Title: In Re Estate of Rose

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

108 Ariz. 101 (1972) 493 P.2d 112 In the Matter of the ESTATE of Eliza Jane ROSE, also known as Eliza Jane Norman, Deceased. In the Matter of the ESTATE of Eliza Jane NORMAN, also known as Eliza Jane Rose, Deceased. Henry G. NORMAN, Jr., Appellant, v. TRANSAMERICA TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. No. 10579-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. January 21, 1972. Rehearing Denied March 21, 1972. *102 Divelbiss & Gage, by Carl W. Divelbiss, Phoenix, for appellant. Lewis & Roca, by Charles Crehore, David L. Cocanower, Phoenix, for appellee. Rehearing Denied March 21, 1972. See 495 P.2d 138. UDALL, Justice: This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of Petitioner's motions to set aside the decree of distribution as to his wife's estate and to deny the Petition for an Order of Final Discharge and Final Discharge of the Administrator of said estate. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. Opinion of the Court of Appeals is hereby vacated. This action centers around two separately instituted probate proceedings, both involving the estate of the same deceased person Eliza Jane Norman, aka Eliza Jane Rose. Eliza Jane Norman died in Phoenix, Arizona, on December 29, 1965. She was survived by her husband, Henry G. Norman, Jr. (Appellant herein) and a number of distant relatives. At the time of her death Mrs. Norman owned an interest in the following described property, situated in Maricopa County: Parcel I had been owned by the deceased at the time of her marriage to Henry Norman in May, 1941, while Parcel II was acquired by the Normans during coverture. In July of 1966, Mr. Norman consulted an attorney preparatory to probating the estate of his deceased wife. However, before probate proceedings were begun, Mr. Norman became ill and was forced to quit work for almost a year. Feeling he could not financially afford to bear the costs of administering his deceased wife's estate, nothing further was done until September 12, 1969, when he filed a petition in the Superior Court for Maricopa County, praying that letters of administration issue to him as administrator of the estate of Eliza Jane Norman, deceased. In March, 1970, while in the process of checking some property in Oklahoma owned by his deceased spouse, appellant first learned that on November 12, 1968, Transamerica Title Insurance Company (hereinafter Transamerica Title) had filed a Petition for Letters of Administration *103 (Probate Cause No. 76043) in the Superior Court for Maricopa County. Said Petition for Letters stated, in part, that "Eliza Jane Rose, aka Eliza Jane Norman, a single woman, died intestate in the City of Phoenix," (emphasis added) and that at the time of the hearing on the petition one or more of the deceased's heirs would nominate Transamerica Title to act as administrator. The petition listed 17 known heirs, none of which resided in Arizona. While notice of the hearing was sent to each of the 17 nonresident heirs, notice was never sent to appellant, the surviving spouse. Notice of said hearing was duly published in the Tempe Daily News under the following caption: "In the Matter of the Estate of ELIZA JANE ROSE, aka ELIZA JANE NORMAN." On December 2, 1968, at the hearing on the Petition for Letters of Administration, Celestine Glass Nash, a niece of the deceased, nominated Transamerica Title to be administrator of the Estate of Eliza Jane Rose, the order deleting the name of Norman. Notice to creditors was duly published and Parcel I, supra, of the deceased's property, held in the deceased's maiden name, was sold. The Order approving the sale was filed on July 2, 1969. By the time appellant learned of this prior proceeding, an order approving Transamerica's final account and report, and decree of distribution had been entered (November 21, 1969). Upon learning of this proceeding, appellant, by motion, sought to have the order of November 21, 1969, approving the final account and ordering distribution, set aside. On May 19, 1970, said motion was denied, and appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, Division One. While appellant has formulated a number of questions for our consideration, the crux of those questions is whether an administrator, nominated by a person who occupies an inferior position in the order of preference pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-417, can, without disclosing the name of the sole heir, confer jurisdiction upon the Superior Court to distribute said estate to persons other than the rightful heir? A person who occupies an inferior position in the order of preference set forth in A.R.S. § 14-417 may act as administrator or may appoint an administrator, subject, however, to a preferential claim and prior court approval. A.R.S. § 14-420 specifically provides that letters of administration are to be granted to the petitioner "although it appears there are other persons having better rights to the administration if such persons fail to appear and claim the issuance of letters," and the validity of a person's appointment as administrator may not be collaterally attacked if there is no jurisdictional defect appearing on the face of the proceedings. Ray v. Sommer, 14 Ariz. App. 160, 481 P.2d 530 (1971). In the case at bar the Superior Court clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings. While the decree of distribution is, by virtue of A.R.S. § 14-704, conclusive of the rights of heirs, legatees or devisees, this does not mean that defrauded parties have no legal recourse. It is well established that in probate proceedings (where the final decree of distribution is made in conformity with the law), the final decree of distribution, when approved by the court, is conclusive as to every matter involved and constitutes a bar to further proceedings concerning the same matter. In re Pedelty's Estate, 61 Ariz. 425, 150 P.2d 362 (1944), but if the decree was procured by fraud: Honk v. Karlsson, 80 Ariz. 30 at 33, 292 P.2d 455 at 457 (1956). A constructive trust arises by operation of law and not by agreement or intention. Brown v. Walls, 10 Ariz. App. 168, 457 P.2d 355 (1969); Cordoba v. Wiswall, 7 Ariz. App. 144, 436 P.2d 922 (1968). It is a remedial device, Condos v. Felder, 92 Ariz. 366, 377 P.2d 305 (1962), used whenever title to property has been obtained through actual fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, undue influence, duress, or through any other means which render it unconscionable for the holder of legal title to continue to retain and enjoy its beneficial interest. Murillo v. Hernandez, 79 Ariz. 1, 281 P.2d 786 (1955); In re Slater's Estate, 6 Ariz. App. 486, 433 P.2d 666 (1967). To justify the imposition of a constructive trust, it is necessary only that the evidence be clear and convincing and it need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. L.M. White Contracting Co. v. Tucson Rock and Sand Co., 11 Ariz. App. 540, 466 P.2d 413 (1970). In Honk v. Karlsson, supra, this Court stated: While the majority in Honk found no fraud to have existed by virtue of Emma Honk's statements claiming herself to be the "only surviving heir of David Swanson, deceased" and therefore held no constructive trust to exist, we are of the opinion in this case that appellant has established a strong case for a finding of fraud. This opinion is based on the following facts: 1. 17 out-of-state heirs were located while appellant who continuously resided with his wife during their married life for more than 20 years in Phoenix was not. 2. The married name of "Norman" was known as evidenced by the Petition for Letters of Administration. 3. The original Petition for Letters of Administration, Notice of Hearing Petition and Affidavit of Mailing Notice were all entitled "In the Matter of the Estate of Eliza Jane Rose, aka Eliza Jane Norman" but all subsequent captions including Notice to Creditors and Order of Appraisers were captioned in the name of "Eliza Jane Rose" only, a name she had not used since her marriage to appellant in 1941. 4. The residence the appellant and his wife lived at continuously until her death *105 was according to the record either the property actually probated by respondent (Parcel I) or in close proximity to the property probated. 5. The Notice of Hearing Petition captioned "Eliza Jane Rose aka Eliza Jane Norman" appeared in the Tempe Daily News. The residence of the decedent, though, as well as the property probated were both situated in the City of Phoenix.[1] The Notice to Creditors did appear in the Phoenix Gazette but it was entitled "Eliza Jane Rose" only. This fact suggests fraud not only as to appellant but to creditors as well, if any existed. 6. If appellant had been notified there is no question as to his legal right to the property. Pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 14-201 and 14-203, there being no surviving children or parent, whether the property herein be considered separate property or community property of the deceased, all right, title and interest of the deceased in said property vested in her surviving spouse (Henry Norman, Jr.) upon the death of decedent, Eliza Jane Norman. 7. There appears to have been no investigation (there is no record on this) into the name of "Norman" by the heirs or administrator since an inquiry into any of the following would have revealed the existence of the appellant: On the basis of the facts, as they were presented to us, it would appear that fraud has been established by clear and convincing evidence. However, this matter will be submitted to the trial court in order that the appellee be given the opportunity to rebut the facts as presented by the appellant and raise any other defenses in his behalf. While the Court in Honk had before it, in making its determination, a full record with sworn testimony of the parties and interested witnesses, depositions of the out-of-state heirs, the efforts made to find the existence of such other heirs, correspondence, etc., we lack such a record from below. There has been no trial on the issue of fraud, nor on any finding of fact. If the facts are established, on remand, to be as they appear in this decision and the appellee is unable to satisfactorily rebut them or raise any defenses relative to them, the appellant will be entitled to the relief requested. Reversed and remanded for a trial de novo. HAYS, C.J., CAMERON, V.C.J., and STRUCKMEYER and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur. NOTE: Justice UDALL was assigned this case prior to his retirement and was recalled by court order to complete same. Justice WILLIAM A. HOLOHAN did not participate. [1] We recognize that this technically complies with the requirement of a "general circulation" newspaper.