Title: Wangler v. Federer

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Wangler v. Federer1986 WY 50714 P.2d 1209Case Number: 85-125Decided: 02/27/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
DEENA L. WANGLER, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF FRED W. DILTS, 
JR., DECEASED, AND ESTERBROOK DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

 
 
v.

 
 
M.V. FEDERER, A/K/A BUD 
FEDERER, RONALD S. JOSEPH, BIG WYOMING LIMITED, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District Court,ConverseCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

D.N. Sherard, Stephen N. 
Sherard, Rex E. Johnson of Sherard, Sherard & Johnson, 
Wheatland.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Sue Davidson of 
Whitehead, Zunker, Gage, Davidson & Shotwell, P.C., Cheyenne.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
BROWN, CARDINE, ROONEY (Retired), and RAPER (Retired), 
JJ.

 
 

BROWN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellants conveyed 
real property to appellees for development by the latter under a profit-sharing 
arrangement. The contractual relationship between the parties fell on bad times, 
and appellants instituted an action against appellees seeking a declaratory 
judgment, specific performance, and damages for breach of 
contract.

 
 

[¶2.]     The trial court held 
generally for appellees. On appeal appellants raise the following major 
issues:1

 
 
I

 
 
Did the trial court 
correctly construe the rights and obligations of the parties under the May 23, 
1977 agreement?

 
 
II

Did the trial court 
correctly construe the rights and obligations of the parties under the February 
1, 1980 memorandum of agreement?

 
 

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

 
 

[¶4.]     This appeal basically 
concerns the interpretation of two contracts entered into between the parties: 

 
 
1. Agreement for Purchase 
of Real Property executed on or about May 23, 1977 (hereinafter 1977 
agreement).

 
 
2. Memorandum of 
Agreement executed on February 1, 1980 (hereinafter 1980 
agreement).

 
 
Both of these contracts 
relate to the development of land and construction of dwellings in the Dilts 
Subdivision at Douglas, 
Wyoming. Generally, the 
above-referenced contracts concern the business relationship among Fred W. 
Dilts, Jr., Ronald S. Joseph and M.V. Federer and their sundry business 
entitites.

 
 

[¶5.]     Fred W. Dilts, Jr. 
(hereinafter Dilts), plaintiff below, now deceased, owned and operated a real 
estate and insurance agency in Douglas, Wyoming, known as the Western Agency. 
Esterbrook Development Company, also plaintiff below, is a Wyoming corporation which 
purchases and sells real estate and holds real estate for investment purposes. 
Dilts and Fred W. Dilts III each owned 50 percent of the shares of stock in the 
corporation.

 
 

[¶6.]     M.V. Federer 
(hereinafter Federer), defendant below, is in the general contracting and 
development business. Federer transacts business through the following 
entities:

 
 
(a) Big Wyoming Ltd., 
defendant below, a Wyoming limited partnership of which Federer is a twenty 
percent owner and the managing general partner;

 
 
(b) Consolidated 
Construction Company, a Wyoming corporation principally owned and 
controlled by Federer. This entity constructed the apartment complex (LaPrele 
Apartments, Ltd.) located on the south half of Block 8 of the Dilts Subdivision, 
the subject of part of the controversy here;

 
 
(c) La Prele Apartments, 
Ltd., a Wyoming limited partnership which owns the 
south half of Block 8 of the Dilts Subdivision and the apartment complex located 
thereon. Federer is the sole general partner and claims to own a five percent 
interest as general partner and nineteen percent as a limited 
partner;

 
 
(d) Spartan Management 
Company, an entity owned by Federer and his wife, which primarily engaged in the 
management of rental property. This entity managed La Prele Apartments, 
Ltd.

 
 

[¶7.]     Ronald S. Joseph 
(hereinafter Joseph), defendant below, is an employee of Federer through 
Consolidated Construction Company.

 
 
I

 
 

[¶8.]     On May 23, 1977, 
Esterbrook Development Company, seller, and Federer and Joseph, buyers, entered 
into an agreement for the purchase and development of real property located in 
Douglas, Wyoming, known as the Dilts Subdivision. 
Generally, this agreement provided that Esterbrook Development Company sell 
approximately 35 acres of land, or all of the Dilts Subdivision, except Block 8, 
to Federer and Joseph, who in turn were to subdivide and develop 
it.

 
 

[¶9.]     Paragraph 4 of the 
agreement provided in part:

 
 
"4. It is understood by 
and between the parties hereto that as additional consideration for Seller's 
election to sell hereunder, that Western Agency, through Fred Dilts and Fred 
Dilts III as brokers therein, are hereby granted an exclusive right to sell 
listing for resale of developed lots or residential units which may be 
constructed on lots to be platted in the area at a stated real estate commission 
of five percent (5%). Exercise of this 
listing agreement shall be as follows:

 
 
"(A) Upon prospective 
sale of developed, vacant lots by 
Buyer herein, prior to the construction of residential units, Seller herein 
shall have the first right of refusal 
to purchase at the same price less a five percent (5%) 
discount.

 
 
"(B) Also, Seller herein 
specifically reserves the right to 
resell any completed residential 
units, provided, however, that after ninety (90) days after the date of 
substantial completion, if any unit has not been subjected to a bona fide 
purchase offer for sale through the efforts of Western Agency or otherwise, then 
the above referred to exclusive right to sell agreement in Western Agency shall 
change to an exclusive agreement in which Buyers themselves may then use their 
own efforts to sell the units, and in which case if the sale is then completed 
by Buyers themselves they may deduct from the commission of five percent (5%) 
otherwise payable to Western Agency any and all accrued builders interest 
specifically accruing upon the particular units, and in the event any unit is 
finally sold through the efforts of Western Agency or of the Buyer, Western 
Agency shall still be entitled to the agreed commission less the proper 
deductions for accruing builders interests on the unit." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
The agreement is not a 
model of contract draftmanship. Its meaning is anything but clear. Apparently 
the parties themselves could not understand it and, therefore, modified its 
terms by actual practice in that Federer and Joseph sold developed vacant lots 
to outside parties and paid a five percent commission to Western Agency in lieu 
of the first right of refusal provided for in subparagraph 
(A).

 
 

[¶10.]  Nonparty building contractors who 
constructed residential units on the lots were asked to list the units with 
Western Agency subject to the terms of the 1977 agreement, but they did not 
necessarily comply.

 
 

[¶11.]  When the relationship of the parties 
under the contract deteriorated, appellants brought suit, claiming that 
appellees had failed to perform as required by the contract. The judgment, after 
a trial to the court, awarded appellants interest and commissions determined to 
be due under the provisions of the 1977 agreement.

 
 

[¶12.]  At the time of trial there were 39 unsold 
developed vacant lots in the Dilts Subdivision. The issue on appeal relative to 
the 1977 agreement concerns the rights of the parties in these 39 remaining 
lots. The district court, in paragraph 5 of the amended judgment, 
ordered:

 
 
"5. In accordance with 
the terms of Paragraph 4 of the May 1977 Agreement, the 39 individual lots 
remaining unsold in the Dilts Subdivision at the time of trial, as individually 
sold, are subject to either a 5% commission on unsold lots or a listing 
obligation for nonparty contractors for a 90 day period after substantial 
completion of construction of residential units on the undivided lots. The first 
right of refusal provision of the section is unaffected by this Judgment as to 
an individual or general sale of those remaining lots."

 
 
The court determined that 
appellants failed to prove other claims under the 1977 
agreement.

 
 

[¶13.]  In essence, appellants now claim that 
with respect to the 39 unsold lots, the 1977 agreement as modified entitles them 
to both a five percent commission on the sale of developed but vacant lots and 
the exclusive right to list and sell residential units built on the lots. We 
cannot agree.

 
 

[¶14.]  We have said that

 
 
"* * * Ambiguous 
contracts are agreements which, because of the language used, are obscure in 
their meaning. [Citations.] If upon a reading of the questioned agreement, we 
perceive an ambiguity, then resort to extrinsic evidence is proper in order to 
fully determine the intent of the contracting parties. * * * [W]ith an ambiguous 
agreement we will look to all of the surrounding circumstances and extrinsic 
evidence introduced with respect to intent. Generally, the question of intent is 
one of law, and fact questions only arise when the language utilized is not 
clear on its face. [Citation.]" Rouse v. 
Munroe, Wyo., 
658 P.2d 74, 77-78 (1983).

 
 

[¶15.]  As noted above, the agreement presented 
here is far from clear on its face. However, having applied the rules stated 
above and having reviewed the record in its entirety, we find that under the 
original terms of the agreement appellants had the exclusive right to list and 
sell developed lots or residential units at a commission of five percent. That 
right was to be exercised in one of two ways. Subparagraph (A) gave appellants 
the right of first refusal. That is, appellants were to have the first 
opportunity to purchase developed but vacant lots at five percent less than the 
proffered purchase price. Appellants could purchase the lots and do with them as 
they pleased, obviously including listing and selling them exclusively through 
Western Agency, or they could forego purchase of the lots and thereby activate 
subparagraph (B). If appellants chose the latter course, they would then be 
entitled upon substantial completion of a residence on the lot to an exclusive 
listing for 90 days. If they sold the residence within 90 days, they would be 
entitled to the five percent commission. If they failed to sell within 90 days, 
appellees would have the exclusive right to sell, and upon sale, appellants 
would be entitled to the five percent commission. Under these terms, appellants 
were entitled either to purchase developed but vacant lots at a five percent 
discount, or to sell residential units under a 90-day exclusive listing 
agreement with a five percent commission. That they were not entitled to both 
under the original contract terms is evidenced in part by the testimony of Fred 
W. Dilts III. At trial, he stated

 
 
"* * * that consideration 
under the contract is still due to Western Agency. * * Either the first right of 
refusal under the contract * * * or once a house was constructed on it, then the 
right to sell the house and take the five percent * * *."

 
 

[¶16.]  Upon hearing all the evidence, the trial 
court found, and neither party disputes, that the original terms of the 
agreement were in effect modified by the conduct of the parties. Instead of 
giving appellants the right of first refusal, appellees sold developed but 
vacant lots to third parties and tendered a five percent commission to 
appellants. Without raising any objection to this process, appellants accepted 
the five percent commission. Neither party contends that the agreement was not 
modified nor that the trial court's finding of a modification was improper. In 
fact, appellants' brief demonstrates their complete agreement with the trial 
court's finding "that the first right of refusal on developed but vacant lots 
was modified so that now appellants are entitled to a 5% commission on the sale 
of said lots by [appellees] in lieu of said first right of 
refusal."

 
 

[¶17.]  Apparently, however, appellants believe 
that despite the modification of subparagraph (A), subparagraph (B) remains in 
full force and effect. Were we to accept that contention, appellants would 
ostensibly be entitled to a five percent commission upon the sale of residences, 
in addition to the five percent commission upon the sale of developed but vacant 
lots to which they are entitled, due to the modification of the contract 
terms.

 
 

[¶18.]  As indicated above, under the original 
terms of the contract, appellants were entitled either to purchase developed but 
vacant lots at a five percent discount or to sell residential units under an 
exclusive 90-day listing agreement at a five percent commission; they were not 
entitled to both. The fact that a modification of the contract occurred in 
actual practice does not now entitle appellants to twice the benefit they would 
have received under the original terms.

 
 

[¶19.]  In giving effect to the intent of 
contracting parties, we are governed by the rule that common sense and good 
faith are the necessary considerations in contract construction. Busch Development, Inc. v. City of 
Cheyenne, Wyo., 
645 P.2d 65 (1982). The words and acts of the parties must be given effect in 
accordance with the meaning which they would convey to reasonable men at the 
time and place of their use or commission. 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 243, p. 630 
(1964).

 
 

[¶20.]  Keeping these standards in mind, we find 
that the only reasonable construction that can be given the contract in light of 
the modification is that the modification of subparagraph (A) of paragraph 4 of 
the 1977 agreement effectively modified subparagraph (B) as well. Where the 
modification of one contract provision has the effect of substantially affecting 
the parties' rights and obligations under other contract provisions, the 
modification must be said to extend to the other provisions as 
well.

 
 

[¶21.]  We cannot say that the trial court's 
interpretation of the 1977 agreement was incorrect.

 
 
II

 
 

[¶22.]  Appellants next contend that the trial 
court incorrectly construed the rights and obligations of the parties under the 
1980 agreement. That agreement involved Block 8 of the Dilts Subdivision which 
was excluded from the 1977 agreement.

 
 

[¶23.]  On February 1, 1980, Dilts, Joseph, 
Federer, Big Wyoming, Ltd., Esterbrook Development Company and La Prele 
Apartments, Ltd., entered into a memorandum of agreement.2 Dilts, Joseph and Federer testified 
that this memorandum of agreement created a partnership relationship among 
them.

 
 

[¶24.]  On February 4, 1980, pursuant to the 
terms of the agreement, Esterbrook Development Company transferred Block 8 to 
Big Wyoming, Ltd., for the agreed sale price of $20,000.3 Thereafter Big Wyoming, Ltd., 
secured a development loan and used Block 8 as collateral. The property was 
transferred by Big Wyoming to La Prele Apartments, Ltd., before development was 
completed in the summer of 1981.

 
 

[¶25.]  The 1980 agreement provided, among other 
things, that:

 
 
1. Esterbrook Development 
Company sell Block 8 to Big Wyoming, Ltd. for $20,000;

 
 
2. Big Wyoming, Ltd., 
with borrowed funds using Block 8 as security, finance the development of Block 
8 and prepare it for construction;

 
 
3. When Block 8 was 
developed, Big Wyoming, Ltd. transfer the property to a proposed limited 
partnership, La Prele Apartments, Ltd., to be comprised of and owned by Dilts, 
Federer and Joseph, or whomever else they agreed upon;

 
 
4. The sale price to La 
Prele Apartments, Ltd., was to be the "then appraised value of the property in 
its developed condition";

 
 
5. La Prele Apartments, 
Ltd., borrow funds to pay for the land and to pay for the construction of 
apartments;

 
 
6. The profit from the 
sale of Block 8 to La Prele Apartments, Ltd., to be the sales price, less land 
and development costs;

 
 
7. The profit from the 
sale to La Prele Apartments, Ltd., to be divided equally among the 
parties;

 
 
8. Each party could 
either take cash for its share of the profits or float its share back into La 
Prele Apartments, Ltd.

 
 

[¶26.]  As with the 1977 agreement, the parties 
to the 1980 agreement departed from its terms in actual 
practice.

 
 

[¶27.]  In June 1980, Federer, in behalf of La 
Prele Apartments, Ltd. (not yet created), entered into an agreement with an 
architect who was to design and supervise construction of the apartments. On 
February 20, 1981, Big Wyoming, Ltd., transferred the south half of Block 8 to 
La Prele Apartments, Ltd.

 
 

[¶28.]  On or about the first day of March 1981, 
Federer entered into four "purchase offer acceptance and receipt agreements" 
with four individuals by the terms of which Federer contracted to transfer 
approximately 76 percent of the interest in La Prele Apartments, Ltd. (still not 
a formalized partnership) to these four individuals. This transfer of interest 
was subject only to the HUD initial closing which had to occur during 1981, and 
which in fact did occur during the first part of April 
1981.

 
 

[¶29.]  On or about March 31, 1981, Federer 
received written notice from Lambrecht Mortgage Corporation that a loan in the 
amount of $1,716,000 had been approved to La Prele Apartments, Ltd. Thereafter, 
on April 1, 1981, Federer, as general partner of La Prele Apartments, Ltd., 
executed a mortgage and mortgage note in favor of Lambrecht Realty Corporation 
in the amount of $1,716,000. In conjunction therewith, Federer, on behalf of 
Consolidated Construction, entered into a construction contract with La Prele 
Apartments, Ltd., and also signed the agreement.

 
 

[¶30.]  On April 3, 1981, Federer formally 
created La Prele Apartments, Ltd. Federer, as general partner, received a five 
percent interest. The limited partner, as nominee, controlled 95 percent of the 
partnership interest. The limited partners, later to be identified, were to 
front 100 percent of the capital investment.

 
 

[¶31.]  During August of 1981, Federer delivered 
to Dilts a cost breakdown of the development costs incurred in the development 
of Block 8. It showed that the south half of Block 8 was sold to La Prele 
Apartments, Ltd., for a price of $96,000. Federer determined the costs of 
developing Block 8 by prorating all of the costs incurred in the development of 
the entire Dilts Subdivision.

 
 

[¶32.]  Dilts objected to the development costs 
as presented by Federer, and further objected to the alleged price paid by La 
Prele Apartments, Ltd. for the developed ground as set forth in the cost 
breakdown. On September 30, 1981, Dilts indicated that he was going to get a 
separate appraisal pursuant to the terms of the 1980 agreement. An appraisal was 
later obtained by Dilts which reflected that Block 8, during May, 1981, was 
worth $370,000 in a developed condition. Meanwhile, the apartments on the south 
half of Block 8 were being constructed.

 
 

[¶33.]  On or about December 15, 1981, La Prele 
Apartments, Ltd., transferred 76 percent of the partnership to four individuals 
pursuant to the terms of the March 1, 1981 purchase offer, acceptance and 
receipt agreements. Federer retained a five percent general partnership interest 
and a nineteen percent limited partnership interest. Each of the limited 
partners were to pay $80,000 for their respective 
interests.

 
 

[¶34.]  Construction of the apartments continued, 
and on or about January 21, 1982, Federer submitted a request for permission to 
occupy pursuant to the terms of the HUD agreement. The north half of Block 8 had 
been titled in the name of Big Wyoming, Ltd., since the transfer to it by 
Esterbrook Development Company in February, 1980. The 1980 agreement provided 
that Dilts would own one-third of any portion of Block 8 where there had been no 
construction.

 
 

[¶35.]  The trial court awarded appellants 
one-third of the profits realized in the sale of the south half of Block 8 to La 
Prele Apartments, Ltd., a one-third interest in the north half of Block 8 
subject to indebtedness for construction costs, and also quieted title to 
Northland Park Subdivision in appellants. The trial court also determined that 
Dilts had waived or otherwise given up any right he had to participate in the La 
Prele Apartments, Ltd. Finally, the trial court determined that appellants 
failed to prove other claims or damages under the 1980 
agreement.

 
 

[¶36.]  In extensive findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, regarding Block 8 and the 1980 agreement, the trial court 
concluded:

 
 
"VIII. Dilts Subdivision, 
Block 8

 
 
"A. Partnership Interests 
in La Prele Apartments, Ltd.

 
 
"18. The February 1980 
Memorandum Agreement was not a binding contract concerning percentage of 
interest in La Prele Apartments, Ltd. Although the agreement contemplated the 
organization of such an entity, the details were left to be agreed upon at a 
later time by the parties. (17 Am.Jur. Contracts § 75, et seq. Madrid v. Norton, (Wyo. 1979), 596 P.2d 1108 
at 1119).

 
 
"19. The December 31, 
1981 time constraint placed upon Plaintiff Fred W. Dilts, Jr.'s decision to 
participate in La Prele Apartments, Ltd. was reasonable in light of tax benefits 
and the circumstances surrounding the final syndication of that 
entity.

 
 
"20. The provisions of 
the February 1980 Memorandum, wherein Big Wyoming, Ltd. agreed that Fred W. 
Dilts, Jr. would be a principal in La Prele Apartments, Ltd., was subject to 
Plaintiff Dilts, Jr.'s acceptance of and action upon the opportunity to 
participate in the syndication of that organization.

 
 
"21. The opportunity 
extended to Plaintiff Fred W. Dilts, Jr. to participate in La Prele Apartments, 
Ltd. fulfilled any responsibility owed by Defendants Federer, Joseph, and Big 
Wyoming, Ltd. under the 1980 Memorandum with regard to Plaintiff Dilts' 
participation in La Prele.

 
 
"22. The final 
syndication of La Prele Apartments, Ltd. without Plaintiff Fred W. Dilts, Jr.'s 
participation therein as principal was the result of Plaintiff Dilts' failure to 
act by the December 31, 1981, deadline rather than by action or inaction on the 
part of Defendants M.V. Federer or Ronald Joseph.

 
 
"23. Plaintiff Fred W. 
Dilts, Jr. was not prejudiced by the April, 1981 formation of La Prele 
Apartments, Ltd. considering his awareness of the terms of Paragraph 4 of the 
1980 Memorandum, the formation of La Prele Apartments, Ltd., with Walter C. 
Urbigkit as nominee of the limited partnership interests, and Plaintiff Dilts' 
subsequent failure to participate in La Prele when the opportunity was presented 
to him.

 
 
"B. Profit from the sale 
of Phase I, Block 8 of La Prele Apartments, Ltd.

 
 
"24. Profits from the 
sale of Phase I (or the South 1/2) of Block 8 are to be determined by 
subtracting the land and development costs allocated to Phase I from the final 
sales price of Phase I when that land was transferred from Big Wyoming, Ltd. to 
La Prele Apartments, Ltd. (See Paragraph 9 of the February 1980 
Memorandum).

 
 
"25. As evidenced by 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 125, by the option to purchase real estate and extension 
thereto, and by the testimony of Defendant M.V. Federer, Defendant Ronald 
Joseph, Fred W. Dilts, III, and Plaintiff Fred W. Dilts, Jr., the final sales 
price for the sale of Phase I (or the South 1/2 of Block 8) to La Prele 
Apartments, Ltd. was $95,800 (ninety-five thousand, eight hundred 
dollars).

 
 
"26. The independent 
appraisals done by Irle Briggs and W.S. Bobbitt were requested and completed 
subsequent to the determination of the final sales price for the South 1/2 of 
Block 8.

 
 
"27. Total land and 
development cost attributable to Phase I of Block 8 is $82,465 (eighty-two 
thousand four hundred sixty five dollars).

 
 
"28. Total profit from 
the sale of the South 1/2 of Block 8 to La Prele Apartments, Ltd. is $13,335.00 
(thirteen thousand three hundred thirty-five dollars), one-third of which, or 
$4,445.00 (four thousand four hundred forty-five dollars) is due and owing 
Plaintiff Fred W. Dilts, Jr. from Defendants M.V. Federer, Ron Joseph, and Big 
Wyoming, Ltd.

 
 
"C. Status of N 1/2 of 
Block 8

 
 
"29. Pursuant to the 
terms of the February 1980 Memorandum Agreement as modified by the subsequent 
sale of the South 1/2 of Block 8 to La Prele Apartments, Ltd., Plaintiff Fred W. 
Dilts, Jr., and Defendants M.V. Federer and Ronald Joseph are each entitled to a 
one-third interest in the North 1/2 of Block 8, subject to $69,034 (sixty-nine 
thousand thirty-four dollars) of land and development cost attributable 
thereto.

 
 
"30. Defendants M.V. 
Federer and Ronald Joseph are entitled to reimbursement for land and development 
expense for the N 1/2 of Block 8; however, the agreement among the parties did 
not contemplate reimbursement for interest on that 
expense."

 
 

[¶37.]  We have often stated our applicable 
standards of review. On appeal, we accept the evidence presented by the 
prevailing party as true, leaving out of consideration entirely conflicting 
evidence presented by the unsuccessful party, giving every favorable inference 
that may fairly and reasonably be drawn from the successful party's evidence. Matter of Abas, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1153 (1985); and Stockton v. Sowerwine, Wyo., 
690 P.2d 1202 (1984). The findings made by a trial court are presumed to be 
correct, and we will not disturb such findings unless inconsistent with the 
evidence, clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the evidence. 
Walter v. Moore , Wyo., 700 P.2d 1219 (1985); and Lebsack v. Town of Torrington, 
Wyo., 698 P.2d 1141, reh. denied and case remanded 703 P.2d 338 (1985). In the present case we find the trial court's conclusions 
supported by the evidence presented, and we are, therefore, obliged to uphold 
them.

 
 

[¶38.]  Appellants claim appellees violated their 
fiduciary duty as partners to Dilts by allegedly failing to disclose all 
relevant information to him. Specifically, appellants claim that Dilts was not 
informed of the appellees' attempts to obtain financing from HUD, or of the 
agreement made between Federer and an architect to design La Prele 
Apartments.

 
 

[¶39.]  It should be noted that the 1980 
agreement was prepared for Dilts by his son (Fred W. Dilts III), an attorney. 
Also, Dilts was requested to make a decision as to whether or not he wished to 
participate in La Prele Apartments, Ltd., on at least three occasions. He 
admitted that he failed to make a decision even when he received letters 
requesting a decision.

 
 

[¶40.]  Furthermore, Dilts was a real estate 
broker in the Douglas area. It is unlikely he 
had no knowledge, as claimed, of the development of Block 8 when he worked in 
the area and held a financial interest in the development. Finally, Dilts signed 
a one year option on behalf of appellant Esterbrook Development Company allowing 
La Prele Apartments, Ltd., to purchase the north half of Block 8 (known as Phase 
II of the Dilts Subdivision) for $95,800, which price was set by 
him.

 
 

[¶41.]  Considering all the facts and 
circumstances, we find the trial court's ruling supported by the evidence. Our 
holding finds additional support in the well-established principle that when 
construing a written agreement, the meaning of the instrument is to be derived 
from the language of such instrument if its terms are clear and unambiguous. 
Wyoming Recreation Commission v. Hagar , Wyo., 711 P.2d 402 (1985); and Bowen v. Korell, Wyo., 
587 P.2d 653 (1978). If the terms are clear, then it falls within the province 
of the court to construe the instrument as a matter of law. Madison v. Marlatt, Wyo., 
619 P.2d 708 (1980).

 
 

[¶42.]  In this case, there are no unique legal 
principles; the case turns on a factual determination. In such situations, we 
give great deference to the fact finder. Matter of SKJ, Wyo., 673 P.2d 640 
(1983).

 
 

[¶43.]  Affirmed.

1 Appellants urge numerous 
sub-issues which we will address in this opinion.

2 Although La Prele 
Apartments, Ltd., purported to enter into the 1980 agreement, it was not created 
until April, 1981.

3 In June of 1979, 
Esterbrook Development Company gave an option to purchase part of Block 8 to a 
fictitious entity called "La Prele Venture Ltd." This option was extended on 
September 30, 1980. The purpose of this option is not entirely 
clear.