Title: S.F. v. Cobra Solutions

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 6/5/06 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
CITY AND COUNTY OF 
SAN FRANCISCO et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S126397 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/5 A103479 
COBRA SOLUTIONS, INC., et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
San Francisco County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. 417-218 
___________________________________ ) 
 
A company seeking contracts for information technology services to a city 
retained a small private law firm.  Two attorneys in the firm provided various 
services to the company, advising it about doing business with the city.  Fifteen 
months later, one of those attorneys successfully won election as the city attorney.  
Before taking office, the new city attorney announced he would personally not 
participate in any case involving a client of his former law firm. 
Fifteen months after the new city attorney was sworn in, his office named 
the company as a defendant in a complaint seeking damages for the city on 
allegations of fraud, statutory violations, and breach of contract.  The company 
sought to disqualify the city attorney’s entire office, arguing that as its former 
attorney he had obtained confidential information about it that precluded him, and 
the public office he now headed, from representing the city against it in a matter 
substantially related to the city attorney’s former representation of the company.  
The trial court disqualified the city attorney and his office.  The Court of Appeal 
upheld that ruling in a two-to-one decision.  We affirm the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
2
I.  BACKGROUND 
The facts and dates recited here are drawn from declarations and exhibits 
submitted on the motion to disqualify and from a written contract between the City 
and County of San Francisco (hereafter City) and Cobra Solutions and TeleCon 
Ltd., two California corporations.  Cobra Solutions is in the business of providing 
“computer products, accessories and related professional services.”  On October 1, 
1998, the related entities of Cobra Solutions and TeleCon Ltd. entered into a 
contract with the City—the so-called City Store Contract—which qualified them 
to bid on contracts for technology goods and services provided to various City 
departments, including the Department of Building Inspection. 
In September 2000, Cobra Solutions retained the law firm of Kelly, Gill, 
Sherburne and Herrera, seeking advice on difficulties the company had 
encountered in performing a City contract with the Department of Building 
Inspection (Department).  According to James Brady, the president and chief 
executive officer of Cobra Solutions, the law firm continued to represent it “in all 
matters” until December 2001, and it also provided legal services for TeleCon “on 
several occasions.” 
In September of 2001, then City Attorney Louise Renne began 
investigating contracts for computer services entered into by the Department.  The 
investigation revealed irregularities in payments made to Marcus Armstrong, a 
Department employee.   
On December 11, 2001, Dennis Herrera, a named partner in Kelly, Gill, 
Sherburne and Herrera, was elected San Francisco City Attorney (City Attorney).  
Herrera was sworn into office on January 8, 2002, and he adopted a blanket policy 
of not participating in any matter involving his former law firm or any of its 
clients regardless of whether he had a conflict in any particular matter.  When 
Herrera assumed office, the City Attorney’s investigation of Marcus Armstrong 
 
 
3
was already underway; results of that investigation led the City Attorney’s Office 
to file a civil complaint on February 10, 2003, naming various defendants 
including Armstrong and alleging causes of action arising from what was 
characterized as a kickback scheme by which Armstrong received payments from 
computer service providers for services they never performed. 
On the same day the complaint was filed the City Attorney’s office issued a 
press release under the heading, “HERRERA NAMES TOP BUILDING 
DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL, TECHNOLOGY VENDORS IN MAJOR PUBLIC 
CORRUPTION SUIT.”  In that press release, City Attorney Herrera denounced 
“Mr. Armstrong and his cronies” for betraying “a public trust,” and asserted that 
“[p]ublic corruption diminishes the confidence of our citizens in their 
government.”  According to the press release, the lawsuit was the product of “a 
yearlong investigation by the City Attorney’s Public Integrity Task Force,” which 
Herrera created on taking office and which he described as a “vehicle for civil law 
enforcement enabling us to aggressively pursue those who would violate the 
public trust.” 
Because the allegations in the City’s lawsuit implicated Armstrong in 
possible criminal misconduct, the City Attorney’s Office referred the matter to the 
United States Attorney for the Northern District of California.  The federal 
prosecutor filed criminal charges against Armstrong, who later pleaded guilty to 
federal charges of mail fraud, wire fraud, and obstruction of justice. 
In March 2003, the City’s investigators discovered that Armstrong had 
deposited more than $240,000 in checks from Cobra Solutions into the bank 
account of a fictitious business entity he created.  When City Attorney Herrera 
learned that the investigation implicated his former client Cobra Solutions in the 
kickback scheme, he took measures to screen himself from the case to the extent 
that it could involve the former client.  To maintain the ethical screen, attorneys 
 
 
4
working on the case were directed to report to Chief Assistant City Attorney Jesse 
Smith and not to discuss the case with Herrera.  Those attorneys maintained 
locked files and computerized records that were inaccessible to Herrera.   
On April 21, 2003, the City filed an amended complaint adding Cobra 
Solutions and TeleCon Ltd. as defendants.  In addition to causes of action for 
fraud, unfair competition, and false claims that the complaint alleged against all 
defendants, it also alleged causes of action against Cobra Solutions and TeleCon 
Ltd.1 for negligent misrepresentation and contractual claims arising from breach of 
the City Store contract. 
Cobra moved to disqualify from the litigation its former counsel Herrera 
and the City Attorney’s Office he heads.  In support of the motion, Cobra 
submitted a bill dated April 13, 2001, showing a charge of four-tenths of an hour 
attributable to Herrera’s “[r]eview of City Store contract document.”  Cobra’s 
president asserted that he and his employees disclosed to Gill and to Herrera 
“confidential aspects of Cobra’s business” in the course of a representation that 
was “broad” enough to include “advocacy with City officials,” review of 
contracts, advice on corporate structure, and drafting of standard agreements, 
forms, and policies.  After a hearing, the trial court granted Cobra’s 
disqualification motion, finding that City Attorney Herrera, while in private 
practice, had personally represented defendants, and that during that representation 
he had “obtained confidential information” regarding “matters related substantially 
to the issues raised against defendants in this litigation.”  The trial court concluded 
that Herrera’s conflict must be imputed to the entire City Attorney’s Office 
because “the personally-conflicted counsel is the head” of that office, and “each of 
                                              
1 
Cobra Solutions and TeleCon Ltd. are apparently related entities, both were 
represented by Herrera’s law firm, and both brought the motion to disqualify; for 
convenience we refer to them collectively as Cobra.  
 
 
5
his deputies serves at his pleasure,” subjecting them “necessarily to his oversight 
and influence.”  Accordingly, the trial court ordered the City to “retain outside 
independent counsel to litigate this matter.”  The City Attorney appealed. 
In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s ruling.  
It concluded that when “an attorney leaves private practice to become the head of 
a public law office” the “vicarious disqualification of the entire public law office 
generally is required in all matters substantially related to the head of the office’s 
earlier private representations.”  The dissenting justice saw no need to recuse the 
entire government law office as long as the personally conflicted City Attorney 
had been shielded by an “effective ethical screen.”  The majority rejected that 
view, but it acknowledged the existence of “sound reasons” against automatically 
imputing the conflict of one attorney to an entire government law office.  Because 
it was unnecessary to reach the issue, the majority expressly refrained from 
deciding whether an ethical screen might suffice to avoid office-wide 
disqualification when a conflicted attorney comes from private practice into a 
government law office to assume a subordinate post, but it held that when, as here, 
the conflicted attorney serves as chief executive of the government law office, 
disqualification of the entire office is necessary.  Given the importance of these 
issues, we granted review. 
II.  RELEVANT LAW 
The authority of a trial court “to disqualify an attorney derives from the 
power inherent in every court ‘[t]o control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of 
its ministerial officers.’ ”  (People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil 
Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1145 (SpeeDee), quoting Code Civ. 
Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(5).)  “Ultimately, disqualification motions involve a 
conflict between the clients’ right to counsel of their choice and the need to 
maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility.”  (SpeeDee, at p. 1145.)  
 
 
6
As we have explained, however, “[t]he paramount concern must be to preserve 
public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar.”  
(Ibid.) 
When disqualification is sought because of an attorney’s successive 
representation of clients with adverse interests, the trial court must balance the 
current client’s right to the counsel of its choosing against the former client’s right 
to ensure that its confidential information will not be divulged or used by its 
former counsel.   
Two ethical duties are entwined in any attorney-client relationship.  First is 
the attorney’s duty of confidentiality, which fosters full and open communication 
between client and counsel, based on the client’s understanding that the attorney is 
statutorily obligated (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (e)) to maintain the client’s 
confidences.  (SpeeDee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1146.)  The second is the 
attorney’s duty of undivided loyalty to the client.  (People v. Flatt (1994) 9 Cal.4th 
275, 282 (Flatt).)  These ethical duties are mandated by the California Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3-310(C) & (E).) 
The interplay of the duties of confidentiality and loyalty affects the conflict 
of interest rules that govern attorneys.  An attorney who seeks to simultaneously 
represent clients with directly adverse interests in the same litigation will be 
automatically disqualified.  (Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 284, fn. 3.)  Moreover, an 
attorney may not switch sides during pending litigation representing first one side 
and then the other.  (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2004) 122 
Cal.App.4th 17, 23.)  That is true because the duty to preserve client confidences 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (e)) survives the termination of the attorney’s 
representation.  (SpeeDee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1147.) 
That enduring duty to preserve client confidences precludes an attorney 
from later agreeing to represent an adversary of the attorney’s former client unless 
 
 
7
the former client provides an “informed written consent” waiving the conflict.  
(Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3-310(E).)  If the attorney fails to obtain such consent 
and undertakes to represent the adversary, the former client may disqualify the 
attorney by showing a “ ‘substantial relationship’ ” between the subjects of the 
prior and the current representations.  (Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 283.)  To 
determine whether there is a substantial relationship between successive 
representations, a court must first determine whether the attorney had a direct 
professional relationship with the former client in which the attorney personally 
provided legal advice and services on a legal issue that is closely related to the 
legal issue in the present representation.  (Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. 
(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 698, 710-711.)  If the former representation involved such 
a direct relationship with the client, the former client need not prove that the 
attorney possesses actual confidential information.  (Id. at p. 709.)  Instead, the 
attorney is presumed to possess confidential information if the subject of the prior 
representation put the attorney in a position in which confidences material to the 
current representation would normally have been imparted to counsel.  (Flatt, 
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 283; Adams v. Aerojet-General Corp. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 
1324, 1332; H. F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Salomon Brothers, Inc. (1991) 229 
Cal.App.3d 1445, 1453-1454.)  When the attorney’s contact with the prior client 
was not direct, then the court examines both the attorney’s relationship to the prior 
client and the relationship between the prior and the present representation.  If the 
subjects of the prior representation are such as to “make it likely the attorney 
acquired confidential information” that is relevant and material to the present 
representation, then the two representations are substantially related.  (Jessen v. 
Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 711; see Farris v. 
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 671, 680 [material confidential 
information is that which is “directly at issue in” or has “some critical importance 
 
 
8
to, the second representation”].)  When a substantial relationship between the two 
representations is established, the attorney is automatically disqualified from 
representing the second client.  (Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 283; see Hazard and 
Hodes, The Art of Lawyering (3d ed. 2000 & 2005-2 supp.) § 13.5, pp. 13-12—
13-13.) 
Although the rules governing the ethical duties that an attorney owes to 
clients are set out in the California Rules of Professional Conduct, those rules do 
not address when an attorney’s personal conflict will be imputed to the attorney’s 
law firm resulting in its vicarious disqualification.  Vicarious disqualification rules 
are a product of decisional law.  (Henriksen v. Great American Savings & Loan 
(1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 109, 114.)  Normally, an attorney’s conflict is imputed to 
the law firm as a whole on the rationale “that attorneys, working together and 
practicing law in a professional association, share each other’s, and their clients’, 
confidential information.”  (SpeeDee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 1153-1154, fn. 
omitted.)  Here we consider whether the judicially created rule requiring vicarious 
disqualification of an entire law firm should apply to a government law office 
when the head of that office has a conflict because that attorney previously, while 
in private practice, represented a client that is now being sued by the government 
entity in a matter substantially related to the attorney’s prior representation. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The trial court found, and it is undisputed here, that City Attorney Herrera 
had a conflict based on his having previously represented, in private practice, the 
Cobra defendants “during which representation he obtained confidential 
information” from them “in matters related substantially to the issues raised 
against [them] in this litigation.”  The trial court further found that each of the City 
Attorney’s deputies “serves at [the] pleasure” of the City Attorney and thus “is 
subject necessarily to his oversight and influence.” 
 
 
9
“Generally, a trial court’s decision on a disqualification motion is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion.  [Citations.]  If the trial court resolved disputed factual 
issues, the reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for the trial court’s 
express or implied findings supported by substantial evidence.  [Citations.]  When 
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings, the appellate court 
reviews the conclusions based on those findings for abuse of discretion.  
[Citation.]  However, the trial court’s discretion is limited by the applicable legal 
principles.  [Citation.]  Thus, where there are no material disputed factual issues, 
the appellate court reviews the trial court’s determination as a question of law. 
[Citation.]”  (SpeeDee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 1143-1144.)  Here there is no 
factual dispute, and we review independently the Court of Appeal’s legal 
conclusion that the City Attorney’s personal conflict is properly imputed to the 
Office of the City Attorney and requires its disqualification.  
The City contends that the vicarious disqualification of its entire city 
attorney’s office is neither compelled nor justified by prior court decisions 
involving government law offices.  It relies on People v. Christian (1996) 41 
Cal.App.4th 986 (Christian).  There the Court of Appeal held there was no actual 
conflict when two attorneys, both supervised by the Contra Costa County Public 
Defender, in a joint trial represented two criminal codefendants who had 
potentially conflicting interests.  (Id. at p. 1001.)  The public defender oversaw 
two independent government law offices—the public defender’s office and an 
alternate defender’s office.  (Id. at p. 992.)  Although the public defender was the 
titular head of the alternate defender’s office, he did not supervise or evaluate 
alternate defender attorneys, did not initiate their promotion or discipline, and he 
had no access to its client files or confidences.  (Id. at pp. 992-993, 999.)  
Concluding that the organization and operation of the two defenders’ offices made 
them, in effect, separate law firms (see Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1-100(B)(1)(d) 
 
 
10
[“law firm” includes “a publicly funded entity which employs more than one 
lawyer to perform legal services”]), the Court of Appeal rejected the view that the 
simultaneous representation of codefendants by the public defender and the 
alternate defender created a conflict, because the county public defender was also 
the titular head of the alternate defender’s office.  (Christian, supra, at p. 1000.)  
Given the public defender’s limited control of the alternate defender’s office in 
Christian, we reject the City’s argument that the attorneys in Christian were 
“attorneys within the same government office.” 
In an analogous case, Castro v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors 
(1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1432 (Castro) a single executive director headed a 
nonprofit corporation with three separate public law units providing service to 
parents and children in dependency proceedings.  The Court of Appeal in Castro 
concluded that there would be no conflict if attorneys from each unit were to 
simultaneously represent clients from a single family whose interests were 
divergent.  (Id. at pp. 1439, 1441-1444.)  In Castro the autonomy of each law unit 
was ensured because the chief attorney in each unit initiated hiring, firing, and 
salary changes for that unit’s attorneys.  (Id. at p. 1438.)  In both Castro and 
Christian, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th 986, the separate law units under a single 
governmental umbrella operated as separate law firms independent of parallel 
units also sheltered under that umbrella.  Both Castro and Christian addressed 
conflicts arising from simultaneous representation, unlike the successive 
representation conflict before us.  But both cases were decided in the wake of the 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 
892 (Younger). 
Younger was a successive representation case in which the Court of Appeal 
upheld the disqualification of the entire Los Angeles County District Attorney’s 
Office in the prosecution of a criminal defendant.  (Younger, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d 
 
 
11
at pp. 896-897.)  The defendant had been represented by the law firm of Johnnie 
L. Cochran, Jr., who was later appointed assistant district attorney, making him 
one of “three top executives” supervising “more than 550” deputy attorneys.  (Id. 
at pp. 894-895.)  When Cochran assumed his new post, the district attorney’s 
office adopted procedures designed to screen Cochran from making crucial 
decisions, such as whether to settle a case, or whether to seek the death penalty in 
a capital case, whenever it involved a defendant formerly represented by the 
Cochran law firm.  (Id. at p. 895, fn. 3.) 
Notwithstanding the ethical screen erected between Cochran and the 
prosecution of defendants formerly represented by his law firm, the Court of 
Appeal upheld the vicarious disqualification of the entire Los Angeles County 
District Attorney’s Office.  It noted that Cochran’s “presence” in a job “near the 
top” of the office’s hierarchy “could possibly affect” the office’s prosecution of 
his firm’s former clients.  (Younger, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at p. 897.)  Pointing 
specifically to Cochran’s role in formulating prosecutorial policies, it expressed 
concern that even seemingly unrelated policy decisions could impact the 
prosecution of these cases.  (Ibid.)  In addition, Cochran’s role in the appraisal and 
promotion of deputies necessarily required him to evaluate the performance of 
deputies prosecuting his firm’s former clients.  The Court of Appeal explained:  
“A deputy handling one or more of such cases would not in all probability forget 
Cochran’s former professional association” with the defense of those cases.  
(Ibid.)  Even absent any impropriety, the Court of Appeal cautioned, public 
perception of the prosecutor’s integrity and impartiality would be at risk unless the 
entire office was disqualified.  (Ibid.) 
The disqualification standard that the Court of Appeal applied in Younger 
no longer controls criminal prosecutions because the Legislature in 1980 enacted 
Penal Code section 1424 (Stats. 1980, ch. 780, § 1, p. 2373), which provides for 
 
 
12
the recusal of local prosecuting agencies only when “the evidence shows that a 
conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would 
receive a fair trial.”  (Pen. Code, § 1424, subds. (a)(1) & (b)(1).)  Section 1424 is 
inapplicable to this case, which is a civil action.  Although the statute, which 
triggers disqualification of a prosecutor from a criminal proceeding “only if” the 
conflict is “ ‘so grave as to render it unlikely that [the] defendant will receive fair 
treatment’ ” (People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 569), has superseded 
Younger’s holding (see People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 147), the concerns 
that the Court of Appeal in Younger expressed about conflicted heads of public 
law offices, whose policymaking and supervisory duties are such as to preclude 
them from being effectively screened, have not lost their relevance.2 
As this court has explained in the past, there are both societal and personal 
interests at stake when an attorney and the attorney’s private or public law firm is 
disqualified.  (SpeeDee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1145.)  The societal interests at 
stake include preserving high ethical standards for every attorney, each of whom is 
obliged to preserve client confidences and whose failure to do so undermines 
public confidence in the judicial system.  (Ibid.)  Attorneys who head public law 
offices shoulder additional ethical obligations assumed when they become public 
servants.  They possess “such broad discretion” that the public “may justifiably 
                                              
2  
We do not decide, because the issue is not before us, whether ethical 
screening might suffice to shield a senior supervisory attorney with a personal 
conflict and thus avoid vicarious disqualification of the entire government legal 
unit under that attorney’s supervision.  In ruling on such a motion, the trial court 
should undertake a factual inquiry into the actual duties of the supervisor with 
respect to those attorneys who will be ethically screened and to the supervisor’s 
responsibility for setting policies that might bear on the subordinate attorneys’ 
handling of the litigation.  In addition, the trial court should consider whether 
public awareness of the case, or the conflicted attorney’s role in the litigation, or 
another circumstance is likely to cast doubt on the integrity of the governmental 
law office’s continued participation in the matter. 
 
 
13
demand” that they exercise their duties consistent “with the highest degree of 
integrity and impartiality, and with the appearance thereof.”  (People v. Superior 
Court (Greer) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 266-267 [disqualification of conflicted 
district attorney].) 
Vicarious disqualification also has an impact on the personal interests of a 
conflicted attorney’s current and former clients.  Current clients have a right to 
retain their chosen counsel, and they will bear the financial burden when their 
chosen counsel is disqualified—a burden that an opponent may desire in order to 
gain a tactical advantage in the litigation.  (SpeeDee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1145.)  
With respect to former clients, they have an overwhelming interest in preserving 
the confidentiality of information they imparted to counsel during a prior 
representation.  That interest is imperiled when counsel later undertakes 
representation of an adversary in a matter substantially related to counsel’s prior 
representation of the former client. 
The burdens of disqualification are heavy both for private sector and public 
sector clients.  When an entire government law office is disqualified, the 
government inevitably incurs the added cost of retaining private counsel (In re Lee 
G. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 17, 28), the delay such substitution entails, and in certain 
types of litigation it may also lose the specialized expertise of its in-house 
attorneys, hampering its ability to protect the public’s interest.  (See e.g., City of 
Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 23, fn. 1 [city 
attorney’s office possessed specialized expertise in the law of sewer construction 
and maintenance].)  Greater legal costs caused by hiring private sector attorneys 
raise the specter “that litigation decisions will be driven by financial 
considerations,” not by the public interest.  (Id. at p. 25.)  And when a government 
law office is disqualified, the expense of that disqualification is ultimately paid by 
the taxpayers. 
 
 
14
 
Other burdens caused by vicarious disqualification are cited by the 
Attorney General, appearing as amicus curiae on behalf of the City.3  He argues 
that office-wide disqualification hampers recruiting by government law offices of 
“ ‘the most promising class of young lawyers.’ ”  (Chambers v. Superior Court 
(1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 893, 900.)  He further asserts that vicarious 
disqualification impugns the integrity of government attorneys by implicitly 
assuming they will violate the confidences of former clients.  
Citing these burdens on government, both the City and its amicus, the 
Attorney General, urge us to hold that whenever a conflicted attorney enters 
government service, that attorney’s conflict should not result in vicarious 
disqualification of the government law office the attorney joins.  Instead, they 
argue, screening the conflicted attorney from matters involving the attorney’s 
former clients—such as the screening of the City Attorney that occurred here—
will suffice to protect client confidentiality. 
Ethical screening is the approach adopted by the American Bar Association 
(ABA), whose Model Rules of Professional Conduct require “a lawyer currently 
serving as a public officer or employee” not to “participate in a matter in which 
the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice.”  
(ABA Model Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.11(d)(2)(i).)  Indeed, the ABA Model 
Rules have long included rules specifically directed to government lawyers and to 
their conflicts arising from successive representation.  As the comment to rule 
1.11(d) explains, “[b]ecause of the special problems raised by imputation within a 
government agency,” the rule “does not impute the conflicts of a lawyer currently” 
                                              
3  
The Attorney General argues in favor of screening with “ethical walls to 
avoid conflicts” within government offices in general, but he expressly has taken 
no position on the ethical screening the City Attorney’s Office in this case used to 
screen the City Attorney from his deputies. 
 
 
15
in government service “to other associated government” lawyers, “although 
ordinarily it will be prudent to screen such lawyers.”  (Id., com. [2].)  Thus, under 
the ABA Model Rules the taint of a conflicted attorney who moves into 
government employment is not imputed to the government law office in which the 
attorney now practices.  (See Hazard & Hodes, The Art of Lawyering, supra, 
§ 14.5, p. 14-13; id., § 15.3, p. 15-10 [“[W]oodenly applying the automatic 
imputation rule that usually governs private law firms would be impractical and 
against the public interest.”].)  
California has not adopted the ABA Model Rules (General Dynamics 
Corp. v. Superior Court (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164, 1190, fn. 6), although they may 
serve as guidelines absent on-point California authority or a conflicting state 
public policy (State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 644, 
656).  California, in contrast to the ABA, has not adopted separate Rules of 
Professional Conduct applicable to government lawyers, but it has addressed 
government law office conflict problems through judicial decisions. 
When an attorney leaves private practice for a government law office, 
California courts have upheld the ethical screening of that attorney within the 
government office to protect confidences the attorney obtained from the former 
client in a prior representation.  For example, in City of Santa Barbara v. Superior 
Court, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th 17, an attorney while in private practice 
represented a homeowner until the attorney left her law firm to join a municipal 
law office that was litigating the same case against the attorney’s former client.  
The Court of Appeal upheld an ethical screen isolating the incoming attorney and 
permitting the municipal law office to continue representing the city.  (Id. at pp. 
26-27.)  And in Chadwick v. Superior Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 108, an 
attorney in a county public defender’s office left to join the local district attorney’s 
office, where he was ethically screened from any involvement with his prior cases.  
 
 
16
The Court of Appeal concluded that the attorney’s personal conflict should not be 
imputed to disqualify the entire district attorney’s office.  (Id. at pp. 116-119.)  In 
both these cases, however, the attorney who was subject to ethical screening was 
simply one of the attorneys in the government office, not, as here, the City 
Attorney under whom and at whose pleasure all deputy city attorneys serve.  
Justifications that the City here advances for ethical screening instead of 
disqualification of the entire City Attorney’s office appear overstated.  Like the 
Court of Appeal majority, we are not persuaded that competent attorneys in 
private practice will be discouraged from running for or seeking appointment to 
posts such as city attorney because their prior private representations might result 
in disqualification of the entire city attorney’s office.  Moreover, it is possible that 
a specific candidate’s potential for causing vicarious disqualification of the city 
attorney’s office could legitimately become a campaign issue.  If so, the city’s 
citizens who will pay for hiring outside counsel will be able to make an informed 
choice at the polls.  Typically such government law offices litigate many cases, 
and office-wide disqualification from one case is unlikely to significantly impair 
the office’s overall operations.  That is certainly so here, where the City 
Attorney’s role in advising City agencies is at least as great as his role in litigating 
on behalf of the City.  
Individuals who head a government law office occupy a unique position 
because they are ultimately responsible for making policy decisions that determine 
how the agency’s resources and efforts will be used.  Moreover, the attorneys who 
serve directly under them cannot be entirely insulated from those policy decisions, 
nor can they be freed from real or perceived concerns as to what their boss wants.  
The power to review, hire, and fire is a potent one.  Thus, a former client may  
 
 
17
legitimately question whether a government law office, now headed by the client’s 
former counsel, has the unfair advantage of knowing the former client’s 
confidential information when it litigates against the client in a matter 
substantially related to the attorney’s prior representation of that client. 
There is another reason to require the disqualification of the conflicted head 
of a government law office.  That reason arises from a compelling societal interest 
in preserving the integrity of the office of a city attorney.  It is beyond dispute that 
the citizens of a city are entitled to a city attorney’s office that unreservedly 
represents the city’s best interests when it undertakes litigation.  Public perception 
that a city attorney and his deputies might be influenced by the city attorney’s 
previous representation of the client, at the expense of the best interests of the city, 
would insidiously undermine public confidence in the integrity of municipal 
government and its city attorney’s office. 
It was a cruel irony that City Attorney Herrera, who on assuming office 
avowedly undertook to fight public corruption, later learned that a client whom he 
had represented while in private practice was an apparent participant in a kickback 
scheme designed to defraud the City.  We have no reason whatsoever to believe 
that City Attorney Herrera knew of or suspected his former client Cobra’s possible 
involvement in the scheme as of February 10, 2003, when the City filed its 
original complaint.  Nonetheless, for the reasons explained in this opinion, not 
only the City Attorney but his entire office must in this case be disqualified.  
 
 
18
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal upholding the disqualification of the 
Office of the City Attorney of San Francisco is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
EPSTEIN, J.* 
 
 
 
 
                                              
* 
Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 
Four, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the 
California Constitution. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
Must an entire government law office be disqualified whenever the office 
head has a conflict because he or she previously represented a client in private 
practice?  Disqualification would certainly be appropriate in some circumstances, 
but I do not agree it should be automatic.  In my view, such a rigid rule needlessly 
burdens the public.  Sound public policy considerations weigh against automatic 
disqualification.  These considerations include the cost of employing outside 
counsel, which may cause some government law offices to forgo meritorious 
cases; the concern that similar cases reflecting a general policy could be handled 
inconsistently; and the disincentive for top-level private practitioners to seek, and 
for voters to elect them to, positions as leaders of government law offices.  I would 
allow the trial court to determine on a case-by-case basis the adequacy of the 
screening procedures undertaken by the government law office.  In exercising its 
discretionary review, the trial court shoud consider all relevant factors, including 
the degree of involvement of the office head with the former client,1 the size of the 
government law office, and the nature of the current suit. 
The automatic disqualification rule arose in the context of private practice, 
at a time when it was relatively uncommon for attorneys to move from one firm to 
                                              
1  
The fact that Mr. Herrera billed Cobra Solutions for only 24 minutes of his 
time (maj. opn., ante, at p. 4) suggests that his degree of involvement with the 
“City Store” contract was minimal. 
 
2 
another.  Thus, the rule’s burdens were relatively light.  Now, however, attorney 
mobility and firm mergers have increased exponentially.  Accordingly, the 
automatic disqualification rule is being questioned even in the private practice 
context.  “The vicarious disqualification of an entire firm can work harsh and 
unjust results, particularly in today’s legal world where lawyers change 
associations more freely than in the past.  A rule that automatically disqualifies a 
firm in all cases substantially related to the tainted lawyer’s former representation 
could work a serious hardship for the lawyer, the firm and the firm’s clients. . . .  
[¶] . . . [¶]  We would nevertheless accept the costs of automatic disqualification, if 
it were the only way to ensure that lawyers honor their duties of confidentiality 
and loyalty.  But it is not.  A client’s confidences can also be kept inviolate by 
adopting measures to quarantine the tainted lawyer.  An ethical wall, when 
implemented in a timely and effective way, can rebut the presumption that a 
lawyer has contaminated the entire firm. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] The changing realities of 
law practice call for a more functional approach to disqualification than in the 
past.”  (In re County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2000) 223 F.3d 990, 996 (maj. opn. 
by Kozinski, J.).) 
The question whether the disqualification of an attorney should be imputed 
to the entire government legal office that lawyer joins has been addressed by the 
American Bar Association (ABA) in a formal ethics opinion.  The ABA declined 
to extend the automatic disqualification rule because “the government’s ability to 
function would be unreasonably impaired.”  (ABA, Com. on Ethics & Prof. 
Responsibility, Formal Opn. No. 342 1975.)  The ABA explained, “The 
relationships among lawyers within a government agency are different from those 
among partners and associates of a law firm.  The salaried government employee 
does not have the financial interest in the success of departmental representation 
that is inherent in private practice.  The important difference in the adversary 
 
3 
posture of the government lawyer is recognized by Canon 7:  the duty of the 
public prosecutor to seek justice, not merely to convict, and the duty of all 
government lawyers to seek just results rather than the result desired by a client.  
The channeling of advocacy toward a just result as opposed to vindication of a 
particular claim lessens the temptation to circumvent the disciplinary rules through 
the action of associates. . . .  Although vicarious disqualification of a government 
department is not necessary or wise, the individual lawyer should be screened 
from any direct or indirect participation in the matter, and discussion with his 
colleagues concerning the relevant transaction or set of transactions is prohibited 
by those rules.”  (Ibid.) 
The majority correctly observes that California has not adopted the ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  (Maj. opn., ante, p.15.)  However, the 
public policy considerations relied upon by the ABA are persuasive, and a leading 
text confirms that the ABA’s position is well accepted throughout the country.  
“[ABA] Model Rule 1.10(a) and most comparable state rules do not impute an 
individual government lawyer’s disqualification to all other members of this 
special kind of ‘firm.’ . . .  [¶] . . .  [W]oodenly applying the automatic imputation 
rule that usually governs private law firms would be impractical and against the 
public interest.  A government legal department—unlike a private firm—cannot 
simply forgo litigating certain cases.  Thus, if the ordinary imputation rules 
applied, the department would either have to select lawyer-employees with limited 
prior legal experience, or expend money hiring special counsel to litigate the 
affected cases” (1 Hazard & Hodes, The Law of Lawyering (3d ed. 2005 supp.) 
§ 15.3, p. 15-10, fn. omitted.) 
In California, case law extending the automatic disqualification rule to 
prosecutors’ offices was nullified by the Legislature.  In Younger v. Superior 
Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 892, the Court of Appeal disqualified an entire 
 
4 
district attorney’s office because of an appearance of impropriety created by the 
fact that a newly appointed supervising district attorney had once been a member 
of the firm representing the defendant.  In response to Younger and other cases, the 
Legislature enacted Penal Code section 1424.  (People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 
Cal.4th 580, 591.)  Under that provision, a district attorney or a city attorney may 
not be disqualified unless the evidence establishes a conflict of interest that would 
render a fair trial unlikely.  The majority correctly notes that section 1424 does not 
apply in a civil action.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12.)  However, as we attempt to 
balance competing public policies we should not ignore the balance struck by the 
Legislature in section 1424.  Certainly, the interest in evenhanded administration 
of justice is at least as weighty in a criminal case, where life or liberty is at stake, 
as it is in a civil action for monetary damages. 
For the reasons stated, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
upholding the disqualification of the Office of the City Attorney of San Francisco.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J.  
 
I CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C.J.   
   
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 119 Cal.App4.th 304 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S126397 
Date Filed: June 5, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Francisco 
Judge: Donald S. Mitchell 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney, Jesse C. Smith, Chief Assistant City Attorney, Therese M. Stewart, Chief 
Deputy City Attorney, Claire Sylvia and Ellen Forman, Deputy City Attorneys, for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Jacob Appelsmith, Assistant Attorney General, Barbara J. Seidman and 
Kenneth L. Swenson, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Ann Miller Ravel, County Counsel (Santa Clara) and Lizanne Reynolds, Deputy County Counsel, for 
County of Santa Clara, California State Association of Counties and League of California Cities as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Steven M. Woodside, County Counsel (Sonoma) for California State Association of Counties and League 
of California Cities as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, Rex S. Heinke, Edward P. Lazarus and Seth M. M. Stodder for 
Children’s Law Center of Los Angeles as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Keker & Van Nest, Gonzalez & Leigh, Ethan A. Balogh, G. Whitney Leigh, Nima Nami, Bryan W. 
Vereschagin, Rita A. Hao, Juan Enrique Pearce and Eumi K. Lee for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
David C. Coleman, Public Defender (Contra Costa) and Ron Boyer, Deputy Public Defender, for California 
Public Defenders Association as Amici Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Claire Sylvia 
Deputy City Attorney 
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Pl., Rm. 234 
San Francisco, CA  94102 
(415) 554-4700 
 
G. Whitney Leigh 
Gonzalez & Leigh 
Two Shaw Alley, Third Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 512-2000