Title: Erickson v. Magill

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Erickson v. Magill1986 WY 37713 P.2d 1182Case Number: 85-121Decided: 02/07/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
ERICK O. ERICKSON AND 
CONNIE ERICKSON, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
RICHARD MAGILL AND KEY 
REAL ESTATE COMPANY, A WYOMING LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS), SCOTT D. McLENNAN AND MARLEEN J. McLENNAN, HUSBAND AND WIFE, 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Rehearing Denied March 
12, 1986.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Don W. Riske, Cheyenne.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Kay Snider Coffman and 
Bert T. Ahlstrom, Jr., Cheyenne.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROONEY* BROWN and CARDINE, JJ., and RAPER, 
J., Retired.

* Retired November 30, 
1985.

 
 

RAPER, Justice, 
Retired.

 
 

[¶1.]     A jury returned a 
verdict finding that defendant Magill (appellee) intentionally interfered with a 
contract between the plaintiffs Ericksons (appellants) and buyers of real estate 
(McLennans); that appellee Magill breached a real estate agent's duty to 
appellants; and that appellants should recover damages in the sum of $25,000 and 
a statutory penalty in the sum of $7,125, for violation of statutory duties, 
against appellee Magill and appellee Key Real Estate Company (Key), the owner of 
Key being the real estate broker for whom appellee Magill was a real estate 
salesman. A judgment was entered for the total of those amounts less a $5,000 
settlement derived by appellants from the McLennans, defendants dismissed from 
the suit before trial. The trial judge thereafter granted appellees judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV).

 
 

[¶2.]     On appeal from the 
JNOV, appellants set out the issues as:

 
 
"1. WHETHER THE COURT 
ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEES' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT.

 
 
"A. WHETHER THE RECORD 
CONTAINS EVIDENCE BY WHICH THE JURY COULD INFER THAT THE APPELLEES INTENTIONALLY 
INTERFERED WITH THE APPELLANTS' CONTRACT AND THAT SUCH INTERFERENCE CAUSED 
DAMAGE TO THE APPELLANTS.

 
 
"B. WHETHER THE RECORD 
CONTAINS EVIDENCE BY WHICH THE JURY COULD INFER THAT THE APPELLEES BREACHED 
THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTIES OWED TO THE APPELLANTS AND THAT SUCH BREACHES CAUSED 
DAMAGE TO THE APPELLANTS.

 
 
"C. WHETHER THE RECORD 
CONTAINS EVIDENCE BY WHICH THE JURY COULD INFER THAT THE APPELLEES VIOLATED W.S. 
33-28-111(a)(xviii) AND THAT SUCH VIOLATION CAUSED DAMAGED [sic] TO THE 
APPELLANTS."1

 
 
Appellees state the 
issues to be:

 
 
"1. WHETHER THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING A JUDGMENT NOT WITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT.

 
 
"A. WHETHER THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANTS FAILED TO CARRY THEIR BURDEN OF 
PROOF AT TRIAL, GENERALLY, AND, SPECIFICALLY, AS TO 
DAMAGES.

 
 
"B. WHETHER THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLEE REALTORS BREACHED NO DUTY OWED TO 
APPELLANTS, AND VIOLATED NO LEGAL OR ETHICAL OBLIGATION WHICH RESULTED IN DAMAGE 
TO THE APPELLANTS."

 
 

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

 
 

[¶4.]     The McLennans, after a 
search for a rural-type property, decided that the five acres with residence 
owned by appellants suited their needs and financial resources. They had just 
moved to the Cheyenne area and required occupancy a few days 
after their signed "Offer, Acceptance & Receipt" had been accepted by 
appellants, since the movers had arrived with their furniture and household 
goods. Appellants required an additional $10,350 earnest money and rent payment 
which was deposited in the form of a check, and a preoccupancy lease agreement 
was executed.

 
 

[¶5.]     The McLennans 
immediately moved their furniture in, with much of the smaller household goods 
being left boxed. After one night of occupancy, December 4-5, 1983, they first 
stopped payment of the check and then notified appellees that they were 
extremely unhappy with the house and wanted a contractor to take a look at it. 
It was explained that even though the electric heat had been turned up, the wind 
was blowing through a tongue and groove ceiling. The kitchen and living room 
area could not be kept comfortable, so in order to keep warm they had to go to 
bed.

 
 

[¶6.]     There were discussions 
most of the day of December 5th with appellants and appellees over what could be 
done about the problem. That evening the McLennans gave appellee Magill a note 
advising that they would not close the contract until such time as there was an 
agreement to withhold money from the purchase price to cover the cost of any 
repairs.

 
 

[¶7.]     The next morning, 
December 6th, the McLennans instructed appellee Magill to cancel the note with 
respect to repairs; they no longer wanted the house under any terms. Another 
note was prepared by the McLennans and delivered to appellees in which they 
advised of the inability of the electric heating units to keep the house at a 
habitable temperature due to the wind blowing through leaks, creating a draft 
which the heating could not overcome. The McLennans considered this a major 
defect not disclosed by appellants, and they considered the contract void.2 It was made clear that they 
intended to move out of the house as soon as they could find other 
accommodations.

 
 

[¶8.]     In that the McLennans 
settled their differences by payment of $5,000 to appellants, the foregoing 
summary is prefatory to additional facts pertaining to the remaining claim 
against appellees.

 
 

[¶9.]     Appellee Magill handled 
the sale of the property on behalf of the owners. When the McLennans announced 
they were refusing to close, Magill and the Key broker discussed the matter at 
some length with the McLennans, warning them that refusal to proceed constituted 
a breach of contract and that they could be required to specifically perform the 
agreement. The McLennans were taken to an attorney where they were informed that 
they would be sued. Regardless of those warnings, the McLennans were adamant 
that they were not going to stay in the house any longer than they had 
to.

 
 

[¶10.]  Appellees had other listings. Appellee 
Magill showed the McLennans a property which interested them. The owners 
accepted an offer prepared and presented to them by appellee Magill. The form of 
offer contained a provision making the sale "contingent upon final resolution of 
a dispute involving the purchasers; relative to the property" of 
appellants.

 
 

[¶11.]  Appellees were accused of interference 
with the contract of appellants with the McLennans. The response of appellee 
Magill in his testimony was that any hope of closing the sale of appellants' 
property to the McLennans was out of the picture, so there was no question of 
interference nor any reason to forego selling another property to them. The 
testimony of Mr. McLennan was that if Key felt it could not find another 
property and arrange the sale for them, "there were other real estate agents in 
this town" and "I was not going to close and they [Magill and Key] didn't get a 
vote in the matter."

 
 

[¶12.]  Mr. Howell, broker-owner of Key, 
testified that while he was convinced the contract of the McLennans with 
appellants was such that the former could be forced to purchase, he had no 
control over the McLennans and

 
 
"[t]hey could care less. 
Regardless of what their legal potential on that property, * * * they told me 
the chandeliers moved in the wind and that they had blankets under the doors and 
they were freezing to death out there, and there was nothing I could do to 
change their minds,"

 
 
and "you can lead a horse 
to water but you can't make [him] drink."

 
 
I

[¶13.]  The trial judge in granting the motion 
JNOV summed it up in his bench decision:

"Laying aside all of the 
defendants' evidence, and taking only that evidence most favorable to 
plaintiffs, I don't find any evidence that the actions of the defendant, or any 
of them, caused plaintiffs' damage, even if we assume the action may have been a 
technical violation of statute, or have been a technical interference with a 
contract, neither of which I admit except for the purpose of this argument right 
now - but I [sic] seems to me, I cannot bring myself to find that this was any 
cause of plaintiffs' damage, other than Mr. McLennan by himself. And when you 
heard him on the witness stand and listened to him and watched him, there was no 
doubt in any mind, here was a man who made up his mind; nobody influenced Mr. 
McLennan; he was a man who had his own views; he expressed them with a great 
deal of conviction and fervor; and he, himself, testified that there was nothing 
that the defendant Magill could have said to him that would have gotten him to 
close on that house.

 
 
"So I'm left in the case 
with the inescapable conclusion that, as a matter of law, that you cannot arrive 
at a verdict that damage, if any, of plaintiff was caused by the action of 
either of these defendants, Mr. Magill or his employer, Key [R]ealty. So you may 
prepare an order."

 
 
We agree with the 
district judge.

 
 

[¶14.]  Pursuant to Rule 50, W.R.C.P., 
appropriate motions to dismiss were made by appellees at the end of appellants' 
evidence and at the close of all the evidence. The trial judge followed the 
approved practice of denying both and, in doing so, still had available the 
motion JNOV giving him a final opportunity to determine the legal question of 
sufficiency of the evidence raised by the motion after the jury had reached a 
verdict. As pointed out in Cody v. 
Atkins, Wyo., 658 P.2d 59 (1983), this procedure can promote judicial 
economy in cases where a JNOV is reversed; the original verdict can be 
reinstated, whereas when a directed verdict is granted at the close of a 
plaintiff's case, generally a new trial is required upon 
reversal.

 
 

[¶15.]  When the evidence is wholly insufficient 
to support a verdict, it is the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict or 
enter a JNOV. Cody v. Atkins, supra. 
In determining whether a motion for a directed verdict or JNOV was proper, we 
apply the same test on appeal as does the trial judge in considering the motions 
originally in that there are only questions of law. Carey v. Jackson, Wyo., 
603 P.2d 868 (1979). The test to be applied is whether the evidence is such that 
without weighing the credibility of the witnesses, or otherwise considering the 
weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion reasonable persons could 
have reached, and such motions should be cautiously and sparingly granted. 
Carey v. Jackson, supra.

 
 

[¶16.]  Applying those standards, we arrive at 
the same conclusion as the trial judge. The evidence as disclosed by the 
transcript is devoid of a showing that appellee Magill caused appellants' damage 
by interfering with their contract with the McLennans. The McLennans were the 
sole cause by their irreversible stand that they would not live in appellants' 
house under any circumstances.

 
 

[¶17.]  In actions for damages arising out of 
interference with a contract, this Court has, in Board of Trustees of Weston County School 
District No. 1, Weston County v. Holso, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1009, 1016-1017 
(1978), set up the elements of proof necessary to establish the 
claim:

 
 
"(1) the existence of a 
valid contractual relationship or business expectancy;

 
 
"(2) knowledge of the 
relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferor;

 
 
"(3) intentional 
interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or 
expectancy; and

 
 
"(4) resultant damage to 
the party whose relationship or expectancy has been 
disrupted."

See also authorities set 
out in Board of Trustees of Weston County 
School District No. 1, WestonCounty v. Holso, supra. Missing is the 
proof of element number three. The transcript is barren of any evidence that 
appellee Magill induced or caused the breach of contract by the McLennans or 
intended to do so. We cannot create liability in the appellees by their merely 
arranging the sale of another property to the McLennans. There must be more. 
Since the failure of proof of any single element required causes the claim to 
fall, we need go no further in the consideration of contractual 
interference.

 
 
II

 
 

[¶18.]  The evidence does not disclose that 
appellees ever breached their fiduciary duties to appellants. They did 
everything possible within reason to persuade the McLennans to close. As stated 
by appellants' expert in the following colloquy:

 
 
"Q Can you physically 
force someone to close on property?

 
 
"A It's very difficult 
to.

 
 
"Q In fact, Mr. Magill 
could not have physically forced these people to close on this property, could 
he?

 
 
"A 
No.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"Q * * * There was 
nothing more that Mr. Magill could have done to force these people to close on 
the property, was there?

 
 
"A Probably 
not."

 
 
Appellants insist that 
appellees should not have arranged the purchase of another property for the 
McLennans. We see no reason or authority for going to such extreme under the 
circumstances of this case. The McLennans terminated the contract before that 
transaction took place.

 
 

[¶19.]  We continue to subscribe to the high 
standards established in Hagar v. 
Mobley, Wyo., 638 P.2d 127 (1981), for real estate salespersons in Wyoming, 
but we find no variance by appellees in this case from the principles of 
honesty, trustworthiness and competency.

 
 
III

 
 

[¶20.]  With reference to W.S. 
33-28-111(a)(xviii) and 33-28-114(b), supra note 1, making it censurable for a 
real estate broker or salesperson to act "for more than one (1) party in a 
transaction without the knowledge of all parties for whom the licensee acts," 
and providing for recovery of a penalty, we need only observe that appellees 
never represented the McLennans adverse to the interest of appellants. In such 
case, there being no violation, no penalty is recoverable.

 
 

[¶21.]  Affirmed.

 
 

1 W.S. 
33-28-111(a)(xviii):

 
 
"(a) The commission shall 
upon a written sworn complaint or may upon its own motion investigate the 
actions of any broker, associate broker or salesman and may censure the 
licensee, suspend or revoke any license issued under this act [§§ 33-28-101 
through 33-28-206] for any of the following:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(xviii) Acting for more 
than one (1) party in a transaction without the knowledge of all parties for 
whom the licensee acts; * * *"

 
 
W.S. 
33-28-114(b):

 
 
"If any person receives 
any money or the equivalent thereof as a fee, commission, compensation or profit 
by or in consequence of a violation of any provision of this act [§§ 33-28-101 
through 33-28-206], he shall, in addition, be liable to a penalty of not less 
than the amount of the sum of money so received and not more than three (3) 
times the sum so received as may be determined by the court, which penalty may 
be recovered in a court of competent jurisdiction by any person 
aggrieved."

2 The full text of the 
note was:

 
 
"This property has a 
major defect which was known by the owners at the time of offer and which was 
not listed in the referenced agreement. The owner acknowledged that this problem 
has been longstanding and they have tried unsuccessfully to correct it. Normal 
nightly winds penetrate the doors, walls, windows and ceilings to such an extent 
that there is a major draft through the house and the electric heating units 
cannot maintain a habitable temperature. This defect was known to the owners at 
the time of the offer; is not readily visible upon inspection; and its 
disclosure to the offeror would have terminated all negotiation at that point. 
The owners['] misrepresentation of the facts makes the referenced contract 
void."