Title: DeHusson v. City of Anchorage

State: alaska

Issuer: Alaska Supreme Court

Document:

583 P.2d 791 (1978) Rosemary DeHUSSON, as guardian, natural mother of the person and personal representative for the Intestate Estate of Walter DeHusson, a minor, Appellant, v. CITY OF ANCHORAGE, Tunnel Bay Construction Company, Stephen and Sons Construction Company and John Doe Corporation, Appellees. No. 2996. Supreme Court of Alaska. July 28, 1978. Paul L. Davis and Michael W. Sewright, Edgar Paul Boyko & Associates, P.C., Anchorage, for appellant. Kenneth P. Jacobus, James M. Powell and Gordon J. Tans, Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin, Anchorage, for appellees. Allan E. Tesche, Municipal Attys' Ass'n, Anchorage, amicus curiae. Murphy L. Clark, Anchorage, for City & Borough of Juneau, amicus curiae. Before BOOCHEVER, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, CONNOR and BURKE, JJ., and DIMOND, J. Pro Tem. RABINOWITZ, Justice. The central issue in this appeal involves a challenge to the notice of claims for injuries section of the Anchorage City Charter which provides, in part: Appellant Rosemary DeHusson, as representative of the estate of Walter DeHusson, instituted a wrongful death action in the superior court against appellee City of Anchorage and several construction companies for the death of her minor son, Walter, who drowned when swept underwater through an open spillway into a large culvert which was part of the Westchester Lagoon recreation project under construction by the city of Anchorage and its contractors. No notice of claim as required by the Anchorage City Charter was given to the municipality within the prescribed 120-day period. Subsequent to appellant's commencement of the superior court action, the municipality moved for summary judgment upon the ground that appellant had not complied with the notice of claim requirements of Section 1.10 of the Charter of the City of Anchorage. The superior court granted the motion for summary judgment and this appeal followed.[2] Our recent opinion in Johnson v. City of Fairbanks, 583 P.2d 181 (Alaska, 1978) is dispositive of the instant case; accordingly, it is unnecessary to reach the issues argued by appellant. In Johnson, we concluded that a similar notice of claims provision in the Fairbanks City Charter[3] was invalid *793 because impliedly prohibited by the two-year statute of limitations: Accordingly, Section 1.10 of the Anchorage City Charter, which bars actions against the city unless the required notice of claim has been filed within 120 days after the injury occurs, is invalid. The superior court's grant of summary judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. MATTHEWS, J., not participating. RABINOWITZ, Justice, with whom BOOCHEVER, Chief Justice, joins concurring. In my view, Section 1.10 of the Anchorage City Charter violates Alaska's constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law. In support of her equal protection attack, appellant argues that the Anchorage Charter's 120-day notice of claim provision discriminates in favor of governmental and against non-governmental tort-feasors, as well as imposing substantial and costly burdens on the victims of governmental torts which are not borne by individuals who have been harmed by the conduct of non-governmental tort-feasors. Thus, the essence of appellant's equal protection argument is that the effect of the notice of claim provision is to arbitrarily divide all tort-feasors into two classifications: private tort-feasors to whom no notice is owed and governmental tort-feasors to whom notice is owed. In appellant's view, the Charter provision also has the effect of dividing the victims of tort-feasors into two arbitrary classes: victims of private tort-feasors who are not subject to the notice requirement, and victims of governmental tort-feasors who are subject to the notice of claim requirements of the Anchorage Charter. Given these classifications, appellant concludes: Appellant's equal protection arguments find judicial support in several jurisdictions. In Reich v. State Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700, 702 (Mich. 1972), the Supreme Court of Michigan observed: In Reich, the Michigan Supreme Court declared the notice of claim provisions unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.[1]Reich has been followed by the Supreme Court of Nevada in Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079, 94 S. Ct. 598, 38 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1973). And of particular significance is the Supreme Court of Washington's decision in Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975). In echoing the classification discussion of the Reich court, the Washington court, in Hunter, observed: In the Hunter court's view, the foregoing classifications flowing from the "nonclaim" statute constituted a barrier to suit for a significant number of victims of governmental "misfeasance." Noting that it is "a rare plaintiff who happens to know of the short notice period he must comply with, or to consult a lawyer before his time to file has expired,"[3] the Hunter court commenced its equal protection analysis by stating: *795 After analyzing the differences advanced to support the classifications created by the Washington "nonclaim" statute,[5] the Hunter court concluded that "the arbitrary burden placed on state claimants by this type of statute cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny."[6] In opposition to the foregoing authorities, appellee City of Anchorage points out that the Supreme Court of Michigan's opinion in the Reich case has been rejected by eight jurisdictions as well as the District of Columbia. Notice of claims provisions have been upheld on the grounds that there exists a rational basis for the legislative classifications created by the notice provisions, and that the notice provisions established by state law are conclusive evidence that the sovereign's waiver of governmental immunity was only conditional or partial.[7] Note, Notice of Claim Provisions: An Equal Protection Perspective, 60 Cornell L.Rev. 417, 431 (1975). In particular, the City of Anchorage argues that "Reich and its progeny have chosen to ignore ... the large number of legitimate state purposes advanced by the notice provision" of the Anchorage Charter. Specifically, appellee contends that the notice and claim provision of the Anchorage Charter serves a variety of legitimate governmental purposes because it enables the city: In light of the foregoing justifications advanced in support of the Anchorage Charter's notice of claim requirement, it is the task of the judiciary to determine whether these asserted grounds of justification pass constitutional muster under appropriate equal protection tests. Turning first to the nature of the right involved, appellant contends that this court should hold that "redress in tort is deserving of the status of a fundamental right, entitled to heightened equal protection scrutiny under Alaska law."[9] Appellant argues that the *796 individual's right to meaningful redress is a "fundamental" right[10] and, therefore, that the municipality must demonstrate a compelling state interest justifying the subject notice of claim provision. Despite the foregoing, I find it unnecessary to determine whether the nature of the right involved is of fundamental proportions and calls for application of the compelling state interest standard of equal protection analysis.[11] I deem it sufficient to note that important rights of redress of persons harmed by governmental conduct are involved, as well as equally significant concomitant rights of access to judicial forums for the adjudication of liability and damage issues flowing from such governmental conduct. Given that these rights are important, I have concluded appellant has demonstrated that the distinctions drawn by the Charter's notice of claim provision between governmental and private tort-feasors are arbitrary and that the resultant categories are suspect. Consequently, the City of Anchorage must meet a significant burden in demonstrating that the distinctions and classifications created by the Charter provision have a fair and substantial relation to legitimate governmental objectives. In choosing to apply the foregoing equal protection test, I would take this occasion to reiterate this court's holding in Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362-63 (Alaska 1976).[12] There we said, in part: Application of the Isakson v. Rickey equal protection test to the purported justifications which have been advanced by appellees and the amicus, in the context of the particular rights involved in the instant litigation, has led me to the conclusion that the Charter provision in question violates the equal protection provision of Alaska's constitution. In reaching this conclusion, I find the reasoning of the Washington Supreme Court in Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975), highly persuasive. I agree with the Washington court's evaluation of the importance of the injured claimant's rights upon which notice of claims statutes, ordinances, or charter provisions impinge. As stated previously, I am also in accord with that court's conclusion that operation of such notice of claim requirements has the effect of creating arbitrary classes of tort-feasors and arbitrary classifications of tort victims. Due to such classifications, governmental tort-feasors are afforded a procedural advantage not available to nongovernmental tort-feasors; further, only victims of governmental negligence face a substantial *797 burden on the right to bring an action against their wrongdoers within the applicable statute of limitations. In Hunter, the Supreme Court of Washington addressed the "ground of difference" most frequently advanced as a justification for the special requirement that notice statutes place on claimants, namely, the size and variety of governmental institutions and activities. In disposing of this justification, the Hunter court stated, in part: In my view, all the justifications advanced in the instant case by appellee regarding the municipality's need for prompt investigation[15] do not relate to any peculiar need of the municipality which supports the requirement of special notice from a victim of the municipality's tortious conduct. All tort-feasors have a similar interest in the prompt investigation of claims; all victims have a similar interest in obtaining redress for their injuries. As was noted by the Hunter court, most governmental units are better equipped to investigate and defend negligence actions than are private tort-feasors.[16] Regarding the proferred justification that the notice of claim provision fulfills the need of the city to know of and correct offending conditions, I think there is merit in appellant's position that there is no greater need to know of hazards in order to repair and avoid further injuries solely because the entity responsible is a governmental unit. In this regard, the Hunter court stated: "Similarly, the importance of immediate knowledge of hazards in order to make repairs and avoid further injuries ... is no greater because the entity *798 responsible for them happens to be part of the government."[17] As to the purported justification that the notice of claim provision is required in order to enable the City Assembly to budget for payment of the claims, the Hunter court commented: Tort damages are speculative until they have been settled through the process of negotiation or by judicial proceedings. Therefore, early knowledge of the existence of possible claims will not have a significant impact on fiscal planning by governmental units. The fact that insurance is becoming harder and more expensive to obtain is not unique to governments; nor are the reasons for higher costs of liability and risk management different for government than they are for private persons or corporations. I cannot accept the additional argument advanced by the amicus Municipal Attorneys' Association that "fundamental differences" exist between municipal and private entities. The amicus asserts that a higher duty is imposed upon municipalities because (1) taxpayers, not stockholders, support the government, and (2) vital services are provided by municipalities which cannot be curtailed. Here, I am persuaded by appellant's analysis that this "fundamental differences" justification In light of the foregoing, I conclude that the justifications advanced in support of the constitutionality of the classifications created by Section 1.10 of the Anchorage City Charter are insufficient when analyzed under the equal protection test adopted in Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 361-63 (Alaska 1976). Therefore, I would hold that the classifications created by the notice of claim requirement between victims of governmental and nongovernmental tortious conduct, as well as between governmental and private tort-feasors, are arbitrary classifications which are not grounded upon fair and substantial distinctions between governmental units on the one hand and private individuals and corporations on the other and thus violate Alaska's constitutional guarantee of equal protection. [1] Section 1.10, Anchorage City Charter. Subsections (c) and (d) of this section read: (c) Failure to give notice of injury or present a claim within the time and in the manner provided shall bar any action upon such claim. (d) This section shall not be deemed to waive any defense of immunity which the city may have from claims for damages arising out of negligence, but shall apply in all cases where such defense is not available to the city. The applicable state statute of limitations is found in AS 09.10.070 and provides: No person may bring an action (1) for libel, slander, assault, battery, seduction, false imprisonment, or for any injury to the person or right of another not arising on contract and not specifically provided otherwise ... unless commenced within two years. [2] Appellant seeks to raise three issues in this appeal: (1) Whether Section 1.10 of the Anchorage City Charter, providing for a 120-day period within which a claimant must supply the city with written notice of his or her tort claim as a condition precedent to holding the city liable, violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Alaska constitutions; (2) Whether the superior court was correct in ruling that the city was not estopped to raise the defense of failure to give notice pursuant to Section 1.10; (3) Whether Section 1.10 of the City Charter of Anchorage, regarding "injury," is applicable to cases involving death. A few states recently have agreed with appellant's equal protection argument and have invalidated notice of claims provisions on the ground that equal protection guarantees would be violated by dividing tort victims into two subclasses: the victims of governmental negligence who must meet notice requirements and the victims of private negligence who are subject to no such requirements. See Reich v. State Highway Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972); Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079, 94 S. Ct. 598, 38 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1973); Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975). The notice of claim provisions considered by these courts were contained in state statutes rather than in municipal charters or ordinances. Criticism of the Reich opinion can be found in Copperrider, The Court, the Legislature, and Governmental Tort Liability In Michigan, 72 Mich.L.Rev. 187, 272 (1973). Other courts have upheld notice of claims provisions on the ground that a rational basis exists for the legislative classifications created by the notice provisions and that the sovereign's waiver of governmental immunity was only conditional or partial. See Note, Notice of Claim Provision: An Equal Protection Perspective, 60 Cornell L.Rev. 417, 431 (1975). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we need not reach appellant's constitutional argument. [3] See Johnson v. City of Fairbanks, 583 P.2d 181 at 182, n. 3, (Alaska, 1978). [4] Id. at 187 (footnote omitted). [1] Unlike AS 09.50.250 which provides for waiver of sovereign immunity by the State of Alaska, the statute waiving sovereign immunity which was considered by the Supreme Court of Michigan contained an explicit notice of claim requirement. Criticism of the Reich opinion can be found in Copperrider, The Court, the Legislature, and Governmental Tort Liability In Michigan, 72 Mich.L.Rev. 187, 272 (1973). See also AS 09.65.070 which provided at the time the suit was filed: (a) An action may be maintained against an incorporated borough, city, or other public corporation of like character in its corporate character and within the scope of its authority, or for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff arising from some act or omission of the unit of local government. [2] Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845, 847 (1975) (footnotes omitted). In Alaska the applicable statute of limitations is two years. AS 09.10.070 provides in part: Actions to be brought in two years. No person may bring an action (1) ... for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising on contract and not specifically provided otherwise ... unless commenced within two years. [3] Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845, 848 (1975) (footnote omitted). [4] Id. 539 P.2d at 848. [5] I will discuss these and other alleged justifications subsequently. [6] Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845, 851 (1975). [7] See Binder v. City of Madison, 72 Wis.2d 613, 241 N.W.2d 613 (1976); Stanley v. City and County of San Francisco, 48 Cal. App. 3d 575, 121 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1975); Wilson v. District of Columbia, 338 A.2d 437 (D.C.Ct.App. 1975); Batchelder v. Haxby, 337 N.E.2d 887 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711, 535 P.2d 1348 (1975), appeal dismissed sub nom. Agost v. Idaho, 423 U.S. 993, 96 S. Ct. 419, 46 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1975); Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1973); Guarrera v. A.L. Lee Memorial Hosp., 51 A.D.2d 867, 380 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1976), appeal dismissed sua sponte, 39 N.Y.2d 942, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1029; Tessier v. Ann & Hope Factory Outlet, Inc., 114 R.I. 315, 332 A.2d 781 (1975); Awe v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97 (Wyo. 1975). [8] Amicus Municipal Attorneys' Association additionally argues in its brief that "compliance with notice of claim provisions soon after the occurrence allows the city or its insurance adjusters to investigate the facts of the claim while they are still available." In making this argument, the Association further contends that "fundamental differences between municipalities and private corporations impose upon the former a higher requirement of efficiency and economy in risk management than in comparably sized private entities." This "high duty" is alleged to arise because the tax paying public supports municipal government and for the further reason that municipalities provide vital public services which cannot be permitted to be curtailed or eliminated by poor risk management. [9] When presented with federal equal protection assertions and when fundamental rights or suspect categories are involved, this court is required to apply the "compelling state interest" standard. [10] Appellant relies upon the following cases to illustrate the "centrality of reasonable redress in the American system of justice." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377, 91 S. Ct. 780, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113, 118 (1971); Payne v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles County, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405, 553 P.2d 565, 570-71 (1976); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70, 72 (1962). Also relied upon by appellant are the dissenting opinions of Justice McQuade in Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711, 535 P.2d 1348, 1356 n. 11 (1975), appeal dismissed sub nom. Agost v. Idaho, 423 U.S. 993, 96 S. Ct. 419, 46 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1975), and Justice Reynoldson in Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904, 908-10 (Iowa 1973). [11] This court has previously discussed the varying equal protection tests in Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362-63 (Alaska 1976); Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700, 706-07 (Alaska 1975); State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125, 1127 n. 12 (Alaska 1974); and State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 145 n. 4 (Alaska 1973). [12] See also State v. Reefer King Co., Inc., 559 P.2d 56, 65 (Alaska 1976). [13] Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). [14] Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845, 849 (1975). See Judge Staton's dissenting opinion in Batchelder v. Haxby, 337 N.E.2d 887, 890-91 (Ind. App. 1975), in which he writes: Repeatedly, the stated purpose of the notice provision ... has been to inform the government entity so that it may investigate the claim, prepare its defense, or settle the claim. In light of this purpose, I can perceive of no rational basis for the distinction between similarly situated tortfeasors and victims on the basis of the tortfeasor's status as a governmental or a private entity. All tortfeasors have a similar interest in the prompt investigation of claims, in settlement, and in the preparation of a defense. All victims have a similar interest in seeking redress for their injuries. (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted) [15] See justifications 1-4 set forth at page 11, supra. [16] As to the asserted justification that the 120-day notice provision protects the city from unreasonable claims, I think the comments of Justice Reynoldson, in his dissent in Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904, 911 (Iowa 1973), are persuasive. Justice Reynoldson said: Even less valid is the frequently-encountered argument that a short-notice statute reduces the number of frivolous or fraudulent claims made against municipalities... . The municipality is protected from stale claims in the same manner as the private sector, that is, by the applicable statute of limitations. There is no good reason for it to enjoy an additional protection. See also Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845, 850 (1975). The court stated, in part: [F]ostering negotiation and settlement to reduce the amount of litigation ... is desirable no matter who the parties are. (citation omitted) [17] Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845, 850 (1975) (citation omitted). [18] Id. 539 P.2d at 849 (citation omitted). At the time of the death involved in this case, the city of Anchorage carried commercial insurance. According to the brief of the Municipal Attorneys' Association, the Municipality of Anchorage is presently a self-insurer. [19] See City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201, 206-09 (Alaska 1962), and note 1, supra. See also Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877, 882 (1973). In regard to this aspect of the case, the Hunter court stated: In light of [the absence of other justifications], the only function the special treatment given governmental bodies seems to perform is the simple protection of the government from liability for its wrongdoing. Our state has clearly and unequivocally abjured any desire to so insulate itself from liability, however, in its absolute waiver of sovereign immunity, which places the government on an equal footing with private parties defendant. ..... Any policy of placing roadblocks in the way of potential claimants against the state [thus] having been abandoned, we cannot uphold nonclaim statutes simply because they serve to protect the public treasury. Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845, 850 (1975).