Title: State v. Haugen

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: November 4, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
GARY HAUGEN,
Appellant.
(CC 04C46224; SC S054853)
En Banc
On automatic and direct
review of the judgment of conviction and sentence of death imposed by the
Marion County Circuit Court.
Joseph Guimond, Judge.
Argued and submitted
June 30, 2010.
Daniel J. Casey,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.  
David B. Thompson,
Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent. 
With him on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, Jerome Lidz,
Solicitor General, Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Erika L.
Hadlock, Deputy Solicitor General, and Gregory Rios, Assistant Attorney
General.
BALMER, J.
The judgment of
conviction and sentence of death are affirmed.
De Muniz, C. J., filed
a concurring opinion in which Gillette and Durham, JJ., joined.
BALMER,
J.  
This
case is before the court on automatic and direct review of defendant's
conviction and sentence of death for aggravated murder.  See ORS 138.012
(providing for direct review in Supreme Court when jury imposes death
sentence).  Defendant has been an inmate in the Oregon State Penitentiary since
1981, when he was convicted of killing his girlfriend's mother.  In 2004, the
state indicted defendant and another inmate, Jason Brumwell, for the killing of
a third inmate.  A jury convicted defendant of one count of aggravated murder
for committing murder after previously having been convicted of murder, ORS
163.095(1)(c), and one count of aggravated murder for committing murder while
confined in prison, ORS 163.095(2)(b).(1) 
In a separate penalty-phase proceeding, the jury affirmatively answered the
four questions set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b), and the trial court entered a
sentence of death.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of
conviction and the sentence of death.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In
reviewing a judgment of conviction, we state the facts in the light most
favorable to the state.  See, e.g., State v. Gibson, 338 Or 560,
562, 113 P3d 423 (2005), cert den, 546 US 1044 (2005) (so stating). 
Shortly after 9:00 a.m. on September 2, 2003, the body of inmate David "Sleepy"
Polin (the victim) was found in the band room of the activities section of the
Oregon State Penitentiary.  He was scheduled to be working in that section of
the prison that morning.  The victim had sustained 84 stab wounds and a
blunt-force trauma to the head resulting in skull fracture.  The victim's hands
reflected wounds that appeared to have been suffered in defending himself
against an attack.  The attack had occurred in an alcove outside the band room,
which was smeared with blood.  Subsequently, the body had been dragged into the
band room.  The victim's blood also was found in a trash can just outside the
alcove.  Inside the trash can was a t-shirt soaked with the victim's blood, one
of his shoes, his inmate identification, bloody rags, and a large threaded
metal rod with victim's blood on it.  The rod was part of a stool from the band
room.  Two "shanks" or homemade knives also were found in the
vicinity (although not in the band room), one of which was hidden in a bathroom
drain.  Strands of Brumwell's hair were found on the victim's clothing.
Security
cameras captured images of defendant and Brumwell shortly before and after 8:00
a.m.  Images from several cameras at different locations in the activities
section showed defendants and the victim in the general area near the band room
in the minutes before the attack.  The images showed defendants repeatedly visiting
a bathroom, in which one of the shanks later was found, and then showed defendant
shortly before the attack with an oddly shaped item concealed under his t-shirt,
possibly the metal rod from the stool.  Another camera was located in the band
room.  That camera showed defendants dragging the body into that room.  Images
from the camera also showed movement through a window in the door to the
alcove, just before defendants dragged the body into the band room.  Images taken
shortly after the attack showed defendants leaving the area and wearing at
least some different clothing than they had been wearing 15 minutes earlier.
The
day of the murder was "shower" day, when inmates take showers and
exchange their clothing.  On the morning of the murder, an inmate observed
defendant in the shower clipping his fingernails with fingernail clippers and
scrubbing his fingernails with a toothbrush.  His hands were soiled by some
dark substance.  The inmate saw Brumwell, whose hands also were soiled, do the
same after defendant handed him the fingernail clippers and toothbrush.  The
dark substance turned red as Brumwell washed.  When defendant entered his cell
at 9:00 a.m., the pants he was wearing were several sizes too large, and he did
not have a belt.  Later, in a clothing bin in the shower area, police recovered
pants and t-shirts, stained with victim's blood, matching the sizes worn by
defendants.  One pair of pants had DNA material in the thigh area matching
defendant's DNA, suggesting that he had worn them.  Those pants also had a
splatter pattern of liquid that matched the victim's blood.
Inmate
Robert Cameron testified at the trial.  He and defendants were members of a
band.  Cameron did not go to the activities section the morning of the murder,
because Brumwell told him that another band had taken their time slot, which
was not true.  Instead, Cameron was at his station working as a clerk.  Sometime
that morning, prior to the discovery of the victim, defendant and Brumwell came
to Cameron's work station.  Cameron noticed that defendant had a "fat lip."
 Defendant asked Cameron to get a jacket out of the laundry cart.  Brumwell
asked Cameron to locate Brumwell's jacket in the laundry cart and rip out the
state identification number.  Brumwell said that his jacket had a "t-shirt
lining," rather than the usual flannel lining.  Cameron found such a
jacket that had a dark stain on it that appeared to be blood.  Cameron did not
remove the state identification number as Brumwell had asked; instead, he hid
the jacket under a yellow raincoat hanging at the work station.  Later, police
recovered the jacket and identified the blood on the jacket as the victim's.  Cameron
also saw defendant and Brumwell take off their shower sandals and put them in a
bag.  When he asked them about that, Brumwell said something about blood.
Later,
in defendant's cell, defendant stated to Cameron that he had killed Polin
because he was a "rat."  Defendant stated that he and Brumwell had attacked
the victim in the alcove outside the band room.  Defendant stated that he had stabbed
Polin 30 times and related that, despite the wounds he had inflicted, Polin "wouldn't
die."  He said that he had hit the victim with a "drum chair"
from the band room and had "caved his fucking head in."  Defendant
referred to wounds on his hands and asked Cameron if they were noticeable.(2) 
Brumwell also admitted to Cameron that he had killed the victim.  
Defendants
had suspected that someone was informing prison officials about their drug
use.  Prisoners had noticed that prison officials usually administered drug
tests during the week.  Accordingly, prisoners timed their drug use for
weekends so that they could produce a clean urinalysis during the week.  Contrary
to the ordinary timing, prison officials gave a Saturday drug test on August
23, 2003, to a friend of defendants, a member of their band, which identified
him as having used drugs.  The following Sunday, prison officials gave another
test, this time to defendants.  Defendants were upset about the tests and
suspected the presence of an informant.  They believed that Polin was the
informant.(3) 
According to Cameron, defendant indicated that he wanted to do "something
really bad to that Mexican downstairs," referring to Polin.  The day
before the murder, another inmate overheard defendants say, referring to the
victim, "we've got to get him."  The inmate saw Brumwell walk toward
the victim clenching his fist until defendant stopped him and said, "Stop,
not here."(4) 
The homicide occurred on Tuesday, September 2.  Defendant and Brumwell both
tested positive for the presence of marijuana based on the sample from the
Sunday test.  The test results came back September 5, three days after the
murder.
The
state indicted defendant and Brumwell for Polin's murder.  As noted, after the joint
guilt-phase trial, a jury convicted defendants of one count of aggravated
murder for committing murder after previously having been convicted of murder,
ORS 163.095(1)(c), and one count of aggravated murder for committing murder while
confined in prison, ORS 163.095(2)(b).  Defendant and Brumwell had separate
proceedings for the penalty phase of the trial.  At defendant's penalty-phase proceeding,
the jury answered the four questions set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(5)
in the affirmative.  The trial court then entered a judgment of conviction
merging the two counts into a single conviction for aggravated murder and
imposing the death penalty.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant
asserts 29 assignments of error.  After reviewing the arguments of counsel, the
record, and the court file, we have determined that four of the assignments of
error merit discussion.  We summarily reject the remaining assignments of error
without discussion, concluding that they either are unpreserved, are controlled
by this court's prior decisions, or are otherwise without merit.
A.        Voir Dire and Guilt
Phase
1.         Interpreters
for Jurors (Assignment of Error Number 1)
Defendant
argues that the trial court erred in excusing sua sponte two prospective
jurors who lacked proficiency in the English language and who needed an
interpreter.  During voir dire, the trial court invited prospective jurors
to indicate any reasons for which they should be excused.  One prospective juror,
Lamloc, stated that his English was "not good enough" and that he had
memory problems.  Lamloc indicated that it would be difficult for him to
concentrate through a lengthy trial and to understand and "process"
the evidence adduced at trial.  Defense counsel inquired whether an interpreter
could be provided, to which the trial court responded that it was not allowed
to provide one for jurors.  Over defendant's objections, the trial court
released Lamloc, explaining that it was doing so both because of "the
language issue" and because of Lamloc's admittedly limited "cognitive
abilities."  The trial court also clarified its position with respect to
translators by noting that the Judicial Department would not provide funds for
the use of translators for jurors.
Several
days later, defense counsel raised concerns that another prospective juror,
Montesinos, lacked sufficient proficiency in English to serve as a juror.  In
response, the trial court indicated that it would obtain an interpreter to
assist with voir dire.  During voir dire, defense counsel tried
questioning Montesinos without using an interpreter.  Listening to the
responses, the trial court was concerned that Montesinos did not understand the
questions.  Montesinos then indicated that he would need an interpreter to
understand the testimony at trial.  The trial court explained that the Judicial
Department would provide an interpreter for voir dire, but not for trial. 
As a result, the trial court excused Montesinos over defense objections.
Defendant
challenges the trial court's ruling on the grounds that it violated his rights
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
and Oregon statutory law.  In accordance with our ordinary practice of
considering state law issues before federal law issues, see State v. Langley,
314 Or 247, 252, 839 P2d 692 (1992), adh'd to on recons, 318 Or 28, 861
P2d 1012 (1993) (describing practice), we turn first to defendant's argument
that the trial court violated Oregon statutes by refusing to provide
interpreters that would enable prospective jurors who were not proficient in
English to serve on the jury.
a.         Oregon Statutes
The parties agree that the trial court excused at
least one prospective juror, Montesinos, because his proficiency in English was
insufficient for him serve as a juror without an interpreter, and the court had
declined to appoint an interpreter for him.(6) 
Defendant argues that Oregon law -- specifically, ORS 45.275 and ORS 45.273 --
requires the state to provide interpreters for prospective jurors who could
serve but for their lack of proficiency in English.  For the reasons that
follow, we disagree with defendant's interpretation of those provisions.
ORS
45.275 provides, in part:
"The court shall appoint a qualified
interpreter in a civil or criminal proceeding, and a hearing officer or the
designee of a hearing officer shall appoint a qualified interpreter in an adjudicatory
proceeding, whenever it is necessary:
"(a) To interpret the proceedings to a
non-English-speaking party;
"(b) To interpret the testimony of a
non-English-speaking party or witness; or
"(c) To assist the court, agency or hearing
officer in performing the duties and responsibilities of the court, agency or
hearing officer."
Defendant also relies on ORS
45.273, which sets out the legislature's policy for creating procedures for the
qualification and use of court interpreters.  ORS 45.273(1) provides: 
"It is declared to be the policy of this
state to secure the constitutional rights and other rights of persons who are
unable to readily understand or communicate in the English language because of
a non-English-speaking cultural background or a disability, and who as a result
cannot be fully protected in administrative and court proceedings unless
qualified interpreters are available to provide assistance."
Nothing
in the text of ORS 45.273 either authorizes or requires the provision of
interpreters for non-English speakers.  Rather, that statute is a general
statement of a policy to "protect" the "constitutional and other
rights" of persons who are not proficient in English "in
administrative and court proceedings."  That general statement is implemented
by the specific provisions in ORS 45.275 and ORS 45.285 for the appointment of
an interpreter for a non-English-speaking party in a civil or criminal
case, a non-English-speaking witness, or a witness who cannot
communicate because of a physical hearing or speaking impairment.  See ORS
45.275(1)(a), (b); ORS 45.285(1)(c)(2) (so providing).  
Apparently
recognizing the absence of any specific statute regarding non-English-speaking
jurors or prospective jurors, defendant argues that ORS 45.275(1)(c) requires
the appointment of an interpreter for such a person.  Paragraph (c), however,
provides for the appointment of an interpreter "to assist the court,
agency or hearing officer" in performing their official duties.  It does
not mention the appointment of an interpreter to assist prospective jurors. 
Even assuming, without deciding, that ORS 45.275(1)(c) would authorize a
trial court to appoint an interpreter for a non-English-speaking juror because
that appointment would "assist the court," the statute nevertheless
does not require the trial court to make such an appointment.  Nothing
in the statutes cited by defendant suggests that the trial court may not
respond to the potential difficulties of seating a non-English-speaking juror
by excusing that juror.  Indeed, ORS 10.050(2) specifically provides that the
trial court may "excuse a juror whose presence on the jury would
substantially impair the progress of the action on trial * * *."  
We
conclude that the trial court's decision not to provide an interpreter for a
non-English-speaking prospective juror, and its subsequent decision to exclude
the prospective juror because he was unable to participate at trial without an
interpreter, did not violate Oregon statutes.          
b.         Federal Law
Defendant
next argues that the exclusion of a non-English-speaking person from the jury
pool violated his Sixth Amendment right to have his jury drawn from a fair
cross-section of the community.(7) 
Under the Sixth Amendment, a person who has been charged with a serious offense
has a fundamental right to a trial by jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US
145, 157-58, 88 S Ct 1444, 20 L Ed 2d 491 (1968), which includes the right to
trial by a jury that is drawn from a "fair cross section of the community." 
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 US 522, 530, 95 S Ct 692, 42 L Ed 2d 690
(1975).
This
court identified the elements of a "fair cross-section" claim in State
v. Rogers, 334 Or 633, 642, 55 P3d 488 (2002):
"[T]he elements of a prima facie case, with regard to
the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement, require a criminal
defendant to show:  (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive'
group in the community; (2) that the representation of that group in venires
from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the
number of such persons in the community; and (3) that the underrepresentation
is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process."
Id. at 642 (quoting Duren v. Missouri,
439 US 357, 364, 99 S Ct 664, 58 L Ed 2d 579 (1979) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).(8)
Defendant
advances a similar argument under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.(9) 
See Rogers, 334 Or at 642 n 8 (summarizing requirements) (quoting
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 US 482, 494, 97 S Ct 1272, 51 L Ed 2d 498 (1977)).
There are four requirements for proving that the selection of the jury panel
violates the Equal Protection Clause.  Rogers, 334 Or at 642 n
8.  First, the defendant must establish that the group is one that is a
"recognizable, distinct class," singled out for different treatment
under the law, as written or as applied.  Second, the defendant must show the
degree of under-representation by comparing the proportion of the group in the
total population to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors, over a
significant period of time.  Third, the defendant must demonstrate that the
state's selection procedure is susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral in
order to support the presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical
showing.  Finally, to make out an equal-protection challenge, the defendant
must show that the exclusion of a cognizable group is "purposeful," which
requires the party to establish a clear pattern that emerges from the effect of
the state's action, inexplicable on grounds other than race, even when the
governing legislation appears neutral on its face.  Id.
Defendant
argues that prospective jurors who lack fluency in English are a "distinctive
group," as that term is used in the fair cross-section cases and a "recognizable,
distinct class," as that term is used in the equal protection cases.  For
example, he points out that the legislature has declared that individuals whose
communication skills in the English language are deficient -- because of a
non-English-speaking cultural background -- are such a distinctive and
sufficiently cognizable class that they need to be protected in administrative
and court proceedings.(10) 
That declaration, defendant asserts, shows that the legislature has recognized
non-English-speaking persons as a distinctive and recognizable group.  Defendant
argues that "it is the very lack of this group's English-language proficiency
that 'defines' and 'limits' it," consistent with the concerns expressed in
the legislative policy statement.  Defendant continues:
"[E]xcluding those lacking English-language proficiency
from jury pools in indigent criminal cases would not serve those purposes [of
the fair-cross-section requirement outlined in Lockhart], but instead
would erode the confidence of such citizens in the criminal justice system, as
well as their belief that they have a civic responsibility to share in the
administration of justice."   
In
addition to characterizing the issue as one of civic participation and
legislative concern, defendant suggests, more significantly, that language is a
measure of race and ethnicity.  In analyzing some ethnic groups or communities
for purposes of an equal protection claim, proficiency in a particular language
may be treated as a surrogate for race or ethnicity.  See Hernandez v. New
York, 500 US 352, 371, 111 S Ct 1859, 114 L Ed 2d 395 (1991) (plurality
opinion) (so stating).  In Hernandez, the plurality observed that
eliminating persons who speak a particular language from a jury pool,
"without regard to the particular circumstances of the trial or the
individual responses of the jurors, may be found by the trial judge to be a
pretext for racial discrimination."  Id. at 371-72.  Accordingly,
defendant argues that the state's failure to provide funding for jurors who
lack proficiency in English effectively excludes potential jurors from the jury
pool on the grounds of language, which, in effect, excludes them on the impermissible
basis of race or ethnicity. 
Defendant
faces a difficult hurdle in claiming that the exclusion of non-English-speaking
jurors violates the United States Constitution.  A federal statute provides
that the ability to speak and understand English is a requirement for service
on a federal jury, 28 USC § 1865(b)(2), (3), and every court that has
considered the issue has upheld that requirement against constitutional
challenge.  E.g., United States v. Angulo-Hernandez, 565 F3d 2,
12 (1st Cir 2009), cert den, ___ US ___, 130 S Ct 776 (2009) (28 USC §
1865 does not violate fair cross-section requirement of Sixth Amendment); United
States v. Aponte-Suarez, 905 F2d 483, 492 (1st Cir 1990) (English proficiency
requirement for jury service is constitutional and serves "overwhelming
national interest.").  Moreover, every state court that has considered
whether a requirement that jurors be proficient in English violates the Sixth
Amendment, the Due Process Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause has concluded
that it does not.  See, e.g., State v. Gibbs, 254 Conn 578,
597-98, 758 A2d 327, 340-41 (2000) (citing cases).  Defendant does not assert
that those cases were wrongly decided, nor does he explain why, if statutes
that exclude those without English proficiency from juries are constitutional, then
a state's administrative decision not to provide interpreters for jurors
without English proficiency would be unconstitutional.  Simply put, no case
supports defendant's position.
Turning
to the first element that is required to make out a violation of the Sixth
Amendment's fair-cross section requirement -- the existence of a
"distinctive group" -- defendant again encounters the problem that,
although numerous courts have considered the issue, no court has concluded that
non-English-speaking persons constitute a distinctive group for Sixth Amendment
purposes.  See Commonwealth v. Acen, 396 Mass 472, 479, 487 NE2d 189,
194 (1986), appeal dismissed, 476 US 1155 (1986) (so stating).  Although
defendant cites Hernandez for the proposition that a trial judge could
find that excluding jurors because they spoke a particular language was a
pretext for racial discrimination, that case involved proficiency in
Spanish, rather than lack of proficiency in English, and here, of course, the
trial court made no finding of racial discrimination, pretextual or otherwise.
Even
assuming, without deciding, that non-English-speaking prospective jurors
constitute a "distinctive group" -- and also assuming that the group
is under-represented in jury pools due to systematic exclusion -- the United
States Supreme Court has consistently held that states may exclude individuals
who are members of such groups from juries if the exclusion is required to
advance significant state interests and is no broader than necessary to serve
those interests.  E.g., Duren, 439 US at 367-68 (so holding for
purposes of Sixth Amendment right to jury trial).  The state argues that its
interests in excluding prospective jurors who are not proficient in English --
including ensuring that jurors understand the proceedings at trial and are able
to participate in deliberations, avoiding the disruption of having interpreters
in the jury room, and not incurring the costs of providing interpreters -- are
compelling.  
We
agree that the interests articulated by the state are sufficient to justify
excluding non-English-speaking persons from the jury pool.  It is critical for
jurors to be able to follow the proceedings in the courtroom and to be able to
participate meaningfully in deliberations.  The state may also reasonably
conclude that the cost of providing interpreters for one or more
non-English-speaking jurors is an expense that the state should not incur.  Those
justifications are similar to the reasons that have led every state and federal
court that has considered the issue to conclude that a state permissibly may
decline to provide interpreters for non-English-speaking jurors.  See Gibbs,
54 Conn at 598-99, 758 A2d at 341; Acen, 396 Mass at 480,
487 NE2d at 194; Aponte-Suarez, 905 F2d at 492 (all so holding).
For
similar reasons, defendant's equal protection argument also is unavailing. 
Even assuming, without deciding, that persons lacking proficiency in English
constitute a "distinct, recognizable class" for purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause, the state's strong interest in the integrity and efficiency
of jury trials justifies its decision not to provide interpreters for those
persons.  Again, every court that has considered the issue has concluded that
the exclusion of such prospective jurors does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause, just as it does not violate the Sixth Amendment.  See, e.g., Gibbs,
254 Conn at 598-99, 758 A2d at 341 (assuming non-English speakers are
cognizable group for equal protection purposes, no constitutional violation
because state's interests in having jurors understand proceedings and avoiding
jury disruption and costs associated with interpreters are "compelling");
State v. Garza, 241 Neb 934, 958, 492 NW2d 32, 49 (2007) (rejecting
Sixth Amendment and equal protection challenges because excluding non-English
speakers from juries "promotes the interests of the state's judicial
process by assuring that jurors can understand the proceedings"); State
v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542, 552, 798 P2d 1, 11 (1990), cert den, 501 US
1259 (1991) (rejecting Sixth Amendment and equal protection challenges because
state "has a significant interest in the integrity of the jury system * *
* [which] is manifestly and primarily advanced by limiting jurors to those who
are capable of understanding the proceedings").    
Defendant,
recognizing the absence of case law supporting his position, argues that Oregon
statutes should lead to a different resolution of the federal constitutional
issues.  He notes that, in contrast to the federal statute and statutes in some
other states requiring English proficiency to serve on a jury, Oregon does not
explicitly bar non-English-speaking jurors from serving.  On the contrary,
defendant points to ORS 45.273(1), quoted above, as establishing a state policy
"to secure the constitutional rights and other rights" of those who cannot
understand English and whose rights cannot be protected "unless qualified
interpreters are available to provide assistance."  Defendant argues that,
even if it is permissible to exclude non-English-speaking jurors by statute,
Oregon has declined to enact such a law and instead has adopted a policy in
favor of interpreters that is intended to secure the rights of its
non-English-speaking citizens.  Therefore, the state violates a defendant's
fair trial and equal protection rights by failing to provide interpreters for
potential jurors who lack proficiency in English.
We
disagree.  As discussed above, see ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 8-10), no
Oregon statute articulates a policy in favor of, much less requires,
interpreters for non-English-speaking jurors, as opposed to parties to a
legal proceeding or witnesses in such a proceeding.  Moreover, we fail to see
how an administrative or judicial decision not to fund interpreters -- as long
as it is applied in a nondiscriminatory manner -- would violate a defendant's
constitutional rights, when a statute excluding non-English-speaking jurors
does not.   
We
conclude that the state's decision not to provide funding for interpreters for jurors
who are not proficient in English does not violate the Sixth or Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
2.         Exclusion
of Evidence of Witness Bias (Assignment of Error Number 6)
Defendant
argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of bias on the part of Robert
Cameron, one of the state's primary witnesses, after Cameron made a comment to
defendant while Cameron was leaving the courtroom.  Cameron testified during
the state's case-in-chief and was extensively cross-examined with respect to
the substance of his testimony and his credibility, as we discuss in greater
detail below.  During the defendants' case-in-chief, they presented a witness,
Brown, who asserted that Cameron had told him that he had lied to prison
officials about defendants' involvement in Polin's death.(11) 
In the state's rebuttal, it again called Cameron, and he testified briefly that
he had never talked to Brown about the case.  As Cameron left the stand, he
allegedly made a remark to defendants, which defense counsel described to the
court, outside the jury's presence:
"As Mr. Cameron was leaving the courtroom,
he looked at our clients and maybe defense counsel as well and said:  How do
you like me now?  And it was audible, certainly to our clients and people at
counsel table.  We believe the jury may or may not have heard it.  We would
like to make sure that the jury is informed that he made that statement."
After a colloquy, the trial
court stated:
"Mr. Cameron, when he got up, I saw him
look towards both Mr. Haugen and Mr. Brumwell and I don't doubt he said
something.  I find that to be inappropriate on Mr. Cameron's behalf.  I do not
find it to be any evidence of anything that the jury should hear about.
"So, you've made a record of what Mr.
Cameron said.  It was inappropriate.  If he was here, I would tell him that,
but I'm not going to allow the jury to hear it." 
Defendant's attorney then
said, "[T]he jury doesn't have to hear it, but it may
indicate his bias."  (Emphasis added.)  Two days later, before
instructions and closing argument, defendant made a pro se objection,
arguing that certain "evidence" should have been admitted, including
"Robert Cameron leaving the stand stating:  How do you like me now?"
a.         Preservation
The
state first contends that defendant failed to preserve his argument that the
trial court erred in excluding Cameron's remark from evidence.  Requiring
preservation of issues at trial is important to judicial efficiency because it allows
the trial court to consider legal argument and correct the error.  State ex
rel Juv. Dept. v. S. P., 346 Or 592, 604, 215 P3d 847 (2009).  In addition,
"the preservation requirement promotes fairness to the adversary parties." 
Id.  There are various levels of specificity by which an issue may be
preserved for review, consistent with those purposes.  See State v. Stevens,
328 Or 116, 122, 970 P2d 215 (1998) (In analyzing preservation of error,
"an appellate court must view the facts in light of the purposes of
fairness and efficiency that underlie the requirement.").  A party ordinarily
may preserve an issue for review merely by raising an issue at trial;
alternatively (and preferably), a party may preserve an issue by raising the
issue, identifying a source for the party's position, and advancing a
particular argument.  See State v. Hitz, 307 Or 183, 188, 766 P2d 373
(1988) (discussing alternative methods of preserving issues for review).
Making
an offer of proof is ordinarily part of preserving an argument that the trial
court erred in excluding evidence.  See State v. Bowen, 340 Or 487, 500,
135 P3d 272 (2006), cert den, 549 US 1214 (2007) (so stating). 
"The purpose of this rule [requiring an offer of proof] is to assure that
appellate courts are able to determine whether it was error to exclude the
evidence and whether any error was likely to have affected the result of the
case."  State v. Affeld, 307 Or 125, 128, 764 P2d 220 (1988).  The
state argues that an offer of proof requires a party to identify the evidence
that the party believes should have been admitted.  See State v. Busby,
315 Or 292, 298, 844 P2d 897 (1993) (An offer of proof must identify what the evidence
would have shown.).  The state asserts that defendant did not make clear to the
trial court what evidence defendant wanted to put on regarding Cameron's bias; defendant
did not suggest that Cameron be recalled to the stand to be examined about his
statement or that either of the defendants or one of the four defense counsel take
the stand to testify as to the statement.  Instead, defendant asked only that
"the jury be informed that he made that statement."  The state argues
that, because defendant failed to offer any "evidentiary vehicle" for
presenting evidence of Cameron's possible bias to the jury, his argument was
not preserved.
We
conclude that the issue was sufficiently preserved for us to consider it. 
After Cameron left the stand, and before the jury was excused, the trial court
asked whether defendants had any further evidence.  Defense counsel replied
that he might have "one more witness" and wanted "a few minutes
to discuss it."  The jury was then excused, and defense counsel described the
remark that Cameron had made when he stepped down, as quoted above.  Defendant
now responds to the state's argument that he did not indicate how Cameron's
remark might be introduced as evidence by asserting that the reference to
"one more witness" was a reference to recalling Cameron to testify
about the remark if the court would permit it.  Although defense counsel could
have been clearer in stating to the trial court, after the jury had been
excused, that he wished to recall Cameron as a witness to testify about the remark,
we believe the purposes of preservation were served by what defense counsel did
say.  Having previously informed the court that he might "have one more
witness," defense counsel later stated that Cameron had made a comment while
passing the defense table and repeated the substance of that comment.(12)
 He told the court that he wanted the jury to be informed of the remark.  With
knowledge that a comment had been made and what the comment was, the trial
court then ruled that it was "not going to allow the jury to hear
it."
The
state also argues that defense counsel's statement, after the court had ruled,
that "the jury doesn't have to hear it, but it may indicate his bias,"
indicates that defendant did not disagree with the court and accepted its
ruling.  However, defendant's equally plausible reading of that remark was that
defense counsel was acknowledging (by repeating) the court's unfavorable ruling
("the jury doesn't have to hear it"), but continuing to object that
the witness's statement reflected bias and that the jury should know about it. 
In addition, defendant himself later stated to the trial court that the jury
should have been told of Cameron's remark.  Moreover, the trial court,
immediately after ruling against defendant's request that the jury be informed
of Cameron's remark, told defense counsel, "So, you've made a record of
what Mr. Cameron said." 
As
noted, it would have been preferable for defense counsel to have requested that
Cameron immediately be recalled to the stand or to have made an offer of proof by
identifying the witness he would have called and what that witness's testimony
would have been, but we think, in these circumstances, that defendant
sufficiently apprised the trial court of his objection and the reasons for it. 
See State v. Milbradt, 305 Or 621, 630, 756 P2d 620 (1988) (citing State
v. Foster, 296 Or 174, 183, 674 P2d 587 (1983)) ("[A] defense attorney
does not have to walk over any more legal coals to protect the record after
first stating the grounds for the objection.").  
b.         Exclusion of Statement
Having
concluded that defendant preserved his objection, we turn to the question whether
the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Cameron's comment to defendants
as he left the witness stand.  Evidence of a witness's bias is generally admissible. 
OEC 609-1 ("The credibility of a witness may be attacked by evidence that
the witness engaged in conduct or made statements showing bias or
interest."); State v. Hubbard, 297 Or 789, 796, 688 P2d 1311 (1984)
("A principle of evidence law in Oregon is that:  It is always permissible
to show the interest or bias of an adverse witness."  (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)).
However,
our cases also make clear that, while evidence of bias is relevant and may be
admitted, it is not necessarily error to exclude such evidence:
"Evidence relevant to the bias or interest of a witness
need not always be admitted.  * * * * Where bias or interest is shown, but
further questioning is objected to, the decision is within the discretion of
the trial judge. "   
Hubbard, 297 Or at 799-800.  As the 1981 Conference Committee
Commentary on OEC 609-1 states,  although the rule permits the credibility of a
witness to be attacked by evidence of conduct or statements showing bias or
interest, "[t]he trial judge retains discretion to control the extent to
which proof of bias or interest may go."  As with other evidence, where
the evidence of conduct or statements showing bias is merely cumulative of
other evidence of bias, the trial court has discretion to exclude it.  See
State v. Cox, 337 Or 477, 487, 98 P3d 1103 (2004), cert den, 546
US 830 (2005) (trial court did not err in excluding evidence of victim's
violent acts towards others to show defendant's reasons for fearing victim,
because evidence, although relevant, "would not have added greatly to the
evidence already before the jury").   
Defendant
now argues in great detail that Cameron's statement was evidence of his
"animosity" towards defendants and was therefore probative of his
bias against them.  Accordingly, defendant asserts, the statement should have
been admitted as evidence of bias under OEC 609-1.  Although the state responds
that Cameron's statement did not necessarily demonstrate any particular
hostility towards defendants, it also concedes that the comment might be
susceptible of such a reading.  If so, the statement was at least marginally
relevant to the issues at trial because it tended to show Cameron's bias. 
Thus, it would have been permissible for the trial court to admit evidence that
Cameron had made the statement.  That does not mean, however, that the trial
court erred in excluding evidence of the comment.  As noted, our cases hold
that a trial court has discretion to limit evidence of bias or interest under
OEC 609-1 if it is simply cumulative of other, similar evidence of bias.
The
state argues that Cameron's remark itself "was no more probative of [his
general hostility towards defendants] than other evidence received at
trial."  Further, according to the state, because there was "ample
and specific evidence" of Cameron's hostility, the admission of his
comment would not have substantially assisted the jury in making a decision
about his credibility.(13) 
We agree.               
Defendant
cross-examined Cameron extensively during the state's case-in-chief and sought
to develop evidence that he was hostile towards defendants and biased against
them.(14) 
The record reflects that, while testifying before the jury, Cameron was
mocking, hostile, and uncooperative toward defense counsel, calling one of
defendant's attorneys a "jerk off" and asserting that the attorney
was trying to "peg [him] in a corner."  Cameron testified that, after
he had decided to testify against defendants, he received a "death
contract" in the mail, threatening him and his brother.  Cameron was upset
with defendants for making him (as well as themselves) look guilty by
committing the murder near the band room during the time when the band in which
he and they were members was scheduled to practice.  Moreover, they involved
him in the attempted cover-up by trying to get him to hide their bloody
clothes.  He thought that murdering Polin because he was a "rat" made
little sense, when there were "baby killers," "child
molesters," "all kinds of rats in this prison bigger than him.  Why
not them?"  And Cameron was hostile to defendants because they had killed
a friend:  "I liked [Polin].  * * * And had I known that somebody was
going to kill him, I would have g[iven] him a head's up, you know.  I wouldn't
let somebody just, you know, sneak attack.  I mean, there's -- I mean, for
what?  For nothing."  In short, Cameron's direct testimony and his answers
on cross-examination provided evidence of bias against defendants.
Cameron
also testified that his life in prison had changed for the worse, not for the
better, after coming forward to testify against defendants -- testimony from
which the jury could have inferred that he now bore some level of hostility
towards defendants.  He said that telling the authorities about defendants had "turned
my life upside down" and that he now was being "treated like
shit."  Cameron stated that the defendants were "doing better time
than I'm doing" and that he was "clearly upset" about being
placed in a segregation unit after coming forward as a witness.  He concluded
that, 
"Since I came forward on this, I have got nothing but
dicked.  So, you [defense counsel] are sitting over there making all of these
innuendos like I am getting something or I did this [coming forward to testify]
for something.  I was doing fine on my own.  I didn't ask them to come to me
with this shit."   
Given
the detailed cross-examination of Cameron and the other evidence that defendant
adduced at trial to show Cameron's dislike of defendants and the multiple
reasons that the jury should view Cameron's testimony with suspicion, we
conclude that the trial court's decision to exclude what defendant now asserts
is additional evidence of bias -- Cameron's remark to defendants as he left the
witness stand -- was within the trial court's discretion.  It was not error.
B.        Penalty Phase
1.         Admission
of Testimony of Psychologists (Assignment of Error Number 22)
Defendant
argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from the psychologists
who evaluated defendant for the parole board and in connection with the
presentence investigation in the trial for his earlier murder, because that
testimony did not satisfy the requirements for admitting scientific evidence.  We
conclude that the objection was not preserved.
A
court may hold a pretrial hearing under OEC 104 to consider whether proposed
evidence meets the standards for admission of scientific evidence set out in State
v. Brown, 297 Or 404, 687 P2d 751 (1984), and subsequent cases.  See
State v. Lyons, 324 Or 256, 260, 924 P2d 802 (1996) (conducting pretrial
hearing on admissibility of scientific evidence in light of Brown); State
v. O'Key, 321 Or 285, 288, 899 P2d 663 (1995) (same).  Here, defendant
filed a motion for an OEC 104 hearing to challenge the admissibility of the
state's anticipated scientific evidence and the qualifications of certain of
the state's expert witnesses.  Defendant's motion requested a hearing that
would cover a wide range of anticipated scientific testimony, from DNA test
results to the operations of the security cameras to medical testimony concerning
the victim's death.  Defendant also asked that the trial court, at that hearing,
consider the anticipated testimony of psychologists that would relate to the
jury's determination of defendant's "future dangerousness" under ORS
163.150(1)(b)(B).   
In response
to defendant's motion, the trial court issued a letter opinion in which it
denied the motion for a pretrial hearing and made several rulings regarding the
scientific evidence that the state intended to introduce.  Two of those rulings
are relevant to the testimony regarding future dangerousness.  As to defendant's
general request for a pretrial determination as to whether the state's proposed
expert witnesses were "properly qualified to present the scientific evidence
and whether they followed the scientifically valid process," the court stated
that those issues did not need to be decided in advance of trial.  The court noted
that defendant would be able to examine all the state's proffered expert
witnesses on their qualifications and the scientific basis for their testimony
-- and to seek to exclude or limit their testimony -- at trial.  
As to
defendant's specific request for a hearing "into the science behind the
evidence that will be presented as to defendant's future dangerousness,"
the court concluded that a pretrial hearing was not required because such a
hearing was premature.  The trial court agreed with defendant that, if one of
the state's psychologists were to offer an expert opinion as to future
dangerousness, then that testimony would "be subject to the standards for
scientific admissibility set forth in Brown."  It noted, however, that
the psychologists' testimony was expected to relate only to defendant's prior
acts and the psychologists' evaluation of those acts; there was "no
indication" that the witnesses would give an expert opinion as to
"future dangerousness or the probability that [defendant] will commit
future acts of violence."   The trial court specifically stated, "If
there is any indication that one or more of the witnesses will [give such an
expert opinion], this court will hold a hearing, outside the presence of the
jury, to determine the admissibility of the proposed evidence."  (Emphasis
added.)  
During
the penalty phase of the trial, five psychologists discussed evaluations of
defendant that they had conducted for the parole board between 1994 and 2004. 
One of those five also testified regarding his participation in the presentence
investigation following defendant's 1981 murder conviction.  Defendant made no
objection at trial to the testimony of any of the psychologists on the grounds
that it failed to meet the standards for scientific evidence set out in Brown
and O'Key.  Defendant did not object to the witnesses'
qualifications, the scientific basis for their testimony, or any of their
statements about defendant's psychological condition.  Nor did defendant --
before or during trial -- disagree with the trial court's initial ruling that,
if it appeared at trial that one of the experts would give an opinion as to
future dangerousness or the probability that defendant would commit future acts
of violence, a hearing on the admissibility of that evidence could be held at
that time.  On appeal, defendant now argues that the psychologists' testimony was
inadmissible because it constituted scientific evidence, but did not meet the Brown/O'Key
standards.
We
agree with the state that defendant's argument is not preserved, because he did
not raise his scientific evidence objection when each of the state's witnesses
testified.  The trial court's pretrial ruling was clear:  The psychologists who
had evaluated defendant for the parole board could testify at the penalty
phase; however, if those witnesses were to offer a scientific opinion as to the
probability of future dangerousness, that testimony would be subject to a
possible Brown/O'Key objection, and the court would hold a hearing on
the objection at that time.  Accordingly, it was incumbent on defendant to make
an appropriate objection at trial.  
A
similar issue arose in State v. Perry, 347 Or 110, 218 P3d 95
(2009).  The defendant had filed a pretrial motion seeking to exclude the
testimony of an expert that the state intended to call on the phenomenon of
"delayed reporting" in child sex abuse cases.  At an OEC 104 hearing
held before trial, the trial court indicated that it would allow the expert to
testify, but it expressed the view that its ruling was conditioned upon the
expert providing "more detail" about what was meant by "delayed
reporting."  Id. at 115-16.  Moreover, the trial court's ruling, as
this court noted, left the expert's testimony "subject to any specific
objections that [the] defendant might make at trial."  Id. at 116. 
Discussing more generally the limits of using a motion for a pretrial hearing to
challenge the validity of scientific testimony, this court stated that a
"general" pretrial ruling "that a certain type of evidence (even
scientific evidence ) is minimally relevant * * * does not relieve a party of
the obligation to make specific objections to discrete pieces of that evidence
at trial, if the dynamics of the trial process reveal other grounds for
objection."  Id. at 116-17.
Perry
describes the situation here.  The trial court made a general pretrial
ruling that the psychologists would be permitted to testify, and it
specifically reserved for trial the possibility of objections to "discrete
pieces of that evidence," such as scientifically based opinion testimony
on the probability of further dangerousness.  Defendant therefore had the obligation
to make specific objections at trial to testimony by the psychologists that he
believed should not have been admitted.  Defendant failed to do so.
We also
agree with the state that defendant was required to raise at trial the specific
grounds for his objections to the scientific foundation for any testimony by
the state's psychologists that he believed was improper.  One purpose of the preservation
requirement is to allow the trial court a fair opportunity to correct any
potential mistakes.  Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 219, 191 P3d 637
(2008) ("Preservation gives a trial court the chance to consider and rule
on a contention, thereby possibly avoiding an error altogether or correcting
one already made, which in turn may obviate the need for an appeal.").  The
trial court did not bear the responsibility for remembering defendant's general
objection to the psychologists' testimony, detecting such testimony when it
occurred, and ruling that all, some, or none of it was appropriate, without any
objection or argument having been offered by defendant.  The responsibility for
watching for such testimony and raising defendant's earlier objection again or
making some other, more specific, objection rested with defendant's counsel.  See
Perry, 347 Or at 116 (stating rule).  Moreover, as noted, before
trial the trial court had not rejected all of defendant's arguments -- rather,
it had stated that, if the experts gave scientifically based opinion testimony,
defendant could raise the issue of whether that testimony met the Brown/O'Key
standards when the testimony was offered.  If the trial court had been
apprised of the objectionable testimony, the trial court, as it had agreed to
do before trial, could have held a hearing -- outside the presence of the jury,
if necessary -- to determine the admissibility of the proposed evidence.  The
trial court then either could have excluded the testimony, explained why it was
appropriate that the jury hear it, or allowed the state to make a further
record.  Defendant never gave the trial court that opportunity.  We conclude
that the issue was not preserved for review.
2.         Consecutive
Sentences (Assignment of Error Number 24)
Defendant
argues that the trial court erred in refusing to impose his death sentence
consecutively to the life sentence that he was already serving.  The basis for
defendant's argument is ORS 137.123(3), which provides:
"When a defendant is sentenced for a crime
committed while the defendant was incarcerated after sentencing for the
commission of a previous crime, the court shall provide that the sentence for
the new crime be consecutive to the sentence for the previous
crime."
(Emphasis added.)  
This
court determines legislative intent, in the first instance, from the text and
context of the statute, and we must apply the text as the legislature has
written it, particularly when the text is not ambiguous.  See State v.
Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-73, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (explaining paradigm); PGE
v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993)
(same).  Defendant urges that, as applicable to this case, the meaning of ORS
137.123(3) is clear from the text.  Defendant's sentence of death was imposed
for the crime of aggravated murder, which he committed while incarcerated on a
sentence of life imprisonment.(15) 
Under those circumstances, according to defendant, "the plain language of
ORS 137.123(3) directs that the trial court 'shall provide that the
sentence for the new crime' -- i.e., the death sentence -- 'be consecutive
to the sentence for the previous crime' -- i.e., the life
sentence." (Emphasis supplied by defendant.)  Defendant argues that the trial
court erred because it did not provide that defendant's death sentence "be
consecutive" to his life sentence.(16) 
In defendant's view, then, his death sentence cannot be carried out until he
has completed his prior sentence of life imprisonment.  Defendant, of course,
recognizes that if his existing sentence of life imprisonment is completed only
when he dies in prison, then his death sentence never can be carried out. 
Defendant argues that ORS 137.123(3) must be followed, despite that counterintuitive
result.
The
state responds that defendant's interpretation of ORS 137.123(3) is incorrect
because it would require that the execution of the death sentence be delayed
until the life sentence has been fully served -- and therefore not be carried
out at all.  That result, the state argues, would conflict with the death
penalty statutes.  The state points out that the death penalty statutes provide
that the execution of a death sentence is automatically delayed to allow for
direct review by this court, the filing and disposition of a petition for certiorari
with the United States Supreme Court, and exhaustion of collateral
remedies.  ORS 137.463(1); ORS 138.686.  After the defendant has exhausted or
waived those remedies, the trial court must hold a death warrant hearing.  ORS
137.463(3), (4).  Following that hearing, if the trial court determines that
the defendant has exhausted or waived all remedies and is mentally competent,
the court issues a death warrant that "shall specify a date [on which the
death sentence is to be executed] not less than 90 days nor more than 120 days
following the effective date of the appellate judgment."  ORS 137.463(5). 
If the death sentence "for any reason * * * is not executed on the date
appointed in the death warrant" and is not "stayed under ORS 138.686
or otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction," the court must then
issue a new death warrant "on motion of the state and without further
hearing."  ORS 137.463(7).  The new warrant must specify an execution
date, not more than 20 days after the date of the state's motion.  Id. 
In other words, the state argues, the statutory scheme "prescribes a
closed set of automatic stays and procedures that act to move the case * * *
along," but does not permit delay of execution while the defendant
completes service of another sentence.
In the
state's view, ORS 137.123(3) can be harmonized with the death penalty statutes
by either (1) interpreting "consecutive to" to mean only that the
sentences must be served one after another without overlap, but not in any
particular order, or (2) interpreting "sentence" in ORS 137.123(3) to
mean "sentence of incarceration," so that death sentences would be
excluded from the statute's reach.  Defendant responds that either
interpretation would conflict with the text of the statute.  In particular, he
argues that even the state concedes that to be "consecutive to" means
"following" or "right after."  Thus, he argues, the new
sentence must "follow" the old sentence.  Additionally, defendant
asserts, the legislature used the term "sentence" without
qualification in ORS 137.123(3) and thus likely intended that term to include a
death sentence.  Further, the legislature used the phrase "term of
imprisonment" in other provisions, e.g., ORS 137.123(5), which
demonstrates that the legislature knew how to use such a term but did not do so
in ORS 137.123(3).
To the
extent that the statutes conflict and cannot be reconciled, each party claims
that one statute is more particular than the other.  "When a general and
[a] particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the
former so that a particular intent controls a general intent that is
inconsistent with the particular intent."  ORS 174.020(2).  Defendant
argues that ORS 137.123(3) applies only to sentences for aggravated murder
committed while the defendant is incarcerated after the commission of a
previous crime, whereas the death penalty statutes apply to all aggravated
murder sentences.  It follows, defendant claims, that ORS 137.123(3) is the
more particular statute and that it trumps the applicable death penalty
statutes.  The state argues that the death penalty statutes apply only to death
sentences, whereas ORS 137.123(3) applies to sentences imposed for any crime,
if the defendant is incarcerated at the time of the crime, and, accordingly,
the more specific death penalty statutes should be applied.  The state further
argues that one of the two counts of aggravated murder of which defendant was
convicted was for committing a crime while confined in a correctional facility,
ORS 163.095(2)(b).  To give effect to the legislature's specific decision to
authorize such a murder to be prosecuted as aggravated murder -- with the
attendant possibility that a jury will decide to impose the death penalty --
ORS 137.123(3) must be interpreted to permit the imposition of the death
penalty even if a defendant is still serving a term of imprisonment.
Following
the rules of statutory construction mentioned previously, we cannot give effect
to ORS 137.123(3) with its requirement of consecutive sentences and, at the
same time, give effect to the statutes that provide for the death penalty for an
aggravated murder that is committed when the defendant is already serving a
life sentence for another murder.  The statutes are in conflict.  In such an
instance, under ORS 174.010 and ORS 174.020(2), we must give effect to all
provisions or particulars of the statutes, if possible, and let the specific
legislative intent control the general.
To
state the obvious, the penalty of death is different in kind from
incarceration.  Incarceration involves the denial of freedoms and privileges
through imprisonment in a state or county facility for a period of years,
sometimes for the life of the inmate.  By contrast, an execution is a single
event at the end of a lengthy process of ensuring that the sentence of death is
consistent with applicable constitutional and statutory standards. 
Incarceration of inmates subject solely to the death penalty is necessary only
until the execution, assuming that the execution is not foreclosed by some  intervening
event.  The two forms of punishment, particularly in a temporal sense, are not
only unlike but are mutually inconsistent.  To treat them as interchangeable or
capable of treatment as consecutive to one another makes little sense.
The
foregoing observation assists in distinguishing between general and particular
legislative intent.  A "particular" legislative intent is
"paramount" and must "control" the general legislative
intent.  ORS 174.020(2).  In terms of criminal law sanctions, the death penalty
is the seldom-used exception to the more often-used punishment of
incarceration.  Moreover, it is the most severe, singular sanction that the
state can impose for any crime -- and it can be imposed only for one crime,
aggravated murder.  The statutes providing for the imposition of a sentence of
death are a more specific expression of legislative intent when compared with a
sentence of incarceration, because a sentence of death is exceptional.  For
that reason, as previously explained, the legislature has enacted a number of
specific statutes to regulate the manner in which a death sentence moves toward
the issuance of a death warrant and the date of execution.  
The
general intent of the legislature, expressed in ORS 137.123(3), is that
sentences for crimes committed in prison must be consecutive to previously
imposed sentences.  While consecutively adding like forms of punishment is
appropriate when multiple sentences of imprisonment are involved, the penalty
of death that the legislature provided for this particular crime would rarely be
carried out if it is consecutive to an existing sentence of life imprisonment. 
The legislature has provided a timetable for carrying out the sequence of
events following the imposition of a death sentence, and it is that schedule
which the legislature intended trial courts and prison officials to observe. 
Put differently, the legislature did not intend that the schedule for
imposition of a sentence of death depend on another, existing, sentence;
instead, the schedule depends on the exhaustion of legal proceedings related to
the aggravated murder conviction that lead to the imposition of the death
penalty and the issuance of the death warrant.
We
conclude that the particular legislative intent is that the sentence of death be
carried out, when its imposition is consistent with proper legal standards, for
aggravated murder committed in prison.  See ORS 163.095(2)(b) (penalty
for aggravated murder applies when "[t]he defendant was confined in a
state, county or municipal penal or correctional facility or was otherwise in custody
when the murder occurred").  If we accepted defendant's argument, the
sentence of death would be contingent, rather than certain, because the state would
have to wait for the completion of defendant's life sentence before executing
the death sentence.  That result would be inconsistent with the legislature's more
specific intent that the death penalty may be imposed for aggravated murders
committed in prison.  Defendant must continue to serve a period of life imprisonment
while he is confined awaiting the execution of the sentence of death.  Pursuant
to the legislature's intent, the period of imprisonment for defendant's earlier
crime runs until such time as the sentence of death for aggravated murder is carried
out according to the schedule determined by statute.  We reject defendant's
argument that the execution of the death sentence must be imposed only after he
has served his life sentence.
III. CONCLUSION
As
previously noted, we have considered defendant's other assignments of error,
and we conclude that they are unpreserved, are disposed of by prior rulings of
this court, or, as argued, are without merit.  In our view, discussion of those
assignments would not benefit the bench, bar, or public.
The
judgment of conviction and the sentence of death are affirmed.
DE MUNIZ, C.J., concurring.
With one exception, I concur in both
the reasoning and the result of the majority's opinion in this case.  The
exception involves the sixth assignment of error, which dealt with the alleged
statement "How do you like me now?" by witness Robert Cameron as he was
stepping away from the witness stand.  The majority concludes that the alleged
error was preserved, but concludes that, even assuming Cameron's statement was
evidence of bias, the trial court did not err in refusing to admit the
evidence.  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 18-26).  In my view, defendant failed to
preserve any error  regarding Cameron's alleged statement.   I, therefore,
would not reach the merits of the assigned error.(1)
The pertinent facts are correctly set
out in the majority opinion.  After Cameron had left the witness stand -- and
after the court had taken a recess -- defense counsel informed the court that, as
Cameron was leaving the witness stand, he had stated "How do you like me
now?" loud enough for counsel and co-counsel to hear the statement.  The
judge and the prosecutor both indicated that they had not heard it.  Defense
counsel stated that he "would like to make sure that the jury is informed
that he [Cameron] made that statement."  Defense counsel did not request
that Cameron be retained as a witness and counsel did not attempt to recall Cameron
to the witness stand.  Neither did defense counsel offer to call any other
witness to the statement.  The substance of defense counsel's offer of proof
was the assertion that the statement had been made and a request that the jury
be "informed" about it.
It has long been the preferred
practice in this state that offers of proof ordinarily be made by questioning a
witness outside the presence of the jury, not by counsel summarizing the
expected testimony.  "Unless the calling of witnesses is waived by the
court or by the adverse party, we think the better practice is to call the
witnesses relied on and ask appropriate questions."  Columbia R. I. Co.
v. Alameda L. Co., 87 Or 277, 291, 168 P 64 (1917), on reh'g, 168 P
440 (1918); see Ashmun v. Nichols, 92 Or 223, 178 P 234, on reh'g,
180 P 510 (1919) (quoting Columbia with approval).  Offers of proof
involving the mere "avowals of counsel" often are problematic.  See
Null v. Siegrist, 262 Or 264, 267, 497 P2d 664 (1972) (evidentiary hearing
conducted outside presence of jury "was in the nature of an offer of proof
and, assuming that plaintiff did change doctors for the reason his counsel
indicated, he should have so testified" (footnote omitted)); First Nat.
Bank v. Oregon Paper Co., 42 Or 398, 402, 71 P 971 (1903) ("If the
appellants were not allowed to prove their claims, they should have called
witnesses, and stated to the court the testimony which it was expected would be
elicited from them, and upon a refusal to receive such testimony take an
exception." (Citation omitted.)).
Here, defendant made no effort to
recall Cameron, and defendant offered no additional witness to testify to what
was said.  Defendant merely asked that the jury be "informed" about
the statement.  Simply put, there was no offer of proof, because defendant did
not offer to prove anything.  Requesting that the court inform
the jury of a statement that the court did not even hear is not sufficient to
preserve the evidentiary error, and this court errs in concluding otherwise. 
Although I concur in the majority's
decision to reject defendant's sixth assignment of error, I do so only because
the error was not preserved.
Gillette and Durham, JJ., join in
this concurring opinion.
1. Defendant
and Brumwell were tried together in the guilt phase of the trial, and the jury
also convicted Brumwell of aggravated murder.  The penalty-phase proceedings
for the two defendants were conducted separately.  Brumwell also was sentenced
to death.  The direct review proceeding of Brumwell's conviction and sentence
is pending before this court.  We sometimes refer to defendant and Brumwell
together as "defendants."
2. A
physician examined defendant's hands a few days later and observed soft-tissue
injuries.
3. There
was an informant, but it was not Polin.
4. In
addition, a few days before the murder, defendant told two other inmates that
"he was getting ready to do something kind of -- kind of foolish and that
he was probably getting more time and that we wouldn't be seeing him."
5. ORS
163.150(1)(b) provides:
"Upon the conclusion of the presentation of
the evidence, the court shall submit the following issues to the jury:
"(A) Whether the conduct of the defendant
that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the
reasonable expectation that death of the deceased or another would result;
"(B) Whether there is a probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society;
"(C) If raised by the evidence, whether the
conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response
to the provocation, if any, by the deceased; and
"(D) Whether the defendant should receive a
death sentence."    
6. Defendant
also asserts that Lamloc was excused solely because he could not participate
without an interpreter.  The state, however, correctly points out that Lamloc
was dismissed both because of his limited English skills and because of his
cognitive limitations.  For that reason, the statutory and constitutional
issues that defendant raises regarding the trial court's failure to provide an
interpreter do not apply to Lamloc.
7. The
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury * * *."
8. Although
the United States Supreme Court has not defined "distinctiveness" for
purposes of the fair-cross-section requirement, it has outlined three considerations
consistent with that requirement's broader purpose:  
"[W]e think it obvious that the concept of
'distinctiveness' must be linked to the purposes of the fair-cross-section
requirement[,] * * * [which are] (1) 'guarding against the exercise of
arbitrary power' and ensuring that the 'commonsense judgment of the community'
will act as 'a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor,' (2)
preserving 'public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system,'
and (3) implementing our belief that 'sharing in the administration of justice
is a phase of civic responsibility.'"
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 US 162, 174-75, 106 S Ct 1758,
90 L Ed 2d 137 (1986) (quoting Taylor, 419 US at 530-31).
9. The
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part: 
"No State shall * * * deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
10. Defendant
cites the legislature's policy statement regarding interpreters, which is set
out in ORS 45.273, quoted above.  See ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 8-9). 
As we have discussed, no Oregon statute requires the appointment of an
interpreter for a juror or treats non-English-speaking jurors as
a distinctive class.
11. In
turn, the state adduced testimony suggesting that Brown was lying. 
12. Neither
the trial judge nor the prosecutors heard the substance of any comment by
Cameron.
13. The
state combines its argument that the trial court did not err in excluding
Cameron's remark with its argument that any error was harmless.  Because we
conclude that it was not error for the trial court to exclude the remark, we do
not address the state's harmless error argument. 
14. Defendant
also sought to impeach Cameron by demonstrating, through cross-examination of
Cameron and the testimony of other witnesses, that he had testified against
defendants in exchange for favorable treatment in prison.  Like evidence of
bias, such evidence of a personal "interest" is admissible under OEC
609-1 to attack the credibility of an adverse witness.  Although both
"bias" and "interest" evidence relate to a witness'
credibility, those kinds of evidence do so in different ways and thus evidence
of bias is not cumulative of different evidence of interest.             
15. Defendant
was serving a life sentence, but he also was eligible for parole and had had
several parole hearings.
16. The
state initially asserts that defendant's argument is not ripe for review.  The
state maintains that the issue that defendant raises is better characterized as
when defendant's death sentence will be executed.  That issue, the state
claims, will not be ripe until defendant has exhausted all post-conviction and
federal habeas remedies, and the state seeks to carry out his death sentence. 
The state further contends that, even if the trial court erred in failing to
impose the death sentence consecutively to the life sentence, neither ORS
137.123(3) nor any other statute dictates the order in which the sentences must
be executed.  Defendant responds that this assignment of error does not concern
the execution of his sentence, but the imposition of the sentence of
death as part of the judgment of conviction, which this court is obligated to
review.  See ORS 138.012(1) (providing for direct review in this court
when jury imposes a death sentence).  We agree with defendant that our
automatic review of the judgment convicting defendant of aggravated murder and
imposing the death penalty permits us to review defendant's claim that the
judgment is inconsistent with ORS 137.123(3).
1. Because
I would not reach the merits of the assigned error, I am not required to
express an opinion about the correctness of the majority's conclusion regarding
the trial court's ruling.  I note in passing, however, that the witness's
expressed defiance of defendant (if it actually occurred), while it might have
a benign or insignificant impact on a jury, also could be seen as an outburst
of animosity that had finally found an outlet.  If the latter, I think that a
reasonable juror could have considered it the pivotal piece of evidence
concerning the witness's credibility, and a valid reason to question that
credibility.