Title: Alvin Lamont Davis v. State of Arkansas

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 07­798 ALVIN LAMONT DAVIS Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered November 8, 2007 PRO SE MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE APPELLANT’S BRIEF AND FOR COPY OF RECORD AT PUBLIC EXPENSE [CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY, CR 91­481, HON. CHRIS PIAZZA, JUDGE] APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTIONS MOOT. PER CURIAM In 1991, appellant Alvin Lamont Davis was convicted by a jury of capital murder and sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment without parole. This court affirmed. Davis v. State, 310 Ark. 582, 839 S.W.2d 182 (1992). In 2006, appellant filed in the trial court a pro se petition pursuant to Act 1780 of 2001, as amended by Act 2250 of 2005 and codified as Ark. Code Ann. §§16­112­201–16­112­208 (Repl. 2006). The act provides that a writ of habeas corpus can issue based upon new scientific evidence proving a person actuallyinnocent ofthe offense or offenses for which he or she was convicted. The trial court denied the petition and this court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was clearly without merit. Davis v. State, CR 06­1176 (Ark. Jan. 18, 2007) (per curiam). In 2007, appellant filed in the trial court a pro se “second or successive petition to vacate and/or set aside judgment” pursuant to Act 1780. The trial court denied the petition without a hearing, and appellant has lodged an appeal here from the order. ­2­ Now before us are appellant’s pro se motions for extension of time to file his brief and for a copy of the record on appeal at public expense. We need not consider these motions as it is apparent that appellant could not prevail in this appeal if it were permitted to go forward. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and hold the motions moot. This court has consistently held that an appeal from an order that denied a petition for postconviction relief will not be permitted to go forward where it is clear that the appellant could not prevail. Pardue v. State, 338 Ark. 606, 999 S.W.2d 198 (1999) (per curiam); Seaton v. State, 324 Ark. 236, 920 S.W.2d 13 (1996) (per curiam). Evidence presented at trial showed that latent fingerprints were taken from the telescope of a rifle that was used to beat the victim, and that fingerprints and palm prints were recovered from the glass foyer at the crime scene. All prints were reviewed for comparison by the Little Rock Police Department and the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory (“Crime Lab”). Ralph Turbyfill, the director of latent fingerprint examiners at the Crime Lab, verified the comparisons made by the Little Rock police. He testified that he personally compared the fingerprints and palm prints taken from the foyer at the crime scene to appellant’s fingerprints, and found that the recovered fingerprints and palm prints exactly matched appellant’s prints taken from his fingerprint card. No testimony at trial indicated that the prints from the scope belonged to appellant. Here, appellant raised the same argument advanced in his original petition under Act 1780. The basis for appellant’s petition was that fingerprints taken from the crime scene should be subject to scientific testing in order to prove appellant’s actual innocence. Appellant again requests that the fingerprints be “tested” using the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (“AFIS”). He also sought “probative” testing that was consistent with methods utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) mandated by the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 and the United States ­3­ Department of Homeland Security, although he did not specify the particular tests. Act 1780 involves scientific testing of evidence introduced at trial. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16­112­103(a)(1) (Repl. 2006) and sections 16­112­201–16­112­208;see also Echolsv. State, 350 Ark. 42, 84 S.W.3d 424 (2002) (per curiam) (decision under prior law). A number of predicate requirements must be met under Act 1780 before a circuit court can order that testing be done. See sections 16­112­201–16­112­203. Two predicate requirements under the act are set forth in sections 16­112­202(3) and (8), as discussed in our prior opinion. These requirements are that the requested testing use a new method or technologythat is substantiallymore probative than the prior testing, and the testing must produce new material evidence to support the defense presented at trial sufficient to raise a reasonable probability that the petitioner did not commit the offense. We find that appellant again failed to demonstrate entitlement to scientific testing under the act. Here, appellant continued to maintain that AFIS is a method of scientific testing superior to the fingerprint comparisons previously performed by the Little Rock Police Department and the Crime Lab. However, appellant failed to demonstrate that utilizing AFIS constituted a new testing method, or that its use is substantially more probative than the prior testing, as both involve identification on fingerprints. Further, as to appellant’s request for testing consistent with FBI methods, merely referring to a federal statute and government agencies did not sufficiently identify the testing requested. As a result, appellant failed to show that the testing sought by appellant constituted new or more probative testing methods than the fingerprint analysis already completed, as mandated by section 16­112­202(3). Moreover, testing must yield fresh evidence that appellant did not commit the offense. ­4­ Utilizing AFIS would only result in a comparison of the latent crime­scene fingerprints to a wider database of suspects for identification purposes. Assuming that the unidentified latent fingerprint taken from the scope of the gun matched a fingerprint in the AFIS database, that finding would not negate or alter the two positive identifications ofappellant’s fingerprints made by fingerprint experts. Moreover, the presence of another person at the crime scene would not preclude appellant’s also being there. And without appellant’s specifying what FBI testing he sought, appellant did not establish the results such tests would produce. In short, appellant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating entitlement to additional scientific testing of fingerprints obtained at the crime scene under section 16­112­202(8). Appeal dismissed; motion moot.