Title: Ex Parte Mutual Sav. Life Ins. Co.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

698 So. 2d 772 (1997)
Ex parte MUTUAL SAVINGS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.
(In re Betty Perkins RICHARDSON v. MUTUAL SAVINGS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY).
1951856.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 11, 1997.
*773 I. David Cherniak and Lawrence J. Seiter of Johnstone, Adams, Bailey, Gordon & Harris, L.L.C., Mobile, for Petitioner.
Christopher E. Peters of Cherry, Givens, Peters, Lockett & Diaz, P.C., and Donald C. Partridge of Hess & Atchison, Mobile, for Respondent.
BUTTS, Justice.
We granted the defendant Mutual Savings Life Insurance Company's petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals to review that court's judgment reversing the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Mutual Savings on Betty Richardson's tort-of-outrage claim.
In October 1991, Mutual Savings issued insurance policies on the lives of Betty Richardson and her son, Rochester Perkins. The policies were issued to Richardson's sister, Geraldine Hall. Hall paid the premiums for the policies and was named as the beneficiary on both policies. Neither Richardson nor Perkins was present when the Mutual Savings agent completed the applications for the policies. The insurance agent left the applications with Hall in order for her to obtain the signatures of Richardson and Perkins. The agent did not witness the signature of either Richardson or Perkins on the applications, and he did not obtain the consent of either of them for Mutual Savings to issue the insurance policies on their lives. Subsequently, the agent received the signed applications from Hall, and after Mutual Savings had issued the policies the agent delivered the policies to Hall. Neither Richardson nor Perkins was aware of the existence of these policies on their lives.
In December 1991, Charles Perkins, the brother of Richardson and Hall, killed Rochester Perkins. Thereafter, the administratrix of Rochester Perkins's estate filed a wrongful death action against Mutual Savings. In January 1994, during the course of her deposition in the wrongful death action, Hall admitted that she had forged the signatures of both Richardson and Perkins on the applications for the insurance policies.
Nine months later, Mutual Savings sent Hall a letter, dated October 14, 1994, notifying her that the life insurance policy on Richardson's life had been cancelled. On the same date, Richardson sued Mutual Savings, alleging that Mutual Savings had committed the tort-of-outrage.
Mutual Savings filed a motion for a summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Richardson appealed; the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the summary judgment for Mutual Savings. Richardson v. Mutual Savings Life Ins. Co., 698 So. 2d 769 (Ala.Civ. App.1996).
In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, we utilize the same standard the trial court used in determining whether the evidence before it "made out a genuine issue of material fact" and whether the movant was "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988); Rule 56(c), Ala.R.Civ.P. When the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating such an issue. Bass v. South Trust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794 (Ala.1989). Evidence is "substantial" if it is of "such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. *774 Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).
Our review is further subject to the caveat that this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So. 2d 412, 413 (Ala.1990).
In Thomas v. BSE Industrial Contractors, Inc., 624 So. 2d 1041, 1043-44 (Ala.1993), this Court elaborated on the burden of proof a plaintiff must carry in order to recover for the tort of outrage:
(Citations omitted.)
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Richardson, we must consider whether she presented substantial evidence from which reasonable persons could find that the actions of Mutual Savings amounted to outrageous conduct and caused her severe emotional distress. Richardson alleged that Mutual Savings did the following acts, which she says amounts to outrageous conduct: (1) That it placed her life at risk by issuing a life insurance policy, in violation of its own rules, on her life, to a beneficiary who had forged her name to the application, and (2) that it allowed the policy to remain in effect while collecting premiums for nine months after Hall had admitted, in sworn testimony, to forging Richardson's signature on the policy application. Additionally, she contends that Mutual Savings performed such acts in spite of its knowledge that Hall's brother had killed her son after Hall had obtained a life insurance policy with Mutual Savings on the son by also forging his signature. In response, Mutual Savings denies these allegations and asserts that Richardson did not produce substantial evidence of any element of the tort-of-outrage cause of action.
In deposition testimony, a representative of Mutual Savings testified as follows regarding its decision to cancel the policy:
Based on these facts and on this Court's high standard with regard to the proof necessary to substantiate an outrage claim, we hold that the conduct of Mutual Savings cannot be characterized as "atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Inmon, at 365. While it is apparent that there was some delay in Mutual Savings' decision to cancel the policy, a delay that some might view as unreasonable, we cannot conclude that Mutual Savings' conduct went beyond the bounds of decency. Moreover, we conclude that Richardson did not present substantial evidence that Mutual Savings' delay caused her to suffer extreme emotional distress. In light of this, we hold that the trial court properly concluded that Mutual Savings was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on Richardson's tort-of-outrage claim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversing the summary judgment, and we remand this cause to that court for further proceedings or an order consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES, HOUSTON, KENNEDY, COOK, and SEE, JJ., concur.