Title: FREDERICK MONROE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

FREDERICK MONROE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 5126 P.3d 97Case Number: 04-105Decided: 01/10/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
FREDERICK 
MONROE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

The 
Honorable Kenneth Stebner, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

Ken Koski, 
State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. Roden, 
Senior Assistant Public Defender. 

 
 
Representing Appellee:

Patrick J. 
Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; David Delicath, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General.                 
            

            

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, VOIGT, BURKE, JJ., and SPANGLER, D.J., 
Retired.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Frederick Monroe 
was convicted of two counts of felony interference with a peace officer.  On appeal, Mr. Monroe challenges the 
denial of his motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement.  He also contends that his absence from a 
competency hearing deprived him of due process.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Monroe 
presents two issues on appeal:

 
 

I.                     
Whether the district court 
erred in denying [his] motion to suppress his statement, violating his rights 
under the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 11 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 
 

II.                   
Whether [his] Fifth, Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendment right to be present at every critical stage of the 
criminal proceedings against him was violated when he was not allowed to attend 
his own competency hearing.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      At the time of 
the incident, Mr. Monroe was incarcerated in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  Corporal Cleta Morrow 
was a correctional officer assigned to Mr. Monroe's unit.  On the afternoon of December 31, 2002, 
the inmates in the unit were locked in their cells to be counted.  After the count was completed, the 
inmates were released from their cells.  
Mr. Monroe exited his cell and approached Corporal Morrow while she was 
standing at a podium doing paperwork.  
She did not notice his approach.  
Mr. Monroe made a derogatory and vulgar reference to Corporal Morrow and 
punched her in the head as she turned toward him.  The blow knocked Corporal Morrow to the 
ground.  Mr. Monroe kicked her.  Corporal Morrow defended herself and 
called for assistance.  

 
 
[¶4]      Officer Knight 
was the first to respond.  He 
sprayed Mr. Monroe with pepper spray and blocked his access to Corporal Morrow 
while she exited the pod.  Mr. 
Monroe attempted to kick Officer Knight.  
Sergeant Peach and Officer Moren entered the pod.  Corporal Morrow also reentered the pod 
to help secure it.  Mr. Monroe 
yelled at Sergeant Peach, referred to Corporal Morrow again in derogatory 
fashion and kicked Sergeant Peach.  
Mr. Monroe was eventually subdued.  
Corporal Morrow and Sergeant Peach were treated for their injuries at the 
local hospital.

[¶5]      Sergeant James 
Rosentreter of the Carbon County Sheriff's Office investigated the 
incident.  On January 7, 2003, he 
interviewed Mr. Monroe at the penitentiary.  Prior to asking Mr. Monroe any 
questions, Sergeant Rosentreter provided a Miranda warning to Mr. Monroe.  He then asked Mr. Monroe if he wanted to 
talk to him.  Mr. Monroe responded 
by saying, "Are you going to get me a good attorney?"  Sergeant Rosentreter replied, "In whose 
eyes?"  Mr. Monroe responded to that 
statement by providing Sergeant Rosentreter with information concerning the 
incident.  Sergeant Rosentreter 
asked follow-up questions to which Mr. Monroe provided additional 
information.  Subsequently, Mr. 
Monroe was charged with two counts of felony interference with a peace officer 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) (LexisNexis 2001).1

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Monroe was 
arraigned on April 28, 2003, and entered a plea of "not guilty" to both 
counts.  On July 9, 2003, defense 
counsel filed a Motion for Evaluation to Determine Competency.  The motion sought an evaluation pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(a) (LexisNexis 2001) in order to determine Mr. 
Monroe's fitness to proceed.  The 
district court granted the motion and entered an order suspending proceedings 
until Mr. Monroe's competency to proceed was determined.  The evaluation was conducted by Dr. 
Abram C. Hitt, a staff psychologist at the WyomingStateHospital.  In early September 2003, Dr. Hitt 
submitted his report in which he concluded that Mr. Monroe was competent to 
proceed with trial.  On September 
17, 2003, the district court entered a Notice of Setting scheduling a competency 
hearing for October 24, 2003.

 
 
[¶7]      On October 24, 
2003, defense counsel and counsel for the State appeared for the scheduled 
hearing.  Mr. Monroe was not present 
because transportation arrangements from the penitentiary had not been 
made.  Defense counsel advised the 
district court that she had no objection to the report and did not contest that 
Mr. Monroe was fit to proceed.  
Defense counsel also requested that the court end the suspension of 
further proceedings and set a trial date.  
The State advised that it had no objection to the report.  The district court determined that Mr. 
Monroe was competent to proceed and scheduled the matter for 
trial.

 
 
[¶8]      Shortly before 
trial, Mr. Monroe moved to suppress the statements that he made to Sergeant 
Rosentreter.  He contended that he 
had invoked his right to counsel but Sergeant Rosentreter improperly continued 
to question him regarding the incident.  
After hearing, the district court denied the motion.  A jury trial was held.  Mr. Monroe asserted a defense of 
"automatism."  Dr. Hitt did not 
testify and the contents of his report were not disclosed to the jury.  Mr. Monroe was found guilty on both 
counts.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
Motion to suppress

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. Monroe 
asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.  He contends that his question, "Are you 
going to get me a good attorney?" was an unambiguous request for counsel which 
prevented further interrogation until he was provided an attorney.  Alternatively, he contends that he made 
an ambiguous request for counsel which limited further interrogation to a 
clarification of his desire for counsel.

 
 
[¶10]   
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we apply the following 
standard of review:

 
 
"Findings of factual issues made by the district 
court considering a motion to suppress are not disturbed on appeal unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994).  Since the district court conducts the 
hearing on the motion to suppress and has the opportunity to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary 
inferences, deductions, and conclusions, evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the district court's determination.  Id.  [I]ssue[s] of law . . . [are] reviewed 
de novo.  Id., Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1170-71 
(Wyo. 
1997)."  

 
 

Jelle v. 
State, 2005 WY 111, ¶ 13, 119 P.3d 403, 407 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Mackrill 
v. State, 2004 WY 
129, ¶ 12, 100 P.3d 361, 364 (Wyo. 2004)).

 
 
[¶11]   
The motion to suppress hearing was relatively limited in scope.  Mr. Monroe contended that his remark, 
"Are you going to get me a good attorney?" was an unequivocal request for 
counsel which precluded further questioning pursuant to our decision in Hadden v. State, 2002 WY 41, ¶ 25, 42 P.3d 495, 504 (Wyo. 2002).  The State contended that Mr. Monroe's 
query did not rise to the level of an unequivocal request for counsel and that, 
based on Hadden, questioning 
regarding the incident was permissible.  
The parties agreed that Mr. Monroe was in custody at the time of the 
interrogation.  Sergeant Rosentreter 
was the only witness.  He testified 
as follows:  

 
 

Q.                
Did you introduce yourself 
to Mr. Monroe?

 
 

A.                 
Yes, I 
did.

Q.        Did 
you tell him what you wanted to speak to him about?

 
 
A.        Yes, 
I did.

 
 
Q.        Did 
you advise him of his rights under Miranda?

 
 
A.        Yes, 
I did.

 
 
Q.        How 
did you do that?

 
 
A.        I 
read it off of a card.

 
 
Q.        Do 
you have that card with you?

 
 
A.        Yes, 
I do.

 
 
Q.        Would 
you state to the Court how you read that advisement?

 
 
A.        Do 
you want me to read it?

 
 
Q.        
Exactly as you would have done it that day, to the best of your 
ability[.]

 
 
A.        Mr. 
Monroe, you have the right to remain silent.  Anything you say can and will be used 
against you in a court of law.  You 
have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are 
being questioned.  If you cannot 
afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any 
questioning, if you wish.  You can 
decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make 
any statements.

 
 
            
And then I asked him, do you understand these rights that I've explained 
to you?  Having those rights in 
mind, do you wish to talk to me now?

 
 

Q.                
How did Mr. Monroe 
respond?

 
 

A.                 
He asked me if I was going 
to get him a good attorney.

 
 

Q.                
Did you take that as a 
request for an attorney?

 
 

A.                 
No.

 
 

Q.                
What [did] you say in 
response to him?

 
 
A.        He 
asked if [I] was going to get him a good attorney.  I said, in whose eyes?  Then Mr. Monroe went on to tell me what 
had happened. 

 
 
Q.        
Specifically, what's the first thing, as you remember, after you said 
good attorney, in whose eyes?

 
 
A.        His 
next statement was, I try to mind my own business out 
here.

 
 
Q.        And 
did he say anything before you responded to him?

 
 
A.        I 
don't understand.

 
 
Q.        Did 
he make any other statements before you said something?

 
 
A.        
Yes.

 
 
Q.        
What's the next thing he said[?]

 
 
A.        That 
-- Let's see.  He said, I try to 
mind my own business out here.  I 
believe his next statement was, if it wasn't for her, I would still be in C 
Unit.  I don't remember, I would 
have to read my report to say exactly how it went.

 
 
Q.        Did 
you prepare a report contemporaneous with this interview?

 
 
A.        Yes, 
I did.

 
 
Q.        Would 
it refresh your recollection to take a look at that 
report?

 
 
A.        Yes, 
it would.

 
 
. . . 

 
 
Q.        
Deputy Rosentreter, I'm showing you a copy of your sheriff's office 
report.

 
 
A.        Yes, 
sir.

 
 
Q.        Would 
you take a look at that real quickly.  
Does that refresh your recollection of the next thing that Mr. Monroe 
said to you?

 
 
A.        
Yes.  He did say, "I'm doing 
my best to mind my own business out here.  
Everyone in C2 knows about this officer and the way she 
is."

 
 
Q.        Did 
you respond to that statement?

 
 
A.        No, I 
didn't.

 
 
Q.        What 
did he say next?

 
 
A.        "She 
has mood swings, you know, unless it's about time for her to get off work.  The 2:00 count, my roommate says, here 
she comes, looks like she was in a race.  
I wanted out and she slammed the door and I got fed up with it and I 
totally lost it."

 
 
Q.        Did 
you say anything at that point?

 
 
A.        
No.

 
 
Q.        What 
was the next thing that was said?

 
 
A.        It 
continues on, "I did what I did and that was it."  

 
 
[¶12]   
After Mr. Monroe made these initial statements, Sergeant Rosentreter 
followed up with only three questions regarding the incident.  He asked Mr. Monroe, "what he did" and 
"what happened." He also asked Mr. Monroe if he received "any marks in the 
incident."  Mr. Monroe responded to 
the questions by providing additional information regarding the incident.  According to Sergeant Rosentreter, Mr. 
Monroe had clear speech during the interview and did not appear to be confused 
in any way. 

 
 
[¶13]   
The district court took the matter under advisement and subsequently 
issued a decision letter.  The 
district court found that Mr. Monroe had not unequivocally invoked his right to 
counsel and, based upon our decision in Hadden, denied the Motion to Suppress. 
The district court explained its reasoning as follows:

 
 
The parties concede that Defendant was "in custody" 
and was subject to "interrogation" by Sgt. Rosentreter.  Appropriately, the parties have narrowed 
the pertinent issue to one of whether, by asking whether Sgt. Rosentreter would 
get Defendant a "good attorney," Defendant was invoking his right to counsel, 
mandating a halt to further questioning.  
If Defendant did not invoke his right to counsel, the parties concede 
that questioning was able to continue and that Defendant voluntarily waived his 
rights and answered the questions of him.

 
 
Both parties cite to Hadden v. State, 2002 WY 41, 42 P.3d 495 
(Wyo. 2002) in which the Wyoming Supreme Court stated:

 
 
To recapitulate:  We held in Miranda that a suspect is entitled to 
the assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation even though the 
Constitution does not provide for such assistance.  We held in Edwards that if the suspect invokes the 
right to counsel at any time, the police must immediately cease questioning him 
until an attorney is present.  But 
we are unwilling to create a third layer of prophylaxis to prevent police 
questioning when the suspect might 
want a lawyer.  Unless the suspect 
actually requests an attorney, questioning may continue.

 
 

Davis v. 
United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994) (emphasis in original).

 
 
In Davis, the defendant was given Miranda warnings, and then he waived his 
right to remain silent and to consult with an attorney prior to 
questioning.  During his interview, 
Davis said, 
"Maybe I should talk to a lawyer."  
Davis was 
told that he had a right to an attorney but then responded that he did not want 
an attorney.  Later in the 
interview, he said, "I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else."  At that point, the interview 
ceased.  Id., 512 U.S.  at 454, 
[114 S. Ct. 2350].  The Supreme 
Court's reasoning continued:

 
 
The Edwards rule - questioning must cease if 
the suspect asks for a lawyer - provides a bright line that can be applied by 
officers in the real world of investigation and interrogation without unduly 
hampering the gathering of information.  
But if we were to require questioning to cease if a suspect makes a 
statement that might be a request 
for an attorney, this clarity and ease of application would be lost.  Police officers would be forced to make 
difficult judgment calls about whether the suspect in fact wants a lawyer even 
though he has not said so, with the threat of suppression if they guess 
wrong.  We therefore hold that, 
after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers 
may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an 
attorney.

 
 

Id., 512 U.S at 461 (emphasis in 
original).

 
 
The Supreme Court concluded its analysis stating that 
the courts below found that Davis's remark - "Maybe I should talk to a 
lawyer" - was not a request for counsel, and it found no reason to disturb this 
conclusion.  Davis, 512 U.S at 
462.  The Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has applied that rule in similar circumstances.  United States v. Zamora, 222 F.3d 756, 
766 (10th Cir. 2000) (Zamora's statement that he "might want to talk to a 
lawyer" was ambiguous, as Zamora appeared to be thinking out loud, and 
questioning was not required to cease).

            

We adopt the rule espoused by Davis and Zamora.  In doing so, we have consulted with the 
views of our brethren in many jurisdictions and find them to be in agreement 
with the rule as well.  State v. Simmons, 2000 MT 329 [¶¶] 
19-24, 15 P.3d 408, [¶¶] 19-24 (Mont. 2000) (although defendant at first 
indicated he wanted an attorney, he then said, "I do not want an attorney 
present just for this part, no"--and answered questions asked of him);  Harte v. State, 13 P.3d 420, 428-29 
(Nev. 2000) (During the course of his interview, Harte said, "Just out of 
curiosity, when do I get to talk to a lawyer?";  "I . . . they . . . they told me, you 
know, that they thought I should talk to a lawyer whatever";  "I don't wanna be a bitch and say, you 
know, give my [sic ] lawyer.  But I 
mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?";   however, in full context of his 
interview and clarity of Miranda 
warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 
(Colo. App. 1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right 
to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498, 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App. 2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to 
remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put 
to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 
4 ¶¶ 9-10, 994 P.2d 61, ¶¶ 19-24 (Okla. 2000) ("I feel as though I should have 
an attorney," was equivocal response); State v. Kiriluk, 1999 UT App 030 ¶¶ 
7-8, 975 P.2d 469, ¶¶ 7-8 (Utah App. 1999), (defendant's response of "I don't," 
when asked if he had anything to say about evidence found in his apartment not 
unambiguous request for counsel or to remain silent); State v. Donesay, 959 P.2d 862, 871 
(Kan. 1998) (adopting rule in context of right to remain silent); Braboy v. State, 745 A.2d 471, 477-79 
(Md. App. 2000) ("I want a lawyer but I can't afford a lawyer," not an 
unambiguous exercise of right to counsel where defendant decided to talk after 
he was informed that a lawyer would be appointed for him if he could not afford 
one); Goodner v. State, 714 N.E.2d 638, 641 (Ind. 1999) (Goodner equivocated about whether or not he should talk 
without a lawyer, but ultimately signed written waiver and talked); State v. Brown, 589 N.W.2d 69, 72-74 
(Iowa App. 1998) (defendant's statement, "Is my lawyer here?" not an unambiguous 
request for counsel); State v. 
Greybull, 1998 ND 102 ¶¶ 8-9, 14-21, 579 N.W.2d 161, ¶¶ 8-9, 14-21 (N.D. 
1998) (defendant's statements, "You can't make me say nothing," "Do I have to 
get a lawyer?" and "Do I need to get a lawyer?" - ambiguous under Davis); Cothren v. State, 705 So. 2d 849, 851-55 
(Ala. Crim. App. 1997) ("I think I want to talk to an attorney before I answer 
that," ambiguous under circumstances of case);  but see Billups v. State, 762 A.2d 609, 
614-16 (Md. App. 2000) (defendant signed signature line on form which purported 
to waive his rights to remain silent and have counsel, but wrote "NO" by his 
signature - construed to be unequivocal exercise of right to remain silent and 
have an attorney).

 
 
                        
Hadden, ¶¶ 
22-25.

 
 
Applying Hadden to the facts of the present case, 
this Court finds that Defendant did not unambiguously exercise his right to 
counsel.  Given the context of 
Defendant's interview with Sgt. Rosentreter and the clarity of the Miranda warnings read to Defendant, 
Defendant did not request counsel simply by asking Sgt. Rosentreter if he would 
get him a "good attorney."  Not only 
were Defendant's follow up statements initially completely voluntary on his part 
(e.g. Sgt. Rosentreter only responded 
by asking "Good in whose eyes?"), but continued questioning was permitted under 
the guidance of Hadden.  Accordingly, Defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel with respect to the custodial 
interrogation.

 
 
[¶14]   
The district court concluded that the phrase, "Are you going to get me a 
good attorney?" was not an unequivocal request for counsel under the 
circumstances.  We agree.  The phrase could be viewed as 
preliminary in nature, seeking information which might be useful to Mr. Monroe 
in determining whether he would exercise his right to counsel.  The query could be viewed as rhetorical, 
one to which Mr. Monroe did not expect a reply.  It could be viewed as a derisive comment 
by Mr. Monroe suggesting his opinion of prospective counsel.  No doubt, there are other possible 
interpretations of the phrase, including the one argued by Mr. Monroe on 
appeal.  

 
 
[¶15]   
Additionally, and perhaps more significantly, we afford deference to the 
finding of the district court because when we examine "the cold words of the 
transcript of testimony, we do not have the benefit of how the trial judge sees 
and hears the witness--the pitch of the voice, facial changes, the movement in 
the witness--all of which may tell a separate story, to be given credence."  Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 839 
(Wyo. 1980) (quoting Madrid v. Norton, 596 P.2d 1108, 1117 
(Wyo. 
1979)).  The district court was able 
to observe Sergeant Rosentreter testify, hear the inflection and intonation of 
his voice, and understand how Mr. Monroe delivered the phrase.  Sergeant Rosentreter did not express any 
doubt regarding whether Mr. Monroe had intended to request an attorney, and the 
district court was in the best position to assess his credibility.  We conclude that the district court's 
finding that Mr. Monroe had not unequivocally invoked his right 
to counsel was not clearly erroneous.  

 
 
[¶16]   
Mr. Monroe also contends that even if his request was equivocal, it was 
sufficient to prevent further questioning regarding the incident absent a signed 
written waiver of his Miranda 
rights.  He relies upon our decision 
in Suliber v. State, 866 P.2d 85 
(Wyo. 1993) in 
support of his position.  In Suliber, we held that police questioning 
following an equivocal request for counsel was limited to clarification of the 
request, and that further interrogation was only permissible after procuring a 
written waiver of that right.  
Id. at 
90-91.

 
 
[¶17]   
We decided Suliber in 1993 
and, in support of our decision, relied heavily upon the holding of the United 
States Supreme Court in Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, reh'g denied 452 U.S. 973, 101 S. Ct. 3128, 69 L. Ed. 2d 984 (1981).  
Subsequently in 1994, the United States Supreme Court refined the 
contours of Edwards with its decision 
in Davis in which it 
held that only an unequivocal request for counsel mandates a halt to 
interrogation.  Davis v. United 
States, 512 U.S. 452, 462, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2357, 
129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994).  We accepted 
this refinement when we adopted the Davis 
rationale.  Hadden, ¶ 25.  Our extensive review in Hadden of other cases regarding 
equivocal requests for counsel, together with our express adoption of Davis, reflects our intention to abandon 
prior, inconsistent approaches.  We 
stated:

 
 
The list of cases cited above is by no means 
exhaustive, and we concede that there are cases to the contrary. See, e.g., 
State v. 
Jones, 102 Wash. App. 89, 6 P.3d 58, 61-62 (2000) (Washington declined to adopt 
Davis rule); and State v. 
Rogan, 91 
Hawai'i 405, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 (Hawai'i 1999) (according broader 
rights under Hawai'i Constitution). However, we find the Davis decision and its progeny convincing, and we 
adopt that rule for Wyoming.

 
 

Hadden, 
¶ 26.  
To the extent that Suliber 
conflicts with our decision in Hadden, it was overruled sub silentio.  We find no error in the district court's 
denial of the motion to suppress.

 
 
Right to be 
present at competency hearing

 
 
[¶18]   
Mr. Monroe asserts that he was deprived of his constitutional right to be 
present at the competency hearing.  
"The Sixth Amendment and the due process clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee an accused the 
right to be present during every stage of the criminal proceeding that is 
critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the 
procedure." Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 
102, ¶ 20, 33 P.3d 758, 765 (Wyo. 2001).  
The question of whether a defendant has the right to be present at a 
specific phase of the criminal proceeding is an issue of law which we review de novo.  Id., ¶ 
19.

 
 
[¶19]   
The district court granted Mr. Monroe's motion for an evaluation.  Dr. Abram Hitt, staff psychologist for 
the StateHospital, conducted the 
evaluation and prepared a forensic report in which he 
concluded:

 
 
[I]t can be stated with a reasonable degree of 
psychological certainty that Mr. Monroe has the basic capacity to comprehend his 
position, understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, 
conduct his defense in a rational manner and cooperate with his counsel to the 
end that a defense may be interposed in his behalf.  It is further concluded that the 
defendant can retain his basic capacity to proceed through the adjudicative 
process in the foreseeable future. 

 
 
[¶20]   
A competency hearing was scheduled.  
Mr. Monroe was not present because arrangements had not been made to 
transport him to the hearing.  
Defense counsel did not seek a continuance.  Instead, defense counsel requested entry 
of a finding of competency to proceed based upon Dr. Hitt's report.  The transcript reflects the 
following:

 
 
The Court:      [Defense counsel] 
is present representing the Defendant, [Prosecutor] is present representing the 
State, Mr. Monroe is not present.  I 
believe arrangements weren't made to have him transported from the 
penitentiary.

 
 
            
But really, the only matter before the Court, the proceedings were stayed 
pending evaluation at the state hospital on his fitness to proceed.  The report indicates a finding that he 
is fit to proceed.

 
 
            
And pursuant to the Statute, 7-11-303, "If neither the State, nor the 
accused or his counsel contests the opinion referred to . . . relative to 
fitness to proceed, the Court may make a determination and finding of record on 
this issue on the basis of the report filed or the Court may hold a hearing on 
its own motion."

 
 
            
Does the Defense wish that the Court make a finding of record on this 
issue on the basis of the report filed?

 
 
[Defense counsel]:    Yes, Your Honor, that's 
correct.  For the record, since I 
have become counsel of record for the case, I have met with my client 
twice.  The first meeting was a very 
lengthy type meeting.  I have 
reviewed the state hospital evaluation with him.  In fact, I read it to him and explained 
things word for word.  So we did go 
through that very carefully.

 
 
            
Based on the findings of the report and based on my interactions with my 
client, I do not contest the findings of the state hospital report.  We would ask the Court at this time that 
we be able to unsuspend proceedings so we're able to set a trial date and get 
things rolling again in this case, Your Honor.

 
 
The Court:      Thank 
you.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:   Your Honor, the State also 
stipulates to the findings in the report, and would ask that the Court enter the 
appropriate order.

 
 
The Court:      All right.  The Court has reviewed the report.  And based on the reading of the statute 
that allows the Court to make a finding if neither the accused nor his counsel 
contests the opinion referred to, will rule on this.  But I will rule that he is fit to 
proceed as stated in the report and set the matter for further proceedings.  Anything further on State versus 
Monroe?

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  
Not from [the] State, Your Honor.

 
 
The Court:      
Okay.

 
 
[¶21]   
Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(f) (LexisNexis 2001), a hearing is 
required only "[i]f the opinion relative to fitness to proceed is contested."2  Dr. Hitt's opinion was not contested and 
supported a finding that Mr. Monroe was competent to proceed.  Based upon the contents of the report 
and the lack of objection to the report, the district court was authorized to 
enter a finding of competency to proceed without holding a hearing.  Because no actual hearing took place, 
Mr. Monroe's right to attend did not arise.  We find no error in the procedure 
utilized by the court or in its determination that Mr. Monroe was fit to 
proceed.3 

 
 
[¶22]   
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) 
provides: 

 
 
(b) 
A person who intentionally and knowingly causes or attempts to cause bodily 
injury to a peace officer engaged in the lawful performance of his official 
duties is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten 
(10) years.

 
 

2Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(f) (LexisNexis 2001) states:

If 
neither the state, nor the accused or his counsel contests the opinion referred 
to in paragraph (c)(iii) of this section relative to fitness to proceed, the 
court may make a determination and finding of record on this issue on the basis 
of the report filed or the court may hold a hearing on its own 
motion.  If 
the opinion relative to fitness to proceed is contested the court shall hold a 
hearing on the issue.  . . . 

 
 

3Mr. Monroe 
does not contest the finding that he was fit to 
proceed.