Title: Tverberg v. Fillner Construction Co.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
Filed 6/28/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
JEFFREY TVERBERG et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S169753 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/4 A120050 
FILLNER CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
) 
 
) 
Solano County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. FCS028210 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
 
We granted review to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeal regarding the 
implications of our decision in Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 (Privette).  
That case holds that the hirer of an independent contractor is not vicariously liable to the 
contractor‟s employee who sustains on-the-job injuries resulting from a special or 
peculiar risk inherent in the work.  Those injuries, Privette explained, are covered by 
workers‟ compensation insurance, the cost of which is generally included in the contract 
price for the project.  (Id. at pp. 697-698.)   
Here, after getting injured at a construction jobsite, an independent contractor 
hired by a subcontractor sued the general contractor.  The trial court granted summary 
judgment for defendant general contractor.  The Court of Appeal reversed.  It held that 
Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, precludes recovery only when jobsite injuries are subject 
to mandatory coverage under California‟s workers‟ compensation system, which is not 
the case when the injured person is an independent contractor.  The court expressly 
 
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disagreed with the Court of Appeal in Michael v. Denbeste Transp., Inc. (2006) 137 
Cal.App.4th 1082 (Michael), which concluded that Privette‟s holding — that the peculiar 
risk doctrine does not make one who hires a contractor vicariously liable for workplace 
injuries sustained by the hired contractor‟s employees — also operates to bar peculiar 
risk liability for workplace injuries of an independent contractor.  We agree with Michael 
that the peculiar risk doctrine does not make a hiring party liable for the workplace 
injuries of an independent contractor.  But we do not agree with Michael that Privette‟s 
holding applies directly in this situation.  Nor do we agree with the Court of Appeal here 
that the presence or absence of workers‟ compensation coverage is the key to resolving 
this case.  Rather, the reason underlying our holding is this:  Unlike a mere employee, an 
independent contractor, by virtue of the contract, has authority to determine the manner 
in which inherently dangerous construction work is to be performed, and thus assumes 
legal responsibility for carrying out the contracted work, including the taking of 
workplace safety precautions.  Having assumed responsibility for workplace safety, an 
independent contractor may not hold a hiring party vicariously liable for injuries resulting 
from the contractor‟s own failure to effectively guard against risks inherent in the 
contracted work. 
I 
Because this case comes before us after the trial court‟s grant of summary 
judgment, we apply these well-established rules:  “ „ “[W]e take the facts from the record 
that was before the trial court when it ruled on that motion,” ‟ ” and we “ „ “ „ “review the 
trial court‟s decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and 
opposing papers except that to which objections were made and sustained.” ‟ ” ‟ ”  
(Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1039, quoting Lonicki v. Sutter Health Central 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 201, 206.)  We also “ „ “liberally construe the evidence in support of 
the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in 
favor of that party.” ‟ ”  (Ibid.) 
 
3 
 
In April and May 2006, defendant Fillner Construction Company was the general 
contractor for the expansion of a commercial-fuel facility operated by Ramos Oil 
Company in Dixon, Solano County, California.  The project required construction of a 
metal canopy over some fuel-pumping units.  To do that work, Fillner hired subcontractor 
Lane Supply, which delegated the work to subcontractor Perry Construction Company, 
which then hired plaintiff independent contractor Jeffrey Tverberg as foreman of Perry‟s 
two-man canopy-construction crew.  Tverberg, who had more than 20 years‟ experience 
in structural steel construction, held a state contractor‟s license under the name J.T. 
Construction, a sole proprietorship consisting exclusively of Tverberg.  Although 
subcontractor Perry paid Tverberg on an hourly basis, it is undisputed that Tverberg was 
not Perry‟s employee but an independent contractor.   
As part of the entire commercial-fuel facility project, defendant general contractor 
Fillner hired subcontractor Alexander Concrete Company to erect eight “bollards,” 
concrete posts intended to prevent vehicles from colliding with the fuel dispensers.  On 
May 1, 2006, which was plaintiff Tverberg‟s first day on the job, subcontractor 
Alexander had already dug eight holes for the bollard footings; each hole was four feet 
wide and four feet deep.  The holes, marked with stakes and safety ribbon, were next to 
the area where Tverberg was to erect the metal canopy.  The bollards had no connection 
to the building of the metal canopy, and Tverberg had never before seen bollard holes at a 
canopy installation.   
Plaintiff Tverberg asked Steve Richardson, the “lead man” for defendant general 
contractor Fillner, to cover the holes with large metal plates that were on the site, but 
Richardson said that he did not have the necessary equipment that day.  Richardson did, 
however, have his crew use a tractor to flatten dirt that was piled around the holes.  And 
Tverberg himself removed three or four stakes that were marking the edges of some of 
the bollard holes.   
 
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The next day, with the bollard holes still uncovered, Tverberg began working on 
the canopy.  He again asked Richardson to cover the holes, but Richardson did not do so.  
A short while later, as Tverberg walked from his truck toward the canopy, he fell into a 
bollard hole and was injured.   
Tverberg then sued general contractor Fillner and subcontractor Perry, which had 
hired Tverberg, seeking damages for physical and mental injuries and lost income under 
theories of negligence and premises liability.  It is not clear whether Tverberg‟s 
complaint sought recovery under a peculiar risk theory.  That theory became an issue 
when defendant general contractor Fillner‟s motion for summary judgment asserted that 
under this court‟s decision in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, Fillner could not be held 
vicariously liable for plaintiff‟s injuries.  Fillner also asserted that it could not be held 
directly liable for negligence in failing to provide a safe workplace.1  Tverberg opposed 
the motion, contending only that Fillner had retained control over safety conditions at the 
jobsite and thus could be held directly liable for its failure to eradicate a known danger, 
namely, the open bollard holes.   
The trial court entered summary judgment for defendant general contractor.  
Citing the Court of Appeal‟s decision in Michael, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th 1082, the trial 
court ruled that plaintiff independent contractor could not hold the general contractor 
vicariously liable on a theory of peculiar risk.  The court also rejected plaintiff‟s 
contention that defendant general contractor could be held directly liable for failing to 
cover the bollard holes, noting that plaintiff had been “aware of the danger posed by the 
bollard holes” but “did not refuse to work around” them, and that defendant had never 
promised to cover the holes.   
On appeal, plaintiff independent contractor argued for the first time that Privette, 
supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, did not bar him from holding the general contractor vicariously 
                                              
1  
Defendant subcontractor Perry Construction Company, which had hired plaintiff 
Tverberg, did not seek summary judgment. 
 
5 
 
liable on a theory of peculiar risk.  The Court of Appeal agreed, and it reversed the trial 
court‟s summary judgment for defendant general contractor.  The Court of Appeal held 
that Privette‟s rule of not imposing vicarious liability against a hiring party for jobsite 
injuries sustained by an employee of an independent contractor does not apply when the 
person injured is the independent contractor himself, because unlike the employee, the 
contractor is not subject to mandatory workers‟ compensation coverage.  The court 
expressly disagreed with the Court of Appeal in Michael, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th 1082, 
1086, that Privette‟s “policies and rationale” would not permit an independent contractor 
to hold a hiring party vicariously liable for workplace injuries.    
We granted defendant general contractor‟s petition for review.   
II 
Informative here is the analysis in our 1993 decision in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 
689; we therefore discuss it in detail.  After Franklin Privette had hired a roofing 
contractor to install a tar and gravel roof on a duplex he owned, one of the contractor‟s 
employees was, in the course of the work, severely burned by hot tar.  (Id. at p. 692.)  
The employee sought recovery under California‟s system of workers‟ compensation for 
the workplace injury.  He also sued Privette, asserting that under the doctrine of peculiar 
risk the duplex owner could be held vicariously liable for the roofing contractor‟s 
negligence.  (Ibid.) 
As we explained in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 695, the term “peculiar risk” 
derives from the Restatement Second of Torts.  A peculiar risk is “neither a risk that is 
abnormal to the type of work done, nor a risk that is abnormally great.”  (Privette, supra, 
at p. 695.)  Rather, it is a special or recognizable danger inherent in the work itself, and 
that arises “either from the nature or the location of the work and „ “against which a 
reasonable person would recognize the necessity of taking special precautions.” ‟ ”  
(Ibid.)   
 
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The doctrine of peculiar risk is a judicially created exception to the common law 
rule that a person hiring an independent contractor to perform inherently dangerous work 
is generally not liable to third parties for injuries resulting from the work.  (Privette, 
supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 693.)  Through this exception to the general rule of hirer 
nonliability, courts sought to ensure that “a landowner who chose to undertake inherently 
dangerous activity on his land should not escape liability for injuries to others simply by 
hiring an independent contractor to do the work.”  (Id. at p. 694.)  Thus, “innocent third 
parties injured by the negligence of an independent contractor hired by a landowner to do 
inherently dangerous work . . . would not have to depend on the contractor‟s solvency in 
order to receive compensation for the injuries.”  (Ibid.)  
At first, the doctrine of peculiar risk was applied to subject a landowner to liability 
only to certain third parties — either bystanders or neighboring property owners — who 
were injured by the work performed by the hired contractor.  (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 
p. 696.)  But over time some courts expanded the doctrine‟s reach to include another 
category of third parties — employees of an independent contractor hired by the property 
owner to perform work that is inherently dangerous, thus subjecting the landowner to 
vicarious liability for such employees‟ on-the-job injuries.  (Ibid.)   
In Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, 702, we rejected that expansion of the peculiar 
risk doctrine.  Our reason:  Workplace injuries to an independent contractor‟s employees 
are already compensable under California‟s Workers‟ Compensation Act (Lab. Code, 
§§ 3600, subd. (a), 3716).  (Privette, supra, at p. 697.)  This no-fault-based recovery 
provides “ „the exclusive remedy against an employer for injury or death of an 
employee.‟ ”  (Ibid.)  Because workers‟ compensation is the exclusive remedy for an 
employee‟s workplace injuries, thus barring recovery from the employer, so too an 
independent contractor‟s employee should not be allowed to recover damages from the 
contractor‟s hirer, who “is indirectly paying for the cost of [workers‟ compensation] 
 
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coverage, which the [hired] contractor presumably has calculated into the contract price.”  
(Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 699.)   
Privette pointed out that liability imposed under the peculiar risk doctrine is 
vicarious, meaning that the liability of a person hiring a contractor to perform inherently 
dangerous work derives not from any negligence by the hirer but from the injury-causing 
negligence of the hired contractor.  (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 695 & fn. 2.)   
Five years later in Toland v. Sunland Housing Group, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 253 
(Toland), we reiterated the vicarious nature of liability imposed under a theory of peculiar 
risk.  As in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, Toland involved an independent contractor‟s 
employee who was injured at the workplace.  Toland declined to impose peculiar risk 
liability against a general contractor for the jobsite injuries of an employee of an 
independent contractor whose negligence had caused the employee‟s injuries.  Peculiar 
risk liability, we said, “is in essence „vicarious‟ or „derivative‟ in the sense that it derives 
from the „act or omission‟ of the [independent] contractor, because it is the [independent] 
contractor who has caused the injury by failing to use reasonable care in performing the 
work.”  (Toland, supra, at p. 265.)  We further explained that general contractors, like all 
others who hire independent contractors, have “the right to delegate to independent 
contractors the responsibility of ensuring the safety of their own workers.”  (Id. at p. 
269.)  Later, in Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659 (Kinsman), we again 
addressed this issue of delegation.   
Kinsman explained that the concept of delegation is helpful to understanding 
Privette‟s rule that the hirer of an independent contractor is not vicariously liable for 
workplace injury suffered by an employee of the negligent independent contractor.  In the 
words of Kinsman:  “[A]t common law it was regarded as the norm that when a hirer 
delegated a task to an independent contractor, it in effect delegated responsibility for 
performing that task safely, and assignment of liability to the contractor followed that 
delegation.  [Citation.]  For various policy reasons discussed in Privette, courts have 
 
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severely limited the hirer‟s ability to delegate responsibility and escape liability. . . .  
[P]rincipally because of the availability of workers‟ compensation, these policy reasons 
for limiting delegation do not apply to the hirer‟s ability to delegate to an independent 
contractor the duty to provide the contractor‟s employees with a safe working 
environment.”  (Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 671.)   
Against this legal backdrop, we now consider the case before us.   
III 
As mentioned at the outset, here an independent contractor who was hired by a 
subcontractor sued the general contractor seeking damages for workplace injuries.  In 
holding that the independent contractor could bring the lawsuit, the Court of Appeal 
looked to our decision in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689.  That case holds that the hirer of 
an independent contractor is not vicariously liable to the contractor‟s employee who 
sustains on-the-job injuries arising from a special or peculiar risk inherent in the work.  
The Court of Appeal reasoned that Privette did not control because unlike the 
independent contractor‟s employee injured at the jobsite, as occurred in Privette, the 
injured independent contractor here was not subject to mandatory coverage for workplace 
injuries under California‟s workers‟ compensation system.2   
The Court of Appeal expressly disagreed with the Court of Appeal in Michael, 
supra, 137 Cal.App.4th 1082, that the reasoning of Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, would 
preclude an on-the-job-injured independent contractor, hired by a subcontractor, from 
holding the general contractor vicariously liable under a theory of peculiar risk.  Michael 
described its conclusion as “consistent with common law principles and public policy” 
set out by this court in Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th 659, 671, which explained that 
principles of delegation are helpful in understanding a hirer‟s vicarious liability.  
                                              
2   
Under Insurance Code section 11846, independent contractors such as plaintiff 
may, but are not required to, obtain coverage for workplace injury by purchasing a 
workers‟ compensation insurance policy.   
 
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(Michael, supra, at p. 1094 [discussing Kinsman].)  Michael also said that the general 
contractor had “no duty to inquire” whether the person hired by the subcontractor was the 
subcontractor‟s “employee or an independent contractor” (Michael, supra, at p. 1095), 
and that no policy supported imposing “ „any greater liability‟ ” on a general contractor 
merely because the subcontractor hired an independent contractor to perform work it 
might have assigned to its own employee (id. at pp. 1095-1096).   
We agree with the Court of Appeal in Michael, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th 1082, that 
an injured independent contractor hired by a subcontractor cannot hold the general 
contractor vicariously liable for those jobsite injuries on a theory of peculiar risk.  But our 
reasoning differs, as we explain below. 
As mentioned earlier, the doctrine of peculiar risk was developed by the courts as 
an exception to the common law rule of hirer nonliability “to ensure that innocent third 
parties injured by the negligence of an independent contractor hired by a landowner to do 
inherently dangerous work . . . would not have to depend on the contractor‟s solvency in 
order to receive compensation for the injuries.”  (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 694, 
italics added.)  “It was believed that as between two parties innocent of any personal 
wrongdoing — the person who contracted for the work and the hapless victim of the 
contractor‟s negligence — the risk of loss occasioned by the contracted work was more 
fairly allocated to the person for whose benefit the job was undertaken.”  (Ibid.)  Privette 
held that an independent contractor‟s injured employee, although qualifying as a “third 
party” with respect to the contract between the hirer and the independent contractor, 
cannot use the doctrine of peculiar risk to recover damages from the hirer of the 
independent contractor for injuries compensable under workers‟ compensation insurance, 
the cost of which is generally included in the contract price for the hired work.  In 
Privette, in which the injured plaintiff had not been delegated authority under the hiring 
contract, the availability of workers‟ compensation insurance to compensate for the injury 
was central to our holding that the hirer should not incur peculiar risk liability for on-the-
 
10 
 
job injury to an independent contractor‟s employee.  But the existence of workers‟ 
compensation coverage is not relevant to deciding whether a hirer should incur vicarious 
liability for workplace injury to an independent contractor who was hired by a 
subcontractor to do inherently dangerous work.   
When an independent contractor is hired to perform inherently dangerous 
construction work, that contractor, unlike a mere employee, receives authority to 
determine how the work is to be performed and assumes a corresponding responsibility to 
see that the work is performed safely.  The independent contractor receives this authority 
over the manner in which the work is to be performed from the hirer by a process of 
delegation.  This delegation may be direct, when the hirer has contracted with the 
independent contractor, or indirect, when the hirer contracts with another contractor who 
then subcontracts the work to the independent contractor.  (See generally Civ. Code, 
§ 2349 [allowing for such delegation of authority]; Rest.3d, Agency, § 3.15; and see 
Michael, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1087, 1093-1094 [general contractor delegated 
authority to subcontractor, who hired independent contractor Denbeste, who, in turn, 
delegated work to the plaintiff].)  Whether direct or indirect, this delegated control over 
the performance of the work removes the independent contractor from the category of 
“innocent third parties” deserving of financial protection under the doctrine of peculiar 
risk.  As this court stressed in Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th 659, when the hirer of an 
independent contractor delegates control over the work to the contractor, the hirer also 
delegates “responsibility for performing [the] task safely.”  (Id. at p. 671; see also 
Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 693.)  Therefore, a hired independent contractor who 
suffers injury resulting from risks inherent in the hired work, after having assumed 
responsibility for all safety precautions reasonably necessary to prevent precisely those 
sorts of injuries, is not, in the words of Privette, supra, at page 694, a “hapless victim” of 
someone else‟s misconduct.  In that situation, the reason for imposing vicarious liability 
 
11 
 
on a hirer — compensating an innocent third party for injury caused by the risks inherent 
in the hired work — is missing.   
As noted earlier, a hirer‟s liability under the doctrine of peculiar risk is vicarious.  
(Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 695 & fn. 2.)  This means that, irrespective of the hirer‟s 
lack of negligence, the hirer incurs liability for the hired contractor‟s act or omission in 
failing to use reasonable care in performing the hired work.  (Toland, supra, 18 Cal.4th at 
p. 265.)  And in hiring an independent contractor to perform work that presents some 
inherent risk of injury to others, the hirer delegates responsibility over the work to the 
contractor.  (See Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 671.)  It would be anomalous to allow 
an independent contractor to whom responsibility over the hired work has been delegated 
to recover against the hirer on a peculiar risk theory while denying such recovery to an 
independent contractor‟s employee, a person who lacks any authority over the hired work.   
For these reasons, we conclude that the doctrine of peculiar risk does not apply 
when, as here, an on-the-job-injured independent contractor hired by a subcontractor 
seeks to hold the general contractor vicariously liable for injuries arising from risks 
inherent in the nature or the location of the hired work over which the independent 
contractor has, through the chain of delegation, been granted control.  Because the bollard 
holes were located next to the area where Tverberg was to erect the metal canopy, the 
possibility of falling into one of those holes constituted an inherent risk of the canopy 
work. 
The Court of Appeal in this case reached a contrary conclusion, reasoning that 
because plaintiff independent contractor was not subject to mandatory workers‟ 
compensation coverage, defendant general contractor could be held vicariously liable on 
a theory of peculiar risk, and on that basis the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court‟s 
grant of summary judgment for defendant general contractor.  Consequently, the Court of 
Appeal did not address other issues raised on plaintiff‟s appeal from the trial court‟s grant 
of summary judgment for defendant general contractor, notably whether defendant could 
 
12 
 
be held directly liable on a theory that it retained control over safety conditions at the 
jobsite.  We therefore remand this matter to the Court of Appeal for consideration of 
those remaining issues.   
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded to that 
court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 168 Cal.App.4th 1278 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S169753 
Date Filed: June 28, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Solano 
Judge: Paul Lloyd Beeman 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Kirk J. Wolden, Clayeo C. Arnold; and Leslie M. Mitchell for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Horvitz & Levy, David M. Axelrad, Stephen E. Norris; Vitale & Lowe, Johanna M. Berta and Robert Lawrence 
Bragg for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Ulich & Terry and Andrew K. Ulich as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Leslie M. Mitchell 
1117 Vallejo Way 
Sacramento, CA  95818 
(916) 447-3426 
 
Stephen E. Norris 
Horvitz & Levy 
15760 Ventura Boulevard, 18th Floor 
Encino, CA  91436-3000 
(818) 995-0800