Title: Chavda v. Wolak

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 86687-Agenda 25-September 1999.
GANDAJI N. CHAVDA et al., Appellants, v. JAMES J. WOLAK et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed December 2, 1999.
JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether a 1997 amendment to section 11-91-1 of the Illinois Municipal Code is
constitutional. We hold that it is.
BACKGROUND
This appeal arises from the Village of Lombard's efforts to vacate a portion of Edson Street, just north of its intersection
with Roosevelt Road. Plaintiffs, Gandaji and Shobhar Chavda, own the property abutting the proposed vacation on the
west. Defendants, James and Janice Wolak, own the property abutting the proposed vacation on the east. On June 4, 1998,
the Village of Lombard adopted Ordinance No. 4482, which provides that (1) the public interest will be served by vacating
the described portion of Edson Street; (2) the fair market value of the described portion of Edson Street is $30,000; and (3)
plaintiffs alone shall pay to the Village of Lombard the fair market value for the described portion of Edson Street.
In enacting Ordinance No. 4482, the Village of Lombard relied upon a 1997 amendment to section 11-91-1 of the Illinois
Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-91-1 (West 1998)). Prior to the 1997 amendment, section 11-91-1 provided, inter alia,
that (1) upon a determination that it will serve the public interest, a municipality may vacate any street or alley within its
jurisdiction; and (2) a municipality may require all abutting owners to pay compensation to the municipality in exchange for
the rights acquired upon vacation. See 65 ILCS 5/11-91-1 (West 1996). The 1997 amendment, in relevant part, added the
following language to section 11-91-1:
Following the adoption of Ordinance No. 4482, plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court of Du Page
County. Plaintiffs' complaint sought a declaration that, upon payment of compensation to the Village as set forth in
Ordinance No. 4482, plaintiffs would be entitled to receive fee title to the entire vacated portion of Edson Street.
Defendants filed a counterclaim, arguing that the amended section 11-91-1 is unconstitutionally vague because it conflicts
with section 11-91-2 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-91-2 (West 1998) (providing that, upon vacation of a
street or alley, title vests proportionately in all abutting owners)); violates the due process clause because, without any
standards, it authorizes a municipality to award title to only one of several abutting owners; and violates equal protection
and special legislation principles because it discriminates in favor of one landowner without any rational basis.
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the trial court entered summary judgment in defendants' favor.
In so ruling, the trial court noted that, under section 11-91-1, before a street or alley may be vacated, the municipality first
must determine that "the public interest will be subserved" by that vacation. By contrast, without requiring any findings
whatsoever, the 1997 amendment to section 11-91-1 authorizes the municipality to confer title to only one of several
abutting property owners. In the trial court's judgment, section 11-91-1, as amended:
Believing that section 11-91-1, as amended, "confer[s] upon a municipality the absolute unilateral and arbitrary right to
award one property owner" title to the vacated property, the trial court held that section unconstitutional and unenforceable.
Because the trial court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional, the appeal from that judgment lies directly with
this court. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a).
ANALYSIS
Absolute and Arbitrary Power
The trial court's analysis rests upon a faulty premise, namely, that, absent a statement from the legislature, a municipality
has no obligation to act in the public interest. Because section 11-91-1, as amended, expressly requires a municipality to
act in the public interest when vacating a street or alley, the trial court believed that the absence of such an express
requirement with respect to the transfer of title means that municipalities are free to discriminate arbitrarily among abutting
property owners when awarding title. Nothing could be further from the truth.
A municipal enactment, adopted under statutory authority, enjoys a presumption of validity. City of Decatur v. Chasteen, 19 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1960). Nevertheless, the due process clause prohibits the arbitrary, unreasonable, and improper use of
municipal power. City of Decatur, 19 Ill. 2d  at 210. Thus, to overcome the presumption of validity, the party challenging
the municipal enactment must show by clear and affirmative evidence that the ordinance is arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable; that there is no permissible interpretation of the enactment that justifies its adoption; or that the enactment
will not promote the safety and general welfare of the public. City of Decatur, 19 Ill. 2d  at 210. Stated conversely, every
municipal enactment must be free from the constitutional infirmities described above. Thus, a municipality's duty to act in
the public interest derives not from a legislative pronouncement but from the due process clause of the constitution itself.
See City of Decatur, 19 Ill. 2d  at 210-11.
Turning to section 11-91-1, as amended, we fail to find a constitutional defect in the legislature's failure to require
expressly that a municipality act in the "public interest" when choosing to award title to one of several abutting property
owners. As discussed above, the absence of such a requirement does not confer absolute and arbitrary authority upon
municipalities. On the contrary, as with every other municipal enactment, the due process clause requires that an ordinance
awarding title to one of several abutting property owners bear a reasonable relationship to the public interest sought to be
protected. An ordinance enacted under section 11-91-1, as amended, therefore is presumed valid. A party challenging such
an ordinance may invalidate it only by presenting clear and convincing evidence that the ordinance is arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable; that there is no permissible interpretation of the ordinance that justifies its adoption; or that the ordinance
will not promote the safety and general welfare of the public. See City of Decatur, 19 Ill. 2d  at 210.
Because section 11-91-1, as amended, in no way grants absolute and arbitrary power to municipalities, the trial court erred
in entering summary judgment in defendants' favor on that basis.
Defendants' Additional Arguments
Defendants argue that, even if section 11-91-1, as amended, is not unconstitutional for the reason given by the trial court, it
is invalid for two additional reasons. Specifically, defendants argue that section 11-91-1, as amended, (1) constitutes
special legislation because it discriminates in favor of one landowner without any rational basis;(1) and (2) is
unconstitutionally vague because it conflicts with section 11-91-2 of the Illinois Municipal Code. Although the trial court
did not decide these issues on the merits, the parties fully briefed and argued these issues in the trial court. Accordingly, we
may address them on appeal. See American National Bank & Trust Co. v. National Advertising Co., 149 Ill. 2d 14, 21
(1992) (appellee may raise any argument that supports the trial court's judgment, even if the argument was not directly
ruled upon by the trial court).
Special Legislation
We easily can dispose of defendants' special legislation claim. Article IV, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution provides
that "[t]he General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable." Ill. Const.
1970, art. IV, §13. The purpose of this clause is the prevention of arbitrary legislative classifications that discriminate in
favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis. People ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 117, 125 (1998). To
this end, a party raising a special legislation claim must, at the very least, prove the existence of an arbitrary legislative
classification. See In re Petition of the Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d 117, 123 (1995).
Turning to section 11-91-1, as amended, defendants do not identify, and we cannot discern, any classification that
discriminates in favor of a select group, let alone one that does so arbitrarily or without a sound, reasonable basis. Section
11-91-1, as amended, simply authorizes a municipality, in its discretion, to award title to one of several abutting property
owners when the public interest so requires. Defendant might have a special legislation claim if, for example, section
11-91-1 dictated that title always be awarded to the owner of the property that abuts the vacated street or alley on the east,
or that title always be awarded to the abutting property owner whose last name contains the fewest letters. But this is not the
case. Because section 11-91-1, on its face, contains no legislative classification, defendants' special legislation claim
necessarily fails.(2)
Vagueness
Defendants' final argument is that section 11-91-1, as amended, is unconstitutionally vague because it conflicts with
section 11-91-2. We disagree.
Again, as amended, section 11-91-1 provides that, if the vacation ordinance provides that only one abutting owner shall
make payment for the entire vacated street or alley, then that abutting owner shall acquire title to the entire vacated street or
alley. Section 11-91-2 provides, in its entirety:
According to defendants, a conflict exists between sections 11-91-1, as amended, and 11-91-2 because, while section
11-91-1 allows municipalities to grant title to only one abutting owner, section 11-91-2 continues to provide, without
exception, that title to a vacated street or alley vests proportionately in all abutting owners.
In construing a statute, a court must ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent in enacting the statute. Collins v.
Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 110 (1993). Where two legislative enactments
allegedly conflict, this court has a duty to construe those statutes in a manner that avoids an inconsistency and gives effect
to both enactments, if such a construction is reasonably possible. Lily Lake Road Defenders v. County of McHenry, 156 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1993). The legislature is presumed to have intended that statutes relating to a single subject and controlled by a
single policy will be consistent and harmonious, and any apparent conflicts between two such statutes will be reconciled if
possible. Collins, 155 Ill. 2d  at 111-12.
Applying these principles to sections 11-91-1 and 11-91-2, we have little difficulty resolving the apparent conflict.
Although section 11-91-2 continues to set forth what appears to be a categorical rule, it is evident that the 1997 amendment
to section 11-91-1 was intended to create a limited exception to that categorical rule. Thus, if the vacation ordinance
provides that compensation is to be paid by only one abutting owner, section 11-91-1 applies and title to the vacated street
or alley vests fully in that abutting owner. In all other instances-that is, when compensation is to be paid by all abutting
owners or when no compensation is required-section 11-91-2 applies and title vests in all abutting owners. To be sure, the
legislature could have drafted the 1997 amendment to section 11-91-1 more artfully, but we have little difficulty discerning
their intent from the face of the amendment.
Accordingly, we reject defendants' claim that sections 11-91-1 and 11-91-2 are in conflict.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
Before concluding, we consider briefly plaintiffs' argument that, if this court rejects defendants' facial challenges to section
11-91-1, as amended, we not only must reverse the entry of summary judgment in defendants' favor but also must enter
summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor.
Essentially, plaintiffs request that we review and reverse the trial court's denial of their motion for summary judgment.
Ordinarily, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and therefore is not appealable. Arangold
Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 357 (1999). However, an exception exists where, as in this case, the parties file opposing
motions for summary judgment on the same claim and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other. Arangold, 187 Ill. 2d  at 358.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits demonstrate that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS
5/2-1005(c) (West 1998). After reviewing the record, we agree with the trial court that genuine issues of material fact exist
and that plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment therefore should be denied. These issues, all of which are raised in
defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, include, but are not limited to, whether (1) the Village
previously transferred a portion of the proposed vacation to defendants; (2) plaintiffs have agreed to the terms set forth in
Ordinance No. 4482; and (3) Ordinance No. 4482 itself is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the public interest.
Significantly, when it entered summary judgment in defendants' favor, the trial court specifically noted that the existence of
these factual issues precluded the entry of summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor. Accordingly, we will not disturb the trial
court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
We reject all of defendants' challenges to the facial validity of section 11-91-1, as amended. This statute does not confer
absolute and arbitrary power upon municipalities, does not constitute special legislation, is not unconstitutionally vague,
and does not conflict with section 11-91-2. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment in
defendants' favor and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
1.      1Although defendants attacked section 11-91-1 on both equal protection and special legislation grounds in the
trial court, they raise only a special legislation challenge before this court.

2.      2This is not to say that an ordinance adopted pursuant to section 11-91-1 cannot create an arbitrary legislative
classification that discriminates in favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis. This question, however, goes
to the constitutionality of the particular ordinance at issue, not to the constitutionality of the enabling legislation.