Title: State v. Louis H. LaCount

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2008 WI 59 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP672-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Louis H. LaCount, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
2007 WI App 116 
Reported at: 301 Wis. 2d 472, 732 N.W.2d 29 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 10, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 16, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
William M. Atkinson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BUTLER, JR., J., join the 
concurrence. 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BUTLER, JR., J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
T. Christopher Kelly and Kelly, Habermehl & Bushaw, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by T. Christopher Kelly. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by James 
M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen. 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 59
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP672-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2002CF127) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Louis H. LaCount, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 10, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 that affirmed the 
Circuit Court for Brown County, Judge William M. Atkinson, 
presiding. 
¶2 
Petitioner, Louis H. LaCount (LaCount), seeks review 
of a published decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed 
LaCount's convictions in the Circuit Court for Brown County for 
securities fraud and for theft by a bailee of property valued at 
                                                 
1 State v. LaCount, 2007 WI App 116, 301 Wis. 2d 472, 732 
N.W.2d 29. 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
2 
 
more than $2,500.  The Respondent is the State of Wisconsin (the 
State). 
¶3 
There are four principal issues upon review.  The 
first issue is whether the circuit court erroneously admitted an 
attorney's expert opinion testimony that LaCount had engaged in 
a securities transaction.  The second issue is whether the 
evidence presented at trial sufficiently supported LaCount's 
conviction for securities fraud.  The third issue is whether the 
circuit court erred by not suppressing the results of the search 
of the office of Gates, Paul & Lear, L.L.C. (GP&L), which was a 
search that allegedly exceeded the scope of the search warrant.  
The fourth issue is whether the circuit court's finding that 
LaCount was a habitual criminal violated his right to a jury 
trial on that issue. 
¶4 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  Doing 
so, we hold as follows: first, that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting the expert 
opinion testimony of Attorney David Cohen that LaCount had 
engaged in a securities transaction; second, that the evidence 
presented 
at 
trial 
was 
sufficient 
to 
support 
LaCount's 
conviction for securities fraud; third, that the circuit court 
did not err by allowing into evidence the results of the search 
of GP&L's office; and, fourth, that the circuit court's finding 
that LaCount was a habitual criminal did not violate LaCount's 
right to a jury trial on that issue. 
 
 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
3 
 
I 
¶5 
LaCount was employed by GP&L as a debt negotiator and 
office manager.  Between June 1998 and October 1999 LaCount was 
involved in three separate business transactions that led to the 
charges in question: first, the liquidation of the corporate 
assets 
of 
SMC 
Machine, 
Inc. 
(SMC); 
second, 
a 
purported 
investment of $64,000 by John Wills (Wills) in a real estate 
venture; and, third, the alleged misappropriation of funds that 
belonged to Mirr Tree Service (MTS). 
¶6 
Before LaCount's arrest, police executed a search 
warrant at the office of GP&L, and they seized approximately 
500,000 pages of documents.  The search warrant sought financial 
records that related to the clients that were named in the 
warrant's 
application, 
specifically 
SMC 
and 
CDM 
Machine 
Corporation.  During their search, the police discovered 
additional evidence that related to MTS and to Wills, even 
though they were not named in the warrant.  The evidence led to 
a ten-count complaint being filed by the State against LaCount, 
which included charges in regard to both MTS and Wills.  After 
the preliminary hearing, one count was dismissed.  LaCount was 
charged with the remaining nine counts in an information filed 
by the State.  LaCount is appealing from his convictions on 
counts seven and nine. 
¶7 
Count seven alleged theft by bailee of property that 
was valued at more than $2,500.  The property in question 
belonged to MTS, and the alleged crime occurred between March 
and October 1999.  Under a March 1999 fee agreement, GP&L, 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
4 
 
through LaCount, took over the finances of MTS for payroll 
purposes and also to pay off creditors.  Allegedly, GP&L issued 
"worthless" payroll checks and also "failed to pay employee 
insurance premiums . . . ."  GP&L apparently collected 
$772,520.20 on behalf of MTS.  However, LaCount was accused of 
comingling that money with other GP&L accounts and of not paying 
out $289,303.79 as promised on MTS's behalf. 
¶8 
Count nine alleged securities fraud based on the 
purported sale of a security between March and April 1999 by 
LaCount to Wills and CPR, Inc. (CPR), a firm owned by Wills.  
Wills apparently met LaCount through GP&L's president, Al 
Nimmer.  According to Wills, LaCount later approached him with a 
potential investment opportunity that related to the Northland 
Turkey Farms (Northland) property.  LaCount allegedly told Wills 
that he was putting together a group of five investors to 
purchase a $350,000 bank mortgage on the Northland property, 
with each of the five investors contributing about $70,000.  
LaCount also allegedly told Wills that if, as expected, 
Northland could not pay off the mortgage in six months, the 
investors would develop the property and sell it for $750,000 to 
$1,000,000, with all five investors sharing in the profit.  As a 
result, Wills purportedly gave LaCount $64,000, in addition to 
Wills allegedly contributing another $4,000 that represented 
what LaCount had promised to pay Wills back for a previous loan.  
The State alleged that LaCount did not disclose material facts 
to Wills about the deal including: first, that the property had 
two other mortgages on it, which totaled another $300,000; 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
5 
 
second, that the property's owner was not interested in selling 
it, and had never discussed with LaCount such a sale; third, 
that, contrary to LaCount's assertions, foreclosure was not 
imminent; and, fourth, that LaCount was currently on parole for 
previous theft convictions, with a condition that he not close 
business deals of more than $50.  Wills alleges that he never 
recovered any of the $64,0002 that he gave to LaCount for the 
investment. 
¶9 
LaCount made a motion to suppress the seized financial 
records that corresponded to the charges relating to MTS and to 
the investment by Wills.  In so doing, he claimed that the 
seizures had exceeded the scope of the search warrant.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied that motion. 
¶10 The circuit court granted LaCount's motion to sever 
count nine, so that a jury's consideration of the other counts 
would not be influenced by a jury's knowledge of LaCount's 
criminal convictions.  LaCount's criminal convictions were 
significant in regard to count nine, because LaCount had a duty 
to inform potential clients of his criminal history and parole 
restrictions before he entered into a securities transaction 
with such clients. 
¶11 LaCount also made a motion in limine to exclude the 
testimony of the State's expert witness, Attorney David Cohen 
(Cohen), who was the supervisory counsel for the Wisconsin 
                                                 
2 The criminal complaint lists an allegation that Wills did 
not recover $64,000, and it contains no explanation as to why 
this figure is not $68,000. 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
6 
 
Department of Financial Institution's Division of Securities.  
According 
to 
LaCount's argument, Cohen's expert testimony 
concerned the application of Wisconsin securities law to the 
presumed facts of LaCount's alleged real estate investment 
agreement with Wills.  LaCount's motion was denied. 
¶12 The jury found LaCount guilty of the securities fraud 
alleged in count nine.3  The circuit court sentenced LaCount to 
11 years on count nine, which was the maximum sentence allowable 
after an enhancement for habitual criminality.  The circuit 
court 
rejected 
LaCount's postsentencing argument that the 
circuit court's application of a penalty enhancer violated 
LaCount's right to a jury trial on that issue. 
¶13 After LaCount's sentencing on count nine, LaCount 
reached a plea agreement with the State on the remaining 
charges.  LaCount entered guilty pleas on four charges (counts 
one, three, four, and seven), and four charges were dismissed 
(counts two, five, six, and eight).  On count seven, the theft 
by bailee charge involving MTS, the circuit court imposed a 15-
year sentence,4 which was to be served concurrently with 
LaCount's 11-year sentence on count nine.  The circuit court 
also sentenced LaCount to 15 years of concurrent probation 
                                                 
3 This was the only count that was tried to a jury because 
LaCount then entered into a plea agreement on the remaining 
counts, including count seven. 
4 The record before us does not reflect that the circuit 
court made a determination on what portion of the sentence would 
be initial confinement and what portion of the sentence would be 
extended supervision. 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
7 
 
(sentence withheld) for each of the remaining charges, to be 
served consecutively to LaCount's sentences. 
¶14 LaCount appealed the circuit court's decision to the 
court of appeals.  The court of appeals rejected all of 
LaCount's arguments and affirmed the circuit court.  LaCount 
filed a petition for review of the court of appeals' decision, 
which we granted. 
II 
¶15 The first issue on review is whether the circuit court 
erroneously admitted an attorney's expert opinion testimony that 
LaCount had engaged in a securities transaction.  We first 
address the standard of review for this issue.  Whether to admit 
proffered "'expert'" testimony rests in the circuit court's 
discretion.  State v. Shomberg, 2006 WI 9, ¶10, 288 Wis. 2d 1, 
709 N.W.2d 370 (citations omitted).  On this issue, our review 
of a circuit court's use of its discretion is deferential, and 
we apply the erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  Id., 
¶¶10-11.  The circuit court's exercise of discretion will not be 
overturned if the decision had "a reasonable basis," and if the 
decision was made "in accordance with accepted legal standards 
and in accordance with the facts of record."  State v. Pharr, 
115 Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983) (citation omitted).  
Furthermore, a reviewing court may search the record for reasons 
to sustain the circuit court's exercise of discretion.  Id. at 
343. 
¶16 LaCount claims that the circuit court erred in 
admitting the testimony of the State's expert witness, Cohen, 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
8 
 
for two reasons.  First, LaCount contends that the testimony was 
impermissible because Cohen testified on the legal definition of 
an investment contract, which allegedly invaded the province of 
the judge as the person having the exclusive responsibility for 
finding and interpreting the applicable domestic law.  Second, 
LaCount alleges that Cohen's testimony was improper because it 
expressed a conclusion on the ultimate fact of whether LaCount's 
deal with Wills and CPR was an investment contract, thus, 
usurping the role of the jury.  LaCount also contends that the 
court of appeals erred by putting the burden on him to prove 
prejudice, and not on the State to prove that the alleged error 
was harmless. 
¶17 The State argues that Cohen's expert testimony on the 
nature of an investment contract was admitted properly by the 
circuit court.  The State asserts that Cohen did not give a 
legal definition of an investment contract in his testimony, and 
that Cohen merely and properly was allowed to describe the 
typical features of an investment contract to assist the jurors 
in their own factual determination as to whether the deal with 
Wills involved a security.  Furthermore, the State argues that, 
even if an error occurred, it was a harmless error. 
¶18 Wisconsin Stat. § 907.02 (2005-06)5 addresses the 
admissibility of expert opinion testimony in Wisconsin courts.  
That section states, "If scientific, technical, or other 
                                                 
5 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
9 
 
specialized 
knowledge 
will 
assist 
the 
trier 
of 
fact 
to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise."6  Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 907.04 states, 
"Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise 
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact." 
¶19 As 
noted 
previously, 
appellate 
courts 
use 
the 
deferential erroneous exercise of discretion standard when 
reviewing a circuit court's decision to admit expert testimony.  
We are satisfied that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in admitting Cohen's testimony, because 
the circuit court's decision rested on a reasonable basis and 
was in accordance with both accepted legal standards and the 
facts in the record.  Cohen's testimony was the type of expert 
testimony that was envisioned by Wis. Stat. § 907.02, because it 
encompassed specialized financial knowledge that would assist 
the jury in understanding the evidence presented at LaCount's 
trial.  Such testimony also could assist the jury in determining 
a fact in issue in the case, here, whether LaCount's transaction 
with Wills involved a security. 
¶20 Even if, as alleged, Cohen's testimony embraced an 
ultimate issue, Wis. Stat. § 907.04 allows such testimony.  
                                                 
6 The parties do not dispute that Cohen was properly 
considered to be an expert witness under this statute. 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
10 
 
Under § 907.04, "'[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.'"  
State v. Elm, 201 Wis. 2d 452, 459, 549 N.W.2d 471 (Ct. App. 
1996) (footnote omitted).  LaCount argues that Cohen's testimony 
was not permissible because Cohen affirmatively answered the 
prosecutor's question on whether LaCount's deal with Wills was 
an investment contract. 
¶21 We also disagree with LaCount's assertion because 
Cohen was directly responding to a series of questions from the 
prosecutor concerning the nature of an investment contract.  One 
of these questions was even objected to by LaCount's counsel as 
being "an improper hypothetical question."  The series of 
questions asked could fairly be characterized as covering 
several hypothetical situations.  Expert opinion testimony on an 
ultimate fact is permissible, even where the evidentiary facts 
on which the ultimate fact in issue depends are in dispute, so 
long as the opinion on the ultimate fact is given using a 
hypothetical case or situation.  See Rabata v. Dohner, 45 Wis. 
2d 111, 123-24, 172 N.W.2d 409 (1969) (citations omitted).  
Accordingly, Cohen was properly allowed to testify on the basic 
factual characteristics of an investment contract, in order to 
assist the jury in determining whether the transaction with 
Wills involved a security. 
¶22 We 
are 
further 
satisfied 
that 
Cohen 
did 
not 
impermissibly testify on a legal issue, contrary to LaCount's 
claim that Cohen improperly testified on the definition of an 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
11 
 
investment contract.  Cohen did testify that the basic features 
of an investment contract were someone "handing over some 
money," while "expecting the other person or some other person 
besides [themselves] to do something to generate a return for 
[them] on that money." 
¶23 However, even if Cohen's statement that a security 
covered basically everything "you can't figure out" was overly 
broad, the jurors were properly instructed that they were not 
bound by any expert's opinion, that they were the sole judges of 
the facts, and that the court was the sole judge of the law.  
Jurors are presumed to have followed jury instructions.  See 
State v. Grande, 169 Wis. 2d 422, 436, 485 N.W.2d 282 (Ct. App. 
1992).  Cohen's testimony was generally consistent with the jury 
instructions that were given and, thus, with Wisconsin law.  
Under such circumstances, "[w]e are unable to perceive any 
prejudicial error."  State v. DiMaggio, 49 Wis. 2d 565, 580, 182 
N.W.2d 466 (1971).  In that case, we emphasized the therapeutic 
effect of the circuit court's correct instructions.  Id. at 579-
80. 
¶24 In summary, we hold that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting the expert 
opinion testimony of Attorney Cohen that LaCount had engaged in 
a securities transaction. 
III 
¶25 The second issue before us is whether the evidence 
presented at trial sufficiently supported LaCount's conviction 
for securities fraud.  We first address the standard of review 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
12 
 
on this issue.  In reviewing whether the evidence was sufficient 
to support a conviction, we must determine whether, after 
viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution, "'any rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  
State v. DeLain, 2005 WI 52, ¶11, 280 Wis. 2d 51, 695 N.W.2d 484 
(citation omitted).  In doing so, we consider all of the 
evidence that was submitted at trial, including any evidence 
that was erroneously admitted.  Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 
40-42 (1988).  For an appellate court to reverse a conviction, 
the evidence at trial must conflict with the fully established 
or conceded facts.  Day v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 392, 400, 284 
N.W.2d 666 (1979). 
¶26 LaCount claims that there was insufficient evidence to 
support his conviction for securities fraud.  Specifically, 
LaCount contends that there was not enough evidence to prove 
that he sold a security to Wills and CPR, here, an investment 
contract.  LaCount claims that the State did not prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that Wills and CPR relied solely on LaCount's 
efforts to earn a profit, which LaCount alleges was required. 
¶27 The 
State 
argues 
that 
sufficient 
evidence 
was 
presented at trial to allow the jury to find LaCount guilty of 
securities fraud for selling Wills an investment contract.  The 
State asserts that LaCount's argument that an investor may not 
put forth any efforts himself or herself, without taking the 
transaction out of the realm of securities law, lacks merit, 
because the meaning of an investment contract is not that 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
13 
 
narrow.  LaCount's proposition would frustrate the remedial 
purposes of securities law because it would, then, be easy to 
evade the law by having an investor put forth a modicum of 
effort.  The State argues that, under Wisconsin law, an 
instrument is not an investment contract only if the investor 
did not rely predominately on the promoter's or a third-party's 
efforts.  The State points out that Wills testified that all of 
the information on the investment contract in question came from 
LaCount, and also that LaCount stated that he would manage the 
investment himself.  The State also argues that, even if 
LaCount's 
proposed 
narrow interpretation of an investment 
contract governs, the evidence presented would have satisfied 
that narrow definition because Wills testified that he lacked 
any role in the development or sale of the Northland property 
for profit.  As a result, on the record of this case, the State 
argues that reasonable jurors could find that LaCount sold Wills 
and CPR an investment contract, and, accordingly, there was 
sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict on count nine. 
¶28 For the reasons discussed in detail below, we conclude 
that the evidence presented at trial sufficiently supported 
LaCount's conviction for securities fraud. 
¶29 The State was required to prove three elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt to convict LaCount of securities fraud.  
First, the prosecution had to establish that LaCount sold Wills 
a security, here, an investment contract.  Wis. Stat. § 551.41.  
Second, the prosecution had to prove that LaCount made an 
"untrue statement of a material fact or [omitted] to state a 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
14 
 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
the light of the circumstances under which they [were] made, not 
misleading . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 551.41(2).  Third, the 
prosecution was required to prove that LaCount acted willfully.  
Wis. Stat. § 551.41.  Because, LaCount contends that the 
prosecution failed to prove only that LaCount sold Wills a 
security, we will limit our discussion to that element. 
¶30 We are satisfied that the State proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that LaCount sold Wills a security, here, an 
investment contract.  We are not persuaded by LaCount's 
argument, which relied on the United States Supreme Court 
decision of SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004), that Wills 
had to depend solely on LaCount's efforts to realize a profit 
for the transaction to be an investment contract.  In Edwards, 
the Court defined an investment contract for purposes of federal 
securities law.  Id.  LaCount's argument fails because Wisconsin 
securities law is far broader in its definition of an investment 
contract than is federal law.  Wisconsin courts have held that 
managerial efforts need not come only from the efforts of a 
person other than the investor.  See Fore Way Express, Inc. v. 
Bast, 178 Wis. 2d 693, 505 N.W.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1993).  
Specifically, Fore Way Express cited the relevant section of the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code in holding that an investment 
contract was any "'investment in a common enterprise with the 
expectation of profit to be derived through the essential 
managerial efforts of someone other than the investor.'"  Id. at 
712, citing Wis. Admin. Code § DFI 1.02(6)(a) (Dec. 2004). 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
15 
 
¶31 We agree with the Fore Way Express court that an 
investor may have a role in the managerial efforts of an 
investment contract, so long as the investor does not provide 
the essential managerial efforts for the investment contract.  
Our holding today also is consistent with the Wisconsin 
Administrative Code, which defines an investment contract as 
"[a]ny investment in a common enterprise with the expectation of 
profit to be derived through the essential managerial efforts of 
someone other than the investor."  Wis. Admin. Code § DFI 
1.02(6)(a) (Dec. 2004).  The judge's instructions to the jury in 
this case, as reflected in the record, were fully consistent 
with Wisconsin law.  Furthermore, we are satisfied that Cohen's 
testimony was consistent with Wisconsin law. 
¶32 In addition, as noted previously, Wills testified at 
trial that all of the information on the investment contract in 
question came from LaCount and also that LaCount promised to 
manage the investment himself.  As a result, Wills' testimony 
would have supported a conviction of LaCount for securities 
fraud under even the more stringent federal standard, let alone 
the Wisconsin standard.  We are satisfied that, after viewing 
the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, "'any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  
DeLain, 280 Wis. 2d 51, ¶11 (citation omitted). 
¶33 In summary, we conclude that the evidence presented at 
trial was sufficient to support LaCount's conviction for 
securities fraud. 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
16 
 
IV 
¶34 The third issue on review is whether the circuit court 
erred by not suppressing the results of the search of GP&L's 
office, one that allegedly exceeded the scope of the search 
warrant.7  LaCount claims that the search warrant authorized only 
                                                 
7 In addition to the specifically-named client materials, 
the search warrant also allowed for the search and seizure of 
items that were located and concealed within the GP&L premises, 
that were: 
1. 
Paper records relating to any type of bank 
account or investment account owned by Gates, 
Paul and Lear, L.L.C. 
2. 
Paper records relating to any type of bank 
account or investment account owned by Louis 
LaCount or Kevin M. Jereczek. 
3. 
Any 
paper 
records relating to the payroll, 
accounts payable, telephone logs or accounts 
receivable of Gates, Paul and Lear, L.L.C. 
4. 
Any paper records indicating the names of past 
and present employees of Gates, Paul and Lear, 
L.L.C. or past and present owners or shareholders 
in Gates, Paul and Lear, L.L.C. 
5. 
Computer 
records 
which 
may 
be 
more 
fully 
described 
as 
any 
of 
the 
above 
types 
of 
information or data stored in the form of 
electronic or magnetic coding on computer media 
or on media capable of being read by a computer 
or computer related equipment.  This media 
includes, but is not limited to fixed hard discs 
and removable hard disc cartridges, laser discs, 
tapes, floppy diskettes and other media capable 
of storing magnetic coding. 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
17 
 
the search for and seizure of records that related to GP&L's 
business with specifically named clients.  LaCount also argues 
that the search warrant did not allow the police to search his 
personal office within GP&L's office.  We first address the 
standard of review for this issue.  Whether a search and seizure 
is constitutional remains a question of law that we review de 
novo and without deference to the circuit court or to the court 
                                                                                                                                                             
6. 
Computer hardware, which may be described as any 
and all electronic devices capable of creating, 
converting, displaying, transmitting or analyzing 
magnetic or electronic impulses or data.  These 
devices include, but are not limited to[,] 
computers, computer peripherals such as printers, 
modems, 
plotters, 
circuit 
boards 
and 
other 
electronic devices. 
7. 
Computer software, which may be described as any 
and all programs or instructions capable of 
interpretation by a computer and related devices 
which is stored in the form of magnetic or 
electronic media.  These items include, but are 
not limited to[,] application software, operating 
systems, programs, compilers, interpreters and 
other programming utilized to communicate with 
computer components. 
8. 
Computer instructions, which may be described as 
existing in the form of books, manuals, notes and 
alike which include, but are not limited to[,] 
written 
or 
printed 
material 
which 
provides 
exemplars 
in 
instructions 
regarding 
the 
operations 
of 
computers, 
peripherals 
and 
software. 
9. 
U.S. Currency received following the commission 
of 
crimes 
of 
Theft, 
contrary 
to 
Section 
943.20(1)(a)(b)&(d), Wisconsin Statutes. 
 
. . . . 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
18 
 
of appeals; however, we benefit from their analyses.  State v. 
Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729, 746, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998). 
¶35 LaCount argues that the search and seizure in the 
present case violated the prohibition in the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution on unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  LaCount claims that the search warrant authorized 
only the search for and seizure of records that related to 
GP&L's business with specifically named clients.  LaCount also 
argues that the search warrant did not allow the police to 
search his personal office within GP&L's office.  As a result, 
LaCount claims that the police exceeded the scope of the search 
warrant. 
¶36 The State argues that LaCount failed to meet his 
burden of proving that he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in any of the specific records that were seized from 
GP&L's office under the search warrant.  Furthermore, the 
relevant financial records were not in LaCount's exclusive 
control, because GP&L's bookkeeper had the records on her 
computer as well.  The State argues that the warrant's first 
five paragraphs allowed for the broad search and seizure of 
paper and computer records regarding GP&L's and LaCount's bank 
and investment accounts, in addition to records of GP&L's 
payroll, accounts payable, accounts receivable, and telephone 
logs.  Furthermore, paragraphs six to eight in the warrant 
authorized the seizure of computer hardware, software, and 
instructions.  As a result, the State argues that the search 
warrant actually authorized the seizure of all of GP&L's 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
19 
 
business records, because the warrant included the authorization 
to seize GP&L's computers.  The State further points out that 
all of the items received into evidence at LaCount's trial were 
within the specific terms of the search warrant.  The State also 
argues that, even if the relevant records should have been 
suppressed, any error in not suppressing them was harmless.  
Even a cursory review of GP&L's records would have disclosed to 
police the names of Wills, CPR, and Northland.  The State also 
argues that the seizure could not have disclosed Wills' and 
CPR's investment contract with LaCount on the Northland property 
deal, because it was never reduced to writing.  The State also 
contends that, because the suppression of GP&L's records would 
not have prevented either Phillip Mirr's or Wills' testimony, or 
the introduction of their own personal records, any error in not 
suppressing the records was harmless. 
¶37 LaCount does not contend that the search warrant was 
constitutionally overbroad in its scope.  LaCount also does not 
contend that the application for the warrant lacked probable 
cause for the issuance of the search warrant.  Accordingly, 
those issues are not before this court.  LaCount only challenges 
the execution of the search warrant, in that he asserts the 
police exceeded the scope of the warrant.  As the proponent of 
the motion to suppress, LaCount had the burden of proving that 
his Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution 
had been violated by the search and seizure in question.  See 
State v. Whitrock, 161 Wis. 2d 960, 972, 468 N.W.2d 696 (1991) 
(citation omitted). 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
20 
 
¶38 A 
search 
warrant's 
execution 
must 
be 
conducted 
reasonably, and the search and seizure must be limited to the 
scope that is permitted by the warrant.  State v. Andrews, 201 
Wis. 2d 383, 390, 549 N.W.2d 210 (1996).  Whether a seized item 
is properly within the search warrant's scope depends on the 
search warrant's terms and on the nature of the items that were 
seized.  Id. at 390-91.  The search warrant here was a premises 
warrant.8  This court has held that a premises warrant generally 
"authorizes the search of all items on the premises so long as 
those items are plausible receptacles of the objects of the 
search."  Id. at 389.  We continued by stating, "'A lawful 
search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in 
which the object of the search may be found and is not limited 
by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be 
required to complete the search.'"  Id. at 389-90 (citation 
omitted). 
¶39 We find LaCount's assertion that the police exceeded 
the scope of the search warrant by searching LaCount's personal 
office within GP&L's office to be without merit.  Because, the 
search warrant was a premises warrant, the police were entitled 
to search the entire premises, including the items within the 
premises, so long as such items were "plausible receptacles of 
the objects of the search."  Id. at 389.  As a result, the 
                                                 
8 The search warrant authorized the search of "[a] business 
office, which is . . . located in one building at 2763 Manitowoc 
Road, Brown County, Wisconsin.  The building can be described as 
a one-story brown brick structure with a glass entry door 
bearing the name of Gates, Paul and Lear, L.L.C." 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
21 
 
search of LaCount's personal office within GP&L's office was 
warranted, because his office's furnishings were plausible 
receptacles that were very likely to have contained the items 
that the search warrant authorized to be searched for and 
seized.  Lawful searches, as here, may extend "'to the entire 
area in which the object of the search may be found and [are] 
not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or 
opening may be required to complete the search.'"  Id. at 389-90 
(citation omitted). 
¶40 Furthermore, LaCount's citation in his brief to 
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), in support of LaCount's 
assertion that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
personal office is misplaced, because LaCount failed to meet his 
burden of providing specific information on what he alleged was 
seized inappropriately.  Furthermore, LaCount failed to meet his 
burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, his 
subjective expectation of privacy.  State v. Orta, 2003 WI App 
93, ¶11, 264 Wis. 2d 765, 663 N.W.2d 358.  This is true because 
LaCount 
never 
provided 
any 
specificity 
on 
his 
alleged 
expectation of privacy.  He never testified as to what he 
claimed was seized inappropriately.  We are satisfied that the 
warrant authorized the police to search all of GP&L's premises, 
including LaCount's personal office therein. 
¶41 We similarly hold that LaCount's assertion that the 
police exceeded the scope of the search warrant by seizing 
records of GP&L's clients other than those specifically named in 
the warrant is without merit.  The DeSmidt decision is 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
22 
 
especially helpful on the issue relating to whether the police 
exceeded the scope of the search warrant.  State v. DeSmidt, 155 
Wis. 2d 119, 133-34, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990).  In that case, we 
stated that, when "there is probable cause to believe that there 
exists a pervasive scheme to defraud, all the records of a 
business may be seized."  Id. (citation omitted). 
¶42 The DeSmidt case dealt with "whether the search of Dr. 
DeSmidt's dental offices and [the] seizure of his dental and 
business records" were constitutional.  Id. at 124.  The police 
investigated DeSmidt after a former employee of his dental 
practice contacted the Wisconsin Department of Justice with an 
allegation that "DeSmidt was submitting fraudulent Medicaid and 
insurance claim forms."  Id. at 125.  A search warrant was 
issued and executed that covered all patient charts, dental 
records, 
x-ray 
negatives, 
business 
records, 
and 
Medicaid 
provider handbooks.  Id. at 126.  The investigators seized "all 
business records and all patient files dated from 1979."  Id. at 
127.  DeSmidt was then charged with 11 counts of medical 
assistance fraud.  Id.  When Dr. DeSmidt challenged the search 
and seizure, this court held "that because there was probable 
cause to believe Dr. DeSmidt's dental practice was 'permeated 
with fraud,' the search for and seizure of all of [his] dental 
and 
business 
records 
was 
reasonable 
and 
therefore  
constitutional . . . ."  Id. at 129.  We further held that, when 
"there is probable cause to believe that there exists a 
pervasive scheme to defraud, all the records of a business may 
be seized."  Id. at 133-34 (citation omitted). 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
23 
 
¶43 We are convinced that the present case is analogous to 
our DeSmidt decision.  Here, as in DeSmidt, we are satisfied 
that the application for the search warrant set forth probable 
cause to believe that a pervasive scheme to defraud existed, 
which made the seizure of all of GP&L's business records 
permissible.  As a result, the seizure of documents from GP&L's 
office was permissible, notwithstanding the large number of 
documents seized. 
¶44 Furthermore, we are satisfied that, when read as a 
whole, the search warrant authorized the search for and the 
seizure of more than merely the records of the clients specified 
in the warrant's application.  The warrant authorized the search 
for and seizure of any paper or computer records that related 
"to any type of bank account or investment account owned by" 
GP&L, LaCount, or Kevin Jereczek.  The search warrant also 
authorized the search for and seizure of any paper or computer 
records that related to GP&L's payroll, telephone logs, accounts 
payable, or accounts receivable.  The warrant further authorized 
the search for and seizure of any paper or computer records that 
indicated "the names of past and present employees of [GP&L] or 
past and present owners or shareholders in [GP&L]."  In 
addition, and more generally, the warrant authorized the search 
for and seizure of computer hardware, computer software, and 
computer instructions.  Because of the wide breadth of the 
search warrant, we are satisfied that the evidence that the 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
24 
 
State used both at the preliminary hearing and also at the trial 
to convict LaCount came within the scope of the search warrant.9 
¶45 Even if error had occurred, we are satisfied that the 
error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  An 
"error is harmless if it is 'clear beyond a reasonable doubt 
that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty 
absent the error.'"  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶49, 254 Wis. 
2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (citation omitted).  We so hold because 
there was sufficient testimony at trial that supports the 
conclusion that the discovery of information related to both of 
the disputed charges would have occurred anyway, notwithstanding 
the results of the search.  We also so conclude because the 
                                                 
9 As we have noted previously, the first nine paragraphs of 
the search warrant allowed for more to be seized than LaCount 
asserts.  The evidence that led to the charges on the disputed 
counts fits within the warrant's language.  For example, on the 
theft by bailee charge relating to MTS, records on that 
transaction would fit under paragraph three (allowing for the 
seizure of paper records relating to the accounts payable and 
accounts 
receivable 
records 
of 
GP&L) 
and 
paragraph 
five 
(allowing for the seizure of computerized equivalents of such 
records) given that GP&L was handling MTS's payroll.  Indeed, 
the State presented at the preliminary hearing an accounts 
receivable document showing client checks that MTS delivered to 
GP&L. 
Furthermore, paragraphs one through five authorized the 
seizure of paper and computerized bank and investment accounts, 
which provided documentation of the Northland property deal.  
Indeed, the bank records produced by the State at trial included 
a computerized printout of bank deposits that included wire 
transfers of $24,000 and $15,000 from Wills to GP&L.  Checking 
account statements and reconciliation statements also provided 
evidence for the securities fraud charge.  The State introduced 
evidence, both at the preliminary hearing and at trial, which 
fit within the terms of the search warrant. 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
25 
 
testimony of Wills and of Phillip Mirr at trial would not have 
been affected, even if some of the records seized had been 
suppressed. 
¶46 In summary, we are satisfied that the circuit court 
did not err by allowing into evidence items that were seized as 
the result of the search of GP&L's office, including the 
personal office of LaCount.  We are satisfied that, for the 
reasons discussed, the police did not exceed the scope of the 
search warrant.  LaCount failed to satisfy his burden of showing 
a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
V 
¶47 The fourth issue on review is whether the circuit 
court's finding that LaCount was a habitual criminal violated 
his right to a jury trial on that issue.  We first address the 
standard 
of review 
for this issue.  Questions of both 
constitutional fact and constitutional law, on the sentence 
enhancement issue, are reviewed de novo.  See Brandmiller v. 
Arreola, 199 Wis. 2d 528, 536-37, 544 N.W.2d 894 (1996). 
¶48 LaCount claims that whether he had been convicted of a 
felony within the five-year period defined for purposes of the 
habitual criminal penalty enhancer in Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2) 
should have gone to the jury before the circuit court sentenced 
LaCount as a habitual criminal.  LaCount now contends that there 
was a factual question as to what portion of the five-year time 
period had been tolled by the time LaCount had served in actual 
confinement while serving a sentence.  LaCount also argues that 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
26 
 
a factual finding by a circuit court of the dates that a 
defendant spent in actual confinement in prison does not fit 
within the narrow exception of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 490 (2000), that allows a judge to determine the existence 
of a prior conviction.  LaCount further contends that the 
State's reliance on a presentence report to establish the dates 
that LaCount was incarcerated was misplaced because that report 
was 
produced 
by 
the 
executive 
branch, 
specifically, 
the 
Department of Corrections, and, therefore, was not a judicial 
record.  LaCount additionally argues that the presentence report 
was not part of a court proceeding that was designed to 
establish facts conclusively, such as a jury trial or a plea 
colloquy. 
¶49 Under Wisconsin law, a convicted defendant is subject 
to a repeat offender sentence enhancement, if that defendant is 
"convicted of a felony during the 5-year period immediately 
preceding the commission of the crime for which [he or she] 
presently is being sentenced . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2).  
When computing the relevant five-year period, the time that the 
defendant "spent in actual confinement serving a criminal 
sentence shall be excluded."  Id. 
¶50 The State contends that LaCount was properly sentenced 
as a repeat offender on count nine because the circuit court 
could constitutionally determine that LaCount's prior felony 
convictions came within the five-year time period for sentence 
enhancement purposes.  The State claims that when, as here, the 
presentence report contains the dates of a defendant's actual 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
27 
 
confinement in prison on prior convictions, any disputed fact 
about a prior conviction is not "too far removed from the 
conclusive significance of a prior judicial record" to satisfy 
the requirements of Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 25 
(2005).  The State also cites People v. Matthews, 842 N.E.2d 
150, 159 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005), which held that it is proper for 
a sentencing court to use a presentence report for facts 
concerning a prior conviction.  Furthermore, the State argues 
that the applicability of LaCount's prior conviction for 
purposes of the penalty enhancer was obvious on the surface of 
the existing judicial record.  The presentence report contained 
information showing that LaCount's earliest possible eligibility 
for release from prison had to be at least six months after his 
sentencing date of November 12, 1993, which would be May 12, 
1994.  As a result, the State asserts that, even if he had been 
released from prison on parole on May 12, 1994, and even if 
LaCount had never returned to prison, he would have committed 
count nine within five years of his release.  Accordingly, 
LaCount's conviction on count nine necessarily came within the 
five-year qualifying period immediately preceding the commission 
of the crime of securities fraud, which is alleged to have 
occurred between March and April of 1999.  The State also argues 
that, even if error occurred, it was harmless because the 
failure to submit such a sentencing factor to a jury is not 
structural error. 
¶51 LaCount relies on Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466, to argue 
that a jury should have determined if the five-year time period, 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
28 
 
for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2), was tolled by the time 
LaCount served in actual confinement.  In Apprendi, the Court 
stated, "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt."  Id. at 490.  The United States Supreme 
Court held that the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes was 
the maximum sentence that a trial court judge could impose, if 
the defendant were punished based on the facts that were 
reflected in the jury's verdict alone.  Id. at 483.  In Blakely, 
the United States Supreme Court reiterated this holding and 
concluded that a trial court judge could not find, for purposes 
of 
a 
sentence 
enhancement, 
that 
a 
defendant 
acted 
with 
deliberate cruelty.  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 
(2004).  Such a finding had to be made by a jury.  Id.  The 
Court held that the relevant statutory maximum was "not the 
maximum sentence [that] a judge may impose after finding 
additional facts, but the maximum [sentence that the judge] may 
impose without any additional findings."  Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
¶52 Both Apprendi and Blakely were limited recently by the 
United States Supreme Court in its Shepard decision.  Shepard, 
544 U.S. at 13.  There, the United States Supreme Court dealt 
with whether the defendant's prior convictions were "generic 
burglary" offenses that would allow the defendant's sentence to 
be raised to the 15-year minimum sentence required of felons in 
possession of firearms under the Armed Career Criminal Act 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
29 
 
(ACCA).  Id. at 16-17.  The prosecution urged the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts to review 
police reports "as a way of telling whether Shepard's guilty 
pleas went to generic burglaries[,]" when a plea colloquy 
transcript, a written plea agreement presented to the court, or 
a comparable record of findings of fact that the defendant 
adopted upon entering his or her plea were not available to give 
such information.  Id. at 17-20.  The United States District 
Court refused to use police reports, and it declined to impose 
the 15-year statutory minimum.  Id. at 17-18.  The United States 
Supreme Court agreed with the district court and held that trial 
courts could not utilize police reports when making a decision 
on whether a prior offense was a "generic burglary" under the 
ACCA.  Id. at 19.  However, the Supreme Court held that "guilty 
pleas may establish ACCA predicate offenses . . . ."  Id.  The 
Supreme Court further held: 
 
[T]o determine whether a [prior] plea of guilty to 
burglary defined by a nongeneric statute necessarily 
admitted elements of the generic offense [to be used 
for sentence enhancement] is limited to the terms of 
the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement 
or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant 
in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed 
by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial 
record of this information. 
Id. at 26.  The Shepard decision relaxed the holdings of both 
Apprendi and Blakely, so that, when Shepard and Apprendi are 
read together, a trial court judge, rather than a jury, is 
allowed to determine the applicability of a defendant's prior 
conviction for sentence enhancement purposes, when the necessary 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
30 
 
information concerning the prior conviction can be readily 
determined from an existing judicial record. 
¶53 We further note that this court recently held that a 
presentence report, which listed the defendant's crime and his 
or her date of conviction, was sufficient to "constitute an 
official report that would serve as prima facie proof of 
habitual criminality" for purposes of a penalty-enhancement 
statute.  State v. Bonds, 2006 WI 83, ¶48, 292 Wis. 2d 344, 717 
N.W.2d 133.  We are satisfied that the same is true in the 
present case, because the presentence report listed LaCount's 
period of actual confinement on the prior conviction in 
question.10  We are satisfied that the presentence report, 
combined with the certified judgment of conviction, was a 
judicial record, not an executive branch record, even though it 
was prepared by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections.  As a 
result, we are satisfied that the circuit court's finding that 
LaCount was a habitual criminal did not violate LaCount's right 
to a jury trial, because the relevant information could be 
readily determined from a judicial record, here the presentence 
report. 
                                                 
10 At sentencing, when the circuit court judge asked whether 
LaCount's counsel had any corrections to the presentence report, 
LaCount's counsel stated, "Any corrections are made in our 
sentencing memorandum."  In the sentencing memorandum, LaCount's 
counsel did not allege that there were any errors in the dates 
of LaCount's actual confinement, as reported in the presentence 
report.  Indeed, after preserving his objection on the need for 
a jury, and not a judge, to make the determination as to when 
LaCount was actually confined for sentence enhancement purposes, 
LaCount "chose not to contest the State's manner of proving the 
dates" of LaCount's actual confinement. 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
31 
 
¶54 Furthermore, the State argues, and we agree, that, 
even if the circuit court had erred on this issue, the error 
would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The United 
States Supreme Court recently held that the "[f]ailure to submit 
a sentencing factor to the jury, like [the] failure to submit an 
element to the jury, is not structural error."11  Washington v. 
                                                 
11 Recuenco "was convicted of assault in the second degree 
based on the jury's finding that he assaulted his wife 'with a 
deadly weapon.'"  Washington v. Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 2549 
(2006).  While the deadly weapon in question was a firearm, the 
jury did not make a factual finding that the weapon was a 
firearm.  Id.  The state "trial court applied a 3-year firearm 
enhancement to [Recuenco's] sentence based on its own factual 
findings," which violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 
303 (2004) (holding that "the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi 
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on 
the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted 
by the defendant.").  Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. at 2549 (emphasis 
omitted).  The firearm was present during the assault, but it 
was not actually used to commit the assault.  Id.  The jury was 
not asked whether the gun was used in the assault, only whether 
Recuenco was armed with a firearm at the time.  Id.  The jury 
answered that question in the affirmative, and the judge 
independently 
applied 
the 
three-year 
firearm 
sentence 
enhancement, as opposed to the one-year deadly weapon sentence 
enhancement.  Id.  
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
32 
 
Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 2553 (2006).  As a result, a harmless 
error analysis is applicable if the error that LaCount claims in 
the present case occurred.  Id. 
¶55 It is important to note that LaCount does not allege 
that the circuit court reached an erroneous conclusion on this 
issue.  LaCount offered no evidence before the circuit court to 
refute the State's claim on repeater enhancement.  LaCount did 
not, nor does he now, claim that the State's information was 
wrong.  Instead, LaCount alleges only that the circuit court 
used an improper procedure because the circuit court did not 
allow a jury to determine whether the sentence enhancement 
information was correct and applicable. 
¶56 Indeed, the circuit court properly used, for repeater 
enhancement purposes, a certified copy of LaCount's previous 
felony convictions of November 12, 1993.  Because of Wis. Stat. 
§ 304.06(1)(b), regardless of the exact sentence that LaCount 
                                                                                                                                                             
Given that the trial court could not have subjected 
Recuenco "to a firearm enhancement based only on the jury's 
finding that [Recuenco] was armed with a 'deadly weapon,' the 
State conceded before the Supreme Court of Washington that a 
Sixth 
Amendment 
violation 
occurred 
under 
Blakely." 
 
Id.  
However, 
the 
State 
requested 
that 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Washington find the Blakely error was harmless and affirm the 
sentence.  Id. at 2550.  However, the Supreme Court of 
Washington held that such errors were structural errors, and, 
therefore, were not subject to a harmless error analysis.  Id.  
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of 
Washington.  Id. at 2553.  The United States Supreme Court held 
that the "[f]ailure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, 
like [the] failure to submit an element to the jury, is not 
structural error."  Id.  As a result, a harmless error analysis 
was applicable and available in such cases.  Id. 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
33 
 
had received on that previous felony conviction, the earliest 
date that LaCount would have been eligible to have been released 
from confinement on discretionary parole would have been six 
months after the conviction date of November 12, 1993, which 
would have been May 12, 1994.  Given that LaCount's securities 
fraud conviction was based on his conduct in March and April of 
1999, the presentence report, which was an existing judicial 
record, showed on its face that even if LaCount actually had 
been released from prison on parole on May 12, 1994, and never 
returned to prison, LaCount would have committed the securities 
fraud in question here within five years of such release.  The 
presentence report listed LaCount's dates of actual confinement 
on the previous felony, which eliminated any possibility of 
error on the circuit court's part.  As a result, the circuit 
court did not have to submit this issue to the jury. 
¶57 In summary, we hold that the circuit court's finding 
that LaCount was a habitual criminal did not violate LaCount's 
right to a jury trial. 
VI 
¶58 We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  Doing 
so, we hold as follows: first, that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting the expert 
opinion testimony of Attorney David Cohen that LaCount had 
engaged in a securities transaction; second, that the evidence 
presented 
at 
trial 
was 
sufficient 
to 
support 
LaCount's 
conviction for securities fraud; third, that the circuit court 
did not err by allowing into evidence the results of the search 
No. 
2006AP672-CR 
 
34 
 
of GP&L's office; and, fourth, that the circuit court's finding 
that LaCount was a habitual criminal did not violate LaCount's 
right to a jury trial on that issue.  We, therefore, affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals, and, thus, the convictions of 
Louis H. LaCount. 
By the Court.—Affirmed. 
 
No.  2006AP672-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶59 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that the circuit court did not err in admitting 
expert 
testimony 
and 
that 
there 
was 
sufficient 
evidence 
presented to support LaCount's fraud conviction. I also agree 
with the majority that the circuit court did not err by allowing 
into evidence the results of the search of GP&L's office and 
that LaCount's right to a jury trial was not violated. I write 
separately, however, because I disagree with the majority's 
discussion regarding the seizure of documents outside the scope 
of the search warrant. 
¶60 The majority correctly states that it is LaCount's 
burden to show that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by 
a 
search. 
State 
v. 
Whitrock, 
161 
Wis. 2d 960, 
972, 
468 
N.W.2d 696 (1991); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131 n.1 
(1978). LaCount has the burden of establishing that he had a 
reasonable 
expectation 
of 
privacy 
by 
a 
preponderance 
of 
evidence. State v. Orta, 2003 WI App 93, ¶11, 264 Wis. 2d 765, 
663 N.W.2d 358. As the majority notes, LaCount has utterly 
failed to establish that any particular piece of evidence was 
seized from his personal office as opposed to being seized from 
another place in GP&L's offices. He has therefore failed to 
establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in any 
record.  
¶61 Case closed. 
¶62 Rather than ending its inquiry with the determination 
that LaCount has failed to meet his burden, the majority makes 
several unnecessary and problematic determinations:  
No.  2006AP672-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
¶63 First, the majority's determination that the general 
premises warrant authorized the officers to take files that were 
not included in the search warrant is based on the claim that 
the furnishings of his office were "plausible receptacles of the 
objects of the search." Majority op., ¶39. It relies on State v. 
Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d 383, 389, 549 N.W.2d 210 (1996). However, 
the issue in Andrews was whether the belongings of a visitor 
could be searched during the execution of a general premises 
warrant, not whether a personal office could be searched, and 
files not specified by the warrant could be seized, pursuant to 
a general premises warrant. Id. at 388.  
¶64 The rule employed in Andrews was that where a warrant 
authorizes a premises search, it allows for the search of 
"closets, chests, drawers, and containers" within the premises. 
Id. at 390 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 
(1982)). That rule tells us nothing about whether documents 
seized are beyond the scope of the warrant. 
¶65 Second, the majority determines that the search 
warrant allowed for the seizure of all of GP&L's business 
records because there was probable cause to believe that there 
was a "pervasive scheme to defraud." It relies on State v. 
DeSmidt, in which this court determined that the breadth of a 
search warrant explicitly authorizing the seizure of all 
business 
records 
was 
supported 
by 
probable 
cause. 
155 
Wis. 2d 119, 129, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990). DeSmidt, however, is 
inapplicable, as it concerned whether a search warrant was 
itself too broad.  The issue in this case is whether records 
No.  2006AP672-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
seized go beyond the scope of the warrant, which is altogether 
distinct from DeSmidt. 
¶66 Additionally, the majority's assertion that there was 
probable cause to believe that there was a pervasive scheme to 
defraud is unsupported. Typically an argument for the existence 
of probable cause describes particular facts underwriting a 
determination of probable cause. The majority adduces nothing in 
this regard. What is the factual basis for the probable cause 
determination that there was a pervasive scheme to defraud? The 
majority does not tell us. 
¶67 Third, the majority concludes that even if there was a 
violation of LaCount's Fourth Amendment rights, the circuit 
court's failure to suppress evidence is harmless. It explains 
that "there was sufficient testimony at trial that supports the 
conclusion that the discovery of information related to both of 
the disputed charges would have occurred . . . notwithstanding 
the results of the search" and that Wills's and Mirr's testimony 
supports the conviction. Majority op., ¶45.  
¶68 A 
determination 
of 
harmless 
error 
requires 
an 
examination of facts surrounding the discovery of information 
and the evidence presented to the jury. Without such an 
examination it is unclear whether the information regarding the 
disputed charges would have been discovered.  In other words, 
what information acquired within the bounds of the Fourth 
Amendment would have led to the discovery of the information? 
Absent an examination of the facts, I cannot agree that a 
failure to suppress is harmless. 
No.  2006AP672-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
¶69 For the reasons set forth, I cannot join these 
unnecessary and problematic determinations regarding the seizure 
of 
documents 
outside 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
search 
warrant. 
Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
¶70 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON 
and 
Justice 
LOUIS 
B. 
BUTLER, 
JR. 
join 
this 
concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2006AP672-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶71 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   The jury 
convicted Louis LaCount of committing securities fraud in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 551.41 by making false representations 
while 
selling 
John 
Wills 
an 
"investment 
contract." 
 
An 
"investment contract" is identified as a type of security in 
Wis. Stat. § 551.02(13)(a).1  A witness for the State, Attorney 
David 
Cohen 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Financial 
Institutions, was permitted, at trial, to define "investment 
contract" and to testify that the transaction between LaCount 
and Wills was "consistent with" an investment contract.  The 
circuit court also defined "investment contract" when it 
instructed the jury.  In order to find that LaCount sold a 
security, an element of the crime of securities fraud, the jury 
was required to find that LaCount sold Wills an investment 
contract.   
¶72 I join the majority opinion, but I write separately to 
point out the following:  (1) it was an erroneous exercise of 
discretion to permit an expert witness, Cohen, to define 
"investment contract," which is a legal term of art, because 
explaining the law to the jury is the exclusive province of the 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 551.02(13)(a) provides in relevant part: 
"Security" means any stock; treasury stock; note; 
bond; debenture; evidence of indebtedness; share of 
beneficial interest in a business trust; certificate 
of interest or participation in any profit sharing 
agreement; 
collateral 
trust 
certificate; 
pre-
organization 
subscription; 
transferable 
share; 
investment contract. 
No.  2006AP672-CR.pdr 
 
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circuit court; (2) it was also an erroneous exercise of 
discretion to permit Cohen to testify that LaCount committed an 
element of the crime——here, the sale of a security in the form 
of an investment contract.  However, because I also conclude 
that the circuit court's errors were harmless, a new trial is 
not warranted.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶73 A key question in LaCount's trial was whether he sold 
Wills a "security," as that term is defined by Wisconsin law.  
It was the State's theory that LaCount sold Wills an "investment 
contract," 
which 
is 
a 
type 
of 
security. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 551.02(13)(a).  At trial, LaCount testified that he did not 
offer an investment to Wills involving Northland Turkey Farms or 
take any money from him.  Before us, LaCount maintains that he 
merely facilitated a joint venture. 
¶74 The background of this case is set out by the majority 
opinion.2  However, relaying more of the record is helpful to my 
assessment of Cohen's testimony relative to the law that was 
applied to LaCount's conduct.  Cohen was asked and answered as 
follows:  
Q. 
. . .  Like one of the things you mentioned 
already was a stock.  Is that an investment 
contract? 
A. 
Yes.  I mean investment contract is a very, very 
broad category.  It basically covers everything.  
You label something like stock and notes because 
you can figure out what those are, but an 
investment contract is basically what you can't 
figure out you call an investment contract.  It 
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶¶5–14. 
No.  2006AP672-CR.pdr 
 
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covers 
everything, 
you 
know, 
including 
the 
stocks, the notes, and then whatever else we 
can't think of because we just, you know—— 
. . . . 
Q. 
Did you review any documents in connection with 
this case involving Mr. Louis LaCount? 
A. 
Yes, I did. 
Q. 
Do 
you 
recall 
what 
kind 
of 
documents 
you 
reviewed?   
A. 
I looked at statements made by the investor.  I 
looked at testimony.  I looked at some bank 
records, the court files, and I'm trying to think 
what else. 
Q. 
Any other kind of legal documents like mortgage 
assignments? 
A. 
I looked at some mortgage assignments.  We looked 
at some things off of CCAP.  We looked at, was 
it, bank records I think that was. 
. . . . 
Q. 
And based on the documents that you indicated 
that you reviewed, are you aware that Mr. Wills 
invested some sixty-four to sixty-nine thousand 
dollars with Mr. Louis LaCount to acquire some 
real estate in Northland Turkey Farms? 
. . . . 
A. 
According to the documents I have in the file, 
yes.  That is I'm aware of that, yes. 
Q. 
And when you reviewed those documents, what else 
did you learn through those documents about the 
facts of this case? 
. . . . 
A. 
Well, I learned about the investment, I learned 
about what his expectations were when he handed 
over the money, and I think that's——what else——
and to some degree what the background was as to 
No.  2006AP672-CR.pdr 
 
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the truthfulness of what he was told or wasn't 
told at that time. 
Q. 
Based upon your training and experience as well 
as your knowledge of those facts that you 
learned, are the things that you learned about 
this Wills-LaCount transaction consistent with an 
investment contract? 
A. 
Yes. 
¶75 In its instructions to the jury in regard to the 
securities fraud for which LaCount was tried, the circuit court 
instructed, in relevant part: 
Before you may find the defendant guilty of this 
offense, the State must prove by evidence which 
satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
following three elements were present. 
 
First, the item sold was a security as defined by 
Wisconsin law.  An investment contract that meets the 
following definition is a security. 
 
An investment contract is any investment in a 
common enterprise with the expectation of profit to be 
delivered through the essential managerial efforts of 
someone 
other 
than 
the 
investor. 
 
A 
"common 
enterprise" means an enterprise in which the fortunes 
of the investor are tied to the effectiveness of the 
efforts of those seeking the investment [or] of a 
third party.  If an investor uses his own efforts to 
achieve a profit, rather than relying on the efforts 
of a promoter or third party, the investment does not 
constitute a security.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶76 Whether to admit evidence is a decision committed to 
the sound discretion of the circuit court.  State v. Franklin, 
2004 WI 38, ¶6, 270 Wis. 2d 271, 677 N.W.2d 276.  We will not 
overturn a discretionary determination of a circuit court, if 
the court considered the relevant facts and applied the proper 
No.  2006AP672-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
standard of law.  Rodak v. Rodak, 150 Wis. 2d 624, 631, 442 
N.W.2d 489 (Ct. App. 1989).  Applying an incorrect legal 
standard is an erroneous exercise of discretion.  State v. 
Carlson, 2003 WI 40, ¶24, 261 Wis. 2d 97, 661 N.W.2d 51.   
¶77 We independently review whether an erroneous exercise 
of discretion is harmless.  See State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶47, 
301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115; State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 
¶49, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.  
B. 
Cohen's Testimony 
¶78 The majority opinion asserts that Wis. Stat. § 907.02 
and Wis. Stat. § 907.04 permit testimony in the form of an 
opinion or inference that embraces the ultimate fact; and 
therefore, it was permissible for Cohen to define investment 
contract 
in 
his 
testimony.3 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
also 
characterizes Cohen's testimony that the transaction between 
LaCount and Wills was "consistent with" an investment contract 
as having been given in response to a "hypothetical" question.4  
I consider both portions of Cohen's testimony in turn. 
¶79 While it is true that Wis. Stat. § 907.04 permits the 
admission of opinion testimony, it does not authorize testimony 
on the ultimate fact when that testimony embraces "a legal 
concept for which a definitional instruction was required."  
Lievrouw v. Roth, 157 Wis. 2d 332, 352, 459 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 
1990).  As the court of appeals explained,  
                                                 
3 Majority op., ¶¶18, 20. 
4 Majority op., ¶21. 
No.  2006AP672-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
[A] witness' opinion that there was an 'emergency' 
(which is permissible under Rule 907.04) differs from 
a [witness'] conclusion that someone was 'negligent' 
(which is not permissible under Rule 907.04) because, 
unlike 'emergency,' which the law does not define for 
juries . . . 'negligence' has prerequisite terms-of-
art elements about which the jury must be instructed. 
Id.  Lievrouw's interpretation of § 907.04 is consistent with 
the federal courts' interpretation of Federal Rule 704, the 
federal analogue to § 907.04.  Montgomery v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990); Strong v. E.I DuPont 
de Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682, 685-86 (8th Cir. 1981); U.S. 
Information Sys., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 
Union No. 3, 313 F. Supp 2d 213, 240-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
¶80 The majority opinion does not address the limitation 
that Lievrouw places on Wis. Stat. § 907.04 opinion testimony.  
Here, Cohen defined "investment contract," a type of security 
identified in Wis. Stat. § 551.02(13)(a), when he opined: 
I mean investment contract is a very, very broad 
category.  It basically covers everything.  You label 
something like stock and notes because you can figure 
out what those are, but an investment contract is 
basically what you can't figure out you call an 
investment contract.  It covers everything, you know, 
including the stocks, the notes, and then whatever 
else we can't think of. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the circuit court instructed the 
jury on the law in the state of Wisconsin in regard to the 
meaning of an investment contract.  The circuit court explained: 
An investment contract is any investment in a 
common enterprise with the expectation of profit to be 
delivered through the essential managerial efforts of 
someone 
other 
than 
the 
investor. 
 
A 
"common 
enterprise" means an enterprise in which the fortunes 
of the investor are tied to the effectiveness of the 
efforts of those seeking the investment [or] of a 
No.  2006AP672-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
third party.  If an investor uses his own efforts to 
achieve a profit, rather than relying on the efforts 
of a promoter or third party, the investment does not 
constitute a security.   
¶81 Cohen's testimony was inconsistent, at least in part, 
with the instruction given by the circuit court.  His testimony 
described wide and non-specific parameters for transactions that 
are investment contracts, when he opined that "an investment 
contract is basically what you can't figure out . . . .  It 
covers everything."  By comparison, the circuit court carefully 
limited the scope of an investment contract to a "common 
enterprise" where the profit is expected to be achieved through 
the "essential managerial efforts" of someone other than the 
investor.  The admission of Cohen's testimony in this regard 
invaded the province of the circuit court, which is the jury's 
exclusive source of the law that the jury will apply.  Wis. 
Stat. § 805.13(3). 
¶82 Cohen also testified to his view that the transaction 
LaCount proposed was "consistent with" a security, an investment 
contract.  He thereby testified that LaCount's conduct satisfied 
an element of the crime of securities fraud.  He did not testify 
in response to a hypothetical question, but rather, he gave his 
opinion in response to a question about the specific transaction 
between LaCount and Wills: 
Q. 
And based on the documents that you indicated 
that you reviewed, are you aware that Mr. Wills 
invested some sixty-four to sixty-nine thousand 
dollars with Mr. Louis LaCount to acquire some 
real estate in Northland Turkey Farms? 
. . . . 
No.  2006AP672-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
A. 
According to the documents I have in the file, 
yes.  That is I'm aware of that, yes. 
Q. 
And when you reviewed those documents, what else 
did you learn through those documents about the 
facts of this case? 
. . . . 
A. 
Well, I learned about the investment, I learned 
about what his expectations were when he handed 
over the money, and I think that's——what else——
and to some degree what the background was as to 
the truthfulness of what he was told or wasn't 
told at that time. 
Q. 
Based upon your training and experience as well 
as your knowledge of those facts that you 
learned, are the things that you learned about 
this Wills-LaCount transaction consistent with an 
investment contract? 
A. 
Yes. 
¶83 The circuit court applied an incorrect legal standard 
in permitting Cohen to define an investment contract and in 
permitting him to testify that the transaction between LaCount 
and Wills was consistent with an investment contract.  See 
Lievrouw, 157 Wis. 2d at 352.  In the first instance, the court 
permitted Cohen to testify to what the law is, thereby invading 
the province of the circuit court; and in the second instance, 
the court permitted Cohen to reach an ultimate fact, which is an 
element of the crime that required court instruction for its 
determination.  Id.  In applying an incorrect legal standard to 
Cohen's testimony, the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  Carlson, 261 Wis. 2d 97, ¶24.  
C. 
Harmless Error 
¶84 Wisconsin statutory law provides that no judgment 
shall be reversed, set aside or a new trial granted for the 
No.  2006AP672-CR.pdr 
 
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erroneous admission of evidence unless a substantial right of 
the party claiming error has been affected.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.18(2).5  In regard to the erroneous admission of evidence, 
we determine whether a substantial right has been affected by 
application of Wisconsin's common law harmless error analysis.  
See State v. Shomberg, 2006 WI 9, ¶18, 288 Wis. 2d 1, 709 N.W.2d 
370.  
¶85 Although harmless error has been subjected to many 
types of analyses in many jurisdictions,6 we apply the harmless 
error analysis set out in Harvey.  Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, ¶47.  
We do so regardless of "whether the error is constitutional, 
statutory, or otherwise."  Carlson, 261 Wis. 2d 97, ¶46.  The 
burden of proving the error was harmless is on the party who 
benefited from the error, in this case the State.  State v. 
Stuart, 2005 WI 47, ¶40, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 695 N.W.2d 259.  In 
order to conclude that an error was harmless, the beneficiary of 
the error in a criminal trial must prove that it is "clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found 
the defendant guilty absent the error."  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 
442, ¶49 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 
(1999)).    
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.18(2) is made applicable to criminal 
cases by Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1). 
6 See, e.g., Fry v. Pliler, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2321, 
2325 
(2007) 
(concluding 
that 
an 
error 
that 
is 
not 
of 
constitutional dimension "is harmless unless it 'had substantial 
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 
verdict.'" (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 
(1993)). 
No.  2006AP672-CR.pdr 
 
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¶86 In applying the harmless error test, we examine the 
totality of the circumstances of each individual case, including 
but not limited to: 
the frequency of the error, the importance of the 
erroneously admitted evidence, the presence or absence 
of 
evidence 
corroborating 
or 
contradicting 
the 
erroneously admitted evidence, whether the erroneously 
admitted evidence duplicates untainted evidence, the 
nature of the defense, the nature of the State's case, 
and the overall strength of the State's case.      
Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, ¶48 (citing State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, 
¶61, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637).  What factors are 
employed in conducting each harmless analysis depends on "the 
nature of the error that occurred" and the harm the error "is 
alleged to have caused."  Carlson, 261 Wis. 2d 97, ¶88 (Sykes, 
J., dissenting). 
¶87 In the case before us, both errors involve erroneously 
admitted evidence.  First, the circuit court erroneously 
admitted Cohen's description of the parameters of an investment 
contract, and his description was not a correct statement of the 
law.  Cohen's definition was overly inclusive.  However, the 
court properly instructed the jury on the definition of an 
investment contract in Wisconsin.  Jurors are presumed to follow 
the instructions of the circuit court.  State v. Grande, 169 
Wis. 2d 422, 436, 485 N.W.2d 282 (Ct. App. 1992).  Furthermore, 
while Cohen's definition of an investment contract is too broad, 
Wills' uncontradicted testimony, set out below, fits well within 
the definition of an investment contract given by the circuit 
court.     
No.  2006AP672-CR.pdr 
 
11 
 
¶88 The second erroneously admitted evidence is Cohen's 
testimony that the transaction between LaCount and Wills was 
"consistent with" an investment contract.  At trial, LaCount 
testified that he did not offer any deal to or take any money 
from 
Wills. 
 
Therefore, 
Wills' 
testimony 
about 
the 
characteristics of the investment he made with LaCount is 
unexplained by the other person to the transaction, LaCount.  
Wills set out his understanding of what he was purchasing as 
follows: 
Q. 
What else did he tell you about Northland Turkey 
Farms? 
A. 
. . .  They had——they owned the property, and I 
forget how many acres, a hundred, two hundred 
acres or something like that, and it was a fairly 
nice looking piece of property . . . .  Mr. 
LaCount was looking for investors to invest in——
to act as a bank and take over the mortgage 
before it was foreclosed on and——it would be up 
to the turkey farm to buy it back eventually as 
their business progressed.  If they couldn't, 
then the property would be probably sold as he 
explained it to me at a sheriff's sale, and at 
that point in time the sheriff's sale would bring 
in "X" amount of dollars, and that would be 
divied up between the five investors, one of 
which I was going to be a fifth of the investors' 
group.   
Q. 
Did he represent to you what the property was 
likely worth and could be sold for? 
A. 
Yes, in the neighborhood of three-quarters of a 
million to a million dollars.  . . . 
. . . . 
Q. 
. . . [D]id Mr. LaCount indicate to you how much 
money he needed from you for this investment? 
A. 
Yes.  . . . I guess that number would come out to 
around $70,000. 
No.  2006AP672-CR.pdr 
 
12 
 
. . . . 
Q. 
Did Mr. LaCount, did he make any representations 
to you about the certainty of this investment or 
the security of the investment? 
A. 
Yes.  . . .  [H]e explained to me that because 
they hold all the finances for the company, they 
are overseeing all their financial matters, when 
the money comes in, they personally or he will 
personally go and purchase the mortgage of the 
property and that there's no way we can lose on 
this property because it's worth well over the 
$350,000 that we're putting into this. 
Q. 
So Mr. LaCount would be the one who would be 
managing the—— 
A. 
Correct. 
Q. 
——the operation? 
A. 
Correct.  
. . . . 
Q. 
Let's talk a little more specifically about what 
you're claiming Mr. LaCount told you.  As I 
understand it, you're saying you were told that 
five people were each going to invest about 
$70,000 to buy out a $300,000 mortgage, isn't 
that right, or $350,000 mortgage? 
A. 
Correct. 
Q. 
Okay.  And then the investors would either be 
able to sell that land.  If it did come to the 
point of a foreclosure, they'd either be able to 
sell it to a developer at a profit or it would 
get sold at a sheriff's sale for a profit? 
A. 
Correct. 
. . . . 
Q. 
So in essence you and the other investors were 
going to act as a developer for the property, 
true? 
No.  2006AP672-CR.pdr 
 
13 
 
A. 
As it was explained to me, I wasn't going to have 
anything to have to do with it other than reap 
the benefit.  Mr. LaCount was going to be the one 
that was going to spearhead the whole——the whole 
deal.   
¶89 Wills' testimony supports the jury's determination 
that LaCount sold Wills a security because LaCount sold Wills an 
investment contract.  Wills described his participation in the 
common enterprise of purchasing some type of rights in property 
owned by Northland Turkey Farms.  His testimony fits within the 
framework of an investment contract as the circuit court 
described investment contract to the jury because of Wills' 
passive participation in the investment and his reliance on the 
efforts of LaCount for the expected profit.  For example, Wills 
described LaCount as saying that he, personally, would do what 
needed to be done to get the deal underway and that Wills would 
have no role in the investment, except providing one-fifth of 
the money and then waiting to "reap the benefit."   
¶90 Cohen's testimony that the transaction between LaCount 
and Wills was "consistent with" an investment contract is not at 
odds with Wills' testimony.  Furthermore, the State's case 
against LaCount was very strong, in part because Wills' 
testimony about the terms of the investment LaCount proposed was 
uncontradicted, but also because other witnesses established a 
money trail into accounts to which LaCount had access.  The 
money trail testimony gave credibility to Wills' testimony about 
the payments he said he made to LaCount and it contradicted 
LaCount's trial testimony that he did not take any money from 
Wills.   
No.  2006AP672-CR.pdr 
 
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¶91 Accordingly, I conclude that it is clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found LaCount 
guilty 
absent 
the 
erroneous 
admission 
of 
Cohen's 
flawed 
definition of an investment contract and absent the admission of 
Cohen's opinion that the transaction between LaCount and Wills 
was "consistent with" an investment contract.7  Therefore, the 
errors were harmless.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶92 In sum, I conclude as follows:  (1) it was an 
erroneous exercise of discretion to permit an expert witness, 
Cohen, to define "investment contract," which is a legal term of 
art, because explaining the law to the jury is the exclusive 
province of the circuit court; (2) it was also an erroneous 
exercise of discretion to permit Cohen to testify that LaCount 
committed an element of the crime——here, the sale of a security 
in the form of an investment contract.  However, because I also 
conclude that the circuit court's errors were harmless, a new 
trial is not warranted.   
                                                 
7 The majority opinion asserts that because the circuit 
court instructed the jury that it was not bound by an expert's 
opinion (Crim. J. Ins. 205), any error in Cohen's testimony was 
harmless.  Majority op., ¶23.  I cannot subscribe to this view 
of the effect of Instruction 205 because to do so would immunize 
from any claim of error in all statements made by expert 
witnesses. 
No.  2006AP672-CR.pdr 
 
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¶93 Accordingly, I respectfully concur.   
¶94 I am authorized to state that Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, 
JR. joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2006AP672-CR.pdr 
 
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