Title: Stephen Joseph Wright v. Wisconsin Elections Commission

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2023 WI 67
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2023AP1412-OA 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Stephen Joseph Wright, Gary Krenz, Sarah J. 
Hamilton, Jean-Luc Thiffeault, Somesh Jha, 
Joanne Kane, and Leah Dudley, 
 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Elections Commission; Don Millis, 
Robert F. Spindell, Jr., Mark L. Thomsen, Ann 
S. Jacobs, Marge Bostelmann, Joseph J. 
Czarnezki, in their official capacities as 
Members of the Wisconsin Elections Commission; 
and Meagan Wolfe, in her official capacity as 
Administrator of the Wisconsin Elections 
Commission, 
 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
Oct. 6, 2023 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER OF 
JUSTICE JANET C. PROTASIEWICZ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
2 
 
 
Before JANET C. PROTASIEWICZ, J.   
 
¶1 
On August 1, 2023, I swore a sacred oath to "faithfully 
and impartially discharge the duties of [my] office."1  In taking 
that oath, I promised——above all else——to decide cases based only 
on the rule of law, not my own personal opinions.  Each of my 
colleagues has taken the same oath.  We all strive to be fair and 
impartial in our work:  "We're people . . . .  We have opinions on 
the issues of the day.  Once we put the black robe on . . . we put 
those opinions aside."2 
¶2 
Here, individual Wisconsin citizens ask the court to 
hear an original action concerning the State's legislative 
districts.  The Wisconsin Legislature seeks to intervene and has 
asked me to recuse.3 
                     
1 See Wis. Stat. § 757.02(1) (2021-22) (setting forth the oath 
of office for judges and justices).  All subsequent references to 
the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise 
indicated. 
2 Patrick Marley, Election 2016: Bradley, Kloppenburg Clash 
Again During Debate, Milwaukee J. Sentinel (Mar. 17, 2016) 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/03/1
8/election-2016-bradley-kloppenburg-clash-again-during-
debate/84898270 (quoting Rebecca G. Bradley). 
3 I refer to the movant as "the Legislature." 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
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¶3 
Recusal decisions are controlled by the law.  They are 
not a matter of personal preference.  If precedent requires it, I 
must recuse.  But if precedent does not warrant recusal, my oath 
binds me to participate.  As Justice Alito has emphasized:  "When 
there is no sound reason for a Justice to recuse, the Justice has 
a duty to sit."4  That is true even when a case is controversial, 
or when my decision may upset those who would rather I step aside.  
Respect for the law must always prevail.  Allowing politics or 
pressure to sway my decision would betray my oath and destroy 
judicial independence.  As Justice Prosser has warned, unjustified 
recusal can affect the integrity of the judicial branch:  
"Successful recusal motions alter the composition of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, so that, in a very real sense, a party moving for 
a justice's recusal is trying to change the composition of the 
court that will hear its case."5 
¶4 
Strict adherence to the law is especially important 
here.  This recusal motion has been filed by a co-equal branch of 
government.  I take its request seriously.  I also appreciate that 
                     
4 Moore v. United States, No. 22-800, at 1 (U.S. Sept. 8, 
2023) (Statement of Alito, J.). 
5 See Appendix B, Justice David T. Prosser's Decision 
Accompanying Order Denying Mot. for Recusal, State ex rel. Three 
Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, Nos. 2013AP2504-08-W, at 9 (Wis. 
July 29, 2015). 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
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this motion has engendered strong feelings in some quarters among 
people of good faith. 
¶5 
In deciding this motion, I have searched the law books—
—and my conscience——to ensure a correct and impartial ruling.  I 
have reviewed the parties' arguments.  I have studied the facts. 
And I have examined every relevant precedent.  Ultimately, I have 
found I must deny the recusal motion.  Before turning to my full 
analysis, I will summarize why I have reached that conclusion. 
I.  SUMMARY 
¶6 
The Legislature first argues that I must recuse because 
the Democratic Party of Wisconsin (DPW) made substantial 
contributions to my campaign ($9.9 million) and would benefit if 
this court were to order the adoption of new maps.  In the 
Legislature's view, due process prohibits me from hearing this 
case because a particular possible resolution may benefit a 
campaign donor.6 
¶7 
This claim lacks merit for two reasons.  First, the 
Legislature has not cited——and I have not found——any case in which 
a judge recused because a political party that was not involved in 
the litigation had contributed to their campaign.  To the contrary, 
                     
6 The Legislature presses this argument in reliance on 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S. 
Ct. 2252, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (2009), which I discuss at greater 
length below. 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
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judges of all political affiliations have denied such motions.7  
And justices of this court have repeatedly participated in 
redistricting cases despite receiving substantial support from 
politically affiliated groups during their campaigns.  For 
example, no justice recused from Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections 
Commission, 2022 WI 19, 401 Wis. 2d 198, 972 N.W.2d 559, even 
though many had received outsized partisan or ideological 
financial support during their latest campaigns.8 
¶8 
Here, the Legislature focuses on contributions that I 
received from the DPW.  But the DPW is not a litigant and plays no 
role in this case.  Rather, this original action petition has been 
filed by citizens who allege violations of their own individual 
rights.  Those citizens, moreover, are not mere stand-ins for a 
political party.  As voters, they claim to advance legal interests 
in excluding partisan influence of all kinds from the districting 
process.  Taken at face value, those interests may, in some 
circumstances, contradict the interests of the DPW.  Thus, for me 
                     
7 See, e.g., Harper v. Hall, 867 S.E.2d 326 (N.C. 2022); 
Dickson v. Rucho, 735 S.E.2d 193 (N.C. 2012). 
8 See Derek Clinger & Robert Yablon, Explainer: Judicial 
Recusal in Wisconsin and Beyond, State Democracy Research 
Initiative, 
at 
26-28 
(Sept. 
5, 
2023), 
available 
at: 
https://uwmadison.app.box.com/s/k2bx0l2b9vwsgiqfl4sfoiwt8m3j43qc 
(discussing examples involving Justices Rebecca Grassl Bradley, 
Rebecca Frank Dallet, Brian Hagedorn, and Jill J. Karofsky). 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
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to recuse myself based on campaign contributions from the DPW——a 
non-party to this case——would be unprecedented. 
¶9 
Accepting the Legislature's theory would also raise a 
swarm of continuing difficulties for each justice.  In recent 
Wisconsin Supreme Court races, the victor has received substantial 
financial support from a single entity.  In 2016, the Wisconsin 
Alliance for Reform spent $2.6 million supporting Justice Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley's campaign (comprising 46.2 percent of total 
spending in that election).  In 2018, Greater Wisconsin Committee 
spent $940,000 supporting Justice Rebecca Frank Dallet's campaign 
(comprising 17 percent of total spending in that election).  In 
2019, the Republican State Leadership Committee spent $1.25 
million supporting Justice Brian Hagedorn's campaign (comprising 
15.2 percent of total spending in that election).  In 2020, A 
Better Wisconsin Together Political Fund spent $1.88 million 
supporting Justice Jill J. Karofsky's campaign (comprising 18.8 
percent of total spending in that election).  And in 2023——where 
the total amount of money spent in support of both candidates 
obliterated historical records——the DPW spent $9.9 million 
supporting my campaign (still comprising only 19.4 percent of total 
spending in that election).  This trend is likely to persist.9 
                     
9 The facts in this paragraph are drawn from Clinger & Yablon, 
supra note 8, at 26-28. 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
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¶10 It would be unworkable, and again unprecedented, to 
conclude that the Due Process Clause requires every elected judge 
to recuse whenever their involvement might be predicted (before 
they have even cast a vote) to benefit non-parties who supported 
their campaign.  Indeed, this court would grind to a halt if that 
were the constitutional standard for recusal.  We would be flooded 
with requests for "conservative" or "liberal" justices to recuse 
whenever a case involved issues of great social or political 
importance to any major campaign funder.  See County of Dane v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 2022 WI 61, ¶91, 403 Wis. 2d 306, 976 N.W.2d 
790 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) ("We have seen bias and recusal 
allegations increase greatly in recent years, turning the 
obligation 
of 
adjudicator 
impartiality 
into 
a 
litigation 
weapon.").  In a system of elected judges, it is inevitable that 
outside groups and political parties will support candidates whose 
judicial philosophies are hoped to align with their own worldviews.  
When those groups participate in a case as litigants, recusal may 
well be warranted as a matter of good judgment (though it is not 
currently required by Wisconsin law).10  Yet it would turn precedent 
on its head, and confound the administration of this court, for 
justices to recuse whenever a possible outcome of a case could 
                     
10 See SCR 60.04(7). 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
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potentially be seen as beneficial to a non-party campaign 
supporter.11 
¶11 For that reason alone, the Legislature's argument based 
on campaign contributions cannot succeed.  But there is a separate, 
second reason:  under binding United States Supreme Court 
precedent, the nature and amount of the DPW's contribution comes 
nowhere close to requiring my recusal. 
¶12 In 
this 
respect, 
the 
Legislature's 
position 
is 
foreclosed by Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 556 U.S. 
868 (2009).  Caperton is the first and only decision of the United 
States Supreme Court to require judicial recusal based on campaign 
contributions.  And the facts of that case were "exceptional."  
Id. at 884.  While a case was pending against his company, a CEO 
spent $3 million promoting the election of a judge who won a spot 
on West Virginia's highest court by merely 50,000 votes——and who 
then cast the deciding vote to overturn a $50 million verdict 
against the CEO's company in that very same pending case.  Id. at 
873-76.  The CEO's $3 million in donations, moreover, had totally 
                     
11 In reaching this conclusion, I do not foreclose the 
possibility that Caperton could require an elected judge to recuse 
based on contributions from a non-party.  But cases involving 
campaign contributions from a political party are an especially 
weak fit for that possibility.  Indeed, many states have partisan 
judicial elections, and it has not been suggested that party-
backed judges must recuse from all cases where the outcome could 
matter to their party. 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
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flattened the field:  it vastly exceeded the amount spent by all 
other supporters of the judge; it was more than three times the 
amount spent by the judge's own campaign committee; and it 
surpassed by $1 million the total amount spent by the campaign 
committees for both of the candidates combined.  See id. at 873. 
¶13 Caperton recognized that its rule would apply only in 
"rare instances."  Id. at 890; see also id. at 887 ("The facts now 
before us are extreme by any measure.").  Indeed, "nowhere in the 
Caperton decision does the Supreme Court state that any lesser 
fact situation would have required [the judge's] recusal in that 
case, and nowhere does the Supreme Court conclude that he would be 
required to recuse himself from an unrelated civil case that 
involved different parties."  State v. Allen, 2010 WI 10, ¶269, 
322 Wis. 2d 372, 778 N.W.2d 863 (Ziegler, J., concurring). 
¶14 Here, as explained above, the Legislature seeks recusal 
in an "unrelated civil case that involve[s] different parties."  
Id.  Moreover, this is obviously a "lesser factual situation."  
Id.  In Caperton, the CEO spent 300 percent more than the judge's 
campaign committee; here, the DPW's contribution was only 57 
percent of the spending by my campaign committee, and was merely 
33 percent of the total spending in support of my campaign.  In 
Caperton, the CEO's donations fully eclipsed all other spending in 
the election; here, the DPW's contribution was just 19 percent of 
all spending on the race.  In Caperton, the CEO's expenditures 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
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were concerning partly because his favored judge won by only 50,000 
votes; here, I defeated Justice Kelly by a decisive 11 percent of 
the vote (the very same margin by which Justice Kelly lost to 
Justice Karofsky only three years earlier).  And in Caperton, the 
CEO spent $3 million while his own case was already pending before 
the West Virginia courts; here, these original action petitions 
were filed months after the election had already concluded. 
¶15 Under 
Caperton, these 
distinctions make all the 
difference.  The DPW's contribution was too small a percentage of 
my campaign committee's fund, and too small a percentage of the 
overall spending on the race, to warrant my disqualification——
especially given that the election was not close and this original 
action petition was not even pending at the time.  While the total 
amount of the DPW's contribution was surely substantial, the 2023 
election broke all historical records in Wisconsin.  Compared to 
total election spending, it falls far short of Caperton's recusal 
standard. 
¶16 This brings me to the Legislature's second argument:  
that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution 
requires recusal because, while campaigning, I described the 
legislative maps as "gerrymandered," "rigged," and "unfair," and 
I expressed disagreement with the Johnson case (which ordered the 
adoption of these maps).  The Legislature views this as legally 
impermissible. 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
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¶17 There are two fundamental issues with the Legislature's 
position.  The first is factual.  While making many of the 
statements that the Legislature spotlights, I also emphasized that 
these were descriptions of my personal "values," not pledges of 
"what I'm going to do on a particular case."  Elsewhere, I 
explained:  "I plan to follow the law.  I tell you what my values 
are because I think that Supreme Court candidates should share 
with the community and the electorate what their values are.  
Nonetheless, I will uphold the law [and] follow the Constitution 
when I make any decisions.  Nothing is prejudged."  I also made 
clear:  "[W]hat my real values are and what's going to happen in 
a case can be two different things, right?  I mean, follow the 
law, you look at the case law, you look at the statutes, you look 
at the constitution, and you follow where . . . it leads you."  
And again:  "I follow laws I don't always necessarily like or agree 
with.  You follow the law." 
¶18 These statements——and there are many of them——expressed 
my fundamental commitments as a judge.  I will set aside my 
opinions and decide cases based on the law.  There will surely be 
many cases in which I reach results that I personally dislike.  
That is what it means to be a judge.  See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 
891 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("All judges take an oath to uphold 
the Constitution and apply the law impartially, and we trust that 
they will live up to this promise."). 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
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¶19 The second issue with the Legislature's position is that 
it is foreclosed by federal precedent.  As two legal experts 
recently explained, "[n]o Supreme Court case has ever held that 
due process required a judge to recuse because of the judge's 
expression of views, whether on the campaign trail or elsewhere.  
In fact, the Court has rejected several such claims."12  Thus, "[no] 
decision of the [United States Supreme] Court would require us to 
hold that it would be a violation of procedural due process for a 
judge to sit in a case after he had expressed an opinion as to 
whether certain types of conduct were prohibited by law."  FTC v. 
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702-03 (1948). 
¶20 More recently, the United States Supreme Court struck 
down a Minnesota rule that banned judicial candidates from 
announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues.  See 
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).  Writing 
for the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia made clear that "[a] judge's 
lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a 
case has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice, 
and with good reason."  Id. at 777.  "For one thing, it is virtually 
impossible to find a judge who does not have preconceptions about 
the law."  Id.  Nor should anybody want to elect such a judge:  
"Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was 
                     
12 Clinger & Yablon, supra note 8, at 10. 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
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a [blank slate] in the area of constitutional adjudication would 
be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias."  Id. at 
778 (quoted source omitted).  The truth is that "avoiding judicial 
preconceptions on legal issues is neither possible nor desirable."  
Id.  And it would violate the First Amendment to "censor what the 
people hear as they undertake to decide for themselves which 
candidate is most likely to be an exemplary judicial officer."  
Id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
¶21 Consider the point practically.  Many other justices 
have written opinions expressing strong views on the legality of 
the current legislative maps.13  Only a month ago, one justice wrote 
an opinion in this very proceeding that describes the mere 
consideration of this original action petition as a "mockery of 
our justice system."14  No other justice has decided that they must 
recuse, even though their prior writings (including from just last 
year) might indicate firm preconceptions of certain issues in this 
action.  And if prejudgment is the concern, their writings are 
just as relevant as my campaign remarks.  As Justice Scalia 
explained, "we doubt . . . that a mere statement of position 
                     
13 See generally Johnson, 401 Wis. 2d 198. 
14 See Wright v. Wisconsin Elections Comm'n, No. 2023AP1412-
OA, unpublished order (Wis. Aug. 15, 2023) (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, 
J., dissenting), available at: https://acefiling.wicourts.gov/
document/eFiled/2023AP001412/692191. 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
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enunciated during the pendency of an election will be regarded by 
a judge as more binding . . . than a carefully considered holding 
that the judge set forth in an earlier opinion."  Republican Party, 
536 U.S. at 781. 
¶22 Simply put:  If issuing an opinion does not disqualify 
a judge from hearing future cases that involve similar issues, 
then neither does expressing agreement with an opinion or 
describing my values about political issues.  That is particularly 
true here, where I made no pledge about the result of any case, 
where I repeatedly disavowed any such pledge or promise, where 
this case did not even exist during my campaign, and where I made 
clear I will vote based only on the rule of law.15 
¶23 That leaves only the Legislature's contention that my 
recusal is required by Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) and (f).  
Paragraph (g) simply requires me to make the subjective 
determination that I can decide this case impartially both in fact 
and appearance.  I have determined that I can do both.  Paragraph 
(f) requires me to determine whether I have a "significant personal 
interest" in the outcome of this case.  The Legislature claims 
that I have a personal interest in keeping my word by invalidating 
                     
15 This conclusion follows from all the precedents cited 
herein and also under an application of the objective "actual bias" 
standard from the Caperton case (which applies to campaign 
statements, as well). 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
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Wisconsin's legislative maps.  That argument fails because I made 
no promise or commitment to voters about how I would decide any 
case.  I simply expressed my personal opinions as permitted by 
Republican Party.  When I put on my robe, I put my personal opinions 
aside. 
¶24 Consistent with the oath I swore, my highest obligation 
is to "faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of [my] 
office."  Those duties include participating in a case when the 
law does not require me to recuse.  Here, under that legal 
standard, I must respectfully deny this motion. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Due Process Clause and Campaign Contributions 
1.  Facts 
¶25 In 2016, Governor Scott Walker appointed Daniel Kelly to 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  After serving four years, he ran to 
retain his seat in 2020.  His opponent, now Justice Jill J. 
Karofsky, won the election by almost 11 points. 
¶26 In 2023, I ran for an open seat on the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, and Justice Kelly opposed me.  Total spending on the race 
smashed all records.  Current estimates range from $51 million to 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
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$56 million, making it the most expensive state supreme court race 
in the nation's history.16 
¶27 In 2015, the Legislature (led by Republicans) enacted a 
law permitting political parties to make unlimited donations 
directly to a judicial candidate's campaign committee.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 11.1104(5).  Pursuant to this law, the DPW donated $9.9 
million to my campaign committee during the 2023 race. 
¶28 Total spending in support of my campaign is currently 
estimated to be $29.1 million.  This figure includes the estimated 
$17.4 million spent by my campaign committee and an estimated $11.7 
million spent by outside groups.  The DPW's contribution represents 
about 33 percent of the total amount spent in support of my 
campaign and 57 percent of the amount my campaign committee spent. 
¶29 Total spending in support of Justice Kelly's campaign is 
estimated to be over $20.5 million. 
¶30 The DPW's $10 million contribution to my campaign 
currently represents about 19 percent of the approximately $51 
million price tag for the 2023 Wisconsin Supreme Court race. 
                     
16 The spending estimates in this section may be found at: 
Wisconsin Supreme Court Race Cost Record $51M, Wis. Democracy 
Campaign 
(July 
18, 
2023) 
https://www.wisdc.org/news/press-
releases/139-press-release-2023/7390-wisconsinsupreme-court-
race-cost-record-51m. 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
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2.  Caperton 
¶31 The United State Supreme Court has found a due process 
violation based on allegations of judicial bias only in 
extraordinary circumstances.  Prior to Caperton, two types of cases 
required a judge to recuse.  One was where the judge had financial 
incentives to rule one way in a case.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876 
(citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).  The other was where 
the judge charged a defendant with criminal contempt and then tried 
to preside over the contempt proceedings.  Id. at 880 (citing In 
re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)).  The first and only time the 
Court found a due process violation in the context of a judicial 
election is Caperton.  Id. at 884.  The Court carefully limited 
its 
holding 
to 
circumstances 
it 
called 
"extraordinary," 
"exceptional," "rare," and "extreme by any measure."  Id. at 884, 
887, 890. 
¶32 In Caperton, a jury awarded a verdict of over $50 million 
against Massey Coal Company.  Id. at 872.  Two years later, Massey 
lost post-verdict motions.  Id.  Its next logical step was to file 
an appeal.  At that point, West Virginia held a supreme court of 
appeals election.  Id. at 873.  Don Blankenship, Massey's CEO, 
contributed $3 million to Attorney Brent Benjamin's bid to replace 
incumbent Justice Warren McGraw on that court.  Id.  Benjamin won 
the election by fewer than 50,000 votes.  Id. 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
18 
 
¶33 Once in office, Justice Benjamin cast the deciding vote 
to reverse the $50 million verdict against Massey.  Id. at 874.  
Against this backdrop, Caperton recognized that in "extreme" or 
"extraordinary" situations a judge's receipt of a campaign 
contribution from a litigant or a lawyer may require his recusal 
under the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 884, 886-87. 
¶34 Caperton noted that "[n]ot every campaign contribution 
by a litigant or attorney creates a probability of bias that 
requires a judge's recusal."  Id. at 884.  A campaign contribution 
offends due process where "there is a serious risk of actual bias—
—based on objective and reasonable perceptions."  Id.  That occurs 
"when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a 
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on 
the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election 
campaign when the case was pending or imminent."  Id.  This test 
requires a court to assess:  (1) "the contribution's relative size 
in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the 
campaign," (2) "the total amount spent in the election," and (3) 
"the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the 
election."  Id. at 884. 
¶35 Applying this test, Caperton found the risk that 
Blankenship's influence engendered actual bias was sufficiently 
substantial that due process required Benjamin's recusal from the 
case.  Id. at 886-87.  Blankenship donated $3 million to unseat 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
19 
 
the incumbent and replace him with Benjamin.  Id. at 873.  
Specifically, he contributed $1,000 to Benjamin's campaign 
committee, almost $2.5 million to a political organization 
supporting Benjamin, and $500,000 in independent expenditures to 
pay for mailings, solicitations, and advertisements for Benjamin.  
Id.  Blankenship's contributions exceeded the total amount 
contributed by all of Benjamin's other supporters by 300 percent.  
Id.  He spent $1 million more than the total amount spent by the 
campaign committees of both candidates combined.  Id.  And Benjamin 
won by less than 50,000 votes.  Id. 
¶36 Caperton also found the temporal relationship between 
the campaign contributions, the justice's election, and the 
pending case troubling.  When Blankenship made his donations, it 
was reasonably foreseeable that Benjamin would be reviewing a 
judgment that cost his biggest donor $50 million.  Id. at 886.  
Caperton held:  "On these extreme facts the probability of actual 
bias rises to an unconstitutional level."  Id. at 886-87. 
3.  Application of Caperton 
a.  "A Person With A Personal Stake In A Particular Case" 
¶37 The Legislature's claim that the DPW's donation offends 
due process fails for one simple reason:  Caperton applies to 
campaign spending by a "person with a personal stake in a 
particular case."  Id. at 884.  Unlike Blankenship, who had a 
direct personal and financial interest in the judgment against his 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
20 
 
company, the DPW is not a party to this case.  I am not reviewing 
a judgment against the DPW.  Neither the petitioners in this case 
nor their attorneys are alleged to have contributed to my campaign.   
¶38 Nor are the petitioners stand-ins for the DPW.  They are 
citizens who allege violations of their own individual rights.  As 
voters, they claim to advance legal interests in excluding partisan 
influence of all kinds from the districting process.  They want 
the maps ungerrymandered.  For this reason, their interests may be 
contrary to those of the DPW because they could also foreclose a 
Democratic 
gerrymander 
in 
the 
future. 
 
To 
be 
blunt:  
Ungerrymandering the map favors voters, not parties. 
¶39 For me to recuse myself based on campaign contributions 
from the DPW——a non-party to this case——would be unprecedented.  
It would also raise unprecedented problems for my colleagues.  In 
recent Wisconsin Supreme Court elections, the winning candidate 
has received substantial financial support from a single entity.  
In 2016, Wisconsin Alliance for Reform spent $2.6 million 
supporting Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's campaign, comprising 
46.2 percent of total spending in that election.  In 2018, Greater 
Wisconsin Committee spent $940,000 supporting Justice Rebecca 
Frank Dallet's campaign, comprising 17 percent of total spending 
in that election.  In 2019, the Republican State Leadership 
Committee spent $1.25 million supporting Justice Brian Hagedorn's 
campaign, comprising 15.2 percent of total spending on that 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
21 
 
election.  In 2020, A Better Wisconsin Together Political Fund 
spent $1.88 million supporting Justice Jill J. Karofsky's 
campaign, comprising 18.8 percent of total spending that 
election.17 
¶40 The Legislature's dramatic expansion of Caperton would 
force Wisconsin justices to recuse whenever their involvement in 
a case might somehow indirectly benefit groups that provided 
substantial support to their campaigns.  It would invite litigants 
to seek recusal of "conservative" or "liberal" justices whenever 
a case involved issues of great social, political, or commercial 
importance to any major campaign funder.  See County of Dane, 403 
Wis. 2d 306, ¶91 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) ("We have seen bias 
and recusal allegations increase greatly in recent years, turning 
the obligation of adjudicator impartiality into a litigation 
weapon.").  Instead of being rare, "disqualification would be 
routine and even structural. Members of the court would be 
prevented from hearing a substantial number of cases for the entire 
duration of the terms they were elected by voters to serve, and 
the court's ability to do its work would be compromised."  See 
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Appellate Ct., No. 117689 at 11 (Ill. 
Sept. 24, 2014) (Order of Karmeier, J.).18  
                     
17 Clinger & Yablon, supra note 8, at 28. 
18 Available at: https://perma.cc/5TYD-ZHCF. 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
22 
 
¶41 The supreme court would grind to halt.  This is not 
hyperbole.  As Wisconsin law stands, when a justice recuses, there 
is no back-up justice to step in.  The court proceeds with less 
than a full bench.  If even one justice recuses, the remaining six 
justices may divide equally on the case, leaving a lower court 
decision on an issue of statewide importance unreviewed and 
unreviewable.  State v. Henley, 2010 WI 12, ¶35, 322 Wis. 2d 1, 
778 N.W.2d 853 (Memorandum of Roggensack, J.) (citing Laird v. 
Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (Memorandum of Rehnquist, J.)).  If two 
or more justices recuse, the supreme court may be unable to issue 
a majority opinion in the case. 
b.  "Significant and Disproportionate Influence" 
¶42 The Legislature's due process claim also fails under 
Caperton's three-factor test for assessing whether campaign 
spending had "a significant and disproportionate influence" in 
placing a judge on a case.  In Caperton, Blankenship bankrolled 
Benjamin' campaign.  The facts of this case are nowhere close to 
those "extreme" and "extraordinary" circumstances. 
¶43 First, the DPW's contribution was 57 percent of the 
spending by my campaign committee.  The relative size of the DPW's 
contribution is not unusual for a Wisconsin Supreme Court race.  
In 2019, Justice Brian Hagedorn's campaign committee spent an 
estimated $1.7 million.  The Republican State Leadership Committee 
spent $1.25 million (or 73 percent of his committee spending) 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
23 
 
supporting his campaign.19  In 2020, Justice Jill J. Karofsky 
received about $1.36 million from the DPW, which was about 50 
percent the amount spent by her campaign committee.20  Both justices 
sat on the last redistricting case, Johnson, 401 Wis. 2d 198.21 
¶44 Second, while the total amount of spending in support of 
my campaign is unknown, it is currently estimated at $29.1 million.  
The DPW's contribution represents about 33 percent of it.  Total 
spending in support of both candidates is currently estimated to 
be $51 million, which means that the DPW's $9.9 million 
contribution is just 19 percent of all spending on the race. 
                     
19 Spending estimates for Justice Hagedorn's campaign and 
Justice Karofsky's campaign come from: Wisconsin Supreme Court 
Finance Summaries, Wis. Democracy Campaign (Apr. 26, 2021), 
available 
at: 
https://www.wisdc.org/follow-the-money/31-
nonpartisan-candidates/656-wisconsin-supreme-court-finance-
summaries. 
20 The Democratic Party of Wisconsin's contribution is noted 
in: PAC, Political Committee Contributions More Than Double in 
Four Years, Wis. Democracy Campaign (Aug. 21, 2020), available at: 
https://www.wisdc.org/news/press-releases/131-press-release-
2020/6669-pac-political-committee-contributions-more-than-
double-in-four-years. 
21 Again, it is not unusual for justices to sit on 
redistricting cases despite having received substantial financial 
support from either the Republican Party or the Democratic Party.  
See, e.g., Harper v. Hall, 867 S.E.2d 326 (N.C. 2022) (regarding 
recusal decisions by Justice Anita Earls and Justice Paul Newby); 
Dickson v. Rucho, 735 S.E.2d 193 (N.C. 2012) (North Carolina 
Supreme Court's one-sentence order denying the motion for Justice 
Newby's recusal). 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
24 
 
¶45 Third, the 2023 Wisconsin Supreme Court election was not 
even close.  I won by a landslide.  Cf. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 896 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (questioning whether a contribution 
has any effect in a landslide election).  The historical record 
suggests that the DPW's contribution had no impact on the outcome 
of the 2023 election.  Justice Kelly has never won a judicial race.  
He was appointed to the supreme court.  In 2020, he ran to retain 
his seat and lost to Justice Karofsky by almost 11 points.  In 
2023, he lost to me by 11 points.  The logical conclusion is that 
the DPW's $10 million donation did not move the needle.  It had no 
discernible influence in placing me on this case. 
c.  "Temporal Relationship" 
¶46 Caperton held that "[t]he temporal relationship between 
the campaign contributions, the justice's election, and the 
pendency of case is also critical."  Id. at 886.  Blankenship 
contributed $3 million to Benjamin's campaign while Massey's case 
was pending but before it filed an appeal.  Id. at 873.  This 
timing made it "apparent that, absent recusal, Justice Benjamin 
would review a judgment that cost his biggest donor's company $50 
million."  Id. at 886. 
¶47 Again, the facts of this case are different.  When the 
DPW contributed to my campaign there was no pending or imminent 
case for me to review.  Yes, I said that I would enjoy taking a 
fresh look at Wisconsin's legislative maps.  However, the 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
25 
 
Legislature does not allege that I knew the identity of the 
petitioners in this case or the nature of their claims.  The 
petitioners filed their original action four months after the 
election.  This is not the sort of temporal relationship that 
alarmed the Caperton Court. 
4.  State ex rel. Three Unnamed Petitioners 
¶48 My understanding of Caperton is supported by Justice 
David Prosser's recusal decision in State ex rel. Three Unnamed 
Petitioners v. Peterson, 2015 WI 103, 365 Wis. 2d 351, 875 N.W.2d 
49.  That case involved a John Doe investigation of alleged illegal 
campaign coordination among certain candidates for elected office 
and issue-advocacy groups.  Several targets of the investigation 
spent an estimated $3.3 million in support of Justice Prosser's 
reelection effort——nearly eight times the amount spent by his 
campaign committee.  See Appendix B, Prosser Decision at 6. 
¶49 According to Justice Prosser, Caperton did not require 
his recusal.  Id. at 9.  There was no pending or imminent litigation 
against the John Doe targets when they financially supported his 
campaign several years earlier.  Unlike Justice Benjamin, he was 
an incumbent.  And unlike West Virginia, Wisconsin had no procedure 
for replacing a justice who withdraws from a supreme court case.  
Justice Prosser observed that "in a very real sense, a party moving 
for a justice's recusal is trying to change the composition of the 
court that will hear its case."  Id.  He admitted that the relative 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
26 
 
size of the targets' campaign contributions——nearly eight times 
the amount spent by his campaign committee——appeared "significant 
and disproportionate" under Caperton.  Id. at 10.  He reasoned 
that the contributions were necessary because, under Wisconsin 
campaign finance law, there was no other way for his campaign 
committee to respond to issue advocacy distorting his record.  Id. 
¶50 If Caperton did not compel Justice Prosser's recusal, it 
certainly does not demand mine.  The DPW is not party——or even a 
subject of——this case.  Its financial support is a fraction of, 
not eight times, my campaign committee spending.  Wisconsin still 
does not have a procedure for replacing a justice who recuses from 
a case.  The Legislature is simply trying to change the composition 
of the court that hears this case. 
¶51 In sum, under Caperton, the distinctions above make all 
the difference.  The DPW's contribution was too small a percentage 
of my campaign committee's fund and too small a percentage of the 
overall spending on the race to warrant my disqualification——
especially given that the election was not close and this original 
action petition was not pending at the time.  While the total 
amount of the DPW's contribution was surely substantial, the 2023 
election broke all historical records in Wisconsin, and compared 
to total election spending, the contribution falls short of 
Caperton's recusal standard. 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
27 
 
B.  Due Process And Campaign Statements 
1.  Facts 
¶52 During my campaign, I gave interviews, participated in 
candidate forums and debates, and traveled the state to speak with 
voters.  I expressed my frank opinions on Wisconsin's legislative 
maps.22  My remarks at a January 9, 2023 candidate forum are 
representative of what I said on the campaign trail: 
So let's be clear here——the maps are rigged.  Bottom 
Line.  Absolutely positively rigged.  They do not reflect 
the people in this state.  They do not reflect 
accurately, representation in either the state assembly 
or the state senate.  They are rigged.  Period.  I'm 
coming right out and saying that.  I don't think you 
could sell to any reasonable person that the maps are 
fair . . . . 
I believe the gerrymandering decision was wrong.  But as 
I indicated to you before I can't ever tell you what I'm 
going to do on a particular case.  But I can tell you my 
values and common sense tell you that it's wrong . . . . 
So as I've indicated, I think those maps are rigged, I 
think they're unfair.  I don't think they fairly reflect 
the population in our state.23 
                     
22 The Legislature's brief includes more than 50 footnotes 
citing nearly 20 articles that quote me.  They boil down to just 
nine instances where I commented on Wisconsin legislative maps:  a 
January 9, 2023 candidate forum; a January 30, 2023 Wisconsin State 
Journal Candidate Questionnaire; a February 14, 2023 interview on 
Wisconsin Public Radio's Central Time; a March 1, 2023 Wedge Issues 
podcast; tweets on March 3, 2023, and March 7, 2023; a PBS 
interview on March 9, 2023; and a March 21, 2023 candidate debate. 
I provide citations for my comments on each of the occasions in 
Appendix A. 
23 Wisconsin Supreme Court Candidate Forum.  See Appendix A. 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
28 
 
¶53 I made very similar comments on other occasions during 
my campaign.  I also told voters the following:24 
I can't ever tell you what I'm going to do on a 
particular case.25 
I'll always be an impartial justice who upholds our 
Constitution.26 
[W]hile I talk about some of the other issues that are 
important to both me and all Wisconsinites, all of my 
decisions are going to be rooted in the law.  I plan to 
follow the law.  I tell you what my values are because 
I think that Supreme Court candidates should share with 
the community and the electorate what their values are.  
Nonetheless, I will uphold the law [and] follow the 
Constitution when I make any decisions.  Nothing is 
prejudged.27 
[W]hat my real values are and what's going to happen in 
a case can be two different things, right?  I mean, 
follow the law, you look at the case law, you look at 
the statutes, you look at the constitution, and you 
follow where, you know, it leads you.28 
[R]emember I'm running for a judicial spot.  I can't 
promise anybody anything.  I can tell you what my 
personal value is.29 
But the question is am I able to fairly make a decision 
on a case.  Of course I am.  That's what I spent my 
entire career doing.  I follow laws I don't always 
necessarily like or agree with.  You follow the law.  
                     
24 I made these statements on occasions noted in Appendix A. 
25 Wisconsin Supreme Court Candidate Forum.  See Appendix A. 
26 Wisconsin State Journal.  See Appendix A. 
27 Wisconsin Public Radio.  See Appendix A. 
28 Wedge Issues Podcast.  See Appendix A. 
29 Pod Save America.  See Appendix A. 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
29 
 
That's what you do.  I can assure you that every single 
case that I will ever handle will be rooted in the law.  
One hundred percent.30 
¶54 The Wisconsin Judicial Commission investigates and 
prosecutes allegations that a judge or judicial candidate has 
violated the Wisconsin Code of Judicial Conduct.  The commission 
received multiple complaints alleging that on several occasions, 
including at the January 9, 2023 candidate forum, I violated 
several code provisions by stating my personal views on 
"contentious political issues."31 
¶55 First, I allegedly violated the Preamble to the Code, 
which requires me to "respect and honor the judicial office as a 
public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our 
legal system." 
¶56 Second, I allegedly violated SCR 60.02, which provides, 
in part, that a judge shall maintain "high standards of conduct 
and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity 
and independence of the judiciary will be preserved." 
                     
30 Wisconsin Supreme Court Candidate Debate. See Appendix A. 
31 The complaint and the Wisconsin Judicial Commission's 
decision are attached to my September 5, 2023 order for 
supplemental briefing. See Wright v. Wisconsin Elections Comm'n, 
No. 2023AP1412-OA, unpublished order (Wis. Sept. 5, 2023), 
available 
at: 
https://acefiling.wicourts.gov/document/eFiled/
2023AP001412/700504. 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
30 
 
¶57 Third, I allegedly violated SCR 60.06(3)(a), which, in 
part, 
requires 
a 
candidate 
for 
judicial 
office 
to 
"maintain . . . the dignity appropriate to judicial office and the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary" and prohibits a 
candidate for judicial office from manifesting "bias or prejudice 
inappropriate to judicial office." 
¶58 Fourth, I allegedly violated SCR 60.06(3)(b), which 
prohibits a candidate for judicial office from making "pledges, 
promises, or commitments" "with respect to cases, controversies, 
or issues that are likely to come before the court." 
¶59 On May 31, 2023, the commission issued a decision stating 
it had held a meeting, reviewed the complaints, and "carefully 
considered" the Code of Judicial Conduct provisions noted above in 
addition to Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 788; Duwe v. Alexander, 
490 F. Supp. 2d 968, 976 (W.D. Wis. 2007); and other authorities.  
The commission dismissed the complaints without action and 
declared the matter "closed."  By declining to file a formal 
complaint against me, the commission determined that the 
allegations against me lacked probable cause.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.85(3), (5). 
2.  Due Process and Prejudgment 
¶60 The Legislature assails my statements that Wisconsin's 
legislative maps are "gerrymandered," "rigged," and "unfair;" that 
the Johnson decision was wrong; and that I agree with the dissent 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
31 
 
in that case.  According to the Legislature, these statements show 
that I "promise[d] to 'ma[k]e new law' to achieve a desired 
outcome," "clearly prejudged the case" in a way irreconcilable 
with the Due Process Clause, and "announced that [my] mind is 
firmly made up on the outcome" of this case.  Allegedly, when I 
"declared [my] prejudgment of the maps, 'it became at once apparent 
that, absent recusal,' [I] would be deciding the validity of 
something [I] already believed to be invalid." 
¶61 There are two fundamental flaws in the Legislature's 
position.  The first is factual.  As noted above, while making the 
statements that the Legislature spotlights I also stressed that 
these were descriptions of my personal "values," not pledges of 
"what I'm going to do on a particular case."  My repeated 
assurances that I would follow the law where it leads me expressed 
my fundamental commitments as a judge.  I will set aside my 
opinions and decide cases based on the law.  There will surely be 
many cases where I reach results that I personally dislike.  That 
is what it means to be a judge.  See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 891 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("[A]ll judges take an oath to uphold 
the Constitution and apply the law impartially, and we trust that 
they will live up to this promise."). 
¶62 The second flaw in the legislature's position is that it 
is foreclosed by federal precedent.  The Due Process Clause 
requires "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal."  In re Murchison, 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
32 
 
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).  It does not prohibit a judge from 
sitting on a case after expressing an opinion on an issue.  As two 
legal experts recently explained, "[n]o Supreme Court case has 
ever held that due process required a judge to recuse because of 
the judge's expression of views, whether on the campaign trail or 
elsewhere."32  In fact, the Court has rejected such claims.  See 
FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at 702-03 ("[No] decision of this 
Court would require us to hold that it would be a violation of 
procedural due process for a judge to sit in a case after he had 
expressed an opinion as to whether certain types of conduct were 
prohibited by law."); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 
(1941) ("That [the Secretary of Agriculture] not merely held but 
expressed strong views on matters believed by him to have been in 
issue, did not unfit him for exercising his duty in subsequent 
proceedings ordered by this Court."); id. (like judges, cabinet 
officers charged with adjudicatory functions "are assumed to be 
men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging 
a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own 
circumstances."); see also Franklin v. McCaughtry, 398 F.3d 955, 
962 (7th Cir. 2005) ("We are not saying that due process would be 
offended if a judge presiding over a case expressed a general 
opinion regarding a law at issue in a case before him or her."). 
                     
32 Clinger & Yablon, supra note 8, at 10. 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
33 
 
¶63 More recently, the United States Supreme Court struck 
down a Minnesota rule that banned judicial candidates from 
announcing their views of disputed legal or political issues.  See 
Republican Party, 536 U.S. 765.  Writing for the Court, Justice 
Scalia made clear that "[a] judge's lack of predisposition 
regarding the relevant legal issues in a case has never been 
thought a necessary component of equal justice, and with good 
reason."  Id. at 777.  "For one thing, it is virtually impossible 
to find a judge who does not have preconceptions about the law."  
Id.  Nor would anybody want to elect such a judge:  "Proof that a 
Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete 
[blank slate] in the area of constitutional adjudication would be 
evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias."  Id. at 778 
(quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (Memorandum of 
Rehnquist, J.)).  And it would violate the First Amendment to 
"censor what the people hear as they undertake to decide for 
themselves which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary 
judicial officer."  Id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
¶64 Justice Scalia explained that judges "have often 
committed themselves on legal issues that they must later rule 
upon."  Id. at 779 (majority opinion).  "Most frequently, of 
course, that prior expression will have occurred in ruling on an 
earlier case."  Id.  But before arriving on the bench, judges also 
state their views on disputed legal and political issues when 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
34 
 
teaching classes, giving speeches, or writing books.  Id.  Thus, 
they cannot be barred from expressing their views while campaigning 
for judicial office.  Id. at 779-80 (noting that it is permissible 
for a judicial candidate to say "I think it is constitutional for 
the legislature to prohibit same-sex marriage" during his 
campaign). 
¶65 Disclosing a predisposition on an issue "is nothing more 
than acknowledgement of the inescapable truth that thoughtful 
judicial minds are likely to have considered many issues and formed 
opinions on them prior to addressing the issue in the context of 
a case."  Duwe, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 975.  In contrast, a pledge, 
promise, or commitment "requires affirmative assurance of a 
particular action.  It is a predetermination of the resolution of 
a case or issue.  It is not a statement of belief or opinion."  
Id. at 976.  A judicial candidate violates the prohibition against 
pledges, promises, or commitments when she uses phrases like "I 
will" or "I will not."  See id.  "Phrases like 'I believe' or 'It 
is my opinion' signal the absence of a commitment."  Id. at 976. 
¶66 Justice David Wecht of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
recently applied these same principles to a situation closely 
resembling this one.  See League of Women Voters of Pa. v. 
Commonwealth, 179 A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2018).  After the court declared 
the state's legislative maps an unlawful partisan gerrymander, the 
legislative respondents sought to disqualify him from the case.  
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
35 
 
They asserted a due process violation based on Justice Wecht's 
campaign 
statements 
calling 
gerrymandering 
"an 
absolute 
abomination," "a travesty," "insane," and "deeply wrong."  Id. at 
1084. 
 
Justice 
Wecht 
said: 
 
"[e]xtreme 
gerrymandering 
is . . . antithetical to the concept of one person, one vote."  
Id.  He had also described how Pennsylvania's maps favored 
Republicans and said:  "I challenge anybody to look at a map of 
our districts and deem them to be compact and contiguous."  Id. 
¶67 Applying the Due Process Clause, Republican Party, and 
Duwe, Justice Wecht held that his campaign statements "expressed 
[his] thoughts on the topic, something manifestly distinct from a 
clear commitment to rule in a certain way if presented with a 
specific challenge based upon a well-developed factual record and 
the benefit of full and fair advocacy."  Id.  He admitted that his 
campaign rhetoric was "sometimes ardent" and that he "did not 
always qualify [his] statements to clarify that [he] would view 
each case on its individual merits."  Id. at 1091.  But he concluded 
that the circumstances of his case were "wholly unlike" the narrow 
situations in which the United States Supreme Court has mandated 
recusal based on the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 1092. 
¶68 Now 
consider 
the 
practical 
implications 
of 
the 
Legislature's argument.  Many current justices on the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court have written opinions expressing strong views on the 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
36 
 
legality of the current legislative maps.33  Only a month ago, one 
justice wrote an opinion in this very proceeding that describes 
the mere consideration of the petitioners' claims as a "mockery of 
our 
justice 
system" 
and 
"degrad[ing] 
this 
court 
as 
an 
institution."34  No other justice has decided that they must recuse, 
even though their prior opinions might appear to indicate clear 
preconceptions of certain issues here.  And if prejudgment is the 
concern, their opinions are just as relevant as my campaign 
remarks.  As Justice Scalia wrote, "[w]e doubt . . . that a mere 
statement of position enunciated during the pendency of an election 
will be regarded by a judge as more binding . . . than a carefully 
considered holding that the judge set forth in an earlier opinion."  
Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 780-81. 
¶69 Simply put:  If issuing an opinion does not disqualify 
a judge from hearing future cases that involve similar issues, 
then neither does expressing agreement with an opinion or 
describing my values about political issues.  That is particularly 
true here, where I made no pledge about the result of any case, 
where I repeatedly disavowed any such pledge or promise, where 
                     
33 See generally Johnson, 401 Wis. 2d 198. 
34 See Wright v. Wisconsin Elections Comm'n, No. 2023AP1412-
OA, unpublished order (Wis. Aug. 15, 2023) (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, 
J., dissenting), available at: https://acefiling.wicourts.gov/
document/eFiled/2023AP001412/692191. 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
37 
 
this case did not even exist during my campaign, and where I made 
clear I will vote based only on the rule of law. 
3.  Caperton and Prejudgment 
¶70 Lacking a single case holding that the Due Process Clause 
requires a judge to recuse based on her campaign statements, the 
Legislature again resorts to Caperton.  As far as I can tell, no 
court has ever applied Caperton in that way.  In fact, some 
justices on the Wisconsin Supreme Court dismissed an attempt to do 
just that.  See State v. Allen, 2010 WI 10, 322 Wis. 2d 372, 778 
N.W.2d 863.  Allen had filed a collateral attack on his criminal 
conviction.  On appeal, he asked the supreme court to disqualify 
Justice Michael Gableman from the case due to his many campaign 
statements portraying himself as a judge who will support the 
prosecution over the defense in criminal cases and expressing bias 
against people accused of crimes, the lawyers who defend them, and 
the judges who uphold their rights.35 
¶71 Justice Ziegler regarded the facts of Allen so far 
removed from Caperton that the prisoner had no due process claim.  
"[T]he allegations in Allen involve a judicial peer and fail to 
state a due process claim because no 'person with a personal stake' 
in Allen 'had a significant and disproportionate influence' in 
                     
35 See Mot. for Recusal, Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372 (Apr. 17, 
2009), available at:  https://perma.cc/8TAA-D7MU. 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
38 
 
placing Justice Gableman on the case 'by raising funds to directing 
[his] election campaign when the case was pending or imminent."  
Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶271 (Ziegler, J., concurring) (quoting 
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884).  "[N]owhere in the Caperton decision 
does the Supreme Court state that any lesser fact situation would 
have required Justice Benjamin's recusal in that case, and nowhere 
does the Supreme Court conclude that he would be required to recuse 
himself from an unrelated civil case that involved different 
parties."  Id., ¶269. 
¶72 Requiring recusal when neither Allen nor the state had 
any influence in placing Justice Gableman on the court, Justice 
Ziegler reasoned, would "invent new law and . . . invite recusal 
motions based upon 'spin' instead of whether a justice can be fair 
and impartial."  Id.  By making allegations that "fail to state a 
due process claim as set forth in Caperton, Allen's efforts 
effectively amount to 'judge shopping.'"  Id., ¶262.  "'[J]udge 
Shopping' damages this court as an institution, inappropriately 
politicizes the court, and nullifies the votes of the electorate."  
Id. 
¶73 Justice Roggensack interpreted Caperton's holding even 
more narrowly.  She agreed that "Allen's allegations do not even 
begin to approach a due process violation."  Id., ¶231 (Opinion of 
Roggensack, J.).  She explained that his claim "is not comparable 
to the claim made in Caperton.  Caperton was based on claims of 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
39 
 
particularized bias against a party in a pending case because of 
actions taken by the other party. . . .  Those actions were alleged 
to have directly benefitted a justice who at the time was about to 
decide" the case.  Id., ¶238 (citing Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884, 
886). 
¶74 The Legislature has likewise failed to state a claim 
that my campaign statements about Wisconsin's legislative maps 
violate due process under Caperton.  Its motion is an attempt "to 
invent 
new 
law" 
and 
amounts 
to 
judge 
shopping, 
which 
inappropriately politicizes this court and attempts to nullify the 
votes of the electorate.  I decline to extend Caperton's holding 
that far. 
4.  The Effect of the Wisconsin Judicial Commission's Decision 
¶75 Finally, the Wisconsin Judicial Commission's May 31, 
2023 decision provides the death blow to the Legislature's due 
process argument.  Codes of judicial conduct are the "principal 
safeguard against judicial campaign abuses."  Caperton, 566 U.S. 
at 889 (quoted source omitted).  "The Due Process Clause demarks 
only the outer boundaries of judicial qualifications."  Id.  
"Because the codes of judicial conduct provide more protection 
than due process requires, most disputes over disqualification 
will be resolved without resort to the Constitution."  Id. at 890; 
see also State v. Hermann, 2015 WI 84, ¶120, 364 Wis. 2d 336, 867 
N.W.2d 772 (Ziegler, J., concurring). 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
40 
 
¶76 The commission rejected claims that my campaign 
statements undermined the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary; demonstrated bias or prejudice; or committed me to a 
decision on a case, controversy, or issue that was likely to come 
before me.36  That disposes of the Legislature's claims that my 
campaign statements violate due process. 
¶77 For the sake of completeness, I want to clarify two 
campaign statements that, as far as I can tell, the commission's 
decision did not directly address.  First, on the campaign trail 
I said:  "I would anticipate that I would enjoy taking a fresh 
look at the gerrymandering question."37  Allegedly, this "invited 
a legal challenge" to replace Wisconsin's maps.  The Legislature 
omits my qualification of that statement.  I explicitly stated 
that whether the issue "will come to the court is a completely 
different question."38 
¶78 Similarly, 
the 
Legislature 
isolates 
my 
comment 
"[p]recedent changes when things need to change to be fair"39 from 
my full remarks and calls it a "promise to 'ma[k]e new law' to 
                     
36 See supra note 31. 
37 Wedge Issues Podcast.  See Appendix A. 
38 Wedge Issues Podcast.  See Appendix A. 
39 Wisconsin Supreme Court Candidate Debate. See Appendix A. 
No. 
2023AP1412-OA   
 
41 
 
achieve a desired outcome."  I made this comment about precedent 
in response to a general question about stare decisis.  I was 
talking about Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  I was not 
referring to Johnson.40 
¶79 Like my other campaign statements about Wisconsin's 
legislative maps, my expressed desire to take a fresh look at the 
maps and my explanation of stare decisis show that I had opinions 
on political and legal issues of the day.  Nothing more. 
C.  Wisconsin Law 
1.  Recusal Under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) 
¶80 The Legislature contends that under § 757.19(2)(g) I 
must recuse due to my campaign statements.  Section 757.19(2)(g) 
provides that "[a]ny judge shall disqualify himself or herself 
from any civil or criminal action or proceeding . . . [when] a 
judge determines that, for any reason, he or she cannot, or it 
appears that she or she cannot, act in an impartial manner." 
¶81 This determination is purely subjective.  The judge 
alone decides whether she can be impartial, and whether there is 
an appearance of partiality.  Section 757.19(2)(g) "does not 
require disqualification in a situation where one other than the 
judge objectively believes there is an appearance that the judge 
is unable to act in an impartial manner" or in a situation where 
                     
40 Wisconsin Supreme Court Candidate Debate. See Appendix A. 
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"the judge's impartiality 'can reasonably be questioned' by 
someone other than the judge."  State v. Am. T.V. & Appliance of 
Madison, Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 175, 183, 443 N.W. 662 (1989); see also 
Donohoo v. Action Wis. Inc., 2008 WI 110, ¶24, 314 Wis. 2d 510, 
754 N.W.2d 480. 
¶82 When a justice decides that, both in fact and in 
appearance, she can act in a fair and impartial manner, the supreme 
court's role is limited to determining that she went through the 
required exercise of making the subjective determination.  
Donohoo, 314 Wis. 2d 510, ¶24; State v. Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d 654, 
663-64, 546 N.W.2d 115 (1996); Am. T.V., 151 Wis. 2d at 182-84. 
¶83 In Donohoo, the appellant, citing § 757.19(2)(g) and the 
Wisconsin Code of Judicial Conduct, moved to disqualify Justice 
Louis Butler from a lawsuit against an organization dedicated to 
protecting the civil rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender people.  Justice Butler had received campaign 
contributions from two board members of a political action 
committee for the organization and a reelection endorsement by the 
organization's attorney.  He also gave a speech at a fundraiser 
for a political action committee that supported LGBTQ equality.  
Donohoo, 314 Wis. 2d 510, ¶¶8-14. 
¶84 Despite these facts, Justice Butler declined to recuse 
himself from the case.  In a letter to the parties, he said that 
he had consulted the Executive Director of the Judicial Commission 
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about these matters.  He disclosed the campaign contributions and 
concluded:  "Because campaign contributions will in no way affect 
my judgment as to the outcome of this proceeding, I am writing to 
advise you of my decision to participate in this case."  Id., ¶32.  
Donohoo held that by sending the letter and continuing to 
participate in the case "Justice Butler clearly determined that he 
could 
be 
impartial. 
That 
is 
all 
that 
is 
required 
by 
§ 757.19(2)(g)."  Id., ¶25. 
¶85 Similarly, in Three Unnamed Petitioners the state moved 
for Justice Prosser's recusal based partly on § 757.19(2)(g).  
Despite having received $3.3 million in campaign support from the 
targets of the John Doe investigation under review, he determined 
that he could decide the case impartially and it would not appear 
otherwise to a reasonable person who understands the facts.41  
¶86 I likewise find no basis for my recusal under 
§ 757.19(2)(g).  I was a circuit court judge for 10 years before 
becoming a supreme court justice.  I have decided many difficult 
cases.  I approached them with an open mind and decided them based 
on the facts and the law.  I approach supreme court cases the same 
way.  In fact, during my campaign, I assured voters that "I will 
always be an impartial justice who upholds the Constitution," "I 
follow laws I don't always necessarily agree with," and that "every 
                     
41 See Appendix B, Prosser Decision at 2. 
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single case that I handle will be rooted in the law."  At my 
investiture I solemnly swore that I would "faithfully and 
impartially discharge the duties of the office to the best of my 
ability so help me God."  I meant what I said.  I have considered 
all of the facts and legal authorities presented for and against 
recusal under § 757.19(2)(g).  I determine that I can, in fact and 
appearance, act in an impartial manner in this case. 
2.  Recusal Under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(f) 
¶87 The Legislature also contends that § 757.19(2)(f) 
requires my recusal.  Section 757.19(2)(f) provides that a judge 
shall disqualify herself from a case when she "has a significant 
financial or personal interest in the outcome of the matter."  The 
Legislature does not claim that I have a "financial interest" in 
this case.  It argues that because I "repeatedly declared to voters 
how [I] would vote on the merits of this case" I have "a substantial 
interest in keeping [my] word and preserving [my] reputation among 
voters by invalidating the maps." 
¶88 A recusal motion based on § 757.19(2)(f) is different 
from a motion based on § 757.19(2)(g). Whereas § 757.19(2)(g) 
requires the judge to make a subjective determination about her 
ability to be impartial in fact and appearance, § 757.19(2)(f) 
requires the judge to make an objective determination that she 
does or does not have significant personal interest in the outcome 
of a case as established by evidence and reasonable inferences.  
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State ex rel. Dressler v. Cir. Ct. for Racine Cnty., 163 Wis. 2d 
622, 643, 472 N.W.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1991).  If the evidence and 
inferences establish that the judge does have a significant 
personal interest in a case, § 757.19(2)(f) requires her recusal. 
¶89 The Legislature cites no case where a judge's campaign 
statements were held to create a "significant personal interest" 
in the outcome of a case thereby requiring recusal under 
§ 757.19(2)(f).  Moreover, the Legislature does not cite a single 
instance during my campaign where I "declared to voters how [I] 
would vote on the merits of this case."  This case did not even 
exist during my campaign.  The petitioners filed it four months 
after the election. 
¶90 During my campaign, I told voters my personal values and 
beliefs about Wisconsin's legislative maps and said that I would 
enjoy taking a fresh look at them——as permitted by the First 
Amendment and Republican Party.  I did not say "I will" or "I will 
not" decide this case or any other case a certain way.  See Duwe, 
490 F. Supp. 2d at 976.  To the contrary, I repeatedly told voters 
that I could not say how I would decide any particular case and 
that I must follow the law where it leads me, even if I disagree 
with it.  
¶91 While Republican Party did not concern § 757.19(2)(f), 
it considered and rejected the premise of the Legislature's 
argument.  In that case, Justice Scalia responded to the argument 
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that campaign statements pose a special threat to open-mindedness 
because once the candidate becomes a judge he will feel reluctant 
to contradict them.  Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 780.  He 
observed that this "might be plausible, perhaps, with regard to 
campaign promises.  A candidate who says 'if elected, I will vote 
to uphold the legislature's power to prohibit same-sex marriages' 
will positively be breaking his word if he does not do so."  Id. 
(emphasis in original).  But it is not true that a judge who states 
his position on issues during a campaign will feel compelled to 
rule in accordance with them.  Justice Scalia explained: 
We doubt, for example, that a mere statement of position 
enunciated during the pendency of an election will be 
regarded by a judge as more binding——or as more likely 
to subject him to popular disfavor if reconsidered——than 
a carefully considered holding that a judge set forth in 
an earlier opinion denying some individual's claim to 
justice.   
Id. at 780-781. 
 
¶92 The Legislature offers no facts establishing or creating 
a reasonable inference that my campaign statements created a 
"significant personal interest" in the outcome of this case.  Nor 
does it cite any case to support that argument.  I therefore 
objectively determine that § 757.19(2)(f) does not require my 
recusal. 
¶93 The Legislature makes one passing reference to SCR 
60.04(1)(b) without developing an argument.  Rule 60.04(1)(b) 
provides in part that "a judge may not be swayed by partisan 
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interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism."  It does not 
support recusal under § 757.19(2)(f) because "a judge's propensity 
to decide cases consistent with statements made or opinions 
expressed during a campaign tend to demonstrate that he or she is 
acting on personal principles previously stated and not deciding 
the pending case on the basis of 'partisan interests, public clamor 
or fear of criticism.'"  Duwe, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 973.  Accordingly,  
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Recuse filed by proposed 
intervenor Wisconsin Legislature is denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
Campaign Statement Sources 
 
 
1. Wisconsin Supreme Court Candidate Forum – Jan. 9, 2023 
 
a. WisPolitics State Supreme Court Election Forum, 
WisconsinEye (Jan. 9, 2023), available at: 
https://wiseye.org/2023/01/09/wispolitics-state- 
supreme-court-election-forum. 
 
 
2. Wisconsin State Journal – Jan. 30, 2023 
 
a. Alexander Shur, Candidate Q&A: Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, Wis. State J. (Jan. 30, 2023), available at: 
https://madison.com/news/local/govt-and- 
politics/elections/candidate-q-a-wisconsin-supreme- 
court/article_fb416ee5-a99e-5a8f-b43d- 
d4652861a65e.html [https://perma.cc/EE2H-ZKZB]. 
 
 
3. Wisconsin Public Radio – Feb. 14, 2023 
 
a. Jonah Beleckis, Janet Protasiewicz Thinks Judicial 
Candidates Should Be Open About Their Values, Wis. 
Pub. Radio (Feb. 14, 2023), available at: 
https://www.wpr.org/janet-protasiewicz-wisconsin- 
supreme-court-justice-primary-election 
[https://perma.cc/C9V6-N9C8]. 
 
 
4. Wedge Issues Podcast – Mar. 2, 2023 
 
a. Jessie Opoien & Jack Kelly, Janet Protasiewicz 
Discusses Supreme Court Bid On Wedge Issues Podcast, 
Cap Times (Mar. 2, 2023), available at: 
https://captimes.com/news/government/janet- 
protasiewicz-discusses-supreme-court-bid-on-wedge- 
issues-podcast/article_111d3475-e040-5e43-a932- 
06819cadc036.html. 
 
 
5. X (f.k.a. Twitter) – Mar. 3, 2023 
 
a. @janetforjustice, X (Mar. 3, 2023, 5:31PM), 
https://x.com/janetforjustice/status/16317996097511178 
25?s=46&t=9FuOdnLF34m1gMWomZ5G-g. 
 
 
 
 
 
6. X (f.k.a. Twitter) – Mar. 7, 2023 
 
a. @janetforjustice, X (Mar. 7, 2023, 1:15PM), 
https://x.com/janetforjustice/status/16331847362636963 
86?s=20. 
 
 
7. PBS Wisconsin – Mar. 9, 2023 
 
a. Zac Schultz, Janet Protasiewicz, Daniel Kelly On 
Wisconsin Redistricting, PBS Wis. (Mar. 9, 2023), 
available at: https://pbswisconsin.org/news- 
item/janet-protasiewicz-daniel-kelly-on-wisconsin- 
redistricting [https://perma.cc/4HH9-PXHP]. 
 
 
8. Pod Save America – Mar. 20, 2023 
 
a. Pod Save America: Mugshots and Milk Shots (Live from 
Wisconsin!), Crooked Media (Mar. 20, 2023), available 
at: https://crooked.com/podcast/mugshots-and-milk- 
shots-live-from-wisconsin. 
 
 
9. Wisconsin Supreme Court Candidate Debate – Mar. 21, 2023 
 
a. State Bar of Wisconsin, WISC-TV, WisPolitics.com 
Supreme Court Debate, WisconsinEye (Mar. 21, 2023), 
available at: https://wiseye.org/2023/03/21/state-bar- 
of-wisconsin-wisc-tv-wispolitics-com-supreme-court- 
debate.