Title: Trinity Med. Center v. ND Bd. of Nursing

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

399 N.W.2d 835 (1987) TRINITY MEDICAL CENTER and Medcenter One, not for profit corporation, Plaintiffs, v. NORTH DAKOTA BOARD OF NURSING; Jan Schauer, Kay Hovland, Yvonne Hamilton, Paulette Voegele, James Shearer, Alice Kotaska, Alvilda Skurdal, Karen Robideau, and Bonnie Bieber, constituting all of the members of the North Dakota Board of Nursing, Defendants. Civ. No. 11257. Supreme Court of North Dakota. January 8, 1987. *836 Bosard, McCutcheon & Rau, Minot, for plaintiff Trinity Medical Center; argued by Gary Lee. Lundberg, Nodland, Lucas & Schulz, Bismarck, for plaintiff Medcenter One. Calvin N. Rolfson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Bismarck, and Larry Kraft, Grand Forks, for defendants. Zuger & Bucklin, Bismarck, amicus curiae for State Nurses Association. Vedder, Price, Kaufman, & Kammholz, Chicago, Ill., amicus curiae for Nat. Council of State Boards of Nursing, Inc. ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice. The issues under consideration were certified to us pursuant to Rule 47.1 of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure by the Honorable Bert L. Wilson, Judge of the District Court of Northwest Judicial District. We affirm. The certified questions and answers by the district court are: The trial court's findings of fact are as follows: We shall hereafter refer to the plaintiffs as the Hospitals and to the defendants as the Board. On March 19, 1986, the Hospitals obtained from the district court of Williams County an ex parte order temporarily restraining the Board from enforcing administrative rules adopted by the Board including 54-03.1-11-04, N.D.A.C., giving the Board authority to order a discontinuation of nursing programs that did not meet its requirements, and an order to show cause why the restraining order should not continue pending final determination of the merits of the complaint. The complaint sought a judgment declaring Section 43-12.1-08(6), N.D.C.C., unconstitutional and *837 an order first temporarily staying and ultimately permanently enjoining the enforcement of certain administrative rules adopted by the Board. The Board denied the essential allegations of the complaint and urged that it be dismissed. On April 24, 1986, the Hospitals served by mail a notice of motion and a motion to certify questions of law to our Court. On May 21, 1986, the district court granted the motion for certification and halted all proceedings. We must first determine whether or not the questions of law are appropriately before us. State v. Lebus, 339 N.W.2d 564, 566 (N.D.1983); Merchant v. Richland County Water Management District, Board of Commissioners, 270 N.W.2d 801, 804 (N.D.1978). The certification of questions of law to the Supreme Court is authorized by Chapter 32-24, N.D.C.C. Section 32-24-01 provides: The decision to submit certified questions of law is within the discretion of the trial court and we may refuse to consider certified questions that are frivolous, or are merely interlocutory, or are of insufficient importance to settle the issues in the case. Section 32-24-02, N.D.C.C.; City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks County, 139 N.W.2d 242, 248 (N.D.1965). In City of Grand Forks, 139 N.W.2d at 248, we said: We additionally said in Lebus, 339 N.W.2d at 566, that "before a certified question will be considered by this Court, the result of the action must depend wholly, or at least principally, upon the construction of the law as it will be determined by the answers to the question or questions certified, regardless of whether answered in the negative or affirmative." The Board argues that many of the facts contained in the Hospitals' complaint are in dispute. It specifically denies the finding of fact in the certification that "[a]pplication of these rules has injured, and will continue to injure the schools of nursing operated by the [Hospitals]." The Board argues, notwithstanding its plea that we decide the certified questions, that if the Hospitals have not been harmed by the application of either Section 43-12.1-08(6), N.D.C.C., or Article 54-03.1, N.D.A.C., the Hospitals would not have standing. Rule 47.1(b)(2), N.D.R.App.P., permits the certifying court to transmit "with the certification order any parts of the record and other documents it deems necessary in answering the certified questions." In this case we have no memorandum opinion; however, it is apparent that the court relied upon the affidavits in the appendix to determine that the Hospitals have been injured and will continue to be injured by the rules in Article 54-03.1, N.D. *838 A.C., promulgated by the Board pursuant to Section 43-12.1-08(6). We agree that the standing is sufficient. See State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106, 107 (N.D. 1980). The two-fold test of standing is that the plaintiff must have suffered some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action, and the asserted harm must not be a generalized grievance shared by all or a large class of citizens. The Board also contends that a reversal of the trial court's answers to the certified questions would not dispose of the action because unresolved issues raised in the Board's answer would remain. The Board alleges as an affirmative defense that the Hospitals are estopped from asserting their claims in equity either by the unclean hands doctrine or by their abuse of the process of law. For this contention the Board relies upon our decision in State v. Vogel, 343 N.W.2d 773 (N.D.1984). In Vogel we concluded that we would not answer certified questions unless our determination would resolve all remaining issues in the case. We commented: In Vogel it was admitted that answering the certified questions would not resolve all remaining issues in the case. Here the district court found that the Hospitals' claims "present no material factual issues, but do present material issues of law which are vital and of great moment, and the answers to which will completely dispose of the [Hospitals'] claims." Because the decision to submit certified questions is within the sound discretion of the district judge we will not dismiss the questions unless presented with sufficient contrary evidence that the district court's findings of fact are in error or unless our analysis of the issues indicates that our answers will not principally resolve all remaining issues in the case. As we believe that the answers to the certified questions will principally resolve the remaining issues in the case, we will proceed to answer the questions. The first certified question is whether or not the authority given by the Legislature to the Board of Nursing in Section 43-12.1-08(6)[1] is a standardless delegation of legislative authority in violation of Article III, Section I, of the North Dakota Constitution.[2] The Hospitals argue that the Board of Nursing has been given unlimited power by *839 the Legislature pursuant to Section 43-12.1-08(6) to establish all standards and educational requirements for entry into the nursing programs. While apparently only a few delegations by Congress to administrative agencies have been held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court, state application of the nondelegation doctrine has been more vigorous. 1 K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 3:14 (2d ed. 1978) (See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446 (1935), and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935)). Professor Davis comments that the state nondelegation doctrine "is both diminishing and changing." He notes that "[d]uring the first half of the twentieth century, holdings of state courts that delegations were invalid for lack of standards or lack of sufficient standards were very numerous." He asserts, however, that "[s]uch holdings are sparse in current reports." Tracing the beginning of the nondelegation doctrine he says: In 1904, this Court followed the Cincinnati, W. & Z.R. Co./Field standard and validated the statute granting boards of county commissioners the discretion to institute judicial proceedings to enforce payment of real property taxes in Picton v. Cass County, 13 N.D. 242, 100 N.W. 711 (1904). This Court in Picton explained the distinction between the delegation of power to make the law and conferring authority as to its execution as follows: Two years earlier than Picton this Court in Glaspell v. City of Jamestown, 11 N.D. 86, 88 N.W. 1023 (1902), held that a statute authorizing district courts to exclude territory from city limits to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. In Glaspell this Court reasoned that granting discretion to restrict city limits was not ascertaining fact, a judicial function, but rather was a determination of public policy, a legislative function.[3] In State ex rel. Rusk v. Budge, 14 N.D. 532, 105 N.W. 724 (1905), this Court determined that the statute authorizing the Capitol Commission the discretion to set the cost in reconstructing the capitol building and the construction of a Governor's residence was an invalid delegation of purely legislative powers. It reasoned that because the statute did not specify a spending *840 limitation the Commission had unlimited discretion to fix the cost of each building and concluded that the cost of each building was a substantive matter of legislative discretion not to be delegated by the Legislature to an administrative agency. This Court explained the distinction between legislative and administrative duties as follows: In Wilder v. Murphy, 56 N.D. 436, 218 N.W. 156 (1928), this Court invalidated the statute that authorized the Board of Administration to enter into arrangements with holding associations for the construction of dormitories at state educational institutions. In concluding that the statute was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an administrative board, this Court said: We think it significant notwithstanding the Wilder Court's holding that it quoted with apparent approval this statement of the United States Supreme Court in Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission: In State ex rel Kaufman v. Davis, 59 N.D. 191, 229 N.W. 105 (1930), this Court upheld the validity of a statute similar in scope to the challenged statute in Wilder v. Murphy. In Davis the Court in distinguishing Wilder said: In Davis it was concluded: In Nord v. Guy, 141 N.W.2d 395 (N.D. 1966), this Court found the statute authorizing the Board of Higher Education to provide education facilities at state educational institutions without specifying where such facilities were to be constructed or the cost of construction to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. In Nord this Court considered the contrast between Wilder v. Murphy, supra, and Kaufman v. Davis, supra, in its constitutional analysis and determined that the challenged statute fell "into the same objectionable pattern that was held to be unconstitutional in Wilder v. Murphy." Nord, 141 N.W.2d at 404. Nord and Wilder were subsequently followed by this Court in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Johanneson, 153 N.W.2d 414 (N.D.1967). In Montana-Dakota Utilities the Court invalidated part of the Territorial Integrity Law as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Finding an absence of adequate safeguards or guidelines to protect against possible arbitrary action, this Court said: On the other hand, in Ralston Purina Company v. Hagemeister, 188 N.W.2d 405 (N.D.1971), this Court upheld provisions of the Poultry Improvement Act authorizing the Poultry Improvement Board to reduce license fees if the Board determined that the fees were excessive where the Legislature fixed the maximum fees to be charged. This Court determined that the Act did not give the Poultry Improvement Board uncontrolled discretion in fixing fees, but only conferred on the Board authority to execute the provisions of the law.[5] This was the explanation: This Court summarized its reasoning as follows: In Southern Valley Grain Dealers v. Bd. of Cty. Comr's, 257 N.W.2d 425 (N.D. 1977), this Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute authorizing the State Board of Equalization or appropriate boards of city or county commissioners to grant a five-year tax exemption to new industries pursuant to Chapter 40-57.1, N.D.C.C. Sections 40-57.1-01 and 40-57.1-03, N.D. C.C., provide that the boards, in determining whether tax exemptions should be granted, and may grant an exemption In validating this broad delegation of authority, we said: In County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc., 371 N.W.2d 321 (N.D.1985), our most recent case exploring the limits of legislative delegation, we held that the statute authorizing the State Historical Board to place sites of historical value on the historical registry was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. In County of Stutsman we found the term "historical value" when considered within the context and policy of Chapter 55-10, N.D.C.C., to be "a reasonably clear guideline and a sufficiently definite standard to pass constitutional muster." We said that such a standard was sufficient "to advise ordinary and reasonable people as to its meaning and to limit the Board's discretionary power to place sites on the Registry." 371 N.W.2d at 328-29. Professor Davis explains that the modern trend of the state nondelegation doctrine is to consider safeguards along with or instead of standards. Davis, supra at § 3:14. He suggests that "[t]he criterion for determining the validity of a delegation should be the totality of the protection against arbitrariness, not just the one strand having to do with statutory standards." He asserts that "what is needed is not simply a substitution of a requirement of safeguards for a requirement of standards but a consideration of both safeguards and standards in order to determine whether the total protection against arbitrary power is adequate." Davis, supra at § 3:15. Ralston Purina Co., Southern Valley Grain Dealers, and County of Stutsman are indicative of the modern trend. We believe that both standards and safeguards are necessary to assure that administrative agencies are not given uncontrolled discretion. Although the standards set forth in the Nurse Practices Act, Ch. 43-12.1, N.D. C.C., are broad, they are sufficient when considered with the safeguards. In this respect we agree with the amicus brief filed by the National Council of State Boards of Nursing, Inc., to the effect that procedural safeguards exist which prevent the Board from engaging in arbitrary rule making: The Minnesota Supreme Court illustrated a mix of standards and safeguards in Minnesota Energy & Economic Development Authority v. Printy, 351 N.W.2d 319 (Minn.1984). In that case, the Court held that the State Legislature did not unconstitutionally delegate its authority to the Energy Economic Development Authority to issue energy development loans following the statutory mandate of fostering cooperation between the government and private sector to assure an available and reliable *845 supply of energy where the statute provided for close legislative monitoring of the Authority's operations. In upholding the constitutionality of the Energy and Economic Development Act after distinguishing the Montana case of Douglas v. Judge, 174 Mont. 32, 568 P.2d 530, 535 (1977), which holds to contrary, the Minnesota Court concluded: Section 43-12.1-01, N.D.C.C., asserts that the practice of nursing "is directly related to the public welfare" and "is subject to regulation and control in the public interest to assure that competent practitioners and high quality standards are available." It stresses that "[i]t is essential to govern qualifications for licensure with requirements for the maintenance of high standards." It concludes with the admonition that the chapter is to "be liberally construed in order to carry out its purposes and objectives." Section 43-12.1-08(18), N.D.C.C., directs the Board to "[p]romulgate and adopt such rules and regulations pursuant to Chapter 28-32 as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter." Section 28-32-02 authorizes an administrative agency to adopt, amend or repeal "reasonable rules in conformity with the provisions of any statute administered or enforced by the agency, and to prescribe methods and procedure required in connection therewith."[7] Section 43-12.1-08(6) provides that the Board shall "[e]stablish standards for all nursing education programs...." This is the section that is alleged to be unconstitutional. It must be read in conjunction with subsections 7 through 16 of Section 43-12.1-08, N.D.C.C.[8] Section 43-12.1-02 divides the field of nursing into two parts. Subsection three defines the practice of nursing as a licensed practical nurse.[9] Subsection five *847 defines the practice of nursing as a registered nurse.[10] Section 43-12.1-10 provides for an examination to be given by the Board upon proof of completion of an "appropriate nursing education program" and upon recommendation "by the nursing faculty of the completed nursing education program."[11] These statutes do provide standards albeit broad in nature. Because of the nature of the subject matter, however, they, of necessity, must be quite broad. True, the Legislature could have specifically set the standards but that would have lessened the flexibility inherent in the Board's rule-making authority and might have increased the hardship, by a possibly premature requirement, upon those subjected to it without the opportunity for further hearing available through the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, Chapter 28-32, N.D.C.C. It follows that Section 43-12.1-08(6) is not unconstitutional as unlawful delegation of legislative power. The next certified question is whether or not the Board has usurped legislative power in passing administrative rules pursuant to Section 43-12.1-08(6), N.D.C.C. The Board, through its rule-making power in determining who may recommend a person to take the test, has not usurped legislative power. It requires no leap of logic to equate high standards of nursing in the interest of public health with a requirement that those who train nurses be accredited pursuant to appropriate authority and that applicants for licensure in nursing receive an appropriate degree before being permitted to write an examination for licensure. The Board has the authority pursuant to Section 43-12.1-08(6) to define "school" as *848 "a post secondary educational institution offering transferrable academic credit" excluding diploma nursing schools from operating nursing programs unless they offer transferrable academic credits. See Section 54-03.1-01-05(5), N.D.A.C.[12] That this marks a tightening of the rules as they relate to the licensing of nurses does not make the rule violative of the state or United States Constitutions. The Board has the authority pursuant to Section 43-12.1-08(6) to direct that only associate and baccalaureate degree graduates may sit for practical and registered nursing license examinations, respectively. See Sections 54-03.1-06-02(6) and 54-03.1-07-02(6), N.D. A.C.[13] This appears to be a reasonable requirement in an area of standard setting. Although this may appear to be a departure from some of this Court's earlier decisions, it comports with our more recent applications of the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative powers as stated and applied in County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc., 371 N.W.2d 321 (N.D. 1985), and the trend of cases nationwide necessitated by the complexities of the society in which we live. We take cognizance of the fact that medical science in general is advancing at a very rapid rate, and, accordingly, knowledge that members of the nursing profession must have to render quality nursing service in matters of life and death is also likewise increasing. This justifies the delegation of standard setting in Section 43-12.1-08, N.D.C.C., under the guidelines prescribed by the other statutes alluded to earlier herein. It would be difficult if not impossible for the Legislature to establish more definitive standards with the flexibility necessary to keep abreast of the developments in medical science. In light of the developments in educational standards it is obvious that the Legislature contemplated that in setting standards the board could require what it has done through the passage of the administrative rules also referred to herein. In this light, we find that Section 43-12.1-08(6), N.D.C.C., is not violative of Article III, Section 1, of the North Dakota Constitution nor is Article 54-03.1, N.D.A.C., a usurpation of that statute or that provision of the State Constitution. It is clear that what authority the Legislature has delegated in this area it can also retract. It is not as though the Legislature had delegated unlimited authority to an agency to perform acts which would be wastefully prohibitive, if not impossible, to undo. The authority to retract in circumstances like this is a safeguarding influence on the Board to enact rules only within the statutory guidelines and to exercise reasonable restraint. For the reasons set forth herein, and respectful of the presumption that all statutes enacted by the Legislature are constitutional, *849 and recognizing that this presumption is conclusive unless it is clearly shown that the statute contravenes the state or federal constitution, Richter v. Jones, 378 N.W.2d 209, 211 (N.D.1985), we affirm the trial court in its answers to both certified questions. GIERKE, VANDE WALLE, LEVINE and MESCHKE, JJ., concur. [1] Section 43-12.1-08(6), N.D.C.C.: "Powers and duties of the board.The board shall: * * * * * * 6 Establish standards for all nursing education programs or acknowledge programs accredited by national nursing accrediting agencies." [2] Article III, Section 1 of the North Dakota Constitution reads: "Section 1. While the legislative power of this state shall be vested in a legislative assembly consisting of a senate and a house of representatives, the people reserve the power to propose and enact laws by the initiative, including the call for a constitutional convention; to approve or reject legislative Acts, or parts thereof, by the referendum; to propose and adopt constitutional amendments by the initiative; and to recall certain elected officials. This article is self-executing and all of its provisions are mandatory. Laws may be enacted to facilitate and safeguard, but not to hamper, restrict, or impair these powers." [3] Glaspell was subsequently followed by this Court in City of Carrington v. Foster County, 166 N.W.2d 377 (N.D.1969). In City of Carrington we concluded that certain statutes authorizing district courts to hear and rule on the merits of annexation petitions prepared by municipal authorities to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the judiciary, as well as an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers principle. Glaspell and City of Carrington consider the question of the contitutionality of the delegation of legislative authority to the judiciary as distinguished from the delegation of power to an administrative agency. [4] Budge was subsequently followed in early North Dakota Supreme Court cases. See State ex rel. Miller v. Taylor, 27 N.D. 77, 145 N.W. 425 (1913) and State ex rel. City of Fargo v. Wetz, 40 N.D. 299, 168 N.W. 835 (1918). [5] This finding distinguished Scott v. Donnelly, 133 N.W.2d 418 (N.D.1965). In Scott this Court held that the power vested in the North Dakota Potato Development Commission to fix fees and to determine the area in which the fees apply was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. In Scott we reasoned that this power provided the Commission with uncontrolled discretion in determining these matters and as such violated Section 175 of the North Dakota Constitution. [6] "The modern view of the delegation doctrine is that clear legislative standards are no longer required to avoid an unconstitutional delegation where the rights of the public are protected against an abuse of administrative power by (1) adequate `procedural safeguards' or (2) adequate `administrative standards,' which have been established by the agency pursuant to a grant of rulemaking authority. 1 K. Davis Administrative Law Treatise §§ 3.14-3.15 (2d ed. 1978 & Supp.1982). See, State ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 283 N.W.2d 12 (1979) (modern tendency is to permit delegation in light of complexity of economic and governmental conditions)." 351 N.W.2d 319 at 350, footnote 13. [7] "28-32-02. Rulemaking power of agencyNoticeAttorney general's opinion. Every administrative agency is authorized to adopt, and from time to time to amend or repeal, reasonable rules in conformity with the provisions of any statute administered or enforced by the agency, and to prescribe methods and procedure required in connection therewith. Prior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any rule, the agency shall adopt a procedure whereby all interested persons are afforded reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or arguments, orally or in writing. In case of substantive rules, opportunity for oral hearing must be granted if requested. The agency shall consider fully all written and oral submissions respecting the proposed rule. Every rule proposed by any administrative agency shall be submitted to the attorney general for an opinion as to its legality before final adoption, and the attorney general shall promptly furnish each such opinion. The attorney general may not approve any rule as to legality when the rule merely repeats or paraphrases the text of the statute purported to be implemented by the rule. The attorney general may not approve any rule as to legality where the rule exceeds the statutory authority of the agency or is written in a manner that is not concise or easily understandable. The attorney general may suggest any revision or rewording of a rule to meet objections as to legality." [8] "43-12.1-08. Powers and duties of the board. The board shall: * * * * * * 7. Conduct surveys as necessary of nursing education programs required to meet board standards. 8. Approve such nursing education programs which meet board standards. 9. Conduct a licensing examination at least once a year for entry into practice as a registered nurse or licensed practical nurse. 10. License candidates who qualify by examination as registered nurses or licensed practical nurses. 11. Maintain a permanent register of the names of all persons to whom licenses to practice as a registered nurse or a licensed practical nurse are issued. Such register shall be open to public inspection. 12. Renew licenses periodically. 13. Promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to chapter 28-32 for renewal of licenses after an absence of five years from the active practice of nursing. 14. Discipline licensees as necessary. 15. Establish standards for quality of practice for registered nurses and licensed practical nurses after consultation with the North Dakota state nurses association, the North Dakota licensed practical nurses association, and other professional nursing groups. 16. Establish standards for quality of practice for registered nurses and licensed practical nurses functioning in specialized roles after consultation with the North Dakota state nurses association, the North Dakota licensed practical nurses association, and other recognized nursing specialty groups." [9] Section 43-12.1-02(3), N.D.C.C., reads: "3. The `practice of nursing as a licensed practical nurse' is defined as the performance of those services, requiring the basic knowledge of biological science and technical skills, commonly performed by a licensed practical nurse under the direction of a registered nurse, licensed physician, or dentist for the purpose of: a. The maintenance of health and prevention of illness. b. The observation and nursing care of persons experiencing changes in their health processes. c. Administering prescribed medications and treatments. d. Teaching and evaluating health practices of patients. e. Providing specialized nursing care when such service is authorized by the board through its rules and regulations and delegated by a registered nurse, physician, or dentist, to a licensed practical nurse who has had additional preparation or experience." [10] Section 43-12.1-02(5), N.D.C.C., reads: "5. The `practice of nursing as a registered nurse' is defined as the performance of acts requiring the specialized knowledge, judgment, and skill based on principles of the biological, physical, behavioral, and social sciences in: a. The maintenance of health and prevention of illness. b. Diagnosing human responses to actual or potential health problems. c. Providing supportive and restorative care, health counseling and teaching, case finding and referral of persons who are ill, injured, or experiencing changes in the normal health processes. d. Administration, teaching, supervision, delegation, and evaluation of health and nursing practices. e. Collaboration in the implementation of the total health care regimen and execution of a medical regimen as prescribed or authorized by a licensed physician or dentist and the performance of such additional acts which are recognized by the nursing profession, in connection with the medical profession, as proper to be performed by registered nurses who have had additional specialized preparation and are authorized by the board through its rules and regulations to perform such acts." [11] "43-12.1-10. License by examination. Any person who desires to practice as a registered nurse or licensed practical nurse in this state shall be required to write and pass the licensing examination given by the board. Such persons shall file a certified written application for license by examination at least thirty days before the examination accompanied by the prescribed fee and submit satisfactory proof of having the following qualifications: 1. Satisfactory completion of the appropriate nursing education program in another country or the appropriate nursing education program approved by a board of nursing in the United States. 2. Recommended to the board by the nursing faculty of the completed nursing education program." [12] Section 54-03.1-01-05(5), N.D.A.C., reads: "5. `School' means a postsecondary educational institution offering transferable academic credit which includes a program in nursing." [13] Section 43-12.1-08(6), N.D.C.C., reads: "The board shall: * * * * * * 6. Establish standards for all nursing education programs or acknowledge programs accredited by national nursing accrediting agencies." Section 54-03.1-06-02(6), N.D.A.C., reads: "Curriculum requirements. The curriculum includes courses from the following academic disciplines and meets requirements for an associate degree with a major in nursing: * * * * * * "6. Courses to meet the school's general requirements for the associate degree." Section 54-03.1-07-02(6), N.D.A.C., reads: "Curriculum requirements. The curriculum includes courses from the following academic disciplines and meets requirements for a baccalaureate degree with an upper division major in nursing: * * * * * * "6. General requirements concepts which will provide the student with an understanding of the principles of education and learning, management and technology, and courses to meet requirements for a baccalaureate degree."