Title: Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11901 
 
KAMEE VERDRAGER  vs.  MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, GLOVSKY & 
POPEO, P.C., & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 5, 2015. - May 31, 2016. 
 
Present:  Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Anti-Discrimination Law, Employment, Sex, Termination of 
employment.  Employment, Discrimination, Sexual harassment, 
Demotion, Retaliation, Termination.  Unlawful Interference.  
Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Discovery. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 3, 2009. 
 
 
The case was heard by Peter M. Lauriat, J., on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Kamee Verdrager, pro se. 
 
Joan A. Lukey (Justin J. Wolosz with her) for the 
defendants. 
 
Ellen J. Messing, for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers 
Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse, for New England Legal 
Foundation & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
                                                 
 
1 Robert Gault, David Barmak, Bret Cohen, R. Robert Popeo, 
and Donald Schroeder. 
2 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  General Laws c. 151B, § 4, prohibits employers 
from discriminating against employees on the basis of gender.  
It also prohibits them from retaliating against employees for 
engaging in "protected activity," i.e., activity undertaken "to 
protest or oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination" 
(citation omitted).  See Thirkield v. Neary & Hunter OB/GYN, 
LLC, 76 F. Supp. 3d 339, 350 (D. Mass. 2015) (interpreting G. L. 
c. 151B).  Here, we are asked to determine whether summary 
judgment should have entered for the employer on an employee's 
claims for gender discrimination and retaliation.  In addressing 
the retaliation claim, we confront the novel question whether it 
is "protected activity" for an employee to search for, copy, and 
share with the employee's attorney confidential documents that 
the employee is authorized to access in the course of employment 
and that may help prove a discrimination claim. 
 
The plaintiff is an attorney who worked for a Boston law 
firm, defendant Mintz, Levin, Ferris, Cohn, Glovsky and Popeo, 
P.C. (firm).  During the course of her employment with that 
firm, from June, 2004, to November, 2008, she complained to her 
superiors and, ultimately, to the Massachusetts Commission 
Against Discrimination (MCAD), that she was being subjected to 
discriminatory treatment on the basis of her gender -- treatment 
that, she believed, led to her demotion in February, 2007.  In 
3 
 
the wake of this demotion, and on the advice of her attorney, 
the plaintiff searched the firm's document management system for 
items that might prove her assertions of discrimination.  In 
November, 2008, after these searches were made known to the 
firm's chairman, the plaintiff's employment was terminated "for 
cause." 
 
In November, 2009, the plaintiff filed the present action 
in the Superior Court, which, as amended, named as defendants 
the firm, certain firm "members"2 with whom she worked, and the 
firm's chairman, R. Robert Popeo.  The complaint alleged that 
both the plaintiff's demotion and her termination were the 
result of discrimination on the basis of gender, and that both 
also constituted retaliation for her having opposed such 
discrimination.  The complaint specified five counts pursuant to 
G. L. c. 151B, § 4:  gender discrimination (against all 
defendants except Bret Cohen); pregnancy discrimination3 (against 
the firm); aiding and abetting discrimination (against all 
except the firm and Cohen); failure to investigate and remedy 
discrimination (against the firm); and retaliation (against all 
                                                 
2 "Members" are the equivalent of "partners" at other law 
firms. 
 
 
3 Pregnancy discrimination is a form of gender 
discrimination.  See Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Massachusetts 
Comm'n Against Discrimination, 375 Mass. 160, 167 (1978) ("any 
classification which relies on pregnancy as the determinative 
criterion is a distinction based on sex"). 
4 
 
except Cohen).  A sixth count, tortious interference with 
contractual relations, was filed only against Cohen, who was not 
named in any of the other counts.  The defendants then 
counterclaimed on various grounds.4  Following cross motions for 
summary judgment, only three of the defendants' counterclaims 
survived,5 and all of the plaintiff's claims were dismissed.  The 
plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of her claims,6 and we 
allowed her petition for direct appellate review. 
 
We conclude, first, that the plaintiff has presented 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that both her 
demotion and her termination were the result of unlawful 
discrimination, as well as evidence allowing an inference that 
both were the result of retaliation.7  Therefore, summary 
                                                 
 
4 The counterclaims alleged breach of fiduciary duty, 
conversion, fraud, breach of contract, breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of two 
Federal computer fraud statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2707, and 
18 U.S.C. § 1030A).  There was also a claim for replevin of the 
documents taken by the plaintiff. 
 
 
5 The surviving claims were breach of fiduciary duty, breach 
of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing.  The motion judge also granted the defendants' 
motion to enter separate and final judgment on all the counts as 
to which summary judgment had entered. 
 
 
6 The defendants did not cross-appeal from the dismissal of 
their claims.  Neither the dismissed counterclaims nor the 
surviving ones are before us. 
 
 
7 As discussed in note 23, infra, the other claims -- for 
pregnancy discrimination, aiding and abetting, and failure to 
5 
 
judgment for the defendants on those counts was inappropriate.  
Second, we hold that an employee's accessing, copying, and 
forwarding of documents may, in certain limited circumstances, 
constitute "protected activity," but only where her actions are 
reasonable in the totality of the circumstances.8  Finally, we 
conclude that judgment was entered properly on the claim against 
Cohen for tortious interference with contractual relations. 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts, which are 
generally undisputed, "drawing inferences in favor of the 
plaintiff where they may reasonably be drawn from the facts."  
Young v. Boston Univ., 64 Mass. App. Ct. 586, 587 (2005), cert. 
denied, 549 U.S. 832 (2006).  To the extent that facts are 
disputed, we resolve them in favor of the plaintiff.  See Miller 
v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007).  We reserve certain 
details for later discussion. 
After graduating from law school in 1999, the plaintiff 
practiced employment and labor law in New York.  In June, 2004, 
she began work as a fifth-year associate at the firm's Boston 
office, in its employment, labor, and benefits (ELB) section. 
Throughout the course of the plaintiff's employment, the 
firm had in place an "Electronic Information System [EIS] 
                                                                                                                                                             
investigate and remedy -- are supported by the same evidence 
that supports the discrimination claims. 
 
 
8 Because it is unnecessary for our decision, however, we do 
not apply this rule to the plaintiff's actions in this case. 
6 
 
Acceptable Use Policy" (EIS policy).  On June 16, 2004, the 
plaintiff signed a copy of that policy and agreed to be governed 
by its provisions.  The plaintiff was trained in the use of 
Desksite, a document management system used by the firm, at the 
beginning of her employment.  She was told that she "was 
supposed to save almost all documents which she authored to the 
public section of DeskSite" and "was expected to search the 
system regularly in connection with her work."  Any documents in 
the "public" section of that system "were available to everyone 
in the firm who could access DeskSite."  Such documents could be 
accessed directly or could be found through a general word 
search of the system's contents.  Users also could choose, 
however, to save documents in a "private" section of the system, 
accessible only to themselves or to individuals that they 
specified.  The EIS policy provided that the "EIS should be 
used, with limited exceptions, only for job-related 
communications.  Although personal use is permitted, employees 
should do so with the full understanding that nothing is 
private" (emphasis in original).  Associates frequently used 
Desksite for personal or nonbusiness reasons, including to check 
the time records of other associates to see "who was getting the 
most work." 
The firm also had in place a confidentiality policy, which 
stated that "[a]ll documents, correspondence, forms and other 
7 
 
work product created or produced by the firm in connection with 
the delivery of legal services to the firm's clients are the 
sole property of [the firm] and its clients.  Such material 
should not be removed from the office or used for any reason 
other than for or in connection with the delivery of services on 
behalf of the firm." 
Shortly after joining the firm, in late June and early 
July, 2004, the plaintiff was assigned to work with Cohen, a 
member in the ELB section, to draft a brief on behalf of one of 
the firm's clients.  In an electronic mail message dated July 
19, 2004, Cohen stated that the client "has really liked our 
pleadings to date.  Let's keep up the good work!"  Another firm 
member, who also worked on the brief, later wrote in an 
evaluation that the plaintiff 
"not only has a sound command of legal principles but she 
appears to have great intuition and reaction to legal 
issues that will make her an excellent advisor to clients 
and an attorney who has much to contribute to strategic 
issues in matters.  On numerous matters in [this] case she 
has dropped by my office to discuss an issue and her 
intuitive response to the issue has been on point and well-
considered . . . . I have not witnessed [her] interaction 
with clients, but I do know that she has had extensive 
contact with opposing counsel and the client in [this] 
matter.  My impression is that [the client] has appreciated 
[the plaintiff's] counsel and that [she] is well-respected 
and had 'run with the ball' in connection with opposing 
counsel in the matter . . . . I would certainly like to 
work with her again on any matters that involve ELB 
litigation[.]" 
 
8 
 
The plaintiff maintains that, while Cohen and the plaintiff 
were working on this brief, he made a number of inappropriate, 
sexually-charged comments to her.9  At some point in July, 2004, 
the plaintiff complained of these incidents to the firm's human 
resources office.  In mid-August, 2004, the plaintiff spoke 
with, among others, the firm's managing director, Peter 
Biagetti, and with the attorney managing the ELB section, 
defendant Robert Gault, about the incidents.  Gault and Biagetti 
met with Cohen in August, 2004, to discuss the plaintiff's 
assertions.  Gault and Biagetti concluded that her complaints 
were "management style complaints" rather than "complaints 
related to gender differences," and decided to hire an executive 
coach to work with Cohen.  At some point during that summer, 
firm chairman Popeo was informed of the plaintiff's complaints.  
Popeo spoke with Biagetti and was told that Biagetti had looked 
into the complaints and had found no evidence of gender-based 
discrimination.10 
                                                 
 
9 In particular, the plaintiff states that Cohen spoke to 
her about "having a 7-year itch [and] wanting to cheat on his 
wife."  He also called the plaintiff on the telephone to tell 
her "in a very provocative tone" that "I was dreaming about you 
last night."  Cohen denies having made such comments. 
 
 
10 Throughout the course of the plaintiff's employment, 
various meetings were held to discuss both the plaintiff's 
claims of discrimination and, more generally, the issue of 
gender discrimination at the firm.  The meetings involved, at 
different points and among others, Gault, the ELB section 
manager; Barmak, who would replace Gault as section manager; 
9 
 
In October, 2004, after a client complained to Cohen about 
the plaintiff's performance, Cohen asked the client to submit 
the complaint in writing, which Cohen then forwarded to Gault, 
the ELB section manager, and Starr, the director of human 
resources.11 
Also in October, 2004, various individuals, both members 
and associates, told the plaintiff that Cohen was making 
negative remarks about her.  In evaluating the plaintiff's 
performance in the fall of 2004, Cohen rated it as "usually 
below expectations."  He wrote that the plaintiff 
"needs a great deal of help on her writing.  She is smart 
and seems to have a great deal of institutional knowledge 
but, at least when I dealt with her, was unable to 
translate her knowledge into a cohesive thought. . . . 
Orally, I find that she does not speak with confidence.  
For example, she says 'um' a lot." 
 
  The concerns regarding the plaintiff's writing were 
echoed in the comments of her other evaluators.  Defendant 
Donald Schroeder, then a senior associate in the ELB section, 
who would later be promoted to membership, rated the plaintiff's 
performance as "always meets expectations."  In his written 
                                                                                                                                                             
firm chairman Popeo; Schroeder, a member of the ELB section; 
Rosemary Allen, a member who oversaw personnel matters; and 
Wendy Starr, director of human resources. 
 
11 Cohen stated in his deposition that he had never 
previously solicited a written complaint against an associate 
and that he did so here "because in my entire time being a 
partner at any law firm . . . I had never once had a client say, 
I don't want to work with this attorney.  She was rude, and it 
upset either me or somebody else." 
10 
 
comments, however, he added that the plaintiff "needs to develop 
her analytical writing skills and organize her thoughts more 
clearly on paper."  Gault rated her work as "usually meets 
expectations" and noted that "I do not have much exposure" to 
her work but "I've seen a few things [in her writing] that 
suggest a need for more attention to detail." 
In January, 2005, Cohen increased the scope of a research 
project he had assigned to the plaintiff.  This project did not 
count toward her quota of hours billable to clients.  Based on 
conversations she had at the time with her colleagues, the 
plaintiff maintains that the scope of the nonbillable work 
assigned to her was greater than that assigned by Cohen to other 
associates, a point that Cohen disputes. 
On February 2, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit upheld a jury verdict in favor of a female 
employee in the firm's Virginia office.  See Gallina vs. Mintz, 
Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, U.S. Ct. App., Nos. 03-
1883 & 03-1947, slip op. at 12 (4th Cir. Feb 2, 2005) (Gallina).  
The jury found that, in violation of Federal antidiscrimination 
laws, the firm had retaliated against the employee for 
complaining of what she believed to be discriminatory treatment 
on the basis of her gender.  Id. at 8.  On February 11, 2005, 
Cherie Kiser, a member in the firm's Washington, D.C., office 
who chaired the firm's diversity committee, left a voicemail 
11 
 
message for Popeo expressing her concern that the firm in 
general, and section manager Gault, in particular, did not take 
seriously employees' complaints of gender discrimination.  Popeo 
later spoke with Kiser, stating his commitment to combatting 
discrimination based on gender, but suggesting that Kiser was 
"overreacting" to what "she was hearing from Gault." 
In March, 2005, the plaintiff underwent her annual 
performance review.  Among her evaluators were Schroeder and 
Gault.  She received an over-all rating of "always meets 
expectations" in five competencies, and an over-all rating of 
"usually meets expectations" in another six competencies.  Each 
evaluator also provided written comments.  Gault wrote that the 
plaintiff "seems very smart but [I] think the writing issues may 
mask some of her inherent intellectual ability."  Schroeder 
wrote that "her writing style is too informal" and that "[s]he 
needs to proofread her work and pay more attention to detail."  
Some of the other comments were positive, including a comment 
from Gault that the plaintiff "[s]eems to have a pretty good 
substantive knowledge of a lot of general employment law 
areas" and from Schroeder that she "is very good with clients."  
In the fiscal year ending that month, the plaintiff had amassed 
12 
 
thirty-three more billable hours per month than the average 
associate.12 
Also in March, 2005, Starr, the human resources director, 
and Rosemary Allen, a firm member who oversaw the firm's 
personnel matters, received complaints from six women that Cohen 
had made inappropriate comments to them.  After investigating, 
Starr and Allen concluded that no gender-based discrimination 
had taken place. 
On July 20, 2005, Eastern Point Consulting Group, Inc. 
(Eastern Point), a consulting company hired in the wake of the 
Gallina case to investigate allegations of discrimination, 
presented the findings from its investigation to the firm.  
Among other things, Eastern Point reported that many female 
attorneys, both members and associates, "believe it is more 
difficult for women than men at [the firm]."  Starr was 
interviewed in the course of this investigation, and stated that 
there is a "tolerance for poor behavior" at the firm. 
In September, 2005, after returning from her honeymoon, the 
plaintiff informed Gault that she was pregnant with her first 
child.  Gault responded, "Well, I suppose these things happen.  
I guess we have your honeymoon to blame for this?"13  He then 
                                                 
12 This number was "annualized" to take into account that 
the plaintiff started working at the firm in the middle of the 
fiscal year. 
 
13 Gault later denied making this remark. 
13 
 
discussed the possibility of the plaintiff reducing her schedule 
to part time, although the plaintiff had not sought a reduction 
in hours or raised the possibility of such a reduction.  
Subsequently, the plaintiff experienced medical difficulties 
related to her pregnancy and was placed on short term 
disability.  Gault and Schroeder exchanged electronic mail 
messages in January, 2006, and March, 2006, in which each 
expressed that he was "frustrated" with the plaintiff's absences 
and lack of availability.  Gault also spoke to the plaintiff's 
neighbors and discovered that she was performing work around her 
house that he did not believe was consistent with the medical 
conditions she reported.14 
In March, 2006, the plaintiff underwent her second annual 
performance review.  Gault was one of her evaluators.  She 
received over-all ratings of "usually exceeds expectations" in 
four competencies, "always meets expectations" in six other 
competencies, and a rating of "usually meets expectations" in 
the eleventh area, business development.  In a written comment, 
Gault stated that, "I noted some areas of substantive knowledge 
and writing in my last review that needed improvement," but that 
he "has seen what seems to be an improvement in her work since 
her last evaluation."  His main criticism was that "I have not 
                                                 
 
14 The record contains the names of these neighbors, but 
does not state how Gault came to be in touch with them or the 
type of chores they had observed. 
14 
 
seen any evidence of production potential/entrepreneurial 
instincts."  Another member wrote "that she spent excessive time 
on the work" he had assigned her and that her "drafting is not 
particularly precise."  On the other hand, a firm member from 
outside ELB wrote positively that "the work [the plaintiff] did 
was for a very demanding client who set pretty unrealistic 
expectations, but [she] was able to meet them." 
In a separate evaluation dated May 1, 2006, Schroeder 
wrote, among other things, that the plaintiff's "writing needs 
to improve" and that she "did not always communicate [her 
reduced] schedule to everyone in ELB and I had to handle a 
number of matters on an emergency basis."15 
On May 3, 2006, the plaintiff gave birth to her first 
child.  She began a planned six-month maternity leave.  In June, 
2006, defendant David Barmak replaced Gault as section manager 
of the ELB section.  While the plaintiff was on leave, she was 
informed that, based on the performance reviews she had received 
in March, 2006, prior to her leave, she would be subject to 
another, interim performance review.  This review would be based 
                                                 
 
15 It is not clear from the record why Schroeder, then a 
senior associate, authored a separate evaluation. 
 
15 
 
on her performance during the first ninety days after her return 
from leave.16 
The plaintiff returned to work on November 1, 2006.  
Thereafter, she registered a relatively low number of billable 
hours compared to other associates in the ELB section.  By early 
February, 2007, the plaintiff had received two negative reviews 
of her work.  One review criticized her for putting into a 
contract "poorly drafted language that needed to be redrafted in 
more conventional form."  The other review, from Schroeder, 
noted, among other things, that she took "too much time to 
complete [a writing] task" he had assigned her and that "I had 
to perform more editing than I normally need to do for memos 
done by more junior associates."  He also noted that "[d]espite 
a full-time schedule, she is coming in at 9[:]30 or so and 
leaving no later than 5[:]30 . . . I cannot understand why she 
has not attempted to step up to the plate."  The plaintiff also 
received positive comments from a client who "was very 
complimentary of [the plaintiff] and [her] work." 
In or around February, 2007, Allen, the member overseeing 
personnel matters, told Popeo, the firm chairman, that the 
                                                 
 
16 The parties dispute whether other associates were 
subjected to a similar review.  The defendants contend that 
other associates of the plaintiff's seniority were evaluated at 
around the same time to determine their potential for membership 
in the firm.  The plaintiff contends, on the other hand, that 
she was not reviewed as part of the aforementioned process. 
16 
 
senior attorneys in the ELB section had requested that the 
plaintiff "be separated from the firm."  Popeo, in his 
deposition, recalled that he proposed demoting the plaintiff, or 
"set[ting] her back," rather than firing her.  He stated that, 
"I participated in the decision to step her back rather than 
terminate her.  Indeed, I asked the Employment and Labor Section 
to consider an alternative to termination." 
On February 23, 2007, Barmak and a member of the human 
resources department met with the plaintiff to inform her that 
she would be "stepped back" two years in seniority, which would 
lower her salary, but also would allow more time before any 
decision would be made on her eligibility for membership.  
According to that human resources officer, this decision was 
based on the plaintiff's having received "mixed reviews, [on the 
fact that there are] partners who won't work with her, [on] low 
utilization, [and on a] high billing rate."  Barmak later 
commented, regarding this decision, that the plaintiff 
"is someone who is playing the system.  She is out a lot, 
[and therefore] there is just a sense that she is not 
someone who is committed to practicing law, that she really 
doesn't want to be here, but as she often says, she is the 
'breadwinner' . . . [and] she doesn't want to move on 
because of the money." 
 
On February 26, 2007, the plaintiff retained an employment 
attorney in contemplation of filing a discrimination complaint 
against the firm.  At around that time, she filed an internal 
17 
 
complaint alleging that the step-back was the result of gender 
discrimination.  An internal body known as the Rapid Workforce 
Response Team, which included Biagetti, investigated this claim.  
The investigators concluded that no discriminatory conduct had 
taken place. 
In April, 2007, the plaintiff's annual performance 
evaluation was completed.  She received two evaluations, both 
strongly positive.  One evaluator wrote that the plaintiff's 
"great work alone should help to drive more employment business 
to the firm." 
At some point before May, 2007, while the plaintiff was 
working on an assignment for a client using the Desksite system, 
she came across an internal memorandum related to the Gallina 
case that discussed issues of gender discrimination at the firm.  
On approximately six occasions between May 8, 2007, and November 
14, 2008, on instructions from her attorney, the plaintiff 
conducted targeted searches seeking other documents that might 
be related to her case or to other issues of gender 
discrimination.  In the course of these searches, the plaintiff 
accessed and forwarded dozens of documents to her personal 
electronic mail address.17  She shared two of those documents 
with her attorney.18 
                                                 
 
17 The documents consisted of time records of various 
attorneys, whose workload and assignments, when compared with 
18 
 
In October, 2007, the plaintiff received three more 
evaluations, including one from Schroeder.19  All were strongly 
positive, with comments ranging from an observation that "[h]er 
interactions with [a specific client] have led to significantly 
more employment work for us," to comments from Schroeder that 
"[s]he has shown some very positive signs in her development 
over the past year and I truly look forward to working with 
her."  In a section for "areas for improvement," one evaluator 
wrote, "Nothing I can identify," a second wrote, "None that I am 
aware of," and Schroeder wrote, "I would like [the plaintiff] to 
get involved in bar association/trade association activities." 
                                                                                                                                                             
her own, she believed relevant to her claims; records from the 
study by Eastern Point; a portion of the firm's annual diversity 
report; documents from the Gallina case; a letter regarding 
another employee's claim against Cohen; a memorandum from the 
firm's "work allocation subcommittee"; a letter "showing that 
the firm was paying [a] public relations [firm] concerning [her] 
case"; a "talking points" memorandum regarding her case; other 
items concerning her case that had either been designated for 
public dissemination or already sent to her in final form; and a 
transcription of voicemail messages left for Popeo over the 
period from February, 2005, through December, 2005.  Though the 
plaintiff's electronic searches turned up additional apparently-
confidential documents, she did not forward these additional 
documents to herself or to her attorney, nor did she "review" 
them. 
 
 
18 The two documents the plaintiff shared with her attorney 
were the letter regarding the claim of another employee against 
Cohen and the transcription of Popeo's voicemail messages.  
Later, she "provided all the documents to her counsel only in 
response to a request for production of documents made by the 
firm in the course of discovery" in her subsequent civil suit. 
 
 
19 It is not clear from the record what occasioned these 
evaluations. 
19 
 
Also in October, 2007, the firm solicited "upward feedback" 
from associates, in which they would provide anonymous comments 
evaluating members with whom they had worked.  Cohen and 
Biagetti each received feedback stating that associates were 
concerned about their behavior towards women. 
On December 11, 2007, the plaintiff filed a complaint with 
the MCAD alleging that her step-back was as a result of gender 
discrimination.  She named the firm, Barmak, Gault, and 
Schroeder as respondents. 
In February, 2008, the plaintiff took a second maternity 
leave, returning to work on September 3, 2008. 
On November 13, 2008, the plaintiff conducted another 
search of the public section of Desksite seeking documents 
related to gender discrimination at the firm.  She found the 
transcript of voicemails left for Popeo over the period from 
February, 2005, through December, 2005, which she immediately 
copied and later forwarded in its entirety to her attorney.20  
The transcript had been prepared by Popeo's administrative 
assistant and, pursuant to his usual practice, saved to the 
public section of Desksite.  Among the messages was the one 
described above, in which firm member Kiser criticized the 
behavior of Gault during a meeting about gender discrimination.  
                                                 
 
20 The record does not reflect when the plaintiff forwarded 
the transcript to her attorney. 
20 
 
Many of the other messages were from Popeo's clients or 
potential clients and concerned sensitive matters protected by 
rules of attorney-client confidentiality and privilege. 
Also in November, 2008, in the wake of the national 
economic slowdown, the firm prepared to lay off employees.  The 
plaintiff, among other associates, was selected for layoff.  
According to the firm, this was because of her low rate of 
billable hours, adjusted for the time that she had been on 
maternity leave.  The plaintiff asserts that the low number of 
billable hours was the result of the "discriminatory and 
retaliatory conduct of" defendants who either did not assign 
work to her or discouraged others from doing so.  On 
November 20, 2008, counsel for the firm contacted the plaintiff 
and offered to settle her discrimination case if she would 
accept the layoff.  The plaintiff rejected this offer on 
November 21, 2008, and she was not then laid off.  On the same 
day that the plaintiff rejected this offer, she visited the 
office of another firm member and showed the member a portion of 
the voicemail transcript containing messages left for Popeo.  
The member contacted Popeo.  Thereafter, the firm's information 
technology department reviewed its records and learned that the 
plaintiff had conducted a number of searches of Desksite that 
appeared to be related to her litigation against the firm.  On 
November 25, 2008, after consulting with Allen and Starr, Popeo 
21 
 
directed that the plaintiff's employment be terminated for 
cause.  On December 5, 2008, Popeo filed a complaint with the 
Board of Bar Overseers (board), claiming that the plaintiff's 
searches of Desksite in order to advance her litigation against 
the firm was a violation of her ethical duties as an attorney.21 
On September 2, 2009, the plaintiff filed a second 
complaint with the MCAD, alleging that the firm, in terminating 
her employment, had discriminated against her on the basis of 
her gender and that it had retaliated against her for having 
filed her first MCAD complaint.  On November 3, 2009, the 
plaintiff brought the present action in the Superior Court, 
naming the firm, Gault, Barmak, and Schroeder as defendants.  In 
January, 2010, she filed an amended complaint naming Popeo and 
Cohen as defendants.  In February, 2010, the defendants filed an 
answer and counterclaims.  In November, 2011, the defendants 
moved to dismiss on the basis of the plaintiff's asserted 
misconduct, i.e., her acquisition of documents by searching 
Desksite.  That motion was denied in July, 2012. 
                                                 
 
21 On November 20, 2011, a hearing committee of the Board of 
Bar Overseers (board) issued a report concluding that the 
plaintiff had violated her ethical duties and recommending that 
her license to practice law be suspended for thirty days.  The 
board reviewed the hearing committee's conclusion and determined 
that the plaintiff had not violated any rule of professional 
conduct.  On August 6, 2012, a single justice of the county 
court adopted the board's recommendation. 
22 
 
In January, 2013, the parties filed cross motions for 
summary judgment.  The motion judge granted the defendants' 
motion and dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims.  Regarding 
the plaintiff's claim that the step-back was discriminatory, he 
concluded that she could not establish at trial that the firm's 
"reason for offering [her] a step-back rather than membership 
consideration . . . [was] pretextual; there is no evidence that 
it was designed to hide a discriminatory motive."  Similarly, 
the judge concluded that the plaintiff could not show that her 
termination was discriminatory because "there is no evidence 
that Mr. Popeo's decision to terminate [her] employment . . . 
was truly motivated by a desire to terminate her due to her 
gender or her pregnancies." 
With respect to the claim that the step-back was 
retaliatory, the judge concluded that 
"[t]here is no evidence that the step-back option was 
designed to retaliate against [the plaintiff] for her 
complaints over a year earlier with regard to Mr. Cohen.  
Similarly, given that [the firm's] and Mr. Popeo's stated 
reason for [the plaintiff's] termination was her 
inappropriate conduct during her employment, [she] cannot 
overcome her burden to demonstrating that the reason for 
her termination was a pretext, and that the real reason was 
to retaliate against her protected activity under G. L. 
c. 151B." 
 
23 
 
He also concluded that the claims against Gault, Schroeder, and 
Cohen were time barred because their allegedly discriminatory 
acts took place outside the relevant limitations periods.22 
2.  Discussion.  The plaintiff maintains that the judge 
erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment on 
her claims of gender discrimination under G. L. c. 151B, § 4; 
her claims of retaliation under G. L. c. 151B, § 4; and her 
common-law claim of tortious interference with contractual 
relations.23 
                                                 
 
22 In particular, with regard to the statutory claims 
against Gault and Schroeder, the judge concluded that the 
allegedly discriminatory acts took place more than 300 days 
before the plaintiff filed her first complaint with the 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.  See G. L. 
c. 151B, § 5.  With regard to the common-law claim against 
Cohen, the judge concluded that the relevant acts had taken 
place more than three years before the plaintiff filed her civil 
suit.  See G. L. c. 260, § 2A. 
 
 
23 As noted, the complaint also included an allegation of 
pregnancy discrimination.  We do not address this count 
separately because the evidence discussed infra regarding gender 
discrimination includes evidence of pregnancy discrimination, 
and because pregnancy discrimination is itself a form of gender 
discrimination.  See Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Massachusetts 
Comm'n Against Discrimination, 375 Mass. 160, 167 (1978).  
Moreover, the plaintiff presented claims for "aiding and 
abetting discrimination" (against all of the individual 
defendants except Cohen) and for "failure to investigate and 
remedy discrimination" (against the firm).  These claims are 
"entirely derivative of the discrimination claim[s]" (citation 
omitted).  See Lopez v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 696, 713 (2012).  
Therefore, to the extent that judgment should not have entered 
on the discrimination claims, it should not have entered on 
these derivative claims. 
24 
 
We review a motion for summary judgment de novo.  "In 
considering a motion for summary judgment, we review the 
evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.  The defendants, as the moving 
parties, have the burden of establishing that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that they are entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law."  Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank Nat'l 
Ass'n, 465 Mass. 775, 777 (2013). 
 
a.  Discrimination claims.  The plaintiff claims that both 
her demotion and her termination constituted discrimination on 
the basis of gender. 
 
General Laws c. 151B, § 4 (1), provides that "[i]t shall be 
an unlawful practice: [f]or an employer, by himself or his 
agent, because of the . . . sex . . . of any individual . . . to 
discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate 
against such individual . . . in terms, conditions or privileges 
of employment."  This provision applies by its terms only to an 
"employer."  G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1).  Nonetheless, individuals, 
whether supervisors, fellow employees, or third parties, also 
may be held liable by provisions that forbid "any person . . . 
to . . . interfere with another person in the exercise or 
enjoyment of any right granted or protected by this chapter," 
G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (4A), and that prohibit "any person, whether 
an employer or an employee or not, to aid [or] abet . . . the 
25 
 
doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter."  G. L. 
c. 151B, § 4 (5).  See Lopez v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 696, 706 
(2012). 
 
To survive summary judgment on claims brought under these 
provisions, an employee-plaintiff must produce evidence from 
which a reasonable jury may infer "four elements:  membership in 
a protected class, harm, discriminatory animus, and causation."  
Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 434 Mass. 493, 502 (2001) (Lipchitz).  
The "question here is whether the plaintiff provided evidence 
from which a reasonable jury could infer the presence of the 
latter two elements, i.e., that the defendants bore 
discriminatory animus and that the animus was the reason the 
defendants [took adverse action with respect to] the plaintiff's 
employment."  See Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672,  
680 (2016) (Bulwer). 
 
Because employees rarely can produce direct evidence of 
discriminatory animus and causation, see Sullivan v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 34, 38 (2005), they may survive a 
motion for summary judgment by producing "indirect or 
circumstantial evidence [of these elements] using the familiar 
three-stage, burden-shifting paradigm first set out in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–805 (1973) (McDonnell 
Douglas)."  Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra at 39-40.  
"In the first stage, the plaintiff" must produce evidence of "a 
26 
 
prima facie case of discrimination," which would allow a jury to 
infer that "(1) [s]he is a member of a class protected by G.  L. 
c. 151B; (2) [s]he performed [her] job at an acceptable level; 
[and] (3) [s]he was terminated" or otherwise subjected to an 
adverse employment action.  Blare v. Husky Injection Molding 
Sys. Boston, Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 441 (1995) (Blare).  In the 
second stage, the burden of production shifts to the employer to 
"articulat[e] a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 
hiring decision."  Id.  At the final stage, the burden of 
production shifts back to the employee to produce evidence that 
"the employer's articulated justification [for the adverse 
action] is not true but a pretext."24  Id. at 443. 
 
Because "Massachusetts is a pretext only jurisdiction," 
id., an employee may survive summary judgment by producing 
evidence "that the respondent's facially proper reasons given 
for its action against him [or her] were not the real reasons 
                                                 
 
24 The employee's burden at this third stage is not, as it 
has sometimes been described, "to demonstrate that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact whether the defendant's proffered 
reason . . . lack[s] reasonable support in evidence or is . . . 
wholly disbelievable" (quotation and citation omitted).  Bulwer 
v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 316, 347 (2014) 
(Sikora, J., dissenting), S.C., 473 Mass. 672 (2016).  This 
language comes originally from Wheelock College v. Massachusetts 
Comm'n Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 130, 138 (1976), and 
refers to the employer's burden at the second stage of the 
burden-shifting paradigm.  Id. (employer does not satisfy burden 
at second stage if it "gives an explanation for a hiring 
decision which has no reasonable support in the evidence or is 
wholly disbelieved"). 
27 
 
for that action," Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Comm'n 
Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 130, 139 (1976), even if that 
evidence does not show directly that the true reasons were, in 
fact, discriminatory.  See Bulwer, supra at 681-682; Lipchitz, 
supra at 500-501.  Such indirect evidence is sufficient at the 
summary judgment stage because, "[c]ombined with establishment 
of a prima facie case . . . a showing of pretext eliminates any 
legitimate explanation for the adverse hiring decision and 
warrants," but does not require, "a determination that the 
plaintiff was the victim of unlawful discrimination."  Blare, 
supra at 446.  Under this familiar three-part test, 
"[w]hile the plaintiff does bear 'the burden of producing 
evidence' that the employer's reasons are pretextual, . . . 
the burden of persuasion at summary judgment remains with 
the defendants, who, 'as the moving part[ies], "ha[ve] the 
burden of affirmatively demonstrating the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact on every relevant issue, 
even if [they] would not have the burden on an issue if the 
case were to go to trial"'" (citations omitted). 
 
Bulwer, supra at 683. 
 
i.  Genuine issues of material fact.  Here, the plaintiff 
has offered indirect evidence that the "step-back" and the 
termination of her employment were discriminatory, and we 
therefore use this three-stage burden-shifting paradigm to 
determine whether there is sufficient evidence of discriminatory 
intent for the plaintiff to survive a motion for summary 
judgment.  The defendants concede, with regard to the first 
28 
 
stage of this paradigm, that the plaintiff has made out a prima 
facie case of discrimination.25  With regard to the second stage, 
the defendants maintain that the plaintiff's "step-back" was 
based on her having received "mixed reviews, [on the fact that 
there were] partners who [would not] work with her, [on] low 
utilization, [and on a] high billing rate."  The defendants 
contend further that the subsequent decision to terminate the 
plaintiff's employment was based on the "good faith" belief that 
she had "violated [f]irm policies and [her own] ethical duties."  
This satisfies the defendants' burden to articulate 
nondiscriminatory reasons for their decisions.  We arrive, 
therefore, at the third stage, where we "consider whether the 
plaintiff has provided evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable 
jury to infer that 'the employer's articulated justification is 
not true but a pretext'" (citation omitted).  See Bulwer, supra 
at 683. 
 
(1) Evidence regarding step-back demotion.  We begin by 
considering evidence that relates to the plaintiff's step-back.  
There are at least four categories of evidence from which a 
reasonable jury might infer that the reasons offered by the 
defendants for the adverse employment decision were pretextual. 
                                                 
 
25 This concession is "for purposes of summary judgment 
only." 
29 
 
First, the plaintiff points to specific instances in which 
"similarly situated [male] employees were treated differently" 
from the way she was.  See Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, 
Inc., 426 Mass. 122, 129 (1997) (Matthews) (such evidence is 
"most probative means of establishing that the plaintiff's 
termination was a pretext").  For instance, defendant 
Schroeder's May, 2006, evaluations criticized the plaintiff for 
not being available for certain emergency assignments, and his 
March, 2006, electronic mail message noted that "[t]his is not a 
job where you can come and go as you please."  Yet, the 
plaintiff maintains in an affidavit there were "many occasions 
when [she] would be looking for Mr. Schroeder during business 
hours and would learn that he and [a particular junior male 
associate] were at the gym."  Similarly, when the plaintiff was 
nursing her first child, Schroeder evaluated her negatively for 
"leaving [the office] no later than 5[:]30," even as Schroeder 
"was sending [the aforementioned male associate] home" earlier 
than the plaintiff because he had "a wife and kid at home." 
Second, there is evidence that Cohen attempted to undermine 
the plaintiff after she complained about his behavior, which may 
allow an inference that the plaintiff's perceived performance 
deficiencies resulted in part from Cohen's animus rather than 
from innate inadequacy.  See generally Casarez v. Burlington 
N./Santa Fe Co., 193 F.3d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 1999), rehearing 
30 
 
denied, 201 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2000) (evidence of pretext where 
supervisor undermined employee's performance); 1 Larson, 
Employment Discrimination § 8.04 at 8-85 (2d ed. 2015) 
("employer's proffered justification for its action may also be 
shown to be pretextual if the respect in which the employee is 
allegedly deficient is of the employer's own making").  While 
Cohen initially complimented the plaintiff's work,26 this changed 
following her August, 2004, complaints, when she was told by 
various individuals that Cohen was "bad-mouthing" her.  In 
October, 2004, Cohen asked a client to submit a written 
complaint against the plaintiff, which he then forwarded to 
Gault, the ELB section manager, and Starr, the human resources 
director.  Cohen stated in his deposition that he had never 
previously solicited a written complaint against an associate.  
In January, 2005, Cohen gave the plaintiff a lengthy assignment 
that did not count toward her quota of billable hours, which the 
plaintiff maintained in her deposition was more extensive than 
                                                 
 
26 In his deposition, Cohen said that the plaintiff's work 
in July, 2004, involving the drafting of a brief for a client, 
was deficient, both in its quality and because she did not work 
over the Fourth of July weekend to address those deficiencies.  
Cohen states also that he "can't say that" he conveyed these 
criticisms to the plaintiff at the time.  Whether to accept 
Cohen's assertion that he believed the plaintiff's work to be 
deficient therefore requires a credibility assessment best left 
to the finder of fact. 
 
31 
 
parallel assignments given to other associates.27  In the wake of 
these incidents, a number of firm members, including Gault, told 
human resources staff during a meeting in February, 2005, that 
the plaintiff and Cohen could not work together and that Starr 
should seek to hire an attorney with qualifications similar to 
the plaintiff's. 
Third, "a reasonable jury could interpret a number of the 
[criticisms made by] the plaintiff's evaluators and supervisors 
as reflecting '[s]tereotypical thinking . . . categorizing 
people on the basis of broad generalizations.'"  Bulwer, supra 
at 686, quoting Lipchitz, supra at 503 n.16.  Such statements, 
"when considered with [other] evidence of disparate or unfair 
treatment, . . . may lend support to" the contention that the 
adverse employment action was made on an impermissible basis.  
Bulwer, supra at 686. 
In particular, Barmak, who replaced Gault as manager of the 
ELB section, described his "impression" that the plaintiff did 
not have a high "level of commitment to her professional 
development and interest in advancement and was more concerned 
about somehow . . . potentially pursuing a [discrimination] 
claim."28  When the plaintiff was pregnant for the first time, 
                                                 
 
27 Gault and Cohen dispute that the assignment was either 
punitive or disproportionate to that given to other associates. 
 
28 Schroeder also stated in his deposition that the 
plaintiff was one of those "people who are caregivers who aren't 
32 
 
Gault sent a colleague an electronic mail message questioning 
her commitment to her work, noting that she was "out a lot 
[which she] says [is] attributable to her medical condition 
tho[ugh] I just got an e-mail re[garding] her taking about 
[four] days off . . . which I assume is vacation."29  Schroeder 
wrote that he was "getting frustrated" because he "cannot give 
work to someone [like the plaintiff] when I don't know if they 
are going to here on any given day."  While "[t]hese kinds of 
comments can, of course, admit of different interpretations by a 
jury," see Bulwer, supra at 687, they could be understood to 
reflect a stereotypical view of women as not committed to their 
work because of family responsibilities.  See Massachusetts 
Elec. Co. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 375 
Mass. 160, 168 (1978) (noting "stereotype that women belong at 
home raising a family rather than at a job as permanent members 
of the work force"). 
Finally, there is evidence that women at the firm, and in 
the ELB section in particular, were subject to discriminatory 
treatment.  See Matthews, supra at 130 n.4 ("evidence which may 
                                                                                                                                                             
being discriminated against but who wish to obtain some leverage 
or benefit from their employers." 
 
 
29 Similarly, after Gault found out that the plaintiff was 
pregnant for the first time, he immediately suggested that she 
consider "alternate work arrangements," apparently assuming that 
she would not be able to continue full-time work while pregnant 
or a new mother. 
33 
 
be relevant to the plaintiff's showing of pretext may include 
the employer's general practice and policies concerning" other 
members of protected class). 
 
For example, the 2005 study by Eastern Point found that 
"[m]any female [attorneys] . . . believe it is more 
difficult for women than men at Mintz.  In particular, they 
indicated that they are not given the same assignments or 
opportunities for exposure that men receive, there are 
fewer women in management for them to look up to or receive 
support from, and male partners make assumptions about the 
ability and willingness of women to do certain work." 
 
The report also indicated that "[m]any female and of color 
respondents believe that white men in the firm have a support 
network amongst themselves and that it is more comfortable and 
familiar within the firm for them."  Similarly, in a voicemail 
message for defendant Popeo, firm member Kiser said that, "with 
respect to these kinds of employment [discrimination] 
complaints, . . [w]e . . . [cannot] stick our heads in the sand.  
We have done that for too long and that is what the problem is." 
 
Moreover, there is evidence that such disparate treatment 
was practiced by some of the same members who wrote the 
plaintiff's evaluations and investigated her discrimination 
complaints.  Cohen's 2007 "upward feedback" included comments 
that "[h]e has engaged in harassing and inappropriate behavior 
toward many women" and that "[h]e indicates a clear bias against 
women in the workplace."  Biagetti, the firm's managing member 
to whom the plaintiff initially brought her concerns, received 
34 
 
"feedback" that he "has different standards for men and women" 
and that he "judges women's work more harshly, and is less 
appreciative of women's work."30  Kiser described Gault as 
responding to gender discrimination complaints by being 
"extremely defensive" and taking "the posture that somehow [the] 
complaints were not legitimate."  Kiser also stated that Gault 
was not "capable" of "separating himself from his own personal 
involvement and possibly his own personal feelings on such 
matters." 
 
According to the Eastern Point survey, many employees 
believed that disparate treatment affected "negatively . . . the 
firm's ability to retain women."  Statistics in the record 
support these assertions.  When the plaintiff joined the firm, 
there were five female associates and four male associates in 
the Boston ELB section senior to her in terms of the year they 
had graduated from law school.  Of those, all of the men were 
promoted to member, while none of the women were.31  "[T]o the 
extent [these numbers] suggest that the highest ranks of [the] 
                                                 
 
30 Other feedback comments included that Biagetti "has been 
known to . . . punish associates for . . . standing up to him 
(especially women)" and that "when he asks a question and a male 
associate hesitates before answering, he perceives that pause as 
thoughtful," whereas "[w]hen a female associate does the same 
thing, he perceives the pause as weakness and uncertainty." 
 
31 The defendants counter that, in citing these numbers, the 
plaintiff "fails . . . to acknowledge individual decisions [by 
these women] to pursue other opportunities."  The defendants' 
interpretation might ultimately prevail, but the question is one 
for the finder of fact. 
35 
 
employer's organization are closed to members of a protected 
class, they may support an inference that the particular 
decision[s]" in question here were "tainted by an unlawful 
bias."  Lipchitz, supra at 508-509 ("evidence indicat[ing]" 
dearth of "women in the corporate ranks of the company" is 
"relevant, and may be properly introduced in a disparate 
treatment case"). 
 
(2) Evidence regarding termination.  We turn to the 
termination of the plaintiff's employment in November, 2008.  
Given that the termination decision was made by Popeo soon after 
he discovered that the plaintiff had copied confidential 
documents, Popeo's explanation -- that he fired the plaintiff 
for taking those documents -- is doubtless plausible. 
 
Nonetheless, there is evidence that Popeo's decision was in 
fact motivated by other considerations.  For example, it is 
clear that he was kept informed, throughout the plaintiff's 
employment, of the plaintiff's discrimination claims and her 
performance deficiencies.  He was told in the summer of 2004 of 
her discrimination complaints, apparently kept a file on her 
case in his office, and was involved in the decision to require 
her step-back.  Even the decision to terminate her employment 
was not made by Popeo individually, but in consultation with 
Starr, the human resources director, and Allen, the member in 
charge of personnel matters, who themselves consulted regularly 
36 
 
with ELB members regarding the plaintiff.  Finally, the 
plaintiff's employment was terminated only a few weeks after she 
was selected for layoff, five days after the firm had offered to 
settle her claims in exchange for her agreement to a lay-off, 
four days after the plaintiff had rejected that offer, and one 
day after Popeo had been informed of her decision in that 
regard.  All of this would allow -- although, of course, not 
require -- a jury to infer that the incident with the documents 
merely provided an excuse to fire an employee who had long been 
viewed negatively by her supervisors, but who would not leave 
the firm voluntarily and who could not otherwise be terminated 
because of her pending discrimination claims. 
 
ii.  Defendants' contentions.  The defendants contend that, 
the above evidence notwithstanding, they are nonetheless 
entitled to summary judgment for several reasons.  First, they 
note that the adverse employment decisions in question were made 
by individuals who were acting independently from the 
plaintiff's immediate supervisors and who were not accused of 
harboring the discriminatory views alleged to have been held by 
those supervisors.  In particular, they point out that the 
decision to "step-back" the plaintiff's seniority was made 
formally by Allen, the member who oversaw personnel matters, and 
Starr, the human resources director, neither of whom was accused 
of harboring discriminatory views.  Similarly, the termination 
37 
 
decision was made by the chairman of the firm, Popeo, who did 
not author any of the allegedly discriminatory evaluations or 
otherwise evaluate the plaintiff's work.  In this regard, the 
defendants note that a "third [party]'s independent decision to 
take adverse action breaks the causal connection between [any] 
retaliatory or discriminatory animus and the adverse action."  
See Mole v. University of Mass., 442 Mass. 582, 598 (2004). 
 
The defendants cannot be excluded from liability on this 
basis.  Because Allen and Starr did not supervise the 
plaintiff's work, they based their decision to require a "step-
back" on the opinions of the plaintiff's supervisors and 
evaluators.  Similarly, Popeo decided to terminate the 
plaintiff's employment only after consulting with Starr and 
Allen, and after having been kept apprised, during the preceding 
months and years, of the negative views of the plaintiff's 
supervisors.  "Where 'the decision makers relied on the 
recommendations of supervisors [whose motives have been 
impugned], the motives of the supervisors should be treated as 
the motives for the decision. . . .  An employer [may not] 
insulate its decision by interposing an intermediate level of 
persons in the hierarchy of decision, and asserting that the 
ultimate decision makers acted only on [the] recommendation'" of 
others.  Bulwer, supra at 688, quoting Trustees of Forbes 
Library v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 384 Mass. 559, 569-570 
38 
 
(1981).  See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 420 (2011) 
(rejecting view that "the employer [is] effectively shielded 
from discriminat[ion]" claims when it "isolates a personnel 
official from an employee's supervisors, vests the decision to 
take adverse employment actions in that official, and asks that 
official to review the employee's personnel file before taking 
the adverse action"). 
 
Second, the defendants contend that summary judgment was 
appropriate because the plaintiff's case rests on "conclusory 
allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported 
speculation."  See Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).  As presented in the defendants' 
brief, this contention, at bottom, is that, because the 
plaintiff proffers no direct evidence of discriminatory motive, 
her claims must fail.  By definition, however, where a 
discrimination claim is based on indirect evidence, "the process 
of arriving at an ultimate finding of unlawful discrimination 
will require an element of inference to tie the evidence of 
unlawful discrimination to the employment decision."  Johansen 
v. NCR Comten, Inc., 30 Mass. App. Ct. 294, 299 (1991).  Where, 
as here, the required inferences are reasonable, it "is not for 
a court to decide on the basis of [briefs and transcripts]" 
whether they are correct, "but is for the fact finder after 
weighing the circumstantial evidence and assessing the 
39 
 
credibility of the witnesses."  Lipchitz, supra at 499, quoting 
Blare, supra at 445. 
 
Finally, the defendants argue that the claims against Gault 
and Schroeder are time barred because the underlying acts took 
place more than 300 days before the plaintiff filed her first 
MCAD complaint.32  See G. L. c. 151B, § 5 (complaint must be 
"filed within 300 days after the alleged act of 
discrimination").  This contention, too, is unavailing.  An 
employer may "be exposed to . . . liability for harms stemming 
from discriminatory evaluations [even] some years after the 
evaluations were conducted, if the evaluations first cause 
tangible harm to the employee at that later point."  Thomas v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 50-51 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. 
                                                 
 
32 The defendants contend, further, that the claims against 
Gault and Schroeder must fail because both were involved in 
hiring the plaintiff, making it unlikely that they harbored any 
animus towards her on account of her gender.  While this 
inference may be plausible, for the court to draw it on summary 
judgment would be inconsistent with the requirement that we 
"draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 
the" plaintiff.  See Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 465 
Mass. 775, 777 (2013).  We note as well that the plaintiff was 
neither married nor a mother at the time she was hired.  See 
Tellepsen Pipeline Servs. Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 
320 F.3d 554, 569 (5th Cir. 2003) ("underlying assumption that 
discriminatory intent would be manifest at the time of hiring 
can be overcome where there is change in circumstances between 
the time of hiring and firing").  See also Martin, Immunity for 
Hire:  How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains Discrimination in 
the Contemporary Workplace, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1117, 1117 (2008) 
("same-actor inference" is "incongruen[t] with both cognitive 
psychological research and the social dynamics of the 
workplace"). 
40 
 
denied, 528 U.S. 1161 (2000).  Here, the plaintiff timely filed 
her first MCAD complaint within 300 of her step-back, which was 
the point "when [the negative] evaluation[s] [were first] 
applied to deny the plaintiff particular benefits or positions" 
(citation omitted), id. at 50, and therefore, the point when her 
"claim[s] accrue[d]" (citation omitted).  Id. 
b.  Retaliation.  The plaintiff also claims that both the 
step-back and the termination were retaliation for the 
"protected activity" of complaining of gender discrimination.33 
i.  In general.  A claim of retaliation is separate and 
distinct from a claim of discrimination.  Abramian v. President 
& Fellows of Harvard College, 432 Mass. 107, 121 (2000).  An 
employee bringing a retaliation claim is not complaining of 
discriminatory treatment as such, but rather of treatment that 
"punish[es]" her for complaining of or otherwise opposing such 
discriminatory treatment.  Ruffino v. State St. Bank & Trust 
                                                 
 
33 While the plaintiff refers to this claim as one for 
"retaliation," G. L. c. 151B "does not actually use the word 
'retaliation'" in describing forbidden employment practices.  
Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 459 Mass. 697, 706 (2011).  Rather, the 
statute forbids "any person [or] employer . . . to discharge, 
expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because he 
has opposed any practices forbidden under this chapter," G. L. 
c. 151B, § 4 (4), and also forbids "any person to coerce, 
intimidate, threaten, or interfere with another person in the 
exercise or enjoyment of any right granted or protected by this 
chapter."  G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (4A).  The word "retaliation" is 
merely "shorthand" that "[c]ourts commonly use . . . for the 
more detailed wordings of antidiscrimination statutes such as" 
G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (4A).  Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, supra at 706 
n.24. 
41 
 
Co., 908 F. Supp. 1019, 1040 (D. Mass. 1995).  For this reason, 
a "claim of retaliation may succeed even if the underlying claim 
of discrimination fails, provided that in asserting her 
discrimination claim, the claimant can 'prove that [she] 
reasonably and in good faith believed that the [employer] was 
engaged in wrongful discrimination'" (alterations original).  
Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 459 Mass. 697, 706-707 (2011) (Psy-Ed), 
quoting Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 
supra at 121. 
To survive summary judgment on a claim of retaliation, an 
employee must produce evidence from which a jury could infer 
four elements.  First, there must be evidence that the employee 
"reasonably and in good faith believed that the employer was 
engaged in wrongful discrimination."  Pardo v. General Hosp. 
Corp., 446 Mass. 1, 21 (2006).  Second, there must be evidence 
that the employee "acted reasonably in response to that belief," 
id., through reasonable acts meant "to protest or oppose . . . 
discrimination" (protected activity).  See Fantini v. Salem 
State College, 557 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2009).  Third, there 
must be evidence that the employer took adverse action against 
the employee.  See Pardo v. General Hosp. Corp., supra.  
Finally, there must be evidence that the adverse action was a 
response to the employee's protected activity (forbidden 
motive).  See id. 
42 
 
Employees claiming retaliation do not often possess direct 
evidence of the fourth element, a forbidden motive.  See, e.g., 
Psy-Ed, supra at 707.  Therefore, they may prove a forbidden 
motive with indirect evidence, which courts evaluate using a 
three-stage burden-shifting paradigm similar to the one 
discussed in McDonnell Douglas, supra.  See Psy-Ed, supra.  At 
the first stage, the employee has the burden of producing 
evidence "that [s]he engaged in protected conduct, that [s]he 
suffered some adverse action, and that 'a causal connection 
existed between the protected conduct and the adverse action'" 
(citation omitted).  Mole v. University of Mass., 442 Mass. 582, 
591-592 (2004) (Mole).  At the second stage, the "employer must 
then articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for" the 
adverse employment decision.  Esler v. Sylvia-Reardon, 473 Mass. 
775, 780 n.7 (2016).  At the third stage, the employee must 
produce evidence that the employer's "stated reason for [its 
adverse action] was a pretext for retaliating against her on 
account of her" protected activity.  Id.  The combination of a 
"prima facie case" of retaliation with "a showing of pretext" 
allows a jury to infer that there was no "legitimate explanation 
for the adverse [employment] decision" and that the employer's 
true motivation was retaliatory.  See Blare, supra at 446. 
 
ii.  Step-back.  We turn to the plaintiff's claim that her 
step-back was retaliatory.  It is undisputed that, for purposes 
43 
 
of summary judgment, the plaintiff has satisfied three of the 
four elements of a retaliation claim.  In particular, the 
parties agree that the plaintiff reasonably and in good faith 
believed that she suffered discrimination; that she engaged in 
protected activity by complaining internally of that alleged 
discrimination; and that, in the form of the step-back, she 
suffered an adverse employment action. 
 
The parties dispute, however, whether there is sufficient 
evidence of the fourth element -- a forbidden motive -- which 
requires proof that the plaintiff's protected actions were the 
reason the firm imposed the step-back.  The plaintiff's 
contention in this regard, relying as it does on indirect 
evidence, must be analyzed using the three-stage burden-shifting 
paradigm discussed above.  See Psy-Ed, supra.  The defendants 
argue that the plaintiff fails at both the first and third 
stages of this paradigm. 
 
As to the first stage, where the plaintiff must make out a 
prima facie case of retaliation, the defendants contend that the 
plaintiff has not presented evidence that "a causal connection 
existed between [her] protected conduct" -- i.e., her internal 
discrimination complaints -- and the step-back.  See Mole, supra 
at 592 (citation omitted).  They note that the step-back took 
place in February, 2007, approximately two and one-half years 
after the plaintiff engaged in the protected activity of 
44 
 
complaining about the behavior of Cohen and Gault.  See id. at 
595 (no causal connection where "time span between . . . 
protected activity and the later adverse actions is too long to 
support [the] desired inference of causation"). 
  
This contention fails because the plaintiff is not seeking 
to prove a "causal connection" through the temporal proximity of 
her protected acts to the adverse action she suffered.  Instead, 
noting that "[t]emporal proximity is but one method of proving 
retaliation," Chungchi Che v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 
342 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir. 2003), the plaintiff presents 
"[e]vidence of discriminatory or disparate treatment in the time 
period between the protected activity and the adverse employment 
action," which "can be sufficient to show a causal connection" 
between the two (citations omitted).  Mole, supra at 596, 
quoting Chungchi Che v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., supra.  
From such evidence, a jury may, though need not, infer that the 
"pattern of retaliatory conduct [began] soon after [the 
protected activity] and only culminate[d] later in actual" 
adverse action.  Mole, supra at 596, quoting Marx v. Schnuck 
Mkts., Inc., 76 F.3d 324, 329 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 
U.S. 1019 (1996). 
 
Here, the plaintiff first engaged in protected conduct in 
the summer of 2004, when she complained of gender discrimination 
to human resources officers and firm members.  See Abril-Rivera 
45 
 
v. Johnson, 806 F.3d 599, 608 (1st Cir. 2015) (it is protected 
activity to "complain about unlawfully discriminatory employment 
practices").  Following that protected conduct, and before the 
February, 2007, step-back, there is evidence, delineated supra, 
that the plaintiff was treated differently from similarly-
situated male colleagues, that her evaluators may have judged 
her through the lens of a stereotype, and that Cohen, her boss, 
tried to undermine her.  From this evidence, a jury could, but 
need not, infer that a "pattern of retaliatory conduct [began] 
soon after [the protected activity] and only culminate[d] later 
in actual" adverse action (citation omitted).  Mole, supra at 
596. 
Given that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of 
retaliation, we move to the second stage, where the defendants 
must provide a lawful explanation for their adverse action.  
Here, they have done so, explaining that the step-back was based 
on the plaintiff's having received "mixed reviews, [on the fact 
that there are] partners who won't work with her, [on] low 
utilization, [and on a] high billing rate." 
We therefore move to the third stage, where the plaintiff 
must present evidence that the defendants' lawful explanation is 
pretextual.  Although the defendants contend that the plaintiff 
can point to no such evidence, that is incorrect.  As described 
supra, the plaintiff has presented evidence from which a jury 
46 
 
might infer that a "pattern of retaliatory conduct [began] soon 
after" she complained of gender discrimination, "culminat[ing] 
later in" her step-back.  See Mole, supra at 596; Chungchi Che 
v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., supra at 39 (inference of 
pretext from evidence of disparate treatment in wake of 
protected activity).  From this, a jury may, but need not, infer 
that the plaintiff's perceived performance deficiencies were 
merely a cover, and that the step-back actually was motivated by 
her protected actions.  This suffices to defeat the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment as it concerns the step-back. 
iii.  Termination.  We turn now to the plaintiff's claim 
that her termination was retaliatory.  The plaintiff presents 
two arguments in support of this contention.  First, she 
maintains that she was fired on the basis of a forbidden motive, 
i.e., for having engaged in the protected activity of filing 
discrimination complaints with the firm, before the MCAD, and in 
the Superior Court.34  She argues that the defendants' proffered 
explanation -- that they fired her for accessing, copying, and 
forwarding confidential documents in pursuit of her 
                                                 
 
34 There is no dispute, for purposes of summary judgment, 
that the plaintiff has satisfied the other components of a 
retaliation claim.  In particular, the parties agree that the 
plaintiff reasonably and in good faith believed that she 
suffered discrimination; that she engaged in protected activity 
by complaining of that alleged discrimination by filing 
complaints internally, at the MCAD, and in the Superior Court; 
and that, in the form of the termination, she suffered an 
adverse employment action. 
47 
 
discrimination claim (self-help discovery) -- is not the actual 
reason for her termination, but rather a pretext.  Second, she 
contends that her acts of self-help discovery themselves 
constituted protected activity, such that, even if the 
defendants' proffered explanation were true, they would not be 
absolved of liability. 
(1) Pretext.  As mentioned, the plaintiff argues that she 
was fired for having engaged in the protected activity of filing 
discrimination complaints, and that the reason the defendants 
offered for her termination -- that she accessed, copied, and 
forwarded documents in violation of company policy and ethical 
rules -- was pretextual.  Because the plaintiff does not claim 
to possess direct evidence that the firm's proffered explanation 
was false, we analyze her claim, as we do all claims involving 
indirect evidence of forbidden motive, using the three-stage 
burden-shifting paradigm described supra.  The defendants 
contend that the plaintiff fails at both the first and third 
stages of the paradigm. 
At the first stage, where the plaintiff must make out a 
prima facie case of retaliation, the contested issue is whether 
the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence of a causal 
connection between the adverse action taken by Popeo 
(termination) and her protected activity (pursuing gender-
discrimination complaints internally, at the MCAD, and in a 
48 
 
court).  In this regard, the plaintiff notes that Popeo fired 
her on November 25, 2008, a few weeks after she had been 
selected for lay-off, five days after the firm had offered to 
settle her claims in exchange for her agreement to the lay-off, 
four days after she had rejected that offer, and one day after 
Popeo had been informed of her decision to reject the offer.  
The temporal proximity between the firm's lay-off decision, the 
plaintiff's decision not to settle her case, and the plaintiff's 
termination is one form of "circumstantial evidence that . . . 
can demonstrate" the required causal connection.  See Mesnick v. 
General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 828 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 504 U.S. 985 (1992). 
The plaintiff also points to more direct evidence of 
Popeo's motivation.  For instance, she notes Popeo's stated view 
that "you don't stay employed by a firm for the purpose of 
enhancing the value of your case as opposed to enhancing your 
career."  She further notes that Popeo consulted with Starr and 
Allen, who held views that the plaintiff might have been 
"falling back on claims of discrimination" and that she was 
"looking for issues to sue us on," about the termination 
decision.  While this evidence is capable of different 
interpretations, it would allow a jury to infer that Popeo fired 
the plaintiff not because of her unethical activity as such, but 
49 
 
because of his view that the plaintiff should not remain at the 
firm while continuing to pursue her discrimination claims. 
This evidence also allows an inference, as required at the 
third stage of the burden-shifting analysis, that the 
defendants' stated reason for firing the plaintiff -- her acts 
of self-help discovery -- was pretextual.  In particular, it 
would allow a jury to infer that Popeo fired the plaintiff 
because she pursued her discrimination claims while refusing to 
accept the firm's settlement offer, and that he cited her 
perceived ethical violations merely as a cover for that unlawful 
motive.  See Psy-Ed, supra at 711-712 (pretext proved by 
combination of temporal proximity and direct evidence).  Summary 
judgment on this claim was, therefore, inappropriate. 
(2) Self-help discovery.  As noted, the plaintiff contends 
that, even if the defendants' proffered reason for firing her -- 
that she engaged in self-help discovery in support of her 
discrimination claims -- ultimately is determined to be the real 
reason, it is nonetheless unlawful, because her acts of self-
help discovery constituted protected activity under G. L. 
c. 151B.  We need not address this contention, as it is relevant 
only to the plaintiff's claim that her termination was 
retaliatory, and we have determined that the defendants are not 
entitled to summary judgment on that issue.  That being said, 
because the issue may arise at trial, has been "fully 
50 
 
briefed . . . and concern[s] matters of important public policy 
that are likely to recur," Matter of the Receivership of Harvard 
Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 434 Mass. 51, 56 (2001), we address 
whether self-help discovery in this context may constitute 
protected activity.  We do not, however, make any determination 
regarding the plaintiff's actions in this case, a matter that is 
for the trial court judge to resolve as and when appropriate. 
The question whether an employee's acts of self-help 
discovery in aid of claims under G. L. c. 151B, § 4, may ever, 
under any circumstances, constitute protected activity is one of 
first impression for this court.  Taking into consideration the 
interests at stake and the views of other courts that have 
addressed the matter, we conclude that such conduct may in 
certain circumstances constitute protected activity under that 
statute, but only if the employee's actions are reasonable in 
the totality of the circumstances.  See Niswander v. Cincinnati 
Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 725 (6th Cir. 2008) ("oppositional 
activity must be reasonable in order to receive protection").  
As the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized, it is best to take 
"a flexible, totality of the circumstances approach that rests 
on consideration of a wide variety of factors, all of which must 
be balanced in order to achieve the essential goals embodied in" 
our antidiscrimination laws.  See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright 
Corp., 204 N.J. 239, 269 (2010) (Quinlan). 
51 
 
Taking this approach requires a determination, based on the 
facts of each case, whether the employee's actions were 
"reasonable under the circumstances" and, as a result, 
constituted protected conduct under G. L. c. 151B.35  See 
Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., supra.  In this way, we strike 
a careful "balance . . . between the employer's recognized, 
legitimate need to maintain an orderly workplace and to protect 
confidential business and client information, and the equally 
compelling need of employees to be properly safeguarded against 
retaliatory actions."  Id. at 722. 
In reaching this conclusion, we do not ignore 
"the concerns of employers that only a bright line rule 
that prohibits any employee from ever disclosing a document 
in pursuit of a discrimination claim and that equally 
prohibits any attorney from reviewing or considering such 
                                                 
 
35 Such a determination is a question of law.  See Leary v. 
Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2000) (discussing 
retaliation for constitutionally protected conduct); Carter-
Obayuwana v. Howard Univ., 764 A.2d 779, 790 (D.D.C. 2001) (same 
under antidiscrimination law).  Summary judgment on this issue 
is appropriate where the moving party establishes the absence of 
genuine issues of material fact pertinent to this legal 
determination.  See Ng Bros. Constr., Inc. v. Cranney, 436 Mass. 
638, 643-644 (2002).  At trial, "disputes as to . . . subsidiary 
facts are within the province of the jury; however, 
responsibility for the ultimate determination" regarding what 
constitutes protected activity "lies with the trial judge."  See 
Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1335 (7th Cir. 
1983) (discussing similar issue in context of patent law).  Cf. 
Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 204 N.J. 239, 250-251 (2010) 
(judge determined as matter of law that self-help discovery of 
document unreasonable, but lawyer's use of document on 
plaintiff's behalf reasonable; question of fact submitted to 
jury whether termination motivated by plaintiff's taking 
document or lawyer's using it). 
52 
 
documents provided by employees will fairly protect their 
interests." 
 
Quinlan, supra at 271-272.  But, while the employers' "right 
to . . . expect that they will have the loyalty of their 
employees" must be part of the calculus, so, too, must the 
"right [of employees] to be free of discrimination in their 
employment and . . . to speak out when they are subjected to 
treatment that they reasonably believe violates that right."  
Id. at 271.  "Balancing all of those considerations is a 
difficult and important task."36  Id. 
We emphasize two points in this regard.  First, the 
protections discussed here are limited, applying as they do only 
                                                 
 
36 To the extent that employers are concerned about 
disclosure of privileged or highly sensitive information, not to 
the plaintiff's attorney, but to the general public in the 
course of litigation, "the trial courts can and should apply an 
array of ad hoc measures from their equitable arsenal designed 
to permit the . . . plaintiff to attempt to make the necessary 
proof while protecting from disclosure" information that is 
sensitive or subject to legal privilege.  See General Dynamics 
Corp. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 4th 1164, 1191 (1994).  Such 
measures may include, without limitation, the "use of sealing 
and protective orders, limited admissibility of evidence, orders 
restricting the use of testimony in successive proceedings, and, 
where appropriate, in camera proceedings."  Id.  Other measures 
may be appropriate where the plaintiff discloses the documents 
to the general public before the start of litigation or in 
violation of a judge's orders.  See generally Sommer v. Maharaj, 
451 Mass. 615, 620-621 (2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1235 
(2009).  Because of the availability of such procedures, "[w]e 
are confident that by taking an aggressive managerial role, 
judges can minimize the dangers to the legitimate privilege 
interests the trial of such cases may present."  See General 
Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, supra. 
53 
 
to employees pursuing claims under G. L. c. 151B.  Second, even 
as to plaintiffs pursuing such claims, protection is afforded 
only to those acts determined to be reasonable under the 
circumstances.  This being so, employees pursuing discrimination 
claims who access, copy, or disseminate confidential material 
"even under the best of circumstances . . . run the significant 
risk that the conduct in which they engage will not be 
found . . . [ultimately] to fall within the protection[s]" of 
the statute.  See Quinlan, supra at 272. 
We are not persuaded that where, as here, the plaintiff is 
an attorney, such that some of the documents at issue may be 
subject to the rules of attorney-client confidentiality and 
privilege, the plaintiff's actions should thereby be stripped of 
the protections afforded other employees by G. L. c. 151B.  
While the status of a document under the confidentiality and 
privilege rules is, to be sure, an important factor to be 
considered in the over-all reasonableness analysis, it is not, 
by itself, dispositive.  Were this not so, an "attorney-litigant 
who is contemplating a wrongful termination action against her 
former employer [would not] be able to consult meaningfully with 
counsel" about the merits of her discrimination case without 
risking "dismissal" of the suit or "disciplinary action for 
improper disclosure of confidences."  See Chubb & Son v. 
Superior Court, 228 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1109 (2014) (attorney 
54 
 
may disclose client documents to her lawyer for purposes of 
wrongful termination suit).  "[T]he shield of confidentiality" 
should not be turned "into a sword" to defeat discrimination 
claims by employee-attorneys whose proof of discrimination may 
be found in such privileged and confidential sources.  See Fox 
Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 89 Cal. App. 4th 294, 
314 (2001). 
The totality of the circumstances analysis to be applied in 
determining whether self-help discovery measures were reasonable 
should begin with the question whether the materials obtained 
would have been discoverable under the process set forth in 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 26, as amended, 423 Mass. 1401 (1996).  It 
stands to reason that self-help discovery ordinarily should not 
be expected to yield more than what a litigant would otherwise 
be entitled to receive through formal discovery mechanisms.37  
Even as to discoverable material, the reasonableness of the 
self-help measures must then be evaluated in the totality of the 
circumstances.  Without limiting the considerations that 
                                                 
 
37 In instances where the employee's work involves 
privileged or otherwise highly sensitive information that is 
relevant to the employee's claims under G. L. c. 151B, the 
employer's assertion of privilege as to such information does 
not by itself render that information exempt from discovery.  
See, e.g., Chubb & Son v. Superior Court, 228 Cal. App. 4th 
1094, 1108 (2014) (in discrimination suit by attorney-employee, 
court may order discovery of documents prepared by firm on 
behalf of clients even if documents subject to attorney-client 
and work-product privileges).  See note 36, supra. 
55 
 
additionally may be relevant in individual cases, the seven 
nuanced factors in Quinlan should be taken into account in any 
such analysis. 
The first factor asks "how the employee came to have 
possession of, or access to, the document."  Quinlan, supra 
at 269.  This factor favors "the employee who [does not] find[] 
a document by rummaging through files or by snooping around in 
offices of supervisors or other employees."  Id. 
A second factor seeks to "balance [the] relevance" of the 
seized documents to the employee's legal action against the 
disruption caused by the seizure "to the employer's ordinary 
business."  Id. at 270.  In so doing, "the focus must be on 
whether the use or disclosure of the document unduly disrupted 
the employer's business, rather than on any effect it had on 
individual company representatives."  Id. 
A third factor looks to "the strength of the employee's 
expressed reason for copying the document rather than, for 
example, simply describing it or identifying its existence to 
counsel so that it might be requested in discovery."  Id.  
A fourth factor asks  
"what the employee did with the document.  If the employee 
looked at it, copied it and shared it with an attorney for 
the purpose of evaluating whether the employee had a viable 
cause of action or of assisting in the prosecution of a 
claim, the factor will favor the employee.  On the other 
hand, if the employee copied the document and disseminated 
it to other employees not privileged to see it in the 
56 
 
ordinary course of their duties or to others outside of the 
company, this factor will balance in the employer's favor." 
 
Id. at 269. 
A fifth factor takes into consideration "the nature and 
content of the particular document in order to weigh the 
strength of the employer's interest in keeping the document 
confidential," id., while the sixth looks to "whether there is a 
clearly identified company policy on privacy or confidentiality 
that the employee's disclosure has violated."  Id. at 270.  As 
the New Jersey Supreme Court noted, the "evaluation of this 
[latter] factor should take into account considerations about 
whether the employer has routinely enforced that policy."  Id. 
A seventh and final factor takes into account "the broad 
remedial purposes the Legislature has advanced through our laws 
against discrimination, including [G. L. c. 151B]."  Id. at 271.  
It also considers the decision's effect on "the balance of 
legitimate rights of both employers and employees."  Id.  This 
final factor is "a supplement" to the other factors, and plays a 
decisive role only in the "close case" in which it would be 
appropriate for these broader considerations to "tip the 
balance."  Id. at 270. 
The application of this test in particular cases may well 
result in determinations that certain acts of self-help 
discovery by the same employee are reasonable, while others are 
57 
 
not.  Indeed, where the nature of documents discovered by this 
means may run the gamut from the plainly relevant and not 
privileged to the not relevant and plainly privileged, that 
result would not be unexpected.38  Were this to be the case, the 
resolution of the claim of retaliation39 likely would entail a 
determination whether the employee's unreasonable and 
unprotected acts, "standing alone, would have induced [the 
employer] to make the same [adverse employment] decision."  See 
Haddad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 455 Mass. 91, 113 (2009), 
                                                 
 
38 By way of illustration, it is not inconceivable that 
arguments might be made in this case that such documents as the 
Eastern Point report and the attorney time records fall at one 
end of the spectrum, while the transcription of the Popeo 
voicemails, with the exception of the Kiser message, falls at 
the other. 
 
39 We leave for another day the question, not addressed by 
the parties, whether defendants may be held liable if they are 
found to have taken adverse action against an employee on the 
basis of her reasonable acts of self-help discovery, but are 
also found to have acted based on a good faith mistake of law 
that her actions were unreasonable and unprotected.  See Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Board of Governors of State 
Colleges & Univs., 957 F.2d 424, 428 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
506 U.S. 906 (1992); Bachelder v. American W. Airlines, Inc., 
259 F.3d 1112, 1130 (9th Cir. 2001); Forman v. Small, 271 F.3d 
285, 299 (D.D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 958 (2002); 
Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 165 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 
1259-1260 (2008), as modified on denial of rehearing (Aug. 28, 
2008).  But see Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 
728 (6th Cir. 2008) (regarding mistake of fact). 
 
58 
 
quoting Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 431 Mass. 655, 666 (2000).40 
c.  Tortious interference.  The motion judge allowed 
Cohen's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's tortious 
interference claim because it was filed more than three years 
after the relevant acts took place and was, therefore, time 
barred.  See G. L. c. 260, § 2A ("actions of tort . . . shall be 
commenced only within three years next after the cause of action 
accrues").  The plaintiff asserts that summary judgment should 
not have been granted because certain of Cohen's allegedly 
discriminatory acts fall within the three-year limitations 
period. 
The plaintiff's contention is unavailing.  The proper 
vehicle for her claims against Cohen would have been "the 
administrative procedure provided in" G. L. c. 151B.  See G. L. 
c. 151B, § 9.  The plaintiff failed to name Cohen in her MCAD 
complaints, and, according to her appellate brief, apparently 
did so for strategic reasons.  "Insofar as the plaintiff's 
common law claim[] [is] merely [a] recast version[] of" a claim 
                                                 
 
40 In Haddad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 455 Mass. 91, 113 
(2009), we applied the rule, originally established in Wynn & 
Wynn, P.C. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 431 
Mass. 655 (2000), that the employer "must show that its 
legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced it to make 
the same decision."  But see University of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. 
v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013); Haddad v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., supra at 113 n.27. 
59 
 
that could have been made "under [G. L.] c. 151B, [it is] barred 
by that statute's exclusivity provision."  Green v. Wyman-Gordon 
Co., 422 Mass. 551, 558 (1996).  See Charland v. Muzi Motors, 
Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 583 (1994) ("An antidiscrimination statute 
such as Chapter 151B reflects the legislature's balancing of 
competing interests.  Employees are protected against certain 
types of discharge.  Employers are protected from unnecessary 
litigation by a relatively short statute of limitations . . . 
and a mandatory conciliation process" [citation omitted]). 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment on the claim for tortious 
interference is affirmed.  The matter is remanded to the 
Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion with respect to the plaintiff's claims under G. L. 
c. 151B, § 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.