Title: Commonwealth v. Graham

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12428 
SJC-12433 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KEVIN GRAHAM, JR.  
(and five companion cases1). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 2, 2018. - September 13, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Speedy trial.  Practice, Criminal, Speedy 
trial, Dismissal.  Witness, Unavailability.  Evidence, 
Failure to prosecute. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 10, 2016. 
 
 
Motions to dismiss were heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted applications for direct 
appellate review. 
 
 
 
Sarah Montgomery Lewis, Assistant District Attorney (Masai-
Maliek King, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Kevin Graham, Jr. 
 
Claudia Leis Bolgen for Ellis Golden. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Two against Kevin Graham, Jr., and three against Ellis 
Golden.  
2 
 
 
 
William M. Jay & Gerard J. Cedrone, of New York, & Chauncey 
B. Wood & Kevin P. Martin, for Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  Rule 36 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, as amended, 422 Mass. 1503 (1996) (rule 36), provides 
that, if a criminal defendant is not tried "within twelve 
months" after arraignment, "he shall be entitled upon motion to 
a dismissal of the charges."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (1) (C).  
A defendant may establish a prima facie violation of rule 36 by 
demonstrating that more than twelve months have elapsed between 
arraignment and trial.  See Commonwealth v. Denehy, 466 Mass. 
723, 729 (2014).  The burden then shifts to the Commonwealth to 
justify the delay, either by showing that it falls within one of 
the "excluded periods" enumerated under rule 36 (b) (2) or by 
showing that "the defendant acquiesced in, was responsible for, 
or benefited from the delay."  Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 411 
Mass. 503, 504 (1992).  "A failure to object to a continuance or 
other delay constitutes acquiescence."  Commonwealth v. Tanner, 
417 Mass. 1, 3 (1994). 
 
The defendants in these companion cases, Kevin Graham, Jr., 
and Ellis Golden, were indicted for murder in the first degree.  
At arraignment, a presumptive trial date was set for June 12, 
2017.  Thereafter, the parties also scheduled various pretrial 
events, such as motion hearings and status conferences, but the 
3 
 
 
presumptive trial date did not change, and the trial was never 
continued.  On June 12, the Commonwealth was not ready for trial 
because of the unavailability of an essential out-of-State 
witness.  The Commonwealth moved to continue the trial so that 
it would have more time to secure the witness's appearance at 
trial.  The judge denied the motion to continue, finding that 
the Commonwealth had failed to exercise due diligence in 
securing the witness's appearance, but agreed to empanel a jury 
and commence trial one week later if the Commonwealth were able 
to produce the witness.  The Commonwealth was unable to do so. 
 
The defendants subsequently moved to dismiss, as more than 
one year had elapsed since their arraignments.  The Commonwealth 
opposed the motions, arguing that much of that time should be 
excluded from the rule 36 calculation, because the defendants 
had failed to object when the various pretrial events were 
scheduled and, therefore, had acquiesced in the delay.  The 
judge allowed the motions to dismiss with prejudice on two 
separate grounds.  He concluded that the defendants' right to a 
speedy trial under rule 36 had been violated, because the 
defendants could not have acquiesced in any delay where the 
presumptive trial date never changed.  He also concluded that 
the defendants were entitled to dismissals for the 
Commonwealth's failure to prosecute. 
4 
 
 
 
We vacate the dismissals and remand the cases for trial.  
We conclude that the judge effectively continued the trial for 
one week and that, because an essential witness resisted 
appearing at trial, this period should be excluded under rule 
36 (b) (2) (B) or (F), placing the Commonwealth within the time 
limits of rule 36.  We also conclude that the judge abused his 
discretion in dismissing the indictments for failure to 
prosecute where the Commonwealth's lack of diligence in 
producing the witness did not rise to the level that would 
warrant dismissal, especially where the indictments are for 
murder, where barely one year had passed since the defendants' 
arraignments, and where the trial had been continued for only 
one week. 
 
We also hold that time can be excluded under rule 36 based 
on a defendant's acquiescence only where the defendant has 
agreed to or failed to object to a continuance or other delay, 
and that the scheduling of an event alone does not constitute 
delay.  Thus, a defendant need not object every time an event is 
scheduled in order to preserve his or her rights under rule 36.  
We further hold that, where the defendant has acquiesced, a 
5 
 
 
delay can be excluded under rule 36 even where it does not 
affect the presumptive trial date.2 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts as found by the motion 
judge, supplemented with uncontroverted evidence that was 
implicitly credited by the judge and is consistent with his 
ultimate findings.  See Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 
429, 431 (2015).  We also summarize the prior proceedings, as 
recorded in the docket and the clerk's minutes.  See 
Commonwealth v. Roman, 470 Mass. 85, 93 (2014) ("For purposes of 
a rule 36 calculation . . . , the docket and the clerk's log are 
prima facie evidence of the facts recorded therein"). 
 
In the early morning hours of August 12, 2004, Thomas 
Hawkins (victim) was shot and killed, and his wallet stolen.  
The police recovered the victim's wallet from a nearby school 
yard later that day; according to the Commonwealth, the wallet 
was empty, apart from some personal papers. 
 
The police investigation was unable to identify any 
material leads in the case until December, 2006, when Juan 
Garcia offered to provide the police with information about the 
killing in return for consideration in his pending narcotics 
case.  No agreement was reached at that time with Garcia, and he 
was subsequently tried and convicted. 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
6 
 
 
 
However, in 2007 Garcia met with the police again and 
agreed to testify before a grand jury.  In his grand jury 
testimony, Garcia stated that, at the time of the killing, he 
heard gunshots and observed two men -- whom he knew and 
identified as the defendants -- fleeing from the area where the 
victim's body was found.  He also testified that he saw the 
defendants passing a wallet between themselves, and that Graham 
was holding a firearm.  Garcia told the grand jury that he was 
cooperating with the Commonwealth in exchange for its support of 
his motion to revise and revoke the sentence he was serving in 
his narcotics case.  However, no indictments were returned by 
that grand jury against the defendants, and the Commonwealth 
apparently did not provide Garcia with the assistance he 
anticipated. 
 
In 2015, another grand jury was convened to investigate the 
killing.  Because Garcia was then living in Florida, the 
Commonwealth read his prior grand jury testimony into the record 
rather than call him to testify.  On June 10, 2016, the grand 
jury indicted the defendants for murder in the first degree, as 
well as armed robbery and unlawful possession of a firearm. 
7 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth's case rested heavily on the testimony of 
Garcia, the sole identification witness.3  The Commonwealth had 
no forensic evidence identifying either defendant as the 
perpetrator of the crimes. 
 
Golden was arraigned on June 20, 2016, and Graham on June 
22, 2016.  Pursuant to Superior Court Standing Order 2-86, all 
criminal cases in the Superior Court are required to be assigned 
to a "case track" at arraignment, thereby establishing a 
presumptive timeline for disposition of the case.  See Superior 
Court Standing Order 2-86, Part III (2009).  The defendants' 
cases were designated as "C" track cases, with the following 
presumptive schedule:  a pretrial conference on July 14, 2016; a 
first pretrial hearing on December 13, 2016; a final pretrial 
hearing on June 1, 2017; and a presumptive trial date of June 
12, 2017.4 
 
The pretrial conference and first pretrial hearing were 
held as scheduled.  On May 11, 2017, the Commonwealth filed its 
first motion to continue the presumptive trial date, stating 
                                                          
 
 
3 According to the Commonwealth, two other individuals 
confirmed to the police that Garcia was where he said he was at 
the time of the shooting, but neither offered any information 
regarding the identities of the persons involved in the killing. 
 
 
4 Cases are assigned to tracks "A", "B," or "C" based on the 
offense charged in the indictment, and on consideration of any 
extenuating or special circumstances raised by the parties.  
Murder cases are presumptively assigned to track "C."  Superior 
Court Standing Order 2-86, Part III (2009). 
8 
 
 
that it needed more time to test deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
evidence found in the victim's shorts.  The motion was denied. 
 
The final pretrial hearing was held as scheduled, on June 
1, 2017, and the presumptive trial date of June 12 was confirmed 
as the actual trial date.  On June 8, the Commonwealth informed 
the court room clerk that it was unable to proceed to trial 
because it could not secure Garcia's attendance.  At a hearing 
on June 9, the Commonwealth stated that it would file a motion 
to continue, which it did on June 12, the trial date. 
In its motion to continue, the Commonwealth made the 
following factual representations:  Although members of the 
Boston police department had been "in regular contact" with 
Garcia since 2015, their last communication with Garcia had been 
in April, 2017.  Once the Commonwealth's first motion to 
continue was denied on May 11, 2017, the police attempted later 
that month to contact Garcia to secure his attendance at trial.  
After several unsuccessful attempts to communicate with Garcia 
by telephone, the police decided to send an officer to Florida 
on June 7, but the officer was unable to locate Garcia.  On the 
afternoon of June 8, the officer received a telephone call from 
Garcia, who, in "a curse laden tirade," accused the officer of 
9 
 
 
going to his workplace and of "harassing" his family members.5  
Garcia then told the officer that he did not "want to be 
bothered any longer regarding these matters."6 
 
After a nonevidentiary hearing, the judge denied the motion 
to continue.  The judge found that the Commonwealth had failed, 
"despite clear warning signs," to compel Garcia's attendance 
through interstate process and that it had therefore failed to 
exercise due diligence in producing a material witness.  
However, although he denied the motion to continue, the judge 
scheduled a "status conference" for June 19, and declared that 
he would empanel a jury and commence trial on that date if the 
Commonwealth were "ready to go." 
 
Following the hearing on June 12, the Commonwealth 
contacted a Florida State Attorney's office in an attempt to 
effectuate the interstate process that the judge had approved.  
An investigator for that office went to Garcia's address on June 
15 but was unable to serve him; the investigator said he spoke 
                                                          
 
5 The Commonwealth maintains that the police officer did not 
go to Garcia's workplace.  The Commonwealth has represented 
that, in attempting to locate Garcia, the officer told persons 
associated with Garcia only that he was "a friend of his from 
Boston." 
 
6 On June 16, 2017, the prosecutor submitted an affidavit 
that reiterated these factual representations.  The judge did 
not make any factual findings whether these representations were 
true but found that he did not need to, because he would deny 
the motion even were he to accept them as true. 
10 
 
 
with someone who indicated that Garcia lived there but was not 
there at the time.  On June 15, Boston police received a 
telephone call from Garcia, who said, "Leave me the fuck alone; 
fuck you," and then hung up the telephone. 
 
On June 19, the prosecutor informed the judge that the 
Commonwealth was not ready for trial because it was still 
searching for Garcia.  The prosecutor made an oral motion to 
continue, which the judge denied. 
 
On June 22, 2017, 367 days after his arraignment, Golden 
filed a motion to dismiss for violation of rule 36 and for 
failure to prosecute.  On June 26, 369 days after his 
arraignment, Graham filed a similar motion.  In opposing these 
motions, the Commonwealth made two arguments.  First, the 
Commonwealth argued that it had exercised due diligence in 
attempting to secure Garcia's attendance at trial, noting that 
Garcia had been "actively avoiding" being located and served.  
Second, the Commonwealth argued that almost all of the time that 
had elapsed since the defendants' arraignments should be 
excluded under rule 36, because the defendants, in failing to 
object to the scheduling of various pretrial events, had 
acquiesced in the delay.  With respect to this second argument, 
the Commonwealth rested solely on "waiver and acquiescence"; it 
11 
 
 
did not argue that any time should be excluded because it fell 
within an "excluded period" under rule 36 (b) (2).7 
 
The judge allowed the rule 36 motion, dismissing the 
indictments against both defendants with prejudice.  The judge 
concluded that, because there had been no change to the 
presumptive trial date, there was no time that could be 
excluded, whether under rule 36 (b) (2) or based on the 
defendants' acquiescence.8  The judge also allowed the 
defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute.  He 
declared that the "crucial" factor in this decision was the 
Commonwealth's failure to exercise due diligence in securing 
Garcia's attendance at trial, combined with what he 
characterized as the unlikelihood that the Commonwealth "will 
                                                          
 
 
7 At the hearing on the defendants' motions to dismiss, the 
judge asked the prosecutor, "Are there any specifically 
enumerated events in [rule 36 (b) (2)] that you are relying on, 
or is it just waiver and acquiescence?" to which the prosecutor 
replied, "It's waiver and acquiescence, Your Honor."  Moreover, 
in its oppositions to the defendants' motions to dismiss, the 
Commonwealth argued only that time should be excluded based on 
"the defendant's agreement to, acquiescence in, or benefit from 
the delay." In its charts accompanying its oppositions, where 
the Commonwealth detailed its calculations of time under rule 
36, it made no mention of any excluded periods under rule 
36 (b) (2). 
 
 
8 The judge rested his dismissal for lack of a speedy trial 
solely on rule 36 grounds; the judge did not find a 
constitutional speedy trial violation, and the defendants make 
no constitutional claim.  If the defendants had made such a 
claim, we would be obliged to consider it even though we 
conclude that there was no rule 36 violation.  See Commonwealth 
v. Dirico, 480 Mass.    ,    (2018). 
12 
 
 
improve its lackluster efforts to date or exercise due diligence 
to produce an increasingly hostile witness."  He also declared 
that the dismissals for failure to prosecute would have been 
without prejudice "[b]ut for the rule 36 violation." 
 
The Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal in these cases, 
and we granted the defendants' applications for direct appellate 
review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Rule 36.  Rule 36 is a "[case] management 
tool, designed to assist the trial courts in administering their 
dockets."  Barry v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 285, 295-296 (1983), 
quoting Reporters' Notes to Mass. R. Crim. P. 36, Mass. Ann. 
Laws, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 525 (1979).  It also 
"creates a means through which [criminal] defendants who desire 
a speedy trial can secure one."  Barry, supra at 296.  Under 
rule 36, "a criminal defendant who is not brought to trial 
within one year of the date of arraignment is presumptively 
entitled to dismissal of the charges unless the Commonwealth 
justifies the delay."  Spaulding, 411 Mass. at 504.9  See Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (1) (C), (D).  Dismissal under rule 36 is 
                                                          
 
 
9 Rule 36 provides that "a defendant shall be tried within 
twelve months after the return day in the court in which the 
case is awaiting trial."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (1) (C), as 
amended, 422 Mass. 1503 (1996).  Where the defendant is under 
arrest, as here, the return day is the date of arraignment.  See 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 2 (b) (15), as amended, 397 Mass. 1226 (1986).  
See also Commonwealth v. Mattos, 404 Mass. 672, 674 (1989). 
13 
 
 
with prejudice.  Commonwealth v. Lauria, 411 Mass. 63, 71 
(1991). 
 
Here, the defendants have established a prima facie 
violation of rule 36 because they were not brought to trial 
within twelve months of arraignment.  The burden therefore 
shifts to the Commonwealth to justify the delay.  Denehy, 466 
Mass. at 729.  In Golden's case, the period between his 
arraignment on June 20, 2016, and the filing of his motion to 
dismiss on June 22, 2017, was 367 days; subtracting twelve 
months (i.e., 365 days) from this period leaves only two days 
that the Commonwealth must justify.  In Graham's case, the 
period between his arraignment on June 22, 2016, and the filing 
of his motion to dismiss on June 26, 2017, was 369 days, leaving 
only four days for the Commonwealth to justify.10,11 
 
There are two separate ways in which the Commonwealth can 
meet its burden of justifying a delay, thereby excluding it from 
the calculation of time under rule 36. 
                                                          
 
 
10 The filing of a motion to dismiss under rule 36 tolls the 
running of the time in which the defendant must be tried.  Barry 
v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 285, 294 (1983). 
 
 
11 In making our calculations, we adhere to rule 36 (b) (3), 
which provides:  "In computing any time limit other than an 
excluded period, the day of the act or event which causes a 
designated period of time to begin to run shall not be included.  
Computation of an excluded period shall include both the first 
and the last day of the excludable act or event."  However, 
"[i]f there are excludable periods of delay which overlap, a day 
is excluded only once."  Barry, 390 Mass. at 292. 
14 
 
 
 
a.  Excluded periods under rule 36 (b) (2).  The first way 
to justify a delay is to show that the delay falls within one of 
the "excluded periods" specifically enumerated under rule 
36 (b) (2).  Such periods include, for example, "delay[s] 
resulting from interlocutory appeals," "delay[s] resulting from 
hearings on pretrial motions," and "delay[s] . . . during which 
any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under 
advisement."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) (A) (iv), (v), (vii). 
 
The judge declared that no time could be excluded under 
rule 36 (b) (2) unless the act or event triggering the exclusion 
resulted in delay of the presumptive trial date.  This was 
error.  As we have consistently recognized, "once [the 
Commonwealth] establishes that an act or event triggers an 
excludable period of time [under rule 36 (b) (2)], the exclusion 
of the period is automatic."  Barry, 390 Mass. at 292.12  See 
Denehy, 466 Mass. at 729 n.6; Commonwealth v. Farris, 390 Mass. 
300, 304 n.3 (1983).  Because there are a "multitude of factors 
[that] might influence the date a trial commences," the 
                                                          
 
 
12 As stated in the Reporter's Notes to rule 36 (b) (2):  
"[T]he court is given the discretion to consider and determine 
whether a proffered explanation for delay is a valid excluded 
period.  But once it is determined that a period of delay is 
within the contemplation of [rule 36 (b) (2)], that period shall 
be excluded from computation of the twelve-month limit."  
Reporter's Notes to Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2), Massachusetts 
Rules of Court, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 210 (Thomson 
Reuters 2018). 
15 
 
 
Commonwealth need not establish whether that act or event had 
any effect on the trial date -- or, for that matter, the 
presumptive trial date.  Barry, supra at 292-293.  Rather, the 
exclusions identified in rule 36 (b) (2) are premised on the 
belief that certain acts or events are "certain to result in 
delay," or are "beyond [the Commonwealth's] control," such that 
any time that elapses as a result of those acts or events should 
not be counted against the Commonwealth.  Reporter's Notes to 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2), Massachusetts Rules of Court, 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 210-211 (Thomson Reuters 2018) 
("The rationale underlying [rule 36 (b) (2)] is that the 
Commonwealth should not be penalized when the defendant elects 
to avail himself of those procedures").  The automatic exclusion 
of these time periods "allows all parties to calculate with 
reasonable certainty the date within which the defendant must be 
tried."  Barry, supra at 292.  If we were to exclude time under 
rule 36 (b) (2) only where an act or event is shown to have 
resulted in an actual delay of the presumptive trial date, the 
parties to a criminal case might not be able to calculate 
whether the allowable 365 days had elapsed until it was too late 
to avoid dismissal of the case.13 
                                                          
 
 
13 Keeping a contemporaneous calculation of excludable delay 
under rule 36 (b) (2) is also important where a defendant, after 
a dangerousness hearing, is ordered to be held in pretrial 
 
16 
 
 
 
We reiterate, however, that the burden is on the 
Commonwealth to demonstrate that a delay should be excluded 
under rule 36 (b) (2).  Denehy, 466 Mass. at 729.  Here, the 
judge concluded that the Commonwealth had disclaimed reliance on 
rule 36 (b) (2).  We agree that, because the Commonwealth did 
not specifically argue for exclusions under rule 36 (b) (2) when 
it opposed the defendants' motions to dismiss, see note 7, 
supra, most of these exclusions have been waived.  The 
Commonwealth's waiver is of consequence because, for example, 
the Commonwealth could have sought to exclude the time required 
to hear and rule on the defendants' pretrial motions -- which, 
based on the record, could have been as much as thirty-two days 
in Golden's case14 and forty-seven days in Graham's case15 -- 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
detention pending trial under G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  Under 
§ 58A (3), a person so detained "shall be brought to a trial as 
soon as reasonably possible, but in absence of good cause, the 
person so held shall not be detained for a period exceeding 120 
days excluding any period of delay as defined in [rule 
36 (b) (2)]." 
 
 
14 An excludable delay under rule 36 (b) (2) (A) (v) is 
calculated as the time between "the date on which the request 
for hearing on the pretrial motion is filed, or, if no such 
request is filed, from the date the hearing is ordered, until 
the conclusion of the hearing."  See Reporter's Notes to Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) (A) (v), supra at 211. 
 
 
The docket indicates that Golden filed a motion to dismiss 
on October 25, 2016, but does not indicate whether a request for 
hearing was filed.  At the first pretrial hearing on December 
13, 2016, a hearing on Golden's motion was scheduled for January 
11, 2017.  The hearing was held as scheduled, and the motion was 
 
17 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
denied on January 13, 2017.  Assuming that there was no request 
for hearing and that the hearing was ordered at the first 
pretrial hearing, the Commonwealth could have sought to exclude 
the thirty days between December 13, 2016, and the motion 
hearing on January 11, 2017, under rule 36 (b) (2) (A) (v).  The 
Commonwealth could have also sought to exclude the two days 
between the hearing on January 11, 2017, and the ruling on 
January 13, 2017, when the matter was "under advisement," under 
rule 36 (b) (2) (A) (vii). 
 
 
15 The docket indicates that Graham filed a motion under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 14, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004) 
(rule 14), for updated pretrial discovery on February 16, 2017, 
and that the motion was heard on March 23, 2017, but does not 
indicate when the hearing was requested or ordered.  Graham 
filed a second rule 14 motion on April 25, 2017; that same day, 
a motion hearing was scheduled for May 2, 2017.  That hearing 
was later rescheduled to May 11, 2017, when both motions were 
allowed.  As to the first motion, the Commonwealth could have 
sought to exclude thirty out of the fifty days between the 
motion hearing on March 23, 2017, and the ruling on May 11, 
2017, when the matter was "under advisement," under rule 
36 (b) (2) (A) (vii).  As to the second motion, the Commonwealth 
could have sought to exclude the seventeen days between when the 
hearing was scheduled on April 25, 2017, and when the hearing 
was held on May 11, 2017, under rule 36 (b) (2) (A) (v). 
 
 
Having said that, because Graham's rule 14 motions sought 
discovery that was mandatory under rule 14 (a) (1) (A), 
including Garcia's address, it is far from clear that the 
Commonwealth could have successfully excluded this time.  In 
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 469 Mass. 516, 528 (2014), we declared 
that where the Commonwealth fails timely to produce mandatory 
discovery and the defendant moves for sanctions or to compel 
under rule 14 (a) (1) (C), "the time it takes to resolve the 
rule 14 (a) (1) (C) motion shall not be excluded automatically 
[under rule 36 (b) (2)] from the ultimate speedy trial 
calculation."  Instead, "[the] motion judge is responsible for 
determining whether any delay occasioned by the resolution of 
that motion should, in fact, toll the speedy trial clock" by 
assessing "whether 'the ends of justice served' by exclusion of 
time spent on a rule 14 (a) (1) (C) motion brought to compel 
mandatory discovery 'outweigh[] the best interests of the public 
and the defendant in a speedy trial.'"  Id., quoting Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) (F).  Here, Graham did not specifically 
 
18 
 
 
under rule 36 (b) (2) (A) (v) and (vii).  Exclusion of these 
time periods would have placed the Commonwealth well within the 
time limits of rule 36, but because the Commonwealth waived 
these exclusions before the motion judge, it cannot now seek to 
exclude that time. 
 
However, there are some exclusions under rule 36 (b) (2) 
that the Commonwealth cannot be held to have waived, because of 
the unusual posture of these cases and because the Commonwealth 
did in substance make arguments in support of these exclusions.  
Specifically, we conclude that the time period between the trial 
date on June 12, 2017, and the "status conference" on June 19, 
2017, should be excluded under either of two exclusions 
contained in rule 36 (b) (2). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
frame his motions as motions for sanctions or to compel under 
rule 14 (a) (1) (C), as he should have to ensure that the time 
would not be excluded under rule 36 (b) (2).  See Taylor, supra 
at 527 ("A defendant yet to receive all mandatory discovery must 
. . . take proactive steps to alert the court and the 
prosecution that certain items have not been timely produced, 
and the vehicle for doing so is a motion for sanctions or to 
compel pursuant to rule 14 [a] [1] [C]").  Perhaps for this 
reason, there is no indication in the record that the motion 
judge made any determination whether the time taken to resolve 
Graham's rule 14 motions should be excluded under rule 
36 (b) (2).  Although a judge might still find that Graham's 
rule 14 motions were in substance motions to compel mandatory 
discovery under rule 14 (a) (1) (C), and that the resulting 
delay should not be excluded under rule 36 (b) (2), the 
Commonwealth could have argued that Graham did not "avail 
himself of the remedies outlined in rule 14," as required under 
Taylor, supra, and therefore that the clock should have been 
tolled. 
19 
 
 
 
The first such exclusion is found in rule 36 (b) (2) (B), 
which provides that "[a]ny period of delay resulting from the 
absence or unavailability of the defendant or an essential 
witness" shall be excluded from the rule 36 calculation.  Rule 
36 (b) (2) (B) states further: 
"A defendant or an essential witness shall be considered 
absent when his whereabouts are unknown and he is 
attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or his 
whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence.  A 
defendant or an essential witness shall be considered 
unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his 
presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or 
he resists appearing at or being returned for trial." 
 
Importantly, an exclusion under rule 36 (b) (2) (B) is 
"established by a party on motion for a continuance."  
Reporter's Notes to Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) (B), supra at 
211. 
 
In filing its motion to continue on June 12, 2017, the 
Commonwealth vigorously argued that the trial date should be 
continued because Garcia -- a witness who was essential to the 
Commonwealth's case -- was unavailable.  The Commonwealth 
specifically sought a continuance so that it would have 
additional time to effectuate interstate process and secure 
Garcia's appearance at trial.  The judge denied the motion to 
continue the June 12 trial date, but also declined to empanel a 
jury on that date or to dismiss the cases.  Instead, the judge 
gave the Commonwealth another week to secure Garcia's 
20 
 
 
appearance, setting a "status conference" for June 19, and 
informing the prosecutor that if the Commonwealth was "ready to 
go" on that date, he would empanel a jury.  The judge declined 
to characterize this one-week period between June 12 and June 19 
as a continuance, specifically declaring, "I've denied [the 
Commonwealth's] motion for a continuance."  He instead 
characterized it as a "wait and see" period.  We fail to see the 
distinction.  We conclude that, for all practical purposes, the 
judge granted the Commonwealth a one-week continuance, with 
trial to begin on June 19 if the Commonwealth could produce 
Garcia. 
 
Thus, the strange posture of these cases is that, although 
the judge denied the Commonwealth's motion to continue, he did 
in effect allow the Commonwealth additional time to secure 
Garcia's appearance.  If the judge had called this one-week 
period what it was -- a continuance -- then the Commonwealth 
could have sought to exclude that period under rule 
36 (b) (2) (B), as a "delay resulting from the . . . 
unavailability of . . . an essential witness."  There is no 
doubt that Garcia is an essential witness in these cases.16  He 
was also unavailable.  As earlier stated, an essential witness 
                                                          
 
 
16 In his order allowing the defendants' motions to dismiss, 
the judge stated, "The Court has no difficulty concluding that 
. . . Garcia is a necessary and material witness." 
21 
 
 
whose whereabouts are known is considered "unavailable" under 
rule 36 (b) (2) (B) "whenever . . . his presence for trial 
cannot be obtained by due diligence or he resists appearing at 
or being returned for trial" (emphasis added).  In denying the 
Commonwealth's motion to continue, the judge concluded that the 
Commonwealth had failed to exercise due diligence in securing 
Garcia's appearance at trial.  However, we need not consider 
whether this was an abuse of discretion because there is 
undisputed evidence in the record indicating that Garcia 
resisted appearing at trial, which provides an adequate 
independent ground for excluding time under rule 36 (b) (2) (B).  
The period between June 12 and June 19 is therefore excludable 
under rule 36 (b) (2) (B). 
 
Alternatively, the period between June 12 and June 19 could 
also fall under rule 36 (b) (2) (F), which excludes "[a]ny 
period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by a judge 
. . . , if the judge granted the continuance on the basis of his 
findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action 
outweighed the best interests of the public and the defendant in 
a speedy trial."17  In filing its motion to continue on June 12, 
                                                          
 
 
17 A period of delay resulting from a continuance may be 
excluded under rule 36 (b) (2) (F) only if "the judge sets forth 
in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, his 
reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the 
 
22 
 
 
the Commonwealth argued that a continuance "[would] not impact 
the defendants' rights to a speedy trial."  And again, although 
the judge denied that motion to continue, he did allow the 
Commonwealth another week to produce Garcia.  In doing so, the 
judge recognized that, under Mass. R. Crim. P. 10, 378 Mass. 861 
(1979) (rule 10), one of the factors that must be considered 
when determining whether to grant a continuance is "[w]hether 
the failure to grant a continuance . . . would be likely to make 
a continuation of the proceeding impossible, or result in a 
miscarriage of justice."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a) (2) (A).  
According to the judge, it was this factor that "led [him] not 
to dismiss the case outright on June 12, even as [he] denied 
[the Commonwealth's motion to continue]."  The judge decided to 
allow the Commonwealth another week "in an attempt to 
accommodate the interests of all parties," and because he 
"expected no prejudice to anyone, if, on June 19, [the parties] 
proceeded to trial on that same date."  Thus, although the judge 
did not characterize it as a continuance, that additional week 
was, in effect, "a continuance granted . . . [based on] findings 
that the ends of justice served . . . outweighed the best 
interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial," 
and is excludable under rule 36 (b) (2) (F).  See Commonwealth 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
granting of the continuance outweigh the best interests of the 
public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 
23 
 
 
v. Davis, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 631, 637 n.11 (2017) (rule 
36 [b] [2] [F] finding "need not be explicit, but may be implied 
from the record"). 
 
We conclude that, whether based on Garcia's unavailability 
under rule 36 (b) (2) (B) or on a continuance under rule 
36 (b) (2) (F), the period between June 12 and June 19 should be 
excluded.  Although the Commonwealth did not specifically seek 
to exclude time under these provisions, this was because of the 
unusual posture that the cases were in:  the Commonwealth could 
not be expected to argue for an exclusion based on a continuance 
where the judge had specifically stated that he had granted no 
such continuance.18  Moreover, the Commonwealth did in substance 
make arguments in support of these exclusions when it filed its 
motion to continue, contending that it was entitled to a 
continuance because an essential witness was unavailable, and 
that a continuance would serve the ends of justice because it 
would not violate the defendants' right to a speedy trial.  
Where the Commonwealth could not have reasonably been expected 
                                                          
 
 
18  Indeed, at the hearing on June 12, 2017, the prosecutor 
expressed confusion over the fact that, although the judge had 
denied the motion to continue trial, the judge was nevertheless 
giving the Commonwealth until June 19 to produce Garcia.  When 
the judge reiterated that he had denied the motion and was "not 
continuing anything," the prosecutor attempted to clarify the 
nature of the one-week period between June 12 and June 19, 
stating:  "I think it matters what the Court calls it for the 
record, Judge."  To this the judge responded, "We'll call it a 
status conference, but you're going to impanel if you're ready." 
24 
 
 
to argue for these exclusions, but nevertheless did establish 
the grounds for applying them, we conclude that it cannot be 
held to have waived those exclusions. 
 
Because the eight days between June 12 and June 19 are 
excluded, the delays here -- two days in Golden's case and four 
days in Graham's case -- have been justified.  Although this 
alone requires us to vacate the dismissals under rule 36, we 
also consider whether there are other excludable delays that may 
affect the amount of time remaining before the cases must be 
tried on remand or dismissed under rule 36. 
 
b.  Exclusions based on defendants' acquiescence.  The 
second way that the Commonwealth can justify a delay is provided 
not by any provision in rule 36 but by the common law.  Under 
the common law, a defendant is not entitled to dismissal if he 
or she acquiesced in, was responsible for, or benefited from the 
delay.  See Barry, 390 Mass. at 295.  A defendant is held to 
have acquiesced in a delay if he or she "agreed to a continuance 
. . .  or has not entered an objection to delay."  Id. at 298.  
Thus, in several cases we have excluded time under rule 36 based 
on the defendant's failure to object to a delay.  See, e.g., 
Roman, 470 Mass. at 93; Denehy, 466 Mass. at 731-732; Lauria, 
411 Mass. at 68-69; Farris, 390 Mass. at 305-306.  In doing so, 
we have emphasized that rule 36 imposes obligations on all 
parties, and that it is the obligation of criminal defendants to 
25 
 
 
"press their case through the criminal justice system."  Lauria, 
supra at 68, quoting Barry, supra at 297.  We have required 
defendants to object to delays in order to preserve their rights 
under rule 36 because we recognize that otherwise, "the public 
interest . . . [may] be thwarted by those defense counsel who 
decide that delay is the best defense tactic."  Barry, supra. 
 
The determination whether a defendant acquiesced in delay 
is often retrospective, and therefore requires "a thorough 
examination of the record."  Reporter's Notes to Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 36 (b) (2), supra at 210.  We note that, in order to avoid 
these difficult retrospective determinations, judges should 
where possible make contemporaneous findings whether time should 
be excluded under rule 36.  In particular, whenever a judge 
grants a continuance -- whether it be a continuance of the trial 
date or a continuance of some other scheduled event, such as a 
pretrial conference or hearing -- the judge should also make a 
finding whether the continuance serves the ends of justice, such 
that the resulting delay should be excluded under rule 
36 (b) (2) (F).  Even where the parties have not requested such 
a finding, a judge should nevertheless make that finding sua 
sponte, in order to make clear whether the delay resulting from 
a continuance can be excluded under rule 36 (b) (2) (F).  Such a 
finding is not burdensome for a judge to make or for a clerk to 
record; the judge need only find, orally on the record or in 
26 
 
 
writing, that the ends of justice served by granting the 
continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the 
defendant in a speedy trial, see rule 36 (b) (2) (F), and the 
clerk need only make a notation of "ends of justice" in 
recording the continuance. 
 
But in cases where the parties have not requested such a 
finding, and where the judge has failed to make one, it becomes 
necessary to consider retrospectively whether that delay can be 
excluded based on the defendant's acquiescence.  Here, the 
Commonwealth contends that almost all of the time that has 
elapsed in both cases should be excluded based on the 
defendants' acquiescence, because every time a pretrial event 
was scheduled, the defendants agreed to the scheduled date or 
failed to object.  For example, at the pretrial conference on 
July 14, 2016, the parties agreed to schedule a status 
conference for September 29, 2016, which was noted in the docket 
with the following entry:  "Case continued by agreement to 
9/26/16 re: Status Conference."  The Commonwealth contends that, 
because the defendants agreed to this date, they "agree[d] to 
[a] continuance," and therefore the seventy-eight days between 
the pretrial conference on July 14 and the status conference on 
September 29 must be excluded.  Applying this logic to the 
entire pretrial period, the Commonwealth contends that, every 
time the defendants agreed to the scheduling of another event, 
27 
 
 
the time leading up to that event must be excluded based on the 
defendants' acquiescence.  By the Commonwealth's calculation, 
this would mean that a total of 330 days should be excluded, in 
both cases, out of the 367 days since Golden's arraignment and 
the 369 days since Graham's arraignment. 
 
In response, the defendants argue (and the judge agreed) 
that there is no time that can be excluded based on their 
acquiescence, because the presumptive trial date of June 12, 
2017, was never postponed.  They contend that any delay under 
rule 36 must be measured in terms of impact on the presumptive 
trial date.  Thus, where the presumptive trial date remained 
unchanged since arraignment, they could not have been expected 
to object to any delay, because there was no delay for them to 
object to.  Under this interpretation, the clock would not be 
tolled under rule 36 even if, for example, the defendant agrees 
to the continuance of a scheduled event, such as a pretrial 
hearing or conference. 
 
In short, each side interprets rule 36 as working harsh 
results upon the other.  The Commonwealth interprets rule 36 to 
mean that defendants must object every time an event is 
scheduled, even if the objection is meritless, or else risk 
having the time excluded based on their acquiescence.  The 
defendants interpret rule 36 to mean that the speedy trial clock 
28 
 
 
runs without pause against the Commonwealth unless the 
presumptive trial date changes. 
 
We reject both of these interpretations.  The 
Commonwealth's interpretation would encourage defense counsel in 
a criminal case to be obstinate rather than flexible, combative 
rather than cooperative.  It would invite defense counsel to 
make baseless objections whenever an event is scheduled for the 
first time.  It also mischaracterizes the clerk's language in 
the docket entries -- stating that the case has been "continued 
to" various dates -- as evidence of "continuances," when all 
that it reflects is the next scheduled event in the case. 
 
Meanwhile, the defendants' interpretation fails to 
recognize that a criminal case has various stages (e.g., 
pretrial conferences for the exchange of discovery and notice of 
certain defenses, motions to suppress, the final pretrial 
hearing to resolve motions in limine and other matters before 
trial, and the trial itself), and that delay arising in any of 
these stages is likely to result in delay in the subsequent 
stages.  If there are no excludable delays under rule 
36 (b) (2), and if the rule 36 clock cannot be tolled even where 
the defendant acquiesces in delay during the various pretrial 
stages, then in complex cases the presumptive trial date is 
likely, as here, to be at or near the 365-day limit, leaving the 
Commonwealth with little or no room for error to avoid dismissal 
29 
 
 
under rule 36 and little time to prepare for trial after the 
pretrial stages are completed. 
 
Our case law recognizes that preparing a case for trial is 
a complex process, full of unexpected events and challenges, and 
rejects any interpretation of rule 36 that would make parties 
less likely to accommodate each other -- defendants because they 
may risk losing their rights to a speedy trial and the 
Commonwealth because it may risk running out of time.  Our 
precedents make clear that time can be excluded based on a 
defendant's acquiescence if the defendant agreed to or otherwise 
failed to object to "a continuance or other delay" (emphasis 
added).  Tanner, 417 Mass. at 3.  This means that, if an event 
is scheduled for a certain date, and the defendant assents or 
fails to object when that event is continued or rescheduled to a 
later date, then that time can be excluded based on the 
defendant's acquiescence.  For example, if a pretrial hearing 
scheduled for March 1 is rescheduled by the parties' agreement 
to March 8, then that eight-day delay may be excluded based on 
the defendant's acquiescence.  Or, if the Commonwealth 
successfully moves to continue the trial date from August 1 to 
August 22, without objection from the defendant, then that 
twenty-two-day continuance can also be excluded based on the 
defendant's acquiescence.  See Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 
Mass. 705, 715 (2016) (time excluded based on defendant's 
30 
 
 
acquiescence where defendant and Commonwealth agreed to continue 
pretrial hearing date, to extend deadline for filing pretrial 
motions, and to continue trial date); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
469 Mass. 516, 525 (2014) (time excluded based on defendant's 
acquiescence where defendant agreed to reschedule presumptive 
trial date).19  But where a defendant agrees for the first time 
to schedule a previously unscheduled event, there is no 
"continuance" or "delay" that can be excluded under rule 36.  In 
these cases, for example, when the defendants agreed to schedule 
a status conference for September 29, 2016, they were not 
agreeing to a continuance or delay, because this was the first 
time a date had been set for that conference.  Just because the 
docket states that "[the] case [was] continued" does not mean 
that there was a continuance to which the defendants were 
required to object, unless an event was in fact continued from 
an earlier date to a later date, or was not held as scheduled.  
Contrary to the Commonwealth's suggestion, nothing in rule 36 or 
our case law requires defendants to object every time another 
event is scheduled.  See Spaulding, 411 Mass. at 506 ("[W]e have 
                                                          
 
 
19 Time can also be excluded under rule 36 based on a 
defendant's acquiescence if the defendant allows an already 
scheduled event to pass without objection.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 411 Mass. 503, 507 (1992) (time 
excluded under rule 36 where defendant allowed scheduled trial 
date to pass without objection); Commonwealth v. Farris, 390 
Mass. 300, 306 (1983) (same). 
31 
 
 
never held that rule 36 time does not begin to run until the 
defendant first makes an objection"). 
 
This does not mean, however, that defendants are absolved 
of their duty to "press their case through the criminal justice 
system." Barry, 390 Mass. at 297.  There are many events that 
may constitute a "delay," potentially taking up time that may 
otherwise be used to prepare for trial, even if the presumptive 
trial date does not change.  Although the more common of these 
events, such as the resolution of pretrial motions, are 
enumerated under rule 36 (b) (2), there are also various 
unanticipated events that the parties may agree to work around.  
For example, a pretrial hearing may need to be rescheduled if 
the Commonwealth's attorney cannot attend because of an 
unexpected family emergency, or a filing deadline may need to be 
extended if defense counsel has an important deadline in another 
case falling on the same date.  Such delays may not have any 
effect on the presumptive trial date, but if the defendant does 
not object to them, they should not be counted against the 
Commonwealth.  Here, the judge erroneously focused only on 
delays that "affect[], or potentially affect[]," the trial date, 
even though we have never held that a continuance or delay must 
have an effect on the trial date, presumptive or otherwise, in 
order for it to be excluded under rule 36.  Indeed, in several 
cases we have excluded time where the defendant acquiesced in a 
32 
 
 
delay to an event other than the trial itself.  See, e.g., 
Williams, 475 Mass. at 715 (continuance in pretrial hearing date 
and extension of filing deadline); Roman, 470 Mass. at 93 
(continuance in pretrial hearing date); Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 
448 Mass. 538, 541 (2007) (extension of filing deadline).20 
 
Having examined the record to determine whether any delay 
here can be justified based on the defendants' acquiescence, we 
conclude that much of the time that the Commonwealth claims is 
excluded must instead be included.  The Commonwealth contends 
that the defendants acquiesced in delay on eight occasions when 
they agreed to schedule a previously unscheduled pretrial 
event,21 and on two other occasions when they failed to object to 
                                                          
 
 
20 A defendant may also be found to have acquiesced in or 
benefited from a delay where a judge proposes a date for the 
next event and the defendant asks for that date to be postponed 
to a later date.  Where this happens, a judge might find that 
the defendant has acquiesced in the delay between the proposed 
date and the later date.  But where this happens, it is 
important that the judge make a contemporaneous finding of 
acquiescence or benefit because, without such a contemporaneous 
finding, the docket may simply reflect the scheduled date of 
this next event. 
 
 
21 The Commonwealth claims that the defendants acquiesced in 
delay when they agreed to schedule the following pretrial 
events:  (1) a status conference for September 29, 2016; (2) a 
motion hearing for January 11, 2017; (3) a status conference for 
February 16, 2017; (4) a motion hearing for March 23, 2017; (5) 
a status conference for April 25, 2017; (6) a motion hearing for 
May 2, 2017; (7) a motion hearing for June 6, 2017; and (8) a 
hearing on June 9, 2017. 
 
33 
 
 
events that were already scheduled at arraignment.22  On none of 
these occasions was there any "continuance or . . . delay" to 
which the defendants could have objected.  Tanner, 417 Mass. at 
3.  See Barry, 390 Mass. at 296 n.13 ("counsel need not object 
where a procedure and timetable is established by the rules").23 
 
However, the record does reveal two occasions on which the 
defendants may have in fact agreed to a continuance or delay.  
In Graham's case, a motion hearing that was scheduled for 
January 11, 2017, appears to have been continued to February 16, 
2017, by the parties' agreement.  Meanwhile, in both cases, a 
motion hearing that was scheduled for May 2, 2017, appears to 
have been continued to May 11, 2017, although the docket does 
not indicate whether this was by agreement.  If the defendants 
agreed to these continuances or failed to object to them, as the 
                                                          
 
 
22 The Commonwealth claims that the defendants acquiesced in 
delay when they failed to object to events that had already been 
presumptively scheduled at arraignment:  (1) the first pretrial 
hearing on December 13, 2016; and (2) the final pretrial hearing 
on June 1, 2017. 
 
 
23 In its opposition to the defendants' motions to dismiss, 
the Commonwealth also argued that the seventeen days between 
April 25, 2017, when Graham filed his second rule 14 motion, and 
May 11, 2017, when the judge ruled on that motion, should be 
excluded because Graham benefited from this delay.  But where 
Graham filed this motion because the Commonwealth had failed to 
provide discovery that was mandatory under rule 14, see note 15, 
supra, he cannot be held to have benefited from such delay.  Cf. 
Taylor, 469 Mass. at 527 ("[I]t makes little sense [to exclude 
time under rule 36 (b) (2)] when a defendant moves to compel 
production of discovery he indisputably is owed"). 
34 
 
 
Commonwealth alleges, then these time periods -- thirty-seven 
days for the first alleged continuance and ten days for the 
second -- could be excluded based on the defendants' 
acquiescence, placing the Commonwealth within the time limits of 
rule 36.  The docket does not provide us with sufficient 
information to determine whether there was acquiescence in delay 
on either of these occasions.  Specifically, in Graham's case, 
it is unclear whether the motion hearing that was scheduled for 
January 11 was in fact continued, or whether it was simply 
canceled, with the next event -- the status conference -- 
scheduled for February 16.24  And in both cases, it is unclear 
whether the motion hearing scheduled for May 2 was continued to 
                                                          
 
 
24 It is not clear why there was a "motion hearing" 
scheduled for January 11, 2017, in Graham's case, because at 
that time Graham had no pending motions.  The hearing was 
described in the docket as a "Hearing Re:  Motion to Dismiss," 
which was likely a reference to a hearing in Golden's case, 
scheduled for the same date, to hear Golden's motion to dismiss.  
Golden's motion hearing was held as scheduled. 
 
 
The docket entry for January 11, 2017, in Graham's case 
states:  "Motion Hearing scheduled for 01/11/2017 . . . has been 
resulted as follows:  . . . Rescheduled.  Reason:  Defense 
Attorney failed to appear, Deft not in Court (in Lockup) Cont 
[t]o 2/16/17 by agree, Hr re:  Status conf."  This could suggest 
that, because there was no need for a motion hearing in Graham's 
case, the parties agreed not to hold one, and agreed to schedule 
their next event (i.e., a status conference) for February 16, 
2017 -- in which case the time between January 11 and February 
16 would not be considered a continuance. 
35 
 
 
May 11 by agreement or whether the defendants objected.25  The 
judge made no findings on these issues, because he assumed, 
incorrectly, that delay resulting from a continuance could not 
be excluded unless it affected the presumptive trial date.  On 
remand, the judge may determine based on an expanded record 
whether the defendants acquiesced in delay during the following 
time periods:  (1) between January 11, 2017, and February 16, 
2017, in Graham's case; and (2) between May 2, 2017, and May 11, 
2017, in both cases.  If so, those time periods must be 
excluded.26 
 
2.  Failure to prosecute.  Having found that the dismissals 
under rule 36 must be vacated, we turn to the judge's dismissal 
of the indictments for failure to prosecute. 
 
Even where dismissal is not required under rule 36, a judge 
nevertheless retains the inherent authority to dismiss an 
indictment for failure to prosecute.  See Commonwealth v. 
Jenkins, 431 Mass. 501, 504 (2000).  Where such dismissal is 
without prejudice, "the judge's action should be upheld in the 
                                                          
 
 
25 The docket entry for May 2, 2017, simply states:  
"[C]ontinued to 5/11/2017 . . . for motion hearing."  The docket 
elsewhere states that the hearing scheduled for May 2, 2017, was 
"[r]escheduled." 
 
 
26 On appeal, the Commonwealth also claims that the judge's 
interpretation of rule 36 violates the separation of powers.  
Because we conclude that the judge's interpretation is 
incorrect, and because we vacate the dismissals, we need not 
address this argument. 
36 
 
 
absence of an abuse of discretion."  Commonwealth v. Connelly, 
418 Mass. 37, 38 (1994).  But where such dismissal is with 
prejudice, "there must be a showing of egregious misconduct or 
at least a serious threat of prejudice."  Id. 
 
Here, the judge concluded that there was a violation of 
rule 36, leaving him with no discretion but to dismiss with 
prejudice.  But the judge also concluded that, "[i]f the [r]ule 
36 period has not expired, such that the Court [does have] 
discretion [to dismiss], the Court . . . grants the [m]otions 
[to dismiss] on the ground[s] of failure to prosecute these 
cases."  The judge further clarified that, "[b]ut for the [r]ule 
36 violation, this dismissal would have been without prejudice."  
Thus, because we have determined that there was no rule 36 
violation in these cases, the dismissal based on failure to 
prosecute must be deemed without prejudice.  We therefore review 
it for abuse of discretion. 
 
Generally, "where a prosecutor is unprepared to present her 
case due to the unexpected absence of a witness, a judge has 
discretion to dismiss the case without prejudice."  Commonwealth 
v. Lucero, 450 Mass. 1032, 1033 (2008).  However, that 
discretion is not unlimited.  "[A] judge's discretionary 
decision constitutes an abuse of discretion where we conclude 
the judge made 'a clear error of judgment in weighing' the 
factors relevant to the decision, such that the decision falls 
37 
 
 
outside the range of reasonable alternatives" (citation 
omitted).  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
Here, the judge concluded that the cases should be 
dismissed for failure to prosecute because the Commonwealth was 
not ready for trial on the first scheduled trial date, June 12, 
2017, and was still not ready for trial one week later, on June 
19.  In reaching this conclusion, the judge weighed the various 
factors that a court must consider under rule 10 when 
determining whether to grant a motion to continue.  This was 
appropriate, given that, where a judge is asked to rule on both 
a motion to continue and a motion to dismiss without prejudice, 
those decisions are in essence two sides of the same coin:  the 
same factors that would weigh in favor of allowing a motion to 
continue would weigh against allowing a motion to dismiss, and 
vice versa.  The factors to be considered under rule 10 include  
"[w]hether the failure to grant a continuance . . . would be 
likely to . . . result in a miscarriage of justice," and 
"whether there has been a failure . . . to use due diligence to 
obtain available witnesses."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a) (2). 
 
We conclude that, in balancing these factors, the judge 
exceeded the limits of his discretion.  In concluding that 
dismissal would not result in a miscarriage of justice, the 
judge gave inadequate weight to the public interest in bringing 
to trial defendants who are charged with murder and to the fact 
38 
 
 
that barely one year had passed since the defendants' 
arraignments.  Although dismissals without prejudice would not 
preclude the Commonwealth from seeking new indictments and 
prosecuting the cases anew, see Commonwealth v. Anderson, 402 
Mass. 576, 579 (1988), it is nonetheless a severe sanction that 
must be exercised with great caution in a murder case that has 
moved with unusual speed to trial. 
 
The judge also gave great weight to his finding that the 
Commonwealth had failed to exercise due diligence in securing 
Garcia's attendance.  The judge made this finding without the 
benefit of an evidentiary hearing, concluding instead that 
dismissal was warranted even if he accepted as true the facts 
proffered by the Commonwealth.  Therefore, in reviewing the 
dismissal for failure to prosecute, we also must accept the 
Commonwealth's proffer as true. 
 
According to that proffer, the police had been in regular 
contact with Garcia since 2015, long after Garcia would have 
realized that the Commonwealth had failed to assist him with his 
own narcotics case, but the police did not learn until June 8, 
2017 -- when Garcia stated in a telephone call that he did not 
"want to be bothered any longer" regarding these cases -- that 
he was unwilling to testify at trial.  To be sure, where there 
were warning signs that Garcia might no longer be willing to 
cooperate, the police should have taken steps to assure his 
39 
 
 
appearance at trial before late May, since it was clear by May 
11, when the Commonwealth's first motion to continue was denied, 
that the trial would proceed as scheduled on June 12.  Moreover, 
when the police were unable to reach Garcia by telephone, they 
should not have waited until June 7 to send an officer to 
Florida to locate him.  And although it is reasonable for the 
Commonwealth not to have sought interstate process when it still 
believed that Garcia was willing to cooperate, if the 
Commonwealth had moved sooner, it would have realized earlier 
that it needed to take steps to compel his attendance.  Having 
said that, the Commonwealth did act promptly once it learned 
that Garcia was unwilling to testify.  And although one can 
fault the effort made by the investigator for the Florida State 
Attorney's office in attempting to serve Garcia with interstate 
process, the Commonwealth is not responsible for the quality of 
that effort.  In short, even if the judge was correct that the 
Commonwealth had not exercised due diligence in procuring 
Garcia's attendance at trial, its lack of diligence does not 
rise to the level that we have, in other cases, recognized as 
justifying dismissal for failure to prosecute, especially where 
the indictments are for murder and where only one additional 
week had been given to locate and produce Garcia for trial.  
See, e.g., Anderson, 402 Mass. at 579 (dismissal within judge's 
discretion where prosecutor was repeatedly tardy and not ready 
40 
 
 
to proceed on first day of trial); Commonwealth v. Joseph, 27 
Mass. App. Ct. 516, 518-519 (1989) (dismissal within judge's 
discretion where prosecutor was not ready for trial because of 
witnesses' absence, apparently made no "inquiry concerning 
[their] absence," and took "cavalier attitude" toward case).  
See also Commonwealth v. Clark, 454 Mass. 1001, 1002 (2009) ("a 
judge has the authority to dismiss an indictment . . . where the 
Commonwealth has repeatedly failed to produce its witnesses and 
effectuate a prosecution" [emphasis added]). 
 
In such circumstances, we expect a judge presiding over a 
murder case to give the Commonwealth more time to locate a 
recalcitrant essential witness, and to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute only where it is apparent that continued diligent 
efforts would prove futile.  Where the interests of justice so 
require, and where the defendant's appearance at trial can be 
assured, a judge may diminish the prejudice to the defendant 
resulting from such a continuance by releasing the defendant on 
bail with appropriate conditions, as the judge did here during 
the pendency of this appeal. 
 
Finally, although the judge identified the Commonwealth's 
failure to prosecute as a separate and alternative ground for 
dismissal, we note that he may have relied to some extent on his 
erroneous conclusion that dismissal was required under rule 36.  
He wrote, for example, that, "[w]ere it not for the expiration 
41 
 
 
of the [r]ule 36 period, the Court might have waited slightly 
longer before dismissing the case, if there were even a glimmer 
of hope that the Commonwealth might actually secure . . . 
Garcia's testimony."  Because he failed to fully consider 
certain factors when exercising his discretion, and because his 
reasoning appeared to rest in part on his view that the time 
limits under rule 36 had run, we conclude that the judge abused 
his discretion in dismissing the indictments for failure to 
prosecute. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the order allowing 
the defendants' motions to dismiss is vacated.  The cases are 
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.