Title: Brooks v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RONALD F. BROOKS,  
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 525, 2006      
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0508014813 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  March 28, 2007 
 
 
Decided:     May 22, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 22nd day of May 2007, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
Ronald Brooks (“Brooks”), the defendant-below appellant, appeals 
from final judgments of conviction entered in the Superior Court on charges of 
trafficking in cocaine, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, 
possession with intent to deliver a narcotic schedule II controlled substance, 
second degree conspiracy, possession of drug paraphernalia, four counts of 
possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, and possession of 
ammunition by a person prohibited and maintaining a vehicle.  Brooks was tried 
before a jury and found guilty of all charges.  The Superior Court adjudicated 
 
2
Brooks an habitual offender and imposed the minimum mandatory sentence of one 
hundred and forty-five years imprisonment.  On appeal, Brooks claims that the 
Superior Court reversibly erred in several respects.  We find no merit to his claims 
and, therefore, affirm. 
 
2. 
Following an investigation, the police obtained a warrant to search a 
townhouse located at 1 Ravine Place, and a Chevrolet Lumina.  The warrant was 
executed on August 16, 2005, shortly after 6:00 a.m.  The townhouse was leased 
by Brooks and his girlfriend, Rose Epps (“Epps”), both of whom were present at 
the time of the search.  The Lumina, which was registered to Epps, was parked 
outside the townhouse.  Inside the residence, the police recovered marijuana in a 
men’s sneaker in the hallway closet; a 9 mm magazine in the kitchen; and a box 
containing .40 caliber ammunition in the kitchen drawer.  More ammunition in 
loaded magazines was found in a plastic bag concealed under a bush outside the 
front door.  Inside the trunk of the Lumina, the police discovered a digital scale, a 
tan and black “cow print” bag containing approximately 350 grams of crack 
cocaine, and four handguns.   
 
3. 
At trial, the following witnesses testified:  Officer Michael Santos, who 
had conducted surveillance of 1 Ravine Place and saw Brooks driving the Lumina; 
Epps, who lived with Brooks; Detective Kevin Murphy, who found Brooks’ 
fingerprints on the trunk of the Lumina; and Joseph Tomchick, who had sold the 
 
3
handguns to Brooks in exchange for money and cocaine.  As noted, the jury found 
Brooks guilty of all of the indicted charges.   
 
4. 
Thereafter, the State petitioned the Superior Court to sentence Brooks 
as an habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214 (a),1 which requires proof of three 
prior felony convictions.  The State called Rodney Hegman (“Hegman”), a 
fingerprint analyst employed at the Delaware State Bureau of Identification, as an 
expert witness.  Hegman testified that he had had access to the original arrest cards 
and that he compared fingerprints taken at Brooks’ arrest in 2005 for the instant 
                                                 
1 11 Del C. § 4214 Habitual criminal; life sentence (a) provides that:  
 
Any person who has been 3 times convicted of a felony, other than those which 
are specifically mentioned in subsection (b) of this section, under the laws of this 
State, and/or any other state, United States or any territory of the United States, 
and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony of this State is 
declared to be an habitual criminal, and the court in which such 4th or subsequent 
conviction is had, in imposing sentence, may in its discretion, impose a sentence 
of up to life imprisonment upon the person so convicted. Notwithstanding any 
provision of this title to the contrary, any person sentenced pursuant to this 
subsection shall receive a minimum sentence which shall not be less than the 
statutory maximum penalty provided elsewhere in this title for the 4th or 
subsequent felony which forms the basis of the State’s petition to have the person 
declared to be an habitual criminal except that this minimum provision shall apply 
only when the 4th or subsequent felony is a Title 11 violent felony, as defined in § 
4201(c) of this title.  Notwithstanding any provision of this title to the contrary, 
any sentence of life imprisonment imposed pursuant to this subsection shall not be 
subject to suspension by the court, and shall be served in its entirety at a full 
custodial Level V institutional setting without the benefit of probation, parole, 
earned good time or any other reduction.  Notwithstanding any provision of this 
title to the contrary, any sentence of less than life imprisonment imposed pursuant 
to this subsection shall not be subject to suspension by the court, and shall be 
served in its entirety at a full custodial Level V institutional setting without the 
benefit of probation or parole, except that any such sentence shall be subject to 
the provisions of §§ 4205(h), 4217, 4381 and 4382 of this title. 
 
11 Del C. § 4214 (a) (2001).  
 
4
offenses, in March 2003 (second degree forgery et al.), August 1997 (robbery first 
degree et al.) and in July 1996 (carrying a deadly weapon et al.).2  Hegman opined 
that all four sets of prints belonged to Brooks.  Based on that testimony, the trial 
court imposed an habitual offender minimum mandatory sentence.   
                                                 
2 During the prosecution’s direct examination of Hegman, the following exchange took place: 
 
Q: Mr. Hegman, I will show you what I believe would be admitted without 
objection as State’s one through four and ask you if you recognize those items? 
A: Yes, I do. 
Q: What are those items? 
A: These are standard or a copy of standard arrest fingerprint cards for Ronald F. 
Brooks. 
Q: And are these the cards that you used in your comparison? 
A: Yes, they are. 
Q: Can you tell us—starting with number one can you give a date or an offense 
that is listed? 
A: The date was August 16th 2005.  The arrest was for possession of a firearm 
during the felony, trafficking in cocaine over 100 grams, possession with the 
intent to deliver cocaine, possession with the intent to deliver marijuana, 
possession of a firearm by a person prohibited and maintaining a dwelling for 
keeping controlled substances.  
Q: That’s number one? 
A: Yes, it is. 
Q: Can you tell us number two? 
A: Number two— 
Q: Can you just tell us the offense date and the lead offense? 
A: The lead charge, first charge? 
Q: Actually for the record it’s probably better to go through the other charges. 
A: March 12th 2003, two counts of forgery second, breach of release, criminal 
impersonation, improper taillights, no proof of insurance, driving without a 
license. 
Q: And number three? 
A: Number three is dated August 5th 1987, for robbery first, assault second, 
conspiracy second and criminal mischief. 
Q: And number four? 
A: Number four dated July 12th 1996 for carrying a concealed deadly weapon, 
carrying a deadly weapon by a person prohibited and resisting arrest.  
    
 
 
5
 
5. 
On appeal, Brooks advances five claims of error.  Brooks contends that: 
(a) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the charges; (b) he was denied 
his constitutional right to a fair trial because the prosecutor made improper 
prejudicial statements to the jury; (c) the Superior Court erred by not ruling on his 
motion to suppress; (d) his trial defense counsel’s assistance was rendered 
ineffective by a conflict of interest; and (5) the Superior Court erred as a matter of 
law in declaring Brooks an habitual offender.   Those contentions generate the five 
issues next discussed. 
 
6. 
Among the crimes for which Brooks was charged and convicted were 
second degree conspiracy (with co-defendant Epps) to trafficking in drugs, and 
four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.  Brooks 
moved for judgment of acquittal on those charges based on insufficient evidence.  
The trial judge denied the motion.  Brooks contends that in so doing the trial court 
reversibly erred.  
 
7. 
We review a claim of insufficiency of the evidence for whether any 
rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 
could find the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt.3  In making that determination, we do not distinguish between direct and 
                                                 
3 Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 990 (Del. 2004).  
 
6
circumstantial evidence.4  Nor do we resolve issues of credibility, as it is for the 
jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses and resolve any conflicts in the 
testimony.5 
 
8. 
We conclude that the Superior Court correctly denied Brooks’ motion 
for judgment of acquittal.  Under Hazim v. State,6 “[a] conviction of second degree 
conspiracy requires the State to prove that [Epps] acted with the intention to 
promote or facilitate the commission of the offense.”7  Viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the State, it appears that the State presented evidence that 
Epps intended to promote or facilitate Brooks’ felony offenses.  Specifically, Epps 
lived with Brooks and was fully aware of Brooks’ activities, including his 
possession of guns and a digital scale;8  and the drugs, guns and scale were found 
in the trunk of the car registered to her.  Therefore, we find no merit to Brooks’ 
claim that the State’s evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt of conspiracy 
in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. 
                                                 
4 Davis v. State, 2003 Del. LEXIS 510, at *6 (Del. Oct. 7, 2003), citing Monroe v. State, 652 
A.2d 560, 563 (Del. 1995).  
 
5 Id. citing Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Del. 1992). 
 
6 2005 Del. LEXIS 27 (Del. Jan. 14, 2005). 
 
7 Id. at *6.  
 
8 When asked by the defense counsel, Epps testified at the trial that: 
 
[Defense Counsel:] Is that right?  I mean from what you’ve just told us, you didn’t 
know what was going on when you weren’t there and you just lived with him. 
Epps: I knew—and at the same time, I knew the things that he was doing. 
 
7
 
9. 
Brooks also challenges the evidentiary support for his conviction of 
four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.  This 
Court has consistently held that a “defendant can be held to ‘possess’ a firearm 
even if it is not found on his person,”9 and that “[t]he law does not look to actual, 
physical control, but rather to accessibility.”10  “A felon is in ‘possession’ of a 
deadly weapon . . . when it is physically available or accessible to him during the 
commission of the crime.”11  In Kornbluth v. State,12 weapons found in close 
proximity to drugs in the same room were deemed sufficient to support a 
conviction for possession of deadly weapons during the commission of a felony, 
because the weapons were physically available or accessible to the defendant 
during the drug offense even though the defendant was not present at the time of 
the search.  Similarly, here the guns and drugs were all found in the same 
location—inside a handbag in the trunk of the Lumina.  Viewed in the light most 
favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find 
that, at the time Brooks committed the felony offenses charged, the guns were 
within his immediate reach and, therefore, were readily accessible.  
                                                 
9 Childress v. State, 721 A.2d 929, 931 (Del. 1998). 
 
10 Id.  
 
11 Mack v. State, 312 A.2d 319, 322 (Del. 1973). 
 
12 580 A.2d 556 (Del. 1990).    
 
8
 
10. Brooks next claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct.  
Although Brooks claims that that conduct was prejudicial, he never made a timely 
objection to it.  Where, as here, “defense counsel fails to raise a timely and 
pertinent objection to alleged prosecutorial misconduct at trial and the trial judge 
does not intervene sua sponte,”13 we review only for plain error.  The first step of a 
plain error review of prosecutorial misconduct mirrors our review for harmless 
error.  We examine the record de novo to determine whether prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred.14  If no misconduct is found, the inquiry ends.  If misconduct 
is found, we next determine whether the misconduct was “so clearly prejudicial to 
substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”15   
 
11. Here, Brooks contends that the prosecutor at trial improperly conveyed 
his personal opinion by using the first person pronouns “I” and “we” during his 
opening remarks to the jury.16  Although a prosecutor must not express a personal 
belief or opinion, no Delaware case holds that the use of the word “I” or “we” in a 
                                                 
13 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 150 (Del. 2006). 
 
14 Id.  
 
15 Id.  
 
16 In the prosecutor’s opening remarks to the jury, he stated: 
 
At the end of the case, I will come back before you and I’ll ask you to return a 
verdict that is consistent with the evidence that you’ll see and hear over the course 
of this trial, and as to each of the elements of each of the offenses, I’ll ask you to 
find the defendant, Ronald, guilty.  
 
9
jury argument is per se improper.17  Although he phrased his argument in the first 
person, the prosecutor was referring to the party he represented, and was not 
expressing his personal opinion regarding Brooks’ guilt.  The prosecutor’s 
comments, taken in context, were not improper. 
 
12. Brooks next contends that the prosecutor elicited unfairly prejudicial 
testimony.  Brooks points to the testimony of Officer Michael Santos that he was 
assigned to the drug unit, and was “familiar” with Brooks through his investigating 
crimes involving drugs and narcotics.18  Brooks’ argument is untenable, because it 
                                                 
17 Booze v. State, 2007 Del. LEXIS 55, at *16 (Del. Feb. 13, 2007), citing Brokenbrough v. State, 
522 A.2d 851, 859 (Del. 1987). 
 
18 At trial, Officer Santos testified in pertinent part, as follows:  
 
Q. Officer Santos, where are you employed? 
A. New Castle County Police Department in Delaware. 
Q. How long have you been employed with the County Police? 
A. I’ve been employed since May of 1994.  
Q. What are your duties with County Police? 
A. I’m currently assigned the drug control unit of the criminal investigations 
division. 
Q. And on a given Tuesday afternoon, what would you otherwise be doing in that 
capacity? 
A. Investigating crimes involving drugs and narcotics and vice.  
Q. In that capacity, have you had occasion to establish surveillance? 
A. Yes. 
* * * 
Q. Could you see the front of the building? 
A. That’s correct. 
Q. Could you describe the building? 
A. I believe it was a two-story town home.  It was blue.  I don’t know if it was 
vinyl or wood siding on each side and it had, I believe, a stone town home aside 
it.  
Q. Could you see the streetscape outside the home? 
A. That’s correct.  I could see the actual unit block of Ravine [sic] in front of the 
residences as they intersect at Colonial—I believe it’s Boulevard. 
 
10
takes Officer Santos’ testimony grossly out of context.  Officer Santos indicated 
that he was familiar with Brooks because he (Officer Santos) had “covertly 
observed” Brooks several times while conducting surveillance of 1 Ravine Place.  
Santos’ testimony did not imply familiarity with Brooks based on facts unrelated to 
the investigation that led to Brooks’ arrest.   
 
13. Brooks next points to the testimony of Corporal Karen Messner, who 
referred to Brooks as a “target” when she executed the search warrant.19  Brooks 
                                                                                                                                                             
Q. Are you familiar with Ronald Brooks? 
A. That’s correct. 
Q. Was the person known as Ronald Brooks present during the time of your 
surveillance? 
A. That’s correct. 
Q. How many times was he present that you were able to see? 
A. I covertly observed him from the platform, I believe it was, four individual times. 
Q. What was Ronald Brooks doing during the time that you saw him? 
A. I observed him to be exiting the location of 1 Ravire [sic].  I observed him 
operation motor vehicles and responding and returning to 1 Ravire [sic] and 
entering 1 Ravire [sic]. 
Q. What motor vehicles did he operate? 
A. I observed him operating, I believe, a blue-colored Chevrolet Lumina four door. 
 
19 At trial, Corporal Messner testified in pertinent part, as follows: 
 
Q. What steps were taken to effect the search warrant? 
A. We used the, what we call our swat team, special entry team, who made entry 
into the residence? 
Q.  Were you present for the entry? 
A.  On the perimeter, yes.  
Q. Were you not actually part of the initial team that went in? 
A. No.   
Q. How long before you entered the residence? 
A. I would say less than four minutes from the initial time it was hit. 
Q. At what time did this take place? 
A. 0656 hours. 
Q. Is there any significance to that particular time to do a search warrant? 
 
11
claims that the State improperly implied to the jury that the officer had received 
tips or complaints of the drug offenses committed by Brooks.  That argument is 
likewise without merit.  Defense counsel did not ask the trial court to grant relief; 
indeed, counsel observed that the word “target” had been unsolicited and 
accidental.20  Second, the Superior Court took adequate steps to caution the State 
and the State’s witness that they should avoid referring to Brooks as a “target.”  
Third, it was undisputed that Brooks was on trial for drug offenses and other 
charges resulting from police discoveries made while executing a search warrant.   
                                                                                                                                                             
A. Well, if we do a daytime search warrant, it has to be after 0600, 6 o’clock in 
the morning.  We waited until then.  Surveillance had shown that our target was 
present inside the residence.   
 
20 Defense counsel stated, in pertinent part, as follows: 
 
[Defense counsel:] I did not stand and object at that time because I didn’t want to 
raise any flags to the jury.  I did not intend either to address the Court and ask for 
a mistrial based on that and, in essence, I had decided that I didn’t want a curative 
instruction either to highlight the fact, but I did mention to Mr. Robertson and 
Corporal Messner who immediately indicated that that was a mistake and that she 
didn’t intend to do that, that I hoped it wasn’t going to happen again because if it 
does, at that point, I think I may need to ask for some type of— 
The Court: All right.  So I understand, at this juncture, you’re putting me on 
notice of what happened, but are not, under the circumstances, making any 
affirmative application of any kind? 
[Defense counsel:] Correct, your Honor. 
The Court: Thank you.  I’ll note the same observation that [the defense counsel] 
did, that the State witnesses should be careful to avoid reference to that.   
 
 
12
 
14. Next, Brooks complains that the prosecutor, in closing argument, 
referred to him as a “drug dealer.”21  Brooks claims that the reference was unfair 
because he was not being tried for being a drug dealer.  Therefore, that 
misrepresentation could only have been calculated to inflame the prejudices of the 
jury.  However, the record is replete with evidence of Brooks’ drug offenses.  
Brooks was charged with—and convicted of—trafficking in over 100 grams of 
cocaine, possession with the intent to deliver cocaine, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, and maintaining a vehicle.  “Where a defendant is charged with 
distributing cocaine, a prosecutor’s closing remarks that he was a ‘drug dealer’ are 
within the permissible bounds of legitimate inference.”22  Therefore, Brooks’ 
improper prosecutorial remarks claim fails.     
 
15. Before trial, Brooks moved to suppress a post-arrest statement that he 
made to police on the ground that the statement was obtained in violation of his 
                                                 
21 In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated that: 
 
This is property of a drug dealer.  We know that from the evidence in this case.  
Right here are the tools of the trade that you would have if you’re going to deal in 
large amounts of crack cocaine.  You have loaded firearms to protect yourself 
against rivals, you have a scale to analyze and weigh crack cocaine before you 
distribute it so somebody, and most importantly, you have the crack itself more 
than three times the threshold weight for trafficking and you heard it testified this 
is about $12,000 worth of crack sitting right here.  That’s what the evidence 
shows.    
 
22 White v. State, 601 So.2d 1116, 1118 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).  
 
13
Fifth Amendment rights, as elaborated in Miranda v. Arizona.23  By letter, the 
prosecution informed the trial court that it did not intend to introduce the statement 
into evidence during its case-in-chief.  The trial judge ruled that given the 
prosecution’s letter, there was no need to hold a suppression hearing.24   On appeal, 
Brooks argues that because statements obtained in violation of Miranda rules may 
be admissible to impeach any conflicting testimony he might give at trial,25 the trial 
judge’s decision not to hold a hearing and decide the suppression motion left him 
unable to knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently decide whether or not to testify. 
 
16. Brooks’ argument fails for three reasons.  First, Brooks cites no 
authority or advances any persuasive grounds for this argument.  Second, although 
the trial judge did not rule on the suppression motion, he gave sufficient guidance 
to Brooks to enable Brooks to make an informed decision whether or not to testify.  
The trial judge acknowledged that although statements taken in violation of only 
Miranda rules may not be used as evidence in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, they 
                                                 
23 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
24 The trial judge stated that: 
 
So, one, the State has agreed that it won’t introduce the statement in its case in 
chief.  Secondly, this Court, I will assume, but without deciding, that it was 
unconstitutionally obtained.  The State does not concede that.  Thirdly, the 
determination of whether or not the statement can come in some form—it may 
need to be redacted for reasons other than voluntariness, trustworthiness, and 
Miranda—will be decided if and when the defendant should testify at trial.  
 
25 Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).  
 
 
14
may be used to impeach conflicting testimony by the defendant.26  In addition, the 
trial judge recognized that an involuntary statement is inadmissible even if there 
was superficial compliance with the requirements of Miranda.  Lastly, the record 
discloses no error in the Superior Court’s determination that Brooks consciously 
and knowingly waived his right to testify.27     
                                                 
26 Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990), citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 
(1971). 
 
27 The following colloquy between the trial judge and Brooks then took place: 
 
The Court: All right.  Then I’ll ask the defendant to stand.  Would you please rise, 
Mr. Brooks?  Ms. van Amerongen has indicated to me that the defense intends to 
rest which means that you will not be taking the witness stand; it that correct? 
The Defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Do you understand that you have a constitutional right to testify or not 
to testify as you choose? 
The Defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Do you understand that that is a decision only you in the final analysis 
can make?  Your attorney can give you advice one way or the other, but 
ultimately it’s your decision and your decision alone.  Do you understand that? 
The defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Do you understand that if you exercise your constitutional right not to 
testify, the jury will be instructed that you have that right and that cannot be held 
against you.  Do you understand that? 
The Defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court:  Have you had enough time, do you think, to talk about all this, the 
pros and cons of testifying, with your attorney? 
The Defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Do you understand that you’ll not be able to come back at any later 
time and say that you wished to testify, but somehow were prevented from doing 
so?  Do you understand that? 
The Defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Do you believe you are knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 
waiving your constitutional right to testify? 
The Defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: I find the waiver of defendant’s right to testify to be knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently made, so it’s accepted.  
 
15
 
17. 
Brooks next argues that his defense counsel gave ineffective 
assistance.  That argument is procedurally impermissible at this stage, because this 
Court does not entertain claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal 
that were not raised below.28   
 
18. Finally, Brooks argues that the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence to support his adjudication as an habitual offender, because no certified 
records of conviction were admitted into evidence by the State.  We review that 
claim to “ensure that a trial judge’s determination of habitual offender status is 
supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error or any abuse of 
discretion.”29 
 
19. 
Under Delaware law, it is the State’s burden to establish that each 
predicate offense satisfies the requirements of the habitual offender statute beyond 
a reasonable doubt.30  For a defendant to be sentenced as an habitual offender, the 
State “need offer only unambiguous documentary evidence of a prior predicate 
conviction, not live witnesses, and not a particular or exclusive type of 
                                                 
28  See DuRoss v. State, 494 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Del. 1985), West v. State, 2007 Del. LEXIS 44, at 
**3-4 (Del. 2006). 
 
29 Folks v. State, 2005 Del. LEXIS 161, at *8 (Del. Apr. 25, 2005), citing Walker v. State, 790 
A.2d 1214, 1221 (Del. 2002). 
 
30 Colon v. State, 2006 Del. LEXIS 487, at *11 (Del. Sep. 22, 2006), citing Hall v. State, 788 
A.2d 118, 127 (Del. 2001). 
 
16
documentary evidence.”31  Here, there is no factual basis to support Brooks’ claim.  
The prosecutor initially filed a motion to have Brooks declared an habitual 
offender, with supporting documentation.32  The State also called an expert witness 
to  testify.  Thus, the State offered sufficient evidence to establish Brooks as an 
habitual offender, and the Superior Court acted within its discretion in enhancing 
the sentence to one hundred and forty-five years minimum mandatory term of 
incarceration.33  Because the Superior Court properly declared Brooks to be an 
habitual offender and imposed sentences within the statutory limits, Brooks’ last 
argument is without merit. 
 
 
                                                 
31 Hall v. State, 788 A.2d 118, 128 (Del. 2001). 
 
32 The trial judge ruled that: 
 
One moment please.  I am satisfied that the State has made a sufficient record 
establishing, one, that the same person, Ronald Brooks, admitted all the felonies 
that were testified to. 
 
Secondly, I am satisfied that there is a sufficient record before the Court 
consisting of the attachments to the State’s position.  Cases such as Tolson versus 
State, number 264, 1997 held in connection with the record evidence that this 
Court can consider at a habitual offender hearing—it says that the Superior Court 
could consider certified copies of convictions to presentence report, the SBI 
record, etcetera.  And I am satisfied that a proper basis has been made for the 
declaration that Ronald Brooks is a habitual offender.  
 
33 11 Del. C. §§ 4201(c) and 4205.   
 
17
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the Superior 
Court are AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Justice