Title: State ex rel. Mobley v. Noble

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Mobley v. Noble, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1291.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-1291 
THE STATE EX REL. MOBLEY, APPELLANT, v. [NOBLE],1 JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Mobley v. Noble, Slip Opinion No.  
2024-Ohio-1291.] 
Mandamus—Procedendo—Relator sought extraordinary writ to compel trial-court 
judge to issue judgment of conviction that constitutes a final, appealable 
order—Adequate remedy in ordinary course of law—Court of appeals’ 
judgment dismissing complaint affirmed—Motion to declare relator a 
vexatious litigator denied. 
(No. 2023-0412—Submitted September 12, 2023—Decided April 9, 2024.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 22AP-488, 2023-Ohio-842. 
 
1. In January 2023, Judge Andria Noble succeeded Judge Colleen O’Donnell, who was the original 
appellee and who presided over the underlying matter at the time that Mobley filed the complaint 
for a writ of mandamus or procedendo.  Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.06(B), Judge Noble is automatically 
substituted for former Judge O’Donnell as a party to this action. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Alphonso Mobley Jr., filed a complaint for a writ of 
mandamus or procedendo in the Tenth District Court of Appeals against appellee, 
Franklin County Common Pleas Court Judge Andria Noble.  Mobley sought to 
compel the judge to issue a judgment of conviction that constitutes a final, 
appealable order.  The court of appeals dismissed Mobley’s complaint, and Mobley 
timely appealed to this court. 
{¶ 2} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Mobley’s 
complaint because he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and 
was not entitled to the extraordinary relief that he sought. 
{¶ 3} While this action was pending, the judge filed a motion requesting 
that this court declare Mobley a vexatious litigator under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B).  
Mobley filed a motion for leave to file a revised reply brief.  For the reasons 
explained below, we decline to declare Mobley a vexatious litigator under 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03 and deny Mobley’s motion for leave to file a revised reply brief. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
{¶ 4} In May 2017, Mobley entered guilty pleas in the Franklin County 
Court of Common Pleas to charges of aggravated arson with a firearm specification 
and criminal use of an explosive device.  The trial court sentenced him to an 
aggregate prison term of 14 years.  In its judgment of conviction, the trial court 
stated: “It is ORDERED that the firearm be confiscated and destroyed.”  
(Capitalization sic.)  Mobley did not appeal the trial court’s judgment of conviction. 
{¶ 5} Rather than appeal, Mobley filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus 
or procedendo in the Tenth District Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court’s 
judgment of conviction was not a final, appealable order.  In particular, Mobley 
argued that the judgment failed to include a “verdict of forfeiture” pursuant to R.C. 
January Term, 2024 
 
3 
2981.04(B) and (C).  He sought to compel the trial court “to enter a final appealable 
order that reflects a sentence indicating a ‘verdict of forfeiture.’ ” 
{¶ 6} The judge moved to dismiss Mobley’s complaint under Civ.R. 
12(B)(6), which Mobley opposed.  The Tenth District had referred the case to a 
magistrate, who recommended that the court of appeals grant the judge’s motion to 
dismiss.  The magistrate concluded that Mobley had an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law by way of a direct appeal from the judgment of 
conviction. 
{¶ 7} Mobley filed objections to the magistrate’s decision and 
simultaneously filed a motion to certify a conflict.  Mobley argued that a conflict 
existed among three Ohio appellate districts as to whether the Rules of Civil 
Procedure apply to criminal-forfeiture orders and among two Ohio appellate 
districts as to whether a “judgment of conviction is final when it does not contain a 
guilty plea, verdict or finding of the court on which the forfeiture order is based.”  
The court of appeals struck Mobley’s motion to certify as premature because the 
court had not yet entered a final judgment. 
{¶ 8} On January 20, 2023, in an unrelated case, the Franklin County 
Common Pleas Court declared Mobley a vexatious litigator under R.C. 2323.52.  
See Tyack v. Mobley, Franklin C.P. No. 21CV2747 (Jan. 20, 2023).  Accordingly, 
in his pending action for a writ of mandamus or procedendo, Mobley filed a motion 
for leave to continue legal proceedings pursuant to R.C. 2323.52(F)(2).  The court 
of appeals granted Mobley’s motion “to the extent that [the] court [would] proceed 
to judgment in [the] matter” but notified him that he was not permitted to file any 
other pleadings in the matter without first obtaining leave to do so. 
{¶ 9} On March 16, 2023, the court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s 
decision, overruled Mobley’s objections in part and found them moot in part, 
denied Mobley’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, granted the judge’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4 
motion to dismiss, and dismissed the case.  The court held that Mobley had an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law through a direct appeal. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The court of appeals correctly dismissed Mobley’s complaint 
1.  Standard of review 
{¶ 10} We review de novo a court of appeals’ dismissal of an extraordinary-
writ complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).  State ex rel. Davies v. Schroeder, 160 Ohio 
St.3d 29, 2020-Ohio-1045, 153 N.E.3d 27, ¶ 7.  “Dismissal is appropriate only if it 
‘appear[s] beyond doubt from the complaint that the relator can prove no set of 
facts warranting relief.’ ”  (Brackets added in Davies.)  Id., quoting State ex rel. 
Zander v. Judge of Summit Cty. Common Pleas Court, 156 Ohio St.3d 466, 2019-
Ohio-1704, 129 N.E.3d 401, ¶ 4. 
{¶ 11} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Mobley needed to prove, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that he had a clear legal right to the requested relief, 
that the trial court had a clear legal duty to provide the requested relief, and that he 
lacked an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Ward v. 
Reed, 141 Ohio St.3d 50, 2014-Ohio-4512, 21 N.E.3d 303, ¶ 10.  To be entitled to 
a writ of procedendo, Mobley needed to prove that he had a clear legal right for the 
trial court to proceed, that the trial court had a clear legal duty to proceed, and that 
he lacked an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
2.  An adequate remedy forecloses extraordinary relief 
{¶ 12} In his complaint, Mobley alleged that the trial court failed to state in 
its judgment entry that “a trier of fact returned or the court entered a ‘verdict of 
forfeiture,’ pursuant to [R.C.] 2981.04(B) [and] (C).”  He asked the court of appeals 
for a writ of procedendo or mandamus to compel the trial court to “enter a final 
appealable order that reflects a sentence indicating a ‘verdict of forfeiture.’ ”  
Relying on our decision in State v. Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318, 2012-Ohio-1908, 
972 N.E.2d 509, overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Henderson, 161 
January Term, 2024 
 
5 
Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, Mobley argued that the 
omission of the verdict of forfeiture from the judgment of conviction meant that it 
was not a final, appealable order. 
{¶ 13} On appeal, Mobley continues to press the claim that under Harris, 
the trial court’s judgment of conviction is not a final, appealable order.  He offers 
several theories in support of his argument, including that the judgment of 
conviction was an “interlocutory order to seize property” from which he could not 
have appealed.  In support, Mobley relies on a case involving a direct appeal from 
a trial court’s judgment dismissing an administrative appeal from the Ohio 
Elections Commission’s denial of a motion for a protective order.  See Cozad v. 
Ohio Elections Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 22AP-312, 2023-Ohio-839, ¶ 1.  In 
Cozad, the court of appeals held that the commission’s order denying Cozad’s 
request for a protective order was interlocutory and nonfinal.  Id. at ¶ 21.  Because 
it involved an interlocutory order, Cozad is inapplicable to Mobley’s claim and his 
reliance on it is misplaced. 
{¶ 14} In the alternative, Mobley argues that the judgment of conviction 
was nonfinal because while two firearms were seized by the state when it searched 
Mobley’s home, the judgment of conviction refers to only a single firearm.  The 
judge contends that Mobley raised this argument for the first time in his appeal to 
this court and that the argument is thus barred.  Yet, in an “Affidavit of Truth in 
Support” that Mobley filed in the court of appeals, he stated that the trial court’s 
judgment of conviction “identifies ‘the firearm’ only in the singular sense,” that 
“the prosecutor fail[ed] to inform the court that two firearms were discovered in the 
search warrant executed” at Mobley’s residence, and that the search-warrant 
inventory identified “two separate and distinct firearms.”  After reviewing the 
record on appeal, for the reasons stated above, we reject the judge’s request that we 
find Mobley’s argument to be barred. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6 
{¶ 15} Nonetheless, whether the judgment of conviction identified the 
correct number of firearms seized does not affect its finality.  Crim.R. 32(C) does 
not require that a judgment of conviction include a related forfeiture order to validly 
impose a sentence.  Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318, 2012-Ohio-1908, 972 N.E.2d 509, 
overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 
2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, at paragraph two of the syllabus (“A journal 
entry of conviction need not include a nonmandatory, related forfeiture in order to 
be a final, appealable order pursuant to Crim.R. 32(C)”); see also State v. Lester, 
130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  As long as a judgment entry includes “(1) the fact of conviction, (2) the 
sentence, (3) the signature of the judge, and (4) entry on the journal by the clerk of 
courts,” it is “a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02.”  Harris at ¶ 22-
23, citing Lester at paragraph one of the syllabus and ¶ 14.  An error in the trial 
court’s judgment of conviction in identifying the seized property could have been 
raised on appeal from that judgment.  See State ex rel. Jones v. Ansted, 131 Ohio 
St.3d 125, 2012-Ohio-109, 961 N.E.2d 192, ¶ 2 (because a firearm specification is 
not a separate criminal offense, a judgment entry that fails to dispose of each 
firearm specification of which the defendant was found guilty is final and 
appealable as long as it “set[s] forth the fact of [the] convictions, the sentence, the 
judge’s signature, and the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the 
clerk,” and the defendant “had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to raise his 
claim of sentencing error”); State v. Legion, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96894, 2012-
Ohio-1045, ¶ 13 (“the failure of the trial court to identify the items forfeited with 
more specificity is a ‘matter of form’ that can be raised as an error in a direct 
appeal”); State ex rel. Walker v. DeWeese, 5th Dist. Richland No. 12 CA 10, 2012-
Ohio-1601, ¶ 4 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that a judgment entry that fails 
to address each forfeiture specification is not final and appealable). 
January Term, 2024 
 
7 
{¶ 16} Here, the judgment entry included the fact of conviction, the 
sentence, and the judge’s signature and it was entered on the journal by the clerk of 
courts.  Therefore, the judgment was final and appealable and triggered Mobley’s 
right to appeal.  And because “[t]he availability of an appeal is an adequate remedy 
even if the relator fails to pursue the appeal,” State ex rel. Davies v. Schroeder, 160 
Ohio St.3d 29, 2020-Ohio-1045, 153 N.E.3d 27, ¶ 10, Mobley is precluded from 
obtaining either a writ of mandamus or a writ of procedendo.  The court of appeals 
properly dismissed Mobley’s complaint, and we affirm that judgment. 
B.  The parties’ motions 
{¶ 17} The judge asks us to designate Mobley a vexatious litigator under 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B).  Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A), we may sanction a represented 
party or a person who signs “an appeal or other action [that] is frivolous or is 
prosecuted for delay, harassment, or any other improper purpose.”  Furthermore, 
should a party “habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause engage[] in 
frivolous conduct under division (A),” then we may find the party to be a vexatious 
litigator.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B).  However, the judge has not argued or provided 
evidence demonstrating that the appeal before us was filed for “delay, harassment, 
or any other improper purpose” or was otherwise frivolous.  Accordingly, we deny 
the judge’s motion to declare Mobley to be a vexatious litigator.  We also deny as 
moot Mobley’s motion to file a revised reply brief. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 18} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals, deny the judge’s motion to declare Mobley to be a 
vexatious litigator, and deny as moot Mobley’s motion to file a revised reply brief. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
DETERS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and would grant appellee’s 
motion to declare appellant to be a vexatious litigator. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8 
FISCHER and DEWINE, JJ., concur in judgment only in part and dissent in 
part and would grant appellee’s motion to declare appellant to be a vexatious 
litigator. 
_________________ 
Alphonso Mobley Jr., pro se. 
G. Gary Tyack, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Thomas W. 
Ellis, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
_________________