Title: Robinson v. Lewis

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
JULIUS M. ROBINSON, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
G. W. LEWIS, as Warden, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
S228137 
 
Ninth Circuit 
14-15125 
 
Northern District of California 
2:13-cv-00604-WBS-AC 
 
 
July 20, 2020 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, and Kruger concurred. 
 
1 
 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
S228137 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
Someone who wishes to challenge a state judgment of 
conviction by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in state 
court must present each claim in a timely fashion.  Generally, 
under California law, there are no fixed, determinate deadlines.1  
Whether a claim has been timely presented is assessed based on 
an indeterminate reasonableness standard.  Here, Julius 
Robinson — like many such petitioners, a self-represented 
prison inmate — filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
challenging his state court judgment in the superior court.  That 
court denied the petition.  Sixty-six days later, he filed a new 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal 
raising the same claims.  The Court of Appeal denied the 
petition.  Then Robinson filed a new original petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus in this court.  After we denied it, Robinson filed 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court 
challenging the same judgment.  The petition was denied, and 
Robinson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. 
                                        
1  
This is a noncapital case.  Habeas corpus procedures in 
capital cases are different from those in noncapital cases.  (See 
generally Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808, 824–825.)  What 
we say in this case involves only noncapital habeas corpus 
procedures. 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
Time limits exist in the federal courts for filing petitions 
challenging a state court judgment.  Whether the petitioner 
proceeded in a timely fashion in state courts often has great 
significance in the federal courts’ determinations of whether the 
federal petition was timely.  It is critical in this case.  The Ninth 
Circuit is uncertain how the California courts treat the time gap 
between the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a 
lower California court and the filing of a new petition in a higher 
California court raising the same claims for purposes of 
determining 
whether 
a 
claim 
was 
timely 
presented.  
Accordingly, it asked us to explain how California law treats 
what we will call “gap delay.”  (See Robinson v. Lewis (9th Cir. 
2015) 795 F.3d 926 (Robinson).)  We accepted the request, 
although we restated the question presented to more accurately 
reflect California law and practice.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
8.548(f)(5).)  The discussion that follows concerns only gap delay, 
not delay in presenting a claim in the first instance. 
As we restated it, the question before us is as follows:  
When a California court denies a claim in a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus, and the petitioner subsequently files the same or 
a similar claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus directed to 
the original jurisdiction of a higher court, what is the 
significance, if any, of the period of time between the earlier 
petition’s denial and the subsequent petition’s filing (66 days in 
this case) for purposes of determining the subsequent claim’s 
timeliness under California law?2 
                                        
2  
As the Ninth Circuit explained in its opinion asking us to 
answer this question, the delay between the Court of Appeal’s 
denial of Robinson’s petition in that court and his filing of a 
petition for review in this court is not at issue in this case. 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
Our answer is that when an original petition is filed in this 
court, we do not consider whether the petition was timely but 
rather whether the claims presented within the petition were 
timely.  We consider only the question of whether each of those 
claims was presented without substantial delay, as set forth in 
In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (Robbins).  Gap delay 
is relevant to this question.  But we do not generally consider, 
separately, whether the gap delay, by itself, made the claims 
raised in the petition untimely, and no specific time limits exist 
for when a new petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be filed 
in a higher court after a lower court denies the petition.  In the 
instant case, a 66-day gap between the denial of a petition in the 
superior court and the filing of a new petition in the Court of 
Appeal would not be considered substantial delay.  It would not 
make any claim raised in the petition untimely if the petitioner 
had otherwise presented that claim without substantial delay. 
Indeed, for the reasons described below, we would never 
consider delay of up to 120 days between denial of a petition in 
the superior court and the filing of a new petition in the Court 
of Appeal (or between denial of a petition in the Court of Appeal 
and the filing of a new petition in this court) to be substantial 
delay for these purposes.  Delay beyond that time period would 
be a subject to consider in the normal Robbins analysis. 
I.  THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S REQUEST 
This case involves the interplay between California law 
and the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996 (AEDPA).  The Ninth Circuit’s opinion requesting us to 
answer 
the 
aforementioned 
question 
described 
its 
understanding of the problem confronting the court.  “Under 
federal habeas law, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), a state prisoner must 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
file a petition for federal habeas review within a one year 
limitations period.  Section 2244(d)(2) further specifies that this 
federal limitations period is tolled for ‘[t]he time during which a 
properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 
collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim 
is pending.’  The federal statute has been interpreted to define 
‘[t]he time that an application for state postconviction review is 
“pending” ’ as including ‘the period between (1) a lower court’s 
adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a notice of 
appeal, provided that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely 
under state law.’  Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191, 126 S.Ct. 
846, 163 L.Ed.2d 684 (2006). 
“Chavis explained that in most states other than 
California, the number of days a petitioner has for filing an 
appeal is established by statute.  Id. at 191-92.  This makes it 
simple to determine whether a filing is ‘timely under state law,’ 
see id., and thus whether a petition for review is ‘properly filed’ 
and the federal statute of limitations tolled, see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(2).  California, however, has a unique system by which 
state habeas petitioners challenge adverse state court decisions.  
Chavis, 546 U.S. at 192.  Rather than requiring a petitioner 
whose habeas petition has been dismissed to appeal that 
decision to a higher court, California law provides that an 
original petition may be filed at each level of the California court 
system.  Id. at 192-193.  Such a petition is timely if filed ‘within 
a “reasonable time.” ’  Id. at 192 (quoting In re Harris, 5 Cal.4th 
813, 828 n.7, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391 (1993)).[3]  
                                        
3  
In fact, as explained below, we do not consider whether a 
petition is timely.  We consider whether the claims in the 
petition are timely. 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
California courts allow a longer delay if the petitioner 
demonstrates good cause.  In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780, 77 
Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311 (1998). 
“If a California court states it has dismissed a state habeas 
petition because the petition was untimely, ‘that would be the 
end of the matter.’  Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226, 122 S.Ct. 
2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002).  When a California state court 
determines that a state prisoner’s state habeas petition is 
untimely under state law, there is ‘no “properly filed” state 
petition, and [the state prisoner is] not entitled to statutory 
tolling’ under the AEDPA.  White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 884 
(9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
“But if a California court dismisses a habeas petition 
without comment, or even if it reviews a petition on the merits 
without discussing timeliness, a federal court ‘must itself 
examine the delay in each case and determine what the state 
courts would have held in respect to timeliness,’ Chavis, 546 
U.S. at 197-98, in order to determine whether the petition was 
‘properly filed’ for purposes of tolling the federal statute of 
limitations, id. at 191 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).  
Observing that California courts had not provided authoritative 
guidance on this issue, Chavis made its own conjecture 
regarding state law, namely ‘that California’s “reasonable time” 
standard would not lead to filing delays substantially longer 
than’ between 30 and 60 days, the range of time allowed for 
filing a notice of appeal by other states’ statutes.  Id. at 199, 201.  
Based on this conjecture, Chavis held that California courts 
would hold the unexplained six-month delay by the state 
prisoner in that case to be unreasonable, and therefore 
concluded the state prisoner had not filed his state habeas 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
petition on time.  Id. at 201.”  (Robinson, supra, 795 F.3d at pp. 
928–929, fn. omitted.) 
Because of continuing uncertainty regarding how 
California’s “reasonable time” standard applies to gap delay, the 
Ninth Circuit turned to us for guidance.  It stated the question 
to be decided as follows:  “When a state habeas petitioner has no 
good cause for delay, at what point in time is that state 
prisoner’s petition, filed in a California court of review to 
challenge a lower state court’s disposition of the prisoner’s 
claims, untimely under California law; specifically, is a habeas 
petition untimely filed after an unexplained 66-day delay 
between the time a California trial court denies the petition and 
the time the petition is filed in the California Court of Appeal?”  
(Robinson, supra, 795 F.3d at p. 928.) 
We restated the question as indicated in the beginning of 
this opinion. 
The Ninth Circuit informs us that “[t]he facts of this case 
are as follows.  Julius Robinson was convicted by a jury of two 
counts of premeditated murder, two counts of malicious 
discharge of a firearm, and gun and gang enhancements.  He 
was sentenced to a determinate term of 17 years, and an 
indeterminate term of 205 years to life.  On February 8, 2011, 
the California Court of Appeal modified the sentence and 
affirmed the judgment.  The California Supreme Court denied 
review, and the deadline for Robinson to seek certiorari review 
with the United States Supreme Court expired on August 9, 
2011. 
“On November 12, 2011, 94 days after the certiorari 
deadline passed, Robinson constructively filed a state habeas 
petition in California Superior Court.  On January 19, 2012, the 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
Superior Court denied Robinson’s petition.  On March 26, 2012, 
66 days after the Superior Court denied his petition, Robinson 
filed a petition with the California Court of Appeal.  On April 5, 
2012, the California Court of Appeal denied Robinson’s petition, 
citing In re Steele, 32 Cal.4th 682, 692, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 536, 85 
P.3d 444 (2004), and In re Hillery, 202 Cal.App.2d 293, 20 
Cal.Rptr. 759 (1962).  Neither case involves a timeliness 
determination.[4]  Accord Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 310, 
131 S.Ct. 1120, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011) (‘California Courts signal 
that a habeas petition is denied as untimely by citing the 
controlling decisions, i.e., [In re] Clark[, 5 Cal.4th 750, 21 
Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729 (1993)] and Robbins.’).  On July 
6, 2012, 91 days after the California Court of Appeal decision, 
Robinson filed a petition with the California Supreme Court.  
The California Supreme Court denied his petition on October 24, 
2012. 
“Robinson filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
in federal district court on March 13, 2013, which was 139 days 
after the California Supreme Court issued its denial.  Adding up 
the delays that were attributable to Robinson (delays of 94, 66, 
91, and 139 days), and excluding the time when his filed 
                                        
4  
As the Ninth Circuit’s opinion suggests, these citations 
were likely in error.  The cited page in Steele explains that, 
although “both trial and appellate courts have jurisdiction over 
habeas corpus petitions, . . . a reviewing court has discretion to 
deny without prejudice a habeas corpus petition that was not 
filed first in a proper lower court.”  (In re Steele, supra, 32 
Cal.4th at p. 692 (Steele).)  Hillery is to the same effect.  (Hillery, 
supra, 202 Cal.App.2d at p. 294.)  Here, Robinson did first apply 
for habeas corpus relief in the superior court, although the Court 
of Appeal might not have been aware of it. 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
petitions were being considered by the California courts, his 
petition was filed 390 days after his conviction became final and 
the time for seeking certiorari review by the Supreme Court 
expired. 
“The government moved to dismiss the petition, on the 
ground that the one-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244 had expired before Robinson filed his petition.  A 
magistrate judge considered whether Robinson was entitled to 
tolling of the statute of limitations for the gaps between each 
lower court denial of Robinson’s habeas petition and his 
subsequent filing of a new petition in the next-level state court.  
She concluded that the 66-day period between the denial of his 
California Superior Court petition and the filing date of his 
Court of Appeal petition was unreasonable, and therefore 
Robinson was not entitled to tolling for that period.  The 
magistrate judge also concluded that Robinson was not entitled 
to tolling for the 91-day period between the denial of his 
California Court of Appeal petition and the filing date of his 
California Supreme Court petition.  Absent tolling for either of 
these two periods, Robinson’s petition was untimely.  The 
district court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and 
recommendations and granted the government’s motion to 
dismiss Robinson’s federal habeas corpus petition with prejudice 
as barred by the statute of limitations. 
“On appeal, we are considering only the question whether 
Robinson is entitled to tolling for the 66-day interval between 
the California Superior Court denial of habeas relief and his 
filing a new petition in the California Court of Appeal.  [A 
footnote here states that “Robinson did not appeal the district 
court’s determination that he was not entitled to tolling for the 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
91-day period.”]  The issue of good cause is absent in this case.  
Although Robinson claimed in district court that the delay was 
‘attributed to further research and litigation of potential issues,’ 
the district court rejected this justification because ‘[t]he 
petition filed in the California Court of Appeal was simply a 
photocopy of the prior petition.’  Robinson did not dispute this 
conclusion in his briefing before our court.  He has therefore 
waived it.  See United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th 
Cir. 2005).”  (Robinson, supra, 795 F.3d at pp. 933–934, fns. 
omitted.) 
II.  DISCUSSION 
We restated the question presented for two reasons. 
First, as originally asked, the question assumed that a 
habeas corpus petition filed in a higher court constitutes a 
challenge to the lower court’s denial of the previous petition.  In 
fact, it is a new petition invoking the higher court’s original 
jurisdiction.  “The Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior 
courts, and their judges have original jurisdiction in habeas 
corpus proceedings.”  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.)  The “people” 
may appeal if the superior court grants habeas corpus relief.  
(Pen. Code, § 1506.)  But in noncapital cases, if the superior 
court denies a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner 
has no statutory right to appeal.  Instead, the petitioner must 
file a new, original petition, generally in the Court of Appeal.  A 
new petition for a writ of habeas corpus differs from an appeal 
in important respects.  The new petition can add to or attempt 
to bolster the claims made in the earlier petition.  Moreover, 
unlike an appeal, a petition can be, and often is, denied without 
full briefing from the parties, oral argument, or opinion. 
All courts in California have original habeas corpus 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
jurisdiction, but that does not mean all courts must exercise it 
in all circumstances.  A higher court “has discretion to deny 
without prejudice a habeas corpus petition that was not filed 
first in a proper lower court.”  (Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 
692; see In re Ramirez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1316.)  For 
this reason, the United States Supreme Court has observed that 
“California’s habeas rules lead a prisoner ordinarily to file a 
petition in a lower court first.”  (Carey v. Saffold, supra, 536 U.S. 
at p. 221.)  We agree.  Petitioners should first file a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus challenging a judgment in the superior 
court that rendered the judgment.  If the superior court denies 
the petition, the petitioner may then file a new petition in the 
Court of Appeal.5  The superior court that rendered the 
judgment is best equipped to consider the claim in the first 
instance, to hold an evidentiary hearing when necessary, and to 
grant relief if appropriate.  A petition filed in a superior court 
that did not render the judgment is subject to transfer to the 
court that did render the judgment.  (Griggs v. Superior Court 
(1976) 16 Cal.3d 341, 347.) 
Although petitioners should start in the superior court 
and then, if unsuccessful, may file a petition in the Court of 
Appeal, it remains true that a petition in the Court of Appeal is 
a new petition invoking that court’s original jurisdiction.  If a 
lower court has made factual findings following an evidentiary 
hearing, the higher court will give those findings great weight, 
                                        
5  
An exception to this general procedure exists.  A petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus may be filed in the Court of Appeal 
in the first instance if it is related to a pending direct appeal.  
(People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426–427, fn. 17; see Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 3.387(b)(2)(B).) 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
but it is not bound by them.  (In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
230, 249 (plur. opn. of Werdegar, J.)  Thus, a Court of Appeal 
that considers a new petition does not directly review the 
superior court’s ruling but makes its own ruling. 
The question as to whether the higher court is reviewing 
the lower court’s decision is more complex when a petitioner 
seeks redress from this court after the Court of Appeal denies a 
petition.  In that event, the petitioner has two options.  The 
petitioner may file a petition for review in this court.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1506.)6  Such a petition is subject to tight time limits.  Unless 
the Chief Justice relieves the party from default, the petition for 
review must be filed in this court within 10 days of finality of 
the Court of Appeal decision.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 
8.500(e)(1), (2).)  A Court of Appeal decision denying a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus without issuing an order to show cause 
is generally final immediately, which means the petition for 
review must be filed within 10 days after the filing of the denial 
order.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.387(b)(2)(A).)  An exception 
exists when the petition is related to an appeal and the denial is 
filed the same day as the appellate decision, in which case the 
denial is final on the same day that the appellate decision is 
final.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.387(b)(2)(B).)  If, but only if, a 
petition for review is filed to challenge the Court of Appeal’s 
denial of the previous petition, this court does, indeed, review 
the Court of Appeal’s rulings on the claims presented in the 
previous petition. 
                                        
6  
Penal Code section 1506 actually refers to a “hearing” in 
this court rather than “review.”  “Hearing” is the word formerly 
used when a party turned to this court for relief, but “review” is 
the word used today.  (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 12, subd. (b).) 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
But the petitioner also has the option of filing a new, 
original petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court 
invoking this court’s original jurisdiction and raising one or 
more claims raised in previous petitions or adding new claims 
not previously raised.  Far more petitioners file an original 
petition in this court than file a petition for review, possibly to 
avoid the stringent procedural requirements.  In that event, the 
petition is an original petition, and we do not directly review the 
lower courts’ rulings although, again, we will give any lower 
court’s factual findings great weight if an evidentiary hearing 
was held. 
The question of “gap delay” following the denial of a 
habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal is clear in the case 
of a petition for review.  A petition filed more than 10 days after 
the Court of Appeal’s decision becomes final is untimely unless 
the Chief Justice relieved the party from default.  It is only when 
an original petition is filed in this court that the question of gap 
delay becomes potentially problematic for petitioners and the 
federal courts.  For these reasons, we restated the certified 
question to make clear that a habeas petition filed in a higher 
court is a new petition involving the higher court’s original 
jurisdiction. 
Second, the question as the Ninth Circuit phrased it 
appeared to assume that timeliness of a habeas corpus petition 
is judged as a whole, rather than on a claim-by-claim basis.  But 
we determine “whether claims in a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus have been timely filed” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 
460, italics added (Reno)), not whether the petition as a whole 
was timely filed.  A given petition containing multiple claims 
might have one or more claims that are untimely and one or 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
more claims that are timely.  In that event, we might bar the 
specific untimely claims.  But we do not find a petition itself to 
be untimely. 
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, in 
noncapital cases, California courts, including this one, 
sometimes simply deny with a summary order petitions that 
clearly lack merit without specifying whether any given claim is 
untimely or otherwise procedurally barred.  (Walker v. Martin, 
supra, 562 U.S. at p. 310.)  This “court rules on a staggering 
number of habeas petitions each year”; because of this, we often 
exercise our “discretion . . . to bypass a timeliness issue and, 
instead, summarily reject the petition for want of merit.”  (Id. at 
pp. 312–313; see also Carey v. Saffold, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 225 
[a court might simply deny an untimely claim on the merits for 
several reasons, such as “where the merits present no difficult 
issue”].)  As the high court has also recognized, issuing 
“summary dispositions in many collateral attack cases can 
enable a state judiciary to concentrate its resources on the cases 
where opinions are most needed.”  (Harrington v. Richter (2011) 
562 U.S. 86, 99 [citing a brief noting that, at that time, this court 
“dispose[d] of close to 10,000 cases a year, including more than 
3,400 original habeas corpus petitions”].) 
With this background, we turn to the question of the 
significance of gap delay in filing original petitions for writ of 
habeas corpus in a higher court after a lower court has denied 
the earlier petition.  We begin by reviewing our general 
timeliness rules.  There are no specific time limits for either 
filing the first petition or filing subsequent petitions in a higher 
court.  Instead, California courts employ a reasonableness 
standard.  The claim must generally be presented without 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
substantial delay.  “Substantial delay is measured from the time 
the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should 
have known, of the information offered in support of the claim 
and the legal basis for the claim.”  (Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th 
at p. 780.) 
“Our rules establish a three-level analysis for assessing 
whether claims in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus have 
been timely filed.  First, a claim must be presented without 
substantial delay.[7]  Second, if a petitioner raises a claim after 
a substantial delay, we will nevertheless consider it on its merits 
if the petitioner can demonstrate good cause for the delay.  
Third, we will consider the merits of a claim presented after a 
substantial delay without good cause if it falls under one of four 
narrow exceptions.”  (Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 460, citing 
Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 780–781.)  Reno and Robbins 
were capital cases.  Only three of the four exceptions cited in 
Reno and Robbins are relevant to noncapital cases:  (1)  “ ‘that 
error of constitutional magnitude led to a trial that was so 
fundamentally unfair that absent the error no reasonable judge 
or jury would have convicted the petitioner’ ”; (2)  “ ‘that the 
petitioner is actually innocent of the crime or crimes of which he 
or she was convicted’ ”; and (3)  “ ‘that the petitioner was 
convicted or sentenced under an invalid statute.’ ”  (Reno, at p. 
460, quoting Robbins, at pp. 780–781.)  “The petitioner bears the 
burden to plead and then prove all of the relevant allegations.”  
                                        
7  
In describing this requirement, we have sometimes used 
the language, “ ‘as promptly as the circumstances allow.’ ”  (In 
re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, fn. 5; see Reno, supra, 55 
Cal.4th at p. 460.)  That language and the term “without 
substantial delay” are equivalent. 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
(Reno, at p. 460.) 
This court does not generally consider gap delay as a 
specific question separate from the larger question of whether a 
claim was timely presented.  California’s habeas corpus 
timeliness standards refer to overall delay in presenting a 
habeas corpus claim and not specifically gap delay.  We consider 
whether, under all of the circumstances, the petitioner 
presented the claim without substantial delay after it was, or 
reasonably should have been, known to the petitioner.  The time 
between levels is just part of that question.  Gap delay, if 
inordinate and unexplained, is relevant to this overall question 
and might be a significant factor in our timeliness analysis 
under Robbins, but it is not the question itself.  There are no 
specific time limitations for presenting a claim in a higher court 
after a lower court has denied the claim. 
Gap delay raises fewer concerns than delay in presenting 
the claim in the first instance.  Once the claim is formally 
presented in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the 
lower court, the state is on notice of its existence and can begin 
to defend against it if appropriate. 
Moreover, even if the time gap between levels is 
substantial, California’s procedure of requiring a new petition, 
rather than permitting an appeal, will usually result in more 
prompt resolution of the claim in the higher court than would 
an appeal.  A notice of appeal merely begins the appellate 
process.  Normally, record production, full briefing, oral 
argument, and a formal judicial opinion will follow, all of which 
can take considerable time.  By contrast, the filing of a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus can be, and often is, the end of the 
process.  A court can simply deny the petition without further 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
proceedings if it is meritless or procedurally barred.  For these 
reasons, while gap delay is relevant to the question of 
timeliness, it is just one piece of the overall picture and is not 
considered independently.  In this case, we would not consider a 
66-day time gap between the superior court and the Court of 
Appeal to be substantial delay under Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th 
770. 
Although no specific time period exists for the 
presentation of a claim, we believe it appropriate to state a 
specific time period within which gap delay would never be 
considered to be substantial delay.  Doing so will provide what 
Robinson calls a “safe harbor,” so petitioners will know that a 
claim presented to a higher court within that time period will 
never be considered untimely due to that delay.  Both parties 
agree that it would be helpful to the state and petitioners, as 
well as the federal courts, to be more specific regarding gap 
delay. 
More specificity should benefit the federal courts as well 
as both sides in habeas corpus litigation by providing a degree 
of certainty.  It would benefit inmates in state court to have 
assurance that if a petition is filed within the time period, the 
claims will not be found untimely due (even in part) to gap delay, 
an 
assurance 
that 
is 
lacking 
under 
today’s 
general 
reasonableness standard.  Today, gap delay in state court can be 
considered as part of the overall untimeliness analysis under 
Robbins, but the inmate petitioner does not know how long of a 
gap delay would be considered substantial.  Specificity should 
also simplify litigation for those petitions that are filed in a 
higher court within the time period.  The parties could tell at a 
glance that the gap delay in those cases was irrelevant to any 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
timeliness issue, and they would not litigate it. 
This court has “inherent authority to establish ‘rules of 
judicial procedure.’ ”  (In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 593.)  
For the reasons stated, we believe it appropriate to exercise this 
authority by establishing a time period for gap delay that 
provides a certain safe harbor for petitioners who file their 
claims within that time period.  We must here decide how long 
the specified time period should be.  As is to be expected, the 
parties disagree on this point, with the Attorney General urging 
shorter time periods and Robinson longer ones. 
We have said that, in contrast to capital litigants, inmates 
serving prison terms who are seeking release “have no incentive 
to engage in delaying tactics that would prolong their 
imprisonment.”  (Catlin v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 300, 
308, fn. 3.)  This is true except in the rare case when a petitioner 
might delay for tactical reasons, as when the petitioner waits for 
the defense attorney or a key witness or a juror to die and thus 
be unavailable to counter allegations the attorney provided 
ineffective assistance or the witness lied or the juror committed 
misconduct.  Thus, normally, intentional delay by the petitioner 
is not a concern. 
On the other hand, good reason exists to require 
reasonably expeditious presentation of these claims.  Timeliness 
requirements “ ‘vindicate society’s interest in the finality of its 
criminal judgments, as well as the public’s interest “in the 
orderly and reasonably prompt implementation of its laws.”  
[Citation.]  . . .  Requiring a prisoner to file his or her challenge 
promptly helps ensure that possibly vital evidence will not be 
lost through the passage of time or the fading of memories.’ ”  
(Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 459.)  Timeliness rules also help 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
“ ‘to avoid the need to set aside final judgments of conviction 
when retrial would be difficult or impossible.’ ”  (In re Martinez 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 945, 956.) 
The Attorney General argues that, because the claim had 
already been presented in the lower court, filing a new petition 
in a higher court is easy.  It might be, and sometimes is, as easy 
as simply filling in the prescribed form and adding a copy of the 
previous petition, as Robinson did in this case.  The Attorney 
General suggests the specified time for filing a new petition in 
the Court of Appeal after a superior court’s denial should be the 
same as the time limit for filing a notice of appeal in the superior 
court (generally 60 days after the judgment is rendered (Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a)), and the time to file a new petition 
in this court should be the same as the time to file a petition for 
review (generally 10 days after the Court of Appeal decision 
(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.387(b)(2)(A), 8.500(e)(1)). 
The analogy to a notice of appeal, although superficially 
appealing, is inapt.  Although petitioners may, and sometimes 
do, simply present the same petition in the higher court as in 
the lower court, they are not required to do so.  They may wish 
to try to bolster the claims.  A notice of appeal is merely a notice 
that the party intends to appeal.  Record preparation and 
briefing comes later, and the matter is not submitted in the 
Court of Appeal until after the case has been fully briefed and 
argued.  A habeas corpus petition, by contrast, effectively 
constitutes the first round of briefing and in many cases the only 
briefing.  Unless the court requests an informal response or 
issues an order to show cause, the matter is submitted when the 
petition is filed.  Accordingly, we do not believe the time limit to 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
file a notice of appeal or a petition for review in this court should 
be the benchmark for gap delay. 
Robinson argues that the safe harbor should be at least six 
months.  He notes the problems inherent in filing a petition from 
within prison.  Inmate petitioners are required to use a standard 
form.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.551(a)(1).)  The form contains 
several pages and requires the petitioner to provide a statement 
describing any previous petitions and how they were decided.  
Often difficulties exist in gaining access to legal materials and 
copying, and in having the finished petition mailed to the court.  
Moreover, when the superior court denies a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, the order “must contain a brief statement of the 
reasons for the denial.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.551(g).)  In 
the new petition, a petitioner might want to address the reasons 
the court stated.  If the superior court had conducted an 
evidentiary hearing, the petitioner might also want to address 
any adverse factual findings. 
All of these considerations convince us that the safe harbor 
should be longer than the 60 days generally provided for filing a 
notice of appeal.  But the six-month period Robinson urges is 
unduly generous.  Whatever difficulties a petitioner might 
encounter in reasserting a claim already made in the lower court 
can usually be met in less than six months.  Moreover, in 
considering how extensive the time gap might be during which 
the matter would remain “pending” in state court, the United 
States Supreme Court observed that it did not “see how an 
unexplained delay of this magnitude [six months] could fall 
within the scope of the federal statutory word ‘pending’ as 
interpreted in Saffold.”  (Evans v. Chavis, supra, 546 U.S. at p. 
201, citing Carey v. Saffold, supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 222–223.)  
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
This observation also counsels against making the safe harbor 
as long as six months.  An unexplained delay of that duration 
might endanger gap delay tolling in federal court. 
As such, a period twice the time for filing a notice of 
appeal, i.e., 120 days, is reasonable.  This time period is not an 
absolute deadline.  Providing a safe harbor simply means that 
delay beyond the specified time would be subject to the normal 
Robbins analysis.  That is, we would consider whether, under all 
of the circumstances, gap delay longer than 120 days constituted 
substantial 
delay 
and, 
if 
so, 
whether 
the 
petitioner 
demonstrated good cause for the delay or an exception applied.  
For these reasons, we adopt a time period of 120 days as the safe 
harbor for gap delay.  A new petition filed in a higher court 
within 120 days of the lower court’s denial will never be 
considered untimely due to gap delay. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We summarize the procedures relevant to gap delay and 
our answer to the question the Ninth Circuit posed as follows:  
Petitioners challenging a state court judgment by means of a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus that is not related to a 
pending direct appeal should first file the petition in the 
superior court that rendered the judgment.  If the superior court 
denies the petition, the petitioner may file a new petition in the 
Court of Appeal.  That court has discretion to deny without 
prejudice a petition presenting claims that had not first been 
presented to the superior court if the court believes it is 
beneficial to do so.  If the Court of Appeal denies the petition, 
the petitioner may either file a petition for review in this court 
or file a new petition for a writ of habeas corpus invoking this 
court’s original jurisdiction.  This court also has discretion to 
ROBINSON v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
deny without prejudice a petition presenting claims that had not 
previously been presented to the lower courts. 
In this process, delay between the filing of the petition in 
a higher court after the lower court denied relief is relevant to 
the overall question of timeliness of the claims presented in the 
petition, but it is not a separate question, and no specific time 
limits exist.  Such delay of up to 120 days would never be 
considered substantial delay and would not, by itself, make the 
claim untimely if the petitioner had otherwise presented the 
claim without substantial delay.  Gap delay beyond that time 
period will not automatically be considered substantial delay 
but will simply be a relevant factor for the court to consider as 
part of its overall analysis under Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th 770. 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Robinson v. Lewis   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX on request pursuant to rule 8.548, Cal. Rules of Court  
Review Granted    
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S228137  
Date Filed:  July 20, 2020  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:    
County:    
Judge:    
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Heather E. Williams, Federal Defender, Carolyn M. Wiggin and David H. Harshaw III, Assistant Federal  
Defenders, for Petitioner and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen, Rachelle A. Newcomb, 
Brian G. Smiley and David Andrew Eldridge, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Carolyn M. Wiggin 
Assistant Federal Defender 
801 I Street, Third Floor 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 498-5700 
 
David Andrew Eldridge 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 
(916) 324-6291