Title: Morris v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Franklin Morris v. State of Maryland, No. 34, September Term, 2010
CRIMINAL LAW – JOINT TRIAL – PLEA-TYPE AGREEMENTS – RIGHT TO
CONFRONT WITNESSES – RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE – WHERE A
DEFENDANT STANDS TRIAL ALONGSIDE A CO-DEFENDANT WHO HAS STRUCK
A DEAL WITH THE STATE AND TRIAL COURT TO NOT PRESENT A DEFENSE
BUT PREDOMINANTLY TO STAND MUTE DURING THE PROCEEDING, THE NON-
PARTICIPATING CO-DEFENDANT IS NOT TRULY ON TRIAL.  BY USING THE
APPEARANCE OF A TRIAL TO INTRODUCE THE CONFESSION OF THE CO-
DEFENDANT, WHO WAS NOT SUBJECT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION AND WHO
HAD NOT BEEN DEEMED GUILTY PREVIOUSLY, THE STATE VIOLATED THE
CONFRONTATION RIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT ACTUALLY ON TRIAL.  SUCH
VIOLATION WAS DEEMED HARMFUL BECAUSE IT WAS UNCLEAR, BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT THE CO-DEFENDANT’S CONFESSION DID NOT
IMPACT THE JURY’S CONCLUSION REGARDING THE DEFENDANT’S GUILT.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 207092040
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 34
September Term, 2010
                                                                             
FRANKLIN MORRIS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Harrell, J.
                                                                             
Filed:    February 23, 2011
1 “The Heart of the Matter,” The End of the Innocence, Don Henley, 1989.
2 The Sixth Amendment states, in pertinent part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3 The relevant portion of Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states that
“in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him . . . [and] to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath . . . .”
Don Henley sang, “trying to get down to the heart of the matter,” often the “more I
know, the less I understand.”1  Apropos of that sentiment, in the present case, the parties brief
and argue an array of issues, only a few of which are actually before this Court and which
we shall decide.  In the process, they glaze the proceedings with a certain degree of
opaqueness.  
After an extensive review of the record, we conclude that Franklin Morris (“Morris”)
preserved a confrontation right challenge for our review.  Moreover, we hold that the
“miscellaneous agreement” (equivalent to a guilty plea agreement), applicable to his co-
defendant at their joint trial, operated to violate Morris’s confrontation right, as protected by
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution (“Constitution”)2 and Article 21 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights (“Declaration of Rights”),3 on the peculiar facts of this
case.  Furthermore, we resolve that that error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
and, accordingly, reverse Morris’s convictions. 
I.
A.
Factual Background.
Late one Friday morning, 23 February 2007, Stewart Williams (“Williams”) and a
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compatriot walked into a retail store, The Wine Underground, located at 4400 Evans Chapel
Road in Baltimore City.  In the midst of unpacking boxes, Richard Seleany, a store
employee, looked up and saw the two individuals.  In the course of his prior employment
with The Wine Underground, Seleany had been robbed.  Noticing that at least one of these
men was wearing a hood and a mask, he assumed another robbery was in the offing.  Taking
preemptive action, Seleany charged the would-be robbers and a fight ensued.  As the brawl
moved out of the store and onto the sidewalk, Williams drew a semi-automatic hand gun and
fired a single shot, narrowly missing Seleany’s head. 
The assailants then turned and fled.  As they ran toward a side road, Williams fired
a second shot at the store employee, missing him again.  Seleany was unable to get a good
look at the would-be robbers’ faces.
Someone, perhaps a neighbor, called the police.  One of the responding police
officers, Joshua Galemore, gleaned relevant information from witnesses at the crime scene,
which data he relayed to police dispatch.  In turn, dispatch broadcasted an alert for a white
sedan.  Officer Raul Alvarez, sitting in his marked police cruiser at the corner of Millbrook
Road and Cold Spring Lane and hearing the dispatch, saw a white sedan matching the
description and traveling east on Cold Spring Lane with two black male occupants.
Alvarez followed the vehicle as it turned right (south) onto York Road and then left
(east) onto Willow Avenue.  As the sedan made this second turn, Officer Alvarez observed
what he believed was the top of a third person’s head in the back seat.  Alvarez activated his
emergency lights.  
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Nearby, Officers Steven Weiss and Kenneth Scott were driving in their unmarked
police car.  They quickly joined the “pursuit.”  The white sedan increased its speed in
response.  The two police cars tracked the white sedan to the 600 block of Willow Avenue,
a residential area.  The front passenger, later identified as Williams, ran into a house
(numbered 609) where he stowed a handgun.  Police learned eventually that it was
Williams’s home.   
Alvarez drew his sidearm and approached the white sedan.  The driver, Morris, the
back-seat passenger, and ultimately Williams were taken into custody.  They were
transported to the Robbery Division, where Detectives Byron Conaway and Robert Jackson
interviewed them separately.  Williams provided written and taped statements in which he
confessed to the crimes at The Wine Underground.  In his taped statement, Williams made
clear that he entered the store “to rob . . . for cash.”  “When [he] attempted to rob the store,”
however, he claimed to have been alone.  Once inside, “the worker[, Seleany,] . . . rushed
towards me . . . . [and t]he gun fired once in the air.”  At some point, after the fight had
moved outdoors, Williams started “r[unning] towards Falls Road.”
Pertinently, the following exchange then occurred.
  
[Detective]: After you ran towards Falls Road, how did you
get into the white [sedan] where the police
attempted to pull you over?
[Williams]:
Basically, I just entered it.
[Detective]: And the person driving, did they drop you off at
your house in front of the door?
[Williams]:
Yeah.
-4-
* * *
[Detective]: What color was the vehicle that you got into at the
scene?
[Williams]:
White.
[Detective]: What kinds of articles of clothing did you have?
Like, what was the description of the clothing that
you had on?
[Williams]:
Blue jeans, black shirt and I think I had on – I
forgot what hoody I had on.  I had a hoody.
[Detective]: You had a hoody?
[Williams]:
Yeah.
[Detective]: Did you have a black mask on?
[Williams]:
Not a mask, but like a shirting, a shirt sleeve.
[Detective]: A shirt sleeve that you, is like a makeshift mask?
Did it look like a mask?
[Williams]:
Some, yeah.
[Detective]: What color was that?
[Williams]:
Gray.  Like black-gray.  It was faded, though, so
I would say gray.
A search warrant was obtained for 609 Willow Avenue.  Detective Conaway, while
executing the warrant, discovered a handgun in the basement of the house.  A ballistics
examination revealed that a shell casing, recovered from the scene of the attempted robbery,
had been fired from the weapon.  A subsequent (and authorized) search of the white sedan
yielded a piece of black cloth, along with other black items of clothing.
For his part, Morris denied any involvement with the attempted armed robbery.  At
trial, he testified that, over the course of a fifteen-year friendship, Williams had telephoned
him often and asked for rides – approximately 40-50 times.  On the morning of 23 February
2007, Williams assertedly phoned Morris around 11:30 a.m., asking to be picked up at the
corner of Falls Road and Coldspring Lane.  When Morris and his white sedan arrived at that
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location, Williams was not there, so Morris called Williams’s cell phone number.  According
to Morris, when Williams and another man arrived, Williams was not “out of breath[.]”
Williams asked Morris to drive him home and, with no query or volunteering about what the
two men’s recent activities had been, off they drove.
When Officer Alvarez activated his vehicle’s emergency lights, Morris did not pull
over the car and stop immediately because he claimed not to have noticed the lights.  Upon
hearing the police cruiser’s siren, however, he stopped the sedan, albeit virtually at the
intended destination – Williams’s house.  Morris believed initially that he was pulled over
for the expired temporary tags on his car.
B.
Procedural History.
On the theory that Williams was the gunman/ robber and Morris the getaway driver,
the State charged both men with various offenses and sought a joint trial in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City.  The morning of the trial dawned with a predicament – although Williams
and the State had discussed a plea agreement previously, Williams announced that he desired
a bench trial, while Morris wanted a jury to decide his fate.  Remarking that the Court of
Special Appeals “strongly disapprove[s]” of a simultaneous bench and jury trial, see Nair v.
State, 51 Md. App. 234, 239, 442 A.2d 196, 199 (1982), cert. denied, 239 Md. 617 (1982),
the trial judge “suggest[ed]” that, “if the State is [still] seeking to keep the co-defendants
together,” “we could enter into a miscellaneous agreement where at the end of the
proceeding, [Williams] would be the beneficiary of [the aforementioned proposed] plea
4 During the subsequent sentencing hearing, Williams’s counsel illuminated somewhat
further why his client chose the route he did – “it was the State’s intention originally to allow
[Williams] to enter into this plea and that is why we didn’t go with a court trial.”
5 The following exchange took place:
[Williams’s Counsel]:
I wanted the Court’s guidance on
that in terms of – I mean, I don’t
want to make it seem like we’re not
participating either.  I don’t know
how that would happen.
[Morris’s Counsel]:
Maybe you’re not.
[Williams’s Counsel]:
Well I know, but –
[Trial Judge]:
Ask questions in cross if you want,
don’t ask them if you don’t want.
And just waive your opening,
waive your close.  You’re still
(continued...)
-6-
agreement [to which] the State has kind of grudgingly acquiesced . . . .”4  
In particular, the judge proposed that, in exchange for an agreed upon sentence of
seventeen years, suspend all but ten, Williams would “stand trial by jury along with [Morris],
[so that] the State [has] got the Defendants side by side.”  During the trial itself, however,
Williams and his counsel simply would “be[] there and contribut[e] nothing to [it]” – that is,
Williams would “waive opening and closing argument, [and] assert the Fifth . . . .”
Nonetheless, he would retain “the right to argue [a] Motion for Judgment of Acquittal just
in case the State’s case goes sour on it and a witness doesn’t testify or anything like that.”
In later pre-trial exchanges, Williams, the prosecutor, and the judge added additional
conditions to the “miscellaneous agreement” – Williams would waive peremptory jury
challenges, but retain his right to cross-examine witnesses.5   Moreover, if the jury found
(...continued)
participating in the sense that if the
State’s case falls apart, you can
move for judgment of acquittal.
-7-
Williams guilty, as was contemplated would occur in all likelihood, the State would drop
additional charges against Williams, stemming from an unrelated incident; otherwise, the
State would be permitted to proceed on those separate charges.
After a brief recess, Williams expressed his desire to “take advantage of the Court’s
offer . . . .”  Morris, however, objected and sought a severance, arguing that “the Court has
made an agreement . . . [that is] beneficial to the State. . . . [b]ecause obviously the State
would . . . like to be in the position to try both of the Defendants at one time . . . .”
Countering, the trial judge averred that “[Williams’s presence] is not adding anything to the
jury trial.”  “If there were no agreement,” he continued, the jury trial would not unfold
differently – “[Williams would] still [assert] the Fifth and you’d not be able to get him to
testify.”  (Emphasis added.)
Morris’s counsel persisted, claiming (erroneously) that, but for this “miscellaneous
agreement,” he would be able to call and interrogate Williams on the witness stand during
Morris’s defense case in the joint trial.  The objection was overruled.  The State then made
clear its intention to use Williams’s pre-trial statements, “since the State still has to prove to
a jury Mr. Williams’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  In the State’s eyes, Williams’s
statements “in no way facially incriminate[], or facially make[] reference to, anybody else,”
so they would be used only against Williams.  Although Morris sought initially a severance,
-8-
contesting the State’s proposed use of the statements, he withdrew ultimately his objection.
After another recess, Morris changed his mind and renewed his objection to the
State’s intended introduction of Williams’s statements.  Apparently, during the break,
Morris’s counsel obtained a copy of the statements and concluded that they inculpated, albeit
indirectly, his client; according to Morris’s counsel, the statement “puts my client into the
mix” by placing his pick-up of Williams closer to the scene of the attempted robbery than did
Morris’s pre-trial version of the events and, therefore, “further[s] my argument as to
severance.”  The parties and the judge then engaged in a discussion about implications for
the situation from Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476
(1968), and related cases.  The gist of this discussion was that, even if a court delivers a
limiting instruction, the confession of a co-defendant in a joint trial, which incriminates
facially the other co-defendant, may not be admitted against that co-defendant – unless the
original co-defendant is available for cross-examination.  The confession may be admitted,
however, if redacted or otherwise altered so that it is incriminating only “when linked with
evidence introduced later at trial . . . .”  Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 107 S. Ct.
1702, 1707, 95 L. Ed. 2d 176, 186 (1987).  In the present case, the trial judge determined that
Williams’s statement was “linkage,” rather than “[Bruton] evidence,” and, thus, he overruled
Morris’s objection.  
The joint trial commenced.  Williams did not participate in voir dire, did not make an
opening or closing statement, did not cross-examine any witness, and generally did not
present a defense.  Furthermore, the judge was not asked to, and did not, instruct the jury that
6 The jury acquitted Williams of attempted first-degree murder, but convicted him of
attempted second-degree murder; attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon; first degree
assault; wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun; use of a handgun during a felony or
crime of violence; and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon.  
-9-
Williams’s statements should not be considered as regards Morris guilt or innocence.
Ultimately, the jury found Morris, as a principal in the second degree, guilty of attempted
robbery with a dangerous weapon; first-degree assault; transporting a handgun in a vehicle;
use of a handgun during a felony or crime of violence; and conspiracy to commit robbery
with a dangerous weapon.6  Thereafter, the trial judge sentenced Morris to twenty years
incarceration for first-degree assault and, after merging attempted robbery into first-degree
assault, concurrent twenty-year sentences for use of a handgun in a crime of violence and
conspiracy.
Morris appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  His brief in this Court summarized
well our intermediate appellate colleagues’ treatment of that appeal.  
On appeal, Mr. Morris argued that the trial court erred in
permitting Mr. Williams to be tried “alongside” Mr. Morris
under the “miscellaneous agreement,” because the sham joint
trial defrauded the jury and permitted the State to circumvent
Mr. Morris’s Confrontation Clause rights.  Additionally, Mr.
Morris argued that the trial court erred by permitting Detective
Conaway to testify that the items recovered from Mr. Morris’s
vehicle were “described on the scene of the robbery,” and that
the trial court compounded this error by questioning Detective
Conaway about these items.  The Court of Special Appeals
rejected both arguments.
[In an unreported opinion, t]he Court of Special Appeals
characterized the first argument . . . as a “Crawford [v.
-10-
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177
(2004)] argument,” and held that Mr. Morris had “waived his
Crawford argument for appeal” by giving “testimony virtually
identical to that portion of the statement that he is complaining
about.”  Additionally, the court concluded that Mr. Williams’[s]
statement did not inculpate Mr. Morris, and, moreover, that “it
supports [Morris’s] own testimony and therefore is
exculpatory.”  With respect to the issue regarding the detective’s
testimony, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that this
testimony “served the limited purpose of establishing why he
seized certain articles of clothing,” and that, in any event, the
testimony “did not harm the appellant any more than the
evidence already admitted.”
We granted Morris’s petition for writ of certiorari.  Morris v. State, 414 Md. 330, 995
A.2d 296 (2010).  Based on the parties’ briefs, as well as their oral arguments, there exists
confusion, however, over what issues are actually before this Court.  By reordering the
questions presented in the successful petition for certiorari – and discussing the relationship
between severance and Crawford in these circumstances – we endeavor to provide needed
clarity.  
([1]) Did [the Court of Special Appeals] properly find Petitioner
did not argue that the trial court’s severance ruling was in error
and that Petitioner waived his Crawford argument?
([2]) Should this Court decline to review Petitioner’s
affirmatively waived complaint about his joint trial when the
[Court of Special Appeals] found that he did not argue that the
trial court’s severance ruling was in error in his opening brief or
reply brief?
(3) Did the [Court of Special Appeals] correctly find that the
trial court properly admitted a detective’s testimony for a limited
purpose and merely asked appropriate clarifying questions? 
II.
-11-
A.
Preservation Contentions.
Morris acknowledges that he did not raise below, and is not raising here, “a simple,
traditional severance issue . . . .”   He concedes also that he is not “rais[ing] a Bruton issue
in this appeal.”  Instead, he unfurls a broad “sham trial” tent, propped up by at least two
supporting arguments.  In particular, Morris avers, as he did before the Court of Special
Appeals, that “the trial court erred by authorizing the sham ‘joint trial’ in this case, and that
the circumvention of Crawford was [but] one of the harms inflicted by this error.”  (Emphasis
added.)   Presumably, the second harm inflicted by this “sham ‘joint trial’” is the
“defraud[ing of] the jury . . . .”  Morris relies on Bowers v. State, 349 Md. 710, 724, 709 A.2d
1255, 1262 (1998), for the precept that “[o]ur cases never intended to permit juries to be
mislead.”  (Citation omitted.)
The State rejoins that Morris’s “current complaint . . . is not preserved for appellate
review; even if preserved, he lacks standing to advance it; even if he has standing, his
complaint has no merit.”  First, the State highlights that, at trial, Morris objected on two
grounds, one erroneous – but for the “miscellaneous agreement,” he would have been able
to call Williams as a witness at their joint-trial – which we shall not consider further, and the
other based on Bruton.  Before the Court of Special Appeals, however, Morris abandoned
these trial objections and articulated that this was a “sham trial” which violated “Morris’s
confrontation clause rights” and “defrauded the jury . . . .”  The abandonment of his trial
objections, according to the State, should prevent Morris from raising substantively different
arguments on appeal.
7 We dispatch with the State’s standing argument in this footnote.  Morris, indeed,
would face formidable standing problems, if he attempted to object to how Williams waived
his rights, without a thorough on-the-record colloquy, see Cubbage v. State, 304 Md. 237,
240, 498 A.2d 632, 634 (1985) (reiterating that waivers of rights must be knowing and
voluntary), or to the trial judge’s active participation in the negotiation process, see Barnes
v. State, 70 Md. App. 694, 707, 523 A.2d 635, 641 (1987) (holding that a “trial judge . . .
[may not] improperly interject[] himself into the plea bargaining process as an active
negotiator” as that “infring[es] upon the function reserved to counsel in the adversary
process”).  Morris, however, protests how the “miscellaneous agreement” impacted his
personal right to confront witnesses presented against him.  As such, he satisfies the standing
requirement.
-12-
Second, the State remonstrates that, even if Morris preserved a “sham trial” argument,
“any complaints about its validity should come from Williams, not Morris.”  Only those
injured by an action have standing to object to it.7  Finally, responding to the merits of
Morris’s appellate argument, the State counters that Morris’s “sham trial”/Crawford
argument is “based on the incorrect premise that Williams was not on trial.”  To the State,
Williams was on trial.  The State, Williams, and the trial court had not formed a plea
agreement.  Rather, Williams struck an agreement with the State and trial court, “whereby
his sentence would be capped in return for dropping his demand for a bench trial.” 
In the State’s words:
Williams went before the jury “cloaked in the presumption of
innocence[,]” and the State was obligated to prove the elements
of the offenses against him beyond a reasonable doubt.  Gerald
v. State, 299 Md. 138, [144-45, 472 A.2d 977, 981] (1983).  The
jury could have acquitted Williams on some or all of the charges
against him – and indeed did acquit him of attempted first
degree murder.  Williams essentially agreed to exercise his right
to a jury trial in return for a guaranteed sentence, but enjoyed the
possibility of an acquittal whether from a failure of the State’s
evidence, leniency on the part of the jury, or some unforseen
structural error in the conduct of the trial.  As this Court noted
8 In Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192, 118 S. Ct. 1151, 1155, 140 L. Ed. 2d 294,
301 (1998), the Supreme Court reconsidered Bruton and Marsh, stating that “[r]edactions
[which] simply replace a name with an obvious blank space or a word such as ‘deleted’ or
a symbol or other similarly obvious indications of alteration . . . leave statements that . . .
closely resemble Bruton’s unredacted statements” and are similarly inadmissible.
-13-
in Smith [v. State, 375 Md. 365, 377-78, 825 A.2d 1055, 1062-
63 (2003)], a defendant may waive any number of rights,
constitutional or otherwise, as part of a negotiated agreement.
Williams was entitled to specific performance of the court’s
agreement notwithstanding the State’s lack of participation in
the agreement.  “Like a plea agreement, an agreement to cap the
sentence in exchange for a waiver of the right to a jury trial
should be enforceable.”  Ogonowski [v. State, 87 Md. App. 173,
185, 589 A.2d 513, 519 (1991)].  There is no principled basis for
arguing that the same is not true when a sentence cap is offered
in exchange for exercising the right to a jury trial.
Assuming that there was a bona fide trial, the State claims that certainly it was within
its right to use Williams’s statement to prove Williams’s guilt.  The fact that Morris also was
on trial demanded only that the State follow the redaction requirements of Bruton and Marsh,
so that Williams’s statement did not incriminate inadvertently Morris.  As Williams’s
statement did not so inculpate Morris, and, in any event, Morris “expressly” waived his
Bruton argument, Williams’s statement was admitted properly.  Crawford, the State entreats,
is inapplicable, as it concerns the Sixth Amendment right of an accused to confront witnesses
against him or her.  Because Williams’s statement was used against Williams alone, any
Crawford concerns evaporate.8 
The Court of Special Appeals determined that Morris did not challenge, on appeal,
“the trial court’s severance ruling,” “its Bruton ruling,” or the impact of Crawford.
(“[Morris] is correct that he made a Crawford argument [to the trial court] . . . .  as part of his
-14-
severance and Bruton arguments, [none of] which . . . are . . . raised on appeal.”).
Nonetheless, it acknowledged, paradoxically that, “[i]n his opening brief, [Morris] contends
the ‘miscellaneous agreement’” violated “his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights under
Crawford . . . .”  “[Morris] maintains that, if he had been tried separately from Williams,” the
intermediate appellate court continued, “Williams’s statement would not have been admitted
into evidence at his ([Morris’s]) trial . . . .”  Thus, it appears – in the Court of Special
Appeals’s own words and Morris’s brief in that court – that Morris, in fact, did raise properly
a Crawford argument on appeal. 
Morris gathers not only Crawford, but also jury deception under his “sham trial” tent.
Under the weight of preservation principles, however, his tent buckles on the latter point.
Nonetheless, Morris adequately, if not inarticulately, preserved his Crawford claim.  Before
the trial court, Morris’s counsel did not rely initially on any particular case, but focused
rather on his client’s general confrontation rights.  As Crawford is grounded in Sixth
Amendment confrontation right principles, we conclude that Morris asserted, at trial, a
Crawford complaint, “albeit tangentially.”  (Emphasis added.) 
The Court of Special Appeals – regarding its perception that Morris failed to maintain
his confrontation argument before it – begins with its identification of a sharp contrast
between the “trial court’s severance . . . [and] Bruton ruling[s],” and Morris’s “‘sham
trial’/confrontation right” argument.  Morris objected to the former at trial, but, according to
the intermediate appellate court, raised the latter – characterized as a wholly different claim
– on appeal.  We fail to see so clear a distinction.  Instead, by raising confrontation concerns
9 Morris argues that, because the statement was not admissible against him had he
been tried separately, the trial court was required, “as a matter of law,” to grant his severance
request.  In support of this assertion, Morris directs our attention to Osburn v. State, 301 Md.
250, 482 A.2d 905 (1984).  For joinder to be proper, a trial court first asks whether “the
evidence offered [is] mutually admissible as to each defendant . . . .”  Osburn, 301 Md. at
254, 482 A.2d at 907 (citing McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 375 A.2d 551 (1977)).  If not,
the trial court then considers the “possibility of significant damage[, or prejudice,] . . . by
evidence . . . admissible [only] against a co[-]defendant . . . .” Eiland v. State, 92 Md. App.
56, 73 (1992), rev’d on other grounds, Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993).
If the evidence is not mutually admissible and prejudices the defendant (against whom it is
inadmissible), then severance is proper normally.
-15-
before the Court of Special Appeals, Morris was not merely alleging error in the admission
of Williams’s statements.  But see Morris v. State, No. 455, September Term, 2008, slip op.
at 13 (Md. App. February 4, 2010) (“[Morris] contends the ‘miscellaneous agreement’ . . .
prejudiced him because the State was able to introduce into evidence Williams’s recorded
statement without regard for his . . . confrontation rights . . . .”).  He was taking issue directly
with the “trial court’s severance ruling . . . .”9  
Although Morris’s trial counsel did not state clearly that he was seeking a severance
“because the miscellaneous agreement was simply a subterfuge or sham, by which the State
could admit Williams’s statement against Morris in violation of Crawford,” he did object to
“the agreement . . . as . . . beneficial to the State” and, presumably, unduly prejudicial, to his
client.  He also stated that he wanted a severance (not simply a redaction pursuant to Bruton)
because the State proposed to admit a statement which “connect[s]” Morris more proximately
to the crime scene and “actually hurts my client.”  (“[W]hat I think [Williams’s statement]
does, [is] to further my argument as to severance –.”).  On this record, we conclude that
Morris preserved, albeit tangentially, a claim that severance was proper, in light of an
10 Stated another way, Morris’s counsel (1) objected to the miscellaneous agreement,
(2) raised confrontation right concerns, and (3) sought a severance as a consequence.  Taken
together, we think he fairly preserved the substance of some, but not all, of the question
framed on appeal.
-16-
impending Confrontation Clause violation caused by the existence of the “miscellaneous
agreement” (i.e., the joint trial).10  
B.
Waiver of Appellate Arguments.
Although determining that Morris did not raise a Crawford argument on appeal, the
Court of Special Appeals continued, holding that even if he had, the ultimate issue was
waived.  That is because, at the trial level, Morris took the stand in his own defense and gave
testimony “virtually identical to the portion of [Williams’s] statement that he is complaining
about.”  Relying principally upon Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 715-16, 415 A.2d 830,
841(1980), the intermediate appellate court observed that a defendant “waive[s] his objection
to the admission of . . . contested evidence,” where he challenges initially the admission of
certain evidence, but subsequently “confirm[s],” through his “own testimony,” “the evidence
to which he had previously objected . . . .”
Morris counters with State v. Logan, 394 Md. 378, 390, 906 A.2d 374, 381 (2006),
in which we stated that a “defendant does not waive an error by attempting to minimize or
explain improperly admitted evidence.”  We perceived that “[i]t would be unfair to permit
the State to introduce evidence, albeit later found to be inadmissible, but not to permit the
defendant, upon pain of waiver, to attempt to meet it, explain it, rebut it or deny it.”  Id.  
Based on our reading of the record, it appears to us that Morris took the stand to try
-17-
to explain, if not rebut, his seeming involvement as the pre-ordained getaway driver.  The
characterization of him as the getaway driver was based partly on the officers’ testimony,
which, among other things, placed Williams in Morris’s white car shortly after the attempted
robbery.  Williams’s statement, however, also identified Morris, but in an indirect, subtle,
and potentially conflicting way.  Earlier in his confession, Williams indicated that, after the
botched robbery attempt, he “ran towards Falls Road.”  In response to the question, “[w]hat
color was the vehicle that you got into at the scene,” however, Williams said “[w]hite,”
without acknowledging – let alone delimiting – the inquisitorial phrase “at the scene.”  When
Morris took the stand at trial, he tried to explain his version of the origin and nature of his
encounter with Williams on the date in question and, thereby, establish his “unwitting
participant” defense.  Without more, we must assume Morris was doing so in response to
both the police testimony and Williams’s statement.  
We determine that Morris raised – and did not subsequently waive – his severance and
Crawford arguments (indeed, they are one and the same).  We also disagree with our
appellate colleagues that Morris “affirmatively waived [his] complaint about his joint trial
. . . .”
C.
Morris’s Confrontation Right Argument.
1.
Was There a Bona Fide Trial of Williams?
Before this Court, Morris alleges more specifically that the “miscellaneous
agreement,” which facilitated the joint trial with his co-defendant, allowed the State to
circumvent Crawford and, thereby, violate his right to confront a witness against him.
11As aptly stated by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Stone, 291
S.W.3d 696, 700 (Ky. 2009):
Bruton, [Marsh], and cases descending from them, address the
dilemma that arises when two or more defendants are jointly
tried, and one (or more) of them has made a voluntary
out-of-court statement which the prosecution wishes to present
as evidence at trial.  While a defendant may be incriminated by
his own voluntary out-of-court statement without offending the
rule against hearsay or the Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation . . . , Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86
S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the use of such statements
against another defendant violates the hearsay rule . . ., and, if
the declarant is not subject to cross-examination, the Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 129 . .
. .
* * * 
Crawford, on the other hand, applies when the out-of-court
statement is offered as evidence against a defendant other than
the declarant.  Crawford holds that a defendant is denied his
Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers by the
introduction into evidence of an out-of-court “testimonial
(continued...)
-18-
Crawford may be implicated when the State proposes to use a prior, out-of-court statement
against a non-declarant.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 124 S. Ct. at 1369, 158 L. Ed. 2d at
197.  The State disagrees with Morris, arguing that Crawford “has no applicability . . . for
the simple reason that [the statement] was used against [the declarant,] Williams, not . . .
Morris.”  After all, as this argument goes, the State had to make its case against Williams,
or so it claimed.  As such, Bruton provides the proper analytical framework because it
addresses the use of a prior, out-of-court statement against the declarant himself, in a joint
trial.11   
11(...continued)
statement” made by a declarant who is unavailable for
cross-examination.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69.
-19-
We might agree with the State, had the joint trial been bona fide as to the prosecution
of Williams.  Were that the case, our analysis would examine whether the taped statement
was redacted sufficiently, or otherwise altered, to not incriminate Morris, as Williams did not
subject himself to cross-examination by taking the stand.  We conclude, however, that this
was not a bona fide trial, at least not as that term has been defined by the Constitution, the
Declaration of Rights, and the Maryland Rules.  As a result, Crawford is at the heart of the
matter.  We explain.
In its consideration of this point, the Court of Special Appeals agreed with the State
regarding the bona fide nature of the joint trial.  The “‘miscellaneous agreement’ applied only
to sentencing,” it reasoned, and so “[t]he State was still required to prove criminal liability
against Williams . . . .”  In arguing that the “miscellaneous agreement” is most akin to a
sentencing cap, the State relied upon Smith and Ogonowski, supra.
In Smith, the defendant agreed to waive his right to a jury trial and proceed with a
bench trial.  See Smith, 375 Md. at 369, 825 A.2d at 1057-58.  In exchange, the State
consented to, among other things, drop “four of five charges and . . . to [recommend] a
sentence cap of 10 years without parole . . . .”  Smith, 375 Md. at 387, 825 A.2d at 1068.  The
judge bound himself to the sentencing cap agreement.  See Smith, 375 Md. at 381, 825 A.2d
at 1065.
12 It appears the judge agreed to the sentencing cap, before remarking “that [Smith]
certainly will make a better decision, I think, as far as sentencing is concerned, if he is found
guilty by the Court than if he is found guilty by a jury . . . .”  Smith, 375 Md. at 381, 825
A.2d at 1065.  Smith’s counsel argued that this comment came before his client’s waiver and,
therefore, impacted improperly his client’s ultimate waiver decision.  Smith, 375 Md. at 368,
825 A.2d at 1057.  According to Smith, the comment made it “unequivocally . . . [clear] that
(continued...)
-20-
Like Smith, Ogonowski involved a defendant bargaining away his right to a jury trial,
in exchange for a sentencing cap.  See Ogonowski, 87 Md. App. at 175, 589 A.2d at 514.
The State initially offered a plea bargain, in return for a sentence of ten years.  See
Ogonowski, 87 Md. App. at 176, 589 A.2d at 514.  The trial judge then agreed to impose ten
years, if the defendant pleaded guilty.  See id.  The defendant, however, asked whether the
court would “be willing to make the same cap in a – if the case was tried before the Court?”
Ogonowski, 87 Md. App. at 176, 589 A.2d at 515.  The trial judge consented, without
objection from the State.  See Ogonowski, 87 Md. App. at 178, 589 A.2d at 515.
Acknowledging there are no “rules governing conditions attached to such a waiver,” the
Court of Special Appeals declined nonetheless “to declare that these agreements are void”
and, instead, “conclude[d] that the most appropriate vehicle for analysis is that of a contract.”
Ogonowski, 87 Md. App. at 183, 589 A.2d at 518.  In determining the appropriate remedy
for the trial court breaching the agreement, the intermediate appellate court compared the
waiver to a plea agreement, stating, “like a plea agreement, an agreement to cap the sentence
in exchange for a waiver of the right to a jury trial should be enforceable.”  Ogonowski, 87
Md. App. at 185, 589 A.2d at 519 (citation omitted).
Although the legal arguments involved in Smith12 and Ogonowski13 are not relevant
12(...continued)
[the trial judge] would impose a harsher sentence if [Smith] were found guilty after a jury
trial, as opposed to a court trial.”  Id.  Such coercion, the defendant persisted, violated his
jury trial right.  See id.  We held that Smith’s waiver was proper, as “the trial judge’s
statement was ambiguous, not unequivocal, and, most importantly, was made after [Smith’s]
counsel had initially indicated, without objection from his client, that [Smith] had already
chosen to waive his constitutional right to a jury trial.”  Id.
13 In Ogonowski, the trial court broke the “miscellaneous agreement” because, after
a guilty verdict had been rendered, but before sentencing, Ogonowski was arrested for drug
distribution-related offenses.  See Ogonowski, 87 Md. App. at 181, 589 A.2d at 517.  The
trial court held that obeying the law was an implicit condition of the agreement and,
thereafter, imposed a sentence exceeding the agreed-upon ten years.  See Ogonowski, 87 Md.
App. at 182, 589 A.2d at 518.  The Court of Special Appeals held that “[t]he agreement had
limited terms” and declined to rewrite it.  Ogonowski, 87 Md. App. at 184, 589 A.2d at 518.
As such, it vacated the violative sentence.  See Ogonowsk, 87 Md. App. at 188, 589 A.2d at
520.
-21-
for present purposes, the State points out that both cases condoned an agreement where a
defendant uses his right to a jury trial as a bargaining chip in exchange for a sentencing cap.
The fact that Williams agreed to waive multiple rights (both constitutional and procedural
in nature) associated with presenting a defense, the State argues, is inapposite, as Smith
approves the notion that “‘[t]here are few, if any instances where a criminal defendant is
prohibited from surrendering his rights, be they constitutional or otherwise . . . .’” Smith, 375
Md. at 378, 825 A.2d at 1063 (quoting State v. Magwood, 290 Md. 615, 619 n.2, 432 A.2d
446, 448 n.2 (1981) (citation omitted)).
In Smith and Ogonowski, the fact that the defendants retained all of their rights, aside
from the right to a jury trial, was important.  The ensuing bench trials were actual trials.
Stated another way, the defendants possessed the right to mount a defense.  In the case sub
judice, the “miscellaneous agreement” required Williams to assert the Fifth and, thereby,
14 To address the possible occurrence of a “manifest injustice,” which may result from
Williams’s waiver of this right, the trial judge allowed creatively that, if necessary, Williams
would get “one or two” challenges, and the State would thereafter get “half . . . .”  This
pressure valve was not utilized.
15 The trial court’s full comment at the sentencing hearing – in response to the State’s
assertion that “[Williams] did not plead guilty, he did have a trial – was “[w]ell, if we
severed, they could still put your client’s [Morris’s] words in.  So how does the presence of
[Williams] who may have the right to a separate trial under [Bruton] if he were contesting
guilt or innocense affect the presentation of the evidence that’s admissible against your
client?”
-22-
waive his constitutional right to testify, a precept elucidated in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S.
44, 49-50, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2708, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37, 44-45 (1987).  Moreover, pursuant to the
agreement, Williams could not make an opening statement or a closing argument.  See
Spence v. State, 296 Md. 416, 419, 463 A.2d 808, 809 (1983) (“It is well-settled . . . that the
opportunity for summation by defense counsel prior to verdict . . . is a basic constitutional
right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”); Baltimore v. Hurlock, 113 Md. 674, 677, 78 A. 558, 559 (1910) (referring
to “[t]he right to open and close”) (emphasis added).  Finally, Williams also had to waive his
right to peremptory jury challenges, as afforded under Maryland Rule 4-313.14
Considering the aggregate effect of these additional and substantial waivers, we
believe – as the trial judge in this case framed it – Williams was not really “contesting guilt
or innocence” – that is, “he did not put on any defense.”15  It is one thing for a defendant to
waive his right to a jury trial; it is quite another for that defendant to waive his rights to take
the stand in his own defense, to present opening and closing statements, and to question the
16 We are not commenting indirectly or negatively upon trial courts proceeding by way
of an agreed statement of facts, joined with a not guilty plea.  In such a situation, the
defendant usually waives numerous rights, like the right to confront witnesses against him
or her.  That is because usually there is no one to confront; after all, there is no factual
dispute.  Thus, where “[t]here is no fact-finding function left to perform[, t]o render
judgment, the court simply applies the law to the facts agreed upon.”  Barnes v. State, 31 Md.
App. 25, 35, 354 A.2d 499, 505 (1976).  With these agreed statements, however, the
defendants are contesting still their guilt and usually argue at least sufficiency of the
evidence.  
In the instant case, there were myriad, outstanding factual issues, the resolution of
which required traditional trial mechanisms.  See id. (intermediate appellate court ordered
a new trial because, by offering only stipulated-to conflicting evidence, the parties deprived
the judge/fact-finder from evaluating the credibility of live witnesses or the reliability of
evidence.  As a result, “there was no proper way to resolve the evidentiary conflicts . . . to
determine ultimate facts which would be sufficient in law to sustain a verdict of guilty”).
Moreover, Williams was not, in the final analysis, challenging his guilt.
-23-
biases of the very citizens selected to decide his guilt or innocence.  Compared to Smith and
Ogonowski, our conclusions here are fairly straightforward: a defendant may waive (or agree
to exercise, as is the current situation) his right to a jury trial, in exchange for a sentencing
cap, and the proceedings may partake of a trial.  Where a defendant waives, in essence, his
right to present a defense, the proceedings are not entitled to be so characterized.  In so
ruling, we note that the principle that a defendant may waive nearly all of his or her rights,
see Smith and Magwood, supra, appears almost singularly in plea agreement, not sentencing
cap, cases.16  See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8, 86 S. Ct. 1245, 1248-49, 16 L. Ed. 2d
314, 318-19 (1966) (explaining that, for a defendant to plead guilty, he or she must also
waive the right to a jury trial, to confront witnesses, and the privilege against
self-incrimination).
We grant, as the State notes, that “[t]he jury could have acquitted Williams on some
-24-
or all of the charges against him – and indeed did acquit him of attempted first degree
murder.”  The likelihood, however, of the jury acquitting Williams on all charges was greatly
diminished (if not negligible), as Williams, in fact, did not contest his guilt.  In Sutton v.
State, 289 Md. 359, 365-66, 424 A.2d 755, 759 (1981), we confronted an illustrative
situation, in which the parties agreed to proceed on an agreed statement of facts, and, as a
result, the defendant “waiv[ed] her right to a jury trial, to confront witnesses, [and] to testify
. . . .”  She also waived her right, however, to “deny the allegations of assault” and “was told
that the trial court had indicated that she would be placed on probation . . . .”  Id.
As a result,
[t]he State . . . presented an agreed statement of facts that
delineated conduct that showed an apparent assault and that
raised no defense.  At the close of the State’s case, the
[defendant], “merely for the record,” made a motion for
judgment of acquittal that was denied.  Thereafter, she presented
no evidence and renewed her motion for judgment of acquittal
that was again denied.
Sutton, 289 Md. at 366, 424 A.2d at 759.
We acknowledged that “[t]rying a case on an agreed statement of facts ordinarily does
not convert a not guilty plea into a guilty plea.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Based on “the
totality of the circumstances, and in particular, the facts that the [defendant’s] plea was
entered at the direction of the trial court and that she was aware that she would be placed on
probation,” we held that “the proceeding was not in any sense a trial and offered no
reasonable chance that there would be an acquittal.  Under these particular circumstances,
the [defendant’s] plea was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.”  Id. (emphasis added).
-25-
In the present case, Williams waived his right to a jury trial, to confront witnesses, to
testify, and to make opening and closing arguments.  Moreover, he also waived his right to
deny the State’s allegations and, in fact, was told what sentence to expect.  He, of course,
preserved his right to move for judgment of acquittal, should the State fail unexpectedly to
present a prima facie case against him, a truly long-odds bet in view of Williams’s pre-trial
statements.  Thus, such a motion appeared cosmetic and “for the record.”  Moreover,
although nominally reserving his right to cross-examination, he engaged in no such exercise.
In view of the totality of the circumstances, the proceeding was not a trial as to Williams’s
guilt or innocence, in that Williams presented no defense and, therefore, was afforded “no
reasonable chance” of a complete acquittal.
2.  The Resemblance to a Guilty Plea Agreement.
If anything, the rather peculiar “miscellaneous agreement” in this case resembles a
guilty plea agreement (as was the case in Sutton).  The State, however, argues that the
agreement was simply between the trial court and Williams, unlike a plea agreement, which
must involve the State.  We believe the State consented to the agreement here explicitly or
implicitly.  In its brief, the State concedes that “it can be inferred . . . that the State expressed
reluctance,” when the miscellaneous agreement was being forged, “at giving either defendant
an ‘empty chair’ defense, if at all possible . . . .”  Moreover, we doubt whether the agreement
would have been struck, in the first place, without the State’s acquiescence.  Thus, the
agreement seems to have been agreed upon by all the parties, including the trial judge, save
Morris.
17 It appears the State and the trial judge envisioned the miscellaneous agreement as
applying only to sentencing, regardless of on which counts the jury returned a guilty verdict
against Williams.  Williams’s counsel wanted the attempted second-degree murder verdict
vacated, however, because he feared it would impact adversely the conditions of his client’s
imprisonment. 
18 Not only may this miscellaneous agreement be compared favorably to a plea
agreement, but it may be distinguished from a sentencing cap.  From the definition of the
word “cap,” as well as our caselaw, see generally Dixon v. State, 364 Md. 209, 772 A.2d 283
(2001), a sentencing cap provides a ceiling, which may not be surpassed by the trial judge,
(continued...)
-26-
Further demonstrating that this agreement was the functional equivalent of a plea
bargain is the fact that Williams was found guilty of attempted second-degree murder.  At
the sentencing hearing, Williams’s counsel voiced concern that “the plea agreement was
[only] to the attempted robbery.”  After some consideration, the trial court agreed to grant
a new trial, presuming that the State would then enter the matter nolle prosequi.  If the
proceeding was a bona fide trial, the trial court would not have ordered a new trial and, in the
process, overturned the jury’s finding of guilt.17 
In the final analysis, this miscellaneous agreement may be characterized fairly as a
plea agreement with escape clauses for the State and Williams.  If the State, despite the
significant procedural advantages in its favor fashioned by the trial court, bungled
presentation of its case against Williams, Williams might have left the courtroom that day
as a free man, but the State was free to pursue the unrelated charges against him.  In short,
it does not appear that Williams, like the defendants in Smith and Ogonowski, assented
simply to face a certain type of fact-finder.  Rather, he conceded, in effect, his guilt, pending
no extraordinary and clearly unexpected misstep on behalf of the State.18 
18(...continued)
when he or she imposes a sentence.  With the State’s consent, however, the judge is able to
impose a lesser sentence.
It would have been interesting to see the judge’s and State’s responses had the jury
returned guilty verdicts against Williams only on the lesser counts.  It is not clear, under the
“miscellaneous agreement,” that the trial court had discretion to impose anything less than
“17, serve the first 10.”  For, while crafting the miscellaneous agreement, the trial judge
explained that, at sentencing, “you [will] receive your original bargain,” which the State
initially offered Williams.  He did not state that “you will receive a sentence not more than
17, serve the first 10.”  Indeed, at the sentencing hearing, the State supported this supposition
– “it was my understanding that the Court had never made clear what counts, but only made
clear what the sentence was.”  We deem this as further indication of the plea bargain-nature
of the miscellaneous agreement.  See Chertkov v. State, 335 Md. 161, 175, 642 A.2d 232, 239
(1994) (“[I]t is clear that a court that binds itself to fulfill the plea agreement thereby
relinquishes his or her right to modify the sentence, thereby imposed, absent the consent of
the parties, and, in particular, in the case of reducing the sentence, absent the consent of the
State.”).
19 In his opening statement, the prosecutor stated that, after the attempted robbery,
“Stewart Williams and [the third man] run around to the alley . . . and Mr. [Seleany] loses
sight.  In that alley is a . . . white Crown Victoria, being driven by Defendant Franklin
Morris.”  Then, he observed that Williams waived his right to remain silent and gave police
a statement, which details how “he fled down towards Falls Road and got into a Crown
Victoria and fled the scene.”
-27-
3.
The Crawford Violation and Harmless Error.
From a practical standpoint, this rather unique “miscellaneous agreement” allowed the
State to employ an out-of-court statement against a non-declarant, Morris, with regard only
to Bruton, but not Crawford.19  Had the co-defendants been tried separately, the State could
not have used Williams’s statement against Morris, pursuant to Crawford, unless (1) Morris
had enjoyed an opportunity to cross-examine Williams, or (2) the State had obtained a final
guilty verdict or plea from Williams, thereby extinguishing his Fifth Amendment right
20 With respect to option two, if the State secured a guilty verdict against Williams,
then his right to appeal would need to expire before the State could force him to testify
against Morris.  In the alternative, if the State obtained a guilty plea from Williams, then it
would have him likely waive his right to appeal, as is customary in such circumstances.
-28-
against self-incrimination.20  In sum, to introduce directly the Williams statement/confession
against Morris, the State could have tried Williams first, or it could have refused to go along
with the plea agreement and, thereby, force a bona fide joint trial (provided Bruton was
satisfied).  It could not proceed, however, as it did and, ultimately, circumvent Crawford. 
This is not to say the violation demands automatically a new trial for Morris.  Like any
violation of the Confrontation Clause, a Crawford violation is subject to harmless error
review.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 829, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278, 165 L. Ed. 2d
224, 241 (2006) (assuming to be correct the Washington Supreme Court’s conclusion that
a statement violative of Crawford was nonetheless harmless); see also Luginbyhl v.
Commonwealth, 628 S.E.2d 74, 77, 48 Va. App. 58, 64 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (en banc)
(citation omitted) (“It is well established that violations of the Confrontation Clause . . . are
subject to harmless error review, . . . and Crawford does not suggest otherwise.”).  As we
stated in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976):
[W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless
a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the
record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot
be deemed “harmless” and a reversal is mandated.  Such
reviewing court must thus be satisfied that there is no reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of – whether
erroneously admitted or excluded – may have contributed to the
rendition of the guilty verdict.
-29-
In the present case, the taped statement (1) confirmed that, after the attempted
robbery, Williams entered a white sedan, but (2) presented potentially conflicting evidence
as to where Williams got into that vehicle vis à vis the crime scene or a more remote location.
The former point is cumulative evidence, provided already by the officers, and so we
consider it no further in our harm analysis.  See Dove v. State, 415 Md. 727, 743-44, 4 A.3d
976, 985-86 (2010) (stating that “cumulative evidence,” which “tends to prove the same point
as other evidence presented during the trial or sentencing hearing,” may render harmless
otherwise reversible error).  The latter point warrants additional reflection.  To start, we
recall the following exchanges, some of which were alluded to previously in this opinion.
[Detective]: And where did you run[, after the attempted
robbery]?
[Williams]:
I don’t even know where I was at to be honest,
but I ran towards Falls Road.
[Detective]: Did you have anybody with you when you
attempted to rob the store?
[Williams]:
No.
* * *
[Detective]: After you ran towards Falls Road, how did you
get into the white [sedan] where the police
attempted to pull you over?
[Williams]:
Basically, I just entered it.
[Detective]: And the person driving, did they drop you off at
your house in front of the door?
[Williams]:
Yeah.
* * * 
[Detective]: What color was the vehicle that you got into at the
scene?
[Williams]:
White.
21 Moreover, Williams was not permitted to and did not take the stand to testify in his
own defense.  As a result, the jury may have inferred that his pre-trial statement, in its
entirety, was uncontested and true.  This would have strengthened the prejudice against
Morris who was trying, at least in part, to rebuff an implication of the statement.
-30-
These remarks show that, early in the statement, Williams provided little evidence of
a getaway plan (“I don’t even know where I was at to be honest, but I ran towards Falls
Road.”).  Then, the detectives adopt, by the premise of their next question, a supposition
(“After you ran towards Falls Road . . . .”).  They ask about the “person driving,” but do not
solicit, and do not receive, the driver’s identity.  Finally, the detectives asked about the color
of the vehicle that Williams entered “at the scene.”  Without parsing further the potentially
ambiguous reference to “at the scene,” Williams responded simply, “[w]hite.”  This last
question and answer, therefore, could suggest – in an indirect and conflicting way – that
Morris may have been closer to The Wine Underground than Morris represented in his
direct-examination responses.
A reasonable jury could decipher the conflicting evidence, by parsing the wording of
the question, and specifically its phrase “at the scene,” to connect this indirect evidence in
a meaningful way to Morris.  Framed rhetorically, but in another way, after the attempted
robbery, did Williams “r[u]n toward Falls Road,” where he met Morris at Falls Road at
Coldspring Lane, or did he dive into Morris’s getaway car “at the [crime] scene”?  The latter
inference endorses the State’s theory that Morris was the pre-ordained getaway driver for the
intended robbery.21
Morris took the stand and explained his exact location on that fateful morning.  Such
22 Seleany testified that one assailant wore a “mask.”  Detective Conaway testified that
a clothing item capable of being so described was recovered from Morris’s car.  More
specifically, Detective Conaway stated that the item recovered “was described on the scene
of the robbery,” a remark the admissibility of which we consider separately and later in this
opinion for the guidance of the trial court on remand, should a new trial occur.  Seleany also
stated that there were two assailants – adding the presence of a driver suggests that the police
should have found three people in the stopped white sedan, which they did.  Officers Alvarez
and Weiss observed that, after Alvarez activated his emergency lights, the white sedan sped
up. 
-31-
testimony was consistent with his “unwitting participant” defense, raised in response, in part,
to Williams’s statement.  Viewed in its entirety, Morris’s testimony addressed as well the
victim’s and officers’ directly incriminating testimony,22 as well as Williams’s statement.
Therefore, we cannot state, with the requisite conviction, that the error, beyond a reasonable
doubt, did not influence the jury’s verdict, with respect to Morris’s guilt.
III.
We turn now briefly to two other matters (one of which we shall address for the
guidance of the trial court on remand, should there be a new trial), which, though briefed,
were discussed infrequently at oral argument.  Initially, we consider whether the trial court
erred in admitting certain allegedly hearsay testimony.  Then, we ponder whether this Court
should determine, on our initiative, whether the trial court erred by not issuing a certain
limiting instruction.
A.
Hearsay.
As summarized efficiently by the Court of Special Appeals in its unreported opinion
in this case,
-32-
[Morris] contends the trial court erred by admitting into
evidence certain improper testimony by Detective Conaway
about items he recovered from [Morris’s] vehicle; and that the
trial judge compounded the error by conducting his own
examination of the detective.  Detective Conaway gave the
challenged testimony after he asked him what items had been
recovered from the white [sedan].  The detective responded, “I
believe it was a dark t-shirt like cut up, it was a piece of black
cloth, and a couple of other items that were black that [were]
described on the scene of the robbery.”  Defense counsel
objected and moved the court to strike the response.  The court
overruled the objection and a bench conference ensued.
Based on the argument that the detective had no basis to know what was described at
the crime scene, Morris’s counsel moved for a mistrial.  The State remonstrated that
Detective Conaway had “conducted a number of interviews,” with Seleany and Williams
among others, to which Morris responded that “there’s nothing written in any report that said
Seleany identified anything out of that car coming from the robbery.”  The trial judge
decided to “de-prejudice” the testimony by his questioning the detective so as to “enlighten
the jury as to [the detective’s source for the statement].”
Although Morris’s counsel objected to the trial court’s stratagem, the trial judge
proceeded anyway, although agreeing to admonish the detective for his “tendency to give us
conclusions rather than facts,” which was “making for a difficult administration of this trial.”
Then, this exchange occurred.
[Trial Judge]:
With respect to the last statement
you said, just so I understand, in
your affidavit you say because all
suspects were inside the vehicle at
the time of the car stop.  It’s
believed that the article of clothing
used during the incident should still
-33-
be inside the vehicle and the
dwelling.  And when you seized the
items that you just referred to, that
was based on the conclusion, plus
what Mr. Seleany told Officer
Galemore, plus what Mr. Stewart
Williams told you, is that correct?
[Det. Conaway]:
You have to repeat that sir, I didn’t
get that one.
[Trial Judge]:
Okay.  You say in the affidavit;
because all suspects were inside the
vehicle at the time of the car stop,
it’s believed that articles of clothing
used during the incident could still
be inside both the vehicle and the
dwelling.
[Det. Conaway]:
Right.
[Trial Judge]:
And you just testified that you’re
not executing the warrant looking
for items that you believe were
associated with the robbery, is that
right?
[Det. Conaway]:
Yes sir.
[Trial Judge]:
Your source of choosing which
objects were associated with the
robbery was what Mr. Seleany, the
victim, told Officer Galemore and
what Mr. Stewart Williams told
you, is that right?
[Det. Conaway]:
Yes sir.
At the conclusion of the trial judge’s questioning, Morris’s counsel approached the
bench, insisting that the trial court “created another very serious problem,” by “l[eading] the
jury to believe . . . that [Seleany and Williams] . . . identified these items that were found in
the car . . . .”  The trial judge disagreed, stating that his questioning clarified why the
detective took certain items from the white sedan, while leaving others.  Moreover, Seleany
and Williams, the latter via his taped statement, described previously the items to the jury.
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The intermediate appellate court set the foundation, explaining that “[a] relevant
extrajudicial statement is generally admissible as non-hearsay “‘when it is offered for the
purpose of showing that a person relied on and acted upon the statement and is not
introduced for the purpose of showing that the facts asserted in the statement are true.’”
(Quoting Graves v. State, 334 Md. 30, 38, 637 A.2d 1197, 1201 (1994) (citations omitted)).
It recognized, however, that extrajudicial statements which explain police conduct, but
nonetheless directly implicate the defendants, are excluded typically as overly prejudicial.
The Court of Special Appeals decided that the detective’s statement “served the
limited purpose of establishing why he seized certain articles of clothing (at least some of
which were moved into evidence) during the search” of the white sedan.  Moreover, the
explanatory statement did not prejudice overly Morris, as “[i]t was undisputed that Williams
was in [Morris’s] car immediately following the attempted robbery . . . .”  Indeed, the
presence of a mask, which was identified by witnesses, served to corroborate Morris’s
testimony.   Regarding the trial judge’s questioning, the intermediate appellate court
concluded that it “clarified for the jury the purpose of the detective’s statement, and was not
a departure from his role as an impartial arbiter.” 
We agree with the Court of Special Appeals’s straightforward reasoning that (1) the
statement illuminated why the detective collected certain items of potential evidence, and (2)
the trial court’s questioning, although somewhat confusing, revealed successfully that the
detective’s statement was not offered for its truth.  In particular, the trial court’s last question
confirmed that the detective’s statement was simply detailing the “source[s for] choosing
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which objects were associated with the robbery.”
B.
Limiting Instruction.
Morris claims that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury that it may consider
the taped statement as evidence only against its maker, Williams, but not against Morris.
Morris points to Maryland Rule 5-105, which provides that “[w]hen evidence is admitted that
is admissible as to one party . . . but not admissible as to another party . . ., the court, upon
request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”
(Emphasis added.)  Morris concedes, however, that he did not request such an instruction at
trial.  Nonetheless, he asks this Court to review the issue pursuant to plain error analysis.  See
Md. Rule 4-325(e) (stating that “[a]n appellate court, on its own initiative or on the
suggestion of a party, may . . . take cognizance of any plain error in the [jury] instructions,
material to the right of the defendant, despite a failure to object”).  We decline to do so as this
matter is quite likely not to re-appear in any new trial. 
JUDGMENT 
REVERSED; 
CASE
REMANDED TO THE COURT OF
S P E C I A L  
A P P E A L S  
W I T H
DIRECTION TO REVERSE THE
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY (AS
TO MORRIS) AND TO REMAND TO
THAT COURT FOR FURTHER
P R O C E E D I N G S  
N O T
INCONSISTENT 
WITH 
THIS
OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID BY
MAYOR & CITY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE.