Title: COOK v COOK

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

N o . 12106 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1972 GAY ANN COOK, Plaintiff and Respondent, -VS - THOMAS NORRIS COOK, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable Robert H . Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Moulton, Bellingham, Longo and Mather, Billings, Montana. Ward Swanser argued, Billings, Montana. For Respondent : Kurth, Jones, Davidson, Calton and Bradley, Billings, Montana. John R . Da~idson~argued, Billings, Montana. Submitted: February 16, 1972 Decided : MAR 2 8 1972 Filed: MAR 2 8 1972 M * Clerk The Honorable Jack D. Shanstrom, District Judge, s i t t i n g i n place of M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s , delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from a decree of divorce and property settlement granted i n favor of t h e p l a i n t i f f wife a g a i n s t t h e defendant husband. From t h e property settlement provisions of t h e decree, t h e husband appeals. N o i s s u e is taken t o the grant- ing of t h e divorce. The m a t e r i a l f a c t s are not i n serious dispute. The p a r t i e s were married f o r t e n years p r i o r t o t h e i r separation i n January, 1971. A t t h a t t i m e , they were 31 and 36 years o l d respectively. No children were born of t h e marriage. Both p a r t i e s were s t e a d i l y employed throughout most of the marriage. A t t h e t i m e of t h e divorce t h e husband w a s earn- ing approximately $15,000 per year as an automotive p a i n t e r . The wife l a s t earned $450 per month as a s e c r e t a r y u n t i l she resigned from g a i n f u l employment about one year before t h e divorce. A t t h e t i m e of t h e t r i a l both p a r t i e s were mentally and physically capable of providing f o r t h e i r own support. The w i f e ' s education consisted of high school plus one year of college. The husband's w a s limited t o high school only. Over t h e years, t h e wife contributed from $80 to $160 per month from h e r earnings toward t h e food and housing needs of the p a r t i e s . The husband generally paid t h e remaining l i v i n g expenses n o t covered by t h e w i f e ' s contributions and saved t h e rest of h i s income. On t h e d a t e of t h e t r i a l , t h e p a r t i e s individually o r j o i n t l y owned t h e a s s e t s h e r e i n a f t e r l i s t e d , a l l of which were acquired during the marriage. The husband correctly argues that approximately 69% of these assets were accumulated through his and not his wife's finances. The properties in dispute on this appeal are as follows: JOINT PROPERTY Investor's Diversified Certificate Equity in Family Home HUSBAND'S INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY Checking account (maintained jointly with his aunt) 1966 automobile 1968 automobile WIFE 'S INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY None TOTAL The judgment of the trial court made no provision for continuing alimony in favor of the wife, but it did in lieu thereof establish a form of property settlement on the following terms. It set aside the 1968 automobile to the wife and ordered the husband to pay her the additional cash sum of $13,317.37. All remaining property was decreed to the husband. The wife's cash settlement figure was arrived at by deducting the value of her automobile from the total assets acquired during the marriage and dividing the remainder by two. In effect, the wife was given the cash value of one-half of the assets acquired during the marriage, including those owned individually by the husband as w e l l a s by t h e p a r t i e s j o i n t l y . The husband was awarded t h e rest of t h e property i n kind. The only i s s u e argued on appeal is whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t had t h e a u t h o r i t y t o award t h e wife a cash sum equal t o one-half of t h e property owned i n d i v i d u a l l y by t h e husband. W e affirm t h e judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . I n doing s o , and con- t r a r y t o t h e husband's contention, w e do n o t impose a community property standard i n Montana. The a u t h o r i t y of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o d e a l i n m a t t e r s of property settlement (as distinguished from alimony and c h i l d support) i n divorce a c t i o n s w a s most r e c e n t l y affirmed i n Libra v. Libra, 157 Mont. 252, 484 P.2d 748, 28 S t . Rep. 460 (1971). In e x e r c i s i n g its a u t h o r i t y , w e t h e r e s a i d of t h e t r i a l c o u r t : " ( a ) divorce c o u r t is a c o u r t of e q u i t y and once equity takes j u r i s d i c t i o n , it w i l l g r a n t complete r e l i e f ; a l s o , t h a t property acquired j o i n t l y during t h e marriage may be divided by t h e c o u r t whether t h e t i t l e t h e r e t o i s i n e i t h e r o r both of t h e p a r t i e s . * * * " * * * I n t h e s e later cases t h e Court approved t h e a l l o c a t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t i e s be- tween t h e p a r t i e s on an e q u i t a b l e b a s i s ac- cording t o t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n even though t h i s required t h a t t i t l e be divested from one and t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e other. " Libra followed c l o s e on t h e h e e l s of Hodgson v. Hodgson, 156 Mont. 469, 482 P.2d 140, 28 S t . Rep. 195.(1971) wherein t h e wife was awarded by way of property s e t t l e m e n t 71% of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s , although h e r f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s through i n h e r i t a n c e w e r e only 59%. W e affirmed under t h e circumstances of t h a t case t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d n o t abuse its d i s c r e t i o n , even though its order i n e f f e c t t r a n s f e r r e d t i t l e t o r e a l property from t h e husband t o t h e wife. Libra and Hodgson should have l a i d t o rest t h e husband's argument on appeal here. I t has already been a t least twice decided i n t h i s S t a t e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t may make an equit- a b l e d i v i s i o n of t h e l i t i g a n t s ' property i n a divorce a c t i o n regardless of t h e state of t i t l e t o t h a t property and regardless of a c t u a l f i n a n c i a l contribution. W e are asked by t h e husband, however, t o retreat from these cases f o r t h e s t a t e d reason t h a t t h e r e is no s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e property d i v i s i o n powers t h e r e i n granted t h e t r i a l court. Appellant cites t h e various provisions contained i n T i t l e 36, R.C.M. 1947, s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e c o r r e l a t i v e f i n a n c i a l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s of husband and wife during t h e i r marriage. The s t a t u t e s r e l i e d upon compose what is commonly c a l l e d t h e Married Women's A c t . The application of these s t a t u t e s t o married couples is undeniable, but t h e r e is no intimation t h a t they a r e a t a l l con- t r o l l i n g upon d i s s o l u t i o n of the marriage by divorce. I n t h e l a t t e r event, t h e t r i a l c o u r t becomes charged with t h e duty of granting "complete r e l i e f " , including property d i v i s i o n , accord- ing t o t h e e q u i t i e s of each individual case. Johnson v. Johnson, 137 Mont. 11, 349 P.2d 310. The d i s t r i c t judge's broad powers i n t h i s regard are expressed i n s e c t i o n 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, where- i n he is empowered t o make " s u i t a b l e allowance to t h e wife f o r h e r support during her l i f e , o r f o r a s h o r t e r period, a s t h e c o u r t may deem j u s t , having regard t o t h e circumstances of t h e p a r t i e s respectively * * *." (Emphasis added.) Appellant a l s o r e f e r s us to f o u r Montana d e c i s i o n s ( a l l p r e d a t i n g Johnson, Hodgson and L i b r a ) f o r e a r l y a u t h o r i t y t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n a d i v o r c e a c t i o n does n o t have t h e d i s c r e t i o n t o make p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n of m a r i t a l a s s e t s i n l i e u of o r i n a d d i t i o n t o alimony. H e cites: Rufenach v. Rufenach, 120 Mont. 351, 185 P.2d 293; Lewis v. Lewis, 109 Mont. 4 2 , 94 P.2d 211; Emery v. Emery, 122 Mont. 201, 200 P.2d 251; a n d , L e w i s v. Bowman e t a l . , 113 Mont. 68, 121 P.2d 162. W e do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y agree t h a t t h e c a s e s last c i t e d s t a n d f o r t h e r e s t r i c t i v e g u i d e l i n e s on t h e power o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a s s e r t e d by a p p e l l a n t , b u t t o e r a s e a l l doubt, w e hereby e x p r e s s l y o v e r r u l e t h e s e c a s e s i n s o f a r a s t h e y a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t herewith. The t r i a l judge's r e s o l u t i o n o f p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n is f e t t e r e d only by t h e range of reason and h i s judgment w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d i n t h e absence o f an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . Bickford v. Bickford, 117 Mont. 372, 158 P.2d 796. N o such abuse o f d i s - c r e t i o n is shown under t h e f a c t s presented h e r e . A l l p r o p e r t y considered f o r d i v i s i o n by t h e t r i a l judge w a s accumulated d u r i n g t h e marriage. True, t h e husband had scrupulously k e p t t i t l e t o t h i s p r o p e r t y p r i m a r i l y i n h i s own name. H e g e n e r a l l y managed t h e b u s i n e s s a f f a i r s o f t h e couple, and he found it simple t o manipulate t i t l e t o h i s b e n e f i t . T h i s does n o t p r e v e n t t h e c o u r t from d e a l i n g t h e w i f e h e r f a i r s h a r e . H e r e t h e c o u r t chose t o t r a n s f e r a l l t i t l e t o t h e husband, both i n d i v i d u a l and j o i n t , r e q u i r i n g a cash s e t t l e m e n t e q u a l t o one-half its v a l u e t o t h e w i f e . There is a u t h o r i t y i n Montana f o r p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n i n those proportions. In Johnson we stated: "And, equal division under normal conditions of property accumulated through joint efforts is not regarded as unreasonable." The district court apparently considered more in this case than mere financial contributions. The law has never confined "joint efforts" to such a narrow meaning. The marital partnership is more than a business relation. The pecuniary and proprietary fruits of the marriage are frequently acquired by joint effort, even though actual financial outlay may be more the contribution of one spouse than the other. This holding does not make Montana a community property state. There is no required percentage of allocation to be applied in all cases. Each case must be looked at by the trial court individually with an eye to its unique circumstances. Under the circumstances here, we are not compelled to state that equal division of the property is an inequitable result. The judgment is affirmed. Jack Shanstrom, district udge, sitting in place of Mr. Justice Wesley Castles. 9 ,As ociate Justices -