Title: State ex rel. Clark v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State ex rel. Clark, Appellant, v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, Appellee.   
[Cite as State ex rel. Clark v. Indus. Comm. (1997), ___ Ohio St. 3d ___.] 
Workers’ compensation -- Application for permanent total disability 
compensation held in abeyance pending another medical 
examination 
and 
combined-effects 
review 
-- 
Industrial 
Commission abuses its discretion under former R.C. 4123.53, 
where 
record 
fails 
to 
disclose 
that 
additional 
medical 
examinations are necessary in determining permanent total 
disability. 
- - 
The Industrial Commission abuses its discretion under former R.C. 4123.53, 
where the record fails to disclose that additional medical examinations 
are necessary or of assistance in determining permanent total disability. 
- - 
 
(No. 95-432 -- Submitted March 18, 1997 -- Decided June 4, 1997.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 93APD10-
1454. 
 
Claimant-appellant, Imogene M. Clark, received two injuries in the 
course of and arising out of her employment as a store manager with United 
 
2
Dairy Farmers.  Her first injury occurred on July 22, 1981, and was allowed by 
appellee, Industrial Commission of Ohio, for “[s]wollen and sprain right leg.”  
This claim was assigned claim No. 81-22100.  Her second injury occurred on 
August 21, 1983, and was allowed by the commission for “[f]racture left lower 
leg; torn medial meniscus, left knee; vasicosilis vein with phlebitis; 
exacerbation of pre-existing dysthymic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, 
psychological factors affecting physical condition.”  This claim was assigned 
claim No. 83-19859.  Claimant has not been gainfully employed since August 
21, 1983.   
 
In April 1988, claimant filed an application for permanent total disability 
(“PTD”) compensation.  On July 10, 1989, the commission ordered claimant to 
report for two medical examinations on the issue of PTD.  On July 19, 1989, 
claimant was examined by commission specialist Daniel E. Braunlin, M.D., an 
orthopedist.  Dr. Braunlin assessed a ten percent permanent partial impairment 
(“PPI”) attributable to the musculoskeletal factors in the claim and found 
claimant unable to return to her previous duties.  He felt that claimant could 
 
3
perform sedentary work and that, by participating in vocational rehabilitation, 
“could be progressed to *** possibly even a level of light activity work.”   
 
On July 28, 1989, claimant was examined by commission specialist Peter 
E. Nims, M.D., a psychiatrist.  Dr. Nims opined that claimant’s allowed 
psychiatric impairments “represent a low degree, twenty to twenty-five per 
cent.”  However, he felt that claimant’s “combined impairments would prohibit 
her from any sustained remunerative employment because of her chronic pain, 
her preoccupation with her symptoms, and limited interest and poor 
concentration.”   
 
On May 24, 1991, the commission ordered claimant to report for another 
round of medical examinations, this time with commission specialists Clarence 
J. Louis, M.D., and Giovanni M. Bonds, Ph.D.  Dr. Louis assessed a “0% 
impairment” attributable to the injury in claim No. 81-22100, and a twenty 
percent PPI attributable to the allowed physical conditions in claim No. 83-
19859.  Dr. Louis also opined that claimant cannot return to her former position 
of employment but, with rehabilitation, could return to sedentary work.   
 
4
 
Dr. Bonds concluded that claimant’s allowed psychological conditions 
produce a twenty percent PPI, “prohibit her from engaging in any sustained 
remunerative employment,” and render her “not psychologically stable enough 
to participate in rehabilitation services, and [make] it unlikely that any 
programs available would return this claimant back to gainful employment.”   
 
On February 10, 1992, a combined-effects review was performed by 
commission specialist Merle Gibson, M.D.  Dr. Gibson concluded that claimant 
suffers a forty percent total combined-effects impairment and is 
psychologically unable to engage in any sustained remunerative employment. 
 
On June 4, 1992, a statement of facts was prepared for the commission 
by its attorney unit.  The statement writer offered no recommendation on the 
issue of PTD, explaining that, “[a]lthough both Commission Psychologist Dr. 
Bonds and combined effects review by Dr. Gibson opine that claimant is not 
capable of sustained remunerative employment, the % P.P.I. are low, and 
Orthopod Dr. Lewis [sic] finds claimant to be capable of sustained 
remunerative employment.”   
 
5
 
On June 30, 1992, claimant’s application for PTD compensation was 
heard by the commission.   However, the commission decided to hold 
claimant’s application in abeyance pending yet another psychological 
examination to be followed by another combined-effects review, after which 
the “claim(s) [would] be returned to the Commission for order without further 
hearing.”   
 
Accordingly, on September 11, 1992, claimant was ordered to report for 
a medical examination with commission specialist Jill Shaffer, Ph.D., a clinical 
psychologist.  Dr. Shaffer assessed a twenty-five percent PPI “due to the 
industrial injury in itself, and not to pre-existing conditions,” and concluded 
that “the industrial injury in itself does not prevent Ms. Clark from returning to 
her former position of employment.”   
 
Thereafter, a combined-effects review was performed by commission 
specialist Walter A. Holbrook, M.D.  Dr. Holbrook assessed a fifty-four 
percent PPI as a result of all allowed conditions and concluded that claimant 
was not medically incapable of performing her former duties of employment, 
 
6
but was capable of performing some sustained remunerative employment.  He 
essentially imposed a restriction of  light duty work with the additional caveat 
that claimant cannot perform occupations “requiring close association with 
other employees or with the general public.”   
 
On August 18, 1993, the commission, without further hearing, issued its 
order finding claimant not permanently and totally disabled and, therefore, 
denied her application for PTD compensation.  The commission based its order 
“particularly upon the report(s) of Dr.(s). Louis, Shaffer, and Holbrook, 
evidence in the file and evidence adduced at the hearing.”   
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus with the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, seeking a writ directing the commission to grant her 
application for PTD compensation.  Claimant alleged that the commission 
“abused its discretion by having [her] re-examined by new Industrial 
Commission doctors after the June 30, 1992 hearing,” and that “[t]here is no 
reasonable basis to conclude that [she] is capable of engaging in sustained 
remunerative employment.”   
 
7
 
The referee concluded that the commission did not abuse its discretion 
when it sought another psychological examination and combined-effects 
review following the June 30, 1992 hearing.  He did recommend, however, the 
issuance of a limited writ pursuant to State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 
57 Ohio St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245. 
 
The court of appeals essentially adopted the referee’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, with one judge dissenting.  The majority held, in particular, 
that relief under State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 315, 626 
N.E.2d 666, is inappropriate under the circumstances.  It found that Dr. 
Holbrook’s report and claimant’s age (fifty-six) provides “some evidence” that 
claimant is not permanently and totally disabled.  Thus, “the commission 
should be given another opportunity to explain the reasoning for its decision.”  
The dissenting judge stated that, “[c]onsidering the report of Dr. Holbrook and 
the nonmedical factors, it is unlikely the respondent commission could find a 
basis for properly concluding that *** [claimant is able] to engage in sustained 
remunerative employment.”  (Emphasis sic.)  
 
8
 
This cause is before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
Hochman & Roach Co., L.P.A., and Gary D. Plunkett, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Melanie Cornelius, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  The issue presented is whether the commission 
abused its discretion when it decided at the June 30, 1992 PTD hearing to 
schedule a third psychological examination followed by another combined-
effects review.1 
 
The commission argues that R.C. 4123.53 empowers it to have a 
claimant examined to determine her right to workers’ compensation benefits 
and “does not limit the number of such examinations.”   
 
Former R.C. 4123.53 (now R.C. 4123.53[A]) provided that “[a]ny 
employee claiming the right to receive compensation may be required by the 
industrial commission to submit himself for medical examination at any time, 
and from time to time ***.”  (Emphasis added.) 1953 H.B. No. 1.  This statute 
gives the commission broad discretion with regard to requiring a claimant to 
 
9
submit to medical examinations.  State ex rel. Anderson v. Indus. Comm. 
(1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 170, 172, 9 OBR 456, 459 N.E.2d 548, 551. 
 
The commission’s discretion under former R.C. 4123.53, however, is not 
unlimited.  While former R.C. 4123.53 imposes no specific limit on the number 
of medical examinations that the commission may schedule, on any given 
issue, neither does it permit the commission to act in an unreasonable, arbitrary 
or unconscionable fashion in its determination to schedule them.  Propriety, not 
aggregation, is the polestar of discretion in this case.  Indeed, the very concept 
of discretion connotes action taken in light of reason, and bounded by the rules 
and principles of law.  Discretion is not the indulgence of administrative whim, 
but the exercise of sound judgment.  It is a privilege of decision-making, not to 
be placed ahead of the responsibility to act fairly and judiciously.  Thus, as in 
other matters, the commission must exercise its discretion with regard to 
requiring a claimant to submit to medical examinations “soundly and within 
legal bounds.”  See State ex rel. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Indus. Comm. 
(1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 57, 62, 67 O.O.2d 74, 77, 310 N.E.2d 240, 244; 
 
10
Copperweld Steel Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1944), 142 Ohio St. 439, 445, 27 O.O. 
376, 378, 52 N.E.2d 735, 737-738. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the commission abuses its discretion under 
former R.C. 4123.53 where the record fails to disclose that additional medical 
examinations are necessary or of assistance in determining PTD. 
 
The commission argues that it had “sound reasons for its course of action 
in this matter.”  Since the claimant’s complaint is directed toward the medical 
activity which occurred “after the June 30, 1992 hearing,” the court need only 
concern itself with the commission’s reasons for referring claimant to 
psychologist Dr. Shaffer for examination and the claim file to Dr. Holbrook for 
a combined-effects review. 
 
The commission claims that the additional psychological examination by 
Dr. Shaffer was necessary because Dr. Bonds “addressed a non-allowed 
psychological condition in his report.  Thus, his report could not be used as 
evidence in this matter.”  The commission explains that Dr. Bonds took “into 
 
11
account a chronic pain syndrome which was never recognized as an allowed 
condition.”   
 
With all due respect to the commission, nowhere in his report does Dr. 
Bonds even mention a “chronic pain syndrome.”  The only reference to 
“chronic pain” is made in conjunction with claimant’s complaints.  At no time 
does Dr. Bonds purport to elevate such complaints to the level of a 
“syndrome,” “condition,” or any such degree of recognition, let alone rely upon 
it in rendering his opinion.  Instead, he very carefully and appropriately based 
his opinions solely on claimant’s allowed psychological injuries: 
 
“(1) the claimant’s industrial injuries[,] i.e., excerbation [sic] of pre-
existing dysthymic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and psychological 
factors affecting physical condition, prevent her from returning to her former 
position of employment.  Her condition is permanent and the degree of 
permanent impairment resulting from the industrial accident is 20% of the body 
as a whole. 
 
12
 
“(2) the claimant’s industrial injuries do prohibit her from engaging in 
any sustained remunerative employment. ***”  (Emphasis added.)   
 
Dr. Bonds did not address “a non-allowed psychological condition in his 
report” or take “into account” anything other than claimant’s allowed 
psychological injuries in rendering his opinions.   
 
The commission next argues that Dr. Louis “concluded that [claimant] 
was limited to sedentary work but documented minimal impairment.  Then Dr. 
Gibson did a combined effects review. *** He equated a forty percent 
impairment with permanent total impairment.  In doing so contradictory 
conclusions deprived his report of its evidentiary value. *** Rather than 
proceed with such defective evidence, the Industrial Commission chose to 
solve the problem prior to making its ultimate decision.”  (Citation omitted.)   
 
The commission’s reasoning with regard to the report of Dr. Louis is 
arbitrary.  The commission’s order was “based particularly upon the report(s) 
of Dr(s). Louis ***.”  Indeed, the very finding made by the commission based 
on Dr. Louis’s report was that claimant “is physically capable of engaging in 
 
13
some sustained remunerative employment.”  This report also helped to form the 
basis for the commission’s conclusion that “claimant possesses the medical 
capacity to engage in a number of sedentary or light duty employment 
opportunities.”  In fact, the commission’s order actually accepts Dr. Louis’s 
findings with respect to both claimant’s PPI and  physical ability to work, 
which are the very “defects” the commission purportedly sought to remedy.  In 
a feat of twisted logic, the commission has managed to argue that an additional 
psychological examination and combined-effects review were justified on the 
basis of a purportedly “defective” report going to claimant’s physical 
capabilities upon which the commission ultimately relied in denying PTD 
compensation. 
 
Moreover, there is no inherent contradiction between a twenty-percent 
impairment rating and a sedentary work restriction.  See State ex rel. Koonce v. 
Indus. Comm. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 436, 633 N.E.2d 520. 
 
As to Dr. Gibson, his report explains that “[p]sychologically, claimant 
*** cannot return to any gainful sustained remunerative employment now, or in 
 
14
the foreseeable future.  Psychiatric evaluation of impairment, even with low to 
moderate percentage values, point to the total and permanent nature of her 
condition.”  (Emphasis added.)  It is in this context that Dr. Gibson 
subsequently concluded that claimant “is totally and permanently impaired.”  
The commission is acutely aware that the assessment of a PPI percentage is a 
medical issue distinct from that of claimant’s ability to engage in sustained 
remunerative employment based on her industrial injuries.  Otherwise, it would 
not direct its medical specialists to assign a PPI percentage and then go on to 
make a medical determination of claimant’s ability to engage in sustained 
remunerative employment.   
 
In light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that the commission 
abused its discretion when it decided at the June 30, 1992 PTD hearing to 
schedule a third psychological examination followed by another combined-
effects review. 
 
The commission also argues that claimant “sat on her right to challenge 
the examining physician’s opinion.  She failed to exercise her right to depose 
 
15
the examining physicians involved. *** Nor does the record indicate [that 
claimant] made any attempt to challenge or thwart such examinations at the 
time they were conducted.”   
 
The only “examining physician’s opinion” that is challenged by claimant 
is that of Dr. Shaffer.  However, the commission misconstrues the nature of the 
challenge.  Claimant’s challenge goes not to the propriety of Dr. Shaffer’s 
opinion itself, but to the commission’s order requiring the claimant to submit to 
the examination in the first place.  We fail to see how deposing Dr. Shaffer has 
anything to do with the commission’s decision to schedule the examination.  
Moreover, former R.C. 4123.53 (now R.C. 4123.53[C]) provided, “If such 
employee refuses to submit to any such examination or obstructs the same, his 
right to have his claim for compensation considered *** shall be suspended 
during the period of such refusal or obstruction.”  The commission cites no 
authority for the proposition that a claimant must make the Hobson’s choice of 
waiving her challenge or having her right to consideration suspended. 
 
16
 
Once the reports of Drs. Shaffer and Holbrook are stricken from 
evidentiary consideration, the only conclusion that can be reached is to grant 
relief consistent with Gay.  All the remaining evidence unanimously indicates 
that the claimant is psychologically unable to engage in any sustained 
remunerative employment or participate in any rehabilitative program that 
would return her to gainful employment. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTE: 
 
1 Claimant phrases her challenge in constitutional terms, and accuses the 
commission of repeatedly examining her in an effort to “manufacture” some 
evidence upon which to deny her application for PTD compensation.  Claimant 
 
17
alleges that the commission “has engaged in a pattern of manufacturing 
evidence with a view towards denying permanent total disability 
compensation,” citing two unreported appellate cases with facts similar to those 
presently before the court.  Such grandiose remonstrations need not be 
addressed.  The gravamen of claimant’s challenge is simply that the 
commission abused its discretion when it decided at the June 30, 1992 PTD 
hearing to schedule a third psychological examination followed by another 
combined-effects review. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  Because I find that the Industrial 
Commission had good cause to order an additional examination, I do not agree 
that the commission abused its discretion in this matter.  Therefore, I would 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.