Title: Appling v. Walker

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 96 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1572   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Julaine K. Appling, Jo Egelhoff, Jaren E. 
Hiller, Richard  
Kessenich and Edmund L. Webster, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Scott Walker, Kitty Rhoades and Oskar Anderson, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
Fair Wisconsin, Inc., Glenn Carlson, Michael 
Childers,  
Crystal Hyslop, Janice Czyscon, Kathy Flores, 
Ann  
Kendzierski, David Kopitzke, Paul Klawiter, Chad 
Wege and  
Andrew Wege, 
          Intervening Defendants-Respondents.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 345 Wis. 2d 762, 826 N.W.2d 666 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No.: 2013 WI App 3  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 31, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 23, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel R. Moeser 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by Michael D. Dean and First Freedoms Foundation Inc., 
Brookfield; Richard Esenberg, Mequon; 
David Austin Robert 
Nimocks, James A. Campbell, and Alliance Defending Freedom, 
 
 
2 
Washington D.C., and oral argument by David Austin Robert 
Nimocks. 
 
For the intervening defendants-respondents, the cause was 
argued by Christopher R. Clark of Lambda Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, Inc., Chicago; with whom on the brief was Brian 
Butler, Barbara Neider, and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Dyann L. Hafner, 
assistant corporation counsel, on behalf of Dane County. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Donald K. Schott, 
Joseph T. Hanes, and Quarles & Brady LLP, Madison; Sarah L. 
Fowles and Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee; and Laurence J. 
Dupuis and ACLU of Wisconsin Foundation, Inc., Milwaukee; and 
John A. Knight and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, 
Chicago; on behalf of LGBT Chamber of Commerce, Katharine 
Heyning, Judith Trampf, Wendy Woodruff, Mary Woodruff, Jayne 
Dunnum, Robin Timm, Virgina Wolf, and Carol Schumacher.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 96
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2011AP1572    
(L.C. No. 
2010CV4434) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Julaine K. Appling, Jo Egelhoff, Jaren E. 
Hiller, Richard Kessenich and Edmund L. 
Webster,   
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners   
 
 
v. 
 
Scott Walker, Kitty Rhoades and Oskar Anderson, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Fair Wisconsin, Inc., Glenn Carlson, Michael 
Childers, Crystal Hyslop, Janice Czyscon, Kathy 
Flores, Ann Kendzierski, David Kopitzke, Paul 
Klawiter, Chad Wege and Andrew Wege, 
 
          Intervening Defendants-Respondents.   
  
FILED 
 
JUL 31, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Wisconsin voters amended the 
state constitution in 2006, adding two sentences: "Only a 
marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or 
recognized as a marriage in this state.  A legal status 
identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for 
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized in this 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
2 
 
state."1  In this case we are asked to determine whether Wis. 
Stat. Chapter 770, by which the legislature created the legal 
status of domestic partnership for same-sex couples,2 violates 
that constitutional provision.3    
                                                 
1 Art. XIII, Sec. 13, Wisconsin Constitution. 
2 Wis. Stat. § 770.01 defines domestic partner and domestic 
partnership as follows: 
(1) “Domestic partner” means an individual who has 
signed and filed a declaration of domestic partnership 
in the office of the register of deeds of the county 
in which he or she resides. 
(2) 
“Domestic 
partnership” 
means 
the 
legal 
relationship that is formed between 2 individuals 
under this chapter. 
To form a domestic partnership, individuals must be members of 
the same sex, must not be nearer of kin to each other than 
second cousins, must be at least 18 years old and capable of 
consent, must share a common residence, and must not be married 
to or in a domestic partnership with another person.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 770.05. 
3 This case contains no challenge to Art. XIII, Sec. 13 
itself.  As the court of appeals stated, "This case is not about 
whether the Wisconsin or United States Constitutions require, on 
equal protection or other grounds, that same-sex couples have 
the right to a legally recognized relationship that is identical 
or substantially similar to marriage. To the contrary, for the 
domestic partnership law to pass muster here, the 'legal status' 
created by that law may not be 'substantially similar' to the 
'legal status' of marriage."  Appling v. Doyle, 2013 WI App 3, 
¶5, 345 Wis. 2d 762, 826 N.W.2d 666. 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
3 
 
¶2 
The question is whether Plaintiffs4 have proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the same-sex domestic partnership 
created by Chapter 770 violates Article XIII, Section 13 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Under our precedent, intent is critical 
to determining what the Amendment means5 and consequently to 
determining whether the statute, which is accorded a presumption 
of constitutionality, withstands the Plaintiffs' challenge.   
¶3 
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the court of 
appeals' holding that Chapter 770 is constitutional based on the 
presumption of constitutionality, the Plaintiffs' failure to 
meet the burden of proof, and the evidence we have reviewed in 
accord with the Dairyland decision, which establishes the 
framework 
we 
use 
to 
interpret 
constitutional 
provisions.  
Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, 295 Wis. 
2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408. 
                                                 
4 Julaine Appling and other named plaintiffs (collectively, 
Plaintiffs) were the president and members of the board of 
directors, respectively, of Wisconsin Family Action, a not-for-
profit organization that advocated publicly for the approval of 
the Marriage Amendment.  At the time of the ratification 
process, Appling also held other positions with Family Research 
Institute of Wisconsin, the Vote Yes for Marriage referendum 
campaign, and the Wisconsin Coalition for Traditional Marriage. 
5 State ex rel. Bare v. Schinz, 194 Wis. 397, 404, 216 N.W. 
509 (1927) ("The constitution means what its framers and the 
people approving of it have intended it to mean . . . . ") 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
4 
 
¶4 
Intervening Defendants6 argue that the Amendment does 
not 
bar 
domestic 
partnerships 
because 
they 
are 
not 
"substantially similar" to marriage, and they point to many 
differences, including a long list of rights of married people 
that are not conferred on domestic partners.  It is Plaintiffs' 
position that what makes the domestic partnership a legal status 
substantially 
similar 
to 
that 
of 
marriage 
is 
that 
the 
similarities 
it 
shares 
with 
marriage 
are 
actually 
"the 
constituent elements that make the legally recognized marital 
relationship what it is——the component parts of the marital 
relationship . . . ." Those elements identified by Plaintiffs in 
their briefs as "constituent elements" of marriage are that it 
is 1) between two persons 2) who are over a certain age, 3) who 
are 
competent 
to 
consent, 
4) 
who 
are 
in 
an 
exclusive 
relationship, 5) who are of specified sexes, and 6) who are not 
                                                 
6 Fair Wisconsin, Inc., a non-profit organization that 
advocates for the civil rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgendered 
people, 
and 
ten 
individuals 
(collectively, 
Intervening Defendants) were granted leave to intervene to 
defend the constitutionality of the domestic partnership statute 
after the Defendants (the governor, secretary of the Wisconsin 
Department of Health Services, and the Wisconsin Registrar of 
Vital Statistics) filed a motion to withdraw from the case on 
the grounds that their position had changed with the new 
administration 
and 
was 
now 
consistent 
with 
that 
of 
the 
Plaintiffs.   
As the court of appeals noted, "The Attorney General has 
declined to defend the domestic partnership law and . . . the 
appointed counsel for the defendants likewise declined to defend 
the law.  Accordingly, the task of defending the law fell solely 
to the intervening defendants-respondents . . . ." Appling v. 
Doyle, 345 Wis. 2d 762, ¶3 n.2. 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
5 
 
closely related.7  Plaintiffs focus on these characteristics——not 
the rights, duties and benefits that are associated with each 
status——as the "essential and material elements on which the 
marriage relation rests"8 and the substantial similarity that 
                                                 
7  See Wis. Stat. §§ 765.02, 765.03 (requirements for 
persons entering into marriage) and Wis. Stat. § 770.05 
(requirements for persons entering into domestic partnerships).   
8 Plaintiffs have not identified any authority for the 
proposition that the elements they identify are the defining 
constituent 
elements 
of 
marriage 
for 
purposes 
of 
our 
"substantially similar" analysis.  The apparent source of the 
phrase "constituent elements" is a citation by Plaintiffs to a 
similar phrase——"essential and material elements on which the 
marriage relation rests"——that appears in Varney v. Varney, an 
1881 case.   
There, a husband sought to void a marriage on the basis of 
the alleged "fraudulent and false representations of the 
respondent as to her previous character for chastity"; the court 
rejected his claim, holding that "no misconception as to the 
character, fortune, health, or temper, however brought about, 
will support an allegation of fraud on which a dissolution of 
the marriage contract, when once executed, can be obtained in a 
court of justice. These are accidental qualities, which do not 
constitute the essential and material elements on which the 
marriage relation rests. The law, in the exercise of a wise and 
sound policy, seeks to render the contract of marriage, when 
once executed, as far as possible indissoluble."  Varney v. 
Varney, 52 Wis. 120, 123, 8 N.W. 739 (1881) (emphasis added).   
Because it does not attempt to say what the essential and 
material elements are, Varney does not support the proposition 
that the six elements Plaintiffs identify in their brief are the 
essential elements of marriage.  At oral argument, Plaintiffs 
appeared to narrow their focus to two characteristics that made 
a status "substantially similar" to marriage: the presence of 
consanguinity prohibitions and gender specificity requirements.  
There was likewise no legal authority cited for the proposition 
that those two characteristics constitute the essence of 
marriage and that any legal status where they are present is 
substantially similar to marriage.  See ¶54 infra.    
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
6 
 
renders the domestic partnership law unconstitutional.  They 
acknowledge that the legislature has the power to create a 
domestic partnership status and accord it as many rights as it 
wishes.  They say that what the legislature cannot do is define 
eligibility based on marriage-like intimate relationships, and 
that it could avoid violating the Amendment by making such a 
status available to cohabiting adults, such as siblings, to 
remove the substantial similarity to marriage.   
¶5 
In short, they contend that it is the "existence of an 
exclusive, intimate relationship——clearly implicit in Chapter 
770——that creates the substantially similar status" and that 
Chapter 770 created "the very thing that the Amendment was 
designed to prohibit."  
¶6 
It is well established that challengers to a statute 
face a very difficult task.  
A statute enjoys a presumption of constitutionality. 
To overcome that presumption, a party challenging a 
statute's constitutionality bears a heavy burden. It 
is insufficient for the party challenging the statute 
to 
merely 
establish 
either 
that 
the 
statute's 
constitutionality is doubtful or that the statute is 
probably 
unconstitutional. 
Instead, 
the 
party 
challenging a statute's constitutionality must "prove 
that 
the 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt."  
State v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶8, 323 Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90 
(citations omitted).  "Furthermore, 'every presumption must be 
indulged to sustain the law if at all possible and, wherever 
doubt exists as to a legislative enactment's constitutionality, 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
7 
 
it must be resolved in favor of constitutionality.'"  Georgina 
G. v. Terry M., 184 Wis. 2d 492, 515, 516 N.W.2d 678 (1994).   
¶7 
Such 
a 
framework 
for 
analysis 
has 
doomed 
many 
challenges, and it dooms this one as well.  Like the circuit 
court and the court of appeals, we conclude that the Plaintiffs 
have not met their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the domestic partnership law is unconstitutional.  Our 
conclusion is compelled by the presumption of constitutionality, 
the Plaintiffs' failure to meet the burden of proof, and the 
evidence we have reviewed in accord with the test set forth in 
the Dairyland decision.9  "The constitution means what its 
framers and the people approving of it have intended it to 
mean . . . ."10  To determine what the framers and the voters 
intended a constitutional amendment to mean, based on our 
precedent we are to consider what is reflected in the plain 
language 
of 
the 
statute, 
the 
constitutional 
debates 
and 
practices of the time as exemplified during the ratification 
campaign that surrounded the voters' passage of the Amendment, 
as well as, to the extent probative, the first legislation 
passed following the Amendment's passage.11     
                                                 
9 "[This 
Court] 
examine[s] 
three 
primary 
sources 
in 
determining the 
meaning of a constitutional provision: the 
plain meaning, the constitutional debates and practices of the 
time, and the earliest interpretations of the provision by the 
legislature, as manifested through the first legislative action 
following adoption."  Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 
2006 WI 107, ¶19, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408.  
10 Bare, 194 Wis. at 404. 
11 Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 295 Wis. 2d 1, ¶19. 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
8 
 
¶8 
The plain language of the Amendment prohibits only a 
status "identical or substantially similar to" marriage, and by 
implication it does not prohibit what is not identical or 
substantially similar thereto.  There are important statutory 
distinctions in the way the state treats marriage and domestic 
partnerships and important differences in the lists of benefits 
and obligations that inhere in the two types of relationships.12  
In light of the totality of those differences, Plaintiffs have 
not overcome the presumption that Chapter 770 is constitutional.   
¶9 
Our conclusion is supported by evidence from the 
drafting and ratification process -- evidence in the drafting 
files13 that the framers of the Amendment intended specifically 
to allow legislation that provided a set of rights and benefits 
to same-sex couples. We are supported in our conclusion by 
evidence 
that 
voters 
were 
repeatedly 
told 
by 
Amendment 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
12 See infra, ¶¶31-32. 
13 For example, the drafting files contain a memorandum from 
Rep. Mark D. Gundrum seeking co-sponsors in the Assembly, which 
says that the proposal "would 'prevent same-sex marriages from 
being legalized in this state'";  it goes on to state that the 
proposal "does not prohibit the state . . . from setting up 
[its] own legal construct to provide particular privileges or 
benefits, such as health insurance benefits, pension benefits, 
joint tax return filing, hospital visitation, etc. as those 
bodies are able and deem appropriate."   
The drafting file contains a press release from Rep. Scott 
Suder, dated March 1, 2006, which states, "Despite what some gay 
rights groups are claiming, Suder said the proposal does NOT 
prohibit the state, local governments, or private businesses 
from extending health insurance benefits and other privileges to 
same sex couples."  
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
9 
 
proponents that the Amendment simply would not preclude a 
mechanism for legislative grants of certain rights to same-sex 
couples.14  We see no evidence that voters who approved the 
Amendment saw it as permitting those rights to be granted only 
in the kind of scheme Plaintiffs now suggest——that is, in 
cohabiting domestic relationships that bear no resemblance at 
all to marriage, with same-sex couples only as incidental 
beneficiaries.15  Of course the Amendment's opponents put out a 
different message to voters, but as the court of appeals noted, 
it makes sense to credit the notion, when the proponents prevail 
in a referendum, that theirs was the message that resonated with 
the majority of voters.16  Finally, our conclusion draws 
additional support, although limited, from the legislature's 
                                                 
14 E.g., an August 2006 publication from the Family Research 
Institute of Wisconsin, "Questions and Answers About Wisconsin's 
Marriage Protection Law," stated, "The second sentence [of the 
Amendment] doesn't even prevent the state legislature from 
taking up a bill that gives a limited number of benefits to 
people in sexual relationships outside of marriage, should the 
legislature want to do so." (Emphasis added.) 
15 That argument is untenable because leaving consideration 
of the associated rights and benefits out of the analysis would 
mean, as the court of appeals noted, that the legislature could 
constitutionally create a set of eligibility requirements that 
did not resemble marriage "and then confer on that status all 
the rights and obligations of marriage." Appling, 345 Wis. 2d 
762, ¶31. As the court of appeals points out, "[s]uch a 
scenario, permissible under [Plaintiffs'] theory, is the very 
definition of marriage by another name," and that is without 
question what the Amendment prohibits. Id. 
16 Appling, 345 Wis. 2d 762, ¶¶47-48 (“[T]he more reasonable 
and obvious conclusion is that voters who ended up favoring the 
amendment were, generally speaking, persuaded by statements of 
the 
proponents, 
including 
proponent 
assurances 
of 
the 
amendment's effect on domestic partnerships.”).   
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
10 
 
careful adoption of the first legislative act following the 
Marriage Amendment, adoption of Chapter 770 itself. 
BACKGROUND 
¶10 The ratification of the Marriage Amendment and the 
passage of the domestic partnership law occurred against a 
backdrop of significant social and legal shifts across the 
country concerning the status of same-sex couples.  What 
happened in two states in particular is relevant because they 
were frequently cited by Amendment proponents in the course of 
the ratification process.  A 2003 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court decision establishing the right of same-sex couples to 
marry in Massachusetts is widely seen as the catalyst for the 
subsequent developments.17  Following a similar court ruling by 
the Vermont Supreme Court, Vermont's legislature passed a law 
that created what became known as "Vermont-style civil unions," 
a legal status for same sex couples that paralleled that of 
                                                 
17 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 
2003) 
(establishing the right of same-sex couples to marry 
in Massachusetts and giving the legislature six months to comply 
with the ruling).     
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
11 
 
marriage in all respects as to state law.18  Those legal 
developments prompted a move among several states including 
Wisconsin for constitutional amendments that were intended to 
prevent similar judicial or legislative acts.19  In the drafting 
files, a legislative memo by Rep. Mark D. Gundrum, one of the 
lead sponsors of the Amendment, described the Amendment as 
necessary because "nothing in our state constitution presently 
protects against our State Supreme Court from doing the same 
thing the Massachusetts Supreme Court did in 2003 (or [the] 
Vermont Supreme Court did in 1999 or the Hawaii Supreme Court 
did in 1993 . . .) and legislating from the bench to radically 
alter marriage in this state and judicially impose same-sex 
marriage on this state."   
                                                 
18 Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (holding 
that the Vermont constitution entitled gay couples in Vermont to 
"the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law to 
married opposite-sex couples.").  The following year, the 
Vermont legislature amended its statutes, creating what were 
later 
referred 
to 
in 
Wisconsin 
before 
and 
during 
the 
ratification process as "Vermont-style civil unions." Vt. Stat. 
tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2000); see also Appling, 345 Wis. 2d 762, 
¶59. Vermont's law explicitly provided that "[p]arties 
to 
a 
civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections, and 
responsibilities under law . . . as are granted to spouses in a 
civil marriage." Vt. Stat. tit. 15, § 1204 (2000).    
19 See Amy Rinard & Steven Walters, "Court endorses gay 
marriage[;] Senate Republicans vow to propose amendment banning 
same-sex unions," Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Nov. 19, 2003, at 
1A (discussing the reaction in the Wisconsin Senate to the 
Massachusetts ruling in Goodridge).  See also Tom Heinen, "59% 
oppose gay unions, survey finds[;] Poll finds most notable rise 
among religious Americans," Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Nov. 19, 
2003, at 18A 
(discussing rising public opposition to same-sex 
marriage in the wake of the Massachusetts ruling). 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
12 
 
¶11 In McConkey v. Van Hollen, we described the passage of 
the Wisconsin Marriage Amendment as follows: 
During both the 2003 and 2005 sessions, the Wisconsin 
State Assembly and Senate adopted a joint resolution 
to amend the Wisconsin Constitution. Though the 2003 
and 
2005 
versions 
contained 
minor 
procedural 
variations, the text of the resolution itself was 
identical. Both versions of the resolution contained 
what the parties have referred to as the title: "To 
create section 13 of article XIII of the constitution; 
relating to: providing that only a marriage between 
one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as 
a marriage in this state." The substance of the 
resolution contained two sections. Section 1 stated 
the text of the proposed marriage amendment. Section 2 
of the resolution addressed the numbering of the new 
proposed amendment. 
Because the joint resolution was passed by two 
successive legislatures, the amendment was submitted 
to the people for ratification.  Wisconsin voters were 
asked the following question: 
Marriage. Shall section 13 of article XIII of the 
constitution be created to provide that only a 
marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid 
or recognized as a marriage in this state and that a 
legal status identical or substantially similar to 
that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not 
be valid or recognized in this state? 
On November 7, 2006, Wisconsin voters approved this 
amendment by a vote of 59 percent to 41 percent. 
McConkey v. Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶¶ 7-8, 326 Wis. 2d 1, 783 
N.W.2d 855, 858-59 (holding that there was no violation of the 
"separate amendment rule," the constitution's requirement that 
voters 
must 
be 
allowed 
to 
vote 
separately 
on 
separate 
amendments). 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
13 
 
¶12 The subsequent passage of Chapter 770 established 
domestic 
partnerships 
and 
conferred 
certain 
rights 
and 
obligations: 
[I]n 2009, the Wisconsin legislature created a chapter 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
statutes 
establishing 
domestic 
partnerships as an option for same-sex couples.  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
ch. 
770 
contains 
eligibility 
requirements and prescribes the manner in which such 
partnerships are formed and terminated.  Chapter 770 
does not specify the rights and obligations of 
domestic partnerships.  The mechanism the legislature 
chose for conferring rights and obligations was to 
select a subset of rights and obligations found in 
other parts of the statutes that already apply to 
marriages and then indicate, in the text of those 
other 
statutes, 
that 
they 
apply 
to 
domestic 
partnerships.  For example, Wis. Stat. § 861.21(2), 
the statute assigning to a surviving spouse his or her 
decedent spouse’s interest in their home, was made 
applicable to domestic partnerships.   
Appling v. Doyle, 2013 WI App 3, ¶7, 345 Wis. 2d 762, 826 
N.W.2d 666. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶13 In the circuit court, both Plaintiffs and Intervening 
Defendants moved for summary judgment.  The circuit court for 
Dane County, Judge Daniel R. Moeser presiding, granted summary 
judgment to the Intervening Defendants.   
¶14 The 
circuit 
court 
considered 
evidence 
from 
the 
legislative drafting files and from the ratification campaign, 
during which voters heard "messages . . .  similar to [those] in 
the Marriage Amendment's drafting files."  It quoted extensively 
from those materials, citing at least a dozen publications and 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
14 
 
statements by Amendment proponents, which it said made clear 
that the repeated message to voters was that the second sentence 
of the Amendment was targeted at a "legally exact replica of 
marriage, but without the title" and that the Amendment was not 
intended to be "about benefits."  It also compiled a list of 
benefits conferred by Ch. 770 and then a non-exhaustive list of 
more than 30 rights conferred by marriage that are not available 
to domestic partners.  The circuit court rejected Plaintiffs' 
arguments that the Amendment's ratification reflected voters' 
intent "to further the general purpose of promoting a conjugal 
model of marriage."20  Focusing on a comparison of the "legal 
status" of each relationship, the circuit court concluded that 
because "the state does not recognize domestic partnership in a 
way that even remotely resembles how the state recognizes 
marriage," and because domestic partners have "far fewer legal 
rights, duties, and liabilities in comparison to . . . [those] 
of spouses," the Plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden to 
prove the statute unconstitutional. 
¶15 The court of appeals likewise addressed what the 
Amendment 
meant, 
considering 
the 
Dairyland 
sources, 
with 
reference to its plain language and the explanations given to 
                                                 
20 See Appling, 345 Wis. 2d 762, ¶62 ("Appling explains that 
the 'conjugal model' is based on the premise that marriage is 
for sexual procreation and is 'child-focused.'")   
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
15 
 
voters during the ratification process about its meaning.  It 
concluded that while the Plaintiffs had the burden to "show 
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt by persuading us 
that the voters who ratified the marriage amendment intended 
that it would ban the particular type of same-sex partnerships 
created by the domestic partnership law," they had fallen “far 
short of meeting [that] burden.”  Appling, 345 Wis. 2d 762, ¶¶4, 
15.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 This case comes to us on a summary judgment ruling, 
and it requires us to interpret a constitutional provision and a 
statute.  "We do not review the circuit court's grant or denial 
of summary judgment under an erroneous exercise of discretion 
standard. 
 
Rather, 
our 
review 
is 
independent 
of 
the 
determination rendered by the circuit court, but we apply the 
same methodology." Tews v. NHI, LLC, 2010 WI 137, ¶40, 330 Wis. 
2d 389, 793 N.W.2d 860 (citations omitted).  We approach this in 
the same manner as the court of appeals, which noted that 
"[u]nder summary judgment methodology, '[i]f there is no dispute 
as to the material facts or inferences, . . . summary judgment 
is appropriate and we proceed to [resolve the dispute by 
considering] the legal issue or issues raised by the [summary 
judgment] motion.' Here there is no dispute about the facts and, 
accordingly, we focus on the parties' legal disputes and the 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
16 
 
application of law to the undisputed facts."  Appling, 345 Wis. 
2d 762, ¶9 (citations omitted).   
¶17 The interpretation of a constitutional provision is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  Dairyland Greyhound 
Park, Inc., 295 Wis. 2d 1, ¶16.  "The constitutionality of a 
statute is a question of law which we review de novo.  In 
reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, 'there is a strong 
presumption that a legislative enactment is constitutional.'"  
Georgina G., 184 Wis. 2d at 515. "The party challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute 'must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the act is unconstitutional.'"21  Id.  "Furthermore, 
                                                 
21 Although our decision today addresses a facial challenge 
to the constitutionality of Chapter 770, we note that this 
court's review of facial challenges and as applied challenges is 
not identical.  The burden of proof that challengers face, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, is the same in both facial and as 
applied constitutional challenges.  See Soc'y Ins. v. Labor & 
Indus. Review Comm'n, 2010 WI 68, ¶27 , 326 Wis. 2d 444, 786 
N.W.2d 385; Georgina G. v. Terry M., 184 Wis. 2d 492, 515, 516 
N.W.2d 
678 
(1994). 
 
However, 
the 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality enjoyed by statutes, which is central to our 
analysis in addressing a facial challenge, is not applicable to 
our review of an as applied challenge.  See Soc'y Ins., 326 Wis. 
2d 444, ¶27.   
In addressing the presumption of constitutionality afforded 
to statutes in the context of as applied constitutional 
challenges, we previously explained, "[w]hile we presume a 
statute is constitutional, we do not presume that the State 
applies statutes in a constitutional manner. Because the 
legislature plays no part in enforcing our statutes, 'deference 
to legislative acts' is not achieved by presuming that the 
statute has been constitutionally applied. As such, neither the 
challenger nor the enforcer of the statute face a presumption in 
an as-applied challenge."   Id. (internal citations omitted). 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
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'every presumption must be indulged to sustain the law if at all 
possible and, wherever doubt exists as to a legislative 
enactment's constitutionality, it must be resolved in favor of 
constitutionality.'"  Id. (citations omitted).   
ANALYSIS 
¶18 Against that daunting standard, Plaintiffs have set 
themselves the task of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Ch. 770, the domestic partnership law, is unconstitutional.  We 
therefore examine whether they have proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Ch. 770 created a legal status identical to or 
substantially similar to that of marriage——the kind of legal 
status that the framers of the Marriage Amendment and the voters 
who adopted it intended to prohibit.  We begin our discussion by 
identifying and applying the test that governs the analysis of 
the meaning of a constitutional provision; we then consider what 
legal status is given to Chapter 770 domestic partnerships and 
whether that legal status is one that the Amendment was meant to 
prohibit.22 
                                                 
22 As the court of appeals noted, "This case is not about 
whether the Wisconsin or United States Constitutions require, on 
equal protection or other grounds, that same-sex couples have 
the right to a legally recognized relationship that is identical 
or substantially similar to marriage. To the contrary, for the 
domestic partnership law to pass muster here, the 'legal status' 
created by that law may not be 'substantially similar' to the 
'legal status' of marriage." Appling, 345 Wis. 2d 762, ¶5.  In 
other words, this case does not involve an attack on the 
constitutional amendment, Article XIII, Section 13, itself. 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
18 
 
I. WHAT TEST DO WE EMPLOY TO DETERMINE THE MEANING OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION? 
¶19 The purpose of construing a constitutional amendment 
"is to give effect to the intent of the framers and of the 
voters who adopted it."  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶10, 264 
Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328 (citations omitted).  Constitutions 
should be construed "so as to promote the objects for which they 
were framed and adopted."  Id.  "We therefore examine three 
primary sources in determining the meaning of a constitutional 
provision: the plain meaning, the constitutional debates and 
practices of the time, and the earliest interpretations of the 
provision by the legislature, as manifested through the first 
legislative action following adoption."  Dairyland Greyhound 
Park, Inc., 295 Wis. 2d 1, ¶19 (citations omitted).   
¶20 Interpreting a constitutional amendment differs from 
interpreting a statute; we undertake a "more intense review" of 
extrinsic evidence when interpreting a constitutional provision: 
Our 
methodology 
in 
interpreting 
a 
constitutional 
provision envisions more intense review of extrinsic 
sources 
than 
our 
methodology 
in 
statutory 
interpretation.  . . .  
The reasons we employ a different methodology for 
constitutional 
interpretation 
are 
evident. 
Constitutional provisions do not become law until they 
are approved by the people. Voters do not have the 
same access to the “words” of a provision as the 
legislators who framed those words; and most voters 
are not familiar with the debates in the legislature. 
As a result, voters necessarily consider second-hand 
explanations 
and 
discussion 
at 
the 
time 
of 
ratification. In addition, the meaning of words may 
evolve over time, obscuring the original meaning or 
purpose of a provision. The original meaning of a 
provision might be lost if courts could not resort to 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
19 
 
extrinsic 
sources. 
Finally, 
interpreting 
a 
constitutional provision is likely to have a more 
lasting effect than the interpretation of a statute, 
inasmuch as statutory language can be more easily 
changed than constitutional language. Thus, it is 
vital for court decisions to capture accurately the 
essence of a constitutional provision. 
Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 295 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶115-116 
(Prosser, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
¶21 Of the three sources identified in Dairyland, the 
first two prongs are the most useful under the circumstances 
presented here: the plain meaning of the amendment, and the 
constitutional debates and practices of the time.  We apply the 
third source——"the earliest interpretations of the provision by 
the legislature, as manifested through the first legislative 
action following adoption"——in a limited sense in a case such as 
this, where the challenge is to the constitutionality of "the 
first legislative action following adoption" itself.  Dairyland 
Greyhound Park, Inc., 295 Wis. 2d 1, ¶49.  In other words, in 
this 
case 
it 
would 
be 
potentially 
problematic 
to 
place 
significant weight on the legislature's enactment of Chapter 770 
when interpreting the Marriage Amendment because the Plaintiffs' 
claim is that that first legislative action following the 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
20 
 
Marriage Amendment, Chapter 770, violated the constitution.23  In 
this context, a meaningful analysis is accomplished with an 
emphasis on the plain meaning of the Amendment and the 
constitutional debates and practices of the times as exemplified 
during the ratification process and limited reliance on the 
legislature's adoption of Chapter 770 itself. 
A. WHAT IS THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE AMENDMENT? 
¶22 To determine what the framers and the voters wanted 
the constitutional provision to accomplish we first look at the 
plain language and meaning of the amendment they ratified. 
¶23 What is prohibited by the Marriage Amendment is "a 
legal status identical or substantially similar to that of 
marriage." 
Like 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
we 
"agree 
with 
[Plaintiffs] that, to properly assess the plain meaning of the 
term 'legal status,' that term must be viewed in context.  The 
issue here is not the generic meaning of 'legal status,' but 
rather . . . its meaning as used in the constitutional phrase 
                                                 
23 Appling argued that the shift in the political makeup of 
the Wisconsin legislature between the ratification of the 
Amendment and the enactment of Chapter 770 means that "the 
Legislature that approved Chapter 770 . . . was not a reliable 
interpreter of the Marriage Amendment."  The court of appeals 
recognized this issue regarding the third source of Dairyland 
evidence about the meaning of a constitutional provision; it 
chose not to resolve the issue, partly on the grounds that 
"ignor[ing] the legislature's 'earliest interpretation' of the 
marriage amendment, namely the domestic partnership law" did not 
affect its ultimate conclusion.  Appling, 345 Wis. 2d 762, ¶72.  
It noted that a finding that the legislature acted in defiance 
of the constitutional amendment, as Plaintiffs essentially 
suggested, "may conflict with the deference we are required to 
accord the legislature." Id., ¶71. 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
21 
 
'[a] legal status identical or substantially similar to that of 
marriage.'" Appling, 345 Wis. 2d 762, ¶24. This is consistent 
with a "paramount rule of constitutional construction . . . that 
the intent of the provision 'is to be ascertained, not alone by 
considering the words of any part of the instrument, but by 
ascertaining the general purpose of the whole[.]' [W]hen the 
intent of the whole is ascertained, no part is to be construed 
so that the general purpose [is] thwarted . . . ."  Dairyland 
Greyhound Park, Inc., 295 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24 (citations omitted).  
Another relevant principle here is that "language is read where 
possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in order to 
avoid surplusage."  C. Coakley Relocation Sys., Inc. v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2008 WI 68, ¶17, 310 Wis. 2d 456, 750 N.W.2d 900.   
¶24 Turning to the words, then, "legal status" means "the 
legal position of the individual in or with regard to the rest 
of the community."  State v. Duket, 90 Wis. 272, 275, 63 N.W. 83 
(1895).  Status is "the sum total of a person's legal rights, 
duties, 
liabilities, 
and 
other 
legal 
relations, 
or 
any 
particular group of them separately considered."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 1419 (7th ed. 1999).  A legal right is "a right 
created or recognized by law."  Id. at 1323.  Rights, duties and 
obligations are important considerations, but a legal status 
can't be fully examined without considering its eligibility and 
formation requirements or constituent elements, because a legal 
status cannot be fully understood without understanding who can 
have it and what is necessary to obtain it.   
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
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¶25 To avoid surplusage, our analysis must also take into 
account 
and 
give 
meaning 
to 
the 
choice 
of 
the 
word 
"substantially" as a modifier of "similar."  For the same 
reason, we take it that the use of "substantially similar" means 
that a status that is merely similar is not meant to be 
prohibited.  (There is no contention by any party that the 
status of domestic partners is identical to that of marriage.) 
¶26 The plain language of the Amendment indicates that the 
framers and the voters intended to prohibit a status that gives 
a domestic partner a sum total of legal rights, duties, 
liabilities, and other legal relations that is more than just 
similar to the sum total of a married person's legal rights, 
duties, liabilities, and other legal relations.   
B. WHAT INFORMATION WAS GIVEN TO VOTERS DURING THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES AND RATIFICATION PROCESS? 
¶27 The second source of information the Dairyland test 
directs us to consider is the content of the constitutional 
debates and practices of the time as exemplified during the 
ratification process.  The ballot question that was presented to 
voters stated a question and provided the text of the proposed 
amendment: 
Ballot Question: "Marriage.  Shall Section 13 of 
article XIII of the constitution be created to provide 
that only a marriage between one man and one woman 
shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in this 
state 
and 
that 
a 
legal 
status 
identical 
or 
substantially 
similar 
to 
that 
of 
marriage 
for 
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized 
in this state?" 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
23 
 
Text of Section: [Article XIII] Section 13. Only a 
marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid 
or recognized as a marriage in this state. A legal 
status identical or substantially similar to that of 
marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid 
or recognized in this state. 
Wisconsin Blue Book 887 (2007-2008).     
¶28 "This court presumes that, when informed, the citizens 
of Wisconsin are familiar with the elements of the constitution 
and with the laws, and that the information used to educate the 
voters during the ratification campaign provides evidence of the 
voters' intent."  Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 295 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶37 (determining voter intent by examining public statements, 
news accounts, polls, news articles, and letters to the editor).   
¶29 We therefore examine the relevant public statements 
made by the Amendment's framers and other proponents that were 
intended to persuade voters during the ratification process.  
During the process, the question of the effect on the rights of 
same-sex couples was a matter of intense debate.  A newspaper 
article dated July 30, 2006, stated, "Although there's not much 
dispute that the proposed constitutional amendment on marriage 
in 
Wisconsin 
would 
bar 
same-sex 
unions, 
there 
is 
deep 
disagreement about what the wording might mean for civil unions 
and domestic-partner benefits." Stacy Forster, "Same-sex ban, 
different interpretations," Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, July 30, 
2006, at 1B. In one letter to the editor of the Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel, taking issue with an opponent's statements, 
Rep. Mark D. Gundrum characterized opponents as "continu[ing] 
the effort . . . to deceive people about the impact the man-
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
24 
 
woman marriage constitutional amendment will have in Wisconsin" 
and flatly rejected the notion that it would "seriously 
jeopardize any legal protections for unmarried couples——gay or 
straight." 
 
Rep. 
Mark 
D. 
Gundrum, 
"Opponents 
Resort 
to 
Deception, Fear," Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, August 6, 2006, at 
2J. (Emphasis added.)  Proponents made numerous statements on 
that issue as the following facts demonstrate. 
¶30 A January 28, 2004, press release on the letterhead of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature 
by 
legislative 
sponsors 
who 
spearheaded the effort to pass the Amendment, Rep. Mark D. 
Gundrum and Sen. Scott Fitzgerald, stated:  
The proposed amendment, while preserving marriage as 
one man-one woman unions, would also preclude the 
creation of unions which are substantially similar to 
marriage. 'Creating a technical "marriage," but just 
using a different name, to massage public opinion 
doesn't cut it,' Gundrum said. . . .  Significantly 
though, the language does not prohibit the legislature 
[and other entities] . . . from extending particular 
benefits to same-sex partners as those legal entities 
might choose to do. 
(Emphasis supplied for the words "same-sex partners.") 
¶31 In December 2005, Sen. Scott Fitzgerald was quoted as 
follows in media accounts of legislative debates when the Senate 
was 
preparing 
to 
vote: 
"The 
second 
[sentence] 
sets 
the 
parameters for civil unions.  Could a legislator put together a 
pack of 50 specific things they would like to give to gay 
couples? Yeah, they could." (Emphasis added.) 
¶32 A November 2006 statement issued by the office of Sen. 
Scott Fitzgerald struck back at opponents of the Amendment and 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
25 
 
said they were "intentionally mislead[ing] the public about the 
amendment." Contrary to those "misleading" representations, the 
statement said,  
Nothing in the proposed constitutional amendment would 
affect the ability of same-sex individuals from 
visiting a sick partner in the hospital or mak[ing] 
medical decisions for their partners as [prescribed] 
by a medical power of attorney. The non-partisan 
Legislative Council has written that the proposed 
amendment does not ban civil unions, only a Vermont-
style system that is simply marriage by another name. 
If the amendment is approved by the voters . . . the 
legislature will still be free to pass legislation 
creating civil unions if it so desires.  
(Emphasis added.)  
¶33 An article written by Sen. Scott Fitzgerald and 
published in the Wisconsin State Journal stated, "Contrary to 
claims from . . . liberal activists, the proposed constitutional 
amendment would not prohibit state or local governments . . . 
from setting up a legal construct to provide privileges or 
benefits such as health insurance benefits, pension benefits, 
joint tax return filing or hospital visitation to same-sex or 
unmarried couples."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶34 The Family Research Institute of Wisconsin, a group 
that advocated for the Amendment (it defined itself as seeking 
to 
preserve 
"traditional 
one-man/one-woman 
marriage 
in 
Wisconsin"), issued a six-page publication dated August 2006, 
listing 13 questions and answers about the meaning of the 
Amendment.  In that publication, the organization stated, "The 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
26 
 
second sentence [of the Amendment] doesn't even prevent the 
state legislature from taking up a bill that gives a limited 
number of benefits to people in sexual relationships outside of 
marriage, should the legislature want to do so."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
¶35 An article authored by Julaine Appling, a named 
plaintiff in this case, published Dec. 13, 2005, stated, 
"Contrary to the message being consistently given by opponents 
of the amendment, the second phrase does not 'ban civil unions.' 
. . . Nor does this phrase threaten benefits already given to 
people in domestic partnership registries by companies or local 
units of government." 
¶36 In an Associated Press article dated Dec. 7, 2005, 
Julaine Appling was quoted as saying, "Nothing in the second 
sentence 
prohibits 
[legislative 
grants 
of 
adoption 
or 
inheritance rights].  Nor does it in any way affect existing 
benefits given by local governments or the private sector."  
J.R. Ross, "Senate approves amendment to ban gay marriage, civil 
unions,"  Associated Press, Dec. 7, 2005. 
 
¶37 This representative sampling of messages, publicized 
by some of the most prominent and prolific advocates of the 
Amendment, makes clear that in response to concerns about what 
exactly the Amendment would prohibit, such advocates answered 
directly that the Amendment would not preclude a legislative 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
27 
 
decision to create a legal mechanism giving unmarried couples in 
intimate relationships specific sets of rights and benefits.  
The message was also clearly given that the Amendment would not 
diminish rights in existing domestic partnerships. Same-sex 
partners were specifically included in such answers.  
C. WHAT LIGHT DOES THE LEGISLATURE'S ADOPTION OF  
CHAPTER 770 SHED ON THE MEANING OF THE MARRIAGE AMENDMENT? 
 
 
¶38 The third source of information used to determine the 
meaning 
of 
a 
constitutional 
amendment 
is 
"the 
earliest 
interpretations 
of 
the 
provision 
by 
the 
legislature, 
as 
manifested through the first legislative action following 
adoption."  Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 295 Wis. 2d 1, ¶19.  
Review of legislation following a constitutional amendment has 
proved particularly useful, for example, in discerning the 
meaning of specific terms in a constitutional amendment.  Payne 
v. City of Racine, 217 Wis. 550, 259 N.W. 437, 440 (1935) 
(discussing subsequent legislation to define the meaning of 
"public utility" in article XI, section 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution); State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 138, 341 N.W.2d 
668 
(1984) 
(adopting 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
reliance 
on 
legislative acts to understand the meaning of "civil process" as 
used in article IV, section 15 of the Wisconsin Constitution).   
¶39 Analysis of the first legislation passed following the 
passage of an amendment, however, provides a limited benefit in 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
28 
 
this case where we are tasked with resolving a challenge to the 
first law passed following the Marriage Amendment.  We do find, 
however, that the legislature's careful drafting of Chapter 770 
and its legislative declaration of policy in Wis. Stat. § 
770.001 provide us with additional, yet limited, support for the 
proposition that the Amendment was not intended to prohibit the 
kind of domestic partnership created by Chapter 770. 
 
¶40 During the drafting process, proponents of Chapter 770 
carefully considered whether Chapter 770 would conflict with the 
Marriage Amendment.  In doing so, proponents of Chapter 770 
sought and received legal opinions and analysis considering 
possible 
conflicts 
between 
Chapter 
770 
and 
the 
Marriage 
Amendment.  For example, members of the legislature and the 
governor 
considered 
legal 
opinions 
from 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislative Council's Chief of Legal Services, Don Dyke, and 
University of Wisconsin Law School Professor David Schwartz, 
both of whom concluded that Chapter 770 did not violate the 
Marriage Amendment.  After careful consideration during the 
drafting process, the legislature then chose to begin Chapter 
770 with a declaration of policy.  This declaration of policy, 
in part, states, "the legal status of domestic partnership as 
established in this chapter is not substantially similar to that 
of marriage. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as 
inconsistent with or a violation of article XIII, section 13, of 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
29 
 
the Wisconsin Constitution."  In considering the third source 
from Dairyland, the legislature's careful consideration of the 
intersection of Chapter 770 and the Amendment along with its 
subsequent declaration of policy provide additional, but not 
dispositive, support for our conclusion today.  
II.  WHAT KIND OF LEGAL STATUS DOES CHAPTER 770 CREATE? 
¶41 Having 
set 
out 
the 
relevant 
evidence 
from 
the 
Dairyland factors, we now look at what kind of legal status Wis. 
Stat. Ch. 770 created.   
¶42 We therefore look at what legal position a person in a 
domestic partnership is in "with regard to the rest of the 
community," Duket, 90 Wis. at 275, what rights and benefits 
there are that the law recognizes such status as having, who can 
have that legal status, and what is necessary to obtain it.  
This part of the discussion is fairly straightforward:  the 
definitions of legal status at issue are standard ones well 
known to the law and involve little more than a review of 
undisputed 
and 
uncontroversial 
facts 
about 
the 
statutory 
provisions concerning domestic partnerships and the statutory 
provisions concerning marriage.   
¶43 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 770.01 
defines 
"domestic 
partnership" as "the legal relationship that is formed between 2 
individuals under this chapter."  The declaration of policy at 
the beginning of Chapter 770 states simply, "The legislature 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
30 
 
finds that it is in the interests of the citizens of this state 
to establish and provide the parameters for a legal status of 
domestic partnership.  The legislature further finds that the 
legal status of domestic partnership as established in this 
chapter is not substantially similar to that of marriage. 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as inconsistent with 
or a violation of article XIII, section 13, of the Wisconsin 
Constitution."24  Wis. Stat. § 770.001.  It does not identify the 
legal status as a contractual relationship.25  It does not impose 
a mutual and equal obligation upon the partners.26  
¶44 Chapter 770 does not impose the same obligations on 
domestic partners as Wisconsin law imposes on married couples 
                                                 
24 Compare Wis. Stat. § 765.001, discussing the legislative 
intent of marriage laws, which states in part, "Marriage is the 
institution that is the foundation of the family and of society. 
Its stability is basic to morality and civilization, and of 
vital interest to society and the state." 
25 Compare Wis. Stat. § 765.001, the legislative policy 
statement regarding marriage laws, which states in part: "The 
consequences of the marriage contract are more significant to 
society than those of other contracts, and the public interest 
must be taken into account always. . . . The impairment or 
dissolution of the marriage relation generally results in injury 
to the public wholly apart from the effect upon the parties 
immediately concerned.  
26 Compare Wis. Stat. § 765.001, which states in part, 
"Under the laws of this state, marriage is a legal relationship 
between 2 equal persons, a husband and wife, who owe to each 
other mutual responsibility and support. Each spouse has an 
equal obligation in accordance with his or her ability to 
contribute money or services or both which are necessary for the 
adequate support and maintenance of his or her minor children 
and of the other spouse."  (Emphasis added.) 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
31 
 
under Wis. Stat. ch. 765 and elsewhere.  Marriage is unique in 
that it is an enforceable contract to which the state is a 
party. See Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 126, 42 N.W.2d 500, 
501 (1950) ("There are three parties to a marriage contract—the 
husband, the wife, and the state.").  Marriage carries with it 
an "equal obligation" that spouses "owe to each other mutual 
responsibility and support."  Wis. Stat. § 765.001(2). Once a 
couple is married, "the law steps in and holds the parties to 
various obligations and liabilities."  Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 
190, 211 (1888).  
¶45 Chapter 770 makes no similar demand on domestic 
partners. Chapter 770 does not refer to a domestic partnership 
as a contract; it does not obligate domestic partners to satisfy 
a duty of "mutual responsibility and support."  
While 
the 
Plaintiffs argue that this obligation can be read into ch. 770 
from the co-habitation requirement, this argument is not 
persuasive given the specificity with which the legislature has 
chosen to articulate spousal obligations under Wis. Stat. Ch. 
765 and elsewhere. 
¶46 As we noted previously, Wis. Stat. § 770.05 sets forth 
the criteria for establishing a domestic partnership as follows: 
(1) Each individual is at least 18 years old and 
capable of consenting to the domestic partnership. 
(2) Neither individual is married to, or in a domestic 
partnership with, another individual. 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
32 
 
(3) The 2 individuals share a common residence. 
 . . .    
(4) The 2 individuals are not nearer of kin to each 
other than 2nd cousins, whether of the whole or half 
blood or by adoption.   
(5) The individuals are members of the same sex. 
¶47 Terminating a domestic partnership does not require 
state approval, nor does it require the approval or consent of 
the second partner, and it can be dissolved automatically if 
either partner marries.27 
¶48 The rights conferred are not listed in Chapter 
770; rather, other statutes have been amended to add 
domestic partners to those whose rights are protected 
in various ways in specific contexts.  As the court of 
appeals noted in its decision, The mechanism the 
legislature 
chose 
for 
conferring 
rights 
and 
                                                 
27 Wis. Stat. § 770.12 states: 
 (1)(a) A domestic partner may terminate the domestic 
partnership by filing a completed notice of termination of 
domestic partnership form with the county clerk who issued the 
declaration of domestic partnership and paying the fee under s. 
770.17. The notice must be signed by one or both domestic 
partners and notarized. 
 . . .  
(4)(a) Except as provided in par. (b), the termination of a 
domestic partnership is effective 90 days after the certificate 
of termination of domestic partnership is recorded under sub. 
(3). 
(b) If a party to a domestic partnership enters into a 
marriage that is recognized as valid in this state, the domestic 
partnership is automatically terminated on the date of the 
marriage. 
 
 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
33 
 
obligations was to select a subset of rights and 
obligations found in other parts of the statutes that 
already apply to marriages and then indicate, in the 
text of those other statutes, that they apply to 
domestic partnerships.  For example, Wis. Stat. 
§ 861.21(2), the statute assigning to a surviving 
spouse his or her decedent spouse's interest in their 
home, was made applicable to domestic partnerships.   
Appling, 345 Wis. 2d 762, ¶7.  Statutes that were amended 
include those governing victim notification (e.g., Wis. 
Stat. § 301.38(1)(a)), administration and transfer of a 
deceased individual's estate (Wis. Stat §§ 852.09, 861.33), 
health care records (Wis. Stat. § 146.81.(5)), power of 
attorney for health care (Wis. Stat. §  155.05), and family 
and medical leave (Wis. Stat. § 103.10).  The circuit 
court's decision noted that domestic partners are not 
included in other statutes granting specific rights to 
spouses; it listed a sampling of statutes granting rights, 
both large and small, accorded to spouses only.  Domestic 
partners, for example, do not have the marital property 
rights spelled out in Wis. Stat. Chapter 766.  They also 
are not permitted to obtain joint fishing licenses (Wis. 
Stat. 29.219(4)). 
 
¶49 Other 
jurisdictions 
treat 
Wisconsin 
citizens 
in 
Chapter 770 domestic partnerships differently than they treat 
Wisconsin citizens in marriages.  The court of appeals observed 
that "[a]lthough Wisconsin recognizes marriages formed in other 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
34 
 
jurisdictions, and Wisconsin marriages are likewise recognized 
in other jurisdictions, the same cannot be said of domestic 
partnerships. . . . When it comes to cross-jurisdictional 
recognition, 
marriages 
and 
domestic 
partnerships 
bear 
no 
resemblance."  345 Wis. 2d 762, ¶37.   
¶50 That 
is 
underscored 
by 
the 
fact 
that 
domestic 
partnerships are not treated as equivalent to marriage, even 
where 
the 
federal 
government 
recognizes 
marriage 
without 
limiting it by gender.  For example, some federal agencies now 
extend federal benefits to spouses in same-sex marriages as well 
as opposite-sex marriages (following the United States Supreme 
Court's ruling in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013), which struck down one provision of the federal Defense 
of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7).  The Internal Revenue Service 
now recognizes marriages regardless of the gender of the spouses 
for tax filing purposes. See Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 
201. (“For Federal tax purposes, the Service adopts a general 
rule recognizing a marriage of same-sex individuals that was 
validly entered into in a state whose laws authorize the 
marriage of two individuals of the same sex even if the married 
couple is domiciled in a state that does not recognize the 
validity of same-sex marriages.”). But it does not recognize for 
tax-related purposes state-recognized domestic partnerships or 
their equivalents. See id. ("For Federal tax purposes, the term 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
35 
 
'marriage' does not include registered domestic partnerships, 
civil unions, or other similar formal relationships recognized 
under state law that are not denominated as a marriage under 
that state's law, and the terms 'spouse,' 'husband and wife,' 
'husband,' and 'wife' do not include individuals who have 
entered into such a formal relationship.").   
 III. IS THIS THE KIND OF LEGAL STATUS THE MARRIAGE AMENDMENT 
WAS MEANT TO PROHIBIT? 
¶51 Having set out the parameters of the legal status of 
domestic partnerships, we now arrive at the crux of the matter:  
have the Plaintiffs carried their burden to show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the domestic partnership law violates 
Article XIII, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution? 
¶52 Keeping as our reference point the intent of the 
framers and the voters, we turn to that specific question.  As 
we have noted, the plain language of the Amendment prohibits a 
legal status "identical or substantially similar to that of 
marriage."  The public statements by proponents of the Amendment 
in the public debates leading up to ratification repeatedly 
emphasized the message that it would not prohibit anything other 
than something that was "marriage by another name."  Thus, the 
plain meaning of "substantially similar" was defined for voters 
as something much more than similarities created by same-sex 
couples' obtaining a specified amount of rights.  For example, 
as we noted previously, in a press release dated Nov. 2, 2006, 
Sen. Scott Fitzgerald issued a statement quoting "the non-
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
36 
 
partisan Legislative Council" as writing that "the proposed 
amendment does not ban civil unions, only a Vermont-style system 
that is simply marriage by another name." (Emphasis added.)  
Without 
the 
further 
qualifications 
now 
advanced 
by 
the 
Plaintiffs, he gave to the voters he hoped to persuade the 
simple message that "only" the all-rights-included Vermont-style 
scheme would be prohibited. 
¶53 Plaintiffs now argue that what makes the Vermont-style 
civil unions similar to the status in Chapter 770 is the nature 
of the relationships, not the rights conferred on them, and they 
argue that it is the intimate nature of the relationship 
"implicit in Ch. 770" that offends the constitutional provision 
by mirroring marriage.28  They aver that when they told voters 
that the Amendment would not stop the legislature from creating 
a mechanism to grant rights to non-married same-sex couples, 
what they meant was a kind of domestic partnership that would 
include "two brothers who live together and share household 
expenses, or a young woman who lives with and helps care for her 
                                                 
28 At oral argument before this court, Plaintiffs asserted 
that their argument had not changed, that this interpretation 
had been the same all through the ratification process, and that 
when proponents asserted that Vermont-style civil unions would 
not be permitted by the Amendment, voters would have understood 
that Chapter 770-style domestic partnerships would not either 
because both impermissibly mirror marriage as intimate domestic 
relationships. 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
37 
 
widowed grandfather."29  However, the statements quoted herein 
make it clear that during the constitutional ratification 
process, 
proponents 
explicitly 
mentioned 
same-sex 
intimate 
relationships when voters raised questions about what kind of 
relationship might legally be recognized if it passed. We have 
found no evidence in the record that proponents made the 
arguments to voters that they now say voters endorsed regarding 
Vermont-style unions, constituent elements of marriage, and 
consanguinity prohibitions and sex-specificity requirements.  
Adopting Plaintiffs' position would require us to believe that 
when voters heard the Marriage Amendment proponents, including 
its legislative sponsors, make public statements that the 
legislature could choose to bundle certain rights and give them 
to same-sex couples in civil unions, voters understood the 
unspoken remainder of that sentence to be "as long as those 
rights are not solely extended to same-sex couples but also 
extended to other pairs of people in domestic settings without 
                                                 
29 It would theoretically be possible to sever portions of 
the statute if that portion rendered it unconstitutional.  See, 
e.g., State v. Hezzie R., 220 Wis. 2d 360, 580 N.W.2d 660 
(1998).  We note, however, that the statute itself contains no 
severability clause, and though there was a suggestion at oral 
argument that severing certain requirements in Chapter 770 might 
eliminate 
what 
Plaintiffs 
considered 
its 
impermissible 
substantial similarities to marriage, the argument is not 
sufficiently developed to make that a reasonable approach to be 
considered in this case.  
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
38 
 
regard to kinship or gender, such as siblings, grandparents and 
grandchildren, and opposite-sex couples."30   
¶54 Plaintiffs' position cannot be squared at all with 
proponents' pre-ratification statements about non-marital sexual 
relationships and civil unions.  To follow Plaintiffs' logic, 
dropping the "specified gender" requirement would make Chapter 
770 less similar to the constituent elements of marriage, but 
obviously dropping the requirement of a particular gender from 
Ch. 770 would make the status available to opposite-gender 
couples and consequently produce domestic partnerships that 
                                                 
30 While plaintiffs identified six elements as "constituent 
elements" of marriage in their brief, that argument changed 
somewhat in oral argument before this court.  When asked by 
Justice Gableman for an example of a legal status that would be 
"not substantially similar" under Plaintiffs' reading of the 
Amendment, counsel gave the example of reciprocal beneficiary 
agreement which was described as follows: 
[It] has an age restriction–you're age 18–it does not 
have a sex specificity or a consanguinity requirement–
that you're of competency to contract–and you are not 
in a marriage or other domestic legal status. That's 
it–those are the requirements. That's something that 
would encompass the examples that we mentioned in our 
brief, of a granddaughter living with a grandfather, 
or two sisters. 
Of course, that legal status, as described, has four of the 
six "constituent elements," and is missing only the sex 
specificity 
requirement 
and 
consanguinity 
prohibition.  
When asked in a follow-up question whether it was accurate 
to state that the Plaintiffs' constitutional argument was 
concerned solely with the identified constituent elements 
and was unconcerned with the size of the "bundle of 
benefits and obligations" conferred on a legal status, 
counsel confirmed that was correct. 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
39 
 
would appear to be even more similar to marriage in respect to 
the mix of genders and the capacity to bear children.  
¶55 It is worth noting another point that undermines the 
contention that the legal status is defined with reference to 
marriage's 
"constituent 
elements," 
which 
is 
that 
the 
"constituent element" approach would appear to require us to 
find unconstitutional Wis. Stat. § 40.02, which defines domestic 
partners for purposes of determining eligibility for state 
employee benefits.  Wisconsin Stat. § 40.02(21d) states: 
 "Domestic partnership" means a relationship between 2 
individuals that satisfies all of the following: 
(a) Each individual is at least 18 years old and 
otherwise competent to enter into a contract. 
(b) Neither individual is married to, or in a domestic 
partnership with, another individual. 
(c) The 2 individuals are not related by blood in any 
way that would prohibit marriage under s. 765.03. 
(d) The 2 individuals consider themselves to be 
members of each other's immediate family. 
(e) The 2 individuals agree to be responsible for each 
other's basic living expenses. 
(f) The 2 individuals share a common residence.  
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 40.02.  If we must strike  down as being 
"substantially similar" to marriage any legal status that has 
too many of the six elements Plaintiffs identify as the 
constituent elements of marriage (relationships between two 
persons of specified sexes over a certain age who are not 
closely related, are competent to consent and are not married to 
someone else), the state's recognition of Chapter 40 domestic 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
40 
 
partnerships for the purpose of granting state employee benefits 
surely seems to run afoul of that test.  At oral argument, 
Plaintiffs were given an opportunity to respond to this question 
and merely noted that they were not challenging that provision 
and that the provision did not create the kind of statewide 
legal status that the Amendment prohibited.  The problem it 
presents for Plaintiffs is that during the ratification process 
they never identified the Chapter 40 domestic partnership 
provision, which was in existence at the time, as conflicting 
with the "substantially similar" Amendment language.  Some 
Plaintiffs clearly stated that existing benefits would not be 
affected,31 yet the meaning they now ascribe to the Amendment 
would 
seem 
to 
invalidate 
Chapter 
40, 
which 
has 
more 
characteristics in common with marriage than a Chapter 770 
domestic partnership. 
¶56 We know what the proponents told voters that the 
Amendment would mean, and we know that voters approved the 
Amendment.  What the voters were told was that the Amendment did 
not mean that government entities, including the legislature, 
would be barred from "extending particular benefits to same-sex 
partners as those legal entities might choose to do."32  That is 
                                                 
31 See ¶25, supra (Rep. Mark D. Gundrum characterized 
opponents as "continu[ing] the effort . . . to deceive people 
about the impact the man-woman marriage constitutional amendment 
will have in Wisconsin" and flatly rejected the notion that it 
would "seriously jeopardize any legal protections for unmarried 
couples – gay or straight."). 
32 See ¶30, supra. 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
41 
 
what the legislature did.  The proper interpretation of a 
constitutional amendment is what framers and the voters who 
approved it thought it meant.  The voters were told by 
proponents, including the framers of the Amendment, that same-
sex 
couples 
could 
be 
granted 
rights 
notwithstanding 
the 
Amendment.  The message given to the voters did not present the 
qualifications 
in 
regard 
to 
extending 
benefits 
that 
the 
Plaintiffs now claim. 
CONCLUSION 
¶57 For the reasons herein, we affirm the court of 
appeals' holding that Chapter 770 is constitutional, based on 
the presumption of constitutionality, the Plaintiffs' failure to 
meet the burden of proof, and the evidence we have reviewed in 
accord with the Dairyland decision, which establishes the 
framework we use to interpret constitutional provisions. 
¶58 The plain language of the Amendment prohibits only a 
status "identical or substantially similar to" marriage, and by 
implication it does not prohibit what is not identical or 
substantially similar thereto.  There are important statutory 
distinctions in the way the state treats marriage and domestic 
partnerships and important differences in the lists of benefits 
and obligations that inhere in the two types of relationships.  
In light of the totality of those differences, Plaintiffs have 
not overcome the presumption that Chapter 770 is constitutional.   
¶59 Our conclusion is supported by evidence from the 
drafting and ratification process——evidence in the drafting 
files that the framers of the Amendment intended specifically to 
No. 
2011AP1572      
 
42 
 
allow legislation that provided a set of rights and benefits to 
same-sex couples.  We are supported in our conclusion by 
evidence 
that 
voters 
were 
repeatedly 
told 
by 
Amendment 
proponents that the Amendment simply would not preclude a 
mechanism for legislative grants of certain rights to same-sex 
couples.  We see no evidence that voters who approved the 
Amendment saw it as permitting those rights to be granted only 
in the kind of scheme Plaintiffs now suggest——that is, in 
cohabiting domestic relationships that bear no resemblance at 
all to marriage, with same-sex couples only as incidental 
beneficiaries.  Of course the Amendment's opponents put out a 
different message to voters, but as the court of appeals noted, 
it makes sense to credit the notion, when the proponents prevail 
in a referendum, that theirs was the message that resonated with 
the 
majority 
of 
voters. 
 
Finally, 
our 
conclusion 
draws 
additional support, although limited, from the legislature's 
careful adoption of the first legislative act following the 
Amendment, adoption of Chapter 770 itself.   
 
By the Court.—The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
 
No.  2011AP1572.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
   
 
¶60 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
majority opinion correctly notes that the instant case does not 
address any challenge to Article XIII, Section 13 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Majority op., ¶1, n.3. 
¶61 Although I agree with the majority opinion that 
Chapter 770 does not violate Article XIII, Section 13, the 
restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples provided in 
Article XIII, Section 13 has been challenged in Wisconsin courts 
as unconstitutional.   
¶62 This court recently declined to accept an original 
action challenging the constitutionality of Article XIII, 
Section 13 under the United States Constitution.1  Recently, the 
federal district court for the Western District of Wisconsin 
declared Article XIII, Section 13, unconstitutional under the 
United States Constitution,2 in line with other recent judicial 
decisions.3   
                                                 
1 Halopka-Ivery v. Walker, 2014AP839-OA, slip op. (Wis. May 
22, 2014) (denying the petition ex parte, with Abrahamson, C.J., 
and Bradley, J., dissenting). 
2 Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-CV-64-BBC, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 
2014 WL 2558444 (W.D. Wis. June 6, 2014). 
3 See, e.g., Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d. 456, 470 
(E.D. 
Va. 
2014); 
Bishop 
v. 
U.S. 
ex 
rel. 
Holder, 
962 
F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1277 (N.D. Okla. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 
961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1195 (D. Utah 2013). 
No.  2011AP1572.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶63 I write separately to call the reader's attention to 
these developments of the law. 
No.  2011AP1572.pdr 
1 
 
¶64 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   I join 
the majority opinion's thoughtful discussion of the petitioners' 
challenge to Wis. Stat. ch. 770 and its reasoned decision that 
is well grounded in foundational legal principles.  I write in 
concurrence 
to 
further 
discuss 
the 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality and the importance of the burden of proof that 
we must employ when a legislative enactment is challenged on 
constitutional grounds.  I do so to illustrate that judicial 
decision-making is not based on whether the statute reviewed is 
grounded 
in 
a 
liberal 
legislative 
philosophy 
or 
in 
a 
conservative legislative philosophy.  But rather, judicial 
decision-making is driven by foundational legal principles that 
require challengers to overcome the statute's presumption of 
constitutionality 
and 
to 
prove 
that 
the 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt if their challenge is 
to succeed.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶65 The 
petitioners 
request 
us 
to 
conclude 
that 
Wisconsin's domestic partnership law creates a "legal status" 
that is "substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried 
individuals" contrary to the prohibition of Article XIII, 
Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which provides in its 
entirety: 
Marriage.  Section 13.  Only a marriage between 
one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as 
a marriage in this state.  A legal status identical or 
substantially 
similar 
to 
that 
of 
marriage 
for 
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized 
in this state.   
No.  2011AP1572.pdr 
2 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶66 In order to prevail, petitioners must overcome the 
presumption 
that 
Wisconsin's 
domestic 
partnership 
law 
is 
constitutional and prove that it is unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶46, 333 
Wis. 2d 273, 797 N.W.2d 854.  The proof that is required is not 
proof in an evidentiary sense, as we usually understand burdens 
of proof.  Rather, it is proof that "establishes the force or 
conviction with which a court must conclude, as a matter of law, 
that a statute is unconstitutional."  Dane County Dep't of Human 
Servs. v. Ponn P., 2005 WI 32, ¶18, 279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 
344.   
A.  Standard of Review 
¶67 Whether a statute is facially unconstitutional is a 
question of law that we independently review, and while we give 
no deference to prior court decisions, we do benefit from their 
analyses.  State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 129, 447 N.W.2d 
654 (1989).   
B.  Constitutional Challenges 
1.  Judicial review 
¶68 When we review a challenge to the constitutionality of 
a statute, we apply foundational legal principles to each case 
that comes before us.  For example, there is a general 
presumption that all legislative acts are constitutional.  
Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2013 WI 78, ¶76, 
350 Wis. 2d 554, 835 N.W.2d 160.  The challenger must overcome 
this presumption.  Id.  The challenger also must prove that the 
statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  GTE 
No.  2011AP1572.pdr 
3 
 
Sprint Commc'ns Corp. v. Wis. Bell, Inc., 155 Wis. 2d 184, 192, 
454 N.W.2d 797 (1990).  The heavy burden that a challenger must 
meet is based on our respect for the legislature as a co-equal 
branch of government.  Ponn P., 279 Wis. 2d 169, ¶16.  Our 
procedures 
promote 
due 
deference 
to 
the 
legislature's 
constitutional function.  Id. (citing State v. Cole, 2003 WI 
112, ¶18, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328).  This deference is 
grounded in the recognition that creating distinctions upon 
which 
public 
policies 
for 
the 
state 
are 
based 
is 
the 
legislature's constitutional prerogative.  Doering v. WEA Ins. 
Group, 193 Wis. 2d 118, 132, 532 N.W.2d 432 (1995). 
¶69 We resolve any doubt about whether a statute is 
constitutional by upholding the legislature's enactment.  Cole, 
264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶11.  Therefore, it is insufficient for a 
challenger to show that the statute's constitutionality is 
doubtful or even that the statute probably is unconstitutional.  
Id.; Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 853, 578 N.W.2d 602 
(1998).  Furthermore, given alternate interpretations of a 
statute, we employ the interpretation that will sustain its 
constitutionality.  Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. DOR, 222 Wis. 2d 
650, 667, 586 N.W.2d 872 (1998).  Stated otherwise, if it is 
shown that there are applications or interpretations of the 
statute that would be constitutional, the challenge will fail.  
Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶30.  
2.  Application 
¶70 The majority opinion carefully addresses petitioners' 
facial challenge to Wisconsin's domestic partnership law to 
determine whether that law creates a "legal status" that is 
No.  2011AP1572.pdr 
4 
 
"substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried 
individuals."  It does so within the court's well-defined 
framework 
for 
analyzing 
facial 
constitutional 
challenges.  
First, the majority opinion accords the domestic partnership law 
"a strong presumption" that it is constitutional.1  Second, the 
majority opinion holds the challengers to their obligation to 
overcome this presumption and to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the law is not constitutional.2  In the process that it 
applies, the majority opinion is consistent with the process 
applied by the court in Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 
WI 
99, 
¶76, 
__ 
Wis. 
2d 
__, 
__ 
N.W.2d 
__, 
where 
the 
constitutionality of the 2011 budget repair bill, otherwise 
known as Act 10, was challenged.   
¶71 In Madison Teachers, the majority opinion applies the 
same basic analytic framework as the majority opinion does here.  
It accords the same presumption of constitutionality to Act 10.3  
Madison 
Teachers 
also 
resolves 
any 
doubt 
about 
the 
constitutionality of Act 10 in favor of upholding the statute, 
by requiring plaintiffs to prove the law unconstitutional beyond 
a reasonable doubt, a burden they did not meet.4  
¶72 Because understanding our decision today requires some 
appreciation of the foundational legal principles employed in 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶17 (quoting Georgina G. v. Terry M., 184 
Wis. 2d 492, 515, 516 N.W.2d 678 (1994)); see also ¶57.  
2 Id. 
3 See Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, ¶¶13, 
76, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __. 
4 See id., ¶¶44, 73.  
No.  2011AP1572.pdr 
5 
 
the judicial decision-making that attends facial constitutional 
challenges, I write to discuss that aspect of our decision, and 
accordingly, I respectfully concur.  
 
 
 
No.  2011AP1572.pdr 
 
 
1