Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Folwell

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Folwell, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-3181.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-3181 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. FOLWELL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Folwell,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-3181.] 
Attorneys — Substantial misconduct — Two-year license suspension with one 
year stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2010-2251 — Submitted February 16, 2011 — Decided July 6, 2011.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-032. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Norman L. Folwell of Marietta, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0056055, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1991.  
On September 23, 2010, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a seven-count 
amended complaint charging respondent with professional misconduct. 
{¶ 2} Prior to the disciplinary hearing on October 15, 2010, before a 
panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, the parties 
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stipulated to the entire case — i.e., the facts, mitigating and aggravating factors, 
and rule violations.  Relator dismissed the charges that were not stipulated.  The 
parties also jointly recommended a two-year license suspension with the second 
year conditionally stayed.  The panel adopted the parties’ stipulated findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction, adding that respondent’s 
practice should be monitored for one year pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(9)(A) during 
the stayed suspension. 
{¶ 3} Based on the panel’s report, the board accepted the panel’s 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommends that respondent be 
suspended from the practice of law for two years, with the second year stayed on 
the conditions that he cooperate with a monitor appointed by relator during the 
stay and commit no further misconduct.  We adopt this sanction. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} The relator and respondent stipulated to the following facts and 
misconduct, which the panel and board adopted. 
Count 1 (Ruble/Phelps) 
{¶ 5} Yolanda Ruble and Cash Phelps shared custody of their minor son   
Ruble hired respondent to represent her son against Allstate Insurance Company 
regarding injuries that her son sustained in a car accident.  Respondent had Ruble 
execute a contingent-fee agreement on her son’s behalf which provided that 
respondent would receive one-third of any recovery from Allstate.  Respondent 
had not represented a minor in a personal-injury action before and did not know 
that an attorney for a minor cannot settle a minor’s claim without probate court 
approval. 
{¶ 6} In the fall of 2008, respondent settled the case with Allstate for 
$20,000, and Ruble signed a waiver releasing her son’s claim.  However, 
respondent did not include Phelps in negotiating the settlement, nor did he get 
Phelps’s permission to settle his son’s claim.  The check was payable to 
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respondent and the minor.  Respondent visited the minor at a juvenile facility, 
where he was incarcerated, in order to have him endorse the settlement check.  On 
December 9, 2008, respondent deposited the check in his client trust account and 
withdrew $6,600 as his fee, leaving $13,400 belonging to the minor. 
{¶ 7} Probate Judge Timothy Williams oversaw the juvenile facility in 
which the minor was being held and learned the next day that the minor had 
endorsed a settlement check.  Judge Williams immediately informed respondent 
that he could not settle a minor’s claim without approval of the probate court and 
that proceeds from a settlement could not be distributed until the settlement has 
been approved.  Judge Williams told respondent that the forms for approving 
settlements could be acquired at the clerk’s office. 
{¶ 8} However, approximately five months later, the minor had turned 
18, yet respondent had not filed an application with the probate court to approve 
the settlement.  On April 29, 2009, Judge Williams again advised respondent that 
he needed to get the court to approve the minor’s settlement. 
{¶ 9} On July 10, 2009, respondent filed an application with the probate 
court to approve the settlement.  Because the settlement proceeds had been 
deposited and Ruble had released Allstate from liability months before, Judge 
Williams reluctantly approved the settlement, ordering the distribution of the 
$20,000 as follows: $13,659.14 to the minor, $5,340.86 to Medicaid, and $1,000 
to respondent for attorney fees.  Thus, respondent was required to return $5,600 of 
the fees that he had collected from the settlement proceeds.  On July 31, 2009, 
respondent disbursed $13,659.14 to the minor from respondent’s client trust 
account. 
{¶ 10} Respondent admitted that at least $13,400 of the client’s funds in 
his trust account between December 12, 2009, and July 31, 2009, had belonged to 
the minor.  However, for most months between January 5, 2009, and July 30, 
2009, the balance in this account was below $13,400, sometimes by as much as 
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$6,232.34.  Thus, respondent used some of the minor’s funds for other purposes, 
including making a payment to another client.  Further, from February 1, 2007, to 
mid-December 2009, respondent neither maintained client ledgers as described by 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(2)(i) through (iv) nor reconciled his client trust account on a 
monthly basis pursuant to Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(5). 
{¶ 11} The parties stipulated that respondent’s conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (failing to provide competent representation), 1.3 (failing to act 
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.15(a)(2) 
(failing to maintain separate client ledgers for the funds in a trust account), 
1.15(a)(5) (failing to perform and retain a monthly reconciliation of the funds in 
his trust account, 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
or misrepresentation, and 8.4(h) (engaging in other conduct that adversely reflects 
on his fitness to practice law). 
Count 2 (Crawford) 
{¶ 12} In August 2006, Darrell Crawford, a real estate agent, hired 
respondent to recover the balance of a commission from real estate broker, Harry 
Welch.  Having been paid $60, on August 6, 2006, respondent sent a demand 
letter to Welch, but Welch refused to give Crawford any further payment.  
Consequently, Crawford paid respondent a flat fee of $1,650 to file a lawsuit 
against Welch.  Respondent never filed a complaint, however, and on December 
2, 2006, Welch died. 
{¶ 13} Later that month, Crawford called respondent to discuss how he 
could recover the balance of the commission.  Respondent advised that once 
Welch’s estate was opened, he could file a lawsuit against Welch’s estate.  In 
August 2007, Crawford informed respondent that Welch’s estate had been 
opened.  Crawford had understood from his discussions with respondent that 
respondent would be filing a claim against Welch’s estate.  In July 2008, 
however, Crawford called the probate court and the county recorder of deeds and 
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learned both that that respondent had not filed suit against Welch’s estate and that 
Welch’s property had been transferred seven months earlier.  Crawford then 
contacted respondent and asked that his attorney fees be refunded.  Two years 
later, respondent refunded Crawford’s attorney fees. 
{¶ 14} The parties stipulated that respondent’s conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R.1.3, 1.16(e) (failing to promptly refund any unearned fee upon 
withdrawal of representation), and 8.4(h).  
Count 3 (Hoover) 
{¶ 15} On May 28, 2007, respondent consulted with William Hoover 
about respondent’s assisting Hoover in obtaining grandparent visitation.  Hoover 
paid respondent $187 for the consultation and for respondent to send a letter to the 
attorney for Hoover’s daughter.  There was no response from Hoover’s daughter’s 
attorney. 
{¶ 16} In November 2007, Hoover asked respondent to file a lawsuit.  
Respondent told Hoover that he would first need to pay respondent a flat fee of 
$750.  On November 21, 2007, Hoover paid respondent $750. 
{¶ 17} On November 27, 2007, Hoover left a message with respondent’s 
secretary that respondent should not proceed.  After confirming that respondent 
received the message, Hoover asked respondent to return the $750 fee.  
Respondent promised to return a portion of the fee, but failed to do so.  Over the 
next several months, Hoover repeatedly asked respondent to refund his fees.  Each 
time, respondent promised a refund, but never followed through.  Finally, on July 
14, 2010, respondent refunded Hoover $400 in attorney fees. 
{¶ 18} The parties stipulated that respondent’s conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(e) and 8.4(h). 
Count 4 (Yates Estate) 
{¶ 19} In June 2008, Bessie Yates hired respondent to probate her 
deceased husband’s estate.  Respondent charged her $1,200, which was to be paid 
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at the completion of the case.  A year passed without respondent’s filing the 
probate case.  In June 2009, Yates met with respondent to sign the final 
paperwork and provide the $300 filing fee. 
{¶ 20} On July 13, 2009, Yates’ son, Phillip, contacted the Washington 
County Probate Court and verified that no estate had been opened.  Two weeks 
later, respondent finally filed the probate case.  Respondent admitted that he could 
have opened the estate sooner. 
{¶ 21} The parties stipulated that respondent’s conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3. 
Count 5 (Washington) 
{¶ 22} On April 4, 2008, Diana Washington hired respondent to pursue a 
postdecree matter in Ohio instead of Philadelphia, where the divorce had been 
granted.  Washington paid respondent a $2,500 flat fee to handle the case.  
Subsequently, respondent informed Washington that he could not help her and 
told her that he would refund most of her attorney fees.  However, as of 
December 2008, respondent had yet to return any of Washington’s attorney fees. 
{¶ 23} Washington filed a grievance against respondent for failure to 
return the unearned fees.  In December 2008, relator notified respondent that an 
investigation had begun.  On March 5, 2009, respondent returned $840 of his fee 
to Washington pursuant to a check from his client trust account.  On July 14, 
2010, respondent refunded the remaining unearned portion of Washington’s 
attorney fees. 
{¶ 24} The parties stipulated that respondent’s conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(e) and 8.4(h). 
Count 6 (Martin Estate) 
{¶ 25} On January 15, 2009, Thomas Martin hired respondent to transfer 
title to certain vehicles.  Subsequently, Martin hired respondent to handle the 
probate case for his deceased father’s estate.  Martin paid a total of $500 for the 
January Term, 2011 
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representation.  On February 26, 2009, Martin met with respondent and provided 
respondent additional information for handling the estate. 
{¶ 26} In April 2009, respondent reassured Martin that the probate case 
“was being taken care of.”  Consequently, Martin believed that the probate case 
had been filed.  In fact, respondent had done nothing on the case since he had met 
with Martin two months earlier. 
{¶ 27} In May 2009, while speaking to Martin, respondent realized that 
Martin believed that respondent had filed the probate case.  However, respondent 
did not correct Martin’s impression.  In fact, respondent never filed the probate 
case, and in August 2009, Martin hired new counsel, who filed the probate case 
within a week.  Respondent then refunded $500 to Martin. 
{¶ 28} The parties stipulated that respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 
8.4 (c), and 8.4(h). 
Count 7 (Burdette) 
{¶ 29} Between 2006 and 2010, Jennifer Burdette was employed as 
respondent’s secretary.  She greeted visitors, answered the phone, scheduled 
respondent’s appointments, and typed documents.  [Id at 83]  Burdette was not an 
attorney. 
{¶ 30} During Burdette’s employment, Oliver Sprouse hired respondent to 
represent him in a civil matter on a contingent fee.  Respondent agreed to pay 
Burdette ten percent of that fee.  After receiving the fee from Sprouse, respondent 
paid ten percent ($200) to Burdette. 
{¶ 31} The parties stipulated that respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 5.4(a) 
(a lawyer shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer). 
Sanction 
{¶ 32} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
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St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
{¶ 33} The parties stipulated to the following mitigating factors: 
respondent had no prior disciplinary record, BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), and 
respondent cooperated with the disciplinary proceedings, BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(d).  The parties also stipulated to the following aggravating factors: 
respondent had engaged in a pattern of misconduct, BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c), 
and respondent had committed multiple offenses, BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d).  
The board also found that the additional aggravating factor of a dishonest or 
selfish motive was proven by clear and convincing evidence.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(b). 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 34} The parties jointly recommended that respondent receive a two-
year suspension from the practice of law with the second year stayed on the 
condition that respondent commit no further misconduct, and the panel added the 
recommendation that respondent accept a monitor to oversee his practice during 
the stayed portion of the suspension. 
{¶ 35} The panel and board found that the jointly recommended sanction 
was consistent with the sanctions that this court had imposed in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Claflin, 107 Ohio St.3d 31, 2005-Ohio-5827, 836 N.E.2d 564,  and 
Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Mishler, 118 Ohio St.3d 109, 2008-Ohio-1810, 886 
N.E.2d 818. 
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 36} In Claflin, the respondent had failed to deliver insurance proceeds 
to his client for more than 32 months while using the funds for expenses and to 
operate his law office.  Id., 107 Ohio St.3d 31, 2005-Ohio-5827, 836 N.E.2d 564, 
¶ 6.  Claflin had had no disciplinary record and had cooperated with the 
disciplinary process, but his actions had harmed his clients.  Id. at ¶ 11, 12.  The 
court noted that disbarment was the presumptive sanction for such 
misappropriation, but that sanction can be tempered when misconduct is an 
isolated incident in an otherwise unblemished career and not a course of 
misconduct.  Id at ¶ 14-15, quoting Toledo Bar Assn. v. Kramer (2000), 89 Ohio 
St.3d 321, 323, 731 N.E.2d 643.  Thus, the court suspended Claflin’s license for 
two years, with one year stayed on the condition that the respondent reimburse the 
client and pay interest on the funds improperly withheld.  Id at ¶ 16. 
{¶ 37} In Mishler, the respondent had settled cases without his client’s 
consent, obtained settlement proceeds with forged client endorsements, charged 
excessive fees, and failed to account for client funds.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. 
Mishler, 118 Ohio St.3d 109, 2008-Ohio-1810, 886 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 2.  The 
respondent had no disciplinary record.  Id at ¶ 41.  The court imposed a two-year 
license suspension, with the second year stayed on the conditions that respondent 
not commit further ethical violations, fully account for and refund client fees with 
interest, and upon reinstatement, complete a probation period of one year and 
establish an office accounting system to track receipts and disbursements of his 
client’s funds.  Id at ¶ 47. 
{¶ 38} After reviewing these cases, the panel and board agreed with the 
parties’ recommended sanction of a two-year suspension with the second year 
stayed on conditions. 
{¶ 39} Having reviewed the record, the stipulations, and the board’s 
findings, conclusions, and recommendations, we agree that respondent committed 
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the stipulated misconduct and that the board’s recommended sanction is supported 
by the record. 
{¶ 40} Consequently, we suspend respondent’s license to practice law for 
two years, with the second year stayed on the conditions that respondent commit 
no further misconduct and that he complete one year of probation and be 
monitored by an attorney appointed by relator in accordance with Gov.Bar R. 
V(9)(B).  If respondent fails to comply with these conditions, the stay will be 
lifted, and he will serve the full two-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to 
respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Philip A. King, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., and Alvin Mathews, for respondent. 
______________________