Title: Rowe v. Housing Authority

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

249 S.W.2d 551 (1952) ROWE v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF LITTLE ROCK et al. No. 4-9852. Supreme Court of Arkansas. June 9, 1952. John F. Park, Little Rock, for appellant. Herschel H. Friday, O. D. Longstreth, Jr., and Pat Mehaffy, Little Rock, for appellee. McFADDIN, Justice. This is a taxpayer's suit, attacking the constitutionality of certain provisions of Act 212 of 1945, which Act is sometimes called the "Urban Redevelopment Law", or the "Blighted Area Law". The Act 212 gives to any Housing Authority (established under Act 298 of 1937 and/or amendatory acts, Ark.Stats. § 19-3001 et seq.) additional powers as regards so-called "blighted" areas. In his complaint, appellant alleged that he was a citizen and taxpayer of Little Rock; *552 that the Housing Authority of Little Rock was attempting to act in this case under said Act 212 of 1945 and previous Acts; that the Housing Authority of Little Rock (hereinafter simply called "Housing Authority") had decided that an area of 10 city blocks in Little Rock was a "blighted area" within the purview of said Act 212; that plaintiff owned property in said 10 block area; that said Housing Authority was seeking to acquire all of said 10 block area even by eminent domain if necessary; that the Housing Authority proposed to "redevelop" said area under the provisions of said Act 212; that said Housing Authority would then resell to private persons some of such redeveloped property; and that public funds of the City of Little Rock would be used by said Housing Authority. The complaint named as defendants the Housing Authority of Little Rock, the five individuals acting as Commissioners of said Authority, the City of Little Rock, the Mayor, and the individual members of the City Council of Little Rock. Injunction was the relief sought. The constitutionality of said Act 212 was attacked by plaintiff on these four grounds, which we quote from his complaint: The Chancery Court sustained a demurrer to the complaint and dismissed the cause when the plaintiff refused to plead further. From said decree of dismissal, there is this appeal. The complaint was filed in the Chancery Court on April 8, 1952; and on the same day, the defendants filed their demurrer, which was sustained. The decree of dismissal was made on April 8th; and the transcript filed in this Court the same day. Thus, it was only a matter of hours from the filing of the suit in the Chancery Court to the lodging of the appeal in this Court. Then attorneys for other property owners in the said 10 block area appeared in *553 this Court, and claimed that the present suit was "too friendly" and sought to intervene here in order that the rule of res judicata[2] might not foreclose their clients in subsequent litigation involving factual questions. Since intervention would be improper on appeal, the parties to this litigation made the following stipulation in this Court: We honor the said stipulation and limit the present decision to the four constitutional questions previously set forth. Housing Authority legislation is not a new subject in our jurisdiction. In Hogue v. Housing Authority of North Little Rock, 201 Ark. 263, 144 S.W.2d 49, there was an attack on Act 298 of 1937[3] which was the first such legislation in this State. In the Hogue case, every constitutional point was presented that is urged in the case at bar save only one point subsequently to be mentioned; and in the Hogue case, this Court held the Housing Authority Act to be constitutional. In Denard v. Housing Authority, 203 Ark. 1050, 159 S.W.2d 764, the Hogue case was reaffirmed. Then by Act 352 of 1941,[4] the Legislature extended the Housing Authority legislation to include rural areas. This 1941 legislation was attacked as unconstitutional, but in Kerr v. East Central Arkansas Regional Housing Authority, 208 Ark. 625, 187 S.W.2d 189, 191, we upheld the original Housing Authority legislation, as well as the 1941 amendment; and in the Kerr case, we quoted from the Hogue case:[5] The cases above cited have decided adversely to the appellant every constitutional question here presented, except the one which relates to the right of the Housing Authority, after redeveloping the "blighted area" to then resell portions of the redeveloped property to individuals other than those whose property had been taken by the Housing Authority in the exercise of eminent domain. It is argued by plaintiff that the effect of such taking by eminent domain and reselling to other private individuals, is to allow private property taken for socalled public use to be resold to other private individuals. This point is really the only material distinction between the Act 212 of 1945 and the Housing Authority Acts considered in our previous cases. But even on this point, we find that practically all of the Courts have held such Redevelopment Acts to be constitutional as against this objection. The Court of Appeals of New York, in Murray v. La Guardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884, 888, disposed of this point: The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had the same question under consideration in Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277, 282, 172 A.L.R. 953, and used this language: To cite, much less discuss, all of the cases involving Housing Authority legislation would consume pages. Most of these cases are collected in the Annotations in 130 A.L.R. 1069 and 172 A.L.R. 966. See also Redfern v. Board of Commissioners of Jersey City, 137 N.J.L. 356, 59 A.2d 641; In the Matter of Slum Clearance in the City of Detroit, 331 Mich. 714, 50 N.W.2d 340; and Opinion to the Governor, 76 R.I. 249, 69 A.2d 531. Regardless of the wisdom of the legislation, we cannot say that the Act 212 is unconstitutional as regards the four grounds on which it is here assailed. The decree is affirmed. ROBINSON, J., disqualified and not participating. [1] There was a fifth ground alleged in the complaint, which related to "due process", but appellant now states that there is no merit to this point. [2] For application of res judicata in such a situation, see McCarroll v. Farrar, 199 Ark. 320, 134 S.W.2d 561. [3] See Section 19-3001 et seq. Ark.Stats. [4] See Section 19-3030 et seq. Ark.Stats. [5] Hogue v. Housing Authority, 201 ark 263, 144 S.W.2d 49. [6] Kerr v. East Central Arkansas Regional Housing Authority, 208 Ark. 625, 187 S.W.2d 189. [7] Certiorari was denied in this case by the United States Supreme Court, 321 U.S. 771, 64 S. Ct. 530, 88 L. Ed. 1066.