Title: GERMINIA ORTENCIA SOLIS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GERMINIA ORTENCIA SOLIS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 165Case Number: No. S-10-0092Decided: 12/16/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

GERMINIA 
ORTENCIA SOLIS,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, 
Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jessica Y. 
Frint, Student Director, and Meggan Hathaway, Student Intern, of the Prosecution 
Assistance Program

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After pleading 
guilty to one count of felony larceny, Appellant Germinia Ortencia Solis was 
ordered to pay $2,328.31 in restitution to the victim of her crime.  Solis challenges the amount of 
restitution imposed.  We hold the 
district court erred in ordering restitution for the full regular retail value 
of the stolen merchandise.  We 
therefore reverse the order of restitution and remand the matter to the district 
court for entry of an amended Judgment and Sentence consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Solis phrases the 
issue as follows:

 
 
Was 
the trial court's restitution order in error as such amount was not the actual 
pecuniary damage as authorized by statute?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On July 29, 2007, 
Solis and Pricilla Enriquez entered the JCPenney retail store in Cheyenne and 
selected a large quantity of clothing that was on sale.  A sales associate rang up the items, 
which totaled $1,011.95, and placed them in five separate bags.  Without paying for the items, Solis and 
Enriquez grabbed the bags and dashed towards a nearby exit door.  When the sales associate followed, 
Enriquez threatened her with a drawn knife.  The sales associate immediately 
retreated from the encounter, and Solis and Enriquez left the store with the 
merchandise.  

 
 
[¶4]      In October 2007, 
the State charged Solis with one count of aiding and abetting aggravated robbery 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-401(c)(ii) and § 6-1-201(a) (LexisNexis 2009), and 
one count of felony larceny under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(a) and (c)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2009). A warrant for Solis' arrest was issued, and she was 
eventually arrested on June 1, 2009.  
Shortly thereafter, the State dismissed the aiding and abetting charge, 
and Solis was bound over to district court on the larceny charge. She later 
entered into a plea agreement with the State in which she agreed to plead guilty 
to that charge in exchange for a sentence of three to five years, to be 
suspended in favor of five years of supervised probation.  The plea agreement also provided that 
Solis would be jointly and severally liable with her co-defendant for full 
restitution in an amount to be determined.  
Pursuant to that agreement, Solis pled guilty to the larceny charge on 
October 26, 2009.  

 
 
[¶5]      A Presentence 
Investigation Report (PSI) subsequently filed with the district court identified 
the restitution amount as $2,328.31, without furnishing details as to how that 
amount was derived.  At the 
sentencing hearing held on January 11, 2010, Solis contested the amount of 
restitution listed in the PSI.  
After some discussion, and with the parties' consent, the district court 
deferred the restitution determination to a later hearing, and proceeded to 
sentence Solis in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement.  

 
 
[¶6]      At the subsequent 
hearing, the State sought restitution in the amount of $1,968.31 for the stolen 
property, which was the full regular retail price of that property.1  In addition, the State asserted a 
restitution claim of $360.00 for the cost to JCPenney of hiring and training a 
new sales associate, since the sales associate who sought to prevent the theft 
had resigned as a result of the incident.  
Solis objected to the imposition of restitution for the cost of the new 
sales associate, and argued that the value of the stolen property was only 
$1,011.95, which was the price of the goods on the day they were stolen and the 
value reflected on the cash register receipts.  Ultimately, the district court agreed 
with the State regarding the losses suffered by JCPenney and ordered Solis to 
pay as restitution the sum $2,328.31 ($1,968.31 for the stolen merchandise plus 
$360.00 for the new sales associate).  
A Judgment and Sentence incorporating the restitution order was entered 
on March 23, 2010.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶7]      Generally, 
appellate review of an order of restitution is confined to a search for 
procedural error or a clear abuse of discretion.  Brown v. State, 2003 WY 72, ¶ 9, 70 P.3d 238, 241 (Wyo. 2003).  We review for 
an abuse of discretion challenges to the amount of restitution set by a trial 
court.  Frederick v. State, 2007 WY 27, ¶ 14, 
151 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Wyo. 2007); Alcaraz 
v. State, 2002 WY 57, ¶ 5, 44 P.3d 68, 70 (Wyo. 2002).  In contrast, we review de novo 
challenges to the authority of the trial court to order restitution.  Penner v. State, 2003 WY 143, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 1045, 1048 (Wyo. 2003).  To the 
extent we are called upon to construe statutes, we follow these 
principles:

 
 

We 
endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's intent.  State Department of Revenue and 
Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994).  We begin by making an "inquiry 
respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to 
their arrangement and connection.'"  
Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish 
Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. 
Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)).  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all 
parts of the statute in pari materia.  845 P.2d  at 
1042.

 
 
When 
the words used are clear and unambiguous, that language establishes the rule of 
law.  A statute is ambiguous only 
where its meaning is vague or ambiguous and subject to varying 
interpretations.  Only if the 
wording is ambiguous or unclear to the point of demonstrating obscurity with 
respect to the legislative purpose or mandate do we resort to additional 
construction.

 
 

Rivera 
v. State, 
846 P.2d 1, 6 (Wyo. 1993) (citations omitted).  Penal statutes must be strictly 
construed and "cannot be enlarged by implication or extended by inference or 
construction."  Smith v. 
State, 902 P.2d 1271, 1284 (Wyo. 1995).  "We also recognize that ambiguity in a 
criminal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity."  ALJ v. State, 836 P.2d 307, 310 
(Wyo. 1992).

 
 

Hampton 
v. State, 
2006 WY 103, ¶ 7, 141 P.3d 101, 104 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Meerscheidt v. State, 931 P.2d 220, 
223-24 (Wyo. 1997)).

 
 

Analysis

 
 
[¶8]      In Wyoming, a 
trial court's power to order restitution springs from statutory law, not any 
inherent authority.  Hampton, ¶ 8, 141 P.3d  at 104.  As part of the sentencing process, a 
trial court is required to order a defendant to pay restitution to each victim 
unless the court specifically finds that the defendant has no ability to pay and 
no reasonable possibility exists that he will have an ability to pay.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-102 (LexisNexis 
2009).  In every case in which 
restitution is ordered, the trial court must set a reasonable amount for actual 
pecuniary damages suffered by each victim as a result of the defendant's 
criminal activities.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-9-103(b) (LexisNexis 2009).  
For purposes of restitution, "pecuniary damage" means all damages "a 
victim could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the 
same facts or event," but does not include "punitive damages and damages for 
pain, suffering, mental anguish and loss of consortium."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2009).

 
 
[¶9]      In this case, 
Solis does not question the district court's authority to order 
restitution.  Rather, her complaint 
concerns the propriety of the amount of restitution awarded.  Solis contends the district court 
improperly ordered her to pay restitution for the full retail value of the 
stolen merchandise.2  She claims, as she did below, that the 
proper measure of pecuniary damages should be $1,011.95, which was the sale 
price of the goods on the day they were stolen.  Under the specific facts and 
circumstances of this case, we must agree with Solis.

 
 
[¶10]   An easily identifiable civil cause 
of action under which JCPenney could recover damages against Solis would be 
conversion.  We have defined 
conversion as "any distinct act of dominion wrongfully executed over one's 
property in denial of his right or inconsistent with it."  Alcaraz, ¶ 8, 44 P.3d  at 71.  Essentially, conversion occurs when a 
person treats the property of another as his own, denying the true owner the 
benefits and rights of ownership.  
Id.  

 
 
[¶11]   In a general conversion action 
involving personal property, the measure of damages is the fair market value of 
the property at the time of the loss.3  Lieberman v. Mossbrook, 2009 WY 65, ¶ 
49, 208 P.3d 1296, 1311 (Wyo. 2009); Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119, 1124 
(Wyo. 1985).  Fair market value is 
defined as "[t]he price that a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is 
willing to pay on the open market and in an arm's-length transaction."  Grommet v. Newman, 2009 WY 150, ¶ 52, 
220 P.3d 795, 815 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1691 (9th ed. 2009)).  In this case, JCPenney was willing to 
sell the merchandise that was stolen on July 29, 2007, at a price discounted 
below its full retail price.  As 
reflected by the sales receipt, $1,011.95 is the sum JCPenney would have 
accepted from a willing purchaser and the price a bona fide buyer would have 
paid for those items on that day.  
We therefore conclude that the actual damages incurred by JCPenney which 
could be recoverable in a conversion action, as measured by fair market value at 
the time of the loss, is the sale price of $1,011.95, and not the items' full 
retail price of $1,968.31.4

 
 
[¶12]   The State directs us to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-1-127 as a basis for upholding the restitution award.  That statute provides the measure of 
damages in civil actions arising from the theft of goods through the act of 
shoplifting, and states in relevant part:

 
 
(a)  A person over ten (10) years of age who 
violates W.S. 6-3-404(a) or (b) is civilly liable to the merchant of the 
property in an amount consisting of:

 
 
(i)  Return of the property in original 
condition or actual damages equal to the full marked or listed price of the 
property; plus

 
 
(ii)  A civil liability of twice the amount of 
the full marked or listed price of the property but not less than fifty dollars 
($50.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00); 
plus

 
 
(iii)  Reasonable attorney's fees and court 
costs.

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
(c)  A conviction or a plea of guilty to a 
violation of W.S. 6-3-404(a) or (b) is not a prerequisite to the bringing of a 
civil suit under this section.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-1-127 (LexisNexis 2009). 

 
 
[¶13]   Initially, we agree that § 1-1-127 
would be applicable to the determination of the proper amount of restitution in 
the instant case.  Although Solis 
was convicted of larceny, the specific facts demonstrate that she also violated 
the shoplifting statute, which in pertinent part makes it a crime for any person 
to willfully take "possession of property offered for sale by a . . . retail 
store without the . . . consent of the owner and with intent to convert the 
property to his own use without paying the purchase price."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-404(a) (NexisLexis 
2009).  Section 1-1-127(c) makes 
clear that, so long as the facts show a violation of the shoplifting statute, no 
actual conviction or plea of guilty to that crime is required for recovery under 
the statute.  However, we are not 
persuaded that § 1-1-127 provides a legal basis for sustaining the district 
court's restitution award.

 
 
[¶14]   Primarily, we disagree with the 
State's contention that the "full marked or listed price" of the stolen property 
is the equivalent of its full retail price.  "List price" is defined as the 
"published or advertised price of goods."  
Black's Law Dictionary 1308 
(9th ed. 2009).  It is, in essence, what a consumer knows 
the price to be at the time and the amount the merchant is seeking and willing 
to accept as compensation for the goods.  
As to "marked" price, common sense dictates that it is the actual price 
placed on the merchandise.  It is 
the price the consumer actually sees and, ultimately, the amount that is 
reflected on the sales receipt.  In 
this case, no question exists that the property at issue was listed and marked 
by JCPenney at a reduced sale price of $1,011.95.  It is this sale price, and not the 
original full retail price of $1,968.31, which we find would generally be 
recoverable in a civil action pursued under § 1-1-127.

 
 
[¶15]   The State also contends that even 
if it is determined that the "full marked or listed price" of the property is 
the sale price of $1,011.95, the restitution order can be sustained because the 
district court, in accordance with § 1-1-127(a)(ii), could have properly added 
as much as $1,000.00 to the price of the goods in determining the civil damages 
which JCPenney was entitled to receive, for a total restitution amount of 
$2,011.95.  Again we disagree.  We find § 1-1-127(a)(ii) to be a penalty 
provision.  Damages awarded pursuant 
to its authority are punitive in nature.  
Punitive damages are specifically excluded from the definition of 
pecuniary damages which can be awarded as restitution. § 
7-9-101(a)(iii).

 
 
[¶16]   In sum, we hold the district court 
abused its discretion in awarding the full retail value of the stolen 
merchandise as restitution instead of its sales price.  We reverse the restitution award and 
remand this case to the district court for entry of an amended Judgment and 
Sentence consistent with this opinion.

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1A representative of JCPenney testified that the full retail price was the 
amount ultimately written off as a loss in the store's inventory. 

 
 

2The other aspect of the restitution award  the $360.00 for hiring and 
training the new sales associate  is not at issue in this 
case.

 
 

3Although special damages might be recoverable in a conversion action, no 
special damages were alleged in this case.

 
 

4At this 
juncture, only sheer speculation would support a finding of a greater fair 
market value.  The record is devoid 
of any evidence that the price of the merchandise would have reverted to its 
full retail price after July 29, 2007, resulting in a greater monetary return 
for JCPenney.