Title: Cottles v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 03/17/2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1140632
____________________
Jeff Cottles
v.
Norfolk Southern Railway Company
Appeal from Morgan Circuit Court
(CV-12-215)
On Application for Rehearing
MURDOCK, Justice.
Norfolk Southern Railway 
Company 
("Norfolk Southern") has
applied for a rehearing of our decision in Cottles v. Norfolk
Southern Ry., [Ms. 1140632, Aug. 26, 2016] ___ So. 3d ___
1140632
(Ala. 2016), which reversed the Morgan Circuit Court's summary
judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern in Jeff Cottles's action
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 
U.S.C.
§ 51 et seq., for injuries he sustained on April 9, 2012,
while working as a track switchman for Norfolk Southern.  In
its application for rehearing, Norfolk Southern presents
several 
arguments 
regarding the 
issue 
whether 
Federal 
Railroad
Administration ("FRA") regulations precluded Cottles's claim
under FELA.  
First, Norfolk Southern asserts that we "improperly
reversed the trial court [by] employing a rationale that had
never been argued by the plaintiff, had not been briefed, and
is based on a United States Supreme Court case which has
nothing to do with railroads, the FRSA [Federal Railroad
Safety Act], FRA regulations, or the FELA."  In concluding on
original submission that FRA regulations did not preclude
Cottles's FELA claim, we noted the United States Supreme
Court's discussion in POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573
U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014), of the differences between
federal preemption of state laws by a federal statute and
preclusion of claims based on one federal statute as a result
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of the subsequent enactment of another federal statute.  We
also quoted from several lower court opinions issued after POM
Wonderful in which courts concluded that the principles
discussed in POM Wonderful dictated that FRA regulations do
not preclude FELA-based claims. See, e.g., Henderson v.
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 87 F. Supp. 3d 610 (S.D. N.Y.
2015); Noice v. BNSF Ry., 348 P.3d 1043, 1048 (N.M. Ct. App.
2015); Infermo v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc.
(No. 10–2498(SRC), Jan. 24, 2012) (D. N.J. 2012) (not selected
for publication in F. Supp.); and Fair v. BNSF Ry., 238 Cal.
App. 4th 269, 189 Cal. Rptr. 3d 150 (2015).
Norfolk Southern's assertion that we made Cottles’s
argument for him on original submission is incorrect.  It is
true that Cottles's brief on original submission did not
discuss federal statutory preclusion, or POM Wonderful, but
Cottles was not required to do so.  The federal-preclusion
issue was first raised by Norfolk Southern in its appellee
brief on original submission seeking to preserve the trial
court's judgment in its favor.  As we noted in our opinion on
original submission:  "Norfolk Southern cites several federal
cases, including Waymire v. Norfolk & Western R.R., 218 F.3d
3
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773 (7th Cir. 2000), in support of its position" that the
Federal Railroad Safety Act ("the FRSA") and FRA regulations
establish a different standard for railroad track safety that
supplants the standard established by FELA.  Cottles, ___ So.
3d at ___.  But Norfolk Southern never raised this argument in
its submissions to the trial court seeking a summary judgment,
and the trial court never mentioned the statutory-preclusion
issue in its judgment below.  As the prevailing party in the
trial court and the appellee in this Court, Norfolk Southern
was, subject to due-process constraints, permitted to raise
new arguments on appeal in support of affirming the trial
court's judgment.  Having done so, it cannot then on rehearing
complain when this Court chooses to address the new argument
it raised.1
Likewise, Norfolk Southern cannot plausibly claim -- as
it purports to do in its rehearing brief -- that this Court
reversed the judgment of the trial court on a ground raised
1See, e.g., Smith v. Mark Dodge, Inc., 934 So. 2d 375, 380
(Ala. 2006) (noting that "this Court will affirm a judgment
for any reason supported by the record that satisfies the
requirements of due process").  In his brief on rehearing,
Cottles does not contend that Norfolk Southern's raising of
this new argument on appeal implicates the aforesaid due-
process constraint but instead confronts the issue on its
merits.  We choose to do the same.
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for the first time on appeal.  Our opinion on original
submission is abundantly clear that the trial 
court's judgment
was reversed because "a conflict of evidence exists as to
whether Norfolk Southern should have conducted inspections in
a manner that would have revealed the defect that caused
Cottles's injury," Cottles, ___ So.  3d at ___, and therefore
"Cottles presented substantial evidence creating a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Norfolk Southern
negligently failed to provide him with a reasonably safe
workplace" under FELA.  Cottles, ___ So.  3d at ___.  We did
not reverse the trial court's judgment because the trial court
misapplied the doctrine of statutory preclusion; the trial
court never discussed that issue.  We reversed the trial
court's judgment because it erred by improperly discounting or
misunderstanding Joe Lydick's testimony concerning the
defective switch and in then concluding that Cottles had not
presented 
substantial 
evidence 
of 
Norfolk 
Southern's
negligence.  We addressed the preclusion issue only because
Norfolk Southern presented it to this Court on appeal as an
alternative ground for this Court to uphold the result reached
by the trial court. 
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Norfolk Southern's insinuation that this Court was off
base in relying on the United States Supreme Court's analysis
in POM Wonderful because, it says, that case "has nothing to
do with railroads, the FRSA, FRA regulations, or the FELA" is
misguided.  It is true that POM Wonderful addressed the
interplay of different federal statutes:  namely, the Lanham
Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125) and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act ("the FDCA") (12 U.S.C. §§ 331 and 343).  It is also
clear, however, that the argument presented by Coca-Cola (the
defendant) in POM Wonderful exactly parallels Norfolk
Southern's preclusion argument in the present case:  namely,
that the plaintiff's claim under one federal statute (the
Lanham Act) that Coca-Cola had deceptively labeled a product
was precluded because food labels are regulated by the Food
and Drug Administration pursuant to a different federal
statute (the FDCA).  The United States Supreme Court rejected
Coca-Cola's preclusion argument and, in doing so, provided
guideposts for determining when one federal statute precludes
a claim under another federal statute.  Specifically, the POM
Wonderful Court concluded that 
"(1) there was no statutory text or established
interpretive 
principle 
to 
support 
preclusion,
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(2) nothing relating to either statute showed a
congressional purpose or design to forbid such
suits, and (3) to the contrary, the statutes
complemented each other in the federal regulation of
misleading 
food 
and 
beverage 
labels. 
 
(POM
Wonderful, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2233.)." 
Fair, 238 Cal. App. 4th at 284, 189 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 161.
As we noted in our opinion on original submission, since
POM Wonderful was decided, courts that have addressed the
issue whether FELA claims are precluded by the FRSA have
relied upon POM Wonderful's analysis and have concluded that
FELA claims are not precluded.  We quoted and cited that
opinion on original submission.  See also, e.g., Madden v.
Anton Antonov & AV Transp., Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d 1011
(D. Neb. 2015); Hananburgh v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., No.
13-CV-2799 (JMF) (S.D. N.Y. March 18, 2015) (not selected for
publication in F. Supp.); and Noice v. BNSF Ry., 383 P.3d 761
(N.M. 2016).  See also Powell v. Union Pac. R.R., No. CIV.
2:09-01857 WBS CKD (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2013)  (not selected for
publication in F. Supp.).  In contrast, Norfolk Southern has
cited a single trial court order from a Minnesota district
court, Schendel v. Duluth, No. 69DUCV132319 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Sept. 29, 2014), which it says "appl[ied] FRSA preclusion in
a FELA case after the POM Wonderful decision."  Both the
7
1140632
weight of authority and logic favor the conclusion that
Cottles's FELA claim is not precluded. 
Norfolk Southern tries to distinguish the analysis in POM
Wonderful by noting differences between the statutory schemes
at issue in that case and those in this case.  But the
criteria 
highlighted 
in 
POM 
Wonderful, 
as 
succinctly
summarized in the passage from Fair quoted above, hold true in
the interaction between FELA and the FRSA. 
First, and most importantly, as noted in Hananburgh:
"The 
FRSA 
contains 
no 
'clearly 
expressed
congressional intention' to preclude FELA claims. As
noted, 
the 
statute 
does 
contain 
an 
express
preemption clause, but that clause does not suffice,
because '[f]or purposes of deciding whether [a
federal statute with an express pre-emption clause]
displaces a regulatory or liability scheme in
another statute, it makes a substantial difference
whether that other statute is state or federal.' 
POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca–Cola Co., 134 S.Ct. 2228,
2238 (2014).  In fact, '[b]y taking care to mandate
express pre-emption of some state laws, Congress if
anything indicated it did not intend [the FRSA] to
preclude requirements arising from other sources,'
such as other federal statutes.  Id."
Norfolk Southern attempts, as it did on original
submission, to overcome the FRSA's lack of any statement or
intention to preclude other federal statutes by 
observing that
the FRSA states that "[l]aws, regulations, and orders related
8
1140632
to railroad safety ... shall be nationally uniform to the
extent practicable."  49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(1) (emphasis
added).  It faults this Court for "fail[ing] to cite or take
into account Congress's statutory provision that regulations
issued by the Secretary [of Transportation] (including the
Track Safety Standards) establish 'the federal standard of
care' under which railroads are required to conduct their
operations.  49 U.S.C. 20106(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added)."
Both of the above-quoted statements from the FRSA come
from the section that expressly concerns preemption of state
laws.  As the United States Supreme Court noted in POM
Wonderful, however, "[p]re-emption of some state requirements
does not suggest an intent to preclude federal claims."  POM
Wonderful, 573 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 2238.  What was true
in that case is also true here:  "[T]he pre-emption provision
by its plain terms applies only to certain state-law
requirements, not to federal law."  573 U.S. at ___, 134
S. Ct. at 2239.  Moreover, focusing on the FRSA's preemption
provision misses the primary purpose of the statute.  "[T]he
principal purpose of the FRSA is to promote railroad safety,
not to achieve nationally uniform railroad safety laws."
9
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Henderson, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 617.  Viewed in this light, a
finding against preclusion actually enhances the FRSA's
purpose.
"FRSA was not created to provide uniformity for
the sake of uniformity. The statute's stated purpose
is to enhance railroad safety and reduce accidents.
49 U.S.C. § 20101. And allowing safety related suits
under FELA will enhance, rather than impede, that
purpose. FRSA regulations provide comprehensive
minimum safety standards that apply to a broad range
of situations. However, a railroad's conduct may
comply with those standards, yet still fall below
the level of ordinary care expected of any
reasonable person. And at least as to railroad
employees, FELA suits serve to ferret out such
situations that might otherwise evade the attention
of regulators or that are less amenable to uniform,
regulatory solutions. This enhances safety by
providing additional incentives for railroads to
conduct their operations safely."
Madden, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 1020–21.2
2See also Noice v. BNSF Ry., 383 P.3d 761, 771 (N.M.
2016): 
"Rather than being in irreconcilable conflict,
we conclude that FRSA and FELA are complementary in
purpose and effect.  Both statutes further railroad
safety 
in 
meaningfully 
distinct 
ways. 
 
See
Henderson, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 621 ('[T]he FELA and
the FRSA complement each other in significant
respects, in that each statute is designed to
accomplish the same goal of enhancing railroad
safety through different means.').  FRSA seeks to
enhance safety in every area of railroad operation,
and to protect the public as well as railroad
workers.  See 49 U.S.C. § 20101.  It does so with
national, comprehensive regulatory standards which
10
1140632
are enforced by government entities.  FELA, by
comparison, focuses solely on the safety of railroad
workers, and does so by providing railroad employees
a private right of action.  Cf. POM Wonderful, [573]
U.S. [at] ___, 134 S.Ct. at 2236-38 (concluding that
specific 
regulations 
regarding 
juice 
labeling
promulgated under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act did not preclude the plaintiff's Lanham
Act claim which asserted that the plaintiff's market
competitor 
mislabeled 
its 
juice 
product 
and
emphasizing the two statutes different enforcement
mechanisms as one of the grounds for denying
preclusion).
"Permitting FELA claims like the Estate's to
proceed is likely to enhance the overall safety of
railroad operation.  Fair v. BNSF Ry. Co., 238 Cal.
App. 4th 269, 189 Cal. Rptr. 3d 150, 160-61 (2015),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1378, 194
L.Ed.2d 361 (2016) ('Allowing safety-related suits
under FELA will enhance FRSA's stated purpose of
promoting railroad safety and reducing accidents.').
In addition, FELA claims may shed light upon
potentially dangerous circumstances that regulators
might otherwise not identify or that are less
amenable to uniform, regulatory solutions.  See
Jerry J. Phillips, An Evaluation of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 25 San Diego L. Rev. 49,
54 (1988) ('The fault-based FELA system, with its
compensation 
exceeding 
the 
typical 
workers'
compensation award (particularly for the more
serious injuries), is designed to serve as a real
and present safety incentive.').  In sum, we
conclude that what the Supreme Court said in POM
Wonderful is directly applicable here:  allowing
FELA suits like the Estate's to proceed 'takes
advantage of synergies among multiple methods of
regulation' 
and 
is 
'consistent 
with 
the
congressional 
design 
to 
enact 
two 
different
statutes, each with its own mechanisms to enhance'
railroad safety.  [573] U.S. [at] ___, 134 S.Ct. at
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Finally, Norfolk Southern faults this Court for failing
to follow -- or even to cite -- its decision in Norfolk
Southern Ry. v. Denson, 774 So. 2d 549, 551 (Ala. 2000).
Denson concerned a railway accident in which a Norfolk
Southern locomotive operated by engineer James Martin and
conductor Vernon Denson collided with a tractor-trailer truck
that had attempted to cross the railroad tracks in front of
the locomotive.  The collision produced extensive fire, which
entered the cab of the locomotive, and Martin and Denson were
severely burned.  The plaintiffs' theory was that because the
locomotive was not air conditioned, they had the windows down,
and, because the windows were down, the flames from the
collision burned the plaintiffs.  Martin and Denson asserted
a claim under FELA alleging that Norfolk Southern had failed
to provide them with a safe place to work because the
locomotive they operated was not air conditioned.  
The trial court denied Norfolk Southern's motion for a
judgment as a matter of law concerning this claim, and the
jury returned substantial verdicts in favor of Martin and
Denson.  Norfolk Southern argued to this Court that the
2239."
12
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plaintiffs' FELA claim could not be sustained because FRA
regulations did not require air conditioning in the cabs of
locomotives.  This Court agreed with Norfolk Southern:
"It would be inconsistent with the sense of the FRA
as to its jurisdiction to hold that the judiciary
could supersede the FRA's regulations by requiring
common carriers to equip their locomotives with air
conditioning. Whether the impetus for change comes
through another federal agency, such as OSHA, or
through the judiciary's construing the FELA, the
impetus constitutes an intrusion into the FRA's
regulatory authority.
"Moreover, the plaintiffs have cited no cases
holding that the FELA requires railroads to equip
their locomotives with air conditioning and we are
not convinced that such a requirement would be
adopted 
by 
jurisdictions 
universally, 
and 
we
question whether it would be the proper role of the
judiciary to adopt or impose such a requirement."
Denson, 774 So. 2d at 556.
Norfolk Southern contends that Denson controls the
outcome in this case.  There are at least two problems with
that contention.  First, Denson was decided well before POM
Wonderful and the cases that have been decided in its wake
that have concluded that FELA claims are not precluded by the
FRSA.  Second, Denson did not consider the differences between
the preemption doctrine and preclusion that the POM Wonderful
13
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Court addressed in detail.  For example, the Denson opinion
stated:
"It is essentially undisputed that if these
claims were based on state law, they would be
preempted by the [Federal Locomotive Inspection Act]
and the FRSA. The plaintiffs remind us that this is
an action based on federal -- not state -- law.
Thus, they contend, the doctrine of preemption is
inapposite. We disagree with that contention. The
practical effect of such a rule would be identical
whether the rule is based on a state statute or on
this Court's interpretation of federal law. Indeed,
the need for uniformity, which is one of the bases
of preemption, has been addressed by the Federal
Railroad Administrator ('the Administrator') in a
context analogous to the one before us."
774 So. 2d at 555.  As already noted, the POM Wonderful Court
made it clear that "[p]re-emption of some state requirements
does not suggest an intent to preclude federal claims."  573
U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 2238.  That Court further rejected
the idea that a federal statutory scheme which states that it
seeks 
to 
achieve 
uniformity 
automatically 
precludes 
regulation
from other sources of federal law and held that a finding of
preclusion is particularly unwarranted if there is no hint of
a congressional intent to have one federal statute preclude
claims authorized by another federal statute.  In short, the
Denson Court's analysis simply does not address the
14
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differences between preemption and preclusion articulated by
the United States Supreme Court in POM Wonderful. 
Conclusion
On original submission, we held that Cottles presented
substantial evidence of Norfolk Southern's negligence through
the testimony of his expert, Joe Lydick, concerning what
Norfolk Southern should have done to inspect the defective
switch.  Norfolk Southern fails to offer any direct attack on
this conclusion. Instead, it relies upon the idea that
Lydick's testimony is irrelevant because FRA regulations do
not 
require 
Norfolk 
Southern 
to 
perform 
track-switch
inspections the way Lydick stated it should have in this
instance.  In essence, Norfolk Southern's application for
rehearing turns on whether the FRSA precludes claims arising
under FELA.  Because Norfolk Southern's arguments concerning
preclusion are not well founded, its application for 
rehearing
is overruled.
APPLICATION OVERRULED.
Parker and Main, JJ., concur.
Bolin and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result.
Wise, J., recuses herself.
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BOLIN, Justice (concurring in the result).
The main opinion addresses additional arguments raised by
Norfolk Southern Railway Company in its application for
rehearing.  I concur only in overruling the application for
rehearing.
Bryan, J., concurs.
16