Title: Cler v. Providence Health System-Oregon

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: December 30, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
ALAN AND DEBI CLER,
Petitioners on Review,
v.
PROVIDENCE HEALTH SYSTEM - OREGON,
dba Providence St. Vincent Medical,
Defendants,
and
OREGON HEMATOLOGY ONCOLOGY ASSOCIATES, PC.,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 0401-00189; CA
A130443; SC S056715)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 14, 2009.
Stephen C. Hendricks, Hendricks Law Firm, P.C.,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioners on review.
Janet M. Schroer, Hoffman Hart & Wagner,
LLP, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. 
With her on the brief was Marjorie A. Speirs.
DURHAM, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Linder, J., dissented and filed an opinion in
which Balmer and Kistler, JJ., joined
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Marilyn
E. Litzenberger, Judge. 222 Or App 183, 192 P3d 838 (2008).
DURHAM, J.
Plaintiff Alan Cler
suffered severe injury to his arm and hand after receiving intravenous
chemotherapy treatment from defendant Oregon Hematology Oncology Associates,
PC.  Cler and his wife (plaintiffs) brought this action against defendant,
alleging that one of defendant's nurses had caused Cler's injury by negligently
administering the chemotherapy treatment.  During defendant's closing argument,
defense counsel made several factual statements regarding a nurse expert who
did not testify at trial; the statements had no basis in this record.  The
trial court overruled plaintiffs' counsel's objections to the statements.  The
jury returned a verdict for defendant.  On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the
trial court had abused its discretion in allowing defense counsel, during
closing argument, to present facts to the jury regarding the anticipated
testimony of an expert witness that was not in the record.  The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.  Cler v. Providence Health
System-Oregon, 222 Or App 183, 192 P3d 838 (2008).(1)  We allowed plaintiffs'
petition for review and, for the reasons that follow, now reverse and remand
for a new trial.
After Cler was
diagnosed with Hodgkin's Lymphoma, a form of cancer, he opted to undergo
chemotherapy treatment that included the intravenous injection of a drug called
Adriamycin.  Adriamycin can cause tissue damage if it leaks out of a patient's
vein and into other tissues.  During Cler's first chemotherapy session, an
oncology nurse employed by defendant administered Adriamycin, which leaked from
Cler's vein and caused severe damage to Cler's arm and hand.  Plaintiffs filed
this personal injury action, alleging that defendant's nurse had not met the
standard of care required for an oncology nurse in her treatment of Cler.  The
case proceeded to jury trial.
At the beginning of
trial, the parties offered opening statements.  During her opening statement, defense
counsel told the jury that she would be calling an oncology nurse, a nurse
manager at Oregon Health Sciences University, to testify as an expert witness. 
Defense counsel offered a summary of the nurse expert's expected testimony,
namely, that defendant's nurse had met the applicable standard of care for
oncology nurses in administering intravenous chemotherapy treatment and that
several other events and circumstances, all consistent with good care, could
have resulted in the injury that plaintiff suffered. 
On the fifth day of
trial, plaintiffs were still presenting their case-in chief.  Before plaintiffs
called Cler as their last witness, defense counsel stated to the court,
"Judge, I do have a doctor here, who I would like to be able to get on if
I can."  Plaintiffs' counsel objected.  After an off-the-record discussion
in chambers, the judge and the lawyers returned to the courtroom, and the judge
addressed the jury:  "Jurors, we're going to give [defense counsel] an
opportunity to talk with a couple of her witnesses in the hallway and then
we'll be resuming testimony just shortly."  After a short break,
plaintiffs' counsel called Cler to testify.  The next day, defendant's oncology
doctor expert testified.  Defense counsel did not call a nurse expert to testify
on defendant's behalf at trial.(2)
During closing
argument, plaintiffs' counsel drew attention to defendant's failure to call a
nurse expert:  
"Can you imagine this institution, Oregon
Hematology Oncology, and they have not called an independent nurse expert to
justify the care in this case? * * * 
"But on a case where we're talking about
nursing care, and everyone agrees * * * when it comes to actually giving the
drugs nowadays, this is nursing duty.  Nurses do this.  Doctors don't do this. 
They don't have an independent nurse expert.
"I mean, can you imagine?  Now, there's a
reason.  It is probably because they couldn't get a nurse expert who would say
that this was okay care.  That's the conclusion that's easy to draw on."
Defense counsel raised no objection to those
statements.  Instead, in her closing argument, defense counsel stated:
"Now, one thing I just want to mention
before I forget, [plaintiffs' counsel] said that we didn't even call an
oncology nurse.  And I hope you remember that when I started my case, and I
gave my opening statement, I told you that I had [two doctors] and [an oncology
nurse] who is the nurse manager at OHSU and has 20 years' of experience in
oncology.  I hope you remember that --" 
Plaintiffs' counsel objected that defense
counsel was "close to testifying as opposed to addressing the evidence
that was before the court."  The trial court responded:  "I'm going
to let her continue * * * in the same vein that you addressed the
evidence."  Defense counsel continued by stating that, at one point during
the trial, her nurse expert had been in the courtroom waiting to testify. 
After plaintiffs' counsel objected twice more, the trial court asked counsel to
discuss the matter in chambers.  Following that discussion, defense counsel
continued her closing argument: 
"[The oncology nurse expert] was here on
[the fifth day of trial,(3)]
prepared to testify in the afternoon.  She sat in the courtroom all afternoon,
and she didn't get on because [plaintiffs' counsel] was calling Mr. Cler in the
afternoon.  She had to leave on the following day.  She got on a plane.  She
was scheduled to go on vacation.  That's why you didn't hear from [her].  She
was prepared to be here.  She sat in the courtroom all that afternoon, and
again, she was prepared to testify and would have testified in our case and
supported our case."(4)
In his rebuttal argument, plaintiffs'
counsel addressed defense counsel's comments concerning the failure of the
nurse expert to testify: 
"You heard me object to the thing about the
nurse expert.  I feel pretty strongly about this.  Look, anybody that tries
these cases knows that you better get your most important and your best witness
on.  
"Now, you guys sat through the testimony
and you know that we accommodated [defense counsel] by taking two witnesses out
of turn.  She had every, every opportunity to get a nurse expert in to testify
in this case.  If she didn't want to call that nurse at some particular time,
there's another procedure that's available.
"You can take a witness outside the bounds
of the courtroom and you can do a videotape deposition and set up a camera and
bring it in.  You saw -- I don't know if you saw there's a television in the
courtroom for a couple of days.  So you can play perpetuated testimony on a TV.
"She had every opportunity under the rules
that we do these cases to get this witness in here, and she did not.  So I
think that you still have to conclude there's a reason that she did not."
The trial court gave no special jury
instructions regarding the nurse expert, but did give the jury the standard
instruction that it must decide the case based on the evidence (testimony and
exhibits) presented at trial and that counsel's opening statements and closing
arguments are not evidence.  The jury returned a verdict for defendant.
Plaintiffs filed a
motion for a new trial, arguing, among other things, that the trial court had
abused its discretion by permitting defense counsel to present facts in her closing
statement that were not in evidence.  The trial court denied plaintiffs'
motion, concluding that the court's failure to sustain the objections that
plaintiffs' counsel made during defense counsel's closing argument "did
not substantially affect plaintiffs' rights" because the statements
"were not probative of the substantive factual issues in the case, nor did
they raise an issue with respect to the credibility of a witness."  The
court also noted that plaintiffs' counsel had been able to rebut defense
counsel's statements in rebuttal "by explaining ways in which defendant
could have preserved the expert's testimony for trial and by suggesting that
defense counsel made choices regarding the order in which she called her
experts." 
Plaintiffs appealed,
assigning error to the trial court's ruling on plaintiffs' objections to the
statements made in defendant's closing argument.  The Court of Appeals agreed
with plaintiffs that the trial court had abused its discretion in allowing
improper argument by defense counsel during closing statements.  Cler,
220 Or App at 189.  The court concluded, however, that the error did not
substantially affect plaintiffs' rights for three reasons:  (1) the trial court
instructed the jury that opening and closing statements are not evidence; (2)
the discussion of plaintiffs' nurse expert "was not even a forkful of the
entire evidentiary pie;" and (3) the trial court, which was in the best
position to evaluate the effect of the improper argument, assessed any
prejudice to plaintiffs as minimal.  Id. at 191-92.  Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court judgment.  
On review, the
parties reprise the arguments that they made to the Court of Appeals. 
Plaintiffs argue that a trial court abuses its discretion by allowing counsel
to deliberately relate facts not in evidence to the jury during argument, and
that such action is per se prejudicial because it violates the other
party's "right to a fair trial within well-established rules."  In
response, defendant argues that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by
allowing counsel to introduce facts not in evidence during argument when those
facts are collateral and when the opposing counsel has "opened the
door" with his or her own improper argument.  Defendant further argues
that, on this record, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the statements at
issue by defense counsel were sufficiently prejudicial so as to warrant
reversal.  
We review a trial
court's decisions regarding control of jury argument for an abuse of
discretion.  R.J. Frank Realty, Inc. v. Heuvel, 284 Or 301, 306, 586 P2d
1123 (1978).  In general, in presenting closing arguments to the jury, counsel
have "a large degree of freedom" to comment on the evidence submitted
and urge the jury to draw any all legitimate inferences from that evidence.  Huber
v. Miller, 41 Or 103, 115, 68 P 400 (1902).  However, that freedom is not
without limitations:(5)
 One such limitation is that counsel may not make "statements of facts
outside the range of evidence."  Id.; see also John H. Wigmore, 6 Evidence
in Trials at Common Law §
1807 (Chadbourn rev 1979) ("[C]ounsel must not make assertions as to facts
of which evidence must have been introduced but has not been or will not be
introduced." (emphasis omitted)); Trial, 88 CJS 353 § 309 (2008)("Counsel must be confined
to the issues and the evidence, and will not be allowed to comment on or state
facts not in evidence or within the issues.").
In closing argument
in this case, over plaintiffs' counsel's objection, defense counsel made four
statements of fact that were not testified to by any witness or otherwise admitted
into evidence:  (1) an oncology nurse manager with 20 years of experience had
been prepared to testify on defendant's behalf; (2) the nurse expert had been
waiting in the courtroom to testify on the afternoon of the fifth day of trial;
(3) the reason that the nurse expert did not testify was because plaintiffs'
counsel called a witness that afternoon and the nurse expert had to go on
vacation the following day; and (4) if the nurse expert had testified, she
would have "supported [defendant's] case."  Defense counsel had no basis
in the record to offer those statements to the jury in her closing argument.
Defendant submits
that, in this case, the extra-record statements were proper because, during
closing argument, plaintiffs' counsel had commented on defendant's failure to
call a nurse expert, asking the jury to draw the inference that defendant could
not find a nurse expert who would have testified that the nurse who treated Mr.
Cler had acted within the applicable standard of care.  According to defendant,
plaintiffs' counsel's comment was improper because plaintiffs' counsel was
aware that the nurse expert had not testified because of scheduling issues.  As
a result, defendant concludes, plaintiffs' misleading statements
"provoked" or "invited" defense counsel's statements.  We
disagree.
In calling attention
to defendant's failure to call a nurse expert, plaintiffs' counsel invoked the
missing witness inference.  In general terms, that inference provides that,
"[w]hen it would be natural under the circumstances for a party to call a
particular witness * * * and the party fails to do so, tradition has allowed
the adversary to use this failure as the basis for invoking an adverse
inference."  2 McCormick on Evidence § 264, at 220 (6th ed 2006).  In Bohle v. Matson Navigation Co.,
243 Or 196, 198, 412 P2d 367 (1966), the court approved generally the use of
that inference, holding that the plaintiff's counsel in a personal injury case
should have been allowed to comment in closing argument on the failure of the
defendant to call a doctor who had examined the plaintiff at defendant's
request because "it is a natural inference that he would have been called
if his testimony would help the defendant's case."  Id.  The
invocation of the missing witness inference by plaintiff's counsel was
consistent with the holding in Bohle.  As the trial court acknowledged,
plaintiff's counsel's comments "addressed the evidence" in the trial
record.
If a party believes
that an opponent has invoked the missing witness inference improperly, the
party is not without recourse.  The party may timely object, and, if necessary,
move to strike or request a curative jury instruction.  If evidence in the record
provides an alternative explanation for a party's failure to call a witness,
that party properly may comment thereon.  Trial, 88 CJS 360 § 313 ("It is proper for counsel to
account for the absence of a desired witness where such absence would be a proper
subject for comment by his or her opponent, where the explanation is based
on evidence in the record, but not otherwise." (emphasis added;
footnote omitted)).  But a party may not pursue the course of action that
defendant chose in this case:  A party may not deprive the court of the
opportunity to rule on the propriety of an opponent's statement by remaining
silent during the opponent's closing argument, and then resorting to self-help
by presenting argument based on facts not in evidence.  Here, defense counsel
failed to object to plaintiffs' counsel's use of the missing witness inference
in closing argument.  Defense counsel never placed the propriety of plaintiffs'
counsel's statements at issue at trial and that issue is not properly assigned
as error on review. 
The Court of
Appeals, in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion, determined
that jury argument may refer to matters that are within the scope of the issues
and the evidence, but that evidence outside the record may not be suggested by
any means.  222 Or App at 183.  For that proposition, the Court of Appeals
cited ORS 40.025(3) (OEC 103(3)), which provides:
"In jury cases, proceedings shall be
conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence
from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or
offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury."
We agree with the Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, we have no trouble also agreeing with the Court of Appeals that
the trial court abused its discretion by overruling plaintiffs' objections to
defendant's improper argument.
Having concluded
that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing defense counsel's
statements, we turn to the question of whether that error requires reversal. 
We will reverse a trial court's judgment only if the trial court's error
substantially affected a party's rights.  See ORS 19.415(2) ("No
judgment shall be reversed or modified except for error substantially affecting
the rights of a party.").
In addressing
plaintiffs' contention that defense counsel's statements regarding facts not in
evidence substantially affected plaintiffs' rights, we focus first on the particular
right at issue in this case:  the right to require opposing counsel to confine
her closing argument to the jury to facts admitted into evidence and permissible
inferences from those facts.  Although not evidence themselves, closing
arguments "are an integral part of trial" that can alter the result
of the trial:
"They provide the attorneys with their final
opportunity to 'persuade the jury to adopt a particular view of the facts.'  Ireland
v. Mitchell, 226 Or 286, 295, 359 P2d 894 (1961).  It is through closing
arguments that the attorneys are able to fully frame the issues and remind the
jury of evidence that they may have heard days earlier.  Further, arguments
give the attorneys a chance to explain the evidence in narrative form.  That
narrative function of arguments -- the opportunity to tell the story of the
case -- is essential to effective advocacy, and the ability to do so can alter
the jury's understanding of the evidence and ultimately change the outcome of a
given case." 
Charles v. Palomo, 347 Or 695, 705, 227 P3d 737 (2010) (holding that the trial
court's error in denying the plaintiff rebuttal argument substantially affected
the plaintiff's rights).  The integrity of closing arguments can only be
ensured when the court requires the parties to limit their arguments to the facts
in evidence and permissible inferences from those facts.  See Kuehl v.
Hamilton, 136 Or 240, 249, 297 P 1043 (1931) (noting that "[e]very
litigant is entitled to a fair trial, and this result cannot be achieved if
counsel is permitted to make statements to the jury of facts not testified to
by any witness nor admissible in evidence").  Thus, a party's introduction
of facts not in evidence during closing arguments can substantially affect the
opposing party's rights.
We determine that,
in this case, defense counsel's introduction during closing argument of facts
not in evidence substantially affected plaintiffs' rights.  In his closing
argument, plaintiffs' counsel framed his narrative of the case.  One aspect of
that narrative involved asking the jury to draw an inference from defendant's
failure to call a nurse expert.(6) 
Defense counsel then framed a different narrative of the case, but in doing so,
impermissibly interjected extra-record facts into the case after the parties
had rested.  Defense counsel introduced those facts over plaintiffs' counsel's
repeated objections and after an in-chambers discussion between the court and
counsel.  In that context, from the jury's perspective, defendant's account of
the absence of the nurse expert would appear to have received the trial court's
imprimatur.  Thus, plaintiffs' counsel's ability to rebut defense counsel's
explanation of the nurse expert's absence was weakened substantially.
Moreover, by making
the assertion that the nurse expert "would have supported" defendant's
case, defense counsel supplied, at least in general terms, the testimony of a
witness who was not subject to oath or cross-examination.(7)  See ORS
40.320(1) ("Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare
that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation * * *.); Wigmore,
6 Evidence in Trials at Common Law at §1806 (when counsel argues facts not in evidence, counsel becomes a
witness without being subject to cross-examination, in violation of the
fundamental purpose of the hearsay rule).  The trial court's admonition to the
jury that the lawyers' arguments "are not evidence" does not overcome
that problem, in our view.  That admonition operates on the assumption, noted
above, that the record evidence frames the context within which lawyer
argumentation permissibly may occur.  The court's admonition helps the jury
understand that it must not confuse a lawyer's advocacy about the record with
the actual witness testimony and other evidence that the court has admitted
into the record in accordance with the rules of evidence.  The comments of
defense counsel to the jury here, however, did not simply convey her view of
the record evidence.  Rather, defense counsel characterized for the jury the
purported testimony of a witness who never took the witness stand.  That
conduct creates an unacceptable risk that the jury would consider the statement
as that of the unsworn witness and not solely that of the lawyer.  ORS
40.025(3) deters the suggestion of inadmissible evidence to the jury by any
means, including through counsel's statements; it does not somehow authorize
that sort of conduct so long as the trial court admonishes the jury that the
statements are not evidence.  For that reason, the court's admonition to the
jury does not eliminate the prejudicial effect of the trial court's error.
The assertion that a
nurse expert would have supported defendant's position was material to the
central issue in the case:  whether defendant's nurse complied with the
applicable standard of care for oncology nurses.  Because defense counsel's
assertion that the nurse expert "would have supported" defendant's
case was not based on evidence in the record, the court's ruling deprived plaintiffs'
counsel of the opportunity to cross-examine that factual assertion or otherwise
rebut defense counsel's factual claim.  In light of those circumstances, we
conclude that the trial court's failure to sustain plaintiffs' objections to defense
counsel's comments substantially affected plaintiffs' rights.  ORS 19.415(2).
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
LINDER, J.,
dissenting.
A common situation
in jury trials, both civil and criminal, is the problem of the so-called
"invited response" or "invited reply."  It occurs when one
party, in closing argument, resorts to an improper argument that, if left
unaddressed, could mislead the jury or otherwise encourage the jury to base its
verdict on an impermissible consideration.  The other party fails to object
and, to counter the provoking argument, resorts to improper argument in
response.  If the party who provoked the exchanges loses and appeals, it often
falls to the appellate court to determine in such a circumstance whether the
"invited response" was error and, if so, whether the error was
prejudicial and warrants a new trial.
In this classic
"invited response" situation, the majority holds that the fact that
one party engages in improper argument does not mean that the opposing party
may do the same in response.  Thus, if the "invited response" is
improper in substance, and if there is a timely objection to it, the trial
court must sustain the objection.  I agree with that portion of the majority's
holding, which is consistent with this court's precedents and with the better
rule endorsed in other jurisdictions.
The majority takes a
serious misstep in further holding, however, that the provoking argument is
irrelevant in determining whether the error warrants reversal.  To the
contrary, the substance of the provoking argument is context for accurately
evaluating the likelihood that the jury's verdict was influenced by an
impermissible consideration.  As I will discuss, plaintiffs in this case
invited the jury to draw an unfavorable inference against the defense that the
evidence in the record did not support.  In response, defendant, too,
improperly went beyond the evidence in the record.  Considered in context,
however, defendant's argument merely offset the improper inference that
plaintiffs had invited the jury to draw.  The only "prejudice" to
plaintiffs was that they may have been deprived of the benefit of their own
improper argument.  Consistent with our precedents, the considered rule adopted
by other courts, and our constitutional obligation to affirm in the absence of
prejudice, plaintiffs are not entitled to a reversal and a new trial in this
case.  For that reason, I dissent. 
I begin by recapping
the pertinent facts.  In this medical negligence case, the defense in opening
statements to the jury briefly summarized the expected testimony of three
experts it intended to call in support of its case, including that of a nurse
manager of the oncology unit at Oregon Health and Science University.  On the
day that the nurse expert was to testify, she was in the courtroom throughout
the afternoon.  The defense did not call her that day due to scheduling issues,
however.  Because the nurse expert was leaving town the next day on a prescheduled
vacation, the defense did not call her on either of the two remaining days of
trial.  By the time the parties presented closing arguments to the jury,
defense counsel had explained to plaintiffs' counsel (as well as to the trial
court) why the nurse expert had not testified.  Despite his awareness of that
explanation, plaintiffs' counsel during closing argument told the jury that
"there's a reason" why plaintiffs had not called a nurse witness,
that it was probably because the defense could not find one that would testify
in its favor, and that the jury should so conclude.
Defense counsel did
not object.  In her closing argument, after arguing in detail and at length
about the significance of the testimony of each side's experts, defense counsel
noted that she wanted to "mention" something in response to
plaintiffs' counsel's argument about defendant's failure to call an oncology
nurse.  Defense counsel reminded the jury that, in opening statements, she had
indicated that she was going to call a nurse expert with 20 years of
experience.  Plaintiffs' counsel did not formally object at that point, but did
voice concern to the trial court about where counsel might be headed with her
argument.  The trial court indicated that it would let defense counsel continue
"in the same vein" in which plaintiffs' counsel had addressed the
argument.  Defense counsel continued by explaining why the nurse expert did not
testify.  Plaintiffs' counsel interrupted, objecting (more than once) that
defense counsel was relying on facts not in evidence.  The trial court, after
discussing the matter in chambers with counsel, overruled the objection. 
Defense counsel completed her explanation to the jury, briefly reminding it
that defendant's nurse expert had been in the courtroom, describing the
scheduling conflict that caused defense counsel not to call the nurse expert,
and stating that the nurse expert otherwise would have "testified in our
case and supported our case."
In plaintiff's rebuttal
argument, plaintiffs' counsel replied to defense counsel's response.  Counsel
asserted, without objection, that the defense had "every opportunity"
to put that nurse expert on the stand and explained how the defense could have
deposed or otherwise perpetuated the nurse expert's testimony.  Plaintiffs'
counsel concluded by again urging the jury to draw an inference against the
defense from its failure to call a nurse witness.  After deliberating, the jury
returned a verdict for the defense.
As plaintiffs
successfully argued to the Court of Appeals, and argue again to this court,
defense counsel, in explaining why the nurse expert did not testify,
impermissibly referred to facts that were not in evidence.  See generally
Huber v. Miller, 41 Or 103, 115, 68 P 400 (1902) (a party in closing
argument may not make "statements of facts outside the range of
evidence" or "assume a fact as though proven when no such inference
can be reasonably drawn from the evidence").  In particular, defense
counsel described the scheduling problems that caused her not to call the nurse
expert who, in opening statements, she had said she would call.  She also told
the jury that the nurse expert would have testified in support of the
defendant's case.  No "evidence" in the record established those
"facts."(1) 
When the trial court allowed defense counsel to argue over plaintiffs' timely
objections on that ground, the trial court erred.  See generally State v.
Blodgett, 50 Or 329, 342, 92 P 820 (1907) (if one party argues facts not in
evidence and not otherwise admissible, trial court must sustain objection to
that argument, rather than leave the other side to refute the assertions in
reply).
Plaintiffs'
argument, however, was equally improper.  In closing argument, after expressing
incredulity at defendant's failure to call a nurse expert, counsel told the
jury that "there's a reason" why defendant did not do so, and it was
"probably because they couldn't get a nurse expert who would say that this
was okay care."  After defense counsel explained the scheduling issue that
arose, plaintiffs' counsel in rebuttal advised the jury of ways in which the
defense could have perpetuated the witness's testimony, and urged the jury
again to draw an unfavorable inference against the defense from its failure to
call a nurse expert.  Plaintiffs' counsel advanced those arguments knowing that
the defense had a nurse expert that it intended to call and aware of defense
counsel's reasons for not calling her.(2)
In making that
argument, plaintiffs invoked a so-called "missing witness" inference
-- e.g., "[w]hen it would be natural under the circumstances for a
party to call a particular witness, or to take the stand as a witness in a
civil case * * * and the party fails to do so, tradition has allowed the
adversary to use this failure as the basis for invoking an adverse
inference."  2 McCormick on Evidence § 264, 220 (6th ed 2006).  For
present purposes, it is not necessary to explore the intricacies of the inference
and when it is properly invoked.(3) 
It suffices to observe that the inference does not arise from "the bare
fact that a particular person is not produced as a witness."  John Henry
Wigmore, 2 Evidence § 286, 199 (Chadbourn rev 1979); see also Tenny
v. Mulvaney, 8 Or 513, 521-22 (1880) (mere fact that witness was not called
was not sufficient to support inference that witness's testimony would have
been unfavorable to defendants).  Rather, it is proper only when the particular
circumstances of a case support it, such as when it would be natural for a
party to call a particular witness, and the party, without explanation, has
failed to do so.  See generally Bohle v. Matson Navigation Co., 243 Or
196, 198-99, 412 P2d 367 (1966) (stating general rule).  Among the limitations
on the inference is the requirement that the witness in fact be within the
power of the party to produce, both legally and practically.  State v.
Hatcher, 29 Or 309, 317-18, 44 P 584 (1896) (party cannot urge adverse
inference from failure to call a witness where record did not show that witness
was within the power of the party to produce); see generally  Wigmore, 2
Evidence § 286 at 200-02 (stating limitation and citing representative
cases).  If, for example, a person is disqualified as a witness or could not be
called due to illness or some other practical circumstance, the inference is
not permissible.  Id. (citing representative cases).(4)
In the
circumstances of this case, plaintiffs' resort to the missing witness inference
was not proper argument.  Plaintiffs' counsel invited the jury to draw an
inference that he had no basis to believe was true (i.e., that no nurse
expert was prepared to testify in favor of defendant), and had ample reason to
believe was not true, given defense counsel's explanation in advance of closing
arguments that her nurse expert did not testify due to scheduling issues.  No
authority approves of the missing witness inference when the party seeking the
inference has been previously informed -- as plaintiffs' counsel had been here
-- that the defense had not called the witness due to scheduling issues.(5)  Analogous cases,
instead, uniformly hold that the inference is not permissible in such a
circumstance.  See, e.g., Bender v. Adelson, 187 NJ 411, 433-46,
901 A2d 907 (2006) (where plaintiff knew that defendants had two independent
expert witnesses who were precluded from testifying for procedural reasons, permitting
missing witness inference was error because it "implied an untruth"
and played on jury's ignorance of actual reason why witnesses did not appear;
error required new trial).(6)
By urging the
missing witness inference when it was not a permissible one, plaintiffs
themselves invited the jury to rely on a "fact" -- i.e., the
inferred fact that defense counsel could not find any nurse expert to testify
in its favor -- that was not established by evidence in the record.  That is
the essential problem with a missing witness inference in circumstances that do
not adequately support it.  See generally Hatcher, 29 Or at 315-16
(counsel's impermissible reliance on missing witness inference resulted in
arguing facts to jury that were not in evidence); Tenny, 8 Or at 521
(same).
The significant
question that this case presents, therefore, is not whether a party may argue
facts or inferences that lack evidentiary support in the record.  It is
undisputed that, as a general proposition, a party may not.  The significant
question is, instead, whether it is relevant to the analysis that the party was
provoked to do so to respond to an improper argument made by the opposing side.
On that point, the
numerous courts in other jurisdictions that have wrestled with the "invited
response" problem uniformly consider the provoking improper argument
relevant.  They differ only on the question:  Relevant to what?  One line of
authority holds that the provoking argument is relevant to determine whether
the "invited reply" is error at all or, if error, whether the
provoking party is estopped to raise the error on appeal.(7) The other line
of authority rejects the proposition that a provoking improper argument
justifies or precludes appellate review of an improper argument in response;
those courts, however, consider the provoking argument a highly relevant
consideration in determining whether a reversal is warranted.  As the United
States Supreme Court has explained in the lead case taking that approach, the
invited response doctrine does not give a party "license to make otherwise
improper arguments" in response to an improper argument; it does, however,
inform whether the "'invited response,' taken in context, unfairly
prejudiced" the opposing side.  United States v. Young, 470 US 1,
12, 105 S Ct 1038, 84 L Ed 2d 1 (1985).  The
provoking argument is important context for that evaluation, because it informs
whether the response merely offset the misleading nature of the provoking
argument, thus producing "no net effect on the jury's
deliberations."  United States v. Mazzone, 782 F2d 757, 763 (7th
Cir), cert den, 479 US 838 (1986).  In other words, to assess
whether the jury was "led astray," the substance of the invited
response must be evaluated in the context of the "opening salvo."  Young,
470 US at 12; see also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 US 168, 182, 106
S Ct 2464, 91 L Ed 2d 144 (1986) (invited response doctrine does not
"excuse improper comments," but instead seeks to accurately assess
"their effect on the trial as a whole").  
Although this court
has not discussed or examined the invited response situation in any depth, our
precedents are in general accord with that latter approach.  The cases on point
hold that the fact that one party advances an improper argument to the jury does
not excuse or otherwise make it proper for the opposing party to respond in
kind.  See, e.g., Walker v. Penner, 190 Or 542, 553, 227 P2d 316
(1951) ("'[T]he mere fact that counsel for one party has injected improper
matter into the case does not license opposing counsel to commit a similar
wrong'[.]") (quoting Trial, 64 CJ § 300, 281); State v. Blodgett,
50 Or 329, 92 P 820 (1907) (same).  But this court also has been unwilling to
reverse such an error, even with timely objection, unless the objecting party
was prejudiced, which depends on "the issue involved and the state of the
evidence."  Blodgett, 50 Or at 344; see also Kuehl v. Hamilton,
136 Or 240, 248, 297 P 1043 (1931) (reversal not warranted where closing
argument that placed facts not in evidence before jury did not materially
prejudice the objecting party).
In assessing the
likelihood that the jury's verdict was influenced by an impermissible
consideration, this court has considered the substance of the provoking
improper argument, as well as that of the responding argument.  See, e.g.,
McKay v. Pacific Bldg. Materials Co., 156 Or 578, 591-92, 68 P2d 127
(1937) (not reversible error for plaintiff to improperly refer to defendant's
ability to obtain insurance where argument was in response to misleading
suggestion by defense that it could not obtain insurance, when in fact
defendant could do so and had done so); Storla v. S. P. & S. Trans. Co.,
140 Or 365, 369-70, 12 P2d 1009 (1932) (where defense in closing argument urged
jury that verdict would cause defendant "a lot of harm" and
"hard days of toil" knowing that defendant was indemnified by
insurance, court declined to reverse based on responsive argument that verdict
would not cost defendant "one cent").(8)  And this court has
endorsed the general observation that "'improper language used in argument
is not ground for reversal, where such language was provoked by the remarks of
counsel for the adverse party'" unless "'it appears quite plainly
that the verdict was influenced thereby.'"  Walker, 190 Or at
553-54 (quoting Trial, 64 CJ § 300, 281).  That observation is
consistent with the usual experience of courts reviewing invited responses for
prejudice, which is that, when the response is not out of proportion to the
provocation, the two arguments will often counter one another in a way that
does not prejudicially influence the jury's deliberations.  See Young,
470 US at 12 (observing that most intermediate courts, in reviewing an invited
response in the context of the argument that provoked it, find no prejudice
justifying reversal as long as the responsive argument is a reasonable reply to
the provocation).(9)
In this case, the
majority takes a very different approach, one that no other jurisdiction or
authority appears to endorse.  The majority treats plaintiffs' own improper
provoking argument as irrelevant to the prejudice analysis by deeming it
"not in issue" given defense counsel's failure to object to it.  __ Or
at ___ (slip op at 9).  That, however, is an inadequate answer.  The failure to
object to an improper argument does not make the argument itself proper.  See
generally Kuehl, 136 Or at 249 (trial courts, consistently with their
traditional power to properly oversee the arguments of counsel, should
intervene to stop arguments based on facts not in the record, despite the lack
of objection); Zimmerle v. Childers, 67 Or 465, 474, 136 P 349 (1913)
(same).(10) 
The failure to object means only that, if the verdict is against the
nonobjecting party, that party generally may not rely on the error as a ground
for reversal on appeal, unless the error qualifies as "plain error." 
State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 601-02, 789 P2d 1352 (1990) (declining to
consider claim of error in closing argument where defendant did not object and
issue was not plain error).
Here, plaintiffs,
who made the initial provoking argument, not defendant, ask this court to
dislodge the jury's verdict and remand this case for a new trial.  In keeping
with our constitutional obligation, if plaintiffs are to have that remedy, they
must identify prejudice by demonstrating that defendant's closing argument may
have caused the jury to base its verdict on an impermissible consideration,
rather than on the evidence.  Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 3 (the court must
affirm a judgment on appeal, "notwithstanding any error committed during
the trial," if the judgment "was such as should have been rendered in
the case").
This record does not
support such a conclusion.  Even considered in isolation, defense counsel's
argument lacked substance.  Defense counsel explained that the defense had been
prepared to call an experienced nurse oncologist, that it did not do so due to
witness scheduling problems, and that the nurse expert would have testified and
"supported [defendant's] case."  The only fact among those that had
not already been stated during counsel's opening statements to the jury was the
fact that the nurse did not testify due to scheduling reasons.  And it required
no leap of faith or logic for the jury to have concluded, from the fact that
the defense intended to call a nurse expert, which the jury knew, and from the
fact that she was in the courtroom throughout the afternoon on which she was scheduled
to testify, which the jury likely observed, that the testimony of that expert
would support the defense case in some way.  Defense counsel's closing argument
related nothing more.  In particular, defense counsel relayed nothing of
the actual substance of the testimony that the nurse expert had been expected
to give.
But in all events,
considered in context, the statements did no more than correct the
misrepresentation that plaintiffs' counsel created.  That is, defense counsel's
statements neutralized the misleading inference that plaintiffs' counsel
expressly invited the jury to draw -- that the defense could not find a nurse
expert who "would say that this was okay care."  When defense counsel
responded to that argument, she did not ask the jury to draw any affirmative
conclusion.  Rather, defense counsel expressly referred to plaintiffs'
argument, and explained the circumstances.  In context, the only point
of the argument -- and no other point was made -- was to have the jury not
indulge the inference that plaintiffs had invited.  As is often true of invited
responses, the net effect of that argument was merely to counter plaintiffs'
own argument and to encourage the jury not to base its verdict on the missing
witness inference.  
When, as happened
here, an improper invited response principally served to deprive the provoking
party of the benefit of its misleading argument to the jury, that is not, under
our constitution, a basis on which an appellate court may disturb the jury's
verdict and give the party a new trial.  Yet, that is the "prejudice"
identified by the majority, which finds reversible error in this case because
plaintiffs' effort to have the jury draw the missing witness inference was
"weakened substantially" by defendant's response.  __ Or at ___ (slip
op at 11).  The inference was not a permissible one in this case, and the fact
that plaintiffs may have been deprived of the benefit of their improper
argument is not cognizable "prejudice" and not ground for reversal.(11)
 Finally, the relevant
context properly must consider the trial court's instructions to the jury. 
Here, the trial court twice instructed the jury that the statements of counsel
were not evidence -- once at the beginning of the trial and again immediately before
closing arguments.  The majority is inappropriately dismissive of the value of
those instructions.  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 12).  This court generally presumes
that a jury adheres to a trial court's instructions, Wallach v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 344 Or 314, 326, 180 P3d 19 (2008), and does so in "invited
reply" situations.  See, e.g., Walker, 190 Or at 554
(considering court's instructions as factor in whether improper invited
response was reversible error).  Such an instruction might not cure a highly
prejudicial closing argument, in which counsel extensively argued inflammatory
off-the-record facts that under no circumstance would have been admissible
during the trial.  See, e.g., Blodgett, 50 Or at 344 (reversal
for improper argument warranted where argument injected highly inflammatory and
prejudicial material that "no one" would "contend for a
moment" would have been admissible during trial).  But this is a far
distance from that circumstance.
For those reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Balmer and Kistler, JJ., join in this dissent.
1. Providence
Health System-Oregon was dismissed from the action and is not a party to this
appeal.  All references to "defendant" are to Oregon Hematology
Oncology Associates, PC.
2. The
parties dispute the details of what occurred during the in-chambers discussion
with the judge, as well as the details of the scheduling issues.  In our view,
the details surrounding the nurse's failure to testify are not pertinent to the
question before us on review.  The pertinent fact is that defendant did not
ultimately call the oncology nurse expert to testify.
3. Although
defense counsel actually referred to the sixth day of trial, her reference to
Mr. Cler and the surrounding context make it clear that she meant the fifth day
of trial.  
4. Although
plaintiffs did not object again at this point, we determine that plaintiffs'
earlier objections adequately preserved plaintiffs' argument that defense
counsel was impermissibly arguing facts not in evidence.  As the trial court
later observed in its order denying plaintiffs' motion for a new trial,
"after the in-chambers discussion between the [trial court] and counsel,
plaintiffs' counsel may have felt it would be futile to continue with his same
objections." 
5. See, e.g., R.J. Frank Realty, 284 Or at 306 (counsel
should refrain from abusive arguments); State Highway Comm'n v. Callahan,
242 Or 551, 558, 410 P2d 818 (1966) (arguments that are "highly
inflammatory * * * and had no reasonable relevance" to the issues in the
case are improper); Bratt v. Smith, 180 Or 50, 60,175 P2d 444 (1946)
(arguments that directly appeal to "passion and prejudice" are beyond
the bounds of legitimate comment on the evidence)
6. The
dissent asserts that we have treated plaintiffs' jury argument as irrelevant to
the analysis of prejudice.  We disagree.  We have considered the entire record,
including plaintiff's jury argument, to determine whether the trial court's
error "substantially affect[ed] the rights of a party."  ORS
19.415(2).
7. The
dissent has determined that plaintiffs' argument to the jury was not proper and
amounted to a misrepresentation.  From that premise, the dissent argues that
defense counsel sought only to correct that misrepresentation by referring to
facts that, according to the dissent, the jury likely already knew by, for
example, viewing people sitting in the courtroom during trial and speculating
about how they might testify if called.  We decline to consider those
assertions as facts established in the record.  Although the dissent cites
several legal propositions with which we have no disagreement, we read the
factual record quite differently; our different reading of the record supports
our disposition here.  For example, in our view, plaintiffs' counsel's closing
argument was not a misrepresentation and was not improper.  That is so because,
according to the record, the defense had not called a nurse expert witness,
either in person or by introducing an expert's testimony through a deposition. 
Nothing compelled plaintiffs' counsel to concur with defense counsel's asserted
reason for not calling the expert witness or the claim that the witness would
have supported defendant's case.  The dissent apparently believes that defense
counsel conveyed nothing of the actual substance of the nurse expert's testimony
to the jury but, again, we read the record differently and reach a different
conclusion.
1. For present purposes, I am willing to presume that a description to
the jury of the scheduling problem that arose during the trial is a "fact
not in evidence" within the meaning of that familiar doctrine.  It is less
than clear to me, however, whether that is correct.  Juries are often apprised
of scheduling issues and other procedural events, if for no other reason than
to explain why continuances, protracted recesses, or other changes to the
expected trial schedule have become necessary.  Explaining such circumstances
to a jury is not the kind of information that ordinarily is delivered by sworn
testimony.  Cf. United States v. Long, 533 F2d 505, 509 (9th Cir 1976)
(trial court properly advised jury that informant's failure to testify was due
to court's procedural ruling).
2. Although the parties disputed certain facts pertaining to the
scheduling issues at trial, the only pertinent fact for purposes of the issue
on review, which is not disputed, is that plaintiffs' counsel had been
informed, before closing argument, why defense counsel did not call its nurse
expert.  In all events, to whatever extent there were factual disputes
pertinent to the issue we must decide, they were implicitly resolved against
plaintiffs by the trial court.
3. The rules limiting the availability of the inference do so because
it so readily invites abuse by counsel.  As one commentator has observed:
"Too often the [missing witness] rule is treated as just another weapon
available for the duel between the lawyers.  Counsel invoke the inference of
adverse testimony without any concern for the actual content of the evidence
and sometimes even urge an inference known to be false just to gain an
advantage."  Robert H. Stier, Jr., Revisiting the Missing Witness
Inference -- Quieting the Loud Voice from the Empty Chair, 44 Md L Rev 137,
155 (1985).
4. The missing witness inference is "always open to explanation"
by the party against whom the inference is invoked.  Wigmore, 2 Evidence
§ 285 at 192.  The fact that the inference is usually advanced in closing argument
therefore poses problems of fairness and judicial efficiency.  As one authority
cautions, "[t]he possibility that the inference may be drawn invites waste
of time in calling unnecessary witnesses or in presenting evidence to explain
why they were not called."  2 McCormick on Evidence § 264 at 223. 
The inference also can entail "substantial possibilities of
surprise."  Id.  Because of those problems, some jurisdictions
require the advance permission of the trial court before arguing the
inference.  See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 447 A2d 52, 58
(DC 1982) (because of dangers of missing witness argument, which essentially
creates  evidence from nonevidence, permission of court must be obtained before
inference can be suggested to jury; onus is not on the party against whom an
inference is made to object after the fact). 
5. Neither do plaintiffs cite any authority to suggest that their argument
under these circumstances was proper.  They rely principally on Bohle,
which merely states the baseline principle that a missing witness inference is
proper when the particular circumstances are such that the inference is
a natural one to draw.  243 Or at 198-99.  Beyond that, plaintiffs merely
assert, without elaboration or evident support, that their own closing argument
to the jury was "reasonable and well established under Oregon law." 
6. See also Calvin v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 746 SW2d 602, 605
(Mo App 1988) ("When a witness'[s] testimony is excluded on an attorney's
motion, it is misconduct constituting manifest injustice and thus reversible
error if that attorney requests the jury to draw an adverse inference from his
opponent's failure to produce that witness even though the error is not preserved
for appellate review.").
7. Cases so holding are far too numerous to cite.  For representative
civil and criminal cases holding that an invited response is not error, see
Richmond Condominiums v. Skipworth Plumbing, 245 SW3d 646, 668 (Tex Ct
App 2008) (defense counsel's "invited" closing argument not improper
when in response to and confined to the provoking argument of opposing counsel );
United States v. Schwartz, 655 F2d 140, 142 (8th Cir 1981) (under
"doctrine of fair reply," government's reply to defense counsel's
statements in closing "not improper" because defense counsel
"open[ed] the door" on the issue).  For representative cases holding
that the provoking party is estopped to claim error on appeal, see Fredrick
v. Dreyer, 257 NW2d 835, 839 (SD 1977) (general rule is that party whose
counsel pursues improper argument and invites reply is estopped to complain); State
v. Hall, 982 SW2d 675, 683-84 (Mo 1998), cert den, 519 US
1083 (1997) (defendant may not provoke reply with own closing argument and then
assert error on appeal to prosecution's comment in response).  
8. This court in Storla arguably followed an estoppel rationale. 
140 Or at 370 (party who provoked improper argument could not "with good
grace" complain about argument made in response).  But the court's
examination of the substance of the two arguments suggests that, in fact, the
court reached the claim of error, but deemed the responsive argument, in the
context of the argument that provoked it, not prejudicial.
9. See generally Trial, 75A Am Jur 2d 63-64 § 470 (2007) ("The
law indulges a liberal attitude toward comments which are a fair retort or
response to the prior argument of opposing counsel. Thus, arguments which are
replies in kind or are provoked by arguments of opposing counsel do not amount
to reversible error.").
10. See also Young, 470 US at 8-10 (trial courts should
promptly intervene and deal with improper arguments by counsel "on both
sides of the table," regardless of lack of objection, to ensure fairness
of the proceedings and adherence to professional standards of conduct).  
11. Worth noting is that plaintiffs, in all events, got the final word and
a last chance to encourage the jury to do what it should not do -- draw an
unfavorable inference against the defense from the fact that the defense did
not have the nurse witness.  As already described, plaintiffs' counsel argued
in rebuttal that the defense could have called the nurse witness; he explained
-- by going beyond the record -- ways in which the defense could have
perpetuated the nurse witness's testimony despite the scheduling problems, and
he urged the jury a final time to conclude that "there was a reason"
why the defense did not call the nurse witness.  Plaintiffs were not entitled
to that inference, but they got a further chance to urge it to the jury,
without objection by the defense, and with the tacit approval of the trial
court.