Title: Ex parte Midsouth Paving, Inc., et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: May 19, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-0860 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte Midsouth Paving, Inc., and Christopher Nivert  
 
 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
 
(In re: Yvonne Mason  
 
v.  
 
Midsouth Paving, Inc., and Christopher Nivert)  
 
(Tallapoosa Circuit Court, CV-20-900093) 
 
 
STEWART, Justice. 
SC-2022-0860 
2 
 
 
Midsouth Paving, Inc. ("Midsouth"), and Christopher Nivert have 
petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Tallapoosa 
Circuit Court ("the trial court") to enter a summary judgment in their 
favor in an action commenced against them by Yvonne Mason. For the 
reasons explained below, Mason's claims against Midsouth and Nivert 
are barred by § 25-5-11, § 25-5-52, and § 25-5-53, Ala. Code 1975, of the 
Alabama Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"), § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala. 
Code 1975. Accordingly, we grant the petition and direct the trial court 
to enter a summary judgment in favor of Midsouth and Nivert.  
Facts and Procedural History 
 
PeopleReady, Inc., is a temporary-employment agency that 
recruits, hires, and supplies temporary employees for Midsouth, a road-
paving contractor, through a contractual agreement ("the labor-supply 
agreement").1 In June 2020, Mason applied with PeopleReady to work as 
a flagger. On July 2, 2020, Mason attended training provided by 
Midsouth, and, shortly thereafter, she began accepting assignments as a 
flagger at Midsouth job sites. During her employment with PeopleReady, 
 
1The labor-supply agreement was entered into between Midsouth's 
parent company, CRH Americas, Inc., f/k/a Oldcastle, Inc., and 
PeopleReady's parent company, TrueBlue, Inc. 
SC-2022-0860 
3 
 
Mason worked as a flagger only at Midsouth job sites. Mason would 
receive a daily text message from PeopleReady with a list of available 
flagging jobs, and Mason had the option to accept or reject the jobs. If 
Mason accepted a job, she would go to the PeopleReady office where she 
would receive a "ticket" to take to the Midsouth job site. PeopleReady 
initially provided Mason with a hard hat, sunblock, water, and a vest 
with "Midsouth" printed on it, and Mason kept those items in her 
automobile. At the job site, Midsouth employees directed and supervised 
Mason's job duties. Mason's flagging duties generally included holding a 
sign that said either "Stop" or "Slow" to help with redirecting traffic led 
by a pilot vehicle during road-paving jobs.  At the end of each shift, a 
Midsouth supervisor would verify the hours Mason worked on her ticket, 
and Mason would return the ticket to the PeopleReady office.  
On August 13, 2020, Mason was working at a Midsouth job site 
when Nivert unintentionally drove his pilot vehicle into Mason while he 
was making a three-point turn. Mason's leg was severely injured, and she 
received multiple surgeries and remained in a hospital and then a 
rehabilitation facility for over a month. PeopleReady began paying 
workers' compensation benefits to Mason after the accident and also paid 
SC-2022-0860 
4 
 
for her continued medical care. Pursuant to the labor-supply agreement, 
Midsouth was an insured alternate employer under PeopleReady's 
workers' compensation insurance policy.  
On November 2, 2020, Mason commenced an action against 
Midsouth and Nivert in the trial court, asserting claims of negligence; 
wantonness; negligent hiring, training, and supervision; and negligence 
per se. Midsouth answered the complaint and raised numerous 
affirmative defenses, including immunity under § 25-5-52 and § 25-5-53 
of the Act ("the exclusive-remedy provisions"). Nivert filed a separate 
answer and raised, among other defenses, the exclusive-remedy 
provisions and asserted that Mason's claims did not meet the 
requirements of § 25-5-11 of the Act, which, generally, requires willful 
conduct to support a civil claim against a co-employee.  
 
Midsouth and Nivert jointly moved for a summary judgment, 
asserting that Mason had been a "special employee" of Midsouth's, that 
Mason had not alleged willful conduct on the part of Nivert, and that, 
therefore, the exclusive-remedy provisions and § 25-5-11 barred her 
claims against Midsouth and Nivert. Midsouth and Nivert supported 
their motion with, among other evidence, deposition testimony from 
SC-2022-0860 
5 
 
various employees of Midsouth and PeopleReady and other documents 
relating to Mason's employment relationship with Midsouth and 
PeopleReady, including a document that Mason had signed entitled 
"Employment Terms and Acknowledgements" ("the employment 
agreement"), which contained the following relevant provision: 
"16. I understand that my employer provides temporary 
associates for its customers to work at the customer's job site. 
While working at the customer's job site, I agree and consent 
that the customer is my special employer ('Special Employer') 
and that the customer directs, controls and supervises my 
work. Workers' Compensation shall be my sole remedy for on 
the job injuries. If I am ever injured in the course of my work 
I agree that I will elect, and solely rely upon [PeopleReady's] 
Workers' Compensation coverage for any recovery for such 
injuries, and waive any recovery whether civil or through 
workers' compensation, from any Special Employer. …" 
 
Midsouth also submitted evidence indicating that Mason's job duties 
while on Midsouth assignments were directed, controlled, and supervised 
exclusively by Midsouth employees. PeopleReady paid Mason for the 
hours she worked at Midsouth assignments based on the hours verified 
on the ticket filled out by a Midsouth supervisor. However, PeopleReady 
submitted an invoice to Midsouth, and Midsouth paid PeopleReady 
Mason's hourly rate of $14.35 plus a 51% additional charge. That 
SC-2022-0860 
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additional charge was used by PeopleReady to pay for, among other 
expenses, workers' compensation insurance. 
Mason filed a response in opposition to the summary-judgment 
motion in which she argued that genuine issues of material fact existed, 
thus precluding the entry of a summary judgment. Mason specifically 
asserted that she was an independent contractor, not a "special 
employee," of Midsouth. Mason supported her response with, among 
other evidence, the labor-supply agreement, which states, in relevant 
part: 
"7. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR 
 
"Supplier [i.e., PeopleReady] enters into this Agreement as an 
independent company. Supplier shall not in any way 
represent that it is an agent, employer, employee, partner, or 
legal representative of Customer [i.e., Midsouth] or any 
Customer Affiliate. As an independent contractor, Supplier is 
not authorized to make any contract, agreement, warranty, or 
representation on behalf of Customer or any of its Affiliates 
without Customer's express written prior approval. Supplier 
is 
solely 
responsible 
for 
the 
recruiting, 
screening, 
interviewing, selecting, testing, and hiring of all TAs 
[temporary associates]. TA [i.e., Mason] shall be considered 
solely an employee of Supplier and not employees or agents of 
Customer or any Customer Affiliate. Customer and its 
Affiliates will not treat TAs as Customer employees or 
Affiliate employees for purposes of worker's compensation 
insurance, federal or state income tax withholding, FICA 
withholding, or any other taxation purpose. ..." 
 
SC-2022-0860 
7 
 
 
Mason also submitted testimony indicating that she believed that 
she had been an employee of PeopleReady, that she had not intended to 
be a special employee of Midsouth, and that she believed that she had 
worked as an independent contractor for Midsouth. Mason also presented 
testimony indicating that she had intended to work for only PeopleReady 
because she had preferred having the ability to accept only the 
assignments she wanted and had not wanted to be constrained by 
another employer. 
 
On August 10, 2022, the trial court entered an order denying 
Midsouth and Nivert's summary-judgment motion. Midsouth and Nivert 
petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.  
Standard of Review 
"'The writ of mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary 
writ, to be "issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in 
the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon 
the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 
3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly 
invoked jurisdiction of the court." Ex parte United Serv. 
Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993); see also Ex 
parte Ziglar, 669 So. 2d 133, 134 (Ala. 1995).' Ex parte Carter, 
… 807 So. 2d 534[,] 536 [(Ala. 2001)]." 
 
Ex parte McWilliams, 812 So. 2d 318, 321 (Ala. 2001). The "denial of a 
summary-judgment motion based on a claim of immunity under the 
SC-2022-0860 
8 
 
exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act … is 
reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus." Ex parte Tenax Corp., 
228 So. 3d 387, 391 (Ala. 2017)(citing Ex parte Salvation Army, 72 So. 3d 
1224, 1228 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)). In conducting our de novo review of 
whether a summary judgment is due to be granted on the basis of the 
applicability of the immunity afforded by the exclusive-remedy 
provisions of the Act, this Court considers whether the defendant 
established a prima facie showing as to each element of the defense 
raising the exclusive-remedy provisions and, if so, whether the plaintiff 
presented substantial evidence to overcome the defendant's prima face 
showing. Gaut v. Medrano, 630 So. 2d 362, 364 (Ala. 1993). 
Discussion 
 
Midsouth and Nivert argue that they are entitled to a summary 
judgment because, they assert, Mason was a special employee of 
Midsouth's and, as a result, was barred from asserting claims against 
Midsouth and Nivert under the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act. 
They further assert that Mason did not allege willful conduct sufficient 
to bring a claim against Nivert under § 25-5-11 of the Act. Section 25-5-
52 provides, in part:  
SC-2022-0860 
9 
 
 
"Except as provided in [the Act], no employee of any 
employer subject to [the Act] ... shall have a right to any other 
method, form, or amount of compensation or damages for an 
injury or death occasioned by an accident or occupational 
disease proximately resulting from and while engaged in the 
actual performance of the duties of his or her employment and 
from 
a 
cause 
originating 
in 
such 
employment 
or 
determination thereof."  
 
Section 25-5-53 provides, in part:  
 
"The rights and remedies granted in [the Act] to an 
employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the 
employee, his or her personal representative, parent, 
dependent, or next of kin, at common law, by statute, or 
otherwise on account of injury, loss of services, or death. 
Except as provided in [the Act], no employer shall be held 
civilly liable for personal injury to or death of the employer's 
employee, for purposes of [the Act], whose injury or death is 
due to an accident or to an occupational disease while engaged 
in the service or business of the employer, the cause of which 
accident 
or 
occupational 
disease 
originates 
in 
the 
employment. In addition, immunity from civil liability for all 
causes of action except those based upon willful conduct shall 
also extend ... to an officer, director, agent, or employee of the 
same employer ...." 
 
In addition, § 25-5-11 allows an injured employee to bring a cause 
of action against, among other third parties, a co-employee whose conduct 
was willful and contributed to the employee's injury, but it does not affect 
the immunity afforded the designated persons in § 25-5-53. See Padgett 
v. Neptune Water Meter Co., 585 So. 2d 900 (Ala. 1991)). 
SC-2022-0860 
10 
 
The exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act also provide immunity 
to any employer characterized as a "special employer" of an injured 
employee that satisfies the following three-pronged test adopted in Terry 
v. Read Steel Products, 430 So. 2d 862 (Ala. 1983): 
"'"When a general employer lends an employee to a 
special employer, the special employer becomes liable for 
workmen's compensation [and thus immune from liability for 
tort actions brought by the employee] only if 
 
"'"(a) the employee has made a contract of 
hire, express or implied, with the special employer; 
 
"'"(b) the work being done is essentially that 
of the special employer; and 
 
"'"(c) the special employer has the right to 
control the details of the work. 
 
"'"When all three of the above conditions are satisfied 
in relation to both employers, both employers are liable for 
workmen's compensation."'" 
 
Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 364 (quoting Terry, 430 So. 2d at 865, quoting in turn 
1C A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 48 (1980)). 
 
There is no dispute regarding the second and third prongs 
identified in Terry; Mason was performing the work of Midsouth, and 
Midsouth controlled the details of her work. The issue is whether Mason 
expressly or impliedly consented to a contract of hire with Midsouth. 
SC-2022-0860 
11 
 
Mason argues, as she did in her response to Midsouth and Nivert's 
summary-judgment motion, that she did not expressly or impliedly 
consent to a contract of hire with Midsouth. Midsouth argues that Mason 
expressly consented to a contract of hire with Midsouth by signing the 
employment agreement with PeopleReady that specifically stated that 
Mason would be a special employee of PeopleReady's customers. The 
employment agreement between PeopleReady and Mason does not evince 
an express contract of hire between Midsouth and Mason; however, as 
discussed below, that agreement supports the contention that Mason 
impliedly consented to a contract of hire with Midsouth.    
In determining whether a worker impliedly consented to a contract 
of hire with a special employer, this Court has considered several factors, 
including: 1) "whether the general employer is, in reality, acting as a 
'labor broker' or a temporary employment agency for the special 
employer," G.UB.MK Constructors v. Garner, 44 So. 3d 479, 488 (Ala. 
2010); 2) "whether the special employer provided the workers' 
compensation insurance," id., and 3) "'"whether the employment with the 
borrowing employer was of such duration that the employee could be 
reasonably presumed to have evaluated and acquiesced in the risks of his 
SC-2022-0860 
12 
 
employment,"'" id. (quoting Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 367, quoting in turn 
Vanterpool v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 766 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1985)).  
Midsouth asserts that it presented evidence affirmatively 
supporting the foregoing factors and, therefore, demonstrated that 
Mason had impliedly consented to a contract of hire with Midsouth.  In 
particular, 
Midsouth 
presented 
evidence 
demonstrating 
that 
PeopleReady is a temporary-employment agency that provides 
temporary employees to Midsouth; that Midsouth paid PeopleReady an 
amount in excess of Mason's hourly rate to cover, among other expenses, 
premiums for workers' compensation insurance; and that Mason worked 
exclusively at Midsouth job sites, used Midsouth's equipment, and 
submitted to Midsouth's control.  
PeopleReady is indisputably a temporary-employment agency, and 
it supplies temporary employees to Midsouth. In cases in which a 
temporary-employment agency places an employee with a special 
employer, "'"the employee applies to the general employer for the specific 
purpose of temporary placement with special employers and thus 
necessarily agrees to a contract of hire with the special employer."'" Ex 
parte Tenax Corp., 228 So. 3d at 392 (quoting Garner, 44 So. 3d at 488, 
SC-2022-0860 
13 
 
quoting in turn Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 366). See also Hicks v. Alabama Power 
Co., 623 So. 2d 1050, 1054-55 (Ala. 1993)(discussing various cases 
involving employment agencies2 and recognizing that the employees in 
those cases did not contact the employment agencies "for the purpose of 
entering into employment with those companies to do the work of those 
companies; rather, the plaintiffs intended for the general employers to 
'market' them to secure employment with another, special employer" and 
that, "[o]nce those plaintiffs were presented by the employment services 
to the special employers, those plaintiffs then entered into a contract of 
hire with those special employers").  
Midsouth presented evidence demonstrating that PeopleReady 
served as a temporary-employment agency that supplied temporary 
workers to various customers, including flaggers for Midsouth, and that 
Mason applied for employment with PeopleReady for the purpose of 
working as a flagger. Accordingly, Midsouth demonstrated that 
PeopleReady acted as a temporary-employment agency for Midsouth. See 
 
2Terry v. Read Steel Prods., 430 So. 2d 862, 865 (Ala. 1983), Marlow 
v. Mid-South Tool Co., 535 So. 2d 120 (Ala. 1988), Bechtel v. Crown Cent. 
Petroleum Corp., 495 So. 2d 1052 (Ala. 1986), and Pettaway v. Mobile 
Point Mfg. Co., 467 So. 2d 228 (Ala. 1985). 
SC-2022-0860 
14 
 
Ex parte Tenax Corp., 228 So. 3d at 392 (quoting Garner, 44 So. 3d at 
488). 
 
The second consideration -- whether the special employer pays 
workers' compensation benefits, also weighs in favor of finding an implied 
contract of hire. Midsouth presented evidence demonstrating that 
PeopleReady physically paid Mason's wages but that, in return, 
Midsouth paid PeopleReady Mason's hourly wages, plus a 51% additional 
charge that was used by PeopleReady to pay for, among other expenses, 
workers' compensation insurance. Moreover, the labor-supply agreement 
required Midsouth to be an insured alternate employer under 
PeopleReady's workers' compensation insurance policy. As we have 
previously explained, whether a special employer participates in funding 
workers' 
compensation 
coverage 
is 
a 
"particularly 
significant" 
consideration, because permitting a civil action against an entity 
providing benefits under the Act would contravene the very purpose of 
the Act. Garner, 44 So. 3d at 489. See also Ex parte Tenax Corp., 228 So. 
3d at 394 (placing import on evidence indicating that the alleged special 
employer paid a portion of the employee's workers' compensation 
insurance premiums). Therefore, Midsouth presented evidence showing 
SC-2022-0860 
15 
 
that it funded, at least in part, workers' compensation insurance that was 
used to cover Mason. 
 
In addressing the third consideration -- whether the employee's 
employment with the alleged special employer "'was of such duration 
that the employee could be reasonably presumed to have evaluated and 
acquiesced in the risks of his employment,'" this Court has considered 
the frequency and exclusivity of the employee's work with the alleged 
special employer and the employee's understanding of the scope of the 
special employer's authority. Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 367 (noting that the 
employee had reported to the alleged special employer's workplace each 
workday, that he was aware that it was his ordinary workplace, and that 
he was aware that he was required to follow instructions of the special 
employer's supervisors). This Court distinguished cases in which an 
employee is briefly or randomly "lent to another employer," noting that, 
in those cases, the employee would have "little or no reason to actually 
consent to a contract of hire with the borrowing employer." Gaut, 630 So. 
2d at 367. This Court in Gaut also discussed Pettaway v. Mobile Paint 
Manufacturing Co., 467 So. 2d 228, 230 (Ala. 1985), and highlighted the 
decision of the employee in that case to accept the employment agency's 
SC-2022-0860 
16 
 
offer of a work assignment as indicative of an implied contract of hire. 
630 So. 2d at 366. Likewise, here, Midsouth presented evidence 
indicating that Mason had applied to PeopleReady to work as a flagger, 
that Mason had accepted only Midsouth job assignments during her 
employment with PeopleReady, and that Midsouth supervisors 
exclusively directed her job duties and verified her work hours. Moreover, 
as mentioned above, Mason signed an employment agreement with 
PeopleReady that specifically designated her as a "special employee" of 
the customer, i.e., Midsouth, and required her to acknowledge her 
understanding that Midsouth would direct, control, and supervise her 
work. Accordingly, Midsouth presented evidence demonstrating that 
Mason's employment with Midsouth "'was of such duration that [she] 
could be reasonably presumed to have evaluated and acquiesced in the 
risks of [her] employment.'" Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 367 (quoting Vanterpool, 
766 F. 2d at 122). 
Midsouth presented evidence demonstrating that PeopleReady 
acted as a temporary-employment agency for Midsouth, that Midsouth 
paid at least a portion of the premiums for workers' compensation 
insurance for PeopleReady's employees working for Midsouth, and that 
SC-2022-0860 
17 
 
Mason "'could be reasonably presumed to have evaluated and acquiesced 
in the risks of [her] employment'" from the duration of her employment 
with Midsouth. Id. As a result, Midsouth demonstrated that Mason 
impliedly consented to a contract of hire with Midsouth, and, as 
mentioned above, there is no dispute regarding the other two factors 
relevant to the determination of whether Midsouth was Mason's special 
employer -- Mason was performing the work of Midsouth, and Midsouth 
had the right to control the details of her work. See Terry, 430 So. 2d at 
865. Accordingly, Midsouth made a prima facie showing of Mason's status 
as a special employee of Midsouth and, thus, the applicability of the 
immunity afforded by the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act. As a 
result, the burden shifted to Mason to present substantial evidence 
demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
her employment status with Midsouth. Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 364.  
 
Mason asserts that a factual dispute exists as to whether there 
existed a mutual contract of hire with Midsouth and, ultimately, whether 
she was a special employee of Midsouth's. First, Mason asserts that 
Midsouth was precluded from entering into a contract of hire with her 
because of the provision in the labor-supply agreement that states that 
SC-2022-0860 
18 
 
temporary associates placed with Midsouth "shall be considered solely an 
employee of [PeopleReady] and not employees or agents of [Midsouth]." 
Mason argues that that "agreement constitutes strong and compelling 
evidence" that Midsouth was not Mason's employer in any capacity and 
that it foreclosed the possibility of Midsouth's offering a contract of hire 
to Mason. Mason relies on Hicks v. Alabama Power Co., in which this 
Court considered a similar provision in a contract between a general 
employer and an alleged special employer prohibiting an employee of the 
general employer from being considered an employee of the special 
employer. 623 So. 2d at 1054-55 (Ala. 1993). Hicks is distinguishable from 
the present case because, in Hicks, the general employer was not an 
employment agency; the employee was placed by a union for employment 
with the general employer, who provided contracting services to another 
company. Additionally, as mentioned above, the Court in Hicks noted the 
distinction between the factual scenario in that case and previous cases 
involving temporary-employment agencies. Moreover, this Court more 
recently considered an argument regarding a similar provision in a 
contract between a maintenance contractor (the general employer) and a 
utility company (the special employer) in Garner. The employee in that 
SC-2022-0860 
19 
 
case argued that he was not a special employee, and he relied on a 
provision in a contract between the companies stating that the 
maintenance contractor's employees that provided services to the utility 
company would continue to be considered the maintenance contractor's 
employees. Garner, 44 So. 3d at 490. This Court noted that the employee 
"was not a party to the contract and there was no evidence indicating that 
he ever saw it or was aware of th[at] provision." Id. This Court explained 
that, although "'"employers certainly may contract as between 
themselves to define their business relationships and accomplish their 
business objectives, an agreement between the employers may not be 
determinative of the issue of special employment."'" Garner, 44 So. 3d at 
490 (quoting Hamberg v. Sandia Corp., 142 N.M. 72, 82, 162 P.3d 909, 
919 (Ct. App. 2007), quoting in turn Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace 
Corp., 78 N.Y.2d 553, 559-60, 585 N.E.2d 355, 358-59, 578 N.Y.S.2d 106, 
109 (1991)). The situation in Garner is much more analogous to the 
present case than is the situation in Hicks.  
Mason also argues that Midsouth did not provide workers' 
compensation benefits, which, she asserts, presents a factual dispute as 
to the existence of an implied contract of hire. Mason relies on the 
SC-2022-0860 
20 
 
remainder of the provision in the labor-supply agreement considering 
temporary associates to be solely employees of PeopleReady that states 
that Midsouth would not treat the temporary associates as its own 
"employees for purposes of worker's compensation insurance, federal or 
state income tax withholding, FICA withholding, or any other taxation 
purpose." Regardless of the terms of the labor-supply agreement, the 
evidence presented indicated that Midsouth paid an amount in excess of 
the temporary associates' hourly wages for the purpose of covering 
additional expenses, including workers' compensation insurance, and 
Midsouth was required to be an insured alternate employer under 
PeopleReady's workers' compensation insurance policy. Accordingly, the 
labor-supply agreement between PeopleReady and Midsouth is not 
substantial evidence demonstrating that Mason did not impliedly 
consent to a contract of hire with Midsouth.  
Mason also points to evidence that she presented indicating that, 
despite signing the employment agreement with PeopleReady addressing 
her status as a special employee with PeopleReady's customers, she was 
not aware that she would be considered a special employee, she did not 
know what a special employer was and no one explained that term to her, 
SC-2022-0860 
21 
 
and she did not realize that she was waiving her right to assert civil 
claims for injuries against PeopleReady's customers. However, this Court 
has explained that "when a competent adult, having the ability to read 
and understand an instrument, signs a contract, he will be held to be on 
notice of all the provisions contained in that contract and will be bound 
thereby." Power Equip. Co. v. First Alabama Bank, 585 So. 2d 1291, 1296 
(Ala. 1991) (citing Massey v. Ingram, 567 So. 2d 1272 (Ala. 1990), and 
Norman v. Amoco Oil Co., 558 So. 2d 903 (Ala. 1990)). Therefore, Mason's 
ignorance of the terms of her employment agreement with PeopleReady 
does not serve as substantial evidence that she did not have an implied 
contract of hire with Midsouth or that she was not a special employee of 
Midsouth's. 
Mason further points to her testimony that she intended to be an 
employee of only PeopleReady and that she never intended to be 
employed by Midsouth. Mason contends that she sought employment 
with PeopleReady because she wanted the flexibility of accepting or 
rejecting jobs based on her preferred schedule. It is undisputed, however, 
that Mason applied to PeopleReady for the purpose of working as a 
flagger. PeopleReady does not have employees who perform flagging 
SC-2022-0860 
22 
 
duties for it; instead, PeopleReady supplies employees to perform 
flagging duties for other companies, particularly Midsouth. See, e.g., 
Hicks, 623 So. 2d at 1054-55 (recognizing that the employees in Terry; 
Marlow v. Mid-South Tool Co., 535 So. 2d 120 (Ala. 1988); Bechtel v. 
Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 495 So. 2d 1052 (Ala. 1986); and 
Pettaway did not seek employment with the temporary-employment 
agencies to perform the work of those agencies but, instead, for the 
purpose of performing the special employers' work). Evidence of Mason's 
intent with respect to her employment is an important consideration. See 
Garner, 44 So. 3d at 488 (stating that "the focus is on what the employee 
intended in providing services for the alleged special employer"). 
However, the evidence Mason presented regarding her intent is not 
substantial evidence sufficient to overcome the evidence demonstrating 
that she was a special employee of Midsouth's. 
 
Perhaps the most instructive case is Pettaway, the facts of which 
are largely indistinguishable from Mason's factual scenario. In that case, 
Pettaway was employed by Manpower, a temporary-employment agency. 
After three months' employment with Manpower, during which he had 
accepted temporary job assignments with various Manpower customers, 
SC-2022-0860 
23 
 
Pettaway accepted an assignment with Mobile Paint Manufacturing 
Company. Pettaway stopped by Manpower's office before and after his 
shifts at Mobile Paint's job site to obtain and return a timesheet. While 
working for Mobile Paint, Pettaway was supervised and directed by 
Mobile Paint employees. Pettaway received paychecks from Manpower, 
but Mobile Paint paid to Manpower Pettaway's wages and an additional 
charge that covered, among other expenses, premiums for workers' 
compensation 
insurance. 
After 
working 
for 
Mobile 
Paint 
for 
approximately three weeks, Pettaway was injured, and he commenced an 
action against Mobile Paint. The trial court in that case entered a 
summary judgment in favor of Mobile Paint, finding that it was 
Pettaway's special employer and, thus, that his claims were barred by 
the Act. Pettaway appealed, and this Court affirmed the summary 
judgment, determining that, under the facts, Mobile Paint was 
Pettaway's special employer.  467 So. 2d at 228-30. Likewise, here, Mason 
accepted job assignments with Midsouth, retrieved a timesheet from 
PeopleReady before each job, had it filled out by a Midsouth supervisor, 
and returned it to PeopleReady at the end of each shift; Mason's pay and 
workers' compensation insurance from PeopleReady was subsidized by 
SC-2022-0860 
24 
 
Midsouth; and Mason's specific job duties were assigned and controlled 
by Midsouth.  
Applying this Court's precedent to the evidence presented, 
Midsouth demonstrated that Mason was a special employee of 
Midsouth's, and Mason failed to present substantial evidence to refute 
that she was a special employee of Midsouth's. In addition, Mason did not 
present any evidence or argument indicating that Nivert acted willfully 
in causing her injuries so as to permit a claim against him under § 25-5-
11. Therefore, the immunity afforded in the exclusive-remedy provisions 
of the Act bars Mason's claims against Midsouth and Nivert. Accordingly, 
Midsouth and Nivert have demonstrated a clear legal right to a summary 
judgment in their favor.  
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED. 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, Mitchell, and 
Cook, JJ., concur. 
Sellers, J., concurs in the result.