Title: Ayling v. Ayling

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Ayling v. Ayling1983 WY 45661 P.2d 1054Case Number: 5808Case Number: 5808Decided: 04/22/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
LARRY 
A. AYLING, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

PATRICIA C. AYLING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). No. 5808

Appeal from the Albany 
County District Court, Arthur T. Hanscum, J.

Cary 
R. Alburn III,Laramie, signed the brief and appeared in oral 
argument on behalf of 
appellant.

Calvin Rerucha 
signed the brief, and Kennard Nelson, of Rerucha & Nelson, Laramie, appeared in oral 
argument on behalf of 
appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant-defendant 
appeals from an order of the district court which modified an original decree 
between the parties with respect to child custody provisions. The original 
decree1 placed custody and control of the 
two children of the parties (a boy born in June 1971 and a girl born in May 
1973) in each party for a period of six months each year. The modification 
order2 placed such custody and control in 
appellee for nine months each year - during the time the children are in school, 
and in appellant for three months each year - during the school summer vacation 
period.3 The court found that each party was 
a fit and proper person to have custody of the children. Appellant contends that 
the issuance of the modification order was in error inasmuch as there was no 
showing of a material and substantial change in the circumstances of the parties 
since the time of the original decree, i.e. he contends that there was 
insufficient evidence of such change in circumstances.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

"(a) * * * On the 
petition of either of the parents, the court may revise the decree concerning 
the care, custody and maintenance of the children as the circumstances of the 
parents and the benefit of the children requires." Section 20-2-113, W.S. 
1977.

However, because 
of the res judicata effect generally afforded divorce decrees, Mentock v. Mentock, Wyo., 638 P.2d 156, 
158 (1981); Heyl v. Heyl, Wyo., 518 P.2d 28, 30 (1974), the party seeking to modify the child custody provisions of 
a divorce decree must show that there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances since the entry of the original decree warranting a modification 
of the child custody provisions. Leitner 
v. Lonabaugh, Wyo., 402 P.2d 713, 719 (1965); Laughton v. Laughton, 71 Wyo. 506, 259 P.2d 1093, 
1097, 43 A.L.R.2d 351 (1953). In ruling on the modification of the child custody 
provisions, the district court must strive to achieve a reasonable balance 
between the rights and affections of the parents, while giving paramount 
consideration to the welfare and needs of the children. Bereman v. Bereman, Wyo., 645 P.2d 1155, 1160 (1982); Mentock, supra; Leitner, supra; Henson v. Henson, Wyo., 384 P.2d 721, 723 (1963); Laughton, 
supra.

[¶3.]     The party moving to 
modify the child custody provisions of a divorce decree has the burden of 
showing that a change in circumstances has occurred, that the change warrants 
modification of the decree, and that the modification will be in the best 
interests of the children. Tanner v. 
Tanner, Wyo., 482 P.2d 443, 444 (1971); Douglas v. Sheffner, 79 Wyo. 172, 331 P.2d 840, 
843 (1958); Laughton, supra, 259 P.2d  
at 1095-1096. In this respect, we will not interfere with the decision of the 
district court unless there is a procedural error or unless there is shown to be 
a clear abuse of discretion. Bereman, supra; Henson, supra; Stirret v. Stirret, 
35 Wyo. 206, 
248 P. 1, 4 (1926).

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. * * *" Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980).

[¶4.]     Accordingly, in order 
to resolve the issue here presented to us, i.e. was there a showing of a 
material and substantial change in circumstances, we must examine the record4 to determine whether the trial 
court could reasonably conclude from the evidence that there was such a 
change.

[¶5.]     Appellant became 
unemployed in August 1981 and remained unemployed until August of 1982, except 
for odd jobs which required him to leave Laramie on occasion for short periods of time. 
In August of 1982, shortly before the hearing on the petition for modification 
of the decree, appellant accepted employment as a respiratory therapist at the 
hospital in Laramie. The working hours were from 11:00 p.m. 
to 7:00 a.m., causing him to be away from the children at night. He relied on a 
man who rented a basement apartment from him to assist the children if a problem 
came up, but the renter did not enter the portion of the house occupied by the 
children to check on them. He was to be available only on call. Appellant also 
had another part-time employment which required him to be away from town on 
occasion.

[¶6.]     Appellee's employment, 
on the other hand, required attendance at it during the daylight hours. The 
children would be alone for the period after school until about 5:00 p.m. They 
were required to call her when they got home after school. Because appellee 
found it difficult to take the children to the school near appellant's home, she 
had them transferred from that school to one near her home. She reported that 
the oldest child had trouble with school work before the transfer and that the 
school work improved after the transfer.

[¶7.]     From the foregoing, the 
following finding of the trial court is reasonable - certainly it does not 
exceed the bounds of reason under the circumstances and cannot be said to be an 
error of law:

"3. That a material and 
substantial change of circumstances has occured [sic] since the awarding of the 
original Decree of Divorce herein, which include but are not limited to the 
following:

"The Respondent's 
[appellant's] change of employment, the nature of his employment, his working 
hours, the requirements of his job and travel requirements; changes in 
caretaking arrangements for the children, educational requirements and other 
circumstances which have arisen[5] and which were not foreseen or 
contemplated at the time of the entry of the Divorce 
Decree."

Appellant's 
unemployed status was certainly an uncontemplated change of circumstances, as 
was the regular night work required by his present employment. The trial court's 
effort was directed at a determination as to whether or not all of the present 
circumstances are a substantial and material change from those which existed at 
the time of the divorce. "Substantial" and "material" are words of degree. An 
exercise of discretion is involved in applying them. If the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in applying these words to the matter before it, we cannot 
second guess its decision.

[¶8.]     There was no abuse of 
discretion in finding from the evidence that a change in circumstances occurred 
which would warrant a modification of the original decree. Presence of a parent 
at home when the children are not in school and changing the school being 
attended by the children each time custody changes are factors which affect the 
best interests of the children.

[¶9.]     
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The original decree was 
entered January 12, 1981.

2 The modification order 
was entered September 23, 1982.

3 As a general rule, 
divided child custody arrangements are not favored absent a good reason 
therefor, but they are often upheld on appeal when the division places the child 
with one parent during the school year and with the other parent during summer 
vacations. See Annotation: "Split," "divided" or "alternate" custody of 
children, 92 A.L.R.2d 695 (1963).

4 Appellant caused a 
transcript of the original divorce proceedings to be prepared and transmitted as 
part of the record on appeal. However, the transcript was not filed with the 
district court until November 3, 1982, more than a month after the order 
modifying the decree was entered. It was, therefore, not before the district 
court for the purpose of the decision, and we have not considered it on 
appeal.

5 Evidence was submitted 
reflecting a difference in control exerted by each party over the children, a 
difference in the type of assistance given to school work, and a difference in 
living environment relative to meals and division of 
housework.