Title: YOEUN YOEUTH V. THE STATE OF WYOMING; DERRICK M. LOO V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

YOEUN YOEUTH V. THE STATE OF WYOMING; DERRICK M. LOO V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 61206 P.3d 1278Case Number: S-08-0136, S-08-0170Decided: 05/01/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
 
 
YOEUN 
YOEUTH,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
DERRICK 
M. LOO,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant, Yoeun Yoeuth:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Alden.

 
 
Representing 
Appellant, Derrick M. Loo:

Dion 
J. Custis, Dion J. Custis, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]        
In 
their consolidated appeals, Derrick Loo and Yoeun Yoeuth challenge the district 
court's denial of their motions to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic 
stop and subsequent search of the vehicle's trunk.  We affirm in both cases, although in 
Ms. Yoeuth's, on a basis different from that of the district 
court.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Mr. 
Loo states his issue as follows:  
Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit reversible error when 
it denied appellant's motion for suppression?  

 
 

[¶3]        
Ms. 
Yoeuth presents this issue:  Did Ms. 
Yoeuth have standing to object to the stop of the vehicle in which she was a 
passenger, and did she lose that standing by vague statements regarding the 
contents of the rental vehicle's trunk?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4]        
At 
about two o'clock on the afternoon of November 3, 2007, Wyoming Highway Patrol 
Trooper Jason Green was on duty on Interstate 80 east of Rawlins.  He observed a speeding eastbound 
vehicle, and gave chase.  During the 
pursuit, as he was about to overtake a silver-colored passenger car, the driver 
of that car abruptly hit his brakes.  
As Trooper Green described it, the driver "[m]ashed on them pretty hard" 
and "slowed way down."

 
 

[¶5]        
Trooper 
Green thought that behavior unusual, so he contacted dispatch for a check on the 
silver car's license plate number.  
The dispatcher initially responded that there was no record of this 
license plate.  However, Trooper 
Green had mistakenly read an "8" on the license plate as a "B."  When that error was corrected, the 
dispatcher informed Trooper Green that the license plate now appeared to be 
registered to two different vehicles.  
Given that information, Trooper Green abandoned his chase of the speeding 
vehicle and continued to observe the silver car.  As Trooper Green followed, the driver 
again hit the brakes abruptly, and slowed from 75 miles per hour, the speed 
limit, to 65 miles per hour.  When 
the car came up behind a semi truck, it did not pass, but instead followed 
behind at approximately one car length, and continued following closely for 
approximately half a mile.  Trooper 
Green decided to stop the silver car for following the truck too 
closely.

 
 

[¶6]        
When 
Trooper Green stopped the car, he noticed for the first time that there was a 
passenger.  Approaching the driver's 
window, he detected a strong smell of perfume coming from inside.  He told the driver that he had been 
stopped for following another vehicle too closely, and because the license plate 
was registered to two different vehicles.  
The driver informed the trooper that the car was rented.  The trooper asked for a driver's 
license, and learned that the driver was Derrick Loo.  The trooper also asked for the rental 
agreement.  When Mr. Loo 
reached into the glove compartment to get it, Trooper Green saw two different 
rental agreements in the glove box, one from Hertz and one from Avis.  Trooper Green also noticed that Mr. 
Loo's hands were trembling, he appeared very uncomfortable, and an artery was 
pulsing visibly at his temple.  
During this time, the passenger fixed her stare straight forward, not 
looking at Trooper Green or engaging him in any way.

 
 

[¶7]        
The 
Hertz rental agreement indicated that Mr. Loo had rented the car in Reno, 
Nevada, just after midnight earlier the same day.  It was a one-way rental agreement, with 
the car to be turned in at Indianapolis, Indiana.  After examining the rental agreement, 
Trooper Green asked Mr. Loo to come to the patrol car.  He told Mr. Loo that he would get a 
warning citation for following too closely.  

 
 

[¶8]        
Although 
it was cold outside, Mr. Loo was sweating heavily as he entered the passenger 
side of the patrol car.  When 
Mr.  Loo entered, Trooper Green observed that Sandy, a trained 
drug-sniffing dog, stirred in the back seat and began sniffing at 
Mr. Loo.  Sandy is not trained 
to alert to humans, but Trooper Green testified that every time he has seen the 
dog sniff at a person the way she sniffed at Mr. Loo, that person was either 
using or in possession of a controlled substance.

 
 

[¶9]        
While 
sitting in the patrol car, Trooper Green asked Mr. Loo about being in Reno, 
where the car had been rented.  Mr. 
Loo said he had gone to Reno for some gambling.  The Trooper asked his destination, and 
Mr. Loo said he was going to Indiana to visit friends.  During the conversation, Mr. Loo would 
not make eye contact with Trooper Green.  He continued to show signs of 
nervousness.  The artery at his 
temple continued pulsing, and sweat beaded up on his forehead.  Trooper Green found this unusual.  In his experience, a detainee's initial 
nervousness usually subsides or goes away when told he will get only a 
warning.

 
 

[¶10]     
Because 
the license plate on the silver car was registered to two vehicles, 
Trooper Green decided to check the vehicle identification number.  Leaving Mr. Loo in the patrol car, 
Trooper Green walked to the silver car to read the number.  This time, the odor of perfume was 
gone.  He began talking to the 
passenger in the car, and asked where they were going.  She said they were going to Indiana, but 
said she did not know why.  Asked 
about being in Reno, she said that they had not done any gambling.  This conversation was short, lasting 
only about a minute. 

 
 

[¶11]     
Trooper 
Green returned to the patrol car, and gave dispatch the vehicle identification 
number.  While waiting for a 
response, he again asked questions of Mr. Loo.  This time, Mr. Loo said they were 
going to Indiana to visit the passenger's family.  He continued to exhibit a high level of 
nervousness.  Trooper Green 
completed the paperwork on the warning ticket, gave the warning to Mr. Loo 
along with his driver's license and rental agreement, and told Mr. Loo he was 
free to go.

 
 

[¶12]     
As 
Mr. Loo was walking back toward his car, Trooper Green asked if he would answer 
a few more questions.  Mr. Loo said 
yes.  Trooper Green reminded Mr. Loo 
that he did not have to answer any more questions.  Mr. Loo said he understood, but was 
willing to answer questions.  
Trooper Green said that he had become "pretty suspicious about everything 
that was going on here," including the fact that Mr. Loo was very nervous 
and sweating.  Mr. Loo denied being 
nervous.  Nevertheless, Trooper 
Green believed that the circumstances were "consistent with things that I see on 
drug interdictions," so he asked Mr. Loo if there was anything illegal in the 
car.  Mr. Loo said no, without 
making eye contact with the trooper.  
Trooper Green asked if he could search the vehicle, and Mr. Loo's 
response was "just stammering and stuttering."  Trooper Green took that to mean 
that Mr. Loo did not consent to a search of the car.

 
 

[¶13]     
Trooper 
Green then said that he was going to have the dog check the car.  When Sandy was let out of the patrol 
car, she ran to the side of the vehicle, sniffed intently at the panel behind 
the rear wheel on the driver's side, and then sat down at a spot between the 
wheel well and the trunk.  This 
behavior was consistent with an alert to drugs.  When asked, Mr. Loo again denied that 
there was anything illegal in the car.  
Trooper Green then asked the passenger if there were any drugs in the 
car.  When she said no, the Trooper 
said that the dog had indicated there were drugs.  The passenger's response was, "I didn't 
put anything in the trunk."  This 
response seemed odd to Trooper Green because, from where the passenger was 
seated inside the vehicle, it would have been difficult for her to see that the 
dog had alerted near the trunk. 

 
 

[¶14]     
Trooper 
Green opened the trunk and found several duffle bags.  Inside one of the bags, he saw packages 
of what appeared to be marijuana.  
He placed Mr. Loo and the passenger under arrest.  At this time, Trooper Green learned the 
identity of the passenger, Yoeun Yoeuth.  
Later testing established that the material in the trunk was marijuana, 
about thirty-seven pounds in total.

 
 

[¶15]     
In 
separate cases, Mr. Loo and Ms. Yoeuth were each charged with possession of 
a controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2007), possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii), and conspiracy to 
deliver a controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1042 
and -1031(a)(ii).  Both Mr. Loo and 
Ms. Yoeuth filed motions to suppress the evidence found by Trooper Green 
when he searched the trunk of the car,1 and consented in writing to a joint 
hearing before the district court.  
At the hearing, Trooper Green was called as a witness by the State, 
cross-examined by counsel for Mr. Loo, and cross-examined by counsel for 
Ms. Yoeuth.  After the district 
court denied both motions, Mr. Loo entered a conditional guilty plea to two 
charges: possession with intent to deliver, and conspiracy to deliver.  Ms. Yoeuth entered a conditional guilty 
plea to a single count of conspiracy to deliver.  They reserved their rights to appeal the 
district court's decision denying their motions to 
suppress.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶16]     
When 
we review a district court's decision to deny motions to suppress, we defer to 
the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 8, 
146 P.3d 492, 495 (Wyo. 2006); O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 18, 
117 P.3d 401, 407 (Wyo. 2005).  "The 
evidence is viewed in a light favorable to the district court's determination, 
because that court had the opportunity to hear the evidence and assess the 
credibility of the witnesses."  Hicks v. State, 2008 WY 83, ¶ 13, 
187 P.3d 877, 880 (Wyo. 2008).  The 
issue of law  whether a search was unreasonable and in violation of 
constitutional rights  is reviewed de 
novo.  Fertig, ¶ 8, 146 P.3d  at 495; 
McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo. 1999).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶17]     
Mr. Loo 
and Ms. Yoeuth moved the district court to suppress the evidence  that is, the 
thirty-seven pounds of marijuana  Trooper Green found when he searched the 
trunk of the rental car.  Both 
contended that Trooper Green violated their constitutional rights throughout the 
encounter.  On appeal, Mr. Loo 
continues to maintain that he suffered violations of his rights under both 
Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, and under the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.  
Precedent suggests that such contentions are best analyzed in stages, 
with the appropriate legal standard applied at each stage.  See O'Boyle, ¶ 28, 117 P.3d  at 
409.  We will analyze five separate 
stages of the encounter:  
1) the initial stop;2 2) the initial detention and 
questioning; 3) the second round of questioning; 4) the canine sniff 
of the car; and 5) the search of the trunk.  At each stage, we must determine 
whether, under all of the circumstances, Trooper Green's actions were reasonable 
and in compliance with our state and federal constitutional prohibitions against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 

 
 

[¶18]     
Ms. 
Yoeuth's appeal is not a direct challenge to the validity of Trooper Green's 
actions.  Her position is that the 
district court incorrectly ruled that she did not have standing to pursue that 
challenge, thereby wrongfully denying her the opportunity to assert that Trooper 
Green violated her constitutional rights.  
We will turn first to the appeal issue raised by Mr. Loo, and then to the 
issues raised by Ms. Yoeuth.

 
 
Mr. 
Loo

 
 

The 
initial stop

 
 

[¶19]     
It 
is established that "a traffic stop initiated by a law enforcement officer after 
personally observing a traffic violation is supported by probable cause and does 
not violate Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution."  Fertig, ¶ 28, 146 P.3d  at 501.  The district court found that "Trooper 
Green followed the silver vehicle for approximately one-half of a mile and 
observed it tailgating a semi-tractor trailer."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-210(a) 
provides that "The driver of a vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more 
closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the 
vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway."  Violation of this provision is a 
misdemeanor.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-5-1201(a).  The district 
court concluded that Trooper Green's observation of the traffic violation 
provided probable cause to initiate a traffic stop.  The district court's findings are fully 
supported by the testimony of Trooper Green during the suppression hearing, and 
are not clearly erroneous.  The 
district court properly analyzed the facts under the applicable law, and we find 
no error in its conclusions.

 
 

[¶20]     
At 
the suppression hearing, defense counsel argued that, before observing the 
traffic violation, Trooper Green's initial suspicions were unfounded.  They suggested that he exaggerated the 
severity of Mr. Loo's braking, and that his suspicion about a problem with 
the license plate stemmed from his own misreading of an "8" as a "B."  In essence, the defendants asserted that 
Trooper Green stopped them only as a pretext to look for evidence of illegal 
drugs.  However, after hearing the 
testimony of Trooper Green, the district court had "little doubt that the facts 
of this case show anything but a pretextual traffic stop."  A law enforcement official who observes 
a traffic violation has probable cause to make a stop regardless of the 
officer's subjective motivation.  Fertig, ¶ 28, 146 P.3d  at 501.  When Trooper Green observed Mr. Loo's 
vehicle following another too closely in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 31-5-210(a) and -1201(a), he had probable cause to make the stop.  We affirm the district court's conclusion 
that "the initial traffic stop of [Mr.] Loo did not violate Article 1, 
§ 4 of the Wyoming Constitution."

 
 

[¶21]     
The 
result is the same under the federal constitution.  The district court accurately stated 
that the test, simply put, is whether "the initial stop [is] justified," and the 
focus is on "a fact-specific reasonableness inquiry."  O'Boyle, ¶ 46, 117 P.3d  at 
414.  The district court determined 
that Trooper Green was justified in stopping Mr. Loo, based on the specific fact 
that he had observed a traffic violation.  
This determination is sound.

 
 
The 
initial detention and questioning

 
 

[¶22]     
The 
detention and questioning of a person after being stopped by a law enforcement 
officer must be reasonable in "scope, duration, and intensity."  Fertig, ¶ 28, 146 P.3d  at 501.  Factors reviewed by the court include 
whether the officer engaged in persistent and unduly sustained questioning, and 
whether the questions asked extended to topics unrelated to the traffic 
offense.  O'Boyle, ¶ 32, 117 P.3d  at 
410.  Typically, a traffic stop must 
last no longer than it would reasonably take for an officer to "request a 
driver's license and vehicle registration; run a computer check; and issue a 
citation," and a driver should "be allowed to proceed without further delay once 
the officer determines that the driver has a valid license and is entitled to 
operate the vehicle."  Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 13, 
64 P.3d 700, 706 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 

[¶23]     
The 
district court did not make a specific finding of how long the initial detention 
lasted.3  It did find that the "time from the 
initial traffic stop to arrest lasted approximately thirty minutes."  The initial detention, only one stage in 
that encounter, was necessarily even shorter.  The district court also found that 
"Trooper Green asked approximately 12 to 17 questions," and that he "did not 
engage in sustained, persistent questioning and the questions he did ask did not 
expand the scope of the detention beyond the traffic offense."  The Trooper's questions were limited to 
the topics of Mr. Loo's "right to operate the silver vehicle and their 
travel plans."  Based on these 
findings, the district court concluded "that this detention was 
reasonable."  The findings are 
supported by the evidence of record, and are not clearly erroneous.  The district court's conclusions are 
fully consistent with Wyoming law.

 
 

[¶24]     
The 
conclusions are the same under federal law.  "The reasonableness 
of a traffic stop detention under the Fourth Amendment is determined by applying 
the two-part inquiry set forth in Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968): (1) 
whether the initial stop was justified; and (2) whether the officer's actions 
during the detention were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
justified the interference in the first instance."  Hembree v. State, 2006 WY 127, 
¶ 12, 143 P.3d 905, 908 (Wyo. 2006) (some internal punctuation 
omitted).  For purposes of this 
case, there is no appreciable difference between the federal standards and the 
Wyoming standards.  Because Mr. 
Loo's initial detention was permissible under the Wyoming 
Constitution, 
it was also permissible under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.

 
 
The 
second round of questioning

 
 

[¶25]     
At 
the end of his initial detention, Trooper Green returned the driver's license 
and rental agreement to Mr. Loo, and said he was free to go.  While Mr. Loo was walking back to 
his car, Trooper Green asked if he would answer a few more questions.  It is undisputed that Mr. Loo gave his 
consent, but that does not end the inquiry.  "[I]f a search or seizure is based upon 
the proposition that consent was given, there should be no question from the 
evidence that consent was really voluntary.'"  O'Boyle, ¶ 38, 117 P.3d  at 412, 
quoting Tobin v. State, 36 Wyo. 368, 
374, 255 P. 788, 789 (1927).  
Factors to be considered include whether the individual was told he could 
refuse the request for further contact, and whether the officer was courteous 
and respectful, or threatening, antagonistic, and coercive.  Seymour v. State, 2008 WY 61, ¶ 19, 
185 P.3d 671, 677 (Wyo. 2008).  

 
 

[¶26]     
The 
district court found that Trooper Green informed Mr. Loo that he was free to 
go.  It also found that "Trooper 
Green acted in a professional and non-antagonistic manner . . . and there is no 
indication that Trooper Green was threatening."  It further found that Mr. "Loo's consent 
was not the product of repeated badgering.  
Trooper Green only asked once whether he could ask . . . some further 
questions and [Mr.] Loo responded affirmatively."  Based on these findings, the district 
court concluded that "a reasonable person in [Mr.] Loo's position would have 
felt free to leave," and that Mr. "Loo's consent to further questioning was 
obtained voluntarily."  The findings 
are consistent with evidence in the record, and the district court's conclusions 
based on those findings are sound.  
We find no error in the district court's decision that Mr. Loo's consent 
to the second round of questioning was voluntary, and that the questioning did 
not violate his rights under the Wyoming Constitution.

 
 

[¶27]     
Again, 
the result is the same under federal standards.  "Under both constitutions, we examine 
the totality of the circumstances to determine if consent was voluntary."  Latta v. State, 2009 WY 35, ¶ 12, 
202 P.3d 1069, 1072 (Wyo. 2009).  
Factors to be considered include: "the demeanor of the law enforcement 
officer, whether the individual was told he could refuse the request, the 
presence of other law enforcement officers, the length of the detention and 
nature of the questioning before consent was given, and other coercive 
factors."  Id.  Applying these factors, the district 
court determined that Mr. Loo 
had validly consented to answer further questions, and Mr. Loo has provided no 
basis on appeal for overruling that determination.

 
 
The 
canine sniff

 
 

[¶28]     
Mr. 
Loo contends, and the State agrees, that if a person is not free to leave the 
scene while the dog performs its sniff, that person is effectively 
detained.  See, e.g., Seymour, ¶ 25, 185 P.3d  at 
678.  This 
detention is permissible only if based upon reasonable suspicion of illegal 
activity.  Id.  We must consider, first, whether the 
officer's actions were justified by a reasonably articulable suspicion of 
illegal activity, and second, whether the detention was reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances that justified the detention.  Damato, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d  at 
704-05.

 
 

[¶29]     
The 
district court provided this list of factors articulated by Trooper Green as 
giving rise to reasonable suspicion:

 
 
1) the 
odor of perfume that dissipated over time; 2) the Avis rental agreement in 
addition to the Hertz rental agreement; 3) [Mr.] Loo's unusually high 
nervousness; 4) Trooper Green's drug detection dog sniffing at [Mr.] Loo 
when [he] entered the patrol car; and 5) Trooper Green's knowledge from 
experience that drug traffickers often rent more than one vehicle in the course 
of transporting contraband.

 
 
In 
addition, the district court noted that Trooper Green received conflicting 
information from Mr. Loo and Ms. Yoeuth.  
He said they had gambled in Reno.  
She denied gambling.  He said 
they were going to Indiana to visit friends, then said they were going to visit 
her family.  She said they were 
going to Indiana, but did not know why.  
The record contains evidence sufficient to support the district court's 
findings on all of these factors.

 
 

[¶30]     
Based 
on all of these factors, the district court concluded that Trooper Green had 
reasonable and articulable suspicions of ongoing criminal activity.  The district court further concluded 
that the detention of Mr. Loo during the dog sniff was reasonably related 
to the circumstances.  Finally, we 
note that this detention could not have lasted more than a few minutes, because 
the dog was already on-scene, ready to be released from Trooper Green's patrol 
car.  Compare State 
v. Welch, 
873 P.2d 601, 605 (Wyo. 1994), in which the patrolman's reasonable suspicions 
justified a fifty-minute detention of Mr. Welch while the drug sniffing dog was 
brought to the scene by another officer.

 
 

[¶31]     
Mr. Loo's 
attorney attacks some of the factors listed by the district court.  For example, he questions Trooper 
Green's testimony about the perfume smell because, when the car was searched 
later, the source of the smell was never found.  On this basis, he contends that "Trooper 
Green's unsubstantiated statement that he smelled perfume is not an articulable 
fact leading to probable cause to search the car."  This argument amounts to an attack on 
Trooper Green's credibility.  But 
the district court found Trooper Green's testimony credible, and "issues 
of credibility and the weight to be given to testimony are matters to be 
resolved by the trier of fact, not an appellate court. Thus, we may not 
substitute our judgment for that of a trial court with respect to issues 
concerning credibility."  Carter-Wallop v. Wallop, 2004 WY 46, 
¶ 10, 88 P.3d 1022, 1025 (Wyo. 2004).  
Trooper 
Green further testified that, in his experience, perfume is sometimes used to 
mask the smell of an illegal substance.  
Contrary to Mr. Loo's contention, the perfume smell therefore 
constituted an articulable fact that, together with the other factors, gave rise 
to reasonable suspicion.  

 
 

[¶32]     
Mr. 
Loo relies on Damato, ¶ 20, 
64 P.3d  at 708, for the proposition 
that the "extreme nervousness' factor is generally considered of limited 
significance."4  The district court actually agreed, 
saying that 
all of the listed factors "are certainly of limited value by themselves," but 
together, were properly considered as part of "the totality of the 
circumstances."  This is entirely 
consistent with Damato, in which we 
said that each 
of the factors considered might be "innocent," but "under the totality of the 
circumstances test, individually innocuous factors can combine to arouse a 
reasonable suspicion for the experienced officer."  Id., ¶ 26, 64 P.3d  at 710.  Based 
on all of the circumstances, the district court concluded that "Trooper Green 
possessed the articulable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity" sufficient to 
detain Mr. Loo during the dog-sniff, and that the detention was reasonable in 
scope, duration, and intensity.  We 
perceive no basis for reversing that conclusion.

 
 

[¶33]     
Under 
the federal constitution, "To 
justify a detention after the initial reason for the stop has concluded, an 
officer must be able to point to the presence of specific and articulable facts 
and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person 
has committed or may be committing a crime."  Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 22, 
169 P.3d 538, 545 (Wyo. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).  As found by the district court, Trooper 
Green established that this requirement was satisfied.  The 
district court properly concluded that the detention during the dog sniff did 
not violate Mr. Loo's rights under the federal 
constitution.

 
 
The 
search of the trunk

 
 

[¶34]     
Under 
the United States Constitution, when a trained and reliable drug dog alerts 
during an exterior sniff of a vehicle, there is probable cause to search that 
vehicle.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Klinginsmith, 
25 F.3d 1507, 1510 (10th Cir. 1994).  
We have suggested that the same is true under the Wyoming 
Constitution.  State 
v. Williams, 
2004 WY 53, ¶¶ 20, 22, 90 P.3d 85, 90-92 (Wyo. 2004).  In any event, Mr. Loo has not 
provided the sort of "precise, analytically sound approach" required for us to 
make an independent analysis under our state constitution.  See VanKooten v. State, 2009 WY 59, ¶ 
12, ____ P.3d ____, ____ (Wyo. 2009).  
Trooper Green's testimony established that Sandy was a trained, reliable, 
and certified drug dog.  Sandy's 
alert near the trunk of Mr. Loo's rental car provided Trooper Green with 
probable cause to search the trunk.

 
 

[¶35]     
In 
sum, Trooper Green's initial stop of Mr. Loo was justified, and the initial 
detention was reasonable in scope, duration, and intensity.  Mr. Loo validly consented to his 
second round of questioning.  
Considering all of the circumstances, Trooper Green had grounds to detain 
Mr. Loo further while the dog sniffed the vehicle.  Once the dog alerted near the trunk, 
Trooper Green had probable cause to search the trunk.  We affirm the district court's denial of 
Mr. Loo's motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the 
search.

 
 

Ms. 
Yoeuth 

 
 

[¶36]     
Ms. 
Yoeuth's appeal involves two separate questions about standing.  The first question is whether she, as a 
passenger in the car, has standing to challenge the constitutionality of any of 
Trooper Green's actions.  If she 
does, the second question is whether she lost her standing to challenge Trooper 
Green's search of the car's trunk by denying any ownership interest in the trunk 
and its contents.  We will consider 
the two questions in this same order because that is how they arose in the 
course of proceedings below.

 
 
Standing 
as a passenger

 
 

[¶37]     
Ms. 
Yoeuth and Mr. Loo were charged in separate actions, and each filed a motion to 
suppress.  Both consented to a joint 
hearing on their motions.  As counsel for Ms. Yoeuth began her 
closing argument at the hearing, the district court asked if she believed "that 
Ms. Yoeuth has standing to allege a violation of her rights?"  Counsel said yes, asserting that Ms. 
Yoeuth, a passenger in the rental car, had a sufficient expectation of privacy 
in the vehicle to support her standing.  
Moments later came this exchange:

 
 
[COUNSEL]:  However, where Mr. Loo's own stop 
and seizure would be illegal, Ms. Yoeuth should be allowed to basically carry on 
the backtails of that because it would not be in the interests of justice for 
Mr. Loo's evidence to be suppressed and Ms. Yoeuth would almost literally be 
left holding the bag, even though she was not the driver of the vehicle.  There was no allegation that she was in 
violation of a Wyoming or federal law at the time of the 
stop.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  But hasn't the Wyoming 
Supreme Court ruled to the contrary?

 
 
[COUNSEL]:  That a passenger does have 
standing?

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Does not have 
standing.

 
 
[COUNSEL]:  Oh, does not have standing? . . .  But she does have standing to argue her 
own detention.  She was never told 
she was free to leave, and the testimony from the trooper is that they were 
about 17 miles east of Rawlins and about three miles shy of Walcott 
Junction.  She was in an area where, 
as a passenger, she could not have gotten up and left.  She was there.

 
 
            
She was also told by the trooper to sit tight because the paperwork would 
be done shortly.  Again, she was not 
told that she was free to leave . . .  
And she was also not told that it was only going to be a warning that was 
going to be issued.

 
 
            
And it is for those reasons that Ms. Yoeuth is incorporated into Mr. 
Loo's argument that if his stop is deemed illegal and the search is deemed 
illegal, then hers  the evidence against her should be suppressed as well.  And that's Ms. Yoeuth's argument for the 
suppression of the stop and search.

  

[¶38]     
On 
appeal, Ms. Yoeuth contends that this exchange amounted to an oral ruling by the 
district court that she did not have standing to challenge the validity of 
Trooper Green's actions because she was only a passenger in the car.5  If there was such a ruling, it was in 
error.  A passenger who is 
rightfully present in a vehicle has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and 
therefore has standing to challenge governmental invasions of that expected 
privacy:

 

Dennis 
Parkhurst as owner of the vehicle which was searched had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in his property, as would all property owners. And we 
find that Derrick Parkhurst as a guest in his brother's automobile could 
reasonably expect that the car in which he was a guest would be free from state 
encroachment. Thus, both appellants have standing to protest the search of the 
car's trunk under § 4, Art. I of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 
 

Parkhurst 
v. State, 
628 P.2d 1369, 1374 (Wyo. 1981).  
The same is true under the federal constitution.  Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 
259, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2408, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132, 141 (2007).

 
 

[¶39]     
However, 
our review of the transcript suggests that the district court was not making an 
oral ruling that she lacked standing, but was instead seeking clarification of 
whether Ms. Yoeuth asserted standing based upon alleged violations of her own 
rights, or of the rights of Mr. Loo.  
A person seeking to suppress evidence must claim a violation of her own 
rights, and cannot stand on the rights of others.  Garvin v. State, 2007 WY 190, 
¶ 12, 
172 P.3d 725, 728 (Wyo. 2007); Parkhurst, 628 P.2d  at 1374.  This interpretation of the district 
court's questions and comments is consistent with defense counsel's response, an 
assertion that Ms. Yoeuth "does have standing to argue her own 
detention."  We agree, but we do not 
think the district court denied Ms. Yoeuth's standing simply because she was a 
passenger in the vehicle.

 
 
Loss 
of standing by denial of ownership

 
 

[¶40]     
We 
turn to the second question, that of whether Ms. Yoeuth lost standing to 
challenge the search of the trunk.  
After the joint hearing on the motions to suppress, the district court 
issued separate decision letters.  
In Ms. Yoeuth's case, the district court did not explicitly address 
the constitutional validity of her stop, detention, or search.  It ruled instead that Ms. Yoeuth 
lacked standing to challenge the validity of Trooper Green's search of the trunk 
because she:

 

renounced 
any interest in the trunk of the rental vehicle by telling Trooper Green that 
she did not put anything in the trunk.  
[Ms.] Yoeuth did not take any precautions to maintain privacy in the 
vehicle's trunk.  Instead, her 
statement disavowed any interest in that area and ownership over its 
contents.

 
 
The 
district court cited Andrews v. 
State, 2002 WY 28, ¶ 20, 40 P.3d 708, 712-13 (Wyo. 2002), to establish 
that a person who denies or renounces ownership of property has no standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of a search of that property.  As for the counterpart under the federal 
constitution, the Andrews opinion 
stated that "The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently held that a 
defendant abandons any expectation of privacy when he unequivocally denies 
ownership of the property.  See, e.g., United States v. Garzon, 119 F.3d 1446, 
1449-52 (10th Cir. 1997)."  Id., ¶ 20, 40 P.3d  at 
713.

 
 

[¶41]     
On 
appeal, Ms. Yoeuth claims that the district court's decision was in error.  She contends that her comment to Trooper 
Green  "I didn't put anything in the trunk"  is not a sufficiently unequivocal 
denial of ownership to establish that she abandoned her expectations of privacy 
in the trunk or its contents.  We 
will evaluate Ms. Yoeuth's claim by comparing her circumstances with those in 
the two cases cited above.

 
 

[¶42]     
In 
the Wyoming case, Andrews, a deputy 
sheriff went to the home of Mr. Andrews' parents.  Mr. Andrews was staying there, 
apparently on a temporary basis.  
The parents gave the deputy permission to search their home.  While searching, the deputy asked 
Mr. Andrews for permission to search his belongings.  Mr. Andrews eventually consented, and 
handed the deputy two duffle bags.  
Andrews, ¶¶ 6-8, 40 P.3d  
at 710-11.  After looking inside the 
two bags, the deputy asked Mr. Andrews about a third duffle bag located 
nearby.  Mr. Andrews stated 
that the bag did not belong to him.  
The deputy asked Mr. Andrews this question:  "Do you understand that if it's not 
yours you have no standing to object to me searching it?"  Mr. Andrews affirmed his 
understanding.  Id., ¶ 9, 40 P.3d  at 711.  Because Mr. Andrews explicitly and 
repeatedly renounced ownership of the bag, we concluded "that he abandoned his 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the third duffel bag at the time of the 
search. He did not, therefore, have standing to challenge the constitutionality 
of the search of the third duffel bag."  
Id., ¶ 23, 40 P.3d  at 
713.

 
 

[¶43]     
The 
situation was quite different in Garzon, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals case.  Mr. Garzon was 
traveling on a bus that made a layover in Denver.  A police officer instructed Mr. Garzon 
and the rest of the passengers to take all of their carry-on luggage off the bus 
and present it to a drug-sniffing dog.  
Mr. Garzon took one of his backpacks, but left two others on the 
bus.  When the officer noticed the 
two backpacks remaining on the bus, he removed them and took them to the 
drug-sniffing dog.  The dog 
alerted.  The officer searched the 
backpack and found illegal drugs.  
Id., 119 F.3d  at 
1448.

 
 

[¶44]     
There 
were no identifying marks on the two backpacks.  The officer asked a couple of other 
passengers if they owned the backpacks, but he never asked that question of 
Mr. Garzon.  The appeals 
court

 
 
emphasize[d] 
that [Mr.] Garzon did nothing to manifest objectively an intent to abandon his 
backpacks that were left on the bus. [He] never once denied ownership of those 
backpacks. Indeed, he did not even stand silent when asked if anyone claimed 
them because no such inquiry was ever directed at [Mr.] Garzon or, so far as 
this record shows, was any such inquiry ever uttered within [his] hearing. 
Further, he never objectively evidenced an abandonment intent by clear and 
unequivocal physical acts, such as throwing them away, giving them to strangers, 
leaving them unguarded on public property or the like. To the contrary, he left 
them in a secure overhead internal luggage rack just as he was told he could by 
the bus driver.  

 
 

Id., 
119 F.3d  at 1450.  The court ruled 
that Mr. Garzon had not denied ownership of the backpacks, abandoned them, or 
renounced his expectation of privacy in them.  Accordingly, the officer's search 
without consent violated Mr. Garzon's constitutional 
rights.

 
 

[¶45]     
Ms. 
Yoeuth's circumstances are closer to Mr. Garzon's than to 
Mr. Andrews'.  Mr. Andrews 
explicitly and repeatedly said he did not own the bag, in response to direct and 
unambiguous questions from the deputy.  
Ms. Yoeuth was never asked any question about ownership, and she never 
denied ownership.  Like 
Mr. Garzon, she did not explicitly disclaim an interest in the trunk or its 
contents.  Ms. Yoeuth's comment that 
she did not put anything in the trunk was ambiguous about ownership of the 
trunk's contents.  It could have 
meant, for example, that she owned the property in the trunk, but Mr. Loo 
had put it there for her.  Her 
comment did not amount to an unequivocal denial of ownership.  We therefore disagree with the district 
court that Ms. Yoeuth abandoned her expectations of privacy in the trunk and its 
contents, and accordingly, we conclude that she did have standing to challenge 
the constitutionality of Trooper Green's search of the 
trunk.

 
 
Opportunity 
to assert her constitutional challenges

 
 

[¶46]     
Having 
concluded that Ms. Yoeuth had standing, in her own right, to challenge the 
initial stop, her subsequent detention, and the search of the trunk, we turn to 
the next part of her argument, as stated in the reply 
brief:

 
 
Ms. 
Yoeuth desired to dispute the existence of probable cause for the stop on two 
grounds and was prohibited from doing so by the 
trial court's erroneous oral ruling on standing.  The two grounds she desires to raise are 
the incredibility of the officer's testimony and the conduct of the officer in 
creating the circumstances that he used to justify the 
stop.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  This contention is 
contradicted by the record.

 
 

[¶47]     
As 
noted above, Ms. Yoeuth agreed to a joint hearing with Mr. Loo on 
their motions to suppress.  At the 
joint hearing, counsel for Ms. Yoeuth was given an opportunity to 
participate fully and completely in the hearing, and she did so.  She had an opportunity to cross-examine 
Trooper Green, and she did so.  The 
prosecution made one objection during this cross-examination, and it was 
overruled.  None of the evidence 
offered by Ms. Yoeuth was excluded by the district court.  Even if it harbored doubts about 
Ms. Yoeuth's standing, the district court placed no boundaries or limits on 
the questions her counsel asked Trooper Green.  The district court's questions about 
standing arose during closing argument, but did not prevent or deter Ms. 
Yoeuth's counsel from making any arguments she chose on Ms. Yoeuth's 
behalf.  In short, Ms. Yoeuth did 
have an opportunity to present all of the facts she chose to offer, and all of 
the arguments she chose to make, in support of her claim that her constitutional 
rights had been violated.

 
 

[¶48]     
As 
counsel for Ms. Yoeuth told the district court in the exchange quoted above, 
"Ms. Yoeuth is incorporated into Mr. Loo's argument that if his stop is deemed 
illegal and the search is deemed illegal, then hers  the evidence against her 
should be suppressed as well."  The 
district court denied Mr. Loo's motion to suppress.  It is apparent from the record that the 
district court either denied Ms. Yoeuth's motion implicitly, or would have 
done so explicitly.

  

[¶49]     
The 
record contains the entire transcript of the joint hearing on the motions to 
suppress, so all of the evidence is before us.  The decision letters in 
Ms. Yoeuth's case and Mr. Loo's case contain very nearly identical 
recitations of the facts, and deal with Trooper Green's interactions with both 
Ms. Yoeuth and Mr. Loo.  From these 
detailed findings of fact, we can determine how the district court evaluated the 
credibility of the witnesses, and weighed the evidence.  Compare Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, N.A., v. 
Hodder, 2006 WY 128, ¶ 32, 144 P.3d 401, 413 (Wyo. 2006) ("[T]he trial 
court's decision letter sets forth detailed findings of fact, including its 
assessment of witness credibility, making it possible for this Court to review 
without re-weighing disputed evidence.").  
We have affirmed the district court's conclusions of law in 
Mr. Loo's case.  The same legal 
standards apply in Ms. Yoeuth's case.

 
 

[¶50]     
Trooper 
Green testified that he observed a traffic violation when the silver car 
followed another vehicle too closely.  
Ms. Yoeuth wants to assert now that the officer's testimony was not 
credible, but 
the district court found that testimony credible as a factual matter, and 
sufficient as a matter of law to establish probable cause to stop the car.  Ms. Yoeuth presented no authority, 
either to the district court or on appeal, suggesting that an officer with 
probable cause for a traffic stop is permitted to stop the driver but 
constitutionally prohibited from stopping the passenger.

 
 

[¶51]     
Ms. Yoeuth's 
detention by Trooper Green was of lesser scope than Mr. Loo's, involving even 
fewer questions and broaching no topics beyond those found acceptable in 
Mr. Loo's case.  Her detention 
was of comparable duration.  It was 
of lesser intensity, as she remained in the rental car while Mr. Loo was 
taken to the patrol car.  There is 
no indication that Trooper Green behaved any differently toward Ms. Yoeuth 
than he did toward Mr. Loo.  
Because Ms. Yoeuth's detention was reasonable in scope, duration, 
and intensity, it did not violate her constitutional rights. 

 
 

[¶52]     
The 
district court found that Trooper Green had reasonably 
articulable suspicions of illegal activity allowing him to detain Mr. Loo 
during the dog sniff.  The same 
suspicions applied to Ms. Yoeuth.  
The district court concluded that the 
dog's alert at the trunk provided Trooper Green with probable cause to search 
the trunk.  That conclusion applies 
equally to Mr. Loo and Ms. Yoeuth.  
In sum, Ms. Yoeuth 
did have a full opportunity to present the district court with all of the facts 
and arguments in support of her motion to suppress.  She did so, but provided no basis for 
the district court to reach a different result in her case than it did in 
Mr. Loo's.  On appeal, she 
provided no basis for this Court to reach a different result.  Accordingly, we affirm the district 
court's denial of Ms. Yoeuth's motion to suppress the evidence. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶53]     
We 
affirm the district court's denial of the motions to suppress in both Mr. Loo's 
case and Ms. Yoeuth's case.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Ms. 
Yoeuth also moved to suppress statements she made to a law enforcement official 
after her arrest, asserting that the interview was improperly conducted after 
she had invoked her right to an attorney.  
The district court denied that motion, and Ms. Yoeuth has stated that she 
is not advancing this as an appeal issue. 

 
 

2Mr. 
Loo contested the validity of the initial traffic stop before the district 
court, but does not pursue that issue on appeal.  It is still necessary to analyze this 
part of the encounter, however, because the validity of the initial stop is 
integral to the decision in Ms. Yoeuth's appeal.  For the sake of organization, we choose 
to include our analysis here.

 
 

3In 
many cases like this, a videotape of the encounter is included in the record, 
allowing us to determine the duration of a detention.  No videotape is available in this 
case.  Trooper Green testified that 
the video camera installed in his patrol vehicle was not working at the 
time.

4That 
case also says that "the telling information is whether the citizen calmed after 
the initial few minutes of the encounter. Extreme and continued nervousness, 
however, is entitled to somewhat more weight."  Damato, ¶ 21, 64 P.3d  at 708 (some 
internal punctuation omitted).  
Trooper Green testified that Mr. Loo remained nervous even after learning 
that he was only getting a warning.  

 
 

5If 
the district court did intend this as an oral ruling, that was not reflected in 
its written decision letter.  The 
decision letter is silent on the question of Ms. Yoeuth's standing as a 
passenger.