Title: In reGorecki

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket Nos. 96299-Agenda 21-September 2003.
							In re MARY ELIZABETH GORECKI, Attorney, Respondent.
Opinion filed November 20, 2003.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	The respondent in this attorney discipline case, Mary Elizabeth
Gorecki, concedes that she violated the Illinois Rules of Professional
Conduct when she left three messages on a telephone answering
machine which falsely indicated that the president of the Kane County
board could be bribed into providing a county job. At issue in this case
is the appropriate sanction to impose for this misconduct. For the
reasons that follow, we suspend respondent's license to practice law
for a period of four months.
BACKGROUND
	In February 2001, the Administrator of the Illinois Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) filed a complaint
before the Hearing Board (see 166 Ill. 2d R. 753(b)) which alleged
that respondent left three messages on a telephone answering machine
stating that a county job could be obtained from the chairman of the
Kane County board, Mike McCoy, if payments were made to McCoy
under the guise of "campaign contributions." The complaint alleged
that the three messages were false, in that respondent had no reason
to believe that a job could be obtained by making payments to McCoy,
and, further, that respondent knew that making payments to McCoy
to secure employment with Kane County would be illegal or improper.
Based on the alleged misconduct, the respondent was charged with:
(1) stating or implying an ability to improperly influence a tribunal,
legislative body, government agency, or official in violation of Rule
8.4(a)(6) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (155 Ill. 2d R.
8.4(a)(6)); (2) engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4) of the Illinois Rules
of Professional Conduct (155 Ill. 2d R. 8.4(a)(4)); and (3) engaging
in conduct that tends to defeat the administration of justice or bring
the courts or legal profession into disrepute in violation of Supreme
Court Rule 771 (134 Ill. 2d R. 771).
	A disciplinary hearing was held before the Hearing Board in
November 2001. Evidence presented before the Hearing Board
established the following facts.
	Respondent has been licensed to practice law in this state since
November 1991. From 1991 to 1996, she served as an assistant
State's Attorney in the Kane County State's Attorney's office. In
1996, respondent entered private practice where she concentrated on
commercial matters. In September 1999, respondent announced her
candidacy for the office of State's Attorney of Kane County. In March
2000, respondent won the primary election and, in November 2000,
she was elected Kane County State's Attorney. Respondent was
serving as the State's Attorney of Kane County at the time of this
appeal.
	Sometime in 1998, while she was in private practice, respondent
was contacted by Jane Morrison, a deputy sheriff in Kane County and
the sister of a long-time friend of respondent. At the disciplinary
hearing, Morrison testified that she called respondent seeking help in
getting a job for her boyfriend, Eric O'Neil. O'Neil had earlier applied
for a job as a highway maintainer for the Kane County department of
transportation but had not received an offer.
	According to Morrison, respondent stated that she would make
some phone calls and get back to her. Sometime thereafter,
respondent phoned Morrison and left three messages on Morrison's
home answering machine. The messages were recorded on a cassette
tape, which Morrison kept. The recorded messages were played for
the Hearing Board and a transcript of the messages was admitted into
evidence. The first message stated:
			"Hey Jane, I talked to uh two people uhm, the first person
I talked to uhm who, you know, allegedly works inside uh,
started talking about Eric's interview, and you know said
something like oh 'He didn't interview well ...' And I said I
heard he interviewed great and you know I ... I just said and
I heard there like you it's allegedly test scores and there
weren't scores and this and that and the other thing and so I
just said okay thanks for the information. I talked to I went
back to my primary source, he just said, 'Meg, quit f-in'
around, get the money together and do it if you're gonna do
it, uhm just meet with your client, get the money, set up an
appointment with McCoy, you know, uhm, sit down, talk to
Eric about it uhm, you know.' There are no guarantees in life
but he said this is the only way to get it done. If you want the
job done uh, you take the bull by the horns and uh you offer
him the money, you know. Of course, there are no ... you
make 'campaign contributions.' That's what I meant to say
... (laughs). Give me a call uh I'll be in and out this weekend.
Uh (cuts off) ... ."
	The first message was cut off because of a time limitation on the
answering machine. The second message began immediately
thereafter:
			"Jane, I don't know when your birthday is or when Eric's
birthday is but the two of you like need to buy each other a
new answering machine, like very soon, cause like I cannot
take the music. Anyway, I talked to Mike McCoy, uhh he's
on board, everything's uh squared up. The only thing he's
getting back to me on is whether or not there are any
positions left. Just that simple. Uhm (inaudible) highway,
street maintenance, snow removal, etc., and he goes you
know Meg, I think we've filled the three spots and I said I
heard there were six, blah, blah, blah. We went back and
forth he's gonna get back to me today or Monday. I'll talk to
ya. Bye."
	Morrison testified that, sometime after the second message, she
had an unrecorded phone conversation with respondent. During this
conversation, respondent explained how the bribery scheme would
work. According to Morrison, respondent told her that an attorney-client contract would be completed and that a check for 10% to 15%
of O'Neil's annual salary, somewhere between $4,000 to $6,000,
would be written to respondent's law firm. This sum would then be
broken down into increments of less than $1,000 and would go into
Mike McCoy's campaign fund in the name of various contributors.
Morrison recalled that respondent expressed regret that Morrison's
mother, an alderman in Aurora, did not get along with McCoy
because respondent could otherwise use the mother's name as one of
the contributors.
	Within two weeks of the first recorded messages, Morrison
received a third and final message on her answering machine:
			"Uh, guy who got it is from Big Rock. I didn't get his
name, but he, he was hired, but he doesn't start, he hasn't
started yet, and that's why no one knows his name,
apparently, 'cause he's not working day-to-day with the
cronies yet. He starts mid-September, allegedly, and, as I
said, it's some guy from Big Rock. Um, I was also told that
they potentially have two more spots. Um, whether or not
those are even gonna be posted, they don't know. Um, and
this other guy I talked to said I'm wasting my time unless I
go, ya know, straight to McCoy. He said if there's gonna be
two more spots, it's gonna be up to McCoy to open those up,
ya know, financially, through whatever budgeting process
they had originally budgeted, 'cause I guess your numbers are
right. Like they had six spots budgeted. Now four are ... ."
	At the disciplinary hearing, Morrison testified that she was
shocked by respondent's suggestions about bribing McCoy and did
not follow them. Morrison stated that she kept the tape-recorded
messages until February 2000 when she turned the answering machine
tape over to the Kane County's sheriff's office. This led to
investigations by, among others, the sheriff's office, the ARDC and a
special prosecutor.
	Although the primary election campaign for Kane County State's
Attorney was underway in February 2000, when Morrison turned over
the answering machine tape, Morrison denied that the timing of the
delivery of the tape was politically motivated. Morrison testified that
she waited more than a year to give the tape to her superiors at the
sheriff's office because, during that time, she was experiencing a
difficult pregnancy and was having marital problems. She explained
that, once she returned from maternity leave, she gave the tape to the
sheriff's office. According to Morrison, the fact that the primary
election campaign was going on was coincidental.
	On cross-examination, Morrison was asked whether she knew
which candidate for State's Attorney her mother had supported in the
primary election. Morrison stated that she did not know. Morrison's
testimony was then impeached with an earlier deposition in which she
stated that she knew her mother was supporting respondent's
opponent in the election. Morrison also acknowledged on cross-examination that she was in possession of the answering machine tape
well before her pregnancy began in January 1999, and that she
continued to work as a deputy sheriff until the eighth month of her
pregnancy, in September 1999. Morrison also conceded that when she
first spoke to the Kane County sheriff's department about the
answering machine tape in February 2000, and recounted the
unrecorded telephone conversation she had with respondent, she did
not include two details: (1) that respondent had discussed creating an
attorney-client contract and (2) that a specific sum of between $4,000
and $6,000 would be paid to respondent.
	Mike McCoy, chairman of the Kane County board since 1996,
testified by way of videotaped deposition. McCoy stated that, in Kane
County, a highway maintainer's job was to plow snow and do other
miscellaneous jobs pertaining to the county highways. Applicants for
the position of highway maintainer were required to take a test and
were interviewed by a panel, who then ranked the applicants. McCoy
stated that his only input into the process of hiring highway
maintainers was to ensure that special consideration was given to
minority applicants.
	McCoy stated that in 1998 or 1999 the highway department had
six vacancies for the job of highway maintainer. McCoy testified that
shortly after these vacancies were filled, respondent contacted him and
stated that she had a client who was interested in one of the positions.
Respondent did not identify the client. McCoy stated that he told
respondent that no jobs were available, but respondent said she
thought two positions were still open. McCoy then told respondent
that he would get back to her. He did not do so, however, and nothing
further occurred.
	McCoy testified that he had never met or heard of Eric O'Neil
before February 2000, when reports of respondent's taped messages
appeared in the press. McCoy stated that he had read transcripts of the
messages left on Morrison's answering machine and that respondent's
references to him were false. McCoy also stated that he had never
accepted a bribe and that he considers himself to be an honest civil
servant. McCoy acknowledged that he is often asked to and does
recommend people for various county jobs. However, he stated that
no new employee was ever expected to kick back any money to him
or to make payments to a political party or to a political campaign.
	When asked whether respondent's statements damaged his
reputation or hurt him politically, McCoy answered that he did not
think so. McCoy stated that he did not think that "anyone really
believed" respondent's statements. McCoy noted that he ran
unopposed in the election for Kane County board chairman and that
he obtained the second highest vote total in Kane County.
	The parties stipulated that a special prosecutor was appointed to
investigate persons implicated in the recorded messages. The special
prosecutor filed a report which provided, in part, that no evidence
existed that McCoy had ever engaged in the illegal or dishonest
conduct described in respondent's telephone messages and that the
matter was closed without convening a grand jury.
	Respondent testified at her disciplinary hearing. When asked
about the messages on the answering machine and her conversations
with Morrison, her recollection was somewhat limited. She recalled
that Morrison contacted her about finding a job for O'Neil. She also
recalled stating to Morrison that she would make some calls and that
she did not, in fact, do so. Respondent did not remember, however,
any of the details of her conversations with Morrison or the timing of
the messages she left Morrison.
	Respondent acknowledged leaving the messages on Morrison's
answering machine. She stated repeatedly that she had no explanation
for the messages and that she could not "even imagine" saying those
words. Respondent denied having any psychological or substance
abuse problems at the time she left the messages. Respondent
acknowledged that, in an earlier statement, she had indicated that she
left the messages in an effort to get Morrison to stop calling her about
getting a job for O'Neil. At the disciplinary hearing, however,
respondent stated that this was not true. Respondent further admitted
that the statements she made to Morrison were false and that she did
not talk to anyone about obtaining a job for O'Neil.
	Respondent spoke to a reporter about the phone messages in
March 2000. Respondent admitted that she was not entirely candid in
her responses to the reporter. She stated that she responded with a
"knee-jerk" political reaction to the reporter's inquiries and that she
was "completely defensive and rationalizing all of it." In September
2000, respondent held a press conference in which she acknowledged
that she made the fabricated statements to Morrison but stated that the
messages on the tape had been "taken out of context." Respondent
testified that, at the time of the press conference, she was "still trying
to rationalize or give it some explanation" and that she did not then
have the courage to take full responsibility for her actions.
	Respondent also admitted that she was not forthright in
responding to an initial request for information sent by the ARDC in
April 2000. Respondent stated that she did not understand how
serious the charges were and, further, that the denials contained in her
response to the ARDC were rationalizations. Respondent submitted
a supplemental response to the ARDC in August 2000, in which she
took full responsibility for the statements on the tape, admitted that
the statements were fictitious and apologized for her improper
conduct.
	Respondent apologized repeatedly before the Hearing Board for
her actions. She stated that she has never given anyone a bribe, has
never accepted a bribe, and has not been the subject of any prior
ARDC complaints or letters of inquiry. She expressed remorse and
dismay for her conduct and stated that her statements to Morrison
were the most horrible thing she has ever done and the worst thing she
could have done to the legal profession. Respondent stated that she
had apologized to Mike McCoy but believed that no apology was
sufficient for what she had done. She also stated that she came to the
disciplinary hearing to make a public apology. She expressed hope
that her reputation and standards had "shown through."
	Several witnesses attested to respondent's good character and
reputation. Substantial evidence was also introduced showing that
respondent had a long history of community and charitable activities.
	At the conclusion of the disciplinary hearing, the Hearing Board
found that the Administrator had proved by clear and convincing
evidence that respondent had engaged in the misconduct as charged.
After weighing the mitigating evidence against the severity of the
misconduct, the Hearing Board recommended a six-month suspension.
The dissent recommended censure. Respondent filed exceptions. The
Review Board affirmed the findings of misconduct but recommended
a two-month suspension. The Administrator filed exceptions to this
court.
ANALYSIS
	Before this court, respondent concedes that her conduct in
leaving the three phone messages on Morrison's answering machine
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, as charged by the
Administrator. Further, although respondent argued before the
Review Board that censure was the appropriate sanction in this case,
she has since abandoned that position. Like the Administrator,
respondent now agrees that a suspension is warranted for her
misconduct. Thus, the only point of disagreement between the parties
in this case is the appropriate length of the suspension to be imposed.
The Administrator argues that a year's suspension is in order, while
respondent contends that a two-month suspension (the disposition
recommended by the Review Board) is appropriate.
	The purpose of attorney discipline is not punishment. Rather,
attorney discipline is undertaken to protect the public, to maintain the
integrity of the profession, and to protect the administration of justice
from reproach. In re Spak, 188 Ill. 2d 53, 67-68 (1999), quoting In re
Fox, 122 Ill. 2d 402, 410 (1988). In determining the appropriate
sanction to impose, we must consider the nature of respondent's
misconduct and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In re
Lidov, 129 Ill. 2d 424, 430 (1989). We may also consider the
deterrent value of a sanction and whether the sanction will help
preserve public confidence in the legal profession. In re Discipio, 163 Ill. 2d 515, 528 (1994). The disciplinary recommendations of the
Hearing Board and Review Board are advisory only. The ultimate
responsibility for imposing discipline rests with this court. In re
Eckberg, 192 Ill. 2d 70, 85 (2000).
	In considering the nature and severity of respondent's
misconduct, the parties dispute whether this court should take into
account Morrison's testimony regarding the unrecorded phone
conversation in which respondent allegedly stated that, to facilitate the
bribery scheme, an attorney-client contract would be completed and
that a sum of between $4,000 to $6,000 would be conveyed to
respondent's law firm. Respondent contends that the unrecorded
conversation was not specifically mentioned in the Administrator's
complaint and, therefore, the conversation constitutes uncharged
conduct that should not be considered by this court. Moreover,
according to respondent, neither the Hearing Board nor the Review
Board made any express finding regarding the conversation.
Respondent further notes that, unlike the other statements for which
the Administrator seeks to sanction respondent, the conversation
describing the details of the bribery scheme was not recorded.
Respondent contends that Morrison's description of the unrecorded
conversation changed from when she first described it to the Kane
County Sheriff's office, with the description becoming more detailed
over time. Respondent also argues that Morrison's actions with
respect to respondent were politically motivated and that her
testimony regarding the unrecorded conversation was not credible.
Accordingly, respondent maintains that the testimony should not be
considered by this court.
	The Administrator disagrees. The Administrator contends that the
unrecorded conversation was not uncharged conduct because the
complaint referenced, in addition to the phone messages, "a series of
conversations" between Morrison and respondent. Further, citing to
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 349
(1937), the Administrator maintains that a disciplinary complaint need
not plead the evidence. The Administrator also observes that
respondent was the only other party to the conversation with
Morrison and that, in her testimony before the Hearing Board,
respondent never denied that the conversation took place. The
Administrator maintains that there is no reason why this court should
not consider Morrison's testimony in full and that the testimony, along
with the phone messages, describe a "detailed and elaborate" bribery
scheme which merits a severe sanction.
	Initially, we note that, although it was not stated as an express
finding, the Hearing Board concluded that much of Morrison's
testimony regarding the unrecorded conversation was corroborated by
her previous statements. After describing Morrison's testimony, the
Hearing Board noted that the report of the interview conducted by the
Kane County sheriff's office when Morrison first turned over the
answering machine tape had been admitted into evidence. That report,
according to the Hearing Board, "confirmed Morrison's testimony"
that she had been told by respondent that O'Neil would have to
contribute 10% to 15% of his salary, that the money would be given
to respondent and that respondent would break the money down into
four smaller donations to McCoy's campaign fund. Neither the
Administrator nor respondent mention this statement by the Hearing
Board or address its significance.
	In any event, however, even if we were to set the testimony
regarding the unrecorded conversation aside, as respondent asks us to
do, we do not believe the seriousness of respondent's misconduct
would be materially affected. The gravamen of respondent's
misconduct in this case is not found in any particular detail contained
in her statements, e.g., whether she mentioned an attorney-client
contract. Rather, it is found in the general message which those
statements conveyed. Although it is undisputed that respondent, in
fact, never spoke to McCoy about receiving kickbacks from O'Neil
and that McCoy was never "on board" with any bribery scheme, there
is nothing of record to indicate that respondent was anything less than
serious in suggesting to Morrison that she should attempt to bribe
McCoy. Thus, even limiting the misconduct to the three phone
messages, as respondent contends we should, we are left with the
salient fact that respondent's statements endorsed, and even
encouraged, the bribing of a public official. As respondent herself
admits, the phone messages, by themselves, violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Respondent's statements are unquestionably a
very serious matter and we view them as such in deciding the
appropriate sanction here.
	The parties also dispute whether the seriousness of respondent's
misconduct may be gauged by the impact it had upon Mike McCoy.
Respondent points to McCoy's testimony that he suffered no harm to
his reputation and that, in his election for chairman of the Kane
County board (which took place after respondent's statements became
public), he received the second highest vote total in Kane County.
From this, respondent argues that McCoy suffered "no actual harm"
and, therefore, that it would be inappropriate to consider the effect of
respondent's conduct upon McCoy in measuring the seriousness of
her actions. We reject respondent's argument for two reasons.
	First, after Morrison turned the answering machine tape over to
the Kane County sheriff's office, a special prosecutor was appointed
to investigate the matters raised by the tape. As a person mentioned
on the tape, McCoy was a principal subject of this investigation and
was questioned by the special prosecutor as to his involvement in any
illegal conduct. Except for respondent's statements, McCoy would
not have had to endure the inconvenience and stress of the special
prosecutor's investigation. It is incorrect, therefore, to say that
respondent's statements had no harmful effect whatsoever upon
McCoy. Second, and more importantly, part of the reason that falsely
accusing a public official of being amenable to bribery is viewed as
serious misconduct is because it places the reputation of that innocent
official at risk. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Atkin, 804
Ohio St. 3d 383, 704 N.E.2d 244 (1999). In this case, it was fortunate
that, for whatever reason, respondent's statements caused no lasting
damage to McCoy's reputation or his political fortunes. However, this
fortuitous outcome does not mean that it would be appropriate to
eliminate all consideration of Mike McCoy in measuring the
seriousness of respondent's misconduct.
	Respondent's statements, which were widely publicized and
which prompted the appointment of a special prosecutor, created a
genuine risk to McCoy's reputation. The reality of this risk is
underscored by the fact that respondent was a former assistant State's
Attorney. As the Review Board noted, as a former assistant State's
Attorney, respondent "had, and would have been perceived as having,
a greater level of awareness of the workings of public officials; thus,
her representations as to their integrity, or lack thereof, carried greater
potential weight." We have previously held that attorney discipline
should be "closely linked to the harm caused or the unreasonable risk
created by the [attorney's] lack of care." In re Saladino, 71 Ill. 2d 263, 276 (1978). In this case, we believe that the risk of harm to
McCoy's reputation created by respondent's statements was
unreasonable and may be properly considered in assessing the
seriousness of her misconduct.
	In addition to contesting the inherent seriousness of respondent's
misconduct, the parties also dispute whether certain other factors may
be weighed in aggravation against her. The parties disagree, for
example, as to whether respondent's failure to provide an explanation
for the phone messages should be considered an aggravating factor.
In this regard, the Hearing Board stated the following:
			"Respondent's total lack of explanation for her messages
to Morrison during the hearing also is disturbing to us and
must play a part in our assessment of her character. Despite
a plea on our part for any rationale for her words, none was
forthcoming. Although we are tempted to suggest a reason
for her behavior, and several have come to mind, it is not
within our province to speculate on her motivation. Suffice
it to say that we find it difficult to accept her claim that she
has a complete and total lack of recall regarding the timing
and intent of the taped messages."
	The Review Board disagreed with the above statement.
According to the Review Board, if respondent "had attempted at the
hearing to provide reasons for her conduct, these attempts might well
have been perceived as a rationalization and undermined the sincerity
of her remorse. Alternatively, if the acts are viewed as aberrant or
irrational, then an attempt to rationally explain these acts long after
the event is an unrealistic burden." Thus, the Review Board concluded
that respondent's "failure to state a reason for her statements was
immaterial" to the consideration of the appropriate sanction in this
case.
	Before this court, the parties now dispute which of the above
positions is correct. The Administrator argues in favor of the Hearing
Board's position, while respondent urges us to adopt the position of
the Review Board. In our view, respondent and the Review Board
have misapprehended the significance of the Hearing Board's
conclusions.
	The Hearing Board was not asking for respondent to provide
nonexistent reasons for her conduct. The Hearing Board was explicit
about what it found troubling, stating: "we find it difficult to accept
[respondent's] claim that she has a complete and total lack of recall
regarding the timing and intent of the taped messages." In other
words, the Hearing Board did not find respondent credible when she
testified that she could not remember why she left the messages on
Morrison's answering machine. Deference is given to the Hearing
Board on questions of credibility (Spak, 188 Ill. 2d at 66), and a lack
of candor before the Hearing Board is a factor that may be considered
in aggravation (see generally In re Stillo, 68 Ill. 2d 49 (1977)).
Respondent's inability to provide an explanation for the messages,
because it was not believed by the Hearing Board, is a factor that must
be given some weight against her.
	In its report, the Hearing Board also made the following
statement:
			"As impressed as we are with the testaments to
Respondent's character, we believe that those attestations are
somewhat undercut by the lack of candor displayed by
Respondent when she initially was confronted with her
misdeeds. Respondent's deceptive responses to the media
and the Administrator is an aggravating factor that casts
some doubt not only on her integrity but also on her ability to
acknowledge her mistakes. Although she stated that she was
'rationalizing' her actions and responded with a 'knee-jerk'
reaction, we believe that her rationalizations continued far
beyond any length of time during which she could claim to be
startled or confused by the disclosure of the taped messages."
	The Review Board agreed with the Hearing Board that
respondent's deceptive response to the ARDC's initial inquiry could
be considered in aggravation. Respondent does not dispute this point.
Accordingly, respondent's response to the ARDC weighs against her
in determining the appropriate sanction here. 
	However, the Review Board rejected the Hearing Board's
position regarding respondent's statements to the media. According
to the Review Board, "statements to media, by a political candidate,
should not be judged as strictly as statements to a court, client, or the
ARDC. Additionally, given the context of media inquiries, some level
of latitude must be afforded to the person responding. *** Responses
to media questions, especially in the context of a heated political
campaign, generally should not be given much if any weight in
aggravation in a disciplinary case. This is particularly true where, as
here, those responses are attempts to exculpate oneself from
accusations that, at the time, may have legitimately appeared to be
politically motivated."
	Once again, the parties dispute whether the Hearing Board or
Review Board was correct. Again, we conclude that respondent and
the Review Board have missed the import of the Hearing Board's
position.
	Respondent first spoke to the media about the phone messages
in March 2000. At the disciplinary hearing, respondent testified that
she was not entirely candid in her statements at that time and that she
responded with a "knee-jerk" political reaction. In September 2000,
respondent held a press conference in which she acknowledged that
she made the fabricated statements to Morrison. Even then, however,
respondent stated that the messages on the tape had been taken out of
context. Respondent testified that, at the time of the press conference,
she was "still trying to rationalize" her behavior and that she had not
yet taken full responsibility for her actions. Based on these facts, the
Hearing Board concluded that respondent's public denials of
wrongdoing "continued far beyond any length of time during which
she could claim to be startled or confused by the disclosure of the
taped messages" and that her denials cast "some doubt not only on her
integrity but also on her ability to acknowledge her mistakes."
	Clearly then, it was the length of time that respondent continued
to rationalize her behavior that troubled the Hearing Board. The
Hearing Board was in no sense saying that off-the-cuff responses to
the media should be judged under the same standards as statements
made in court. Although, in the context of this case, we do not give
it a great deal of weight, we agree with the Hearing Board's
conclusion that the length of time it took respondent to accept
responsibility for her statements may be considered in evaluating
respondent's character and determining the appropriate sanction.
	Balanced in mitigation against the foregoing misconduct and
aggravating factors is what both the Hearing Board and Review Board
accurately termed an "impressive" history of charitable and
community activities on the part of respondent. Without question,
respondent has devoted a tremendous amount of time to serving the
Kane County community. Among other things, respondent has, for the
past 10 years, volunteered at a homeless shelter, the Hesed House, at
least once a month and on many holidays; worked with severely
handicapped children; served for over 10 years on the Rosary High
School board of trustees; volunteered for 2½ years with the Child
Advocacy Center, to help with fund-raising for and sponsoring of
needy families; volunteered time for other charitable organizations,
including "Two Women for Women" (a breast cancer organization),
Court Appointed Special Advocates, the Cancer Society, the Tri-City
Family Counseling Center, Hospice, Boy Scouts, Exchange Club,
Rotary, Kiwanis and Toys for Tots. Respondent also founded in 1994,
and has participated in until the present, an organization called
"Prevent Child Abuse Kane County," which educates people about
child abuse; taught and lectured in community colleges and high
schools on a volunteer basis, sometimes as an unpaid substitute
teacher, about law and government; served on the Kane County
Sexual Assault Task Force; and developed a cable television program
called "Family Advocacy," in which respondent had a doctor, police
officers, and counselors discuss ways of dealing with problems that
can lead to court intervention, such as abuse, and physical and mental
problems.
	Further mitigation in this case was provided by several character
witnesses. A judge, a high school teacher who administers a
scholarship fund with respondent and who has known her for 18
years, and an attorney who was the head of the Kane County Child
Advocacy Center all testified to respondent's reputation for honesty
and integrity. Significantly, their opinions of respondent were not
changed by the misconduct committed by respondent which is at issue
here.
	Finally, respondent offered compelling testimony on her own
behalf at the disciplinary hearing. Respondent, who had not previously
been disciplined, accepted full responsibility for her actions. She
expressed deep remorse for the statements she made to Morrison. She
also apologized to the ARDC, the legal profession, her constituents
and to Mike McCoy. Both the Hearing Board and the Review Board
considered respondent's expressions of remorse and acceptance of
responsibility to be genuine and credible. We agree with this
assessment.
	We turn then to the appropriate sanction to impose in this case.
The Administrator cites numerous decisions both from this court and
from other jurisdictions to support its contention that the misconduct
in this case warrants a suspension of one year. The cases cited are
distinguishable, however, either in terms of the actual misconduct
committed or in the number of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances which are present.
	The facts of this case are unique. Respondent did not commit any
crime, she took no money, and she took no action to further a bribery
or kickback scheme. Her misconduct is contained solely in the
statements she made to Morrison. Nevertheless, those statements, as
respondent concedes, violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Representations such as those made by respondent undermine public
confidence in the integrity of the government and, in conjunction with
the aggravating factors discussed above, merit a suspension.
	Like the Hearing Board, we do not want to lose sight of the fact
that, although the misconduct in this case is quite serious, respondent
has otherwise "led what appears to be an exemplary life devoted to
assisting others." We are in agreement with many of the conclusions
reached by he Hearing Board. We do, however, weigh the mitigating
evidence more heavily than perhaps the Hearing Board did. We
emphasize, in particular, that given respondent's character evidence,
her years of good works, and her genuine expressions of remorse and
acceptance of responsibility, that there is little likelihood of
misconduct from respondent in the future. See In re Mason, 122 Ill. 2d 163, 173-74 (1988). Taking into account the serious nature of the
offense and the evidence in mitigation and aggravation, we conclude
that a four-month suspension is the appropriate sanction in this case.
CONCLUSION
	For the forgoing reasons, we suspend respondent's license to
practice law for a period of four months.
	Respondent suspended.