Title: IN RE: SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION OF LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 1176

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-1 
____________ 
 
 
IN RE:  SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION OF LEGISLATIVE 
APPORTIONMENT 1176. 
 
[March 9, 2012] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
With the goal of reforming this state‘s legislative apportionment process, in 
2010, the Florida voters approved an amendment to the Florida Constitution 
establishing stringent new standards for the once-in-a-decade apportionment of 
legislative districts.  These express new standards imposed by the voters clearly act 
as a restraint on the Legislature in drawing apportionment plans.  After the 
Legislature draws the apportionment plans, this Court is required by the Florida 
Constitution to review those plans to ensure their compliance with the constitution.  
In this review, we are obligated to interpret and apply these standards in a manner 
that gives full effect to the will of the voters.  In order to do so, our review 
necessarily becomes more extensive than in decades past. 
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we declare the plan apportioning 
 
 
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districts for the Florida House of Representatives to be constitutionally valid under 
the Florida Constitution.  We declare the plan apportioning the districts for the 
Florida Senate to be constitutionally invalid under the Florida Constitution.  The 
Legislature is now tasked by the Florida Constitution with adopting a new joint 
resolution of apportionment ―conforming to the judgment of the supreme court‖ as 
set forth in article III, section 16(d). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The once-in-a-decade process of redistricting follows the United States 
Census Bureau‘s release of new census data.  Article III, section 16, of the Florida 
Constitution expressly entrusts the Legislature with the obligation to redraw this 
state‘s legislative districts and expressly entrusts this Court with the mandatory 
obligation to review the Legislature‘s decennial apportionment plans.  The Florida 
House of Representatives and the Florida Senate must adopt a joint resolution 
apportioning the legislative districts in accordance with federal and state 
constitutional requirements.  Id.  After the Legislature adopts a joint resolution of 
apportionment, the Florida Constitution requires the Attorney General to petition 
this Court for a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of the Legislature‘s 
apportionment plans as enacted.  Art. III, § 16(c), Fla. Const.  Within thirty days of 
receiving the Attorney General‘s petition, and after permitting adversary interests 
to present their views, the Court has a mandatory obligation under the Florida 
 
 
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Constitution to render a declaratory judgment determining the validity of the 
Legislature‘s apportionment plans.  Id.  
Before 2010, this Court held that Florida‘s constitutional requirements 
guiding the Legislature during the apportionment process were ―not more stringent 
than the requirements under the United States Constitution.‖  In re 
Constitutionality of House Joint Resolution 1987 (In re Apportionment Law—
2002), 817 So. 2d 819, 824 (Fla. 2002).  Under this construction of the Florida 
Constitution, we reviewed legislative apportionment plans to determine whether 
those plans complied with (1) the general provisions of the United States 
Constitution, which set forth the one-person, one-vote standard under the Equal 
Protection Clause, and (2) the specific provisions of the state constitution, article 
III, section 16(a), requiring districts to be ―consecutively numbered‖ and to consist 
of ―contiguous, overlapping or identical territory.‖ 
On November 2, 2010, the voters approved Amendment 5 (Fair Districts 
Amendment) for inclusion in the Florida Constitution, greatly expanding the 
standards that govern legislative apportionment.1  When approving the Fair 
Districts Amendment for placement on the 2010 ballot, this Court explained that 
the ―overall goal‖ of the Amendment was twofold: ―[T]o require the Legislature to 
                                         
 
1.  Amendment 6 adopted identical standards for congressional redistricting.  
The Legislature‘s congressional redistricting plan is not currently before us. 
 
 
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redistrict in a manner that prohibits favoritism or discrimination, while respecting 
geographic considerations‖ and ―to require legislative districts to follow existing 
community lines so that districts are logically drawn, and bizarrely shaped districts 
. . . are avoided.‖  Advisory Op. to Atty. Gen. re Standards for Establishing 
Legislative Dist. Boundaries, 2 So. 3d 175, 181, 187-88 (Fla. 2009) (plurality 
opinion).  After its passage, the Fair Districts Amendment was codified as article 
III, section 21, of the Florida Constitution.   
With the advent of the Fair Districts Amendment, the Florida Constitution 
now imposes more stringent requirements as to apportionment than the United 
States Constitution and prior versions of the state constitution.  The new standards 
enumerated in article III, section 21, are set forth in two tiers, each of which 
contains three requirements.  The first tier, contained in section 21(a), lists the 
following requirements: (1) no apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with 
the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; (2) districts shall 
not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity 
of racial or language minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish 
their ability to elect representatives of their choice; and (3) districts shall consist of 
contiguous territory.  The second tier, located in section 21(b), lists three additional 
requirements, the compliance with which is subordinate to those listed in the first 
tier of section 21 and to federal law in the event of a conflict: (1) districts shall be 
 
 
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as nearly equal in population as is practicable; (2) districts shall be compact; and 
(3) where feasible, districts shall utilize existing political and geographical 
boundaries.  See art. III, § 21(b), Fla. Const.  The order in which the constitution 
lists the standards in tiers one and two is ―not [to] be read to establish any priority 
of one standard over the other within that [tier].‖  Art. III, § 21(c), Fla. Const.  
These express new standards imposed by the voters clearly act as a restraint 
on legislative discretion in drawing apportionment plans.  In this original 
declaratory judgment proceeding, we must define these new standards for the first 
time since the passage of the Fair Districts Amendment.  Although this Court‘s 
role is unquestionably circumscribed by the extremely short time frame set forth in 
article III, section 16(c), of the Florida Constitution, such a limitation cannot deter 
the Court from its extremely weighty responsibility entrusted to us by the citizens 
of this state through the Florida Constitution to interpret the constitutional 
standards and to apply those standards to the legislative apportionment plans.   
When interpreting constitutional provisions, this Court endeavors to 
ascertain the will of the people in passing the amendment.  We follow the approach 
that has been consistently undertaken when interpreting constitutional provisions: 
The fundamental object to be sought in construing a 
constitutional provision is to ascertain the intent of the framers and the 
provision must be construed or interpreted in such manner as to fulfill 
the intent of the people, never to defeat it.  Such a provision must 
never be construed in such manner as to make it possible for the will 
of the people to be frustrated or denied. 
 
 
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Pleus v. Crist, 14 So. 3d 941, 944-45 (Fla. 2009); Zingale v. Powell, 885 So. 2d 
277, 282 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 852 (Fla. 1960));   
 Caribbean Conservation Corp. v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm‘n, 838 
So. 2d 492, 501 (Fla. 2003). 
This Court‘s duty to measure the Legislature‘s apportionment plans with the 
yardstick of express constitutional provisions arises from the ―well settled‖ 
principle that ―the state Constitution is not a grant of power but a limitation upon 
power.‖  In re Apportionment Law Senate Joint Resolution No. 1305, 1972 
Regular Session (In Re Apportionment Law—1972), 263 So. 2d 797, 805 (Fla. 
1972).  With the recent addition of section 21 to article III of the Florida 
Constitution, the Legislature is governed by a different and more comprehensive 
constitutional measurement than before—the limitations on legislative authority in 
apportionment decisions have increased and the constitutional yardstick has more 
measurements. 
In addition to measuring the Legislature‘s compliance with these standards, 
we recognize the crucial role legislative apportionment plays with respect to the 
right of citizens to elect representatives.  Indeed, the right to elect 
representatives—and the process by which we do so—is the very bedrock of our 
democracy.  To ensure the protection of this right, the citizens of the state of 
Florida, through the Florida Constitution, employed the essential concept of checks 
 
 
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and balances, granting to the Legislature the ability to apportion the state in a 
manner prescribed by the citizens and entrusting this Court with the responsibility 
to review the apportionment plans to ensure they are constitutionally valid.  The 
obligations set forth in the Florida Constitution are directed not to the Legislature‘s 
right to draw districts, but to the people‘s right to elect representatives in a fair 
manner so that each person‘s vote counts equally and so that all citizens receive 
―fair and effective representation.‖  Once validated by the Court, the 
apportionment plans, which redraw each of the 40 Senate districts and each of the 
120 House districts, will have a significant impact on the election of this state‘s 
elected representatives for the next decade. 
On February 9, 2012, the Legislature passed Senate Joint Resolution 1176 
(Joint Resolution), apportioning this state into 120 House districts and 40 Senate 
districts.  The next day, the Attorney General fulfilled her constitutional obligation 
by filing a petition in this Court for a declaratory judgment to determine the 
validity of the legislative apportionment plans contained within the Joint 
Resolution.  Following the Attorney General‘s filing, this Court ―permit[ted] 
adversary interests to present their views‖ as required by article III, section 16(c).  
Under this Court‘s plenary authority to review legislative apportionment plans, we 
now have ―jurisdiction to resolve all issues by declaratory judgment arising under 
article III, section 16(c), Florida Constitution.‖  In re Apportionment Law 
 
 
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Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution 1 E, 1982 Special Apportionment Session (In 
re Apportionment Law—1982), 414 So. 2d 1040, 1045 (Fla. 1982). 
We have carefully considered the submissions of both those supporting and 
opposing the plans.2  We have held oral argument.  For the reasons more fully 
explained below, we conclude that the Senate plan is facially invalid under article 
III, section 21, and further conclude that the House plan is facially valid.  We agree 
with the position of the House that the House plan can be severed from the Senate 
plan.  In accordance with article III, section 16(c), of the Florida Constitution, the 
Court enters a declaratory judgment determining that the apportionment plan for 
the House of Representatives as contained in Senate Joint Resolution 1176 is 
constitutionally valid and determining that the apportionment plan for the Senate as 
contained in Senate Joint Resolution 1176 is constitutionally invalid. 
                                         
 
2.  The House and Senate submitted briefs in support of the Joint Resolution.  
Briefs in opposition to the Joint Resolution were submitted by the following 
entities: (1) the League of Women Voters of Florida, the National Council of La 
Raza, and Common Cause Florida (together ―the Coalition‖); (2) the Florida 
Democratic Party (FDP); and (3) the City of Lakeland.  The Attorney General filed 
a brief, which did not take a position on whether the plans should be approved, but 
instead argued for an extremely limited review and for allowing all fact-based 
challenges to be brought subsequently in a trial court.  The Florida State 
Conference of NAACP Branches, which did not take a position for or against the 
Joint Resolution, directed its comments solely to the interpretation of the Federal 
Voting Rights Act and Florida‘s constitutional minority voting protection 
provision.  Finally, the Florida State Association of Supervisors of Elections filed a 
comment to make the Court aware of the qualifying deadlines for the Florida 
Legislature and Congress under the Florida Statutes. 
 
 
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II.  HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF  
ARTICLE III OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION 
In order to provide context for our present task of determining the validity of 
the House and Senate apportionment plans, we first review the historical evolution 
of the constitutional provisions pertinent to the Legislature‘s decennial 
apportionment.   
Before 1968, there was no process by which challengers to the Legislature‘s 
apportionment plans could seek direct and immediate review of the apportionment 
plans by the Supreme Court of Florida.  Under the Florida Constitution of 1885, 
which was in effect until the adoption of the 1968 Constitution, litigation 
surrounding the validity of the Legislature‘s adopted apportionment plans 
proliferated.  Indeed, ―[f]rom the years 1955 through 1966, no fewer than seven 
apportionment plans were formulated by the state legislature, all of which were 
determined eventually to be invalid by the federal judiciary.‖  In re Apportionment 
Law—1982, 414 So. 2d at 1048 & n.4 (citing Swann v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316 
(S.D. Fla. 1962); Swann v. Adams, 214 F. Supp. 811 (S.D. Fla. 1963), rev‘d, 378 
U.S. 553 (1964); Swann v. Adams, 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Fla. 1965), rev‘d, 383 
U.S. 210 (1966); Swann v. Adams, 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Fla. 1965), rev‘d, 385 
U.S. 440 (1967); Swann v. Adams, 263 F. Supp. 225 (S.D. Fla. 1967)). 
In some cases, litigation over a particular plan literally spanned a period of 
several years, infusing the apportionment and the electoral process with 
 
 
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uncertainty.  The end product of the Legislature‘s attempt to avoid further 
apportionment litigation was the drafting of article III, section 16.  In 1968, the 
citizens of Florida approved article III, section 16, for inclusion in the Florida 
Constitution, which provided a mechanism whereby the Supreme Court of Florida 
was given mandatory and express jurisdiction to determine the validity of the 
Legislature‘s enacted apportionment plan under a strict thirty-day time limit.  See 
id. at 1048; see also art. III, § 16(c), Fla. Const.3   
The affirmative decision of the voters to place the apportionment 
responsibility squarely in the state judiciary rather than leave it to the federal 
judiciary was in line with the United States Supreme Court‘s recognition of that 
preference: 
The power of the judiciary of a State to require valid reapportionment 
or to formulate a valid redistricting plan has not only been recognized 
by this Court but appropriate action by the States in such cases has 
been specifically encouraged.  State of Maryland Committee for Fair 
Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 676 (1964); City of Scranton 
v. Drew, 379 U.S. 40 (1964), citing Butcher v. Bloom, 203 A.2d 556 
(1964); Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 724 (1964).  See also Kidd 
v. McCanless, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956), and discussion thereof in Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 235-236 (1962). 
Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409 (1965) (parallel citations omitted). 
                                         
 
3.  This constitutional provision is still in effect and has not been changed, 
other than a minor revision in subsections (b) and (f) to provide that if the Court is 
required to apportion the state, it must file ―an order making such apportionment‖ 
with the custodian of state records. 
 
 
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In addition, article III, section 16, required the Legislature to comply with 
federal and state constitutional standards:   
The legislature . . . shall apportion the state in accordance with the 
constitution of the state and of the United States into not less than 
thirty nor more than forty consecutively numbered senatorial districts 
of either contiguous, overlapping or identical territory, and into not 
less than eighty nor more than one hundred twenty consecutively 
numbered representative districts of either contiguous, overlapping or 
identical territory. 
Art. III, § 16(a), Fla. Const.  In every apportionment decision since the adoption of 
article III, section 16, this Court has reviewed the validity of the Legislature‘s joint 
resolution of apportionment consistent with the language of that provision, 
examining criteria such as population disparities between legislative districts 
(federal equal protection standard of one-person, one-vote), territorial boundaries 
(contiguity), and numbering issues (consecutiveness).4   
In 2002, this Court discussed the scope of the Legislature‘s duty in relation 
to the constitutional standards, explaining that ―the requirements under the Florida 
Constitution [were] not more stringent than the requirements under the United 
                                         
 
4.  See In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1972); In re 
Apportionment Law—1982, 414 So. 2d 1040; In re Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 
Special Apportionment Session 1992 (In re Apportionment Law—1992), 597 So. 
2d 276 (Fla. 1992); In re Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 2d at 832.  In In re 
Constitutionality of House Joint Resolution 25E, 863 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2003), this 
Court was required to determine the validity of a House Joint Resolution after the 
House redrew districts in response to the Department of Justice‘s objection that 
one of those districts was retrogressive within the meaning of Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act with respect to Hispanic voters. 
 
 
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States Constitution.‖  In re Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 2d at 824 (citing 
In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at 807-08).  Limited by a 
construction of Florida‘s constitution that was not more extensive than the United 
States Constitution, the Court declined to require the Legislature to adopt an 
apportionment plan using the following four objective standards proposed by 
Common Cause Florida and the Florida League of Women Voters:  
[A]ll districts should (1) have equal population as closely as possible; 
(2) be drawn to be compact and contiguous and respect local political 
boundaries; (3) not dilute the voting strength of any racial, ethnic, or 
minority group; and (4) be drawn neutrally without regard to the 
incumbent or political party. 
Id. at 832.  Other challengers, including the Attorney General, ―questioned the 
Legislature‘s decision not to articulate objective standards that guided its 
redistricting process.‖  Id. at 831.  The Court rejected all of these arguments, 
making the following observation: 
The only standards that the Legislature is constitutionally 
required to follow in redistricting are the equal protection standard of 
―one-person, one-vote,‖ the Florida Constitutional requirement that 
legislative districts be ―either contiguous, overlapping, or identical 
territory,‖ and the requirement not to discriminate against any racial 
or language minority or political group.  See [Davis v.] Bandemer, 
478 U.S. [109,] 118-27 (1986); In re Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 597 
So. 2d at 278-80.  While the other ―standards‖ advocated by the 
opponents have been traditional considerations in the redistricting 
process, they are not constitutionally required.  See Shaw v. Reno, 
509 U.S. [630,] 647 [(1993)]; Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. [735] 
752 n. 18 [(1973)].  Hence, we decline the Attorney General‘s and 
other parties‘ requests to return the plan to the Legislature to create 
standards.  As explained above, for those standards that can be fully 
 
 
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addressed in this opinion, we conclude that the Legislature has 
complied with the requirements set forth by the federal and state 
constitutions. 
Id. at 832. 
Under the state constitutional framework, while the Florida Constitution 
grants the Legislature the authority to apportion the legislative districts every ten 
years, the authority is circumscribed by the right of the people to instruct their 
representatives on the manner in which apportionment should be conducted.  As 
this Court stated in 1972: 
When the people of Florida adopted the Constitution of 1968 
they reserved to themselves the right to instruct their representatives 
and, at the same time, authorized the election of these representatives 
in senatorial and representative districts which may be ―either 
contiguous, overlapping or identical territory.‖   
In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at 807.   
In 2010, with the passage of the Fair Districts Amendment, the people of 
Florida increased the instructions to their representatives to provide additional 
constitutional imperatives for their elected representatives to follow when drawing 
the senatorial and representative districts.  Our conclusion in 2002 that the above 
criteria were not constitutionally required has been expressly overridden by a 
constitutional amendment approved by the voters of Florida on November 2, 2010.   
The ballot summary for the Fair Districts Amendment on which Florida 
citizens voted stated:  
 
 
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Legislative districts or districting plans may not be drawn to favor or 
disfavor an incumbent or political party.  Districts shall not be drawn 
to deny racial or language minorities the equal opportunity to 
participate in the political process and elect representatives of their 
choice.  Districts must be contiguous.  Unless otherwise required, 
districts must be compact, as equal in population as feasible, and 
where feasible must make use of existing city, county and 
geographical boundaries. 
Standards for Establishing Legislative Dist. Boundaries, 2 So. 3d at 179.  Proposed 
by initiative petitions that the organization FairDistrictsFlorida.org sponsored, this 
constitutional amendment is now codified in article III, section 21, of the Florida 
Constitution and imposes additional substantive standards with which the 
Legislature must comply in carrying out its constitutional duties in establishing 
legislative district boundaries.  See art. III, § 21, Fla. Const. 
As approved by Florida voters, article III, section 21, provides in full:   
In establishing legislative district boundaries: 
(a) No apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the 
intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; and 
districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or 
abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to 
participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect 
representatives of their choice; and districts shall consist of 
contiguous territory. 
 
(b) Unless compliance with the standards in this subsection 
conflicts with the standards in subsection (a) or with federal law, 
districts shall be as nearly equal in population as is practicable; 
districts shall be compact; and districts shall, where feasible, utilize 
existing political and geographical boundaries. 
 
(c) The order in which the standards within subsections (a) and 
(b) of this section are set forth shall not be read to establish any 
priority of one standard over the other within that subsection. 
 
 
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Art. III, § 21, Fla. Const. (footnotes omitted). 
In contrast to the standards that guided the Legislature during prior 
apportionment cycles, the standards governing the instant apportionment process 
are now more stringent than the requirements under the United States Constitution 
and prior versions of the Florida Constitution.  It is our task to interpret these new 
constitutional standards, together with the previous constitutional standards, 
against the apportionment plans contained within the Joint Resolution.  Through 
our interpretation of these provisions, we necessarily determine the validity of both 
the House and Senate legislative apportionment plans. 
In making these determinations, we first set forth the applicable standard of 
review.  We next discuss each of the separate constitutional requirements imposed 
by the Florida and United States Constitutions and how the requirements are to be 
analyzed both individually and collectively.  Then, in light of challenges raised by 
the opponents of the plans, we examine whether the Legislature‘s apportionment 
plans are facially consistent with these requirements. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW 
The overarching question to be considered by the Court in this declaratory 
judgment proceeding is the constitutional validity of the plans contained within the 
Legislature‘s joint resolution of apportionment.  See In re Apportionment Law—
 
 
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2002, 817 So. 2d at 824; In re Apportionment Law—1982, 414 So. 2d at 1052.  
The validity of the joint resolution is determined by examining whether the 
Legislature has operated within the constitutional limitations placed upon it when 
apportioning the state‘s legislative districts.  The newly added constitutional 
standards are directly related to ensuring that the process by which citizens choose 
their elected officials is fair. 
Like Florida, other states have recognized that legislative redistricting is 
fundamental to ensuring that citizens choose their elected officials in an equitable 
manner.  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stressed this very principle when it 
recently invalidated the Pennsylvania 2012 apportionment plan, stating that 
―[l]egislative redistricting ‗involves the basic rights of the citizens . . . in the 
election of their state lawmakers.‘ ‖  Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment 
Comm‘n, 7 MM 2012, 2012 WL 375298, at *1 (Pa. Feb. 3, 2012) (quoting Butcher 
v. Bloom, 203 A.2d 556, 559 (Pa. 1964)).  The Supreme Court of Colorado has 
similarly emphasized that ―[t]he basic purpose of the constitutional standards for 
reapportionment is to assure equal protection for the right to participate in the . . . 
political process and the right to vote.‖  In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. 
Assembly, 45 P.3d 1237, 1241 (Colo. 2002). 
The recognition of the critical importance of redistricting in ensuring the 
basic rights of citizens to vote for the representatives of their choice is highlighted 
 
 
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by a series of voting cases from the United States Supreme Court, most notably in 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964): 
[T]he right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and 
democratic society.  Especially since the right to exercise the 
franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other 
basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of 
citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. . . .  
 
. . . . 
. . .  To the extent that a citizen‘s right to vote is debased, he is 
that much less a citizen. 
Id. at 561-62, 567. 
 
In explaining the goal of legislative apportionment in terms of the rights of 
voters, the United States Supreme Court in Reynolds emphasized: 
Since the achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens 
is concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment, we conclude 
that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal 
participation by all voters in the election of state legislators.  Diluting 
the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic 
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as 
invidious discriminations based upon factors such as race . . . . 
Id. at 565-66. 
In describing the significance of its prior jurisprudence in Reynolds, the 
United States Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the right of voters to 
fair representation: 
 
Furthermore, in formulating the one person, one vote formula, 
the Court characterized the question posed by election districts of 
disparate size as an issue of fair representation.  In such cases, it is not 
that anyone is deprived of a vote or that any person‘s vote is not 
counted.  Rather, it is that one electoral district elects a single 
 
 
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representative and another district of the same size elects two or 
more—the elector‘s vote in the former district having less weight in 
the sense that he may vote for and his district be represented by only 
one legislator, while his neighbor in the adjoining district votes for 
and is represented by two or more. 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 123.  In Bandemer, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized that fairness in voting under the federal constitution extended to 
dilution of the right to vote based on districts that were drawn in a manner that 
favored a political party. 
With fairness in drawing the legislative districts as the focus, article III, 
section 21, imposes additional standards upon the Florida Legislature to follow in 
apportionment proceedings.  Article III, section 21, also provides Florida citizens 
with additional constitutional protections to ensure that their right to fair and 
effective representation is not impaired by the manner in which the legislative 
districts are drawn.  These constitutional constraints imposed on the Legislature in 
drawing legislative districts are designed to ―maximize electoral possibilities by 
leveling the playing field‖ for the increased protection of the rights of Florida‘s 
citizens to vote and elect candidates of their choice.  Brown v. Sec‘y of State, No. 
11-14554, 2012 WL 264610, at *12 (11th Cir. Jan. 31, 2012). 
Throughout these proceedings, the Attorney General, the Senate, and the 
House have asserted that the Legislature should have full discretion in balancing 
the constitutional criteria that apply to apportioning legislative districts.  However, 
 
 
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when addressing similar arguments that state legislatures should have full 
discretion in considering such matters, the United States Supreme Court in 
Reynolds eloquently stated: ―We are cautioned about the dangers of entering into 
political thickets and mathematical quagmires.  Our answer is this: a denial of 
constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our 
office require no less of us.‖  377 U.S. at 566. 
Although the advent of new constitutional requirements undoubtedly 
increases the Legislature‘s apportionment obligations, the House and Senate plans 
still come to this Court with an initial presumption of validity.  In re 
Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 2d at 824-25.  This presumption serves to 
recognize the deference initially owed to legislative acts upon passage.  Thus, what 
was true in 1972 regarding the respective roles of the Court and the Legislature in 
the apportionment process still holds true today: 
[W]e emphasize that legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter 
for legislative consideration and determination.  Judicial relief 
becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion 
according to federal and state constitutional requisites.  If these 
requisites are met, we must refrain, at this time, from injecting our 
personal views into the proposed reapportionment plan.  Even though 
we may disagree with the legislative policy in certain areas, the 
fundamental doctrine of separation of powers and the constitutional 
provisions relating to reapportionment require that we act with 
judicial restraint so as not to usurp the primary responsibility for 
reapportionment, which rests with the Legislature. 
In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at 799-800; see also In re 
 
 
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Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 2d at 824 (same). 
Even though we continue to recognize the presumption of validity that 
governs ordinary legislative acts, the operation of this Court‘s process in 
apportionment cases is far different than the Court‘s review of ordinary legislative 
acts, and it includes a commensurate difference in our obligations.  Challenges to 
the constitutionality of ordinary legislative acts passed by the Legislature must be 
brought in a trial court and then reviewed by a district court of appeal.  This Court 
has mandatory jurisdiction in those circumstances only if the legislative act is 
found to be unconstitutional.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  
In contrast, the Court‘s mandatory review to determine the validity of 
apportionment plans every ten years derives from a different provision of the 
constitution: article III, section 16(c).  The constitution specifies that the Attorney 
General ―shall‖ file a petition for a declaratory judgment and that this Court ―shall 
permit adversary interests to present their views.‖  Art. III, § 16(c), Fla. Const.  In 
this type of original proceeding, the Court evaluates the positions of the adversary 
interests, and with deference to the role of the Legislature in apportionment, the 
Court has a separate obligation to independently examine the joint resolution to 
determine its compliance with the requirements of the Florida Constitution.  
Because it is the obligation of this Court to enter a judgment declaring the joint 
resolution valid or invalid, the Court has routinely accepted that judicial relief 
 
 
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would be warranted where the Legislature has ―fail[ed] to reapportion according to 
federal and state constitutional requisites.‖  In re Apportionment Law—2002, 817 
So. 2d at 824 (quoting In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at 800). 
This Court in In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at 806, while 
cognizant that ―[t]he propriety and wisdom of legislation are exclusively matters 
for legislative determination,‖ also recognized that the Legislature‘s authority was 
not unbridled.  The Court observed that, although ―in accordance with the doctrine 
of separation of powers, [it would] not seek to substitute its judgment for that of 
another coordinate branch of the government,‖ pursuant to that same constitutional 
doctrine, the Court was also responsible for measuring legislative acts ―with the 
yardstick of the Constitution.‖  Id. 
Unlike 2002, when ―the requirements under the Florida Constitution [were] 
not more stringent than the requirements under the United States Constitution,‖ In 
re Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 2d at 824, now, the Florida Constitution 
imposes a higher standard on the Legislature when formulating the state‘s 
apportionment plans.  The citizens of Florida mandated additional constitutional 
imperatives for their elected representatives to follow when redrawing senatorial 
and representative districts. 
The new requirements dramatically alter the landscape with respect to 
redistricting by prohibiting practices that have been acceptable in the past, such as 
 
 
- 22 - 
crafting a plan or district with the intent to favor a political party or an incumbent.   
By virtue of these additional constitutional requirements, the parameters of the 
Legislature‘s responsibilities under the Florida Constitution, and therefore this 
Court‘s scope of review, have plainly increased, requiring a commensurately more 
expanded judicial analysis of legislative compliance. 
It is this Court‘s duty, given to it by the citizens of Florida, to enforce 
adherence to the constitutional requirements and to declare a redistricting plan that 
does not comply with those standards constitutionally invalid.  We reject the 
assertions of the Attorney General and the House that a challenger must prove 
facial invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt.  While there have been decisions of 
this Court reciting that principle with regard to legislative enactments, such as Crist 
v. Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc., 978 So. 2d 134, 139 
(Fla. 2008), cited by the House, that principle of statutory construction was stated 
only once in an apportionment decision and was made in the context of an attack 
on multi-member districts.  See In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at 
805-06.  Since 1972, we have never used that principle of statutory construction 
when enunciating the standard for our review of legislative apportionment, 
including our last comprehensive statement in 2002.  Therefore, to use the standard 
of beyond a reasonable doubt would be a departure from our precedent in 
 
 
- 23 - 
legislative apportionment jurisprudence.5 
We conclude that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is ill-suited for an 
original proceeding before this Court in which we are constitutionally obligated to 
enter a declaratory judgment on the validity of the legislative plans.  Unlike a 
legislative act promulgated separate and apart from an express constitutional 
mandate, the Legislature adopts a joint resolution of legislative apportionment 
solely pursuant to the ―instructions‖ of the citizens as expressed in specific 
requirements of the Florida Constitution governing this process. 
Because ―legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative 
consideration and determination,‖ In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at 
799-800, this Court will defer to the Legislature‘s decision to draw a district in a 
                                         
 
5.  There is a difference between the Court‘s role in reviewing a legislative 
apportionment plan to determine compliance with constitutionally mandated 
criteria and the Court‘s role in interpreting statutes; this Court has stated its 
responsibility in construing statutes differently.  For example, in Tyne v. Time 
Warner Entertainment, 901 So. 2d 802, 810 (Fla. 2006), in upholding a statute as 
constitutional, the Court stated that it had ―an obligation to give a statute a 
constitutional construction where such a construction is possible.‖  This Court has 
stated that it is 
committed to the fundamental principle that it has the duty if 
reasonably possible, and consistent with constitutional rights, to 
resolve doubts as to the validity of a statute in favor of its 
constitutional validity and to construe a statute, if reasonabl[y] 
possible, in such a manner as to support its constitutionality—to adopt 
a reasonable interpretation of a statute which removes it farthest from 
constitutional infirmity.   
Id. (quoting Corn v. State, 332 So. 2d 4, 8 (Fla. 1976)). 
 
 
- 24 - 
certain way, so long as that decision does not violate the constitutional 
requirements.  With an understanding that the Court‘s responsibility is limited to 
ensuring compliance with constitutional requirements, and endeavoring to be 
respectful to the critically important role of the Legislature, the Court has 
previously acknowledged that its duty ―is not to select the best plan, but rather to 
decide whether the one adopted by the legislature is valid.‖  In re Apportionment 
Law—1992, 597 So. 2d at 285. 
This principle is in keeping with the United States Supreme Court‘s decision 
in Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 941 (2012), which stated that ―redistricting 
ordinarily involves criteria and standards that have been weighed and evaluated by 
the elected branches in the exercise of their political judgment.‖  In Perez, when it 
became clear that a state‘s redistricting plan would not obtain preclearance under 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, a federal district court drew an interim 
redistricting plan without giving deference to the state‘s policy choices.  In 
reversing the federal court‘s drawing of the plan, the Supreme Court explained that 
a federal district court may not wholly disregard policy choices made by a state‘s 
legislature, where those policy choices are not inconsistent with the United States 
Constitution or the Voting Rights Act.  Id. at 943.  The Supreme Court held that a 
―state plan serves as a starting point‖ for a federal district court because ―[i]t 
provides important guidance that helps ensure that the district court appropriately 
 
 
- 25 - 
confines itself to drawing interim maps . . . without displacing legitimate state 
policy judgments with the court‘s own preferences.‖  Id. at 941.   
Perez is in conformity with the federal judiciary‘s strong preference to yield 
to states in making initial redistricting decisions as long as there is no violation of 
either the United States Constitution or the Voting Rights Act.  As was emphasized 
in Scott v. Germano over 45 years ago, the ―power of the judiciary of a State to 
require valid reapportionment or to formulate a valid redistricting plan has not only 
been recognized by [the United States Supreme] Court but appropriate action by 
the States in such cases has been specifically encouraged.‖  Germano, 381 U.S. at 
409. 
 Any attempt to use Perez in support of an argument that the state judiciary 
is constrained in performing its constitutionally mandated review takes the holding 
of Perez out of context.  In contrast to Perez, this Court‘s initial review of the 
Legislature‘s joint resolution of apportionment does not require any balancing of 
concerns for federal versus state sovereignty.  Nor is this Court engaged at this 
point in redrawing the plans.  Rather, this Court is required by the state constitution 
to evaluate whether the Legislature‘s apportionment plans conflict with Florida‘s 
express constitutional standards.  See art. III, § 16(c), Fla. Const.  The Supreme 
Court‘s concerns in Perez regarding judicial overreach by the federal court in 
redrawing the state‘s apportionment plan do not apply to this original state 
 
 
- 26 - 
proceeding, during which this Court is mandated to assess the Legislature‘s 
compliance with constitutional standards.  At this juncture, the Court plays no role 
in drawing the Legislature‘s apportionment plans, and the deference owed by the 
federal courts to the state in the drawing of the plan is not implicated. 
In our initial review of the Legislature‘s plan, we recognize the limitations of 
this Court‘s responsibilities.  At the same time, we acknowledge and accept our 
paramount responsibility in apportionment, as set forth by the Florida Constitution, 
to ensure that the adopted plans comply with the constitutionally required 
mandates.  ―In other words, it is this Court‘s duty to enforce adherence to the 
constitutional requirements and to declare a redistricting plan that does not comply 
with those standards unconstitutional.‖  In re Legislative Districting of State, 805 
A.2d 292, 316 (Md. 2002). 
Where the legislative decision runs afoul of constitutional mandates, this 
Court has a constitutional obligation to invalidate the apportionment plan.  To 
accept the Legislature‘s assurances that it followed the law without any type of 
inquiry or any type of meaningful review by this Court would render the Court‘s 
review of the new constitutional standards, and whether the Legislature complied 
with the new standards, essentially meaningless.  To accept the Legislature‘s and 
Attorney General‘s position that this Court should not undertake a meaningful 
review of compliance with the new constitutional standards in this proceeding, but 
 
 
- 27 - 
instead await challenges brought in trial courts over a period of time, would be an 
abdication of this Court‘s responsibility under the Florida Constitution.  This 
approach would also create uncertainty for the voters of this state, the elected 
representatives, and the candidates who are required to qualify for their seats.6 
The question then becomes how this Court will accomplish its review in a 
meaningful way given the nature of this constitutionally required proceeding.  
Undoubtedly, this Court is limited by time to be able to relinquish for extensive 
fact-finding as we have undertaken in other original proceedings,7 or to appoint a 
commissioner to receive testimony and refer the case back to the appellate court 
together with findings that are advisory in nature only.8  A review of prior 
reapportionment decisions from 1972, 1982, and 1992 reveals that in the past, the 
Court has retained exclusive state jurisdiction to allow challenges to be later 
brought, and then, on one occasion, the Court appointed a commissioner to conduct 
fact-finding on a specific challenge pursuant to our apportionment original 
                                         
 
6.  According to the comment filed on behalf of the Florida State 
Association of Supervisors of Election, the qualifying date for all federal, state, 
county, and district candidates is between June 4 and June 8, 2012, pursuant to 
section 99.061, Florida Statutes. 
 
7.  See, e.g., Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 329 (Fla. 2007) 
(relinquishing in an all writs original proceeding to the trial court for that court to 
make factual findings on lethal injection and to then file those findings with this 
Court so this Court could make the ultimate determination). 
 
8.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Clark v. Klingensmith, 170 So. 616, 618 (Fla. 
1936). 
 
 
- 28 - 
jurisdiction.9 
In light of two distinct developments, our past approach is not determinative 
of our review in this post-2010 case.  The first development, as mentioned above, 
is that in 2010, the voters imposed upon the Legislature explicit, additional state 
constitutional standards.  In contrast to 2002, where the challenges exceeded our 
limited scope of review because they were based on violations of federal law, the 
challenges in 2012 are based specifically on allegations that the plans facially 
violate the requirements of the new provisions of our state constitution. 
The second development is that technology has continued to advance in the 
last decade, allowing this Court to objectively evaluate many of Florida‘s 
constitutionally mandated criteria without the necessity of traditional fact-finding, 
such as making credibility determinations of witnesses.  In furtherance of the goal 
to conduct an objective evaluation of the plans, the Court required all plans, 
including alternative plans, to be submitted electronically in .doj format, allowing 
for every party and the Court to evaluate the plans using the same statistical 
analysis and data reports.  To ensure that the Court would have the means to 
objectively evaluate the plans, the Court specified in its order the manner in which 
the House and Senate plans should be submitted to the Court in .doj format: 
For each plan file submitted for the newly created 
                                         
 
9.  See Milton v. Smathers, 351 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1977). 
 
 
- 29 - 
apportionment plans, the Attorney General is directed to specify the 
software used to create the plan, the data and criteria used in drafting 
the plan, the source of the data used in drafting the plan, and any other 
relevant information.  The Attorney General is also directed to file 
along with the plan statistical reports for both the new plans and the 
last legally enforceable plans in searchable Portable Document Format 
(PDF), which include at a minimum the following from the 2010 
Census: the population numbers in each district, the total voting age 
population (VAP) in each district, and the VAP of each racial and 
ethnic group in each district.  Reports with additional information and 
statistics (e.g., compactness measurements), and reports for prior 
apportionment plans, may also be submitted in searchable PDF 
format.  
The Attorney General is also directed to provide the Court with 
maps of the House and Senate apportionment plans depicting the new 
districts, which shall include maps depicting the entire state as well as 
regional maps.  In addition to the maps depicting the districts, the 
Attorney General may also file maps depicting the apportionment 
plans with data overlays.  For each such map, the Attorney General is 
directed to specify the data depicted in the data overlay and the source 
of that data.  The Attorney General may also file maps other than 
maps depicting the new apportionment plans, including maps of prior 
apportionment plans with or without any data overlays. 
In re Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment, No. SC12-1 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 
order filed Jan. 25, 2012).  As for parties, the Court permitted the filing of 
alternative plans and ordered the parties to comply with the following 
requirements: 
Parties submitting alternative plans must submit the alternative plans 
electronically in .doj format . . . .  
For each plan file submitted, the submitting party must specify 
the software used to create the plan, the data and criteria used in 
drafting each plan, the source of the data used in drafting the plan, and 
any other relevant information.  The submitting party shall also 
specify whether the alternative plan is a partial or complete plan, and 
the population deviation for each district in the plan; if a partial plan is 
 
 
- 30 - 
submitted, the submitting party must specify what county or counties 
are included in the partial plan.  Parties may also submit statistical 
reports related to each submitted plan in searchable PDF format.  
For each submitted alternative plan, the submitting party must 
file map(s) depicting the alternative plan districts with this Court.  At 
least one map shall be filed that reflects the entire alternative plan.  
The submitting party may file additional maps showing regions or 
areas of interest.  In addition to maps depicting the districts of the 
alternative plan, the submitting party may also file maps depicting the 
apportionment plans with data overlays, including maps of the prior 
plans.  Each such map shall specify the data depicted in the data 
overlay and the source of that data.  For each map filed with the 
Court, the submitting party shall file the map in electronic PDF format 
and provide the Court with fifteen (15) color paper copies. 
Id.  The only opponent in this case to submit an alternative plan was the Coalition, 
which submitted two alternative plans to this Court: an alternative Senate plan and 
an alternative House plan.10 
The Court permitted alternative plans because alternative plans may be 
offered as relevant proof that the Legislature‘s apportionment plans consist of 
district configurations that are not explained other than by the Legislature 
considering impermissible factors, such as intentionally favoring a political party 
or an incumbent.11  The Legislature is not obligated to accept alternative plans; this 
                                         
 
10.  After the deadline for the submission of briefs and alternative plans had 
passed, the Coalition sought to file a supplemental appendix, including a revised 
alternative House plan.  The Court denied that request, and the supplemental 
appendix was stricken.  See In re Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment, 
No. SC12-1 (Fla. Sup. Ct. order filed Feb. 22, 2012). 
 
11.  In 1982, this Court concluded that because the proceeding was limited 
to reviewing the facial constitutional validity of the joint resolution, ―the 
 
 
- 31 - 
Court, however, may review them to evaluate whether the Legislature‘s adopted 
plans are contrary to law.  See, e.g., Holt, 2012 WL 375298, at *36 (explaining that 
alternative plans may be used as proof that the final plan ―contained subdivision 
splits that were not absolutely necessary‖). 
In furtherance of our goal to ensure that the Court had complete information, 
at the Court‘s direction, the Attorney General filed an appendix to the petition for 
declaratory judgment and filed the apportionment plans electronically in .doj 
format, which would allow this Court and the challengers to perform an objective 
statistical analysis of the plans submitted by using standard redistricting software.  
The House and Senate each developed and utilized its own web-based redistricting 
software, MyDistrictBuilder and District Builder, respectively.  This Court had 
access to both MyDistrictBuilder and District Builder as well as the data in the 
House program, which included census data, American Community Survey data, 
and voter registration and elections data.  We have also received the incumbent 
                                                                                                                                   
suggestion that we should adopt an alternative plan [was] not permissible in these 
proceedings.‖  In re Apportionment Law—1982, 414 So. 2d at 1052.  We did not 
conclude that alternative plans were impermissible for the purposes of 
constitutional comparison.  With the advent of the new amendment codified in 
article III, section 21, of the Florida Constitution, portions of which bear a striking 
resemblance to the Federal Voting Rights Act, we deem it necessary, as we did in 
1992, to review alternative apportionment plans to assess effect and intent.  See In 
re Apportionment Law—1992, 597 So. 2d at 282 n.7 (permitting all interested 
parties to file alternative apportionment plans in support of their arguments with 
respect to whether or not the Joint Resolution impermissibly discriminated against 
a minority group). 
 
 
- 32 - 
addresses upon which the challengers based their claims that districts were drawn 
to favor incumbents.12 
The type of information available for this original review is objective data.13  
In performing its objective analysis of the data, the Court did not rely on the 
figures or statistical analysis contained in the appendices filed by the FDP or the 
Coalition.  Instead, the Court utilized the MyDistrictBuilder and District Builder 
software applications to evaluate the Legislature‘s apportionment plans and the 
Coalition‘s alternative plans.  The Court utilized both software applications to 
evaluate voting-age population14 and to conduct a visual inspection of the districts.  
All of the maps depicting districts contained in this opinion were obtained using 
District Builder, except for a map depicting the City of Lakeland.  This Court 
utilized MyDistrictBuilder when analyzing undisputed voter registration and 
                                         
 
12.  We ordered the production of the incumbents‘ addresses upon which the 
opponents rely in their arguments.  See In re Joint Resolution of Legislative 
Apportionment, No. SC12-1, Order on Incumbents‘ Addresses (Fla. Sup. Ct. order 
filed Feb. 21, 2012).  The Attorney General, Florida Senate, and Florida House of 
Representatives were given the opportunity to advise the Court regarding whether 
any of the addresses were inaccurate and, if so, to provide the correct address. 
 
13.  In that regard, although the Court did not strike the affidavit of the 
Florida Democratic Party‘s expert, as requested by the House and Senate, the 
Court did not rely on that affidavit, instead conducting its own independent 
analysis using objective data. 
 
14.  The voting-age population numbers contained in MyDistrictBuilder 
were consistent with those contained in District Builder.  With respect to the 
Legislature‘s apportionment plans, these voting-age population numbers were also 
consistent with the Attorney General‘s appendix. 
 
 
- 33 - 
election data because MyDistrictBuilder contained that data, but District Builder 
did not.15  Specifically, this Court utilized the registration and election data to 
conduct an analysis of minority voting behavior in evaluating challenges to 
individual districts.  Further, this Court utilized this data to examine the overall 
political composition of the House and Senate plans, as well as the political 
composition of each challenged district. 
The Court additionally acquired Maptitude for Redistricting and inputted 
into Maptitude the voter registration, political, and elections data utilized by 
MyDistrictBuilder.  The Court also inputted the incumbent addresses into 
                                         
 
15.  The House recognized that this data was required in order to evaluate 
compliance with Florida‘s minority voting protection provision as well as the 
Federal Voting Rights Act, and it included the data in MyDistrictBuilder.  See 
Open Data and Code for MyDistrictBuilder, 
http://mydistrictbuilder.wordpress.com/opendata (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) 
(―Elections data is required to comply with: Sections 2 and 5 of the federal Voting 
Rights Act; and Florida‘s Constitution, Article III, Sections 20(a) and 21(a), which 
both read, ‗districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or 
abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in 
the political process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their 
choice‘ ‖).  The Senate chose to omit this data from District Builder.  The District 
Builder Help Manual states: ―Recent changes to the Florida Constitution require 
that districts not be ‗drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or 
an incumbent.‘ . . .  With this new language, the mere presence of political metrics 
in the interface for building districts could create a perception, unsubstantiated and 
inaccurate though it may be, that partisan factors influenced how districts were 
drawn.  The Senate, in an abundance of caution, therefore departed from traditional 
practice and chose to omit voter registration counts and election results from 
District Builder‘s dashboard.‖  District Builder Help Manual, 
https://db10.flsenate.gov/db1/help (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). 
 
 
- 34 - 
Maptitude.  The Court utilized Maptitude to conduct additional evaluation of the 
plans, such as the location of incumbents‘ addresses and calculations of the 
percentage of prior population retained by a district.  This Court also examined 
graphical data overlays of voting-age population using Maptitude in evaluating 
certain challenged districts.  Finally, the Court used ESRI Redistricting, also 
acquired by the Court, to generate compactness scores using compactness 
measurements of Reock and Area/Convex Hull, compactness measures that were 
used by the House in its plan data reports. 
The controversy between the parties, set forth primarily by the House and 
Senate, is that no conclusion as to intent to favor a political party or incumbent can 
be made.  The challengers contend that this Court is able to perform its review 
based on an assessment of statistical analysis, a visual examination of the plans, 
and an evaluation of legislative history.  The challengers contend that this evidence 
will enable the Court to discern intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an 
incumbent because intent can be inferred from effect.  We will discuss these 
arguments in more detail when we analyze the specific standards and apply them to 
the House and Senate plans.  
Finally, we have the guidance of the many state courts that have similar 
provisions providing their respective state supreme courts with original 
 
 
- 35 - 
jurisdiction.16  Those courts have, over the years, both validated and invalidated 
plans based on many of the same criteria now contained in Florida‘s constitution.17  
As in those states, the Florida Constitution ―expressly entrusts to this Court the 
responsibility, upon proper petition, to review the constitutionality of districting 
                                         
 
16.  See Ark. Const. art. VIII, § 5; Cal. Const. art. XXI, § 3(b); Colo. Const. 
art. V, § 48(e); Conn. Const. art. III, § 6(d); Haw. Const. art. IV, § 10; Idaho Const. 
art. III, § 2(5); Ill. Const. art. IV, § 3(b); Iowa Const. art. III, § 36; Kan. Const. art. 
X, § 1(b); Mass. Const. amend. art. CI, § 3; Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3; Md. 
Const. art. III, § 5; Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 3.71, 4.262; N.J. Const. art. II, § 2, ¶ 7; 
Ohio Const. art. XI, § 13; Or. Const. art. IV § 6(3)(b); Pa. Const. art. II § 17(d); Vt. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 1909(a), (f); Wash. Rev. Code § 44.05.130. 
 
17.  Compare In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, No. 
11SA282, 2011 WL 5830123 (Colo. Nov. 15, 2011) (invalid); Twin Falls Cnty. v. 
Idaho Comm‘n on Redistricting, No. 39373, 2012 WL 130416 (Idaho Jan. 18, 
2012) (invalid); Schrage v. State Bd. of Elections, 430 N.E.2d 483 (Ill. 1981) 
(invalid); In re Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 
1972) (invalid); In re Legislative Districting of the State, 805 A.2d 292 (Md. 2002) 
(invalid); Hartung v. Bradbury, 33 P.3d 972 (Or. 2001) (invalid); Holt v. 2011 
Legislative Reapportionment Comm‘n, No. 7 MM 2012, 2012 WL 375298 (Pa. 
Feb. 3, 2012) (invalid); In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor and 
W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 323 (Vt. 1993) (invalid), with Harvey v. Clinton, 826 
S.W.2d 236 (Ark. 1992) (valid); Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992) (valid); In 
re Reapportionment of the Colo. Gen. Assembly, 46 P.3d 1083 (Colo. 2002) 
(valid); Fonfara v. Reapportionment Comm‘n, 610 A.2d 153 (Conn. 1992) (valid); 
Kawamoto v. Okata, 868 P.2d 1183 (Haw. 1994) (valid); Bonneville Cnty. v. 
Ysursa, 129 P.3d 1213 (Idaho 2005) (valid); Beaubien v. Ryan, 762 N.E.2d 501 
(Ill. 2001) (valid); In re Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 196 N.W.2d 209 
(Iowa 1972) (valid); In re Stovall, 45 P.3d 855 (Kan. 2002) (valid); In re 2003 
Legislative Apportionment of House of Representatives, 827 A.2d 810 (Me. 2003) 
(valid); Legislative Redistricting Cases, 629 A.2d 646 (Md. 1993) (valid); McClure 
v. Sec‘y of the Commonwealth, 766 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 2002) (valid); Leroux v. 
Sec‘y of State, 640 N.W.2d 849 (Mich. 2002) (valid); In re Reapportionment of 
Towns of Woodbury & Worcester, 861 A.2d 1117 (Vt. 2004) (valid). 
 
 
- 36 - 
plans prepared and enacted by the political branches of government and the duty to 
provide appropriate relief when the plans are determined to violate the United 
States and [Florida] Constitutions.‖  In re Legislative Districting of State, 805 A.2d 
292, 316 (Md. 2002).   
With our important responsibility to ensure that the joint resolution of 
apportionment comports with both the United States and Florida Constitutions, and 
with full awareness of the inherent limitations in the process set out in the state 
constitution, we undertake our constitutionally mandated review of the facial 
validity of the Senate and House plans contained within Senate Joint Resolution 
1176. 
B.  THE STANDARDS GOVERNING OUR ANALYSIS 
Although this is the fifth time the Court has had the responsibility to 
undertake its constitutionally mandated review of legislative apportionment, it is 
the first time that the Court has been charged with defining and applying the 
criteria of article III, section 21.  This Court‘s interpretation of the language 
contained in sections 16(a) and 21 of article III begins with the basic principles 
spelled out by this Court in its 1972 apportionment decision: 
Every word of the Florida Constitution should be given its intended 
meaning and effect.  In construing constitutions, that construction is 
favored which gives effect to every clause and every part of it.  A 
construction which would leave without effect any part of the 
language used should be rejected if an interpretation can be found 
which gives it effect. 
 
 
- 37 - 
 In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at 807.   
In accord with those tenets of constitutional construction, this Court 
―endeavors to construe a constitutional provision consistent with the intent of the 
framers and the voters.‖  Zingale, 885 So. 2d at 282 (quoting Caribbean 
Conservation Corp., 838 So. 2d at 501).  In ascertaining the intent of the voters, the 
Court may examine ―the purpose of the provision, the evil sought to be remedied, 
and the circumstances leading to its inclusion in our constitutional document,‖ In 
re Apportionment Law—1982, 414 So. 2d at 1048, with the view that a 
constitutional amendment must be assessed ―in light of the historical development 
of the decisional law extant at the time of its adoption.‖  Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 
2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. 1980). 
 
Guided by both this Court‘s precedent and a proper construction of the 
pertinent provisions contained within article III, we must determine whether the 
Legislature‘s joint resolution is facially consistent with the specific constitutionally 
mandated criteria under the federal and state constitutions.  The Federal Equal 
Protection Clause requires that districts conform to the one-person, one-vote 
standard.  Article III, section 16(a), requires the Legislature to apportion both the 
Senate and the House in ―consecutively numbered . . . districts of either 
 
 
- 38 - 
contiguous, overlapping or identical territory.‖18 
The new standards enumerated in article III, section 21, are set forth in two 
tiers, each of which contains three requirements.  The first tier, contained in section 
21(a), lists the following requirements: (1) no apportionment plan or district shall 
be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; (2) 
districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the 
equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political 
process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice; and (3) 
districts shall consist of contiguous territory.  See art. III, § 21(a), Fla. Const.  The 
second tier, located in section 21(b), enumerates three additional requirements in 
drawing district lines, the compliance with which is subordinate to those listed in 
the first tier of section 21 and to federal law in the event of conflict: (1) districts 
shall be as nearly equal in population as is practicable; (2) districts shall be 
compact; and (3) where feasible, districts shall utilize existing political and 
geographical boundaries.  See art. III, § 21(b), Fla. Const.  The order in which the 
constitution lists the standards in tiers one and two is ―not [to] be read to establish 
any priority of one standard over the other within that [tier].‖  Art. III, § 21(c), Fla. 
Const. 
                                         
 
18.  We have previously interpreted ―consecutively numbered‖ to not require 
districts to be consecutively numbered such that each district is adjacent to the next 
numbered district.  See In re Apportionment Law—1982, 414 So. 2d at 1050. 
 
 
- 39 - 
We interpret the specific constitutional directive that tier two is subordinate 
to tier one in the event of conflict to mean that the Legislature‘s obligation is to 
draw legislative districts that comport with all of the requirements enumerated in 
Florida‘s constitution.  However, should a conflict in application arise, the 
Legislature is obligated to adhere to the requirements of section 21(a) (tier one) 
and then comply with the considerations in section 21(b) (tier two) to the extent 
―practicable‖ or ―feasible,‖ depending on the wording of the specific constitutional 
standard.  With this basic framework in mind, we interpret the standards, beginning 
with the newly enacted tier-one standards and then moving to the newly enacted 
tier-two standards.  After we explain and interpret the standards, we set forth how 
the standards interact for purposes of evaluating the apportionment plans. 
1.  Tier-One Standards  
a.  Intent to Favor or Disfavor a Political Party or an Incumbent 
The first of the new and significantly different requirements in our state 
constitution is the provision in article III, section 21(a), providing that ―[n]o 
apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a 
political party or an incumbent.‖  Although this requirement is entirely new to this 
state, at least five other states share a similar constitutional or statutory 
 
 
- 40 - 
requirement.19  Florida‘s constitutional provision, like the constitutional provision 
requiring protection of racial and language minorities against discrimination, is a 
tier-one requirement under the state constitution, meaning that the voters placed 
this constitutional imperative as a top priority to which the Legislature must 
conform during the redistricting process. 
This new requirement in Florida prohibits what has previously been an 
acceptable practice, such as favoring incumbents and the political party in power.  
See, e.g., In re Apportionment Law—1992, 597 So. 2d at 285.  The desire of a 
political party to provide its representatives with an advantage in reapportionment 
is not a Republican or Democratic tenet, but applies equally to both parties.20  
Thus, in 1992, when the Democrats were in control of the Legislature and, by 
default, the redistricting process, we rejected a claim of impermissible political 
                                         
 
19.  States that share a similar constitutional provision include California 
and Washington.  See, e.g., art. XXI, § 2(e), Cal. Const.; Wash. Const. art. II, § 
43(5).  Idaho, Iowa, Montana and Oregon codify similar provisions by statute.  See 
Idaho Code § 72-1506; Iowa Code § 42.4(5); Mont. Code § 5-1-115; Or. Rev. Stat. 
§ 188.010(2). 
 
20.  The observation made by journalist Bill Cotterell highlights past 
redistricting practices by quoting a politically powerful Democratic senator and 
Senate president: ―The legendary Senator Dempsey Barron once said running 
redistricting was like owning a prized hunting dog about to have puppies.‖  Bill 
Cotterell, A Process Free of Politics (Wink, Wink), Tallahassee Democrat (Feb. 
22, 2012), available at 
http://www.tallahassee.com/article/20120223/COLUMNIST03/202230328/Bill-
Cotterell-process-free-politics-wink-wink. 
 
 
- 41 - 
gerrymandering, stating in full: 
Finally, several of the opponents observe that the Joint 
Resolution is nothing more than a gerrymandering effort by the 
Democratic majority of the legislature to protect Democratic 
incumbents.  We have little doubt that politics played a large part in 
the adoption of this plan.  However, the protection of incumbents, 
standing alone, is not illegal, and none of the opponents seriously 
contend that the Joint Resolution is invalid because of political 
gerrymandering. 
Id. 
A decade later, when faced with a claim that the Republican majority of the 
Legislature had improperly limited input from Democratic members, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida similarly observed that the 
―raw exercise of majority legislative power does not seem to be the best way of 
conducting a critical task like redistricting, but it does seem to be an unfortunate 
fact of political life around the country.‖  Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 
1297 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 
 
―The term ‗political gerrymander‘ has been defined as ‗[t]he practice of 
dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape, 
to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition‘s voting 
strength.‘ ‖  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271 n.1 (2004) (plurality opinion) 
(quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary 696 (7th ed.1999)).  While some states have 
sought to minimize the political nature of the apportionment process by 
 
 
- 42 - 
establishing independent redistricting commissions to redraw legislative districts,21 
Florida voters have instead chosen to place restrictions on the Legislature by 
constitutional mandate in a manner similar to the constitutions of other states. 
The Florida Constitution now expressly prohibits what the United States 
Supreme Court has in the past termed a proper, and inevitable, consideration in the 
apportionment process.  See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286 (plurality opinion) 
(―[P]artisan districting is a lawful and common practice . . . .‖); Miller v. Johnson, 
515 U.S. 900, 914 (1995) (―[R]edistricting in most cases will implicate a political 
calculus in which various interests compete for recognition . . . .‖). 
 
Florida‘s express constitutional standard, however, differs from equal 
protection political gerrymandering claims under either the United States or 
Florida Constitutions.  Political gerrymandering claims under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution focus on determining when partisan 
districting as a permissible exercise ―has gone too far,‖ Vieth, 541 U.S. at 296 
(plurality opinion), so as to ―degrade a voter‘s or a group of voters‘ influence on 
the political process as a whole.‖  Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132 (plurality opinion); 
see also Fla. Senate v. Forman, 826 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2002) (relying on the 
                                         
 
21.  See, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3) (added by initiative measure 
in 2000); Cal. Const. art. XXI, § 2 (added by initiative measure in 2008); Idaho 
Const. art. III, § 2(2) (created in 1994); Wash. Const. art. II, § 43 (added by 
constitutional amendment in 1982). 
 
 
- 43 - 
Bandemer test for political gerrymandering claims under Florida‘s equal protection 
clause and overturning trial court finding of political gerrymandering). 
In contrast to the federal equal protection standard applied to political 
gerrymandering, the Florida Constitution prohibits drawing a plan or district with 
the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or incumbent; there is no acceptable 
level of improper intent.  It does not reference the word ―invidious‖ as the term has 
been used by the United States Supreme Court in equal protection discrimination 
cases, see, e.g., Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983), and Florida‘s 
provision should not be read to require a showing of malevolent or evil purpose.  
Moreover, by its express terms, Florida‘s constitutional provision prohibits intent, 
not effect, and applies to both the apportionment plan as a whole and to each 
district individually. 
We recognize that any redrawing of lines, regardless of intent, will 
inevitably have an effect on the political composition of a district and likely 
whether a political party or incumbent is advantaged or disadvantaged.  In fact, a 
plurality of the Supreme Court has quoted ―one of the foremost scholars of 
reapportionment‖ as observing that ―every line drawn aligns partisans and interest 
blocs in a particular way different from the alignment that would result from 
putting the line in some other place.‖  Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 129 n.10 (quoting 
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Fair Criteria and Procedures for Establishing Legislative 
 
 
- 44 - 
Districts 7-8, in Representation and Redistricting Issues (Bernard Grofman, et al. 
eds. 1982)).  In short, redistricting will inherently have political consequences, 
regardless of the intent used in drawing the lines.  Thus, the focus of the analysis 
must be on both direct and circumstantial evidence of intent.  See, e.g., Vill. of 
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). 
The Senate argues that ―it is a Sisyphean task to discern whether the 
Legislature had . . . an [improper] intent.‖22  To the extent that the Senate argues 
that our task is futile, endless, or impossible, we reject this argument.  Rather, the 
Senate‘s approach to permit each trial court to define the standards in a discrete 
proceeding, to make findings of fact based on the trial court‘s interpretation of the 
standards, and to eventually have the cases work their way up to this Court would 
itself be an endless task. 
This Court has before it objective evidence that can be reviewed in order to 
perform a facial review of whether the apportionment plans as drawn had the 
impermissible intent of favoring an incumbent or a political party.  While we agree 
that the standard does not prohibit political effect, the effects of the plan, the shape 
                                         
 
22.  A ―Sisyphean‖ task is one synonymous with futile and endless labor.  
The term ―Sisyphean‖ derives from ―Sisyphus,‖ a ―cruel King of Corinth 
condemned forever to roll a huge stone up a hill in Hades only to have it roll down 
again on nearing the top.‖  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language (4th ed. 2000).  A ―Sisyphean task,‖ then, is one that is ―[e]ndlessly 
laborious or futile.‖  Id. 
 
 
- 45 - 
of district lines, and the demographics of an area are all factors that serve as 
objective indicators of intent.  See, e.g., Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 104 
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (concluding that because of the lack of compactness and the fact 
that incumbents were protected in 87% of the new districts, ―[d]espite its 
conspicuous absence from any direct discussion, incumbency appears to have been 
the unacknowledged third-most-significant factor used when redistricting‖), aff‘d, 
522 U.S. 801 (1997), and aff‘d sub nom. Acosta v. Diaz, 522 U.S. 801 (1997), 
and aff‘d sub nom. Lau v. Diaz, 522 U.S. 801 (1997).  One piece of evidence in 
isolation may not indicate intent, but a review of all of the evidence together may 
lead this Court to the conclusion that the plan was drawn for a prohibited purpose. 
With respect to intent to favor or disfavor an incumbent, the inquiry focuses 
on whether the plan or district was drawn with this purpose in mind.  As explained 
by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in upholding this specific constitutional 
provision as applied to Florida‘s congressional redistricting, ―the incumbency 
provision is neutral on its face, explicitly requiring that lines not be designed to 
help or handicap particular candidates based on incumbency or membership in a 
particular party.  Far from ‗dictat[ing] electoral outcomes,‘ the provision seeks to 
maximize electoral possibilities by leveling the playing field.‖  Brown, 2012 WL 
264610, at *12. 
At the outset, objective indicators of intent to favor or disfavor a political 
 
 
- 46 - 
party can be discerned from the Legislature‘s level of compliance with our own 
constitution‘s tier-two requirements, which set forth traditional redistricting 
principles.  A disregard for these principles can serve as indicia of improper intent.  
See, e.g., Sims, 377 U.S. at 578 (noting that a ―desire to maintain integrity of 
various political subdivisions, insofar as possible, and provide for compact districts 
of contiguous territory‖ undermines opportunities for political favoritism); Pearson 
v. Koster, No. SC92200, 2012 WL 131425, at *2 (Mo. Jan. 17, 2012) (stating that 
the purpose of the constitutional requirements that districts be contiguous, 
compact, and nearly equal in population is ―to guard, as far as practicable, under 
the system of representation adopted, against a legislative evil, commonly known 
as ‗gerrymander‘ ‖ (quoting State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 146 S.W. 40, 61 
(Mo. 1912))). 
The tier-two requirements of article III, section 21(b), are meant to restrict 
the Legislature‘s discretion in drawing irregularly shaped districts; strict 
compliance with their express terms may serve to undercut or defeat any assertion 
of improper intent.  Cf. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 (stating that in racial 
gerrymandering context where race-neutral considerations are the basis for 
redistricting, and are not subordinated to race, a State can ―defeat a claim that a 
district has been gerrymandered on racial lines‖); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 335 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (stating in proposing a standard for political gerrymandering claims 
 
 
- 47 - 
that ―[j]ust as irrational shape can serve as an objective indicator of an 
impermissible legislative purpose, other objective features of a districting map can 
save the plan from invalidation‖).  However, where the shape of a district in 
relation to the demographics is so highly irregular and without justification that it 
cannot be rationally understood as anything other than an effort to favor or disfavor 
a political party, improper intent may be inferred. 
 In making this assessment, we evaluate the shapes of districts together with 
undisputed objective data, such as the relevant voter registration and elections data, 
incumbents‘ addresses, and demographics, as well as any proffered undisputed 
direct evidence of intent.  We note that the Court has access to the same voter 
registration and election data used by the House in its redistricting software. 
Similar to the partisan inquiry, the inquiry for intent to favor or disfavor an 
incumbent focuses on the shape of the district in relation to the incumbent‘s legal 
residence, as well as other objective evidence of intent.  Objective indicators of 
intent may include such factors as the maneuvering of district lines in order to 
avoid pitting incumbents against one another in new districts or the drawing of a 
new district so as to retain a large percentage of the incumbent‘s former district.  
When analyzing whether the challengers have established an unconstitutional 
intent to favor an incumbent, we must ensure that this Court does not disregard 
obvious conclusions from the undisputed facts. 
 
 
- 48 - 
The Court emphasizes that mere access to political data cannot 
presumptively demonstrate prohibited intent because such data is a necessary 
component of evaluating whether a minority group has the ability to elect 
representatives of choice—a required inquiry when determining whether the plan 
diminishes a protected group‘s ability to elect a candidate of choice.  See Guidance 
Concerning Redistricting Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 
7470, 7471 (Feb. 9, 2011) (DOJ Guidance Notice) (United States Department of 
Justice guidance notice requiring a functional analysis of voting behavior to 
determine whether retrogression has occurred).  Likewise, the fact that the Senate 
or House, or their staff, may or may not have had the incumbents‘ addresses is not 
determinative of intent or lack of intent.  And, as discussed in the challenges 
section below, the fact that there were more registered Democrats than registered 
Republicans in this state, but that there are more Republican-performing districts 
than Democratic-performing districts in both the newly drawn Senate and House 
plans, does not permit a conclusion of unlawful intent in this case.  Rather, when 
the Court analyzes the tier-two standards and determines that specific districts 
violate those standards without any other permissible justification, impermissible 
intent may be inferred. 
b.  Minority Voting Protection 
The next newly added provision in article III, section 21(a), provides that 
 
 
- 49 - 
―districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the 
equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political 
process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice.‖  
(Emphasis added.)  The emphasized ―or‖ separates two clauses in the preceding 
sentence, and each clause shares the same negative verb, ―shall not be drawn.‖  As 
a plurality of this Court explained in Standards for Establishing Legislative District 
Boundaries, 2 So. 3d at 189 (plurality opinion), ―[t]his verb modifies both clauses, 
thereby indicating that both clauses impose a restrictive imperative, each of which 
must be satisfied.‖  Accordingly, this portion of section 21(a) imposes two 
requirements that plainly serve to protect racial and language minority voters in 
Florida: prevention of impermissible vote dilution and prevention of impermissible 
diminishment of a minority group‘s ability to elect a candidate of its choice. 
The dual constitutional imperatives ―follow[] almost verbatim the 
requirements embodied in the [Federal] Voting Rights Act.‖  Brown, 2012 WL 
264610, at *8.  The first imperative, that ―districts shall not be drawn with the 
intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language 
minorities to participate in the political process,‖ art. III, § 21(a), Fla. Const., is 
essentially a restatement of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which 
prohibits redistricting plans that afford minorities ―less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in the political process.‖  42 U.S.C. § 
 
 
- 50 - 
1973(b) (2006).  Section 2 relates to claims of impermissible vote dilution. 
Florida‘s second imperative, that ―districts shall not be drawn . . . to 
diminish [racial or language minorities‘] ability to elect representatives of their 
choice,‖ art. III, § 21(a), Fla. Const., reflects the statement codified in Section 5 of 
the VRA prohibiting apportionment plans that have ―the purpose of or will have 
the effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens . . . on account of race or color 
. . . to elect their preferred candidates of choice.‖  42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b) (2006).  
Section 5 attempts to eradicate impermissible retrogression in a minority group‘s 
ability to elect a candidate of choice.  Although Section 5 applies only to ―covered 
jurisdictions,‖ Florida‘s constitutional prohibition applies to the entire state. 
Consistent with the goals of Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA, Florida‘s 
corresponding state provision aims at safeguarding the voting strength of minority 
groups against both impermissible dilution and retrogression.  Interpreting 
Florida‘s minority voting protection provision in this manner gives due allegiance 
to the principles of constitutional construction, under which the Court considers 
―the purpose of the provision, the evil sought to be remedied, and the 
circumstances leading to its inclusion in our constitutional document.‖  In re 
Apportionment Law—1982, 414 So. 2d at 1048.  Before its placement on the 
ballot and approval by the citizens of Florida, sponsors of this amendment, 
including the Florida State Conference of NAACP Branches (NAACP) and 
 
 
- 51 - 
Democracia Ahora, acknowledged that Florida‘s provision tracked the language of 
Sections 2 and 5 and was perfectly consistent with both the letter and intent of 
federal law.  See Amici Curiae Br. of Fla. State Conference of NAACP Branches 
& Democracia Ahora, Inc., at 3-5, Roberts v. Brown, 43 So. 3d 673 (Fla. 2010) 
(No. SC10-1362).  Those groups further contended that viewing ―the requirements 
of [Florida‘s provision as being] thoroughly consistent with the Voting Rights 
Act‘s text and [placing an] emphasis on protecting the equal opportunities of 
minorities‖ did ―not require extended analysis to see.‖  Id. at 8. 
Moreover, all parties to this proceeding agree that Florida‘s constitutional 
provision now embraces the principles enumerated in Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA.  
Because Sections 2 and 5 raise federal issues, our interpretation of Florida‘s 
corresponding provision is guided by prevailing United States Supreme Court 
precedent.  This approach not only corresponds to the manner in which this Court 
addressed Federal VRA claims in 1992, see In re Apportionment Law—1992, 597 
So. 2d at 280-82, but it squares with how other jurisdictions have interpreted 
comparable state provisions.23 
                                         
 
23.  Several jurisdictions require the state‘s redistricting body to expressly 
comply with the VRA when drawing district lines.  See Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 2, § 
1(14)(A); Cal. Const. art. XXI, § 2(d)(2).; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-1-102(1)(a)(II); 10 
Ill. Comp. Stat. 120/5-5(a), (d); Iowa Code § 42.4; Mich. Comp. Laws § 
3.63(b)(ii); Mich. Comp. Laws § 4.261a; Mont. Code Ann. § 5-1-115(2); N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 163-132.1B(a); Or. Rev. Stat. § 188.010; Tenn. Code. Ann. § 3-1-
103(6).  Courts interpreting these standards have not departed from prevailing 
 
 
- 52 - 
Florida‘s provision is unique among the states in that it incorporates 
language from the VRA but does not explicitly reference the VRA.24  We therefore 
review the language of Sections 2 and 5, and how each has been judicially 
interpreted, to give meaning to our state counterpart.  The Court nonetheless 
recognizes our independent constitutional obligation to interpret our own state 
constitutional provisions. 
In our review, we conclude that in applying the federal provisions to the 
challenges and legislative justifications, the Court must necessarily approach the 
application of each federal provision differently due to the manner in which the 
Court reviews Florida‘s constitutional provisions in a facial review of the 
apportionment plans.  For example, in this case, the House and Senate use 
Florida‘s minority voting protection provision as a justification for the manner in 
which they drew specific districts.  The challengers, on the other hand, urge the 
                                                                                                                                   
United States Supreme Court precedent.  See, e.g., Vandermost v. Bowen, No. 
S198387, 2012 WL 246627, at *27 n.39 (Cal. Jan. 27, 2012) (relying on Supreme 
Court precedent to discuss Sections 2 and 5 in relation to state provision requiring 
compliance with the VRA). 
 
24.  Like Florida‘s, the District of Columbia‘s provision does not expressly 
reference the VRA, but the District of Columbia‘s appellate court has construed it 
in conformity with Section 2 of the VRA.  See Kingman Park Civic Ass‘n v. 
Williams, 924 A.2d 979, 987 (D.C. 2007) (relying on Section 2 precedent from the 
Supreme Court to review a claim under provision disallowing redistricting plans 
that have ―the purpose and effect of diluting the voting strength of minority 
citizens‖ (quoting D.C. Code § 1-1011.01(g)). 
 
 
- 53 - 
Court to conclude that many of the districts were drawn to impermissibly dilute the 
voting strength of minorities and, in turn, the voting strength of the Democratic 
Party. 
 In contrast to the posture of the case in which this Court reviews Florida‘s 
minority voting protection provision, Section 2 claims under the VRA are brought 
by plaintiffs who challenge the apportionment plan on the grounds of 
impermissible vote dilution.  Section 5 of the VRA applies only to covered 
jurisdictions that must obtain preclearance by the Department of Justice before an 
apportionment plan goes into effect; in Florida, only five counties are covered, not 
the entire state. 
As explained by the United States Supreme Court, the VRA ―was designed 
by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting,‖ South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966), and to help effectuate the Fifteenth 
Amendment‘s guarantee that no citizen‘s right to vote shall ―be denied or abridged 
. . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.‖  Voinovich v. 
Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 152 (1993) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XV).  Sections 2 
and 5 of the VRA ―combat different evils,‖ Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 
U.S. 471, 477 (1997), and ―differ in structure, purpose, and application.‖  Georgia 
v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 478 (2003) (quoting Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 883 
(1994) (plurality opinion)).  Section 2, specifically, applies nationwide and 
 
 
- 54 - 
provides that ―[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, 
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.‖  42 U.S.C. § 
1973(a) (2006). 
A denial or abridgement of the right to vote in violation of Section 2 occurs 
when 
based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political 
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political 
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a 
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its 
members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate 
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of 
their choice. 
Id. § 1973(b).  Section 2 thus prohibits any practice or procedure that, when 
― ‗interact[ing] with social and historical conditions,‘ impairs the ability of a 
protected class to elect its candidate of choice on an equal basis with other voters.‖  
Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 153 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 
(1986)).  Importantly, Section 2 employs a ―results‖ test, under which proof of 
discriminatory intent is not necessary to establish a violation of the section.  
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 395 (1991); see also Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 
520 U.S. at 482 (―[P]roof of discriminatory intent is not required to establish a 
 
 
- 55 - 
violation of Section 2.‖).25 
 
The United States Supreme Court has commonly referred to one such 
prohibited practice or procedure under Section 2 as ―vote dilution,‖ which is the 
practice of reducing the potential effectiveness of a group‘s voting strength by 
limiting the group‘s chances to translate the strength into voting power.  Shaw, 509 
U.S. at 641.  ―[T]he usual device for diluting the minority voting power is the 
manipulation of district lines‖ by either fragmenting the minority voters among 
several districts where a bloc-voting majority can routinely outvote them or 
―packing‖ them into one or a small number of districts to minimize their influence 
in adjacent districts.  Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 153-54.  For instance, under the 
interpretation of federal law, impermissible ―packing‖ might occur when a 
minority group has ―sufficient numbers to constitute a majority in three districts‖ 
but is ―packed into two districts in which it constitutes a super-majority.‖  Id. at 
153. 
The Supreme Court‘s leading case interpreting Section 2, Gingles, 478 U.S. 
                                         
 
25.  The United States Supreme Court has recognized that vote dilution 
claims can be brought separate and apart from statutory claims based on the VRA.  
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits racial vote dilution where the plaintiff 
establishes that the electoral scheme was adopted with the intent to racially 
discriminate.  See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (plurality 
opinion); see also Clark v. Putnam Cnty., 293 F.3d 1261, 1266 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(citing Bolden for the proposition that ―[i]n order to state a racial vote dilution 
claim under the Constitution, intent to racially discriminate must be shown‖). 
 
 
- 56 - 
at 50, set out three ―necessary preconditions‖ that a plaintiff is required to 
demonstrate before he or she can establish that a legislative district must be 
redrawn to comply with Section 2.  These preconditions require an individual 
challenging the plan to show that: (1) a minority population is ―sufficiently large 
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district‖; 
(2) the minority population is ―politically cohesive‖; and (3) the majority 
population ―votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the 
minority‘s preferred candidate.‖  Id. at 50-51.  When the three Gingles 
preconditions are met, courts must then assess the totality of the circumstances to 
determine if the Section 2 ―effects‖ test is met—that is, if minority voters‘ political 
power is truly diluted.  Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013 (1994). 
A successful vote dilution claim under Section 2 requires a showing that a 
minority group was denied a majority-minority district that, but for the purported 
dilution, could have potentially existed.  See id. at 1008 (―[T]he first Gingles 
condition requires the possibility of creating more than the existing number of 
reasonably compact districts with a sufficiently large minority population to elect 
candidates of its choice.‖).  Majority-minority districts are ones ―in which a 
majority of the population is a member of a specific minority group.‖  Voinovich, 
507 U.S. at 149; see also Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13 (2009) (plurality 
opinion) (―In majority-minority districts, a minority group composes a numerical, 
 
 
- 57 - 
working majority of the voting-age population.‖). 
By contrast, a crossover or coalition district ―is one in which minority voters 
make up less than a majority of the voting-age population‖ but are, at least 
potentially, ―large enough to elect the candidate of [their] choice with help from 
voters who are members of the majority and who cross over to support the 
minority‘s preferred candidate.‖  Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 13.  Influence districts are 
districts in which a minority group can influence the outcome of an election even if 
its preferred candidate cannot be elected.  Id. 
The showing of either an additional minority influence district or a crossover 
district, as opposed to an actual majority-minority district, is insufficient for 
Section 2 purposes; what is required is that ―the minority population in the 
potential election district [be] greater than 50 percent.‖  Id. at 19-20.  Moreover, 
while ―there is no § 2 right to a [minority] district that is not reasonably compact, 
the creation of a noncompact district does not compensate for the dismantling of a 
compact [minority] opportunity district.‖  League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 
Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 430-31 (2006).  As the United States Supreme Court has 
explained, ―[t]he practical consequence of drawing a district to cover two distant, 
disparate communities is that one or both groups will be unable to achieve their 
political goals.‖  Id. at 434.  Therefore, with respect to the compactness inquiry for 
Section 2 purposes specifically, there would be ―no basis to believe a district that 
 
 
- 58 - 
combines two farflung segments of a racial group with disparate interests provides 
the opportunity that § 2 requires or that the first Gingles condition contemplates.‖  
Id. at 433. 
Most recently, in Perez, 132 S. Ct. at 944, an eight-justice majority of the 
Supreme Court cited to the plurality decision in Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 13-15 
(declining to recognize a Section 2 claim where the district was composed of only 
39% black voting-age population), to hold that a federal district court would have 
no basis for drawing a districting plan to create a ―minority coalition opportunity 
district.‖  The Perez decision is of course binding precedent only as to the 
interpretation of Section 2 jurisprudence under the VRA and was specifically 
concerned with limiting the circumstances under which a federal district court 
could draw an interim apportionment plan. 
Unlike the posture of a Section 2 VRA claim before a federal court, the 
Florida Supreme Court is charged with analyzing the apportionment plan to 
determine compliance with all constitutional provisions.  Florida‘s provision now 
codifies these Section 2 principles, but the question is whether those principles set 
a floor, as well as a ceiling, for our interpretation of Florida‘s constitution—
whether there would be a violation of Florida‘s minority protection provision with 
respect to vote dilution if the plan could be drawn to create crossover districts or 
even influence districts.  The challengers assert that by overly packing minorities 
 
 
- 59 - 
into single districts, the Legislature has acted to minimize the influence of not only 
minorities, but also Democrats in the surrounding districts.  Where that claim has 
been made, we will consider that specific argument when reviewing the district 
challenges below. 
In contrast to vote dilution claims under Section 2, Section 5 of the VRA is 
limited to particular ―covered jurisdictions‖ and relates to claims of retrogression 
in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the 
electoral franchise.  Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 478.  Section 5 ―suspend[s] all changes 
in state election procedure,‖ including redistricting plans, in jurisdictions covered 
by the VRA ―until they are submitted to and approved by a three-judge Federal 
District Court in Washington, D.C., or the Attorney General‖ of the United States.  
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2509 (2009); see 
also Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 133 (1976).  Florida is not a covered 
jurisdiction for the purposes of Section 5, but the state does include five covered 
counties: Collier, Hardee, Hendry, Hillsborough, and Monroe.  Florida‘s new 
constitutional provision, however, codified the non-retrogression principle of 
Section 5 and has now extended it statewide.  In other words, Florida now has a 
statewide non-retrogression requirement independent of Section 5. 
Preclearance under Section 5 is granted only if the change ―neither has the 
purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on 
 
 
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account of race or color.‖  Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2509 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
1973c(a) (2006)).  A violation can be shown where the drawing of the district lines 
has ―the purpose of or will have the effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens 
. . . on account of race or color, or [membership in a language minority group], to 
elect their preferred candidates of choice.‖  42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b).26  The primary 
objective of Section 5 is to avoid retrogression.  ―[A] plan has an impermissible 
[retrogressive] ‗effect‘ under § 5 only if it ‗would lead to a retrogression in the 
position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral 
franchise.‘ ‖  Bossier, 520 U.S. at 478 (quoting Beer, 425 U.S. at 141).  The 
existing plan of a covered jurisdiction serves as the ―benchmark‖ against which the 
― ‗effect‘ of voting changes is measured.‖  Id. 
In its 2006 reauthorization, Congress amended Section 5 to add the express 
prohibition against ―diminishing the ability‖ of minorities ―to elect their preferred 
candidate‖ as a response to the United States Supreme Court‘s 2003 decision in 
Ashcroft.  This amended language mirrors the language of Florida‘s provision.  
Before the amendment to Section 5, the Ashcroft Court concluded that Section 5 
granted to covered jurisdictions the discretion to trade off ―safe‖ districts with 
―influence or coalition districts,‖ particularly if the new plan did not ―change[] the 
                                         
 
26.  While Florida‘s provision borrows language from Section 5, it does not 
incorporate the portion of Section 5 placing the burden of proof on the covered 
jurisdiction to establish the requirements necessary to obtain preclearance. 
 
 
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minority group‘s opportunity to participate in the political process.‖  539 U.S. at 
482. 
Disagreeing with the United States Supreme Court‘s interpretation, Congress 
overruled Ashcroft, concluding that ―trade-offs‖ that ―would allow the minority 
community‘s own choice of preferred candidates to be trumped by political deals 
struck by State legislators purporting to give ‗influence‘ to the minority community 
while removing that community‘s ability to elect candidates‖ were ―inconsistent 
with the original and current purpose of Section 5.‖  H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 44 
(2006).  As Congress explained, the new ―Section 5 [was] intended to be 
specifically focused on whether the electoral power of the minority community 
[was] more, less, or just as able to elect a preferred candidate of choice after a 
voting change as before.‖  Id. at 46.  That is, ―[v]oting changes that leave a 
minority group less able to elect a preferred candidate of choice, either directly or 
when coalesced with other voters, cannot be precleared under Section 5.‖  Id.  The 
United States Supreme Court has yet to interpret this aspect of Congress‘s 2006 
amendment. 
Just as Section 2 jurisprudence guides the Court in analyzing the state vote 
dilution claims, when we interpret our state provision prohibiting the diminishment 
of racial or language minorities‘ ability to elect representatives of choice, we are 
guided by any jurisprudence interpreting Section 5.  However, the Court must 
 
 
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remain mindful that we are interpreting an independent provision of the state 
constitution. 
Certainly, by including the ―diminish‖ language of recently amended 
Section 5, Florida has now adopted the retrogression principle as intended by 
Congress in the 2006 amendment.  Accordingly, the Legislature cannot eliminate 
majority-minority districts or weaken other historically performing minority 
districts where doing so would actually diminish a minority group‘s ability to elect 
its preferred candidates.  In other words, in addition to majority-minority districts, 
coalition or crossover districts that previously provided minority groups with the 
ability to elect a preferred candidate under the benchmark plan must also be 
recognized.  See Texas v. United States, No. 11-1303 (TBG-RMC-BAH), 2011 
WL 6440006, at *18-19 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2011) (concluding that minority 
coalition districts are also included in the calculation of whether a new districting 
plan diminishes the ability of a minority group to elect a candidate of choice).  We 
nonetheless conclude that under Florida‘s provision, a slight change in percentage 
of the minority group‘s population in a given district does not necessarily have a 
cognizable effect on a minority group‘s ability to elect its preferred candidate of 
choice.  This is because a minority group‘s ability to elect a candidate of choice 
depends upon more than just population figures. 
 
To undertake a retrogression evaluation requires an inquiry into whether a 
 
 
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district is likely to perform for minority candidates of choice.  This has been 
termed a ―functional analysis,‖ requiring consideration not only of the minority 
population in the districts, or even the minority voting-age population in those 
districts, but of political data and how a minority population group has voted in the 
past.  The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) has defined what a functional 
analysis of electoral behavior entails: 
In determining whether the ability to elect exists in the 
benchmark plan and whether it continues in the proposed plan, the 
Attorney General does not rely on any predetermined or fixed 
demographic percentages at any point in the assessment.  Rather, in 
the Department‘s view, this determination requires a functional 
analysis of the electoral behavior within the particular jurisdiction or 
election district. . . . .  [C]ensus data alone may not provide sufficient 
indicia of electoral behavior to make the requisite determination.  
Circumstances, such as differing rates of electoral participation within 
discrete portions of a population, may impact on the ability of voters 
to elect candidates of choice, even if the overall demographic data 
show no significant change. 
Although comparison of the census population of districts in the 
benchmark and proposed plans is the important starting point of any 
Section 5 analysis, additional demographic and election data in the 
submission is often helpful in making the requisite Section 5 
determination. . . .  Therefore, election history and voting patterns 
within the jurisdiction, voter registration and turnout information, and 
other similar information are very important to an assessment of the 
actual effect of a redistricting plan. 
DOJ Guidance Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. at 7471; see also Texas, 2011 WL 6440006, at 
*15-18 (proposing a functional test similar to that of the DOJ). 
We recognize that in certain situations, compactness and other redistricting 
criteria, such as those codified in tier two of article III, section 21, of the Florida 
 
 
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Constitution, will be compromised in order to avoid retrogression.  Indeed, the 
DOJ has even noted that ―compliance with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act may 
require the jurisdiction to depart from strict adherence to certain of its redistricting 
criteria.  For example, criteria that require the jurisdiction to . . . follow county, 
city, or precinct boundaries . . . or, in some cases, require a certain level of 
compactness of district boundaries may need to give way to some degree to avoid 
retrogression.‖  DOJ Guidance Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. at 7472.  Tier two of article 
III, section 21, specifically contemplates this need, but only to the extent 
necessary.  Therefore, as does the DOJ, in making our own assessment, we will 
rely upon ―alternative or illustrative plans . . . that make the least departure from 
[Florida‘s] stated redistricting criteria needed to prevent retrogression.‖  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
The Attorney General, the Senate, and the House all argue that an inquiry 
under Florida‘s provision, like an inquiry under the Federal VRA, is too fact-
intensive to be resolved in the instant original proceeding, which is limited to a 
narrow thirty-day window.  In fact, the Senate takes the position that this Court 
should outright decline to review whether the Senate plan complies with this 
provision. 
In oral argument, the attorney for the Senate stated that ―[n]o rational person 
could expect seven appellate-court justices to resolve these extraordinarily tough 
 
 
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factual issues.‖  This argument was in support of the Senate‘s position that 
challenges based on the new constitutional provisions, including the minority 
voting protection provision, should await challenges brought in the trial court after 
validation of the plans. 
We acknowledge that in 2002, this Court declined ruling on Federal VRA 
claims and race-based discrimination claims, instead leaving those claims to be 
brought on an ―as-applied‖ basis.  See In re Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 
2d at 825.  Of course, as we have mentioned previously, at that time, there was no 
explicit state constitutional requirement, and it was entirely logical to defer such 
claims until after this Court determined the facial validity of the plans under the 
Florida Constitution. 
Further, the Legislature, in its defense of the reason for drawing certain 
districts in a particular configuration, relies on the need to comply with the Federal 
VRA and the corresponding provision of the Florida Constitution.  The Legislature 
asserts that it is far too difficult for this Court to review claims regarding 
diminishment of voting strength, but it nevertheless justifies the drawing of a 
number of districts on this basis. 
If the Legislature is utilizing its interest in protecting minority voting 
strength as a shield, this Court must be able to undertake a review of the validity of 
that reason.  Therefore, by the very nature of the challenges and the reasons 
 
 
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advanced for the shape of the districts, it is necessary to perform a facial review 
and analyze the objective data that we have available.  Because a minority group‘s 
ability to elect a candidate of choice depends upon more than just population 
figures, we reject any argument that the minority population percentage in each 
district as of 2002 is somehow fixed to an absolute number under Florida‘s 
minority protection provision. 
To hold otherwise would run the risk of permitting the Legislature to engage 
in racial gerrymandering to avoid diminishment.  However, the United States 
Supreme Court has cautioned:  ―[W]e do not read . . . any of our other § 5 cases to 
give covered jurisdictions carte blanche to engage in racial gerrymandering in the 
name of nonretrogression.  A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored 
to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond what was reasonably 
necessary to avoid retrogression.‖  Shaw, 509 U.S. at 655.  This is especially true 
in light of the United States Supreme Court‘s admonition: 
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to 
our society.  They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much 
of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their 
skin.  Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular 
dangers.  Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may 
balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us 
further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer 
matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire.  It is for these 
reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands 
close judicial scrutiny. 
 
 
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Id. at 657. 
In a manner consistent with what is required to determine whether a district 
is likely to perform for minority candidates of choice, the Court‘s analysis of this 
claim and any defense for the manner in which the district was drawn will involve 
the review of the following statistical data: (1) voting-age populations; (2) voting-
registration data; (3) voting registration of actual voters; and (4) election results 
history.27  This approach is analogous to the review we undertook in 1992 of 
objective statistical data in order to facially decide Section 2 claims.  There, when 
analyzing whether the joint resolution complied with Section 2 of the VRA, this 
Court held that its ―analysis [would] include a consideration of all statistical data 
filed herein, including a breakdown of white, black, and Hispanic voting-age 
populations and voting registrations in the legislative districts contained in the 
Joint Resolution and in other proposed plans, none of which [were] disputed.‖  In 
re Apportionment Law—1992, 597 So. 2d at 282 (footnotes omitted). 
Based on the foregoing, we analyze Florida‘s minority voting protection 
provision as safeguarding the voting strength of minority groups against 
impermissible dilution and retrogression. 
c.  Contiguity 
                                         
 
27.  The Court utilized the House political data and software in analyzing all 
of these figures. 
 
 
- 68 - 
The third of the tier-one standards is contiguity.  The requirement that 
districts shall consist of contiguous territory exists in both sections 16(a) and 21(a) 
of article III.28  By including this standard in the first subsection of the new 
amendment, the voters made clear their intention to establish that the section 21(b) 
standards of compactness, nearly equal population, and utilizing political and 
geographical boundaries are subservient to the contiguity requirement. 
This Court has defined contiguous as ―being in actual contact: touching 
along a boundary or at a point.‖  In re Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 2d at 
827 (quoting In re Apportionment Law—1992, 597 So. 2d at 279).  ―A district 
lacks contiguity ‗when a part is isolated from the rest by the territory of another 
district‘ or when the lands ‗mutually touch only at a common corner or right 
angle.‘ ‖  Id. (quoting In re Apportionment Law—1992, 597 So. 2d at 279).  No 
party has advocated that the interpretation of this constitutional provision has 
                                         
 
28.  Section 16(a) specifically requires that that districts be ―of either 
contiguous, overlapping or identical territory.‖  Neither of the latter two 
requirements in this standard, that districts must be of overlapping or identical 
territory, is at issue in the instant petition.  This Court has never defined the term 
―overlapping,‖ and it has never come into play under the Constitution of 1968.  
The phrase ―identical territory‖ refers to multi-member districts.  See In re 
Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at 806-07.  A multimember district is a 
district in which the same voters elect more than one representative to serve a 
geographical area that could be divided into several areas, each represented by a 
single person.  See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142 (1971).  As has been 
the case since 1982, the 2012 apportionment plan consists solely of single-member 
districts as to both the House and Senate plans. 
 
 
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changed, and we interpret the clause in section 21(a) consistent with our previous 
interpretation of whether a district is contiguous under section 16(a).   
2.  Tier-Two Standards 
 
We now turn to a discussion of the tier-two standards, which require that 
―districts shall be as nearly equal in population as is practicable,‖ that ―districts 
shall be compact,‖ and that ―districts shall, where feasible, utilize existing political 
and geographical boundaries.‖  Art. III, § 21(b), Fla. Const.  Strict adherence to 
these standards must yield if there is a conflict between compliance with them and 
the tier-one standards. 
a.  As Nearly Equal in Population as Practicable 
Although the express requirement of equal population is new to the Florida 
Constitution, this Court‘s precedent establishes the importance of the federal one-
person, one-vote requirement as both an apportionment principle and a proper 
starting point in judicial analysis.  We evaluate this federal principle in conjunction 
with the newly enacted state constitutional requirement set forth in article III, 
section 21(b), requiring districts to be ―as nearly equal in population as is 
practicable.‖ 
As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that ―state legislatures be 
apportioned in such a way that each person‘s vote carries the same weight—that is, 
 
 
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each legislator represents the same number of voters.‖  In Apportionment Law—
1992, 597 So. 2d at 278 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).  This 
concept, commonly referred to as the one-person, one-vote requirement, is 
determined ―by analyzing the population figures in each district.‖  In re 
Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 2d at 825.  In construing the one-person, one-
vote requirement, this Court explained: 
The Constitutions of Florida and the United States require that one 
man‘s vote in a district be worth as much as another.  Mathematical 
exactness is not an absolute requirement in state apportionment plans; 
however, deviations, when unavoidable, must be de minimis.  
Whether a deviation is de minimis must be determined on the facts of 
each case. 
In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at 802. 
When discussing the one-person, one-vote requirement in 2002, this Court 
relied on the United States Supreme Court and defined equal protection as  
―requir[ing] that a State make an honest and good faith effort to 
construct districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is practicable.‖  
[In re Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 597 So. 2d at 279] (quoting 
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577).  In White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 
(1973), the Supreme Court held that ―minor population deviations 
among state legislative districts [do not] substantially dilute the 
weight of individual votes in larger districts so as to deprive 
individuals in these districts of fair and effective representation.‖ 
In re Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 2d at 826 (emphasis added). 
 
 
- 71 - 
 
Although requiring mathematical exactness for congressional districts,29 the 
United States Supreme Court has also explained that mathematical precision under 
the one-person, one-vote requirement is not paramount for state legislative districts 
when it must yield to other legitimate redistricting objectives, such as compactness 
and maintaining the integrity of political subdivisions: 
[S]ome deviations from population equality may be necessary to 
permit States to pursue other legitimate objectives such as 
―maintain[ing] the integrity of various political subdivisions‖ and 
―provid[ing] for compact districts of contiguous territory.‖  Reynolds, 
supra at 578.  As the Court stated in Gaffney, ―a[n] unrealistic 
overemphasis on raw population figures, a mere nose count in the 
districts, may submerge these other considerations and itself furnish a 
ready tool for ignoring factors that in day-to-day operation are 
important to an acceptable representation and apportionment 
arrangement.‖  412 U.S. at 749. 
Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983) (alterations in original). 
Applying that body of law during the 2002 apportionment cycle before the 
most recent constitutional amendment, this Court rejected the argument that the 
one-person, one-vote standard would require the Legislature to utilize advanced 
computer technology to design districts ―in exactly the same numerical size.‖  In re 
                                         
 
29.  Congressional districts fall under a stricter standard under the federal 
constitution.  Any variance, no matter how small, must be justified, unless it can be 
shown that the variance occurred despite an effort to achieve precise mathematical 
equality.  Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983).  The United States 
Supreme Court has noted that ―congressional districts are not so intertwined and 
freighted with strictly local interests as are state legislative districts and that, as 
compared with the latter, they are relatively enormous.‖  White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 
783, 793 (1973). 
 
 
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Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 2d at 826.  We concluded that ―[e]ven if the 
advent of computer-based redistricting software [had] lowered the maximum 
permissible deviation, . . . the relatively minor deviation before us in [that] case 
[did] not lead to the conclusion that either the House or Senate plans [were] 
facially in violation of the one-person, one-vote requirement.‖  Id. at 827.  There, 
the House plan had a maximum percentage deviation between the largest and 
smallest number of people per representative (statistical overall range) of 2.79%, 
and the Senate plan had a maximum percentage deviation between the largest and 
smallest number of people per representative (statistical overall range) of 0.03%.  
Id. at 826. 
Now, the Florida voters have expressly spoken on the issue of population 
equality in Florida‘s redistricting process.  Article III, section 21(b), requires 
districts to be ―as nearly equal in population as is practicable.‖  To interpret this 
provision, we apply the principles governing constitutional construction.  The 
Court ―endeavors to construe a constitutional provision consistent with the intent 
of the framers and voters,‖ Zingale, 885 So. 2d at 282, and in construing the 
language of the Florida Constitution, ―[e]very word of the Florida Constitution 
should be given its intended meaning and effect.‖  In re Apportionment Law—
1972, 263 So. 2d at 807. 
Florida‘s standard unmistakably uses the same language that the Supreme 
 
 
- 73 - 
Court has used when interpreting the federal equal protection one-person, one-vote 
standard.  See In re Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 2d at 826 (describing the 
federal one-person, one-vote criteria as requiring the Legislature to construct 
districts ―as nearly of equal population as is practicable‖ (quoting In re 
Apportionment Law—1992, 597 So. 2d at 279)).  Further, this Court has relied on 
Supreme Court precedent to interpret the one-person, one-vote standard in a like 
manner. 
The FDP and the Coalition assert that Florida‘s equal population 
requirement imposes a stricter standard than this Court has previously employed.  
The challengers‘ assertion therefore raises the question of whether compliance 
with the standard under the Florida Constitution is measured differently than how 
it has been measured under the United States Constitution; in other words, whether 
the Legislature has less room for flexibility in population deviation among the 
legislative districts because the requirement is now enshrined in the Florida 
Constitution. 
We resolve this question by concluding that the voters‘ inclusion of this 
standard in the second tier of article III, section 21, recognizes that, as under the 
federal constitution, strict and unbending adherence to the equal population 
requirement will yield to other redistricting considerations, but that those 
considerations must be based on the express constitutional standards.  The Florida 
 
 
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Constitution embraces this construction, expressly mandating that the equal 
population requirement give way to contiguity, the prohibition against the intent to 
favor an incumbent or political party, and the need to comply with the minority-
protection provision.  In addition, article III, section 21, instructs that Florida‘s 
equal population requirement be balanced with both compactness and the use of 
political and geographical boundaries. 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that although the 
Equal Protection Clause requires state legislatures to make an ―honest and good 
faith effort‖ to construct districts ―as nearly of equal population as is practicable,‖ 
there are legitimate reasons for states to deviate from creating districts with 
perfectly equal populations, including maintaining the integrity of political 
subdivisions and providing compact and contiguous districts.  Sims, 377 U.S. at 
577; see also Brown, 462 U.S. at 842. 
We imbue Florida‘s provision with the same meaning, subject to this 
important caveat.  Because obtaining equal population ―if practicable‖ is an 
explicit and important constitutional mandate under the Florida Constitution, any 
deviation from that goal of mathematical precision must be based upon compliance 
with other constitutional standards.  Accordingly, compliance with Florida‘s equal 
population standard must be assessed in tandem with the other constitutional 
considerations. 
 
 
- 75 - 
b.  Compactness 
Compactness is the second of the tier-two standards.  Because the 
requirement that districts ―shall be compact‖ is a new constitutional requirement, 
the Court begins by defining it.  Before 2010, ―neither the United States nor the 
Florida Constitution require[d] that the Florida Legislature apportion legislative 
districts in a compact manner.‖  In re Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 2d at 
831.  Now, however, the Florida Constitution expressly requires that ―districts 
shall be compact.‖  Art. III, § 21(b), Fla. Const.  Although compactness is a new 
constitutional requirement in Florida, compactness is a well-recognized and long-
standing constitutional standard in at least twenty state constitutions30 and at least 
six state statutes.31 
                                         
 
30.  States that constitutionally require compactness during reapportionment 
include Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  See Alaska 
Const. art VI, § 6; Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14); Cal. Const. art. XXI, §§ 2(d), 
(e)); Colo. Const. art. V, § 47; Haw. Const. art. IV, § 6(4); Ill. Const. art. IV, § 
3(a); Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 2; Md. Const. art. III, § 4; Mo. Const. art. III, § 2; 
Mont. Const. art. V, § 14(1); Neb. Const. art. III, § 5; N.J. Const. art. IV, § 2; N.Y. 
Const. art. III, § 4; Ohio Const. art. XI, § 9; Pa. Const. art. II, § 16; R.I. Const. art. 
VII, § 1; art. VIII, § 1; S.D. Const. art. III, § 5; Vt. Const. ch. II, §§ 13, 18; Va. 
Const. art. II, § 6; Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(5); W.V. Const. art. VI, § 4; Wis. 
Const. art. IV, § 4. 
 
31.  States that codify a compactness requirement by statute include Idaho, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, and North Dakota.  See Idaho 
Code Ann. § 72-1506; Iowa Code § 42.4(4); Mich. Comp. Laws §4.261; Minn. 
Stat. § 2.91(2); Miss. Code Ann. § 5-3-101); N.M. Stat. §§ 2-8D-2, 2-7C-3; N.D. 
 
 
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In defining this standard, as with the other standards, we start with the 
proposition that in interpreting constitutional provisions, 
[f]irst and foremost, this Court must examine the actual language used 
in the constitution.  ―If that language is clear, unambiguous, and 
addresses the matter in issue, then it must be enforced as written.‖  
The words of the constitution ―are to be interpreted in their most usual 
and obvious meaning, unless the text suggests that they have been 
used in a technical sense.‖  Additionally, this Court ―endeavors to 
construe a constitutional provision consistent with the intent of the 
framers and the voters.‖  Constitutional provisions ―must never be 
construed in such manner as to make it possible for the will of the 
people to be frustrated or denied.‖ 
Lewis v. Leon Cnty., 73 So. 3d 151, 153-54 (Fla. 2011).  Thus, a fundamental tenet 
of constitutional construction applicable in our analysis is that the Court will 
construe a constitutional provision in a manner consistent with the intent of the 
framers and the voters and will interpret its terms in their most usual and obvious 
meaning. 
The Senate contends that this Court should not undertake to define 
compactness and instead leave that task to the Legislature.  The Senate asserts that 
―compactness is . . . the paradigmatic example of an elusive concept with no 
precise meaning.‖  However, as is universally recognized, it is the exclusive 
province of the judiciary to interpret terms in a constitution and to define those 
terms.  See Lawnwood Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Seeger, 990 So. 2d 503, 510 (Fla. 
                                                                                                                                   
Cent. Code Ann. § 54-03-01.5.  The District of Columbia also statutorily requires 
compactness in redistricting.  See D.C. Code § 1-1011.01. 
 
 
- 77 - 
2008) (―[I]t is the duty of this Court to determine the meaning of this constitutional 
provision.‖); Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377, 384 (N.C. 2002) (noting 
during the review of a legislative apportionment plan that ―it is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is‖ (quoting 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))). 
This is particularly the case with the new constitutional standards on 
apportionment because the standards serve as a limit on the exercise of the 
Legislature‘s authority.  Further, it is incumbent upon this Court to define the term 
in accordance with the intent of the voters, which, in this case, was to require the 
Legislature to redistrict in a manner that prohibits favoritism or discrimination.  
See Ervin v. Collins, 85 So. 2d 852, 855 (Fla. 1956) (―We are called on to construe 
the terms of the Constitution, an instrument from the people, and we are to 
effectuate their purpose from the words employed in the document.‖). 
A compactness requirement serves to limit partisan redistricting and racial 
gerrymanders.  In fact, as the Illinois Supreme Court recognized, ―compactness is 
‗almost universally recognized‘ as an appropriate anti-gerrymandering standard.‖  
Schrage v. State Bd. of Elections, 430 N.E.2d 483, 486 (Ill. 1981) (quoting James 
M. Edwards, The Gerrymander and ―One Man, One Vote‖, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 879, 
893 (1971)); Pearson, 2012 WL 131425, at *34 (holding that the purpose of the 
constitutional requirements that districts be contiguous, compact, and nearly equal 
 
 
- 78 - 
in population is ―to guard, as far as practicable, under the system of representation 
adopted, against a legislative evil, commonly known as ‗gerrymander‘ ‖ (quoting 
Hitchcock, 146 S.W. at 61)). 
Courts around the country have generally defined the term ―compactness‖ 
on a geographical basis.  See, e.g., Hickel v. Se. Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 45 
(Alaska 1992) (defining compactness as ―having a small perimeter in relation to 
the area encompassed‖); Schrage, 430 N.E.2d at 486 (defining compactness simply 
as meaning ―closely united‖); Acker v. Love, 496 P.2d 75, 76 (Colo. 1972) 
(defining the term as ―a geographic area whose boundaries are as nearly 
equidistant as possible from the geographic center of the area being considered‖); 
Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm‘n, 
121 P.3d 843, 869 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (― ‗Compactness‘ refers to length of the 
district‘s borders.  The shorter the distance around the district, the more compact 
the district.‖); see also Kilbury v. Franklin Cnty. ex rel. Bd. of Cnty. Comm‘rs, 90 
P.3d 1071, 1077 (Wash. 2004) (reviewing various legislative redistricting cases 
like Hickel and Acker, and concluding that the phrase ―as compact as possible‖ 
does not mean ―as small in size as possible,‖ but rather ―as regular in shape as 
possible,‖ when reviewing a local government redistricting case). 
Defining compactness geographically also conforms to the ordinary 
dictionary definition of the term.  For example, the Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate 
 
 
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Dictionary defines the word ―compact‖ as ―having a dense structure or parts or 
units closely packed or joined.‖  Black‘s Law Dictionary defines ―compact‖ as 
―closely or firmly united or packed . . . having a small surface or border in 
proportion to contents or bulk.‖  Black‘s Law Dictionary 281 (6th ed. 1990).   
The Senate asserts, however, that the term includes both a geographical 
component and a functional component and should be construed to include such 
concepts as communities of interest.  The Senate further refers this Court to other 
courts that have analyzed the term by examining functional factors such as whether 
constituents in the district are able to relate to and interact with one another, 
whether constituents in the district are able to access and communicate with their 
elected representatives, or whether the district is united by commerce, 
transportation, and communication.32 
Those cases defining compactness as a functional concept derive from states 
that, for the most part, have different constitutional provisions from those in 
Florida and discuss the numerous requirements in tandem, including contiguity, 
geographical compactness, and respecting communities of interest and common 
interests.  See, e.g., Wilson, 823 P.2d at 552 (discussing in tandem California‘s 
                                         
 
32.  Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 552 (Cal. 1992); In re 2003 Legislative 
Apportionment of House of Representatives, 827 A.2d 810, 815 (Me. 2003); In re 
Legislative Districting of State, 475 A.2d at 443; Schneider v. Rockefeller, 293 
N.E.2d 67 (N.Y. 1972); Parella v. Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226, 1252 (R.I. 2006); 
In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 
323, 330-31 (Vt. 1993). 
 
 
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state constitution‘s requirements of contiguity and geographical compactness while 
also respecting communities of interest and considering constituents‘ shared 
interests such as transportation facilities, similar work opportunities, and access to 
the same media of communication); In re 2003 Legislative Apportionment of 
House of Representatives, 827 A.2d 810, 815 (Me. 2003) (analyzing a claim where 
by statute, the apportionment plan districts were required to be a ―functionally 
contiguous and compact territory,‖ and to facilitate representation by minimizing 
impediments to travel within the district); In re Reapportionment of Towns of 
Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d at 330-31 (addressing Vermont‘s 
constitutional mandates that seek to maintain ―geographical compactness and 
contiguity‖ together with additional statutory requirements to consider and 
maintain ―patterns of geography, social interaction, trade, political ties and 
common interests‖). 
Moreover, this position appears to be at odds with the Legislature‘s prior 
position that the term ―compact‖ under the Fair Districts Amendment did not 
include factors regarding functional compactness, where courts look to 
transportation links, communication, jobs, and other aspects that involve a 
community of interest analysis.  See Initial Brief at 13-14, Fla. Dep‘t of State v. 
Fla. State Conference of NAACP Branches, 43 So. 3d 662 (Fla. 2010) (No. SC10-
1375) (―A district that becomes less compact in order to promote a community of 
 
 
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interest—or which deviates from a local boundary to further minority interests—
might reflect a rational harmonization of such relative standards.‖ (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted)). 
We conclude that the language of the Florida Constitution does not give the 
term ―compact‖ such an expansive meaning.  If we were to include ―communities 
of interest‖ within the term ―compactness,‖ the Court would be adding words to 
the constitution that were not put there by the voters of this state.  In construing the 
words used in the constitution, the Court is not at liberty to add words and terms 
that are not included in the text of the constitution.  See Pleus, 14 So. 3d at 945 
(―We remain mindful that in construing a constitutional provision, we are not at 
liberty to add words that were not placed there originally or to ignore words that 
were expressly placed there at the time of adoption of the provision.‖). 
Expanding the definition of compactness to include factors such as the 
ability to access and communicate with elected officials and their ability to relate 
and interact with one another would be contrary to the average voter‘s 
understanding of compactness and would be contrary to the usual and ordinary 
meaning of the word.  In fact, using such a broad definition of this term would 
almost read out the requirement of compactness—enlarging this term to such a 
degree that it would frustrate the will of the people in passing this constitutional 
amendment.  Accordingly, we hold that when reviewing compactness, the term 
 
 
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should be construed to mean geographical compactness. 
Our consideration of the term ―compact‖ as a geographical concept raises 
the issues of how it is to be measured and how other constitutional considerations 
will impact that measurement.  The Senate and the Attorney General again urge the 
Court not to undertake a compactness assessment because determining whether an 
apportionment plan complies with this principle exceeds the scope of this Court‘s 
limited review.  The Senate specifically contends that compactness has no precise 
definition and, further, that this Court is incapable of determining whether the 
shape of the district is irregular due to other considerations that must go into the 
apportionment process, like equal population, protecting minority voting rights, 
and utilizing geographical and political boundaries.  Since all of these policies 
must be balanced, the Senate maintains, Florida courts should simply defer to the 
Legislature‘s judgment. 
Contrary to the Senate‘s and the Attorney General‘s assertions, compactness 
does not require such a unique and factual determination that appellate courts are 
completely unable to review the matter absent a trial record.  A significant number 
of states mandate that during the apportionment process districts be drawn 
compactly, and at least fourteen of those states vest original jurisdiction to review 
 
 
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legislative apportionment in the state supreme court.33  Given that other state 
supreme courts have accomplished a similar task without much difficulty, we 
reject any suggestion that this Court lacks a similar ability to evaluate whether the 
Legislature complied with the compactness requirement in Florida.  Having made 
that determination, we decide how this Court will go about measuring 
compactness. 
As a geographical inquiry, a review of compactness begins by looking at the 
―shape of a district‖; the object of the compactness criterion is that a district should 
not yield ―bizarre designs.‖  Hickel, 846 P. 2d at 45; see also Kilbury, 90 P.3d at 
1077 (―[T]he phrase ‗as compact as possible‘ does not mean ‗as small in size as 
possible,‘ but rather ‗as regular in shape as possible.‘ ‖).  Compact districts should 
not have an unusual shape, a bizarre design, or an unnecessary appendage unless it 
is necessary to comply with some other requirement.  Hickel, 846 P.2d at 45 
(―Compact districting should not yield ‗bizarre designs.‘ ‖); Schrage, 430 N.E.2d at 
487 (―A visual examination of Representative District 89 reveals a tortured, 
                                         
 
33.  States requiring compactness and that vest original jurisdiction in the 
Supreme Court include California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, 
Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington.  
See Cal. Const. art. XXI, § 3(b); Colo. Const. art. V, § 48(e); Haw. Const. art. IV, 
§ 10; Idaho Const. art. III, § 2(5); Ill. Const. art. IV, § 3(b); Iowa Const. art. III, § 
36; Me. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 3; Md. Const. art. III, § 5; Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 
3.71, 4.262; N.J. Const. art. II, § 2, ¶ 7; Ohio Const. art. XI, § 13; Pa. Const. art. II 
§ 17(d); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 1909(a), (f); Wash. Rev. Code § 44.05.130. 
 
 
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extremely elongated form which is not compact in any sense.‖); In re Livingston, 
160 N.Y.S. 462, 469-70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1916) (noting that the challenged district 
was ―most irregular in shape [and] really grotesque,‖ and holding that ―[i]f the 
constitutional provision relating to compactness means anything, this district, as 
laid out, manifestly does not conform to it‖); see also Shaw, 509 U.S. at 635-36 
(describing a snake-like district that was drawn so bizarrely that it ―inspired poetry: 
‗Ask not for whom the line is drawn; it is drawn to avoid thee‘ ‖ (quoting Bernard 
Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: ‗When It 
Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn‘t Everything, It‘s the Only Thing‘?, 14 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 1237, 1261 n.96 (1993))). 
In addition to a visual examination of a district‘s geometric shape, 
quantitative geometric measures of compactness have been used to assist courts in 
assessing compactness.34  In fact, there is commonly used redistricting software 
that includes tools designed to measure compactness.  The House actually used two 
such measurements.  First, the House utilized the Reock method (circle-dispersion 
                                         
 
34.  See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 
455 n.2 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (―[T]wo 
standard measures of compactness are the perimeter-to-area score, which compares 
the relative length of the perimeter of a district to its area, and the smallest circle 
score, which compares the ratio of space in the district to the space in the smallest 
circle that could encompass the district.‖); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 348 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (―[C]ompactness . . . can be measured quantitatively in terms of 
dispersion, perimeter, and population ratios, and the development of standards 
would thus be possible.‖). 
 
 
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measurement), which measures the ratio between the area of the district and the 
area of the smallest circle that can fit around the district.  This measure ranges 
from 0 to 1, with a score of 1 representing the highest level of compactness as to its 
scale. 
Second, the House used the Area/Convex Hull method in its analysis, which 
measures the ratio between the area of the district and the area of the minimum 
convex bounding polygon that can enclose the district.  The measure ranges from 0 
to 1, with a score of 1 representing the highest level of compactness.  A circle, 
square, or any other shape with only convex angles has a score of 1.  Both 
measures used by the House have gained relatively broad acceptance in 
redistricting. 
Despite this Court‘s use of visual and numerical measurements of 
geographic compactness, our review of that mandate cannot be considered in 
isolation.  Other factors influence a district‘s compactness, including geography 
and abiding by other constitutional requirements such as ensuring that the 
apportionment plan does not deny the equal opportunity of racial or language 
minorities to participate in the political process or diminish their ability to elect 
representatives of their choice. 
The Florida Constitution does not mandate, and no party urges, that districts 
within a redistricting plan achieve the highest mathematical compactness scores.  
 
 
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Given Florida‘s unique shape, some of Florida‘s districts have geographical 
constraints, such as those located in the Florida Keys, that affect the compactness 
calculations.  Other times, lower compactness measurements may result from the 
Legislature‘s desire to follow political or geographical boundaries or to keep 
municipalities wholly intact.  See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Levin, 
293 A.2d 15, 19 (Pa. 1972) (―[A]ttempts to maintain the integrity of the boundaries 
of political subdivisions . . . will in reality make it impossible to achieve districts of 
precise mathematical compactness.  A great many if not most of the counties, 
cities, towns, boroughs, townships and wards in this Commonwealth have a 
geographical shape which falls far short of ideal mathematical compactness.‖). 
Thus, if an oddly shaped district is a result of this state‘s ―irregular 
geometry‖ and the need to keep counties and municipalities whole, these 
explanations may serve to justify the shape of the district in a logical and 
constitutionally permissible way.  Nevertheless, non-compact and ―bizarrely 
shaped districts‖ require close examination.  As explained by the Supreme Court of 
Alaska in Hickel, if 
―corridors‖ of land that extend to include a populated area, but not the 
less-populated land around it, [the district] may run afoul of the 
compactness requirement.  Likewise, appendages attached to 
otherwise compact areas may violate the requirement of compact 
districting. 
Hickel, 846 P. 2d at 45-46. 
 
 
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Since compactness is set forth in section 21(b), the criteria of section 21(a) 
must predominate to the extent that they conflict with drawing a district that is 
compact.  However, if a district can be drawn more compactly while utilizing 
political and geographical boundaries and without intentionally favoring a political 
party or incumbent, compactness must be a yardstick by which to evaluate those 
other factors.  Among the section 21(b) criteria, the standard for compactness is 
that the district ―shall be compact‖ without qualification. 
In sum, we hold that compactness is a standard that refers to the shape of the 
district.  The goal is to ensure that districts are logically drawn and that bizarrely 
shaped districts are avoided.  Compactness can be evaluated both visually and by 
employing standard mathematical measurements.   
c.  Utilizing Existing Political and Geographical Boundaries 
In tandem with compactness, article III, section 21(b), requires that ―districts 
shall, where feasible, utilize existing political and geographical boundaries.‖  
Unlike the mandate of compactness, this requirement is modified by the phrase 
―where feasible,‖ suggesting that in balancing this criterion with compactness, 
more flexibility is permitted.  We begin by interpreting the terms ―political and 
geographical boundaries,‖ remaining mindful that, as with all of the constitutional 
provisions, our goal is to construe the provision in ―such manner as to fulfill the 
intent of the people, never to defeat it.‖  Zingale, 885 So. 2d at 282.  Further, we 
 
 
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construe the provision by looking to the ―purpose of the provision, the evil sought 
to be remedied, and the circumstances leading to its inclusion in our constitutional 
document.‖  In re Apportionment Law—1982, 414 So. 2d at 1048. 
The interpretation given by a plurality of the Court explains the purpose of 
this provision and the proper interpretation: 
The purpose of the standards in section (2) of the proposals is to 
require legislative and congressional districts to follow existing 
community lines so that districts are logically drawn, and bizarrely 
shaped districts—such as one senate district that was challenged in 
Resolution 1987, 817 So. 2d at 824-25—are avoided.  Since the ―city‖ 
and ―county‖ terminology honors this community-based standard for 
drawing legislative and congressional boundaries, and further 
describes the standards in terms that are readily understandable to the 
average voter, we conclude that the use of different terminology does 
not render the summaries misleading. 
Standards for Establishing Legislative Dist. Boundaries, 2 So. 3d at 187-88 
(emphasis added).  In that case, we accepted the argument that the term ―political 
boundaries‖ primarily encompasses municipal or county boundaries.  The FDP 
likewise in its brief argues that the ―basic purpose of this provision is to keep 
communities together and sensibly adhere to natural boundaries across the state.‖  
Certainly, cities and counties would be existing political boundaries. 
Consistent with this approach, the House in its brief emphasizes that the 
House plan was drawn with respect for county integrity, stating as follows: 
[C]ounty lines were usually preferable to other boundaries, because 
county lines are the most readily understood, consistently compact, 
functional, and stable.  County boundaries are substantially less likely 
 
 
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to change than municipal boundaries, and—unlike municipalities—all 
counties are contiguous.  Moreover, although all Floridians have a 
home county, millions live outside any incorporated area.  
Additionally, by using a strategy of keeping counties whole, the 
House Map necessarily keeps many municipalities whole within 
districts.  And importantly, numerous Floridians advocated an 
emphasis on county boundaries at the twenty-six public meetings 
during the summer of 2011. 
House Brief at 12-13 (footnotes omitted).  The House additionally asserts that there 
is an advantage in using county lines in order to further other constitutional goals 
such as compactness: 
[T]he House‘s consistent respect for county boundaries provided the 
additional benefit of creating compact districts.  And many testified to 
the Legislature that their idea of compactness supported preserving 
county integrity where practicable.  Where county lines could not 
serve as the district line, the House relied on municipal boundaries 
and geographic boundaries such as railways, interstates, state roads, 
and rivers.  Consistent with other public testimony, the House 
resolved to draw accessible districts with understandable shapes—
without fingers, bizarre shapes, or ―rat tails.‖ 
Id. at 13-14 (citations omitted). 
On the other hand, the Senate takes the position that the ―political and 
geographical boundaries requirement directly presents the kind of ‗fact-intensive‘ 
issues that cannot be meaningfully reviewed in this truncated proceeding.‖  
Ironically, in contradiction to the position of the House, the Senate asserts that ―it 
is a ‗plain fact‘ that boundary requirements tend[] to conflict with compactness 
norms.‖  The Senate argues that the requirement of utilizing political boundaries is 
―internally inconsistent,‖ necessitating choices between political boundaries and 
 
 
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geographical boundaries.  Although the House in its brief points to the ―numerous 
Floridians‖ who advocated an emphasis on county boundaries at the twenty-six 
public meetings, the Senate does not acknowledge that public viewpoint.35 
The Senate argues that since Florida‘s Constitution provides the Legislature 
with the choice of political or geographical boundaries, the choice of boundaries 
was a matter that should be left entirely to the discretion of the Legislature.  During 
oral argument, counsel for the Senate further alleged that Florida was ―unique 
among the fifty states to count geographical boundaries.‖  In actuality, many other 
states have constitutional requirements that require the consideration of 
geographical boundaries.36  Again, consistent with the holding of other states, this 
Court is likewise able to evaluate whether the Legislature complied with that 
requirement in Florida.  Accordingly, we turn to our construction of the meaning of 
―political and geographical boundaries‖ as contained within our state constitution. 
The Senate argues for a pick-and-choose legislative discretion regarding 
                                         
 
35.  At each of the twenty-six hearings held at different locations around the 
State, the public gave recommendations for the House, Senate, and congressional 
plans, and preserving county boundaries was a common request. 
 
36.  At least five state constitutions require geographical boundaries or 
features to be considered, including Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Maryland, and 
Washington.  See, e.g., Alaska Const. art VI, § 6; Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 2, § 
1(14); Haw. Const. art. IV, § 6; Md. Const. art. III, § 4; Wash. Const. art. II, § 
43(5).  In all except Hawaii, the state constitutions also require consideration of 
political or county boundaries. 
 
 
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which boundaries to choose from, including a very broad list that encompasses not 
only easily ascertainable political boundaries, such as counties and municipalities, 
but extending even to ―man-made demarcations,‖ such as ―well-traveled 
roadways.‖  While discretion must be afforded to accommodate for well-
recognized geographical boundaries, the decision to simply use any boundary, such 
as a creek or minor road, would eviscerate the constitutional requirement—as well 
as the purpose for the requirement, which is aimed at preventing improper intent. 
The Senate‘s approach that almost anything can be a ―geographical 
boundary‖ may be why the opponents of the Senate‘s plan criticize the Senate‘s 
plan for not only lack of compactness but also for containing the same ―finger-like 
extensions,‖ ―narrow and bizarrely shaped tentacles,‖ and ―hook-like shape[s],‖ 
which are constitutionally suspect and often indicative of racial and partisan 
gerrymandering. 
We reject the Senate‘s view because it would render the new constitutional 
provision virtually meaningless and standardless.  We accept the House‘s view of 
geographical boundaries that are easily ascertainable and commonly understood, 
such as ―rivers, railways, interstates, and state roads.‖  Together with an analysis of 
compactness, an adherence to county and city boundaries as political boundaries, 
and rivers, railways, interstates and state roads as geographical boundaries will 
provide a basis for an objective analysis of the plans and the specific districts 
 
 
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drawn.  In addition, we also reject the contention that following a municipal 
boundary will necessarily violate the compactness requirement.  In a compactness 
analysis, we are reviewing the general shape of a district; if a district has a small 
area where minor adjustments are made to follow either a municipal boundary or a 
river, this would not violate compactness. 
There will be times when districts cannot be drawn to follow county lines or 
to include the entire municipalities within a district.  The City of Lakeland in its 
challenge to the Senate plan asserts a violation of this provision because the Senate 
plan splits the City of Lakeland into two state Senate districts.  We will analyze 
this argument further, but certainly not every split of a municipality will violate 
this prohibition; the constitutional directive is only that ―existing political and 
geographical boundaries‖ should be used ―where feasible.‖ 
3.  How These Standards Interact 
Having set forth the constitutional standards, we must now decide the 
appropriate framework in which to evaluate how these standards interact.  This 
includes a determination of how best to approach challenges to the joint resolution 
of apportionment. 
An examination of the explicit language used in the Florida Constitution is 
the necessary starting point for any analysis of constitutional provisions.  See 
Zingale, 885 So. 2d at 282.  The text of the constitution provides unambiguous 
 
 
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direction for the analysis of how these constitutional standards interact.  It provides 
that the tier-two standards are subordinate and shall give way where compliance 
―conflicts with the [tier-one] standards or with federal law.‖  Art. III, § 21(b), Fla. 
Const.  Although the tier-two standards are subordinate to the tier-one 
requirements, the constitution further instructs that no standard has priority over 
the other within each tier.  See art. III, § 21(c), Fla. Const.  Consequently, the 
Legislature is tasked with balancing the tier-two standards together in order to 
strike a constitutional result, but this Court remains ―sensitive to the complex 
interplay of forces that enter a legislature‘s redistricting calculus.‖  Miller, 515 
U.S. at 915-16. 
Florida‘s tier-two standards—that districts shall be as nearly equal in 
population as is practicable, shall be compact, and shall utilize existing political 
and geographical boundaries where feasible—circumscribe the Legislature‘s 
discretion in drawing district lines, requiring it to conform to traditional 
redistricting principles.  See id. at 916 (defining ―traditional‖ redistricting 
principles to include ―compactness, contiguity, and respect for political 
subdivisions‖); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959-60 (1996) (plurality opinion) 
(noting federal district court‘s conclusion that ―traditional redistricting principles‖ 
include ―natural geographical boundaries, contiguity, compactness, and conformity 
to political subdivisions‖).  Indeed, the extent to which the Legislature complies 
 
 
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with the sum of Florida‘s traditional redistricting principles serves as an objective 
indicator of the impermissible legislative purpose proscribed under tier one (i.e., 
intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent). 
In other words, the goal of the tier-two requirements is ―to guard, as far as 
practicable, under the system of representation adopted, against a legislative evil, 
commonly known as ‗gerrymander.‘ ‖  Pearson, 2012 WL 131425, at *2 (quoting 
Hitchcock, 146 S.W. at 61).  There is no question that the goal of minimizing 
opportunities for political favoritism was the driving force behind the passage of 
the Fair Districts Amendment.  See Standards for Establishing Legislative Dist. 
Boundaries, 2 So. 3d at 181 (plurality) (―The overall goal of the proposed 
amendments is to require the Legislature to redistrict in a manner that prohibits 
favoritism or discrimination, while respecting geographic considerations.‖). 
Both the Coalition and the FDP maintain that Florida‘s tier-two principles 
are not only independent constitutional requirements, but provide the Court with 
indicators of how well the Legislature complied with the tier-one criteria.  They 
allege that population deviations, lack of compactness, and failure to utilize 
political and geographical boundaries serve as tools used by the Legislature to 
engage in the intentional act of favoring (or disfavoring) a political party or an 
incumbent.  The House agrees with this position: ―Indeed, the purpose of other 
standards—such as compactness, equal population, and adherence to political 
 
 
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boundaries—was to prohibit political favoritism by constraining legislative 
discretion.‖  House Brief at 22. 
Likewise, this Court held the new standards to have ―a natural relation and 
connection,‖ all directed at the ―overall goal of . . . requir[ing] the Legislature to 
redistrict in a manner that prohibits favoritism or discrimination, while respecting 
geographic considerations.‖  Standards for Establishing Legislative Dist. 
Boundaries, 2 So. 3d at 181.  We agree that in the context of Florida‘s 
constitutional provision, a disregard for the constitutional requirements set forth in 
tier two is indicative of improper intent, which Florida prohibits by absolute terms.  
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 335 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―[I]rrational shape can serve as 
an objective indicator of an impermissible legislative purpose . . . .‖); Schrage, 430 
N.E.2d at 486 (―[C]ompactness is ‗almost universally recognized‘ as an 
appropriate anti-gerrymandering standard.‖ (quoting James M. Edwards, The 
Gerrymander and ―One Man, One Vote,‖ 46 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 879, 893 (1971))). 
As was stated in Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578, a ―desire to maintain integrity of 
various political subdivisions, insofar as possible, and provide for compact districts 
of contiguous territory‖ undermines opportunities for political favoritism.  Of 
course, the correlation between a lack of compliance with traditional redistricting 
principles and impermissible intent cannot be considered in isolation.  In addition 
to prohibiting improper intent, tier one forbids the Legislature to draw districts that 
 
 
- 96 - 
diminish minorities‘ ability to elect representatives of choice or deny minorities an 
equal opportunity to participate in the political process.  See art. III, § 21(a), Fla. 
Const.  Given this requirement, efforts to preserve or create minority districts could 
be misinterpreted as an action intended to favor (or disfavor) a political party or an 
incumbent. 
The challengers assert that minority protection has been used as a pretext for 
drawing districts with the intent to favor a political party or an incumbent.  This is, 
of course, a troubling assertion because that would frustrate rather than further the 
overarching purpose of the Fair Districts Amendment. 
In examining the reasoning behind drawing a district in a particular way, we 
remain cognizant that both federal and state minority voting-rights protections may 
require the preservation or creation of non-compact districts or may help to explain 
the shape of a challenged district.  Therefore, the reason for drawing lines a certain 
way may be the result of legitimate efforts by the Legislature to comply with 
federal law or Florida‘s tier-one imperative.  Cf. DOJ Guidance Notice,76 Fed. 
Reg. 470 at 7472 (―[C]ompliance with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act may 
require the jurisdiction to depart from strict adherence to certain of its redistricting 
criteria.‖). 
The fact that the tier-two principles expressly yield to this requirement in tier 
one demonstrates that the Florida Constitution specifically contemplates this need, 
 
 
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but only to the extent necessary.  Where it can be shown that it was possible for the 
Legislature to comply with the tier-two constitutional criteria while, at the same 
time, not diminishing minorities‘ ability to elect representatives of choice or 
denying minorities an equal opportunity to participate in the political process, the 
Legislature‘s plan becomes subject to a concern that improper intent was the 
motivating factor for the design of the district.  It is critical that the requirement to 
protect minority voting rights when drawing district lines should not be used as a 
shield against complying with Florida‘s other important constitutional imperatives; 
the Court‘s obligation is to ensure that ―every clause and every part‖ of the 
language of the constitution is given effect where ―an interpretation can be found 
which gives it effect.‖  In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at 807. 
Because compliance with the tier-two principles is objectively ascertainable, 
it provides a good starting point for analyzing challenges to the Legislature‘s joint 
resolution.  Where adherence to a tier-one requirement explains the irregular shape 
of a given district, a claim that the district has been drawn to favor or disfavor a 
political party can be defeated.  Where it does not, however, further inquiry into 
the Legislature‘s intent becomes necessary. 
In determining whether the plans are constitutionally valid, we have 
considered the role of the alternative plans submitted by the Coalition.  If an 
alternative plan can achieve the same constitutional objectives that prevent vote 
 
 
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dilution and retrogression of protected minority and language groups and also 
apportions the districts in accordance with tier-two principles so as not to disfavor 
a political party or an incumbent, this will provide circumstantial evidence of 
improper intent.  That is to say, an alternative plan that achieves all of Florida‘s 
constitutional criteria without subordinating one standard to another demonstrates 
that it was not necessary for the Legislature to subordinate a standard in its plan. 
It is with this global approach to determining the validity of the Legislature‘s 
House and Senate apportionment plans in mind that we turn to the challenges 
raised to the apportionment plans before this Court. 
C.  CHALLENGES TO THE APPORTIONMENT PLANS 
1.  General Challenges 
 
We next proceed to examine the Coalition‘s and the FDP‘s arguments that 
they claim demonstrate improper intent on the part of the Legislature in drawing 
the apportionment plans. 
a.  Partisan Imbalance as Demonstrative of Intent 
 
At the time the apportionment plans were drawn in 2012, of the 120 seats in 
the House, 39 were held by Democrats and 81 by Republicans, and of the 40 seats 
in the Senate, 12 were held by Democrats and 28 by Republicans. The position of 
Governor was held by a Republican.  The Coalition and the FDP essentially allege 
that with the Republicans in charge of drawing the apportionment plans, the plans 
 
 
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were drawn with the intent to favor the Republican Party. 
One of the primary challenges brought by the Coalition and the FDP is that a 
statistical analysis of the plans reveals a severe partisan imbalance that violates the 
constitutional prohibition against favoring an incumbent or a political party.  The 
FDP asserts that statistics show an overwhelming partisan bias based on voter 
registration and election results.  Under the circumstances presented to this Court, 
we are unable to reach the conclusion that improper intent has been shown based 
on voter registration and election results. 
 
We further note that in the two cases cited by the FDP, Arizona Minority 
Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 
208 P.3d 676 (Ariz. 2009), and Good v. Austin, 800 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. Mich. 
1992), the courts were discussing political fairness or competitiveness, not the 
intent of the drafting party to favor or disfavor a political party.  As discussed in 
Arizona Minority Coalition, 208 P.3d at 598, the Arizona Constitution requires the 
commission drafting the plan to favor competitive districts when doing so is 
practicable and would not cause significant detriment to other goals.  In Good, 800 
F. Supp. at 561-62, a federal court tasked with drawing the congressional districts 
in Michigan outlined testimony given by dueling experts in a trial, which included 
descriptions of the statistical analyses done to determine whether a plan was 
politically fair; political fairness is one of the many ―relevant secondary criteria‖ 
 
 
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recognized by federal courts in congressional apportionment.  Here, although 
effect can be an objective indicator of intent, mere effect will not necessarily 
invalidate a plan.  With this in mind, we review the FDP‘s claim that the partisan 
imbalance of the Legislature‘s plan reflects an intent to favor Republicans and to 
disfavor Democrats. 
We first address voter registration and acknowledge the reality that based on 
the 2010 general election data, of the voters in the state who registered with an 
affiliation with one of the two major parties, 53% were registered as Democrats 
and 47% were registered as Republicans.  The challengers point out that in contrast 
to the statewide statistics showing that registered Democrats outnumber 
Republicans, the Senate and House plans contain more districts in which registered 
Republicans outnumber registered Democrats than vice versa.  As of 2010, in the 
Senate plan there were 18 of 40 Senate districts (45.0%) in which registered 
Democrats outnumbered registered Republicans, and 22 Senate districts (55.0%) in 
which registered Republicans outnumbered registered Democrats.  In the House 
plan, there were 59 of 120 House districts in which the registered Democrats 
outnumber registered Republicans (49.2%), and 61 districts in which registered 
Republicans outnumber registered Democrats (50.8%). 
While Democrats outnumber Republicans statewide in voter registration, 
this fact does not lead to the conclusions asserted by the challengers that these 
 
 
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statistics demonstrate that the plans were drawn with intent to favor Republicans.  
Although there are more registered Democrats than Republicans, as of 2010, there 
were over 2.5 million voters who are not registered as Democrats or Republicans.  
Further, voter registration is not necessarily determinative of actual election 
results.  The actual election results show that the existence of more registered 
Democrats than registered Republicans statewide has not necessarily translated 
into Democratic Party victories in statewide elections.  To illustrate, Florida last 
elected a Democratic governor, Lawton Chiles, in 1994. 
In further support of their argument that the apportionment plan shows 
partisan imbalance reflective of impermissible intent to favor a political party, the 
challengers rely on actual statewide election results.  In the 2010 gubernatorial 
election, Governor Rick Scott, a Republican, received 48.7% of the overall vote 
and Alex Sink, a Democrat, 47.6% of the overall vote.  Of the major-party-
affiliated voters, Scott received 50.6% of the vote, and Sink 49.4%.  However, 
under the Senate plan, Governor Scott would have won in 26 Senate districts 
(65.0%), and Sink in 14 Senate districts (35.0%).  Similarly, under the House plan, 
Scott would have won in 73 House districts (60.8%), and Sink in 47 House 
districts (39.2%). 
In the 2008 presidential election, President Barack Obama, a Democrat, 
received 50.9% of the overall state vote and Senator John McCain, a Republican, 
 
 
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received 48.1% of the overall state vote.  Of the major-party-affiliated voters, 
51.4% voted for Obama and 48.6% for McCain.  Yet in the Senate plan, Obama 
would have won in 16 Senate districts (40.0%), while McCain would have won in 
24 Senate districts (60.0%).  Likewise, in the House plan, Obama would have won 
in 53 House districts (44.2%), while McCain would have won in 67 House districts 
(55.8%). 
 
We do not agree that the partisan imbalance in the Senate and House plans 
demonstrates an overall intent to favor Republicans in this case.  Explanations 
other than intent to favor or disfavor a political party could account for this 
imbalance.  First, it has been observed that Democrats tend to cluster in cities, 
which may result in a natural ―packing‖ effect, regardless of where the lines are 
drawn.  A plurality of the United States Supreme Court has explained: 
Whether by reason of partisan districting or not, party constituents 
may always wind up ―packed‖ in some districts and ―cracked‖ 
throughout others.  See R. Dixon, Democratic Representation 462 
(1968) (―All Districting Is ‗Gerrymandering‘ ‖); Schuck, 87 Colum. 
L. Rev. at 1359.  Consider, for example, a legislature that draws 
district lines with no objectives in mind except compactness and 
respect for the lines of political subdivisions.  Under that system, 
political groups that tend to cluster (as is the case with Democratic 
voters in cities) would be systematically affected by what might be 
called a ―natural‖ packing effect.  See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 159 
(O‘Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 289-90 (plurality).  Second, the imbalance could be a result of a 
legitimate effort to comply with VRA principles or other constitutional 
 
 
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requirements.  Although the FDP summarily argues that the partisan imbalance 
cannot be a result of such attempts, it fails to explain why. 
We reject any suggestion that the Legislature is required to compensate for a 
natural packing effect of urban Democrats in order to create a ―fair‖ plan.  We also 
reject the suggestion that once the political results of the plan are known, the 
Legislature must alter the plan to bring it more in balance with the composition of 
voters statewide.  The Florida Constitution does not require the affirmative 
creation of a fair plan, but rather a neutral one in which no improper intent was 
involved. 
Although we have rejected the challenge that statewide voter registration 
and election results demonstrate an overall intent to favor the Republican party, we 
evaluate these statistics when examining individual districts. 
b.  History of Resistance to the Amendments 
The Coalition next takes issue with the fact that the Legislature ―attempted 
every possible legal maneuver to keep the FairDistricts Amendments from 
becoming law‖ and then attempted to invalidate the congressional amendment in 
federal court.  However, evidence that the Legislature resisted efforts to make the 
new constitutional standards enforceable law does not equate to evidence that the 
Legislature would then intentionally disregard that law once it was in effect. 
c.  “Gentlemen’s Agreement” as Indicative of Intent 
 
 
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The Coalition next points to a ―gentlemen‘s agreement‖ between the House 
and Senate, by which each chamber would ―rubber stamp‖ the other chamber‘s 
plan, allowing each to protect its own incumbents without interference from the 
other.  Although the Joint Resolution was passed with both chambers voting to 
approve the other chamber‘s plan, it is uncontroverted that each chamber agreed to 
draft its own plan without input from, debate from, or interference by the other.  
The challengers assert that this ―gentlemen‘s agreement‖ is indicative of improper 
intent.  The fact that the House did not debate or amend the Senate‘s plan or that 
the Senate did not debate or amend the House plan is legally irrelevant.  From the 
beginning of the process, it was clear that each chamber would embark on its 
separate approach to redistricting, using different software and inputting different 
data.  The fact that the process occurred on two different tracks without formal 
communication or coordination between the two chambers or that there was a 
―gentlemen‘s agreement‖ does not provide circumstantial evidence of improper 
intent. 
d.  Failure to Adopt the Coalition’s Alternative Plans 
The Coalition takes issue with the Legislature‘s treatment of its proposed 
alternative plans, which the Coalition also submitted to this Court.  Specifically, 
the Coalition states that the Senate and House did not properly consider the 
Coalition‘s plans, which the Coalition argued contained less population deviation, 
 
 
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were more compact, and better utilized political and geographical boundaries.  We 
do not consider the failure of the Legislature to adopt the Coalition‘s alternative 
plans to be indicative of an improper intent. 
e.  Legislature’s Failure to Introduce Proposed Plans at Public Hearings 
In this claim, the Coalition appears to ascribe improper motive to the failure 
of the Legislature to introduce proposed apportionment plans during the public 
hearings to ensure that the plans were fully aired in public.  Although a review of 
the public hearing testimony reveals that many individuals were upset that the 
Legislature was soliciting their comments in the absence of a plan, some 
individuals recognized that there may be legitimate reasons for the Legislature‘s 
approach.  Compare Public Hrg. Tr. 1140 (―[W]hy couldn‘t the Legislature have 
come up with a map that we could then look at and see how it affects Wakulla 
County and Lafayette County and then have them testify and see what is going 
on[?]‖); Public Hrg. Tr. 1153-54 (―This process and these hearings are very 
troubling.  The Legislature has invited the public to comment, but you don‘t give 
us anything to comment on.  Where are the maps?  This isn‘t a conversation.‖); 
with Public Hrg. Tr. 1154-55 (―[I]f you would come in with maps drawn then we 
would be hearing from all of the naysayers that . . . you met in a back room, smoke 
filled room and drew the maps yourself and now you are just wanting us to rubber 
stamp them.‖); Public Hrg. Tr. 2798 (―You have correctly taken a common sense 
 
 
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approach by seeking public input before the maps are drawn and not afterwards.‖).  
More importantly, the Florida Constitution imposes no such requirement on the 
Legislature, and we conclude that this aspect of the process is not indicative of 
intent to produce partisan plans. 
Having determined that none of the above general challenges should be used 
in this facial review of the validity of the House and Senate plans, we proceed to 
analyze the compliance of the House plan as a whole with the constitutional 
standards and then examine the challenges to the individual House districts.  We 
then analyze the Senate plan and districts in the same manner. 
2.  The House Plan 
a.  Overall Challenges 
Tier-One Requirements 
Intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent.  The first 
requirement that we address in looking at the overall plan is this important 
constitutional requirement, the purpose of which is to prevent the drawing of 
districts designed to protect a political party or an incumbent.  We see no overall 
objective indicia of improper intent with respect to the House plan.  It is 
undisputed that the House plan pits both Democratic and Republican incumbents 
against each other.  While we recognize that the new districts on average retain 
59.7% of the population of their predecessor districts, this fact standing alone does 
 
 
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not demonstrate intent to favor incumbents. 
Finally, as discussed below, the House plan has complied with the tier-two 
standards, making improper intent less likely.  Indeed, the purpose of the tier-two 
standards—equal population, compactness, and utilizing political and geographical 
boundaries—is to prohibit political favoritism by constraining legislative 
discretion. 
Florida minority voting protection provision.  The FDP generally alleges 
that the House plan improperly over-packs black voters into minority districts to 
dilute their vote elsewhere.  To the extent this argument is made, it is without 
merit.  Under the House plan, there are twelve black majority-minority districts37 
and sixteen Hispanic majority-minority districts.38  None of the black majority-
minority districts is a super-majority district requiring the Legislature to ―unpack‖ 
it on this record.  As to the sixteen Hispanic majority-minority House districts, 
                                         
 
37.  These House districts, with their corresponding black voting-age 
populations (VAPs) are as follows: District 8 (50.0%), District 13 (50.7%), District 
14 (50.7%), District 46 (52.1%), District 61 (51.3%), District 88 (51.8%), District 
94 (54.6%), District 95 (57.7%), District 102 (52.1%), District 107 (56.9%), 
District 108 (62.9%), and District 109 (50.6%). 
 
38.  These House districts, with their corresponding Hispanic voting-age 
populations are as follows: District 43 (54.9%), District 48 (53.0%), District 62 
(51.9%), District 87 (50.0%), District 103 (82.1%), District 105 (69.0%), District 
110 (89.5%), District 111 (93.0%), District 112 (73.0%), District 113 (66.8%), 
District 114 (66.0%), District 115 (65.5%), District 116 (84.4%), District 117 
(55.2%), District 118 (81.2%), and District 119 (86.8%). 
 
 
- 108 - 
eleven do have large percentages: District 103 (82.1%), District 105 (69.0%), 
District 110 (89.5%), District 111 (93.0%), District 112 (73.0%), District 113 
(66.8%), District 114 (66.0%), District 115 (65.5%), District 116 (84.4%), District 
118 (81.2%), and District 119 (86.8%).  These high percentages could be explained 
by the fact that the Hispanic population in Miami-Dade County, where these 
districts are located, is densely populated.  The challengers have failed to establish 
that another majority-minority district for either black or Hispanic voters 
potentially could have been created.  We conclude that on this record, any facial 
claim regarding vote dilution under Florida‘s constitution fails.  While the Court 
does not rule out the potential that a violation of the Florida minority voting 
protection provision could be established by a pattern of overpacking minorities 
into districts where other coalition or influence districts could be created, this 
Court is unable to make such a determination on this record.  
To the extent that the opponents contend that the overall House plan 
amounts to retrogression under the Florida Constitution, we conclude that this 
argument is also without merit.  The record reveals that the House undertook a 
functional analysis when drawing its plan in order to guard against retrogression.  
As to black majority and crossover House districts, the fact that there is one fewer 
black crossover district as compared to the benchmark plan does not alter this 
conclusion because one additional black majority-minority district has emerged 
 
 
- 109 - 
from a previously existing crossover district.  Apportionment plans that increase 
minority voting strength are entitled to preclearance under Section 5, see Ashcroft, 
539 U.S. at 477, and we conclude that the same principle applies under Florida 
law. 
With respect to House districts with sizeable Hispanic populations, we 
likewise conclude that there has been no unconstitutional retrogression under the 
Florida Constitution.  Because three new Hispanic majority-minority districts have 
emerged from previously existing influence or crossover districts, the Hispanic 
influence in the remaining number of districts has shifted.  No challenger has 
established or alleged that this change has affected the Hispanic voters‘ ability to 
elect a person of their choice in the respective districts. 
  
Contiguity.  No party challenges contiguity as to the House plan.  Upon a 
review of the plan, we conclude that this plan does not violate the contiguity 
requirement under article III, sections 16(a) and 21(a), of the Florida Constitution. 
Tier-Two Requirements 
 
Equal population.  In looking at this constitutional requirement, the 2010 
census data shows that Florida has a total population of 18,801,310, and the ideal 
population for each House district is 156,678 individuals.  The most populated 
district in the House plan is District 75, which has a population of 159,978 (an 
additional 3,300 individuals than the ideal, or a deviation of 2.11%), and the least 
 
 
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populated district is District 76, which has a population of 153,745 (2,933 fewer 
individuals than the ideal, or a deviation of -1.87%).  Thus, the total deviation is 
3.97%.  This is 1.18% higher than the 2.79% population deviation the Court 
approved in 2002. 
 
The House aptly acknowledges that ―[c]onsiderations of compactness and 
emphasis on county integrity, of course, had to be weighed against other 
considerations, including population equality.‖  For example, the House explains 
that it set a population deviation upper limit that would allow Charlotte County, 
whose population deviated only slightly from the ideal, to remain whole. 
Compactness.  A visual inspection of the plan reveals that it as a whole 
appears to be compact and that only a few districts are highly irregular.  A visual 
inspection of the plan reveals that there are districts that are clearly less compact 
than other districts, with visually unusual shapes.  These include Districts 70, 88, 
and 117.  Under the House plan, only three districts have significantly low 
compactness scores using both Reock and Area/Convex Hull: House Districts 88, 
117, and 120.  We note that Districts 70, 88, and 117 are majority-minority or 
minority-opportunity districts, and they are discussed more thoroughly below in 
conjunction with challenges to individual districts.  We also note that District 120 
includes the unusual geography of the Florida Keys and will therefore necessarily 
score low on the compactness scales. 
 
 
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Political and geographical boundaries.  The House explains that in 
considering the appropriate balance of equal population, compactness, and 
adherence to existing boundaries, it emphasized county integrity while adhering to 
other tier-two standards.  As explained in the House‘s brief: ―Where practicable, it 
sought to keep counties whole within districts, or to wholly locate districts within 
counties, depending on county populations.  Where not feasible, the House sought 
to ‗anchor‘ districts within a county—tying the geography representing a majority 
or plurality of the district‘s residents to one county.‖  The House also considered 
municipal boundaries and geographical features, but decided that ―county lines 
were usually preferable to other boundaries.‖  The underlying reason for this 
approach as expressed in the House‘s brief was that 
[c]ounty boundaries are substantially less likely to change than 
municipal boundaries, and—unlike municipalities—all counties are 
contiguous.  Moreover, although all Floridians have a home county, 
millions live outside any incorporated area.  Additionally, by using a 
strategy of keeping counties whole, the House Map necessarily keeps 
many municipalities whole within districts.  And importantly, 
numerous Floridians advocated an emphasis on county boundaries at 
the twenty-six public meetings during the summer of 2011. 
(Footnote omitted.)  A review of the House plan reveals that it consistently used 
county boundaries where feasible, leaving thirty-seven of sixty-seven counties 
whole. 
The House further explained that ―[w]here county lines could not serve as 
the district line, the House relied on municipal boundaries and geographic 
 
 
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boundaries such as railways, interstates, state roads, and rivers.‖  As previously 
discussed, we have adopted the House‘s view of geographical boundaries as those 
that are easily ascertainable and commonly understood (e.g., rivers, railways, 
interstates, and state roads). 
Conclusion as to Overall Challenges to the House Plan 
A review of the House plan and the record reveals that the House engaged in 
a consistent and reasoned approach, balancing the tier-two standards by 
endeavoring to make districts compact and as nearly equal in population as 
possible, and utilizing political and geographical boundaries where feasible by 
endeavoring to keep counties and cities together where possible.  Although the 
House plan has a higher population deviation than in the past, the House has 
explained that this deviation was necessary to achieve other required objectives, 
such as consistent use of county boundaries.  The House further asserts that its 
―consistent respect for county boundaries provided the additional benefit of 
creating compact districts.‖ 
In addition, the House approached the minority voting protection provision 
by properly undertaking a functional analysis of voting strength in minority 
districts.  A facial review of the House plan reveals no dilution or retrogression 
under the Florida Constitution.  Further, we find no objective plan-wide indicia of 
improper attempt to favor or disfavor a political party or incumbent. 
 
 
- 113 - 
b.  Challenges to Individual House Districts 
We discuss the challenges to the individual House districts in turn.  We 
conclude that the challengers have not demonstrated that any of these districts 
violate the Florida Constitution. 
House District 38 
The FDP summarily alleges that District 38 retains a high percentage of the 
population from its predecessor district in order to benefit the incumbent in that 
district.  However, the FDP does not point to any additional indicators of improper 
intent, and we deny this claim. 
House District 70 
The FDP contends that District 70 is non-compact and fails to utilize 
boundaries because it cuts across four counties (Pinellas, Hillsborough, Manatee, 
and Sarasota) as well as three major metropolitan areas (St. Petersburg, Bradenton, 
and Sarasota) and splits the town of Palmetto.  The FDP also contends that District 
70 is overly packed with minorities and that the House should have drawn the 
district with more natural boundary lines in order to allow those minorities to have 
a greater influence in neighboring District 71.  The Coalition, on the other hand, 
raises no objection to this district. 
District 70 is a black-opportunity district (black VAP of 45.1%; Hispanic 
VAP of 15.3%).  It extends into four counties, taking in the areas with the highest 
 
 
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concentration of minorities from St. Petersburg, Bradenton, and Sarasota.  
Significantly, part of District 70 extends into Hillsborough County, which is a 
covered jurisdiction under Section 5 of the VRA, and must obtain preclearance 
from the DOJ.  District 70 is depicted below. 
 
District 70 is strikingly similar to its predecessor district, old District 55, 
which has a black VAP of 49.4% and a Hispanic VAP of 13.6% and which also 
reached into St. Petersburg, Bradenton, and Sarasota.  In adopting District 70, the 
Legislature stated that its intent was to comply with Section 5 of the VRA: 
[I]t is the intent of the Legislature to establish State House District 70, 
which is consistent with Section 5 of the federal Voting Rights Act; 
does not deny or abridge the equal opportunity of racial or language 
minorities to participate in the political process or diminish their 
ability to elect representatives of their choice . . . . 
 
 
- 115 - 
Fla. S.J. Res. 1176, at 22 (Reg. Sess. 2012) (SJR 1176). 
Tier-two requirements must yield when necessary to comply with federal 
law (here, Section 5 of the VRA) and Florida‘s minority voting protection 
provision.  Although the FDP summarily asserts that District 70 is overly packed 
with minorities and that it could have been drawn differently to be more compact 
and to better utilize boundaries, the FDP has not demonstrated that this can be done 
without causing retrogression. 
House District 88 
The FDP contends that District 88, located near the east coast of Palm Beach 
County, was drawn to benefit the Republican Party under the guise of preserving 
that district as a black majority-minority district.  To prove this point, the FDP 
claims that new District 88 is the least compact of all the House districts, asserting 
that non-compact districts are often a sign of partisan gerrymanders.  The 
Coalition, on the other hand, does not challenge this district. 
District 88 is an odd-shaped, long, and thin district with jagged edges.  It is 
contained entirely in Palm Beach County, running adjacent to coastal District 89 
through the county, stretching from Lake Park and Riviera Beach south to Delray 
Beach. 
 
 
- 116 - 
 
District 88 is clearly visually non-compact, and the compactness measures confirm 
this with a Reock score of 0.08 and an Area/Convex Hull score of 0.34.  Under 
either scale, this district has the lowest compactness measurements of all the 
districts in the 2012 House plan. 
District 88 is a black majority-minority district, with a black VAP of 51.8%.  
The predecessor to District 88, old District 84 in the benchmark plan, was also a 
black majority-minority district, with a black VAP of 53.5%.  This district was 
drawn differently in 2002, oriented westward and inland from West Palm Beach 
rather than southward. 
The Legislature formed this district with the stated intent to preserve 
 
 
- 117 - 
minority voting opportunities.  The Legislature explained that its intent was 
to establish State House District 88, which is consistent with Section 2 
of the federal Voting Rights Act; does not deny or abridge the equal 
opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the 
political process or diminish their ability to elect representatives of 
their choice; is more compact than the comparable district in the 
benchmark plan; is nearly equal in population as practicable . . . . 
SJR 1176 at 27.  The House Staff Analysis further explains that ―Palm Beach 
County has produced a majority-minority Black district in years past and this 
district recreates that opportunity.  However, this district does it in a different 
manner than the current district.‖  Fla. H. Comm. on Reapp., CS/HJR 6011 (2012) 
Staff Analysis at 33-34 (Jan. 30, 2012) (House Staff Analysis). 
The tier-two requirement of compactness must yield if it conflicts with the 
requirement to adhere to Florida‘s minority voting protection provision.  Here, the 
record reflects that the House considered this interplay.  When questioned about 
whether this district violated the compactness requirement, the record shows the 
House determined that the configuration of District 88 was more compact than the 
configuration of its predecessor district and more compact than two potential 
alternatives.  Further, the House conducted an analysis of the voting behavior of 
minority districts.  The FDP does not assert or demonstrate that the district can be 
drawn more compactly while also adhering to Florida‘s minority voting protection 
provision.  Accordingly, this claim fails. 
House District 99 
 
 
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The Coalition alleges that the Legislature drew District 99 with the intent to 
disfavor a black Democratic incumbent who currently represents District 93 under 
the 2002 House plan, a black majority-minority district with a black VAP of 
50.9%.  Old District 93 is now the equivalent of District 94, which remains a black 
majority-minority district (black VAP of 54.6%) under the 2012 House plan.  The 
Coalition contends that the incumbent‘s residence was intentionally placed one 
block outside of his current district and instead placed in District 99, which 
neighbors new District 94 to the south, to pit him against another Democratic 
incumbent.  Our review reveals that he has indeed now been drawn into District 
99, a majority-white district (white VAP of 54.3% and Hispanic VAP of 29.1%). 
 
However, this may be incidental to wide-sweeping changes made by the 
House in this region of the state.  As compared to the 2002 plan, the 2012 House 
plan is much more compact with respect to District 94 and its neighboring districts.  
The 2002 and 2012 plans for this region of the state are depicted below. 
 
 
- 119 - 
 
 
The Coalition does not contend that the districts violate the standards of equal 
population, compactness, or utilizing political and geographical boundaries.  We 
conclude that there are no objective indicia of intent to disfavor an incumbent on 
this record. 
House Districts 100, 101, 102, 103, and 105 
The FDP generally alleges that Districts 100, 101, 102, 103, and 105 do not 
utilize political boundaries because they cut through various cities in Miami-Dade 
 
 
- 120 - 
County.  The FDP also alleges that District 105 divides three counties and 
therefore fails to utilize political boundaries.  The area is depicted below: 
 
While these House districts do cut through multiple cities, they keep other cities 
intact.  Importantly, this area of Miami-Dade County is heavily and densely 
populated with numerous cities adjacent to each other. 
Moreover, the minority voting protection provision comes into play, because 
several of the objected-to districts are minority districts.  District 101 is a black and 
Hispanic coalition district (black VAP of 36.4% and Hispanic VAP of 33.7%).  
District 102 is a black majority-minority district with a black VAP of 52.1%.  
District 103 is a Hispanic majority-minority district with a Hispanic VAP of 
 
 
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82.1%.  The FDP has not shown that it was feasible for the Legislature to keep 
more municipalities together in this heavily populated area while comporting with 
Florida‘s minority voting protection provision. 
District 105 is located in Collier, Broward, and Miami-Dade Counties; it is a 
Hispanic majority-minority district with a Hispanic VAP of 69.0%.  The 
predecessor to District 105 (old District 112) was also a Hispanic majority-
minority district with a Hispanic VAP of 71.4%.  Collier County, a county in 
which part of District 105 is located, is one of the five Florida counties that must 
obtain preclearance from the DOJ under Section 5 of the VRA.  As previously 
explained, Section 5 prohibits diminishing a minority group‘s ability to elect the 
representative of its choice; however, it differs from Florida‘s minority voting 
protection provision in terms of territory covered.  It therefore alters the 
geographical scope of the retrogression analysis.  Because Section 5 applies only to 
the five covered counties, it protects from retrogression minority voting strength in 
only those counties.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.  Therefore, Section 5 is violated 
unless the ability of a minority group to elect a representative of its choice in that 
covered county does not diminish.  District 105‘s predecessor also included 
portions of Collier County and drew from Hispanic populations in Miami-Dade 
and Broward Counties.  As explained by the House Staff Analysis: ―A similarly 
built district [to District 105] has been a majority-minority Hispanic district in 
 
 
- 122 - 
years past and this district recreates that opportunity.‖  House Staff Analysis at 35. 
The FDP has not demonstrated that it was feasible for the Legislature to 
configure District 105 differently while comporting with Section 5 of the VRA and 
Florida‘s minority voting protection provision. 
House Districts 115 and 117 
The FDP summarily alleges that Districts 115 and 117, both of which are 
located in Miami-Dade County, are non-compact and do not utilize political and 
geographical boundaries.  Districts 115 and 117 are Hispanic majority-minority 
districts, with Hispanic VAPs of 65.5% and 55.2%, respectively.  District 117 also 
has a black VAP of 37.0%.  We have recognized that the tier-two requirements of 
compactness and utilizing existing political and geographical boundaries must 
yield when necessary in order to avoid conflict with tier-one requirements.  The 
FDP does not allege how either district could be drawn differently to be more 
compact without violating Florida‘s minority voting protection provision.  
Accordingly, the FDP has failed to satisfy its burden of proof with respect to these 
two districts. 
c.  Conclusion as to the House Plan 
We conclude that the Coalition and the FDP have not successfully 
demonstrated that the House plan violates one or more of the constitutional 
standards.  In making this determination, we have reviewed the challenges to the 
 
 
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House plan as a whole and the challenges to individual districts.  Based on the 
nature of the review that this Court is able to perform in a facial challenge, we find 
that there has been no demonstrated violation of the constitutional standards in 
article III, section 21, and we conclude that the House plan is facially valid. 
3.  The Senate Plan 
a.  Overall Challenges 
 
In reviewing the Senate plan, we begin by evaluating overall adherence to 
the constitutional requirements.  Then we evaluate a claim that the Senate plan was 
renumbered for the purpose of favoring incumbents by allowing them to be eligible 
to serve for longer than they would have otherwise.  Finally, we consider the 
challenges to individual districts brought by the Coalition, the FDP, and the City of 
Lakeland.  We emphasize that our analysis takes into consideration both the overall 
challenges and the results of our analysis of challenges to individual districts.  In 
addition, in looking at the approach used in developing the Senate plan, where 
appropriate, we compare it to the approach used in developing the House plan, 
which we have upheld.  We make that comparison not because the process used by 
the House and its approach on compliance with the standards is the only way to 
approach apportionment, but because overall the House‘s approach to ensuring 
compactness and utilizing consistent political and geographical boundaries led to a 
plan that has withstood the challenges to its validity.  Further, the House‘s use of 
 
 
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political and elections data to engage in protecting minority districts allowed the 
House to engage in the appropriate functional analysis of the districts.  Finally, we 
note that the process employed by the House included openly considering different 
plans that the Redistricting Subcommittee analyzed for factors such as 
compactness and note the fact that the House plan pits incumbents against one 
another. 
Tier-One Requirements 
 
Intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent.  In 
evaluating the Senate plan, we first address this important constitutional 
requirement, the purpose of which is to prevent the drawing of a plan or districts 
designed to protect a political party or an incumbent.  We conclude that the Senate 
plan is rife with objective indicators of improper intent which, when considered in 
isolation do not amount to improper intent, but when viewed cumulatively 
demonstrate a clear pattern. 
First, the Coalition alleges that the Senate plan does not pit incumbents 
against each other, and the Senate has not contested this.  This Court was provided 
with the addresses of 21 incumbents and has confirmed that of the addresses 
provided, none of the incumbents would run against another incumbent. 
Second, the new districts on average are composed of 64.2% of their 
predecessor districts.  While this percentage is just an average, our below analysis 
 
 
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of the individual district challenges reveals that at least some incumbents appear to 
have been given large percentages of their prior constituencies.  These percentages 
are of even greater concern given that the 2002 Senate plan was drawn at a time 
when intent to favor a political party or an incumbent was permissible and there 
were no requirements of compactness or utilizing existing boundaries. 
Third, as discussed further below, the Senate admittedly renumbered the 
Senate plan in order to allow incumbents to be eligible to serve longer than they 
would have otherwise.  Not only do we conclude that this renumbering was 
improper as it was intended to favor incumbents, but we note that the renumbering 
process indicates that the Senate specifically considered incumbent information 
when renumbering the districts. 
Fourth, although we do not consider the partisan balance of the plan as 
evidence of intent, the FDP alleges that the 2012 Senate plan has two fewer 
Democratic districts than the 2002 plan based on voter registration.  However, 
because voter registration alone is not an accurate measure of how districts 
perform, we do not consider this as conclusive evidence of improper intent.  
Fifth, the majority (70.0%) of under-populated districts are Republican-
performing districts when the 2010 gubernatorial and 2008 presidential elections 
are considered.  Population deviations are at the heart of the requirement of one-
person, one-vote, which generally requires that district populations be nearly equal 
 
 
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to ensure that every individual‘s vote counts as much as any other‘s.  Under-
populated districts are comparatively over-represented.  Thus, it appears that under 
the Senate plan, individuals residing in Republican-performing districts are over-
represented as compared to individuals living in Democratic-performing districts. 
 
Florida’s minority voting protection provision.  The FDP and the 
Coalition contend that the Senate‘s overall plan amounts to vote dilution and 
retrogression under the Florida Constitution.  The Coalition further asserts that 
when engaging in its retrogression analysis, the Senate interpreted Florida‘s 
provision too strictly by limiting the data upon which it relied and failing to 
conduct the required functional analysis.  While this failure is relevant to other 
defects in the plan, we conclude on this record that the Senate plan does not 
facially dilute a minority group‘s voting strength or cause retrogression under 
Florida law. 
 
No opponent has demonstrated that the Senate plan facially dilutes minority 
voting strength as a whole under the Florida Constitution.  The FDP has not 
submitted any alternative plans, and the Coalition‘s alternative Senate plan does 
not demonstrate that an additional majority-minority district can be created.  While 
the Court does not rule out the potential that a violation of the Florida minority 
voting protection provision could be established by a pattern of overpacking 
minorities into districts where other coalition or influence districts could be 
 
 
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created, this Court is unable to make such a determination on this record. 
Nor has any challenger demonstrated that the Senate plan retrogresses as a 
whole under Florida law.  There are as many Senate minority districts as there 
were under the 2002 Senate benchmark plan with what appears to be 
commensurate voting ability.  Although there is one fewer Hispanic influence 
district, there are now two additional Hispanic majority-minority districts when 
compared to the 2002 benchmark.  Districts that increase minority voting strength 
when compared to the benchmark are entitled to preclearance under Section 5, see 
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 477, and we conclude that the same principle applies under 
Florida law. 
 
Contiguity.  The FDP contends that the Senate plan ―stretches [contiguity] 
to its limits,‖ but notably does not argue that any of districts under the Senate plan 
are not contiguous.  In looking at the Senate plan, it is clear that this plan does not 
violate the contiguity requirement under article III, sections 16(a) and 21(a), of the 
Florida Constitution. 
Tier-Two Requirements 
 
Equal population.  In looking at this constitutional requirement, the 2010 
census data shows that Florida has a total population of 18,801,310, and the ideal 
population for each Senate district is 470,033 individuals.  The most populated 
district in the Senate plan is District 3, which has a population of 474,685 (an 
 
 
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additional 4,652 individuals, or a deviation of 0.99%), and the least populated 
district is District 23, which has a population of 465,343 (4,690 fewer individuals 
or a deviation of -1.00%).  Thus, the total deviation is 1.99%.  As to Florida‘s 
standard, we must view the population deviation in conjunction with the other tier-
two standards.39 
Compactness.  The Senate contends that the Court should find that the 
Senate plan is facially compact because the plan is now more compact than the 
2002 plan.  We reject this comparison as evidence of compliance because the 2002 
Senate plan had no requirement for compactness and thus cannot serve as an 
adequate benchmark in establishing adherence to the newly added compactness 
requirement. 
A visual inspection of the plan reveals a number of districts that are clearly 
less compact than other districts, with visually bizarre and unusual shapes.  These 
                                         
 
39.  Citing Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 2004), 
aff‘d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004), the FDP also raises a separate claim as to equal 
population, arguing that the Senate plan deviates from equal population not to 
serve any rational purpose, but rather to discriminate against Democrats, 
minorities, and certain regions of the state.  The FDP argues that this is done by 
systematically over-populating Democratic and minority districts.  Having 
examined the numbers, we conclude that the FDP has not established a violation of 
the equal population provision on this basis alone.  This case stands in contrast to 
Larios, where the population deviations were only barely within the 10% overall 
range and the evidence was clear that the deviation was the result of the 
Legislature‘s belief that the 10% overall range was a ―safe harbor,‖ within which it 
could engage in a systematic and express strategy to over-represent rural areas and 
Democrats, the party in power. 
 
 
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districts include Districts 1, 3, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19, 27, 29, 30, and 34.  Districts 
with the lowest Reock and Area/Convex Hull scores are Districts 1, 6, 12, 19, 34, 
and 40.  As explained above in our discussion of the standards, we reject the 
Senate‘s definition of compactness as including communities of interest. 
 
Political and geographical boundaries.  Unlike the House, the Senate did 
not use any consistent definition of political and geographical boundaries.  Some 
districts adhere to county boundaries (e.g., District 5), while others freely split 
counties and follow a variety of roads and waterways, including minor residential 
roads and creeks (e.g., District 1).  In some districts, the Senate constantly 
switched between different types of boundaries within the span of a few miles. 
Conclusion as to Overall Challenges to the Senate Plan 
We recognize that the Senate did not have the benefit of our opinion when 
drawing its plan.  However, it is clear from a facial review of the Senate plan that 
the ―pick and choose‖ method for existing boundaries was not balanced with the 
remaining tier-two requirements, and certainly not in a consistent manner.  We 
again note that while the existing boundaries requirement is stated as ―where 
feasible‖ and the equal population requirement is stated in terms of ―as is 
practicable,‖ the compactness requirement does not contain those modifiers; rather, 
the constitutional expression is that ―districts shall be compact.‖  The concept of 
―communities of interest‖ is not part of the constitutional term ―compactness.‖ 
 
 
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Although we hold that the Senate plan does not facially dilute or retrogress 
under Florida law as a whole, we further conclude that the Senate failed to conduct 
a functional analysis as to retrogression in order to properly determine when, and 
to what extent, the tier-two requirements must yield in order to avoid conflict with 
Florida‘s minority voting protection provision.  Although the Senate touts its 
adherence to the recommendations of the Florida NAACP and LatinoJustice 
PRLDEF regarding minority districts, this does not absolve the Senate of its 
independent responsibility to draw an apportionment plan that adheres to all of the 
constitutional requirements. 
The record is clear that in drawing districts for the 2012 apportionment 
cycle, the Senate employed an incorrect and incomplete retrogression analysis.  
Based on the record, the Senate formulated its apportionment plan without 
reference to election results or voter-registration and political party data; instead, it 
relied on voting-age population data and attempted to maintain the core of a new 
Senate district‘s predecessor district (which the Senate apparently knew had 
performed for a certain minority group in the past).40  Although it was 
                                         
 
40.  See Senate Brief at 1 (―Staff prepared the proposal without reference to 
election results [or] voter-registration data . . . .‖); id. at 4 (―The Senate also 
formulated the Senate Plan without reference to political party [or] voter 
registration . . . data . . . .‖); Senate Comm. on Reapportionment Hrg. Tr. 6323-26 
(Dec. 6, 2011) (explaining the use of voting-age population, but not the use of data 
regarding registered voters or election results); Senate Floor Debate Tr. 6613 (Jan. 
17, 2012) (statement by the Chair of the Senate Committee on Reapportionment 
 
 
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acknowledged during the February 9, 2012, Senate floor debate that the use of 
voter and election performance data to safeguard minority voting opportunities is 
consistent with accepted practice in other states and is a data set that the DOJ uses 
when evaluating whether to preclear a covered jurisdiction under Section 5 of the 
VRA, it was also stated that the Senate need not rely on such data when 
undertaking its retrogression analysis.  Not only does this position ignore the 
DOJ‘s guidance on this issue requiring a functional approach, see DOJ Guidance 
Letter, at 7471 (―[C]ensus data alone may not provide sufficient indicia of electoral 
behavior to make the requisite determination.‖), but it has been squarely rejected 
by at least one federal court.  See Texas, 2011 WL 6440006, at *12 (―[S]imple 
voting-age population analysis cannot accurately measure minorities‘ ability to 
elect and, therefore, Texas misjudged which districts offer its minority citizens the 
ability to elect their preferred candidates in both its benchmark and proposed 
Plans.‖).  As a result, the Senate did not properly consider when tier-two 
                                                                                                                                   
that to prevent backsliding, the Senate looked at the 2002 Senate plan and used 
voting-age population numbers to maintain majority-minority districts); id. at 6758 
(statement by the Senate reapportionment committee chair that voting-age 
population rather than voting performance data were used); Senate Floor Debate 
Tr. 6831-33 (Feb. 9, 2012) (acknowledging that House used voter performance 
data to create effective minority-opportunity districts, but stating that the Senate 
―saw no need for this type of information‖ because it ―know[s] that [its] minority 
opportunity districts do not diminish minority voting strength‖ by (1) preserving 
minority opportunity districts with little statistical/geographical change to ensure 
continued undiminished ability, and (2) following the districts proposed by the 
Florida NAACP and LatinoJustice organizations). 
 
 
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requirements must yield in order to avoid conflict with Florida‘s minority voting 
protection provision. 
Finally, applying expansive definitions to the tier-two standards and failing 
to follow a consistent approach in applying the standards undermine the purpose of 
article III, section 21, which was intended to restrict legislative discretion in an 
effort to level the playing field and to prevent gerrymandering.  See Pearson, 2012 
WL 131425, at *2 (explaining that the purpose of constitutional requirements that 
districts be contiguous, compact, and nearly equal in population is ―to guard, as far 
as practicable, under the system of representation adopted, against a legislative 
evil, commonly known as ‗gerrymander‘ ‖ (quoting Hitchcock, 146 S.W. at 61)). 
A review of the individual districts, discussed below, reveals constitutional 
violations.  These districts illustrate the Senate‘s inconsistent approach as to the 
tier-two standards and the ramifications of the failure to conduct a functional 
analysis as to retrogression. 
b.  Numbering Scheme 
We first address the numbering of the Senate plan.  With respect to 
numbering, the Florida Constitution states only that Senate districts shall be 
―consecutively numbered.‖  Art. III, § 16(a), Fla. Const.  However, because the 
Constitution requires that Senate terms must be staggered, the number of a Senate 
district determines the years in which elections must be held for that district.  See 
 
 
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art. III, § 15(a), Fla. Const.  Here, the issue we must address is whether the Senate 
districts were renumbered with the intent to favor incumbents, in violation of 
article III, section 21(a).  Specifically, the Coalition contends that by renumbering 
the apportionment plan so that incumbents eligible for reelection in 2012 would 
receive a chance to serve for a maximum of ten years, rather than eight, the Senate 
plan violates the prohibition on favoring incumbents. 
Unquestionably, the numbering of a Senate district, whether given an odd or 
even number, directly affects the length of time a senator may serve.  See art. III, § 
15(a), Fla. Const.  Article III, section 15(a), provides for staggered Senate terms.  
In accordance with that requirement, the constitution requires Senate elections to 
occur in particular districts in alternating general election years, with the year of 
the election to be determined by whether the district is designated by an odd or 
even number.  Id. (―Senators shall be elected for terms of four years, those from 
odd-numbered districts in the years the numbers of which are multiples of four and 
those from even-numbered districts in even-numbered years the numbers of which 
are not multiples of four.‖).  The constitution further provides that ―at the election 
next following a reapportionment, some senators shall be elected for terms of two 
years when necessary to maintain staggered terms.‖  Id. 
Moreover, any senator who represents a district where a change in the 
district lines has resulted in a change in constituency must stand for reelection in 
 
 
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the next general election after reapportionment.  In our decision on the validity of 
the apportionment plan in 1982, we addressed the effect of reapportionment on 
―holdover Senate terms‖ as part of our ―jurisdiction to resolve all issues . . . arising 
under Article III, section 16(c).‖  In re Apportionment Law—1982, 414 So. 2d at 
1045.  In that case, senators in several odd-numbered districts were elected to four-
year terms in 1980.  The question before this Court was whether the provisions of 
article III, section 15(a), required that the terms of these senators be truncated to 
two years or whether the terms would hold over until the next scheduled election 
for those districts in 1984.  Id. at 1046.  We concluded that ―the Florida 
Constitution, by its provisions, requires, upon reapportionment, that senate terms 
be truncated when a geographic change in district lines results in a change to the 
district‘s constituency.‖  Id. at 1047-48.  Our conclusion was based on the 
language of article III, section 1, which mandates that senators be elected from the 
districts they represent, as well as the final clause of article III, section 15(a).  Id. at 
1050.  Thus, whether a Senate district is given an even or odd number determines 
both whether a senator will serve a two-year term or a four-year term prior to 
reapportionment and whether the senator will serve a two-year term upon election 
following the reapportionment. 
In 2002, the Court rejected the argument of several challengers who asserted 
that ―the newly created Senate districts are invalid because the Legislature changed 
 
 
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the numbering of the newly created Senate districts from the existing Senate 
districts in order to circumvent the constitutional legislative term limit 
provisions. ‖  In re Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 2d at 831.  In rejecting the 
claim, the Court ―conclude[d] that the theoretical possibility that some current 
senators may be able to serve ten years in the Florida Senate is not a sufficiently 
important dependent matter arising under article III, section 16, Florida 
Constitution, that we should address it at this time.‖  Id. 
The question we must first answer is whether, as a result of the new 
requirements in article III, section 21(a), prohibiting apportionment plans that have 
the intent of favoring incumbents, the numbering of Senate districts is now a 
matter for this Court‘s review under article III, section 16.  In light of the addition 
of the article III, section 21(a), provision that no ―apportionment plan . . . shall be 
drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor . . . an incumbent,‖ the challengers assert 
that the Senate‘s apportionment plan was renumbered for the benefit of 
incumbents, in violation of the Florida Constitution.  The Senate has asserted that 
the provisions of article III, section 21, apply only to the drawing of district lines 
and not the numbering scheme. 
We reject the Senate‘s assertion that numbering is excluded from the 
evaluation under the standards set forth in article III, section 21.  This Court 
―endeavors to construe a constitutional provision consistent with the intent of the 
 
 
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framers and the voters.‖  Zingale, 885 So. 2d at 282; see also Gray, 125 So. 2d at 
852.  ―Moreover, in construing multiple constitutional provisions addressing a 
similar subject, the provisions ‗must be read in pari materia to ensure a consistent 
and logical meaning that gives effect to each provision.‘ ‖  Caribbean Conservation 
Corp., 838 So. 2d at 501 (quoting Advisory Op. to the Governor—1996 
Amendment 5 (Everglades), 706 So. 2d 278, 281 (Fla. 1997)). 
While the introductory clause of article III, section 21, states that the 
provision applies ―[i]n establishing legislative district boundaries,‖ subsection (a) 
then states that ―no apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the intent to 
favor or disfavor . . . an incumbent.‖  (Emphasis added.)  The numbers of the 
Senate districts are unquestionably part of the ―apportionment plan‖ for purposes 
of reviewing whether the plan is designed with the intent to favor or disfavor an 
incumbent.  The Joint Resolution necessarily defines the boundaries of each 
district by its number.  See, e.g., SJR 1176 at 52 (―District 1 is composed of: (a) 
That part of Escambia County consisting of: 1. All of voting tabulation districts 15, 
18, 19, 20, 21 . . . .‖).  Further, the numbering of the districts determines the length 
of the terms senators will serve following apportionment, see art. III, § 15(a), Fla. 
Const., as well as the maximum length of time each senator will be eligible to 
serve, see art. VI, § 4(b)(1)-(2), Fla. Const.  Thus, not only is it a matter for our 
review in determining the validity of the apportionment plan in light of the addition 
 
 
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of article III, section 21, but the Legislature is prohibited from numbering the 
districts with the intent to favor or disfavor an incumbent.  See art. III, § 21(a), Fla. 
Const. 
In this case, the clear intent of the constitutional provisions is to prevent the 
Legislature from passing an apportionment plan that has a built-in bias favoring an 
incumbent.  Adopting a renumbering system that significantly advantages 
incumbents by increasing the length of time that they may serve by two years most 
assuredly favors incumbents.  Further, purposefully manipulating the numbering of 
the districts in order to allow incumbents to serve in excess of eight years would 
also appear to frustrate the intent of the voters when the term limits amendment 
was adopted.  See Advisory Op. to Atty. Gen.—Ltd. Political Terms in Certain 
Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d 225, 228 (Fla. 1991) (discussing the purpose of the 
term limit amendment prior to its placement on the ballot).41 
                                         
 
41.  Article VI, section 4(b)(1)-(2), is the current term limit provision of the 
Florida Constitution and was adopted by citizen initiative in 1992.  The initiative 
petition itself stated: 
The people of Florida believe that politicians who remain in office too 
long may become preoccupied with re-election and become beholden 
to special interests and bureaucrats, and that present limitations on the 
President of the United States and Governor of Florida show that term 
limitations can increase voter participation, citizen involvement in 
government, and the number of persons who will run for elective 
office. 
Political Terms in Certain Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d at 226. 
 
 
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We now turn to the Coalition‘s allegation that the Senate plan was in fact 
renumbered to benefit incumbents.  Clearly, the numbering of a district determines 
not only the length of each senator‘s individual term, but also determines the 
length of the maximum consecutive period of time a senator will be eligible to 
serve in the Senate.  Under article VI, section 4(b), of the Florida Constitution, ―No 
person may appear on the ballot for re-election‖ to the office of Florida senator ―if, 
by the end of the current term of office, the person will have served (or, but for 
resignation, would have served) in that office for eight consecutive years.‖  It 
should first be emphasized that the Florida Constitution does not limit senators to a 
maximum of eight consecutive years.  Rather, the constitution prohibits anyone 
who has already served for eight years from standing for reelection.  Conversely, 
any senator who has served for less than eight years is not prohibited from seeking 
reelection. 
The interaction between the term-limit provision of article VI, section 4(b), 
and the staggering of Senate terms under article III, section 15(a), determines the 
overall length of time a senator will be eligible to serve.  Under these provisions, 
most senators who are first elected in general election years as scheduled by article 
III, section 15(a), will be eligible to serve for a maximum of eight consecutive 
years in the Senate.  An exception applies to senators who are first elected to two-
year terms in the election following reapportionment; these senators, if 
 
 
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subsequently reelected, will have served only six years at the conclusion of their 
second terms, making them eligible for reelection to a third term of four years, 
thereby allowing them to serve up to ten years.  A senator may also be eligible to 
serve longer than eight years if the senator was first elected in a special election.  
See § 100.101, Fla. Stat. (2011) (providing that a special election or special 
primary election shall be held ―[i]f a vacancy occurs in the office of state senator or 
member of the state house of representatives‖). 
The Coalition‘s claim is based on the fact that by altering the district 
numbers of certain incumbents during reapportionment, the Senate has changed the 
year certain senators must stand for reelection, the length of the terms of office 
these senators will serve, and, ultimately, the maximum length of time such 
senators will be eligible to serve.  Thus, a senator elected in an even-numbered 
district in 2006 would, if subsequently reelected in 2010 and 2012,42 serve a final 
term of two years from 2012 to 2014.  By changing the district number from even 
to odd, that senator‘s final term would not expire until 2016, allowing the senator 
to serve for a maximum of ten years.  Similarly, a senator elected from an odd-
numbered district in 2008, by running in an even-numbered district in 2012, would 
                                         
 
42.  As all of the district lines for each Senate district have changed in the 
2012 Senate plan, resulting in a change in constituency, all senators must stand for 
reelection in the next general election after the 2012 reapportionment.  See In re 
Apportionment Law—1982, 414 So. 2d at 1047-48. 
 
 
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be eligible to serve for a maximum of ten years.  Without the reversal of numbers 
from odd to even, or from even to odd, each of these senators would have served 
for a maximum of eight years. 
 
In this case, there is no question that district numbers were assigned with the 
intent to favor incumbents.  The Senate Committee on Reapportionment published 
its first proposed plan on November 28, 2011.  The plan was formally introduced 
at the committee‘s next meeting on December 6, 2011, as Senate Joint Resolution 
1176.  In this version of the Senate plan, the distribution of district numbers across 
the state was essentially unchanged from the 2002 Senate plan.  Under that original 
numbering, at least 1643 out of the 29 non-term-limited incumbents would have 
been eligible to serve a maximum of eight years and three incumbents would have 
been eligible to serve a maximum of nine years. 
On December 30, 2011, however, the Committee on Reapportionment 
published a Committee Substitute to the plan proposed on November 28.  Under 
the new plan, 39 districts were assigned new numbers.  The Coalition asserts that 
as a result of the renumbering, 28 out of 29 incumbents would be eligible for ten- 
or eleven-year terms.  Because the Court was not provided the addresses for every 
incumbent senator, the Court cannot verify the correctness of that statement 
                                         
 
43.  This Court was provided with the addresses for only 21 of the 29 non-
term-limited senators. 
 
 
- 141 - 
although it does not appear to be a disputed fact.  We can verify that at least the 16 
senators that were previously eligible for eight years will now be eligible to serve a 
maximum of ten years, and the three incumbents originally eligible for nine years 
will be eligible to serve for eleven years.44  None of the senators for whom this 
Court was provided addresses will be limited to a maximum of eight years under 
the new numbering scheme. 
In the bill analysis attached to the Committee Substitute, Senate staff wrote 
that the changes in numbering were based on whether each senator had served a 
two-year or a four-year term prior to redistricting.  Specifically, staff wrote that the 
Committee Substitute ―[a]ssigns odd-numbered districts in a manner equitable to 
senators elected to terms of two years or less prior to redistricting and assigns 
even-numbered districts in a manner equitable to senators elected to four year 
terms prior to redistricting.‖  Fla. S. Comm. on Reapp., CS for SJR 1176 (2012), 
Staff Analysis 13 (rev. Jan. 16, 2012).  In a section entitled ―Effect of Proposed 
Changes,‖ the analysis stated: 
Reapportionment in 2012 will change the constituencies of all 
senate districts, and many senate terms will be truncated.  Twenty-five 
(25) senators elected in 2010, or in special elections thereafter, will 
have served terms shortened to two years or less.  Two of those 25 
senators not only will get truncated terms but also will be disqualified 
                                         
 
44.  Two senators were eligible to serve for 10 years under the November 28 
numbering.  The district numbers for those incumbents have not changed from odd 
to even, and they remain eligible to serve for 10 years. 
 
 
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from appearing on the ballot for reelection (Senator from the 26th 
District and Senator from the 34th District). 
An equitable method for numbering would be to assign odd 
numbers to districts represented by senators serving shortened two-
year terms prior to redistricting; allowing them to seek election to full 
four-year terms after redistricting.  Such a balance avoids the inequity 
of some senators having terms shortened to two years (or less) both 
before and after redistricting, while others have the opportunity to 
serve full four-year terms both before and after redistricting.  Only 20 
odd numbers are available, however, and assigning 23 is not possible. 
To reconcile the provisions cited above and achieve an equitable 
result, professional staff considered not only the incidence of shortened 
senate terms but also when senators were first elected to the Senate (and 
when they would be disqualified from appearing on the ballot for 
reelection). 
Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added). 
 
Article III, section 21(a), prohibits any apportionment plan from being 
drawn with the intent to favor an incumbent.  The Senate has argued that the 
renumbering of its plan does not in fact ―favor‖ incumbents; rather, the Senate 
maintains that the result of the numbering was merely to compensate certain 
incumbents who served truncated, two-year terms prior to redistricting by allowing 
them to serve longer terms if they are reelected.  As the Senate conceded in a prior 
reapportionment case, however, ―elected officials have no property rights to the 
office to which they have been elected.‖  In re Apportionment Law—1982, 414 So. 
2d at 1046.  To the contrary, it is the voters who have the rights in the process by 
which their representatives are elected. 
 
 
- 143 - 
The Senate‘s plan plainly favors certain incumbents by renumbering districts 
to allow them to serve longer than they would otherwise be eligible to serve.  
Because we conclude that the plan was drawn with the intent to favor incumbents, 
in violation of article III, section 21(a), we declare the renumbering in the 
apportionment plan to be invalid. 
c.  Challenges to the Senate Districts 
We now turn to an examination of the challenges raised as to specific Senate 
districts.  We first discuss the districts that we find to be in violation of the Florida 
Constitution.  Then we discuss the district challenges that the Court rejects.  
Finally, we discuss the challenge brought by the City of Lakeland. 
Northwest Florida: Senate Districts 1 and 3 
The FDP and the Coalition contend that Districts 1 and 3 in the Panhandle 
violate the constitutional standards of compactness, utilizing political and 
geographical boundaries where feasible, and no intent to favor incumbents.  Our 
facial review of both of these districts confirms that at least two constitutional 
standards were violated: compactness and utilizing existing political and 
geographical lines where feasible.  The Senate‘s failure to adhere to these 
constitutional standards appears to be based on the erroneous belief that, in the 
drawing of the districts, the factor of ―communities of interest‖ could be elevated 
above the constitutional mandates. 
 
 
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Although the Senate‘s stated motivation was a desire to keep coastal 
communities together and separate from rural communities, it is also significant 
that District 1 keeps 86.1% of its predecessor district (old District 4), and District 3 
keeps 82.6% of its predecessor district (old District 2).  Both of these percentages 
are far greater than the average for the Senate plan (64.2%).  Because there is no 
constitutionally valid justification for the deviation from the constitutional 
standards, we are obligated to declare these districts invalid. 
As the below map shows, Districts 1 and 3 are horizontal districts in 
northwest Florida.  District 1 stretches east to west through the coastal areas of five 
counties, and District 3 takes in the non-coastal areas to the north of District 1. 
 
Both districts contain a majority-white voting-age population.45  Thus, no 
considerations with respect to Florida‘s minority voting protection provision come 
                                         
 
45.  The voting-age populations of the two districts are as follows.  District 
1:  black VAP 12.5%; Hispanic VAP 5.2%; white VAP 77.5%.  District 3: black 
VAP 14.4%; Hispanic VAP 3.5%; white VAP 78.1%. 
 
 
- 145 - 
into play. 
 
Both districts are visually non-compact as they stretch through the 
Panhandle, and the compactness measures confirm this.  District 1 received a 
Reock score of 0.12 (closer to 1 is better), and an Area/Convex Hull score of 0.46 
(closer to 1 is better).  District 3 received a 0.24 Reock score and a 0.74 
Area/Convex Hull score. 
The districts are bounded to the east by Gulf, Calhoun, and Gadsden 
Counties.  The more critical and constitutionally suspect boundary is the boundary 
between Districts 1 and 3, which follows no consistent political or geographical 
boundary.  Instead, the district dividing line follows a variety of boundaries, 
switching between major roads (Interstate 10), minor roads, county lines, city 
boundaries, major waterways, rivers, and even creeks.  It is evident that although 
the Senate followed numerous different boundaries when drawing Districts 1 and 
3, often switching between different types of boundaries within the span of a few 
miles, it sacrificed compactness not to comply with the requirements of equal 
population or utilizing political or geographical boundaries, but rather to create a 
coastal district and an inland rural district. 
In passing the Joint Resolution, the Legislature stated its intent was to 
―establish Senate District 1, which ties coastal communities of the Florida 
Panhandle in Escambia, Santa Rosa, Okaloosa, Walton, and Bay Counties,‖ and to 
 
 
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―establish Senate District 3, which ties rural Panhandle communities in Escambia, 
Santa Rosa, Okaloosa, Walton, Bay, Washington, Holmes, and Jackson Counties.‖  
SJR 1176 at 38.  The Senate staff analysis indicates that the coastal and rural 
districts were created based on public testimony received by the Legislature.46 
Although the Senate staff analysis points to selected testimony in favor of 
the horizontal orientation, a review of the public hearings demonstrates that the 
public testimony in support of horizontal coastal and rural districts was by no 
means unanimous.  While members of the public testified that they wanted coastal 
areas together and separate from rural areas because of common interests, other 
members of the public testified in support of vertical districts that would unite 
counties. 
We commend the Legislature for holding multiple public hearings and 
                                         
 
46.  See New Senate Districts, District Descriptions (S000S9008) (Senate 
Staff Document), in Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Appendix at 1006, In re 
Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, No. SC12-1 (Fla. Feb. 
10, 2012) (Senate District Descriptions) (―The committee heard testimony at the . . 
. public hearings and at the October 5, 2011, Senate Reapportionment Committee 
meeting that rural and agricultural interests in the northern part of the Panhandle 
have different traditions and representational needs than the urban and tourism 
interest in the southern part of the Panhandle.  Additionally, the committee heard 
testimony pointing out that commerce and communication flow east and west 
along the main transportation corridors of the region, Interstate 10 and U.S. 
Highway 98, not north and south. . . .‖); id. (―District 1 is supported by the same 
testimony as District 3.  Its horizontal configuration recognizes the differences 
between the rural North and the urban South.  District 1 honors the request of 
members of the public who called for representation that reflects their distinct 
communities.‖). 
 
 
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obtaining public input.  However, the Legislature is required to follow the 
requirements in the constitution, including the requirements that districts be drawn 
―as nearly equal in population as is practicable,‖ to be ―compact,‖ and to ―where 
feasible, utilize existing political and geographical boundaries.‖  Art. III, § 21(b), 
Fla. Const.  While the equal population and political and geographical boundaries 
requirements are stated in terms of ―as nearly as is practicable‖ or ―where 
feasible,‖ the compactness requirement is not modified by such qualifiers but 
framed in terms of ―shall.‖  As explained above, maintaining communities of 
interest is not a constitutional requirement, and comporting with such a principle 
should not come at the expense of complying with constitutional imperatives, such 
as compactness. 
A review of the Coalition‘s alternative plan reveals that it was possible to 
draw districts in the Panhandle that are more visually compact and keep more 
counties together; only one county, Okaloosa County, is split in the Coalition‘s 
plan.  Further, when drawing the districts to be compact and utilize consistent 
political boundaries, the Coalition districts also retain less of the core population of 
predecessor districts—66.2% and 58.4%—closer to the average (64.2%) of the 
Senate plan. 
The orientation of Districts 1 and 3 is in fact very similar to the composition 
of Districts 2 and 4 in 2002, depicted below.  Although part of Okaloosa County is 
 
 
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now included in District 1, that area consists in large part of the Eglin Air Force 
Base.  The incumbents in Districts 1 and 3 both live in Okaloosa County and 
would represent largely the same constituencies as they did under the 2002 plan. 
 
The drawing of the districts sacrificed compactness—a constitutional 
imperative—in order to keep coastal communities together.  Further, although the 
Senate followed numerous different boundaries when drawing Districts 1 and 3, 
often switching between different types of boundaries within the space of a few 
miles, it sacrificed compactness, not in a reasoned balancing effort to comply with 
the requirements of equal population or to utilize political or geographical 
boundaries such as municipal or county boundaries, but rather to create a coastal 
district and an inland rural district. 
We also consider it significant that in doing so, a high percentage of 
population from predecessor districts was retained to the benefit of the incumbents.  
 
 
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While it is not only the fact that the districts maintained overwhelming percentages 
of the former core constituencies in isolation, in the context of our overall analysis 
of this district, it is significant.  There is no valid constitutional justification for the 
decision to draw Districts 1 and 3 in this configuration, and we conclude that 
Districts 1 and 3 are constitutionally invalid. 
Northeast Florida: Senate Districts 6 and 9 
The FDP and the Coalition challenge District 6 on the grounds that the 
Senate used Florida‘s minority voting protection provision as a pretext for partisan 
favoritism and violated the requirements of compactness and utilizing political and 
geographical boundaries.  Based on the objective data before this Court, we 
conclude that District 6 violates constitutional mandates by sacrificing 
compactness and utilizing boundaries when not necessary to do so to avoid conflict 
with the minority voting protection provision. 
District 6 begins at the northern edge of Duval County, meanders through 
Jacksonville, and then stretches southward across five counties to Daytona Beach, 
with arms to Palatka and St. Augustine.  District 6 is adjacent to neighboring 
District 9, which stretches along the coast from north of Jacksonville Beach to 
South Daytona Beach with District 6 on its western border.  Districts 6 and 9 are 
depicted below. 
 
 
- 150 - 
 
District 6 is not compact visually, and the mathematical measures of 
compactness confirm this.  District 6 received a Reock score of 0.12 (closer to 1 is 
better), and an Area/Convex Hull score of 0.43 (closer to 1 is better).  Although 
part of District 6‘s western border follows the St. Johns River, it is evident that its 
non-compactness is not a result of attempting to utilize an existing political or 
geographical boundary.  Neighboring District 9 is also visually not compact as a 
 
 
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result of having District 6 on its western border, and it received a Reock score of 
0.15 and an Area/Convex Hull score of 0.61.47 
The stated justification for the configuration of District 6 is minority voting 
protection.  As we have explained previously, because the Senate never performed 
an appropriate functional analysis, the reliability of this justification is 
questionable.  District 6 is a black opportunity district, with a black VAP of 47.7%.  
District 6 is not a majority-minority district, and neither was its predecessor in the 
benchmark Senate plan.  The benchmark district, old District 1, had a black VAP 
of 46.9%.  In short, this is not a district where the Senate‘s goal was to create a 
majority-minority district. 
While the percentage falls short of a majority, District 6 is one in which an 
analysis of voting behavior that this Court is able to perform using the House‘s 
redistricting software and the House‘s voter registration and election data reveals 
that black voters are likely able to elect their representative of choice.  District 6 
would perform Democratic; it would have voted 58.7% for Sink (D) in the 2010 
gubernatorial election, 63.3% for Obama (D) in the 2008 presidential election, and 
52.0% for Davis (D) in the 2006 gubernatorial election.  Democrats would make 
                                         
 
47.  Newly created District 9 would perform Republican; it would have 
voted 57.5% for Scott (R) in the 2010 gubernatorial election, 57.2% for McCain 
(R) in the 2008 presidential election, and 59.6% for Crist (R) in the 2006 
gubernatorial election.  Of the registered voters in District 9, 44.5% would be 
Republican. 
 
 
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up 58.0% of registered voters, and 69.4% of the registered Democrats would be 
black (showing opportunity for black voters among Democrats).  Further, 87.2% of 
the black voters would be registered Democrats (showing voting cohesion among 
black voters in general).  As to the registered voters who actually voted in the 2010 
general election, the numbers would be quite similar: Democrats would make up 
57.6% of registered voters, 69.2% of the Democrats would be black, and 92.2% of 
the black voters would be Democrats.  Black voters would have also controlled the 
Democratic primary, with 67.3% of the Democrats voting in the primary being 
black.  This analysis indicates that the district will likely afford black voters the 
ability to elect candidates of their choice. 
The Legislature formed this district with the stated intent to preserve 
minority voting opportunities.  The Legislature stated that it intended to ―tie[] 
communities of similar socioeconomic characteristics in the northeastern portion of 
the state from the St. Johns River basin to Interstate 95 between Daytona Beach 
and Jacksonville, consistent with traditional, race-neutral redistricting principles‖ 
and to create a district with ―a near majority black voting-age population, 
comparable to that of the existing district.‖  SJR 1176 at 39.48  District 6 retains 
                                         
 
48.  The Senate staff analysis further explains that ―District 6 preserves the 
core of an existing district that has long elected an African-American member to 
the Senate.  The district connects communities in the northeastern portion of the 
state from the St. Johns River basin to Interstate 95 between Daytona Beach and 
Jacksonville.‖  Senate District Descriptions at 1007. 
 
 
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70.3% of its predecessor district (old District 1).  However, as discussed above, the 
Senate in drawing this district did not perform a functional analysis, but rather 
focused on keeping the core of old District 1.  Old District 1, however, was drawn 
at a time when compactness was not a constitutional imperative.  Because 
compactness is now a requirement, the Legislature is permitted to violate 
compactness only when necessary to avoid conflict with tier-one standards, 
including the minority voting protection provision. 
 
In support of its argument, the Coalition submitted a proposed alternative 
plan that includes a black opportunity district contained entirely within Duval 
County (Coalition District 1).  That district is depicted below. 
 
Coalition District 1 has a black VAP of 42.4%.  While we recognize that this is 
lower than the black VAP of the benchmark District 1 (which has a black VAP of 
46.9%), our inquiry does not end there.  An examination of voting strength must be 
 
 
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conducted.  The equivalent district under the Coalition‘s alternative plan would 
perform Democratic; it would have voted 57.3% for Sink (D) in the 2010 
gubernatorial election, 61.0% for Obama (D) in the 2008 presidential election, and 
49.1% for Davis (D) in the 2006 gubernatorial election.  Democrats would make 
up 56.1% of registered voters, and 66.4% of the registered Democrats would be 
black (showing opportunity for black voters among Democrats).  Further, 86.8% of 
the black voters would be registered Democrats (showing voting cohesion among 
black voters in general).  As to the registered voters who actually voted in the 2010 
general election, the numbers would be quite similar: Democrats would make up 
55.8% of registered voters, 65.8% of the Democrats would be black, and 91.6% of 
the black voters would be Democrats.  Black voters would have also controlled the 
Democratic primary, with 64.3% of the Democrats voting in the primary being 
black.  This analysis indicates that the district will likely afford black voters the 
ability to elect candidates of their choice.49 
                                         
 
49.  Contrary to the Senate‘s representations at oral argument, the federal 
district court order in Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1298-99 (S.D. Fla. 
2002), does not require this Court to reach an opposite conclusion.  Martinez 
involved Section 2 vote dilution claims based on the Legislature‘s 2002 House, 
Senate, and congressional apportionment plans; it did not address claims regarding 
Section 5 diminishment.  See id. at 1298-1324.  The district court in Martinez most 
certainly never found that reducing the black voting-age population from 46.9% 
(the percentage under the 2002 benchmark) in District 6 to 42.4% (the percentage 
in the equivalent district under the Coalition‘s alternative plan) would diminish the 
ability of black voters in this part of the state to elect candidates of choice.  The 
 
 
- 155 - 
Thus, the Coalition has demonstrated that District 6 can be drawn much 
more compactly and remain a minority-opportunity district.  In addition to being 
much more visually compact, the compactness measurements are much better.  
Coalition District 1 scores a 0.32 on Reock and a 0.66 on Area/Convex Hull, 
compared to Senate District 6, which scores a 0.12 on Reock and 0.43 on 
Area/Convex Hull. 
We recognize that our role is not to select the ―best plan.‖  However, the 
Coalition‘s plan demonstrates that Senate District 6 violates the constitutional 
standards of compactness and utilizing existing political and geographical 
boundaries.  The alternative plan shows how political and geographical boundaries 
can be better utilized and demonstrates how District 6 can be made more compact 
by placing it entirely within Duval County rather than stretching southward across 
five counties to Daytona Beach, without violating Florida‘s minority voting 
protection provision. 
Further, although adjoining District 9, standing alone, is not invalid, the 
reason for its lack of compactness and failure to utilize political and geographical 
boundaries was its location adjacent to District 6.  As a result of District 6 being 
made more compact, District 9 becomes more compact as well. 
                                                                                                                                   
Senate‘s after-the-fact reliance on Martinez to justify its decision to draw District 6 
in this manner is therefore unavailing. 
 
 
- 156 - 
The Senate violated the compactness standard in drawing Districts 6 and 9, 
and it failed to perform the functional analysis necessary to properly determine 
when compactness should yield because of a conflict with the tier-one standard of 
minority voting protection.  This is also indicative of intent to favor incumbents 
and a political party.  By keeping District 6 in the same configuration of old 
District 1, the Senate retained a high percentage of the population of predecessor 
districts not only for new District 6, which retains 70.3%, but for new District 9, 
which retains 69.7%.  Moreover, the configuration of District 6 draws in 
Democratic neighborhoods that would otherwise be contained in the surrounding 
districts.  There is no valid justification for Districts 6 and 9.  Contrary to any 
arguments presented either in the Senate‘s briefs or during oral argument, there is 
no constitutional impediment to the alternatives set forth in the Coalition plan, 
which comply with the constitutional requisites.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
Districts 6 and 9 are constitutionally invalid. 
Central Florida: Senate Districts 10 and 12 
The Coalition next asserts that District 10 was drawn to favor an incumbent, 
and the FDP contends that District 12 uses Florida‘s minority voting protection 
provision as a pretext for partisan favoritism.  While the challenges are based on 
different grounds, we consider these claims in tandem because the Senate justifies 
the boundaries of District 10 based in part on its assertion that it was required to 
 
 
- 157 - 
draw District 12 in the manner that it did in order to ensure minority voting 
protection.  Thus, we start with District 10, then review District 12, and conclude 
that District 10, as drawn, violates the constitution. 
The Coalition asserts that District 10 violates article III, section 21, because 
this district was gerrymandered into a bizarre shape in order to include a particular 
incumbent‘s residence and provide him with a safe Republican seat.  The Coalition 
further asserts that the district barely misses another incumbent‘s residence that is 
located on the border between District 10 and District 13, preventing two 
incumbent Republicans from running against each other. 
A visual examination of the challenged districts is set forth below: 
 
As shown in the above map, District 10 is located mostly on the west side of 
 
 
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Orlando, and this portion of the district is fairly compact, following county lines on 
its west and south sides, continuing until it reaches District 12 on the eastern side, 
and District 14, which is a Hispanic majority-minority district, on the southeastern 
side.  At that point, District 10 squeezes in between Districts 12 and 14 through a 
small stretch of land less than half of a mile wide in order to create an odd-shaped 
appendage that reaches out toward District 13, picking up Belle Isle, Edgewood, 
and Winter Park.  The appendage is approximately 12 miles long at its longest 
portion and 8.5 miles wide at its widest, with the majority of the portion being 
between two and five miles in width.  Based on undisputed information provided 
to this Court in conjunction with this review, an incumbent lives in the 
appendage.50  The district line between Districts 10 and 13 stops just short of 
another Republican incumbent‘s residence by following the boundary between the 
cities of Winter Park and Maitland for approximately 3.5 miles. 
 
Although the compactness measures for District 10 reflect that the district is, 
overall, relatively compact (Reock: 0.36; Area/Convex Hull: 0.75), District 10 is 
visually non-compact as a result of the bizarrely shaped appendage.  See, e.g., 
                                         
 
50.  When a senator asked during the January 17, 2012, floor debate if any 
incumbent lived in the appendage of newly numbered Senate District 10, the 
response given was that if an incumbent lived there it was ―news to me,‖ even 
though the incumbent who lived there was present during the debate. 
The incumbent addresses provided to the Court verify that an incumbent 
does in fact live in the part of District 10 that we refer to as the appendage. 
 
 
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Hickel, 846 P.2d at 46 (―[A]ppendages attached to otherwise compact areas may 
violate the requirement of compact districting.‖).51 
The dividing line between the District 10 appendage and surrounding 
Districts 12, 13, and 14 does not consistently follow any particular political or 
geographical boundary, sometimes following parts of the city boundaries for Belle 
Isle, Winter Park, and Edgewood, but other times constantly shifting from major 
roads to minor roads to railroad tracks.  In looking to the population deviation, we 
note that District 10 is one of the most populated districts with 3,995 people above 
the ideal population. 
 
Of course, tier-two standards must yield if the Legislature cannot comply 
with the requirements of both tier one and tier two.  The Legislature asserts that 
District 10 was drawn in this manner because of Districts 12 and 14.  District 14 is 
a new Hispanic majority-minority district with a Hispanic VAP of 50.5%; there 
was no predecessor Hispanic majority-minority district in the 2002 Senate plan.  
District 12 is a coalition district with a 40.0% black VAP and 20.9% Hispanic 
VAP.  Notably, District 12 is not a black majority-minority district, nor was its 
predecessor in the benchmark Senate plan. 
District 12, which is located in the western and northern portions of the 
                                         
 
51.  The rest of the district is relatively compact, which is reflected in the 
compactness scores. 
 
 
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Orlando area, takes in the areas with the highest concentration of black residents 
from Orlando, Ocoee, Winter Garden, Apopka, Maitland, Winter Park, and 
Sanford.  It is not a visually compact district, and the compactness measures 
confirm this (Reock: 0.24; Area/Convex Hull: 0.41).  It extends into two counties, 
running in a relatively narrow path on the west end of Orlando and extending 
upwards and to the east, hugging the top of the area, with a few portions reaching 
out. 
The Legislature formed this district with the stated intent to preserve 
minority voting opportunities.  The Legislature explained that its intent was to 
―tie[] urban communities of similar socioeconomic characteristics in Orange and 
Seminole Counties, consistent with traditional, race-neutral redistricting 
principles‖ and create a district with ―a majority-minority voting-age population, 
comparable to that of the existing district.‖  SJR 1176 at 41.  The predecessor to 
District 12 was old District 19, a coalition district with a black VAP of 33.1% and 
a Hispanic VAP of 35.5%.  District 12 retained 49.0% of its predecessor district. 
As discussed above, the Senate in drawing this district did not perform a 
functional analysis.  Here, the Senate in essence asserts that the districts in the 
Orlando area do not need to be compact because of a focus on increasing minority 
voting strength.  However, the Senate failed to consider whether this goal could be 
obtained by performing an analysis that adheres to all of the constitutional 
 
 
- 161 - 
criteria.52 
In reviewing both Districts 10 and 12, we conclude that District 10, which is 
visually non-compact and clearly encompasses an incumbent in an appendage, is 
constitutionally defective.  Although the Legislature contends that District 10 was 
drawn because of concerns of not diluting minority voting strength in surrounding 
districts or causing unlawful retrogression, the Senate never performed the 
functional analysis necessary to ensure that the reasoning was constitutionally 
valid.  Nothing in the record reflects that the process of drawing the districts in this 
area recognized the importance of balancing the constitutional values. 
After reviewing the compactness of District 10, as well as its failure to 
observe boundaries and the location of incumbents in this area, and in light of the 
Senate‘s failure to conduct a functional analysis as to District 12, we conclude that 
there is no valid constitutional justification for District 10.  Based on the objective 
data before this Court, we conclude that District 10 violates constitutional 
mandates because it is visually non-compact with an appendage that reaches out to 
clearly encompass an incumbent, and this bizarre shape cannot be justified based 
on concerns pertaining to ensuring minority voting strength.  District 10 is 
constitutionally invalid. 
                                         
 
52.  While no party challenges District 14, the Senate likewise should 
perform the necessary analysis on that district as well. 
 
 
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Southwest Florida: Senate District 30 
The FDP argues that District 30 was drawn with the intent to favor an 
incumbent in violation of the Florida Constitution.  As evidence, the FDP points to 
the fact that District 30 contains a high percentage of its former constituency, is 
non-compact, and fails to utilize political and geographical boundaries.  After 
examining all the constitutional requirements, we conclude that the district as 
drawn violates the Florida constitutional standards that districts ―shall be compact‖ 
and utilize political and geographical boundaries where feasible.  Further, the 
failure to comply with the tier-two standards, in the absence of any constitutionally 
valid justification, objectively indicates intent to favor an incumbent. 
District 30 is located in Collier and Lee Counties.  It stretches from Cape 
Coral, extends over water to Sanibel Island and back over water to Fort Meyers 
Beach, and then travels down the west coast all the way to the Everglades, 
encompassing Naples and Marco Island as it winds its way down.  The map of 
District 30, below, best shows its odd-shaped configuration, which resembles an 
upside-down alligator. 
 
 
- 163 - 
 
District 30 is a white-majority district (white VAP of 78.4%).  District 30 
retains 84.9% of its constituency from old District 37 and a shape nearly identical 
to its predecessor district.  It is visually non-compact, and the mathematical 
measures of compactness support this conclusion, with a Reock score of 0.18 and 
an Area/Convex Hull score of 0.56 (closer to 1 is better). 
In terms of political and geographical boundaries, District 30 is bounded to 
the north and south by county lines, but the district cuts through the city of Bonita 
Springs, and the mainland‘s only connection to Sanibel Island is a bridge that is cut 
in half by the district line.  Thus, in addition to being non-compact, District 30 
splits counties, municipalities, and geographical features. 
In passing the joint resolution, the Legislature stated its intent with respect to 
this district was to ―tie[] coastal communities in Lee and Collier Counties.‖  SJR 
 
 
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1176 at 47.  The Senate districts surrounding coastal District 30 are Districts 23, 
28, and 40.  Districts 23 and 28 are both white-majority districts (white VAPs of 
75.2% and 87.9%, respectively).  They are visually and numerically much more 
compact than District 3053 and do not need to comply with Florida‘s minority 
voting protection provision.  District 40, on the other hand, is in a covered county 
under Section 5 of the VRA. 
With the exception of the boundary it shares with District 40, District 30 
does not need to be configured to avoid diminishing minority voting strength, and 
thus the Legislature is required to draw District 30 to be ―as nearly equal in 
population as is practicable,‖ to be ―compact,‖ and to ―where feasible, utilize 
existing political and geographical boundaries.‖  Art. III, § 21(b), Fla. Const.  
The aforementioned stated legislative intent demonstrates that in creating 
District 30, the Legislature intended to tie coastal communities together.  However, 
as we have discussed in analyzing the constitutional phrase ―compactness‖ and our 
discussion of Districts 1 and 3, maintaining communities of interest is not required 
by the constitution, and comporting with such a principle must not come at the 
expense of complying with constitutional imperatives.  We also consider it 
significant that District 30 maintained a large percentage of the same constituency 
                                         
 
53.  District 23 has a Reock score of 0.45 and an Area/Convex Hull score of 
0.81.  District 28 has a Reock score of 0.37 and an Area/Convex Hull of 0.89. 
 
 
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as the predecessor district.  On this record, there is no valid constitutional 
justification for the Legislature‘s decision to draw District 30 in this manner.  
District 30 is constitutionally invalid. 
Southeast Florida: Senate Districts 29 and 34 
The FDP and the Coalition contend that Districts 34 and 29 are not compact.  
Additionally, the Coalition argues that the Senate plan keeps the black voting-age 
population in District 34 the same as it was in the predecessor district, without 
undertaking the required functional analysis.  The Coalition argues that the Senate 
included as many Democrats as possible into this district in order to dilute their 
votes elsewhere.  The Coalition asserts that this evidences intent to favor an 
incumbent and a political party.  Specifically, the Coalition contends that the 
decision to draw District 34 this way was a ploy to keep the neighboring 
Republican incumbent seat safe in District 29 by using minority protection as a 
pretext for partisan favoritism.  We conclude that both districts are constitutionally 
invalid because they are not compact, do not utilize political and geographical 
boundaries where feasible, and appear to have been drawn with the intent to favor 
an incumbent and a political party. 
District 34 is a narrow district stretching approximately fifty miles from 
Riviera Beach and Lake Park in Palm Beach County southwards in a narrow strip 
to Fort Lauderdale in Broward County.  At its narrowest point, which is in Boca 
 
 
- 166 - 
Raton, District 34 is less than a mere tenth of a mile wide, connected by the I-95 
corridor.  Following a jagged path south, District 34 slices through cities and 
neighborhoods, often gathering up residents on one side of a residential street but 
not the other. 
District 29, which is adjacent to District 34, is a long and narrow coastal 
district that snakes along the outer banks and eastern shoreline to the east of 
District 34.  District 29 begins in Jupiter, wraps around the top of District 34 to 
take in Palm Beach Gardens, then travels south in a narrow sliver along the coast 
through Lake Worth, Palm Beach, Boca Raton, and Pompano Beach to Fort 
Lauderdale.  These districts are depicted in the map below. 
 
 
 
- 167 - 
Districts 34 and 29 are clearly not compact, and the mathematical 
measurements confirm this.  Under the Reock method of measurement, District 34 
scores a low 0.05 (closer to 1 is better)—the least compact of all of the Senate 
districts; District 34 does not fare much better under the Area/Convex Hull method 
of measurement, scoring 0.25 (closer to 1 is better).  As a result of the shape of 
District 34, District 29 is also visually non-compact, and it has a Reock score of 
just 0.15 and an Area/Convex Hull score of 0.56.  In addition, these districts do not 
adhere to a consistent boundary as they travel through counties and cities. 
Unquestionably, minority protection was an important factor in considering 
how to draw District 34 because it is a black majority-minority district with a black 
VAP of 55.8%.  As it travels down the coast, the district takes in the 
neighborhoods with the highest concentrations of black residents in Broward and 
Palm Beach Counties.  The incumbent for this district is a Democrat.  In the 
benchmark plan, the predecessor to District 34 (old District 29) was also a black 
majority-minority district, having a black voting-age population of 60.7%.54  
District 34‘s shape is similar to the shape it had under the 2002 Senate plan, and 
the district retains 79.4% of its prior population. 
Neighboring District 29‘s shape is also similar to the shape it had under the 
                                         
 
54.  The opponents do not contend that the change from 60.7% to 55.8% 
resulted in retrogression under Florida law. 
 
 
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2002 Senate plan, and it retains 82.1% of its prior population.  The incumbent for 
this district is a Republican.  It is a white-majority district, having a white VAP of 
79.4%.  Its predecessor (old District 25) was also a white-majority district under 
the 2002 benchmark plan, having a white VAP of 78.0%. 
The Legislature‘s stated intent with respect to District 34 was to preserve 
minority voting opportunities.  The Legislature explained that its intent was to 
―tie[] communities of similar socioeconomic characteristics along Interstate 95 and 
U.S. 1 in Palm Beach and Broward Counties, consistent with traditional, race-
neutral redistricting principles‖ and to create the district with ―a majority black 
voting-age population, comparable to that of the existing district.‖  SJR 1176 at 48.  
The Senate staff analysis further explains that the configuration of District 34 
―preserves the core of a district that has consistently elected candidates preferred 
by minority voters.‖  Senate District Descriptions at 1014.  Under the 2012 Senate 
plan, District 34 would be solidly Democratic, and an analysis of voting behavior 
indicates that the district will likely afford black voters the ability to elect 
candidates of their choice.55 
                                         
 
55.  District 34 would have voted 82.1% for Sink (D) in the 2010 
gubernatorial election, 84.9% for Obama (D) in the 2008 presidential election, and 
77.0% for Davis (D) in the 2006 gubernatorial election.  Democrats would make 
up 67.7% of registered voters, 67.0% of the Democrats would be black (showing 
opportunity for black voters among Democrats), and 85.2% of black voters in this 
district would be Democrats (showing voting cohesion among black voters in 
general).  As to the registered voters who actually voted in the 2010 general 
 
 
- 169 - 
As to District 29, the Senate acknowledged that the district was adjacent to a 
minority-opportunity district, stating that it was creating a district that ―ties the 
coastal communities of Broward and Palm Beach Counties; is equal in population 
to other districts; follows political and geographical boundaries; [and] is adjacent 
to a minority-opportunity district to its west and the Atlantic Ocean to the east.‖  
SJR 1176 at 46 (emphasis added).56 
Of course, the requirement of compactness must yield when necessary to 
avoid a conflict with the tier-one standard of protecting minority voting.  However, 
as we have previously discussed, the Senate in drawing minority districts did not 
perform a functional analysis, but rather focused on keeping the core of the 
minority districts under the 2002 Senate plan.  The 2002 Senate plan, however, 
was drawn at a time when compactness was not a constitutional imperative. 
We also consider the partisan favoritism claim.  Every Senate district 
immediately surrounding District 34 (Districts 27, 31, 32, and 36), except for 
                                                                                                                                   
election, the numbers would be quite similar: Democrats would make up 73.1% of 
voters; 69.7% of the Democrats would be black (opportunity); and 90.9% of the 
black voters would be Democrats (cohesion). 
 
56.  The Senate staff analysis likewise recognizes that District 29 ―is 
adjacent to a minority-opportunity district (District 34) to its west.‖  Senate District 
Descriptions at 1012. 
 
 
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District 29, is a majority-white district that would perform Democratic.57  Unlike 
the surrounding districts, District 29 would remain competitive, but lean 
Republican in terms of election results,58 and the incumbent in this district is a 
Republican.  The challengers essentially maintain that District 34 was drawn to 
take Democratic voters out of District 29 to keep it competitive under the guise of 
maintaining District 34 as a black majority-minority district.  The current 
configuration would, in effect, favor a Republican incumbent. 
The Coalition has submitted an alternative plan that shows a different 
configuration for this area that is more compact overall. 
                                         
 
57.  District 27 has a white VAP of 65.9% and would perform Democratic.  
District 31 has a white VAP of 53.3% and would perform Democratic.  District 32 
has white VAP of 57.7% and would perform Democratic.  District 36 has a white 
VAP of 50.7% and would perform Democratic. 
 
58.  District 29 would have voted 47.7% for Sink (D) and 49.9% for Scott 
(R) in the 2010 gubernatorial election, 51.0% for Obama (D) and 48.2% for 
McCain (R) in the 2008 presidential election, and 48.7% for Davis (D) and 49.1% 
for Crist (R) in the 2006 gubernatorial election. 
 
 
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For a point of reference, the Coalition District 29 is equivalent to the Senate 
District 34 (black majority-minority districts under both plans with black VAPs of 
55.7% and 55.8%, respectively), and an analysis of voting behavior likewise 
reveals that Coalition District 29 will likely afford black voters the ability to elect 
candidates of their choice.59  We note that the non-diminishment standard does not 
                                         
 
59.  Coalition District 29 would be Democratic and would have voted 79.8% 
for Sink (D), 82.6% for Obama (D), and 75.1% for Davis (D) in the 2010 
gubernatorial, 2008 presidential, and 2006 gubernatorial elections, respectively.  In 
that district, 68.3% of registered voters would be Democrats, 65.5% of registered 
Democrats would be black (showing opportunity among black voters), and 85.1% 
of registered black voters would be Democrats (showing cohesion among black 
voters).  In terms of actual voters based on 2010 general election data, Democrats 
would make up 73.0% of voters, 68.2% of the Democrats who voted would be 
 
 
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prohibit any change to existing boundaries or to population percentages of a 
previously existing black majority-minority district.  The Coalition‘s plan makes 
the area, as a whole, more compact than the corresponding area under the Senate 
plan. 
Under the Senate plan, the districts surrounding District 34 have the 
following compactness measurements (closer to 1 is better): District 27 (Reock: 
0.23; Area/Convex Hull: 0.82); District 29 (Reock: 0.15; Area/Convex Hull: 0.56); 
District 31 (Reock: 0.43; Area/Convex Hull: 0.85); District 32 (Reock: 0.49; 
Area/Convex Hull: 0.92); and District 36 (Reock: 0.25; Area/Convex Hull: 0.63).  
Including the scores for District 34, the average Reock score of these districts is 
0.27, and the average Area/Convex Hull score is 0.67. 
As a comparison, under the Coalition‘s plan, the districts surrounding its 
District 34 equivalent (Coalition District 29), including that district itself, have the 
following compactness measurements: District 25 (Reock: 0.32; Area/Convex 
Hull: 0.67); District 29 (Reock: 0.42; Area/Convex Hull: 0.76); District 30 (Reock: 
0.37; Area/Convex Hull: 0.77); District 31 (Reock: 0.18; Area/Convex Hull: 0.77); 
District 32 (Reock: 0.35; Area/Convex Hull: 0.75); and District 35 (Reock: 0.38; 
Area/Convex Hull: 0.78).  These districts in the Coalition‘s plan have, on average, 
                                                                                                                                   
black (opportunity); and 90.5% of the black voters would be Democrats 
(cohesion). 
 
 
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a Reock score of 0.34 and an Area/Convex Hull score of 0.75, improving upon the 
Senate plan‘s compactness.  While the role of alternative plans is not to select the 
―best plan,‖ the Coalition‘s plan demonstrates that the Senate was able to draw 
districts in this region of the state to better comply with Florida‘s compactness 
requirement while, at the same time, maintaining a black majority-minority district. 
 
In order to evaluate the partisan favoritism claim, we further evaluate the 
effect of this more compact configuration on the political composition of the 
districts.  As a result of the black Democratic voters in the long narrow strip of 
District 34 between West Palm Beach and Pompano Beach being dispersed into 
surrounding districts under the Coalition‘s plan, rather than being concentrated in 
District 34, the equivalent to District 29 in the Coalition plan—Coalition District 
31—becomes Democratic.60  The Coalition‘s plan creates five Democratic districts 
in this area, as opposed to the four Democratic districts in the 2012 Senate plan.61 
                                         
 
60.  Coalition District 31would be solidly Democratic and would have voted 
54.9% for Sink (D), 58.2% for Obama (D), and 56.5% for Davis (D). 
 
61.  The comparable districts surrounding Coalition District 29 (Coalition 
Districts 25, 30, 31, 32, and 35) are majority-white districts (white VAP of 71.0%, 
55.9%, 61.2%, 68.0%, and 56.0%, respectively).  Each of these districts would be 
solidly Democratic.  The election results for these districts are as follows: Coalition 
District 25 (61.4% Sink (D), 36.0% Scott (R); 63.3% Obama (D), 36.0% McCain 
(R); 63.4% Davis (R), 34.6% Scott (R)); Coalition District 30 (55.7% Sink, 41.6% 
Scott; 60.0% Obama, 39.3% McCain; 56.6% Davis, 41.2% Crist); Coalition 
District 31 (54.9% Sink, 42.7% Scott; 58.2% Obama, 41.0% McCain; 56.5% 
Davis, 41.2% Crist); Coalition District 32 (56.7% Sink, 40.9% Scott; 59.9% 
 
 
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The Democratic voters in this area of the state are concentrated and the area is 
largely Democratic; the Coalition‘s plan does not appear to purposefully draw 
Democratic districts but rather to draw logical, compact districts in a neutral 
manner. 
We conclude that the Senate‘s decision to draw this region in a less compact 
manner is indicative of intent to favor an incumbent and a political party by 
keeping District 29 essentially the same as its predecessor district.  Further, in 
drawing this area of the state, the Senate violated the compactness requirement by 
simply keeping the cores of the previously existing districts without performing a 
functional analysis and endeavoring to draw compact districts that also adhere to 
Florida‘s minority voting protection provision. 
There is no constitutionally valid justification for Districts 29 and 34.  
Although the Senate‘s stated intent in drawing these districts was also to ―tie[] 
communities of similar socioeconomic characteristics along Interstate 95 and U.S. 
1 in Palm Beach and Broward Counties,‖ SJR 1176 at 48, there is no demonstrated 
community of interest that is being maintained, and, importantly, utilizing political 
and geographical boundaries and mandating compactness are constitutional 
requirements, whereas maintaining communities of interest is not.  In this case, we 
                                                                                                                                   
Obama, 39.5% McCain; 58.6% Davis, 39.6% Crist); Coalition District 35 (59.8% 
Sink, 37.8% Scott; 61.4% Obama, 37.8% McCain; 60.1% Davis, 38.0% Crist). 
 
 
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conclude that the only reason for maintaining this configuration based on the 2002 
Senate plan was to benefit an incumbent and a political party in general.  Districts 
29 and 34 are constitutionally invalid. 
Remaining Challenged Districts 
We now briefly discuss the remaining challenged districts, all of which we 
reject because no constitutional violation has been shown. 
Senate District 4.  The FDP summarily challenges District 4, alleging that it 
could have been drawn in a manner such that the district lines crossed fewer 
county boundaries.  District 4 includes all of Nassau County and then reaches into 
Duval County twice, stopping at the Duval county line and including any portions 
of Duval County that are not within Districts 6 or 9.  However, in order to satisfy 
the equal population requirement, the district cannot be contained entirely within 
Nassau County.  Thus, this claim fails. 
Senate District 15.  The Coalition challenges District 15 on the basis that it 
was configured to favor an incumbent by removing from his district parts of 
Hillsborough County because he is unpopular in that county.  Regardless of 
whether the facts relied upon by the Coalition are true, there are simply no 
objective indicators of improper intent.  District 15 is not oddly shaped or strangely 
contorted and the objected-to portion of the district now follows a county boundary 
where it did not before.  The Coalition has failed to carry its burden with respect to 
 
 
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this district. 
Senate Districts 25 and 26.  The FDP summarily asserts that Districts 25 
and 26 fail to utilize political and geographical boundaries, because they split 
multiple counties and cities and because District 26 extends across most of the 
peninsula from near the Atlantic Ocean to near the Gulf of Mexico.  While it may 
be possible that Districts 25 and 26 could have been drawn to split fewer counties 
and cities while adhering to the remaining constitutional requirements, the FDP 
does not demonstrate that this can be done. 
Senate Districts 28 and 33.  The FDP summarily alleges that Districts 28 
and 33 retain high percentages of the populations from their predecessor districts in 
order to benefit the incumbents in those districts.  In challenging these districts, the 
FDP does not point to any other indicators of improper intent, and we deny these 
challenges. 
Senate District 38.  The Coalition argues that the Legislature over-packed 
this district with Democrats in order to dilute the Democratic vote elsewhere.  
District 38 is a black majority-minority district located in Miramar, Miami 
Gardens, and North Miami with a black VAP of 58.3%.  Its predecessor district 
under the 2002 benchmark plan (old District 33) is also a black majority-minority 
district with a black VAP of 59.2%.  District 38 is visually compact, and the 
compactness measurements reflect this with a Reock score of 0.55, and an 
 
 
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Area/Convex Hull score of 0.83 (closer to 1 is better).  The comparable district 
under the Coalition‘s alternative plan, Coalition District 33, is not a black majority-
minority district, containing a black VAP of just 48.3%, and is visually less 
compact, with correspondingly lower compactness scores (Reock: 0.33; 
Area/Convex Hull: 0.69).  The Coalition has not carried its burden to demonstrate 
that District 38 violates constitutional mandates. 
Senate Districts 35 and 36.  The Coalition contends that Districts 35 and 36 
were both drawn to protect the incumbents in those districts in that the Senate plan 
consolidates black and Hispanic voters into neighboring districts in order to retain 
in Districts 35 and 36 much of the same population the incumbents in these 
districts now serve.  We conclude that the Coalition has not satisfied its burden of 
proof, as it appears there could be valid justifications for the shape of each district.  
Both districts are defined by their surrounding districts, which include minority 
districts.  Further, neither district is contorted or strangely shaped given these 
considerations. 
District 35 is a coastal district bounded to the east by the Atlantic Ocean and 
to the west by two majority-minority districts, District 37 (Hispanic VAP of 
83.7%), and District 38 (black VAP of 58.3%), as well as District 40, which has a 
black VAP of 35.1% and a Hispanic VAP of 39.8%.  The predecessors to Districts 
 
 
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37 and 38 are also majority-minority districts in the benchmark plan,62 and District 
40‘s predecessor in the benchmark plan, old District 39, contains similar voting-
age populations with a black VAP of 29.1% and a Hispanic VAP of 43.0%.  
Significantly, District 40 includes three covered counties (Monroe, Collier, and 
Hendry Counties) for purposes of Section 5 preclearance under the VRA.  District 
40 reaches around District 37 and District 35 and necessarily affects the 
configuration of the districts in the Miami-Dade County area. 
 
District 36 is bounded to the east by the Atlantic Ocean, to the north by 
District 34, a black majority-minority district (black VAP of 55.8%), and to the 
south by District 38, black majority-minority district (black VAP of 58.3%).  As 
discussed in more detail above, the predecessor districts to Districts 34 and 38 
were also black majority-minority districts.  However, as previously discussed, 
although the Coalition offers an alternative configuration for this area, the 
corresponding district to District 38 in the Coalition‘s plan reduces the black VAP 
below that of a majority and makes the district less compact.  We conclude that the 
Coalition has not carried its burden of proof with respect to these districts. 
d.  City of Lakeland  
In the final individual challenge to the 2012 Senate plan, the City of 
                                         
 
62.  Old District 36 with a Hispanic VAP of 79.2% and old District 33 with 
a black VAP of 59.2%. 
 
 
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Lakeland alleges that the Legislature violated the requirement of article III, section 
21(b), to utilize existing political boundaries where feasible.  Lakeland claims that 
the Senate plan ignored Lakeland‘s municipal boundaries and bifurcated the city 
into two Senate districts, District 24 and District 16.  Lakeland contends that the 
record of legislative proceedings is devoid of any factual predicate upon which the 
Senate could have relied when it determined that it was not feasible to utilize 
Lakeland‘s existing municipal boundaries.63  In contrast to other areas of the state 
where the splitting of municipalities was necessitated by population sizes and the 
close proximity between major municipalities, Lakeland has asserted that such a 
justification does not apply to it because of its location. 
As argued by Lakeland, the Senate‘s failure to utilize Lakeland‘s municipal 
boundary split the city into two pieces.  Lakeland asserts that the western piece 
consists of approximately 40.9 square miles, contains 63,292 citizens, and is 
included in District 24 (old District 21).  The eastern piece consists of 
approximately 33.8 square miles, contains 34,130 citizens of Lakeland and is 
included in District 16 (old District 15).  In addition, the southwest portion of 
Lakeland also borders District 26 (old District 17), but that district does not dissect 
                                         
 
63.  Although the City of Lakeland also claims that the Senate plan favors 
incumbents by giving each incumbent a protected district, it does not rely on any 
specific allegations regarding the two districts in which Lakeland is split.  Instead, 
it relies on an argument made by the Coalition, which does not reference Lakeland 
specifically. 
 
 
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any part of Lakeland. 
The below map from the Lakeland‘s brief depicts graphically the split of 
Lakeland: 
 
As described in Lakeland‘s brief: 
Senate District 24 includes portions of western Polk and eastern 
Hillsborough counties, along with a substantial majority of Manatee 
County.  Beginning in the northwest corner of the district in eastern 
Hillsborough County, the district includes all of the municipal 
boundaries of Plant City.  Heading approximately ten (10) miles east 
from Plant City into western Polk County, the northeastern corner of 
the district boundaries cuts directly through the center of the City of 
Lakeland, taking the more populated southwestern portion of the City, 
while leaving the northeastern half behind.  Heading south from Plant 
City and Lakeland, the district captures an approximately fifteen (15) 
to twenty (20) mile wide swath of mostly rural land in eastern 
Hillsborough and western Polk counties, widening on the 
 
 
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Hillsborough side just before the Manatee County border.  Upon 
reaching the southern borders of Polk and Hillsborough counties, the 
district expands to include virtually all of Manatee County.  The 
district boundaries follow the entire eastern, western, and southern 
borders of Manatee County, with only a small portion in the northwest 
of the county omitted from this district.  Along the Manatee County 
coast, the district captures the entire city limits of several beachfront 
cities, including Anna Maria, Holmes Beach, and Bradenton Beach, 
and the vast majority of Bradenton and Palmetto.  Overall, Senate 
District 24 is approximately forty-five (45) miles wide at its widest 
point (the entirety of Manatee County), with a maximum height of 
approximately fifty-five (55) miles (from Lakeland to the southern 
border of Manatee County). 
The below map depicts the City of Lakeland in context of the surrounding 
districts (Lakeland is on the border between Districts 16 and 24, near the center of 
the map): 
 
While Lakeland asserts that the Senate plan does not comply with article III, 
 
 
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section 21(b), because it failed to utilize its municipal boundary, the Florida 
Constitution does not require the Legislature to use every municipal boundary.  
The requirement of section 21(b) is that the Legislature should utilize political and 
geographical boundaries where feasible. 
As we discussed in our analysis of this standard, unlike the House‘s 
approach, the Senate failed to adhere to any consistent definition of ―political and 
geographical boundary.‖  This is especially evident because in the case of District 
24, the Senate placed part of inland Lakeland with the coastal communities of 
Manatee County, whereas in Districts 1 and 3, the Senate justified the split of five 
counties by claiming it wanted to keep the coastal communities together. 
The only explanation for the splitting of Lakeland on this record occurred 
during the Senate floor debate when a senator inquired as to why the City of 
Lakeland had been divided.  In response, the Chair of the Senate Committee on 
Reapportionment replied that the Senate‘s first consideration was creating two 
minority districts in Orlando and one minority district in Tampa and from there, he 
described the various boundaries of the district including those places where the 
political and geographical boundaries were utilized.  He concluded, stating: 
 
In redistricting as you have suggested in your question requires 
us to balance priorities and this area of the state as you have suggested 
does represent a convergence and a reconciliation of many different 
priorities. . . .  And I think you make an excellent argument . . . that 
we could have done that, but at this point any change to this part of 
the region would have ripple [effects] throughout the entire area and 
 
 
- 183 - 
in the bordering districts, and we believe that this arrangement that is 
in the proposal represented the best reconciliation of priorities. 
Because the Senate operated under an inconsistent definition of ―political 
and geographical boundaries‖ and did not have the benefit of this Court‘s 
interpretation of this important constitutional requirement, we conclude that when 
the Senate drew this portion of the plan, it did so with an incorrect understanding 
of both compactness and utilizing political and geographical boundaries.  Also, to 
the extent that the ripple effect referred to was a result of concerns for minority 
protection, because no functional voting analysis was undertaken, the Senate‘s 
conclusions as to that constitutional principle are questionable.  Because we are 
declaring the Senate plan invalid based on a number of reasons, the Senate will 
have the opportunity to review Districts 16 and 24 and, after applying the correct 
definitions of these terms, determine whether it is feasible to utilize the municipal 
boundaries of Lakeland. 
e.  Conclusion as to the Senate Plan 
We hold that the Senate plan is invalid.  In doing so, we consider the fact 
that the Senate failed to conduct a functional analysis as to regression in order to 
properly determine when, and to what extent, the tier-two requirements must yield 
to avoid conflict with Florida‘s minority voting protection provision.  Moreover, as 
to the requirements of compactness and utilization of existing boundaries, the 
Senate‘s expansive interpretations—interpretations we reject—and inconsistent use 
 
 
- 184 - 
of these standards undermined the purpose of these requirements.  Additionally, we 
conclude that the Senate plan is rife with objective indicators of improper intent. 
We have examined and declared Senate Districts 1, 3, 6, 9, 10, 29, 30, and 
34 to be in violation of constitutional requirements.  We have also expressed our 
concerns with respect to the City of Lakeland.  Finally, we declare the numbering 
scheme to be invalid because it was intended to benefit incumbents by making 
them eligible to serve for longer periods of time than they would have otherwise 
been eligible to serve.  Accordingly, the Senate plan does not pass constitutional 
muster, and it is our duty under the Florida Constitution to declare it invalid. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Fair Districts Amendment changed the constitutional framework for 
apportionment, introducing significant reforms in the drawing of legislative 
districts.  Before the passage of the Fair Districts Amendment in 2010, there is no 
question that the House and Senate plans would have passed constitutional muster 
and both would have been validated by this Court. 
The citizens, through our state constitution, have now imposed upon this 
Court a weighty obligation to measure the Legislature‘s Joint Resolution with a 
very specific constitutional yardstick.  The constitutional imperatives set forth in 
article III, sections 16 and 21, of the Florida Constitution are the instructions given 
to the Legislature by the citizens, mandating how apportionment plans are to be 
 
 
- 185 - 
drawn.  These instructions are a further expression of the will of this state‘s 
citizens to ensure that their right to elect representatives is not frustrated as a result 
of partisan favoritism or incumbent protection. 
The citizens have expressed their will, requiring the Legislature to ―redistrict 
in a manner that prohibits favoritism or discrimination, while respecting 
geographic considerations‖ and ―to require legislative districts to follow existing 
community lines so that districts are logically drawn, and bizarrely shaped districts 
. . . are avoided.‖  Standards for Establishing Legislative Dist. Boundaries, 2 So. 3d 
at 181, 187-88 (plurality opinion).  The new constitutional provisions seek to level 
the playing field in how legislative districts are drawn.  These mandates are 
specific, and the citizens of this state have entrusted to the Supreme Court of 
Florida the constitutional obligation to interpret the constitution and ensure that 
legislative apportionment plans are drawn in accordance with the constitutional 
imperatives set forth in article III, sections 16 and 21.  A failure to define these 
constitutional imperatives in a manner consistent with the will of the voters would 
frustrate the intended purpose of this new amendment. 
We conclude that the challengers have demonstrated that the Senate plan, 
but not the House plan, violates the constitutional requirements.  We therefore 
declare the Senate plan constitutionally invalid and the House plan constitutionally 
valid.  The language of Senate Joint Resolution 1176 establishes that the 
 
 
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Legislature intended the Senate and House plans to be severable from each other in 
the event either plan was held invalid.  See SJR 1176, § 7, at 669. 
The Court recognizes that this opinion represents the first time since the 
passage of the Fair Districts Amendment that this Court has judicially interpreted 
the newly added constitutional provisions of article III, section 21.  While we 
commend the Legislature for its efforts to interpret these standards, we also 
acknowledge that the Legislature lacked the benefit of our guiding construction. 
This Court understands that its obligations are not just to rule on the facial validity 
of the standards in this case, but to ensure that this decision charts a reliable course 
for the Legislature and the judiciary to follow in the future.   
We have interpreted each of the new standards in this opinion, which are set 
forth in the two tiers of article III, section 21(a), (b).  The first tier, contained in 
section 21(a), lists the following three requirements: (1) no apportionment plan or 
district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an 
incumbent; (2) districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or 
abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in 
the political process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their 
choice; and (3) districts shall consist of contiguous territory.  We have explained as 
follows with respect to these standards.  The Florida Constitution prohibits 
drawing a plan or district with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or 
 
 
- 187 - 
incumbent; there is no acceptable level of improper intent.  By its express terms, 
Florida‘s constitutional provision prohibits intent, not effect, and applies to both 
the apportionment plan as a whole and to each district individually.  The minority 
voting protection provision imposes two requirements that plainly serve to protect 
racial and language minority voters in Florida: prevention of impermissible vote 
dilution and prevention of impermissible diminishment of a minority group‘s 
ability to elect a candidate of its choice.  Finally, districts must be contiguous. 
The second tier, contained in section 21(b), lists the following three 
requirements: (1) districts shall be as nearly equal in population as is practicable; 
(2) districts shall be compact; and (3) districts shall utilize existing political and 
geographical boundaries where feasible.  These requirements circumscribe the 
Legislature‘s discretion in drawing district lines to guard against gerrymandering, 
requiring it to conform to traditional redistricting principles.  The Legislature is 
required to make districts as nearly of equal population as is practicable, but 
deviations from equal population may be based on compliance with other 
constitutional standards.  Compactness refers to the shape of the district; the goal is 
to ensure that districts are logically drawn and that bizarrely shaped districts are 
avoided.  Compactness can be evaluated both visually and by employing standard 
mathematical measurements.  As to utilizing political and geographical boundaries, 
we accept the House‘s view of geographical boundaries as those that are easily 
 
 
- 188 - 
ascertainable and commonly understood, such as ―rivers, railways, interstates, and 
state roads.‖  Strict adherence to these standards must yield if there is a conflict 
between compliance with them and the tier-one standards.  Importantly, the extent 
to which the Legislature complies with the requirements contained in tier two 
serves as an objective indicator of impermissible legislative purpose proscribed 
under tier one (e.g., intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent).  
Because we have now defined Florida‘s new constitutional standards 
through this opinion, this Court has provided the Legislature with parameters for 
the application of the standards to the apportionment plan.  Through our 
interpretation and review, we have attempted to provide the Legislature with 
direction as to the specific constitutional problems that we conclude have been 
proven and to the general problems with the entire Senate plan, including the 
renumbering of the districts.  As the next phase of this apportionment process 
begins, we are confident the Legislature will apply these standards in a manner 
consistent with the interpretation we have heretofore provided, keeping as its goal 
a Senate plan that would pass constitutional muster.  The Court views its 
constitutional obligation of drawing a plan to be the course of last resort. 
In accordance with article III, section 16(d), the Governor and the 
Legislature must now follow the procedures enumerated therein, which govern the 
process that ensues when the Supreme Court of Florida declares an apportionment 
 
 
- 189 - 
plan to be constitutionally invalid.  The Legislature is now tasked by the Florida 
Constitution with adopting a new joint resolution of apportionment conforming to 
the judgment of this Court.  Because we have declared the House‘s apportionment 
plan to be valid, the only plan that needs to be redrawn by the Legislature is the 
Senate plan.64 
The Coalition has requested that this Court provide ―clear instructions as to 
how to remedy the breach‖ if the Court were to find the plans to be ―non-
compliant.‖  However, the Court‘s role at this time is not to dictate the 
apportionment plan that the Court would draw, but to provide the Senate with 
sufficient guidance in our interpretation of the standards and our application of 
those standards. 
We have held that Senate Districts 1, 3, 6, 9, 10, 29, 30, and 34 are 
constitutionally invalid.  The Legislature should remedy the constitutional 
problems with respect to these districts, redrawing these districts and any affected 
districts in accordance with the standards as defined by this Court, and should 
conduct the appropriate functional analysis to ensure compliance with the Florida 
minority voting protection provision as well as the tier-two standards of equal 
                                         
 
64.  Accordingly, any ultimate responsibility of the Court regarding 
reapportionment would be limited to the redrawing of the Senate plan, and this 
would occur only if the revised Senate apportionment plan is declared to be 
invalid.  See art. III, §16(f), Fla. Const. 
 
 
- 190 - 
population, compactness, and utilization of existing political and geographical 
boundaries.  As to the City of Lakeland, the Legislature should determine whether 
it is feasible to utilize the municipal boundaries of Lakeland after applying the 
standards as defined by this Court.  In redrawing the apportionment plan, the 
Legislature is by no means required to adopt the Coalition‘s alternative Senate 
plan.  Finally, we have held that the numbering scheme of the Senate plan is 
invalid.  Accordingly, the Legislature should renumber the districts in an 
incumbent-neutral manner. 
Given the absolute urgency in complying with the strict time limits set forth 
in article III, section 16(c), stating that this Court ―shall enter its judgment‖ within 
thirty days from the filing of the Attorney General‘s petition, our prior practice 
when determining the validity of the Legislature‘s joint resolution of 
apportionment has been to not allow a motion for rehearing. 
In accordance with article III, section 16(c), of the Florida Constitution, the 
Court enters this declaratory judgment declaring the apportionment plan of the 
House of Representatives as contained in Senate Joint Resolution 1176 to be 
constitutionally valid under the Florida Constitution and declaring the 
apportionment plan of the Senate as contained in Senate Joint Resolution 1176 to 
be constitutionally invalid under the Florida Constitution.  As contemplated by the 
Florida Constitution, in accordance with article III, section 16(d), the Legislature 
 
 
- 191 - 
now has the task to ―adopt a joint resolution conforming to the judgment of the 
supreme court.‖  Art. III, § 16(d), Fla. Const. 
No motion for rehearing shall be entertained.  This case is final. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs with an opinion. 
LABARGA, J., concurs with an opinion. 
PERRY, J., concurs with an opinion. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
 
LEWIS, J., concurring. 
 
While I concur with the majority decision, I write separately to address two 
aspects of this process, the second of which also applies to the entire 
reapportionment process in general.  First, I commend the parties for superb 
briefing of the issues, as well as the professional demeanor and articulate 
presentations during oral argument.  The quality of legal representation has been 
exemplary and served to crystallize the issues presented to enable this Court and 
the parties to engage in a thoughtful and intelligent dialogue.  
Second, it must be recognized that the elements and standards that must be 
utilized in review of legislative plans for reapportionment have been expanded 
dramatically by the recent adoption of article III, section 21 of the Florida 
Constitution.  Thus, the redistricting process now involves a complex series of 
 
 
- 192 - 
elements that this Court must evaluate to determine the validity of reapportionment 
plans.  We have the constitutional obligation to conduct, to the best of our ability, 
the heightened review contemplated and expressed by the citizens of Florida who 
voted to add this amendment to our constitution.  Further, in this first review under 
the new constitutional standards, we necessarily must engage in an analysis and 
application of those new standards in the context of this redistricting.  However, 
despite our duty to review legislative reapportionment plans for constitutional 
compliance, I write to again reiterate and emphasize that this Court is limited to 
resolving only facial challenges to such plans.   
In my concurrence to the majority decision approving the 2002 legislative 
reapportionment plans, I presented the historical background of the drafting of the 
1968 Florida Constitution.  See In re Constitutionality of House Joint Resolution 
1987, 817 So. 2d 819, 834-36 (Fla. 2002) (Lewis, J., concurring).  This history 
revealed the intent of the drafters at that time in two respects with regard to the 
scope of this Court‘s review pursuant to article III, section 16 of the Florida 
Constitution.  First, the Constitutional Revision Commission sought to remove the 
bulk of litigation with regard to redistricting from the federal court system and to 
place it within the state court system.  See id. (Lewis, J., concurring).65  Second, 
                                         
 
65.  The drafting of the 1968 Florida Constitution occurred after three 
successive reapportionment plans were invalidated by the federal courts on the 
basis of equal protection violations.  A federal district court ultimately assumed the 
 
 
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and more pertinent to the plan we consider today, this history revealed that beyond 
the consecutive and territorial requirements enunciated in section 16(a), the 
drafters envisioned the scope of this Court‘s review of legislative reapportionment 
plans to be limited solely to whether the plans complied with the one person, one 
vote requirement of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.  See House Joint Resolution 1987, 817 So. 2d at 
834-36 (Lewis, J., concurring).  For this reason, the strict time limit of thirty days 
could be considered facially reasonable for this Court to complete the review 
required by article III, section 16, as contemplated by the drafters.   
In my earlier concurrence, I addressed this structural temporal concern and 
concluded that the perception of the public with regard to this Court‘s ability to 
review plans of reapportionment conflicted with the time and structural limits 
placed upon this Court by the Florida Constitution: 
Based upon the knowledge and expectations of the drafters, there 
would be no need for this Court to engage in the acceptance and 
adversarial testing of evidence, fact finding, or any other significant 
factual examinations of reapportionment plans. 
In truth, this Court is not designed, nor is it structured, to 
engage in these types of activities. . . .  
                                                                                                                                   
responsibility for redistricting the State of Florida.  See id. at 833-34 (Lewis, J., 
concurring); see also Swann v. Adams, 263 F. Supp. 225, 226-28 (S.D. Fla. 1967) 
(noting the ―[j]udicial apportionment of the Florida Legislature is required‖ and 
delineating a reapportionment plan that provided for 48 Senate districts and 119 
House of Representative districts). 
 
 
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The issue today, therefore, is how this Court should address the 
collision of the framework of limited review enacted by the drafters of 
the 1968 Constitution, and the factual depth and complexity of the 
challenges brought by the opponents of the 2002 reapportionment 
plan.  Certainly, the opponents‘ claims are based upon allegations of 
extraordinarily involved, fact-specific wrongs effected by the 
Legislature in drawing the proposed legislative districts.  To be sure, 
advancing technology has also driven the process.  This Court, 
however, is constrained by the limitations and parameters of article 
III, section 16(c).  Due to the time restrictions and structural 
limitations imposed by the Florida Constitution, and absent clear 
error, we have been afforded neither the constitutional time nor 
constitutional structure to engage in the type of fact-intensive, 
intricate proceedings required to adjudicate the vast majority of the 
claims presented by the opponents here or the responses of the 
legislative bodies.  The parameters of our review simply do not allow 
us to competently test the depth and complexity of the factual 
assertions presented by the opponents. 
Id. at 835-36 (Lewis, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  Although ten years have 
elapsed since I first suggested the concerns with regard to fact-intensive challenges 
to  reapportionment plans, nothing has improved and, indeed, with the addition of 
multiple new constitutional requirements than were mandated ten years before, see 
art. III, § 21, Fla. Const., my concerns are equally, if not more, applicable in 2012.   
 
I authored the opinion that authorized that the amendment that delineated 
additional standards for legislative redistricting be placed on the 2010 election 
ballot.  See Advisory Op. to Att‘y Gen. re Standards For Establishing Legislative 
Dist. Boundaries, 2 So. 3d 175 (Fla. 2009) (plurality opinion).  This amendment, 
which has now become article III, section 21 of the Florida Constitution, was 
intended to rectify the absence of constitutional standards to safeguard against 
 
 
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alleged political gerrymandering and to respect geographic boundaries and 
compactness.  Notably, in 2002, this Court rejected an equal protection challenge 
to a redistricting plan that at that time divided Marion County into four Senate 
districts.  See Florida Senate v. Forman, 826 So. 2d 279, 280 (Fla. 2002).  This 
Court reversed the circuit court‘s determination that the Senate plan constituted an 
impermissible political gerrymander.   In reaching this decision, the Court noted 
that, unlike other state constitutions, the Florida Constitution contained no 
provisions requiring that the Legislature draw districts that treat similarly situated 
communities in a similar matter or give consideration to local boundaries:   
The appellees‘ actual complaint is that the Senate plan should 
be declared unconstitutional because the Legislature ignored 
traditional principles of redistricting such as compactness and 
preservation of communities of interest. . . .  However, in House Joint 
Resolution 1987, this Court specifically rejected this type of claim: 
―[N]either the United States nor the Florida Constitution requires that 
the Florida Legislature apportion legislative districts in a compact 
manner or that the Legislature preserve communities of interest.‖  817 
So. 2d at 831.  See also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647, 113 S. Ct. 
2816, 125 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1993) (―[T]raditional districting principles 
such as compactness . . . and respect for political subdivisions . . . are 
important not because they are constitutionally required—they are not 
. . . .‖); [In re Apportionment Law Senate Joint Resolution No. 1305, 
1972 Regular Session, 263 So. 2d 797, 801 (Fla. 1972)] (―[T]here is 
no requirement that district lines follow precinct or county lines.‖). 
Id. at 282.   
 
The 2010 amendment reversed those legal principles and incorporated 
political and geographic boundary and compactness standards, along with others, 
 
 
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into the Florida Constitution.  See Establishing Legislative Dist. Boundaries, 2 So. 
3d at 181 (―The overall goal of the proposed amendments is to require the 
Legislature to redistrict in a manner that prohibits favoritism or discrimination, 
while respecting geographic considerations.‖).  By adopting additional redistricting 
standards to the Florida Constitution, it is clear that the citizens of Florida intended 
that this Court review legislative apportionment plans for constitutional 
compliance in greater detail than ever before.  See id. at 183 (noting that article III, 
section 21, ―change[s] the standard of review to be applied when either the 
attorney general seeks a ‗declaratory judgment‘ with regard to the validity of a 
legislative apportionment, or a redistricting plan is challenged‖).   
It was the decision of the citizens of Florida to implement the desired 
changes to our state constitution through the constitutional initiative process.  We 
must never understate that the Florida Constitution belongs to the people of 
Florida.  Therefore, we as a Court are required to conduct the heightened review 
envisioned by the citizens of our State when they voted to amend our state 
constitution.  Thus, to the extent possible, we must evaluate the legislative 
reapportionment plans to determine whether they comply with the standards 
delineated in article III, section 21, e.g., whether the plans were drawn with the 
intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; whether the plans were 
drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of 
 
 
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racial or language minorities to participate in the political process; whether the 
plans diminish the ability of language or racial minorities to elect representatives 
of their choice; whether the districts in the plans are compact; whether the plans 
utilize existing political and geographical boundaries where feasible; and whether 
the districts are as nearly equal in population as is practicable.   
At the same time, I emphasize, as I did in 2002, that our current 
constitutional structure, with the thirty-day time limitation, does not permit this 
Court to develop, consider, and address all factual challenges to the legislative 
plans.  Challenges that require expert testimony and complex factfinding are 
neither workable nor appropriate in this Court.  Nothing in article III, section 21, 
expanded the authority or jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate as-applied 
challenges in the redistricting process.  Were the opposite true, challenges that may 
warrant and should receive adversarial testing in a judicial forum would be 
relegated to hollow legal arguments without substance before this Court.  The 
deadline and structural limitations placed upon this Court would inevitably result 
in the frustration of an intelligent, purposeful review of any factual challenge to 
reapportionment plans proposed by the Legislature.   
 
This Court is not structurally equipped to conduct complex and multi-
faceted analyses with regard to many factual challenges to the 2012 legislative 
reapportionment plan.  As was the case in 2002, we can only conduct a facial 
 
 
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review of legislative plans and consider facts properly developed and presented in 
our record.  See House Joint Resolution 1987, 817 So. 2d at 824 (emphasizing that 
the Court would only pass ―upon the facial validity of the plan and not upon any 
as-applied challenges‖).  In Brown v. Butterworth, 831 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2002), the Fourth District Court of Appeal articulated the distinction between a 
facial challenge to a reapportionment plan and an as-applied challenge: 
First, there is the facial challenge, in which a party seeks to show that, 
as written, the plan explicitly violates some constitutional principle. 
Second, there is an as-applied challenge, in which a party seeks to 
establish that, based on facts existing outside the plan, and as applied 
to one or more districts, the plan violates the federal or state 
constitutions, or the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). 
 
Id. at 686 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).  In the context of a challenge to a 
statute, the First District Court of Appeal explained that, ―A facial challenge 
considers only the text of the statute, not its application to a particular set of 
circumstances, and the challenger must demonstrate that the statute‘s provisions 
pose a present total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional standards.‖  
Ogborn v. Zingale, 988 So. 2d 56, 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Cashatt v. State, 873 So. 2d 430, 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)).   
Thus, our proper scope of review encompasses those challenges that may be 
determined from the reapportionment maps themselves and objective statistical 
data before us.  During these expedited proceedings, modern technology has 
provided this Court with an abundance of information in a very short period of 
 
 
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time.  Nevertheless, despite the ease of access to data, the constitutional time limit 
under which this Court is constitutionally required to operate continues to provide 
a less than optimum forum to address for the first time extremely complex issues 
related to whether the reapportionment plans comply facially with the standards 
articulated in article III, section 21 of the Florida Constitution.   
However, because we have been provided sophisticated technology, we are 
able to recognize patterns—or a lack thereof—when we evaluate the facial validity 
of the plans before us.  We are also able to draw conclusions based upon those 
observations.  The majority decision today reflects that while a variety of different 
rationales and concepts may be available for application in redistricting, the 
rationales or concepts actually used must be applied consistently.  Applying a 
particular rationale in one part of Florida, but a completely different rationale in 
another part of the state, creates legitimate constitutional questions as to the 
boundaries drawn and the justifications for those boundaries as asserted by the 
drafters.  Where a reapportionment plan adheres consistently to generally 
acceptable rationales and concepts with regard to the drafting of district 
boundaries, that plan is less likely to be called into question based upon a facial 
examination of the maps and objective statistical data. 
The dissent contends that the Florida Constitution does not require 
consistency in the drawing of legislative reapportionment maps, and consistency 
 
 
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need not be considered in the redistricting process.  However, the dissent overlooks 
that where there is a marked absence of consistent logic in the drawing of 
legislative boundaries, the asserted reasons for constitutional deviations become 
excuses to avoid the standards mandated by our constitution.  In this way, a lack of 
consistency directly contravenes the legitimacy of a plan. 
Today‘s decision also demonstrates that terms used within the newly 
adopted constitutional standards need definitional parameters.  In Establishing 
Legislative District Boundaries, we stated the following with regard to the 
constitutional standard that ―districts shall, where feasible, utilize existing political 
and geographical boundaries‖: 
Although the phrase ―political and geographical boundaries‖ 
used in the proposed amendments may be technically broader than the 
―city, county, and geographical boundaries‖ phrase used in the [ballot] 
summaries, we conclude that this differing use of terminology could 
not reasonably mislead voters.  The sponsor asserts that the terms 
―city‖ and ―county‖ are utilized in the summaries because they are 
more understandable to the average citizen than the legal concept of 
―political‖ boundaries.  We agree that most voters clearly understand 
the concept of a city or county boundary, but may be perplexed to 
define exactly what a ―political boundary‖ may encompass.  See 
Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151, 155 (Fla. 1982) (noting that 
voters ―must be able to comprehend the sweep of each proposal‖ 
(quoting Smathers v. Smith, 338 So. 2d 825, 829 (Fla. 1976))). The 
purpose of the standards in section (2) of the proposals is to require 
legislative and congressional districts to follow existing community 
lines so that districts are logically drawn, and bizarrely shaped 
districts—such as one senate district that was challenged in 
Resolution 1987, 817 So. 2d at 824-25—are avoided.  Since the ―city‖ 
and ―county‖ terminology honors this community-based standard for 
drawing legislative and congressional boundaries, and further 
 
 
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describes the standards in terms that are readily understandable to the 
average voter, we conclude that the use of different terminology does 
not render the summaries misleading. 
2 So. 3d at 187-88 (footnote omitted).  The majority decision further clarifies that 
the term ―geographical boundaries‖ does not encompass every tree, creek, railroad 
track, or road—no matter how small or obscure.  Instead, the boundaries relied 
upon by legislators to draw district boundaries must be both logical and objectively 
reasonable.   
 
The dissent asserts that the decision of the majority to reject the Senate 
reapportionment plan is based upon pure speculation and conjecture.  I disagree 
and find that such political rhetoric does not assist an intelligent analysis and 
discussion.  In the majority decision today, this Court rejects the Senate plan based 
only upon a facial examination of the reapportionment maps and the objective data 
provided.  Therefore, contrary to the contention of the dissent, the Court has 
properly exercised judicial restraint in a manner that was both warranted and 
constitutionally necessary.  It is obvious from the face of the maps and the data in 
our record that serious violations of article III, section 21 of the Florida 
Constitution have occurred.  Moreover, we have a constitutional duty to recognize 
these violations and require that the Senate plan be amended so that the new 
standards adopted by the citizens of Florida are effectuated.  Indeed, we would be 
derelict in our obligation under the Florida Constitution if we were to ignore these 
 
 
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violations.  Contrary to the suggestion by the dissent, there is no joy or pleasure in 
this exercise; we follow the constitution as the will of the people of Florida. 
 
In conclusion, I recognize that the Florida Constitution of 2012 contains 
more elements and standards for redistricting than it did a decade ago, and the 
citizens of Florida expect this Court to conduct a more detailed and probing review 
of legislative plans of reapportionment than ever before.  While we as a Court must 
fulfill our constitutional obligations to the citizens of Florida to the fullest extent 
possible, our review must not extend beyond that which our constitutional structure 
and the limited time allotted under the constitution permits.  Today, this Court has 
attempted to maintain that delicate, proper balance and conducted only a limited 
facial review of the joint resolution through examination of the reapportionment 
maps and objective statistical data.  Therefore, I concur with the decision of the 
majority to approve the plan submitted by the Florida House of Representatives, 
but reject the plan submitted by the Florida Senate. 
 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring. 
 
I wholeheartedly concur with the scholarly and well-reasoned majority 
opinion which, in painstaking detail, fulfills the mandate set forth by the 
Constitution of Florida and its new redistricting amendment.  It is important to 
keep in mind that the majority opinion approved the House plan because it met 
 
 
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constitutional muster.  It disapproved the Senate plan, not in haphazard fashion, but 
after carefully examining each district and detailing the reasons for disapproving 
 specific districts.  I write primarily to respond to the dissent‘s position that the 
thirty-day period provided for this proceeding by article III, section 16, does not 
afford this Court sufficient opportunity to examine the plans.   
While it would have been preferable to have the luxury of more time, we 
were able, given advances in technology, to carefully examine both plans and 
make a facial determination based on this undisputed data within the time allotted 
by the constitution.  It would be a complete and unjustified derogation of our 
constitutional obligation if we ignore our constitutional mandate to examine the 
plans to determine whether they meet constitutional muster by simply saying we 
do not have the time.  Moreover, it is illogical to conclude that we should ignore a 
clear mandate now contained in the Florida Constitution to address these new 
provisions, especially where a different process is not available within the 
constitutional time frame.  This reasoning renders the new constitutional 
amendment essentially meaningless and runs counter to the intent of article III, 
section 16(c), that the validity of the plans be timely determined to provide for a 
more orderly election process.   
The dissent also states that we conduct this constitutional proceeding as an 
appellate court and should therefore avoid consideration of factual matters.  This 
 
 
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ignores the provision in article III, section 16(c), that requires this proceeding to be 
brought as an original proceeding in this Court.  In this original proceeding, we 
have before us a plethora of census and other undisputed data upon which to 
evaluate the actions of the Legislature in creating these plans.  Based on this data, 
the majority has, in a careful and considered fashion, determined that the House 
plan is valid and that the Senate plan suffers constitutional flaws that require us to 
declare it invalid.  Our responsibility to the citizens to faithfully carry out our 
constitutional duty to the fullest extent possible—with the data and resources 
available to us in the proceeding dictated by the constitution—is made more 
pressing by the additional standards now contained in the newly enacted Fair 
Districts amendment.  For these reasons, I write to concur.   
 
 
PERRY, J., concurring. 
 
I concur fully with my esteemed colleague, Justice Pariente, but write to 
highlight concern regarding the appearance that ―the Legislature is utilizing its 
interest in protecting minority voting strength as a shield.‖  Majority op. at 65.  
While nothing in the record before us has proven that the Legislature so acted, I 
write to caution against even the appearance of the Legislature diminishing the 
ability of minority voters to elect effective representation.  The appearance of 
impropriety is as bad as impropriety itself.  I am fearful that we have cloaked 
 
 
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ourselves in a permissive standard of review where the Legislature need not 
demonstrate its adherence to each of the new constitutional mandates.   
 
It concerns me that under the guise of minority protection, there is—at the 
very least— an appearance that the redistricting process sought to silence the very 
representatives of the people the Legislature indicates it is trying to protect.66  For 
example, during floor debate one such representative, Senator Arthenia Joyner, 
rose in opposition to the redistricting plan, stating: 
I believe that [the reapportionment plan] was prepared in violation of 
Florida's Redistricting standards.  Specifically I believe the 
Legislature is poised to use the pretext of minority protection to 
advance an agenda that seeks to preserve incumbency and pack 
minority seats in order to benefit a particular party. 
 
Packing a district with more minority voters than is necessary 
to create an opportunity to elect representatives of choice bleaches 
surrounding districts and limits the influence of minorities overall. 
 
 . . . . 
 
Our maps actually fail to create new opportunities for 
minorities to participate in the political process and elect their 
representatives of choice.  While this plan does guarantee a certain 
number of black Legislators will be elected, it also ensures that we 
will be in a perpetual minority in the House and the Senate with little 
ability to advance an agenda that will benefit the very people we 
represent. 
 
I believe this approach will, as it has in the past, continue to 
diminish the ability of our communities of color to impact the 
legislative process.  The Legislature has shown a clear indifference to 
                                         
 
66.  I note that each of the House members of the Florida Conference of 
Legislative Black State Legislators voted against the reapportionment plan.  Floor 
Vote on SJR 1176, 2012 Session (Fla. Feb. 3, 2012), 
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/floorvote.aspx?VoteId=12689&Bill
Id=48155&&. 
 
 
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many of the issues we have fought for because we are a part of such a 
small minority.  They just do not have to listen to our constituents. 
 
 . . . . 
 
 . . . Ironically at precisely the same time so many were 
declaring their support of the Voting Rights Act.  I am not aware of a 
single member of the Legislature who spoke out against the current 
Secretary of State's efforts to declare Section V of the Voting Rights 
Act inapplicable to the regions in Florida that have had heightened 
histories of racism. 
Having thus expressed her concerns that minorities were packed into districts in 
numbers greater than necessary for them to elect the representative of their choice, 
thereby limiting their ability to influence adjacent districts, she was told ―tough 
luck.‖  
 
Likewise, Senator Nan Rich rose in opposition, stating eloquently: 
 
Two years ago . . . the voters could not have spoken louder or 
with more clarity.  They said they were tired of elected officials 
drawing seats that favored themselves or their party of choice and 
their voices could not have been stronger. 
 
In an election when our Governor failed to get even a majority 
of the electorate, Floridians agreed on the Fair District standards by 63 
percent, yet we are here today considering maps that I believe are 
drawn in violation of Fair District standards. 
 
 . . . . 
 
While everybody professed their great desire to support 
minority voters, I agree with my friend, Senator Joyner, who believes 
that for too long the so-called protection of minority voters has been 
used by this Legislature as a pretext to draw seats that preserve 
incumbency and advance the interest of a particular political party. 
 
Bleaching seats in the name of minority protection is a practice 
that must be resisted.  It ultimately diminishes the impact minority 
voters have in the governance of this state and makes it easy for 
communities of color to be neglected by the vast majority of elected 
officials. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
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In spite of all of that I believe the maps that are being passed 
out today look a lot like the ones the voters were hoping would be 
gone when they passed Amendment 6.  This plan still protects 
incumbents.  It still gerrymanders, it still has districts that meander 
around the state with no apparent logic and it will still very likely 
result in a Congressional delegation that is grossly disproportionate to 
the partisan makeup of this state. 
 
Certainly, the Senate was tasked with maintaining the delicate balance 
between righting an historical, racist wrong and moving forward into an era of 
racial equality where one person, one vote is not quantified by the color of the 
voter.  However, as stated by Justice Pariente: 
 
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to 
our society.  They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much 
of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their 
skin.  Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular 
dangers.  Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may 
balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us 
further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer 
matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire.  It is for these 
reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands 
close judicial scrutiny. 
Majority op. at 66 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657). 
 
Further, while I also agree that ―a minority group‘s ability to elect a 
candidate of choice depends upon more than just population figures,‖ majority op. 
at 62, 66, I cannot agree that there was a rational basis for the Senate to decide to 
turn a blind eye to population data when drawing their plan, see concurring in part 
and dissenting in part op. at 209.  By refusing any attempt to draw more compact 
 
 
- 208 - 
districts while maintaining the required racial proportions, there is at least the 
appearance that the Senate thumbed its nose at the will of the people.  This Court 
finds that on this record, ―the Senate plan does not facially dilute a minority 
group‘s voting strength or cause retrogression under Florida law,‖ majority op. at 
126; however, when the outcome appears to be antithetical to minority interest, I 
am skeptical when the burden is not on the Legislature to demonstrate that despite 
such appearance, the underlying intent is ultimately valid.  Because the Senate now 
has ―the benefit of our opinion when drawing its plan[,]‖ majority op. at 129, it is 
my hope that there is no further appearance of misuse of Florida‘s minority voting 
protection provision.    
 
With all due respect, Justice Canady‘s reliance on Perry is misplaced.  
Significantly, there the federal court was tasked with redrawing the districts for the 
State of Texas; it was not a state court review under the state constitution.  
Secondly, the claims were presented under the Federal Voting Rights Act and the 
United States Constitution.  The Supreme Court was balancing the right of the 
State of Texas to undergo the redistricting process without substituting its policies 
for that of the United States Supreme Court.  Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 941 (―This Court 
has observed before that ‗faced with the necessity of drawing district lines by 
judicial order, a court, as a general rule, should be guided by the legislative policies 
underlying‘ a state plan—even one that was itself unenforceable—‗to the extent 
 
 
- 209 - 
those policies do not lead to violations of the Constitution or the Voting Rights 
Act.‘ ‖) (quoting Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 79 (1997)).   
 
Here, we are tasked with reviewing the reapportionment plan by interpreting 
Florida‘s new constitutional minority protection provision.  The people of Florida 
voted to add these new redistricting mandates.  They ―could not have spoken 
louder or with more clarity.‖  As recognized by the majority, the citizens of Florida 
have entrusted us to interpret and apply these constitutional standards.  We cannot 
simply be a rubber stamp for the Legislature‘s interpretation of the constitution.  
We therefore ―recognize[] our independent constitutional obligation to interpret 
our own state constitutional provisions.‖  Majority op. at 52.   
 
 
CANADY, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I concur in the majority‘s ruling that the redistricting plan for the House of 
Representatives is valid, but I dissent from the ruling that the plan for the Senate is 
invalid.  With respect to the Senate plan, I conclude that the opponents have failed 
to overcome the presumption that a redistricting plan adopted by the Legislature is 
constitutional.  Because it has not been shown that the Legislature‘s choices in 
establishing the district lines in the Senate plan are without a rational basis under 
the applicable constitutional requirements, I would validate that plan. 
I. 
 
 
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This Court has recognized that legislative enactments are ordinarily ―clothed 
with a presumption of constitutionality.‖  Crist v. Fla. Ass‘n of Criminal Def. 
Lawyers, Inc., 978 So. 2d 134, 139 (Fla. 2008).  When the constitutional validity of 
a legislative enactment is challenged, ―[t]o overcome the presumption [of 
constitutional validity], the invalidity must appear beyond reasonable doubt.‖  Id. 
(quoting Franklin v. State, 887 So. 2d 1063, 1073 (Fla. 2004)).  We applied this 
presumption of constitutionality in our review of legislative redistricting plans in 
1972, when we considered the first case in which we exercised our authority under 
article III, section 16 of the Florida Constitution.  In that decision we specifically 
acknowledged the controlling principle that a legislative enactment should not be 
declared unconstitutional ―unless it clearly appears beyond all reasonable doubt 
that, under any rational view that may be taken of the statute, it is in positive 
conflict with some identified or designated provision of constitutional law.‖  In re 
Apportionment Law Senate Joint Resolution No. 1305, 1972 Regular Session, (In 
re Apportionment—1972), 263 So. 2d 797, 805-06 (Fla. 1972) (quoting City of 
Jacksonville v. Bowden, 64 So. 769, 772 (Fla. 1914)).  We also ―emphasize[d] that 
legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and 
determination‖ and that ―the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers and the 
constitutional provisions relating to reapportionment require that we act with 
 
 
- 211 - 
judicial restraint so as not to usurp the primary responsibility for reapportionment, 
which rests with the Legislature.‖  Id. at 799-800. 
In 2002—in our most recent decision under article III, section 16—we 
rejected the argument ―that the Legislature‘s joint resolution of apportionment is 
not presumptively valid.‖  In re Constitutionality of House Joint Resolution 1987, 
(In re Apportionment—2002), 817 So. 2d 819, 825 (Fla. 2002).  We unequivocally 
reaffirmed the view we adopted in 1972, holding ―that the joint resolution of 
apportionment identified in article III, section 16, Florida Constitution, upon 
passage is presumptively valid.‖  In re Apportionment—2002, 817 So. 2d at 825. 
In our 2002 decision we also stated that under article III, section 16, our 
review ―is extremely limited.‖  In re Apportionment—2002, 817 So. 2d at 824.  
Recognizing the inherent limitations of a review process conducted by an appellate 
court during a thirty-day period, we acknowledged that we can ―only pass upon the 
facial validity of the plan.‖  Id.  We specifically held that the article III, section 16, 
―proceeding before this Court is not the proper forum to address such a fact-
intensive claim‖ as that presented by a claim under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
42 U.S.C §§ 1973-1973q (2006), or by a claim of political gerrymandering.  In re 
Apportionment—2002, 817 So. 2d at 831.  The majority of the panel took the view 
that under article III, section 16, the Court had ―not been afforded a structure to 
 
 
- 212 - 
competently address claims that cannot be determined from the [redistricting] plan 
itself.‖  In re Apportionment—2002, 817 So. 2d at 836 (Lewis, J., concurring). 
With today‘s decision, the majority of this Court effectively abrogates these 
precedents that recognized the circumscribed nature of the thirty-day review 
process under article III, section 16, and the presumption of constitutionality with 
which a legislative redistricting plan is clothed.  The Court has now transformed 
the nature of the constitutional review process and cast aside the presumption of 
constitutionality.  And it has done so in the absence of any argument from the 
opponents of the redistricting plan that we should recede from our precedent 
applying the presumption of constitutionality to redistricting plans. 
The majority‘s departure from our precedents is not justified by the adoption 
in 2010 of article III, section 21, Florida Constitution, which created certain 
additional ―[s]tandards for establishing legislative district boundaries.‖  Art. III, § 
21, Fla. Const.  Although section 21 unquestionably altered the scope of the issues 
to be considered in our review of a legislative redistricting plan, nothing in section 
21 changed the structure or nature of the thirty-day review process previously 
existing under section 16.  The text of section 21 does not explicitly address the 
judicial review process.  And it is unwarranted to conclude that section 21 
implicitly altered the structure or nature of the existing constitutional review 
process. 
 
 
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It may well be that some of those who supported the adoption of section 21 
desired to transform the redistricting process from what this Court has previously 
acknowledged it to be—―primarily a matter for legislative consideration and 
determination‖—into a matter controlled by the largely discretionary rulings of the 
majority of this Court.  In re Apportionment—1972, 263 So. 2d at 799-800.  A 
different constitutional amendment to effect such a transformation in the 
redistricting process might have been proposed for the consideration of Florida‘s 
voters.  But the voters who adopted section 21 could not have known—from the 
text of the proposed amendment, much less the ballot summary—that such a 
transformation would be brought about by the adoption of section 21. 
Weighty reasons support adhering to our precedent establishing that 
redistricting plans adopted by the Legislature are presumed to be constitutionally 
valid and that this Court should ―act with judicial restraint‖ in our review of such 
plans.  In re Apportionment—1972, 263 So. 2d at 800.  In Perry v. Perez, 132 S. 
Ct. 934, 941 (2012)—a case that was decided in January of this year presenting 
claims under the Voting Rights Act and the United States Constitution—the 
Supreme Court of the United States observed that ―experience has shown the 
difficulty of defining neutral legal principles in this area, for redistricting ordinarily 
involves criteria and standards that have been weighed and evaluated by the 
elected branches.‖  The Supreme Court recognized the importance of ensuring that 
 
 
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the lower court act to vindicate federal rights ―without displacing legitimate state 
policy judgments with the court‘s own preferences.‖  Id.  Although these 
observations in Perry are no doubt based in part on federalism concerns, it is clear 
that Perry‘s concern about the ―difficulty of defining neutral legal principles‖ to 
ensure that the ―policy judgments‖ of the ―the elected branches‖ are not displaced 
by judicial ―preferences‖ is applicable to not only federal but also state judicial 
intervention.  Id. 
The concerns voiced by the Supreme Court in Perry echo concerns 
articulated in prior decisions where the Supreme Court considered the definition of 
―discernible and manageable standards by which political gerrymander cases are to 
be decided.‖  Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123 (1986).  Although a narrow 
majority of the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility of articulating such 
standards, a majority of the Supreme Court has never been able to agree on a 
particular test or set of tests. 
In Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306-07 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in the judgment), Justice Kennedy recognized the ―obstacle[]‖ presented by the 
continuing ―absence of rules to limit and confine judicial intervention‖ in the 
adjudication of political gerrymandering claims: ―With uncertain limits, 
intervening courts—even when proceeding with best intentions—would risk 
assuming political, not legal, responsibility for a process that often produces ill will 
 
 
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and distrust.‖  In his opinion for the plurality in Vieth, Justice Scalia emphasized 
the importance of a solid and demonstrable criterion ―to enable the state 
legislatures to discern the limits of their districting discretion, to meaningfully 
constrain the discretion of the courts, and to win public acceptance for the courts‘ 
intrusion into a process that is the very foundation of democratic decisionmaking.‖  
541 U.S. at 291 (plurality). 
―The term ‗political gerrymander‘ has been defined as ―[t]he practice of 
dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape 
to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition‘s voting 
strength.‖  Id. at 271 n.1 (quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary 696 (7th ed. 1999)).  A 
political gerrymandering claim is thus akin to a claim under section 21 that a 
district has been ―drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an 
incumbent.‖  Art. III, § 21(a), Fla. Const.  And the concerns regarding ―discernible 
and manageable standards,‖ Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 123, to be utilized by judges in 
determining the validity of political gerrymandering claims are directly applicable 
to the context of an improper intent claim under section 21. 
The justification for the rule of deference embodied in the presumption of 
constitutionality is not vitiated by the adoption of the particular standards 
contained in section 21.  As the foregoing discussion shows, the justification for 
deference has a firm, widely acknowledged grounding with respect to the portion 
 
 
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of section 21(a) that prohibits conduct akin to the conduct at issue in a political 
gerrymandering claim.  The justification for deference also has a compelling basis 
with respect to the parts of section 21(b) concerning compactness and the use of 
existing political and geographical boundaries.  Those standards do not embody 
inflexible, determinate requirements eliminating the exercise of legislative policy 
judgments in making the choices necessary to draw district lines.67  By their very 
nature, those standards permit a range of choice by the Legislature in the drawing 
of district boundaries.  Given that reality, the application of nondeferential review 
to the plan drawn by the Legislature after the Legislature has ―weighed and 
evaluated‖ the proper balancing of the different ―criteria and standards‖ of section 
                                         
 
67.  The requirement from section 21(b) that ―districts shall be as nearly 
equal in population as is practicable‖ does lend itself to a determinate test.  In 
Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533, 577 (1964)), the Supreme Court determined that the requirement from the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that electoral districts be 
―as nearly of equal population as is practicable‖ allowed ―minor deviations from 
mathematical equality.‖  The Supreme Court then concluded that ―an 
apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10% falls within 
this category of minor deviations.‖  Id.  In adopting the amendment that has been 
codified in section 21, the people of Florida chose to add to their constitution the 
well-defined phrase ―of nearly equal population as practicable.‖  Because it uses 
the identical language as the prior cases interpreting the equal population 
requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment, the equal population standard of 
section 21(b) must be interpreted in accordance with those well-established 
precedents.  Cf. Fla. Dep‘t of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So. 2d 250, 263 
(Fla. 2005) (―In the absence of any indication in the Constitution to the contrary, 
we conclude that the term ‗municipal or public purposes‘ [as used in a newly 
enacted statute] should be construed in accordance with the definition utilized by 
the Court in its prior decisions.‖). 
 
 
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21(b), creates the danger of ―displacing legitimate [legislative] policy judgments 
with the court‘s own preferences.‖  Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 941. 
The circumscribed nature of the thirty-day constitutional review process 
provides an additional compelling reason for not abandoning the rational-basis 
review required by our precedent and the acknowledgement that our review ―is 
extremely limited.‖  In re Apportionment—2002, 817 So. 2d at 824.  We conduct 
the constitutional review process as an appellate court without the benefit of any 
fact-finding proceedings.  We can only rely on facts that are undisputed.  It is 
impossible for us to thoroughly evaluate disputed fact-intensive issues.  We have 
previously recognized that the adjudication of claims arising from the provisions of 
the Voting Rights Act—which are analogous to the provisions of section 21(a) 
protecting the rights of ―racial or language minorities‖—often involve a ―fact-
intensive‖ inquiry which cannot be undertaken within the limits of our review 
pursuant to section 16.  In re Apportionment—2002, 817 So. 2d at 829.  We are 
similarly constrained in the evaluation of factual issues relevant to a determination 
of improper intent.  Given the structural limitations imposed on our review, 
adherence to the presumption of constitutionality helps ensure that we avoid 
reliance on suspicion and surmise—rather than adjudicated facts—as a basis for 
declaring a redistricting plan constitutionally invalid. 
 
 
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These considerations point to the wisdom of adhering to our precedent that 
clothes a redistricting plan with a presumption of constitutionality and prevents us 
from declaring a plan invalid unless it is clear that ―under any rational view that 
may be taken of the [redistricting plan], it is in positive conflict with‖ the 
requirements of our constitution.  In re Apportionment—1972, 263 So. 2d at 806 
(quoting Bowden, 64 So. at 772).  Failing to adhere to that precedent creates the 
risk of having our decisions adjudicating the validity of redistricting plans decline 
into a species of ―‗it-is-so-because-we-say-so‘ jurisprudence.‖68 
II. 
Reasonable questions and concerns can certainly be raised about certain 
choices the Legislature made in drawing district lines.  But the proper analysis of 
constitutionality cannot be driven by questions and concerns.  Instead, under our 
precedents, the analysis of constitutionality must focus on whether there is a 
rational relationship between the choices made by the Legislature and the 
constitutional standards.  The majority, however, takes a very different approach 
than the approach required by our precedents. 
The foundation of the majority‘s decision is constructed from three 
interrelated elements: (1) the effective repudiation of the presumption of 
                                         
 
68.  Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 552 (1989) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 
 
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constitutionality and the rational-basis scrutiny it entails; (2) the imposition of 
judicially created extra-constitutional constraints on the Legislature‘s utilization of 
political and geographical boundaries in the drawing of district lines; and (3) 
conclusions of fact based solely on suspicion and surmise. 
The majority acknowledges the presumption of constitutionality but carries 
out its review of the Senate district plan in a manner that is heedless of the limits 
imposed by that presumption.  The majority thus applies a strict-scrutiny analysis 
rather than the rational-basis review required by our precedents. 
The majority imposes a requirement to use ―consistent‖ boundaries, majority 
op. at 129, 145, in the drawing of district lines—a requirement that is nowhere to 
be found in the text of section 21 and that cannot reasonably be implied from the 
text.  This judicial requirement of ―consistent‖ utilization of boundaries has far-
reaching consequences and is subject to no ―rules to limit and confine judicial 
intervention.‖  Vieth, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Based on nothing more than suspicion and surmise, the majority concludes 
that certain district lines were drawn with improper intent—when there is an 
evident, rational, permissible basis for the drawing of those lines.  The majority 
fails to recognize the structural limitations of our review process, which preclude 
the adjudication of fact-intensive claims. 
 
 
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The most salient legal consequence of the majority‘s decision is that we can 
no longer say that the ―primary responsibility for [redistricting] . . . rests with the 
Legislature.‖  In re Apportionment—1972, 263 So. 2d at 800.  The most salient 
practical consequence of the majority‘s decision is the unsettling of four minority 
Senate districts—Districts 6, 12, 14, and 34—drawn by the Legislature to ensure 
compliance with the requirement of the constitution that districts ―not be drawn 
with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or 
language minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish their 
ability to elect representatives of their choice.‖  Art. III, § 21(a), Fla. Const. 
The majority‘s opinion leaves much in a state of uncertainty.  As the 
majority acknowledges, in their initial brief, the League of Women Voters of 
Florida, the National Council of La Raza, and Common Cause Florida 
(―Coalition‖) stated that if ―this Court finds that any or all of [the constitutional] 
standards are breached, the non-compliant plans should be returned to the 
Legislature with clear instructions as to how to remedy the breach.‖  Brief of the 
Coalition at 16, In re Joint Resolution of Reapportionment, No. SC12-1 (Feb. 17, 
2012) (emphasis added).  As the discussion to follow shows, the majority has 
failed to consistently provide such clarity. 
III. 
 
 
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I now turn to the grounds relied on by the majority for invalidating the 
Senate Plan.  First, I will address why the majority‘s decision to invalidate the 
numbering of Senate districts adopted by the Legislature is unwarranted under 
section 21.  Next, I will discuss the specific districts in the Senate plan with which 
the majority finds fault.  With respect to each of these districts, neither the 
opponents nor the majority have shown the absence of a rational basis under the 
constitutional standards for the lines drawn by the Legislature.  Finally, I will 
explain my disagreement with the majority‘s comments regarding the City of 
Lakeland‘s challenge. 
Senate District Numbering 
I would reject the challenge to the numbering of districts in the Senate plan.  
Section 21 is a limitation on the power of the Legislature only with respect to 
―establishing legislative district boundaries.‖  Art. III, § 21, Fla. Const.  The 
prohibition on action to ―favor or disfavor . . . an incumbent‖ applies only to the 
manner in which district lines are ―drawn.‖  Art. III, § 21(a), Fla. Const.  The 
numbering of the Senate districts is totally unrelated to any advantage incumbent 
senators will obtain vis-à-vis challenger candidates.  The majority stretches the text 
of section 21 to reach legislative decisions that are not within the scope of section 
21. 
Senate Districts 1 and 3 
 
 
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The majority contends that Senate Districts 1 and 3 were drawn without 
respecting any consistent political or geographical boundary lines and that the 
districts are not compact.  The majority rejects as illegitimate the Legislature‘s 
asserted interest in maintaining a coastal community of interest in one district and a 
rural community of interest in the other district.  The majority also asserts that the 
configuration of the districts shows that they were drawn improperly to favor the 
incumbent senators from each of the districts.  The majority‘s analysis with respect 
to these districts illustrates how it has cast aside the presumption of 
constitutionality and departed from the proper confines of our limited review. 
Section 21 provides that ―districts shall, where feasible, utilize existing 
political and geographical boundaries.‖  Art. III, § 21(b), Fla. Const.  This 
provision does not require that the Legislature make a choice between using either 
political boundaries or geographical boundaries.  Indeed, the text clearly 
contemplates that both political and geographical boundaries will be utilized.  The 
majority, however, imposes a requirement of consistency that is designed to limit 
the exercise of policy judgment by the Legislature under section 21.  See majority 
op. at 129, 145.  This is a purely judicially created extra-constitutional 
requirement.  It amounts to a judicial assertion that the constitution is violated if 
political boundaries and geographical boundaries are not utilized in a fashion that 
suits judicial sensibilities.  It cannot be reconciled with the text of section 21. 
 
 
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In the context of legislative districting, compactness will necessarily be a 
matter of degree.  It is not a standard that is subject to a neat, objective test.  On the 
contrary, the requirement is inherently vague.  (The requirement that districts be 
compact is akin in its vagueness to a rule of court requiring that appellate briefs be 
brief.)  In section 21, the compactness standard is on an equal footing with the 
standards related to equal population and the utilization of political and 
geographical boundaries.  The Legislature thus may exercise its policy judgment to 
utilize political and geographical boundaries even when doing so may result in a 
district that is less compact than it might otherwise be. 
In the case of Senate Districts 1 and 3, the Legislature‘s choice to utilize 
certain political boundaries and geographical boundaries has resulted in the 
creation of districts that are less compact than many other districts in the Senate 
plan.  It cannot be said, however, that the drawing of the district lines for Districts 
1 and 3 has no rational basis related to the constitutional standards. 
The majority‘s rejection of the Legislature‘s consideration of communities 
of interest is wholly unwarranted.  Nothing in section 21 provides that the 
standards set forth there—along with those in section 16—are the exclusive, 
legitimate considerations that may be taken into account by the Legislature in 
drawing district lines.  ―[M]aintaining communities of interest‖ has been 
recognized as a ―traditional districting principle[].‖  Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 
 
 
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977 (1996).  Although the Legislature is not constitutionally required to maintain 
communities of interest, nothing in the constitution precludes the Legislature from 
giving consideration to such a traditional districting principle.  The voters adopting 
section 21 would have had no way of knowing—either from the text of the 
amendment or the ballot summary—that the proposed amendment would preclude 
the Legislature from considering existing communities of interest.  Such a 
limitation on legislative authority should not be read into the constitution by 
implication. 
Finally, the majority‘s conclusion that these districts were drawn with an 
improper intent to favor the incumbent senators is based on suspicion and surmise.  
It is indeed ironic that the majority relies on this factor as a ground for invalidating 
these districts when the only alternative Senate district map submitted to the Court 
reconfigures these districts but in a way that also maintains the two incumbent 
senators in different districts. 
Senate Districts 6 and 9 
The Senate cogently describes the challenge to Senate District 6 as based on 
the assertion that 
the Legislature (or this Court) should engage in a deliberate effort to 
dismantle functioning minority districts and replace them with 
districts with cognizably lower minority voting age population (VAP), 
without a shred of evidence either that the lower numbers will not 
―diminish‖ minority voters[‘] ―ability to elect‖ or any evidence (or 
 
 
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even credible allegation) that these gratuitous reductions will enhance 
minority (as opposed to Democratic) opportunities elsewhere. 
 
Reply Brief of the Florida Senate at 6-7, In re Joint Resolution of 
Reapportionment, No. SC12-1 (Feb. 23, 2012). 
In accepting this unwarranted challenge, without the benefit of any fact-
finding proceeding on the contested retrogression issue, the majority decides that—
based on the subordinate compactness standard—it is empowered to make an ad 
hoc determination concerning how much minority voting strength can be 
diminished without transgressing the unequivocal constitutional prohibition on 
drawing district lines ―to diminish‖ the ―ability‖ of ―racial or language minorities‖ 
―to elect representatives of their choice.‖  Art. III, § 21(a), Fla. Const.  This can be 
reconciled with neither the plain meaning of diminish—―to make less or cause to 
appear less,‖ Webster‘s Third International Dictionary 634 (1993)—nor the law 
interpreting the analogous provision in section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 1973c (2006). 
Relying on an alternative proposed by the Coalition, the majority thus 
concludes that District 6 could be reconfigured by reducing its black VAP from 
47.7 percent in the Legislature‘s plan to a black VAP of 42.4 percent in the 
Coalition‘s plan.  Majority op. at 151, 153.  Under the majority‘s approach, the 
current functioning minority district will be replaced by a district in which the 
2006 Democrat candidate for governor received less than a majority of the vote.  
 
 
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By comparison, in both the benchmark district and the district adopted by the 
Legislature the 2006 Democrat candidate for governor obtained a majority.  The 
differences in performance admittedly are not large, but the differences are at the 
margin where many elections are decided.69  The Legislature undoubtedly had a 
rational basis for the conclusion that the configuration of District 6 as adopted was 
necessary to avoid prohibited retrogression in the ability of blacks to elect a 
representative of choice.70  Blithely observing that the justification for Senate 
District 6 under the nonretrogression rule is ―questionable,‖ the Court substitutes 
                                         
 
69.  Pursuant to calculations performed by the software purchased by this 
Court, in District 1 of the 2002 Benchmark Senate Plan, 54.49 percent of voters 
selected the Democrat candidate for governor (Jim Davis) in the 2006 
gubernatorial election, while 43.28 percent of voters selected the Republican 
candidate (Charlie Crist).  In the Legislature‘s proposed District 6, 52.02 percent of 
voters selected the Democrat in that election and 45.71 percent selected the 
Republican.  In contrast, in the Coalition‘s District 1, only 49.06 percent of voters 
selected the Democrat and 48.61 percent selected the Republican.  And, ironically, 
in its appendix, the Coalition offered an even less persuasive figure.  The Coalition 
asserted that only 48.1 percent of voters in its proposed District 1 voted for the 
Democrat in the 2006 gubernatorial election. 
 
70.  I wholeheartedly agree with the view—cited by the majority—
articulated in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993), that ―[r]acial classifications 
of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society.‖  I also agree with the 
majority‘s rejection of ―any argument that the minority population percentage in 
each district as of 2002 is somehow fixed to an absolute number under Florida‘s 
minority protection provision.‖  Majority op. at 66.  Although the nonretrogression 
provision of section 21(a) does not require the Legislature to draw covered 
minority districts in a manner that rigidly preserves or increases the minority VAP 
with each redistricting, the doctrine of nonretrogression does require the 
Legislature to draw the boundaries of performing minority ability districts so that 
the districts will continue to perform as minority ability districts. 
 
 
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its determination for the judgment of the Legislature.  Majority op. at 183.  In 
doing so, the majority ignores the presumption of constitutionality and the 
constitutional priority given to the protection of ―racial or language minorities.‖  
See Art. III, § 21(a), Fla. Const. 
The majority also ignores the findings of the three-judge panel in Martinez 
v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1298-99 (S.D. Fla. 2002), that ―[t]here is a 
substantial degree of racially polarized voting in . . . northeast Florida‖ and that  
 
[i]n any district in [that area] in which blacks do not comprise a 
majority or near majority of actual voters, it is likely that the black 
candidate of choice (if different from the candidate of choice of non-
black voters) will not often prevail; instead, the candidate of choice of 
non-black voters will prevail. 
Such findings are highly relevant to the ―functional analysis‖ of retrogression to 
which the majority refers.  See, e.g., majority op. at 63, 126, 130.  Contrary to the 
majority‘s conclusion, there is no reliable functional analysis establishing that the 
alternative district mandated today by this Court is a district that ensures that the 
ability of black voters to elect a senator ―of their choice‖ is not diminished.  Art. 
III, § 21(a), Fla. Const.  And the majority has cited no case authority under section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act in which a district plan was upheld against a 
retrogression challenge where a choice was made to reduce the minority VAP in a 
performing minority district in a manner similar to that mandated by the Court 
today. 
 
 
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The alternative district proposed by the Coalition is unquestionably more 
compact than Senate District 6.  But the compactness standard of section 21(b) is 
unquestionably subordinate to the requirements of section 21(a) that protect the 
rights of minority voters.  By mandating the creation of a more compact district in 
which the voting influence of black voters is diminished, the majority fails to give 
effect to the constitutional protection for minority voters required by section 21(a). 
 
The majority recognizes that the configuration of District 9 flows from the 
configuration of District 6 in the Legislature‘s plan and invalidates District 9 based 
on the conclusion that Districts 6 is invalid.  Because I disagree with the 
conclusion regarding District 6, I also disagree with the conclusion regarding 
District 9. 
Senate Districts 10 and 12 
The majority invalidates Senate District 10 based on suspicion, surmise, and 
speculation.  Suspicion and surmise are the predicates for the conclusion that 
District 10 was drawn with an improper intent to favor the incumbent senator.  
Speculation is the predicate for the conclusion that District 12—drawn to protect 
the rights of minority voters in a performing minority district—might have been 
drawn in a different manner without retrogressing. 
The reality is that the configuration of Senate District 10 can reasonably be 
understood to result directly from the drawing of District 12 as a nonretrogressive 
 
 
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district where there is currently a performing black district, together with the 
drawing of District 14 as a new Hispanic-majority district with a Hispanic VAP of 
50.5 percent.  No one has challenged and the majority does not question the 
configuration of District 14, the new Hispanic-majority district.  With respect to 
District 12, the majority faults the Legislature for failing to perform a ―functional 
analysis.‖  Majority op. at 160.  In contrast with what it offered as a rationale for 
its decision with respect to District 6, the majority provides no analysis with 
respect to the maintenance of black voters‘ ability to elect the candidate of their 
choice in District 12 and fails to suggest any alternative configuration for District 
12 that it would deem to be nonretrogressive. 
The majority‘s opinion with respect to Districts 10 and 12 can only be 
described as conclusory.  It illustrates as vividly as anything in the opinion how the 
majority‘s acknowledgment of the presumption of constitutionality is meaningless.  
Rather than reviewing the persuasiveness of the opponents‘ allegations of 
unconstitutionality, the majority puts the burden on the Legislature to affirmatively 
prove constitutionality and then invalidates District 10 because ―[n]othing in the 
record reflects that the process of drawing the districts in this area recognized the 
importance of balancing the constitutional values.‖  Majority op. at 161.  And by 
failing to articulate a clear rationale that would guide the Legislature in remedying 
the supposed constitutional violation, the majority makes it more likely that the 
 
 
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Court will ultimately determine that it must draw the district lines for the Florida 
Senate. 
Senate District 30 
The majority invalidates Senate District 30 based on the conclusion that the 
district is not compact and was drawn with an improper intent to favor the 
incumbent senator.  The majority faults the district for having an ―odd-shaped 
configuration.‖  Majority op. at 162.  As it did with respect to Districts 1 and 3, the 
majority dismisses the legitimacy of the Legislature‘s consideration of a coastal 
community of interest in the fashioning of District 30.  I reject the majority‘s 
conclusion with respect to the utilization of a coastal community of interest for the 
reasons I previously expressed in the discussion of Districts 1 and 3.  In addition, 
the majority gives short shrift to the impact on District 30 of the configuration of 
adjoining District 40, which flows from the requirements of section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act.  The boundary between Districts 30 and 40 constitutes roughly one-
third of the 313-mile perimeter of District 30.  And the majority fails to reckon 
with the reality that the coastal geography of Florida will necessarily result in some 
districts with an odd-shaped configuration.  The objectors have not overcome the 
presumption of constitutionality with which Senate District 30 is clothed. 
Senate Districts 29 and 34 
 
 
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The majority declares Senate Districts 29 and 34 invalid on the ground that 
they are not compact.  The majority concludes that the configuration of both 
districts is driven by an improper intent to favor the incumbent senator in District 
29.  The majority relies on an alternative majority black district suggested by the 
Coalition to show that District 34 could have been drawn in a different fashion to 
meet the requirement of nonretrogression.  This alternative majority black district 
has a configuration which is itself far from neatly compact.  Here, the majority 
once again—based on suspicion and surmise regarding improper intent—simply 
substitutes its judgment for the Legislature‘s judgment, without any showing that 
the judgment of the Legislature is not rationally related to the requirements of the 
constitution. 
The City of Lakeland 
The majority has neither accepted nor rejected the challenge made to the 
Senate district plan by the City of Lakeland.  Instead, the majority expresses its 
―concerns.‖  Majority op. at 184.  This is no way to adjudicate a claim of 
constitutional invalidity. 
The City essentially argues that section 21 precluded the Legislature from 
dividing the City into two different Senate districts.  I would reject this argument.  
Nothing in section 21 prohibits the Legislature from drawing district lines through 
municipalities.  The reality is that many municipalities will necessarily be divided 
 
 
- 232 - 
by legislative district lines.  The district line drawn through the City of Lakeland 
largely follows geographical boundaries—including Interstate 4 and United States 
Highway 98.  In order to accept the City‘s argument, this Court would simply have 
to substitute its preference for the policy choice made by Legislature.  The 
presumption of constitutionality enjoyed by the districting plan precludes this 
result.  The City has failed to establish that the Senate district line which traverses 
the City is not rationally related to the standards of Florida‘s Constitution. 
For reasons I have already explained, I disagree with the majority‘s 
condemnation—in its discussion of the City of Lakeland‘s claim—of the Senate‘s 
use of ―an inconsistent definition of ‗political and geographical boundaries.‘‖  
Majority op. at 183.  I also disagree with the majority‘s condemnation of the 
Senate‘s supposed ―incorrect understanding of both compactness and utilizing 
political and geographical boundaries.‖  Id.  Any suggestion that the use of 
geographical boundaries is somehow less acceptable than the use of political 
boundaries is totally at odds with the text of section 21, which establishes no 
preference for political over geographical boundaries.  Any suggestion that the 
Legislature must choose between political and geographical boundaries and 
consistently follow that choice is likewise totally at odds with the text of section 
21, which does not expressly require such consistency and cannot reasonably be 
understood as implying a requirement of such consistency. 
 
 
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IV. 
 
In the majority‘s analysis, the presumption that redistricting plans adopted 
by the Legislature are constitutional—a presumption that this Court unanimously 
reaffirmed ten years ago—is a quickly vanishing presumption.  ―As the cloud is 
consumed and vanisheth away,‖71 so goes the presumption of constitutionality—
consumed by the majority‘s strict-scrutiny analysis.  I dissent from this 
unwarranted expansion of the power of this Court. 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
Original Proceeding – Apportionment Law 
 
Michael A. Carvin of Jones Day, Washington, D.C., Andy Bardos, Special 
Counsel to the President, The Florida Senate, Tallahassee, Florida, Peter M. 
Dunbar and Cynthia S. Tunnicliff of Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell and 
Dunbar, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
For The Senate as proponents  
 
George N. Meros, Jr., Allen Winsor, Charles T. Wells, Jason L. Unger, and 
Charles B. Upton, II of GrayRobinson, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, George T. 
Levesque, General Counsel, Florida House of Representatives, Tallahassee, 
Florida, and Miguel A. De Grandy, P.A., Coral Gables, Florida, 
 
 
For The House of Representatives as proponents 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Timothy D. Osterhaus, Deputy Solicitor 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
                                         
 
71.  Job 7:9 (King James). 
 
 
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For The Attorney General as Proponents 
 
Jon L. Mills, Karen C. Dyer, and Elan M. Nehleber of Boies, Schiller and Flexner, 
LLP, Orlando, Florida, Joseph W. Hatchett of Akerman Senterfitt, Tallahassee, 
Florida, Marc E. Elias, Kevin J. Hamilton, John Devaney, and Abha Khanna of 
Perkins Cole, LLP, Washington, D.C., 
 
 
The Florida Democratic Party as opponents 
 
Ronald G. Meyer of Meyer, Brooks, Demma and Blohm, P.A., Tallahassee, 
Florida, Paul M. Smith, Michael B. DeSanctis, Jessica Ring Amunson, and Kristen 
M. Rogers of Jenner and Block, LLP, Washington, D.C., J. Gerald Hebert, 
Alexandria, Virginia, 
 
 
For The League of Women Voters of Florida, National Counsel of La Raza, 
and Common Cause Florida as opponents 
 
 
David A. Theriaque, S. Brent Spain, and Christopher F. Busch of Therique and 
Spain, Tallahassee, Florida, and Timothy J. McCausland, Lakeland, Florida, 
 
 
For the City of Lakeland, Florida as opponents 
 
Ronald A. Labasky of Brewton Plante, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida , on behalf of the 
Florida State Association of Supervisors of Elections, Inc.; and Charles G. Burr of 
Burr and Smith, LLP, Tampa, Florida, Victor L. Goode and Dorcas R. Gilmore, 
NAACP, Baltimore, Maryland, Allison J. Riggs and Anita S. Earls of Southern 
Coalition For Social Justice, Durham, North Carolina, 
 
 
Other Interested Parties Responding