Title: Pepin v. Allstate Insurance Co.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Pepin v. Allstate Insurance Co. (2003-037); 176 Vt. 307; 848 A.2d 269

2003-037

[Filed 27-Feb-2004]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2004 VT 18

                                No. 2003-037

  Ronald L. Pepin	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Chittenden Superior Court

  Allstate Insurance Company	                 September Term, 2003

  Matthew I. Katz, J.

  Stephen S. Blodgett and Jason J. Sawyer of Blodgett, Watts & Volk, P.C.,
    Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

  Patricia S. Orr and Cassandra S. Edson of Unsworth Powell Barra Orr &
    Bredice, PLC, Essex Junction, for Defendant-Appellee.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Allen, C.J.
            (Ret.), Specially Assigned

       ¶  1.  ALLEN, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.    Plaintiff Ronald
  L. Pepin appeals from the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of his
  complaint against defendant Allstate Insurance Company.  Plaintiff argues
  that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint because he
  established a prima facie case that the removal of personal property from
  his home by a court-appointed master constituted "theft" covered by his
  homeowner's insurance policy.  We affirm.
   
       ¶  2.  In March 1998, pursuant to divorce proceedings, plaintiff and
  his wife were ordered to sell two homes that they owned in South
  Burlington.  Given the animosity between the parties, the court appointed a
  master to carry out the responsibilities set out in its order.  The court
  stated that, in the event that the parties were "unable to agree upon the
  process for sale of the dwellings, the real estate agent, etc., the Master
  shall make all decisions necessary to implement" its order. 

       ¶  3.  In October 1999, the court appointed the master as plaintiff's
  representative and agent because of plaintiff's limited availability to
  sign documents necessary to accept offers and complete closings on the
  properties in a timely manner.  Specifically, the court authorized the
  master to 

    act in the name, place and stead of [plaintiff], to sign his name
    and in his name execute, acknowledge and deliver any and all
    instruments, documents, or other writings, and to do, perform and
    otherwise transact any and all transactions on his behalf, which
    are necessary or advisable to accomplish the sale or transfer of
    the land and buildings, and personal property therein if any,
    located [in South Burlington], so that any purchaser shall receive
    full title in fee simple free and clear of all liens and
    encumbrances.

       ¶  4.  In connection with anticipated closings in October and
  November 1999, the master repeatedly asked plaintiff to remove his personal
  property from one of the homes.  Plaintiff removed some of his property,
  but he did not remove all of it.  The closings did not occur.  In
  anticipation of a December 17, 1999 closing, the master asked plaintiff to
  remove his remaining belongings by December 8.  On December 14, after
  plaintiff failed to comply with her request, the master hired a company to
  remove and dispose of plaintiff's remaining property.  Plaintiff discovered
  that his property was missing and filed a police report on December 15.  In
  the report, plaintiff stated his belief that the realtor had removed
  personal property worth $2000 from his basement without his permission. 
  Plaintiff indicated that he would contact the realtor to ascertain the
  status of his belongings and contact police if any other information was
  needed. 
   
       ¶  5.  The house was eventually sold in May 2000.  In a letter to
  the master, plaintiff's attorney indicated that plaintiff was filing a
  claim for lost property with his insurance carrier, and needed the master
  to substantiate that property had been removed from his home.  Plaintiff's
  attorney also informed the master that 

    [b]ecause there are a number of claims and offsets for payment of
    expenses (including [plaintiff's] claim that his property should
    have been retained rather than dumped), I will be requesting the
    Court to hold the net proceeds from the sale of the properties,
    that is after all expenses of closing are paid, for a final
    accounting.  

  Notwithstanding the concerns expressed in this letter, plaintiff agreed to
  the master's final distribution of funds from the sale of the marital
  properties, including the allocation of expenses.  The master's report did
  not account for the personal property that had been removed from
  plaintiff's home, and plaintiff raised no issue with respect to this
  property.  The family court accepted the recommendation in the master's
  report, and plaintiff did not appeal this decision. 

       ¶  6.  In July 2000, plaintiff submitted a claim to defendant Allstate
  Insurance Company seeking $62,801.88 in reimbursement for the property
  removed by the master.  Plaintiff's homeowner's policy covered his property
  against "[t]heft, or attempted theft, including disappearance of property
  from a known place when it is likely that a theft had occurred."  Defendant
  denied coverage, explaining that plaintiff's loss could not be considered a
  theft loss because the removal of the property had been completed under a
  court order. 
   
       ¶  7.  Plaintiff then filed a declaratory judgment action against
  defendant, seeking insurance coverage, injunctive relief, and damages.  The
  trial court granted summary judgment for defendant after concluding that
  there were no material facts at issue and plaintiff had failed to make out
  a prima facie case that his belongings were the object of theft.  The court
  found that "theft" meant "stolen," which the law defines as "the unlicensed
  apportation [sic] of personal property with the intent to permanently
  deprive the owner thereof."  The court concluded that plaintiff failed to
  show that his property had been the object of "theft" because the master
  had been authorized to arrange for the removal of the property, and
  plaintiff was estopped from challenging her authority because he had not
  appealed the family court decision.  The court explained that "[w]ithout
  some showing, both factual and legal, that the Master was without authority
  to remove the property from the building, and then had a duty to preserve
  what had been removed, we cannot conclude that this property was the object
  of theft, by the Master or tradesmen in her employ."  The court therefore
  granted summary judgment for defendant.  Plaintiff appealed.     

       ¶  8.  We review a grant of summary judgment using the same standard
  as the trial court.  Richart v. Jackson, 171 Vt. 94, 97,