Title: BURNS v. STATE ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIV.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BURNS v. STATE ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIV.2000 WY 1074 P.3d 924Case Number: 99-160Decided: 04/28/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Glen H. BURNS, Sr., 
Appellant (Petitioner)v. STATE of Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division, Appellee (Respondent).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J.

Representing 
Appellant: Bernard Q. Phelan of 
Phelan - Watson Law Office, Cheyenne, WY.Representing Appellee: Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General, and Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1] Glen H. 
Burns (Burns) appeals a denial of workers' compensation benefits. Finding that 
the Hearing Examiner's decision was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor otherwise 
not in accordance with the law, we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Burns 
presents this issue for our review:

[¶3] Was the 
decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings, (OAH), supported by 
substantial evidence or was it arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not supported 
by law?

[¶4] The 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (Division) states the issues 
as:

[¶5] The Hearing 
Examiner denied benefits for the Employee's 1997 blood clot because it was 
unrelated to his 1987 slip and fall injury.

I. Is the Hearing 
Officer's Order Denying Benefits supported by substantial evidence and within 
his discretion?

II. Is the Hearing 
Examiner's Order Denying Benefits in accordance with Wyoming 
law?

FACTS

[¶5] In December 
1987, while employed by New Orbit Drilling Company, Burns was involved in a 
work-related accident and suffered injuries to his neck, right shoulder, and 
left knee. Burns received extensive treatment for a neck injury, and the 
Division awarded him a 20 percent permanent disability rating. In December 1997, 
ten years after his accident, Burns reported to his physician that his left leg 
was cold, numb, and pale. That physician referred Burns to a specialist, who 
diagnosed a circulatory impairment in the leg. Burns underwent treatment on the 
leg, which he sought to have covered by the Division as a result of his 1987 
accident. The Division denied his claims as unrelated to the 
accident.

[¶6] Burns 
challenged the denials, and a Hearing Examiner heard the matter. At the hearing, 
Burns presented the deposition of his treating physician, who opined that the 
current condition was causally related to the knee injury in 1987. The Division 
presented the written opinions of three reviewing physicians who stated that 
there was no relationship, and attributed Burns' circulatory problem to other 
factors including diffuse atherosclerosis disease and a long history of smoking. 
The Hearing Examiner issued an Order Denying Benefits, which included a finding 
of fact that Burns' circulatory condition did not result from his 1987 accident 
and a conclusion of law that Burns failed to meet his burden of proving 
causation. Burns appealed the denial to the district court, which affirmed, 
finding "the hearing examiner's decision is neither arbitrary nor capricious, 
and is supported by substantial evidence." Burns filed a timely appeal to this 
court.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶7] Our 
standard of review in workers' compensation cases is well 
established:

[¶8] A claimant 
for worker's compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the essential 
elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the contested case 
hearing. Martinez v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 917 P.2d 619, 621 (Wyo. 1996). When an agency decides that the party charged with the 
burden of proof has failed to meet that burden, the case is reviewed under the 
"[a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with the law" language of WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114 (c)(ii) (1990). City of Casper 
v. Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 1995). On appeal the complainant . . . has the 
burden of proving arbitrary administrative action. Knight v. Environmental 
Quality Council of State of Wyo., 805 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1991); Wyoming 
Bancorporation v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432, 439 (Wyo. 1974); Marathon Oil Co. v. 
Welch, 379 P.2d 832, 836 (Wyo., 1963); Whitesides v. Council of City of 
Cheyenne, 78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520, 526 (1957). The agency, as the trier of 
fact, is charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of 
witnesses. Utech, 895 P.2d  at 451, and cases there cited. The deference normally 
accorded to the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the 
administrative agency, and the agency's decision as to the facts will not be 
overturned unless it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weigh of the 
evidence. Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 
1994).

[¶9] Pederson v. 
State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997). 
Following this guidance, we will not disturb the Hearing Examiner's decision 
unless Burns can show that it was arbitrary or capricious, or can show that the 
findings of fact were contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. We 
will not find an agency's action to be arbitrary or capricious if it is "based 
on a consideration of relevant factors and is rational." Mortgage Guaranty Ins. 
Corp. v. Langdon, 634 P.2d 509, 520 (Wyo. 1981).

DISCUSSION

[¶10] Burns 
contends that the Hearing Examiner discounted the testimony of his physician and 
gave too much weight to the statements of the three reviewing physicians. The 
Division responds that weighing the evidence is within the Hearing Examiner's 
discretion, and the Examiner reached a reasonable conclusion given the evidence 
presented.

[¶11] In his 
deposition, Burns' physician testified that he believed Burn's circulatory 
problem resulted from his 1987 work accident. He further testified that he had 
little information about that accident and that his opinion would be more 
conclusive if he had Burns' complete medical records from that accident. The 
physician conceded that his diagnosis was speculative and said: "[i]t would be 
an even firmer opinion if I were able to review his records, possibly his X rays 
or studies from 1987. That would help immensely, too, being a more firm 
opinion."

[¶12] The 
Division presented the opinions of three reviewing physicians, pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-801 (d) (Lexis 1999).1 Those opinions were admitted at the 
hearing without objection. Although the reviewing physicians did not personally 
examine or treat Burns, we cannot say that the Hearing Examiner erred in 
crediting their definitive opinions over the treating physician's equivocal 
testimony.

[¶13] We hold 
that the Hearing Examiner could have reasonably concluded that Burns failed to 
prove that his condition resulted from the 1987 accident. That decision, 
therefore, was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with 
the law.

[¶14] 
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-801 (d) (Lexis 1999) reads in relevant 
part:

The 
director may provide for the investigation of facts and circumstances regarding 
any claim filed under this act. To carry out investigations, he may acquire the 
services of one (1) or more physicians licensed to practice medicine in this 
state to serve as medical consultants[.]