Title: Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 74 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP1523 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Rock-Koshkonong Lake District, Rock River-
Koshkonong Association, Inc. and Lake Koshkonong 
Recreational Association, Inc., 
          Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources, 
          Respondent-Respondent, 
Lake Koshkonong Wetland Association, Inc. and 
Thiebeau Hunting Club, 
          Intervenors-Respondents. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 336 Wis. 2d 677, 803 N.W.2d 853 
(Ct. App. 2011 - Published) 
PDC No: 2011 WI App 115 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 5, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel T. Dillon 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., 
dissent. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
petitioners-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by William P. O’Connor, Mary Beth Peranteau and Wheeler, 
Van Sickle & Anderson, S.C., Madison, and Arthur J. Harrington 
and Douglas M. Poland and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by William P. O’Connor and Arthur J. Harrington.  
For the respondent-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Cynthia R. Hirsch, assistant attorney general, and the brief was 
filed by Joanne F. Kloppenburg, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
2
For the intervenors-respondents, there was a brief filed by 
Charles V. Sweeney and Mitchell R. Olson, and Axley Brynelson, 
LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Charles V. Sweeney.  
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Miriam Ostrov and 
Midwest Environmental Advocates, Inc., Madison, on behalf of the 
River Alliance of Wisconsin. 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas D. Larson, 
Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Realtors Association.   
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Elizabeth Wheeler, 
Madison, on behalf of Clean Wisconsin, Wisconsin Wetlands 
Association and Wisconsin Lakes.  
An 
amicus 
curiae 
brief 
was 
filed 
by 
Duffy 
Dillon, 
Janesville, on behalf of the Manitowish Chain Defense Fund, LLC.  
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Andrew C. Cook and 
Emily Stever Kelchen, and Great Lakes Legal Foundation, Inc., 
Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce and 
Midwest Food Processors Association.   
 
 
 
 
 
2013 WI 74
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP1523   
(L.C. No. 
2006CV1846) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Rock-Koshkonong Lake District, Rock River-
Koshkonong Association, Inc. and Lake 
Koshkonong Recreational Association, Inc., 
 
          Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent, 
 
Lake Koshkonong Wetland Association, Inc. and 
Thiebeau Hunting Club, 
 
          Intervenors-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case, involving a dispute 
about the water levels on Lake Koshkonong, presents fundamental 
questions about the authority of the Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources (the DNR), and the criteria it uses in 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
2 
 
regulating the level of water in navigable waters that are 
affected by dams.   
¶2 
Wisconsin Stat. § 31.02(1)1 authorizes the DNR to 
regulate the level and flow of water in the navigable waters of 
Wisconsin.  The DNR may order benchmarks designating "the 
maximum level of water that may be impounded and the lowest 
level of water that may be maintained by any dam."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 31.02(1).  The statute provides that the DNR may regulate 
water levels "in the interest of public rights in navigable 
waters or to promote safety and protect life, health and 
property."  Id.   
¶3 
The dispute here results from a 2003 petition (the 
Petition) by the Rock-Koshkonong Lake District, Rock River-
Koshkonong Association, Inc., and Lake Koshkonong Recreational2 
Association, Inc. (collectively, the District)3 to raise the DNR-
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 The complaint initiating judicial review of the DNR 
decision by the Rock County Circuit Court named "Lake Koshkonong 
Recreational Association, Inc." as one of the petitioners.  
However, the proper name of the entity is "Lake Koshkonong 
Recreation 
Association, 
Inc." 
as 
indicated 
by 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Financial 
Institution 
corporate 
records.  
Therefore, all further references to the association will use 
its proper name. 
3 The Rock-Koshkonong Lake District filed the Petition in 
2003 to raise the water levels on the lake.  After the DNR 
rejected the Petition, Rock River-Koshkonong Association, Inc. 
and 
Lake 
Koshkonong 
Recreation 
Association, 
Inc. 
jointly 
petitioned 
with 
the 
Rock-Koshkonong 
Lake 
District 
for 
a 
contested case hearing.  For the sake of simplicity, we will 
refer to all three entities as the District throughout this 
opinion, unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
3 
 
designated water levels of Lake Koshkonong.  The DNR rejected 
the Petition, and its denial was affirmed by an administrative 
law judge (ALJ) in a contested case hearing by the Rock County 
Circuit Court, Daniel T. Dillon, Judge, and by the court of 
appeals.  See Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. DNR, 2011 WI App 
115, 336 Wis. 2d 677, 803 N.W.2d 853.  The ALJ's decision was 
adopted as the decision of the DNR. 
¶4 
We are presented with four issues. 
¶5 
First, what level of deference, if any, should be 
accorded to the DNR's conclusions of law under the circumstances 
of this case? 
¶6 
Second, did the DNR exceed its authority in making a 
water level determination under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) "in the 
interest of public rights in navigable waters," by considering 
the impact of water levels on private wetlands that are adjacent 
to Lake Koshkonong and located above the ordinary high water 
mark?  
¶7 
Third, did the DNR exceed its authority in making a 
water level determination under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) "in the 
interest of public rights in navigable waters" by considering 
wetland water quality standards in Wis. Admin. Code § NR 103? 
¶8 
Fourth, did the DNR err in making a water level 
determination under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) by excluding evidence 
and refusing to consider the impacts of water levels on 
residential 
property 
values, 
business 
income, 
and 
public 
revenue? 
¶9 
We conclude the following: 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
4 
 
¶10 The DNR's conclusions of law are subject to de novo 
review because the DNR's water level order under Wis. Stat. 
§ 31.02(1) is heavily influenced by the DNR's interpretation of 
the scope of its own powers, its interpretation of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, its disputed interpretation of the statute it 
utilized, and its reliance upon statutes and rules outside of 
Wis. Stat. ch. 31. 
¶11 The 
DNR 
properly 
considered 
the 
impact 
of 
the 
Petition's proposed water levels on public and private wetlands 
in 
and adjacent to Lake Koshkonong.  However, the DNR 
inappropriately relied on the public trust doctrine for its 
authority to protect non-navigable land and non-navigable water 
above the ordinary high water mark.  The DNR has broad statutory 
authority grounded in the state's police power to protect non-
navigable wetlands and other non-navigable water resources.  
Thus, the DNR may consider the water level impact on all 
adjacent property under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1). 
¶12 The DNR was entitled to consider the water quality 
standards in Wis. Admin. Code § NR 103, promulgated under Wis. 
Stat. ch. 281, when making a Wis. Stat.§ 31.02(1) water level 
determination.  By statute, the DNR is responsible for writing 
and enforcing wetland water quality standards in this state.  
Accordingly, it would be unreasonable for the DNR to ignore 
statutes and its own administrative rules when making a water 
level determination affecting wetlands.  Therefore, the DNR may 
consider § NR 103 water quality standards when making a water 
level determination under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) that affects 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
5 
 
wetlands and may apply these standards when appropriate after 
weighing the factors in the statute.  However, Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.92 suggests that the DNR is not required to apply ch. 281 
standards in making a determination under Wis. Stat. § 31.02 
because ch. 31 is excepted from the provisions of ch. 281.   
¶13 The DNR erroneously excluded most testimony on the 
economic impact of lower water levels in Lake Koshkonong on the 
residents, businesses, and tax bases adjacent to and near Lake 
Koshkonong.  This evidence was relevant to the DNR's decision-
making under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1).  Although the DNR is granted 
substantial discretion in its decision-making under the statute, 
it must consider all probative evidence when its decision is 
likely to favor some interests but adversely affect others.  In 
this case, the DNR's exclusion of most economic evidence was 
inconsistent with its acceptance of competing economic evidence 
that helped sustain its water level decision.   
¶14 We remand this case to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶15 We begin the statement of facts and procedural history 
with an examination of the Rock River, Lake Koshkonong, and the 
Indianford Dam.  Next, we explain the purpose of ch. 31 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes, the history of water levels on Lake 
Koshkonong, and the Petition.  We then summarize the contested 
case hearing and the resulting decision, In the Matter of the 
Review of the Water Level Decision for Lake Koshkonong and the 
Indianford Dam on the Rock River in Rock County, Wisconsin, Case 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
6 
 
No. 3-SC-2003-28-3100LR, (DNR, Dec. 1, 2006) [hereinafter the 
Decision], which was adopted by the DNR.  Finally, we lay out 
the procedural history of the District's appeal. 
A. The Rock River 
 
¶16 The Rock River originates in Dodge County near 
Theresa, just south of the Fond du Lac County line.  It flows in 
a southerly, then southwesterly direction, passing through such 
Wisconsin communities as Watertown, Fort Atkinson, Janesville, 
and Beloit before entering Illinois.  The Rock River empties 
into the Mississippi River near Rock Island, Illinois.  Its 
total length is nearly 300 miles. 
 
¶17 The mouth of the Rock River flows into Lake Koshkonong 
about four miles downstream from the City of Fort Atkinson in 
Jefferson County.  The outlet of the lake, which funnels water 
back into the narrow channel of the Rock River, is situated 
about six miles upstream from the Indianford Dam in Rock County. 
B. Lake Koshkonong 
¶18 Lake Koshkonong, the sixth largest inland lake in 
Wisconsin, is a natural widening of the Rock River4 located in 
Jefferson, Rock, and Dane Counties.  While Lake Koshkonong has a 
wide surface area (approximately 10,460 acres), it is quite 
shallow.  At the current targeted water level ordered by the DNR 
in 1991, Lake Koshkonong's average depth is only five feet and 
                                                 
4 Lake Koshkonong and the Rock River are navigable waters 
under Wisconsin law.  See Wis. Stat. § 30.10(1) and (2) 
(declarations of navigability for lakes and streams).   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
7 
 
its maximum depth is only seven feet.5  The topography of the 
shoreline is gently sloped in such a way that water levels of 
one to two feet can extend quite far into the lake. 
¶19 Lake Koshkonong has 27 miles of shoreline.  Ten miles 
of shoreline have been developed for residential and some 
commercial use.  Approximately 2,788 residential parcels are 
located within a half-mile of the lake, with more than 600 
riparian parcels adjacent to the lake. 
 
¶20 Lake 
Koshkonong 
contains 
12.4 
miles 
of 
wetland 
shoreline.  Among the largest wetlands in and adjacent to the 
lake are Koshkonong Creek (278 acres of shallow marsh and 
floodplain forest); Krumps Creek (335 acres of shallow marsh); 
Mud Lake (921 acres of shallow marsh); Otter Creek (334 acres of 
shallow marsh and floodplain forest); Thiebeau Marsh (494 acres 
of shallow marsh, shrub, and meadow); and the state-owned and 
DNR-managed Koshkonong Wildlife Area (715 acres of shallow 
marsh, shrub, and meadow known as an area of "special natural 
resource interest" under Wis. Admin. Code § NR 103.04).  These 
areas and all of Lake Koshkonong are replete with diverse 
species of wildlife and vegetation.  The ALJ found that the 
                                                 
5 Around the time of statehood, Lake Koshkonong had a very 
different appearance than it does today.  Visiting the area in 
July 1850, Dr. I.A. Lapham wrote, "The water is from 4 to 12 
feet deep.  At the time of our visit, . . . wild rice was 
growing abundantly over almost its whole surface, giving it more 
the appearance of a meadow than a lake."  W.H. (Bill) Rodgers, 
Early History of Lake Koshkonong 1 (Mar. 21, 1961) (unpublished 
manuscript) 
(on 
file 
with 
Hoard 
Historical 
Museum, 
Fort 
Atkinson, Wis.).   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
8 
 
wetland shoreline has eroded since 1940.  "The reduced frequency 
of low water conditions during the summer and the increase in 
the average summer water levels . . . account for the loss of 
wetlands over the past 70 years." 
C. The Indianford Dam 
¶21 The Indianford Dam affects water levels on the Rock 
River and Lake Koshkonong.  In 1843 the Wisconsin territorial 
legislature authorized Clouden and Luke Stoughton to build the 
original dam; however, the Stoughtons did not construct the dam 
until after March 1851, when the state legislature again 
authorized construction.  Around 1917 the dam was reconstructed, 
which raised water levels on Lake Koshkonong.  The Rock-
Koshkonong Lake District, which was created in 1999, took over 
ownership and operation of the dam from Rock County in 2004.6 
 
¶22 The dam fell into general disrepair in the 1960s until 
it was rehabilitated in 2002.  Because of this disrepair, the 
dam's operation was compromised and it failed to regulate water 
levels on Lake Koshkonong——to conform with the target levels set 
by the DNR——for much of the time between the late 1960s until 
about 2002.  As a result, water levels on Lake Koshkonong since 
1965 have almost always exceeded the current target level of 
776.20 feet above mean sea level (msl),7 as the following chart 
from the Decision illustrates: 
                                                 
6 Rock County took over ownership of the dam in December 
1965 from the Wisconsin Power & Light Co. 
7 Msl is a unit of measurement for water levels.   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
9 
 
 
Date 
Water Level 
(ft.) 
Date 
Water Level 
(ft.) 
Date 
Water Level 
(ft.) 
1965 
776.60 
1978 
777.64 
1991 
776.40 
1966 
776.25 
1979 
777.27 
1992 
776.49 
1967 
776.28 
1980 
777.23 
1993 
779.16 
1968 
777.01 
1981 
776.51 
1994 
776.51 
1969 
776.90 
1982 
776.88 
1995 
777.02 
1970 
776.36 
1983 
776.63 
1996 
777.72 
1971 
776.31 
1984 
776.63 
1997 
776.98 
1972 
777.23 
1985 
776.51 
1998 
776.79 
1973 
777.86 
1986 
778.98 
1999 
777.44 
1974 
777.61 
1987 
776.51 
2000 
777.59 
1975 
777.15 
1988 
776.10 
2001 
777.18 
1976 
776.49 
1989 
776.25 
2002 
776.68 
1977 
776.11 
1990 
776.75 
 
 
 
¶23 The "statistically significant upward trend in average 
water levels" on Lake Koshkonong from 1932 to 2003 was partly 
attributable to the "diminished operating range of the wicket 
gates" on the dam before its 2002 repairs, as well as debris on 
the trash racks of the dam that impeded flowage.   
D. Wis. Stat. Chapter 31 and the District's Petition 
¶24 Chapter 31 of the Wisconsin Statutes grants the DNR 
authority to regulate dams and bridges affecting navigable 
waters in the state.  The DNR may regulate and control the level 
and flow of water in all navigable waters "in the interest of 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
10 
 
public rights in navigable waters or to promote safety and 
protect life, health and property."  Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1).  
Section 31.02(2) states that the "construction, operation, [and] 
maintenance . . . of dams in navigable waters shall be subject 
to the supervision of the [DNR] and to the orders and 
regulations of the [DNR]."  Thus, a dam operator must petition 
the DNR8 for an order if it wishes to raise or lower the water 
levels of a navigable body of water in a manner inconsistent 
with a previously existing order. 
¶25 The 
Wisconsin 
Railroad 
Commission 
(the 
Railroad 
Commission) 
issued 
the 
first 
water 
level 
order 
for 
the 
Indianford Dam in 1919.  The next order was not issued until 
1982, when the DNR, on its own motion, issued another order 
reestablishing water levels pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1).  
The DNR determined that the existing order was inadequate to 
control the water levels of Lake Koshkonong. 
¶26 However, 
the 
1982 
order 
was 
appealed 
by 
three 
individuals, two lake-based recreation clubs, a property owners 
association, and Rock County.  The Jefferson County Circuit 
Court's decision affirming the 1982 order was appealed to the 
court of appeals, which remanded to the DNR to hold a hearing 
before issuing any water level order.  A compromise between the 
                                                 
8 The legislature originally delegated authority to issue 
water level orders to the Railroad Commission.  § 3, ch. 380, 
Laws of 1915 (creating Wis. Stat. ch. 69m. § 1596——2.1. (1915)).  
The Public Service Commission and then the DNR became the 
successor agencies responsible for issuing water level orders 
under Wis. Stat. ch. 31.  
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
11 
 
DNR and the parties resulted in a 1991 water level order.  The 
1991 order left the 1982 order largely intact, raising slightly 
the minimum lake elevation in the winter and eliminating a 
flashboard9 requirement.10 
¶27 In 2002, after the rehabilitation of the Indianford 
Dam restored full operating capability to the dam's gates, the 
water levels on Lake Koshkonong began to reflect more closely 
the levels set by the 1991 order.  As a result, water levels on 
the lake dropped below recorded levels since the 1930s.  On 
April 21, 2003, the District11 petitioned the DNR, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1), to amend the 1991 order.  The District 
contended that the 1991 order was "not consistent with the 
public interest" because lower water levels on Lake Koshkonong 
led to severe restrictions on recreational boating and in many 
cases "piers must be extended far from shore to reach navigable 
water depths."  In addition, the District expressed concern for 
the effect that the winter drawdown in the 1991 order had on 
shore erosion, plants, and animal species. 
                                                 
9 A flashboard is a "board or structure of boards extending 
above a dam to increase its capacity."  The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 691 (3d ed. 1992).   
10 The DNR amended the 1991 order in 2004 to reflect the 
change in ownership of the Indianford Dam from Rock County to 
the Rock-Koshkonong Lake District.  The 2004 amendment made no 
substantive changes to the 1991 water order. 
11 Rock-Koshkonong Lake District was established by Rock 
County in 1999, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 33.24 and 33.37(1), 
"to undertake a program of . . . protection and rehabilitation 
for Lake Koshkonong."  More than 4,000 parcels of land in Rock, 
Jefferson, and Dane Counties make up the Rock-Koshkonong Lake 
District.   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
12 
 
¶28 The following chart compares the 1991 water level 
order and the proposed water levels in the Petition:12 
 
MSL Levels 
(at lake gage) 
1991 Order Petition 
Change 
May through October 
 
 
 
Target 
776.20' 
776.8' 
+0.6' (7.2 in.) 
Maximum 
(all gates open) 
776.33' 
777.0' 
+0.67' (8 in.) 
Minimum 
775.73' 
776.4' 
+0.67' (8 in.) 
November through April 
 
 
 
Maximum 
(all gates open) 
775.77' 
777.0' 
+1.23' (14.8 in.) 
Minimum 
775.00' 
776.4' 
+1.4' (16.8 in.) 
¶29 In 2003 and 2004 the DNR conducted an environmental 
assessment (EA) of the Petition's proposed water level order to 
determine whether an environmental impact statement (EIS) would 
be needed.  The DNR completed a draft EA in December 2004, after 
which a public hearing was held in January 2005 for comment on 
the findings.  The DNR certified the EA as complete in March 
2005 and determined that an EIS would not be necessary. 
¶30 On April 15, 2005, the DNR issued a proposed order 
denying the Petition, keeping the summer maximum water level at 
                                                 
12 A chart with identical information appears in the 
Decision and in the court of appeals opinion, Rock-Koshkonong 
Lake District v. DNR, 2011 WI App 115, ¶5, 336 Wis. 2d 677, 803 
N.W.2d 853. 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
13 
 
776.33 msl but raising the winter drawdown minimum to 775.50 msl 
instead of 775.00 msl. 
¶31 Shortly 
thereafter, 
the 
District 
filed 
a 
joint 
petition for a contested case hearing of the DNR's denial of the 
Petition. The DNR granted the request and then filed a hearing 
request with the Department of Administration, Division of 
Hearings and Appeals (DHA).13 
E. The Contested Case and Decision 
¶32 The ten-day contested case hearing on the DNR's 
proposed order commenced on March 29–30, 2006, in Jefferson, and 
continued in Madison at the DHA offices on April 3–5 and 10–14.  
During the Jefferson hearing, members of the public provided 
sworn testimony and statements on how the Petition would affect 
their community and personal interests, while representatives of 
the parties to the contested case provided expert testimony. 
¶33 As part of its pre-filed direct expert testimony, the 
DNR sought to show the adverse impact that the District's 
proposed water level increase would have on adjacent wetlands 
                                                 
13 Rock River-Koshkonong Association, Inc. (RRKA) and Lake 
Koshkonong Recreation Association, Inc. (LKRA) joined in the 
petition for a contested case hearing.  RRKA is comprised of 
more than 300 members, including riparian business owners on 
Lake Koshkonong and the Rock River.  LKRA is an association of 
approximately 38 individual and business members who rely on 
Lake Koshkonong and the Rock River for business, recreation, and 
tourism. 
The Intervenors in this case——Lake Koshkonong Wetland 
Association, 
Inc. 
and 
the 
Thiebeau 
Hunting 
Club 
(the 
Intervenors)——also were certified as parties to the contested 
case proceeding. 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
14 
 
and water quality in Lake Koshkonong and the Rock River.  One 
DNR expert testified in detail how raising the water levels of 
Lake Koshkonong would "result in secondary and cumulative 
adverse impacts to wetlands."  These adverse impacts included 
continued erosion of wetlands; loss of wildlife and fish 
habitat; 
loss 
of 
vegetation 
and 
floodplain 
forest; 
and 
eventually 
reduced 
recreational 
opportunities 
for 
hunters, 
fishermen, trappers, and birdwatchers.  Furthermore, while Lake 
Koshkonong has lost a great deal of wetlands over the years and 
will continue to lose wetlands, raising water levels in the lake 
as the District proposes would exacerbate the losses.  Other DNR 
experts echoed these conclusions.14  Overall, the DNR experts 
testified to the importance of making sure the proposed DNR 
water level order satisfied the wetland water quality standards 
in Wis. Admin. Code § NR 103. 
¶34 Expert 
testimony 
on 
behalf 
of 
the 
Intervenors 
concurred with the DNR testimony on adverse impacts to wetlands 
and wetland water quality if the District's proposed water level 
order were implemented. 
¶35  The 
Jefferson 
County 
Farm 
Drainage 
Board 
also 
presented testimony on the adverse impact of higher water levels 
on Lake Koshkonong: any increase in water levels would lead to 
backups in the drainage district upstream from the lake, causing 
lands to stay flooded longer and increase crop losses.  Dennis 
                                                 
14 The District and the DNR also devoted a significant 
amount of testimony to disputing the validity of water level 
modeling by the District. 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
15 
 
Kutz, an agricultural landowner in the drainage district, 
indicated in pre-filed direct testimony that his yield on corn 
could "be reduced downward from 180 to 100 bushels per acre at a 
cost of $200–$300 per acre.  Other farmers would likely have 
similar losses." 
¶36 The District presented evidence at the contested case 
hearing, through expert testimony, on modeling data to predict 
water levels under the Petition, along with the probable effect 
of the District's water level order on navigation, water 
quality, and fish and wildlife habitat. 
¶37 The District also presented evidence of economic 
impacts resulting from, and anticipating, lower water levels on 
the lake.  Land use planner and real estate analyst John 
Stockham testified that a reduction in historical water levels 
on Lake Koshkonong would have adverse effects on property values 
and commercial activity related to the lake.  Essentially, 
Stockham testified that lower water levels than those observed 
before the Indianford Dam was fully operational in 2002 would 
result in decreased waterfront usage; loss of the ability to use 
existing 
piers 
for 
boating, 
swimming, 
and 
other 
water 
activities; loss of access to shoreline for boats; and reduced 
areas of navigability.  Reduced usable water access would, over 
time, have an adverse impact on property values around Lake 
Koshkonong; this reduced value would be reflected in the slower 
rate of increase for Lake Koshkonong property values compared to 
"lakefront 
property 
values 
in 
general 
in 
south 
central 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
16 
 
Wisconsin."15  Stockham testified that lake-based businesses also 
would suffer losses from reduced water levels.  The most 
affected businesses would be lakefront marinas, taverns, and 
restaurants that depend on boaters and tourists for a large 
portion of their revenue.  Even businesses in nearby communities 
who cater to lake-related activity would suffer from water 
levels on Lake Koshkonong reduced from their historical levels.  
In addition, reduced water access and property values would 
result in a loss of tax base for local taxing jurisdictions.   
¶38 Dr. Russell Kashian, an economics professor at the 
University of Wisconsin-Whitewater, also provided testimony on 
behalf of the District on the economic impact of lowering a 
lake's water level.  Using various economic methodologies, 
Kashian concluded that a reduction in historical water levels on 
Lake Koshkonong would result in a negative economic impact in 
two areas: property values and a reduced rate of appreciation of 
those values, and economic activity in communities surrounding 
the lake. 
¶39 In regard to lake property values, Kashian posited 
that lower water levels mean a greater distance between the lake 
home and the shore, and that the increased distance would result 
                                                 
15 Testimony 
on 
behalf 
of 
the 
Intervenors 
by 
Linn 
Duesterbeck, 
a 
real 
estate 
appraiser, 
contradicted 
John 
Stockham's assertions on the reduced rate of property value 
increases around Lake Koshkonong since 2002.  Duesterbeck's 
property value testimony was later excluded by the ALJ, along 
with the testimony of John Stockham and Dr. Russell Kashian, as 
outside the scope of a Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) water level 
determination. 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
17 
 
in lower property value; Kashian also testified that property 
value is adversely affected by a decrease in shoreline length.  
The reduction in lake water levels, both real and perceived by 
potential property buyers, would lead to a softening of demand 
for lake property and a consequent reduction in prices, along 
with a slower appreciation in property value over time.  Kashian 
cited numerous studies on the economic impact of reduced lake 
water levels to support his conclusions.  Kashian concluded that 
the DNR's proposed water level order would endanger Lake 
Koshkonong property values.   
¶40 Finally, Kashian testified on the adverse effects that 
reduced lake water levels would have on economic activity in the 
local community.  Assuming a three-foot reduction in Lake 
Koshkonong water levels, Kashian testified that "real estate and 
service sector businesses would witness a decline of $9 million 
in gross sales that support an estimated 150 total jobs."  
Moreover, "local retail businesses would witness a decline of 
$5.25 million in gross retail sales that support an estimated 
200 total jobs." 
¶41 Public testimony on the commercial effects of adhering 
to the DNR's 1991 water level order echoed the District's expert 
testimony.  A campground and marina owner testified to the 
"huge" economic impact that lake-based tourism has on area 
business and property values, as well as the negative impact 
that lower water levels would have.  Several other business 
owners on Lake Koshkonong testified that current low water 
levels required the installation of piers of up to 300 feet in 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
18 
 
length in order to accommodate customers who access their 
businesses by boat. 
F. The Decision's Findings of Facts and Analysis 
¶42 On December 1, 2006, the ALJ, William S. Coleman, Jr., 
issued a meticulous, comprehensive Decision affirming the DNR's 
proposed order rejecting the Petition.  The Decision contained 
120 findings of fact,16 which, after laying out the history and 
statistics on Lake Koshkonong and the Indianford Dam, may be 
briefly summarized as follows: 
1. 
Historical Water Levels on Lake Koshkonong——Water 
levels rose from 1932 to 2003, and this was due in part to the 
defective Indianford Dam.  Consequently, summer water levels on 
the lake were above the DNR's target levels every year but two 
from 1965 to 2003. 
2. 
Wetlands——The high historical water levels on the lake 
have eroded shoreline wetlands around the lake.  The reduced 
frequency of low water conditions in the lake have contributed 
to this loss of wetland.  Other than the state-owned Koshkonong 
Wildlife Area, the findings of fact do not explicitly identify 
how much of the wetlands are publicly owned, or what portion of 
the wetlands are above the ordinary high water mark. 
3. 
Water Quality——Higher water levels have caused a 
"degraded 
turbid 
algae-dominant 
water 
condition" 
in 
Lake 
Koshkonong.  An increase in water levels would likely further 
                                                 
16 The District does not dispute any of the 120 findings of 
fact. 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
19 
 
degrade water quality in the lake.17  Higher water levels would 
lead to additional loss of wetlands, which would affect the lake 
system's ability to slow flood and storm waters, and "filter 
nutrients, sediments and other pollutants," such that more 
pollutants would be carried downstream. 
4. 
The Ordinary High Water Mark18 (OHWM)——The OHWM on Lake 
Koshkonong increased from 1979 to 2001, due in part to the 
diminished capacity of the Indianford Dam to properly regulate 
water levels.  The DNR considered 778.11 msl to be "a 
representative OHWM" for purposes of evaluating the Petition.  
The higher water levels under the Petition could result in a 
higher OHWM. 
5. 
Erosion Protection from Riprap Structures19——Higher 
water levels on the lake would likely overwhelm existing riprap 
structures that protect wetland shoreline.  These structures 
would more quickly degrade and result in expensive fortification 
of the structures.  In any event, the riparian wetlands would 
                                                 
17 According to the findings of fact, Lake Koshkonong is 
likely to remain in a degraded condition regardless of whether 
the DNR's proposed order or the Petition is adopted. 
18 "By ordinary high-water mark is meant the point on the 
bank or shore up to which the presence and action of the water 
is so continuous as to leave a distinct mark either by erosion, 
destruction 
of 
terrestrial 
vegetation, 
or 
other 
easily 
recognized characteristic."  Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 
Wis. 261, 272, 145 N.W. 816 (1914).   
19 Riprap is a "loose assemblage of broken stones erected in 
water or on soft ground as a foundation."  The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 1556 (3d ed. 1992).  Riprap 
is used to protect shorelines from water or ice erosion.   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
20 
 
not be protected from increased wave action and would continue 
to erode. 
6. 
Wildlife——Past and continued higher water levels would 
adversely impact habitats for herptiles and bird species.  
Continued loss of wetland would result in loss of wildlife and 
fish habitat in and around Lake Koshkonong. 
7. 
Winter Drawdown——The findings of fact contain numerous 
pros and cons of maintaining the winter drawdown of the lake 
levels (under the DNR's proposed order) and eliminating the 
winter drawdown under the Petition.  The findings generally 
point to adverse impacts on wetlands, wildlife, water quality, 
and riprap structures if the winter drawdown were eliminated. 
 
8. 
Agricultural Drainage——Higher water levels will cause 
backups in a drainage district upstream from Lake Koshkonong.  
Slower drainage would cause farmland to be flooded longer, 
resulting in delays in planting and smaller crop yields. 
 
9. 
Public Access——The shallow, sloping waters of Lake 
Koshkonong make it difficult for most recreational boats to 
utilize public boat ramps on the lake under either the DNR's 
proposed water level order or the District's proposed higher 
levels.  However, there are a number of boat access points along 
the Rock River near the lake that have sufficient depth for 
recreational boats.   
 
10. Riparian Access——Most riparian property owners favor 
raising the lake's water levels so that they may shorten their 
piers.  Boat lifts and shore stations also could be maintained 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
21 
 
closer to shore if the District's proposed higher water levels 
were implemented. 
 
11. Natural Scenic Beauty——Fuller "pool levels" are more 
aesthetically pleasing to riparian property owners than exposed 
lake beds.  However, some riparians value the beauty of the 
wetlands that would be lost with higher water levels. 
 
12. Navigability——Raising water levels on the lake would 
increase the surface area of the lake by up to 63 acres and 
mitigate existing navigational obstacles in the lake.20 
 
13. The Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) Standard——The findings of 
fact concluded with, "The net negative effects of the proposed 
higher water levels far outweigh the enhancements to navigation 
and access."  Thus,  
[a]llowing increased water levels as proposed by the 
District would be inconsistent with the interest of 
public rights in Lake Koshkonong and the Rock River, 
and would not serve to protect life, health or 
property.  Public safety may be marginally promoted 
with increased water levels, but the water levels 
specified in the DNR's 2005 order do not pose undue 
risks to public safety. 
¶43 The Decision noted that the DNR objected during the 
contested case hearing to admitting evidence related to the 
                                                 
20 No one appears to have challenged any of the ALJ's 
findings of fact.  We note, however, that the ALJ found that 
Lake Koshkonong has a surface area of approximately 10,460 
acres, after the water levels in Lake Koshkonong were lowered to 
conform to the DNR's 1991 order.  The figure 10,460 acres is 
identical to the figure used by the DNR in a 1971 Wisconsin 
Conservation 
Bulletin. 
 
Shoreland 
is 
Vulnerable, 
Wis. 
Conservation Bulletin, (DNR, Madison, Wis.), July-August 1971, 
at 22.   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
22 
 
effect of water levels on real estate values, business income, 
and 
public 
revenues. 
 
The 
Decision 
sustained 
the 
DNR's 
objections, citing Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. 
DNR, 115 Wis. 2d 381, 404, 340 N.W.2d 722 (1983), and asserting 
that "[s]econdary or indirect economic impacts of a water level 
determination do not bear on the statutory standard set forth in 
section 31.02(1)."  Therefore, the ALJ struck Stockham and 
Kashian's economic testimony on behalf of the District, along 
with all related exhibits, as secondary economic impacts outside 
the scope of the statute.21  The Decision did consider riparian 
access, which the ALJ said "comprehends at least one component 
of these asserted secondary impacts."  The Decision acknowledged 
that riparian owners' "diminished utility and enjoyment of their 
property [resulting from lower water levels] . . . doubtless 
reduces the value of that property to them." 
¶44 The Decision noted that the DNR was required to 
balance and accommodate conflicting interests when making a 
water level determination and that the DNR had done that here.  
Furthermore, the DNR "evaluated the proposed water level 
increase against the appropriate regulatory standards, including 
chapter NR 103, Wis. Admin. Code." 
                                                 
21 In a contested case hearing, a hearing examiner "shall 
not be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence.  The 
agency or hearing examiner shall admit all testimony having 
reasonable 
probative value, but shall exclude immaterial, 
irrelevant or unduly repetitious testimony or evidence that is 
inadmissible under s. 901.05."  Wis. Stat. § 227.45(1).   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
23 
 
¶45 Thus, the Decision closes with a conclusion of law 
that "the DNR's decision [to reject the District's proposed 
higher water levels] . . . is necessary to protect the public 
rights 
in 
navigable 
waters 
and 
reasonably 
balances 
and 
accommodates public and private rights, the promotion of safety, 
and the protection of life, health, and property." 
¶46 The DNR adopted the Decision as its own, by operation 
of Wis. Stat. § 227.46(3)(a) (2003–04) and Wis. Admin. Code § NR 
2.155(1) (Sept. 2004). 
G. The District's Appeal 
¶47 Following the Decision, the District petitioned for 
review by the Rock County Circuit Court under Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.53.  The District contended that the Decision erroneously 
interpreted "public rights in navigable waters" and the phrase 
"protect . . . property."  The District argued that the DNR 
improperly expanded its consideration of "public rights in 
navigable waters" to include private wetlands and that the DNR 
improperly considered wetland water quality standards in Wis. 
Admin. Code § NR 103, as promulgated under Wis. Stat. ch. 281.  
The District further argued that it was improper for the DNR to 
categorically exclude all evidence of economic effects on 
property in its Decision because, by doing so, it misinterpreted 
the 
mandate 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 31.02(1) 
to 
"protect . . . property."  However, the circuit court affirmed 
the Decision, concluding that the DNR's interpretation of the 
statutes was reasonable and that the Decision was supported by 
substantial evidence. 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
24 
 
¶48 The District appealed to the court of appeals, which 
certified the District's appeal to this court on the issue of 
"ambiguity" in Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) related to the phrase 
"protect . . . property."  This court denied the certification 
request.   
¶49 The court of appeals then issued an opinion affirming 
the 
DNR's 
Decision, 
this 
time 
holding 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 31.02(1), including its "protect . . . property" language, was 
"unambiguous."  Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist., 336 Wis. 2d 677, 
¶47.  First, the court of appeals reasoned that when the 
legislature wants the DNR to consider property values and 
economic effects in its decision-making, "it does so in clear, 
unambiguous language."  Id., ¶42 (citing statutes).  Second, the 
court of appeals concluded that if the DNR were required to 
consider economic factors when making a determination under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 31.02(1) 
to 
"protect . . . property," 
such 
an 
interpretation "would have no logical stopping point."  Id., 
¶43.  Finally, the court of appeals looked to this court's 
interpretation of similar statutory language in City of New 
Lisbon v. Harebo, 224 Wis. 66, 271 N.W. 659 (1937), for the 
proposition 
that 
protection 
of 
property 
is 
"limited 
to 
protection 
of 
real 
property 
from 
hydrologic 
events 
like 
flooding."  Id., ¶45. 
¶50 The court of appeals decision also held that the DNR's 
consideration of the impact of water levels on adjacent wetlands 
and § NR 103 water quality standards was reasonable.  The court 
of appeals determined these considerations to be consistent with 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
25 
 
"the very resources [the DNR] has been assigned to protect" and 
that the DNR is not restricted to considerations below the OHWM.  
Id., ¶¶52–53.  The court of appeals also concluded that the DNR 
has a responsibility to protect water quality standards in this 
state, and to disregard that duty when making a water level 
determination under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) would be absurd.  Id., 
¶56.   
¶51 The District petitioned this court for review, which 
we granted on February 23, 2012.   
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
 
¶52 This court normally provides a separate section on 
"standard of review" before proceeding to its legal analysis.  
In this case, the standard of review is itself an issue, namely, 
whether the court should give deference to the DNR's conclusions 
of law. 
 
¶53 When a party appeals to the court of appeals or seeks 
review in this court "from a circuit court order reviewing an 
agency decision," the appellate court reviews the decision of 
the agency, not the decision of the circuit court.  Lake Beulah 
Mgmt. Dist. v. DNR, 2011 WI 54, ¶25, 335 Wis. 2d 47, 799 
N.W.2d 73 (quoting Hilton ex rel. Pages Homeowners' Ass'n v. 
DNR, 2006 WI 84, ¶15, 293 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 166).   
 
¶54 In Hilton, the court examined the standard of review 
that should be applied to an ALJ decision that had been 
expressly 
adopted 
by 
the 
DNR 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.46(3)(a).  The court concluded that "because the DNR has 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
26 
 
expressly adopted the ALJ decision, the ALJ decision should be 
afforded the same deference afforded the agency."  Hilton, 293 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶14.   
 
¶55 In this case, the Decision contains 120 specific 
findings of fact.  The District does not challenge any of these 
findings.  If it did challenge any of the findings of fact, the 
court would apply a substantial evidence standard.  See id., ¶16 
(citing Borsellino v. DNR, 2000 WI App 27, ¶7, 232 Wis. 2d 430, 
606 N.W.2d 255).   
 
¶56 In this case, the Decision contains four conclusions 
of law grounded in the facts.  However, the District asserts 
that the DNR exceeded the scope of its authority under Wis. 
Stat. § 31.02(1) by focusing on the protection of public and 
private wetlands above the OHWM; misinterpreted the mandate to 
"protect . . . property" in § 31.02(1); and excluded relevant 
evidence that should have been considered under the statute.  
The District also asserts that the DNR improperly considered the 
standards in Wis. Admin. Code § NR 103 in making its water level 
determination under § 31.02(1).   
 
¶57 These assertions involve issues of agency procedure 
and agency interpretation of law that are treated separately as 
questions of law.   
¶58 Agency determinations involving questions of law, 
including 
interpretation and application of statutes, are 
reviewable by this court under Wis. Stat. § 227.57(5).  ABKA 
Ltd. P'ship v. DNR, 2002 WI 106, ¶30, 255 Wis. 2d 486, 648 
N.W.2d 854.  Section 227.57(5) provides that "[t]he court shall 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
27 
 
set aside or modify the agency action if it finds that the 
agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law." 
 
¶59 While statutory interpretation is normally a question 
of law determined independently by a court, a court may give an 
agency's interpretation of a statute great weight deference,22 or 
due weight deference,23 or no deference.24  Racine Harley-
Davidson, Inc. v. Wis. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 86, 
¶¶11, 19, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184.  See generally 
                                                 
22 Great weight deference is appropriately applied to an 
agency's legal conclusions where: 
(1) the agency was charged by the legislature 
with the duty of administering the statute; (2) the 
interpretation 
of 
the 
statute 
is 
one 
of 
long- 
standing; (3) the agency employed its expertise or 
specialized knowledge in forming the interpretation; 
and (4) the agency's interpretation will provide 
uniformity and consistency in the application of the 
statute. 
Hilton ex rel. Pages Homeowners' Ass'n v. DNR, 2006 WI 84, ¶15, 
293 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 166 (quoting Clean Wis., Inc. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n, 2005 WI 93, ¶39, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 N.W.2d 768) 
(brackets omitted).   
23 Due weight deference is applied when "the agency has some 
experience in an area, but has not developed the expertise which 
necessarily places it in a better position to make judgments 
regarding the interpretation of the statute than a court."  
Clean Wis., 282 Wis. 2d 250, ¶42 (quoting Hutson v. Wis. Pers. 
Comm'n, 2003 WI 97, ¶33, 263 Wis. 2d 612, 665 N.W.2d 212) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
24 As a general rule, a reviewing court accords an agency no 
deference when the agency has decided an issue of first 
impression, when an agency lacks experience or expertise in 
deciding a legal issue, or when an agency has taken inconsistent 
positions on a legal issue.  UFE, Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 
285, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996).  But there are additional reasons for 
not according deference, as noted infra in this opinion.   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
28 
 
Salvatore 
Massa, 
The 
Standards 
of 
Review 
for 
Agency 
Interpretations of Statutes in Wisconsin, 83 Marq. L. Rev. 597 
(2000).  Deference, however, "does not mean that the court 
accepts the agency interpretation without a critical eye.  The 
court itself must always interpret the statute to determine the 
reasonableness of the agency interpretation.  Only reasonable 
agency interpretations are given any deference."  Racine Harley-
Davidson, 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶15.   
 
¶60 Here the DNR is charged by the legislature with the 
duty of administering Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1), and it brought to 
its enforcement of the statute a great deal of expertise and 
specialized knowledge.  However, the DNR's interpretation of the 
statute is not long-standing with respect to some of the issues 
before this court, and, as will be seen, its interpretation is 
not likely to be uniform and consistent in its application 
because of the diverse factual circumstances that will be 
presented.  Thus, the DNR's conclusions of law in statutory 
interpretation are not entitled to great weight deference.   
¶61 Another factor works against deference.  "The nature 
and scope of an agency's powers are issues of statutory 
interpretation."  Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. 
DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶6, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612 (citing GTE 
N., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 176 Wis. 2d 559, 564, 500 
N.W.2d 284 (1993)).  Courts are not bound by an agency's 
decision concerning the scope of its own power.  Wis. Citizens 
Concerned, 270 Wis. 2d 318, ¶11; Wis.'s Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 81 Wis. 2d 344, 351, 260 N.W.2d 712 (1978); 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
29 
 
Big Foot Country Club v. DOR, 70 Wis. 2d 871, 875, 235 
N.W.2d 696 (1975); Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n, 8 Wis. 2d 582, 592, 99 N.W.2d 821 (1959) (citing cases).   
¶62 In this case, the DNR is at odds with the District 
over the scope of the agency's power.  As will be seen, the DNR 
has given new interpretations to both the Wisconsin Constitution 
(Article IX, Section 1) and Wisconsin Statutes, disregarded some 
past decisions of this court, and acted inconsistently with some 
of its own prior positions.  Under these circumstances, we 
afford no deference to the DNR's interpretation and application 
of Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) and consider the legal issues presented 
de novo.25   
 
¶63 The DNR concluded that the economic impacts of lower 
water levels on residential and business property are not 
relevant in making a water level determination, despite language 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 31.02(1) 
authorizing 
the 
DNR 
to 
                                                 
25 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.57(8) provides in part: 
The court shall reverse or remand the case to the 
agency if it finds that the agency's exercise of 
discretion 
is 
outside 
the 
range 
of 
discretion 
delegated to the agency by law; is inconsistent with 
an agency rule, an officially stated agency policy or 
a prior agency practice, if deviation therefrom is not 
explained to the satisfaction of the court by the 
agency; 
or 
is 
otherwise 
in 
violation 
of 
a 
constitutional or statutory provision . . . . 
This statute implicates the scope of the DNR's authority as well 
as the agency's past decisions and policy.  It provides 
additional authority for not affording deference to the DNR in 
this matter. 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
30 
 
"protect . . . property."  As will be discussed later in this 
opinion, categorically excluding these economic factors from 
consideration in a water level determination under § 31.02(1) is 
not reasonable.  Cf. Racine Harley-Davidson, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 
¶15 (stating that only reasonable agency interpretations receive 
deference).   
 
¶64 Thus, 
we 
afford 
no 
deference 
to 
the 
DNR's 
interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) in this 
case. 
B. The DNR'S Consideration of Impacts on Wetlands 
Adjacent to Navigable Waters  
 
¶65 The District contends that the DNR, in making a water 
level determination under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) "in the interest 
of public rights in navigable waters," exceeded its authority 
when it considered impacts on private wetlands adjacent to Lake 
Koshkonong that are above the OHWM.  The District is also 
concerned about the application of the public trust doctrine to 
any wetlands that are not navigable in fact unless those 
wetlands are below the OHWM.  The District asserts that the 
DNR's position significantly expands the scope of the DNR's 
public trust jurisdiction. 
 
¶66 The 
Decision 
explains 
the 
decision-maker's 
understanding of the applicable law.  In his Discussion section, 
the ALJ wrote: 
"Public rights" in the state's public trust 
navigable waters extend beyond navigation relating to 
commerce, and include the following: "sailing, rowing, 
canoeing, bathing, fishing, hunting, skating, and 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
31 
 
other public purposes," Nekoosa Edwards Paper Co. v. 
Railroad Commission, 201 Wis. 40, 228 N.W. 144, 147 
(1929); right to clean, unpolluted water, Reuter v. 
DNR, 
43 
Wis. 2d 272, 
168 
N.W.2d 860 
(1969); 
consideration of wetlands and near shore lands, Just 
v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 
(1972); wildlife habitat, and preservation of scenic 
beauty, Village of Menomonee Falls v. DNR, 140 
Wis. 2d 579, 412 N.W.2d 505 (Ct. App. 1987). 
 
¶67 This paragraph cites the public trust doctrine as 
authority for the DNR to regulate wetlands and near shorelands, 
wildlife habitat, and scenic beauty.   
 
¶68 The DNR's brief to this court confirms this position: 
 
 
1. 
"Wetlands in and adjacent to navigable waters 
have long been included in public rights to navigable waters 
because of their special relationship to navigable waters." 
 
 
2. 
"[P]ublic rights in wetlands 'adjacent to or near 
navigable waters' are public rights in, not beyond, navigable 
waters." 
 
 
3. 
"If petitioners were correct that the public 
trust 
does 
not 
extend 
to 
privately 
owned 
non-navigable 
lands . . . then the shoreland zoning law fails, too." 
 
 
4. 
"[P]ublic rights embrace all wetlands in or 
adjacent to navigable waters, privately or publicly owned, above 
or below the OHWM." 
 
¶69 In evaluating the District's concerns about these 
claims, it is necessary to examine the constitutional and 
statutory directives associated with public rights in navigable 
waters and the wetlands adjacent to them, along with this 
court's interpretation of these directives.   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
32 
 
 
¶70 Wisconsin has a long tradition of "protect[ing] our 
valuable water resources."  Lake Beulah, 335 Wis. 2d 47, ¶31.  
The state relies on several sources of authority to achieve this 
objective.   
¶71 Article IX, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
commands that the state hold navigable waters in trust for the 
public: 
The state shall have concurrent jurisdiction on 
all rivers and lakes bordering on this state so far as 
such rivers or lakes shall form a common boundary to 
the state and any other state or territory now or 
hereafter to be formed, and bounded by the same; and 
the river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading 
into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the 
carrying places between the same, shall be common 
highways and forever free, as well to the inhabitants 
of the state as to the citizens of the United States, 
without any tax, impost or duty therefor. 
Wis. Const. art. IX, § 1. 
 
¶72 This court has long held that the public trust in 
navigable waters "should be interpreted in the broad and 
beneficent spirit that gave rise to it in order that the people 
may fully enjoy the intended benefits."  Diana Shooting Club v. 
Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 271, 145 N.W. 816 (1914); Lake Beulah, 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
33 
 
335 Wis. 2d 47, ¶31.26  Broadly interpreting the public trust has 
resulted 
in 
recognition 
of 
more 
than 
just 
commercial 
navigability 
rights. 
 
Protection 
now 
extends 
to 
"purely 
recreational purposes such as boating, swimming, fishing, 
hunting, . . . and . . . preserv[ing] 
scenic 
beauty." 
 
R.W. 
Docks & Slips v. State, 2001 WI 73, ¶19, 244 Wis. 2d 497, 628 
N.W.2d 781 (citing State v. Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d 454, 457, 338 
N.W.2d 492 (1983)).   
¶73 Because the public trust doctrine is rooted in Article 
IX, Section 1, however, it is important to understand its 
history and its core principles so that it is properly 
interpreted.  There is no better place to start than Justice 
George Currie's scholarly analysis of the doctrine in Muench v. 
Public Service Commission, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952): 
After 
the 
Revolutionary 
War, 
the 
original 
thirteen states were impoverished and were confronted 
with the problem of paying the debts created by the 
war.  States without western lands demanded that 
Virginia, and other states claiming such lands to the 
west, should cede the same to the Confederation to be 
sold to pay such debts.  In 1783 the Virginia 
legislature authorized the ceding of the Northwest 
                                                 
26 The legislature is "bound by its duty to protect the 
navigable waters of the state for the citizens' benefit" and "to 
evaluate," before acting to affect the water, "all potential 
benefits that can be derived from water."  Gabe Johnson-Karp, 
That the Waters Shall be Forever Free: Navigating Wisconsin's 
Obligations Under the Public Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes 
Compact, 94 Marq. L. Rev. 415, 422 & n.37 (2010).  For a general 
discussion of the evolution of the public trust doctrine in 
Wisconsin, see Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, The Evolution of the 
Public Trust Doctrine and the Degradation of Trust Resources: 
Courts, Trustees and Political Power in Wisconsin, 27 Ecology 
L.Q. 135 (2000).   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
34 
 
Territory to the Confederation, and the actual deed of 
conveyance was executed March 1, 1784.  This cession 
was made upon two conditions: (1) The new states to be 
admitted as members of the Federal Union were to have 
the same rights to sovereignty as the original states; 
and 
(2) 
the 
navigable 
waters 
flowing 
into 
the 
Mississippi and the St. Lawrence rivers, and the 
carrying places between them, were to be forever free 
public highways.  These conditions were incorporated 
into the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which set up the 
machinery 
for 
the 
government 
of 
the 
Northwest 
Territory. 
Sec. 1, art. IX of the Wisconsin constitution, 
adopted by the territorial convention on February 17, 
1848, and approved by the act of congress admitting 
Wisconsin into the Union, incorporated verbatim the 
wording of the Northwest Ordinance with respect to 
navigable waters . . . .  
Muench, 261 Wis. at 499. 
 
¶74 Justice Currie then explained that a number of 
questions rise naturally from the article: (1) What are 
"navigable waters"?  (2) Who owns the "land" under "navigable 
waters"?  (3) What are the public rights in navigable streams 
apart from navigation for commercial purposes?  (4) What are the 
geographic limits of the public trust in navigable waters?  Id. 
at 500–08.   
 
¶75 The answers to these questions, in Muench and other 
cases, are interrelated, and they help to explain the District's 
concern with the DNR's position.   
1. Questions Raised by the Public Trust Doctrine 
 
¶76 The public trust doctrine is premised upon the 
existence of "navigable waters."  The test of navigability 
discussed in Olson v. Merrill, 42 Wis. 203, 212 (1877), whether 
a stream has the capacity to float logs to market (at least part 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
35 
 
of the year), has long since been replaced by the standard of 
"navigable in fact for any purpose."27  Muench, 261 Wis. at 505–
06.   
[S]ince 1911 it is no longer necessary in determining 
navigability of streams to establish a past history of 
floating 
of 
logs, 
or 
other 
use 
of 
commercial 
transportation, because any stream is "navigable in 
fact" which is capable of floating any boat, skiff, or 
canoe, of the shallowest draft used for recreational 
purposes.   
Id. at 506; see also Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d at 459; DeGayner & Co. 
v. DNR, 70 Wis. 2d 936, 946–47, 236 N.W.2d 217 (1975).   
 
¶77 The DNR's position seeks to extend its public trust 
jurisdiction28 beyond navigable waters to non-navigable waters 
and land.  Wetlands are often not "navigable in fact."  Non-
navigable land is by definition not navigable and may not be 
marshy or "wet."  Eliminating the element of "navigability" from 
the public trust doctrine would remove one of the prerequisites 
for 
the 
DNR's 
constitutional 
basis 
for 
regulating 
and 
                                                 
27 Justice Currie cites Olson v. Merrill, 42 Wis. 203, 212 
(1877), as one of the early cases that established the "saw-log" 
test.  Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 500, 53 
N.W.2d 514 (1952).  The "saw-log" test first appears in Whisler 
v. Wilkinson, 22 Wis. 546 (*572), 549 (*576) (1868).   
28 In furtherance of the state's public trust obligations, 
"the legislature has delegated substantial authority over water 
management matters to the DNR."  Wis.'s Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. 
DNR, 85 Wis. 2d 518, 527, 271 N.W.2d 69 (1978); see also ABKA 
Ltd. P'ship v. DNR, 2002 WI 106, ¶12, 255 Wis. 2d 486, 648 
N.W.2d 854 (noting that the "legislature has delegated to the 
DNR 
broad 
authority 
to 
regulate 
under 
the 
public 
trust 
doctrine").   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
36 
 
controlling water and land.29  Applying the public trust doctrine 
to non-navigable land above the OHWM would eliminate the 
rationale for the doctrine.  The ramifications for private 
property owners could be very significant. 
 
¶78 The public trust doctrine vests the ownership of land 
under lakes——i.e., lake beds——in the state.  By contrast, the 
public trust doctrine in Wisconsin gives riparian owners along 
navigable streams a qualified title in the stream beds to the 
center of the stream, while the state holds the navigable waters 
in trust for the public.  In reality, the state effectively 
                                                 
29 This court has rejected theories that attempt to extend 
the public trust doctrine beyond its historical limitations.  
For instance, in DeGayner & Co. v. DNR, 70 Wis. 2d 936, 236 
N.W.2d 217 (1975), the court reviewed the issue of whether Five 
Mile Creek, a tributary of the Namekagon River in Bayfield 
County, was navigable in fact, thereby requiring a permit to 
construct a dam to create an artificial lake.  Id. at 938–39.  
While the court determined that the creek was navigable in fact, 
it rejected a theory offered by an amicus that a stream should 
be considered "as a navigable water [irrespective of any other 
finding], because it is a tributary of a natural and valuable 
navigable resource, the Namekagon river."  Id. at 948.  The 
DeGayner court continued:   
There is evidence to show that the flow of spring 
water from Five Mile Creek is important in maintaining 
the 
fish 
life 
and 
the 
water 
quality 
of 
the 
Namekagon . . . .  [Nonetheless, the] test, proposed 
by the amicus . . . , has not been recognized by the 
statutes or by the common law; and, as the trial judge 
pointed out, that test, in its simplistic form, can be 
carried to ridiculous extremes, for it would mean that 
all tributaries, since they eventually run into some 
navigable body of water, must be held navigable.   
Id.   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
37 
 
controls the land under navigable streams and rivers without 
actually owning it. 
 
¶79 In Muench, the court observed: 
The United States [S]upreme [C]ourt in Barney v. 
Keokuk (1876), 94 U.S. 324, 24 L. Ed. 224, declared 
that the individual states have the right to determine 
for themselves the ownership of land under navigable 
waters.  At an early date in its history the Wisconsin 
court put itself on record as favoring the trust 
doctrine, that the state holds the beds underlying 
navigable waters in trust for all of its citizens, 
subject only to the qualification that a riparian 
owner on the bank of a navigable stream has a 
qualified title in the stream bed to the center 
thereof. See the discussion of this subject in 
McLennan v. Prentice (1893), 85 Wis. 427, 443-445, 55 
N.W. 764. 
Muench, 261 Wis. at 501–02.   
 
¶80 Muench quotes two sentences from Illinois Steel Co. v. 
Bilot:   
The United States never had title, in the 
Northwest Territory out of which this state was 
carved, to the beds of lakes, ponds, and navigable 
rivers, except in trust for public purposes; and its 
trust in that regard was transferred to the state, and 
must there continue forever, so far as necessary to 
the 
enjoyment 
thereof 
by 
the 
people 
of 
this 
commonwealth.  Whatever concession the state may make 
without violating the essentials of the trust, it has 
been 
held, 
can 
properly 
be 
made 
to 
riparian 
proprietors. 
Id. at 502 (quoting Ill. Steel Co. v. Bilot, 109 Wis. 418, 426, 
84 N.W. 855 (1901)).   
¶81 The Bilot case went on to say:   
Under that [concession to riparian proprietors], by 
long-established judicial policy, which has become a 
rule of property, a qualified title to submerged lands 
of rivers navigable in fact has been conceded to the 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
38 
 
owners of the shores.  Otherwise the title to lands 
under all public waters is in the state, and it is 
powerless to change it. . . .  Hence we must presume 
from the evidence that the title to the land in 
dispute is where the evidence tends to show it is.  We 
should say in passing that the term "qualified title" 
as above used refers to that interest in the beds of 
navigable 
streams 
which 
has 
passed 
to 
private 
ownership according to the uniform holdings of this 
court,——a full title, subject to the public rights 
which were incident to the lands forming such beds at 
the time of the creation of the trust above mentioned.  
No private ownership has been conceded which displaces 
or materially affects such public rights.  As to them 
the state has not abdicated and cannot abdicate its 
trust. 
Bilot, 109 Wis. at 426 (emphasis added).   
¶82 The state's ownership of lake beds was confirmed in 
State 
v. 
McDonald 
Lumber 
Co., 
18 
Wis. 2d 173, 
176, 
118 
N.W.2d 152 (1962), Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. 
DNR, 85 Wis. 2d 518, 526, 271 N.W.2d 69 (1978), and State v. 
Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d 91, 101–02, 408 N.W.2d 337 (1987).  The 
rule is different with respect to the beds under streams30 in 
part because streams can change course, streams can become 
unnavigable over time, and navigable streams can be very narrow 
and shallow, so that state ownership of stream beds could be 
problematic and impractical. 
¶83 Writing in Diana Shooting Club, Justice Vinje observed 
that "[i]t would no doubt have been more logical to hold, as 
English 
courts 
do, 
that 
private 
ownership 
ends 
where 
                                                 
30 "In some of the states embraced within the Northwest 
territory the title to the bed of navigable streams remained in 
the state.  In Wisconsin it is held to be in the riparian 
owners."  Diana Shooting Club, 156 Wis. at 268.   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
39 
 
navigability begins."  Diana Shooting Club, 156 Wis. at 269.  
But he added that,  
there is nothing inconsistent in the doctrine of 
private ownership of beds of navigable streams subject 
to all the burdens of navigation and the incidents 
thereof.  As long as the state secures to the people 
all the rights they would be entitled to if [the 
state] owned the beds of navigable rivers, it fulfills 
the trust imposed upon it by the organic law which 
declares that all navigable waters shall be forever 
free.   
Id.   
 
¶84 Contemplating the question of ownership is important 
because the public trust doctrine implicates state ownership or 
virtual state ownership——by virtue of its trust responsibility——
of land under navigable waters.  If the public trust were 
extended to cover wetlands that are not navigable, it would 
create significant questions about ownership of and trespass on 
private land, and it would be difficult to cabin expansion of 
the state's new constitutionally based jurisdiction over private 
land.31   
¶85 In its discussion of public trust, the DNR points 
specifically to M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Town of Somers, 
141 Wis. 2d 271, 288, 414 N.W.2d 824 (1987), where this court 
                                                 
31 Virtual state ownership of navigable waters and the land 
beneath navigable waters——under the public trust doctrine——does 
not implicate questions of eminent domain.  The State has no 
need to take what it already "owns."  However, geographic 
expansion of the public trust beyond the boundaries of the OHWM 
of navigable waters would inevitably raise a slew of new 
questions about just compensation.  This has never been a part 
of public trust jurisprudence.   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
40 
 
stated that a parcel of private wetland located "partly within 
and partly outside a shoreland area should be treated as if the 
entire wetland was located within a shoreland area."  To apply 
this reasoning to the scope of the public trust doctrine would 
not represent a logical application of the doctrine. 
 
¶86 There is no constitutional foundation for public trust 
jurisdiction over land, including non-navigable wetlands, that 
is not below the OHWM of a navigable lake or stream.  Applying 
the state's police power to land above or beyond the OHWM of 
navigable waters——to protect the public interest in navigable 
waters——is different from asserting public trust jurisdiction 
over non-navigable land and water.   
¶87 The public trust doctrine entails public rights in 
navigable waters, including non-commercial "sailing, rowing, 
canoeing, bathing, fishing, hunting, skating, and other public 
purposes."  Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co., 201 Wis. at 47.  The 
state's public trust duty "requires the state not only to 
promote navigation but also to protect and preserve its waters 
for fishing, hunting, recreation, and scenic beauty."  Wis.'s 
Envtl. Decade, 85 Wis. 2d at 526 (emphasis added).  The court 
cited Muench to support scenic beauty. 
¶88 Applying the "scenic beauty" referenced in Muench and 
Wisconsin's Environmental Decade to this case takes the concept 
beyond its original purpose to protect and preserve navigable 
"waters."  In Muench, the court noted the passage of Chapter 
523, Laws of 1929, which amended Wis. Stat. § 31.06(3) "so as to 
provide that the enjoyment of scenic beauty is a public right to 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
41 
 
be considered by the Public Service Commission in making 
findings as to whether a permit for a proposed dam shall be 
issued."  Muench, 261 Wis. at 508.32  See also DeGayner, 70 
Wis. 2d at 949.   
¶89 Considering 
scenic 
beauty 
in 
relation 
to 
the 
construction of a dam in navigable waters is different from 
claiming public rights under the public trust doctrine to the 
scenic beauty of non-navigable shoreland.  Yet, the DNR has 
taken the position that the public trust doctrine protects a 
public right to "scenic beauty (which on its face extends to the 
shore above the OHWM)." 
¶90 Article IX, Section 1, does not vest the state with 
constitutional trust powers to "protect" scenic beauty by 
regulating non-navigable land bordering lakes and rivers.  As 
will be noted, the state may have statutory authority to weigh 
in on scenic beauty beyond its public trust jurisdiction, but 
giving the state constitutional trust power to regulate "scenic 
beauty" would arguably give the state authority to regulate any 
private land that could be seen from navigable waters.   
                                                 
32 In Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 
(1972), the state correctly argued in its brief to this court 
that the public trust doctrine requires the legislature to 
preserve the trust in navigable waters: "The carrying out of 
that duty requires not only a promotion of navigation . . . but 
the protection and preservation of the incidents to navigation 
such as hunting, fishing, recreation, and scenic beauty, as they 
are defined in Muench v. Public Service Comm[ission] (1952), 261 
Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, 55 N.W.2d 40."  (Emphasis added.)   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
42 
 
¶91 Public trust jurisdiction has always been confined to 
a limited geographic area.  In Diana Shooting Club, the court 
said:  
Hunting on navigable waters is lawful when it is 
confined strictly to such waters while they are in a 
navigable 
stage, 
and 
between 
the 
boundaries 
of 
ordinary high-water marks.  When so confined it is 
immaterial what the character of the stream or water 
is.  It may be deep or shallow, clear or covered with 
aquatic vegetation.  By ordinary high-water mark is 
meant the point on the bank or shore up to which the 
presence and action of the water is so continuous as 
to 
leave 
a 
distinct 
mark 
either 
by 
erosion, 
destruction of terrestrial vegetation, or other easily 
recognized characteristic.  Lawrence v. Am. W[riting] 
P[aper] Co., 144 Wis. 556, 562, 128 N.W. 440 [(1910)].  
And where the bank or shore at any particular place is 
of such a character that it is impossible or difficult 
to ascertain where the point of ordinary high-water 
mark is, recourse may be had to other places on the 
bank or shore of the same stream or lake to determine 
whether a given stage of water is above or below 
ordinary high-water mark. 
Diana Shooting Club, 156 Wis. at 272; see also Bilot, 109 
Wis. at 425.   
 
¶92 The Diana Shooting Club holding was reaffirmed in 
Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d at 104, where the court stated that "Lake 
Superior is navigable and if the non-navigable site is a part of 
the lake, then the land below the OHWM is held in trust for the 
public."  (Emphasis added.).  See also McDonald Lumber Co., 18 
Wis. 2d at 176–77; Houslet v. DNR, 110 Wis. 2d 280, 286, 329 
N.W.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1982) ("[T]he OHWM marks the boundary 
between lake bed titled in the state, which is subject to state 
regulation in the public interest, and property titled in 
private owners.").   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
43 
 
 
¶93 The limitation thus stated in the cases is clearly 
inconsistent with the interpretation of the public trust 
doctrine espoused by the DNR.   
 
¶94 In sum, we believe the District has raised legitimate 
concerns about the DNR's reliance upon the public trust doctrine 
as authority for some of its regulation in this case. 
2. Police Power as a Basis for Protecting Water Resources 
 
¶95 This review of the constitutionally based public trust 
doctrine does not disarm the DNR in protecting Wisconsin's 
valuable water resources.  For instance, the DNR has broad 
statutory authority grounded in the state's police power to 
protect wetlands and other water resources.  See Just, 56 
Wis. 2d at 10–11.  This police power is sometimes buttressed by 
requirements imposed by federal law.  Moreover, the agency has 
explicit statutory authority in this case to consider the impact 
of the water levels of Lake Koshkonong on public and private 
wetlands adjacent to the lake, Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1), because it 
has police power authority to "protect . . . property."   
 
¶96 The Just case is a textbook example of using the 
state's 
police 
power 
to 
support 
legislation 
"to 
protect 
navigable waters and the public rights therein from the 
degradation and deterioration which results from uncontrolled 
use and development of shorelands."  Id. at 10.  The Wisconsin 
Legislature approved the Water Quality Act of 1965 by Chapter 
614, Laws of 1965.  The Act authorized the passage of shoreland 
zoning ordinances by counties, subject to certain requirements.  
Marinette County passed such an ordinance.  It later prosecuted 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
44 
 
Ronald Just for filling in wetlands on his shoreland property 
without a required permit.  Id. at 14.   
¶97 When the case reached the supreme court, the court 
explained that the real issue was whether "the conservancy 
district provisions and the wetlands-filling restrictions are 
unconstitutional because they amount to a constructive taking of 
the Justs' land without compensation."  Id. 
¶98 Marinette County and the state argued that the 
contested provisions constituted "a proper exercise of the 
police power of the state and do not so severely limit the use 
or depreciate the value of the land as to constitute a taking 
without compensation."  Id.  The state's principal argument in 
its brief had been that "[t]he Marinette County Shoreland Zoning 
Ordinance Is A Valid Police Power Regulation."  The state 
explained that the purpose of the ordinance was not intended to 
"preserve wetlands in their natural state.  The basic purpose of 
the ordinance is the protection of navigable waters, and the 
public rights therein, from the degradation and deterioration 
which results from the uncontrolled use and development of 
shorelands."  The state said:   
It has long been the law in Wisconsin that laws 
and regulations to prevent pollution and protect the 
waters of the state from degradation are valid police 
power enactments. . . .  The basis for such police 
power regulation is the legislature's duty to promote 
the general health, safety and welfare and to protect 
and preserve the public trust in navigable waters of 
the State of Wisconsin.  
 . . . .  
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
45 
 
The ordinance should . . . be upheld as a valid police 
power regulation.   
The court then responded in the Just opinion as follows: 
The protection of public rights may be accomplished by 
the exercise of the police power unless the damage to 
the property owner is too great and amounts to a 
confiscation.  The securing or taking of a benefit not 
presently enjoyed by the public for its use is 
obtained by the government through its power of 
eminent domain.  The distinction between the exercise 
of the police power and condemnation has been said to 
be a matter of degree of damage to the property owner.  
In the valid exercise of the police power reasonably 
restricting the use of property, the damage suffered 
by the owner is said to be incidental.  However, where 
the restriction is so great the landowner ought not to 
bear 
such 
a 
burden 
for 
the 
public 
good, 
the 
restriction has been held to be a constructive taking 
even though the actual use or forbidden use has not 
been transferred to the government so as to be a 
taking in the traditional sense. 
Id. at 15. 
 
¶99 The court's emphasis on the state's police power is 
evident in the following passages: 
 
This case causes us to re-examine the concepts of 
public benefit in contrast to public harm and the 
scope of an owner's right to use of his property.  In 
the instant case we have a restriction on the use of a 
citizen['s] property, not to secure a benefit for the 
public, but to prevent a harm from the change in the 
natural character of the citizens' property. . . .  
What makes this case different from most condemnation 
or police power zoning cases is the interrelationship 
of 
the 
wetlands, 
the 
swamps 
and 
the 
natural 
environment of shorelands to the purity of the water 
and to such natural resources as navigation, fishing, 
and scenic beauty.  Swamps and wetlands were once 
considered 
wasteland, 
undesirable, 
and 
not 
picturesque. 
 
But 
as 
the 
people 
became 
more 
sophisticated, 
an 
appreciation 
was 
acquired 
that 
swamps and wetlands serve a vital role in nature, are 
part of the balance of nature and are essential to the 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
46 
 
purity of the water in our lakes and streams.  Swamps 
and wetlands are a necessary part of the ecological 
creation and now, even to the uninitiated, possess 
their own beauty in nature. 
The exercise of the police power in zoning must be 
reasonable and we think it is not an unreasonable 
exercise of that power to prevent harm to public 
rights [in navigable waters] by limiting the use of 
private property to its natural uses. 
 
. . . .  
 
Wisconsin has long held that laws and regulations 
to prevent pollution and to protect the waters of this 
state 
from 
degradation 
are 
valid 
police-power 
enactments. 
Id. at 16-18.33 
 
¶100 If there is any question that the court was not 
relying on the public trust doctrine to sustain the shoreland 
zoning ordinance and its authorizing legislation, the court 
noted that the Marinette County ordinance applied to "lands 
within 1,000 feet of the normal high-water elevation of 
navigable lakes, ponds, or flowages and 300 feet from a 
navigable river or stream."  Id. at 10.  These dimensions far 
exceed the geographic limitations of public trust jurisdiction.  
It should be obvious that the state does not have constitutional 
public trust jurisdiction to regulate land a distance of more 
than three football fields away from a navigable lake or pond.   
                                                 
33 "In Just we upheld, as a valid exercise of the police 
power, Marinette County's shoreland zoning ordinance against a 
challenge that the ordinance amounted to a constructive taking 
of the Just[s'] land without compensation."  M&I Marshall & 
Ilsley Bank v. Town of Somers, 141 Wis. 2d 271, 286, 414 
N.W.2d 824 (1987) (emphasis added).   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
47 
 
 
¶101 The police power is potent, and legislation grounded 
in the state's police power is presumed constitutional and will 
be sustained unless it is deemed unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Nonetheless, as Just makes clear, the 
distinction between the DNR's constitutionally based public 
trust authority and the DNR's police power-based statutory 
authority is that the latter is subject to constitutional and 
statutory protections afforded to property, may be modified from 
time to time by the legislature, and requires some balancing of 
competing interests in enforcement. 
 
¶102 Wisconsin Stat. § 31.02(1) also makes a distinction 
between the DNR's public trust authority and its police power 
authority.  Only part of Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) embodies the 
public trust doctrine.  See Wis. Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n, 5 Wis. 2d 167, 174, 92 N.W.2d 241 (1958) (stating that 
language 
in 
§ 31.02 
"promot[ing] 
safety . . . and . . . protect[ing] 
property" 
"involve[s] 
subjects covered by the police power of the state").   
 
¶103 If the statute read only that the department "in the 
interest of public rights in navigable waters," may regulate and 
control the level and flow of water in all navigable waters, the 
statute would be seen as a direct enforcement mechanism for the 
public trust in navigable waters.  But the statute does more.  
It 
contains 
a 
disjunctive 
element 
giving 
the 
department 
authority to regulate and control the flow of water in all 
navigable waters "to promote safety and protect life, health and 
property."  Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1).  Because the quoted language 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
48 
 
follows the key word "or," the department is given distinct and 
different authority to consider interests affected by the level 
of the "navigable waters." 
3. The History of Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) and Application 
 
¶104 Wisconsin Stat. § 31.02(1) originated in Section 3, 
Chapter 380, Laws of 1915.  The "or" between the words "the 
interest of public rights in navigable waters" and the words "to 
promote safety and protect life, health and property" was 
present in the beginning in relation to the power to control 
water levels.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 69m., § 1596——2.1. (1915) 
(created by Section 3 of Chapter 380, Laws of 1915). 
 
¶105 By contrast, Wis. Stat. ch. 69m., § 1596——7.3. (1915), 
created by the same section of ch. 380, directs the Railroad 
Commission to consider whether "the construction, operation or 
maintenance of the proposed dam will not materially obstruct 
existing navigation or violate other public rights and will not 
endanger life, health or property."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
¶106 Both provisions distinguish "public rights" from other 
interests, and those other interests need not be in or part of 
navigable waters.  The section relating to the water level 
regulations appears to give the Railroad Commission some 
discretion about what it will consider; the other section 
requires consideration of multiple factors before permitting 
construction of a dam. 
 
¶107 Clearly, both sections empower the Railroad Commission 
to consider water level effects on property.  Flooding was an 
obvious concern.  The early statutes contain frequent references 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
49 
 
to flooding caused by dams.  We see no reason, however, why 
"property" 
would 
not 
include 
property 
rights 
generally, 
particularly riparian rights under common law. 
 
¶108 The "bundle of rights conferred upon a property owner 
by virtue of his contiguity to a body of water, whether a lake 
or stream, are referred to as riparian rights."  Mayer v. 
Grueber, 29 Wis. 2d 168, 174, 138 N.W.2d 197 (1965).  "It is 
clear in Wisconsin that the mere fact that one owns property 
abutting a natural body of water presumptively confers certain 
rights."  Id.; see also Stoesser v. Shore Drive P'ship, 172 
Wis. 2d 660, 667, 494 N.W.2d 204 (1993).  We see no evidence 
that the legislature in 1915 intended to exclude riparian rights 
from the consideration of property in Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1). 
 
¶109 Property abutting a natural body of water includes 
wetlands, which make up 12.4 miles of Lake Koshkonong's 
shoreline.  The District acknowledges that "privately owned 
wetlands are entitled to consideration as 'property' to be 
protected in establishing a water level order."  There can be no 
dispute that the DNR can consider water level impact on all 
adjacent property under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1). 
 
¶110 No property owner's riparian rights are absolute.  
They are balanced against the rights of other riparians and the 
public, particularly if they impinge upon public rights in 
navigable waters.  But the rights of all riparians must be 
considered in a water level determination.  The DNR may 
emphasize 
some 
rights 
over 
others 
in 
its 
water 
level 
determinations, and its exercise of discretion will normally be 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
50 
 
upheld so long as it considers all property rights and so long 
as it does not accord some non-navigable land or water above the 
OHWM a constitutional preference as trust land over other 
property. 
C. Application of Water Quality Standards 
¶111 We next turn to the District's contention that 
applying wetland water quality standards in a Wis. Stat. 
§ 31.02(1) water level determination, specifically water quality 
standards in Wis. Admin. Code § NR 103,34 is expressly prohibited 
by Wis. Stat. § 281.92.   
¶112 The District asserts that the legislature delegated 
rule-making authority to the DNR in Chapter 614, Laws of 1965.  
Chapter 614 extensively revised then-Wis. Stat. ch. 144 of the 
statutes, giving what is now the DNR a directive to "adopt rules 
setting standards of water quality to be applicable to the 
waters of the state, recognizing that different standards may be 
required for different waters or portions thereof."35  § 37, ch. 
614, Laws of 1965. 
                                                 
34 Chapter NR 103 was promulgated pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.15(2)(b), which authorizes the DNR to adopt rules for 
wetland water quality standards.   
35 Wisconsin Stat. § 144.025(2)(b) (1965), which is now Wis. 
Stat. § 281.15(1), read in full: 
 
The 
department 
shall 
adopt 
rules 
setting 
standards of water quality to be applicable to the 
waters of 
the 
state, recognizing that different 
standards may be required for different waters or 
portions thereof.  Such standards of quality shall be 
such as to protect the public interest, which include 
the protection of the public health and welfare and 
the present and prospective future use of such waters 
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¶113 Chapter 614 defined "waters of the state": 
 
"Waters of the state" includes those portions of 
Lake Michigan and Lake Superior within the boundaries 
of Wisconsin, and all lakes, bays, rivers, streams, 
springs, ponds, wells, impounding reservoirs, marshes, 
watercourses, drainage systems and other surface or 
ground 
water, 
natural 
or 
artificial, 
public 
or 
private, within the state or its jurisdiction. 
Wis. Stat. § 144.01(1) (1965). 
 
¶114 The District asserts that: 
DNR erred as a matter of law in applying ch. NR 103.  
Those rules, which define wetland functions and values 
and are intended to be determinative of regulatory 
decisions, were promulgated under the authority of ch. 
281.  But DNR's authority to apply rules promulgated 
under sec. 281.15 has always been limited by sec. 
281.92, which provides: "Nothing in this chapter [ch. 
281] affects ss. 196.01 to 196.79 or ch. 31." 
Therefore, the District concludes, consideration of "public 
rights in navigable waters" in Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) cannot 
include the application of water quality standards in Wis. Stat. 
ch. 281 and its underlying administrative code.  In effect, the 
District contends that nothing in Wis. Stat. ch. 281 affects 
Wis. Stat. ch. 31.36 
                                                                                                                                                             
for public and private water supplies, propagation of 
fish and aquatic life and wildlife, domestic and 
recreational purposes and agricultural, commercial, 
industrial and other legitimate uses.  In all cases 
where the potential uses of water are in conflict, 
water 
quality 
standards shall be interpreted to 
protect the general public interest. 
36 A March 27, 2006, memorandum from Patricia Ann Trochlell 
of the DNR——labeled Exhibit 850 at the contested case hearing——
appears to confirm the District's contention, as Trochlell 
wrote: 
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  2008AP1523 
 
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¶115 Once 
again, 
the 
text 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 31.02(1) 
authorizes the DNR to "regulate and control the level and flow 
of water in all navigable waters" in the interest of "public 
rights in navigable waters or to promote safety and protect 
life, health and property."  Some of the "property" to be 
"protected" is wetlands, both public and private.  How should 
the DNR square this with Wis. Stat. § 281.92?  
¶116 The District's reading of these two statutes——that the 
DNR cannot apply wetland water quality standards in § NR 103 
when making a § 31.02(1) water level determination——is not 
reasonable.  The DNR should not be forced to ignore relevant 
statutes and its own administrative rules on water quality 
standards in making a water level determination.  It should not 
be forced to disregard its recognized statewide statutory 
mission as well as its own property.37    
                                                                                                                                                             
Questions 
have 
arisen 
regarding 
the 
department's 
authority to consider water quality standards for 
activities regulated under ch. 31.  Ch. 281.92 
provides: "Nothing in this subchapter affects ss. 
196.01 to 196.79 or ch. 31.["]  This means that the 
department cannot apply water quality standards such 
as NR 102 and NR 103 to dams regulated under ch. 31. 
(Emphasis added.)  However, Trochlell goes on to state that 
DNR's responsibility under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1), "in the 
interest of public rights in navigable waters" and to "promote 
safety and protect life, health and property" requires DNR to 
"consider [effects] to wetlands under ch. 31 when evaluating 
water level impacts to wetlands."  (Emphasis added.) 
37 See Wis. Stat. § 281.11 ("The [DNR] shall serve as the 
central unit of state government to protect, maintain and 
improve the quality and management of the waters of the state, 
ground and surface, public and private."). 
No. 
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¶117 The 
history 
of 
the 
two 
statutes 
at 
issue 
is 
enlightening.  As previously noted, Wis. Stat. § 31.02 was 
originally enacted in 1915 as Section 1596——2.1. of ch. 69m.  
§ 3, ch. 380, Laws of 1915 (the Water Powers Act).  The statute 
in 1915 read: "The commission, in the interest of public rights 
in navigable waters or to promote safety and protect life, 
health and property is empowered to regulate and control the 
level and flow of water in all navigable waters."  Wis. Stat. 
ch. 69m, § 1596——2.1. (1915).  This section was renumbered in 
1917 as Wis. Stat. § 31.02, as part of the newly created Wis. 
Stat. ch. 31.  § 3, ch. 474, Laws of 1917.  The new § 31.02 was 
entitled "Powers of the railroad commission" because the 
Railroad Commission was the state agency originally responsible 
for making water level determinations. 
¶118 Wisconsin Stat. § 281.92 was first enacted in 1919, 
four 
years 
after 
the 
predecessor 
statute 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 31.02(1).  Section 1407m——1.(12) stated: "Nothing in this act 
shall be construed to alter, amend, repeal, impair, or affect 
any of the provisions of sections 1797m——1 to 1797m——109 or of 
chapter 31 of the Wisconsin statutes."  § 2, ch. 447, Laws of 
1919 (emphasis added).  The state board of health originally had 
the responsibility for enforcing the predecessor to Wis. Stat. 
ch. 281.  See generally ch. 447, Laws of 1919.   
¶119 Four years later, the latter statute was renumbered as 
Wis. Stat. § 144.12 and amended to read, "Nothing in this 
chapter shall be construed to affect the provisions of sections 
1797m——1 to 1797m——109 or of chapter 31 of the statutes."  § 27, 
No. 
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ch. 448, Laws of 1923.  This section was renumbered as Wis. 
Stat. § 144.27 in 1979, § 624, ch. 221, Laws of 1979, and 
finally renumbered as the current Wis. Stat. § 281.92 in 1995.  
1995 Wis. Act. 227, § 435.   
¶120 The court of appeals looked at this history and made 
the following observations: 
This statutory history shows that Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.92 was originally adopted to demarcate the 
regulatory spheres of influence of the state Board of 
Health and the Railroad Commission; the Board of 
Health's 
water 
purification 
and 
water 
pollution 
prevention responsibilities were not to affect the 
authority of the Railroad Commission in dam regulation 
under Wis. Stat. ch. 31, and the Railroad Commission's 
responsibilities were not to affect the authority of 
the Board of Health in its sphere of regulation. 
Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist., 336 Wis. 2d 677, ¶60.  Now that both 
Wis. Stat. ch. 281 and ch. 31 responsibilities fall to the DNR, 
the court of appeals said, the District's reading of these two 
statutes is illogical.  Id.  
 
¶121 In our view, the effect of Wis. Stat. § 281.92 upon 
Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) cannot be so easily dismissed.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 281.92 has remained essentially intact for nearly a 
century, including almost 50 years in which the DNR has had the 
dual responsibility of enforcing Wis. Stat. chs. 31 and 281.  
The DNR's jurisdiction in Wis. Stat. ch. 281 is broader and 
different from its jurisdiction in Wis. Stat. ch. 31.  If the 
purpose served by Wis. Stat. § 281.92 had ceased to exist, the 
statute would probably have been amended or eliminated rather 
than simply renumbered. 
No. 
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¶122 Ultimately, 
we 
must 
interpret 
both 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 31.02(1) and 281.92 in a way that harmonizes the purposes of 
the two statutes.  "Apparently conflicting provisions of law 
should be construed so as to harmonize them and thus give effect 
to the leading idea behind the law."  Beard v. Lee Enters., 225 
Wis. 2d 1, 15, 591 N.W.2d 156 (1999).  Construing Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.92 as forbidding the DNR from applying water quality 
standards when making a water level determination in the 
interest of "public rights in navigable waters" is too absolute.  
As 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
stated, 
the 
more 
reasonable 
interpretation is that "nothing in the DNR's water protection 
responsibilities under ch. 281 and the associated administrative 
rules expands or restricts its responsibilities to set water 
levels under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1)."  Rock-Koshkonong Lake 
Dist., 336 Wis. 2d 677, ¶57.  That interpretation harmonizes the 
statutes and "give[s] effect to" the idea behind both laws: that 
the DNR should not be straitjacketed when managing the water 
resources of this state.  Beard, 225 Wis. 2d at 15.   
¶123 The DNR may consider the water quality standards in 
Wis. Admin. Code § NR 103, promulgated under Wis. Stat. ch. 281, 
when making a Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) water level determination.  
Full consideration of these standards is different from a 
requirement that the DNR always apply them in making a 
§ 31.02(1) determination. 
¶124 As we understand it, the DNR did not apply the § NR 
103 wetland water quality standards in this case.  Rather, the 
analysis in the ALJ's Decision stated that the DNR evaluated the 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
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proposed water level increase in the District’s Petition 
"against the appropriate regulatory standards, including chapter 
NR 103, Wis. Admin. Code." 
¶125 Therefore, we conclude that the DNR may consider 
wetland water quality standards in Wis. Admin. Code § NR 103 
when making a water level determination under Wis. Stat. 
§ 31.02(1).  Wisconsin Stat. § 281.92 does not preclude the DNR 
from applying the wetland water quality standards in § NR 103 or 
other parts of ch. 281, when appropriate, after weighing factors 
under § 31.02(1).   
D. Consideration of Economic Impacts 
 
¶126 We turn now to the District's final contention that it 
was wrong as a matter of law for the DNR to exclude most of the 
evidence of economic impacts at the contested case hearing.  The 
District argues that the requirement in Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) to 
"protect . . . property" should be broadly interpreted so as to 
consider the effect of proposed water levels on residential 
property values, business income, and local tax revenue.  The 
DNR, on the other hand, asserts that it properly interpreted 
"protect . . . property" to include consideration of only the 
direct "hydrologic impacts" to real property like flooding and 
the impacts on the utility and enjoyment of riparian access 
rights.   
 
¶127 Statutory interpretation starts with the text of the 
statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
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inquiry."  Id.  However, if a statute is ambiguous——that is, 
"capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons 
in two or more senses"——then a reviewing court may turn to 
scope, history, context, and purpose of the statute.  Id., ¶¶47–
48.   
 
¶128 Wis. Stat. ch. 31 does not define "property."38  If the 
legislature does not provide a definition, we may resort to 
dictionaries.  DOR v. River City Refuse Removal, Inc., 2007 WI 
27, ¶46, 299 Wis. 2d 561, 729 N.W.2d 396.  However, dictionary 
definitions are not especially helpful to us in this case.  See, 
e.g., The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
1452 (3d ed. 1992) (defining "property" as "1.a. Something 
owned; a possession. b. A piece of real estate . . . c. 
Something tangible or intangible to which its owner has legal 
title"); Black's Law Dictionary 1232 (7th ed. 1999) (defining 
"property" 
as 
"The 
right to possess, use, and enjoy a 
determinate thing").   
¶129 Regardless of how property is defined, certain rights 
are traditionally associated with property ownership.  These are 
known as the "bundle of rights" and commonly include the right 
"to possess, use and dispose" of the property, among other 
                                                 
38 As one legal scholar put it, "What is property?  Nearly 
every first-year property course [in law school] begins and ends 
with 
this 
query. 
 
The 
instructor 
never 
answers 
the 
question. . . .  The question is unanswerable because the 
meaning of the chameleon-like word property constantly changes 
in 
time 
and 
space."  John Edward Cribbet, Concepts in 
Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Property, 1986 U. 
Ill. L. Rev. 1, 1.   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
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rights.  Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419, 435–36 (1982) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Mitchell Aero, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 42 
Wis. 2d 656, 662, 168 N.W.2d 183 (1969) ("Ownership is often 
referred to in legal philosophy as a bundle of sticks or 
rights."); Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of 
Rights, 32 Vt. L. Rev. 247, 253 (2007) (listing 11 incidents of 
full ownership in property, including inter alia, the right to 
possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to the 
income, the right to capital, and the right to alienate); A.M. 
Honoré, Ownership, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 107, 112–
24 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961).   
¶130 In this case, we must determine whether the DNR must 
consider the effects of a water level determination on the 
economic incidents of "property."  The meaning of the word 
"property," as used in Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1), is not clear on 
its face in the context presented.  Thus, the word is ambiguous, 
as the court of appeals initially concluded in its certification 
to this court.   
 
¶131 What does the word "protect" mean?  Again, no 
definition of the term exists in Wis. Stat. ch. 31.  Definitions 
in a standard dictionary are only marginally helpful.  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1456 (3d 
ed. 1992) (defining "protect" as "1. To keep from being damaged, 
attacked, stolen, or injured; guard."). 
 
¶132 Given 
the 
lack 
of 
a 
plain 
meaning 
of 
"protect . . . property," we must look further to interpret this 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
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phrase.  We find that history, purpose, precedent, and the DNR's 
past practice support a broad interpretation of the phrase 
"protect . . . property" so that the DNR is not limited to 
consideration of hydrologic damage to real property and riparian 
rights when making a water level determination under Wis. Stat. 
§ 31.02(1). 
 
¶133 The construction and operation of dams, the water 
levels upstream caused by dam placement, and a network of 
navigable waters have played an important role in Wisconsin's 
economic development since early statehood.  See, e.g., Joseph 
A. Ranney, Trusting Nothing to Providence: A History of 
Wisconsin's Legal System 137 (1999) (discussing the use of dams 
for lumber mills and transportation of goods on navigable waters 
in nineteenth-century Wisconsin).  The territorial legislature 
recognized the role that dams and streams played in economic 
development with its passage of the Milldam Act.  DNR Waterway 
and Wetland Handbook, ch. 140 Dams, at 2 (stating that the 
purpose behind legislative regulation of dams was to "encourage 
economic development").   
¶134 This court also recognized the economic impacts of 
dams and the resulting sustained water levels on impounded 
bodies of water.  In Fisher v. Horicon Iron & Manufacturing Co., 
this court, in considering the constitutionality of the Milldam 
Act, noted that "enterprising towns and flourishing villages 
have grown up" around dams and depend upon the dams for their 
"wealth and prosperity."  Fisher, 10 Wis. 293 (*351), 297 (*354) 
(1860).  In Smith v. Youmans, this court similarly recognized an 
No. 
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interest that residential riparian owners acquired in higher 
lake levels behind a dam maintained over a 40-year period.  
Smith, 96 Wis. 103, 109, 70 N.W. 1115 (1897).  These higher lake 
levels led property owners to build summer homes, summer 
resorts, and make other "sundry valuable improvements" on lake 
lots.  Id. at 106 (statement of facts).  While these acts and 
cases predate Wis. Stat. § 31.02, the history is instructive as 
to 
the 
role 
dams 
and 
water 
levels 
played 
in 
economic 
development.   
¶135 In 1909 the legislature created a joint Special 
Legislative Committee on Water Powers, Forestry, and Drainage.  
A.J.R. 8, Laws of 1909.  Two members of this joint committee, 
state Senators Paul O. Husting and Henry Krumrey, issued a 
report 
to 
the 
governor 
and 
legislature 
detailing 
their 
observations of impounded lakes while touring the state with the 
joint committee: 
Summer resorts have sprung up along the lake shores 
and summer homes have been built by people from 
various parts of the state and of the United States.  
Piers have been built into the lakes and other 
improvements made by the riparian.  By reason thereof 
the shores are beginning to become very valuable and 
property rights are becoming important. 
Spec. Legis. Comm. on Water Powers, Forestry, and Drainage, 49th 
Leg., Minority Rep. of Senators Paul O. Husting and Henry 
Krumrey, at 24 (Wis. 1910).  The report of the full committee 
was even more expansive in its discussion of water power, the 
resulting reservoirs of water and their importance to industry, 
residential riparians, and commercial recreation interests.  See 
No. 
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generally Rep. of the Comm. on Water Powers, Forestry, and 
Drainage of the Wis. Leg. 1910, 49th Leg.  For example, the 
committee report noted that impounded waters behind dams created 
very favorable conditions for summer cottages on lake banks and 
launches for tourists and hunters.  Id. at 27.   
¶136 The 
special 
legislative 
committee's 
full 
report 
resulted in the Water Powers Acts of 1911, 1913, and 1915.  DNR 
Waterway and Wetland Handbook, at 4.  The 1915 Water Powers Act 
survived, while this court found the former two acts to be 
unconstitutional.39  The 1915 act included the requirement that 
the then-Railroad Commission protect property when setting water 
levels.  Wis. Stat. ch. 69m., § 1596——2. (1915).  In 1917 the 
legislature renumbered the Water Powers Law as Wis. Stat. ch. 
31, with its requirement to protect property as it survives 
today.  § 3, ch. 474, Laws of 1917.  In light of the legislative 
reports giving rise to the Water Powers Act containing the 
"protect . . .  property" language of Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1), one 
can reasonably infer that riparian residential property and 
lake-based businesses were prime considerations for protecting 
property. 
                                                 
39 Chapter 652, Laws of 1911 (the 1911 Water Powers Act) was 
found unconstitutional as a taking of private property without 
compensation.  State ex rel. Wausau St. R.R. Co. v. Bancroft, 
148 Wis. 124, 134 N.W. 330 (1912).  The 1913 Water Powers Act 
(ch. 755, Laws of 1913) was found unconstitutional because it 
did not provide adequate due process.  State ex rel. Owen v. 
Wis.-Minn. Light & Power Co., 165 Wis. 430, 162 N.W. 433 (1917).   
No. 
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¶137 One 
of 
the 
first 
cases 
to 
interpret 
the 
new 
requirement to protect property was Town of Bear Lake v. 
Wisconsin-Minnesota Light & Power Co., 16 W.R.C.R. 710 (1915).  
In that case, riparian property owners brought a complaint to 
the Railroad Commission over a plan for a new dam that the 
owners claimed would cause flooding, destroying town highways 
and "rendering valu[e]less much taxable property therein."  Id. 
at 710.  The Railroad Commission held that property to be 
protected from overflow was not limited to land downstream from 
a dam, but applied upstream as well.  Id. at 717.  Furthermore, 
the respondent power company urged the Railroad Commission to 
accept an expansive view of property in the Water Powers Act; 
namely, the property interests in a water level determination 
are "of sufficient magnitude and importance to the community or 
the state as to make those property interests a matter of public 
concern."  Id. at 719.  Notably, while the decision discussed 
the location of property to be protected and the importance of 
property to the community, the decision did not explicitly limit 
the protection of property to only direct physical impacts. 
¶138 Another early Railroad Commission case discussing the 
protection of property in the context of a water level 
determination is informative.  In In re Determining the High 
Water Mark to be Established on the Rest Lake Reservoir Operated 
by the Chippewa & Flambeau Improvement Co., riparian residents 
opposed the raising of water levels on the Rest Lake reservoir 
because it would result in "injury to their property."  16 
W.R.C.R. 727, 731 (1915).  The Railroad Commission recognized 
No. 
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that the waters of the affected area were "among the most famous 
summer resort and fishing waters in the state."  Id. at 733.  
Residents and resort owners invested "large sums of money" in 
improvements on the waters.  Id. at 733–34.  The Railroad 
Commission held: 
We are of the opinion that the Commission is required 
to take into consideration the effect of [water] 
levels fixed by it upon property which may be affected 
by those levels and that where the property to be so 
affected includes the most valuable property in the 
community, is large in acreage, and not shown to be 
subject to overflow, the protection of such property 
is a matter of more than private interest and becomes 
a matter affecting the public welfare. 
Id. at 736.40  Thus, the Railroad Commission in Rest Lake made a 
direct link between protecting property in a water level 
determination and economic damage to valuable land.  While 
initially 
the 
potential 
damage 
was 
physical 
in 
nature 
(overflowing of land), the Commission was mindful of the 
                                                 
40 This court affirmed the Rest Lake water level order in 
Chippewa & Flambeau Improvement Co. v. Railroad Commission of 
Wisconsin, 164 Wis. 105, 159 N.W. 739 (1916). 
The DNR correctly notes that this court's opinion in 
Chippewa & Flambeau used the words "imperil[]," "injury," and 
"damage" in relation to property.  Id.  The DNR argues that 
these words "connote direct harm to property, not economic harm 
to property values or taxes or business."  We decline the 
invitation to take such a narrow view of these words.  While one 
can certainly suffer physical injury, one can also undergo 
economic or financial injury as well, particularly as a result 
physical damage.  See, e.g., U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Economic 
Injury 
Disaster 
Loans, 
http://www.sba.gov/content/economic-
injury-disaster-loans (last visited July 8, 2013).   
No. 
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improvements to the land that increased its value and that the 
value would no doubt be affected by the level of the water.41   
¶139  It is unreasonable to conclude, given the preceding 
history, 
context, 
and 
interpretations 
of 
the 
phrase 
"protect . . . property," 
that 
economic 
impacts 
cannot 
be 
considered when making a water level determination under Wis. 
Stat. § 31.02(1).  The DNR, the agency currently charged with 
making a water level determination under § 31.02(1), must 
protect the same property interests as in 1915 and before——that 
is, not only land itself, but improvements to the land, the 
                                                 
41 The DNR and court of appeals look to this court's 
decision in City of New Lisbon v. Harebo, 224 Wis. 66, 271 N.W. 
659 (1937) for support that "protect . . . property" applies 
only to the protection of property from events like flooding.  
Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist., 336 Wis. 2d 677, ¶45.  We disagree.  
Harebo was about whether a permit for dam construction under 
Wis. Stat. § 31.06(3) (1935) was required before condemnation 
proceedings for flowage rights.  Specifically, was condemnation 
of all the flowage rights necessary before the grant of a permit 
so as not to "endanger property"?  Harebo, 224 Wis. at 70.   
The Harebo court asked what is meant by property, and 
looked to Wis. Stat. § 31.02, which has "precisely the same 
formula" for protecting property as Wis. Stat. § 31.06(3) 
(1935).  Id. at 72.  The court concluded, "It is not proper to 
isolate the word 'property' and assert that injury to property 
means normal flowage by the ordinary operation of the dam, since 
this is the inevitable consequence of building and maintaining a 
dam."  Id. at 73.   
The Harebo holding was limited to whether the Public 
Service Commission (at the time, the agency tasked with 
regulating flowage and water level) was required to protect 
property from being flooded by normal dam operation in the 
context of dam permit approval.  While this holding obviously 
implicates physical damage to property, it does not limit the 
protection of property solely to physical impacts such as 
flooding.   
No. 
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community's interest in the land, and investments in and capital 
derived from the land.  These property interests have not 
diminished in importance, but now they must be balanced against 
impacts on wildlife, water quality, wetlands, recreation, and 
other more modern considerations.   
¶140 The DNR's own Waterway and Wetland Handbook has 
guidelines in place for economic considerations when regulating 
water levels under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1).  DNR Waterway and 
Wetland Handbook, ch. 130, at 3 (stating that the DNR "may 
regulate and control water level and flow to: . . . Minimize 
economic losses resulting from too much or too little water").  
We also note that the DNR considered economic impacts of water 
levels on Lake Koshkonong when it conducted an EA for the 
proposed 1982 water level order.42 
¶141 Equally significant, the DNR's model shoreland zoning 
ordinance (which was adopted by Marinette County in 1967 and was 
at issue in the Just case) stated in the beginning and states 
now: 
1.2  Findings of Fact.  Uncontrolled use of the 
shorelands and pollution of the navigable waters of 
_____ County will adversely affect the public health, 
safety, convenience, and general welfare and impair 
the tax base.  The legislature of Wisconsin has 
delegated responsibility to the counties to further 
the maintenance of safe and healthful conditions; 
prevent and control water pollution; protect spawning 
grounds, fish and aquatic life; control building 
                                                 
42 The Environmental Impact Assessment Screening Worksheet 
for the proposed 1982 water level order discussed how "taverns, 
marinas, bait dealerships" and other commercial establishments 
"will benefit from a stable recreational pond."   
No. 
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sites, placement of structures and land uses; and to 
preserve shore cover and natural beauty.  This 
responsibility is hereby recognized by _____ County, 
Wisconsin. 
Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., A Model County Shoreland Zoning 
Ordinance for Wisconsin's Shoreland Protection Program at 5 
(June 2010, rev. Dec. 2010) (emphasis added).  This was 
explicitly acknowledged by the Just court: "The Marinette county 
shoreland zoning ordinance in secs. 1.2 and 1.3 states the 
uncontrolled use of shorelands and pollution of navigable 
waters . . . affect public health, safety, convenience, and 
general welfare and impair the tax base."  Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 
11 (emphasis added).  Reference to the tax base is generally 
included in county shoreland zoning ordinances.  See, e.g., Dane 
Cnty., Wis., Code of Ordinances § 11.016(1) (2013); Marinette 
Cnty., Wis., Code of Ordinances § 21.01(2) (2013); Code of 
Ordinances, Rock Cnty., Wis. § 4.201(2) (2013).  Consequently, 
the DNR's stated position in the present case——disavowing any 
consideration of the effects of water levels on the tax base——is 
directly contrary to the statutory and case law authority it 
relies on in the Decision.   
¶142 In this case, the DNR considered riparian access and 
enjoyment when making the water level determination for Lake 
Koshkonong under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) but excluded testimony on 
economic impacts of lower water levels on both riparian and non-
riparian property owners and communities in close proximity to 
the lake.  At oral argument, the DNR claimed that economic 
No. 
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interests were subsumed into the admitted testimony on riparian 
interests. 
¶143 The DNR's Decision and current position relies on this 
court's previous opinion in Wisconsin's Environmental Decade 
when it characterized the evidence of economic impacts as 
"secondary or indirect economic impacts."43  In that case, the 
court held that the DNR did not need to consider socioeconomic 
impacts in determining whether to issue an EIS in connection 
with Wis. Stat. ch. 30 permits.  Wis.'s Envtl. Decade, 115 
Wis. 2d at 395.   
¶144 We disagree with the DNR's application of Wisconsin's 
Environmental 
Decade 
to 
this 
case. 
 
First, 
the 
alleged 
socioeconomic injuries in that case——a possible decline in 
downtown Appleton's business because of a new shopping mall 
outside of the city——did not have "a direct causal relationship 
to the minor changes to the physical environment found by the 
DNR."  Id. at 404.  Here, the decision to raise or lower water 
levels has a direct economic impact on the riparian community.  
Second, the case before us is not about issuing an EIS; this 
                                                 
43 Yet, the DNR did not exclude evidence of secondary 
economic loss entirely; the ALJ admitted testimony on the loss 
of board feet of green ash and diminished crop yields in 
drainage districts.  In fact, the testimony of diminished crop 
yields that would result from higher waters is an explicit 
finding of fact in the Decision. 
It is inconsistent for the DNR to consider the economic 
impacts of higher water level proposals like these, but refuse 
to consider economic impacts from lower water levels under the 
current order. 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
68 
 
case is about what the DNR should consider in protecting 
property, as directed by Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1), when making a 
water level determination.   
¶145 It is important to note that the economic testimony 
excluded 
at 
the 
contested 
case 
hearing 
supplemented 
the 
testimony of residents and business owners that the ALJ allowed 
to stay in.  In other words, the excluded testimony was 
different from the testimony that the ALJ accepted.  The 
included testimony spoke to how long the piers of lake-based 
businesses have to be in order to make effective use of 
navigable water, while the excluded expert testimony of John 
Stockham spoke to the money lost by these businesses with water 
levels on Lake Koshkonong reduced from their historical levels.  
The included testimony covered riparian access and enjoyment, 
while the excluded testimony of Stockham and Dr. Kashian 
explained how property may have diminished in value or risen in 
value more slowly than comparable lake property because of the 
reduced access.  The included testimony spoke to the natural 
scenic beauty, hunting, fishing, camping, and boating on and 
around Lake Koshkonong, while the excluded testimony talked 
about the overall economic impact that lower water levels would 
have 
on 
the 
community 
that 
depends 
on 
these 
enumerated 
activities——not only the impact on businesses but also on the 
municipalities that surround the lake.  The DNR rightly 
considered the direct impact of lower water levels on riparian 
properties, but wrongly excluded the cumulative economic effect 
of the lower water levels on these properties.  It is a familiar 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
69 
 
principle of environmental law that secondary effects are often 
more substantial than the primary effects of an action. 
¶146 The DNR asks how it would go about an economic 
analysis:44  How would it monetize the value of riparian 
property?  What would be its logical stopping point?  We do not 
hold that the DNR must consider remote economic impacts; a 
reasonableness standard should apply.  The DNR has discretion as 
to which impacts are too attenuated to consider,45 and it can 
refute any economic evidence.  Moreover, evidence of economic 
impacts is not dispositive in a water level determination; 
hypothetically, on remand the DNR could still reject a petition 
for 
higher 
water 
levels 
on 
Lake 
Koshkonong 
even 
after 
considering the economic impacts of lower water levels on 
property.  However, it is clear that the DNR must consider the 
economic impacts in the first place.   
                                                 
44 The DNR is capable of conducting an economic analysis in 
other contexts.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 285.01(12) and 
227.137.  However, we are not requiring the DNR to conduct an 
economic analysis, per se.  We hold that the DNR must consider 
economic 
impacts 
to 
property 
when 
making 
a 
water 
level 
determination under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1).   
Furthermore, the DNR asserts that it cannot consider 
economic impacts like property values on a proposed higher water 
level order.  This assertion would produce an absurd result in 
the case of a proposed lower water level order.  The DNR's 
narrow interpretation of "protect . . . property" would mean 
that 
only 
direct 
physical 
impacts 
to 
property 
could 
be 
considered but no evidence of ruined property values or business 
receipts could be considered. 
45 It merits repeating that an ALJ must admit "all testimony 
having reasonable probative value, but shall exclude immaterial, 
irrelevant or unduly repetitious testimony or evidence."  Wis. 
Stat. § 227.45(1).   
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
70 
 
¶147 We make one further observation.  Raising and lowering 
water levels, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1), is a classic 
example of government regulation.  A regulation may severely 
diminish the value of property, but in a regulatory "taking" 
under the Fifth Amendment, the "regulation or government action 
'must deny the landowner all or substantially all practical uses 
of a property in order to be considered a taking for which 
compensation is required.'"  Eberle v. Dane Cnty. Bd. Of 
Adjustment, 227 Wis. 2d 609, 622, 595 N.W.2d 730 (1999).  If the 
economic impact of government regulation is not considered at 
the 
time 
the 
regulation is initiated, when will it be 
considered?   
¶148 We conclude that the DNR erred when it excluded 
testimony on economic impacts of lower water levels when making 
a water level determination under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1).   
III. CONCLUSION 
¶149 The DNR's conclusions of law are subject to de novo 
review because the DNR's water level order under Wis. Stat. 
§ 31.02(1) is heavily influenced by the DNR's interpretation of 
the scope of its own powers, its interpretation of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, its disputed interpretation of the statute it 
utilized, and its reliance upon statutes and rules outside of 
Wis. Stat. ch. 31. 
¶150 The 
DNR 
properly 
considered 
the 
impact 
of 
the 
Petition's proposed water levels on public and private wetlands 
in 
and adjacent to Lake Koshkonong.  However, the DNR 
inappropriately relied on the public trust doctrine for its 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
71 
 
authority to protect non-navigable land and non-navigable water 
above the ordinary high water mark.  The DNR has broad statutory 
authority grounded in the state's police power to protect non-
navigable wetlands and other non-navigable water resources.  
Thus, the DNR may consider the water level impact on all 
adjacent property under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1). 
¶151 The DNR was entitled to consider the water quality 
standards in Wis. Admin. Code § NR 103, promulgated under Wis. 
Stat. ch. 281, when making a Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) water level 
determination.  By statute, the DNR is responsible for writing 
and enforcing wetland water quality standards in this state.  
Accordingly, it would be unreasonable for the DNR to ignore 
statutes and its own administrative rules when making a water 
level determination affecting wetlands.  Therefore, the DNR may 
consider § NR 103 water quality standards when making a water 
level determination under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) that affects 
wetlands and may apply these standards when appropriate after 
weighing the factors in the statute.  However, Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.92 suggests that the DNR is not required to apply ch. 281 
standards in making a determination under Wis. Stat. § 31.02 
because ch. 31 is excepted from the provisions of ch. 281.   
¶152 The DNR erroneously excluded most testimony on the 
economic impact of lower water levels in Lake Koshkonong on the 
residents, businesses, and tax bases adjacent to and near Lake 
Koshkonong.  This evidence was relevant to the DNR's decision-
making under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1).  Although the DNR is granted 
substantial discretion in its decision-making under the statute, 
No. 
  2008AP1523 
 
72 
 
it must consider all probative evidence when its decision is 
likely to favor some interests but adversely affect others.  In 
this case, the DNR's exclusion of most economic evidence was 
inconsistent with its acceptance of competing economic evidence 
that helped sustain its water level decision.   
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶153 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  This case 
presents a question that the majority can——indeed does——answer 
by interpreting Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) (2009-10).  Yet the 
majority 
unnecessarily 
reaches 
out 
to 
the 
constitutional 
principle of the public trust doctrine from the Wisconsin 
Constitution, constricting the doctrine and misreading this 
court's precedent, especially the well-settled law articulated 
in Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 
(1972).  Wisconsin's long and robust history of protecting the 
public trust is widely acknowledged and respected.  The public 
trust doctrine imposes on the state, as trustee, the affirmative 
duty to protect, preserve, and promote the public's right to 
Wisconsin's waters. 
¶154 The 
majority opinion attempts to undermine this 
court's precedent, recharacterize its holdings, and rewrite 
history.  Instead of limiting itself to addressing only what 
must be addressed, the majority seizes this opportunity to limit 
the public trust doctrine in an unforeseen way, transforming the 
state's affirmative duty to protect the public trust into a 
legislative choice.  It needlessly unsettles our precedent and 
weakens the public trust doctrine that is enshrined in the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  This represents a significant and 
disturbing shift in Wisconsin law.   
¶155 The majority also errs in expanding the type of 
evidence that the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) must 
consider in these cases.  A straightforward interpretation of 
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) would not require the DNR to consider 
secondary or indirect economic impact when making water level 
determinations.  The economic evidence admitted during the ten-
day contested case hearing was sufficient to discharge the DNR's 
duty to "protect . . . property," and the excluded evidence was 
not relevant or required.  The DNR has a difficult job to do 
under this statute, and in this case, the DNR did it well.  The 
decisions of the DNR, the circuit court, and the court of 
appeals each properly concluded that § 31.02(1) does not require 
consideration of such secondary or indirect economic impact.  
The fact is that the DNR sufficiently considered the protection 
of property, and therefore, it was not error to strike the 
secondary or indirect economic evidence that it struck. 
¶156 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
I. WISCONSIN COURTS HAVE AGGRESSIVELY PROTECTED THE PUBLIC 
TRUST DOCTRINE. 
¶157 To 
understand 
the 
significance 
and 
to 
see 
the 
potential implications of the majority's novel interpretation of 
the Just case, it is necessary to appreciate how settled the 
public trust doctrine has been in Wisconsin until now.  This 
court highlighted the constitutional basis of the public trust 
doctrine in Muench v. Public Service Commission, 261 Wis. 492, 
53 N.W.2d 514, aff'd on reh'g, 261 Wis. 492, 55 N.W.2d 40 
(1952).  In that case, the court traced the history of the 
public trust doctrine to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.  
Muench, 261 Wis. at 499.  The language from the Northwest 
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
3 
 
Ordinance 
of 
1787 
was 
then 
adopted 
by 
the 
territorial 
constitutional convention in 1848, approved by an act of 
Congress 
which 
admitted 
Wisconsin 
into 
the 
Union, 
and 
incorporated in the Wisconsin Constitution as follows: 
The state shall have concurrent jurisdiction on all 
rivers and lakes bordering on this state so far as 
such rivers or lakes shall form a common boundary to 
the state and any other state or territory now or 
hereafter to be formed, and bounded by the same; and 
the river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading 
into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the 
carrying places between the same, shall be common 
highways and forever free, as well to the inhabitants 
of the state as to the citizens of the United States, 
without any tax, impost or duty therefor. 
Wis. Const. art. IX, § 1.    
¶158 Early on, this court declared that the public trust 
not only required preservation of the trust, it also required 
promotion of it.  City of Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 449, 
214 N.W. 820 (1927) ("The equitable title to these submerged 
lands vests in the public at large, while the legal title vests 
in the state, restricted only by the trust, and the trust, being 
both active and administrative, requires the lawmaking body to 
act in all cases where action is necessary, not only to preserve 
the trust, but to promote it." (emphasis added)). 
¶159 In 
Diana 
Shooting 
Club 
v. 
Husting, 
this 
court 
described the state's responsibilities under the public trust 
doctrine:  
The wisdom of the policy which, in the organic laws of 
our state, steadfastly and carefully preserved to the 
people the full and free use of public waters cannot 
be questioned. Nor should it be limited or curtailed 
by narrow constructions. It should be interpreted in 
the broad and beneficent spirit that gave rise to it 
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
4 
 
in order that the people may fully enjoy the intended 
benefits. 
Diana Shooting Club, 156 Wis. 261, 271, 145 N.W. 816 (1914) 
(emphasis added).   
¶160 The court in Muench adopted the language from Diana 
Shooting Club and demonstrated the growth of the public trust 
doctrine over time by describing its own holding as "keeping 
with the trend manifested in the development of the law of 
navigable waters in this state to extend the rights of the 
general public to the recreational use of the waters in this 
state, and to protect the public in the enjoyment of such 
rights."  Muench, 261 Wis. at 512.   
¶161 This court in Just v. Marinette County further 
interpreted the doctrine while upholding a shoreland zoning 
statute enacted pursuant to the state's public trust duty.  The 
court stated:  
The active public trust duty of the state of Wisconsin 
in respect to navigable waters requires the state not 
only to promote navigation but also to protect and 
preserve those waters for fishing, recreation, and 
scenic beauty. To further this duty, the legislature 
may 
delegate 
authority 
to 
local 
units 
of 
the 
government, which the state did by requiring counties 
to pass shoreland zoning ordinances. 
Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 18 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
This court explained that the purpose of the statute at issue in 
that case was to "protect navigable waters and the public rights 
therein from the degradation and deterioration which results 
from uncontrolled use and development of shorelands."  Id. at 
10.  We noted that the stated purpose of the shoreland 
regulation program is to "aid in the fulfillment of the state's 
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
5 
 
role as trustee of its navigable waters and to promote public 
health, safety, convenience and general welfare."  Id.   
¶162 Since then this court has consistently reiterated the 
purpose and the significance of the public trust doctrine in its 
cases.  For example, Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. 
DNR (Environmental Decade 1978), described the duties of the 
state under the public trust as "not only to promote navigation 
but also to protect and preserve its waters for fishing, 
hunting, recreation, and scenic beauty."  Envtl. Decade 1978, 85 
Wis. 2d 518, 526, 271 N.W.2d 69 (1978).  We described the 
state's responsibility as long-acknowledged and highlighted the 
legislature's delegation of water management to the DNR in 
furtherance of "the state's affirmative obligations as trustee."   
Id. at 526-27.   
¶163  Recently, this court reiterated these principles in 
Lake Beulah Management District v. DNR, holding that under the 
applicable statutes and the public trust duties, the DNR can and 
must consider whether an inland well would harm waters of the 
state before issuing a permit for the well.  Lake Beulah, 2011 
WI 54, ¶3, 335 Wis. 2d 47, 799 N.W.2d 73.  This court explained 
jurisprudence on the public trust doctrine: 
We reaffirmed this maxim in Muench v. Public Service 
Commission in our examination of the history and 
evolution 
of 
the 
public 
trust 
doctrine, 
which 
indicated a "trend to extend and protect the rights of 
the public to the recreational enjoyment of the 
navigable waters of the state." We have further 
explained, "The trust doctrine is not a narrow or 
crabbed concept of lakes and streams."  
Id., ¶31 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
6 
 
¶164 Our cases demonstrate that the scope of the public 
trust doctrine is such that the state holds title to the land 
between the ordinary high water marks, and state regulation 
consistent with the public trust doctrine extends to surrounding 
areas.  The ownership of land was emphasized in Diana Shooting 
Club, which was a case about trespass.  In that case, there was 
no trespass because the hunter was hunting between the ordinary 
high water marks, land that was held in trust for the public.  
Diana Shooting Club, 156 Wis. at 272.  In contrast, regulation 
consistent with the public trust doctrine was at issue in Just 
because the shoreland zoning statute extended well beyond the 
ordinary high water mark, and the court held that it could be 
regulated pursuant to the public trust doctrine.  Just, 56 Wis. 
2d at 14, 17.   
¶165 In 
furtherance 
of 
the 
state's 
trustee 
responsibilities, the legislature has enacted statutes to 
discharge its duties.  As the court explained in Environmental 
Decade 1978, several chapters of the Wisconsin statutes, 
including Chapter 31, which is at issue in this case, were 
enacted "[i]n furtherance of the state's affirmative obligations 
as trustee of navigable waters."   85 Wis. 2d at 527.  We dealt 
with a similar situation in this court's unanimous decision in 
Lake Beulah, where the legislature had used a statute to 
implement its public trust duties.  This court stated, "[W]e 
conclude that, through Wis. Stat. §281.11 and § 281.12, the 
legislature has delegated the State's public trust duties to the 
DNR in the context of its regulation of high capacity wells and 
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
7 
 
their potential effect on navigable waters such as Lake Beulah."  
Lake Beulah, 335 Wis. 2d 47, ¶34 (emphasis added).  That 
decision dealt with non-navigable water, and explained its 
relationship to the public trust doctrine.  The statutes created 
to preserve and promote the public trust doctrine allowed the 
regulation of non-navigable waters because of the potential 
effects non-navigable waters have on navigable waters. 
II. 
THE MAJORITY UNNECESSARILY UNDERMINES WELL-SETTLED LAW ON 
WISCONSIN'S PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE. 
¶166 The heart of the public trust doctrine lies in 
protecting, preserving, and promoting the public's right to 
Wisconsin's waters, and this court has vigilantly guarded these 
rights.  The public trust doctrine entrusts to the state the 
duty to protect, preserve, and promote the public trust.  The 
majority untethers our constitutional jurisprudence from its 
foundation and attempts to transform 165 years of constitutional 
precedent into a mere legislative exercise of the state's police 
power.  The citizens of Wisconsin may rightly wonder why the 
majority is limiting the protection of Wisconsin's waters and 
reaching a constitutional question that is not essential to its 
holding.  I refuse to unnecessarily constrict our holdings on 
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
8 
 
this important constitutional doctrine, especially in a case 
that should be decided on statutory grounds.1   
¶167 The central issue in this case is one of statutory 
interpretation——namely, whether the DNR can consider wetlands 
above the ordinary high water mark when determining water levels 
under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1).  Wisconsin Stat. § 31.02(1) states 
in relevant part: "The department, in the interest of public 
rights in navigable waters or to promote safety and protect 
life, health and property[,] may regulate and control the level 
and flow of water in all navigable waters . . . ."  Both the 
majority and the petitioner agree that a simple reading of 
§ 31.02(1) 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
statute 
allows 
for 
consideration of private wetlands.  In fact, the majority 
                                                 
1 Two other issues are decided by the majority.  The first 
is the standard of review.  The majority lays out the 
appropriate framework to determine the standard of review.  It 
then determines that the standard of review here should be de 
novo 
review 
because 
it 
believes 
that 
the 
DNR 
has 
not 
consistently interpreted Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) and that the 
question presented is one of the scope of the DNR's power.  
Majority op., ¶¶58-64.  Because I would reach the same result 
under any level of deference, I will not address the majority's 
application of the oft-cited rules from Racine Harley-Davidson, 
Inc. v. State, 2006 WI 86, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184.  See 
also Hilton ex rel. Pages Homeowners' Ass'n v. DNR, 2006 WI 84, 
293 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 166 (discussing the standard of review 
of an agency decision in a case related to the public trust 
doctrine). 
 
Even 
applying 
de 
novo 
review, 
the 
DNR's 
interpretations 
were 
reasonable 
and 
should 
therefore 
be 
affirmed.   
The second issue decided by the majority is whether Wis. 
Stat. § 281.92 bars the DNR from considering water quality 
standards from Wis. Admin. Code § NR 103 when making its 
determination under § 31.02(1).  I agree with the majority that 
Wis. Stat. § 281.92 does not bar the DNR from such a 
consideration. 
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
9 
 
states: 
"The 
District 
acknowledges 
that 
'privately 
owned 
wetlands are entitled to consideration as "property" to be 
protected in establishing a water level order.'  There can be no 
dispute that the DNR can 'consider' water level impact on all 
adjacent property under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1)."  Majority op., 
¶109.  Because that interpretation is dispositive of the issue, 
I would stop the analysis there.   
¶168 Instead, the majority reaches that conclusion and then 
embarks on a constitutional analysis in which it reads the part 
of the statute before the "or" to be a direct enactment of the 
public trust doctrine and the part after the "or" as an exercise 
of police powers.  Majority op., ¶¶102-103.  It speculates as to 
how the statute could have been written so it "would be seen as 
a direct enforcement mechanism for the public trust in navigable 
waters" while explaining that the actual language could not be a 
direct enforcement mechanism.  Majority op., ¶103.  The majority 
does not cite any cases that interpret Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) the 
way it does now, and it ignores the cases that suggest that the 
entire statute is an embodiment of the public trust doctrine.2  
Reading the statute as the majority does attempts to strip the 
state, trustee of the public trust doctrine, of the ability to 
regulate anything that is not between the ordinary high water 
marks pursuant to the public trust doctrine.  The majority 
reaches a constitutional issue that it is not required to reach, 
                                                 
2 See discussion of Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc., 
v. DNR (Environmental Decade 1978), 85 Wis. 2d 518, 271 N.W.2d 
69 (1978) and Lake Beulah Management Dist. v. DNR, 2011 WI 54, 
335 Wis. 2d 47, 799 N.W.2d 73, at ¶165.   
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
10 
 
and it engages in a strained analysis to bolster its holding.  
Both Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) and the long-settled public trust 
doctrine support a consideration of the impact on wetlands 
adjacent to Lake Koshkonong when regulating water levels 
pursuant to the public trust doctrine. 
¶169 To support its holding, the majority misconstrues Just 
v. Marinette County. The majority calls the Just case "a 
textbook example of using the state's police power [as opposed 
to using the constitutional public trust doctrine] to support 
legislation 'to protect navigable waters and the public rights 
therein . . . .'"  Majority op., ¶96.  The majority uses this 
interpretation of Just to explain that the statute at issue 
here, § 31.02(1), is only half based on the public trust 
doctrine; the rest, as the majority would have us believe, 
derives only from the state's police power and is disconnected 
from the public trust doctrine. 3   
                                                 
3 Although it does not answer why it matters in this case, 
the majority leaves no doubt about the significance of its novel 
interpretation of the Just case, namely that it changes the ease 
with which the legislature can modify regulation and creates a 
more lenient legal standard for this court to apply when it 
reviews such changes: 
The police power is potent, and legislation grounded 
in the state's police power is presumed constitutional 
and 
will 
be 
sustained 
unless 
it 
is 
deemed 
unconstitutional 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt.  
Nonetheless, as Just makes clear, the distinction 
between the DNR's constitutionally based public trust 
authority and the DNR's police power-based statutory 
authority 
is 
that 
the 
latter 
is 
subject 
to 
constitutional and statutory protections afforded to 
property, may be modified from time to time by the 
legislature, and requires some balancing of competing 
interests in enforcement.  
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
11 
 
¶170 The clear language of Just rebuts the majority's 
conclusion that it was only a police power case.4  The thrust of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Majority op., ¶101.  In other words, rights that are not 
protected by the constitution are easier to take away.  In 
addition, the majority's interpretation transforms what was an 
affirmative duty on the state as trustee into a right to 
regulate when the legislature chooses to do so, allowing the 
state to ignore its duty with respect to things that impact 
navigable waters but are not physically located between the 
ordinary high water marks.   
4 Scholarship interpreting Just supports the conclusion that 
this court extended the public trust doctrine through Just to 
allow for regulation above the ordinary high water mark.  See, 
e.g., 
Melissa 
K. 
Scanlan, 
Implementing 
the 
Public 
Trust 
Doctrine: A Lakeside View into the Trustees' World, 39 Ecology 
L.Q. 123, 138 (2012) (explaining that "[a]s scientific knowledge 
about the interconnectedness of hydrology has increased, courts 
and the legislature have expanded the public trust doctrine to 
cover activities on shorelands, wetlands, nonnavigable waters, 
and groundwater adjacent to navigable waters."); Richard M. 
Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & 
Charting Its Future, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 665, 668 (2012) 
("[I]n a controversial 1972 decision, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court expressly [held] that the public trust doctrine could be 
asserted to bar the filling of privately-owned wetlands, in 
order to preserve those wetlands in their natural condition."); 
Jason 
J. 
Czarnezki, 
Environmentalism 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 90 Marq. L. Rev. 465, 470, 494 (2007) (referencing 
Just to support a statement that the constitutionality of 
shoreland and wetland protection via zoning ordinances was 
upheld under the public trust doctrine and citing Just in 
concluding that "the constitution might textually embrace the 
notion that private property owners do not have inherent rights 
to change the 'essential natural character of their land' for 
development purposes."). 
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
12 
 
the Just opinion showed that the court believed it was relying 
on the public trust doctrine.  The court explicitly held that 
land above the ordinary high water mark is subject to the public 
trust doctrine.  Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 18-19 ("Lands adjacent to 
or near navigable waters exist in a special relationship to the 
state.  They have been held subject to special taxation and are 
subject to the state public trust powers . . . ." (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted)). 
¶171 In an attempt to circumvent the clear language of the 
Just case, the majority makes a circular argument.  The majority 
imports its conclusion from earlier in the opinion——that the 
public trust does not extend beyond the ordinary high water 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also Paul G. Kent & Tamara A. Dudiak, Wisconsin Water 
Law: A Guide to Water Rights and Regulations 1, 12 (2d ed. 
2001), 
http://learningstore.uwex.edu/assets/pdfs/g3622.pdf 
(stating that "because of the importance of public trust, the 
courts have used the public trust doctrine as a justification 
for regulation of shoreland and wetland areas adjacent to 
natural navigable waters on the theory that such regulation is 
necessary to protect public trust waters and to ensure the right 
of the public to access those waters." (citation omitted)); 
Melissa K. Scanlan, The Evolution of the Public Trust Doctrine 
and the Degradation of Trust Resources: Courts, Trustees and 
Political Power in Wisconsin, 27 Ecology L.Q. 135, 165 (2000) 
(citing Just in a section entitled "Cases in Which Trustees 
Acted to Further the Trust"); Patrick O. Dunphy, The Public 
Trust Doctrine, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 787, 807 (1976) (explaining 
Just, "The strong public trust doctrine in Wisconsin may have 
been the most significant reason for the court’s initiative. . . 
. By recognizing the interrelationship of the land and the water 
and extending the trust to shorelands, the court has added a new 
dimension to the trust.")  
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
13 
 
mark——and applies it to support its subsequent conclusion.5  
Regarding Just, it states: 
If there is any question that the court was not 
relying on the public trust doctrine to sustain the 
shoreland 
zoning 
ordinance 
and 
its 
authorizing 
legislation, the court noted that the Marinette County 
ordinance applied to "lands within 1,000 feet of the 
normal high-water elevation of navigable lakes, ponds, 
or flowages and 300 feet from a navigable river or 
stream."  These dimensions far exceed the geographic 
limitations of public trust jurisdiction. 
Majority op., ¶100 (citation omitted).  The majority's only 
apparent support for its conclusion about the dimensions of the 
public trust jurisdiction comes from its own earlier analysis.  
The Just case establishes the opposite conclusion——that the DNR 
pursuant to the public trust doctrine may consider the impact on 
land above the ordinary high water mark.  
¶172 Not only does an appropriate interpretation of Just 
rebut the majority's conclusions, this court has repeatedly 
interpreted the public trust doctrine more broadly than the 
majority does today, and there is no compelling reason presented 
in this case to change that interpretation.  See supra, ¶¶161-
165.  The case law indicates that the state has the power to 
regulate 
lands 
beyond 
the 
ordinary 
high 
water 
mark 
in 
discharging the duties entrusted to it under the public trust 
doctrine.  See, e.g., Lake Beulah, 335 Wis. 2d 47, ¶34.  
Likewise, the cases demonstrate that the legislature has an 
                                                 
5 For an explanation of why the majority mistakenly believes 
that the public trust doctrine cannot extend beyond the ordinary 
high water marks, see infra, ¶172.   
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
14 
 
affirmative duty as trustee to protect and promote the public 
trust.  See, e.g., City of Milwaukee, 193 Wis. at 449.   
¶173 One explanation for the majority's puzzling holding is 
that it appears to confuse the concepts of ownership of (or 
title to) the land with regulation pursuant to the public trust 
doctrine. In the cases the majority cites to support its 
position that public trust jurisdiction is confined to limited 
geographic areas, the idea of ownership of the land was 
paramount, but here, ownership of the private wetlands is not at 
issue.6  The issue is only whether the DNR has the authority 
under the public trust doctrine to consider the impact on those 
adjacent wetlands consistent with its duties under the public 
trust doctrine.  After citing cases it believes support its 
proposition that the public trust doctrine is limited to water 
between the ordinary high water marks, the majority explains the 
problem it sees: 
Contemplating the question of ownership is important 
because the public trust doctrine implicates state 
ownership or virtual state ownership——by virtue of its 
trust responsibility——of land under navigable waters.  
If the public trust were extended to cover wetlands 
that are not navigable, it would create significant 
new questions about ownership of and trespass on 
private land, and it would be difficult to cabin 
expansion of the state's new constitutionally based 
jurisdiction over private land.   
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 
272, 145 N.W. 816 (1914) (holding that no trespass occurred 
because the hunter was located between the ordinary high water 
marks, property which was land held in trust for the public 
pursuant to the public trust doctrine).   
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
15 
 
Majority op., ¶84.  The quotation from the majority demonstrates 
its misunderstanding of the argument of the DNR.  The DNR in 
this case was not asserting that the public trust doctrine gives 
the state ownership of the private wetlands; rather it argues 
that the public trust doctrine allows the DNR to consider the 
impact on the wetlands when determining water levels.  It quotes 
the Just court's statement that "[l]ands adjacent to or near 
navigable waters . . . are subject to the state public trust 
powers" and emphasizes the Just decision's reference to the 
wetlands "adjacent to" not "within" navigable waters. 
¶174 Allowing the trustee to discharge its public trust 
duties by considering things that affect navigable waters is 
consistent with our precedent.  If it could not, how then would 
the state discharge its extensive duties "not only to promote 
navigation but also to protect and preserve its waters for 
fishing, hunting, recreation, and scenic beauty"?  Envtl. Decade 
1978, 85 Wis. 2d at 526 (citations omitted).  Therefore, the DNR 
did not err in relying on its public trust power to consider the 
impact of raising the water levels on adjacent private wetlands 
even when the wetlands are above the ordinary high water mark.  
The conclusion the majority reaches is a novel interpretation 
that cannot be squared with the extensive public trust doctrine 
case law.   
III. THE "PROTECT . . . PROPERTY" ELEMENT OF WIS. STAT. 
§ 31.02(1) DOES NOT REQUIRE ADMISSION OF THE STRICKEN 
EVIDENCE.  
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
16 
 
¶175 Despite acknowledging that the decision adopted by the 
DNR was "meticulous [and] comprehensive," the majority reverses, 
holding that the DNR was required to consider additional 
evidence on the secondary or indirect economic impacts of 
raising the water level when making its determination under Wis. 
Stat. § 31.02(1).7  Because I do not believe the statute requires 
the DNR to consider the evidence that was stricken to discharge 
its duty to "protect . . . property," I dissent. 
¶176 During 
the 
ten-day 
contested 
case 
hearing, 
a 
significant amount of evidence was heard.  The parties presented 
testimony and other evidence related to the economic impact of 
the change in the water level, including testimony on the 
implications for navigation, information about the impact on use 
and enjoyment of riparian property by riparian owners, impact on 
fish and fowl, and information about the impact on natural 
beauty and recreation.  Some evidence was later stricken from 
the record on the grounds that the "[s]econdary or indirect 
economic impacts of a water level determination do not bear on 
the statutory standard set forth in section 31.02(1)."  The 
stricken evidence included testimony and exhibits from experts 
who testified as to the potential economic effects of the water 
level determination on residential property values, business 
incomes, and tax revenues.  However, the DNR's decision 
                                                 
7 The majority holds: "We find that history, purpose, 
precedent, 
and 
the 
DNR's 
past 
practice 
support 
a 
broad 
interpretation of the phrase 'protect . . . property' so that 
the DNR is not limited to consideration of hydrologic damage to 
real property and riparian rights when making a water level 
determination under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1)."  Majority op., ¶132.   
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
17 
 
specifically noted 
its consideration of riparian property 
owner's interests in their property:  
The diminished ease of access experienced by many 
riparians and their desire for higher water levels, 
reflects their diminished utility and enjoyment of 
their property, which doubtless reduces the value of 
that property to them.  This diminished utility and 
enjoyment of the property, and the expectation that 
higher water would enhance the utility and enjoyment 
of riparian property, has been considered and weighed 
under the standards of Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1). 
(Emphasis added).   
¶177 As explained above, Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) states:  
"The department, in the interest of public rights in navigable 
waters or to promote safety and protect life, health and 
property[,] may regulate and control the level and flow of water 
in all navigable waters . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) 
(emphasis added).  The majority focuses on "protect . . . 
property" and interprets it to mean that striking the secondary 
or indirect economic impact evidence constituted reversible 
error.  The more reasonable interpretation of the statute, as 
demonstrated by the quotation set forth above, is that the DNR 
sufficiently considered the protection of property when making 
its determination under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1).   
¶178 In other statutes that the DNR administers, the 
legislature has specifically included language about such 
economic impact, whereas in § 31.02(1) the legislature has not 
signaled that the DNR must consider such secondary or indirect 
economic impact.  For example, Wis. Stat. § 30.195(2)(c)2 
requires consideration of whether the proposed change "will 
improve the economic or aesthetic value of the applicant's 
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
18 
 
land."  Wisconsin Stat. § 285.01(12) requires the DNR to 
consider "energy, economic and environmental impacts and other 
costs" to determine air-pollution regulation.  The DNR's 
permitting process for dams under Wis. Stat. § 31.06(3)(b) looks 
at whether the proposal is "in the public interest, considering 
ecological, aesthetic, economic and recreational values."  None 
of this language is present in Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1).  If the 
legislature intended that the DNR must consider such secondary 
or indirect economic impact, the legislature would have drafted 
the statute to signal such a requirement.8   
¶179 As the court of appeals aptly observed, the District's 
interpretation, now adopted by the majority, has no logical 
stopping point.  Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. DNR, 2011 WI App 
115, ¶43, 336 Wis. 2d 677, 803 N.W.2d 853.  If it is reversible 
error not to consider this type of secondary or indirect 
economic impact, what evidence is the fact-finder, in its 
discretion, allowed to exclude?  The court of appeals explained 
this problem: 
For example, it is unclear under the District's 
construction 
whether 
the 
DNR's 
consideration 
of 
economic effects on real property would be limited to 
property values of riparian owners or would also 
include the values of adjacent or area properties not 
situated directly on the lake.  Similarly, if the DNR 
were required to consider revenues of businesses 
directly linked to lake recreational activities, like 
                                                 
8 Further support for this proposition is found in the 
majority's explanation of zoning ordinances which explicitly 
require a consideration of the "tax base" when making zoning 
decisions. Majority op., ¶141. Wisconsin Stat. § 31.02(1) 
contains no such language evincing the legislature's intent that 
the DNR consider secondary or indirect economic evidence. 
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
19 
 
marinas and bait shops, would it also be required to 
consider revenues of businesses with less direct links 
to use of navigable waters, such as gas stations and 
convenience stores? 
Id., ¶43.  The majority's interpretation of this statute adds an 
unnecessary layer of confusion for the DNR when reviewing these 
cases.     
¶180 Instead of applying the governing statute or this 
court's interpretation of similar statutes, the majority relies 
on language from Railroad Commission cases from the early 1900s 
to support its conclusion that the legislature in 1915 did not 
intend to exclude riparian rights from consideration in Wis. 
Stat. § 31.02(1), and that therefore, it was reversible error to 
exclude evidence of such secondary or indirect economic impact 
to water level changes.9  The language in these Railroad 
Commission decisions, on closer examination, supports the DNR's 
position 
that 
the 
duty 
to 
protect 
property 
requires 
consideration of only physical impacts on property.  The 
                                                 
9 The majority also relies on a legislative report from 
1910, Report of the Comm. on Water Powers, Forestry, and 
Drainage of the Wis. Leg. 1910, 49th Leg., which explained that 
land near the shores of lakes was becoming very valuable.  See 
majority op., ¶135.  The majority then states: "In light of the 
legislative reports giving rise to the Water Powers Act 
containing the 'protect . . .  property' language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 31.02(1), one can reasonably infer that riparian residential 
property and lake-based businesses were prime considerations for 
protecting property."  Id., ¶136.  The majority fails to connect 
the observations in the legislative report with its "reasonable 
inference."  One could just as reasonably infer that protection 
from physical damage to lakeshore property was the prime 
consideration for including language about protecting property 
in the statute and that the legislature did not expect the 
Railroad Commission to consider such secondary or indirect 
economic impact from changing water levels. 
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
20 
 
majority finds its support, in one case, by focusing on what the 
Railroad Commission did not say—which is dubious support at 
best.  It finds its support in the second case by focusing on a 
passing 
reference 
to 
private 
development, 
while 
not 
acknowledging the actual basis given by the Railroad Commission 
for its holding—which clearly focuses on the potential for 
shoreline and property "to be destroyed." 
¶181 The first of the Railroad Commission cases on which 
the majority relies, Town of Bear Lake v. Wisconsin-Minnesota 
Light & Power Co., 16 W.R.C.R. 710 (1915), involved a dispute 
over the water level maintained by a dam and that level's 
physical impact on surrounding land.  The Railroad Commission 
stated: "[t]his level will not endanger life or health . . .  
[i]t will, however, affect property and overflow a large acreage 
of land . . . ."  Id. at 716.  The majority explains that the 
Railroad Commission's decision "did not explicitly limit the 
protection of property to only direct physical impacts."  
Majority op., ¶137.  The absence of an explicit limitation is 
not evidence that the statute requires consideration of such 
secondary or indirect economic impact; it is the natural result 
of the fact that Bear Lake was about physical flooding of 
property.   
¶182 The other Railroad Commission case, In re Determining 
the High Water Mark to be Established on the Rest Lake Reservoir 
Operated by the Chippewa and Flambeau Improvement Co., 16 
W.R.C.R. 727, 731 (1915), considered Rest Lake's water level, 
and like the Bear Lake decision, involved severe physical damage 
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
21 
 
to property.  The Chippewa & Flambeau Improvement Company 
requested permission from the Railroad Commission to adopt 
certain high and low water marks, but property owners vigorously 
protested——arguing that the wide variation in water levels 
negatively affected their property.  Id. at 731.  The Railroad 
Commission agreed with property owners that the "disastrous 
effects upon shore property are only too plainly visible" from 
such a great variation in the water level.  Id. at 734.  It 
described the consequences as follows:  
Banks are lined with dead trees, logs, rocks and 
debris in an effort to prevent the shore lines from 
being obliterated. . . .  When the banks give away 
large trees fall into the water.  In one instance, 
thirty large green timber trees were counted lying in 
the lake where the shore had been taken away this 
year. . . .   In places the old shore lines have 
disappeared . . . .  The gradual disappearance of what 
are now islands was fully shown by the testimony.  
Id.  While the Railroad Commission briefly mentioned that large 
sums of money were used to improve private homes along the lake, 
its ultimate reason for protecting this property was concern for 
potential physical damage rather than secondary or indirect 
economic impact.  In denying the petition, the Railroad 
Commission found, "[t]he effect of [the proposed water level] 
will be to give a very wide variation in levels, tending to 
destroy the shore line and property around the lakes."  Id. at 
738 (emphasis added).  Neither of these cases supports the 
majority's conclusion about the legislative intent in 1915.    
 
¶183 Further, the majority minimizes this court's past 
interpretation 
of 
similar 
statutory 
language, 
which 
has 
explicitly limited its reading to a narrow interpretation of the 
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
22 
 
language.  In City of New Lisbon v. Harebo, this Court held that 
a dam may "endanger property" when "by reason of its location, 
or manner of construction, or the character of the soil upon 
which it is built . . . it [would] tend to flood cities or 
villages or [would be] likely to give way and create havoc and 
destruction below the dam . . . ."  New Lisbon, 224 Wis. 66, 73, 
271 N.W. 659 (1937).  We made sure to point out that "we are of 
the opinion that this is as much as the section can be held to 
mean."  Id.  Thus, this court expressly limited the construction 
of "endanger property," and concluded that a dam would not 
endanger property if injury to the property resulted from 
"normal flowage by the ordinary operation of the dam."  Id.  The 
court's narrow reading of "endanger property" as applying to 
only physical damage and hydrologic events supports a limited 
reading of "protect . . . property" in Wis. Stat. § 31.02.10    
¶184 It is illogical and contrary to the plain meaning of 
the statute to hold, as the majority does, that language 
referring to "protect[ing] life, health and property" requires 
the DNR to consider such secondary or indirect economic impacts.  
                                                 
10 Another case that provides support for the conclusion 
that such secondary or indirect economic impact is not required 
to be considered is Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc., v. 
DNR (Environmental Decade 1983), 115 Wis. 2d 381, 340 N.W.2d 722 
(1983).  In Environmental Decade 1983, this court held that the 
DNR did not need to consider socioeconomic impact in determining 
whether it needed to issue an environmental impact study in 
connection with a permit.  Id. at 395.  While it is 
distinguishable on its facts (as noted by the majority), I agree 
with the DNR decision's assessment that this court's reasoning 
in Environmental Decade 1983 "applies with similar force here, 
even though that case involved action by the DNR under Chapter 
30, not Chapter 31, Stats."   
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
23 
 
It is apparent that the cases relied on by the majority do not 
lead to its conclusion.  Further, contrary to the majority's 
position, the plain language is clear and certainly does not 
compel the majority's conclusion.  The fact is that the DNR 
sufficiently 
considered 
the 
protection 
of 
property, 
and 
therefore, I conclude that it was not error to strike the 
secondary or indirect economic evidence that it struck.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶185  This case presents a question that the majority can——
indeed does——answer by interpreting Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1).  Yet 
the majority unnecessarily reaches out to the constitutional 
principle of the public trust doctrine from the Wisconsin 
Constitution, constricting the doctrine and misreading this 
court's precedent, especially the well-settled law articulated 
in Just v. Marinette County.  Wisconsin's long and robust 
history of protecting the public trust is widely acknowledged 
and respected.  The public trust doctrine imposes on the state, 
as trustee, the affirmative duty to protect, preserve, and 
promote the public's right to Wisconsin's waters. 
¶186 The 
majority opinion attempts to undermine this 
court's precedent, recharacterize its holdings, and rewrite 
history.  Instead of limiting itself to addressing only what 
must be addressed, the majority seizes this opportunity to limit 
the public trust doctrine in an unforeseen way, transforming the 
state's affirmative duty to protect the public trust into a 
legislative choice.  It needlessly unsettles our precedent and 
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
24 
 
weakens the public trust doctrine that is enshrined in the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  This represents a significant and 
disturbing shift in Wisconsin law.   
¶187 The majority also errs in expanding the type of 
evidence that the DNR must consider in these cases.  A 
straightforward interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) would 
not require the DNR to consider secondary or indirect economic 
impact when making water level determinations.  The economic 
evidence admitted during the ten-day contested case hearing was 
sufficient to discharge the DNR's duty to "protect . . . 
property," and the excluded evidence was not relevant or 
required.  The DNR has a difficult job to do under this statute, 
and in this case, the DNR did it well.  The decisions of the 
DNR, the circuit court, and the court of appeals each properly 
concluded that § 31.02(1) does not require consideration of such 
secondary or indirect economic impact.  The fact is that the DNR 
sufficiently 
considered 
the 
protection 
of 
property, 
and 
therefore, it was not error to strike the secondary or indirect 
economic evidence that it struck. 
¶188 For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent.  
¶189 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent.  
No.  2008AP1523.npc 
 
 
 
1