Title: Derrick Tyrone Smith v. State of Florida  (order)

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 6, 2011 
 
 
CASE NO.:  SC09-2063 
 
Lower Tribunal No.:  83-02653-CFAN 
 
 
DERRICK TYRONE SMITH 
vs. STATE OF FLORIDA 
Appellant(s) 
 
Appellee(s) 
 
 
Derrick Smith, a defendant under sentence of death, appeals from the circuit 
court’s summary denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief filed 
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  Previously, we affirmed 
Smith’s conviction and sentence of death after retrial, Smith v. State, 641 So. 2d 
1319 (Fla. 1994), and the circuit court’s denial of Smith’s initial motion for 
postconviction relief.  Smith v. State, 931 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 2006).  As explained 
below, we reverse and remand this case to the postconviction court for further 
proceedings. 
 
The postconviction court summarily denied Smith’s allegations that (1) 
letters from the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding expert testimony on 
comparative bullet lead analysis offered at his retrial constituted newly discovered 
evidence and (2) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by 
failing to disclose information regarding trial witness Priscilla Walker.  We find 
these claims to be sufficiently pleaded to warrant an evidentiary hearing.  
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Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case to the postconviction court for an 
evidentiary hearing on these two claims. 
 
Further, shortly before Smith filed his notice of appeal, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in reviewing Smith’s federal habeas 
petition, disagreed with some of this Court’s findings in Smith’s initial 
postconviction appeal and determined that six Brady claims “involve[d] favorable 
[undisclosed] evidence that was actually suppressed.”  Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of 
Corr., 572 F.3d 1327, 1348 (11th Cir. 2009).  The court held that these claims 
needed to be considered in a “cumulative materiality analysis” under Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).  Smith, 572 F.3d at 1342.  These claims are as 
follows: 
(1) Melvin Jones sought help from the prosecutor with the probation 
violation and grand theft charges against him; (2) Melvin Jones, 
fearing arrest, sought help from the prosecutor in regard to the sexual 
abuse allegations his daughter was making against him; (3) one or 
more police reports indicated that Melvin Jones had initially been 
considered as a suspect in 1983; (4) a prosecutor’s synopsis of an 
interview of David McGruder and some police reports cast doubt on 
McGruder’s identification of Smith; (5) a prosecutor’s note indicated 
that Jones and Johnson had met briefly in a holding cell before the 
1983 trial; and (6) several reports showed that Priscilla Walker’s 
statement to the police about when Smith was at her house conflicted 
with statements by others about where he was during that time. 
Id., 572 F.3d at 1348.  In light of the Eleventh Circuit’s findings, we direct that on 
remand the circuit court consider these claims in its analysis. 
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Accordingly, we reverse the court’s order summarily denying relief and 
remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
QUINCE, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
CANADY, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the decision to remand for an evidentiary hearing on the newly 
discovered evidence claim regarding the comparative bullet lead evidence.  I 
dissent, however, from the decision to remand the Brady claim related to Priscilla 
Walker.  Because that claim is procedurally barred, I would affirm its denial by the 
postconviction court.  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(d)(2)(A) provides 
that “no motion” filed beyond the one-year time limitation will be considered 
unless it alleges “the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the 
movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the 
exercise of due diligence.”  See Jimenez v. State, 997 So. 2d 1056, 1064 (Fla. 
2009).  Smith’s motion—which was filed beyond the one-year time limitation—
did not allege due diligence and thus did not satisfy the basic pleading 
requirements to overcome the rule’s procedural bar. 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
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A True Copy 
Test: 
 
jn 
Served: 
 
GLENN  MARTIN 
MARTIN J. MCCLAIN 
KATHERINE VICKERS BLANCO 
HON. KEN  BURKE, CLERK 
HON. MARK IRWIN SHAMES, JUDGE