Title: Lulay v. Lulay

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket Nos. 87874, 87896 cons.-Agenda 13-March 2000.
GAIL LULAY, Appellee, v. MICHAEL LULAY et al.,								 Appellants.
	JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
	Michael Lulay and Kiley Lulay were divorced on March 11,
1996. Pursuant to the judgment for dissolution of marriage,
Michael and Kiley have joint custody over their three minor
children. On November 30, 1998, Gail Lulay, Michael's mother,
filed a petition in the circuit court of Du Page County under
section 607(b)(1) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/607(b)(1) (West 1998)), seeking
visitation with her three grandchildren.
	Michael and Kiley filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
visitation. See 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1998). The parents argued
that section 607(b)(1) should not be interpreted to permit a
grandparent to sue his or her own child for visitation with
grandchildren; and that if the statute is construed in this manner,
the statute is an unconstitutional infringement on their
fundamental liberty interest, as parents, in raising their children.
The circuit court denied the parents' motion to dismiss. On the
parents' request, however, the circuit court certified the following
question of law for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308):
		"Should section 607 of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/607) be
interpreted to permit the court to conduct a hearing and
determine whether it is in the best interest of a child to
visit with grandparents who seek such visitation from
their own child? If so, is such a statute constitutional?"
The appellate court denied the parents' application for leave to
appeal.
	The parents filed separate petitions for leave to appeal in this
court. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. This court granted the petitions for
leave to appeal and consolidated the cases. We subsequently
permitted the Attorney General of the State of Illinois to intervene
to defend the constitutionality of section 607(b)(1). See 134 Ill. 2d
R. 19.
STATUTE
	Section 607(b)(1) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act provides:
			"(b)(1) The court may grant reasonable visitation
privileges to a grandparent, great-grandparent, or sibling
of any minor child upon petition to the court by the
grandparents or great-grandparents or on behalf of the
sibling, with notice to the parties required to be notified
under Section 601 of this Act, if the court determines that
it is in the best interests and welfare of the child, and may
issue any necessary orders to enforce such visitation
privileges. Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this
subsection (b), a petition for visitation privileges may be
filed under this paragraph (1) whether or not a petition
pursuant to this Act has been previously filed or is
currently pending if one or more of the following
circumstances exist:
				(A) the parents are not currently cohabiting on a
permanent or an indefinite basis;
				(B) one of the parents has been absent from the
marital abode for more than one month without the
spouse knowing his or her whereabouts;
				(C) one of the parents is deceased;
				(D) one of the parents joins in the petition with the
grandparents, great-grandparents, or sibling; or
				(E) a sibling is in State custody." 750 ILCS
5/607(b)(1) (West 1998).
ANALYSIS
I. Troxel v. Granville
	Recently, the United States Supreme Court, in Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)
(plurality opinion), addressed the constitutionality of the State of
Washington's nonparental visitation statute. The Washington
statute provides: " 'Any person may petition the court for
visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody
proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person
when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or
not there has been any change of circumstances.' " Troxel, 530
U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 54, 120 S. Ct.  at 2057-58, quoting
Wash. Rev. Code §26.10.160(3) (1994) (section 26.10.160(3)).
	In Troxel, the parents, who were never married, had two
children. The father regularly brought the children to visit with his
parents. The father, however, committed suicide, and, eventually,
the mother informed the paternal grandparents that she wished to
limit their visitation with the children to one visit per month.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 53, 120 S. Ct.  at 2057.
The grandparents in Troxel petitioned for visitation under section
26.10.160(3). The trial court found that more extensive visitation
with the grandparents was in the children's best interests and
therefore ordered the visitation. Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 54, 120 S. Ct.  at 2058.
	The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's
visitation order on the basis that nonparents lack standing to seek
visitation under section 26.10.160(3) unless a custody action is
pending. The appellate court reasoned that this limitation on
nonparental visitation actions was consistent with the
constitutional restrictions on state interference with parents'
fundamental liberty interest in raising their children. Troxel, 530
U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 54, 120 S. Ct.  at 2058, quoting In re
Troxel, 87 Wash. App. 131, 135, 940 P.2d 698, 700 (1997).
	The Supreme Court of Washington disagreed with the
appellate court's construction of the statute, holding that the plain
language of section 26.10.160(3) gives grandparents standing to
seek visitation regardless of whether a custody action is pending.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 55, 120 S. Ct.  at 2058,
citing In re Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 12, 969 P.2d 21, 26-27 (1998).
The Washington Supreme Court held, however, that section
26.10.160(3) is an unconstitutional infringement on the
fundamental right of parents to rear their children. Specifically, the
court found that the statute is too broad because it allows "any
person" to petition for forced visitation with the child "at any
time" with the only requirement being that the visitation serve the
best interest of the child. Thus, the Washington Supreme Court
held, the statute is infirm because it allows the state to interfere
with the fundamental right of parents to rear their children without
requiring a threshold showing of harm to the child as a result of
the discontinued visitation. Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d 
at 55, 120 S. Ct.  at 2058-59, citing In re Smith, 137 Wash. 2d  at
15-21, 969 P.2d  at 28-31.
	The United States Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion,
found that section 26.10.160(3), as applied to the facts of the case,
is an unconstitutional infringement on the mother's fundamental
liberty interest in raising her children. Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 57, 120 S. Ct.  at 2060-61. The Court began its
analysis with a discussion of the important role that grandparents
play in the prevalent existence of single-parent households. The
Court pointed out that the nationwide enactment of nonparental
visitation statutes is certainly due to the states' recognition of the
changing realities of the American family. Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___,
147 L. Ed. 2d  at 55-56, 120 S. Ct.  at 2059. Indeed, all 50 states
have statutes that provide for grandparent visitation in some form.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___ n.*, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 61 n.*, 120 S. Ct.  at
2064 n.* (citing nonparental visitation statute from each state). In
enacting these statutes, states have "sought to ensure the welfare
of the children therein by protecting the relationships those
children form with such third parties. *** The extension of
statutory rights in this area to persons other than a child's parents,
however, comes with an obvious cost. For example, the State's
recognition of an independent third-party interest in a child can
place a substantial burden on the traditional parent-child
relationship. *** [T]hese statutes can present questions of
constitutional import." Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at
56, 120 S. Ct.  at 2059.
	Turning to the Washington statute, the Court in Troxel
focused on its broad scope. Section 26.10.160(3) allows "any
person" to petition for visitation "at any time," and the court may
grant such visitation rights whenever "visitation may serve the best
interest of the child." The statute contains no requirement that a
court must give deference to the parent's decision that visitation
would not be in the child's best interest. "Thus, in practical effect,
in the State of Washington a court can disregard and overturn any
decision by a fit custodial parent concerning visitation whenever
a third party affected by the decision files a visitation petition,
based solely on the judge's determination of the child's best
interests." (Emphasis in original.) Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 57-58, 120 S. Ct.  at 2061.
	Next, looking at the facts of the case, the Court noted that the
grandparents did not allege, and no court has found, that the
mother was an unfit parent. This point is pivotal because a court
must presume that fit parents act in the best interests of their
children. Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 58, 120 S. Ct. 
at 2061, citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101, 118, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2504 (1979). The Court emphasized that
the trial court in the case gave no special weight to the mother's
determination of her children's best interests. In fact, a review of
the trial court's findings showed that the trial court presumed that
the grandparents' request for visitation should be granted unless
the children would be adversely affected. Thus, the trial court
effectively placed upon the mother the burden of disproving that
visitation would be in the best interests of her children. Troxel,
530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 58-59, 120 S. Ct.  at 2062. The
Court also stressed that the grandparents did not allege that the
mother sought to cut off visitation entirely. Rather, the mother
asked that the duration of the visits between her children and the
grandparents be shorter than that requested by the grandparents.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 60, 120 S. Ct.  at 2062-63.
	As applied in the case before it, the Court in Troxel found that
section 26.10.160(3) is an unconstitutional infringement on the
mother's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of her children. The Court stated that "the
Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the
fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply
because a state judge believes a 'better' decision could be made."
Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 61, 120 S. Ct.  at 2064.
	The Court concluded that, because it rested its decision on the
"sweeping breadth" of section 26.10.160(3) and the application of
the statute to the facts in the case, it need not consider whether due
process requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a
showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a prerequisite to
granting visitation. Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 61,
120 S. Ct.  at 2064. The Court continued: "We do not, and need
not, define today the precise scope of the parental due process
right in the visitation context. *** Because much state-court
adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we
would be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation
statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter." Troxel,
530 U.S. at ___,147 L. Ed. 2d  at 61, 120 S. Ct.  at 2064. Rather,
"the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation turns
on the specific manner in which that standard is applied," and "the
constitutional protections in this area are best 'elaborated with
care.' [Citation.]" Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 61,
120 S. Ct.  at 2064.
	With Troxel in mind, we review the certified question
presented in this case.
II. Statutory Construction
	The first portion of the certified question asks: "Should
section 607 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act (750 ILCS 5/607) be interpreted to permit the court to conduct
a hearing and determine whether it is in the best interest of a child
to visit with grandparents who seek such visitation from their own
child?" The answer is yes.
	We first review the development of grandparent visitation in
Illinois. Prior to the legislature's enactment of section 607(b)(1),
Illinois common law provided no visitation rights to grandparents
unless there was a showing of "special circumstances." In Chodzko
v. Chodzko, 66 Ill. 2d 28 (1976), for example, the circuit court of
Cook County allowed a maternal grandfather to intervene in the
divorce proceeding between his daughter and her husband and
receive visitation privileges with his grandchildren over the
objection of the mother. The supreme court reversed the order
granting visitation on the basis that the grandfather's petition
contained no allegations to support a conclusion that either parent
was unfit or had forfeited the superior right to the custody and care
of the children. Chodzko, 66 Ill. 2d  at 34.
	Moreover, the court in Chodzko stated:
		"[N]o special circumstances have been established that
would warrant granting special visitation rights to the
grandfather. It is commendable that a bond of love and
affection, as alleged, exists between the grandfather and
the minor children; however, this and the allegation of
past favors do not justify carving out of the custody and
visitation rights of the natural parents still another
visitation right and vesting it in the grandfather. The right
to determine the third parties who are to share in the
custody and influence of and participate in the visitation
privileges with the children should vest primarily with the
parent who is charged with the daily responsibility of
rearing the children. In the absence of unusual
circumstances, these matters should not be of judicial
concern." Chodzko, 66 Ill. 2d  at 34-35.
We note parenthetically that the court in Chodzko did not address
the propriety of the grandfather's suing his own child for visitation
rights with the grandchildren.
	In 1981, the General Assembly passed the first version of
section 607. Specifically, the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act was amended to provide that the "court may grant
reasonable visitation privileges to a grandparent or great-grandparent of any minor child upon the grandparents' or great-grandparents' petition to the court *** if the court determines that
it is in the best interest and welfare of the child." Ill. Rev. Stat.
1981, ch. 40, par. 607(b) (as amended by Public Act 82-344, eff.
January 1, 1982). This provision was construed as recognizing a
grandparent's right to seek visitation after the parents divorced.
See Bush v. Squellati, 122 Ill. 2d 153, 157-58 (1988), citing Towne
v. Cole, 133 Ill. App. 3d 380, 384 (1985).
	Section 607 was amended the next year to add that the court
"may grant reasonable visitation privileges to a grandparent or
great-grandparent whose child has died where the court determines
that it is in the best interests and welfare of the child." Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 607(b) (as amended by Public Act
82-1002, eff. September 17, 1982).
	In 1985, the General Assembly again added to the language
of section 607 to permit grandparent visitation following adoption
of the minor by the spouse of the custodial parent after either death
or termination of parental rights of the other parent. Ill. Rev. Stat.
1985, ch. 40, par. 607(b) (as amended by Public Act 84-667, eff.
September 20, 1985).
	In 1989, the provision was rewritten to allow grandparents to
seek visitation privileges regardless of whether, among other
things, "the parent, through whom the grandparent or great-grandparent is related to the child, is living," and regardless of
whether a proceeding for dissolution of marriage is pending
between the parents of the child. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par.
607(b)(1)(A) (as amended by Public Act 86-855, eff. September
8, 1989). Thus, this amendment allowed grandparents to seek
visitation regardless of whether the nuclear family was still intact.
	The applicable portion of the statute, however, was rewritten
a year later. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 607(b)(1) (as amended
by Public Act 86-1452, eff. July 1, 1991). This amendment
reflects the current version of section 607(b)(1), which we are
addressing in this case. See 750 ILCS 5/607(b)(1) (West 1998).
	In interpreting the scope of section 607(b)(1), we are guided
by certain well-established principles of statutory construction.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the legislature. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997); Eagan v. Chicago Transit Authority, 158 Ill. 2d 527, 531 (1994). The best evidence of legislative intent is the
language used in the statute itself, which must be given its plain
and ordinary meaning. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d  at 177; Eagan, 158 Ill. 2d 
at 531-32. The statute should be evaluated as a whole, with each
provision construed in connection with every other section. Paris,
179 Ill. 2d  at 177; Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990).
Further, in construing a statute, a court is not at liberty to depart
from the plain language of the statute by reading into it exceptions,
limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express.
Eagan, 158 Ill. 2d  at 532; Kraft, Inc., 138 Ill. 2d  at 189. Where the
statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it will be given effect
without resort to other aids of construction. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d  at
177; Eagan, 158 Ill. 2d  at 532. We conduct de novo review when
resolving an issue of statutory construction. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d  at
177-78.
	Applying these principles, we hold that section 607(b)(1)
permits a grandparent to file a petition for visitation where the
grandparent's own child, i.e., the parent, objects to the visitation
between the grandparent and grandchild. The plain language of
section 607(b)(1) provides that the "court may grant reasonable
visitation privileges to a grandparent *** of any minor child upon
petition to the court by the grandparents *** if the court
determines that it is in the best interests and welfare of the child."
750 ILCS 5/607(b)(1) (West 1998). A petition for visitation may
be filed "if one or more of the following circumstances exist: (A)
the parents are not currently cohabiting on a permanent or an
indefinite basis; (B) one of the parents has been absent from the
marital abode for more than one month without the spouse
knowing his or her whereabouts; (C) one of the parents is
deceased; (D) one of the parents joins in the petition with the
grandparents, great-grandparents, or sibling; or (E) a sibling is in
State custody." 750 ILCS 5/607(b)(1) (West 1998).
	Accordingly, a grandparent, such as Gail Lulay, may file a
petition seeking visitation where, as in this case, the first
enumerated circumstance is present, i.e., the parents are not
currently cohabiting on a permanent basis. In this case, the parents
are divorced. The statute makes no exception for a situation where
a parent who opposes the visitation is the child of the petitioning
grandparent. Thus, the fact that Michael Lulay, Gail's son and the
father of the minor children, opposes the visitation does not alter
Gail's ability under section 607(b)(1) to petition for visitation.
There is simply no language in the statute to support such an
interpretation.
	Furthermore, three of the enumerated circumstances under
which a grandparent may file a visitation petition refer to
situations involving "one of the parents," without ever specifying
that the petitioning grandparent must be unrelated to the parent
opposing visitation. A grandparent may petition for visitation
where "one of the parents has been absent from the marital abode
for more than one month without the spouse knowing his or her
whereabouts." 750 ILCS 5/607(b)(1)(B) (West 1998). Under this
circumstance, the absent parent, by virtue of his or her absence, is
presumably not the parent opposing visitation. The statute does not
state that the present parent, who is opposing visitation, must be
unrelated to the grandparent. A grandparent may also petition for
visitation where "one of the parents is deceased." 750 ILCS
5/607(b)(1)(C) (West 1998). The statute does not state that the
surviving parent, who is opposing the visitation, must be unrelated
to the petitioning grandparent. Finally, a grandparent may petition
for visitation where "one of the parents joins in the petition with
the grandparents." 750 ILCS 5/607(b)(1)(D) (West 1998). The
statute does not state that the nonjoining parent, the parent
opposing visitation, must be unrelated to the grandparent.
	To construe section 607(b)(1) as barring a visitation petition
because the grandparent is related to a parent who opposes
visitation would impermissibly add an exception that the
legislature did not include. Because the plain language of the
statute permits the petition at issue, we need not resort to other
aids of statutory construction.
	Michael and Kiley Lulay, the parents in this case, cite
decisions from other jurisdictions to support their argument that
section 607(b)(1) should not be interpreted to permit a grandparent
to file a petition for visitation where the grandparent's own child
objects. See Steward v. Steward, 111 Nev. 295, 303-04, 890 P.2d 777, 782 (1995) (interpreting grandparent visitation statute to "set
up a presumption against court-ordered grandparental visitation
when divorced parents with full legal rights to the children agree
that it is not in the child's best interest to see the grandparents);
Olds v. Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Iowa 1984) (holding that
grandparent visitation statute does not provide a means for
grandparents to seek visitation privileges from their own child); In
re Adoption of a Child by M., 140 N.J. Super. 91, 94-95, 355 A.2d 211, 213 (1976) (holding that, although grandparent visitation
statute does not prohibit grandparents from seeking visitation
privileges when their own child has such rights, "it would seldom,
if ever, be in the best interests of the child" to grant such
visitation).
	We have interpreted our Illinois statute by giving the language
used in section 607(b)(1) its plain and ordinary meaning.
Therefore, the cases to which the parents cite in this regard are
inapposite.
III. Constitutionality of Statute
	Because we have determined that the plain language of
section 607(b)(1) permits a grandparent to file a petition for
visitation where the grandparent's own child objects to the
visitation, we must now address whether section 607(b)(1), as so
interpreted and thus applied to this case, where both parents
oppose visitation, is constitutional. The answer is no. We hold that
section 607(b)(1), as applied to this case, is an unconstitutional
infringement on Michael and Kiley Lulay's fundamental liberty
interest in raising their children.
	We begin our analysis with the recognition that statutes carry
a strong presumption of constitutionality, and that the party
challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of
rebutting this presumption. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 377 (1997); see Tully v. Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297, 304
(1996). This court, however, has the duty to interpret the statute
and to protect the rights of citizens against acts beyond the scope
of the legislature's power. Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 378. We review de
novo the constitutionality of a statute. See Russell v. Department
of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 441 (1998).
	A court generally applies the rational basis test in examining
the constitutionality of a statute under substantive due process. See
Tully, 171 Ill. 2d  at 304. To satisfy this test, a statute need only
bear a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose, and must be
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. Tully, 171 Ill. 2d  at 304. If,
however, challenged legislation impinges upon a fundamental
constitutional right, the court will examine the statute under the
strict scrutiny standard. Tully, 171 Ill. 2d  at 304. To withstand the
strict scrutiny standard, a statute must serve a compelling state
interest, and be narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interest,
i.e., the legislature must use the least restrictive means to serve the
compelling interest. See Tully, 171 Ill. 2d at 304-05; People v.
R.G., 131 Ill. 2d 328, 342 (1989). Accordingly, we must first
determine whether section 607(b)(1) impinges upon a fundamental
constitutional right such that we must review the statute under the
strict scrutiny test.
A. Fundamental Right
	The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." The due process clause
"includes a substantive component that 'provides heightened
protection against government interference with certain
fundamental rights and liberty interests.' " Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___,
147 L. Ed. 2d  at 56, 120 S. Ct.  at 2059-60, quoting Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 787, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997).
	As the United States Supreme Court stated in Troxel, the
"liberty interest at issue in this case-the interest of parents in the
care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest
of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court."
Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 56, 120 S. Ct.  at 2060
(reviewing Court decisions that have recognized and explained the
fundamental interest of parents in the upbringing of their children);
accord People v. R.G., 131 Ill. 2d 328, 342-43 (1989) (upholding
the constitutionality of the "Minors Requiring Authoritative
Intervention" statutes (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 803-1
et seq.) and recognizing that, under United States Supreme Court
precedent, "parents have a liberty interest in bearing and raising
their children").
	In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923), the Court held unconstitutional a statute that
prohibited the teaching of certain foreign languages at an
elementary school. The Court reasoned that the due process clause
protects the rights of parents to "establish a home and bring up
children" and "to control the education of their own." Meyer, 262 U.S.  at 399, 401, 67 L. Ed.  at 1045, 1046, 43 S. Ct.  at 626, 627.
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy
Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925), the Court held unconstitutional a statute that required
parents to send their children to public schools, reasoning that the
statute interfered with the liberty right of parents "to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control." The
Pierce Court explained that the "child is not the mere creature of
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations." Pierce, 268 U.S.  at 535, 69 L. Ed.  at 1078,
45 S. Ct.  at 573.
	Years later, the fundamental right of parents to raise their
children remained an important focus in the jurisprudence of the
United State Supreme Court. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972), the Court held
unconstitutional a statute that declared that, upon the death of the
mother, children of unwed fathers became wards of the state. The
Court reasoned: "The private interest here, that of a man in the
children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. It is
plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her children 'come[s] to this
Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made
to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic
arrangements.' [Citation.]" Stanley, 405 U.S.  at 651, 31 L. Ed. 2d 
at 558, 92 S. Ct.  at 1212.
	Soon after, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972), the Court held, albeit primarily on the
basis of the first amendment right to free exercise of religion, that
a state's compulsory education law did not apply to a group of
Amish children. The Court emphasized: "The history and culture
of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is
now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition." Yoder, 406 U.S.  at 232, 32 L. Ed. 2d  at 35, 92 S. Ct. at
1541-42; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394 (1982) (determining the
standard of proof necessary in termination of parental rights case
and noting the Court's "historical recognition that freedom of
personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment"); Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101, 118, 99 S. Ct. 2493,
2504 (1979) (stating that "[o]ur jurisprudence historically has
reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with
broad parental authority over minor children"). In light of this
extensive precedent, the Court in Troxel concluded that "it cannot
now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children." Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 57, 120 S. Ct. 
at 2060.
	Section 607(b)(1) allows grandparents to petition for court-ordered visitation with the grandchildren when both parents have
decided not to allow such visitation. By allowing the State to
interfere with the parents' decision in this regard, section
607(b)(1) impinges upon the fundamental constitutional right of
parents to make decisions regarding the upbringing of their
children.
	The State and the grandmother, Gail Lulay, argue that, even
if section 607(b)(1) impinges upon a fundamental right, the statute
does not significantly interfere with the fundamental right, and
therefore, we should apply the rational basis test in reviewing the
constitutionality of section 607(b)(1). See R.G., 131 Ill. 2d  at 343
(stating that only statutes that "significantly interfere" with a
fundamental right are subject to strict scrutiny), citing Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-88, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618, 630-31, 98 S. Ct. 673, 681-82 (1978). The State contends that section 607(b)(1)
does not give grandparents the absolute right to visitation. Rather,
the statute merely creates a procedure by which grandparents may
petition for visitation under certain circumstances. The State
points out that section 607(b)(1) states only that a court "may grant
reasonable visitation privileges" (emphasis added) (750 ILCS
5/607(b)(1) (West 1998)) and that the grandparents have the
burden of proving that visitation is in the child's best interests and
welfare.
	In light of the nature of the fundamental right at stake, the
State's and the grandmother's argument is not persuasive.
Encompassed within the well-established fundamental right of
parents to raise their children is the right to determine with whom
their children should associate. See Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285,
291 (N.D. 1999) (stating that "[d]eciding when, under what
conditions, and with whom their children may associate is among
the most important rights and responsibilities of parents," in
holding that its most recent grandparent visitation statute was
unconstitutional). It is the role of parents to nurture their children
and to influence and shape their children's character. As the
United States Supreme Court has recognized, "[i]t is cardinal with
us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 88 L. Ed. 645, 652, 64 S. Ct. 438, 442 (1944). This "preparation for obligation" includes the
parents' determination of who will be instrumental in the
development of their child's personality and character. Section
607(b)(1) allows the State to usurp the decisionmaking function of
parents with respect to the relationships that their children will
have. This decisionmaking function lies at the core of parents'
liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children.
To hold that section 607(b)(1) is not a significant interference with
the fundamental right of parents to raise their children would be to
effectively obliterate that fundamental right.
	The significant interference that section 607(b)(1) has on
parents' fundamental right is further evidenced by the procedure
contemplated by the statute. The grandparents may file a petition
for visitation under certain circumstances; in this case, where the
parents are divorced. The parent or parents are then haled into
court. The parents must presumably hire attorneys, and then
present evidence and defend their decision regarding the visitation
before a trial court. The parents' authority over their children is
necessarily diminished by this procedure. This can only be
characterized as a significant interference with parents'
fundamental right to make decisions regarding the upbringing of
their children. Indeed, the "burden of litigating a domestic
relations proceeding can itself be 'so disruptive of the parent-child
relationship that the constitutional right of a custodial parent to
make certain basic determinations for the child's welfare becomes
implicated.' " Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 62, 120 S. Ct.  at 2065, quoting 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 78, 120 S. Ct.  at 2079 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
	In comparison, in People v. R.G., 131 Ill. 2d 328, 343-44
(1989), this court concluded that the "Minors Requiring
Authoritative Intervention" statutes (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch.
37, par. 803-1 et seq.) "necessarily affect[ ] the fundamental right
of the parents of a runaway minor to control over their family."
Those statutes provide, among other things, that if the State takes
a minor into limited custody and the minor refuses to return home,
the State, during the first 21 days, must refuse any demand made
by the parents to return the child home. The court reasoned that,
even though "the State neither takes the minor out of the home nor
alters the parents' temporary or permanent custody of the minor,
the State nevertheless intercedes, on behalf of the minor, in the
family relationship." R.G., 131 Ill. 2d  at 344. Thus, the statutes
"significantly interfere[ ] with the family relationship and can only
be justified if the State has a compelling interest." R.G., 131 Ill. 2d 
at 344.
	Likewise, by allowing the State to override the decisions of
parents regarding the upbringing of their children, section
607(b)(1) significantly interferes with the fundamental rights of
parents. Indeed, section 607(b)(1) ultimately allows the State,
under certain circumstances, to force parents to deliver their
children to individuals whom the parents have decided the
children should not see. The constitutionality of section 607(b)(1),
which significantly interferes with a fundamental constitutional
right, must therefore be evaluated under strict scrutiny. See Tully,
171 Ill. 2d  at 304.
B. Strict Scrutiny
	As discussed, to withstand the strict scrutiny test, a statute
must serve a compelling state interest, and the statute must be
narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interest. See Tully, 171
Ill. 2d at 304-05; R.G., 131 Ill. 2d  at 342. The State and the
grandmother argue that the State has a compelling interest, as
parens patriae, to protect children whose lives have been
disrupted through certain triggering events such as the divorce of
the parents. The State cites the decision in West v. West, 294 Ill.
App. 3d 356, 364 (1998), which, in upholding the facial validity
of section 607(b)(1), reasoned that the State "has a compelling
interest in maintaining and safeguarding an established
grandparent-grandchild relationship where it has been proven by
the grandparent that it is in the best interest of the child for the
relationship to continue."
	The State also cites legislative history to support the existence
of a compelling interest in this case. When the first version of the
Illinois grandparent visitation statute was before the General
Assembly, the bill's sponsor, Representative Matijevich, argued
that the statute "will help assure that close grandparent-child ties
and relationships will not be severed because of divorce." 82d Ill.
Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 6, 1981, at 146 (statements
of Representative Matijevich). Representative Stewart argued that
"the relationship of grandchildren and their grandparents should
be one that the state should encourage, and I believe that
grandparents should have an opportunity even if the parents cannot
see their way clear [to] provi[d]ing them one, to allow that
relationship to continue. *** Certainly children in divorce cases do
need some basis of security. *** [T]he opportunity of continuing
a relationship with grandparents is important ***." 82d Ill. Gen.
Assem., House Proceedings, May 6, 1981, at 149-50 (statements
of Representative Stewart). Representative Topinka added that
"the trauma of an abrupt termination of a meaningful relationship
with grandchildren can really be detrimental to the child. This
provides the entry for grandparents to have some redress to get to
their *** grandchildren, and again to create some form of family."
82d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 6, 1981, at 150-51
(statements of Representative Topinka).
	In contrast, the parents cite decisions from other jurisdictions
that question the premise that grandparent visitation is always
beneficial to the child. In Brooks v. Parkerson, 265 Ga. 189, 194,
454 S.E.2d 769, 773 (1995), for example, the Supreme Court of
Georgia held its grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional and
noted that "there is insufficient evidence that supports the
proposition that grandparents' visitation with their grandchildren
always promotes the children's health or welfare." Moreover,
"even if such a bond exists and would benefit the child if
maintained, the impact of a lawsuit to enforce maintenance of the
bond over the parents' objection can only have a deleterious effect
on the child." Brooks, 265 Ga. at 194, 454 S.E.2d  at 773.
Likewise, in In re Application of Herbst, 971 P.2d 395, 399 (Okla.
1998), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in holding that the
Oklahoma grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional as
applied to parents who were married and living together and who
both opposed the grandparent's visitation with their child,
reasoned that a "vague generalization about the positive influence
many grandparents have upon their grandchildren falls far short of
the necessary showing of harm which would warrant the state's
interference with this parental decision regarding who may see a
child."
	Generalizations about whether grandparent visitation is
beneficial to the children are not determinative of this case. We
recognize that the State has a compelling interest in the welfare of
minors under certain circumstances. Indeed, this court in R.G. held
that the rights of parents must yield to the State's compelling
interest to intercede on behalf of minors who have absented
themselves from home without parental consent. R.G., 131 Ill. 2d 
at 353. The court reasoned that "[w]hen a minor detaches himself
or herself from parental authority by running away from home, the
minor jeopardizes his or her welfare. The minor must find money,
food and shelter, not to mention adult guidance, schooling, and
medical care, among other things." R.G., 131 Ill. 2d  at 346.
	Similarly, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 88 L. Ed. 645, 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944), the Court held that a state's child labor
laws, which prohibited minors from selling merchandise on a
public street, were constitutional as applied to the case. The Court
therefore upheld the conviction of a parent under these statutes for
allowing her child to sell religious magazines on a public street.
The Court recognized the fundamental right of parents to raise
their children but reasoned that the state, acting as parens patriae,
may restrict parents' control by such things as requiring school
attendance, mandating vaccination for the children, and regulating
the children's labor. See Prince, 321 U.S.  at 166-67, 88 L. Ed.  at
652-53, 64 S. Ct.  at 442; see also Yoder, 406 U.S.  at 230, 32 L. Ed. 2d  at 33, 92 S. Ct.  at 1540 (distinguishing Prince on the basis
that exempting Amish children from compulsory school
attendance law was not a case in which "any harm to the physical
or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order,
or welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred").
	Here, the State essentially argues that it has a compelling
interest in maintaining the relationship between a grandparent and
her grandchildren where the children's parents are divorced yet
stand united in their parental decision that the children should not
visit with the grandparent. The State maintains that it has an
interest under these circumstances in protecting these children
whose lives have been disrupted because of their parents' divorce.
This interest is nothing like the compelling interests involved in
cases such as R.G. and Prince. Moreover, the parents in this case,
Michael and Kiley Lulay, have not been alleged to be unfit. We
therefore presume that they are acting in the best interests of their
children. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 58, 120 S. Ct.  at 2061. Although the parents are divorced, they agree that it
would not be in the best interests of their children to spend time
with their grandmother.
	We are not unsympathetic to the plight of grandparents who
wish to visit with their grandchildren. In fact, we commend
grandparents who are involved in the lives of their grandchildren
and recognize their important role in many families. Nevertheless,
in this case, we cannot allow the State to use its power to impose
its judgment that visitation may be better for the grandchildren
over the joint decision of two fit parents who have determined that
the visitation should not occur. The facts of this case do not
warrant the State's interference with the parents' joint decision
regarding who may have visitation privileges with their children.
To allow such interference would unconstitutionally infringe on
the parents' well-established fundamental liberty interest in
making decisions regarding the upbringing of their children.
	We hold that section 607(b)(1), as interpreted and applied to
this case, does not serve a compelling state interest and therefore
does not satisfy the strict scrutiny test. We therefore hold that
section 607(b)(1), as applied to this case, is an unconstitutional
infringement on Michael and Kiley Lulay's fundamental liberty
interest in raising their children. Because we hold that the
application of section 607(b)(1) to this case is unconstitutional, we
need not address the father's argument that section 607(b)(1) is
facially unconstitutional. We note that the State and the
grandmother maintain that this argument is outside the scope of
the certified question.
CONCLUSION
	Section 607(b)(1) permits a grandparent to file a petition for
visitation where the grandparent's own child, i.e., the parent,
objects to the visitation between the grandparent and grandchild.
Therefore, we answer the first portion of the certified question in
the affirmative. We hold, however, that section 607(b)(1), as
applied to this case, is an unconstitutional infringement on
Michael and Kiley Lulay's fundamental liberty interest in raising
their children. We thus answer the second portion of the certified
question in the negative.
	We reverse the decision of the circuit court of Du Page
County, which denied the parents' motion to dismiss Gail Lulay's
petition for visitation. We remand this cause to the circuit court of
Du Page County with directions to dismiss Gail Lulay's visitation
petition.
 

	JUSTICE HEIPLE, specially concurring:
	I agree with the decision to reverse the trial court on grounds
of unconstitutionality. However, the majority fails to settle the
issue of grandparental visitation under our statute. The majority
finds that section 607(b)(1) of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/607(b)(1) (1998) is
unconstitutional as applied to this case's particular set of facts.
This leaves open the possibility that other grandparents, under a
slightly different set of facts, might successfully petition for
grandparent visitation under section 607. Section 607, however,
should be deemed unconstitutional on its face.
	In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000), a mother in the state of Washington tried to
limit visitation after the father of her children committed suicide.
The paternal grandparents responded by petitioning for visitation.
The United States Supreme Court noted that, under the
grandparent visitation statute in effect in Washington, "a court can
disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent
concerning visitation whenever a third party affected by the
decision files a visitation petition, based solely on the judge's
determination of the child's best interests." (Emphasis in original.)
Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 57-58, 120 S. Ct.  at
2061. The Court went on to state that "the Due Process Clause
does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of
parents to make childrearing decisions simply because a state
judge believes a 'better' decision could be made." Troxel, 530
U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 61, 120 S. Ct.  at 2064.
	The statute at issue in this case, section 607, states in pertinent
part that:
			"The court may grant reasonable visitation privileges to
a grandparent, great-grandparent, or sibling of any minor
child upon petition to the court by the grandparents or
great-grandparents or on behalf of the sibling *** if the
court determines that it is in the best interests and welfare
of the child ***. *** [A] petition for visitation privileges
may be filed under this paragraph if one or more of the
following circumstances exist:
* * *
				(C) one of the parents is deceased[.]" 750 ILCS
5/607(b)(1)(C) (West 1996).
	Thus, under section 607, if one parent dies, a grandparent can
petition for visitation, which can be granted if the court finds that
visitation is in the best interests of the child. This case is simply
Troxel by a different name and is precisely the remedy the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional. The rationale of Troxel
clearly points to a ruling that section 607 be held unconstitutional
on its face. Accordingly, I respectfully specially concur.
	The majority holds that section 607 of the Illinois Marriage
and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/607 (West 1998))
allows Gail Lulay to file a petition in this case and that "[t]o allow
such interference would unconstitutionally infringe on the parents'
well-established fundamental liberty interest in making decisions
regarding the upbringing of their children" (Slip op. at 19). With
both of those propositions, I agree. The majority then continues,
holding that the statute is unconstitutional only "as interpreted and
applied to this case." (Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 19. With that,
I respectfully disagree.
	I would hold the statute unconstitutional on its face. In the
majority's own words,
		"section 607(b)(1) allows the State to usurp the
decisionmaking function of parents with respect to the
relationships that their children will have. This
decisionmaking function lies at the core of parents' liberty
interest in the case, custody, and control of their children."
Slip op. at 5.
Contrary to the majority's conclusion, such usurpation is not a
function of the particular facts in this case. We are reviewing this
case not because Gail Lulay simply failed to allege that Michael
and Kiley Lulay are unfit parents. Rather, this case is before us
because section 607(b)(1), on its face, does not require any such
allegation before any parent can be dragged into court to defend
his or her parental decisionmaking to the State. Consequently, the
fatal flaw that the majority so astutely identifies in the passage
above will be present in every section 607(b)(1) case, and the
statute is unconstitutional on its face. This is a facial flaw, and I
would hold section 607(b)(1) unconstitutional on its face.
	JUSTICES HEIPLE and FREEMAN join in this special
concurrence.