Title: Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1029.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1029 
STETTER ET AL. v. R.J. CORMAN DERAILMENT SERVICES, L.L.C., ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1029.] 
Torts — Employer intentional torts — R.C. 2745.01 — R.C. 2745.01 does not 
violate rights to trial by jury, to a remedy, to open courts, to due course of 
law, or to equal protection under Ohio Constitution — R.C. 2745.01 does 
not violate separation of powers — R.C. 2745.01 does not conflict with 
legislative authority granted by Section 34 or 35, Article II, Ohio 
Constitution — R.C. 2745.01 does not eliminate common-law cause of 
action of employer intentional tort. 
(No. 2008-0972 — Submitted February 18, 2009 — Decided March 23, 2010.) 
ON AMENDED ORDER from the United States District Court, Northern District of 
Ohio, Western Division, Certifying Questions of State Law, No. 3:07CV866. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
1. 
R.C. 2745.01, as enacted by Am.H.B. No. 498, effective April 7, 2005, 
does not violate the Ohio Constitution's trial-by-jury provision (Section 5, 
Article I), the right-to-a-remedy and open-courts provisions (Section 16, 
Article I), the due-course-of-law provision (Section 16, Article I), the 
equal protection provision (Section 2, Article I), or the separation-of-
powers doctrine and is therefore constitutional on its face. 
2. 
R.C. 2745.01, as enacted by Am.H.B. No. 498, effective April 7, 2005, 
does not conflict with the legislative authority granted to the General 
Assembly by Sections 34 and 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  
(Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., ___ Ohio St.3d ____, 2010-Ohio-
1027, ___ N.E.2d ____, syllabus, followed.) 
3. 
R.C. 2745.01, as enacted by Am.H.B. No. 498, effective April 7, 2005, 
does not eliminate the common-law cause of action for an employer 
intentional tort. 
__________________ 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} We accepted review of certified questions of state law from the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, 
regarding the validity of R.C. 2745.01, Ohio's employer intentional-tort statute, 
under the Ohio Constitution.  For the reasons that follow, we answer the certified 
questions in the negative and hold that R.C. 2745.01, which was enacted by 
Am.H.B. No. 498, 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5533, effective April 7, 2005, is 
facially constitutional.  See also our decision in case No. 2008-0857, Kaminski v. 
Metal & Wire Prods. Co., ___ Ohio St.3d ____, 2010-Ohio-1027, ___ N.E.2d 
____, decided today as well. 1 
                                                 
1.  Some of the issues of this case and of Kaminski overlap.  In resolving the issues that overlap, 
we have considered all the briefs that have been filed in both cases. 
 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
I. The Certification Order and the Questions to Be Answered 
{¶ 2} The federal district court’s amended certification order sets forth 
the following brief statement of the facts: 
{¶ 3} “The Complaint alleges that on March 13, 2006, while employed 
by Defendant R.J. Corman Derailment Services LLC, Plaintiff Carl Stetter was 
injured while working in the course and scope of his employment.  Plaintiff Carl 
Stetter applied for and received workers’ compensation benefits as a result of the 
injuries he sustained on March 13, 2006. 
{¶ 4} “Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in the Wood County Common 
Pleas Court.  Defendants removed the action to the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division.  Federal jurisdiction is based 
upon 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because there is diversity between the parties and the 
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 
{¶ 5} “Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that Defendants committed an 
employer intentional tort.  On February 29, 2008, pursuant to an order of this 
Court, Defendants filed an Amended Answer in which they asserted that Plaintiffs 
are unable to establish any deliberate intent by the Defendants to cause Plaintiffs’ 
injuries and therefore Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by R.C. 2745.01.  On March 
17, 2008, pursuant to an Order of this Court, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Strike 
and/or For Declaratory Judgment asserting that R.C. 2745.01 is unconstitutional.  
To fully adjudicate this matter and determine the rights and liabilities of each 
party, this Court needs a determination by the Ohio Supreme Court regarding the 
constitutionality of R.C. 2745.01 under the Ohio Constitution.  The Supreme 
Court of Ohio has not yet had opportunity to issue a decision on the 
constitutionality of R.C. 2745.01, as enacted by House Bill 498 effective April 7, 
2005.” 
{¶ 6} The federal court certified the following eight questions to this 
court: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
{¶ 7} “1.  Is R.C. §2745.01, as enacted by House Bill 498, effective 
April 7, 2005, unconstitutional for violating the right to trial by jury? 
{¶ 8} “2.  Is R.C. §2745.01, as enacted by House Bill 498, effective 
April 7, 2005, unconstitutional for violating the right to a remedy? 
{¶ 9} “3.  Is R.C. §2745.01, as enacted by House Bill 498, effective 
April 7, 2005, unconstitutional for violating the right to an open court? 
{¶ 10} “4.  Is R.C. §2745.01, as enacted by House Bill 498, effective 
April 7, 2005, unconstitutional for violating the right to due process of law? 
{¶ 11} “5.  Is R.C. §2745.01, as enacted by House Bill 498, effective 
April 7, 2005, unconstitutional for violating the right to equal protection of the 
law? 
{¶ 12} “6.  Is R.C. §2745.01, as enacted by House Bill 498, effective 
April 7, 2005, unconstitutional for violating the separation of powers? 
{¶ 13} “7.  Is R.C. §2745.01, as enacted by House Bill 498, effective 
April 7, 2005, unconstitutional for conflicting with the legislative authority 
granted to the General Assembly by §34 and §35, Article II, of the Ohio 
Constitution? 
{¶ 14} “8.  Does R.C. §2745.01, as enacted by House Bill 498, effective 
Apri17, 2005, do away with the common law cause of action for employer 
intentional tort?” 
{¶ 15} We reviewed the parties’ preliminary memoranda and consented to 
answer the eight certified questions of the amended order.  119 Ohio St.3d 1452, 
2008-Ohio-4562, 893 N.E.2d 520. 2 
                                                 
2.  The federal district court had previously certified similar questions to this court, and this court 
accepted those questions on August 6, 2008.  119 Ohio St.3d 1405, 2008-Ohio-1880, 891 N.E.2d 
766.  However, the federal court issued an amended order because the original incorrectly referred 
to Senate Bill 80, rather than House Bill 498, as the bill that enacted R.C. 2745.01. 
 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
{¶ 16} Plaintiffs Carl and Doris Stetter are the petitioners in this matter.  
The respondents are defendants R.J. Corman Derailment Services, L.L.C., and 
R.J. Corman Railroad Group, L.L.C. 
II. Analysis 
{¶ 17} R.C. 2745.01, effective April 7, 2005, provides in its entirety: 
{¶ 18} “(A) In an action brought against an employer by an employee, or 
by the dependent survivors of a deceased employee, for damages resulting from 
an intentional tort committed by the employer during the course of employment, 
the employer shall not be liable unless the plaintiff proves that the employer 
committed the tortious act with the intent to injure another or with the belief that 
the injury was substantially certain to occur. 
{¶ 19} “(B) As used in this section, ‘substantially certain’ means that an 
employer acts with deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer an injury, a 
disease, a condition, or death. 
{¶ 20} “(C) Deliberate removal by an employer of an equipment safety 
guard or deliberate misrepresentation of a toxic or hazardous substance creates a 
rebuttable presumption that the removal or misrepresentation was committed with 
intent to injure another if an injury or an occupational disease or condition occurs 
as a direct result. 
{¶ 21} “(D) This section does not apply to claims arising during the 
course of employment involving discrimination, civil rights, retaliation, 
harassment in violation of Chapter 4112 of the Revised Code, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress not compensable under Chapters 4121 and 4123 of 
the Revised Code, contract, promissory estoppel, or defamation.”  150 Ohio 
Laws, Part IV, 5533. 
{¶ 22} In Kaminski, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2010-Ohio-1027, ____ N.E.2d 
___, we reviewed the history and development of employer intentional-tort law in 
Ohio.  In particular, we examined this court’s decisions in Brady v. Safety-Kleen 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 624, 576 N.E.2d 722, and Johnson v. BP Chems., 
Inc. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 298, 707 N.E.2d 1107, both of which struck down 
legislation governing employer intentional torts.  We draw upon Kaminski in 
answering the certified questions of this case.3 
A.  The Statutory Purpose 
{¶ 23} In an argument going to the eighth certified question, petitioners 
assert that R.C. 2745.01 “does not do away with the common law cause of action 
for employer intentional tort.”  (Emphasis added.)  Rather than arguing that R.C. 
2745.01 is unconstitutional, petitioners present an elaborate argument that R.C. 
2745.01 is actually constitutional when understood in its proper context. 
{¶ 24} Petitioners first contend that the portion of R.C. 2745.01(A) 
regarding the employer’s intent to injure another is actually a codification of the 
common-law cause of action developed by this court, in such cases as 
Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 23 
O.O.3d 504, 433 N.E.2d 572, and in Fyffe v. Jeno’s, Inc. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 
115, 570 N.E.2d 1108.  Petitioners then assert that R.C. 2745.01(A) both 
acknowledges the existing common-law action for employer intentional torts and 
creates “a new statutory cause of action for deliberately intended employer 
intentional torts.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
{¶ 25} Petitioners accordingly contend that the General Assembly meant 
to accept this court’s holdings in Brady and Johnson. 
{¶ 26} For reasons also discussed in Kaminski, we reject petitioners’ 
construction of R.C. 2745.01.  It was the General Assembly’s intent in enacting 
R.C. 2745.01, as expressed particularly in 2745.01(B), to permit recovery for 
employer intentional torts only when an employer acts with specific intent to 
                                                 
3.  To facilitate our discussion of the numbered certified questions, we address them out of order. 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
cause an injury.  See id., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2010-Ohio-1027, ___ N.E.2d ___, 
at ¶ 56. 
{¶ 27} To accept petitioners’ view of the statute, we must ignore the 
history of employer intentional-tort law in Ohio and the dynamic between the 
General Assembly’s attempts to legislate in this area and this court’s decisions 
reacting to those attempts.  Instead, we find that R.C. 2745.01 embodies the 
General Assembly’s intent to significantly curtail an employee’s access to 
common-law damages for what we will call a “substantially certain” employer 
intentional tort.  We do not view the statute as a codification of this court’s 
decisions in Brady, 61 Ohio St.3d 624, 576 N.E.2d 722, and Johnson, 85 Ohio 
St.3d 298, 707 N.E.2d 1107. 
{¶ 28} It does not necessarily follow, however, that R.C. 2745.01 does 
away with the common-law cause of action for employer intentional tort, which is 
the query posed by the eighth certified question.  Although the statute 
significantly limits lawsuits for employer workplace intentional torts, it does not 
abolish the tort entirely.  See Talik v. Fed. Marine Terminals, Inc., 117 Ohio St.3d 
496, 2008-Ohio-937, 885 N.E.2d 204, ¶ 17 (“The General Assembly modified the 
common-law definition of an employer intentional tort by enacting R.C. 
2745.01”).  Accordingly, we answer the eighth certified question by holding that 
R.C. 2745.01 does not eliminate the common-law cause of action for an employer 
intentional tort. 
B.  Sections 34 and 35, Article II, Ohio Constitution 
{¶ 29} The seventh certified question asks whether R.C. 2745.01 
impermissibly conflicts with the legislative authority granted to the General 
Assembly by Sections 34 and Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  We 
reviewed this issue in Kaminski, and we held that no such conflict exists.  In 
Kaminski, we clarified that both constitutional provisions function as grants of 
authority to the General Assembly and not as limitations on legislative authority. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
{¶ 30} To the extent that this court in Johnson, and the plurality in Brady, 
construed Sections 34 and 35 as preventing the General Assembly from enacting 
legislation in this area, we disclaim that reasoning.  See Kaminski, at the syllabus.  
Because of the significant differences between the current statute and the statutes 
invalidated in Johnson and Brady, we limit those decisions to the specific statutes 
invalidated in those cases.  Accordingly, for the reasons stated in Kaminski, we 
answer the seventh certified question in the negative and hold that R.C. 2745.01, 
as enacted by Am.H.B. No. 498, effective April 7, 2005, does not conflict with 
the legislative authority granted to the General Assembly by Sections 34 and 35, 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
C.  Other Constitutional Provisions 
{¶ 31} The remaining certified questions in this case test the 
constitutionality of R.C. 2745.01 under provisions other than Sections 34 and 35, 
Article II. 
{¶ 32} Our inquiry is guided by familiar and well-established principles of 
constitutional adjudication.  In Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 
2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, we reiterated that all statutes enjoy a strong 
presumption of constitutionality:  “Before a court may declare unconstitutional an 
enactment of the legislative branch, ‘it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible.’ ” Id. at 
¶ 25, quoting State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 
O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 33} Furthermore, a party raising a facial challenge to a statute, as 
petitioners do here, must demonstrate that there is no set of circumstances under 
which the statute would be valid.  Arbino at ¶ 26, citing United States v. Salerno 
(1987), 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697.  “ ‘The fact that a 
statute might operate unconstitutionally under some plausible set of circumstances 
is insufficient to render it wholly invalid.’ ”  Arbino at ¶ 26, quoting Harrold v. 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 37.  See also 
Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 
377, ¶ 25-26. 
{¶ 34} “A fundamental principle of the constitutional separation of 
powers among the three branches of government is that the legislative branch of 
government is ‘the ultimate arbiter of public policy.’ ”  Arbino at ¶ 21, quoting 
State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Information Network v. 
Dupuis, 98 Ohio St.3d 126, 2002-Ohio-7041, 781 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 21.  In fulfilling 
that role, the legislature is entrusted with the power to continually refine Ohio’s 
laws to meet the needs of our citizens.  Id. 
{¶ 35} It is not the role of the courts “to establish legislative policies or to 
second-guess the General Assembly’s policy choices.  ‘[T]he General Assembly 
is responsible for weighing [policy] concerns and making policy decisions; we are 
charged with evaluating the constitutionality of their choices.’ ”  Groch v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 212, 
quoting Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 113. 
{¶ 36} Section 1, Article II of the Ohio Constitution provides that all 
legislative power of the state is vested in the General Assembly.  Thus, the 
General Assembly possesses the authority to enact any law that does not conflict 
with the Ohio and United States Constitutions.  See State ex. rel Jackman v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 159, 162, 38 O.O.2d 
404, 224 N.E.2d 906.  Included within this authority is the power to “alter, revise, 
modify, or abolish the common law” as the General Assembly deems necessary to 
further the common good.  Arbino at ¶ 131 (Cupp, J., concurring).  See Thompson 
v. Ford (1955), 164 Ohio St. 74, 79, 57 O.O. 96, 128 N.E.2d 111 (using its police 
powers, “the General Assembly may modify or entirely abolish common-law 
actions and defenses”); accord Strock v. Presnell (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 214, 
527 N.E.2d 1235. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
{¶ 37} “While stare decisis applies to the rulings rendered in regard to 
specific statutes, it is limited to circumstances ‘where the facts of a subsequent 
case are substantially the same as a former case.’  Rocky River v. State Emp. 
Relations Bd. (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 1, 5, 539 N.E.2d 103.  We will not apply 
stare decisis to strike down legislation enacted by the General Assembly merely 
because it is similar to previous enactments that we have deemed unconstitutional.  
To be covered by the blanket of stare decisis, the legislation must be phrased in 
language that is substantially the same as that which we have previously 
invalidated. 
{¶ 38} “A careful review of the statutes at issue * * * reveals that they are 
more than a rehashing of unconstitutional statutes.  In its continued pursuit of 
reform, the General Assembly has made progress in tailoring its legislation to 
address the constitutional defects identified by the various majorities of this court.  
The statutes before us * * * are sufficiently different from the previous 
enactments to avoid the blanket application of stare decisis and to warrant a fresh 
review of their individual merits.”  Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 
880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 23-24.  See also Groch, 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 
883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 104-106. 
{¶ 39} As with the statutes at issue in Arbino and Groch, the statute at 
issue in this case resembles previous invalid legislation in some respects, but it 
differs in significant and important ways.  Consequently, even though this court 
has struck down employer intentional-tort statutes in previous cases, stare decisis 
does not necessarily compel the conclusion that R.C. 2745.01 is also 
unconstitutional.  Rather, we conduct a fresh review of the statute in light of its 
specific terms. 
1.  Open Courts and Right to a Remedy (Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution) 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
{¶ 40} The second certified question asks whether R.C. 2745.01 violates 
the right to a remedy.  The third certified question asks whether R.C. 2745.01 
violates the right to an open court. 
{¶ 41} Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides, “All courts 
shall be open and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, 
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice 
administered without denial or delay.”  Section 16 contains several distinct 
guarantees.  First, legislative enactments may restrict individual rights only “by 
due course of law,” a guarantee equivalent to the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Groch v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 108.  We address 
that facet of Section 16 in Part II(C)(3), below. 
{¶ 42} Additionally, separate concerns are implicated by Section 16’s 
provisions that this state’s courts shall be open to every person with a right to a 
remedy for injury to his person, property, or reputation.  “ ‘When the Constitution 
speaks of remedy and injury to person, property, or reputation, it requires an 
opportunity granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ”Arbino, 
116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 44, quoting Hardy v. 
VerMeulen (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 45, 47, 512 N.E.2d 626.  “A statute need not 
‘completely abolish the right to open courts’ to run afoul” of Section 16.  Arbino 
at ¶ 45, quoting Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415, 426, 633 N.E.2d 
504.  Any statute that eliminates a right to a judgment or to a properly rendered 
verdict is unconstitutional, and an individual cannot be “wholly foreclosed from 
relief after a verdict is rendered in his or her favor.”  Arbino at ¶ 45.  This court 
has invalidated statutes and rules as violative of this aspect of Section 16, Article I 
in cases involving a “serious infringement of a clearly preexisting right to bring 
suit.”  Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 355, 
639 N.E.2d 31. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
{¶ 43} We now address the open-courts and right-to-a-remedy provisions 
of Section 16 as applicable to this case. 
{¶ 44} Petitioners contend that requiring employees to show a “deliberate 
intent” to cause injury denies a meaningful remedy to employees injured by acts 
committed with the “substantially certain” level of intent who are relegated to 
workers’ compensation recovery only.  Petitioners assert that “[t]he right to bring 
a civil action for damages is the only meaningful remedy for an intentional tort in 
any context, including the context of employment.” 
{¶ 45} Petitioners further assert that requiring an employee to show an 
employer’s deliberate intent to cause injury “will effectively close Ohio’s courts” 
to employees injured by an employer acting with something less than deliberate 
intent.  To this end, petitioners emphasize that in Johnson, 85 Ohio St.3d at 306, 
707 N.E.2d 1107, this court stated that former R.C. 2745.01(D) was flawed 
because it might force an employee to prove “at a minimum, that the actions of 
the employer amount to criminal assault.” 
{¶ 46} As we noted in Kaminski at ¶ 96, the majority opinion in Johnson 
did not rely solely on Sections 34 and 35, Article II in overturning the employer 
intentional-tort statute at issue in that case.  Much of the discussion in Johnson 
shows that the statute was determined to be unconstitutional based in large part on 
the heavy burden it placed on employees seeking a civil remedy. 
{¶ 47} In this regard, this court stated in Johnson, 85 Ohio St.3d at 306, 
707 N.E.2d 1107, that former R.C. 2745.01 “created a cause of action that is 
simply illusory” and that the statutory requirements “are so unreasonable and 
excessive that the chance of recovery of damages by employees for intentional 
torts committed by employers in the workplace is virtually zero.”  Id. at 307, 707 
N.E.2d 1107.  These statements resemble the standards governing judicial review 
of alleged violations of Section 16’s guarantee of the right to a remedy and right 
to an open court.  See, e.g., Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
N.E.2d 420, ¶ 47, 97 (statutory remedies must be “meaningful” to comply with 
Section 16). 
{¶ 48} Current R.C. 2745.01, however, jettisons many of the attributes 
that troubled this court in past versions.  For example, the current statute does not 
require employees to establish an intentional tort by clear and convincing 
evidence, in contrast to former R.C. 2745.01, which was invalidated in Johnson.  
See 85 Ohio St.3d at 306, 707 N.E.2d 1107; see former R.C. 2745.01(B) (146 
Ohio Laws, Part I, 756) (clear-and-convincing-evidence standard applied to all 
elements of an employer intentional tort) and (C)(1) (id.) (clear-and-convincing-
evidence standard applied to responses to employers’ motions for summary 
judgment).  Moreover, the current version does not require that a court impose 
sanctions for failing to comply with certification requirements, such as the 
requirement to attest that an action is not brought for an improper purpose such as 
harassment.  See former R.C. 2745.01(C)(2).  146 Ohio Laws, Part I, 757. 
{¶ 49} Additionally, current R.C. 2745.01, in contrast to former R.C. 
4121.80 (141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 733) struck down in Brady, does not provide that 
an employee who recovers for an intentional tort may collect only the amount 
recovered in excess of the workers’ compensation benefits the employee also 
received, former R.C. 4121.80(A) (id.), does not provide that the Industrial 
Commission, rather than a court, must determine the amount of damages and does 
not cap the amount of damages recovered for an employer intentional tort, 
4121.80(D) (id. at 735), and does not establish an intentional tort fund, 
4121.80(E) (id.). 
{¶ 50} It is apparent that the General Assembly responded to this court’s 
previous decisions by eliminating many of the features identified by this court as 
unreasonable, onerous, and excessive.  Thus, in reviewing R.C. 2745.01, we find 
a more limited statute than those previously held to be unconstitutional. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
{¶ 51} Petitioners point out that the Johnson court objected to requiring an 
employee to prove the equivalent of a criminal assault.  But Johnson's objections 
were largely based on former R.C. 2745.01’s imposition of a clear-and-
convincing-evidence burden of proof.  Because the current statute has no such 
requirement, it is distinguishable from the one in Johnson, and the statute here 
imposes no similar burden on an employee’s right to an open court. 
{¶ 52} In Hardy, 32 Ohio St.3d at 49, 512 N.E.2d 626, we rejected the 
notion that “causes of action as they existed at common law or the rules that 
govern such causes are immune from legislative attention.”  This is because “[n]o 
one has a vested right in rules of the common law.  * * * The great office of 
statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to 
adapt it to new circumstances.”  Fassig v. State ex rel. Turner (1917), 95 Ohio St. 
232, 248, 116 N.E. 104.  See Leis v. Cleveland Ry. Co. (1920), 101 Ohio St. 162, 
128 N.E. 73, paragraph one of the syllabus (because there is no property or vested 
right in rules of the common law, “they may be added to or repealed by legislative 
authority”); see also Munn v. Illinois (1876), 94 U.S. 113, 134, 24 L.Ed. 77 (there 
is no vested interest in any rule of the common law; alteration of the common law 
is permissible unless prohibited by specific constitutional limitations). 
{¶ 53} “ ‘ “ ‘This court would encroach upon the Legislature’s ability to 
guide the development of the law if we invalidated legislation simply because the 
rule enacted by the Legislature rejects some cause of action currently preferred by 
the courts.  * * * Such a result would offend our notion of the checks and balances 
between the various branches of government, and the flexibility required for the 
healthy growth of the law.’ ” ’ ”  Groch, 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 
N.E.2d 377, ¶ 118, quoting Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 
193, 202, 551 N.E.2d 938, quoting Klein v. Catalano (1982), 386 Mass. 701, 712-
713, 437 N.E.2d 514, and Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co. (1978), 
476 Pa. 270, 280-281, 382 A.2d 715. 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
{¶ 54} As this court has often recognized, workers’ compensation laws 
are the result of a unique mutual compromise between employees and employers, 
in which employees give up their common-law remedy and accept possibly lower 
monetary recovery, but with greater assurance that they will receive reasonable 
compensation for their injury.  Employers in turn give up common-law defenses 
but are protected from unlimited liability.  See, e.g., Bickers v. W. & S. Life Ins. 
Co., 116 Ohio St.3d 351, 2007-Ohio-6751, 879 N.E.2d 201, ¶ 19; Arrington v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 109 Ohio St.3d 539, 2006-Ohio-3257, 849 N.E.2d 1004, 
¶ 19; Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 115, 119, 748 N.E.2d 
1111; Blankenship, 69 Ohio St.2d at 614, 23 O.O.3d 504, 433 N.E.2d 572. 
{¶ 55} For the reasons that follow, we hold that current R.C. 2745.01 does 
not violate the right to an open court or the right to a remedy and that the statute 
provides for meaningful remedies. 
{¶ 56} First, R.C. 2745.01 is not retroactive and, therefore, has no effect 
on employees whose causes of action arose before the statute’s effective date and 
whose claims have vested. 
{¶ 57} Second, R.C. 2745.01 allows employees to recover for an 
intentional tort for injuries that result from a deliberate intent to injure.  R.C. 
2745.01(A) and (B). 
{¶ 58} Third, R.C. 2745.01 allows recovery for an intentional tort for 
situations involving the deliberate removal of an equipment safety guard or 
deliberate misrepresentation of a toxic or hazardous substance.  R.C. 2745.01(C).  
The claims listed in R.C. 2745.01(D), such as discrimination, sexual harassment, 
and retaliation, are unaffected by this enactment. 
{¶ 59} Fourth, workers’ compensation recovery is a meaningful remedy 
for workers whose injuries result from conduct committed with an intent less than 
deliberate intent, such as conduct that is reckless (as it is under our current case 
law).  Furthermore, when an injury results from an employer’s violation of a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
specific safety requirement, an additional recovery by the injured worker is 
constitutionally available.  Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.4 
{¶ 60} The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2745.01 pursuant to its 
authority to modify the rules of the common law.  “The power to alter or abolish a 
common-law cause of action necessarily includes the power to modify any 
associated remedy.”  Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 
420, ¶ 132 (Cupp, J., concurring), citing State v. Barlow (1904), 70 Ohio St. 363, 
374-375, 71 N.E. 726.  Meaningful remedies through the workers’ compensation 
system are available for those employees whose claim against their employer falls 
short of the statutory elements necessary for an employer intentional tort.  We 
answer the second and third certified questions in the negative and hold that R.C. 
2745.01, as enacted by Am.H.B. No. 498, effective April 7, 2005, does not violate 
the right to a remedy or the right to an open court of Section 16, Article I of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
2.  Right to Trial by Jury (Section 5, Article I, Ohio Constitution) 
{¶ 61} The first certified question asks whether R.C. 2745.01 violates the 
right to trial by jury.  Section 5, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides that 
“[t]he right of trial by jury shall be inviolate, except that, in civil cases, laws may 
be passed to authorize the rendering of a verdict by the concurrence of not less 
than three-fourths of the jury.”  The jury-trial right conferred by Section 5, Article 
I (and by the analogous Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution) is 
“one of the most fundamental and long-standing rights in our legal system, having 
derived originally from the Magna Carta.”  Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-
                                                 
4.  The final sentence of Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution provides:  “When it is 
found, upon hearing, that an injury, disease or death resulted because of [the] failure by the 
employer [to comply with any specific requirement for the protection of the lives, health or safety 
of employees], such amount as shall be found to be just, not greater than fifty nor less than fifteen 
per centum of the maximum award established by law, shall be added by the board [i.e., the 
Industrial Commission of Ohio], to the amount of the compensation that may be awarded on 
account of such injury, disease, or death * * *.” 
January Term, 2010 
17 
 
Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 31.  See Arrington, 109 Ohio St.3d 539, 2006-
Ohio-3257, 849 N.E.2d 1004, ¶ 21 (right to trial by jury was “[d]esigned to 
prevent government oppression and to promote the fair resolution of factual 
issues”). 
{¶ 62} Petitioners argue that requiring employees to show an employer’s 
deliberate intent to injure in order to recover civil damages “would deprive the 
victims of non-deliberate intentional tortfeasors of their right to trial by jury” and 
that “[a]ny deprivation of the right to bring a civil action amounts to an ipso facto 
deprivation” of that right. 
{¶ 63} Petitioners’ arguments fail to take into account that the right to a 
jury trial is not absolute.  Section 5, Article I applies only to those causes of action 
to which the right attached at common law when Section 5 was adopted.  Arbino 
at ¶ 32.  Moreover, Section 5’s specific guarantee is that a jury will resolve any 
questions of fact, and a challenge to a statute under that section will succeed “only 
if the statute actually intrudes upon the jury’s fact-finding function.”  Id. at ¶ 34, 
90. 
{¶ 64} The right to trial by jury does not act as “a limit on the ability of 
the legislature to act within its constitutional boundaries.”  Id., 116 Ohio St.3d 
468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 126 (Cupp, J., concurring).  “[I]t is 
long-settled constitutional law that it is within the power of the legislature to alter, 
revise, modify, or abolish the common law as it may determine necessary or 
advisable for the common good.”  Id. at ¶ 131.  Thus, the right to trial by jury 
does not prevent the General Assembly from altering a cause of action.  Id. at ¶ 
131-132. 
{¶ 65} In Arrington, we observed that employer intentional-tort claims 
typically retain a right to trial by jury because, under Blankenship, intentional 
torts do not arise from employment, and the employer thus loses immunity from a 
common-law suit.  109 Ohio St.3d 539, 2006-Ohio-3257, 849 N.E.2d 1004, ¶ 24, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
citing Blankenship, 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 23 O.O.3d 504, 433 N.E.2d 572.  
However, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2745.01 via its authority to alter a 
common-law cause of action, and it acted within the bounds of its authority in 
setting the parameters of an employer intentional tort. 
{¶ 66} With R.C. 2745.01, the General Assembly has effectively 
determined that injuries to an employee resulting from an employer’s actions that 
fall short of deliberate intent do arise from employment.  An employee who 
cannot demonstrate deliberate intent under R.C. 2745.01 has the same status as an 
employee injured by the negligence of his employer.  Both employees must seek 
recovery pursuant to Ohio’s workers’ compensation statutes, and neither has a 
constitutional right to a jury.  See Arrington, 109 Ohio St.3d 539, 2006-Ohio-
3257, 849 N.E.2d 1004, at ¶ 25-26 (“We have never held that a worker seeking to 
participate in the [workers’ compensation fund] is entitled to a trial by jury 
because of Section 5, Article I, Section 35, Article II, or any other constitutional 
provision”). 
{¶ 67} An employee who can establish a prima facie case that his 
employer deliberately intended to injure him is not prevented by R.C. 2745.01 
from submitting his claim to a jury, for the jury to determine questions of fact.  
Consequently, the statute does not violate the right to a trial by a jury, because it 
does not intrude on the traditional province of the jury, and it allows the jury to 
determine damages when they are legally available. 
{¶ 68} Accordingly, we answer the first certified question in the negative 
and hold that R.C. 2745.01, as enacted by Am.H.B. No. 498, effective April 7, 
2005, does not violate the right to a jury trial conferred by Section 5, Article I of 
the Ohio Constitution. 
3.  Due Process (Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution) 
{¶ 69} The fourth certified question asks whether R.C. 2745.01 violates 
the right to due process of law.  As noted supra, this court has recognized that the 
January Term, 2010 
19 
 
“due course of law” aspect of Section 16, Article I is the equivalent of the Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution.  See also Arbino, 116 Ohio 
St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 48. 
{¶ 70} Petitioner asserts that we are required to apply strict scrutiny to our 
review of the statute’s effect on an employee’s right of due process because the 
statute violates fundamental rights to an open court, to a remedy, and to a jury 
trial.  Under this standard, a statute will be held unconstitutional unless it is 
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.  Groch, 117 Ohio St.3d 
192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 155; Sorrell, 69 Ohio St.3d at 423, 633 
N.E.2d 504. 
{¶ 71} A statute that does not impinge upon a fundamental right, however, 
will be reviewed under a rational-basis test.  Under this test, a statute will be 
upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and it is not 
unreasonable or arbitrary.  Groch at ¶ 157; Mominee v. Scherbarth (1986), 28 
Ohio St.3d 270, 274, 28 OBR 346, 503 N.E.2d 717.  “In conducting this review, 
we must consider whether the General Assembly’s purposes in enacting the 
legislation at issue provide adequate support to justify the statute’s effects.”  
Groch at ¶ 157. 
{¶ 72} Because the statute does not impinge upon fundamental rights and 
does not violate the right to an open court, the right to a remedy, or the right to 
trial by jury, we reject petitioners’ argument that strict scrutiny should apply, and 
we instead review under the rational-basis standard.  See Groch at ¶ 156; Arbino, 
116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 49. 
{¶ 73} As an initial matter, R.C. 2745.01 is not unreasonable or arbitrary.  
As we noted in Kaminski at ¶ 99, “R.C. 2745.01 appears to harmonize the law of 
this state with the law that governs a clear majority of jurisdictions.”  See, e.g., 6 
Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law (2008), Section 103.03 (“the common-law 
liability of the employer cannot, under the almost unanimous rule, be stretched to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
include accidental injuries caused by the gross, wanton, wilful, deliberate, 
intentional, reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence, breach of statute, or other 
misconduct of the employer short of a conscious and deliberate intent directed to 
the purpose of inflicting an injury”) (footnote omitted); Talik, 117 Ohio St.3d 496, 
2008-Ohio-937, 885 N.E.2d 204, ¶ 32, citing 6 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation 
Law (2007) 103-10, Section 103.04[1] (“Ohio is one of only eight states that have 
judicially adopted a ‘substantial certainty’ standard for employer intentional 
torts”) (footnote omitted).  It is not unreasonable or arbitrary to conform Ohio’s 
law of employer intentional torts to that of a majority of jurisdictions. 
{¶ 74} Furthermore, R.C. 2745.01 is rationally related to legitimate 
purposes.  The two most important reasons for the exclusivity of the workers’ 
compensation remedy are “first, to maintain the balance of sacrifices between 
employer and employee in the substitution of no-fault liability for tort liability 
and, second, to minimize litigation, even litigation of undoubted merit.”  6 
Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, Section 103.03. 
{¶ 75} As to the first important reason, “it must be remembered once 
again that this is a no-fault system as to both employer and employee.”  Id.  
Conventional standards regarding what a “just” result might be are subordinated 
to other concerns in this setting, and awards are routinely made to employees 
injured as the result of their own misconduct.  Id.  See State ex rel. Gross v. Indus. 
Comm., 115 Ohio St.3d 249, 2007-Ohio-4916, 874 N.E.2d 1162, ¶ 20, 22 (a 
claimant who willfully or deliberately violates a workplace rule and is thereby 
injured is not statutorily disqualified from receiving workers’ compensation 
benefits; “[t]he no-fault nature of our workers’ compensation scheme is a 
statutory mandate,” and in the absence of a statutory provision providing 
otherwise, workers’ compensation benefits may not be denied on the basis of fault 
to a claimant who was injured in the course and scope of employment”).  Given 
that a claimant’s fault is irrelevant in most situations to his or her workers’ 
January Term, 2010 
21 
 
compensation recovery, it is not incongruous to likewise provide, as the General 
Assembly has in R.C. 2745.01, that an employer’s liability for most injuries is 
limited to the claimant’s recovery of workers’ compensation benefits. 
{¶ 76} As to the second important reason, “every presumption is on the 
side of avoiding the imposition of the complexities and uncertainties of tort 
litigation on the compensation process.”  6 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation 
Law, Section 103.03.  One of the fundamental pillars supporting Section 35, 
Article II is the exclusivity of the no-fault compensation system.  The inclusion of 
this feature in Section 35, Article II underscores the importance the Constitution 
places on avoiding litigation over workplace injuries. 
{¶ 77} No more extensive examination of the relationship between the 
statute’s purposes and its effects is necessary.  When conducting a rational-basis 
review, “ ‘we are to grant substantial deference to the predictive judgment of the 
General Assembly.” ’  Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 
420, at ¶ 58, quoting State v. Williams (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 531, 728 
N.E.2d 342.  See also Groch, 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 
377, at ¶ 72.  Courts may not “usurp the legislative function” by substituting their 
judgment for that of a legislative authority.  Cent. Motors Corp. v. Pepper Pike 
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 581, 584, 653 N.E.2d 639. 
{¶ 78} The state manifestly has a legitimate interest in legislating in the 
area of employer intentional torts.  The fact that a clear majority of jurisdictions 
apply standards the same as or similar to those contained in R.C. 2745.01, and the 
well-established rationale behind Section 35, Article II, which underlies the 
statute, establish that the statute furthers legitimate purposes that are neither 
unreasonable nor arbitrary.  Because R.C. 2745.01 survives rational-basis review 
under the “due course of law” aspect of Section 16, Article I, we answer the 
fourth certified question in the negative and hold that R.C. 2745.01, as enacted by 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
Am.H.B. No. 498, effective April 7, 2005, does not violate the right to due 
process of law of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
4.  Equal Protection (Section 2, Article I, Ohio Constitution) 
{¶ 79} The fifth certified question asks whether R.C. 2745.01 violates the 
right to equal protection of the law.  Ohio’s Equal Protection Clause, Section 2, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution, provides, “All political power is inherent in the 
people.  Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit.”  This 
provision is interpreted as the equivalent of the federal Equal Protection Clause.  
See Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 63. 
{¶ 80} Because no fundamental right or suspect class is implicated in this 
case, we review R.C. 2745.01 under the rational-basis test.  Oliver v. Cleveland 
Indians Baseball Co. Ltd. Partnership, 123 Ohio St.3d 278, 2009-Ohio-5030, 915 
N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 9.  Under this test, a challenged statute will be upheld if the 
classifications it creates bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government 
interest or are grounded on a reasonable justification, even if the classifications 
are not precise.  Groch, 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, at ¶ 
82; Arbino at ¶ 49. 
{¶ 81} Petitioners assert that R.C. 2745.01 creates two classes of 
intentional-tort victims:  employee victims and victims injured outside the 
workplace.  Petitioners further assert that employee victims are denied equal 
protection under the statute because they must prove that the employer-tortfeasor 
acted with deliberate intent to injure in order to recover damages, while non-
employee victims can recover upon a showing that the tortfeasor acted only with 
the belief that injury to the victim was substantially certain to occur. 
{¶ 82} For reasons similar to those that led us to conclude above that the 
statute does not violate the due-course-of-law provision of Section 16, Article I, 
we also find that R.C. 2745.01 does not violate the equal protection provision of 
Section 2, Article I.  Employee victims who can establish under the statute that 
January Term, 2010 
23 
 
their injuries were caused by their employer’s deliberate intent may recover for an 
intentional tort.  The statutory classifications petitioners complain of merely 
recognize that employees suffering job-related injuries that are not the result of an 
employer’s deliberate intent are not situated similarly to tort victims injured in, 
say, a car accident or on the operating table.  See Holeton, 92 Ohio St.3d at 131-
132, 748 N.E.2d 1111 (a tort victim who is injured on the job is not situated 
similarly to a tort victim who is injured off the job; recovery by the former is 
governed by the Workers’ Compensation Act, but recovery by the latter is not). 
{¶ 83} Moreover, the Ohio Constitution itself draws the classification 
between persons who, as employees, are injured on the job and those persons who 
are injured other than in the workplace.  The workers’ compensation system 
authorized by Section 35, Article II provides that employers who comply with the 
requirements of that system “shall not be liable to respond in damages at common 
law or by statute for * * * death, injuries, or occupational disease” sustained by 
employees on the job.  R.C. 2745.01 reasonably furthers the legitimate 
constitutional purpose of maintaining the social bargain between employer and 
employee inherent in the workers’ compensation relationship.  Moreover, the 
statute furthers another central purpose – minimizing litigation. 
{¶ 84} The General Assembly has permissibly modified the common law 
of employer intentional torts through R.C. 2745.01 by establishing that an 
employee who cannot demonstrate the deliberate intent of his employer to injure 
him is situated similarly to other employees who recover within the workers’ 
compensation system.  See Thompson, 164 Ohio St. at 79, 57 O.O. 96, 128 
N.E.2d 111 (the General Assembly may, within constitutional limitations, 
legislate to change the common law).  It is one of the General Assembly's 
fundamental constitutional prerogatives to engage in line-drawing of this type. 
{¶ 85} Because the classifications created by R.C. 2745.01 bear a rational 
relationship to a legitimate government interest and are grounded on a reasonable 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
justification, we answer the fifth certified question in the negative and hold that 
R.C. 2745.01, as enacted by House Bill 498, effective April 7, 2005, does not 
violate the right to equal protection of the law of Section 2, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
5.  Separation of Powers 
{¶ 86} The sixth certified question asks whether R.C. 2745.01 violates the 
separation of powers. 
{¶ 87} “The separation-of-powers doctrine represents the constitutional 
diffusion of power within our tripartite government.  The doctrine was a 
deliberate design to secure liberty by simultaneously fostering autonomy and 
comity, as well as interdependence and independence, among the three branches.  
See, e.g., Fairview v. Giffee (1905), 73 Ohio St. 183, 187, 76 N.E. 865; Zanesville 
v. Zanesville Tel. & Tel. Co. (1900), 63 Ohio St. 442, 451, 59 N.E. 109; 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), 343 U.S. 579, 635, 72 S.Ct. 863, 
96 L.Ed. 1153 (Jackson, J., concurring).  The doctrine ‘is “implicitly embedded in 
the entire framework of those sections of the Ohio Constitution that define the 
substance and scope of powers granted to the three branches of state 
government.” ’  State ex rel. Bray v. Russell [2000], 89 Ohio St.3d 132, 134, 729 
N.E.2d 359, quoting S. Euclid v. Jemison (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 157, 159, 28 
OBR 250, 503 N.E.2d 136.  We previously explained as follows: 
{¶ 88} “ ‘ “[T]he people possessing all governmental power, adopted 
constitutions, completely distributing it to appropriate departments.”  Hale v. 
State (1896), 55 Ohio St. 210, 214, 45 N.E. 199, 200.  They vested the legislative 
power of the state in the General Assembly (Section 1, Article II, Ohio 
Constitution), the executive power in the Governor (Section 5, Article III, Ohio 
Constitution), and the judicial power in the courts (Section 1, Article IV, Ohio 
Constitution).  They also specified that ‘ “ ‘[t]he general assembly shall [not] * * 
* exercise any judicial power, not herein expressly conferred.’ ” ’  Section 32, 
January Term, 2010 
25 
 
Article II, Ohio Constitution.’ ”  Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-
Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, ¶ 114-115, quoting State ex rel. Ohio Academy of 
Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 462, 715 N.E.2d 1062; see 
also State v. Hochhausler (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 463, 668 N.E.2d 457. 
{¶ 89} Petitioners assert that R.C. 2745.01 violates the separation-of-
powers doctrine because it “constitute[s] a legislative exercise of the judicial 
power to weigh proof and rule on evidence in civil actions” and that the statute 
“delegate[s] to the Industrial Commission of Ohio the exclusively judicial 
function of adjudicating the civil recovery of certain intentional tort victims.” 
{¶ 90} Because the General Assembly has acted within its grant of power 
to define the scope and contours of the tort of workplace intentional injury, the 
separation-of-powers doctrine is not violated by requiring all employees whose 
injuries are not the result of the statutorily defined tort of workplace intentional 
injury to recover within the workers’ compensation system.  Such employees are 
situated similarly to employees injured as the result of the employer’s negligence 
or even recklessness for purposes of Section 35, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution.  Just as the Industrial Commission does not exercise a judicial 
function when it determines, pursuant to Section 35, the recovery for employees 
who are injured as a result of negligence, recklessness, or other cause, the same is 
true when the commission determines the recovery for employees who are injured 
by more egregious conduct of an employer that falls short of deliberate intent. 
{¶ 91} In addition, R.C. 2745.01 does not attempt to remove from the 
courts the power to adjudicate claims of employer intentional torts.  The courts 
retain the ability to handle such claims. 
{¶ 92} Accordingly, we answer the sixth certified question in the negative 
and hold that R.C. 2745.01, as enacted by Am.H.B. No. 498, effective April 7, 
2005, does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. 
III. Conclusion 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
{¶ 93} As we noted in Groch, 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 
N.E.2d 377, ¶ 212, “It is not this court’s role to establish legislative policies or to 
second-guess the General Assembly’s policy choices.  ‘[T]he General Assembly 
is responsible for weighing [policy] concerns and making policy decisions; we are 
charged with evaluating the constitutionality of their choices.  * * *  Using a 
highly deferential standard of review appropriate to a facial challenge to these 
statutes, we conclude that the General Assembly has responded to our previous 
decisions and has created constitutionally permissible limitations.’  (Emphasis 
sic.)  Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 113.” 
{¶ 94} In enacting R.C. 2745.01, the General Assembly has not exceeded 
its authority to change the common law in the area of employer intentional torts.  
Accordingly, we must uphold the constitutionality of the statute.  In conclusion, 
we answer the eight certified questions as follows: 
{¶ 95} In response to questions one through six:  R.C. 2745.01, as enacted 
by Am.H.B. No. 498, effective April 7, 2005, does not violate the Ohio 
Constitution's trial-by-jury provision, the right-to-a-remedy and open-courts 
provisions, the due-course-of-law provision, the equal protection provision, or the 
separation-of-powers doctrine and is therefore constitutional on its face. 
{¶ 96} In response to question seven:  R.C. 2745.01, as enacted by 
Am.H.B. No. 498, effective April 7, 2005, does not conflict with the legislative 
authority granted to the General Assembly by Sections 34 and 35, Article II of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 97} In response to question eight:  R.C. 2745.01, as enacted by 
Am.H.B. No. 498, effective April 7, 2005, does not eliminate the common-law 
cause of action for an employer intentional tort. 
So answered. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, 
JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2010 
27 
 
 
O’CONNOR, J., concurs in the answers only. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 98} I dissent from the majority opinion for the reasons stated in my 
dissent in Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2010-Ohio-
1027.  Additionally, I would hold that R.C. 2745.01 restricts employees’ 
constitutional rights to a remedy and to open courts.  Section 16, Article I of the 
Ohio Constitution provides, “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.” 
{¶ 99} R.C. 2745.01 purports to grant employees the right to bring 
intentional-tort actions against their employers, but in reality defines the cause of 
action into oblivion.  An employee may recover damages under the statute only if 
his employer deliberately intends to harm him.  It is difficult to conjure a scenario 
where such a deliberate act would not constitute a crime.  Are we to believe that 
criminally psychotic employers are really a problem that requires legislation in 
Ohio? 
{¶ 100} No, the purpose of R.C. 2745.01 is to take away the right of Ohio 
workers to seek damages for their employers’ intentional acts.  As set forth by this 
court in Fyffe v. Jeno’s, Inc. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 115, 570 N.E.2d 1108, 
paragraphs one and two of the syllabus, to recover damages for a workplace 
intentional tort, a plaintiff must prove that an employer knew of a dangerous 
situation in the workplace but forced an employee to encounter that danger 
knowing that an injury to the employee was substantially certain to result.  The 
ability to successfully prosecute an intentional workplace tort claim was 
dependent upon an extraordinary set of facts that took the employer-employee 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
 
relationship outside the norm contemplated by Ohio’s workers’ compensation 
statutes.  Now, an employee no longer has a remedy for such an injury. 
{¶ 101} The majority acknowledges that this court found fault with 
former R.C. 2745.01 in Johnson v. BP Chems., Inc. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 298, 
707 N.E.2d 1107, but asserts that the current version of R.C. 2745.01 
“eliminate[s] many of the features identified by this court as unreasonable, 
onerous, and excessive.”  The central fact is that both versions render a workplace 
intentional-tort claim illusory.  Both versions eliminate a meaningful remedy for 
injured workers in egregious cases.  Both eliminate an employee’s right to seek 
damages, including punitive damages, in a court of law.  And both remove an 
important check on employer behavior.  Former R.C. 2745.01 is as 
distinguishable from the current version as a pig with lipstick is distinguishable 
from a pig without; that one version is cosmetically different from the other is 
irrelevant. 
{¶ 102} The majority answers the eighth certified question—“Does R.C. 
§2745.01, as enacted by House Bill 498, effective April 7, 2005, do away with the 
common law cause of action for employer intentional tort?”—in the negative.  My 
question is, “What’s left?” 
__________________ 
Barkan & Robon, Ltd., Joseph R. Deitz Jr., R. Ethan Davis, and James M. 
Tuschman, for petitioners. 
Eastman & Smith, Ltd., Margaret Mattimoe Sturgeon, Robert J. Gilmer 
Jr., and Sarah E. Pawlicki, for respondents. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
Elisabeth A. Long, Deputy Solicitor, and Robert X. Eskridge and Sharon A. 
Jennings, Assistant Attorneys General, in support of respondents for amicus 
curiae Attorney General of Ohio. 
January Term, 2010 
29 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Kurtis A. Tunnell, Anne Marie Sferra, and 
Vladimir P. Belo, in support of respondents for amici curiae American Insurance 
Association and Property Casualty Insurers Association of America. 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., Joseph W. Ryan Jr., and Daniel 
B. Miller; and Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, L.L.P., and Mark S. Olson, in 
support of respondents for amicus curiae International Association of Defense 
Counsel. 
Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin, and Michael J. Hickey; 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., and Thomas R. Sant; and Vorys, Sater, Seymour & 
Pease, L.L.P., and Robert A. Minor, in support of respondents for amici curiae 
Ohio Chamber of Commerce, Ohio Chapter of the National Federation of 
Independent Business, and Ohio Self-Insurers Association. 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Richard D. Schuster, Michael J. 
Hendershot, Kristi K. Wilhelmy, and Benjamin A. Shepler, in support of 
respondents for amicus curiae Ohio Council of Retail Merchants. 
______________________