Title: People v. McCoy

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90364-Agenda 14-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. KEVIN 							McCOY, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 17, 2003.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Cook County found
defendant, Kevin McCoy, guilty of two counts of aggravated criminal
sexual assault and not guilty on several other counts, including an
unlawful restraint count. The court sentenced defendant to 15 years'
imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that his convictions for
aggravated criminal sexual assault were legally inconsistent with his
acquittal for unlawful restraint. The appellate court affirmed. No.
1-99-3176 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). For
the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the appellate
court.
BACKGROUND
	On September 11, 1998, L.W., an adult, was sleeping in her
bedroom at a home in Riverdale, Illinois, in which she lived with her
mother and defendant. She heard a loud noise as her bedroom door
opened and a person put a pillow over her face. The person started
punching her face through the pillow and told her to "shut up, move
your legs, move your legs." L.W. recognized the voice as that of
defendant. L.W. fought defendant and faked an asthma attack, telling
defendant that she could not breathe and that she was going to die.
Eventually, L.W. could not fight any more, and she remained still as
defendant placed his fingers in her vagina and then in her anus. She
felt something poking her on her left side but could not see the object.
When defendant went into the bathroom, L.W. ran from the house. As
defendant chased L.W. into the street, she began screaming and ran to
the door of a neighbor. The neighbor opened the door and allowed
L.W. to come in and call the police. The police took her home and
then to the hospital. She was examined at the hospital, where she was
administered a rape kit and treated for cuts on her lip and face. A
detective examined the scene the next day and found L.W.'s bedroom
in dissarray with bed linens strewn about. He found a screwdriver
wrapped up in the bed linen, as well as a pillow with a reddish brown
stain.
	Defendant later gave a statement to an assistant State's Attorney,
stating that he was at home smoking crack and "went into [L.W.'s]
bedroom because I wanted to seduce her." In the statement, defendant
said that L.W. was in her bed and that he got on top of her and put a
pillow over her head because she was screaming. L.W. struggled and
he punched her through the pillow and cut L.W.'s lip. He inserted his
finger into her vagina and anus.
	The State charged defendant in a 15-count information that
included six counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS
5/12-14 (West 1998)). At trial, defendant conceded that he had a
physical altercation with L.W., but denied putting his finger into
L.W.'s vagina or anus. He also denied making a written confession to
the assistant State's Attorney. The trial court found defendant guilty
of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and not guilty of
all of the other charges, including unlawful restraint. Specifically, the
court convicted defendant on count I, which alleged that defendant
caused bodily harm to the victim by striking her, in violation of section
12-14(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2)
(West 1998)) and count III, which alleged that defendant threatened
or endangered the life of the victim by placing a pillow over her face,
in violation of section 12-14(a)(3) (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(3) (West
1998)). After merging the two counts into one offense, the trial court
sentenced defendant to 15 years' imprisonment.
	Defendant appealed, arguing that the convictions for aggravated
criminal sexual assault were legally inconsistent with the acquittal for
unlawful restraint and must therefore be vacated. Defendant relied
upon People v. Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d 270 (1996), where we held
that legally inconsistent jury verdicts cannot stand. The appellate court
agreed that the findings were legally inconsistent, but held that legal
inconsistency in a bench trial does not contradict our rule in
Klingenberg. Rather, the court quoted People v. Rhoden, 299 Ill.
App. 3d 951, 960-61 (1998):
			" 'While legally inconsistent findings in a criminal trial
may, on occasion, indicate confusion on the part of the trial
judge, there is not the same compelling reason to apply a per
se rule in the context of a bench trial as there is in the context
of a jury trial. This is so because a court reviewing a jury
verdict generally lacks a sufficient basis to determine if the
jury was confused. However, a reviewing court, by
examining the trial record, may often ascertain whether a
judge sitting as finder of fact was confused in making his or
her disposition of a charge or charges. Moreover, in a bench
trial, the trial judge is presumed to know the law.' "
The appellate court also noted, following Rhoden, that, in a bench
trial, if there is a rational basis for the court's judgment, and an
examination of the record as a whole indicates that there was no
confusion, legally inconsistent findings by a trial judge may stand. The
appellate court affirmed defendant's convictions after finding the
record did not reveal confusion by the trial judge and that the acquittal
of the unlawful restraint charge was rational. No. 1-99-3176
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed
defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. Because
the appellate court judgment presents only issues of law, our review
is de novo. People v. Johnson, 206 Ill. 2d 348, 359 (2002).


ANALYSIS


	Defendant argues that the appellate court correctly found the trial
court's findings to be legally inconsistent, but applied the wrong
standard in reviewing the trial court's findings by following the
Rhoden standard. Defendant argues that this court should apply
Klingenberg to bench trials and reverse and remand this matter for
further proceedings. Defendant alternatively argues that if this court
is to apply the Rhoden standard, the record demonstrates confusion
by the trial court. The State argues that the trial court's findings were
not legally inconsistent. In the alternative, the State argues that if the
findings were legally inconsistent, this court should not apply
Klingenberg to bench trials, but should instead adopt the Rhoden
standard. Under Rhoden, the State contends the record reveals a
rational basis for the court's findings of guilt.
	Subsequent to briefing and argument in this matter, we
reconsidered and overruled Klingenberg. People v. Jones, No. 93511
(May 22, 2003). We held in Jones that criminal "defendants in Illinois
can no longer challenge convictions on the sole basis that they are
legally inconsistent with acquittals on other charges." Jones, slip op.
at 8. Although Jones arose in the context of reviewing a jury trial, it
also controls here.
	In Jones, we were persuaded by the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461, 105 S. Ct. 471 (1984), which "reiterated that consistency in the
verdicts is not required as a matter of constitutional law and that
inconsistent verdicts can often be explained as a product of juror
lenity." Jones, slip op. at 5, citing Powell, 469 U.S.  at 63, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 467, 105 S. Ct.  at 475. We also concluded that the views of the
dissenters in Klingenberg were correct. Jones, slip op. at 8, citing
Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 285-89 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by
Freeman, J.). We found that the Klingenberg majority mistakenly
searched for a rational explanation of juror lenity. Jones, slip op. at 8.
We also agreed with the Klingenberg dissent that Powell was correct
in that there was no reason to allow only the defendant to appeal
because one could not assume that the acquittal was the "correct"
verdict. Jones, slip op. at 8. We further agreed that the acquittal is just
as likely a boon given to a defendant. Jones, slip op. at 8. Thus, we
rejected the Klingenberg decision's central rationale that legally
inconsistent verdicts are "unreliable" and "suggest confusion or
misunderstanding on the part of the jury." Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at
281.
	We follow Jones here because the prospect of confusion
identified in Klingenberg on the part of a judge sitting in a bench trial
is decidedly diminished from that of a jury. Indeed, we must presume
that a trial judge knows the law. Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346-47, 70 L. Ed. 2d 530, 536-37, 102 S. Ct. 460, 465 (1981); People v.
Woolley, 178 Ill. 2d 175, 200 (1997). In Harris, the United States
Supreme Court rejected a defendant's challenge to an inconsistent
verdict rendered in a bench trial. The Court stated:
		"We are not persuaded that an apparent inconsistency in a
trial judge's verdict gives rise to an inference of irregularity
in his finding of guilt that is sufficiently strong to overcome
the well-established presumption that the judge adhered to
basic rules of procedure.
			Other explanations for an apparent inconsistency are far
more likely. Most apparent is the likelihood that the judge's
actual observation of everything that transpired in the
courtroom created some doubt about the guilt of one
defendant that he might or might not be able to articulate in
a convincing manner." Harris, 454 U.S.  at 346-47, 70 L. Ed. 2d  at 536-37, 102 S. Ct.  at 465.
The Harris court also stated that the federal Constitution does not
prohibit state judges from being excessively lenient. Harris, 454 U.S. 
at 348, 70 L. Ed. 2d  at 537, 102 S. Ct.  at 465.
	Though we do not encourage trial judges to stray from their duty
to follow the law, we do acknowledge, without condoning, the clear
reality that trial judges may exercise lenity in what they perceive as the
interests of justice. Thus, we do not reject an inconsistent verdict
rendered in a bench trial as unreliable and suggestive of confusion. We
also find that our other reasons as expressed in Jones for denying a
defendant the right to challenge an inconsistent verdict rendered by a
jury apply with equal force here. Jones, slip op. at 8. Therefore, it is
no longer necessary for reviewing courts to examine the record as a
whole to rule out confusion on the part of the trial judge.
	We need not reach the issue of whether defendant's convictions
on two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault were inconsistent
with the unlawful restraint acquittal. Even if the verdict was
inconsistent, the trial court's findings of guilt stand. We lastly note
that had defendant been found guilty of unlawful restraint, a Class 4
felony (720 ILCS 5/10-3 (West 2002)), the trial judge could have
sentenced defendant to a maximum of six years if the trial judge found
aggravating factors to be present. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West 2002).
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial judge could not
have run defendant's sentence on the unlawful restraint count
concurrently with his 15-year sentence based on the two counts of
aggravated criminal sexual assault. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4 (West 2002).
Thus, the trial court's findings may also reflect sound judicial
management given the repetitive multiple counts of the 15-count
information.
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring:
	In People v. Jones, No. 93511 (May 22, 2003), this court
reconsidered and overruled Klingenberg. I dissented from the majority
in Jones, in large part, because of the majority's unwarranted
abandonment of the principle of stare decisis and because I believe
that the case should have been analyzed on an entirely different basis
that would have avoided a reconsideration of Klingenberg. Today's
decision follows Jones. While I believe that in Jones this court
unnecessarily and unwisely overruled Klingenberg, Jones is now the
law and, accordingly, the result in this case is mandated by principles
of stare decisis.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this special
concurrence.