Title: DONALD RAY DAVES v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DONALD RAY DAVES v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 47Case Number: S-10-0135Decided: 03/14/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

                                                                                                

DONALD 
RAY DAVES,Appellant(Defendant),V.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

          

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Alden.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Justin Daraie, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Daraie.

 
 
KITE, 
C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., files a specially concurring 
opinion.

 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Donald Ray Daves 
was convicted after a jury trial of twelve counts involving the kidnapping and 
sexual assault of his wife (hereinafter referred to as "the victim").  On appeal, he challenges the district 
court's response to a jury question requesting a definition of "used a firearm" 
and claims he was denied his constitutional right to be present when the court 
provided supplemental instructions to the jury.  He also argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to convict him on four counts of first degree sexual assault 
because the State did not prove that he gained the victim's submission by 
threatening her, her boyfriend and himself.  We affirm.

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Daves has 
failed to establish the district court committed plain error when it defined 
"used a firearm" for the jury.  We 
further conclude that, although the district court erred by failing to provide 
the supplemental instructions to the jury in open court while the defendant was 
present, the error was not prejudicial.  
Finally, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the first 
degree sexual assault convictions because the State demonstrated Mr. Daves 
threatened the victim and himself with serious bodily injury or death in order 
to obtain her submission to the sexual assaults.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Daves 
presents the following issues on appeal:

 
 

I.              
Did 
the trial court misinstruct the jury on the definition of "use of a 
firearm"?

 
 

II.            
Was 
Mr. Daves denied his right to be present during supplemental jury 
instruction?

 
 

III.           
Was 
there sufficient evidence to support all the prosecution 
theories?

 
 
The 
State provides a more detailed statement of the issues:

 
 

I.              
Did 
the district court's instruction defining what it means to have "used" a firearm 
while committing a felony violate clearly established Wyoming law, and was it a 
valid and reasonable interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-101(a)?

 
 

II.            
Did 
the district court commit reversible error by conferring with counsel and 
responding to questions presented by the jury during 
deliberations?

 
 

III.           
Was 
the evidence sufficient to support appellant's convictions for first degree 
sexual assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302 
(a)(ii)?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      On April 4, 2009, 
Mr. Daves and the victim were in the process of getting a divorce.  Mr. Daves told the victim that he was 
going to return some of her jewelry, so she agreed to meet with him.  He picked her up at her residence in 
Laramie because it was storming and the road conditions were poor.  They went to a coffee shop, and he 
returned some of her jewelry.  He 
told her that the rest of her jewelry was buried with his dead parakeet near an 
access area on the Laramie River.  
She agreed to accompany him to the access area to retrieve the 
jewelry.  

 
 
[¶5]      While they were 
at the access area, Mr. Daves pulled a gun and forced her to perform oral sex on 
him.  He then decided that he would 
take her to a motel.  They went to 
two different motels because the first one did not have any available 
rooms.  At both places, he hid the 
gun in his clothing and took the victim into the motel office with him.  He told her to "act normal," while they 
were in the motel offices so that people would not get suspicious.  Once they were in the motel room, he put 
the gun next to him on the bed.  He 
forced her to remove her clothes and have sexual intercourse with him.  During that encounter, he put the gun on 
the table.   

 
 
[¶6]      After the second 
sexual assault, he again aimed the gun at her.  He also told her that "somebody was 
going to die that night."  Mr. Daves 
sexually assaulted the victim two more times.  During the course of the night, he 
alternately pointed the gun at her and himself, threatening to commit suicide in 
her presence.  He also threatened to 
kill the victim's boyfriend.  At 
some point he put the gun in its case, but then directed her to get it out of 
the case and kill him with it.  He 
finally dropped her off at her residence the next morning, after she promised to 
meet him later at a park.  He 
stated, "Do not deceive me.  Do not 
make me use this gun."     

 
 
[¶7]      As soon as she 
arrived home, the victim told her parents about the assaults and they summoned 
the police.  When the officers 
attempted to contact Mr. Daves at the camper trailer where he was residing, he 
took off in his vehicle.  After 
leading the officers on a chase over the icy back roads outside of Laramie, he 
eventually surrendered.  

 
 
[¶8]      The State charged 
Mr. Daves with one count of aggravated assault and battery in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2009), one count of possession of a 
deadly weapon with unlawful intent in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-103 
(LexisNexis 2009),  four counts of 
first degree sexual assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2009), five counts of use of a firearm while committing a felony in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-101(a) (LexisNexis 2009), and one count of 
kidnapping in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2009).  After a jury trial, he was 
convicted on all twelve charges.  
The district court sentenced him to serve a lengthy term of 
incarceration.  Mr. Daves 
appealed.  

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
 
 

A.   Definition 
of "Used a Firearm."  

 
 

[¶9]      Mr. Daves was 
charged with five counts of use 
of a firearm while committing a felony, in violation of  § 6-8-101(a):

 
 
(a) 
A person who uses a firearm while committing a felony shall be imprisoned for 
not more than ten (10) years in addition to the punishment for the felony. For a 
second or subsequent conviction under this section a person shall be imprisoned 
for not more than twenty (20) years in addition to the punishment for the 
felony.

 
 
Count 
IV was one of the charges under this statutory section.  Instruction No. 13 informed the 
jury:

 
 
For 
Count IV, the elements of the crime of Use of Firearm While Committing a Felony, 
as charged in this case are:

 
 

1.    
On or 
about the 4th or 5th day of April 
2009;

2.    
In Albany 
County, Wyoming;

3.    
The 
Defendant, DONALD RAY DAVES;

4.    
Used a 
Firearm;

5.    
While 
committing the felony of Sexual Assault 
in the First Degree . . . .

 
 
[¶10]   During deliberations, the jury sent 
the following question to the district court judge:  "[W]e have a definition of threatened 
to use a firearm[.]'1  [W]e would like the definition of 
[u]sed a firearm' as referred to in instruction #13 on [Count] 4."  The district court judge called in 
counsel, without the defendant, and told them about the jury's question and the 
research his assistant had done on the definition of "use of a firearm."  The research had uncovered an ALR 
article on the definition of "use" of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), 
which criminalized carrying or using a firearm while committing a violent crime 
or drug trafficking.  F. Dougherty, 
What Constitutes "Use" of a Firearm for 
Purposes of 18 U.S.C.A., § 924(c)(1), Providing Penalty for Use of Firearm 
During Drug Trafficking Crime or Crime of Violence, 125 A.L.R. Fed. 545 
(1995).    

 
 
[¶11]   At first, defense counsel stated 
that he did not believe the jury needed to be instructed on the definition 
because "this is not technical legal language."  He stated that he thought they should be 
instructed to "use their common understanding of the word."  The district court judge decided to 
instruct the jury in writing, as follows:

 
 
LADIES 
AND GE[N]TLEMEN:

 
 
As 
a general proposition, a firearm is "used" if [it] is available to facilitate 
the underlying offense, and it is not required that the weapon be actually 
brandished or fired.  One method in 
which a firearm may be used is to protect the underlying criminal 
enterprise.  Further, a firearm can 
be used as a device to embolden or lend courage to the actor, or as a device to 
intimidate the alleged victim.

 
 
The 
written instruction was consistent with the ALR article, and defense counsel did 
not object.  

 
 
[¶12]   On appeal, Mr. Daves maintains that 
the district court erred by instructing the jury in accordance with the ALR 
article because a later United States Supreme Court decision, Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 
116 S. Ct. 501, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1995), superseded by statute, rejected parts of 
the definition set out in the article.2  Because defense counsel did not object 
to the instruction, we apply our plain error standard of review.  "In order to demonstrate plain error, he must show a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law was violated, the violation clearly appears in the 
record, and it denied him a substantial right to his material prejudice.'"  Dougherty v. State, 2010 WY 127, ¶ 24, 239 P.3d 1176, 1183 (Wyo. 2010), 
quoting Creecy v. State, 2009 
WY 89, ¶ 17, 210 P.3d 1089, 
1093 (Wyo. 2009).  In addition, we 
always apply the following standards to claims of errors in jury instructions:

 
 
When 
reviewing questions involving jury instructions, we afford the trial 
court significant deference. Jury "[i]nstructions must be considered as a 
whole, and individual instructions, or parts of them, should not be singled out 
and considered in isolation." We confine our review to a "search for prejudicial 
error." "[A]s long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire 
charge covers the relevant issue, reversible error will not be 
found."

 
 

Id. 
(citations 
omitted).  

 
 
[¶13]   The alleged error is clearly shown 
in the record as the transcript includes a reading of the jury question and the 
supplemental instruction by the district court judge and there are documents in 
the exhibits folder which mirror the district court's rendition.  Turning to the second element of our 
plain error analysis, we consider whether the district court's instruction 
violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  We start with the Bailey decision, which considered 
consolidated appeals of two defendants in different casesBailey and 
Robinson.  Both defendants were 
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) for use of a firearm during and in 
relation to a drug trafficking crime.  
Bailey was stopped for a traffic infraction and the officers saw him push 
something between the seat and front console of his vehicle.  A resulting search of the passenger 
compartment turned up 30 grams of cocaine.  
The § 924(c)(1) conviction was based on a loaded firearm found in the 
trunk of the car he was driving.  Bailey, 516 U.S.  at 139, 116 S. Ct.  at 
503-04.  Robinson was convicted 
under the statute for having a firearm in a locked trunk in a bedroom closet 
when she sold crack cocaine to an undercover officer.  Id. at 140, 504. 

 
 
[¶14]   The United States Supreme Court 
reversed the defendants' § 924(c)(1) convictions, concluding that their actions 
did not involve "use" of a firearm.  
In reaching that decision, the court noted that the statute criminalized 
"carrying" or "using" a firearm 
during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.  Id. at 142-43, 505.  In order to distinguish carrying and 
using a firearm, the court stated that "use" of a firearm under  § 924(c)(1) "requires evidence 
sufficient to show an active employment 
of the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an operative 
factor in relation to the predicate offense."  Id. at 143, 505 (emphasis in 
original).   Thus, mere 
possession of a firearm was insufficient to amount to "use" under the 
statute.  The court rejected a 
definition of "use" which included having a gun in place "to protect the drugs 
or to embolden" the defendant.  Id. at 143-45, 505-07.  
However, the court also noted that active employment of a firearm can 
include many different activities.

 
 
The 
active-employment understanding of "use" certainly includes brandishing, 
displaying, bartering, striking with, and, most obviously, firing or attempting 
to fire a firearm. We note that this reading compels the conclusion that even an 
offender's reference to a firearm in his possession could satisfy § 924(c)(1). 
Thus, a reference to a firearm calculated to bring about a change in the 
circumstances of the predicate offense is a "use," just as the silent but 
obvious and forceful presence of a gun on a table can be a 
"use."

 
 
 Id. at 148, 508.  

[¶15]   Because the result in Bailey was based upon the unique 
language of § 924(c)(1), the ruling is not binding upon us in interpreting our 
Wyoming statute.  We, therefore, 
start with our traditional rules of statutory interpretation.  

 
 
"In 
interpreting statutes, we primarily determine the 
legislature's intent. If the language is sufficiently clear, we do not resort to 
rules of construction. We apply our general rule that we look to the ordinary 
and obvious meaning of a statute when the language is unambiguous." We construe 
together all parts of the statutes in pari materia, and, in ascertaining the 
meaning of a given law, we consider and construe in harmony all statutes 
relating to the same subject or having the same general 
purpose.

 
 
When 
the language is not clear or is ambiguous, the court must look to the mischief 
the statute was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its 
enactment, the public policy of the state, the conclusions of law, and other 
prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances, making use of the accepted 
rules of construction to ascertain a legislative intent that is reasonable and 
consistent.

 
 

Merrill 
v. Jansma, 
2004 WY 26, ¶ 28, 86 P.3d 270, 284-85 (Wyo.2004) 
(citations omitted).

 
 

Stanton 
v. State, 2006 
WY 31, ¶ 12, 130 P.3d 486, 491 
(Wyo. 2006).  

 
 
[¶16]   The ordinary and obvious meaning of 
"use" is "to employ for some purpose, put into service, make use of."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 
2524 (2002).  The supplemental 
instruction provided by the district court included this concept.  Mr. Daves argues, however, that the 
instruction expanded the definition of "use" beyond that allowed in Bailey to allow the jury to convict him 
even if they found he merely possessed, or even constructively possessed, the 
gun without actively employing it in the commission of the predicate 
felonies.  Because there is no 
statutory definition of "use" applicable to § 6-8-101 and we have not previously 
interpreted that term in the context of the statute, the district court did not 
violate a clear and unequivocal rule of law when it instructed the jury.  Thus, even if we accept Mr. Daves' 
argument that the supplemental instruction could be read in a way that did not 
comport completely with Bailey, we 
would not conclude that the instruction was clearly erroneous.  Furthermore, reading the instruction as 
a whole, we do not believe that Mr. Daves' concerns are valid.  The entire tenor of the instruction 
indicates that the "use" contemplated by the statute had to be in the context of 
actually facilitating the crime.   

[¶17]   
A review of the evidence presented in this case also demonstrates 
that Mr. Daves was not prejudiced by the supplemental instruction.  The record is clear that he "used" the 
gun in accordance with both the general meaning of the term and the "active 
employment" definition approved by the Supreme Court in Bailey.  While they were in the truck at the 
access area near the river, Mr. Daves pulled the gun and pointed it at the 
victim.  The victim promised to do 
whatever he asked.  He then forced 
her to perform oral sex on him while he held the gun in his hand.    

[¶18]   Mr. Daves told the victim that if 
she tried to escape, he would "put a cap in [her] head . . .  leav[ing] a hole the size of a coffee 
mug."  He had the gun with him while 
they were in the motel office, booking a room.  Once they were in the motel room, he 
continued to threaten her with the gun and remind her of its presence.  At some point, he put the gun into a 
case and placed it on a table.  
However, that did not change the fact that he had consistently threatened 
to shoot her over the course of the evening.  As the Supreme Court stated in Bailey, even "the silent but obvious and 
forceful presence of a gun on a table can be use'" as defined in that decision. 
 Bailey, 516 U.S.  at 148, 116 S. Ct.  at 
508.  The evidence established that 
Mr. Daves "used" the firearm as contemplated in Bailey by actively employing it and 
making it an operative factor in committing the underlying felonies.  In addition, he "used" the firearm in 
accordance with the plain definition of the term by employing it for the purpose 
of making the victim submit to his will.  
Mr. Daves was not, therefore, prejudiced by the district court's 
instruction on the definition of "used a firearm."  

 
 

B.   Supplemental 
Jury Instruction Process

 
 
[¶19]   As we mentioned in the discussion 
of the first issue, the jury sent a note to the judge asking for additional 
legal guidance on the definition of "used a firearm."  It also sent a second note asking for 
the legal definition of "unlawfully confined" in relation to the kidnapping 
charge.  The district court 
discussed both questions with counsel, but Mr. Daves was not present during 
these discussions.  The district 
court then responded to each question with a written instruction.3    

 
 
[¶20]   Mr. Daves claims the district court 
violated his constitutional right to be present during the supplemental jury 
instruction proceedings.  This 
argument has two aspectshis right to be present at the jury instruction 
conference with the judge and counsel and his right to be present when the jury 
was instructed.  The determination 
of whether Mr. Daves had  the right 
to be present is one of law, see, 
e.g., DeMillard v. State, 2008 WY 93, ¶ 8, 190 P.3d 128, 130 (Wyo. 2008); 
however, that does not completely define our standard of review.  Because no objection was lodged to his 
absence or the method the district court used to instruct the jury, the plain 
error standard of review applies.  
See, Snow v. State, 2009 WY 117, ¶¶ 24-27, 216 P.3d 505, 513-14 (Wyo. 
2009).  Under that standard, which 
we quoted above, the defendant has to demonstrate the record shows a violation 
of a clear and unequivocal rule of law and such violation denied him a 
substantial right to his material prejudice.  Dougherty, ¶ 24, 239 P.3d  at 
1183.

 
 
[¶21]   The Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, Article 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution and the due 
process clauses of each guarantee a criminal defendant the right to be present 
during every critical stage of his trial.  
Maupin v. State, 694 P.2d 720, 722 (Wyo. 1985); Seeley v. State, 959 P.2d 170, 177 (Wyo. 
1998).  This principle is also 
confirmed in W.R.Cr.P. 43, which provides in relevant 
part:

 
 

(a) 
Presence Required. 
- The defendant shall be present at the initial appearance at the arraignment, 
at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of 
the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, 
except as otherwise provided by this rule.

. 
. . .

(c) 
Presence Not Required. - 
A defendant need not be present in the following 
situations:

. 
. . .

            
(3) At a conference or argument upon a question of 
law[.]

 
 
[¶22]   We start with the first 
questionwhether Mr. Daves had the right to be present during the conference 
when the attorneys and the judge decided how to the respond to the jury's 
questions.  We have unequivocally 
stated that a defendant's presence is not required during a jury instruction or 
jury question conference where counsel and the judge are simply discussing 
questions of law.  W.R.Cr.P. 
43(c)(3); Lobatos v. State, 875 P.2d 716, 724 (Wyo. 1994); Seeley, 959 P.2d  at 177.  Thus, the district court did not err by 
not having him present for the conference.

 
 
[¶23]   The more substantive question 
involves the way the judge responded to the jury's question by instructing them 
in writing, rather than in open court with the defendant present.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-209 (LexisNexis 
2009)4 states:

 
 
            
After the jurors have retired for deliberation, if there is a 
disagreement between them as to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to 
be informed as to any part of the law arising in the case, they may request the 
officer to conduct them to the court where information upon the matter of law 
shall be given. The court may give its recollection as to the testimony on the 
points in dispute, in the presence of or after notice to the parties or their 
counsel.

 
 
[¶24]   Under this statute, the judge 
should have answered the jury's questions in open court rather than responding 
to them in writing.  Moreover, the 
defendant is entitled to be present when a jury's question on a substantive 
matter is answered.  Answering a 
jury's question is tantamount to jury instruction.  "Jury instruction is generally held to 
be a point in the criminal proceeding which warrants the presence of the 
defendant."  Seeley, 959 P.2d  at 177.  See also, Maupin, 694 P.2d  at 723.  

 
 
[¶25]   It is clear from the transcript of 
the conferences and the written instructions that the judge instructed the 
jurors in writing without bringing them into open court and the defendant, 
obviously, was not present.  This 
procedure was erroneous.  The first 
two elements of the plain error analysis are, therefore, satisfied.  We turn then to the central question, 
whether Mr. Daves was materially prejudiced by the procedure employed by the 
district court.  We conclude that he 
was not.

 
 
[¶26]   As we stated, above, the 
instruction defining "used a firearm" was not clearly erroneous and Mr. Daves 
has not demonstrated that the district court's definition of "unlawfully 
confined" was incorrect.  Because 
the jury was not improperly instructed, the likelihood of prejudice resulting 
from the way the instruction was delivered to the jury is lessened.  

 
 
[¶27]   One of the reasons a defendant is 
entitled to be present when the jury is instructed is to exert a psychological 
influence on the jury.  Maupin, 694 P.2d  at 723; Seeley, 959 P.2d  at 179.  However, the real danger occurs when the 
jury is instructed in open court and the defendant is not there, leaving the 
impression of an empty chair on the jury.  
Maupin, 694 P.2d  at 723.  That concern is not present when the 
court instructs the jury in writing.  
Seeley, 959 P.2d  at 179.  The danger is further mitigated in this 
case because Mr. Daves was present to exert his psychological influence during 
all other phases of the trial, including when the jury returned its verdict, and 
each juror was polled to confirm that he or she agreed with verdict.  Id.  
   

 
 
[¶28]   Moreover, this was not an 
especially close case.  The bulk of 
the evidence was provided by the victim's testimony.  As the district court acknowledged 
during the jury instruction conference, the result turned on whether or not they 
believed the victim.  This factor 
distinguishes the present case from Maupin, 694 P.2d  at 723-24, where we reversed the defendant's 
conviction because the case was close and Mr. Maupin's absence during the latter 
part of the trial, including closing arguments and when the trial court 
responded to a jury question, was obviously prejudicial.  Unlike in Maupin, the record does not disclose 
that Mr. Daves' presence when the jury was given the supplemental instructions 
was critical. 

 

C.        Sufficiency of Evidence  Sexual Assault 
Charges

 
 

[¶29]   Mr. Daves asserts he is entitled to 
reversal of his four sexual assault convictions because there was not sufficient 
evidence to support all of the prosecution's theories.  Mr. Daves was charged with sexual 
assault in the first degree under § 6-2-302(a)(ii):

 
 
(a) 
Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in 
the first degree if:

. 
. . .

            
(ii) The actor causes submission of the victim by threat of death, 
serious bodily injury, extreme physical pain or kidnapping to be inflicted on 
anyone and the victim reasonably believes that the actor has the present ability 
to execute these threats[.]

 
 
He 
claims that the prosecutor advanced three theories about who he threatened to 
gain the victim's submission to the sexual assaultsthe victim, her boyfriend 
and Mr. Daves, himself.  Mr. Daves 
argues that because the verdict form was general, it is impossible to tell which 
theory the jury believed; therefore, under the tenets of Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, 57 P.3d 1242 (Wyo. 2002), the State 
has to establish there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict on all 
three theories.

 
 
[¶30]   When reviewing a sufficiency of the 
evidence claim, we apply the following standard:

 
 
[W]e 
examine and accept as true the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences 
which can be drawn from it. We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by 
the defendant. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, 
we determine whether a jury could have reasonably concluded each of the elements 
of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard applies whether 
the supporting evidence is direct or circumstantial.

 
 
 Anderson v. State, 2009 WY 119, ¶ 6, 216 P.3d 1143, 1145 (Wyo.2009), 
quoting Martin v. State, 2007 
WY 2, ¶ 32, 149 P.3d 707, 715 (Wyo.2007).

 

Dawes 
v. State, 2010 
WY 113, ¶ 17, 236 P.3d 303, 307 
(Wyo. 2010).   

 
 
[¶31]   Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963, 966-67 (Wyo. 1995) 
and Tanner, ¶¶ 11-13, 57 P.3d  at 
1245-46, both concerned charges under the burglary statute, which states: "A 
person is guilty of burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a 
building, occupied structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied 
portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a) (LexisNexis 
2009).  Under the terms of § 
6-3-301(a), there are many ways the crime of burglary may be committed.  The information, jury instructions and 
general verdict forms in Bush and Tanner failed to specify which aspects 
of the statute were charged.  We 
stated that when the statute the defendant was charged with violating includes 
alternatives, the prosecution must either specify which alternative is at issue 
or must demonstrate that there is sufficient evidence to support each of the 
alternatives.  Bush, 908 P.2d  at 967; Tanner, ¶¶ 11-15, 57 P.3d  at 
1245-46.

 
 
[¶32]   The elements of sexual assault 
under § 6-2-302(a)(ii) include that the defendant caused "submission of the 
victim by threat of death, serious bodily injury, extreme physical pain or 
kidnapping to be inflicted on anyone and the victim reasonably believe[d] that 
the actor has the present ability to execute these threats."  Section 6-2-302(a)(ii).  The jury instructions specified that the 
State was alleging that Mr. Daves caused the victim's submission by "threatening 
to inflict death or serious bodily injury on anyone."  He claims that, because the State 
submitted evidence and argued that he threatened three different peoplethe 
victim, the victim's boyfriend, and himself, it has to establish that there was 
sufficient evidence on each of the theories.  Mr. Daves claims the evidence is 
insufficient because there was no showing that the victim reasonably believed he 
had the present ability to execute the threat against her boyfriend and his 
threats to commit suicide did not satisfy the statutory "anyone."  

 
 
[¶33]   The sexual assault statute states 
that the defendant has committed the crime when he makes a threat against anyone.  
Adams v. State, 2003 WY 152, 79 P.3d 526 (Wyo. 2003) addressed 
similar statutory language.  Adams 
was charged with conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, which required a 
showing that he agreed with one or more 
persons to commit the crime of delivery of a controlled substance, and 
delivery of a controlled substance, which required a showing that he delivered a 
controlled substance to another 
person.  Id., ¶ 20, 79 P.3d  at 
533.

 
 
[¶34]   We rejected Adams' claims that the 
State was required to prove that he conspired with specific persons and that he 
delivered the controlled substance to specific persons.

 
 

Bush 
and its progeny do not require that the jury verdict be premised on a finding 
that Adams conspired with each of the Leibees and Hartmann just because they 
were all identified in the charging document. Rather, those cases require only 
that when two separate actions or theories of a crime are specified in the 
alternative that both of the actions or theories be supported by a sufficiency 
of the evidence. Here, the jury instruction given required that the jury find 
that Adams conspired with "another person." In any event, there was sufficient 
evidence presented at trial that Adams conspired with each of the Leibees and 
Hartmann.

 
 
Likewise, 
Bush and subsequent cases do not mandate that Adams' delivery conviction 
be reversed based on his speculation regarding the basis for the verdict 
rendered. Adams' delivery conviction is sustainable so long as sufficient 
evidence was presented that he delivered methamphetamine "to another" in May of 
2001. In this instance, the record evidences that the delivery charge surrounded 
Adams' delivery of methamphetamine to Benjamin. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
the jury's verdict was based on the jury's finding that Adams delivered 
methamphetamine to Neuman as Adams argues.

 
 

Id., 
¶¶ 
21-22, 79 P.3d  at 533.  

 
 
[¶35]   Under the circumstances presented 
here, § 6-2-302(a)(ii) simply required the State to prove that Mr. Daves 
threatened serious bodily injury or death to "anyone" and the victim reasonably believed he 
had the present ability to execute those threats.  Consistent with Adams, the State was not obligated to 
prove that the threat was directed toward a specific person.  As the victim described the events which 
took place throughout the night, it was clear that Mr. Daves threatened to kill 
her and, considering that he aimed the gun at her multiple times, she reasonably 
believed he had the ability to carry through with that threat.  In addition, Mr. Daves aimed the gun at 
himself, causing her to beg him not to kill himself in her presence.  He obviously had the present ability to 
execute that threat as well.  

 
 
[¶36]   The victim also testified that Mr. 
Daves said he was going to kill her boyfriend and demanded she take him to where 
the boyfriend lived.  She refused, 
so she could not have reasonably believed he had the present ability to execute 
that threat.  Nevertheless, his 
ability to carry out the threat of seriously injuring or killing either the 
victim or himself, was sufficient to satisfy the element of "caus[ing] 
submission of the victim by threat of death [or] serious bodily injury . . . to 
be inflicted on anyone" under § 6-2-302(a)(ii).  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶37]   The district court did not commit 
plain error in its response to the jury's request for a definition of "used a 
firearm."  Although the district 
court erred by instructing the jury in writing instead of in open court with the 
defendant present, that error was not prejudicial under the facts of this 
case.  Finally, the evidence was 
sufficient to support Mr. Daves' convictions on the four counts of sexual 
assault in the first degree because the State proved the requisite element of 
causing the victim's submission by threat of death or serious bodily injury to 
anyone.  

 
 

[¶38]   Affirmed.   

 
 

VOIGT, 
Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 
[¶39]   I concur in the majority 
opinion.  I write separately only to 
mention one other reason that responses to all substantive jury questions should 
be read to the jury in open court, with the defendant present.  If a written response is simply handed 
to a bailiff for delivery to the jury in the jury room, the record does not 
reflect whether the instruction was thereafter read or given to each of the 
jurors by the presiding juror, or even that the presiding juror received the 
written instruction from the bailiff.

FOOTNOTES

1The 
judge had instructed the jury on the definition of "threatens to use" a deadly 
weapon with regard to the aggravated assault and battery charge.    

2The cumulative supplement (pocket part) to the ALR edition indicated that 
Bailey had changed the law on this 
issue.  

3The district court's instruction with regard to the definition of 
"unlawfully confined" stated:  "A 
confinement is unlawful if it is accomplished by force, threat or 
deception."    

4Although this statute is found in the Code of Civil Procedure, we have 
recognized its efficacy in criminal prosecutions, as well.  See, e.g., Heywood v. State, 2007 WY 149, 170 P.3d 1227 (Wyo. 2007); Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342 (Wyo. 1976).