Title: State v. Henry W. Aufderhaar

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 108 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2820-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Henry W. Aufderhaar,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 208 
Reported at:  277 Wis. 2d 173, 689 N.W.2d 674 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 27, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert J. Kennedy   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
J. Paul Neumeier, Jr., Raymond E. Krek and Krek & Brantmeier, 
S.C., Jefferson, and oral argument by Raymond E. Krek. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Christopher G. Wren, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2005 WI 108
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2820-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2003CF223) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Henry W. Aufderhaar, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   Henry W. Aufderhaar 
seeks review of a court of appeals decision affirming a circuit 
court order denying Aufderhaar's motion to dismiss the criminal 
proceedings against him or transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile 
court.  Aufderhaar argues that neither the circuit court 
exercising juvenile court jurisdiction1 nor the circuit court to 
which waiver was ordered2 had personal jurisdiction over him 
                                                 
1 In order to distinguish the types of actions in the 
circuit court, we refer to this court as the "juvenile court." 
2 We refer to the circuit court to which waiver was ordered 
as the "adult court" or the circuit court. 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
2 
 
because the juvenile court, which held a waiver hearing and 
waived him into adult court, failed to follow the statutory 
requirements for service of process in juvenile cases.  We 
conclude that the failure to follow the statutory requirements 
for 
service 
defeats 
the 
State's 
assertion 
of 
personal 
jurisdiction and requires the circuit court to dismiss the 
criminal charges without prejudice and the juvenile court to 
vacate the waiver order.  We therefore reverse and remand. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
Aufderhaar was fifteen years old and living with his 
parents in Whitewater, Wisconsin on June 4, 2001, when he was 
interviewed by a police officer about five allegations of 
second-degree sexual assault of a child and two allegations of 
fourth-degree sexual assault of a child.  Later that month, on 
June 29, he moved with his parents.  The family lived with 
Aufderhaar's grandfather for approximately two weeks and then 
moved to Montana.  On August 21, the Jefferson County District 
Attorney filed a delinquency petition against Aufderhaar, but 
when authorities learned that Aufderhaar had moved with his 
family to Montana, the file was transferred to Walworth County, 
where the incidents were alleged to have occurred. 
¶3 
On October 9, 2001, Walworth County attempted to mail 
documents containing the pending charges to Aufderhaar and his 
parents in Montana, but the mail was returned as "Attempted-Not 
Known."  On October 26, a delinquency petition was filed in 
Walworth 
County with a 
return date 
of November 8. 
 On 
October 31, a juvenile court clerk mailed the summons and 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
3 
 
delinquency petition to the Aufderhaars' former address in 
Whitewater.  Aufderhaar did not appear for the initial plea 
hearing on November 8 and a capias was ordered.  The court did 
not grant a continuance, nor was service made personally or by 
certified mail.  The case then sat dormant for about a year and 
a half. 
¶4 
On March 6, 2003, the juvenile court clerk received a 
telephone call from Montana authorities that Aufderhaar was 
involved in a juvenile matter in that state relating to sexual 
behavior.  The clerk forwarded this information to the district 
attorney's office and on March 12, the district attorney filed a 
petition for waiver into adult court in the still-pending 
delinquency petition.  By this time, Aufderhaar was more than 
seventeen years old.  The Montana authorities had given the 
Walworth County clerk a new address for Aufderhaar, so she sent 
the waiver petition to that new address.  The waiver petition 
was not returned.   
¶5 
On April 23, the juvenile court waived Aufderhaar in 
absentia into adult court.  It subsequently issued an order to 
that effect.  A criminal complaint was filed, and a warrant was 
issued. 
¶6 
On October 2, 2003, Aufderhaar appeared in Walworth 
County and challenged the adult court's personal jurisdiction 
over him.  He asserted that Wis. Stat. § 938.27(3)(a)1 (2001-02)3 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
4 
 
mandates the juvenile court to notify the child and parents of 
all 
hearings, 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.273(1) 
requires 
a 
continuance and personal service if there is no appearance at 
the initial proceeding and that the same statute allows for 
service by certified mail in the event personal service is 
deemed to be impracticable.  Aufderhaar alleged that because the 
statute was not followed, the juvenile court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over him and it had no authority to waive him into 
adult court.  In the alternative, Aufderhaar argued that the 
waiver in absentia violated due process.  Aufderhaar also argued 
that the 502-day delay in filing the juvenile waiver petition 
was unreasonable and prejudiced him. 
¶7 
The circuit court rejected these arguments.  It 
concluded that Aufderhaar had absconded with his family in order 
to avoid prosecution.  The circuit court stated that although 
the juvenile court did not expressly say at the waiver hearing 
that any attempt at service would have been ineffectual because 
the Aufderhaars were intent on avoiding service, such an 
assumption was implicit in its mention that there was a warrant 
out for Aufderhaar's father, who was "on the run."  The circuit 
court concluded that it was correct to assume service would have 
been ineffectual.  The circuit court ruled, in the alternative, 
that Aufderhaar had notice of the waiver hearing because the 
waiver petition mailed to him was presumed to have reached him 
since it was not returned as undeliverable.  In the circuit 
court's view, this notice was sufficient to defeat the claim of 
lack of personal jurisdiction.  Regarding the delay, the circuit 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
5 
 
court held that while the State may have been negligent in not 
acting in a timely manner, it did not do so with the intent to 
manipulate the system so as to be able to try Aufderhaar as an 
adult.  Therefore, there was no violation of his due process 
rights. 
¶8 
Aufderhaar then filed a petition for leave to appeal a 
nonfinal order.  He raised three arguments:  (1) that there was 
an unreasonable delay in the filing of the waiver petition (502 
days); (2) that he was not given proper notice of the waiver 
hearing; and (3) that the waiver granted in absentia denied him 
due process.4  The court of appeals granted the petition.  On 
appeal, the court affirmed the circuit court's denial of 
Aufderhaar's motion, but on different grounds.  The court of 
appeals rejected the circuit court's conclusion that service 
would have been ineffectual because Aufderhaar's father was "on 
the run," stating: 
First, the record shows no factual basis for finding 
that the father had moved to avoid the law other than 
that he had two pending misdemeanors.  Second, even 
had the father moved to avoid the law and would work 
to avoid personal service, we fail to see how sending 
                                                 
4 Aufderhaar raised two other issues in his brief that were 
not raised in the petition.  Aufderhaar alleged that the waiver 
petition was insufficient as a matter of law and that the 
delinquency petition should have been dismissed because it was 
not timely filed.  The court of appeals declined to address 
these issues, stating, "The major holding here is that when this 
court accepts an interlocutory appeal, the appellant is limited 
to briefing only those issues presented in the petition for 
leave to appeal and may not raise additional issues without the 
prior consent of the court."  State v. Aufderhaar, 2004 WI App 
208, ¶1, 277 Wis. 2d 173, 689 N.W.2d 674.   
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
6 
 
certified mail to the correct mailing address in 
Montana would somehow have been a useless exercise.  
And third, we do not understand how a juvenile can be 
held to be vicariously liable for the actions of a 
parent in moving out of state such that the State is 
relieved from even trying to get the correct address 
and mailing a document to that address by certified 
mail. 
The court of appeals further stated: 
It is undisputed that the juvenile court erred when, 
following Aufderhaar's nonappearance at his initial 
hearing to respond to the delinquency petition, it 
failed to comply with Wis. Stat. § 938.273, which 
requires the court to continue the matter and to order 
either personal service or service by certified mail 
unless 
it 
finds 
that 
such 
service 
would 
be 
ineffectual.  The question to be decided is the legal 
ramifications of such a failure. 
The court concluded that the State's failure to follow the 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 938.273 did not deprive the juvenile 
court of personal jurisdiction over Aufderhaar, pursuant to 
State v. Jermaine T.J., 181 Wis. 2d 82, 510 N.W.2d 735 (Ct. App. 
1993).  The court stated "'it is the delinquency petition that 
is the critical procedure for acquiring personal jurisdiction 
over the juvenile.'"  (Quoting Jermaine T.J., 181 Wis. 2d at 
91.)  In response to the 502-day delay, the court affirmed the 
circuit court's conclusion that the delay was not intentional 
and therefore not in violation of Aufderhaar's due process 
rights. 
¶9 
Aufderhaar filed a petition to review, raising two 
issues:  (1) whether a 502-day delay between the filing of the 
juvenile delinquency petition and the filing of a waiver 
petition 
demands 
dismissal 
of 
the 
adult 
court 
criminal 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
7 
 
proceedings; and (2) whether the failure of the State and the 
juvenile court to follow the statutory provisions for service 
deprived the circuit court of personal jurisdiction.  We granted 
the petition. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶10 Due process determinations are questions of law we 
decide de novo.  State v. Sorenson, 2002 WI 78, ¶25, 254 Wis. 2d 
54, 646 N.W.2d 354.  This case turns in part on questions of 
statutory interpretation to which we apply a de novo standard of 
review, but benefiting from the analyses of both the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶12, 
262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700. 
B. 
Waiver Petition 
¶11 Aufderhaar first argues that the 502-day delay between 
the filing of the juvenile delinquency petition and the filing 
of a waiver petition violates his due process rights and 
requires dismissal of the adult court criminal proceedings.  We 
have ruled that only an intentional delay by the State to avoid 
juvenile court jurisdiction constitutes a due process violation 
requiring dismissal.  See State v. Montgomery, 148 Wis. 2d 593, 
595, 436 N.W.2d 303 (1989).  We agree that there is no evidence 
the State delayed filing the waiver petition until after 
Aufderhaar turned seventeen.  The State did not resume its 
prosecution of Aufderhaar until Montana authorities called on 
March 6, 2003, explaining that Aufderhaar was involved in a 
juvenile matter in Montana and providing a current address for 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
8 
 
Aufderhaar.  We agree with the court of appeals that "it is 
quite apparent that Aufderhaar was himself the catalyst for the 
State's renewed interest in him."  Because the record shows that 
the waiver petition was filed in response to Aufderhaar's 
Montana actions and not in response to Aufderhaar turning 
seventeen, we conclude the delay was not an intentional attempt 
by the State to avoid the juvenile system, and therefore the 
State did not violate Aufderhaar's due process rights.5 
 
C. 
Personal Jurisdiction 
¶12 Aufderhaar next argues that the circuit court does not 
have personal jurisdiction over him because the State and 
juvenile court failed to follow the statutory requirements for 
service of process in juvenile cases, which deprived the 
juvenile court of the personal jurisdiction required in order to 
validly waive Aufderhaar into adult court.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 938.27(3)(a)1 requires the court to "notify, under s. 938.273, 
the juvenile, any parent, guardian and legal custodian of the 
juvenile . . .  of all hearings involving the juvenile under 
this subchapter, except hearings on motions for which notice 
need only be provided to the juvenile and his or her counsel."  
                                                 
5 Alternatively, Aufderhaar argues we should abandon the 
test set out in State v. Montgomery, 148 Wis. 2d 593, 595, 436 
N.W.2d 303 (1989).  He favors a standard that would hold that 
egregiously negligent delay by the State can also violate due 
process rights.  Aufderhaar fails to persuade us that the 
Montgomery decision is no longer good law; accordingly, we 
decline to overrule it. 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
9 
 
Further 
statutory 
requirements 
are 
found 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.273(1): 
Service of summons or notice required by s. 
938.27 may be made by mailing a copy thereof to the 
persons summoned or notified.  If the persons, other 
than a person specified in s. 938.27(4m), fail to 
appear at the hearing or otherwise to acknowledge 
service, a continuance shall be granted, except where 
the court determines otherwise because the juvenile is 
in 
secure 
custody, 
and 
service 
shall 
be 
made 
personally by delivering to the persons a copy of the 
summons or notice; except that if the court is 
satisfied that it is impracticable to serve the 
summons or notice personally, it may make an order 
providing for the service of the summons or notice by 
certified mail addressed to the last-known addresses 
of the persons.  The court may refuse to grant a 
continuance when the juvenile is being held in secure 
custody, but in such a case the court shall order that 
service of notice of the next hearing be made 
personally or by certified mail to the last-known 
address of the person who failed to appear at the 
hearing.  Personal service shall be made at least 72 
hours before the time of the hearing.  Mail shall be 
sent at least 7 days before the time of the hearing, 
except where the petition is filed under s. 938.13 and 
the person to be notified lives outside the state, in 
which case the mail shall be sent at least 14 days 
before the time of the hearing. 
(Emphasis added.)   
¶13 For our interpretation of these statutes, we rely on 
the criteria of statutory interpretation set out in State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  In Kalal, we explained that our 
focus was to determine "statutory meaning."  Id., ¶44.  We 
explained that: 
[j]udicial deference to the policy choices enacted 
into law by the legislature requires that statutory 
interpretation focus primarily on the language of the 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
10 
 
statute.  We assume that the legislature's intent is 
expressed 
in 
the 
statutory language. 
 
Extrinsic 
evidence of legislative intent may become relevant to 
statutory interpretation in some circumstances, but is 
not the primary focus of inquiry.  It is the enacted 
law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding on the 
public. 
 
Therefore, 
the 
purpose 
of 
statutory 
interpretation is to determine what the statute means 
so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended 
effect. 
Id.  As we have said many times, we begin with the language used 
in the statute and if that language is plain and clearly 
understood, we ordinarily stop our inquiry.  See Seider v. 
O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶¶44-53, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.  
Context is also important when determining the plain meaning of 
a statute, as is the purpose of the statute and its scope, if 
those qualities can be ascertained from the language of the 
statute itself.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶46-48.  These are all 
intrinsic sources for statutory interpretation.  Id.  
¶14 However, if the meaning of the statute is not plain 
and the statute "is capable of being understood by reasonably 
well-informed persons in two or more senses," then the statute 
is ambiguous.  Id., ¶47.  When a statute is ambiguous, we often 
consult extrinsic, "interpretive resources outside the statutory 
text," such as legislative history.  Id., ¶50. 
¶15 The parties agree that Wis. Stat. § 938.27(3)(a)1 
plainly required service of a summons or notice on both 
Aufderhaar and his parents and that Wis. Stat. § 938.273(1) 
describes how that is to be accomplished.  The State asks that 
we conclude that "personal jurisdiction attaches" when service 
is accomplished in a "statutorily authorized manner."  The State 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
11 
 
takes this position in part based on our opinion in State v. 
Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 867, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998), that 
juvenile court proceedings are not criminal proceedings, but 
rather, 
they 
often 
are 
hybrids 
with 
civil 
and 
criminal 
components.6 
 
We 
agree 
with 
these 
contentions, 
as 
does 
Aufderhaar.  Where the State and Aufderhaar fundamentally 
disagree is on two points:  (1) whether the required service 
occurred; and (2) if, not, what is an appropriate remedy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Although 
delinquency 
proceedings 
adjudicate 
juveniles 
alleged to have violated state or federal criminal law, see 
Wis. Stat. §§ 938.02, 938.12, Wisconsin courts have stated that 
"a juvenile delinquency proceeding is civil in nature," N.E. v. 
Wisconsin DHSS, 122 Wis. 2d 198, 209, 361 N.W.2d 693 (1985), and 
that "[g]enerally, juvenile delinquency proceedings are not 
criminal proceedings."  State v. Wolfe, 2001 WI App 136, ¶15, 
246 Wis. 2d 233, 631 N.W.2d 240; see also State v. Hezzie R., 
219 Wis. 2d 848, 867, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998).  We also note that 
Wis. Stat. § 938.35(1) states, 
"A judgment in 
a 
[juvenile 
delinquency] proceeding on a petition under this chapter is not 
a conviction of a crime."  The United States Supreme Court has 
stated:  
[T]he juvenile court proceeding has not yet been held 
to be a "criminal prosecution," within the meaning and 
reach of the Sixth Amendment, and also has not yet 
been regarded as devoid of criminal aspects merely 
because it usually has been given the civil label.  
Little, indeed, is to be gained by any attempt 
simplistically to call the juvenile court proceeding 
either "civil" or "criminal."  The Court carefully has 
avoided this wooden approach. 
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971). 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
12 
 
1. 
Service of summons 
¶16 The State argues that personal jurisdiction in the 
juvenile court attached on October 31, 2001, when the Walworth 
County juvenile court clerk mailed the summons for appearance on 
the delinquency petition to Aufderhaar's Whitewater, Wisconsin 
address by regular mail, and it was not returned.  This mailing 
occurred after the court had knowledge that Aufderhaar had moved 
to Montana.7  The State also asserts that a notice of hearing and 
waiver petition mailed to Rollins, Montana on March 14, 2003, 
was sufficient, as it was not returned.  The State contends 
these mailings, either individually or collectively, satisfy 
Wis. Stat. § 938.27(3)(a)1 and Wis. Stat. § 938.273(1).8  We 
disagree.   
¶17 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 938.27(3)(a)1 
plainly 
requires 
notice "under s. 938.273" be given to the juvenile and "any 
parent."  Wisconsin Stat. § 938.273(1) provides three ways in 
which statutorily sufficient notice may be provided:  (1) by 
mailing a summons or notice for appearance in regard to the 
delinquency petition and the juvenile and any parent appear; (2) 
by personal service on the juvenile and any parent; or (3) if 
                                                 
7 On October 9, 2001, a notice of juvenile referral was sent 
to Aufderhaar and his parents in Hot Springs, Montana.  This 
notice was returned undelivered.  
8 The 
State 
also 
argues 
that 
a 
juvenile's 
personal 
appearance is not required for the court to obtain personal 
jurisdiction.  Because we conclude that the juvenile court 
failed to obtain personal jurisdiction through its failure to 
follow the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 938.27(3)(a)1 and Wis. 
Stat. § 938.273(1), we need not resolve this issue. 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
13 
 
the court is satisfied that it is impracticable to serve the 
summons or notice personally, by certified mail addressed to the 
last known addresses of the persons to be served.   
¶18 If the mailing of the summons that the State sent on 
October 31, 2001, had resulted in Aufderhaar and a parent's 
appearance, we would agree that personal jurisdiction attached 
with that mailing.9  However, no one appeared in response to the 
mailings.  At that point, the State could have caused personal 
jurisdiction to attach by personal service or by convincing the 
court to order service by certified mail and then completing 
service by that mode.   
¶19 The court of appeals was correct in stating, "It is 
undisputed that the juvenile court erred when, following 
Aufderhaar's nonappearance at his initial hearing to respond to 
the delinquency petition, it failed to comply with Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.273."  After Aufderhaar failed to appear at the initial 
hearing, § 938.273(1) required the juvenile court to grant a 
continuance and to order personal service or service via 
                                                 
9 We do not decide whether the March 14, 2003 mailing of the 
petition to waive juvenile court jurisdiction would have been 
sufficient to cause personal jurisdiction to attach because no 
appearance resulted from that mailing.  However, we do note that 
the waiver petition did not contain a description of the 
activities that allegedly caused the filing of a delinquency 
petition, the statute or statutes that the delinquency petition 
alleged Aufderhaar violated or a copy of the delinquency 
petition.  Therefore, the waiver petition did not provide 
Aufderhaar with notice of the charges pending against him.  Due 
process encompasses the right to be informed of "the nature and 
cause of the accusation."  Holesome v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 95, 
102, 161 N.W.2d 283 (1968). 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
14 
 
certified mail.  The juvenile court did none of these things, 
but rather, it ordered a capias under Wis. Stat. § 938.28.  This 
was insufficient to cause personal jurisdiction to attach.10   
¶20 The State also argues that proper notice was given to 
the Aufderhaars even though the juvenile court did not follow 
Wis. Stat. § 938.273(1).  The State argues that the court of 
appeals 
erred 
in 
characterizing 
the 
various 
mailings 
as 
establishing constructive notice.  The State contends that when 
the clerk's office mailed the summons and delinquency petition 
in 
October 
2001 
to 
the 
Aufderhaars' 
former 
address 
in 
Whitewater, 
an 
address 
"reasonably 
calculated 
to 
reach 
[Aufderhaar]," actual notice of the delinquency petition was 
established.  Further, the circuit court stated that Aufderhaar 
"clearly receive[d] at least one of those two notices" sent in 
March 2003 regarding the waiver hearing.   
¶21 To support this argument, the State points to cases 
such as State ex rel. Flores v. State, 183 Wis. 2d 587, 612, 516 
N.W.2d 362 (1994), for the proposition that the "mailing of a 
letter creates a presumption that the letter was delivered and 
received."  Under this rule, the State argues that because the 
proper documents had been mailed to various addresses and not 
returned, Aufderhaar had actual notice and therefore personal 
                                                 
10 We note that the State has the burden to prove compliance 
with statutory service requirements, that is, to establish that 
the juvenile was properly served and is therefore subject to the 
court's jurisdiction.  See Hagen v. City of Milwaukee Employee's 
Ret. Sys. Annuity & Pension Bd., 2003 WI 56, ¶12, 262 Wis. 2d 
113, 663 N.W.2d 268. 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
15 
 
jurisdiction was obtained over him.  The court of appeals 
agreed, citing to Flores as part of its rationale that the 
juvenile court had obtained personal jurisdiction. 
¶22 The State's argument fails because whether Aufderhaar 
had constructive or actual notice is irrelevant.  Personal 
jurisdiction in this case depends on compliance with the 
procedures set out in Wis. Stat. § 938.273(1).  As we have 
already stated, after Aufderhaar failed to appear at the initial 
hearing, the statute requires the juvenile court to grant a 
continuance and order service to be made personally or via 
certified mail, yet the juvenile court did none of these things.  
We also note that Flores is not a service of process case, but 
rather, it concerns an evidentiary rule that the mailing of a 
letter creates a presumption that the letter was delivered and 
received. 
 
The 
provisions 
of 
§ 938.273(1), 
rather 
than 
evidentiary rules, govern service and personal jurisdiction in 
juvenile cases. 
¶23 The State makes an alternative argument that personal 
jurisdiction in the juvenile court attaches when the State files 
a delinquency petition.  It points to Jermaine T.J., which was 
cited by the court of appeals in its decision affirming the 
circuit court's denial of Aufderhaar's motion to dismiss as 
supportive of this contention.  In Jermaine T.J.,11 the juvenile 
                                                 
11 The statute at issue in State v. Jermaine T.J., 181 
Wis. 2d 82, 510 N.W.2d 735 (Ct. App. 1993), was Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.273, a predecessor of Wis. Stat. § 938.273, but the 
statutes contain identical requirements. 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
16 
 
was in custody when the delinquency petition was filed.  
Jermaine T.J., 181 Wis. 2d at 85.  A secure detention hearing 
was conducted and Jermaine was released to his parents the same 
day.  Id.  Delinquency and waiver petitions and a summons were 
sent by regular mail to Jermaine and his parents.  Id.  Jermaine 
failed to appear at the date set for the initial appearance on 
the delinquency and waiver petitions and the juvenile court 
issued a capias.  Id.  When Jermaine was taken into custody on 
an unrelated charge, he then made an initial appearance on the 
waiver and delinquency petitions on which he previously had 
failed to appear.  Id.  He did not contest the court's 
jurisdiction over him at that hearing.12  The court orally 
informed Jermaine of the date of the waiver hearing, but he 
failed to appear again and a second capias was issued. Id. at 
86.  After Jermaine was arrested again, the waiver hearing was 
held and Jermaine was waived into adult court.  Id.   
¶24 As in the present case, Jermaine moved to dismiss the 
case because the service statute was not followed, but the 
circuit court denied the motion and the court of appeals 
affirmed.  The court of appeals stated "the juvenile court did 
not order that Jermaine be personally served; nor did it find 
that personal service would be ineffectual and order service by 
certified mail.  Under the unambiguous terms of the statute, we 
conclude that this was error."  Id. at 87.  However, the court 
                                                 
12 See Gibson v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 810, 815, 177 N.W.2d 912 
(1970) (concluding personal jurisdiction may be acquired by 
appearance). 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
17 
 
of appeals ultimately ruled that "[w]e do not agree that the 
error of the juvenile court mandates that this case be 
dismissed."  Id. at 88.  The court likened Jermaine's situation 
of being arrested pursuant to an improperly issued capias to 
that of an illegal arrest, and "[i]n Wisconsin, an illegal 
arrest is not a jurisdictional defect."  Id. at 90 (citing State 
v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 240, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986)).   
¶25 To support its argument that the provisions in Wis. 
Stat. § 938.273 need not be followed in order for the juvenile 
court to obtain personal jurisdiction, the State cites to the 
statement in Jermaine T.J. that "we conclude that it is the 
delinquency 
petition 
that 
is 
the 
critical 
procedure 
for 
acquiring personal jurisdiction over the juvenile."  Id. at 91 
(citing Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 238-240).  The State misconstrues 
the analyses in Jermaine T.J. and Smith.   
¶26 First, Jermaine appeared in regard to the delinquency 
and 
waiver 
petitions 
without 
contesting 
jurisdiction.  
Aufderhaar did not.  This is an important difference because it 
provided an alternative route for personal jurisdiction to 
attach.  As the court of appeals explained, "'[The] physical 
presence gives the juvenile court jurisdiction over the custody 
of the child.'"  Jermaine T.J., 181 Wis. 2d at 89 (quoting State 
ex rel. La Follette v. Circuit Court, 37 Wis. 2d 329, 343, 155 
N.W.2d 141 (1967)).  We find no fault with this reasoning, as it 
supports our conclusion that while a delinquency petition is 
"critical" for acquiring personal jurisdiction, it is not, in 
itself, sufficient.  Second, Jermaine T.J. did not address the 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
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question presented here because, as the court noted, personal 
jurisdiction was obtained by an alternate means, appearance.  
¶27 Accordingly, we agree with Aufderhaar that unless the 
defect is waived by appearance, compliance with statutory 
provisions regarding service of process is required before a 
juvenile court has personal jurisdiction.13  Additionally, a 
juvenile's actual knowledge of the pendency of the action is not 
equivalent to service.  See Hagen v. City of Milwaukee 
Employee's Ret. Sys. Annuity & Pension Bd., 2003 WI 56, ¶13, 262 
Wis. 2d 113, 663 N.W.2d 268  (citing Heaston v. Austin, 47 
Wis. 2d 67, 71, 176 N.W.2d 309 (1970)).  Allowing the juvenile 
court to waive Aufderhaar into adult court, where the criminal 
penalties are more substantial, without its following the proper 
statutory procedure fails to "provide due process through which 
each juvenile offender and all other interested parties are 
assured fair hearings, during which constitutional and other 
legal rights are recognized and enforced," one of the stated 
purposes 
of 
the 
Juvenile 
Justice 
Code. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.01(2)(d).   
2. 
Remedy 
¶28 Because personal jurisdiction never attached, the 
juvenile court could not waive Aufderhaar into adult court.  
                                                 
13 We have previously stated that "[f]ailure to obtain 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant by statutorily proper 
service of process is a fundamental defect fatal to the action, 
regardless of prejudice."  Hagen, 262 Wis. 2d 113, ¶13 (citing 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 167 Wis. 2d 524, 
534-35, 481 N.W.2d 629 (1992). 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
19 
 
Therefore, the waiver order was ineffective, and we reverse the 
court of appeals decision affirming the circuit court's denial 
of Aufderhaar's motion to dismiss the criminal action in adult 
court.  However, we do so without prejudice.  Additionally, 
because the juvenile proceeding commenced before Aufderhaar 
turned seventeen years old, Wis. Stat. § 938.12(2); D.W.B. v. 
State, 158 Wis. 2d 398, 399, 462 N.W.2d 520 (1990) (juvenile 
court proceeding is commenced on the date the juvenile petition 
is filed), this proceeding should be returned to the point at 
which the jurisdictional defect occurred.  Thereafter, the 
juvenile court can determine whether it will attempt service 
sufficient to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 938.273(1).  If it does 
obtain sufficient service to accord personal jurisdiction over 
Aufderhaar, it may file yet another waiver petition to transfer 
the matter into adult court.  Or in the alternative, the court 
may dismiss the delinquency petition.  We leave that decision to 
the judgment of the juvenile court. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶29 We conclude that the failure to follow the statutory 
requirements for service defeats the State's assertion of 
personal jurisdiction and requires the circuit court to dismiss 
the criminal charges without prejudice and the juvenile court to 
vacate the waiver order.  We therefore reverse and remand. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and cause remanded. 
 
 
No. 
2003AP2820-CR   
 
 
 
1