Title: Attorney Grievance v. Steinhorn

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Neil Warren Steinhorn, Misc. Docket AG No. 15, 
September Term, 2017 
 
ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT — DISCIPLINE — INDEFINITE SUSPENSION — 
Respondent, Neil Warren Steinhorn, violated Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional 
Conduct 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(a), (c), and (d).  These violations stemmed from Respondent’s 
misrepresentations to the court about the total amount owed to Respondent’s client, a home 
owners’ association (“HOA”), by its debtors, several condominium owners who failed to 
pay their monthly HOA fees.  Specifically, in the complaints filed to recoup this debt, 
Respondent grouped his attorney’s fees with the damages sought, listing one aggregate 
figure, even though the complaint form specifies that damages and attorney’s fees should 
be itemized on separate lines.  In doing so, Respondent misrepresented to the court that he 
was not seeking any attorney’s fees, which prevented the court from assessing the 
reasonableness of those fees.  An indefinite suspension with the right to apply for 
reinstatement after six months is the appropriate sanction for this misconduct.      
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County  
Case No. 03-C-17-006386 
Argued: October 9, 2018   
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 15 
 
September Term, 2017 
 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
NEIL WARREN STEINHORN  
 
 
                 Barbera, C.J., 
 
Greene 
*Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty, 
 
 
               JJ. 
 
 
                 Opinion by Barbera, C.J. 
 
 
 
Filed: December 20, 2018 
 
*Adkins, J., now retired, participated in the 
hearing and conference of this case while an 
active member of this Court; after being recalled 
pursuant to the MD. Constitution, Article IV, 
Section 3A, she also participated in the decision 
and adoption of this opinion. 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
2018-12-20 
10:42-05:00
 
 
 
On June 26, 2017, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Petitioner”), 
acting through Bar Counsel, filed in this Court a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial 
Action (“Petition”) against Neil Warren Steinhorn (“Respondent”).  The Petition alleged, 
among other things,1 violations of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“MLRPC”) 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal) and 8.4 (Misconduct).2  Those charges arise 
from misleading complaints Respondent filed with the District Court of Maryland sitting 
in Baltimore County while representing the Council of Unit Owners of Kingswood 
Commons, Inc. (“Kingswood”), a homeowners’ association, in several debt collection 
cases.  Specifically, Respondent inflated the damages sought on the complaint form by 
thirty percent without separately indicating, as the form requires, that this increase 
constituted his attorney’s fees.   
Pursuant to Maryland Rules 19-722(a) and 19-727, this Court designated the 
Honorable Keith R. Truffer (“hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The 
hearing was held on March 13, 2018.  Respondent testified and presented evidence on his 
                                                          
 
1  The Petition initially alleged that Respondent also violated MLRPC 1.5 (Fees), 
1.15 (Safekeeping Property), and 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation), but 
Petitioner dropped these charges after the hearing.   
2  On July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct were 
renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct and were recodified, 
without substantive changes, to Title 19 of the Maryland Rules.  Because we judge 
Respondent’s conduct based on the extant rules at the time of his actions, we refer to the 
MLRPC throughout this decision.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Butler, 456 Md. 227, 
230 n.1 (2017).  
 
 
2 
 
behalf.  On April 27, 2018, the hearing judge issued written findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, concluding that Respondent did not commit any violations of the MLRPC.   
Bar Counsel, on behalf of Petitioner, took no issue with the hearing judge’s findings 
of fact but filed exceptions to each conclusion of law.  Petitioner asserts that Respondent 
violated MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4 because he provided the District Court with false 
information, misled the District Court with that information, and engaged in disreputable 
conduct.  Petitioner also excepts to the hearing judge’s finding of certain mitigating factors 
and asks us to consider other aggravating factors in addition to the ones the hearing judge 
found.  Respondent counters that although he made a mistake, he did not violate any of the 
MLRPC.   
On October 9, 2018, this Court heard oral argument in this matter.  Petitioner asks 
us to disbar or, in the alternative, suspend Respondent.  Respondent requests that we affirm 
the hearing judge’s legal conclusions and dismiss this action.  For the following reasons, 
we agree with Petitioner that Respondent violated MLRPC 3.3 and 8.4 and, consequently, 
suspend Respondent from practicing law indefinitely with the right to apply for 
reinstatement no sooner than six months after the suspension takes effect.     
I. 
A. The Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact  
1. Background  
Respondent was admitted to the Maryland Bar in 1974.  In 1979, after a five-year 
stint as an Assistant State’s Attorney, Respondent transitioned to private practice.  On June 
4, 1990, Respondent was convicted of money laundering and transporting stolen goods, 
 
3 
 
United States v. Steinhorn, 927 F.2d 195, 196 (4th Cir. 1991), and subsequently, in 
September 1990, this Court suspended him from practicing law in Maryland.  Thereafter, 
on February 1, 1994, following affirmance of his convictions,3 this Court disbarred 
Respondent by consent.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Steinhorn, 333 Md. 580 (1994).  
In October 2007, this Court granted Respondent’s Petition for Reinstatement to the 
Maryland Bar.  In re Reinstatement of Steinhorn, 401 Md. 698 (2007).  Since his 
reinstatement, Respondent has handled exclusively debt collection cases, representing 
homeowner associations, small businesses, and bail bondsmen.  In one such matter, 
Respondent assisted Kingswood in collecting past due condominium fees from several 
condominium unit owners.          
2. Respondent’s Court Filings  
As part of his work for Kingswood, Respondent filed two form complaints—entitled 
DC-CV-001, Complaint/Application and Affidavit in Support of Judgment—with the 
District Court of Maryland sitting in Baltimore County in 2014.  The first complaint, filed 
on January 14, 2014, sought to recover $9,120 in delinquent condominium fees from 
Aileen Pratt, a condominium unit owner.  The second complaint, filed on April 2, 2014, 
also sought to collect $9,120 in outstanding condominium fees from Jason Green, another 
condominium unit owner.  Respondent submitted affidavits in support of those claims, 
                                                          
 
3  Respondent’s convictions were affirmed in an unpublished decision, see United 
States v. Steinhorn, 946 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1991), and his request for post-conviction relief 
was subsequently denied in an unpublished decision, see United States v. Steinhorn, 986 
F.2d 1416 (4th Cir. 1993).    
 
4 
 
which were signed by Marc Greenberg (“Greenberg”), an agent of Kingswood.  Greenberg 
relied on Respondent’s representations about the accuracy of those filings.   
The $9,120 figure listed on both complaints represented unpaid condominium fees 
for a four-year period (2011-2014) plus Respondent’s thirty-percent attorney’s fee.4  In 
other words, of the $9,120 sought in the complaints, $6,912 was for the outstanding HOA 
fees and $2,208 was for attorney’s fees.5  Respondent conjoined the unpaid assessments 
($6,912) with the agreed-upon attorney’s fees ($2,208) in each complaint filed with the 
court, listing one figure ($9,120) in the damages line, leaving the line designated for 
attorney’s fees blank (see image below).       
 
                                                          
 
4  The math indicates that Respondent’s fees were closer to thirty-two percent of the 
total amount recovered, not the thirty percent he indicated in his testimony.     
  
5  The hearing judge’s findings note that Respondent “determined the monthly 
amounts due from the debtor to be $144 and that his agreed attorney’s fee was $46, 
calculated at 30% of the amount recovered.  Each of the complaints filed on behalf of 
Kingswood failed to state these damage amounts separately, instead claiming an aggregate 
of $190 per month in damages.”  The figures discussed above illustrate the aggregate of 
these monthly assessments over the four-year delinquency period to demonstrate how the 
$9,120 figure was calculated.     
 
5 
 
3. The Complaint to the Attorney Grievance Commission    
In 2016, Kingswood terminated Respondent’s representation and replaced him with 
Brian Fellner, Esq. (“Fellner”).  Fellner discovered that Respondent did not timely remit 
several payments he collected for Kingswood.  Fellner then filed a complaint with 
Petitioner, alleging that Respondent’s delay was unwarranted.  Bar Counsel investigated 
and determined that Respondent was also inflating the amount of damages sought in his 
court filings, and that he failed to rectify the issue once it was called to his attention.  
Petitioner concluded that such conduct violated MLRPC 3.3 and 8.4, among other charged 
violations.6             
4. Respondent’s Testimony  
During the hearing on his conduct, Respondent “candidly admitted” that he made a 
mistake, and he “denied any intent to deceive the court.”  He testified that he only sought 
to collect that which was rightfully owed to him based on his fee agreement with 
Kingswood.   
The hearing judge found, as a matter of fact, that Respondent’s testimony was 
credible and that Respondent never intended to make a false statement to the District Court. 
The hearing judge was persuaded by the fact that Respondent did not personally benefit 
from his conduct.  The judge was also swayed by Respondent’s sincere remorse and his 
implementation of new office procedures to prevent those issues from reoccurring.       
                
                                                          
 
6  See supra note 1.    
 
6 
 
B. The Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law   
Based on the record and the above-summarized findings of fact, the hearing judge 
concluded that Petitioner failed to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
Respondent violated MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4 (a), (c), and (d).  As noted at the outset, 
Petitioner has filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.       
     II. 
Standard of Review  
“In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original and complete jurisdiction 
and conducts an independent review of the record.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Good, 
445 Md. 490, 512 (2015) (citation omitted).  Where, as here, neither party has filed 
exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact, we treat those facts as established.  
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Reno, 436 Md. 504, 508 (2014); see also Md. Rule 19-
741(b)(2)(A).  We review de novo the hearing judge’s legal conclusions, Md. Rule 19-
741(b)(1), to determine if they are supported by clear and convincing evidence, Md. Rule 
19-727(c), and we decide, if the attorney committed misconduct, the appropriate sanction.  
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Butler, 456 Md. 227, 238 (2017).  
III. 
The Rule Violations 
 
Based upon our independent review of the record, we disagree with the hearing 
judge’s legal conclusions and hold that Respondent violated MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(a), 
(c), and (d).   
 
 
7 
 
MLRPC 3.3, Candor Toward the Tribunal 7  
MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that a lawyer shall not “knowingly . . . 
make a false statement of fact . . . to a tribunal.”  This duty is premised on the idea that 
“[e]very court has the right to rely upon an attorney to assist it in ascertaining the truth of 
the case before it.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith, 442 Md. 14, 34 (2015) (citation 
omitted).  Therefore, “an attorney ‘must be candid at all times with a tribunal or inquiry 
board.’” Butler, 456 Md. at 238 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Joseph, 422 Md. 
670, 699 (2011)).  Accordingly, a lawyer violates MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) when he or she 
knowingly provides the court with false information, Smith, 442 Md. at 34 (citing Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Ward, 394 Md. 1, 32 (2006)), or fails to correct any false information 
previously provided, Joseph, 422 Md. at 699.   
Petitioner excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent did not violate 
MLRPC 3.3(a)(1).  Petitioner contends that the hearing judge applied an erroneous legal 
standard in concluding that Respondent’s filings were not “knowingly false” because he 
had “no intent to deceive anyone” and no “party suffered any harm.”  Respondent counters 
that he made an honest mistake, but the factual findings of the hearing judge compel the 
legal conclusion that he did not violate MLRPC 3.3(a)(1).  We agree with Petitioner and 
therefore sustain its exception. 
As an initial matter, we reject Respondent’s assertion that we are compelled to 
uphold the hearing judge’s legal conclusions because we have accepted his factual findings 
                                                          
 
7  MLRPC 3.3 is now codified at Maryland Rule 19-303.3.    
 
8 
 
as established.  According to Respondent, the only legal conclusion that can be reached 
from the hearing judge’s “exculpatory” factual findings is that Respondent did not violate 
MLRPC 3.3.  Respondent is mistaken.  His assertion runs counter to the well-established 
standard of review in attorney grievance proceedings.    
As part of our independent review of the record, we are free to reach different legal 
conclusions than those of the hearing judge, even if we accept the judge’s factual findings.  
See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Patterson, 421 Md. 708, 724 (2011) (noting that we 
afford no deference to a hearing judge’s legal conclusions).  In Attorney Grievance 
Commission v. Taylor, for example, the hearing judge found, and Bar Counsel did not 
contest, that Mr. Taylor never commingled or mishandled client funds deposited into his 
client trust account.  405 Md. 697, 707, 714 (2008).  We concluded, however, that because 
he deposited “personal funds into the trust account in excess of the amount needed to cover 
bank charges,” Mr. Taylor violated MLRPC 1.15(b) (Safekeeping Property).8  Id. at 714.  
We therefore overturned the hearing judge’s legal conclusion and sanctioned Mr. Taylor, 
“notwithstanding the hearing judge’s finding that there was no . . . misuse of client funds.” 
Id. at 715.  Likewise, here, our de novo review leads us to the conclusion that Respondent 
violated MLRPC 3.3(a)(1), notwithstanding the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent 
acted with no intent to deceive anyone.            
                                                          
 
8  MLRPC 1.15(b), now codified at Maryland Rule 19-301.15, provided, at the time 
of the Taylor decision, that “[a] lawyer may deposit the lawyer’s own funds in a client trust 
account for the sole purpose of paying bank service charges on that account, but only in an 
amount necessary for the purpose.”  Taylor, 405 Md. at 714.  The revised Maryland Rule 
19-301.15(b) refers readers to Maryland Rule 19-408(b) for the same proposition.    
 
 
9 
 
We need not look any further than Respondent’s testimony to reach this conclusion.  
Respondent testified that he reviewed each complaint to ensure its accuracy before filing 
it with the court.  He further testified that he “knew what the attorney’s fees were,” that he 
“knew what the division was going to be subsequent to the payment of the judgment” 
($6,912 for the debt and $2,208 for attorney’s fees), and that those figures “should have 
been separated.”9  (Emphasis added).  Yet, despite this knowledge, Respondent did not 
separate those figures on the complaint forms he filed with the District Court, and he did 
not file corrected forms thereafter, even after this issue was called to his attention.  It 
follows that Respondent knowingly submitted false information to the court—that the 
underlying debt was $9,120, when, in fact, it was only $6,912—which he failed ever to 
correct.  Consequently, clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that Respondent 
violated MLRPC 3.3(a)(1).   
That the hearing judge found as a fact that Respondent did not intend to deceive the 
court, did not harm anyone, and did not benefit from this practice—findings that Bar 
Counsel has not excepted to and we thus adopt—is immaterial to our analysis.  What 
matters for purposes of finding an MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) violation is whether an attorney knows 
that the information he or she presents to the tribunal is incorrect.  Ward, 394 Md. at 32.  
                                                          
 
9  The instructions for the District Court complaint form specify that attorneys “need 
to indicate . . . whether [they] are claiming ‘attorney’s fees.’”  Eliot M. Wagonheim, District 
Court of Maryland, Small Claims: How to File a Small Claim in the District Court of 
Maryland 12 (2016), https://perma.cc/CZN2-RQD9.  Any reasonable attorney with over a 
decade of experience filing small claims with the District Court would know that attorney’s 
fees must be listed separately from the principal damages sought.     
 
 
10 
 
When it came to the accuracy of court filings in Respondent’s office, “the buck stop[ped]” 
with him,10 as he noted in his testimony; the blame therefore rests with him for the 
erroneous filings at issue here.11                           
MLRPC 8.4, Misconduct 12   
1. MLRPC 8.4(c)  
MLRPC 8.4(c) states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage 
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”  This rule is grounded 
in the idea that “[h]onesty is of paramount importance in the practice of law.”  Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Agbaje, 438 Md. 695, 715 (2014) (citing Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Ellison, 384 Md. 688 (2005)); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Myers, 
333 Md. 440, 449 (1994) (“Candor and truthfulness are two of the most important moral 
character traits of a lawyer.”).  We have held that, “in the context of Rule 8.4(c), so long 
as an attorney knowingly makes a false statement, he necessarily engages in conduct 
involving misrepresentation.  No intent to deceive is necessary.”  Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Dore, 433 Md. 685, 708 (2013); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zhang, 
                                                          
 
10  The record indicates that Respondent’s work force is small, consisting primarily 
of family members, including his two sons, his wife, and a part-time secretary.  It is unclear 
whether any of these individuals are attorneys, but Respondent’s testimony makes clear 
that he is responsible for approving all legal filings.       
  
11  It is insignificant that Respondent has now implemented new office procedures 
designed to prevent this issue from arising again because, by his own admission, he never 
corrected either of the inaccurate complaints previously filed with the court, despite the 
continuing obligation to do so.  See Joseph, 422 Md. at 699.  
 
12  MLRPC 8.4 is now codified at Maryland Rule 19-308.4.    
 
11 
 
440 Md. 128, 168-69 (2014) (highlighting the difference between fraud and deceit, which 
require an intent to deceive, and dishonesty and misrepresentation, which do not require 
any specific intent).   
Petitioner excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent did not violate 
MLRPC 8.4(c).  Petitioner asserts that the hearing judge erred in concluding that 
Respondent did not violate MLRPC 8.4(c) because his pleadings “never . . . disrupt[ed] . . . 
any court proceeding” and “no judge . . . ever objected” to his filings.  Respondent again 
counters that the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent committed a genuine error but did 
not intend to deceive anyone necessarily means that he did not violate MLRPC 8.4(c).  We 
again agree with Petitioner and therefore sustain its exception.         
There is significant overlap between MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c).  Dore, 433 Md. 
at 707.  Indeed, “[a] lawyer that violates [MLRPC] 3.3(a) generally violates [MLRPC] 
8.4(c) as well.” Id. (quoting Douglas R. Richmond, The Ethics of Zealous Advocacy: 
Civility, Candor and Parlor Tricks, 34 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 3, 28 (2002)).  This overlap 
occurs because both rules are violated when a lawyer—regardless of intent—knowingly 
makes a false statement to the court.  Id. at 708; see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Framm, 449 Md. 620, 662 (2016).  Because we have concluded that Respondent knowingly 
submitted false statements to the court, we similarly conclude that such submissions 
violated MLRPC 8.4(c).   
We nevertheless address the significance of Respondent’s misrepresentations 
independent of his lack of candor towards the tribunal because there are instances where 
an attorney may engage in misleading conduct, in violation of MLRPC 8.4(c), that is not 
 
12 
 
necessarily dishonest conduct, in violation of 3.3(a)(1).13  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n 
v. Nwadike, 416 Md. 180, 194 (2010) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Calhoun, 391 
Md. 532, 548 (2006)) (noting that an attorney can mislead “by silence and lack of 
communication[,]” in violation of MLRPC 8.4(c), without acting dishonestly).  By 
grouping his attorney’s fees with the damages listed in his complaints, Respondent misled 
the court into believing that he was not collecting any attorney’s fees when the facts 
demonstrate otherwise.  See In re Clark’s Case, 37 A.3d 327, 329, 331 (N.H. 2012) (finding 
a violation when an attorney “entered zeros . . . on the two [bankruptcy] forms instructing 
filers to enter . . . the debtor’s spouse’s income” because he “in effect [told] the court that 
[the debtor’s] husband had no income when . . . he did”).  In other words, Respondent 
concealed the material fact that he was collecting attorney’s fees, thereby preventing the 
court from assessing the reasonableness of those fees.    
We have long held that concealment of material facts constitutes an MLRPC 8.4(c) 
violation.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Barton, 442 Md. 91, 142 (2015) (citation 
omitted) (“[w]e have found a [MLRPC] 8.4(c) violation when a misrepresentation is . . . 
based upon a concealment of material facts.”); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
                                                          
 
13  The MLRPC inherently envisions a difference between dishonesty and 
misrepresentation, as MLRPC 8.4(c), for example, lists the two as separate ways to commit 
misconduct.  Here, Respondent committed an affirmative dishonest act by listing $9,120 
as the total debt owed, when he knew only $6,912 was due as debt, which violated MLRPC 
3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c); however, he also misled the court through silence, rather than an 
affirmative falsity, by not indicating his intention to collect attorney’s fees, which 
constitutes a distinct violation of MLRPC 8.4(c).  It is true that “[t]here are circumstances 
where failure to make a disclosure” can violate MLRPC 3.3(a)(1), cmt. 3 to MLRPC 3.3, 
but those tend to involve situations where an attorney makes intentional misrepresentations 
to the court to achieve a specific outcome.  See, e.g., Framm, 449 Md. at 659.   
 
13 
 
Robaton, 411 Md. 415, 428 (2009) (holding that an attorney violated MLRPC 8.4(c) by 
failing to disclose a debtor’s payment to a non-attorney professional on a bankruptcy form 
submitted to the court).  Accordingly, we hold that when a lawyer, like Respondent, files a 
complaint and conceals his or her intent to collect attorney’s fees by joining them together 
with the damages sought, listing one aggregate amount due, that lawyer commits 
misconduct.                 
2. MLRPC 8.4(d) 
In light of the above, we have no difficulty sustaining Petitioner’s final exception, 
and therefore conclude that Respondent also violated MLRPC 8.4(d).  MLRPC 8.4(d) 
provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  Prejudice to the administration of justice may 
“be measured by the practical implications the attorney’s conduct has on the day-to-day 
operation of our court system.”  Dore, 433 Md. at 710.  Thus, we have held that depriving 
the court of knowledge and, in turn, the ability to act upon that knowledge is a violation of 
MLRPC 8.4(d).  See Robaton, 411 Md. at 429 (holding that an attorney violated MLRPC 
8.4(d) by failing to inform the court that a bankruptcy debtor was paying the attorney, 
which “deprived the court and trustee of the knowledge that the debtor was being assisted 
by counsel,” thus preventing “the court and creditors of the ability to find out how much 
of the debtor’s assets ha[d] been paid to the attorney”).  
 
14 
 
Here, Respondent failed to inform the court that he was collecting attorney’s fees.14 
Through his omissions, Respondent deprived the court of the ability to evaluate the 
reasonableness of his fees, an essential judicial oversight function.  See Cohn v. Bd. of 
Prof’l Responsibility, 151 S.W.3d 473, 489 (Tenn. 2004) (“[b]y filing for attorney’s fees 
using a method that avoided, almost entirely, the scrutiny of the court, [respondent] 
eviscerated . . . [essential] judicial oversight functions.”), superseded by statute, Tenn. Sup. 
Ct. R. 9, § 1.3, as recognized in Hughes v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 259 S.W.3d 631, 
638 (Tenn. 2008).  Respondent also failed to submit any supporting documentation 
justifying the reasonableness of the fees sought, in contravention of the Maryland Rules. 
See Md. Rule 3-306(c)(4)(C); Md. Rule 3-741(d)(2).15  Such conduct is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice, in violation of MLRPC 8.4(d).  Robaton, 411 Md. at 429.   
Respondent stresses that no District Court judge ever objected to his filings.  
Respondent is correct that, technically speaking, no objections were ever made, but that is 
not because the District Court judges approved of or overlooked Respondent’s conduct; on 
the contrary, it is because those judges were unaware of what was occurring since 
Respondent’s complaints, on their face, concealed the material fact that he was collecting 
                                                          
 
14  Notably, none of the filings that Respondent submitted to the court (e.g., the 
complaints, statements of fees due, and requests for garnishment on wages) as part of his 
debt collection work for Kingswood included any information about Respondent’s 
intentions to collect attorney’s fees.   
 
15  Maryland Rule 3-306(c)(4)(C), for example, requires a plaintiff’s attorney 
seeking attorney’s fees to demonstrate entitlement to and the reasonableness of those fees.  
Similarly, Maryland Rule 3-741(d)(2) requires an attorney to provide evidence supporting 
the right to any fees sought in judgment on affidavit proceedings.  These rules are designed 
to assist the court in assessing the reasonableness of attorney’s fees given the risk for abuse.  
 
15 
 
attorney’s fees.  Respondent’s conduct thus engendered disrespect for the court, 
constituting further evidence of his misconduct.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Brigerman, 441 Md. 23, 40 (2014) (quoting Agbaje, 438 Md. at 717) (“‘Conduct which is 
likely to . . . engender disrespect for the court is conduct prejudicial to the administration 
of justice.’”).          
3. MLRPC 8.4(a) 
MLRPC 8.4(a) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to . . .  violate . . . the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.” Put 
simply, when an attorney violates any of the MLRPC, that attorney also violates MLRPC 
8.4(a).  Framm, 449 Md. at 664.  Because we have held that Respondent violated multiple 
provisions of the MLRPC, Respondent necessarily also violated MLRPC 8.4(a).  Butler, 
456 Md. at 242.   
    IV. 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors  
Having determined that Respondent committed misconduct, we next address the 
presence of any mitigating or aggravating factors.  A weighing of “the attorney’s 
misconduct against any existing mitigating and aggravating factors” is essential to 
determining the proper sanction.  Framm, 449 Md. at 665 (quoting Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Coppola, 419 Md. 370, 405 (2011)).  Bar Counsel bears the burden of proving 
the “existence of aggravating factors . . . by clear and convincing evidence.”  Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Lang, 461 Md. 1, 27-28 (2018) (first citing Md. Rule 19-727(c); and 
then citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Eckel, 443 Md. 75, 85 n.5 (2015)).  The charged 
 
16 
 
attorney “must show the presence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”  Id. at 27 (citing Joseph, 422 Md. at 695).  
1. Aggravating Factors  
The hearing judge found several aggravating factors: Respondent’s prior 
disciplinary record, his extensive experience practicing law, and his use of the improper 
filing method in more than one case.16  Respondent takes no issue with those findings, 
presumably because he believes he did not violate the MLRPC.  Petitioner asks us to find 
the presence of additional aggravating factors, including a dishonest motive, a pattern of 
misconduct, and a refusal by Respondent to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his 
conduct.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling, 434 Md. 658, 676 (2013).  We 
decline to so. 
Petitioner has failed to satisfy its burden of proof regarding the existence of 
additional aggravating factors.  We defer to the hearing judge’s credibility finding that 
Respondent had no intent to deceive, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tanko, 427 Md. 15, 
55 (2012), and therefore we decline to conclude that he exhibited a dishonest motive, 
particularly given that he procured no pecuniary benefit from his misconduct.  See Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Stinson, 428 Md. 147, 195 (2012) (finding a dishonest and selfish 
                                                          
 
16  We note that because the hearing judge concluded that Respondent did not 
commit any MLRPC violations, “it was not necessary for the hearing judge to make 
findings of fact relevant to aggravating factors.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dyer, 453 
Md. 585, 657-58 (2017).  However, because we have concluded that Respondent 
committed violations of the MLRPC, we rely on the hearing judge’s aggravation and 
mitigation findings to determine the appropriate sanction. 
 
 
17 
 
motive because respondent retained unearned fees and double billed her client).  We 
likewise cannot find that Respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct because Petitioner 
has only presented us with two problematic complaints filed within a short time span.  
Despite Respondent’s allusions during his testimony that he used the impermissible filing 
method in other cases, Petitioner has not proven that Respondent committed a series of 
violations over time.17  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling, 459 Md. 194, 276 (2018); 
see also Coppola, 419 Md. at 406.  And finally, the hearing judge’s factual determination 
that Respondent demonstrated sincere remorse is not clearly erroneous.18  Sperling, 459 
Md. at 276 (stating that the hearing judge is “in the best position to assess” remorse).  This 
is not a case in which the charged attorney outright refused to acknowledge any 
wrongdoing or expressed remorse solely for purposes of damage control.  See, e.g., 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling, 432 Md. 471, 497 (2013); Stinson, 428 Md. at 
195; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 597 (2005).    
2. Mitigating Factors  
The hearing judge also found several mitigating factors: Respondent did not profit 
from his conduct, no client suffered any harm, no court proceeding was ever disrupted, 
                                                          
 
17  Petitioner argues that Respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct; yet, 
Petitioner only submitted two problematic filings into the record.  Thus, any reference to 
other potential improper filings are “not a part of the record before [us],” and therefore, 
“we will not address such matters.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 
376, 381 n.1 (2001).        
          
 
18  During his testimony, Respondent expressed regret for the erroneous filings, 
stating, “I’m just totally ashamed that I’m here for myself and my family. . . . I should not 
have agreed that [the fees] be presented to the court that way. . . . I [made] a mistake.”   
 
 
 
18 
 
Respondent acted timely to cure his wrongs, and Respondent implemented new office 
procedures to prevent future problems.  Petitioner, citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Shuler, 443 Md. 494, 507 (2015), excepts to the findings that Respondent did not profit 
from his conduct and that no court proceeding was ever disrupted, arguing that these 
findings “do not constitute mitigation . . . under the applicable case law.”19  We disagree.   
Respondent has satisfied his burden of proof regarding the hearing judge’s 
mitigation findings.  A hearing judge has discretion to decide which mitigation factors are 
applicable based on the testimony before that judge, see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 (2006), so long as those findings are “within the realm of 
permissible mitigating factors,” Sperling, 459 Md. at 278 (citing Shuler, 443 Md. at 507).  
Here, the fact that Respondent did not profit from his conduct and that no court proceeding 
was ever disrupted “are within [that permissible] realm,” id., even though such factors are 
not explicitly enumerated in our case law.  See Lang, 461 Md. at 72 (sustaining Mr. Lang’s 
exception to the hearing judge’s failure to find that “his actions lacked any moral 
turpitude[,]” even though such a factor is not technically “a mitigating factor we 
recognize”).     
                                                          
 
19  In Shuler, we provided a list of fourteen mitigating factors.  443 Md. at 507.  
Petitioner claims that because two of the hearing judge’s mitigation findings (that 
Respondent did not profit from his misconduct and that no court proceedings were ever 
disrupted) are not explicitly included in that list, those findings should not be considered 
as mitigating factors in this case.  Petitioner essentially treats our list in Shuler as 
exhaustive.  We reject such a rigid interpretation of our case law.  We have long held that 
the list of mitigating factors is “non-exhaustive.”  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n 
v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 31 (1999); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stolarz, 379 Md. 387, 
405 (2004).        
 
19 
 
V. 
The Sanction  
Finally, we turn to the appropriate sanction for Respondent’s misconduct.  Because 
“the purpose of attorney discipline is to protect the public, not punish the attorney[,]” 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mixter, 441 Md. 416, 527 (2015), “we aim to impose a 
sanction ‘commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with 
which they were committed,’” Framm, 449 Md. at 665 (quoting Good, 445 Md. at 513).   
We have imposed a range of sanctions for dishonest and deceitful conduct, from 
reprimand to disbarment, with a suspension (be it definite or indefinite) falling somewhere 
between the two.  See Myers, 333 Md. at 449-50; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Litman, 
440 Md. 205, 219 (2014).  Our precedent indicates that disbarment is warranted, typically 
as a matter of course, when an attorney is “willfully dishonest for personal gain.”  Myers, 
333 Md. at 449 (citation omitted).  In contrast, a reprimand may be appropriate when, 
among other reasons, there is no specific intent and the charged attorney either is a 
neophyte who expeditiously admits to misconduct, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Maxwell, 307 Md. 600, 604 (1986), or lacks a disciplinary record, Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Paul, 423 Md. 268, 293 (2011).  Ultimately, however, “‘[t]he appropriate 
sanction depends on the facts and circumstances of the case before us.’”  Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Sweitzer, 452 Md. 26, 43 (2017) (quoting Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Levin, 438 Md. 211, 228 (2014)).    
Here, neither disbarment nor a reprimand is suitable.  On the one hand, Respondent 
did not exhibit a specific intent to deceive.  He knowingly submitted inaccurate information 
 
20 
 
to the court, but he did not purposefully do so for personal gain, and no client or the court 
suffered any palpable harm, rendering disbarment unsuitable.  See Tanko, 427 Md. at 55 
(“It is the absence of a specific intent to deceive, inherently dishonest conduct, and selfish 
motive that spares Respondent from the ultimate sanction of disbarment[.]”).  On the other 
hand, Respondent is an experienced attorney, with a prior disbarment.  Further, in the 
present disciplinary action, we have concluded that Respondent committed serious 
violations of the MLRPC, rendering a reprimand inadequate.  See Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Gordon, 413 Md. 46, 63 (2010) (holding that “misrepresentations to the court 
in violation of [MLRPC] 3.3(a)(1) . . . and 8.4(c)” warrant a sanction greater than a 
reprimand); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cassidy, 362 Md. 689, 700 (2001) (“when we 
consider Respondent’s conduct in light of his prior disciplinary history, it is clear that, to 
protect the public, an increase in the degree of discipline beyond that of a reprimand is 
necessary”); Maxwell, 307 Md. at 604.  
Thus, we hold that an indefinite suspension from the practice of law is the 
appropriate sanction to be imposed in this case.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tun, 
428 Md. 235, 246 (2012) (stating that intentional dishonest misconduct warrants 
disbarment, while unintentional or negligent misconduct usually warrants an indefinite 
suspension); Litman, 440 Md. at 219 (“Disbarment for misleading . . . a tribunal may be 
the correct sanction in many situations.  In some cases . . . an indefinite suspension is more 
appropriate.”).  We are informed by our decisions in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Poverman, 440 Md. 588 (2014) and Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Robaton, 411 Md. 415 
 
21 
 
(2009).20  In Poverman, a reciprocal disciplinary case, we imposed an indefinite suspension 
upon an attorney who falsely certified on his annual registration statement to the Delaware 
Bar that there were no disciplinary charges pending against him.  440 Md. at 592, 595, 607.  
In imposing the sanction, we balanced the severity of Poverman’s misconduct—a knowing 
misrepresentation to an authoritative body—and his substantial experience practicing law 
with the fact that no clients or investors were ever harmed.  Id. at 606-08.  Similarly, in 
Robaton, we imposed an indefinite suspension upon an attorney who failed to make 
mandatory disclosures on several bankruptcy forms filed on behalf of a client.  411 Md. at 
425-26.  We stressed that although the misconduct “resulted from indifference, rather than 
from a selfish motive[,]” none of those facts negated the severity of the attorney’s 
misconduct and the need for a comparable sanction.  Id. at 430-31.          
Respondent’s conduct here is akin to Poverman and Robaton.  Although 
Respondent may not have acted with a selfish motive or harmed any client, neither negates 
the fact that he knowingly submitted false information to the court, which any reasonable 
attorney with his extensive experience handling debt collection matters would have known 
to avoid.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hodes, 441 Md. 136, 208 (2014) 
(highlighting an attorney’s substantial experience in a specific field of law as the basis for 
a more severe sanction).  Furthermore, unlike in Poverman and Robaton, Respondent’s 
                                                          
 
20  We have imposed indefinite suspensions upon other attorneys who knowingly 
misrepresented material facts.  E.g., Litman, 440 Md. at 221; Attorney Grievance Comm’n 
v. Kepple, 432 Md. 214, 232 (2013); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harrington, 367 Md. 
36, 51 (2001); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cohen, 361 Md. 161, 179 (2000).     
 
22 
 
disciplinary record is severely blemished by his previous disbarment.21  Accordingly, the 
indefinite suspension we impose here will adequately protect the public by “send[ing] the 
message to the legal community and the public at large that this Court [will not tolerate] 
this type of conduct.” Dore, 433 Md. at 727.  The suspension will begin thirty days after 
the filing date of this decision.  Respondent will be eligible to apply for reinstatement no 
sooner than six months after his suspension takes effect.  See Litman, 440 Md. at 220 
(stating that we typically require a six-month waiting period to apply for reinstatement after 
imposing an indefinite suspension for dishonest conduct).   
 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT 
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY 
THE 
CLERK 
OF 
THIS 
COURT, 
INCLUDING 
COSTS 
OF 
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO 
MARYLAND 
RULE 
19-709(d), 
FOR 
WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED 
IN 
FAVOR 
OF 
THE 
ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST 
NEIL WARREN STEINHORN.   
 
                                                          
 
21  Although we have imposed a ninety-day suspension on other attorneys who 
submitted similar false filings with the court, none of those attorneys had a prior discipline 
record.  See Dore, 433 Md. at 720, 727; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Geesing, 436 Md. 
56, 68, 71 (2013); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Parsons, 310 Md. 132, 142-43 (1987).  
Here, Respondent was previously disbarred, a factor that “in and of itself” may provide 
grounds for disbarment, although we decline to impose such a sanction given the nature of 
Respondent’s misconduct and the mitigating factors discussed supra.  See Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Shakir, 427 Md. 197, 208 (2012) (“A history of MLRPC violations 
may provide justification for disbarment in and of itself[.]”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n 
v. Harris, 371 Md. 510, 556-57 (2002) (emphasizing the need to impose a severe sanction, 
an indefinite suspension, due to the attorney’s prior discipline history, while stressing that 
disbarment was not warranted because the attorney’s personal circumstances, his 
preoccupation with the death of his mother and mother-in-law, mitigated his misconduct).