Title: Law v. Maercklein

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

292 N.W.2d 86 (1980) Dorothy C. LAW, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. F. W. MAERCKLEIN, Special Administrator of the Estate of Dennis R. Fann, Deceased, Defendant, and The Unsatisfied Judgment Fund for the State of North Dakota, Appellee. Civ. No. 9697. Supreme Court of North Dakota. April 30, 1980. *87 Nevin Van de Streek, of Eaton & Van de Streek, Minot, for plaintiff and appellant. Thomas W. Robb, Spec. Asst. Atty. Gen., Bismarck, for Unsatisfied Judgment Fund. *88 VANDE WALLE, Justice. Dorothy C. Law appeals from an order of dismissal and judgment entered pursuant thereto by the Ward County district court on September 4, 1979. We affirm. The facts of this case are not in dispute. Mrs. Law's son, Danny Hymas, was killed in a car accident while riding in a car driven by Dennis R. Fann, who was also killed in the accident. Mr. Hymas was a resident of North Dakota at the time of his death, was single, and left no issue. The parties have stipulated that Mrs. Law is not a resident of North Dakota. Mrs. Law brought a wrongful-death action against the estate of Mr. Fann and, pursuant to stipulation, took judgment for $10,203.40, against which she received $4,000 from the insurance carrier covering the car. Mrs. Law applied to have the remaining balance paid out of the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund ("Fund"), but the Attorney General, on behalf of the Fund, objected to such payment because Mrs. Law was not a resident of this State. These facts were presented to the district court on stipulation and the court agreed with the Attorney General that Mrs. Law could not recover from the Fund because she was not a resident nor had she made any contribution to the Fund. Mrs. Law made timely appeal to this court. The first issue for consideration is whether or not the district court properly interpreted Section 39-17-03, N.D.C.C., by reading it to require that an applicant must be a North Dakota resident. Section 39-17-03, N.D.C.C., provides, in part: The district court applied this court's decision in Benson v. Schneider, 68 N.W.2d 665 (N.D.1955), to hold that Mrs. Law was precluded from recovering from the Fund because she was not a North Dakota resident. In that proceeding a nonresident sought recovery from the Fund upon an unsatisfied judgment rendered against an individual for injuries to the nonresident sustained in a car accident while driving in the State. This court held that the nonresident was not entitled to collect from the Fund because Section 39-1703, N.D.R.C., 1953 Supp. (predecessor to Section 39-17-03, N.D.C.C.), confined participation in the Fund to North Dakota residents and that such a limitation could be constitutionally imposed. Mrs. Law contends that the Benson case is distinguishable from the one at bar because in that case the nonresident was both the applicant and the person who had been injured in the automobile accident which gave rise to his cause of action. Here, the person who was killed in the accident, from whose death Mrs. Law derives her cause of action, was a North Dakota resident. Mrs. Law asserts that her wrongful-death action was in essence an action brought by or on behalf of her deceased son's estate so that his residency could be used to meet the residency requirements of Section 39-17-03, N.D.C.C.[1] We do not agree that the wrongful-death action brought by Mrs. Law was in essence for the benefit of the estate. Wrongful-death actions are brought for the protection of those persons within a fixed *89 degree of relationship to and dependency on the deceased who suffer actual damage because of the wrongful killing of the deceased. Satterberg v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 19 N.D. 38, 121 N.W. 70 (1909). Wrongful-death actions, unlike survivor actions which are brought to recover damages the deceased himself could have recovered had he lived, are brought to compensate the survivors for their losses. Sheets v. Graco, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 63 (N.D.1980); Armstrong v. Miller, 200 N.W.2d 282 (N.D.1972). But a wrongful-death action is an entirely new cause of actionnot merely a continuation of the decedent's claim. When Mrs. Law brought the wrongful-death action she was asserting her own rights, not those of her son. Under these circumstances his residency cannot be a factor in Mrs. Law's attempt to meet the requirements of Section 39-17-03, N.D.C.C. Several hypothetical situations were presented by Mrs. Law to show the "anomalous" results that could occur if the district court's interpretation is followed. These hypothetical situations are not now before the court and we need not decide the issues they raise. But to obviate the results alleged in the hypothetical situations, Mrs. Law suggests that Section 39-17-03 be read to require only that the person who is injured or killed in the accident be a North Dakota resident at the time of the injury or death. This suggested interpretation is similar to that adopted in Rosenfield v. Angerstein, 71 N.J.Super. 409, 177 A.2d 38 (1962). In that case the estate of a Pennsylvania woman killed in a New Jersey car accident made a claim for payment from the New Jersey Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund. The claim was denied and the estate appealed, asserting that the right to recover from the fund was dependent upon the status of the decedent's minor son, who was a New Jersey resident and for whose benefit, in part, the judgment was recovered. The New Jersey Superior Court held, based on wording used in Betz v. Director, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 27 N.J. 324, 142 A.2d 632 (1958), that it is the residency of the decedent which is the determinative factor in allowing recourse from the Fund. We do not find the decision of the New Jersey court persuasive. Although such an interpretation would make the statute more favorable to Mrs. Law's claim, we do not believe this is what the Legislature intended. The unequivocal wording of Section 39-17-03 is: Where the wording of a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of the statute should not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Richard v. Johnson, 234 N.W.2d 22 (N.D.1975); Sec. 1-02-05, N.D.C.C.[2] It is true that in Tang v. Ping, 209 N.W.2d 624, 626 (N.D.1973), this court stated: But we cannot ignore, in our desire to liberally construe this legislation, the plain wording used in the statute. That plain wording indicates that Fund applicants must be North Dakota residents. We therefore affirm the district court's holding limiting recovery to those persons. We next consider Mrs. Law's challenge to the constitutionality of this requirement. In considering a constitutional challenge to a statute, it is presumed that an enactment of the Legislature is constitutional and that such presumption is conclusive unless the Act is clearly shown to be in contravention of the State or Federal Constitution. *90 Where the Act is regularly enacted by the Legislature, the only test of its validity is whether or not it violates either the State or Federal Constitution. Gableman v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 379 (N.D.1974); Souris River Telephone Mutual Aid Corp. v. State, 162 N.W.2d 685 (N.D.1968). In Benson v. Schneider, supra, this court upheld the constitutionality of the residency requirement, stating: We reaffirm that holding and apply it here. Article IV, Section 2, of the United States Constitution provides, in part: This provision does not require that the rights of nonresidents at all times equal those of the residents of a State. Benson v. Schneider, supra. As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Commission, 436 U.S. 371, 98 S. Ct. 1852, 56 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1978): By making residency a requirement under Section 39-17-03, N.D.C.C., the State has not imposed upon Mrs. Law's pursuit of a common calling; nor has it interfered with her ownership or enjoyment of property; nor has it denied her access to the courts of this State. As was stated in Benson v. Schneider, supra: Before we consider whether or not the residency requirement of Section 39-17-03 denies nonresidents equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we determine which standard will be used in our examination. This court has identified these three standards of constitutional review: Benson v. N. D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96 (N.D.1979); Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445 (N.D.1979); Johnson v. Hasset, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D.1974). Our concerns here are similar to those found in cases that have applied the traditional rational-basis test, such as Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, 225 N.W.2d 39 (N.D.1974). That proceeding involved an equal-protection challenge to statutes limiting recovery from the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund to $5,000 in those cases in which the tortfeasor could not be ascertained, while permitting a recovery of $10,000 in other cases. This court rejected the challenge, concluding that the purpose of the Fund was to provide some compensation to victims of automobile accidents who otherwise would be left without a means of recovery and that the allocation among recipients, the amounts available, the number of other State functions in need of money, and other considerations were matters within the competency of the Legislature. Recovery from the Fund is not a fundamental right. Neither are classifications based on residency inherently suspect.[3]Horst v. Guy, 211 N.W.2d 723 (N.D.1973); accord, Ward v. Bd. of Examiners of Eng., Etc., Com. of P. R., 409 F. Supp. 1258 (D.Puerto Rico 1976), aff'd, 429 U.S. 801, 97 S. Ct. 37, 50 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1976). Nor do we find the intermediate standard used in Herman v. Magnuson, supra, applicable here. We therefore apply the traditional rational-basis test. Under this standard we find the classification is rationally related to the State's objective of limiting recovery to residents alone. This is a legitimate objective. As noted by this court in Horst v. Guy, supra, an action to secure payment of a veteran's bonus: The State has an interest in the general welfare of its residents, which is promoted by compensating them for injuries caused by financially irresponsible drivers, that does not extend to residents of other States. A residency-based classification furthers this legitimate objective by limiting recovery to only those whose welfare concerns the State. Accordingly, we hold that Section 39-17-03 is not violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The residency requirement of Section 39-17-03 is constitutional.[4] Mrs. Law does not meet this requirement and therefore cannot recover from the Fund. Because of our holding on the first two issues, we need not consider the other issues raised by the parties. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PEDERSON, PAULSON and SAND, JJ., concur. [1] It is conceded by counsel for the Fund that had the estate brought the action, instead of Mrs. Law, it would not have been contested. Because this is not the situation before the court, we need not consider whether the estate would be a "resident" for purposes of Section 39-17-03. See Rosenfield v. Angerstein, 71 N.J.Super. 409, 177 A.2d 38 (1962), discussed infra. [2] Our holding that the clear meaning of the statute should govern so that "resident" means "resident" is consistent with our reasoning in Lohnes v. Cloud, 254 N.W.2d 430 (N.D.1977), wherein this court in effect held that, as used in Section 39-17-03, "State court" means "State court." [3] Classifications which are within the inherently suspect category are discussed in State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1977). [4] See Holly v. Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund, 29 Md.App. 498, 349 A.2d 670 (1975), in which the Maryland Court of Special Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the residency requirement in its Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law.