Title: State ex rel. Bayou Liquors, Inc. v. City of Casper

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State ex rel. Bayou Liquors, Inc. v. City of Casper1995 WY 190906 P.2d 1046Case Number: 94-254Decided: 11/20/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE 
of Wyoming, ex rel., BAYOU LIQUORS, INC., Bi-Rite Package Liquor Store, Bob's 
Place, Bouzis Bros.', d/b/a Casper Liquor Store and Sandbar Lounge, Broncos 
Lounge, D's Oregon Trail Bar, Dorn's Fireside, Galles Sales, Inc., d/b/a Galles 
Liquor Mart, Galloway's Lounge, Hilltop Liquors, Horseshoe Bar, LBM Lounge & 
Liquor, MCJ, Inc., d/b/a C.Y. Liquors & Josh's Pub, Moonlight Liquors, Inc., 
My Brother's Place, Oil City Liquors, Paradise Liquors & Lounge, Party-Time, 
Inc., Sage Industries, d/b/a Sky Blue Lounge, The Shadows, Inc., a/k/a The 
Wright Place, Sonny's Sports Lounge and Sunshine Liquors,

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

The CITY OF CASPER and 
Luker Development Company, Inc., 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

Les Bowron of 
Beech Street Law Offices, Casper, for Appellants.

Robert L. 
Mullen, Casper City Attorney, Casper, for Appellee City of 
Casper.

Thomas N. Long, 
H. Frank Gibbard and Paula J. Williams of Thomas N. Long, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
Appellee Luker Development Co., Inc.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, Justice.

[¶1]      This case calls 
for a determination of whether a current liquor license holder has standing to 
challenge the renewal and transfer of a liquor license to another competitor. 
Bayou Liquors, Inc. and several other holders of current liquor licenses 
(hereinafter appellants) challenge the transfer of a liquor license by the City 
of Casper to Luker Development Company, Inc. (Luker). The district court 
dismissed the action, concluding that appellants lacked standing.

[¶2]      We 
reverse.

[¶3]      Appellants do not 
present a concise statement of the issues, but we can extract a simple, single 
issue from their brief:

Do appellants have 
standing to challenge the transfer of a liquor license to a 
competitor?

Appellee Luker 
phrases the issue as:

I.          
Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment for 
Appellees on the basis that Appellants lacked standing to challenge the renewal 
of the liquor license of a competing liquor establishment?

A.        Whether 
Appellants have standing to request judicial review of the City of Casper's 
administrative action?

B.        Whether the 
Wyoming Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-37-101 et seq. 
(1988), gives Appellants standing to challenge the City of Casper's 
administrative decision?

Appellee City of 
Casper raises two issues:

1.         
Whether the district court was correct in granting summary judgment to 
Appellees based upon a determination that Appellants lack standing to challenge 
transfer and renewal of a liquor license;

2.         If 
summary judgment was not properly granted on the basis of the Appellants' lack 
of standing, whether the disposition of the case should be sustained on an 
alternative theory which appears in the record.

FACTS

[¶4]      The original 
complaint in this matter was filed on April 14, 1993. After adding Luker as a 
necessary and indispensable party, appellants, in their Second Amended 
Complaint, sought a declaratory judgment that the City of Casper had violated 
numerous state and local laws in renewing and transferring liquor license number 
48 to Luker. Appellants alleged violations of the following: W.S. 
12-4-102(a)(iv) and (c) (1986); W.S. 12-4-103(a)(v) (1986); W.S. 12-4-601(b) 
(1986); Casper City Ordinances Chapter 5.08.050(A), (B) and (C); City of Casper 
Resolution 81-9; and common law duty, Sterner v. United States, 774 P.2d 639, 
644 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶5]      After a hearing 
on motions for summary judgment, the district court granted appellees' motion 
concluding that, as competitors, appellants were not one of the parties 
identified by our decision in Walker v. Board of County Comm'rs, 644 P.2d 772 
(Wyo. 1982) as having standing to challenge actions of licensing authorities 
that issue or renew retail liquor licenses. The district court entered an order 
on July 25, 1994, granting appellees' motion for summary judgment, and 
appellants now appeal.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶6]      A party is 
granted summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56; Dubray v. 
Howshar, 884 P.2d 23, 25 (Wyo. 1994). Our review is conducted in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, and no deference is accorded to the 
district court's decisions on issues of law. Harbel v. Wintermute, 883 P.2d 359, 
362 (Wyo. 1994). We use the same factual materials and the same standards as the 
district court in our review and may affirm the summary judgment on any legal 
grounds appearing in the record. Id.

DISCUSSION

[¶7]      The concept of 
"standing to sue" refers to a right to relief that goes to the existence of a 
personal claim for relief. Matter of Various Water Rights in Lake DeSmet 
Reservoir, 623 P.2d 764, 767 (Wyo. 1981).

The doctrine of standing 
is a jurisprudential rule of jurisdictional magnitude. At its most elementary 
level, the standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should refrain 
from considering issues in which the litigants have little or no interest in 
vigorously advocating. Washakie Co. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 317 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28. 
Accordingly, the doctrine of standing focuses upon whether a litigant is 
properly situated to assert an issue for judicial or quasi-judicial 
determination. Laramie Rivers Co. v. Wheatland Irr. Dist., 708 P.2d 20, 27 (Wyo. 
1985). A litigant is said to have standing when he has a "personal stake in the 
outcome of the controversy." This personal stake requirement has been described 
in Wyoming as a "tangible interest" at stake. The tangible interest requirement 
guarantees that a litigant is sufficiently interested in a case to present a 
justiciable controversy. Laramie Rivers, 708 P.2d  at 27 (quoting Int'l Ass'n 
Fire Fighters v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 702 P.2d 1294, 1297-98 (Wyo. 
1985)).

Schulthess v. 
Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 556-57 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶8]      Appellants claim 
standing based on two theories. First, they claim that they have standing under 
this court's decision in Walker v. Board of County Comm'rs, 644 P.2d 772 (Wyo. 
1982) as citizens or residents and taxpayers of Casper. Second, appellants also 
claim standing by virtue of their being competitors of Luker. Luker counters 
that appellants do not have standing under either theory. Essentially, Luker's 
argument is that Walker provides the exclusive list of who has standing to 
challenge the issuance or renewal of a liquor license and appellants do not fit 
within any of the identified groups given standing in that case. Furthermore, 
Luker claims that standing, based on a status of being a competitor, is not 
available because the only interest such a party would have would be 
impermissible - i.e., a desire to restrain competition. For the same reason, 
Luker asserts that appellants cannot have standing as residents since their 
impermissible motive gives them "unclean hands."

[¶9]      In Walker, we 
confronted the issue of who has standing to seek a hearing and judicial review 
of a decision to issue a liquor license under the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), W.S. 16-3-101, et seq. 644 P.2d  at 774. We held 
that:

[A] right to a hearing 
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act with resulting judicial review in 
matters pertaining to the issuance or renewal of a retail liquor license exists 
only (1) to those people and residents referred to in § 12-4-104(b)(i) and (iv) 
for the purposes there set forth; and (2) to matters involving revocation or 
suspension of such licenses by the Wyoming Liquor Commission pursuant to § 
12-7-201(d), W.S. 1977.

644 P.2d  at 775. 
Since neither Walker nor this case involves the second situation, the relevant 
statute is W.S. 12-4-104(b) (1986 Rpl.), subsections (i) and (iv), which 
provides in relevant part:

A license or permit shall 
not be issued, renewed or transferred if the licensing authority finds from 
evidence presented at the hearing:

(i)         The 
welfare of the people residing in the vicinity of the proposed license or permit 
premises shall be adversely and seriously affected;

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

(iv)       The desires of 
the residents of the county, city or town will not be met or satisfied by the 
issuance, renewal or transfer of the license or permit[.]

Thus, according 
to Walker, the only parties who have standing to challenge, in a hearing with 
resulting judicial review, the issuance or renewal of a retail liquor license 
are: (1) people residing in the vicinity of the proposed license or permit 
premises who claim that their welfare will be adversely and seriously affected; 
and (2) residents of the county, city or town who claim that their desires will 
not be met.1

[¶10]   At first blush it is easy to 
distinguish Walker from this case. Walker, as we have already pointed out, 
involved actions seeking a hearing and judicial review under the Wyoming APA. 
However, in this case, appellants' cause of action is for declaratory judgment, 
not review under the APA. Indeed, appellants could not proceed pursuant to the 
APA even if they so desired since the City of Casper is not subject to the act. 
See Foster's Inc. v. City of Laramie, 718 P.2d 868, 872 (Wyo. 1986). Since 
cities are not agencies within the meaning of the APA and administrative 
decisions by the city council are not reviewable under the act, id., it would 
appear that we are not constrained by the holding in Walker and could find 
standing in parties not identified in that case.

[¶11]   We conclude, however, that the 
better result is to apply Walker's standing requirements to both APA and non-APA 
reviews of cases involving the issuance or renewal of retail liquor licenses. 
Our decision is based upon considerations of uniformity. While the governing 
bodies of cities are not agencies under the APA, county boards of commissioners, 
which are also licensing authorities, are agencies. See W.S. 16-3-101(b)(i) 
(1990 Rpl.) and W.S. 12-4-101(a) (Cum.Supp. 1995). Thus if we were to go beyond 
the holding in Walker and allow standing for other parties when the decision was 
made by a city, we would then have the anomaly of different parties having 
standing to challenge retail liquor licenses solely on the basis of where that 
particular license was issued.2 We could not tolerate such a 
result. Therefore, we must deny standing to appellants on the basis of their 
being competitors to Luker, since standing was not granted to parties on that 
basis in Walker.

[¶12]   We must now decide if appellants 
have standing as residents, a group recognized as having such in Walker. W.S. 
12-4-104(b)(iv). We conclude that they do. The term "resident" is not defined in 
Title 12, however appellants are clearly "residents" within the ordinary meaning 
of that term. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, New 
College Edition (resident: One who makes his home in a particular place). 
Certainly one does not become any less of a resident of a county, city or town 
just by virtue of the fact they happen to own a liquor license. Indeed, the 
statute at issue makes no such distinction; it simply says "resident." We hold 
that owners of a retail liquor license can be a "resident" and consequently have 
standing under Walker and 12-4-104(b)(iv) to challenge the issuance or renewal 
of a retail liquor license in the same manner as any other resident of the 
county, city or town.

[¶13]   We find further guidance in 
reaching this conclusion from cases decided by our sister state of Colorado. In 
that state, competing liquor license holders do not have standing to challenge 
the issuance of liquor licenses by reason of any economic injury. Kornfeld v. 
Perl Mack Liquors, Inc., 193 Colo. 442, 567 P.2d 383 (1977). They do, however, 
have standing to challenge that action as a resident of the affected 
neighborhood. Brass Monkey, Inc. v. Louisville City Council, 870 P.2d 636, 639 
(Colo. App. 1994); Norris v. Grimsley, 41 Colo. App. 231, 585 P.2d 925, 927 
(1978). The Colorado courts have concluded that competitors, like any resident, 
have a legitimate interest that, among other things, "the character of their 
neighborhood, the safety of their children, and the value of their property, be 
adequately protected" giving them "a strong interest in insuring that the liquor 
licensing procedure is fairly and properly administered." Norris, 585 P.2d  at 
927.

[¶14]   Our decision in Walker also 
required that in order to have standing, a resident had to do so for the 
purposes set forth in § 12-4-104(b)(iv). 644 P.2d  at 775. That is, that the 
desires of the resident would not be met or satisfied by the issuance, renewal 
or transfer of the liquor license. We think that actions which seek to ensure 
that licenses are issued, renewed or transferred in compliance with the liquor 
code and local ordinances fits within the broad purpose enunciated by the 
statute. Certainly residents have a strong interest in seeing compliance with 
the law. Norris, 585 P.2d  at 927. However, we do note from appellants' complaint 
that not all of them are residents of the City of Casper. Only residents of the 
licensing authority may challenge its decisions. W.S. 12-4-104(b)(iv). Residents 
who live within the boundaries of a licensing authority other than one whose 
action is being challenged do not have a sufficient interest on which standing 
could be based. On remand, the district court should dismiss those parties from 
the proceedings.

[¶15]   Luker complains, however, that 
appellants have "unclean hands" and should not have standing because their 
motive in bringing this action is to stifle competition. We have a hard time 
understanding how appellants could stifle competition, assuming they succeeded 
in this action. It is the city's decision to issue the license. W.S. 
12-4-101(a). If appellants are ultimately successful, then the Casper City 
Council may simply follow the correct procedures and reissue the license. 
Appellants cannot, by this action, reduce the number of liquor licenses within 
the licensing authority, nor have they made any request to limit the number of 
licenses or have the City not reissue this one. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence in the record that appellants are, in fact, motivated by 
anti-competitive desires in bringing this action. Luker apparently bases its 
argument solely on the fact that appellants alleged standing based on their 
status as competitors. Just because they have alleged standing on that basis is 
not, by itself, evidence that appellants have "unclean hands." Luker's bald 
assertion in its brief is not sufficient proof of an improper motive. If 
appellants were challenging a decision to issue more licenses and Luker could 
present us with some evidence, then perhaps the argument would have more merit; 
but that is not the case. In any event, while appellants are not entitled to 
freedom from competition, they, like all other residents, are entitled to fair 
competition within the requirements of the law.

[¶16]   Luker also argues that appellants 
cannot bring a declaratory judgment action because there is no justiciable 
controversy since a declaration that the renewal and transfer of the liquor 
license was invalid will not affect any "rights, status or other legal interest" 
of appellants. We need not spend much time on this argument other than to note 
that we have already found that appellants have standing as residents and, as 
such, possess an interest in the compliance with the law by which the licensing 
authority is governed.

[¶17]   Relying on Kurpjuweit v. 
Northwestern Development Co., Inc., 708 P.2d 39 (Wyo. 1985), Luker claims that a 
declaratory judgment action is an improper vehicle in which to challenge the 
decision of an administrative agency. We disagree. In Kurpjuweit we held that a 
party could use declaratory judgment to determine rights under a lease, 
including which party was entitled to a liquor license. Indeed, in that case we 
said that while the court could not direct the issuance of a liquor license, it 
could require a party to take the necessary steps to transfer the license to the 
party to whom it properly belonged under a lease. Kurpjuweit, 708 P.2d  at 44-45. 
We also noted that a court cannot direct the issuance of a liquor license since 
the legislature has placed that responsibility on the local licensing authority 
and a declaratory judgment action could not be used to "usurp or replace 
specific administrative relief." Id. (emphasis added). In this case, a 
declaratory judgment in favor of appellants would not direct the issuance of the 
liquor license to any one party. Furthermore, this action is not usurping or 
replacing any specific administrative relief since, in fact, there is no 
administrative relief available to appellants. See Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas 
Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1167-68 (Wyo. 1982) (a declaratory judgment 
action may be used to challenge the decisions of an administrative body unless 
it will prejudge issues over which the agency has primary 
jurisdiction).

[¶18]   Lastly, the City of Casper urges us 
to affirm summary judgment on the merits of appellants' claim. We decline to do 
so. The district court granted summary judgment on the issue of standing alone. 
Standing is a jurisdictional issue which must be decided before the merits of a 
case are even reached. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 316-17 (Wyo. 1980). Since the district court never reached the merits, we 
find it prudent to let it do so in the first instance.

CONCLUSION

[¶19]   Appellants, as residents, have 
standing under this court's decision in Walker and W.S. 12-4-104(b)(iv) to 
challenge the decision of the licensing authority regarding retail liquor 
licenses.

[¶20]   Reversed and remanded.

THOMAS, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom TAYLOR, J., joins.

[¶21]   I dissent. The majority opinion 
invokes a clearly erroneous application of the law with respect to declaratory 
judgment actions. The district judge correctly ruled that the plaintiffs in the 
action, the appellants here, were not entitled to seek a declaratory judgment 
because of lack of standing. He is entitled to have his ruling 
affirmed.

[¶22]   I recognize that we have held our 
declaratory judgment statutes are to be liberally construed to give effect to 
the remedial purposes and to provide relief from uncertainty. In re Gen. 
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76 
(1988), cert. granted in part, Wyoming v. United States, 488 U.S. 1040, 109 S. Ct. 863, 102 L. Ed. 2d 987, aff'd, 492 U.S. 406, 109 S. Ct. 2994, 106 L. Ed. 2d 342, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 938, 110 S. Ct. 28, 106 L. Ed. 2d 639, cert. denied, 
City of Riverton, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 926, 109 S. Ct. 3265, 106 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1989) and cert. denied, Shoshone Tribe v. Wyoming, 492 U.S. 926, 
109 S. Ct. 3265, 106 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1989). Even so, we also have held, quoting from 
our statute, that "a declaratory judgment is open only to those persons `* * * 
interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a 
contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by the 
Wyoming constitution or by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise 
* * *'" and "that the judiciary will not invoke its remedial powers unless 
presented with a justiciable controversy." Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo. 1992), appeal after remand, 869 P.2d 125 (1994). In this 
case, I am satisfied these plaintiffs had no interest beyond that of the general 
interest of the public.

[¶23]   A leading treatise on declaratory 
judgments couches the rule in this language:

The general rule is that 
a party having only such interest as the public generally has cannot maintain an 
action, and this rule is applicable to declaratory judgment actions.

1 WALTER H. 
ANDERSON, ACTIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, § 162, at 313 (2d ed. 1951) 
(footnotes omitted).

The decided 
cases support this view and, in their rationale, they demonstrate the soundness 
of the rule. E.g., Kolwicz v. City of Boulder, 36 Colo. App. 142, 538 P.2d 482 
(1975); Greer v. Lewiston Golf & Country Club, Inc., 81 Idaho 393, 342 P.2d 719 (1959); Asendorf v. Common School Dist. No. 102 of Sedgwick County, 175 Kan. 
601, 266 P.2d 309 (1954); Schroder v. City of Lincoln, 155 Neb. 599, 52 N.W.2d 808 (1952); Eacret v. Holmes, 215 Or. 121, 333 P.2d 741 (1958); Wright v. 
Nashville Gas & Heating Co., 183 Tenn. 594, 194 S.W.2d 459 (1946); Jenkins 
v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983); Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713 (Utah 1978); 
Lyon v. Bateman, 119 Utah 434, 228 P.2d 818 (1951). See Ahern v. Baker, 148 
Colo. 408, 366 P.2d 366 (1961). In Ahern, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
considered a situation in which individuals or corporate entities holding 
package liquor licenses sought to require the Secretary of State to prohibit 
sales by delivery to the premises of the customer. The court ruled the 
plaintiffs lacked standing.

[¶24]   In a similar vein, other courts 
have required some individual interest on the part of a plaintiff in a 
declaratory judgment action. E.g., Riley v. County of Cochise, 10 Ariz. App. 55, 
455 P.2d 1005 (1969); Torres v. City of Yorba Linda, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1035, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 400 (1993); Healthamerica Corp. of Kentucky v. Humana Health Plan, 
Inc., 697 S.W.2d 946 (Ky. 1985); Waite v. Holmes, 133 Mont. 512, 327 P.2d 399 
(1958); King County v. Washington State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 28 Wn. App. 230, 622 P.2d 898 (1981).

[¶25]   We are setting out on a merry chase 
if we acknowledge that those who have the same interest as the general public 
can bring declaratory judgment actions to challenge the decisions of 
governmental officials or bodies with which they disagree. The chase will be 
like the current television commercials in which the rabbit just keeps going and 
going and going and going. We would never overtake that litigation.

[¶26]   In its reliance upon Walker v. Bd. 
of County Comm'rs of Albany County, 644 P.2d 772 (Wyo. 1982), the majority 
engrafts upon the declaratory judgment statutes, WYO. STAT. §§ 1-37-101 to -115 
(1988), a rule peculiar to the liquor licensing statutes. I can perceive no 
justification for adopting a statutory statement of standing identifying those 
persons who can contest liquor license applications as a rule of standing for 
our declaratory judgment statutes. The mere fact that this case involves 
licensing of a liquor establishment does not furnish that justification. For 
examples of the correct rule, I refer the reader to Florida State Racing Comm'n 
v. Broward County Kennel Club, 77 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1955), which relies upon a 
liquor licensing case, Turner v. City of Miami, 160 Fla. 317, 34 So. 2d 551 
(1948). Turner was an injunction action, but the Supreme Court of Florida ruled 
its standing concept in those cases was analogous to the appropriate one for a 
declaratory judgment action. In Bd. of Registration Comm'rs v. Campbell, 251 Ky. 
597, 65 S.W.2d 713 (1933), the Supreme Court of Kentucky held, in an action by a 
candidate against the Board of Registration Commissioners of the City of 
Louisville, that the Democratic and Republican County Executive Committees were 
not necessary or proper parties. The thrust of the ruling is that those bodies 
had no interest of their own in the subject matter of the action.

[¶27]   In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 
59 S. Ct. 972, 83 L. Ed. 1385 (1939), the Supreme Court of the United States ruled 
that legislators must claim a direct injury to achieve standing. Other federal 
and state courts have ruled consistently in cases involving declaratory judgment 
actions by legislators. Risser v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 860, 112 S. Ct. 180, 116 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1991); Kennedy v. Sampson, 
511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Colorado Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508 
(Colo. 1985); Zemprelli v. Thornburgh, 73 Pa. Cmwlth. 101, 457 A.2d 1326 (1983). 
What is sauce for legislators ought to be sauce for liquor dealers.

[¶28]   I am satisfied that, in order to 
seek relief against a governmental officer or body under our declaratory 
judgment statutes, it is essential a plaintiff assert some interest of his own, 
separate and apart from the interest of the public in order to demonstrate 
standing to proceed. In this case, the plaintiffs claimed none, nor did they 
have any, other than the standing invented by this court. Their remedy must be 
sought in the legislature or at the polls. The judgment of the district judge 
should be affirmed.

 FOOTNOTES

1           
In its decision letter, the district court denied standing, 
stating:

In [Walker], the Wyoming 
Supreme Court identified the five parties who have legal concerns with actions 
of authorities that issue or renew retail liquor licenses. Competing liquor 
dealers, in the position of Plaintiffs, are not among those listed. The 
Plaintiffs lack standing * * *.

While it is true that we 
identified five parties that could have an interest in the issuance or renewal 
of a retail liquor license, we went on to explain, however, why not all of them 
had standing. 644 P.2d  at 774. The only private parties that have standing are 
those identified in W.S. 12-4-104(b)(i) and (iv).

2           
Neither party has suggested that we overrule or modify our holding in 
Walker in any way. We decline to do so on our own initiative without the benefit 
of briefing or oral arguments.