Title: Natrona County School Dist. No. 1 v. Ryan

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Natrona County School Dist. No. 1 v. Ryan1988 WY 139764 P.2d 1019Case Number: 88-13, 88-14Decided: 11/15/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
NATRONA COUNTY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1; The WyomingState Board of Education; and The State 
Department of Education, Petitioners

 
 
v.

 
 
Joanne RYAN 
and Edward Ryan, husband and wife, as next friends of Tammy Ryan, 
Respondents.

 
 
NATRONA COUNTY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Petitioner

 
 
v.

 
 
The STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, State of Wyoming; Lynn Simons, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, State of Wyoming; Dr. Audrey Cotherman, Deputy Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, State of Wyoming, Respondents

 
 
Robert H. McCrary and Judith A. 
Struder of Schwartz, Bon, McCary & Walker, Casper, for PetitionerNatronaCountySchool 
District No. 1 in Case Nos. 88-13 and 
88-14.

 
 
Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General 
and Rowena L. Heckert, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Petitioner State 
of Wyoming in Case No. 88-13 and Respondents State of Wyoming in Case No. 
88-14.

 
 
John Rivera of the Protection & 
Advocacy System, Inc., Cheyenne, for Respondents Ryan in Case No. 
88-13. 

 
 

Before Cardine, C.J., and Thomas, 
Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ., and Brown, J.,. * Urbigkit, J., delivered the opinion 
of the Court; Brown, J., Ret., concurred in the result.

 
 
*Retired June 30, 
1988.

 
 
Urbigkit, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     In this five-way 
funding dispute, appeal is presented for decision concerning state and local 
school district educational obligation for a handicapped individual between her 
twenty-first and twenty-second birthdays. The controversy invokes consideration 
of the Wyoming Constitution, state educational statutes, state agency 
administrative regulations, federal statutes, federal regulations, and an 
operational education funding agreement between the state and federal 
governments as each affect the operation of the local school 
district.

 
 
I. 
PARTIES

 
 

[¶2.]     Participating parties 
as the litigation developed before an appointed hearing officer (hearing 
officer) were Natrona County School District No. 1 (School 
District); the handicapped individual, Tammy Ryan, through her 
parents as next friends (Tammy Ryan); the State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction as a constitutional elected officer (State Superintendent);1 and the Wyoming State Board of 
Education (State Board). An obvious non-participant involved party is the 
federal government by virtue of federal funding for handicapped children's 
education and the operational intergovernment contract executed by the State 
Board.

 
 

[¶3.]     Procedural contest was 
initially instituted by Tammy Ryan regarding the obligation of the School District to provide an educational program for her 
beyond her twenty-first birthday. That controversy was assigned by the State 
Superintendent under state rule and federal statute to a hearing officer as 
independent of any of the parties. From his adverse decision, the School District petitioned for the present administrative 
agency appeal to the district court. As phrased in terms of an administrative 
decision on funding, the State Superintendent's adverse decision to the 
School District was also removed by petition 
for review to the district court, and the separately developed proceedings were 
consolidated by order of the district court. The State Board and State 
Superintendent also petitioned for review from certain aspects of the hearing 
officer's decision and are both petitioners and respondents in the present 
appeal proceeding.

 
 

[¶4.]     Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09, the district court certified the combined litigation to this court, 
essentially presenting issues of contest between the School District and Tammy 
Ryan and the School District with both the 
State Board and the State Superintendent. The State Superintendent and State 
Board are petitioners on procedural issues in the hearing, and Tammy Ryan is 
respondent to objections taken from the hearing officer's decision by the 
School District, the State Board and the State 
Superintendent.2

 
 
II. ISSUES RAISED 
BY LITIGANTS FOR APPEAL DECISION

 
 

[¶5.]     The central issue 
raised on appeal by the School District 
is:

 
 
Can the Natrona County School 
District No. 1 and the State Department of Education provide an education to 
Tammy Ryan, a person over the age of twenty-one years, through age twenty-two, 
pursuant to order of an administrative hearing officer, when such action is 
beyond the scope of state and federal law that limits access to education to 
those children under twenty-one years of age?

 
 

[¶6.]     Additionally, the 
School District raised several secondary issues 
and phrased them as whether:

 
 
State or federal funds are available 
to fund the education of Tammy Ryan beyond her twenty-first birthday in 
contravention of state and federal law?

 
 
Assurances made by the State in the 
Title VI-B State Plan in order to conform to the requirements of and receiving 
of funding under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA), 
and the Wyoming State Board of Education Rules and Regulations Governing 
Services for Handicapped Children in Wyoming school districts (SBE Rules) which 
provide that a child may continue to receive educational services through age 
twenty-two, form a basis to award educational services to Tammy Ryan in 
derogation of state and federal law?

 
 
An Individualized Education Program 
(IEP), required by federal law for each individual handicapped child, developed 
by and through actions of a school district employee without formal approval or 
authorization by the Board of Trustees, can obligate Natrona County School 
District No. 1 (NCSD # 1) to provide through that IEP a free appropriate 
education to a person over the age of twenty-one and can such IEP be a guarantee 
of services to that child through her twenty-second birthday, even if provision 
of those services is beyond the period of eligibility for educational services 
provided for under state and federal law?

 
 
The State Superintendent can sever 
the issue of funding from the issue of the duty to provide educational services 
by invoking Section 7 of the SBE Rules dealing with controversies between the 
State Department of Education and a unified school district to determine the 
source of funds, and in that manner determine eligibility for an appropriate 
public education over the age of twenty-one?

 
 

[¶7.]     The State Board and the 
State Superintendent, as respondents, raise the following 
issues:

 
 
1. Is the decision of the hearing 
officer that Tammy Ryan, a handicapped woman, [TR] is entitled to a free 
appropriate public education from age twenty-one until age twenty-two arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion and not in accordance with law? Is it also in 
excess of the statutory jurisdiction and authority of the administrative forum, 
lacking statutory right and in violation of procedure required by 
law?

 
 
2. Did the hearing officer have 
jurisdiction to hear a legal dispute over eligibility for a free public 
education brought by one too old to be a child of public school age as defined 
by state law?

 
 
3. May a party to a special 
education due process hearing lawfully subpoena members of a state agency, 
having no personal knowledge of the petitioners' case, in contravention of SBE 
Rules, Section 12, and the Administrative Procedure Act, W.S. 
16-3-107(h).

 
 
Tammy Ryan questions these 
points:

 
 
I. Did the impartial hearing officer 
have proper jurisdiction to decide whether Tammy Ryan, as a handicapped 
twenty-one year old student in the Natrona County School District No. 1, was 
entitled to a free appropriate public education, based on assurance made by the 
Wyoming State Board of Education to the federal 
government?

 
 
II. Was the decision of the 
impartial hearing officer in accordance with applicable law when his decision 
relied upon duly promulgated regulations and other assurances made by the State 
Board of Education?

 
 
A. Was the EHA Title VI-B State 
Plan, including all its assurances that twenty-one year handicapped students 
would receive a free appropriate public education, duly adopted pursuant to 
valid statutory authority?

 
 
B. By making the assurances 
contained in the EHA Title VI-B State Plan submitted to the federal government, 
did the state obligate itself to provide services to twenty-one year old 
handicapped students in Wyoming?

 
 

[¶8.]     We will consider in 
decision that public education, pursuant to the Wyoming Constitution and 
statutory system, is the primary responsibility of this state within the 
principles of federalism. Imposition by external supercission of this basic 
commitment of Wyoming can only come from explicit 
requirements resulting contractually by acceptance of federal funds. 
Consequently, in according primacy to state responsibility, any supervening 
federal regulation is given strict scrutiny.

 
 
III. STATUS OF 
PROCEEDINGS

 
 

[¶9.]     The School District filed two petitions for relief for 
litigative transfer of these educational funding issues to the district court. 
The first was from the decision of the hearing officer which had declared the 
School District responsible for the education 
of the handicapped individual, Tammy Ryan, until her twenty-second birthday. The 
second was filed in response to a decision of the State Superintendent which 
denied state funding for the education required by the hearing officer in which 
the State Superintendent regarded the matter as a controversy between a local 
school district and the State Department of Education, and had declared that to 
the extent that federal Title VI-B State Plan flow through funds were available 
to the School District, it could allocate as needed within the local educational 
program for funding but could not use state foundation program funds to 
provide the education to Tammy Ryan or to the others of similar age 
status.

 
 

[¶10.]  Generally, in appealing the controversy 
to the district court, the School District argued that the ruling by the hearing 
officer, based in part on a United States Supreme Court opinion in Board of 
Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed., Westchester County v. 
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1982) defining 84 
Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq. (1976 ed. & Supp. IV 
1986), and which resulted in full funding for educational services to Tammy 
Ryan, was contrary to the advice memorandum of the Deputy State Superintendent 
determining that federal funds could be used only on a per pupil 
basis.

 
 

[¶11.]  As the major decision in this complex 
administrative proceeding now presented, we reverse the decision of the hearing 
officer which would extend educational responsibilities of the School District for the handicapped person beyond her 
twenty-first birthday. We also void regulations of the State Board and decision 
of the State Superintendent that the School 
District has either obligation or discretion to provide handicapped 
adult education.

 
 
IV. 
FACTS

 
 

[¶12.]  Tammy Ryan, as a multiple handicapped 
student then nearly twenty-one years old, by her parents as next friends, filed 
a complaint on July 2, 1987 with the State Superintendent requesting a due 
process hearing after being informed by the School District administration that 
the State Department of Education had advised she would no longer be eligible 
for a public education at taxpayer expense once she reached the age of 
twenty-one. The complaint specifically asked for a determination of her 
eligibility and the School District's 
obligations to her after age twenty-one. A hearing was granted by direction of 
the State Superintendent as held before a designated independent hearing officer 
on August 10, 1987.

 
 

[¶13.]  A motion to amend the complaint was filed 
on July 17, 1987 for the purpose of making the State Department of Education 
(State Superintendent) a co-respondent. The amended complaint petitions for a 
decision that would require the State Superintendent to order the 
School District to continue the 
post-twenty-first birthday education.3 Responsively, the State 
Superintendent contended that the School 
District could continue the education provided state funds were not 
used.

 
 

[¶14.]  The State Board moved pre-hearing to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that issues raised in connection 
with federal law and State Board rules involving a "school age child" were 
inapplicable to Tammy Ryan whose eligibility for special education had expired 
on August 5, 1987 (twenty-first birthday). The hearing officer took the motion 
under advisement without expressly ruling. The State also sought to quash 
subpoenas issued by the hearing officer to State Department of Education 
upper-echelon personnel. The motion to quash was denied for which a further 
appeal issue is presented by the State Superintendent.

 
 

[¶15.]  The hearing officer concluded that 
failure by the School District to provide Tammy 
Ryan with education through age twenty-one, which would encompass the year after 
she turned twenty-one and expire on her twenty-second birthday, would deny her a 
right to a free appropriate public education. He based this conclusion on 
language contained in the Title VI-B State Plan, in effect since 1981, in 
accordance with the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA), stating 
that education would be assured by the state to handicapped students "through 
age twenty-one." Further support for his position, he reasoned, could be found 
in SBE Rules, § 74.

 
 

[¶16.]  The School 
District, faced with providing educational services to Tammy Ryan, 
also sought a ruling on the issue of funding from the State Department of 
Education. City of Evanston v. Griffith, 715 P.2d 1381 (Wyo. 1986). The State 
Superintendent, unwilling to allow the hearing officer to render a decision on 
the funding issue, severed this issue from those of eligibility at the scheduled 
hearing. In this second proceeding, the State Superintendent held that the 
School District could use its federal funding 
any way it saw fit to satisfy the decision of the hearing officer, as long as no 
state funds were expended for the adult. This meant in finite result that the 
School District was obligated to fund 
post-twenty-first birthday education by detouring other federal funds or using 
local resources as reducing its capacity for educational response to persons 
under twenty-one years of age. Judicial appeals from both decisions followed.4 City of Evanston v. Griffith, 
715 P.2d 1381 (Wyo. 1986); Simons v. 
Laramie County 
School Dist. No. One, 741 P.2d 1116 (Wyo. 1987).

 
 
V. 
BACKGROUND

 
 

[¶17.]  The principles regulating the educational 
rights of the handicapped are found in both Wyoming statutes and federal funding 
provisions. At the state level, handicapped children have educational rights 
conferred by Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 23, and a free education guaranteed by Wyo. 
Const. art. 7, §§ 1 and 9 and art. 21, § 28. These principles, in conjunction 
with the mandates of W.S. 21-4-301 and 21-2-501,5 confer a free appropriate public 
education to children "under the age of twenty-one." The federal law is 
generally embodied in 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq. (1976 ed. & Supp. IV 
1986).6

 
 

[¶18.]  The EHA is a funding measure under which 
the federal government extends monetary assistance to states for the schooling 
of handicapped children. Acceptance of these funds by the State Department of 
Education on behalf of local school districts, can tie the state to certain 
standards and conditions in its use. See Monahan v. State of Neb., 491 F. Supp. 1074 (D.Neb. 1980), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 645 F.2d 592 (8th 
Cir.), remanded sub nom.  Rose v. 
State of Neb., 530 F. Supp. 295 (D.Neb. 1981), judgment aff'd in part and 
vacated in part 687 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom.  Rose v. Nebraska, 460 U.S. 1012, 103 S. Ct. 1252, 75 L. Ed. 2d 481, and remanded 575 F. Supp. 132 (D.Neb. 1983), judgment aff'd as modified sub nom.  Rose v. State of Neb., 748 F.2d 1258 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom.  Lutjeharms v. Rose, 474 U.S. 817, 106 S. Ct. 61, 88 L. Ed. 2d 50, reh'g denied by 474 U.S. 1014, 106 S. Ct. 547, 88 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1985). An informative and comprehensive law journal analysis applying 
EHA to Wyoming state law was written by Robert J. Walters, Comment, Education 
for Handicapped Children in Wyoming: What Constitutes a Free Appropriate Public 
Education and Other Administrative Hurdles, XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 225 
(1984).7

 
 
1. "Free Appropriate Public 
Education"

 
 

[¶19.]  The EHA "requires that in order to 
qualify for funds under the act a state must demonstrate that it has in effect 
'a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate 
public education.' 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1)." Association for Retarded Citizens in 
Colorado v. 
Frazier, 517 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D.Colo. 1981).8

 
 

[¶20.]  Title 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1982 ed. 
& Supp. IV 1986) defines a free appropriate public education 
as

 
 
special education and related 
services which (A) have been provided at public exense, under public supervision 
and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State 
educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or 
secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in 
conformity with the individualized education program required under section 
1414(a)(5) of this title.

 
 

[¶21.]  The term "free appropriate public 
education" (the institutionalists and many law journal writers use the acronym 
FAPE) acquires substance under 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq. (1976 ed. & Supp. 
IV 1986) through the utilization of the Individualized Education Program 
(IEP).9 An IEP is defined 
as

 
 
a written statement for each 
handicapped child developed in any meeting by a representative of the local 
educational agency or an intermediate educational unit who shall be qualified to 
provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet 
the unique needs of handicapped children, the teacher, the parents or guardian 
of such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child, which statement shall 
include (A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such 
child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional 
objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided 
to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in 
regular educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and 
anticipated duration of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria 
and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual 
basis, whether instructional objectives are being 
achieved.

 
 
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(19) (1982 ed. 
& Supp. IV 1986). To further insure compliance with the IEP mechanism, 20 
U.S.C. § 1414(a) (5) (1982 ed. & Supp. IV 1986) requires that local 
educational agencies review and, if necessary, revise each handicapped child's 
IEP annually.

 
 

[¶22.]  The prerequisites of a free appropriate 
public education must be compatible with the precepts of the state educational 
agency.  20 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (18) 
(B) (1982 ed. & Supp. IV 1986). Nevertheless, the practices and programs the 
state educational agency must generate are defined by the EHA.  20 U.S.C. § 1412(2) (1982 ed. & 
Supp. IV 1986). Among those practices and programs are: (1) an intent to provide 
full educational opportunity to all handicapped children, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2) 
(A) (1982 ed. & Supp. IV 1986); (2) within an established age limit, 20 
U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1982 ed. & Supp. IV 1986); and (3) a system which is 
devised to recognize handicapped children and the limit to which each child may 
or may not be obtaining relevant special education and associated services, 20 
U.S.C. § 1412(2) (C) (1982 ed. & Supp. IV 1986). See also Comment, supra, 
XIX Land & Water L. Rev. at 228.

 
 

[¶23.]  Now Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for 
a majority of the court in Rowley, 458 U.S.  at 200, expressly rejected the lower court's 
finding "that the Act requires New 
York to maximize the potential of each handicapped child 
commensurate with the opportunity provided non handicapped children." The court 
then went on to hold that as defined in the EHA,

 
 
a "free appropriate public 
education" consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the 
unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are 
necessary to permit the child "to benefit" from the instruction. Almost as a 
checklist for adequacy under the Act, the definition also requires that such 
instruction and services be provided at public expense and under public 
supervision, meet the State's educational standards, approximate the 
grade levels used in the State's regular education, and comport with the child's 
IEP. Thus, if personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient 
supportive services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction, and the 
other items on the definitional checklist are satisfied, then the child is 
receiving a "free appropriate public education" as defined by the Act. [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 

Id. at 188-89.

 
 

[¶24.]  The United States Supreme Court, in its 
view of the EHA, recognizes certain factors, outside the facts of Rowley, that 
may have influenced the decision. One consideration involved is the 
long-standing philosophy that education should be left to state control, within 
constitutional limitations. This conforms to the current trend of minimizing 
federal involvement in affairs with local disposition. This concern was 
manifested by limiting review of state and local educational decisions, and is 
evidenced by the court's reference to San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, reh'g denied 411 U.S. 959, 93 S. Ct. 1919, 36 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1973). The emphasis on procedural 
rights rather than substantive attributes for the individual is clearly defined 
in majority and dissent. Note, Education--Handicapped Children--The Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act Entitles Handicapped Children to Individually, 
Beneficially, Designed Education Program; Reviewing Court to Determine 
Reasonableness of Program Formulation and Procedural Compliance with Act, 13 
Seton Hall L. Rev. 575 (1983). See also Note, Education--Board of Education 
v. Rowley: The Supreme Court Takes a Conservative Approach to the Education of 
Handicapped Children, 61 N.C.L. Rev. 881 (1983).

 
 
2. Wyoming 
Law

 
 

[¶25.]  The Wyoming Constitution, as differing 
from the United States Constitution and constitutions of some states, explicitly 
acknowledges the right to education.10 Painter and Johnson, The 
Wyoming 
Education Code of 1969, V Land & Water L. Rev. 531, 559 (1970). 
Wyo. Const. 
art. 7, § 1 also authorizes the legislature to "provide for the establishment 
and maintenance of a complete and uniform system of public instruction, 
embracing free elementary schools of every needed kind and grade, * * * and such 
other institutions as may be necessary." Additionally, Wyo. Const. art. 21, § 28 
commands the legislature to "make laws for the establishment and maintenance of 
systems of public schools which shall be open to all the children of the state 
and free from sectarian control." In 1969, the Wyoming legislature expressly set out an 
educational code which provided a specific program for handicapped children. 
Since passage of the EHA by the federal government, the program, updated to 
reflect the federal law, provided in W.S. 21-14-101:

 
 
Each and every child of school 
age in the state of Wyoming having a mental, physical or 
psychological handicap or social maladjustment which impairs learning, shall be 
entitled to and shall receive a free and appropriate education in accordance 
with his capabilities. [Emphasis added.]

 
 

[¶26.]  The Wyoming legislature, in a 
housekeeping move, made a slight modification to W.S. 21-14-101, changing it to 
W.S. 21-2-501, providing that "every child of school age in the state of 
Wyoming having a mental, physical or psychological handicap or social 
maladjustment which impairs learning, shall be entitled to and shall receive a 
free and appropriate education in accordance with his capabilities." (Emphasis 
added.)11 Other provisions in the education 
code which modify and provide meaning to the term school age child are 
W.S. 21-4-301 and 21-4-302.12 While congressional authority 
embracing education of the handicapped student is postulated in part on its 
provisional spending prerogative or under a policy of dual federalism, U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 8, the Wyoming legislature's authority originates 
directly in state constitutional obligation and guarantee, Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
23; art. 7, §§ 1 and 9; and art. 21, § 28.

 
 

[¶27.]  In 1980, this court characterized the 
constitutional educational right for children as a "matter of fundamental 
interest" in isolating a classification based on wealth as suspect when applied 
to that fundamental interest.  
Washakie County School Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 
333 (Wyo.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980). This state's 
constitutional right to education suggests another difference between Wyoming's duty to support 
education for handicapped children and the conditions the EHA levies on other 
participating states. As both laws require a free appropriate public education 
for a handicapped child, the difference lies in the language of the Wyoming statutes and the 
goals envisioned by that language. In Rowley, the United States Supreme Court 
established that a handicapped child secures a free appropriate public education 
if personalized training, rendered with adequate supportive services, permits 
the child "to benefit" from that training. Thus, the United States Supreme Court 
instituted minimal standards to which states must adhere to be eligible for 
federal funds. The rules promulgated by the State Department of Education 
implementing the laws governing handicapped education, declare that their 
purpose is "to ensure that, * * * * each school-age handicapped child in 
Wyoming receives a free and appropriate education, in accordance with the 
child's individual capabilities * * * *." SBE Rules § 1 (emphasis added). See 
also Comment, supra, XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 225.

 
 

[¶28.]  The criteria "in accordance with the 
child's individual capabilities" provides the most substantive authorization for 
educational opportunity to Wyoming handicapped children. This phrase 
expresses what form a free appropriate public education is to assume within 
local educational agencies. Whereas the EHA envisions "meaningful access" to 
public education, Rowley, 102 S. Ct.  at 
3048, the Wyoming embodiment of its statutes as 
regulations could be viewed to include a meaningful education as well. However, 
as in the EHA, in Wyoming the guarantee of a free appropriate 
public education does not compel the state to furnish handicapped children with 
the "best available education." Comment, supra, XIX Land & Water L. Rev. at 
235. Consequently, we determine that enforcement of state constitutional and 
statutory standards for substantive educational accomplishment for the 
individual also achieves compliance with any federal requirement that could 
lawfully be included in the state-federal plan and accompanying regulations. 
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 
73 L. Ed. 2d 690, 102 S. Ct. 3034.

 
 

[¶29.]  The EHA also empirically requires an 
impartial due process hearing that employs the state's administrative procedure 
act, and the rules issued by the state educational agency. 34 C.F.R. § 
300.506(b) (1987). Although state administrative procedural rules may differ, 
the hearing officer may not be an employee of the agency handling the hearing, 
be involved in the education or care of the subject child, or have a 
professional or individual prejudice. 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a) (1) and (2) (1987). 
Additionally, the hearing process addressed by the regulations envisions an 
adversary proceeding, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) and (d) (1982 ed. & Supp. IV 
1986), as left to the discretion of the individual states to decide whether to 
restrict the hearing process to the state educational authority or place it 
within the local educational level.  
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (2) (1982 ed. & Supp. IV 1986). If the state 
agency conducts the hearing, then the decision of the hearing officer is deemed 
administratively final, 34 C.F.R. § 300.509 (1987), as differentiated from a 
hearing involving the local educational agency which, on appeal, must first be 
reviewed by the state educational agency prior to judicial review. 34 C.F.R. § 
300.510 (1987).

 
 

[¶30.]  Although some courts13 have held that judicial review 
under the EHA is not limited to the kind of review required by the federal 
Administrative Procedure Act, the court in Rowley, 102 S. Ct.  at 3051 stated that

 
 
the provision that the reviewing 
court must base its decision on the "preponderance of the evidence" is by no 
means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound 
educational policy for those of the school authorities which they 
review.

 
 
Consequently, any adjudicatory 
discussion of handicapped student education requires primary recognition of the 
federalism function of the EHA. The broad array of judicial rights pyramided 
from the EHA mandate a close state attention to the complex due process dual 
jurisdiction status since both state and federal courts have original 
jurisdiction.

 
 
VI. 
DISCUSSION

 
 
1. Standard of 
Review

 
 

[¶31.]  The primary responsibility of the state 
legislature for public education is constitutional. The judiciary in 
constitutional perspective is entitled to become involved only when these 
constitutional prerequisites are not met. Otherwise, the courts are confined to 
interpreting and enforcing the intent of the legislature. In this controversy, 
the potential obligation of the School District 
to provide adult education and the authority of the State Superintendent to 
administratively enforce statutes with that of the State Board to adopt rules, 
brings our attention to both statute and constitution.

 
 

[¶32.]  In this case, the hearing officer was 
presented no realistic factual conflict when faced with a decision comprising 
questions of law. No one questioned the handicapped status of Tammy Ryan. 
Consequently, the decision is peculiarly presented for judicial determination 
and not administratively emplaced hearing officer decision. No deference is 
accorded in our consideration to the legal conclusions of the hearing officer as 
the administrative officer which involve basic educational eligibility and 
responsibility.  Holding's Little 
America v. Board of County Com'rs of Laramie County, 712 P.2d 331 (Wyo. 
1985); Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 3, Natrona County v. District 
Boundary Bd. of Natrona County, 489 P.2d 413 (Wyo. 1971); Wyoming Dept. 
of Revenue v. Wilson, 401 P.2d 960 (Wyo. 1965). Here on appeal, state 
educational responsibilities and funding obligations as litigable issues solely 
present issues of law. Consequently, the subject of our review is whether either 
the hearing officer or the State Superintendent correctly applied the legal 
rules to a defined set of facts, Cody Gas Co. v. Public Service Com'n of 
Wyoming, 748 P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 1988); Walker v. Karpan, 726 P.2d 82 
(Wyo. 1986); and Belco Petroleum Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 587 P.2d 204 (Wyo. 1978), or committed error in the application of an erroneous rule 
of law.  Rocky Mountain Oil and 
Gas Ass'n. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 749 P.2d 221 (Wyo. 1987); Wendling v. Cundall, 568 P.2d 888 
(Wyo. 
1977).

 
 
2. Legislative History of 20 
U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (1976 ed. & Supp. IV 1986)

 
 

[¶33.]  The EHA as amended July 1, 1976, replaced 
the language of existing part B to provide an entitlement formula for fiscal 
years 1977 through 1979. This formula established eligibility rules and annual 
document standards not previously contained within the language of the EHA. This 
section, designed to establish basic minimum procedures governing the 
distribution of federal funds to states observing the standards, set up service 
priorities and timetables for assurance of compliance by states requesting 
funds. By providing a state plan to obtain federal funds, a single state agency 
assures the federal government that all handicapped children between the ages of 
three through twenty-one are identified, located and evaluated. If special 
education or related services are needed, they are to be provided. Among those 
purposes designed to be achieved by the EHA were: (1) priority assurances for 
delivery of services to those handicapped children with the most need; and (2) 
to focus on the problem of erroneous classification and labeling of children by 
setting a limit on the population of children who may be counted as eligible for 
services. These purposes focus on the "zero reject" principle of the EHA, which 
is based on the theory that all children can benefit from an 
education.  20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1982 
ed. & Supp. IV 1986).

 
 

[¶34.]  While it was the functional intent of 
Congress by financing incentive to promote education for all handicapped 
children, the statutory language provides some flexibility to states in carrying 
out the mandate of providing educational opportunities to their school-age 
handicapped children. The exceptions affording this state flexibility under 20 
U.S.C. § 1412(2) (B) (1982 ed. & Supp. IV 1986) contendably resulted in 
failure of some states to provide desired educational services. Rather than 
mandate services for these children, Congress adopted the Education of the 
Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, P.L. 99-457, 100 Stat. 1145, which furnishes 
significantly greater financial incentives.14 However, in addition to the 
substantive provisions, a system of procedural guarantees is created, including 
specifically, a fair hearing opportunity to be individually provided for each 
student.15

 
 
3. Scope of Hearing Officer's 
Function

 
 

[¶35.]  All parties to this action address 
different aspects of the hearing officer's authority to hear evidence concerning 
Tammy Ryan's rights. The School District argues 
that the decision of the hearing officer was beyond his jurisdiction and 
authority. The State Superintendent and State Board, while also questioning the 
authority or jurisdiction of the hearing officer in context, dispute the holding 
as being arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. Tammy Ryan alleges 
that neither the State nor the School District could dismiss the procedural 
requirements established by 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1) (E) (1982 ed. & Supp. IV 
1986) and 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.500, et seq. (1987), which allows Tammy Ryan, as a 
recipient of educational services under 34 C.F.R. § 300.300 (b) (4) (1987), to 
present complaints in a formal hearing protesting a change in her present 
placement status. The continuum of argument is switched from statutory to 
individualized issues of need by Tammy Ryan.

 
 

[¶36.]  The statutory purpose of the hearing 
officer is to make determinations as "to any matter relating to the 
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the 
provision of a free appropriate public education to such child," William S. v. 
Gill, 536 F. Supp. 505, 510 (N.D.Ill. 1982) (quoting from 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(b) (1) (E)) (emphasis in original), with the key word in this quote being 
"child." Tammy Ryan asserts that the complaint filed July 2, 1987, four weeks 
prior to her twenty-first birthday, entitles her to this designation. However, 
this argument does not address the fact that any decisions made as to her 
situation as a handicapped student became effective after she reached adult 
status on August 5, 1987.

 
 

[¶37.]  A hearing officer addressing a change in 
educational placement of a school-age child is within the authority 
granted by law when adjudicating educational rights of a child.  20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(1)(E) (1982 ed. 
& Supp. IV 1986). However, this same language does not apply to an adult 
when the age of twenty-one is reached which becomes a decision of law. Support 
for this position can be found not only in federal case law, Honig v. 
Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S. Ct. 592, 595, 98 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1988), ("the Act 
limits eligibility to disabled children between the ages of 3 and 21" 
(emphasis added)), but also in Wyoming statutes W.S. 21-4-301 and 21-4-302 
defining school age children as "over six (6) years of age and under the age of 
twenty-one (21)." (W.S. 21-4-302 extends eligibility for attendance in public 
schools to five year olds.)

 
 

[¶38.]  We find that the hearing officer was 
without authority or jurisdiction to hear issues affecting this twenty-one year 
old adult, thus unable to force a continuation of Tammy Ryan's status quo, and 
could not decide the issues before him on August 10, 1987. In determining that a 
hearing was required to effect due process with regard to Tammy Ryan's 
educational rights, the State Superintendent also then misinterpreted the 
administrative issue presented.16

 
 

[¶39.]  As to mootness of any action by an 
administrative agency or judicial body, we have stated 
that:

 
 
We are committed to the rule that an 
appellate court will dismiss a case if, pending appeal, an event occurs which 
makes the determination of the issues presented unnecessary and thus renders the 
case moot. * * * *

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
Appropriate judicial restraint 
should be exercised when a controversy has been resolved and thus become moot at 
the time the case is presented to this court. Advisory opinions generally are to 
be avoided because the adversary system does not function as contemplated in the 
absence of a case or controversy.

 
 

In the Interest of 
AJ, 736 P.2d 721, 
723 (Wyo.1987).

 
 
Appellate courts, including trial 
courts in an appellate role, will not render decisions which cannot be carried 
into effect.

 
 

Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Public 
Service Commission, 
617 P.2d 1079, 1085 (Wyo. 1980).

 
 

[¶40.]  The decision by the hearing officer, 
partially based on non-completion of Tammy Ryan's IEP by the School District, 
forces this court to address some aspects of his opinion as though the 
School District in complying with the EHA, must 
fully complete all of the student's IEP to Tammy Ryan's satisfaction. Thus, any 
decision we make with respect to this opinion, regardless of eligibility for 
educational services, does not reflect a decree "which cannot be carried into 
effect." Northern Utilities, 617 P.2d  at 1085. See also Simons, 
741 P.2d 1116.

 
 

[¶41.]  In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in 
a concurring opinion in Honig, in a situation not unlike the facts of this case, 
discussed the effect mootness has regarding the present rule in federal cases, 
that an actual controversy must survive at all stages of appellate review, not 
merely at the time the complaint is filed. The Chief Justice contends that 
actions begun when a case and controversy existed have a right to be heard and 
that the United States Supreme Court has an obligation to hear these cases, 
regardless of their current controversy status. Otherwise, an individual may 
lose some of the rights to which he is entitled. In support of this reasoning, 
he states that:

 
 
All agree that this case was "very 
much alive," * * * * when the action was filed in the District Court, and very 
probably when the Court of Appeals decided the case. It is supervening events 
since the decision of the Court of Appeals which have caused the dispute between 
the majority and the dissent over whether this case is moot. Therefore, all that 
the court actually holds is that these supervening events do not deprive 
this Court of the authority to hear the case. I agree with that holding, 
and would go still further in the direction of relaxing the test of mootness 
where the events giving rise to the claim of mootness have occurred after our 
decision to grant certiorari or to note possible 
jurisdiction.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
I would leave the mootness doctrine 
as established by our cases in full force and effect when applied to the earlier 
stages of a lawsuit, but I believe that once this Court has undertaken a 
consideration of a case, an exception to that principle is just as much 
warranted as where a case is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 
[Emphasis in original.]

 
 

Honig, 108 S. Ct.  at 607-09.

 
 

[¶42.]  The posture of this case in companion 
petitions by the School District and 
cross-petition by the State Board and State Superintendent is singularly broader 
than the one student and her separate education. The comprehensive decision 
required here will affect all Wyoming public education and, consequently, 
dismissal for mootness would be unjustified wherein the societal determinants 
require constitutional, statutory and administrative rule adjudication. The 
compelling public interest and the outstanding issues in conflict between the 
state agencies and the local school district require resolution of the basic 
question presented. Com., Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. v. Dentici, 
117 Pa. Commw. 
70, 542 A.2d 229 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1988). Cf.  
Ballard v. Wyoming Pari-Mutuel Com'n 
of State of Wyo., 750 P.2d 286 (Wyo. 1988). 
SeeNatrona CountySchool 
District No. 1 v. McKnight, 764 P.2d 1039 (Wyo. 
1988).

 
 
4. State Funding Pre-Age 
Twenty-One, Federal Funding Post Age Twenty-One

 
 

[¶43.]  Within this separate appeal issue, the 
State Board supports its position of allowing school districts to spend federal 
funds for handicapped students post-twenty-first birthday on a per capita basis 
by use of language contained in the Title VI-B State Plan. The State Board, in 
responding to 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq. (1976 ed. & Supp. IV 1986), wrote a 
plan for obtaining federal funding for handicapped children by stating an intent 
to comply with the goals established in the EHA. These goals envision nationwide 
educational services for handicapped children from birth to age 
twenty-one. The regulations applying the language of 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq. 
(1976 ed. & Supp. IV 1986) also, however, encourage state and local 
educational agencies to go beyond the federal statutory 
minimums.

 
 

[¶44.]  The Title VI-B State Plan subjects local 
school districts to the following requirement: the same expenditure out of state 
and local funds for the handicapped child as the per pupil expenditure in the 
district, less capital outlay, debt service and funds targeted for special 
students. This is the "excess costs" requirement that school districts are only 
to use federal dollars to pay for the greater expense of educating handicapped 
students. (34 C.F.R. §§ 300.182, 300.183, 300.229 (1987)). Comparable services 
with state and local funds are to be administered to all handicapped students. 
(34 C.F.R. § 300.231 (1987)). The school districts cannot supplant federal funds 
money formerly spent from state and local resources on handicapped children. (34 
C.F.R. § 300.230 (1987)).

 
 

[¶45.]  The Wyoming Constitution creates direct 
funding criteria based on age ranges in Wyo. Const. art. 7, § 9 by providing 
that "the legislature shall * * * * create and maintain a thorough and efficient 
system of public schools, adequate to the proper instruction of all youth of the 
state, between the ages of six and twenty-one, free of charge * * * *." 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶46.]  Justification for this defined age 
limitation can be found in the minutes of the Wyoming State Constitutional 
Convention. Mr. Burritt of JohnsonCounty was concerned that many of the 
school districts in the various counties were obtaining more funds for the 
education of children within their borders than they were entitled to receive. 
He wanted to amend the proposed language of Wyo. Const. art. 7, § 9, stating 
that the language "the legislature may require, by law, that every child of 
sufficient mental and physical ability shall attend public schools during the 
period between the ages of six and eighteen years * * * *" should only 
apply as to funding to those "actually in attendance and enrolled." Journals and 
Debates of the Constitutional Convention at 186, 733 (1893) (emphasis added). In 
working as a county superintendent of education, he "found that they [the school 
districts] had made their report, sending in the names of every person 
between the school ages, in that district, whether they attended school 
or not." Mr. Brown of AlbanyCounty stated: "I think there is but one 
way to apportion this money among the schools, and that is the way provided by 
this section." Mr. Brown added: "What reason can there be against the theory of 
counting every person of school age in the county?" Mr. Brown concluded: 
"We have, by law, now a way ascertaining the age of every person in the county 
who is entitled to it; our assessors are required to incorporate this in his 
report." Mr. Jeffrey commented: "I have always been of the opinion that this 
matter of apportionment of school money properly belongs to the legislature, and 
the discussion here this morning tends further to prove it." Thereafter, an 
attempt to strike language in this section as to apportionment of funds to 
counties "according to the number of children of school age," was 
defeated. Journals and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, supra at 733-36 
(emphasis added).

 
 

[¶47.]  Reading the minutes of the constitutional 
convention debates in conjunction with the Wyoming Constitution and W.S. 
21-4-301, 21-4-302, and 21-2-501, establish the definition of "child of school 
age" to be five years of age to twenty-one years of age; thus, Wyoming is 
constitutionally obligated and statutorily directed to provide education to 
handicapped children only between five and twenty-one years of age. The 
dispository decision is not whether Tammy Ryan is eligible for federal aid as an 
adult twenty-one years old or older, but whether the Wyoming statutory scheme 
requires that the local school district provide extended educational services 
after the twenty-first birthday for the additional year for any student. 
Our responsibility under W.S. 21-4-301 is to determine if the hearing officer 
made an error of law in his decision. We conclude that the hearing officer 
improperly based his decision on the State Board's unauthorized expansion in the 
Title VI-B State Plan despite Wyoming Constitution and 
statute.

 
 

[¶48.]  Additionally, the hearing officer's 
finding, based on an incompleted IEP, to secure education for another year past 
the twenty-first birthday is also wrong. Tammy Ryan used her previously 
developed IEP to support her contention that the School District's original 
intent was to educate her through her twenty-first year, thus allowing her to 
graduate from the School District's special 
education program. She contends that the School District's policy, prior to 
receiving the State Department of Education advice memorandum, was to allow the 
student to complete the school year rather than terminate the student upon 
reaching his twenty-first birthday. We first fail to see how this change in 
procedure as to Tammy Ryan's continued eligibility for educational services 
would affect her since she reached her twenty-first birthday prior to the 
beginning of the school year in question. Furthermore, the plan cannot be 
enforced if it lacks legislative justification as the School District's educational responsibility. It becomes 
illegal and unenforceable as legally unauthorized.  K N Energy, Inc. v. City of Casper, 755 P.2d 207 (Wyom 1988); Bright v. 
Los Angeles 
Unified School Dist., 18 Cal. 3d 450, 134 Cal. Rptr. 639, 556 P.2d 1090 
(1976).

 
 

[¶49.]  The hearing officer based his incomplete 
IEP assessment on the graduation policy statement issued by the School District. He states:

 
 
The IEP goals for Tammy Ryan have 
not been met. She has not graduated under the graduation policy of the school 
district [just] because the Child Study Committee determined that Tammy has 
completed her individualized education program. Rather, she is considered to 
have "exited services" because she reached the twenty-one year old limit 
contained in the [new] policy.

 
 

[¶50.]  The language in both the revised policy 
regarding the graduation of handicapped students by the School District and the 
old policy effective prior to the State Department of Education ruling on the 
use of state and federal funds for handicapped students, had the same results in 
its application to Tammy Ryan. Whichever policy is applied, the language of the 
old policy:

 
 
[A] handicapped student will be 
considered to graduate whenever the Child Study Committee determines that the 
student has completed his/her individualized education program or at the 
end of the school year following the student's 21st birthday. [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
or under the language of the new 
policy:

 
 
In the case of extended educational 
services, a handicapped student will be considered to graduate whenever the 
Child Study Committee determines that the student has completed his/her 
individualized education program or upon reaching the age of 21. 
[Emphasis added.]

 
 
the effect was the same because of 
the date of her birth. If a school year can be considered as complete when 
applied to a handicapped student or whether the student is on a full year or 
nine month program the day before a new school year begins then, Tammy Ryan, 
having "exited services," satisfies the requirements of both 
policies.

 
 

[¶51.]  Based on the individual's 1987 continuing 
need for educational services and the hearing officer's interpretation of the 
School District's "Graduation of Handicapped Students" policy, the hearing 
officer's ruling went on further to imply that the School District had engaged 
in a contractual relationship with the Ryan family. He opines 
that:

 
 
Tammy Ryan has a continuing need for 
educational services which has been recognized by the school district through 
the approval by the Child Study Committee of the services requested on her 
behalf. The school district has committed to the Ryans to offer educational and 
related services for Tammy after age twenty-one and up to the day of her 22nd 
birthday.

 
 

[¶52.]  Tammy Ryan asserts similar claims in her 
argument to this court. She notes that "legislation enacted pursuant to the 
spending power is much in the nature of a contract * * * *." Rowley, 458 U.S.  at 204 n.6 (citing 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 67 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1981). Thus, the family maintains that 
the Title VI-B State Plan, formulated to secure the necessary federal funding to 
supplement and enhance the state and local funds already in place for use by the 
handicapped student in Wyoming, became an obligation on the part of 
the State as to providing further educational services to those handicapped 
students twenty-one years old. Again, we do not agree as a matter of state 
statutory constitution without regard to SBE Rule, § 74. The cited federal cases 
can be distinguished.

 
 

[¶53.]  Tammy Ryan quotes Georgia Ass'n. of 
Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 716 F.2d 1565, 1578 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied 
721 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. granted and judgment vacated 468 U.S. 1213, 
104 S. Ct. 3581, 82 L. Ed. 2d 880, remanded to and modified on other grounds 740 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1228, 105 S. Ct. 1228, 84 L. Ed. 2d 365 (1985) as her authority to this contention. McDaniel can be 
distinguished as it stands for the right of severely handicapped children to 
receive, at public expense, educational services in excess of the 180 days 
constituting a school year in Georgia. In that action, 
Georgia and its individual school 
districts potentially were to lose their federal EHA funding. This effect was 
considered because the State of Georgia refused to grant additional 
educational services to all handicapped students beyond 180 days regardless of 
individual need and whether or not the student's IEP had been met for that 
school year.

 
 

[¶54.]  We specifically reject the contention 
embodying a claim of ultra vires yet binding administrative agency contract. 
Regardless of what the State Superintendent or State Board indicated it would do 
concerning providing educational services to the age groups three to five and 
eighteen to twenty-one in the Title VI-B State Plan submitted, those agencies, 
as well as its citizens, are still subject to state law. We have said in 
Tri-County Elec. Ass'n., Inc. v. City of Gillette, 584 P.2d 995, 1006 (Wyo. 1978) 
that

 
 
it is the duty of courts to sustain 
the legality of contracts when fairly entered into, if reasonably possible to 
do so, rather than to seek loopholes and technical legal grounds for 
defeating their intended purpose. [Emphasis added.]

 
 
This is an event, as described by 
the phrase "if reasonably possible to do so," where a contract, even if formed, 
is null and void, for as we also said in Tri-County Electric, "it will not be 
supposed that the parties entered into a contract contemplating a contract 
amounting to a violation of the law * * * *." Id. at 1006. It is a well-settled principle 
that "contracts cannot be used as a 'device to hoodwink the law.' Contractual 
provisions cannot rise above constitutional and statutory law." Id. at 1004 (quoting from Rural Electric Co. v. State 
Board of Equalization, 57 Wyo. 451, 120 P.2d 741, reh'g denied 57 Wyo. 451, 122 P.2d 189 
(1942)).

 
 

[¶55.]  Tammy Ryan claims, as a jurisdiction 
factor, that an improper "change in educational placement" occurred, denying her 
access to further educational services from the School 
District. That is not this case.

 
 

[¶56.]  We recognize the procedural 
responsibility government has in protecting the student's rights to a free 
appropriate public education, which requires guidelines for her to question the 
purpose for any change in educational placement. However, placement issues ended 
with the twenty-first birthday. School districts like municipalities are 
creatures of the state and can exercise only those powers and functions that are 
conferred by statutory definition.  
K N Energy, Inc., 755 P.2d 207. So, even though Tammy Ryan had not 
then and may never complete the goals embodied in the School District's handicapped student graduation policy, 
the local education agency cannot be held responsible for non-achievement where 
state law provides the age limitation for school district continued education 
responsibility for any child.17

 
 

[¶57.]  To summarize, the Wyoming Constitution 
and statutes limit agency authority to promulgate rules or execute contracts 
and, if not authorized, the provisions are void. The mandate of the Wyoming 
Constitution for education in the public schools ends at the twenty-first 
birthday and the constitutional terminal has also served as the legislative 
omega. Lacking more, the School District was 
neither authorized nor required to expend its funds for adult education not 
statutorily justified. See Stewart By and Through Stewart v. Salem School 
Dist. 24J, 65 Or. App. 188, 670 P.2d 1048 (1983) as differing only as 
involving an under-age child, not an over-age adult.

 
 
5. Use of Additional Federal 
Funds

 
 

[¶58.]  The State Superintendent asserts that, in 
making assurances to the State Department of Education that educational services 
to twenty-one year olds would be provided, it relied upon language contained in 
both federal statutes and regulations. In developing a plan to gain funding for 
educational services to handicapped children, the State Board construes 34 
C.F.R. § 300.186 (1987) as meaning that those funds ascribed to individuals 
counted as age twenty-one in the profile submitted to the federal government for 
entitlement purposes, are designated as per capita recipients of flow through 
funding. This is the "district can do what it can with $ 209 to $ 211" subject. 
This is also the "if you can, you must" federal funds procurement 
syndrome.

 
 

[¶59.]  The School District challenges by appeal 
the decision of the State Superintendent that it can take or should use these 
funds for post-twenty-first education when it cannot use state funding 
for the same purpose, but also contests the argument of the student that the 
availability of the funds in some fashion creates an obligation distinct from 
statutory authentication. With detailed and comprehensive analysis of the 
complex federal regulations as attenuated by the State Board regulations, both 
the State and Tammy Ryan argue that acceptance and use of the available federal 
funds of about $ 209 or $ 211 per student is justified for education of the 
post-twenty-first birthday handicapped person. We do not 
agree.

 
 

[¶60.]  In determining that the Wyoming statutes confine public school education to the 
twenty-first birthday, we also determine that the School 
District has no authority to use even non-state funds for 
unauthorized educational programs. The complex of legal problems in 
counter-arguments need not be pursued by us in effectuating the limitation 
designed by state statute.18

 
 

[¶61.]  Our analysis that federal statutes and 
the regulations interpreting those statutes support our conclusions--that 
local school districts and the State Department of Education, as collective 
receptacles for local and state tax dollars, cannot dispense educational 
services to any student under their respective dominion, that is beyond the 
definition of school age child as determined by state 
statutes.

 
 

[¶62.]  Dispositively stated, the Wyoming 
Constitution sets the required limit at the twenty-first birthday and any 
provisions beyond that age are the sole responsibility of the legislature in 
adoption of enabling legislation and provided funding. In construing statutes, 
the legislative intent is the primary consideration.  City of Evanston, 715 P.2d 1381. The sole limitation other than availability of funding is the 
legislature's primary obligation for public education to age twenty-one. 
Washakie County School Dist. No. One, 606 P.2d 310. We not only determine 
that receipt by the School District of $ 209 to $ 211 cannot engender liability 
for total costs of $ 16,000 or more, but that under present legislation, neither 
the State nor the School District has legal authority to apply for and accept 
funds for post-twenty-first birthday adult education to be used by the public 
school district.

 
 

[¶63.]  In regard to the reliance by Tammy Ryan 
on the administrative regulations of the State Department of Education in 
claiming the right to additional educational services, we hold that the 
administrative regulations, specifically SBE Rule, § 74(E), that infract upon 
acts of the legislature, are void and no remonstrations that they are merely an 
exercise of administrative discretion can save them. Bright, 18 Cal. 3d 450, 556 P.2d 1090, 134 Cal. Rptr. 639.

 
 

[¶64.]  The conclusion by the State Department of 
Education that the federal regulations allow flow through financing of extended 
educational services to a handicapped twenty-one year old student from Title 
VI-B State Plan funds was contrary to law and an abuse of discretion by that 
agency. Although construction of statutes by agency officials charged with their 
execution, including the interpretation of authority vested in them to implement 
and carry out the statutory provisions, is entitled to weight; final 
responsibility for interpretation rests with the courts.  Simons, 741 P.2d 1116; Bright, 
556 P.2d 1090.

 
 

[¶65.]  This court will, in exercise of its 
judicial responsibility, void and vacate administrative regulations that alter 
or amend statutes or enlarge or impair their scope.19

 
 
6. Subpoena of Agency 
Personnel

 
 

[¶66.]  As an issue included in its petition for 
review to the district court, the State Board and State Superintendent included 
the denial by the hearing officer of a motion to quash subpoenas of personnel 
within the State Department of Education. A convoluted record status and 
briefing situation does not make resolution of the issue as presented in behalf 
of the State Superintendent any easier to provide. (No responsive briefing 
discussion was provided.) The School District, 
acting pursuant to authority of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, 
requested issuance of subpoenas by the hearing officer to subpoena for 
testimony, State Department of Education personnel Audrey Cotherman, Dennis 
Donohue and Kenneth Blackburn. Although the subpoenas are included in the 
record, the motion of the State to quash is not. However, the three witnesses 
did testify, and the issue for this case is moot. Resolution of this issue would 
require us to render an advisory opinion for future cases, which invitation we 
decline.  Ballard, 750 P.2d 286.

 
 
VII. 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶67.]  The decision of the hearing officer is 
reversed and the decision of the State Superintendent is also reversed since 
Natrona County School District No. 1, is neither entitled nor obligated to 
provide educational services for individuals within the district after the 
recipient becomes twenty-one by reaching his or her twenty-first birthday. The 
petitions for review are granted and the decisions from which appeal is taken 
are reversed.

 
 
Brown, J., Ret., concurred in the 
result.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The record, 
briefing, and documentation variously lists the operational administrative 
agency as the State Superintendent, the State Department of Education, and 
Deputy Superintendent by name. We consider that the proper party is the State 
Superintendent as hereafter designated as the administrative agency for this 
discussion and decision pursuant to Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 11 and art. 7, § 14. 
Wyo. Const. 
art. 4, § 11 provides for the office and Wyo. Const. art. 7, § 14 
supplies:

 
 
The general 
supervision of the public schools shall be entrusted to the state superintendent 
of public instruction, whose powers and duties shall be prescribed by 
law.

 
 
The general 
organization of the State Department of Education was created in 1969 and was 
restructured by 1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 90, § 
3.

 
 
Statutorily, 
in addition to the constitutional function of a State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction and the diverse rule making, accreditation, and supervisory 
responsibilities of the State Board of Education, there has existed since 
1969

 
 
a separate 
and distinct state department designated as the state department of education 
which shall be under the supervision of the state superintendent and consist of 
the state superintendent and such divisions, staffed by personnel and provided 
with facilities the state superintendent determines necessary to assist him in 
the proper and efficient discharge of his respective 
duties.

 
 
W.S. 
21-2-104.

 
 
Structurally, as a matter of political science, the interjection of a 
"separate department" in addition to the constitutional office of the State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction and the statutory responsibilities of the 
State Board of Education is interesting in function and except as permitted by a 
delegation section, W.S. 21-2-105, would not seem to define an entity existence 
or separate function from the office of the State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction. Consequently, for the purpose of evaluation of education to the 
handicapped, we will accord decisional responsibilities to the State Board of 
Education and not the amorphous department to which may be delegated 
administrative and non-discretionary duties by the State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction.

 
 

2In 
generalized terms, the state superintendent, as a constitutional officer, is 
answerable for the administration of education as a state responsibility. The 
state board consists of nine members appointed by the Governor to six year 
staggered terms, with the state superintendent as an ex-officio nonvoting 
member. It is designated as an appeal board for school districts appealing 
action by the State Department of Education. Educational planning involving 
federal funding as well as the state plan required thereby is a further 
responsibility. W.S. 21-2-301.

To be 
compared in statutory text are W.S. 21-2-201, the general supervision of public 
schools shall be entrusted to the state superintendent who shall be the 
administrative head and chief executive officer of the state department of 
education, as followed in W.S. 21-2-202 by a list of duties encompassing 
thirteen defined responsibilities, with W.S. 21-2-304 involving the duties of 
the state board, providing the state board shall establish policies for public 
education of the state consistent with the Wyoming Constitution and statutes, 
and may promulgate rules necessary to implement its responsibilities under the 
Wyoming Education Code of 1969 and then exercise defined functions of 
approximately three pages of assigned 
responsibilities.

The 
significance in this case is that administrative decisions on funding are 
clearly a function of the state superintendent, while execution of federal grant 
contracts and the adoption of policies and regulations relating to the 
distribution of the funds comes within the province of the state board. Pursuant 
to this authority, the state board, on June 19, 1986, adopted the Wyoming State 
Board of Education Rules and Regulations for Handicapped Children in Wyoming 
School Districts encompassing 111 sections and 100 pages as effective for the 
1986-87 and succeeding school years. These provisions are generally and will be 
for the purpose of this opinion described as SBE 
rules.

In addition 
to the general powers as provided by W.S. 21-2-304 by even more recent 
legislation, the state board is responsible in conjunction with the separate 
school districts for education of the handicapped 
as:

 
 
Each school 
district of this state having any school age children residing in the district 
who possess any of the handicaps covered under this article, shall, subject to 
the rules and regulations of the state board, provide for the appropriate 
diagnosis, evaluation, education or training, and necessary related services, 
and may include, but is not limited to room and board, for those children. If 
the school district is unable to provide the necessary and appropriate programs 
and services, it shall contract with another school district or agency to obtain 
them. If the programs and services cannot reasonably be provided by the 
district or by interdistrict contracts, the state board shall assist local 
boards of trustees in arranging for the appropriate educational programs and 
services either within or without the state pursuant to its rules and 
regulations and financed as provided by law. [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
W.S. 
21-2-502.

 
 

3The 
incongruity of a State Superintendent hearing ordering the State Superintendent 
to do something was never addressed directly since no order was entered by the 
hearing officer authorizing the amended complaint. However, the State 
Board answered in general denial. The hearing officer decision determined 
that funding was beyond the scope of his due process forum in his determination 
that as to the School District, Tammy Ryan was 
entitled to "a full range of educational and related services * * * * through 
age twenty-two." In a comparable case now also pending before this court on 
appeal, Wyoming State Board of Education v. Cochran, 764 P.2d 1037 (Wyo. 
1988), the hearing officer reached a directly opposite conclusion. However, the 
district court in the succeeding declaratory judgment in GoshenCounty 
in effect reversed the hearing officer and also reached the opposite decision 
from that of the State Superintendent from which this current appeal by the 
School District is 
taken.

 
 

4Tammy Ryan, 
age twenty-one on August 5, 1987, as about four feet tall and weighing 
approximately 200 pounds, was found by the hearing officer as a multiple 
handicapped person suffering from hydrocephalus, mental retardation, blindness, 
paralysis and obesity. Evidence indicated that the further year's education 
would cost about $ 16,000 if provided in-district and $ 200,000 out-of-district. 
Cost to the state for persons for the additional year over age twenty-one was 
estimated to total four million dollars for a biennium which funding had been 
denied by the legislature. The allocable federal funding which was estimated to 
total about $ 209 to $ 211 for that adult student was considered in State 
Superintendent decision to be available. This would leave a revenue funding 
deficit for in-district education for this one person of about $ 15,700 and 
out-of-district care of up to $ 200,000.

 
 

5W.S. 
21-4-301 provides:

 
 
Except as 
otherwise provided by law, the public schools of each school district in the 
state shall at all times be equally free and accessible to all children resident 
therein over six (6) years of age and under the age of twenty-one (21), subject 
to such regulations as the board of trustees may 
prescribe.

 
 
W.S. 
21-2-501 provides:

 
 
Every child 
of school age in the state of Wyoming having a mental, physical or psychological 
handicap or social maladjustment which impairs learning, shall be entitled to 
and receive a free and appropriate education in accordance with his 
capabilities.

 
 

6The federal 
law originated in 1970 with the passage of the Education of the Handicapped Act 
(P.L. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175), and has been amended numerous times. The Education 
of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 579), expanded many 
fiscal aspects and created a bureau and national advisory committee. The changes 
in 1975, Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-142, 89 
Stat. 773), added a finding and purpose section and provided more detailed 
provisions on entitlements and allocations. The Education of the Handicapped 
Amendments of 1977 (P.L. 95-49, 91 Stat. 230) authorized special educational 
model programs, and the Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1983 
(P.L. 98-199, 97 Stat. 1357) created the Office of Special Education Program 
within the Department of Education inter alia and established regional resource 
centers. Two changes occurred in 1986. First, the Handicapped Children's 
Protection Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796) was approved August 5, 1986 
and authorized attorney fees to be awarded to prevailing parties. Second, the 
Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986 (P.L. 99-457, 100 Stat. 
1145) was approved October 8, 1986 reauthorizing discretionary programs and 
authorized early intervention for handicapped 
youth.

 
 

7The federal 
preclusion has similar aspects to speed limit and twenty-one year old drinking 
age federal legislation. Surprisingly, this well-written law journal article was 
not cited by any of the litigants in appellate briefs. This often considered 
subject is illustrated by the numerous other law journal articles, many of which 
are cited in Comment, supra, XIX Land & Water L. Rev. at 226 
n.8.

 
 

8

The Act's 
emphasis on the unique needs of the handicapped child and on the individualized 
programming make it clear that "appropriate education" is to be determined in 
relation to each handicapped child. Beyond these confines, however, the Act 
fails to provide a definite standard for determining the minimal or acceptable 
limits of "appropriate education." The regulations promulgated under the Act do 
nothing more than paraphrase the purpose and broad definition of appropriate 
education from the Act itself. Therefore, it appears that the Act and 
regulations leave the task of specifically defining "appropriate education" up 
to the local educational authorities, and in cases of dispute, to the courts. 
Given this lack of direction, it is not surprising that courts have arrived at 
various interpretations.

 
 
Note, 
Springdale School 
District No. 50 v. Grace: "Appropriate 
Education" Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 15 
Creighton L. Rev. 950, 957 (1982) (footnotes 
omitted).

 
 

9

After 
Rowley, a handicapped child is receiving an appropriate education when the 
program the school provides allows the child to benefit educationally. If a 
child is being educated in the regular classroom, the educational-benefit 
standard is satisfied when the IEP is reasonably calculated to allow the child 
to obtain passing marks and grade advancement. In formulating this test of 
educational benefit, the Supreme Court reasoned that when the child is 
mainstreamed into the regular classroom the school system itself monitors 
educational progress with a system of grading and advancement. Therefore, the 
Court concluded, because graduation is equated with education in our society, 
grading and advancement constitute important indicators of educational benefit 
for the handicapped children being educated in the regular 
classroom.

 
 
Note, 
Board of Education v. Rowley: Handicapped Children Are Entitled to a 
Beneficial Education, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 279, 293 (1983) (footnotes 
omitted).

 
 

10Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 23 
provides:

 
 
The right of the citizens 
to opportunities for education should have practical recognition. The 
legislature shall suitably encourage means and agencies calculated to advance 
the sciences and liberal arts.

11Effective 
July 1, 1987, the legislature amended and renumbered former W.S. 21-14-101 (1986 
Replacement) as present W.S. 21-2-501 and substituted "Every" for "Each and 
every."

 
 

12W.S. 
21-4-302 provides:

 
 
(a) A pupil 
may register in the first grade in the public schools of this state in the year 
in which his sixth birthday falls on or before September 
15.

(b) A pupil 
may register in kindergarten in the public schools of this state in the year in 
which his fifth birthday falls on or before September 
15.

 
 

13See Doe 
v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800, 805-06 (1st Cir. 1982), remanded 561 F. Supp. 121 
(D.Mass. 1983), judgment aff'd 728 F.2d 30 (1st Cir.), order aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part sub nom.  Town of 
Burlington v. Dept. of Educ. for Com. of Mass., 736 F.2d 773 (1st Cir.), 
cert. granted sub nom.  School 
Committee of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dept. of Educ. of Mass., 469 U.S. 1071, 105 S. Ct. 562, 83 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1984), judgment aff'd 471 U.S. 359, 105 S. Ct. 1996, 85 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1985) and Department of Educ., State of Hawaii 
v. Katherine D. By and Through Kevin and Roberta D., 727 F.2d 809, 814 (9th 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1117, 105 S. Ct. 2360, 86 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1985). These deviations may call into 
question any future district court certification without initial decision as 
otherwise permitted by W.R.A.P. 12.09.

 
 

14In its 
legislative re-authorization of the EHA and the services it provides to all 
handicapped children, Congress extended some education services to handicapped 
infants and pre-schoolers and granting special incentives to children from birth 
to age two. This amendment provides for a program of early intervention services 
which will make special education for three to five year olds mandatory under 
the EHA by 1990. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, P.L. 
99-457, 100 Stat. 1145.

 
 

15The carrot 
had grown, but the stick was more severely preserved in placement and 
size.

 
 

16The record 
reflects a more recent decision of the State Superintendent that the mistake 
would not be repeated since the result might create an opportunity by hearing 
request for an additional education year for each handicapped student as 
required by continued eligibility during any status 
litigation.

 
 

17Actually, 
the record reflects that the student was held back from "graduation" by her 
parents in order to seek the additional year in school. It is fair to anticipate 
that in the additional year now passed, by June, 1988, graduation should have 
occurred and consequently, as to this student, the issue is now actually moot. 
She has received the additional year that she 
requested.

 
 

18To hold 
otherwise, places the local school district in a proverbial bear trap of 
potential violation of federal law in use of the minimal funds and correlative 
violation of state authority to provide the required additional supporting 
funding from other resources.

 
 

19By virtue of 
SBE Rule, § 84, "Status of Child During Hearings," requiring continued education 
during the course of litigation as well as the "stay put" provision in the 
federal educational act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (3) (1982 ed. & Supp. IV 1986), 
we establish as a course of disposition of this case and the others similarly 
situate that until the mandate issues in this case, payments made and benefits 
conferred shall be financed as if the recipient had not achieved the 
twenty-first birthday. This accords with suggestion afforded by the State 
Superintendent in decision and litigant briefs.