Title: Lukehart v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-628 
____________ 
 
ANDREW RICHARD LUKEHART,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[November 8, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from an order denying a motion to 
vacate a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of death 
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  Because the order concerns 
postconviction relief from a capital conviction for which a sentence of death was 
imposed, this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), 
Florida Constitution. 
 
Andrew Richard Lukehart was tried and convicted for the 1996 murder of 
five-month-old Gabrielle Hanshaw.  Lukehart v. State, 776 So. 2d 906, 910-11 
(Fla. 2000).  He was sentenced to death.  This Court affirmed his convictions and 
 
 
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sentence of death, but remanded for resentencing on the aggravated child abuse 
conviction.  Id. at 927.  The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari relief.  
Lukehart v. Florida, 533 U.S. 934 (2001).   
 
On September 27, 2001, Lukehart filed a shell motion for postconviction 
relief, which the trial court struck as improper.  Lukehart then filed a motion to 
vacate judgment and sentence pursuant to rules 3.850 and 3.851 on June 20, 2002.   
Claim III contained claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The State agreed 
to an evidentiary hearing regarding claim III, which was held May 9-10, 2007.  
After the evidentiary hearing, the court denied claim III and summarily denied the 
remainder of Lukehart’s claims.  This Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of 
postconviction relief.  Lukehart v. State, 70 So. 3d 503, 508 (Fla. 2011).  In his 
brief on appeal, Lukehart asserted that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion requesting that his medication be stopped.  Addressing the claim, this Court 
stated that Lukehart improperly raised it through a motion to amend pleadings and 
that such claims could be raised properly in successive postconviction motions.  Id. 
at 514-15. 
 
On December 19, 2011, Lukehart filed a Successive Motion to Vacate 
Judgment and Sentence Pursuant to 3.850(f) with Special Request for Leave to 
Amend raising three claims relating to his taking medication during trial.  
Specifically, Lukehart asserted that: (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to (a) 
 
 
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learn the effects of the medication Lukehart was taking, (b) inform the court and 
the jury that Lukehart was on medication and explain its effects, (c) move the court 
for the medications to cease, and (d) request a continuance; (2) Lukehart was 
incompetent at trial due to medication; and (3) Lukehart was involuntarily required 
to take medication.  The circuit court summarily denied the motion and subsequent 
rehearing.  Because Lukehart’s motion is untimely, we find that the postconviction 
court properly summarily denied Lukehart’s motion.  Further, because Lukehart 
did not address the merits of his claim on appeal, and because the postconviction 
court did not rule on the merits, we do not reach the merits of his claim.  
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s order. 
 
The postconviction court first determined that the motion was controlled by 
rule 3.851.  The court noted Lukehart’s reliance on this Court’s opinion, but stated:  
While the Florida Supreme Court indicated such claims could be 
raised via a successive motion for postconviction relief, the court 
never indicated Rule. 3.850 was the appropriate procedural vehicle [or 
rule], nor did the court excuse the Defendant from the pleading 
requirements of either Rule 3.850 or 3.851. . . . Because the 
Defendant’s instant Motion was filed after October 1, 2001, it falls 
under the purview of Rule 3.851. 
Applying rule 3.851(d), the court found Lukehart’s motion procedurally time-
barred because “the facts upon which the claims are predicated were known to the 
movant and/or could have been ascertained by the movant or the movant’s attorney 
by the exercise of due diligence.”  Lukehart argues that (1) rule 3.850(f) controls 
 
 
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his motion, (2) that even if rule 3.851 applies, his motion was proper under rule 
3.851(d)(2)(C), and (3) that it would be a miscarriage of  justice for his claim not 
to be heard since the information came out during his evidentiary hearing for his 
initial postconviction motion.  We disagree.    
 
Rule 3.851(f)(5)(B) permits the denial of a successive postconviction motion 
without an evidentiary hearing “[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case 
conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.”  When determining 
whether an evidentiary hearing is required on a successive rule 3.851 motion, the 
court may look at the entire record.  Because a court’s decision whether to grant an 
evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion is ultimately based on written materials 
before the court, its ruling is tantamount to a pure question of law, subject to de 
novo review.  See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 (Fla. 2003) (holding that 
“pure questions of law” that are discernable from the record “are subject to de 
novo review”).  In reviewing a trial court’s summary denial of postconviction 
relief, we accept the defendant’s allegations “as true to the extent that they are not 
conclusively refuted by the record.”  Rutherford v. State, 926 So. 2d 1100, 1108 
(Fla. 2006) (quoting Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 355 (Fla. 2004)).  The 
summary denial of a newly discovered evidence claim will be upheld if the motion 
is legally insufficient or its allegations are conclusively refuted by the record.  
 
 
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McLin v. State, 827 So. 2d 948, 954 (Fla. 2002); see also Foster v. State, 810 So. 
2d 910, 914 (Fla. 2002).  
 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 governs the timeliness of 
postconviction motions in capital cases.  Rule 3.851(d)(1) prohibits the filing of a 
postconviction motion more than one year after the judgment and sentence become 
final.  An exception to the rule permits otherwise untimely motions if the movant 
alleges that “the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the 
movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the 
exercise of due diligence.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A).   
 
We find that the circuit court correctly determined that Lukehart’s motion 
was untimely.  “To be considered timely filed as newly discovered evidence, the 
successive rule 3.851 motion was required to have been filed within one year of the 
date upon which the claim became discoverable through due diligence.”  Jimenez 
v. State, 997 So. 2d 1056, 1064 (Fla. 2008).  Taking Lukehart’s allegations as true, 
the testimony that prompted Lukehart’s motion was given on May 9, 2007.  
Accordingly, the motion should have been filed no later than May 9, 2008.1  
Furthermore, Lukehart’s assertion that counsel was unaware that he was on 
medication until the evidentiary hearing is clearly refuted by the record because 
                                         
 
1.  Lukehart filed a motion to amend his initial postconviction motion on 
June 1, 2007, which this Court found was properly denied because he should have 
filed a successive motion.   
 
 
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Dr. Krop, whose testimony spurred the instant motion, evaluated Lukehart for 
mental health related issues before he was tried.  In fact, Lukehart’s motion states, 
“Mr. Edwards, Lukehart’s trial counsel, knew Lukehart was on medication . . . . 
[and that] Dr. Crown informed postconviction counsel that Lukehart had been 
taking three medications.”  Based on these facts, the postconviction court properly 
found that Lukehart’s motion was time-barred.  Accordingly, we find that the 
lower court properly summarily denied Lukehart’s claim.2 
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result. 
QUINCE, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
William Arthur Wilkes, Judge - Case No. 16-1996-CF-002645-AXXX-MA 
 
Michael Paul Reiter, Ocala, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
                                         
 
2.  We find without merit Lukehart’s assertion that the lower court should 
have reviewed his petition under rule 3.850.  Lukehart argues that this Court’s 
ruling on his claim regarding the postconviction court’s denial of his motion to 
amend his initial postconviction motion after the evidentiary hearing should have 
required the postconviction court to accept his claim under rule 3.850(f).  The 
postconviction court was not bound by this Court’s opinion to review Lukehart’s 
successive motion under rule 3.850.     
 
 
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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General and Charmaine Millsaps, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee