Title: P. v. Carter

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ISHMAEL MICHAEL CARTER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S278262 
 
Third Appellate District 
C094949 
 
Yolo County Superior Court 
CRF19987081 
 
 
May 20, 2024 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. CARTER 
S278262 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
In 2007, defendant Ishmael Michael Carter was 
committed to Coalinga State Hospital pending trial on a petition 
to commit him as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq., the Sexually 
Violent Predator Act (SVP Act).  After awaiting trial for over 12 
years, Carter sought to enforce his due process right to a timely 
trial by filing a motion to dismiss the petition.  In addition, 
Carter filed a motion under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 
118 (Marsden) to replace the Yolo County Public Defender’s 
Office and his deputy public defender as his counsel because he 
believed the office would be disqualified from litigating the 
motion to dismiss on his behalf. 
Following a hearing, the trial court denied Carter’s 
Marsden motion, declined to rule on the motion to dismiss, and 
conducted 
a 
trial 
resulting 
in 
Carter’s 
indeterminate 
commitment as an SVP.  The Court of Appeal affirmed.  Carter 
contends the trial court’s Marsden inquiry was insufficient and 
requires full reversal of the judgment or, in the alternative, 
conditional reversal pending reconsideration of his Marsden 
motion and potential litigation of his motion to dismiss.  The 
Attorney General asserts that the trial court properly denied the 
Marsden motion with respect to Carter’s public defender at the 
time but concedes that the trial court should have investigated 
whether a potential conflict of interest would have prevented 
her from litigating the motion to dismiss.  The Attorney General 
PEOPLE v. CARTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
contends that remand should be limited to investigating that 
potential conflict. 
We hold that the trial court conducted an insufficient 
Marsden inquiry and erred in instructing Carter to file his 
motion to dismiss pro se.  But we agree with the Attorney 
General that “[f]ull reversal at this stage would be premature.”  
We conditionally reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
and remand with directions to conditionally vacate the SVP 
judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
I. 
On May 29, 2007, the Yolo County District Attorney’s 
Office filed a petition to commit Carter as an SVP.  In August 
2007, the trial court found probable cause to commit Carter to 
the custody of the State Department of State Hospitals at 
Coalinga State Hospital pending his SVP trial.  After Carter 
waived time for trial to receive treatment, his trial was 
repeatedly continued for over 12 years, often at the request of 
Carter’s counsel.  During that period, Carter was continually 
represented by the Yolo County Public Defender’s Office.  Chief 
Deputy Public Defender Allison Zuvela primarily appeared as 
counsel for Carter for the first two years after the petition was 
filed.  Deputy Public Defender Brett Bandley primarily 
appeared as counsel for Carter for the following six years.  
Zuvela resumed as counsel in October 2015. 
On December 13, 2019, Carter filed a pro se Marsden 
motion and a pro se motion to dismiss the petition.  The Marsden 
motion requested “disqualification of the public defenders office 
and the Chief Deputy Public Defender, Allison Zuvela.”  The 
motion to dismiss asserted that Carter “has been at Coalinga 
PEOPLE v. CARTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
state Hospital for . . . 12 years, in violation of [People v. Superior 
Court (Vasquez) (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 36].” 
On January 15, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the 
Marsden motion.  Carter explained that he filed the motion 
because “I’ve been sitting here for 12 and a half years and there’s 
been multiple delays that was not at my request.”  Carter 
further explained that when he was represented by Bandley, 
there were times “when I had to leave messages that it feels like 
the Public Defender’s Office abandoned us because we’re not 
hearing from nobody.  And a lot of times when he was 
supposed — when the trials or my court hearings was delayed, 
I wouldn’t find out until I called in and the secretary was telling 
me.  So I wasn’t being informed a lot of times when he was on 
the case.”  With respect to Zuvela, Carter acknowledged that 
“[a]side from having a trial,” there was nothing “she should be 
doing that she hasn’t done yet.”  He said, “Every time I 
requested something she’s actually pushed to get it done if she 
could.  If there’s some kind of delay, when she had the 
opportunity she notified me and let me know either by letter or 
she’s called me.” 
In response, 
Zuvela explained that “it was my 
understanding from Mr. Bandley that they were — he wanted 
Mr. Carter to do as much [of] the [sex offender treatment] 
program as possible . . . .  One of the issues and problems with 
what is going on in Coalinga is they keep on [changing] the 
program so they can’t finish the program.  But in November of 
2017, Mr. Carter indicated to me, he’s like, ‘Okay, I’m ready.  I 
have it together and I want my trial.’ ”  Zuvela explained that at 
that time Carter had to be reevaluated by medical professionals.  
That process took over two years and had just been completed 
days prior to the Marsden hearing.  She added, “I understand 
PEOPLE v. CARTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
that it’s frustrating for Mr. Carter, but I think we’re in a good 
position to go to trial.”   
Carter clarified that he “was informed that this process 
was necessary in order to get the other portion of the claim taken 
care of.”  He said that Zuvela was “aware of everything that is 
going on and the continual delays that have been hampering the 
functioning of this hospital.”  He concluded, “I give her credit 
when I did give her information she needed I — she went after 
it.  It’s getting the hospital to conform to what the law says 
which is the problem.”  Zuvela added, “I think Coalinga State 
Hospital is extremely frustrating and . . . they keep changing 
the [sex offender treatment program].  It’s my opinion it’s so no 
one can ever graduate, but that’s my opinion.” 
The court denied Carter’s Marsden motion, explaining, 
“From what Ms. Zuvela has told us today, I’m satisfied that she’s 
been diligent trying to push the case forward.  She hasn’t 
necessarily delayed the process.  She’s promptly communicated 
with you and described what happened.  From my vantage point 
she has done her job as your lawyer.  It doesn’t mean in a perfect 
world this couldn’t have happened sooner, but many of the 
reasons of why it’s so slow is not because of what she did or didn’t 
do, it’s because of what other people did or didn’t do.” 
The court then asked Zuvela if she had discussed Carter’s 
motion to dismiss with him, and she confirmed she had.  She 
explained, “he’s saying he’s frustrated he hasn’t had his trial, 
and so I would have to say that I am not living up to my ethical 
duties to pursue this for trial, and — in order to have that — 
have that be granted.  [¶] So in essence, the first step was a 
Marsden hearing.  I don’t think I’ve breached my ethical duties 
and I think I’ve been trying to fight for speedy trial.”  Zuvela 
PEOPLE v. CARTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
then described Vasquez as “the case where he said he wanted a 
speedy trial and he didn’t get the speedy trial and case is 
dismissed and Mr. Vasquez was released from Coalinga State 
Hospital on those grounds because his lawyer didn’t push for a 
trial in a timely manner and his lawyer did not meet their 
ethical duties.”  Zuvela explained, “if the Court did not grant the 
Marsden motion, and that I have done what I need to do, I don’t 
think I can ethically pursue [the motion to dismiss].” 
The trial court said to Carter, “Based on what Ms. Zuvela 
has said, you could still pursue this motion, but I don’t think she 
can represent you and advocate for it.  So you would be 
representing yourself and I would give the DA an opportunity to 
respond.  Do you wish to pursue this motion representing 
yourself?”  Carter replied, “I can’t represent myself to that 
extent . . . .”  He then described Vasquez as the case in which “he 
was sitting here for 17 years and never given the trial he 
requested, and they didn’t just put it on his attorney, but they 
put it also on the DA’s office for the delay . . . .”  The court said 
to Carter, “You can pursue that if you wish.  One thing the Court 
would need to see is a declaration — a statement by you under 
oath saying these are the facts and the dates and the events that 
support this request.  [¶] In the text of the motion you’ve made 
reference to things but I can’t necessarily say that I can tell from 
that there are facts that would justify the result that you’re 
asking for.”  The court continued, “If you want to pursue [the 
motion to dismiss],” “you may have to do it on your own because 
it sounds like your attorney’s position is since she is still your 
attorney and she would have to say she didn’t do her job right 
and she doesn’t believe that’s true, she can’t argue on behalf of 
you on this motion because at least it in part requires her to say 
she didn’t do her job right.”   
PEOPLE v. CARTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
The court reiterated, “If you want to pursue this, I would 
ask that you submit at least a declaration to add to your motion.  
[¶] Until you do that, I won’t be asking the district attorney to 
file a response because there isn’t enough here right now to 
grant your motion, and I don’t know if there will be or not, but 
we need a declaration for the motion to be presentable.”  Carter 
said, “It’s just I have to have help in doing that stuff because I’m 
not really versed in the law.”  The court responded, “I’ll leave 
that issue in your hands, and I won’t receive anything more from 
you.  [¶] We’ll never talk about this motion again and if you want 
to pursue it, you need to file a declaration and you’ll send that 
to your attorney or to the Court and then we’ll bring it up again.” 
Carter did not make further efforts to file the motion to 
dismiss.  Around May 2021, Supervising Deputy Public 
Defender Monica Brushia took over as counsel for Carter.  On 
September 13, 2021, he waived his right to a jury trial, and a 
bench trial began.  Following trial, the court held that Carter 
was an SVP and ordered him committed for an indeterminate 
term to Coalinga State Hospital. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of Carter’s 
Marsden motion, explaining that “the trial court correctly 
perceived that the delay was not attributable to Zuvela but 
others, including the district attorney’s office.”  (People v. Carter 
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 739, 750 (Carter).)  “[T]o the extent 
defendant wanted a public defender who would push harder for 
trial,” the court explained that Carter “got what he wanted in 
replacement of the prior attorney with Zuvela.”  (Ibid.)  The 
court concluded that it was a “tactical decision” to have Carter 
“complete sex offender treatment at Coalinga State Hospital 
before requesting trial” and that Carter “had previously 
assented to” that decision.  (Id. at p. 752.)  The court then 
PEOPLE v. CARTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
characterized Carter’s motion to dismiss as “functionally a 
Marsden motion or a quasi-Marsden motion, because it created 
a conflict between the public defender, who did not believe she 
and the public defender’s office had failed to diligently pursue a 
timely trial on his behalf, and defendant, who maintained he 
had been denied a speedy trial while represented by the public 
defender’s office.”  (Id. at p. 750.) 
Justice Robie agreed that “the trial court did not err in 
denying [Carter’s] Marsden motion” but disagreed with “the 
majority’s conclusion that defendant’s requested motion to 
dismiss for violation of his right to a timely trial was 
functionally the equivalent of a Marsden motion or a quasi-
Marsden motion.”  (Carter, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 760 
(conc. & dis. opn. of Robie, J.).)  Justice Robie further concluded 
that the trial court erred under Wood v. Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 
261, which requires the court “ ‘to inquire into the possibility of 
a conflict of interest’ ” and “ ‘adequately act in response to what 
its inquiry discovers.’ ”  (Carter, at p. 767 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
Robie, J.).)  Justice Robie explained that by focusing only on 
whether Zuvela had a conflict of interest with respect to herself, 
the trial court did not investigate any conflict of interest she may 
have had with respect to “the district attorney’s office, 
Coalinga[,] . . . defense counsel who represented [Carter] prior 
to Zuvela,” or “the trial court.”  (Id. at pp. 768–769 (conc. & dis. 
opn. of Robie, J.).)   
We granted review to consider whether the trial court 
deprived Carter of effective assistance of counsel by failing to 
appoint substitute counsel to evaluate and potentially argue his 
motion to dismiss after appointed counsel refused to consider 
the motion based on an asserted conflict in arguing her own 
ineffectiveness. 
PEOPLE v. CARTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
II. 
As noted, the issue before us arises from two motions that 
Carter filed pro se in the trial court:  a Marsden motion and a 
motion to dismiss.  The two motions are interrelated in the 
circumstances here, though they are governed by different legal 
frameworks. 
A. 
Carter’s Marsden motion was based on his statutory right 
to effective assistance of counsel.  (See Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 6603, subd. (a); People v. Hill (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 646, 652.)  
This right includes the right to “conflict-free representation.”  
(People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 419.)  Individuals 
subject to SVP petitions have a due process right to a Marsden 
hearing.  (Hill, at p. 652.)  “[S]ubstitute counsel should be 
appointed when . . . necessary under the Marsden standard, 
that is whenever, in the exercise of its discretion, the court finds 
that the defendant has shown that a failure to replace the 
appointed attorney would substantially impair the right to 
assistance of counsel . . . .”  (People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 
684, 696 (Smith).)  “Essentially, a claim of conflict of interest 
constitutes a form of ineffective assistance of counsel.”  (People 
v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 435.) 
Carter’s motion to dismiss was based on an asserted 
violation of due process.  As we recently explained, “individuals 
facing commitment under the SVP Act have a due process right 
to a timely trial.”  (Camacho v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 
354, 379 (Camacho).)  “SVP trials are unlike criminal trials in 
that they are not aimed primarily at establishing an individual’s 
liability for past events, but instead at establishing the 
individual’s present need for mental health treatment.”  (Id. at 
PEOPLE v. CARTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
p. 377.)  “Once a judge has found probable cause to believe an 
individual is an SVP, that individual is held in a state hospital 
and begins to receive mental health treatment — even before 
trial is ever held.  For this reason, both sides may have a 
common interest in delaying trial.  From the individual’s 
perspective, allowing more time for treatment may ultimately 
improve the chance of success at trial, insofar as treatment may 
help address a mental disorder that a jury might otherwise find 
poses a risk to the public.”  (Ibid.) 
To determine whether an alleged SVP’s due process right 
to a timely trial has been violated, we consider the factors set 
forth in Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 530–531:  “the 
length of the pretrial delay, the reason for the delay, the 
defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant 
caused by the delay.”  (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 380, 
citing Barker, at p. 530.)  “[T]he permissibility of pretrial delay 
depends to a great extent on who bears responsibility for it and 
why.”  (Camacho, at p. 384.) 
“In general, delays sought by the defendant’s counsel 
weigh against the defendant’s claim of a speedy trial violation.  
([Vermont v. Brillon (2009) 556 U.S. 81, 90–91].)  This rule flows 
from the ordinary principle that an ‘ “attorney is the 
[defendant’s] agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance 
of the litigation,” ’ such that the client must assume the 
consequences of the attorney’s delay.  [Citation.]  [¶] Applying 
this principle in Brillon . . . , the United States Supreme Court 
reversed a state court’s decision that pretrial delay should be 
charged against the state when the blame for the delay lay with 
court-appointed counsel for an indigent criminal defendant.  
[Citation.]  The high court explained that ‘assigned counsel 
generally are not state actors for purposes of a speedy-trial 
PEOPLE v. CARTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
claim . . . .  [¶] . . . Their “inability or unwillingness . . . to move 
the case forward,” [citation], may not be attributed to the State 
simply because they are assigned counsel.’  [Citation.]  The court 
noted that the analysis might be different if, as Brillon had 
argued, the delay was shown to result from ‘a systemic 
“breakdown in the public defender system.” ’ ”  (Camacho, 
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 385.) 
As we explained in Camacho, the Courts of Appeal in 
recent years have applied these principles in the SVP context.  
In Vasquez, “the Court of Appeal reviewed the record of the 17-
year delay in that case and affirmed the superior court’s finding 
that delays sought by defense counsel could not be attributed to 
Vasquez himself, but instead resulted from an institutional 
breakdown related to budget cuts and understaffing in the 
public defender’s office that handled his case.  [Citation.]  
Concluding the delay violated Vasquez’s due process right to a 
timely SVP trial, the court dismissed the petition for 
commitment. 
“Two years later, the appellate court in People v. DeCasas 
[(2020)] 54 Cal.App.5th 785 (DeCasas) confronted a 13-year 
delay caused by ‘the same reduction of the SVP unit staff’ at the 
same public defender’s office as in Vasquez. [Citation.]  
Following the logic of Vasquez, the court found a due process 
violation and dismissed the petition for commitment.  [Citation.] 
“Finally, the court in [In re Butler (2020)] 55 Cal.App.5th 
614 dismissed a petition for commitment after finding a due 
process violation based on pretrial delay.  Though there were 
‘several factors . . . suggesting that the public defender’s 
mismanagement of this case went beyond any particular 
attorney’s performance,’ the court found that even if those 
PEOPLE v. CARTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
circumstances did not constitute systemic breakdown in the 
public defender’s office, it would be ‘fundamentally unfair to 
hold Butler personally and solely accountable for delays caused 
by his counsel’ where the record showed that counsel refused to 
convey Butler’s explicit demands for trial, failed to demand a 
probable cause hearing or consult with a defense expert, and did 
not ever ‘come close to being ready for trial.’ ”  (Camacho, supra, 
15 Cal.5th at p. 378.) 
B. 
With these principles in mind, we evaluate the trial court’s 
denial of Carter’s Marsden motion and its conclusion that 
Zuvela could not litigate the motion to dismiss on Carter’s 
behalf. 
Having both motions before it, the trial court should have 
considered Carter’s Marsden motion in the context of his 
proposed motion to dismiss.  In other words, the court should 
not have simply determined whether Zuvela had “done her job” 
up to that point but should have asked whether a conflict of 
interest would have prevented Zuvela from effectively 
investigating and potentially litigating Carter’s motion to 
dismiss.  (Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 695 [a Marsden ruling 
“is forward-looking in the sense that counsel would be 
substituted in order to provide effective assistance in the future” 
(italics omitted)].)  Carter called attention to the relationship 
between his two motions by saying he “was informed that [the 
Marsden] process was necessary in order to get the other portion 
of the claim taken care of.”  Focusing on this relationship was 
essential to adequately evaluating the Marsden motion. 
Regardless of whether Zuvela had “done her job,” other 
factors may have been relevant to Carter’s motion to dismiss.  In 
PEOPLE v. CARTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
Vasquez, the record showed that despite defense counsel’s best 
efforts, they were unable to adequately prepare for trial due to 
“dramatic budget cuts” in the public defender’s office.  (People v. 
Superior Court (Vasquez), supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 73.)  At a 
hearing on Vasquez’s motion to dismiss, one of his former public 
defenders testified that she was “ ‘doing what [she] needed to 
do’ ” and that “ ‘Mr. Vasquez was a priority,’ ” but staffing 
shortages slowed her progress on his case and she ultimately 
was unable to take it to trial because she was transferred out of 
the SVP unit.  (Id. at p. 53.)  This testimony simultaneously 
demonstrated that the attorney had fulfilled her duty to move 
the case forward and supported the court’s finding that an 
“institutional breakdown” in the public defender system caused 
the delay in holding Vasquez’s trial.  (Id. at p. 54.)  The court in 
DeCasas similarly found undue delay based in part on defense 
counsel’s description of “the deleterious effects of the staffing 
cuts on their ability to effectively represent their clients.”  
(People v. DeCasas, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 810.)  Both cases 
concluded that the trial courts did not adequately guard against 
the delays.  (Id. at p. 810; Vasquez, at p. 81.)  And in both cases, 
the Courts of Appeal held that the pretrial delay warranted 
dismissal of the SVP petitions.  (DeCasas, at p. 813; Vasquez, at 
p. 83.) 
By claiming that while Bandley was his attorney, there 
were “multiple delays . . . not at [his] request” and times when 
it “fe[lt] like the Public Defender’s Office abandoned us,” Carter 
attempted to show an institutional breakdown like those 
identified in Vasquez and DeCasas.  Carter also identified delays 
by the hospital as “the problem.”  And Zuvela confirmed the 
hospital had repeatedly changed the sex offender treatment 
program, prolonging Carter’s treatment.  In addition, Carter 
PEOPLE v. CARTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
asserted in his motion to dismiss that the trial court “never 
exercised reasonable control over all the proceedings connected 
with this pending litigation” and had not fulfilled its “obligation 
to act proactively to protect [his] right to a timely trial.”  He also 
identified “communication between [Zuvela] and the DA’s office” 
as a reason for the delay.  These claims had nothing to do with 
Zuvela’s performance — as the trial court said, “many of the 
reasons of why it’s so slow is not because of what she did or didn’t 
do, it’s because of what other people did or didn’t do” — and the 
record does not reveal any reason why she could not have 
investigated and potentially litigated these issues on Carter’s 
behalf.  Given the trial court’s lack of inquiry into whether 
Zuvela had any conflict that would have prevented her from 
litigating Carter’s motion to dismiss, its denial of the Marsden 
motion rests on error of law, constituting an abuse of discretion.  
(In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159.) 
The Attorney General points out that Zuvela may have 
been unable to litigate delays allegedly caused by Bandley due 
to a potential conflict of interest.  But it is also possible that 
delays by Bandley were due to institutional deficiencies or to his 
strategy for Carter to complete treatment before requesting 
trial.  Under the latter circumstances, Zuvela might not have 
had any reason to litigate her colleague’s performance.  
Although the Court of Appeal characterized the delay as a 
“tactical decision” (Carter, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 752), the 
trial court did not inquire into these issues, and after the trial 
court left Carter without counsel on his motion to dismiss, it was 
not litigated further.  (See id. at p. 773 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
Robie, J.) [a reviewing court cannot “decide the merits of the 
motion to dismiss based on a record that does not provide an 
opportunity for meaningful review because defendant was 
PEOPLE v. CARTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
denied his statutory right to counsel”].)  On this record, reversal 
is required no matter the applicable standard of prejudice 
because it cannot be said whether Bandley’s delay was a “tactic” 
or whether Carter “had previously assented to” it.  (Carter at 
p. 752.)   
As Justice Robie observed, the trial court compounded its 
error when it left Carter to pursue his motion to dismiss without 
the assistance of counsel.  (Carter, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 770 (conc. & dis. opn. of Robie, J.).)  “Motions and briefs of 
parties represented by counsel must be filed by such counsel.”  
(People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 173.)  A narrow exception 
to this rule allows the filing of “pro se motions regarding 
representation, including requests for new counsel.”  (Ibid.)  But 
Carter’s motion to dismiss, which was distinct from his Marsden 
motion, was not a request for new counsel.  Indeed, in response 
to the trial court’s instruction that Carter would have to proceed 
on his own, Carter made clear that he wanted the assistance of 
counsel in preparing and filing his motion to dismiss. 
C. 
We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying Carter’s Marsden motion without an 
adequate inquiry and further erred in denying Carter the 
assistance of counsel in determining whether to file a motion to 
dismiss.  The Attorney General concedes that a limited remand 
in these circumstances is appropriate, and we agree.  Whether 
Carter was denied his right to substitute counsel or his right to 
a timely trial appear distinct from the issues of whether Carter 
“has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or 
more victims,” “has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes 
[him] a danger to the health and safety of others,” and should be 
PEOPLE v. CARTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
committed as an SVP.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (a)(1).)  
“ ‘[W]hen the validity of a [judgment] depends solely on an 
unresolved or improperly resolved factual issue which is distinct 
from [the judgment], such an issue can be determined at a 
separate post-judgment hearing and if at such hearing the issue 
is resolved in favor of the People, the [judgment] may stand.’ ”  
(People v. Moore (2006) 39 Cal.4th 168, 176–177; see People v. 
Minor (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 194, 200.) 
On remand, the trial court should conduct a Marsden 
hearing to determine whether a conflict of interest would 
prevent the Yolo County Public Defender’s Office from litigating 
Carter’s motion to dismiss.  If so, then the Marsden motion 
should be granted, and an attorney not affiliated with that office 
should be appointed to evaluate Carter’s motion to dismiss.  (See 
People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change 
Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1139 [“When a conflict of 
interest requires an attorney’s disqualification from a matter, 
the disqualification normally extends vicariously to the 
attorney’s entire law firm.”]; 59 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 27, 29 (1976) 
[“Where two deputies represent conflicting interests in the same 
case, it is the same as one public defender representing both 
interests.”]; see also People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 84 
[“if a defendant requests substitute counsel and makes a 
showing during a Marsden hearing that the right to counsel has 
been substantially impaired, substitute counsel must be 
appointed as attorney of record for all purposes”].)  If the 
Marsden motion is denied, the Yolo County Public Defender’s 
Office should have the opportunity to evaluate Carter’s motion 
to dismiss.  In either case, if the motion to dismiss is filed and 
the trial court determines that Carter’s due process rights were 
violated, then the court should address whether dismissal is the 
PEOPLE v. CARTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
appropriate remedy — a question we have not yet addressed in 
the SVP context.  (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 382, fn. 5.) 
If the Marsden motion is granted but a motion to dismiss 
is not filed, or if it is filed and properly denied, then the court 
should consider whether the Marsden error affected the 
judgment.  
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand with instructions to direct the trial court (1) to 
conditionally vacate its September 27, 2021 order finding Carter 
a sexually violent predator within the meaning of Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 6600 et seq., (2) to vacate its January 
15, 2020 order denying Carter’s motion pursuant to Marsden, 
supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, (3) to reconsider that motion consistent 
with this opinion, (4) to give counsel an opportunity to evaluate 
Carter’s motion to dismiss, and (5) to determine whether any 
Marsden error affected the judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Carter 
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Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 86 Cal.App.5th 739 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
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Opinion No. S278262 
Date Filed:  May 20, 2024 
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Court:  Superior  
County:  Yolo 
Judge:  Daniel M. Wolk 
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Counsel: 
 
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant.  
 
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, 
Clara M. Levers, Julie A. Hokans, Rachelle A. Newcomb and Clara M. 
Levers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion):  
 
John L. Staley 
Attorney at Law 
12463 Rancho Bernardo Road, No. 372 
San Diego, CA 92128 
(858) 335-2713 
 
Clara M. Levers 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 210-7773