Title: Matter of Adoption of JLP

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Adoption of JLP1989 WY 119774 P.2d 624Case Number: C-88-12Decided: 05/25/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter 
of the ADOPTION OF JLP. RHF, Appellant (Respondent)

 
 
v.

 
 
RMC and RNC, 
Appellees (Petitioners)

 
 
James A. Raymond of Brown, Raymond 
& Rissler, P.C., Casper, for Appellant.

 
 
Eric A. Distad, Casper, for 
Appellees.

 
 
Before Cardine, C.J., and Thomas, 
Urbigkit, Macy, and Golden, JJ. Macy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court; 
Urbigkit, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

 
 
Macy, Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant RHF appeals 
from an order terminating his parental rights to JLP and from a subsequent 
decree of adoption by which appellee RNC, as stepfather of JLP and husband of 
appellee RMC, adopted the minor child. Appellant, as a convicted rapist serving 
a lengthy prison sentence, essentially challenges the determination that he is 
unfit to have custody and control of the minor child.

 
 
We affirm.

 
 
Appellant states the issues as 
being:

 
 
I.

 
 
WHETHER RULE 56, W.R.C.P., IS 
APPLICABLE TO AN ADOPTION PROCEEDING.

 
 
II.

 
 
WHETHER THE CRITERIA OF § 14-2-308, 
ET SEQ., W.S. 1977, MAY BE CONSIDERED IN A PROCEEDING FOR ADOPTION PURSUANT TO § 
1-22-101, ET SEQ., W.S. 1977.

 
 
III.

 
 
WHETHER PETITIONERS SHOWED BY CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO GRANT AN ADOPTION WITHOUT PARENTAL 
CONSENT.

 
 

[¶2.]     Appellees, 
alternatively, describe  the issues 
in this manner:

 
 
I.

 
 
WHETHER Rule 56, W.R.C.P., is 
applicable in an action seeking the termination of parental rights and 
adoption?

 
 
II.

 
 
WHETHER the criteria of W.S. 
14-2-308 may be considered in an action based jointly on W.S. 1-22-101 and W.S. 
14-2-308?

 
 
III.

 
 
WHETHER Petitioners presented, by 
clear and convincing evidence, facts sufficient to terminate Appellant's 
parental rights, thereby rendering his consent to adoption 
unnecessary?

 
 
Although we believe that appellees 
have more accurately identified the issues presented by this case, we would 
synthesize as the dispositive issue: Whether or not summary judgment is 
available in an action to terminate parental rights and, if so, whether or not 
appellees established, by clear and convincing evidence, facts sufficient to 
terminate the parental rights of appellant in this case.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant is the 
natural father of JLP. JLP was born on July 8, 1983. Appellant never married 
RMC, the child's mother, but apparently they resided together after the birth of 
JLP until appellant's present incarceration, which commenced upon his arrest on 
two rape charges in April 1985. In October 1985 appellant was sentenced to a 
term of twenty-five to  thirty years 
in the Wyoming State Penitentiary in connection with the two rapes, one of which 
involved the rape of an elderly woman who subsequently 
died.

 
 

[¶4.]     RMC and RNC were 
married in November 1986. In April 1987 they filed a petition for adoption 
wherein they sought the termination of appellant's parental rights and the 
adoption of JLP by RNC. As grounds for the termination of appellant's parental 
rights, the petition listed appellant's incarceration and unfitness pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-309 (1977) of the termination statutes. Additionally, the 
petition alleged that appellant had abandoned the child and had failed to 
contribute to the child's support. These allegations were made pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-22-110 (1977) of the adoption statutes, which provides for adoption 
without the consent of a natural parent.

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellant was served 
with the petition at the penitentiary, and he filed various pro se pleadings in 
response, including a petition to establish his paternity. In July 1987 
appellant filed an untimely demand for a jury trial.1 The district court did not respond 
to the demand for a jury trial, and the demand apparently was deemed to have 
been waived as not being timely  and 
for failure to file the requisite fee. See W.R.C.P. 38.2 Appellees served a request for  admissions upon appellant to which he 
responded. Social studies were ordered and prepared in accordance with Wyo. 
Stat. § 14-2-314 (1977). In August 1987 a guardian ad litem was appointed 
to represent the interests of JLP, and counsel for appellant was appointed in 
November 1987.

 
 

[¶6.]     After a pretrial 
conference held August 5, 1988, the matter was set for a hearing on October 3, 
1988. Thereafter, however, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment  on the termination question. A hearing 
on the motion was held September 21, 1988, with the guardian ad litem and 
counsel for both parties in attendance. On October 4, 1988, the district court 
granted the motion, thereby terminating appellant's parental rights. The decree 
of adoption was entered on October 6, 1988, after a hearing held on that 
day.

 
 

[¶7.]     As a preliminary 
matter, we note our agreement with appellees that this case involves only a 
review of a termination action decided pursuant to the termination 
statutes.  Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-2-308 to 
-319 (1977). Appellant attempts to posture the case as strictly an adoption 
proceeding premised solely upon the adoption statutes, Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-22-101 to 
-116 (1977), and argues that the criteria of the termination statutes were 
improperly considered in the proceeding. We observe, however, that the petition 
for adoption requested a termination of appellant's parental rights pursuant to 
the termination statutes. In addition, the termination proceeding was prosecuted 
separately from, although incidentally to, the adoption proceeding, and the 
district court properly relied upon § 14-2-309 of the termination statutes in 
its order terminating  appellant's 
parental rights. At the motion hearing, counsel for appellees specifically 
stated that the motion was made on the basis of § 14-2-309(a)(iv). The actual 
adoption was accomplished in a later related proceeding. Thus, we are not 
reviewing an action in the nature of an adoption proceeding against a 
nonconsenting parent pursuant to § 1-22-110.3 If appellant's parental rights were 
properly terminated, and we herein determine they were, then appellant was a 
stranger to the subsequent adoption proceeding and had no right to object to or 
participate in that proceeding.  
Section 14-2-317. See also PAA v. Doe, 702 P.2d 1259 (Wyo. 1985) 
(same effect under § 1-22-110(a)(vii) where father was adjudged guilty of 
cruelty, abuse, neglect, or mistreatment of the child--his consent to adoption 
was not required, and he was a stranger to adoption proceeding). Thus, we review 
only the propriety of the order terminating appellant's parental 
rights.

 
 

[¶8.]     Our review of a 
termination of parental rights is guided by the following principles. The 
application of the termination statutes is a matter of strict scrutiny.  AG v. Big Horn County Department of 
Public Assistance and Social Services, 762 P.2d 42 (Wyo. 1988); JG v. Quillen, 742 P.2d 770 (Wyo. 1987). Strict 
scrutiny is required because of the tension between the fundamental liberty of 
familial association and the compelling state interest in protecting the welfare 
of children.  PL v. Johnson 
County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 761 P.2d 985 
(Wyo. 1988); 
JG, 742 P.2d 770. The evidence supporting a termination must be clear and 
convincing.  Section 14-2-309(a); 
ZLW v. Johnson County Department of Public Assistance and Social 
Services, 761 P.2d 1000 (Wyo. 1988); LP v. Natrona County  Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 1984). Due to the fundamental nature of 
the rights affected by a termination action, the procedures involved must 
satisfy due process.  LP, 679 P.2d 976; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982); Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham  County, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 
101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981). See also Blair v. Supreme Court of 
State of Wyoming, 671 F.2d 389 (10th Cir. 1982), 
wherein the Tenth Circuit noted that former Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-305(a) (1977) 
(repealed in 1981) provided that no order terminating parental rights may be 
entered without a hearing.4

 
 

[¶9.]     Is a termination of 
parental rights accomplished by summary judgment after a motion hearing 
compatible with the foregoing principles?  
Generally, we think not.5 Rarely could a petitioner establish 
its case under any of the various grounds available pursuant to § 14-2-309 
without a full evidentiary hearing. The instant case, however, presents a 
situation which we believe comes within the purview of the principle, 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in a related context, that 
"fundamental fairness may be maintained in parental rights termination 
proceedings even when some procedures are mandated only on a case-by-case basis, 
rather than through rules of general application." Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 757, citing 
Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18, 
68 L. Ed. 2d 640, 101 S. Ct. 2153. In 
Lassiter, the Supreme Court held that the constitution does not require 
the appointment of counsel for an indigent parent in every termination 
proceeding and that the decision as to whether the appointment of counsel is 
required is to be made in the first instance by the trial court, subject to 
appellate review.  Id., 452 U.S.  at 
31-32.

[¶10.]  In LP, 679 P.2d 976, we held that 
termination proceedings are civil in nature.  Section 14-2-312 specifically provides 
that the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure "are applicable in actions brought 
under this act." W.R.C.P. 1 reads in material part:

 
 
These rules govern procedure in all 
courts of record in the State of Wyoming, in all actions, suits or proceedings 
of a civil nature, in all special statutory proceedings except as provided in 
Rule 81, and in all appeals in criminal cases.

 
 
W.R.C.P. 81 provides in 
part:

 
 
Statutory provisions shall not apply 
whenever inconsistent with these rules, provided, (1) that in special statutory 
proceedings any rule shall not apply insofar as it is clearly inapplicable * * * 
*.

 
 
Thus, our statutes and rules clearly 
contemplate that W.R.C.P. 56 regarding summary judgment is applicable in 
proceedings brought pursuant to the termination statutes. Additionally, the 
Supreme Court decisions in Santosky and Lassiter indicate the 
fundamental fairness and propriety of a particular procedure invoked in a 
termination proceeding may be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, we 
hold that summary judgment is not necessarily precluded in every  termination of parental rights case, and 
we look to the facts in the instant case to determine if summary judgment was 
properly entered against appellant.

 
 

[¶11.]  Summary judgment is appropriately granted 
where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56(c); Doud v. First 
Interstate Bank of Gillette, 769 P.2d 927 (Wyo. 1989); St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. 
Albany County School District No. 1, 763 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 
1988).

 
 
[W]e review the judgment in the same 
light as the district court, using the same information. A party moving for 
summary judgment has the burden of proving the nonexistence of a genuine issue 
of material fact. Material fact has been defined as one which, if proved, would 
have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of 
action or defense asserted by the parties. Upon examination of a summary 
judgment, we view the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, giving him all favorable inferences which may be drawn from 
the facts.

 
 

Garner v. Hickman, 709 P.2d 407, 410 (Wyo. 1985) 
(citations omitted), quoted in Doud,  769 P.2d  at 928, and Albrecht v. 
Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, B.V., 762 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Wyo. 
1988).

 
 

[¶12.]  Section 14-2-309(a)(iv) provides for the 
termination of parental rights where "the parent is incarcerated due to the 
conviction of a felony and a showing that the parent is unfit to have the 
custody and control of the child." Termination under this paragraph of the 
statute requires proof, by clear and convincing evidence, of two elements: (1) 
that the parent is incarcerated on a felony conviction; and (2) that the parent 
is unfit to have custody and control of the child.  RW v. State ex rel. Laramie County 
Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 766 P.2d 555 (Wyo. 
1989).

 
 

[¶13.]  In support of their motion for summary 
judgment, appellees submitted or relied upon the social/home studies of 
appellant and appellees prepared by DPASS; appellant's responses to appellees' 
requests for admissions; and the other pleadings and filings in the record. A 
review of these materials reveals the following information. In 1977 or 1978, 
when he was seventeen years old, appellant raped a teenage girl, using a gun to 
threaten her. For that offense appellant served a split sentence  at the Wyoming State Penitentiary and at 
the Wyoming Boys' School. In 1982 appellant was convicted of aggravated assault 
with a hammer, and he served time in the NatronaCounty jail for that 
offense.

 
 

[¶14.]  In March 1985 appellant raped an 
eighteen-year-old girl, apparently again in NatronaCounty. Also in March 1985 appellant raped 
and beat up a woman in her eighties6 who subsequently died from the 
trauma. In August 1985 appellant pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault 
and to one count of attempted sexual assault, and he was thereafter sentenced to 
a term of not less than twenty-five years nor more than thirty years in the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary. The materials in the record indicate appellant 
either refused to participate in or attended only fifteen percent of the 
"Specific Modalities for Sex Offenders Program" at the penitentiary. Finally, 
materials submitted in support of summary judgment disclose that appellant had 
used illegal drugs, including marijuana, cocaine, crank, amphetamines, acid, and 
paint fumes, from the age of seventeen until his present incarceration, although 
he did complete a drug and alcohol abuse program at the 
prison.

 
 

[¶15.]  Appellant, who was represented by 
counsel, submitted nothing in response to the materials appellees submitted in 
support of their motion for summary judgment. Once the moving party has properly 
supported a motion for summary judgment by affidavits, answers to 
interrogatories, or depositions, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rely 
upon allegations or denials in his pleadings but must come forth with materials 
demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. W.R.C.P. 56; Whipple  v. Northern WyomingCommunity 
College Foundation of Sheridan, 753 P.2d 1028 (Wyo. 1988). See also 
Jones Land and Livestock Co. v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 733 P.2d 258 
(Wyo. 1987) (once movant has established prima facie case, burden shifts to 
opposing party to come forward with competent evidence of specific facts 
countering the facts presented by the movant). Although appellant failed to 
present any evidence in opposition to the motion, the district court did have 
before it the two social summaries which indicated that appellant was actively 
involved in the child's life prior to his incarceration, that he had completed a 
substance abuse program at the penitentiary, that he wished to maintain a  relationship with the child, and that 
appellee RMC had not allowed JLP to visit appellant at the 
penitentiary.

 
 

[¶16.]  Viewing the record in the light most 
favorable to appellant, we hold that appellees unquestionably established by 
clear and convincing evidence that appellant is incarcerated upon a felony 
conviction and that he has at least twenty more years to serve on his minimum 
sentence. Thus the first element in § 14-2-309(a)(iv) was satisfied, and there 
simply was no response available to appellant in opposition to the evidence on 
that element.

 
 

[¶17.]  With respect to the element of unfitness, 
we observe that the term "unfit" is not defined in the termination statutes.7 It seems clear, nevertheless, that 
incarceration alone is insufficient to establish unfitness. See RW, 766 P.2d  at 558-59 (Urbigkit, J., specially concurring). It has been suggested, 
however, that unfitness might be deduced from an extended prison term. 
Id. 
See also Zipf v. Patricia P., 175 Cal. App. 3d 115, 220 Cal. Rptr. 525, 535 
(1985) (totality of convictions could disclose a criminal propensity permitting 
inference that parent will be incarcerated for extended periods resulting in a 
substantial breach of parental  
duties).

 
 

[¶18.]  Parental unfitness has been defined in 
other jurisdictions. In Petition of Kauch, 358 Mass. 327, 264 N.E.2d 371, 373 (1970) (quoting Richards 
v. Forrest, 278 Mass. 547, 180 N.E. 508, 510 (1932)), the 
court, in a custody context, defined unfit as meaning "'unsuitable, incompetent, 
or not adapted for a particular use or service.'" That definition was quoted as 
being applicable to termination cases in Wright v. Superintending School 
Committee, City of Portland, 331 A.2d 640, 644 (Me. 1975). In State v. 
Johnson, 214 Kan. 780, 522 P.2d 330 (1974), the court 
recited the above definition and noted that the word "unfit" usually imports 
something of moral delinquency. The court in that case also stated that 
"'incapacity to appreciate and perform the obligations resting upon parents 
might render them unfit, apart from other moral defects.'" Id. at 334 (quoting Vallimont v. Medford, 
182 Kan. 334, 
321 P.2d 190, 196 (1958)). The California  
Court of Appeal, in Zipf, 220 Cal. Rptr.  at 535, said that "unfitness means 
a probability that the parent will fail in a substantial degree to discharge 
parental duties toward the child." Another California case, Kay v. Boyd 
C., 93 Cal. App. 3d 14, 155 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1979), involved an appeal of the 
trial court's finding of unfitness premised upon a felony conviction for armed 
burglary and a history of criminal conduct. The California Court of Appeal held 
that, in some circumstances, the crime of armed burglary may render the 
perpetrator an unfit parent and further that, with respect to present unfitness 
of a parent, the trial court may consider the parent's history of criminal 
conduct. Id. at 412-13.

 
 

[¶19.]  Although neither the legislature nor this 
Court has precisely defined unfitness, we have had occasion to review 
terminations of parental rights accomplished pursuant to § 14-2-309(a)(iv). In 
our recent decision in RW, 766 P.2d 555, we upheld a termination premised 
upon § 14-2-309(a)(iv). In RW, the parental rights of both parents 
respecting one child were terminated subsequent to their convictions for 
second-degree murder and aiding and abetting in  same in connection  with the murder of another of their 
children. The parents in that case did not directly contest the finding of 
unfitness, but rather they argued that the district court had erred in finding 
the State had no burden to prove termination was the least intrusive means to 
accomplish the State's interest in protecting the child. This Court determined, 
in a holding which failed to receive the support of a majority of the Court, 
that, while the least intrusive means was an element in termination cases 
premised upon § 14-2-309(a)(iii) regarding neglected and abused children, it had 
no application to terminations accomplished pursuant to § 14-2-309(a)(iv).  RW, 766 P.2d 555. Three justices 
of this Court, in two specially concurring opinions, expressed disagreement 
with, or at least questioned, that proposition. The specially concurring 
opinions acknowledged, however, that, under the circumstances of the case, the 
unfitness was obvious and the termination was justified.  Id. at 557-59 (Thomas, J., specially 
concurring, with whom Golden, J., joined, and Urbigkit, J., specially 
concurring).8

 
 

[¶20.]  In RDW v. GJS, 716 P.2d 353 (Wyo. 
1986), the father against whom termination was sought was, or had recently been, 
incarcerated in federal prison on drug charges and was shown to have been an 
international drug smuggler for all of his adult life. In addition, the father 
in that case admittedly had involved the child's mother in drug smuggling, and 
the mother had died while transporting drugs when a balloon containing cocaine 
burst in her gastrointestinal tract. In rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence regarding unfitness, we concluded:

 
 
It is easy for us to find a plethora 
of evidence sufficient to support the trial court's determination that 
appellant's parental rights should be terminated. In summary, "* * * * if 
[appellant] had any redeeming qualities, he managed to keep them fairly well 
concealed."

 
 

Id. at 355 (quoting PAA, 702 
P.2d at 1266).

 
 

[¶21.]  In JG, 742 P.2d 770, we reviewed a 
termination of a father's parental rights where the father had been incarcerated 
on a felony conviction for second-degree sexual assault against his children. 
The district court terminated the father's parental rights on the basis of both 
paragraphs (iii) and (iv) of §  
14-2-309(a). On appeal the father challenged, inter alia, the 
constitutionality of paragraph (iv) of the statute, asserting that the statute 
lacked a standard for determining whether a parent was unfit and thus the 
statutory language was unconstitutionally vague. We did not reach the father's 
vagueness challenge because the issue had not been properly preserved for 
appellate review. We stated, nevertheless, that appellant's conduct as disclosed 
by the record "demonstrate[d] unequivocally that the appellant [wa]s an unfit 
parent by any standard." JG, 742 P.2d  at 775.

 
 

[¶22.]  We are convinced that the record in the 
instant case dictates a similar conclusion regarding the fitness of appellant. 
The materials submitted by appellees in support of their motion for summary 
judgment established that appellant has a consistent history of criminal 
activities. He has repeatedly committed forcible rapes, beginning when he was 
seventeen years old, culminating in the rape and death of an elderly woman for 
which he is now incarcerated under an extended prison sentence. The summary 
judgment materials also indicated that appellant has refused or at least 
resisted the rehabilitative program for sexual  offenders available to him. Further, the 
district court had before it information that appellant has been a consistent 
user of illegal drugs from age seventeen until his present incarceration. With 
respect to the relationship which the length of appellant's sentence may bear to 
his fitness, we note  that the child 
will be well into adulthood before appellant's minimum sentence expires. 
Relating this evidence to the various formulations and definitions of unfitness 
noted earlier illustrates that appellant has a long history of criminal conduct, 
that his crimes indicate extreme moral delinquency, that he will be unable to 
discharge his parental duties throughout the minority of the child, and that he 
is generally unsuitable to perform the requisite parental functions. This 
evidence, as in the JG case, graphically demonstrates that appellant is 
an unfit parent by any standard.

 
 

[¶23.]  Appellant did not respond to this 
evidence submitted by appellees in support of their motion for summary judgment. 
Appellant contends, nevertheless, that the evidence in the record indicating 
that before his incarceration he was actively involved in the child's life, that 
he completed a substance abuse program  
at the penitentiary, and that he desires to maintain contact with the 
child is sufficient to structure a genuine issue of material fact regarding his 
fitness as a parent. We cannot agree. We believe that appellees have succinctly 
captured the essence of these contentions with the observation in their brief 
that, "during the same time period that Appellant contends he was being a fine 
father to his son, [he] was using every kind of illegal drug and raping and 
terrorizing women in his home town."

 
 

[¶24.]  Appellant's failure to respond with 
competent opposing evidence to the summary judgment materials presented by 
appellees acutely demonstrates that nothing further could be gained by an 
evidentiary hearing. There are no issues of material fact. Appellant does not 
suggest, nor can we envision, that anything further could be developed in an 
evidentiary hearing which would refute the unequivocal showing of incarceration 
and unfitness made by appellees in support of their motion for summary 
judgment.

 
 

[¶25.]  We have said, in the context of a 
termination proceeding, that due process requires a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard; i.e., some kind of hearing.  
LP, 679 P.2d  at 987-88. In the instant case  there was a hearing, albeit an 
abbreviated summary judgment motion hearing, at which appellant appeared through 
counsel.9 Although, in response to appellees' 
initial showing, appellant had the burden to come forth with specific evidence 
to establish a genuine issue of fact, he failed to do so, and it is manifestly 
obvious that he could not do so. Thus, under the circumstances of this case, the 
applicable grounds for termination of appellant's parental rights were 
established by clear and convincing evidence at the summary judgment hearing, 
appellant was accorded adequate due process under the circumstances, and 
appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We emphasize and 
caution, however, that our decision herein reflects the specific and unusual 
facts presented by this case. We can foresee few other situations in which 
summary judgment could properly be utilized to effect a termination of parental 
rights.

 
 

[¶26.]  The order terminating appellant's 
parental rights is affirmed, and, as a consequence, appellant's challenge to the 
subsequent decree of adoption will not be addressed as appellant was a stranger 
to that proceeding. 

 
 

[¶27.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The right to 
a jury trial in a termination proceeding is provided by Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-312 
(1977).

 
 

2Appellant 
does not raise as an issue on appeal the denial of his demand for a jury trial, 
although he does mention it in connection with his argument regarding the 
propriety of summary judgment. In this vein, see LP v. Natrona County 
Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 
1984), in which this Court upheld the trial court's denial of a jury trial to a 
father in a termination proceeding where the father, acting pro se, had failed 
to properly serve the demand and had failed to deposit the required 
fee.

 
 

3In the order 
granting summary judgment, the district court indicated that, in addition to the 
other specific grounds for termination, appellant's abandonment of JLP supported 
termination. Abandonment is a ground for termination under § 14-2-309 and is 
also a ground for granting adoption without consent pursuant to § 1-22-110. 
Although it is not altogether clear, it appears the district court was relying 
upon the termination statute with respect to abandonment. The statutory basis of 
the district court's finding of abandonment is of little consequence in this 
case, however, since we herein hold that termination was properly granted 
pursuant to § 14-2-309(a)(iv) regarding incarceration and 
unfitness.

 
 

4Section 
14-2-312 of the current enactment provides that, upon the filing of a petition, 
the judge "shall set the petition for hearing."

 
 

5The question 
has not been resolved uniformly in other jurisdictions. In People v. Ray, 
88 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 44 Ill. Dec. 182, 411 N.E.2d 88 (1980), appeal 
dismissed sub nom. Ray v. Illinois, 452 U.S. 956, 69 L. Ed. 2d 967, 101 S. Ct. 3102 (1981), the court upheld a summary judgment terminating the parental 
rights of a mother convicted of murder and cruelty to children in connection 
with the death of one of her children. The court found there were no genuine 
issues of material fact on the question of unfitness. Cf. People in Interest 
of S.B., 742 P.2d 935 (Colo. App. 1987), cert. denied 754 P.2d 1177 
(1988) (affirming summary judgment adjudicating child dependent and 
neglected--an adjudication which may lead to termination as a possible remedy). 
Department of Social Services v. Harold K., 159 Cal. App. 3d 94, 205 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1984), and Matter of Christina T., 590 P.2d 189 (Okla. 1979), 
are cases holding that termination cannot be accomplished by summary judgment, 
although both cases relied, at least in part, upon the fact that in those states 
termination actions are designated as special proceedings not subject to the 
general rules of civil procedure.

 
 

6The victim 
is listed variously in the record as being either eighty-two years old or 
eighty-seven years old.

 
 

7See Comment, Family 
Law--Wyoming's 
New Termination of Parental Rights Statute, XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 
621 (1982) (term "unfit" is vague and in need of judicial construction in 
absence of legislative definition).

 
 

8In the 
instant case appellant has not raised as an issue whether the district court 
improperly failed to consider the availability of a less intrusive means to 
accomplish the State's interest in protecting the child. Under the facts of this 
case, however, we are convinced that a less intrusive means to protect the child 
is clearly impractical. See RW, 766 P.2d  at 558 (Thomas, J., specially 
concurring); and TR v. Washakie County Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, 736 P.2d 712, 718 (Wyo. 1987).

 
 

9Although 
appellant does not raise it as an issue, we note that it has been held that a 
convict has no constitutional right to personally appear in a civil termination 
proceeding and that due process is satisfied if the convict has been allowed to 
appear through counsel and by deposition. Quenette v. Skjonsby, 341 N.W.2d 619 (N.D. 1983).

 
 
URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶28.]  In this case, the father, while 
incarcerated in the penitentiary, asked for an opportunity to testify in court 
before a decision was made to terminate his parental rights, which was denied. 
In the myriad of prior summary judgment cases, we had previously not gone so far 
as to define relations between parent and child to be excluded from at least the 
opportunity of the parent to present live testimony to defend a constitutional 
interest as parent. See Payne v. SuperiorCourtofLos AngelesCounty, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405, 553 P.2d  565 (1976) and In 
Interest of F. H., 283 N.W.2d 202 (N.D. 1979). In the nature of the family 
relationship, I do not believe that a denial of testimonial defense can ever be 
justifiably entrusted to summary judgment without leaving at least a scintilla 
of fact issue unchallenged.  
Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986).

 
 

[¶29.]  The issue here is not termination of 
parental rights; it is the  use of 
summary judgment against a person incarcerated in the penitentiary who is 
physically denied the opportunity to provide personal testimony. Furthermore, 
the issue is not even appearance in person, since at least the deposition 
testimony of the father should have been permitted and required.  Matter of Adoption of Quenette, 
341 N.W.2d 619 (N.D. 1983); In Interest of F. H., 283 N.W.2d 202. The 
proper test of summary judgment is not whether the trial court might make the 
same decision after holding a hearing; it is that an issue of fact exists in 
recognition that parental rights always cultivate some foliage of factual 
inquiry from its constitutional stem requiring a trial with a live record to 
assess where justice is to be found.  
State ex rel. Gladden v. Sloper, 209 Or. 346, 306 P.2d 418 
(1957).

 
 

[¶30.]  It would have been appropriate and 
responsive in this case, if the cost of appearance under guard was unacceptable, 
to provide deposition testimony by telephone arrangements which are an efficient 
and inexpensive mechanism. I can certainly recognize within the factual analysis 
comprehensively made by the majority why termination could be clearly justified. 
However, summary judgment  should 
neither be elongated nor parental rights diluted by the use of affidavit 
instrumentation of that non-trial mechanism to terminate the most fundamental 
relationship--parental status. My concern is equal protection and due process as 
a right of a parent to defend.

 
 

[¶31.]  The significance of the opportunity of 
the father to testify was forcefully recognized in analysis of a termination 
proceeding where this court was defendant in a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
case, Blair v. Supreme Court of State of Wyo., 671 F.2d 389 (10th Cir. 
1982). In Blair, the federal court recognized as procedural 
attributes:

 
 
It is apparent from Blair's 
complaint and exhibits attached thereto that Judge Spangler held a full hearing 
at which Blair testified and was represented by counsel.

 
 

Id. at 391.

 
 

[¶32.]  For the law to then be applied in denial 
of federal court relief:

 
 
We recently recognized in Wise v. 
Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328 at 1331 (10th Cir. 1981), that the relationship between 
parent and child is constitutionally protected. As such, "the state's power to 
legislate, adjudicate and administer all aspects of family law, including 
determinations of custodial and visitation rights, is subject to  scrutiny by the federal judiciary within 
the reach of the Due Process and/or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Id. at 1332.

 
 
Recent Supreme Court opinions make 
it plain that the state has a compelling interest in the welfare of minor 
children and his authority to terminate parental rights under certain limited 
circumstances, so long as it makes that determination in the best interest of 
the child and after a hearing. See Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 
452 U.S. 18, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 
68 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S. Ct. 549, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1978); 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 
(1972).

 
 

Id. at 390.

 
 

[¶33.]  The consideration of summary judgment in 
termination of parental rights cases is not lacking in available precedent. 
There are well-considered cases which until now appear to be without converse 
persuasion which reject the affidavit-based process for final issue 
determination in this character of constitutional right inquiry.1 A detailed  analysis is found in Matter of 
Christina T., 590 P.2d 189 (Okl. 1979), which involved the similar situation 
of the incarcerated father. That court observed in regard to the termination 
proceedings pursued against the father by summary 
judgment:

 
 
The question for determination in 
this case is whether a juvenile court action brought to adjudicate a child 
dependent and neglected may be decided on motion for summary 
judgment.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
Summary judgment is not applicable 
to juvenile proceedings. Our statutes and this Court's past decisions make it 
absolutely clear that a hearing on a juvenile petition is mandatory. This is, as 
we have stated on many occasions, a matter of highest constitutional magnitude 
for the fundamental integrity of the family unit which has found protection in 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Ninth Amendment, may not be intruded upon without affording parent and child due 
process of law. "The fundamental requisite of due process is the right to be 
heard. [citations omitted] The hearing required by the Due Process Clause must 
be 'meaningful' [citation omitted] and 'appropriate to the nature of the case' 
[citation omitted]. These requisites are all the more important when the 
judicial procedure concerns the continuance of the parent-child relationship." 
York 
v.  Halley, supra, [534 P.2d 363 
(Okl. 1975)] at 365.

 
 
The trial court's sustention of the 
state's motion for summary judgment deprived appellant and his minor daughter of 
their rights to due process of law.

 
 

Id. at 190-92 (footnotes 
omitted).

 
 

[¶34.]  Similar conclusions denying access to 
summary judgment for termination of parental right cases are found in Matter 
of Matthew S., 201 Cal. App. 3d 315, 247 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1988); In re Mark 
K., 159 Cal. App. 3d 94, 205 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1984); and In re Henson, 77 
Misc.2d 694, 354 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1974). Cf.  State v. James, 38 Wash. App. 264, 
686 P.2d 1097 (1984) for paternity analysis.

 
 

[¶35.]  The policy concepts expressed by those 
authorities are not singularly different from what we earlier said in DS and 
RS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911, 919 
(Wyo. 1980):

 
 
We admonish that the burden of 
proving neglect or abuse is upon him who seeks to take the child from the 
parent. We emphasize that the trial court and the appellate court will strictly 
scrutinize claims that a natural parent is unfit because of abuse or neglect. 
This means that the court's duty to protect the child will be balanced against 
its duty to protect democratic values.

 
 

[¶36.]  To me, this strict scrutiny defines an 
actual hearing with live witnesses and the father afforded at least a chance to 
appear by deposition, if not in person. See review of law journals directed 
generally to the subject  of 
parental rights in In Interest of J.L., 761 P.2d 985, 987 n.2 (Wyo. 1988). The 
foundational law has been established in a course of constitutional decisions by 
the United States Supreme Court as founded upon Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972), followed by the commitment 
case of Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1979), and more recently including Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Services of Durham County, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640, reh'g denied 453 U.S. 927, 102 S. Ct.  889, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1023 (1981) and 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982). See also, Annotation, 
Parent's Involuntary Confinement, or Failure to Care for Child as Result 
Thereof, as Evidencing Neglect, Unfitness, or the Like in Dependency or 
Divestiture Proceeding, 79 A.L.R.3d 417 (1977 & 1988 
Supp.).

 
 

[¶37.]  I respectfully dissent but further point 
out anxiously that unexpended and unexcused efforts to at least provide 
deposition testimony in the future should indeed confine this decision "to a few 
other situations," but preferably to leave it as only one of a  kind.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In offering 
this conclusion, I do not ignore majority opinion citations. In People v. 
Ray, 88 Ill.App.3d 1010, 44 Ill.Dec. 182, 411 N.E.2d 88, 91 (1980), 
appeal dismissed 452 U.S. 956, 101 S. Ct. 3102, 69 L. Ed. 2d 967 (1981), 
where the mother was convicted of murder in the death of another child, the 
subsequent use of summary judgment in a termination proceeding was not presented 
as an appellate issue after the court had "affirmed the respondent's conviction 
of murder and cruelty to children on evidence of common design and participation 
in her boyfriend's course of torture and abuse that resulted in the death of her 
child. (People v. Ray [, 80 Ill.App.3d 151, 35 Ill.Dec. 688, 399 N.E.2d 977 (1979)])." The presented appellate issue of the second case was 
constitutional equal protection in challenging statutory grounds for the finding 
of parental unfitness. Ray, 411 N.E.2d  at 90. In the Colorado case, People 
in Interest of S.B., 742 P.2d 935 (Colo.App. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. 
N.B. v. People, 754 P.2d 1177 (Colo. 1988), termination was not then an 
issue where the father was in jail awaiting trial for the first degree murder of 
the mother and the dependent and neglected status of the daughter was clearly 
self-evident with one parent jailed and the other 
deceased.