Title: Commonwealth v. Jenks

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13016 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ALFRED JENKS. 
 
 
July 2, 2021. 
 
 
Evidence, Scientific test.  Practice, Criminal, Postconviction 
relief. 
 
 
In this case, we are called upon once again to determine 
whether a defendant has met the modest threshold under G. L. 
c. 278A, § 3, to be entitled to a hearing on his motions for 
postconviction forensic testing.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 481 Mass. 799, 804 (2019); Commonwealth v. Clark, 472 
Mass. 120, 132 (2015); Commonwealth v. Wade, 467 Mass. 496, 507 
(2014) (Wade II).  At issue here is whether the defendant, 
Alfred Jenks, has satisfied the requirement of § 3 (b) (5) that 
he point to information "demonstrating that the evidence or 
biological material has not been subjected to the requested 
analysis," either because "the requested analysis had not yet 
been developed at the time of [his] conviction," see § 3 (b) (5) 
(i), or because his trial attorney failed to seek available 
analysis that "a reasonably effective attorney would have 
sought," see § 3 (b) (5) (iv).  For the reasons discussed infra, 
we conclude that Jenks has met the statutory threshold under § 3 
(b) (5) (iv) to be entitled to a hearing on his motions.1 
 
Background.  We summarized the facts of the underlying 
shooting, as the jury could have found them, in Commonwealth v. 
Jenks, 426 Mass. 582, 583-584 (1998) (Jenks I).  As pertinent 
here, Jenks was convicted in 1996 of murder in the first degree 
and a related firearm offense, in connection with the shooting 
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Boston 
Bar Association, and by the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services Innocence Program, Boston College Innocence Program, 
the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and 
New England Innocence Project. 
2 
 
death of the victim at a crowded dance hall. Jenks was convicted 
of premeditated murder on a theory of transferred intent, based 
on evidence that, during an altercation on the dance floor, he 
shot at particular individuals with the intent to kill them, and 
one of the bullets passed through a wall, killing the victim. 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth presented audio evidence that 
seven shots were fired.  Six projectiles, six casings, and a 
nine millimeter semiautomatic handgun were recovered from the 
scene, and a hole in the wall suggested that an unrecovered 
projectile had traveled outside the dance hall.  Based on his 
use of a comparison microscope to compare the recovered 
projectiles and casings with each other and with "test fires" 
(projectiles and casings test fired from the recovered firearm), 
a ballistics expert for the Commonwealth opined that all of the 
recovered projectiles and casings had been fired from the same 
nine millimeter handgun that was recovered from the scene. 
 
The defense theory was that shots had been fired from more 
than one firearm and that Jenks had fired in self-defense to 
fend off a physical attack by multiple individuals, at least one 
of whom had a firearm.  In support of this theory, defense 
counsel presented the testimony of two experts:  a chemist (who 
had experience in ballistics and firearms) testified that, based 
on the trajectory of the projectiles, two of the projectiles had 
been fired from opposite sides of the room; and an audio 
engineer testified that, based on an analysis of the audio 
recording of the gunshots, the last two gunshots were similar in 
frequency to each other and different in frequency from the 
preceding five gunshots, which could indicate that two different 
guns had been fired.  Neither expert had analyzed the recovered 
firearm, projectiles, casings, or the test fires performed by 
the Commonwealth's expert, and there is no indication in the 
docket that any other potential defense expert requested to view 
that evidence.2 
 
This court affirmed Jenks's convictions and the denial of 
his first motion for a new trial.  See Jenks I, 426 Mass. at 
588.  He then filed additional motions for a new trial in 2004 
and 2010, which were denied.  Jenks's gatekeeper applications 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, for leave to appeal from the 
denial of those motions also were denied. 
 
In September 2019, Jenks filed a motion for postconviction 
testing and analysis of ballistics evidence, arguing, among 
 
 
2 The trial judge had allowed Jenks's motions for funding 
for a firearms expert, a ballistician, and an audio engineer. 
3 
 
other things, that he was entitled to the testing under G. L. 
c. 278A and Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 
1501 (2001).  In support of his motion, Jenks submitted the 
affidavit of a ballistics expert, who opined that "[t]here is 
information . . . indicating that more than one firearm may have 
been present during the incident."  More specifically, the 
expert attested that some of the evidence envelopes containing 
projectiles recovered from the scene appeared to indicate 
weights in excess of 140 grains, and the average weight of nine 
millimeter projectiles is 115 grains, leading the expert to 
opine that "further examination is merited."3 
 
The motion judge, who was not the trial judge, denied the 
motion without a hearing.  The judge determined that Jenks had 
met all but one of the requirements to be entitled to a hearing 
on his motion under G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b).  More specifically, 
the judge determined that Jenks failed to satisfy the 
requirement of § 3 (b) (5) that Jenks point to information 
demonstrating that the evidence has not been subjected to the 
requested analysis, noting that the proffered ballistics expert 
"d[id] not attempt to qualify the requested analysis under any 
of the five subsections of [§] 3 (b) (5)."4  The motion judge 
 
 
3 As noted above, the only weapon recovered from the scene 
was a nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol.  There was testimony 
at trial that a nine millimeter firearm can only accommodate 
nine millimeter casings, but that various types of .38 caliber 
class ammunition could be fitted into a nine millimeter casing. 
 
 
4 To satisfy G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5), a motion must point 
to "information demonstrating that the evidence or biological 
material has not been subjected to the requested analysis" for 
one of five reasons: 
 
"(i) the requested analysis had not yet been developed at 
the time of the conviction; 
 
"(ii) the results of the requested analysis were not 
admissible in the courts of the commonwealth at the time of 
the conviction; 
 
"(iii) the moving party and the moving party's attorney 
were not aware of and did not have reason to be aware of 
the existence of the evidence or biological material at the 
time of the underlying case and conviction; 
 
"(iv) the moving party's attorney in the underlying case 
was aware at the time of the conviction of the existence of 
4 
 
also rejected Jenks's arguments under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), 
concluding that Jenks failed to make a prima facie showing that 
the requested discovery was likely to uncover evidence that 
might warrant a new trial. 
 
Jenks filed a renewed motion to permit testing of 
ballistics evidence in November 2019, again based on both G. L. 
c. 278A and Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), accompanied by a 
supplemental affidavit from Jenks's proffered ballistics expert.  
In the supplemental affidavit, the expert opined that "[o]ne 
area where the methodology of ballistics analysis has changed 
since the time of the 1994 incident in this case is that now 
comparison microscopes routinely utilize digital camera 
technology, whereas digital photography was rarely utilized in 
the forensic setting in the early to mid-90's."  The expert also 
pointed to the absence of certain measurements in the report 
created by the Commonwealth's ballistics expert at the time of 
trial, including the absence of information about the weights of 
some of the projectiles, the diameters of the projectiles, the 
dimensions of the land and groove impressions, and the direction 
of the rifling system.  According to Jenks's expert, if the 
diameters of any of the projectiles were determined to be .357 
inches or greater, then the projectiles in question were not 
fired from the nine millimeter firearm recovered at the scene. 
 
Based on this, Jenks argued that he had made the prima 
facie showing required by Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) (4), and 
alternatively, that he had satisfied the requirements of G. L. 
 
the evidence or biological material, the results of the 
requested analysis were admissible as evidence in courts of 
the commonwealth, a reasonably effective attorney would 
have sought the analysis and either the moving party's 
attorney failed to seek the analysis or the judge denied 
the request; or 
 
"(v) the evidence or biological material was otherwise 
unavailable at the time of the conviction." 
 
 
Section 3 (b) also requires that "when relevant" the motion 
"shall include specific references to the record in the 
underlying case or to affidavits that are filed in support of 
the motion that are signed by a person with personal knowledge 
of the factual basis of the motion."  The motion judge 
interpreted this to require that Jenks support any factual 
representations about advances in the equipment or methodology 
associated with ballistics analysis with an affidavit from an 
expert in the field. 
5 
 
c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5), by, among other means, pointing to 
information that Jenks's trial counsel failed to seek an 
analysis that "a reasonably effective attorney" would have 
sought, see § 3 (b) (5) (iv). 
 
The judge denied the renewed motion "for the reasons 
discussed in [his] earlier memorandum."  The judge also 
"reject[ed] any argument that Jenks has shown, even on a 
preliminary basis, ineffective assistance of counsel." 
 
A single justice of this court granted Jenks's application 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, for leave to appeal from the 
denial of his postconviction motions for forensic testing, and 
he now appeals. 
 
Discussion.  Jenks's primary argument on appeal is that he 
has satisfied the preliminary showing under G. L. c. 278A, § 3, 
such that he was entitled to a hearing on his motions for 
postconviction forensic testing.  As noted above, the motion 
judge determined that Jenks had satisfied all of the statute's 
requirements, except § 3 (b) (5).  Jenks asserts that he 
satisfied that subsection in two ways, either viewed alone or in 
combination.  First, he argues that his motion pointed to 
adequate information under § 3 (b) (5) (iv), demonstrating that 
a reasonably effective attorney would have engaged an 
independent ballistics expert to analyze the evidence and to 
fill in the gaps left open by the Commonwealth's expert report, 
but his attorney did not do so.  Second, he argues that his 
motion pointed to adequate information under § 3 (b) (5) (i), 
demonstrating that there have been material advances in the 
analysis of ballistics evidence and in the documentation of such 
analysis since the time of Jenks's trial, such that the analysis 
he seeks "had not yet been developed" at the time of his 
conviction. 
 
As we recently reiterated in Williams, 481 Mass. at 804: 
 
"'[T]he threshold determination to be made at the 
preliminary stage, pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 3, . . . is 
essentially nonadversarial,' Wade II, 467 Mass. at 503; the 
Commonwealth may, but need not, provide an initial 
response.  G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (e).  And although the motion 
judge makes a preliminary determination as to whether a 
defendant has included all the information required by § 3 
based on a review of the motion and the supporting 
documentation, it is not until the hearing stage that the 
defendant must prove the assertions that he or she makes in 
that motion.  See Wade II, supra at 503-504, quoting G. L. 
6 
 
c. 278A, § 3 (c).  At the motion stage, '[t]he judge does 
not "make credibility determinations, or . . . consider the 
relative weight of the evidence or the strength of the case 
presented against the [defendant] at trial."'  
[Commonwealth v.] Moffat, 478 Mass. [292,] 296 [2017], 
quoting Wade II, supra at 505-506.  In other words, at the 
motion stage, the movant's burden is low.  See [Clark, 472 
Mass. at 124-125]." 
 
We review the denial of a G. L. c. 278A, § 3, motion de novo.  
Moffat, supra at 298. 
 
We turn first to Jenks's claim that he satisfied the 
requirements of § 3 (b) (5) (iv) by pointing to information 
demonstrating that his trial attorney failed to seek available 
analysis that "a reasonably effective attorney would have 
sought."  Significantly, § 3 (b) (5) (iv) "does not require that 
a defendant satisfy the general ineffective assistance standard 
under Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96–97 (1974), but, 
rather, that he or she demonstrate 'only that "a" reasonably 
effective attorney would have sought the requested analysis, not 
that every reasonably effective attorney would have done so.'"  
Moffat, 478 Mass. at 302, quoting Wade II, 467 Mass. at 511.  
"The determination whether a reasonable attorney would have 
sought the testing is an objective one," and "a moving party is 
not required to explain the tactical or strategic reasoning of 
the party's trial counsel in not seeking the requested analysis" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Moffat, supra. 
 
We are of the view that Jenks has satisfied the low bar 
under § 3 (b) (5) (iv) to be entitled to a hearing on his 
motions.  More specifically, Jenks has pointed to information 
(in form of his expert's supplemental affidavit) that the two-
page ballistics report produced by the Commonwealth's expert 
lacked basic measurements that one would expect to see in such a 
report, including the "unusual" omission of the weights of some 
(but not all) of the projectiles.  According to Jenks's expert, 
the omitted measurements had the potential to demonstrate that 
not all of the projectiles were fired from the same firearm, 
which was a key element of the defense's theory of the case.  
The record also indicates the trial judge had granted defense 
counsel's request for funds for a ballistics expert, but that no 
such expert requested to view the recovered firearm, 
projectiles, or casings, or the test fires performed by the 
Commonwealth's expert.  Under these circumstances, Jenks has 
satisfied § 3 (b) (5) (iv), by pointing to sufficient 
information that his trial attorney failed to seek basic 
7 
 
ballistics analysis that a reasonable attorney would have 
sought. 
 
Having determined that Jenks has cleared the threshold to 
proceed to a hearing, we need not address his further arguments 
under § 3 (b) (5) (i), and we express no opinion as to his 
likelihood of success on the merits.5 
 
Conclusion.  The orders denying Jenks's G. L. c. 278A 
motions are reversed, and the case is remanded to the Superior 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Dennis M. Toomey for the defendant. 
 
Kristen W. Jiang, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Anthony D. Mirenda, Neil Austin, Rachel Hutchinson, John 
Frank Weaver, & Madison F. Bader for Boston Bar Association, 
amicus curiae. 
 
Ira L. Gant & Lisa M. Kavanaugh, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, Sarah Carlow, of Connecticut, Radha Natarajan, 
Sharon Beckman, & Chauncey Wood for Committee for Public Counsel 
Services & others, amici curiae. 
 
 
5 Jenks also argues that the motion judge erred in denying 
him the requested discovery under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) (4).  
We conclude that the motion judge did not abuse his discretion 
in declining to grant the requested discovery at the motion 
stage pursuant to rule 30 (b) (4).  See Commonwealth v. Linton, 
483 Mass. 227, 242 (2019) ("The requirements of G. L. c. 278A 
are, by design, less stringent than a motion for a new trial 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30").  For the reasons discussed 
above, we now remand for an evidentiary hearing on Jenks's 
motions for postconviction testing under G. L. c. 278A, § 7.  
Following that hearing, nothing precludes the judge from 
considering anew whether Jenks has met the requirements of rule 
30 (b) (4).