Title: State v. Black

State: minnesota

Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court

Document:

183 N.W.2d 774 (1971) STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. William Anthony BLACK, Appellant. No. 42363. Supreme Court of Minnesota. February 5, 1971. Lindquist & Vennum and Edward R. Garvey and Norman L. Newhall, Jr., Minneapolis, for appellant. Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Robert W. Johnson, County Atty., Gerard W. Snell, Asst. County Atty., Anoka, for respondent. Heard before KNUTSON, C. J., and OTIS, PETERSON, KELLY, and ROSENGREN, JJ. PER CURIAM. The issue here for review is whether it was proper for the trial court to revoke defendant's probation because he applied for a marriage license. We hold that the revocation was not justified and therefore reverse. On September 26, 1968, defendant pled guilty to possession of marijuana in violation of Minn.St. 618.02. Imposition of sentence was stayed and defendant was placed on probation. One of the conditions of probation was as follows: Early in September 1969, defendant revealed to his probation officer his desire to marry a girl who would become 16 years of age on October 3 and who was also on probation. The agent expressed disapproval. On September 25, 1969, the agent gave the court an adverse report with respect to defendant, but the court, nevertheless, continued the stay of sentence until August 1970. With the consent of the girl's parents, on October 28, 1969, defendant applied to the probate court of Anoka County for a license to marry her. The application came to the attention of the probation officer 2 days later. Thereupon, the commissioner of corrections notified the court that defendant *775 Upon receipt of this information, the district court on November 3, without notice to defendant, revoked probation and ordered him to appear for sentencing. Defendant requested and was granted a hearing on the propriety of that order. At the hearing on November 4, 1969, the court stated: In response to counsel's examination with respect to the grounds for revocation, the officer testified: Counsel asked the officer if he had any proof that defendant was going to get married prior to obtaining permission, to which the officer answered: Defendant himself testified that he realized he had to approach his probation officer, that he expected to request permission, and that he did not intend to marry until he could obtain permission. Before imposing sentence, the court stated: Thereupon, defendant was committed to the Youth Conservation Commission for a term not to exceed 20 years. He has been free on bail pending appeal. The court's impressions transmitted to the Department of Corrections included, among other things, the following observation: We decline to hold that a requirement that defendant secure approval of his probation agent before getting married offends public policy. We find this a reasonable condition which is directed not only at defendant's rehabilitation but at the protection of his prospective wife and children as well. It is enough to say that there may be situations where marriage compounds rather than resolves a probationer's problems. Until and unless he is economically and psychologically capable of supporting a family, it is proper to forbid his marriage, and in so doing he is denied no constitutional rights. However, under the circumstances here presented, we find inadequate proof of intent to marry without approval, let alone execution of that purpose. At the time defendant's probation was revoked, the 5-day waiting period had not elapsed and he was therefore not yet eligible to secure a marriage license. While the record shows he had previously expressed indignation that his probation officer's approval was necessary, there is no evidence that he ever expressed an intent to ignore the terms of his probation. Whatever preliminary steps he took were not irreversible. In any event, nothing in the conditions of his probation suggests that it would be revoked for merely securing a license. There is every reason to believe *776 that faced with a term of 20 years for violating his probation he would take the precaution of securing approval. Marriage being a matter of public record, it was not a surreptitious action which he was likely to feel would escape the attention of the court. Whatever may have been his intention, he did not in fact violate his probation. Hence the revocation was improper. Reversed.