Title: STATE v FORSNESS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12141 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1972 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, G I L M A N RUSSELL FORSNESS, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighth J u d i c i a l District, Honorable Robert J. Nelson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Robert J, Campbell argued, Missoula, Montana, For Respondent: Hon. Robert Lo Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana. David Gliko, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana . J o Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana. Arthur Matteucci and James R, Walsh, Deputy County Attorneys, Great F a l l s , Montana. Submitted: March 15, 1972 Decided: M R 2 9 1 9 n F i l e d : IWMR 2 9 1972 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal is by the defendant, Gilman Russell Forsness, who was t r i e d and convicted f o r s e l l i n g dangerous drugs i n the eighth j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Cascade. He appeals from the judgment. This appeal is taken by a volunteer counsel who did not take part i n the t r i a l . The issues on appeal a r e narrowly directed t o the a c t i v i t i e s of t r i a l counsel. However, i n order t o put the case i n perspective, t h a t i s , t o gauge the s i n c e r i t y of rather strange and strained charges on appeal we f e e l it neces- sary t o s e t f o r t h the background appearing i n the record. Defendant was convicted of s e l l i n g dangerous drugs, LSD, marihuana , and an acid called "window panetP t o h i s sixteen year old son K i m Forsness, who i n turn peddled it t o other young people i n Great F a l l s , A t the time of h i s a r r e s t defendant was 42 years of age and had been married several times, H i s f i r s t marriage was t o ~ i m ' s mother and of t h i s marriage there were three children, K i m 17, Nancy 15 and Suzanne 13. From the time of the divorce from ~ i m ' s mother, defendant contributed l i t t l e t o the support of h i s family and Mrs. Delores Forsness had t o work t o support her children. Defendant had a t l e a s t one more marriage, one more c h i l d , and one more divorce a t the time of h i s a r r e s t . The record reveals defendant had r e t i r e d from the United States A i r Force a f t e r ten years of service; t h a t he had worked for the Federal Aviation Agency; and t h a t he had no previous a r r e s t record. Testimony indicates t h a t sometime during the l a t e 1960's defendant became involved i n the "hippie movement" and moved t o San Francisco, C a l i f o r n i a , where he lived i n t h e Haight-Ashbury a r e a . The record a l s o indicates t h a t t h e son K i m lived with h i s f a t h e r f o r a period of time i n San Francisco, where h i s f a t h e r introduced him t o t h e drug c u l t u r e . Further, when K i m returned t o Montana i n the f a l l of 1970, he commenced t o s e l l drugs t o young people i n t h a t a r e a . A t about t h e time K i m began s e l l i n g various drugs, h i s mother contacted the Great F a l l s police informing them t h a t she was worried about a l e t t e r K i m had received from h i s f a t h e r concerning t h e drug trade. She gave t h e l e t t e r t o t h e c i t y police who a t t h e time were investigating both her son and her ex-husband, who had appeared i n Great F a l l s a few days previous. The next day, December 15, 1970, she gave the c i t y police per- mission t o search her son's room where they found marihuana , c a l l e d Panama Red, and correspondence between the defendant and K i m , f u r t h e r involving them i n t h e s a l e of drugs. O n January 4, 1971, K i m Forsness was a r r e s t e d a t h i s home. A t the home s e v e r a l IGA money orders were found which were made out t o one Bob White of San Francisco, a man defendant had d i r e c t e d K i m t o contact t o purchase drugs. After being given t h e Miranda warning, K i m gave a w r i t t e n statement t o t h e police which involved t h e defendant, i n t h a t he gave and helped h i s son t o obtain drugs t o s e l l . Defendant was a r r e s t e d on January 8, 1971 and appeared on January 11, 1971, before Judge Nelson. A t t h a t time defendant informed Judge Nelson t h a t he would procure p r i v a t e counsel, but Judge Nelson appointed Robert A . Tucker, Esq. t o be h i s counsel u n t i l defendant procured h i s own attorney. O n January 13, 1971, defendant appeared with M r . Tucker before Judge Bradford and upon a motion made by M r . Tucker defendant was s e n t t o t h e s t a t e h o s p i t a l a t Warm Springs, Montana, f o r psychiatric evalua- tion. In mid-February 1971, he was returned t o Cascade County, along with a n evaluation r e p o r t which indicated he could stand t r i a l . Due t o defendants a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t he was n o t given com- petent counsel, we w i l l d e t a i l h i s p r e t r i a l a c t i v i t i e s . O n February 24, 1971, counsel f i l e d a motion t o dismiss with b r i e f , which was denied; on March 2, 1971, defendant, with counsel, appeared before Judge Bradford and was granted a continuance on arraignment and on t h a t same day Judge Bradford s e t t r i a l f o r A p r i l 5 , 1971; on March 5, 1971, defendant d i s q u a l i f i e d Judge Bradford and Judge Hatfield was c a l l e d i n and on t h a t same day a motion t o dismiss was f i l e d before Judge Hatfield; on March 8, 1971, counsel Tucker f i l e d a motion t o withdraw a s counsel, which was granted. The c o u r t then appointed Gregory H. Warner, Esq. t o represent defendant who approved both the withdrawal of Tucker and t h e appointment of Warner; on March 30, 1971, t h e t r i a l d a t e of April 5, 1971, was vacated and r e s e t f o r May 4 , 1971; O n April 16, 1971, because of a c o n f l i c t i n t r i a l d a t e s , Judge Hatfield was relieved of the case and Judge Nelson accepted j u r i s d i c t i o n ; on A p r i l 23, 1971, defendant appeared with counsel Warner, who f i l e d and argued a motion t o dismiss and on t h a t same d a t e preliminary i n s t r u c t i o n s were s e t t l e d f o r t h e case; on April 26, 1971, defendant appeared before Judge Nelson, w i t h counsel, and heard the judge deny a11 motions. Upon being requested t o e n t e r a plea, defendant declined and a plea of n o t g u i l t y was entered by t h e court; on A p r i l 29, 1971, the c o u r t granted t h e s t a t e ' s motion t o add c e r t a i n witnesses; and on May 4 , 1971, the case f i n a l l y went t o t r i a l . O n May 4, 1971, p r i o r t o t h e commencement of the t r i a l , defendant's counsel, Warner, asked t o withdraw and t h a t a new counsel be obtained because defendant had reauested t h a t he with- draw. The court denied t h e request and the case went t o t h e jury, r e s u l t i n g i n defendant's conviction. It should be noted here t h a t i n addition t o counsel Gregory H. Warner, Esq, a young practioner, defendant had a t the counsel t a b l e Donald L. Ostrem, Esq., who has practiced law a number of years i n s t a t e and f e d e r a l t r i a l courts. Two issues a r e presented by defendant f o r review: 1. Did the t r i a l court e r r i n refusing t o accept the withdrawal of counsel a f t e r discharge by t h e defendant? 2. Did the d i s t r i c t court v i o l a t e the due process c l a u s e of the Fourteenth Amendment t o the United S t a t e s Constitution by forcing t h e defendant t o t r i a l with a court appointed counsel, which counsel defendant had discharged and who did n o t have t h e confidence of t h e accused? W e find/%%rit t o defendant's f i r s t i s s u e . Here t h e defendant, who i n e a r l y January 1971, s a i d he would obtain h i s own counsel but did not do s o , has had four lawyers represent him up t o and including t h i s appeal. M r . Tucker l a s t e d t h e f i r s t two months ; M r . Warner entered the c a s e i n mid-March and went through the t r i a l ; M r . Ostrem p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the t r i a l a s s i s t i n g M r . .Warner; and Mr. Campbell who appears a s a volunteer on appeal. Procedurally, M r . Warner and M r . Tucker delayed arraignment from January u n t i l A p r i l 26, knowing from Late March t h a t t r i a l was s e t for May 4. Discharge of h i s counsel on May 3 , t h e day before t r i a l , f o r the following reasons was not s u f f i c i e n t t o delay t h e t r i a l . Defendant s t a t e d : '"or the record, I would l i k e it t o show t h a t I refuse counsel because the e f f o r t s he has made have not been i n m y best i n t e r e s t . Furthermore I have been held incommunicado for four months. I have been disallowed t o make four c a l l s . I have not been allowed t h a t opportunity, s i r . "* * *Sir, may I s t a t e t h a t you a r e denying m e m y r i g h t t o c a l l a lawyer of m y choice." The t r i a l judge refused t o discharge counsel a t t h i s l a t e date. The charges contained i n defendant's statement dehors the record. As a matter of f a c t , the record reveals t h a t the t r i a l judge and various counsel gave the defendant every oppor- t u n i t y t o present h i s case. ~ e f e n d a n t ' s only claim, r e a l l y , is t h a t he could not have counsel o r h i s choice. The second issue for review i s concerned with the alleged violation of the due process clause of t h e Fourteenth Amendment t o the United States Constitution. Defendant argues t h a t h i s r i g h t t o counsel a s an indigent necessarily incorporates h i s r i g h t t o e f f e c t i v e counsel. He alleges t h a t when the appearance of counsel takes on the cloak of pro forma rather than t h a t of zeal and action, he was denied h i s day i n court. Wilson v. S t a t e , 222 Ind. 6 3 , 51 N.E.2d 848; Hawkins v. S t a t e , (Fla. 1966), 184 So.2d 486; Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F.Supp. 579. Here, in e f f e c t , defendant i n using the words "effective counsel" and one t h a t he has "confidence in", i s alleging t h a t he had inadequate counsel. W e find the record does not support t h i s allegation. W e have noted i n d e t a i l the e f f o r t s of two de- fense counsel on h i s behalf. Claimed inadequacy of counsel must not be tested by a greater sophistication of appellate counsel, nor by t h a t counselts unrivaled opportunity t o study the record a t l e i s u r e and c i t e d i f f e r e n t t a c t i c s of perhaps doubtful efficacy. Success is not the t e s t of e f f i c i e n t counsel, frequently n e i t h e r vigor, z e a l , nor s k i l l can overcome the t r u t h . W e agree with counsel f o r defendant t h a t the r i g h t t o be represented by counsel i n a criminal proceeding is a funda- mental r i g h t e s s e n t i a l t o criminal j u s t i c e . S t a t e v. Schenk, 151 Mont. 493, 444 P.2d 861; S t a t e v . Gray, 152 Mont. 310, 448 P.2d 744; S t a t e v. Noller, 142 Mont. 35, 381 P.2d 293. However, we do not agree with defendant's contention t h a t he can dismiss h i s counsel j u s t before going t o t r i a l , a f t e r counsel had adequately represented him f o r several months, and then on appeal a l l e g e h i s basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s have been v i o l a t e d . Severa 1 recent f e d e r a l cases have covered t h i s argument f u l l y . United S t a t e s v. Davis, 365 F.2d 251; Davis v. Stevens, 326 F.Supp. 1182, 1183. In the l a t t e r case, which c i t e d United S t a t e s v. Davis, the court said: 'blonetheless , while t h i s r i g h t t o counsel includes t h e r i g h t of a n indigent defendant t o have counsel appointed f o r h i s b e n e f i t f r e e of charge t o him, Gideon v. Wainwright, supra r i g h t of an , i t never has been held t h a t t h i s t o counsel a l s o comprehends a r i g h t indigent defendant t o have counsel of h i s choice appointed f o r him. Rather, it is the duty'of the court t o appoint counsel f o r t h e indigent defendant, and unless t h e r e is good cause shownhy the appointment of a p a r t i c u l a r attorney should not have been made, the defendant must accept the attorney s e l e c t e d by t h e court unless he waives the r i g h t t o be represented by counsel. This proposition of law is supported by numerous cases. [ c i t i n g cases]" The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court is affirmed. n Mr. J u s t i c e Haswell s p e c i a l l y concurring: I concur i n t h e r e s u l t but not a l l t h a t is s a i d i n t h e foregoing opinion. . I A + . Wd&QQ Associate u s t f c e