Title: People v. Greer

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 96806-Agenda 7-May 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 							
JEREMY GREER, Appellant.
Opinion filed September 23, 2004. 
	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	In 1993, defendant pled guilty to one count of first degree murder
and received a 60-year prison sentence. The appellate court affirmed
defendant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. People v. Greer,
281 Ill. App. 3d 1149 (1996) (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23). On December 12, 2000, defendant filed a pro se
postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
(Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 through 122-8 (West 2000)); however, the
petition did not come to the attention of the circuit court until July 10,
2001, more than 90 days later. Since no action was taken on the
petition within 90 days of filing, the circuit court docketed the petition
for further consideration and appointed counsel for defendant, as the
Act requires. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1, 122-4 (West 2000).
Appointed counsel subsequently filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel, alleging there was "no basis on which to present any
meritorious issue for review." Counsel supported his motion with a
brief purporting to comply with the procedures established in Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967).
In his brief, counsel outlined his investigative efforts on defendant's
behalf and stated, as to each issue raised in defendant's pro se petition,
that counsel could not "properly substantiate" the claim. Counsel
concluded that defendant's claims were not meritorious and no issues
of merit could be raised on his behalf. The circuit court granted
counsel's motion to withdraw and dismissed defendant's pro se
petition sua sponte.
	The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded for further proceedings. 341 Ill. App. 3d 906. The appellate
court held that "counsel appointed pursuant to the Act may move for
leave to withdraw if he or she complies with Supreme Court Rule
651(c) and can demonstrate that no meritorious issues can be
presented for review." 341 Ill. App. 3d at 910. However, the appellate
court determined that the circuit court had erred in dismissing
defendant's petition sua sponte "because its power to do so had
expired and there was no motion to dismiss on file for the trial court
to grant." 341 Ill. App. 3d at 910.
	We granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.
2d R. 315(a). On appeal, defendant contends that the circuit court's
second-stage order, granting appointed counsel's motion to withdraw
based on lack of merit, was unauthorized by the Act and deprived
defendant of his statutory right to counsel. As defense counsel
observed in oral argument before this court, no other aspect of the
appellate court's judgment is in issue. In order to provide a proper
context for discussion of defendant's claim, we will provide a more
detailed recitation of facts.
	Defendant pled guilty to one count of first degree murder on
September 13, 1993. Two other counts, charging first degree murder
under alternative theories, were dismissed at the time of the guilty
plea.
	Prior to the plea, the circuit court advised defendant of the
possible penalties he faced given the hypothetical applicability of an
array of "statutory factors" and the possible existence of "certain
circumstances." In the course of the court's explanation of potential
penalties, which included the death penalty, the prosecutor advised the
court that the State would not be seeking a sentence of death. The
prosecutor did not explain whether that decision was related to
defendant's guilty plea. In any event, the court advised defendant of
his rights and confirmed that the guilty plea was an "open plea."
	A factual basis was presented to support the guilty plea. The
State's evidence indicated that defendant intended to kill Lori
Caruthers and he carried out the murder in a premeditated manner
pursuant to a preconceived plan, acting in concert with two other
men, Anthony Walker and Richard Pallente. According to the factual
basis presented by the State, defendant not only continued his
association with Anthony Walker after Walker expressed a desire to
kill Caruthers and her friend, Mischell Knepler, defendant affirmatively
indicated he was prepared to assist in that endeavor, saying, "Find
them." Walker's sister, Tanya, would have testified that defendant
later instructed her not to let Caruthers use the telephone at the
Walker residence and in fact stopped Carruthers when she attempted
to leave the Walker residence through the back door of the house.
	Richard Pallante would have testified that defendant obtained a
pistol at defendant's residence on the day of the murder and stated
that they had to kill Caruthers because she knew too much. According
to Pallante, defendant and Walker laughed when Walker said, in
effect, that defendant was cruel. Pallante would have testified that
defendant and Walker persuaded him to give them a ride, and he
arrived at the Walker residence around 7 p.m. on the evening of the
murder. Defendant and Walker entered the car with Caruthers.
Pallante headed west on Old Jacksonville Road in the direction of
Knepler's house. At some point the three men stopped and exited the
car, at which time Walker told Pallante that defendant was going to
kill Caruthers because she knew too much. Defendant got Caruthers
out of the car. After a short period of time, defendant returned and
Walker asked defendant what was happening. When defendant
responded that they were "just talking," Walker urged him to "hurry
up." Thereafter, the same sequence of events transpired a second time.
After defendant departed from the car for a third time, and was gone
for a while, Walker instructed Pallante to drive in the direction
defendant and Caruthers had gone. Pallante located defendant and
Caruthers and parked on the opposite side of the road from them.
Defendant returned to the car and there was a repetition of the
previous exchanges between defendant and Walker, at which time
Walker started to get out of the car, saying, "I'll do it myself."
Defendant responded, "No, I'll do it." He then got out of the car and
walked over to where Caruthers was standing. Shortly thereafter,
there was a single gunshot and Caruthers fell to the ground. Defendant
pulled Caruthers' body further into the ditch, got back into the car,
and the three men left the scene, traveling toward Springfield.
Defendant said he had told Caruthers that her friend, Mischell, was
dead, and Caruthers begged him not to shoot her before he killed her.
	After the factual basis was presented, defendant entered a plea of
guilty. At that time, the court stated:
			"This is an open plea. The State has indicated that they
will not be presenting aggravating evidence to seek the death
penalty. I consider that as a part of a very limited plea
agreement. Other than for that, has any force, threats, or have
any threats or promises been made to you to cause you to
enter this plea of guilty this morning?"
Defendant responded, "No." The court thereupon noted for the record
that defendant had been advised of the "possible penalties that might
be imposed, including an extended term or natural life imprisonment."
The court found the plea to be voluntary, "an open plea with the one
exception *** previously *** stated," and further found a factual basis
for the plea. The court accepted defendant's plea of guilty and entered
judgment thereon.
	A sentencing hearing was conducted on November 30, 1993,
during which evidence in aggravation and mitigation was presented.
Thereafter, the State argued for a sentence of natural life
imprisonment or, in the alternative, an extended-term sentence,
suggesting that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and
premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan (see 720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1992)) and that the offense was accompanied by
exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.
Defense counsel argued that nothing in the defendant's background or
the circumstances of the offense warranted a sentence more than the
mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years' imprisonment. Defendant
made a statement in allocution.
	The circuit court sentenced defendant to the maximum non-extended-term sentence of 60 years' imprisonment. Given the court's
ambiguous statements leading up to imposition of sentence, it is
impossible to tell whether the court found no statutory factors to
support a sentence of natural life imprisonment or an extended term,
or the court simply deemed such sentences inappropriate. In
pronouncing sentence, the sentencing judge stated that he had
considered all "applicable statutory mitigating and aggravating
factors."
	Defendant subsequently filed a motion for reduction of sentence.
Defendant's motion was heard and denied on September 26, 1995. As
previously noted, defendant appealed and the appellate court affirmed
defendant's conviction and sentence. Greer, 281 Ill. App. 3d 1149
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	On December 12, 2000, the defendant filed a pro se
postconviction petition, alleging that (1) appellate counsel on direct
appeal had rendered ineffective assistance in that counsel had failed to
"argue petitioner's guilty plea was not entered into knowingly and
voluntarily because trial counsel incorrectly advised the petitioner that
he was eligible for the death penalty," and (2) petitioner's guilty plea
"was not entered into knowingly and voluntarily because it was based
upon trial counsel's representation of a bogus plea bargain." With
respect to the first allegation, defendant claimed that his trial
attorney's advice regarding the availability of the death penalty was
erroneous and, had he known that he was not eligible for the death
penalty, "he would not have given up all his rights to avoid an
extended term or natural life sentence, although he was not legally
eligible for either one of those sentence[s] as well." As for the second
allegation, defendant claimed he pled guilty upon defense counsel's
representation that an agreement had been reached for a 45-year
prison sentence, though he admits the record shows "no such deal had
ever been agreed upon." Defendant's petition does not address his
own acknowledgment in open court that no promises had been made
to induce him to enter the guilty plea.
	Because no one brought the petition to the attention of the circuit
court within 90 days of filing, the court docketed the petition for
second-stage consideration and appointed counsel for defendant, as
the Act requires. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1, 122-4 (West 2000).
Obviously, there was never an initial determination as to merits of the
petition.
	On October 11, 2001, defendant's appointed attorney filed a
motion to withdraw as counsel. Counsel stated that he had reviewed
the record, transcripts of proceedings, the State's Attorney's files, and
had interviewed "all relevant parties," including defendant; however,
he could find "no basis on which to present any meritorious issue for
review." Counsel supported his motion with a brief purporting to
comply with Anders procedures. In that brief, counsel meticulously
detailed his activities after appointment and, with respect to each of
defendant's contentions, stated that he could not "properly
substantiate" defendant's claim, concluding that petitioner's claim was
"not meritorious." Counsel suggested that he had considered other
possible issues, but could find no issue of merit.
	Counsel's motion to withdraw was heard on December 18, 2001.
The judge presiding noted that he had not been the original trial judge
in the case and that the clerk had failed to bring defendant's petition
to his attention in a timely manner, necessitating appointment of
counsel. The court confirmed that defendant had discussed counsel's
motion to withdraw with counsel and advised defendant that he could
appeal if the court allowed counsel's motion, but he would have to do
so pro se. The court then granted the motion and dismissed
defendant's pending petition, stating:
			"The Court having reviewed the materials submitted by
[counsel] finds that there is no constitutional claim of merit
and that it is appropriate that the postconviction petition
therefore be dismissed."
The court thereupon directed the clerk to file notice of appeal on
behalf of defendant.
	The appellate court held that defendant had not been denied his
statutory right to counsel when the trial court granted appointed
counsel's motion for leave to withdraw. In so holding, the appellate
court noted and followed Fourth District precedent in People v.
Norton, 203 Ill. App. 3d 571, 573-74 (1990):
		"This court has held that a defendant receives sufficient
representation of counsel in a postconviction proceeding
under the Act when counsel complies with Supreme Court
Rule 651(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)), even if appointed counsel
moves to withdraw upon finding no meritorious issues to
present. Norton, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 573, 561 N.E.2d  at 350.
Defendant does not allege that appointed counsel did not
comply with the requirements of Rule 651(c) or that
appointed counsel was incorrect in his assessment that there
were no meritorious issues to present. Therefore, under this
court's precedent, defendant received adequate
representation on his postconviction petition." 341 Ill. App.
3d at 908-09.
The appellate court concluded that the circuit court, under the
circumstances, had acted properly when it allowed postconviction
counsel to withdraw. 341 Ill. App. 3d at 909-10. In so holding, the
appellate court declined to follow the Third District's decision in
People v. McKenzie, 323 Ill. App. 3d 592 (2001), upon which
defendant relied.
	The appellate panel in McKenzie had specifically overruled three
Third District cases (People v. Robinson, 160 Ill. App. 3d 366 (1987);
People v. Rial, 214 Ill. App. 3d 420 (1991); People v. Cokley, 219 Ill.
App. 3d 209 (1991)) that had reached a result consistent with Norton.
The crux of the McKenzie court's reasoning was that the legislature
has mandated appointment of counsel for indigents desiring
representation at the second stage of postconviction proceedings, but
has not specifically provided for withdrawal of counsel:
			"It appears from our review of the Act that the legislature
intended to create procedures to give a convicted defendant
a last-ditch opportunity to change the outcome of his criminal
case. It also appears, from the legislators' decision not to
provide for withdrawal, that they intended for the defendant
to have the assistance of trained counsel throughout the
process. We, therefore, conclude from the absence of
authorizing language that withdrawal of appointed counsel is
in contravention of the statute ***." McKenzie, 323 Ill. App.
3d at 595-96.
	As additional support for its decision, the McKenzie court seized
upon certain comments this court made in People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64 (1988), in the course of addressing separation-of-powers and
due process arguments. Those comments, taken out of context, are
cited in McKenzie as the following propositions: (1) Rule 651(c) is
concerned with appointment of counsel at the appellate level, while
section 122-2.1 of the Act provides for appointment of counsel at the
trial stage of postconviction proceedings; (2) the appointment of
counsel at the hearing stage of postconviction proceedings is a matter
for the legislature; and (3) a postconviction petitioner is entitled to
have counsel represent him on a petition once he sets out allegations
demonstrating a meritorious constitutional claim. McKenzie, 323 Ill.
App. 3d at 596. Defendant's position before this court relies heavily
on McKenzie and makes essentially the same arguments.
	We note, at the outset, that the defendant in this case arrived at
the second stage of postconviction proceedings without there ever
having been a determination that his pro se petition presented the gist
of a meritorious claim. In that respect, this case differs from
McKenzie, where such a finding was made prior to advancement to
the second stage of postconviction proceedings and the appointment
of counsel. Notwithstanding that difference, we recognize that
sections 122-2.1 and 122-4 of the Act require appointment of counsel
for an indigent defendant desiring representation when his or her pro
se postconviction petition is not summarily dismissed by the circuit
court within 90 days of filing, irrespective of whether the circuit court
has actually considered the merits of the petition. We begin our
analysis with a discussion of the purpose of the Act and the procedural
mechanism for its implementation.
	Illinois' Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a procedural
mechanism through which a criminal defendant can assert " 'that in the
proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction there was a
substantial denial of his or her rights under the Constitution of the
United States or of the State of Illinois or both.' " People v. Rogers,
197 Ill. 2d 216, 220-21 (2001), quoting 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West
2000). In a postconviction proceeding, the circuit court does not
redetermine a defendant's guilt or innocence, but instead examines
constitutional issues which escaped earlier review. Rogers, 197 Ill. 2d 
at 221. A postconviction proceeding is a collateral attack upon the
prior conviction (Rogers, 197 Ill. 2d at 221) and affords only limited
review of constitutional claims not presented at trial (People v.
Coleman, 206 Ill. 2d 261 (2002)). We stress that postconviction
procedures entail review of the prior proceeding that resulted in a
defendant's conviction, whether or not evidence is introduced
concerning matters outside the record.
	Under the provisions of the Act, an indigent defendant who has
not been sentenced to death is not automatically entitled to
appointment of counsel. The source of the right to counsel in a
postconviction matter is statutory rather than constitutional (People
v. McNeal, 194 Ill. 2d 135, 142 (2000)), and the Act does not provide
for appointment of counsel unless an indigent defendant's petition
survives the first stage of postconviction proceedings. 725 ILCS
5/122-2.1, 122-4 (West 2000). If the circuit court reviews a pro se
petition and determines that it is frivolous or patently without merit,
the court may summarily dismiss the petition without appointment of
counsel. It is only after a defendant's petition has been found to set
forth the gist of a meritorious claim, or the court fails to take any
action on the petition within 90 days of filing, that the process
advances to second-stage proceedings and counsel is appointed. 725
ILCS 5/122-2.1, 122-4 (West 2000). Of course, in the latter instance,
the petition may well be frivolous or patently without merit, and the
defendant is appointed counsel only through the fortuity of the circuit
court's inaction.
	Once counsel is appointed for an indigent defendant, he or she is
entitled only to the level of assistance guaranteed by the Act. McNeal,
194 Ill. 2d  at 142. This court has determined that to be only a
"reasonable" level of assistance. McNeal, 194 Ill. 2d  at 142; People
v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 410 (1999). As this court stated in People
v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 364-65 (1990):
			"Because the right to counsel in post-conviction
proceedings is derived from a statute rather than the
Constitution, post-conviction petitioners are guaranteed only
the level of assistance which that statute provides. Section
122-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Supreme Court
Rule 651 provide post-conviction petitioners with a
reasonable level of assistance in post-conviction proceedings,
but do not guarantee that they will receive the same level of
assistance that the Constitution guarantees to defendants at
trial. This distinction is rational, because trial counsel plays a
different role than counsel in post-conviction proceedings.
[Citation.] At trial, counsel acts as a shield to protect
defendants from being 'haled into court' by the State and
stripped of their presumption of innocence. (Ross v. Moffitt
(1974), 417 U.S. 600, 610-11, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341, 351, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 2444.) Post-conviction petitioners, however, have
already been stripped of the presumption of innocence, and
have generally failed to obtain relief on appellate review of
their convictions." (Emphasis in original.)
This court has repeatedly held that counsel must perform specific
duties in his or her postconviction representation in the circuit court,
as set forth in Supreme Court Rule 651(c). McNeal, 194 Ill. 2d  at 142;
Turner, 187 Ill. 2d  at 410. Rule 651(c) requires that the record in
postconviction proceedings demonstrate that appointed counsel "has
consulted with petitioner either by mail or in person to ascertain his
contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights, has examined the
record of the proceedings at the trial, and has made any amendments
to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate
presentation of petitioner's contentions." 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c).
	Fulfillment of the third obligation under Rule 651(c) does not
require postconviction counsel to advance frivolous or spurious claims
on defendant's behalf. If amendments to a pro se postconviction
petition would only further a frivolous or patently nonmeritorious
claim, they are not "necessary" within the meaning of the rule.
Moreover, the mere filing of an amended petition by counsel under
such circumstances would appear to violate the proscriptions of
Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137). At least one appellate
panel has held Rule 137 applicable to proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. See People v. Bowman, 335 Ill. App. 3d
1142, 1154-55 (2002). Rule 137 provides in pertinent part:
		"The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate
by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper;
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and that
it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation." 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.
An attorney, such as the one in this case, who determines that
defendant's claims are meritless cannot in good faith file an amended
petition on behalf of defendant.
	Defendant argues that preparation of an amended petition under
the pertinent circumstances need not violate Rule 137 if appointed
counsel does not sign the amended petition he or she prepares on
behalf of the defendant. Ignoring for the moment the attorney's role
in preparing a document for filing which he or she knows will
consume the time and energies of the court and opposing counsel by
advancing frivolous arguments, we note defendant's alternative
argument, that Rule 137 poses no problem because "[c]ounsel could
simply aver, according to Rule 651(c), that the petition does not need
to be amended and present the petitioner's contentions according to
the dictates of Rule 651(c)."
	It seems to us that these arguments purposefully avoid the
pertinent ethical considerations in this case and beg the questions
asked, but not adequately answered, in oral argument before this
court: What is defense counsel to do after he or she determines that
defendant's petition is frivolous? Is counsel to stand mute at all
subsequent proceedings? How can counsel, ethically, "present the
petitioner's contentions" when counsel knows those contentions are
frivolous? Obviously, the answer is counsel cannot.
	We find the words of the United States Supreme Court in McCoy
v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 100 L. Ed. 2d 440, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988), instructive as to the responsibilities of appointed
counsel, and we quote the Court at length:
 			"At the trial level, defense counsel's view of the merits of
his or her client's case never gives rise to a duty to withdraw.
That a defense lawyer may be convinced before trial that any
defense is wholly frivolous does not qualify his or her duty to
the client or to the court. Ethical considerations and rules of
court prevent counsel from making dilatory motions,
adducing inadmissible or perjured evidence, or advancing
frivolous or improper arguments, but those constraints do not
qualify the lawyer's obligation to maintain that the stigma of
guilt may not attach to the client until the presumption of
innocence has been overcome by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
			After a judgment of conviction has been entered, however,
the defendant is no longer protected by the presumption of
innocence. *** Although trial counsel may remain silent and
force the prosecutor to prove every element of the offense,
counsel for an appellant cannot serve the client's interest
without asserting specific grounds for reversal. In so doing,
however, the lawyer may not ignore his or her professional
obligations. Neither paid nor appointed counsel may
deliberately mislead the court with respect to either the facts
or the law, or consume the time and the energies of the court
or the opposing party by advancing frivolous arguments."
McCoy, 486 U.S.  at 435-36, 100 L. Ed. 2d  at 451-52, 108 S. Ct.  at 1900-01.
	An attorney who is appointed to represent a defendant after the
90-day default provision of the Act is applied may well find that he or
she represents a client attempting to advance arguments that are
patently without merit or wholly frivolous, a client whose petition
would have been summarily dismissed had the circuit court timely
considered the merits of the petition. Defendant suggests that there
are no ethical constraints which would preclude postconviction
counsel from assisting such a client in needlessly consuming the time
and energies of the court and the State by advancing frivolous
arguments. McCoy holds to the contrary.
	Defendant contends that appointed postconviction counsel cannot
move to withdraw because the Act does not specifically authorize
withdrawal. Defendant submits that this court must presume, from the
Act's silence on this point, that the legislature intended to prohibit
withdrawal of counsel.
	Legislative "silence is not an unmistakable implication."
Armstrong v. Resolution Trust Corp., 157 Ill. 2d 49, 60 (1993). For
example, in In re St. Louis, 67 Ill. 2d 43 (1977), the State argued that
it was the intent of the legislature to allow law enforcement officials
to retain juvenile records indefinitely regardless of whether charges
were eventually brought. This court disagreed, stating, "The fact that
the Juvenile Court Act is silent as to the expungement of juvenile
records does not necessarily imply that such records could be made
and retained where their retention would serve no discernible
purpose." St. Louis, 67 Ill. 2d  at 47. Legislative silence is not
dispositive.
	In construing a statute, a court is to ascertain and give effect to
the intent of the legislature. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 211 (2002).
In order for us to accept the defendant's position, that the legislature
intended to prohibit withdrawal of appointed postconviction counsel
irrespective of the merits of defendant's petition, we would have to
reconcile that purported intent with three clear manifestations of intent
to the contrary.
	First, section 122-4 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act,
regarding pauper petitions, provides, "A petitioner who is a prisoner
*** who files a pleading *** that purports to be a legal document
seeking post-conviction relief *** against the State *** in which the
court makes a specific finding that the pleading *** is frivolous shall
not proceed as a poor person and shall be liable for the full payment
of filing fees and actual court costs ***." 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West
2000). By this provision, the legislature seeks to penalize a defendant
for filing a frivolous petition; yet, defendant, in this instance, would
have us presume that the legislature intended that a defendant filing a
frivolous petition should have the benefit of appointed counsel
throughout postconviction proceedings. The foregoing portions of
section 122-4 exhibit an intention inconsistent with that which
defendant attributes to the legislature.
	Second, the legislature has seen fit to confer upon the circuit
court the power, without the necessity of appointing counsel, to
dismiss, outright, petitions at first stage when they are deemed
frivolous or patently without merit. The fact that the legislature has
required appointment of counsel for indigent defendants when the
circuit court has not considered a postconviction petition in a timely
manner does not, in our opinion, indicate that the legislature intended
that such a defendant have continuing representation throughout the
remainder of postconviction proceedings, where counsel later
determines that the petition is frivolous or clearly without merit. The
purpose behind appointment of counsel in the latter instance might be,
and probably is, nothing more than a desire to jumpstart a process that
has shown no signs of progress. There appears to be no other
rationale for treating similarly situated defendants differently. Each
defendant has filed a frivolous petition. The legislature surely did not
intend to accord the latter defendant continuing representation after
counsel determines the petition to be frivolous when the former
defendant is never given counsel in the first place.
	Finally, it is inconceivable that the legislature intended to grant
defendants in postconviction proceedings-who are entitled only to a
"reasonable" level of assistance-a statutory right to counsel of greater
duration than that received by defendants on direct appeal--where the
level of assistance required is of a higher magnitude and of
constitutional dimension (see generally Owens, 139 Ill. 2d at 364-65),
but counsel are nonetheless allowed to withdraw in accordance with
Anders procedures. Defendant's position simply makes no sense.
	We are confident that the legislature did not intend to require
appointed counsel to continue representation of a postconviction
defendant after counsel determines that defendant's petition is
frivolous and patently without merit. Nothing in the Act requires the
attorney to do so, and the attorney is clearly prohibited from doing so
by his or her ethical obligations.
	Counsel, in this case, determined that defendant's claims were
meritless. We agree with that assessment. Defendant does not argue
to the contrary. The record clearly refutes defendant's claims.
	Defendant first claimed that his guilty plea was not entered into
knowingly and voluntarily because trial counsel incorrectly advised
him that he was eligible for the death penalty. Defendant contended
that his trial attorney's advice regarding the availability of the death
penalty was erroneous and, had he known that he was not eligible for
the death penalty, "he would not have given up all his rights to avoid
an extended term or natural life sentence, although [he claimed] he
was not legally eligible for either one of those sentence[s]."
	We believe defendant was eligible for the death penalty.
Therefore, counsel's advice to that effect was not erroneous. A
defendant may be found eligible for the death penalty where "the
murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner
pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human
life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant created a
reasonable expectation that the death of a human being would result
therefrom." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 2000). In our opinion,
defendant's conduct qualified him for the death penalty. Moreover,
the record certainly suggests-from the timing of the prosecutor's
announcement that he would not seek the death penalty-that the death
penalty was taken off the table in the course of plea negotiations.
Though the parties and the court at various times referred to the guilty
plea as an "open plea," the circuit court obviously believed the State's
decision not to pursue the death penalty was part of the plea, as the
court's comments indicate:
			"The State has indicated that they will not be presenting
aggravating evidence to seek the death penalty. I consider
that as a part of a very limited plea agreement."
Later, the court again stated that the guilty plea was "an open plea
with the one exception *** previously *** stated." In sum, the record
reveals that defense counsel's advice to defendant was not erroneous
and, in fact, the record suggests that the State's decision not to pursue
the death penalty was part of a plea agreement.
	The record also refutes defendant's second postconviction claim.
As previously noted, defendant claimed that his guilty plea "was not
entered into knowingly and voluntarily because it was based upon trial
counsel's representation of a bogus plea bargain." Specifically,
defendant claimed he had pled guilty upon defense counsel's
representation that an agreement had been reached for a 45-year
prison sentence.
	In People v. Jones, 144 Ill. 2d 242, 263 (1991), this court held
that a defendant's acknowledgment in open court, at a plea
proceeding, that there were no agreements or promises regarding his
sentence, served to contradict his postconviction assertion that he pled
guilty in reliance upon an alleged, undisclosed promise by defense
counsel regarding sentencing. See also People v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403, 454 (2003) (defendant's allegations were "totally contradicted by
the record of the plea"); People v. Maury, 287 Ill. App. 3d 77 (1997)
(record indicated that defendant answered "no" when the circuit court
inquired whether any extraneous promises had been made to him).
When the defendant in this case was asked, in open court, whether any
promises had been made to him to cause him to enter his plea of
guilty, he responded, "No." His own words refute his postconviction
allegations.
	The record itself demonstrates that defendant's postconviction
allegations were patently without merit and frivolous. Under the
circumstances, the Act presents no impediment to withdrawal of
counsel. Although we hasten to emphasize that the inability of
postconviction counsel to "properly substantiate" a defendant's claims
is not the standard by which counsel should judge the viability of a
defendant's postconviction claims, and that an attorney moving to
withdraw should make some effort to explain why defendant's claims
are frivolous or patently without merit, it nonetheless appears that
counsel fulfilled his duties as prescribed by Rule 651(c), and the
record before us supports counsel's assessment that the defendant's
postconviction claims were frivolous and without merit.
Consequently, though the procedure in the circuit court leaves
something to be desired, defense counsel should be allowed to
withdraw, and we affirm the judgment of the appellate court in that
respect.
	We express no opinion on issues not raised by defendant in this
appeal. The judgment of the appellate court, remanding the cause to
the circuit court, is affirmed.
Affirmed.