Title: Campbell v. Husky Hogs, LLC

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 103,458 
 
ROBERT L. CAMPBELL, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
HUSKY HOGS, L.L.C., 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Kansas law recognizes the tort of retaliatory discharge when an employee is 
terminated for filing a wage claim under the Kansas Wage Payment Act. 
 
2. 
The alternative remedies doctrine is a substitution of law concept under which a 
federal or state statute can substitute for a state retaliatory discharge claim if the 
substituted statute provides an adequate remedy.  
 
3.  
The statutory remedies for violating the Kansas Wage Payment Act are not an 
adequate substitute remedy for a state retaliatory discharge claim based upon a wage 
claim filing because the wage claim redresses a different harm, the statutory 
administrative process varies greatly from the judicial process applicable to wrongful 
termination, and the statutory damages are limited by the wages wrongly withheld. The 
judicial process will better serve the public interest in deterring this type of retaliatory 
misconduct. 
 
2 
 
 
 
Appeal from Phillips District Court; WILLIAM B. ELLIOTT, judge. Opinion filed May 20, 2011. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
Larry G. Michel, of Kennedy Berkley Yarnevich & Williamson, Chartered, of Salina, and Angela 
Chesney Herrington, of the same firm, were on the brief for appellant.  
 
Daniel C. Walter, of Ryan, Walter & McClymont, Chtd., of Norton, was on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  This court considers for the first time whether a common-law tort for 
retaliatory discharge may be brought against an employer when an employee claims he or 
she was fired for filing a wage claim under the Kansas Wage Payment Act (KWPA), 
K.S.A. 44-313 et seq. The district court dismissed the lawsuit because there was no 
previously recognized exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine for discharging an 
employee for filing a KWPA wage claim. The district court also found there was an 
adequate remedy available under that Act. We hold the pleadings state a valid claim for 
retaliatory discharge, and the statutory remedies provided by the KWPA are an 
insufficient substitute for common-law remedies. As such, we reverse and remand for 
further proceedings. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Robert L. Campbell was an at-will employee with Husky Hogs, L.L.C., for about 
1 year when he filed a complaint with the Kansas Department of Labor (KDOL) alleging 
Husky Hogs was not paying him as required by the KWPA. Campbell was fired 1 
business day after KDOL acknowledged receiving his claim. Campbell filed this lawsuit 
in Phillips County District Court alleging Husky Hogs terminated him for pursuing his 
statutory rights under the KWPA. Husky Hogs denied the allegation. 
3 
 
 
 
 
The company also filed a K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6) motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. It argued Kansas had not previously recognized a retaliatory discharge claim 
for alleging KWPA violations and no public policy reasons existed for allowing such a 
claim now. Campbell conceded the legal issue was one of first impression, but he argued 
Kansas public policy strongly favors wage earners and compliance with the statutory 
mandates, so his claim should qualify as an exception sometimes permitted at common 
law. 
 
The district court granted Husky Hogs' motion. It held Campbell's termination did 
not violate Kansas public policy, even though it was required to assume the discharge 
resulted from filing the disputed wage claim. And the district court sua sponte determined 
that even if Campbell had stated a valid common-law retaliatory discharge claim, it was 
supplanted by the KWPA because that Act provides Campbell an adequate substitute 
remedy. Campbell filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. This court 
transferred the case pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(c) (transfer on court's own motion). 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Standard of Review 
 
Whether a district court erred by granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim is a question of law subject to unlimited review. Ritchie Paving, Inc. v. City of 
Deerfield, 275 Kan. 631, 633, 67 P.3d 843 (2003). An appellate court is required to 
assume the facts alleged by the plaintiff are true, along with any inferences reasonably 
drawn from those facts. The appellate court then decides whether the facts and inferences 
state a claim based on the plaintiff's theory or any other possible theory. Bland v. Scott, 
279 Kan. 962, 963, 112 P.3d 941 (2005) (quoting McCormick v. Board of Shawnee 
4 
 
 
 
County Comm'rs, 272 Kan. 627, Syl. ¶ 1, 35 P.3d 815 [2001], cert. denied 537 U.S. 841 
[2002]).  
 
Exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine 
 
Kansas historically adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine, which holds that 
employees and employers may terminate an employment relationship at any time, for any 
reason, unless there is an express or implied contract governing the employment's 
duration. Morriss v. Coleman Co., 241 Kan. 501, 510, 738 P.2d 841 (1987). But there are 
specific statutory exceptions to this rule, such as terminations based on race, gender, or 
disability. See K.S.A. 44-1009 (It is unlawful for an employer to terminate or otherwise 
discriminate against a person because of race, religion, color, sex, disability, national 
original, or ancestry or to commit other discriminatory employment practices listed in the 
statute.). 
 
There are also exceptions recognized by Kansas courts through our case law. Over 
the past 30 years, exceptions to the at-will doctrine created a common-law tort for 
retaliatory discharge. These exceptions gradually eroded the general terminable-at-will 
rule when an employee is fired in contravention of a recognized state public policy. 
Ortega v. IBP, Inc., 255 Kan. 513, 518, 874 P.2d 1188 (1994) ("[I]t is clear that this state 
has recognized exceptions to the doctrine of employment-at-will when an employee is 
discharged in contravention of public policy."); Anco Constr. Co. v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 
626, Syl. ¶ 5, 693 P.2d 1183 (1985) ("When an employee is terminated in violation of 
federal public policy, however, no state cause of action is pled.").  
 
To date, this court has endorsed public policy exceptions in four circumstances: 
(1) filing a claim under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act, K.S.A. 44-501 et seq; (2) 
whistleblowing; (3) filing a claim under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 45 
5 
 
 
 
U.S.C. § 51 (2006) et seq.; and (4) exercising a public employee's First Amendment right 
to free speech on an issue of public concern. Anco Constr. Co., 236 Kan. at 629 (workers 
compensation); Palmer v. Brown, 242 Kan. 893, 900, 752 P.2d 685 (1988) 
(whistleblowing based on good-faith reporting of coworkers or employers infraction 
pertaining to public health and safety); Hysten v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co., 
277 Kan. 551, 561, 108 P.3d 437 (2004) (FELA); Larson v. Ruskowitz, 252 Kan. 963, 
974-75, 850 P.2d 253 (1993) (retaliatory discharge claim when a public employee is 
terminated for exercising First Amendment rights to free speech on an issue of public 
concern); see also Flenker v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 266 Kan. 198, 204, 967 P.2d 
295 (1998) (whistleblowing based on good-faith reporting of federal Occupational Safety 
and Health Act violations); Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 242 Kan. 804, 815, 752 P.2d 
645 (1988) (employer prohibited from terminating employee because of absence caused 
by work-related injury and potential workers compensation claim), overruled on other 
grounds by Gonzalez-Centeno v. North Central Kansas Regional Juvenile Detention 
Facility, 278 Kan. 427, 101 P.3d 1170 (2004); Cox v. United Technologies, 240 Kan. 95, 
Syl., 727 P.2d 456 (1986) (recognizing tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers 
compensation claim but declining to apply it under specific facts of case), overruled on 
other grounds by Coleman, 242 Kan. at 813-15. 
 
Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981), was the first 
Kansas case recognizing a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. There, plaintiff 
alleged he was terminated for claiming workers compensation benefits against his 
employer. The Workers Compensation Act did not contain an express provision making 
it unlawful to terminate an employee for filing a claim. In fact, the Murphy court noted 
the legislature had considered amending the law to explicitly permit a retaliation claim on 
two occasions, but neither amendment passed. 6 Kan. App. 2d at 496. Nevertheless, the 
Court of Appeals held a strong public policy could be implied from the statutory scheme 
and that policy needed protection against job-related retaliation. It noted the Workers 
6 
 
 
 
Compensation Act provided efficient remedies and protections for employees, was 
designed to promote the welfare of people in the state, and was the exclusive remedy 
available for injured workers. As such, "[t]o allow an employer to coerce employees in 
the free exercise of their rights under the act would substantially subvert the purposes of 
the act." 6 Kan. App. 2d at 496. Four years later, the Court of Appeals' analysis was 
affirmed by this court in Anco Constr. Co., 236 Kan. at 629, and then reaffirmed in 
subsequent cases. See Rebarchek v. Farmers Co-op Elevator & Mercantile Ass'n, 272 
Kan. 546, 560-62, 35 P.3d 892 (2000); Brown v. United Methodist Homes for the Aged, 
249 Kan. 124, 132, 815 P.2d 72 (1991); Coleman, 242 Kan. at 810; Cox, 240 Kan. at 96. 
 
 
Almost 2 decades after Anco Constr. Co., this court applied the same analysis 
recited in Murphy to recognize that a retaliatory discharge claim under FELA was 
necessary to protect an employee's exercise of statutory FELA rights. Hysten, 277 Kan. at 
561. In Hysten, a railroad employee filed a retaliatory discharge claim alleging the 
railroad retaliated against him for filing a tardy claim for work-related injuries. The 
railroad argued this was not a valid state law retaliatory discharge claim, but was instead 
dependent upon a federal policy. Disagreeing, this court held:  
 
"Regardless of whether FELA or the Kansas Workers Compensation Act supplies the 
framework to support an injured worker's pursuit of recovery, the public policy 
underlying that framework would be undermined if the worker could be fired for the 
exercise of his or her statutory right. Such a situation effectively releases an employer 
from the obligation of the statute. [Citation omitted.]" (Emphasis added.) 277 Kan. at 
556-57.  
 
The case law makes it obvious that Kansas courts permit the common-law tort of 
retaliatory discharge as a limited exception to the at-will employment doctrine when it is 
necessary to protect a strongly held state public policy from being undermined. As such, 
7 
 
 
 
the first question in analyzing Campbell's claim becomes whether such a state public 
policy is found within the KWPA. 
 
 
The public policy embedded in the KWPA 
 
The parties dispute what authority may be considered when determining whether a 
strongly held public policy exists in this state. Husky Hogs argues the legislature must 
expressly declare a public policy against retaliatory job actions for filing a wage claim 
under the KWPA before Kansas courts may recognize a common-law tort of retaliatory 
discharge as an exception to at-will employment. But Campbell argues the test is not so 
strict and that public policy has been implied from statutory schemes. Campbell's 
argument is consistent with Kansas case law. 
 
We have stated that courts tasked with determining whether a public policy exists 
are faced with three situations: (1) The legislature has clearly declared the state's public 
policy; (2) the legislature enacted statutory provisions from which public policy may 
reasonably be implied, even though it is not directly declared; and (3) the legislature has 
neither made a clear statement of public policy nor can it be reasonably implied. 
Coleman, 242 Kan. at 808. We also have held that public policy must be clearly declared 
by the constitution, statutory enactments, or the courts, and it must be "'so united and so 
definite and fixed that its existence is not subject to any substantial doubt.'" Hysten, 277 
Kan. at 555 (citing Riddle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 27 Kan. App. 2d 79, 998 P.2d 114 
[2000]). We also have acknowledged that while public policy may be determined by both 
the legislature and the courts, courts must respect legislative expressions when 
ascertaining whether a public policy exists. Coleman, 242 Kan. at 808. 
 
8 
 
 
 
As to this question, both parties refer us to the Kansas federal court decision in 
Kistler v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 1268 (D. Kan. 1985), which 
suggested there was an express policy declaration governing a wage-related claim. In 
Kistler, the plaintiff alleged retaliatory discharge in federal district court, contending she 
was fired for testifying against her employer at an unemployment compensation hearing. 
Such hearings are provided for under K.S.A. 44-701 et seq. In determining Kansas public 
policy prevented a termination under those circumstances, the court held the legislature 
had "strongly expressed a policy against allowing employers to interfere with 
unemployment compensation hearings" by enacting K.S.A. 44-615. 620 F. Supp. at 1269. 
But the relevant portion of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 44-615 states: 
 
 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to discharge any 
employee or to discriminate in any way against any employee because . . . such employee 
may testify as a witness before the secretary of labor, or shall sign any complaint or shall 
be in any way instrumental in bringing to the attention of the secretary of labor any 
matter of controversy between employers and employees as provided herein." (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
It is not immediately clear from the statute what provisions of the labor code are 
subject to the "as provided herein" language. And since K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 44-615 
appears in Article 6 of Chapter 44, one interpretation could be that it applies only to 
Article 6 claims. The Kistler court did not address this ambiguity about the statute's scope 
but simply assumed K.S.A. 44-615 applied to unemployment compensation hearings, 
which arise from Article 7. The court then held that K.S.A. 44-615 was an express 
declaration of public policy, so the plaintiff stated a valid retaliatory discharge claim. 620 
F.2d at 1269-70. As a secondary holding, the Kistler court also noted that in workers 
compensation cases Kansas courts had stressed that a retaliatory discharge claim was 
necessary to preserve the purposes of the Workers Compensation Act. Applying this 
9 
 
 
 
same rationale to the facts, the Kistler court held the same was true in the unemployment 
compensation case before it. 620 F. Supp. at 1270. 
 
We must decide whether Kistler's extension of K.S.A. 44-615 to an Article 7 
unemployment compensation claim as an express legislative statement of public policy 
against job retaliation was correct. If so, then there is a strong argument Campbell's 
Article 4 claim seeking his unpaid wage is supported by an express legislative statement 
of public policy against retaliatory misconduct by employers. The question is whether "as 
provided herein" only refers to the Article 6 provisions or applies more broadly to other 
articles within Chapter 44. Answering this inquiry requires statutory interpretation, which 
is subject to unlimited review. Weber v. Board of Marshall County Comm'rs, 289 Kan. 
1166, 1175, 221 P.3d 1094 (2009). 
 
To interpret this statute, we first examine its plain language to ascertain legislative 
intent. If the language is not plain and unambiguous, we employ statutory construction or 
consult legislative history. In re Tax Exemption Application of Mental Health Ass'n of the 
Heartland, 289 Kan. 1209, 1211, 221 P.3d 580 (2009). But the statute's language 
provides no clarity to our inquiry, so we consider the statute's history. 
 
K.S.A. 44-615 was enacted in 1920, L. 1920, ch. 29, sec. 15, along with several 
other provisions creating a Court of Industrial Relations and conferring certain rights and 
duties upon it. L. 1920, ch. 29, secs. 1-30. Its duties were later transferred to the Secretary 
of Human Resources (now Secretary of Labor), when subsequent amendments to K.S.A. 
44-615 simply changed the governing body from that court to the Secretary. Compare L. 
1920, ch. 29, sec. 15 with L. 1976, ch. 370, sec. 33; L. 2004, ch. 179, sec. 32. In other 
words, "as provided herein" was originally drafted to apply only to the other provisions 
adopted in the same bill from 1920. A comparison of the 1920 enactments to Article 6, L. 
1920, ch. 29, secs. 3-28, shows they originally included what is now K.S.A. 44-603 
10 
 
 
 
through K.S.A. 44-628. Notably, neither the unemployment compensation provisions at 
issue in Kistler, nor the KWPA at issue in Campbell's case, were part of these 1920 
statutory enactments. 
 
Given this history, and with nothing else to guide the analysis, we hold that K.S.A. 
2010 Supp. 44-615 does not apply to any provision under any section in Chapter 44, 
except Article 6. See Redd v. Kansas Truck Center, 291 Kan. 176, 195, 239 P.3d 66 
(2010) (Appellate courts must consider various provisions of an act in pari materia to 
reconcile and bring the provisions into workable harmony if possible.). We find Kistler's 
reliance on K.S.A. 44-615 misplaced in deciding that the legislature made an express 
statement against job retaliation in the context of an unemployment compensation 
hearing. But the Kistler court's recognition of a retaliatory discharge claim under the 
KWPA may still be correct under its secondary holding that public policy may be 
inferred from the statutory right. We address next whether Campbell's retaliatory 
discharge claim may be implied from the KWPA's statutory scheme. See Hysten, 277 
Kan. at 556 ("We are attempting to discern the breadth and depth underlying public 
policy."). 
 
The KWPA was enacted in 1973. L. 1973, ch. 204, secs. 1-16. It is an expansive 
and comprehensive legislative scheme that is broad in its scope and the rights created for 
Kansas workers to secure unpaid wages earned from their labors. See K.S.A. 44-313 et 
seq. It is applicable to most Kansas employers. See K.S.A. 44-313(a). It requires, among 
various other provisions, that employers promptly pay wages and benefits (K.S.A. 2010 
Supp. 44-314; K.S.A. 44-315). It also permits specific damages awards for willful 
nonpayment (K.S.A. 44-315); controls and limits wage withholdings (K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 
44-319); prohibits waivers of the rights created (K.S.A. 44-321); and mandates that the 
Secretary of Labor enforce and administer the KWPA's provisions through administrative 
proceedings, compulsory process to compel witness attendance and document 
11 
 
 
 
production, and permits application to the district courts for citations in contempt (see 
K.S.A. 44-322; K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 44-322a). The Secretary of Labor is expressly 
authorized to adopt such rules and regulations as are deemed necessary to accomplish the 
KWPA's purposes. K.S.A. 44-325. 
 
In Burriss v. Northern Assurance Co. of America, 236 Kan. 326, 333, 691 P.2d 10 
(1984), cert. denied 474 U.S. 821 (1985), this court commented on the safeguards Kansas 
law has extended to wages and benefits earned by its workers, noting: 
 
"Throughout the history of this state, the protection of wages and wage earners has been a 
principal objective of many of our laws. See, for example, K.S.A. 60-2307, originally 
enacted as G.S. 1868, ch. 38, § 6, providing that otherwise exempt personal property shall 
not be exempt from attachment or execution for wages; K.S.A. 44-312, enacted in 1901, 
giving preference to the payment of wages in the case of receiverships or assignments for 
the benefit of creditors; the statute restricting garnishment of wages, K.S.A. 60-2310, 
which reflects the rationale of G.S. 1868, ch. 80, § 490; and the wage payment act, 
K.S.A. 44-313 et seq., enacted in 1973. K.S.A. 40-3103, like the statutes mentioned 
above, gives preference to wage earners, in order that they and the families dependent 
upon them are not destitute." 
 
This language was repeated recently in Coma Corporation v. Kansas Dept. of 
Labor, 283 Kan. 625, 644, 154 P.3d 1080 (2007), in recognition of what the Coma court 
characterized as "the strong and longtime Kansas public policy of protecting wages and 
wage earners." In Coma, we held that denying an undocumented worker access to 
KWPA's statutory mechanisms for enforcing an employment contract would "directly 
contravene the public policy of the State of Kansas." 283 Kan. at 645.  
 
This court has recognized retaliatory discharge claims in different circumstances, 
including those in which employees are discharged for exercising a statutory right. 
12 
 
 
 
Hysten, 277 Kan. at 561 (FELA); Anco Constr. Co., 236 Kan. at 629 (workers 
compensation). Campbell's petition, which alleges an adverse job action against him for 
pursuing his statutory right to payment of earned but unpaid wages, clearly fits within 
this type. And it is meaningful that this statutory right relates to employment because it 
dovetails with much of our prior case law. For example in Hysten, which concerned the 
railroad employee terminated after filing a FELA claim for a work-related injury, this 
court held:  
 
"The design and language of the Kansas Workers Compensation Act and the logic of 
Murphy, 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, persuade us that Kansas has a 'thoroughly established' 
public policy supporting injured workers' rights to pursue remedies for their on-the-job 
injuries and opposing retaliation against them for exercising their rights. It matters not 
that the vehicle for that exercise is a federal rather than a state statutory provision." 277 
Kan. at 561.  
 
That principle is applicable to the KWPA. We hold the KWPA embeds within its 
provisions a public policy of protecting wage earners' rights to their unpaid wages and 
benefits. And just as we found a common-law retaliatory discharge claim when an injured 
worker is terminated for exercising rights under the Workers Compensation Act, we find 
such a cause of action is necessary when an employer fires a worker who seeks to 
exercise KWPA rights by filing a wage claim. To do otherwise would seriously 
undermine the public policy and the protections afforded by the KWPA. Cf. Hysten, 277 
Kan. at 556-57. 
 
Campbell's petition states a claim for relief 
 
Having determined a cause of action exists for retaliatory discharge based on the 
pursuit of a wage claim under the KWPA, we must next consider whether Campbell 
states such a claim. In his petition, Campbell alleges: (1) He filed a complaint with the 
13 
 
 
 
KDOL alleging he was not being paid properly under the KWPA; (2) Husky Hogs 
terminated him after he filed the complaint only 1 business day after Campbell received 
acknowledgement that his complaint was filed; (3) the termination was in retaliation for 
filing the complaint with the KDOL; (4) Campbell suffered damages, including lost 
wages, as a result of being terminated; and (5) his termination violated an important 
public policy under Kansas law. We resolved the public policy factor above. 
 
In Rebarchek, this court held that the elements for a prima facie claim for 
retaliatory discharge for filing a workers compensation claim are: (1) The plaintiff filed a 
claim for workers compensation benefits or sustained an injury for which he or she might 
assert a future claim for such benefits; (2) the employer had knowledge of the plaintiff's 
workers compensation claim injury; (3) the employer terminated the plaintiff's 
employment; and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity or injury 
and the termination. 272 Kan. at 554. 
 
As noted above, in reviewing a dismissal under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6), appellate 
courts assume the facts alleged by plaintiff are true, along with any inferences reasonably 
drawn from them. Bland, 279 Kan. at 963. Given the similarities between alleging 
retaliatory discharge for filing a workers compensation claim and filing a KWPA claim, 
we find the allegations stated by Campbell sufficient to avoid dismissal at this early stage 
in the proceedings under our standard of review. 
 
KWPA provides an inadequate substitute remedy 
 
In addition to finding Campbell had not stated a claim upon which relief may be 
granted, the district court sua sponte held that the remedies available for violating the 
KWPA provided an adequate substitute remedy for Campbell's common-law retaliatory 
discharge claim and dismissed the case on that alternative basis. Campbell disagrees, 
14 
 
 
 
arguing the KWPA can only address his wage claim and noting the common-law 
remedies traditionally available for a wrongful termination claim, including punitive 
damages, are not permitted in the administrative action before the Secretary. 
 
Under the alternative remedies doctrine, a state or federal statute could be 
substituted for a state retaliation claim—if the substituted statute provides an adequate 
alternative remedy. Hysten, 277 Kan. at 561; Flenker, 266 Kan. at 202-03. Therefore, the 
issue is whether the statutory remedy under the KWPA is adequate and thereby precludes 
the common-law remedy sought by Campbell. 
  
In Hysten, when deciding whether FELA provided an adequate substitute remedy 
for the plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim, this court examined whether the FELA and 
common-law actions were subject to the same procedures, allowed similar levels of 
claimant control, and made available the same damages. 277 Kan. at 562-64. We stated: 
 
 
"We also do not regard the unavailability of compensatory damages for pain and 
suffering and punitive damages as trivial. As we recognized in Coleman, a retaliatory 
discharge action, such as the one Hysten brings here, is designed to redress a violation of 
state public policy. [Citation omitted.] The availability of compensatory damages beyond 
those designed to eliminate purely economic loss and particularly the availability of 
punitive damages can deter such violations. As Judge Posner said: 'It is a grave matter for 
an employer to fire an employee for exercising a legal right.' [Citation omitted.] 
Deterrence of such conduct is essential." 277 Kan. at 563. 
 
Similarly, the disparate processes and dissimilar remedies make it untenable to 
find the KWPA claim is an adequate substitute remedy for Campbell's common-law 
retaliatory discharge claim. First, as discussed above, the district court's holding is 
problematic because the wage claim redresses a different harm. The KWPA action and its 
statutory remedies relate to Campbell's claim that Husky Hogs did not pay him all earned 
15 
 
 
 
wages. But the retaliatory discharge claim would redress the employment termination. 
Since these causes do not address the same wrong, it is difficult to conclude the 
legislature supplanted the retaliatory discharge claim with KWPA. 
 
But just as importantly, Campbell does not receive the same process under his 
KWPA claim as he would in litigating the wrongful termination claim. KWPA permits 
the Secretary of Labor to hold hearings and investigate alleged violations of the act. 
K.S.A. 44-322; K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 44-322a. The Secretary or presiding officer 
determines whether the unpaid wage claim is valid, how much the employer owes in 
unpaid wages, assesses applicable damages, and may seek a contempt order in district 
court if the employer refuses to obey the Secretary's order. K.S.A. 44-322; K.S.A. 2010 
Supp. 44-322a. But neither party in an administrative action has a right to a jury trial and 
the Secretary has considerable statutory discretion both to determine whether a dispute 
exists and to control the investigation of that dispute. See K.S.A. 44-322; K.S.A. 2010 
Supp. 44-322a. Regarding damages under the KWPA, the Secretary has authority to 
award the unpaid wages and damages for willful nonpayment, but they are limited to 1 
percent of the unpaid wages for each day payment is not submitted up to 100 percent of 
the unpaid wages. K.S.A. 44-315. 
 
While these statutory remedies may adequately compensate Campbell for his 
unpaid wage claim, it is difficult to see how they adequately compensate him for 
wrongful termination or provide a better deterrent for the retaliatory misconduct alleged. 
Retaliatory discharge is a tort. A tort is a breach of duty imposed by law. Under common 
law, Campbell may seek future lost wages, any other actual damages, and applicable 
remedies for pain and suffering, as well as punitive damages. See Hysten, 277 Kan. at 
563.  
 
 
16 
 
 
 
This court has previously criticized the allocation of a common-law action to an 
administrative agency. See Hysten, 277 Kan. at 562; Flenker, 266 Kan. at 208-10; 
Coleman, 242 Kan. at 813-14. In this case, we hold the KWPA is not an adequate 
substitute remedy for Campbell's common-law retaliatory discharge claim. The district 
court erred in so finding.  
 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.