Title: In re Detention of Lieberman

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 91344-Agenda 13-January 2002.
In re DETENTION OF BRAD LIEBERMAN (The People of the 
 								State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Brad Lieberman, Appellee).
Opinion filed July 3, 2002.
 
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court: 
		In 1980, respondent, Brad Lieberman, was convicted of seven
counts of rape. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 11-1. In January
2000, the State filed a petition in the circuit court of Cook County
alleging that respondent is a "sexually violent person" subject to
involuntary civil commitment pursuant to the Sexually Violent
Persons Commitment Act (the Act or Commitment Act) (725
ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 1998)). At issue in this appeal is whether
respondent's 1980 convictions for the crime of rape constitute
"sexually violent" offenses subjecting him to commitment as a
"sexually violent person" under the version of the Commitment
Act in effect at the time the State filed the petition at bar.(1) The
circuit court of Cook County denied respondent's motion to
dismiss the State's petition to commit him as a sexually violent
person. The circuit court thereafter certified the following question
for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308(a)
(155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)): "Whether the Respondent's conviction for
the crime of rape (Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 38 §11-1) is a conviction of
a sexually violent offense for purposes of a civil commitment of
a 'sexually violent person' under the Sexually Violent Persons
Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207[/1] et seq." The appellate court
granted respondent's application for leave to file an interlocutory
appeal. The appellate court answered the certified question in the
negative, and reversed the judgment of the circuit court. 319 Ill.
App. 3d 1020. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the
judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	In 1980, respondent was convicted in the circuit court of Cook
County of six counts of rape (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par.
11-1(a)) and one count of attempted rape. That same year,
respondent was found guilty of one count of rape and one count of
attempted rape in Lake County. Respondent was sentenced to a
number of terms of imprisonment to run concurrently, the longest
of which required him to serve 40 years in prison.
	Respondent was scheduled to be released from the Illinois
Department of Corrections on January 9, 2000. On January 6,
2000, the State filed in the circuit court of Cook County a petition
pursuant to section 15 of the Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/15
(West 1998)) alleging that respondent is a "sexually violent
person" within the meaning of section 5(f) of the Act (725 ILCS
207/5(f) (West 1998)) and therefore subject to involuntary civil
commitment to the control, care and custody of the Department of
Human Services. In support of this petition, the State alleged that
in 1980 respondent was convicted of seven "sexually violent
offenses" in Cook County and two "sexually violent offenses" in
Lake County. The petition further alleged that respondent suffers
from several mental disorders, including paraphilia and "sexually
attracted to non-consenting females, non-exclusive type." The
petition also alleged that respondent is subject to involuntary civil
commitment under the Act because he is "dangerous to others"
and that "his mental disorders create a substantial probability that
he will engage in future acts of sexual violence."
	Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the State's petition
pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1998)). In his dismissal motion, respondent
noted that the crime of rape was abolished by the General
Assembly in 1984 as part of a comprehensive rewriting of this
state's sex offense statutes. Respondent further observed that,
under the version of section 5(e) of the Commitment Act (725
ILCS 205/5(e) (West 1998)) in effect at the time the State filed the
petition at bar, a "[s]exually violent offense" for purposes of the
Act was defined as criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-13
(West 1998)), aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS
5/12-14 (West 1998)), predatory criminal sexual assault of a child
(720 ILCS 5/12-14.1 (West 1998)), and aggravated criminal
sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16 (West 1998)). Respondent argued
that because the crime of rape was not included in section 5(e)'s
definition of a "sexually violent offense," the State's petition
failed to allege a claim under the Act and warranted dismissal.
	On February 1, 2000, the circuit court denied respondent's
motion to dismiss. The circuit court judge found that the offense
of criminal sexual assault "replaced rape" in the Criminal Code of
1961, and he regarded the two offenses "as basically the same."
The circuit court judge further found that "the legislature did not
spell out rape [in section 5(e) of the Commitment Act] because
rape was not on the books. They did spell out criminal sexual
assault which I believe incorporates rape." Therefore, the circuit
court judge concluded, respondent's convictions for rape fell
within section 5(e)'s definition of a "sexually violent offense" and
respondent was subject to proceedings under the Commitment
Act.
	On February 9, 2000, the circuit court certified the following
question for review, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (155
Ill. 2d R. 308(a)): "Whether the Respondent's conviction for the
crime of rape (Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 38 §11-1) is a conviction of a
sexually violent offense for the purpose of a civil commitment of
a 'sexually violent person' under the Sexually Violent Persons
Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207[/1] et seq." The appellate court
granted respondent's petition for leave to appeal.
 	The appellate court answered the certified question in the
negative and reversed the judgment of the circuit court. 319 Ill.
App. 3d 1020. The appellate court found that the version of
section 5(e) of the Commitment Act in effect at the time the
State's petition was filed did not include the now-abolished
offense of rape within the definition of "sexually violent offenses."
Therefore, the appellate court concluded, a petition for involuntary
commitment brought pursuant to the Act cannot be based upon a
rape conviction. In addition, the appellate court rejected the
argument advanced by the State that because the elements of the
former offense of rape were "subsumed" into the subsequently
enacted offenses of criminal and aggravated criminal sexual
assault, respondent's convictions for rape were "sexually violent
offenses" within the meaning of the Commitment Act. As a final
matter, the appellate court ruled that the legislature's subsequent
amendment to section 5(e) of the Act adding the offense of rape to
the definition of a "sexually violent offense" (725 ILCS
207/5(e)(1.5) (West 2000)) supported its conclusion that the Act
as originally drafted did not intend for rape to be included within
the definition of a "sexually violent offense." We granted the
State's petition for leave to appeal under our Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d
R. 315).

ANALYSIS
	We are asked in this appeal to determine whether a conviction
for the crime of rape constitutes a "sexually violent offense"
within the meaning of the version of the Sexually Violent Persons
Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 1998)) in effect
at the time the State filed its petition in the circuit court. The issue
before us is a matter of statutory construction. Accordingly, our
review is de novo (Sylvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill. 2d 225,
232 (2001)), and our inquiry is conducted within a familiar
analytic framework.
	It is well settled that the primary objective of this court in
construing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain and give effect
to the intention of the legislature. Michigan Avenue National Bank
v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). All other rules
of statutory construction are subordinate to this cardinal principle.
Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d  at 232; Henrich v. Libertyville High School,
186 Ill. 2d 381, 387 (1998). We determine legislative intent by
examining the language of the statute, which is "the most reliable
indicator of the legislature's objectives in enacting a particular
law." Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504; see also
In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000); Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386,
392 (1996). The statutory language is to be given its plain,
ordinary and popularly understood meaning (Union Electric Co.
v. Department of Revenue, 136 Ill. 2d 385, 397 (1990)), and we are
to afford the statutory language the fullest, rather than narrowest,
possible meaning to which it is susceptible (Lake County Board of
Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 119 Ill. 2d 419, 423
(1988)).
	Because all provisions of a statutory enactment are viewed as
a whole (Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504; Bubb
v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 382 (1995)),
words and phrases should not be construed in isolation, but must
be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute
(Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d  at 232; Michigan Avenue National Bank,
191 Ill. 2d at 504). Each word, clause and sentence of the statute,
if possible, must be given reasonable meaning and not rendered
superfluous. Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d  at 232; A.P. Properties, Inc. v.
Goshinsky, 186 Ill. 2d 524, 532 (1999). Accordingly, in
determining the intent of the legislature, the court may properly
consider not only the language of the statute, but also the reason
and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the
purpose to be achieved. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000);
Stern v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 179 Ill. 2d 160, 164 (1997);
People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 345 (1992). "Legislative intent
can be ascertained from a consideration of the entire Act, its
nature, its object and the consequences that would result from
construing it one way or the other." Fumarolo v. Chicago Board
of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54, 96 (1990); see also People ex rel.
Meyer v. Gerner, 35 Ill. 2d 33, 39 (1966); Carrigan v. Liquor
Control Comm'n, 19 Ill. 2d 230, 233 (1960). In construing a
statute, we also presume that the General Assembly, in its
enactment of legislation, did not intend absurdity, inconvenience
or injustice. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504;
Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 350, 362-63 (1986).
"Statutes must be construed in the most beneficial way which their
language will permit so as to prevent hardship or injustice, and to
oppose prejudice to public interests." Mulligan v. Joliet Regional
Port District, 123 Ill. 2d 303, 313 (1988); see also Illinois
National Bank v. Chegin, 35 Ill. 2d 375, 378-79 (1966).
	The Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS
207/1 et seq. (West 1998)) took effect on January 1, 1998 (Pub.
Act 90-40, eff. January 1, 1998). The Commitment Act applies to
an individual who has been convicted of a "sexually violent
offense" and who is nearing release or discharge from custody.
Section 15 of the Act allows the State to petition the court for the
civil detention of criminal offenders beyond their imposed periods
of incarceration if the State can show that the offender satisfies the
criteria of a "[s]exually violent person." 725 ILCS 207/15 (West
1998); see also In re Detention of Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d 548, 553
(2000).
	Pursuant to section 5(f) of the Commitment Act (725 ILCS
207/5(f) (West 1998)), a "[s]exually violent person" is defined as
an individual who
			"has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has
been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense,
or has been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense
by reason of insanity and who is dangerous because he or
she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it
substantially probable that the person will engage in acts
of sexual violence."
Section 5(e) of the Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/5(e) (West
1998)) provides the definition for what is considered to be a
"[s]exually violent offense" for purposes of the Act. At the time
the State filed the instant petition against respondent, an offense
was deemed to be "sexually violent" if it fell within any one of the
three subsections of section 5(e). Because the State's petition at
bar relies only upon the definition of a "[s]exually violent offense"
contained in subsection (1) of section 5(e), our review is confined
to this specific statutory provision. Pursuant to section 5(e)(1), a
"[s]exually violent offense" is defined as "[a]ny crime specified in
Section 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of
1961." 725 ILCS 205/5(e)(1) (West 1998). Thus, under the
applicable version of the statute, a "[s]exually violent offense" was
defined by the General Assembly as criminal sexual assault (720
ILCS 5/12-13 (West 1998)), aggravated criminal sexual assault
(720 ILCS 5/12-14 (West 1998)), predatory criminal sexual
assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1 (West 1998)), or
aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16 (West
1998)). See also Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d  at 552.
	In the matter at bar, the State contends that the appellate court
erred in holding that the General Assembly did not intend to
include the former offense of rape within the definition of a
"[s]exually violent offense" found in the version of the
Commitment Act in effect at the time the State filed the
commitment petition at bar. The State advances two arguments in
support of its position that, although the offense of rape is not
specifically included within the definition of a "[s]exually violent
offense" under the applicable version of section 5(e)(1) of the Act,
respondent is nevertheless subject to involuntary civil commitment
proceedings under the Act. First, the State asserts that the General
Assembly intended that the former offense of rape be "subsumed"
into the subsequently enacted offenses of criminal and aggravated
criminal sexual assault. According to the State, because the
conduct of respondent in his underlying rape convictions is
precisely the type of conduct which is chargeable under the
offenses of criminal and aggravated criminal sexual assault, it
follows that the crime of rape is at the core of these subsequently
enacted offenses. Therefore, the State reasons, respondent's
convictions for rape are convictions for a "sexually violent
offense" within the meaning of the Commitment Act and,
accordingly, respondent is subject to proceedings under that Act.
Second, the State argues that the legislature's subsequent
amendment of section 5(e) of the Commitment Act to add the
offense of rape and other abolished sex offenses within the
definition of a "sexually violent offense" serves to clarify that the
legislature originally intended that the crime of rape be considered
a "sexually violent offense" for purposes of the Act. In sum, the
State concludes, the appellate court's ruling that rape does not
constitute a "sexually violent offense" within the meaning of the
applicable version of the Commitment Act constitutes an absurd
result which thwarts the General Assembly's intent in passing the
Act, which is to authorize the State to file a petition to civilly
commit violent recidivist sex offenders who pose a continuing
threat to society.
	Respondent counters that the plain language of the applicable
version of section 5(e)(1) of the Commitment Act does not include
the specific offense of rape within the definition of a "[s]exually
violent offense." Relying upon the rule of statutory construction
which provides that when a statute lists certain matters, those
matters omitted were intended to be excluded (see 2A N. Singer,
Sutherland on Statutory Construction §47.23 (6th ed. 2000)
(discussing the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius)),
respondent argues that the absence of the former offense of rape
from the definition of a "[s]exually violent offense" in section
5(e)(1) of the Act gives rise to an inference that the legislature
intended to exclude individuals convicted of rape from the Act's
coverage. Thus, respondent concludes, because he was not
convicted of a "sexually violent offense" within the meaning of
section 5(e)(1), he does not come within the statutory definition of
a "sexually violent person" contained within section 5(f) of the
Act. Accordingly, respondent asserts that the State's petition fails
to allege a claim under the Commitment Act. For the reasons set
forth below, we disagree with respondent's interpretation of the
Commitment Act.
 	As stated, in construing the meaning of a statute, the primary
objective of this court is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislature's intent. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d 
at 503-04. All other rules of statutory construction are subordinate
to this cardinal principle. Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d  at 232. To this end,
in addition to considering the language of the statute, we may
properly consider the reason and necessity for the law, the evils
sought to be remedied by the law, and the purpose to be achieved
by the enactment. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d  at 42; Stern, 179 Ill. 2d  at
164. Indeed, " '[w]here the spirit and intent of the General
Assembly in adopting an act are clearly expressed and its objects
and purposes are clearly set forth, courts are not bound by the
literal language of a particular clause which would defeat the
obvious intent of the legislature.' " People v. McCoy, 63 Ill. 2d 40,
45 (1976), quoting Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co.
v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n, 42 Ill. 2d 385, 395 (1969).
	In order to determine whether individuals, such as respondent,
who were convicted of the now-repealed offense of rape are
subject to civil commitment under the version of the Commitment
Act in effect at the time the State filed the petition at bar, we must
first address the threshold question of whether the former offense
of rape was subsumed into the subsequently enacted crimes of
criminal and aggravated criminal sexual assault. In answering this
question, we must discern the legislature's intent in repealing the
offense of rape and enacting a new statutory scheme governing the
prosecution of sex crimes.
	In 1984, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 83-1067,
more commonly known as the Criminal Sexual Assault Act (Pub.
Act 83-1067, eff. July 1, 1984). The Criminal Sexual Assault Act
repealed eight statutes which had defined sex offenses in sections
11-1 through 11-11.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961, including the
offense of rape.(2) This court has previously observed that the
Criminal Sexual Assault Act "recodif[ied] the sexual offenses into
a comprehensive statute with uniform statutory elements that
would criminalize all sexual assaults without distinguishing
between the sex of the offender or the victim and the type of
sexual act proscribed." People v. Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d 263, 271
(1987). To this end, the Criminal Sexual Assault Act replaced the
repealed offenses with the newly created offenses of criminal
sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual
abuse, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse. See Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d  at 271-72.
	In its submissions to this court, the State contends that the
legislature intended that the offenses of criminal sexual assault and
aggravated criminal sexual assault created by the Criminal Sexual
Assault Act "subsume" the offense of rape. We agree. The intent
of the General Assembly in passing House Bill 606, which became
the Criminal Sexual Assault Act, is clearly set forth in the
legislative debates. For example, Senator Netsch, the Senate
sponsor of House Bill 606, stated that the overall purpose of
rewriting the sex crimes statutes was "to take a hodgepodge of
preexisting statutes and fit them into a consistent coherent whole
which is a spectrum of sex offenses *** [and] create[ ] one
comprehensive law that reflects the fact that rape encompasses all
types of sexual assault committed by both sexes against victims of
both sexes and all ages." 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate
Proceedings, June 27, 1983, at 351-52 (statements of Senator
Netsch); see also 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May
10, 1983, at 163 (statements of Representative Jaffe) (because the
offense of rape "encompasses all types of sexual assault," the
legislature drafted House Bill 606 with the intent of repealing the
"narrow" rape statute and "creat[ing] one comprehensive law").
	Senator Netsch explained that by enacting House Bill 606, the
legislature intended to "increase convictions of sex offenders," and
observed that "for the first time we have done what virtually every
other state has done and what most prosecutors have asked us to
do, and that is to create several levels of gradations, if you will, of
what has been traditionally called rape. The point is not, and I
emphasize, is not to make the conviction of sex offenders less
easy. It is to increase it and make it more likely." 83d Ill. Gen.
Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 27, 1983, at 352-53 (statements
of Senator Netsch); see also 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, May 10, 1983, at 163 (statements of Representative
Jaffe) (the purpose of House Bill 606 is to "increase convictions
of sex offenders by creating uniform statutory elements").
	During the legislative debates, it was noted that House Bill
606 "removes the word 'rape' entirely from the Criminal Code and
substitutes *** the phrase 'criminal sexual assault.' " 83d Ill. Gen.
Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 27, 1983, at 355 (statements of
Senator Bloom). Senator Netsch explained that by repealing the
offense of rape, House Bill 606 intended to "close[ ] a number of
gaps in the spectrum of sex offenses *** [by] recogniz[ing] that
there is a large spectrum of sex offenses which have not been
effectively covered in the past [under the crime of rape] and which
should be effectively covered." 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate
Proceedings, July 1, 1983, at 101 (statements of Senator Netsch).
Senator Netsch also stressed that "[a]lthough the term 'rape' is no
longer in this bill as a legal term of art, rape will remain a part of
our language *** because it is a generic term which does include
all of the victims of sex crimes." 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate
Proceedings, November 2, 1983, at 13 (statements of Senator
Netsch).
	The legislative history of the Criminal Sexual Assault Act
reveals that, although the word "rape" was removed from the
Criminal Code of 1961, the General Assembly intended that the
core concepts of the offense of rape animate the redrafted statute.
Our conclusion that the offense of rape was subsumed by the
subsequently created offenses of criminal and aggravated criminal
sexual assault finds additional support in a comparison of the
elements of the former offense of rape with the elements of
criminal and aggravated criminal sexual assault. This comparison
reveals that the Criminal Sexual Assault Act broadened the scope
of sexual conduct deemed criminal. For example, prior to its
repeal, section 11-1(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provided that
the offense of rape was committed when "[a] male person of the
age of 14 years and upwards *** has sexual intercourse with a
female, not his wife, by force and against her will." Ill. Rev. Stat.
1983, ch. 38, par. 11-1(a). Subsection (b) of section 11-1 defined
"[s]exual intercourse" as "any penetration of the female sex organ
by the male sex organ." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11-1(b).
	In contrast to the offense of rape, which could be charged only
where the offender was male and the victim was female, the
subsequently enacted offenses of criminal and aggravated criminal
sexual assault use gender neutral language, thereby widening the
range of these offenses. Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par.
11-1(a), with 720 ILCS 5/12-13, 12-14 (West 1998). In addition,
although the offense of rape focused on the victim's state of mind
and required a showing by the prosecutor that the crime was
committed against the victim's will, the offenses of criminal and
aggravated criminal sexual assault do not require evidence of the
state of mind of the victim. Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38,
par. 11-1(a), with 720 ILCS 5/12-13, 12-14 (West 1998).
Furthermore, an individual may charge his or her spouse with the
offenses of criminal and aggravated criminal sexual assault,
whereas the offense of rape could only be committed by a male
against a female who was not his wife. Compare Ill. Rev. Stat.
1983, ch. 38, par. 11-1(a), with 720 ILCS 5/12-12(g), 12-13(a)
(West 1998). Finally, the Criminal Sexual Assault Act also
broadened several of the definitions relating to sexual crimes. For
example, the definition of "penetration" under the repealed rape
statute was limited to the penetration of the female sex organ by
the male sex organ. In contrast, the subsequently enacted criminal
sexual assault statute defines "penetration" far more broadly as
"any contact, however slight," and "any intrusion, however slight."
Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11-1(b), with 720 ILCS
5/12-12(f) (West 1998).
	The above comparisons reveal that the conduct underlying
respondent's rape convictions would have also subjected
respondent to charges under the subsequently enacted criminal
sexual assault statutes. As set forth above, the legislature,
acknowledging that rape encompasses all types of sexual assault,
redrafted the sex crimes laws in order to create a comprehensive
statute which recognizes several gradations of conduct
traditionally considered "rape." The legislative debates show that
the redrafting of these laws was intended to address the reality that
"[t]he Illinois Sex crimes statutes, had, over time, become overly
cumbersome, unduly restrictive, and archaic" (A. Jaffe & R.
Becker, Four New Basic Sex Offenses: A Fundamental Shift in
Emphasis, 72 Ill. B.J. 400, 400 (1984)), that a wholesale revision
was necessary to "create statutes which reflected[ed] information
learned in past decades about the nature of sexual assault" (83d Ill.
Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 10, 1983, at 162
(statements of Representative Jaffe)), and that the revised statutes
were intended to increase the number of sex-crime convictions. To
this end, not only have the subsequently enacted sex offenses been
framed in terms broader than those found in the former offense of
rape, the new offenses are also defined in terms of the behavior of
the offender rather than the state of mind of the victim. We
conclude that in creating the offenses of criminal and aggravated
criminal sexual assault, the General Assembly intended that the
elements of the former offense of rape be subsumed into these new
offenses.
	Having found that the former offense of rape stands at the
core of the offenses of criminal and aggravated criminal sexual
assault, we turn to the question of whether a conviction for rape
falls within the definition of a "[s]exually violent offense" under
the applicable version of the Commitment Act. We conclude that
because section 5(e)(1) of the Commitment Act defines the
offenses of criminal and aggravated criminal sexual assault as
"[s]exually violent offense[s]," and because the former offense of
rape is subsumed into criminal and aggravated criminal sexual
assault, it follows that a conviction for the crime of rape
constitutes a "sexually violent offense" under the applicable
version of the Commitment Act.
	Our conclusion is supported by a review of the legislative
debates with respect to Senate Bill 6, which ultimately was
enacted as the Commitment Act (Pub. Act 90-40, eff. January 1,
1998). Representative Dart, the House sponsor of Senate Bill 6,
explained that the intent of the General Assembly in passing this
legislation was to "keep our streets in our community safe from
individuals who pose an ongoing threat to our children and to
adults, as well. This is an attempt to reach out and to ensure that
these people, who we know are predators, who are going to prey
on our children and on adults in our community, frankly, are not
going to be out there and that we are going to ensure that our
streets are more safe." 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings,
May 15, 1997, at 167 (statements of Representative Dart).
Similarly, the Senate sponsor of Senate Bill 6, Senator Radogno,
stated that the legislature intended that the Commitment Act
"allow for the civil commitment at the conclusion of a criminal
sentence of persons determined by a court to be in continuing
danger of committing sex crimes" (90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate
Proceedings, March 18, 1997, at 30 (statements of Senator
Radogno)), that this law be used against those who "tend to be
repeat offenders" (90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings,
March 18, 1997, at 30 (statements of Senator Radogno)), and that
under this Act, "the worst of the worst, in terms of sex offenders,
will be kept off the streets" (90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate
Proceedings, May 21, 1997, at 24 (statements of Senator
Radogno)).
	To give the Commitment Act the construction that respondent
seeks would be to deny effect to the legislature's clearly expressed
intent in enacting this law: to keep our communities safe from
predatory sex offenders who pose an ongoing threat to our
citizens. Although respondent relies upon the rule of statutory
construction that items omitted from a list are intended by the
legislature as exclusions from that list, we observe that the rule of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius "is a rule of statutory
construction and not a rule of law," and it is "subordinate to the
primary rule that the legislative intent governs the interpretation of
the statute. Thus, it can be overcome by a strong indication of
contrary legislative intent or policy." 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on
Statutory Construction §47.23, at 315 (6th ed. 2000).
	In light of the clearly expressed intent of the General
Assembly in enacting the Commitment Act, we do not believe that
the legislature intended to exempt the crime of rape from the
definition of a "sexually violent offense." Respondent's proposed
construction of the statute would be an unwarranted triumph of
form over substance, defeating the very purpose for which the
statute was enacted. Indeed, this court has previously cautioned
that " '[w]hen the literal enforcement of a statute would result in
great injustice and lead to consequences which the legislature
could not have contemplated, the courts are bound to presume that
such consequences were not intended and will adopt a
construction which it may be reasonable to presume was
contemplated by the legislature.' " People ex rel. Cason v. Ring,
41 Ill. 2d 305, 312-13 (1968), quoting Village of Glencoe v.
Hurford, 317 Ill. 203, 220 (1925).
	In the matter at bar, respondent's proposed interpretation of
section 5(e)(1) of the Commitment Act leads to absurd
consequences which the legislature could not have contemplated:
an entire class of violent sex offenders would be excluded from
the application of a statute intended to prevent the return of violent
recidivist sexual offenders to our streets. Because such an
interpretation of section 5(e)(1) leads to absurd results and
prejudices the public interest in keeping citizens safe from violent
sexual offenders, this interpretation is rejected.
	Accordingly, we hold that the General Assembly intended to
include the former crime of rape within the definition of a
"[s]exually violent offense" found in section 5(e)(1) of the
applicable version of the Commitment Act. We conclude that the
legislature's omission of the now-repealed offense of rape from
this definition was purely inadvertent and constituted a situation
"where a legislative intention, otherwise clear, was in part
mistakenly or inaccurately stated." Gill v. Miller, 94 Ill. 2d 52, 58
(1983). "[C]ourts must construe the acts to reflect the obvious
intent of the legislature even if the words of a particular section
must be read as modified or altered so as to comport with the
legislative intent." Ring, 41 Ill. 2d  at 313; see also Gill, 94 Ill. 2d 
at 59 (observing that "this court has decided that where applying
language literally in a clause of an otherwise coherent statute
would frustrate the spirit of the statute and the intent of the
legislature, language may be disregarded, modified or supplied to
give effect to the legislative design"). We stress, however, that
"this technique of construction is to be exercised with caution"
(Gill, 94 Ill. 2d at 58), and its application is limited to those
exceptional situations where, such as in the matter at bar,
adherence to the literal language of the statute would produce a
result that is clearly and demonstrably at odds with the intent of
the General Assembly.
	Our conclusion that the General Assembly intended to include
the former offense of rape within the Commitment Act's definition
of a "sexually violent offense" is further supported by the
legislature's subsequent amendment of section 5(e) of the Act. A
subsequent amendment to a statute may be an appropriate source
for discerning legislative intent. People v. Parker, 123 Ill. 2d 204,
211 (1988); Carey v. Elrod, 49 Ill. 2d 464, 472 (1971). In Public
Act 91-875, effective June 30, 2000, the General Assembly
expanded the list of "sexually violent"offenses by adding a new
subsection (1.5) to section 5(e) of the Commitment Act. Section
5(e)(1.5) provides that a "sexually violent offense" includes "[a]ny
former law of this State specified in Section 11-1 (rape), 11-3
(deviate sexual assault), 11-4 (indecent liberties with a child) or
11-4[.1] (aggravated indecent liberties with a child) of the
Criminal Code of 1961." 725 ILCS 207/5(e)(1.5) (West 2000).(3)
	Respondent contends that the amendment to section 5(e) of
the Act, accomplished by Public Act 91-875, made a substantial
change to the law and was not, as the State contends, simply a
"clarification" of the General Assembly's intent that the former
offense of rape was to be included within the definition of a
"sexually violent offense" in the original version of the
Commitment Act. We disagree with respondent's assertions.
	Although respondent is correct in arguing that an amendatory
change in the language of a statute creates a presumption that it
was intended to change the law as it theretofore existed, this court
has previously held that " 'the presumption is not controlling
[citations] and may be overcome by other considerations.' "
Parker, 123 Ill. 2d  at 211, quoting People v. Nunn, 77 Ill. 2d 243,
248 (1979). We explained in Parker that, although the amendment
of an unambiguous statute usually indicates a purpose to change
the law, "[t]he circumstances surrounding the amendment should
be considered and: 'If they indicate that the legislature intended
only to interpret the original act, the presumption of an intention
to change the law is rebutted.' " Parker, 123 Ill. 2d  at 211, quoting
People v. Youngbey, 82 Ill. 2d 556, 563 (1980); see also 1A N.
Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §22.30, at 366, 374
(6th ed. 2000) ("Although generally, a statutory amendment is
presumed to have been intended to change the law, the legislative
history may indicate that the amendment was intended instead as
a clarification. *** [In addition, the] time and circumstances
surrounding the enactment of the amendment may indicate that the
change wrought by the amendment was formal only-that the
legislature intended merely to interpret the original act"). Under
such circumstances, "[w]e do not believe that the legislature
should be precluded from later clarifying an already unambiguous
law to confirm its earlier intent, without being held to have thereby
intended to change the law." Parker, 123 Ill. 2d  at 212.
 	A review of the legislative debate with respect to House Bill
4116 (which became Public Act 91-875) reveals that the intent of
the General Assembly in amending the Commitment Act was to
"include[ ] in the definition of a 'sexually violent offense' the
former crimes of rape, deviate sexual assault, indecent liberties
with a child or aggravated indecent liberties with a child," because
"[t]hese provisions were overlooked previously." 91st Ill. Gen.
Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 7, 2000, at 64 (statements of
Senator Cronin). In addition, during the legislative debates, House
Bill 4116 was characterized by Representative Turner, the House
sponsor of this legislation, as "cleanup language *** given to us
by the Attorney General" (91st Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, March 3, 2000, at 192 (statements of Representative
Turner)), apparently in response to arguments, such as that raised
at bar, that individuals convicted of rape did not fall within the
purview of the Commitment Act.
	We conclude that the amendment to section 5(e) of the
Commitment Act accomplished by Public Act 91-875 was
intended as a clarification of existing law and not as a change in
the law. The use of the terms "cleanup language" and
"overlooked" indicate that the amendment was introduced to make
it clear that several repealed sex offenses, including the former
offense of rape, were originally intended to be included within the
Commitment Act's definition of a "sexually violent offense." The
particular circumstances at bar indicate that the legislature did not
overlook the fact that the now-repealed crime of rape is an
appropriate underlying offense for civil commitment under the
Act. Instead, the specific facts in the instant case indicate that the
legislature overlooked the need to make specific reference to the
former offense of rape in light of the fact that the offenses of
criminal and aggravated criminal sexual assault, which subsumed
the crime of rape, are specifically listed in the Commitment Act as
"sexually violent offenses." In addition, the General Assembly,
when made aware of the argument that the former offense rape
was expressly included within the Act's definition of a "sexually
violent offense," amended the statute to clarify its original intent.
"An amendment, which in effect construes and clarifies a prior
statute must be accepted as the legislative declaration of the
meaning of the original act, where the amendment was adopted
soon after the controversy arose concerning the proper
interpretation of the statute." 1A N. Singer, Sutherland on
Statutory Construction §22.31, at 379-80 (6th ed. 2000); see also
Gill, 94 Ill. 2d  at 58. Accordingly, we conclude that the
amendment to the Commitment Act was intended as a clarification
of existing law.
	In sum, we find that the definition of a "sexually violent
offense" set forth in the version of section 5(e)(1) of the
Commitment Act in effect at the time the State filed the petition
at bar includes the offense of rape. Because respondent was
convicted of a "sexually violent offense" within the meaning of
the Commitment Act, he satisfied the definition of a "sexually
violent person" contained in section 5(f) of the Commitment Act.
Accordingly, the appellate court erred in reversing the circuit
court's judgment denying respondent's motion to dismiss the
State's commitment petition.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the appellate
court is reversed. We remand this cause to the circuit court of
Cook County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We stress, however, that our decision today expresses no opinion
with respect to the sufficiency of the State's commitment petition.
Reversed and remanded.
 
 
1.      1Subsequent to the filing of the commitment petition at bar, the
General Assembly amended section 5(e) of the Commitment Act by
specifying that a "sexually violent offense" now includes the offense of
rape. Pub. Act 91-875, eff. June 30, 2000. Our opinion today addresses
the preamended version of section 5(e).

2.      2Specifically, the Criminal Sexual Assault Act repealed the offenses
of rape (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11-1), deviate sexual assault
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11-3), indecent liberties with a child
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11-4), aggravated indecent liberties
with a child (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11-4.1), contributing to the
sexual delinquency of a child (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11-5),
aggravated incest (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11-10), incest (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11-11), and sexual abuse of a child by a
family member (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11-11.1).

3.      3We note that the amendment to the Commitment Act does not apply
to respondent. A statutory amendment cannot be given retroactive effect
in the absence of a clear expression of legislative intent to do so.
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27, 38-39 (2001).