Title: State v. Ruff

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Ruff, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-995.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-995 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. RUFF, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Ruff, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-995.] 
Criminal law—Allied offenses of similar import—R.C. 2941.25—Aggravated 
burglary and rape. 
(No. 2013-1441—Submitted August 19, 2014—Decided March 25, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County,  
Nos. C-120533 and C-120534, 2013-Ohio-3234. 
_____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import 
within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must evaluate three 
separate factors—the conduct, the animus, and the import. 
2. 
Two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the meaning of 
R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses 
involving separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense 
is separate and identifiable. 
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3. 
Under R.C. 2941.25(B), a defendant whose conduct supports multiple 
offenses may be convicted of all the offenses if any one of the 
following is true: (1) the conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar 
import, (2) the conduct shows that the offenses were committed 
separately, or (3) the conduct shows that the offenses were committed 
with separate animus. 
____________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to revisit the holding in State v. Johnson, 
128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, with respect to when two 
or more offenses are allied offenses of similar import.  Because the circumstances 
of when offenses are of dissimilar import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) 
have been unclear, we hold that offenses with resulting harm that is separate and 
identifiable are offenses of dissimilar import.  We therefore reverse the judgment 
of the court of appeals. 
Case Background 
{¶ 2} A jury convicted appellee, Kenneth Ruff, of the rape of three 
women, along with three associated aggravated burglaries, the attempted rape of a 
fourth woman, and sexual battery of a minor.  For purposes of this opinion, we are 
concerned only with the rape and aggravated-burglary convictions. 
{¶ 3} At trial, K.B. testified that in January 2009, she was living in a 
group home so that her meals and medication could be monitored.  She stated that 
on the night of the attack, she went to bed at 10:00 p.m. and took her medicine to 
help her sleep.  The next thing she remembered was waking up in the middle of 
the night with a man raping her.  K.B. testified that she started to cry and scream 
but the man told her, “Shut up or I will kill you.”  The man, whom she had never 
seen before, then left.  At trial, she identified Ruff as the person who raped her.  
After the rape, K.B. stayed in the group home for a couple of months and then 
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moved into her own apartment.  DNA analysis of semen found in the panties 
collected from K.B.’s bedroom matched Ruff’s DNA. 
{¶ 4} S.W. testified at trial that she was living in a basement apartment 
on the afternoon of May 27, 2009, when a man came over and asked for her ex-
husband.  She told the man that she was no longer with her ex-husband, and the 
man left.  Later that night, a noise awakened her, and she saw somebody coming 
toward her.  When she realized it was not her boyfriend, she told the person to 
leave and yelled for help.  During the rape, S.W. grabbed her phone, but the 
assailant jerked it out of her hands, placed his thumb on her throat, and pushed 
down, saying, “If you don’t stop fighting me, I’m gonna hurt you.”  Later, S.W. 
realized that the man who raped her was the same one who had come by earlier 
that day looking for her ex-husband.  S.W. said that after that night she made sure 
all windows were locked and slept with all the lights on with a baseball bat and a 
pipe in her bed.  S.W. identified Ruff as the man who raped her.  DNA analysis of 
semen found on her body matched Ruff’s DNA sample. 
{¶ 5} During opening statements, the state represented that the third 
woman, P.F., had died before trial.  Details of the events of September 9, 2009, 
were testified to by a sexual-assault nurse examiner from the medical history that 
P.F. gave her during her examination.  The examiner testified that she writes 
down word for word what a victim says.  According to the statement, P.F. was 
sitting on her couch when a black man entered her apartment and demanded 
money.  When she said that she did not have any, he pushed her down on the 
couch and raped her.  When P.F. yelled for help, the man put his arm across her 
neck and said, “I killed once already, and I won’t hesitate to do it again.”  He also 
hit her on the head with his cell phone and choked her several times.  The 
examiner stated that P.F. had an abrasion and swelling on the right side of her 
forehead and that there were petechiae in front of her right ear lobe, on the right 
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side of her neck, and on her chest, which was consistent with being choked.  DNA 
analysis of the semen found on P.F.’s panties matched Ruff’s DNA profile. 
{¶ 6} At sentencing, Ruff requested that the three aggravated-burglary 
counts be merged into the corresponding rape counts.  The trial court denied the 
motion and imposed an eight-year prison term for each of the three aggravated-
burglary counts and ordered that they be served concurrently with each other and 
the other sentences imposed.  For the three rapes, the trial court imposed a ten-
year prison term for each count and ordered them to be served consecutively to 
each other and to the five-year, consecutive prison terms for attempted rape and 
sexual battery, for a total of 40 years. 
{¶ 7} Ruff appealed to the First District Court of Appeals.  He raised a 
number of issues regarding his convictions and alleged that the court improperly 
imposed consecutive sentences, abused its discretion in imposing a 40-year 
sentence, and failed to merge allied offenses. 
{¶ 8} The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on the 
nonsentencing issues, but agreed with Ruff that because the conduct relied upon 
to establish the rapes was the same conduct used to establish the physical-harm 
element of the aggravated burglaries, the offenses were allied and subject to 
merger.  The court of appeals determined that Ruff’s challenges to the imposition 
of consecutive sentences and the aggregate term of the sentences were moot.  The 
sentences for the aggravated-burglary and rape counts relating to P.F., K.B., and 
S.W. were vacated, and the cases were remanded for the state to elect which allied 
offense would be pursued for sentencing. 
{¶ 9} The state appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction on 
this sole proposition of law: “The import of rape and aggravated burglary are 
inherently different.”  137 Ohio St.3d 1440, 2013-Ohio-5678, 999 N.E.2d 695.  In 
other words, we were asked to determine what “import” means within the 
meaning of R.C. 2941.25. 
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Analysis 
Protection Against Double Jeopardy  
{¶ 10} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”  This protection applies to Ohio 
citizens through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), 
and is additionally guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10.  
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three abuses: (1) “a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,” (2) “a second prosecution for the 
same offense after conviction,” and (3) “multiple punishments for the same 
offense.”  North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 
L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 
794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989).  It is the third protection—multiple 
punishments for same offense—that is before us now. 
{¶ 11} In interpreting the federal rule against imposing multiple 
punishments for the same offense, the United States Supreme Court has said: 
 
The assumption underlying the rule is that Congress ordinarily 
does not intend to punish the same offense under two different 
statutes.  Accordingly, where two statutory provisions proscribe 
the “same offense,” they are construed not to authorize cumulative 
punishments in the absence of a clear indication of contrary 
legislative intent. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691-692, 100 S.Ct. 
1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1979).  Therefore, we look to the Ohio statute, R.C. 
2941.25, on this point. 
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The statute, R.C. 2941.25 
{¶ 12} The General Assembly in codifying double-jeopardy protections 
has expressed its intent as to when multiple punishments can be imposed:  
 
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed 
to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the 
indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, 
but the defendant may be convicted of only one. 
(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more 
offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two 
or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately 
or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information 
may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be 
convicted of all of them. 
 
R.C. 2941.25. 
{¶ 13} Because the prosecution selects the charges that may be brought 
based upon the criminal conduct of an accused, and that conduct may potentially 
support convictions of multiple offenses, the judge must determine whether the 
conduct can be construed to constitute a single or more than one offense.  Thus, 
R.C. 2941.25(A) allows only a single conviction for conduct that constitutes 
“allied offenses of similar import.”  But under R.C. 2941.25(B), a defendant 
charged with multiple offenses may be convicted of all the offenses if any one of 
the following is true: (1) the conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar import, (2) 
the conduct shows that the offenses were committed separately, or (3) the conduct 
shows that the offenses were committed with separate animus.  State v. Moss, 69 
Ohio St.2d 515, 519, 433 N.E.2d 181 (1982). 
{¶ 14} Application of the statute has generated considerable debate. 
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Abstract Comparison vs. Actual-Conduct Tests 
{¶ 15} Early cases decided shortly after the effective date of the statute 
held that before two offenses would be deemed to constitute allied offenses of 
similar import, “there must be a recognized similarity between the elements of the 
crimes committed,” and where the facts of a case revealed that the same conduct 
by the defendant constituted the two offenses, a defendant should be afforded the 
protection of R.C. 2941.25(A).  State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 128, 397 
N.E.2d 1345 (1979); see also State v. Roberts, 62 Ohio St.2d 170, 405 N.E.2d 247 
(1980); State v. Thomas, 61 Ohio St.2d 254, 400 N.E.2d 897 (1980); State v. 
Donald, 57 Ohio St.2d 73, 386 N.E.2d 1341 (1979).  The cases led to formation 
of a two-step test that, first, compared the elements of the offenses involved and, 
second, reviewed the defendant’s conduct and animus for each offense. State v. 
Blankenship, 38 Ohio St.3d 116, 117, 526 N.E.2d 816 (1988).  That test was 
altered to require an abstract analysis of the offenses that were being compared 
under R.C. 2941.25(A).  State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 710 N.E.2d 699 
(1999), paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 16} We later acknowledged that Rance was producing “inconsistent, 
unreasonable, and, at times, absurd results.” State v. Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 
2008-Ohio-1625, 886 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 20.  We overruled Rance in State v. Johnson, 
128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, syllabus.  In Johnson, we 
emphasized that abstract analysis of elements of a crime was insufficient and that 
the defendant’s conduct must be considered when evaluating whether offenses are 
allied.  Id. at ¶ 44.  While it is true that the syllabus in Johnson says that “[w]hen 
determining whether two offenses are allied offenses of similar import subject to 
merger under R.C. 2941.25, the conduct of the accused must be considered,” this 
language does not offer the complete analysis necessary to determine whether 
offenses are subject to merger rather than multiple convictions and cumulative 
punishment.  We agree with the state that our decision in Johnson was incomplete 
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because R.C. 2941.25(B) provides that when a defendant’s conduct constitutes 
two or more offenses of dissimilar import, the defendant may be convicted of all 
of the offenses. 
The positions of the parties 
{¶ 17} The state contends that in analyzing whether offenses are allied 
offenses of similar import, the court must consider whether they are of the same 
family of offenses or have a recognized similarity or have the same importance, 
consequence, and significance and, finally, whether they were committed 
separately or with a separate animus.  In the state’s view, rape and aggravated 
burglary can never be allied offenses because rape is not merely incident to 
aggravated burglary.  The state classifies rape as a crime against a person, 
whereas aggravated burglary is a crime against property.  This difference in 
classification means they will always have different import, the state concludes. 
{¶ 18} Ruff contends that adopting the state’s proposition of law would 
not only undermine but would completely reverse Johnson’s holding.  He argues 
that the state’s proposed rule that crimes against property and crimes against a 
person should never merge overlooks situations in which one offense is not 
complete without the other offense, such as the situation here.  An offender does 
not commit aggravated burglary until the offender inflicts or attempts to or 
threatens to inflict physical harm on another.  In Ruff’s view then, aggravated 
burglary, by requiring an element related to physical harm, must always merge 
with a violent offense such as rape.  But this view ignores the fact that the crimes 
may have dissimilar import. 
{¶ 19} In short, neither party’s position completely follows the language 
of the statute. 
Meaning of “Similar Import” 
{¶ 20} In the cases decided before Rance, this court said that offenses are 
of similar import if it is possible to commit one offense and commit the other 
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offense with the same conduct.  Donald, 57 Ohio St.2d at 75, 386 N.E.2d 1341, 
quoting the court of appeals (“R.C. 2941.25(A) ‘prohibits duplication where both 
crimes are motivated by a single purpose and where both convictions rely upon 
identical conduct and the same evidence’ ”).  But R.C. 2941.25(B) states that the 
same conduct can be separately punished if that conduct constitutes offenses of 
dissimilar import.  R.C. 2941.25(B) sets forth three categories in which there can 
be multiple punishments: (1) offenses that are dissimilar in import, (2) offenses 
similar in import but committed separately, and (3) offenses similar in import but 
committed with separate animus. 
{¶ 21} The defendant’s conduct is but one factor to consider when 
determining whether multiple offenses are allied offenses of similar import 
pursuant to R.C. 2941.25(B).  One justice in Johnson succinctly explained the 
idea of dissimilar import: “In practice, allied offenses of similar import are simply 
multiple offenses that arise out of the same criminal conduct and are similar but 
not identical in the significance of the criminal wrongs committed and the 
resulting harm.”  Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 
1061, ¶ 64 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).  In other words, offenses are 
not allied offenses of similar import if they are not alike in their significance and 
their resulting harm. 
{¶ 22} We have previously cautioned that the inquiry should not be 
limited to whether there is separate animus or whether there is separate conduct.  
Courts must also consider whether the offenses have similar import.  State v. 
Baer, 67 Ohio St.2d 220, 226, 423 N.E.2d 432 (1981). 
{¶ 23} The state alleges that no opinion from this court has ever clearly 
defined “import.”  However, in at least two cases we have illustrated when 
offenses are of dissimilar import.  In each case, we held that when the defendant’s 
conduct put more than one individual at risk, that conduct could support multiple 
convictions because the offenses were of dissimilar import.  State v. Jones, 18 
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Ohio St.3d 116, 118, 480 N.E. 2d 408 (1985) (although there was only one car 
accident, “we view appellant’s conduct as representing two offenses of dissimilar 
import—the ‘import’ under R.C. 2903.06 being each person killed”); State v. 
Franklin, 97 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-5304, 726 N.E.2d 26, ¶ 48 (even though 
the defendant set only one fire, his conduct caused six offenses of dissimilar 
import due to risk of serious harm or injury to each person).  We have also 
indicated that offenses are not allied offenses of similar import if neither is 
incident to the other.  Moss, 69 Ohio St.2d 515, 520, 433 N.E.2d 181 (aggravated 
burglary was not an allied offense of aggravated murder, because it was not 
incident to and an element of aggravated murder).  What we conclude from these 
cases is that two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the meaning of 
R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses involving 
separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense is separate and 
identifiable. 
The test for merger of multiple offenses 
{¶ 24} When the defendant’s conduct constitutes a single offense, the 
defendant may be convicted and punished only for that offense.  When the 
conduct supports more than one offense, however, a court must conduct an 
analysis of allied offenses of similar import to determine whether the offenses 
merge or whether the defendant may be convicted of separate offenses.  R.C. 
2941.25(B). 
{¶ 25} A trial court and the reviewing court on appeal when considering 
whether there are allied offenses that merge into a single conviction under R.C. 
2941(A) must first take into account the conduct of the defendant.  In other words, 
how were the offenses committed?  If any of the following is true, the offenses 
cannot merge and the defendant may be convicted and sentenced for multiple 
offenses: (1) the offenses are dissimilar in import or significance—in other words, 
each offense caused separate, identifiable harm, (2) the offenses were committed 
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separately, and (3) the offenses were committed with separate animus or 
motivation. 
{¶ 26} At its heart, the allied-offense analysis is dependent upon the facts 
of a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses on the defendant’s conduct.  The evidence 
at trial or during a plea or sentencing hearing will reveal whether the offenses 
have similar import.  When a defendant’s conduct victimizes more than one 
person, the harm for each person is separate and distinct, and therefore, the 
defendant can be convicted of multiple counts.  Also, a defendant’s conduct that 
constitutes two or more offenses against a single victim can support multiple 
convictions if the harm that results from each offense is separate and identifiable 
from the harm of the other offense. We therefore hold that two or more offenses 
of dissimilar import exist within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the 
defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses involving separate victims or if the harm 
that results from each offense is separate and identifiable. 
{¶ 27} In this case, Ruff was charged with three counts of rape and three 
counts of aggravated burglary involving three victims.  The trial court imposed 
separate sentences for each offense because it believed that the offense of 
aggravated burglary was complete upon the entry into the dwelling.  The court of 
appeals disagreed and determined that because the physical harm that constituted 
the aggravating factor for the burglary offense was the rape of the victim, Ruff 
could not be separately convicted for both the aggravated burglary and rape of 
each victim. 
{¶ 28} Although the state’s proposition of law asks that we declare that 
every aggravated burglary is of dissimilar import to rape, we decline to create an 
absolute rule based upon the definition of the offenses.  We do not hold that every 
aggravated burglary and rape automatically lead to the same import.  As we have 
explained, even if Ruff committed the aggravated burglary and the corresponding 
rape of each victim with the same conduct, he could still be convicted of both 
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offenses if the offenses are of dissimilar significance and have separate and 
identifiable harm.  The court of appeals, however, did not consider the import of 
the offenses. 
{¶ 29} We therefore reverse and remand this cause for the court of 
appeals to consider whether the import of the aggravated burglary and the import 
of the rape were similar or dissimilar in each of the three separate events. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 30} Rather than compare the elements of two offenses to determine 
whether they are allied offenses of similar import, the analysis must focus on the 
defendant’s conduct to determine whether one or more convictions may result 
because an offense may be committed in a variety of ways and the offenses 
committed may have different import.  No bright-line rule can govern every 
situation. 
{¶ 31} As a practical matter, when determining whether offenses are 
allied offenses of similar import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must 
ask three questions when defendant’s conduct supports multiple offenses: (1) 
Were the offenses dissimilar in import or significance? (2) Were they committed 
separately? and (3) Were they committed with separate animus or motivation?  
An affirmative answer to any of the above will permit separate convictions.  The 
conduct, the animus, and the import must all be considered. 
{¶ 32} As was previously stated, “We recognize that this analysis may be 
sometimes difficult to perform and may result in varying results for the same set 
of offenses in different cases.  But different results are permissible, given that the 
statute instructs courts to examine a defendant’s conduct—an inherently 
subjective determination.”  Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 
N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 52 (plurality opinion per Brown, C.J.). 
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{¶ 33} The judgment of the Hamilton County Court of Appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals for proceeding 
consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
FRENCH, J., concurs in judgment only. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
____________________ 
 
FRENCH, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 34} This case boils down to a question of legislative intent: Did the 
General Assembly intend to punish a burglar the same as a burglar who rapes 
someone?  Specifically, the court of appeals was required to determine whether 
the offenses of aggravated burglary and rape share a “similar import” under R.C. 
2941.25.  While I agree with the majority’s decision to remand this case for a 
similar-import determination, I disagree with the test the majority has articulated.  
I would determine the similar-import requirement by adopting the standard in 
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), 
which the vast majority of jurisdictions use, and which is essentially the same as 
the similar-import test used by this court for decades. 
Multiple Punishments, Legislative Intent, and Blockburger 
{¶ 35} The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause protects only 
against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for “ ‘the same offense, 
* * * and then only when such occurs in successive proceedings.’ ”  State v. 
Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427, 2013-Ohio-4982, 999 N.E.2d 661, ¶ 10, quoting 
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997).  
In a single criminal proceeding, the permissibility of multiple punishments is a 
question of legislative intent.  Washington at ¶ 10. 
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{¶ 36} For over 80 years, the United States Supreme Court has 
determined whether two statutory provisions proscribe the “same offense” by 
using the rule established in Blockburger.  “[W]here the same act or transaction 
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision 
requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”  Blockburger at 304.  If the 
answer to this question is no, then the legislature intended for the conduct to be 
punishable as a single offense.  Id. 
{¶ 37} The Blockburger rule, also known as a same-elements test, 
“ ‘focuses on the statutory elements of the offense’ ” and not the particular facts 
of the case or the proof offered to establish the crimes.  Albernaz v. United States, 
450 U.S. 333, 338, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981), quoting Iannelli v. 
United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975), fn. 17; 
see also United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 
556 (1993) (rejecting a same-conduct test). 
Blockburger and R.C. 2941.25’s “Similar Import” Requirement 
{¶ 38} Like the Double Jeopardy Clause, R.C. 2941.25 does not prohibit 
multiple punishments simply because the offenses involve the same conduct.  A 
same-conduct finding only begins the analysis; the court must then determine 
whether the offenses themselves share a “similar import.”  R.C. 2941.25(A).  
Offenses with a “dissimilar import” do not merge, nor do offenses committed 
with a separate animus as to each.  R.C. 2941.25(B).  We unanimously reaffirmed 
these three bars to merger in Washington and recognized that offenses do not 
merge unless they involve (1) the “same conduct,” (2) a “similar import,” and (3) 
a single “animus.”  Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427, 2013-Ohio-4982, 999 
N.E.2d 661, at ¶ 12, quoting R.C. 2941.25(A) and (B). 
{¶ 39} So when do offenses have similar import?  We answered this 
question the same way “[f]or decades,” Washington at ¶ 13, in a manner very 
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similar to the Blockburger test.  Specifically, we compared the statutory elements 
of the offenses to determine whether “the elements ‘correspond to such a degree 
that the commission of one offense will result in the commission of the other.’ ”  
Washington at ¶ 13, quoting State v. Mitchell, 6 Ohio St.3d 416, 418, 453 N.E.2d 
593 (1983), citing State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 131, 397 N.E.2d 1345 
(1979); see also State v. Preston, 23 Ohio St.3d 64, 65, 491 N.E.2d 685 (1986).  
This inquiry comports with the judicial doctrine of merger, which asks whether 
“ ‘one crime necessarily involves another.’ ”  State v. Botta, 27 Ohio St.2d 196, 
201, 271 N.E.2d 776 (1971), fn. 1, quoting 21 American Jurisprudence 2d 90 
(1965). 
{¶ 40} We did not overrule any of these cases in State v. Johnson, 128 
Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061.  As we clarified in 
Washington, the Johnson syllabus merely abandoned a “portion” of the similar-
import analysis that we articulated in State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 636, 710 
N.E.2d 699 (1999).  Washington at ¶ 9.  Beyond the Johnson syllabus, however, 
“we were divided,” and not even a plurality agreed as to how to replace Rance.  
Id. at ¶ 15. 
Blockburger Is the Best Barometer of Legislative Intent 
{¶ 41} Ohio courts have had little difficulty relying on Blockburger when 
determining whether offenses constitute the same offense in the successive-
prosecution context of the Double Jeopardy Clause, see State v. Zima, 102 Ohio 
St.3d 61, 2004-Ohio-1807, 806 N.E.2d 542, ¶ 41, and the vast majority of 
jurisdictions rely on Blockburger in the multiple-punishments context.  See, e.g., 
State v. Cross, 362 S.W.3d 512, 520 (Tenn.2012) (describing the Blockburger test 
as the “majority view” in the multiple-punishments context); Jackson v. State, 291 
P.3d 1274, 1278 (Nev.2012); People v. Ream, 481 Mich. 223, 238, 750 N.W.2d 
536 (2008); United States v. Ehle, 640 F.3d 689, 696 (6th Cir.2011).  To avoid 
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any more confusion, I recommend using the Blockburger rule when determining 
whether offenses satisfy the similar-import prong of R.C. 2941.25. 
{¶ 42} By contrast, the majority’s similar-import test does not examine 
legislative intent.  Instead, it collapses into a single analysis that considers 
conduct dispositive and looks to the number of victims (at least in cases with 
victims) and the significance of the resulting harm.  R.C. 2941.25 already requires 
subjective inquiries into the offender’s conduct and animus.  A court must also 
determine whether the offenses, as defined by the legislature, share a similar 
import.  “Because the statutory elements, not the particular facts of the case, are 
indicative of legislative intent, the focus must be on these statutory elements.”  
Ream at 238.  “[T]he critical double jeopardy inquiry is not factual, i.e., whether 
the same conduct is at issue in charges brought under different statutes, but legal, 
i.e., ‘whether the “offense”—in the legal sense, as defined by Congress—
complained of in one count is the same as that charged in another.’ ”  United 
States v. Basciano, 599 F.3d 184, 198 (2d Cir.2010), quoting United States v. 
Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 146 (2d Cir.1999).  We succinctly put a same-conduct 
interpretation to rest a century ago: “The words ‘same offense’ mean same 
offense, not the same transaction, not the same acts, not the same circumstances 
or same situation.”  State v. Rose, 89 Ohio St. 383, 386, 106 N.E. 50 (1914). 
{¶ 43} I recognize that comparison of elements is not a one-size-fits-all 
solution to determine the legislative import of two or more offenses.  But just as it 
is unnecessary to apply the Blockburger test where there exists a clearer 
indication of legislative intent, Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 367, 103 S.Ct. 
673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983), this court has recognized that it is unnecessary to 
compare the elements of offenses in cases in which the legislative import may be 
apparent on the face of a statute itself.  See, e.g., State v. Childs, 88 Ohio St.3d 
558, 561, 728 N.E.2d 379 (2000); State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-
January Term, 2015 
17 
Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 37; State v. Miranda, 138 Ohio St.3d 184, 2014-
Ohio-451, 5 N.E.3d 603, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 44} The perpetuation of a single fact-based test will continue to move 
Ohio further from the prevailing view while producing uneven and flawed 
interpretations of R.C. 2941.25.  Accordingly, I disagree with the majority’s test 
and would adopt the Blockburger rule. 
____________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 45} There is a perfectly valid test available to determine whether the 
heinous crimes committed in this case are allied offenses.  See State v. Johnson, 
128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 48-50 (minority 
opinion per Brown, C.J.).  Johnson is straightforward, simple, and in no need of 
the modification, enhancement, explanation, or tweaking that the majority opinion 
imposes. 
{¶ 46} The first part of the test in Johnson requires a determination of 
whether “the multiple offenses can be committed by the same conduct.”  Id., ¶ 49.  
An aggravated burglary occurs when a person enters an occupied structure 
intending to commit a criminal offense and “inflicts, or attempts or threatens to 
inflict physical harm on another.”  R.C. 2911.11(A)(1).  It does not take sophistry 
to contemplate a fact pattern where aggravated burglary and rape are committed 
by the same conduct.  It takes only a casual examination of the facts in this case.  
As the court of appeals stated, “each aggravated burglary was not completed until 
Mr. Ruff raped his victims * * *.”  2013-Ohio-3234, ¶ 33. 
{¶ 47} In each case, Ruff entered an occupied structure intending to 
commit a criminal offense and while inflicting or threatening to inflict physical 
harm on a woman, raped her.  The two charged crimes, aggravated burglary and 
rape, can be committed with the same conduct.  Indeed, as the court of appeals 
stated, “the state necessarily relied upon evidence of the rapes to establish the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
elements of the aggravated-burglary offenses.”  Id.  The rape in each case is an 
essential part of the aggravating circumstance because Ruff did not inflict, attempt 
to inflict, or threaten to inflict physical harm except incidental to the rape.  The 
first part of the test in Johnson is met. 
{¶ 48} Accordingly, we must look to the second part of the test in 
Johnson, which requires consideration of whether the crimes were committed by 
the same conduct, as “ ‘a single act, committed with a single state of mind.’ ”  
Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 49 (minority 
opinion per Brown, C.J.), quoting State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-
Ohio-4569, 985 N.E.2d 149, at ¶ 50 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting).  In January 2009 
and May 2009, Ruff entered a building intending to rape the woman within and he 
did rape the woman.  But the viciousness of the crimes ought not to cloud our 
judgment about what happened.  The facts of the January 2009 and the May 2009 
rapes plainly indicate that Ruff committed allied offenses.  Ruff entered an 
occupied structure intending to commit a rape and committed a rape.  The 
aggravated burglaries and the rapes were part and parcel of the same conduct.  He 
ought, therefore, to be punished and punished severely for committing a rape, but 
he ought not, he cannot also, be punished for an aggravated burglary, which was 
incidental to the rape. 
{¶ 49} The September 2009 rape is different.  In that case, Ruff entered an 
occupied structure and demanded money.  There is no indication that he inflicted, 
attempted to inflicted, or threatened to inflict physical harm with respect to the 
demand for money.  Once inside the structure, Ruff raped the woman occupying 
it.  As the court of appeals stated, the demand for money does not make this case 
different with respect to the first part of the test in Johnson because, like the other 
two cases, the “aggravated burglary was not completed until Mr. Ruff raped his 
victims * * *.”  2013-Ohio-3234, ¶ 33. 
January Term, 2015 
19 
{¶ 50} But I am unable to conclude based on the facts of the September 
2009 rape that Ruff entering a building intending to obtain money and 
subsequently raping the woman found within the building are the same conduct.  
It is obvious that the two crimes were not committed with a single state of mind.  I 
conclude that the aggravated burglary and the rape of September 2009 are not 
allied offenses. 
{¶ 51} Accordingly, using the unmodified straightforward test set forth in 
Johnson, I would affirm in part (the January 2009 aggravated burglary and rape 
are allied offenses; the May 2009 aggravated burglary and rape are allied 
offenses), dissent in part (the September 2009 aggravated burglary and rape are 
not allied offenses), and remand to the trial court for appropriate sentencing. 
____________________ 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Rachel 
Lipman Currant, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
The Farrish Law Firm and Michaela M. Stagnaro, for appellee. 
 
Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel 
T. Van and Joseph J. Ricotta, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Katherine R. Ross-Kinzie, 
Assistant State Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Office of the 
Ohio Public Defender. 
___________________