Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE PARENTAL RIGHTS TO: A.D., D.D., and K.D, Minor Children, CL V. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE PARENTAL RIGHTS TO:  A.D., D.D., and K.D, Minor Children, CL V. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2007 WY 23151 P.3d 1102Case Number: C-06-4Decided: 02/09/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE PARENTAL RIGHTS TO:  
A.D., D.D., and K.D, Minor Children,

 
 
C.L.,

 
 
Appellant

(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
WYOMING 
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES,

 
 
Appellee

(Petitioner).

 
 

Appeal from the DistrictCourtofPlatteCounty

The Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 
 

Representing Appellant:

            
Cole N. Sherard, Wheatland, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, 
Deputy Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. Cooley.

 
 
Guardian Ad Litem:

Eric E. Jones, Wheatland, Wyoming.      

 
 
 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
KITE, J., delivers the opinion of the Court; HILL, J., 
files a dissenting opinion, in which GOLDEN, J., joins.

 
 
KITE, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      CL (Mother) appeals 
from the district court's order granting the Wyoming Department of Family 
Service's (DFS) petition to terminate her parental rights.  The district court 
concluded there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother's parental 
rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (v) (LexisNexis 2005).  Applying our 
deferential standard for reviewing the evidence while still recognizing the 
fundamental right to associate with family, we conclude there was sufficient 
evidence to support the district court's order terminating Mother's parental 
rights.  
Consequently, we affirm. 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mother poses the 
following issues on appeal:

 
 
A.        Did the 
District Court err in finding clear and convincing evidence to terminate the 
parental rights of the Appellant under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-30[9](a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2006) because the child(ren) have been abused or neglected and 
reasonable efforts by an authorized agency have been unsuccessful in 
rehabilitating the family and it was shown that the child(ren)'s health and 
safety would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the 
parent?

 
 
B.        Did the 
District Court err in finding clear and convincing evidence to terminate the 
parental rights of the appellant under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-30[9](a)(v) 
(LexisNexis 2005) because the child(ren) had been in foster care under the 
responsibility of the State of Wyoming for fifteen (15) of the most recent 
twenty-two (22) months and a showing that the parent is unfit to have custody 
and control of the child(ren)?

 
 
DFS phrases the appellate issue as:

 
 
Whether the district court's decision that appellant's 
parental rights to the minor children should be terminated was established by 
clear and convincing evidence?        

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mother and CD 
(Father) are the biological parents of DD, KD and AD.  DFS has been 
involved with this family since the oldest child was an infant.  In January 2003, 
DFS removed the children from the parents' home based upon allegations of 
physical abuse by Father and neglect because of the filthy and unsafe condition 
of the home.  
Mother and Father admitted the allegations of neglect, and the district 
court adjudicated the children to be neglected.  The children were returned to the custody of 
the biological parents for a trial home placement in July of 2003.  The reunification 
attempt ended when DFS again removed the children from the family home in 
September 2003, naming new allegations of physical abuse and neglect.  The children have 
been in DFS' care and custody since that time.   

 
 
[¶4]      The parents were 
generally uncooperative with DFS, and Mother was openly hostile toward the DFS 
caseworker.  
The parents did not consistently maintain employment, support the 
children, or have a suitable home.  Father was imprisoned after the children were 
removed from the home the second time and DFS attempted to work with Mother so 
she could be reunified with the children.  She continued, however, to fail to comply 
with DFS requirements.  Citing a lack of progress in reunifying the 
family, DFS filed a petition to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights 
on July 21, 2004.    

 
 
[¶5]      The district court 
held a hearing on the termination petition in the spring of 2005.1  The evidence offered at the hearing showed 
Mother had recently begun to make some efforts to lead a more responsible 
life.  Before 
the hearing, she had found a suitable home and employment.  At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the district court terminated Father's parental rights, but 
ruled that DFS had not proven, by clear and convincing evidence, the children's 
health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by returning them to Mother's 
custody or that she was unfit to have custody of the children.  Pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-316 (LexisNexis 2005),2 the district 
court continued the hearing for six months and ordered DFS to retain custody of 
the children but make additional efforts to rehabilitate Mother.  In its oral ruling, 
the district court told Mother she had "one more chance" to meet the 
requirements to be reunified with her children and ordered her to cooperate 
fully with DFS in order to accomplish that.    

 
 
[¶6]      On June 22, 2005, DFS 
and Mother agreed to a case plan.  Many of the elements of the case plan had 
been outlined in the district court's order continuing the hearing and in prior 
case plans.  
The June 2005 case plan included the following objectives and tasks, 
which we paraphrase:  

 
 

1.                  
Mother would achieve emotional stability, good mental 
health and a healthy parent-child bond with her children.  In order to achieve 
this objective, Mother agreed to continue individual therapy once per week, 
attend family therapy with the children once per week, and complete a parenting 
class.

 
 

2.                  
Mother would provide for her children.  Her tasks to 
complete this objective included maintaining full-time employment, providing 
insurance for herself and the children, and complying with her child support 
obligations.

 
 

3.                  
Mother would have a stable, safe and appropriate home 
environment.  
In order to accomplish this objective, Mother was required to maintain a 
home for the children, with no other family members present, and to keep the 
home in an acceptable condition with no household pets.

 
 

4.                  
Mother would live a drug and alcohol free lifestyle.  She was directed to 
submit to random urinary analysis tests in order to gauge her compliance with 
this objective.

 
 

5.                  
In the fifth objective, Mother agreed to weekly visitations 
with the children, as well as "telephone visits as arranged."  The case plan 
indicated the visits were initially intended to be supervised and then would "go 
to unsupervised as recommended by therapists."  

 
 
The other objectives of the plan pertained to the 
children's day-to-day educational activities and healthcare and were not within 
Mother's control.  

 
 
[¶7]      On November 1, 2005, 
the district court held another hearing to consider DFS' termination 
petition.  The 
evidence at the second hearing established Mother performed many of the tasks 
outlined in the case plan.  However, she had lived in three different 
residences and changed jobs once during the six months between the 
hearings.  The 
children's therapist, the family therapist, and the DFS caseworker opined Mother 
had not yet demonstrated a sufficiently stable lifestyle to allow them to 
recommend the family be reunified.  Citing the length of time the children had 
been in foster care and the need for permanency in their lives, the district 
court terminated Mother's parental rights to DD, AD and KD.  Mother filed a 
timely appeal with this Court.   

 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      Mother challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court's termination 
decision.  

 
 
            
[W]e apply our traditional principles of evidentiary review when a party 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination.  Thus, we examine 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, assuming 
all favorable evidence to be true while discounting conflicting evidence 
presented by the unsuccessful party.  

 
 

SLB v. JEO (In the Interest of ANO), 2006 WY 74, ¶ 7, 136 P.3d 797, 799-800 (Wyo. 2006), quoting 
SLJ v. Dep't of 
Family Servs., 2005 WY 3, ¶ 19, 104 P.3d 74, 79-80 (Wyo. 2005).

            

DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶9]      Because the right 
to associate with one's family is fundamental, courts must strictly scrutinize 
petitions to terminate a parent's rights to his or her children.  SLB,  ¶ 7, 136 P.3d at 
799-800; TF v. Dep't 
of Family Servs., 2005 WY 118, ¶ 15, 120 P.3d 992, 1000 (Wyo. 2005).  Thus, a case for 
termination of parental rights must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence.  SLJ, ¶ 19, 104 P.3d  
at 79-80.  
"Clear and convincing evidence is that kind of proof that would persuade 
a trier of fact that the truth of the contention is highly probable.'"  Id., quoting MN v. Dep't of Family 
Servs., 2003 WY 135, ¶ 5, 78 P.3d 232, 234 (Wyo. 2003).    

 
 
[¶10]   In this case, the district court found 
clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to 
two separate statutory provisions, § 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (v):

 
 
(a) The parent-child legal relationship may be terminated 
if any one (1) or more of the following facts is established by clear and 
convincing evidence:

 
 
* * *

 
 
            
(iii) The child has been abused or neglected by the parent and reasonable 
efforts by an authorized agency or mental health professional have been 
unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family or the family has refused 
rehabilitative treatment, and it is shown that the child's health and safety 
would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the parent;

 
 
            
* * * 

 
 
            
(v) The child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the 
state of Wyoming for fifteen (15) of the 
most recent twenty-two (22) months, and a showing that the parent is unfit to 
have custody and control of the child;

            

[¶11]   Termination of parental rights pursuant 
to § 14-2-309(a)(iii) requires the "establishment of three elements:  (1) abusive 
treatment or neglect by the parent;  (2) unsuccessful efforts to rehabilitate the 
family;  and 
(3) the child's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by remaining 
with or returning to the parent."  RS v. Dep't  of Family Servs., 2004 WY 87, ¶ 12, 94 P.3d 1025, 1028 (Wyo. 2004).  Mother does not contest the district court's 
findings that the first two elements of subsection (iii) were satisfied.  She focuses on the 
third element, claiming there was insufficient evidence to support the district 
court's conclusion that the children's health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized if they were returned to her.  

 
 
[¶12]   Under § 14-2-309(a)(v), DFS was charged 
with proving the children had been in foster care under the State's 
responsibility for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and that Mother 
was unfit to have custody and control of the children.  BSC v. Natrona County 
Dep't of Family Servs., 2004 WY 167, ¶¶ 30-31, 102 P.3d 890, 899 (Wyo. 
2004).  Mother 
does not dispute the children have been in foster care, or otherwise under the 
State's responsibility,3 for at least fifteen of the twenty-two months 
preceding the hearing.  However, she does take issue with the 
district court's finding that she was unfit to have custody and control of the 
children.  The 
evidence pertaining to whether the children's health and safety would be 
seriously jeopardized if returned to Mother is also relevant to the 
determination of whether she is unfit.   See,  e.g., MN, ¶¶ 28-31, 78 P.3d  at 
238-39.  
Consequently, we will consider, together, the disputed elements of 
subsections (iii) and (v).  

 
 
[¶13]   Mother claims DFS failed to prove the 
disputed elements by clear and convincing evidence because the evidence adduced 
at the final hearing showed she had substantially complied with the case 
plan.  As 
described above, the June 2005 case plan identified a number of objectives and 
required Mother to fulfill certain tasks in advancement of the objectives.  The first objective 
was for Mother to attain emotional stability and mental health and achieve a 
healthy parent-child relationship with her children.  The plan 
specifically required that she attend individual therapy once a week.  Mother attended her 
therapy sessions regularly, but, at some point, she and her therapist decided to 
reduce her appointments to twice per month.  Mother apparently did not seek DFS approval 
for the change.     

 
 
[¶14]   The plan also required that Mother 
attend weekly family therapy sessions.  She fulfilled that task.  However, family 
therapist Kim Pexton testified the relationship between Mother and the children 
was not a healthy parent-child relationship, but was more of a peer 
relationship.  
She also stated there had been no significant change in the relationship 
between Mother and the children over the time she had been conducting family 
therapy.     

 
 
[¶15]   Jane Stearns, who counseled all three 
children individually, testified at both hearings.  Ms. Stearns stated 
the children needed stability and structure and, when that was threatened, their 
behavior regressed.  
Like Ms. Pexton, Ms. Stearns did not see the relationship between Mother 
and the children as a normal parent-child relationship.  She testified that 
AD was an especially challenging child, was not as emotionally stable as DD and 
KD, and tended to view her mother in the role of a girlfriend rather than a 
parent.  Ms. 
Stearns was also concerned that DD had been given too many adult 
responsibilities while in Mother's custody.  The counselor also indicated KD acted out 
after visits with Mother, and, when faced with the possibility of being returned 
to Mother's custody, DD became anxious.    

 
 
[¶16]   A DFS caseworker, who had worked with 
the family for over two years, echoed the therapists' assessment of the 
relationship between Mother and the children as being more of a peer 
relationship than a parent-child relationship.  She testified Mother was reluctant to take on 
a parental role and assume the responsibilities for disciplining the 
children.  The 
caseworker also questioned Mother's sincerity in implementing the parenting 
skills she had been taught, citing an example of Mother giving DD appropriate 
direction while being supervised by DFS staff, and then later, secretly telling 
him something different.       

 
 
[¶17]   The case plan also required that Mother 
support her children by maintaining full-time employment, providing health 
insurance and paying child support.  At the time of the second hearing, Mother 
worked two part-time jobs, amounting to full-time employment.  She had maintained 
her part-time position with Pizza Hut during the entire six-month period between 
the hearings, but had exchanged a part-time position at A&W for a job 
delivering the Casper Star-Tribune during the same period.  She obtained health 
insurance for herself and her children through her employment with Pizza 
Hut.  With 
regard to her child support obligation, she testified her check from A&W was 
garnished while she worked there.  After Mother left that position, she 
apparently did not make other arrangements to pay child support.  Mother testified 
that before the second hearing she had received a letter indicating child 
support enforcement planned to start garnishing her Pizza Hut paycheck.  Consequently, 
although it does appear Mother paid child support for the majority of the time, 
it was not of her own volition.    

 
 
[¶18]   The third objective of the plan 
required Mother to maintain a stable, safe and appropriate home.  The family had a 
history of living in multiple, often unsuitable, residences.  Mother was living 
in a trailer house at the time of the first hearing, but was behind in her rent 
payments.  
After the hearing, she was evicted and began staying with her parents, 
whose residence had previously been rejected as a suitable home for the 
children.  Less 
than two months before the second hearing, she found another home.  The DFS caseworker 
testified the home was physically appropriate, but expressed concern about the 
short time Mother had been able to maintain a suitable residence and her history 
of being unable to provide consistent appropriate shelter for her children.              

 
 
[¶19]   On a related matter, Mother did not 
have a support system of family and friends to help her with the children in 
times of difficulty.  
Mother testified the children's maternal grandmother could help her with 
childcare.  
However, Mother had reported in a psychological evaluation that her own 
childhood with the grandmother and her husband was wrought with abuse and 
neglect, bringing into question whether the maternal grandmother was an 
appropriate caregiver.  Equally disturbing, AD had apparently shown 
some indication she had been sexually abused by one of Mother's relatives.  When questioned 
about the possible danger her family members posed to the children, Mother 
testified that she would not break off the relationship with her siblings on the 
basis of an unsubstantiated report that AD had possibly been sexually assaulted, 
but if she regained custody of the children, she would not allow them to stay 
with any family members, other than her mother.   

 
 
[¶20]   It is obvious from this evidence that 
the possibility of Mother losing her current residence at some point in the 
future was substantial and she did not have a suitable alternative place to 
shelter the children should that happen.  The lack of a history of maintaining an 
appropriate family home, together with the absence of a support system to help 
her in times of difficulty, undermined Mother's efforts to comply with the 
objective of maintaining a stable, safe and appropriate home for the 
children.  See AA v. Dep't of Family 
Servs., 2004 WY 82, ¶ 29, 93 P.3d 982, 990-91 (Wyo. 2004) (indicating lack 
of stability in home is a factor to be considered in determining whether a 
child's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by being returned to 
the parent's custody).

 
 
[¶21]   The fourth objective required Mother to 
live a drug and alcohol free lifestyle.  In April 2004, she tested positive for 
methamphetamine, leading to the requirement that she submit to random urinary 
analysis.  
Although all of the tests following the first one were negative, Mother 
had refused to be witnessed while providing the samples, and the DFS caseworker 
was, therefore, unable to validate the results of the tests.  Nevertheless, the 
case worker testified at the second hearing that she did not believe Mother was 
using drugs or alcohol.      

 
 
[¶22]   The fifth objective concerned 
visitation with the children.  Mother attended weekly visits with the 
children. However, she did not make arrangements for telephone visits, claiming 
conflicts between her work schedule and the children's activities.  The other 
objectives were not within Mother's control.    

 
 
[¶23]   In addition to the testimony about the 
specific criteria included in the case plan, evidence was presented at the 
second hearing showing Mother still maintained a relationship with Father, who 
was incarcerated in a federal penitentiary.  Father had a decidedly poor history as a 
parent, having been convicted of physical abuse of one of the children and of 
various other crimes.  
Mother was aware of his tendency to be violent with the children, and 
yet, Mother testified she still communicated with Father through letters and 
telephone calls and, within a few weeks prior to the second hearing, Mother had 
been to Colorado to visit him in the 
federal penitentiary.  
The psychological evaluation admitted into evidence at the initial 
hearing indicated Mother was emotionally dependent upon Father and the evaluator 
was concerned she would "tolerate situations which [would] place the children or 
herself at risk for harm."  Although by all accounts Father would be 
imprisoned until after the children were grown and should not, therefore, pose a 
physical danger to the children if they were returned to Mother, the DFS 
caseworker testified that Mother's history with Father demonstrated she was 
inclined to place her romantic relationships ahead of her relationship with the 
children.    

 
 
[¶24]   The family therapist, Ms. Pexton, also 
opined that, because of the level of instability in Mother's situation, she did 
not believe Mother was a fit parent and that the children's health and safety 
would be jeopardized by being returned to Mother's care.  The children's 
individual counselor, Ms. Stearns, expressed the opinion that the children would 
suffer a serious regression in their emotional well-being if they were returned 
to Mother and then, potentially, had to be removed from her custody again 
because of her lack of stability.  The DFS caseworker testified she believed the 
children's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized if they were 
returned to Mother.  
Even Mother's therapist, who testified on her behalf, could only state 
that she "would hope" Mother could eventually be reunified with the children. 

 
 
[¶25]   After considering the family's history 
and the evidence presented at both termination hearings, the district court made 
the following pertinent findings: 

 
 
The simple facts are that despite her well-intended efforts 
to get her own life on track, [Mother] has had three different residences in the 
last six months, has changed jobs once, and continues to have a friend-friend 
relationship with her children as [o]pposed to a parent-child relationship.

 
 
The undisputed evidence in this case is that the children 
need structure and stability.  The clear and convincing evidence is that 
even after almost three years in foster care, [Mother] is not yet ready to 
provide that structure and stability for her children.

 
 
The Court realizes that terminating parental rights is a 
drastic measure.  
Six months ago I was not willing to take that step and was hopeful that 
significant progress would occur so as to allow reunification.  Now the best 
interests of the children must come to the forefront.  Three years of 
effort to reunify is enough.  The children need security, stability and 
finality.  The 
clear and convincing testimony from Ms. Pexton and Ms. Stearns is that these 
children are not yet ready to return to their mother and that another failure 
would be disastrous to the children.  Furthermore, there was not a clear picture of 
when, if ever, reunification would be successful.

 
 
Therefore, this Court must conclude, based on clear and 
convincing evidence, that the children's health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized by returning to [Mother] and that at this time [Mother] is unfit to 
have custody and control of the children.  

 
 
[¶26]   Mother argues that the district court 
erred by failing to recognize her compliance with the case plan and should have 
measured her fitness by her situation at the time of the second hearing.  In MN, ¶ 13, 78 P.3d  
at 236, we recognized courts often consider the family's history over a long 
period of time in determining whether parental rights should be terminated.  

 
 
We have previously recognized that in the ordinary parental 
rights termination case consideration must be given to a combination of factors, 
incidents, and conditions that demonstrate the neglect required to justify 
termination of parental rights.  Rarely do we find a single condition or 
incident that, standing alone, would justify termination.  Rather, neglect is 
usually manifested by numerous incidents and conditions extending over a 
considerable length of time.  See TR v. WashakieCounty Dep't of Pub. Assistance 
and Soc. Servs., 736 P.2d 712, 716 (Wyo.1987); Matter of MLM, 682 P.2d 982, 988 (Wyo.1984).

 
 

Id.  
See generally, RS, 2004 WY 87, 94 P.3d 1025 (recognizing parent's pattern of 
behavior established basis for termination).  Thus, the district court properly considered 
the entire history of the family in making its decision.  

 
 
[¶27]   The district court acknowledged 
Mother's efforts leading up to the second hearing; however, it concluded, based 
upon the long period of time the children had been in DFS custody, the relative 
short period Mother had attempted to comply with DFS requirements, the lack of 
complete compliance with the directives, and the need for a final resolution of 
the case, Mother's parental rights must be terminated.  We cannot fault the 
district court's reasoning.  Although Mother presented evidence that she 
had complied with several of the tasks assigned to her in the case plan, she did 
not complete all of the tasks and, more importantly, the evidence showed the 
overall objectives of the plan were not achieved.  

 
 
[¶28]   Several of the objectives could not be 
measured by the sheer accomplishment of a specific task.  For example, the 
first objective required Mother to achieve a healthy parent-child relationship 
with her children.  
She was given certain tasks in order to help her fulfill that objective, 
including attending individual and family therapy and completing parenting 
classes.  These 
tasks were meant to provide her with tools to help her obtain the ultimate goal; 
however, the objective would not necessarily be accomplished by rote completion 
of the tasks.  
Instead, determination of whether the objective had been met required a 
qualitative measure.  
The therapists who testified on behalf of DFS stated that, while Mother 
made an effort to complete the tasks, she did not achieve a healthy parent-child 
bond.   
          

 
 
[¶29]   Similarly, objective three required 
Mother to maintain a safe, stable and appropriate home.  She claims she 
satisfied this objective by obtaining an appropriate home before the second 
hearing. Again, she misses the overall point.  The case plan, agreed to in June of 2005, 
required she maintain a stable and acceptable home for the children without the 
presence of other family members.  And yet, she lived with her parents, in what 
had been determined an unacceptable environment, for part of the six months 
between the two hearings. The determination of whether or not a home is "stable" 
requires a qualitative judgment.  The fact that she had an appropriate home for 
a short period of time prior to the second hearing was not sufficient to 
override the long history of multiple, inappropriate homes.   

 
 
[¶30]   Because the determination of the 
ultimate issues in this case required a review of subjective, qualitative 
factors, the district court was required to gauge the credibility and sincerity 
of the witnesses.  
"It was within the district court's province to weigh the evidence and 
judge the credibility of the witnesses."  CJ v. SA, 2006 WY 49, ¶ 18, 132 P.3d 196, 203 (Wyo. 
2006).  See also, RS, ¶ 34, 94 P.3d  
at 1033-34.  
The district judge actually sat in the courtroom and observed the 
demeanor of the witnesses; consequently, he was in the best position to make 
those difficult factual determinations. In accordance with our standard of 
review, we defer to the district court's evidentiary findings and conclude 
sufficient evidence exists to support the district court's decision to terminate 
Mother's parental rights.

 
 
[¶31]   This is a classic case where the best 
interests of the children diverge from the fundamental rights of the 
parent.  In 
similar circumstances, we have said:  "When the rights of a parent and the rights 
of a child are on a collision course, the rights of the parent must yield.'" 
 SD v. Carbon County 
Dep't of Family Servs., 2002 WY 168, ¶ 27, 57 P.3d 1235, 1241 (Wyo. 2002), 
quoting Matter of 
MLM, 682 P.2d 982, 990 (Wyo. 1984).  While parents have 
a fundamental right to raise their children, children have a right to stability 
and permanency in their family relationships.  Section 14-2-309(a) recognizes there must be 
limits on the amount of time DFS will attempt to rehabilitate a parent while the 
children remain in foster care.   The time limits recognize that the 
children's right to stability and permanency is superior to the parent's right 
to familial association.  See, e.g., In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 736 A.2d 1246 (N.J. 1999) 
(holding there is "a strong public policy in favor of permanency . . . [and] 
[i]n all our guardianship and adoption cases, the child's need for permanency 
and stability emerges as a central factor.").  

 
 
[¶32]   Sections 14-3-309(a)(v) and 14-3-431(m) 
incorporate federal mandates which provide, in order to receive federal welfare 
funds, state laws must require the responsible state agency to initiate 
termination proceedings if a child has been in foster care for fifteen of the 
most recent twenty-two months.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 670 et. seq. (codifying 
many federal child welfare laws, including the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act of 1970 (P.L. 96-272), the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 
(ASFA) (P.L. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115), and Strengthening Abuse and Neglect Courts 
Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-314) ).  The purpose of the federal laws is to 
"respond to the needs of children lost in the foster care system by promoting 
permanency through reunification or adoption."  L. D'Ambra, Rights of Children in 
Termination of Parental Rights Cases:  A Review of Federal and State Law Involving 
Parents with a Mental or Developmental Disability, 20 Child. Legal Rts. 
J. 2, 3 (Summer 2000).   The federal government recognized that 
the permanency decision, whether it is to reunify or adopt, must be made within 
a reasonable amount of time.  

 
 
By providing stricter time-frames, ASFA tried to prevent 
children from remaining indefinitely in foster care.  ASFA's new 
requirements increase the accountability of parents through shortened 
time-frames, which may act as an impetus to permanency.  Under ASFA, parents 
are given shorter time-frames to work on issues that caused the child to be 
removed by the state.  

 
 

Id. at 4.  The Wyoming legislature followed the 
federal lead and adopted statutes which require the parent to rehabilitate, with 
the aid of state services, within a reasonable amount of time.  Failing that, the 
children's interest in permanency commands that the parent's rights be 
terminated so that the child will be available for adoption.  

 
 
[¶33]   In the case at bar, Mother made 
significant efforts to rehabilitate herself, but she did not, and perhaps could 
not, make sufficient progress within a reasonable amount of time.  At the time of the 
second hearing, the children had been placed out of the home for nearly three 
years.  For 
much of that time, Mother did not consistently comply with DFS requirements in 
order to be reunified with the children.  As the district court recognized, at the time 
of the second hearing there still was no clear indication of when, if ever, 
Mother would be sufficiently rehabilitated to provide the children with the 
stability necessary to allow reunification.  The lack of a clear resolution of the case 
was emotionally disturbing to the children and interfered with their progress in 
becoming healthy and well-adjusted.  Under these circumstances, it was entirely 
appropriate for the district court to favor the children's right to permanency 
and terminate Mother's parental rights.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶34]   The district court's order terminating 
Mother's parental rights to DD, AD, and KD, pursuant to § 14-2-309(a)(iii) and 
(v), was supported by clear and convincing evidence.  The district court 
properly considered DFS' efforts to reunify this family and Mother's efforts to 
rehabilitate herself over the entire three year period these children were in 
foster care, and the district court reasonably concluded the interests of the 
children in a safe and stable home outweighed Mother's rights as a parent.

 
 
[¶35]   Affirmed.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The delay in bringing 
this matter to hearing was the result of continuances granted at the request of 
both DFS and Mother.    

 
 

2Section 14-2-316 
states:

 
 
If the court does not 
terminate the parent-child legal relationship, it shall dismiss the petition or 
direct an authorized agency to continue to make efforts to rehabilitate the 
parent and continue the hearing for no longer than six (6) months.  The authorized 
agency shall provide the court with any additional reports regarding its 
rehabilitative efforts and results.  Pending final hearing, the court may continue 
the present placement of the child or place the child in the temporary custody 
of an authorized agency and fix responsibility for temporary child support.

 

3DD and KD have been in 
foster care, and AD has been placed in a group home and foster care at various 
times.  

 
 
HILL, Justice, dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, J., joins.

 
 
[¶36]   I respectfully dissent because I do not 
agree that the record on appeal contains clear and convincing evidence that 
mandates the termination of CL's parental rights to her three children (DD born 
2/15/93; AD born 2/9/94; KD born 1/13/97).  I reach this conclusion in the light of our 
many decisions that hold the termination of parental rights is a matter over 
which we exercise "strict scrutiny" and that the applicable evidentiary standard 
is clear and convincing evidence.  I also take into account the circumstance 
that we apply our traditional principles of evidentiary review (i.e., " examine 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, assuming 
all favorable evidence to be true while discounting conflicting evidence 
presented by the unsuccessful party.").  See, e.g., In re ANO, 2006 WY 
74, ¶ 7, 136 P.3d 797, 799-800 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶37]   By order entered on June 28, 2005, the 
district court found that the children at issue had been adjudicated neglected 
and that they had been in foster care for more that fifteen of the most recent 
twenty-two months.  
However, it also found that there was not clear and convincing evidence 
to support termination of CL's parental rights, there was not clear and 
convincing evidence that returning the children to CL would seriously jeopardize 
the three children's health and safety, and there was not sufficient evidence 
that CL was unfit to have the custody and control of her three children.

 
 
[¶38]   The district court also directed DFS to 
"continue to make efforts to rehabilitate  for no longer than six months."  CL was ordered to 
comply with the following requirements:

 
 
            
1.  The kids will remain in the custody and care of the State 
of Wyoming, Department of Family 
Services until further ordered.

            
2.  [CL] will comply with every request and or demand of the 
Department of Family Services and her case worker, Katrina Price.

            
3.  [CL] will immediately contact the Department of Family 
Services to create a new case plan for reunification.

            
4.  [CL] will maintain full-time employment.

            
5.  [CL] will abstain from using drugs or alcohol.

            
6.  [CL] will maintain appropriate healthcare for the three 
minor children.

            
7.  [CL] will maintain a safe and appropriate home and keep 
current with all past due and future rent.  [CL] will have NO pets or animals of any kind 
at her home.

            
8.  [CL] will continue her weekly individualized counseling 
sessions at PeakWellnessCenter with Brenda Kofford or 
any other counselor as deemed necessary.

            
9.  [CL] will continue with visitation as arranged by the 
Department of Family Services and will be on time to all scheduled visits.  If [CL] cannot 
attend a visitation because of transportation problems, she will notify the 
Department of Family Services immediately to arrange an alternate 
visitation.

            
10.  [CL] will keep current with any future child support 
payments and she will make arrangements with Child Support Enforcement to pay 
back any outstanding arrearages.

 
 
[¶39]   A Case Plan was formulated and it is 
appended to Vol. IV of the record on appeal (and accurately summarized at pp. 
4-5 of the published opinion).  The district court conducted a hearing on 
November 1, 2005, to take evidence concerning CL's progress during the preceding 
six months.  I 
have read that transcript from cover to cover (188 pages).  Although CL did not 
comply 100% with the directives of the district court and the supervising DFS 
case worker, even the district court conceded that CL's efforts were "to a large 
extentsuccessful."  
Examination of that transcript leaves me with the impression that CL did 
about as well at complying with the district court's and DFS's directives as any 
person could have been expected to do.  The following items are undisputed in the 
record.  
(1)  CL 
is at once required to maintain full-time employment, and faulted that she will 
not be at home enough because she works full-time or more.  (2)  She is faulted for 
losing a part-time job at A&W, although she lost that job because she left 
work so as not to miss a visitation that was set on a new schedule.  (3)  She is faulted for 
going to her therapist only twice a month, even though her therapist testified 
that in her professional judgment CL had progressed so far that she required 
only every-other-week sessions (and also, thus, to avoid over dependence on the 
therapist).  
CL's home is characterized as being a "threat to her children's health 
and safety," and CL is characterized as "unfit" because she did not reach her 
goals 100%.  
However, I do not see any evidence to support those conclusions, much 
less clear and convincing evidence.  The only evidence to support those 
conclusions is the minor failings detailed in the district court's decision 
letter.

 
 
[¶40]   I also perceive that DFS took the 
position in this case that if the district court were to decide to return the 
children to their mother's custody and control, then DFS should "not be involved 
with this family any further:"

 
 
            
Because when the children were returned to the home for a very short 
period of time [in 2003], they had to be removed.  And I can foresee  to make an educated 
guess, that could happen.  And I am just not sure that it would be 
better for them at all to be removed again.  They would almost be better off just to stay 
in the family and fend for themselves.

            
And it is my opinion, that  you know, if we're going to wait for 
children to grow up enough to put them back in the home and fend for themselves, 
then family services needs to be taken out of it.  Because it is just too detrimental for them 
to be taken out again.

 
 
I view this as the sort of hysteria and irrationality that 
justifies the high standards set by the governing statutes and our standard of 
review with respect to the termination of parental rights.  It appears that 
both DFS and the district court took the position that there would be a 
six-month grace period for CL, and then her parental rights would be terminated 
so long as there was some thread of failure to grasp onto.

 
 
[¶41]   I cannot agree that this record 
justifies the use of the statutory guillotine on CL.  I would remand this 
case to the district court with instructions that it direct DFS to continue to 
provide needed services to this family, including CL.  It may be that 
those efforts will never result in the ideal of complete reunification.  However, these 
children are now 14, 13, and 10 years-of-age, and it is difficult for me to 
grasp how termination of CL's parental rights is going to improve their 
lot.