Title: People v. Aguayo

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
VERONICA AGUAYO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S254554 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division One 
D073304 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
SCS295489 
 
 
August 25, 2022 
 
Justice Jenkins authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, Groban, and Guerrero concurred. 
 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
S254554 
 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
After a physical altercation with her father, defendant 
Veronica Aguayo was charged with and convicted of both assault 
with a deadly weapon other than a firearm (Pen. Code,1 § 245, 
subd. (a)(1)), and assault by means of force likely to cause great 
bodily injury (id., subd. (a)(4)).  Evidence that defendant hit her 
father with a bicycle chain and lock supported each aggravated 
assault conviction.  
A defendant may be charged in an accusatory pleading 
with “two or more different offenses connected together in their 
commission” and “may be convicted of any number of the 
offenses charged.”  (§ 954.)  In this regard, “[w]e have repeatedly 
held that the same act can support multiple charges and 
multiple convictions.”  (People v. Gonzalez (2014) 60 Cal.4th 533, 
537 (Gonzalez).)  However, if two alleged offenses are “different 
statements of the same offense” (§ 954), both offenses may be 
charged based on the same act, but convictions for both cannot 
stand.  (See People v. Vidana (2016) 1 Cal.5th 632, 648 
(Vidana).)  The issue we confront here is whether “assault upon 
the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument other 
than a firearm” (assault with a deadly weapon; § 245, subd. 
(a)(1)) and “assault upon the person of another by any means of 
force likely to produce great bodily injury” (force likely assault; 
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise noted.  
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
2 
§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) are separate offenses, or whether they 
constitute “different statements of the same offense” (§ 954).  
The Courts of Appeal that have addressed this question have 
reached conflicting results.  (See post, at p. 8.)  
As we explain below, the answer to this question “turns on 
the Legislature’s intent in enacting these provisions, and if the 
Legislature meant to define only one offense, we may not turn it 
into two.”  (Gonzalez, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 537.)  In prior 
decisions involving section 954, we outlined specific factors to 
consider in examining the statutory language of the offense(s) 
before turning to other indicia of legislative intent.  (See People 
v. White (2017) 2 Cal.5th 349 (White); Vidana, supra, 1 Cal.5th 
632; Gonzalez, supra, 60 Cal.4th 533.)  Having analyzed this 
case under that framework, we hold that assault with a deadly 
weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and force likely assault (id., subd. 
(a)(4)) are “different statements of the same offense” (§ 954). 
We reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment affirming both 
convictions.   
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On August 18, 2017, 43-year-old defendant Veronica 
Aguayo was working on her bicycle in her parents’ yard.  Her 
72-year-old father, Luis Aguayo (Father), turned on the 
sprinklers to water the plants and accidentally got defendant’s 
cell phone charger wet.  Each testified at trial to their version of 
what happened next.   
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
3 
 
Father testified that defendant began yelling expletives 
and “came at” him with a bicycle chain and lock,2 hitting him in 
the back.  When she tried to hit him again, Father grabbed the 
lock and tried to wrest it from defendant’s hands.  When Father 
let go of the bicycle lock, defendant hit Father’s head, arms, and 
chest with the lock approximately 15 times.  Father grabbed the 
bicycle chain, and the two struggled back and forth until 
defendant slipped and pulled Father down on top of her.  
Defendant stood up and while Father was still on his knees, 
defendant grabbed a ceramic pot located nearby and threw it at 
him.  It hit Father on a part of his head where he had previously 
had brain surgery.  Father grabbed a rock to throw at defendant, 
but reconsidered and threw the rock away.  The rock ricocheted 
off a nearby wall and hit defendant on the head.    
 
As Father turned to go inside the house, defendant struck 
him with the bicycle chain on his chest, arms, and back.  The 
two struggled once more over the bicycle chain, and Father 
wrested control of it.  Defendant grabbed a rock and was about 
to hit Father with it, but her mother, who had appeared in the 
doorway, told her, “Don’t do that.”  Defendant asked Father for 
the bicycle chain, which Father threw back to her.  Defendant 
then rode away on her bicycle.  Father opined that during the 
struggle defendant struck him with the bicycle chain 
approximately 50 times.  
 
Defendant’s account of the struggle diverged from Father’s 
in several respects.  She testified that she acted in self-defense.  
 
2  
At times, the record refers to the bicycle chain and lock as 
either the chain or lock or both, though the two appear to be one 
unit.  The opinion tracks the description used by each witness 
during their testimony.   
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
4 
Initially, she confronted Father about her wet phone charger 
and he said, “ ‘I do what I want to do because this is my house.’ ”  
Defendant then called Father a “fucking asshole,” and he 
started to come towards her.  Fearful of Father, defendant 
started swinging the chain and yelled, “Get away from me. ”  
Defendant hit Father in the head with the bicycle chain.  Father 
charged at defendant and she hit him a second time with the 
bicycle lock.  After he got hold of the bicycle lock, Father hit 
defendant’s legs with it several times, though she did not 
sustain any visible injuries or bruises.  According to defendant, 
Father threw the ceramic pot at her, not the other way around.   
 
As relevant here, an amended information charged 
defendant with two offenses:  (1) assault with a deadly weapon, 
with an enhancement allegation that she “personally used a 
dangerous and deadly weapon, to wit:  bicycle chain/lock” 
(§§ 245(a)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(23); count 2); and (2) force likely 
assault (§ 245(a)(4); count 3).  The jury found defendant guilty 
on both assault charges and found true the deadly-weapon-use 
enhancement allegation attached to count 2.  
 
The trial court imposed concurrent sentences for these 
convictions but stayed the sentence on count 3 (force likely 
assault) under section 654.  Defendant appealed, arguing that 
her conviction for force likely assault must be vacated because 
it is a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon.  
The Court of Appeal rejected this claim, reasoning that an 
assault can be committed with an inherently deadly weapon 
without necessarily using force likely to produce great bodily 
injury.  The court also rejected defendant’s claim that the two 
convictions were impermissibly based on the same conduct, 
pointing to what it viewed as multiple acts of hitting Father with 
the bicycle chain and hitting his head with the ceramic pot.  
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
5 
However, it remanded to the trial court with directions to 
determine defendant’s eligibility for a pretrial mental health 
diversion program.  (See §§ 1001.35, 1001.36.)  It conditionally 
reversed the judgment for this limited purpose.  
 
After granting review, we subsequently directed the 
parties to answer the following questions:  Are force likely 
assault and assault with a deadly weapon “different statements 
of the same offense for purposes of section 954?  If so, must one 
of defendant’s convictions be vacated?”  Our opinion here 
addresses only the section 954 issue briefed by the parties. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Defendant contends that the assault with a deadly weapon 
count and the force likely assault count are merely different 
ways of stating the same offense.  Assuming we agree, she posits 
that because these counts arose from the same set of facts, she 
may be convicted of only one count.  We agree with defendant’s 
contention.   
 
We begin our analysis by examining legal principles that 
guide our determination of when multiple charges in an 
accusatory pleading allege different offenses or represent 
“different statements of the same offense” under section 954. 
A. Different Statements of the Same Offense 
  
Section 954 provides that “[a]n accusatory pleading may 
charge two or more different offenses connected together in their 
commission, or different statements of the same offense or two or 
more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, 
under separate counts.”  (Italics added.)  “The prosecution is not 
required to elect between the different offenses or counts set 
forth in the accusatory pleading, but the defendant may be 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
6 
convicted of any number of the offenses charged.”3  (§ 954; see 
Vidana, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 649.)  One of section 954’s 
objectives is to assist in a “just administration of the criminal 
law” — for instance, one trial involving multiple charges alleged 
in a single accusatory pleading would obviate the need for 
“another trial of the same facts with its attendant trouble and 
expense” on any withheld charges.  (People v. Piner (1909) 11 
Cal.App. 542, 547; see People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 122 
[explaining “legitimate future use of multiple convictions” 
pursuant to § 954].)   
 
We have also stated that section 954 “ ‘does not permit 
multiple convictions for a different statement of the same 
offense when it is based on the same act or course of conduct.’ ”  
(Vidana, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 650.)  Put another way, “ ‘if a 
defendant cannot be convicted of a greater and a lesser included 
offense based on the same act or course of conduct, dual 
convictions for the same offense based on alternate legal 
theories would necessarily be prohibited.’ ”  (Ibid.)   
 
Whether statutory offenses charged in an accusatory 
pleading “define different offenses or merely describe different 
ways of committing the same offense properly turns on the 
Legislature’s intent in enacting these provisions, and if the 
Legislature meant to define only one offense, we may not turn it 
into two.”  (Gonzalez, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 537, 538–540 [oral 
copulation of intoxicated person and oral copulation of 
 
3  
While a defendant may be properly convicted of different 
offenses based on the same act, he or she may be punished for 
only one of those offenses.  (§ 654; see People v. Jones (2012) 54 
Cal.4th 350, 358 [“Section 654 prohibits multiple punishment 
for a single physical act that violates different provisions of 
law”].) 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
7 
unconscious person are different offenses]; see White, supra, 2 
Cal.5th at pp. 354–359 [rape of intoxicated person and rape of 
unconscious person are different offenses]; accord, Vidana, 
supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 637, 647–649 [grand theft by larceny and 
grand theft by embezzlement are different statements of same 
offense].)   
 
To determine such intent under the section 954 
framework, we do not employ traditional principles of statutory 
interpretation, which are designed to ascertain the meaning of 
an ambiguous statute.  Here, we must resolve any uncertainty 
about what the Legislature intended when it enacted assault 
with a deadly weapon and force likely assault, i.e., whether it 
intended to define two different offenses or two different ways of 
committing the same offense.  (See Vidana, 1 Cal.5th at p. 637; 
Gonzalez, 60 Cal.4th at p. 537.)  To that end, we consider the 
text and structure of the statutes; the elements of the two 
offenses; their prescribed punishments; and other indicia of 
legislative intent, including legislative history and the wider 
historical context of the statutes’ enactment to resolve the 
question.  (See Vidana, at pp. 637–647; Carmack v. Reynolds 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 844, 850.)  None of these individual factors is 
necessarily dispositive.  (Vidana, at p. 648.)  With these guiding 
principles in mind, we begin our analysis of the question before 
us by examining the statutory language of the aggravated 
assaults at issue.   
1. Statutory language of section 245 
 
Assault with a deadly weapon and force likely assault are 
separately set out in section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (section 
245(a)(1)) and section 245, subdivision (a)(4) (section 245(a)(4)), 
respectively.  (See Stats. 2011, ch. 183, § 1.)  The former makes 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
8 
it a crime to “commit[] an assault upon the person of another 
with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm.”  
(§ 245(a)(1).)  The latter makes it a crime to “commit[] an assault 
upon the person of another by any means of force likely to 
produce great bodily injury.”  (§ 245(a)(4).)  The prescribed 
punishment for both forms of aggravated assault is identical:  
“imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years, 
or in a county jail for not exceeding one year, or by a fine not 
exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both the fine and 
imprisonment.”  (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), (4).) 
 
The lower courts are divided on whether these two types 
of aggravated assaults are, for purposes of section 954, separate 
offenses or the same offense.  (See, e.g., People v. Brunton (2018) 
23 Cal.App.5th 1097 (Brunton) [different statements of same 
offense]; but see In re Jonathan R. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 963 
[separate offenses]; cf. In re C.D. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 1021, 
1029 [under § 245, subd. (c) assault with a deadly weapon and 
force likely assault against peace officer or firefighter are a 
single offense].)    
 
Relying 
on 
Brunton, 
defendant 
argues 
that 
subparagraphs (a)(1) and (a)(4) of section 245 do “not plainly 
state whether, for purposes of section 954,” they are different 
statements of the same offense or different crimes.  Focusing 
instead on section 245’s legislative history, she maintains that 
the two aggravated assaults have been long understood to 
constitute but “one offense” (quoting In re Mosley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 
913, 919, fn. 5 (Mosley)).  The Attorney General, for his part, 
argues that assault with a deadly weapon and force likely 
assault are separate offenses because they “are defined by 
different 
elements, 
listed 
in 
different 
self-contained 
subparagraphs, punished differently, and found together in a 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
9 
subdivision that includes other assault crimes with separate 
elements and different punishments.”  He maintains that these 
considerations based on section 245’s plain language signal the 
Legislature’s intent to create separate offenses; he, therefore, 
suggests we need not resort to section 245’s legislative history. 
 
At the outset, we conclude that the text of section 245 does 
not definitively show whether the Legislature intended assault 
with a deadly weapon (§ 245(a)(1)) and force likely assault (§ 
245(a)(4)) to be separate offenses or different statements of the 
same offense.  First, our reading of section 245’s express 
language reveals it does not, for instance, list the two 
aggravated assaults as part of “a series of acts, either of which 
separately or together, may constitute the offense.”  (People v. 
Frank (1865) 28 Cal. 507, 513 [under former § 470, “ ‘the falsely 
making,’ 
‘altering,’ 
‘forging,’ 
‘counterfeiting,’ 
‘uttering,’ 
‘publishing,’ ‘passing,’ ‘attempting to pass,’ any of the 
instruments or things therein mentioned, with the intent 
specified, is declared to be forgery”]; People v. Ryan (2006) 138 
Cal.App.4th 360, 366–367 [same, following Frank].)  Instead, as 
the Attorney General observes, section 245 lists each 
aggravated assault separately (see § 245, subds. (a)(1)–(4), (b), 
(c)), and each provision is what we have described as “self-
contained” — that is, each “sets forth all the elements of a crime, 
and each prescribes a specific punishment,” although the 
aggravated assaults at issue here prescribe the same 
punishment.  (Gonzalez, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 539; see also 
§ 245, subd. (a)(1), (4); see ante, at p. 8.)   
 
It is not dispositive, however, that assault with a deadly 
weapon and force likely assault are “self-contained” in separate 
subparagraphs with separate punishments.  (Gonzalez, supra, 
60 Cal.4th at p. 539.)  The Penal Code supplies numerous 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
10 
examples of separate, “self-contained” provisions that constitute 
alternative means of committing a single offense.  (See, e.g., 
Vidana, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 648 [though larceny (§ 484(a)) and 
embezzlement (§ 503) are contained in separate provisions, 
there is clear intent to create single crime of theft]; People v. 
Duffy (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 257, 265 [carrying concealed 
firearm in a vehicle (§ 25400, subd. (a)(1)) or on the person 
(§ 25400, subd. (a)(3)) is “a singular offense”]; see id. at pp. 264–
266; People v. Ryan, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 366 [“there was 
but one crime of forgery [§ 470, subds. (a), (d)], and that the 
various acts proscribed by the statute were simply different 
means of committing that offense”].)   
  
Next, the Attorney General emphasizes that the two 
aggravated assaults appear to “differ in their necessary 
elements.”  (Gonzalez, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 539.)  Assault with 
a deadly weapon requires the use of a deadly weapon or 
instrument, whereas force likely assault 
includes any 
application of force likely to cause great bodily injury, regardless 
whether any weapon or instrument is used.4  (People v. Aguilar 
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1031 (Aguilar).)  However, because force 
likely assault includes most assaults with a deadly weapon or 
instrument, in addition to force likely assaults in the absence of 
a weapon or instrument, there is significant overlap between the 
two offenses.  (See People v. McGee (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 107, 
 
4  
Compare these alternate provisions of CALCRIM No. 875: 
(1) “defendant did an act with a deadly weapon other than a 
firearm that by its nature would directly and probably result in 
the application of force to a person”; and (2) “defendant did an 
act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the 
application of force to a person” and the force was “likely to 
produce great bodily injury”).   
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
11 
115 [“force likely to produce great bodily injury was defendant’s 
use of the deadly weapon, a knife”].)     
 
In Aguilar, we described these two offenses as 
“functionally identical” — except with respect to inherently 
dangerous weapons — in that “[b]oth the ‘weapon or instrument’ 
clause of the statute and the ‘force likely’ clause look to the 
probability or capability of producing great bodily injury.”  
(Aguilar, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1033; id. at p. 1032, quoting 
People v. Davis (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 806, 815 [“ ‘all aggravated 
assaults are ultimately determined based on the force likely to 
be applied against a person’ ”].)  Thus, as we indicated in 
Vidana, a comparison of the offenses’ elements does “not 
definitively resolve” whether assault with a deadly weapon and 
force likely assault “are a single offense.”  (Vidana, supra, 1 
Cal.5th at p. 648 [“we have long held that premeditated murder 
and felony murder — although requiring different elements — 
are not distinct crimes but simply alternative means of 
committing the single offense of murder”].)  As such, the fact 
that the two types of aggravated assaults are self-contained and 
have different elements reveals little of the Legislature’s intent 
regarding this section 954 inquiry.  
 
Next, we consider section 245’s legislative history to 
ascertain the Legislature’s intent.  As we explain more fully 
below, when this legislative history is viewed in the context of 
our past decisions — which have described force likely assault 
“as an alternative” to assault with a deadly weapon (Aguilar, 
supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1030), and have stated that both types of 
assault constitute “one offense” (Mosley, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 
919, fn. 5) — it becomes clear that the Legislature has tacitly 
approved the statements this court has made regarding the 
relationship between the two aggravated assaults.  (See People 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
12 
v. Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100–101 (Ledesma) 
[“ ‘Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and 
acquiesced in, the courts’ construction of [a] statute’ ” if it does 
not alter that construction by subsequent legislation].)  
2. Legislative history of section 245 
 
To place our evaluation of section 245’s legislative history 
in context, we begin with the language of the section when it 
was initially enacted in 1872.  Section 245 did not originally 
include force likely assault.  As relevant here, it instead 
prohibited “an assault upon the person of another with a deadly 
weapon, instrument, or other thing.”  (Pen. Code, former § 245, 
enacted 1872; see Aguilar, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1030.)  We had 
occasion to interpret section 245 the year following its 
enactment, and we reversed a defendant’s assault with a deadly 
weapon conviction because the indictment failed to allege the 
use of a deadly weapon pursuant to the statute:  “ ‘[T]he fact that 
a deadly weapon was resorted to by the prisoner is made by the 
statute itself an indispensable characteristic of such an assault, 
and one which distinguishes it from all others.’ ”  (Aguilar, at 
p. 1031, italics omitted, quoting People v. Murat (1873) 45 Cal. 
281, 283.)   
 
Two years later, ostensibly in response to Murat, the 
Legislature added the “ ‘force likely’ clause as an alternative to 
the ‘deadly weapon’ clause” in former section 245, subdivision 
(a)(1).  (Aguilar, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1030, italics added.)  The 
1874 statute, as amended, provided:  “Every person who 
commits an assault upon the person of another with a deadly 
weapon or instrument, or by any means or force likely to produce 
great bodily injury, is punishable by imprisonment in the State 
Prison, or in a County Jail, not exceeding two years, or by fine 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
13 
not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by both.”  (Former § 245, 
as amended by Code Amends. 1874, ch. 614, § 22, p. 428; see 
Aguilar, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 1030–1033 [detailing history of 
§ 245].)  Thereafter, we had the opportunity to address section 
245 once more in Mosley.  We there observed that this amended 
version of section 245 “define[d] only one offense” and that force 
likely assault was “not an offense separate from” assault with a 
deadly weapon.  (Mosley, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 919, fn. 5.)  These 
two descriptions of aggravated assaults remained together in 
the same provision until 2011, when the Legislature amended 
and reorganized former section 245, subdivision (a)(1).  (Stats. 
2011, ch. 183, § 1.)  
 
In amending section 245 in 2011, the Legislature 
identified the amendment’s primary purpose:  to split assault 
with a deadly weapon and force likely assault into separate 
paragraphs in the wake of a 2000 voter-approved initiative, 
Proposition 21, which imposed possible collateral consequences 
resulting from a conviction of the former, but not of the latter.  
(See People v. Brown (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1, 4, fn. 1.)  
Proposition 21 expressly added assault with a deadly weapon to 
the statutory “serious felony” list for purposes of applying the 
Three Strikes law.  (§1192.7, subd. (c)(31); see also People v. 
Myers (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 546, 554 [Prop. 21 “ ‘delete[d] for 
serious felony purposes the personal use requirement for assault 
with a deadly weapon’ ”].)  However, Proposition 21, as enacted 
by the voters, did not designate force likely assault as a “serious” 
felony.  (See People v. Haykel (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 146, 148.)  
Because former section 245(a)(1) at the time included both forms 
of aggravated assaults, it was unclear from the face of a 
judgment reflecting a section 245(a)(1) conviction whether the 
conviction was subject to the adverse consequences of a “serious” 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
14 
felony conviction.  (See People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 
1072.)   
 
As explained above, section 245’s legislative history 
expressly states that the 2011 amendment made “technical, 
nonsubstantive changes” to address Proposition 21’s effects on 
section 245.  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1026 (2011–
2012 Reg. Sess.).)  However, according to the bill’s author, the 
amendment did “not create any new felonies or expand the 
punishment for any existing felonies.  It merely split[] an 
ambiguous code section into two distinct parts.”  (Sen. Com. on 
Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1026 (2011–2012 Reg. 
Sess.) as introduced Feb. 18, 2011, pp. 4–5; hereafter Report on 
Assem. Bill 1026.)  The Legislature further stated that the 
purpose of separating the two forms of assault in the 2011 
amendment was to “ ‘reorganize[]’ ” section 245 to provide for a 
“ ‘more efficient assessment of a defendant’s prior criminal 
history’ ” and “ ‘a more accurate and earlier disposition of 
criminal cases.’ ”  (Sen. Rules Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 
1026 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 18, 2011, pp. 2–
3.)  Having a judgment showing the “true nature” of a former 
section 245(a)(1) conviction — by indicating whether it was 
pursuant to subparagraph (a)(1) or (a)(4) — would allow a 
prosecutor to settle appropriate cases prior to a preliminary 
hearing and avoid “clogging the court system.”  (Sen. Rules 
Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1026, supra, p. 3 [“it will be 
clear what type of an assault occurred”].) 
 
Notably, our decisions in Mosley and Aguilar — indicating 
that former section 245 “defines only one offense” (Mosley, 
supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 919, fn. 5), and reaffirming the view that 
force likely assault is “ ‘not an offense separate from’ ” assault 
with a deadly weapon (Aguilar, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1036, 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
15 
quoting Mosley, at p. 919, fn. 5) — both preceded the 2011 
amendment to section 245.  The Legislature is presumed to be 
aware of these earlier cases when it made what the legislative 
history described as “technical, nonsubstantive changes” to 
section 245 in 2011.  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1026 
(2011–2012 Reg. Sess.); see Ledesma, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 
100–101.)  Accordingly, had the Legislature intended in 2011 to 
create separate offenses by relocating force likely assault into its 
own paragraph, it presumably would have made that intent 
clear. 
 
Supporting this conclusion is the fact that the Legislature, 
in otherwise amending section 245 to expand its scope, has 
expressly stated its intent to create new crimes.  For example, 
in 1982, the Legislature “create[d] a new crime of assault with a 
firearm” under subdivision (a)(2) (Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, 
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 846 (1981–1982 Reg. Sess.) as 
introduced March 9, 1981, p. 3).  And in 1989, in two separate 
bills, the Legislature added to section 245 the “new crime[s]”5 of 
assault with a machine gun or an assault weapon under 
subdivision (a)(3) (Stats. 1989, ch. 18, § 1) and assault with a 
semiautomatic rifle under subdivision (b) (Stats. 1989, ch. 1167, 
§ 1).  Thus, the Legislature has expressly declared when 
statutory revisions to section 245 constitute new crimes.    
 
Accordingly, we reject the Attorney General’s argument 
that the 2011 amendment reflects the Legislature’s intent to 
create two separate offenses for purposes of section 954.  
 
5  
See Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 292 (1989–1990 
Reg. Sess.) (“the bill would create a new crime”); Legis. Counsel’s 
Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1504 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) (“the bill 
would create a new crime”). 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
16 
Defendant, in our view, has the better argument.  Section 245’s 
legislative history — which reaches back to 1872 and reflects 
amendments that have expanded the number of offenses 
described in 245 through the years — makes clear when the 
Legislature amends section 245 to create a “new crime,” it does 
so expressly.  Our reading of this legislative history, combined 
with Mosley’s and Aguilar’s statement that force likely assault 
is “ ‘not an offense separate from’ ” assault with a deadly weapon 
(Aguilar, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1037, quoting Mosley, supra, 1 
Cal.3d at p. 919, fn. 5), and the Legislature’s subsequent failure 
to indicate otherwise, convinces us that the Legislature 
intended assault with a deadly weapon and force likely assault 
to constitute “different statements of the same offense” for 
purposes of section 954.  (See Ledesma, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 
100–101.)  
3. The Attorney General’s Additional Arguments 
 
 
The Attorney General, for his part, does not dispute that 
the primary purpose of the 2011 amendment was to make it 
easier to identify from a judgment the conduct on which a 
section 245 conviction is based.  He also concedes that assault 
with a deadly weapon and force likely assault at some point 
described “a single offense of aggravated assault.”  Nevertheless, 
he contends the Legislature’s 2011 amendment to section 245, 
which reorganized section 245 by placing force likely assault and 
assault with a deadly weapon into “two distinct parts” (Report 
on Assem. Bill 1026, supra, p. 5), signaled the Legislature’s 
intent to treat these forms of aggravated assaults as separate 
offenses.  He asserts that “[c]oncluding that the two assault 
crimes in section 245, subdivision (a)(1) and (a)(4) are different 
statements of the same offense would be directly antithetical to 
the very point in separating them out into distinct subdivisions.”   
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
17 
 
We are unpersuaded for several reasons.  First, we assign 
little significance to the bill author’s statement that the 2011 
amendment sought to split former section 245, subdivision (a)(1) 
into “two distinct parts.”  (Report on Assem. Bill 1026, supra, 
p. 5, italics added.)  The Attorney General argues this reveals a 
“clear intent to make ‘distinct’ assault provisions, which is the 
essence of an intent to create separate offenses under section 
954.”  But the statement’s use of the term “distinct” cannot bear 
the weight the Attorney General places on it.  The Legislature 
clearly identified its express purpose for enacting the 2011 
amendment.  As noted above (see ante, at pp. 13–14), the reason 
for separating and distinguishing between these two types of 
assaults was merely to allow the court and parties to readily 
identify whether a resulting conviction would constitute a 
strike.  Indeed, long before the 2011 amendment and consistent 
with that amendment’s express purpose, we advised that even 
though section 245, subdivision (a) “define[d] only one offense,” 
a resulting judgment should “specify which of the two categories 
of conduct prohibited by section 245 (i.e., assault (1) with a 
deadly weapon or instrument, or (2) by means of force likely to 
produce great bodily injury) was involved in the particular case.”  
(Mosley, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 919, fn. 5.)  “[S]uch a finding,” we 
explained, “should be made for the benefit of probation and 
correction officials who may . . . attach significance thereto.”  
(Ibid.)  
 
Furthermore, as we have noted, had the Legislature 
sought to make them truly distinct offenses without any overlap 
(see ante, at pp. 10–11), it could have added language signaling 
this intent when it placed force likely assault in its own 
subdivision in 2011.  By way of comparison, when the 
Legislature in 1982 established assault with a firearm as newly 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
18 
added section 245, subdivision (a)(2), it did not simply require 
the use of a firearm in subdivision (a)(2) (“assault . . . with a 
firearm”); it simultaneously excluded the use of a firearm in 
subdivision (a)(1) (“assault . . . with a deadly weapon or 
instrument other than a firearm”).  (Assem. Office of Research, 
Conc. in Sen. Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 846 (1981–1982 Reg. 
Sess.), as amended Sept. 11, 1981, p. 1 [“this bill:  [¶] 1) 
[s]pecified . . . [assault with a deadly weapon or instrument] did 
not include assault with a firearm; and [¶] 2) [c]reated a new 
crime of assault with a firearm”].)  This made clear that the 
offenses were discrete and presumptively separate.   
 
It stands to reason that if the Legislature had wanted to 
make assault with a deadly weapon and force likely assault 
unmistakably separate, it would have utilized this same 
approach with the 2011 amendment.  However, when it placed 
force likely assault in a different paragraph from assault with a 
deadly weapon, the Legislature did not add defining language to 
force likely assault — such as “without the use of a weapon or 
instrument” — to eliminate any perceived overlap of the two 
types of aggravated assaults.  Instead, the Legislature made 
“technical, nonsubstantive changes” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., 
Assem. Bill No. 1026 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.)), and underscored 
that the 2011 legislation did “not create any new felonies or 
expand the punishment for any existing felonies.”  (Sen. Rules 
Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1026 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) 
as introduced Feb. 18, 2011, p. 3; see ante, at pp. 13–14.) 
 
Next, the Attorney General asserts that other portions of 
section 245’s legislative history suggest the Legislature, in 
amending section 245 over the years, had an “overarching” 
purpose to create four separate subdivisions for aggravated 
assault.  Asking that we construe section 245(a) and its series of 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
19 
amendments as a whole, the Attorney General surmises that “it 
would be remarkable if the Legislature intended some of the 
subparagraphs in that provision to constitute separate offenses, 
while allowing other seemingly equal subparagraphs to stand as 
different statements of the same offense.”   
 
We are not persuaded that there is a singular purpose 
governing these amendments.  For instance, the 1982 
amendment adding assault with a firearm as a new crime had a 
specific punitive purpose “aimed at assuring that some time is 
served for offenses involving serious crimes.”  (Ways and Means 
Staff Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 846 (1981–1982 Reg. Sess.), as 
amended May 6, 1981; see Stats. 1982, ch. 136, § 1; see People v. 
Milward (2011) 52 Cal.4th 580, 585  [“the Legislature’s apparent 
purpose was to require a minimum punishment of six months’ 
imprisonment in county jail for aggravated assaults committed 
with a firearm”].)  Likewise, the purpose of the 1989 amendment 
adding the crime of assault with a machine gun or assault 
weapon was to “eliminate from California society, except under 
limited 
circumstances, 
weapons 
essentially 
military 
or 
antipersonnel in nature which are considered to pose an 
intolerable threat to the well-being of the citizens of this state.”  
(Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis on Sen. Bill No. 292 (1989–
1990 Reg. Sess.), as amended Feb. 27, 1989, pp. 4–5.)  These 
substantial policy considerations for the earlier amendments 
that created new crimes stand in stark contrast to the 
underlying purpose of the 2011 amendment:  to make “technical, 
nonsubstantive changes” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 
1026 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.)) and “not [to] create any new 
felonies or expand the punishment for any existing felonies”  
(Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1026 
(2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 18, 2011, p. 2).  In 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
20 
short, we perceive no legislative intent mandating that the 
internal structure of section 245 be wholly consistent in the 
manner that the Attorney General suggests.   
 
On a related point, the Attorney General contends “there 
is nothing inconsistent” between the legislative declaration that 
the 2011 amendment did “ ‘not create any new felonies’ ” and his 
argument “that the Legislature intended the two felonies to be 
distinct and separate.”  This argument would perhaps carry 
more weight if assault with a deadly weapon and force likely 
assault were considered separate offenses prior to the 2011 
amendment.  But as we have emphasized above, both assaults 
were combined in one paragraph beginning in 1874 when the 
Legislature added the “ ‘force likely’ ” clause “ ‘as an 
alternative’ ” to the “deadly weapon” clause.  (Aguilar, supra, 16 
Cal.4th at p. 1030.)  We observed early on that far from setting 
out separate offenses, former section 245, subdivision (a)(1) 
“define[d] only one offense”; force likely assault “is not an offense 
separate from — and certainly not an offense lesser than and 
included within — the offense of assault with a deadly weapon.”  
(Mosley, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 919, fn. 5.) 
   
 
The Attorney General also relies on the fact that assault 
with a deadly weapon is classified as a serious felony (§ 1192.7, 
subd. (c)(31)), while force likely assault is not so classified (see 
People v. Winters (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 273, 277).  This 
distinction, he argues, establishes that these forms of 
aggravated assault are separate offenses.  We agree that the 
basis for the 2011 amendment was to identify and give effect to 
this distinction.  (See ante, at pp. 13–14.)  However, we part 
ways with his suggestion that by classifying assault with a 
deadly weapon as a serious felony, the Legislature meant to 
define it as a separate offense.  
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
21 
 
For instance, the mere inclusion of assault with a deadly 
weapon as a serious felony under section 1192.7, subdivision 
(c)(31), does not necessarily reflect its status as a standalone 
offense, i.e., one that is separate from force likely assault.  We 
have long rejected the view that section 1192.7 “consist[s] only 
of specific statutory offenses and enhancements.”  (People v. 
Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 347.)  Instead, we have 
recognized that the “ ‘list of serious felonies as set out in section 
1192.7 and incorporated into section 667, is an amalgam of 
different elements,’ ” which include repealed felonies, a general 
reference to felonies punishable by death or imprisonment, 
enhancements that may attach to any felony, and “criminal 
conduct which does not correspond precisely to the elements of 
any then-existing criminal offense.”  (Guerrero, at p. 347.)  That 
assault with a deadly weapon and not force likely assault is 
included in section 1192.7, subdivision (c) largely reflects that 
“a meaningful difference exist[s] between the two clauses” and 
the conduct proscribed by each clause (Aguilar, supra, 16 
Cal.4th at p. 1030); it does not, without more, signal the 
Legislature’s intent to create separate offenses.  (See Couzens, 
Cal. Practice Guide:  Sentencing California Crimes (The Rutter 
Group 2022) ¶ 20.4 [because § 1192.7 “frequently focus[es] on 
criminal conduct rather than a discrete code section, a number 
of additional convictions may be characterized as strikes simply 
because of the way the crimes were committed”].)   
 
Nor do the strike consequences for a serious felony 
classification make assault with a deadly weapon an offense 
distinct from force likely assault for purposes of section 954.  
While differing punishments may indicate that offenses are 
independent from one another (see Gonzalez, supra, 60 Cal.4th 
at p. 539), punishment for committing an offense is “annexed, 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
22 
upon conviction” (§ 15, italics added) and is a primary and direct 
result of the offense.  In contrast, “ ‘the possibility of increased 
punishment in the event of a subsequent conviction,’ ” such as a 
prior conviction for a serious felony, is properly cast as a 
“ ‘collateral consequence’ ” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 
857, 878), i.e., “one which does not ‘inexorably follow’ from a 
conviction of the offense . . . ” (People v. Crosby (1992) 3 
Cal.App.4th 1352, 1355).  Put another way, the designation of 
assault with a deadly weapon as a serious felony for purposes of 
the Three Strikes law does not change the nature of its 
underlying punishment, which is identical to that of force likely 
assault.  (See ante, at p. 8.)    
 
Nor do we agree with the Attorney General that our 
holding requires that the jury be informed that a conviction for 
assault with a deadly weapon, but not for force likely assault, is 
considered a “serious” felony.  That a defendant should be 
punished “under the provision that provides for the longest 
potential term of imprisonment” (former § 654)6 is not a concern 
implicated here because the base term punishments for assault 
with a deadly weapon and force likely assault are the same.  
Moreover, even if the designation of a “serious” felony later 
increases 
a 
defendant’s 
total 
term 
of 
imprisonment, 
“[i]nformation regarding the consequences of a verdict is . . . 
irrelevant to the jury’s task . . . [and] providing jurors 
sentencing information invites them to ponder matters that are 
 
6  
Effective January 1, 2022, newly amended section 654 
provides that judges have discretion to sentence a defendant to 
any of the convicted crimes rather than the one that provides for 
the longest term of punishment.  (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1.)  
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
23 
not within their province . . . .”  (Shannon v. United States 
(1994) 512 U.S. 573, 579.)   
 
Lastly, we are unpersuaded by the Attorney General’s 
policy arguments based on section 654.  The Attorney General 
first suggests that if we were to conclude that assault with a 
deadly weapon and force likely assault were separate offenses, 
there would be little danger of multiple punishments on counts 
that arise from the same act or omission because section 654 
would require a stay of punishment for one count where multiple 
convictions occur.  (See People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 
1226–1227; People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 336.)  While 
this may be true, it is beside the point.  The issue before us is 
whether section 954 permits multiple convictions where, as we 
conclude here, the convictions are based on different statements 
of the same offense.  Our decision in Vidana forecloses the 
possibility of multiple convictions where the two types of 
aggravated assaults constitute “different statements of the 
same offense.”  (§ 954; see Vidana, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 648.)   
 
We likewise find unavailing the Attorney General’s 
related policy argument permitting “an alternative conviction 
[that] may prevent the defendant from otherwise escaping 
justice” if one of the convictions is overturned.  (See People v. 
Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1128–1129.)  Because force 
likely assault and assault with a deadly weapon are the same 
offense for purposes of section 954, any “alternative” conviction 
would in fact be duplicative and improper as a matter of law.  
(See Vidana, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 650; People v. Coyle (2009) 
178 Cal.App.4th 209, 217 [three convictions for a single murder 
impermissible where “[t]he three counts simply alleged 
alternative theories of the offense”].)  
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
24 
 
Having carefully considered the Attorney General’s 
arguments, we find ample support for our conclusion that 
assault with a deadly weapon and force likely assault are 
“different statements of the same offense” (§ 954).  As such, 
defendant may not be convicted of both based on the same act or 
course of conduct.  (Vidana, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 651.)7  
B. Same or Separate Acts 
 
We now turn to the Attorney General’s assertion that 
section 954 is no impediment to defendant’s dual convictions for 
a different reason:  they are based on separate acts.  In support 
of this contention, the Attorney General relies largely on 
Father’s trial testimony and opines that the jury could have 
found defendant guilty of both counts based on multiple 
different acts, “including the 50 times [defendant] hit her father 
with the bicycle chain or (as to count 3) her additional act of 
throwing the [ceramic pot] at his head.”  Based on defendant’s 
own admissions, the Attorney General also argues that the jury 
had before it evidence that defendant “committed at least two 
separate assaults with the bicycle chain.”  
 
Defendant contends that the jury made no finding of fact 
that there were separate acts supporting the section 245(a)(1) 
and section 245(a)(4) convictions, respectively.  Therefore, she 
argues it was conceivable that the jury impermissibly relied on 
 
7  
We disapprove In re Jonathan R., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th 
963, which reached a contrary conclusion (see ante, at p. 8), to 
the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
Further, based on our holding that these two types of 
aggravated assaults are alternative means of committing the 
same offense, we need not determine whether force likely 
assault is a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly 
weapon.   
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
25 
the same act to convict defendant of both counts.  As important, 
defendant asserts that an appellate court’s determination that 
she struck Father twice with the bicycle chain and lock in two 
separately punishable acts would constitute judicial factfinding 
that “necessarily violates” the Sixth Amendment.  
 
We agree with defendant that the jury did not make a 
finding of fact identifying which act supported which specific 
count.  It did not make such finding because it was never asked 
to do so by way of the prosecution’s argument, a unanimity 
instruction, or the like.  (See People v. Jennings (2010) 50 
Cal.4th 616, 679 (Jennings).)  The prosecution did not identify 
the particular act supporting each aggravated assault, and it did 
little to differentiate between the two counts.  For example, the 
charging allegation and verdict form did not specify the act of 
force defendant used to commit the force likely assault.  The 
respective jury instructions (listing the element of whether 
“[t]he defendant did an act [with a deadly weapon other than a 
firearm] that by its nature would directly and probably result in 
the application of force to the person”) also did not identify what 
act defendant committed for each count.  (See ante, at p. 10, fn. 
4.)  During closing argument, the prosecution referred to 
defendant hitting Father with the bicycle chain to establish both 
the assault with a deadly weapon and force likely assault 
counts.  At the same time, with regard to the force likely assault 
count, the prosecution referred to defendant using both the 
bicycle chain and the ceramic pot to assault Father.   
 
Without conclusively determining the standard of 
prejudice applicable in this context, we are persuaded that there 
is a reasonable probability the jury would have convicted 
defendant of one or the other assault offense, rather than both, 
had the jury been instructed that the two offenses could not be 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
26 
based on the same act or course of conduct.  (People v. Watson 
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)  The record demonstrates that the 
prosecution and defense counsel viewed the offenses as 
essentially identical and based on the same act or course of 
conduct, which may in turn explain the absence of an unanimity 
instruction.  (See Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 679 [“no 
unanimity instruction is required if the case falls within the 
continuous-course-of-conduct exception, which arises ‘when the 
acts are so closely connected in time as to form part of one 
transaction’ ”].)  Given this shared understanding, it is 
reasonably probable that the jury understood the offenses in the 
same way.8   
 
Contrary to the Attorney General’s contention, the issue 
is not whether the jury could have found that defendant struck 
Father at least two times and up to 50 times — which would be 
relevant to whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain 
each conviction (see People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 
804) — but whether there is a reasonable probability the jury 
failed to do so.    
 
8  
We decline the Attorney General’s invitation to address 
the application of Vidana’s “course of conduct” prong in this 
context (Vidana, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 648, fn. omitted).  Our 
holding in this case does not depend on the view that individual 
acts within a course of conduct may not form the basis of 
separate convictions for the same offense.  Instead, we confirm 
that the same course of conduct may not form the basis of 
separate convictions for the same offense.  We express no 
opinion regarding the validity of the former.  For similar 
reasons, we need not address whether the completed act rule 
applies to an otherwise single course of conduct.  (See People v. 
Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329 [“a new and separate 
violation of section 289 is ‘completed’ each time a new and 
separate ‘penetration, however slight’ occurs”].)    
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
27 
 
Nor are we, as a reviewing court, at liberty to accept the 
Attorney General’s invitation to determine whether “the record 
as a whole provides an ample basis on which to conclude that 
the jury found two separate acts beyond a reasonable doubt 
based on [defendant’s] admissions.”  It is axiomatic that 
criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled to “ ‘a jury 
determination that [they are] guilty of every element of the 
crime with which [they are] charged, beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  (Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 477.)  
Here, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have 
convicted defendant of only one, and not both, aggravated 
assault offenses.  In this circumstance, we cannot affirm based 
on our own view of what the evidence would support.  (Sullivan 
v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 280 [“The Sixth Amendment 
requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical 
jury’s action”].)  Further, defendant’s admission that she struck 
Father at least two times with the bicycle chain does not 
inexorably show that the jury relied on separate acts in reaching 
its guilty verdicts.    
 
Last, we reject the Attorney General’s assertion that a 
reviewing court’s authority to make such a finding to support 
the convictions is akin to a sentencing court’s determination 
whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences under 
section 654.  (See People v. Carter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 831, 
841 [“Whether a defendant had multiple intents or objectives is 
a question of fact for the sentencing court”].)  Unlike a jury 
determination of each element of a charged offense, the 
“imposition of consecutive terms . . . does not implicate a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.”  (People v. Black (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 799, 821.)  Section 654 is largely a sentencing issue, 
which lies outside the historical province of a jury.  (Oregon v. 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
28 
Ice (2009) 555 U.S. 160, 168; People v. Mosley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 
1044, 1057–1058.)   
CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION 
 
Based section 245’s statutory language and legislative 
history — illuminated by statements we made in Aguilar and 
Mosley that have endured amid a series of amendments to the 
provision — we conclude that assault with a deadly weapon (§ 
245(a)(1)) and force likely assault (§ 245(a)(4)) are “different 
statements of the same offense” (§ 954).  We, therefore, conclude 
that a defendant may not be convicted of both types of 
aggravated assault based on the same act or course of conduct.  
(See Vidana, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 650.)  Here, there is a 
reasonable probability that the jury viewed the two charged 
assault offenses as based on the same act or course of conduct.  
Thus, the Court of Appeal erred by determining for itself that 
defendant’s “convictions are based on multiple acts — hitting 
her father with the bicycle chain and lock, and hitting him with 
the ceramic pot.”     
 
We therefore reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment and 
remand the matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
(See Vidana, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 651, fn. 18 [“we express no 
opinion on whether striking the larceny conviction or the 
embezzlement conviction or consolidating the two convictions is 
the proper remedy”]; see, e.g., People v. Craig (1941) 17 Cal.2d 
453, 458–459, overruled on another point in White, supra, 2 
Cal.5th at p. 359.) 
 
PEOPLE v. AGUAYO 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
29 
 
JENKINS, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Aguayo 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 31 Cal.App.5th 758 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S254554 
Date Filed:  August 25, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  San Diego 
Judge:  Dwayne K. Moring 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Linnéa M. Johnson and Howard C. Cohen, under appointments by the 
Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler 
and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Julie L. 
Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Meredith S. White, Warren 
Williams, Junichi P. Semitsu and Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Howard C. Cohen 
Appellate Defenders, Inc. 
555 West Beech Street, Suite 300 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 696-0282 
 
Steve Oetting 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9207