Title: Howell v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
LLOYD DAREN HOWELL 
 
v.  Record No. 070150 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
November 2, 2007 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
In this appeal, we consider whether a trial court may 
require a defendant to pay for the installation of a security 
system as restitution for a criminal offense.  For the reasons 
stated below, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be 
reversed. 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
On November 25, 2004, Laurice and Patrick Thomas 
discovered that the building where their tax service business 
is located in the City of Roanoke had been burglarized.  
Windows had been broken and a computer, two printers, 
calculators, an “open” sign, and a number of smaller items 
were missing.  Upon police investigation, fingerprints from 
the broken glass were found to match those of Lloyd Daren 
Howell (“Howell”).  After the burglary, Mr. and Mrs. Thomas 
installed a security system in the building. 
 
At trial, Howell pled guilty to statutory burglary and 
grand larceny.  He was sentenced for these charges in 
combination with a plea of guilty on an unrelated robbery 
charge.  Howell was sentenced to 25 years with 14 years 
 
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suspended for robbery, 10 years with 6 years suspended for 
burglary, and 5 years with 4 years suspended for grand 
larceny.  As conditions of his suspended sentence, the trial 
court imposed five years of probation and restitution of 
$1,399.00.  Of this restitution amount, $1,040.00 was for the 
installation of the security system and included eight months 
of service monitoring charges.* 
 
Howell objected to the portion of the restitution amount 
that related to the security system.  He appealed to the Court 
of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment in an 
unpublished opinion.  Howell v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2847-
05-3 (December 19, 2006).  The Court of Appeals held that 
“[t]he condition was reasonably related to Howell’s criminal 
activities and . . . therefore, was an appropriate exercise of 
the trial court’s judicial discretion under Code § 19.2-303.”  
Id., slip op. at 4.  We awarded Howell an appeal upon one 
assignment of error: “The trial court erred in ordering Howell 
to pay as restitution the cost of the security system 
installed at Thomas Tax Service after the burglary.” 
II.  Analysis 
Sentencing determinations are within the discretion of 
the trial court, and will be reversed if the trial court 
                     
* As a result of a clerical error, the restitution amount 
from the burglary and grand larceny of Thomas Tax Services was 
included in the Sentencing Order from the unrelated robbery 
charge. 
 
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abused its discretion.  See e.g., Lane v. Commonwealth, 223 
Va. 713, 719, 292 S.E.2d 358, 362  (1982) (citations omitted); 
see also Martin v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d 
___, ___ (2007) (this day decided). 
The statutes dealing with probation and suspension are 
remedial and intended to give the trial court valuable tools 
to help rehabilitate an offender through the use of probation, 
suspension of all or part of a sentence, and/or restitution 
payments.  See Peyton v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 503, 508, 604 
S.E.2d 17, 19 (2004); Code §§ 19.2-303 to -306. “Restitution” 
is defined, in pertinent part, as “a restoration of something 
to its rightful owner: the making good of or giving an 
equivalent for some injury (as a loss of or damage to 
property).”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1936 
(1993). 
The General Assembly has limited the scope of restitution 
a court may order to payments for “damages or losses caused by 
the offense.”  Code § 19.2-303 provides in relevant part 
[a]fter conviction, . . . the court may . . . 
suspend the sentence in whole or part and . . . 
may, as a condition of a suspended sentence, 
require the defendant to make at least partial 
restitution to the aggrieved party or parties 
for damages or loss caused by the offense for 
which convicted. 
Restitution ordered as a condition of a suspended sentence is 
subject to Code § 19.2-305(B) which provides that “[a] 
 
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defendant placed on probation following conviction may be 
required to make at least partial restitution . . . for 
damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was 
had.”  Code § 19.2-305.1(A) also provides that “no person 
convicted of a crime . . . which resulted in property damage 
or loss, shall be placed on probation or have his sentence 
suspended unless such person shall make at least partial 
restitution for such property damage or loss.” 
 
The Commonwealth contends that after the burglary the 
Thomases were afraid, and that Mrs. Thomas was not comfortable 
being alone at the business.  The Thomases stated that “they 
felt forced to install a new security system at their 
business” after the burglary.  Consequently, the Commonwealth 
maintains that the installation of the security system was 
“damages or loss caused by” Howell’s burglary of the building 
as envisioned by the applicable provisions of the Code.  We 
disagree. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, considering a federal statute similar to ours, has 
interpreted the language “actual damages or loss caused by the 
offense” to limit the damages or loss which the defendant can 
be ordered to repay to “those which were directly caused by 
the offense.”  See United States v. McMichael, 699 F.2d 193, 
195 (4th Cir. 1983).  Costs that result only indirectly from 
 
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the offense, that are a step removed from the defendant’s 
conduct, are too remote and are inappropriate for a 
restitution payment.  In another case, the Fourth Circuit 
considered reimbursement to the government for costs 
associated with investigation and prosecution.  Using the same 
federal statutory provision, the court stated “[w]e do not 
read the language . . . to authorize reimbursement . . . [for] 
costs [that] result only indirectly from the offense.”  United 
States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir. 1980). 
A Kansas statute that limits restitution to “damage or 
loss caused by the defendant’s crime” has likewise been 
interpreted to mean that not all consequences of the offense 
are appropriate for restitution.  The Supreme Court of Kansas 
held that “[r]estitution orders must have limitations.  Not 
all tangential costs incurred as a result of a crime should be 
subject to restitution.” State v. Beechum, 833 P.2d 988, 994 
(Kan. 1992). 
The Kansas Court of Appeals, in a case holding that a 
restitution order was improper, held that there was not 
sufficient evidence to require the defendant to pay for the 
installation of a security system.  State v. Chambers, 138 
P.3d 405, 414-15 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).  The trial court had 
ordered the defendant to pay for the installation of a 
security system in the building that he burglarized, finding 
 
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that it was “ ‘a direct causal effect’ ” of the crime.  Id. at 
414.  The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed this portion of the 
restitution order, explaining that “the purchase of the 
security system was prompted by concern that [defendant], a 
neighbor of the victim, would reoffend, but this purchase was 
an example of ‘tangential costs incurred as a result of a 
crime,’ not a cost caused by the crime.”  Id. at 415. 
We hold that the installation of a security system, while 
related to Howell’s burglary, was not caused by the offense as 
required by Code §§ 19.2-303, -305(B), -305.1(A).  The 
attenuation is too great; therefore, we hold that the trial 
court abused its discretion by requiring Howell to pay the 
cost of the security system as restitution. 
III.  Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals will be 
reversed as to the portion of the restitution amount 
related to the security system.  The case will be 
remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to 
remand to the trial court for corrections to Howell’s 
sentencing orders.  
Reversed in part 
                                       and remanded.