Title: City of Boston v. Conservation Commission of Quincy

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13244 
 
CITY OF BOSTON  vs.  CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF QUINCY 
& another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 2, 2022. – July 25, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Wetlands Protection Act.  Municipal Corporations, Conservation 
commission, By-laws and ordinances.  Department of 
Environmental Protection.  Statute, Supersedure. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 2, 2018. 
 
The case was heard by Gregg J. Pasquale, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings, and entry of separate and final 
judgment was ordered by Heidi E. Brieger, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
James S. Timmins, City Solicitor, for the defendants. 
Sammy S. Nabulsi for the plaintiff. 
Richard Lyman, Michael Parker, & Ryan Grondahl, for NAIOP 
Massachusetts, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
1 Jay Duca, in his capacity as agent for the conservation 
commission of Quincy. 
2 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The city of Boston (Boston) petitioned the 
conservation commission of Quincy (commission) for permission to 
build a bridge to Long Island in Boston (bridge), as the bridge 
would have an impact on wetlands in Quincy.  The commission 
denied Boston's application pursuant to the State Wetlands 
Protection Act (act) and Quincy's local wetlands ordinance 
(local ordinance), the latter of which is concerned almost 
exclusively with permitting procedures.  After Boston applied to 
the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) for a 
superseding order of conditions, the DEP allowed the project to 
proceed. 
Pursuant to the act and its accompanying regulations, G. L. 
c. 131, § 40; 310 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 10.00 (2014), the DEP's 
interpretation of the act supersedes that of a local 
conservation commission.  However, a conservation commission's 
decision regarding wetlands may stand, despite a superseding 
order by the DEP, if the conservation commission relied on 
provisions in a local ordinance that are more stringent than the 
provisions in the act.  See Oyster Creek Preservation, Inc. v. 
Conservation Comm'n of Harwich, 449 Mass. 859, 865 (2007). 
The issue here is whether the DEP's order supersedes the 
commission's decision.  The commission claims it relied on the 
local ordinance's reference to "cumulatively adverse effect[s] 
upon wetland values," and that this language is more stringent 
3 
 
than the language in the act.  However, we conclude that the DEP 
order supersedes that of the commission because the commission 
did not rest its determination on more stringent local 
provisions.2 
 
Background.  Boston closed the bridge in 2014 for safety 
reasons and removed the original bridge superstructure in 2015, 
leaving only the bridge's piers.3  In 2018, Boston submitted a 
notice of intent to the commission, requesting permission to 
rebuild the bridge's superstructure so Boston could reopen the 
bridge and restore access to rehabilitation facilities on Long 
Island.  The project's purpose was "to support [Boston's] goal 
of providing [o]pioid addiction treatment services to the 
public."  Before the bridge closed, Long Island had housed a 
multi-bed homeless shelter, drug treatment programs, and 
transitional housing programs.  According to the notice of 
intent, Boston would conduct work in Quincy to rebuild the 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by NAIOP 
Massachusetts, Inc. 
 
3 In this context, the "superstructure" is "the part of a 
bridge that rests on the piers and abutments."  Dictionary.com, 
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/superstructure [https://perma 
.cc/22WQ-C74W].  A pier, in turn, is "an intermediate support 
for the adjacent ends of two bridge spans."  Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 1712 (2002). 
4 
 
bridge on the existing piers.  Boston submitted the notice of 
intent pursuant to the act and the local ordinance.4 
 
The commission denied Boston's application after holding 
public hearings on the matter.  The commission reasoned in a 
written decision that Boston had not provided sufficient 
information about how Boston would mitigate the environmental 
impact of (1) repairing and replacing the piers, and (2) 
repairing a road that would provide access to the bridge (access 
road). 
Boston sought a superseding order of conditions from the 
DEP pursuant to the act.  See G. L. c. 131, § 40, nineteenth 
par.  See also Parkview Elecs. Trust, LLC v. Conservation Comm'n 
of Winchester, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 833, 837 (2016) ("Insofar as a 
commission's decision is based on local law and State law, [the] 
DEP has jurisdiction to review it and supersede that portion of 
the commission's decision that is based on State law").  The DEP 
issued a superseding order of conditions.5 
Boston also sought certiorari review in the Superior Court 
as to the commission's application of the local ordinance.  See 
G. L. c. 249, § 4.  See also Friedman v. Conservation Comm'n of 
 
4 Relevant portions of the local ordinance, which is in the 
record, are set out in the Appendix. 
 
5 The DEP's office of appeals and dispute resolution upheld 
the superseding order of conditions, as did a Superior Court 
judge. 
5 
 
Edgartown, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 539, 542 (2004) ("an action in the 
nature of certiorari is the appropriate means of review by 
applicants dissatisfied with a local conservation commission's 
order, under a local wetlands by-law, that prevents or restricts 
building on the applicants' land").  A Superior Court judge 
ordered the commission to consider additional materials.  The 
commission held another hearing, considered the materials, and 
again denied Boston's application, noting in its supplemental 
decision the same issues with the piers and the access road that 
it had noted in its initial decision. 
Back in the Superior Court, Boston moved for partial 
judgment on the pleadings regarding its claims about the 
commission's decision, and the commission cross-moved for 
judgment on the pleadings.  The judge allowed Boston's motion 
and denied the commission's motion, concluding that the project 
would be governed by the DEP's superseding order of conditions.  
A different Superior Court judge entered a separate and final 
judgment on the issues that had been resolved, and the 
commission appealed.6  We transferred the case to this court on 
our own motion. 
 
6 The judge had not resolved Boston's request for a 
declaratory judgment that the commission's determination was a 
constitutional taking of property and conflicted with the home 
rule amendment. 
6 
 
 
Discussion.  "We review the allowance of a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings de novo . . . ."  Kraft Power Corp. v. 
Merrill, 464 Mass. 145, 147 (2013). 
The act "was created to protect wetlands from destructive 
intrusion" (citation omitted).  Miramar Park Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Dennis, 480 Mass. 366, 368 (2018).  A person seeking to 
undertake activity that the act governs must file a notice of 
intent with the local conservation commission.  G. L. c. 131, 
§ 40, first par.  The local conservation commission must then 
determine whether the act applies to the proposed work, G. L. 
c. 131, § 40, third par., and, if necessary, impose conditions 
on the project, G. L. c. 131, § 40, eighteenth par.  A local 
conservation commission also will consider any applicable local 
ordinances.  See DeGrace v. Conservation Comm'n of Harwich, 31 
Mass. App. Ct. 132, 135-136 (1991). 
An applicant "aggrieved by" the order of a local 
conservation commission may ask the DEP to issue its own order, 
which will "supersede the prior order of the conservation 
commission."  G. L. c. 131, § 40, nineteenth par.  See DeGrace, 
31 Mass. App. Ct. at 135.  Nevertheless, where a conservation 
commission "rests its determination on provisions of a local 
bylaw that are more protective than the act[,] . . . a 
superseding order of conditions issued by the DEP cannot preempt 
the conservation commission's bylaw-based determination."  
7 
 
Oyster Creek Preservation, Inc., 449 Mass. at 865.  "This rule 
is [premised] on the recognition that the act establishes 
Statewide minimum wetlands protection standards, and local 
communities are free to impose more stringent requirements."  
Id. at 866. 
Importantly, "[t]he simple fact[] . . . that a local by-law 
provides a more rigorous regulatory scheme does not [prohibit] a 
redetermination of the local authority's decision by the DEP 
except to the extent that the local decision was based 
exclusively on those provisions of its by-law that are more 
stringent and, therefore, independent of the act."  Healer v. 
Department of Envtl. Protection, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 718-719 
(2009).  See id. at 719 (DEP's order superseded that of 
conservation commission where, "although provisions of the 
town's wetlands by-law are in fact more stringent than the act, 
the commission's decision to allow the project had nothing to do 
with the specifics of the more rigorous provisions of its 
regulatory scheme"). 
A local conservation commission that wishes to rely on a 
more stringent local bylaw or ordinance must explain how the 
bylaw or ordinance applies to the facts presented.  "[I]f a town 
conservation commission simply refers to a by-law without 
providing any indication that it actually relied on it or how it 
did so, any comparison of the statute and the by-law to 
8 
 
determine which is more protective is rendered difficult or 
impossible.  A town's by-law may contain some exceptionally 
protective provisions, and a commission's general reference to 
the by-law in its decision, without elaboration, would allow it 
to insulate the decision from scrutiny" (citation omitted).  
Oyster Creek Preservation, Inc., 449 Mass. at 866 n.12. 
Here, the commission claims it relied on the local 
ordinance's reference to "cumulatively adverse effect[s] upon 
wetland values," and that this language is more stringent than 
the language in the act.7  According to the commission, it did 
not have enough information to determine the cumulative effects 
of the work that would occur on the piers and the access road. 
The commission does not explain in its brief, and did not 
explain in its decisions denying Boston's application, how its 
own analysis differs from the analysis that the DEP was 
authorized to perform.  Accordingly, and as discussed further 
infra, we conclude that the DEP's superseding order of 
conditions preempts the commission's determination. 
1.  The piers.  The commission's initial decision stated 
that Boston "did not fully quantify adverse impacts" to land 
 
7 The commission also argues in passing that the local 
ordinance's definition of "alter" is broader than that term's 
definition in the act.  However, the commission does not argue 
that it relied on the definition of "alter" in reaching its 
determination, and there is no indication in its written 
decisions that it did so. 
9 
 
under the ocean or to wetlands interests, "or propose sufficient 
mitigation to meet performance standards that will result from 
the repair and replacement of some or all of the concrete 
piers."  The commission also decided that the proposed work on 
the piers would involve a greater impact on land containing 
shellfish than Boston acknowledged and that, "[a]s a result, 
interests of protection of fisheries, land containing shellfish, 
and of wildlife habitat and prevention of pollution are not 
adequately assessed and no mitigation measures are proposed to 
provide adequate protection of the resource areas and 
interests."  The commission concluded by stating that the 
project "could not be conditioned to meet the performance 
standards at 310 [Code Mass. Regs. §] 10.25(6), 310 [Code Mass. 
Regs. §] 10.34(4) and [310 Code Mass. Regs. §] 10.35(3)."  The 
supplemental decision included these same findings with the one 
exception that, instead of referencing specific regulations, it 
determined that the project "could not be conditioned to meet 
performance standards and to protect wetland resource areas and 
interests."8 
 
8 One of the commission's main concerns was that Boston 
would need to use cofferdams to repair and replace the piers.  A 
cofferdam is "a temporary watertight enclosure . . . from which 
the water is pumped to expose the bottom of a body of water and 
permit construction (as of foundations or piers)."  Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 439 (2002). 
10 
 
The regulations that the commission cited in its initial 
decision exclusively were DEP regulations supplementing the act.  
See 310 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 10.00.  Therefore, the commission 
did not rely on the local ordinance for its decision on the 
piers.  As such, the DEP's analysis regarding the piers controls 
because the DEP's interpretation of the act supersedes that of 
the commission.  See Parkview Elecs. Trust, LLC, 88 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 837. 
Moreover, even if the commission also applied the local 
ordinance to the piers, its analysis cannot stand because the 
ordinance does not treat more stringently than the act the 
factors that the commission considered. 
As just discussed, the commission was concerned in its 
decisions with the impact that the piers would have on 
fisheries, wildlife habitat, pollution, land under the ocean, 
and land containing shellfish.9  The act addresses these factors.  
 
9 Although the decisions also reference "wetland interests," 
that is too "vague and general" a factor to be considered 
separately.  See Oyster Creek Preservation, Inc., 449 Mass. at 
866 n.12.  Additionally, the commission appears to suggest in 
its appellate brief that it was concerned with future impacts 
from the piers, which it purports may be considered under the 
local ordinance but not under the act.  At least where a local 
bylaw does not allow expressly for consideration of future 
impacts, however, "prospective violations of a town by-law are 
not a legally tenable ground for denial of a submission that on 
its face complies with applicable law."  Fafard v. Conservation 
Comm'n of Reading, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 565, 571 (1996).  And, in 
any event, the commission's written decisions do not clearly 
express a concern with future impacts. 
11 
 
G. L. c. 131, § 40, first par. (addressing "land under . . . 
waters"), eighteenth par. (addressing "prevention of pollution," 
"protection of land containing shellfish," "protection of 
wildlife habitat," and "protection of fisheries").  The 
regulations do as well.  See, e.g., 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.25 
(land under ocean); 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.34 (land 
containing shellfish).  The local ordinance also references 
these factors, but does not provide rules or definitions more 
stringent than those found in the act and the regulations.  
Rather, the local ordinance is concerned almost entirely with 
the procedure for permit applications.  Its substantive 
provisions are limited to broad "[p]urpose" and "[s]cope" 
sections, which merely prohibit several activities in protected 
areas without the commission's approval.  These sections do not 
give the commission additional authority over fisheries, 
wildlife habitats, pollution, land under the ocean, or land 
containing shellfish that the DEP does not also have.  Contrast 
Cave Corp. v. Conservation Comm'n of Attleboro, 91 Mass. App. 
Ct. 767, 771-772 (2017) ("It is plain that the ordinance here 
imposes more stringent controls than the act as to matters 
regulated under the order of conditions issued by the commission 
for the roadway extension project. . . .  [T]he ordinance 
includes vernal pools . . . as resource areas entitled to 
12 
 
protection.  By contrast, the act makes no mention of vernal 
pools . . ."). 
Because the commission did not base its decision on factors 
other than those that the DEP was authorized to consider, its 
ruling on the piers is preempted by the superseding order of 
conditions. 
The case of Cave Corp., which the commission relies on in 
its argument about the piers, is not to the contrary.  See Cave 
Corp., 91 Mass. App. Ct. at 773.  There, the local conservation 
commission concluded that "any disturbance to the 125-foot area 
on the subject parcels of land will result in cumulative adverse 
impacts upon the resource area values" (alteration omitted).  
Id. at 769.  The Appeals Court reasoned that this conclusion was 
appropriate despite a superseding order of conditions "[i]n 
light of the commission's mandate to consider the cumulative 
effects of the proposed subdivision with regard to the purpose 
and the objectives of the ordinance, and the evidence before 
it."  Id. at 771-772, 774.  Here, in contrast, the commission 
did not rely on cumulative effects when analyzing the piers.  
The commission relied on distinct factors that the DEP also 
could consider pursuant to the act and the regulations. 
Additionally, the ordinance at issue in Cave Corp., unlike 
the local ordinance here, specified the cumulative impacts that 
the commission should consider.  Id. at 773 (ordinance directed 
13 
 
commission to "take into account the cumulative adverse effects 
of loss, degradation, isolation, and replication of protected 
resource areas throughout the community and the watershed, 
resulting from past activities, permitted and exempt, and 
foreseeable future activities"). 
Finally, in Cave Corp., the court considered the 
"cumulative adverse effects" language when analyzing whether the 
conservation commission's decision was arbitrary or capricious, 
not when deciding whether the ordinance at issue was more 
stringent than the act.  Id. at 773-774.  According to the 
court, the ordinance was more stringent because, unlike the act, 
it addressed "vernal pools" and "prohibit[ed] entirely any 
disturbance within the additional wetland protection zone 
established by the ordinance."  Id. at 771-772.  As mentioned 
above, the court then held that the commission's decision was 
not arbitrary or capricious considering, among other factors, 
"the commission's mandate to consider the cumulative effects of 
the proposed subdivision."  Id. at 774. 
2.  The access road.  The commission stated in its 
decisions that it had insufficient information "on the wetland 
impacts from the needed repairs to [the access road]" and, 
therefore, was "unable to assess the cumulative wetlands impacts 
as it is required to do under the [o]rdinance."  The initial 
decision cited a memorandum from the commission's consulting 
14 
 
engineers that "identified needed repairs to the [access road] 
. . . with wetland impacts."  That memorandum observed that the 
access road "is the only access road to the proposed . . . 
[b]ridge.  It is showing significant signs of slope failure at 
multiple locations and within the wetlands buffer zone.  
Additionally, an abandoned sewer tunnel under the causeway may 
impact the roadway loading."  The consultants asked the 
commission to "[i]ndicate whether the applicant has considered 
additional improvements needed on roadways leading up to the 
bridge to handle the anticipated traffic," and to describe, for 
"any additional improvements, . . . all potential wetland 
resource area impacts associated with those improvements."  The 
consultants further stated that the commission "should evaluate 
cumulative wetland impacts from the bridge and roadway 
construction, and not allow segmentation of work within its 
jurisdiction." 
The impacts with which the commission's consultants and the 
commission were concerned were within the DEP's purview.  The 
DEP addressed the access road in its superseding order of 
conditions, stating that, according to the notice of intent, 
"[a]pproximately 126 [square feet] of [b]uffer [z]one will be 
permanently altered as a result of roadway and lighting 
improvements."  The DEP also cited the assertion in Boston's 
notice of intent that "5,218 [square feet] of [b]uffer [z]one 
15 
 
associated with [c]oastal [b]ank . . . will be temporarily 
disturbed."  According to the notice of intent, this temporary 
impact would "occur due to work within the existing roadway." 
If the DEP thought that there were other road-related 
impacts affecting wetlands, it was required to address them -- 
even if they concerned parts of the access road outside the 
areas addressed by the act.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 10.05(6)(b) ("when the issuing authority has determined that 
an [a]ctivity outside the [a]reas [s]ubject to [p]rotection 
under [G. L. c.] 131, § 40[,] and outside the [b]uffer [z]one 
has in fact altered an [a]rea [s]ubject to [p]rotection under 
[G. L. c.] 131, § 40, it shall impose such conditions on any 
portion of the activity as are necessary to contribute to the 
protection of the interests identified in [G. L. c.] 131, 
§ 40").10  To the extent the commission considered impacts 
related to the access road other than those that the DEP found 
meaningful, the different analyses are not due to the local 
ordinance being more stringent than the act.  And certainly, the 
commission did not indicate in its decision that it was relying 
exclusively on any particular cumulative impacts regarding the 
access road. 
 
10 The regulations define "[i]ssuing [a]uthority" as "a 
conservation commission, mayor, the selectmen or the [DEP], 
whichever is applicable."  310 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.04. 
16 
 
Additionally, if the DEP agreed with the commission that 
Boston had presented insufficient information about impacts 
related to the access road, it would have denied Boston's 
application on that basis.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 10.05(7)(h) ("If the [DEP] determines that insufficient 
information was submitted, it shall affirm the denial and 
instruct the applicant to refile with the conservation 
commission and include the appropriate information"). 
Accordingly, the superseding order of conditions preempts 
the commission's decision to the extent that the commission's 
decision was premised on impacts related to the access road. 
Conclusion.  Because the DEP's superseding order of 
conditions preempts the commission's denial of Boston's 
application, the Superior Court judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
Appendix. 
 
 
 
The relevant portions of the local ordinance are as 
follows: 
"Purpose.  The purpose of this chapter is to protect the 
wetlands, related water resources, and adjoining land areas in 
the city by prior review and control of activities deemed by the 
Quincy conservation commission likely to have a significant or 
cumulatively adverse effect upon wetland values; including, but 
not limited to, the following:  Public or private water supply, 
groundwater, flood control, erosion and sedimentation control, 
storm damage prevention, water pollution, fisheries, shellfish, 
wildlife habitat, recreation, aesthetics (the visual quality and 
appearance of a project and/or quiet enjoyment of undisturbed 
resource areas), and aquaculture values (collectively, the 
'wetland values protected by this chapter'). 
 
"Scope.  Except as permitted by the conservation commission 
or as provided in this chapter, no person shall remove, fill, 
dredge, build upon or alter the following resources or land 
under said resources or land within one hundred feet of said 
resources:  Any freshwater wetland including any marsh, wet 
meadow, bog or swamp; any saltwater wetland; any lake, river, 
pond, stream, drainageway, canal, estuary or the ocean; any 
bank, beach, dune or flat bordering on said water or wetlands; 
or any land subject to flooding or inundation by groundwater, 
surface water, tidal action or coastal storm flowage."