Title: Donald v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SHAUN S. DONALD,   
 
§ 
§ 
No.  256, 2005 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of the 
§ 
State of Delaware in and for 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Kent County 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
§ 
No. 0411003103 
§ 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted: April 12, 2006 
Decided: June 27, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, and 
RIDGELY, Justices constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
Ronald G. Poliquin, Esquire of Dover, Delaware for Appellant. 
 
John Williams, Esquire of the Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware for 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RIDGELY, Justice: 
 
2
Defendant-Appellant Shaun S. Donald appeals the Superior Court’s denial 
of her motion to suppress evidence.  She was convicted of maintaining a dwelling 
for keeping controlled substances, conspiracy second degree, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, and possession of a non-narcotic schedule I controlled substance.1  
On appeal, Donald challenges the reasonableness of an administrative search of the 
residence she shared with Terrance Harrison, who was on probation.   
We conclude that the administrative search did not violate Donald’s rights 
under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because the officers had 
consent to search the home from the probationer who lived there, reasonable 
grounds existed to support the search, and Donald did not object to the search of 
the residence she shared with Harrison.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
I. 
Background 
On November 4, 2004, Corporal David S. Hake, Jr. of the Delaware State 
Police stopped a vehicle operated by Terrance Harrison for registration and turn 
signal violations.2  Once stopped, Corporal Hake discovered that Harrison was 
wanted for a probation violation.  Furthermore, Corporal Hake noticed marijuana 
on Harrison’s shirt. During a search of Harrison’s vehicle, approximately four 
grams of crack cocaine, a marijuana cigar, a three-inch knife, and bottle of alcohol 
                                          
 
1 In violation of 16 Del. C. § 4755(a)(5), 11 Del. C. § 512(2), 16 Del. C. § 4771(a), and 16 Del. 
C. § 4754(a), respectively. 
2 There was a passenger, Lavar Lewis, with Harrison when he was stopped by Hakes. 
 
3
were discovered.  Corporal Hake, a member of the Governor’s Drug Task Force, 
called for the assistance of two Probation officers, Ramburg and Wheeler, who 
later arrived at the scene.  Harrison and his passenger were arrested and taken to 
Delaware State Police Troop 3.   
Harrison told the officers that he lived with his girlfriend, Defendant Shaun 
S. Donald.  He gave his address as the house occupied by him and Donald in 
Magnolia, Delaware.  Donald herself was not on probation.  A pay stub found in 
the driver’s side door of the vehicle and dated only a few days earlier corroborated 
this address as his home.  This was not the address listed in Harrison’s probation 
records, however. 
Probation Officer Ramsburg sought and received permission from his 
supervisor to conduct an administrative search of the house, because Ramsburg 
believed there were exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search for 
further evidence of illegal drug activity.  Corporal Hake believed that word of 
Harrison’s arrest would spread and that evidence at the residence would be 
destroyed.     
Shortly after midnight, Corporal Hake accompanied Officers Ramburg and 
Wheeler to Harrison’s residence.  They knocked on the door and Donald answered.  
The probation officers informed her that they were there to search the residence 
because Harrison had been arrested for drug charges and was in violation of his 
 
4
probation.  Donald verified that Harrison did in fact live at her residence as her 
live-in boyfriend.     
Donald did not object to Ramburg and Wheeler entering the residence and 
beginning an administrative search.  After Ramburg and Wheeler commenced the 
search, Corporal Hake asked Donald for her consent for him to join in the 
administrative search, and she gave it.  Once the officers were inside the home, the 
evidence used to convict Donald was found in plain view.     
Prior to trial, Donald moved to suppress the evidence seized at her home.  
The Superior Court denied the motion, holding that the administrative search of 
Harrison’s residence by the probation officers was reasonable.  The Superior Court 
also found that the probation officers had acted reasonably in determining that the 
home was in fact Harrison’s residence.   
II. 
Discussion 
On appeal, Donald challenges the Superior Court’s denial of her motion to 
suppress the evidence found in her home during the search.  We review the 
Superior Court’s denial of a motion to suppress after an evidentiary hearing for 
abuse of discretion.3  Where it is claimed that the Superior Court erred in 
formulating and applying the law to undisputed facts, our review is de novo.4   
 
                                          
 
3 Norcross v. State, 816 A.2d 757, 762 (Del. 2003). 
4 Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 860 (Del. 1999). 
 
5
A. The Officers Had Reasonable Grounds to Search the Home. 
Donald’s first claim is that the probation officers did not have reasonable 
grounds to believe that Harrison might be involved in criminal activity and that 
evidence would be at the home, even after Harrison was arrested for having drugs 
in his car.  If there were reasonable grounds, the probation officers would be 
justified in conducting a warrantless administrative search of a probationer’s 
residence.  As a condition of his probation, Harrison had agreed to allow probation 
officers to search his home pursuant to Delaware Department of Corrections 
regulations.5   
Both the United States and Delaware constitutions protect ordinary citizens 
from unreasonable searches and seizures.6  As part of their criminal sanctions, 
probationers do not have the same liberties as ordinary citizens.7  This Court has 
held that administrative searches of probationer homes require only reasonable 
                                          
 
5 See also United States v. Knights, 534 A.2d 112, 121 (2001); Fuller v. State, 844 A.2d 290, 292 
(Del. 2004). 
6 U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Del. Const. Art I, § 6.  We previously summarized the protections 
afforded by the federal and Delaware Constitutions against unreasonable searches in Scott v. 
State: 
The United States and Delaware Constitutions protect the right of persons to be 
secure from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Searches and seizures are per se 
unreasonable, in the absence of exigent circumstances, unless authorized by a warrant 
supported by probable cause.  A recognized exception to the warrant requirement, 
however, is for searches that are conducted pursuant to a valid consent. 
To be valid, a consent to search must be voluntary.  The person giving such 
consent must also have the authority to do so.  Third party authority to consent to a search 
must include both possession and equal or greater control, vis-a-vis the owner, over the 
area to be searched.  Scott v. State, 672 A.2d 550, 552 (Del. 1996).   
7 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119 (Del. 2002).   
 
6
grounds, even if the probation officers do not satisfy each technical requirement of 
the search and seizure regulations of the Department of Correction.8  The special 
nature of probationary supervision justifies a departure from the usual warrant and 
probable cause requirements for searches, but a search of a probationer’s home 
must be reasonable.9   
The Superior Court concluded that a reasonable suspicion existed in this 
case to search Harrison’s residence: 
The remaining issue is whether Probation Officer Ramsburg had 
reasonable suspicion to search Harrison’s residence.  Mr. Ramsburg 
arrived at the scene of a traffic stop of a vehicle that was believed to 
be registered to the Defendant.  Harrison, wanted for violation of 
probation, was the driver of the vehicle.  A green leafy substance, 
believed to be and field tested positive for marijuana, was located on 
Harrison’s shirt.  Harrison admitted to the officers that he was 
smoking marijuana.  A bottle of gin and a bottle of brandy were also 
found in the vehicle.  Harrison, who was under the age of 21, also 
admitted to drinking that evening.  The most important discovery to 
this case, however, was found in the pocket of the driver’s side door.  
Located there was a baggie that contained 9 loose rocks of crack 
cocaine and 1 piece of crack cocaine that was sealed in a little zip lock 
bag.  The rocks were weighed and determined to be approximately 4 
grams.  Based on the quantity, packaging and location of the cocaine 
in the vehicle, the Officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that 
Harrison was engaging in the distribution of crack cocaine. 
 
We agree.  Further, there was evidence linking Harrison to the place to be 
searched -- Donald’s home.  Harrison told the officers that he lived with Donald.  
He gave them the address, which was corroborated by his recent pay-stub with 
                                          
 
8 See, e.g., Fuller v. State, 844 A.2d 290, 292 (Del. 2004) (citations and footnotes omitted).   
9 Fuller, 844 A.2d at 292 (citing Griffin, 3483 U.S. at 873-74). 
 
7
Donald’s address printed on it.  Based on the totality of the circumstances, we 
conclude that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the 
administrative search of Harrison’s home was reasonable.   
B.  The Fourth Amendment does not Require Express Consent 
from a Co-Occupant Present at Commencement of the Search 
when an Absent Co-Occupant Has Given Express Consent. 
 
We next examine whether the Fourth Amendment requires officers to obtain 
the express consent of a co-occupant who is present at the commencement of a 
search, when an absent co-occupant has already provided his or her consent.  This 
Court has required a party who gives consent to have authority to do so, holding 
that a joint possessor of property may give consent to search jointly held property.  
Any evidence seized as a result of such a search may be used against the other 
occupant if the consenting party has sufficient control over premises to bind the 
joint possessor to his consent.10  “Sufficient control” is: 
more frequently predicated upon a joint and equal possession and 
control of the premises searched.  The line of reasoning which 
underlies the joint control doctrine may be stated as follows: the 
consenting person has the authority, acting in his own behalf and not 
as agent for the non-consenter, to permit a search of premises to 
which he has immediate right of possession and control; a search 
pursuant 
to 
such 
consent 
is 
reasonable, 
absent 
other 
circumstances tending to make it unreasonable; evidence that is the 
product of a reasonable search may be used against anyone. 
Thus, where two or more persons have joint and equal possession and 
control of the premises, the prevailing rule is that any one of them 
                                          
 
10 See Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262 (Del. 1967), aff'd on other grounds, 240 A.2d 146 (Del. 
1968), aff'd, 395 U.S. 213 (1969).   
 
8
may consent to a search; and the evidence thus disclosed may be used 
against any of them.11 
 
Thus, consent by a co-occupant may be sufficient as to other co-occupants.12 
Similarly in De Shields v. State,13 this Court reiterated that “[p]olice may 
conduct a warrantless search if consent is obtained from a third party who 
possesses common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or 
effects sought to be inspected.”14  Determining whether there is common authority 
is a factual question that requires the trial court to consider: 
the use of the property by persons generally having joint access or 
control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any 
of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own 
right and that others have assumed the risk that one of their number 
might permit the common area to be searched.15 
 
The United States Supreme Court held recently in Georgia v. Randolph that 
when a co-occupant is present and objects to a search, police may not search under 
the consent exception to the warrant requirement, despite having the consent of the 
other co-occupant.16  The Court applied “the rule that a physically present 
inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as to him, 
                                          
 
11 Jenkins, 230 A.2d at 271(quotations and footnote omitted).   
12 See, e.g., Jenkins, 230 A.2d 262. 
13 De Shields v. State, 534 A.2d 630 (Del. 1987). 
14 Id. at 643 (citations and quotations omitted). 
15 Id. (citations, quotations, and footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
16 Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1519 (March 22, 2006) (defining a co-occupant, co-
tenant, or co-inhabitant as one with common control and authority). 
 
9
regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.”17  “The constant element in 
assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness in consent cases … is the great 
significance given to widely shared social expectations…”18   
In Randolph the United States Supreme Court rejected what had been the 
majority rule allowing the consent of one owner to override the consent of another 
owner when both were present.  Thus, in situations where a non-probationer 
having common control and authority over a probationer’s home expressly objects 
to a warrantless search, there can be no search unless a valid exception to the 
requirement for a warrant applies.   
Donald invites us to expand Randolph and require officers affirmatively to 
seek consent from a co-occupant even when another co-occupant has already 
provided consent.  We decline to do so.  Police are not required “to take 
affirmative steps to find a potentially objecting co-tenant before acting on the 
permission they had already received.”19  Likewise, police are not required to take 
affirmative steps to seek consent from a potentially objecting co-tenant, even when 
present.  Applying Randolph to the facts before us, Donald could have prevented 
the search of her home without a warrant by expressly objecting to it.  She did not.  
                                          
 
17 Id. at 1528 (emphasis added).  It held, “a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence 
over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as 
reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident.”  Id. at 1526. 
18 Id. at 1521.   
19 United States v. McGregor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503 (D. Cal., Apr. 17, 2006).   
 
10
We view Randolph as requiring only that officers stop a warrantless search based 
upon the consent of a co-occupant when another co-occupant of the home 
expressly objects to the search.   
While a co-occupant does not forfeit her own Fourth Amendment rights by 
allowing a probationer to live with her, she must object to the search to which the 
probationer has consented in order to prevent a search without a warrant.  Because 
Donald did not do that, we conclude that the Superior Court did not err when it 
denied the motion to suppress.    
C. Even without the Police Officer’s Participation, the Evidence 
Would Have Been Found. 
 
Finally, we examine whether Donald’s consent to Corporal Hake’s request 
to join the probation officers in the search is relevant on appeal.  Donald contends 
that she believed she had no choice but to consent to the request from the police 
officer to join the search with the probation and parole officers because the 
probation officers were in her home and had begun their search.  She challenges 
the voluntariness of her consent to Corporal Hakes’ request to join in the search of 
the premises.   
We do not need to consider the merits of this claim.  Even if we were to 
accept her argument that her consent to Corporal Hake’s search was invalid, the 
outcome here would not be different.  The seized evidence was in plain view.  
Donald has not shown that the probation officers would not have found the 
 
11
evidence, nor has she shown that Corporal Hake was in a unique position to 
discover the evidence.   
III. 
Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.