Title: Winn v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
HILLARD M. WINN, 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 260, 2022 
§   
§ 
§  Court Below–Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§   
§  Cr. ID No.  0603002909 (N) 
§                                            
   
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: December 27, 2022 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
February 20, 2023 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to 
affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Hillard M. Winn, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his motion for correction of an illegal sentence.  The State has filed 
a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face 
of Winn’s opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
Following a four-day trial in 2006, a Superior Court jury found Winn 
guilty of one count of first-degree burglary, one count of possession of a deadly 
weapon during the commission of a felony (“PDWDCF”), one count of third-degree 
2 
 
assault, and one count of terroristic threatening.  Before sentencing, the State moved 
to have Winn declared a habitual offender under then-extant 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).  
On January 3, 2007, the Superior Court granted the State’s motion and sentenced 
Winn as follows: for first-degree burglary, as a habitual offender, to thirty years of 
incarceration; for PDWDCF, to two years of incarceration; for third-degree assault, 
to one year of incarceration, suspended for decreasing levels of supervision; and for 
terroristic threatening, to one year of incarceration, suspended for one year of Level 
II probation.  We affirmed Winn’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal.1  
(3) 
In 2010, Winn filed a motion under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a), 
arguing, among other things, that his sentence was illegal because (i) the court did 
not hold a separate hearing on the State’s habitual-offender motion, (ii) the State 
failed to provide Winn with adequate notice of the evidence on which it intended to 
rely in support of the habitual-offender motion, and (iii) Winn’s nolo contendere 
plea to escape after conviction could not be used as a predicate felony to support the 
habitual-offender motion.  The Superior Court denied the motion, and we affirmed 
that denial on appeal.2  In 2017, Winn filed another motion for correction of an illegal 
sentence.  The Superior Court denied the motion, and we affirmed that denial on 
appeal.3 
 
1 Winn v. State, 2008 WL 223257 (Del. Jan 28, 2008). 
2 Winn v. State, 2011 WL 556439 (Del. Feb. 16, 2011). 
3 Winn v. State, 2018 WL 2435547 (Del. May 29, 2018). 
3 
 
(4) 
In June 2022, Winn filed a third motion for correction of an illegal 
sentence, arguing (i) the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the 
State’s motion to declare Winn a habitual offender because the motion was untimely 
and improperly filed; (ii) the State failed to present evidence of the requisite number 
of prior convictions to subject Winn to habitual-offender sentencing; and (iii) his 
prior convictions resulting from plea agreements could not be used to establish his 
habitual-offender status because they “contain legal error.”  On July 8, 2022, the 
Superior Court denied the motion, finding that Winn’s motion was simply a rehash 
of the arguments he raised in his 2010 motion for correction of an illegal sentence, 
the denial of which was affirmed by this Court.  This appeal followed. 
(5) 
We review the denial of a motion for correction of illegal sentence for 
abuse of discretion.4  To the extent a claim involves a question of law, we review the 
claim de novo.5  A motion to correct an illegal sentence may be filed at any time.6  
A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, 
is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is 
 
4 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 
5 Id. 
6 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a). 
4 
 
uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not 
authorize.7  
(6) 
On appeal, Winn argues that the Superior Court erred when it relied on 
the law-of-the-case doctrine to deny his motion because he did not raise his current 
objections to his sentence in his 2010 motion.  Winn also argues that the Superior 
Court erred when it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion.  Winn’s 
arguments are unavailing. 
(7) 
The first claim Winn asserted below was that his sentence is illegal 
because the State failed to file the documentation supporting its habitual-offender 
motion before the first scheduled sentencing date and did not formally request a 
continuance of the sentencing hearing in violation of the Superior Court’s rules.  We 
find this argument—essentially, that the State did not provide proper notice of its 
intent to seek habitual-offender sentencing—to be substantially similar to Winn’s 
2010 argument that the State had failed to give him adequate notice of the evidence 
on which it intended to rely in support of its habitual-offender motion.  Accordingly, 
the Superior Court correctly determined that the claim was barred by the law-of-the-
case doctrine.8  Similarly, Winn’s argument that his 1998 nolo contendere plea to 
escape after conviction could not be used as a predicate conviction was also raised 
 
7 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
8 See id. at 579 (finding that the law-of-the-case doctrine bars re-litigation of an illegal sentence 
under Rule 35(a) when that issue has been previously decided by this Court). 
5 
 
and rejected in connection with his 2010 motion.9  It, too, was therefore barred by 
the law-of-the-case doctrine.   
(8) 
Winn also argued below that his 1985 prior robbery conviction (the 
underlying felony for his 1988 conviction for escape after conviction) could not also 
be used as a predicate felony for habitual-offender purposes.  Winn’s position is not 
supported by our case law and is without merit.10  As to Winn’s last argument—that 
Winn’s 1992 and 1988 pleas could not be used to establish his habitual-offender 
status because prior to 2008 the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form did not list 
the right to assistance of counsel on appeal as one of the rights a defendant waived 
by entering into a plea agreement—relief is not available to him under Rule 35(a).11  
As a final matter, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to 
hold a hearing on Winn’s motion because Rule 35 does not call for, much less 
require, an evidentiary hearing. 
 
 
9 Not only did Winn raise this issue in his 2010 motion for correction of sentence, but he also 
raised the issue at sentencing, thereby preserving the argument for appeal. 
10 See, e.g., Stevenson v. State, 2016 WL 258783 (Del. Jan. 19, 2016) (upholding a habitual-
offender sentence predicated on a federal conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon as well 
as the underlying felony conviction). 
11 See Brittingham, 705 A.2d at 578 (“Because [the appellant’s] claims [concerning the validity of 
his predicate convictions] would require an examination of errors occurring at other proceedings 
prior to the imposition of the sentence, no relief is available to [the appellant] under Rule 35(a).” 
(cleaned up)). 
6 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
         Chief Justice