Title: Hodges v. Lister

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

207 Kan. 260 (1971)
485 P.2d 165
OSCAR R. HODGES, Appellant,
v.
DENNIS D. LISTER, a minor, through his next friend and natural guardian, Elbert Lister, Appellee.
No. 45,956

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 15, 1971.
Thomas H. Graber, of Hill, Mason, Graber and Nicklin, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Theo. H. Hill, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for the appellant.
Kenneth H. Hiebsch, of Gamelson, Hiebsch, Robbins and Tinker, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHROEDER, J.:
This is an appeal in a damage action for personal injuries arising from an automobile collision at an open, uncontrolled city intersection.
The trial court sustained a motion to dismiss and/or a motion for a directed verdict, before the plaintiff had presented all of his evidence on his case in chief, on the ground that the plaintiff by his admissions had convicted himself of contributory negligence which was a proximate cause of the collision.
The controlling question on appeal is whether the trial court erred in terminating the plaintiff's case by declaring "the plaintiff's evidence rested."
*261 The case involves a collision of two automobiles at an open city intersection which has no traffic control signs or signals. The litigants are the two drivers. Oscar R. Hodges (plaintiff-appellant) filed his petition against Dennis D. Lister, a minor, through his next friend and natural guardian, Elbert Lister (defendant-appellee), seeking damages for personal injury and property damages. At the pretrial conference the issues of fact to be determined resolved into the usual issue of negligence and contributory negligence which may have been the proximate cause of the collision and the damages and injuries sustained by the plaintiff.
When the case was called for trial, a jury was impaneled and the plaintiff commenced the presentation of his evidence. The plaintiff took the stand on his own behalf and testified under oath that on June 3, 1968, he was involved in an accident with Dennis Lister at the intersection of 22nd and Park Place in Wichita, Kansas. The plaintiff immediately prior to the accident was traveling west on 22nd Street at approximately 20 m.p.h., but as he approached the intersection of 22nd and Park Place he reduced his speed to around 15 m.p.h. When approximately 14 feet east of the intersection he looked to the north and south and observed no traffic approaching the intersection. Just as he entered the intersection the plaintiff again looked to the north and to the south and could see no oncoming traffic. When he looked the first time the plaintiff could see approximately one-fourth of a block to the north, and the second time he looked he could see approximately one-half of a block to the north.
A building at the northeast corner of the intersection located next to the sidewalk obstructed the view on the plaintiff's approach to the intersection. There also was a tree in front of the obstructing building on Park Place between the sidewalk and the curb.
The plaintiff further testified he was three quarters of the way through the intersection when his car was struck on the right side by an automobile driven by Dennis Lister. When the plaintiff concluded his testimony and was excused, the trial court asked:
Thereupon an affirmative response from the plaintiff's attorney was met with a direction by the trial judge that he "Call the witness concerning liability first."
Bobby Watson, an officer of the Wichita police department, was *262 called and testified under oath that he was a traffic investigator. After giving testimony concerning his qualifications, Watson said he arrived at the scene of the accident on June 3, 1968, shortly after it occurred. At that time the Renault driven by the plaintiff was across the center line of Park Place and south of the intersection of 22nd Street. The other car, an Oldsmobile, driven by the defendant, was situated over the southwest curbline at the intersection. The plaintiff was found lying 40 feet south of the south curbline of Park Place. He was unconscious at the time, and the officer did not know whether the plaintiff would live because of the extensive injuries inflicted to his head. The officer established the point of impact 8 feet south of the north curbline of 22nd Street and 11 feet east of the west curbline of Park Place. From this point the defendant's car was deflected to the south, southwest, jumped the curb, which is 6 or 8 inches tall, and struck a retaining wall 13 or 14 inches high around a residence, and came to rest pointing in a southwesterly direction. The plaintiff's car came to rest with the left rear of the car 12 feet south of the curbline of 22nd Street. It was knocked in a curving manner covering 36 feet from the point of impact. The plaintiff's car appeared to have been airborne from the point of impact to its resting place. It ended up facing east, with the plaintiff lying a little less than 30 feet from his automobile.
The measurements taken by the officer disclose the skid marks left by the defendant's automobile. The right front wheel skidded 52 feet before impact and another 30 feet after impact. The right rear wheel skidded 36 feet to the point of impact and 28 feet after impact. The left front wheel skidded 28 feet to the point of impact, became airborne 14 feet and then skidded 10 more feet. No skid marks for the left rear wheel could be detected.
Counsel for the plaintiff proceeded to qualify the officer to testify concerning traffic accident reconstructions as determined from the physical facts available, but the trial court interrupted excusing the jury from the courtroom. The record then discloses:
"Mr. Pinkerton: Yes, it is.
"Mr. Pinkerton: Yes.
"The Court: And what will that be?
"Officer Watson: Yes, about forty miles an hour.
"The Court: Mr. Lister's car  the defendant?
"Officer Watson: Yes.
"Mr. Pinkerton: Yes.
"The Court: Would you make that proffer now?"
Counsel for the plaintiff then proffered the further testimony of Officer Watson and Jack Clark, the clerk of the traffic court of the city of Wichita. The proffer was summary in nature disclosing that Watson would testify the defendant's car was speeding 40 to 50 m.p.h. at the time of the accident; that judging from the speed of the defendant's automobile it was a minimum of 208 feet from the intersection, when the defendant first began to stop; and that the location of the defendant's car at the time the plaintiff entered the intersection was back a sufficient distance to the north so as not to constitute a hazard had the defendant been obeying the speed limit. The proffer of Clark's testimony was that he had control of the records of the traffic court of the city of Wichita, which would show a signed statement wherein the defendant admitted he failed to reduce his speed to avoid an accident.
The trial court interrupted and the record discloses the following:
Counsel for the plaintiff then further attempted to show what Officer Watson's testimony would be relative to the probable distance of the defendant's vehicle from the intersection at the time the plaintiff entered the intersection.
Further presentation of the plaintiff's evidence was terminated by the trial court in the following manner:
"The Court: Would you read it back.
"Mr. Pinkerton: I have heard no motion.
The jurors were then returned to the courtroom and the trial court gave them an explanation for terminating the case.
Judgment was entered for the defendant on the ground the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The reason given by the trial court was that the plaintiff failed to see a vehicle approaching on Park Place from the north which was there to be seen. He declared the defendant's vehicle approaching from the north was a hazard and should have been seen by any careful driver.
The trial judge concluded:
The foregoing clearly demonstrates arbitrary action on the part of the trial court, which has prejudicially affected the right of the plaintiff to fully present his evidence in the trial of the case. The trial court required the plaintiff to present a portion of his case in chief by proffered testimony, which at best was summarily stated. It also suggested interposition of the appropriate motion by counsel for the defendant. The trial court took into consideration depositions which had never been offered into evidence by either party, and whose admissibility was never determined. Furthermore, the trial court assessed court costs contrary to the provisions of K.S.A. 60-2003.
Jury fees, lunch money, and the mileage paid to the jury panel called to the courthouse for the trial of the case are not among the items of cost assessable to a party litigant by the foregoing section of the statute. These jury fees and costs are payable by the county from the county treasury. (K.S.A. 1970 Supp. 28-122; and K.S.A. 28-150.)
The trial court in directing the payment of these costs by the plaintiff disregarded the clear statutory directive.
*266 The taxation of costs is purely a creature of statute and a court has no inherent power to award costs beyond statutory authorization. The point has been reviewed many times by this court regarding the taxation of attorneys' fees as costs. (Walker v. Davis Van & Storage Co., 198 Kan. 452, 424 P.2d 473; and McGuire v. McGuire, 190 Kan. 524, 376 P.2d 908.)
The appellee on appeal relies on the proposition that admissions made by a party in an action are the strongest kind of evidence (Hiniger v. Judy, 194 Kan. 155, 398 P.2d 305) and upon the rules stated in Blackmore v. Auer, 187 Kan. 434, 357 P.2d 765, where this court said:
A case to the same effect is Folkerts v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 190 Kan. 159, 372 P.2d 997.
Cases upon which the appellee relies for the proposition that the appellant has by his admissions established his contributory negligence as a matter of law are Mies v. Twietmeyer, 193 Kan. 97, 392 P.2d 118; Smithson, Executor v. Dunham, 201 Kan. 455, 441 P.2d 823; and Jarboe v. Pine, 189 Kan. 44, 366 P.2d 783.
Whether the appellant is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law when he is involved in an intersection collision, where he testifies he did not see the other automobile with which he collided at the intersection, is a highly controversial matter in this jurisdiction. Sullivan v. Johnston, 164 Kan. 386, 190 P.2d 417, and the authorities reviewed and cited therein are indicative. Fine points of distinction are made in the cases, and the proffer here required of the plaintiff in presenting his evidence was wholly unwarranted.
We do not, however, rest our decision on the controversial nature *267 of the legal proposition just mentioned. Instead, we bottom our decision on the proposition that the plaintiff in the trial of a negligence action to a jury is entitled to present all of his evidence bearing on the material issues on his case in chief in open court before a motion for a directed verdict may properly be entertained. The plaintiff is not required, as the trial court directed here, to proffer a portion of his evidence. It is a prerequisite to a motion for a directed verdict lodged by the defendant that all of the plaintiff's evidence on the material issues be presented before the jury in open court where the rules of evidence prevail. (See K.S.A. 60-250.) Under all of the facts and circumstances here presented the trial court has no authority to terminate the plaintiff's case by arbitrarily declaring "the plaintiff's evidence rested."
The rules to be applied in reviewing the propriety of an order by the trial court sustaining a motion for a directed verdict are set forth in Toole v. Johnson, 195 Kan. 88, 402 P.2d 823.
The provisions of K.S.A. 60-241 (b) authorize the defendant in an action tried to the court without a jury to move for involuntary dismissal of the action at the close of the plaintiff's case, where, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. (Mackey-Woodard, Inc. v. Citizens State Bank, 197 Kan. 536, 419 P.2d 847.) Clearly, that is not the situation here, where the case was being tried to a jury. Here the defendant's motion to dismiss, stated as an alternative to the motion for a directed verdict, had no office to perform.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed with directions to grant a new trial.