Title: Blickenstaff v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Tony Eugene Blickenstaff v. State of Maryland
No. 119, September Term, 2005
Headnote: Maryland Code (1999), § 9-105 of the Correctional Services Article, by its plain
language, provides that trial judges may sentence an individual to a local correctional facility
if the sentence to be then executed is for a period of not more than eighteen months.
Section 9-105 does not prohibit a trial judge from imposing a sentence consecutive to a
sentence for a prior unrelated conviction even though the aggregation of the two sentences
may exceed eighteen months. 
Circuit Court for Frede rick County
Case # 05-036346
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 119
September Term, 2005
Tony Eugene Blickenstaff
v.
State of Maryland
Bell, C. J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed: August 1, 2006
1 Maryland Code (2002, 2005 Supp.), § 9-404 of the Criminal Law Article states in
pertinent part:
“(a) Prohibited — In general. — A person may not knowingly escape
from a place of confinement.
. . . 
(c) Penalty. — A person who violates this section is guilty of the felony
of escape in the first degree and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not
exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding $20,000 or both.”
This case arises from the denial by the Circuit Court for Frederick County of a motion
to correct an alleged illegal sentence.  On April 27, 2004, Tony Eugene Blickenstaff,
appellant, entered a guilty plea to the crime of first degree escape.1  Pursuant to a plea
agreement, he was sentenced to eighteen months in the local detention center, to run
consecutive to the one-year sentence he was serving at the time of the escape.  On May 20,
2005, appellant filed a Motion for Modification to Correct Illegal Sentence.  On May 25,
2005, the motion was denied by the Circuit Court for Frederick County.  
Appellant timely noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  This Court, on its
own initiative and prior to any proceedings in the intermediate appellate court, granted
certiorari.  Blickenstaff v. State, 390 Md. 500, 889 A.2d 418 (2006).  Appellant submits one
question:
“Did the trial court illegally sentence appellant to serve more than
eighteen months in a local correctional facility?”
We hold that the plain language of the pertinent statute in the case sub judice does not
prohibit a trial judge from sentencing an individual to serve more than a total of eighteen
months in a local correctional facility based upon the aggregation of a prior sentence on an
2 With our resolution of the issue presented we need not address other arguments put
forth by the parties.
3 This sentence was due to appellant’s violation of probation which was imposed for
a June 3, 2002, guilty plea to second degree assault.  
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unrelated offense with the “then executed” sentence.  Therefore, the trial court did not
illegally sentence appellant.2 
  I. Facts
On July 9, 2004, appellant received a one-year sentence to be served in the Frederick
County Adult Detention Center (“FCADC”).3  The court’s commitment order authorized
work release.  On November 2, 2004, appellant failed to return to the FCADC from his work
release assignment.  A warrant was issued by the Circuit Court for Frederick County and on
November 22, 2004, appellant was arrested in Florida and subsequently returned to the
FCADC.  On April 27, 2005, appellant pled guilty to first degree escape based on his failure
to return to the FCADC pursuant to the terms of his work release.  Appellant was offered
a plea agreement providing for either a sentence of eighteen months in a local correctional
facility or three years in the Division of Corrections.  Appellant requested that he be
sentenced to eighteen months in FCADC to run consecutive to his original one-year
sentence.  The trial judge then imposed that sentence.
II. Standard of Review  
The case sub judice was tried without a jury.  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-131(c),
this Court will review the case on both the law and the evidence.  We will not set aside the
4 As evidenced in oral argument, appellant does not argue that the sentence itself is
illegal, just that he cannot be sentenced to serve the eighteen months — consecutive to the
(continued...)
-3-
trial court’s judgment based upon the evidence unless we find it to be clearly erroneous.  Id.
We recently stated in Gray v. State, 388 Md. 366, 879 A.2d 1064 (2005):
“The clearly erroneous standard does not apply to legal conclusions.  Nesbit
v. GEICO, 382 Md. 65, 72, 854 A.2d 879, 883 (2004).  ‘When the trial court’s
order “involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and
case law, our Court must determine whether the lower court’s conclusions are
legally correct under a de novo standard of review.”’ Nesbit, 382 Md. at 72,
854 A.2d at 883 (quoting Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392, 788 A.2d 609,
612 (2002)).”
Gray, 388 Md. at 374-75, 879 A.2d at 1068.  We shall address the legal issue of the
sentencing in the case at bar under a de novo standard of review.
III. Discussion
Maryland Code (1999), § 9-105 of the Correctional Services Article as relevant here
provides:
“§ 9-105. Sentencing to local correctional facilities.
Notwithstanding any other law, a judge may sentence an individual to
a local correctional facility if:
(1) the sentence to be then executed is for a period of not more than 18
months . . . .”  (Emphasis added.)
Appellant argues that the trial judge illegally sentenced him to serve more than eighteen
months in a local correctional facility — a violation of § 9-105 — by making the eighteen-
month sentence run consecutive to his original one-year sentence, thereby causing
appellant’s total incarceration time to exceed eighteen months.4  The State argues that § 9-
4(...continued)
one-year term already imposed for a previous offense — in a local correctional facility.
Appellant contends that he should be in a Department of Corrections facility.  
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105 does not require a trial judge to consider previously imposed sentences for unrelated
convictions.  The State contends that “the sentence to be then executed” refers to the
sentencing for the criminal conviction or convictions before the trial judge at a particular
time, rather than previously imposed sentences for unrelated convictions.  § 9-105 (emphasis
added).  We agree with the State.
It is first necessary to examine the language of § 9-105.  As we recently stated in Toth
v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (2006) (No. 96, September Term, 2005) (filed June 5,
2005):
“The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the Legislature.  Mackey v. Compass Mktg., Inc.,
391 Md. 117, 141, 892 A.2d 479, 493 (2006); Kushell v. DNR, 385 Md. 563,
576, 870 A.2d 186, 193 (2005).  If the statute is unambiguous when construed
according to its ordinary and everyday meaning, then we give effect to the
statute as it is written.  Mackey, 391 Md. at 141, 892 A.2d at 730; Collins v.
State, 383 Md. 684, 689, 861 A.2d 727, 730 (2004).”
Toth, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (No. 96, September Term, 2005) (filed June 5, 2005).
The plain language of § 9-105 is clear and unambiguous.  A trial judge may sentence a
defendant  to a local correctional facility if the sentence “to be then executed is for a period
of not more than 18 months.”  § 9-105  (emphasis added).  The word “then” contemplates
sentencing at that particular disposition, not the aggregation of previous sentences for
unrelated convictions.  
5 The opinion of the Attorney General discussed Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.
Vol.), Art. 27, § 705(g), the predecessor rule to § 9-105, however, the language is the same
in both provisions considered.  
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Appellant bases his argument solely on language contained in an opinion issued by
the Attorney General which stated:  “In our opinion, the law does not permit a judge to
commit a defendant to a local detention facility for more than eighteen months, even if that
period of confinement derives from consecutive sentences, rather than a single sentence.”
81 Op. Att’y Gen., No. 96-029 (Sept. 13, 1996) (unpublished).  Appellant’s reliance on this
language is misguided.
The question presented to the Attorney General in 1996 was:  “[W]hether a defendant
can be sentenced to a local detention facility for consecutive sentences under the following
circumstances: no single sentence exceeds eighteen months, but the total time to be served
exceeds eighteen months.”  81 Op. Att’y Gen., No. 96-029 (Sept. 13, 1996) (unpublished).5
This question does not address the particular factual situation extant in the case sub judice.
As the State posits:  “This question does not address the sentence at issue in the present case
as the response contemplates that the consecutive sentences ‘to be then executed’ derive
from the same disposition. Th[e] opinion does not call for the aggregation of unrelated
sentences received at different times and for separate convictions.”
Discussing the sentencing limit, the 1996 Attorney General opinion looked to an
earlier opinion:  “In 68 Opinions of the Attorney General 194 (1983), Attorney General
Sachs interpreted the predecessor to Article 27, § 705(g).  At the time, the provision was
6 We include a significant part of the Attorney General’s opinion on the issue because
it is the sole stated basis for the appellant’s position.
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codified as § 705F, applicable to ‘regional detention centers,’ but was otherwise identical.”
81 Op. Att’y Gen., No. 96-029 (Sept. 13, 1996) (unpublished).  Addressing the 1983
opinion, the Attorney General stated in 1996:6
“The Attorney General was asked whether ‘the law permit[ted] a court
to sentence an offender to a regional detention center for a period in excess of
18 months – the limit specified in Article 27, § 705F.’  Discussing the
legislative history, Attorney General Sachs noted that language in question
differed from that in the statute when it was originally enacted in 1968:
The language then was a[s] follows:  ‘[A] judge . . . may
sentence a convicted offender to a Regional Detention Center
. . . provided the sentence imposed is for a period of not more
than 18 months.’
This change in § 705F was effected by – and was the
express purpose of – Chapter 205, Laws of Maryland 1975.
The title of the Act states its purpose, in relevant part, as
follows:  ‘F[or] the purpose of repealing the provision that the
length of the sentence imposed is a basis for determining that a
convicted offender may be sentenced to a regional detention
center; [and] providing that the length of the sentence to be
executed is a basis for determining that a convicted offender
may be sentenced to a regional detention center.’  
68 Opinions of the Attorney General at 203.  In concluding that no law
permits a judge to commit an offender to a regional detention center for more
than eighteen months, the Attorney General observed ‘that, by placing an 18-
month limit on the sentence “to be then executed,” the General Assembly
intended the commitments to regional detention centers be limited to 18
months or less of actual confinement.’  Id.  See also Minovich v. State, 18 Md.
App. 368, 375, 306 A.2d 642 (1973).  We are aware of no development in the
law since 1983 that would cause us to reach a different conclusion.
“However, the eighteen-month limit on sentence length in § 705(g)
applies only to the act of sentencing.  68 Opinions of the Attorney General at
204.  This limit, Attorney General Sachs wrote, is not ‘a flat prohibition
against the incarceration of an offender with a sentence of more than 18
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months in a [local] detention center.’
Indeed, § 705E [now § 705(f)] provides that State
prisoners may be housed in [local] detention centers pursuant to
agreement between the Commissioner of Correction and the
jurisdictions administering the regional detention center.
Nothing in § 705 imposes any limit – as to length of sentence or
otherwise – on the category of State prisoners that may, by
agreement, be housed in [local] detention centers.  Similarly,
State inmates with sentences of more than 18 months actual
confinement may be transferred to regional detention centers
pursuant to the provisions of Article 27, § 690(e) or § 700(c).”
81 Op. Att’y Gen., No. 96-029 (Sept. 13, 1996) (unpublished) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
The Attorney General’s opinion upon which appellant bases his entire argument
clearly does not attempt to opine that the holding of inmates in local correctional facilities
for periods in excess of eighteen months is entirely proscribed.  It simply clarifies that,
pursuant to § 9-105, a trial judge may not sentence a convicted individual to a local
correctional facility if the sentence to be  then executed is for a period of more than eighteen
months.  
The sentencing in the case sub judice was made pursuant to a plea agreement between
appellant and the State.  As stated supra, appellant pled guilty to first degree escape — a
violation of § 9-404 of the Criminal Law Article.  The penalty on conviction for such a
violation is up to ten years.  The sentence then executed based upon the plea agreement was
eighteen months — within the provisions of § 9-105.  Maryland Code (2002), § 9-407 of the
Criminal Law Article, however, stipulates that “[a] sentence imposed for a violation of § 9-
-8-
404 . . . : (1) shall be consecutive to any term of confinement being served or to be served
at the time of the escape.”  Therefore, the trial judge was mandated to run the eighteen-
month sentence for first degree escape consecutive to appellant’s one-year unrelated
sentence for violation of probation in relation to the prior second degree assault conviction.
IV. Conclusion
We hold that § 9-105 of the Correctional Services Article, by its plain language,
provides that trial judges may sentence an individual to a local correctional facility if the
sentence to be then executed is for a period of not more than eighteen months.  Section 9-
105 does not prohibit a trial judge from imposing a sentence consecutive to a sentence for
a prior unrelated conviction and sentence.  Therefore, we hold that the eighteen-month
sentence to run consecutive with appellant’s prior unrelated one-year sentence in the local
correctional facility was proper.  We affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Frederick
County.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR FREDERICK COUNTY AFFIRMED
WITH COSTS.