Title: In re Disqualification of Jennings

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Disqualification of Jennings, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2013-Ohio-3489.] 
 
 
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF JENNINGS. 
THE STATE OF OHIO v. GONZALEZ. 
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Jennings, ___ Ohio St.3d ___,  
2013-Ohio-3489.] 
Judges—Affidavits of disqualification—R.C. 2701.03—Disqualification not 
warranted solely because of judge’s passing acquaintance with 
defendant—Defendant’s alleged phone call to judge’s daughter not shown 
to have caused bias or prejudice—Argument for disqualification purely 
speculative. 
(No. 13-AP-048—Decided June 28, 2013.) 
ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Lucas County Court of Common Pleas 
Case No. CR12-2997. 
_____________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Ronnie L. Wingate, counsel for defendant Matthew Gonzalez, has 
filed an affidavit with the clerk of this court under R.C. 2701.03 seeking to 
disqualify Judge Linda J. Jennings from presiding over any further proceedings in 
case No. CR12-2997, now pending for trial in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Lucas County. 
{¶ 2} Wingate alleges that Judge Jennings’s participation in the 
underlying case creates an appearance of impropriety because of (1) the judge’s 
alleged personal connections with Gonzalez, (2) the judge’s “incensed” reaction 
to Gonzalez’s alleged phone call to the judge’s daughter, and (3) the possibility of 
additional charges against Gonzalez based on that alleged phone call. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 3} Judge Jennings has responded in writing to the allegations in 
Wingate’s affidavit, stating that she has no bias or prejudice against Gonzalez and 
pledging to be fair and impartial throughout his case. 
{¶ 4} For the reasons explained below, no basis has been established to 
order the disqualification of Judge Jennings. 
Judge Jennings’s alleged personal connections with Gonzalez 
{¶ 5} Gonzalez has been charged with various crimes relating to his 
alleged video recording of tanning-booth patrons at his hair salon.  In his 
affidavit, Wingate alleges that Judge Jennings was previously a patron of 
Gonzalez’s salon, Judge Jennings’s daughter remains a patron of the salon, and 
the judge’s daughter is a friend of Gonzalez and his wife.  Wingate also states that 
while Judge Jennings was in private practice, Gonzalez’s brother interned with an 
attorney in her law office for three years.  These personal connections, according 
to Wingate, raise questions about the judge’s ability to preside fairly over 
Gonzalez’s criminal trial. 
{¶ 6} In response, Judge Jennings states that her hairdresser rented space 
at Gonzalez’s salon nine years ago, and the judge does not recall having any 
conversations with Gonzalez, other than in passing.  Further, Judge Jennings is 
aware that her daughter, who is 42 years old with her own family, patronized 
Gonzalez’s salon, but the judge has “no knowledge of how long she did so, nor 
* * * any knowledge of when that patronage terminated.”  Similarly, the judge has 
no knowledge of whether her daughter is friends with Gonzalez or his wife.  
Finally, Judge Jennings recalls that Gonzalez’s brother assisted another attorney 
in her former law office, but that was 13 years ago and she rarely saw him. 
{¶ 7} “Generally, the more intimate the relationship between a judge and 
a person who is involved in a pending proceeding, the more acute is the concern 
that the judge may be tempted to depart from the expected judicial detachment or 
to reasonably appear to have done so.”  In re Disqualification of Shuff, 117 Ohio 
January Term, 2013 
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St.3d 1230, 2004-Ohio-7355, 884 N.E.2d 1084, ¶ 6.  Here, nothing in the record 
suggests that Judge Jennings has the type of close personal or professional 
relationship with Gonzalez or his salon that would cause an objective, 
disinterested observer to question her ability to remain impartial in Gonzalez’s 
criminal trial.  See, e.g., In re Disqualification of Panagis, 74 Ohio St.3d 1213, 
657 N.E.2d 1328 (1989) (judge’s “passing acquaintance” with a party or his 
counsel did not require disqualification); In re Disqualification of Ellwood, 74 
Ohio St.3d 1241, 657 N.E.2d 1347 (1992), quoting In re Disqualification of 
Cross, 74 Ohio St.3d 1228, 657 N.E.2d 1338 (1991) (“ ‘The prior professional 
activities of a judge are not grounds for disqualification when the record fails to 
demonstrate the existence of a relationship or interest that clearly and adversely 
impacts on a party’s ability to obtain a fair and impartial trial’ ”).  In addition, just 
as “the mere existence of a friendship between a judge and * * * a party will not 
disqualify the judge from cases involving that * * * party,” In re Disqualification 
of Bressler, 81 Ohio St.3d 1215, 688 N.E.2d 517 (1997), the mere allegation that 
a party before a judge is a friend of the judge’s adult daughter will not result in 
judicial disqualification. 
Gonzalez’s alleged phone call to the judge’s daughter 
{¶ 8} Wingate next claims that at a recent court conference, Judge 
Jennings informed the parties that Gonzalez had called her daughter, asked if her 
mother was a judge, and then requested the daughter to “ask her mother to go easy 
on him.”  In a “stern foreboding tone,” Judge Jennings, according to Wingate, 
said to “tell your client to stop calling my daughter.”  When Wingate inquired 
how the judge knew that Gonzalez was the caller, she responded:  “It was him.”  
Wingate claims that the judge “reacted as any parent, both defensively and 
incensed,” and he questions how she can remain impartial in the underlying case. 
{¶ 9} Judge Jennings acknowledges making these comments, but she 
denies that she acted defensively or that she was incensed, and she disagrees that 
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her tone was stern or foreboding.  Instead, the judge claims that her admonition 
“was stated simply and matter-of-factly and was stated no differently than it 
would have been stated to any other counsel representing a defendant on my 
docket who had improperly contacted a victim or party.” 
{¶ 10} Nothing about Judge Jennings’s disclosure of the improper phone 
call or her admonition to Wingate seems improper or evidence of bias.  To be 
sure, Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(1) requires that Judge Jennings step aside if she has 
developed a personal bias or prejudice against Gonzalez based on the phone call.  
Judge Jennings, however, steadfastly denies any ill will or hostility towards 
Gonzalez, concluding:  “If [Gonzalez] did telephone my daughter, I can set that 
aside and not consider it for any purpose.”  “A judge is presumed to follow the 
law and not to be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must be 
compelling to overcome these presumptions.”  In re Disqualification of George, 
100 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5.  Given the speculative 
nature of Wingate’s fears of potential judicial bias, and given Judge Jennings’s 
assurance that she can preside over Gonzalez’s trial fairly and impartially, those 
presumptions have not been overcome here. 
{¶ 11} Moreover, the record is unclear about whether Gonzalez actually 
placed the telephone call to Judge Jennings’s daughter.  If he did, Gonzalez 
cannot force disqualification by engaging in such improper conduct and then 
claiming that the conduct biased the judge against him, unless the judge could not 
reasonably remain unaffected by the phone call.  See, e.g., In re Disqualification 
of Donofrio, 135 Ohio St.3d 1253, 2012-Ohio-6338, 986 N.E.2d 13, ¶ 7 (personal 
attacks on a judge will not lead to a judge’s disqualification), citing Mayberry v. 
Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 464, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971) (“[a] judge 
cannot be driven out of a case”) and Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sweeney, 136 F.3d 
216, 219 (1st Cir.1998), quoting 13A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice 
& Procedure, Section 3542, 577-578 (2d Ed.1984) (“ ‘A party cannot force 
January Term, 2013 
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disqualification by attacking the judge and then claiming that these attacks must 
have caused the judge to be biased against [her]’ ” [brackets sic]). 
Alleged future charges 
{¶ 12} Wingate also claims that after Judge Jennings disclosed the 
improper phone call to the parties, the prosecutor informed Wingate that the state 
may consider additional charges against Gonzalez.  For her part, Judge Jennings 
states that she has no knowledge of any conversations that Wingate has had with 
the prosecutor’s office. 
{¶ 13} Wingate’s allegation here is based entirely on speculation.  He has 
not alleged that Gonzalez has been charged with any additional crimes relating to 
the phone call, nor has he explained how the prosecutor’s statement should result 
in Judge Jennings’s disqualification from the underlying case.  “Allegations that 
are based solely on hearsay, innuendo, and speculation—such as those alleged 
here—are insufficient to establish bias or prejudice.”  In re Disqualification of 
Flanagan, 127 Ohio St.3d 1236, 2009-Ohio-7199, 937 N.E.2d 1023, ¶ 4. 
{¶ 14} For the reasons stated above, the affidavit of disqualification is 
denied.  The case may proceed before Judge Jennings. 
________________________