Title: Commonwealth v. Whitfield

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-13323 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SHAMIA WHITFIELD. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 6, 2023. - May 19, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Discovery, Disclosure of identity of 
informer.  Privileged Communication.  Evidence, Informer, 
Privileged communication, Relevancy and materiality. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on August 31, 2022. 
 
The case was reported by Wendlandt, J. 
 
 
Kathryn Sherman, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
John P. Warren for the respondent. 
Luke Ryan, Molly Ryan Strehorn, & Joshua M. Daniels, for 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  This matter is before us on a reservation and 
report by a single justice of the Commonwealth's petition for 
2 
 
relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.1  The Commonwealth 
challenges a Boston Municipal Court judge's order allowing the 
defendant's motion for discovery and requiring the Commonwealth 
to disclose significant, albeit redacted, information about a 
confidential informant (informant).2  The Commonwealth relied on 
information from the informant to obtain a search warrant that 
led to the seizure of firearms from the defendant's apartment, 
as well as the defendant's arrest on charges of unlicensed 
possession of firearms and ammunition.  The Commonwealth 
maintains that the information ordered to be disclosed is 
protected under the confidential informant privilege.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 472 Mass. 827, 847 (2015), S.C., 482 
Mass. 838 (2019), citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 
60 (1957); Mass. G. Evid. § 509 (2019). 
 
We conclude that, if disclosed, the information requested 
in the defendant's motion for discovery would, in effect, reveal 
the informant's identity.  In addition, the defendant does not 
dispute that disclosure of the informant's identity would give 
 
1 Although the Commonwealth commenced this action by filing 
a petition in the county court, for convenience we refer to the 
respondent as the "defendant." 
 
 
2 This case is one of two that we decide today involving a 
petition for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, concerning 
the potential disclosure of information that has been asserted 
as protected by the informant privilege.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gandia, 492 Mass.     (2023). 
3 
 
rise to a concern for the informant's safety.  Accordingly, the 
Commonwealth's invocation of the informant privilege was proper, 
and the burden shifted to the defendant to show that the 
requested information was material and relevant to her defense.  
See Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 847.  We further hold that the 
defendant failed to make the required showing here; accordingly, 
the motion judge abused her discretion in allowing the 
defendant's motion for disclosure.3  The case is remanded to the 
county court for entry of a judgment reversing the order 
allowing the defendant's motion for discovery and remanding the 
matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.4 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts as found by the 
motion judge, supplemented with undisputed facts from the 
record.5  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 481 Mass. 710, 712, 
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 247 (2019).  On April 16, 2019, 
 
3 The defendant conceded at oral argument that, if this 
court determined that the Commonwealth properly invoked the 
informant privilege and that the standard set forth in 
Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 472 Mass. 827, 846-848 (2015), S.C., 
482 Mass. 838 (2019), applied to the defendant's discovery 
motion, the defendant had failed to meet her burden under that 
standard.  For the reasons discussed infra, we would reach the 
same conclusion with or without the defendant's concession. 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
5 The defendant's motion, with the assent of the 
Commonwealth, to expand the record to include the transcripts of 
eight hearings that took place in the Boston Municipal Court, is 
allowed. 
4 
 
Detective Brian Ball of the Boston police department (BPD), 
acting on information provided by a "carded"6 informant, filed an 
application for a search warrant, with a supporting affidavit, 
to search the defendant's person and her home for firearms.  The 
informant had told Ball and BPD Detective John Burrows that, 
within the previous thirty days, the informant had seen the 
defendant in possession of two black rifles on multiple 
occasions.  One of the rifles was an AK-47-style weapon with a 
wooden stock and curved, "banana" feeding device, and the other 
was described as long with a straight feeding device.  The 
informant had seen the weapons at the defendant's house and had 
observed them being loaded and unloaded with live ammunition.  
The informant identified the defendant from a photograph.7 
 
 
6 A "carded" informant is one whose identity is known to 
commanding officers and whose cooperation with law enforcement 
has been approved.  BPD's use of informants is governed by rule 
333 of the BPD Rules and Procedures.  This rule requires BPD to 
keep certain records on each confidential informant, including 
payment receipts, debriefing reports, confidential informant 
cards, photographs, informant working agreements, and criminal 
history checks of the informant.  With the exception of the 
confidential informant card and the informant working agreement, 
all other BPD records concerning a confidential informant must 
refer to the informant only by a code substituted for the 
informant's name.  Boston Police Department Rules and 
Procedures, Rule 333:  Confidential Informant Procedures (Mar. 
1, 2006). 
 
 
7 The photograph is described in Ball's affidavit as a 
"sanitized booking photo[graph]."  The record before us does not 
indicate exactly which measures were taken to "sanitize" the 
photograph at issue here.  However, we note that the term 
 
5 
 
 
The warrant affidavit also included some information about 
the informant's reliability.  Ball averred that, on at least 
three prior occasions, the informant had provided reliable 
information to the BPD that had led to numerous arrests for 
firearms and drug violations.  Examples of these arrests were 
included in the warrant affidavit.  The informant also had 
informed police of the location of an individual who was wanted 
on a default warrant, leading to that individual's arrest.  In 
addition, the informant had conducted controlled purchases of 
drugs, which led to the seizure of drugs and firearms.  Ball 
averred that the informant has maintained regular and prompt 
contact with investigators during multiple BPD investigations. 
 
In describing the informant's prior involvement in BPD 
investigations, Ball purposefully omitted certain information to 
protect the identity of the informant.  Specifically, Ball 
omitted the precise dates of the investigations and the 
identities of those arrested, as well as the seizures that the 
informant's information had produced.  Ball stated that the 
defendant, who was then under BPD investigation, might know one 
or more "individuals who have come into contact with" the 
informant as a result of the informant's cooperation with BPD.  
 
"sanitized," when used in these contexts, indicates that 
information identifying the photograph as a booking photograph 
has been removed.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 594 
(2005). 
6 
 
The informant requested anonymity due to safety concerns.  Ball 
averred that disclosure of the informant's identity "would pose 
an undue risk to [the informant's] safety" and would place the 
informant in "imminent danger of bodily harm or death."  Ball 
also averred that such disclosure would harm the BPD's 
reputation for protecting informants and, thus, would hinder the 
BPD's investigations and its ability to recruit cooperators.  An 
assistant clerk of the Boston Municipal Court issued the warrant 
on April 16, 2019. 
 
BPD officers executed the search warrant on April 22, 2019.  
After advising the defendant of the Miranda warnings, officers 
inquired whether there were any firearms in the house.  The 
defendant responded that the guns were under her bed and a crib 
in her bedroom.  Officers recovered a Model 9 rifle and a 
twelve-gauge shotgun from the bedroom, and loose ammunition and 
shotgun shells from several locations in the apartment.8  The 
defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of possession 
of a firearm without a firearm identification (FID) card, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (h), and one count of possession of ammunition 
without an FID card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h). 
 
Citing Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (C), as appearing in 
442 Mass. 1518 (2004), and Mass. R. Crim. P. 17, 378 Mass. 885 
 
 
8 At the time of the warrant's execution, no one present in 
the apartment was licensed to possess firearms or ammunition. 
7 
 
(1979), the defendant filed a motion seeking discovery of 
"rewards and promises" offered to the informant, and documents 
and information related to the informant's participation in 
other criminal investigations.  Specifically, the defendant 
requested "all documents" held by the BPD involving its 
recruitment of the informant and its work with the informant on 
any prior occasion, including debriefing reports.  These 
included any documents regarding whether the informant was paid 
or made agreements with any law enforcement agency, and any 
related documentation.  The defendant also requested a "complete 
history" of the informant's involvement with "any law 
enforcement agency," including case names, docket numbers, and 
the outcomes of those cases.  In addition, the defendant sought 
disclosure of the dates of warrants to which the informant had 
contributed, and copies of any police reports that pertained to 
the informant. 
 
The defendant argued that the requested information was 
necessary because the warrant lacked indicia of the informant's 
reliability, credibility, and veracity.  See Commonwealth v. 
Amral, 407 Mass. 511, 520 (1990), citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 154, 155-156 (1978) (establishing defendant's entitlement 
to in camera hearing where defendant asserts facts that cast 
doubt on veracity of material representations in warrant 
affidavit concerning reliability of confidential informant).  
8 
 
The defendant specifically did not request the identity of the 
informant, positing further that "the requested information 
should in no way reveal the identity of the informant."  The 
Commonwealth filed an opposition, arguing that the requested 
information was protected by the informant privilege, see 
Commonwealth v. Dias, 451 Mass. 463, 468 (2008), and that its 
disclosure effectively would identify the informant. 
 
At a nonevidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion, the 
prosecutor offered to provide the defendant with receipts of any 
monetary transactions between the BPD and the informant.  The 
prosecutor asserted, however, that the Commonwealth was not 
obligated to disclose the requested information if there were a 
"safety concern."  He also observed that, to overcome the 
privilege, the defendant bore the burden of showing that the 
information was material and relevant, and necessary to the 
administration of a fair trial.  Defense counsel maintained that 
the information sought in the discovery motion corresponded with 
the information that the BPD was required to retain as part of 
its collaboration with any informant and offered to sign a 
protective order.  He also observed that he believed the motion 
was appropriate, given the difficulty defendants confront in 
prevailing on motions to suppress. 
 
The judge subsequently issued written findings of fact and 
a decision allowing the motion in full.  In the decision, the 
9 
 
judge recognized that, "[a]ssuming that the Commonwealth has 
asserted the informer's privilege, the defendant must first make 
a showing that the discovery sought is both 'material and 
relevant.'"  The judge then concluded that the information the 
defendant sought was "relevant and material to the issue of 
probable cause" and was "essential" for defense counsel's 
"preparation for a zealous defense . . . regarding his client's 
anticipated [m]otion to [s]uppress."  See Amral, 407 Mass. 
at 518. 
 
The factual findings on which the judge's decision was 
based included the following:  (1) "[t]he application for [the] 
search warrant contained no particularity about [the 
informant's] track record"; and (2) "[d]isclosure of BPD Rule 
333 information, via code number, will not reveal the true 
identity of [the informant]."  With these factual findings in 
mind, the judge reasoned that the Commonwealth's offer to 
disclose records of payments received by the informant was "not 
sufficient to test the veracity of the affidavit and/or the 
reliability of [the informant]."  The judge concluded that 
because disclosure of the information requested, using the 
informant's code number, would not reveal the informant's 
identity, such disclosure properly balanced the informant's 
safety with the defendant's rights to due process and to a 
zealous defense. 
10 
 
 
The Commonwealth moved for reconsideration.  A decision on 
that motion was delayed for approximately one year, due to 
scheduling issues resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic; the 
Commonwealth subsequently filed a motion for a decision on its 
motion for reconsideration.  In response to the Commonwealth's 
request for a decision, the judge ordered defense counsel to 
submit an affidavit in support of the defendant's original 
motion for discovery.  In the ordered affidavit, defense counsel 
averred that, inter alia, "[t]he search warrant affidavit does 
not contain any information regarding [the informant]'s track 
record or anything that could indicate the veracity of [the 
informant]," and "[c]ounsel needs this information to prepare 
for trial." 
 
At a subsequent nonevidentiary hearing, the prosecutor 
argued that defense counsel's affidavit did not satisfy the 
"high standard" to establish that the requested information was 
relevant and material to the defense, and essential to a fair 
determination of the case.  When the judge commented that the 
prosecutor had provided "no information" about the informant's 
reliability, the prosecutor responded that the defendant was not 
permitted to attack the reliability of the informant through a 
discovery motion and had to file a motion to suppress in order 
to do so.  The judge denied the motion for reconsideration, 
ordered the Commonwealth to produce all ordered discovery by no 
11 
 
later than September 2, 2022, two weeks from the date of the 
hearing, and ordered that a show cause hearing be held if the 
discovery were not produced by that date. 
 
On August 31, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a petition for 
extraordinary relief in the county court pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3.  A single justice then stayed the discovery 
deadline and reserved and reported the matter to this court.9 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  We review a 
decision on a motion for disclosure of information subject to 
the Commonwealth's assertion of the informant's privilege for an 
abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. D.M., 480 Mass. 1004, 
1006 (2018).  Where, as here, the motion judge conducted a 
nonevidentiary hearing, and the record before the judge 
consisted only of documentary evidence, such as the warrant 
affidavit, "'we are in the same position as the motion judge' to 
 
 
9 Where the single justice has exercised her discretion to 
reserve and report the matter, we proceed to adjudicate the 
merits.  See Martin v. Commonwealth, 451 Mass. 113, 119 (2008).  
However, we reiterate that neither this court nor a single 
justice thereof "is required to review, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, the substantive merits of every confidential 
disclosure order."  Commonwealth v. D.M., 480 Mass. 1004, 1004 
n.2 (2018).  "To the contrary, disclosure of information 
relating to confidential informants and witnesses does not in 
and of itself constitute exceptional circumstances" warranting 
exercise of this court's extraordinary power of superintendence.  
Id.  No party, including the Commonwealth, should expect this 
court to exercise its extraordinary powers of general 
superintendence lightly.  See Commonwealth v. Richardson, 454 
Mass. 1005, 1005-1006 (2009), citing Commonwealth v. Narea, 454 
Mass. 1003, 1004 n.1 (2009). 
12 
 
assess the documentary evidence put forward by the parties."  
Johnson, 481 Mass. at 715, quoting Commonwealth v. Monroe, 472 
Mass. 461, 464 (2015).  See Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 
645, 654-655 (2018) ("We now affirm the principle that an 
appellate court may independently review documentary evidence, 
and that lower court findings drawn from such evidence are not 
entitled to deference"). 
"An appellate court's review of a [motion] judge's decision 
for abuse of discretion must give great deference to the judge's 
exercise of discretion; it is plainly not an abuse of discretion 
simply because a reviewing court would have reached a different 
result."  Vazquez Diaz v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 336, 344 
(2021), quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 
(2014).  Concluding that there was an abuse of discretion does 
not equate to a finding that "the judge was not conscientious 
or, for that matter, not intelligent or honest."  Vazquez Diaz, 
supra at 345, quoting L.L., supra.  Rather, "a judge's 
discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of discretion where 
we conclude the judge made a clear error of judgment in weighing 
the factors relevant to the decision, such that the decision 
falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives."  Vazquez 
Diaz, supra, quoting L.L., supra. 
 
b.  Informant privilege.  "The government's privilege not 
to disclose the identity of an informant has long been 
13 
 
recognized in this Commonwealth."  Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 846, 
quoting Dias, 451 Mass. at 468.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 509.  The 
privilege is meant to "encourage 'every citizen' in his [or her] 
'duty . . . to communicate to [the] government any information 
which [the citizen] has of the commission of an offense against 
its laws."  Commonwealth v. Swenson, 368 Mass. 268, 276 (1975), 
quoting Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487, 488 (1872).  
"While the privilege is not absolute, it should be respected as 
far as reasonably possible consistent with fairness to a 
defendant" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Shaughnessy, 455 Mass. 346, 353 (2009).  The scope of the 
informant privilege is limited by its underlying purpose:  
"where the disclosure of the contents of a communication will 
not tend to reveal the identity of an informer, the contents are 
not privileged."  Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60. 
 
The informant privilege thus "extends to information that 
would tend to reveal the identity of the informant" (citation 
omitted).  United States v. Tzannos, 460 F.3d 128, 140 (1st Cir. 
2006).  As such, the privilege "not only protects the release of 
the name of the informant but also forbids the disclosure of 
details that would in effect identify the informant" (emphasis 
in original).  Commonwealth v. John, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 702, 706 
(1994).  See Commonwealth v. Douzanis, 384 Mass. 434, 436 n.4 
(1981) (disclosure of dates, times, and locations of all 
14 
 
meetings between defendant and informant, as well as copies of 
all written and oral statements made by informant, in effect 
would identify informant); John, supra at 703, 707 (same). 
 
The analysis of whether an informant's identity should be 
kept confidential under the privilege or disclosed "may best be 
described as generally occurring in two stages."  Bonnett, 472 
Mass. at 846.  In the first stage of the analysis, a court makes 
a preliminary determination whether the Commonwealth properly 
asserted the informant privilege, see Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 509(a)(1), and if so, whether the defendant has met his or her 
burden to challenge the Commonwealth's invocation of the 
privilege by establishing "an impermissible interference with 
[the defendant's] right to present a defense."  Bonnett, supra.  
The informant privilege may be asserted by the Commonwealth 
where the Commonwealth otherwise would be required to provide an 
informant's identity to a defendant as part of its discovery 
obligations under Mass. R. Crim. P. 14.  See id., quoting 
Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 59.  Should a defendant wish to overcome 
the informant privilege, the defendant bears the burden of 
challenging the Commonwealth's assertion.  Dias, 451 Mass. at 
464.  "We have characterized a defendant's obligation at this 
juncture as 'relatively undemanding,' but it does require the 
defendant to articulate a basis sufficient for the judge to 
'assess the materiality and relevancy of the disclosure to the 
15 
 
defense, if that relevancy is not apparent from the nature of 
the case.'"  D.M., 480 Mass. at 1006, quoting Bonnett, supra at 
847. 
 
Only if both the Commonwealth and the defendant have met 
their burdens in the initial stage should a judge then proceed 
to the second stage of the analysis, where the judge must 
"decide whether the informant's identity and concomitant 
information are sufficiently 'relevant and helpful to the 
defense of an accused' that it must be disclosed."  Bonnett, 472 
Mass. at 847, quoting Dias, 451 Mass. at 468.  This 
determination necessitates a balancing of "the public interest 
in protecting the flow of information against [the defendant's] 
right to prepare his [or her] defense."  Bonnett, supra at 847-
848, quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62.  The inquiry at the 
balancing stage must be case-specific:  "[w]hether a proper 
balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must . . . tak[e] into 
consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the 
possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other 
relevant factors."  Roviaro, supra.  Where disclosure (1) is 
sufficiently "relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused" 
or (2) "is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the 
privilege must give way."  Dias, supra, quoting Roviaro, supra 
at 60–61. 
16 
 
 
c.  Application.  i.  Commonwealth's assertion of informant 
privilege.  The defendant argues that because she did not seek 
disclosure of the informant's name, and because the judge found 
that disclosure of the information requested would not reveal 
the informant's identity, the informant privilege does not 
apply.  She contends that the judge's order therefore should be 
reviewed in the context of a motion judge's broad discretion to 
order discovery under Mass. R. Crim. P. 14.10  We disagree.  
Rather, based on the record before us, we conclude that the 
extensive amount of information requested by the defendant 
would, in effect, reveal the informant's identity such that the 
informant's privilege is applicable to this case.11 
 
 
10 The defendant does not refute the Commonwealth's 
assertion that the informant's safety would be in danger if his 
or her identity were revealed.  Compare D.M., 480 Mass. at 1005 
(disclosure of identity of informant with current and prior 
involvement in firearms cases would endanger informant). 
 
 
11 In concluding that the informant privilege has been 
properly asserted here, where the information requested would in 
effect reveal the informant's identity, we do not set forth a 
rigid test or add any additional step to the analysis laid out 
in Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 846.  Rather, consideration of whether 
disclosure of requested information, short of an informant's 
name and address, might place an informant in danger has always 
been part of a case-specific inquiry into whether the informant 
privilege is properly invoked.  See Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 
Mass. 511, 526 n.11 (1990) (privilege properly asserted where 
disclosure of requested information "would be tantamount to 
revealing the informant's identity"); Commonwealth v. Douzanis, 
384 Mass. 434, 436 n.4 (1981) (applying privilege where 
requested information "would in effect identify the informant" 
and permitting judge on remand to consider "whether full or 
 
17 
 
 
Here, the search warrant issued to search the defendant's 
home and person relied on the informant's assertions that the 
informant had seen the defendant load and unload firearms inside 
her home within the thirty days prior to the application for the 
warrant.  The expansive nature of the ordered discovery would 
risk providing details that would allow the defendant, or others 
familiar with her home, to retrace their activities over the 
preceding thirty days and discern the identity of the informant 
on that basis.  See Commonwealth v. Benlien, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 
834, 838 n.7 (1989) (date of controlled purchase remained 
undisclosed because of "need not to pinpoint the encounter and 
thus impair the anonymity of the informer").  Moreover, the 
informant has provided information leading to the arrest of 
three other individuals for firearms offenses, the execution of 
a search warrant that located firearms and drugs, and the arrest 
of one person on a default warrant.  The disclosure of the 
details of those events -- their dates, locations, and the names 
of the involved parties -- would permit those familiar with the 
informant to piece together a detailed picture of the 
 
partial disclosure of the demanded information would in fact 
reveal the informant's identity"); Commonwealth v. John, 36 
Mass. App. Ct. 702, 706 (1994) ("the privilege not only protects 
the release of the name of the informant but also forbids the 
disclosure of details that would in effect identify the 
informant" [emphasis in original]).  See also Roviaro v. United 
States, 353 U.S. 53, 60 (1957) (contemplating whether contents 
of communication would "tend to" reveal informant's identity). 
18 
 
informant's assistance to law enforcement, effectively 
identifying the informant.12 
 
Given our conclusion that the requested disclosure would in 
effect disclose the informant's identity, and the parties' 
agreement -- appropriate in the circumstances of this case -- 
that disclosure of the informant's identity would place the 
informant in danger, we conclude that the Commonwealth properly 
met its burden to invoke the informant privilege. 
 
ii.  Defendant's burden to make showing of materiality and 
relevancy.  Because the Commonwealth properly invoked the 
informant privilege, the burden shifted to the defendant to 
"challeng[e] the assertion of the privilege as an impermissible 
interference with . . . her right to present a defense."  
Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 846.  While a defendant's burden at this 
stage is "relatively undemanding," see D.M., 480 Mass. at 1006, 
quoting Bonnett, supra at 847, "[c]ases that have required 
disclosure have done so on a 'standard of materiality or 
 
 
12 As noted supra, the motion judge's contrary finding, 
based solely on the documentary evidence, is due no deference.  
See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 481 Mass. 710, 714–715, cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 247 (2019); Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 
Mass. 645, 654-655 (2018).  We note only that, to the extent the 
motion judge relied solely on the substitution of a code for the 
informant's name in concluding that disclosure of the requested 
evidence would not reveal the informant's identity, her reliance 
was inconsistent with the fact-specific inquiry into the 
practical implications of disclosure that this stage of the 
analysis demands.  Compare Douzanis, 384 Mass. at 436 n.4; John, 
36 Mass. App. Ct. at 706-707. 
19 
 
something roughly akin thereto," Dias, 451 Mass. at 469, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Lugo, 406 Mass. 565, 571 (1990).  "As to 
materiality, we have said that the 'proper inquiry' concerns 
'whether disclosure would have provided material evidence needed 
by the defendant for a fair presentation of his case to the 
jury.'"  Dias, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Madigan, 449 Mass. 
702, 706 (2007). 
 
A defendant must make "some offering" so that the judge 
"may assess the materiality and relevancy of the disclosure to 
the defense."  Dias, 451 Mass. 469, quoting Swenson, 368 Mass. 
at 276.  "In other words, the defendant has some obligation to 
show an exception to the privilege that the informer remain 
anonymous."  Dias, supra, quoting Swenson, supra.  A distinction 
exists between a demand for disclosure for pretrial purposes, 
where the issue is probable cause for arrest or a search, and a 
demand for disclosure at trial, where the issue is the 
defendant's guilt or innocence.  See Lugo, 406 Mass. at 571.  
While the standards of disclosure for pretrial purposes are 
"more demanding" than those applicable when disclosure is sought 
for trial purposes, in either instance a defendant nevertheless 
must offer some evidence to support the materiality and 
relevancy of disclosure.  See D.M., 480 Mass. at 1006. 
 
The defendant maintains that the requested discovery was 
material and relevant to an anticipated "Franks/Amral" motion 
20 
 
challenging the accuracy of the information in the warrant.  See 
Amral, 407 Mass. at 520, citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-156.  As 
she did at the motion hearing, the defendant argues on appeal 
that she demonstrated her material need for the requested 
information by stating that there was "no track record" 
supporting the informant's reliability and no other means of 
verifying the information in the affidavit.  The Commonwealth 
argues that the defendant made an insufficient showing that the 
requested information was material and relevant to a pretrial 
defense or to a defense at trial. 
 
Although we have no doubt that the motion judge engaged in 
a good faith effort to weigh the interests involved, as 
presented to her by the parties, we conclude that the judge 
erred in finding that the defendant made a sufficient showing of 
materiality to satisfy her burden in the initial stage of the 
analysis under Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 847, and accordingly, the 
judge abused her discretion in ruling that disclosure was 
warranted, whether for pretrial or trial purposes. 
 
To be entitled to a Franks/Amral hearing, a defendant must 
"by affidavit assert[] facts which cast a reasonable doubt on 
the veracity of material representations made by the affiant 
concerning a confidential informant."  Amral, 407 Mass. at 522.  
The defendant did not assert any case-specific facts in her 
original motion, at either hearing, or in the requested 
21 
 
affidavit that cast a reasonable doubt on the informant's 
veracity or the facts in the affidavit.  Indeed, although the 
defendant's motion cited to Amral, supra, the record does not 
indicate that the defendant meant to assert that the search 
warrant affidavit was untruthful -- only that the possibility of 
its untruthfulness existed, due to the lack of information about 
the informant's "track record" and information about the 
investigation itself.  However, "[m]ere suspicion that there was 
no informant, or that the informant's 'reliability' credentials 
have been misstated, or that his information was other than as 
recited by the affiant," as was the case here, does not rise to 
the level of an articulated challenge that warrants a 
Franks/Amral hearing.  Id.  See Douzanis, 384 Mass. at 439 
(requiring something more than "naked claim" that affiant 
fabricated information before ordering Franks/Amral hearing).  
The defendant's suggestion that the requested information may 
bear on an eventual Franks/Amral defense, without more, was not 
a sufficiently articulated basis that would have allowed the 
judge to assess the materiality and relevancy of the disclosure.  
See John, 36 Mass. App. Ct. at 706 ("A discovery motion, by 
itself, seeking information about facts contained in the warrant 
affidavit, is not sufficient to overcome [the warrant's] 
presumption of validity"). 
22 
 
 
Finally, the brief, vague, and conclusory assertion in 
defense counsel's affidavit that the requested information was 
"needed to prepare for trial" does not pass muster for a showing 
of materiality.  A judge "cannot be required to assess the need 
for disclosure . . . without some guidance" as to the "scheme of 
the defense."  Swenson, 368 Mass. at 276.  Although the 
defendant's burden at this stage is "relatively undemanding," 
see Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 847, it was not met here, and the 
motion judge abused her discretion in concluding otherwise when 
faced with this evidentiary record.13 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We hold that the information requested by 
the defendant would in effect disclose the informant's identity 
and that the defendant failed to show that the requested 
information was relevant and material to her defense.  
Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the county court for 
entry of a judgment reversing the motion judge's order allowing 
the defendant's motion for discovery and remanding the matter to 
 
 
13 Because we find that the defendant has failed to meet her 
burden, albeit a "relatively undemanding" one, at the initial 
stage of the analysis under Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 847, "[w]e 
need not speculate about what the results of a second-stage 
Roviaro balancing exercise might have been."  Id. at 850. 
 
23 
 
the Boston Municipal Court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
14 On remand, the motion judge may entertain a request, if 
any is made, for compromise relief that might allow disclosure 
of some lesser amount of information "while minimizing danger to 
the [informant]" (citation omitted).  Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 850.  
We express no view as to the appropriateness of any potential 
compromise.  Rather, it is within the motion judge's discretion 
to consider any such request in the first instance, consistent 
with the legal principles discussed supra.