Title: STATE EX REL KOTWICKI v DISTRICT

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12945 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE OF M O N T A N A 1975 THE STATE OF M O N T A N A ex r e l . , ANTONIO KOTWICKI, Rela t o r , THE DISTRICT C O U R T OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT e t a l . , Respondents. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel of Record: For Relator: W. William Leaphart argued, Helena, Montana For Respondents: Leif B. Erickson, Jr. argued, Helena, Montana Submitted : January 27, 1975 Decided: 4 4 6 - 4 ,975 2 , Filed: ~ + t > ~ , , , ; , - a , - ! . I M r . ChiefJustice James T. Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding wherein r e l a t o r seeks an appropriate w r i t d i r e c t e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , L e w i s and Clark County, requiring t h a t court t o reverse i t s order of December 4 , 1974, denying a motion t o suppress t h e evidence seized by o f f i c e r s from r e l a t o r ' s presence on September 25 and 2 6 , 1974. Counsel f o r r e l a t o r was heard ex p a r t e and t h e r e a f t e r an order was issued c a l l i n g f o r an adversary hearing and staying a l l matters u n t i l t h e f u r t h e r order of t h e Court. Counsel appeared upon t h e d a t e fixed f o r t h e hearing, b r i e f s w e r e f i l e d and respond- e n t c o u r t f i l e d a motion t o dismiss because r e l a t o r had adequate r e l i e f by appeal. See S t a t e ex rel. LaFlesch, Mont . I 592 P.2d 1403, 31 St.Rep. 772. The f a c t s are: An o f f i c e r of t h e Montana Highway P a t r o l was working radar on I n t e r s t a t e highway 15, north of Helena on September 25, 1974, a t approximately 9:30 p.m., when a v e h i c l e t r a v e l i n g about 70 m.p.h. was sighted. The o f f i c e r pursued and stopped t h e vehicle and advised t h e d r i v e r , r e l a t o r here, t h a t he had been stopped f o r d r i v i n g i n excess of t h e nighttime speed l i m i t . Further t h a t an appearance bond of $15 would have t o be posted. The amount i s a standard bond i n such cases. Relator could not post bond, advising the o f f i c e r t h a t he was unemployed and h i s only Montana address was General Delivery, Colstrip. H i s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e was from o u t of s t a t e . Following standard pro- cedure, r e l a t o r w a s placed under arrest. Relator then drove h i s v e h i c l e t o t h e county j a i l . A t t h e j a i l , r e l a t o r was permitted t o phone a f r i e n d i n an e f f o r t t o post bond. After learning t h a t h i s f r i e n d d i d not have t h e money r i g h t then and t h a t it would be a while, t h e deputy s h e r i f f on duty informed r e l a t o r he would have t o be locked up. The deputy s h e r i f f searched r e l a t o r p r i o r t o placing him i n t h e c e l l block. I n t h e process t h e deputy s h e r i f f discovered a small bag of p l a n t - l i k e material i n r e l a t o r ' s r i g h t shoe. The deputy l i f t e d it from t h e shoe and i n placing it on t h e counter top i n t h e j a i l receiving a r e a , made t h e comment: "What do we have here?" The d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h a t t h i s comment was made t o no one i n p a r t i c u l a r . However, r e l a t o r , thinking t h e remark had been made t o him, responded by answering "Marijuana." Shortly t h e r e a f t e r r e l a t o r was placed i n t h e c e l l block and then brought back and f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , advised of h i s r i g h t s under t h e Miranda decision. Later t h a t evening a deputy county attorney advised r e l a t o r of h i s r i g h t s with respect t o a search of h i s v e h i c l e and requested a waiver of those r i g h t s and a consent t o search. Although r e l a t o r a t one point s t a t e d , "you might j u s t a s w e l l look i n it, i t ' s f u l l of marijuana", he subsequently revoked h i s consent. The next morning r e l a t o r was again asked by t h e deputy county attorney t o consent t o a search and i n such conversation was advised t h a t i n any event a search warrant would be obtained. A t t h a t t i m e r e l a t o r signed a permission t o search. The search was t h e r e a f t e r conducted and t h e i t e m s seized a r e t h e s u b j e c t of t h e motion t o suppress. Relator contends (1) t h a t h i s c u s t o d i a l a r r e s t f o r ex- ceeding t h e speed l i m i t v i o l a t e s t h e Fourth Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s Constitution and A r t . 11, Sec.11 of t h e Montana Constitution; ( 2 ) t h a t h i s c u s t o d i a l a r r e s t a s a r e s u l t of not having s u f f i c i e n t funds t o post t h e appearance bond v i o l a t e s t h e equal protection clause of t h e Fourteenth Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s Constitution; (3) t h a t a l l evidence was e i t h e r i d e n t i f i e d o r derived from p o l i c e questions asked i n v i o l a t i o n of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694, and ( 4 ) t h a t h i s consent t o t h e search was not "voluntary1' under t h e standard established i n Schneckloth v , Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2 0 4 1 , 36 L Ed 2d 854. R e l a t o r ' s c u s t o d i a l a r r e s t f o r exceeding t h e speed l i m i t d i d not v i o l a t e t h e Fourth Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s Con- s t i t u t i o n nor A r t . 11, Section 11, of t h e Montana Constitution. I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , t h e Fourth Amendment reads: "The r i g h t of t h e people t o be secure i n t h e i r persons * * * a g a i n s t unreasonable * * * s e i z u r e s , s h a l l not be violated * * *." The Montana Constitution reads: "The people s h a l l be secure i n t h e i r persons * * * from unreasonable * * * seizures." Under these c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions, we must inquire i n t o whether r e l a t o r ' s c u s t o d i a l a r r e s t was reasonable under t h e p a r t i c u l a r circumstances of t h i s case. W e hold t h a t it w a s . Upon stopping r e l a t o r , t h e highway patrolman learned t h e s e f a c t s : r e l a t o r possessed an Arizona d r i v e r ' s license; r e l a t o r was unemployed; t h e only address r e l a t o r could give was "General Delivery, Colstrip"; and, while C o l s t r i p is i n Rosebud County, r e l a t o r was d r i v i n g a c a r licensed i n Big Horn County. It is common knowledge t h a t C o l s t r i p i s today a boom town, a construc- t i o n town, with nearly t h e e n t i r e population t r a n s i e n t . Given t h e s e f a c t s , it was reasonable f o r t h e highway patrolman t o be- l i e v e t h a t r e l a t o r was a t r a n s i e n t , unlikely t o r e t u r n and pay t h e f i n e i f he was allowed t o d r i v e on down t h e road without having posted an appearance bond. The highway patrolman was c l e a r l y within h i s r i g h t s when he d i r e c t e d relator t o proceed t o t h e county j a i l and d i r e c t e d h i s incarceration. Section 31-112, R.C.M. 1947, empowers a p a t r o l - man, upon making dn arrest, t o d e l i v e r t h e offender: (1) t o t h e nearest j u s t i c e of t h e peace, during o f f i c e hours; - o r ( 2 ) t o t h e county j a i l , - o r (3) d e l i v e r a summons t o t h e offender, or ( 4 ) accept a deposit f o r appearance. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e Montana Highway P a t r o l Manual d i r e c t s patrolmen t o r e f r a i n from allowing o u t of s t a t e " v i o l a t o r s t o proceed without f i r s t s e t t i n g and accept- i n g an appearance bond". Even i f it be conceded t h a t r e l a t o r was not an "out of s t a t e v i o l a t o r " , where t h e circumstances a r e such t h a t t h e v i o l a t o r does not have t h e cash f o r t h e appearance bond on h i s person, it i s not during o f f i c e hours f o r t h e j u s t i c e s of t h e peace, and it i s unlikely t h a t t h e v i o l a t o r w i l l honor a summons, t h e patrolman properly exercised h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n de- l i v e r i n g r e l a t o r t o t h e county j a i l . Relator contends t h a t a reasonable a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e booking and j a i l i n g of r e l a t o r would have been t o allow r e l a t o r t o wait i n t h e lobby u n t i l h i s f r i e n d a r r i v e d with t h e bond money. Even conceding t h e patrolman had nothing b e t t e r t o do than t o watch r e l a t o r , t h e r e was nothing a t t h a t time t o a s s u r e t h e patrolman t h a t r e l a t o r ' s f r i e n d would show up i n t h e half hour o r forty-five minutes i n which he did. The patrolman q u i t e poss- i b l y might have had t o watch over r e l a t o r f o r an hour o r two and still had t o book and jail r e l a t o r i f h i s f r i e n d never showed up. This uncertain "babysitting" is unreasonable. Relator concedes t h e s t a t e has an i n t e r e s t i n c o l l e c t - ing f i n e s f o r speeding v i o l a t i o n s . However, r e l a t o r does not pre- s e n t any v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e t o taking t h e offender i n t o custody, which would ensure t h e c o l l e c t i o n of these f i n e s when t h e circum- stances a r e such t h a t t h e offender is unlikely t o r e t u r n and pay t h e f i n e . R e l a t o r ' s a r r e s t was an a r r e s t f o r a t r a f f i c offense. It was not an a r r e s t f o r a crime involving moral t u r p i t u d e , which a r r e s t i n i t s e l f might blemish h i s f u t u r e . That being t h e case, we hold t h e s t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e c o l l e c t i o n of t h i s f i n e out- weighed t h e r e l a t o r ' s i n t e r e s t i n being f r e e from t h i s c u s t o d i a l a r r e s t . Neither does r e l a t o r ' s c u s t o d i a l a r r e s t f o r exceeding t h e speed l i m i t v i o l a t e t h e equal p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e of t h e Fourteenth Amendment of t h e United S t a t e s Constitution. Re- l a t o r contends f i r s t t h a t he was only taken i n t o custody when it became apparent t h a t he d i d n o t have s u f f i c i e n t funds t o p o s t t h e bond; t h a t he was, i n e f f e c t , a r r e s t e d f o r not c a r r y i n g money. Relator r e l i e s on Williams v. I l l i n o i s , 399 U.S. 235, 2 4 0 , 2 4 1 , 243, 2 4 4 ; 90 S.Ct. 2018, 36 L Ed 2d 586, wherein t h e c o u r t concluded: " * * * when t h e aggregate imprisonment exceeds t h e maximum period fixed by t h e s t a t u t e and r e s u l t s d i r e c t l y from an involuntary nonpayment of a f i n e o r c o u r t c o s t s we a r e confronted with an impermissible discrimination t h a t r e s t s on a b i l i t y t o pay * * *." H e f u r t h e r r e l i e s on Tate v. Short, 4 0 1 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L Ed 2d 130, 133, wherein t h e Court adopted t h e view of four members of t h e Court i n Morris v . Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 90 S.Ct. 2232, 26 L Ed 2d 773, by s t a t i n g : " ' * * * t h e Constitution p r o h i b i t s t h e S t a t e from imposing a f i n e a s a sentence and then automatically converting it i n t o a j a i l term s o l e l y because t h e defendant i s i n d i g e n t and cannot forthwith pay t h e f i n e i n f u l l . ' " R e l a t o r ' s argument i s t h a t , although t h e $15 is techni- c a l l y an appearance bond, i n p r a c t i c e it i s t h e a c t u a l f i n e . at her than appear, v i o l a t o r s f o r f e i t t h e bond and t h e matter is dropped. Section 32-21-157, R.C.M. 1947, provides t h e s t a t e has t h e option of punishing a t r a f f i c offender with a f i n e o r with imprisonment, - but n o t both. A s such, r e l a t o r argues, under Tate, when t h e patrolman opted t o i s s u e a summons t o appear, he chose t o f i n e t h e r e l a t o r and was thereby precluded from incarcerating.him. However, t h e i n s t a n t case i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h o s e c i t e d by r e l a t o r on a t l e a s t t h r e e grounds. F i r s t , t h e c a s e s c i t e d by r e l a t o r involve t h e conversion of sentences received from t h a t of f i n e t o imprisonment. Here, w e a r e involved not with a j u d i c i a l l y imposed sentence but with an appearnce bond designed t o prevent t h e offender from e n t i r e l y escaping punishment. Second, t h e cases c i t e d by r e l a t o r involved incarceration i n excess of s t a t u t o r y l i m i t s . N o such claim i s made here. Third, each case c i t e d by r e l a t o r involves t h e indigency of t h e defend- a n t whereby he i s unable t o pay t h e f i n e . H e r e , t h e r e is no claim made t h a t r e l a t o r was s o indigent he could not pay t h e $15 bond, merely t h a t he d i d not have t h e cash i n h i s pocket. In- deed, he was d r i v i n g a new 1974 automobile. W e hold t h a t t h i s case i s not within t h e r a t i o n a l e of Williams, Tate o r Morris. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court spec- i f i c a l l y s t a t e d i n Williams: " * * * W e have no occasion t o reach t h e question whether a S t a t e i s precluded i n any other circum- stances from holding an indigent accountable f o r a f i n e by use of a penal sanction * * * . I 1 The Court i n Williams a l s o a n t i c i p a t e d t h e problem inherent i n its decision i f applied t o other f a c t s i t u a t i o n s , such a s t h e case a t hand, when it s t a t e d : "The S t a t e is not powerless t o enforce judgments a g a i n s t those f i n a n c i a l l y unable t o pay a f i n e ; indeed, a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t would amount t o inverse discrimination since it would enable an indigent t o avoid both t h e f i n e and imprisonment f o r nonpayment whereas other defendants must always s u f f e r one o r t h e o t h e r conviction." When t h e f a c t s a r e such a s t o reasonably i n d i c a t e t o t h e patrolman t h a t t h e offender is unlikely t o r e t u r n and pay t h e f i n e , t h e s t a t e must have t h e power t o e i t h e r take t h e offender i n t o custody o r t o require an appearance bond i n order t o be assured t h e offender w i l l s u f f e r some punishment. W e have pre- viously disposed of r e l a t o r ' s contention t h a t hn should have been allowed t o w a i t i n t h e lobby u n t i l h i s f r i e n d a r r i v e d with t h e bond money. To have allowed r e l a t o r t o have proceeded on h i s way simply because he d i d not have $15 i n h i s pocket would have r e s u l t e d i n t h e "inverse discrimination" condemned by t h e united S t a t e s Supreme Court s i n c e another offender under l i k e circumstances with $15 i n h i s pocket would have had t o post bond, whereas r e l a t o r q u i t e possibly could have escaped punishment a l t o g e t h e r merely by leaving t h e s t a t e . The circumstances of t h i s a r r e s t could have happened t o anyone--rich o r poor. R e l a t o r ' s incarceration was not t h e r e s u l t of a d e n i a l of equal protection based upon indigency, but, from t h e f a c t s , was t h e r e s u l t of being within t h e c l a s s of persons unlikely t o r e t u r n and pay t h e f i n e . Were t h e l o g i c of r e l a t o r t o be followed through, then anyone unable t o post any kind of a bond would have t o be immediately released because t h e bond was discriminatory a g a i n s t him. Instead, bond is required t o assure t h e appearance of t h e accused a t court. This is a l e g i t i m a t e purpose which has been upheld and needs no f u r t h e r comment. R e l a t o r ' s second equal protection argument is t h a t he was not t r e a t e d t h e same a s other individuals i n p r e c i s e l y t h e same s i t u a t i o n . Officer Kessner, who picked up r e l a t o r , t e s t i - f i e d t h a t during t h e period from January 1974 t o September 1974 he had stopped approximately twenty motorists f o r exceeding t h e n i g h t speed l i m i t who were not a b l e t o post bond on t h e spot. O f those approximately twenty motorists, f i v e were brought i n t o t h e s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e u n t i l they could come up with t h e money. Four of these f i v e obtained t h e money within a "very s h o r t period of time". Only one person, o t h e r than r e l a t o r , was incarcerated be- cause he was unable t o post bond. Relator had t h e burden of proof t o show t h a t he was i n e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same s i t u a t i o n a s t h e four persons taken t o t h e s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e who were not booked and j a i l e d , but d i d come up with t h e money within a "very s h o r t period of time". Relator has not sustained h i s burden, Relator merely p o i n t s t o four persons who w e r e not booked and j a i l e d , but with no attempt t o f i n d o u t whether he was i n e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same s i t u a t i o n . There was no attempt t o f i n d o u t how long "a very s h o r t period of t i m e " was, and whether r e l a t o r ' s f r i e n d arrived within t h a t time. I n addition, r e l a t o r ' s counsel c u t off t h e testimony of Officer G s s n e r which might have answered t h e ques- t i o n as t o why r e l a t o r was booked and j a i l e d when t h e o t h e r four were not: "Q. Is it normal procedure t o put them i n j a i l i f they c a n ' t post bond? W h i l e they a r e even waiting f o r someone t o come and post bond f o r them? A. No, I d o n ' t book them until-- "Q. D o you have any departmental guidelines a s t o when and when not you should take somebody i n t o custody f o r a speeding t i c k e t ? A. Yes, sir, I do." The "departmental guidelines" r e f e r r e d t o , d i r e c t highway p a t r o l - men t o r e f r a i n from allowing out of s t a t e " v i o l a t o r s t o proceed without f i r s t s e t t i n g and accepting an appearance bond". The guidelines do not explain whether a v i o l a t o r should be booked and j a i l e d . Having determined t h a t r e l a t o r ' s c u s t o d i a l a r r e s t was v a l i d , it follows t h a t t h e search of r e l a t o r ' s person was a l s o v a l i d . United S t a t e s v. Robinson, 4 1 4 U.S. 218, 94 S . C t . 467, 38 L Ed 2d 427; Gustafson v. Florida, 4 1 4 U.S. 2 6 0 , 94 S.Ct. W e f i n d r e l a t o r ' s t h i r d contention, t h a t a l l evidence was e i t h e r i d e n t i f i e d o r derived from p o l i c e questions asked i n v i o l a t i o n of Miranda, t o be without m e r i t . Relator contends t h e deputy's question, "What do we have here?" was asked p r i o r t o r e l a t o r being given t h e Miranda warning and thus r e l a t o r ' s answer, "Marijuana", and t h e bag of marijuana should be suppressed. I n no event should t h i s reasoning r e q u i r e t h e suppression of t h e bag found i n r e l a t o r ' s shoe. That bag was discovered pursuant t o a v a l i d search, p t i o r t o any statements r e l a t o r made. Neither should r e l a t o r ' s spontaneous answer be suppressed. A reading of Miranda i n d i c a t e s t h a t it a p p l i e s t o "interrogation" of t h e defendant. I n t h i s case, t h e r e was no interrogation. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h e question of t.he deputy was not d i r e c t e d t o anyone i n p a r t i c u l a r . F i n a l l y , we hold t h a t r e l a t o r ' s consent t o t h e search of h i s c a r was "voluntary" under t h e standard established i n Schneckloth. Relator contends t h e circumstances surrounding h i s consent t o search point toward coercion: O n t h e n i g h t of h i s a r r e s t , he had refused t o consent t o t h e search of h i s c a r ; he consented only a f t e r having spent a night i n j a i l ; he con- sented only a f t e r having been informed by a deputy county a t t o r - ney t h a t a search warrant could be obtained regardless of h i s consent; and, h i s consent was obtained while he was i n custody. Schneckloth held t h a t voluntariness i s t o be determined from t h e " t o t a l i t y of t h e circumstances". I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e circum- stances noted by r e l a t o r , t h e record shows r e l a t o r signed a w r i t t e n "Permission t o Search'' which r e c i t e d : "I, Ramon Kotwicki, have been informed * * * of m y CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT not t o have a search made of t h e premises and property owned by m e and/or under m y c a r e , custody and c o n t r o l , with- o u t a search warrant. "Knowing of m y lawful r i g h t t o r e f u s e t o consent t o such a search, I w i l l i n g l y give m y permission * * *.I' While r e l a t o r would use t h e night spent i n j a i l t o show invol- untariness, it was a night i n which r e l a t o r might r e f l e c t on t h e f a c t t h a t he had already t o l d t h e deputy county a t t o r n e y "you might j u s t a s well look i n it, i t ' s f u l l of ~ a r i j u n a n a . " Also, r e l a t o r had previously, i n March 1 9 7 4 , been a r r e s t e d f o r criminal possession of dangerous drugs and had, a t t h a t t i m e , been f u l l y advised of h i s r i g h t s for purposes of t h a t proceeding. W e hold, a s did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , t h a t under t h e " t o t a l i t y of circum- stances" present here r e l a t o r ' s consent t o search h i s c a r was voluntary. Finding no e r r o r , t h e order of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t is affirmed. -. " V ~ ,,--,-,,,-2A-,;cLl,,,,,--,,-c------------ Chief' J u s t i c e W e concur: J u s t i c e s /