Title: State v. Paul Rutzinski

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 22 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Paul Rutzinski,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  228 Wis. 2d 512, 597 N.W.2d 775 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 20, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
November 2, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Kremers 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Craig A. Mastantuono, Maureen B. Fitzgerald and 
Fitzgerald & Mastantuono, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Craig A. Mastantuono. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2001 WI 22 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-3541-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Paul Rutzinski,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.  
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case requires us to decide 
under what circumstances a cell-phone call from an unidentified 
motorist provides sufficient justification for an investigative 
traffic stop.  Relying on information obtained from such a call, 
a Greendale police officer, Jerome Sardina (Officer Sardina), 
made an investigative traffic stop of the petitioner, Paul 
Rutzinski (Rutzinski).  During this stop, Officer Sardina 
obtained evidence that Rutzinski was operating his motor vehicle 
while intoxicated.  
¶2 
Rutzinski subsequently moved to suppress the evidence 
obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the information 
in the motorist's call was not sufficiently reliable to justify 
FILED 
 
MAR 20, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
2 
the stop and, therefore, the stop was unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The Circuit Court 
for 
Milwaukee 
County, 
Jeffery 
A. 
Kremers, 
Judge, 
denied 
Rutzinski's motion and entered a judgment of conviction, finding 
Rutzinski guilty of illegally operating a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated.  The court of appeals, in State v. Rutzinski, No. 
98-3541-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 11, 1999), 
affirmed the circuit court judgment. 
¶3 
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that under 
the 
circumstances 
of 
this 
case, 
the 
information 
in 
the 
motorist's 
call 
provided 
sufficient 
justification 
for 
an 
investigative stop of Rutzinski.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals.  
I 
 
¶4 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  On February 12, 
1998, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Officer Sardina was on patrol 
in Greenfield near 68th Street and Grange Avenue when he 
overheard a police dispatch requesting a squad to respond to the 
area of 51st Street and Grange Avenue.  According to the 
dispatch, an unidentified motorist calling from a cell phone 
reported that he or she was observing a black pickup truck 
weaving within its lane, varying its speed from too fast to too 
slow, and "tailgating."  Officer Sardina responded to the 
dispatch. 
 
¶5 
The 
dispatcher 
then 
issued 
a 
second 
dispatch, 
indicating that the motorist was still on the phone, and he or 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
3 
she and the black pickup had traveled to 60th Street and Grange 
Avenue. 
 
In 
light 
of 
this 
information, 
Officer 
Sardina 
determined that the vehicles were heading toward him.  Hence, he 
positioned his squad car in the median and waited. 
 
¶6 
Shortly thereafter, Officer Sardina saw the vehicles 
pass his location.  He then pulled his squad car behind the 
black pickup.  Upon doing so, the dispatcher stated that the 
motorist had indicated that he or she was in the vehicle ahead 
of the truck and saw Officer Sardina's squad car, and that 
Officer Sardina was following the correct truck.   
¶7 
Although Officer Sardina did not independently observe 
any signs of erratic driving, he then activated his emergency 
lights and conducted a traffic stop of the black pickup.  During 
this stop, Officer Sardina observed that Rutzinski, the driver 
of the pickup, had glassy, bloodshot eyes, smelled like alcohol, 
and was slurring his speech.  A subsequent Intoxilyzer test 
revealed that Rutzinski had a .21 blood-alcohol concentration.  
The motorist who had reported Rutzinski's erratic driving also 
pulled over when Officer Sardina initiated the stop.  Although 
the motorist did not speak with Officer Sardina, he or she did 
speak at that time with Officer Sardina's supervisor.  However, 
there 
is 
no 
record 
of 
the 
motorist's 
name 
or 
other 
identification, or any indication of what was said between 
Officer Sardina's supervisor and the motorist.   
¶8 
In light of the evidence obtained as a result of 
Officer Sardina's stop, the State charged Rutzinski with one 
count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
4 
an intoxicant, fourth offense, and one count of operating a 
motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration, fourth 
offense.  In response, Rutzinski filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained as a result of the stop.  Rutzinski argued 
that the unidentified motorist's call did not present reliable 
and credible grounds upon which to justify the stop.  And 
because the call provided Officer Sardina's sole basis for the 
stop, Rutzinski contended, the stop was unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11. 
¶9 
The 
trial 
court 
denied 
Rutzinski's 
motion.  
Thereafter, Rutzinski pled "no contest" to one count of 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant, fourth 
offense.1 
 
The 
circuit 
court accepted 
Rutzinski's plea and entered judgment accordingly.   
 
¶10 Rutzinski then appealed the circuit court's judgment 
of conviction, again arguing that the traffic stop violated the 
Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11.2   On May 11, 1999, 
the court of appeals rejected Rutzinski's argument and affirmed 
the circuit court judgment.  Rutzinski, unpublished slip op. at 
3.   
                     
1 The circuit court dismissed the second count based on 
Rutzinski's plea and judgment of conviction on count one. 
2 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10) (1999-2000), an 
appellate court may review during an appeal from a judgment of 
conviction an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, 
notwithstanding the fact that the trial court entered the 
judgment of conviction upon the defendant's plea of no contest. 
 See State v. Princess Cinema of Milwaukee, 96 Wis. 2d 646, 648-
49, 292 N.W.2d 807 (1980). 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
5 
 
¶11 Rutzinski thus petitioned this court for review, which 
we granted. 
II 
 
¶12 Rutzinski asks this court to determine whether Officer 
Sardina's stop violated the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution3 and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.4  This requires us to apply the undisputed facts to 
constitutional standards.  As such, this case presents a 
question of law, which we review de novo.  State v. Jackson, 147 
Wis. 2d 824, 829, 434 N.W.2d 386 (1989).   
                     
3 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides:   
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.  
 
The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states by means 
of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).  
  
4 Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable searches 
and 
seizures 
shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause, 
supported 
by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
  
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
6 
 
¶13 To 
date, 
we 
consistently 
have 
conformed 
our 
interpretation of Article I, Section 11 and its attendant 
protections with the law developed by the United States Supreme 
Court under the Fourth Amendment.  State v. Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 
201, 208, 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999).  Under both provisions, the 
constitutional imperative is that all searches and seizures be 
objectively reasonable under the circumstances existing at the 
time of the search or seizure.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 
806, 810 (1996); State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 55-56, 556 
N.W.2d 681 (1996).   
¶14 Investigative traffic stops, regardless of how brief 
in duration, are governed by this constitutional reasonableness 
requirement.  Whren, 517 U.S. at 809-10; State v. Guzy, 139 
Wis. 2d 663, 674-75, 407 N.W.2d 548 (1987).  In accordance with 
this requirement, a police officer may temporarily stop a 
suspicious vehicle to maintain the status quo while determining 
the 
identity 
of 
the 
driver 
or 
obtaining 
other 
relevant 
information.  United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 
(1985); Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d at 675.  However, to pass muster under 
the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11, an officer 
initiating an investigative stop must have, at a minimum, a 
reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the vehicle 
have committed an offense.  Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228; Guzy, 139 
Wis. 2d at 675.  As the United States Supreme Court first 
articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), this 
requires that the stop be based on something more than the 
officer's "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.'" 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
7 
 At the time of the stop, the officer must be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, objectively warrant a 
reasonable person with the knowledge and experience of the 
officer to believe that criminal activity is afoot.5  Id. at 21-
22, 27; Hensley, 469 U.S. at 226; Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 55.   
¶15 When reviewing a set of facts to determine whether 
those facts could give rise to a reasonable suspicion, courts 
should apply a commonsense approach to strike a balance between 
the interests of the individual being stopped to be free from 
unnecessary or unduly intrusive searches and seizures, and the 
interests of the State to effectively prevent, detect, and 
investigate crimes.  Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228; Waldner, 206 
Wis. 2d at 56.  In every case, a reviewing court must undertake 
an independent objective analysis of the facts surrounding the 
                     
5 The Wisconsin legislature codified the Terry standard in 
Wis. Stat. § 968.24 (1997-98):  
After having identified himself or herself as a 
law enforcement officer, a law enforcement officer may 
stop a person in a public place for a reasonable 
period of time when the officer reasonably suspects 
that such person is committing, is about to commit or 
has committed a crime, and may demand the name and 
address of the person and an explanation of the 
person's 
conduct. 
 
Such 
detention 
and 
temporary 
questioning shall be conducted in the vicinity where 
the person was stopped. 
 
As we previously have explained, § 968.24 must be interpreted in 
light of Terry and the cases following it.  State v. Jackson, 147 
Wis. 2d 824, 831, 434 N.W.2d 386 (1989). 
 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
8 
particular 
search 
or 
seizure 
and 
determine 
whether 
the 
government's need to conduct the search or seizure outweighs the 
searched or seized individual's interests in being secure from 
such police intrusion.  Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228; State v. 
McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶18, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795; 
Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 56. 
III 
¶16 In the present case, Rutzinski does not dispute that 
Officer Sardina could have initiated an investigative traffic 
stop if he personally had observed Rutzinski's alleged erratic 
driving.  However, as Rutzinski correctly indicates, Officer 
Sardina did not personally observe any suspicious driving; 
rather, he relied upon the motorist's tip to form a reasonable 
suspicion.  This tip, Rutzinski argues, did not provide 
sufficient information to justify the stop.      
¶17 In some circumstances, information contained in an 
informant's tip may justify an investigative stop.  See Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (rejecting the argument "that 
reasonable cause for a stop and frisk can only be based on the 
officer's personal observation, rather than on information 
supplied by another person").  However, informants' tips vary 
greatly in reliability.  Thus, before an informant's tip can 
give rise to grounds for an investigative stop, the police must 
consider its reliability and content. 
¶18 Tips should exhibit reasonable indicia of reliability. 
 Cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983) (applying same 
standard to probable cause determination).  In assessing the 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
9 
reliability of a tip, due weight must be given to:  (1) the 
informant's 
veracity; 
and 
(2) 
the 
informant's 
basis 
of 
knowledge.  Id. at 230.  These considerations should be viewed 
in light of the "totality of the circumstances," and not as 
discrete elements of a more rigid test:  "[A] deficiency in one 
[consideration] may be compensated for, in determining the 
overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the 
other, or by some other indicia of reliability."  Id. at 233.  
Although there is no per se rule of reliability, these 
considerations outline a general spectrum of potential types of 
tips that, under specific circumstances, can give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion. 
¶19 On one end of the spectrum are cases in which the 
police receive a tip from an informant whom they are reasonably 
justified in believing to be truthful.  The United States 
Supreme Court examined this situation in Adams v. Williams, 407 
U.S. 143.  In Adams, an informant approached a police officer 
and indicated that a particular individual in a nearby vehicle 
was in possession of drugs and a gun.  Id. at 144-45.  The 
officer personally knew the informant, and the informant had 
provided the officer with information in the past.  Id. at 144, 
146. 
 Thus, 
based on the 
informant's tip, 
but without 
independently investigating or corroborating any of the facts 
therein, the officer located the individual identified in the 
tip and conducted an investigative stop and protective pat-down 
for weapons.  Id. at 145.  As a result, the police obtained 
incriminating evidence.  Id. at 145.   
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
10
¶20 Upon review of a motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained as a result of the stop, the Supreme Court held that 
the informant's tip was sufficiently reliable to justify the 
stop.  Id. at 149.  First, the Court explained that because the 
informant had provided the officer information in the past and 
"came 
forward 
personally 
to 
give 
information 
that 
was 
immediately verifiable at the scene," the officer had some 
opportunity to assess informant's veracity.  Id. at 146.  
Second, the Court reasoned that because the tip came from an 
informant whom the investigating officer personally knew, the 
officer could have arrested the informant for giving a false tip 
had the tip proven to be untrue.  Id. at 146-47.  This threat of 
potential arrest, the Court explained, could lead a reasonable 
officer to conclude that the informant would not provide a false 
tip; in other words, the officer could presume that the 
informant's tip was reliable.  Id. at 147.  In light of these 
considerations, the Court upheld the stop without undertaking 
any further analysis to determine the informant's basis of 
knowledge.  Id. at 146-47.  
¶21 Adams illustrates that in some circumstances, an 
informant's 
veracity 
can 
afford 
a 
tip 
with 
sufficient 
reliability to justify an investigative stop.  That is, if there 
are strong indicia of the informant's veracity, there need not 
necessarily 
be 
any 
indicia 
of 
the 
informant's 
basis 
of 
knowledge.  
¶22 At the other end of the spectrum are cases where a 
totally anonymous informant provides the police with a tip 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
11
which, 
through 
independent 
police 
investigation 
or 
other 
corroboration, indicates that the informant possesses "inside 
information."  The Supreme Court examined this scenario in 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990).  In that case, the police 
received an anonymous telephone call stating that the defendant 
would leave a particular address "at a particular time in a 
brown Plymouth station wagon with the right taillight lens 
broken," drive to a certain named motel, and be in possession of 
a brown attaché case containing approximately one ounce of 
cocaine.  Id. at 327.  Based on this information, the police 
proceeded to the address indicated by the informant and located 
a station wagon matching the vehicle described in the tip.  Id. 
 At approximately the time indicated by the informant, the 
officers observed the defendant leave the building and enter the 
station wagon.  Id.  The officers then followed the defendant's 
vehicle as it headed along the most direct route to the motel 
named in the tip.  Id.  Just prior to reaching the motel, the 
officers stopped the defendant and undertook a consensual search 
of her car.  Id.  During this search, the officers located the 
attaché case, which they found to contain marijuana and cocaine. 
 Id.  The defendant subsequently moved to suppress the evidence 
obtained as a result of the search, contending that the officers 
did not have a reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial 
investigative stop.  Id. at 327-28. 
¶23 On review, the Court held that although this was "a 
close case," under the circumstances, the anonymous tip, as 
corroborated by the officers, "exhibited sufficient indicia of 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
12
reliability to justify the investigatory stop."  Id. at 332.  
The Court explained that "if a tip has a relatively low degree 
of reliability, more information will be required to establish 
the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the 
tip were more reliable."  Id. at 330.  It then noted that the 
tip at issue, in itself, provided virtually no indication of the 
informant's veracity or basis of knowledge.  Id. at 329.  
Accordingly, "something more" than the tip was required.  Id. 
(quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 227).   
¶24 However, the Court further noted that the informant's 
tip not only contained easily obtainable facts such as the 
defendant's whereabouts or the type of car she drove, but also 
predicted the defendant's future behaviorthat she would leave 
at a certain time and drive to a particular motel.  Id. at 332. 
 These predictions were important, the Court explained, because 
once the accuracy of the predictions was verified, the police 
reasonably 
could 
infer 
that 
the 
informant 
had 
"inside 
information."  Id.  That is, when the police verified the 
predictions, they had reason to believe that the informant had a 
firm basis of knowledge.  This basis of knowledge, the Court 
concluded, 
provided 
the 
tip 
with 
sufficient 
indicia 
of 
reliability to justify the investigative stop.  Id.  Hence, 
although the initial anonymous tip did not, in itself, justify 
an investigative stop, the corroboration of the informant's 
predictions did.   
¶25 White illustrates that in cases where the police 
receive a tip from an unidentifiable informant, the tip 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
13
nonetheless may be deemed reliable if it contains "inside 
information" or a similar verifiable explanation of how the 
informant came to know of the information in the tip, which the 
police in turn independently corroborate.  Stated another way, 
if a tip contains strong indicia of an informant's basis of 
knowledge, there need not necessarily be any indicia of the 
informant's veracity.   
¶26 We are mindful, however, that the Adams and White 
analyses do not create a per se rule by which to judge the 
objective reasonableness of an investigative stop based on an 
informant's tip.  As stated above, when assessing whether a stop 
is constitutionally reasonable, a reviewing court must balance 
the interests of the individual being stopped against the 
interests of the State to effectively root out crime.  Hensley, 
469 U.S. at 228; McGill, 2000 WI 38, at ¶18; Waldner, 206 
Wis. 2d at 56.  In light of this balancing test, we recognize 
that there may be circumstances where an informant's tip does 
not exhibit indicia of reliability that neatly fit within the 
bounds of the Adams-White spectrum, but where the allegations in 
the tip suggest an imminent threat to the public safety or other 
exigency that warrants immediate police investigation.  In such 
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 do 
not require the police to idly stand by in hopes that their 
observations reveal suspicious behavior before the imminent 
threat comes to its fruition.  Rather, it may be reasonable for 
an officer in such a situation to conclude that the potential 
for danger caused by a delay in immediate action justifies 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
14
stopping the suspect without any further observation.  Thus, 
exigency can in some circumstances supplement the reliability of 
an informant's tip in order to form the basis for an 
investigative stop.  Cf. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S. 
Ct. 447, 455 (2000) (noting that exigencies of some scenarios 
likely would outweigh the individual's right to be free from an 
investigative traffic stop). 
IV 
¶27 The Supreme Court recently examined the limits of the 
White-Adams reliability spectrum in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 
266 (2000).  In J.L., the police received an anonymous telephone 
call reporting "that a young black male standing at a particular 
bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun."  Id. at 
268.  The police had no audio recording of the call, nor did 
they know anything about the informant.  Id.  Nonetheless, based 
on the allegation and information in the tip, two officers 
proceeded to the bus stop, located a black male wearing a plaid 
shirt, and, without independently observing any suspicious 
behavior, initiated an investigative stop of that person.  Id.  
As a result of the stop, the police discovered that the suspect 
was carrying a concealed weapon without a license and while 
under the age of eighteen, thus violating Florida law.  Id. at 
268-69.  The suspect later moved to suppress evidence of the 
gun, arguing that the police discovered it as a result of an 
unconstitutional stop based on an unreliable anonymous tip.  Id. 
at 269.   
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
15
¶28 On review, the Supreme Court ruled that the stop was 
unconstitutional.  Id. at 274.  The Court explained that this 
case involved a totally anonymous tip.  Id. at 270.  Thus, 
unlike the tip in Adams "from a known informant whose reputation 
[could] be assessed and who [could] be held responsible if her 
[or his] allegations turn out to [have been] fabricated," the 
tip in this case failed to demonstrate the informant's veracity. 
 Id.  For this reason, the Court explained, the police were 
required under White to corroborate the tip.  Id.  However, to 
corroborate a tip, the Court further explained, the police must 
do more than verify easily obtainable information that tends to 
identify the suspect; they must verify information that tends to 
indicate the informant's basis of knowledge about the suspect's 
alleged illegal activity.  Id. at 271-72.  Hence, a totally 
anonymous tip must contain not only a bald assertion that the 
suspect is engaged in illegal activity (e.g., that the suspect 
illegally possesses a gun), but also verifiable information 
indicating how the tipster came to know of the alleged illegal 
activity (i.e., the informant's basis of knowledge).  Id. at 
272; see also White, 496 U.S. at 331-32.  In this case, the 
Court noted, the anonymous tip did not contain any information 
such as a prediction regarding the suspect's future behavior 
which, if corroborated, would indicate the informant's basis of 
knowledge.  J.L., 529 U.S. at 271.  Rather, "[a]ll the police 
had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, 
unaccountable informant who neither explained how he [or she] 
knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he [or 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
16
she] had inside information about [the suspect]."  Id.  Thus, 
the Court concluded that the tip failed under White analysis.  
Id. at 271.  
¶29 Further, the Court rejected Florida's argument that 
the content of a tip alleging that a suspect possesses a firearm 
necessarily entails such exigency that it warrants an exception 
to the general rule that 
tips must 
exhibit 
indicia of 
reliability.  Id. at 272.  The Court noted that "[f]irearms are 
dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes justify unusual 
precautions."  Id.  However, it reasoned that a firearms 
exception would create a rule under which any person seeking to 
harass 
another 
individual 
could 
simply 
allege 
that 
the 
individual possesses a gun.  Id.  The Court explained:  "As we 
clarified when we made indicia of reliability critical in Adams 
and White, the Fourth Amendment is not so easily satisfied."6  
                     
6 Although the Court refused to adopt Florida's proposed 
firearms exception, it carefully limited its holding to the 
facts of the case: 
The facts of this case do not require us to 
speculate about the circumstances under which the 
danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great 
as to justify a search even without a showing of 
reliability.  We do not say, for example, that a 
report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the 
indicia of reliability we demand for a person carrying 
a firearm before the police can constitutionally 
conduct a frisk.  Nor do we hold that public safety 
officials in quarters where the reasonable expectation 
of Fourth Amendment privacy is diminished, such as 
airports . . . and 
schools . . . , 
cannot 
conduct 
protective 
searches on 
the basis 
of 
information 
insufficient to justify searches elsewhere. 
 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
17
Id. at 273.  Accordingly, the Court held that the anonymous tip 
did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop 
and, therefore, the stop was constitutionally unreasonable.  Id. 
at 274. 
¶30 In the present case, Rutzinski analogizes Officer 
Sardina's investigative traffic stop to the stop in J.L..  
First, he points out that Officer Sardina, like the officers in 
J.L., did not independently observe any suspicious behavior.  
Second, he contends that like the tip in J.L., the tip at issue 
here came from an unidentified informant who provided no 
predictions regarding Rutzinski's future conduct.  As such, 
Officer Sardina could neither presume that the informant was 
being truthful, nor could he conclude that the informant had 
inside information about whether Rutzinski was intoxicated.  And 
third, Rutzinski asserts that under J.L., this court cannot 
create a constitutional "drunk driving" exception to the Adams-
White reliability requirement.  For these reasons, and based on 
the Supreme Court's holding in J.L., Rutzinski contends that 
although the informant's tip in this case may have given Officer 
Sardina grounds to investigate the situation and perhaps form a 
reasonable suspicion based on facts that he personally may have 
observed, the tip did not, in itself, provide a reasonable basis 
for Officer Sardina's investigative stop.  Therefore, Rutzinski 
                                                                  
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2000) (citations 
omitted).  In doing so, the Court implicitly affirmed that there 
are circumstances in which exigency can supplementor, in very 
extreme 
circumstances, 
possibly 
supplantthe 
Adams-White 
reliability analysis. 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
18
claims that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment and Article 
I, Section 11.  
¶31 We reject Rutzinski's arguments.  To be sure, Officer 
Sardina did not independently observe any suspicious behavior.  
But the present case involves a very different set of facts than 
those in J.L..  
¶32 First, unlike the caller in J.L., the informant in 
this case exposed him- or herself to being identified.  The 
informant indicated to the police prior to the stop that he or 
she was in the vehicle in front of Rutzinski's pickup.  Officer 
Sardina thus could infer that by revealing that he or she was in 
a particular vehicle, the informant understood that the police 
could discover his or her identity by tracing the vehicle's 
license plates or directing the vehicle to the side of the road.7 
 That is, like the officer in Adams, Officer Sardina could 
reasonably have concluded that the informant knew that he or she 
potentially could 
be arrested if 
the 
tip 
proved 
to be 
fabricated.8  Accord United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 
                     
7 The informant did pull to the side of the road when 
Officer Sardina initiated the stop.  However, Officer Sardina 
did not ask the informant to do so, and we cannot infer from the 
record that Officer Sardina expected this result.  Consequently, 
we do not consider this fact in assessing the constitutionality 
of the stop.  
8 Section 946.41 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides in part 
that it is a Class A misdemeanor to knowingly give false 
information to a police officer while the officer is doing any 
act 
in 
an 
official 
capacity 
and 
with 
lawful 
authority.  
Similarly, Wis. Stat. §  146.70 establishes a penalty for 
intentionally dialing "911" to report an emergency while knowing 
that the alleged fact situation does not exist. 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
19
760, 763 (9th Cir. 1978) (Kennedy, J.) (holding that by 
"presenting himself to the [police] and doing so while driving a 
car from which his identity might easily be traced, the 
[unidentified] 
informant 
was 
in 
a 
position 
to 
be 
held 
accountable for his intervention"); State v. Slater, 986 P.2d 
1038, 1043 (Kan. 1999) (holding and providing cites for cases 
from 
several 
jurisdictions 
which 
hold 
that 
tips 
from 
unidentified 
informants 
generally 
are 
reliable 
when 
"the 
informant gives enough information that his or her identity may 
be ascertained").  As explained in Adams, this threat of arrest 
could lead a reasonable police officer to conclude that the 
informant is being truthful.  
¶33 Second, unlike the caller in J.L., the informant in 
this case provided the police with verifiable information 
indicating his or her basis of knowledge.  The informant 
explained that he or she was making personal observations of 
Rutzinski's 
contemporaneous 
actions. 
 
Additionally, 
the 
informant provided not only a description of Rutzinski's vehicle 
and the direction in which it was traveling, but also indicated 
the time at which Rutzinski's vehicle passed specific locations 
as it progressed toward Officer Sardina, Officer Sardina's 
arrival on the scene, and that Officer Sardina was following a 
black pickup.  While many people may have been able to identify 
Rutzinski's vehicle and the general direction in which it was 
traveling, only a person contemporaneously observing the vehicle 
or possessing "inside information" (for example, a person in 
contact with Rutzinski at the time in question) would have been 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
20
able to indicate where the vehicle was located and the setting 
surrounding the vehicle at the given time.  Thus, Officer 
Sardina reasonably could have inferred from this information 
that the informant had a reliable basis of knowledge.  
¶34 And third, unlike the tip in J.L., the tip in the 
present case suggested that Rutzinski posed an imminent threat 
to the public's safety.  The informant in this case alleged that 
Rutzinski was driving erratically.  Erratic driving is one 
possible sign of intoxicated use of a motor vehicle.  State v. 
Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 453 n.6, 475 N.W.2d 148 (1991).  As 
such, based on the reliability of and the allegations contained 
in the informant's tip, Officer Sardina reasonably could have 
suspected that Rutzinski was intoxicated.  Accordingly, Officer 
Sardina was justified in initiating an investigative traffic 
stop of Rutzinski. 
¶35 Rutzinski responds that Officer Sardina nonetheless 
should have waited until he personally observed signs that 
Rutzinski may have been intoxicated before initiating the 
traffic stop.  But this argument ignores the tremendous 
potential danger presented by drunk drivers.  As the Vermont 
Supreme Court recently explained in a case with a strikingly 
similar fact pattern to the case at hand:  
 
In contrast to the report of an individual in 
possession of a gun [as in J.L.], an anonymous report 
of an erratic or drunk driver on the highway presents 
a 
qualitatively 
different 
level 
of 
danger, 
and 
concomitantly greater urgency for prompt action.  In 
the case of a concealed gun, the possession itself 
might be legal, and the police could, in any event, 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
21
surreptitiously 
observe 
the 
individual 
for 
a 
reasonable period of time without running the risk of 
death or injury with every passing moment.  An officer 
in pursuit of a reportedly drunk driver on a freeway 
does not enjoy such a luxury.  Indeed, a drunk driver 
is not at all unlike a "bomb," and a mobile one at 
that. 
State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 867 (Vt. 2000); see also State v. 
Tucker, 878 P.2d 855, 864 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) ("The risk of 
danger presented to the public by a drunken driver is so great 
that we cannot afford to impose strict, verifiable conditions on 
an anonymous tip before an investigatory stop can be made in 
response to such a tip."); State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338, 340 
(N.H. 1995) (considering exigency of situation created by 
alleged drunk driving in holding traffic stop based on tip by 
unidentified informant to be constitutional); State v. Stolte, 
991 S.W.2d 336, 343 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (considering the 
"immediate threat to public safety" caused by drunk drivers in 
upholding an investigative stop based on information in an 
informant's tip); cf. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 
496 U.S. 444, 451-55 (1990) (holding that "the magnitude of the 
drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating 
it" outweighs individuals' rights to be free from traffic stops 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
22
at sobriety checkpoints).9  In light of the potential for 
imminent danger that drunk drivers present, the informant's 
allegations suggesting that Rutzinski may have been intoxicated 
supplemented the reliability of the tip, and further justified 
Officer Sardina's investigative stop.10   
¶36 This is not to suggest that we advocate a blanket rule 
excepting tips alleging drunk driving from the Adams-White 
reliability requirement.  As the Supreme Court explained in 
J.L., the Constitution is not so easily satisfied.  Rather, we 
merely 
acknowledge 
the 
Supreme 
Court's 
caveat 
that 
"extraordinary dangers sometimes justify unusual precautions."  
                     
9 In 1999 the United States suffered 15,786 fatalities in 
alcohol-related traffic accidentsan average of one fatality 
every thirty-three minutes.  National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, United States Dept. of Transp., Traffic Safety 
Facts 
1999 
1 
(2000), 
available 
at 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/ncsa/pdf/Alcohol99.pdf. 
 
These 
fatalities 
comprised 
thirty-eight 
percent 
of 
all 
traffic 
fatalities for that year.  Id.  Further, during 1999 "[a]n 
estimated 308,000 persons [nationwide] were injured in crashes 
where police reported that alcohol was presentan average of one 
person injured approximately every 2 minutes."  Id. 
The same year, there were 309 fatalities in Wisconsin as a 
result of alcohol-related traffic accidents.  Id. at 7.  This 
represents forty-one percent of all traffic fatalities in 
Wisconsin for 1999.  Id.  
10 To be sure, intoxication is not the only possible cause 
of erratic driving.  Erratic driving can be the result of 
something as innocuous as the driver waving at a bee in the car 
or something as serious as the driver having a heart attack.  
But regardless of the cause, erratic driving can be very 
dangerous and often is symptomatic of intoxication.  State v. 
Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 453 n.6, 475 N.W.2d 148 (1991).  For 
these reasons, an officer may make a traffic stop to investigate 
observations or reliable reports of erratic driving.   
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
23
J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1379.  Because drunk driving is an 
extraordinary danger, we cannot adopt Rutzinski's position that 
the police must dismiss allegations of possible drunk driving 
when assessing whether an informant's tip justifies a traffic 
stop.  While such allegations cannot form the sole basis for an 
investigative stop, they certainly must be considered when 
examining 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
particular police conduct.   
¶37 For these reasons, Officer Sardina's investigative 
stop of Rutzinski does not implicate the same constitutional 
deficiencies present in the police action in J.L..  Unlike the 
tip in J.L., the informant's tip in this case contained 
sufficient indicia of reliability and alleged a potential 
imminent danger to public safety.  These factors substantially 
outweighed the minimal intrusion that the stop would have 
presented had Rutzinski indeed not been intoxicated.  Therefore, 
we hold that Officer Sardina acted reasonably in conducting the 
investigative stop.   
V 
¶38 In sum, we hold that the tip in this case provided 
sufficient justification for an investigative stop of Rutzinski. 
 First, the tip contained sufficient indicia of the informant's 
reliability:  the information in the tip exposed the informant 
to possible identification and, therefore, to possible arrest if 
the tip proved false; the tip reported contemporaneous and 
verifiable observations regarding Rutzinski's alleged erratic 
driving, 
location, 
and 
vehicle's 
description; 
and Officer 
No. 
98-3541-CR 
 
 
24
Sardina verified many of the details in the informant's tip.  
Second, the allegations in the tip could suggest to a reasonable 
police officer that Rutzinski was operating his vehicle while 
intoxicated.  This exigency strongly weighs in favor of 
immediate police investigation.  For these reasons, we conclude 
that the stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment or Article I, 
Section 11, and we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 98-3541-CR.ssa 
 
1 
¶39 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  I 
agree with the majority's conclusion that the tip in this case 
provided sufficient justification for an investigative traffic 
stop for driving while intoxicated. 
¶40 Not 
all 
tips, 
however, 
will 
provide 
sufficient 
justification to enable law enforcement officers to conduct an 
investigative traffic stop.  See majority op. at ¶36. 
¶41 Case law from other states shows that law enforcement 
units have adopted policies regarding tips of drunk or erratic 
driving that help to ensure that resulting traffic stops are 
lawful.  For example, police dispatchers in Texas ask an 
anonymous caller alleging drunk or erratic driving to pull over 
at the scene.  See, e.g., State v. Stolte, 991 S.W. 2d 336, 340 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1999).  Law enforcement units in Wisconsin might 
consider adopting policies to promote the reliability of tips.