h a t had t h e wife e i t h e r made a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a posting of a supersedeas bond, moved t o d i s s o l v e t h e s t a y of execution, o r asked t h e c o u r t t o impose a r e n t a l a s p a r t of t h e s t a y of execution, he would have had the option of continued occu- pancy o r removal. Because of h i s w i f e ' s i n a c t i o n , t h e husband contends he w a s l i m i t e d i n h i s choices and should n o t be required t o pay r e n t . W e w i l l n o t allow t h e husband t o b e n e f i t from h i s own r e c a l c i t r a n c e . From t h e d a t e of the i n i t i a l decree g r a n t i n g h i s wife t h e property, he knew o r should have known t h a t he was using and occupying r e a l t y which w a s n o t h i s own. W e f i n d t h a t it was h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , n o t t h e w i f e ' s , t o proceed toward a determination and p r o t e c t i o n of h i s r i g h t s . This Court w i l l n o t allow a person t o b e n e f i t from h i s own i n a c t i o n . A s a matter of f a i r n e s s , w e conclude t h a t t h e husband's occupancy of h i s w i f e ' s property from t h e d a t e of t h e i n i t i a l decree makes him l i a b l e t o her f o r reasonable r e n t a l value. I n determining t h a t value, w e a r e obliged t o r e s p e c t t h e D i s t r i c t Court's judgment, and i n t h e absence of a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n , t h a t judgment w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d on appeal. N o such abuse took p l a c e here. Lumby v. Doetch (1979), - Mont. , 600 P.2d 200, 202, 36 St.Rep. 1684, 1687. I n t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h e wife claimed i n t e r e s t on $13,000 from t h e d a t e of t h e judgment and on $6,000 from September 1, 1979. Husband does n o t deny l i a b i l i t y f o r t h e i n t e r e s t on t h e $6,000, b u t a s s e r t s t h a t because of t h e s t a y of execution, he owes no i n t e r e s t on t h e $13,000. Section 25-9-205, MCA, provides t h a t i n t e r e s t i s pay- a b l e on judgments a t t h e r a t e of 10 percent per annum; b u t , under Section 2, Chap. 649, Laws of 1979, t h a t r a t e a p p l i e s only t o t h e balance owing on judgments from and a f t e r J u l y 1, 1979. P r i o r t o t h a t d a t e , t h e previous l e g a l r a t e of 6 percent a p p l i e s . Rule 31, M.R.App.Civ.P., provides i n r e l e v a n t p a r t t h a t , " [ i l f a judgment f o r money i n a c i v i l case i s affirmed, whatever i n t e r e s t i s allowed by law s h a l l be payable from t h e d a t e t h e judgment was rendered o r made i n the d i s t r i c t c o u r t . " The husband maintains t h a t when he l i m i t e d h i s appeal t o t h e i s s u e of h i s retirement pension, h i s wife could have e l e c t e d t o accept t h e o t h e r b e n e f i t s i n t h e decree and could have asked t h e c o u r t t o d i s s o l v e t h e s t a y of execution; t h a t her f a i l u r e t o do s o o r t o ask t h a t t h e c o u r t r e q u i r e t h e payment of r e n t f o r t h e r e a l property a s a condition t o t h e s t a y , amounted t o a waiver of any claim on her p a r t f o r i n t e r e s t o r r e n t ; t h a t , i n f a c t , t h e s t a y was n o t entered u n t i l a f t e r she f i l e d her n o t i c e of appeal; and t h a t it can be assumed t h a t wife permitted t h e s t a y t o continue because it inured t o her b e n e f i t . W e do n o t agree. W e held i n Resner v. Northern Pac. R.R. Co. (1973), 161 Mont. 177, 505 P.2d 86, t h a t a judgment bears i n t e r e s t from t h e d a t e of its e n t r y i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t even though it i s s u b j e c t t o d i r e c t a t t a c k , c i t i n g Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo (1961), 55 Cal.2d 439, 1 1 Cal.Rptr. 580, 582, 360 P.2d 76, 78. Although t h e s e cases d i d n o t involve a s t a y of judgment, they stand f o r t h e proposition t h a t once a person i s l i a b l e f o r a money judgment, and payment i s n o t made, t h e person e n t i t l e d t o t h e judgment i s f u r t h e r e n t i t l e d t o a f a i r r a t e of i n t e r e s t . The husband moved t h e c o u r t f o r a s t a y of execution. Thereafter, he made no attempt t o d i s s o l v e t h e s t a y himself o r make any attempt t o determine what o b l i g a t i o n s were accruing. This Court w i l l n o t allow t h e husband t o avoid paying i n t e r e s t merely by arguing t h a t h i s wife d i d n o t do enough t o secure it. W e w i l l d e f e r t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s judgment i n t h i s matter, f o r w e determine t h a t i n t e r e s t w a s properly imposed under Rule 31, M.R.App.Civ.P., and a p p l i - cable case law. This cause i s affirmed on a l l i s s u e s . W e concur: %&a w - a d b d J q Chief J u s t i c e V Q j 4 % ~ . J u s t i c e s This cause was submitted p r i o r t o January 5, 1981.