Title: Christopher D. Moffett v. State of Arkansas

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 05-457 NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION CHRISTOPHER D. MOFFETT Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered March 2, 2006 PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF UNION COUNTY, CR 2002-427, HON. HAMILTON HOBBS SINGLETON, JUDGE AFFIRMED PER CURIAM A jury found Christopher Moffett guilty of two counts of residential burglary, two counts of theft of property and one count of felon in possession of a firearm, and sentenced him to a total of 46 years' or 552 months' imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Mr. Moffett appealed the judgment, and the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Moffett v. State, CACR 03-751 (Ark. App. April 28, 2004). Mr. Moffett filed a timely petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, which was denied without a hearing. He now brings this appeal of that order. Appellant Moffett raises two points on appeal, as follows: (1) that the trial court erred in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the charges on the basis of a speedy-trial violation; (2) that the trial court should have granted a hearing on the issue of trial counsel's failure to request a mistrial following introduction of appellant's criminal record, and erred in failing to find that counsel was ineffective for that reason. In the order denying postconviction relief, the trial court found that any errors by counsel were rendered harmless by appellant's explicit judicial confession to the charges. Appellant presented his speedy trial claim in two sections of his petition, and the trial court further found that, as to the second section, appellant should have raised the claims on direct appeal. We do not reverse a denial of postconviction relief unless the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 146 S.W.3d 871 (2004). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court after reviewing the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Flores v. State, 350 Ark. 198, 85 S.W.3d 896 (2002). As the State correctly notes, citing to Camargo v. State, 346 Ark. 118, 55 S.W.3d 255 (2001), a speedy-trial claim is cognizable in a Rule 37.1 petition proceeding when argued as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because appellant was incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction on a different charge, the applicable time period is the twelve-month period set out in Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1(b). The issue as framed in Camargo was whether trial counsel were ineffective was dependent upon whether the State would have been able to prove sufficient excluded periods to bring the trial within the one-year period required by the rule. Id. at 126, 55 S.W.3d at 261. But, in Camargo, the defendant's trial was held forty-two days in excess of the one-year period, and had trial counsel moved for a dismissal, the defendant would have made a prima facie showing of a violation of the rule, the burden shifting to the State to show good cause for the delay. Id. Here, it appears that counsel would not have been able to make the prima facie showing of a violation. Appellant asserts that he was arrested on February 22, 2002, but admits that this arrest was on a parole violation for a different charge. Appellant calculates his speedy-trial period commencing on the date of that arrest. His trial was held on March 17th and 18th of 2003. The State contends appellant was arrested on the charges on which he was convicted in this matter on February 27, 2002, that the speedy-trial period commenced on that date, and that there were excluded periods which brought the trial within the one-year period. We cannot agree, however, that the record shows the speedy-trial period commenced prior to the date the information was filed on August 13, 2002. Rule 28.2(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the time for trial begins running from the date the charge is filed, with the exception that the time runs from the date of arrest if, before the date the charge is filed, "the defendant has been continuously held in custody or on bail or lawfully at liberty to answer for the same offense or an offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode[.]" The twelve-month period begins on the date the information is filed or the date of arrest, whichever occurs first. Jackson v. State, 334 Ark. 406, 976 S.W.2d 370 (1998). However, the arrest must be the arrest for the same charges as the trial on which the period is calculated, not unrelated charges for which the defendant may be incarcerated. The information sets out February 27, 2002, as the date of appellant's arrest, and there are other documents that list that date for arrest, an affidavit for warrant of arrest, a finding of probable cause for detention, and documents verifying appellant's appearance in district court. There is, however, no return of service for any arrest warrant. Appellant quotes an exchange between the prosecutor and appellant during appellant's cross-examination at trial, contending this exchange demonstrated to the prosecuting attorney, defense counsel, the trial court and the jury, that appellant's speedy trial rights had been violated. Instead, the exchange demonstrates that appellant was incarcerated for the period from his arrest on the parole violation until the time of his trial on the prior charge, not on the charges at issue here. Where a defendant is incarcerated in prison in this state pursuant to conviction on a prior offense, the time for trial commences on the day the charge is filed. Hall v. State, 281 Ark. 282, 663 S.W.2d 926 (1984). This court has held that for felony offenses, the charge is filed on the date that the information or indictment is filed in circuit court, not the date an affidavit for an arrest warrant is filed. Watson v. State, 358 Ark. 212, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2004). Even if the arrest date on the charges in this case were February 27, 2002, as indicated on the information, and the speedy-trial period began to run on that date, there was no violation. The State has provided in its supplemental addendum an order that documents a period in response to a motion for continuance by the defense that would be excluded by Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3(c). That excluded period would be sufficient to bring the trial within the twelve-month period. Whether the speedy-trial period ran from the date of the information, or the date of appellant's arrest on these charges, his trial was within the twelve-month period and any motion by trial counsel asserting a violation would have been unsuccessful. Trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to make an argument that is meritless. Greene, 356 Ark. at 70, 146 S.W.3d at 880. Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in not holding a hearing on the issue of counsel's failure to move for a mistrial because his prior criminal record was introduced. An evidentiary hearing should be held in a postconviction proceeding unless the files and the records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. Sanders v. State, 352 Ark. 16, 98 S.W.3d 35 (2003). The trial court has discretion pursuant to Ark. R. Cr. P. 37.3(a) to decide whether the files or records of the case are sufficient to sustain the court's findings without a hearing. Greene, 356 Ark. at 66, 146 S.W.3d at 877. We cannot say the trial court abused that discretion in determining the petition and record were sufficient to support its findings. In an appeal from a trial court's denial of a petition under Rule 37.1, the question presented is whether, based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly erred in holding that counsel's performance was not ineffective under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d 352 (2003). Under the criteria for assessing the effectiveness of counsel as set out in Strickland, when a convicted defendant complains of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show first that counsel's performance was deficient through a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. Additionally, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Andrews v. State, 344 Ark. 606, 42 S.W.3d 484 (2001) (per curiam). There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Noel v. State, 342 Ark. 35, 26 S.W.3d 123 (2000). To rebut this presumption, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt, i.e., that the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Greene, 356 Ark. at 64, 146 S.W.3d at 876. Here, the trial court found that appellant had failed to show prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland test, relying upon appellant's explicit judicial confession and what the court characterized as overwhelming evidence presented on all counts. While there may be an element of prejudice to any reference to a defendant's prior conviction, as appellant asserts, we cannot say that the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding that appellant failed to present a claim here that overcame the presumption of reasonable professional assistance. Appellant's confession is such strong evidence of guilt that, when the totality of the evidence is considered, any prejudice from a reference to appellant's prior conviction would not be sufficient to change the outcome of the trial. Furthermore, the State introduced appellant's prior felony conviction during its case-in-chief as a required element of one of the charges. The jury would have knowledge of the conviction, regardless of any other reference to it. Appellant has not shown that a motion for a mistrial for reference to the prior conviction would have been successful. We cannot say the trial court erred in finding trial counsel was not ineffective. Because appellant has not demonstrated reversible error on either point on appeal, we must affirm the trial court's denial of postconviction relief. Affirmed.