Title: State v. Shannon. Dissenting Opinion by J. Nakayama [pdf]. ICA Opinion, filed 09/28/2007 [pdf], 116 Haw. 38. Dissenting Opinion by J. Nakamura [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 02/22/2008 [pdf], 117 Haw. 234.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

‘LAW LIBRARY.

 

-FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*

 

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

=--000~;

 

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee

ERIC K. SHANNON, Respondent/Defendant~Appellant

 

no. 27919

CERTIORARI 70 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APP!
(HPD CRIMINAL NO. 04447936)

May 29, 2008

a3

MOON, C.J.) LEVINSON, ACOBA, AND DUFFY,
‘AND NAKAYAMA, J., DISSENTING

QUOI 62 AVH 002

 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.
Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai'i
(Petitioner) seeks review of the October 17, 2007 Judgment of the

Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA),' entered pursuant to its

 

+ pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 602-58 (Supp. 2007),
‘a party may appeal the decision of the ICA. Seg HRS § 602-59(a). In
determining whether to accept or reject the appiication for writ of
Gertiorars, thie court reviews the ICR decision for:

(2) Grave errors of law or of facts or
(2) Obvious inconsistencies in the decision of the (ICA

with that of the supreme court, federal decisions, oF
its own decision,

land the magnitude of auch errors oF inconsistencies
Gictating the need for further eppeal

RS § 602~!

dsscr

 

(b). The grant or denial of a petition for certiorari is
jonery with this court. gee HRS § €02-59(a)

 
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published opinion? filed on September 28, 2007, gee State
Shannon, 116 Hawai'i 38, 69 P.34 990 (App. 2007), vacating the
April 6, 2006 Judgment of the District Court of the First
Circuit, Kaneohe Division (the court)? revoking the Deferre
Acceptance of Guilty Plea (DAGP) granted to Respondent /Defendant~
Appellant Eric K. Shannon (Respondent) and convicting him of
criminal trespass in the second degree, in violation of HRS
§ 706-814 (a) (1) (1993).

We hold that (1) under HRS § 653-1 (1993 & Supp.
2007),* referring to @ DAGP, and incorporating HRS § 706-624
(2993 & Supp. 2007), pertaining to probation, the defendant must
be given a written copy of the conditions imposed pursuant to his
or her DAGP, (2) an “actual notice” rule such as that applied by
federal courts cannot be validly substituted for the written
notice required by our statutes, (3) Respondent was not given 2
written copy of his conditions, and, therefore, under State v

Lee, 10 Haw. App. 192, 862 P.2d 295 (1993), his DAGP could not be

 

+ The opinion of the ICA was authored by Fi
foley, whe was Joined by Associate Judge Alexa D-H
Ceaig'#, Nakamura f1led a dissenting opinion.

fhe majority opinion and the “ich dissent” reters to" Jud
dissenting opinion.

ding Judge Daniel R.
Associate Jud:
ine TCA

Nakamura’ =

 
  

 

       

>The Honorable 7. David Woo, Jr. presided.

‘ks § 706-6142) (2) provides in pertinent part that [a] person

commits the offense of criminal trespass in the second degree if. . © (e]he

person knowingly enters or remains onlawfully in or upon prenisss ‘that are
jgned to exclude intruders or are’ fencea{.]"

 

 

   

gee inten note 18
+ fee inten notes 19 & 20.

 
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revoked by the court, (4) further, consistent with the written
conditions requirenent and HRS § 853-3 (1993) as it is construed
with HRS § 706-627(1) (1993), a motion to revoke a DAGP for
failure to comply with its conditions must be in writing,
(5) Petitioner did not file @ written motion to revoke
Respondent’s DAGP, therefore, (a) Respondents’s period of
deferral was not tolled, and (b) the deferral period expired
before the court ruled on the motion to revoke. Accordingly,
Respondent's DAGP could not be revoked and Petitioner's motion to
revoke must be dismissed with prejudice. Ultimately, then, the
JCA did not gravely err in vacating the court’s judgment. see
‘Shannon, 116 Hawai'i at 39, 69 P.3d at 991.

I.

The following matters adduced are from the record and
the submissions of the parties. On February 11, 2005, Petitioner
charged Respondent with criminal trespass in the second degree
‘via amended complaint,” according to Petitioner. Respondent
entered a guilty plea and orally moved for DAGP. The court
granted Respondent’s motion for DAG and deferred Respondent’ s
plea for one year, provided that Respondent “[(1)] remain arrest

and conviction free for that period, [(2)] . . . complete forty

 

 

It appears that Lf there were a written complaint, it was not made
fa part of the record on appeal. However, the calendar from the court
fndicstes that on February 11, 2005, Petitioner wes “orally charged.”
(Capitalization altered.)

 

 
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hours of community service, and [(3)] . . . pay a ‘CICF’{"] fee
of twenty-five dollars.” Respondent’s Proof of Compliance
hearing was set for January 27, 2006.

At the January 27, 2006 proof of compliance hearing,
Petitioner orally moved to have Respondent’s DAGP revoked, and
the court continued the hearing to March 26, 2006. On March 24,
2006, the court again continued the hearing, until April 6, 2006.

At the April 6, 2006 hearing, Respondent made several
notions related to the DAGP. First, Respondent moved to have his
forty hours of community service converted to a fine.? The court
denied the motion. Next, Respondent requested another
continuance “so that he could obtain a transcript of [his)
change-of-plea hearing” because defense counsel believed there
might be grounds to vacate his plea. ‘The court denied that
motion without prejudice, noting that “it[ has] taken over a year
for that motion to [be] file(d,)” and its “general practice” of
allowing the withdrawal of DAGPs only “relucant (1y).””

Having disposed of Respondent’s motions, the court
considered Petitioner's motion to revoke Respondent's DAGP.

Petitioner introduced a probation report indicating that

 

‘CICE” is not defined by the parties or by the record.

* Respondent attended a “screening/placenent interview” related to
his comunity service requirement, but failed to report to his assigned
location, AB of Decenber 3, 2005, the Adult/dJuveniie Community Service and
Restitution Unit reported 20 the Court that Respondent's conmunity service
Obligation renaines outstanding.

 

 
 

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Respondent had been arrested on August 12, 2005. Respondent
objected to the introduction of the probation report on the
grounds that it was inadmissible hearsay and because it violated
Respondent's right to “confront{} . . . whatever evidence is
going to be adduced against him... .” Ultimately, the court
took judicial notice that Respondent had been arrested subsequent
to entering his DAGP.

he to revocation of the ORGP, Respondent

argued that (the court] lacked jurisdiction to set aside the
DAG(P] because the deferral period had already expired. In

other words, the prosecuter’s oral notion to set aside the’

Because (fet tionerl did-net file's notion a2 re:
sSreuant to [HRS Eze [eic, eresueably BRS $ 70e~

 

(Emphasis added.) Alternatively, relying on Lea, Respondent
argued that his DAGP could not be revoked for failure to comply
with conditions because Petitioner had not “show(n) proof that

[Respondent] had received written notification” of those

According to Petitioner, Respondent faced “two charges of
Tenporary Restraining Order{ and} a charge of Theft in the Fourth Degree.”

= HRS § 706-627(1) provides that

dylnon the {iling of emotion to revoke a probation...
the period of probation shell be tolled ponding the hearing
upon’ the motion and the decision of the court.” The period

Fa fh and Incioding the filing dateof thew
‘decision of the colrt concerning the notion for purposes of
Computation of the Feusining period of probation, if any.

he even x

SOUL, During the period of tolling of the probation, the
Sefendant shall rensin subject to sil terme ana consitions
Of the probation except a8 otherwise provided by this
chapter’

1s added.)

 

 
 

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conditions. Finally, Respondent argued that the condition that
he renain “arrest and conviction free” during the deferral period
was improper because “(t]here is no condition . . . under [HRS §]
706-624 that permits any type of prohibition to be arrest free.”
Ultimately, the court revoked Respondent’ s DAGP,

Lb]ased on the report from the probation office, based on
the (clourt’s judicial notice that certain charges have been
Filed against (Respondent], +. . and the [eloure's finding
that of the [forty] hours Of comunity service that
(Respondent) was orde:

  

Thus, the court accepted Respondent's guilty plea, adjudged him
guilty and imposed fines totaling $225.
m

on appeal to the ICA, Respondent alleged that “(the
court] committed reversible error” (1) in finding “that the
period of deferral had been tolled by [Petitioner's] oral motion
on January 27, 2006, to set aside (Respondent's) DAGIP]," (2) in
“reviewing @ hearsay probation report without making a finding
that the probation officer was unavailable to testify in
violation of the due process and the confrontation clausest,]”
(3) in “set[ting] aside the DRG(P] without any evidence that

[Respondent] had signed in writing the conditions of the

 

deferral{,]” (4) because the court “lacked statutory authority to
impose a DAG(P] condition that (Respondent) remain arrest

free[,]” (5) in “refus{ing] to convert (Respondent’s] community

 

service to a fine(,]” and (6) in “den(ying Respondent's] motion

to continue the matter to permit him to obtain a transcript of

 
 

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the change-of-plea hearing in order to determine whether grounds
exist, in addition to a native tenant rights defense, to vacate”
the DAGP.
nr

‘The ICA found Respondent’s third issue on appeal to be
dispositive and held that the court “erred in setting aside
[Respondent's] DAG[P] because (Respondent] did not receive
written copy of the conditions of his DAG(®]." Shannon, 116
Hawas's at 39, 169 P.3d at 991 (boldfaced font omitted). The ICA
stated that HRS § €53-1(b) (Supp. 2007)* “incorporates and
permits courts accepting DAG{Ps) to impose any conditions

enumerated in HRS § 706-624." Id. at 40, 169 P.3d at 992 (citing

 

State v. Kaufman, 92 Hawai'i 322, 329, 991 P.2d 832, 839 (2000);
tate v. Dannenberg, 74 Haw. 75, 82, 837 P.2d 776, 779 (1992).

The ICA rejected Petitioner’s argunent that
Respondent's “receipt of actual, oral notice [of the conditions
of his DAGP] at the February 11, 2005 hearing was sufficient.”
Id. The ICA reasoned that Petitioner’s position was incorrect
under Leg. It explained that the legislative intent underlying
HRS § 706-624 precluded reliance on actual notice in lieu of
written notice of conditions. It declared tht

[t]he intent of HRS § 706-624 is to provide the defendant
with notice of what is expected of him ins form which will
not escape Ais memory.

 

RS § €53-1(b) provides in pertinent part that “[t]he proceedings
ay be deferred upon any of the conditions specified by section 706-624."

 
 

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The requirement of HRS § 706-626(3) that a defendant
be proviged with a written statement of the conditions ef
his probation also provises assursnce that a defendant will
know the exact terms and conditions of his probation before
is probation can be revoked for failure to comply with the
ferns and conditions.

 

 

Ida (quoting Lag, 10 Haw. App. at 198, 862 P.2d at 298) (ellipsis
points in original). Although the ICA acknowledged that the
court's calendar indicated that on February 11, 2005, the court
orally advised Respondent of the conditions of his DAGP, it was
observed that “there is no evidence in the record that
[Respondent] received a written copy of his conditions.
{Respondent} contends that he did not receive a written copy, and
[Petitioner] does not contend otherwise." Id. Accordingly, the
ICA vacated the court’s April 6, 2006 decision to revoke
Respondent's DAGP and “remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.” Id.
Ww.

In its application for certiorari, Petitioner presents
2 single question, “whether the ICA gravely erred in vacating the
trial court’s decision to set aside [Respondent's] DAGI®),
notwithstanding his actual notice of the terms and conditions
thereof.”

v.

‘The revocation of @ DAGP is reviewed for an abuse of
Giscretion. See Kaufman, 92 Hawai'i at 326-27, 991 P.2d at 836
37 (stating that, like “[t]he grant or denial of a DAG(P),” the

“setting aside, or revoking a DAG(P] is properly within the

 
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discretion of the trial court. Generally, to constitute an

abuse, it must appear that the court cli

 

ely exceeded the bounds
of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice
to the substantial detriment of the party litigant.) Similarly,
sentencing decisions are also reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard. See State v. Davia, 87 Hawai'i 249, 253,
953 P.2d 1347, 1361-52 (1998) (“the authority of @ trial court to
select and determine the severity of a penalty is normally
undisturbed on review in the absence of an apparent abuse of
discretion or unless applicable statutory or constitutional
conmands have not been observed.”)

vr.

Petitioner points to the ICA's reliance on the policy
concerns expressed in Lee, namely, that written notification of
conditions ensures that probationers are aware of the conditions
with which they must comply. In that connection, Petitioner
argues that “Respondent did not contend that he was unaware of
the terms and conditions of his DAG[2]." Petitioner reiterates
the ICA diseent’s argument that “[iJn United State's isicl vw
Arbizu, 431 F.3d 469 (Sth Cir. 2005), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that every other circuit
court to address this issue had held that the government's
failure to provide the notice required by the [18 U.S.C.

§§ 3583 (£) and 3603(1)] does not Limit the (trial) court's

authority to revoke supervised release where the defendant had

 
 

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actual notice of the release terms.” (Citing Shannon, 116
Hawas's at 41-42, 169 P.3d at 993-94 (Nakamura, J., dissenting) .)
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) (Third brackets in
original.)

Petitioner further argues that the court’s calendar
“reflects that Respondent was apprised of the terms of his
deferral” and that Respondent's knowledge of those terms was
proven by the facts that (1) Respondent paid the CICF fine on
March 14, 2005, and (2) Respondent twice requested to have his
community service requirement converted to a fine. Based on
that, Petitioner argues that “Respondent . . . was avare of the
terms and conditions of his deferral, and just as evidently
cognizant that he had failed to fulfill them.”

vin.

The legislature adopted HRS chapter 853, entitled

“criminal Procedure: Deferred Acceptance of Guilty Plea, Nolo

Contendere Plea,” because it determined that certain offenders

 

petitioner notes that other federal cases espoused similar rules.
(citing United States vy, Ortega-Brita, 311 F.ad 1136, 1138 (9th Cir~ 2002)
(agreeing with the First_and eighth Circuits that “a failure to provide
written notice of . . . conditions (of supervised release] will not
automatically invalidate the revocation of [defendent’s] release based upon
violation of such conditions"): United states v, Felix, 994 F.2d 550, S51 (eth
Giz, "1992) {holding that "the failure to order OF to provide a weiteen
statement” of consitions of supervised release be furnished to the defendant
doesnot “automatically result{] in the insbility of a sentencing court te
revoke supervised relesse based ona violation of one of the conditions”
(citations omitted); of, United Skates x. TapiacMarauea, 361 F.3d 535, 538
(Sth cir. 2000) (explaining that the rule in OreeasrBrite "would have
Conpelled affirmance of the judgment [revoking defendant’s supervised release)
{f'[hia} release from custody had not rendered his appeal mos"). Although
Petitioner acknowledges that this court is free to give greater constitutional
protection under the Havai's Conatieution than what 12 afforded under the
Federal constitution, it argues that in this case, “logic and sound regard for
such protection is not warranted. = ss

 

 

 

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should be provided the opportunity to be conviction free
consistent with the government's penal goals. The legislature

explained that

“in certain criminal cases, particularly those involving
ficet time, accidental, or situational offenders, it is in
the best interest of the [prosecution] and the defendant
that the defendant be given the opportunity to Keep bis (or
her] record free of s criminal conviction, if he (or shel

Con comply with certain tems and conditions during a period
designated by court order.

   

  

 

 

State v, Putnam, 93 Hawai'i 362, 367-68, 3 P.3d 1239, 1244-45
(2000) (quoting 1976 Haw. Sess. L. Act 154, § 2 at 279) (emphasis
omitted) (brackets in original). Thus, in appropriate cases, the
court may suspend the proceedings for a set period of tine
provided that the defendant complies with certain conditions
imposed by the court. See HRS § 853-1(c) (1993) (“Upon the
defendant’s completion of the period designated by the court and
in compliance with the terms and conditions established, the
court shall discharge the defendant and dismiss the charge
against the defendant.”) Such conditions are imported from HRS
§ 106-624 relating to conditions of probation. In that regard,
the DAGP statute provides, in pertinent part, that
nay be det sadivions

‘iscified by section 706-62...” The court may defer the

Proceedings for tuch period of time as the court shall

Sizect but in no case to exceed the maximum

‘Silowabie; provided that, if the defendant has entered 9

ples of guilty or nolo contendere to a petty misdenesncr,

Mich case the court may defer the proceedings for a period
not to exceed one year...

 

 

 

 

HRS § 853-1(b) (emphasis added). HRS § 853-1(c)-(e) (1993)
further state that once the period of “probation” has terminated,

Af the defendant has complied with the terms and conditions, the

=n
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charges shall be dismissed without an adjudication of guilt or
conviction and the defendant may thereafter apply to have his o

Kealaski, 95 Hawai'i 309,

 

her record expunged. See also State
312, 22 P.3d $88, $91 (2001) (noting that “there is no conviction
when the acceptance of . . . a plea is deferred” (internal
quotation marks and other citation omitted))); Putnam, 93 Hawas's
at 368, 3 P.3d at 1245 (noting that “[tJhe effect of 2 (ORGP) was
. « « to enable a defendant to retain a record free of @ criminal
conviction by deferring a guilty plea for a designated period and
imposing special conditions which the defendant was to
successfully complete” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).

To the extent that a defendant who has entered a OAGP
remains at liberty, subject to certain conditions on his or her
behavior, the deferral period is similar to probation. the
commentary on HRS § 706-624(3), relating to written conditions of
probation, explains that “[p]robation attempts to correct the
defendant without interrupting the defendant’ s contact with open
society.” As with probation, DAGPs are afforded to those
defendants who meet certain criteria. See HRS § 853-1 (providing
that a defendant may be granted a DAGP when (1) the “defendant
voluntarily pleads guilty or nolo contendere,” (2) the court

believes it is unlikely that the defendant will

 

ngage in a
criminal course of conduct” in the future, and (3) the interests

of “Justice and the welfare of society do not require that the

12+
 

s++7OR PUBLICATION IN WEST! HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS!

defendant shall presently suffer the penalty imposed by law").
‘The circunstances mitigating in favor of a OAGP are similar to
the considerations evaluated by @ court when determining whether
probation is appropriate. See HRS § 706-621 (Listing ten
specific factors to be weighed by the court in deciding whether
probation should be granted).

conversely, if the defendant does not successfully
complete his or her deferral period in compliance with the terms
and conditions imposed by the court, “the court may enter an
adjudication of guilt and proceed as otherwise provided.” HRS
§ 853-3; see also Kaufman, 92 Hawai'i at 330, 991 P.2d at 640
(holding that “the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
setting aside [defendant's] DAG[P], accepting his guilty plea,
and convicting and sentencing him accordingly” where the
defendant was convicted of other crimes during his deferral
period in violation of the conditions of his DAGP). Similarly, a
court is required to “revoke probation if the defendant has
inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial requirement
imposed as @ condition . . . or has been convicted of a felony.”

HRS § 706-625(3) (Supp. 2007).

“Accordingly, the DAGP statutory scheme does not list. independent
conditions with which the defendant must comply. HRS § 853-4 (1993 4 Supp.
S007), entitled “Chapter not spplicable; when(,j" lists circunstances related
fo the nature of the offense, the attributes or history of the defendant, and
the nature of the victia, none of which fe applicable to the instant case
Such considerations are akin to factors relating to consideration for
probation Listed in HRS § 706-621 (1993)

 

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vint.
This court hae previously acknowledged the substantial
similarity between the DAGP and probation statutes. See Kaufman,
92 Hawai'i at 328, 991 P.2d at 638 (holding that “it is clear
that the DAGIP) deferral period is closely analogous to a
‘probationary period’” (emphasis added)). In Kaufman, the

sentencing court set aside the defendant’s DAGP, accepted his

 

guilty plea, and sentenced him accordingly. Id. at 325-26, 991
P.2d at 838-36. Kaufman appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the
court “lacked jurisdiction to set aside [his] DAG[P) after the
deferral period had expired{.]" Id. at 323, 991 P.2d at 833.
‘The ICA affirmed, and this court accepted certiorari in order to
“clarify that @ motion to set aside a DAG[P] tolls the period of
deferral pending the decision of the court on the motion.” Id.
In reaching that conclusion, this court conceded that
“[t}he legislature has not enacted @ tolling provision
specifically applicable to DAG[P] deferral periods.” Id, at 328,
991 P.2d at 838. Nevertheless, based on the express language of
the statute and the legislative intent, this court concluded that
the deferral period of a DAGP is “closely analogous” to a period
of probation. Id, This court related that the statute
“ideferred [proceedings] upon any of the conditions specified in
section 706-624,’ entitled ‘Conditions of Probation./” id.
(quoting HRS § 853-1 (1976 & Supp. 1984)). This court also

considered the legislative history of HRS chapter 853, which

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eee

 

referred to the deferral period as a “probationary period.” 1d.
{announcing that “{t]his sentencing alternative [ (referring to
deferred pleas)) is employed in those cases where the interests
of both the public and the defendant are best subserved by
discharging the defendant without @ judgment of conviction, after
the defendant has successfully completed a probationary period”
(quoting Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 616-76, in 1976 Senate
Journel, at 1182) (brackets and emphasis in original).

Based on the foregoing, it was decided that the
deferral period of @ DAGP and a probationary period were “closely
analogous.” Id, Because of the close relationship between the
two statutes, it was deemed appropriate to apply the tolling
provision contained in the probation statute to Kaufman's DAGP.
See ids at 329, 991 P.2d at 639 (“Although HRS § 706-627 does not
specifically address deferral periods under a DAG{P), the public
policy concerns and legislative intent underlying the tolling of
probation are equally applicable to the tolling of a deferral
period pursuant to (a) DAGIP].")

1.

Consistent with the foregoing and as earlier noted, HRS
§ 853-1(b) provides in relevant part that [t]he proceedings may
be deferred upon any of the conditions specified by section
706-624." Relatedly, this court has observed that “by its
express terms, the provisions of HRS $ 706-624 are exported and

incorporated by reference into HRS § 853-1." Kaufman, 92 Hawai'i

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at 328, 991 P.2d at 839 (emphasis added). In turn, HRS § 706-624
Lists conditions that can be imposed during a defendant's
probation."* In conjunction with the conditions, HRS § 706-
624(3) (1993), entitled “Written statement of conditions|, 1"
mandates that “{tlh all be given a wi
any cequirenents imposed pursuent to this section, stated with
sufficient specificity to enable the defendant to avide the
ge: -" (Emphases added.)

In addition to guiding behavior, the Conmentary on HRS
§ 706-624 explains that the purpose of notice in writing “is to
provide the defendant with notice of what is expected of the
éefendant ina form which will not escape the defendant's
memory.” (Emphasis added.) The rationale for affording
probationers a written copy of the conditions imposed during

their probationary period is equally applicable to defendants

Pertinent to this case are the following provisions in HRS § 706

eat

(2) Mandatory Conditions.

an explicit condition of # sentence of probstion
ta)
‘ate crime during the tere of probation:
{2i Discretionary conditions.
ae further conditions of # sentence of probation: thet
the defendant

iwi”

 

 

 

few ‘described in section TOE
S05 tiT Te

id)” Baya tine imposed pursuant to section 706-
Sosy ie)

added.)

 

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Sa

 

granted DAGPS during the “closely analogous” “deferral period.”
Kaufman, 92 Hawai'i at 32, 991 P.2d at 838. Therefore, in much
the same way, @ defendant who must comply with conditions
pursuant to a DAGP that are derived from the probation statute
logically must be given notice of those same conditions “in a
form which will not escape {his or her] memory.” Commentary on
RS § 706-624. Inasmuch as defendants sentenced to probation and
those granted @ DAGP are similarly expected to comply with
certain conditions to demonstrate that they can be “correct [ed)
|. . without interrupting [theiz] contact with open society(,]"
Adu, it is equally necessary to provide both categories of
defendants with written notice of those conditions.

Furthermore, the incorporation of HRS § 706-624(3) is
compatible with the underlying purposes of HRS chapter 853.
DAGPs are utilized where, under the particular circumstances, “a
record free of a felony conviction, which would foreclose certain
educational, professional, and job opportunities my . . . be
more conducive to offender rehabilitation and crime prevention

State

 

than the deterrent effects of a conviction and sentence.

vs Naone, 92 Hawai's 269, 306, 990 P.2d 1171, 1188 (App. 1999)

(quoting 1976 Haw. Sess. L. Act 184, § 1 at 279); see also State
Martin, 56 Haw. 292, 293, 536 P.2d 127, 128 (1975) (noting

that the district court counseling service “reconnended that,

on (defendant's) lack of eri cord, or any
academic or disciplinary problems, gainful employment, and good

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character and reputation, the motion for DAG[P] . . . was worthy
of consideration” (emphases added)). The conditions imposed
pursuant to a DAGP, like those for probation, are intended to aid
“the rehabilitation of the defendant.” Commentary on HRS § 706-
624.

Given the importance of abiding by the conditions in
the DAGP scheme, it is manifest that defendants whose DAGPs are
accepted should be explicitly apprised of the conditions of their
pleas in writing. Accordingly, in connection with the conditions
from HRS § 706-624 that are incorporated by reference in HRS
§ 853-1, the “provision” in HRS § 706-624(3) that requires a
defendant who is granted probation to be given a written copy of
the conditions, must necessarily apply to the defendant granted a
DAGP, who must adhere to such similar conditions.

x

Based on the foregoing, the ICA correctly applied Lee.
In Lee, the ICA reversed the circuit court’s decision to revoke
Lee's probation for violation of a condition on the ground that
he was never given a written copy of the conditions of his
probation. 10 Haw. App. at 192, 862 P.2d at 295-96. Looking to
the Commentary on, and legislative history of, HRS § 706-624(3),
as observed before, Lee explained that the “intent [of HRS § 706-
624(3)] is to provide the defendant with notice of what is
expected of him in a form which will not escape his memory.” Id.

at 198, 862 P.2d 298 (quoting Conmentary on HRS § 706-624 (1985)

18+
 

se4poR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER!
eee

(internal quotation marks omitted). The ICA added that this
requirement “also provides assurance that a defendant will know
the exact terms and conditions of his probation before his
probation can be revoked for failure to comply with the terms and
conditions.” Id.

Because HRS § 706-624 is incorporated by reference into
HRS § 853-1, Lee's reasoning is comparable here, The Hawai'i
Legislature recognized that 2 DAGP is a “substantial benefit”
conferred upon a defendant. Dissent at 7 (quoting Sen. Stand.
Comm. Rep. No. 2481, in 2000 Senate Journal, at 1026). However,
this does not undermine the fact that the defendant is still
subject to 2 “probationary” period and, therefore, only confirms
the necessity of written conditions.

xr.

As opposed to Lee, the federal cases relied upon by the
dissent and the ICA dissent adopt an “actual notice” rule. See
dissent at 15 (stating that “federal case law interpreting
similar federal statutes uniformly hold[s] that evidence of
actual notice is sufficient to satisfy the federal statute's
written notice requirement” (capitalization and boldfaced font
omitted))? see also Shannon, 116 Hawai'i at 41, 169 P.3d at 993
(takanura, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of the rule adopted
in Arbizu, 431 F.3d at 470, that “the government's failure to
provide the notice required by the statutes does not limit the

[trial] court's authority to revoke supervised release where the

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defendant had actual notice of the release terms” (internal

quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original)). The dissent
finds persuasive the reasoning of the federal courts that have
adopted an “actual notice” rule pursuant to 18 U.S.C. $$ 3583(£)
and 3603(1). See dissent at 15-18.

Those courts acknowledge that it would contravene the
purpose of the statute to revoke a defendant's probation for
violation of @ condition of which the defendant was unaware.
However, they posit that it was not Congress’ intent “that a
defendant who does not receive the proper written notice should
be immune from revocation... ." Id. at 16 (quoting Arbizu,
431 F.3¢ at 473) (internal quotation marks and other citation
omitted). The ICA dissent slso found the reasoning of Arbizy
persuasive, arguing that “[a) defendant who knows that his
supervised release terms bar certain conduct should not be
allowed to engage in that conduct and then hide behind the
governnent’s failure to follow statutory notice procedures during
sentencing.” Shannon, 116 Hawai'i 41-42, 169 P.3d at 993-94
(akamura, J., dissenting) (quoting Arbigu, 431 F.3d at 471)

(internal quotation marks omitted) .*

 

he noted by the dissent, dissent at 15-18, and the TCA dissent,
Shannon, 116 Hawai'i at 41-42, 169 F.3d at 993-94 (Makamura, J., dissenting),
Federal circuits define actual notice, in the context of 16 0:8.c, 88 3889(£)
and 3603(1), as notice “sufficient to’ serve as a guide for tho defendant's
Conduct.” Belixy 394 F.24 at $52 (citation and internal quotation seeks
caitted). In Helix, the Eighth Circuit held that the defendant receives
sufficient actual notice that he violate no lave while on supervised release
for bank fraud charges, when the district judge orally told the defendans chat
sopervised release was “like probation” and that "he hed better not mess Up on
[the judge’ s) probetion,” which the defendant scknowledged and promised to
(wont inved...)

 
    

 

 

 

 

 

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|FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAWAI'I REPORTS 24D PACIFIC REPORTER
aL

 

A straightforward reading of HRS § 706-624(3) prohibits
the adoption of an “actual notice” rule. The version of HRS

§ 706-624(3) applicable when Petitioner’s DAGP was accepted”

 

M(. continued)
wetay clean.” Jd at $52.
tn Gitege-Beito, 911 F.3d at 1138-39, the Ninth Circuit addressed
a situation wnere the exchange betusen the defendant and Judge was “virtually
identical to that described in Felix.” The Ninth Circuit held that the
Celloguy with the defendant, uhere the judge informed the defendant that the
ferns of his supervised release was “Like parole” and that “if you do
Senething wrong, you go beck to Jail,” was sufficient oral notice to
Sénstiture actual notice of the defendant's conditions of compliance and
Setisty the purposes of 18 U.S.C. $§ 3863(4) and 396032). Ide at 1139,
Aaditionally, the Orteaa-Brite court reasoned that ite “holding [found]
Gdditional support in. (defendant’ e] pl nent, in which (Gefendant}
scknowiedgea that he is in violation ponditions of the release.” 1d.
In United States v. Ramgs-Santiagg, 925 F.2d 15, 16 (1st Cir.
1591), the court ‘concluded that the defencent’s supervised release was
properly revered because it uas “undisputed” that "upon being sentenced” the
Beendant and his counsel “received copies of the sentence, to which were
neds inter alia the conditions of his supervised release,” the
requires" were mets dd at 16-17, The notice was
‘Sufticieatly clesr snd specific... to serve as 2 guide for [defendant]'s
cxpected behavior during the term of supervised release.” Id, 3t 17
‘Resuming afauende that the standard announced in the
aforenentioned fedefal cases applies without consiering the actual language
and commentary of our own statute, the evidence presented in this case 18
Snoufficlent to satisfy the requitenent thet s defendant be given notice
sufficient to "serve ss 2 guide for the defendant’ s conduct.” Felix, 994 F.2d
Gt S52. "The record does not indicate that Respondent was orally apprised of
the seriousness of remaining arrest and conviction free. Although the ICR
‘in digtus that the “[the court] calendar reflects that (the court)
ly apprised (Responsent] of his special conditions(,]” shannon, 116
Nowaiti at 40, 169 Pd at 992, novhere in the calendar is it erated with
Specificity that Respondent wes “apprised” of these tems. The court calendar
Rerely delineates the conditions of Respondent's OXGP snd, at best, shows what
EGnaitione the court intended to Impose on Respondent’s DAGP. or’ does the
Secord incicate Respondent wae told that his DAGP was “Like parole,” oF that,
he "better not mess up,” a2 in Felix and Ortega-Brite. The record’ also does
hot indicate, and the parties do not contest, woether Respondent was given a
Copy of his sentence as in Kapos-Santiaga. Thus, st cannot be said thet,
Eikde"on'the secors, there existe substantial evidence ro support the
Conclusion thet Respondent was given sufficient actual notice even under the
federal cases.

 

 

 

     

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Yan 2006, HRS § 706-624(3) was amended to read:

‘the court shell order the defendant at the tine of
sentencing to sign a written acknowledgenent of receipt of
Scnditione of probation, The defendant shall be given a
Witten copy of any requirenents inposed pursuant to this
(ection, stated with sufficient specificity to enable the
‘cont ine

 

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provided that “[t]he defendant shall be given a written copy of
any requirements imposed pursuant to this section, stated with
sufficient specificity to enable the defendant to guide the
defendant's self accordingly." (Emphasis added.)

Contrary to the position espoused by the dissent and
the ICA dissent, it is 2 well-established tenet of our statutory
interpretation that the use of the word “shall” generally
indicates the legislature's intention to make a provision
mandatory, as opposed to discretionary. See Gray v. Admin. Dir.
of the Court, 84 Hawai'i 138, 150 n.17, 931 P.2d 580, 592 n.17
(2997) (observing that “{t]he word ‘shall’ is generally construed
as mandatory in legal acceptation”); Yoelimy v, Broderick, 91
Hawai'i 125, 129-30, 980 P.2d 999, 1003-04 (App. 1999) (declaring
that “(t]he word ‘shall’ ‘must be given a compulsory meaning

: and is inconsistent with a concept of discretion’” (quoting
Black's Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990) (other citation
omitted)))+ but see Narmore v, Kawatuchi, 112 Hawai'i 69, 03, 143
P.3d 1271, 1285 (2006) (noting that “[w]hile the vord ‘shall’ is

generally regarded as mandatory, in certain situations it may

 

+ continued)
defendant to comply with the conditions accordingly.

2006 Haw. Sess. L. Act 230, § 20 at 1010 (emphasis omitted). This anendnent
is inapplicable to Respondent inasmuch aa the court accepted his DAGP om
February 11, 2005, before the anananent became effective, gue. 2006 aw. Sess.
L. Act 230," 54 at 1025 (providing that the act would take effect upon its
spproval),"and the amendnent was not nade retroactive, sea 200€ Haw. Sess, L.
Ret 230, $ $1 at 1025 (stating chat “(eJhis Act does not affect rights and
duties that matured, penalties that were incurred, “and proceedings that nere
begun, before its effective date”). “Thus, the amendment dees not change the
analysis in this opinion,

 

 

 

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properly be given a directory meaning” (quoting Jack Endo Elec.

wu Inc., 59 Haw, 612, 616-17, 585 P.2d 1265,
1269 (1978) (citation omitted))). “We cannot change the Language
of the statute, supply @ want, or enlarge upon it in order to
make it suit a certain state of facts. We do not legislate or
make laws.” State v, Dudoit, 90 Hawai'i 262, 271, 978 P.2d 700,
70 (1999). Thus, under the plain and unambiguous language of
HRS § 706-624(3), St 4s mandated that defendants be given written
copies of their conditions.

8.
Additionally, this court has interpreted the word

“shall” as “directory” rather than mandatory only where a three
part test has been satisfied.

an e. Planning Comm‘

Gis F.2d 95 [1980)], ths court articu
ese or sreermining when the word “she

 
 

  

 

 

preted as directory. First, “shall” can be read in a
onemandatory sense i +3 purpose"

+ mtg at
Bie, ela Pe2a at 102. Second, “anal” wili not be re
mandatory when “untust consequences” result.” Jd. Fi
Sthe word “shall” say be held to be Rerely directory, shel
hovadvantace te lost, when no riche Je destroves, whan oe
i by giving Te that construction.” Id. at 677,
Bip Peza st 103.

 

Leslie v. Bd. of Appeals of County of Hawai'i, 109 Hawai'i 384,
394, 126 P.3d 1071, 1081 (2006) (emphases added). HRS § 706-
624(3) does not meet any of the three Perry criteria.

First, there is nothing in the “statutory design” of
either HRS chapter 706, part II, relating to probation, or HRS

chapter @53, relating to DAGPs, that refutes the conclusion that

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HRS § 706-624(3) is “compulsory.” See id. To the contrary, the
underlying policy concerns that certain defendants be allowed to
“rehabilitate” themselves while remaining conviction-free by
complying with specific conditions, see Putnam, 93 Hawai'i at
367-68, 3 P.3d at 1244-45 (explaining the legislative intent to
allow DAGPs so that certain offenders could “keep [their]
record(s] free of a criminal conviction” (citation and emphasis
onitted)), supports a conclusion that “shall,” as used in HRS

$ 706-624 (3), was meant to impose @ mandatory duty on the court.

Second, “unjust consequences” would result if “shall”
as used in this statute was construed to be directory. To
illustrate, some defendants sentenced to probation or DAGPs could
be given written conditions to guide their conduct, while others
would not be accorded direction in @ tangible form. Given the
importance of the conditions in a probationary or DAGP framework,
it would be inherently unfair to permit disparate enforcement of
the requirement that defendants be given the court's directive in
writing to ensure compliance with the conditions.

Third, construing “shall” in this context as directory
would deprive the individual defendants and society of the
intended benefits of the DAGP. As described above, the written
conditions are intended to facilitate adherence to the DAGP
conditions and thus, promote compliance. Successful observance
of the conditions benefits the individual, who remains

conviction-free, and also benefits society, in that the present

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and future productivity of these defendants is preserved and
enhanced. Putnam, 93 Hawai'l at 367-68, 3 P.3d at 1244-45
(explaining that “in certain criminal cases . . . it is in the
best interest of the [prosecution] and the defendant that the
defendant be given the opportunity to keep his [or her} record
free of a criminal conviction, if he [or she] can comply with
certain terms and conditions during a period designated by court
order” (quoting 1976 Haw. Sess. L. Act 154, § 2 at 279)
(emphasis omitted) (brackets in original).
c.

Similarly, Lee cited to State v. Medina, 72 Haw. 493,
824 P.24 106 (1992), in support of its determination thet “actual
notice” was not a substitute for a written copy of the court's
conditions in a similar context. See Lee, 10 Haw. App. at 198,
862 P.2d at 298 (holding that “[iJn view of the plain mandate and
legislative purpose of HRS § 706-624,” the defendant's probation
could not be revoked for vielation of conditions because the
“{djefendant was never given a written copy of the conditions of
his probation’). In Medina, this court: upheld the dismissal of
charges against the defendant for violating a court order
temporarily restraining him from contacting, threatening, or
physically abusing the complainant. 72 Haw. at 493-94, 824 P.2d
at 106, Although the defendant had “actual knowledge” of the
order, id. at 494, 824 P.2d at 106, he had never been personally

served with the order, contrary to HRS § 586-6, which then

25+
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAKAI'T REEORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER:
mandated that such orders “shall be personally served uson the

ring in

 

respondent unless the respondent was present at the h
which case the respondent may be served by regular mail(,]" ide
The Medina court found “unconvincing” the prosecution’ s
argument that the defendant's “actual knowledge” of the existence
of the order was sufficient to allow the prosecution for its
violation, reasoning that “here statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, that language must ordinarily be regarded es
conclusive unless literal application would produce an absurd or
unjust result clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies
of the statute.” Id. at 494, 824 P.2d at 107 (citing State v
Ealama, 62 Haw. 199, 612 P.2¢ 168 (1980)). Analogously, in the
situation where a probationer has not received a written copy of

the conditions of his or her probation and is facing revocation,

Lee indicated that “(t]he requirement of HRS § 706-624(3) . . .
w surance that a 2 hi

tems and conditions of his proba " a

kevoked for failure to comply...” 10 Haw. App. at 199, 862

P.2d 298 (emphasis added).
o.

Based on the foregoing, it is manifest that sentencing
courts are mandated to provide defendants written copies of the
conditions of a DAGP. Tt would be violative of the statute to
adopt an “actual notice” rule such as that applied by the federal

courts as a substitute for written notice. The ICA’s conclusion

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s++POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAL'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER**#

that “[the court) erred in setting aside (Respondent's) DAG{?]

ve a written copy of the

 

because [Respondent] did not r
conditions of his DAG(,]” Shannon, 116 Hawai'i at 39, 169 F.3d
at 992 (formatting altered), then, was correct.
xr.

In contrast to the foregoing analysis, the dissent
contends that (1) the written statenent of conditions “is not a
‘condition’ per se by which further proceedings may be
Geferred{,]” dissent at 4, (2) HRS § 853-3 provides consequences
to the defendant if he or she violates the conditions set by the

court pursuant to HRS $§ 853-1," 706-624(1),"* and 706-

ip des entirety, HRS $ 853-1 provides:

(a) Upon proper motion as provided by this chapter:

(i) “Pine o defendant voluntarily pleads guilty or
holo contendere, prior to conmencenent of 2
trial, toe felony, misdemeanor, oF petty
misdemeanor:

(2) Te'appeare to the court that the defendant is
not likely agein to engage in a criminal course
of conduct; and

(3) The ends of Justice and the welfare of society
Go not require that the defendant shall
Presently suffer the penalty inposed by law,

tthe court, without accepting the plea of nolo contendere or
Entering & judgaent of guile and with the consent of the
Gefendent and after considering the recommendations, if any,
Of the prosecutor, may defer further proceedings.
(6) tne proceedings nay be deferred uron giv of the
Gp. As 8 forther

Ecndition, the court_shail inpose a compensation fee
pursuant to section 351-62.6, . + - The court my defer the
Proceedings fora period of tine as the court shall direct
Dut inno case to exceed the maximum sentence ellowsble .

The defendant may be subject to ball oF recognizanc
tne court's discretion during the peried during which the
proceedings are deferred.

cl” open the defendant’ s completion of the period

designated by the court and in complience with the terms and
Conditions established, the court shall discharge the
Gefendant and dieniss the charge against the defendant.
Td] Discharge of the defendant and dismissal of the
charge against the defendant under this section shell be
(cont ince

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

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624(2),* id., (3) HRS chapter 53 contains no “consequences for
a court’s non-compliance with HRS $ 706-624(3)[,]” id, (citation
omitted) (emphasis added), and (4) “complying with the plain
Language of both HRS § 653-1(b) and HRS § 853-3 would create a
confusing incoherence should a trial court defer proceedings on
the ‘condition’ of HRS § 706-624(3)[,]” Ad. (brackets omitted).

‘Thus, according to the dissent, “the plain language of HRS § 853-

 

continued)
without adjudication of guilt, shall eliminate any civil
Sanission of guilt, ana is not 4 conviction.

{e) Upon discharge of the defendant and dismissal of
the charge Sgainst the defendant under this section, the
Gefendant may apply for expungenent not less than one year,
following discharge, pursuant to section #31-2-2

 

   

(Emphasis added.)

RS § 7106-62412) sete forth the “nandatory conditions of
probation," which at the time Respondent’ DAGP was accepted inclused
la) That the defendant not commit another
federal or state crime during the term of
probation:

(b) That the defendant report to « probation officer
fas directed by the court or the probation
eeticer;

(c) That the defendant remain within the
Jurisdiction of the court, unless granted
Permission to leave by the court of # probation
Sificers

(a) That the defendant notify 2 probation officer
prior to any change in address or employment;

(e) That the defenant notify s probation officer
promptly if arrested or questioned by = law
enforcement officer) and

() That the defendant permit a probation officer to
visit the defendant. at the defendant's home or
elsewhere a2 specified b the court.

HRS § 706-6242) enumerates the “discretionary conditions of
probation,” which at the time Respondent's OAGP was accepted, permitted a
fourt “to the extent that the conditions are reasonably felstes” to general
sentencing factors and “reasonably necessary,” to require that the defendant
a 1m of imprisonment or house eftest, (2) perform community
service, (3) meet various financial obligations, including making restitution,
(4) avoid certain activities, people, and places (5) obtain necessary medical
(tment, including treataent for substance abies, and, percinent to ehis
/ (6) “[slatisty ether reasonable conditions © the court may iapose{s]”

 

 

   

 

 

28+
 

s+e7OR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § KAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’

 

—_—__SSSSSSSSSSSsSSSSee
1(b) is ambiguous” such that this court “may look to its

legislative history for guidance.” Id. at 5." Respectfully,
this reasoning fails to comport with a plain reading of the
mentioned statutes.
a

Conditions 1isted in HRS § 706-6241) are denominated
‘mandatory conditions of probation[.]” Additional conditions are
set out in HRS § 706~624(2) as “discretionary conditions of
probation{.J” HRS § 853-1, by its express terms, incorporates
these conditions with respect to the DAGP statute. Cf. Kaufman,
92 Hawas's at 328, 991 P.2d at 838 (noting that “the DAG(P)
statute, by its plain language and in light of its legislative
history, provides that the deferral period . . . [1s] subject to
[the] conditions of probation” (citations and internal quotation

The dissent algo considers briefly the other argunents Respondent
raised on appeal to the ICk, judging then to be without merit. See dissent at
Te 'hrthough none of these issues are dispositive of this sppeal, it is worth
foting thet Respondent's argument regarding the condition that ne’ remain
Serest free may havo merit.

{To summarize, Respondent argued that the court did not have
statutory authority to impose 2 condition that he remain arrest free during
Fio"Sefetral period. In response, Petitioner argued, inter alia, that the
Court had authority under HRS § 706-606(1)(q) to require that Respondent
Sfstetisfy other reasonable conditions as the court may impose.” (Emphasis
isles.) dels questionable whether Fequiring a defendant to remain arrest
fee is 2 reasonable condition.

Unlike the other conditions delinested in HRS § 706-624, 2
defendant cannot contol waether he or she is arrested. It would seem
Patentiy vntoir to revoke a defendant's DAGP for failure to comply with
Bonditione sisply because the defendant was arrested, if it was later
Scortained ehet the defendant had comivted ne misdeed. This consideration
tin°be discerned in comparing HRS § 706-624 (1) (a), which mandates that “the

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sefencant eal or ‘during the tine of
probucion(sT* (emphasis. added) to HRS § 70e-624{1)(e), which requires the
Bevencant to “gotifv s orcbsticn officer promptly if arrested cr questioned by

nent officer." {ompheses added.) These sections seen to
Sndieate the Stature distinguishes comitting a crime and merely being
iitasced cr suspected cf doing 20, The condition that Respondent remain
SEreestTana conviction free" blure this distinction and therefore, may be
unreasonable snd inpernissible.

 

Slaw enter

  

 

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marks omitted)). ‘Thus, HRS § 853-1(b) unambiguously establishes
which conditions are applicable to DaGPs.*

HRS § €53-3 instructs that “[ulpon any violation of 2
term or condition set by the court for a [DAGP], the court may
enter an adjudication of guilt and proceed as otherwise
provided.” Accordingly, HRS § 953-3 manifestly establishes the
Gissent’s so-called “consequences” of a violation. on the other
hand, HRS § 706-624(3) unambiguously requires that “the defendant
shall be given a written copy of any requirements imposed
pursuant to this section, stated with sufficient specificity to

enable the defendant to comply with the conditions accordingly.”

 

the dissent relies on State v, Sylva, 61 Han, 385, 605 7.24 496
(1980), to conclude that construing Lee and the provisions of HRS 706-624
creates ambiguity. See dissent at 13 tnoting that this court,
“notwithstanding the plain Language of HRS § €53-4(7)," “Limited application”
of the statute to minors uho were tried as adulte (citing dulvar €l/ Haw. at
589, €05 P.20 at 93)).. HAS § €53°4(7) provides that “Ielhis chapter shall
ot apply when... (7) (t]he defendant’ is found to be a law violator oF
Gelinguent child for the conmission of any offense defined ae ¢ felony by the
Hawaii Penal Code or for sny conduct which if perpetrated in this seave gould
constitute a felonyl.*

In Sylva, the defendant’s request for AGP was denied pursuant
to URS § 053-4(7) Because as a juvenile, he was adjudicated for offenses which
Would have been felonies if connitted by an adult. €1 Haw. at 386, 608 PZ
at 497. On appeal, this court determined that reading the
Sin'the context of the entire stature and consti
with the purposes of the statutes{,]” ARS § 853-4(7) was ambiguous,
followed Literally would result in'an sbeurd result, because “every defendant,
with a juvenile record for offenses which would have been felonies. if
Committed by an adult would be automatically disqualified from the benefits of
[a] DAG(P.)* “Id. at 386-83, 605 F.2d at 496-99. Accordingly, as neces above,
this court determined that HRS § B53-4(7) was applicable only’ in ceses where
the minor had been tried as an adult, id, at 365, 603 P-2d 499, and gave the
statute a renedial constroction,

‘Sulva did not address whether reading HRS § 706-624 with HRS
$ 853-1 created anbiguity, and pertinently, was decided before the probetion
statute was enacted. In the Instant case, reading HRS $ 106-624 with HRS
§ €53-1 does not create any anbiguity with any other section or with the
Purposes of HRS § 853-1, and therefore, Sviva is inapposite, Further, the
Fenedial construction applied in Sylva cannot be ignored.

 

   

 

   

      

    

 

     

 

   

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On its face, HRS § 706-624(3) does not pertain to

 

mandatory oF discretionary conditions, but to the “written
statenent of conditions.” Plainly then, HRS § 706-624(3) does
not pertain to conditions the defendant must comply with or
follow. Rather, that section imposes a requirement on how the
defendant is to be notified of the mandatory conditions under HRS
§ 706-624(1) and the discretionary conditions under HRS § 706-
624(2) that the court has chosen to impose. See Conmentary on
HRS § 706-624 (explaining that the purpose of including the
notice provision “is to provide the defendant with notice of what
is expected of the defendant in 2 form which will not escape the
defendant's menory*).

Thus, there are no “consequences” stated in HRS chapter
853 for non-compliance with HRS § 706-624 (3) because HRS § 706-
624(3) does not relate to 2 condition imposed on the defendant.
The “consequences” in HRS § 853-3 obviously relate only to the
defendant inasmuch as such consequences refer only to a condition
“set by the court” for the defendant to follow. The court does
not set as a condition of probation or of the DAGP that delivery
of a written copy of the conditions be performed by the
defendant. Moreover, the violation of conditions in HRS § 653-3

that “may result in an adjudication of guilt” patently would not

 

% Respectfully, the dissent's dismissal of Les, on the ground that
“construing the plain language of SRS § 853-1 was not before the Tch in thet
ease(,)* dissent at 12, undervalues the import of that case. As previously
Siscussed, se supra, the ICA's reasoning in Lee 1s instructive in the instant
case becauee The =

 

 

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apply to the failure to provide a statement of the conditions
imposed upon the court system, Hence, contrary to the dissent’s

sonfusing incoherence[,]” dissent

 

position, there cannot be any
at 4, for a court under any plain reading of the statutes
involved.”

‘The fact that HRS § 653-1 does not explicitly adopt the
written condition provision of HRS § 706-624(3) does not mean HRS
§ 106-624 (3) does not apply to OAGPs. As noted before, this
court's precedent deems DAGPs and probation analogous, such that
statutory provisions governing probation may be applied to DAGPs
even when not explicitly authorized in the DAGP statute. See,
e.g, Kaufman, 92 Hawai's at 528, 991 P.2d at 838 (holding that
“the DAG deferral period is closely analogous to a probationary
period” such that “the probation tolling statute . . . applies
analogously to the deferral of a DAG(P]” (internal quotation
marks omitted). Given the similarity between probation and
DAGrs previously recognized by this court, see id., and the fact
that both schemes impose the sane conditions, see HRS § 953-1(b),
ie is evident that the conditions must be communicated to the
defendant in the same way, whether the defendant is subject to

probation or to a DAGP.

 

H the dissent's assertion thet there are no consequences if the
court faile to comply with HRS § 706-624 3) cennot be agreed to. Aside from
the Feasons set forth supra, case law establishes that this failure renders
the court incompetent to revoke a defendant's probaticn for failure to comply
With those conditions. See Leg, 10 Haw. App. at 192, 662 7.24 at 295°96
{holding that “a defendant’s probation may [not] be revoked for his failure to
comply with a special condition of probation,” when “he was never provided
with uritcen notice of that condition"); cf. Keutman 92 Howal't at 328, 992
P.2d at 638 (holding that OAGPs and probation are closely snalogous) «

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Se
B,

With all due respect, the dissent’s analysis of the
legislative history of HRS $§ 853-1, 853-3, and 706-624, see
dissent at 5-11, does not support its conclusion that HRS § 706-
624(3) is not applicable to DAGP conditions. The dissent recites
the amendments made and notes the paucity of guidance from the
legislature, but otherwise fails to demonstrate how the
legislative changes indicate that HRS § 706-624(3) is intended to
apply only te probation and not to DAGPs. In fact, the
legislature favors formality and regularity of procedures in
informing defendants of the conditions by which they must
abide.” See discussion gupra and Commentary to HRS $$ 706-624
and 706-604.

XIII.
a

It would appear logical and consistent with the penal
code’s insistence that the regularity and formality of imposing
probation or DAGP conditions in writing, should extend as well to

a motion to revoke probation or DAGP for failure to comply with

® As noted before and significantly, the most recent anendnent to
ns § 706-6243) added the provision that "(t]he court shall order the
Gefendant st the tine of sentencing to sign a written acknowledgenent of
Fecelpe of conditions of probation.” 2006 Maw, Sess. L. Act 230, § 20 at
1010," the spendnent thus mandates e specific time st which the Court must
provide the defendant with the written copy of the conditions of probation,
Chereby meting the process more uniform. Additionally, the direction that
this be done at the tine of sentencing, meaning that it aust be done in a
Courtrcom curing a court proceeding, Lends formality to the occasion. Thus,
Ghe inportonce ef complying with the conditions is impressed upon the
Sefendont. As noted Bubra, this anendnent is not applicable to Respondent.

 

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those same conditions.** Moreover, the statutes regarding the
Amposition of conditions and the statutes regarding revocation
for failure to comply with such conditions all relate to
“probationary periods.” See Kaufman, 92 Hawai'i at 328, 991 P.2d
at 836. Hence, they must be read together. See State v.
Mupihea, 98 Hawai'i 196, 202, 46 P.3d 498, 504 (2002) (**Laws in
pari materia, or upon the sane subject matter, shall be construed
with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may
be called upon in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.’*
(Quoting HRS § 1-16 (1993)) (other citation omitted)
(underscoring added); Putnam, 93 Hawai'i at 371 n.9, 3 P.3d at
1248 n.9.
B

As noted previously, HRS § 706-624(3) requires that

defendants be given written copies of conditions on probation.

In that connection, HRS § 706-627(1) (1993) provides that

 

# Although this issue was not raised in the application for
certiorari, it was argued to the ICA. Respondent argued that the plain and
tunambiguous language of HRS § 706-227 (1) "require[s) the filing of @
rotion to set aside « OAG(P) in order to toll the deferral period. . aste
matter of procedural due process.” (Emphasis in original.) Accordingly,
Respondent argued that because Petitioner did not file a written motion to
revoke Respondent's DAGE, "the one-year period of deferral had expired" "by
February 11, 2006,” “and’ [the court) was without Jurisdiction to set aside the
DAG(F) + . son April 6, 2006,

Petitioner answered that “revocation of @ DAGP is specifically and
gupressly governed by HRS § 853~3[,]" (quoting state v, Eutnam, 93 Hawal't
3e2, "368, 3 F.3e 1238, 1245 (2000), a “plain reading of [which) oes not
require that a written motion be filed in order to set asice (a dlefendant’s
DxG[P)." Relatedly, Petitioner posited thet absent “an expressed requirencnt
within the DAGIP] statute of a written motion to set aside, the oral motion
Would seen to suffice.” (Citing state w. Babago, 102 fawai't 236, 245, 81
F.3d 1131 1140 (2003)). Finally, Petitioner argued that Respondent “had ample
Rotice of [itel intention to set-aside (aic] his deferral from hit appearance
before the court on January 27, 2006, for proof of compliance hearing.
wherein he was found in violation of his DAGP terms vs t+

 

   

 

 

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Jon the notion to
The period of probaticn shall be tolled pending the hearing
pen’ the motich and the decision of the court.

ing eh: from the

 

Rotlen thresh and inciudine the Zilina date of the wisten
decision of the coast concerning the motion for purposes of
Genputetion of the Feneining Period of probation, 4 ¢ny

Sao Se SRS ESSE EEiting of the probation, the

Sefendant snail Tessin subject to oil terms ane conditions

of he chat ion’ excep en sthernae prvice by this
(emphases added.) First, reading the plain language of this
statute, it is evident that motion to revoke probation, and by
analogy, a motion to revoke # DAGP, must be in writing. Cf
Kaufman, 92 Hawai'i at 329, 991 P.2d at 839 (concluding that the
express language of the DAGP statute as well as “the public
policy concerns and legislative intent underlying the tolling of
probation” rendered that provision “equally applicable to the
The

 

tolling of a deferral period pursuant to [a] DAGIP]”
statute expressly requires that such a motion be filed. “File”
As not defined in the statute. In its ordinary application, to
“file” Ls “to deliver a legal document to the court clerk or

record custodian for placement into the official record.”

plack’s Law Dictionary 660 (8th ed. 2004). See Blaisdell v
Dep't of Pub, Safety, 113 Hawai'i 315, 319, 151 P.3d 796, 800
(2007) ("Where a term is not statutorily defined . . . we may

rely upon extrinsic aids to determine such intent. Legal and lay
dictionaries are extrinsic aids which may be helpful in
discerning the meaning of statutory terms.” (Quoting Singleton

vs Liquor Comm'n, 111 Hawai'i 234, 243-44, 140 P.3d 1014, 1023-24

-35-
 

‘s+4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS:

 

 

(2006) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation
omitted))).”

In this context, a plain reading of the statute leads
to the conclusion that the “filing of a motion” is required to be
in writing. See Putnam, 93 Hawai'i at 367, 3 P.3d at 1244
(instructing that “we must read statutory language in the context
of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with
its purpose” (citation omitted)). Hence, only written motions
can be presented to the court clerk to be placed into the
official record. See State v, Gomes, ~~ Hawai'i --, --, 177 P.3d
928, 942 (2008) (stating that this court is “bound to construe
statutes so as to avoid absurd results” (quoting Zavese v, Dep't
of Labor & Indus, Relations, 113 Hawai'i 1, 31, 147 P.3d 785, 025
(2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)}). In
contrast, oral motions, such as the one challenged herein, cannot
be “filed” for inclusion in the official record.

c.

Second, reading HRS § 706-624(3) in pari materia with
HRS § 706-627(1), it is evident that the legislature favors
formality where conditions of probation and analogously, DAGPs
are concerned, such that both the conditions and motions to
revoke for failure to comply with those conditions must be in

writing. The commentary on HRS § 706-627 supports the conclusion

 

Wd whether an oral motion constitut
627(1}.. Neither Petitioner nor
spective contentions oh this

Our courte have not addr
the “filing of a motion” under HRS §
Respondent offers cases to support ite or hia 1
Sete.

 

 

 

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that the motion to revoke probation must be in writing.
It emphasizes that the statute requires “writte

notice” of the intent to revoke as a matter of procedural due

process. Specifically, it states in relevant part that

[e)hds section affords the defendant threatened with loss oF
change of suspension or probation status the sane crocedural
Brotection afforded a defendant at the tine of ociainal

Sioa: ng to revoke sus
Eexet Fs ftntormalit
Scunsel ang to be heard -upen the evidence,

This ison ares where dangers of abuse are

xeuL_and the noreal procedural protection’

Sioper. thats defendant has ho right to

Huspension or probation does not justify the

flteration of his status by nethoas that aust

Seon and sonet ines be unfair~

Although written notice, the right to be represented
by counsel, and the Fight to controvert and be Heard upon
the evidence, axe provided by this section, it is not
Cohtenplated that the court aust strictly enforce the rules
of evidences ss

 

Conmentary on HRS § 706-627 (emphases added) (citation omitted)
(quoting Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 2, comments at 152
(1954)). ‘The procedural protections available at the tine of
original sentencing are codified at HRS 706-604 (1993 6 Supp.
2006)" ‘Those protections include (1) the opportunity to be

% HRS § 706-604 provides, in pertinent part, tha
(2) Before {mposing sentence, the court shall afford

bf the defendant’s disposition

2), dis-cauxt shail furnish to the defendant or the
defendant's counsel. g-copy of the report of any ore
sentence diagnosis or savcholoaical, psychiatric, oF other
Redicel exeninetion ang afterd-tair opportunity, if the
Gefendant or the prosecating ettorney so requests, £2.
Soutrovart te supplement thea. The court shall amend or
Sraer the anenanent of the report upon finding that any
Correction, modification, or addition is needed and, where
Speropriate, shall requite the prompt preparation of an
amended report in wich material required to be deleted is
Completely renoved or other anendnents, including additions,
are made

 

 

(continued...)

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heard and (2) the opportunity to review, dispute, or supplenent
any pre-sentencing diagnosis or medical examination report.

The defendant must be informed of the presentence
report beforehand in order to prepare for the hearing on his
sentence. The Commentary on HRS § 706-604 explains that “[t)he
right of the defendant to controvert the pre-sentence report is
meaningless to the extent that the report, or a part thereof, is
not made available to the defendant.” As a matter of due process
2 motion to revoke probation or, analogously, to revoke a DAGP is
Like a presentence report in that the defendant must be notified
beforehand in order to allow him to contest it, if he wishes.

‘The same formality must exist because 2 motion to revoke
probation or a DAGP allows the court to render other sentencing
alternatives that had been open to it at the time of the original
sentencing.

Additionally, HRS § 706-604 requires that “the court

 

shall furnish a copy of the [presentence] report . . .
(Emphasis added.) In line with this “procedural protection[,]”
the penal code indicates that a defendant, “threatened with loss
or change of . . . probation status{, must be given] the sane
procedural protection afforded . . . at the time of original
disposition{, i.e., sentencing]. Commentary on HRS § 706-627.

Similarly, a motion to revoke probation or a DAGP must algo be in

#(.. .continved)

(Enphases ‘sdded.)

 

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Se

writing and the defendant provided a copy in a manner equivalent
to the procedural protection of written conditions that was
originally required “at the time of original disposition.” Id.

‘The Commentary on HRS § 706-604 posits that “[a]nything
less than full disclosure is inconsistent with the truth-seeking
function of the judicial process and the rehabilitative function
of penal sentences.” These concerns lend credence to the
position that motions to revoke are weighty matters deserving
proportional solemnity in their resolution. See Commentary on
HRS § 706-627 (“Determinations to revoke . . . probation are
sometimes made with a degree of informality that does not afford
|. . adequate opportunity . . . to be heard... .")-

xIV.

‘The dissent concludes that because HRS § 706-627(1)
refers to a written ruling by the court on a motion to revoke
probation, but does not contain @ similar reference to initiating
the motion to revoke, non-written revocation motions satisfy the
statutory requirements. Dissent at 19-20 (arguing “that the
legislature intended, for purposes of tolling a deferral period,”
an oral motion to revoke a DAGP suffices (citing State v. white,
110 Hawai'i 79, 83, 129 P.3d 1107, 1111 (2006) (for the
proposition that “[wJhen construing a statute, our foremost
obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of
the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the

language contained in the statute itself”)). However, it appears

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that under HRS § 706-627(1),%* a court’s written decision on a
motion to revoke probation establishes a definite end date for
purposes of tolling the probationary period, If, however, a
written decision is not filed by the court, the probationary
period could conceivably be tolled indefinitely, subject to other
rules, See, e.0., Kaufman, 92 Hawai'i at 327, 991 P.2d at 637
(explaining that “[a] court may defer the proceedings for such
period of time as the court shall direct but in no case to exceed
‘the maximum sentence allowable”).

Therefore, HRS § 706-627(1) anticipates that a court
may make an oral ruling on a motion to revoke probation but fail
to reduce its ruling to writing, and, in the interest of
finality, allows the tolling period to be computed using the date

of the oral ruling under those circumstances. Based on the

 

foregoing, it is manifest that the “written” decision of the
court is not analogous to the prosecution's motion to revoke
probation, but rather, is one of two conceivable ways the

applicable tolling period may be measured from the time a motion

 

to revoke is filed. Indeed, as opposed to an acknowledgment in

 

% to reiterate, the pertinent portion of the statute provides:

‘The period of tolling shail be conputed from the fling date
of the motion through and inclusing the filing date of the’
written decision of the court concerning the motion For
urposes ef computation of the rensining period of
probation, if any.

initten decisian upon the notion, the period shall be
Geaputed by reference to the date the court makes @ decision
tipon the motion In open court.

 

HRS § 106-627(2) (empheses added)

 

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the statute that courts may “fail to file a written decision,
nothing in the statute tolerates the “fail{ure] to file a
written” motion to revoke. (Emphasis added.) See discussion
supra.

xv.

Because Petitioner did not file a written motion to
revoke Respondent's DAGP, the probationary period was not tolled.
Respondent's DAGP was entered on February 11, 2005. The court
accepted the DAGP and imposed a one-year deferral period. On
January 27, 2006, Petitioner made its oral motion to revoke
Respondent's DAGP. As stated above, because the motion was not
in writing, it was ineffective for purposes of tolling the
deferral period. Thus, the deferral period terminated on
February 11, 2006.

on April 6, 2006, the court purported to set aside
Respondent's DAGP. However, inasmuch as the deferment period had
expired approximately two months earlier, the court lacked
jurisdiction to revoke Respondent’s DAGP. See Kealaiki, 95
Hawai‘ at 315, 22 P.3d at 594 (“Successful completion of the
deferral period results in dismissal of the charge and can lead
to expungement of the defendant's criminal record.” (Citing HRS
§ 953-1(c) and (e)); Putnam, 93 Hawai'i at 368, 3 P.3d at 1245
(explaining that the legislature’s intent in enacting the DAGP
statute was “to enable a defendant to retain a record free of @

criminal conviction by deferring a guilty plea for a designated

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‘**FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**+

period and imposing special conditions which the defendant was to
successfully complete” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Kaufman, 92 Hawai'i at 327, 991 P.2d at €37 (noting
that, pursuant to HRS § 853-1(c), “a court cannot set aside a
DAG(P] after the period of deferral has expired”); see also State
vs Viloria, 70 Haw. 58, 60, 759 P,2d 1376, 1377 (1986) ("A
sentencing court had jurisdiction to revoke a sentence of
probation up until the termination of probation.“); Palana, 62
Haw. at 162, 612 P.2d at 1170 (*{A] sentencing court [has] the
authority to revoke the probation of a defendant at any tine
before the termination of the period of probation... ./");%
si. State v. Jom, 69 Haw. 602, 603, 752 P.2d 597, 598 (1988)
(affirming the trial court’s denial of a deferred acceptance of
no contest (DANC) plea in a drunk driving case because “[a]
repeat offender given 2 DANC plea on the first offense could

+ escape enhanced sentencing under the DUI statute by
committing a second offense after DANC jurisdiction had expired
but within the five year period of the DUI sentencing scheme”
(citation omitted)). Inasmuch as Respondent’s DAGP could not
have been revoked for lack of written conditions, see Lee, supra,
and Petitioner's oral motion to revoke should have been in

writing, the decision of the ICA is affirmed, the court’s order

*  Ealana discussed HRS § 706-628, which et the tine governed the
revocation of probation or suspension of sentence. In 1985, IRS § 706-628 was
repealed and consolidated with HRS § 706-625. 1985 Haw. Sess. L. Act 192, $¢
T'S ae 327-28.

 

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granting Petitioner’s motion to set aside Respondent's DAGP is
vacated, and the matter is remanded with instructions to dismiss

the motion with prejudice.

petitioner/plaintife-
appellee.

Hayden Aluli, on the Coren e, Debt te
brief, for respondent /
defendant-appeiiant.

43+