Title: Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 77 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP1365 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission, 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
Valarie Beres and Mequon Jewish Campus, Inc., 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 375 Wis. 2d 183, 895 N.W.2d 77 
PDC No:  2017 WI App 29 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 26, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 1, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Sandy A. Williams 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Ryan J. Walsh, chief deputy solicitor general, Brad D. 
Schimel, attorney general, Misha Tseytlin, solicitor general, 
and Kevin M. LeRoy, deputy solicitor general.  There was an oral 
argument by Ryan Walsh. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Jeffrey J. Shampo and Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review 
Commission, Madison.  There was an oral argument by Jeffrey J. 
Shampo. 
 
 
 
2 
There was an amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of 
Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, Inc. by Thomas C. 
Kamenick, Richard M. Esenberg, and Wisconsin Institute for Law & 
Liberty, Inc., Milwaukee. 
 
 
2018 WI 77
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP1365 
(L.C. No. 
2015CV358) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Valarie Beres and Mequon Jewish Campus, Inc., 
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   Valerie Beres was denied 
unemployment compensation benefits on the ground that she was 
terminated for engaging in "misconduct" as an employee, namely 
absenteeism, as defined by Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5)(e) (2015-16).1  
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
The governing statute, Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5)(e), reads as 
follows: 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP1365   
 
2 
 
The statute sets forth the circumstances in which absenteeism 
will constitute "misconduct" barring unemployment compensation 
benefits. 
¶2 
The Ozaukee County Circuit Court, Sandy A. Williams, 
Judge, adopted the position of the Department of Workforce 
Development that the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5)(e) 
allows an employer to adopt its own rules regarding employee 
absenteeism; that the employer's absenteeism rules need not be 
consistent with the statute's definition of "misconduct" based 
on absenteeism; and that an employee's violation of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sec. 108.04.  Eligibility for benefits. 
 
. . . . 
 
(5) Discharge for misconduct.  An employee whose 
work is terminated by an employing unit for misconduct 
by 
the 
employee . . . is 
ineligible 
to 
receive 
benefits . . . . "[M]isconduct" includes:  
 
. . . . 
 
(e) Absenteeism by an employee on more than 2 
occasions within the 120-day period before the date of 
the employee's termination, unless otherwise specified 
by his or her employer in an employment manual of 
which the employee has acknowledged receipt with his 
or her signature, or excessive tardiness by an 
employee in violation of a policy of the employer that 
has been communicated to the employee, if the employee 
does not provide to his or her employer both notice 
and one or more valid reasons for the absenteeism or 
tardiness. 
Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5)(e) (emphasis added). 
No. 
2016AP1365   
 
3 
 
employer's absenteeism rules constitutes "misconduct" under 
§ 108.04(5)(e) barring unemployment compensation benefits.2   
¶3 
In contrast, the court of appeals concluded that an 
employee 
who 
is 
terminated 
for 
violating 
an 
employer's 
absenteeism rules is not barred from obtaining unemployment 
compensation benefits unless the employee's conduct violates the 
statutory definition of "misconduct" based on absenteeism.3  The 
court of appeals also concluded that an employee cannot be 
denied unemployment compensation benefits for violating an 
employer's absenteeism policy that is "stricter" than the 
absenteeism policy set forth in the statute.  
¶4 
The single issue presented to the court is as follows:  
Does Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5)(e) allow an employer to adopt an 
attendance or absenteeism policy that differs from that set 
forth in § 108.04(5)(e) such that termination of an employee for 
violating the employer's policy results in disqualification for 
                                                 
2 No one disputes that the employer's absenteeism policy in 
the instant case was contained in an employment manual of which 
the employee has acknowledged receipt with her signature as 
required by the statute. 
3 DWD v. LIRC, 2017 WI App 29, 375 Wis. 2d 183, 895 
N.W.2d 77. 
No. 
2016AP1365   
 
4 
 
unemployment compensation benefits even if the employer's policy 
is more restrictive on the employee?4  
¶5 
We conclude that the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.04(5)(e) allows an employer to adopt its own absenteeism 
policy that differs from the policy set forth in § 108.04(5)(e), 
and that termination for the violation of the employer's 
absenteeism 
policy 
will 
result 
in 
disqualification 
from 
receiving 
unemployment 
compensation 
benefits 
even 
if 
the 
employer's policy is more restrictive  than the absenteeism 
policy set forth in the statute.  Beres was terminated for not 
complying with her employer's absenteeism policy.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that Beres was properly denied benefits.  
I 
                                                 
4 Because 
resolving 
this 
issue 
implicates 
the 
authoritativeness of an administrative agency's interpretation 
and application of a statute, we asked the parties to address 
the following issue:  "Does the practice of deferring to agency 
interpretations of statutes comport with Article VII, Section 2 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, which vests the judicial power in 
the unified court system?"   
We heard arguments in the instant case on the same day that 
we heard Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 2018 WI 
75, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  The Tetra Tech court 
decided to end the practice of deferring to administrative 
agencies' conclusions of law.  However, the Tetra Tech court 
also said that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.57(10), courts will 
give "due weight" to an administrative agency's experience, 
technical competence, and specialized knowledge as the court 
considers the agency's arguments.  The court's Tetra Tech 
opinion contains our analysis of the deference issue, which we 
incorporate and apply in the instant case. 
No. 
2016AP1365   
 
5 
 
¶6 
For purposes of deciding the issue presented, the 
facts are brief and undisputed.  Valerie Beres, a registered 
nurse, was employed by Mequon Jewish Campus.  Beres had signed 
her employer's written attendance policy providing that an 
employee in his or her probationary period may have his or her 
employment terminated if, in a single instance, the employee 
does not give the employer advance notice of an absence.  The 
employer's policy was that an employee must "call in 2 hours 
ahead of time" if the employee was unable to work his or her 
shift.  
¶7 
In 
the 
instant 
case, 
Beres 
was 
in 
her 
90-day 
probationary period when she did not come to work due to "flu-
like symptoms."  She did not communicate with her employer two 
hours prior to the beginning of her shift to inform her employer 
that she was sick and that she was unable to work her shift.  
Beres's employer terminated her employment three days later 
because of her violation of the employer's absenteeism policy. 
¶8 
Beres filed for unemployment compensation benefits.  
The Department of Workforce Development (DWD) denied benefits on 
the ground that when Beres violated her employer's written "No 
Call No Show" attendance policy, she committed "misconduct" 
under Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5)(e).  This statutory provision 
addresses 
when 
absenteeism 
constitutes 
"misconduct" 
disqualifying a terminated employee from obtaining unemployment 
compensation benefits. 
¶9 
Beres appealed DWD's decision to the Labor and 
Industry Review Commission (LIRC).  LIRC reversed the decision 
No. 
2016AP1365   
 
6 
 
of DWD, concluding that an employee is not disqualified from 
obtaining unemployment compensation benefits when the employee 
is terminated for violating an employer's absenteeism policy if 
that policy is more restrictive than the "2 in 120" day standard 
provided by Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5)(e).  LIRC determined that 
Beres did not commit "misconduct" because although she violated 
her employer's "stricter" absenteeism policy, she did not 
violate the "2 in 120" day statutory standard.  Accordingly, 
LIRC held that Beres was entitled to unemployment compensation 
benefits.  DWD appealed to the circuit court. 
¶10 The circuit court reversed LIRC's decision, adopting 
DWD's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5)(e):  An employer 
may, in a written employment manual signed by the employee, set 
forth its own policy regarding absenteeism, and a violation of 
the employer's policy constitutes "misconduct" under the statute 
resulting in a terminated employee's disqualification from 
obtaining unemployment compensation benefits.  In the instant 
case, the employer's policy (of which Beres acknowledged receipt 
with her signature) was that during an employee's probationary 
period, a single instance of an employee's absence without 
notification to the employer would result in termination.  In 
other words, the employer commanded that a single "No Call No 
Show" would result in termination.  According to the circuit 
court, under § 108.04(5)(e), termination for violating the 
employer's absenteeism policy is termination for "misconduct" 
and renders the terminated employee ineligible for unemployment 
compensation benefits. 
No. 
2016AP1365   
 
7 
 
¶11 LIRC appealed to the court of appeals.  The court of 
appeals 
adopted 
LIRC's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.04(5)(e), holding that an employee is not disqualified 
from obtaining unemployment compensation benefits when the 
employee violates an employer's absenteeism policy if that 
policy is "stricter" than the "2 in 120" day standard provided 
by § 108.04(5)(e).  The court of appeals concluded that Beres 
did not commit "misconduct" because although she violated her 
employer's "stricter" absenteeism policy, she did not violate 
the "2 in 120" day standard under the statute. 
II 
¶12 The instant case requires this court to determine the 
validity of LIRC's order interpreting and applying Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.04(5)(e).  The court may set aside an order of LIRC if 
LIRC acted "without or in excess of its powers."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.09(7)(c)6.a.  It is the province and duty of the judiciary 
to say what the law is.5  Because we determine that LIRC based 
its order on an incorrect interpretation of § 108.04(5)(e), we 
conclude that LIRC acted without or in excess of its powers. 
¶13 In contrast to LIRC's interpretation of the statute, 
we conclude that the text of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5)(e) plainly 
allows an employer to adopt its own attendance (or absenteeism) 
policy that differs from the policy set forth in § 108.04(5)(e), 
and termination for the violation of the employer's policy will 
                                                 
5 State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶36, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 
N.W.2d 460 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).   
No. 
2016AP1365   
 
8 
 
result 
in 
disqualification 
from 
receiving 
unemployment 
compensation benefits even if the employer's policy is more 
restrictive than the policy set forth in the statute.   
III 
¶14 The governing statute is Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5)(e).  
It states that "misconduct" includes an employee's absenteeism 
if the employee is absent on more than 2 occasions within a 
described 120-day period "unless otherwise specified by his or 
her employer in an employment manual of which the employee has 
acknowledged receipt with his or her signature."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.04(5)(e).  The governing statute reads as follows: 
Sec. 108.04.  Eligibility for benefits. 
 
. . . . 
 
(5) Discharge for misconduct.  An employee whose 
work is terminated by an employing unit for misconduct 
by 
the 
employee . . . is 
ineligible 
to 
receive 
benefits . . . . "[M]isconduct" includes:  
 
. . . . 
 
(e) Absenteeism by an employee on more than 2 
occasions within the 120-day period before the date of 
the employee's termination, unless otherwise specified 
by his or her employer in an employment manual of 
which the employee has acknowledged receipt with his 
or her signature, or excessive tardiness by an 
employee in violation of a policy of the employer that 
has been communicated to the employee, if the employee 
does not provide to his or her employer both notice 
and one or more valid reasons for the absenteeism or 
tardiness. 
Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5)(e) (emphasis added).  The key language, 
the meaning of which the parties dispute, is the "unless" clause 
emphasized above.     
No. 
2016AP1365   
 
9 
 
¶15 The statute is written in ordinary English and creates 
a simple framework.  The text of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5)(e) has 
three main clauses relating to absenteeism.  Only the first two 
clauses are relevant in the instant case.     
¶16 First, the statute defines "misconduct" as including 
absenteeism:  "[M]isconduct includes: . . . [a]bsenteeism by an 
employee on more than 2 occasions within the 120-day period 
before the date of the employee's termination."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.04(5)(e).   
¶17 Second, the statute sets forth an "unless" clause in 
defining "misconduct," including absenteeism.     
¶18 The word "unless" is an ordinary word in everyday 
language.  A helpful, but not dispositive, canon of statutory 
interpretation is that words in a statute that have a common 
meaning retain that common meaning in the statute.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.01(1); Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, ¶¶8, 20, 260 
Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656 (cited with approval in State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶45,  271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110). 
¶19 The word "unless" ordinarily 
means "except if."  
Replacing the word "unless" with the words "except if" where the 
word "unless" appears in the statute may run into grammatical 
issues, but it helps make the meaning of the statute clear:  An 
employee commits statutory "misconduct" by absenteeism if he or 
she is absent on more than two occasions within the 120-day 
period before the date of the employee's termination, except if 
the employee violates his or her employer's absenteeism policy 
No. 
2016AP1365   
 
10 
 
that is specified "in an employment manual of which the employee 
has acknowledged receipt with his or her signature."  This 
reading of the statute makes clear that an employer can opt out 
of the statutory definition of "misconduct" by absenteeism and 
set its own absenteeism policy, the violation of which will 
constitute statutory "misconduct."   
¶20 We can further test whether the word "unless" in Wis. 
Stat. § 108.04(5)(e) means "except if" by replacing the word 
"unless" used elsewhere in the statute with the words "except 
if."  A general rule of interpretation is that the same word 
used several times in a statute has the same meaning every time 
it is used.  Bank Mut. v. S.J. Boyer Const., Inc., 2010 WI 74, 
¶31, 326 Wis. 2d 521, 785 N.W.2d 462 ("When the same term is 
used throughout a chapter of the statutes, it is a reasonable 
deduction that the legislature intended that the term possess an 
identical meaning each time it appears.").    
¶21 For example, under Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5)(f), an 
employee's falsifying business records of the employer is 
"misconduct" "[u]nless" the falsification is "directed by an 
employee's employer."  This provision can be restated to say 
that an employee commits "misconduct" when he or she falsifies a 
business record "except if" the employee is directed to do so by 
his or her employer.  The word "unless" can also be replaced by 
the words "except if" in § 108.04(5)(g).  We therefore conclude  
that the word "unless" in § 108.04(5) means "except if."  See 
Bank Mut., 326 Wis. 2d 521, ¶31. 
No. 
2016AP1365   
 
11 
 
¶22 As an alternative argument, LIRC contends that Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.04(5)(e) 
disqualifies 
a 
former 
employee 
from 
obtaining unemployment compensation benefits only when the 
employee violates both the statutory "2 in 120" standard and an 
employer's absenteeism policy.  This argument fails because it 
rewrites the statute by striking and replacing the word "unless" 
in the text of the statute with the word "and."  These two words 
are not synonymous with one another.  Neither LIRC nor this 
court can rewrite this statute to replace the word "unless" with 
the word "and." 
* * * * 
¶23 We conclude that the word "unless" in the "unless 
otherwise specified" clause of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5)(e) means 
that an employee will be considered to have been terminated for 
"misconduct," and thus disqualified from obtaining unemployment 
compensation benefits, if the employee violates the statutory 
definition of absenteeism, except if the employee adheres to the 
employer's absenteeism policy specified in the employment manual 
of which the employee acknowledged receipt with his or her 
signature in accordance with the statute.     
¶24 In 
the 
instant 
case, 
Beres's 
employer 
has 
an 
absenteeism policy specified in its employment manual.  Beres 
acknowledged receipt of this policy in the employment manual 
with her signature.  Beres violated the employer's policy when 
she missed an entire shift without providing her employer notice 
of 
the 
absenteeism. 
 
Under 
these 
circumstances, 
Beres's 
violation 
of 
her 
employer's 
written 
absenteeism 
policy 
No. 
2016AP1365   
 
12 
 
constituted 
"misconduct" 
by 
absenteeism 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.04(5)(e), and Beres was properly denied the benefits at 
issue.  
¶25 For the reasons set forth, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No. 
2016AP1365   
 
 
 
1