Title: 99-CV-2959 Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 79 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1899 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Board of Regents of the University of  
Wisconsin System,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
State of Wisconsin Personnel Commission,  
 
Respondent-Respondent-Co-Appellant, 
Dale R. Brenon,  
 
Appellant. 
__________________________________ 
 
Dale R. Brenon,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
State of Wisconsin Personnel Commission,  
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 28, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 28, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael N. Nowakowski   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant there were briefs (in the 
court of appeals) by Paul R. Erickson and Gutglass, Erickson, 
Bonville, Seibel & Falkner, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument 
by Paul R. Erickson. 
 
For 
the 
respondent-respondent-co-appellant 
there 
were 
briefs (in the court of appeals) by Kristine A. (Edwards) Long 
and Hurley, Burish & Milliken, S.C., Madison, and oral argument 
by Kristine A. Long. 
 
 
2
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by David 
C. Rice, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 79 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1899  
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 2959 & 00 CV 661) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
 
Board of Regents of the University of  
Wisconsin System,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Personnel Commission,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent-Co- 
          Appellant, 
 
Dale R. Brenon,  
 
          Appellant. 
 
__________________________________ 
 
Dale R. Brenon,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Personnel Commission,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 28, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
01-1899   
 
2 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Dane 
County, Michael Nowakowski, Circuit Court Judge.  Reversed in 
part and affirmed in part.   
 
¶1 
WILLIAM 
A. 
BABLITCH, 
J.   Appellant 
Dale 
Brenon 
(Brenon) successfully challenged his discharge by his employer, 
the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, more 
specifically 
the 
University 
of 
Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
Police 
Department (UWM), in an appeal to the Wisconsin Personnel 
Commission (Commission).  During a hearing on damages for the 
wrongful discharge, the Commission denied admission of evidence 
related to additional alleged misconduct committed by Brenon 
during his employment with UWM.  UWM discovered this evidence 
after Brenon's initial discharge and argued that this evidence 
should have been admitted to limit any award of back pay to 
Brenon.  The circuit court reversed the Commission's decision to 
exclude this evidence and remanded for a new hearing where UWM 
would be permitted to introduce this evidence.  The court of 
appeals certified this appeal to this court. 
¶2 
We examine two issues.  First, we examine whether the 
Commission 
properly 
excluded 
UWM's 
evidence 
on 
Brenon's 
subsequent misconduct when it was offered, without prior notice, 
during a hearing on damages to reduce the amount of back pay on 
Brenon's wrongful discharge.  We conclude that the Commission 
properly exercised its discretion in excluding this evidence 
because Brenon did not receive proper notice, consistent with 
No. 
01-1899   
 
3 
 
due process and the civil service statutes,1 prior to UWM's 
introduction of this evidence.  Second, we address whether the 
Commission properly denied fees and costs to Brenon based on its 
conclusion that UWM's disciplinary actions against Brenon were 
substantially justified.  Granting great weight deference, we 
uphold this determination.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit 
court's decision to reverse and remand the matter for a new 
hearing, and we affirm the circuit court's decision to deny fees 
and costs.   
I 
¶3 
Brenon began employment at UWM in October 1974 as a 
police cadet.  At the time of his discharge, Brenon was serving 
with permanent status in class as a police sergeant.   
¶4 
In November 1995, UWM Police Chief Philip Clark 
received reports from various officers that Brenon had told 
inappropriate racist and sexist jokes.  Clark directed Brenon's 
supervisor, Lieutenant Richard Sroka, to investigate and gather 
information.   
¶5 
Sroka sent Brenon an electronic mail message asking 
Brenon to meet with him.2  A few days later, they met, and Sroka 
                                                 
1 The civil service law is found under Wisconsin Stat. ch. 
230 (1999-2000).  Wisconsin Stat. § 230.34 specifically governs 
disciplinary actions taken against civil service employees.   
2 The text of the electronic mail message was as follows: 
 
Dale, I need to meet with you on Friday morning, 
12/08/95, regarding some recent personnel issues that 
I have just been made aware of.  I will be away in 
Madison the rest of this week but will attempt to get 
in the office on Friday as early as I can.  No big 
No. 
01-1899   
 
4 
 
informed Brenon of the allegations against him.  Sroka asked if 
the allegations were true, and Brenon admitted to telling the 
jokes. 
 
Sroka 
informed 
Brenon 
that 
this 
conduct 
was 
unsatisfactory and that it must stop.  Brenon apologized, and 
Sroka stated that he thought Brenon's conduct would stop.  Sroka 
told Brenon that he considered the matter closed and later 
described the meeting as a warning or an oral reprimand.   
¶6 
Immediately thereafter, Sroka reported to Clark about 
the meeting, including the oral reprimand.  Clark, however, told 
Sroka to instead prepare a ten-day suspension without pay for 
Brenon. 
 
Sroka 
immediately 
reported 
Clark's 
disciplinary 
decision to Brenon, and Brenon then met with Clark, asking him 
to reconsider his decision.  Clark's decision, however, remained 
final.   
¶7 
As a result, Sroka prepared a letter of suspension 
dated December 19, 1995, for Brenon.  According to the letter, 
the suspension would take effect from January 22, 1996 to 
February 2, 1996.  The letter offered the following explanation 
for the disciplinary action:     
This disciplinary action is based on your conduct, as 
related by four officers of this Department, that 
during the first week of November, 1995 you related 
racially 
demeaning 
jokes 
to 
them 
while 
in 
the 
performance of your duties as a police sergeant.  
Regardless of the motivation for relating such jokes, 
this 
conduct 
exhibits 
unprofessional 
behavior, 
                                                                                                                                                             
deal, won't take up much of your time, but please 
wait.  Thank you. 
No. 
01-1899   
 
5 
 
demonstrates a lack of sensitivity and creates a 
hostile environment within a diverse workplace.3   
The letter also warned that "any further violation of work rules 
will result in further disciplinary action, up to and including 
discharge."   
¶8 
After this letter was issued, an investigation into 
Brenon's conduct continued.  UWM received information from one 
female police cadet concerning sexist and racist comments and 
jokes told by Brenon as well as alleged dishonest conduct by 
Brenon in the performance of his duties.  In addition, UWM 
received a report from another female officer who stated that 
                                                 
3 The letter specified the following rule violations: 
This conduct constitutes violations of University of 
Wisconsin System Work Rules IV., B and J, which 
states: 
B. 
Threatening, intimidating, interfering with, or 
using abusive language towards others. 
J. 
Failure to exercise good judgement, [sic] or 
being discourteous in dealing with fellow employees, 
students or the general public. 
These actions violate University Police Rules and 
Regulations, Article I – Conduct, Section 4, which 
states: 
4. 
When dealing with any person, employees shall at 
all times conduct themselves in a courteous and 
helpful manner.   
As these violations in and of themselves show cause 
for disciplinary action, the greater concern is that 
such behavior is not acceptable for a University of 
Wisconsin-Milwaukee Police Supervisor.   
 
No. 
01-1899   
 
6 
 
Brenon harassed her and made several sexual comments and jokes 
to her.  Several other officers were also interviewed.   
¶9 
Clark and UWM Labor Relations Manager Shannon Bradbury 
met with Brenon.  During the meeting, Brenon admitted to making 
several inappropriate jokes and comments, but denied telling 
racial jokes after notification of his suspension.   
¶10 Clark later notified Brenon to report to a pre-
disciplinary hearing on February 5, 1996.  The notice identified 
the hearing subject matter as "allegations of [Brenon] making 
sexually 
explicit 
and 
demeaning 
comments 
and 
jokes 
to 
subordinates, . . . allegations 
of 
retaliation 
against 
subordinates in violation of UW System Work Rules and the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Sexual Harassment Policy, and 
continuing inappropriate activity subsequent to his suspension."  
Clark and Bradbury met with Brenon on February 5.  During the 
meeting, Clark informed Brenon of the allegations against him 
and told him that UWM was considering disciplinary action 
against him ranging from a 30-day suspension without pay to 
discharge.   
¶11 UWM discharged Brenon effective February 11, 1996.  A 
February 9, 1996 letter provided the following explanation for 
this disciplinary action: 
This termination is based on other complaints of your 
conduct, untruthfulness uncovered in the course of the 
investigation of those complaints and your retaliation 
against 
subordinates 
who 
cooperated 
in 
those 
investigations. 
 
Specifically, 
complaints 
were 
received that subsequent to your learning of your 10 
day suspension, you continued to tell jokes to 
No. 
01-1899   
 
7 
 
subordinate officers substituting "Irishman" for other 
ethnic groups.  Additionally, new complaints were 
received about your making sexually explicit and 
demeaning comments, telling ethnically and sexually 
demeaning jokes.   
. . . . 
These examples are not an exhaustive list, but merely 
indicative of a much larger problem of continuing 
inappropriate and abusive treatment of subordinates 
and co-workers which cannot be tolerated in a UWM 
Police Department supervisor.  Your behavior is all 
the more unacceptable in light of the frequent and 
numerous training programs you have attended on proper 
supervisory 
practices, 
appropriate 
interpersonal 
relations in the workplace, and dealing with the 
sensitive issues of diversity in a campus environment.4   
                                                 
4 The letter specified the following rule violations: 
This conduct constitutes violations of University of 
Wisconsin System Work Rules; I E., and IV., B., D., 
and J., which state: 
Prohibited Conduct 
I. 
E. 
Failure to provide accurate and complete 
information whenever such information is required by 
an authorized person.   
IV. B. 
Threatening, intimidating, interfering with, 
or using abusive language towards others. 
IV. D. 
Making 
false 
or 
malicious 
statements 
concerning other employees, supervisors, students or 
the University.   
IV. J. 
Failure to exercise good judgement, [sic] or 
being discourteous in dealing with fellow employees, 
students or the general public.   
These actions violate University Police Rules and 
Regulations, Article I – Conduct, Section 4, which 
states: 
No. 
01-1899   
 
8 
 
¶12 Brenon appealed his suspension and his termination to 
the Commission pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 230.44(1)(c) (1999-
2000).5  He sought review on whether UWM had just cause for its 
disciplinary decisions and whether either decision constituted 
excessive discipline.   
¶13 On October 7, 1997, Commissioner Donald Murphy issued 
a proposed decision and order on Brenon's appeal.  In it, 
Commissioner Murphy concluded that UWM had violated Brenon's due 
process rights in issuing the initial ten-day suspension.  He 
concluded that UWM failed to provide Brenon with adequate notice 
and a pre-disciplinary hearing prior to the suspension and 
therefore recommended that the Commission reject the suspension.  
However, he determined that, because Brenon had failed to 
                                                                                                                                                             
4. 
When dealing with any person, employees shall at 
all times conduct themselves in a courteous and 
helpful manner. 
In addition, a complaint was made by one of your 
subordinates to the Office of Diversity/Compliance on 
December 28, 1995 regarding the hostile environment 
created by your demeaning, degrading and otherwise 
inappropriate racial, ethnic and sexually explicit 
language, as well as an intimidating and retaliatory 
management style.  Their investigation and findings 
corroborated the findings of the University Police 
Department's investigation.   
This continuing unprofessional behavior demonstrates a 
lack of sensitivity and creates a hostile work 
environment within a diverse workplace and is not 
acceptable for a University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
Police Supervisor. 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-1899   
 
9 
 
exercise good judgment in violation of University of Wisconsin 
System Work Rule IV. J.,6 this conduct was sufficient to warrant 
some disciplinary action.  He deemed that the ten-day suspension 
was excessive discipline for this violation and that an oral or 
written reprimand was appropriate.   
¶14 With respect to the termination, Commissioner Murphy 
concluded that UWM failed to prove all the allegations of 
misconduct that prompted Brenon's termination and that UWM had 
no just cause for the termination.  The evidence, he noted, 
failed to establish that Brenon told derogatory ethnic jokes 
after notification of the ten-day suspension, that he retaliated 
against any employees, and that he was otherwise untruthful 
during the investigation.  As a result, Commissioner Murphy 
considered 
the 
termination 
as 
an 
excessive 
exercise 
of 
discipline and ordered the modification of Brenon's termination 
of employment to a suspension of ten days without pay.  He also 
ordered a reinstatement of Brenon.  The Commission, although 
amending some language, adopted the findings of the proposed 
decision and order.  It reserved jurisdiction to consider a 
request 
by 
Brenon 
for 
costs 
and 
fees 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 227.485(3). 
¶15 The Commission later rejected Brenon's request for 
costs 
and 
fees, 
concluding 
that 
UWM 
was 
"substantially 
justified" in taking its position on Brenon's conduct and 
                                                 
6 Commissioner Murphy noted that the evidence fell short of 
showing that Brenon violated the other work rules as alleged. 
No. 
01-1899   
 
10 
 
therefore an award for fees and costs was not warranted.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 227.485(1)(f) and (3).  The Commission then granted 
leave to conduct discovery related to the remedy.   
¶16 A remedy hearing was scheduled.  Before the hearing, 
Commissioner Murphy proposed the following statement of issues 
for hearing: (1) the sum of Brenon's back pay and other credits, 
(2) the sum of UWM's mitigation damages and set-offs, and (3) 
the total sum of Brenon's remedy.  After the May 18, 1999 
hearing, Commissioner Murphy issued a proposed decision and 
order, recommending $159,533.64 in back pay to Brenon for the 
time period from February 11, 1996 to May 22, 1999, and 
additional back pay plus interest until Brenon's reinstatement.  
The decision noted that UWM had failed to mitigate its damages 
by reinstating Brenon and also ordered UWM to immediately offer 
reinstatement 
to 
Brenon 
to 
his 
former 
position 
or 
its 
equivalent.   
¶17 During the remedy hearing, UWM attempted to introduce 
evidence related to alleged misconduct committed by Brenon 
during his employment with UWM but was not discovered by UWM 
until after his termination.  The misconduct consisted of 
Brenon's alleged practice of copying and removing confidential 
documents from UWM.  UWM first questioned Brenon on this conduct 
on June 24, 1996, during a pre-hearing deposition.  During this 
deposition, UWM demanded that Brenon return all confidential 
files.  Brenon subsequently returned one box of documents.   
¶18 When UWM sought to introduce evidence related to this 
misconduct at the remedy hearing, Brenon objected on the basis 
No. 
01-1899   
 
11 
 
of relevancy.  UWM responded that the evidence was relevant 
because it would show that UWM would have terminated Brenon for 
misconduct in June 1996 if he had still been employed there.  
Accordingly, on this "after-acquired evidence" theory, UWM 
argued that this evidence applied toward the issue of mitigation 
of damages in the wrongful termination case because it would 
limit an award of back pay at June 1996.  Commissioner Murphy 
initially 
overruled 
Brenon's 
objection. 
 Brenon, however, 
continued his argument on the objection.  He asserted that he 
had not been charged with any misconduct on the issue and that 
the issue had not been included in the notice of hearing.  After 
a recess, Commissioner Murphy sustained the objection and 
excluded the evidence.  UWM made an offer of proof on the issue, 
during which Commissioner Murphy specifically asked whether it 
had been UWM's intent to present the document evidence in order 
to show just cause for terminating Brenon in June 1996.  UWM 
answered affirmatively.   
¶19 In the proposed decision and order on damages, 
Commissioner Murphy concluded that the decision to exclude the 
evidence at the hearing "was proper."  He stated that "[t]o have 
ruled otherwise would have been in deprivation of appellant's 
[Brenon's] job property rights without due process of law."   
¶20 The Commission adopted the proposed decision and 
order.  It also provided additional discussion on its decision 
to exclude the after-acquired evidence.  Specifically, it 
concluded that this evidence, if admitted, would have unfairly 
required Brenon to address a significant new issue on which he 
No. 
01-1899   
 
12 
 
had no prior notice.  The Commission rejected UWM's arguments 
that Brenon had prior notice based on evidence in the record.7  
Instead, based on this evidence, the Commission held that it was 
reasonable for Brenon to conclude that the document removal 
issue would be addressed in a pending replevin action seeking 
these documents or in a new disciplinary action following his 
restoration to his former job.  The Commission declined to 
address the question of whether introduction of this evidence 
would violate the civil service code.  It stated: 
There is also a question as to whether it would 
violate the civil service code to sanction what would 
be in effect the retroactive addition of reasons for 
the discharge of the appellant.  However, because the 
commission concludes that lack of notice precludes 
litigation of the issue of the missing documents at 
this point in the remedy process, it will not address 
the question of whether injecting this issue into this 
case at this time would violate the civil service 
code.  (Citations omitted.)   
                                                 
7 UWM supported its position that Brenon had proper notice 
that this evidence would be raised at the remedy hearing based 
on three evidentiary items.  First, UWM cited the June 1996 
deposition at which Brenon was asked about the documents.  
Second, UWM cited a June 20, 1998 letter from UWM to the 
Commission 
in 
opposition 
to 
appellant's 
motion 
for 
reinstatement, which stated in relevant part:  "If ordered to 
return Brenon to the workplace at this time, UWM would be forced 
to 
consider 
initiating 
a 
formal 
investigation, 
possibly 
resulting in disciplinary action against him, for unauthorized 
possession of university property with regard to the records 
issue."  Third, UWM cited a May 14, 1999 memo and settlement 
offer, which discussed the process that would be followed if 
Brenon were reinstated to his job.  In relevant part, it stated:  
"After the final decision we also intend to reinstate your 
client and initiate the discipline process because of his gross 
violation of the records policies."   
No. 
01-1899   
 
13 
 
¶21 UWM moved for reconsideration.  In support of its 
motion, UWM pointed to newly discovered documents that Brenon 
recently provided to UWM that had been at his home.8  UWM argued 
that Brenon should have disclosed these allegedly confidential 
documents in June 1996 and that this evidence provided a basis 
for the Commission to overturn its order for reinstatement and 
back pay.  UWM also cited to McKennon v. Nashville Banner 
Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995), to support its argument 
that the after-acquired evidence should have been admitted at 
the remedy hearing.   
¶22 The 
Commission, 
however, 
held 
that 
the 
newly 
discovered documents did not provide a material difference to 
allow UWM to raise any issue surrounding the documents at that 
time.  It maintained that UWM never raised the document removal 
issue before the remedy hearing and that it therefore waived 
this issue.  The Commission also distinguished McKennon, noting 
that Brenon's case involved a discharge under the civil service 
code, requiring due process before any disciplinary action.  
Such a limitation on back pay based on subsequent misconduct, 
the Commission determined, would effectively amount to an 
unlawful retroactive discharge requiring notice.  UWM, the 
Commission stated, could not now add additional reasons for 
                                                 
8 UWM pointed to the fact that it had filed a replevin 
action on April 28, 1998, in Milwaukee County Circuit Court 
seeking the recovery of documents that had allegedly been 
removed from the workplace.  In connection with this proceeding, 
UWM contended that Brenon had recently returned, on September 
29, 1999, ten file boxes containing about 24,000 documents.  
No. 
01-1899   
 
14 
 
discharge after its initial notice of termination, Brenon's 
disciplinary hearing, and the hearings before the Commission.  
The Commission relied on State ex. rel. Tracy v. Henry, 219 
Wis. 53, 262 N.W. 222 (1935), in reaching its conclusion.   
¶23 UWM appealed the Commission's decision on the merits 
of the suspension and discharge and on the decision to exclude 
the after-acquired evidence to the circuit court (Case No. 99 CV 
2959).  Brenon appealed the Commission's decision on fees and 
costs to the circuit court (Case No. 00 CV 661).  The cases were 
consolidated.  The Circuit Court of Dane County, Judge Michael 
Nowakowski presiding, upheld the Commission's findings on the 
merits, concluding that the Commission's modifications to UWM's 
discipline of Brenon were reasonable.  The court also affirmed 
the Commission's decision denying fees and costs to Brenon.  The 
court, however, reversed the Commission's decision and order 
related to the back pay award.  The court concluded that the 
Commission's refusal to consider evidence related to the 
document removal was an abuse of discretion.  The court's 
decision was based in part on its conclusion that the Commission 
applied an incorrect rule of law by concluding that Tracy was 
applicable and by concluding that McKennon was inapplicable.  It 
also concluded that the Commission failed to properly engage in 
a balancing of interests to determine whether the evidence was 
admissible in light of any surprise element of the evidence.  
The court remanded to the Commission for further hearings at 
which UWM would be permitted to offer evidence in support of its 
after-acquired evidence theory.   
No. 
01-1899   
 
15 
 
¶24 The court of appeals certified this case to us.  The 
court presented the following issue for certification:  "whether 
the Personnel Commission is permitted to consider 'after-
acquired evidence' when deciding the remedy for a civil service 
employee 
who 
was 
wrongfully 
discharged." 
 
We 
accepted 
certification on this issue and on the issue of whether Brenon 
is entitled to fees and costs.   
II 
¶25 We rephrase the first issue.  The first issue is 
whether the Commission properly excluded evidence of Brenon's 
alleged misconduct when it was offered, without prior notice, 
during a hearing on damages to reduce the amount of back pay for 
Brenon's wrongful termination.  We review the decision by the 
Commission, not the decision by the circuit court.  Currie v. 
DILHR, 210 Wis. 2d 380, 386, 565 N.W.2d 253 (Ct. App. 1997). 
¶26 Admission of evidence is a matter of discretion with 
the Commission.  J.I. Case Co. v. LIRC, 118 Wis. 2d 45, 48, 346 
N.W.2d 315 (Ct. App. 1984).  We uphold the Commission's 
discretionary decision if there is a reasonable basis for it.  
Prahl v. Brosamle, 142 Wis. 2d 658, 667, 420 N.W.2d 372 (Ct. 
App. 1987).  A proper exercise of discretion must be based on 
facts appearing in the record and on the appropriate and 
applicable law.  Id.   
¶27 Our review, like UWM's arguments, focuses primarily on 
the legal bases for the Commission's decision, in particular the 
civil service statutes and the due process clause.  The 
Commission concluded that the attempted introduction of the 
No. 
01-1899   
 
16 
 
after-acquired evidence on the alleged document removal amounted 
to a retroactive termination of Brenon.  As a result, it 
excluded this evidence in part because UWM had not provided 
notice to Brenon as required under the civil service statutes 
and the due process clause.  Our review of whether the 
Commission properly based its decision on this law requires a 
determination on a question of law, that is, whether UWM was 
required to provide notice, following due process and civil 
service statutory requirements, to Brenon before it could 
introduce this evidence during the remedy proceeding.  We first 
resolve this question of law before we address the Commission's 
discretionary decision.  We also examine the additional legal 
bases for the Commission's determination, namely the Tracy 
decision and waiver.   
¶28 We are not bound by an administrative agency's 
conclusions when reviewing questions of law.  Kelley Co. v. 
Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 244, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992).  Instead, 
we have applied three levels of deference to conclusions of law 
and statutory interpretation by an agency.  Id.  "First, if the 
administrative agency's experience, technical competence, and 
specialized knowledge aid the agency in its interpretation and 
application of the statute, the agency determination is entitled 
to 'great weight.'"  Id.  Second, if the agency determination is 
very nearly one of first impression, the agency determination is 
entitled to "due weight."  Id.  Third, if the issue is one of 
first impression for the agency and the agency lacks special 
No. 
01-1899   
 
17 
 
expertise or experience in its determination, our standard of 
review is de novo.  Id. at 245.   
¶29 The Commission argues that it has experience applying 
constitutional standards of due process and therefore its 
decision on this issue should be accorded due weight deference.  
However, the issue before us is one of first impression, that 
is, whether standards on due process and the civil service 
statutes 
even 
apply, 
requiring 
notice, 
before 
UWM 
could 
introduce the after-acquired evidence on Brenon's misconduct.  
The Commission has not provided any support to show that it has 
experience in addressing this issue.  As a result, we apply a de 
novo standard.  In turn, we review this question independently, 
while benefiting from the analyses of the Commission and the 
circuit court.  Auman v. School Dist. of Stanley-Boyd, 2001 WI 
125, ¶6, 248 Wis. 2d 548, 635 N.W.2d 762.   
¶30 Applying a de novo standard, we conclude that UWM was 
required to provide notice to Brenon as contemplated by the 
civil service statutes and as required under due process before 
it could introduce evidence related to his alleged misconduct in 
copying and removing confidential documents from the UWM Police 
Department.  Notice and a proper hearing addressing this 
misconduct is required to remain faithful to the due process 
interests of civil service employees in Wisconsin and to remain 
consistent with the policies of security of tenure and impartial 
evaluation prior to termination.  See Watkins v. Milwaukee 
County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 88 Wis. 2d 411, 420, 276 N.W.2d 775 
(1979). 
No. 
01-1899   
 
18 
 
¶31 In reaching this conclusion, we distinguish McKennon, 
in which the United States Supreme Court allowed after-acquired 
evidence, but did so in the context of at-will employment.  In 
McKennon, McKennon was discharged from Banner Publishing Company 
when she was 62 years old.  McKennon, 513 U.S. at 354.  She sued 
alleging that her discharge violated the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967.  Id.  During a subsequent deposition, 
Banner discovered that McKennon had copied and removed several 
confidential documents.  Id. at 355.  A few days later, Banner 
terminated her (again) for removal and copying records.  Id.  
After Banner conceded its discrimination, the District Court 
granted summary judgment to Banner and concluded that, because 
of her subsequent termination, McKennon was not entitled to any 
remedy, including back pay.  Id.  This judgment was affirmed on 
appeal.  Id.   
¶32 The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that McKennon 
could obtain relief despite her employer's discovery of evidence 
to 
support 
her 
termination 
subsequent 
to 
her 
initial 
termination.  Id. at 361-63.  The Court's decision balanced 
competing interests:  an employee's interest in deterring and 
gaining 
compensation 
for 
discriminatory 
conduct 
and 
the 
employer's interest in obtaining relief from an employee's 
inevitable discharge.  Id. at 362.  The employer, however, 
carried the burden when it sought to rely on after-acquired 
evidence.  Id. at 362-63.  In this respect, the Court stated 
that an employer must "establish that the wrongdoing was of such 
severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on 
No. 
01-1899   
 
19 
 
those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time 
of the discharge."  Id.  Due process considerations were never 
at issue.  Cf. Vorwald v. Sch. Dist. of River Falls, 167 
Wis. 2d 549, 557, 482 N.W.2d 93 (1992) (at-will employees have 
no property interest in employment).   
 
¶33 Due 
process 
considerations 
and 
protections 
are 
certainly at issue in this case however.  Brenon is a permanent 
civil service employee, and as such, he has a property interest 
in 
his 
employment 
pursuant 
to 
statute. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 230.34(1)(a) 
(such 
employees 
"may 
be 
removed, 
suspended without pay, discharged, reduced in base pay or 
demoted only for just cause"); see also Arneson v. Jezwinski, 
225 Wis. 2d 371, 393, 592 N.W.2d 606 (1999) ("An employee who 
may be dismissed only for 'just cause' has a property interest 
in continued employment which is protected by the due process 
clause of the federal constitution.").  Because of this property 
interest, the statutes require the appointing authority to 
provide notice to the employee prior to any disciplinary action.  
See 
Wis. Stat. § 230.34(1)(b) 
(requiring 
the 
appointing 
authority to "furnish to the employee in writing the reasons for 
the [disciplinary] action").  Further, the employee is entitled 
to a hearing permitting him to address the employer's reasons 
for any disciplinary action.  These pretermination protections 
are required under the due process clause pursuant to Cleveland 
Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).  See 
Hanson v. Madison Serv. Corp., 150 Wis. 2d 828, 840-46, 443 
N.W.2d 315 (Ct. App. 1989).   
No. 
01-1899   
 
20 
 
 
¶34 We 
discuss 
Loudermill 
briefly. 
 
In 
Loudermill, 
Loudermill was hired to work as a security guard——a classified 
civil servant position under Ohio law——for the Cleveland Board 
of Education.  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 535.  Shortly thereafter, 
he was terminated when the Board of Education discovered that he 
had been convicted of a felony and had failed to report this 
conviction as required on his job application.  Id.  Loudermill 
was not afforded an opportunity to respond to the charge or 
challenge the dismissal.  Id.  He filed a federal suit, claiming 
that Ohio law failed to afford him, as required by the 
constitution, the opportunity to respond to the charges prior to 
his removal.  Id. at 536.  The District Court dismissed the 
claim, and the Court of Appeals reversed.  Id. at 536-37.   
¶35 The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that Loudermill 
was not provided proper due process procedures before his 
termination.  The Court noted that Ohio law specifically 
conferred a property right to Loudermill in his employment,9 and 
accordingly, 
he 
could 
not 
be, 
pursuant 
to 
due 
process 
guarantees, deprived of this substantive right except pursuant 
to constitutionally adequate procedures.  Id. at 538, 548.  The 
Court concluded, however, that the procedures required did not 
need to be elaborate; they only need to be "an initial check 
                                                 
9 The Ohio statute at issue entitled Loudermill to retain 
his position "during good behavior and efficient service," and 
could 
not 
be 
dismissed 
"except . . . for . . . misfeasance, 
malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office."  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 124.11 (West 1984); see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 
470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985).    
No. 
01-1899   
 
21 
 
against mistaken decisions——essentially, a determination of 
whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges 
against the employee are true and support the proposed action."  
Id. at 545-46.  The essential elements were notice and an 
opportunity to respond.  Id. at 546.  The Court noted the 
private interests in retaining employment——specifically the 
severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood.  Id. 
at 542-43.  Indeed, it is this specific property interest that 
necessitates notice and hearing for a civil servant in Wisconsin 
prior to termination.   
¶36 Brenon's property interest in his employment and 
livelihood existed not only when UWM sought to initially 
terminate him, but also when it sought to introduce evidence of 
misconduct to show termination to limit his award of back pay.  
As a result, UWM could not introduce evidence of his subsequent 
misconduct without adequate notice and hearing.  Adequate notice 
and hearing must follow the due process requirements discussed 
in Loudermill.  Such notice and hearing is consistent with 
policies of security of tenure and impartial evaluation prior to 
deprivation of this property interest in employment.  See 
Watkins, 88 Wis. 2d at 420.  UWM concedes that it did not 
provide any such notice to Brenon prior to its introduction of 
this evidence at the remedy hearing.  Adequate notice should 
have been provided to Brenon at the time that UWM would have 
acted on the misconduct.  The Commission relied on this lack of 
notice in justifying its decision to exclude the evidence.  Lack 
No. 
01-1899   
 
22 
 
of notice provided a reasonable basis for the exclusion of the 
evidence.   
¶37 Requiring notice in this case is consistent with 
Tracy, 
which 
the 
Commission 
also 
cited 
in 
making 
its 
determination.  In Tracy, the state treasurer discharged several 
civil service oil inspectors without reason.  Tracy, 219 Wis. at 
55.10  The discharges, however, were found illegal.  Id.  In a 
subsequent investigation, the treasurer found that, for some of 
the inspectors, there had existed a just cause for their 
discharges at the time of the original illegal discharges, but 
that a reasonable time had expired for those inspectors to 
provide an explanation pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 16.24 (1933).  
Id. at 56.  The treasurer therefore notified these inspectors of 
their subsequent discharges by letter.  Id.  Nevertheless, the 
circuit 
court 
ordered 
the 
treasurer 
to 
reinstate 
these 
inspectors as of the date of their original discharges, 
concluding that the subsequent discharges did not affect their 
rights to gain relief from the time of the original discharges 
                                                 
10 The statute at issue was Wis. Stat. § 16.24(1)(1933), 
which stated: 
No permanent subordinate or employe . . . shall be 
removed, suspended without pay, discharged, or reduced 
in pay or position except for just cause, which shall 
not be religious or political.  In all such cases the 
appointing officer shall, at the time of such action, 
furnish to the subordinate his reasons for the same 
and allow him reasonable time in which to make an 
explanation.  The reasons for such action and the 
answer thereto shall be filed in writing with the 
director prior to the effective date thereof.   
No. 
01-1899   
 
23 
 
to the time of the alleged subsequent discharges.  Id. at 57-59.  
The primary question was whether the subsequent discharges 
defeated the court's reinstatement of these inspectors to the 
time of the original discharges.  Id. at 59-60.  The court held 
the subsequent discharges would not operate retroactively to be 
effective on the date of the original discharges, and that, even 
though valid, the subsequent discharges should not affect the 
reinstatements.  Id. at 61, 63.   
¶38 For our purposes, the court's holding is important 
insofar as it showed that the subsequent discharges were valid 
because the treasurer complied with the notice requirements.  
See id. at 63 (the reinstatement could occur despite "just and 
valid 
causes 
for 
discharge" 
which 
were 
"effective 
upon 
compliance with the conditions precedent and the expiration of 
time prescribed under [Wis. Stat. § 16.24(1) (1933)]").  Thus, 
although Tracy does not discuss an after-acquired evidence 
question, it does lend support to the conclusion that notice 
must be provided on a subsequent discharge in order to limit 
back pay.  Therefore, the Commission also appropriately cited 
Tracy as consistent with its holding in this case.   
¶39 Finally, the Commission appropriately relied on UWM's 
waiver as a legal basis in excluding the after-acquired evidence 
from 
the 
remedy 
hearing. 
 
Before 
the 
remedy 
hearing, 
Commissioner Murphy specifically enumerated the issues for 
discussion at the hearing.  Extensive briefing by both parties 
followed.  UWM never informed Brenon that it intended to present 
evidence related to Brenon's alleged document removal in order 
No. 
01-1899   
 
24 
 
to limit its damages on back pay.  As the Commission noted, 
UWM's evidence instead indicated that the document removal issue 
would be addressed during the replevin action or in a subsequent 
disciplinary action.  As a result, UWM waived this issue. 
¶40 In sum, we conclude that the facts in the record and 
the legal basis (the civil service code, due process concerns, 
Tracy, and waiver) which the Commission relied on support its 
decision to exclude the after-acquired evidence in this case.  
Accordingly, we hold that the Commission's decision to exclude 
the after-acquired evidence was not an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.   
III 
¶41 The second issue that we address is whether the 
Commission erred in denying fees and costs to Brenon for 
successfully defending claims of wrongful termination on his 
misconduct involving the telling of racial and sexist jokes.  
Brenon sought fees and costs pursuant to statute.11  He is 
entitled to fees and costs unless UWM can show that it was 
"substantially 
justified 
in 
taking 
its 
position . . . ."  
                                                 
11  Wisconsin Stat. § 227.485(3) provides: 
In any contested case in which an individual, a 
small nonprofit corporation or a small business is the 
prevailing party and submits a motion for costs under 
this section, the hearing examiner shall award the 
prevailing party the costs incurred in connection with 
the contested case, unless the hearing examiner finds 
that the state agency which is the losing party was 
substantially justified in taking its position or that 
special circumstances exist that would make the award 
unjust. 
No. 
01-1899   
 
25 
 
Wis. Stat. § 227.485(3). 
 
"Substantially 
justified" 
means 
"having 
a 
reasonable 
basis 
in 
fact 
and 
law."  
Wis. Stat. § 227.485(2)(f).  To meet this burden, UWM must show 
(1) a reasonable basis and truth for the facts alleged; (2) a 
reasonable basis and law for the theory propounded; and (3) a 
reasonable connection between the facts alleged and the legal 
theory advanced.  See Sheely v. DHSS, 150 Wis. 2d 320, 337, 442 
N.W.2d 1 (1989).  The Commission concluded that UWM had met this 
burden and denied costs to Brenon.  We now review this decision 
by the Commission. 
¶42 The 
question 
of 
whether 
UWM 
was 
substantially 
justified in its position requires an interpretation of the 
statute.  Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.  
See Dodgeland Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 2002 WI 22, ¶22, 250 
Wis. 2d 357, 639 N.W.2d 733.  As mentioned, there are three 
levels of deference under which we review questions of law:  
"great weight," "due weight," and de novo.  Id.  We conclude 
that the Commission's decision is entitled to great weight 
deference on this issue.   
¶43 An agency's conclusions on questions of law are 
entitled to great weight deference when (1) the agency is 
charged by the legislature with the duty of administering the 
statute; (2) the interpretation of the statute is long-standing; 
(3) the agency employed its expertise or specialized knowledge 
in 
forming 
the 
interpretation; 
and 
(4) 
the 
agency's 
interpretation will provide uniformity and consistency in the 
application 
of 
the 
statute. 
 
Kannenberg 
v. 
LIRC, 
213 
No. 
01-1899   
 
26 
 
Wis. 2d 373, 384, 571 N.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1997).  In this case, 
UWM and the Commission have provided numerous instances in which 
the Commission has applied this statute, showing its long-
standing experience.  In addition, in such instances, the 
Commission employs its expertise and knowledge in interpreting 
the statute, determining whether agencies are substantially 
justified in taking its position.  Finally, the Commission's 
interpretation will provide consistency in application of this 
statute.  For these reasons, we conclude that the Commission's 
interpretation 
is 
entitled 
to 
great 
weight 
deference.  
Accordingly, we uphold the Commission's interpretation of the 
statute if it is not contrary to the clear meaning of the 
statute, even if another interpretation is more reasonable.  Id.  
In other words, we will uphold the Commission's decision if it 
has "'any rational basis.'"  Dodgeland, 2002 WI 22, ¶30 
(citation omitted).   
¶44 The Commission concluded that UWM was substantially 
justified in its position.  In reaching this determination, it 
first examined its decision to reject the ten-day suspension 
issued against Brenon.  It noted that its key reason for finding 
no just cause for the suspension was that UWM failed to provide 
sufficient pre-disciplinary process to satisfy due process and 
statutory requirements.  The primary reason for such notice, the 
Commission concluded, is to provide an opportunity for the 
employee to respond to the alleged misconduct and to try to 
persuade the employer to impose a lesser penalty.  Based on this 
reasoning, 
the 
Commission 
then 
concluded 
that 
the 
pre-
No. 
01-1899   
 
27 
 
disciplinary process provided by UWM in this case "possessed 
enough of the attributes of a sufficient due process proceeding 
to support a conclusion that respondent [UWM] had a reasonable 
basis in law and fact for contending that the just cause 
standard had been met in this regard."  The Commission discussed 
the "attributes" present in this case as follows:   
Under the facts present here, appellant [1] was given 
notice of the specific allegation against him, i.e., 
the . . . [racist] joke he had repeated; [2] was given 
an opportunity to answer the allegation during his 
meeting with Mr. Sroka; [3] was made aware as a part 
of his meeting with Mr. Sroka that the purpose of the 
meeting was to discuss this particular allegation and 
what consequence should follow; [4] was provided 
notice, although not until the end of his meeting with 
Mr. Sroka, of the fact that a ten-day suspension was 
being 
contemplated; 
and 
[5] 
was 
provided 
an 
opportunity, through his meeting with Chief Clark, to 
persuade the employer to impose a lesser penalty.   
Based on these "attributes," the Commission determined that UWM 
was substantially justified in its position and it denied 
Brenon's 
application 
for 
costs 
and 
fees 
on 
the 
ten-day 
suspension. 
 
¶45 Brenon disagrees with this conclusion for three main 
reasons.   
¶46 First, Brenon asserts that his notice was inadequate.  
His only notice, he argues, was an electronic mail message from 
Sroka telling him that he wanted to talk to him about "a 
personnel matter" but that it was "no big deal."  Further, 
although Sroka informed him of the allegations against him 
during their meeting, Brenon argues that he was not notified 
that Clark was actually considering suspension or termination.  
No. 
01-1899   
 
28 
 
Adequate notice, he asserts, would have provided him with the 
opportunity to prepare responses to the allegations and to 
obtain counsel prior to the meetings. 
¶47 Second, he argues that his meetings with Sroka and 
Clark provided no real opportunity for him to be heard.  In 
particular, 
he 
argues 
that 
his 
meeting 
with 
Clark 
was 
meaningless because Clark had no authority to change any 
disciplinary decision.  UWM administration officials, Brenon 
contends, had determined his discipline before the meeting, and 
therefore, he was not afforded any meaningful hearing prior to 
discipline.   
¶48 Third and finally, Brenon argues that UWM failed to 
follow the guidelines for disciplinary procedure imposed by the 
collective bargaining agreement that UWM voluntarily applied to 
non-union employees.  Under these union rules, Brenon contends 
that discipline must be applied progressively, which first 
requires a reprimand before suspension.  Brenon asserts that an 
agency is not substantially justified in its position if it 
fails to follow its own rules, citing Stern v. DHFS, 212 
Wis. 2d 393, 569 N.W.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1997).   
¶49 Despite these arguments, when granting great weight 
deference to the Commission's determination, we conclude that 
its decision must be upheld.  In making its determination, the 
Commission looked collectively at all of the occurrences before 
UWM suspended Brenon.  The Commission did not conclude that 
these occurrences were sufficient to provide Brenon with due 
process.  It only determined that these occurrences were 
No. 
01-1899   
 
29 
 
sufficient for UWM to conclude that Brenon had been adequately 
notified and heard and that it could then suspend him.  We 
uphold this decision. 
¶50 Certainly, UWM could have and should have provided 
Brenon with additional notice of the allegations against him 
prior to any meetings in order for Brenon to adequately prepare.  
However, Sroka fully informed Brenon of the seriousness of his 
conduct at their meeting.  Sroka then provided Brenon with an 
opportunity to respond and then warned him that his conduct must 
stop.  Sroka informed Brenon that he was then going to talk with 
Clark about the meeting.  Brenon later met with Clark, 
attempting 
to 
persuade 
Clark 
to 
change 
the 
disciplinary 
decision.  Clark testified that he made the ultimate decision on 
discipline.  Further, the fact that Clark met with Brenon 
indicates that Clark was willing to at least consider Brenon's 
explanation and change his disciplinary decision.  Indeed, 
additional notice may have provided Brenon with more time to 
prepare.  Further, under these facts, a different reasonable 
interpretation could have been reached by the Commission.  
However, we conclude that the Commission's decision had a 
rational basis.  Based on the above facts, the Commission could 
conclude that UWM had a reasonable basis to issue a ten-day 
No. 
01-1899   
 
30 
 
suspension 
against 
Brenon. 
 
We 
therefore 
uphold 
this 
determination.12 
¶51 The Commission also denied the application for fees 
and costs as it related to the subject of discharge.  It 
concluded that UWM was substantially justified in taking its 
position in light of representations from co-workers that Brenon 
was continuing to engage in inappropriate behavior.  The 
Commission noted that some of these allegations were not 
corroborated; however, it held that UWM had no reason to doubt 
the reliability of these allegations at the time of the 
discharge.  The allegations, it concluded, came from various 
sources and were consistent with Brenon's past behavior.  Thus, 
UWM acted reasonably by taking steps to discharge Brenon because 
"discharge was the next step in the progressive discipline 
process . . . ."   
¶52 Brenon 
contends 
that 
UWM 
was 
not 
substantially 
justified in taking this position, but does not significantly 
develop this argument.  In essence, he argues that because the 
initial 
suspension 
was 
not 
justified 
and 
was 
excessive, 
termination was clearly inappropriate.  He also asserts that 
                                                 
12  Stern v. DHFS, 212 Wis. 2d 393, 569 N.W.2d 79 (Ct. App. 
1997) does not change our holding.  There, the agency's failure 
to follow its own rules provided only part of the court's basis 
for not finding the agency's actions "substantially justified."  
Stern, 212 Wis. 2d at 399-403.  Here, even if UWM's failure to 
follow union rules could provide the entire basis for finding 
that it was not substantially justified in its actions, Brenon 
only alleges that UWM "voluntarily" applied these rules, not 
that it was required to apply them, in this instance.   
No. 
01-1899   
 
31 
 
termination was not necessarily the next step in the progressive 
discipline.  As a result, termination was not justified.   
¶53 Again, applying great weight deference, we conclude 
that the decision by the Commission must be upheld.  UWM's 
subsequent investigation of Brenon's conduct after it issued the 
suspension revealed several of his co-workers, in particular two 
female 
cadets, 
had 
serious 
complaints 
about 
Brenon's 
inappropriate conduct.  In its decision to terminate, UWM also 
relied on the inappropriateness of the comments in light of 
Brenon's supervisory position.  Again, in light of these facts 
and the other facts relied on by the Commission, we cannot 
conclude that the Commission's decision on this issue was 
without any rational basis.  The decision to terminate, in the 
wake of the ten-day suspension, was reasonable.  We therefore 
deny Brenon's request for fees and costs as it relates to the 
decision on discharge as well.   
IV 
¶54 In conclusion, we reverse in part and affirm in part 
the decision of the circuit court.  We reverse the circuit 
court's decision on the after-acquired evidence issue.  As a 
result, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
Commission 
properly 
denied 
admission to UWM's evidence showing prior misconduct by Brenon 
to support its argument that his back pay should be limited.  
Notice of such misconduct was required before such evidence 
could be introduced.  We affirm the circuit court's decision 
denying costs and fees to Brenon.  The Commission correctly 
No. 
01-1899   
 
32 
 
determined that UWM was substantially justified in suspending 
Brenon and in terminating him.  We uphold these determinations. 
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is reversed 
in part and affirmed in part.   
¶55 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
CHIEF 
JUSTICE, 
did 
not 
participate. 
 
No.  01-1899.dss 
 
1 
 
 
¶56 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (dissenting).  I respectfully 
dissent.  I read nothing in Cleveland Board of Education v. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985,) or State ex rel. Tracy v. 
Henry, 219 Wis. 53, 262 N.W. 222 (1935), that precludes 
application of the after-acquired evidence doctrine of McKennon 
v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995), in a 
remedy hearing under the civil service code in order to 
determine the proper measure of back pay damages for wrongful 
termination. 
¶57  The McKennon after-acquired evidence rule allows 
later-discovered 
evidence 
of 
employee 
misconduct 
supplying 
independent justification for termination to be admitted on the 
issue of remedy for an earlier wrongful termination.  McKennon, 
513 U.S. at 360-61.  "The employee's wrongdoing must be taken 
into account . . . lest the employer's legitimate concerns be 
ignored."  Id. at 361.  Accordingly, in determining a back pay 
remedy for an illegal employment termination——in McKennon it was 
a termination in violation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment 
Act——the 
after-acquired 
evidence 
rule 
allows 
admission of evidence that the employee would have been 
terminated on separate, later-discovered grounds.  Id. at 363.   
¶58  As the majority notes, Loudermill held that due 
process requires notice and an opportunity for "'some kind of 
hearing' prior to the discharge of an employee who has a 
constitutionally protected property interest in his employment."  
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542.  However, "the pretermination 
No.  01-1899.dss 
 
2 
 
'hearing,' though necessary, need not be elaborate."  Id. at 
545.  "The essential requirements of due process . . . are 
notice and an opportunity to respond."  Id. at 546.  There is no 
reason why the notice and hearing requirements of due process 
cannot be satisfied within the context of a remedy hearing.  As 
long as the employee has notice and an adequate opportunity to 
respond on the after-acquired evidence issue, there can be no 
due process violation. 
¶59  As the circuit court in this case held, applying the 
after-acquired evidence rule is fully consistent with Tracy.  
There, this court was concerned with the issue of whether a 
subsequent legal discharge could operate retroactively to the 
date of a prior illegal discharge.  Tracy, 219 Wis. at 54.  The 
court said no; a civil service employee illegally discharged is 
entitled to recovery from the time of the illegal discharge up 
until the subsequent legal discharge as if he had been 
reinstated during that time period.  Id. at 62. 
¶60  Application of the after-acquired evidence rule here 
does 
not 
operate 
to 
make 
a 
subsequent 
legal 
discharge 
retroactive to the date of the illegal discharge.  UWM seeks 
only to limit Brenon's back pay recovery to damages from the 
date of the original wrongful discharge to the date that it says 
it could validly have discharged him on the independent, newly-
discovered grounds.  This does not run afoul of Tracy.  Indeed, 
the public employees in Tracy were limited to a back pay 
recovery "as of the date of their original illegal discharge, as 
No.  01-1899.dss 
 
3 
 
employees in the state civil service . . . up to the time of a 
valid discharge."  Id. at 62. 
¶61  The real question here is whether Brenon was 
"ambushed" with the after-acquired evidence issue at the remedy 
hearing.13  That UWM considered the "purloined documents" as 
serious misconduct certainly came as a surprise to no one.  The 
parties had been waging a pitched battle over the return of the 
documents ever since the issue arose in Brenon's June 1996 
deposition.  The documents were the subject of a replevin action 
initially filed in 1997 and re-filed in 1998, which Brenon 
resisted.  As the majority notes, Brenon had originally returned 
a single box of UWM documents upon demand after his deposition; 
very shortly after the Commission's decision in this matter, 
Brenon capitulated on the replevin action and disgorged ten more 
boxes of UWM documents.  Majority op. at ¶¶17, 22 n.8.  In 
addition, as the majority also notes, in arguing against any 
reinstatement order in this matter, UWM put Brenon on notice 
that if reinstated, he would immediately face disciplinary 
action for unauthorized possession of university property.  
Majority op. at ¶20 n.7. 
                                                 
 
13  I do not understand the majority to have created a rule 
that the after-acquired evidence doctrine can never be applied 
in the context of civil service or other public employment.  
Rather, the majority has upheld the Commission's decision to 
exclude the evidence in this case as a proper exercise of 
discretion.  Majority op. at ¶40.  For an example of the 
application of the McKennon after-acquired evidence rule in the 
context of a protected civil service employee, see Brogdon v. 
City of Klawock, 930 P.2d 989 (Alaska 1997).  McKennon v. 
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995).    
No.  01-1899.dss 
 
4 
 
¶62  It may well be that Brenon assumed the dispute over 
the documents would be litigated outside the forum of the remedy 
hearing, and was therefore surprised when the matter came up at 
that hearing as after-acquired evidence for purposes of limiting 
his back pay recovery.  As the circuit court noted, however, 
exclusion of evidence as remedy for unfair surprise is usually 
appropriate only if the alternative of a continuance would cause 
undue delay or if the surprise results in a danger of prejudice 
or confusion of issues.  Magyar v. Wisconsin Health Care 
Liability Ins. Plan, 211 Wis. 2d 296, 303, 564 N.W.2d 766 
(1997). 
¶63  Ordinarily, "the drastic measure of excluding a 
witness should be avoided by giving the surprised party more 
time to prepare, if possible."  Id. at 303-04.  Magyar held that 
"continuance 
is 
usually 
the 
more 
appropriate 
remedy 
for 
surprise; exclusion should be considered only if a continuance 
would result in a long delay."  Id. at 304.  The determination 
of whether to exclude evidence or grant a continuance to allow 
the surprised party to prepare is made by evaluating "whether 
the surprise was unfair, and, if so, whether the unfair surprise 
outweighed the probative value of the evidence."  Id.  Here, 
neither the hearing examiner nor the Commission applied this 
balancing test or considered the alternative of a continuance. 
¶64  I would conclude that any unfair surprise on Brenon's 
part does not outweigh the probative value of the after-acquired 
evidence in this case.  The after-acquired evidence relating to 
Brenon's unauthorized possession of confidential university 
No.  01-1899.dss 
 
5 
 
documents is highly probative of the proper measure of Brenon's 
back pay damages, provided UWM can prove that it could and would 
have validly terminated him on these independent grounds.  
Despite the lengthy and convoluted procedural history of this 
matter, there is no allegation that UWM's failure to disclose 
its after-acquired evidence theory violated any scheduling order 
or discovery rule.  A short continuance to allow Brenon to 
prepare to address the issue would have accomplished the dual 
purpose of giving him his due process notice and opportunity to 
respond, and would have mitigated any unfair surprise. 
¶65  I agree completely with the majority's resolution of 
the second issue in the case regarding the denial of Brenon's 
costs and fees, which is consistent with the circuit court's 
analysis.  I would affirm the circuit court's decision in its 
entirety.            
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  01-1899.dss 
 
 
 
1