Title: Rajneesh Foundation v. McGreer

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

737 P.2d 593 (1987)
303 Or. 371
RAJNEESH FOUNDATION International, a Nonprofit Corporation, and Rajneesh Neo-Sannyas International Commune, an Oregon Cooperative Corporation, Petitioners On Review, Ma Anand Sheela, Appellant-Cross-Respondent,
v.
Rosemary McGreer, Respondent On Review.
Rosemary McGreer, Respondent On Review,
v.
Rajneesh Foundation International, a Non-Profit Corporation, and Rajneesh Neo-Sannyas International Commune, an Oregon Cooperative Corporation, Petitioners On Review,
Ma Anand Sheela, and Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, Respondents.
A8210-06678; CAA31894; SCS33111.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
As Corrected March 31, 1987.
May 27, 1987.
Robert J. McCrea, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.
Mark K. Cushing, Portland, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the brief were Barbee B. Lyon and Tonkin, Torp, Galen, Marmaduke & Booth, Portland.
Before PETERSON, C.J., and LENT, LINDE, CAMPBELL, JONES and CARSON, JJ.
PETERSON, Chief Justice.
In Rajneesh Foundation v. McGreer, 80 Or. App. 168, 721 P.2d 867 (1986), the Court *594 of Appeals held (1) that the trial court erred in considering the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the defendant's counterclaims after an order of default had been entered against the plaintiffs, and (2) that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss a counterclaim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Because of its disposition, the Court of Appeals did not consider the plaintiffs' contention that the trial court erred in denying their motion to dismiss two defamation counterclaims.
On review, we reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the trial court did not err in considering and granting the motion to dismiss the section 1985 counterclaim. Rajneesh Foundation v. McGreer, 303 Or. 139, 734 P.2d 871 (1987). We did not consider the trial court's ruling as to the defamation counterclaims.
The plaintiffs have moved for reconsideration, asking that this court consider the merits of their contentions that the trial court erred in failing to grant their motion to dismiss the defamation counterclaims. In view of our earlier ruling on the default issue, the plaintiffs are entitled to have those claims of error considered and decided. We now do so.
The plaintiffs' claims on appeal relate to allegedly defamatory statements made by plaintiff Sheela. The defendant's second counterclaim alleged that Sheela appeared on a Portland radio program and made the following statements concerning defendant:
In the third counterclaim, the defendant alleged that Sheela wrote a letter to the editor of the Rajneesh Times. The letter was published and stated, in part:
The plaintiffs moved to dismiss, arguing that the allegedly defamatory statements were not statements of fact, but opinion, and, as such, were constitutionally protected. Sheela's statements that the defendant "lies a lot", that "she has been saying nothing but lies" and that she and others "[spread] fear through outrageous lies" are statements of fact, not opinion. The statements were defamatory. Murphy v. Harty, 238 Or. 228, 243, 393 P.2d 206 (1964). ("It is libelous to publish of a man that he is a liar, regardless of his profession or occupation.").
The plaintiffs argue that the statements in the letter to the editor of the Rajneesh Times do not refer to defendant. ORCP 20 E(1) provides:
The counterclaim alleged that the statements in Sheela's letter concerned defendant. Even without invoking the liberal rule of pleading stated in our earlier opinion ("If the pleadings against the defaulting party imply or reasonably require an inference of facts constituting a claim for relief, *595 they are sufficient to support a default judgment." 303 Or. at 144, 734 P.2d 871), the allegations are sufficient.[1]
Our conclusion is fortified by the evidence. The trial judge heard evidence  for several days  on damages, and carefully considered the plaintiffs' objections. At the conclusion of the hearing, he stated:
The allegations in defendant's second and third counterclaims for defamation were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to state claims for relief. Plaintiffs' contentions to the contrary are without merit.
Reconsideration granted. Previous opinion adhered to. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
[1]  Plaintiffs also argue that the terms "insolent racists" and "religious bigots," included in the letter published in the Rajneesh Times, are statements of opinion and are not defamatory. We do not address these issues because the letter also accused defendant of "spreading fear through outrageous lies." Even without the terms "insolent racists" and "religious bigots," the letter contained statements of fact capable of a defamatory meaning.