Title: Martin Marietta Magnesia Specialties, L.L.C. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Martin Marietta Magnesia Specialties, L.L.C. v. Pub. Util. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2011-
Ohio-4189.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-4189 
MARTIN MARIETTA MAGNESIA SPECIALTIES, L.L.C., APPELLANT, v. 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE. 
CALPHALON CORPORATION, APPELLANT, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES 
COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE. 
KRAFT FOODS GLOBAL, INC., APPELLANT, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES 
COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE. 
WORTHINGTON INDUSTRIES, APPELLANT, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES 
COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE. 
BRUSH WELLMAN, INC., APPELLANT, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES  
COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Martin Marietta Magnesia Specialties, L.L.C. v. Pub. Util. 
Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4189.] 
Termination date of special contracts entered into under R.C. 4905.31 — Public 
Utilities Commission erred in determining that it needed to refer to its 
earlier electric-deregulation decisions to interpret the plain language of 
the special contracts. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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(Nos. 2009-1064, 2009-1065, 2009-1067, 2009-1071, and 2009-1072 — 
Submitted May 24, 2011 — Decided August 25, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, No. 08-893-EL-CSS. 
APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, No. 08-145-EL-CSS. 
APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, No. 08-146-EL-CSS. 
      APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, No. 08-67-EL-CSS. 
APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, No. 08-254-EL-CSS. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J. 
I. Introduction 
{¶ 1} Martin Marietta Magnesia Specialties, L.L.C., the Calphalon 
Corporation, Kraft Foods Global, Inc., Worthington Industries, and Brush 
Wellman, Inc., each appeal from a decision of the Public Utilities Commission of 
Ohio (“PUCO”) that established February 2008 as the termination date for special 
contracts they entered into with the Toledo Edison Company for the sale of 
electricity.  These special contracts had been approved by the PUCO pursuant to 
R.C. 4905.31, which permits “reasonable arrangements” between public utilities 
and their customers.  Generally, such contracts include arrangements that differ 
from the standard rate schedules and are often tailored to a specific customer’s 
service. 
{¶ 2} The parties to these appeals have asked us to determine the 
termination date of appellants’ special contracts with Toledo Edison.  Appellants 
contend that Toledo Edison agreed in 2001 that the contracts would not terminate 
until Toledo Edison stopped collecting regulatory-transition charges from its 
customers.  Appellants further contend that their contracts did not expire until 
December 31, 2008, the date when Toledo Edison stopped collecting regulatory-
transition charges. 
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 3} In contrast, intervening appellee Toledo Edison and the PUCO 
maintain that the special contracts expired in February 2008, as provided by the 
commission’s orders in electric-deregulation cases involving Toledo Edison. 
{¶ 4} The PUCO found that based on the language of the special contracts 
and its orders in the earlier electric-deregulation cases, the contracts terminated in 
February 2008.  The commission erred in this determination, and we accordingly 
reverse its order and enter judgment in favor of appellants. 
II. Facts 
{¶ 5} In 2008, appellants filed complaints pursuant to R.C. 4905.26 
against Toledo Edison with the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.  See PUCO 
case No. 08-893-EL-CSS (Martin Marietta); PUCO case No. 08-145-EL-CSS 
(Calphalon); PUCO case No. 8-146-EL-CSS (Kraft); PUCO case No. 08-67-EL-
CSS (Worthington); and PUCO case No. 08-254-EL-CSS (Brush Wellman).  In 
proceedings before the commission, the attorney examiner consolidated the five 
complaints, and the parties then filed joint stipulations of fact. 
{¶ 6} The record reveals that between 1990 and 1997, Toledo Edison 
entered into an electric-service contract with each appellant, and those contracts 
became valid after approval by the commission pursuant to R.C. 4905.31.  
According to the terms of these contracts, appellants received discount pricing for 
electric service below the standard tariff rates charged by Toledo Edison to other 
large industrial customers. 
{¶ 7} On October 5, 1999, the General Assembly enacted Am.Sub.S.B. 
No. 3, codified as R.C. Chapter 4928, which restructured Ohio’s electric-utility 
industry to allow retail customers to buy electric service from providers other than 
local electric-service providers.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 3, 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 
7962 (“S.B. 3”).  Following passage of that legislation, in a series of cases 
involving Toledo Edison and other electric utilities, the PUCO attempted to ease 
the transition from a regulated rate structure to a market rate structure.  See 
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Toledo Edison’s electric-transition-plan case, case No. 99-1212-EL-ETP; rate-
stabilization-plan case, case No. 03-2144-EL-ATA; and rate-certainty-plan case, 
case No. 05-1125-EL-ATA (collectively, “the S.B. 3 cases”). 
{¶ 8} Through a series of agreed stipulations and commission orders in the 
S.B. 3 cases, special-contract customers were able to extend the duration of their 
contracts with Toledo Edison. 
{¶ 9} In the first S.B. 3 case, Toledo Edison’s electric-transition-plan case, 
special-contract customers were given a “one-time” opportunity to extend their 
special contracts, provided that those customers agreed to the offer by December 
31, 2001.  None of the appellants was a party to the electric-transition-plan case, 
but each received notice of the offer to extend its special contracts from Toledo 
Edison pursuant to the electric-transition-plan stipulation and the commission’s 
order approving that stipulation.  Each accepted the offer to extend the terms of its 
contract with Toledo Edison until the date that Toledo Edison stopped collecting 
its regulatory-transition charges. 
{¶ 10} Thereafter, each appellant amended its agreement with Toledo 
Edison, referred to as “the 2001 Amendments.”  Each agreement contained the 
following language: “This Agreement, as amended, shall terminate with the bill 
rendered for the electric usage through the date which RTC ceases for the [Toledo 
Edison] Company.”  The contracts defined “RTC” as regulatory-transition 
charges. 
{¶ 11} The next opportunity to extend these contracts occurred in the 
second S.B. 3 case, Toledo Edison’s rate-stabilization-plan case.  In that case, the 
commission again approved a joint stipulation filed by Toledo Edison and other 
parties allowing Toledo Edison’s customers to extend the term of any special 
contract beyond the extension approved in the electric-transition-plan case.  
However, unlike the electric-transition-plan case, neither the rate-stabilization-
plan stipulation nor the commission’s order required Toledo Edison to notify its 
January Term, 2011 
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special-contract customers of the opportunity to extend, and Toledo Edison did 
not directly communicate with appellants or any other special-contract customer 
regarding this option.  None of Toledo Edison’s special-contract customers, 
including appellants, was a party to the rate-stabilization-plan case.  Despite this, 
nine of Toledo Edison’s 46 special-contract customers requested Toledo Edison to 
extend the terms of their special contracts, and Toledo Edison agreed.  None of 
the appellants in this case, however, submitted a similar request to Toledo Edison 
to extend the term of its contract. 
{¶ 12} Another stipulated contract extension was approved in the third 
S.B. 3 case, Toledo Edison’s rate-certainty-plan case.  This stipulation provided 
that those special contracts that were extended under the rate-stabilization-plan 
case would continue in effect until December 31, 2008.  The stipulation further 
provided that special contracts extended under the electric-transition-plan case but 
not under the rate-stabilization-plan case—such as appellants’ contracts—would 
continue in effect until February 2008.  The stipulation stated that the February 
2008 termination date for such contracts was “consistent with the [electric-
transition-plan’s] method of calculation of the contract end dates.” 
{¶ 13} The commission’s order in the rate-certainty-plan case also 
authorized Toledo Edison to continue to recover regulatory-transition charges 
through December 31, 2008.  Accordingly, Toledo Edison continued to recover 
regulatory-transition charges after February 2008, through December 31, 2008.  
Notably, appellants were not parties to the rate-certainty-plan case and were not 
notified that an end date for special contracts would be established in that case. 
{¶ 14} Thus, following the order in the rate-certainty-plan case, 
appellants’ contracts were arguably scheduled to terminate (1) according to the 
contracts, upon the termination of the regulatory-transition charges and (2) 
according to the rate-certainty-plan order, in February 2008. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 15} Between February 2006 and September 2007, Toledo Edison 
informed appellants that their special contracts would terminate in February 2008, 
and in response, between January and July 2008, appellants filed the underlying 
complaints, alleging that Toledo Edison’s attempt to unilaterally change the plain 
language of the special contracts was unreasonable and unlawful.  According to 
appellants, the 2001 Amendments to their special contracts provided that the 
contracts were to terminate on the date that Toledo Edison stopped collecting 
regulatory-transition charges, which turned out to be December 31, 2008.  
Appellants complained that despite this provision of the contract, Toledo Edison 
intended to terminate the contracts in February 2008,  the date set by the 
commission in the third S.B. 3 case, ten months before the utility ceased 
collecting the regulatory-transition charges. 
{¶ 16} Toledo Edison subsequently entered into escrow agreements with 
Worthington, Calphalon, Kraft, and Brush Wellman, whereby those appellants 
agreed to escrow the difference between what those appellants and Toledo Edison 
alleged should be the cost of electric service between February 2008 and 
December 31, 2008.  There is no escrow agreement between Martin Marietta and 
Toledo Edison. 
{¶ 17} On February 19, 2009, the commission issued its order dismissing 
appellants’ complaints.  The commission found that appellants’ special contracts 
terminated in February 2008, and it noted that the electric-transition-plan 
stipulation provided that Toledo Edison’s collection of regulatory-transition 
charges would continue until its cumulative distribution sales reached a certain 
level based on the number of kilowatt-hours.  The commission concluded that the 
February 2008 contract end date—which was established in the rate-certainty-
plan case—was consistent with the electric-transition-plan stipulation’s “original 
method of calculation” of the contract-termination dates agreed to by Toledo 
Edison and appellants in the 2001 Amendments.  Because the electric-transition-
January Term, 2011 
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plan stipulation formed the basis for the 2001 Amendments, the commission 
concluded that appellants had agreed to Toledo Edison’s “offer” that the electric-
transition plan’s method of calculation would determine the termination dates for 
appellants’ special contracts. 
{¶ 18} Appellants timely filed a joint application for rehearing, but the 
commission denied that application. 
{¶ 19} These appeals followed.  Because the appeals share identical facts 
and legal issues, we consolidated these cases for briefing and oral argument.  122 
Ohio St.3d 1463, 2009-Ohio-3385, 909 N.E.2d 639.  Appellants jointly raise four 
propositions of law.  For the reasons discussed below, we sustain appellants’ first 
proposition of law, reverse the commission’s orders, and do not reach the 
remaining propositions of law. 
III.  Standard of Review 
{¶ 20} “R.C. 4903.13 provides that a PUCO order shall be reversed, 
vacated, or modified by this court only when, upon consideration of the record, 
the court finds the order to be unlawful or unreasonable.”  Constellation 
NewEnergy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 104 Ohio St.3d 530, 2004-Ohio-6767, 820 
N.E.2d 885, ¶ 50.  We will not reverse or modify a PUCO decision as to questions 
of fact when the record contains sufficient probative evidence to show that the 
commission’s decision was not manifestly against the weight of the evidence and 
was not so clearly unsupported by the record as to show misapprehension, 
mistake, or willful disregard of duty.  Monongahela Power Co. v. Pub. Util. 
Comm., 104 Ohio St.3d 571, 2004-Ohio-6896, 820 N.E.2d 921, ¶ 29.  The 
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the PUCO’s decision is against 
the manifest weight of the evidence or is clearly unsupported by the record.  Id. 
IV. Appellants’ First Proposition of Law 
{¶ 21} In their first proposition of law, appellants contend that the 
commission erred when it failed to apply the clear and unambiguous language of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the 2001 Amendments to their special contracts.  They argue that the 2001 
Amendments expressly state that their contracts would terminate on the date that 
Toledo Edison ceased its collection of regulatory-transition charges, i.e., 
December 31, 2008, but Toledo Edison terminated their contracts in February 
2008.  Appellants therefore argue that the commission unlawfully and 
unreasonably disregarded the plain language of the 2001 Amendments when it 
allowed Toledo Edison to terminate appellants’ contracts in February 2008, ten 
months before the regulatory transition-charges ended. 
A. The PUCO ignored the plain language of the 2001 Amendments 
to appellants’ special contracts 
{¶ 22} When confronted with an issue of contract interpretation, the role 
of the court is to give effect to the intent of the parties to that agreement.  The 
court examines the contract as a whole and presumes that the intent of the parties 
is reflected in the language used in the agreement.  Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 
100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 11.  “Where the parties 
following negotiation make mutual promises which thereafter are integrated into 
an unambiguous contract duly executed by them, courts will not give the contract 
a construction other than that which the plain language of the contract provides.”  
Aultman Hosp. Assn. v. Community Mut. Ins. Co. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 51, 544 
N.E.2d 920, paragraph one of the syllabus.  “When the language of a written 
contract is clear, a court may look no further than the writing itself to find the 
intent of the parties.”  Westfield Ins. Co. at ¶ 11.  Evidence cannot be introduced 
to show an agreement between the parties that is materially different from that 
expressed by the clear and unambiguous language of the instrument.  Blosser v. 
Enderlin (1925), 113 Ohio St. 121, 148 N.E. 393, paragraph two of the syllabus.  
“As a matter of law, a contract is unambiguous if it can be given a definite legal 
meaning.”  Westfield Ins. Co. at ¶ 11. 
January Term, 2011 
9 
 
{¶ 23} The 2001 Amendment to appellants’ special contracts provided that 
those contracts “shall terminate with the bill rendered for the electric usage 
through the date which [the regulatory-transition charge] ceases for the [Toledo 
Edison] Company.”  This language is clear and unambiguous.  Accordingly, the 
commission was bound to give effect to the parties’ intent, as expressed in the 
plain language of the agreements. 
{¶ 24} Contrary to the commission’s determination that appellants and 
Toledo Edison had agreed in the 2001 Amendments that the contract-termination 
dates would be determined by a calculation that tied regulatory-transition charges 
to Toledo Edison’s distribution sales,  nothing in the 2001 Amendments specifies 
that appellants’ special contracts would end when Toledo Edison’s distribution 
sales reach a certain level.  Because no such provision was included, and because 
the actual termination provision is unambiguous, the commission should have 
determined the intent of the parties to the special contracts from the four corners 
of the document. 
{¶ 25} The parties here agreed that the termination date of the contracts 
would be the termination of the regulatory-transition charges.  Thus, based on the 
plain language of these agreements, Toledo Edison should not have been allowed 
to terminate appellants’ special contracts in February 2008; rather, they remained 
in effect until December 31, 2008, when the utility ceased collecting the 
regulatory-transition charges. 
B. Counterarguments of Toledo Edison and the PUCO 
{¶ 26} In response to appellant’s first proposition of law, Toledo Edison 
and the PUCO raise four counterarguments.  None has merit. 
1. The S.B. 3 cases did not provide the language of the  
special contracts with special meaning 
{¶ 27} On appeal, the PUCO argues that the S.B. 3 cases were an integral 
part of appellants’ special contracts and provided special meaning to the language 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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used in the agreements.  The PUCO maintains that appellants’ special contracts 
are entirely dependent on the commission’s S.B. 3 orders because (1) the 
contracts were first extended through the 2001 Amendments pursuant to the 
electric-transition-plan case and (2) the commission fixed the end point of Toledo 
Edison’s collection of regulatory-transition charges in the rate-certainty-plan case. 
{¶ 28} For its part, Toledo Edison contends that it would be impossible to 
determine the intent of the contracting parties without reference to the 
commission’s orders in the S.B. 3 cases.  In Toledo Edison’s view, the 
commission necessarily had to review the circumstances surrounding the 2001 
Amendments to the special contracts to determine the meaning of “regulatory- 
transition charges” and when those charges would cease according to the 
agreements.  Otherwise, Toledo Edison avers, the termination language contained 
in the 2001 Amendments had no meaning. 
{¶ 29} We recognize that when circumstances surrounding an agreement 
invest the language of the contract with a special meaning, extrinsic evidence can 
be considered in an effort to give effect to the parties’ intention.  See Shifrin v. 
Forest City Ents., Inc. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 635, 597 N.E.2d 499, syllabus.  See 
also Graham v. Drydock Coal Co. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 311, 313-314, 667 
N.E.2d 949 (extrinsic evidence is admissible when circumstances surrounding the 
agreement give the plain language of the contract special meaning); Latina v. 
Woodpath Dev. Co. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 212, 214, 567 N.E.2d 262 (parol 
evidence is admissible to provide special meaning given by the industry to 
language employed in a contract). 
{¶ 30} However, the circumstances do not show that the commission’s 
orders in the S.B. 3 cases invested the language of the special contracts with any 
special meaning or reflected the intent of the contracting parties.  None of the 
appellants was a party to the S.B. 3 cases or joined in the stipulations approved by 
the commission in those cases.  Further, the 2001 Amendments did not tie 
January Term, 2011 
11 
 
termination of the contracts to Toledo Edison’s distribution sales reaching a 
certain level.  Rather, the 2001 Amendments tied termination of the contracts to 
the end of the regulatory-transition charges.  Thus, the commission erred in 
relying on the S.B. 3 cases to alter the plain meaning of appellants’ special 
contracts and in allowing Toledo Edison to terminate the special contracts in 
February 2008, when it continued to collect regulatory-transition charges until 
December 2008. 
2. The commission did not invoke its authority under R.C. 4905.31 
 to supervise or modify the special contracts 
{¶ 31} Both Toledo Edison and the PUCO contend that appellants’ special 
contracts are “reasonable arrangements” pursuant to R.C. 4905.31, and as such, 
are subject to the commission’s continuing supervision and regulation, and they 
maintain that the commission acted within this authority when it determined the 
end dates for appellants’ contracts.  The PUCO further argues that R.C. 4905.31 
gives the commission authority to modify appellants’ special contracts. 
{¶ 32} There is no dispute that pursuant to R.C. 4905.31, the commission 
has authority to regulate, supervise, and modify special contracts.  But nowhere in 
the commission’s orders in this case did it claim to be using that authority to 
supervise, regulate, or modify appellants’ special contracts.  In fact, the 
commission expressly denied on rehearing that it modified the terms of these 
special contracts in the underlying cases.  Given that the commission never 
invoked the authority provided by R.C. 4905.31 in the proceedings below and 
affirmatively disclaimed that it was modifying the contracts, it cannot defend its 
decision on that basis on appeal. 
3. Toledo Edison’s regulatory-transition charges  
did not cease on January 1, 2006 
{¶ 33} Both Toledo Edison and the PUCO claim that the collecting of 
regulatory-transition charges referred to in the 2001 Amendments ended long 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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before appellants’ special contracts were terminated in February 2008.  
Specifically, they contend that Toledo Edison stopped collecting those particular 
regulatory-transition charges on January 1, 2006.  Therefore, they contend, the 
commission properly determined that the contracts did not extend to December 
31, 2008. 
{¶ 34} According to Toledo Edison and the PUCO, the rate-certainty-plan 
case ordered that new regulatory charges—the “RTC rate components,” which are 
made up of regulatory-transition charges and extended regulatory-transition 
charges—were to replace the regulatory-transition charges referred to in the 2001 
Amendments.  According to appellees, the extended regulatory-transition charges 
replaced the regulatory-transition charges referenced in the 2001 Amendments to 
appellants’ contracts.  That is, the PUCO and Toledo Edison concede that Toledo 
Edison continued to collect regulatory-transition charges after January 1, 2006, 
but they maintain that those charges were not the same regulatory-transition 
charges originally tied to the termination of the special contracts.  Instead, they 
claim that those “original” regulatory-transition charges ended in January 2006 
and that Toledo Edison collected the RTC rate components after January 2006 
and until December 31, 2008. 
{¶ 35} During oral argument before this court, counsel for the PUCO 
contradicted the statements in the PUCO brief and claimed that Toledo Edison 
stopped collecting regulatory-transition charges in February 2008, rather than 
January 2006.  Counsel maintained that the regulatory-transition charges referred 
to in appellants’ special contracts were designed to recover different costs than 
those costs intended to be recovered by the extended regulatory-transition charge.  
Counsel explained that the regulatory-transition charges were implemented to 
recover Toledo Edison’s “stranded” costs, while the extended regulatory-
transition charges recovered Toledo Edison’s deferred fuel costs.  The PUCO’s 
counsel argued that the regulatory-transition charges set forth in the 2001 
January Term, 2011 
13 
 
Amendments were no longer being collected, because Toledo Edison was no 
longer recovering its stranded costs.  Rather, according to counsel, from February 
2008 until the end of December 2008, Toledo Edison was recovering its deferred 
fuel costs solely through the collection of the extended regulatory-transition 
charges. 
{¶ 36} However, these arguments are contradicted by the agreed 
stipulation of facts that the commission relied on to resolve this case.  Toledo 
Edison and appellants filed a joint stipulation of facts in these cases when they 
were before the commission that stated that the rate-certainty-plan case 
“authorized [Toledo Edison] to recover [regulatory-transition charges] through 
December 31, 2008, and [Toledo Edison] has continued to recover [regulatory-
transition charges] after [appellants’] February 2008 billing dates.”  The parties 
further stipulated that Toledo Edison “project[ed] its Regulatory Transition 
Charge will cease on or before December 31, 2008.” 
{¶ 37} The joint stipulation was submitted into evidence on July 23, 2008, 
well after the dates (January 1, 2006, and February 2008) on which Toledo Edison 
and the PUCO now allege that regulatory-transition charges had ended.  
Moreover, although the agreed stipulation references both the regulatory-
transition charges and the extended regulatory-transition charges, the stipulation 
makes no distinction between the regulatory-transition charges referred to in the 
2001 Amendments and those discussed in the rate-certainty-plan case. 
{¶ 38} Toledo Edison stipulated that it did not stop collecting regulatory-
transition charges until December 31, 2008.  If Toledo Edison had been collecting 
only extended regulatory-transition charges or the RTC rate components between 
February and December 2008—as it and the PUCO now allege—certainly Toledo 
Edison could have stipulated to that fact or litigated the issue.  For whatever 
reason, Toledo Edison did neither. 
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{¶ 39} Further, the commission never found that Toledo Edison had 
stopped collecting regulatory-transition charges on January 1, 2006, or in 
February 2008, or at any other time before December 31, 2008.  If Toledo Edison 
had actually stopped collecting regulatory-transition charges in February 2008, 
the commission would have said so.  Instead, the commission held that the 
contract-termination dates were consistent with the “method of calculation” for 
when regulatory-transition charges should have ended, not when those charges 
actually ended. 
4. Appellants’ complaints were not an improper collateral attack 
 on the commission’s prior orders 
{¶ 40} Appellants filed complaints pursuant to R.C. 4905.26 challenging 
Toledo Edison’s right to terminate the special contracts in February 2008.  The 
commission dismissed appellants’ complaints, finding in part that the complaints 
were an improper collateral attack upon the commission’s orders in the rate-
stabilization-plan and rate-certainty-plan cases, the latter of which established the 
contract-termination dates.  According to the commission, to allow appellants to 
collaterally attack its prior decisions “at this late date” may give appellants an 
unfair advantage over other special-contract customers who followed those cases 
and took the risk of extending their contracts when today’s market rates were 
unknown.  Toledo Edison and the PUCO claim on appeal that the commission 
acted reasonably and lawfully in dismissing appellants’ complaints on this 
ground. 
{¶ 41} Contrary to the commission’s finding, its prior orders can be 
collaterally attacked through R.C. 4905.26 complaint proceedings.  We have long 
held that “R.C. 4905.26 is broad in scope * * *. * * * [R]easonable grounds may 
exist to raise issues which might strictly be viewed as ‘collateral attacks’ on 
previous orders.”  Allnet Communications Servs., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1987), 
January Term, 2011 
15 
 
32 Ohio St.3d 115, 117, 512 N.E.2d 350, citing W. Res. Transit Auth. v. Pub. Util. 
Comm. (1974), 39 Ohio St.2d 16, 68 O.O.2d 9, 313 N.E.2d 811. 
{¶ 42} As to the commission’s concern that appellants may have gained an 
unfair advantage over those Toledo Edison special-contract customers who 
extended their contracts when today’s market prices were unknown, that concern 
is irrelevant to the critical issue before us:  the meaning of the language contained 
in the 2001 Amendments to appellants’ special contracts. 
{¶ 43} Intertwined with its collateral-attack argument, Toledo Edison also 
raises the equitable defenses of waiver and laches.  Toledo Edison complains that 
it informed appellants of the February 2008 actual termination of their contracts in 
2006 and 2007, but the first appellant to file a complaint with the commission 
challenging the termination date waited until January 2008 to do so.  These 
defenses are not well taken. 
{¶ 44} Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known legal right.  State 
ex rel. Madden v. Windham Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1989), 42 
Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 537 N.E.2d 646.  Appellants filed their complaints with the 
commission between January and July 2008, at the latest only a few months after 
Toledo Edison’s attempt to terminate the contracts in February 2008.  Toledo 
Edison offers no argument or evidence as to how appellants have voluntarily 
waived their claims. 
{¶ 45} Toledo Edison’s laches argument also lacks merit.  The elements of 
laches are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence 
of an excuse for such a delay, (3) knowledge—actual or constructive—of the 
injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party.  State ex rel. Cater v. N. 
Olmsted (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 315, 325, 631 N.E.2d 1048.  Toledo Edison must 
establish all four elements, but it has not shown that there was any unreasonable 
or prejudicial delay in this case.  At most, a four-month window occurred between 
termination of the contracts and litigation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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C. Conclusion to First Proposition of Law 
{¶ 46} Appellants’ first proposition of law is well taken.  The commission 
erred in determining that evidence of the stipulations and orders in Toledo 
Edison’s electric-transition-plan and rate-certainty-plan cases were needed to 
interpret the plain language of the 2001 Amendments, which provided that 
appellants’ special contracts were to continue until Toledo Edison stopped 
collecting the regulatory-transition charges.  That occurred on December 31, 
2008.  Accordingly, the commission unlawfully and unreasonably allowed Toledo 
Edison to terminate the special contracts in February 2008. 
V. Appellants’ Second, Third, and Fourth Propositions of Law 
{¶ 47} Due to our disposition of the first proposition of law, we need not 
address appellants’ remaining propositions of law. 
VI. Conclusion 
{¶ 48} The decision of the commission is reversed, and we enter judgment 
for appellants. 
Orders reversed. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, CUPP, 
and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Craig I. Smith; Kravitz, Brown & Dortch, L.L.C., and Michael D. Dortch; 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Thomas J. O’Brien, and Matthew W. Warnock; and 
Crowell & Moring, L.L.P., and Daniel W. Wolff, for appellants. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, William L. Wright, Section Chief, 
and Thomas W. McNamee and John H. Jones, Assistant Attorneys General, for 
appellee. 
 
Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., James F. Lang, and N. Trevor 
Alexander, for intervening appellee. 
______________________