Title: JIM W. STOKER V. TINA STOKER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JIM W. STOKER V. TINA STOKER2005 WY 39109 P.3d 59Case Number: 04-96Decided: 04/07/2005
  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
                                                                                                                                   

 
 
 
 
JIM W. 
STOKER,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
TINA 
STOKER,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
            
John D. Bowers of Bowers & Associates Law Offices, PC, Afton, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
            
Kenneth S. Cohen, Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and SKAVDAHL, DJ.

 
 
 
 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant, 
Jim W. Stoker (the husband), and the appellee, Tina Stoker (the wife), were 
married in 1995 and divorced in 2002.  
In the divorce proceeding, the district court awarded the wife a judgment 
equivalent to one-half of the appraised value of real property known as the "dry 
farm."  On appeal, the husband 
essentially argues that the district court failed adequately to consider all of 
the factors listed in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 (LexisNexis 2003) in disposing 
of the dry farm property.  We find 
that the district court did adequately consider these factors, and 
affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Whether the 
district court adequately considered the factors listed in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-114, and ultimately whether the district court's consideration of such 
factors led to a just and equitable property division under the circumstances of 
the instant case?

 
 

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      When the wife met 
the husband, she was unemployed, renting a trailer, "on welfare," was not 
receiving child support, and her possessions consisted of household items and 
utensils, her children's property, and a car.  The husband and wife then lived together 
in the husband's home for about two years prior to their marriage on July 27, 
1995.  The husband had "a couple" 
children from a previous marriage1 and the wife had three minor 
children from a previous relationship.2  However, no children were born to the 
husband and wife.

 
 
[¶4]      During her 
marriage to the husband, the wife testified that she:  (1) was employed at least forty hours 
per week and earned an average wage of $7.00 per hour; (2) performed the 
housework, cooked, did the laundry, and cared for her children; (3) paid 
ninety-five percent of the utilities (telephone bill, electric bill, propane 
bill (although the husband sometimes traded his services for propane)); (4) 
purchased the groceries and the wood to heat the residence; and (5) made between 
one and three payments of $158.00 for the husband's tractor loan, when the 
lender was unable to contact the husband.  
The wife's parents also "often paid the bills for [the husband and 
wife's] house, utilities, water, lights, propane and clothing" because "they 
would be turned off and have to have a deposit before they'd turn them back on" 
and "[the husband and wife] had to have a telephone and they had to have 
heat."

 
 
[¶5]      It further 
appears from the record that, during the marriage, the husband:  (1) was a farrier, raised and cared for 
horses, and trained race horses in Casper for six weeks over a "couple" of 
summers; (2) provided a residence for the wife and her children; and (3) paid 
the water bill and the insurance for the residence.  The wife testified that the husband 
never declared income for tax purposes (the wife filed an individual return 
during the marriage), used his income primarily to feed and maintain his horses 
(as opposed to "buying new furniture," for example), did not send money home 
when he worked in Casper,3 and did not support her 
children.

 
 
[¶6]      In 1998, the 
husband "got in [a] bind with the bank" regarding the real property on which the 
aforementioned residence was situated.  
According to the wife's mother, the property "was going to be foreclosed 
on and . . . [the husband, wife, and the wife's children] would be out in the 
street within two weeks."  The 
husband "trusted" the wife's father to help him, and the wife's father made 
financial arrangements to "have this paid off so that they wouldn't be out in 
the street."  The property was 
apparently quitclaimed to the wife's parents so that they could obtain a loan in 
order to retire the indebtedness.  
The wife's mother testified that at the time, she further informed the 
husband and wife that the property would be returned to them if 
they

 
 
would 
stop their drinking and show that they could make a go of the farm, pay their 
taxes and their bills and have a family oriented home or it would be a cold day 
in hell before I gave it back to them.  
And I gave them six months to do it.

 
 
[¶7]      At some point, a 
sale of about eight acres of the property was contemplated.  That portion of the property was listed 
with a realtor for seven months and ultimately sold for $70,000.00.  All but approximately $43,000.00 of the 
sale proceeds was used to satisfy the financial obligations incurred by the 
husband and wife.  A lawsuit ensued 
between the husband and his in-laws regarding the remaining property and the 
proceeds from the sale of the eight-acre parcel.  The lawsuit was apparently settledthe 
remaining real property (including the residence) was transferred to the 
husband,4 and the wife's parents kept 
the remaining sale proceeds.5  The husband admitted that the wife and 
her family got him out of a "tight spot," but added that he felt he had "paid 
dearly for it."

 
 
[¶8]      The wife's mother 
also submitted approximately $22,000.00 in checks issued by the wife's parents 
between 1996 and 2003 as "examples" of payments they made directly on behalf of 
the husband, the wife, and the wife's children.  The testimony, and the checks, reflect 
payments for upkeep of the residence and real property, utilities, propane, the 
children's doctor bills, property taxes for the husband's property, school 
expenses, clothing, wife's vehicle license, satellite television, groceries, 
cash, legal fees on behalf of the wife and her parents, and other items.  A good portion of these payments were 
made from the aforementioned $43,000.00, but some expenditures obviously 
occurred prior to the existence of those proceeds.

 
 
[¶9]      In October 2001, 
the wife filed for a divorce due to "[i]rreconcilable differences."  The wife testified that she was tired of 
the husband "coming home drunk and being abusive" and that after the husband had 
been drinking he would be in a "bad mood" and want to "start yelling, 
fighting."  According to the wife, 
the husband physically "grabbed" her more than once during the marriage and 
after one incident in which the husband "pushed [the wife] against the wall and 
grabbed ahold of [the wife's] neck to choke" her in the presence of her youngest 
child, the wife sought, and received, a restraining order.6  The wife acknowledged that at one time 
she had a drinking problem, but she completed rehabilitation and had not had a 
drink since May 26, 1999.

 
 
[¶10]   The husband alleged that the wife 
had a relationship with another man, which caused the irreconcilable differences 
between the husband and wife.  The 
wife testified that she met another man through her employment and visited him 
at hotels (where he was staying for work purposes) to watch videos.  The wife denied that she had an affair 
with the other man, denied that she ever had "intimate relations" with the other 
man, and testified that she and the other man were seeing each other as 
"friends."

 
 
[¶11]   The district court entered a 
divorce decree in December 2002.

 
 

 
 
[¶12]   The dispute in the instant case 
focuses on the district court's disposition of real property known as the "dry 
farm."  Historically, the husband's 
family owned and operated a 203-acre farm and/or ranch near Thayne, Wyoming, and the husband purchased the 
property in 1968.  In 1990, the 
husband sold a 150-acre portion of the property known as the "dry farm" to Ray 
Johnston, apparently to satisfy a judgment resulting from the husband's divorce 
from a previous wife.7

 
 
[¶13]   The husband testified that as early 
as 1993, he discussed the possibility of selling a twenty-acre parcel of his 
property to the local school district, and re-acquiring a portion of the dry 
farm property from Ray Johnston.8  Six or seven months after the husband 
and wife were married, a Section 1031 exchange was finalized, wherein the school 
district acquired the twenty-acre parcel from husband and husband used the 
proceeds to re-acquire two parcels (totaling forty-eight acres) of the dry farm 
property from Ray Johnston for $143,414.00.  The wife testified that the husband 
discussed the negotiations with her, but she did not contribute money to the 
transaction and was not formally involved in the 
negotiations.

 
 
[¶14]   Apparently, the two parcels 
acquired in this exchange were deeded to "Jim W. Stoker and Tina Stoker, husband 
and wife, as tenants by the entireties."  
The wife testified that her name was included in the deeds because the 
seller executed the deeds as such--it "happened" because "[w]e were married"and 
the wife was never asked to enter a prenuptial or postnuptial agreement 
regarding the property.  The husband 
also testified that the seller included the wife's name on the deeds essentially 
"because I was married to her for, like, six months," and the husband had not 
requested that the seller exclude the wife's name from the deeds.  According to the husband, he and the 
wife "never talked about" the wife's interest in the property prior to the 
marriage, and there was no agreement prior to, or after, the marriage that the 
wife would not have an interest in the property.

 
 
[¶15]   The husband testified that he 
trained horses for a "couple years" on the forty-eight-acre dry farm property 
and also leased it to another individual "on shares" of hay for a "couple years" 
in order to feed husband's horses.  
The wife testified that during the marriage, she would ask if the husband 
needed any help on the dry farm property and run errands "or bring him things or 
help him fix things on the land,"9 and that she contributed 
"toward keeping the dry farm property as marital property."  At some point, the wife discovered a tax 
notice regarding the dry farm property.  
The property had apparently been sold because of delinquent property 
taxes in July 1998, and the wife's parents redeemed the property in January 1999 
by paying $104.25 in property taxes.  
The wife testified that the husband previously "had the same problem . . 
.."  The wife's parents proceeded to 
pay the property taxes on the dry farm property from 1999 to November 
2003.

 
 
[¶16]   The district court conducted a 
hearing regarding the disposition of the forty-eight-acre dry farm property in 
December 2003.10  The parties stipulated that at that 
time, the property was valued at $240,000.00 to $340,000.00.  At the hearing, the district court ruled 
from the bench, finding that the husband "has land but not much money," and as 
follows:

 
 
            
Actually, it boils down to this.  
In terms of where I look at it from the starting point is was there a 
gift intended when Tina's name was put on the property?  The property was titled such at that 
time.  The Court takes note of the 
following factors:  Mr. Stoker had 
knowledge from prior marriages and  or at least there was evidence of it.  . . .

 
 
            
He has children from prior marriages but he set the thing up in 1996 to 
where if Tina survived him, his other children would be disinherited because it 
was a tenancy by the entirety and everything would have gone to her.  Now, that's a significant legal fact in 
the Court's mind.  

 
 
            
In terms of  obviously, you know, they lived together for two years, 
evidently, trying to decide if they could make it and then they got 
married.  And it's true.  Jim provided at least from  
essentially, at the time they got married, he had his home and the property that 
was sold to the school district and that was basically it, plus probably some 
horses and tack and farm equipment.  
He sold the school district property and used the proceeds to get the dry 
farm property.  This dry farm 
property, that occurred at that point in time and he put her name on 
it.

 
 
            
So, you know, the one thing  and these cases are instructive that have 
been provided.  The law presumes a 
gift, you know, if there was no evidence that it was otherwise.  And there really was no testimony as to 
why her name was put on it, so that presumption remains.  And then I look at the background facts 
on the thing and that and it could have easily been put in his name or 
otherwise.  So we're  the starting 
point is if there's a presumption of that.

 
 
            
Now, I go into it and look at it from the standpoint of, okay, what are 
the equities?  We've got this 
property here that's essentially 50/50.  
It looks like, first of all, out of the whole thing, the home property 
has gone back to Jim.  He's got that 
free and clear.  Secondly, the thing 
that I look at in the course of the marriage is while you have these things and 
people have their faults -- and that may be why the other person loves them, is 
because of their faults.  It makes 
them  You know, so to tell you the truth, I don't look at it, maybe, as harshly 
as clients and Counsel wish I would because we all have our 
shortcomings.

 
 
            
But this is essentially what it appears to me, based on what's gone 
on.  I mean, shortly after they were 
married, they started having financial problems on this loan on the home.  It's pretty clear that Tina was the 
worrier, was the person who tried making sure that there was  the bills were 
paid; there was heat in the house; there was food on the table.  She worked forty hours a week to do 
that, which is a full-time job.  It 
may not be the most money, but she did the best she could.

 
 
            
Jim, on the other hand, he worked full-time in the horse racing game and 
he's good at that and everything but evidently from the testimony here, it 
doesn't really return much money.  . 
. .  But it may be that one of the 
things that attracted Tina to Jim is that she worried about things and took care 
of those details and that's the kind of wife he wanted.

 
 
            
The other equity, I guess, the main thing that I look at is he did keep 
these children, her children, while she was not receiving any child 
support.  But on the other hand, 
probably the cost of upkeep was primarily paid for through Tina's income.  So it doesn't come out all that great 
for Jim.

 
 
            
Mainly, he used his income that he received from the dry farm, he took 
the income from the dry farm and what he got from his horse racing and training 
and, apparently, plowed that back into his occupation as a trainer of the 
horses.

 
 
            
So in terms of it all, as I look at it, Jim's got his home back.  He's still got the situation with regard 
to the . . . dry farm property.  I'm 
here, looking at it from the standpoint of, okay, what equities do we have to 
offset that?  Quite frankly, in 
terms of the traditional function of trying to keep a home together and 
everything else, the equities go in favor of Tina.  There could be an argument that she 
should be awarded more than half, if we start out from the premise that she had 
half given to her, but I'm not going to do that.

 
 
            
I am awarding her half of the property.

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
            
But given where we are, this is one of these things, Jim, that I don't 
know what else I can do.  You know, 
your case is basically that you made a fool's bargain when you made that 
deed.  And I understand where it's 
at, but those are significant acts.  
And once that's done, the only thing I'm doing is looking at the equities 
to try to divide it up any other way, to depart from that, and I've already 
explained that.

 
 
[¶17]   The district court subsequently 
entered a formal decree in February 2004, in which decree it additionally found 
as follows:

 
 
1.         
Wife "contributed to the marriage through payment of household expenses, 
utilities and arranging for payment of other debts during the course of the 
marriage," and husband "contributed to the marriage through payment of some 
marital expenses and providing a home for [wife] and her children"; 
and

 
 
2.         
Husband did not produce sufficient evidence "to overcome the presumption 
that [husband] intended to give a fifty percent interest" in the dry farm 
property to wife.

 
 
[¶18]   Rather than granting the wife an 
actual interest in the property, the district court awarded the wife a 
$170,000.00 money judgment equivalent to one-half of the property's stipulated 
value.11  The decree provided that if the money 
judgment is not paid by a date certain, the property is to be appraised and 
sold; if the property is appraised and sold for less than $340,000.00, the wife 
will receive one-half of the sale proceeds and if the property is appraised and 
sold for more than $340,000.00, the wife will receive the judgment amount (plus 
interest).  The husband now appeals 
the district court's disposition of the dry farm property.

 
 

 
 

[¶19]   In Hall v. Hall, 2002 WY 30, 
¶¶ 12, 14, 40 P.3d 1228, 1230 (Wyo. 2002), we 
stated:

 
 
            
Decisions regarding the division of marital property are within the trial 
court's sound discretion, and we will not disturb them on appeal unless there 
was an abuse of discretion.  
Davis v. Davis, 980 P.2d 322, 323 (Wyo.1999).  An abuse of 
discretion occurs when the property disposition shocks the conscience of this 
court and appears to be so unfair and inequitable that reasonable people cannot 
abide it.  Id.

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
The 
trial court possesses a great amount of discretion in dividing marital 
property.  A just and equitable 
division of property is just as likely not to be equal.  Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1032 
(Wyo.2000).  Although the trial 
court cannot divide the property in such a way that it would punish one of the 
parties, it may consider fault of the respective parties, together with all 
other facts and circumstances surrounding the dissolution of the marriage in 
dividing a couple's marital assets.  
997 P.2d  at 1034.  We are 
required to limit our review of the record to an evaluation of whether the trial 
court's decision was supported by sufficient evidence, and we afford to the 
prevailing party every favorable inference while omitting any consideration of 
evidence presented by the unsuccessful party.  Id.  Findings of fact not supported by the 
evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the great weight of the evidence 
cannot be sustained.  Id.

 
 

 
 
[¶20]   The husband contends that the 
district court failed adequately to consider all of the factors listed in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114, and asks that we remand the case to the district court 
for reconsideration of these factors.  
He argues that if the district court had evaluated the evidence according 
to the requisite statutory factors, the wife would not have received any 
interest in the dry farm property because:

 
 
1.         
Wife shared some fault for the divorce by virtue of her own drinking 
problem and her relationship with another man.

 
 
2.         
Wife entered the marriage "on welfare and renting a trailer house with 
her three" children.  Husband 
brought a family ranch into the marriage, has remained a rancher, and will lose 
"a good portion of the ranching operations" to satisfy the judgment for the 
wife's benefit in this case.

 
 
3.         
Husband brought all of the real property into the marriage, and wife did 
not contribute to the purchase of the dry farm property or negotiate for its 
purchase.  At most, wife paid "for 
some of the family necessities for her and her children."  Wife's family also received $43,200.00 
from the sale of other parcels of husband's property.

 
 
4.         
The length of the marriage was only six years, no children were born of 
the marriage, and no other significant property was acquired during the 
marriage.

 
 
[¶21]   The husband concludes that the 
district court either based its decision solely on the so-called "gift 
presumption" and therefore failed properly to weigh all of the relevant 
statutory factors, or the district court sought to punish the husband for 
alleged misdeeds during the marriage.

 
 
[¶22]   It is undisputed that the dry farm 
property was subject to distribution by the district court.12  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 provides, in 
pertinent part, with respect to the disposition of marital 
property:

 
 
            
In granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the 
property of the parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the 
respective merits of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by 
the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens 
imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and 
children.

 
 

"There 
are no specific guidelines as to how much weight is given to each of the 
factors;" the "trial court has the discretion to determine what weight should be 
given each of these individual factors."  
Barney v. Barney, 705 P.2d 342, 346 (Wyo. 1985); 
Wallop v. Wallop, 2004 WY 46, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d 1022, 1030 (Wyo. 
2004).  There are "no hard and fast rules' 
governing property divisions."  
Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707, 712 (Wyo. 1980) (quoting Young v. Young, 472 P.2d 784, 785 (Wyo. 
1970)).

 
 

[¶23]   We find that the district court 
sufficiently considered the requisite statutory factors in disposing of the dry 
farm property.  The district court 
clearly considered the respective merits of the parties.  "Merit is deservedness, goodness."  Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 819 (Wyo. 
1984).  The district court considered the 
evidence regarding each party's fault in the dissolution of the marriage, but 
noted that "we all have our shortcomings" and did not appear to attach much 
significance to that evidence.13  The district court also commented 
extensively regarding each party's role in, and contributions to, the marriage 
and the property.  In finding that 
the wife's contributions included "arranging for payment of other debts during 
the course of the marriage," the district court further recognized the 
considerable evidence of contributions by the wife's parents to the marriage and 
to the property.14  The district court then contrasted the 
"equities" of the two parties and concluded that such equities favored the 
wife.

 
 
[¶24]   It is also apparent that the 
district court considered the condition in which each party would be left by the 
divorce.  The district court:  (1) specifically referred to the 
husband's assets prior to, and during, the marriage, and the implications of the 
settlement of the lawsuit between the husband and his in-laws;15 (2) noted that the husband 
essentially had land but not much money; and (3) structured the judgment, after 
much contemplation as to how it would affect the parties, in a way that allowed 
the husband an opportunity to retain the dry farm property if he wished.16  Not even the husband felt that the wife 
should be left with nothing following the divorce.

 
 

[¶25]   Contrary to the husband's appellate 
argument, the district court also clearly considered the party through whom the 
dry farm property was acquired.  The 
parties presented extensive evidence and argument on the derivation of the dry 
farm property17 and the district court 
expressly referred to that evidence on the record during the hearing18 and again while explaining 
the rationale for its decision.  The 
following discussion from Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 2003 WY 16, ¶ 9, 
62 P.3d 587, 590-91 (Wyo. 2003) appears to be 
analogous:

 
 
A 
reading of [Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114] indicates that the party through whom 
the property was acquired is one of the multiple factors the trial 
court considers in determining the appropriate division of property.  In McCulloh [v. Drake, 
2001 WY 56, ¶ 15, 24 P.3d 1162 (Wyo. 2001)], we made it clear that property 
inherited by one party can be awarded to the party by whom it was 
inherited or given.  
McCulloh, at ¶ 15.  
But we did not hold that property inherited by one spouse must always be 
awarded to the spouse that received it.  
. . .  We have never 
established bright line rules for the disposition of a gift or inheritance, and 
we do not do so now.  Instead, we 
review whether the trial court considered the appropriate factors in making the 
disposition.  The particular 
circumstances of the case dictate the property 
distribution.

 
 
(Emphasis 
in original.)  That the district 
court did not weigh this factor as heavily as the husband would have preferred 
is not determinative.

 
 

[¶26]   With respect to the burdens imposed 
on the property for the benefit of either party, we note that "[j]oint ownership 
of property resulting from a demonstrated intent to share is a burden imposed 
upon the property for the benefit' of both owners; the statute directs 
consideration of this burden as one factor."  Paul, 616 P.2d at 712 (quoting Beckle v. Beckle, 452 P.2d 205, 208 (Wyo. 1969)).  See also Harkins v. 
Harkins, 917 P.2d 176, 177 (Wyo. 
1996) and Klatt v. Klatt, 654 P.2d 733, 
735-36 (Wyo. 
1982).  The district court clearly emphasized 
this factor in its decision, but also evaluated this factor in the context of 
the parties' respective merits and through whom the dry farm property was 
acquired.

 
 

[¶27]   According to the husband, the "gift 
presumption" the district court relied upon in this regard is "inconsistent" 
with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 because the statute states that the district 
court "shall" have "regard for" the "party through whom the property was 
acquired . . .."  However, this 
Court has previously considered the "gift presumption" in reviewing the 
disposition of property pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114.  For example, in Tyler v. Tyler, 
624 P.2d 784, 785 (Wyo. 1981), the 
husband and wife had entered an antenuptial agreement "which provided for 
separate ownership, enjoyment and disposal of their separate properties, whether 
acquired before or during their marriage."  
We stated the "general rule that when title to real property is taken in 
the name of both spouses and the consideration therefor is furnished by only one 
of them, there is a rebuttable presumption that a gift of one-half interest 
therein is intended for the other spouse . . ." and found sufficient evidence 
"to support the district court's finding that a gift of one-half of the property 
was intended and made by husband to wife."  
Id. at 785-86.19

 
 

[¶28]   In Tyler, 624 P.2d  at 786-87, the 
husband similarly argued

 
 
that 
even if wife owned the property jointly with him, the district court abused its 
discretion in awarding one-half of the property to wife inasmuch as it was paid 
for entirely by husband, and that the spirit of the antenuptial agreement would 
be accomplished only by awarding all ownership of the property to husband.  He points to § 20-2-114, W.S.1977 in 
support of his argument, stressing the direction therein that regard should be 
given to "the party through whom the property was 
acquired."

 
 
(Footnote 
omitted.)  We responded as 
follows:

 
 
            
However, the element having to do with the party through which the 
property was acquired is only one of several elements set forth in the statute 
for consideration by the trial court.  
The other elements there set forth are to receive like consideration, 
e.g., condition in which the parties will be left by the divorce and merits of 
the parties.

 
 
            
In the final analysis, the district court disposed of the interests of 
husband and wife in accordance with the antenuptial agreement (treating each 
party as owning one-half interest in the property).  Husband retained his separate 
properties, and wife retained hers.

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
The district court did not here abuse its 
discretion.

 
 

Tyler, 624 P.2d  at 787.  See also Wallop, 2004 WY 
46, ¶¶ 14-32, 88 P.3d at 1028-32 and Barton v. Barton, 996 P.2d 1, 
3-5 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 

[¶29]   We therefore conclude that the 
district court adequately considered the requisite statutory factors in 
disposing of the dry farm property.  
The husband's appellate argument primarily concerns the weight the 
district court placed on each factor according to the husband's particular view 
of the evidence.  "Our function is 
not to reconsider or retry the district court's decision unless the exercise of 
discretion results in a clearly unjust and inequitable determination."  Barney, 705 P.2d  at 
344; see 
also Piper v. Piper, 487 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Wyo. 1971).  The husband has failed to demonstrate 
that, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the wife, the 
district court abused its discretion in disposing of the dry farm property.  See generally McLoughlin v. 
McLoughlin, 996 P.2d 5, 6-8 (Wyo. 2000); 
Mann v. Mann, 979 P.2d 497, 499-500 (Wyo. 1999); 
Harkins, 917 P.2d at 177-78; and 
Winterholler v. Winterholler, 486 P.2d 232, 233-34 (Wyo. 
1971).

 
 
[¶30]   We affirm.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

  1The husband had been married 
twice prior to his marriage to Tina Stoker.

  2Two of the wife's minor 
children resided with the husband and wife during their marriage, and the third 
child lived with the husband and wife during part of their 
marriage.

  3The husband testified that he 
did send money home from Casper, but did not know "where it went . . 
.."

  4The property was by that time 
unencumbered, and the parties agreed that it was not to be considered "marital 
property" per se, but the district court could consider the results of the 
settlement in disposing of the dry farm property that is at issue in this 
appeal.

  5The wife apparently had no 
right to these proceeds, but again, the parties agreed that the district court 
could consider this in disposing of the dry farm property.

  6The husband apparently 
stipulated to the restraining order without an evidentiary hearing.  The choking incident occurred after the 
husband saw the wife's car at the motel wherein the wife's male "friend" was 
staying.

  7The previous wife's name 
appeared on the deeds to the dry farm property during her marriage to the 
husband.

  8The husband and wife were 
apparently living together at this time.

  9The husband denied that the 
wife ever worked on the dry farm property.

  10The hearing had apparently 
been delayed pending a resolution of the aforementioned lawsuit between the 
husband and his in-laws.

  11The husband does not question 
the district court's use of the higher value in arriving at this 
figure.

  12Indeed, property "may be 
awarded to one spouse even though it was the separate property of the other" and 
a "just and equitable division of property in a divorce case may consider a 
spouse's separate property."  
Barney v. Barney, 705 P.2d 342, 345 (Wyo. 1985).  See also Metz v. Metz, 
2003 WY 3, ¶ 8, 61 P.3d 383, 386 (Wyo. 2003).

  13This would seem to undermine 
the husband's contention that the district court sought to punish the husband 
for misdeeds during the marriage.

  14The husband does not argue 
that it was improper for the district court to consider such 
evidence.

  15In addition to the references 
contained throughout the district court's ruling, the following colloquy 
occurred during the hearing:

 
 
THE 
COURT: Okay.  And your point, [the husband's counsel], 
is the [wife's] parents are giving [the sale proceeds] to [the wife], so I 
should take that into account in this divorce case?

 
 
            
[HUSBAND'S COUNSEL:]  Yes, 
your Honor . . ..

  16This is precisely what the 
husband requested in the event the district court ruled in the wife's 
favor.

  17See Karns v. Karns, 
511 P.2d 955, 956 (Wyo. 1973) (trial court advised "as to the 
derivation of the various properties, and in the absence of any showing to the 
contrary we must assume that the court gave proper consideration to that 
factor").

  18The following colloquy 
occurred between the district court and the husband's 
counsel:

 
 
            
THE COURT: . . . So that's all 
we're really fighting about, is over the dry farm property.  And I gather from what I was looking at 
here, [husband's counsel], what you're saying is . . . that this dry farm 
property was something that was owned by . . . [husband] before the marriage and 
then he somehow sold it and then got it back or something?

 
 
            
[HUSBAND'S COUNSEL:]  Yeah . . 
..

 
 

19The 
husband also contends that if it was appropriate for the district court to apply 
this presumption, the presumption was rebutted in the instant case because there 
was never an express agreement or promise that the wife was to receive a 
one-half interest in the dry farm property.  This argument does not accurately 
characterize the totality of the evidence presented on the issue, and undermines 
the very purpose of having such a presumption, especially in light of that 
evidence.