Title: Gonzalez v. Mathis

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
LUIS GONZALEZ, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
JOHN R. MATHIS et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S247677 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Seven 
B272344 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BC542498 
 
 
August 19, 2021 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, Kruger, and Jenkins concurred.  
 
1 
 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
S247677 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
There is a strong presumption under California law that a 
hirer of an independent contractor delegates to the contractor 
all responsibility for workplace safety.  (See generally Privette v. 
Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 (Privette); SeaBright Ins. 
Co. v. US Airways, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 590 (SeaBright).)  This 
means that a hirer is typically not liable for injuries sustained 
by an independent contractor or its workers while on the job.  
Commonly referred to as the Privette doctrine, the presumption 
originally stemmed from the following rationales:  First, hirers 
usually have no right to control an independent contractor’s 
work.  (Privette, at p. 693.)  Second, contractors can factor in “the 
cost of safety precautions and insurance coverage in the contract 
price.”  (Ibid.)  Third, contractors are able to obtain workers’ 
compensation to cover any on-the-job injuries.  (Id. at pp. 698–
700.)  Finally, contractors are typically hired for their expertise, 
which enables them to perform the contracted-for work safely 
and successfully.  (See id. at p. 700; Rest.3d Torts, Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm, § 57, com. c, p. 402.)   
We 
have 
nevertheless 
identified 
two 
limited 
circumstances in which the presumption is overcome.  First, in 
Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198 
(Hooker), we held that a hirer may be liable when it retains 
control over any part of the independent contractor’s work and 
negligently exercises that retained control in a manner that 
affirmatively contributes to the worker’s injury.  (Id. at p. 202.)  
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
Second, in Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659 
(Kinsman), we held that a landowner who hires an independent 
contractor may be liable if the landowner knew, or should have 
known, of a concealed hazard on the property that the contractor 
did not know of and could not have reasonably discovered, and 
the landowner failed to warn the contractor of the hazard.  (Id. 
at p. 664.)   
We granted review in this case to decide whether a 
landowner may also be liable for injuries to an independent 
contractor or its workers that result from a known hazard on the 
premises where there were no reasonable safety precautions it 
could have adopted to avoid or minimize the hazard.  We 
conclude that permitting liability under such circumstances, 
thereby creating a broad third exception to the Privette doctrine, 
would be fundamentally inconsistent with the doctrine.  When 
a landowner hires an independent contractor to perform a task 
on the landowner’s property, the landowner presumptively 
delegates to the contractor a duty to ensure the safety of its 
workers.  This encompasses a duty to determine whether the 
work can be performed safely despite a known hazard on the 
worksite.  As between a landowner and an independent 
contractor, the law assumes that the independent contractor is 
typically better positioned to determine whether and how open 
and obvious safety hazards on the worksite might be addressed 
in performing the work.  Our case law makes clear that, where 
the hirer has effectively delegated its duties, there is no 
affirmative obligation on the hirer’s part to independently 
assess workplace safety.  Thus, unless a landowner retains 
control over any part of the contractor’s work and negligently 
exercises that retained control in a manner that affirmatively 
contributes to the injury (Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 202), it 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
will not be liable to an independent contractor or its workers for 
an injury resulting from a known hazard on the premises.  
Because the Court of Appeal held otherwise, we reverse the 
judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
This case comes before us after the trial court granted a 
motion for summary judgment.  We therefore “take the facts 
from the record that was before the trial court when it ruled on 
that motion.  [Citation.]  ‘ “We review the trial court’s decision 
de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and 
opposing papers except that to which objections were made and 
sustained.” ’  [Citation.]  We liberally construe the evidence in 
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve 
doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.  
[Citation.]”  (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 
1028, 1037.) 
Defendant John R. Mathis lives in a one-story house with 
a flat, sand-and-gravel roof.  The roof contains a large skylight 
covering an indoor pool.  Plaintiff Luis Gonzalez is a professional 
window washer who first started cleaning Mathis’s skylight in 
the 1990s as an employee of Beverly Hills Window Cleaning.  In 
the mid-2000s, Gonzalez started his own professional window 
washing company.  Gonzalez advertised his business as 
specializing in hard to reach windows and skylights.  His 
marketing materials stated that he “trains his employees to take 
extra care . . . with their own safety when cleaning windows.”        
In or around 2007, Mathis began regularly hiring 
Gonzalez’s company to clean the skylight.  Gonzalez would climb 
a ladder affixed to the house to access the roof.  Directly to the 
right of the top of the ladder, a three-foot-high parapet wall runs 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
parallel to the skylight.  Mathis constructed the parapet wall for 
the aesthetic purpose of obscuring air conditioning ducts and 
pipes from view.  The path between the edge of the roof and the 
parapet wall is approximately 20 inches wide.  Gonzalez would 
walk between the parapet wall and the edge of the roof and use 
a long, water-fed pole to clean the skylight.  Gonzalez testified 
that he did not walk on the other side of the parapet wall — i.e., 
between the parapet wall and the skylight — because air 
conditioning ducts, pipes, and other permanent fixtures made 
the space too tight for him to navigate.   
On August 1, 2012, at the direction of Mathis’s 
housekeeper, Gonzalez went up on to the roof to tell his 
employees to use less water while cleaning the skylight because 
water was leaking into the house.  While Gonzalez was walking 
between the parapet wall and the edge of the roof on his way 
back to the ladder, he slipped and fell to the ground, sustaining 
serious injuries.  Gonzalez did not have workers’ compensation 
insurance.    
Gonzalez contends that his accident was caused by the 
following dangerous conditions on Mathis’s roof:  (1) Mathis’s 
lack of maintenance caused the roof to have a very slippery 
surface made up of “loose rocks, pebbles, and sand”; (2) the roof 
contained no tie-off points from which to attach a safety harness; 
(3) the roof’s edge did not contain a guardrail or safety wall; and 
(4) the path between the parapet wall and the roof’s edge was 
unreasonably narrow and Gonzalez could not fit between the 
parapet wall and the skylight due to obstructing fixtures.  
Gonzalez testified that he knew of these conditions since he first 
started cleaning Mathis’s skylight, although the roof’s condition 
became progressively worse and more slippery over time.  
Gonzalez also testified that he told Mathis’s housekeeper and 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
accountant “months before the accident” that the roof was in a 
dangerous condition and needed to be repaired, though Gonzalez 
did not indicate that his work of cleaning the skylight could not 
be performed safely absent the roof’s repair.    
The trial court granted Mathis’s motion for summary 
judgment, finding that Mathis owed no duty to Gonzalez 
pursuant to the Privette doctrine.  The Court of Appeal reversed.  
It held that a landowner may be liable to an independent 
contractor or its workers for injuries resulting from known 
hazards in certain circumstances.  (Gonzalez v. Mathis (2018) 20 
Cal.App.5th 257, 272–273 (Gonzalez).)  More specifically, the 
Court of Appeal relied on dicta in Kinsman providing that, 
“ ‘when there is a known safety hazard on a hirer’s premises that 
can be addressed through reasonable safety precautions on the 
part of the independent contractor, . . . the hirer generally 
delegates the responsibility to take such precautions to the 
contractor’ ” (Gonzalez, at p. 268) to hold that, “[a]s a corollary, 
the hirer can be held liable when he or she exposes a contractor 
(or its employees) to a known hazard that cannot be remedied 
through reasonable safety precautions” (id. at pp. 272–273).  
The Court of Appeal additionally held that disputed issues of 
material fact existed as to whether Gonzalez could have taken 
reasonable safety precautions to avoid the danger, precluding 
summary judgment.  (Id. at pp. 273–274.)     
We granted review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
The Privette doctrine holds that a hirer generally 
delegates to an independent contractor all responsibility for 
workplace safety and is not liable for injuries sustained by the 
contractor or its workers while on the job.  We are asked to 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
determine whether, despite the Privette doctrine, a landowner 
may be liable for injuries stemming from a known hazard on the 
premises that neither the contractor nor its workers could have 
avoided through the adoption of reasonable safety precautions.  
To resolve this, it is helpful to provide an overview of the 
principles underlying Privette and its progeny.  We then discuss 
the general premises liability rules that apply to known hazards 
on the landowner’s property.  Finally, we discuss whether, 
under Privette, a landowner delegates to an independent 
contractor any duty it might otherwise owe under the usual 
premises liability rules to protect the contractor or its workers 
from known hazards on the property.    
A. The Privette Doctrine 
In Privette, we considered whether a landowner could be 
liable for injuries sustained when an independent contractor’s 
employee fell off a ladder while carrying hot tar up to a roof 
during a roof installation.  (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 691–
692.)  We held that the doctrine of peculiar risk — which 
provides that landowners are vicariously liable for injuries to 
third parties resulting from the negligence of independent 
contractors in performing inherently dangerous work on the 
landowners’ property — does not apply to injuries sustained by 
the contractor’s own employees.  (Ibid.)  We explained that the 
doctrine was meant to ensure that third parties received 
compensation from the person who benefitted from the work 
(i.e., the landowner) in the event the contractor was insolvent.  
(Id. at p. 701.)  The availability of workers’ compensation, 
however, eliminates this concern as to the contractor’s own 
employees by ensuring that the employees will receive some 
compensation for their injuries.  (Id. at pp. 701–702.)  We also 
noted that allowing a contractor’s employees to sue the hirer 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
would lead to the anomalous result where the “nonnegligent 
person’s liability for an injury is greater than that of the person 
whose negligence actually caused the injury” because the 
contractor’s exposure would be limited to workers’ compensation 
while the hirer would be subject to tort damages.  (Id. at p. 698.)  
We further observed that imposing tort liability on hirers “would 
penalize those individuals who hire experts to perform 
dangerous work rather than assigning such activity to their own 
inexperienced employees.”  (Id. at p. 700.)   
Over the nearly three decades since we decided Privette, 
we have repeatedly reaffirmed the basic rule that a hirer is 
typically not liable for injuries sustained by an independent 
contractor or its workers while on the job.  Our more recent cases 
emphasize delegation as the key principle underlying this rule:  
Because the hirer presumptively delegates to the independent 
contractor the authority to determine the manner in which the 
work is to be performed, the contractor also assumes the 
responsibility to ensure that the worksite is safe, and the work 
is performed safely.  (SeaBright, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 600.)  
This rule applies even where the hirer was at least partially to 
blame due to its negligent hiring (Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1235, 1238) or its failure to comply with 
preexisting 
statutory 
or 
regulatory 
workplace 
safety 
requirements (SeaBright, at p. 594).  It also applies to a solo 
independent contractor who has no employees and who has 
declined to obtain workers’ compensation insurance, such that 
the contractor will receive no coverage for his or her injuries.  
(Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 518, 521 
(Tverberg).)   
We have nonetheless identified two situations in which a 
hirer has failed to effectively delegate all responsibility for 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
workplace safety to the independent contractor.  First, in 
Hooker, we held that a hirer will be liable where it exercises 
retained control over any part of the contractor’s work in a 
manner that affirmatively contributes to the worker’s injuries.  
(Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 202.)  The hirer in Hooker had 
contractually retained the right to correct certain dangerous 
conditions on the worksite that were created by the contractor’s 
work.  (Ibid.)  We nevertheless rejected the plaintiff’s argument 
that such retained control over the safety conditions of the 
worksite, in and of itself, was sufficient to establish liability.  (Id. 
at pp. 210–211.)  We reasoned “it would be unfair to impose tort 
liability on the hirer of the contractor merely because the hirer 
retained the ability to exercise control over safety at the 
worksite” since “the person primarily responsible for the 
worker’s on-the-job injuries[] is limited to providing workers’ 
compensation coverage.”  (Id. at p. 210.)  But if the hirer 
negligently exercises its retained control “in a manner that 
affirmatively contributes to an employee’s injuries, it is only fair 
to impose liability on the hirer.”  (Id. at p. 213.)  We also made 
clear in Hooker that this exception to Privette is not met solely 
because a hirer is aware that there is an unsafe condition on the 
worksite or knows that the contractor is engaging in an unsafe 
work practice.  (See id. at pp. 214–215.)  Something more is 
required, such as “ ‘inducing injurious action or inaction through 
actual direction’ ” (id. at p. 211); directing “ ‘the contracted work 
be done by use of a certain mode’ ” (id. at p. 215); or interfering 
with “ ‘the means and methods by which the work is to be 
accomplished’ ” (ibid.).  Thus, we found that the hirer in Hooker 
did not exercise its retained control in a manner that 
affirmatively contributed to the injury where it merely 
permitted vehicles to use the overpass and knew that, in order 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
to allow vehicles to pass through, the contractor’s crane operator 
was required to engage in the unsafe practice of retracting the 
crane’s stabilizing outriggers.  (Id. at pp. 214–215.)  But we did 
find that the hirer in Hooker’s companion case, McKown v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 219 (McKown), exercised its 
retained control in a manner that affirmatively contributed to 
the injury where it requested the independent contractor to use 
the hirer’s own defective equipment in performing the work.  (Id. 
at p. 225.)   
Second, in Kinsman, we addressed whether a landowner 
may be liable for injuries sustained by an independent 
contractor’s employee that were caused by a concealed hazard; 
specifically, hidden asbestos dust and debris at a worksite.  We 
held that the landowner could be liable if “the landowner knew, 
or should have known, of a latent or concealed preexisting 
hazardous condition on its property, the contractor did not know 
and could not have reasonably discovered this hazardous 
condition, and the landowner failed to warn the contractor about 
this condition.”  (Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 664, fn. 
omitted.)  We based our holding on the premises liability rule 
that a landowner has a duty to warn a visitor of a dangerous 
condition on the property “ ‘so that [the visitor], like the host, 
will be in a position to take special precautions when [the 
visitor] comes in contact with it.’ ”  (Kinsman, at p. 673, quoting 
Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 119; see also Rest.2d 
Torts, § 343.)  Our holding was also grounded in Privette’s strong 
presumption in favor of delegation.  We explained that, while a 
landowner delegates to an independent contractor the duty to 
protect its workers against hazards on the worksite, such 
delegation “is ineffective when the hirer, as landowner, fails to 
provide the contractor with the information — the existence of 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
a latent hazard — necessary to fulfill that responsibility.”  
(Kinsman, at p. 679; see also id. at p. 673.)        
B. Premises Liability Rules Applicable to Known 
Hazards    
As described above, Kinsman involved a concealed hazard, 
which is not at issue here.  Nonetheless, we discussed in 
Kinsman the usual landowner liability rule regarding an 
obvious hazard that applies to persons who visit the premises.  
(Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 672–674.)  We explained 
that, typically, “ ‘if a danger is so obvious that a person could 
reasonably be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a 
warning, and the landowner is under no further duty to remedy 
or warn of the condition.’ ”  (Id. at p. 673.)  Still, we observed 
that landowners may be liable for injuries to persons resulting 
from an obvious hazard where “ ‘ “the practical necessity of 
encountering the danger, when weighed against the apparent 
risk involved, is such that under the circumstances, a person 
might choose to encounter the danger.” ’ ”  (Ibid., quoting 
Krongos v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 387, 
391, 394 [owner of a construction yard could be liable to an 
employee of the yard’s lessor for injuries resulting from an 
obvious hazardous power line].)  This rule is consistent with the 
Restatement Second and Restatement Third of Torts.  (Rest.2d 
Torts, § 343A [a landowner is generally not liable for injuries 
resulting from a “known or obvious” hazard, “unless the 
[landowner] should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge 
or obviousness”]; Rest.3d Torts, Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm, § 51, com. k, p. 251 [same].)   
We did not determine in Kinsman whether or under what 
circumstances the above rule — which is set forth in section 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
343A of the Restatement Second of Torts (titled “Known or 
Obvious Dangers”) — might apply to independent contractors.  
Instead, our rule in Kinsman applies only to situations in which 
an independent contractor could not be reasonably expected to 
ascertain or discover a hidden danger, a circumstance not at 
issue here.  (Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 673.)  We did, 
however, squarely address the related section 343 of the 
Restatement Second of Torts (titled “Dangerous Conditions 
Known to or Discoverable by Possessor”).  We observed that this 
section “must be modified, after Privette” as applied “to a hirer’s 
duty to the employees of independent contractors.”  (Kinsman, 
at p. 674.)  Section 343 provides that a landowner is liable for a 
hazard on the premises when it “ ‘(a) knows or by the exercise of 
reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize 
that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, 
and [¶] (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize 
the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it.’ ”  
(Kinsman, at p. 674, quoting Rest.2d Torts, § 343, italics added 
by Kinsman.)  We explained that the italicized phrase does not 
apply to independent contractors because, once the contractor 
becomes aware of a concealed hazard’s existence, it becomes the 
contractor’s responsibility to take whatever precautions are 
necessary to protect itself and its workers from the hazard.  
(Kinsman, at p. 674.)    
Despite the above reasoning, we speculated in dicta in 
Kinsman that, even as to independent contractors, “[t]here may 
be situations . . . in which an obvious hazard, for which no 
warning is necessary, nonetheless gives rise to a duty on a 
landowner’s part to remedy the hazard because knowledge of the 
hazard is inadequate to prevent injury.”  (Kinsman, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 673.)  We further observed that, “when there is a 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
known safety hazard on a hirer’s premises that can be addressed 
through reasonable safety precautions on the part of the 
independent contractor, a corollary of Privette and its progeny is 
that the hirer generally delegates the responsibility to take such 
precautions to the contractor . . . .”  (Kinsman, at p. 673.)  The 
Court of Appeal relied on this discussion to create a third 
exception to the Privette doctrine:  Where there were no 
reasonable safety precautions the independent contractor could 
have taken to avoid or protect against a known hazard, the 
landowner may be liable.  (Gonzalez, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 272–273.)  But, as the Court of Appeal acknowledged, we did 
not set out to resolve in Kinsman whether or under what 
circumstances a landowner may be liable to an independent 
contractor or its workers for injuries resulting from known 
hazards on a premises; instead, we resolved only whether a 
landowner may be liable for concealed hazards on a premises.  
(Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 664; see also Gonzalez, at p. 
272, fn. 1.)  And,  we had no need to determine whether a 
landowner could be liable where no reasonable safety 
precautions exist that would protect an independent contractor 
or its workers from a known hazard on the premises, since the 
plaintiff in Kinsman acknowledged that “reasonable safety 
precautions against the hazard . . . were readily available . . . .”  
(Kinsman, at p. 664; see also B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 
10 Cal.5th 1, 11 [“ ‘ “[C]ases are not authority for propositions 
not considered” ’ ”].)  We resolve this question below. 
C. Delegation of a Landowner’s Duties Regarding 
Known Hazards under Privette    
This case compels us to answer a simple but important 
question:  If there is a known hazard on a property that the 
independent contractor cannot remedy or protect against 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
through the adoption of reasonable safety precautions, and the 
contractor or one of its workers is injured after proceeding to do 
the work anyway, is the landowner liable to the contractor in 
tort?  We conclude that, pursuant to Privette’s strong 
presumption that a hirer delegates to an independent contractor 
all responsibility for workplace safety, a landowner owes no duty 
to the contractor or its workers to remedy a known hazard on 
the premises or take other measures that might provide 
protection against the hazard.  Privette’s “no duty” rule applies 
even where the contractor is unable to minimize or avoid the 
danger through the adoption of reasonable safety precautions.  
A landowner does not fail to delegate responsibility to the 
contractor for workplace safety simply because there exists a 
known hazard on the premises that cannot be readily addressed 
by the contractor.  Were we to hold otherwise, we would vastly 
expand hirer liability and create considerable tension with 
decades of case law establishing that a hirer is not liable where 
it is merely aware of a hazardous condition or practice on the 
worksite.      
Further analysis of our reasoning in Kinsman, Hooker, 
and SeaBright make this conclusion clear.  As we recognized in 
Kinsman, 
applying 
to 
independent 
contractors 
the 
Restatement’s rule that a landowner may be liable where it 
“ ‘should expect’ ” that a visitor “ ‘will fail to protect themselves 
against’ ” a known hazard on the premises would be inconsistent 
with Privette’s presumption of delegation.  (Kinsman, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 674, quoting Rest.2d Torts, § 343.)  Once an 
independent contractor becomes aware of a hazard on the 
premises, “the landowner/hirer delegates the responsibility of 
employee safety to the contractor” and “a hirer has no duty to 
act to protect the employee when the contractor fails in that 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
task . . . .”  (Kinsman, at p. 674.)  A rule establishing landowner 
liability for a known hazard where there were no reasonable 
safety precautions the contractor could have adopted to protect 
against the hazard would turn Privette’s presumption of 
delegation on its head by requiring the landowner to 
affirmatively assess workplace safety.  The landowner would 
need to determine whether the contractor is able to adopt 
reasonable safety precautions to protect against the known 
hazard and, if not, to remedy the hazard.  This makes little sense 
given that a landowner typically hires an independent 
contractor precisely because of the contractor’s expertise in the 
contracted-for work and the hirer usually has no right to 
interfere with the contractor’s decisions regarding safety or 
otherwise control the contractor’s work.  (Privette, supra, 5 
Cal.4th at pp. 693, 700; see also Torres v. Reardon (1992) 3 
Cal.App.4th 831, 840 [As between the hirer and the contractor, 
“the contractor better understands the nature of the work and 
is better able to recognize risks peculiar to it”]; Rest.3d Torts, 
Physical and Emotional Harm, § 57, com. c, p. 402 [“[H]irers of 
independent contractors have less knowledge than employers 
about the safety-related details and methods of the work”].)  Our 
conclusion in Kinsman that a landowner delegates all 
responsibility 
to 
independent 
contractors 
to 
“ ‘protect 
themselves against’ ” a known hazard (Kinsman, at p. 674, 
italics omitted), coupled with the principles underlying 
Privette’s straightforward rule that a hirer of an independent 
contractor delegates to the contractor all responsibility for 
workplace safety (see Privette, at p. 693; SeaBright, supra, 52 
Cal.4th at p. 597), leads us to reject a rule that would allow a 
contractor to recover in tort so long as it proves it was unable to 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
adopt reasonable safety precautions in the face of a known 
hazard.   
In addition, a rule that would expose a landowner to tort 
liability whenever an independent contractor is unable to adopt 
reasonable safety precautions to protect against a known danger 
would create tension with our holding in Hooker by providing an 
avenue for liability premised upon a hirer’s failure to correct an 
unsafe work condition.  In Hooker, we held that a hirer is not 
liable under Privette where it merely permits a dangerous work 
condition or practice to exist.  (Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 
215.)  This is true even where the hirer knows of the danger and 
has the authority and ability to remedy it.  The facts of Hooker 
make this clear:  The hirer in Hooker had the authority to 
prevent traffic on an overpass the independent contractor was 
constructing.  (Id. at p. 214.)  The hirer also knew that, to allow 
traffic to pass through, the contractor’s crane operator was 
required to (i.e., had no other option other than to) engage in the 
unsafe practice of retracting the crane’s stabilizing outriggers.  
(Ibid.)  Despite the hirer’s knowledge of the unsafe practice, we 
held that the hirer was not liable for failing to take affirmative 
steps within its authority to remedy it.  (Id. at pp. 214–215.)   
In the nearly two decades following our opinion in Hooker, 
courts have consistently reaffirmed that “[a] hirer’s failure to 
correct an unsafe condition” is insufficient, by itself, to establish 
liability under Hooker’s exception to the Privette doctrine.  
(Khosh v. Staples Construction Co., Inc. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 
712, 718; see also Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc. (2012) 
202 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1446 (Tverberg II) [“[P]assively 
permitting an unsafe condition to occur . . . does not constitute 
affirmative contribution”].)  To be liable, a hirer must instead 
exercise its retained control over any part of the contracted-for 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
work — such as by directing the manner or methods in which 
the contractor performs the work; interfering with the 
contractor’s 
decisions 
regarding 
the 
appropriate 
safety 
measures to adopt; requesting the contractor to use the hirer’s 
own defective equipment in performing the work; contractually 
prohibiting the contractor from implementing a necessary safety 
precaution; or reneging on a promise to remedy a known 
hazard — in a manner that affirmatively contributes to the 
injury.  (See Hooker, at pp. 212, fn. 3, 215; McKown, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at p. 225; Tverberg II, at pp. 1446–1448; Ruiz v. Herman 
Weissker, Inc. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 52, 65–66; Ray v. 
Silverado Constructors (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1132–1134 (Ray).)   
We recognize that Hooker was based upon a retained 
control theory of liability (which applies to all hirers), whereas 
this action is based upon a premises liability theory (which 
would apply to only landowner hirers).  Nevertheless, a rule that 
exposes a landowner to liability whenever there are no safety 
precautions available to protect an independent contractor or its 
workers against a known hazard would, in practice, swallow the 
rule we set forth in Hooker, at least as applied to landowners, 
because it would expose the landowner to liability even in 
situations in which it did not interfere with or exert control over 
any part of the contractor’s work, such as the contractor’s 
decisions regarding workplace safety.  Indeed, it would give rise 
to a “Catch-22” situation:  A landowner could avoid liability 
under Hooker by declining to interfere with the contractor’s 
decisions regarding whether or how it might safely perform the 
work in view of a hazard on the worksite, only to be potentially 
liable under the Court of Appeal’s rule for not exercising control 
over the contractor’s work by attempting to remedy or provide 
protections against that hazard.   
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
Finally, our conclusion is consistent with our holding in 
SeaBright.  In SeaBright, we addressed whether a hirer could 
be liable where an employee of an independent contractor hired 
to maintain and repair a luggage conveyor belt was injured 
because the conveyor belt lacked the safety guards required by 
Cal-OSHA regulations.  (SeaBright, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 
594–595.)  In answering “no” to this question, we explained that 
even though the hirer’s regulatory duty to install the safety 
guards preexisted the contract, the hirer delegated to the 
independent contractor “any tort law duty it owe[d] to the 
contractor’s employees to ensure the safety of the specific 
workplace that is the subject of the contract.”  (Id. at p. 594, 
italics omitted; see also id. at pp. 601, 603.)  The Court of 
Appeal’s proposed third exception to Privette would subject a 
landowner to liability for failing to remedy a known hazard on 
the premises, even though a hirer who fails to comply with 
clearly defined statutory and regulatory workplace safety 
requirements — and thereby creates an unsafe condition on the 
worksite — is not liable for such injuries under SeaBright.    
Following our holdings in Hooker and SeaBright, several 
Court of Appeal decisions have found no hirer liability in 
circumstances strikingly similar to those presented here.  In 
Delgadillo v. Television Center, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1078, 
an employee of an independent contractor fell to his death while 
he was washing a commercial building’s windows when his 
descent apparatus detached from the roof.  (Id. at p. 1081.)  The 
plaintiffs submitted evidence that (1) the building’s owners had 
a statutory and regulatory duty to provide approved anchor 
points on the roof to support window washers; (2) the building 
contained no such anchor points; and (3) without the anchor 
points, there was no safe way to clean the windows.  (Id. at pp. 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
1083–1084.)  The court nevertheless determined that the 
landowners owed no duty because, under our holding in 
SeaBright, they delegated to the contractor the duty to comply 
with all statutory and regulatory requirements necessary to 
provide a safe workplace.  (Delgadillo, at p. 1091.)  The court 
also found that the owners did not exercise retained control over 
the contractor’s work in a manner that affirmatively contributed 
to the injury because, while the building had inadequate anchor 
points, the owners did not “suggest or request” that the 
contractor use them in cleaning the windows.  (Id. at p. 1093.)  
Like SeaBright, Delgadillo illustrates that even where an 
unsafe condition exists on the premises due to the landowner’s 
failure to comply with specific statutory and regulatory duties, 
the landowner is not liable because it is the contractor who is 
responsible for its own workers’ safety.       
Similarly, in Madden v. Summit View, Inc. (2008) 165 
Cal.App.4th 1267, the court applied our holding in Hooker to 
find that the hirer (a general contractor) was not liable for 
injuries suffered by an employee of an independent contractor 
who fell from a raised patio during construction of a residential 
home.  (Madden, at pp. 1271, 1276–1278.)  The plaintiff claimed 
the hirer was negligent for failing to install protective railing 
along the open side of the patio.  (Id. at pp. 1270–1271.)  The 
court held that this was insufficient to amount to affirmative 
contribution.  (Id. at pp. 1276–1278.)  The court explained that, 
while the plaintiff alleged that its employer (the independent 
contractor) had no authority to install protective railing, there 
was no evidence that the hirer “participated in any discussion 
about placing a safety railing along the patio, became aware of 
any safety concern due to the lack of such a railing, or intervened 
in any way to prevent such a railing from being erected.”  (Id. at 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
p. 1277.)  In other words, there was no evidence that the hirer 
“directed that no guardrailing or other protection against falls 
be placed along the raised patio, or that it acted in any way to 
prevent such a railing from being installed.”  (Id. at pp. 1276–
1277.) 
Finally, in Brannan v. Lathrop Construction Associates, 
Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1170 (Brannan), an employee of an 
independent contractor fell off a wet plastic scaffold that he 
believed was the only means of access to the area in which he 
was working.  (Id. at p. 1174.)  The contractor had the authority 
to stop the work due to a safety concern but did not have any 
authority to remove the scaffold.  (Id. at pp. 1174, 1178.)  The 
court held that the hirer was not liable for the employee’s 
injuries because there was no indication that it exercised any 
retained control over the contractor’s work in a manner that 
affirmatively contributed to the injury.  (Id. at pp. 1179–1180.)  
The court reasoned that even if the presence of the scaffold 
required the plaintiff to climb over it to perform his work, the 
hirer never directed the plaintiff to climb over the scaffold.  (Id. 
at pp. 1178–1179.)  The court further noted that the contractor 
did not ask the hirer to remove the scaffolding for safety reasons, 
nor did the hirer promise to do so.  (Id. at p. 1180.) 
The above cases illustrate how the Court of Appeal’s rule 
would subject landowners, but not general contractors or other 
hirers, to potential tort liability under an identical set of factual 
circumstances.  All of our Privette line of cases, aside from 
Kinsman, considered “whether an employee of an independent 
contractor may sue the hirer of the contractor under tort 
theories covered in chapter 15 of the Restatement Second of 
Torts.”  (Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 200.)  That chapter 
covers the circumstances under which any hirer (whether a 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
landowner or other hirer) may be liable for injuries sustained to 
third persons due to the work of an independent contractor.  
Kinsman, on the other hand, considered whether a landowner 
(but not a general contractor or subcontractor) may be liable for 
injuries sustained by an independent contractor’s workers 
under the premises liability tort theories covered by chapter 13 
of the Restatement Second of Torts.  (See Kinsman, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 673.)  Thus, the Kinsman rule applied only to 
landowners (which we clarified in Kinsman also includes land 
possessors), and not to nonlandowner hirers.  
If we were to adopt the Court of Appeal’s rule regarding 
known hazards, which is based on the premises liability rules 
discussed in Kinsman and thus applies exclusively to landowner 
hirers, we would be holding landowners liable for known 
dangerous 
conditions 
on 
the 
worksite 
even 
though 
nonlandowner hirers would not be liable under the same 
circumstances.  To illustrate this discord, the landowners in 
Delgadillo would be liable because they owned a building that 
had an unsafe but known condition on the roof (i.e., the lack of 
statutorily required anchor points) and there were no 
reasonable safety precautions the window washers could have 
implemented in order to avoid the hazard and clean the windows 
safely.  This liability would attach even though the landowner 
did not exercise any retained control over the contracted-for 
work in a manner that affirmatively contributed to the injury.  
But the general contractors in Brannon and Madden would not 
be liable because they did not own the premises and also did not 
exercise any retained control over the contracted-for work in a 
manner that affirmatively contributed to the injury.      
Tort law sometimes imposes heightened duties on 
landowners, including a duty to remedy obvious hazards on 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
their property in certain circumstances.  Nonetheless, we can 
think of no compelling reason for making the Privette doctrine 
largely inapplicable to landowner hirers such that they are 
unable to delegate the duty to maintain a safe workplace to an 
independent contractor.  Indeed, it would be contrary to 
Privette’s strong presumption that 
all hirers delegate 
responsibility for workplace safety to independent contractors if 
we created two disparate rules under which landowners would 
be liable for known hazards on the worksite in certain 
circumstances while other nonlandowner hirers would not be 
liable for such hazards under the same circumstances.  If 
anything, a landowner — perhaps especially a residential 
homeowner — will normally be less likely than a general 
contractor to have knowledge regarding the “methods used and 
requirements of the work being performed” by an independent 
contractor (Toland v. Sunland Housing Group, Inc. (1998) 18 
Cal.4th 253, 268 (Toland)) and is, therefore, less likely to 
understand whether and what safety precautions are available 
to protect the contractor’s workers from a known hazard on the 
premises.  It made sense for us to adopt a rule in Kinsman that 
holds landowners accountable for concealed hazards on their 
property of which they should reasonably be aware and the 
independent contractor is unlikely to discover because the 
landowner is the only party with knowledge of the danger and 
cannot effectively delegate responsibility for workplace safety 
without alerting the contractor to the danger.  (Kinsman, supra, 
37 Cal.4th at p. 677; see also id. at p. 679.)  This rationale does 
not apply where the hazard is open and obvious, as in this case.  
Moreover, we stopped short in Kinsman of imposing a duty on 
the landowner to remedy the concealed hazard or to provide the 
contractor with safety precautions that would protect it against 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
the hazard, recognizing that it is the contractor’s duty to 
implement whatever precautions are necessary to protect its 
workers against the hazard once warned of it.  (See id. at pp. 
673–674.)  Stated differently, once the hazard is known to the 
contractor, the contractor has at its disposal all of the 
information necessary to determine whether or how the work 
can be performed safely.  We therefore decline to adopt a rule 
that subjects landowners to greater liability than other hirers 
for injuries stemming from known hazards.   
Furthermore, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a 
landowner to ever obtain summary judgment were we to adopt 
a rule that subjects landowners to potential liability where  
there are no reasonable safety precautions available to protect 
against a known danger.  (Cf. Toland, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 
268 [rejecting a rule that would impose liability based on a 
hirer’s “ ‘superior knowledge’ ” of the “ ‘risk[s]’ ” of the work 
because the rule would not be amenable to summary judgment]; 
see also id. at pp. 275–276 (conc. & dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).)  
The question of whether the independent contractor, in 
hindsight, could have adopted reasonable safety precautions to 
protect against a known hazard will almost always encompass 
disputed issues of material fact.  (See Gonzalez, supra, 20 
Cal.App.5th 
at 
pp. 
273–274 
[recognizing 
that 
the 
reasonableness of a party’s actions in confronting a known 
hazard or taking precautions to protect against the hazard “is 
generally a question of fact for the jury to decide”].)  If a plaintiff 
were able to survive summary judgment merely by alleging 
there were no reasonable safety precautions available, Privette’s 
presumption of delegation would be rebuttable in nearly all 
instances, which would effectively amount to no presumption at 
all.   
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
We acknowledge that there will sometimes be financial 
and other real world factors that might make it difficult for an 
independent contractor to raise safety concerns with the hirer 
or to simply walk away from a job it has deemed to be unsafe.  
But independent contractors can typically factor the cost of 
added safety precautions or any increased safety risks into the 
contract price.  (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 693.)  They can 
also purchase workers’ compensation to cover any injuries 
sustained while on the job.  (Id. at pp. 698–700.)1  Furthermore, 
our holding avoids the unfair “tort damages windfall” that would 
result from adopting a rule that allows independent contractors 
and their workers to obtain tort damages from the landowner 
while the landowner’s own employees are limited to workers’ 
compensation.  (SeaBright, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 599; see also 
Privette, at p. 700.)  Were we to adopt the Court of Appeal’s 
rule — which applies only to injuries suffered by independent 
contractors and their employees — we would allow contractors 
and their employees to obtain tort damages from the landowner 
when injured as a result of a known hazard on the premises.  
Conversely, those persons who were directly employed by the 
landowner would be limited to workers’ compensation for any 
injuries sustained while on the premises.  To impose tort 
liability “on a person who hires an independent contractor for 
specialized work would penalize those individuals who hire 
 
1  
That 
Gonzalez 
himself 
did 
not 
have 
workers’ 
compensation insurance does not change our analysis.  Gonzalez 
was legally required to obtain workers’ compensation coverage 
for his employees (Lab. Code, § 3700) and he had the option of 
obtaining coverage for himself (Ins. Code, § 11846).  Moreover, 
the “presence or absence of workers’ compensation coverage” is 
not key to determining whether Privette should apply.  
(Tverberg, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 522.) 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
experts to perform dangerous work rather than assigning such 
activity to their own inexperienced employees.”  (Privette, at p. 
700.)   
Gonzalez argues that the Privette doctrine applies only 
where the independent contractor is specifically tasked with 
repairing the hazard or where the hazard was created by the 
work for which the contractor was retained.  Only then, in 
Gonzalez’s view, is the risk inherent to the work the contractor 
was hired to perform.  Gonzalez’s argument goes well beyond 
the rule adopted by the Court of Appeal and fails on its merits 
for at least two reasons.  First, Gonzalez’s view of the risk 
inherent to his work is overly narrow:  It cannot be seriously 
disputed that cleaning a skylight will always entail at least 
some risk of falling off a roof.  Second, Gonzalez’s position is 
contrary to our holdings in Tverberg and Kinsman.  We 
recognized in Tverberg that the bollard holes that caused the 
independent contractor’s injury were wholly unrelated to his 
task of constructing a metal canopy.  (Tverberg, supra, 49 
Cal.4th at p. 523 [“The bollards had no connection to the 
building of the metal canopy, and [the independent contractor] 
had never before seen bollard holes at a canopy installation”].)  
The contractor also did not create the hazard; the holes were dug 
by a different subcontractor for a different purpose.  (Id. at p. 
522.)  Nevertheless, we determined that the doctrine of peculiar 
risk does not apply when an independent contractor “seeks to 
hold the general contractor vicariously liable for injuries arising 
from risks inherent in the nature or the location of the hired 
work over which the independent contractor has, through the 
chain of delegation, been granted control.”  (Id. at pp. 528–529, 
italics added.)  Since the proximity of the bollard holes to the 
location where the canopy was to be constructed made “the 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
possibility of falling into one of those holes . . . an inherent risk 
of” the contractor’s work, the contractor — and not the hirer — 
was responsible for protecting himself against that risk.  (Id. at 
p. 529.)  Similarly, in Kinsman, the independent contractor was 
hired to install scaffolding and not to remove or remediate the 
asbestos hazard.  (Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 664.)  The 
plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos was also not caused by his work; 
instead, the work of other contractors generated asbestos dust 
and debris to which the plaintiff was exposed.  (Ibid.)  We did 
not hold that the landowner in Kinsman could be liable because 
the hazard was not inherent to the contractor’s work.  Instead, 
we held that the landowner could be liable if the asbestos hazard 
was unknown to and undiscoverable by the contractor and the 
landowner failed to warn of it, irrespective of the fact that the 
contractor did not create the hazard and was not hired to 
remediate the hazard.  (Id. at pp. 675, 683.)  As these and our 
other Privette cases make clear, a hirer presumptively delegates 
to an independent contractor all responsibility for workplace 
safety, such that the hirer is not responsible for any injury 
resulting from a known unsafe condition at the worksite — 
regardless of whether the contractor was specifically tasked 
with repairing the unsafe condition and regardless of whether 
the danger was created by the work for which the contractor was 
retained.  
Gonzalez additionally argues that delegation under 
Privette “is essentially a form of primary assumption of risk” and 
that, pursuant to the principles governing the primary 
assumption of risk doctrine, Mathis had “an affirmative duty to 
not increase the risk above the level inherent in the activity.”  
Relying on primary assumption of risk cases, Gonzalez argues 
that since Mathis increased the risk that he would fall off the 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
roof, Mathis must be held liable.  Gonzalez is mistaken; the 
primary assumption of risk and Privette doctrines “are distinct.”  
(Gordon v. ARC Manufacturing, Inc. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 705, 
717.)  The Privette doctrine is concerned with who owes a duty 
of care to ensure workplace safety — the hirer or the 
independent contractor — under principles of delegation.  (See 
SeaBright, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 599–600.)  The assumption 
of risk doctrine asks whether a defendant owes a duty of care 
where the plaintiff voluntarily assumes the risks of a dangerous 
activity or occupation.  (See Kahn v. East Side Union High 
School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1003–1005.)   
If the risks are inherent to the activity or occupation and 
cannot be mitigated without fundamentally altering the nature 
of the activity or occupation, primary assumption of risk applies 
and the defendant owes no duty of care.  (See, e.g., Avila v. 
Citrus Community College Dist. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 148, 163 
[defendant owed no duty because being hit by a pitch, whether 
intentionally or not, is an inherent risk of baseball]; Priebe v. 
Nelson (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1112, 1132 [defendant owed no duty 
because kennel worker “assumed the risk of being bitten or 
otherwise injured by the dogs under her care and control”].)  
Secondary assumption of risk is essentially a form of 
comparative negligence under which a defendant owes a duty of 
care to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff bears some fault for 
voluntarily encountering a known risk.  (Gregory v. Cott (2014) 
59 Cal.4th 996, 1001.)  If the strong presumption of delegation 
under Privette is overcome, assumption of risk and comparative 
fault principles may become relevant.  (See McKown, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at pp. 223, 226 [although the hirer was liable for 
affirmatively contributing to the injury, the jury allocated 55 
percent of the fault to the independent contractor under 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
comparative negligence principles].)  But these principles have 
no bearing on whether, in the first instance, Mathis delegated 
to Gonzalez a duty to ensure workplace safety under Privette.  If 
Gonzalez’s view were correct, then there would have been no 
need for us to articulate in Hooker that a hirer is liable only 
where it exercises retained control over any part of the 
independent contractor’s work in a manner that affirmatively 
contributes to the injury.  Instead, we would have simply held 
that a hirer is liable whenever it increases the risk of injury.   
For these reasons, we conclude that a landowner will 
generally not be liable for an injury to an independent 
contractor or its workers resulting from a known hazard on the 
property.  Of course, if there is evidence that the landowner 
exercised any retained control over any part of the contractor’s 
work in a manner that affirmatively contributed to the injury, 
the landowner’s actions would fall within the established 
Hooker exception to the Privette doctrine.  But we decline to find 
a broad third exception to the Privette doctrine that would 
expose a landowner to liability for known hazards on the 
worksite where the independent contractor is unable to adopt 
reasonable safety precautions to protect against the hazard.  
Such a rule would be inconsistent with the strong presumption 
under Privette that a landowner delegates all responsibility for 
workplace safety to the independent contractor.     
D. Application to the Present Case  
We now apply our holding to the facts of this case.  
Gonzalez contends that Mathis’s roof was hazardous because 
the skylight could only be cleaned while walking along an 
unreasonably narrow path between the parapet wall and the 
roof’s exposed edge and, due to Mathis’s years-long failure to 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
28 
maintain the roof, this path was slippery and covered in loose 
sand, gravel, and rocks.  Gonzalez additionally argues that he 
was not hired to and lacked the expertise necessary to repair the 
roof or change the permanent fixtures on the roof such that he 
and his workers could clean the skylight safely.  Thus, Gonzalez 
concludes, Mathis’s duty to maintain the roof in a reasonably 
safe condition was never delegated to him.  But while Mathis 
may not have delegated any duty to repair the roof or make 
other structural changes to it, Mathis did delegate to Gonzalez 
a duty to provide a safe workplace to his workers and to perform 
the work for which he was retained in a safe manner.  This 
encompassed a duty on Gonzalez’s part to assess whether he and 
his workers could clean the skylight safely despite the existence 
of the known hazardous conditions on the roof.  It would be 
contrary to the principles underlying Privette to hold that 
Mathis also had a duty to determine whether the work could be 
performed safely absent remediation of a known hazard.  
Landowners, like Mathis, hire independent contractors 
precisely because of their expertise in the contracted-for work.  
This expertise puts contractors in a better position to determine 
whether they can protect their workers against a known hazard 
on the worksite and whether the work can be performed safely 
despite the hazard.         
We emphasize that our holding applies only to hazards on 
the premises of which the independent contractor is aware or 
should reasonably detect.  (See Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 
675.)  Although we recognized in Kinsman that the delegation 
of responsibility for workplace safety to independent contractors 
may include a limited duty to inspect the premises (id. at p. 677), 
it would not be reasonable to expect Gonzalez to identify every 
conceivable dangerous condition on the roof given that he is not 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
29 
a licensed roofer and was not hired to repair the roof (see id. at 
pp. 677–678).  Here, however, it is undisputed that Gonzalez 
was aware of the roof’s dangerous conditions.  Consequently, 
Gonzalez had a duty to determine whether he and his workers 
would be able to clean the skylight safely despite the known 
dangerous conditions.      
We also do not address whether and under what 
circumstances a landowner might be liable to an independent 
contractor or its workers who are injured as a result of a known 
hazard on the premises that is not located on or near the 
worksite.  (See Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 674, fn. 2.)  
Gonzalez argues that the path between the parapet wall and the 
edge of the roof was just a means to access the worksite, as 
opposed to being a part of the worksite, but this is belied by the 
undisputed evidence in the record.  The path ran parallel to the 
skylight and Gonzalez testified that he utilized it while cleaning 
the skylight.  Moreover, even if it were true that Gonzalez was 
required to traverse the path just to get to the skylight, it still 
would have constituted an inherent risk in the job for which he 
was hired.  (See Tverberg, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 529 [“Because 
the bollard holes were located next to the area where Tverberg 
was to erect the metal canopy, the possibility of falling into one 
of those holes constituted an inherent risk of the canopy work”].)  
We do not resolve whether Mathis might have been liable under 
circumstances not presented on these facts, such as if the hazard 
had been located nowhere near the skylight and had been wholly 
unconnected to Gonzalez’s work in cleaning the skylight.   
Gonzalez alternatively argues that, even if we decline to 
adopt the Court of Appeal’s rule, Mathis should still be held 
liable under the well-established Hooker exception to Privette.  
First, he claims that Mathis retained sole authority to hire a 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
30 
professional roofer to repair the roof and exercised that 
authority in a manner that affirmatively contributed to his 
injury by failing to do so.  We made clear in Hooker, however, 
that a hirer does not exercise any retained control over the 
contractor’s work in a manner that affirmatively contributes to 
the contractor’s injury by merely permitting or failing to correct 
an unsafe work condition.  (Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 214–
215; see also Padilla v. Pomona College (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 
661, 667, 671 [hirer’s sole ability to depressurize the pipes that 
caused the plaintiff’s injury did not amount to an exercise of 
retained control in a manner that affirmatively contributed to 
the injury].)  Although Gonzalez testified that he informed 
Mathis’s housekeeper and accountant that the roof was in poor 
condition and should be repaired, neither Mathis nor any of his 
staff promised, expressly or implicitly, to repair the roof.  (See 
Hooker, at p. 212, fn. 3 [“[I]f the hirer promises to undertake a 
particular safety measure, then the hirer’s negligent failure to 
do so should result in liability if such negligence leads to an 
employee injury”]; Tverberg II, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 
1448 [triable issue as to whether hirer’s statement that it did 
not currently have the materials needed to cover the bollard 
holes amounted to an implicit promise to cover the bollard holes 
once such materials were obtained]; Brannan, supra, 206 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1180 [case would have been decided differently 
had the hirer promised to remove the wet scaffolding].)  They 
also did not prohibit or dissuade Gonzalez from implementing 
any particular safety measure or from requesting repairs as a 
condition of continuing the work.  (See Ray, supra, 98 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1134, 1137 [hirer contractually prohibited 
independent contractor from implementing the one safety 
precaution that would have saved the worker’s life].)   
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
31 
We do not decide whether there may be situations, not 
presented here, in which a hirer’s response to a contractor’s 
notification that the work cannot be performed safely due to 
hazardous conditions on the worksite might give rise to liability.  
For example, we do not decide whether a hirer’s conduct that 
unduly coerces or pressures a contractor to continue the work 
even after being notified that the work could not be performed 
safely due to a premises hazard would fall under the Hooker 
exception to Privette.  We decide only that neither Mathis nor 
any member of his staff exercised any retained control over 
Gonzalez’s work in a manner that affirmatively contributed to 
Gonzalez’s injury simply by being made aware that the roof was 
slippery and needed repair.          
Second, Gonzalez argues that Mathis exercised his 
retained control over the work in a manner that affirmatively 
contributed to Gonzalez’s injury when Mathis’s housekeeper 
directed Gonzalez to go on to the roof on the day of the accident 
to tell his workers to use less water in cleaning the skylight.  
However, the general direction to “go on to the roof” did not 
interfere with or otherwise impact Gonzalez’s decisions 
regarding how to safely perform the work or provide a safe 
workplace for his employees.  Mathis’s housekeeper did not, for 
example, direct Gonzalez to walk between the parapet wall and 
the roof’s edge or otherwise influence his decisions regarding 
whether and how he might safely cross over the roof in order to 
reach his workers.  And, although Mathis’s housekeeper did 
exert some control over how Gonzalez conducted his work by 
directing him to “use less water,” Gonzalez does not contend that 
the use of less water was in any way causally connected to his 
injury.  Gonzalez instead contends that he was injured because 
the configuration of the roof required him to walk between the 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
32 
parapet wall and the roof’s exposed edge, and the roof’s 
dilapidated condition made its surface very slippery.  Thus, the 
housekeeper’s instruction did not amount to an exercise of 
retained control over any part of the work in a manner that 
affirmatively contributed to Gonzalez’s injury.    
In sum, pursuant to Privette, Mathis delegated all 
responsibility for workplace safety to Gonzalez.  This delegation 
included a responsibility on Gonzalez’s part to ensure that he 
and his workers would be able to clean the skylight safely 
despite the known dangerous conditions on the roof which 
increased the risk of falling.  Mathis is not liable under our well-
established precedent because he did not exercise any retained 
control over any part of Gonzalez’s work in a manner that 
affirmatively contributed to Gonzalez’s injury.     
III.  DISPOSITION 
We 
conclude 
that, 
under 
Privette, 
a 
landowner 
presumptively delegates to an independent contractor all 
responsibility for workplace safety, including the responsibility 
to ensure that the work can be performed safely despite a known 
hazard on the worksite.  For this reason, a landowner will 
generally owe no duty to an independent contractor or its 
workers to remedy or adopt other measures to protect them 
against known hazards on the premises.  Though a landowner 
may, nevertheless, be liable for a known hazard on the premises 
if it exercises its retained control over any part of the 
independent contractor’s work in a manner that affirmatively 
contributes to the injury, Gonzalez failed to present any 
evidence tending to show that such circumstances existed in this 
case.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
GONZALEZ v. MATHIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
33 
and remand to the Court of Appeal with instructions to affirm 
the trial court’s judgment.  
 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Gonzalez v. Mathis 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 20 Cal.App.5th 257 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S247677 
Date Filed: August 19, 2021 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Gerald Rosenberg  
 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Evan D. Marshall; Law Offices of Wayne McClean, Wayne McClean; 
Panish Shea & Boyle, Brian J. Panish and Spencer R. Lucas for 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Arbogast Law, David M. Arbogast; The Bronson Firm and Steven M. 
Bronson for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Latham & Watkins, Marvin S. Putnam, Jessica Stebbins, Robert J. 
Ellison and Michael E. Bern for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Fred J. Hiestand for the Civil Justice Association of California as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
June Babiracki Barlow and Neil Kalin for California Association of 
Realtors as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
Newmeyer & Dillion, Alan H. Packer and Jack R. Rubin for California 
Building Industry Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Edward L. Xanders and Eleanor S. 
Ruth for Association of Southern California Defense Counsel as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
LeClairRyan and William A. Bogdan for Associated General 
Contractors of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants 
and Respondents. 
 
Horvitz & Levy, Stephen E. Norris and Joshua C. McDaniel for 
American Property Casualty Insurance Association and Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Evan D. Marshall 
11400 West Olympic Boulevard, Suite 1150 
Los Angeles, CA 90064 
(310) 458-6660 
 
Michael E. Bern 
Latham & Watkins LLP 
555 11th Street NW 
Washington, DC 20004 
(202) 637-1021