Title: State v. Jason Phillips

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-2912-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Jason Phillips,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  209 Wis. 2d 559, 563 N.W.2d 573 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-PUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 22, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 8, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Emmanuel Vuvunas 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Bradley, J. (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J., and Bablitch, J., joins 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Paul Lundsten, assistant attorney general with whom 
on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
Arthur B. Nathan and Nathan Law Office, S.C., Racine and oral 
argument by Arthur B. Nathan. 
 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jason Phillips,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
MAY 22, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.   This case presents three 
issues for review: 
(1) Should an appellate court independently review a 
circuit court’s finding on the voluntariness of a defendant’s 
consent to search, or must the appellate court give deference to 
the circuit court's determination;  
(2) Did the defendant in the present case voluntarily 
consent to the warrantless search of his bedroom; and  
(3) If the defendant voluntarily consented to the search 
of his bedroom, should the evidence seized during that search be 
suppressed because drug agents obtained it by exploiting their 
unlawful entry into the defendant’s home. 
¶2 
This case is before the court on petition for review 
of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. 
Phillips, 209 Wis. 2d 559, 563 N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1997), 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
2 
reversing a judgment of conviction entered by the circuit court 
for Racine County, Judge Emmanuel J. Vuvunas.  The circuit court 
denied defendant Jason Phillips' pretrial motion to suppress 
physical 
evidence 
that 
the 
drug 
agents 
seized 
during 
a 
warrantless search of his home.  After the circuit court's 
denial of his motion to suppress, the defendant pled no contest 
to possession of marijuana as a repeat offender in violation of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 161.41(3r) and 161.48(2)(1993-94).1  The defendant 
then appealed from the judgment of conviction, and the court of 
appeals reversed.  The court of appeals found that the search of 
the defendant’s home violated the defendant’s rights guaranteed 
by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution2 and 
                     
1 Unless otherwise stated, all future references to Wis. 
Stats. are to the 1993-94 version of the statutes. 
Wis. Stat. § 161.41(3r) provides: "It is unlawful for any 
person to possess or attempt to possess tetrahydrocannabinols 
. . . .  Any person who violates this subsection may be fined 
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than 6 months or 
both." 
Wis. Stat. § 161.48(2) provides: 
If any person is convicted of a 2nd or subsequent 
offense under this chapter that is specified in s. 
161.41 . . . (3r), any applicable minimum and maximum 
fines and minimum and maximum periods of imprisonment 
under s. 161.41 . . . (3r) are doubled.  A 2nd or 
subsequent offense under s. 161.41 . . . (3r) is a 
felony and the person may be imprisoned in state 
prison. 
2 U.S. Const. amend. IV provides: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
3 
art. I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.3  We accepted the 
State’s petition for review and now reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
¶3 
On September 29, 1994, three agents from the Metro 
Drug Unit of the Racine County Sheriff's Department went to the 
home of the defendant, Jason Phillips.  According to the 
testimony of Agent Joseph Zblewski, a confidential informant had 
provided to the agents information that Phillips was involved in 
the sale of marijuana.  Based on this information, the agents 
went to the Phillips' home to pursue a "knock and talk" 
encounter.  The agents did not have a warrant to search 
defendant's home or to arrest the defendant. 
  ¶4 The agents testified that, upon their arrival at the 
defendant's home, they saw a young male they believed to be 
Phillips at the rear of the residence.  The agents then observed 
this individual descend an exterior stairwell to an area they 
believed to be a cellar.  According to the testimony of the 
agents, they approached the open cellar doors at the top of the 
stairwell, and Agent Zblewski called, "Hey, Jason."  Phillips 
                                                                  
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.  
3 Wis. Const. art. I, § 11 provides: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable searches 
and 
seizures 
shall 
not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause, 
supported 
by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the persons or things to be seized.  
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
4 
responded by coming to the doorway at the bottom of the 
stairwell where Agent Zblewski could see him.  Agent Zblewski 
testified that both the exterior cellar doors and the door at 
the base of the stairs were open. 
¶5 
Agent 
Zblewski 
then 
started 
down 
the 
stairs, 
identified himself as a drug agent, and showed Phillips his 
sheriff's badge and metro drug unit identification.4  The three 
agents descended the stairs and continued through the open door 
into the basement area where the defendant resided.  The 
basement was described as a small living or storage area, 
adjacent to which was a closed door leading to the defendant's 
bedroom.  At that time, the defendant identified himself as 
Jason Phillips.  Agent Zblewski did not request and never 
received from Phillips permission to enter the basement. 
¶6 
Agent Zblewski testified that once he entered the 
basement he explained to Phillips that the agents had received 
                     
4 The facts of the 29 September 1994 encounter between the 
agents and the defendant are disputed.  The agents’ and the 
defendant’s description of the encounter vary.  In addition, 
discrepancies exist among the individual agents regarding when 
and where consent to search the bedroom area of the basement was 
obtained from Phillips.  When presented with conflicting 
testimony, 
findings 
of 
fact 
are 
required 
to 
assess 
the 
credibility of the witnesses to determine which version of the 
event is more credible.  We will uphold the circuit court's 
credibility determination unless such determination goes against 
the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.  See 
State v. Pires, 55 Wis. 2d 597, 602-03, 201 N.W.2d 153 (1972); 
Madkins v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 347, 184 N.W.2d 144 (1971); State 
v. Johnson, 177 Wis. 2d 224, 230-31, 501 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 
1993).  The circuit court here found more credible the testimony 
of the agents.  That finding does not go against the great 
weight or clear preponderance of the evidence. 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
5 
information 
that 
Phillips 
was 
in 
possession 
of 
drug 
paraphernalia and marijuana and that the agents intended to take 
the items from the defendant.  According to Agent Zblewski, 
Phillips, after a short discussion, admitted that he had the 
items in his bedroom.  Agent Zblewski then asked Phillips if the 
agents could enter the bedroom and collect the marijuana and any 
drug paraphernalia because Phillips was in violation of the law 
for possessing them.  Agent Zblewski testified that Phillips 
responded to this request by opening the door to his bedroom and 
walking inside.  The agents followed Phillips into the bedroom. 
 Agent Zblewski admitted that the agents had not received from 
Phillips verbal permission to enter the bedroom, but they 
assumed from Phillips' conduct that they could follow him 
inside.  Once inside the bedroom, Phillips immediately retrieved 
a small baggie containing marijuana, handed it to the agents, 
and 
then 
pointed 
out 
to 
the 
agents 
a 
number 
of 
drug 
paraphernalia items. 
¶7 
According to Agent Zblewski, he again asked Phillips 
for permission to search the bedroom after Phillips handed over 
the baggie of marijuana and pointed out the drug paraphernalia. 
 Agent Zblewski testified that Phillips then gave his verbal 
consent for the agents to search the rest of his bedroom.  At 
that time, Agent Zblewski took Phillips out of the bedroom and 
into the common storage area of the basement.  The other two 
agents continued to search Phillips' bedroom.  While in the 
common area of the basement, Agent Zblewski and Phillips had a 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
6 
conversation in which Phillips denied dealing marijuana, but 
made a number of incriminating statements. 
¶8 
At 
the 
conclusion 
of 
their 
search, 
the 
agents 
confiscated 11.5 grams of marijuana, pipes, and other drug 
paraphernalia.  Agent Zblewski testified that, during the 
encounter, Phillips was not placed in handcuffs and that 
Phillips was not arrested that day.  When leaving, the agents 
informed Phillips that he would be receiving in the mail 
citations for possession of marijuana and for possession of drug 
paraphernalia. 
¶9 
Phillips was subsequently charged with possession of 
marijuana as a repeat offender, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 161.41(3r) and 161.48(2).  In a pretrial proceeding, Phillips 
filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to Agent 
Zblewski 
and 
the 
physical 
evidence 
obtained 
during 
the 
warrantless search of his home.  The circuit court denied the 
motion. 
¶10 Phillips eventually pled no contest to possession of 
marijuana as a repeat offender.  He then appealed from the 
judgment of conviction, claiming that the circuit court erred in 
failing to suppress the results of the warrantless search.  
Phillips argued that the agents’ search violated his rights 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶11 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the search 
of Phillips’ home violated his Fourth Amendment protections.  
The court concluded that the evidence seized during the search 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
7 
should have been excluded by the circuit court because the 
consent given by Phillips to search his bedroom was not so 
attenuated as to purge the taint from the agents’ unlawful entry 
into his home.  Upon review of the facts before us, we conclude 
that Phillips did voluntarily consent to the search of his 
bedroom and that the agents did not exploit their unlawful entry 
into Phillips' home.  We therefore hold that the agents’ 
warrantless search of Phillips’ bedroom and the seizure of 
evidence therefrom did not violate Phillips' constitutional 
protections under either the Fourth Amendment or art. I, § 11.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶12 The first issue we address is whether we should review 
de novo, or grant deference to, the circuit court’s finding that 
the defendant voluntarily consented to the warrantless search of 
his home.  This court has traditionally treated questions of 
constitutional fact as mixed questions of fact and law, and it 
has applied a two-step standard when reviewing lower court 
determinations of constitutional fact.  See State v. Owens, 148 
Wis. 2d 922, 926, 436 N.W.2d 869 (1989); State v. Rodgers, 119 
Wis. 2d 102, 107-08, 349 N.W.2d 453 (1984); State v. Woods, 117 
Wis. 2d 701, 715, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984); Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 
2d 457, 469, 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977); State v. Pires, 55 Wis. 2d 
597, 602-03, 201 N.W.2d 153 (1972). 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
8 
¶13 As we explained in Woods,5 an appellate court reviewing 
issues of constitutional fact examines two determinations made 
by the circuit court, but applies a different standard of review 
to each.  The circuit court first determines the evidentiary or 
historical facts relevant to the issue.  The circuit court then 
applies those facts to resolve the constitutional questions.  
See Woods, 117 Wis. 2d at 714. 
 
The standard of review by the appellate court of 
the 
trial 
court’s 
findings 
of 
evidentiary 
or 
historical facts is that those findings will not be 
upset on appeal unless they are contrary to the great 
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.  This 
standard of review does not apply, however, to the 
trial 
court’s 
determination 
of 
constitutional 
questions.  Instead, the appellate court independently 
determines the questions of ‘constitutional’ fact. 
 
Id. at 715 (citations omitted).  Wisconsin appellate courts have 
employed this two-step standard when reviewing circuit courts' 
                     
5 We recognize that State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 715, 
345 N.W.2d 457 (1984) was "overruled sub nom" by Woods v. 
Clusen, 794 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1986).  As we explained in State 
v. Jones, 192 Wis. 2d 78, 93, 532 N.W.2d 79 (1995), Clusen was a 
habeas case connected with Woods.  "'The writ of habeas corpus 
is not a proceeding in the original criminal prosecution but an 
independent civil suit' that 'does not afford 'direct' appellate 
review but only 'collateral' review of the legality of criminal 
judgments." Jones, 192 Wis. 2d at 93 n.3 (citing James S. 
Liebman & Randy Hertz, 1 Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and 
Procedure, sec. 2.2 at 6-7 (2d ed. 1994))(emphasis in original). 
 "Since the habeas corpus case was a collateral, independent 
civil suit in a federal court other than the United States 
Supreme Court, it cannot have 'overruled' the decision by this 
court in a different, criminal suit."  Id. 
 
   
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
9 
conclusions concerning a variety of constitutional challenges.  
See, e.g., State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 165, 570 N.W.2d 
384 (1997)(reviewing whether an independent source existed for 
an in-court identification made after a lineup that violated an 
accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel); State v. Cummings, 
199 Wis. 2d 721, 748, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996)(reviewing whether 
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel was denied); 
State 
v. 
Jones, 
192 
Wis. 2d 
78, 
93, 
532 
N.W.2d 
79 
(1995)(reviewing whether defendant's waiver of Miranda rights 
was valid); State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 516, 515 N.W.2d 847 
(1994)(reviewing 
whether 
police 
violated 
defendant's 
Fifth 
Amendment 
privilege 
against 
self-incrimination; 
State 
v. 
Clappes, 
136 
Wis. 
2d 
222, 
234-35, 
401 
N.W.2d 
759 
(1987)(reviewing whether defendant’s confession was voluntary); 
State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 283-84, 389 N.W.2d 12 
(1986)(reviewing whether guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent); State v. Hartwig, 123 Wis. 2d 278, 284, 366 N.W.2d 
866 (1985)(reviewing whether defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to silence had been scrupulously honored); Woods, 117 Wis. 2d at 
715 (reviewing whether under Fourth Amendment probable cause to 
arrest existed). 
¶14 Wisconsin courts have also applied this two-step 
standard of review when determining whether the facts found by 
the circuit court satisfy the reasonableness requirements for 
searches under the Fourth Amendment and art. I, § 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  See, e.g., Isiah B. v. State, 176 
Wis. 2d 639, 646, 500 N.W.2d 637 (1993)(reviewing whether under 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
10
Fourth Amendment student had reasonable expectation of privacy 
in locker); State v. Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, 447, 477 N.W.2d 
277 (1991)(reviewing whether consensual search of home was 
sufficiently attenuated under 
Fourth 
Amendment 
from 
prior 
unlawful search); State v. Whitlock, 161 Wis. 2d 960, 971, 468 
N.W.2d 696 (1991)(reviewing whether defendant had reasonable 
expectation of privacy in duplex or stereo equipment); State v. 
Jackson, 
147 
Wis. 2d 
824, 
829, 
434 
N.W.2d 
386, 
388 
(1989)(reviewing whether investigatory stop was supported by 
reasonable suspicion).  We have utilized this standard where the 
reasonableness of a warrantless search was based on the "plain 
view" doctrine, see Bies, 76 Wis. 2d at 469, on the "search 
incident to an arrest" exception to the warrant requirement, see 
State v. Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 217, 225-26, 455 N.W.2d 618 
(1990), and, as in this case, on the defendant’s voluntary 
consent.  See State v. Turner, 136 Wis. 2d 333, 344, 401 N.W.2d 
827 (1987). 
¶15 In Turner, we made clear which standard of review this 
court would apply when reviewing whether a defendant voluntarily 
consented to the warrantless search of his home. 
 
[W]e are permitted to independently determine from the 
facts as found by the trial court whether any time-
honored constitutional principles were offended in 
this case.  This is true whether we are examining the 
voluntariness of defendant’s consent to search or 
whether we are deciding if defendant’s confession was 
voluntarily procured. 
 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
11
Turner, 136 Wis. 2d at 344 (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 
104, 110 (1985) and Woods, 117 Wis. 2d at 715).  
¶16 The State here asks this court to overrule its 
decision in Turner and to review under a deferential standard 
the circuit court’s determination of the defendant’s voluntary 
consent.  We decline to do so.  The State notes that federal 
courts consider voluntariness of consent a factual question that 
must be determined from the totality of the circumstances, see, 
e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), and that 
federal appellate courts grant deference to the circuit courts’ 
determination of the issue.  See, e.g., United States v. 
McGuire, 957 F.2d 310, 314 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 828 (11th Cir. 1996).  In addition, the 
Wisconsin court of appeals appears to have splintered on whether 
to apply the two-step analysis or a deferential standard when 
reviewing a circuit court's determination of voluntary consent. 
 Compare State v. Flynn, 190 Wis. 2d 31, 41, 527 N.W.2d 343 (Ct. 
App. 1994)(reviewing de novo circuit court's determination) and 
State v. Xiong, 178 Wis. 2d 525, 531, 504 N.W.2d 428 (Ct. App. 
1993)(same) with State v. McKinney, 168 Wis. 2d 349, 356, 483 
N.W.2d 595 (Ct. App. 1992)(applying clearly erroneous standard) 
and State v. Nehls, 111 Wis. 2d 594, 598, 331 N.W.2d 603 (Ct. 
App. 1983)(same). 
¶17 The deferential standard employed by the federal 
courts is based on those courts’ interpretation of the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Schneckloth.  In holding that 
voluntariness of consent is a question of fact, the United 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
12
Supreme Court in Schneckloth primarily relied on its conclusion 
that a proper analysis of the issue does not turn on per se 
rules or bright-line tests, but rather is very fact-specific and 
based on the totality of circumstances involved in each case.  
See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49.  We too recognize that a 
circuit court's determination of voluntariness is fact-specific 
and 
often 
turns 
on 
"credibility 
choices 
resulting 
from 
conflicting testimony."  United States v. Freyre-Lazaro, 3 F.3d 
1496, 
1501 
(11th 
Cir. 
1993). 
 
This, 
however, 
does 
not 
sufficiently distinguish the issue of voluntariness of consent 
from other constitutional determinations circuit courts must 
make.    
¶18 The determination of voluntariness of consent is no 
more fact-specific or credibility-based than determining whether 
a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to silence had been 
scrupulously honored by investigators; or whether a defendant 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered a guilty plea; 
or whether the "search incident to an arrest" exception 
justified a warrantless search of the area around a defendant.  
In each of these latter three situations, this court applies a 
two-step analysis to review the circuit court's determination.  
See Hartwig, 123 Wis. 2d at 284; Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 283-84; 
Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d at 225-26.  We see no reason to treat the 
determination of voluntariness of consent any differently. 
¶19 This court's decision to utilize the two-step standard 
of review to questions of constitutional fact does not turn on 
whether the underlying determination of the circuit court was 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
13
fact-specific or based on credibility choices.  Rather, the 
principal reason for independent appellate review of matters of 
constitutional fact is to provide uniformity in constitutional 
decision-making.  See State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 171, 388 
N.W.2d 565 (1986); see also Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d at 226.  It is 
the 
duty 
of 
the 
reviewing 
court 
to 
independently 
apply 
constitutional principles to the facts as found by the circuit 
court because 
"[t]he scope 
of constitutional 
protections, 
representing the basic value commitments of our society, cannot 
vary from trial court to trial court, or from jury to jury."  
Woods, 117 Wis. 2d at 715 (quoting State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 
284, 305-06, 128 N.W.2d 645 (1964)(Wilkie, J. concurring)).  "In 
 applying the skeletal constitutional rule, appellate courts 
flesh out the rule and provide guidance to litigants, lawyers, 
and trial and appellate courts."  McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d at 166. 
 The duty to provide uniformity in constitutional decision-
making applies with equal force to the determination of 
voluntariness of consent. 
¶20 We therefore decline the State's request that we 
overrule our decision in Turner and apply a deferential standard 
when reviewing whether the defendant voluntarily consented to 
the warrantless search of his home.  Voluntariness of consent is 
a question of constitutional fact, and we continue to review the 
circuit court's determination of this mixed issue of fact and 
law under the two-step analysis laid out in Turner.  Employing 
this standard, we will not upset the circuit court’s findings of 
evidentiary or historical fact unless those findings are 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
14
contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence.  See Turner, 136 Wis. 2d at 344.  We will, however, 
independently apply the constitutional principles to the facts 
as found to determine whether the standard of voluntariness has 
been met.  See id.  Having determined the proper standard of 
review, we next decide the substantive issue of whether the 
defendant voluntarily consented to the warrantless search of his 
bedroom.  
¶21 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and art. I, sec. 11, of the Wisconsin Constitution both protect 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  But for a few 
inconsequential differences in punctuation, capitalization, and 
the use of the singular or plural form of a word, the texts of 
the Fourth Amendment and art. I, § 11 are identical.  "This 
court has consistently and routinely conformed the law of search 
and seizure under the state constitution to that developed by 
the United States Supreme Court under the fourth amendment."  
Fry, 131 Wis. 2d at 172; see also Isiah, 176 Wis. 2d at 646.  We 
have therefore concluded that the standards and principles 
surrounding the Fourth Amendment are generally applicable to the 
construction of art. I, § 11.  See State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 
619, 624, 184 N.W.2d 836 (1971). 
¶22 Since physical entry of the home is "the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed," 
it is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches 
and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively 
unreasonable.  Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984); 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
15
see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); 
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990); Laasch v. State, 84 
Wis. 2d 587, 594, 267 N.W.2d 278 (1978)(citing State v. 
McGovern, 77 Wis. 2d 203, 214, 252 N.W.2d 365 (1977)); State v. 
Elam, 68 Wis. 2d 614, 621, 229 N.W.2d 664 (1975).  In Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the United States Supreme 
Court stated the governing fundamental principle: "Thus, the 
most basic constitutional rule in this area is that searches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval 
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions."  Id. at 454-55 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
357 (1967).   
¶23 One 
well-established 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is a search conducted 
pursuant to consent.  See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219.  
Accordingly, a warrantless search conducted pursuant to consent 
which is "freely and voluntarily given" does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. Id.  The issue here is whether Phillips 
voluntarily consented to the warrantless search of his bedroom. 
¶24 There are two determinations made by the circuit court 
that 
we 
must 
review 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
defendant 
voluntarily consented to the warrantless search of his bedroom. 
 First, the circuit court expressly found that the defendant in 
fact consented to the search of his bedroom.  This finding of 
historical fact is not contrary to the great weight and clear 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
16
preponderance of the evidence.  See Turner, 136 Wis. 2d at 344. 
 Consent to search need not be given verbally; it may be in the 
form of words, gesture, or conduct.  See United States v. 
Griffin, 530 F.2d 739, 741 (7th Cir. 1976); see also United 
States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650, 652 (1st Cir. 1990).  According 
to the agents' testimony, when asked by Agent Zblewski whether 
the agents could search the defendant’s bedroom, the defendant 
did not respond verbally, but he opened the door to and walked 
into his bedroom, retrieved a small baggie of marijuana, handed 
the baggie to the agents, and pointed out a number of drug 
paraphernalia items.  The defendant’s conduct provides a 
sufficient basis on which to find that the defendant consented 
to the search of his bedroom.  We will not upset the circuit 
court's finding.  
¶25 The remaining question concerning the defendant's 
consent to search the bedroom is whether the defendant's consent 
was voluntary.  When, as here, the State attempts to justify a 
warrantless search on the basis of consent, the Fourth Amendment 
requires that the State demonstrate that the consent was 
voluntarily given.  See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248; see also 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983); Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d 
at 114-15; Nehls, 111 Wis. 2d at 598.  The State has the burden 
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's 
consent was voluntary.  See Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d at 114; Xiong 
178 Wis. 2d at 532. 
¶26 The test for voluntariness is whether consent to 
search was given in the absence of duress or coercion, either 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
17
express or implied.  See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 248-49; 
Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d at 110.  We make this determination after 
looking at the totality of the circumstances, see Schneckloth, 
412 U.S. at 226; Rogers, 119 Wis. 2d at 114, considering both 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
consent 
and 
the 
characteristics of the defendant.  See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 
226, 229; Xiong, 178 Wis. 2d at 534-36.  No single criterion 
controls our decision.  See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.  
¶27 After independently reviewing the facts found by the 
circuit court under the test for voluntariness established in 
Schneckloth and applied in Rogers, we conclude that the State 
has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's consent to search his bedroom was voluntary and was 
not the product of duress or coercion. 
¶28 First, the evidence presented illustrates that the 
agents did not use any misrepresentation, deception, or trickery 
to entice the defendant to give his consent to search his 
bedroom.  See Rogers, 119 Wis. 2d at 112.  On the contrary, the 
State demonstrated that the agents identified themselves as 
metro drug unit agents and fully informed the defendant of the 
events leading to their presence at his home and the reasons 
behind their request to search his bedroom.  Although the agents 
entered the defendant's home without a warrant, they did so 
while in the presence of and while in communication with the 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
18
defendant.6  Prior to asking for his consent to search, the 
officers 
disclosed 
to 
the 
defendant 
almost 
all 
of 
the 
information they possessed concerning their interest in his 
home.  When the defendant consented to the search of his 
bedroom, he was fully aware that the agents did not have a 
warrant to search his home; that the agents were investigating a 
report that he was selling marijuana; that they believed there 
were drugs and drug paraphernalia in the bedroom; and that they 
intended to confiscate them.  In this case, the agents did not 
mask their identities or misrepresent the purpose for being at 
the defendant's home; nor did they mislead the defendant into 
believing that they had a warrant to search his home. 
¶29 Second, there is no credible evidence that the agents 
threatened, physically intimidated, or punished the defendant.  
                     
6 The illegality of the agents' warrantless entry into the 
defendant's basement is not before us.  The State concedes, and 
the circuit court expressly found, that that the agents' initial 
entry into the defendant's basement was illegal.  The agents did 
not discover or seize any evidence before they conducted the 
consensual search of the defendant's bedroom.  The extent to 
which this illegal entry tainted the subsequent search of the 
bedroom is discussed at length below. 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
19
See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.7  The State demonstrated that 
the agents did not physically subdue or restrain the defendant. 
 The agents did not brandish their weapons, and they never 
placed the defendant in handcuffs.   The agents testified that 
they did not take the defendant into custody or remove him from 
the premises; nor did they arrest him.  Rather, the agents 
testified that, at the conclusion of their search, the agents 
informed the defendant that they would send a citation in the 
mail.  In addition, the evidence shows that the agents did not 
deprive the defendant of any necessities, prolong the encounter 
to wear down the defendant's resistance, or employ any other 
coercive interrogation tactics before the defendant consented to 
the search of his bedroom.  
¶30 Third, the evidence presented at the suppression 
hearing establishes that the questioning of Phillips and the 
search of his home took place under generally non-threatening, 
                     
7 The defendant testified that during their search of his 
home, the agents threatened that if the defendant did not 
consent to a search, the agents would get a warrant and search 
the entire house, including the defendant's parents' residence. 
 The agents did not testify that such a threat was made; nor did 
the circuit court make a finding whether this historical fact 
occurred.  This court may assume that a missing finding was 
determined in favor of the circuit court's order or judgment.  
See Sohns v. Jensen, 11 Wis. 2d 449, 453, 105 N.W.2d 818 (1960); 
In re Estate of Villwock, 142 Wis. 2d 144, 149, 418 N.W.2d 1 
(Ct. App. 1987). Since the circuit court found the defendant's 
version of the story not credible and concluded that the 
defendant voluntarily consented to the search, we assume that 
the court implicitly found that the agents did not make any 
threats or promises to the defendant before he consented to the 
search of his bedroom. 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
20
cooperative conditions.  The State demonstrated that the agents 
and the defendant were open and forthright during the encounter, 
each posing questions and providing information.  Although the 
agents were investigating the defendant's involvement in an 
alleged crime, they appear to have interacted with the defendant 
in a truthful and respectful manner.  Agent Zblewski testified 
that, during the search, he had a short conversation with the 
defendant in which the defendant denied that he sold marijuana, 
but explained where and how he grew marijuana plants, including 
a description of the location, number, and sex of his marijuana 
plants.  The defendant testified that, to be nice, he gave to an 
agent one of his personal magazines to take when the agent left.8 
 Such testimony is inconsistent with a conclusion that the 
encounter between the agents and the defendant was coercive or 
that the defendant’s will was in any way overcome by the agents’ 
tactics. 
¶31 In addition, other than asking whether the agents had 
a warrant, the defendant neither acted annoyed with nor objected 
to the agents' presence in his home.  On the contrary, the 
defendant cooperated with the agents and affirmatively assisted 
                     
8  During cross-examination at the suppression hearing, the 
defendant testified as follows: 
Q. 
Did you turn any items over to the officers? 
A. 
No, I did not.  Well, yes, I gave them a 
magazine. 
Q. 
A magazine from where? 
A. 
It was one of my personal magazines which he said 
that he didn't have to take, but he would like to take 
it to read, so I figured I would be nice and just give 
him that. 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
21
in their search of the bedroom, locating the marijuana and 
identifying items of drug paraphernalia.   The defendant's 
cooperation and assistance evince both the non-threatening 
nature of the encounter and the voluntariness of his consent.  
See United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1470 (5th Cir. 
1993)(listing extent and level of defendant's cooperation with 
police as one factor in evaluating voluntariness of consent); 
United 
States 
v. 
Webb, 
633 
F.2d 
1140, 
1142 
(5th 
Cir. 
1981)(finding defendant's assistance in search supports finding 
consent was voluntary); Nehls, 111 Wis. 2d at 599 (same). 
¶32 To rebut the evidence presented by the State, the 
defendant points to the allegedly coercive effect of the agents' 
presence in the basement.  Although we recognize that coercion 
can be imposed by implicit as well as explicit means, see 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228, we find that the mere presence of 
officers in the defendant's basement is insufficient to support 
a finding of coercion by those officers.  See United States v. 
Stone, 471 F.2d 170, 173 (7th Cir. 1972).  "To hold that the mere 
condition of being 'upset' by the presence at one's home of [] 
agents is enough to make any consent the product of coercion 
might effectively 
foreclose 
almost 
all 
searches 
conducted 
pursuant to a voluntary consent."  Stone, 471 F.2d at 173; see 
also Nehls, 111 Wis. 2d at 600.  Like the courts in Stone and 
Nehls, we decline to so hold. 
¶33 The record provides little information concerning the 
characteristics of the defendant.  When assessing voluntariness, 
courts 
generally 
focus 
on 
characteristics 
such 
as 
the 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
22
defendant's age, intelligence, education, physical and emotional 
condition, and prior experience with police.  See Schneckloth, 
412 U.S. at 226; Turner, 136 Wis. 2d at 363.  In this case, we 
know that the defendant was 24 years of age, and therefore not a 
minor, at the time he consented to the search.  See Haley v. 
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948).  From the testimony at the 
suppression hearing, we know that the defendant could hear and 
respond to questions, and that he could speak and understand the 
English language. See Xiong, 178 Wis. 2d at 536.  In addition, 
no evidence was presented to the circuit court that would 
suggest that the defendant was uneducated or possessed below 
average intelligence.  See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. at 
424-25; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 563 (1958).  Nor was 
any evidence produced to show that at the time he consented to 
the search of his home, the defendant was under the influence of 
intoxicants or other drugs.  See United States v. Rambo, 789 
F.2d 1289, 1296-96 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Gay, 774 
F.2d 368, 376-77 (10th Cir. 1985).  Since the defendant was 
charged as a repeat offender, we know that he had some past 
experience with the criminal justice system.  See Watson, 423 
U.S. at 424-25; Laing v. United States, 891 F.2d 683, 686 (8th 
Cir. 1989).  In short, there was no evidence or testimony 
suggesting that the defendant was particularly susceptible to 
improper influence, duress, intimidation, or trickery. 
¶34 We also know that the agents did not inform the 
defendant that he could withhold consent.  This fact weighs 
against, but is not fatal to, a determination of voluntary 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
23
consent.  See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227; U.S. v. Muniz-
Melchor, 894 F.2d 1430, 1440 (5th Cir. 1990).  Courts have 
concluded that although this is a factor to be taken into 
account, the State is not required to demonstrate the defendant 
knew that he could refuse consent.  See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 
249; Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d at 110.  "The state’s burden in a 
consent search is to show voluntariness, which is different from 
informed consent."  Xiong, 178 Wis. 2d at 532 (citing Rodgers, 
119 Wis. 2d at 110).  In addition, the circuit court in this 
case found that, at the time he gave his consent, the defendant 
in fact knew that he could refuse to give consent to search his 
bedroom.  Accordingly, we give this factor little weight in our 
consideration of the totality of circumstances surrounding the 
defendant’s consent to search his bedroom. 
¶35 Having 
reviewed 
the 
totality 
of 
circumstances 
presented in this case, we find that the State has met its 
burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's consent to search his bedroom was secured in the 
"absence of actual coercive, improper police practices designed 
to overcome the resistance of a defendant."  Xiong, 178 Wis. 2d 
at 532; see Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d at 110; see also Schneckloth, 
412 U.S. at 226, 248-49.  We therefore conclude that the 
defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his bedroom. 
¶36 Having 
determined 
that 
the 
defendant 
voluntarily 
consented to the warrantless search of his bedroom, we must 
decide the third issue presented in this case: whether the 
evidence seized during the consensual search of the defendant's 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
24
bedroom should be excluded because it was seized as a result of 
the agents' exploiting their unlawful entry into the basement. 
The State concedes, and the circuit court expressly found, that 
the agents' initial entry into the defendant's home was 
"undeniably illegal."  The issue then is whether the discovery 
of the evidence in defendant's bedroom has come at the 
exploitation of the illegal entry or was sufficiently attenuated 
as to dissipate the taint caused by that entry.  See Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 
at 447-48. 
¶37 Whether evidence should be suppressed because it was 
obtained pursuant to a Fourth Amendment violation is a question 
of constitutional fact.  See Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 447.  As 
explained above, we review such mixed questions of fact and law 
under a two-step standard of review.  See id.  Applying this 
standard to the issue now before the court, we conclude that the 
agents did not exploit the unlawful entry into the defendant's 
home to secure the defendant's consent to search his bedroom. 
¶38 The mere fact that consent to search is voluntary 
within the meaning of Schneckloth and Rogers does not mean that 
it is untainted by prior illegal conduct.  See Brown, 422 U.S. 
at 603; Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 448.  When, as here, consent to 
search is obtained after a Fourth Amendment violation, evidence 
seized as a result of that search must be suppressed as "fruit 
of the poisonous tree" unless the State can show a sufficient 
break in the causal chain between the illegality and the seizure 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
25
of evidence.  Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88; Brown, 422 U.S. at 
602.9 
¶39 In Brown, the United States Supreme Court set forth 
three factors for determining whether the causal chain has been 
sufficiently attenuated: (1) the temporal proximity of the 
official misconduct and seizure of evidence; (2) the presence of 
intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of 
the official misconduct.  See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04; 
                     
9 While 
the 
analysis 
and 
facts 
considered 
in 
the 
voluntariness and "fruits" tests "overlap to a considerable 
degree, they address separate constitutional values and they are 
not always coterminous."  United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 
F.3d 1046, 1054 (10th Cir. 1994).  It is important "to understand 
that (i) the two tests are not identical, and (ii) consequently 
the evidence obtained by the purported consent should be held 
admissible only if it is determined that the consent was both 
voluntary and not an exploitation of the prior illegality."  Id. 
at 1054-55 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure 
§8.2(d) at 190 (1987)(citations omitted)). 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
26
Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 448.10  In the final analysis, however, 
the question is still whether the evidence objected to has come 
at the "exploitation of a prior police illegality or instead by 
means sufficiently attenuated so as to be purged of the taint." 
 Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 447-48; see Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. 
   
¶40 Under the temporal proximity factor, we examine "both 
the amount of time between the illegal entry and the consensual 
search and the conditions that existed during that time."  
Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 448-49; see Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 
U.S. 98, 107-08 (1980).  In this case, only a few minutes 
elapsed between the time of the unlawful entry and the 
consensual search of the defendant’s bedroom.  This fact weighs 
                     
10 The dissent asserts that we should also consider in our 
attenuation analysis the fact that the agents did not read to 
the defendant the warnings established in Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966).  The dissent is correct in stating that the 
United States Supreme Court does consider Miranda an important 
factor in determining whether a confession is obtained by 
exploitation of an illegal arrest.  See Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U.S. 590, 603 (1975); accord State v. Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, 
448, 477 N.W.2d 277 (1991).  Unlike in Brown and Anderson, 
however, the case now before us does not involve a contested 
confession or statement.  The Fifth Amendment and Miranda focus 
on the privilege against self-incrimination, whereas the issue 
presented here is governed by the Fourth Amendment right to 
privacy.  Miranda, therefore, does not apply because the 
defendant's 
consent 
to 
search 
was 
not 
a 
testimonial 
or 
communicative 
statement, 
nor 
was 
the 
request 
to 
search 
equivalent to a custodial interrogation.  See State v. Turner, 
136 Wis. 2d 333, 351, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987).  Since Miranda only 
governs in-custody interrogation, a mere request to search does 
not invoke its protections. See id.  Accordingly, it is 
irrelevant to our limited Fourth Amendment inquiry whether the 
agents in this case read to the defendant the Miranda rights. 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
27
against finding the consensual search attenuated.  See United 
States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir. 1997).  The time 
span between the illegal entry and the search, however, is not 
dispositive.  See id.; United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 
1471 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Fazio, 914 F.2d 950, 957-
58 (7th Cir. 1990).  We must also consider the conditions 
existing at the time the defendant consented to the search of 
his bedroom.  See Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 449. 
¶41 In 
this 
case, 
the 
conditions 
surrounding 
the 
defendant's consent, although not ideal, lean toward a finding 
that any taint created by the initial entry had dissipated prior 
to the consensual search of his bedroom.  See Anderson, 165 
Wis. 2d at 450.  As explained above, the agents, after entering 
the basement, did not restrain the defendant, take him into 
custody, or arrest him.11  According to the agents, they and the 
defendant were open and forthright, each asking questions and 
providing information.  Prior to consenting to the search, the 
defendant did not act annoyed with or object to the agents' 
presence in the basement.  In addition, when asked whether the 
agents could search his bedroom, the defendant opened the door 
                     
11 Compare 
Dunaway 
v. 
New 
York, 
442 
U.S. 
200, 
202 
(1979)(assessing police action where officers illegally arrested 
suspect 
and 
took 
him 
to 
police 
station 
for 
in-custody 
interrogation), Brown, 422 U.S. at 593-94 (assessing police 
action where officers broke into suspect's apartment, illegally 
arrested suspect, held him at gun-point and took him into 
custody for interrogation), and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 475 (1963)(assessing police action where officers 
entered suspects home, dragged him from bed, and handcuffed 
him).  
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
28
to his bedroom, located the marijuana, turned it over to the 
agents, and pointed out other drug paraphernalia in the bedroom. 
 In the strictest of custodial conditions, the passing of only a 
short time might not be long enough to purge the initial taint. 
 See Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 107.  In this case, however, the non-
threatening, non-custodial conditions surrounding the search of 
defendant's bedroom lean toward a finding that any taint created 
by the agents' unlawful entry into the basement had dissipated 
when the defendant consented to the search.12 
                     
12 The dissent contends that the "facts of this case 
undermin[e]" 
our 
characterization 
as 
non-threatening 
and 
cooperative the encounter between the agents and the defendant. 
Dissent at 4.  To support this assertion, the dissent latches 
onto the defendant's allegation that the agents threatened to 
search the whole house if he refused to consent.  The dissent, 
however, does not explain that, in addition to making this 
allegation, the defendant denied that the door to the basement 
was open, denied that the agents identified themselves before 
entering the basement, denied that he led the agents into his 
bedroom, and denied that he turned over any items to the agents. 
 As we explained in note 7, the circuit court found the 
defendant's testimony not credible and gave no weight to his 
allegation that the agents threatened him.  Unlike the dissent, 
we do not accept this alleged threat as an established or 
credible fact in this case. 
The dissent also finds relevant to this inquiry the fact 
that the defendant's mother was ill at the time of the search 
and that she died shortly thereafter.  There is nothing in the 
record that suggests the agents in this case knew of the 
defendant's mother's condition prior to entering the defendant's 
basement or that they exploited this information to coerce the 
defendant into consenting to the search.  Absent establishing 
such coercion, these facts, although tragic, are irrelevant and 
inappropriate to consider in addressing the issues presented in 
this case. 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
29
¶42 The second factor we consider in our attenuation 
analysis is the presence of intervening circumstances between 
the unlawful entry and the consensual search of defendant's 
bedroom.  See Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 450-51.  The court of 
appeals concluded and the dissent argues that, due to the 
temporal proximity involved, the State cannot rely on the 
presence of intervening circumstances to purge the taint of the 
unlawful entry.  We disagree.  Upon review, we conclude that an 
intervening circumstance did occur and that this factor supports 
a finding that the agents did not exploit their unlawful entry 
into defendant's home. 
¶43 The only intervening circumstance in this case was the 
short discussion between Agent Zblewski and the defendant.  This 
discussion was significant, however, because it provided the 
defendant with sufficient information with which he could decide 
whether to freely consent to the search of his bedroom.  Agent 
Zblewski testified that after entering the basement he and the 
defendant had a conversation in which Agent Zblewski explained 
the purpose of the visit.  According to Agent Zblewski, he 
answered the defendant's questions and explained that the agents 
did not have a warrant to search the bedroom.   After this 
conversation, the defendant therefore knew that the agents were 
investigating an alleged crime and that, without his consent, 
the agents could not search his bedroom.  The information the 
defendant gained from the conversation with Agent Zblewski 
illustrates that the defendant was not improperly surprised, 
frightened, or confused when he consented to the search of his 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
30
bedroom.  See Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 451.  The fact that a 
short conversation took place between the agents and the 
defendant supports a finding that the agents did not exploit 
their unlawful entry into defendant's home by surprising or 
misleading the defendant into consenting to the search. 
¶44 The third factor is the purpose and flagrancy of the 
official conduct.  See Brown, 422 U.S. at 604; Anderson, 165 
Wis. 2d at 451.  This factor is "particularly" important because 
it is tied to the rationale of the exclusionary rule itself.  
See Brown, 422 U.S. at 604; Fazio, 914 F.2d at 958.  "Because 
the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to discourage 
police misconduct, application of the rule does not serve this 
deterrent function when police action, although erroneous, was 
not undertaken in an effort to benefit the police at the expense 
of the suspect's protected rights."  Fazio, 914 F.2d at 958. 
¶45 The court of appeals found that the agent's entry into 
defendant's home had a "quality of purposefulness" and the 
agents' acts were so flagrant as to require exclusion of the 
evidence discovered.  We disagree.  Upon review, we conclude 
that the conduct of the agents here, although erroneous, did not 
"rise to the level of conscious or flagrant misconduct requiring 
prophylactic exclusion" of the evidence discovered during the 
consensual search of the defendant's bedroom.  Anderson, 165 
Wis. 2d at 451 (quoting Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 110). 
¶46 In this case, there is no dispute that the agents' 
initial entry into the defendant's home was unlawful.  This fact 
alone, however, does not end our inquiry under this factor.  
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
31
"The question whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriate 
in a particular case has long been regarded as an issue separate 
from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the 
party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by the police 
conduct."  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983); see also 
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980).  We must, 
therefore, review the particular conduct of the agents in this 
case. 
¶47 We agree with the State that there is no evidence in 
this case to suggest that the agents' unlawful entry into 
defendant's home was purposeful or flagrant.  The State concedes 
that the purpose of the agents' trip to the defendant's home was 
to investigate an alleged crime.  The agents testified that they 
intended to talk with the defendant and to request his 
permission 
to 
search 
his 
bedroom. 
 
While 
the 
agents 
inappropriately entered the basement to talk with defendant, 
there is no evidence of bad faith on their part.  The agents 
found no evidence as a result of the illegal entry, nor did they 
uncover information that they used to influence the defendant to 
consent to a search.  The agents did not go to the defendant's 
home without individualized suspicion; nor does it appear that 
they purposefully searched his home as part of a systematic and 
continuing series of Fourth Amendment violations.  See United 
States v. Pierre, 932 F.2d 377, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1991).  There is 
simply no evidence that the agents' purposely entered the 
basement without a warrant to "bolster[] the pressures for [the 
defendant] to give consent" or to "vitiate[] any incentive on 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
32
his part to avoid self-incrimination."  Brown, 422 U.S. at 605 
n.12.13 
¶48 Under this third factor, we must also consider the 
manner in which the agents entered the defendant's basement.  
See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603.  The facts of this case show that 
the agents did not use violence, threats, or physical abuse to 
gain entry into the defendant's basement.  The agents did not 
gain entry to the basement by breaking through, unlocking, or 
even opening a window or door.  Nor did the agents use trickery 
or deception to gain entry into the basement.  According to 
Agent Zblewski's testimony, the agents, while in eyesight of and 
in communication with the defendant, walked through an open door 
into the basement where defendant resided.  The agents did not 
rush in unannounced, but rather descended the stairs to the 
basement slowly while they identified themselves and showed the 
                     
13 Unlike the dissent, we do not read into the agents' 
testimony a "quality of purposefulness".  The agents testified 
that one purpose of going to the defendant's home was to seek 
the defendant's permission to search his home.  Agent Brian 
Londre testified that the agents "were just going to talk to 
Jason [Phillips] and see if [they] could search his living 
area."  In addition, Agent Zblewski testified that, had the 
defendant asked, the agents would have left.  The agents' 
express purpose therefore was not to search, as suggested by the 
dissent, but to seek the defendant's permission to search.  In 
our attenuation analysis, this distinction is one of substance 
not semantics.  In addition, even if the agents intended to 
search the defendant's home, there is no evidence in the record 
suggesting that the agents intended to exploit an unlawful entry 
to conduct such a search.  As did the circuit court, we 
characterize the agents' entry as one of error not intention.  
Reviewing the record, we refuse to presume the officers acted 
with a "quality of purposefulness." 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
33
defendant their official badges.  The conduct of the agents in 
the present case, although in error, did not rise to a level of 
"conscious or flagrant misconduct."  Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 110. 
¶49 On balance, having applied to the facts of this case 
the factors set out in Brown and Anderson, we conclude that the 
evidence presented shows that the agents did not exploit their 
unlawful entry into defendant's home.  Although the span of time 
between the challenged conduct and the consent was short, we 
cannot find that the consensual search of the bedroom came at 
the exploitation of the challenged conduct.  See Wong Sun, 371 
U.S. at 488.  The consensual search of the defendant's bedroom 
was therefore purged of any taint created by the unlawful entry. 
 Accordingly, we agree with the circuit court that the evidence 
discovered during the consensual search of the defendant's 
bedroom should not have been suppressed.  See id.  The 
exclusionary rule should not apply when the causal connection 
between unlawful police conduct and the procurement of evidence 
is "so attenuated as to dissipate the taint" of the unlawful 
action.  See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (1984) 
(quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)). 
¶50 Having 
concluded 
that 
the 
defendant 
voluntarily 
consented to the warrantless search of his bedroom and that the 
agents did not exploit their unlawful entry into the defendant's 
home, we conclude that the evidence discovered and seized during 
the consensual search of defendant's bedroom should not have 
been suppressed.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
No. 95-2912-CR 
 
34
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.
NO. 95-2912.awb 
 
1 
¶51 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Dissenting).  Like the court of 
appeals, I conclude that the evidence seized during the 
warrantless search should be excluded because it was seized as a 
result 
of 
the 
agents' 
exploitation 
of 
their 
concededly 
unconstitutional entry.  Both the facts of this case and  
precedent support this conclusion. 
¶52 The issue is whether the connection between the 
illegal police entry and the subsequent seizure of evidence has 
become so attenuated as to purge the seizure from the taint of 
the constitutional violation.  It is the State's burden to prove 
the admissibility of evidence after the primary taint has been 
established.  See State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, 186, 453 
N.W.2d 127 (1990). 
¶53 The 
attenuation 
issue 
focuses 
on 
three 
primary 
factors: temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and the 
purpose and flagrancy of any official misconduct.  See Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); State v. Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 
441, 448, 477 N.W.2d 277 (1991).  The majority's review of the 
facts of this case leads it to conclude that the defendant's 
consent to search and the agents' subsequent discovery of 
illegal drugs were purged of any taint arising from the 
unconstitutional entry.  I disagree. 
¶54 Consideration of the first factor, temporal proximity, 
includes measurement of the intervening time as well as 
consideration of then existing conditions which might outweigh 
the short time interval.  See Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 449; 
State v. Tobias, 196 Wis. 2d 537, 548, 538 N.W.2d 843 (Ct. App. 
NO. 95-2912.awb 
 
2 
1995).  The existence of a "congenial atmosphere" may thus weigh 
in favor of attenuation.  See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 
108 (1980); Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 449.  Neither the short 
time interval nor the existing conditions weigh in favor of 
attenuation in this case.  
¶55 The majority's consideration of temporal proximity 
begins with a concession that "[i]n the strictest of custodial 
conditions, the passing of only a short time might not be long 
enough to purge the initial taint."  Majority op. at 27.  While 
acknowledging that the temporal proximity consists of "only a 
few minutes," the majority attempts to save the situation by 
relying 
on 
the 
"non-threatening, 
cooperative" 
atmosphere 
surrounding the search.  Such reliance is misplaced. 
¶56 In support of this picture of a "non-threatening, 
cooperative" atmosphere, the majority throughout the opinion 
maintains that there is no evidence that shows coercive police 
tactics.  There is no evidence that the agents used "any 
misrepresentation, 
deception, 
or 
trickery 
to 
entice 
the 
defendant to give his consent to search his bedroom."  Majority 
op. at 17.  "There is no credible evidence that the agents 
threatened . . . the defendant."  Majority op. at 18.  There is 
no evidence that the agents "employ[ed] any other coercive 
interrogation tactics before the defendant consented to the 
search of his bedroom."  Majority op. at 19.  There is no 
evidence that the defendant "act[ed] annoyed with or object[ed] 
to the agents' presence in the basement."  Majority op. at 26. 
 
NO. 95-2912.awb 
 
3 
¶57 Contrary to the lack of evidence assertions, the 
record reflects an alternative that undermines the picture of a 
"non-threatening, 
cooperative" 
encounter. 
 
As 
the 
State 
conceded, the entry into the basement was illegal.  Three 
officers came into the small basement storage area to ask the 
defendant questions and to search his living quarters for drugs. 
 The officers asked permission to search his room and the 
defendant inquired if they had a search warrant.  The defendant 
testified: 
 
A:  They said they didn't need one.  And they said if 
they had to come back with one that they'd have to 
bust down the door and search through the whole house. 
 
Q:  Is it your testimony that they said they wanted to 
search the house or they just wanted to search your 
room? 
 
A:  When they first came down, they just said they 
wanted to search the room. They said if I did not give 
them permission they would come back with a search 
warrant and they would search the whole house . . . . 
¶58 The officers knew that the defendant's parents lived 
upstairs in the house.  The record reflects that his mother was 
dying of cancer.14  The threat of busting down the door and 
searching the living area of his mother paints a picture of 
something less than a non-threatening atmosphere.  Yet, in the 
                     
14 The record indicates that the defendant and his mother 
were very close and that he sold his share of a small video 
business so that he could remain in the home and care for his 
mother during her long illness.  The record also indicates Agent 
Londre recalled that "on that particular night [the defendant] 
appeared nervous and he did appear concerned for his mother as 
he related her condition to the agents." She died three weeks 
after the defendant entered his plea in this case. 
NO. 95-2912.awb 
 
4 
face of this record, the majority clings to its assertion that 
"[t]here is nothing in the record that suggests the agents . . . 
exploited this information [of the sick mother upstairs] to 
coerce the defendant into consenting to the search."  Majority 
op. at 27 n.12. 
¶59 In a further attempt to buttress its analysis, the 
majority also expansively portrays the findings of the circuit 
court, effectively claiming that the circuit court uniformly 
believed the facts as testified to by the three agents and 
uniformly 
dismissed 
the 
defendant's 
testimony. 
 
Such 
an 
expansive portrayal is inconsistent with the more limited 
findings of the court which only addressed the consent to enter 
the building and consent to enter the bedroom.  The court 
actually stated its credibility finding as follows: 
 
there is no doubt that they [the agents] did not have 
actual consent to go into the basement area.  I think 
that's pretty clear from the testimony.  It's also 
pretty clear to the Court that, and I find the 
officers' testimony believable, that they did have 
consent to go into this room, where they found the 
items, and I'm quite puzzled how to handle the two 
different situations. 
Again specifically referencing the defendant's consent to enter 
the bedroom, the court then noted that "I find the officers to 
be credible on that issue, but I don't know how the one 
interacts with the other." 
¶60 The credibility findings of the court were limited and 
the majority's attempt to support its analysis by illusory 
broader findings is unpersuasive.  The findings of the court 
NO. 95-2912.awb 
 
5 
support the conclusion that the court believed some historical 
facts in the testimony of the agents and some historical facts 
in the testimony of the defendant.15 
¶61 In addition to some of the facts of this case 
undermining 
the 
majority's 
picture 
of 
"non-threatening, 
cooperative conditions," case law cited by the majority also 
undermines the majority's attenuation conclusion.  In Rawlings 
v. Kentucky, a defendant detained for approximately 45 minutes 
pending issuance of a search warrant not only did not object to 
being detained, but got up, put an album on the stereo, and 
offered the detaining officers something to drink.  Witnesses 
                     
15 The majority broadly claims that "the circuit court found 
the defendant's testimony not credible."  As the findings above 
and the record actually demonstrate, it was not the case that 
the court uniformly dismissed the defendant's testimony in favor 
of the agents.  For example, during his testimony, Agent Londre 
indicated that the three agents had express permission to enter 
the defendant's home.  Yet, the circuit court noted that 
"[t]here 
was, 
for 
sure, 
no 
consent," 
a 
position 
also 
acknowledged by the State.  Thus, while the circuit court's 
findings must be read to have concluded that the defendant 
consented to the ultimate search, the circuit court's findings 
cannot honestly be read as a unilateral rejection of the 
defendant's testimony in regards to the conditions existing 
prior to that consent. 
Even more ironically, the majority justifies its finding of 
attenuation by citing existing conditions such as "when asked 
whether the agents could search his bedroom, the defendant 
opened the door to his bedroom, located the marijuana, [and] 
turned it over to the agents . . . ."  Majority op. at 26-27.  
Thus, the majority's reasoning comes full circle.  The very 
search and seizure of evidence which the State must demonstrate 
was not tainted by the unconstitutional entry is the also the 
majority's chief evidence of the lack of that same taint. 
  
NO. 95-2912.awb 
 
6 
for both sides indicated that a "congenial atmosphere" existed 
during the 45-minute detention period.  As this court described 
the Rawlings holding in Anderson, "the Court found that the non-
threatening, congenial conditions that existed 
during the 
detention outweighed the relatively short period of time between 
the initiation of the detention and the admission."  Anderson, 
165 Wis. 2d at 449.  Significantly, the Rawlings court expressed 
concern that under the "strictest of custodial conditions," even 
a 45-minute time span might not be enough to purge the initial 
taint.  See Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 107. 
¶62 In State v. Anderson, officers illegally searched the 
garage of the defendant the day before he was arrested and made 
incriminating statements.  Even after taking the defendant into 
custody the next day, the officers and the defendant exchanged 
humorous anecdotes and the defendant indicated that he had 
intended to call the police that morning anyway.  Under these 
circumstances, this court determined that the combination of the 
at least seven-hour interval between the illegal search and the 
defendant's statements and the non-threatening and congenial 
atmosphere existing during that interval purged any taint from 
the prior search.  See Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 450. 
¶63  The standard by which the majority analyzes this case, 
whether 
the 
conditions 
were 
"non-threatening 
[and] 
non-
custodial" is also a puzzling one.  While non-threatening 
conditions may in some cases outweigh temporal proximity, I 
question the majority's use of a "non-custodial" prong for the 
attenuation analysis.  That prong is not referenced in Rawlings 
NO. 95-2912.awb 
 
7 
or Anderson and appears to be contrary to the examinations in 
those cases.  If non-threatening and congenial conditions 
existing in a custodial situation argue for attenuation, as in 
Rawlings, I fail to see the merit in declaring that because only 
a non-custodial interaction occurs the taint is more likely 
attenuated.  As the facts of this case demonstrate, a non-
custodial situation may also exhibit threatening conditions. 
¶64 The 
majority's 
attenuation 
analysis 
essentially 
indicates that so long as agents answer questions raised by 
individuals confronted in their own home, but not taken into 
custody, and so long as those individuals do not take the added 
step of attempting to expel the agents, then  sufficient "non-
threatening [and] non-custodial" conditions exist to dissipate 
any taint.  Such a result is inconsistent with the understanding 
of the "conditions" element of the temporal proximity factor 
embraced in Rawlings and Anderson.  It creates a rule whereby 
extreme temporal proximity may be disregarded in the absence of 
violence or protest over the constitutional violation and an 
arrest.  The conditions presented in this record do not outweigh 
the very limited temporal proximity between the unlawful entry 
and the search.  Thus, the temporal proximity factor supports 
the conclusion that the evidence seized during the search was 
not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal entry. 
¶65 In addressing the second attenuation factor, the 
presence of intervening events, the majority declares, "[t]he 
fact that a short conversation took place between the agents and 
the defendant supports a finding  that the agents did not 
NO. 95-2912.awb 
 
8 
exploit their unlawful entry into defendant's home by surprising 
or misleading the defendant into consenting to the search."  
Majority op. at 29.  I do not believe that the existence of a 
momentary conversation, without more, inevitably leads to the 
conclusion that the officers did not exploit their initial 
illegal entry.   
¶66 Contrary to the majority's interpretation of the 
facts, both the court of appeals and the circuit court 
acknowledged that the facts of this case allowed no time for an 
intervening event.  The search of the living quarters followed 
almost immediately after the warrantless entry.  In describing 
the 
brevity 
of 
events, 
the 
circuit 
court 
stated 
that 
"[e]verything happened rather quickly . . . . There obviously 
was no intervening period of time between the officers coming in 
and the subsequent search."16  
¶67 The sole case cited by the majority in its brief 
discussion of the intervening events factor is also easily 
distinguished from the facts of this case.  In applying the 
intervening event factor, the Anderson court concluded that the 
fact that the defendant was given Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966) warnings and had signed a waiver of constitutional 
rights "weigh in favor of finding that the statement and 
resultant search were voluntary and sufficiently attenuated from 
                     
16 It appears inconsistent for the majority, which so 
strongly relied upon the circuit court's findings for its 
examination of the conditions surrounding the constitutional 
violation and search, to now ignore the circuit court's 
determination that no intervening events could have occurred.   
NO. 95-2912.awb 
 
9 
the illegal searches."  Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 448.  During 
the intervening time the Anderson defendant also signed a 
consent to search and seize form.  
¶68 Here, Phillips was never given Miranda warnings.17  
Unlike the defendant in Anderson, Phillips did not have any 
prior knowledge that he might be the target of a police 
investigation.  Unlike in Anderson, where the intervening time 
was at least seven hours between the illegality and the search, 
here the search followed almost immediately on the heels of the 
illegal entry. Nothing in this brief chain of events convinces 
me that this short conversation eliminated any potential for the 
defendant to be "surprised, frightened, or confused" by the 
agents' unanticipated and unlawful entry into the defendant's 
home.  Indeed, if the mere existence of a short conversation 
were all that were required to fulfill this court's attenuation 
analysis, such an analysis would be a superfluous exercise.  
¶69 The final factor in the attenuation analysis is an 
examination of the flagrancy and purposefulness of the agents' 
                     
17  The majority mistakenly concludes that this dissent 
would apply Miranda to this case. I do not believe Miranda 
applicable to the present case in the absence of a custodial 
arrest.  However, I also do not believe that the majority can 
dispute that one of the chief reasons the taint in Anderson was 
ruled attenuated was the fact that the defendant there had been 
given a Miranda warning.  No such supporting factor exists in 
this case, because it cannot—there as was no custodial arrest.  
That inequality does not, despite the majority's apparent 
interpretation 
of 
the 
dissent 
to 
the 
contrary, 
require 
application of Miranda to this case.  However, it does preclude 
one strong potential foundation for the majority's otherwise 
weak attenuation conclusion which they attempt to buttress 
through citation to Anderson.   
NO. 95-2912.awb 
 
10
misconduct.  See Brown, 422 U.S. at 604.  As this court has 
noted in the past, "physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." 
 State v. Douglas, 123 Wis. 2d 13, 17, 365 N.W.2d 580 
(1985)(quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 
U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). "At the very core of the Fourth Amendment 
stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there 
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."  Payton v. 
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).   
¶70 In determining that the agents' entry into the 
defendant's home was not flagrant, the majority again relies 
upon a paucity of evidence indicating that the agents used 
force, violence, threats, or deception when entering the home.  
Again, the majority fails to acknowledge the agents' threat to 
knock down the door and search the living area of the parents if 
the agents had to return with a warrant.  The majority also 
rests on the absence of any evidence that the defendant "act[ed] 
annoyed with or object[ed] to the agents' presence . . . ."  
Majority op. at 26.  Such reliance on the absence of evidence 
disregards the State's burden in proving attenuation.  It also 
fails to acknowledge that this was not a situation where one 
officer casually entered a defendant's home to ask some 
questions.  Rather, three officers all entered the home for the 
purpose of questioning the single defendant. 
¶71 The conduct of the agents in this case also exhibits a 
"quality of purposefulness."  See Brown, 422 U.S. at 605.  One 
of the agents testified that all three officers went to the 
NO. 95-2912.awb 
 
11
defendant's home with the expressed purpose of talking to him 
and of searching his living area.  Thus, despite the majority's 
assertions to the contrary that rely upon the more generalized 
description of another agent, the concededly improper entry of 
the agents into the defendant's home for the purpose of 
conducting 
a 
search 
displays 
the 
necessary 
elements 
of 
purposefulness.18 
¶72 Again citing Anderson and Rawlings, the majority 
concludes that "the conduct of the agents here . . . did not 
'rise to the level of conscious or flagrant misconduct requiring 
prophylactic exclusion' of the evidence discovered during the 
consensual search of the defendant's bedroom."  Majority op. at 
29 (quoting Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 110).  Once again, the 
majority's reliance on the holdings of Anderson and Rawlings 
ignores the significantly different facts presented to this 
court.   
¶73 In Rawlings, the officers detained the defendant 
apparently believing that they could temporarily do so legally 
and that a warrant to search the premises would allow them to 
search the occupants therein.  The Rawlings court, believing the 
legality of the detention to be an open question, determined 
                     
18  The 
majority's 
failure 
to 
acknowledge 
the 
inconsistencies among the agents' statements trips up the 
majority opinion.  I am aware of no legal doctrine which 
indicates that the acceptable actions or intentions of two 
agents, assuming they are to be believed, in any way forgives 
the purposeful misconduct of a third agent.   
NO. 95-2912.awb 
 
12
that the conduct was accordingly not so flagrant or purposeful 
as to require exclusion.  See Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 110. 
¶74 Similarly, in Anderson, the officers searched the 
defendant's garage at least twice.  The first time they searched 
the garage the officers were accompanied by and had the consent 
of the defendant's 15-year-old daughter.  While it was later 
established that the daughter did not have the authority to 
consent to the search, this court found the officers' reliance 
upon her consent to be reasonable and did not find purposeful or 
flagrant misconduct.  See Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 452.  In the 
second search, the officer appeared before a judge and swore to 
and signed an affidavit for a warrant.  For some unexplained 
reason the officer executed the search with only the affidavit, 
believing he had a valid warrant.  While it was later 
established the officer had only the affidavit in his possession 
at the time of the search, the court again found that his 
conduct was not purposeful or flagrant.  See id. 
¶75  The agents in this case never attempted to get a 
warrant prior to entering the defendant's home.  The agents did 
not rely on another's consent in entering the defendant's home. 
 There is no evidence that the agents were under the mistaken 
impression that their actions were legal.  Thus, while the facts 
of this case may not be read to be as flagrant or as purposeful 
as other potential extreme hypotheticals, the nature of the 
police 
intrusion 
into 
the 
defendant's 
home 
and 
its 
purposefulness cannot be dismissed. 
NO. 95-2912.awb 
 
13
¶76 More importantly, even if the majority's argument that 
the entry was not flagrant or purposeful is taken at face value, 
that fact is not dispositive of the larger attenuation analysis. 
 As this court noted in an attenuation case dealing with an 
illegal lineup: 
 
With respect to the third factor, the fact that the 
arrest was not flagrant and was not [purposeful] is 
not enough alone to validate the lineup.  Rather, the 
absence of this factor merely means that less is 
required in terms of intervening circumstances. 
Walker, 154 Wis. 2d at 187. 
¶77 Having considered the three traditional factors under 
the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule, I conclude 
that all three factors argue in favor of excluding the evidence 
obtained as a result of the constitutional violation.  A review 
of the facts and prior case law supports the conclusion the 
State has failed to meet its burden of showing sufficient 
attenuation between the illegal entry and the evidence seized 
during the search.  Accordingly, I dissent.  
¶78 I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, 
CHIEF JUSTICE and WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. join this opinion.