Title: Pederson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Pederson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.1997 WY 85939 P.2d 740Case Number: 96-111Decided: 06/26/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

In The Matter of The Worker's Compensation Claim of 
Della M. Pederson, an Employee of Sheridan County School District No. 2: DELLA 
M. PEDERSON,  

Appellant (Employee-Claimant, Petitioner), 

 

v. 

 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION,  

Appellee (Objector-Defendant, 
Respondent).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court, Sheridan County 

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Rene 
Botten, of Northern Wyoming Law Associates, Sheridan.

Representing 
Appellee: 

Robert R. 
Rogers and Anthony T. Wendtland, of Davis & Cannon, Sheridan, for 
Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN JJ. 

THOMAS, 
Justice. 

[¶1]      The primary 
challenge by Della M. Pederson (Pederson) to the denial of worker's compensation 
benefits by the hearing examiner is that the decision did not comport with the 
evidence. The hearing examiner found that the evidence did not demonstrate a 
job-related injury resulting from an accident at the job site and the "injury" 
for which Pederson sought benefits was not caused by her employment. Instead, 
the hearing examiner ruled that "the difficulties she encountered before and 
after September 15, 1994 [the date of the claimed injury] were the result of a 
pre-existing condition." The pre-existing condition found by the hearing 
examiner was diabetes with associated physical deterioration. As collateral 
issues, Pederson asserts procedural improprieties leading to a decision that was 
arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law. The record includes substantial evidence, although controverted in 
part, to support the findings of fact by the hearing examiner. We are satisfied 
that the decision is not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not supported by law. We hold that the hearing examiner correctly 
applied the law to the facts that properly were found, and the decision of the 
hearing examiner is affirmed.

 

[¶2]      In the Brief of 
Appellant, Della M. Pederson, the issues are stated as:

 

I.          
Is the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order denying the award of benefits arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law?

 

II.          
Is the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order denying the award of benefits arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law 
because it intentionally mischaracterizes the doctor's testimony, is unsupported 
by substantial evidence and is contrary to the weight of the 
evidence?

 

In the Brief of Appellee, 
State of Wyoming, the Worker's Compensation Division (Division) offers this 
counter-statement of the issues:

 

I.          
Whether the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order Denying Benefits contains prejudicial error.

 

II.          
Whether the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order Denying Benefits is supported by substantial 
evidence.

 

The Reply Brief for 
Appellant states no additional issues, but incorporates subtitles for Pederson's 
arguments as follows:

 

The Hearing 
Officer abused his discretion in not informing Della of what matters he took 
official notice of and not affording her of an opportunity to contest the facts 
noticed.

 

The 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, dated February 20, 1996 
intentionally mischaracterizes the doctor's testimony, is unsupported by 
substantial evidence and is contrary to the weight of the 
evidence.

 

[¶3]      Prior to 
September 15, 1994, Pederson had been employed by the Sheridan County School 
District as a cook for approximately seventeen years. In claiming worker's 
compensation benefits, Pederson asserts she injured her foot at work on that 
day. She testified her ankle "snapped" while she was attempting to move a loaded 
mixing bowl. She went to see her podiatrist the next day, and he diagnosed 
Charcot's foot, a deterioration of the bony structure of the foot, related to 
diabetes, which can lead to multiple fractures in bony regions. Charcot's foot 
generally is a progressive condition that develops over a period of time. The 
podiatrist testified that diabetics often suffer from this condition, along with 
neuropathy, a condition indicated by a loss of nerve sensation in the foot 
because of chemical and circulatory changes occurring in the small blood 
vessels. Pederson did not tell her podiatrist that her foot had "snapped" at 
work.

 

[¶4]      On September 21, 
1994, Pederson executed a Report of Occupational Injury or Disease (Report of 
Injury) in which she described the situation in this way: "I went to work. My 
foot hurt some. As morning progressed, my foot got extremely bad. I could not 
handle pain and I had to go home." On the Report of Injury, Pederson noted that 
her foot had been treated two years earlier in Billings, and that she had 
suffered a fall on the same foot the spring before. Pederson's medical records 
demonstrate that she visited an orthopaedic surgeon in Sheridan in February of 
1993, and that physician said she suffered from a complete collapse of the 
medial arch. The medical records also show that Pederson saw the podiatrist for 
symptoms in the same foot on September 12, 1994, three days before she says she 
heard her foot "snap."

 

[¶5]      Pederson sought 
worker's compensation benefits, and the Division denied the claim. After she 
filed an objection, a contested case hearing was held on November 7, 1995. The 
hearing examiner decided that Pederson did not suffer an injury which was 
causally linked to her employment or that arose out of the course and scope of 
her employment. The hearing officer denied Pederson's claim for benefits, and 
she appealed that decision to the district court. The Division filed a motion to 
certify the question to this court, which was opposed by Pederson. The district 
judge then entered an order certifying the case to this 
Court.

 

[¶6]      A claimant for 
worker's compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the essential 
elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the contested case 
hearing. Martinez v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 917 P.2d 619, 621 (Wyo. 1996). When an 
agency decides that the party charged with the burden of proof has failed to 
meet that burden, the case is reviewed under the "[a]rbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law" language of WYO. 
STAT. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) (1990). City of 
Casper v. Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 1995). On appeal the complainant, 
Pederson in this instance, has the burden of proving arbitrary administrative 
action. Knight v. Environmental Quality 
Council of State of Wyo., 805 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1991); Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432, 439 (Wyo. 1974); Marathon Oil 
Co. v. Welch, 379 P.2d 832, 836 (Wyo. 1963); Whitesides v. Council of City of 
Cheyenne, 78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520, 526 (1957). The agency, as the trier of 
fact, is charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of 
witnesses. Utech, 895 P.2d  at 451, and cases there cited. The deference normally 
accorded to the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the 
administrative agency, and the agency's decision as to the facts will not be 
overturned unless it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence. Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc. 
v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 1994). Demonstrating evidentiary 
contradictions in the record does not establish the irrationality of the ruling, 
but we do examine conflicting evidence to determine if the agency reasonably 
could have made its finding and order based upon all of the evidence before it. 
Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 971 
(Wyo. 1996); Knight, 805 P.2d  at 274; 
Ward v. Board of Trustees of Goshen 
County School Dist. No. 1, 865 P.2d 618, 623 (Wyo. 1993); State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Div. v. Ramsey, 839 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo. 1992).

 

[¶7]      The primary 
contention by Pederson is that the decision of the hearing officer should be set 
aside because it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law. The hearing officer found that Pederson, despite her 
testimony, had not suffered any sort of "pop" or "snap" or trauma to her foot at 
work on September 15, 1994. That determination was based on the fact that the 
following day she did not report a "pop" or "snap" to her podiatrist. Further, 
she did not mention this "pop" or "snap" on the Report of Injury. That report 
was submitted on September 21, 1994, and never was 
amended.

 

[¶8]      Pederson's 
counter to the action of the hearing officer is that no evidence was presented 
to show that she suffered an injury other than at the work place. This argument 
begs the question of whether she suffered any injury at any time. The hearing 
officer is charged with determining the credibility of the witnesses, and that 
judgment is given deference in the reviewing court. Pederson's failure to tell 
her doctor about the claimed injury and her failure to set it forth on her 
Report of Injury, both events occurring within days of the claimed incident, 
provided a rational basis for the hearing officer to disbelieve her later 
testimony. It would be improper for this court to re-weigh the evidence under 
the circumstances.

 

[¶9]      We turn then to 
Pederson's procedural objections. She complains that the hearing examiner took 
judicial notice of interrogatories and the answers thereto without informing 
her. She also insists that these documents never were made a part of the record, 
and the hearing officer improperly relied on them. The pertinent provision of 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, WYO. STAT. § 16-3-108(d) (1990), 
states:

 

Notice may be taken of judicially cognizable facts. 
In addition notice may be taken of technical or scientific facts within the 
agency's specialized knowledge or of information, data and material included 
within the agency's files. The parties shall be notified either before or during 
the hearing or after the hearing but before the agency decision of material 
facts noticed, and they shall be afforded an opportunity to contest the facts 
noticed.

 

Our court rules, our 
statutes, and our prior decisions permit administrative agencies to officially 
notice their files. Application of 
Campbell County, 731 P.2d 1174, 1180 (Wyo. 1987); Hansen v. Mr. D's Food Center, 827 P.2d 371, 374 (Wyo. 1992). See In Matter 
of Worker's Compensation Claim of Beverly Nelson v. Sheridan Manor v. State, ex 
rel., Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 939 P.2d 252 (Wyo. 
1997).

 

[¶10]   The questions then become whether 
the Employee/Claimant's Responses to Objector/Defendant's First Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production of Documents are an official part of the agency's 
file and whether Pederson was notified that the hearing examiner would consider 
this document so that she was afforded an opportunity to object. Pederson's 
answers to the interrogatories were filed on April 11, 1995, as a part of the 
Objector/Defendant's Disclosure Statement. From that point on, the document was 
an official part of the agency's file. The document is present in the 
file.

 

[¶11]   With respect to notice and an 
opportunity to object, the brief filed on behalf of the Division emphasizes, and 
we recognize, that the Order Setting Hearing and Order For Filing Disclosure 
Statement, sent to the parties on September 12, 1995, some two months before the 
hearing, contained this statement:

 

All parties are hereby given notice that this office 
will take official notice of and receive into evidence subject to the provisions 
of Section 16-3-108, W.S. 1977, the entire content of the official file in this 
matter, as maintained by the Clerk of the District Court.

 

Pederson did have notice 
almost two months before the hearing that the hearing officer would notice the 
official file.

 

[¶12]   While what we have said justifies 
the notice of the official file by the hearing officer, we must consider the use 
of the file in the adjudicative process. Adjudicative facts of which notice is 
taken by definition must be relevant because if they are not relevant they 
cannot be adjudicative facts. 21 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 5104 (1977). In this instance, had the hearing 
examiner received the answers to interrogatories into evidence during the 
hearing, they would have been subject to the following provision of the Rules 
for Contested Case Practice and Procedure Before the Office of Administrative 
Hearings, Ch. 3 § 1(b):

 

Evidence may be received in written form, yet if such 
written evidence would not be admissible under the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, 
all parties should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to confront and 
cross-examine the author of the written evidence. Generally, such a reasonable 
opportunity is afforded by giving all parties written notice of the intent to 
introduce and rely upon the written evidence a reasonable period of time prior 
to the scheduled evidentiary hearing.

 

We are satisfied that the 
answers to interrogatories pass the test of relevance found in WYO. R. EVID. 
401.

 

[¶13]   While Pederson complains that the 
interrogatories were not relevant and proper evidence in the hearing, the record 
discloses that she did not attempt to amend her answers to interrogatories. She 
did not object when the Division made them an exhibit, and she did not object 
within a reasonable time when the hearing officer took judicial notice of the 
file. Furthermore, since these are Pederson's own answers to the 
interrogatories, the right to cross-examine is not significant. The passage 
relied upon by the hearing examiner out of the answers to interrogatories is 
essentially the same as Pederson's testimony at the hearing. In the Order 
Setting Hearing and Order For Filing Disclosure Statement, the hearing examiner 
clearly stated that he would take judicial notice of and receive into evidence 
the official file. In referring to the documents in the order entered after the 
hearing, he did not err. The answers to interrogatories were a part of the 
record; they were not objected to; and they were relevant evidence before the 
examiner.

 

[¶14]   In her final contention Pederson 
asserts that the findings of fact and conclusions of law were improperly drafted 
by the attorneys for the Division and then adopted by the hearing examiner. The 
hearing examiner can submit written findings in lieu of reading them into the 
record. WYO. STAT. § 16-3-110 (1990). We have never required that the document 
be drafted by the hearing examiner; the statute is satisfied so long as the 
document is adopted by the hearing examiner as the decision in the case. We can 
only conclude that the draft was adopted by the hearing examiner in this 
instance.

 

[¶15]   The decision of the hearing 
examiner in this case was not arbitrary, capricious, nor did it constitute an 
abuse of discretion. It was supported by substantial evidence, and it was 
otherwise in accordance with law. The procedural errors complained of by 
Pederson are not demonstrated by the record. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order Denying Benefits entered by the hearing examiner is 
affirmed.