Title: People v. Gray

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
DONTRAE RENAY GRAY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S269237 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Two 
B302236 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
MA065662 
 
 
August 14, 2023 
 
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in 
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 
Evans concurred. 
 
Justice Groban filed a concurring opinion. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
S269237 
 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
We granted review in this matter to determine whether 
hearsay that qualifies as a spontaneous statement under 
Evidence Code section 1240 is always admissible at a probation 
revocation hearing without consideration of the balance of 
relevant interests.  The Court of Appeal in this case concluded 
that, because the statements at issue fell within a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception, they automatically satisfied the minimum 
due process requirements necessary for their admission into 
evidence.  According to that court, it was not necessary to 
balance defendant’s confrontation interests against any 
countervailing interests of the government.  We conclude that 
the Court of Appeal erred.  We therefore reverse the court’s 
judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
In September 2015, defendant Dontrae Renay Gray 
pleaded no contest to one count of assault with a deadly weapon 
(Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and admitted that he personally 
inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the offense (id., 
§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).  The trial court imposed a seven-year 
prison sentence, suspended execution of that sentence, and 
placed defendant on formal probation for five years.  As a 
condition of probation, defendant was required to obey all laws.   
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
2 
At approximately 8:00 a.m. on March 30, 2019, while 
defendant was still on probation, police officers received a 911 
call from a woman reporting that someone was “trying to break” 
and “kick . . . in” the door of a residence.  Police arrived at the 
residence approximately four minutes later and encountered the 
caller, N.S., at the front of the residence.  Officers observed 
damage to the wooden front door.  Two officers went to the rear 
of the residence, located defendant, and detained him there.  
After the officers had taken defendant into custody, another 
officer entered the residence and spoke with N.S. in the living 
room.  N.S. appeared frightened and was breathing heavily.  She 
had several bruises or red marks on her arms and a small 
scratch on her cheek.   
A body-worn camera worn by one of the officers captured 
N.S.’s statements regarding the incident.  N.S. was recorded 
stating that she and defendant had been dating for 
approximately two months, and that she had called the police 
twice the previous day because defendant had refused to leave 
the residence, where N.S. cared for a disabled woman.  N.S. 
reported that the police had responded to both calls and had told 
defendant to leave after the second call.  N.S. said that when she 
awoke the next morning and checked her phone, she saw that 
defendant had been calling her.  When N.S. was assisting the 
woman, N.S. heard defendant yelling at her from the back door.  
N.S. recounted that she had told defendant that she was not 
going to open the door and that he was “always hitting [her] and 
everything else.”  N.S. told the officer that defendant then went 
to the front of the residence, opened the screen door with a key 
he had stolen, and kicked in the front door.  N.S. relayed that 
defendant then entered the residence and started “punching 
[her] everywhere” and “stomping [her] out.”  She stated that 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
3 
defendant tried to punch her approximately 20 times, mainly on 
her arms, and that she fell to the ground.  She had visible 
injuries from defendant’s assault and reported that she was in 
pain. 
Defendant was arrested and charged with inflicting 
corporal injury upon a person in a dating relationship (Pen. 
Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and residential burglary (id., § 459).  
The prosecution filed a motion requesting that defendant’s 
probation be revoked based on the same incident.   
N.S. subsequently recanted in part.  A few days after the 
incident, N.S. informed a police detective that she had told police 
officers that defendant had hit her only because she was mad at 
defendant and wanted him out of her house.  N.S. averred that 
she was injured by falling backward after defendant kicked the 
front door open, and not by defendant directly.  N.S. also told 
the prosecutor that she had previously been “lying about some 
things.”   
N.S. did not appear at defendant’s criminal trial despite 
proper service of a subpoena and the court’s issuance of a body 
attachment order.  The prosecution sought to admit N.S.’s 
statements as recorded on the body-worn camera video, but the 
trial court ruled that the statements were testimonial and 
therefore inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. 
Const., 6th Amend.) as construed in Crawford v. Washington 
(2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford).  The prosecution then announced 
that it was unable to proceed and the court granted defendant’s 
motion to dismiss the criminal proceeding.   
The trial court held a probation revocation hearing several 
weeks later.  Defendant again objected that the admission of the 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
4 
video 
containing 
N.S.’s 
statements 
violated 
his 
Sixth 
Amendment rights under Crawford as well as his due process 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The trial court ruled 
that the Sixth Amendment applied only in criminal proceedings 
and therefore did not apply at a probation violation hearing.  
The court then ruled that N.S.’s statements within the first 
seven minutes of the video qualified as spontaneous statements 
under Evidence Code section 1240.  Without making an express 
finding of good cause for not securing N.S.’s live testimony at the 
revocation hearing, the court admitted N.S.’s recorded 
statements.  It then found that defendant violated his probation 
and imposed the previously suspended sentence of seven years’ 
imprisonment.   
Defendant appealed from the order revoking his 
probation, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.  (People v. Gray 
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 947 (Gray).)  The Court of Appeal 
acknowledged that N.S.’s statements were testimonial under 
Crawford and therefore inadmissible at defendant’s criminal 
proceeding (id. at p. 949), but found that consideration 
irrelevant in determining whether the statements were 
admissible at defendant’s probation revocation hearing (id. at 
pp. 956–957).1  The Court of Appeal held that hearsay that 
qualifies as a spontaneous statement under Evidence Code 
section 1240 automatically satisfies the minimum due process 
 
1  
The parties did not dispute that N.S.’s statements are 
testimonial under Crawford.  Accordingly, we accept the parties’ 
agreement on this point.  We express no opinion on whether the 
facts here establish the foundation for a spontaneous statement 
under Evidence Code section 1240, or the circumstances under 
which a spontaneous statement might qualify as testimonial for 
Crawford purposes. 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
5 
requirements applicable at probation revocation hearings.  
(Gray, at p. 949.)  It rejected defendant’s argument that, before 
such spontaneous statements may be admitted, the trial court 
must make a finding of good cause to dispense with cross-
examination, and also find that this good cause outweighed 
defendant’s need for confrontation.  (Id. at pp. 953–955.)   
As the Court of Appeal in this case recognized (Gray, 
supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 949), there is a split of authority 
regarding 
the 
prerequisites 
for 
admitting 
spontaneous 
statements in probation revocation hearings.  Specifically, 
courts are divided over whether an additional showing, beyond 
satisfaction of the criteria for spontaneous statements set out in 
Evidence Code section 1240, is required to protect a 
probationer’s due process rights in this context.  (Compare 
People v. Liggins (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 55, 66 (Liggins) 
[requiring good cause for not allowing confrontation and 
application of a balancing test that weighs probationer’s 
confrontation rights against government’s countervailing 
interests] with People v. Stanphill (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 61, 81 
(Stanphill) [finding spontaneous statements are automatically 
admissible at probation revocation hearing without any further 
showing of good cause or application of a balancing test].)  We 
granted review to resolve this conflict.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
Defendant contends the Court of Appeal erred in holding 
that a hearsay statement that comes within the spontaneous 
statement exception to the hearsay rule automatically satisfies 
a probationer’s constitutional due process right of confrontation 
and is automatically admissible at a probation revocation 
hearing.  To resolve this issue, we first examine the due process-
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
6 
based right to confrontation in revocation hearings recognized 
by the United States Supreme Court and this court, and the 
conflicting decisions of the Courts of Appeal that have addressed 
this question.   
A.  The Due Process Right to Confrontation in 
Probation Revocation Hearings 
In conducting a probation revocation hearing, a trial court 
exercises its discretion to “revoke and terminate the supervision 
of the person if the interests of justice so require and the court, 
in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report of the 
probation or parole officer or otherwise that the person has 
violated any of the conditions of their supervision, or has 
subsequently committed other offenses, regardless of whether 
the person has been prosecuted for those offenses.”  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1203.2, subd. (a).)  The facts supporting a probation revocation 
must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  (People v. 
Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 447 (Rodriguez).)   
It is well established that neither parole nor probation 
revocations are part of a criminal prosecution, and thus “the full 
panoply of rights due a defendant in [a criminal] proceeding does 
not apply.”  (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 480 
(Morrissey) [parole hearings]; see Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 
411 U.S. 778, 782 (Gagnon) [probation hearings]; People v. 
Winson (1981) 29 Cal.3d 711, 716 (Winson) [citing Morrissey’s 
holding that a parolee is not entitled to the same protections as 
a defendant in a criminal prosecution].)2  That said, “[p]robation 
 
2  
The Supreme Court extended the same due process 
guarantees outlined in Morrissey to probation revocation 
hearings in Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at page 782.  Like parole, 
 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
7 
revocation, like parole revocation, . . . does result in a loss of 
liberty.”  (Gagnon, at p. 782.)  Therefore, “[i]t is fundamental 
that both the People and the probationer or parolee have a 
continued post-conviction interest in accurate fact-finding and 
the informed use of discretion by the trial court.  The 
probationer or parolee’s concern is ‘to insure that his liberty is 
not unjustifiably taken away and the [People’s] to make certain 
that it is neither unnecessarily interrupting a successful effort 
at rehabilitation nor imprudently prejudicing the safety of the 
community.’ ”  (Winson, at p. 715.)   
A defendant during a probation revocation hearing has no 
Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.3  (See U.S. Const., 
6th Amend. [“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him” (italics added)].)  But due process principles protect a 
defendant’s interests even at a revocation hearing, providing the 
defendant “the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
 
probation “arises after the end of the criminal prosecution.”  
(Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 480.)  Because the same rules 
apply to both probationers and parolees (Winson, supra, 
29 Cal.3d at p. 716), we refer to both types of revocation 
hearings in this opinion.  For ease of reference, we also refer at 
times to the subject of a revocation hearing as a defendant.   
3  
The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation applies only 
to testimonial statements.  (Michigan v. Bryant (2011) 562 U.S. 
344, 354, citing Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 68; People v. 
Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 981 (Cage).)  A statement made in 
the course of a police interrogation is testimonial “when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is 
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution.”  (Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 
813, 822.)   
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
8 
witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good 
cause for not allowing confrontation).”  (Morrissey, supra, 
408 U.S. at p. 489; see Black v. Romano (1985) 471 U.S. 606, 
611–612 (Black) [reaffirming the minimum due process 
procedures set forth in Morrissey and Gagnon].)4  These 
minimum requirements of due process, the Morrissey court 
concluded, would vindicate the shared “interest in not having 
parole revoked because of erroneous information” and “a further 
interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness.”  (Morrissey, 
at p. 484; see also id. at p. 484, fn. 12 [“ ‘the principles of 
fundamental justice and fairness would [appear to] afford the 
parolee a reasonable opportunity to explain away the accusation 
of a parole violation’ ”].)   
These due process rights are not absolute.  The United 
States Supreme Court has explained that, in the revocation 
setting, “the process should be flexible enough to consider 
evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that 
would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.”  
(Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 489; see also id. at p. 490 [“We 
have no thought to create an inflexible structure for parole 
revocation procedures”].)  The high court reiterated in Gagnon:  
“While in some cases there is simply no adequate alternative to 
live testimony, we emphasize that we did not in Morrissey 
 
4  
The array of requirements compelled by due process for 
probation revocation hearings include:  “(1) written notice of 
claimed violations, (2) disclosure of adverse evidence, (3) the 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses [unless the 
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing 
confrontation], (4) a neutral and detached hearing board, and 
(5) a written statement by the fact finders as to the evidence 
relied on and the reasons for revocation.”  (Rodriguez, supra, 
51 Cal.3d at p. 441, citing Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 489.)   
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
9 
intend to prohibit use where appropriate of the conventional 
substitutes for live testimony, including affidavits, depositions, 
and documentary evidence.”  (Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at p. 783, 
fn. 5.)   
While it is clear that due process protects a probationer’s 
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses absent a 
showing of good cause (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 489; 
Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at p. 786), the high court has not yet 
specified the showing necessary to establish good cause.  Our 
case law provides some guidance, however.   
This court first addressed the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence in a probation revocation hearing in Winson, supra, 
29 Cal.3d 711.  Relying on Morrissey and Gagnon, we held that 
the transcript of a witness’s testimony from a preliminary 
hearing was improperly admitted at a revocation hearing in the 
absence of a showing of the witness’s unavailability or other 
good cause.  (Id. at pp. 713–714, 717.)  We recognized that the 
right of confrontation in revocation hearings is not absolute and 
“may be denied if the trier-of-fact finds and expresses good cause 
for doing so,” as may occur when the witness is “legally 
unavailable” or is at risk of harm if he or she were to appear.  
(Id. at p. 719.)  Similarly, we added, there may be circumstances 
where it is “ ‘appropriate’ ” for witnesses to “give evidence by 
document, affidavit or deposition.”  (Ibid.)  We concluded that 
“[t]he issue of whether former testimony may be utilized in lieu 
of a witness’[s] personal appearance is best resolved on a case-
by-case basis.”  (Ibid.)  Applying these principles to the facts 
before us, we determined in Winson that the preliminary 
hearing transcript had been improperly admitted because “the 
testimony at issue was that of the sole percipient witness to the 
alleged [probation] violation, a finding of no legal unavailability 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
10 
was made in the underlying proceedings in which the charges 
were then dismissed, no additional evidence was introduced 
which established the witness’[s] unavailability, and the court 
made no specific finding of good cause for denying the right to 
confront and cross-examine.”  (Ibid., italics omitted.)   
In People v. Maki (1985) 39 Cal.3d 707 (Maki), we 
considered whether the good cause requirement applied to 
documentary evidence submitted at a revocation hearing.  (Id. 
at p. 709.)  There, the prosecution offered copies of a car rental 
invoice with the defendant’s name and signature, and a hotel 
receipt bearing his name, to establish that the defendant 
violated the terms of his probation by traveling out of state.  (Id. 
at pp. 709, 716.)  After concluding that no hearsay exception 
applied to the evidence in question, we examined “whether the 
court could nonetheless properly consider the documents in 
determining whether to revoke [the] defendant’s probation” 
without making a finding of good cause.  (Id. at pp. 713–714.)   
We concluded that “documentary hearsay evidence which 
does not fall within an exception to the hearsay rule may be 
admitted if there are sufficient indicia of reliability regarding 
the proffered material,” even if the trial court makes no finding 
of good cause to deny the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses.  (Maki, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 709.)  Applying this 
standard, we found that although the issue was “close” (id. at 
p. 716), the documentary evidence was sufficiently reliable to 
allow for its admission into evidence (id. at pp. 716–717).  In 
concluding the car rental invoice was reliable, we explained:  “If 
the invoice were simply printed and filled out by an unidentified 
hand and devoid of defendant’s signature, our conclusion would 
be that it alone, or even accompanied by the hotel receipt 
[bearing the defendant’s name], would be insufficient to find a 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
11 
violation of probation.  However, the identification of 
defendant’s signature on the printed invoice and the fact that it 
is an invoice of the type relied upon by parties for billing and 
payment of money, lead us to find it sufficient here.”  (Id. at 
p. 717, fn. omitted.)   
Most recently, in People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144 
(Arreola), we rejected the argument that Maki had impliedly 
overruled Winson.  (Id. at pp. 1156–1157.)  We reaffirmed that 
a transcript of a witness’s preliminary hearing testimony is 
inadmissible at a revocation hearing absent a showing of good 
cause for dispensing with the requirement of live testimony.  (Id. 
at pp. 1148, 1159.)  We reiterated that a trial court must 
determine “on a case-by-case basis” whether former testimony 
is admissible at a revocation hearing, with the court 
ascertaining whether a “showing of good cause . . . has been 
made” and further considering “other circumstances relevant to 
the issue” of the statement’s admission.  (Id. at p. 1160.)   
Our decision in Arreola provided a detailed description of 
the case-specific balancing process that governs a court’s 
analysis.  We stated that “[t]he broad standard of ‘good cause’ is 
met (1) when the declarant is ‘unavailable’ under the traditional 
hearsay standard [citation], (2) when the declarant, although 
not legally unavailable, can be brought to the hearing only 
through great difficulty or expense, or (3) when the declarant’s 
presence would pose a risk of harm (including, in appropriate 
circumstances, mental or emotional harm) to the declarant.”  
(Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1159–1160.)  We further 
explained that the showing of good cause for dispensing with the 
requirement of live testimony must be evaluated in the context 
of “other circumstances relevant to the issue, including the 
purpose for which the evidence is offered (e.g., as substantive 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
12 
evidence of an alleged probation violation, rather than, for 
example, simply a reference to the defendant’s character); the 
significance of the particular evidence to a factual determination 
relevant to a finding of violation of probation; and whether other 
admissible evidence, including, for example, any admissions 
made by the probationer, corroborates the former testimony, or 
whether instead the former testimony constitutes the sole 
evidence establishing a violation of probation.”  (Id. at p. 1160.)  
We noted that “[s]everal federal circuit courts have adopted a 
similar 
approach, 
balancing 
the 
defendant’s 
need 
for 
confrontation against the prosecution’s showing of good cause 
for dispensing with confrontation.”  (Id. at p. 1160, citing U.S. v. 
Martin (9th Cir. 1993) 984 F.2d 308, 311, U.S. v. Bell (8th Cir. 
1986) 785 F.2d 640, 643.)   
In reaching this result, we clarified that our holding in 
Maki pertained only to the admission of documentary evidence 
in revocation hearings.  (Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1156–
1157.)  We pointed out the “evident distinction between a 
transcript of former live testimony and the type of traditional 
‘documentary’ evidence involved in Maki that does not have, as 
its source, live testimony.”  (Id. at p. 1157.)  We also noted that, 
after Winson, “the United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed, 
rather than retreated from, the Morrissey-Gagnon requirements 
and specifically the requirement that the probationer at a 
revocation hearing be ‘entitled to cross-examine adverse 
witnesses, unless the hearing body specifically finds good cause 
for not allowing confrontation.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1158, quoting Black, 
supra, 471 U.S. at p. 612.)   
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
13 
B.  Case Law Concerning the Due Process Right to 
Confrontation as Pertaining to Spontaneous 
Statements 
A spontaneous statement is a statement that “[p]urports 
to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event 
perceived by the declarant” and “[w]as made spontaneously 
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused 
by such perception.”  (Evid. Code, § 1240.)  Absent another basis 
for exclusion, a spontaneous statement may be considered as 
evidence at a criminal or civil trial, notwithstanding its hearsay 
character.  (Ibid.) 
As previously noted, the Courts of Appeal are divided on 
the question of whether a showing of good cause for not allowing 
confrontation (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 489; Gagnon, 
supra, 411 U.S. at p. 786) and application of Arreola’s balancing 
test (Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1160) are required before 
statements that come within the spontaneous statement 
exception to the hearsay rule may be admitted at a probation 
revocation hearing.   
In Stanphill, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th 61, the Court of 
Appeal considered whether Arreola’s balancing test applies to 
the admission of spontaneous statements at a revocation 
hearing.  There, the trial court revoked the defendant’s 
probation following a hearing in which the court admitted the 
victim’s hearsay statements made to law enforcement officers, 
identifying the defendant as one of his assailants.  (Id. at pp. 65–
67.)  The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that spontaneous 
declarations under Evidence Code section 1240 “are a special 
breed of hearsay exception which automatically satisfy a 
probationer’s 
due 
process 
confrontation/cross-examination 
rights without the court having to find good cause for the 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
14 
witness’s absence under Arreola or perform the [federal] 
balancing test.”  (Stanphill, at p. 81.)   
The Court of Appeal in Liggins, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th 55 
disagreed with Stanphill’s holding that spontaneous statements 
are categorically admissible at a revocation hearing.  In Liggins, 
the victim told police officers that the defendant had physically 
attacked her during an argument.  (Id. at p. 60.)  After the 
defendant was apprehended nearby, the victim identified the 
defendant as the person who had assaulted her.  (Ibid.)  The 
victim subsequently recanted and failed to appear at the 
defendant’s probation revocation hearing.  (Ibid.)  At that 
hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation after 
admitting as spontaneous statements the victim’s statements to 
the police officers recounting the defendant’s conduct as well as 
her subsequent identification of the defendant.  (Ibid.)   
The Court of Appeal reversed.  (Liggins, supra, 
53 Cal.App.5th at p. 70.)  Although it agreed that the victim’s 
out-of-court statements constituted spontaneous statements, 
the appellate court found it “contrary to the California Supreme 
Court’s 
holding 
in 
Arreola . . . to 
treat 
Evidence 
Code 
section 1240 as an automatically applicable proxy for 
compliance with due process minima.”  (Id. at p. 67.)  The 
Liggins court reasoned that the importance of a defendant’s due 
process-based confrontation right in the context of probation 
revocation will vary with the circumstances, and determining 
when the state’s interest outweighs a defendant’s right to 
confrontation can be determined only “by situational weighing 
of the Arreola balancing factors.”  (Id. at pp. 66–67.)   
The Court of Appeal below sided with Stanphill and held 
that spontaneous statements categorically satisfy the minimum 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
15 
due process requirements applicable at revocation hearings 
because 
of 
their 
inherent 
reliability. 
 
(Gray, 
supra, 
63 Cal.App.5th at p. 949.)   
C.  We Reject a Categorical Approach Which 
Requires the Admission of All Spontaneous 
Statements Without Any Further Showing 
The Attorney General asserts that the particular 
reliability and unique nature of spontaneous statements make 
them categorically admissible under the due process clause, 
without requiring a further finding of good cause or a balancing 
of interests under Arreola.  The Court of Appeal below likewise 
concluded that satisfaction of the criteria within Evidence Code 
section 1240 “is enough by itself to achieve the purpose and 
function of the due process guarantees applicable to probation 
revocation hearings.”  (Gray, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 954.)  
We reject this categorical approach, and instead reaffirm 
Arreola’s case-by-case analysis as applicable here.   
A categorical approach — which would allow even 
testimonial spontaneous statements to be admitted at probation 
revocation hearings without any case-by-case consideration of 
the reasons for not allowing confrontation — is inconsistent 
with this court’s precedent and that of the United States 
Supreme Court.  As we have explained, the high court has held 
that due process entitles parolees and probationers certain 
“minimum requirements,” including “the right to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer 
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation).”  
(Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 489; see Gagnon, supra, 
411 U.S. at p. 782.)  Consistent with these minimum due process 
protections, we have held that the transcript of a witness’s 
preliminary hearing testimony cannot be introduced in lieu of 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
16 
the witness’s live testimony “ ‘in the absence of the declarant’s 
unavailability or other good cause’ ” (Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th 
at p. 1148; see also Winson, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 719), with the 
presence or absence of good cause to be determined on a case-
by-case basis (Arreola, at p. 1160; Winson, at p. 719).   
The balancing test we adopted allows trial courts to 
examine the government’s showing of good cause, and to weigh 
a defendant’s confrontation rights against the government’s 
countervailing interests.  It is a comprehensive, holistic 
approach and no single factor is dispositive.5   
Fundamentally, trial courts must balance the defendant’s 
interests in confronting a hearsay declarant against the 
government’s showing of “good cause,” that is to say, the 
government’s countervailing interests in presenting the 
evidence without the declarant’s presence.  (Arreola, supra, 
7 Cal.4th at p. 1160.)  Keeping with the flexible nature of due 
process, Arreola did not articulate fixed rules regarding what 
trial courts must consider in conducting this balancing.  We did, 
however, identify several circumstances that should be taken 
into consideration when weighing a defendant’s confrontation 
rights against the government’s countervailing interests.  
 
5  
We acknowledge that, in Arreola, we referred to “the 
showing of good cause that has been made.”  (Arreola, supra, 
7 Cal.4th at p. 1160, italics added.)  To the extent this phrasing 
could be construed as requiring a threshold showing of good 
cause before proceeding to a separate balancing of interests, the 
question was not before us, and “ ‘[i]t is axiomatic that cases are 
not authority for propositions not considered.’ ”  (People v. Avila 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 566; cf. Williams v. Chino Valley 
Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 97, 107 [clarifying 
prior decision to the extent it could be construed as speaking “too 
broadly” on an issue that was not previously before the court].)   
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
17 
Among them, as “the significance of the particular evidence to a 
factual 
determination” 
needed 
to 
make 
a 
violation 
determination increases, so does the importance of the 
probationer’s confrontation right.  (Ibid.)  Similarly, if no “other 
admissible evidence” corroborates the statements at issue and 
the statements the government seeks to introduce instead 
“constitute[] the sole evidence establishing a violation of 
probation,” a defendant’s right to confrontation is heightened.  
(Ibid.)  Applying this framework, it follows that the reliability of 
a particular statement could — but not necessarily must — 
defeat a defendant’s right to confront and cross-examine a 
declarant at a revocation hearing.   
The Attorney General urges us to hold that “[t]he unique 
value of [spontaneous statements under Evidence Code 
section 1240] gives rise to ‘good cause’ per se for its admission, 
regardless of the availability of the declarant.”  We decline to do 
so.  This court has previously recognized that spontaneous 
statements, “although not necessarily more reliable or accurate, 
are more likely to represent ‘ “the unreflecting and sincere 
expression of one’s actual impressions and belief.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 269.)  Yet we have not previously 
held that spontaneous statements are so reliable that they 
categorically outweigh a defendant’s due process right to 
confront and cross-examine a witness about such expressions of 
belief.  Nor is such a blanket rule necessary.  Trial courts can 
evaluate the reliability of the statements in applying Arreola’s 
balancing test.  (See Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1157.)  
Because our adopted framework already allows courts to give 
due consideration to a spontaneous statement’s reliability, along 
with other relevant circumstances, we reject the position of the 
Attorney General and the Court of Appeal below that the 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
18 
admission of evidence under Evidence Code section 1240 always 
comports with a defendant’s due process right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses at a probation revocation hearing.6   
Moreover, this balancing framework is consistent with a 
due process-based right to confrontation in the probation 
context.  The framework affords probationers a meaningful 
opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses in 
appropriate circumstances “to assure that the finding of a 
[probation] violation will be based on verified facts and that the 
exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge 
of the [probationer’s] behavior.”  (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at 
p. 484.)  It is also consistent with the flexible character of the 
due process principles that give rise to a probationer’s 
confrontation rights here.  (See id. at p. 481 [“due process is 
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands”].)  The “touchstone of due 
process” is “fundamental fairness.”  (See Gagnon, supra, 
 
6  
We do not disagree that the reliability of evidence is an 
important factor in determining the strength of a defendant’s 
confrontation right at a probation revocation hearing.  But we 
decline to hold that it is dispositive in all cases.  As the Oregon 
Supreme Court stated when addressing a similar question:  
“The presumed reliability of an ‘excited utterance’ is, certainly, 
a factor that will weigh in favor of admission over a defendant’s 
objection, and, even under [a] balancing [test], such evidence is 
likely to be admitted in most cases.  However, we do not see a 
reason to completely eliminate consideration of other factors 
that might lead to a different conclusion.”  (State v. Martin 
(2022) 370 Or. 653, 669–670 [522 P.3d 841, 853–854], fn. 
omitted; accord, Liggins, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 69 
[concluding that reliability “has a place in the case-by-case 
weighing of interests required by Arreola,” but “it is only one of 
several factors to be weighed, and it must not be assigned 
dispositive weight in all cases to the exclusion of other factors”].)   
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
19 
411 U.S. at p. 790.)  As the United States Supreme Court has 
noted of due process, “ ‘[i]ts application is less a matter of rule.  
Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of 
facts in a given case.’ ”  (County of Sacramento v. Lewis (1998) 
523 U.S. 833, 850.)   
The remaining arguments advanced by the Attorney 
General and the Court of Appeal below also do not persuade us 
to abandon a balancing process in favor of a blanket rule of 
admissibility for testimonial spontaneous statements.  Both 
reason that it would be incongruous to provide probationers 
greater confrontation rights than afforded to defendants in 
criminal trials.  The Attorney General contends “confrontation 
rights at revocation hearings must be more flexible than at 
criminal trials and should yield particularly to permit the 
admission of highly trustworthy forms of evidence that would 
promote the reliability of factfinding.”  The Court of Appeal 
below similarly noted that it “would make no sense” for the 
“standard for admitting hearsay in probation revocation 
hearings” to “be more onerous than the standard for admitting 
hearsay at trial.”  (Gray, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 955.)   
But the Arreola standard as applied here today does not 
give probationers greater rights than criminal defendants.  
Testimonial statements by a nontestifying declarant may be 
admitted against a defendant in a criminal trial only when the 
declarant is unavailable and was previously subject to cross-
examination (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 55–56, 68), 
regardless of the existence of a hearsay exception.  At a 
revocation hearing, however, it is possible that testimonial 
statements falling within a hearsay exception could nonetheless 
be admitted when the government’s interests override the 
defendant’s 
confrontation 
rights 
under 
the 
specific 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
20 
circumstances of the case.  In other words, the right to confront 
witnesses exists as a procedural due process safeguard at a 
probation revocation hearing, but it may give way to a showing 
of good cause (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 489) and a 
balancing of all relevant facts in a given case (Arreola, supra, 
7 Cal.4th at pp. 1159–1160).  No such balancing process applies 
to testimonial statements against a defendant in a criminal 
trial.  In short, our decision here does not conflict with 
Morrissey, or this court’s precedent, by providing probationers 
with greater rights than those afforded to criminal defendants.   
We are also unpersuaded that we should not adopt a 
balancing test here because, as the Attorney General notes, 
Arreola was “a case in which no exception to the hearsay rule 
applied whatsoever,” whereas this case involves spontaneous 
statements under Evidence Code section 1240.  The Court of 
Appeal below similarly attempted to distinguish Winson, Maki, 
and Arreola on the ground that each case “involved statements 
that were inadmissible under the rules of evidence.”  (Gray, 
supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 954, italics added.)  It is true that 
we were not previously asked to apply a balancing test to 
evidence that was otherwise admissible under a hearsay 
exception.  But it does not necessarily follow that we should 
recognize a categorical exception to the balancing test whenever 
a 
hearsay 
exception 
applies, 
regardless 
of 
all 
other 
considerations.  For the reasons outlined ante, we reject such a 
categorical approach for spontaneous statements under 
Evidence Code section 1240.7 
 
7  
As noted, we have accepted, without further analysis, the 
parties’ agreement that the statements at issue here constitute 
 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
21 
Both the Court of Appeal and the parties before us have 
addressed whether the United States Supreme Court’s 
Crawford opinion impacts our analysis here.  As previously 
noted, in Crawford, the high court held that testimonial 
statements by a declarant who does not appear at trial are 
inadmissible against the defendant in a criminal prosecution 
unless the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the 
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant.  (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 68–69.)  Crawford 
established a new framework for analyzing confrontation clause 
claims.  (See Cage, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 969.)  Before 
Crawford, hearsay evidence was admissible if the witness was 
unavailable and the statements had adequate “ ‘indicia of 
reliability,’ ” i.e., they fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay 
exception” 
or 
bore 
“particularized 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness.”  (Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66, 
overruled in Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36.)  After Crawford, the 
focus is no longer on whether the hearsay statement bears 
adequate indicia of reliability, but rather on whether the 
statement is considered testimonial in nature under Crawford 
and its progeny.  (Crawford, at pp. 68–69 [“Where testimonial 
statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability 
sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the 
Constitution actually prescribes:  confrontation”]; see Cage, at 
p. 979.)  In other words, generalized indicia of reliability cannot 
save a testimonial hearsay statement from being excluded 
under the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.  Any such 
 
testimonial evidence that comes within the spontaneous 
statement exception.  We do not decide what due process-based 
confrontation rights, if any, apply to the admission of 
nontestimonial evidence that comes within a hearsay exception. 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
22 
testimonial statement by a witness is inadmissible unless the 
witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, regardless of whether 
such statement is deemed reliable by the court.  In sum, a 
reliability-based approach is no longer the touchstone of a 
confrontation clause analysis.  (Hemphill v. New York (2022) ___ 
U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 681, 690].)   
Although a defendant’s right to confrontation at a 
probation revocation hearing stems from the due process clause 
rather than the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause, we are 
not persuaded that Crawford and its progeny have no relevance 
here.  Crawford underscores the importance of confrontation, as 
enshrined in the Sixth Amendment, when the People offer out-
of-court testimonial statements against a defendant in a 
criminal trial.  At probation revocation hearings, where a 
defendant’s liberty interest is also at stake, courts similarly 
should consider the importance of a defendant’s confrontation 
rights, albeit under the due process clause and the framework 
prescribed by Morrissey and its progeny, including our case law.  
Just as Crawford rejected a regime premised on the perceived 
reliability of the hearsay evidence in question, we see no 
persuasive reason to regard the fact that testimonial hearsay 
falls within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as the 
sole consideration relevant to the evidence’s admissibility in a 
probation revocation hearing.  When dealing with testimonial 
statements at a probation revocation hearing, it is appropriate 
to weigh the defendant’s confrontation rights against the 
government’s reasons for not producing the declarant.  While a 
defendant’s interest in confrontation may be diminished by the 
reliability of testimonial hearsay evidence, reliability alone does 
not render such evidence admissible in revocation proceedings.  
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
23 
We therefore decline to require trial courts to rely solely on the 
consideration 
of 
reliability 
in 
determining 
whether 
a 
defendant’s due process right to confrontation at a revocation 
proceeding is protected.   
We emphasize that a defendant’s due process right to 
confront testimonial witnesses against him is not absolute; a 
defendant’s interests can be outweighed by the government’s 
substantial showing of good cause for not making the witness 
available at the revocation hearing, by sufficient independent 
evidence corroborating the hearsay evidence, and by other 
indicia of reliability including the fact that the statements fall 
within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.  What 
cannot be done, however, is reducing the analysis to a single 
determination that hinges solely on whether a statement 
qualifies as a spontaneous statement under Evidence Code 
section 1240.8 
Because the Court of Appeal in this case did not evaluate 
whether N.S.’s statements were admissible under Arreola, or, if 
the statements should not have been admitted, whether that 
error was prejudicial, we remand the matter to the Court of 
Appeal to decide those questions in the first instance.9 
 
8  
We disapprove People v. Stanphill, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th 
61, to the extent it is inconsistent with this holding. 
9  
We note that the Court of Appeal apparently viewed the 
prosecution’s unsuccessful attempts to secure N.S.’s presence as 
“insufficient to establish ‘good cause.’ ”  (Gray, supra, 
63 Cal.App.5th at p. 951.)  As we have explained, witness 
unavailability as described in Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at page 
1160, is neither a threshold requirement nor a dispositive factor 
in determining whether Morrissey’s “good cause for not allowing 
 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
24 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand the matter to that court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
confrontation” requirement has been met.  (Morrissey, supra, 
408 U.S. at p. 489.)   
1 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
S269237 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Groban 
 
At a probation revocation proceeding, a trial court must 
weigh the probationer’s interest in confrontation against the 
government’s good cause for not producing a witness.  (See 
generally maj. opn., ante, at pp. 5–12; see also People v. Arreola 
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1159–1160 (Arreola).)  I write separately 
to emphasize that, as part of this balancing test set forth in 
Arreola, the potential for emotional or mental harm to the 
witness can be a relevant factor bearing on the state’s 
demonstration of good cause.  Arreola specifically provides that 
“[t]he broad standard of []‘good cause’ is met . . . when the 
declarant’s presence would pose a risk of harm (including, in 
appropriate circumstances, mental or emotional harm) to the 
declarant.”  (Arreola, at pp. 1159–1160, italics added, citing 
Cohen et al., The Law of Probation and Parole (1983 ed.) § 9.32, 
pp. 466–467; see Cohen, at p. 467 [noting that “the term ‘harm’ ” 
includes not only physical harm, but may include “mental harm, 
such as emotional trauma to a rape victim”].)   
Here, the People sought to revoke defendant Dontrae 
Renay Gray’s probation based, in part, on an allegation that he 
inflicted corporal injury upon a person in a dating relationship.  
(See maj. opn., ante, at p. 3.)  I express no view regarding the 
factual record underlying that allegation, nor do I have an 
opinion as to whether good cause can be established on remand.  
I note simply that, as a general matter, although not all alleged 
victims of domestic violence are similarly situated, there are 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Groban, J., concurring 
2 
often unique challenges associated with procuring victim 
testimony in domestic violence cases.  (See Lininger, Prosecuting 
Batterers After Crawford (2005) 91 Va. L.Rev. 747, 768 [“Victims 
of domestic violence are more prone than other crime victims to 
recant or refuse to cooperate after initially providing 
information to police.  Recent evidence suggests that 80 to 85 
percent of battered women will recant at some point”]; Beloof & 
Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to 
Admit Domestic Violence Victims’ Out of Court Statements As 
Substantive Evidence (2002) 11 Colum. J. Gender & L. 1, 3 
[“Non-cooperation by recantation or failure to appear at trial is 
an epidemic in domestic violence cases”]; People v. Brown (2004) 
33 Cal.4th 892, 899 (Brown) [describing the complications 
presented in domestic violence cases, including “ ‘victims who 
refuse to testify, who recant previous statements, or whose 
credibility is attacked by defense questions on why they 
remained in a battering relationship’ ”]; see also Katirai, 
Retraumatized in Court (2020) 62 Ariz. L.Rev. 81, 97 [“[C]ourts 
still report that many survivors do not appear for criminal 
hearings or refuse to cooperate with prosecutors”].)   
Domestic violence victims, by testifying, may be 
facilitating their partner or family member’s incarceration.  
This, for some, may prove emotionally or mentally harmful.  
(See Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 899 [“ ‘A fundamental 
difference between family violence and other forms of violence 
(such as street violence) is that family violence occurs within 
ongoing relationships that are expected to be protective, 
supportive, and nurturing.  The ties between victim and 
victimizer often are the strongest emotional bonds, and victims 
frequently feel a sense of loyalty to their abusers’ ”].)  Our prior 
case law and today’s decision make clear that, “in appropriate 
PEOPLE v. GRAY 
Groban, J., concurring 
3 
circumstances” (Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1160), trial 
courts may consider the potential emotional and mental harm 
that alleged victims may suffer if they are compelled to testify.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
  
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Gray 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 63 Cal.App.5th 947 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S269237 
Date Filed:  August 14, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Renée F. Korn 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
William J. Capriola, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 
Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Michael Katz, Scott A. 
Taryle and Teresa A. Reed Dippo, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion):  
 
William J. Capriola 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1536 
Sebastopol, CA 95473 
(707) 829-9490 
 
Teresa A. Reed Dippo 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 510-3896