Title: Attorney Grievance v. Seltzer

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Aaron G. Seltzer, Misc. Docket AG No.
55, September Term, 2010.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – DISBARMENT – PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT:
The Respondent, Aaron G. Seltzer, having been found to be in violation of the Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct 8.1(b), and 8.4(a) through (d), was disbarred.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 55
September Term, 2010
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND 
v. 
AARON G. SELTZER
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
Eldridge, John C., (Retired,  
 Specially Assigned), 
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:   December 22, 2011
Aaron G. Seltzer, Respondent, was admitted to the Bar of this Court on December 12,
2001.   On December 9, 2010, the Attorney Grievance Commission (“Petitioner” or “Bar
1
Counsel”), acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751(a),  filed a “Petition for Disciplinary or
2
Remedial Action” against Seltzer, which incorporated two complaints, one by a real estate
agent, Debbie Jenkins, and the other by June Carolyn Piper-Brandon, a partner of Seltzer’s
realty company, Advance Realty Anne Arundel Inc.  With respect to Ms. Jenkins’s complaint,
Bar Counsel alleged that Respondent violated various Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct under Maryland Rule 16-813, including Rule 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d) (Misconduct),3
for engaging in deceitful acts and misrepresentations in connection with Seltzer’s attempted
Seltzer was decertified from the practice of law on April 7, 2010, because
1
he failed to pay his Client Protection Fund dues.
Rule 16-751(a) provides in relevant part:
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(a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action.
(1) Upon approval or direction of Commission. Upon approval
or direction of the [Attorney Grievance] Commission, Bar
Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action
in the Court of Appeals.
Rule 8.4 provides in relevant part:
3
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct . . . or do so through the acts of another; 
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation; 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice;
purchase of commercial real estate in Baltimore, Maryland, as well as Rule 8.1(b) (Bar
Admission and Disciplinary Matters)  for failing to cooperate with Bar Counsel in the course
4
of its investigation of the complaints, failing to appear for a Statement Under Oath  for which
5
Rule 8.1 states in pertinent part:
4
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a
lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in
connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
* * *
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension
known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly
fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an
admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does
not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by
Rule 1.6.
Rule 16-732 provides, in pertinent part: 
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(a) Approval and issuance. (1)  The Chair of the Commission
may authorize Bar Counsel to issue a subpoena to compel the
attendance of witnesses and the production of designated
documents or other tangible things at a time and place specified
in the subpoena if the Chair finds that (A) the subpoena is
necessary to and in furtherance of an investigation being
conducted by Bar Counsel pursuant to Rule 16-731 or (B) the
subpoena has been requested by a disciplinary authority of
another jurisdiction pursuant to the law of that jurisdiction for
use in a disciplinary or remedial proceeding in that jurisdiction
to determine alleged professional misconduct or incapacity of a
lawyer subject to the jurisdiction of that disciplinary authority. 
(2)  Upon approval, Bar Counsel may issue the subpoena.
* * *
(g) Recording of statements. Everything said by the witness
at the time and place specified in the subpoena shall be
contemporaneously recorded stenographically or
(continued...)
2
he was duly subpoenaed, and failing to provide Bar Counsel with documents requested by
subpoena.  Bar Counsel alleged with respect to Ms. Piper-Brandon’s complaint that Seltzer
again violated Rule 8.4(a), (b), (c) and (d) for converting funds in his realty company’s
operating account for his own use and misappropriating funds in his realty company’s escrow
account and Rule 8.1(b) for failing to respond to a request for information by Bar Counsel. 
In an Order dated December 10, 2010, this Court referred the matter to Judge Paul M.
Bowman of the Circuit Court for Kent County for hearing, pursuant to Rule 16-757.6
(...continued)
5
electronically, and the witness shall be placed under oath.  
Rule 16-757 provides:
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(a) Generally.   The hearing of a disciplinary or remedial action
is governed by the rules of evidence and procedure applicable to
a court trial in a civil action tried in a circuit court.  Unless
extended by the Court of Appeals, the hearing shall be
completed within 120 days after service on the respondent of the
order designating a judge.  Before the conclusion of the hearing,
the judge may permit any complainant to testify, subject to
cross-examination, regarding the effect of the alleged
misconduct.   A respondent attorney may offer, or the judge may
inquire regarding, evidence otherwise admissible of any
remedial action undertaken relevant to the allegations. Bar
Counsel may respond to any evidence of remedial action. 
(b) Burdens of proof.  The petitioner has the burden of proving
the averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence.
A respondent who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of
mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense
or matter by a preponderance of the evidence. 
(c) Findings and conclusions.  The judge shall prepare and file
or dictate into the record a statement of the judge’s findings of
fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial
(continued...)
3
Seltzer was served, through the Client Protection Fund,  with the Petition for
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Disciplinary or Remedial Action, as well as the Court of Appeals’s Order, Writ of Summons,
Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents, and Request for Admission of Facts
and Genuineness of Documents.  Seltzer did not file an Answer or any other response.  An
Order of Default was subsequently entered about which notice was sent to Seltzer at his last
known address.  The order permitted Respondent 30 days within which to move to vacate the
order; no motion to vacate was filed.  The case proceeded on the Requests for Admissions of
Facts and Documents, which were deemed admitted by Judge Bowman because Seltzer failed
to respond.
Judge Bowman subsequently issued his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(...continued)
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action, and conclusions of law.  If dictated into the record, the
statement shall be promptly transcribed.  Unless the time is
extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed
statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record
no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing.  The
clerk shall mail a copy of the statement to each party. 
(d) Transcript.  The petitioner shall cause a transcript of the
hearing to be prepared and included in the record. 
(e) Transmittal of record.  Unless a different time is ordered by
the Court of Appeals, the clerk shall transmit the record to the
Court of Appeals within 15 days after the statement of findings
and conclusions is filed.
Prior   attempts   by   Bar   Counsel   to   serve   Seltzer   personally   were 
7
unsuccessful.  Pursuant to Rule 16-753, Bar Counsel properly served the Executive Director
of the Client Protection Fund, who in turn served Seltzer at his last known address by
certified mail and ordinary mail.  
4
memorandum; he addressed Ms. Jenkins’s complaint and found that beginning in 2008,
Seltzer was simultaneously a partner of four different companies, Village Green, Death Star,
Advance Realty, and First Class.  In 2008, Seltzer submitted a contract to purchase real
property on behalf of a fifth company, Allied Baltimore Development Group, LLC, to Ms.
Jenkins, an agent for the seller of several commercial properties in Baltimore.  One of the
contract provisions was that Allied’s deposit would be held by Village Green.  At no time,
however, did Seltzer explain nor did Ms. Jenkins or her seller understand that Seltzer executed
the contract on behalf of Allied or that he was affiliated with Village Green, or any of the
other companies, Death Star, Advance Realty or First Class.  Pursuant to the contract of sale,
Seltzer was to provide Village Green with a check representing a deposit which was drawn
on Death Star’s bank account.  The check was returned for insufficient funds.  After Seltzer
repeatedly assured Ms. Jenkins that he would pay the deposit but failed to do so, the sale did
not go through.
In October/November 2008, Respondent was the
managing member of Village Green Title, LLC, (hereinafter
“Village Green”) which was located at 1662 Village Green,
Crofton, Maryland.  During that same time period, Respondent
was also the managing member of Death Star, LLC (hereinafter
“Death Star”) which was located at 5468 Wellington Drive,
Trappe, Maryland 21673.  The Trappe address for Death Star was
Respondent’s residence at that time.  During that same time
period, Respondent was a 49% partner in Advance Realty Anne
Arundel Incorporated (hereinafter “Advanced Realty”) which
was located at 5 Crain Highway, N., Glen Burnie, Maryland
21061.  Respondent was also the managing member of First
Class Real Estate, LLC, (hereinafter “First Class”) which was
located at 1662 Village Green, Crofton, Maryland, 21114, the
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same address as Village Green.
In October of 2008, Respondent submitted a contract on
behalf of Allied Baltimore Development Group, LLC,
(hereinafter “Allied”), to Biddison Lane, LLC (hereinafter
“Seller”) to purchase commercial real estate located at 4004,
4006, 4008, 4010 and 4012 Biddison Lane, in Baltimore,
Maryland (hereinafter “Biddison Lane”).  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-
1).  Unbeknownst to the Seller, Respondent executed the contract
of sale on behalf of Allied.  The contract price for Biddison Lane
was $1,540,000.00 and required Allied to provide an earnest
money deposit of $15,000.00 to be held by Village Green.  Both
the Seller and the Seller’s Agent, Debbie Jenkins, (hereinafter
“Jenkins”) were never advised that Respondent was the
managing member of Village Green, Death Star or a partner in
Advanced Realty.
On or about November 8, 2008, Respondent wrote check
number 1076 in the amount of $15,000.00 payable to Village
Green on the account of Death Star.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-2). 
That check represented the earnest money deposit for Biddison
Lane pursuant to the contract of sale.  Death Star’s check number
1076, written in the amount of $15,000.00 was never negotiated. 
(Petitioner’s Exhibit B-28).  Further, Death Star did not have
$15,000.00 in its account at the time Respondent wrote check
number 1076.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-28).  Respondent misled
Jenkins into believing that he had deposited Death Star’s check
number 1076 into Village Green’s escrow account.  Although
Jenkins attempted to get verification from the Respondent that
the $15,000.00 earnest money deposit for Biddison Lane was
negotiated and held in Village Green’s escrow account, she could
never obtain that verification from the Respondent.  By e-mail
dated November 10, 2008, Respondent advised Jenkins that he
would provide her with the $15,000.00 check the following day. 
(Petitioner’s Exhibit B-3).  Respondent did not provide Jenkins
or the Seller with the $15,000.00 check pursuant to the contract
of sale.  
By letter dated December 12, 2008, Respondent executed
an “Addendum/Amendment” to the contract of sale between
Allied and the Seller.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-4).  Respondent
had still not provided Jenkins or Seller with proof that the good
faith deposit owed pursuant to the original contract of sale was
6
being held by Village Green.  On or about March 18, 2009,
Respondent submitted a second “Addendum/Amendment” to the
Contract of Sale to Jenkins and the seller.  Pursuant to the second
“Addendum/Amendment,” Respondent agreed to provide valid
verifiable proof of financing or proof of cash to the Seller within
48 hours and to increase the deposit by an additional $50,000.00
for a total of $65,000.00 to be held by Village Green. 
(Petitioner’s Exhibit B-5).  Respondent further agreed to make
the deposit non-refundable.  Respondent never deposited any
money into Village Green’s escrow account pursuant to the
second “Addendum/Amendment.”
On April 15, 2009, Respondent executed a third
“Addendum to Contract.” Pursuant to the third “Addendum to
Contract,” Respondent agreed, on behalf of Allied to place an
additional $25,000 in escrow for a total of $40,000.00 to be held
by Village Green.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-6).  Respondent never
deposited any money on behalf of Allied into Village Green’s
escrow account for the good faith deposit of Biddison Lane.  The
sale of Biddison Lane never occurred between the Seller and
Allied.
When the sale between Allied and Ms. Jenkins’s client did not go through, Seltzer
returned to Ms. Jenkins with what purported to be a new buyer, this time seeking to purchase
the property, at a lower price, in the name of First Class company.  Like before, Seltzer gave
Ms. Jenkins a check as a deposit, drawn on the Death Star’s account, which was returned for
insufficient funds.  Seltzer never explained his role as the managing member of First Class. 
In June of 2009, Respondent presented a “Contract of
Sale” dated June 18, (sic) 2008, to the Seller on behalf of First
Class to purchase Biddison Lane for $1,200,000.00.  (Petitioner’s
Exhibit B-7).  Respondent executed that “Contract of Sale” on
behalf of First Class in June of 2009.  Pursuant to that “Contract
of Sale,” it was agreed that a non-refundable deposit of
$50,000.00 would be held by the Seller.  The address for First
Class is the same address as Village Green.  Respondent never
advised the Seller or Jenkins that he was a managing member of
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First Class.  Respondent gave Jenkins check number 2013, dated
July 4, 2009, written on the account of Death Star in the amount
of $50,000.00.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-8).  That check was
returned for insufficient funds.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-27). 
After that check was returned for insufficient funds, Respondent
sent Jenkins a June 24, 2009 e-mail to mislead her into believing
monies would be transferred into Death Star’s account so that
check number 2013 would clear the bank.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit
B-11).  There was never a $50,000.00 transfer or deposit into
Death Star’s account.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-27).  The Seller
was never able to negotiate Death Star’s $50,000.00 check which
was the non-refundable deposit for Biddison Lane because
Respondent never had $50,000.00 in the Death Star account. 
(Petitioner’s Exhibit B-22).
To induce Ms. Jenkins’s client to sell the commercial properties, Seltzer provided three
fraudulent documents, attesting to First Class’s financial condition and ability to purchase the
properties.  These documents included: a letter from Oppenheimer and Company, Inc.,
ostensibly authored by an Oppenheimer employee, which later was found to be false; a bank
statement from Chase Investment Services Group, discussing an alleged Seltzer Family Trust
account that, in fact, did not exist at Chase; and an e-mail from Chase discussing this Trust,
ostensibly written by a person later found not to be affiliated with Chase.
Respondent provided several fraudulent documents to
Jenkins.  Respondent provided Jenkins with a letter date June 26,
2009, ostensibly from Oppenheimer and Company, Incorporated
(hereinafter “Oppenheimer”).  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-9).  That
letter is fraudulent because Marc C. Hotten, whose name appears
as the author, was not an employee of Oppenheimer on June 26,
2009.  Further, Respondent created that June 26, 2009, letter to
induce the Seller to enter into the contract submitted by First
Class because it stated that there was over $3,000,000.00
unencumbered funds on deposit with Oppenheimer.  Respondent
also provided Jenkins with a Chase Investment Services Group
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(hereinafter “Chase”) statement which was fraudulent. 
(Petitioner’s Exhibit B-10).  Respondent provided the Chase
statement to induce the Seller to enter into the June 26, 2009,
contract because it stated that there was $292,414.66 in the
“Seltzer Family Trust.”  That statement was fraudulent because
Chase does not maintain account(s) titled “Seltzer Family Trust.” 
That statement was given to the Seller and Jenkins to
demonstrate that there were funds available to purchase Biddison
Lane.  By e-mail dated June 24, 2009, Respondent provided
Jenkins with a fraudulent e-mail from his broker, Robert E.
Miller, an alleged employee of Chase.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-
11).  That e-mail was fraudulent because Chase does not have an
employee named Robert Miller and does not maintain any
accounts titled “Seltzer Family Trust.”  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-
12).
Once Ms. Jenkins’s complaint was filed, Seltzer repeatedly evaded Bar Counsel’s
multiple requests for information, including failing to respond to four subpoenas for
documents and to appear for a Statement Under Oath.
By letter dated January 20, 2010, the Office of Bar
Counsel’s Investigator, William M. Ramsey, requested
documents from the Respondent concerning the attempted
purchase of Biddison Lane.  (Petitioners Exhibit B-13). 
Although the Respondent received the January 20, 2010, letter,
he never provided the Office of Bar Counsel the documents
requested.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-14).  Mr. Ramsey mailed a
second letter to the Respondent dated February 22, 2010. 
(Petitioner’s Exhibit B-15).  Although the Respondent received
Mr. Ramsey’s February 22, 2010 letter, he did not respond to Mr.
Ramsey nor did he schedule a meeting to be interviewed by Mr.
Ramsey.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-14). 
On March 30, 2010, Mr. Ramsey served four (4) Bar
Counsel subpoenas on the Respondent.  (Petitioner’s Exhibits B-
17, 18, 19 and 20).  Those subpoenas requested the Respondent
to produce his documents on the Chase account titled “Seltzer
Family Trust,” the BB&T account number 515-39-07449, titled
“Death Star, LLC,” the BB&T account number 515-58-53176,
9
titled “Death Star, LLC” and to appear for a Statement Under
Oath and produce documents.  The Respondent’s Statement
Under Oath was to be held on April 6, 2010 at the Office of Bar
Counsel.  At the Respondent’s request, his Statement Under Oath
schedule for April 6, 2010 was rescheduled to Thursday, April
22, 2010.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-21).  Thereafter, the
Respondent requested and the Office of Bar Counsel agreed to
reschedule the Statement Under Oath to April 26, 2010. 
(Petitioner’s Exhibit B-22).  Respondent failed to appear for the
April 26, 2010, Statement Under Oath and failed to produce any
documents requested in the four (4) subpoenas.  (Petitioner’s
Exhibit B-25).  
On April 27, 2010, the Respondent sent an e-mail to the
Office of Bar Counsel advising that he was in the hospital and
inquiring whether the Office of Bar Counsel was still willing to
take his Statement Under Oath.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-23).  In
response, the Office of Bar Counsel advised the Respondent, that
if he was going to cooperate then he would have to immediately
send the documents requested in the subpoenas.  (Petitioner’s
Exhibit B-24).  Although Respondent agreed to send the
documents requested to the Office of Bar Counsel, he never did. 
(Petitioner’s Exhibit B-24).  
Judge Bowman concluded that Seltzer’s failure to disclose his role as managing
member of First Class during negotiations for the second contract, paired with the bad Death
Star checks, fraudulent documents and his multiple failures to respond to Bar Counsel’s
requests for information, established, by clear and convincing evidence, that Seltzer had
engaged in a pattern of deceit that indeed violated Rules 8.4 (a), (b), (c) and (d) and 8.1(b).
By his conduct, the Respondent violated all of the rules of
professional conduct charged by Petitioner in the Petition for
Disciplinary 
or 
Remedial Action.  Respondent’s
misrepresentations and deceit perpetrated on the Seller and their
agent, Jenkins, began in October of 2008 and continued through
July of 2009.  Respondent never disclosed to the Seller or Jenkins
that he was the managing member of Village Green and Death
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Star and a partner in Advanced Realty.  Respondent never made
the good-faith deposit required pursuant to the first contract. 
Respondent never had $15,000.00 in his Death Star bank account
to make the food-faith deposit.  Thereafter, Respondent entered
into three (3) “Addendums/Amendments” to contract of sale with
the Seller and agreed to a non-refundable deposit, which he never
provided. 
Respondent never disclosed to the Seller or Jenkins that
he was the managing member of Death Star, Village Green, First
Class or a partner in Advanced Realty when he entered into the
second contract to purchase Biddison Lane.  Although
Respondent provided a $50,000.00 check written on the account
of Death Star to the Seller, that check was never negotiable
because the Respondent never had $50,000.00 in the account.  
Further, the Respondent created three (3) fraudulent documents
to induce the Seller to enter into the second contract of sale with
First Class.  The Respondent created the Oppenheimer letter, the
Chase Statement and the e-mail purportedly from Chase to
induce the Seller to enter into the contract with First Class.  The
Respondent’s continuing course of deceit and misrepresentations
for nine (9) months violated Rule 8.4(a), (b) and (c). 
Respondent’s continuing course of deceit for nine (9) months
was prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of
8.4(d).  Further, Respondent violated Rule 8.1 by his willful
failure to be interviewed by Bar Counsel’s investigator, Mr.
Ramsey and to produce any documents requested by Mr. Ramsey. 
The Respondent ignored Mr. Ramsey’s letters of January 20,
2010 and February 22, 2010.  Thereafter, the Respondent
willfully ignored four (4) subpoenas duly served upon him.  Not
only did the Respondent fail to produce the documents requested
in the four (4) subpoenas, he also failed to appear for a Statement
Under Oath.  The Respondent avoided the Office of Bar Counsel
throughout the investigation and rescheduled his Statement
Under Oath from April 6  to April 22  and then to April 26,
th
nd
2010.  Thereafter, the Respondent failed to appear for the
Statement Under Oath on April 26, 2010.  Respondent sent an e-
mail to the Office of Bar Counsel the following day in an attempt
to appear as if he was cooperating, however, never produced any
documents or rescheduled his Statement Under Oath.  The
Respondent’s willful refusal to be interviewed by Bar Counsel,
11
produce documents to Bar Counsel and to comply with the four
(4) subpoenas duly served upon him violates 8.1(b). 
Respondent’s misrepresentations, deceit and fraudulent letters
violated Rule 8.4(d), conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
With regard to the second complaint, that of Ms. Piper-Brandon, Judge Bowman found
that Seltzer, Ms. Piper-Brandon’s Advanced Realty Anne Arundel, Inc. co-owner, used his
signatory authority to withdraw from Advanced Realty’s operating account at least $2,300,
to which he was not entitled, and to transfer, without authorization, $5,500 from Advanced
Realty’s escrow account.
Petitioner alleges that Respondent violated Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct 8.1(b) and 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d),
by converting funds to his own use without entitlement from
Advanced Realty Anne Arundel Incorporated’s (hereinafter
“Advanced Realty”) operating account, for misappropriating
funds from Advanced Realty’s escrow account and for failing to
respond to request for information from the Office of Bar
Counsel.  
In February of 2010, June Caroline Piper-Brandon,
(hereinafter “Piper-Brandon”), owned 51% of Advanced Realty
and the Respondent owned 41%.  Both Piper-Brandon and
Respondent had signatory authority on Advanced Realty’s
operating and escrow accounts.  On February 18, 2010,
Respondent withdrew $1,300.00 from Advanced Realty’s
operating account maintained at Suntrust Bank.  (Petitioner’s
Exhibit B-35).  Respondent did not have any entitlement to the
$1,300.00 he withdrew from Advanced Realty’s operating
account on February 18, 2010.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-35).  On
February 19, 2010, Respondent withdrew $800.00 from
Advanced Realty’s operating account for his own use without
entitlement.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-35).  Thereafter, on February
23, 2010 and February 26, 2010, Respondent withdrew $1,000.00
on each date from Advanced Realty’s operating account for his
own use without entitlement.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-35). 
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Respondent has never repaid the $2,300.00 he took without
entitlement to Advanced Realty.
On February 23, 2010, Respondent transferred $4,000.00
from Advanced Realty’s escrow account maintained at Suntrust
Bank.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-33).  Respondent had no
entitlement to the $4,000.00 transferred from Advanced Realty’s
escrow account.  Further, the $4,000.00 transferred from
Advanced Realty’s escrow account were funds belonging to
Advanced Realty’s clients.  
On March 2, 2010, Respondent withdrew $1,500.00 from
Advanced Realty’s escrow account for his own use.  Respondent
had no entitlement to the $1,500.00 he withdrew on March 2,
2010.  Further those funds belonged to Advanced Realty’s
clients.
In addition, Seltzer withdrew or transferred $9,156 from Advanced Realty’s escrow
account to two individuals who were not clients of Advanced Realty and not entitled to the
money.  Thereafter, Seltzer attempted, but failed, to make a subsequent corresponding deposit
of $9,156 by writing a bad check from his Death Star account, in which he never had the
requisite money.
On March 8, 2010, the Respondent wired $9,156.00 from
Advanced Realty’s escrow account to JP Morgan Chase, made
payable to Hymowitz and Freeman.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-33
and 37).  Hymowitz and Freeman are not clients of Advanced
Realty.  There was no corresponding deposit into Advanced
Realty’s escrow account prior to the Respondent’s write transfer
of $9,156.00 on March 8, 2010.  On March 9, 2010, Respondent
deposited Death Star’s check number 2125 in the amount of
$9,156.00 into Advanced Realty’s escrow account, however, that
deposit was returned on March 12, 2010, due to insufficient
funds in the Death Star account.  (Petitioner’s Exhibits 27 and
33).  On March 15, 2010, Respondent deposited Death Star’s
check number 2133 in the amount of $7,000.00 into Advanced
Realty’s escrow account.  However, that deposit was returned on
March 18, 2010, due to insufficient funds in the Death Star
13
account.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-27 and 33).  Respondent never
had the funds in Death Star’s account to issue those two checks. 
(Petitioner’s Exhibit B-27).  The Respondent had no entitlement
to the $9,156.00 that he transferred from Advanced Realty’s
escrow account and wired to Hymowitz and Freeman.  Further,
Hymowitz and Freeman had no entitlement to the $9,156.00 that
they received from Advanced Realty’s escrow account.  The
Respondent used funds belonging to Advanced Realty’s clients
when he transferred $9,156.00 from Advanced Realty’s escrow
account.  Respondent never repaid the funds he wired from
Advanced Realty’s escrow account, the fees associated with that
wire transfer and the returned deposit fees associated with the
two non-negotiable Death Star checks.
Again, when Bar Counsel contacted Seltzer regarding his unauthorized withdrawals
from Advanced Realty’s operating and escrow accounts, Seltzer never responded to the
complaint.
The Office of Bar Counsel mailed the Respondent letters
on March 23, 2010 and April 6, 2010, requesting a response to
Piper-Brandon’s complaint.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-29 and 30). 
The Respondent never responded to Bar Counsel’s request for
information concerning the complaint of Piper-Brandon.  On
April 27, 2010, the Office of Bar Counsel e-mailed the
Respondent requesting a response to Piper-Brandon’s Complaint. 
(Petitioner’s Exhibit B-24).  Although the Respondent responded
to Bar Counsel’s e-mail and agreed to respond the following
Monday, he never provided a response to Piper-Brandon’s
Complaint.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-24).  
Judge Bowman found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Seltzer’s conduct,
specifically the misappropriation of funds to which he was entrusted, established that he had
violated Rules 8.4 (a), (b), (c) and (d) and his failure to respond to the Piper-Brandon
complaint, established he had violated Rule 8.1(b).
14
By his conduct, Respondent violated Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct 8.1(b), and 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d) by
converting funds to his own use from Advanced Realty’s
operating account, for misappropriating funds from Advanced
Realty’s escrow account and for failing to respond to Bar
Counsel’s request for information.
The Respondent violated Rule 8.1(b) by failing to respond
to Bar Counsel’s letters of March 23, 2010 and April 26, 2010. 
Thereafter, the Respondent acknowledged Bar Counsel’s April
27, 2010 e-mail, however, still failed to provide a response to the
Complaint of Piper-Brandon in violation of 8.1(b).  
The Respondent violated Rules 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d),
when he withdrew funds from Advanced Realty’s operating
account and escrow account without entitlement.  The monies the
Respondent withdrew from Advanced Realty’s operating account
did not belong to him.  Respondent withdrew a total of $2,300.00
and converted those funds for his own use without entitlement. 
The removal of the $2,300.00 from Advanced Realty’s operating
account was an act of deceit and an act of theft in violation of
Rule 8.4(b) and (c).  Further, when Respondent transferred,
withdrew or wired funds from Advanced Realty’s escrow
account where there were no corresponding deposit(s) and no
client(s) associated with those transfer(s), withdrawal(s) or
wire(s), it resulted in a misappropriation of funds belonging to
Advanced Realty’s client(s) in violation of Rules 8.4(b) and (c). 
Respondent’s act of taking those funds was deceitful and a theft
from Advanced Realty’s clients.  Further, the Respondent never
repaid the funds he misappropriated.  Respondent knew he was
not entitled to the $14,656.00 he misappropriated from Advanced
Realty’s escrow account.  Respondent’s knowledge that he was
not entitled to those funds is evidenced by his attempt to deposit
$16,156.00 into Advanced Realty’s escrow account.  After
Respondent misappropriated monies from Advanced Realty’s
escrow account, he then knowingly wrote two checks from his
Death Star account and deposited them into Advanced Realty’s
escrow account knowing that those checks would not be honored. 
At the time the Respondent wrote the two Death Star checks, he
did not have $16,156.00 in his Death Star account.  At the time
the Respondent wrote Death Star check number 2125, he had a
zero balance in the account.  (Petitioner’s Exhibit B-27).  At the
15
time Respondent wrote the Death Star check number 2133, his
balance in the Death Star account was $839.11.  Therefore,
Respondent knew he did not have the funds to replace the monies
that he misappropriated from Advanced Realty’s escrow account. 
Respondent’s theft of funds belonging to Advanced Realty’s
clients violated Rule 8.4(a), (b), (c) and (d).  Respondent’s course
of conduct of misappropriating funds is conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d).
In summary, this Court finds that the Respondent violated
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 8.1(b) and 8.4(a), (b),
(c) and (d), in connection with the Jenkins and Piper-Brandon
complaints.
Bar Counsel has not filed any exceptions to the hearing judge’s Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and recommends disbarment.  Seltzer also has not filed any exceptions,
and he failed to appear at oral argument before this Court.   
8
After oral argument, a per curiam order disbarring Respondent was entered on October
7, 2011.  The order stated:
For reasons to be stated in an opinion later to be filed, it
is this 7th day of October, 2011, 
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the
respondent, Aaron Gregory Seltzer, be, and he is hereby,
disbarred, effective immediately, from the further practice of law
in the State of Maryland; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court shall strike the
name of Aaron Gregory Seltzer from the register of attorneys,
and pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-713, shall certify that fact to
the Trustees of the Client Protection Fund and the clerks of all
Prior to oral argument, Sara B. Seltzer, the Respondent’s wife, filed a 
8
 “Motion  for Postponement and in the Alternative Motion to  Consent  to Sanctions.”  In
response, Bar Counsel moved to strike the motion for postponement on grounds that Ms.
Seltzer was “not admitted to the Bar of the State of Maryland and may not prepare or file
motions on behalf of the Respondent.” We granted Bar Counsel’s motion.
16
judicial tribunals in the State; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent shall pay all costs as taxed by
the Clerk of this Court, including the costs of all transcripts,
pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-715(c), for which sum judgment
is entered in favor of the Attorney Grievance Commission of
Maryland against Aaron Gregory Seltzer.
We now state the reasons for our previously-issued order.
Standard of Review
“This Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney discipline proceedings
in Maryland.”  Attorney Grievance v. Stern, 419 Md. 525, 556, 19 A.3d 904, 925 (2011),
quoting Attorney Grievance v. Nwadike, 416 Md. 180, 192, 6 A.3d 287, 294 (2010).  “In our
independent review of the record, we accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact as prima facie
correct unless shown to be clearly erroneous.”  Attorney Grievance v. Lara, 418 Md. 355, 364,
14 A.3d 650, 656 (2011), citing Attorney Grievance v. Palmer, 417 Md. 185, 205, 9 A.3d 37,
49 (2010).  If no exceptions are filed, we may treat the hearing judge’s findings of fact as
established for the purpose of determining the appropriate sanction.  Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A). 
We conduct an independent review of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.  Rule 16-
759(b)(1);  Stern, 419 Md. at 556, 19 A.3d at 925. 
Discussion
We accept Judge Bowman’s findings of fact as established by clear and convincing
evidence, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A); no exceptions have been filed by either
Bar Counsel or Seltzer. 
We also agree that the findings of fact sufficiently establish that Seltzer violated Rules
17
8.4 (a), (b), (c) and (d) when he continually misrepresented and deceived Ms. Jenkins,
submitted fraudulent documents, and issued bad checks.  
With respect to Rule 8.4 (b), which prohibits a lawyer from committing “a criminal act
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer,”
Seltzer’s multiple fraudulent documents submitted to Ms. Jenkins, purportedly signed by
representatives of Oppenheimer and Company, Inc. and a Chase Investment Services Group,
who in reality were not affiliated with the companies, as well as a Chase bank statement
detailing a trust account that did not exist, all in an effort to induce Ms. Jenkins’s client to join
in a contract of sale, constituted criminal acts.  Section 7-104(b) of the Criminal Law Article,
Maryland Code (2002),  for one, prohibits theft by deception with the intent to deprive the
9
owner of the property.  As to Ms. Jenkins’s complaint, the facts establish that Seltzer
knowingly attempted, through bad checks and fraudulent documents, to defraud Ms. Jenkins
and her client and induce them to enter a contract of sale. 
When an attorney intentionally submits fraudulent documents to obtain pecuniary gain,
Section 7-104(b) of the Criminal Law Article, Maryland Code (2002)
9
provides: 
(b) [Unauthorized control over property] – By deception. – A
person may not obtain control over property by willfully or
knowingly using deception, if the person:
(1) intends to deprive the owner of the property;
(2) willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the
property in a manner that deprives the owner of the property; or
(3) uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing the use,
concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner
of the property.
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Rule 8.4(c), which prohibits a lawyer from “engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,” also is violated.  That Seltzer engaged in deceitful conduct
outside of the practice of law does not immunize the sanctionable nature of his behavior.  See,
e.g., Attorney Grievance v. Jordan, 386 Md. 583, 594, 873 A.2.d 1161, 1167 (2005)
(concluding that an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) violated when she “intentionally submitted
false documents to her [homeowner’s] insurance company for the purpose of obtaining
monetary benefits to which she was not entitled”).
As to Rule 8.4(d), which defines professional misconduct as “engag[ing] in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice,” Seltzer’s pattern of deceitful conduct with
Ms. Jenkins was certainly prejudicial to the administration of justice because it is “conduct
that impacts on the image or the perception . . . or the legal profession . . . and that engenders
disrespect . . . and for the legal profession may be prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
Attorney Grievance v. Marcalus, 414 Md. 501, 522, 996 A.2d 350, 362 (2010), quoting
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Richardson, 350 Md. 354, 368, 712 A.2d 525, 532 (1998). 
Attorney misconduct, especially when criminal or egregious, may violate Rule 8.4(b) even if
it involves an act that is unrelated to legal practice.  Id. at 521, 996 A.2d at 361; see also
Attorney Grievance v. Shryock, 408 Md. 105, 125, 968 A.2d 593, 604-05 (2009) (Violations
of Rules 8.4(b) and (c) generally “constitute violations of [Rule] 8.4(d), in that the conduct
that supports a violation of [Rule] 8.4(b) and (c) amounts to conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice.”).
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As to Rule 8.4(a), which provides that it is misconduct to “violate or attempt to violate
the Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct,” it is well established that various rule
violations, of themselves, are sufficient to support a violation.  Attorney Grievance v. Webster,
402 Md. 448, 468, 937 A.2d 161, 172 (2007).  Seltzer’s violations of Rules 8.4(b), (c) and (d)
clearly support a violation of Rule 8.4(a).
With regard to Seltzer’s conduct during Bar Counsel’s investigation of Ms. Jenkins’s
complaint, we also conclude that he violated Rule 8.1(b), which prohibits a lawyer, in
connection with a disciplinary matter, from “knowingly fail[ing] to respond to a lawful
demand for information from . . . [a] disciplinary authority.”  Seltzer received and failed to
respond to two letters and four subpoenas from Bar Counsel requesting that he produce
documents related to the Jenkins’s complaint.  He also failed to appear for his scheduled
Statement Under Oath, which Seltzer rescheduled twice with the Office of Bar Counsel before
finally failing to appear.  Although Seltzer sent Bar Counsel an e-mail claiming that his poor
health delayed his response, Seltzer ultimately did not provide any documents or statement
regarding the complaint.  Repeated failures to respond to Bar Counsel’s letters, as we
recognized in Attorney Grievance v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 994 A.2d 928 (2010), are
sufficient bases for us to agree with the hearing judge that Seltzer violated Rule 8.1(b).
With respect to the charges raised in Ms. Piper-Brandon’s complaint, we likewise
conclude that Seltzer’s conversion and misappropriation of funds from Advanced Realty’s
operating and escrow accounts violated Rules 8.4(a), (b), (c) and (d), and his subsequent
20
failure to respond to Bar Counsel’s request for information violated Rule 8.1(b).  The hearing
judge’s undisputed findings demonstrate that Seltzer converted funds from Advanced Realty’s
operating account for his own use, misappropriated funds from Advanced Realty’s escrow
account, and tried to cover up his misconduct by attempting to deposit multiple checks in
Advanced Realty’s accounts from the Death Star account, which Seltzer knew to be
underfunded.  As to Rule 8.4(b), Seltzer’s multiple withdrawals of funds from the operating
and escrow accounts constituted thievery and criminal acts that reflect adversely on Seltzer’s
honesty and trustworthiness.  
With regard to Rule 8.4(c), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in acts of
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, even when not practicing law, Seltzer clearly
engaged in dishonesty when he removed, for personal use, funds to which he was entrusted
and to which he was not entitled.  See Attorney Grievance v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 381,
386, 773 A.2d 463, 465, 469 (2001) (concluding that Rule 8.4 (a), (b), and (c) was violated
where attorney embezzled money from her employer).  
Seltzer’s misappropriation of his company’s funds for his own use was clearly
prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of Rule 8.4 (d).  See Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 359, 624 A.2d 503, 511 (1993), citing
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ezrin, 312 Md. 603, 541 A.2d 966 (1988) (conversion of
partnership funds as grounds for violation of Rule 8.4(d)).  Finally, Seltzer’s failure to respond
to Bar Counsel’s request for information again constituted a violation of Rule 8.1(b).  These
21
multiple rule violations are violative of Rule 8.4(a).
Sanction
Our primary goal in disciplining an attorney is to protect the public.  Bleecker, 414 Md.
at 176, 994 A.2d at 945.  To effectuate that goal, we may consider, among other things, the
following aggravating, non-exhaustive list of factors in Standard 9.22 of the American Bar
Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions: 
(a) prior disciplinary offenses; 
(b) dishonest or selfish motive; 
(c) a pattern of misconduct; 
(d) multiple offenses; 
(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the
disciplinary agency; 
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; 
(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
(h) vulnerability of victim; 
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law; 
(j) indifference to making restitution.
Id. at 176-77, 994 A.2d at 945-46.  Bar Counsel urges us to consider factors (b) and (d) in
aggravation. 
Seltzer’s dishonest and selfish motive are apparent throughout his misconduct with
regard to Ms. Jenkins and Advanced Realty.  He knowingly and willfully attempted to induce
Ms. Jenkins and her client to enter a contract of sale through his provision of fraudulent
documents and bad checks, and misappropriation of funds in the operating and escrow
accounts of Advanced Realty, including funds which belonged to his clients.  We have often
22
stated that “intentional misappropriation of funds entrusted to an attorney’s care is an act
infected with deceit and dishonesty, and, in the absence of compelling extenuating
circumstances justifying a lesser sanction, will result in disbarment.”  Attorney Grievance v.
Webster, 402 Md. at 473, 937 A.2d at 175; accord Attorney Grievance v. Spery, 371 Md. 560,
810 A.2d 487 (2002).
Under factor (d), Seltzer’s conduct was “egregious and violated multiple rules.” 
Bleecker, 414 Md. at 178, 994 A.2d at 946.  Seltzer developed multiple schemes to defraud
and steal from others.  In his real estate transactions, Seltzer misrepresented to the seller his
dual roles in Allied and Village Green, issued bad checks, and provided fraudulent documents
as to his financial stature, all in an effort to induce the seller to enter a contract of sale that
Seltzer did not intend to honor.  He made multiple withdrawals of funds to which he was not
entitled. 
“[I]ntentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most important matters
of basic character to such a degree as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer
almost beyond excuse,” and thus fraud and misappropriation of client funds by lawyers for
their own pecuniary gain, paired with repeated avoidance of Bar Counsel during investigation,
warrant a grave sanction.  Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488; Attorney Grievance
v. Johnson, 409 Md. 470, 508, 976 A.2d 245, 267 (2009) (disbarring two attorneys involved
in a “fraudulent, equity-stripping transaction”); Jordan, 386 Md. at 600, 873 A.2d at 1171
(disbarring an attorney who submitted fraudulent documents to her homeowner’s insurance
23
company in order to receive monetary benefits to which she was not entitled); Spery, 371 Md.
at 571, 810 A.2d at 493 (disbarring an attorney for intentionally and knowingly converting
real estate partnership funds); Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 419, 773 A.2d at 488 (disbarring an
attorney who misappropriated $3,880.67 from her employer for her own use); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Lazerow, 320 Md. 507, 515-516, 578 A.2d 779, 783 (1990) (disbarring
an attorney who misappropriated down payments of home purchasers in order to fund his
business’s construction of additional homes).  In the instant case, we agree with Bar Counsel
that Seltzer’s “utter lack of truthfulness, creation of fraudulent documents and
misappropriation of funds demonstrates that he is unfit to practice law.”
Accordingly, we have disbarred the Respondent, Aaron G. Seltzer.  
24