Title: People v. Mataele

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
TUPOUTOE MATAELE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S138052 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
00NF1347 
 
 
July 21, 2022 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the Court, 
in which Justices Corrigan, Groban, Jenkins, and Guerrero 
concurred. 
 
Justice Groban filed a concurring opinion. 
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, in which 
Justice Kruger concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
S138052 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
A jury convicted defendant Tupoutoe Mataele of the 
murder of Danell Johnson, the attempted murder of John 
Masubayashi, and conspiracy to commit the murders of Johnson 
and Masubayashi.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a), 
182, subd. (a).)1  The jury found true a special circumstance 
allegation that defendant committed the murder while lying in 
wait.  (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(15).)  The jury also found true 
an allegation that defendant was armed with and personally 
used a firearm in the commission of each offense.  (§§ 12022, 
subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a).)  Allegations that defendant 
suffered a prior strike conviction and a prior serious felony 
conviction were found true.  (§§ 667, subd. (a), 1170.12, subds. 
(a)–(d).)     
Following a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of 
death.  The trial court denied defendant’s motions to set aside 
the death verdict and for a new trial, and sentenced defendant 
to death.  It also sentenced him to a life term plus nine years for 
the attempted murder count, the firearm enhancements, and 
the prior serious felony conviction.  The court stayed the 
sentence on the conspiracy count pursuant to section 654.  This 
appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).) 
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise indicated. 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
We affirm the judgment in its entirety.  We also remand 
the matter for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to 
consider whether to exercise its newly conferred discretion 
under Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) and Senate 
Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) to strike the firearm and 
prior serious felony enhancements, respectively. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Guilt Phase Evidence 
1.  Prosecution evidence 
Defendant participated in a criminal enterprise with 
numerous individuals.  Although the initial enterprise was an 
ongoing identity theft and bank fraud scheme, later the venture 
included the purchase and sale of methamphetamine.  Peter 
Song managed the group, which also included Johnson, 
Masubayashi, Minh Nghia Lee, James Chung, Ryan Carrillo, 
David Song, and Tweeney Mataele (defendant’s brother, 
nicknamed “Baby”).  At one point, nearly the entire group lived 
together in an apartment in Los Angeles referred to as the 
“Penthouse.”   
Several members of the group also belonged to criminal 
street gangs.  Masubayashi and Johnson were members of the 
Tiny Rascals gang.  Chung, Carrillo, and Baby were members of 
the Pinoy Real gang.  Defendant was a member of the Sons of 
Samoa gang, but socialized mostly with Pinoy Real gang 
members.  Lee was a member of the Asian Mob Assassins gang.   
The shooting of Johnson and Masubayashi stemmed from 
various disputes within the group.  Chung was angry with 
Johnson because Johnson had received a speeding ticket when 
he was driving Chung’s Jeep Cherokee and had provided the 
police officer with false identification.  The police went to 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
Chung’s house and questioned him.  Chung worried that he 
would be in violation of his parole because of the car incident.  
Chung was also upset with Masubayashi after Chung was 
nearly caught committing bank fraud.  Chung threatened 
Masubayashi with a butcher knife over the incident and told 
him to watch his back.  Chung called Johnson and Masubayashi 
“snitches” based on the incidents.  Chung also wanted to replace 
Masubayashi as Peter Song’s second-in-command in the 
criminal enterprise.  Masubayashi and Johnson eventually 
moved out of the Penthouse and lived in an apartment in 
Anaheim owned by Takahisa Suzuki.   
On the evening of November 11, 1997, defendant, Chung, 
Carrillo, and Lee were at the Penthouse when Chung began 
complaining about Masubayashi and Johnson.  Defendant 
volunteered to kill Masubayashi, stating, “We’re going to handle 
them, take care of them” and “Let’s go smoke those 
motherfuckers.”  Chung, Lee, and Carrillo responded, “Let’s do 
it.”  Carrillo noticed that defendant possessed a .357 magnum 
handgun, which Carrillo had previously seen defendant carry on 
numerous occasions.   
Lee drove defendant, Chung, and Carrillo in Chung’s Jeep 
Cherokee to the home of Allan Quiambao, another Pinoy Real 
gang member.  During the drive, defendant repeated that he 
would kill Johnson and Masubayashi.  The group met Quiambao 
outside and told him that they were headed to Anaheim to “do” 
Johnson and Masubayashi.  Quiambao understood this to mean 
the group would kill them.   
The group returned to the Jeep and continued driving 
toward Anaheim.  A police officer stopped the Jeep after Carrillo 
threw a cigarette butt out the window.  Carrillo saw defendant 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
hide his gun inside the crack of the seats prior to the stop and 
then tuck it in his waistband after the police officer left.   
Lee parked the Jeep in a parking lot near Suzuki’s 
apartment complex.  The group agreed that only defendant and 
Carrillo would go to the apartment because there was no 
animosity between them and Masubayashi and Johnson.  Lee 
and Chung would wait in the Jeep.  As they were walking to the 
apartment, defendant told Carrillo that he was going to “do,” 
meaning kill, everyone in the apartment.  Defendant telephoned 
Johnson, who had been grocery shopping with his girlfriend, Sia 
Her.  Johnson and Her met defendant and Carrillo outside the 
apartment complex.  The four continued to Suzuki’s apartment, 
where Masubayashi and his girlfriend, Alexis Huliganga, were 
asleep inside.  Masubayashi awoke and the men decided to go 
out to a strip club or to shoot pool.  Defendant, who weighed 
more than 300 pounds, was wearing dark jeans and a green-and-
black plaid flannel; Carrillo, who had a thinner build, wore a 
white jersey with black letters and a beanie on his head.   
As the group walked toward Masubayashi’s car, they 
noticed a police patrol car driving by.  Masubayashi and Carrillo 
saw defendant remove his gun from his waistband and hide it 
beneath the tire of a parked car.  Defendant and Carrillo 
returned to Suzuki’s apartment, where defendant explained to 
Her that they had come back because the police were outside 
and he was “strapped,” meaning he had a gun.  After the patrol 
car left, Johnson returned to the apartment to collect defendant 
and Carrillo, while Masubayashi continued walking to his 
vehicle.  Defendant retrieved the gun once outside and 
Masubayashi picked the men up in his car, a two-door Nissan.  
Carrillo sat behind Masubayashi and defendant sat behind 
Johnson.   
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
Defendant and Carrillo told Masubayashi that they also 
wanted to drive and directed him to Chung’s Jeep.  
Unbeknownst to Masubayashi and Johnson, Lee and Chung 
were hiding inside the Jeep.  Masubayashi parked his car next 
to the Jeep and Johnson got out of the front seat to let defendant 
and Carrillo exit the car.  Masubayashi saw Carrillo walk 
toward the back of the Nissan while defendant stayed beside the 
passenger door.  Masubayashi recalled that he had left compact 
discs in Chung’s Jeep and opened his car door to retrieve them.  
Defendant suddenly drew his gun and shot Johnson in the head.  
Masubayashi turned and saw Johnson’s head bobbing.  
Defendant next bent inside the Nissan and shot Masubayashi.  
Just before he was shot, Masubayashi remembered seeing 
defendant’s dark forearm and his green-and-black flannel shirt 
inside the car and defendant’s gun pointed at him.   
Masubayashi dashed out of the car and ran through the 
parking lot toward a Jack in the Box restaurant.  Defendant shot 
at Masubayashi several more times.  Masubayashi ran across 
the street as defendant and Carrillo climbed into the backseat 
of the Jeep.  Lee started the car and drove toward Masubayashi, 
saying, “I’m going to run his ass over.”  Masubayashi hid behind 
a telephone pole, and Lee stopped the Jeep just in front of it.  
Masubayashi ran away from the Jeep and collapsed in the 
middle of the street.  Carrillo became aware of people watching 
in front of a nearby restaurant and saw a uniformed security 
guard nearby.  Defendant told Lee to let him out of the Jeep so 
he could “finish John off.”  Defendant got out of the Jeep and 
walked toward Masubayashi.  Lee, Chung, and Carrillo drove 
off.   
A restaurant patron and private security guard noticed 
Masubayashi lying in the street and stopped to help him.  Police 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
officers arrived at the scene shortly thereafter and found 
Masubayashi lying on his back in the middle of the street with 
a gunshot wound to his chest.  Masubayashi was taken to the 
hospital, where he told police officers that defendant had shot 
him and Johnson.  A forensic pathologist who performed an 
autopsy on Johnson testified that Johnson died from a close 
range gunshot wound to his neck and brain.  An analysis of 
bullets and fragments indicated the shots were fired from either 
a .38 special or .357 magnum handgun. 
Two eyewitnesses — Jose Rodriguez and John Fowler — 
testified regarding their observations.  In the early morning 
hours of November 12, 1997, Rodriguez, Fowler, and Matthew 
Towne2 were seated on a bench outside the Gateway Urgent 
Care Clinic in Anaheim when they heard what sounded like a 
car backfiring.  Rodriguez took a few steps forward and peered 
around the side of a brick wall.  He saw the profile of a man 
approximately 50 feet away in a dark parking lot firing a gun in 
the direction of the Jack in the Box.  Rodriguez described the 
shooter as a Black male, approximately 25 years old, about six 
feet tall, heavyset, and wearing dark clothing.  Fowler looked 
around the side of the brick wall and noticed a black car parked 
with the engine running.  He also saw the silhouette of a man 
walking across the parking lot toward the Jack in the Box and 
firing a gun.  He described the shooter as possibly African-
American, approximately five feet and ten inches tall, thin to 
medium build, and possibly wearing a beanie.  However, Fowler 
also emphasized at trial that it was dark and difficult to 
 
2  
As discussed post, Towne was unavailable at the guilt 
phase of trial.  His statements to police officers, made shortly 
after the shooting, were not admitted at trial. 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
determine how big the shooter was, and that he simply saw a 
“basic shadow” walking across the parking lot.  The men ran into 
the clinic to call 911.   
Carrillo returned to Quiambao’s house after the shooting 
and changed clothes.  Carrillo seemed scared, paranoid, and 
frantic.  He appeared to be praying and repeatedly stated, “They 
shot him.”  When Quiambao asked Carrillo who shot them, 
Carrillo replied, “T-Strong.”3     
Defendant arrived at Quiambao’s home an hour or two 
later.  Defendant told Carrillo that he had discarded the gun and 
ran from Anaheim to Quiambao’s house.  Quiambao repeatedly 
asked defendant why he had shot Johnson and Masubayashi, 
but defendant did not respond.  Quiambao asked defendant 
what he did with the gun, and defendant replied that he threw 
it away.  Defendant left Quiambao’s house; Carrillo stayed there 
and fell asleep.   
Later that morning, defendant and Carrillo purchased 
fake identification cards and used them to travel with Baby to 
Utah.  They lived with defendant’s relatives in Salt Lake City 
for five or six months.  In 1998, Carrillo and Baby returned to 
Los Angeles and defendant remained in Utah.        
In late 1999 or early 2000, Masubayashi began dating 
Glenda Perdon (Glenda Bloemhof at trial).  Unbeknownst to 
Masubayashi, Perdon had previously associated with members 
of the Pinoy Real gang, and she had seen defendant at 
Quiambao’s house on a few occasions.   
In April 2000, Masubayashi spotted defendant in the 
parking lot of the Ramona Hotel in Cerritos.  Masubayashi had 
 
3  
“T-Strong” was defendant’s given name at birth.   
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
not seen defendant since the shooting.  He told Perdon that he 
had observed defendant and wanted to notify the police.  Perdon 
mentioned that she had overheard defendant brag about killing 
Johnson when she was at defendant’s house for a barbeque.  
According to Perdon, defendant said, “I came in my pants when 
I saw that nigger flop after I shot him.”  Perdon also relayed that 
defendant had mentioned the name “John” when he described 
the shooting, which Masubayashi understood to refer to him.  
Perdon recalled that this conversation took place around the 
time of the shooting and that defendant had then fled to Utah.     
Shortly thereafter, Masubayashi and Perdon went to the 
Anaheim police station to provide additional information.  
Masubayashi informed a police detective that he had seen 
defendant.  He also told the detective that, based on his 
conversation with Perdon, it was possible Clarito Mina had been 
driving the Jeep on the night in question.  At trial, however, 
Masubayashi testified that he was sure Lee had been driving 
the Jeep.   
In mid-May 2000, defendant was arrested on an 
outstanding warrant for unrelated charges.  Carrillo, Chung, 
and Lee were also eventually arrested.  In October 2001, a felony 
complaint was filed charging defendant with murder, attempted 
murder, and conspiracy to commit murder.  
Defendant was jointly tried before a single jury with 
codefendant Lee at the guilt phase trial.  A death verdict was 
not sought against Lee.  Chung also was charged with first 
degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and premeditated 
attempted murder, but he was tried separately.  Carrillo 
testified for the prosecution as part of a plea bargain under 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
which he pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and 
attempted murder, for which he received a six-year sentence.   
2.  Defense evidence 
Defendant presented evidence suggesting that it was 
Carrillo who shot Johnson and Masubayashi.  The defense also 
sought to portray Carrillo as a liar and an unreliable witness.   
 
Testifying on his own behalf, defendant maintained that 
he was on good terms with Johnson and Masubayashi, and 
denied shooting them.  He said that on the night in question, he 
and Carrillo went to Suzuki’s apartment and spoke with 
Johnson and Masubayashi about going out.  Defendant 
acknowledged that he hid a gun, a .357 magnum, under the tire 
well of a parked vehicle when a police car approached the group, 
but testified that it was Carrillo who subsequently retrieved the 
weapon.   
According 
to 
defendant, 
the 
foursome 
got 
into 
Masubayashi’s car and drove to pick up Chung at his Jeep.  
Defendant testified that Masubayashi parked his car next to 
Chung’s Jeep and Johnson let defendant out of the car.  As 
defendant was walking toward the Jeep, he heard two gunshots, 
turned around, and saw Carrillo’s arm in Masubayashi’s car.  
Defendant related that he pushed Carrillo up against the car 
and yelled, “What the fuck are you doing?”  Carrillo replied, “It’s 
a setup, man.  It’s a setup.”   
Defendant testified that he saw Masubayashi run from the 
car as Carrillo followed and shot at him.  Defendant maintained 
that Carrillo returned to the Jeep and yelled, “Let’s go, let’s go, 
let’s go.”  Defendant conceded that he instructed the driver to 
“go get” Masubayashi, but maintained that he intended to help 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
Masubayashi, not run him over.4  Carrillo began screaming, 
“Yeah, we’ve got to get him.  We’ve got to get him.  He seen us.  
He knows where we live.  We’ve got to do this.  We got to finish 
him.”  Defendant told the group to stop the Jeep because he 
“wasn’t going to be a part of it,” and he got out of the car and 
started running.   
Defendant testified that he made his way to Quiambao’s 
house, where he met Carrillo outside.  Defendant asked Carrillo 
why he shot Johnson and Masubayashi.  Carrillo replied that “it 
was a setup” and claimed that Masubayashi had a gun.  Once 
inside, Quiambao asked defendant why he had shot Johnson.  
Defendant did not respond and looked at Carrillo and 
Quiambao.  He then asked Quiambao to get him something to 
drink.  When Quiambao left the room, defendant asked Carrillo 
what he had told Quiambao.  According to defendant, Carrillo 
responded that he thought defendant was in jail and he did not 
know what to do, so he told Quiambao that defendant shot 
Johnson.  When Quiambao returned with a drink, he again 
asked defendant why he shot Johnson and Masubayashi, 
adding, “They are our friends.”  Defendant responded, “Why?  
Why don’t you shut the hell up?”   
Later that morning, defendant testified, he and Baby went 
to see someone about getting fake identification.  The following 
day, defendant, Baby, and Carrillo flew to Salt Lake City.  The 
group lived in a hotel for several weeks and eventually moved to 
a family member’s house.  Defendant said that he left 
periodically, traveling to San Francisco, Portland, Seattle, and 
 
4  
Defendant initially refused to identify who was driving the 
Jeep after the shooting, but later testified that Clarito Mina was 
the driver, not Lee.   
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
Los Angeles, until he returned to Los Angeles in late 1999.  
Defendant claimed that he went into hiding in Salt Lake City 
because he refused to go to jail for a crime he did not commit.   
Defendant admitted that he “ran” with the Sons of Samoa 
gang, but denied being an actual gang member.  He 
acknowledged that he had been at Quiambao’s house with 
Perdon and discussed Johnson’s murder and the shooting of 
Masubayashi, but denied ever making the statement to Perdon 
that he shot Johnson.     
Carrillo’s sister-in-law, Alana Swift Eagle, testified that 
Carrillo drank heavily and used methamphetamine daily.  She 
also related that Carrillo was a dishonest person and a very 
manipulative liar.   
The defense presented evidence that, despite Carrillo’s 
recollection that one of the rounds fired by defendant hit a metal 
pole, there was no ballistic evidence recovered from that 
vicinity.  Additional evidence was introduced suggesting that 
the bullet recovered from Johnson’s body would not have been 
fired by a Smith & Wesson-manufactured .357 handgun, 
although Carrillo maintained that defendant’s gun was made by 
Smith & Wesson.  However, the criminologist’s earlier 
testimony that either a .38 special or a .357 magnum handgun 
fired the bullet that killed Johnson was not called into question.  
She also testified that many gun parts are interchangeable and 
a person could attach a pair of Smith & Wesson grips onto 
another brand of gun. 
Correctional nurse Jean Huang treated Carrillo for chest 
pain when he was incarcerated at the Orange County Jail.  
Huang testified that Carrillo had told her that he had been a 
frequent methamphetamine user and heavy alcohol drinker.  
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
Forensic toxicologist Darrell Clardy testified that a person who 
consumed as much alcohol and drugs as Carrillo reported would 
likely 
be 
disoriented, 
confused, 
and 
susceptible 
to 
misinterpreting what was happening.   
Shawn Monroe testified that defendant and Carrillo came 
to his home in November 1997, at which time Carrillo inquired 
about procuring false identification cards.  When Monroe asked 
Carrillo why the fake identifications were needed, Carrillo 
responded that he “just shot some fools in Orange County and 
he “need[ed] to leave town.”  Defendant instructed Carrillo to 
“shut up.”  Based on their interaction, Monroe thought that 
Carrillo was the shooter.   
Quiambao also testified that in 2001 Carrillo admitted 
that he was the shooter.  However, Quiambao was impeached on 
cross-examination by a taped interview with detectives, in 
which he stated that defendant was the shooter.   
B.  Penalty Phase Evidence 
1.  Prosecution evidence 
The prosecution’s case in aggravation included evidence 
regarding defendant’s criminal history and victim impact 
testimony. 
In March 1988, when defendant was in seventh grade, he 
exposed himself to two female students and touched their 
breasts and buttocks.  In June 1991, defendant and three other 
individuals robbed Thomas Kinsey.  In December 1993, 
defendant robbed another person, John Hagen, at gunpoint.   
Two of Johnson’s cousins described their close relationship 
with him and explained how his death impacted their families’ 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
lives.  Johnson’s girlfriend described the grief and emotional 
struggle she felt after Johnson died. 
2.  Defense evidence 
In mitigation, the defense focused on defendant’s family 
history, background and character, brain activity, and 
adjustment to prison.  Concerning these matters, defendant 
presented the testimony of several family members as well as 
various experts.  He also took the stand on his own behalf once 
again.   
Professor Inoke Funaki testified as an expert witness on 
Tongan culture.  He described Tongan parenting style as 
authoritarian and strict, adding that it is common for Tongan 
husbands to physically abuse their wives and children.     
Defendant and several of his family members described 
the emotional and physical abuse that occurred in defendant’s 
home.  Defendant’s parents argued constantly, and defendant’s 
father often beat his mother.  Defendant’s parents also hit 
defendant and beat him with a broom handle.  Defendant was 
described as a loving brother, protective family member, caring, 
courteous, and respectful.  
Defendant was the target of ridicule in elementary school 
because he was bigger than the other children and did not have 
nice clothes.  He was respectful to his teachers and 
administrators in elementary and middle school.  Defendant’s 
high school football coach described him as kind, polite, and a 
good kid.  Defendant quit high school in tenth grade and started 
working in construction to help his family financially.     
In 
1992, 
defendant 
provided 
mouth-to-mouth 
resuscitation to Monroe when he was shot by a rival gang 
member.  Defendant befriended a young woman who had felt 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
unsafe when she was walking to school and he became a father 
figure to her. 
Defendant denied robbing Kinsey.  He admitted to robbing 
Hagen, but testified that he accepted responsibility when 
contacted by the police and expressed remorse.   
In July 1997, defendant witnessed the murder of his 
cousin, Loma Mataele.  Defendant was very close to Loma and 
was heartbroken by her death.  He testified that Loma’s death 
“really messed [him] up in the head.”   
Following the shooting of Johnson and Masubayashi, 
defendant set up weekly family meetings to encourage family 
members to better themselves and help each other.  Defendant 
recognized that he had made mistakes in his own life.  
Several experts testified regarding defendant’s brain 
function and ability to benefit from life in prison.  Dr. Kenneth 
Nudleman testified that defendant’s neurological test results 
were generally in the normal range, and there were no 
structural changes to the brain associated with violent behavior.  
Clinical 
psychologist 
and 
neuropsychologist 
Dr. Timothy 
Collister testified that defendant performed well in the 
neurological tests he administered, was very intelligent, and 
gave straightforward and honest answers.  Collister opined that 
defendant could benefit from education and rehabilitation.   
Dr. Nancy Kaser-Boyd opined that defendant suffered 
from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and posttraumatic 
stress disorder, but his above average intelligence, normal brain 
function, and relationships would mitigate some of the risk 
factors in defendant’s life, including child abuse, domestic 
violence, 
racism, 
and 
poverty. 
 
Psychopharmacologist 
Dr. Ronald 
Siegel 
testified 
regarding 
the 
effects 
of 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
methamphetamine, including paranoia, irritability, impulsivity, 
psychosis, and delusions resulting from sustained use.   
James Esten, a retired employee from the Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation, testified as a correctional 
consultant.  Based on his review of defendant’s custodial history 
and an interview with defendant, Esten opined that defendant 
was suitable for and adaptable to prison life, and was a good 
candidate to lead a productive and nonviolent life in prison.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Excusal of two prospective jurors for cause  
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously excluded 
two prospective jurors based on their death penalty views in 
violation of the constitutional standards set forth in 
Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 and Wainwright v. 
Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 (Witt).  We conclude that the record 
fairly supports the excusals and therefore uphold the trial 
court’s rulings.   
a.  Legal principles 
“Under state and federal constitutional principles, a 
criminal defendant has the right to be tried by an impartial jury.  
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.)  With 
regard to jury selection in a capital case, decisions by this court 
and the United States Supreme Court have made clear that 
prospective jurors’ personal opposition to the death penalty is 
not a sufficient basis on which to remove them from jury service 
in a capital case, ‘ “so long as they clearly state that they are 
willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to 
the rule of law.” ’ ”  (People v. Schultz (2020) 10 Cal.5th 623, 646 
(Schultz).) 
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“Excusal for cause is permissible, however, when the 
prospective juror’s beliefs regarding the death penalty ‘would 
“prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her] 
duties as a juror in accordance with [the court’s] instructions 
and [the juror’s] oath.” ’ ”  (Schultz, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 647, 
quoting Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.)  Although “a prospective 
juror may not be excused for cause based on ‘general objections’ 
or ‘conscientious or religious scruples’ against the death penalty 
[citation], excusal is proper when a prospective juror cannot 
‘consider and decide the facts impartially and conscientiously 
apply the law as charged by the court’ [citation].”  (Schultz, at 
p. 649.)  This rule balances the interest of a criminal defendant, 
who “has a right to an impartial jury drawn from a venire that 
has not been tilted in favor of capital punishment by selective 
prosecutorial challenges for cause,” and the state’s “strong 
interest in having jurors who are able to apply capital 
punishment within the framework state law prescribes.”  
(Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9 (Uttecht).)   
We review a trial court’s determination regarding juror 
bias for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 
1, 41 (Jones).)  “ ‘[A]ppellate courts recognize that a trial judge 
who observes and speaks with a prospective juror and hears that 
person’s responses (noting, among other things, the person’s 
tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor), 
gleans valuable information that simply does not appear on the 
record.’  [Citation.]  As such, ‘the reviewing court generally must 
defer to the judge who sees and hears the prospective juror, and 
who has the “definite impression” that he is biased, despite a 
failure to express clear views.’ ”  (Ibid.; see also Uttecht, supra, 
551 U.S. at p. 9 [“Deference to the trial court is appropriate 
because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical 
importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of 
potential jurors”].)   
“During voir dire, jurors commonly supply conflicting or 
equivocal responses to questions directed at their potential bias 
or incapacity to serve.  When such conflicting or equivocal 
answers are given, the trial court, through its observation of the 
juror’s demeanor as well as through its evaluation of the juror’s 
verbal responses, is best suited to reach a conclusion regarding 
the juror’s actual state of mind.  [Citation.]  ‘ “ ‘There is no 
requirement that a prospective juror’s bias against the death 
penalty be proven with unmistakable clarity.  [Citations.] 
Rather, it is sufficient that the trial judge is left with the definite 
impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully 
and impartially apply the law in the case before the juror.’ ” ’  
[Citation.]  ‘[T]he [trial court’s] finding may be upheld even in 
the absence of clear statements from the juror that he or she is 
impaired because “many veniremen simply cannot be asked 
enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been 
made ‘unmistakably clear’; these veniremen may not know how 
they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or 
may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true 
feelings.”  [Citation.]  Thus, when there is ambiguity in the 
prospective juror’s statements, “the trial court, aided as it 
undoubtedly [is] by its assessment of [the venireman’s] 
demeanor, [is] entitled to resolve it in favor of the State.” ’ ”  
(Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 41, quoting Uttecht, supra, 
551 U.S. at p. 7; see also People v. Duenas (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1, 
10 [“When the prospective juror’s answers on voir dire are 
conflicting or equivocal, the trial court’s findings as to the 
prospective juror’s state of mind are binding on appellate courts 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
if supported by substantial evidence”].)  “Even when ‘ “[t]he 
precise wording of the question asked of [the venireman], and 
the answer he gave, do not by themselves compel the conclusion 
that he could not under any circumstance recommend the death 
penalty,” the need to defer to the trial court remains because so 
much may turn on a potential juror’s demeanor.’ ”  (Jones, at 
p. 42, quoting Uttecht, at p. 8.)     
With this standard in mind, we turn to whether the trial 
court properly excluded the two prospective jurors in question.  
b.  Analysis 
i.  Prospective Juror No. 259  
In her questionnaire, Prospective Juror No. 259 signaled 
a degree of uncertainty and discomfort regarding the death 
penalty.  Asked whether there was anything that she wanted to 
bring to the court’s attention that might affect her ability to be 
a fair and impartial juror in this case, Prospective Juror No. 259 
wrote:  “Little uncomfortable seeing how young the [two] men 
were, and finding out the crime was done [eight] years ago.  Just 
questioning myself if I can be impartial, without being 
sympathetic.”  She also stated that she did not believe the death 
penalty was a deterrent and that it was for “evil people in the 
world, who cannot be reformed” and who “will continue to 
murder, with no remorse.”  She noted that she used to believe 
that the death penalty was “for no one,” but “too many crimes 
are [by] repeat murderers.”  She also stated that she “d[id]n’t 
care for” having the responsibility of deciding whether someone 
lives or dies and she “would rather give that responsibility to 
someone else.”  She added that in deciding whether a person 
should receive the penalty, she “would have to be sure that it 
serves a purpose — life is too precious for a chosen few to take 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
it away.”  She also indicated in her questionnaire, however, that 
she would not have a problem voting for the death penalty if she 
believed the individual committed the crime willfully and 
without remorse and has no chance of being rehabilitated, that 
she could set aside her personal feelings and follow the law, and 
that she would look at all the criteria before deciding whether to 
vote for death or life imprisonment.  
During voir dire for the selection of seated jurors, 
defendant’s counsel asked Prospective Juror No. 259 how she 
felt about sitting in judgment in a case of this nature.  
Prospective 
Juror 
No. 259 
answered, 
“I’m 
hoping 
the 
prosecution doesn’t have enough evidence to get to the second 
phase.”  She added, “I don’t want to see the second phase.  I see 
two innocent men, and I’m hoping that he doesn’t have enough.”  
Defendant’s counsel clarified that Prospective Juror No. 259 
should 
assume 
a 
defendant’s 
innocence 
before 
the 
commencement of trial, and asked whether, assuming that they 
did get to the second phase, she could engage in the weighing 
process and consider the appropriate factors.  Prospective Juror 
No. 259 responded that she could do so and would keep an open 
mind.     
Counsel for codefendant Lee asked Prospective Juror 
No. 259 whether she had concerns about her ability to give her 
individual opinion at the end of the case.  Prospective Juror 
No. 259 stated that she did not, but defense counsel observed 
that she had “hesitated a little bit.”  Prospective Juror No. 259 
responded, “The only thing I have is I just see these men.  
They’re just so young.”  She added, “I’ve got sons about that age.  
Maybe that might taint my view a little bit.”  Counsel explained 
that it was okay to feel sympathy for the victims and the 
defendant, but that it was not okay to have it affect a juror’s 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
decision in the guilt phase.  Prospective Juror No. 259 replied, 
“I could do that, but it’s going — going to — it’s going to be very 
hard.”  She reiterated:  “It’s something I don’t want to do.  I can 
do it.  I’ve been in trials before where I had to take the facts, but 
it’s going to be very hard.”       
The prosecutor then questioned Prospective Juror No. 259 
about her prior comment that she hoped there would be 
insufficient evidence at the guilt phase. Prospective Juror 
No. 259 acknowledged that she had said that.  She reiterated 
that she did not want to get to the penalty phase and hoped the 
prosecutor did not have enough evidence.  She added: “If you 
have enough to convince me, I don’t mind getting to the second 
phase.  But, you know, if you’re asking me how do I feel about 
the second phase, I don’t want to get to the second phase if at all 
possible.”  She stated that she understood the prosecutor’s cause 
for concern, but explained, “I actually think you have the bigger 
burden than the other two lawyers.  Because I actually see them 
as innocent and I actually think you have a bigger burden to tell 
me what you believe to make them guilty.  And that’s why I say, 
yeah, yeah, well, you’re right.  I am pulling for them.”  She 
added:  “I’ll tell you right now.  Because I don’t want to get to 
the second phase.  I don’t.”  The prosecutor asked, “Because of 
the way you feel, do you think that would substantially impair 
your ability to render — I use this term that — everybody says 
‘I don’t want to say I’m unfair,’ but do you think it would 
substantially impair your ability to render a fair verdict, either 
at the guilt or the penalty phase?”  Prospective Juror No. 259 
responded, “Yes.”   
The trial court granted the prosecutor’s request to excuse 
Prospective Juror No. 259 for cause.  The court noted that she 
had equivocated in her questionnaire when she stated that she 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
“would have to be sure that the death penalty serves a purpose” 
and “life is too precious for a chosen few to take it away.”  The 
court also pointed to her statement in court that she would be 
pulling for the defense and subsequent admission that this 
would substantially impair her ability to return a death verdict.   
Viewed as a whole, Prospective Juror No. 259’s written 
and oral responses to questions regarding her ability to impose 
the death penalty in this case demonstrated a potential bias.  
She acknowledged several times that she was uncomfortable 
after seeing how young the defendants were in this case, and 
that their age might taint her view and render her biased 
toward the defense.  She repeatedly and candidly admitted that 
she was “pulling for” defendants, and at least six times stated 
that she hoped the prosecutor did not have enough evidence to 
get to the penalty phase.  Above all else, she ultimately admitted 
that her views would substantially impair her ability to render 
a fair verdict, either at the guilt or penalty phase.  We conclude 
the trial court acted well within its discretion in excusing 
Prospective Juror No. 259.   
ii.  Prospective Juror No. 190  
Prospective Juror No. 190’s questionnaire responses 
reflected doubt about her ability to vote for the death penalty.  
She wrote that she has “much ambivalence about the death 
penalty” and she “[h]ate[s] the death penalty.”  When asked 
whether she would make any changes to the criminal justice 
system, Prospective Juror No. 190 wrote that she would 
“eliminate death penalty — speed up system.”  In response to a 
question regarding whether she would like to bring anything to 
the court’s attention that might affect her ability to be a fair and 
impartial juror in this case, Prospective Juror No. 190 wrote:  
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
“Though I am not morally opposed to the death penalty, I would 
not vote for it because if a mistake it couldn’t be undone.”  She 
added that she “formerly considered the death penalty immoral, 
but now just am concerned because human error might cause a 
wrong decision.”  She also wrote that she was “not sure it is our 
right” to decide whether defendant should receive the death 
penalty.  However, she answered in the negative when asked 
whether she held an opinion concerning the death penalty that 
would make her automatically refuse to vote for the death 
penalty in any case.  She also checked “Agree Somewhat” in 
response to the questionnaire statement “Any person who kills 
another should get the death penalty,” adding that although she 
was “scared to make a mistake, sometimes it is the only answer.”  
She further indicated that she could set aside her personal 
feelings regarding what the law ought to be and follow the law 
as the court explains it to her.   
During voir dire, Prospective Juror No. 190 offered that 
she 
had 
been 
“reflecting” 
since 
completing 
the 
jury 
questionnaire and her views had changed.  She stated:  “And 
I found that I — when I filled it out, I thought I was more anti 
death penalty than I actually am.  I’m coming down more in the 
middle.”  She added:  “Initially when I filled it out, I thought 
that I would favor life without parole . . . at all times or in most 
circumstances.  But in looking at myself, I also think that death 
can be a moral decision after examining what I do believe.”  She 
explained that she “didn’t realize that we would have set factors 
to consider.  And I’m grateful and relieved that we will, should 
we get there.”     
Prospective Juror No. 190 also indicated that she “ha[d] 
concerns looking at our system as a whole.  Whereas 12 people 
might find one way, the same exact case, 12 people tomorrow 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
might find another way.  So it’s the whole system that concerns 
me.  In this case, I think I can focus just on this case.”  When 
asked to clarify, Prospective Juror No. 190 reiterated, “I just 
think it’s a flaw in the system.”  She later stated, “And I do have 
concerns about — for the same reason, because the system is 
flawed, that a mistake might be made; but I also think that it 
could be certain beyond a reasonable doubt.  And I could vote for 
the death penalty.”   
Later in voir dire, the prosecutor questioned Prospective 
Juror No. 190 about her change in attitude regarding the death 
penalty.  The following colloquy occurred:   
“[Prosecutor]:  [W]hen I see a juror who says, ‘I could not 
vote for [the death penalty],’ and then they completely change 
and say, ‘It’s moral, and I could vote for it’ —  
“[Prospective Juror No. 190]:  Right. 
“[Prosecutor]: — Can you understand that I’d be 
concerned about that? 
“[Prospective Juror No. 190]:  Absolutely.  I can definitely 
understand. 
“[Prosecutor]:  What is it that you heard that hasn’t just 
educated you but it’s made you completely change your mind 
about whether you could fairly evaluate evidence and vote for a 
death verdict? 
“[Prospective Juror No. 190]:  When I wrote that, I’m 
thinking when — especially when you’re a child.  But, as you’re 
growing up, even though I wake up in the morning and the news 
is that somebody has been put to death for a crime, I just get 
sick.  I mean I really hate that.  And the thought that one person 
could have been put to death for a crime they didn’t commit 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
makes me sick.  So that was what I was thinking when I wrote 
that.  However, in my right and wrong, moral and not moral 
world, I believe that the death penalty is a valid punishment, a 
moral and right punishment.  Okay.  But I do have those 
concerns, maybe I wouldn’t be fair to you or to — you know, if 
we got to the penalty phase. 
“[Prosecutor]:  Okay. 
“[Prospective Juror No. 190]:  It’s possible. 
“[Prosecutor]:  Well, that’s — that’s the crux of where I’m 
going. 
“[Prospective Juror No. 190]:  Okay. 
“[Prosecutor]:  And any time I pick specific questions it’s 
all going to the same place ultimately. 
“[Prospective Juror No. 190]:  Okay. 
“[Prosecutor]:  So let me ask you:  You say maybe you could 
be fair.  I’ll use one of [defense counsel]’s phrases. . . .  Dig deep 
and tell me.  Could you be fair to both sides or not?  Could you — 
would your beliefs substantially impair your ability to be a fair 
juror in this case?   
“[Prospective Juror No. 190]:  No.”   
In response to further questioning from the prosecutor 
regarding her written response questioning whether it was a 
juror’s right to impose the death penalty, Prospective Juror 
No. 190 stated:  “Exactly.  Exactly.  I’m not sure.”  When the 
prosecutor pointed out the inconsistency between her written 
and voir dire responses, Prospective Juror No. 190 stated, “I’m 
not sure it’s our right to take a life, the state’s right to take a 
life,” but added, “I am sure it’s right for the state to — that it is 
okay for the state to do that.  I am sure.  I have an emotional 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
reaction, but I’m sure that’s okay.”  When the prosecutor asked 
her what caused her to change her mind, she responded:  “I’m 
saying in — where I’m saying there is truth and there is right 
and there is morality, that it is moral if — if it’s, you know — if 
the truth is found, then it is moral to take a life.  However, in 
my emotional reaction in my everyday world and knowing that 
people are flawed, it would be — it would be — my emotional 
reaction is that it’s difficult.  It’s — it’s — if a mistake could be 
made it would be hard.”     
The prosecutor agreed that the job of a capital juror would 
be very difficult, but pointed out that Prospective Juror No. 190 
wrote on her questionnaire that she hates the death penalty.  
She agreed, “I do.  I hate that we have to have it.”  The 
prosecutor responded, “But that’s not what you wrote.”  When 
Prospective Juror No. 190 was asked whether she believed that 
she could be fair and neutral, she responded that she did not 
want to be here but she believed she could be fair and neutral.  
When asked to confirm that she was neutral now, she 
responded:  “I hate the death penalty.  I hate the death penalty.  
I hate that we have to have the death penalty. . . .  But I do think 
I could vote on it.”     
Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel 
expressed concern that the questioning was too extensive and 
was becoming adversarial in an effort to establish cause.  The 
trial court noted that it had granted a challenge for cause raised 
by defense counsel the previous day due to an “extreme 
inconsistency” between what a prospective juror said in court 
and in the questionnaire, and allowed the prosecutor to continue 
because Prospective Juror No. 190 was “hugely inconsistent” in 
her questionnaire responses compared with her statements 
during voir dire.   
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
In response to further questioning, Prospective Juror 
No. 190 explained that she changed her mind regarding her 
ability vote for a death penalty after learning that she could 
consider aggravating and mitigating factors.  She reiterated 
that she would rather not have to impose the death penalty, but 
it was her position “right now” that she would be neutral.  When 
asked whether she would be pulling for one side or the other at 
the beginning of the penalty phase, she responded:  “I . . . would 
rather not have to — I think I probably would rather not have 
to impose the death penalty.”  The prosecutor asked whether 
that meant she would be “pulling for the defendant, 
Mr. Mataele, hoping that there would be insufficient evidence.”  
She conceded, “I probably would.  I would probably hope that 
I would be able to weigh the factors honestly in favor of the 
defendant.”  
The trial court granted the prosecutor’s request to excuse 
Prospective Juror No. 190 for cause.  The court explained:  
“I have already commented that she’s equivocal on this and 
hugely inconsistent, and her credibility with me in open court is 
shattered.  I do not believe her when she says that she could be 
a fair and impartial juror.  She’s all over the map.  Her 
statements and her [jury] questionnaire are straightforward 
and dramatic in terms of her opposition to the death penalty and 
when she said she would not vote for the death penalty.  So, for 
all those reasons, the challenge for cause on [Prospective Juror 
No.] 190 is granted.”   
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial 
court’s conclusion that Prospective Juror No. 190’s views 
regarding capital punishment would prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of her duties as a juror.  She indicated 
in her questionnaire response that she would not vote for death 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
because if it were a mistake it could not be undone, and 
expressed concern that human error could result in the wrong 
decision.  Several times during voir dire, she repeated her 
concerns regarding the possibility of a mistake being made and 
acknowledged that she might not be fair to the prosecutor at the 
penalty phase and that she probably would be pulling for the 
defendant.  Although she also stated during voir dire that she 
thought she could vote for the death penalty and that her views 
had evolved since completing the jury questionnaire, the trial 
court found her to be “hugely inconsistent” and equivocal, and 
stated that it did not believe her when she said that she could 
be a fair and impartial juror.   
As the high court has observed, “[t]he judgment as to 
‘whether 
a 
venireman 
is 
biased 
. . . 
is 
based 
upon 
determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly 
within a trial judge’s province.  Such determinations [are] 
entitled to deference . . . on direct review[.]’ ”  (Uttecht, supra, 
551 U.S. at p. 7.)  In Witt, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
“ ‘[t]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more 
indicative of the real character of his opinion than his words.  
That is seen below, but cannot always be spread upon the record.  
Care should, therefore, be taken in the reviewing court not to 
reverse the ruling below upon a such a question of fact, except 
in a clear case.’ ”  (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 428, fn. 9.)  Given 
Prospective Juror No. 190’s conflicting responses and the court’s 
determination that she was equivocal and not credible when she 
said she could impose the death penalty, we must defer to the 
trial court, which “was in the best position to determine which 
of these two conflicting versions represented [the prospective 
juror’s] true state of mind.”  (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 
401, 441 (Cowan); see Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 43 [holding 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
that the prospective juror’s “equivocation in response to 
questioning requires that we defer to the trial court’s 
assessment of her initial and ultimate state of mind”]; People v. 
Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 431–432 [when prospective 
juror has made statements that support exclusion for cause, the 
fact that the juror also made statements that might have 
warranted retaining her on the jury does not change the 
conclusion that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 
ruling]; People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 55–56 
(Merriman) 
[“Having 
assessed 
[the 
prospective 
juror’s] 
demeanor firsthand during questioning, the trial court could 
properly find the questionnaire responses the better reflection 
of [the juror’s] true state of mind”].)  Accordingly, we conclude 
the court acted within its discretion in excusing Prospective 
Juror No. 190.   
2.  Constitutionality of substantial impairment 
standard for determining juror bias in capital 
cases  
Relatedly, defendant contends that the “substantial 
impairment” standard used for determining jury bias in capital 
cases violates his right to an impartial jury, thereby requiring 
reversal of his death judgment.  We disagree. 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees the right of a defendant in all criminal prosecutions 
to a trial by an “impartial jury.”  (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.)  The 
California Constitution independently guarantees the right to 
trial by an impartial jury.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; see People v. 
Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 462 (Thomas).)  “The Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury and the due process right 
to a fundamentally fair trial guarantee to criminal defendants a 
trial in which jurors set aside preconceptions, disregard 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
extrajudicial influences, and decide guilt or innocence ‘based on 
the evidence presented in court.’ ”  (Skilling v. United States 
(2010) 561 U.S. 358, 438.)  “[P]art of the guarantee of a 
defendant’s right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to 
identify unqualified jurors.  [Citations.]  ‘Voir dire plays a 
critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his 
[constitutional] right to an impartial jury will be honored.  
Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge’s responsibility to 
remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to 
follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot 
be fulfilled.’ ”  (Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 729–730, 
italics omitted.)   
“In Witherspoon v. Illinois [ ], the United States Supreme 
Court held that a prospective juror cannot be excused for cause 
based on his or her views on capital punishment without 
violating a defendant’s right to an impartial jury under the 
Sixth Amendment, unless, as is pertinent here, the prospective 
juror made it ‘unmistakably clear’ that he or she would 
‘automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment 
without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the 
trial of the case . . . .’  [Citation.]  In Wainwright v. Witt [ ], 
however, the court revisited Witherspoon and declared that the 
proper standard was ‘whether the [prospective] juror’s views 
would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his 
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his 
oath.” ’ ”  (People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 558 (Griffin), 
overruled on another ground by People v. Riccardi (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 758, 824, fn. 32.) 
The high court has on numerous occasions reaffirmed 
Witt’s substantial impairment standard in determining jury 
bias in capital cases.  (E.g., Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 9; 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
30 
Morgan v. Illinois, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 728; Gray v. Mississippi 
(1987) 481 U.S. 648, 658.)  In Uttecht, the court reviewed its 
jurisprudence in this area, concluding:  “These precedents 
establish at least four principles of relevance here.  First, a 
criminal defendant has the right to an impartial jury drawn 
from a venire that has not been tilted in favor of capital 
punishment by selective prosecutorial challenges for cause.  
[Citation.]  Second, the State has a strong interest in having 
jurors who are able to apply capital punishment within the 
framework state law prescribes.  [Citation.]  Third, to balance 
these interests, a juror who is substantially impaired in his or 
her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law 
framework can be excused for cause; but if the juror is not 
substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible.  
[Citation.]  Fourth, in determining whether the removal of a 
potential juror would vindicate the State’s interest without 
violating the defendant’s right, the trial court makes a judgment 
based in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed 
deference by reviewing courts.”  (Uttecht, at p. 9.) 
Defendant argues that the substantial impairment 
standard is improperly premised on balancing the competing 
interests of the State and the defendant, rather than the 
intentions of the framers of the United States Constitution.  In 
making this argument, defendant relies upon several recent 
United States Supreme Court decisions addressing the Sixth 
Amendment, in which that court emphasized the need to 
interpret that provision in light of its historical context.  (Alleyne 
v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. 99; Blakely v. Washington 
(2004) 542 U.S. 296; Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 
36; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584; Apprendi v. New Jersey 
(1999) 530 U.S. 466; Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 227.) 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
31 
As a threshold matter, we are mindful that the high 
court’s interpretation 
of 
the 
appropriate 
standard 
for 
determining jury bias in capital cases under the Sixth 
Amendment is binding on this court.  (People v. Taylor (2009) 
47 Cal.4th 850, 865, fn. 7 [“Because, as defendant recognizes, 
this court cannot overrule a decision of the United States 
Supreme Court, we do not address his attack on Faretta [v. 
California (1975) 422 U.S. 806]”]; Stock v. Plunkett (1919) 
181 Cal. 193, 194–195 [decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court involving a federal question are binding on this court].)  
This is so even if we were to agree with defendant that 
subsequent decisions by that court have called into question 
whether the substantial impairment standard is consistent with 
the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.  (See Hohn v. 
United States (1998) 524 U.S. 236, 253 [United States Supreme 
Court decisions remain binding precedent until high court 
“see[s] fit to reconsider them, regardless of whether subsequent 
cases have raised doubts about their continued vitality”].)  
Moreover, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the substantial 
impairment standard even after issuing the Sixth Amendment 
decisions cited by defendant.  (White v. Wheeler (2015) 577 U.S. 
73, 77 [“ ‘a juror who is substantially impaired in his or her 
ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law 
framework can be excused for cause’ ”]; Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. 
at p. 9.)  Accordingly, Witt’s substantial impairment standard 
remains binding on this court, and we are not at liberty to 
consider defendant’s federal claim any further.   
Nor do we find convincing defendant’s corresponding 
contention that the substantial impairment standard violates 
his right to trial by an impartial jury under the state 
Constitution.  “In People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 767, we 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
32 
adopted the Witt standard as the test for determining whether 
a defendant’s right to an impartial jury under article I, section 
16 of the state Constitution was violated by an excusal for cause 
based on a prospective juror’s views on capital punishment.”  
(Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 558; Thomas, supra, 51 Cal.4th 
at p. 462 [same]; People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 78 
[“Under the applicable state and federal constitutional 
provisions, prospective jurors may be excused for cause if their 
views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of 
their duties”].)  Defendant offers no persuasive reason for us to 
reconsider whether this standard is consistent with the state 
Constitution’s impartial jury guarantee.   
For the reasons mentioned above, we conclude that the 
substantial impairment standard violates neither the federal 
nor state Constitutions.  
3.  Denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss charges  
Defendant contends the nearly four-year interval between 
the shootings and the filing of an amended felony complaint was 
unjustified and prejudiced his ability to defend against the 
charges, thereby violating his due process rights under the state 
and federal Constitutions.  We find no constitutional violation.  
a.  Background 
Johnson and Masubayashi were shot just after midnight 
on November 12, 1997, but defendant was not criminally 
charged with the resulting offenses until October 2001.  Before 
trial, defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him, 
arguing the passage of time between the shootings and the filing 
of charges violated his right to due process because it resulted 
in the unavailability of exculpatory witnesses and the loss of 
evidence material to his defense.  Specifically, defendant 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
33 
claimed the asserted delay prejudiced his ability to locate 
witnesses and present other evidence to challenge the credibility 
of Carrillo and Quiambao.  Defendant argued that the 
prosecution possessed evidence that he was the shooter based 
on Masubayashi’s statements to police shortly after the shooting 
occurred, and could have pursued charges at that time.  
The trial court reserved ruling on the motion until the 
conclusion of the penalty phase.  Following trial, the court 
denied the motion, determining that the asserted prefiling delay 
had not prejudiced defendant.  It also found that any “delay” was 
caused by defendant’s flight from the crime scene and 
subsequent escape to Utah with Carrillo; his procurement of 
false identification documents and threatening witnesses who 
were involved in the case to get them to say nothing to the police; 
Lee and Chung giving false cross-alibis to the police the day 
after the shooting; the initial equivocation of Masubayashi 
regarding the driver of the Jeep; and legitimate police 
investigation in an effort to gather sufficient evidence to prove 
the case in court beyond a reasonable doubt, which was made 
more difficult because many of the material witnesses were 
admitted gang members.   
b.  Discussion 
“The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 15 of the California Constitution protect a defendant 
from the prejudicial effects of lengthy, unjustified delay between 
the commission of a crime and the defendant’s arrest and 
charging.”  (Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 430.)  A defendant 
seeking to dismiss a charge on this ground must first 
demonstrate prejudice arising from the delay, “such as by 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
34 
showing the loss of a material witness or other missing evidence, 
or fading memory caused by the lapse of time.”  (People v. Abel 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 908, (Abel).)  “ ‘The prosecution may offer 
justification for the delay, and the court considering a motion to 
dismiss balances the harm to the defendant against the 
justification for the delay.’ ”  (People v. Nelson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 
1242, 1250 (Nelson), quoting People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
81, 107.)  However, “[i]f the defendant fails to meet his or her 
burden of showing prejudice, there is no need to determine 
whether the delay was justified.”  (Abel, at p. 909; see id., at 
pp. 908–909 [“Prejudice to a defendant from precharging delay 
is not presumed”].)     
The state and federal constitutional standards regarding 
what justifies “delay” differ.  (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
p. 1251.)  However, because the law under the California 
Constitution is at least as favorable to defendant as federal law 
in this regard, we apply California law to defendant’s claim.  
(Ibid.; Abel, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 909, fn. 1.)   
“[U]nder California law, negligent, as well as purposeful, 
delay in bringing charges may, when accompanied by a showing 
of prejudice, violate due process.”  (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
p. 1255.)  “[W]hether the delay was negligent or purposeful is 
relevant to the balancing process.  Purposeful delay to gain an 
advantage is totally unjustified, and a relatively weak showing 
of prejudice would suffice to tip the scales towards finding a due 
process violation.  If the delay was merely negligent, a greater 
showing of prejudice would be required to establish a due 
process violation.”  (Id., at p. 1256.)  “The justification for the 
delay is strong when there is ‘investigative delay, [and] nothing 
else.’ ”  (Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 431.)  “A court should not 
second-guess the prosecution’s decision regarding whether 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
35 
sufficient evidence exists to warrant bringing charges.  ‘The due 
process clause does not permit courts to abort criminal 
prosecutions simply because they disagree with a prosecutor’s 
judgment as to when to seek an indictment. . . .  Prosecutors are 
under no duty to file charges as soon as probable cause exists 
but before they are satisfied they will be able to establish the 
suspect’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  (Nelson, at 
p. 1256.) 
“We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling on 
a motion to dismiss for prejudicial prearrest delay [citation], and 
defer to any underlying factual findings if substantial evidence 
supports them [citation].”  (Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 431.)  
Because the trial court deferred ruling on defendant’s motion to 
dismiss until after the trial had concluded, we will consider all 
evidence that was before the court up to that time.  (Ibid.)  Thus, 
evidence presented at trial may be used to support or reject 
defendant’s assertion of unjustified prejudice. 
Defendant first claims prejudice from Detective Guy 
Reneau’s unavailability at trial due to health problems, 
meaning the defense could not examine him about statements 
Masubayashi had made.  Detective Reneau was the original lead 
investigator on the case.  He had interviewed Masubayashi at 
the hospital on November 12, 1997, and again at Masubayashi’s 
home on November 18, 1997.  At the hospital, when Reneau first 
asked Masubayashi who shot him, Masubayashi said, “I don’t, 
I don’t know.”  When asked again, Masubayashi said it was 
defendant.  One week later, Masubayashi told Reneau that he 
recalled seeing an arm with defendant’s flannel shirt inside 
Masubayashi’s car when he was shot.  These interviews were 
recorded and made available to the defense.  Reneau was 
subsequently placed on medical leave and was not among the 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
36 
officers who interviewed Masubayashi when he went to the 
police in April 2000.  Notwithstanding Reneau’s absence from 
trial, the defense questioned Masubayashi at the guilt phase 
regarding his prior statements to the detective.  
We find that defendant has not demonstrated that the 
passage of time between the offenses and filing charges 
prejudiced him in this respect.  Defendant had access to the 
taped interviews and transcripts of Reneau’s interviews of 
Masubayashi, and he questioned Masubayashi extensively at 
trial regarding his prior statements.  To the extent 
Masubayashi’s 
interview 
with 
Reneau 
conflicted 
with 
Masubayashi’s testimony, defendant was able to point out the 
inconsistencies to the jury without Reneau testifying.  To the 
extent defendant claims that Reneau could have shed additional 
light on Masubayashi’s statements in the taped interviews, his 
claim is speculative and unsupported by proof of actual 
prejudice.  (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 875 
(Alexander).) 
Defendant further complains that the passage of time 
before charges were brought prevented him from acquiring 
evidence to impeach Carrillo’s and Quiambao’s credibility.  In 
the trial court, defense counsel alleged that Carrillo was 
“engaged in various nefarious activities including bank fraud, 
money laundering, drug manufacturing and drug sales,” but the 
asserted prefiling delay prevented the defense from “locating 
and interviewing witnesses who could offer evidence attacking 
his credibility by showing his character for dishonesty, the 
existence 
of 
his 
bias 
interest, 
and 
motive 
against 
defendant . . . .”  Defense counsel alleged that in light of “the 
substantial delay in prosecution, the defense is unable to locate 
and interview Quiambao because he has changed his life around 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
37 
and joined the United States Navy and is geographically 
unavailable to the defense.”  These speculative claims do not 
amount to a showing of actual prejudice.  (People v. Jones (2013) 
57 Cal.4th 899, 923.)  Moreover, Carrillo and Quiambao testified 
at trial and defense counsel was able to challenge their 
credibility through their prior inconsistent statements, habitual 
drug use, and gang involvement.   
Defendant argues that the asserted prefiling delay caused 
eyewitness Matthew Towne to become unavailable to testify at 
the guilt phase of trial.  As noted previously, Towne was one of 
three bystanders positioned outside of the Gateway Urgent Care 
Clinic who saw the shooter.  According to defense counsel’s offers 
of proof made at the guilt and penalty phases (the circumstances 
surrounding which will be described in more detail post), Towne 
would have testified that he saw a shooter with a thin build in 
the parking lot across the street.  At the time of the shooting, 
defendant weighed more than 300 pounds; Carrillo was closer to 
160 pounds.   
We conclude that Towne’s unavailability at the guilt phase 
of trial was not caused by any delay in bringing the charges.  
Rather, the defense temporarily lost communication with Towne 
sometime after charges were filed, for reasons having no 
apparent connection to any pretrial delay.  A private 
investigator for the defense first contacted Towne in February 
2004, more than two years after defendant had been charged, at 
which time Towne agreed to testify whenever necessary.  In 
November 2004, Towne moved from Indiana to Nevada, and he 
provided the investigator with a current address and telephone 
number.  The investigator conducted a second recorded 
interview with Towne by telephone on January 15, 2005.  
However, in April 2005, the investigator was unable to reach 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
38 
Towne using the number provided, and he did not regain contact 
with Towne until August 2005.  At a hearing on the motion to 
dismiss, the investigator stated that he chose not to compel 
Towne’s attendance at trial through interstate compact because 
Towne had always been a cooperative witness and the 
investigator thought compulsion was unnecessary and would 
only alienate Towne.  Thus, even assuming Towne’s testimony 
could have served any evidentiary purpose, no connection exists 
between Towne’s unavailability and the passage of time before 
bringing the charges.  (Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 877.) 
Defendant next contends the asserted prefiling delay 
impaired the defense effort to call witness Perdon to testify that 
defendant never made a comment to her in which he bragged 
about shooting Johnson.  As will be described post, defendant’s 
alleged statement to Perdon, which Perdon then relayed to 
Masubayashi, was admitted notwithstanding the hearsay rule 
as an admission by a party opponent (Evid. Code, § 1220) within 
a prior inconsistent statement (id., § 1235).  Contemporaneous 
police reports documented Perdon’s interview from April 2000, 
and Perdon testified that she told police what she knew to be 
true at that time and that the incident was fresher in her mind 
in 2000 than 2005.  
As we have held, prejudice from fading witness memories 
due to passage of time is diminished where contemporaneous 
police reports exist that may be introduced into evidence or used 
to refresh the witness’s recollection.  (Scherling v. Superior 
Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 493, 506.)  Thus, Perdon’s ability at trial 
to independently recall a conversation that took place between 
her and defendant was not critical to the prosecution’s case.  
Moreover, as will also be described post, the trial court found 
that Perdon’s inability to recall whether defendant admitted to 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
39 
killing Johnson was evasive and untruthful.  Therefore, the trial 
court’s ruling suggests that Perdon’s professed inability to recall 
defendant’s inflammatory statement was not based on the 
passage of time.  Furthermore, Perdon’s testimony was “not of 
crucial significance” to the prosecution’s case, which rested 
primarily on the testimony of Masubayashi, Carrillo, and 
Quiambao.  (Ibid.) 
In sum, defendant’s claims of prejudice are speculative 
and inadequately supported.  Accordingly, we conclude the trial 
court acted within its discretion when it denied defendant’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of prejudice.  Because we conclude the 
trial court properly found defendant was not prejudiced by the 
passage of time, there is no need to address defendant’s further 
argument challenging the prosecutor’s justifications for any 
asserted delay.     
4.  Exclusion of Towne’s hearsay statements  
As noted, eyewitness Towne could not be located at the 
time of the guilt phase trial.  Defendant contends the trial court 
abused its discretion when it excluded Towne’s out-of-court 
statements describing the shooter in a manner that was 
inconsistent with defendant’s build on the night in question.  
Defendant asserts the statements should have been admitted 
under the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule.  
(Evid. Code, § 1240.)  We conclude there was no error. 
Officer Terrance Bowers interviewed Towne shortly after 
the shooting occurred.  Towne told Bowers that he saw a thin 
male, approximately five feet and eight inches to six feet tall, 
walking through the parking lot away from the driver’s door of 
Masubayashi’s car and firing three to four gunshots in an 
eastbound direction.  Defendant sought to introduce Towne’s 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
40 
statements to Bowers as spontaneous statements.  After the 
prosecution objected on hearsay grounds, the trial court 
conducted a hearing to determine the admissibility of the 
statements.     
At this hearing, Officer Bowers testified that he arrived at 
the scene of the shooting approximately five to 10 minutes after 
it occurred.  There were groups of people standing around, 
including Fowler and Towne, who had told other police officers 
they had seen something and had been directed to wait at the 
scene until officers could speak with them.  Upon arrival, 
Bowers spent a few minutes assisting Officer Heinzel with the 
homicide scene.  The officers agreed that Bowers would speak 
with Fowler and Towne while Heinzel would speak with other 
individuals.  Bowers addressed Fowler, and then Towne.  
Bowers asked Towne what he had heard and seen.  Bowers 
recalled that Towne appeared to be “nervous” and “a little 
visibly shaken” during the interview, but he could not recall 
anything specific that made him think Towne was nervous or 
anything else about Towne’s demeanor.  In response to further 
questioning, Bowers stated that he would not describe Towne as 
appearing upset.   
The trial court sustained the prosecution’s hearsay 
objection to the admission of Towne’s statements.  The court 
explained, “I don’t think the fact that a witness is nervous 
qualifies as a spontaneous declaration . . . where the Code 
requires that the statement . . . ‘was made spontaneously while 
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such 
perception.’ ”  The court added, “This seems to be common 
nervousness and nothing more.  It is almost like any other 
witness interview in the sense that just the mere presence of a 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
41 
police officer could cause somebody to become nervous.  It 
doesn’t qualify.”   
Evidence Code section 1240 provides:  “Evidence of a 
statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the 
statement:  [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an 
act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶]  
(b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the 
stress of excitement caused by such perception.”  For an out-of-
court statement to fall within the spontaneous statement 
exception to the hearsay rule, “ ‘(1) there must be some 
occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement 
and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the 
utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive 
and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be 
supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in 
abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance 
of the occurrence preceding it.’ ”  (People v. Poggi (1988) 
45 Cal.3d 306, 318 (Poggi).)   
“The crucial element in determining whether a declaration 
is sufficiently reliable to be admissible under this exception to 
the hearsay rule is . . . the mental state of the speaker.”  (People 
v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 903 (Farmer), abrogated on 
other grounds by People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690.)  
“A number of factors may inform the court’s inquiry as to 
whether the statement in question was made while the 
declarant was still under the stress and excitement of the 
startling event and before there was ‘time to contrive and 
misrepresent[,]’ ” such as “the passage of time between the 
startling event and the statement, whether the declarant 
blurted out the statement or made it in response to questioning, 
the declarant’s emotional state and physical condition at the 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
42 
time of making the statement, and whether the content of the 
statement suggested an opportunity for reflection and 
fabrication.”  (Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 64.)  
“Whether the requirements of the spontaneous statement 
exception are satisfied in any given case is, in general, largely a 
question of fact.”  (Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 318.)  We review 
the trial court’s ruling concerning whether a hearsay statement 
falls within the spontaneous statement exception for abuse of 
discretion.  (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 752 (Lynch), 
abrogated on other grounds by People v. McKinnon (2011) 
52 Cal.4th 610.)  “ ‘[T]he discretion of the trial court is at its 
broadest’ when it determines whether an utterance was made 
while the declarant was still in a state of nervous excitement.”  
(Thomas, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 496.)   
We have “rarely held” that answers to extensive 
questioning 
by 
police 
officers 
constitute 
spontaneous 
statements.  (Farmer, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 904.)  In such cases, 
we have emphasized that the declarant was the victim of the 
crime and made the identifying remarks while under the stress 
of excitement caused by experiencing the crime.  (Ibid.; see also 
People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 719 (Morrison).)  
Indeed, we held that the trial court abused its discretion when 
it admitted as a spontaneous utterance the statements made by 
the victim of an attack when her description of the crime was 
comprehensive, made in response to questioning, and there was 
no evidence that the victim “was excited or frightened when she 
spoke, or that her physical condition at the time of her 
statements precluded deliberation.”  (Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th 
at p. 754.)  We also have cautioned against finding a 
spontaneous statement when the declarant was “merely an 
uninjured witness whose excitement might wane — and would 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
43 
thus be in a position to fabricate answers — through the 
sobering interrogation of an investigator.”  (Farmer, at p. 904.)   
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it ruled that Towne’s statements to Officer 
Bowers did not meet the requirements of the spontaneous 
statement exception because the statements were not made 
while Towne was under the stress of excitement caused by the 
shooting.  As noted earlier, Bowers arrived at the scene 
approximately five to 10 minutes after the shooting.  At that 
time, Towne, Fowler, and other individuals were standing 
around in groups waiting to be interviewed by police officers.  
Although the extent of Towne’s prior communication with other 
police officers is unclear, it is uncontroverted that he and Fowler 
had told other officers that they had seen something and were 
instructed to wait for further questioning.  After Bowers spent a 
few minutes assisting Officer Heinzel with the murder scene, he 
spoke with Fowler separately, and then with Towne.  Towne 
made the statements in response to Bower’s questions regarding 
what he had seen and heard.  Bowers testified that Towne 
appeared nervous and a little visibly shaken, but not necessarily 
upset, and he could not recall anything specific that made him 
describe Towne as nervous.  Given that the discretion of the trial 
court “ ‘is at its broadest’ ” when it determines the declarant’s 
mental state (Thomas, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 496), on this 
record we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it excluded Towne’s statements as inadmissible 
hearsay.5   
 
5  
The cases cited by defendant do not suggest a different 
result, as they either involve statements made by a victim 
 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
44 
5.  Exclusion of Carrillo’s hearsay statements  
Defendant asserts the trial court abused its discretion 
when it excluded as inadmissible hearsay an out-of-court 
statement purportedly made by Carrillo to his sister-in-law, 
Alana Swift Eagle.  We find no error. 
Eagle was called as a defense witness.  Defense counsel 
sought to introduce statements that Carrillo made to Eagle in 
2001 when Eagle saw Carrillo on a jail bus.  Specifically, Eagle 
asked Carrillo if he had killed Johnson, and Carrillo responded 
that “everything points to T-Strong” and Carrillo was “going to 
run with that.”  The prosecution objected on hearsay grounds.  
 
(Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 719 [victim identified 
defendants minutes after she was shot multiple times]; Thomas, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 496 [victim “identified defendant minutes 
after he was attacked when he still was bleeding and ‘obviously 
distressed’ ”]) or an uninjured eyewitness whose demeanor left 
no doubt that the person was still reacting to the event (People 
v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 810 [declarant was 
“hysterical” when she spoke with police officer]; People v. Brown 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 541 [trial court’s finding that the 
declarant was still reacting to the events when he made his 
statement to his sister-in-law was supported by evidence that 
“he could not stop his body from shaking nor stem the flow of 
tears”]).  Furthermore, in each of these cases we upheld the trial 
court’s ruling on the statements in question under an abuse of 
discretion standard.  Even if the circumstances in which the 
statements were made bear certain similarities to the 
circumstances in which Towne made his statements, it is not 
incongruous to determine that the trial court here also acted 
within its discretion when it excluded Towne’s statements.  (See 
People v. Liggins (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 55, 63–64 [“Faced with 
two competing interpretations of the record, the standard of 
review decides the issue.  On appeal, we cannot second-guess 
the trial court’s assessment of the evidence in determining [the 
declarant’s] state of mind”].) 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
45 
Defense counsel argued that Carrillo’s statement was 
admissible as a prior inconsistent statement because he had 
testified during the prosecution’s case-in-chief that defendant 
shot Johnson.  The trial court excluded the statement for a 
variety of reasons, ruling that it constituted inadmissible 
hearsay, it was too ambiguous to be relevant, and its prejudicial 
effect outweighed its probative value.   
“A hearsay objection to an out-of-court statement may not 
be overruled simply by identifying a nonhearsay purpose for 
admitting the statement.  The trial court must also find that the 
nonhearsay purpose is relevant to an issue in dispute.”  (People 
v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 585.)  “Relevant evidence is 
evidence ‘having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any 
disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action.’ ”  (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 821.)  
“Under Evidence Code section 352, a trial court may exclude 
otherwise relevant evidence when its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, 
confusion, or consumption of time.  ‘Evidence is substantially 
more prejudicial than probative [citation] if, broadly stated, it 
poses an intolerable “risk to the fairness of the proceedings or 
the reliability of the outcome [citation].” ’ ”  (People v. Riggs 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 290 (Riggs).)   
“The proponent of proffered testimony has the burden of 
establishing its relevance, and if the testimony is comprised of 
hearsay, the foundational requirements for its admissibility 
under an exception to the hearsay rule.  [Citations.]  Evidence 
is properly excluded when the proponent fails to make an 
adequate offer of proof regarding the relevance or admissibility 
of the evidence.”  (Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 724.)   
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
46 
Notwithstanding the general rule that hearsay is 
inadmissible for its truth, “[a] statement by a witness that is 
inconsistent with his or her trial testimony is admissible to 
establish the truth of the matter asserted in the statement 
under the conditions set forth in Evidence Code sections 1235 
and 770.  The ‘fundamental requirement’ of section 1235 is that 
the statement in fact be inconsistent with the witness’s trial 
testimony.”  (People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1219, 
fn. omitted (Johnson).)   
We review the trial court’s rulings regarding the 
admissibility of the evidence for an abuse of discretion.  (Riggs, 
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 290.)  A trial court’s decision to admit or 
exclude evidence “ ‘ “will not be disturbed unless there is a 
showing that the trial court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or 
absurd manner resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” ’ ”  (People 
v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 445; People v. Rodriguez (1999) 
20 Cal.4th 1, 9–10.)  “This standard of review affords 
considerable deference to the trial court provided that the court 
acted in accordance with the governing rules of law.  We 
presume that the court properly applied the law and acted 
within its discretion unless the appellant affirmatively shows 
otherwise.”  (Mejia v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 
151, 158.)  
Under this deferential standard of review, we conclude 
that the trial court acted within its discretion when it excluded 
Carrillo’s statement.  At trial, Carrillo testified that defendant 
shot Johnson.  He also gave detailed testimony regarding his 
involvement in the events leading to the shooting.  Defendant 
asserts that Carrillo’s alleged statement to Eagle that 
“everything pointed to T-Strong” being the shooter and he was 
“going to run with that” allowed for an inference that Carrillo 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
47 
himself shot Johnson, conflicting with his testimony.  But the 
statement’s 
ambiguity 
accommodates 
a 
more 
plausible 
interpretation, and one consistent with Carrillo’s testimony, as 
another identification of defendant as Johnson’s assailant.  
(People v. Najera (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 212, 218–219; see also 
People v. Guillen (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 934, 1024 [trial court 
properly excluded ambiguous statements as having little 
probative value, contrary to defendant’s claim that the 
statements implied a third party authorized the attack]; People 
v. Frye (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 941, 951.)  “Facing ‘two competing 
interpretations of the record, the standard of review decides the 
issue.’  [Citation.]  Since the evidence can reasonably be 
interpreted either way, we cannot say the trial court abused its 
discretion to rule as it did.”  (People v. Roberts (2021) 
65 Cal.App.5th 469, 477.)   
Moreover, “[t]he statement’s ambiguity, and the weakness 
of the inference favorable to [defendant], not only diminished 
the statement’s relevance, but enhanced the risk its admission 
would have misled the jury.”  (Najera, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 218–219.)  As such, we conclude that “[i]n excluding the 
statement, the trial court did not exercise its discretion ‘ “in an 
arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in 
a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ”  (Id., at p. 219.) 
6.  Admission of defendant’s statement to Perdon  
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion 
when it permitted Masubayashi to testify regarding Perdon’s 
statement to him that defendant had bragged about killing 
Johnson, notwithstanding the hearsay character of this 
testimony.  Again, we find no error. 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
48 
Shortly before trial, District Attorney Investigator Gary 
Hendricks interviewed Masubayashi.  During the interview, 
Masubayashi told Hendricks that in 2000, just before 
Masubayashi went to the Anaheim Police Department, Perdon 
advised him that defendant had told her, “I came in my pants 
when I saw that nigger flop.”  Defendant was referring to 
Johnson when he purportedly made this statement.  Neither 
Masubayashi nor Perdon had disclosed this statement in any 
prior interview.   
The trial court allowed the prosecution to ask Perdon 
about defendant’s alleged statement to her.  (See Evid. Code, 
§ 1220 [hearsay exception for statements made by a party-
opponent].)  On direct examination, the prosecution asked 
Perdon if defendant ever spoke with her about a shooting that 
took place in 1997, or any shooting, or if he ever made the 
statement described above.  Each time, Perdon responded, 
“I can’t remember.”  Perdon testified that she may have seen 
defendant at Quiambao’s house on a few occasions, but could not 
remember telling Masubayashi about her conversations with 
defendant.     
The trial court found there was a reasonable basis in the 
record 
to 
conclude 
that 
Perdon’s 
testimony 
regarding 
defendant’s alleged statement to her was evasive and untruthful 
such that her prior statements would be considered 
inconsistent.  It noted that Perdon said she did not recall 
whether defendant made this statement, but on other occasions 
she seemed to say that certain things were true.  The court 
explained that Perdon’s inability to recall whether such an 
inflammatory statement was made, considered in light of her 
ability to remember certain other things from that time period, 
was 
indicative 
of 
her 
being 
evasive 
and 
untruthful.  
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
49 
Masubayashi subsequently testified to Perdon’s recounting of 
defendant’s statement.     
As noted, the “ ‘fundamental requirement’ ” of Evidence 
Code section 1235 is that a witness’s prior statement must 
actually be inconsistent with his or her trial testimony.  
(Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1219.)  “ ‘ “Inconsistency in 
effect, rather than contradiction in express terms, is the test for 
admitting a witness’[s] prior statement . . . .” ’ ”  (Cowan, supra, 
50 Cal.4th at p. 462.)  “Thus, for example, ‘ “[w]hen a witness’s 
claim of lack of memory amounts to deliberate evasion, 
inconsistency is implied.  [Citation.]  As long as there is a 
reasonable basis in the record for concluding that the witness’s 
‘I don’t remember’ statements are evasive and untruthful, 
admission of his or her prior statements is proper.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 859; see also Johnson, at 
pp. 1219–1220.)   
In People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 712, for 
example, we held that the trial court properly admitted the 
witness’s prior statements to a police officer under the hearsay 
exception for prior inconsistent statements because the record 
provided a reasonable basis to conclude her subsequent “I don’t 
remember” testimony was evasive and untruthful.  We noted 
that the witness had been the defendant’s friend, admitted she 
was reluctant to testify, had failed to appear at a previous 
hearing, and claimed that even reading her prior testimony and 
listening to a taped recording of her police interview did not 
refresh her recollection.  (Ibid.; see also People v. Bryant, Smith 
and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 415 [upholding trial court’s 
ruling that witness’s claimed failure of recollection was actually 
deliberate evasion tantamount to denial when record showed 
that witness was able to recall defendant’s statements during a 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
50 
police interview conducted 10 years after the murder, but 
claimed memory loss when he testified two and a half years 
later].) 
We conclude there was a sufficient basis for the trial court 
to have concluded that Perdon’s forgetfulness at trial was 
deliberately evasive, such that the court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding the challenged statement admissible 
notwithstanding the general hearsay bar.  As observed earlier, 
Perdon and defendant’s brother were friends, and she associated 
with other Pinoy Real gang members.  She recalled spending 
time at Quiambao’s house in 1999 and testified that she may 
have seen defendant there a few times and had conversations 
with him, but she could not remember if defendant had made 
the statement in question in which he bragged about shooting 
Johnson.  The trial court, which had the benefit of observing 
Perdon’s demeanor, could find that Perdon was deliberately 
evasive when she claimed not to recall whether defendant made 
such an inflammatory statement, while at the same time she 
could recollect other details associated with that time period.  
Accordingly, we find no error in the admission of Perdon’s 
statement relaying defendant’s confession.  (See People v. 
Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 403 [multiple hearsay consisting 
of prior inconsistent statement and admission of defendant is 
admissible].)   
7.  Failure to instruct concerning confessions  
Defendant contends the trial court erred by not 
instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.70, the cautionary 
instruction defining confessions and admissions.  He claims the 
court’s failure to instruct the jury to view with caution 
defendant’s purported statement to Perdon in which he bragged 
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51 
about shooting Johnson was prejudicial because there was 
evidence the statement was fabricated.  We find that any error 
was harmless. 
At the time defendant was tried, the trial court had a duty 
to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 2.70 on its own motion if 
evidence of a defendant’s oral confession or admission was 
presented.6  (People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 94; see 
People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1190 (Diaz) [as of 2015, 
CALJIC No. 2.70 no longer required to be given sua sponte].)  
The trial court did not do so.  However, the trial court did 
instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 2.71, the cautionary 
instruction defining admissions, which directed the jury to view 
with caution any statement of a defendant not made in court 
which tends to prove his guilt.7   
 
6  
CALJIC No. 2.70 then read: “A confession is a statement 
made by a defendant in which [he] [she] has acknowledged [his] 
[her] guilt of the crime[s] for which [he] [she] is on trial.  In order 
to constitute a confession, the statement must acknowledge 
participation in the crime[s] as well as the required [criminal 
intent] [state of mind].  [¶]  An admission is a statement made 
by [a] [the] defendant which does not by itself acknowledge [his] 
[her] guilt of the crime[s] for which the defendant is on trial, but 
which statement tends to prove [his] [her] guilt when considered 
with the rest of the evidence.  [¶]  You are the exclusive judges 
as to whether the defendant made a confession [or an 
admission], and if so, whether that statement is true in whole or 
in part.  [¶]  [Evidence of [an oral confession] [or] [an oral 
admission] of the defendant not made in court should be viewed 
with caution.]” 
7  
The trial court instructed the jury as follows:  “An 
admission is a statement made by a defendant which does not 
by itself acknowledge his guilt of the crimes for which the 
defendant is on trial, but which statement tends to prove his 
 
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52 
“We have long recognized that th[e] cautionary instruction 
[defining admissions] is sufficiently broad to cover all of a 
defendant’s out-of-court statements.”  (People v. Clark (2011) 
52 Cal.4th 856, 957.)  Indeed, as the Attorney General points 
out, the only difference between the instructions was that a 
confession 
would 
have 
been 
defined 
as 
a 
statement 
acknowledging guilt, whereas an admission is a statement 
tending to establish guilt when considered with other evidence.  
As such, a jury would reasonably interpret “confessions” to also 
be admissions and apply the cautionary instruction provided.  
Moreover, it bears repeating that the purpose of CALJIC 
No. 2.70, like CALJIC No. 2.71, is “to aid the jury in evaluating 
whether the defendant actually made the statement.”  (Diaz, 
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1184.)  That purpose is served when the 
instruction advises the jurors, as it did here, that “[t]he jurors 
are the exclusive judges as to whether the defendant made an 
admission, and if so, whether that statement is true in whole or 
in part,” and that “[e]vidence of an oral admission of the 
defendant not made in court should be viewed with caution.”  
Furthermore, the court also instructed the jury with CALJIC 
Nos. 2.20 (believability of a witness), 2.21.1 (discrepancies in 
testimony), and 2.22 (weighing conflicting testimony).  These 
additional instructions also functioned to inform the jury how to 
evaluate the credibility of Masubayashi’s testimony regarding 
defendant’s statement.  Accordingly, defendant fails to show 
 
guilt when considered with the rest of the evidence.  You are the 
exclusive judges as to whether the defendant made an 
admission, and if so, whether that statement is true in whole or 
in part.  [¶]  Evidence of an oral admission of a defendant not 
made in court should be viewed with caution.” 
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53 
prejudice resulting from the trial court’s failure to give CALJIC 
No. 2.70. 
8.  Use of 1996 version of CALJIC No. 8.71  
Defendant asserts the trial court’s use of the 1996 version 
of CALJIC No. 8.71, the instruction regarding reasonable doubt 
concerning the degree of murder, impermissibly skewed the 
jury’s deliberations toward first degree murder and lowered the 
prosecution’s burden of proof.  We conclude there was no error. 
The jury was instructed concerning first degree murder 
(on theories of premeditation and lying in wait) and second 
degree murder (with malice aforethought but without 
premeditation).  The jurors also were instructed that if they 
found defendant guilty of murder, they must determine the 
degree.  Using the then-current version of CALJIC No. 8.71 (6th 
ed. 1996), the trial court further instructed the jury:  “If you are 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously agree 
that the crime of murder has been committed by a defendant, 
but you unanimously agree that you have a reasonable doubt 
whether the murder was of the first or of the second degree, you 
must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a 
verdict fixing the murder as of the second degree as well as a 
verdict of not guilty of murder in the first degree.”  (Italics 
added.)     
The jury was additionally instructed with CALJIC 
No. 17.10, which provided:  “If you are not satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty of the crime of first 
degree murder as charged in count I, and you unanimously so 
find, you may convict him of any lesser crime provided you are 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the lesser 
crime.”  The trial court also instructed the jury with CALJIC 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
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54 
No. 17.40:  “The People and the defendant are entitled to the 
individual opinion of each juror.  Each of you must consider the 
evidence for the purpose of reaching a verdict if you can do so.  
Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but should do so 
only after discussing the evidence and instructions with the 
other jurors.  Do not hesitate to change an opinion if you are 
convinced it is wrong, however, do not decide any question in a 
particular way because a majority of the jurors, or any of them, 
favor that decision.  Do not decide any issue in this case by the 
flip of a coin, or by any other chance determination.”  The jury 
was further given CALJIC No. 8.74:  “Before you may return a 
verdict in this case, you must agree unanimously not only as to 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty; but also if you 
should find him guilty of an unlawful killing, you must agree 
unanimously as to whether he is guilty of murder of the first 
degree or murder of the second degree.”  Additionally, the court 
directed the jury to read the instructions as a whole and in light 
of all the others, and the jury was generally instructed on 
reasonable doubt.   
We review a claim of instructional error de novo.  (People 
v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1210.)  “When considering a 
claim of instructional error, we view the challenged instruction 
in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record 
to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury 
applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.”  (People v. 
Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1229.) 
In People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 411, we advised 
that “the better practice is not to use the 1996 revised versions 
of CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72 [relating to manslaughter], as the 
instructions carry at least some potential for confusing jurors 
about the role of their individual judgments in deciding between 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
55 
first and second degree murder, and between murder and 
manslaughter.”  We declined to decide whether the giving of 
CALJIC No. 17.40, addressing the jurors’ duty to render an 
individual decision, adequately dispelled the possibility of 
confusion, ruling instead that any error in giving the 1996 
revised versions of CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72 was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Moore, at p. 412.) 
In People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 246 (Salazar), 
we clarified that Moore did not stand for the proposition that the 
1996 revised versions of CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72 were 
erroneous; rather, we simply observed in Moore that “the 
instructions created ‘at least some potential for confusing jurors 
about the role of their individual judgments in deciding between’ 
the greater and lesser offenses.”  (Salazar, at p. 247.)  Salazar 
confirmed the “familiar proposition that ‘ “[t]he correctness of 
jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of 
the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or 
from a particular instruction.” ’ ”  (Salazar, at p. 248.)  We 
subsequently concluded that the 1996 revised versions of 
CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72 were not erroneous when considered 
with the rest of the charge to the jury.  (Salazar, at p. 248; People 
v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326 (Rivera) [same].)   
In Salazar, the jury was instructed with CALJIC Nos. 8.74 
(unanimous agreement as to offense — first or second degree 
murder or manslaughter), 17.10 (conviction of lesser included or 
lesser related offense — implied acquittal), and 17.40 
(individual opinion required — duty to deliberate), in addition 
to CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72.  (Salazar, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 
p. 247.)  We held that a reasonable juror, considering the 
instructions as a whole, would have understood the phrase 
“ ‘unanimously agree that you have a reasonable doubt’ ” to 
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“reflect the principle stated in CALJIC No. 17.10:  ‘the court 
cannot accept a guilty verdict on a lesser crime unless you have 
unanimously found the defendant not guilty of the charged 
crime.’ ”  (Salazar, at pp. 247–248.)  We also rejected the very 
interpretation advanced by defendant here — that the 1996 
revised version of CALJIC No. 8.71 lowered the prosecution’s 
burden of proof by making first degree murder the default 
verdict.  (Salazar, at p. 247.)  We pointed out that the 1996 
versions of CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72, “[i]f anything, [ ] skewed 
the deliberations in [a defendant’s] favor.  They could reasonably 
be understood to tell the jurors that if they all agreed there was 
reasonable doubt as to the degree of the crime, because some 
jurors were not convinced, then [a] defendant was entitled to the 
benefit of the doubt and a verdict of the lesser offense.  No logical 
reading of the instructions leads to a compelled verdict of first 
degree murder.”  (Salazar, at p. 247.)  We also emphasized that 
the defendant’s interpretation “assumes the jury would 
disregard not only CALJIC Nos. 8.74 and 17.10, but also the 
explicit directions of CALJIC No. 17.40 emphasizing each juror’s 
duty to decide the case as an individual.”  (Salazar, at p. 248.)  
More recently, we held that the use of CALJIC No. 8.71 was not 
erroneous, when considered in the context of the instructions as 
a whole, where the jury was also instructed with CALJIC 
Nos. 8.74 and 17.40.  (Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 326.) 
As in Salazar, the jury here was also instructed with 
CALJIC Nos. 8.74, 17.10, and 17.40.  And, like in Rivera, there 
is no evidence that the jury was confused by the instruction.  
(Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 327.)  Consistent with our 
precedent, we conclude that the trial court’s use of the 1996 
revised version of CALJIC No. 8.71 was not erroneous when 
considered with the rest of the charge to the jury and “given the 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
57 
lack of any indication that the jury was confused or misled into 
returning the greater verdict of first degree murder despite a 
juror having a reasonable doubt of such a finding.”  (Rivera, at 
p. 327.)  We therefore reject defendant’s argument for reversal 
on this basis. 
9.  Sufficiency of evidence for lying-in-wait special 
circumstance  
Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to 
support the jury’s special circumstance finding that he killed 
Johnson while lying in wait.  We disagree. 
We analyze a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a 
special circumstance finding under the same standard applied 
to a conviction:  “Reviewed in the light most favorable to the 
judgment, the record must contain reasonable and credible 
evidence of solid value, ‘such that a reasonable trier of fact could 
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  (People 
v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 201 (Stevens).) 
At the time of defendant’s capital crime, the special 
circumstance required that the murder be committed “while 
lying in wait.”  (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(15), italics added; see 
People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 246 (Streeter).)  Also at 
that time, “ ‘ “the elements of the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance required an intentional killing, committed under 
circumstances that included a physical concealment or 
concealment of purpose; a substantial period of watching and 
waiting for an opportune time to act; and, immediately 
thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a 
position of advantage.” ’ ”  (People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 
116, 171.)  “ ‘ “ ‘The element of concealment is satisfied by a 
showing “ ‘that a defendant’s true intent and purpose were 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
58 
concealed by his actions or conduct.  It is not required that he be 
literally concealed from view before he attacks the victim.’ ” ’ ”  
(People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 853 (Combs).)  The 
period of watchful waiting “ ‘ “need not continue for any 
particular length ‘ “of time provided that its duration is such as 
to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation and 
deliberation.” ’ ”  (Suarez, at p. 171; see also Stevens, supra, 
41 Cal.4th at p. 202 [“The purpose of the watching and waiting 
element is to distinguish those cases in which a defendant acts 
insidiously from those in which he acts out of rash impulse”].) 
We conclude that the evidence amply supports the lying-
in-wait special circumstance finding.  To carry out their plan to 
murder Johnson and Masubayashi, defendant, Lee, Chung, and 
Carrillo devised a scheme in which defendant and Carrillo 
would lure Johnson and Masubayashi from their apartment 
under the pretext of going out to a strip club or to shoot pool.  As 
defendant sat in the backseat of Masubayashi’s car, he was 
armed with a gun, waiting for an opportune time to kill 
Masubayashi and Johnson.  Continuing the ruse of going out, 
defendant directed Masubayashi to stop at Chung’s Jeep 
Cherokee, where Lee and Chung were hiding and waiting, 
claiming that he wanted to drive as well.  After Johnson exited 
Masubayashi’s car to let defendant out of the back seat, 
defendant surprised Johnson by shooting him in the head.  
Thus, the evidence is sufficient to establish an intentional 
killing, committed from a position of advantage immediately 
after a period of concealment and watchful waiting.  (See, e.g., 
Combs, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 853 [sufficient evidence of lying 
in wait when the defendant devised a ruse about needing a ride 
to a campsite, sat behind the victim in the car, waited until the 
car was in a more deserted location, and then strangled her].)   
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10.  Constitutionality of lying-in-wait special-
circumstance instruction  
Defendant asserts the lying-in-wait special-circumstance 
instruction violated his constitutional rights to due process, to a 
fundamentally fair trial, and to a reliable verdict and penalty 
determination.  (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. 
Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15.)  Specifically, defendant argues that 
CALJIC No. 8.81.15 is unconstitutional because it does not 
distinguish lying-in-wait murder from premeditated and 
deliberate murder, and because the instruction does not require 
a substantial period of watchful waiting or require that the 
concealed purpose must be a deadly one.  We have previously 
rejected these challenges.  (People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 
281 (Cage) [“As we have held before, the special circumstance of 
lying in wait instruction is constitutional”]; Streeter, supra, 
54 Cal.4th at pp. 251–252 [same]; People v. Bonilla (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 313, 332–333 [same].)  We find no persuasive reason 
to deviate from our prior decisions in the present case.       
11.  Constitutionality of lying-in-wait special 
circumstance  
Defendant further contends the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance itself is unconstitutional because it fails to 
adequately narrow the class of persons eligible for the death 
penalty.  We have repeatedly rejected these claims (see, e.g., 
People v. Delgado (2017) 2 Cal.5th 544, 576 (Delgado) [lying-in-
wait special circumstance does not apply to all murders and is 
not constitutionally infirm]; Cage, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 281 
[same]; Streeter, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 252–253 [same], and 
we continue to do so here for the same reasons. 
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60 
12.  Cumulative effect of asserted guilt phase errors  
Defendant contends his convictions should be reversed 
because the cumulative prejudice of the alleged errors during 
the guilt phase violated his due process right to a fundamentally 
fair and reliable trial under the California and federal 
Constitutions.  We have identified only one error occurring in 
the guilt phase of defendant’s trial — the trial court’s failure to 
provide the jury with the cautionary instruction defining 
confessions — and have found it harmless.  There is no other 
error to accumulate.    
B.  Penalty Phase and Sentencing Issues 
1.  Refusal to allow Towne to testify at the penalty 
phase  
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it 
prohibited the defense from calling Towne as a witness during 
the penalty phase, resulting in a violation of his federal and 
state constitutional rights to due process, to a penalty 
determination based on all available mitigating evidence, and to 
a fair and reliable determination of penalty.  We agree that the 
exclusion of Towne’s testimony at the penalty phase was state 
law error, but find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
because there was no reasonable possibility that it affected the 
penalty verdict. 
As noted in connection with defendant’s argument 
concerning pretrial delay, the defense intended to call Towne to 
testify at the guilt phase of defendant’s trial, but their efforts to 
locate him were unsuccessful.8  Following the guilt phase 
 
8  
We are not asked to decide whether defendant was 
prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to secure Towne’s 
 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
61 
verdicts, however, the defense successfully contacted Towne.  
The defense sought to have Towne testify at the penalty phase 
regarding his observations of the shooter, under the theory that 
this evidence could go to lingering doubt.  When the court asked 
what Towne would be testifying to, recalling that perhaps he 
would say the shooter was short, defense counsel answered:  
“Well, not so much short but he was medium build.  His 
testimony is pretty consistent with Fowler’s testimony so it 
would be duplicating pretty much what Fowler said.  And then 
I have Officer [Bowers] . . . available to testify in case there 
might be a discrepancy.  I don’t have the police report with me 
right now, but I’m certain that he would be in a position to say 
the shooter was not a 300-pound Samoan.”   
The prosecution argued that Towne’s testimony was 
inadmissible at the penalty phase because it was merely an 
attempt to relitigate the issue of defendant’s guilt.  The trial 
court ruled that Towne’s testimony constituted new evidence 
regarding the issue of guilt and excluded it on that basis.  
Defendant raised the issue again in his motion for new trial, 
which the court denied.9   
 
appearance at the guilt phase trial, and we offer no opinion on 
that question. 
9  
Defendant’s motion for new trial included an affidavit 
from Towne averring, for the first time, that the shooter 
“definitely had a thin build” and was wearing a cap on his head.  
However, these added specifics were not before the trial court 
when it ruled on the admissibility of Towne’s testimony at the 
penalty phase, and we therefore do not consider them in our 
determination of whether the court erred.  (See People v. Avila 
(2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 771, 780, fn. 4 [“We review the 
correctness of the trial court’s ruling at the time it was made 
 
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62 
“[A] capital defendant has no federal constitutional right 
to have the jury consider lingering doubt in choosing the 
appropriate penalty . . . .”  (People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 
863, 911; accord, People v. Gay (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1195, 1220 
(Gay).)  Admissibility of lingering doubt evidence is instead 
authorized by statute.  (Gay, at p. 1220.)  Pursuant to section 
190.3, “[i]n the proceedings on the question of penalty, evidence 
may be presented by both the people and the defendant as to 
any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence 
including, but not limited to, the nature and circumstances of 
the present offense . . . .”  In determining the penalty, the trier 
of fact shall consider “[t]he circumstances of the crime of which 
the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the 
existence of any special circumstances found to be true pursuant 
to Section 190.1.”  (§ 190.3, factor (a).)   
In People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 146 (Terry), we 
held that evidence that may create a lingering doubt regarding 
the defendant’s guilt is admissible as evidence in mitigation at 
 
and not by reference to evidence produced at a later date.  
[Citation.]  Since the [evidence was] proffered in support of 
defendant’s new trial motion, [it is] not relevant to an 
assessment of the propriety of rulings that were made during 
trial”]; People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 872, fn. 19 [“To 
preserve a contention that evidence should have been admitted, 
a party’s offer of proof must make clear the substance of the 
proffered testimony”]; In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405 
[“It has long been the general rule and understanding that ‘an 
appeal reviews the correctness of a judgment as of the time of 
its rendition, upon a record of matters which were before the 
trial court for its consideration’ ”].)  Defendant does not 
challenge the court’s denial of his motion for new trial, to which 
Towne’s affidavit was attached.    
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63 
a penalty phase retrial in a capital case.10  We explained:  
“Indeed, the nature of the jury’s function in fixing punishment 
underscores the importance of permitting to the defendant the 
opportunity of presenting his claim of innocence.  The jury’s 
task, like the historian’s, must be to discover and evaluate 
events that have faded into the past, and no human mind can 
perform that function with certainty.  Judges and juries must 
time and again reach decisions that are not free from doubt; only 
the most fatuous would claim the adjudication of guilt to be 
infallible.  The lingering doubts of jurors in the guilt phase may 
well cast their shadows into the penalty phase and in some 
measure affect the nature of the punishment.  Even were it 
desirable to insulate the psychological reactions of the jurors as 
to each trial, no legal dictum could compel such division, and, in 
any event, no statute designs it.”  (Ibid.)   
We reaffirmed Terry’s holding in Gay, supra, 42 Cal.4th 
1195.  There, we held that the trial court erred when it excluded 
as irrelevant evidence proffered at a penalty phase retrial of a 
codefendant’s out-of-court admissions that he was the sole 
shooter, and the corroborating testimony of four eyewitnesses.  
(Id., at pp. 1216, 1223.)  We reiterated that although 
“incompetent or irrelevant [evidence] is not admissible at the 
penalty phase,” this does not “call[] into question what ‘ “is 
certainly the rule that if the evidence would have been 
admissible on the trial of the guilt issue, it is admissible on the 
trial aimed at fixing the penalty.” ’ ”  (Id., at pp. 1220–1221.)  We 
 
10  
Terry involved an examination of section 190.1, a 
predecessor statute to section 190.3, factor (a), which also 
permitted “the presentation of evidence as to ‘the circumstances 
surrounding the crime . . . and of any facts in . . . mitigation of 
the penalty.’ ”  (Terry, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 146.)   
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emphasized:  “ ‘[T]hat the defendant cannot relitigate the issue 
of guilt or innocence . . . does not preclude the admission of 
evidence relating to the circumstances of the crime or the 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, including evidence 
which may mitigate a defendant’s culpability by showing that 
he actually did not kill the victim.  The test for admissibility is 
not whether the evidence tends to prove the defendant did not 
commit the crime, but, whether it relates to the circumstances 
of the crime or the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.’ ”  
(Id., at p. 1223, quoting State v. Teague (Tenn. 1995) 897 S.W.2d 
248, 252.) 
The Attorney General tries to distinguish Gay and Terry 
on the ground that those cases involved penalty retrials.  He 
maintains that “evidence is not admissible at the penalty phase 
for the purpose of creating reasonable doubt,” with the exception 
of a retrial of the penalty phase.  The Attorney General 
misunderstands the nature of Towne’s proffered testimony as 
well as the significance of a penalty retrial in this context.   
First, Towne’s proffered statement regarding the build of 
the shooter constituted not reasonable doubt evidence, but 
lingering doubt evidence, which is admissible under section 
190.3, factor (a).  Allowing the jury to consider lingering doubt 
evidence does not amount to an improper attempt to “relitigate 
the . . . conviction.”  (Terry, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 145.)  Because 
of differing standards of proof at the two trial phases, a jury 
determination that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt does not preclude a jury from entertaining lingering or 
residual doubt as to the nature or extent of the defendant’s 
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65 
guilt.11  (Gay, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1229, fn. 1 (conc. opn. of 
Werdegar, J.).)      
Second, although both Gay and Terry involved penalty 
retrials, it is clear that lingering doubt evidence is relevant 
under section 190.3, “[w]hether in the penalty phase of a unitary 
trial or in a penalty retrial.”  (Gay, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1229 
(conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.); see ibid. [“Our holding today, 
although made in the context of a penalty retrial, logically 
applies as well to an ordinary penalty phase.  What is relevant 
in one is equally relevant in the other”].)  People v. Blair (2005) 
36 Cal.4th 686 is illustrative.  There, the prosecution offered the 
testimony of the defendant’s former chemistry teacher at the 
penalty phase of a unitary trial to prove that the defendant was 
familiar with the dangerous properties of cyanide, which was 
used to kill the victim.  (Id., at p. 749.)  We held the evidence 
was relevant to show “that defendant could have been the 
individual who placed the cyanide in the gin bottle given to [the 
victim and her friend], and that defendant was aware that 
inserting cyanide into the gin bottle could cause their deaths.”  
(Ibid.)  We found the evidence properly admitted under section 
190.3, factor (a) as a circumstance of the crime for which the 
defendant was convicted or of the special circumstance which 
the jury found true.  In so concluding, we rejected the 
defendant’s argument “that we have placed limitations on 
defendants who seek to introduce, at the penalty phase, 
evidence relevant to issues of guilt or innocence, and that 
parallel limitations should be imposed on prosecution evidence.”  
(Blair, at p. 749.)  We observed that a defendant is not precluded 
 
11  
To the extent language in In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 
814, suggests otherwise, it is disapproved. 
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from introducing “any and all evidence relevant to guilt or 
innocence at the penalty phase.  Indeed, in many circumstances 
evidence related to guilt or innocence, and properly designed to 
raise a lingering doubt, will be relevant and admissible.”  (Id., 
at p. 750, citing cases.) 
It is true that “in an ordinary penalty phase, tried before 
the same jury that recently heard and decided guilt, the defense 
is far less likely to offer lingering doubt evidence, and the court 
might legitimately exclude some offered evidence as cumulative 
and wasteful of court time.”  (Gay, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1229 
(conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.); Terry, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 146 [“If 
the same jury determines both guilt and penalty, the 
introduction of evidence as to defendant’s asserted innocence is 
unnecessary on the penalty phase because the jury will have 
heard that evidence in the guilt phase”].)  But “this difference in 
the two procedural circumstances does not affect the relevance 
of lingering doubt evidence.”  (Gay, at p. 1229 (conc. opn. of 
Werdegar, J.).)   
Towne’s testimony would have been relevant and 
admissible at the guilt phase, but he could not be located.  And 
because he did not testify at the guilt phase, his testimony at 
the penalty phase cannot be deemed cumulative or a waste of 
judicial resources.12  In short, Towne’s testimony that the 
 
12  
The record in this case does not suggest that the delay in 
presenting Towne’s testimony was a result of deliberate 
gamesmanship or sandbagging by the defense.  We therefore 
have no cause to comment on that issue, except to note that the 
trial court retains discretion to sanction either party for 
discovery violations, including by imposing the sanction of 
precluding witness testimony.  (See People v. Hajek and Vo 
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1233.)      
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shooter had a thin or medium build, which was inconsistent 
with defendant’s build but similar to Carrillo’s build, was 
admissible at the penalty trial under section 190.3 as a 
circumstance of the offense.  The trial court abused its discretion 
when it excluded this evidence at the penalty trial. 
Nevertheless, we conclude the trial court’s error was 
harmless under the circumstances.  “Error in admitting or 
excluding evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial is 
reversible if there is a reasonable possibility it affected the 
verdict.”  (Gay, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1223.)  In other words, to 
determine whether an error is harmless under this standard, we 
must decide whether it is “ ‘unimportant in relation to 
everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as 
revealed in the record.’ ”  (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 
86.) 
The dissenting opinion speculates that Towne’s testimony 
may well have played an important role in the penalty phase by 
providing a description of the shooter consistent with Fowler’s 
testimony that more closely matched the build of Carrillo than 
that of defendant.  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 1, 3, 5.)  But 
based on our review of the trial record and even taking into 
account defendant’s posttrial filings relating to Towne’s 
proffered testimony, we can assume that Towne would have 
testified that for a few seconds, and from across a dark parking 
lot in the middle of the night, he saw a shooter of a thin or 
medium build with black skin wearing a cap.  And given defense 
counsel’s proffer that Towne’s testimony would be “pretty 
consistent with Fowler’s testimony so it would be duplicating 
pretty much what Fowler said,” we can also take note that 
Fowler’s testimony was replete with references to the poorly lit 
conditions and difficulty in discerning any of the shooter’s 
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68 
distinguishing features, including how big he was.  As Fowler 
put it, he saw a “basic shadow.”  We do not find this to be the 
sort of eyewitness testimony that would have “appreciably 
weakened the case in aggravation.”  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at 
p. 7.)  
It also bears noting that the dissent places heavy reliance 
only on certain details extracted from defendant’s motion for 
new trial.  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 1, 3, 5.)  The dissent 
discounts, for example, the defense investigator’s affidavit 
attached to that motion declaring that Towne described the color 
of the shooter’s skin as black, a description inconsistent with 
Carrillo’s skin color and more closely matching that of 
defendant.  Thus, although Towne’s and Fowler’s testimony 
regarding the shooter’s build may have stood in contrast to that 
of Rodriguez, the third eyewitness at the Gateway Clinic, who 
testified that the shooter was heavyset, Towne’s statement that 
the skin color of the shooter was black, which lined up with 
Rodriguez’s initial statement to police officers and Fowler’s 
subsequent interview with defense investigators, would have 
pointed away from Carrillo and toward defendant. 
In any event, this evidence pales in comparison to the 
evidence at the guilt phase, properly considered at the penalty 
phase as circumstances of the case, establishing defendant’s 
guilt.  To recap:  Masubayashi and Carrillo, both of whom knew 
defendant and were with him when the shooting took place, 
identified defendant as the shooter.  Masubayashi testified that 
he had observed defendant carrying a gun on the night in 
question, saw defendant exit Masubayashi’s car, shoot and kill 
Johnson, and then reach into the car and shoot Masubayashi.  
Carrillo testified that he was with defendant when defendant 
communicated his plan to kill Johnson and Masubayashi, he 
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69 
accompanied defendant to Johnson and Masubayashi’s 
apartment with the intent to lure them out and kill them, he 
saw defendant tuck a gun in his waistband before they set out 
for the evening, and he watched defendant shoot Johnson and 
Masubayashi.  Sia Her also testified that defendant told her he 
was “strapped” that night.  Masubayashi, Carrillo, and 
defendant testified that defendant was carrying a .357 magnum 
handgun, which was one of two possible guns identified as firing 
the bullet that killed Johnson.  Quiambao testified that, after 
the shooting took place, Carrillo returned to his apartment and 
told him that defendant shot Johnson.  And when defendant 
arrived at Quiambao’s house, he did not respond to Quiambao’s 
question asking why he shot Johnson and Masubayashi.  
Instead, when pressed, defendant told Quiambao to “shut the 
hell up.”  Defendant also admitted to Quiambao that he threw 
the gun away.  The dissenting opinion ignores the weight of the 
testimony from Carrillo and Masubayashi, both of whom the 
jury found credible, and downplays the inculpatory testimony of 
Quiambao and Her.   
Moreover, beyond the circumstances of the crime, which 
involved the murder of Johnson by means of lying in wait and 
the attempted murder of Masubayashi, the prosecution 
presented penalty phase evidence of defendant’s sexual 
misconduct and two prior robberies and the testimony from 
several of Johnson’s family members and friends regarding the 
pain and suffering caused by Johnson’s death.    
Significantly, defendant’s penalty phase evidence focused 
not on lingering doubt, but on defendant’s family history, 
background and character, brain activity, and adjustment to 
prison as factors in mitigation.  Defense counsel’s closing 
argument referenced lingering doubt only briefly, conjecturing 
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that perhaps Carrillo would admit on his death bed that he was 
the shooter, but he did not mention Fowler’s testimony or any 
other details suggesting that defendant was not the shooter.  
Thus, to the extent that Towne’s testimony, if admitted, might 
have gone to the issue of lingering doubt, defense counsel’s 
failure to raise the issue even given Fowler’s admitted 
testimony — which was essentially the same as Towne’s 
excluded testimony — serves to further underscore the 
inconsequential nature of the error.  Moreover, the trial court 
properly instructed the jury on lingering doubt, and the jury 
reached a verdict only a few hours after beginning their 
deliberations. 
In light of these circumstances, we conclude there is no 
reasonable possibility that the additional testimony defendant 
could have elicited from Towne would have affected the jury’s 
verdict at the penalty phase.    
2.  Instruction on deliberations with alternate juror 
substituted at penalty phase  
Following the guilt phase verdicts, the trial court excused 
one of the seated jurors, who was replaced with an alternate 
juror for the penalty phase.  Defendant claims the trial court’s 
special instruction requiring the penalty phase jury to accept 
the guilt phase verdicts and findings violated his state and 
federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, due process, and a 
reliable determination of penalty.  
The trial court instructed the penalty phase jury that “[f]or 
the purposes of this penalty phase of the trial, the alternate 
juror must accept as having been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt those guilty verdicts and true findings rendered by the 
jury in the guilt phase of this trial.”  The court also instructed 
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the jury that “if any individual juror has a lingering or residual 
doubt about whether the defendant killed the victim, he or she 
must consider it as a mitigating factor and assign to it the 
weight you deem appropriate.”     
We have on numerous occasions considered and rejected 
the argument that this special instruction is constitutionally 
defective.  (See, e.g., People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 64–66 
(Cain); id., at p. 67 [“An instruction that allows the jurors to vote 
against the death penalty phase if they have residual doubt as 
to guilt or truth of the special circumstances is sufficient even 
though it requires the [alternate] jurors to accept the guilt phase 
verdicts”].)  Most recently, in People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 
513, 604, we stated:  “We have made clear that ‘[a]s a matter of 
law, the penalty phase jury must conclusively accept [the guilt 
phase jury’s] findings’ as to the defendant’s guilt and the truth 
of the special circumstance allegations beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  [Citation.]  We have also rejected the suggestion ‘that 
anytime a juror is replaced at the penalty phase, the jury should 
engage in guilt phase deliberations anew.’  [Citation.]  And, most 
notably, in People v. Cain[ ], we found no constitutional defect in 
the trial court instructing the jury, including a new juror who 
replaced an excused juror, that it must accept the guilt phase 
verdicts and findings at the penalty phase.”  We also reiterated 
in Miles that an instruction regarding lingering doubt as a 
mitigating factor sufficiently apprises alternate jurors that they 
may vote against the death penalty if they doubt the defendant’s 
guilt.  (Miles, at p. 604, citing People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 
648, 708; see also Cain, at p. 67; People v. Nguyen (2015) 
61 Cal.4th 1015, 1089 [“There is no reason to think that the 
jurors would have interpreted the instructions to permit only 
the original jurors, and not the former alternate jurors, to 
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consider lingering doubt”].)  Defendant offers no reasoned basis 
for us to reconsider our previously expressed view.   
3.  Admission of juvenile criminal history 
Defendant asserts the jury’s consideration of his juvenile 
criminal history violated his federal constitutional rights under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  He contends that 
recent United States Supreme Court decisions applying the 
Eighth Amendment to juveniles undercuts the use of juvenile 
criminal activity as an aggravating factor in determining 
whether to impose a death sentence.  We conclude otherwise. 
During the penalty phase, the prosecution presented 
evidence that when defendant was 13 years old, he exposed 
himself to two female students and touched their buttocks and 
breasts.  The prosecution also presented evidence that 
defendant robbed and assaulted Thomas Kinsey when 
defendant was age 16.   
Juvenile criminal activity involving the use or attempted 
use of force or violence is admissible as aggravating evidence 
under section 190.3, factor (b).  (People v. Taylor (2010) 
48 Cal.4th 574, 652.)  We have repeatedly held that the 
admission of such evidence is constitutional.  (E.g., People v. Lee 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 649; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 
909.)   
In People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1239 (Bramit), 
we examined and rejected the defendant’s claim that, in light of 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. 
Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, the admission of juvenile criminal 
activity violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  We 
concluded the defendant’s reliance on Roper was “badly 
misplaced,” explaining that Roper “holds that the execution of 
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individuals who were under 18 years of age at the time of their 
capital crimes is prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  It says nothing about the propriety of permitting 
a capital jury, trying an adult, to consider evidence of violent 
offenses committed when the defendant was a juvenile.  An 
Eighth Amendment analysis hinges upon whether there is a 
national consensus in this country against a particular 
punishment.  [Citations.]  Defendant’s challenge here is to the 
admissibility of evidence, not the imposition of punishment.”  
(Bramit, at p. 1239; see also Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 
pp. 653–654 [same].) 
We have further held that three additional high court 
decisions — Hall v. Florida (2014) 572 U.S. 701, Miller v. 
Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, and Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 
U.S. 48 — do not alter our conclusion that evidence of juvenile 
misconduct may be considered on the question of what 
punishment a defendant may receive for crimes committed as 
an adult.  (Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 342–343; People v. 
Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 87.)  In Rices, we observed that “[t]he 
high court has never suggested that evidence of juvenile 
misconduct may not be admitted in deciding the proper 
punishment for crimes an adult commits” and, furthermore, 
“[n]o legal principle prohibits admitting evidence of [an adult’s] 
violent juvenile conduct on the question of what the punishment 
for those crimes should be.”  (Rices, at p. 87.)  Consistent with 
our prior precedent, we conclude the jury’s consideration of 
defendant’s juvenile criminal activity as an aggravating factor 
under section 190.3, factor (b), was permissible. 
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4.  Admission of evidence of unadjudicated robbery  
Defendant maintains that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error when it failed to instruct the jury on aiding and 
abetting liability after the prosecution presented evidence that 
defendant robbed Kinsey as an aider and abettor.  We conclude 
that any error was harmless. 
At the penalty phase, the prosecution sought to introduce 
evidence under section 190.3, factor (b) that defendant and three 
other individuals robbed Kinsey in 1991.  Section 190.3, 
factor (b) allows the jury to consider “[t]he presence or absence 
of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or 
attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied 
threat to use force or violence.”  The trial court held a Phillips 
hearing (People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29) to make a 
preliminary determination concerning whether there was 
substantial evidence to prove that defendant robbed Kinsey.  
The court subsequently ruled that the evidence fit within section 
190.3, factor (b) as criminal activity involving the use or 
attempted use of force or violence and would be admissible 
under that provision.  Defendant did not object to the trial 
court’s ruling.     
The prosecution subsequently presented the following 
evidence regarding defendant’s participation in the robbery of 
Kinsey:  Defendant and three other individuals approached 
Kinsey when he was walking in Hollywood.  Defendant moved 
toward Kinsey, commenting on Kinsey’s briefcase.  One of the 
other individuals grabbed Kinsey’s briefcase and fled.  
Defendant then pushed Kinsey and demanded money from him.  
As defendant approached Kinsey, he said, “I’m going to fuck you 
up.”  Defendant also pulled his fist back as if to punch Kinsey.  
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A patrolling officer saw three men, including defendant, 
cornering and pushing Kinsey.  The officer approached the 
group, ordered everyone on the ground, and interviewed the 
individuals to determine what had occurred.  Kinsey told the 
officer that defendant had asked Kinsey for more money, pushed 
Kinsey, and pulled his arm back as if to punch Kinsey.     
The trial court instructed the jury that in determining 
which penalty to impose, if applicable, it shall consider “the 
presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant, other 
than the crimes for which the defendant has been tried in the 
present proceedings, which involved the use or attempted use of 
force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or 
violence.”  The court further instructed the jury that evidence 
was introduced for the purpose of showing that defendant 
committed a second degree robbery against Kinsey, and that in 
order for a juror to consider the robbery of Kinsey as an 
aggravating circumstance, the juror must find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant did in fact commit the criminal 
activity.  The court also instructed the jury on the elements of 
robbery.  It further instructed:  “For the purpose of determining 
whether a person is guilty as an aider or abettor to robbery, the 
commission of the crime of robbery is not confined to a fixed 
place or a limited period of time, and may continue[] so long as 
the stolen property is being carried away to a place of temporary 
safety.”   
Defendant contends the evidence supported a finding of 
his involvement in Kinsey’s robbery as an aider and abettor 
only, and therefore the trial court should have provided CALJIC 
Nos. 3.00 and 3.01, which describe the essential elements of 
aider and abettor liability.  Defendant maintains that without 
such an instruction, the prosecution could proceed only on a 
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76 
direct perpetrator theory of liability for the robbery of Kinsey, 
and the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to show that 
defendant robbed Kinsey as a direct perpetrator. 
We conclude that defendant has forfeited his claim on 
appeal by failing to object at trial to admission of other crimes 
evidence on the ground it did not meet section 190.3, factor (b)’s 
criteria.  (See, e.g., Delgado, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 580; People v. 
Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1175 (Livingston); People v. 
Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1052; People v. 
Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1059–1060.)  In Livingston, 
the defendant contended that certain evidence in aggravation 
should not have been admitted under section 190.3, factor (b) 
because the evidence was insufficient for a jury to conclude that 
he was guilty of a crime involving violence.  We held that this 
argument was not cognizable on appeal because defendant did 
not object to the evidence on this basis at trial.  (Livingston, at 
p. 1175.)  This was so, we explained, because the evidence was 
admitted at the penalty phase of a capital trial as aggravating 
evidence, not to support a conviction for that crime.  (Ibid.)  
“ ‘Even if defendant need do nothing at trial to preserve an 
appellate claim that evidence supporting his conviction is legally 
insufficient, a different rule is appropriate for evidence 
presented at the penalty phase of a capital trial.  There the 
ultimate issue is the appropriate punishment for the capital 
crime, and evidence on that issue may include one or more other 
discrete criminal incidents.  [Citation.]  If the accused thinks 
evidence on any such discrete crime is too insubstantial for jury 
consideration, he should be obliged in general terms to object, or 
to move to exclude or strike the evidence, on that ground.’ ”  
(Ibid.)   
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We recently reaffirmed this principle in Delgado, 
explaining that “because the penalty decision is normative and 
the prosecution need not prove that any given aggravating 
circumstance exists in order to obtain a death judgment 
[citation], [a] defendant may not challenge the verdict on the 
ground that the prosecutor failed to prove each of the elements 
of an uncharged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  His claim 
of error lies in the erroneous admission of such evidence; that 
claim must be preserved by a timely objection in the trial court.”  
(Delgado, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 581.)   
Here, as in Livingston and Delgado, defendant’s challenge 
on appeal is directed to the sufficiency of evidence admitted at 
the penalty phase of a capital trial as aggravating evidence.  
(Livingston, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1175; Delgado, supra, 
2 Cal.5th at p. 581.)  Defendant “ ‘should be obliged in general 
terms to object, or to move to exclude or strike the evidence, on 
that ground.’ ”  (Livingston, at p. 1175.)  Defendant’s failure to 
raise such an objection at trial constitutes a forfeiture.  
Although defendant has forfeited his claim, we also reject 
it on the merits.  “Although specific instruction on the elements 
of other crimes introduced in aggravation under section 190.3, 
factor (b) is generally not required” (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 1083, 1154 (Gutierrez)), “ ‘when such instructions are 
given, they should be accurate and complete’ ” (People v. Prieto 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 268 (Prieto)).  We find the trial court’s 
failure to instruct the jury on aider and abettor liability as it 
related to the robbery of Kinsey was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt because, despite any misinstruction, the 
evidence overwhelmingly showed that defendant committed an 
act involving the use or threat of use of force or violence under 
section 190.3, factor (b). 
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Gutierrez and Prieto are instructive in this respect.  In 
Gutierrez, the prosecution sought to introduce as a crime in 
aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b), that defendant 
resisted, by the use of force or violence, an executive officer in 
the performance of that officer’s duty in violation of section 69.  
(Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 1153–1154.)  Although a 
violation of section 69 requires a specific intent to interfere with 
the executive officer’s performance of duty, the trial court 
provided an instruction on general criminal intent.  (Gutierrez, 
at p. 1154.)  Nevertheless, we found the error was “clearly 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” because “[t]here was 
evidence that defendant harbored the requisite specific intent.”  
(Ibid.)  Similarly, in Prieto, the prosecution alleged in 
aggravation that the defendant possessed deadly weapons while 
in jail in violation of section 4574.  (Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 
p. 269.)  The defendant asserted the trial court’s instruction on 
section 4574 was deficient because it did not require the jury to 
find that he knew of the weapon’s presence and its nature as a 
deadly weapon.  (Ibid.)  The defendant admitted he possessed 
the weapons — two half-foot-long shanks with sharpened ends 
hidden under the defendant’s bunk — for protection, and offered 
no evidence suggesting that he did not know of the weapons’ 
presence in his cell and their nature as deadly weapons.  (Ibid.)  
We held that any instructional error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (Ibid.) 
In the present case, even assuming a deficiency in the 
instructions, 
the 
evidence 
pointed 
unerringly 
toward 
defendant’s culpability in the commission of the robbery of 
Kinsey as an aider and abettor.  Defendant approached Kinsey 
with three other individuals, one of whom grabbed Kinsey’s 
briefcase and fled.  Defendant pushed Kinsey, threatened to 
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79 
“fuck [Kinsey] up,” pulled back his fist as if he was going to 
punch Kinsey, and demanded more money from him.  Given the 
overwhelming evidence, there is no reasonable possibility that 
the trial court’s failure to instruct on aider and abettor liability 
would have affected the jury’s penalty deliberations.  Defendant 
does not contend that the evidence would be insufficient to 
support a finding that he committed the robbery of Kinsey as an 
aider and abettor, nor does he claim that the criminal activity 
did not involve the use of force or violence or the express threat 
to use violence.  (See Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 73 [proper 
focus for consideration of prior violent crimes in aggravation is 
on the facts of the defendant’s past actions as they reflect on his 
character, not the labels assigned to the past crimes; 
accordingly, the instructions were not essential to the jury’s 
consideration of crimes in aggravation under section 190.3, 
factor (b)].)  And that evidence notwithstanding, we see no 
reasonable possibility that defendant would have obtained a 
more favorable outcome if the aider and abettor instruction had 
been given, in light of the great weight of the aggravating 
evidence against him. 
5.  Challenges to California’s death penalty law  
Defendant challenges the constitutionality of numerous 
features of California’s capital sentencing scheme.  We have 
repeatedly considered and rejected such challenges, and 
defendant offers no persuasive reason for us to reconsider the 
following conclusions: 
“Section 190.3, factor (a), under which the jury may 
consider the ‘circumstances of the crime’ as a factor in 
aggravation or mitigation of penalty, is not so broad as to make 
imposition of a death sentence arbitrary and capricious.”  
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(People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 141–142; People v. Brown 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 401.)  
“The death penalty scheme is not unconstitutional for 
failing to require . . . findings beyond a reasonable doubt as to 
the existence of aggravating factors other than section 190.3, 
factors (b) and (c), that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating 
factors, or that death is the appropriate penalty.”  (People v. 
Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 853.)  The United States Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 
270, Blakely v. Washington, supra, 542 U.S. 296, Ring v. 
Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
supra, 530 U.S. 466 do not alter these conclusions.  (Bramit, 
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1250 & fn. 22.) 
“Because the decision whether to sentence a defendant to 
death is essentially a normative one, we have held the 
prosecution bears no burden of persuasion in the penalty phase.”  
(People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1289.)  “Nor does the 
federal or state Constitution require an instruction explaining 
that there is no burden of proof in the penalty phase.”  (Ibid.) 
“The death penalty law is not unconstitutional because it 
does not require unanimous jury findings, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that particular aggravating factors (other than prior 
criminality) exist.”  (People v. Amezcua and Flores (2019) 
6 Cal.5th 886, 928; People v. McDaniel (2021) 12 Cal.5th 97, 
142–148.)   
“CALJIC No. 8.88 is not constitutionally flawed or 
impermissibly vague because (1) it uses the phrase ‘so 
substantial’ to compare aggravating factors with the mitigating 
factors [citations]; (2) it uses the term ‘warrants’ instead of 
appropriate’ [citations]; (3) it fails to instruct the jury that a life 
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sentence is mandatory if the aggravating factors do not 
outweigh the mitigating factors [citations]; [and] (4) it fails to 
instruct that a verdict of life in prison could be returned even if 
the circumstances in aggravation outweighed those in 
mitigation.”  (People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1179.) 
“[T]he death penalty law is constitutional though it . . . 
does not require that the jury be instructed on the presumption 
of life.”  (People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1267, italics 
omitted.) 
“The trial court has no obligation to delete from CALJIC 
No. 8.85 inapplicable mitigating [or aggravating] factors.”  
(People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 618.) 
“[T]here is no Eighth Amendment requirement that our 
death penalty procedures provide for intercase proportionality 
review.”  (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 346; People 
v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126.) 
“The capital sentencing scheme does not violate equal 
protection by denying certain procedural protections to capital 
defendants that are available to noncapital defendants.”  (People 
v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 612; People v. Molano (2019) 
7 Cal.5th 620, 678.)  
“California’s death penalty does not violate international 
law or international norms of decency.”  (People v. Frederickson 
(2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1027; People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 
965.) 
Because defendant has not demonstrated any basis for 
this court to find error in California’s death penalty laws, there 
is no reason to conclude that the cumulative impact of the 
alleged deficiencies in California’s death penalty scheme 
renders it constitutionally infirm.  (People v. Williams (2013) 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
82 
58 Cal.4th 197, 296; People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706, 
756.) 
6.  Cumulative effect of asserted guilt and penalty 
phase errors   
Defendant contends that the penalty judgment must be 
reversed due to the cumulative prejudice of the alleged errors 
committed during the guilt and penalty phases in violation of 
his due process right to a fundamentally fair and reliable trial 
under the California and federal Constitutions.  We have found 
one harmless error in the guilt phase: the trial court’s failure to 
instruct the jury on confessions in addition to admissions.  We 
have found or assumed two errors, but no prejudice, in the 
penalty phase:  the trial court’s exclusion of Towne’s testimony 
as evidence of lingering doubt under section 190.3, and the 
court’s failure to instruct on aider and abettor liability after the 
prosecution presented evidence pursuant to section 190.3, 
factor (b) that defendant committed second degree robbery as an 
aider and abettor.  We conclude that the cumulative effect of 
these errors does not warrant reversal of the penalty judgment.  
(People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 525; People v. Panah 
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 479–480.) 
C.  Newly Conferred Discretion Concerning the 
Firearm and Serious Felony Enhancements 
Defendant contends that certain ameliorative legislation, 
enacted after he was sentenced, applies retroactively to his case 
and that a limited remand is appropriate to allow the trial court 
to consider its newly conferred sentencing discretion.  We agree.   
On January 1, 2018, Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. 
Sess.) became effective.  (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, §§ 1, 2.)  The bill 
vested courts with authority to exercise their discretion to strike 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
83 
or dismiss firearm enhancements imposed under section 
12022.5 (see § 12022.5, subd. (c)).  Prior to the enactment of 
Senate Bill No. 620, these enhancements were mandatory.  
(§ 12022.5, former subd. (c).)  
On January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. 
Sess.) became effective.  (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1, 2.)  This 
legislation amended sections 667, subdivision (a) and 1385, 
subdivision (b) to permit a trial court to exercise discretion to 
strike or dismiss prior serious felony enhancements “in the 
furtherance of justice.”  (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1, 2.)  At 
the time defendant was sentenced, the trial court was required 
under section 667, subdivision (a), to enhance the sentence 
imposed for conviction of a serious felony by five years for each 
qualifying prior serious felony conviction.   
The Attorney General agrees that Senate Bill No. 620 
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) and Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 
Reg. Sess.) apply retroactively to defendant’s case, but 
maintains that a remand is unnecessary because the trial court 
indicated an intent not to strike the enhancements.  The 
Attorney General argues that remand for resentencing is 
unwarranted because the trial court’s statements and 
sentencing choices suggest that it would not have exercised its 
discretion to dismiss the enhancements.   
Based on our review of the record, we do not glean a clear 
indication that the trial court, when it originally sentenced 
defendant, would not have stricken the enhancements.  (See, 
e.g., People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425.)  Thus, 
we agree that a limited remand is appropriate under the 
circumstances for the sole purpose of allowing the trial court to 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
84 
consider whether to exercise its newly conferred discretion and 
strike the enhancements.   
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed in its entirety.  The matter is 
remanded for the trial court to consider whether to strike the 
prior 
serious 
felony 
enhancement 
under 
section 
667, 
subdivision (a) and the firearm enhancements under section 
12022.5, subdivision (a), and thereafter to amend the abstract of 
judgment accordingly.   
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
1 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
S138052 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Groban 
 
I concur fully with the majority, but write separately to 
expand on the majority’s observation that “[w]e are not asked to 
decide whether defendant was prejudiced by defense counsel’s 
failure to secure [eyewitness Matthew] Towne’s appearance at 
the guilt phase trial[.]”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 60–61, fn. 8.)  As 
described more fully below, I believe a habeas corpus proceeding 
would be the appropriate forum to explore such a claim. 
Defendant Tupoutoe Mataele contends that Towne’s 
testimony would have been valuable to his defense.  “According 
to defense counsel’s offers of proof made at the guilt and penalty 
phases . . . , Towne would have testified that he saw a shooter 
with a thin build in the parking lot across the street.  At the time 
of the shooting, defendant weighed more than 300 pounds; 
[Ryan] Carrillo was closer to 160 pounds.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 37.)  This testimony would have been consistent with 
eyewitness John Fowler’s trial testimony; Fowler described the 
shooter as having a thin-to-medium build and being about 5 feet 
10 inches.  Like Fowler, Towne was a disinterested third-party 
eyewitness.  As the majority recognizes, “Towne’s testimony 
would have been relevant and admissible at the guilt phase, but 
he could not be located.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 66.)   
But defense  counsel made a decision that did not work out 
well for his client.  Counsel decided not to legally compel Towne’s 
appearance at trial, and instead relied on Towne’s voluntary 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Groban, J., concurring 
2 
appearance.1  When trial commenced and counsel could not 
locate Towne, the trial court afforded defense counsel some time 
to secure Towne’s appearance at trial, but ultimately declined 
“to delay the trial anymore to try to get a witness in here who 
may never appear before the court.”  As such, Towne’s testimony 
was not presented to the jury during the guilt phase of Mataele’s 
trial.  While the defense located Towne before the penalty phase, 
the trial court precluded Towne from testifying on the basis that 
his testimony constituted new evidence on the issue of guilt.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 61.)   
“As we have observed in the past, certain practical 
constraints make it more difficult to address ineffective 
 
1  
In seeking a mid-trial continuance, defense counsel 
presented 
testimony 
from 
Defense 
Investigator 
David 
Carpenter, who described for the trial court his efforts to locate 
Towne.  In so doing, Carpenter explained in part, “[w]e didn’t 
subpoena Mr. Towne because Mr. Towne was at all times 
friendly.  California subpoena in Nevada is worthless.  It was 
the suggestion to [defense counsel] that we not go through the 
interstate compact that would serve to alienate him.  I didn’t 
feel it was appropriate and a waste of time.”  The “interstate 
compact” referred to by Carpenter is more formally known as 
the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from 
without the State in Criminal Cases (“the Act”).  (See Pen. Code, 
§ 1334.)  The California Legislature adopted the Act in 1937, 
with slight modifications, as sections 1334 to 1334.6 of the Penal 
Code.  (See People v. Cavanaugh (1968) 69 Cal.2d 262, 266.)  The 
Act has now been adopted in all fifty states, plus the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.  (Studnicki & 
Apol, Witness Detention and Intimidation:  The History and 
Future of Material Witness Law (2002) 76 St. John’s L.Rev. 483, 
532.)  It permits a court to order that a material witness in a 
criminal prosecution be taken into custody in another state and 
delivered to the court to ensure the witness’s attendance at trial.  
(Pen. Code, §§ 1334–1334.6.)   
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Groban, J., concurring 
3 
assistance claims on direct appeal rather than in the context 
of a habeas corpus proceeding.   [Citations.]  The record on 
appeal may not explain why counsel chose to act as he or she 
did.”  (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198 (Mickel).)  
Perhaps for this reason, Mataele’s appellate counsel does not 
ask us here to consider whether trial counsel was ineffective.   
In order to make a showing of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-prong standard 
under Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668.  First, 
“the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  (Id. at p. 688.)  
Second, the court asks whether “there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.”  (Id. at 
p. 694; see also People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 653.)   
As to the question of deficient performance, we do not 
have the benefit of a declaration from defense counsel, but 
notably, in moving for a new trial, counsel argued that “a new 
trial should be granted in the guilt phase based on Matt 
Towne’s expected testimony.”  He tried to characterize Towne’s 
expected testimony as “newly discovered evidence” and 
asserted in part, “[a]ssuming arguendo a lack of due diligence 
in discovering the evidence presented at the motion for a new 
trial, this lack of due diligence cannot justify a denial of the 
new trial motion where the newly discovered evidence would 
probably lead to a different result at trial.  If a trial court 
determines that a defendant did not have a fair trial on the 
merits and that by reason of the newly discovered evidence the 
result could reasonably and probably be different on retrial, it 
should not seek to sustain an erroneous judgment imposing 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Groban, J., concurring 
4 
criminal penalties on the defendant as a way of punishing 
defense counsel’s lack of diligence.”  
I take no view on the reasonableness of trial counsel’s 
actions.  (Cf. People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 523 
[considering the phrase “reasonable diligence” within the 
meaning of Evidence Code, section 240, subdivision (a)(5) and 
explaining, “ ‘[w]hat constitutes due diligence to secure the 
presence of a witness depends upon the facts of the individual 
case.  [Citation.]  The term is incapable of a mechanical 
definition’ ”].)   
Similarly, I take no position on whether Mataele was 
prejudiced by any potential ineffectiveness by trial counsel.  
Again, “[w]e are not asked to decide whether defendant was 
prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to secure Towne’s 
appearance at the guilt phase trial[.]”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 60–61, fn. 8.)  The question of counsel’s ineffectiveness at 
the guilt phase, and any prejudice therefrom, poses a distinct 
question from the question debated by the majority and the 
dissent, i.e., whether Mataele was prejudiced by the trial 
court’s erroneous exclusion of Towne’s testimony  at the 
penalty phase. 
On habeas corpus, a petitioner provides a court with 
“reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the 
claim, including pertinent portions of trial transcripts and 
affidavits or declarations.”  (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 
464, 474.)  Mataele can provide sworn declarations as to why 
defense counsel did not use legal process to secure Towne’s 
testimony at the guilt phase.  Similarly, additional evidence, 
including declarations, might further illuminate exactly what 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Groban, J., concurring 
5 
Towne would have testified to and if it would have been helpful 
to the defense at guilt.  Moreover, if an order to show cause 
issues, the court may conduct an evidentiary hearing and hear 
directly from relevant witnesses, including (if they are 
available) Mataele’s trial counsel, Mataele’s investigator 
(Carpenter) and, most significantly, Towne himself.  (In re 
Figueroa (2018) 4 Cal.5th 576, 587) [if “the court conclude[s] 
there are factual issues in dispute, ‘it may appoint a referee 
and order an evidentiary hearing’ ”].)  In sum, this is a highly 
fact-specific inquiry that will benefit from additional argument 
and evidence that is not part of the record before us on direct 
appeal.  This is precisely what a habeas corpus proceeding is 
best suited for.  (Cf. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 198.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
  
1 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
S138052 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
Defendant Tupoutoe Mataele was sentenced to death by a 
jury wrongly prevented from hearing testimony from an 
eyewitness who would have described the shooter in a manner 
inconsistent with Mataele’s size.  As today’s opinion holds, the 
trial court erred in excluding this testimony in the penalty 
phase.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 67.)  But I cannot agree with 
today’s further holding that the error was harmless.  In the 
circumstances here, I believe the error was of the sort that “may 
have led a single juror to vote for the death penalty, who, if the 
error had not occurred, would not have done so.”  (People v. Terry 
(1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 153 (Terry).)  
Mataele weighed 300 to 350 pounds at the time of the 
shooting.  Eyewitness Matthew Towne would have described the 
shooter to the jury as a male wearing a cap who “definitely had 
a thin build” and was around 160 to 170 pounds, “definitely not 
anywhere near 300 pounds.”  Ryan Carrillo, who accepted a six-
year plea deal to testify against Mataele, and whom the defense 
argued was the actual shooter, weighed 145 pounds and 
admitted to wearing a cap the night of the shooting. 
The prosecution’s case against Mataele rested on Carrillo’s 
immunized testimony and John Masubayashi’s limited view of 
the shooter’s forearm.  Towne’s testimony would have matched 
the description provided by another eyewitness, John Fowler, 
who described the shooter as a man half the size of Mataele.  In 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
2 
my view, “there is a reasonable possibility” that Towne’s 
testimony would have been sufficient to create a lingering doubt 
about the shooter’s identity and thereby cause one or more 
jurors to select a different penalty.  (People v. Gay (2008) 
42 Cal.4th 1195, 1227 (Gay).)  Under the applicable standard of 
review, the death verdict cannot stand.   
A penalty phase error requires reversal if “ ‘there is a 
reasonable possibility such an error affected a verdict.’ ”  (People 
v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 218, fn. 15, italics omitted.)  
This standard “ ‘is the same, in substance and effect, as the 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. 
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.’ ”  (Ibid., italics omitted.)  It is 
not satisfied so long as there is a doubt “based upon ‘reason.’ ”  
(Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317.)  A “reviewing 
court making this harmless-error inquiry” must not “ ‘become in 
effect a second jury.’ ”  (Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 
1, 19.)  We ask only whether absence of the error “could 
rationally lead to a contrary finding.”  (Ibid.)  This stringent 
standard serves to ensure “ ‘reliability in the determination that 
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.’ ”  (People 
v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448.)  “Anything less [than the 
Chapman standard] would force a reviewing court to run a 
constitutionally unacceptable risk of affirming a judgment 
against a human being for whom death may not be the 
appropriate penalty.”  (Id. at p. 470 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) 
Today’s opinion discounts Towne’s testimony because he 
saw the shooter for only a few seconds across a dark parking lot.  
It states that because defense counsel proffered that Towne’s 
testimony would be “ ‘pretty consistent with Fowler’s testimony 
. . . ,’ we can also take note that Fowler’s testimony was replete 
with references to the poorly lit conditions and difficulty in 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
3 
discerning any of the shooter’s distinguishing features, 
including how big he was.  As Fowler put it, he saw a ‘basic 
shadow.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 67–68.)  But Fowler 
repeatedly testified that he was “sure” the shooter was not 300 
pounds and that the shooter did not approach the size of 
Mataele.  And, as Towne indicated in a declaration, Towne was 
prepared to testify that the shooter was a 5’ 8” to 6” tall male 
who “definitely had a thin build” and “was definitely not 
anywhere near 300 pounds.” 
Beyond having obvious “exculpatory value” standing on its 
own, as the Attorney General’s briefing concedes, Towne’s 
testimony would have served an important role in relation to the 
other eyewitness testimony.  The only third party eyewitnesses 
were Towne, Fowler, and Jose Rodriguez.  At the scene, 
Rodriguez told police that the shooter was of “medium” build.  At 
trial, he testified that the shooter was “kind of maybe heavyset” 
based on the baggy clothes he observed, but that his recollection 
would have been better at the scene and that if there was a 
discrepancy, he would go with what he initially told police.  
Fowler initially described the shooter as having thin build and 
wearing a cap.  At trial, he maintained that the shooter had 
thin-to-medium build and wore a beanie.  
Towne’s testimony that the shooter had thin build would 
have reinforced Fowler’s testimony and lent credence to 
Rodriguez’s statements at the scene.  Towne’s testimony would 
have broken any perceived tie between Rodriguez’s testimony 
and Fowler’s testimony about the shooter’s size and would have 
supported Fowler’s testimony that the shooter was wearing a 
hat (Rodriguez could not recall whether the shooter was wearing 
a hat).  The fact that each eyewitness observed the shooter in 
poor lighting conditions made the fact that Towne’s testimony 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
4 
corroborated Fowler’s of even greater value.  The prosecutor 
recognized the consequential nature of Fowler’s testimony for 
the defense, emphasizing his cross-examination of Fowler in 
closing argument.  A second, disinterested eyewitness providing 
the same description of the shooter in the parking lot 
inconsistent with Mataele’s physical appearance would have 
more strongly countered the prosecution’s case than Fowler’s 
testimony alone. 
The court notes that a defense investigator’s affidavit 
stated that Towne described the shooter to him as Black, “which 
lined up with Rodriguez’s initial statement to police officers and 
Fowler’s subsequent interview with defense investigators” and 
“would have pointed away from Carrillo and toward defendant,” 
who is Tongan.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 68.)  But Towne’s affidavit 
makes no mention of the shooter’s race, and despite what the 
court “assume[s]” (id. at p. 67), we do not know what Towne 
would have said on this point if he had testified.  It does not 
appear Towne identified the shooter’s race at the scene.  Nor did 
Fowler, who testified at trial that he could not determine the 
race of the person and had mistakenly told a defense 
investigator years later that the shooter was African American 
because he “assumed that person to be” based on the person’s 
“silhouette . . . , the way the person was walking holding the 
gun.”  Rodriguez testified that while he described the shooter as 
Black at the scene, he could not tell what ethnicity the shooter 
was, see the shooter’s face, or recall why he thought the person 
was Black.  In sum, it is unlikely that whatever testimony 
Towne might have offered about the shooter’s race would have 
appreciably diminished the significance of his testimony, 
corroborating Fowler’s, about the shooter’s size as a basis for 
lingering doubt. 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
5 
Today’s opinion says Towne’s testimony would have 
“pale[d] in comparison to the evidence at the guilt phase . . . 
establishing defendant’s guilt.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 68.)  
However, a jury “may properly conclude that the prosecution 
has discharged its burden of proving defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt but . . . may still demand a greater degree of 
certainty of guilt for the imposition of the death penalty.”  
(Terry, supra, 61 Cal.2d at pp. 145–146.)  The question is 
whether it is within reason that Towne’s testimony may have 
prevented “absolute certainty” in the mind of one or more jurors 
and thereby “mitigate[d] against imposing the death penalty.”  
(Gonzalez v. Wong (9th Cir. 2011) 667 F.3d 965, 993.)  A juror 
entertaining “doubt, however slight” (People v. Hamilton (2009) 
45 Cal.4th 863, 950), “which does not rise to reasonable doubt[,] 
can be expected to resist those who would impose the irremedial 
penalty of death” (Smith v. Balkcom (5th Cir. 1981) 660 F.2d 
573, 581). 
As noted, the prosecution’s case at the guilt phase focused 
on the testimony of Carrillo and Masubayashi.  Although the 
jury may have found their testimony credible beyond a 
reasonable doubt, their testimony was hardly so compelling as 
to foreclose any possible doubt about Mataele’s role. 
Carrillo, who faced special circumstance murder charges, 
gave an immunized statement about his involvement in the 
crime, naming Mataele as the shooter.  He then pled guilty to 
reduced charges and a six-year sentence.  Carrillo testified he 
would have done anything to get out of jail at the time of his 
statement, and the jury was instructed to view his testimony 
with caution.  Fowler’s eyewitness testimony described a shooter 
half the size of Mataele and wearing a cap, as Carrillo was 
wearing that night.  And Shawn Monroe testified that Carrillo 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
6 
asked him for help finding someone to provide fake 
identification documents because “[Carrillo] said he just shot 
some fools out in Orange County” and “need[ed] to leave town.”  
Mataele testified that Carrillo was the shooter, and Allan 
Quiambao testified Carrillo admitted to the shooting in 2001. 
Carrillo’s testimony was also inconsistent with the 
prosecution’s other evidence on key points.  Carrillo said he was 
in the car with Masubayashi when Danell Johnson and 
Masubayashi were shot; Masubayashi said Carrillo got out of 
the vehicle before any shots were fired.  Carrillo had blood on 
his clothes, inconsistent with forensic evidence that there was 
no blood spatter anywhere near where Carrillo alleged to have 
been sitting at the time of Johnson’s death.  All of the blood 
inside and outside of the vehicle was to the right of Johnson 
where the shooter would have stood.   
Towne, on the other hand, was a disinterested eyewitness 
whose testimony may have been given more weight than 
Carrillo’s.  His testimony, combined with Fowler’s, may have 
further drawn Carrillo’s testimony into doubt. 
As for Masubayashi, he was in the car with Johnson but 
was not looking in Johnson’s direction when Johnson was shot.  
Masubayashi testified that he saw Mataele’s forearm holding a 
gun pointing into the car after hearing the shot that killed 
Johnson.  But Masubayashi did not see who was shooting at him 
as he took off across the parking lot, which is what Towne would 
have testified to.  At the scene, Masubayashi told an officer who 
asked who shot him, “ ‘patch me up and I’ll tell you.’ ”  In the 
hospital, Masubayashi first maintained that he could not 
identify whether the shooter was Mataele, Carrillo, or someone 
from the neighboring car; he said he “d[id not] know who” shot 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
7 
him “because [he] c[ouldn’t] even see.”  Nor could Masubayashi 
identify the gun when he was first interviewed.  He thought the 
shooter was Mataele because Mataele had a gun earlier that 
evening, and a week after the shooting, Masubayashi continued 
to name Mataele as the shooter.  But he indicated he was still 
not sure because he could not see the shooter’s face and the 
events occurred too quickly. 
In these circumstances, it seems quite plausible that the 
jury could have credited aspects of Carrillo’s and Masubayashi’s 
testimony while still harboring some doubt about Mataele’s role.  
Further, although the jury could have understood aspects of 
Quiambao’s and Sia Her’s testimony to suggest that Mataele 
was the shooter, their testimony was also not inconsistent with 
the defense’s theory that while Mataele was present and carried 
a gun earlier that evening, Carrillo was the shooter.  The jury 
requested readbacks of Quiambao’s, Masubayashi’s, Carrillo’s, 
and Her’s testimony, indicating they were “focused on 
defendant’s role in the murder” and did not view this as an 
airtight case.  (Gay, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1227.)  The 
prosecutor’s argument in the penalty phase focused in large part 
on the circumstances of the crime, describing it as a “cold-
blooded,” “calculated murder” that warranted a death verdict.  
Admitting Towne’s testimony at the penalty phase would have 
appreciably weakened the case in aggravation.  In sum, 
although there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mataele was the shooter, there 
is a reasonable possibility that had Towne’s testimony been 
admitted, at least one juror would have “demand[ed] a greater 
degree of certainty of guilt for the imposition of the death 
penalty.”  (Terry, supra, 61 Cal.2d at pp. 145–146.) 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
8 
Today’s opinion also relies on the prosecution’s other 
penalty phase evidence in finding the error harmless, but the 
evidence was hardly overwhelming.  The prosecutor presented 
victim impact testimony from two of Johnson’s cousins and Sia 
Her, who was Johnson’s girlfriend at the time of the shooting.  
The prosecution also introduced evidence of three prior 
incidents that were not especially aggravated; indeed, the 
prosecutor told the jury in his penalty phase opening statement 
that these “may not be the most violent crimes you’ve heard 
about in your whole life.”  First, Deputy Sheriff Claude Waddle 
testified that Mataele, at age 13, admitted to exposing himself 
to and touching two classmates on the breast and buttocks.  One 
of the victims testified that she “vaguely remember[ed]” Mataele 
exposing himself to her and did not remember him ever touching 
her.  Second, Thomas Kinsey testified that when Mataele was 
17 years old, four individuals confronted him (Kinsey) for his 
briefcase and asked him for money.  Officer David Dooros 
testified that he observed Mataele push Kinsey and draw back 
his arm as if to punch Kinsey.  Dooros broke up the scene and 
Kinsey was unharmed.  Third, John Hagen testified that when 
Mataele was 19 years old, Mataele put a gun to his (Hagen’s) 
head and took his wallet.  Mataele pled to five years for armed 
robbery. 
In total, the prosecution’s penalty phase case-in-chief was 
comprised of eight witnesses, lasted less than a day, and took up 
fewer than 70 pages of the reporter’s transcript.  There was no 
rebuttal. 
The defense’s case in mitigation, by contrast, lasted seven 
days and included 32 witnesses.  Numerous witnesses described 
generational violence, poor supervision and discipline, and 
Mataele’s father’s alcohol abuse.  Relatives described how 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
9 
Mataele and his mother were brutally beaten by his father for 
decades.  Mataele tried to protect his mother and younger 
siblings from their father.  Mataele also supported the family 
financially at times and helped care for a disabled family 
member, Cece, whom he loved like a daughter.  In addition, 
family members, friends, teachers, and coaches described 
Mataele as smart, loving, artistic, respectful, and kind.  Mataele 
organized weekly “family home meetings” to encourage the kids 
in the family to go to school and other family members to get a 
job, help one another, and stay out of trouble.  Thirty to fifty 
family members would attend each week, and Mataele led the 
meetings.  Witnesses described how Mataele’s advice led them 
to positive lifestyle changes.  Further, medical and correctional 
experts described Mataele’s intelligence and ability to benefit 
from educational opportunities; reviewed his confinement 
records and reported no incidents involving drugs, weapons, or 
gang activity; and testified that Mataele would be a “good 
candidate to lead a productive, nonviolent life in prison.”  The 
trial court said it thought defense counsel was doing “a 
marvelous job in presenting a different picture of Mr. Mataele 
to this jury” and in bringing evidence “in front of the jury 
regarding a defendant’s other personality . . . than . . . a 
coldblooded killer.” 
The penalty trial in this case was not an instance where 
the totality of the evidence portrayed the defendant as 
irredeemably depraved or dangerous.  The jury was ultimately 
unpersuaded by the defense evidence of Mataele’s background 
and character.  But Towne’s testimony would not have been 
cumulative of such evidence.  Instead, it would have responded 
directly to the prosecution’s reliance on the brutality of the 
murder by sowing doubt about Mataele’s role.  If Towne had 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
10 
been allowed to testify at the penalty phase, it is reasonably 
possible that one or more jurors would have refrained from 
voting for death because of lingering doubt as to whether 
Mataele was the shooter, among other mitigating factors. 
The court considers it “significant[]” that the defense’s 
penalty phase argument focused “not on lingering doubt, but on 
defendant’s family history, background and character, brain 
activity, and adjustment to prison as factors in mitigation.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 69.)  It contends that “defense counsel’s 
failure to raise the issue even given Fowler’s admitted 
testimony — which was essentially the same as Towne’s 
excluded testimony — serves to further underscore the 
inconsequential nature of the error.”  (Id. at p. 70.)  But it should 
come as no surprise that the defense did not make a lengthier 
lingering doubt argument when it was prohibited from 
presenting the most persuasive evidence it had of Mataele’s 
innocence.  As noted, Fowler’s testimony on its own was of less 
persuasive value than Towne’s testimony and Fowler’s 
testimony would have been combined.  Defense counsel plainly 
would have made more of lingering doubt had Towne’s 
testimony been admitted.  Indeed, in objecting to the prosecutor 
questioning Mataele about the shooting during Mataele’s 
penalty phase testimony, defense counsel said, “We’re not here 
to relitigate the whole guilt phase all over again. . . .  If I wanted 
to relitigate some stuff, which I couldn’t because I couldn’t even 
put Towne on, well, then maybe it’s a different story.  I’d be 
reopening it.  But I intentionally stayed away from relitigating 
the guilt issues part because I couldn’t even present Mr. Towne 
to establish some sort of lingering doubt.” 
Even so, defense counsel did argue lingering doubt at some 
length during his penalty phase closing argument.  He also 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
11 
continued to urge the jury to question the credibility of 
Masubayashi and Carrillo, noting they were the “cornerstone” 
and “foundation” of the prosecution’s case.  And he reminded the 
jury that “just because we didn’t repeat it during the penalty 
phase doesn’t mean you are precluded from considering it 
during this second phase.”  It is clear that defense counsel 
wanted the jury to continue to consider evidence that Mataele 
was not the shooter.  On this record, I see no basis for concluding 
that “defense counsel’s failure to raise the issue . . . serves to 
further underscore the inconsequential nature of the error.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 70.) 
Finally, the trial court’s instruction on lingering doubt 
does not tend to show that the exclusion of Towne’s testimony 
was harmless.  If anything, the fact that the prosecution did not 
oppose the instruction and the trial court agreed to issue it, 
despite recognizing its discretion not to do so, confirms that the 
defense theory of lingering doubt was in play.  Because the 
exclusion of Towne’s testimony reduced the value of the 
requested instruction to the defense, I cannot conclude that the 
error was harmless. 
The standard of review here bears emphasis:  The 
erroneous exclusion of Towne’s testimony can be found harmless 
only if there is no reasonable possibility that absent the error, 
the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors, including 
lingering doubt, would have led one or more jurors to vote for 
life imprisonment without parole instead of death.  Although my 
colleagues are confident there is no such possibility, I am not.  
Given the circumstances of this capital sentencing trial, it is 
hard to think of evidence more potentially consequential than 
eyewitness testimony identifying someone other than the 
defendant as the actual killer.  It is reasonably possible that one 
PEOPLE v. MATAELE 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
12 
or more jurors would not have been certain beyond all possible 
doubt that Mataele was the shooter and, on that basis, would 
have refrained from voting for death.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent from the penalty judgment while joining today’s opinion 
affirming Mataele’s convictions. 
LIU, J. 
 
 
I Concur: 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Mataele 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S138052 
Date Filed:  July 21, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Orange 
Judge:  James A. Stotler 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Stephen M. Lathrop, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler 
and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Julie L. 
Garland and James William Bilderback II, Assistant Attorney 
General, Holly D. Wilkens, Annie Featherman Fraser, Kristen 
Kinnaird Chenelia and Donald W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Stephen M. Lathrop 
904 Silver Spur Road #430 
Rolling Hills Estates, CA 90274 
(310) 237-1000 
 
Donald W. Ostertag 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9557