Title: Garg v. Garg

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. 03-C-03-001370DL
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 97
September Term, 2005
______________________________________
AJAY GARG
v.
DEEPA GARG
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.,
Raker, J., joins in the judgment only
______________________________________
Filed:    June 8, 2006
Respondent, Deepa Garg, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
seeking a limited divorce from her husband, petitioner Ajay Garg, custody of their minor
child, Chaitanya, spousal and child support, and certain ancillary relief.   Mr. Garg moved
to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that (1) he had not been validly served, and (2)
because of proceedings already pending in a court in Indore, India, the Maryland court was
precluded from exercising jurisdiction in the custody matter.  After conducting an evidentiary
hearing, the Circuit Court concluded that, because of the pending case in India, it should not
exercise jurisdiction, announced its findings in support of that conclusion, dismissed the
entire action, and, pursuant to a subsequent motion, assessed costs and attorneys’ fees against
Ms. Garg.  The court never ruled on the service of process issue.  
The Court of Special Appeals vacated that judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings.  Garg v. Garg, 163 Md. App. 546, 881 A.2d 1180 (2005).  It held that (1) even
if there might be a basis for concluding that the Maryland court should not exercise
jurisdiction over the custody dispute, it clearly had subject matter jurisdiction over the
divorce action, (2) the Circuit Court erred in deferring a request by respondent to appoint an
attorney for the child pending resolution of the jurisdictional issue – in effect that, as a matter
of law, it was required to appoint an attorney for the child before deciding the jurisdictional
issue, and (3) in revisiting the jurisdictional issue on remand, the trial court was to apply the
newly enacted Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) rather
than the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) that was in effect when the
complaint was filed.
1 We note that petitioner’s motion to dismiss the divorce action was based on lack
of proper service, not on any assertion of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Mr. Garg
contended that the complaint and summons were never properly served on him but were
instead left with one Seenu Devappa in Hartford, Connecticut, on Ms. Garg’s assertion
that Devappa was authorized to receive service for Mr. Garg.  Garg averred that he had
never lived in Connecticut and that service on Mr. Devappa was not authorized by him or
by either Maryland or Connecticut law.  Neither the Circuit Court nor the Court of
Special Appeals addressed that issue.  It was not raised in Mr. Garg’s petition for
certiorari, and there is no complaint about it in his brief in this Court.
-2-
Petitioner is not contesting the intermediate appellate court’s determination that the
divorce action may proceed in Maryland, so we have no occasion to address that issue.1 He
does complain about the other two rulings, however, and his complaint is legitimate.  The
Court of Special Appeals erred in even addressing the Circuit Court’s decision to defer the
appointment of counsel for the child, as that was not a matter raised by Ms. Garg in her brief
and was therefore not before the court.  It was apparently injected sua sponte by the appellate
court, without the benefit of argument, and then used to resolve the appeal.  Having
improperly injected the issue, the court then erred in its ruling on it; the court should not have
second-guessed the discretionary decision by the Circuit Court judge which, under the
circumstances, was entirely appropriate and well within the permissible bounds of his
discretion.  The Court of Special Appeals also erred in concluding that the UCCJEA had any
 application to this case; the plain language of the statute makes clear that the statute does not
apply.
Because the intermediate appellate court ruled as it did on the appointment-of-counsel
issue, it never addressed the principal issues actually raised by respondent in her appeal –
-3-
whether the Circuit Court was correct in its determination that it had no jurisdiction under
the UCCJA over the custody issue and whether the court erred in assessing expenses and
attorneys’ fees against her.  We shall remand the case to the Court of Special Appeals so it
can properly decide those issues, which were fully briefed and argued in that court but, in
part because of the subsequent enactment of the UCCJEA, have no further public
importance, other than to the parties, warranting review by this Court.
BACKGROUND
Mr. and Ms. Garg were born and raised in India and were married there in July, 1991.
Mr. Garg first came to the United States in 1985 as a student, earned a degree in chemical
engineering, and remained gainfully employed here until 2000.  In October, 1991, shortly
after their marriage, Ms. Garg joined her husband in the U.S. and took up residence with him
in Massachusetts.  She became an American citizen in 1997 or 1998.  Mr. Garg has remained
a citizen of India.  The child’s citizenship status is unclear.
Both parties made trips back to India.  In June, 1995, while pregnant, Ms. Garg
returned to India to stay with Mr. Garg’s parents in Indore, and, on September 23, 1995,
Chaitanya was born there.  Mr. Garg visited them a month later, but they all resumed
residence  in Massachusetts in January, 1996, and, except for a visit to India by Ms. Garg and
Chaitanya in January, 1999, continued to live there until July, 1999, when they returned to
Indore.  The family remained in India until Ms. Garg and Chaitanya came to Maryland on
-4-
May 24, 2002.
The critical events relevant to this case occurred during the spring of 2002.  It is
evident that there had been significant family discord; each party has accused the other of a
variety of inappropriate behavior.  The parties were living in Indore, and Chaitanya – then
six-and-a-half years old – was enrolled in school there.  In March, Ms. Garg, without notice
to her husband, removed Chaitanya from his school, and moved with him to the home of Ms.
Garg’s parents in Mumbai (formerly Bombay), nearly 400 miles away.  On April 1, 2002,
through counsel, Ms. Garg filed an action in the Mumbai court for maintenance allowance.
That action never progressed because Mr. Garg was not served with process.  
A week later, on April 8, 2002, Mr. Garg filed an action in the Indore court seeking
the return of Chaitanya.  It was an action solely for custody; he did not seek a divorce.  Mr.
Garg alleged that, under India law, the father is the natural guardian of his children over five
years of age, and the basis of his complaint was that Ms. Garg had unlawfully abducted
Chaitanya from his guardianship.  At some point, before any proceedings on that complaint,
Ms. Garg contacted a lawyer in Indore, Vimal K. Gangwal, Esq., by phone, claimed that she
had been deserted by her husband, and requested Mr. Gangwal’s professional assistance.  She
also, at some point in April, signed a general power of attorney, appointing her father, Shri
V. K. Govil, as her attorney, with authority, among other things, to “attend to all the Court
cases on my behalf.”
On May 24, Ms. Garg and Chaitanya left India for the United States, settling in
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Maryland.  In a subsequent statement, her attorney, Mr. Gangwal, asserted that Ms. Garg was
unaware of the action in the Indore court when she left.  It is not clear from whom he got that
information; he later claimed that he had not been able to reach Ms. Garg after she left India.
In June, 2002, having first tried other methods of serving Ms. Garg, Mr. Garg published
notice of his action in a Mumbai newspaper, apparently as a means of serving her by
publication.  
On July 11, 2002, the Indore court assumed jurisdiction.  The order shows that Ms.
Garg was represented by Mr. Gangwal in the proceeding.  The essential issue was whether
jurisdiction should lie (1) in Mumbai, (2) where the child was currently living in the U.S.,
or (3) in Indore, where the child had been living with his father prior to the mother’s
removing him.  Mr. Garg, relying on the Guardians and Wards Act, asserted that custody
jurisdiction belonged with the court where the child “ordinarily resides,” that, under that law,
the child was ordinarily residing in Indore, and that the mother’s removal of the child could
not defeat that jurisdiction.
Gangwal filed an application in the nature of a motion to dismiss, in which he argued
that, because the parties and the child were all Hindu, the applicable law was not the
Guardians and Wards Act but rather the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and that,
under that Act, jurisdiction lay either in Mumbai or in Baltimore, Maryland, where, he
asserted, the child was currently residing.  Although Mr. Gangwal insisted that he had been
unable to contact his client since she departed India, he obviously knew that she was in the
2 The record shows that on January 2, 2003, the presiding judge of the Indore court
sent a summons for Ms. Garg to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County with a request
that it be served on her and that the summons and other documents from the Indore
proceeding were, in fact, served on her through the Baltimore County Sheriff’s office on
February 25, 2003.
-6-
Baltimore area and averred that they “are/were in USA at the time when the notice from the
US Court was served.”  It is not clear what notice he was referring to.  There was no
proceeding in a U.S. court until Ms. Garg filed this action in February, 2003, and the record
shows that service of process from the Indore court was served on her at that time.2 
The Indore court dismissed Ms. Garg’s application, holding that the Guardians and
Wards Act was applicable, that, under § 9 of that Act, jurisdiction lay where the child had
been “ordinarily residing,” and that the mother’s removal of the child did not suffice to
abrogate that jurisdiction.  Ms. Garg was directed to file an answer to the complaint.  On
August 26, 2002, Mr. Gangwal advised the court that, “after repeated calls,” he had received
no instructions from his client, and the court therefore decided to proceed ex parte.  It is not
clear whether anything further has occurred in the Indore court.  Mr. Garg testified in this
case, in September, 2003, that a hearing had been scheduled in the Indore court for some time
in October, 2003.
On February 24, 2003, Ms. Garg filed this action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County seeking, as we have said, a limited divorce, custody of Chaitanya, spousal and child
support, and ancillary relief.  It appears that, by then, Mr. Garg had returned to the U.S. and,
according to Ms. Garg, was living in Connecticut.  The ground asserted for the divorce and
-7-
custody was extreme cruelty on Mr. Garg’s part directed at her and the child.  On those same
allegations of cruelty and threats, Ms. Garg, on March 7, filed an ex parte motion for
immediate custody, which was denied because she had failed to provide the notice required
under Maryland Rule 1-351.  The court did, however, temporarily enjoin Mr. Garg from
removing the child from Maryland.  On March 18, Ms. Garg filed another ex parte motion
for immediate custody, based on the same allegations of cruel behavior and threats, which
also was denied.  
Mr. Garg in due course moved to dismiss the entire action on the ground that he had
not been properly or effectively served with process and separately moved that the court
decline to exercise jurisdiction over the custody action on the ground that jurisdiction lay
with the court in India.  Quoting Maryland Code, § 9-206(a) of the Family Law Article (1999
Repl. Vol.) (FL), which was part of the Maryland version of the UCCJA, he averred that a
Maryland court “shall not exercise its jurisdiction under [the UCCJA] if, at the time of filing
the petition, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in a court of
another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this subtitle, unless the
proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state because this State is a more appropriate
forum or for other reasons.”  Ms. Garg moved to strike that motion on the ground that
Maryland really did have jurisdiction, notwithstanding the pending proceeding in India.
On May 2, 2003, before the court could rule on any of the pending jurisdictional
issues, Ms. Garg asked the court to appoint independent counsel for the child, the cost to be
3 Effective October 1, 2002, the Circuit Court had adopted an internal
administrative policy of referring motions for the appointment of counsel for a child to a
(continued...)
-8-
“subsidized” by the court.  The motion alleged a “credible fear” by Ms. Garg that Mr. Garg
“will kidnap the minor child and abduct him to India,” that “the health, safety and welfare
of the minor child may be adversely affected if prompt action by the Court is not taken to
protect the child,” and that, due to the adversity of the proceedings, it was in the best interest
of “the minor children” that “they” have counsel representing “their” interests.  Mr. Garg
opposed the motion, noting that (1) Ms. Garg had failed to substantiate in any way her
allegations of possible abduction by Mr. Garg and that it was, in fact, she who had abducted
the child from Indore, (2) a hearing on Mr. Garg’s motions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction
and to decline to exercise jurisdiction had been set for July 28, and (3) it would be premature,
in light of the jurisdictional challenges, for the court to appoint independent counsel at that
point.
On July 7, Judge Fader, who was to conduct (and later did conduct) the hearing on the
jurisdictional issues, postponed that hearing, then set for July 28, and, in a memorandum to
the Assignment Office, noted that “the Motion to Appoint Counsel for Minor Child (5/03/03)
just sits until the attorney filing the motion complies with the procedural responsibility to
have the matter directed to the Judge of the Family Division assigned to hear these motions
regarding appointment of counsel on a rotating monthly basis as the Bar [h]as been so
informed.”3  On July 23, he reset the hearing for September 23, 2003.  There were, at the
3(...continued)
designated judge assigned to the Family Division of the court, rather than to the general
chambers judge.  That policy was communicated to the Bar in the November issue of the
Baltimore County Bar Association newsletter.  It does not appear, however, that counsel
was required to present such a motion to the designated Family Division judge; rather,
either the clerk’s office, the assignment office, or some other administrative official
would collect those motions, once filed and answered, and refer them to the designated
judge.  Judge Fader’s memorandum was to the Assignment Office, and it may well have
been in response to that memorandum that the motion was eventually referred to Judge
Dugan, who was then assigned to the Family Division.
-9-
time, some on-going discovery disputes, and counsel for Ms. Garg had advised the court that
he needed to be out of the country for a period due to a family emergency.  On September
3, 2003, Judge Dugan, who apparently was the designated Family Division judge to whom
the motion was presented, issued the order that the Court of Special Appeals found so
egregious – that the motion to appoint counsel “will be held in abeyance by the court until
after [Judge Fader] rules on the issue of jurisdiction.”
The hearing on the jurisdictional issues took place as scheduled, on September 23.
By then, depositions and other discovery had taken place.  At no time during that hearing did
Ms. Garg ask for a ruling on her motion to have counsel appointed for the child (or any
consequent continuance that granting the motion might entail); nor did she complain about
Judge Dugan’s order deferring a ruling on that request or even mention the matter.  As a
result, the motion was never taken up by Judge Fader or formally resolved, other than by the
fact that no counsel was ever appointed.
The witnesses were Mr. and Ms. Garg, Ms. Garg’s father and brother, and two experts
-10-
in India law who gave partially conflicting opinions.  Ms. Garg repeated her allegations of
cruelty and abuse on the part of her husband and was vigorously cross-examined on that and
other aspects of her testimony.  The expert called by Mr. Garg stated that (1) it was proper
for Mr. Garg to bring his action in India under the Guardians and Wards Act, which was the
applicable statute, (2) the test under India law in a custody case is the best interest or welfare
of the child standard, and (3) although there is a maternal preference under India law until
the child is five, there is no preference – maternal or paternal –  thereafter.  She cited a 2001
case from the Supreme Court of India attesting that the standard in custody cases is the
welfare of the child.  The expert for Ms. Garg opined that the case in India should have been
brought under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, and that due process was not
followed in the India proceeding.  She agreed, however, that, for a child over five, there is
no maternal or paternal preference under India law and that the controlling standard is the
welfare of the child.
After considering the testimony and other evidence, the court announced from the
bench that it was dismissing the action.  As a predicate for some of its findings, the court
made clear that it had little regard for Ms. Garg’s credibility:
“I have looked at this lady and listened to her testimony.  She is
cool, she is calculating, she makes up her mind what she wants
to say when she wants to say it and I believe – I don’t believe
her; I believe that most of the stuff she has made up to get her
way.”
The court expressed a similar view about the testimony of Ms. Garg’s father.
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The court recited seven reasons for its decision, all keying on the criteria stated in the
UCCJA for a Maryland court to exercise jurisdiction:
First, the court stated that it was not convinced that there was abuse of any magnitude,
other than a little pinching of the child, “because I do not accept her testimony or any of her
witnesses’ testimony to that effect.”
Second, based on the limited agreement of the two experts, the court found that there
was no maternal or paternal preference under India law with respect to Chaitanya, who was
over five, and thus concluded that India law was not so far against Maryland public policy
that the court would not enforce that law.
Third, the court observed that the India court believed it had jurisdiction, and “[f]rom
what I see, the service aspects comport with due process of this country and, more
importantly, an attorney has entered his appearance for her submitting the attorney and her
to the jurisdiction of the Indian court.”  The court noted that when an attorney enters an
appearance, there is a presumption that “he does represent the person he says that he
represents,” and that there was no testimony “to overcome that presumption that she has
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the Indian court and has in fact also been properly
served there.”
Fourth, again doubting Ms. Garg’s credibility, Judge Fader announced that he was
“not convinced that there is any neglect or failure by the father to support his child in India
or to care for his child in India as has been testified to by the mother of the child.”
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Fifth, responding to Ms. Garg’s testimony regarding her fear of her husband, the court
stated that, if she did have that fear, “she has manufactured that fear herself based on a base
of disappointment with the man she married and the man her father agreed she would marry,”
and that her alleged fear was “not based on any other facts.”
Sixth, the court concluded as a matter of law that the UCCJA applied not only among
the States of the United States, but to foreign countries as well.  In that regard, it found that
the father had filed suit in India to have the court there adjudicate the custody issue, but that
“India never had a chance to because she spirited that child out of India for no reason.”  The
court continued:
“And even though she indicates now that this country is the
home state for six months or more and it is true that the child
has been a resident of America for longer than six months, her
spiriting the child away, her committing a fraud on the Court by
removing the child means that that home state preference and
designation is not to be given.”
The Court further concluded, in this regard, that “everything before me indicates that India
and their laws and the procedure in the court was at least as good to adjudicate this matter
as the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.”
Finally, the court declared that it did not know Chaitanya’s citizenship status, but that
it was not a determining factor.  The court assumed “that the Indian court will give that factor
some consideration when it adjudicates this issue.”
An order dismissing the case for the reasons stated by the court, a transcript of which
was appended, was filed October 1, 2003.  On October 9, Ms. Garg filed both a motion to
4 A similar provision is included in the UCCJEA as well.  See FL § 9.5-208(c)
(2004 Repl. Vol.).
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alter or amend the judgment and a notice of appeal.  The only basis for the motion to alter
or amend was the request that, pending the appeal, the order dismissing the action be
amended to continue in effect the temporary injunction issued in March, 2003, precluding
Ms. Garg from removing Chaitanya from the State.  That motion was denied.
On October 3, 2003, Mr. Garg filed a motion to charge Ms. Garg with travel expenses
and attorneys’ fees.  He noted that, under the UCCJA (FL § 9-208(c)) (1999 Repl. Vol.), as
it then existed before enactment of the UCCJEA, when a court dismissed a petition because
the petitioner wrongfully took the child from another State or engaged in similar
reprehensible conduct, the court may, in appropriate cases, charge the petitioner with
necessary travel and other expenses, including attorneys’ fees, incurred by other parties or
their witnesses.4  In his motion, he listed a number of expenses incurred for travel, discovery,
and trial which, together with attorneys’ fees, amounted to $5,314.  Ms. Garg’s principal
response to the motion was that the request and evidence to support it should have been
presented at the hearing, not afterward.  Unimpressed with that defense, the court granted the
motion and entered judgment against Ms. Garg for $5,314.
In her appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Ms. Garg raised four issues: (1) did the
Circuit Court err in applying the UCCJA in an international context where the foreign nation
(India) had not issued an order or decree concerning custody; (2) did the court err
5 Ms. Garg did not assert that the Circuit Court had dismissed the divorce action on
that ground, but merely pointed out that the Circuit Court had never ruled on that defense.
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substantively in dismissing the action in contravention of FL §§ 1-201(a)(5), 1-201(b)(1), and
2-503(d); (3) did the court err in dismissing her complaint for divorce for alleged insufficient
service of process;5 and (4) did the court abuse its discretion in awarding expenses and
attorneys’ fees.  Nowhere in her brief is there any complaint about Judge Dugan’s order
deferring action on the motion for appointment of counsel for Chaitanya until resolution of
the jurisdictional issues.
The Court of Special Appeals did not rule on any of the four issues raised by Ms.
Garg.  Instead, it determined that (1) the Circuit Court erred in dismissing the divorce action
based on the case pending in the Indore court because the action in that court did not
encompass a divorce, and (2) “fundamental fairness suggests” that Chaitanya “should have
a lawyer to articulate his interest and to assist on the critical and complex issues that were
determinative of his future.”  Garg v. Garg, supra, 163 Md. App. at 578, 881 A.2d at 1198.
The deferral of the motion to appoint counsel, which, as noted, was not pressed at the
ultimate hearing before Judge Fader, was thus regarded as an abuse of discretion amounting
to legal error.  In light of that determination, the appellate court vacated the entire judgment
of the Circuit Court, including the award of expenses and attorneys’ fees, and remanded for
the court (1) to appoint counsel for the child, (2) to resolve the service of process issue, and
(3) to revisit and resolve the jurisdictional issues under the UCCJEA.
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We granted certiorari to review the rulings of the Court of Special Appeals and, save
for the issues going to the divorce action, shall reverse the judgment of that court.
DISCUSSION
FL § 1-202 provides that, in any action in which custody, visitation rights, or the
amount of support of a minor child is contested, “the court may: (1) appoint to represent the
minor child counsel who may not represent any party to the action; and (2) impose against
either or both parents counsel fees.”  (Emphasis added).  Unquestionably, the statute merely
authorizes a court to appoint counsel in those kinds of cases; it does not mandate such an
appointment.  The decision whether to appoint independent counsel for the child is a
discretionary one, reviewable under the rather constricted standard of whether that discretion
was abused.
We described that standard in Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 295-96, 825 A.2d 1008,
1115 (2003):
“The abuse of discretion standard requires a trial judge to use
his or her discretion soundly and the record must reflect the
exercise of that discretion.  Abuse occurs when a trial judge
exercises discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner or when
he or she acts beyond the letter or reason of the law.”
See also Cooley v. State, 385 Md. 165, 175, 867 A.2d 1065, 1071 (2005); Kelly v. State, ___
Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (2006).
We are unable to discern anything even approaching an abuse of discretion on this
6 Mr. Garg has not argued that Ms. Garg waived her right to complain about Judge
Dugan’s order, and we shall not resolve the issue on that ground.  In judging whether
either Judge Dugan or Judge Fader abused his discretion in not appointing counsel,
however, it is relevant to consider the lack of interest shown by Ms. Garg in more
urgently pursuing the matter when she had the opportunity to do so. 
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record.  As noted, the motion was never formally denied, but merely referred to the judge
specially assigned to hear the case, or at least the question of whether the court had any
jurisdiction, or should exercise jurisdiction, to hear the case.  If Ms. Garg felt strongly
enough about the need for independent counsel for Chaitanya, she could have pressed the
point when she appeared before Judge Fader – asked him to rule upon the motion and, if
necessary, grant a continuance in order for counsel to be appointed.  There was no
emergency; the child was with her and had been with her for over a year and Mr. Garg was
under an injunction, which he showed no sign of disobeying, not to remove the child from
Maryland.  She did not press the point, however, but was instead content to have the hearing
proceed without counsel for Chaitanya.6 
Jurisdiction or its exercise under both the UCCJA and UCCJEA is a threshold legal
issue that the law requires be resolved expeditiously.  See FL § 9-223 (1999 Repl. Vol.)
(UCCJA) (“on the request of a party to a custody proceeding that raises a question of
existence or exercise of jurisdiction under this subtitle, the case shall be given calendar
priority and handled expeditiously); FL § 9.5-106 (2004 Repl. Vol.) (UCCJEA).  Although
the jurisdictional issues were, to a large extent, fact-driven, as they often are, they did not
relate in any way to, much less determine, who should have custody of Chaitanya, what
7 There was some potential confusion regarding relevance of the best interest of
the child in resolving jurisdiction under the UCCJA.  FL § 9-204(a)(2) (1999 Repl. Vol.),
in setting forth when a court has jurisdiction, stated as one of the factors whether “it is in
the best interest of the child that a court of this State assume jurisdiction because (i) the
child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least 1 contestant, have a significant
connection with this State, and (ii) there is available in this State substantial evidence
concerning the child’s present or future care, protection, training, and personal
relationships.”  In their prefatory note to the UCCJEA, however, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which drafted both the UCCJA and the
UCCJEA, observed:
“The ‘best interest’ language in the jurisdictional sections of
the UCCJA was not intended to be an invitation to address the
merits of the custody issue in the jurisdictional determination
or to otherwise provide that ‘best interests’ considerations
should override jurisdictional determinations or to provide an
additional jurisdictional basis.”
To resolve any ambiguity on that point, the “best interests” language was deleted
from the jurisdiction sections of the UCCJEA.
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visitation should be allowed, or what was in the child’s best interest.7    The sole purpose of
the hearing before Judge Fader was to determine which court should consider and resolve
those issues.  Given that both parents were ably represented by counsel of their choosing, the
court obviously (though, in the light of Ms. Garg’s disinclination to press the issue, tacitly)
felt that it did not need another lawyer to weigh in on the purely legal issue of jurisdiction.
It was not unreasonable, much less arbitrary, capricious, or beyond the letter or reason of the
law for the court to reach that conclusion.
Because the Court of Special Appeals erred in vacating the Circuit Court judgment
upon its determination that the trial court was obliged to appoint counsel for Chaitanya, its
judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for it to resolve the issues actually raised
-18-
by Ms. Garg.  In doing so, the intermediate appellate court must apply the UCCJA.  It was
in clear error in holding that the newly enacted UCCJEA applied.  The UCCJEA was enacted
by 2004 Md. Laws, ch. 502 and took effect October 1, 2004.  Section 4 of the Act states
expressly that “this Act applies only to cases filed to establish or modify custody or motions
or other requests for relief filed in child custody cases on or after the effective date of this
Act.”  By the plain terms of the statute, therefore, it does not apply to cases to establish
custody filed before October 1, 2004, which Ms. Garg’s action clearly was.  
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN CONFORMANCE WITH
THIS OPINION; COSTS IN COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO DATE AND COSTS IN THIS COURT TO
BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.
Judge Raker joins in the judgment only.