Title: Mussack v. State, Department of Education

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAW LIBRARY

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPOR’
Wo. 27534

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
JOHN E. MUSSACK, Claimant-Appellant,

3

vs =
2

°

g

a

Gans

STATE OF HAWAI'I, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
‘Employer-Appellee, Self-Insured,

 

and
Insurance Adjuster-Appellee.

JOHN MULLEN AND COMPANY,
APPEAL FROM THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS APPEALS BOARD

(CASE NO, AB 2004-023 (2-00-41331))

(py: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, and Duffy, JJ.
‘and Acoba, J., concurring in the result only)

Claimant-Appellant John E. Mussack ("Mussack”) appeals

from the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board’ s*
(*LIRABY) July 28, 2005 decision and order affirming the decision
of the Director of Labor and Industrial Relations (“director”)
denying his claim for workers compensation against his. employer,
("DOE")? and the

the State of Hawai'i, Department of Education

Iwase and Board members Carol K,

 

* posed chairman Randall ¥,
Yenamoto and Vicente f- Aguino presided
"1 Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 386-3 (Supp. 2000) stati

 

son

 

(a) 1f an employee suffers personal injury either by
ind in the course of the exployment or by

Sisease proxinstely coused by or resulting from the nature of the
exploynent, ‘the employee's employer or the special ‘compensation
fund shall’ pay conpensstion to the employes or the employee’ s
dependents 28 provided in this chapter.

‘Recident arising out of and in the course of the employment
includes the wilful act of a third person directed against an
exployee because of the employe’ s employment,

 

accident arising out of

 
   

+ NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER
LIRAB's September 1, 2005 order denying Mussack’ s motion for
reconsideration.

On appeal, Mussack argues that the LIRAB erred inasmuch
a5 it (1) departed from lawful procedure by admitting the file of
the case (a) without giving him notice, in violation of the
pretrial order, (b) without his agreement, and (c) without
affording him the opportunity to object, (2) admitted a report by
De. Daryl B. Matthews ("Dr. Matthews’ Report”) and 00E files
regarding Mussack (“DOE documents”) into evidence although they
were not authenticated and hearsay evidence, and (3) concluded
that Mussack had not sustained an injury on September 28, 2000
even though “there was a variety of evidence that Mussack
sustained an injury.”

Upon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs

submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to

 

the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we hold that

(2) The LIRAB did not depart from lawful procedure

 

(b) No compensation shall be allowed for an injury incurred
by an enployee by the employee's wilful intention to injure
oneself cr ancther by actively engaging in any unprovoked non-vork
related physical altercation ctner than in self defense, or by the
exployee’# intoxication.

{e) A Claim for montal stress resulting solely fron
‘iplinary action taken in good faith by the employer shall not

flowed; provided that if @ collective bargeining agreement oF
other employment agreement specifies a different standard than
good faith for disciplinary actions, the standards set in the
collective bargaining agreement or other employment agreement
shall be applied in 1ieu of the good faith standard. for purposes
of this subsection, the standards set in the collective bargaining
agreenent or other’ enploynent agreenent shail be applied in any
Proceeding before the department, the appellate beesd, and the
Sppeliate courts

 

   

 

 
\OT_FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

where it admitted Dr. Matthews’ report and DOB documents as part
of the file of the case. The LIRAB’s pretrial order did not
require the DOE to provide Mussack with notice where the DOE did
net introduce these documents. Moreover, inasmuch as stipulation
is voluntary? and not @ prerequisite to admitted evidence, the
LIRAB may admit evidence that was not stipulated. Further,
Mussack’s failure to object to the Director’s file does not
amount to a LIRAB violation of “lawful procedure” where the
record does not indicate that the LIRAB refused to hear
objections to this evidences‘

(2) De. Matthews’ Report and DOE documents were

admissible because they are relevant® to the issue of Mussack’s

 

» _sgtipuration” se defined as “a voluntary agreenent between
Jsing parties concerning sone relevant point; especisily, an agreenent
fehating teva proceeding made by attorneys representing adverse parties to the
proceeding.” Black's Lau Dictionary 1455 (eth ed. 200¢)

  

 

 

‘see Hawai's Rules of Evidence ("MRE") 103 (“Error may not be
predicted upon ruling which sdnite or excludes evidence unless a substantial
Pigne of the party ia affected, and... a timely cbjection or motion to
Strike appears of record, stating the specific ground ef objection, if the
Specific ground was not apparent fron the context”)

+ the LIRAB Se an agency within the definition of the Hawai'i
Adninistrative Procedure Ret, gee Cazinero v. Kohala Susar co. 54 aw. 479,

teh, 510. P.2d 85, 91 (1973), and therefore, under Haval't Administrative Rule
$'1b-4)-41, “statutory and Connon lew rules relating to the admission or
Fejection of evidence” do not apply to the LIRAB. fawas's Aaministrative Rule
SioslorF201, “eneitied “Mearings Process,” describes the adaissicn of evidence
38 follows:

    

 

The admissibility ef evidence at the hearing shell not be governed
by the rules of evidence, and all relevant ccal and documentary
ividence shal)

 

evant i

Bocunentary evidence may De receives 1h the form of copies,
provides that, upon request, all other parties to the proceeding
Shell be given an opportunity to compare the copy with the
Gfigine!. if the original is not available, a copy say still be
Gdnssibie, but the unavailability of the original snd the reasons

3

 

 

 
 

*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *
injury on September 29, 2000;
(3) the LIRAB did not clearly err‘ by concluding that
Mussack did not sustain a psychiatric injury on September 29,

2000. We decline to disturb the LIRAB’s determination of the

 

therefor shall be considered by the hearings officer when
considering the weight of the documentary evidence... - The
Girector shall notify the parties whenever possible before the
hearing of the material to be co noticed and the parties shall be
afforded an opportunity at the hearing to contest the facts s0
Poticed.

 

(Emphasis added.) See also HRS § 91-10 (1993) (*[AIny oral oF docunentary
evidence may be received, but every agency shall as a matter of policy provide
for the exclusion of irrelevant, iamaterial, of unduly repetitious
eridence."); Cazinere, 54 Haw. st 483, 510 2.26 at 33 ("{h]hen an agency is
faced with evidence of doubtful adnissibility, it is preferable that it allow
the adnission of such evicence rather than to exclude the same, (because).

‘If the record on review contains not only all evidence which was clearly
Admissible, but algo all evidence of doubtful adniseibility, the court which
is called upon to review the case can usually sake an end of it, whereas if
evidence was excluded which that court regards aa having been admissible, 6
few trial oF fehearing cannot be avoided.)

“The rules of evidence governing administrative hearings are much less

formal than those governing judicial proceedings. This is due in part (sie)
the absence of 2 jury. Thus, the general rule ia that hearsay evidence is

 

 

ganiesible in agency proceedings.” Price v. Zoning bd. of Appeals, 77 nawai't
26, 176 n. &, 663 P20 €25, 637 n.8 (citing 4 J. Stein, Gy Mitchell &
Mezines, Raninistrative Low § 22.01 (1996))+ Thus, Ore Matthews” Report and

the DOE’ documents nay be adnissible even ae hearsay documents.” As long as Dr.
Matthexs' Report and the DOs documents were relevant =~ "having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the deverminaticn
of the action nore probable or less probable than st would be without the

 

evidence” == the LIRAB properly adaitted it. HRE 401. See Loui Ws Bd. of
Med. Exam'rs, 78 Hawai'i 21, 31, 869 P24 705, 718 (1995)

 

«See tosua v, Koa House Rest., 97 Hawai'i 402, 406, 38 P.3¢ 570,
574 (2001) ("A [Conclusion of Law] that presents mixed questions of fact and
law 45 reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard because the conclusion is
Gependent upon the facts and circumstances of the particular cese,” {internal
quotation marks, citations and brackets in original onitted)); in re Mate

x 94 Hawai'i $7, 219, 9 P34 408, 431. (2000) “Th finding
Of fact] or a nixed determination of law and fact is clearly erroneous wher
(2) the recore lacks substantial evidence to support the finding or
Getermination, of (2) despite substantial evidence to support the finding oF
Gevermination, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm
Conviction thet a mistake has been nade.”)

 

 
 

/* NOT_FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

weight and credibility of the evidence,’ and the substantial

 

evidence in the record did not support Mussack’s claim

(4) The LIRAB did not abuse its discretion by denying
Nussack’s motion for reconsideration where Mussack “raise(d]
argunents or evidence that could and should have been brought
during the earlier proceeding:"* and

(5) The LIRAB did not commit reversible error by
Finding that Mussack was not injured on September 29, 2000, where
his ongoing injuries began on September 25, 2000 because (a) he
did not seek to amend the LIRAB’s March 2, 2004 pretrial order
which plainly listed this issue and (b) even if the LIRAS erred,

it was harmless because Mussack did not present evidence other

 

> See taawa, 97 Hawai'i at 409-10, 38 F.3d at 577-78 ("It is well
established that courts decline te consider the weight of the evidence to
Socertain whether it weighs in favor of the administrative findings, or to
Heview the agency's findings of fact by passing upon the credibility of
Witnesses of conflicts in testimony, especially the findings of an expert
agency dealing with a specislized field.” (citations and block quotation
fermateing omitted) }

 

+ the presunption that @ workers’ compensation claim is for a
“covered work infury” erelates solely to the ‘work-connectedness’ of ai

injury.” "See Tamashize v. Contral Specialist, Inc., 97 Hawai'i 86, 31, 34
brbd"Yé, at 1200) thoiding thet the Ich extended TAS § 386-05 too far when it

Biglied’ the presumption to the "able-te-secuneswork™ Sasue) An employer
{bbnot be expected £0 Gtaprove the existence of an injury to the pleintitf,
father, the Elsinant has the burden to establish that he or she wae. injared
Enrough physicians” reports ana diagnoses.” Gfe Bottle. Sivahiza, 95\Baves's
Sos JeshZ3 bead t16;/724, (2001) eo estabiiah standing, the Plaines ef omose
show a distinct ang polpable injury to himself (or herseif]")." At that point,
St°the Linas Concludea, there ia & presunpeion that the injury ss connected tO

 

 

 

   

   

 

   

+ see Sousarie vs Miller, 92 Hawes": 505, 513,
(2000) (*{t}he purpore of @ motion for reconsideration is to allow tl
io present new evidence and/or arguments that could not have been pr
Goring the earlier adjedicated motion, Reconsideration is not s device to
Felitigate old mattere of to raise arguments or evidence that could and should
have been brought during the esrlier proceeding.” (quotation marks and
cieations casted) ).

 

 

 

 

 
 

sor eg ULC ION WEST'S AWAMRERORS AN PACHICREPORTER

Maura M. Okamoto, lice bles

Deputy Attorneys General,
for enployer-appellee,
State of Hawai't, Pate 6 Naweene vem
Department of Education

ea

 

SONCURRENCE BY ACOBA, J.

T concur in the result only.
aN

 

Mussack’s three physicians’ reports list only two dates of

injury/itinens, Septenber 29, 2000 and Octeber 13, 2000.” Homever, Musi
fd’ thst he was injured on Osteber 13,2000.

Sea Laaua, 97 Howas's at 409-10, 38 Fad at $77~

6