Title: Commonwealth v. Perez

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12251 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  FERNANDO PEREZ. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     April 3, 2017. - August 25, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & 
Cypher, JJ.1 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Sentence.  Due Process of Law, Sentence.  
Practice, Criminal, Sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 16 and March 2, 2001. 
 
 
Following review by the Appeals Court, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 
912 (2004) and 67 Mass. App. Ct. 1116 (2006), a motion for 
resentencing, filed on March 7, 2016, was considered by Daniel 
A. Ford, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered by 
him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant. 
 
Elizabeth Dunphy Farris, Assistant District Attorney 
(Katherine E. McMahon, Assistant District Attorney, also 
present) for the Commonwealth. 
 
Merritt Schnipper, for Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case and authored this opinion prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  In the early morning hours of December 23, 2000, 
the juvenile defendant, Fernando Perez, who was then seventeen 
years of age, embarked on a crime spree in downtown Springfield.  
Accompanied by his adult uncle and armed with a handgun, the 
defendant committed two robberies, all within a span of thirty 
minutes.  While attempting a third robbery, he shot the intended 
victim, a plain-clothed Springfield police officer.  In 
November, 2001, a Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of 
armed robbery, armed assault with intent to rob, assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and related firearms 
offenses.  The judge sentenced the defendant to multiple 
concurrent and consecutive terms, resulting in an aggregate 
sentence of thirty-two and one-half years,2 with parole 
eligibility after twenty-seven and one-half years. 
                                                          
 
 
2 The judge dismissed certain indictments, and on the 
remaining indictments, he imposed the following sentences.  On 
the first set of indictments, the judge sentenced the defendant 
as follows:  armed robbery (count 1), from five to seven and 
one-half years in State prison; armed robbery (count 3), from 
five years to five years and one day in State prison, to run 
from and after the sentence for count 1; armed robbery (count 
5), ten years' probation to run from and after the sentence on 
count 4 in the second set of indictments; and unlawful 
possession of a firearm (count 7), two and one-half years in the 
house of correction, concurrent with the sentence for count 3. 
 
 
On the second set of indictments, the judge sentenced the 
defendant as follows:  armed assault with the intent to rob 
(count 2), seven and one-half to ten years in State prison, to 
run from and after the sentence on count 3 in the first set of 
3 
 
 
 
In 2015, after our decision in Diatchenko v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (2013) (Diatchenko 
I), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015), the defendant filed a motion for 
resentencing under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001), arguing that the aggregate sentence imposed 
violated the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment under 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the 
cognate provision of art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, by requiring him to serve twelve and one-half years 
longer before parole eligibility than a juvenile defendant 
convicted of murder.  He argued also that the sentence violated 
his right to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and that, as a consequence, 
he was entitled to be resentenced to a term of years allowing 
parole eligibility on the same terms as a juvenile convicted of 
murder.  A Superior Court judge denied the motion, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
indictments; assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon 
(count 4), from nine years and 364 days to ten years in State 
prison, to run from and after the sentence for count 2; unlawful 
possession of a firearm (count 5), two and one-half years in the 
house of correction, concurrent with the sentence for count 7 of 
the first set of indictments; and unlawful discharge of a 
firearm (count 6), one day in the house of correction, 
concurrent with the sentence for count 5. 
4 
 
 
defendant appealed.  We granted the defendant's application for 
direct appellate review.3 
 
On appeal, the defendant relies primarily on Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (invalidating death penalty 
for juveniles), and its progeny4 to support his claim that the 
aggregate sentence violates the proscription against cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and art. 26.  We 
decline the invitation to decide the issue on Eighth Amendment 
grounds, especially where the United States Supreme Court has 
not interpreted the Eighth Amendment as broadly as urged by the 
defendant.  Instead, we resolve the issue under art. 26, which 
we have interpreted more broadly than the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Eighth Amendment.5  We conclude that where a 
juvenile is sentenced for a nonmurder offense or offenses and 
the aggregate time to be served prior to parole eligibility 
exceeds that applicable to a juvenile convicted of murder, the 
sentence cannot be reconciled with art. 26 unless, after a 
                                                          
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Youth 
Advocacy Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
 
 
4 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010) (prohibiting 
life sentence without possibility of parole for juveniles 
convicted of nonhomicide offenses); and Miller v. Alabama, 567 
U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory life sentence 
without parole for juveniles convicted of murder). 
 
 
5 See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 
466 Mass. 655, 668 (2013) (Diatchenko I), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 
(2015). 
5 
 
 
hearing on the factors articulated in Miller v. Alabama, 567 
U.S. 460, 477-478 (2012) (Miller hearing), the judge makes a 
finding that the circumstances warrant treating the juvenile 
more harshly for parole purposes than a juvenile convicted of 
murder.  Accordingly, we remand the matter to the Superior Court 
for a Miller hearing to determine whether the sentence comports 
with the requirements of art. 26.  If not, then the defendant 
must be resentenced. 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.  We recite the facts the jury could 
have found.  On December 23, 2000, around 1 A.M., the defendant, 
then aged seventeen, committed two robberies and attempted a 
third.  The three crimes occurred within thirty minutes of each 
other and within a several-block radius of downtown Springfield.  
The defendant was armed with a handgun, and his uncle, Tito 
Abrante, shuttled him from crime to crime.6  The defendant first 
robbed a married couple at a train station and then robbed a man 
walking on Main Street.  In the third incident, he approached 
Carlo D'Amato, an off-duty detective with the Springfield police 
department.  Detective D'Amato said, "What's up?" to which the 
defendant replied, "I'm going to rob you . . . ."  In response, 
Detective D'Amato said, "I don't think so.  You should really 
                                                          
 
 
6 Tito Abrante has a criminal history and, at the time, had 
been recently released from prison.  He was charged with crimes 
related to these events, but was tried separately from the 
defendant. 
6 
 
 
think about this.  I'm a Springfield police officer and you 
should think about what you're doing."  As Detective D'Amato 
reached for his badge, the defendant shot him; the defendant 
continued to fire the weapon as he retreated from the scene.  
Detective D'Amato suffered serious injuries that required 
multiple surgeries.  On January 30, 2001, the police arrested 
the defendant in Scranton, Pennsylvania.  In statements to 
Scranton and Springfield police, the defendant admitted to 
shooting Detective D'Amato but claimed Abrante committed the 
other robberies. 
 
2.  Sentencing.  Prior to sentencing, the trial judge 
ordered a G. L. c. 123, § 15 (e), evaluation in aid of 
sentencing, which was performed by Dr. Michael Sherry, a 
designated forensic psychologist.  In addition, a Superior Court 
probation officer in Hampden County, Laura Periera, prepared a 
presentence investigation report at the court's direction.  The 
judge previously had received and reviewed two reports from Dr. 
Pamela Dieter-Sands, a licensed psychologist and the defendant's 
expert witness.7  In her report, Dieter-Sands detailed the 
defendant's upbringing, how he lived under the extreme stress of 
his father's violence, and the vacuum that was left when an 
uncle who had nurtured and supported the defendant was murdered 
                                                          
 
 
7 Dr. Pamela Dieter-Sands testified at trial regarding the 
defendant's mental state at the time he committed his offense. 
7 
 
 
in the spring of 2000.  The defendant filled the void left by 
this "loving father figure" with Abrante, whom he first met 
about one month after his uncle's death.  Periera reported that 
"this defendant believed that if he did not follow through with 
[Abrante's] orders, he would be subjected to bodily harm." 
 
The Commonwealth sought concurrent life sentences on two of 
the defendant's armed robbery convictions, and term-of-years 
sentences totaling twenty to thirty years on the remaining 
felony convictions.  The defendant requested a sentence of ten 
years in State prison and urged the judge to consider the 
defendant's evaluations and his "horrible upbringing."  Before 
pronouncing sentence, the trial judge stated, "I recognize . . . 
that at the time of these offenses [the defendant] was only 
[seventeen] years old.  And young men of the age of [seventeen] 
frequently do not have the maturity to make good judgments.  But 
the law makes them responsible for their acts as adults, 
nonetheless."8  The judge sentenced the defendant to an aggregate 
term of thirty-two and one-half years imprisonment, resulting in 
parole eligibility after twenty-seven and one-half years. 
                                                          
 
 
8 At the time of the conviction in 2001, the age threshold 
for a juvenile offender was seventeen years of age.  However, in 
2013, the Legislature amended various provisions of G. L. 
c. 119, including § 72, which raised the age threshold from 
seventeen to eighteen years of age.  See G. L. c. 119, § 72, as 
amended through St. 2013, c. 84, §§ 21-22A (effective Sept. 18, 
2013).  See also Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 630-
631 (2013). 
8 
 
 
 
3.  Posttrial proceedings.  The defendant appealed from his 
sentences to the appellate division of the Superior Court, which 
dismissed the appeal.  On February 15, 2002, the defendant filed 
identical motions to revise and revoke his sentences on the 
grounds of "basic fairness and justice, and the [d]efendant's 
personal circumstances and background," pursuant to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 29, 378 Mass. 899 (1979).  On January 3, 2006, the 
trial judge denied the motions. 
 
On October 25, 2004, the Appeals Court affirmed the 
convictions.  Commonwealth v. Perez, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 912, 914 
(2004).  On December 27, 2005, the defendant filed a motion for 
a new trial, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 
435 Mass. 1501 (2001), on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence.  The trial judge denied the motion without a hearing, 
and the Appeals Court affirmed the denial.  Commonwealth v. 
Perez, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 1116 (2006) (unpublished opinion). 
 
Thereafter, on March 7, 2016, the defendant filed a motion 
for a resentencing hearing pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), 
relying on our decision in Diatchenko I.  The motion judge9 
denied the motion, concluding "that a sentence providing for 
parole eligibility after [twenty-seven and one-half] years is 
not the functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole, 
                                                          
 
 
9 Because the trial judge had retired, the motion was heard 
by the same judge who had presided over Abrante's trial. 
9 
 
 
and therefore that the sentence imposed in this case was not 
constitutionally infirm."  On November 15, 2016, the judge 
denied the defendant's motion to reconsider, and the defendant 
filed an appeal in the Appeals Court.  On January 18, 2017, this 
court granted the defendant's application for direct appellate 
review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  We review the denial 
of a motion brought under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a) for an abuse 
of discretion.  Commonwealth v. Wright, 469 Mass. 447, 461 
(2014).  Under that standard, the issue is whether the judge's 
decision resulted from "'a clear error of judgment in weighing' 
the factors relevant to the decision . . . such that the 
decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" 
(citation omitted).  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 
n.27 (2014). 
 
2.  Constitutionality of the sentence.  The Commonwealth 
advances a litany of arguments against the defendant's right to 
a review of the sentence, none of which is persuasive.  We agree 
that a judge has broad discretion in sentencing and that "[i]t 
is not within the power of this court to review an otherwise 
lawful sentence . . . [where] [t]his authority is delegated to 
the [a]ppellate [d]ivision of the Superior Court under G. L. 
c. 278, §§ 28A-28C."  Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 405 Mass. 369, 
379 n.7 (1989).  Nonetheless, we have the power to review a 
10 
 
 
sentence to determine whether it is unconstitutional, and we 
exercise that power when, as here, it is appropriate to do so. 
 
The defendant contends that his aggregate sentence -- which 
requires him to serve twenty-seven and one-half years before he 
is eligible for parole -- violates art. 26, because juveniles 
convicted of the more serious crime of murder at the time of his 
offenses were eligible for parole after fifteen years.  The crux 
of his argument is that our decision in Diatchenko I10 created a 
presumptive ceiling on parole eligibility for crimes less 
serious than murder, and that a sentence that treats him more 
harshly than a juvenile convicted of murder therefore violates 
the principle of proportionality inherent in art. 26. 
 
We begin by outlining the parameters of the constitutional 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  In Diatchenko 
I, 466 Mass. at 667, we interpreted art. 26 more broadly than 
the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth 
                                                          
 
 
10 In Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 667, we declared 
unconstitutional G. L. c. 265, § 2, to the extent that it 
mandated a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of 
parole for a juvenile convicted of murder in the first degree.  
We also determined that G. L. c. 127, § 133A, barring parole 
eligibility for defendants convicted of murder in the first 
degree, was inapplicable to juveniles.  Id. at 673.  Thus, under 
Diatchenko I, a juvenile sentenced for murder in 2002 would be 
eligible for parole after fifteen years.  In this case, we 
analogize the juvenile defendant's eligibility for parole to a 
juvenile defendant convicted of murder in 2002. 
11 
 
 
Amendment.11  See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (mandatory sentence of 
life in prison without parole for juvenile offenders violates 
Eighth Amendment; individualized sentence required).  Based on 
the science undergirding the Supreme Court's determination that 
"children are constitutionally different from adults for 
purposes of sentencing," id. at 471, we held that a life 
sentence without the possibility of parole violates art. 26, 
regardless of whether such a sentence is mandatory or imposed in 
the sentencing judge's discretion.  Diatchenko I, supra at 671.  
The point of our departure from the Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence was our determination that, under art. 26, the 
"unique characteristics of juvenile offenders" should weigh more 
heavily in the proportionality calculus than the United States 
Supreme Court required under the Eighth Amendment.  Id.  The 
touchstone of art. 26's proscription against cruel or unusual 
                                                          
 
 
11 Under the United States Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment 
juvenile sentencing jurisprudence, an offender's status as a 
juvenile places only narrow limitations on the range of 
permissible sentences.  For example, although in Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), the Supreme Court held that 
the Eighth Amendment prohibited the death penalty for juveniles, 
the Court has not eliminated the possibility that a juvenile may 
be sentenced to imprisonment for life.  Miller, 567 U.S. at 489, 
prohibits only a mandatory sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole.  With respect to juveniles convicted of 
nonhomicide offenses, the Eighth Amendment has not been 
construed to impose a temporal limitation on the sentence that 
may be imposed.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.  Rather, taking into 
account the distinctive attributes of offenders who are 
juveniles at the time of the crime and the nature of the 
offense, the Eighth Amendment requires only a "meaningful 
opportunity" for, not a right to, parole.  Id. 
12 
 
 
punishment, however, remains proportionality.  See id. at 669, 
citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010).  The essence 
of proportionality is that "punishment for crime should be 
graduated and proportioned to both the offender and the offense" 
(citation omitted).  Miller, supra at 469.  Our specific inquiry 
here is whether the requirement of proportionality bars the 
imposition, on a juvenile defendant, of consecutive sentences 
for nonmurder offenses with a resulting parole eligibility date 
that exceeds that applicable to juveniles convicted of murder. 
 
Although we have not been called upon to decide 
proportionality in this nonmurder context for juvenile 
defendants, we have considered proportionality as it pertains to 
adult defendants.  See Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 495, 
496 (1981) (challenging constitutionality of sentence of forty 
years for possession of sawed-off shotgun).12  We followed in 
that case "a tripartite analysis to determine whether a 
defendant has met his burden" to establish a disproportionality 
of constitutional dimensions.  Id. at 497, citing Commonwealth 
v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 910 (1976). 
 
"The first prong of the disproportionality test 
requires inquiry into the 'nature of the offense and the 
                                                          
 
 
12 In Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 495, 497-499 
(1981), we held that the defendant's sentence of from forty to 
fifty years in State prison for possession of a machine gun, in 
violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (c), was not so disproportionate 
as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment and art. 26. 
13 
 
 
offender in light of the degree of harm to society.' . . .  
The second prong of the disproportionality analysis 
involves a comparison between the sentence imposed here and 
punishments prescribed for the commission of more serious 
crimes in the Commonwealth. . . .  The final prong this 
court examines in the disproportionality analysis is a 
comparison of the challenged penalty with the penalties 
prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions." 
 
Cepulonis, supra at 497-498.  That tripartite analysis, 
supplemented with the greater weight given to a juvenile 
defendant's age, provides a useful framework for our 
consideration of this juvenile defendant's challenge to the 
constitutionality of his sentence.  See Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. 
at 669. 
 
We examine first "the nature of the offense and the 
offender in light of the degree of harm to society" (emphasis 
supplied).  Jackson, 369 Mass. at 910.  With respect to the 
first part, we do not discount the severity of the defendant's 
multiple offenses -- among other crimes, he shot a police 
officer during an attempted armed robbery, after having 
committed two other armed robberies only minutes earlier.  The 
evidence established that the police officer suffered serious 
injuries necessitating multiple surgeries.  In the abstract -- 
i.e., without considering the offender -- the nature of the 
multiple offenses, and the "degree of the harm to society," id., 
was such that a judge in the exercise of discretion might be 
warranted in imposing consecutive sentences for the crimes, 
14 
 
 
aggregating to a sentence of thirty-two and one-half years with 
parole eligibility after twenty-seven and one-half years.  
Disproportionality is not, however, an abstract inquiry.  The 
first prong of the disproportionality test also requires 
consideration of the particular offender.  In Diatchenko I, 466 
Mass. at 670, quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, we reasoned that 
the unique characteristics of juvenile offenders, including 
their "diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform," 
made imposition of a life sentence without parole eligibility 
unconstitutional.13  Because of those characteristics, imposition 
of an aggregate sentence of thirty-two and one-half years -- 
with parole eligibility exceeding that available to a juvenile 
defendant convicted of murder -- while perhaps within the range 
of a judge's discretion, may satisfy the first prong of the 
disproportionality test only if the factors described in Miller, 
supra at 477-478, are considered by the sentencing judge. 
 
We come to a similar conclusion under the second prong of 
the proportionality calculus.  Under that prong, we consider the 
disparity "between the sentence imposed [on the juvenile] and 
                                                          
 
 
13 The juvenile defendant was sentenced in 2002.  Although, 
as the dissenting opinion describes, the sentencing judge 
"considered the factors relating to the defendant's age, 
competency, culpability, background, and familial influence," 
post at    , the judge did not have the benefit of "current 
scientific research on adolescent brain development, and the 
myriad significant ways that this development impacts a 
juvenile's personality and behavior" (footnote omitted).  
Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 669. 
15 
 
 
punishments prescribed for the commission of more serious crimes 
in the Commonwealth."  Cepulonis, 384 Mass. at 498.  On its 
face, the aggregate sentence imposed on this juvenile defendant, 
albeit for serious crimes, is more severe -- at least as to 
parole eligibility -- than a sentence that could be imposed on a 
juvenile convicted of murder, the most serious criminal offense 
under our law.14  A facial disproportionality of this magnitude 
in the punishment for nonmurder offenses is presumptively beyond 
that which can be tolerated by art. 26.  In this regard, we are 
persuaded by the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 69, that juvenile "defendants who do not 
kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are 
categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of 
punishment than are murderers."  We agree that under art. 26, 
"[t]here is a line 'between homicide and other serious violent 
offenses against the individual.'"  Id., quoting Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008).  In the absence of 
extraordinary circumstances, which we discuss infra, this line 
must not be crossed to treat a juvenile convicted of a nonmurder 
offense, or multiple nonmurder offenses, more harshly than a 
                                                          
 
 
14 See G. L. c. 279, § 24, which provides in relevant part: 
"In the case of a sentence of life imprisonment for murder in 
the first degree committed by a person on or after the person's 
fourteenth birthday and before the person's eighteenth birthday, 
the court shall fix a minimum term of not less than [twenty] 
years nor more than [thirty] years . . . ." 
16 
 
 
juvenile convicted of murder.  The juvenile defendant's 
aggregate sentence fails the second prong of the 
disproportionality test.  We therefore need not discuss the 
third prong. 
 
Based on the Cepulonis analysis, therefore, a juvenile 
defendant's aggregate sentence for nonmurder offenses with 
parole eligibility exceeding that applicable to a juvenile 
defendant convicted of murder is presumptively disproportionate.  
That presumption is conclusive, absent a hearing to consider 
whether extraordinary circumstances warrant a sentence treating 
the juvenile defendant more harshly for parole purposes than a 
juvenile convicted of murder.  That inquiry, ultimately whether 
the sentence is proportionate to the offender, as a juvenile, 
and to the particular offenses, must be assessed in light of the 
Miller factors as set forth infra. 
 
We turn next to the details of a Miller hearing, conducted 
to identify any extraordinary circumstance where the presumptive 
disproportionality of a juvenile sentence may have been 
dispelled.  In addition to the factors a judge ordinarily would 
consider in exercising discretion in sentencing, see 
Commonwealth v. Costa, 472 Mass, 139, 147 (2015), the judge must 
weigh factors specifically related to the juvenile's age.  See 
Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-478 (identifying factors relevant to 
consideration of juvenile's age in sentencing).  Drawing from 
17 
 
 
the factors articulated in Miller, we conclude that the judge 
must weigh (1) the particular attributes of the juvenile, 
including "immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate 
risks and consequences"; (2) "the family and home environment 
that surrounds [the juvenile] from which he cannot usually 
extricate himself"; and (3) "the circumstances of the . . . 
offense, including the extent of [the juvenile's] participation 
in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have 
affected him."  Id. at 477.  Only after the judge weighs those 
factors, applies them uniquely to the juvenile defendant, and 
considers whether a punishment exceeding that applicable to a 
juvenile convicted of murder (at least with respect to parole 
eligibility) is appropriate in the circumstances, may such a 
sentence be imposed.  See Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 668. 
 
Contrary to the dissent's view of the sentencing hearing, 
the judge expressly declined to consider the juvenile 
defendant's age as a mitigating factor, which, as we have said, 
is required in the circumstances of this case.  Defense counsel 
went to great lengths in emphasizing the juvenile's age, his 
family circumstances, and the uncle's role in encouraging the 
juvenile's involvement in the offenses, factors that take on 
greater significance when, as here, a sentencing decision must 
be informed by a Miller hearing.  Presaging the United States 
Supreme Court's assessment of the attributes of youth in the 
18 
 
 
Roper line of cases, the judge accepted that "young men at the 
age of [seventeen] frequently do not have the maturity to make 
good judgments."  However, without the benefit of the United 
States Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment juvenile sentencing 
jurisprudence and our interpretation of art. 26 in Diatchenko I, 
the judge did not consider this as a mitigating factor.  
Instead, he concluded that "the law makes them responsible for 
their acts as adults, nonetheless."  While the judge was correct 
that a juvenile defendant's age does not excuse criminal 
conduct, it does not appear that he gave appropriate 
consideration to the defendant's age as a mitigating factor in 
the sentencing.  Accordingly, the purpose of the Miller hearing 
has not been met in this case. 
 
To be clear, we do not suggest that a juvenile convicted of 
nonmurder offenses may never be sentenced to consecutive terms 
or to a term with parole eligibility exceeding that available 
for a juvenile convicted of murder.  That option remains open to 
a sentencing judge in an appropriate case, after weighing the 
factors considered in the Miller hearing, and when the art. 26 
requirements as articulated here are met. 
 
3.  Right to resentencing for parole eligibility after 
fifteen years.  The defendant argues that his right to due 
process compels resentencing to conform his parole eligibility 
to that available to juveniles convicted of murder.  He claims 
19 
 
 
that the court's reasoning in Costa, 472 Mass. at 144, should be 
applied to him.  He is mistaken.  Costa was not decided on 
constitutional grounds, and therefore, it has no bearing on the 
due process claim asserted by the defendant.  Id. at 145.  On 
the contrary, Costa is sui generis.  Costa, a juvenile 
defendant, was sentenced to consecutive life sentences for 
murder, on the apparent assumption that the structure of his 
sentence was irrelevant; at the time, he was not eligible for 
parole at all.  Id. at 141-142.  Because of the change in the 
sentencing of juveniles convicted of murder brought by 
Diatchenko I, it simply was not possible to know if the 
sentencing judge would have made the same "somewhat symbolic" 
choice to impose consecutive sentences.  Costa, supra at 143.  
For that reason only, Costa was entitled to a resentencing 
hearing.  The court emphatically did not hold that Costa was 
entitled to be resentenced to concurrent life terms to allow 
parole eligibility after fifteen years.  Id. at 144.  Thus, our 
ruling in Costa does not advance the defendant's argument that 
he is entitled to be resentenced to a term that permits parole 
eligibility on the same terms as a juvenile convicted of murder. 
 
Conclusion.  Because the juvenile defendant's sentences are 
presumptively disproportionate under art. 26, and the judge 
imposed the sentences without the benefit of a Miller hearing, 
we vacate the denial of the defendant's rule 30 motion.  We 
20 
 
 
remand the case to the Superior Court for a Miller hearing and, 
if necessary, for resentencing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J. (dissenting, with whom Cypher, J., joins).  I 
disagree with the court's conclusion that the defendant's 
sentence violates art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights based on the test from Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 
Mass. 495 (1981).  The ultimate purpose of the three-prong test 
is to determine whether the punishment is "so disproportionate 
to the crime that it 'shocks the conscience.'"  Diatchenko v. 
District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 669 
(2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015), quoting Cepulonis, supra at 
497.  The sentence in this case is not so disproportionate. 
 
I would conclude that the first prong of the Cepulonis 
analysis, which requires consideration of the underlying crimes 
and the defendant's personal characteristics, is satisfied.  See 
Cepulonis, 384 Mass. at 497.  The judge meticulously considered 
both factors.  The judge noted the seriousness of the crimes and 
even presciently considered the factors relating to the 
defendant's age, competency, culpability, background, and 
familial influence that the United States Supreme Court, in 
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477-478 (2012), would 
subsequently mandate for juveniles in capital cases.1 
                                                          
 
1 The judge explicitly considered that the defendant was 
seventeen years old and that "young men at the age of 
[seventeen] frequently do not have the maturity to make good 
judgments."  The judge also noted the defendant's intellectual 
limitations, difficulty in his upbringing, and susceptibility to 
his uncle's influence, and a psychological report detailing his 
2 
 
 
 
The second prong, which requires comparing the aggregate 
sentence given to the defendant with sentences for more serious 
crimes in the Commonwealth, is also satisfied.  See Cepulonis, 
384 Mass. at 498.  Given the number and the seriousness of the 
convictions, I would not conclude that the aggregate sentence in 
this case is out of proportion with sentences for more serious 
crimes.  Although a defendant convicted of a single count of 
murder, as the court points out, would become parole-eligible 
before twenty-seven and one-half years had elapsed, the 
defendant here was convicted of, and sentenced for, multiple 
crimes:  three counts of armed robbery, two counts of unlawful 
possession of a firearm, one count of armed assault with the 
intent to rob, one count of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon, and one count of discharging a firearm within 
500 feet of a dwelling.  Precluding a judge from entering 
consecutive sentences for these serious offenses, particularly 
when a judge had already closely considered the defendant's 
youth and its signature features, would unduly hamper a judge's 
sentencing discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Lucret, 58 Mass. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
desire to please adults.  Nevertheless, the judge was within his 
discretion to conclude that there was "no question that [the 
defendant] was old enough, intelligent enough, [and] capable of 
knowing right from wrong" such that his "bad judgment" in 
committing three armed robberies could not be "excused by age or 
by any of the other circumstances of [the defendant's] life."  
As the judge stated, he looked to "the offense and to the victim 
of the offense, as well as to the defendant," just as the 
Cepulonis analysis requires. 
3 
 
 
App. Ct. 624, 628 (2003) (judicial discretion to impose 
concurrent or consecutive discretion is "[f]irmly rooted in 
common law").  That an aggregate sentence for multiple crimes 
may exceed the sentence for a single, more serious crime does 
not in itself establish an art. 26 violation for a juvenile, as 
the court today indicates. 
 
Looking to the sentences in other jurisdictions, I would 
also conclude that the third prong is satisfied in this case.  
See Cepulonis, 384 Mass. at 498.  States such as New Hampshire 
and Indiana allow for a comparable sentence for crimes similar 
to the defendant's most serious convictions.  For example, four 
of the defendant's convictions -- three of armed robbery, N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 636:1(III), and one of assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon, id. at § 631:1(I)(a) -- could each 
result in twenty-year sentences.  Id. at § 651:2(II-g).  Judges 
in New Hampshire retain the well-established common-law 
discretion to impose consecutive sentences.  Duquette v. Warden, 
N.H. State Prison, 154 N.H. 737, 743-744 (2007).  Similarly, in 
Indiana the defendant's three convictions of armed robbery would 
likely qualify as two felonies at level two and one felony at 
level three,2 Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1, which would carry sentences 
                                                          
 
 
2 Indiana classifies robbery as a level two felony if there 
was serious bodily injury resulting to any person other than the 
defendant, and it classifies robbery as a level three if the 
robbery was committed while armed with a deadly weapon or 
4 
 
 
of between ten and thirty years, and between three and sixteen 
years, respectively.  Id. at §§ 35-50-1-2(2)(a)(12), 35-50-2-
4.5, 35-50-2-5(b).  Judges in Indiana have statutory authority 
to impose consecutive sentences for crimes of violence, which 
include both level two and level three armed robbery, without 
limiting the duration of the consecutive sentence.  Id. at § 35-
50-1-2(c). 
 
For these reasons, I believe the defendant's sentence 
satisfies art. 26.  I respectfully dissent. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
results in bodily injury to any person other than defendant.  
Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1(1)(a).