Title: McGUIRE v NELSON

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12851 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA. 1975 D O U G L A S R. McGUIRE, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - HOWARD NELSON e t a l . , Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Recording : For Appellant : Berger, Anderson, S i n c l a i r and Murphy, B i l l i n g s , Montana Richard Anderson argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent: Bennett and Bennett, Bozeman, Montana Anderson, Symmes, Forbes, Peete & Brown, B i l l i n g s , Montana Rockwood Brown argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: March 5, 1975 Decided : J U M 1 3 1975 Filed : JuR 3.3 7975 Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. Plaintiff Douglas R. MeGuire appeals from a judgment entered in the district court, Gallatin County, when, after pre- sentation of plaintiff's case in chief, the court granted a motion for a directed verdict in favor of defendant American Honda Company. The action was brought by plaintiff to recover damages suffered as a result of a motorcycle accident involving a motor- cycle owned by plaintiff and manufactured by defendant. Plaintiff, while riding the motorcycle with his wife be- hind him, began a descent down an incline in an area near Bozeman, Montana used by motorcyclists and known as the "Pits", when his front wheel locked resulting in his being thrown over the handle- bars onto the ground. He received a broken pelvis; his wife was not injured. Plaintiff originally brought a negligence action against the local Honda dealer, Howard Nelson, d/b/a Harmony House, alleg- ing the dealer negligently sold plaintiff's wife the wrong size tire for the Honda. The particular model owned by plaintiff was a CT200 90 C.C. trail bike and had the unique design feature which required a 2.50 x 17 tire in the front and a 2.75 x 17 tire in the rear. Nelson sold plaintiff's wife a 2.75 x 17 tire which was mounted on the front wheel. While going down the hill plaintiff alleges the tire was forced up against the fender of the Honda causing the Honda to stop, throwing both plaintiff and his wife from the Honda, resulting in the injuries to plaintiff. The jury in that action found for plaintiff and awarded him $45,000. Nelson appealed that verdict to this Court challeng- ing the in court demonstration by plaintiff's expert witness. The witness was allowed to perform a demonstration in the presence of the jury which was designed to demonstrate that force applied to the front wheel suspension system would bind the front wheel and how the oversized tire might have locked the wheel and caused the accident. The witness was allowed to suppress the suspension by the use of a furniture clamp on one side of the wheel. On appeal, this Court in McGuire v. Nelson, 162 Mont. 37, 508 P.2d 558, held there was no foundation to show that the force used in the demonstration was similar to the conditions and the force applied to the front suspension by two persons on the bike at the time of the accident. The cause was returned to the dis- trict court for a new trial. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint naming American Honda Company as an additional defendant. The complaint against Honda is a strict liability case alleging that Honda marketed a dangerously defective product, negligently designed it, and neg- ligently failed to warn against the consequences of misuse. The case was tried to a jury on June 4, 1974. When plain- tiff rested his case both defendants moved for a directed verdict. Hondals motion was granted and judgment entered. The matter was settled between defendant Nelson and plaintiff on a covenant not to sue, for the amount of $3,750. Several issues are presented for review on appeal. The dispositive issue concerns the exclusion of the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness, Roy Prussing, as to his opinion con- cerning the design of the suspension system and its relation to the fender and tire and ultimately the safety of this design and/ or its defects; also the matter of proof of causation of the accident. Witness Prussing was duly qualified as an expert witness. His testimony shows that he was a graduate of Utilities Engineer- ing Institute of Chicago and was a registered professional engi- neer in the states of Montana, Wyoming and Minnesota; that he has been a professional engineer s i n c e 1944 and been i n t h e engineer- ing business s i n c e 1936; t h a t f o r 10-12 years he worked a s an engineer f o r an Indian Motorcycle firm and during h i s a s s o c i a t i o n with t h a t company he had an opportunity t o work with many d i f - f e r e n t types of motorcycles; t h a t he a l s o had extensive operation- a l experience. There was no challenge of h i s c r e d e n t i a l s a s an expert witness by defendant Honda Company o r defendant Howard Nelson. During testimony it was established t h a t Prussing had examined t h e machine involved here and t h e t e r r a i n where t h e acci- dent occurred. He had examined primarily t h e design f e a t u r e s of t h e f r o n t suspension; t h e method employed i n suspending t h e f r o n t wheel; t h e clearance b u i l t i n t o t h e suspension system; and charac- t e r i s t i c s such as l i m i t s of t r a v e l clearance, e t c . He explained t h e working p a r t s and how t h e t i r e and wheel functioned with t h e suspension. H e explained t o the jury t h e meaning of t h e two t i r e s i z e s involved i n t h e case. It seems t h a t t h e engineer experi- mented with thc c o r r e c t tire f o r t h e f r o n t wheel and interpolated clearance f i g u r e s t o t h e l a r g e r tire t o a r r i v e a t h i s opinion a s it concerned the problem a t hand. Objection was entered and t h e jury w a s excused. Prussing explained he had used two f u r n i t u r e clamps t o depress t h e suspen- s i o n system t o avoid any binding e f f e c t and t h e purpose was t o e s t a b l i s h t h e point a t which t h e suspension system was f u l l y de- pressed and/or l e t t h e suspension system go t o t h e l i m i t of its t r a v e l . This would permit t h e engineer t o e s t a b l i s h clearance between fender and fork within t h e design l i m i t s of t h e suspen- sion system. A t t h i s point t h i s testimony was had: "THE COURT: Ask him t h e sixty-four d o l l a r quest- ion. Are t h e tests s i m i l a r t o r i d i n g t h i s under t h e circumstances of t h e case, under McGuirels testimony? W e r e a l l y haven't g o t t h a t i n , but we know what h i s testimony was, t h a t lie was r i d i n g it out on the pits and suddenly it froze. "Q. Did the use of the furniture clamps on tne machine in question, Mr. Prussing, duplicate the up and down action of the suspension? "MR. LYMAN H. BENNETT, JR.: Objected to as calling for a conclusion of this witness with- out any foundation laid at all in the light of the fact that the witness can't-- "THE COURT: I don't know that it is or not. Overruled, at this time. "MR. LYMAN H. BENNETT, JR.: May we ask him a question on voir dire? "THE COURT: Wait a minute until we get this out. You can voir dire. You can cross him, as a matter of fact. " Q . Did the use of the furniture clamps, Mr. Prussing, in your opinion, merely duplicate the up and down action of the flection as it depresses over bumps in the terrain over which the bicycle was ridden? A. It did. It establishes the limits of travel. " Q . And did it cause the suspension to do anything other than what it would do in normal use on the trail? A. It did not. We merely held it there so I could take measurements. "Q. And then you released them? A. Then I re- leased them. "2. A11 right. " Under cross-examination, he testified: "MR. BROWN: Now, Mr. Prussing, I will hold you to your scientific standing. Can you state with any scientific accuracy that the pressure applied with the clamp was the same that you would experience in the field, with any reasonable scientific cer- tainty? "THE WITNESS: The clamps applied pressure to that suspension system to the point where it bottomed out or reached the end of its travel. This same thing would happen in the field under field con- ditions. " There followed a great deal of testimony designed to dim- inish the accuracy of the engineer's tests. He freely admitted he did not measure pressure in foot pounds but seemed to indicate he could establish from the evidence at hand and his experiments, that the wheel under field conditions of the day of the accident would make contact with t h e fender housing. Then t h i s testi- mony was had: "MR. BROWN: So, you c a n ' t t e l l by your test whether o r not t h i s t i r e a c c u r a t e l y locked up, seized, o r bound. You can merely s t a t e t h a t it rubbed, i s t h a t r i g h t ? "THE WITNESS: T h a t ' s r i g h t . The degree of con- t a c t I could not say a t t h a t t i m e of t h e accident what it was. "MR. BROWN: NOW, i s n ' t it t r u e , M r . Prussing, t h a t t h e real answer t o that. sixty-four d o l l a r question of whether it would s e i z e o r bind a s clamped i n t h i s case would be what i s c a l l e d a dynamic test, t h a t i s , a test i n t h e f i e l d , a c t u a l l y operating t h e machine under similar conditions? "THE WITNESS: That would be a dynamic test; r i g h t . "MR. BROWN: W e l l , m y question is: Is it n o t t r u e t h a t a dynamic test would be t h e only way which you could determine whether t h i s p a r t i c u l a r t i r e on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r suspension would, i n f a c t , bind o r seize a s alleged? "THE WITNESS: I d o n ' t t h i n k so. I t h i n k t h a t could be determined s t a t i s t i c a l l y , a l s o . "MR. BROWN: W e l l , you previously t e s t i f i e d t h a t you d o n ' t know from your test whether it d i d , and could not t e l l from t h e test t h a t you took; i s t h a t r i g h t ? "THE WITNESS: I d i d not make t h a t test myself. I made measurements, and by c a l c u l a t i o n s , i n m y opin- ion, it would r u b and make contact. "MR. BROWN: But, you a r e n o t w i l l i n g t o s t a t e s c i e n t i f i c a l l y beyond t h a t t h a t it would r u b o r make contact? "THE WITNESS: I t would make contact. It would rub. To what e x t e n t i n f o o t pounds, I am n o t i n a posi- t i o n t o say. "MR. BROWN: You, y o u r s e l f , d i d n o t conduct any dynamic tests o r tests i n t h e f i e l d ? "THE WITNESS: I d i d not." P l a i n t i f f then proposed a hypothetical question t h a t in- cluded design, d e f e c t and causation, based on reasonable c e r t a i n t y as e s t a b l i s h e d by mechanical design standards and knowledge. A f t e r o b j e c t i o n s by both defense counsel, t h e c o u r t ruled. ' 0 : Taking t h e hypothetical question by its four corners, and assuming f o r t h e purpose 3f m y r u l i n g t h a t a l l of t h e f a c t s alleged and s e t o u t i n t h e hypothetical question could be proved o r would be a matter of record i n t h i s cause, t h e Court is still going t o s u s t a i n t h e objection. I think t h a t t h e c o u r t , t h e Supreme Court has indicated t o t h i s t r i a l c o u r t t h a t t h e evidence must be r e l a t e d t o those P i t s and t o what a c t u a l l y occurred out t h e r e . And I think t o allow t h i s , t o go i n on t h e question of design, now, question of design i s a question of d i s c r e - t i o n . It is a question of d i s c r e t i o n among design engineers. That is why we have d i f f e r e n t designs and s i t u a t i o n s . It is a question of c u t t i n g and covering. It i s a question of econ- omics. It i s a f i g h t between t h e engineer and t h e production department. It is a f i g h t between the engineer and t h e designing engineer a s t o how much they can afford t o spend on design i n order t o produce t h i s o r t h a t . And w e g e t i n t o a multi- p l i c i t y of problems here. And I am going t o sus- t a i n t h e objection. "NOW, do you want t o use t h i s witness f o r any- thing e l s e ? "MR. ANDERSON: I would, without going i n t o ex- a c t l y what h i s examination i s , ask him i f , based upon such examination of t h i s machine and t h e accident scene, he has any opinion a s t o whether t h e f r o n t suspension design is a s a f e one." Immediately t h e r e were objections which were sustained by t h e court. The witness w a s not allowed t o give h i s opinion as it concerned s a f e design. There has been a g r e a t deal s a i d about t h e holding of t h i s Court i n t h e f i r s t case, McGuire v. Nelson, supra. W e ex- cluded t h e r e an i n c o u r t demonstration because t h e r e was no foundation. It was a negligence a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e d e a l e r who sold t h e t i r e t o p l a i n t i f f ' s wife. The i n s t a n t c a s e i s one t h a t t h e court and defense counsel c h a r a c t e r i z e a s s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y - - d e f e c t i v e product--negligent design--failure t o warn. There has been no prohibition declared a g a i n s t s t a t i c t e s t s o r using clamps i n connection therewith, i f t h e r e is a process used o r an expert t h a t can use these processes t o e s t a b l i s h causation and i n t h i s case t h e design problems. When p l a i n t i f f r e s t e d h i s case i n chief Honda moved f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t on two p r i n c i p a l grounds: (1) t h e r e was no proof of any d e f e c t i v e condition i n t h e Honda CT200 which would be unreasonably dangerous t o t h e user; and ( 2 ) no causal connection has been established i n t h i s c a s e between t h e claimed condition of t h e oversized, wrong sized t i r e and t h e accident. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t granted t h e d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t . It has long been held by t h i s Court t h a t t h e law does not favor d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t s and t h e evidence t h e r e f o r e w i l l be viewed i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o appellants, a s having proved what it tends t o prove. Johnson v. Chicago, M. & S t . P. R. Co., 71 Mont. 390, 394, 230 P. 52. This Court has a l s o long held t h a t cases should not be withdrawn from a jury unless reason- a b l e and fair-minded men could reach only one conclusion from t h e f a c t s . I n r e E s t a t e of Hall v. Milkovich, 158 Mont. 438, 492 P.2d 1388. Honda Company, i n support of t h e d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t , argues t h a t n e i t h e r p l a i n t i f f nor h i s wife a c t u a l l y s a w t h e f r o n t wheel a t t h e time of t h e accident and t h e r e f o r e , they were unable t o s t a t e p r e c i s e l y what happened i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e f r o n t t i r e a t t h e time. The only other evidence p l a i n t i f f could o f f e r a s i d e from t h e testimony of Prussing regarding h i s test and t h e s a f e t y of t h e design, was t h e testimony of p l a i n t i f f , h i s wife and h i s cousin, George Barclay, who a f t e r an outing t e n months a f t e r t h e accident occurred, observed t h a t t h e f r o n t wheel rubbed when they rode over rocks o r jumped on t h e f r o n t fork. A s t h i s Court s t a t e d i n Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, 162 Mont. 506, 517, 513 P.2d 268, circumstantial evidence i s s u f f i c i e n t and o f t e n t i m e s necessary i n a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y case t o prove causation. I n Brandenburger t h e Court quoted from Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas A i r c r a f t Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 639: "'There would be l i t t l e gain t o t h e consuming public i f t h e c o u r t s would e s t a b l i s h a form of recovery with one hand and take it away with t h e other by e s t a b l i s h i n g impossible standards of proof. The proof required i n a s t r i c t lia- b i l i t y case must be r e a l i s t i c a l l y t a i l o r e d t o t h e circumstances which caused t h e form of a c t i o n t o be c r e a t e d . ' " I n cases, such a s t h e i n s t a n t one, where no one can t e s t i f y he a c t u a l l y saw t h e t i r e bind with t h e fender, circum- s t a n t i a l evidence must be allowed o r t h e c o u r t would be taking away t h e r i g h t of p l a i n t i f f t o recover on a. s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y action. It would be u n r e a l i s t i c t o expect t h e r i d e r s of t h e Honda t o a c t u a l l y observe t h e f r o n t t i r e bind f o r them t o proceed under a strict l i a b i l i t y theory of design d e f e c t . Here, t h e r e was testimony from subsequent r i d e r s t h a t t h e t i r e caught when it went over l a r g e rocks. There w a s a l s o testimony of rub marks i n s i d e t h e f r o n t fender and gouge marks on t h e tire. The Honda engineer t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e rub marks could have been l e f t by t h e oversized tire. A l l t h a t testimony, com- bined with P r u s s i n g l s testimony a s t o whether o r not he considered t h e design t o be dangerous, had it been allowed i n t o testimony, would have been s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o allow t h e case t o go t o t h e jury, although it is a l l circumstantial evidence. I n f a c t , h i s Prussing i n h i s testimony, indicated that/testimony could lend support t o causation as well a s design d e f e c t . Viewing t h e causa- t i o n i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o p l a i n t i f f , a s we must, reason- a b l e and f a i r minded men could reach d i f f e r e n t conclusions. W e have an impasse on t h e testimony of t h e engineer as t o t h e design d e f e c t , e t c . The defense maintains it invades t h e province of the jury and t h e court held it t o be improper evidence, i n any case. Of course, t h e r e w a s a g r e a t d e a l of discussion about t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of expert testimony. I n Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability, V.1, $12.02[2] [a], p. 246, quoting from Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646, 655, it is stated: "The modern tendency of the courts everywhere is to take a more liberal and rational view respecting the admissibility and scope of such testimony. This court early announced that in all proceedings involving matters of a scientific, mechanical, professional, or of like nature, re- quiring special study, experience or observation, or where the connection between the cause and effect was a matter of specialized knowledge, not within the knowledge of laymen in general, expert opinion testimony was admissible to aid the court or the jury in arriving at a correct deter- mination of the litigated issue. There are many matters of scientific investigation and specialized knowledge in the fields of the professions, trades, business, industry, art, and other endeavors where the minds of those not learned therein necessarily grope but blindly. Expert opinion in such cases is indispensable to aid the jurors in reaching a correct conclusion, and the fact that the matter inquired about is a vital and controlling fact in the trial, or is even the ultimate fact, which the jury are to pass upon and determine, is no reason why the opinion should not be received." Product liability is a relatively new branch of the law, and the role of the expert witness in this field has become more important. This Court stated in Brandenburger, quoting the Hawaii Supreme Court in Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d 240, 243, as to the acceptable type of evidence to be used by a plaintiff to prove a defect in a manufacturer's or distribu- tor's product, in a strict liability case: "'The nature and quality of evidence used in products liability cases to show the defect and the nexus between the defect and the accident naturally varies. The most convincing evidence is an expert's pinpointing the defect and qiving his opinion on the precise cause of the accident after a thorouqh inspection.'" (Emphasis added.) The fact that Prussing's qualifications as an expert was n3ver questioned and his experience in the field as a mech- anical engineer; considering his experience working with motor- cycles; and considering that Prussing inspected the particular Honda model involved in the accident and was familiar with the design both from personal observation and from studying schematics of the suspension system supplied by the Honda Company, it is apparent that Prussing was well qualified to give his opinion as to the alleged defect in the design of the Honda model in ques- tion and whether it could or did cause the accident, as alleged. We can find no difference between that testimony and the testi- mony this Court allowed in Brandenburger where an expert witness was allowed to testify as to the defect in the design of the roof of the Toyota Land Cruiser. Counsel for Honda argues that such testimony invades the province of the jury. Admittedly Prussing's testimony would in- volve the ultimate conclusion which the jury was required to determine. This, however, does not of itself furnish a basis for its rejection. Although there are authorities which indicate that the appropriate test should be whether the opinion invades the province of the jury, it would seem that the better reasoned cases reject this as the test. In VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed. 51920, Professor Wig- more in his criticism of the rule states: " * * * because the witness, in expressing his opinion, is not attempting to 'usurp' the jury's function; nor could if he desired. He is not attempting it, because his error (if it were one) consists merely in offering to the jury a piece of testimony which ought not to go there; and he could not usurp it if he would, because the jury may still reject his opinion and accept some other view, and no legal power, not even the judge's order, can compel them to accept the witness' opinion against their own. * * *" Wigmore's views have been widely adopted in the United States. Bridges v. Lintz, 140 Col. 582, 346 P.2d 571; Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., supra; Schweiger v. Solbeck, 191 Ore. 454, 230 P.2d 195, 29 ALR2d 435. Rule 409 of the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence, p. 210, expressly states that a witness may draw an inference "whether or not any such inference embraces an ultimate i s s u e t o be decided by t h e t r i e r of f a c t * * * I 1 . This Court has repeatedly held t h a t expert opinion evi- dence is admissible i n explaining t h e cause of a p a r t i c u l a r a c c i - dent. Pachek v. Norton Concrete Co., 1 6 0 Mont. 16, 2 1 , 499 P.2d 766. The opinion of a witness on a m a t e r i a l question of science, a r t , o r t r a d e i n which he i s s k i l l e d i s admissible i n evidence. Section 93-401-27, R.C.M. 1947. There a r e a multitude of cases allowing expert testimony on the ultimate question before t h e jury. See annotation: 62 ALR2d 1426. The t r u e test would seem t o be whether t h e subject i s s u f f i c i e n t l y complex so a s t o be s u s c e p t i b l e t o opinion evidence, and whether t h e witness i s properly q u a l i f i e d t o give h i s opinion. Here, t h e r e is no doubt t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e suspension system of t h e f r o n t wheel of a CT200 90 C.C. Honda t r a i l bike t o its t i r e s i z e would not be common knowledge t o members of t h e jury, but a question of mechanical engineering. Also, t h e r e is no doubt t h a t Prussing i s well q u a l i f i e d t o t e s t i f y on t h e matter. I n view of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e jury can e i t h e r r e j e c t o r accept t h e expert witness' opinion o r give limited weight t o it, we f a i l t o see how t h e admission of t h e evidence here could c o n s t i t u t e a usurpation of t h e j u r y ' s function. The judgment of t h e d i s t reversed and t h e cause remanded f o r a new t r i a l . - J u s t i c e W e concur: , /" . i ., a S ' . + - " .. . . ". . . . ?. &' Chief J u s t i c e