Title: Penrose v. Garcia, Jr., et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: June 16, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-0871 
_________________________ 
 
John M. Penrose and Amy Lynn Penrose 
 
v.  
 
Jose Garcia, Jr.; Nereyda P. Garcia; Tammy Chavers; Prattville 
Real Estate Properties, LLC, d/b/a Re/Max Properties II; Greg 
Watts; AAA Inspections, LLC; James E. Brown; and Brown 
Properties, Inc. 
 
 
 
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court 
(CV-22-900055) 
 
 
MITCHELL, Justice. 
SC-2022-0871 
2 
 
 
John M. Penrose and Amy Lynn Penrose bought a house in 
Montgomery.  After moving in, they discovered multiple problems with 
the house and sued several parties that had been involved in the 
transaction, alleging that those parties' negligent or intentional acts had 
prevented the Penroses from discovering the house's problems before the 
purchase closed.   
During discovery, the Penroses failed to provide timely and 
complete responses to the defendants' discovery requests or to appear at 
two hearings on the resulting motions to compel.  Following the second 
missed hearing, the Montgomery Circuit Court dismissed the Penroses' 
lawsuit with prejudice.   Invoking Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., the Penroses 
moved the trial court to reinstate their lawsuit, arguing among other 
things that the dismissal violated their due-process rights because no 
defendant had moved for dismissal and because the trial court had given 
them no indication that it was considering that sanction.  The trial court 
denied their motion.  The Penroses appeal.  We affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
After a new job required John to relocate from South Carolina to 
Alabama, the Penroses engaged Tammy Chavers, a real-estate agent 
SC-2022-0871 
3 
 
with Prattville Real Estate Properties, LLC, d/b/a Re/Max Properties II 
("Re/Max"), to assist them with their long-distance house hunt.  Chavers 
helped the Penroses find a house in Montgomery that they liked, and, 
after Chavers allegedly assured them that there were no problems with 
the house, the Penroses signed a contract with the sellers, Jose Garcia, 
Jr., and Nereyda P. Garcia.  Under the terms of that contract, the 
Penroses had a period to perform inspections before deciding whether to 
complete the transaction.  
 
The Penroses hired Greg Watts, an inspector with AAA Inspections, 
LLC, to conduct a formal inspection of the house for them.  After receiving 
Watts's inspection report, the Penroses asked the Garcias to remedy 
some minor problems that Watts had identified.  The Garcias apparently 
agreed to do so, and none of the problems Watts identified or the repairs 
the Garcias completed are at issue in this action. 
 
The Penroses also had a termite inspection done on the house.  
Although the Garcias had signed a disclaimer denying any knowledge of 
termite activity, the pest-control company that performed the inspection 
submitted a report stating that there were signs of a previous termite 
SC-2022-0871 
4 
 
infestation -- and that the Garcias had hired the company two years 
earlier to treat an infestation. 
 
Around this same time, James E. Brown, a licensed real-estate 
appraiser and the owner of Brown Properties, Inc. ("BPI"), conducted an 
appraisal of the house.  Brown's initial appraisal indicated that the 
market value of the house was $85,000 less than the price the Penroses 
had agreed to pay.  But the Penroses state that Chavers then persuaded 
Brown to issue a new appraisal that included a bonus room above the 
garage in the calculated square footage of the house.  The Penroses say 
that Brown agreed to this request even though the bonus room did not 
meet industry standards to be considered living space.  The second 
appraisal came in $45,000 higher. 
 
The Penroses proceeded with purchasing the house and moved in 
shortly after the July 2021 closing.  They say that almost immediately 
they began discovering problems with the house, most notably termite 
and water damage.  Six months later, the Penroses sued the Garcias, 
Chavers and Re/Max ("the Re/Max defendants"), Watts and AAA 
Inspections ("the AAA defendants"), and Brown and BPI ("the BPI 
SC-2022-0871 
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defendants"), asserting negligence, wantonness, fraud, breach-of-
contract, and conspiracy claims.  
 
The Re/Max defendants, the AAA defendants, and the BPI 
defendants filed separate answers to the Penroses' complaint.1   At about 
the same time, they also served interrogatories and requests for 
production on the Penroses.  The Penroses eventually produced some 
documents, but they did not answer the interrogatories.  After repeatedly 
asking for the requested discovery -- and after receiving repeated 
assurances that it was coming -- the Re/Max defendants, the AAA 
defendants, and the BPI defendants finally filed motions asking the trial 
court to compel the Penroses to respond. 
 
The trial court held a hearing on the motions.  Neither the Penroses 
nor their attorney appeared at that hearing.  After considering the 
movants' arguments, the trial court ordered the Penroses to produce the 
requested discovery within 14 days.   
 
1The Garcias did not file an answer and have not participated in 
either the trial-court litigation or these appellate proceedings.  After the 
time for filing an answer had run, the Penroses successfully moved the 
trial court to enter a default judgment against the Garcias.  The record 
shows that a damages hearing was scheduled, but there is no indication 
whether that hearing was held or whether the amount of damages was 
ever set. 
SC-2022-0871 
6 
 
One day after the deadline set by the trial court, the Penroses 
finally submitted responses to some of the interrogatories while objecting 
to others because, the Penroses argued, the questions sought confidential 
or irrelevant information.  The Re/Max defendants, the AAA defendants, 
and the BPI defendants then filed new motions to compel asking the trial 
court to strike the Penroses' objections and to direct them to provide full 
responses. 
 
The trial court held a hearing on this second round of motions to 
compel; again, neither the Penroses nor their attorney showed up.  After 
hearing from the movants, the trial court entered a judgment noting that 
the Penroses' attorney had failed to appear at the last two hearings and 
stating that, after a review of the record, it was dismissing the Penroses' 
lawsuit with prejudice based on their failure to prosecute. 
 
Forty-two days later, the Penroses moved the trial court to reinstate 
their lawsuit under Rule 60(b), arguing that dismissal with prejudice (1) 
was unwarranted under the circumstances2 and (2) violated their due-
 
2The Penroses stated that their attorney had missed the first 
hearing only because his child was admitted to the hospital earlier that 
morning and had missed the second hearing because he was not aware of 
it due to problems with his email receiving Alacourt notifications. 
SC-2022-0871 
7 
 
process rights.  The Re/Max defendants, the AAA defendants, and the 
BPI defendants filed a joint response arguing that the Penroses' motion 
was effectively a motion to alter, amend, or vacate that was untimely 
because it had not been filed within the 30-day period permitted by Rule 
59, Ala. R. Civ. P.  In the alternative, they argued that the trial court's 
dismissal of the Penroses' lawsuit was appropriate under the 
circumstances.  The trial court denied the Penroses' postjudgment 
motion.  The Penroses appealed. 
Motion to Dismiss the Penroses' Appeal 
 
Echoing the argument that they made in their joint response to the 
Penroses' postjudgment motion, the Re/Max defendants, the AAA 
defendants, and the BPI defendants have moved this Court to dismiss 
this appeal.  Specifically, they state that the Penroses' motion was in 
substance an untimely Rule 59 motion that did not toll the time for taking 
an appeal.  Accordingly, they argue, the Penroses' notice of appeal -- filed 
49 days after the trial court dismissed the lawsuit -- was untimely and 
failed to invoke this Court's jurisdiction.  See generally R & G, LLC v. 
RCH IV-WB, LLC, 122 So. 3d 1253, 1256-57 (Ala. 2013) (explaining that 
an untimely Rule 59 motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of 
SC-2022-0871 
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appeal and that this Court has no jurisdiction over an untimely appeal). 
Whether this timeliness argument is meritorious turns on whether the 
Penroses' motion is considered a Rule 59 or a Rule 60(b) motion. 
 
To be sure, the postjudgment motion filed by the Penroses bears 
indicia of both a Rule 59 and a Rule 60(b) motion.  For starters, the 
Penroses styled their motion as a "motion to reconsider order of dismissal 
and/or relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)."  Although "[t]he Alabama Rules of 
Civil Procedure make no reference to a 'motion to reconsider,'" this Court 
has stated that it will treat "a motion so styled as a Rule 59(e) motion to 
'alter, amend, or vacate' a judgment, if it complies with the guidelines for 
such post-trial motions set out in Rule 59."  Ex parte Johnson, 673 So. 2d 
410, 412 (Ala. 1994).3  The body of the Penroses' motion additionally 
contains language expressly asking the trial court to "alter, amend, or 
vacate" its judgment dismissing the lawsuit.  While this language is not 
accompanied by a citation to Rule 59, it is clearly rooted in Rule 59(e), 
not Rule 60(b).   
 
3Of course, the Penroses' postjudgment motion did not comply "with 
the guidelines for … post-trial motions set out in Rule 59," Johnson, 673 
So. 2d at 412, because it was filed more than 30 days after the entry of 
the trial court's judgment of dismissal. 
SC-2022-0871 
9 
 
 
On the other hand, the Penroses' motion expressly invokes Rule 
60(b) and contains no mention of Rule 59.  The motion also contains an 
argument that undisputedly may be raised in a Rule 60(b) motion -- 
whether the trial court's judgment was entered in violation of the 
Penroses' due-process rights.  See Ex parte Full Circle Distrib., L.L.C., 
883 So. 2d 638, 641 (Ala 2003) (explaining that a judgment is void and 
may be set aside at any time under Rule 60(b)(4) if it was entered in a 
manner inconsistent with due process).   
Citing Cornelius v. Green, 477 So. 2d 1363 (Ala. 1985), the 
defendants moving to dismiss this appeal suggest that the Penroses' 
failure to invoke a specific Rule 60(b) ground in their motion is fatal to 
their argument that their motion should be considered under Rule 60(b).  
We disagree.  In Cornelius, this Court held that a postjudgment motion 
was properly considered a Rule 59 motion as opposed to a Rule 60(b) 
motion in part because that motion "did not allege any of the 60(b) 
grounds."  477 So. 2d at 1364-65.  But, notably, that motion failed to cite 
Rule 60(b) at all and did not contain any argument addressing one of the 
enumerated Rule 60(b) grounds.  Id.  In contrast, the Penroses have cited 
Rule 60(b) and have argued that the trial court's dismissal of their 
SC-2022-0871 
10 
 
lawsuit violated their due-process rights.  While it is true the Penroses 
did not specifically cite Rule 60(b)(4) in their motion, this Court has 
indicated that a specific citation like that is not necessary if the 
applicable ground can be discerned from the motion itself.  See R.E. 
Grills, Inc. v. Davison, 641 So. 2d 225, 230 (Ala. 1994) ("Because [the 
plaintiff's] 'Motion to Reinstate' does not specify any Rule 60(b) ground 
for relief, we must interpret the substance of the grounds alleged in his 
motion to determine which of the six clauses of Rule 60(b) applies."). 
 
In sum, the Penroses' postjudgment motion invoked Rule 60(b) and 
contained a due-process argument that is a proper subject for a Rule 60(b) 
motion.  Considering that motion as a whole, and not merely its title or 
any isolated part, we conclude that the motion is best viewed as a Rule 
60(b) motion.  We therefore treat it as such for the purpose of determining 
whether this appeal is timely.4  Because a party may file a Rule 60(b) 
motion alleging that a judgment was entered in violation of that party's 
due-process rights at any time postjudgment, see Full Circle Distrib., 
 
4This Court has repeatedly stated that it "will look at the substance 
of a motion, rather than its title, to determine how that motion is to be 
considered under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure."   Pontius v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 915 So. 2d 557, 562-63 (Ala. 2005).   
 
SC-2022-0871 
11 
 
L.L.C., 883 So. 2d at 641, and because a party may appeal the denial of 
such a motion by filing a notice of appeal within 42 days of the trial court's 
denial, see Ex parte Keith, 771 So. 2d 1018, 1021-22 (Ala. 1998), the 
Penroses' notice of appeal was timely and the motion to dismiss must be 
denied. 
Standard of Review 
 
A trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) postjudgment motion alleging 
that the underlying judgment was entered in violation of the movant's 
due-process rights is reviewed de novo.  Campbell v. Taylor, 159 So. 3d 4, 
8 (Ala. 2014); see also Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Austin, 34 So. 3d 
1238, 1242 (Ala. 2009) (explaining that the de novo standard of review 
applies to the denial of a motion based on Rule 60(b)(4) grounds "because 
the issue of jurisdiction raised in a Rule 60(b)(4) motion is a purely legal 
one").  We note, however, that while "a party may appeal the denial of a 
Rule 60(b) motion, … the scope of appellate review is limited to the 
correctness of the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion, and not the correctness 
of the underlying judgment."  Keith, 771 So. 2d at 1021 (citing Hilliard v. 
SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A., 581 So. 2d 826 (Ala. 1991)).  Thus, to 
the extent that the Penroses also argued in their postjudgment motion 
SC-2022-0871 
12 
 
that the trial court exceeded its discretion by dismissing their lawsuit for 
failure to prosecute, see Curry v. Miller, 261 So. 3d 1175, 1178 (Ala. 
2018), they may not repeat that argument on appeal -- we can consider 
only whether the underlying judgment of dismissal is void due to the 
alleged lack of due process afforded the Penroses. 
Analysis 
 
In Ex parte Weeks, 611 So. 2d 259 (Ala. 1992), this Court explained 
the procedural due-process rights that parties are entitled to under the 
United States Constitution and the Alabama Constitution.  In doing so, 
we stated that due process generally requires "a fair and open hearing 
before a legally constituted court or other authority, with notice and the 
opportunity to present evidence and argument, … and information as to 
the claims of the opposing party, with reasonable opportunity to 
controvert them."  Weeks, 611 So. 2d at 261.   
The Penroses argue that their due-process rights were violated 
because they were given no notice or opportunity to respond before the 
trial court dismissed their lawsuit for failure to prosecute.  In their 
telling, this appeal is simply about a trial court that dismissed an action 
with prejudice after an attorney mistakenly failed to show up for a 
SC-2022-0871 
13 
 
hearing.  To support their position, they cite multiple cases in which 
either this Court or the Court of Civil Appeals has reversed a dismissal 
entered following a missed hearing.  See Burdeshaw v. White, 585 So. 2d 
842 (Ala. 1991); Thompkins v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 336 So. 3d 195 
(Ala. Civ. App. 2021); Hosey v. Lowery, 911 So. 2d 15 (Ala. Civ. App. 
2005); Brown v. Brown, 896 So. 2d 573 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004); Miller v. 
Miller, 618 So. 2d 728 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993).   
But, as the trial court noted in its judgment dismissing the 
Penroses' lawsuit, it took that action after their attorney missed a second 
hearing and "after … a review of the filings."  Those filings show that the 
failure to attend the second hearing was far from the only example of 
"dilatoriness on the part of the plaintiff[s]."  Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 
U.S. 626, 634 (1962).  Rather, the record indicates that the Penroses 
repeatedly gave little heed to the rules and orders of the court.   
To review, the Re/Max defendants, the AAA defendants, and the 
BPI defendants served interrogatories and requests for production upon 
the Penroses in February 2022.  The Penroses did not respond to those 
interrogatories within the 30-day period set forth in Rule 33(a), Ala. R. 
Civ. P.  No less than eight times, attorneys for those defendants contacted 
SC-2022-0871 
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the Penroses' attorney requesting the overdue discovery responses.  The 
record contains email correspondence indicating that the Penroses' 
attorney was working on the discovery, but the Penroses resisted 
providing some of the requested information because, they said, the 
information sought was personal or irrelevant.  Nevertheless, the 
Penroses' attorney repeatedly told the defendants that responses were 
coming.   
Finally, more than two months after the deadline for serving the 
discovery responses had passed, the Re/Max defendants, the AAA 
defendants, and the BPI defendants filed motions to compel asking the 
trial court to intervene.  After the Penroses' attorney missed the hearing 
on those motions, the trial court ordered the Penroses to submit their 
responses within 14 days.  They did not do so.  One day after the deadline 
set by the trial court, the Penroses finally submitted responses to the 
interrogatories, but their responses were incomplete.  For example, the 
Penroses objected to providing background information about their 
educations, 
their 
employment 
histories, 
and 
other 
real-estate 
transactions in which they had been involved.  The Re/Max defendants, 
the AAA defendants, and the BPI defendants then filed another round of 
SC-2022-0871 
15 
 
motions to compel, again asking the trial court to order the Penroses to 
respond.  After the Penroses' attorney did not appear at the hearing on 
those motions, the trial court dismissed their lawsuit with prejudice. 
When the trial court reviewed the filings in this case, it found a 
pattern of the Penroses failing to comply with court rules and orders. 
While the failure to attend the second hearing may have been the straw 
that broke the camel's back, it is undisputed that the Penroses had by 
then already failed to respond to discovery requests for over three months 
and that, after the trial court finally ordered them to respond, they still 
failed to do so within the timeline set by the court.  Moreover, their late 
responses contained objections to innocuous requests for information, 
and the trial court could have rightfully concluded that at least some of 
those objections were frivolous.  The Penroses do not address this aspect 
of their conduct in their appellate brief, focusing instead on the hearings 
that were missed.  But, all things considered, it is clear that this case is 
distinguishable from the cases on which the Penroses have relied, in 
which a dismissal was entered on the basis of a single missed hearing.  
See, e.g., Hosey, 911 So. 2d at 18 (concluding that the plaintiffs' due-
process rights were violated when the trial court sua sponte dismissed 
SC-2022-0871 
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their claims against one of the defendants because their attorney did not 
attend a hearing on a motion that had been rendered moot).  
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Link is instructive.  
There, a federal district court sua sponte dismissed a plaintiff's lawsuit 
for failure to prosecute after the plaintiff's attorney had failed to show up 
for a pretrial conference.  370 U.S. at 629.  In rejecting the plaintiff's 
argument that the district court had erred by doing so, the Supreme 
Court recognized that the fundamental requirement of due process is the 
opportunity to be heard but also noted that "this does not mean that every 
order entered without notice and a preliminary adversary hearing 
offends due process."  Id. at 632.  The Court then explained that the 
circumstances of the case before it -- which included evidence of other 
"dilatoriness on the part of the plaintiff," id. at 634 -- were "such as to 
dispense with the necessity for advance notice and hearing."  Id.  
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the dismissal.  Id. at 636.   
This Court's caselaw is consistent with Link.  We have repeatedly 
explained that a trial court has the inherent authority to act sua sponte 
to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with 
court rules and orders.  See, e.g., S.C. v. Autauga Bd. of Educ., 325 So. 3d 
SC-2022-0871 
17 
 
793, 797 (Ala. 2020); Ex parte Folmar Kenner, LLC, 43 So. 3d 1234, 1239 
(Ala. 2009); Ex parte Courtaulds Fibers, Inc., 784 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Ala. 
2000).  And any due-process concerns that might attend a dismissal 
entered sua sponte are mitigated when the party whose action is 
dismissed later presents argument to the trial court in a postjudgment 
motion challenging the dismissal.  That is what happened here -- and 
though the trial court ultimately denied the Penroses' postjudgment 
motion, there is no reason to think their motion was not duly considered. 
Conclusion 
 
The trial court dismissed the Penroses' lawsuit sua sponte after 
they failed to provide timely and complete responses to discovery 
requests or to appear at two hearings held to consider motions to compel 
stemming from that failure.  The Penroses argue that the trial court 
violated their due-process rights by dismissing their case without giving 
them prior notice; but, based on our review of what occurred below, it is 
clear that the trial acted well within its authority.  The order denying the 
Penroses' Rule 60(b) motion seeking to set aside the judgment of 
dismissal is therefore affirmed. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
SC-2022-0871 
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Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.