Title: Johnny Williamson v. State Of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-1527 
____________ 
 
JOHNNY WILLIAMSON, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[May 10, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Johnny Williamson appeals the denial of his successive motion for 
postconviction relief.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
Williamson was sentenced to death for the 1985 prison murder of Daniel Drew.  
See Williamson v. State, 511 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1987).  In his motion, Williamson 
asserted that newly discovered evidence that could be used to impeach two inmates 
who testified against him at trial probably would have produced an acquittal or a 
sentence other than death if presented at trial.  Because we conclude that none of 
the alleged newly discovered evidence would have affected the guilt-phase verdict 
or the decision to impose the death penalty, we affirm the denial of relief. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Williamson’s claim centers on impeachment evidence concerning the 
testimony of Kenneth Baez and Omer Williamson (hereinafter referred to as 
Omer).  In his motion, Williamson relied on an affidavit by Rigoberto Sanchez-
Velasco, who was executed in 2002, and a motion for postconviction relief seeking 
to withdraw his plea filed by Omer in 1993.  Sanchez-Velasco was a prison inmate 
and Omer was Williamson’s codefendant, who testified against Williamson 
pursuant to a plea agreement with the State.  The facts as related in this Court’s 
opinion in the direct appeal focused on Omer’s testimony: 
According to Omer Williamson’s testimony, Omer owed Drew $15 in 
connection with a marijuana sale.  Omer decided not to pay Drew 
because Omer believed Drew had been lying to him.  When Omer told 
the appellant that he did not intend to repay Drew, Williamson said 
that they would have to kill Drew because Drew was “a country boy” 
who would stab Omer if he didn’t pay his debt.  “Chickenhead” 
Robertson, another inmate at the facility and co-defendant in 
Williamson’s trial, learned of the plan to kill Drew and offered to look 
for a knife.  When Robertson and Williamson were unable to find a 
knife, Omer went to his cell and got a metal rod from the sink which 
Drew had previously sharpened to a point.  While Robertson acted as 
a lookout, Williamson and Omer went to the maintenance shop 
building where Drew was working.  Williamson asked an inmate 
working at the shop to send Drew outside.  When Drew came out 
Omer stood behind him, while Williamson gave him $5 so that it 
would look like they had given Drew less than Omer owed him and he 
had gotten upset and pulled a knife on them.  Williamson then told 
Drew that Omer was having trouble getting the rest of the money and 
needed a knife to collect.  Drew had apparently made a knife for 
Williamson and gave it to him at that point in the conversation.  On 
Williamson’s signal, Omer grabbed Drew by the throat from behind.  
Williamson stabbed Drew and a struggle ensued, with Omer throwing 
 
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Drew to the ground, kicking him in the head several times.  
Williamson continued to stab Drew with the knife.  When Omer 
became “grossed out” he gave Williamson the rod and left.  
Williamson then straddled Drew stabbing him repeatedly with the 
knife and metal rod. . . . 
 
. . . Omer pled guilty to first-degree murder and agreed to 
testify against Williamson and Robertson in return for the state’s 
agreement not to seek the death penalty. . . .  Williamson, who did not 
testify during the guilt phase of the trial but did testify during the 
penalty phase, was found guilty of [first-degree murder].  Following 
the jury’s recommendation of death, the trial court imposed the death 
penalty, finding three aggravating circumstances:  1) the capital felony 
was committed while Williamson was under a sentence of 
imprisonment;  2) Williamson had been previously convicted of a 
violent felony;  and 3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated 
and premeditated manner without a pretense of moral or legal 
justification.  The trial court found no mitigating circumstances. 
 
Williamson, 511 So. 2d at 290-91.   
 
Baez was one of several inmate witnesses called to testify in the State’s case.  
He testified on direct examination that Williamson asked him for a shank before 
lunchtime on the day Drew was killed and said he wanted “to kill the son of a 
bitch.”  After Baez was cross-examined about inconsistent deposition testimony, 
he stated on redirect that Omer asked him about a knife on the afternoon of the 
murder.  Baez said he changed his testimony from the grand jury proceeding to the 
deposition in an effort to keep from being called to testify at trial.  
 
Another inmate, Stephen Bishop, also testified that on the day of the killing, 
Williamson and Robertson asked where they could get a knife.  Inmate Melvin 
Harris testified that Williamson, who was with Robertson and Omer, asked Harris 
 
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to send Drew out of the maintenance building to speak with Williamson just before 
the killing.  Harris testified that he then looked through a window and saw Omer 
hit Drew and Williamson stab Drew.  Similarly, inmate Ronnie Presley saw Omer 
hold Drew and Williamson appear to hit him, then saw Williamson covered in 
blood.  Presley also testified that Williamson said, “I wanted to get away with this, 
but there ain’t no way that I can now,” and that the “son of a bitch wouldn’t die.” 
Presley testified that he helped Williamson dispose of the bloody clothes and that 
Robertson helped him hide a knife.  
 
After the murder, a correctional officer found Williamson in his cell wearing 
pants but no shirt or shoes.  The shoes Williamson subsequently identified as his 
appeared to have bloodstains.  Boxer shorts, socks, and a T-shirt found in his 
laundry bag also appeared to have blood on them.  Some of the blood on one of the 
socks was identified as Type O, Drew’s blood type.  
 
This Court affirmed Williamson’s first-degree murder conviction and 
sentence of death.  Williamson, 511 So. 2d at 290.  We rejected a claim that the 
trial court erred in denying a mistrial when the prosecutor asserted in the guilt-
phase rebuttal closing argument that Omer’s plea to first-degree murder showed 
that the killing was premeditated.  The Court concluded that the statement was a 
fair comment on the evidence and a permissible rebuttal to the defense’s closing 
argument.  Id. at 291-92.  The Court also determined that the trial court did not err 
 
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in sentencing Williamson to death but Omer to life imprisonment.  The Court 
concluded that both the judge and the jury were aware of Omer’s plea and probable 
life sentence and could have concluded from the evidence that Williamson was the 
dominant actor in the murder.  “There was testimony that Williamson first 
suggested the killing, that he formulated the plan and recruited Robertson as the 
lookout, and that he was the one who repeatedly stabbed Drew.”  Id. at 292-93. 
 
The Court subsequently affirmed the denial of Williamson’s first motion for 
postconviction relief and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1994).  An issue pertinent to the current 
appeal was whether the trial court erred in summarily denying a newly discovered 
evidence claim based on affidavits of two prisoners in Alabama, where Omer was 
eventually transferred for his safety after testifying in this case.  The affidavits 
claimed that Omer said he “lied to the Florida authorities so that he could avoid the 
electric chair.”  Id. at 88.  The Court concluded that the affidavits would probably 
not produce an acquittal on retrial because (1) the affidavits constituted 
impeachment evidence at best and Omer had already been substantially impeached 
at trial, including by a witness who heard Omer say he intended to “fix 
[Williamson’s] ass,” (2) the affidavits did not “set forth in what particular way 
Omer lied,” and (3) the affidavits were largely consistent with the State’s case 
against Williamson.  Id. at 89. 
 
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Williamson next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district 
court, the denial of which was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit.  See Williamson v. Moore, 221 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2000).  
The Eleventh Circuit wrote on two of nine issues raised by Williamson.  First, the 
court concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate and 
present a claim of self-defense, failing to challenge the State’s case on 
premeditation, or failing to cross-examine witnesses adequately.  Id. at 1180-82.  
Second, the court concluded that the prosecutor did not commit a violation of 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), in failing to turn over written notations of 
the prosecutor’s mental impressions of the case and nonverbatim, nonadopted 
witness statements taken by the prosecutor.  Id. at 1182-83. 
 
In 1997, Williamson filed a successive motion for postconviction relief 
based on an affidavit by Rigoberto Sanchez-Velasco containing alleged newly 
discovered evidence regarding trial witnesses Baez and Omer.  In the affidavit, 
Sanchez-Velasco swore to the following:  (1) two to three days before the killing, 
Omer and Drew argued about money; (2) on the day of the murder, Sanchez-
Velasco and Baez, both Hispanics, were playing poker from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m., and 
neither Omer nor Williamson approached Baez and asked for a knife; (3) after 
Sanchez-Velasco heard about the killing, he asked Omer for money Omer owed 
him but Omer, who had blood on his clothes, said he “fucked up” and did not have 
 
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anything for Sanchez-Velasco; (4) after the killing, Baez said that prison 
authorities were offering money and transfers closer to home for prisoners who 
would testify against Williamson and were telling the prisoners what to say in their 
testimony; and (5) subsequently, Baez had $100 in his prison account and was 
transferred to South Florida. 
 
Williamson supplemented the motion in 2003 with a claim based on Omer’s 
motion for postconviction relief that was filed in 1993.1  In the 1993 motion, Omer 
sought to withdraw his plea of guilty with respect to Drew’s murder on the grounds 
that it was coerced.  The trial court granted Williamson an evidentiary hearing only 
on issues raised by Omer’s motion.  The trial court denied an evidentiary hearing 
on issues raised in the Sanchez-Velasco claim after the prosecutor stated during the 
Huff hearing2 that Sanchez-Velasco refused to testify in a deposition that was 
authorized to perpetuate his testimony and taken one day before his execution. 
 
Omer and his trial counsel, Baya Harrison, testified during the 2004 
evidentiary hearing on Williamson’s motion.  Following the hearing, the trial court 
entered an order denying Williamson’s motion for postconviction relief.  The court 
found the claims regarding both the Sanchez-Velasco affidavit and Omer’s 
postconviction motion untimely.  The court further addressed the merits and found 
                                          
 
 
1.  Williamson also filed a supplemental claim based on Ring v. Arizona, 
536 U.S. 584 (2002).  He does not appeal the trial court’s denial of his Ring claim.   
2.  Huff  v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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that the Sanchez-Velasco affidavit contained inadmissible hearsay and that Omer’s 
testimony during the evidentiary hearing failed to support the claim that Omer’s 
trial testimony would be so discredited that Williamson would probably be 
acquitted on retrial.  
ANALYSIS 
 
Although the trial court concluded that the claims in Williamson’s motion 
were untimely and without merit, we address only the determination that the 
alleged newly discovered evidence would not have changed the outcome of the 
trial or penalty phase.  In the analysis that follows, we discuss the probability of 
acquittal on each of the two claims, and then address the probability of a lesser 
sentence and the claim of cumulative error. 
I.  PROBABILITY OF ACQUITTAL 
 
To warrant a new trial, “newly discovered evidence must be of such nature 
that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”  Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 
512, 521 (Fla. 1998).  Newly discovered evidence meets this standard if it 
“weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt 
as to his culpability.”  Id. at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 
1996)).  In determining whether the evidence compels a new trial, the trial court 
must “consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible.” Id. at 
 
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521 (quoting Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 916 (Fla. 1991)).  The assessment also 
considers 
whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or whether it 
constitutes impeachment evidence. The trial court should also 
determine whether this evidence is cumulative to other evidence in the 
case. The trial court should further consider the materiality and 
relevance of the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly 
discovered evidence.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
 
In this case, the trial court summarily denied one of the claims now on 
appeal and denied the other claim after an evidentiary hearing.  Because different 
standards of review apply to our review of these rulings, we address each claim 
separately. 
A.  Sanchez-Velasco Affidavit 
 
The trial court denied the Sanchez-Velasco claim without an evidentiary 
hearing because it rests entirely on an affidavit containing inadmissible hearsay.  In 
the affidavit, Sanchez-Velasco stated that Omer and Drew argued about money 
several days before the killing and that Omer stated immediately after the murder 
that he had “fucked up.”  The affidavit further reflects that Sanchez-Velasco spent 
the entire day of the murder playing cards with Baez and that neither Williamson 
nor Omer approached Baez and asked him for a knife.  The affidavit also contains 
Baez’s statements that prison officials offered and gave him rewards in exchange 
for testifying against Williamson and told him what to say in his testimony.  In the 
 
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order denying relief, the trial court stated that it authorized a deposition to 
perpetuate Sanchez-Velasco’s testimony before he was executed on October 2, 
2002, but Sanchez-Velasco declined to testify.  The court concluded that “[a]lleged 
newly discovered evidence that would not be admissible at trial is not ‘evidence’ 
and cannot ‘be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on 
retrial.’”   
 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(f)(5)(B) permits denial of a 
successive motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing “[i]f the 
motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled 
to no relief.”  As noted above, a trial court ruling on a newly discovered evidence 
claim must “consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible.”  
Jones, 709 So. 2d at 521.  The Sanchez-Velasco affidavit would not be admissible 
during a retrial because it does not meet any of the criteria for admission of a prior 
statement by an unavailable witness under section 90.804, Florida Statutes (2006).  
In Randolph v. State, 853 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 2003), this Court affirmed the 
exclusion from a postconviction evidentiary hearing of an affidavit by a witness 
who died before the hearing.  In concluding that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion, we noted that the affidavit fell outside the four hearsay exceptions for a 
statement by an unavailable declarant:  (1) former testimony; (2) statement under 
belief of impending death; (3) statement against interest; and (4) statement of 
 
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family or personal history.  Id. at 1062; see also Lighbourne v. State, 644 So. 2d 
54, 56-57 (Fla. 1994) (concluding that affidavits and letter from inmates 
unavailable to testify in postconviction hearing constituted inadmissible hearsay).  
Likewise, the contents of the Sanchez-Velasco affidavit are inadmissible hearsay 
by an unavailable declarant. 
 
Williamson asserts that Baez’s statement to Sanchez-Velasco that neither 
Williamson nor Omer approached Baez and asked for a knife on the day of the 
killing, that he was offered inducements to testify, and that he was told what to say 
during his testimony could all be used to impeach Baez in a retrial.  The trial court 
did not address the use of the affidavit for impeachment, however, and Williamson 
does not explain how it could be used to impeach Baez under the rules of evidence.   
 
In theory, the Sanchez-Velasco affidavit could be introduced under section 
90.608, Florida Statutes (2006), to impeach Baez through prior inconsistent 
statements (assuming he would deny that he was given money and a transfer in 
exchange for testifying and told what to say) and to show his bias in favor of the 
State.3  See Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1982) (“Merely because a 
statement is not admissible for one purpose does not mean it is inadmissible for 
                                          
 
 
3.  Because Sanchez-Velasco died without perpetuating his testimony, 
impeachment pursuant to section 90.608(5) through “[p]roof by other witnesses 
that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached,”—
whether Williamson approached Baez for a knife—would be unavailable. 
 
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another purpose.”); Dias v. State, 812 So. 2d 487, 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“A 
statement inadmissible as hearsay can still be admissible for another reason, such 
as for impeachment purposes.”).  However, even assuming the admissibility for 
impeachment purposes of the hearsay (by Sanchez-Velasco) and double hearsay 
(by Omer and Baez via Sanchez-Velasco) contained in the affidavit, its effect 
would have been negligible given Sanchez-Velasco’s refusal to testify, the 
substantial impeachment of Baez at trial through prior inconsistent statements, and 
the other evidence against Williamson.  
 
Finally, the argument between Omer and Drew about money overheard by 
Sanchez-Velasco and Omer’s statement after the killing that he had “fucked up” 
and had no money to pay Sanchez-Velasco would not have impeached Omer’s trial 
testimony.  The evidence at trial already reflected that the killing was prompted by 
a money dispute between Omer and Drew.  Omer admitted at trial that he had 
decided not to pay Drew a $15 debt.  Williamson suggested killing Drew because 
he thought Drew would stab Omer if Omer confronted Drew without a weapon.  
Therefore, the information in the Sanchez-Velasco affidavit would have been 
merely cumulative on the financial motive for the killing. 
 
In sum, the Sanchez-Velasco affidavit would be inadmissible during a retrial 
as substantive evidence, would have little effect on Williamson’s premeditation if 
admitted to impeach Baez, and would have been cumulative if admitted to impeach 
 
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Omer.  Thus, the motion, files, and record conclusively show that the affidavit is 
not such that it would probably produce an acquittal or conviction of a lesser 
included offense on retrial.   
B.  Omer Williamson’s Motion and Testimony 
 
In a sworn postconviction motion filed in 1993, Omer asserted that he was 
coerced into pleading guilty to first-degree murder and testifying against 
Williamson.  He claimed that his attorney negotiated the plea without his 
knowledge and that he was given five minutes to decide whether to accept the plea.  
Omer claimed he was told that if he did not sign the plea agreement, the State 
“would sentence him to death that day” and could not protect him from his 
codefendants.  Omer also claimed that although he held Drew while Williamson 
stabbed the victim, he did so because he feared Williamson and did not “agree of 
his own free will to participate, plan, or commit the act of murder.”  Omer testified 
that he did not pursue the motion and the record reflects it was denied in 1994 on 
several grounds, including that it was not timely filed.  In his testimony during the 
evidentiary hearing, Omer reaffirmed his allegations of the coercive circumstances 
of the plea, except that he said he was never told he would not be protected from 
his codefendants.  However, he stated that he agreed to tell the truth about the 
killing, including that he and Williamson had a plan to kill Drew that included a 
prearranged signal.  Omer testified that he would have continued to pursue the 
 
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motion if he thought it would help him, even though it contained falsehoods.  This 
led to the following exchange: 
Q.  All right.  Sometimes the truth can be twisted according to how 
much you have to gain from what you’re saying. 
A.  I understand what you’re saying, yes. 
Q.  Is that fair to say, I mean? 
A.  Yes. 
 
Baya Harrison, Omer’s trial counsel, testified that Omer instructed 
him to negotiate a plea that would enable him to avoid the death penalty.  
Harrison said he was trying to beat Williamson’s counsel to the prosecutor’s 
office to make a deal.  Harrison denied Omer’s assertions that he encouraged 
Omer to lie under oath at Williamson’s trial and that the state attorney had 
indicated he was the person to make the decision whether Omer received the 
death penalty.  
 
The trial court concluded that “[t]he testimony presented at the evidentiary 
hearing fails to support the claim that Omer’s trial testimony is now so discredited 
that [Williamson] probably would be acquitted on a retrial.”  The court also found 
Omer’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing that “there was a plan to murder 
Drew, and that, notwithstanding his earlier denial, he had willingly participated in 
that plan” to be “credible and persuasive.”  
 
When the trial court rules on a newly discovered evidence claim after an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court reviews the court’s findings on questions of fact, 
 
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the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence for competent, 
substantial evidence.  Melendez v. State, 718 So. 2d 746, 747-48 (Fla. 1998) 
(citing Blanco v. State, 702 So. 2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 1997)).  As with rulings on 
other postconviction claims, this Court reviews the trial court’s application of the 
law to the facts de novo.  See Hendrix v. State, 908 So. 2d 412, 423 (Fla. 2005) 
(reviewing de novo the trial court’s application of the law to the facts in ruling on a 
postconviction claim that the government withheld material evidence); Gore v. 
State, 846 So. 2d 461, 468 (Fla. 2003) (reviewing de novo the application of the 
law to the facts on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel); Demps v. 
State, 761 So. 2d 302, 306 (Fla. 2000) (reviewing de novo the denial of a claim 
that newly discovered evidence of an internal prison memo reflecting that the 
victim named a different inmate as the assailant rendered death sentence 
disproportionate in light of the life sentences imposed on codefendants). 
 
Although Omer, in his postconviction motion, recanted his trial testimony 
that he willingly participated in a plan to commit the murder, he retracted the 
recantation during the evidentiary hearing.  The trial court determined that Omer 
was “credible and persuasive” during the evidentiary hearing when he reaffirmed 
that he and Williamson planned Drew’s murder.  “This Court does not substitute 
its judgment for that of the trial court on issues of fact when competent, substantial 
evidence supports the circuit court’s factual findings or on issues of witness 
 
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credibility.”  Smith v. State, 931 So. 2d 790, 803 (Fla. 2006) (citing Windom v. 
State, 886 So. 2d 915, 921 (Fla. 2004)).  Accordingly, we defer to the trial court’s 
findings crediting Omer’s hearing testimony. 
 
Further, the trial court did not err as a matter of law in rejecting the assertion 
that Omer’s trial testimony would be so discredited by the new evidence that 
Williamson would probably be acquitted in a retrial.  The motion and evidentiary 
hearing testimony would constitute negligible impeachment at best.  It was clear 
from the cross-examination that in agreeing to testify against Williamson and 
Robertson, the third codefendant, Omer avoided exposure to the death penalty.  In 
addition, Omer admitted during trial that he had eighteen prior felony convictions 
and acknowledged he had lied to Williamson in stating that he was in prison for 
second-degree murder rather than sexual abuse of a child.  The thrust of the new 
evidence, that Omer could lie to serve his own interest and had lied in his 
postconviction motion, would not be a revelation to jurors on retrial. 
 
Under similar circumstances, this Court affirmed the denial of a new trial in 
Brown v. State, 381 So. 2d 690, 693 (Fla. 1980).  In that case, we agreed with the 
trial court “that a witness’s post trial recantation of testimony, followed by a clear 
retraction of the post trial statements, is not sufficient to overturn a jury verdict and 
sentence.”  Id.; cf. Duckett v. State, 918 So. 2d 224, 233 (Fla. 2005) (concluding 
that, in light of witness’s refusal to testify at evidentiary hearing following 
 
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recantation in post-trial interviews, “it appears that she would not testify to 
anything new at a new trial” and therefore the purported change in testimony 
would be unlikely to result in a new trial), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 103 (2006).  As 
in Brown, the impeachment from Omer’s sworn motion and postconviction hearing 
testimony is not such that it would probably result in an acquittal of Williamson for 
first-degree murder. 
II.  PROBABILITY OF A LIFE SENTENCE 
 
In order to grant a new penalty phase based on newly discovered evidence, 
the newly discovered evidence must be of such a nature that it would probably 
result in a life sentence.  Rutherford v. State, 926 So. 2d 1100, 1108 (Fla. 2006).  
Williamson asserts that even if the newly discovered evidence would not create a 
likelihood of acquittal in a retrial, the Sanchez-Velasco affidavit and Omer’s 
postconviction motion and evidentiary hearing testimony would be admissible in 
the penalty phase to create residual doubt of guilt and negate the heightened 
premeditation necessary for the “cold, calculated, and premeditated” (CCP) 
aggravating factor found by the trial court.  We conclude that under both the 
standard of review applied to summary denials and the standard of review applied 
to denials after an evidentiary hearing, this claim is also without merit.   
 
This Court has held that “residual or lingering doubt . . . is not an 
appropriate matter to be raised in mitigation during the penalty phase proceedings 
 
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of a capital case.”  Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 572 n.5 (Fla. 1996); see also 
Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128, 1152 (Fla. 2006) (concluding that the trial 
court “appropriately excluded evidence offered to establish residual or lingering 
doubt from consideration when making its sentencing determination”).  Further, 
although section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2006), “‘relaxes the evidentiary 
rules during the penalty phase of a capital trial’ a party cannot introduce hearsay 
evidence unless the opposing party has a fair opportunity to rebut the hearsay.”  
Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270, 282 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Blackwood v. State, 777 
So. 2d 399, 411 (Fla. 2000)).  In Parker, this Court affirmed a trial court’s decision 
to exclude contents of an affidavit by a deceased victim that were not admissible 
under section 90.804, Florida Statutes, on grounds that “the State had no fair 
opportunity to rebut because the State could not question the victim.”  Id.  The 
Sanchez-Velasco affidavit would be excludable from a new penalty phase under 
the same rationale. 
Even if we assume that the Sanchez-Velasco affidavit and Omer’s motion 
and evidentiary hearing testimony would be admissible during a new penalty 
phase, it is unlikely that this evidence would rebut evidence of the CCP aggravator.  
In the sentencing order, the trial court explained its finding that the murder was 
CCP—one of three aggravators, with no mitigation—as follows: 
The Defendant had not even a pretense of justification for murdering 
the decedent.  The Defendant testified on his own behalf at the 
 
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sentencing phase and admitted stabbing the decedent multiple times.  
The evidence was conclusive that the Defendant was the primary 
leader in planning the murder, securing a weapon, and personally 
committing the murderous act.  Although he denied having the brass 
rod, the evidence is clear that he took it with him for the sole purpose 
of committing the murder.  After the murder, the Defendant 
meticulously sought to conceal evidence and impede the investigation.  
The “cold” manner of the murder was further evidenced by the 
Defendant’s statements in effect reflecting that he was disappointed 
that it took so much effort to kill the decedent.  Later statements to 
Omer James Williamson, reflected that the Defendant was very aware 
that the State needed sufficient evidence of premeditation in order to 
convict for first degree murder, and that an absence of the weapons 
available to the prosecution as evidence, particularly the brass rod, 
would be helpful to his case. 
 
The pathologist testified that the body of the decedent contained 
several marks made by a blunt instrument, which supported the 
testimony of Omer James Williamson that the Defendant had 
unsuccessfully tried to stab the [decedent] with the brass rod. 
 
In summary, the Defendant committed a murder for no reason 
at all; his only explanation suggested that he didn’t know why he had 
done it.  But it is unequivocally clear that he planned the murder and 
executed it with precision, according to the plan.  This murder is best 
put in proper perspective, by the observation that this homicide so 
offended even the inmates at Cross City Correctional Institution, that 
several broke the “code of silence,” testified for the State at the trial 
concerning what they had witnessed, and thereby risked their own 
personal safety thereafter in the prison system. 
 
The nature of the cumulative and negligible impeachment of Baez and Omer 
regarding Williamson’s premeditation and Omer’s motivation for the killing is not 
such that it probably would have produced a life sentence.  See Rutherford, 926 So. 
2d at 1108. 
III.  CUMULATIVE EFFECT 
 
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Williamson urges us to consider the evidence presented in his successive 
postconviction motion and the evidentiary hearing in tandem with evidence 
presented in prior postconviction proceedings.  Our precedent supports cumulative 
consideration of all admissible newly discovered evidence.  See Lightbourne v. 
State, 841 So. 2d 431, 436 (Fla. 2003); Jones, 709 So. 2d at 522.  Williamson 
specifically relies on affidavits presented in his previous postconviction motion 
from two Alabama inmates who claimed that Omer told them that he lied during 
Williamson’s trial to avoid the electric chair.  See Williamson, 651 So. 2d at 89.  
This Court affirmed the denial of relief based on these affidavits partially because 
Omer was substantially impeached at trial, rendering the affidavits “cumulative in 
nature.”  Id.   
 
These affidavits add nothing concerning Baez and little to the impeachment 
of Omer.  In fact, the affidavits’ assertion that Omer admitted lying in 
Williamson’s trial is weakened by Omer’s reaffirmation, during the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing, of his trial testimony that he and Williamson planned Drew’s 
murder and his retraction of his assertion to the contrary in his postconviction 
motion.   
 
Williamson also weaves the prosecutor’s trial preparation notes into his 
cumulative error argument.  These notes were the subject of claims under Brady 
and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), presented in Williamson’s first 
 
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postconviction motion and appeal.  See Williamson, 651 So. 2d at 88.  The Court 
concluded that the notes were not discoverable under Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.220.  Id.; see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(g)(1) (precluding discovery 
of attorney work product).  As the Eleventh Circuit noted in addressing the same 
claim, these documents, which include nonverbatim and nonadopted notes of 
witness interviews, impressions of witness remarks, and discussions of trial 
strategy, are not admissible.  See Williamson, 221 F.3d at 1183.  Accordingly, they 
are not properly part of an analysis of the cumulative effect of all admissible 
evidence in a newly discovered evidence claim. 
 
For these reasons, Williamson’s cumulative error argument is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Williamson has not established that his alleged newly discovered evidence 
probably would have changed the outcome of the guilt or penalty phases of his 
trial, either alone or in tandem with evidence presented in previous postconviction 
proceedings.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Williamson’s 
successive motion for postconviction relief. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Dixie County,  
E. Vernon Douglas, Judge - Case No. 85-130-CF 
 
Harry P. Brody and Jeffrey M. Hazen of Brody and Hazen, P.A., Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Meredith Charbula and Charmaine M. Millsaps, 
Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
 
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