Title: Reiter v. Pneumo Abex

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTE:
Reiter v. Pneumo Abex, No. 72, September Term, 2008
                                                                                                                                    
PRODUCTS LIABILITY; SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE THAT DECEASED         
     
STEELWORKERS WERE EXPOSED TO ASBESTOS PRODUCTS
SUPPLIED BY PARTICULAR CORPORATIONS:  Petitioners’ evidence was
sufficient to generate a jury issue on the question of whether each decedent was exposed
to asbestos dust at the specific site where the decedent actually worked, but was
insufficient to generate a jury issue on the question of whether any of the Respondents’
products were used at the specific site where the decedent actually worked.  Under these
circumstances, the Circuit Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Respondents
was legally correct.  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 72
September Term, 2008
                                                                                
 CATHERINE L. REITER ET AL. 
v.
PNEUMO ABEX, LLC ET AL.
                                                                                
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Rodowsky, Lawrence F. (Retired,
specially assigned), 
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, 
specially assigned), 
JJ.
                                                                                
Opinion by Murphy, J.
                                                                                 
Filed:    November 19, 2010
The Petitioners in the case at bar are the widows of steelworkers who were
employed by the Bethlehem Steel Corporation at its Sparrows Point facility (“facility”),  
1
and the Respondents are corporations that supplied products containing asbestos to the
facility.   In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Petitioners -- in their individual and
2
representative capacities --  filed complaints in which they asserted that their husbands
died from lung cancer caused by exposure to the asbestos contained in the products
supplied by the Respondents.  The Petitioners’ cases were among the cases
“consolidated”  into two groups: (1) the “Adams” Group, which included decedents
William A. Reiter and Harold R. Williams; and (2) the “Conyers” Group, which included
decedent William H. Johnson.  At the conclusion of a two day motions hearing, the
Circuit Court granted Respondents’ motions for summary judgment, and entered
judgment against each of the Petitioners.  
 Petitioner Charlotte J. Johnson is the Personal Representative of the Estate of William
1
H. Johnson; Petitioner Catherine L. Reiter is the Personal Representative of the Estate of
William A. Reiter; and Petitioner Arlene Williams is the Personal Representative of the
Estate of Harold R. Williams. 
 The Respondents are Eaton Corporation (“Eaton”) (successor in interest to Cutler-
2
Hammer, Inc. (“Cutler-Hammer”)), Pneumo Abex LLC (“Abex”), and Square D
Company (“Square D”). Abex manufactured and sold asbestos-containing automotive
friction products including brake lining and pads under different trade names from
approximately 1927-1987. Abex brake linings were used in the brake assembly systems
manufactured by Westinghouse as well as Square D. Cutler-Hammer manufactured and
sold certain products that contained asbestos components from approximately 1920-1984.
Square D also manufactured and sold crane braking equipment from 1955-2004. Prior to
the mid 1980’s some of their braking equipment components contained some quantity of
encapsulated asbestos.
Petitioners noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and that court
affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court.  Reiter v. ACandS, Inc., 179 Md. App. 645,
947 A.2d 570 (2008).  Petitioners then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in which they
requested that this Court answer the following questions:
I. Whether the grant of summary judgment dismissing
[Petitioners’] asbestos injury claims as a matter of law on the
issue of substantial factor causation constitutes error where
[Petitioners] presented evidence that asbestos-containing crane
brakes of the [Respondents] were present throughout the areas
where [Petitioners] worked and that [Petitioners] worked in the
vicinity of those crane brakes when the crane brakes emitted
asbestos-containing dust to which [Petitioners] were exposed[?] 
II. Whether the grant of summary judgment dismissing
[Petitioners’] asbestos injury claims as a matter of law on the
issue of substantial factor causation constitutes error where the
court requires direct testimonial evidence of specific exposures
and ignores circumstantial evidence of such exposures[?]
III. Whether the grant of summary judgment dismissing
[Petitioners’] asbestos injury claims as a matter of law on the
issue of substantial factor causation constitutes error where the
grant of summary judgment is based on the theory of market
share 
liability 
and 
the 
evidence 
demonstrated 
that
[Respondents’] asbestos-containing products were in place
where [Petitioners] worked and that these products emitted dust
to which [Petitioners] were exposed[?]
We granted the petition.  405 Md. 506, 954 A.2d 467 (2008). From our review of
the record, we conclude that Petitioners’ evidence was sufficient to generate a jury issue
on the question of whether (1) each decedent was exposed to asbestos dust at his
2
workplace, and (2) Respondents manufactured some of the crane brake products used at
the facility.  We also conclude, however,  that Petitioners’ evidence was insufficient to
establish that any of the Respondents’ products were used at the specific site(s) where the
Petitioners actually worked.  We shall therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of
Special Appeals.
Factual Background
The record includes the following information about the decedents:
William H. Johnson, who worked as a laborer in the
slab yard from 1960-1972, died of lung cancer on May 16, 2003.
Respondents Square D and Cutler-Hammer are implicated in his
suit. Mr. Johnson was never deposed. Mr. Johnson’s only fact-
specific witness was Mr. Walter John Sperl (“Mr. Sperl”).
Although he occasionally worked with Mr. Johnson at other
locations in the facility, Mr. Sperl testified that the only location
at which Mr. Johnson worked with any frequency or regularity
was the area of the slab yard adjacent to the 56-Inch Hot Strip
Mill. This area was the size of nearly three football fields.
William A. Reiter, who worked in the tin mill from
1947-1990, died on November 25, 2002 from carcinoma of the
lung, atrial fibrillation, hypertension and coronary heart disease.
Only Square D is implicated in his suit. Mr. Reiter was never
deposed. The only fact-specific witness deposed in Mr. Reiter’s
case was Mr. Lloyd Martin (“Mr. Martin”). Mr. Martin began
working with Mr. Reiter at the tin mill sometime in 1960 when
Mr. Reiter held a ground level position in the tin mill as a line
worker in the coil prep line. According to Mr. Martin, Mr. Reiter
never worked at any location of the tin mill other than the coil
prep line. The tin mill itself accounted for nearly 480 acres of
the entire Sparrows Point facility. The coil prep line accounted
for 50 square feet of this area.
3
Harold R. Williams, who worked as a laborer at the
facility from 1964-1993, died on October 17, 2003 of
pneumonia and small cell lung cancer. Square D, Abex, and
Cutler Hammer are all implicated in Mr. Williams’ suit. The
only witness deposed in Mr. Williams’ suit was Robert Freeman
(“Mr. Freeman”), who testified at his deposition that beginning
in the early 1960’s he worked with Mr. Williams in the scrap
yard. By the mid 1960’s both men were assigned to work at the
“finishing end” of the Number 3 Rod and Wire Mill. Mr.
Freeman stated that he and Mr. Williams would see each other
roughly 15-20 times per day and that Mr. Williams’ job duties
were performed exclusively at the finishing end. The finishing
end of the Number 3 Rod and Wire Mill was an area that was
the size of nearly three football fields.
The record includes the following product identification evidence:
Slab Yard: Joe Burlock, who worked at the blooming
mills and the slab yards from 1964-1985, testified that Cutler-
Hammer and Square D brake linings were used on the crane
brakes throughout the site during this time. Eddie Hawkes, who
worked as a crane operator in the slab yard from 1964-1975,
identified both Cutler-Hammer and Square D braking systems
on crane brakes at these mills throughout the period that he
worked there.  William Devilbiss, who worked at the blooming
3
mills and slab yards as well as the hot strip mills from 1964
through the 1980’s, testified that Cutler-Hammer brake linings
were used at these sites during this period of time.
Tin Mill: Gerald Myers, who worked in the tin mill from
the early 1960’s through the 1980’s, testified that Square D
brake linings were used at that site during this period of time.  
Bobby Sherrod, who worked in the tin mill from 1975-1985,
testified that Square D brake linings were used at that site during
the entire time that he worked there. James Tent, who worked at
the tin mill from 1970-1972, testified that Square D brake
 Eddie Hawkes was one of the plaintiffs whose claims against the Respondents
3
were allowed to proceed to trial. 
4
linings were used on the crane brakes at that site during this
period of time.  
Rod and Wire Mills:  Neil White, who worked in one of 
the three rod & wire mills from 1959 into the 1980s, identified
Westinghouse (Pneumo Abex) crane brake linings, Square D
brake linings, and Cutler-Hammer brake linings in the mill
throughout that period of time. Frank Mortis, who worked from
1970 to 2003 as an electrician throughout the facility, identified
crane brake units supplied by Cutler-Hammer and Square D. 
The record shows that, while granting motions for summary judgment in the
Petitioners’ cases, and denying the Respondents’ motions for summary judgment in cases
involving other plaintiffs, the Circuit Court delivered an oral opinion that included the
following findings and conclusions:
The Court is mindful of the case law which has been
adverted to by all parties concerned, in particular the Balbos
case, and would note that in Balbos, the Court of Appeals
adopted what is known as the frequency, regularity, and
proximity test to determine the legal sufficiency of evidence of
substantial factor causation in asbestos personal injury cases.
And Balbos makes it clear that when the exposure of any
given bystander, and in all instances, the plaintiffs in these cases
are bystanders, whether the exposure of any given bystander to
any particular supplier's product will be legally sufficient to
permit a finding of substantial factor causation is fact specific to
each case…
While each of the overhead cranes, without dispute, had
multiple braking systems, these brakes were not located
anywhere close to the average worker in these cavernous
facilities; rather, the brakes were located dozens of feet off the
ground and were in some instances five, maybe eight stories
high in some locations.
5
Taking into account the massive cavernous size of the
facilities as well as the distance from laborers to the braking
systems on the cranes, plaintiffs have . . . failed to show that
workers were sufficiently proximate to or in the vicinity of the
crane brakes to be considered in or very near the presence of
asbestos-containing products and able to inhale fibers released
from the products, as the Court of Appeals indicated in Georgia-
Pacific [v.] Pransky, 369 [Md.] 360, [a] 2002 case . . . .
In other case law which I think is relevant to advert to at
this point and which is relied upon heavily by each of the
defendants with reference to the bystander cases before the
Court, Lohrmann tells us that to support a reasonable inference
of substantial factor causation from circumstantial evidence, and
in large measure, these cases [are] circumstantial evidence
cases, there must be evidence of exposure to a specific product
on a regular basis over some extended  period of time in
proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked.
To support a reasonable inference of substantial factor
causation of a crane brake as to an asbestos-related disease,
plaintiffs must do more than simply place themselves in the
same massive facility in which overhead cranes were utilized
and must do more than simply show that they or co-workers saw
cranes being utilized overhead and that they helped to hook up
or load -- hook up loads onto cranes, they must demonstrate that
they were proximate to or in the vicinity of a particular
manufacturer's crane brakes at a time when such might have
been expelling respirable fibers . . . .
Therefore, concluded as to those plaintiffs who did not
work specifically on or adjacent to overhead crane brake
systems or did not work regularly on the overhead cranes
themselves failed to satisfy the proximity prong of the Balbos
test as well as prescribed under the Maryland law.
Therefore, the claims of such plaintiffs, in viewing all the
facts and inferences in a light most favorable to them, amount
essentially to fiber drift claims.
6
Such plaintiffs have not submitted evidence, any
evidence, no matter how attenuated or circumstantial, that would
allow this Court to strain to permit their claims to survive the
summary judgment.
With respect to the motions of summary judgment of the
[] direct defendants here today are granted as to Plaintiffs . . .
William A. Reiter, . . . Harold R. Williams, [and] William H.
Johnson.
Additionally, even assuming arguendo that these
plaintiffs could satisfy the proximity prong of Balbos, they still
failed the separate frequency and regularity requirements of the
Balbos test based upon what has been presented.
Further, even if they were able to satisfy the frequency,
proximity and regularity requirements of Balbos, the claims still
fail as to their arguments in this context as presented amount to
really market share liability which is not recognized under
Maryland law.
As to the various plaintiff and co-worker testimony,
cannot, does not, has not placed these plaintiffs in the vicinity of
or proximate to any specific manufacturer’s product at specific
points in time. 
With respect to those plaintiffs working directly on or
adjacent to, truly in the vicinity of the crane brakes the Court has
concluded otherwise.
Those individuals include Plaintiff James Crudup who
was a laborer and electrician between 1952 and 1992, whose
work involved cleaning up dust and debris throughout the mills
and working in close proximity to the electricians and
millwrights those workers who would be more directly working
with the crane break, the asbestos-containing brake linings,
removal and such, repair and adjustments.
On a weekly basis there’s evidence that Mr. Crudup used
7
his air hose to blow out the brakes, he was in the immediate area
when the brakes were blown out and dust accumulated in the
brake systems was released into the atmosphere.
As to Plaintiff Eddie Hawkes who the Court understands
to have been a laborer between 1946 and I believe 1975 who
worked inside and outside the crane [] themselves, he indeed
was a crane operator at—I believe it’s the blooming mills for a
period of 1952 to ’64, I’m satisfied the standards test is shown
and satisfied.
With respect to Mr. Howard, Freddie Howard who is a
painter who worked between 1940 and 1983, according to the
evidence presented and shown by the plaintiffs his primary job
was to clean the dust off of and paint the many cranes
throughout the many buildings, facilities near—he was near the
repairmen, again, primarily electricians and millwrights working
on fixing, dealing with the brake linings which are the asbestos-
containing products at issue here, the dust created by the repairs
being done and is the person most clearly shown to have been
working with the electricians.
Taking into account both the finite number of cranes in
the different facilities as well as the typically long tenure of the
plaintiffs just noted at the particular facilities where they were
employed, it’s reasonable to infer in those specific instances in
the former Adams now Conyers group that such plaintiffs
worked on or closely adjacent to all the crane brakes in a given
facility, meaning a particular building at Sparrows Point and did
so regularly and frequently. 
This combined with the plaintiff and co-worker testimony
placing asbestos-containing crane brake linings by specific
manufacturers at specific Sparrows Point facilities, particular
mills, leads the Court to infer, at least for summary judgment
purposes, that these plaintiffs indeed worked proximately and
frequently and regularly around all the crane brakes of all
manufacturers identified at particular facilities at Sparrows
Point. 
8
Again this differs from the laborers and the other workers
against whom summary judgment has been granted by the court,
assuming arguendo that those laborers and workers could satisfy
the Balbos test, there’s been no showing that they worked in the
vicinity of every crane brake at the Sparrows Point facility. 
As stated above, after the judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed by the Court
of Special Appeals, this Court issued a writ of certiorari to address the Petitioners’
questions.  
Discussion
The following standard of review is applicable to the case at bar:  
Whether summary judgment was granted properly is a
question of law. The standard of review is de novo, and whether
the trial court was legally correct. See Walk v. Hartford
Casualty, 382 Md. 1, 14, 852 A.2d 98, 105 (2004). Maryland
Rule 2-501(e) states that a trial court "shall enter judgment in
favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response
show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." In reviewing a grant of summary
judgment under Rule 2-501(e), we independently review the
record to determine whether the parties properly generated a
dispute of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jurgensen v. New
Phoenix, 380 Md. 106, 114, 843 A.2d 865, 869 (2004). We
review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and construe any reasonable inferences which may be
drawn from the facts against the movant. Id. 
To survive a motion for summary judgment, there must
exist not just a dispute as to any facts, but rather as to facts
which are material, i.e. necessary to the determination of the
case. Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 580, 831 A.2d 18,
25 (2003); Lippert v. Jung, 366 Md. 221, 227, 783 A.2d 206,
9
209 (2001); Beatty v. Trailmaster, 330 Md. 726, 737, 625 A.2d
1005, 1011 (1993).
Livesay v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 1, 9-10, 862 A.2d 33, 35 (2004).
In Eagle-Picher Industries v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 604 A.2d 445 (1992), this
Court stated: 
Whether the exposure of any given bystander to any particular
supplier's product will be legally sufficient to permit a finding
of substantial-factor causation is fact specific to each case. The
finding involves the interrelationship between the use of a
defendant's product at the workplace and the activities of the
plaintiff at the workplace. This requires an understanding of the
physical characteristics of the workplace and of the relationship
between the activities of the direct users of the product and the
bystander plaintiff.  See, e.g., Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d
435 (3d Cir. 1992) [1992 Asbestos Lit.R. (Andrews) 24, 745]. 
Within that context, the factors to be evaluated include the
nature of the product, the frequency of its use, the proximity, in
distance and in time, of a plaintiff to the use of a product, and
the regularity of the exposure of that plaintiff to the use of that
product. 
Balbos, 326 Md. at 210, 604 A.2d at 460. 
The Respondents were not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that the
decedents did not work “directly on” or “immediately adjacent to” crane brakes.   In
4
  Although the Circuit Court’s opinion included a “hands on” or “adjacent to” analysis,
4
the case at bar is not one in which the Petitioners are entitled to a reversal on the ground
that an appellate court should ordinarily consider only the grounds relied upon by the trial
court in granting summary judgment.  See, e.g., Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 695,
785 A.2d 726, 729 (2001); PaineWebber v. East, 363 Md. 408, 422, 768 A.2d 1029, 1036
(2001).  In its opinion, the Circuit Court expressly concluded that the Petitioners’
evidence “cannot, does not, has not placed these [decedents] in the vicinity of or
proximate to any specific manufacturer’s product at specific points in time.”  (Emphasis
supplied).  That conclusion is the basis for our affirmance. 
10
ACandS v. Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 667 A.2d 16 (1995), the plaintiff alleged that his
asbestosis was caused by exposure to block and pipecovering insulation called
“Unibestos” when he walked past several large furnaces five to six times per shift on a
daily basis.  The evidence showed that, nearly everyday, at least one of the furnaces
would need to be relined with new insulation.  Under these circumstances, although the
plaintiff never “worked hands on” with the insulation, this Court stated: 
The foregoing evidence sufficiently supports a finding that
exposure to Unibestos was a substantial cause of McNeil’s
asbestosis. Bethlehem employees continually removed and
reapplied insulation to the furnaces in No. 4 Open Hearth. For
more than twenty years, McNeil worked outside the partially
open-sided No. 4 Open Hearth building and was required to
enter it five to six times a day. 
Id. 340 Md. at 353, 667 A.2d at 125.
From our review of the Circuit Court’s on-the-record opinion, we reject the
Petitioners’ argument that the Circuit Court erroneously required “direct testimonial
evidence” and/or ignored “circumstantial evidence.”  We also reject the Petitioners’
argument that the Circuit Court’s “grant of summary judgment [was erroneously] based
on the theory of market share liability.”  The case at bar is a “circumstantial evidence”
case in which the Petitioners were required to present evidence of exposure to a “specific
product [made or manufactured by the Respondents] on a regular basis, over some
extended period of time, in proximity to where the [decedents] actually worked.”
Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162-1163, (4th Cir. 1986)
11
(Emphasis supplied).  Even though they are unable to present “direct”  product
identification testimony, the Petitioners argue (in the words of their brief): 
. . . In these cases [they] did not merely show that Respondents’
crane brakes emitted dust someplace [in the facility] which
drifted throughout the mill…. Instead Petitioners presented
evidence that each Petitioner was exposed to dust from crane
brakes over a period of years at specific sites and presented
evidence of each Respondents crane brakes at those sites when
Petitioners worked there.
We hold that the “specific site” where each decedent worked was the
limited area in the facility where the decedent was located on a day-to-day to basis. 
While a “boiler room” or an “engine room” may constitute a specific site, a factory
the size of an airplane hanger does not.  In Balbos, supra, this Court stated:
“In Blackston [v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co.,] (11th
Cir.1985), 764 F.2d 1480, the plaintiff had been a
pipefitter for thirty-five years, but the case involved only
two years of that period during which the plaintiff
worked on the construction of a paper mill in Georgia.
The defendant, one of the contractors on that job, used
the asbestos product in question, but the plaintiff's
evidence "did not show that he was working in the
vicinity [where] it was being used." Id. at 1481.
Robertson v. Allied Signal [Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 367-68
(3d Cir.1990)] presented the claims of workers at a tire
manufacturing facility where the principal activity took
place in a building three levels high with a total area of
862,000 square feet. One of the defendants, Allied
Signal, made the asbestos brakes used on certain cutting
machines in the stock-cutting area. The trial court had
granted summary judgment for Allied Signal. That
judgment was reversed as to one plaintiff whose job was
12
to run the mill that supplied the cutters, so that that
plaintiff worked in proximity to the cutters for seven
years. Judgment for Allied Signal was affirmed as to the
other plaintiffs who worked elsewhere in the building.
The size of the tire manufacturing facility in Robertson
was used to distinguish that case in Rotondo v. Keene
Corp., 956 F.2d at 441 [1992 Asbestos Lit R. at 24,750].
Rotondo was a welder at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard
in 1942-43. The defendant manufactured an asbestos
pipe covering called "Ehret." In reviewing a judgment for
the plaintiff, the Third Circuit applied governing
Pennsylvania law, as enunciated in Eckenrod v. GAF
Corp., 544 A.2d 50, where
    "[t]he court stated that 'a plaintiff must establish more
than the presence of asbestos  in the workplace; he must 
prove that he worked in the vicinity of the product's
use.' In particular, a plaintiff must present evidence 'to
show that he inhaled asbestos fibers shed by the specific
manufacturer's product.' The relevant evidence is 'the
frequency of the use of the product and the regularity of
the plaintiff's employment in proximity thereto.'"956 F.2d
at 439 [1992 Asbestos Lit.R. at 24,748] (quoting 544
A.2d at 52-53 (citations omitted)).
Those requirements were satisfied in Rotondo for the
following reasons:
    "In summary, the testimony introduced in the instant
case did not merely place Ehret pipecovering
'somewhere' in a large facility, but rather placed it in the
specific area (i.e., the boiler room) in which Rotondo
worked. In addition, the evidence established that
Rotondo worked in the boiler room of the Monticello at
least 2 days a week for at least 3 to 4 months during the
summer of 1942, and that the pipecoverers used the Ehret
13
product fifty percent of the time."956 F.2d at 442 [1992
Asbestos Lit.R. at 24,751].
The facts in the cases before us are quite similar to those
in Roehling v. National Gypsum, 786 F.2d 1225 [(1986)].
The plaintiff was a pipefitter who for six months had
worked on the construction of new boilers at the power
station of an industrial plant. He did not apply insulation,
a task done by asbestos installers who followed behind in
the progress of the work. The boiler walls were insulated
with asbestos block and then covered with asbestos
cement. An insulator-helper testified that "'tons of'" the
defendant's cement were used on the boiler walls. Id. at
1227. Summary judgment for the cement supplier was
reversed because the facts and underlying inferences
established that the plaintiff "worked in the same
limited area of the plant, at the same time" as the
insulators "working side by side." Id. at 1228. 
Balbos, 326 Md. at 211-212, 604 A.2d at 460-461.  (Emphasis supplied).  
Applying these holdings to the case at bar, Mr. Johnson’s specific work site was
the area of the slab yard adjacent to the 56-Inch Hot Strip Mill (still around 3 football
fields in length); Mr. Reiter’s specific work site was the 50 square feet of the tin mill
reserved for the coil prep line; and Mr. Williams’s specific work site was the finishing
end of the Number 3 Rod Mill (also nearly 3 football fields in length). 
Petitioners argue that the factual scenario(s) presented in this appeal are nearly
identical to those present in McNeal v. Eaton Corp., 2002 PA Super 281, 806 A.2d 899
(2002). There is no merit in that argument.  In McNeal, the plaintiff, who worked at an
industrial facility as a welder, asserted that he was exposed to asbestos from dust created
14
through the operation of Cutler-Hammer brakes. His exposure evidence was presented
through the testimony of a coworker, who testified that he saw the plaintiff  working
around the cranes (suspended roughly 25 feet above him) while the cranes were repaired
with Cutler-Hammer and Clark brake products. In the case at bar, however, although the
testimony of each “plaintiff-specific” witness was sufficient to show that (1) each
decedent worked near a crane, and (2) that each decedent worked close enough to the
crane to breathe in the dust emitted from the cleaning of the crane brakes, it is undisputed
that the plaintiff-specific witnesses did not identify any of the suppliers of the asbestos
products at the “specific sites” where the decedents worked.
As the Court of Special Appeals stated:
The dimensions of the tin mill are illustrative of the sheer size
of the Sparrows Point facility. The tin mill alone was one and
one-half miles long and one-half mile wide, covering an area of
480 acres or 20,908,800 square feet. The tin mill was, in turn,
made up of several other mills, not all of which were in the same
building. These mills included the 42 skin pass, 42 tandem mill,
56 tandem mill, 66 tandem mill, 56 hot mill, and 68 hot mill.
The slab yard included the 40 inch mill, the 40 by 80 slab mill
and the 45 by 90 slab mill), the 56 inch and 68 inch hot strip
mills, the pipe mills, the 56 inch cold strip mills, the tin mill, the
54 inch mill, three rod and wire mills, the blooming mills, the
160 inch plate mill, the 60 inch plate mill, the blast furnace, four
open hearths, the 56 inch sheet mill, the 66 inch sheet mill, and
the coke ovens.
The Number 3 Rod and Wire mill was also at least three football
fields in length, and the mills on the finishing side of the facility
were said to be the size of small towns.
15
Reiter, 179 Md. App. at 650, 947 A.2d at 573 (2008). The size of these areas are in no
way analogous to the engine room in Balbos or the boiler room in Rotondo. 
Mr. Reiter worked on a daily basis in the 50 square feet of the tin mill reserved for
the coil prep line.  His plaintiff-specific witness testified that overhead cranes were used
to move coils in the area where he and Mr. Reiter worked, and that the cranes would
generate dust that they would breathe in.  This testimony, however, does not establish that
a Square D product was used on the cranes at that specific site.  Evidence that some
Square D products were used somewhere in the 480 acre tin mill does not establish that a
Square-D product was on the crane that was in the 50 square feet where Mr. Reiter
“actually worked.”
Mr. Williams’s plaintiff-specific witness testified as follows. There were two
overhead cranes in the Number 3 Rod and Wire Mill-- one over the finishing end and one
over the shipping and storage end.  The cranes were about 25-30 feet high, and
“whenever the crane came overhead and hammed on the bumper dust would fall.”  He
and Mr. Williams were both close enough to breathe in the dust.  No witness, however,
can identify which Respondent’s asbestos product was used on the crane at the specific
site where Mr. Williams worked.  
5
Mr. Johnson’s plaintiff-specific witness testified as follows.  He saw crane
 The record shows that there was only one crane located near the finishing end of the
5
Number 3 Rod and Wire Mill. 
16
mechanics work on the brakes, that airhoses would be used to clean off the brakes, and
that both he and Mr. Johnson would be in the area when this work was done -- sometimes
working directly underneath the crane itself.  There were, however, at least six different
cranes located in the slab yard.  Under these circumstances, the evidence is insufficient to
establish that Cutler-Hammer or Square D products were used on the cranes located at or
near the “specific site” where Mr. Johnson “actually worked” (the area of the slab yard
next to the 56 Inch Hot Strip Mill). 
As stated above, the Circuit Court denied the Respondents’ motions for summary
judgment with respect to those Plaintiffs who presented deposition testimony that was
legally sufficient to establish both that (1) they were close enough to the dust emitted
from the crane brakes, and (2) the Respondent’s products were used at the “specific site”
or sites where each actually worked.  The record shows that Mr. Hawkes testified as follows
during his deposition: 
DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL: And did you see the
name Mark, Square D, or Cutler-Hammer on any of the
brake shoes themselves?
MR. HAWKES: Yes, they were tagged.
DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL: Where?
MR. HAWKES: On the brake shoes, and also they were
stamped.  Some of them were stamped.
DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL: What were the brake shoes
stamped with?
17
MR. HAWKES: Looked like with a stamp.
Mr. Crudup’s plaintiff specific witness testified as follows:
Q: Either from your time as a laborer or from your time
in the electrical department do you recall the names of
the manufacturers of any of the electrical equipment
we’ve been discussing today?
A: I remember General Electric and Westinghouse. There
was some more I just can’t think. 
Q: Fair enough. How do you remember the General
Electric?
A. Well, the way you look, you would see the name
would be on top of that. 
Q: Do you know – getting back to [Counsel’s] point, like
what time frame was it that you first started noticing the
General Electric name on the Equipment?
A: Well mostly working around the mills, cleaning the
mills, we would have to clean all around them and you
could see the name. 
Q: Tell us what you know about – you identified
Westinghouse as one of the manufacturers… What sort
of equipment did you see the Westinghouse name on?
A: Motors, Westinghouse motors, Westinghouse panels. 
Q: And when Mr. Crudup was a laborer, did he—to what
extent did he work around the Westinghouse equipment?
A: The same as I did.
Q: And would your answer be the same with regard to
18
the General Electric Equipment?
A: Yes.
Because the record shows that Abex products went into Westinghouse motors, a
reasonable trier of fact could reasonably infer that Mr. Crudup was exposed to an asbestos
product supplied by Respondent Abex.  
Although Mr. Howard’s plaintiff-specific witness was never asked to identify any
of the suppliers of the break pads, his testimony was sufficient to establish that Mr.
Howard painted cranes everywhere in the facility, and therefore “actually worked” at
“specific sites” where the Respondents’ products were used.
Unlike the product identification testimony available to the plaintiffs who
prevailed at the motions hearing, the Petitioners’ product identification testimony was
insufficient to support a reasonable inference that any of the Respondents’ products were
used at the specific sites where Mr. Reiter or Mr. Williams or Mr. Johnson actually
worked.  Moreover, every general product identification witness testified on deposition
that the brake linings, pads, and shoes were not interchangeable.  According to these
witnesses, Cutler-Hammer products had to be replaced with Cutler-Hammer products,
Square-D with Square-D, and Abex with Abex.  This testimony makes the case at bar
distinguishable from ACandS v. Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 667 A.2d 16 (1995), which
involved interchangeable asbestos products.
19
Conclusion
Although the Petitioners’ evidence was sufficient to generate a jury issue on the
question of whether each decedent was exposed to asbestos dust at the specific site where
the decedent actually worked, we hold that the Petitioners’ evidence was insufficient to
generate a jury issue on the question of whether any of the Respondents’ products were
used at the specific site where the decedent actually worked.  Under these circumstances,
the Respondents were entitled to summary judgment with respect to the claims asserted
against them by the Petitioners.  
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; COSTS
TO BE PAID BY PETITIONERS.  
   
20