Title: Wright v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
DAVID WRIGHT, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 19, 2009 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0802023870 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  July 8, 2009 
Decided:  August 19, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Nicole M. Walker, Office of the public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware for 
appellant. 
 
 
Abby Adams, Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
David Wright appeals from a Superior Court final judgment of conviction of 
Second Degree Kidnapping.  Wright claims that the trial judge erroneously denied 
his motion for a judgment of acquittal because his restraint of the victim was 
incidental to, and not independent of the crime of robbery.  Because we find no 
merit to Wright’s claims, we AFFIRM. 
FACT AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
Around 6 a.m. on December 31, 2007, Robert Steck went to the Lewes/ 
Rehoboth Moose Lodge.  Steck, who was the Lodge administrator, planned to 
gather cash and checks from the Lodge bar to make a bank deposit.  Steck gathered 
approximately $5,000 in cash and $1,270 in checks, placed the money in a bag, 
and set the building’s alarm.  After Steck left the building and locked the doors, 
Wright—wearing a ski mask and a hooded sweatshirt, and carrying a shotgun—
approached Steck. 
 
Wright demanded several times that Steck drop his bag, but Steck refused.  
Although Wright brandished his shotgun at Steck, Steck refused to drop the bag.  
Wright bludgeoned Steck with the shotgun, and Steck dropped the bag.  Wright 
next ordered Steck to unlock the door to the Lodge and go back inside.  Wright 
followed Steck into the vestibule, ordered him to lie face down on the floor, and 
proceeded to duct tape Steck’s hands and feet together.  Wright then rummaged 
through Steck’s pockets and took his wallet, cell phone, and pocket knife.  At that 
 
3 
point, the building’s audible alarm went off.  Wright fled, locking the entry door 
behind him.  The Delaware State Police responded within a few minutes of the 
alarm.  By then, Steck had loosened his duct tape bonds and unlocked the door for 
the police. 
 
On January 28, the State Police took Wright into custody on an unrelated 
warrant.  While Wright was in custody, the police connected him to the Moose 
Lodge robbery and arrested Wright for that robbery on February 20.  Wright 
waived indictment, and on March 31, 2008, the State filed an information charging 
him with First Degree Robbery, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission 
of a Felony, Second Degree Kidnapping, Wearing a Disguise During the 
Commission of a Felony, Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited, 
and Third Degree Assault. 
 
Trial began on November 10, 2008.  At trial, Wright stipulated to being a 
person prohibited from possessing a deadly weapon, and the State entered a nolle 
prosequi on the Third Degree Assault charge.  At the close of the State’s case, 
Wright’s counsel moved orally for a judgment of acquittal on the Kidnapping 
charge.  Counsel argued: 
In light of the facts set out in Weber [v. State1] and in its prodigy [sic], 
I think in this case the kidnapping was completely incidental to the 
robbery.  I think that the important factors that the Court should look 
                                                 
1  
547 A.2d 948 (Del. 1988). 
 
 
4 
at are that the victim was not removed from the scene.  He was only 
moved to a couple of feet inside the vestibule.  While he was confined 
with the duct tape, he was able to get out of the duct tape and also 
unlock the door…. 
 
* * * 
 
Also … there was not an exceptional amount of duct tape used to bind 
the person.  I think the significant factor is that he really wasn’t 
removed from the scene.  In the other cases that I saw, frequently a 
victim was taken away somewhere and something happened.  In this 
case, I think that the kidnapping was completely incidental to the 
robbery, and I would ask that under the facts of Weber, as to the 
kidnapping charge, that it be dismissed by the [c]ourt. 
 
After hearing the State’s response, the trial judge denied the motion, reasoning: 
 
[T]he other case that talks about th[is] situation is Douglas v. State, 
879 A.2d 594 [Del.] 2005. 
 
The movement and/or restraint, of course, is independent of and not 
incidental to the underlying charge of robbery. 
 
Here I am finding the robbery was basically completed outside the 
Moose Lodge.  The victim was confronted by a person who displayed 
a shotgun….  [T]he evidence shows that after the victim was moved 
inside the vestibule of the Moose Lodge from outside of public view 
to inside, it is a fair instance [sic] that that was done simply to get the 
victim out of public view.  And in the vestibule, the victim, of course, 
was detained and restrained. 
 
For sufficiency purposes, to move forward to the jury, I find that there 
is sufficient evidence of restraint that was substantial interference with 
the victim’s liberty in addition to that ordinarily incident to the 
robbery that occurred by use of the shotgun….  So for sufficiency 
purposes it will move forward to the jury. 
 
 
5 
 
On November 14, 2008, a jury convicted Wright of all charges.  The 
Superior Court declared Wright a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a), 
and on January 14, 2009, sentenced Wright to a total of 74 years incarceration.  
Fifteen of those years were for the Kidnapping conviction.  Wright timely appealed 
the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal on Kidnapping Second Degree. 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
The trial judge denied Wright’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on the 
Kidnapping charge.  He reasoned that Wright had “basically completed” robbing 
Steck outside the lodge and that, by forcing him into the lodge and duct taping him, 
Wright had restrained his liberty in a manner exceeding the restraint that would 
ordinarily be incident to First Degree Robbery.  On that basis, the trial judge found 
sufficient evidence for the Kidnapping charge to go to the jury. 
 
On appeal, Wright’s central argument is that the State was required—but 
failed—to establish that he restrained Steck’s liberty in a manner greater than what 
was necessary to successfully rob Steck.  Wright makes three contentions in 
support of that argument.  First, Wright argues that the entire chain of events at the 
Moose Lodge was directly related to the robbery, which began when he 
encountered Steck outside the Lodge and ended when Wright fled.  Moving Steck 
into the Lodge and duct taping him, Wright claims, was inextricably linked to the 
robbery because that conduct: (1) allowed Wright to evade detection; (2) facilitated 
 
6 
stealing additional items in furtherance of that same robbery; and (3) was 
necessary to overcome Steck’s resistance to the robbery.  Second, Wright contends 
that the State conceded, in its information, that Wright restrained Steck to facilitate 
a robbery; therefore, Steck’s restraint was incidental to the robbery.  Third, Wright 
argues that the fact that Steck was quickly able to free himself from his bonds and 
open the door for the police establishes that there was no significant restraint. 
 
The central issue is whether Wright restrained Steck incidentally to or 
separately from the robbery.  If the restraint was incidental to the robbery, then as a 
matter of law it could not support an independent Kidnapping charge.  Whether 
Wright restrained Steck incidentally to the robbery requires determining whether 
Wright’s interference with Steck’s liberty exceeded the interference required to 
further the robbery.  Before turning to that issue, it is helpful first to outline the 
legal framework for analyzing whether restraining a victim in the course of a 
separate crime gives rise to an independent charge of Kidnapping. 
 
Wright was charged with violating 11 Del. C. § 783(3), which provides: 
 
A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when the person 
unlawfully restrains another person with any of the following 
purposes: … (3) to facilitate the commission of any felony or flight 
thereafter … and the actor voluntarily releases the victim alive, 
unharmed, and in a safe place prior to trial. 
 
The Kidnapping statute defines “restrain” to mean: 
 
… restrict[ing] another person's movements intentionally in such a 
manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him 
 
7 
from 1 place to another, or by confining him either in the place where 
the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, 
without consent. A person is moved or confined “without consent” 
when the movement or confinement is accomplished by physical 
force, intimidation or deception....2 
 
That statutory definition embodies three elements: “(1) substantial interference 
with another's liberty; (2) by movement or confinement; (3) without consent.”3  It 
is undisputed that Wright moved and confined Steck without his consent.  
Therefore, only the first element―substantial interference with another’s 
liberty―is at issue. 
We have construed the “substantial interference” requirement as a limitation 
on the scope of offenses that constitute kidnapping,4 to “insure[] that where the 
movement or restraint is entirely incident[al] to the underlying crime, there cannot 
be a kidnapping conviction under 11 Del. C. § 783A.”5  Where, as here, a 
kidnapping charge is based on an underlying offense it:  
should not be submitted to the jury unless the trial judge concludes 
that there are facts in the record which would support independent 
convictions on the kidnapping charge and on the underlying charge.  
                                                 
2  
11 Del. C. § 786(a). 
 
3  
Weber, 547 A.2d 948, 957 (Del. 1988) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 
4  
Id. at 958 (citing Burton v. State, 426 A.2d 829, 833-36 (Del. 1981), additional citations 
omitted). 
 
5  
Id. at 958 (citing Burton, 426 A.2d at 834) (emphasis in original).  11 Del. C. § 783A 
(First Degree Kidnapping) differs from Section 783 (Second Degree Kidnapping—the statute 
Wright was charged under) only in that Section 738A requires that the kidnapper not voluntarily 
release the victim unharmed prior to trial.  Cf. 11 Del. C. § 783A.  
 
 
8 
The trial judge must determine, as a matter of law, if the evidence of 
restraint proves that there was “much more” (substantial) interference 
with the victims [sic] liberty than is ordinarily incident to the 
underlying crime.6 
 
In Weber v. State,7 we adopted a two step analytical framework governing 
cases where a Kidnapping charge accompanies an underlying offense.  In those 
cases, the defendant is entitled to a specific jury instruction that, to convict on the 
kidnapping charge, the jury must find that the movement and/or restraint of the 
victim is “independent of” and not “incidental to” the underlying crime.8  Before 
delivering that instruction, “the trial judge must determine if the facts presented in 
the State’s case warrant the submission of that issue to the jury at all.”9  “Thus, a 
trial judge must consider, as a [threshold] matter of law, whether the evidence of 
restraint [is sufficient to prove] that there was substantial interference with the 
victims’ liberty in addition to that which is ordinarily incident to the underlying 
crime.”10 
                                                 
6  
Id. at 959 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
7  
547 A.2d 948 (Del. 1988) 
 
8  
Id. at 959. 
 
9  
Douglas v. State, 879 A.2d 594, 599 (Del. 2005) (quoting Weber, 547 A.2d at 959). 
 
10  
Id. 
 
 
9 
 
The Standard of Review 
 
Generally, we would review a sufficiency determination under Weber to 
ensure that it is supported by the record and is the product of an orderly and logical 
reasoning process.11  Here, however, Wright does not challenge the Superior 
Court’s Weber sufficiency determination.  Instead, he appeals the denial of a 
motion for a judgment of acquittal (which incorporates a sufficiency 
determination).  Both parties agree that the standard of review of the denial of 
Wright’s motion for a judgment of acquittal is de novo, to determine “whether any 
rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”12 
Having set forth the standard of review and the analytical framework for 
determining whether a restraint is “incidental to” or “independent of” an 
underlying offense, we turn to the facts.   
The State Did Not Concede That Wright’s Restraint of Steck’s Liberty Was 
Incident to the Robbery 
 
 
The issue of whether the State conceded, in its information, that Wright 
restrained Steck for the purpose of facilitating a robbery―and that therefore the 
                                                 
11  
Id. at 599-600. 
 
12  
Farmer v. Farmer, 844 A.2d 297, 300 (Del. 2004).  That standard, in effect, is essentially 
the same as the Weber standard.   
 
 
10 
restraint was incidental to the robbery―requires us to interpret the Kidnapping 
statute.  We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo.13  
 
Wright was charged with violating 11 Del. C. § 783(3), which provides: 
A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when the person 
unlawfully restrains another person with any of the following 
purposes: … (3) to facilitate the commission of any felony or flight 
thereafter … and the actor voluntarily releases the victim alive, 
unharmed, and in a safe place prior to trial. 
 
The information charged Wright with: 
 
… unlawfully restrain[ing] Richard Steck with the intent to facilitate 
the commission of any felony or flight thereafter and did voluntarily 
release him unharmed prior to trial.” 
 
The language of the charging document precisely tracks § 783(3).  To accept 
Wright’s argument would require us to interpret “facilitating” to mean that an 
unlawful restraint is always “incidental” to the felony it facilitates.  Wright’s 
interpretation would render Section 783(3) a nullity.  We reject it. 
Wright’s Restraint of Steck’s Liberty Was 
Independent of the Underlying Robbery 
 
Wright next argues that, because he did not restrain Steck’s liberty more 
than that which was required to rob him, the restraint was incidental to the robbery.  
The State responds that the restraint of Steck’s liberty exceeded what was 
necessary for the robbery; therefore, the restraint was a crime separate from and 
                                                 
13  
Tony Ashburn & Son v. Kent County Reg’l Planning Comm., 962 A.2d 235, 239 (Del. 
2008). 
 
 
11 
independent of the robbery.  This legal dispute rests on competing interpretations 
of the critical terms “incidental to” and “independent of.”  Wright’s argument 
presupposes that criminal conduct is legally incidental to an underlying offense, 
where that conduct is committed only to further the commission of the underlying 
offense.14  The State’s argument assumes that criminal conduct is legally 
independent of an underlying offense, if that conduct constitutes an act that is not 
an element of the underlying offense.  Wright’s argument rests on a faulty premise, 
because under our case law on Kidnapping, the inquiry is whether the defendant 
                                                 
14  
See, e.g., Appellant’s Op. Br. at 9 (“The robbery and the restriction of Steck’s movement 
were tied together…  The State’s own charging decision demonstrates the incidental nature of 
the restriction.  It charged Wright with restricting Steck’s movement for the purpose of 
facilitating the robbery.  Thus, the purpose of the restriction was to ensure that the robbery was 
completed efficiently.  See Allen v. State, [970 A.2d 203, 219 (Del. 2009)] (recognizing that 
there can only be a finding of kidnapping if the purpose of the restriction of movement was more 
than to ensure an underlying robbery was completed.”)). 
   
Wright’s reading of Allen is inaccurate.  Wright appears to rely on the following language in 
Allen: 
 
Allen contends that the trial judge erred by failing to follow the process required 
by Weber v. State before submitting the charge of Kidnapping in the Second 
Degree to the jury.  He contends that “[t]he perpetrator's sole intent appear[ed] to 
have been nothing more than to complete the robbery efficiently[,]” and that “[i]t 
would be manifestly unjust to allow a conviction based on a charge lacking 
independent criminal intent to remain of record.”  The State concedes that a 
Weber instruction should have been given.  We agree. 
 
Allen, 970 A.2d at 219.  It is clear from the Allen opinion that the Court was agreeing with the 
State’s concession that the trial court should have given a Weber instruction, not with the 
defendant’s contention that a restraint based only on intent to complete a robbery efficiently 
cannot give rise to Kidnapping liability.  Wright fails to point to any other authority in support of 
his contention that restraints that only serve to abet a robbery cannot give rise to Kidnapping 
liability.  As discussed above, this approach treats 11 Del. C. § 738(3) as a nullity, and must be 
rejected.    
 
 
12 
interfered “much more” with the victim’s liberty than the level of interference 
typically associated with the underlying offense.15  
 
As the Superior Court stated in State v. Amad:16  
 
The degree or amount of restraint which is ordinarily incident[al] to 
robbery consists of that restraint which is necessary to prevent or 
overcome resistance to the taking and retention of property, or to 
compel or otherwise cause the victim to deliver up the property.17 
 
 
Wright argues that the restraint required to move Steck into the vestibule and 
to duct tape him did not exceed the level ordinarily incidental to robbery―to 
conceal the robbery from passersby and to prevent Steck from resisting.  Wright 
points to Steck’s earlier refusal to relinquish the bag containing the Lodge’s 
receipts.  Amad, which involved facts analogous to this case, completely undercuts 
Wright’s argument.  In Amad, four armed men entered a credit union, restrained 
the employees by binding their hands behind their backs with duct tape, took cash 
out of the registers, and fled.18  The Superior Court held: 
In this case, each of the credit union employees had their hands bound 
behind their backs with duct tape, while they were face down, on the 
floor.  This restraint commenced during the robbery and continued 
after the robbery was concluded.  The fact that the victims were able 
                                                 
15  
Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 948, 959 (Del. 1988). 
 
16  
State v. Amad, 767 A.2d 806 (Del. Super. 1999) (aff’d Amad v. State, 1999 WL 169399 
(Del.)) (overruled on other grounds by Poteat v. State, 840 A.2d 599 (Del. 2003)). 
 
17  
Id. at 809. 
 
18  
Id. at 807. 
 
 
13 
to escape their bindings so quickly does not diminish the nature of the 
restraint imposed.  While the restraint imposed was obviously done to 
facilitate the robbery and the flight therefrom, the Court remains 
convinced that the restraint could be viewed by a reasonable juror as 
“much more” restraint than that necessary to accomplish the theft of 
the credit union money.  Therefore, the issue was properly presented 
to the jury for its determination pursuant to the instructions given.19 
 
Here, as in Amad, Wright duct taped Steck to facilitate the robbery and his flight.  
Even if it is assumed, without deciding, that ordering Steck into the building’s 
vestibule to conceal the robbery was ordinarily incidental to that offense, duct 
taping Steck was “much more” restraint than that typically associated with a 
robbery.  The level of restraint necessary to accomplish the typical robbery would 
be pointing a weapon at the victim and commanding the victim to stay still or 
move to a different location.   
 
Attempting to distinguish Amad, Wright points out that Amad involved four 
robbers and three firearms and that nothing was taken from the employees 
personally.  That distinction is without merit.  First, that there were more robbers 
and guns in Amad than here is unresponsive to the legally significant issue—the 
restraint of the victim’s liberty.  That there were more robbers (and guns) in Amad 
establishes only that the robbery there was larger in scale.  Second, Wright fails to 
explain the legal significance of the fact that in Amad nothing was taken directly 
from the employees.  Even if the theft of the Lodge’s money and of Steck’s 
                                                 
19  
Id. at 809 (emphasis added). 
 
 
14 
personal items constituted one single robbery, there was sufficient evidence for a 
rational juror to conclude that ordering Steck back into the Lodge and then duct 
taping him constituted “much more” of a restraint than would ordinarily be 
incidental to a robbery.20  Wright’s argument that binding Steck was necessary 
because of Steck’s earlier “resistance” (his refusal to turn over the bag containing 
the lodge’s money until Wright hit him), created at most a factual dispute.  A 
rational juror could (and evidently twelve did) resolve that dispute in favor of the 
State. 
 
Finally, Wright’s argument that binding Steck was not a significant restraint 
because he was able to escape shortly after the police left is without merit.  The 
“degree or duration” of the restraint is legally irrelevant to whether the restraint 
was incidental to, or independent from, the underlying offense.21   
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. 
                                                 
20  
Id. 
 
21  
See Douglas v. State, 879 A.2d 594, 600 (Del. 2005) (questioning the trial judge’s 
analysis of the “‘degree or duration’ of the movement and restraint” the defendant applied to the 
victims, instead of focusing on whether the restraint was an independent act.  See also Weber 547 
A.2d at 958 (“When a defendant is charged with kidnapping in conjunction with an underlying 
crime such as rape, robbery, or assault, the dispositive issue is not the degree or duration of the 
movement and/or restraint, but whether the movement and/or restraint are incident to the 
underlying offense or are independent of the underlying offense.”) (emphasis in original); see 
also Amad, 767 A.2d at 809 (“The fact that the victims were able to escape their bindings so 
quickly does not diminish the nature of the restraint imposed”).