Title: Isbell v. Commercial Investment Associates

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
ROSCOE H. ISBELL 
v.  Record No. 061000 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   April 20, 2007 
 
COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES, INC. 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Randall G. Johnson, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider the question whether the 
Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, Code §§ 55-
248.2 through –248.40 (the Act), creates a statutory cause 
of action allowing a tenant to recover damages for personal 
injuries resulting from his landlord’s alleged 
noncompliance with duties imposed by the Act.  We find that 
the General Assembly did not plainly manifest an intention 
to abrogate the common law rule that a landlord is not 
liable in tort for a tenant’s personal injuries caused by 
the landlord’s failure to repair premises under the 
tenant’s control and possession.  Therefore, we will affirm 
the judgment of the circuit court granting the landlord’s 
motion for summary judgment. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
In a motion for judgment asserting a common law 
negligence claim, Roscoe H. Isbell sought damages against 
Commercial Investment Associates, Inc. (Commercial) and Bar 
 
2
Properties, LLC for personal injuries Isbell allegedly 
sustained when he fell down worn and slippery stairs 
located inside an apartment he leased from the named 
defendants.1  Isbell claimed that the stairway’s state of 
disrepair was brought about by the defendants’ alleged 
negligence in failing to inspect and maintain the premises, 
and in failing to replace or repair unsafe conditions.  He 
also alleged that the condition of the stairs posed an 
unreasonable risk of harm to persons such as Isbell and 
that the defendants negligently failed to warn him of the 
unsafe condition of the stairway. 
Commercial filed a motion for summary judgment, 
asserting that Isbell failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted because, as a matter of law, a 
landlord owes no duty to maintain premises that are within 
a tenant’s exclusive control.  In his written response to 
the motion for summary judgment and during oral argument on 
the motion, Isbell argued that a violation of the Act gives 
rise to a private cause of action for personal injury.  
Although the circuit court opined from the bench that the 
                                                 
1 In its grounds of defense to Isbell’s motion for 
judgment, Commercial acknowledged that it managed the 
leased premises and that Bar Properties, LLC was the owner 
at the time Isbell allegedly sustained his injuries.  
Isbell nonsuited his claim against Bar Properties, LLC, and 
it is therefore not a party to this appeal. 
 
3
Act does not create such an action, it took the motion for 
summary judgment under advisement. 
Isbell subsequently requested leave to file an amended 
motion for judgment.  In his proposed amended pleading, 
Isbell once again asserted a claim for common law 
negligence.  He also alleged that he was entitled to 
recover under the Act, claiming that the defendants’ 
“failure to maintain and/or repair the property, [and] 
failure to warn [Isbell] . . . constituted a breach and 
violation of the [d]efendants’ duties, obligations, and 
responsibilities under the . . . Act . . . and [that] said 
breaches and violations proximately caused [his] damages 
and injuries.” 
After additional oral argument, the circuit court 
granted Commercial’s motion for summary judgment, denied 
Isbell’s motion to file an amended motion for judgment, and 
dismissed the action against Commercial with prejudice.  In 
a letter opinion, the circuit court first explained that, 
based on this Court’s decisions in Caudill v. Gibson Fuel 
Co., 185 Va. 233, 38 S.E.2d 465 (1946), and Paytan v. 
Rowland, 208 Va. 24, 155 S.E.2d 36 (1967), a landlord’s 
failure to fulfill a contractual obligation to repair 
leased premises under a tenant’s possession and control 
does not impose liability in tort on the landlord.  Thus, 
 
4
the circuit court concluded that Isbell failed to state a 
cause of action under the common law for his alleged 
personal injuries. 
The circuit court also concluded that Isbell could not 
recover monetary damages for personal injuries under the 
Act.  Analyzing the provisions of Code § 55-248.40, the 
circuit court reasoned that damages under that section were 
only available in tandem with an award of an injunction.  
Since Isbell no longer resided on the premises where he 
allegedly sustained his injuries, the court concluded that 
Isbell was not entitled to either injunctive relief or 
damages.  We awarded Isbell this appeal, limited to the 
issue whether the circuit court erred in holding that the 
Act “could not be relied upon by [Isbell] in support of a 
private cause of action for damages.”2 
ANALYSIS 
The question whether the Act abrogates the common law 
and provides a tenant with a statutory cause of action in 
tort against his or her landlord for personal injuries 
                                                 
2 On brief, Isbell asserts that, in his proposed 
amended motion for judgment, he stated a claim for 
negligence per se and that the circuit court overlooked 
that theory of liability.  Irrespective of whether Isbell 
stated such a claim in his proposed amended motion for 
judgment, the circuit court did not decide whether a 
landlord’s breach of the statutory duties imposed by the 
Act can form the basis of a common law claim for negligence 
per se, nor is that issue before us in this appeal. 
 
5
resulting from the landlord’s violation of obligations and 
duties imposed by the Act is a matter of first impression 
before this Court.  As the circuit court recognized, it is 
well-settled in Virginia that, under the common law, a 
landlord has “no duty to maintain in a safe condition any 
part of the leased premises that [is] under [a tenant’s] 
exclusive control.”  Paytan, 208 Va. at 26, 155 S.E.2d at 
37 (citing Oliver v. Cashin, 192 Va. 540, 65 S.E.2d 571 
(1951)).  Neither does any contractual duty undertaken by a 
landlord to repair leased premises under a tenant’s control 
render the landlord liable in tort for injuries sustained 
by the tenant as a result of the landlord’s breach of a 
covenant to make such repairs.  Id. at 27, 155 S.E.2d at 38 
(citing Caudill, 185 Va. 233, 38 S.E.2d 465); see also 
Luedtke v. Phillips, 190 Va. 207, 211, 56 S.E.2d 80, 82 
(1949).  In Caudill, this Court explained the common law 
rule in detail: 
Where the right of possession and enjoyment of 
the leased premises passes to the lessee, the 
cases are practically agreed that, in the absence 
of concealment or fraud by the landlord as to 
some defect in the premises, known to him and 
unknown to the tenant, the tenant takes the 
premises in whatever condition they may be in, 
thus assuming all risk of personal injury from 
defects therein.  An agreement by the landlord to 
repair does not affect the rule, so far as 
concerns the landlord’s liability for personal 
injuries, due to defects in the premises leased 
for a private purpose, although the existence of 
 
6
the defect is attributable to the failure to 
repair. 
 
. . . . 
 
Generally it is held that, where complete 
possession is surrendered to the lessee, no 
action of tort can be maintained against the 
lessor except for fraud or concealment, hence 
that no recovery can be had for personal injuries 
on account of the landlord’s failure to repair, 
and that his covenant to repair renders him 
liable only to an action for the breach of 
covenant, in which recovery is limited to the 
costs of repairs and any loss of use suffered by 
the tenant after the lapse of a reasonable time 
from giving the notice in which to make repairs. 
 
185 Va. at 239−41, 38 S.E.2d at 469 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Isbell does not dispute these principles of the common 
law.  Instead, he asserts that the Act abrogated the common 
law and provided a statutory cause of action in tort 
allowing a tenant to recover damages for personal injuries 
sustained as a result of a landlord’s violation of the 
statutory duties to “[c]omply with the requirements of 
applicable building and housing codes materially affecting 
health and safety” and to “[m]ake all repairs and do 
whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit 
and habitable condition.”  Code § 55-248.13(A)(1)-(2).  
Isbell contends that the language used in Code §§ 55-
248.40, -248.21, and –248.4 signals the General Assembly’s 
 
7
intent to abrogate the common law and create this statutory 
cause of action.3  We do not agree. 
                                                 
3 Code § 55-248.40 states: 
Any person adversely affected by an act or 
omission prohibited under [the Act] may institute 
an action for injunction and damages against the 
person responsible for such act or omission in 
the circuit court in the county or city in which 
such act or omission occurred.  If the court 
finds that the defendant was responsible for such 
act or omission, it shall enjoin the defendant 
from continuance of such practice, and in its 
discretion award the plaintiff damages as herein 
provided. 
 
Code § 55-248.21 states: 
Except as provided in this chapter, if there 
is a material noncompliance by the landlord with 
the rental agreement or a noncompliance with any 
provision of this chapter, materially affecting 
health and safety, the tenant may serve a written 
notice on the landlord specifying the acts and 
omissions constituting the breach and stating 
that the rental agreement will terminate upon a 
date not less than 30 days after receipt of the 
notice if such breach is not remedied in 21 days. 
If the landlord commits a breach which is 
not remediable, the tenant may serve a written 
notice on the landlord specifying the acts and 
omissions constituting the breach, and stating 
that the rental agreement will terminate upon a 
date not less than 30 days after receipt of the 
notice. 
 
If the landlord has been served with a prior 
written notice which required the landlord to 
remedy a breach, and the landlord remedied such 
breach, where the landlord intentionally commits 
a subsequent breach of a like nature as the prior 
breach, the tenant may serve a written notice on 
the landlord specifying the acts and omissions 
constituting the subsequent breach, make 
reference to the prior breach of a like nature, 
and state that the rental agreement will 
 
8
The General Assembly has proclaimed, “The common law 
of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the 
principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this 
Commonwealth, shall continue in full force . . . and be the 
rule of decision, except as altered by the General 
Assembly.”  Code § 1-200.  When construing a statute in 
derogation of the common law, we apply several established 
principles.  “[A] statutory provision will not be held to 
change the common law unless the legislative intent to do 
                                                                                                                                                 
terminate upon a date not less than 30 days after 
receipt of the notice. 
 
If the breach is remediable by repairs and 
the landlord adequately remedies the breach prior 
to the date specified in the notice, the rental 
agreement will not terminate.  The tenant may not 
terminate for a condition caused by the 
deliberate or negligent act or omission of the 
tenant, a member of his family or other person on 
the premises with his consent whether known by 
the tenant or not.  In addition, the tenant may 
recover damages and obtain injunctive relief for 
noncompliance by the landlord with the provisions 
of the rental agreement or of this chapter.  The 
tenant shall be entitled to recover reasonable 
attorneys’ fees unless the landlord proves by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the landlord’s 
actions were reasonable under the circumstances.  
If the rental agreement is terminated due to the 
landlord’s noncompliance, the landlord shall 
return the security deposit in accordance with 
§ 55-248.15:1. 
 
Code § 55-248.4 defines “[a]ction” as a 
“recoupment, counterclaim, set off, or other 
civil suit and any other proceeding in which 
rights are determined, including without 
limitation actions for possession, rent, unlawful 
detainer, unlawful entry, and distress for rent.” 
 
9
so is plainly manifested.”  Herndon v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 
Inc., 266 Va. 472, 476, 587 S.E.2d 567, 569 (2003); accord 
Schwartz v. Brownlee, 253 Va. 159, 166, 482 S.E.2d 827, 831 
(1997) (citing Wackwitz v. Roy, 244 Va. 60, 65, 418 S.E.2d 
861, 864 (1992)); Boyd v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 346, 349, 
374 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1988) (citing Hannabass v. Ryan, 164 
Va. 519, 525, 180 S.E. 416, 418 (1935)).  “Statutes in 
derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed 
and not to be enlarged in their operation by construction 
beyond their express terms.”  Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. 
Kinzer, 206 Va. 175, 181, 142 S.E.2d 514, 518 (1965); 
accord Blake Constr. Co. v. Alley, 233 Va. 31, 34, 353 
S.E.2d 724, 726 (1987); Hyman v. Glover, 232 Va. 140, 143, 
348 S.E.2d 269, 271 (1986).  Accordingly, “[a] statutory 
change in the common law is limited to that which is 
expressly stated in the statute or necessarily implied by 
its language because there is a presumption that no change 
was intended.”  Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 179, 186, 523 
S.E.2d 246, 250 (2000); accord Couplin v. Payne, 270 Va. 
129, 136, 613 S.E.2d 592, 595 (2005); Boyd, 236 Va. at 349, 
374 S.E.2d at 302; Strother v. Lynchburg Trust & Sav. Bank, 
155 Va. 826, 833, 156 S.E. 426, 428 (1931).  “When an 
enactment does not encompass the entire subject covered by 
the common law, it abrogates the common-law rule only to 
 
10
the extent that its terms are directly and irreconcilably 
opposed to the rule.”  Boyd, 236 Va. at 349, 374 S.E.2d at 
302; accord Couplin, 270 Va. at 136, 613 S.E.2d at 595; 
Mitchem, 259 Va. at 186−87, 523 S.E.2d at 250. 
In Wicks v. City of Charlottesville, 215 Va. 274, 208 
S.E.2d 752 (1974), we explained the reason for applying 
these principles: 
[The General Assembly] is presumed to have known 
and to have had the common law in mind in the 
enactment of a statute.  The statute must 
therefore be read along with the provisions of 
the common law, and the latter will be read into 
the statute unless it clearly appears from 
express language or by necessary implication that 
the purpose of the statute was to change the 
common law. 
 
Id. at 276, 208 S.E.2d at 755; accord Keister’s Adm’r v. 
Keister’s Ex’rs, 123 Va. 157, 162, 96 S.E. 315, 317 (1918). 
Employing these established canons of construction, we 
conclude that the General Assembly did not intend to 
abrogate the common law rule that a landlord is not liable 
in tort for a tenant’s personal injuries sustained as a 
result of the landlord’s failure to repair premises under 
the tenant’s possession and control.  Nowhere in the Act is 
there express language creating a cause of action in tort 
for a landlord’s breach of duties imposed by the Act.  Nor 
is such a cause of action necessarily implied by the Act’s 
language. 
 
11
 
Instead, a close examination of the Act as a whole 
reveals an integrated statutory scheme governing 
contractual relationships between landlords and tenants.  
Indeed, the General Assembly expressly stated that the Act 
“shall apply to all rental agreements entered into on or 
after July 1, 1974, which are not” otherwise specifically 
exempted from its reach.  Code § 55-248.3:1 (emphasis 
added).  As the Act defines them, “[r]ental agreement[s]” 
are “agreements, written or oral, . . . embodying the terms 
and conditions concerning the use and occupancy of a 
dwelling unit and premises.”  Code § 55-248.4. 
 
In furtherance of its purpose “to simplify, clarify, 
modernize and revise the law governing the rental of 
dwelling units and the rights and obligations of landlords 
and tenants,” Code § 55-248.3, the Act imposes certain 
duties on landlords.  The provisions of Code § 55-248.13(A) 
require a landlord to “1. Comply with the requirements of 
applicable building and housing codes materially affecting 
health and safety; [and] 2. Make all repairs and do 
whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit 
and habitable condition.”  At common law, a landlord would 
not have these responsibilities unless the landlord 
expressly covenanted to assume them in an agreement with 
the tenant.  See Luedtke, 190 Va. at 211, 56 S.E.2d at 82 
 
12
(a landlord was under no implied covenant to repair the 
demised premises).  Nevertheless, we do not make the 
inference urged by Isbell that the imposition of these 
statutory duties on a landlord necessarily gives rise to 
liability in tort for the landlord’s failure to fulfill 
them. 
We find further evidence that the General Assembly did 
not intend to provide relief in the Act beyond that 
normally available for a breach of contract when we compare 
the Act’s provisions concerning a landlord’s duties to 
those set forth in the Uniform Residential Landlord and 
Tenant Act (URLTA).  The language appearing in URLTA 
§ 2.104(a) is identical to the terms of Code § 55-248.13(A) 
at issue here.  The drafters’ comment accompanying URLTA 
§ 2.104 states, “Generally duties of repair and maintenance 
of the dwelling unit and the premises are imposed upon the 
landlord by this section.”  It continues, “This section 
follows the warranty of habitability doctrine now 
recognized” in several jurisdictions.  URLTA § 2.104 cmt.; 
see also Hinson v. Delis, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1972), overruled on other grounds by Knight v. 
Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268, 273 n.7 (Cal. 1981); Javins v. 
First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); 
Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Haw. 1969); Jack Spring, 
 
13
Inc. v. Little, 280 N.E.2d 208 (Ill. 1972); Rome v. Walker, 
196 N.W.2d 850 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Kline v. Burns, 276 
A.2d 248 (N.H. 1971); Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409 
(Wis. 1961).  In these cases cited by the drafters of 
URLTA, the relief afforded to the respective tenants was 
consistent with our common law regarding the extent of a 
landlord’s liability for breach of a covenant to repair 
leased premises.  Compare Kline, 276 A.2d at 252 (“If a 
material or substantial breach of the implied warranty of 
habitability is found, the measure of the tenant’s damages 
is the difference between the agreed rent and the fair 
rental value of the premises as they were during their 
occupancy by the tenant in the unsafe, unsanitary or unfit 
condition.”), with Caudill, 185 Va. at 240-41, 38 S.E.2d at 
469 (holding a landlord’s “covenant to repair renders him 
liable only to an action for the breach of covenant, in 
which recovery is limited to the costs of repairs and any 
loss of use suffered by the tenant after the lapse of a 
reasonable time from giving the notice in which to make 
repairs”). 
Neither do the provisions of the Act upon which Isbell 
relies expressly state or necessarily imply a legislative 
intent to provide damages for a tenant’s personal injuries 
sustained as a result of a landlord’s noncompliance with 
 
14
the duties imposed by Code § 55-248.13(A)(1)-(2).  Rather, 
the remedies provided in the Act for a landlord’s violation 
of these statutory obligations are more akin to those 
available in an action for breach of contract than the type 
of damages recoverable in an action in tort for personal 
injury. 
Pursuant to Code § 55-248.21, a tenant’s remedy for a 
landlord’s “material noncompliance . . . with the rental 
agreement or a noncompliance with any provision of [the 
Act], materially affecting health and safety,” is 
termination of the rental agreement after providing written 
notice to the landlord and an opportunity for the landlord 
to correct the breach.  A tenant may also recover damages 
and obtain injunctive relief.4  The focus of this section is 
clearly to provide a tenant with the right to terminate the 
rental agreement if a landlord fails to comply “with any 
provision . . . materially affecting health and safety.”  
That remedy, along with damages and injunctive relief, is 
available exclusively to “the tenant.”  The Act 
specifically provides that the term “[t]enant” does “not 
include . . . an authorized occupant, . . . a guest or  
invitee, or . . . any person who guarantees or cosigns the 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, a tenant may file an action for 
assertion and pay the amount of rent required under the 
rental agreement into court.  Code § 55-248.27. 
 
15
payment of the financial obligations of a rental agreement 
but has no right to occupy a dwelling unit.”  Code § 55-
48.4.  That the General Assembly limited the availability 
of damages under Code § 55-248.21 to persons in contractual 
privity with landlords, i.e., tenants, demonstrates that it 
intended to provide for consequential damages flowing from 
a breach of contract and not damages for personal injury 
caused by tortious conduct.  To conclude otherwise would 
mean that a tenant could obtain damages for personal 
injury, but a person whose recovery for a landlord’s 
tortious acts or omissions is, ordinarily, derivative of 
the tenant’s could not do so.  See Oliver, 192 Va. at 543, 
65 S.E.2d at 572 (“The duties and liabilities of the 
landlord to the guests and invitees of the tenant, with 
respect to personal injuries, are ordinarily the same as 
those which the landlord owes to the tenant.  They stand in 
the tenant’s shoes.”)  If the damages provided for in Code 
§ 55-248.21 lie only in an action for breach of contract, 
then limiting their availability to tenants, because they 
are in privity with landlords, is entirely consistent with 
our jurisprudence in the area of damages.5  See 
                                                 
5 The Act also imposes certain duties on tenants, 
including the responsibility to “[c]omply with all 
obligations primarily imposed upon tenants by applicable 
provisions of building and housing codes materially 
 
16
Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 
236 Va. 419, 425, 374 S.E.2d 55, 58 (1988). 
While Code § 55-248.40, the other section of the Act 
that Isbell chiefly cites in support of his claim of a 
statutory cause of action, does not limit its applicability 
specifically to tenants, a careful reading of its language 
nonetheless discloses a legislative intent to provide 
contract remedies, not a recovery in tort.  The General 
Assembly’s prescribed mode for awarding relief under this 
section is inconsistent with Isbell’s position for at least 
two reasons.  First, the provisions of Code § 55-248.40 
commit the factual determination whether a defendant was 
responsible for an act or omission prohibited by the Act 
entirely to “the court,” providing no role to a jury.  Such 
an assignment of the fact-finding duty solely to the court 
is entirely appropriate in an equitable claim, but at odds 
                                                                                                                                                 
affecting health and safety;” and to “[k]eep that part of 
the premises he occupies and uses as clean and safe as the 
condition of the premises permit.”  Code § 55-248.16(A)(1)–
(2).  A landlord’s remedies for a tenant’s “material 
noncompliance . . . with the rental agreement or a 
violation of § 55-248.16 materially affecting health and 
safety” include termination of the rental agreement as well 
as damages and injunctive relief.  Code § 55-248.31(A) and 
(G).  Given the similarity between these provisions and 
Code §§ 55-248.13(A)(1)–(2) and –248.21, if we adopted 
Isbell’s position in this case, a landlord, by implication, 
would have a statutory cause of action in tort for personal 
injuries sustained as a result of a tenant’s failure to 
fulfill the duties imposed by the Act. 
 
17
with the role of the court vis-à-vis the jury in an action 
at law for damages, such as an action for personal injury.  
See Bethel Inv. Co. v. City of Hampton, 272 Va. 765, 769, 
636 S.E.2d 466, 469 (2006) (The right to a jury trial under 
Va. Const., art. I, § 11 “is not applicable to proceedings 
in which there was no right to jury trial when the 
Constitution was adopted, such as ordinary suits in 
chancery, but it is clearly applicable to common-law 
actions seeking to recover damages.”) (citing Stanardsville 
Vol. Fire Co. v. Berry, 229 Va. 578, 583, 331 S.E.2d 466, 
469 (1985)); see also Rule 3:21(a).  Second, to allow the 
question whether the tenant may recover damages for his or 
her personal injuries to turn on the court’s discretion 
would be inconsistent with the recognized principle of tort 
law that “a plaintiff is entitled to compensation 
sufficient to make him whole.”  Schickling v. Aspinall, 235 
Va. 472, 474−75, 369 S.E.2d 172, 174 (1988) (emphasis 
added).6 
Furthermore, the provision in Code § 55-248.40 
allowing a court to enjoin a defendant from continuing an 
act or omission prohibited by the Act and to award damages 
                                                 
6 We also find unpersuasive Isbell’s argument that the 
portion of the Act’s definition of the term “[a]ction” 
referring to “other civil suit and any other proceeding in 
which rights are determined,” Code § 55-248.4, contemplates 
a tort action for personal injury. 
 
18
in its discretion conforms to the longstanding authority of 
chancery courts to award damages incident to an award of 
equitable relief.  See, e.g., Advanced Marine Enters., Inc. 
v. PRC Inc., 256 Va. 106, 122, 501 S.E.2d 148, 157 (1998); 
White v. White, 181 Va. 162, 169, 24 S.E.2d 448, 451 
(1943).  Notably, Code § 55-248.40 also limits the damages 
that a court can award to “damages as herein provided.”  
Thus, unless another part of the Act provides for damages 
in tort, a court has no authority to award that type of 
relief.  As we have already stated, we find no such 
provision. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Reading the Act as a whole, we conclude that the 
General Assembly did not plainly manifest an intention, 
either through express language or by necessary 
implication, to abrogate the common law and make a landlord 
liable in tort for a tenant’s personal injuries sustained 
on leased premises within the tenant’s control and 
possession as a result of the landlord’s breach of duties 
imposed by the Act.  Instead, the Act provides a 
comprehensive scheme of landlords’ and tenants’ contractual 
rights and remedies.  Therefore, we will affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed.