Title: United Concrete & Constr., Inc. v. Red-D-Mix Concrete, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 72 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1566   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
United Concrete & Construction, Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Red-D-Mix Concrete, Inc., 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and Allied 
Insurance  
Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 343 Wis. 2d 679, 819 N.W.2d 563 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Unpublished)     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 23, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie   
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Des Jardins   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, CROOKS, J.J., concur. 
(Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Frank Kowalkowski, James Kalny, and Davis & Kuelthau, S.C., 
Green Bay, and oral argument by Frank Kowalkowski.   
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief by Valerie 
J. Revnew and Epiphany Law, LLC, Appleton, and oral argument by 
Valerie J. Revnew. 
  
 
 
2013 WI 72
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP1566 
(L.C. No. 
2008CV1595) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
United Concrete & Construction, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Red-D-Mix Concrete, Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and Allied 
Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and cause remanded with instructions.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   There are many vagaries in 
the 
law. 
 
However, 
we 
deal 
here 
with 
the 
concrete.  
Specifically, certain batches of concrete that United Concrete 
and 
Construction, 
Inc. 
(United) 
purchased 
from 
Red-D-Mix 
Concrete, Inc. (Red-D-Mix) and now complains were defective.  
United used the concrete to pour outdoor installations (known in 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
2 
 
the industry as "flatwork") at various properties.  After 
problems 
arose 
with 
the 
installations, 
United 
obtained 
assignments 
from 
a 
number 
of 
the 
property 
owners,1 
who 
transferred their putative right to sue Red-D-Mix over to 
United.  United then exercised that right, filing a complaint in 
tort and contract, in both its own name and in that of the 
assignees, and alleging violations of Wis. Stat. § 100.18 (2011-
12).2  The circuit court3 granted summary judgment for Red-D-Mix, 
on the grounds that United's claims through the property owners 
and its tort claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine, 
its § 100.18 claim could not proceed because the allegedly 
actionable statements constituted puffery and because United was 
not a member of the public within the meaning of the statute, 
and damages had been insufficiently established to support the 
remaining claims.  Disagreeing entirely with the trial judge, 
the court of appeals reversed on all grounds.   
¶2 
As shown below, the court of appeals was in the main 
correct, but reached the wrong result in one respect and was 
overbroad or imprecise in others.  To wit, the court of appeals 
properly reversed the circuit court's ruling regarding puffery, 
                                                 
1 Following the court of appeals and the parties, we will 
also occasionally call the property owners "homeowners." 
2 All subsequent citations to the Wisconsin statutes are to 
the 2011-12 edition.  None of the provisions relevant to the 
instant case have changed in any pertinent respect since the 
underlying conduct giving rise to the dispute occurred.   
3 The Honorable John A. Des Jardins presiding.   
No.  2011AP1566   
 
3 
 
though it incorrectly determined that puffery is always a 
question of fact for the jury.  On the next issue, the court of 
appeals erred in its determination that the claims United 
asserted through the assignments were valid, when, with two 
exceptions,4 the economic loss doctrine barred the homeowners 
from suing Red-D-Mix and thus barred United from suing in their 
name.  Finally, the court of appeals rightly reversed the 
circuit court for finding all the asserted damages speculative, 
though in doing so it prematurely interpreted the legal 
significance of the assignments.  Its language construing the 
assignments 
is 
overruled. 
 
See 
Griebler 
v. 
Doughboy 
Recreational, Inc., 160 Wis. 2d 547, 556, 466 N.W.2d 897 (1991) 
(overruling specific language from the court of appeals decision 
under review).   
¶3 
When the case is returned to it, the circuit court is 
directed to dismiss the claims asserted through the assignments, 
and to allow the remaining claims to proceed to trial.  
Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with 
instructions.  
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶4 
Because this case is here on summary judgment, we 
recite the facts in the light most favorable to United, the 
party opposing summary judgment, and accept as true its 
                                                 
4 See infra note 19.   
No.  2011AP1566   
 
4 
 
allegations.5  Kraemer Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 89 
Wis. 2d 555, 567, 278 N.W.2d 857 (1979).   
¶5 
From 2002 to 2004, Red-D-Mix supplied United with 
concrete,6 which United then poured at various job sites.  During 
that time, United complained to Red-D-Mix that its product was 
generating excessive "bleed water,"7 thereby damaging several of 
United's projects, including a number of basements.  When the 
problem was not resolved to United's satisfaction, it severed 
its business relationship with Red-D-Mix.   
¶6 
In 2007, unhappy with price increases at its new 
supplier, M&M Concrete, United contacted Red-D-Mix to inquire 
into the possibility of restoring the relationship.  John Clark, 
a salesman for Red-D-Mix who had not been with the company 
during the earlier difficulties with bleed water, came to 
United's offices at its request.  There, he met with Timothy 
Hippert, the president of United, and Kevin Kluess, United's 
foreman.  Hippert and Kluess sought assurances from Clark that 
the problems with the concrete had been resolved and that Red-D-
                                                 
5 For 
this 
reason, 
we 
will 
not 
insert 
an 
ungainly 
"allegedly" before every allegation.  We do not thereby imply 
the truth of any factual assertion.   
6 The briefs and court of appeals opinion refer only to 
concrete, not cement, so we do the same. 
7 As explained in the summary judgment materials, "bleed 
water" is essentially excess water that seeps out of concrete 
after it has been poured and rests on the surface.  There was 
testimony taken at depositions that such water can make the 
upper layers of the concrete weaker and more likely to 
prematurely degenerate.   
No.  2011AP1566   
 
5 
 
Mix could now guarantee a high-quality, durable product.  When 
Clark delivered those assurances, the two companies entered into 
a new contract.   
¶7 
The good will was short lived.  Customers soon began 
alerting 
United 
to 
defects 
in 
their 
outdoor 
concrete 
installations, such as pitting, discoloration, crumbling, and 
spalling.8  In response, United asked property owners to sign an 
assignment of rights.  The assignment indicated that the 
signatory "desires to transfer any and all rights they [sic] may 
have arising from the supply of defective concrete for the 
purpose of prosecution and/or otherwise resolving the claims as 
seen fit by" United.  It informed the reader that "the legal 
effect of signing this Assignment fully and forever extinguishes 
any and all claims which he/she has or might have had against 
any company for the supply of defective concrete for use in 
flatwork performed by a third-party as of the date of execution 
except as expressly reserved."  The assignment then concluded, 
"Assignor conveys, assigns, transfers and sets over unto 
Assignee, all rights to any causes of action and/or claims of 
any nature, whether known or unknown, in any way relating to the 
outstanding 
claims 
that 
exist 
in 
his/her 
favor . . . ."  
Ultimately, 22 property owners acquiesced to United's request.  
Of these, 20 did so without any conditions.  Of the other two, 
one, the Michaels, insisted on a reservation of rights in 
                                                 
8 To spall is to "[b]reak off . . . in fragments; splinter, 
chip."  Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 2935 (6th ed. 2007). 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
6 
 
return.  The other, the Beyers, sued United in small claims 
court and agreed to the assignment as part of a stipulated 
dismissal, in exchange for United promising to either repair the 
damaged concrete or pay for its replacement.   
II. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶8 
Its assignments in hand, United brought suit in its 
own name and through the assignments against Red-D-Mix in 
Outagamie County Circuit Court, demanding damages, in its third 
and final amended complaint, for breach of contract, breach of 
express 
warranty, 
breach 
of 
implied 
warranty, 
false 
representations 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 100.18, 
negligence, 
indemnification, and contribution.9  Red-D-Mix moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that damages were speculative because United 
had not yet performed any repairs.  The motion further argued 
that the negligence claims were barred under the economic loss 
doctrine, as no harm befell any individuals or property other 
than the concrete itself, aside from two minor incidents 
involving grass growing in a driveway and abnormal wear and tear 
on a floor.  With respect to the assigned claims as a whole, 
Red-D-Mix contended that they should all be dismissed because, 
under our decision in Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., Inc., 2005 WI 
113, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 699 N.W.2d 189, the owners could sue only 
United, not Red-D-Mix, and they therefore had nothing to assign.  
Lastly, Red-D-Mix submitted, in its motion for summary judgment, 
                                                 
9 Red-D-Mix filed a counterclaim, alleging that United was 
itself negligent in various actions it took with respect to the 
concrete.  The counterclaim is not before us.   
No.  2011AP1566   
 
7 
 
that United's Wis. Stat. § 100.18 claim was based on puffery and 
that United was not a "member of the public" protected by the 
statute, and thus its claim failed as a matter of law on both 
grounds.10   
¶9 
The circuit court more or less embraced in full Red-D-
Mix's view of the case, holding that the claims made through the 
assignments and all of the tort claims were prohibited by the 
economic loss doctrine,11 that the representations forming the 
basis for the Wis. Stat. § 100.18 claim were puffery and were 
being improperly brought by a non-member of the public, and that 
United had not alleged sufficient damages to proceed to trial. 
¶10 Reversing, the court of appeals took exception to the 
circuit court on each point.  United Concrete & Constr., Inc. v. 
Red-D-Mix Concrete, Inc., No. 2011AP1566, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. June 13, 2012).  The court first concluded that 
damages were not overly speculative for summary judgment 
purposes because United "could present sufficient evidence to 
enable a reasonable jury to award damages in an amount supported 
                                                 
10 Red-D-Mix also argued to the circuit court that the 
assignments were unsupported by consideration and that no 
warranties were given.  It does not raise the former, and 
mentions the latter only in a passing footnote without citation 
or elaboration.  We will therefore address neither.  See State 
v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶28 n.13, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87 
("[W]e do not usually address undeveloped arguments.") (citation 
omitted).  Extensive litigation regarding various insurance 
issues also took place at the circuit court.  Those issues have 
not been presented for our review. 
11 United did not appeal the dismissal of its tort claims so 
we do not discuss them further. 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
8 
 
by the evidence."  Id., ¶10.  It then determined that Linden did 
not foreclose the suit, reasoning that "[w]hile the homeowners 
may have had no rights against Red-D-Mix to assign, the 
Assignments neither strip from United its right to sue Red-D-Mix 
nor protect United from [the] homeowners' potential breach-of-
contract claims."  Id., ¶11.  Turning to the Wis. Stat. § 100.18 
claim, the court of appeals considered the issue unfit for 
summary judgment disposal, as questions remained as to "what 
role, if any, Clark's being a 'new' salesperson should play in 
his credibility, what he said, and whether it constituted 
'puffing' . . . ." 
 
Id., 
¶14. 
 
Finally, 
the 
panel 
also 
instructed the circuit court that the issue of whether United 
was a member of the public in the sense contemplated by § 100.18 
"presents a question of fact."  Id., ¶16 (citation omitted).  
Elaborating, the court explained that "[a] jury reasonably could 
find that a particular relationship existed between United and 
Red-D-Mix because of their past dealings; it just as reasonably 
could find that United was a member of 'the public' when Red-D-
Mix, through Clark, solicited United's business anew."  Id.  As 
such, the matter was properly submitted to the trier of fact, 
not the court on summary judgment.  Id. 
¶11 We granted Red-D-Mix's petition for review.  Finding 
no error in the court of appeals' decision to afford United a 
trial, but finding several errors in its analysis, we affirm in 
part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.   
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
9 
 
¶12 As noted, we review a summary judgment order.  In such 
instances, we approach the issues independently of the lower 
courts, while applying the same standards they did.  Admanco, 
Inc. v. 700 Stanton Drive, LLC, 2010 WI 76, ¶14, 326 
Wis. 2d 586, 786 N.W.2d 759.  Those standards require us to 
answer whether any genuine issues of material fact are in 
dispute rendering a trial necessary.  Id., ¶28.  In so doing, we 
examine the summary judgment record while considering the facts 
in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment——here, 
United——and 
assuming 
the 
truth 
of 
its 
allegations.  Kraemer Bros., Inc., 89 Wis. 2d at 567.  If there 
is but a single reasonable inference to be drawn from the 
undisputed facts, and if that inference favors the movant, 
summary judgment is proper.  Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338, 
294 N.W.2d 473 (1980), abrogated on other grounds by Olstad v. 
Microsoft Corp., 2005 WI 121, 284 Wis. 2d 224, 700 N.W.2d 139.   
IV. 
DISCUSSION 
¶13 Red-D-Mix challenges the court of appeals decision on 
four main grounds: 1) that United was not a member of the public 
vis-à-vis Red-D-Mix and consequently cannot bring suit pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 100.18; 2) that the misrepresentations were mere 
puffery and therefore not prohibited by that statute; 3) that 
some claims are barred by the economic loss doctrine; and 4) 
that all claims are foreclosed by the speculativeness of the 
requested damages.  We hold that the first issue was not 
properly preserved by Red-D-Mix in its petition for review and 
accordingly decline to address it.  As to the second issue, we 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
10 
 
conclude that the truth or falsity of the statements in question 
was ascertainable, and thus the § 100.18 claim should have been 
submitted to a trier of fact.  With respect to the third issue, 
we agree with Red-D-Mix that United cannot file suit in the 
homeowners' names because they have no cause of action under the 
economic loss doctrine.  On the final issue, we hold that the 
speculativeness of damages should not have prompted the grant of 
summary judgment, but we overrule language from the court of 
appeals' opinion prematurely construing the legal significance 
of the assignments.  
A. UNITED'S WIS. STAT. § 100.18 CLAIM SURVIVES SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
¶14 Red-D-Mix asserts that summary judgment was correctly 
granted on the Wis. Stat. § 100.18 claim because United was not 
a member of the public, as required by the provision, and 
because the misrepresentations here were mere puffery as a 
matter of law.  We do not reach the first argument, as Red-D-Mix 
failed to raise it in its petition for review, and we reject the 
second one, as the statements do not represent puffery.   
1. Red-D-Mix Failed to Preserve Its Argument That United Is 
Not a Member of the Public 
¶15 Wisconsin Stat. § 100.18 creates civil liability for 
certain kinds of fraudulent representations.  In essence, as 
relevant here, it exposes a corporation to lawsuits for damages 
if it uses untrue statements to sell its wares to the public.    
To make out a claim under the statute, therefore, a plaintiff 
must show, inter alia, "that the defendant made a representation 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
11 
 
to the public with the intent to induce an obligation . . . ."  
State v. Abbott Labs., 2012 WI 62, ¶37, 341 Wis. 2d 510, 816 
N.W.2d 145 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also K&S 
Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection Mach. Sales, Inc., 2007 WI 70, 
¶20, 
301 
Wis. 2d 109, 
732 
N.W.2d 792 
(collecting 
cases 
construing the "member of the public" language in § 100.18).     
¶16 By supreme court rule, "[i]f a petition [for review] 
is granted, the parties cannot raise or argue issues not set 
forth in the petition unless ordered otherwise by the" court.  
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(6).  In its petition for review, Red-
D-Mix framed its issues as, first, whether it is a "question of 
law or a question of fact whether a statement made by a seller 
of a product is sufficient to support a misrepresentation claim 
or is instead inactionable puffery" and, second, whether it is 
permissible 
for 
"a 
contractor 
[to] 
circumvent . . . Linden . . . and initiate a cause of action it 
admits belongs to its customers . . . ."  It said nothing in 
either that section or its discussion section about being a 
member of the public.  Indeed, the only mention of that issue in 
the petition for review appears in its recitation of the 
procedural history.  In granting the petition, we did not 
instruct the parties to brief or argue any additional issues.  
Quite to the contrary, we specifically informed Red-D-Mix that 
it was not to "raise or argue issues not set forth in the 
petition for review," and cited to § 809.26(6).    
¶17 Red-D-Mix now asks us to forgive the omission because 
the "member of the public" issue "is an essential element of 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
12 
 
[its] [Wis. Stat.] § 100.18 claim," which can be reduced to the 
proposition "that when the facts are undisputed, the Court, as a 
matter of law, should decide if a § 100.18 claim must be 
dismissed."  As a result, Red-D-Mix says, "the issue of whether 
the statement was made to the public is before this Court along 
with every other element of misrepresentation that United saw 
fit to address."  We are unpersuaded.  The two questions are 
manifestly discrete.  The statements could be puffery and not 
made to a member of the public; they could be made to a member 
of the public but not puffery; they could be neither or both.  
The puffery issue is raised in the petition for review and 
discussed at length.  The member of the public issue is 
completely absent.  To adopt Red-D-Mix's interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(6) would be to render the provision 
meaningless.  A party could then guarantee our review of any 
issue by simply mentioning the statute associated with a certain 
claim and nakedly asserting that the lower court erred in its 
ruling on that statute, even when there were numerous unrelated 
issues stemming from the same statute.  Such a construction 
requires this court to do all the labor reasonably expected of 
counsel, and we do not accept it.  Cf. Johnson v. Blackburn, 227 
Wis. 2d 249, ¶29 n.11, 595 N.W.2d 676 (1999) (declining to 
address an issue not raised in the petition for review, even 
though the unraised issue related to the same statute as the 
raised issue).   
¶18 Red-D-Mix chose to exclude the question of whether 
United was a member of the public from the petition for review, 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
13 
 
and we honor that choice.  The court of appeals' disposition of 
the matter stands.    
2. The Contested Statements Were Not Puffery 
¶19 The circuit court thought the comments the Red-D-Mix 
salesman, Clark, made at his meeting with United were puffery as 
a matter of law and as a result could not support a Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18 claim.  Conversely, the court of appeals thought it 
could not be determined whether they were puffery on summary 
judgment at all.  We take a third route: the remarks were not 
puffery, but that conclusion could and should have been reached 
by the trial judge during the summary judgment proceedings.   
a) Clarifying the Misrepresentations at Issue 
¶20 Before getting into the merits of the dispute, it is 
important to clarify exactly which statements are at issue.  
Beginning at the circuit court, Red-D-Mix has consistently taken 
the position that the misrepresentation consisted only of 
Clark's statements to the effect that Red-D-Mix's concrete was 
"good and durable."  Notably, Red-D-Mix takes the position that 
the court should not factor into its puffery analysis the fact 
that Clark, in addition to the more general endorsement of the 
product, 
specifically 
reassured 
United 
that 
its 
previous 
concerns with the concrete had been addressed and those 
particular problems——i.e., the issues flowing from excessive 
bleed water——were no longer occurring.  In support, Red-D-Mix 
notes that United offered no averments in its third and final 
amended complaint regarding an exchange at the meeting over the 
previous 
problems 
United had encountered with Red-D-Mix's 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
14 
 
product.  Like the circuit court and the court of appeals, we 
take a broader view than does Red-D-Mix. 
¶21 As a notice pleading state, Wisconsin law requires 
only that a complaint "set forth the basic facts giving rise to 
the claims."  Apple Hill Farms Dev., LLP v. Price, 2012 WI App 
69, ¶17, 342 Wis. 2d 162, 816 N.W.2d 914 (citing Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.02(1)(a)).  The purpose of a complaint in a notice 
pleading jurisdiction is to provide "sufficient detail" such 
"that the defendant, and the court, can obtain a fair idea of 
what the plaintiff is complaining, and can see that there is 
some basis for recovery."  Midway Motor Lodge of Brookfield v. 
Hartford Ins. Grp., 226 Wis. 2d 23, 35, 593 N.W.2d 852 (Ct. App. 
1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
¶22 United satisfied that standard here.  While it is true 
that United did not characterize Clark in its complaint as 
speaking specifically to the bleed water problems it had in the 
past, it did alert Red-D-Mix to its accusation that Clark had 
misrepresented the quality of his company's concrete at the 2007 
meeting.  By the time summary judgment pleadings were filed, 
Red-D-Mix was well aware of United's reliance upon Clark's 
purported declaration that the bleed water problems had been 
rectified.  Indeed, in Red-D-Mix's own motion for summary 
judgment, it attached excerpts from a deposition with Hippert, 
the president of United, at which he made abundantly clear that 
he recalled seeking at the meeting "some guarantee from them 
that they had solved that problem" with the bleed water and that 
in response Clark "assured us that they had cured their 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
15 
 
problems . . . ."  Unsurprisingly, in light of that transcript, 
the attorneys debated the significance of the assurance at 
length during the summary judgment hearing, and both the circuit 
court and court of appeals took it into account.  Red-D-Mix had 
more than adequate notice of the statements to prepare its 
defense and respond to United's case, both of which it did 
thoroughly.  There is no defect in the pleadings and we 
incorporate the statements into the allegations in our puffery 
analysis.     
b) The Statements Were Not Puffery 
¶23 Having resolved that threshold issue, we will now 
demonstrate why Clark's statements were not puffery, and why the 
circuit court should have held as much at summary judgment. 
¶24 We begin with some brief background.  The concept of 
puffery is as old as our legal system.  See Stefan J. Padfield, 
Is Puffery Material to Investors? Maybe We Should Ask Them, 10 
U. Pa. J. Bus. & Emp. L. 339, 350-53 (2008) (tracing the roots 
of puffery to the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, or "buyer 
beware").  An early American case succinctly summarized its 
underlying rationale: "[t]he law recognizes the fact that men 
will naturally overstate the value and qualities of the articles 
which they have to sell.  All men know this, and a buyer has no 
right to rely upon such statements."  Kimball v. Bangs, 11 N.E. 
113, 114 (Mass. 1887).  Some years later, Judge Learned Hand 
elaborated, categorizing "some kinds of talk" as that "which no 
sensible man takes seriously, and if he does he suffers from his 
credulity.  If we were all scrupulously honest, it would not be 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
16 
 
so; but, as it is, neither party usually believes what the 
seller says about his own opinions, and each knows it."  Vulcan 
Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853, 856 (2d Cir. 1918).    
¶25 Consistent with other jurisdictions, Wisconsin has 
adopted these same essential principles into its common law.  In 
our state, a salesperson engages in puffery when he gives voice 
to "the exaggerations reasonably to be expected of a seller as 
to the degree of quality of his product, the truth or falsity of 
which cannot be precisely determined."  State v. Am. TV & 
Appliance of Madison, Inc., 146 Wis. 2d 292, 301-02, 430 
N.W.2d 709 
(1988)(internal 
quotation 
marks 
and 
citation 
omitted).  Exaggerations of this sort do not subject the speaker 
to liability under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 because they convey only 
the seller's opinion and are "not capable of being substantiated 
or refuted . . . ."  Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2004 
WI 32, ¶44, 270 Wis. 2d 146, 677 N.W.2d 233 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).   
¶26 Clark's promise to United that Red-D-Mix had remedied 
the bleed water issues cannot reasonably be regarded as puffery 
under the aforementioned definitions.  Excessive bleed water is 
a technical problem, with a technical definition and a technical 
solution.  To gather information on this technical issue, both 
parties retained experts who undertook extensive investigations 
into the precise composition of the concrete used in the 
relevant properties, and then submitted elaborate reports on 
that composition.  There is nothing in the record to suggest 
that a trier of fact, properly instructed and assisted by expert 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
17 
 
testimony, would be unable to ascertain whether Red-D-Mix used 
an acceptable combination of ingredients in its concrete or did 
not.  Cf. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 
598, 627, 657 (2010) (discussing excessive bleed water in 
concrete amongst other technical problems occurring as a result 
of the particular composition of concrete).  In fact, we would 
be hard pressed to invent a hypothetical statement less similar 
to the vague and amorphous hype typically classified as puffery 
than 
a 
specific 
reference 
to 
a 
specific 
problem 
in 
a 
relationship 
between 
two 
specific 
parties 
in 
a 
highly 
specialized industry.  See, e.g., Tietsworth, 270 Wis. 2d 146, 
¶43 (classifying as puffery claims that a product was "a 
masterpiece" and of "premium quality"); Am. TV, 146 Wis. 2d at 
299 (judging the endorsement of a product as "the finest" to be 
puffery); Consol. Papers, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 153 
Wis. 2d 589, 594, 451 N.W.2d 456 (Ct. App. 1989) (explaining why 
an advertisement promising that a product had a "long equipment 
life" was puffery). 
¶27 To attack this straightforward application of well-
established law, Red-D-Mix emphasizes two facts: 1) that the 
salesman did not work at the company during the earlier 
problems; and 2) that the earlier problems related to basements 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
18 
 
and not outdoor projects.  Neither has any bearing on the 
puffery inquiry.12 
¶28 To explain, the reason that a valid defense of puffery 
defeats a Wis. Stat. § 100.18 suit is that the defense 
undermines part of the statute's first element: that the 
defendant related a misrepresentation of fact.  Am. TV, 146 
Wis. 2d at 302.  This is so because a salesperson who simply 
declares that his product is the "best" or the like, is not 
representing a fact at all, let alone misrepresenting one.  
Rather, he is merely delivering a nebulous, abstract, highly 
generalized pitch for his wares.  By contrast, when Clark told 
United that the problem with the bleed water had been fixed, he 
was very much making a specific, factual statement.  That he may 
not 
have 
been familiar with the problems prior to the 
conversation, or had any idea whether they had been addressed or 
not, does not transform the factual statement into puffery, for 
                                                 
12 Red-D-Mix also insists that the statements cannot support 
a Wis. Stat. § 100.18 action because they looked only to the 
future, not the past.  Not so.  Clark told United that a 
specific problem that had occurred historically was no longer an 
issue.  Whether Red-D-Mix fixed a defect is a factual question 
about the past, not the future.  To hold otherwise would be to 
permit suppliers to make whatever outlandish claims they could 
dream up to move their products without fear of lawsuit, because 
every such claim could be categorized as one relating to the 
future sale of the product and not its present condition.     
No.  2011AP1566   
 
19 
 
it does not render this highly specific comment any more general 
than it would have been otherwise.13   
¶29 Our 
conclusion 
is 
bolstered 
by 
the 
absurd 
and 
pernicious consequences that would follow if we gave our stamp 
of approval to Red-D-Mix's theory.  To reiterate Judge Hand's 
explication, salespeople should not be punished for trying to 
improve their sales with claims "which no sensible man takes 
seriously, and if he does he suffers from his credulity."  
Vulcan Metals Co., 248 F. at 856.  It is surely not so naïve, 
though, for a potential customer to expect a salesperson to 
speak the truth when he represents, on behalf of his company, 
that a specific problem that had cropped up in the past between 
the same two parties, relating to the same product, had been 
solved.  Cf. Radford v. J.J.B. Enters., Ltd., 163 Wis. 2d 534, 
544-45, 472 N.W.2d 790 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a boat-
owner did not engage in puffery when he assured the individual 
purchasing the boat from him that its hull was sound and all dry 
rot had been removed).  A world in which companies are relieved 
of liability when their representatives make statements of the 
sort Clark made is a world in which companies have every 
                                                 
13 United has also contended that Red-D-Mix conveyed false 
information in violation of Wis. Stat. § 100.18 when Clark told 
Hippert and Kluess that it was using a new plant and the same 
supplier as M&M Concrete, the company United turned to after it 
ended its earlier relationship with Red-D-Mix.  Our analysis 
focuses on the specific promise that the bleed water problem had 
been remedied, as that promise lies at the heart of the case.  
These other closely related statements are not puffery for the 
same reasons.   
No.  2011AP1566   
 
20 
 
incentive to keep their salespeople in the dark about the flaws 
in their products, and salespeople have every incentive to 
confidently deliver as many unfounded promises as they can, 
while the "sensible man" suffers the consequences.  That is not 
the world common law courts envisioned in developing the concept 
of puffery. 
¶30 We need not dwell long on dispatching Red-D-Mix's 
other line of attack: that the earlier problems involved 
basements 
while 
the 
defects 
giving 
rise 
to 
the 
present 
litigation involved outdoor projects.  For one thing, this 
distinction, whatever its truth, does not go towards puffery.  
Even if Clark did mean only that the concrete was no longer 
excessively bleeding in such a way as to damage basements, the 
truth or falsity of that statement is just as capable of 
ascertainment as the truth or falsity of a more general 
assurance that the concrete was not bleeding overmuch, indoors 
or outdoors.  And, in any event, the summary judgment materials 
made clear beyond doubt that United believed Clark was indeed 
making that more general assurance, and that the assurance was 
proven untrue by the deterioration of the concrete Red-D-Mix 
supplied.  In the excerpted transcript of Hippert's deposition 
that Red-D-Mix attached to its motion for summary judgment, he 
characterized the earlier problem as the inability to "get a 
concrete that we could pour and finish without it bleeding 
substantially" and then elaborated that "in general, it's 
bleeding, but our primary focus was on basements."  Such 
testimony makes plain that United believed the earlier bleeding 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
21 
 
problem was the same as the one afflicting the later deliveries 
of concrete, and that those later problems contradicted Clark's 
promise.  Incontrovertibly, then, Red-D-Mix had the opportunity 
to rebut the claim before the circuit court, and this argument 
is meritless.  The statements were not puffery, and United 
therefore had a colorable claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18.14   
c) Puffery Is Not Always a Question of Fact, Nor One of Law 
¶31 One final question on the subject remains, namely, 
whether puffery is a matter for the judge at summary judgment or 
the trier of fact at trial.  The answer is dictated by our 
foregoing analysis: it depends.   
¶32 Below, the court of appeals made the blanket assertion 
that "[w]hether a statement is puffery is a question of fact."  
United Concrete, No. 2011AP1566, ¶13 (citation omitted).  Unlike 
the panel, we do not understand the law to accord puffery any 
unique status in summary judgment proceedings.  Rather, like 
most other issues, it is best decided by a court on summary 
judgment when there are no genuine issues of material fact in 
dispute and when, viewing the record in the light most favorable 
to the party opposing summary judgment, the single reasonable 
inference to be drawn from the facts favors the movant.  
                                                 
14 Red-D-Mix 
argues 
in 
the 
alternative 
that 
if 
the 
statements were not puffery, they were inactionable on the 
grounds they constituted opinion.  For the same reasons that we 
reject its puffery argument, we reject its opinion argument.  
Radford v. J.J.B. Enters., Ltd., 163 Wis. 2d 534, 544-45, 472 
N.W.2d 790 (Ct. App. 1991) (disposing of opinion and puffery 
issues simultaneously and with identical reasoning). 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
22 
 
Admanco, Inc., 326 Wis. 2d 586, ¶28; Grams, 97 Wis. 2d at 338.  
Where this cannot be said, as will often be the case, it should 
go to the jury.   
¶33 The benefits of our approach are readily apparent.  
Most 
obviously, 
it 
conforms 
to 
clear, 
well-established, 
universal summary judgment procedure, with which our circuit 
court judges are intimately familiar and long accustomed to 
applying.  Cf. Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2) (providing that summary 
judgment is allowed "in circuit courts of this state in all 
civil actions and special pleadings . . . except where different 
procedure is prescribed by statute or rule.").      
¶34 In the same vein, it simply does not make sense to 
assume that puffery is, always and everywhere, a matter for the 
jury.  When there is no reasonable interpretation of the record 
that would evidence puffery, it wastes the taxpayers' and the 
parties' 
time 
and 
money, 
not 
to 
mention 
scant 
judicial 
resources, to assemble a jury and submit to it the question.  
Cf. Yahnke v. Carson, 2000 WI 74, ¶20, 236 Wis. 2d 257, 613 
N.W.2d 102 (noting that "the purposes of summary judgment 
procedure in this state" are to "avoid[] unnecessary trials and 
conserv[e] the resources of the courts and litigants alike").   
¶35 The dispute at hand proves our point.  Unless the 
meeting between Clark and United took place on "opposite day,"15 
                                                 
15 "'Opposite 
Day' 
is 
a 
fictitious 
holiday, 
usually 
celebrated by school-aged children, in which statements on that 
day are intentionally false, but taken to mean the opposite by 
listeners aware that the holiday is being celebrated."  Attorney 
Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Siskind, 930 A.2d 328, 343 n.9 (Md. 
2007) (citations omitted).   
No.  2011AP1566   
 
23 
 
there is no defensible view of the record to support the 
conclusion that Clark's statements constituted puffery.  For 
purposes of summary judgment, Red-D-Mix assumed that Clark 
promised the previous issues with bleed water had been resolved.  
In ruling on the motion, then, the circuit court had no need to 
wonder whether the statements had actually been made, nor to 
consider the credibility of Red-D-Mix's salesman versus the 
credibility of United's employees or any other matter within the 
sole province of the trier of fact.  See, e.g., Fischer v. 
Cleveland Punch & Shear Works Co., 91 Wis. 2d 85, 92, 280 
N.W.2d 280 (1979) ("The credibility of witnesses and the weight 
given to their testimony are matters left to the jury's 
judgment . . . .") (citation omitted).  The judge had only to 
ask whether the truth or falsity of the statements was 
ascertainable.  For the reasons we surveyed above, it was well 
within his competence to find, as a legal matter, that it was. 
¶36 To support its contrary view, the court of appeals 
relied upon a lone footnote from one of its previous opinions.  
See Lambert v. Hein, 218 Wis. 2d 712, 724 n.4, 582 N.W.2d 84 
(Ct. App. 1998).  Its reliance was misplaced.  In the cited 
footnote, the court of appeals held that the trial judge 
correctly let the jury consider whether the phrase "quality 
construction," as used in the real estate industry, was puffery.  
Id.  It further held that "whether 'puffery' may be construed as 
a warranty depends on the objective context in which the 
statement is made" and that in the case at bar "competing 
affidavits" precluded the granting of summary judgment.  Id.  
No.  2011AP1566   
 
24 
 
Neither holding is in conflict with our own today.  The latter 
conclusion——that puffery may also be a warranty in certain 
contexts——does not speak to whether a statement is puffing in 
the first place.  The former conclusion——that whether a 
particular phrase in a particular industry constituted puffery 
was rightly determined by the jury——is in perfect harmony with 
our own position that the question of puffery is sometimes 
appropriate for disposition at summary judgment, and sometimes 
not.  Lambert does not impose an absolute bar on circuit courts 
dealing with puffery on motions for summary judgment, and the 
court of appeals below should not have expanded its narrow, 
fact-specific holding as it did. 
¶37 The approach we take here is consistent with the well-
reasoned precedent of other jurisdictions.  A number of courts 
have refrained from drawing a bright line around puffery in 
terms of whether it presents a question of fact or of law, 
recognizing, as we do, that while it is usually a question of 
fact it can at times be a question of law, and that courts 
should apply the usual summary judgment standard to figure out 
which label fits more closely in a given case.  See Donald 
Braman et al., Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1531, 1571 n.146 (2010) ("Many of the issues in 
puffery . . . are often resolved as matters of law rather than 
fact.") (emphasis added); Snyder v. Farnam Cos., 792 F. Supp. 2d 
712, 723 (D.N.J. 2011) (observing that puffery "is normally a 
question of fact for the jury") (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation 
marks 
and 
citation 
omitted); 
Redmac, 
Inc. 
v. 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
25 
 
Computerland of Peoria, 489 N.E.2d 380, 382 (Ill. Ct. App. 1986) 
("Whether the issue [of puffery] is one of law or fact may be 
debatable; however, it is generally considered a question of 
fact . . . .") 
(emphasis 
added) 
(citations 
omitted). 
 
A 
substantial majority of decisions resolving the puffery question 
do not purport to apply a blanket rule; they simply determine, 
with reference to the specific facts and allegations and the 
general rules of summary judgment, whether the question can be 
resolved as a matter of law by the court or instead requires the 
consideration of the jury.  See, e.g., Park Rise Homeowners 
Ass'n v. Resource Const. Co., 155 P.3d 427, 435 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2006) ("Turning to the phrase 'quality construction,' we reject 
the . . . argument that, as a matter of law, the phrase cannot 
be treated as puffery . . . .") (emphasis added); In re Level 3 
Commc'ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., 667 F.3d 1331, 1340 (10th Cir. 2012) 
("Many of the statements in plaintiff's complaint are, as a 
matter of law, nothing more than puffery.") (emphasis added).   
¶38 Though such decisions do not explicitly endorse our 
conclusion that puffery is ordinarily a matter of fact, but 
sometimes one of law, they follow the same rule we set forth 
here.  For rather than treating puffery as either always or 
never a question of fact, they simply apply the time-tested 
summary judgment standards to the specific motions under 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
26 
 
review.16  In sum, the circuit court should have held as a matter 
of law that the remark was not puffery for purposes of summary 
judgment, and on remand it is instructed to do so.17         
B. UNITED'S REMAINING CLAIMS SURVIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
PART 
¶39 Having disposed of United's Wis. Stat. § 100.18 claim, 
we are left with the balance of its complaint.  Recall that in 
addition to § 100.18, United relied upon theories of breach of 
contract, 
breach 
of 
express 
warranty, 
breach 
of 
implied 
warranty, indemnification, and contribution.  These claims were 
brought both in its own name and through its assignments from 
the homeowners.  The circuit court found all of them failed at 
summary judgment on account of either the economic loss 
doctrine, the speculativeness of the requested damages, or both.  
On appeal, the court of appeals reached the opposite conclusion 
                                                 
16 To the extent other jurisdictions do employ language 
implying 
a 
more 
categorical 
distinction, 
we 
respectfully 
disagree with them for the reasons stated.  See, e.g., Newcal 
Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1053 (9th 
Cir. 
2008) 
("[T]he 
determination 
of 
whether 
an 
alleged 
misrepresentation 'is a statement of fact' or is instead 'mere 
puffery' is a legal question that may be resolved" without the 
jury's involvement) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).         
17 Our determination that the statements were not puffery 
for summary judgment purposes does not mean that United 
automatically prevails on its Wis. Stat. § 100.18 claim.  That 
determination will be made by the jury, and the parties are 
still entitled to submit evidence to the jury regarding whether 
the statements were actually made, whether they constituted 
misrepresentation under the statute, and so on.     
No.  2011AP1566   
 
27 
 
on each point.  Both courts were partly correct and partly 
incorrect, compelling us to affirm in part and reverse in part.     
1. United's Claims Through the Assignments are Impermissible 
¶40 Before explaining why the claims United asserted 
through the assignments are impermissible, we pause to rebut the 
concurrence's unfounded and unshared assertion that no such 
claims exist.   
¶41 To be sure, the complaint did not explicitly indicate 
that United was suing Red-D-Mix through the assignments in the 
homeowners' name.  Nevertheless, that has been the uncontested 
view of everyone involved in the case from its inception to the 
present day.  In the circuit court, both parties proceeded with 
the understanding that United was suing both in its own name and 
that of the homeowners.  The circuit court itself memorialized 
that understanding in its summary judgment order, dismissing 
"all claims asserted by United . . . through the assignments 
from the property owners . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  All the 
briefs at the court of appeals refer to claims being filed 
through the assignments, as does the court of appeals' opinion 
and the petition for review.  Neither party denies at this late 
date, nor did they ever, that United filed claims through the 
assignments in the homeowners' name. 
¶42 Alone among every attorney or judge who has ever 
participated in this case, from its commencement to today, Chief 
Justice Abrahamson and the two justices joining her in the 
concurrence, believe United did not sue in the homeowners' name 
in addition to its own.  Contrary to their suggestion, we are 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
28 
 
not here adopting "Red-D-Mix's mistaken depiction of the 
complaint," concurrence, ¶68, we are adopting the depiction 
shared by the attorney who drafted and filed the complaint, the 
attorney who responded to it, the circuit court that ruled on 
it, and the three judges on the court of appeals panel who heard 
the case before us.  Perhaps the most definitive statement on 
the matter comes from the lawyer who has represented United 
throughout these proceedings, who wrote in her response to Red-
D-Mix's motion for summary judgment that her client was 
"asserting causes of action in its own name as well as on behalf 
of the property owners as alternative theories of recovery."  
(Emphasis added.)  This unequivocal sentence was penned by the 
same person who signed the complaint itself.  It is difficult to 
comprehend why the concurring justices believe they understand 
the nature of the complaint better than its author. 
¶43 The 
concurrence's 
unexplained 
assertions 
notwithstanding, we do not believe the circuit court or parties 
will have to guess as to which claims were filed in the 
homeowners' name, given that all of them have repeatedly 
referred to those claims throughout the litigation, including 
the circuit court in the very order the concurrence paraphrases.  
See id., ¶65 (noting that the circuit court summary judgment 
order dismissed "claims asserted through the assignments from 
the property owners . . . .").  The concurrence thinks we should 
be more "precise in telling the circuit court which parts of the 
complaint it should strike."  Id., ¶70.  We do not share its 
doubts over the circuit court's abilities, or think any more 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
29 
 
precision is required, as it already dismissed the claims 
asserted through the assignments and thus presumably knows what 
those claims are. 
¶44 In profoundly misleading fashion, the concurrence 
suggests that United agrees that the assignments are a "red 
herring" in the same sense that the concurrence uses that term.  
Id., ¶66.  United calls the assignments a "red herring" in its 
brief here with respect to its argument on damages, and the term 
was employed in the same context at oral argument.  As shown 
below, we agree with United on that point.  Neither United nor 
anyone else, aside from the concurrence, has ever contended that 
the assignments are a "red herring" in the sense that United did 
not sue through them.  Everyone else has taken the exact 
opposite position at every stage of the litigation. 
¶45 The concurrence helpfully attaches the complaint.  We 
might just as easily attach the numerous documents making 
abundantly clear how novel the concurrence's interpretation of 
that complaint is.  To name just a few of these documents, there 
is United's brief opposing summary judgment, the circuit court 
order, the briefs at the court of appeals, the court of appeals' 
opinion, and the petition for review.  Trees should not have to 
die in order for us to substantiate such an obvious and 
uncontested point, so we decline to add any appendices of our 
own.        
¶46 Returning from the concurrence's imagined version of 
the case to the actual dispute, consider again the court of 
appeals opinion.  In reversing the trial judge, the court of 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
30 
 
appeals' entire analysis of Linden occupies two sentences, 
quoted here in full:  
The trial court concluded that the homeowners could 
not sue Red-D-Mix on their own, and so had no rights 
to assign, because a property owner cannot sue a 
subcontractor directly.  See Linden, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 
¶¶17, 32.  While the homeowners may have had no rights 
against Red-D-Mix to assign, the Assignments neither 
strip from United its right to sue Red-D-Mix nor 
protect 
United 
from 
[the] 
homeowners' 
potential 
breach-of-contract claims.   
United Concrete, No. 2011AP1566, ¶11.  This is a rather 
confusing train of thought.  The court of appeals accurately 
sums up the trial judge's reasoning, but then proceeds to ignore 
his conclusion.  If the circuit court was in fact correct that 
the homeowners cannot sue Red-D-Mix, rendering the assignments 
nullities, then summary judgment was in fact properly granted on 
the claims United brought through the assignments.  Rather than 
resolving that issue, the court of appeals decided instead to 
address only the claims in United's own name and the potential 
claims by the homeowners against United.  In other words, the 
"may" in the paragraph quoted above leaves a crucial question 
unanswered, and creates needless uncertainty on remand.   
¶47 Linden answers the question definitively.  There, we 
held that the economic loss doctrine18 prevents a homeowner from 
                                                 
18 The economic loss doctrine, as interpreted by Linden v. 
Cascade Stone Co., Inc., 2005 WI 113, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 699 
N.W.2d 189, was raised and fully briefed at the court of 
appeals, and discussed by that court, and it was raised in the 
petition for review and fully briefed here.  It is properly 
before us. 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
31 
 
suing a subcontractor in tort for purely economic loss.  Linden, 
283 Wis. 2d 606, ¶¶26-31.  Expounding, we determined that a tort 
suit does not lie "when . . . the defective product is a 
component part of an integrated structure or finished product" 
and the damage is solely "to an integrated product, which 
results in only economic loss," rather than physical harm or 
personal injury.  Id., ¶28 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  To hold otherwise, we reasoned, "would 
require a finding of property damage in virtually every case in 
which" the only harm that occurs is to the product itself, "and 
would prevent contractual rules from serving their legitimate 
function in governing commercial transactions."  Id., ¶27 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
¶48 The claims United asserted against Red-D-Mix through 
the assignments squarely fit within the class of lawsuits 
governed by Linden.  United had a contract with Red-D-Mix, and 
contracts with the homeowners.  No contract existed between Red-
D-Mix and the homeowners.  With only two exceptions,19 the 
                                                 
19 There is evidence in the record suggesting that two 
properties did suffer damage outside of the concrete itself, one 
involving grass growing in a driveway and problems with 
landscaping, the other involving unusual wear and tear to a 
carpet.  At the summary judgment hearing, counsel for Red-D-Mix 
suggested that these two claims could not be dismissed under the 
economic loss doctrine.  It was a prudent concession.  See 
Linden, 283 Wis. 2d 606, ¶6 ("Economic damages" covered by the 
doctrine "do not include losses due to . . . damage to other 
property.") (citation omitted).  Because these homeowners' 
claims are not barred by the economic loss doctrine, and because 
damages as a general matter are not fatally speculative, see 
infra ¶55, they should be included in the case that goes to 
trial.    
No.  2011AP1566   
 
32 
 
damages were to the installed concrete itself, and there were no 
physical injuries or personal harm.  In short, the three parties 
stood in the same position as those discussed in Linden.20   
¶49 Although the plaintiffs in Linden abandoned their 
contract claims before their case reached our court, id., ¶31, 
we nevertheless spoke unequivocally on the subject.  In 
situations like these, we said, "homeowners retain contractual 
remedies against the general contractors, who in turn have their 
own remedies against the subcontractors."  Id., ¶30.  That is to 
say, contractual claims should be brought between parties in 
privity of contract.  The homeowners and Red-D-Mix were not in 
privity, and United cannot create a cause of action for its 
customers where none lies.21   
¶50 United attempts to distinguish Linden on two principle 
grounds.22  Neither is convincing.  First, it stresses that 
                                                 
20 United argued to the circuit court that Linden applies 
only to subcontractors and not suppliers, and that Red-D-Mix can 
only be characterized as the latter.  It does not press that 
argument here so we do not take it up in detail.  Suffice it to 
say, as we do above, that the parties stand in the same position 
vis-à-vis one another as did the parties in Linden in all 
relevant respects.   
21 Both parties grant that if any property owners sue 
United, it can then bring Red-D-Mix in as a third-party 
defendant.   
22 In addition to these two points, United maintains that 
Red-D-Mix conceded the assignments' validity in a prior motion 
during the litigation over insurance coverage in the case.  It 
provides no citations and scant argument in support.  We read 
the motion simply as arguing, in a largely unrelated proceeding, 
that the homeowners transferred whatever rights they might have 
had to sue Red-D-Mix to United, not that they necessarily 
enjoyed such rights. 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
33 
 
"privity of contract exists between the opposing parties" here, 
while it did not in Linden.  This is true, but immaterial.  The 
privity of contract between United and Red-D-Mix has nothing to 
do with the relationship between the homeowners and Red-D-Mix, 
or the ability of the former to sue Red-D-Mix.  If the 
homeowners cannot file an action against Red-D-Mix, then United 
cannot do so in their name. 
¶51 Lastly, United urges us to accept the claims on the 
basis that Linden imposed no bar on third-party contract 
beneficiary actions.  We grant that Linden left unsettled the 
permissibility of such suits.  Id., ¶31.  That question will 
remain open, as United did not claim, in its complaint, that it 
was exercising any rights to sue on behalf of the homeowners as 
third-party beneficiaries. 
¶52 To summarize, Linden precludes United from suing Red-
D-Mix in the name of the homeowners.  The circuit court properly 
dismissed those claims on summary judgment, and the court of 
appeals improperly reinstated them.  It is reversed insofar as 
it did so, and those claims will not go to trial. 
2. United's Claims in Its Own Name are Permissible 
¶53 The circuit court rejected United's claims brought in 
its own name on the grounds that damages were too speculative.  
In 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
judgment, 
however, 
they 
were 
sufficiently concrete to justify a trial.  We agree with the 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
34 
 
court of appeals, though we overrule its premature determination 
regarding the effect of the assignments.23 
¶54 In order to survive summary judgment, a complaint 
sounding in contract must allege damages.  See, e.g., Black v. 
St. Bernadette Congregation of Appleton, 121 Wis. 2d 560, 566, 
360 N.W.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1984).  Such allegations must reflect 
"[t]he fundamental idea in allowing damages for breach of 
contract," that is, "to put the plaintiff in as good a position 
financially as he would have been in but for the breach" by 
giving the aggrieved party "what he contracts for or its 
equivalent."  Cent. Brown Cnty. Water Auth. v. Consoer, 
                                                 
23 United objects to Red-D-Mix's briefing of this issue on 
the grounds that it was not presented in the petition for 
review.  Although the word "damages" does not appear in the 
petition's statement of issues, the question of whether damages 
are speculative is closely intertwined with the question of 
whether the action is barred by Linden, which was raised.  An 
examination of our own discussion shows as much, as does 
inspection of the court of appeals opinion, the briefs, or the 
arguments to the trial court.  In a word, Red-D-Mix has always 
taken the position that the claims asserted through the 
assignments are invalid because the property owners cannot sue 
Red-D-Mix under Linden, and that is one of the reasons why 
United's own damages (which are in part claimed on behalf of the 
owners) are speculative.  It has taken that position at every 
stage of litigation and in every court, and it took it in its 
petition for review.  In this sense, the two issues are not only 
linked, each is part and parcel of the other.   
Moreover, even though the petition did not specifically 
mention damages in its framing of the issue, it did discuss it 
at some length in the argument section of the petition, putting 
both United and the court on notice that it was inherent in the 
issue raised.  To refuse to address it would be to adopt a 
crimped reading of our procedural rules, and would impair the 
comprehensiveness 
of 
our 
decision 
and 
create 
unnecessary 
ambiguity on remand.  
No.  2011AP1566   
 
35 
 
Townsend, Envirodyne, No. 09-C-0131, 2013 WL 501419, unpublished 
slip op. at *10 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 11, 2013) (quoting Schubert v. 
Midwest Broad. Co., 1 Wis. 2d 497, 502, 85 N.W.2d 449 (1957) and 
DeSombre v. Bickel, 18 Wis. 2d 390, 398, 118 N.W.2d 868 (1963)).  
A party satisfies its burden at summary judgment with respect to 
damages if it advances evidence that it did not "receive[] the 
benefit of its bargain." Id.  One way of making this showing is 
to submit evidence that raises a material question of fact as to 
whether a product or service provided "was of lesser quality" 
than guaranteed under the agreement, and whether its defects led 
the plaintiff to incur "costs needed to repair the alleged 
defects."  Id.  As a more general matter, to be recoverable in a 
contract claim, damages have to "flow[] from the breach."  
Denhart v. Waukesha Brewing Co., 21 Wis. 2d 583, 595, 124 
N.W.2d 664 
(1963) 
(citation 
omitted), 
and 
they 
"must 
be 
reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was made as a 
probable result of the breach."  Peterson v. Cornerstone Prop. 
Dev., LLC, 2006 WI App 132, ¶50, 294 Wis. 2d 800, 720 N.W.2d 716 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
¶55 The record contains evidence suggesting that flatwork 
required replacement because of the deterioration in Red-D-Mix's 
concrete.  United has already replaced one driveway, belonging 
to the Beyers, pursuant to a settlement with the aggrieved 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
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party.24  Another couple, the Michaels, demanded a reservation of 
rights to sue United in return for executing the assignment, 
entitling them to hale United into court at any time.  Replacing 
the work done for either the Beyers or the Michaels would not 
have been necessary if United had procured durable concrete from 
Red-D-Mix.  The latter's failure to supply such concrete 
breached its contract with United, and the cost of replacement 
is directly attributable to that failure, i.e., it "flow[s] from 
the breach."  Denhart, 21 Wis. 2d at 595.  Furthermore, a 
competent supplier of concrete knows that if it sells a 
substandard product, the end-users will likely see their 
properties marred.  Red-D-Mix was aware of that inevitability as 
well, or should have been, so the damages were "reasonably 
foreseeable at the time the contract was made as a probable 
                                                 
24 In its initial brief, Red-D-Mix submits that the Beyers 
should be excluded from the equation because evidence of its 
case in small claims court was only given to the circuit court 
presiding over this matter after summary judgment was entered 
below.  However, it concedes that "reference to" the small 
claims litigation was made prior to that date in circuit court, 
and that the stipulation and order calling for the replacement 
preceded the summary judgment hearing.  Red-D-Mix does not 
challenge the veracity of United's representations to the 
circuit court regarding the Beyers' case, nor the nature of the 
order.  The trial judge was made adequately aware of the case 
and United's reliance upon it for us to consider it here. 
No.  2011AP1566   
 
37 
 
result of the breach."  Peterson, 294 Wis. 2d 800, ¶50.25  
Damages are not speculative.     
¶56 One final point.  The above-quoted passage from the 
court of appeals opinion regarding the assignments creates 
confusion on the question of damages, in addition to the 
ambiguity it inserts into the economic loss doctrine.  To repeat 
the most essential sentence, the court of appeals announced that 
"[w]hile the homeowners may have had no rights against Red-D-Mix 
to assign, the Assignments neither strip from United its right 
to sue Red-D-Mix nor protect United from homeowners' potential 
breach-of-contract claims."  United Concrete, No. 2011AP1566, 
¶11.  In the preceding section we had occasion to comment on the 
problematic ambiguity of the term "may" in the first sentence.  
Now, we must overrule the premature statement made in the 
second. 
¶57  As shown above, there was sufficient evidence in the 
record regarding damages for United to survive summary judgment.  
The court of appeals did not need to construe the legal 
significance of the assignments in order to reach its result, 
let alone to do so with no explanation, no consideration of the 
                                                 
25 Obviously, nothing in this opinion should be taken to 
limit United, in its showing of damages, to expenses undertaken 
with respect to the Beyers' and Michaels' properties.  We focus 
on those properties only because they are sufficient for United 
to surmount the hurdle of summary judgment.  United is entitled, 
like all plaintiffs, to prove up to the jury's satisfaction any 
damages that stem from the breach and which were reasonably 
foreseeable by Red-D-Mix at the time it contracted to supply the 
relevant concrete to United.   
No.  2011AP1566   
 
38 
 
assignments' terms, and no citation to authority.  We overrule 
its comments on the status of the assignments.  If the 
assignments become relevant in any further proceedings before 
the circuit court, they can be interpreted afresh at that time.    
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶58 As shown above, the court of appeals was in the main 
correct, but reached the wrong result in one respect and was 
overbroad or imprecise in others.  To wit, the court of appeals 
properly reversed the circuit court's ruling regarding puffery, 
though it incorrectly determined that puffery is always a 
question of fact for the jury.  On the next issue, the court of 
appeals erred in its determination that the claims United 
asserted through the assignments were valid, when, with two 
exceptions,26 the economic loss doctrine barred the homeowners 
from suing Red-D-Mix and thus barred United from suing in their 
name.  Finally, the court of appeals rightly reversed the 
circuit court for finding all the asserted damages speculative, 
though in doing so it prematurely interpreted the legal 
significance of the assignments.  Its language construing the 
assignments is overruled.   
¶59 When the case is returned to it, the circuit court is 
directed to dismiss the claims asserted through the assignments, 
and to allow the remaining claims to proceed to trial.  We 
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.  
                                                 
26 See supra note 19.   
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39 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded 
to the circuit court with instructions. 
 
                     
 
                                 
 
 
No.  2011AP1566.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶60 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the court of appeals' unpublished per curiam opinion in 
this case.  Like the court of appeals, I would reverse the order 
for summary judgment and remand the matter to the circuit court 
for trial without any specific instructions. 
¶61 I have trouble with the majority opinion's instruction 
to the circuit court "to dismiss the claims asserted through the 
assignments, and to allow the remaining claims to proceed to 
trial."  Majority op., ¶¶3, 59.  To take a page out of the 
majority opinion's play on the word "concrete," I suggest that 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
instruction 
"to 
dismiss 
[United 
Concrete's] claims asserted though the assignments" is not 
concrete enough.    
¶62 Just what claims does the majority have in mind that 
have to be dismissed?  Why make the circuit court and the 
parties guess which claims the majority wants dismissed?  Just 
tell us!     
¶63 As I read the complaint, which I have attached hereto 
as Exhibit A, United Concrete has not asserted any claims 
through the assignments.  United Concrete's complaint has seven 
numbered claims.  All the claims United Concrete asserts in the 
complaint are for injuries United Concrete alleges it has 
suffered as a result of Red-D-Mix's conduct. 
¶64 The circuit court order dismissed United Concrete's 
entire complaint.  The substantive portion of the dismissal 
order reads as follows: 
No.  2011AP1566.ssa 
 
2 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that 
Red-D-Mix Concrete, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment 
is granted.  The Court rules that all claims asserted 
by United Concrete & Construction, Inc. through the 
assignments from the property owners and all tort 
based claims are precluded by the holding in Linden v. 
Cascade, 2005 WI 113, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 699 N.W.2d 189 
and the Economic Loss Doctrine. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, with respect 
to the Plaintiff's Wis. Stat. § 100.18 claim, the 
statements made by Red-D-Mix Concrete, Inc.'s salesman 
constitute "puffery" and are not actionable under the 
statute. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, with respect 
to United Concrete & Construction, Inc.'s remaining 
claims, the Plaintiff has not sufficiently established 
damages, to support its claims (emphasis added). 
¶65 This circuit court order organizes United Concrete's 
complaint into four categories of claims: (1) claims asserted 
through the assignments from the property owners; (2) tort based 
claims; (3) Wis. Stat. § 100.18 claim; and (4) remaining claims.  
The circuit court order does not make clear which of the seven 
claims in United Concrete's complaint it viewed as being based 
on the assignments.   
¶66 The reality of this case is that the whole issue of 
the assignments is, as United Concrete has maintained, a "red 
herring,"1 diverting attention from the real issues:  Did Red-D-
                                                 
1 Others have viewed the discussion of the assignments in 
this case as a "red herring."  At oral argument, Justice 
Roggensack 
commented about the assignments to Red-D-Mix's 
counsel during rebuttal as follows: 
Whatever is going on here [with the assignments], to 
me it feels like a "red herring," what's going on with 
the homeowners.  They're not here.  We've got a 
dispute between Red-D-Mix and United and that's what I 
think we're gonna focus on here. 
No.  2011AP1566.ssa 
 
3 
 
Mix violate Wis. Stat. § 100.18, did Red-D-Mix breach the 
contract, 
and 
is 
United 
Concrete's 
claim 
for 
damages 
speculative?      
¶67 The majority opinion confirms the reality of this 
case, explaining at ¶41:  "The complaint did not explicitly 
indicate that United was suing Red-D-Mix through the assignments 
in the homeowners' name."  
¶68 While recognizing the reality of this case, the 
majority 
opinion 
sometimes 
accepts 
Red-D-Mix's 
mistaken 
depiction of the complaint.2  Indeed, the majority opinion 
repeatedly vacillates between reality and spin.     
¶69 The 
majority 
opinion's 
adoption 
of 
Red-D-Mix's 
mistaken depiction of the complaint rather than the reality of 
the complaint culminates in the majority opinion's instruction 
to the circuit court "to dismiss the claims asserted through the 
assignments, and to allow the remaining claims to proceed to 
trial."  
¶70 I vote for concrete reality.  The majority opinion 
should be precise in telling the circuit court which parts of 
the complaint it should strike.  
                                                                                                                                                             
An audio recording of the oral argument can be found on the 
Supreme Court's website at http://www.wicourts.gov/opinions/ 
soralarguments.htm, at 1:13:58 – 1:14:15. 
2 See, for example, ¶¶39, 41, 43, 48 of the majority 
opinion, treating the complaint as if United Concrete's claims 
for "breach of contract, breach of express warranty, breach of 
implied 
warranty, 
indemnification, 
and 
contribution" 
were 
"brought both in [United Concrete's] own name and through its 
assignments from the homeowners." 
No.  2011AP1566.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶71 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this opinion. 
No.  2011AP1566.ssa 
 
 
 
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EXHIBIT A 
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2
 
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3
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4
 
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5
 
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6