Title: In re Knappenberger

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  May 20, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
ALLAN F. KNAPPENBERGER,
Accused.
(OSB 01-9, 01-121, 01-122; SC S49996)
En Banc
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted March 9, 2004.
Peter R. Jarvis, Hinshaw & Culbertson, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for the accused.  With him on the
briefs was Leta E. Gorman.
Stacy J. Hankin, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake
Oswego, argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State
Bar.
PER CURIAM
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for 90
days, commencing 60 days from the filing of this decision.
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) charged Allan F. Knappenberger (the accused) with
violating Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule
(DR) 5-101(A) (conflict of interest with lawyer's self-interest)
and DR 6-101(B) (neglect of legal matter) in the course of
representing three clients:  Mura, Loitz, and Bridge.  A trial
panel of the Disciplinary Board concluded that the accused
committed the alleged violations and imposed a one-year
suspension (with nine months stayed pending satisfactory
compliance with conditions described below) and a two-year
probationary period. 
On automatic and de novo review, ORS 9.536(2)-(3)
(2001), we conclude that the accused violated DR 5-101(A) and DR
6-101(B) respectively in the Mura and Loitz matters, but that the
accused did not violate DR 5-101(A) and DR 6-101(B) in the Bridge
matter.  We suspend the accused from the practice of law for 90
days.
I.  FACTS
The Bar has established the following facts by clear
and convincing evidence.  BR 5.2.  The accused is a sole
practitioner admitted to the Bar in 1973.  He works principally
as a domestic relations lawyer, although he also has experience
in criminal law and other matters.
A.  The Mura Matter
In June 1993, Mura pleaded guilty to a charge of sexual
abuse of his daughter.  Later that year, Mura's daughter
allegedly recanted her allegation of abuse.  Mura then retained
the accused to represent him in post-conviction proceedings.  In
October 1993, the accused filed a petition for post-conviction
relief based in part on the alleged recantation and the failure
of Mura's original lawyer to investigate the possibility that
another person had abused Mura's child.
Due to a calendaring error, the accused filed the
petition one day late. (1) In January 1994, the state filed a
motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it had not been
filed timely.  
On January 30, 1994, the accused sent Mura two letters. 
The first letter included a copy of the state's motion to
dismiss, informed Mura that he need not be present at the
February 14, 1994, hearing on the state's motion, and stated that
Mura and the accused would have to discuss the accused's further
participation in the case in light of Mura's financial situation. 
The second letter informed Mura of the February 28, 1994, trial
date and again emphasized that they would have to discuss
attorney fees before the accused would proceed further with his
representation of Mura.  Neither letter discussed with Mura the
potential import of the state's motion to dismiss.  In addition,
although the accused arguably had committed malpractice by
failing to meet the post-conviction filing deadline, neither
letter suggested in any way that a potential conflict of interest
could arise out of the accused's error or suggested that Mura
consider seeking independent legal advice.
The accused met with Mura on February 1, 1994. 
According to a February 2, 1994, memorandum that the accused
dictated, the accused informed Mura at the meeting that his case
"had slipped substantially as a result of not getting the little
girl to the psychologist back in October or November, 1993."  The
accused further informed Mura that he would not continue to work
on the case without getting paid and that he would not blame Mura
"for dismissing the case at this time and cutting his losses." 
The memorandum does not state that the accused discussed the
motion to dismiss with Mura other than to remind Mura that the
hearing was imminent. 
The accused responded to the state's motion to dismiss
on February 13, 1994.  The accused's memorandum in opposition and
accompanying affidavit argued that the trial court should deny
the motion because the accused had caused the untimely filing and
the accused's delay was not attributable to Mura.  Although the
accused testified at the trial panel hearing that he sent a copy
of his response to Mura, Mura did not testify that he received
that response, and the accused's time sheet entries do not
indicate that the accused sent a copy of the response to Mura.
At the February 14, 1994, hearing, the trial court
granted the state's motion to dismiss, concluding that the
petition had not been filed timely and had not alleged facts that
constituted grounds for the late filing.  On February 21, 1994,
the accused informed Mura by letter that the court had dismissed
his petition due to a missed deadline and that Mura had 30 days
in which to file a notice of appeal.
B.  The Loitz Matter
Loitz retained the accused in 1997 with the goal of
reducing monthly spousal support payments.  Following a trial,
the trial court ordered a reduction in Loitz's monthly support
obligation, but the reduction was not as much as the accused
hoped.  The accused encouraged Loitz to appeal.  Loitz took the
accused's advice, and the accused filed, briefed, and argued the
case before the Court of Appeals. 
The accused spoke with Loitz on the same day as the
Court of Appeals oral argument, September 21, 1999.  Except for
one telephone call on January 27, 2000, the accused had no
further communication with Loitz regarding his case.  During the
subsequent months, however, the following events occurred.  On
September 28, 1999, the accused received a letter from Court
Bonds, the company that had issued the supersedeas bond for
Loitz's appeal, reminding the accused that the premium on the
supersedeas bond was overdue.  On October 6, the Court of Appeals
affirmed without opinion the trial judge's decision.  On October
12, opposing counsel filed a statement for costs and a petition
for attorney fees, and mailed a copy to the accused, which the
accused received on October 15.  On October 18, the accused
received a second letter from Court Bonds reminding him that the
premium on the supersedeas bond was overdue.  On October 21, the
accused received a copy of a letter from opposing counsel to the
Court of Appeals related to the petition for attorney fees.  On
November 18, Court Bonds sent a third letter to the accused
demanding premium payment on the supersedeas bond within 10
working days.  On November 19, the accused dictated a letter to
Loitz regarding the need to renew the bond, but the dictation
tape was not transcribed and no letter was sent to Loitz.  
Loitz learned of the overdue payment on the bond when
he received a November 30, 1999, letter from Court Bonds.  In
early December 1999, Loitz faxed the accused twice and called the
accused's office questioning whether the issue of the bond had
been addressed and whether the Court of Appeals had rendered a
decision.  The accused did not respond to those inquiries.  On
December 20, the Court of Appeals issued an appellate judgment
against Loitz in the amount of $8,157.50. 
During those months, the accused's staff gave him a
daily log outlining the first-class mail that the accused
received.  The accused was responsible for reviewing the log and
the mail, and either handling the mail himself or delegating that
task to his staff.  Although the accused received the above-described correspondence and although the Court of Appeals
decision was in the accused's client file, the accused did not
send those documents to Loitz or otherwise notify Loitz of their
contents.   
Loitz spoke with the accused on January 27, 2000, but,
in Loitz's words, received "no news" on the Court of Appeals
decision.  Loitz first learned of the Court of Appeals decision
and the appellate judgment against him when he sold a piece of
property in July 2000 and the title search identified the
judgment.  Loitz again attempted to contact the accused, but the
accused did not respond. 
C.  The Bridge Matter
Bridge retained the accused to represent her in a
marital dissolution proceeding in which the main issue was the
validity of a prenuptial agreement.  In July 1998, the trial
court signed a judgment of dissolution of marriage upholding the
validity of the agreement, but nonetheless awarded some spousal
support to Bridge.  The accused filed a notice of appeal in
August 1998.  The opposing party cross-appealed.
In June 1999, counsel for the opposing party filed an
answering brief.  That brief included a motion to dismiss
Bridge's appeal on the ground that the accused had failed to
serve properly Bridge's former husband with the notice of
appeal. (2)  The accused thought that the motion had little
chance of success.  The accused sent the opposing party's brief
to Bridge with a transmittal letter that did not call express
attention to the risk of dismissal as a result of the motion.  
The accused discussed the status of the case with
Bridge on May 6, 1999, August 11, 1999, and January 5, 2000. 
There is no indication in the record whether the accused
discussed the motion with Bridge or whether she questioned the
accused about the motion.  
On April 12, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed
Bridge's appeal, because the accused had failed to serve the
notice of appeal properly.  Bridge, 166 Or App at 462.  Due to
the cross-appeal, however, the Court of Appeals addressed the
validity of the prenuptial agreement, rejected the accused's
arguments, and vacated the spousal support award to the accused's
client.  Id. at 463-65. 
Bridge first received notice of the Court of Appeals
decision from a friend on April 27, 2000.  In her testimony
before the trial panel, Bridge asserted that she must have
attempted to contact the accused after hearing about the
decision.  There is no contemporaneous record of such an attempt,
however, and Bridge testified that she was not sure if she had 
contacted or had attempted to contact the accused.  For his part,
the accused asserted at the trial panel hearing that he had sent
a copy of the Court of Appeals decision to Bridge or that he had
contacted her in April 2000 regarding that decision, though there
is no record of such an attempt.  
At his own expense, the accused hired another lawyer to
file a petition for review in this court and, on May 17, 2000,
requested an extension of time in which to file that petition. 
He sent Bridge a copy of that motion and later sent Bridge a copy
of the petition for review.  The accused spoke with Bridge about
the Court of Appeals decision on May 22, 2000.  At that time, the
accused discussed his “plans to appeal the appeal.”    
It is unclear whether Bridge spoke to the accused after
May 22, 2000.  Although Bridge apparently kept a daily logbook of
her activities, including telephone calls, she also stated at the
trial panel hearing that she had "tried to" record instances when
the accused contacted her. 
The accused did not inform Bridge that opposing counsel
filed a petition for costs and attorney fees, that this court
denied Bridge's petition for review, and that the Court of
Appeals entered an appellate judgment against her in the amount
of $3,320.50.  Bridge first learned about those events when a
collection agency contacted her in November 2000.  Bridge sent a
letter to the accused in December 2000 that generally complained
about the quality of the accused's representation.  The accused
did not respond to that letter.  
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In an amended formal complaint filed in August 2001,
the Bar alleged one violation of DR 5-101(A) arising out of the
accused's conduct in the Mura matter, one violation of DR 6-101(B) arising out of the accused's conduct in the Loitz matter,
and violations of DR 5-101(A) and DR 6-101(B) respectively
arising out of the accused's conduct in the Bridge matter.  The
trial panel held a hearing at which Mura, Loitz, Bridge, and the
accused testified.
The trial panel found that the accused committed the
four alleged violations.  The trial panel suspended the accused
for one year, with nine months stayed pending satisfactory
compliance with certain requirements.  The trial panel required
the accused (1) to seek counsel and guidance regarding office
management procedures; and (2) to submit to psychological
screening for the purpose of determining whether his work habits
are the result of treatable conditions.  The trial panel also
imposed a two-year probationary period to follow the accused's
three-month active suspension.  
III.  DISCUSSION
The accused concedes that he violated DR 5-101(A) in
the Mura matter, a concession with which we agree, but he
disputes the trial panel's sanction for that violation.  We
therefore address the conceded violation of DR 5-101(A) in the
sanctions analysis below.  We turn to the merits of the Bar's
charges that the accused violated DR 6-101(B) in the Loitz matter
and violated DR 6-101(B) and DR 5-101(A) in the Bridge matter.  
A.  DR 6-101(B)
DR 6-101(B) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer."  Determining whether a
lawyer violated DR 6-101(B) is a fact-specific inquiry in which,
using an objective standard, we assess whether the lawyer acted
neglectfully.  See In re Magar, 335 Or 306, 319, 66 P3d 1014
(2003) (stating that lawyer's mental state is irrelevant when
determining whether lawyer acted neglectfully).  The neglect
inquiry is not dependent on the outcome of the matter at issue. 
Rather, viewing the lawyer's conduct along a temporal continuum,
we consider whether the lawyer engaged in a course of neglectful
conduct that reflects a "failure to act or * * * failure to act
diligently."  Id. at 321.
In the present case, the accused argues that the Bar
has not shown a course of neglectful conduct in the Loitz matter and, in particular, emphasizes that he diligently tried and
appealed Loitz's case.  Although he concedes that information
"fell through the cracks" after September 1999, the accused
attributes those circumstances to unreliable office procedures
and misfiling.  
The Bar counters that, after September 21, 1999, the
accused failed to perform any significant work in the Loitz
matter.  The Bar argues that the accused failed to review the
mail and mail logs that his staff prepared; failed to respond to
important events in Loitz’s case, including the Court of Appeals
decision, the petition for attorney fees, the money judgment, and
the letters from Court Bonds; failed to inform Loitz of those
events; and failed to respond to Loitz's inquiries regarding the
bond and the Court of Appeals decision.
We conclude that the accused violated DR 6-101(B) with
respect to the Loitz matter.  Over the course of several months
in late 1999 and early 2000, several significant events occurred
in Loitz's case.  Although the accused admittedly received
correspondence on several occasions from multiple sources
regarding those events and although Loitz sought information from
the accused in early December 1999, the accused's only response
was a single dictated, but untranscribed, letter and one
telephone call in which he failed to apprise Loitz of the Court
of Appeals decision or the judgment against him.  Evidently, the
accused not only failed to read and respond to mail related to
Loitz matter when his office received it, but he neglected
otherwise to check on the status of Loitz’s case anytime
thereafter, despite Loitz's inquiries.  Those failures
demonstrate a violation of DR 6-101(B).   
The accused's emphasis on his pre-September 1999
representation of Loitz does not absolve him of responsibility
for his later neglect.  Assuming without deciding that the
accused diligently tried and appealed Loitz's case through oral
argument in the Court of Appeals, that diligence did not give the
accused license to abandon his client after oral argument in
light of the later events that called for his attention.  We
agree with the trial panel that the accused's handling of the
Loitz matter shows a course of neglectful conduct sufficient to
sustain the Bar's burden on the second cause of complaint.
We reach a different conclusion with respect to the
Bridge matter.  The accused emphasizes that he sent Bridge copies
of the relevant documents, initiated contact with Bridge to
discuss the status of her case and the Court of Appeals decision,
and pursued a petition for review in Bridge’s case at his own
expense.  The accused also notes that Bridge testified before the
trial panel that she was able to speak with the accused or his
legal assistant when she wished to do so. 
The Bar asserts that the accused first violated DR 6-101(B) by failing to serve the notice of appeal properly.  The
Bar also argues that the accused failed to communicate adequately
with Bridge and to inform Bridge of the statement for attorney
fees, this court’s denial of review, and the entry of a money
judgment against Bridge.
In contrast to the Loitz matter, the accused did not
engage in a course of neglectful conduct while representing
Bridge.  As an initial matter, the Bar overreaches when it
asserts that the accused violated DR 6-101(B) by failing to serve
the notice of appeal properly.  As this court made clear in
Magar, 335 Or at 320-21, a single instance of arguably neglectful
conduct does not suffice to establish a violation of DR 6-101(B). 
Furthermore, unlike the Loitz matter, the accused read and
responded to the mail that he received regarding Bridge’s case,
and he sent Bridge copies of that correspondence.  The accused
updated Bridge on the status of the case while it was under
consideration by the Court of Appeals, and, following the court's
decision, he pursued a petition in this court.  He informed
Bridge of that action and sent her copies of the relevant
documents.  
The Bar faults the accused for failing to keep Bridge
informed of the risk of dismissal inherent in the state's motion
to dismiss and the status of her case in the Court of Appeals. 
In fact, however, the record contains conflicting and incomplete
testimony on that score.  As noted above, the accused may have
discussed the motion with Bridge, and the accused testified that
it was likely that he did contact Bridge regarding the Court of
Appeals decision.  Bridge was unable to testify with certainty
when and whether she spoke to the accused, at one point stating,
“It’s a long time ago and my memory is not that great.”  Her
uncertain testimony also called into question the accuracy and
completeness of her daily logbook.
In those ways, this cause of complaint is unlike the
accused’s handling of the Loitz matter as well as earlier cases
finding neglect of a legal matter.  See In re McKee, 316 Or 114,
127, 849 P2d 509 (1993) (finding accused lawyer to have neglected
matter when he failed to contact witnesses, allowed matter to be
dismissed due to clerical error, and failed to keep client
informed of progress of case); In re Recker, 309 Or 633, 636, 789
P2d 663 (1990) (accused lawyer neglected matter when she accepted
client’s case, but failed to return calls, failed to perform any
work on matter, and failed to return original documents or cash
advance).  Although the question is a close one in light of the
accused’s failures to inform Bridge of this court’s denial of
review and the judgment against her, the Bar has not shown by
clear and convincing evidence a course of neglectful conduct with
respect to the accused’s handling of the Bridge matter.    
B.  DR 5-101(A)
The trial panel also found that the accused violated DR
5-101(A) in the Bridge matter.  DR 5-101(A) provides:
"(A) Except with the consent of the lawyer's
client after full disclosure,
"(1) a lawyer shall not accept or continue
employment if the exercise of the lawyer's professional
judgment on behalf of the lawyer's client will be or
reasonably may be affected by the lawyer's own
financial, business, property, or personal interests. 
* * *"
DR 10-101(B)(1) defines "full disclosure" as "an
explanation sufficient to apprise the recipient of the potential
adverse impact on the recipient, of the matter to which the
recipient is asked to consent."  DR 10-101(B)(2) further provides
that, as used in DR 5-101, "'full disclosure' shall also include
a recommendation that the recipient seek independent legal advice
to determine if consent should be given and shall be
contemporaneously confirmed in writing."  
The parties focus on whether the accused's interests in
minimizing his service-of-process error and avoiding a potential
malpractice claim would have affected or reasonably may have
affected the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of
Bridge.  The accused disputes the Bar's assertion that the error
triggered a conflict requiring consent after full disclosure
under DR 5-101(A).  First, the accused argues that no clear and
convincing evidence demonstrates that his service-of-process
error would have resulted in malpractice liability given his
reasonable belief in the likelihood that the motion to dismiss
would fail.  He also notes that the error was legally harmless
because the Court of Appeals addressed his substantive arguments
in reaching the merits of the cross-appeal.  Finally, the accused
emphasizes that, even after he recognized the significance of his
error, he was in no position to exercise his professional
judgment in any way other than to attempt to correct the error,
in which case his interests were aligned with the interests of
his client.
The Bar responds that "the pendency or potential
pendency of a malpractice claim by a client against a lawyer
triggers the lawyer's duty to obtain consent after full
disclosure as provided in DR 5-101(A)(1)."  In this instance, the
Bar asserts that a potential malpractice claim against the
accused arose when the opposing lawyer moved to dismiss the
appeal or when the Court of Appeals granted that motion.  That
potential claim, according to the Bar, reasonably may have
impaired the accused's exercise of his professional judgment
while representing Bridge, thus requiring him to seek Bridge's
consent pursuant to DR 5-101(A).
As with the other conflicts-of-interest rules, DR 5-101(A) is "based upon the concern that, when a lawyer undertakes
the representation of a client with interests differing from the
interests of the lawyer or the lawyer's other clients, the
lawyer's judgment might become impaired or the lawyer's loyalty
might become divided."  In re Kluge, 335 Or 326, 335, 66 P3d 492
(2003).  To vindicate that concern and to prevent compromised
representation, DR 5-101(A) requires a lawyer to look forward and
to determine whether, in accepting or continuing representation,
the lawyer's and the client's interests will conflict -- in terms
of DR 5-101(A)(1), whether the lawyer's professional judgment 
"will be or reasonably may be affected" by his or her own
interests.  That operative text expresses two degrees of
certainty with respect to that determination.  Cf. In re Tonkon,
292 Or 660, 666, 642 P2d 660 (1982) (interpreting former DR 5-101(A) (1980)).  That is, DR 5-101(A) requires consent after full
disclosure if, based on the facts in an individual case, (1) the
exercise of the lawyer's professional judgment "will be" affected
by his or her financial, business, property, or personal
interests, regardless of whether the determination of an effect
on the lawyer's professional judgment is reasonable; or (2) the
exercise of the lawyer's professional judgment "reasonably may be
affected" by his or her financial, business, property, or
personal interests.  By using "may" rather than "will," the
latter phrase expresses a lesser degree of certainty and sweeps
more broadly than the former.  This court recently emphasized,
however, that under DR 5-101(A) the determination whether a
lawyer's professional judgment "may be affected" must be
reasonable.  In re Obert, 336 Or 640, ___, ___ P3d ___ (May 6,
2004) (slip op at 10). 
In certain circumstances, the desire to avoid or to
minimize potential liability for an error made during the course
of a lawyer's representation of a client may require consent
after full disclosure under either of the two scenarios described
in the wording of DR 5-101(A).  By linking any potential
malpractice claim with a duty to disclose and seek consent under
DR 5-101(A), however, the Bar seems to be suggesting the adoption
of a per se rule. (3)  In effect, the Bar presumes that, in all
factual circumstances, any error by a lawyer that may harm his or
her client, and thus every potential malpractice claim, will or
reasonably may affect the lawyer's professional judgment in a way
that implicates DR 5-101(A).  
The Bar's interpretation is incorrect.  Many errors by
a lawyer may involve a low risk of harm to the client or low risk
of ultimate liability for the lawyer, thereby vitiating the
danger that the lawyer's own interests will endanger his or her
exercise of professional judgment on behalf of the client.  Even
if the risk of some harm to the client is high, the actual effect
of that harm may be minimal, or, if an error does occur, it may
be remedied with little or no harm to the client.  In those
circumstances, it is possible for a lawyer to continue to
exercise his or her professional judgment on behalf of the client
without placing the quality of representation at risk.  See In re
Hopp, 291 Or 697, 634 P2d 238 (1981) (finding no DR 5-101(A)
violation when accused had incidental financial or proprietary
interest in outcome of litigation).  It simply does not follow,
then, that any error made during the course of a lawyer's
representation will or reasonably may affect his or her
professional judgment in a way that requires consent after
disclosure under DR 5-101(A). (4)
We do not catalogue the myriad situations in which a
lawyer's error does or does not trigger DR 5-101(A).  It suffices
to say that, to prove a violation of DR 5-101(A), the Bar cannot
assert simply that an error occurred and, therefore, created some
risk, however minimal, of impaired professional judgment as a
result of the potential malpractice liability.  Rather, the Bar
must show by clear and convincing evidence that the lawyer's
error, and the pending or potential liability arising from that
error, will or reasonably may affect the lawyer's professional
judgment.  That conclusion will depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case.
In the present matter, the Bar has failed to meet its
burden.  Before the opposing party filed the motion to dismiss
the appeal, the accused did not recognize that he made an error
in serving the notice of appeal.  After reading the motion, the
accused realized that, if granted, the motion imperiled his
client's case, and he called Bridge's attention to the motion. 
In the accused's opinion, however, the motion had little chance
for success.  And, although the Bar alleges that the motion
immediately raised the potential for malpractice liability, the
Bar does not assert that the accused's opinion was unreasonable
or that it would have been evident to a reasonable lawyer at
that time that Bridge had a viable malpractice claim.  Thus, the
unlikelihood of the motion's success reduced the risk to the
client from the alleged error, and, even in light of that risk,
the accused was not in a position to expect that his alleged
error would result in malpractice liability.  See Stevens v.
Bispham, 316 Or 221, 227, 851 P2d 556 (1993) (describing
elements of legal malpractice claim).  When opposing counsel
filed the motion, then, there is no clear and convincing
evidence that the accused's professional judgment was affected,
nor is it reasonable to conclude that the error may have
affected the accused's professional judgment.
Once the Court of Appeals granted the motion, the
accused obviously realized that he made an error, but he also
understood that the error would not have altered the ultimate
outcome of Bridge's case.  As noted, because of the cross-appeal, the Court of Appeals still reached the merits and
rejected the accused's arguments.  The court's decision revealed
that the accused's error did not eliminate the possibility of an
otherwise successful appeal.  In the absence of such a causal
link, the risk of malpractice liability arising from the
accused's error remained remote to nonexistent.  The facts
demonstrate that no violation of DR 5-101(A) occurred in the
Bridge matter.
IV.  SANCTION
The parties agree, as do we, that probation and the
conditions that the trial panel imposed are inappropriate.  We
turn to whether a suspension is appropriate for the accused's
violations of DR 5-101(A) in the Mura matter and DR 6-101(B) in
the Loitz matter, and, if so, what length of suspension to
impose.
To determine the appropriate sanction, we rely on the
American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards).  Kluge, 335 Or
at 348.  We make a preliminary determination of the appropriate
sanction by considering (1) the duty violated, (2) the accused's
mental state, and (3) the actual or potential injury caused by
the accused's misconduct.  ABA Standard 3.0.  We then examine
any aggravating or mitigating circumstances to determine if the
sanction should be adjusted.  Finally, we review our prior case
law for guidance in determining the appropriate sanction.  In re
Worth, 336 Or 256, 274, 82 P3d 605 (2003).
A.  Preliminary Analysis
With regard to the duty violated, the accused violated
duties that he owed to his clients in both matters.  With regard
to the mental state, the accused acted with knowledge of the
conflict of interest in the Mura matter.  The accused was aware
of the jeopardy to Mura resulting from his error, which gave
rise to the acknowledged conflict.  ABA Standards at 7 (defining
"knowledge" as "the conscious awareness of the nature or
attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious
objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result").  In
neglecting the Loitz matter, the accused acted negligently.  Id.
(defining "negligence" as "the failure of a lawyer to heed a
substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will
follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation"). 
Finally, with regard to actual or potential injury, Mura
suffered potential harm as a result of the accused's divided
loyalty, and Loitz suffered anxiety and frustration, as well as
the potential injury to his legal interests, as a result of the
accused's neglect.
We find preliminarily that a suspension is the
appropriate sanction for both violations.  ABA Standard 4.32
provides that "[s]uspension is generally appropriate when a
lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully
disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and
causes injury or potential injury to a client."  ABA Standard
4.42 provides that "[s]uspension is generally appropriate when * * * (b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes
injury or potential injury to a client."  In this instance, the
accused acted with knowledge of the conflict in the Mura matter
and did not fully disclose that conflict to Mura, and the
accused engaged in a pattern of neglect in the Loitz matter. 
B.  Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
We next consider the applicable aggravating and
mitigating factors to determine whether we should adjust the
preliminary sanction.  First, the accused has had two prior
disciplinary offenses.  The Bar admonished the accused for
violating DR 5-101(A) in 1990.  Because that admonition involved
the same disciplinary rule at issue in the Mura matter and a
similar conflict between a client and the accused's personal
interests, we consider it as evidence of past misconduct.  In re
Cohen, 330 Or 489, 498-501, 8 P3d 953 (2000) (explaining
treatment of letters of admonition in sanctions analysis); In re
Jones, 326 Or 195, 200, 951 P2d 149 (1997) (discussing
considerations in application of "prior offenses" aggravating
factor).  The Bar reprimanded the accused for violating DR 7-104(A)(1) (communicating with represented party on subject of
representation) in 2000, and we accord that reprimand some, but
not considerable, weight.  As to the other aggravating factors,
the accused engaged in multiple offenses and has substantial
experience in the practice of law.  The sole mitigating
circumstance is that the accused had a cooperative attitude
toward the disciplinary proceedings. 
C.  Case Law
Citing In re Howser, 329 Or 404, 987 P2d 496 (1999); In re Cohen, 316 Or 657, 853 P2d 286 (1993); and In re
Harrington, 301 Or 18, 718 P2d 725 (1986), the accused argues
that a reprimand is the appropriate sanction for the conceded
violation of DR 5-101(A) in the Mura matter.  We agree with the
Bar, however, that the cases that the accused cites are
inapposite.  In Howser, which involved violations of DR 5-105(C)
and DR 2-110(B), this court imposed a reprimand in light of the
accused lawyer's lack of a prior disciplinary record and after
concluding that the mitigating factors outweighed the
aggravating factors.  In Cohen, this court imposed a reprimand
for a violation of DR 5-105(E) after concluding that the
mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors and that
the accused lawyer's clients were not actually injured. 
Finally, in Harrington, this court noted that the accused lawyer
acted in the utmost good faith, was motivated by kindness and
consideration for the less fortunate, and did not cause injury
to his clients.  
Here, the accused cannot point to similar factors that
led this court to favor a reprimand in Howser, Cohen, and
Harrington, and, in addition, the aggravating factors outweigh
the mitigating factors.  More on point is In re Hockett, 303 Or
150, 734 P2d 877 (1987), in which this court explained that a
single violation of a conflicts rule would justify a 30-day
suspension.  Id. at 163-64.

In cases involving DR 6-101(B) violations similar to
the accused's violation, this court generally has imposed 60-day
suspensions.  See In re LaBahn, 335 Or 357, 67 P3d 381 (2003)
(60-day suspension for single violation of DR 6-101(B)); In re
Schaffner, 323 Or 472, 918 P2d 813 (1996) (60-day suspension for
knowing neglect of clients' case over period of time); cf.
Cohen, 330 Or at 506-07 (reprimand for single violation of DR 6-101(B) when multiple mitigating factors existed).  Here, the
accused's misconduct in the Loitz matter did not result in as
serious an injury to his client as the misconduct at issue in
LaBahn and did not involve a knowing violation, as in Schaffner. 
Nevertheless, the accused's neglect of Loitz's case over several
months caused Loitz anxiety and frustration, and deprived Loitz
of an opportunity to be made aware of the appellate judgment
against him and respond accordingly.  We also note again that
the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.  
In accordance with the above analysis, we conclude
that a 90-day suspension is appropriate for the accused's
violations of DR 5-101(A) and DR 6-101(B).
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for
90 days, commencing 60 days from the date of filing of this
decision.

1. ORS 138.510(2) (1991) established a 120-day filing
period for petitions for post-conviction relief.  Oregon Laws
1993, chapter 517, section 1, extended to two years the time to
file a petition for post-conviction relief.  ORS 138.510(2)
(1993).
2. The trial court's judgment had discharged opposing
counsel, and the opposing party (husband) was unrepresented at
the time that the accused filed the notice of appeal.  Opposing
counsel successfully argued that the notice of appeal was
defective because the accused could not show that he had served
the notice on the unrepresented husband.  Bridge and Bridge, 166
Or App 458, 461-62, 998 P2d 780 (2000) (discussing motion to
dismiss appeal).  But see Ginther and Ginther, 167 Or App 418,
423-24 & n 4, 1 P3d 1062 (2000) (discussing ORS 9.390 and its
requirement that adverse party receive notice of withdrawal of
counsel, and distinguishing Bridge). 
3. Indeed, as quoted above, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at
16), the Bar's stated position sweeps broadly.  Some potential
for a malpractice claim exists in every case, and a lawyer's
concern about malpractice liability need not await any actual or
alleged error.  What the Bar does not recognize is that, by its
terms and taken to its logical conclusion, the Bar's approach
would require a lawyer to disclose that conflict and seek
consent from the client at the outset of virtually every case.
4. The Bar mistakenly relies on In re Lawrence, 332 Or
502, 31 P3d 1078 (2001), to support its interpretation of DR 5-101(A).  In Lawrence, the trial court entered a default judgment
against the accused lawyer's client after the lawyer failed to
file a timely response.  After being advised that the client had
a viable legal malpractice claim against him, the lawyer
continued to represent the client in other matters without
making a full written disclosure, and, more importantly, he
obtained a written release from his client, which provided that
the lawyer would continue to handle other matters for the client
for no fee in exchange for his client giving up any malpractice
claim against the lawyer.
Lawrence did not state a general principle that any
claim or potential claim for malpractice triggers DR 5-101(A). 
This court did not examine when DR 5-101(A) became operative in
such circumstances, and this court's discussion focused solely on whether the accused lawyer satisfied the definition of "full
disclosure" in DR 10-101 despite his failure to confirm his oral
advice in writing.  Moreover, Lawrence did not involve merely a
harmful error on the part of the lawyer.  After the error had
occurred, the lawyer clearly responded to the possibility of a
malpractice claim by essentially settling the potential claim
for an amount that would be determined by the extent of his
further work for the client.