Title: Johnson v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARCUS J. JOHNSON, 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 377, 2007 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0403012959 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 14, 2007 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: October 24, 2007 
 
 
 
 
Corrected: November 20, 2007 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 20th day of November, 2007, upon consideration of the 
appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to affirm, and the record below, 
it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Marcus Johnson, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief.  The State of 
Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that 
it is manifest on the face of Johnson’s opening brief that the appeal is 
without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
 
2
(2) 
The record reflects that a Superior Court jury convicted 
Johnson in October 2005 of multiple drug-related offenses, including 
trafficking in cocaine and possession with intent to deliver cocaine.  This 
Court affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct appeal.1 Johnson filed 
his original motion for postconviction relief in January 2007, as well as two 
subsequent amendments to the motion.2  He raised four issues in the original 
motion he filed in Superior Court: (i) the evidence was insufficient to sustain 
his convictions; (ii) the State made improper references to his decision not to 
testify; (iii) his trial counsel was ineffective; and (iv) his convictions violated 
double 
jeopardy 
principles. 
His 
two 
amendments 
expanded 
his 
ineffectiveness claims and his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
and also raised a claim that his confrontation rights were violated.   The 
Superior Court denied all of Johnson’s claims.  This appeal followed. 
(3) 
In his opening brief on appeal, Johnson again argues that the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that his trial counsel 
was ineffective.  He also raises two additional issues, which were not 
                                                 
1 Johnson v. State, 2006 WL 3759403 (Del. Dec. 22, 2006). 
2 Although the State contends that Johnson filed a motion for postconviction relief 
while his direct appeal was pending, the Superior Court docket does not reflect the filing 
of such a motion.  The docket does reflect an order of the Superior Court, dated July 14, 
2006, denying a motion for postconviction relief or modification of sentence.  It appears, 
however, that the July 14 order was addressed solely to Johnson’s case identified by the 
Cr. ID number 0204002388 but inadvertently was docketed as well in Johnson’s present 
case, identified by Cr. ID number 0403012959. 
 
3
asserted in his postconviction motion.3  We will not consider these two new 
claims for the first time on appeal.4  Moreover, we will not consider any 
claims that Johnson may have raised below but did not brief on appeal.5 
(4) 
With respect to Johnson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, the Superior Court held that this claim was procedurally barred 
because Johnson had failed to raise it on direct appeal.  We agree.  Superior 
Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3) provides that any ground for postconviction 
relief that was not previously raised in the proceedings leading to the 
judgment of conviction is thereafter barred unless the defendant can show 
cause for the procedural default and prejudice.6  Johnson’s opening brief on 
appeal offers no explanation why he failed to raise his sufficiency of the 
evidence argument in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.  
Accordingly, we find no abuse of the Superior Court’s discretion in holding 
this claim to be procedurally barred.7 
                                                 
3 Johnson’s two new arguments, which we will not consider, are: (i) the Superior 
Court failed to properly record sidebar conferences at trial; and (ii) once the State 
dismissed the charges of conspiracy and possession of cocaine, the remaining charges 
also should have been dismissed. 
4 See Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
5 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997) (holding that claims not 
briefed on appeal are deemed waived). 
6 Super. Cr. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).  
7 See Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 551 (Del. 1998). 
 
4
(5) 
Johnson next asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective 
because: (i) counsel misinformed Johnson about the mandatory minimum 
prison sentence that he faced if convicted, thus leading Johnson to choose to 
go to trial rather than accept a plea offer; (ii) counsel inaccurately stated on 
appeal that the drugs were found under the passenger seat, rather than on the 
passenger seat; and (iii) counsel failed to request a jury instruction that 
Johnson could not be found “liable” once the State dismissed the conspiracy 
charge on the second day of trial.  Johnson’s last claim of ineffectiveness 
was not raised in his postconviction petition in the Superior Court.  
Accordingly, we will not consider that new ground for the first time on 
appeal.8 
(6) 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
petitioner is required to establish: (a) that defense counsel’s representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (b) that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of the case would have been different.9 There is a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct was professionally reasonable.10  
                                                 
8 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
9 Id. at 551-52 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). 
10 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 
 
5
Moreover, the defendant must assert concrete allegations of actual prejudice 
or else risk summary dismissal.11 
(7) 
In this case, the record supports the Superior Court’s conclusion 
that Johnson’s ineffectiveness claims lacked merit.  Although defense 
counsel initially misinformed Johnson about the potential mandatory 
minimum sentence he faced if convicted, it is clear that counsel’s mistake 
was later corrected.  Contrary to his contention, the record supports the 
conclusion that Johnson was present in the courtroom with his counsel prior 
to the start of trial when a discussion took place with the trial judge 
regarding the mandatory minimum sentence Johnson faced if convicted.  
Johnson was informed that he was facing a mandatory minimum sentence of 
five years.  Moreover, the transcript also reflects that the State’s plea offer to 
the trafficking charge, carrying a two-year mandatory minimum sentence, 
was still available to Johnson.  Johnson proceeded to trial.  Accordingly, 
under the circumstances, Johnson could not establish any prejudice from 
counsel’s initial error.  
(8) 
Johnson also argues that his counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective on appeal for stating that the drugs were found under the 
passenger seat rather than on top of the passenger seat.  Even if we assume 
                                                 
11 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
 
6
that counsel misstated this fact in his opening brief on appeal, Johnson 
cannot establish any prejudice from this error because it would not have 
changed the outcome of his appeal.  The facts at trial established that 
Johnson was sitting in the driver’s seat of the vehicle in which the drugs 
were found.  Johnson’s passenger testified at trial that the drugs did not 
belong to him.  Regardless of whether the drugs were found under the 
passenger seat or on top of the passenger seat, the evidence at trial was 
sufficient to support Johnson’s convictions.  The location of the drugs on top 
of the passenger seat would not have changed the Court’s conclusion on 
appeal that “this was not a very close case.”12  Accordingly, we find no merit 
to Johnson’s second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
12 Johnson v. State, 2006 WL 3759403 (Del. Dec. 22, 2006).