Title: State v. Tonnie D. Armstrong

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Tonnie D. Armstrong,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Previously reported at:  223 Wis. 2d 331, 
  588 N.W.2d 606 (1999) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 20, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Bradley, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J., joins. 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
No.  97-0925-CR & 97-0926-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-0925-CR & 97-0926-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Tonnie D. Armstrong,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
APR 20, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.    (on motion for reconsideration). 
On motion for reconsideration, defendant-appellant Tonnie D. 
Armstrong asks this court to reverse his conviction, contending 
that harmless error is inapplicable where an appeal is filed 
under Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10).  Armstrong contends that our 
opinion in this case contravened prior Wisconsin precedent 
without addressing that precedent.  At the least, Armstrong 
requests an opportunity for both parties to brief and argue this 
issue. 
¶2 
To clarify the original Armstrong opinion, we modify 
footnote 38 of the opinion at 223 Wis. 2d 331, 369-70, 588 
N.W.2d 606 (1999) by adding the following language to the end of 
that note: 
 
We recognize that some courts have interpreted 
this court's opinion in State v. Monahan, 76 Wis. 2d 
387, 251 N.W.2d 421 (1977), to establish a total 
rejection of the use of the harmless error rule in 
appeals filed under Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10).  E.g., 
State v. Pounds, 176 Wis. 2d 315, 324-26, 500 N.W.2d 
373 (Ct. App. 1993); Jones v. Wisconsin, 562 F.2d 440, 
No.  97-0925-CR & 97-0926-CR 
 
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445-46 (7th Cir. 1977).  We do not read Monahan so 
broadly. 
 
The 
following 
constitutes 
our 
entire 
commentary on the harmless error rule in Monahan: 
 
The state suggests that a harmless error 
rule 
be 
formulated 
to 
apply 
where 
a 
defendant is appealing pursuant to sec. 
971.31(10), Stats.  It is suggested that 
such a rule will further the interests of 
judicial economy.  We have considered this 
argument, but we do not adopt such a rule.  
 
Monahan, 76 Wis. 2d at 401.  We made this statement in 
response to the State's detailed proposal in Monahan 
that we adopt a specific procedure for courts to 
follow when determining whether a defendant's decision 
to plead guilty was affected by the denial of the 
suppression motion.  That statement simply indicates 
that 
we 
had 
considered 
the 
State's 
proposed 
methodology but declined to adopt it.  We do not read 
Monahan to preclude, in any way, the use of a harmless 
error approach in § 971.31(10) appeals and we withdraw 
from Pounds all language to the contrary.  See Pounds, 
176 Wis. 2d at 324-26.  We also withdraw any language 
that might be construed in a contrary fashion from 
State v. Esser, 166 Wis. 2d 897, 480 N.W.2d 541 (Ct. 
App. 1992).  
¶3 
The motion for reconsideration is denied without 
costs. 
 
 
97-0925-CR & 97-0926-CR.awb 
 
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¶4 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (on motion for reconsideration) 
 (dissenting).   Armstrong 
asserts 
in 
his 
motion 
for 
reconsideration that a direct contradiction in Wisconsin law was 
created when this court released its opinion.  I agree.  Without 
explanation we said in State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 588 
N.W.2d 606 (1999) that the harmless error doctrine applied to 
appeals taken after a guilty plea pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.31(10); State v. Pounds, 176 Wis. 2d 315, 324-26 (Ct. App. 
1993) said that it did not.  Because the majority on 
reconsideration concludes in a modified footnote that this 
discrepancy should be decided and Wisconsin law changed, without 
the benefit of full briefing and analysis, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶5 
Upon reconsideration, the majority modifies a footnote 
and 
states 
that 
it 
“recognize[s] 
that 
some 
courts 
have 
interpreted” State v. Monahan, 76 Wis. 2d 387, 251 N.W.2d 421 
(1977) to be a complete bar to applying a harmless error 
analysis where the appeal is taken after a guilty plea under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10).  Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d at 369 n.38.  
That is an understatement.  The fact of the matter is that every 
court that has interpreted Monahan has cited it for the 
proposition that the harmless error doctrine cannot be applied 
to appeals taken after a guilty plea.  Yet, in the face of this 
unanimous interpretation, the majority concludes that it will 
not “read Monahan so broadly.”  Id.   
¶6 
Monahan has been interpreted “so broadly” by two 
federal circuits, the Seventh in Jones v. State, 562 F.2d 440, 
97-0925-CR & 97-0926-CR.awb 
 
2 
446 (7th Cir. 1977), and the First in United States v. Weber, 
668 F.2d 552, 562-63 (1st Cir. 1981).  Monahan has been 
interpreted “so broadly” by the Maryland Court of Appeals in 
Bruno v. Maryland, 632 A.2d 1192, 1198 (Md. 1993).  Monahan has 
been interpreted “so broadly” by Wisconsin’s own court of 
appeals in Pounds, 176 Wis. 2d at 324-26, and State v. Esser, 
166 Wis. 2d 897, 906 n.6, 480 N.W.2d 541 (Ct. App. 1992).   
¶7 
Additionally, the 
“broad” 
reading 
of 
Monahan is 
supported by opinions of other courts, both state and federal, 
which have concluded likewise.  See, e.g., Weber, 668 F.2d at 
562-63; Jones, 562 F.2d at 446; New York v. Grant, 380 N.E.2d 
257, 264-65 (N.Y. 1978); California v. Hill, 528 P.2d 1, 29-30 
(Cal. 1974), overruled on other grounds, California v. Devaughn, 
558 P.2d 872, 876 (Cal. 1977).  That conclusion, however, has 
not been unanimous.  See, e.g., Bruno, 632 A.2d at 1198-1203.   
¶8 
Regardless of their end opinion, at least these courts 
had the benefit of having the issue fully briefed so that they 
could better articulate the rationale behind their conclusion 
and more fully appreciate the ramifications of their conclusion. 
 The majority has merely replaced a statement written without 
supporting rationale in Monahan with another statement written 
without supporting rationale in footnote 38.  Why should (or 
should not) the harmless error doctrine apply to appeals taken 
under Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10)?  Jones, Weber, Grant, Hill, and 
Bruno offer the reader a justification; the majority does not. 
¶9 
In sum, I conclude that this court should have asked 
for additional briefing.  Monahan did not provide a clear 
97-0925-CR & 97-0926-CR.awb 
 
3 
answer.  The interpretation other courts have given to that 
answer is clearly not the answer the majority assigns to it 
today.  The correct answer is not a foregone conclusion.  
Different courts have answered this question differently.  What 
they have all had is a full briefing prior to their decision.  
What they have all done is provide a reasoned answer in their 
opinion.  We should have had and done the same.  Because we did 
not, I respectfully dissent from the denial of Armstrong’s 
motion for reconsideration. 
¶10 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion. 
 
 
97-0925-CR & 97-0926-CR.awb 
 
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