Title: Commonwealth v. LaPlante

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12570 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DANIEL J. LaPLANTE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 5, 2019. - June 6, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Sentence, Cruel and unusual 
punishment, Parole.  Due Process of Law, Sentence, Parole.  
Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Parole.  Parole. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on January 12, 1988. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 416 Mass. 433 (1993), a 
motion to vacate sentence, filed on June 12, 2015, was heard by 
Hélène Kazanjian, J. 
 
 
A request for leave to appeal was allowed by Lowy, J., in 
the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
 
Crystal L. Lyons, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Benjamin H. Keehn & Afton M. Templin, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & 
others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
 
2 
LOWY, J.  At the age of seventeen, the defendant, Daniel J. 
LaPlante, murdered a thirty-three year old pregnant mother, 
Priscilla Gustafson, and her two young children, Abigail and 
William Gustafson.  The issue before us is whether the 
defendant's sentence of three consecutive terms of life 
imprisonment, with the possibility of parole after forty-five 
years, constitutes cruel or unusual punishment in violation of 
art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Because we 
conclude that, on the specific facts of this case, the 
defendant's sentence is within constitutional bounds, we affirm. 
Background.  1.  Facts.  The facts we recite are drawn from 
the Superior Court judge's sentencing memorandum, which the 
parties have designated as their statement of agreed facts:1 
"[The defendant] carefully planned [two] intrusions 
into the Gustafson[s'] home; first breaking in on 
November 16, 1987, and stealing items.  While he could 
have stopped there, he decided to return.  He obtained 
a gun and lied to his brother's friend in order to get 
bullets.  He practiced loading and unloading the guns.  
On December 1, 1987, [the defendant] broke into the 
Gustafson[s'] house for the second time, carrying the 
loaded weapon.  When he heard Priscilla Gustafson and 
her [five year old] son William entering the house, he 
said that his first thought was to jump out the 
window.  But he decided not to.  He confronted them 
with the gun, brought them to the bedroom, put William 
in the closet and tied Priscilla to the bed.  [The 
defendant] said that after he tied Priscilla to the 
                     
 
1 Our opinion affirming the defendant's convictions on 
direct appeal also contains a statement of the facts underlying 
the defendant's crimes and the subsequent police investigation, 
which we do not repeat here.  See Commonwealth v. LaPlante, 416 
Mass. 433, 433-439 (1993). 
 
 
3 
bed, his plan was to leave.  But once again he decided 
not to.  Instead, he made the decision to rape her.  
After raping her, he acknowledged that he could have 
left.  Instead, he decided he would kill her.  After 
he killed Priscilla, [the defendant] made the decision 
to take William into the bathroom and drown him.  As 
he was leaving, he encountered [seven year old] 
Abigail.  He lured her into the bathroom and made the 
decision to drown her as well. . . .  After fleeing 
the scene, [the defendant] went home, ate and then 
attended his niece's birthday party as if nothing had 
happened." 
 
2.  Sentencing and other posttrial proceedings.  In 1988, 
the defendant was convicted of three counts of murder in the 
first degree and sentenced to three consecutive terms of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  This court 
affirmed the convictions after plenary review.  Commonwealth v. 
LaPlante, 416 Mass. 433, 444 (1993). 
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments" contained in the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids 
mandatory sentences of life without parole for juvenile 
offenders.2  Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).  The 
following year, this court held that Miller was retroactive to 
cases on collateral review, and we determined that the 
protections of art. 26 extend beyond the Eighth Amendment 
protections outlined in Miller, such that art. 26 prohibits the 
                     
 
2 Throughout this opinion, the term "juvenile" offender 
refers to an offender who was under the age of eighteen at the 
time of the offense. 
 
 
4 
imposition of life sentences without the possibility for parole 
-- whether such imposition is mandatory or discretionary -- on 
juvenile offenders.  Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the 
Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 658-659 (2013) (Diatchenko I), 
S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015). 
In a separate opinion issued the same day as Diatchenko I, 
we noted that, going forward, the contours of a new sentencing 
scheme for juvenile homicide offenders would be left to the 
sound discretion of the Legislature.  Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 
Mass. 676, 691 n.11 (2013), S.C., 474 Mass. 576 (2016).  We 
emphasized, however, that any constitutional sentencing scheme 
must "avoid imposing on juvenile defendants any term so lengthy 
that it could be seen as the functional equivalent of a sentence 
of life without parole."  Id. 
Under Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 673, the remedy for 
juvenile homicide offenders such as the defendant, who had been 
sentenced under statutory provisions since declared 
unconstitutional, was to leave their life sentences in full 
force and effect, but to hold that the statutory prohibition on 
parole eligibility did not apply to them.  Consequently, the 
defendant's three consecutive life sentences were restructured 
in accordance with applicable statutory provisions and parole 
regulations, with the result that he would become eligible for 
parole after serving forty-five years in prison. 
 
 
5 
The defendant subsequently filed a motion to vacate his 
sentence.  While that motion was pending, this court decided 
Commonwealth v. Costa, 472 Mass. 139, 149 (2015), in which we 
held that juvenile defendants who were sentenced to consecutive 
terms of life imprisonment before our decision in Diatchenko I 
were entitled to a resentencing hearing at which, 
"in addition to the factors considered at any 
sentencing, the judge should consider (a) the Miller 
factors; (b) evidence regarding the defendant's 
psychological state at the time of the offense; and 
(c) evidence concerning the defendant's postsentencing 
conduct, whether favorable or unfavorable."3 
 
In light of Costa, the Commonwealth conceded that the defendant 
was entitled to a resentencing hearing, and the motion judge 
ordered that the defendant be resentenced. 
                     
 
3 We enumerated the "Miller factors" as follows: 
 
"(1) the defendant's 'chronological age and its 
hallmark features -- among them, immaturity, 
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences'; (2) 'the family and home environment 
that surrounds' the defendant; (3) 'the circumstances 
of the homicide offense, including the extent of [the 
defendant's] participation in the conduct and the way 
familial and peer pressures may have affected him' or 
her; (4) whether the defendant 'might have been 
charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for 
incompetencies associated with youth -- for example, 
[the defendant's] inability to deal with police 
officers or prosecutors (including on a plea 
agreement) or [the defendant's] incapacity to assist 
his [or her] own attorneys'; and (5) 'the possibility 
of rehabilitation.'" 
Commonwealth v. Costa, 472 Mass. 139, 147 (2015), quoting Miller 
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477-478 (2012). 
 
 
6 
Following a period for the parties to conduct discovery and 
to obtain expert evaluations, an evidentiary hearing was held, 
during which the Commonwealth offered the expert testimony of 
Dr. Fabian M. Saleh and a number of exhibits were entered in 
evidence.  Based on the evidence presented, after considering 
traditional sentencing factors as well as the additional factors 
set forth in Miller and Costa, the sentencing judge reinstated 
the sentence of three consecutive life terms with parole 
eligibility after forty-five years. 
The defendant filed a "gatekeeper" application with this 
court pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, for leave to appeal from 
the resentencing judge's ruling, as well as a motion for direct 
entry of the appeal.  The single justice directed entry of the 
appeal on the question "whether a juvenile homicide offender may 
be required to serve forty-five years in prison before his or 
her first opportunity to seek release based on rehabilitation."  
We limit our answer to this question to the specific facts of 
this case, where the juvenile offender's resentencing occurs 
when he is well into adulthood and follows a hearing at which 
evidence is presented regarding the offender's postsentencing 
conduct and prospects for rehabilitation. 
Discussion.  The defendant concedes that the Eighth 
Amendment does not bar the sentence that he received and that 
the evidence in this case supported the resentencing judge in 
 
 
7 
exercising her discretion to impose the most severe punishment 
permitted under our State Constitution.  Therefore, the sole 
question before us is whether this defendant's sentence crosses 
the line drawn by art. 26, which prohibits the imposition of 
"cruel or unusual punishments." 
"Where a defendant claims that a judge has made an error of 
constitutional dimension, 'we accept the judge's subsidiary 
findings of fact absent clear error and leave to the judge the 
responsibility of determining the weight and credibility to be 
given . . . testimony presented at the motion hearing."  
Commonwealth v. Perez, 480 Mass. 562, 567-568 (2018) (Perez II), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Villagran, 477 Mass. 711, 713 (2017).  
However, we "review independently the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts found."  Perez II, supra, 
quoting Villagran, supra. 
The defendant invites this court to announce a bright-line 
rule, a ceiling that no legislator or sentencing court 
constitutionally may exceed in setting parole eligibility for a 
juvenile homicide offender.  We decline this invitation.  We 
also decline the Commonwealth's invitation to declare that where 
each life sentence carries an individually permissible parole 
eligibility period of fifteen years, the aggregate term to be 
served before initial parole eligibility is not subject to a 
proportionality analysis under art. 26.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
 
 
8 
Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 679 (2017) (Perez I) (analyzing 
constitutionality under art. 26 of "aggregate time to be served 
prior to parole eligibility" of juvenile nonhomicide offender).  
Instead, the constitutionality of the defendant's sentence, 
including the aggregate term to be served before parole 
eligibility, is to be evaluated in light of the particular facts 
presented. 
"To reach the level of cruel and unusual, the punishment 
must be so disproportionate to the crime that it 'shocks the 
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.'"  
Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 495, 497 (1981), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 910 (1976).  We make 
this determination by applying the three-prong 
disproportionality test set forth in Cepulonis, supra at 497-
498.  See Perez I, 477 Mass. at 684 (applying Cepulonis 
disproportionality test in context of juvenile defendant's 
challenge to constitutionality of his sentence). 
The three prongs include (1) an "inquiry into the 'nature 
of the offense and the offender in light of the degree of harm 
to society'"; (2) "a comparison between the sentence imposed 
here and punishments prescribed for the commission of more 
serious crimes in the Commonwealth"; and (3) "a comparison of 
the challenged penalty with the penalties prescribed for the 
same offense in other jurisdictions" (citation omitted).  
 
 
9 
Cepulonis, 384 Mass. at 497-498.  The burden of proving 
disproportionality rests on the defendant.  Id. at 497.4 
Moreover, where, as here, the defendant, a juvenile 
homicide offender, was originally sentenced before Miller and 
Diatchenko I and has now been resentenced after the age of 
forty, the resentencing must comply with the procedures set 
forth by this court in Costa.  The Costa inquiry includes 
consideration of the Miller factors -- among them, the 
"possibility of rehabilitation" -- as well as an assessment of 
the defendant's postsentencing conduct, "whether favorable or 
unfavorable."  Costa, 472 Mass. at 147, 149, quoting Miller, 567 
U.S. at 478.5 
                     
 
4 As noted above, the defendant concedes that the facts of 
his case warrant the most severe punishment permitted under our 
Constitution.  As a result, this case defies direct application 
of the second Cepulonis prong.  The defendant simply does not 
suggest that there are "more serious crimes" to which this 
multiple homicide ought to be compared.  And with respect to the 
third Cepulonis prong, the defendant cannot point to any case 
from outside this jurisdiction invalidating a forty-five year 
period before parole eligibility where the defendant committed 
three distinct and deliberate murders. 
 
 
5 A resentencing proceeding under Costa differs from a 
proceeding pursuant to a motion to revise or revoke a sentence 
under Mass. R. Crim. P. 29, 378 Mass. 899 (1979).  See Costa, 
472 Mass. at 148 n.5.  The consideration of these factors at a 
Costa hearing does not violate the separation of powers.  Id. at 
149 n.6.  Rather, here, as in Costa, "[t]he decision whether to 
grant parole [will] remain within the parole board's 
discretion."  Id. 
 
 
10 
These same factors -- the Miller factors and an assessment 
of the defendant's postsentencing conduct -- inform our analysis 
of the constitutionality of the resulting sentence under art. 
26.  "Disproportionality is not . . . an abstract inquiry."  
Perez I, 477 Mass. at 684.6  Rather, we must conduct a 
proportionality analysis under art. 26 that takes into account 
all of the facts and circumstances that were before the 
resentencing judge at the Costa hearing. 
In so doing, we remain mindful of our determination that 
under art. 26, "the 'unique characteristics of juvenile 
offenders' should weigh more heavily in the proportionality 
calculus than the United States Supreme Court required under the 
Eighth Amendment."  Perez I, 477 Mass. at 683, quoting 
Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 671.  That distinction formed the 
basis for our holding in Diatchenko I that, under art. 26, all 
juvenile homicide offenders "should be afforded a 'meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
                     
 
6 For this reason, this case does not compel us to decide 
whether the defendant's sentence would have been constitutional 
if it had been imposed upon him at the age of eighteen, when he 
was originally sentenced.  Cf. Diatchenko v. District Attorney 
for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 670 (2013), S.C., 471 
Mass. 12 (2015) (holding that "because the brain of a juvenile 
is not fully developed, either structurally or functionally, by 
the age of eighteen, a judge cannot find with confidence that a 
particular offender, at that point in time, is irretrievably 
depraved" [emphasis added]). 
 
 
 
11 
rehabilitation.'"  Diatchenko I, supra at 674, quoting Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).7 
Here, the defendant will have the opportunity to appear 
before the parole board after serving an aggregate term of 
forty-five years.  In Diatchenko I and Brown, we effectively 
held constitutional the statutory default period of fifteen 
years before parole eligibility for a juvenile offender 
convicted of a single count of murder in the first degree, while 
recognizing the discretion of the Legislature to adjust that 
period going forward to distinguish among "lesser" and "more 
severe" degrees of murder.  Brown, 466 Mass. at 689 n.10, 690.  
See Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 673-674.  Then, in Commonwealth 
v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 62 (2015), we held constitutional that 
same fifteen-year period for juvenile offenders convicted of 
murder in the second degree.  It stands to reason, therefore, 
that the discretion to which we referred in Brown would permit 
                     
 
7 On appeal before this court, the defendant argues that our 
analysis under art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights also should proceed "mindful of" the "shortened life 
expectancies" of juvenile offenders such as the defendant.  
However, no evidence regarding the defendant's life expectancy -
- or the life expectancies of juvenile offenders in general -- 
was presented to the resentencing court, and the defendant 
ultimately "does not contend" that our analysis in this case 
should "turn on" such factors. 
 
 
12 
some period in excess of fifteen years before parole eligibility 
for a juvenile offender convicted of murder in the first degree.8 
Further, by remanding the case for resentencing in Costa, 
this court confirmed that in cases involving multiple counts of 
murder, sentencing judges retain the discretion to impose 
consecutive terms of life imprisonment.  We "emphatically did 
not hold that Costa was entitled to be resentenced to concurrent 
life terms to allow parole eligibility after fifteen years."  
Perez I, 477 Mass. at 687.9 
The question remains whether a period of forty-five years 
of incarceration before parole eligibility is proportioned "to 
both the offender and the offense" in this case, Diatchenko I, 
466 Mass. at 669, quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 469, given all the 
evidence before the resentencing judge.  We do not dwell long on 
the facts of the defendant's offenses, which, as the defendant 
                     
 
8 In fact, we have since held that even juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders may be sentenced to an aggregate period before parole 
eligibility that exceeds fifteen years, where "extraordinary 
circumstances" warrant such a sentence.  See Commonwealth v. 
Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 686 (2017) (Perez I). 
 
 
9 Moreover, here, unlike in Perez I, we do not begin from 
any presumption of disproportionality under art. 26.  The 
presumption in Perez I applies specifically to nonhomicide 
offenders whose sentence would result in a period of 
incarceration before parole eligibility that exceeds that 
imposed on juveniles convicted of murder.  Perez I, 477 Mass. at 
686.  See Commonwealth v. Lutskov, 480 Mass. 575, 583 (2018). 
 
 
13 
concedes, are so egregious as to warrant the most severe 
punishment permissible under our Constitution. 
With respect to the characteristics of the defendant, the 
resentencing judge concluded that "the evidence submitted at the 
hearing did not reflect that at the time of the murders he 
displayed the 'hallmark features' of a juvenile, that is, 
immaturity, impetuosity and failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences."  Rather, she found that the defendant "acted 
deliberately and intentionally" when committing these "three 
distinct and brutal murders" and that, in describing those 
murders to Saleh as an adult, he displayed "an extraordinary 
lack of empathy." 
The resentencing judge further found that the defendant's 
"family and home environment was . . . relatively unremarkable."  
As to his psychological state, she credited the testimony of 
Saleh that the defendant currently suffers from antisocial 
personality disorder, which Saleh described as a "severe form of 
a personality disorder with the hallmark[s] being the disregard 
for the rights of others . . . [and] the lack of remorse."  
Based on Saleh's testimony, the resentencing judge also found 
that the murders of the victims "were a result of Conduct 
Disorder, Child onset Type, rather than any adverse childhood 
experiences, learning disabilities or immaturity."  Ultimately, 
the resentencing judge concluded that although the defendant has 
 
 
14 
"shown signs of improved behavior" in recent years, his 
"prognosis for rehabilitation in the future is 'guarded.'" 
Based on the record before us, we need go no further.  The 
defendant's sentence is proportional both to the crimes he 
committed and to his particular characteristics as an offender, 
giving due weight under art. 26 to the fact that he was a 
juvenile when he committed the crimes. 
Conclusion.  For these reasons, we conclude that the 
sentence imposed on the defendant by the resentencing judge does 
not violate art. 26 and therefore affirm her resentencing 
decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.