Title: Schlegel v. Sweeney

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Schlegel v. Sweeney, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3841.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-3841 
SCHLEGEL v. SWEENEY, JUDGE, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Schlegel v. Sweeney, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3841.] 
Prohibition—Relator has an adequate remedy at law by way of an appeal following 
final judgment in common pleas court, and statute enacted after filing of 
appropriation action does not patently and unambiguously divest common 
pleas court of subject-matter jurisdiction—Writ denied. 
(No. 2022-0025—Submitted August 2, 2022—Decided November 1, 2022.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
DEWINE, J. 
{¶ 1} We are asked to issue a writ of prohibition to stop an ongoing 
appropriation case.  A lawsuit is pending in the Mahoning County Court of 
Common Pleas in which the Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District seeks to take 
Edward Schlegel’s property so it can build a bike trail.  During the pendency of the 
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case, the General Assembly passed a law that said that a park district in Mahoning 
County may not use its eminent-domain power to build a recreational trail. 
{¶ 2} Based on this new law, Schlegel filed suit in this court asking us to 
issue a writ of prohibition halting the Mahoning County appropriation proceeding.  
The new law, Schlegel argues, divests the Mahoning County court of jurisdiction.  
We are not convinced that the new law is a jurisdictional bar, so we deny Schlegel’s 
request for a writ of prohibition. 
I.  An appropriation action and a new law 
{¶ 3} In 2019, the Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District filed an 
appropriation action seeking to use its eminent-domain power to take Schlegel’s 
property in order to extend an existing bike trail.  While that case was pending, the 
General Assembly enacted a law (the “anti-appropriation provision”) that said, “No 
park district created under Chapter 1545. of the Revised Code and located in a 
county with not less than 220,000 and not more than 240,000 residents * * * shall 
appropriate property * * * for the purpose of providing a recreational trail.”  
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 110, Section 715.05(B). 
{¶ 4} Schlegel asked the court of common pleas to dismiss the 
appropriation case, pointing out that the park district was in Mahoning County and 
that the county fell within the designated population range.  Concluding that the 
statute was not retroactive, the court denied Schlegel’s motion to dismiss. 
{¶ 5} Schlegel then filed the instant lawsuit in this court seeking a writ of 
prohibition.  Judge Maureen Sweeney, who is presiding over the appropriation 
action, argues that the writ should be denied because Schlegel has an adequate 
remedy by way of appeal and her court has general subject-matter jurisdiction.  We 
previously granted an alternative writ in this matter to receive evidence and 
briefing.  166 Ohio St.3d 1482, 2022-Ohio-1284, 186 N.E.3d 813. 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
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II.  Schlegel is not entitled to a writ of prohibition 
{¶ 6} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Schlegel must establish that the 
trial court has exercised judicial power, that the court exceeded its authority, and 
that he lacks an adequate remedy for his injury in the ordinary course of law.  State 
ex rel. Drouhard v. Morrow Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 161 Ohio St.3d 357, 2020-Ohio-
4160, 163 N.E.3d 518, ¶ 17.  In the vast majority of cases, “a court having general 
subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party 
contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.”  State ex rel. Plant 
v. Cosgrove, 119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 893 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 5.  We 
dispense with the adequate-remedy requirement only in the limited circumstance 
when the inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks subject-matter 
jurisdiction over a cause of action.  State ex rel. Ohio Edison Co. v. Parrott, 73 
Ohio St.3d 705, 707, 654 N.E.2d 106 (1995). 
{¶ 7} Schlegel’s claim fails because he cannot meet the third prong: he has 
an adequate remedy at law by way of an appeal following final judgment in the 
common pleas court.  And he is unable to satisfy the narrow exception to the 
adequate-remedy requirement because he cannot demonstrate a patent and 
unambiguous lack of jurisdiction in the common pleas court. 
A.  Schlegel has an adequate remedy by way of appeal 
{¶ 8} The trial court held that the anti-appropriation provision does not 
apply to Schlegel’s case.  Schlegel can challenge that determination by filing an 
appeal from a final judgment of the common pleas court.  The availability of an 
“appeal is considered an adequate remedy that will preclude a writ of prohibition.”  
State ex rel. Huntington Natl. Bank v. Kontos, 145 Ohio St.3d 102, 2015-Ohio-
5190, 47 N.E.3d 133, ¶ 17. 
{¶ 9} Schlegel contends that he has no ability to appeal the trial court’s 
denial of the motion to dismiss because of the bifurcated nature of appropriation 
proceedings.  In an appropriation case, the court first decides whether the agency 
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may appropriate property, and second, if necessary, a jury determines the amount 
of compensation due.  R.C. 163.09(B)(2).  At the first step, the property owner in 
his answer may demand a prompt hearing to challenge the agency’s “right to make 
the appropriation.”  R.C. 163.09(B)(1).  And the owner may immediately appeal an 
adverse order issued after that hearing.  R.C. 163.09(B)(3).  Schlegel contends that 
because the anti-appropriation provision was not in effect when he filed his answer, 
he was unable to raise his anti-appropriation-provision argument in a hearing on 
the agency’s right to make the appropriation and, thus, has lost his right to appeal 
the trial court’s decision that the statute is not retroactive.  But that’s not correct. 
{¶ 10} In addition to the right to an immediate appeal following a hearing 
on the agency’s right to make the appropriation, a property owner in an 
appropriation case may appeal from the final judgment following a compensation 
trial “as in other civil actions from the judgment of the court.”  R.C. 163.19.  Thus, 
once the compensation trial is complete, Schlegel may appeal from “the final 
judgment adjudicating both the validity of the taking and the compensation due.”  
(Emphasis in original.)  State ex rel. Bohlen v. Halliday, 164 Ohio St.3d 121, 2021-
Ohio-194, 172 N.E.3d 114, ¶ 22; see also R.C. 2505.02 (providing for an appeal 
from a final order).  Because Schlegel has an adequate remedy by way of appeal, 
he may not obtain a writ of prohibition unless he can show that the trial court 
patently and unambiguously lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. 
B.  The trial court does not patently and unambiguously lack subject-matter 
jurisdiction 
{¶ 11} Schlegel next argues that he is entitled to relief because it is patent 
and unambiguous that the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.  He asserts 
that the court “cannot possibly have jurisdiction over illegal takings.” 
{¶ 12} We have explained that “[w]hen a court has the constitutional or 
statutory power to adjudicate a particular class or type of case, that court has 
subject-matter jurisdiction.”  Ostanek v. Ostanek, 166 Ohio St.3d 1, 2021-Ohio-
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2319, 181 N.E.3d 1162, ¶ 36, citing Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., 162 Ohio St.3d 
639, 2020-Ohio-5220, 166 N.E.3d 1180, ¶ 14.  Common pleas courts “have such 
original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters * * * as may be provided by law.”  
Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 4(B).  And the Eminent Domain Act 
provides jurisdiction in appropriation cases to the court of common pleas in the 
“county in which the property sought to be appropriated is located.”  R.C. 
163.01(D) and 163.05. 
{¶ 13} Schlegel does not dispute that the Mahoning County Court of 
Common Pleas had subject-matter jurisdiction when the suit was filed, but he 
contends that the anti-appropriation provision divested the court of jurisdiction 
when it took effect.  We disagree.  Schlegel’s position conflates the court’s 
“subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case” with its “legal authority to grant the 
relief sought,” Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman, 157 Ohio St.3d 296, 
2019-Ohio-2845, 136 N.E.3d 436, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 14} When a court of common pleas patently and unambiguously lacks 
jurisdiction to hear a case, “it is almost always because a statute explicitly removed 
that jurisdiction.”  Id. at ¶ 9.  The statute at issue here provides that “[n]o park 
district” in a county with a qualifying population “shall appropriate property * * * 
for the purpose of providing a recreational trail.”  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 110, Section 
715.05(B).  By its terms, that language limits the appropriation authority of certain 
park districts, not the jurisdiction of a court.  In contrast, “[j]urisdictional statutes 
‘speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the 
parties.’ ”  Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 
L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), quoting Republic Natl. Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 
U.S. 80, 100, 113 S.Ct. 554, 121 L.Ed.2d 474 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
{¶ 15} We expect the General Assembly to speak in clear terms when 
limiting jurisdiction.  If the legislature “does not rank a statutory limitation on 
coverage as jurisdictional,” then “courts should treat the restriction as 
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nonjurisdictional in character.”  Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-516, 
126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006).  The anti-appropriation provision does 
not contain any explicit language of jurisdictional consequence.  See Cincinnati v. 
Fourth Natl. Realty, L.L.C., 163 Ohio St.3d 409, 2020-Ohio-6802, 170 N.E.3d 832, 
¶ 10.  Thus, even if we assume that the anti-appropriation provision applies, the law 
does not alter the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. 
{¶ 16} Because the anti-appropriation provision does not patently and 
unambiguously eliminate the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction, the court “can determine its own jurisdiction, and [Schlegel] 
has an adequate remedy by appeal,” Plant, 119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 
893 N.E.2d 485, at ¶ 5. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 17} Because he has an adequate remedy by way of an appeal and the trial 
court does not patently lack jurisdiction, Schlegel is not entitled to a writ of 
prohibition. 
Writ denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DONNELLY, STEWART, and 
BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Johnson & Johnson Law Firm and Molly K. Johnson, for relator. 
Comstock, Springer & Wilson Co., L.P.A., and Marshall D. Buck, for 
respondents Mahoning County Common Pleas Court Judge Maureen Sweeney, 
Mahoning County Auditor Ralph T. Meacham, and Mahoning County Treasurer 
Daniel R. Yemma. 
Roth, Blair, Roberts, Strasfeld & Lodge, L.P.A., James E. Roberts, and 
Elizabeth H. Farbman, for respondent Board of Commissioners of the Mill Creek 
Metropolitan Park District. 
_________________