Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Joseph W. Weigel

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 124 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP659-D   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Joseph W. Weigel, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent- 
          Cross-Appellant, 
     v. 
Joseph W. Weigel, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Respondent.  
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST WEIGEL     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 19, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 4, 2012   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-cross-respondent, there were 
briefs filed by Terry E. Johnson, Peterson, Johnson & Murray, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Terry E. Johnson.   
 
 
For the Office of Lawyer Regulation, there were briefs 
filed by Paul Schwarzenbart, Madison, and oral argument by Paul 
Schwarzenbart.  
 
 
2012 WI 124
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP659-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Joseph W. Weigel, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent-Cross- 
          Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph W. Weigel, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 19, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
revoked.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Joseph W. Weigel has appealed 
from 
a 
referee's 
report 
concluding 
that 
he 
engaged 
in 
professional misconduct and recommending that his license to 
practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for 30 months.  The 
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) has cross-appealed as to the 
sanction recommended by the referee.  The OLR asks this court to 
revoke Attorney Weigel's license to practice law. 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
We conclude that the referee's findings of fact are 
supported by satisfactory and convincing evidence.  We further 
determine that the seriousness of Attorney Weigel's misconduct 
warrants the revocation of his license to practice law in 
Wisconsin.  We also conclude that the full costs of the 
proceeding, which are $24,309.84 as of November 6, 2012, should 
be assessed against Attorney Weigel, and we conclude that 
Attorney Weigel should be required to reimburse any shortfall in 
his law firm's trust account. 
¶3 
Attorney Weigel was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1960 and practices in Milwaukee.  In 1979 he was 
privately reprimanded for failing to promptly notify a client of 
the adverse result in her damages action against an opposing 
party and an insurance company.  In 2012 he was publicly 
reprimanded for entering into a stock redemption agreement that 
contained a "non-compete" clause restricting the rights of his 
former 
partner, 
Alvin 
Eisenberg, 
to 
practice 
law 
after 
termination of their relationship, and for misleading clients 
and the public by continuing to use the firm name, "Eisenberg, 
Weigel, Carlson, Blau & Clemens, S.C.," after Attorney Eisenberg 
left the firm.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Weigel, 
2012 WI 71, 342 Wis. 2d 129, 817 N.W.2d 835.  
¶4 
As with Attorney Weigel's most recent disciplinary 
case, the facts underlying this matter also arise out of the 
dissolution of his practice with Alvin Eisenberg.  The firm now 
known as Weigel, Carlson, Blau & Clemens, S.C., was formerly 
known as Eisenberg, Weigel, Carlson, Blau & Clemens, S.C.  The 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
3 
 
firm was incorporated in 1975 by Alvin Eisenberg as the sole 
shareholder.  Throughout its history the firm has concentrated 
its practice in the area of representing injured persons in 
personal injury matters. 
¶5 
Attorney 
Weigel 
joined 
the 
firm 
in 
1990 
as 
a 
shareholder and officer.  Prior to March 1, 1999, Attorney 
Weigel was a four percent shareholder in the firm as well as an 
officer.  A number of other attorneys also held a four percent 
interest in the firm.  Pursuant to the stock redemption 
agreement of March 1, 1999, Attorney Weigel, along with 
Attorneys Clemens and Blau, became the sole shareholders in the 
firm.  Attorney Weigel has served as president of the firm since 
that time. 
¶6 
Prior to March 1, 1999, Attorney Eisenberg controlled 
the firm's trust accounts and generally controlled the firm.  In 
1995 or 1996 the firm sustained a third-party forgery loss in 
excess of $50,000 from its trust account.  In 1996 or 1997 the 
firm sustained another third-party forgery loss of approximately 
$20,000 from its trust account.  Those trust account theft 
losses were not reported to the OLR and the trust account was 
not replenished to replace the missing funds.  In addition, the 
trust account was not isolated or replaced with a new trust 
account and the firm did nothing to determine the exact amount 
of the trust account deficiency. 
¶7 
Although Attorney Weigel had signature authority on 
the trust account for at least part of the 1990s, he says he was 
not specifically aware of the losses sustained to the account at 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
4 
 
the time of the thefts.  He was, however, aware of the losses at 
the time he entered into the stock redemption agreement in March 
1999.  Both before and after March 1999, neither the prior nor 
successor 
law 
firm 
regularly 
kept 
transaction 
ledgers, 
individual client ledgers, copies of monthly bank statements, 
deposit records, disbursement records, or monthly reconciliation 
reports for the trust account as required by supreme court 
rules.   
¶8 
Attorney Weigel has stated that the deficits in the 
trust account since 1999 have ranged from $100,000 to over 
$1,000,000.  He estimates the current trust account deficit to 
be approximately $100,000 to $150,000.   
¶9 
Attorney Weigel testified at the hearing before the 
referee that without adequate trust account records, the firm, 
since March 1999, has reacted to claims by individuals and 
entities who did not receive their proper share of settlements 
by going to each client's signed settlement statement to see if 
the claimed amount had been paid.  Attorney Weigel has said that 
since March 1999, he and the other shareholders in the firm have 
reduced the deficit in the trust account by injecting personal 
funds into the account or by not taking the full distributions 
of amounts payable to the firm for attorney fees earned and 
costs advanced.   
¶10 Attorney Weigel asserts that clients have always 
received their net share of settlement proceeds in a timely 
manner, but he admits that payments to third parties have been 
delayed in order to avoid having checks drawn on the trust 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
5 
 
account payable to third parties returned for insufficient 
funds.  Attorney Weigel also admits the firm's trust account has 
been out of balance since before 1999 and the problem continues 
to the present. 
¶11 From March 1999 through 2007 the firm maintained an 
IOLTA trust account with Norwest Bank, now known as Wells Fargo 
Bank, in Milwaukee.  In October of 2003 the firm opened a second 
IOLTA trust account with Wells Fargo Bank.  On January 11, 2007, 
Wells Fargo Bank issued an insufficient funds notice to the firm 
relative to the second trust account.  The OLR received a copy 
of the notice pursuant to SCR 20:1.15(h)(3).  When OLR did not 
receive information from Wells Fargo Bank indicating that the 
notice had been sent through inadvertence or mistake, by letter 
dated January 26, 2007, the OLR notified Attorney Weigel that it 
had a duty to investigate the overdraft in the trust account and 
that Attorney Weigel was required to provide a written response.  
Various correspondence between Attorney Weigel and the OLR 
ensued.   
¶12 On January 15, 2007, in the context of a separate 
matter under investigation, the OLR served a subpoena duces 
tecum directed to Attorney Weigel requiring the law firm to 
produce trust account records that are required to be kept under 
SCR 20:1.15.  After Attorney Weigel failed to supply trust 
account records pursuant to the subpoena, the OLR suggested a 
protocol by which Attorney Weigel would produce all trust 
account records of the firm so that OLR could conduct an audit.  
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
6 
 
Attorney Weigel produced some records but was unable to produce 
all records requested. 
¶13 Since May 2003 Attorney Weigel has been a signatory on 
an IOLTA trust account at Tri City National Bank of Milwaukee 
for a business partnership.  Attorney Weigel failed to disclose 
the Tri City National trust account on each of the yearly trust 
account/WisTAF certifications filed with the State Bar of 
Wisconsin for the years 2005 through 2009.  In addition, in the 
trust account/WisTAF certificate portions of the membership dues 
and supreme court assessments statements filed with the State 
Bar of Wisconsin for the years 2005 through 2009, Attorney 
Weigel falsely certified that he complied with each of the 
recordkeeping requirements set forth in SCR 20:1.15. 
¶14 Vance Masci, M.D., MPH, is a physician licensed in the 
state of Wisconsin who has a specialty in occupational medicine.  
Dr. Masci was the owner and proprietor of Milwaukee Occupational 
Medicine, S.C. (MOMS).  Between 2002 and 2005 certain clients 
who retained Attorney Weigel's firm to assert personal injury 
claims were provided medical services by MOMS, which in turn 
billed the clients for the cost of those medical services. 
¶15 After settling a personal injury matter, Attorney 
Weigel has a standard business practice whereby the firm and the 
client execute a settlement statement.  The settlement statement 
provides that the client understands that any charges not 
reflected 
on 
the 
statement 
will 
be 
the 
client's 
sole 
responsibility.  To the extent that Attorney Weigel's firm trust 
account records are available, they show that payments due to 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
7 
 
MOMS for medical services provided to MOMS' clients generally 
were made six or more months after the firm had paid itself for 
legal fees and costs earned in the settled cases.  Dr. Masci 
filed a grievance with the OLR against Attorney Weigel in 2005.   
¶16 In May 2004 L.B. retained Attorney Weigel's firm to 
represent her in a personal injury case arising out of an auto 
accident.  In August of 2005, L.B. received a notice from the 
University of Wisconsin Medical Foundation saying she was being 
billed $25 for an insufficient funds charge because a check from 
Attorney Weigel's firm for payment of expenses incurred in the 
case had bounced.  L.B. called the firm and was told it would 
take care of the charge, but it did not do so.  L.B. paid for 
the charge.  Although the firm told her it would reimburse her, 
it did not do so.  
¶17 On or about June 6, 2006, L.B. agreed to settle her 
claim arising out of the auto accident for $100,000.  Sometime 
prior to June 8, 2006, American Family Insurance Company, the 
liability insurer for the other driver involved in L.B.'s case, 
transmitted $100,000 to the firm in settlement of the claim.  
The settlement funds were deposited in the firm's trust account 
with Wells Fargo Bank.  On June 8, 2006, L.B. executed a 
settlement statement confirming her agreement to settle her 
case.  The firm gave L.B. a check in the net amount of 
$44,138.27.  That check cleared.   
¶18 Although the settlement statement showed the sum of 
$37,381.93 was due and owing to the firm for attorney fees and 
costs in the L.B. case, no corresponding check or deposit in 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
8 
 
that amount appears in the firm's trust account records, and 
Attorney Weigel provided no back-up documentation showing the 
date the firm was paid on the L.B. file.  In addition to 
providing for payment to the firm for attorney fees and 
expenses, the settlement statement in L.B.'s case also listed 
"outstanding bills and liens paid out of settlement proceeds" to 
third parties for medical expenses for treatment necessitated by 
L.B.'s injuries sustained in the accident.  L.B. understood the 
firm 
would 
promptly 
remit 
payment 
to 
the 
third 
parties 
identified in the settlement statement. 
¶19 In late October 2006 L.B. received a letter from the 
administrator for her health insurance plan saying it had 
learned her claim had been settled and that the sum of 
$15,243.01 was due and owing from her to reimburse the plan for 
sums paid on her behalf for medical services arising out of the 
accident.  This amount differed from the amount of $15,000 that 
was shown on the settlement statement as the sum due to L.B.'s 
health insurance plan, and it also differed from the amount 
shown on the settlement statement as the total of the plan's 
claim.   
¶20 In January 2007 L.B. received a letter from the 
collection agency for Aurora Health Care stating that $499.40 
remained due and owing for services and threatening collection 
action.  Also in January of 2007, L.B. received a statement from 
Cully R. White Neurosurgery & Spine, S.C., stating that the sum 
of $531.72 remained due and owing.  
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
9 
 
¶21 In February 2007 L.B. filed a grievance against 
Attorney Weigel in connection with the failure to pay third 
parties as directed by her in the settlement statement she and 
the firm had signed.  Although Attorney Weigel told OLR staff 
that all of L.B.'s medical bills had been paid prior to the time 
she filed the grievance, he supplied no records showing the date 
or dates upon which payments were made, and the trust account 
records supplied by Attorney Weigel contained no evidence of 
payments from the trust accounts in the exact amounts shown on 
the settlement statement as owed to L.B.'s creditors. 
¶22 On March 24, 2011, the OLR filed a complaint against 
Attorney Weigel alleging ten counts of misconduct: 
 
COUNT ONE:  By deliberately failing to promptly 
deliver funds to Milwaukee Occupational Medicine, S.C. 
("MOMS") and other third-party payees, as directed by 
clients of his law firm, including grievant-client 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
10 
 
[L.B.], Weigel violated former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1)1 and 
SCR 20:8.4(c).2   
 
COUNT TWO:  By failing to maintain a transaction 
register for his law firm's trust accounts since 
July 1, 2004, Weigel violated former and current 
SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)a.3 
                                                 
1 Former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) (effective July 1, 2004, through 
June 30, 2007) provided: 
 
(d) Prompt notice and delivery of property.  
 
(1) Notice and disbursement.  Upon receiving 
funds or other property in which a client has an 
interest, or in which the lawyer has received notice 
that a 3rd party has an interest identified by a lien, 
court order, judgment, or contract, the lawyer shall 
promptly notify the client or 3rd party in writing. 
Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted 
by law or by agreement with the client, the lawyer 
shall promptly deliver to the client or 3rd party any 
funds or other property that the client or 3rd party 
is entitled to receive. 
2 SCR 
20:8.4(c) 
(former 
and 
current) 
states 
it 
is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation; . . . ." 
3 Former SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)a. (effective July 1, 2004, 
through December 31, 2009) provided: 
 
(f) Record-keeping 
requirements 
for 
trust 
accounts.  
 
(1) Demand accounts. Complete records of a trust 
account that is a demand account shall include a 
transaction register; individual client ledgers; a 
ledger for account fees and charges, if law firm funds 
are held in the account pursuant to sub. (b)(3); 
deposit 
records; 
disbursement 
records; 
monthly 
statements; and reconciliation reports, subject to all 
of the following:  
 
a. Transaction register. The transaction register 
shall contain a chronological record of all account 
transactions, and shall include all of the following:  
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
11 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
1. the date, source, and amount of all deposits;  
 
2. the date, check or transaction number, payee 
and amount of all disbursements, whether by check, 
wire transfer, or other means;  
 
3. the date and amount of every other deposit or 
deduction of whatever nature;  
 
4. the identity of the client for whom funds were 
deposited or disbursed; and  
 
5. the 
balance 
in 
the 
account 
after 
each 
transaction. 
Current 
SCR 
20:1.15(f)(1)a. 
(effective 
January 
1, 
2010) 
provides:   
 
(f) Record-keeping requirements for all trust 
accounts. 
 
(1) Draft accounts. Complete records of a trust 
account that is a draft account shall include a 
transaction register; individual client ledgers for 
IOLTA accounts and other pooled trust accounts; a 
ledger for account fees and charges, if law firm funds 
are held in the account pursuant to sub. (b)(3); 
deposit 
records; 
disbursement 
records; 
monthly 
statements; and reconciliation reports, subject to all 
of the following:  
 
a. Transaction register. The transaction register 
shall contain a chronological record of all account 
transactions, and shall include all of the following:  
 
1. the date, source, and amount of all deposits;  
 
2. the date, check or transaction number, payee 
and amount of all disbursements, whether by check, 
wire transfer, or other means;  
 
3. the date and amount of every other deposit or 
deduction of whatever nature;  
 
4. the identity of the client for whom funds were 
deposited or disbursed; and  
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
12 
 
 
COUNT THREE:  By failing to maintain individual 
client ledgers in the form of a subsidiary ledger for 
each individual client for the firm's trust accounts, 
Weigel violated former SCR 20:1.15(e)(iii)4 and former 
and current SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)b.5 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
5. the 
balance 
in 
the 
account 
after 
each 
transaction. 
4 Former SCR 20:1.15(e)(iii) (effective through June 30, 
2004) provided:  
 
Complete records of trust account funds and other 
trust property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall 
be preserved for a period of at least six years after 
termination of the representation. Complete records 
shall 
include: . . . (iii) a 
subsidiary 
ledger 
containing a separate page for each person or company 
for whom funds have been received in trust, showing 
the date and amount of each receipt, the date and 
amount of 
each disbursement, and any unexpended 
balance, . . . ." 
5 Former SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)b. (effective July 1, 2004, 
through December 31, 2009) provided:  
 
(f) Record-keeping 
requirements 
for 
trust 
accounts. (1) Demand accounts.  . . .  
 
b. Individual 
client 
ledgers. 
 
A 
subsidiary 
ledger shall be maintained for each client or matter 
for which the lawyer receives trust funds, and the 
lawyer shall record each receipt and disbursement of 
that client's funds and the balance following each 
transaction.  A lawyer shall not disburse funds from 
the trust account that would create a negative balance 
with respect to any individual client or matter. 
Current 
SCR 
20:1.15(f)(1)b. 
(effective 
January 
1, 
2010) 
provides:  
 
(f) Record-keeping requirements for all trust 
accounts. (1) Draft accounts.  . . .  
 
b. Individual 
client 
ledgers. 
 
A 
subsidiary 
ledger shall be maintained for each client or 3rd 
party for whom the lawyer receives trust funds that 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
13 
 
 
COUNT FOUR:  By failing to complete trust account 
deposit slips in accordance with SCR 20:1.15, and by 
failing to preserve complete copies of the monthly 
statements and deposit slips, Weigel violated former 
SCR 
20:1.15(e)(vi)6 
and 
former 
and 
current 
SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)d.7 
and 
former 
and 
current 
SCR 20:1.15(e)(6).8 
                                                                                                                                                             
are deposited in an IOLTA account or any other pooled 
trust account.  The lawyer shall record each receipt 
and disbursement of a client's or 3rd party's funds 
and the balance following each transaction.  A lawyer 
shall not disburse funds from an IOLTA account or any 
pooled trust account that would create a negative 
balance with respect to any individual client or 
matter. 
6 Former SCR 20:1.15(e)(vi) (effective through June 30, 
2004) provided:   
 
Complete records of trust account funds and other 
trust property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall 
be preserved for a period of at least six years after 
termination of the representation. Complete records 
shall 
include: . . . (vi) monthly 
statements, 
including canceled checks, vouchers or share drafts, 
and duplicate deposit slips. 
7 Former SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)d. (effective July 1, 2004, 
through December 31, 2009) provided: 
 
(f) Record-keeping 
requirements 
for 
trust 
accounts. (1) Demand accounts.  . . .  
 
d. Deposit records.  Deposit slips shall identify 
the name of the lawyer or law firm, and the name of 
the account.  The deposit slip shall identify the 
amount of each deposit item, the client or matter 
associated with each deposit item, and the date of the 
deposit.  The lawyer shall maintain a copy or 
duplicate of each deposit slip.  All deposits shall be 
made intact.  No cash, or other form of disbursement, 
shall be deducted from a deposit.  Deposits of wired 
funds shall be documented in the account's monthly 
statement. 
Current SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)d. (effective January 1, 2010) states:  
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
14 
 
 
COUNT FIVE:  By failing to maintain and preserve 
complete trust account disbursement records, Weigel 
violated former SCR 20:1.15(e)(ii)9 and former and 
current SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)e.10 and former and current 
SCR 20:1.15(e)(6). 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(f) Record-keeping requirements for all trust 
accounts.  (1) Draft accounts.  . . .  
 
d. Deposit records. Deposit slips shall identify 
the name of the lawyer or law firm, and the name of 
the account.  The deposit slip shall identify the 
amount of each deposit item, the client or matter 
associated with each deposit item, and the date of the 
deposit.  The lawyer shall maintain a copy or 
duplicate of each deposit slip.  All deposits shall be 
made intact.  No cash, or other form of disbursement, 
shall be deducted from a deposit.  Deposits of wired 
funds shall be documented in the account's monthly 
statement. 
8 SCR 20:1.15(e)(6) (former and current, effective July 1, 
2004) provides: 
 
(e) Operational requirements for trust accounts.  
 
. . .  
 
(6) Record retention. A lawyer shall maintain 
complete records of trust account funds and other 
trust property and shall preserve those records for at 
least 6 years after the date of termination of the 
representation. 
9 Former SCR 20:1.15(e)(ii) (effective through June 30, 
2004) provided:   
 
Complete records of trust account funds and other 
trust property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall 
be preserved for a period of at least six years after 
termination of the representation. Complete records 
shall include: . . . (ii) a disbursements journal, 
listing the date and payee of each disbursement, with 
all disbursements being paid by check, . . . . 
10 Former SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)e. (effective July 1, 2004, 
through December 31, 2009) stated: 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
15 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(f) Record-keeping 
requirements 
for 
trust 
accounts. (1) Demand accounts.  . . .  
 
e. Disbursement records.  
 
1. Checks. 
Checks 
shall 
be 
pre-printed 
and 
prenumbered.  The name and address of the lawyer or 
law firm, and the name of the account shall be printed 
in the upper left corner of the check.  Trust account 
checks shall include the words "Client Account," or 
"Trust Account," or words of similar import in the 
account name.  Each check disbursed from the trust 
account shall identify the client matter and the 
reason for the disbursement on the memo line.  
 
2. Canceled checks. Canceled checks shall be 
obtained from the financial institution.  Imaged 
checks may be substituted for canceled checks. 
 
3. Imaged 
checks. 
Imaged 
checks 
shall 
be 
acceptable if they provide both the front and reverse 
of the check and comply with the requirements of this 
paragraph.  The information contained on the reverse 
side 
of 
the 
imaged 
checks 
shall 
include 
any 
endorsement signatures or stamps, account numbers, and 
transaction dates that appear on the original.  Imaged 
checks shall be of sufficient size to be readable 
without magnification and as close as possible to the 
size of the original check.  
 
4. Wire 
transfers. 
Wire 
transfers 
shall 
be 
documented by a written withdrawal authorization or 
other documentation, such as a monthly statement of 
the account that indicates the date of the transfer, 
the payee, and the amount. 
Current SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)e. (effective January 1, 2010) states: 
 
(f) Record-keeping requirements for all trust 
accounts. (1) Draft accounts.  . . .  
 
e. Disbursement records.  
 
1. Checks. 
Checks 
shall 
be 
pre-printed 
and 
prenumbered.  The name and address of the lawyer or 
law firm, and the name of the account shall be printed 
in the upper left corner of the check.  Trust account 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
16 
 
 
COUNT SIX:  By failing to maintain and preserve 
complete 
monthly 
reconciliation 
reports, 
Weigel 
violated former SCR 20:1.15(e)(v)11 and former and 
                                                                                                                                                             
checks shall include the words "Client Account," or 
"Trust Account," or words of similar import in the 
account name.  Each check disbursed from the trust 
account shall identify the client matter and the 
reason for the disbursement on the memo line.  
 
2. Canceled checks. Canceled checks shall be 
obtained from the financial institution.  Imaged 
checks may be substituted for canceled checks.  
 
3. Imaged 
checks. 
Imaged 
checks 
shall 
be 
acceptable if they provide both the front and reverse 
of the check and comply with the requirements of this 
paragraph.  The information contained on the reverse 
side 
of 
the 
imaged 
checks 
shall 
include 
any 
endorsement signatures or stamps, account numbers, and 
transaction dates that appear on the original.  Imaged 
checks shall be of sufficient size to be readable 
without magnification and as close as possible to the 
size of the original check. 
 
4. Wire 
transfers. 
Wire 
transfers 
shall 
be 
documented by a written withdrawal authorization or 
other documentation, such as a monthly statement of 
the account that indicates the date of the transfer, 
the payee, and the amount. 
11 Former SCR 20:1.15(e)(v) (effective through June 30, 
2004) stated: 
 
Complete records of trust account funds and other 
trust property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall 
be preserved for a period of at least six years after 
termination of the representation. Complete records 
shall include: . . . (v) a determination of the cash 
balance (checkbook balance) at the end of each month, 
taken from the cash receipts and cash disbursement 
journals and a reconciliation of the cash balance 
(checkbook balance) with the balance indicated in the 
bank statement, . . . . 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
17 
 
current SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)g.12 and former and current 
SCR 20:1.15(e)(6). 
                                                 
12 Former SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)g. (effective July 1, 2004, 
through December 30, 2009) provided:   
 
(f) Record-keeping 
requirements 
for 
trust 
accounts. (1) Demand accounts. . . .  
 
g. Reconciliation 
reports. 
 
For 
each 
trust 
account, the lawyer shall prepare and retain a printed 
reconciliation report on a regular and periodic basis 
not less frequently than every 30 days.  Each 
reconciliation report shall show all of the following 
balances and verify that they are identical:  
 
1. the balance that appears in the transaction 
register as of the reporting date;  
 
2. the total of all subsidiary ledger balances 
for 
IOLTA 
accounts 
and 
other 
pooled 
accounts, 
determined by listing and totaling the balances in the 
individual client ledgers and the ledger for account 
fees and charges, as of the reporting date; and  
 
3. the adjusted balance, determined by adding 
outstanding deposits and other credits to the balance 
in the financial institution's monthly statement and 
subtracting outstanding checks and other deductions 
from the balance in the monthly statement.  
Current 
SCR 
20:1.15(f)(1)g. 
(effective 
January 
1, 
2010) 
provides: 
 
(f) Record-keeping requirements for all trust 
accounts.  (1) Draft accounts. . . .  
 
g. Reconciliation 
reports. 
For 
each 
trust 
account, the lawyer shall prepare and retain a printed 
reconciliation report on a regular and periodic basis 
not 
less 
frequently 
than 
every 
30 
days. 
Each 
reconciliation report shall show all of the following 
balances and verify that they are identical:  
 
1. the balance that appears in the transaction 
register as of the reporting date; 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
18 
 
 
COUNT SEVEN:  By converting funds belonging to 
clients, including but not limited to [L.B.] and 
clients 
who 
were 
also 
patients 
of 
MOMS, 
by 
systematically using client funds to pay obligations 
owed to other clients and/or to pay third party 
creditors of other clients, Weigel violated former and 
current SCR 20:8.4(c). 
 
COUNT EIGHT:  By failing to produce trust account 
records as requested by OLR in the course of its 
investigations, Weigel violated former and current 
SCR 20:1.15(e)(7).13 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
2. the total of all subsidiary ledger balances 
for 
IOLTA 
accounts 
and 
other 
pooled 
accounts, 
determined by listing and totaling the balances in the 
individual client ledgers and the ledger for account 
fees and charges, as of the reporting date; and 
 
3. the adjusted balance, determined by adding 
outstanding deposits and other credits to the balance 
in the financial institution's monthly statement and 
subtracting outstanding checks and other deductions 
from the balance in the monthly statement. 
13 SCR 20:1.15(e)(7) (former and current, effective July 1, 
2004) provides: 
 
(e) Operational requirements for trust accounts.  
 
. . .  
 
(7) Production of records. All trust account 
records have public aspects related to a lawyer's 
fitness to practice. Upon request of the office of 
lawyer regulation, or upon direction of the supreme 
court, the records shall be submitted to the office of 
lawyer regulation for its inspection, audit, use, and 
evidence under any conditions to protect the privilege 
of clients that the court may provide.  The records, 
or an audit of the records, shall be produced at any 
disciplinary proceeding involving the lawyer, whenever 
material.  Failure to produce the records constitutes 
unprofessional conduct and grounds for disciplinary 
action. 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
19 
 
 
COUNT NINE:  By failing to disclose the existence 
of the Tri[ ]City National trust accounts in the 
certification part of the annual state bar dues 
statement, and by falsely certifying that he had 
complied with each of the recordkeeping requirements 
set forth in SCR 20:1.15, Weigel violated former and 
current SCR 20:1.15(i)(1)14 and former and current 
SCR 20:8.4(c). 
                                                 
14 Former SCR 20:1.15(i)(1) (effective July 1, 2004, through 
June 30, 2007) provided: 
 
(i) Certification 
of 
compliance 
with 
trust 
account rules.  
 
(1) Annual requirement.  A member of the state 
bar of Wisconsin shall file with the state bar of 
Wisconsin annually, with payment of the member's state 
bar dues or upon any other date approved by the 
supreme court, a certificate stating whether the 
member is engaged in the practice of law in Wisconsin. 
If the member is practicing law, the member shall 
state the account number of any trust account, and the 
name of each financial institution in which the member 
maintains a trust account, a safe deposit box, or 
both, as required by SCR 20:1.15.  The state bar shall 
supply to each member, with the annual dues statement, 
or at any other time directed by the supreme court, a 
form on which the certification must be made. 
Current SCR 20:1.15(i)(1) (effective July 1, 2007) provides: 
 
(i) Certification 
of 
compliance 
with 
trust 
account rules.  
 
(1) Annual requirement. A member of the state bar 
of Wisconsin shall file with the state bar of 
Wisconsin annually, with payment of the member's state 
bar dues or upon any other date approved by the 
supreme court, a certificate stating whether the 
member is engaged in the practice of law in Wisconsin.  
If the member is practicing law, the member shall 
state the account number of any trust account, and the 
name of each financial institution in which the member 
maintains a trust account, a safe deposit box, or 
both, as required by this section.  The state bar 
shall supply to each member, with the annual dues 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
20 
 
 
COUNT TEN:  By failing to disclose to OLR in the 
course of the investigations that he deliberately 
caused his law firm not to promptly reimburse MOMS for 
client 
medical 
expenses 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
clients' directions and to not promptly pay [L.B.'s] 
third 
party 
creditors 
as 
directed, 
and 
instead 
represented to OLR that the delayed payment[s] were 
caused by other factors, Weigel violated SCR 22.03(6)15 
and former and current SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶23 James J. Winiarski was appointed referee.  A hearing 
was held on January 31, 2012.  The witnesses at the hearing were 
Attorney Weigel and Timothy P. Muehler, a certified public 
accountant and attorney, who served as a forensic auditor for 
the OLR.  At the beginning of the hearing, the parties submitted 
a 
partial 
stipulation 
of 
facts, 
which 
included 
multiple 
exhibits.  In the stipulation and/or his live testimony, 
Attorney Weigel admitted that he cannot produce many required 
trust account records;16 that he failed to promptly deliver funds 
to third-party payees; that he would pay whichever of the third 
parties was badgering him most for payment; that he commingled 
                                                                                                                                                             
statement, or at any other time directed by the 
supreme court, a form on which the certification must 
be made. 
15 SCR 22.03(6) provides:  
 
In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, 
the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance. 
16 Attorney Weigel claims that when Eisenberg owned the 
firm, the building had flooding problems that destroyed some 
records.  He also claims a computer crash destroyed other 
records. 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
21 
 
client trust funds with firm assets by leaving earned fees in 
the trust account; and that he injected firm funds into the 
trust account to cover deficits.  Attorney Weigel estimated the 
deficit in the trust account from 1999 to the present as being 
between $100,000 and $1,000,000, and he estimated the current 
trust account deficit to be approximately $100,000.   
¶24 Attorney Weigel stated that before he bought out Alvin 
Eisenberg, he understood the trust account was running a deficit 
but he claimed he did not know the full extent of the deficit.  
In his testimony at the hearing, Attorney Weigel said that when 
he and his partners bought Alvin Eisenberg out, "I would have 
believed the problem to be closer in the $200,000, $250,000 
range.  After we bought him out and some other things started to 
come to light, it was obvious that we were closer to the million 
dollar range than the $250,000 range."  When asked how long 
after the March 1999 buyout Attorney Weigel came to the 
conclusion that the trust account was running closer to a 
million dollar deficit, he estimated "somewhere over the course 
of six months or so," which would have meant late 1999 or early 
2000.  When asked whether he gave any thought to reporting Alvin 
Eisenberg to the relevant authorities and walking away, Attorney 
Weigel responded, "I thought of it but just made a moral 
decision not to do that."  Attorney Weigel later elaborated by 
saying: 
[A]t that point I have got to make a decision: either 
I walk away from the thing, contact the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation and say, hey, this is where we're at 
but it didn't happen on my watch at which point the 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
22 
 
whole——you know, we probably had 70 families out of a 
job, the company's out of business, the law firm is 
out of business, and nobody gets paid.  Who is going 
to come in and pay those people. 
¶25 When asked if he ever sent Alvin Eisenberg a writing 
complaining about the fact that he had inherited a million 
dollar deficit, Attorney Weigel answered, "No, not really."  
¶26 The referee issued his report and recommendation on 
April 23, 2012.  The referee found that the OLR had met its 
burden of proof as to all of the counts of misconduct alleged in 
its complaint.  The referee said: 
 
Weigel testified that he believed the trust 
account was out of balance at the time he and the 
other attorneys purchased the Firm from Eisenberg on 
March 1, 1999.  Any and all problems with the trust 
account at the time of purchase, including any 
deficits, could have been isolated by opening a new 
trust account at that time and by making no further 
use of the existing trust account for new cases.  
Weigel maintains he did not do so because he wished to 
make sure all obligations of the existing trust 
account were properly paid.  However, those goals 
could also have been met by opening a new trust 
account, while still dealing with the problems in the 
existing trust account. 
 
I am most suspect of Weigel's claim that the Firm 
continued to use the trust account in order to make 
whole clients and others with money due from the trust 
account.  The evidence would certainly support a 
conclusion that Weigel and the law Firm did not wish 
to account for or explain the many deficits and 
problems with the trust account. 
 
Even if there were substantial problems with the 
trust account at the time of purchase from Eisenberg 
in 1999, that does not excuse Weigel and the Firm from 
maintaining all trust account records required by 
Supreme Court Rules after the purchase.  The need for 
proper trust account records was exacerbated by any 
pre-existing problems with the trust account.  Such 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
23 
 
records would have isolated the pre-existing trust 
account problems and possibly provided evidence that 
Weigel and the new Firm were not responsible for some 
of the prior trust account problems.  
 
. . .  
 
It is quite clear from the evidence that Weigel 
and his law Firm made a deliberate decision to not 
acknowledge and report the many problems with the 
trust account, and instead attempted to pay their way 
out of the problems.  The lesser "evil" was to pay 
each subsequent claim made against the trust account.  
One has to consider the sheer magnitude of the many 
problems that must have existed in the trust account 
between 1999 and 2007, which would lead Weigel and the 
law Firm to be willing to pay off hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in claims, allegedly caused by 
Eisenberg before 1999, without disclosure to the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation. 
¶27 The referee said there was no evidence that any client 
suffered a monetary loss as a result of Attorney Weigel's and 
the firm's trust account misconduct since all amounts due 
individuals were ultimately paid in full.  The referee also 
noted there was no evidence of direct misappropriation by 
Attorney Weigel or the firm.  The referee went on to say: 
 
However, the evidence clearly shows there have 
been long delays in paying individuals funds due them 
from the trust account.  This is a form of harm.  In 
addition, using funds received on behalf of current 
clients to pay the obligations of past clients is also 
a form of harm.  . . .  
 
Simply because funds were ultimately obtained 
from some source to pay off individuals with a claim 
against the trust account, does not mean there was not 
harm to clients.  When a client trust account is 
properly maintained, the existing funds always equal 
the liabilities.  When liabilities exceed existing 
trust funds, clients and creditors of the trust 
account suffer increased risk of nonpayment.  This is 
a form of harm.  
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
24 
 
 
. . .  
 
Today, Weigel estimates the current deficit in 
the trust account to be approximately $100,000.00. 
This means that clients and creditors with proper 
claims against the trust account are currently at risk 
because there are insufficient funds within the trust 
account to pay those obligations.  This is also a form 
of harm.  In essence, the entire scheme that has been 
used by [Weigel] and the law Firm for approximately 
the past thirteen years has put all individuals with a 
proper interest in the trust account at risk. 
¶28 Turning to the appropriate level of discipline to 
impose for Attorney Weigel's misconduct, the referee said 
mitigating factors in the case included the fact there was no 
evidence Attorney Weigel stole any money from the trust account; 
there was no evidence any individual or entity has experienced a 
monetary loss from the mishandling of the trust account; 
Attorney Weigel's general character and his positive reputation 
in the community; and his many years of practice as a lawyer 
with minimal prior disciplinary action.   
¶29 The referee said aggravating factors in the case 
included the length of time the trust account has been out of 
balance; the fact that a deficit still exists despite hundreds 
of thousands of dollars being put into the account; the 
intentional 
failure 
to 
keep 
trust 
account 
records; 
the 
deliberate failure to disclose all trust accounts to the OLR as 
required on a yearly basis; the intentional failure to isolate 
and stop using the problematic account by opening a new one; the 
intentional delay in timely paying trust account obligations; 
the "Ponzi" scheme type of thinking that occurred in response to 
the problems; the length of time it took Attorney Weigel to 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
25 
 
acknowledge his failure to keep trust account records; and 
Attorney Weigel's failure to bring the trust account problem to 
the OLR's attention prior to 2007.  The referee said: 
 
I am particularly concerned with the number of 
years that have elapsed since the 1999 purchase, 
during which the trust account has been substantially 
out 
of 
balance 
and 
no 
trust 
account 
records 
maintained.  Any reasonable lawyer, upon learning that 
a trust account is out of balance and has a deficit, 
would stop using the account, thereby isolating the 
problems, and begin using a new trust account.  I do 
not accept Weigel's explanation that he did so to make 
certain all clients and individuals with a claim 
against the trust account would ultimately be paid.  
That goal could have been met as easily with the 
establishment of a new trust account, with or without 
the knowledge of OLR.   
 
I believe profit motives as well as selfish 
motives [led] to Weigel's decision to continue to use 
the out of balance and deficit prone trust account.  
Upon learning of the trust account problems, an 
intentional decision was made to attempt to cover up 
the problems.  The intent was to try to alleviate the 
substantial trust account problems by a series of 
misplaced actions which included [commingling] of 
funds, delayed trust account payments, and Ponzi 
scheme type actions, which included paying prior 
clients from settlement funds received on behalf of 
new clients.  
 
. . .  
 
It is hard to imagine a more intentional failure 
to maintain trust account records than exists in this 
case.  Also, the period of time the trust account has 
been out of balance with hundreds of thousands of 
dollars of deficits, is striking.  Simply, there was 
an intentional failure to follow Supreme Court Rules 
for many years.  Weigel and the Firm sought to hide 
the 
many 
trust 
account 
problems, 
rather 
than 
acknowledging those problems and [dealing] with them 
in a proper fashion. 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
26 
 
¶30 The referee concluded that an appropriate sanction for 
Attorney Weigel's misconduct was to suspend his license for a 
period of 30 months.  The referee also recommended that Attorney 
Weigel should be ordered to pay all costs of the disciplinary 
proceeding, and the referee recommended this court consider 
entering an order dealing with the current trust account 
problems and requiring Attorney Weigel to pay restitution in the 
form of being responsible for all current trust account 
deficits.   
¶31 Both parties have appealed. 
¶32 Attorney Weigel argues that the OLR has failed to 
prove by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that he 
converted client or third-party funds.  He asserts he did not 
create the deficit in the trust account "but he resolved to do 
right by the firm's clients and fix it."  Attorney Weigel 
recognizes that his efforts to correct the deficit violated 
supreme court rules.  However, he contends his efforts were 
successful 
because 
the 
deficit 
was 
reduced 
from 
around 
$1,000,000 to less than $150,000 today.  Attorney Weigel also 
admits he did not maintain ledgers as required by supreme court 
rules and that the firm's trust account was substantially out of 
balance throughout his tenure as managing partner of the firm.  
However, he says "his actions to correct the problem caused by 
Eisenberg's thefts were guided by personal conscience and moral 
judgment, as the Rules demand."   
¶33 Attorney Weigel says in Counts One and Seven of its 
complaint, 
the 
OLR 
alleges 
that 
he 
violated 
former 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
27 
 
SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) and SCR 20:8.4(c) by failing to promptly 
deliver funds to third parties and by converting client funds.  
He says the only third party identified by the OLR was MOMS.  
Attorney Weigel says his uncontroverted testimony established 
that MOMS agreed to accept payments on a rolling basis in 
consideration for future business.  
¶34 Attorney Weigel also argues the OLR failed to prove he 
converted client funds.  He claims the OLR has acknowledged it 
presented no client or third party who asserts an actual 
monetary loss due to irregularities in the trust account.  
However, he says the OLR now argues that Attorney Weigel must 
prove he did not convert client funds.   
¶35 Attorney Weigel also disagrees with the referee's 
recommendation for a 30-month suspension.  He submits the 
appropriate discipline lies between a public reprimand and a 60-
day suspension.   
¶36 The OLR asserts that the referee correctly concluded 
that Attorney Weigel violated former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) and 
SCR 20:8.4(c) as alleged in Counts One and Seven.  The OLR says 
Attorney Weigel fails to acknowledge the referee's specific 
findings that Attorney Weigel admitted his firm deliberately 
paid certain creditors involved in settlements on a tardy and 
late basis because there were insufficient funds in the trust 
account, and that they would pay the squeakiest wheel when there 
were insufficient funds in the trust account to pay all 
individuals who had a claim against the trust account.   
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
28 
 
¶37 The 
OLR 
says 
Attorney 
Weigel 
admitted 
he 
systematically delayed payments to third parties.  The OLR 
reasons that since SCR 20:1.15 prohibits commingling a lawyer's 
personal funds with client trust funds, it follows that the rule 
does not contemplate a lawyer "borrowing" money from one client 
to pay the bills of a prior client when the rule plainly 
requires paying Client A's bills using Client A's money and 
paying Client B's bills using Client B's money.   
¶38 The OLR says the fact that the thousands of individual 
clients affected by Attorney Weigel's misconduct were not named 
at trial does not change the fact that thousands of clients were 
affected by his misuse of their monies held in trust.  The OLR 
suggests that if the firm, as Attorney Weigel asserts, settled 
thousands of cases every year and the trust account had a 
deficit from March 1999 until the date of trial in January 2012, 
thousands of clients did not have their third-party bills timely 
paid because their money was diverted to pay the third-party 
bills of clients ahead of them in the trust account queue.   
¶39 The OLR says that it did present evidence regarding 
former client L.B., who signed her settlement statement on 
June 8, 2006, and received her share of the settlement proceeds.  
L.B.'s settlement statement said, "I accept the settlement and 
further authorize the disbursements stated above."  The OLR says 
at that point, from the client's perspective, there was no 
reason 
the 
third-party 
bills 
should 
not 
have 
been 
paid 
immediately.  Instead, the OLR says, to the extent payments made 
on L.B.'s behalf can be traced, bills were not paid until eight 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
29 
 
months after the settlement and in the meantime the third-party 
creditors that should have been paid in June of 2006 continued 
to hound L.B. for payment.   
¶40 The OLR argues that based on the partial stipulation 
and Attorney Weigel's admissions, ample evidence supports the 
referee's conclusion that, as alleged in Count One, Attorney 
Weigel systematically violated former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) and 
SCR 20:8.4(c) 
by 
failing 
to 
promptly 
disburse 
settlement 
proceeds of clients such as L.B. to third-party payees such as 
MOMS.   
¶41 The OLR says the same analysis applies to Attorney 
Weigel's attack on the referee's conclusion that he converted 
client funds.  The OLR says in denying that the findings 
established he converted any client funds, Attorney Weigel 
confuses conversion with misappropriation.  The OLR notes 
conversion has been described as: 
[T]he unauthorized use of a client's funds for the 
lawyer's own purpose.  It includes temporary use, and 
it extends to use that does not result in personal 
gain or benefit to the lawyer.  Paying one client out 
of money due another, keeping an unearned advance fee, 
holding on to unused escrow funds, and applying client 
funds to the client's bill are all examples of 
conversion. 
ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct § 45:503 (2007) 
(emphasis added; citations omitted).   
¶42 In its cross-appeal, the OLR argues that this court 
should revoke Attorney Weigel's license rather than impose the 
30-month suspension recommended by the referee.  It argues 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
30 
 
revocation is necessary and appropriate to protect the public 
and 
the 
legal 
profession. 
 
It 
says 
Attorney 
Weigel 
systematically converted millions of dollars of client funds 
over a period of more than ten years and in doing so, and in 
lying to the OLR in an effort to conceal his improper trust 
account practices, he engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and 
misrepresentation. 
¶43 The OLR argues revocation is the only appropriate 
sanction and anything less would undermine the public's faith in 
the honesty and integrity of the bar.  It says this is not a "no 
harm" case, and it argues actual harm was done to clients when 
their money was used without their consent for purposes 
unrelated to their cases.  Because of the lack of records, the 
OLR says Attorney Weigel has not even established the absence of 
monetary harm, as opposed to other types of harm.  The OLR says: 
 
An attorney who intentionally refuses to comply 
with the recordkeeping requirements of SCR 20:1.15 and 
who believes himself entitled to unilaterally use 
client money without the clients' consent, and even 
worse without accounting for the use of their money——
and who does so for over ten years and with tens of 
millions of client dollars——does untold harm to the 
reputation of the legal system and to the court 
responsible 
for 
oversight 
of 
the 
system 
and 
enforcement 
of 
the 
rules 
of 
professional 
responsibility.   
¶44 A referee's findings of fact will not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are reviewed de 
novo.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 
2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  This court is 
free to impose whatever discipline it deems appropriate, 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
31 
 
regardless 
of 
the 
referee's 
recommendation. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.   
¶45 Attorney Weigel argues that the OLR improperly shifted 
the burden of proof to him on its allegations that he converted 
client or third-party funds.  While Attorney Weigel concedes 
that his inability to produce the trust account records required 
by the rules of professional responsibility is a violation of 
supreme court rules, he argues the failure to maintain and 
produce the records required by the rules does not equate to a 
finding that he converted client or third-party funds.  He 
argues the OLR has the burden to prove conversion and he asserts 
the mere fact he cannot produce records does not prove 
conversion.  We disagree.   
¶46 The Comment to SCR 20:1.15 provides, "A lawyer must 
hold the property of others with the care required of a 
professional fiduciary."  In In re Trust Estate of Martin, 39 
Wis. 2d 437, 159 N.W.2d 660 (1968), we explained: 
A trustee is not handling his own funds but funds of 
others and he must always be able to make a full 
accounting of his stewardship.  When a trustee's 
accounts are not clear and accurate, all presumptions 
are against him and the obscurities and doubts are to 
be taken adversely against him.   
Id. at 441-42.  
¶47 Although Martin did not involve an attorney's trust 
account, we find the same rationale applies in the attorney 
regulatory context.  In this regard, we find instructive the 
South Carolina Supreme Court's holding in Matter of Miles, 516 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
32 
 
S.E.2d 661 (1999):  "When disciplinary counsel presents clear 
and convincing evidence of trust account violations or other 
inadequate 
recordkeeping, 
a 
lawyer's 
records 
must 
be 
sufficiently detailed to overcome the allegations."  Id. at 663.   
¶48 Attorney Weigel admits that he failed to keep the 
records required by SCR 20:1.15.  He also admits that he failed 
to promptly deliver funds to third parties and that he routinely 
advanced money rightly belonging to one client to pay funds owed 
to different clients.  The record clearly supports the referee's 
findings of fact that the OLR met its burden of proof on all of 
the counts in its complaint, including Counts One and Seven.   
¶49 Turning to the appropriate sanction, although most 
cases involving trust account violations that have resulted in 
revocation of an attorney's license to practice law have 
involved the attorney misappropriating funds to his or her own 
use, see, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Stange, 
2012 WI 66, 341 Wis. 2d 642, 815 N.W.2d 384, the scope of the 
trust account deficit in this case and the length of time it has 
continued requires a very strong sanction.  From 1999 until the 
present, Attorney Weigel systematically robbed Peter to pay 
Paul, paying clients out of money due to other clients, not 
distributing funds in a timely fashion to third-party medical 
providers and others, instead paying the "squeakiest wheel."  
Attorney Weigel admitted using both personal and firm funds to 
try to cover the trust account deficit and he admitted doing so 
on a regular basis since taking control of the firm in March of 
1999. 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
33 
 
¶50 Attorney Weigel admits that when he purchased the firm 
from Alvin Eisenberg, he was aware the trust account was running 
a deficit which he believed to be in the $200,000 to $250,000 
range.  He admits that by late 1999 or early 2000 he recognized 
the trust account deficit was closer to $1,000,000.  Yet, he did 
not report the problem to the OLR, nor did he close the terribly 
out of balance trust account and open a new one.17  It was 
apparently the culture of the law firm, both when Alvin 
Eisenberg was in charge and after Attorney Weigel took over, not 
to keep the requisite trust account records.  Attorney Weigel 
argues that his motives were selfless, that he tried to remedy 
the situation by gradually paying off the trust account deficit 
he inherited, thereby saving the jobs of the many people who 
worked at the law firm, and that he would have made more money 
if he had simply walked away from the firm.  We concur, however, 
with the referee that profit motives as well as selfish motives 
led to Attorney Weigel's decision to try to hide the trust 
account problems for many years rather than acknowledging the 
problems and dealing with them in an appropriate fashion. 
                                                 
17 SCR 20:8.3(a) provides, "A lawyer who knows that another 
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority."  
Attorney Weigel had no qualms about reporting Alvin Eisenberg to 
the OLR for other, relatively minor squabbles arising out of the 
dissolution of their partnership.  It is inconceivable that he 
would choose not to report a million dollar trust account 
deficit to the OLR.  
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
34 
 
¶51 We reject Attorney Weigel's claim that the OLR failed 
to prove that anyone was harmed by the trust account violations.  
L.B. was required to pay healthcare bills out of her own money 
that she thought had been paid by the firm.  MOMS failed to 
receive timely payments.  Attorney Weigel admitted that third 
parties routinely had to wait for months to get paid.  By 
Attorney Weigel's own admission, his law firm's trust account 
has run a deficit of between $100,000 and $1,000,000 for over 13 
years.  This is not a case where an attorney's failure to 
strictly comply with the recordkeeping requirements of the trust 
account rule amounts to nothing more than a technical violation.  
¶52 A six- or seven-figure deficit in an account that 
holds client funds is an ethical failure of epic proportions.  
We agree with the OLR that it would be difficult to imagine a 
more aggravated pattern of misconduct than the one presented 
here.  We agree with the OLR that any sanction less than 
revocation would undermine the public's confidence in the 
honesty and integrity of the bar.  Revocation of Attorney 
Weigel's license is the only sanction proportionate to the 
seriousness of the misconduct, and revocation will also protect 
the public, the courts, and the legal system, and it will deter 
other lawyers from engaging in similar misconduct.  We also 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
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agree with the referee that Attorney Weigel should be assessed 
the full costs of the proceeding.18 
¶53 Finally, we address the referee's recommendation that 
this court consider entering an order dealing with the current 
trust account problems and requiring Attorney Weigel to pay 
restitution in the form of being responsible for all current 
trust account deficits.  In order to deal with the remaining 
trust account deficits, we deem it appropriate to order Attorney 
Weigel to freeze any existing trust accounts and open a new one.  
We also find it appropriate to order that in the event any 
shortfalls should be found to exist in the old trust account or 
                                                 
18 Attorney Weigel has filed an objection to the OLR's 
statement of costs, saying this court should disallow the costs 
submitted by the OLR because they were unnecessary, excessive, 
and the OLR over-litigated the case from start to finish.  
Supreme court rule 22.24(1m) provides that the court's general 
policy is that upon a finding of misconduct it is appropriate to 
impose all costs upon the respondent.  In cases involving 
extraordinary circumstances the court may, in the exercise of 
its discretion, reduce the amount of costs.  We find no 
extraordinary circumstances in this case that would warrant a 
deviation from the court's general policy.   
Attorney Weigel has also filed two motions to compel 
production of materials he claims are relevant to his objections 
to claimed costs.  We deny both motions.  While the first motion 
alleges that OLR failed to provide sufficient information or 
materials to allow Attorney Weigel to assess the veracity of the 
claimed costs, the second motion asserts "it is likely that the 
information and materials OLR is refusing to produce will lead 
to newly discovered evidence that may warrant a new hearing."  
In deciding this matter this court has had the benefit of a 
referee's report issued after the evidentiary hearing, briefs 
filed 
by 
the 
parties, and oral argument.  Rather than 
challenging costs, it appears Attorney Weigel would like to re-
litigate the case.  We decline his request. 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
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accounts, Attorney Weigel must reimburse the amount of the 
shortfall.  He should be entitled to seek contribution, to the 
extent permitted by law, from any other individuals he believes 
should be required to contribute. 
¶54 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Joseph W. Weigel to 
practice law in Wisconsin is revoked, effective February 1, 
2013. 
¶55 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 30 days of the date 
of this order, Joseph W. Weigel shall freeze any existing trust 
accounts and shall not deposit any additional funds into them.  
In addition, he shall see to it that the firm opens a single new 
client trust account.  All subsequent funds received by the firm 
that are required to be placed in trust shall be deposited only 
into the new trust account, and recordkeeping for the new 
account shall strictly comply with all pertinent supreme court 
rules.  In the event any shortfalls are found to exist in the 
old trust account or accounts, Attorney Weigel is ordered to 
reimburse the amount of the shortfall.  Attorney Weigel may seek 
contribution, to the extent permitted by law, from any other 
individuals who he believes should make contribution.  Any 
shortfall in the old trust account or accounts shall be remedied 
within 90 days of the date of this order. 
¶56 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Joseph W. Weigel shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
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¶57 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Joseph W. Weigel comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of an 
attorney whose license to practice law has been revoked.  
 
No. 
2011AP659-D   
 
 
 
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