Title: State ex rel. Combs v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Combs v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4110.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-4110 
THE STATE EX REL. COMBS v. GREENE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Combs v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Elections,  
Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4110.] 
Elections—Mandamus—Writ of mandamus sought to compel board of elections to 
verify signatures on relator’s nominating petition to be candidate for 
township trustee—R.C. 3501.38(E)(1)—A circulator of a part-petition must 
indicate the number of signatures contained on that part-petition—Writ 
denied. 
(No. 2019-1234—Submitted October 2, 2019—Decided October 4, 2019.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Relator, L. Stephen Combs, seeks a writ of mandamus ordering 
respondent, the Greene County Board of Elections, to count the signatures on his 
petition and certify his name to the November 5, 2019 general-election ballot as a 
candidate for Xenia Township Trustee.  We deny the writ. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Combs submitted his nominating petition on August 6, 2019.  It 
consisted of three part-petitions.  The first had 13 signatures, the second had 11 
signatures, and the third had 20 signatures.  At the bottom of each part-petition, 
Combs signed a declaration, “under penalty of election falsification,” that included 
the statement, “I am the circulator of the foregoing petition containing 44 
signatures.” 
{¶ 3} At its August 19 meeting, the board rejected Combs’s petition because 
the circulator statement on each part-petition indicated 44 signatures—the total 
number on the entire petition—rather than the number of signatures on the 
individual part-petition.  Because it rejected the petition on this basis, the board did 
not complete its verification of the signatures. 
{¶ 4} Combs requested an expedited reconsideration hearing.  In an 
affidavit, Combs avers that he received no notice of a hearing but that an unnamed 
representative of the board told him on September 3 that the expedited hearing had 
already taken place and that his petition had been denied.  The board denies that a 
hearing occurred.  The minutes of its August 27 meeting reflect that the board was 
informed of Combs’s reconsideration request, that the board’s legal counsel 
advised that it could hold a hearing but was not required to, that the board chair 
observed that it had not been the board’s practice to hold reconsideration hearings 
in such circumstances, and that the topic died for lack of a motion.  The board’s 
deputy director avers in an affidavit that the minutes are accurate and that no 
hearing on Combs’s request for reconsideration took place. 
{¶ 5} On September 6, Combs filed his complaint seeking a writ of 
mandamus ordering the board to verify the signatures on his petition and to certify 
his name to the November 5 ballot. 
 
 
January Term, 2019 
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II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Mandamus Standard 
{¶ 6} Combs is entitled to a writ of mandamus if he establishes by clear and 
convincing evidence that (1) he has a clear legal right to have his petition signatures 
verified and, if they are sufficient, have his name placed on the ballot, (2) the board 
has a clear legal duty to verify the signatures and place his name on the ballot, and 
(3) he lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. 
Davis v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, 137 Ohio St.3d 222, 2013-Ohio-4616, 998 
N.E.2d 1093, ¶ 12.  Because of the proximity of the election, Combs lacks an 
adequate remedy outside this proceeding.  See State ex rel. Finkbeiner v. Lucas Cty. 
Bd. of Elections, 122 Ohio St.3d 462, 2009-Ohio-3657, 912 N.E.2d 573, ¶ 18. 
B.  Indication of the Number of Signatures on Each Petition Paper 
{¶ 7} Combs argues that he has a clear legal right to have his petition 
signatures verified and his name placed on the November ballot and that the board 
has a clear legal duty to verify the signatures and place his name on the ballot.  We 
disagree. 
{¶ 8} R.C. 3501.38(E)(1) provides, “On each petition paper, the circulator 
shall indicate the number of signatures contained on it * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  
“Petition paper” means “part-petition,” not the petition as a whole.  Ohio Renal 
Assn. v. Kidney Dialysis Patient Protection Amendment Commt., 154 Ohio St.3d 
86, 2018-Ohio-3220, 111 N.E.3d 1139, ¶ 24 (“the General Assembly has 
distinguished between a ‘petition’ and the individual ‘part-petitions’ or ‘petition 
papers’ that constitute a petition”).  And “R.C. 3501.38(E) demands strict 
compliance.”  State ex rel. Commt. for the Referendum of Lorain Ordinance No. 
77-01 v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 96 Ohio St.3d 308, 2002-Ohio-4194, 774 
N.E.2d 239, ¶ 49.  Combs did not strictly comply with R.C. 3501.38(E)(1), because 
he did not, on each petition paper, indicate the number of signatures the petition 
paper contained. 
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1.  Statutory Interpretation and Strict Compliance 
{¶ 9} Combs raises two arguments regarding the interpretation of and strict 
compliance with R.C. 3501.38(E)(1).  These arguments are without merit. 
{¶ 10} Combs first argues that he actually complied with R.C. 3501.38, 
because the statute reads: “All * * * nominating petitions * * * shall * * * be 
governed by the following rules: * * * (E)(1) On each petition paper, the circulator 
shall indicate the number of signatures contained on it.”  Combs posits that by “it,” 
the statute means the nominating petition. 
{¶ 11} The interpretation Combs seeks is contrary to a plain reading of the 
statute.  To accept Combs’s reading would require that we set aside the ordinary 
rules of grammar and apply the singular “it” to the plural “nominating petitions” 
and overlook the proximate phrase “each petition paper” in favor of the phrase 
“nominating petitions,” which appears at the very start of R.C. 3501.38.  The 
construction he advocates is also at odds with other parts of the statutory scheme.  
There is no statutory requirement that a petition be circulated by a single circulator, 
and it is common for more than one person to circulate the separate parts of a 
petition.  Requiring each of those individual circulators to state the total number of 
signatures on the entire petition, including signatures that the circulator did not 
witness, would be inconsistent with the form of the circulator statement set forth in 
R.C. 3513.261.  And it would be counter to the state’s interest in deterring and 
preventing fraud, see State ex rel. Linnabary v. Husted, 138 Ohio St.3d 535, 2014-
Ohio-1417, 8 N.E.3d 940, ¶ 31. 
{¶ 12} Combs also argues that only substantial, not strict, compliance with 
R.C. 3501.38(E)(1) is required, citing R.C. 3513.261.  But R.C. 3513.261 merely 
provides that a nominating petition must be substantially in the form provided in 
the statute; it does not change the fact that candidates are required to strictly comply 
with R.C. 3501.38(E)(1).  State ex rel. Simonetti v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
151 Ohio St.3d 50, 2017-Ohio-8115, 85 N.E.3d 728, ¶ 26 (R.C. 3513.261 “requires 
January Term, 2019 
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only substantial compliance with the prescribed ‘form’ of the nominating petition” 
but “contains no language regarding substantial compliance as to other matters”). 
2.  Secretary of State Form No. 3-R 
{¶ 13} Combs argues that he has a clear legal right to relief because, he 
claims, he complied with the secretary of state’s Form No. 3-R, which is a form 
created by the secretary that may be circulated to obtain electors’ signatures for a 
candidate for township office.  Form No. 3-R contains a statement requiring the 
circulator to declare, under penalty of election falsification: 
 
I am the circulator of the foregoing petition containing [number of] 
signatures; * * * I witnessed the affixing of every signature; * * * 
all signers were to the best of my knowledge and belief qualified to 
sign; and * * * every signature is to the best of my knowledge and 
belief the signature of the person whose signature it purports to be 
* * *. 
 
Citing State ex rel. Crowl v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 144 Ohio St.3d 346, 
2015-Ohio-4097, 43 N.E.3d 406, ¶ 10, Combs argues that because this declaration 
uses the word petition—not part-petition or petition paper—the secretary of state 
has interpreted R.C. 3501.38(E)(1) to require the circulator to state the number of 
signatures on the full petition, not the number on the part-petition, and that we 
should defer to the secretary’s interpretation. 
{¶ 14} As explained above, however, Combs’s interpretation would not 
make sense in any situation in which there is more than one circulator: each 
individual circulator would be unable to make the required declaration because he 
would not have witnessed the signatures on the part-petitions that he did not 
circulate.  In addition, Combs overlooks the fact that Form No. 3-R’s declaration 
refers to the number of signatures on the foregoing petition.  Combs’s three 
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declarations—coming at the end of his three part-petitions—cannot all logically 
refer to 44 foregoing signatures.  It is therefore unlikely that the secretary has 
interpreted R.C. 3501.38(E)(1) as Combs suggests.  Moreover, “when an election 
law is clear, ‘the settled rule is that [it is] mandatory and require[s] strict 
compliance.’ ”  (Brackets sic.)  Ohio Renal Assn., 154 Ohio St.3d 86, 2018-Ohio-
3220, 111 N.E.3d 1139, at ¶ 8, quoting State ex rel. Phillips v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 93 Ohio St.3d 535, 539, 757 N.E.2d 319 (2001).  Since R.C. 
3501.38(E)(1) is clear, no interpretation is warranted, and the question of deference 
is moot.  The secretary lacks the authority to change the statute’s requirements. 
3.  Lack of Fraud 
{¶ 15} Combs next argues that he has a clear legal right to relief because he 
committed no fraud, citing Ohio Manufacturers’ Assn. v. Ohioans for Drug Price 
Relief Act, 149 Ohio St.3d 250, 2016-Ohio-5377, 74 N.E.3d 399, ¶ 44 (“OMA”).  
In OMA, we noted that “[t]he requirement that a circulator state the number of 
signatures personally witnessed ‘is a protection against signatures being added 
later.’ ”  Id., quoting State ex rel. Loss v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 29 Ohio St.2d 
233, 234, 281 N.E.2d 186 (1972) (invalidating a part-petition because the line 
indicating the total number of signatures witnessed was left blank).  We then stated, 
“We are not dealing here with a case of minor or negligent miscounts.  Systemic 
overcounts of the magnitude seen in this case are an open invitation to fraud and 
make this case different from all previous cases cited by the parties.”  Id. 
{¶ 16} However, this case does not present an “overcount” in the sense that 
that word was used in OMA.  Combs wrote on each part-petition that there were 
“44” signatures.  But each part-petition contains only 20 numbered signature lines 
and could therefore contain a maximum of 20 signatures.  Combs did not attempt 
to do what the statute required (write on each part-petition the number of signatures 
witnessed on that part-petition) and then negligently execute that task by 
miscounting the signatures—he misinterpreted R.C. 3501.38(E)(1) and thus did 
January Term, 2019 
7 
 
something other than what it required.  And we have never held that the absence of 
fraud is an excuse for not complying with a statute’s strict requirements. 
{¶ 17} In this mandamus action, Combs’s burden is to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that he has a clear legal right to the relief he seeks.  Combs 
suggests that writing on each part-petition the total number of signatures on the 
entire petition was sufficient to accomplish R.C. 3501.38(E)(1)’s goal of preventing 
fraud.  But even assuming that is true, he fails to explain how meeting what he 
perceives to be the statute’s goal in a way other than the one expressly set forth by 
the legislature translates into a clear legal right to have his name certified to the 
ballot. 
4.  Reconsideration Hearing 
{¶ 18} Combs asserts that the board held a hearing on his request for 
reconsideration, and he argues that the board violated a legal duty by not providing 
him with prior notice of the hearing.  The board counters that it did not hold a 
hearing.  Combs’s evidence that a hearing occurred consists of his own affidavit, in 
which he avers that “someone” at the board told him on September 3 that his 
hearing request had been granted and that the hearing had already taken place.  The 
board’s evidence includes its meeting minutes, indicating that Combs’s 
reconsideration request died for lack of a motion, and the affidavit of its deputy 
director, who prepared the minutes, averring that the minutes are accurate and that 
no hearing was held.  On this record, Combs has not established by clear and 
convincing evidence that a hearing occurred.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Jackson, 
81 Ohio St.3d 308, 311, 691 N.E.2d 262 (1998) (“When clear and convincing 
evidence is required, we are not disposed to let the matter turn on allegations of the 
possible failure of service and affidavits with possible hearsay evidence”). 
{¶ 19} Moreover, as Combs acknowledges, boards of elections have no 
legal duty to hold reconsideration hearings.  Combs is correct that if a board 
nevertheless chooses to hold a hearing, it must provide notice to the parties.  See 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Secretary of State Directive 2019-18, Section 1.04, Ohio Election Official Manual, 
at 12-11.  But Combs has not asked us to order the board to hold a new hearing with 
proper notice, and he has not explained how the notice requirement (or a board’s 
failure to meet it) would give rise to a clear legal right to the relief that he does seek 
in this action—an order compelling the board to verify his petition signatures and 
place his name on the ballot. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 20} Because Combs has not established a clear legal right to the relief he 
seeks or a clear legal duty on the part of the board to provide it, we deny the writ. 
Writ denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and 
STEWART, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
Isaac, Wiles, Burkholder & Teetor, L.L.C., Donald C. Brey, Mark R. 
Weaver, and Matthew R. Aumann, for relator. 
Stephen K. Haller, Greene County Prosecuting Attorney, and Elizabeth A. 
Ellis, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
________________________