Title: Commonwealth v. Williams

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12549 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  QUINTON K. WILLIAMS. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     October 2, 2018. - February 13, 2019. 
 
Present (Sitting at Worcester):  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, 
Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Jury and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, Challenge 
to jurors. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Brockton Division of 
the District Court Department on March 1, 2016. 
 
 
The case was tried before Daniel J. Hourihan, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Edward Crane for the defendant. 
 
Gail M. McKenna, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Anthony Mirenda, Caroline S. Donovan, Amanda Hainsworth, 
Christopher J. Cifrino, & Justin Marble, for Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The defendant, Quinton K. Williams, an African-
American man, was charged with possession of a class B substance 
with the intent to distribute pursuant to G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32A (a).  During jury selection, over the defendant's 
objection, the judge excused for cause a prospective juror who 
stated that she believed that "the system is rigged against 
young African American males."  The defendant subsequently was 
convicted and now appeals, claiming that the judge abused his 
discretion in dismissing the prospective juror. 
 
Our jurisprudence regarding how to assess beliefs or 
opinions expressed by prospective jurors during voir dire has 
been less than clear.  Accordingly, we take this opportunity to 
set forth the factors that a judge should consider when a 
prospective juror discloses a belief or opinion based on his or 
her world view.  We conclude that although the voir dire was 
incomplete, it did not prejudice this defendant.  Thus, we 
affirm the conviction.1 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services and by the Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, the New England Innocence 
Project, the Innocence Project, the Charles Hamilton Houston 
Institute for Race and Justice, the Criminal Justice Institute 
at Harvard Law School, retired Supreme Judicial Court Justice 
Geraldine S. Hines, retired United States District Court Judge 
for the District of Massachusetts Nancy Gertner, Harvard Law 
School Professor Ronald S. Sullivan, Jr., and Northeastern 
University Professor Jack McDevitt. 
3 
 
 
Background.  During jury selection, the judge asked 
questions of the entire venire, including the following: 
"[Y]ou've been read a copy of the complaint which charges 
[the defendant], which is just an allegation, that he 
possessed [a] class B controlled substance, cocaine, with 
the intent to distribute. 
 
"Is there anything about the subject matter or your views 
about the subject matter that would affect your ability to 
be fair and impartial in deciding the case?" 
 
Prospective juror no. 15 (prospective juror), among other 
potential jurors, answered in the affirmative.  Subsequently, 
the judge and the prospective juror had the following exchange 
at sidebar:   
Q.:  "I believe you might have answered a question 
affirmatively.  Was that a -- a hardship question?" 
 
The clerk:  "No. . . .  It was on fair and impartial . . . 
[o]r bias." 
 
Q.:  "You feel like you might have a bias in the case?" 
 
A.:  "Yeah.  I worked with, like, low income youth in a 
school setting.  I worked a lot with people who were 
convicted of -- like teenagers who were convicted of drug 
crimes. 
 
"And frankly, I think the system is rigged against young 
African American males. 
 
"I'm happy to serve on the jury trial -- on the jury 
because I think it's important, but -- " 
 
Q.:  "You think that belief might interfere with your 
ability to be fair and impartial?" 
 
A.:  "I don't think so." 
 
Q.:  "You -- you think you can put aside that opinion and 
bias -- " 
4 
 
 
A.:  "I don't think I can put it aside.  I think that's --" 
 
Q.:  "No?" 
 
A.:  " -- the lens that I view the world through, but I 
think I can be unbiased -- I think I can be -- I think I 
can listen to the evidence." 
 
Q.:  "All right.  But you're going to have to be able to 
put that out of your mind and look at only the evidence.  
Do you think you can do that?" 
 
A.:  "I think so." 
 
Q.:  "I have to be assured that you can though.  You think 
you -- as -- as you sit in there, it might -- your 
experiences with -- with people in that type of a situation 
is going to have you look at it differently?" 
 
A.:  "Probably." 
 
Q.:  "Okay.  Step over there for a minute." 
 
 
When the prospective juror stepped away from the sidebar, 
the Commonwealth requested that she be excused for cause and the 
following discussion ensued between the judge and the parties: 
The prosecutor:  "I ask that she be excused for cause." 
 
The judge:  "Okay.  What do you say?" 
 
Defense counsel:  "Judge, I'm objecting. 
 
"I mean there -- there's -- the drug -- the issues 
regarding the mass incarceration of young African American 
males has been all over the news.  Everybody has read about 
it.  This is -- she has a little more information, but she 
did say she could be impartial. 
 
"And by the way, he's not a juvenile.  He's an adult." 
 
The judge:  "Yeah.  But he's a youthful looking guy, and 
she says she's going to have trouble.  She hesitated quite 
5 
 
a bit, Counsel, and I -- I -- I find on the record that she 
really struggled with it. 
 
"She said I'll try to and then that --  
 
"I'm going to let her go for cause.  I think -- " 
 
The judge thereafter excused the prospective juror for 
cause.  By the end of jury selection, the Commonwealth and the 
defendant each had one remaining peremptory challenge.  
Ultimately, the jury found the defendant guilty.  We granted the 
defendant's application for direct appellate review. 
Discussion.  The defendant argues on appeal that it was 
error to dismiss the prospective juror for cause because neither 
her work experience nor her belief that the criminal justice 
system is unfair to African-American men rendered her unfit to 
serve, and further that the dismissal was prejudicial. 
We agree that holding particular beliefs about how African-
American men are treated in the criminal justice system should 
not be automatically disqualifying.  See Mason v. United States, 
170 A.3d 182, 187 (D.C. 2017).  However, that is not what 
happened here.  The judge undertook to determine whether, given 
her opinion about the criminal justice system, the prospective 
juror could nevertheless be an impartial juror in the trial of 
an African-American man.  However, the voir dire ultimately was 
incomplete because the judge did not inquire further to 
determine whether, given the prospective juror's beliefs based 
6 
 
on her life experiences, she nevertheless could fairly evaluate 
the evidence and follow the law. 
Instead, the judge decided that the prospective juror was 
not able to be impartial because she expressed uncertainty about 
being able to "put aside" her beliefs and experiences and 
because she acknowledged that she would look at the case 
"differently" due to her experiences.  As discussed infra, a 
judge in this situation should focus not on a prospective 
juror's ability to put aside his or her beliefs formed as a 
result of life experiences, but rather on whether that juror, 
given his or her life experiences and resulting beliefs, is able 
to listen to the evidence and apply the law as provided by the 
judge. 
A judge's discretion in this realm, although broad, is 
rooted in determining a prospective juror's impartiality based 
on the juror's answers in a sufficiently thorough voir dire.  
Because the voir dire of the prospective juror here did not 
address whether she could fairly evaluate the evidence and apply 
the law given her belief regarding the justice system, the 
judge's assessment of her ability to be a fair and impartial 
juror was incomplete.  However, because we conclude that the 
defendant was not prejudiced as a result, we affirm. 
1.  Standard.  A criminal defendant is entitled to a trial 
by an impartial jury pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the 
7 
 
United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  See Commonwealth v. Vann Long, 419 Mass. 
798, 802 (1995), and cases cited.  That is, each juror must be 
"impartial as to the persons involved and unprejudiced and 
uncommitted as to the defendant['s] guilt or past misconduct."  
Commonwealth v. Ricard, 355 Mass. 509, 512 (1969).  General Laws 
c. 234A, § 67A, addresses the situation when a prospective juror 
indicates that he or she may not be able to be impartial, 
stating in pertinent part: 
"To determine whether a juror stands indifferent in the 
case, if it appears that, as a result of the impact of 
considerations which may cause a decision to be made in 
whole or in part upon issues extraneous to the case, 
including, but not limited to, community attitudes, 
possible exposure to potentially prejudicial material or 
possible preconceived opinions toward the credibility of 
certain classes of persons, the juror may not stand 
indifferent, the court shall, or the parties or their 
attorneys may, with the permission and under the direction 
of the court, examine the juror specifically with respect 
to such considerations, attitudes, exposure, opinions or 
any other matters which may cause a decision to be made in 
whole or in part upon issues extraneous to the issues in 
the case." 
 
Thus, if it appears that a juror might not stand 
indifferent, the judge must hold an individual voir dire, the 
scope of which is within the judge's sound discretion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 355 (1994).  Concluding 
whether a prospective juror stands indifferent is also within 
the judge's discretion.  Commonwealth v. Ruell, 459 Mass. 126, 
136, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 841 (2011).  However, this 
8 
 
discretion is not unfettered; the judge's conclusion must be 
supported by a voir dire that sufficiently uncovers whether the 
prospective juror can fairly evaluate the evidence and follow 
the law.  See Commonwealth v. Perez, 460 Mass. 683, 688 (2011) 
("judge's duty is to 'examine jurors fully regarding possible 
bias or prejudice'"). 
We have not been particularly precise when discussing the 
handling of juror opinions, and, as a result, our jurisprudence 
is somewhat muddled regarding the proper procedure for 
determining impartiality when a prospective juror expresses any 
preconceived opinions he or she has regarding the case to be 
tried as compared to an opinion formed based on his or her life 
experiences or belief system.  Nonetheless, there is an 
important difference between the two:  asking a prospective 
juror to put aside his or her preconceived notions about the 
case to be tried is entirely appropriate (and indeed necessary)2; 
however, asking him or her to put aside opinions formed based on 
his or her life experiences or belief system is not. 
We acknowledge that we have said repeatedly that, in 
determining juror impartiality, the general rule is that a judge 
                                                          
 
 
2 The same is true for other extraneous information related 
to the trial but not admitted in evidence.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Blanchard, 476 Mass. 1026, 1029 (2017); 
Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 221-222 (2012), cert. 
denied, 568 U.S. 1129 (2013). 
9 
 
must look at whether jurors can "set aside their own opinions."  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 478 Mass. 804, 819 (2018); 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 821 (2017), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 54 (2018); Commonwealth v. Andrade, 468 Mass. 543, 
547-548 (2014); Perez, 460 Mass. at 688-689; Commonwealth v. 
Bryant, 447 Mass. 494, 501 (2006); Commonwealth v. Leahy, 445 
Mass. 481, 495 (2005); Commonwealth v. Stroyny, 435 Mass. 635, 
639 (2002).  However, in so doing, we have not differentiated 
between opinions regarding the case and opinions about 
particular topics based on a prospective juror's life 
experiences or world view.  Even so, none of the above-cited 
cases has to do with the latter. 
Where a prospective juror "has expressed or formed an 
opinion regarding the case, or has an interest, bias, or 
prejudice related to the unique situation presented by the 
case," the judge must satisfy him or herself that the 
prospective juror will set aside that opinion or bias and 
properly weigh the evidence and follow the instructions on the 
law.  Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 482, cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 881 (1979).  Otherwise, removal of the prospective 
juror "is clearly appropriate in the interest that persons 
actually prejudiced not be seated on the jury even if it tends 
to skew an otherwise balanced panel."  Id.  Where, on the other 
hand, a prospective juror has expressed an opinion or world view 
10 
 
based upon his or her life experience or belief system, rather 
than asking him or her to set it aside (which is difficult if 
not impossible to do), a judge must determine whether, given 
that particular opinion, the juror nevertheless is able to be 
impartial in the case to be tried.3  See id. at 487 ("No human 
being is wholly free of the interests and preferences which are 
the product of his cultural, family, and community experience.  
Nowhere is the dynamic commingling of the ideas and biases of 
such individuals more essential than inside the jury room"). 
Thus, we emphasize that, in determining each prospective 
juror's ability to be impartial, although a judge may require a 
prospective juror to set aside an opinion regarding the case, 
the judge should not expect a prospective juror to set aside an 
opinion born of the prospective juror's life experiences or 
belief system. 
2.  Analysis.  After the prospective juror responded 
affirmatively to the question put to the entire venire regarding 
                                                          
 
3 Whether a juror's thoughts about a particular matter that 
have been formed through his or her life experiences are 
characterized as an opinion, point of view, belief system, or 
bias, as discussed infra, the dispositive question that must be 
asked is whether the juror can decide the case based on the 
evidence presented and the law as provided by the judge.  That 
said, we agree with the view expressed by the concurrence that 
there are some belief systems that may be incompatible with the 
ability to be a fair and impartial juror.  See post at    .  
Religious beliefs that prohibit one from sitting in judgment of 
another are an example. 
11 
 
whether there was anything about their views on the subject 
matter that would affect their ability to be fair and impartial 
in deciding the case, she was called to sidebar for an 
individual voir dire.  See Flebotte, 417 Mass. at 355.  At 
sidebar, the prospective juror stated her opinion that the 
"system is rigged against young African American males."  The 
judge asked questions in an attempt to determine whether the 
prospective juror could be impartial.  See Perez, 460 Mass. at 
688-689.  See also G. L. c. 234A, § 67A.  The colloquy that 
followed warrants closer review. 
 
The judge's first question to the prospective juror was 
proper:  "You think that belief might interfere with your 
ability to be fair and impartial?"  The prospective juror 
responded, "I don't think so."4  The judge went on to ask the 
juror:  "You . . . think you can put aside that opinion and bias 
--."  He did not get a chance to finish the question because the 
                                                          
 
 
4 The prospective juror phrased this answer, as well as 
others, to reflect the form of the judge's questions, i.e., her 
answer sometimes began with, "I think," in response to a 
question phrased, "You think . . . ?"  We note that an answer 
that mirrors the syntax of a judge's question does not 
necessarily indicate an equivocal answer.  See Commonwealth v. 
Prunty, 462 Mass. 295, 311-312 (2012); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 
447 Mass. 494, 501 (2006), citing Commonwealth v. Leahy, 445 
Mass. 481, 495-496 & n.13 (2005) (affirming judge's 
determination of impartiality where juror responses included "I 
think.  I've never done this before so it's hard"; "I think I 
could"; and "I suppose so"); Commonwealth v. Ascolillo, 405 
Mass. 456, 459-460 (1989). 
12 
 
prospective juror interrupted him, stating that she did not 
think that she could put "it" aside, and that "it" was "the lens 
that [she viewed] the world through."  Although she also 
affirmed that she could be unbiased and could listen to the 
evidence, it was within the judge's discretion to inquire 
further if he was not satisfied that her answer was unequivocal.  
See Commonwealth v. Clark, 446 Mass. 620, 629-630 (2006). 
The judge did continue to question the prospective juror, 
telling her that she would "have to be able to put that out of 
[her] mind and look at only the evidence."  When the judge asked 
her, "Do you think you can do that?" the prospective juror 
responded, "I think so."  Finally the judge asked:  "You think 
. . . your experiences with . . . people in that type of a 
situation is going to have you look at it differently," implying 
that the prospective juror could not take her life experiences 
into account as a juror.  After the juror responded, "Probably," 
the judge excused her for cause. 
Although the prospective juror indicated that, due to 
experiences she had, she believed that the "system is rigged 
against young African American males," and that this belief was 
not one that she could "put aside," she did not express any 
opinions having to do with the defendant or the case about to be 
13 
 
tried.5  Nevertheless, the record here indicates that the judge 
required the prospective juror to "put aside" her firmly held 
beliefs shaped by her life experiences in order to serve, and 
excused her because her experiences would cause her to "look at 
[the case] differently." 
Every prospective juror comes with his or her own thoughts, 
feelings, opinions, beliefs, and experiences that may, or may 
not, affect how he or she "looks" at a case.  Indeed, this court 
has acknowledged on multiple occasions that jurors do not 
approach their duties with a tabula rasa.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 817-818 (1975) ("Jurors 
do not come to their temporary judicial service as sterile 
intellectual mechanisms purged of all those subconscious factors 
which have formed their characters and temperaments such as 
racial or ethnic background, sex, economic status, intellectual 
                                                          
 
 
5 At a certain point during the colloquy, after the 
prospective juror told the judge that she could not put aside 
"the lens that [she] view[ed] the world through," the judge 
responded that she was "going to have to be able to put that out 
of [her] mind and look at only the evidence."  The concurrence 
suggests that it is not clear whether the judge "was directing 
the juror to set aside any preconceived notions that may affect 
her ability fairly to consider the evidence in this case or to 
set aside the 'lens' through which she viewed the world."  Post 
at    .  However, there is nothing in the record to indicate 
that the judge was referring to the former.  In fact, except for 
the judge informing the prospective juror that she would have to 
be able to "look at only the evidence," and asking her, "Do you 
think you can do that?" to which she replied, "I think so," 
there was no discussion about whether the prospective juror had 
any opinions about the case at all. 
14 
 
capacity, family status, religious persuasion, political 
leanings, educational attainment, moral convictions, employment 
experience, military service or their individual appreciations 
of the social problems of the moment"); Ricard, 355 Mass. at 512 
("Every individual has impressions and beliefs, likes and 
dislikes"). 
It would neither be possible nor desirable to select a jury 
whose members did not bring their life experiences to the court 
room and to the jury deliberation room.  See, e.g., J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) ("Individuals are not expected to ignore as jurors 
what they know as men -- or women").  See also Mutina, 366 Mass. 
at 820 ("Juries are generally instructed by judges in their 
charges and urged by counsel in their argument that they must 
not leave their common sense outside the jury room").  Thus, a 
prospective juror may not be excused for cause merely because he 
or she believes that African-American males receive disparate 
treatment in the criminal justice system.6  For that reason a 
                                                          
 
6 We note that there is ample empirical evidence to support 
such a conclusion.  See generally E. Hinton, L. Henderson, & 
C. Reed, Vera Institute of Justice, An Unjust Burden:  The 
Disparate Treatment of Black Americans in the Criminal Justice 
System, at 7-9 (May 2018), citing Starr & Rehavi, Mandatory 
Sentencing and Racial Disparity:  Assessing the Role of 
Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 Yale L.J. 2, 28-30 
(2013) (Federal prosecutors are more likely to charge African-
Americans than similarly situated Caucasians with offenses that 
carry higher mandatory minimum sentences); C. Crawford, T. 
15 
 
trial judge must take care to determine whether such an opinion 
would affect a prospective juror's ability to be impartial. 
The questioning here raises two concerns.  First, as 
discussed supra, a judge should not require a prospective juror 
to disregard his or her life experiences and resulting beliefs 
in order to serve.7  As we have acknowledged, bringing one's life 
                                                          
 
Chiricos, & G. Kleck, Race, Racial Threat, and Sentencing of 
Habitual Offenders, 36 Criminology 481, 503 (1998) (similar 
disparity for State prosecutors with respect to decisions to 
charge under habitual offender statutes).  See also United 
States Sentencing Commission, Demographic Differences in 
Sentencing:  An Update to the 2012 Booker Report, at 6 (Nov. 
2017) (African-American male defendants received sentences that 
were 19.1 per cent longer on average than similarly situated 
Caucasian male defendants).  These disparities also exist for 
victims of crime.  See C. Spohn & D. Holleran, Prosecuting 
Sexual Assault:  A Comparison of Charging Decisions in Sexual 
Assault Cases Involving Strangers, Acquaintances, and Intimate 
Partners, 18 Just. Q. 651, 680-681 (2001) (prosecutors in Kansas 
City and Philadelphia were less likely to file sexual assault 
charges when victim was African-American rather than Caucasian). 
 
The problem of racial discrimination in the criminal 
justice system has not escaped the attention of this court.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Buckley, 478 Mass. 861, 877 (2018) 
(Budd, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 
539-540 (2016).  See also Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 
658, 670 (1999) (Ireland, J., concurring). 
 
The Commonwealth, too, acknowledges in a letter it filed 
pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 16 (l), as amended, 386 Mass. 1247 
(1982), that the "views and opinions expressed by [the 
prospective juror] are generally accepted, and shared within the 
community at large." 
 
 
7 Again, this is not to be confused with the firm 
requirement that all jurors set aside any preconceived opinions 
they may have formed regarding a case or a defendant prior to 
having heard the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 
Mass. 461, 482, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). 
16 
 
experiences to jury service is appropriate (and perhaps 
inevitable).  Mutina, 366 Mass. at 820.  Asking prospective 
jurors to "put aside" or "disregard" what they think, feel, or 
believe comes perilously close to improperly requiring them to 
"leave behind all that their human experience has taught them."  
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642 (1980) ("Jurors are not 
expected to come into the jury box and leave behind all that 
their human experience has taught them"). 
Second, a judge who proceeds in this fashion mistakenly 
equates an inability to disregard one's life experiences and 
resulting beliefs with an inability to be impartial.  A judge 
should not assume that a prospective juror is unable to be 
impartial merely because he or she expressed uncertainty about 
being able to put aside his or her firmly held beliefs.  
Instead, an otherwise qualified prospective juror should only be 
excused for cause if, given his or her experiences and resulting 
beliefs, the judge concludes that the prospective juror is 
unable to fairly evaluate the evidence presented and properly 
apply the law.  See Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 
221-222 (2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1129 (2013) ("defendant 
is not entitled to a jury that knows nothing about the crime, so 
long as jurors are able fairly to weigh the evidence in the 
case, set aside any information they learned outside the court 
17 
 
room, follow the judge's instructions, and render an impartial 
verdict"). 
Thus, when a prospective juror states an opinion or belief, 
whether it is specific to the case or not, the judge must 
satisfy himself or herself that the prospective juror will be 
able to fairly evaluate the evidence and apply the judge's 
instructions on the law.8  See Perez, 460 Mass. at 688-689; 
Commonwealth v. Auguste, 414 Mass. 51, 53-54, 57 (1992) (judge 
was required to investigate whether "juror would be impartial in 
his or her determination of the evidence" after juror expressed 
concern regarding convicting based on defendant's race).  See 
also Commonwealth v. McAlister, 365 Mass. 454, 459 & n.4 (1974), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1115 (1975) (before excusing three jurors 
for cause, "judge took pains to assure that the attitudes 
expressed were more than just personal convictions and that they 
would interfere with the jurors' capacity to perform their 
duty").  Compare Vann Long, 419 Mass. at 804-805; Commonwealth 
                                                          
 
 
8 There are countless variations of a proper voir dire in a 
situation such as this.  The exchange between the judge and a 
prospective juror during jury selection for the trial of 
Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 478 Mass. 804, 816-817 (2018) provides 
a good example; the concurrence also provides a helpful outline.  
See post at    .  No special terms or particular phrasing is 
required.  However, through the voir dire the trial court judge 
must determine whether a prospective juror who has expressed a 
deeply held opinion or belief relevant to the issues or parties 
in the case can nevertheless fairly evaluate the evidence and 
follow the instructions on the law. 
18 
 
v. Somers, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 920, 921-922 (1998) (juror 
improperly empaneled in case where defendant charged with 
firearm-related offenses and juror stated he has "strong 
opinions about gun control" and defendant "would not want me on 
a jury"). 
Judges are expected to, and indeed must, use their 
discretion and judgment to determine whether a prospective juror 
will be fair and impartial based on verbal and nonverbal cues as 
well as the totality of the circumstances.  See Ruell, 459 Mass. 
at 136.  Here, however, the judge made that determination based 
upon whether the prospective juror could do something that is 
arguably impossible to do -- put aside her life experiences and 
her resulting world view.9  See Mutina, 366 Mass. at 820. 
3.  Prejudice.  At oral argument the defendant conceded, 
and we agree, that he suffered no actual prejudice from the 
error, as the Commonwealth completed jury selection with a 
                                                          
 
 
9 The question is not, as the concurrence implies, whether 
the voir dire was done in an artful way, see post at    , but 
instead whether it was done in a way that would allow the judge 
to determine the prospective juror's ability to fairly evaluate 
the evidence and follow the judge's instructions.  Although the 
judge determined that the prospective juror could not be 
impartial because he found that "she hesitated quite a bit" and 
that "she really struggled with it," the record reflects that 
the question with which she "hesitated" and "struggled" was 
essentially whether she could put aside her world view, not 
whether she could, given her world view, fairly evaluate the 
evidence and follow the law. 
19 
 
peremptory challenge left available to use (and which could have 
been used on the prospective juror had she not been excused for 
cause).  Moreover, the defendant has not argued that any member 
of the jury that ultimately convicted him was biased.  We 
therefore address only the defendant's arguments that the error 
should result in an automatic reversal of his conviction. 
The defendant claims that striking the prospective juror 
for cause resulted in structural error,10 warranting automatic 
reversal for two different reasons:  (1) it effectively resulted 
in an extra peremptory challenge for the Commonwealth; and (2) 
it infringed on the defendant's constitutional right to a jury 
comprised of a representative cross section of the community.11 
Structural error is "[g]enerally . . . error that 
'necessarily render[s] a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or 
                                                          
 
 
10 The defendant uses the terms "presumed prejudice" and 
"prejudicial per se" rather than "structural error" throughout 
his briefs.  We note that presumptions of prejudice can be 
rebutted and, here, the Commonwealth can demonstrate that the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of its 
unexercised peremptory challenge.  See Commonwealth v. McNulty, 
458 Mass. 305, 318 (2010) (applying harmless beyond reasonable 
doubt standard to nonstructural constitutional error).  However, 
we do not consider the arguments for structural error waived 
because the defendant makes clear that he is analogizing to two 
well-established types of structural error -- denied peremptory 
challenges and Soares violations.  See discussion, infra. 
 
 
11 The defendant raised the second argument during oral 
argument.  We granted both parties leave to submit further 
briefing on this issue pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 16 (l), as 
amended, 386 Mass. 1247 (1982). 
20 
 
an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.'"  
Commonwealth v. Hampton, 457 Mass. 152, 163 (2010), quoting 
Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218-219 (2006).  As such, 
structural errors defy harmless error analysis, and when claims 
of structural error that are timely raised and preserved on 
appeal are upheld, they require automatic reversal.  
Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 118-119 (2010) (no 
prejudice analysis necessary where defendant's right to public 
trial was violated).  Structural errors "have been recognized in 
limited circumstances . . . [and] occur rarely."  Hampton, 
supra, citing Recuenco, supra at 218 n.2.  The defendant argues 
that the facts here are analogous to cases that have resulted in 
structural error.  We conclude that the defendant's comparisons 
miss the mark. 
 
a.  "Extra" peremptory challenge for Commonwealth.  The 
defendant contends that the dismissal of a prospective juror for 
cause at the Commonwealth's request had the practical effect of 
giving the Commonwealth an "extra" peremptory challenge, and 
claims that in such an instance prejudice should be presumed.  
He argues that an extra peremptory challenge erroneously awarded 
to the Commonwealth is equivalent to denying a valid peremptory 
challenge to the defendant.  We have held that the latter 
results in the automatic reversal of a conviction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Wood, 389 Mass. 552, 564 (1983).  The defendant 
21 
 
reasons that a bonus peremptory challenge for the Commonwealth 
should similarly result in presumed prejudice.  Although the 
argument is creative, we are not convinced. 
Denying a defendant the right to exercise a valid 
peremptory challenge is prejudicial per se because "[t]he 
purpose of the properly exercised peremptory challenge is to aid 
the constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury."  Id. at 
560, citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 216-220 (1965).  And 
we have held that "the right to be tried by an impartial jury is 
so basic to a fair trial that an infraction can never be treated 
as harmless error."  Wood, supra at 564. 
Here, the judge did not deny the defendant the opportunity 
to exercise a peremptory strike; instead, the judge dismissed a 
prospective juror whom the defendant had hoped would be on the 
jury.  This scenario did not implicate the defendant's right to 
an impartial jury because where a potential juror is erroneously 
excused, the presumption is that that individual was replaced by 
another fair and impartial juror.  See Northern Pac. R.R. v. 
Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 646 (1886) (after judge excused juror 
favored by employer, "[a] competent and unbiased juror was 
selected and sworn, and the [employer] had . . . a trial by an 
impartial jury, which was all it could demand").  See also 
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (defendants are 
not entitled to jury of any particular composition).  The 
22 
 
defendant is not entitled to automatic reversal based on an 
extra, unused peremptory strike provided to the Commonwealth. 
 
b.  Fair cross section of community.  A defendant's right 
to a fair and impartial jury includes the right to a jury drawn 
from a venire representing a fair cross section of the 
community.  See Soares, 377 Mass. at 478.  The defendant 
acknowledges that "the right to a jury representative of a 
cross-section of the community cannot require that each jury 
include constituents of every group in the population."  
Commonwealth v. Benjamin, 430 Mass. 673, 677 (2000), quoting 
Soares, supra at 481.  However, he claims that erroneously 
dismissing the prospective juror was reversible error because it 
deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury made up of a 
fair and representative cross section of the community by 
limiting the chance that citizens, including African-Americans, 
holding this viewpoint about the criminal justice system would 
be represented on the jury.  We disagree. 
 
The defendant asserts that his case may be compared 
favorably to Soares, supra.  In Soares, this court held that the 
intentional use of peremptory challenges to exclude certain 
"discrete groups," including African-Americans,12 from a jury is 
                                                          
 
12 "[T]hose generic group affiliations which may not 
permissibly form the basis for juror exclusion . . . [are] sex, 
race, color, creed or national origin."  Soares, 377 Mass. at 
488-489. 
23 
 
an art. 12 violation of a defendant's right to a fair and 
impartial jury.13  Id. at 486, 488, 492.  As a result, this 
error, unaddressed at the time of trial, was held to be 
prejudicial per se.  Id. at 492.  See Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 
Mass. 307, 325-326 (2017) (Soares violation is structural 
error). 
The defendant argues that although the error in this case 
is different, he is harmed similarly in that it reduced the 
likelihood that his jury would be drawn from a representative 
cross section of the community.  The comparison is inapt. 
 
In Soares, 377 Mass. at 488-490, the Commonwealth 
improperly used peremptory challenges to strike prospective 
jurors because they were members of a discrete group.  In 
contrast, here, the prospective juror was not struck due to 
being a member of a discrete group.  Instead, after conducting a 
voir dire, the judge excused the prospective juror because he 
found that she could not be a fair and impartial juror based on 
how she responded to his questions.  Although, as discussed 
supra, the judge made this finding without determining whether 
the prospective juror could fairly evaluate the evidence and 
                                                          
 
13 The court reasoned that the right to a representative 
jury pool is "wholly susceptible to nullification" if the 
Commonwealth is permitted to exercise peremptory challenges to 
remove jurors on the basis of their membership in certain 
groups.  Soares, 377 Mass. at 486. 
24 
 
follow the instructions on the law, the judge made a good faith 
attempt to gauge whether she was qualified to serve.  The judge 
did not conclude or otherwise suggest that the prospective 
juror's belief about the criminal justice system was 
disqualifying in and of itself. 
 
It is the exclusion of prospective jurors "solely by virtue 
of their membership in, or affiliation with, particular, defined 
groupings in the community" that violates a defendant's 
constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury, Soares, 377 
Mass. at 486, not excusing prospective jurors for cause because 
the judge believes, after voir dire, that they cannot be 
impartial, see id. at 482.  This is so even if, as here, the 
voir dire is not complete. 
In arguing that prejudice should be presumed in these 
circumstances, the defendant points to Mason v. United States, 
170 A.3d 182 (D.C. 2017), and King v. State, 414 A.2d 909 (Md. 
1980).  These extrajurisdictional cases are distinguishable.  In 
King, supra at 910, prospective jurors were excused because they 
disagreed with marijuana laws in a marijuana possession case.  
In Mason, supra at 185, a potential juror was disqualified 
specifically because of her belief that the criminal justice 
system is biased against African-American men.  In both cases 
the trial court judges treated the beliefs of the prospective 
jurors as "in themselves disqualifying."  Id. at 187.  See King, 
25 
 
supra at 910-913.  Here, by contrast, as discussed supra, the 
judge conducted a voir dire to determine whether the prospective 
juror could be impartial. 
4.  Conclusion.  Although the voir dire of the prospective 
juror was incomplete, the defendant has not shown that the 
resulting dismissal of the prospective juror for cause resulted 
in prejudice.  We therefore decline to set aside the verdict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring, with whom Gaziano, J., joins).  I 
agree with the court that a prospective juror may not be excused 
for cause from sitting on a jury simply because the juror 
believes that "the system is rigged against young African 
American males."  And I would like to believe that, if I were 
once again a trial court judge, I would have conducted the voir 
dire of this prospective juror a bit differently from how the 
judge in this case did after the juror raised her hand to the 
question, "Is there anything about the subject matter or your 
views about the subject matter that would affect your ability to 
be fair and impartial in deciding the case?" 
 
I would like to believe that I would have acknowledged that 
I respect the juror's point of view, but noted that it was this 
particular defendant and not the criminal justice system that 
was on trial, and then asked whether the juror was confident 
that she could fairly and impartially decide in this case, based 
on the evidence she would hear at trial and the law I would 
explain to her, whether the Commonwealth had met its burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense 
charged.  And I would like to believe that I would have 
evaluated her answer to that question, including her demeanor 
and any apparent equivocation, to determine whether she would be 
a fair and impartial juror. 
2 
 
 
 
But I know, based on my experience questioning thousands of 
prospective jurors during more than eleven years as a Superior 
Court judge, that a trial judge often needs to discuss with 
potential jurors whether their personal beliefs, opinions, and 
life experience would affect their ability to be fair and 
impartial, and that not every such discussion travels down the 
same road.  And I know from that experience that there are 
times, with the benefit of additional thought and the wisdom of 
hindsight, in which a judge will recognize that a discussion 
with a juror could have been handled more artfully.  We have no 
template for such questioning; nor would it make sense to 
attempt to create one because there are so many different ways 
that prospective jurors may share their concerns about the risk 
of possible bias.  Addressing such concerns is necessarily 
improvisational, and therefore often imperfect. 
 
It is with the benefit of this trial court experience that 
I examine whether the judge abused his discretion in excusing 
this prospective juror for cause, recognizing that we "afford a 
trial judge a large degree of discretion in the jury selection 
process."  Commonwealth v. Vann Long, 419 Mass. 798, 803 (1995). 
 
Every prospective juror brings his or her opinions, 
beliefs, and life experience to the court house when asked to 
perform juror service.  We do not require jurors to leave them 
at the front door; nor could they.  See Commonwealth v. Mutina, 
3 
 
 
366 Mass. 810, 817 (1975) ("Jurors do not come to their 
temporary judicial service as sterile intellectual mechanisms 
purged of all those subconscious factors which have formed their 
characters and temperaments . . .").  Indeed, we expect jurors 
to apply common sense derived from their life experience when 
evaluating the evidence presented at trial.  See Commonwealth v. 
Caruso, 476 Mass. 275, 289 (2017) ("Jurors may rely on their own 
common sense and life experience in their role as fact 
finders").  And we aim for diverse juries precisely because we 
believe that the quality of fact finding will be enhanced by 
jurors' varied life experiences and points of view.  See 
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 487, cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 881 (1979) ("No human being is wholly free of the interests 
and preferences which are the product of his cultural, family, 
and community experience.  Nowhere is the dynamic commingling of 
the ideas and biases of such individuals more essential than 
inside the jury room"); id. at 478 ("fair jury is one that 
represents a cross section of community concepts" [citation 
omitted]).  The goal in jury selection is not to select jurors 
without opinions or beliefs, but to select jurors whose opinions 
and beliefs do not affect their ability fairly and impartially 
to find the facts, to follow the law, and to render a just 
verdict.  See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 478 Mass. 804, 818 (2018) 
(judge "required to determine whether jurors . . . were capable 
4 
 
 
of setting aside their own opinions, weighing the evidence 
without considering extraneous issues, and following his legal 
instructions"). 
 
But there certainly are opinions, beliefs, and life 
experiences that might affect a juror's ability to fairly and 
impartially find the facts or apply the law, or a judge's 
confidence in the juror's ability to do so.  If a juror were to 
characterize himself or herself as a white nationalist, we would 
expect a judge to inquire into whether those beliefs would 
affect the juror's ability to be fair and impartial, especially 
in a case with an African-American defendant.  See G. L. 
c. 234A, § 67A ("if it appears that, as a result of the impact 
of considerations which may cause a decision to be made in whole 
or in part upon issues extraneous to the case, . . . the juror 
may not stand indifferent, the court shall . . . examine the 
juror specifically with respect to such considerations, 
attitudes, exposure, opinions or any other matters which may 
cause a decision to be made in whole or in part upon issues 
extraneous to the issues in the case").  And even if such a 
juror were to insist that he or she would be fair, we would not 
fault a judge -- who has the benefit of observing the juror's 
affect and demeanor -- for questioning the sincerity of the 
juror's claim and deciding to excuse the juror for cause.  See 
Commonwealth v. Mattier (No. 2), 474 Mass. 261, 274-275 (2016) 
5 
 
 
(judge's determination regarding juror bias "is essentially one 
of credibility, and therefore largely one of demeanor" [citation 
omitted]); Commonwealth v. Ruell, 459 Mass. 126, 136, cert. 
denied, 565 U.S. 841 (2011) ("A judge has broad discretion in 
deciding whether a prospective juror is impartial . . ."). 
 
Nor need the opinion or belief be on the fringe to warrant 
such inquiry.  Opinions about the proper balance between the 
needs of law enforcement and the protection of civil liberties 
in a criminal case, about defensive medicine in a medical 
malpractice case, or about the prevalence of racism in a 
discrimination case, for instance, could provide reason for 
further individual questioning.  And while we do not expect 
people to transform into blank slates upon taking a seat in the 
jury box, dismissal for cause is appropriate where the judge, 
after evaluating a prospective juror's responses to voir dire 
questions, reasonably concludes that a belief or opinion will 
cloud that juror's ability fairly to evaluate the evidence and 
follow the court's instructions.  See Commonwealth v. Colton, 
477 Mass. 1, 17 (2017) ("As a general principle, it is an abuse 
of discretion to empanel a juror who will not state 
unequivocally that he or she will be impartial"). 
 
Here, the prospective juror indicated that she was 
concerned about her own potential bias by raising her hand when 
members of the venire were asked whether anything about the 
6 
 
 
subject matter of the case, or their views on the subject 
matter, would affect their ability to be fair and impartial.  
Under such circumstances, it was certainly appropriate for the 
judge to explore through individual voir dire whether this juror 
would, in fact, be fair and impartial.  See G. L. c. 234A, 
§ 67A. 
 
I infer from the judge's questions that he wanted to be 
assured that the juror would decide the case based solely on the 
evidence, and that her fact finding would not be unfairly 
influenced by her opinion and life experience.  The judge began 
his questioning by asking whether the prospective juror felt 
that she might have a bias in the case.  When the juror answered 
in the affirmative and expressed her view that "the system is 
rigged against young African American males," the judge 
proceeded to ask whether her belief might interfere with her 
ability to be fair and impartial.  "I don't think so," the juror 
responded.  The judge followed up on this response, asking 
whether the juror thought she would be able to "put aside that 
opinion and bias."  When the juror told the judge that she did 
not think she could "put it aside" and that her belief was "the 
lens that [she] view[ed] the world through," the judge informed 
the juror that she was "going to have to be able to put that out 
of [her] mind and look at only the evidence."  It is not clear 
from this instruction whether the judge -- who properly 
7 
 
 
emphasized the importance of looking only at the evidence -- was 
directing the juror to set aside any preconceived notions that 
may affect her ability fairly to consider the evidence in this 
case or to set aside the "lens" through which she viewed the 
world.  While asking a juror to set aside preexisting opinions 
regarding a particular case or set of circumstances is proper, 
see Kennedy, 478 Mass. at 818, I agree with the court that it 
would be improper to instruct a juror to set aside his or her 
life experiences or beliefs more broadly.  Cf. Soares, 377 Mass. 
at 486 n.30 (where "tendencies do not stem from individual 
biases related to the peculiar facts or the particular party at 
trial, but from differing attitudes toward the administration of 
justice and the nature of criminal offenses," "differences in 
juror attitudes" enhance jury deliberations).  I also agree that 
the judge's subsequent question, which asked whether the juror's 
experience working with low-income youth was "going to have 
[her] look at it differently" wrongly implied that the juror was 
required to set aside her world view. 
 
Nevertheless, I infer from the judge's spare findings (and 
findings are routinely spare when a prospective juror is 
dismissed) that the judge excused this juror for cause not 
because of her opinions or world view, but because he was not 
assured of her ability to be impartial.  A juror certainly may 
not be excused for cause solely because he or she believes that 
8 
 
 
the criminal justice system disfavors African-American 
defendants.  See Mason v. United States, 170 A.3d 182, 187 (D.C. 
2017) ("Standing alone, the belief that the criminal-justice 
system is systemically unfair to blacks is not a basis to 
disqualify a juror").  In fact, the belief voiced by this 
prospective juror is shared by many in our community, including 
most African-Americans.1  Aggressively excusing jurors who hold 
this belief therefore risks excusing a disproportionate number 
of African-American jurors.  Here, however, the judge appeared 
less concerned with the juror's beliefs about the inequities of 
the criminal justice system or her specific answers to his 
                                                          
 
 
1 See Hyams Foundation and MassINC Polling Group, Racial 
Inequities, Policy Solutions:  Perceptions of Boston's 
Communities of Color on Racism and Race Relations 19 (Mar. 2018) 
(in Boston, fifty-two percent of all people surveyed and forty-
one percent of black people surveyed thought Boston police 
officers treat black and Latino people "somewhat or very 
fairly"; forty-five percent of all people surveyed and twenty-
seven percent of black people surveyed thought Boston courts 
treat black and Latino people "somewhat or very fairly"); Voters 
Split on Whether Criminal Justice System Treats All People 
Fairly, NBC News, Nov. 8, 2016, https://www.nbcnews.com/card/ 
nbc-news-exit-poll-voters-split-whether-criminal-justice-system-
n680366 [https://perma.cc/PTF8-XGT8] (nationwide, eighty-two 
percent of black voters and forty-two percent of white voters 
believe criminal justice system treats black people unfairly).  
See generally Balko, Opinion, There's Overwhelming Evidence that 
the Criminal-Justice System Is Racist.  Here's the Proof, Wash. 
Post, Sept. 18, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
opinions/wp/2018/09/18/theres-overwhelming-evidence-that-the-
criminal-justice-system-is-racist-heres-the-proof/ 
?utm_term=.7fc6ef33714f [https://perma.cc/BU4Z-8E37] (compiling 
studies demonstrating racial bias in various aspects of criminal 
justice system). 
9 
 
 
questions than with the manner in which she responded.  The 
judge noted that the juror "hesitated quite a bit" and "really 
struggled with it."2  I infer from these findings that the judge 
understood the juror's hesitation and struggle to reflect her 
uncertainty whether she could decide the case based solely on 
the evidence.  And because the judge was not assured that she 
would be fair and impartial, he exercised his discretion to err 
on the side of caution and excuse the juror for cause.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Seguin, 421 Mass. 243, 246 (1995), cert. denied, 
516 U.S. 1180 (1996) (judge properly "pursued the subject" where 
prospective juror hesitated before answering question regarding 
opinion on insanity defense). 
                                                          
 
 
2 The court correctly asserts that a prospective juror's 
hesitation in answering a question, or his or her apparent 
struggle in answering it, means little if the question itself 
asks the juror to do the impossible.  See ante at note 9.  But 
the record does not clearly identify which question the judge 
was referring to when he said that the prospective juror 
"hesitated quite a bit" and "really struggled with it."  The 
court assumes, perhaps correctly, that the judge was referring 
to his question, "But you're going to have to be able to put 
that out of your mind and look at only the evidence.  Do you 
think you can do that?"  The court then assumes that the judge 
found that the prospective juror hesitated and struggled with 
"whether she could put aside her world view."  Id.  Given the 
compound nature of the judge's question, however, the judge 
reasonably could have understood the prospective juror to be 
hesitating and struggling with whether she could "look at only 
the evidence."  It is also possible that the judge, in 
describing the prospective juror's hesitation and struggle, was 
referring to her manner of response to an earlier question -- 
whether she thought her "belief might interfere with [her] 
ability to be fair and impartial." 
10 
 
 
 
I might have exercised my discretion differently and denied 
the prosecutor's motion to excuse this juror for cause, leaving 
it to the prosecutor to use a peremptory challenge if she wanted 
to remove the juror from the panel.  And I might have credited 
the juror's assertion that she did not think her opinion of the 
criminal justice system might interfere with her ability to be 
fair and impartial, and that she believed she could decide the 
case based solely on the evidence.  But I did not speak with 
this prospective juror -- the trial judge did.  His evaluation 
of the juror's demeanor and her confidence in her ability to be 
fair is therefore entitled to great deference.  See Commonwealth 
v. Stroyny, 435 Mass. 635, 639 (2002) ("Whether to accept the 
declaration of a juror that he or she is disinterested lies 
within the broad discretion of the trial judge").  See also 
Mattier (No. 2), 474 Mass. at 274-275.  "An appellate court's 
review of a trial judge's decision for abuse of discretion must 
give great deference to the judge's exercise of discretion; it 
is plainly not an abuse of discretion simply because a reviewing 
court would have reached a different result."  L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
Because judges' quick and often difficult decisions 
concerning whether to excuse a juror for cause are entitled to 
substantial deference, I am reluctant to find that a judge 
abused his discretion where, as here, the judge made a good 
11 
 
 
faith decision to excuse the juror because of concerns about her 
ability to decide the case based solely on the facts and the 
law.  I do not believe that such a decision satisfies the test 
for an abuse of discretion articulated in L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 
n.27:  that "a judge's discretionary decision constitutes an 
abuse of discretion where we conclude the judge made a clear 
error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the 
decision . . . such that the decision falls outside the range of 
reasonable alternatives" (quotation and citation omitted). 
 
Therefore, as much as I appreciate the concerns raised by 
the defendant regarding the judge's manner of addressing the 
prospective juror's opinion on racial biases in our criminal 
justice system, I would decide the issue the court did not 
decide and conclude that the judge's decision to excuse the 
juror was not an abuse of discretion.  For these reasons, I 
concur.