Title: Tronfeld v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, 
JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
JAY TRONFELD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. Record No. 052635 
 
 
 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    November 3, 2006 
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG 
Pamela S. Baskervill, Judge 
 
Jay Tronfeld appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court 
of the City of Petersburg sustaining a demurrer on behalf of the 
defendants, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (“Nationwide”) 
and Todd Schmitt (collectively, the “Defendants”).  On appeal, 
Tronfeld asserts the trial court erred in finding that the 
alleged statements were opinion and thus not actionable under 
Virginia law as defamation per se.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court. 
I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
Nationwide employed Schmitt as an insurance adjuster.  In 
February 2005, Schmitt, acting within the scope of his 
employment with Nationwide, met with Donald Spellman to discuss 
an injury that Spellman sustained from an accident with an 
insured of Nationwide.  During this meeting, Schmitt and 
Spellman discussed settlement of the personal injury claim and 
whether the settlement could be completed without the 
intervention of an attorney. 
 
During the meeting, they discussed the possible selection 
of an attorney to serve as counsel for Spellman in his claim 
against Nationwide.  In response to Spellman selecting Tronfeld 
as his counsel, Schmitt made these statements (“Schmitt’s 
statements”): 
(1) That Jay Tronfeld just takes peoples’ money. 
(2) That clients of Jay Tronfeld would receive more 
money [for their claims] if they had not hired 
Jay and had dealt with the adjuster [directly].1 
At the time of the alleged statements, Tronfeld actively 
engaged in the practice of law and operated the law firm Jay 
Tronfeld & Associates.  Tronfeld’s law practice primarily 
involved the representation of private individuals in personal 
injury matters, and his firm used extensive marketing through 
print, radio and television to attract clients. 
Tronfeld filed an amended motion for judgment in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Petersburg, alleging that the 
statements made by Schmitt were defamation per se because the 
statements impute “Tronfeld as unfit to perform the duties of 
his employment” and that he “lacks integrity and is dishonest in 
performing the duties of his employment.”  As a consequence, 
Tronfeld alleges he was prejudiced “in his work and chosen 
                                                 
1 Tronfeld concedes on appeal that a third statement by 
Schmitt, “that Jay Tronfeld was no good,” is a statement of 
opinion and thus not actionable in a cause of action for 
defamation.  Therefore, this statement is not at issue in this 
appeal and we do not consider it. 
 
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profession” as an attorney.  The Defendants filed a demurrer, 
contending Schmitt’s statements were expressions of opinion and 
therefore could not be the basis for a cause of action for 
defamation. 
In a hearing on the demurrer, the trial court ruled from 
the bench that Schmitt’s statements were “expressions of 
opinion” and that the demurrer should be sustained.  On November 
15, 2005, the trial court entered a final order sustaining the 
demurrer.  We awarded Tronfeld this appeal. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
The purpose of a demurrer is to determine whether a motion 
for judgment states a cause of action upon which the requested 
relief may be granted.  Welding, Inc. v. Bland County Service 
Authority, 261 Va. 218, 226, 541 S.E.2d 909, 913 (2001).  “A 
demurrer admits the truth of all properly pleaded material 
facts.  ‘All reasonable factual inferences fairly and justly 
drawn from the facts alleged must be considered in aid of the 
pleading.’ ”  Ward's Equipment, Inc. v. New Holland N. America, 
Inc., 254 Va. 379, 382, 493 S.E.2d 516, 518 (1997) (quoting Fox 
v. Custis, 236 Va. 69, 71, 372 S.E.2d 373, 374 (1988)). 
 
A demurrer does not admit the correctness of the 
conclusions of law found in the challenged pleading.  Ward’s 
Equipment, Inc., 254 Va. at 382, 493 S.E.2d at 518.  On appeal, 
a plaintiff attacking a trial court's judgment sustaining a 
 
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demurrer need show only that the court erred, not that the 
plaintiff would have prevailed on the merits of the case.  
Thompson v. Skate America, Inc., 261 Va. 121, 128, 540 S.E.2d 
123, 127 (2001). 
 
Historically, a cause of action for defamation has been 
viewed as the means to protect a basic right because “the 
individual's right to personal security includes his 
uninterrupted entitlement to enjoyment of his reputation.” 
Jordan v. Kollman, 269 Va. 569, 575, 612 S.E.2d 203, 206 (2005) 
(quoting The Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 7, 325 S.E.2d 
713, 720 (1985)).  At common law, defamatory words that are 
actionable per se are: 
(1) Those which impute to a person the commission of 
some criminal offense involving moral turpitude, for 
which the party, if the charge is true, may be 
indicted and punished.  
 
(2) Those which impute that a person is infected with 
some contagious disease, where if the charge is true, 
it would exclude the party from society. 
 
(3) Those which impute to a person unfitness to 
perform the duties of an office or employment of 
profit, or want of integrity in the discharge of the 
duties of such an office or employment. 
 
(4) Those which prejudice such person in his or her 
profession or trade. 
Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 889, 275 S.E.2d 632, 635 (1981); 
see also Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 
146-47, 334 S.E.2d 846, 849 (1985) (setting out the common law 
 
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standard for defamation per se); Shupe v. Rose's Stores, Inc., 
213 Va. 374, 376, 192 S.E.2d 766, 767 (1972) (identifying words 
at common law which are actionable per se).  A person maligned 
by defamation per se may recover compensatory damages for injury 
to reputation, humiliation, and embarrassment without 
demonstrating any financial loss.  Great Coastal Express, 230 
Va. at 151, 334 S.E.2d at 852. 
 
Unless Schmitt’s statements are opinion, they are 
sufficient to sustain a cause of action for defamation per se 
because the statements prejudice Tronfeld in his profession as 
an attorney at law.  To state that an attorney “just takes 
people’s money” and that an attorney’s clients receive less for 
their claims because of the attorney’s services implies a 
combination of dishonesty, incompetence or the crimes of larceny 
by trick or obtaining money by false pretenses.  See, e.g., Code 
§ 18.2-178.  As such, Schmitt’s statements “impute to [Tronfeld] 
the commission of some criminal offense involving moral 
turpitude,” and “impute to [Tronfeld] unfitness to perform the 
duties of . . . employment . . . or want of integrity in the 
discharge of the duties of such . . . employment.”  Fleming, 221 
Va. at 889, 275 S.E.2d at 635.  Such statements damage an 
attorney’s standing to engage in his or her chosen profession 
and carry the connotation that he or she lacks the integrity and 
fitness to practice law.  The dispositive issue is thus whether 
 
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Schmitt’s statements are opinion or contain a provably false 
connotation. 
 
Speech that does not contain a provably false factual 
connotation, or statements which cannot reasonably be 
interpreted as stating actual facts about a person, are not 
actionable.  Yeagle v. Collegiate Times, 255 Va. 293, 295, 497 
S.E.2d 136, 137 (1998); see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal 
Co., 497 U.S. 1, 16-17, 20 (1990).  Statements that are relative 
in nature and depend largely upon the speaker's viewpoint are 
expressions of opinion.  Jordan, 269 Va. at 576, 612 S.E.2d at 
206; see also Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 119, 335 S.E.2d 
97, 101 (1985).  Whether an alleged defamatory statement is one 
of fact or opinion is a question of law and is, therefore, 
properly decided by the court instead of a jury.  Fuste v. 
Riverside Healthcare Ass'n, 265 Va. 127, 132-33, 575 S.E.2d 858, 
861 (2003).  Although a defamatory statement may be inferred, a 
court may not “extend the meaning of the words used beyond their 
ordinary and common acceptance.”  Perk v. Vector Resources 
Group, 253 Va. 310, 316, 485 S.E.2d 140, 144 (1997). 
 
On appeal, Tronfeld asserts that the trial court erred in 
finding that Schmitt’s statements were merely opinions and 
therefore not actionable as defamation per se.  Tronfeld 
contends the statements are not opinion because evidence could 
be presented at trial that Tronfeld is competent in his 
 
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profession, that claimants did receive more money after hiring 
Tronfeld as opposed to what the insurance company offered, and 
that Tronfeld’s clients receive a measurable value for his 
services in return for the fee he receives.  Collectively or 
separately, Tronfeld argues Schmitt’s statements are provably 
false. 
 
Citing our decisions in Chaves and Fuste, the Defendants 
respond that the trial court correctly found the alleged 
statements to be expressions of opinion and thus not actionable.  
They argue that Schmitt’s comments cannot be proven true or 
false and depended on Schmitt’s personal viewpoint for meaning.  
We agree with Tronfeld. 
 
In Chaves, an architect brought a defamation claim in 
response to statements in a letter written by a competitor that 
the architect had “no prior experience” and was charging “over 
50% more than what could be considered a reasonable fee.”  230 
Va. at 115, 335 S.E.2d at 99.  This Court concluded that words 
characterizing a professional as “inexperienced” do not impute 
unfitness in the discharge of his professional duties.  We also 
held that the competitor’s statements that the architect was 
charging more than a reasonable fee were insufficient as a 
matter of law to state a cause of action for defamation because 
it was a statement of opinion and “statements by competitors 
 
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that they can undersell others fall on prospective customers’ 
ears like repetitive drumbeats.”  Id. at 119, 335 S.E.2d at 101. 
 
In Fuste, the defendant’s employees stated the two 
plaintiff doctors had “abandoned their patients,” and that there 
were “concerns about their competence.”  265 Va. at 130, 575 
S.E.2d at 860.  In rejecting the trial court’s sustaining of a 
demurrer, we held the statements that the doctors had 
“abandoned” their patients and that there were “concerns about 
their competence” not only prejudiced the doctors in the 
practice of their profession but also contained “a provably 
false factual connotation.”  Id. at 133, 575 S.E.2d at 861. 
 
With these cases as a background, we conclude that, whether 
considered individually or together, Schmitt’s statements “are 
capable of being proven true or false” and thus are actionable 
in defamation.  Chaves, 230 Va. at 118, 335 S.E.2d at 101.  The 
statement “[t]hat Jay Tronfeld just takes people’s money” is 
capable of disproof by evidence, if adduced, that Tronfeld’s 
clients received monetary or other relief as a result of his 
legal services.  It would not be a matter of opinion that 
Tronfeld takes a client’s money without rendering a service of 
value in return if Tronfeld, for example, produced evidence of a 
settlement or judgment he obtained for that client. 
 
Schmitt’s other statement, “that clients of Jay Tronfeld 
would receive more money [for their claims] if they had not 
 
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hired Jay and had dealt with the adjuster [directly],” could 
similarly be proven false.  The statement would not be opinion 
if the evidence showed a settlement or judgment Tronfeld 
obtained for a client which exceeded the offer made by an 
insurance company to the client prior to the retention of 
Tronfeld as his or her legal counsel. 
 
In this regard, Schmitt’s statements, whether considered 
separately or together, are analogous to the defendant’s 
statements in Fuste, that the plaintiff physicians had 
“abandoned” their patients.  We held that statement was not 
opinion, but “capable of being proven true or false,” and thus 
actionable in a claim for defamation per se.  Fuste, 265 Va. at 
133, 575 S.E.2d at 862.  Schmitt’s statements in the case at bar 
present a clear, if not clearer, case for proof as a matter of 
fact than the statements in Fuste. 
 
Contrary to the Defendants’ claim, the case at bar is not 
controlled by Chaves.  The statement at issue in Chaves, that 
the plaintiff charged more than a reasonable fee, was of 
necessity a statement of opinion because it was based solely on 
a speaker’s viewpoint of what “reasonable” would be.  230 Va. at 
119, 335 S.E.2d at 101.  Thus, the statement was not capable of 
being proved true or false, unlike Schmitt’s statements.  
Yeagle, 255 Va. at 295, 497 S.E.2d at 137.  See Fuste, 265 Va. 
at 133, 575 S.E.2d at 862. 
 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, the trial court erred in sustaining the 
demurrer of the Defendants because Schmitt’s statements are 
capable of “a provably false factual connotation” and are thus 
not opinion.  Yeagle, 255 Va. at 295, 497 S.E.2d at 137; accord 
Fuste, 265 Va. at 133, 575 S.E.2d at 562; WJLA-TV v. Levin, 264 
Va. 140, 156, 564 S.E.2d 383, 392 (2002).  As Schmitt’s 
statements could prejudice Tronfeld in his profession, those 
statements do support a cause of action for defamation per se 
under Virginia law.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment 
of the trial court and will remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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