Title: Foster v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-1761 
____________ 
 
KEVIN DON FOSTER,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[October 17, 2013] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Kevin Don Foster appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion 
filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 to vacate the judgment of 
conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death.  Because the order 
concerns postconviction relief from a capital conviction for which a sentence of 
death was imposed, this Court has jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1), 
Florida Constitution.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court’s 
order denying postconviction relief. 
 
- 2 - 
FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
Kevin Foster was convicted of the April 1996 first-degree murder of Mark 
Schwebes, the Riverdale High School band teacher, in Fort Myers, Florida.  Foster, 
eighteen years of age, did not attend Riverdale High School at the time.  However, 
he was the leader of a group that called itself “Lords of Chaos,” which did include 
students from that school.  In furtherance of a mission to carry out widespread 
vandalism in the community, Foster and five other members of the group decided 
to vandalize Riverdale High School and set its auditorium on fire on the night of 
April 30, 1996.  That plan was interrupted, however, when Schwebes drove up to 
the auditorium and confronted two members of the group—Christopher Black and 
Thomas Torrone—about the vandalism.  Foster was not confronted because he had 
run away.  Later, after Black told Foster that Schwebes was planning to contact the 
school resource officer the next day, Foster agreed with Black that Schwebes 
“must die.”  Foster, along with Black and Lords of Chaos members Peter Magnotti 
and Derek Shields, went to Foster’s home where Foster obtained a shotgun which 
he loaded with #1 buckshot, a map to locate Schwebes’ home, gloves, and ski 
masks.  After calling Schwebes’ telephone number to confirm he was home, 
Foster, Black, Magnotti, and Shields went to Schwebes’ home.  On the way to 
Schwebes’ home they stopped and placed a stolen license tag on Shields’ vehicle.  
When Schwebes answered their knock on the door, Foster shot him in the face with 
 
- 3 - 
the shotgun that he brought with him.  Foster then shot Schwebes a second time in 
the pelvis.   
After a jury trial at which the members of the Lords of Chaos who had 
participated in the murder and the conspiracy testified against Foster in exchange 
for plea deals, Foster was convicted of first-degree murder.  The penalty phase 
resulted in a jury recommendation of death by a nine-to-three vote.  After finding 
two aggravating factors1 and rejecting or attaching little to no weight to the twenty-
three mitigators offered by Foster,2
Foster raised seven issues on direct appeal: (1) his numerous pretrial change 
of venue motions were improperly denied; (2) the court erred in permitting the 
State to elicit hearsay testimony of several witnesses; (3) comments of the trial 
judge during the guilt phase demonstrated that the court had prejudged the case; 
 the trial court sentenced Foster to death.  Foster 
appealed and this Court affirmed in Foster v. State, 778 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 2000).   
                                         
 
1.  The aggravating factors were (1) the capital felony was committed for the 
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from 
custody; and (2) the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and 
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.   
 
2.  The trial court expressly rejected a number of proffered mitigators.  The 
court did not reject the mitigators that Foster was helpful to neighbors, was a nice 
young man, was a good worker, was polite, and had good character, according to 
over twenty witnesses.  The trial court did not state what, if any, weight was given 
to these mitigators.  Other mitigators not rejected but expressly given little to no 
weight were that he was a premature baby and was abandoned by his father at one 
month of age, and that he will adjust well to prison.  The trial court expressly 
rejected Foster’s age of eighteen as a statutory mitigator.   
 
- 4 - 
(4) the avoid arrest aggravator should not have been submitted to the jury in the 
penalty phase; (5) the trial court erred in admitting charging information 
concerning other crimes at the Spencer hearing; (6) the trial court failed to properly 
consider the mitigating circumstances and its findings are unclear; and (7) the 
sentence was disproportionate in comparison to other cases.  See Foster, 778 So. 
2d at 912 n.8.  
As to the motions for change of venue, this Court held that although there 
was a “great deal of publicity about the case in the local community,” the trial 
court properly denied the motions for change of venue.  Id. at 913.  We concluded 
that “the media coverage as a whole did not reach such an inflammatory level to 
have irreversibly infected the community so as to preclude an attempt to secure an 
impartial jury.”  Id.  We also noted that the jurors who were impaneled in Foster’s 
case did not indicate they had been exposed to the “more egregious” examples of 
publicity cited by Foster.  Id. at 914. 
Foster raised several hearsay claims on appeal.  As to the first hearsay claim, 
Foster contended that the trial court erred in admitting double hearsay contained in 
the statements of Magnotti, Shields, and another member of the group, Bradley 
Young, that Black told them Schwebes had threatened to go to the Riverdale High 
School campus police.  Id. at 915.  We held that this testimony was properly 
admitted to establish knowledge and motive, not the truth of the matter asserted.  
 
- 5 - 
Foster, 778 So. 2d at 915.  Foster also contended that the testimony of Young, 
Magnotti, and Shields that Black said Schwebes “had to die” was inadmissible 
hearsay.  Id.  We held this testimony was not inadmissible hearsay because it was 
not admitted to prove Schwebes had to die, but was admitted to establish the 
conspiracy and Foster’s part in it, pursuant to the hearsay exception in section 
90.803(18)(e), Florida Statutes (1997).  Id.  For this same reason, other testimony 
about planning and carrying out the killing, such as that relating to finding 
Schwebes’ address, replacing the birdshot in the shotgun with more lethal 
ammunition, and subsequent conversations about the murder, was also properly 
admitted.  Id.   
Foster also challenged the testimony of David Adkins, whom Schwebes had 
dinner with shortly after the confrontation at the auditorium.  Adkins testified that 
Schwebes told him he planned to report the group.  Although we held this 
testimony to be inadmissible hearsay, we concluded it was harmless.  Id. at 916.  In 
the next hearsay claim, Foster challenged the redirect testimony of Shields about a 
prior consistent taped statement he gave to law enforcement immediately after his 
arrest and before any plea negotiations.  We held that the testimony was not 
improper hearsay because it was offered to rebut an express or implied charge 
made in cross-examination of Shields that his testimony resulted from the improper 
influence of his plea deal.  Id.  The last hearsay claim on direct appeal concerned 
 
- 6 - 
the testimony of Peter Magnotti’s mother, who related a telephone conversation 
she had with Ruby Foster, Foster’s mother, in which Ms. Foster attempted to 
persuade Ms. Magnotti to help create an alibi for Foster.  See id. at 917.  We held 
that this testimony was improper hearsay but concluded that the error was 
harmless.  Id.  Foster’s other claims on direct appeal were found to be without 
merit.  
Because the postconviction claims for which Foster was given an 
evidentiary hearing concern the penalty phase of trial, we briefly review that 
portion of the trial proceedings next.  A discussion of the defense evidence in the 
penalty phase of the trial is set forth in this Court’s direct appeal opinion, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
The defense presented numerous witnesses who presented a 
picture of Foster as a kind and caring person.  May Ann Robinson, 
Foster’s neighbor, testified that he once helped her start her car and 
offered to let her borrow a lawn mower.  Robert Moore, another 
neighbor, testified that Foster was well-mannered and a hard worker.  
Shirley Boyette found Foster to be very caring, intelligent, and well-
mannered.  Robert Fike, Foster’s supervisor at a carpentry shop, and 
James Voorhees, his co-worker, found him to be a reliable worker.  
Voorhees also testified that Foster was very supportive to Voorhees’ 
son who suffered from and eventually died of leukemia.  Similarly, 
Raymond and Patricia Williams testified that Foster was very nice to 
their son who suffered from spina bifida.  Peter Albert, who is 
confined to a wheelchair, related how Foster had helped Albert’s 
mother care for him after his wife died.  Foster also helped Albert in 
numerous other ways, including preparing his meals, fixing things 
around the house, and helping Albert in and out of his swimming 
pool. 
 
- 7 - 
There was additional testimony that described Foster’s 
involvement with foreign exchange students.  Foster was also known 
to have given positive advice to young children.  Foster’s sister, Kelly 
Foster, testified to how he obtained his GED after dropping out of 
high school and that he obtained a certificate for the completion of an 
“auto cad” program at a vocational-technical school.  Finally, Foster’s 
mother testified that he was born prematurely and suffered from 
allergies, and that Foster’s father abandoned him a month after birth.  
On cross-examination, many of the witnesses who testified to Foster’s 
kindness admitted that they had not been in contact with him for a 
number of years. 
 
Foster, 778 So. 2d 911-12.  Foster’s mother also presented a lengthy photographic 
slide show created by her and the defense team containing photographs of Foster 
during his childhood and with family and friends.  The photographs depicted 
Foster’s childhood as normal and one in which he had the advantages of a loving 
family, vacations in America and abroad, and many friends.   
 
After the penalty phase of trial, a Spencer3
                                         
 
3.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993) (allowing for a hearing 
before only the judge at which additional evidence may be presented before 
sentencing).  
 
 
 hearing was held at which the 
victim’s sister testified to victim impact evidence.  Over objection, the State also 
submitted a copy of the charges brought against Foster in a separate case—
charging Foster with twenty-seven crimes allegedly committed by Foster and the 
Lords of Chaos—as evidence going toward proof of the avoid arrest aggravator.  
On direct appeal, we concluded that the evidence of those other unproven charges, 
 
- 8 - 
which were not convictions of a capital or other violent felony, should not have 
been considered.  See Foster, 778 So. 2d at 919.  However, the error was harmless 
because the improper evidence was submitted only to the judge at the Spencer 
hearing, there was already evidence in the record of those other crimes, and there 
was no indication that the trial court relied on the improper information in 
sentencing Foster.  See id.  The defense did not present any additional mitigating 
evidence at the Spencer hearing and Foster did not testify, although he submitted 
an affidavit in which he professed his innocence, complained of the media’s 
treatment of him and his family, and further complimented his defense counsel for 
doing a “commendable job.”   
On June 25, 1998, the trial court entered the sentencing order in which 
Foster was sentenced to death.  The court expressly rejected Foster’s age of 
eighteen as a statutory mitigator based on the conclusion that Foster was not young 
emotionally or mentally, Foster had been out of school for two years, had obtained 
a GED, had taken other courses “in preparation for life as an adult,” and had 
traveled abroad.  On direct appeal, we held that the trial court correctly evaluated 
and rejected the age mitigator, and we noted that the evidence showed Foster was 
the leader of the group, had above-average intelligence, and “produced no evidence 
of any emotional or mental irregularities, chronic or otherwise, despite the 
availability of two mental experts.”  Foster, 778 So. 2d at 921.     
 
- 9 - 
POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDINGS 
Foster filed his initial postconviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.850 on September 27, 2001,4 and a corrected amended motion on 
May 27, 2010.5  A Huff hearing was held on October 22, 2010.6
                                         
 
4.  Foster’s motion was filed under rule 3.850 because the current version of 
the postconviction rule for capital cases, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, 
applies to postconviction motions filed on or after October 1, 2001.  See Franqui v. 
State, 59 So. 3d 82, 95 n.13 (Fla. 2011); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(a).   
  After the Huff 
 
5.  In his amended motion, Foster raised the following postconviction 
claims:  (1) Foster was deprived of his right to a fair and impartial jury due to juror 
misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel during voir dire; (2) Foster is 
being denied his constitutional rights in that rules prohibiting his lawyers from 
interviewing jurors to determine if constitutional error was present are 
unconstitutional under the unique circumstances of this case; (3) Foster was denied 
effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase in that trial counsel failed to 
investigate and prepare mitigating evidence and failed to adequately challenge the 
State’s aggravating circumstances such that no adversarial testing could occur; 
(4) counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to effectively object to the 
avoid arrest aggravating circumstance at penalty phase; (5) Foster was denied 
effective assistance of counsel pretrial and at the guilt phase of his capital trial; 
(6) newly discovered evidence shows that the forensic science used to convict 
Foster was neither reliable nor valid, thus depriving him of his constitutional 
rights; (7) the existing procedure that the State of Florida utilizes for lethal 
injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution; (8) newly discovered empirical 
evidence demonstrates that Foster’s conviction and sentence of death constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment; (9) Foster’s trial was fraught with procedural and 
substantive errors which cannot be harmless when viewed cumulatively; 
(10) Foster’s death sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation 
of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution; and (11) Foster’s death sentence violates the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because the law and jury 
instructions shifted the burden to Foster to prove that death was inappropriate. 
 
- 10 - 
hearing, the postconviction court issued an order scheduling an evidentiary hearing 
only on Foster’s claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the 
penalty phase of trial by abdicating the responsibility for developing mitigation to 
Foster’s mother, by the defense team being impaired and disorganized, by failing 
to discover and present mental mitigation and present testimony of a 
neuropsychologist, and by failing to sufficiently challenge the evidence of 
aggravating circumstances.   
At the evidentiary hearing held April 26-29, 2011, Foster presented 
numerous witnesses, although his lead defense counsel at trial was not available to 
testify because he died before the matter was heard.  From the defense team, Foster 
presented the testimony of defense co-counsel Marquin Rinard, defense 
investigator Roberta Harsh, and paralegal James Wootton.  In addition, Foster 
presented the testimony of his half-sister, Kelly Foster; his aunt, Linda Albritton; 
his cousin, Candy Albritton-Green; his grandfather, Jack Bates, Sr.; his biological 
father, Jack Bates, Jr.; his mother’s first husband, Ronald Newberry; clinical 
psychologist Dr. Ernest Bordini; clinical psychologist Dr. Faye Sultan; 
neuropsychologist Dr. Ruben Gur; and neurologist Dr. Thomas Hyde.  The State 
                                                                                                                                   
6.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993) (holding that in all capital 
cases the judge must allow the attorneys an opportunity to be heard on an initial 
postconviction motion for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary 
hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to the motion).  
 
- 11 - 
presented the testimony of psychiatrist and neurologist Dr. Leon Prockup, 
psychiatrist Dr. Robert Wald, and clinical psychologist Dr. Michael Gamache.   
 
After hearing the evidence, Judge Edward Voltz, Jr., denied Foster’s motion 
for postconviction relief in a comprehensive order which Foster now appeals.  As 
explained more fully below, we find no merit in Foster’s claims and affirm the 
order denying postconviction relief. 
ANALYSIS 
Standard of Review 
To obtain relief on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant 
“must show that his attorney’s performance was deficient and that the deficient 
performance prejudiced his defense.”  Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771 (Fla. 
2004) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  In order to 
establish deficient performance, the defendant must show that his attorney’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness by committing 
errors “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . 
by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  As to proof of prejudice 
where, as here, the defendant claims that counsel provided ineffective assistance in 
the penalty phase, “the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, 
absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”  Strickland, 466 
 
- 12 - 
U.S. at 695.  “We do not require a defendant to show ‘that counsel’s deficient 
conduct more likely than not altered the outcome’ of his penalty proceeding, but 
rather that he establish ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in [that] 
outcome.’ ”  Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 44 (2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 693-94).  We defer to the postconviction court’s factual findings as long as 
they are supported by competent, substantial evidence but review de novo the 
circuit court’s legal conclusions.  See Johnson v. State, 104 So. 3d 1010, 1022 (Fla. 
2012); Sochor, 883 So. 2d at 771-72.  “[W]e apply a mixed standard of review 
because both the performance and the prejudice prongs of the Strickland test 
present mixed questions of law and fact.”  Sochor, 883 So. 2d at 771.  With these 
standards in mind, we turn to the claims for which an evidentiary hearing was 
granted. 
I.  CLAIMS FOR WHICH AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WAS HELD 
A. Claim that Defense Counsel Abdicated Responsibility for Mitigation 
We turn first to Foster’s claim that trial counsel abdicated responsibility for 
the investigation and presentation of mitigation to Foster’s mother.  Foster argues 
that “the entire penalty phase was presented as Ms. Foster’s version of Kevin’s 
life” and that “[c]ounsel did not question whether her version was, in fact, true.”  
At the evidentiary hearing, Foster presented Roberta Harsh, defense investigator, 
who testified that the defense team “pulled out all the stops” and used everything at 
 
- 13 - 
their disposal in representing Foster.  Paralegal James Wootton testified that even 
before the guilt phase began, the defense team knew it had to gear up for the 
penalty phase due to the overwhelming amount of evidence of guilt.7
Dr. Wald, along with neuropsychologist Dr. Masterson who was to work at 
Dr. Wald’s direction, was appointed almost immediately after Foster’s arrest.  The 
order of appointment indicated that the experts were to assist counsel in preparing 
the defense and to make such examinations of Foster and such reports to defense 
counsel as defense counsel may direct.  Wootton testified that, although there was 
discussion amongst the defense team about whether Foster was mentally ill or 
abused as a child, the answer was always that he was not.  Wootton also testified 
that the input from the family indicated that there was nothing wrong with Foster 
and that he was a wholesome, healthy young man who was being framed by his 
codefendants.  Wootton explained that although Foster’s mother voiced her 
opinions about the defense, made suggestions concerning witnesses, and attended 
about half of the team meetings on the case, it was Foster himself along with lead 
  Wootton 
testified that Foster had been evaluated by psychiatrist Dr. Wald early in the case.   
                                         
 
7.  Wootton testified that his main responsibility was to organize all the trial 
documents and computerize them into a trial program called “Trial Scout,” which 
ultimately contained thousands of pages of documents.   
 
- 14 - 
counsel Robert Jacobs who made the decision about the theory of his defense, 
which was to present Foster as a good child who deserved to be saved.8
Foster also presented the testimony of defense co-counsel Marquin Rinard, 
an assistant public defender experienced in capital cases.  Rinard explained that a 
mitigation specialist was not retained, but that the defense team compiled Foster’s 
school records and many of his medical records.  Rinard saw no written report 
from Dr. Wald, who later explained at the evidentiary hearing that he did not 
believe he was asked to prepare a written report.  Dr. Wald’s patient records were 
unavailable because they had been transferred to a doctor who purchased his 
practice in 2001 and were then lost.  However, based on billing records Dr. Wald 
maintained, he testified that he did do an evaluation of Foster and, based on his 
normal practices, that evaluation would have attempted to discover any indication 
of mental or behavioral disorders.  In the mental status examination, Dr. Wald 
testified, he would have looked for delusion patterns, indications of auditory 
hallucinations, paranoia, cognitive function, memory, concentration, and issues of 
judgment.  Dr. Wald explained that his normal practice would also have been to 
look for indications of bipolar disorder, manic characteristics, depression, and 
suicidal ideations.   
   
                                         
 
8.  Because Foster’s lead defense counsel at trial, Robert Jacobs, died in 
2007, his testimony about what mitigation was investigated and how strategic 
decisions were made concerning the penalty phase was unavailable. 
 
- 15 - 
Foster’s mother provided alibi information for the guilt phase and provided a 
long list of possible witnesses for the penalty phase but, Rinard testified, it was 
Jacobs and Foster who decided on the theory of the defense.  Rinard said he felt 
sure he and Jacobs discussed Foster’s age, emotional level, and progress in school.  
According to Rinard’s testimony, none of the witnesses that the defense team 
contacted provided any information causing them to suspect that Foster had mental 
health problems, and neither of Foster’s defense counsel noted any indication of 
mental health problems or depression in their encounters with Foster.  In 
depositions taken by the State of seven of Foster’s relatives in Amarillo, Texas, 
which were attended by a public defender on Foster’s behalf, those relatives 
reported generally that Foster had a normal childhood with a loving mother and 
extended family.  None testified to any abuse of Foster or to any abusive 
environment in his home.  Rinard testified that Jacobs took primary responsibility 
for both phases of the trial and that, based on the information they had, defense 
counsel knew they must attempt to humanize Foster at the penalty phase of trial 
and present him in the best light possible.   
In support of the effort to humanize Foster for the penalty phase jury, Rinard 
testified that the defense team compiled a great deal of information about Foster 
helping others and being a good person, which they thought was necessary to 
overcome the negative guilt phase evidence about Foster.  The defense discovered 
 
- 16 - 
incidences in which Foster assisted disabled people in their homes and did yard 
work for them, and found that Foster was closely involved with people who were 
terminally ill, all of which was favorable information for the jury.  At the penalty 
phase of trial, the defense presented twenty-four witnesses who were members of 
Foster’s family, friends of the family, childhood friends of Foster, his former 
employer, and neighbors.  Their testimony showed that Foster was a normal and 
good child loved by family and friends, as well as a helpful, polite, and 
compassionate teenager.   
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Foster’s older half-sister, Kelly 
Foster, testified that she assumed lead counsel Jacobs decided what evidence was 
to be presented in the penalty phase.  As to Foster’s childhood, Kelly testified that 
her first stepfather, Kevin Foster’s biological father, treated her roughly, but 
Foster’s mother divorced him and the family moved soon after Foster was born.9
                                         
 
9.  Kelly Foster’s biological father was Ronald Newberry, Ruby Foster’s 
first husband.  
  
She testified that the next stepfather, Brian Burns, was the father figure to her and 
Foster for the rest of their childhood.  Although he had anger issues and had been 
“physical” with their mother, Burns had been a good father and remained close to 
the family even after the divorce.  After divorcing Burns, Foster’s mother married 
again, to truck driver John Foster, and spent a lot of time on the road with him, 
 
- 17 - 
leaving the children with relatives.  John Foster later stopped driving a truck and 
opened a pawn shop.  Foster’s mother divorced him after she and he had a few 
“scuffles.”  Kelly related that other relatives had mental problems.  Other family 
members testified at the evidentiary hearing that there was mental illness in the 
family.  They also related that Foster was a hyperactive child who was clumsy and 
often had accidents.  None of the negative aspects of the family background 
evidence was reported to the defense team at the time of trial. 
Based on the evidence presented, the circuit court denied relief on this claim, 
finding that defense counsel did not abdicate their responsibility for mitigation to 
Foster’s mother.  The court concluded that Foster and lead counsel Jacobs made 
the decisions regarding mitigation strategy for the case and that Ms. Foster merely 
provided contact information for possible penalty phase witnesses, suggestions of 
inconsistencies in the evidence, and questions that she believed should be asked of 
witnesses.  The favorable, humanizing mitigation presented in the penalty phase 
was the only mitigation that Foster and his counsel determined should be 
presented.  We have recognized that “[c]ompetent defendants who are represented 
by counsel maintain the right to make choices in respect to their attorneys’ 
handling of their cases” which “includes the right to either waive presentation of 
mitigation evidence or to choose what mitigation evidence is introduced by 
counsel.”  Hojan v. State, 3 So. 3d 1204, 1211 (Fla. 2009). 
 
- 18 - 
The court further found that Foster failed to meet his burden to establish the 
prejudice prong of Strickland.  Competent, substantial evidence supports the circuit 
court’s findings and we affirm denial of relief on this claim.   
B. Claim that the Defense Team was Impaired and Disorganized 
Foster next contends that his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance 
because the defense team was disorganized, confused, and impaired.  This claim 
was also included within the purview of the evidentiary hearing.  The circuit court 
found, after hearing the testimony, that the allegations were unproven.  In denying 
relief, the court noted testimony that Jacobs, who had Parkinson’s disease, was not 
adversely affected in his representation of Foster by his Parkinson’s tremors.  
Wootton denied seeing any confusion on Jacobs’ part and testified that Jacobs 
could think on his feet and do what needed to be done.  He said he was around 
Jacobs enough to be able to say that Jacobs was not affected by the disease in any 
way that would have hindered his ability to defend Foster.  Defense co-counsel 
Rinard testified that he never saw Jacobs trembling or confused.  The 
postconviction court stated, “The Court finds their testimony that Mr. Jacobs was 
not trembling or confused to be more credible than those of other witnesses who 
were not in close proximity to Mr. Jacobs during trial, or who have a motive for 
bias against Mr. Jacobs and in favor of Defendant’s motion.”   
 
- 19 - 
In attempting to prove that the defense team was confused, impaired, and 
disorganized, Foster relies primarily on a book about the murder and trial titled 
Someone Has to Die Tonight10
Foster also argues that paralegal Wootton characterized the defense as 
“disorganized.”  Wootton actually testified that when he first started his job with 
the public defender, the Foster documents were stored in a box and were “more so 
disorganized than organized.”  He explained that his job was “to put it all together 
to prepare - - to put it into this [trial] software program.”  Thus, Wootton’s 
comment about disorganization did not refer to the defense team generally, just to 
the documents he was given to organize and computerize for trial preparation—
 by Jim Greenhill which, Foster contends, reported 
that the defense appeared “confused.”  Foster also alleges that according to the 
Greenhill book, jurors who were close to Jacobs throughout trial noticed his 
tremors and confusion and found it “off-putting.”  However, Foster did not present 
testimony at the evidentiary hearing in support of these specific allegations.  Foster 
did present the testimony of Jack Bates, Jr., Foster’s biological father, who testified 
at the evidentiary hearing that Jacobs “would sometimes get I think frustrated, or 
somewhat confused.”  The State’s objection that the statement called for 
speculation was sustained.  Even if that testimony had been admitted, it would not 
have proven that the defense team was disorganized, confused, or impaired.   
                                         
 
10.  Jim Greenhill, Someone Has to Die Tonight (2006). 
 
- 20 - 
which he testified that he did.11
We reiterated in Clark v. State, 35 So. 3d 880 (Fla. 2010), that “[a]s long as 
the trial court’s findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, this 
Court will not ‘substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of 
fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be given 
the evidence by the trial court.’ ”  Id. at 886 (quoting McLin v. State, 827 So. 2d 
948, 954 n.4 (Fla. 2002)); see also Bell v. State, 965 So. 2d 48, 63 (Fla. 2007) 
(“Questions of credibility are left to the determination of the circuit court, and 
provided there is competent, substantial evidence to support those credibility 
assessments, we will defer to that court’s decision.” (citing Archer v. State, 934 So. 
2d 1187, 1196 (Fla. 2006) (“This Court is highly deferential to a trial court’s 
judgment on the issue of credibility.”))).  The postconviction court had before it 
competent, substantial evidence refuting Foster’s claim that the defense team was 
  The circuit court concluded that Foster failed to 
meet his burden that the defense team was in any way impaired during trial.  We 
agree.   
                                         
11.  Foster contends that Wootton’s testimony was not competent because 
evidence supplemented into the record after the hearing—a letter written by 
Wootton—showed that he had a sexual relationship with Foster’s mother, Ruby 
Foster, and told her in the letter that “counsel fucked up.”  Regardless of the fact 
that Wootton may have had a relationship with Ruby Foster during the trial and 
may not have been truthful about that fact when he testified at the hearing, the 
circuit court correctly found that the totality of the evidence supported the 
conclusion that the defense team was not confused, disorganized, or impaired.   
 
 
- 21 - 
disorganized, confused, or impaired.  We will not second-guess the circuit court on 
its findings based on this evidence or on the court’s credibility determinations.  For 
these reasons, the postconviction court did not err in denying Foster’s claim and 
we affirm.   
C. Claim of Deficient Investigation and Presentation 
of Foster’s Background and Mental Mitigation 
 
In Foster’s next claim for which an evidentiary hearing was held, he 
contends that trial counsel was deficient in the investigation and presentation of 
Foster’s mental health and background mitigation, and that counsel should have 
sought neuropsychological testing of Foster.  The circuit court denied the claims, 
concluding that trial counsel cannot be found deficient in failing to present 
negative mitigating information about Foster when none was provided to counsel 
by Foster, his family, or his friends and where counsel had no reason to believe 
such negative information existed.  The court cited denial of any mental health 
issues by Foster and his family, and concluded that the “subtle” or “soft” findings 
of mental issues by Foster’s current experts do not cause the court to find any clear 
indication existed that Foster suffered from organic brain damage or other mental 
impairments such that trial counsel was obligated to seek neuropsychological 
testing.  The court further found that the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing did not substantiate claims that Foster suffered a history of concussions, 
which would have been a red flag for possible brain damage or that he had an 
 
- 22 - 
abusive or troubled childhood.  The court found that defense counsel was never 
advised of any mitigation arising from the conditions of Foster’s childhood, and 
disagreed that the testimony revealed “significant mitigation leads” which defense 
counsel should have followed.  Thus, the circuit court concluded that trial counsel 
made a reasonable tactical decision not to pursue further mental health 
investigation after receiving an initial diagnosis that there were no mental health 
issues and after receiving no indication of mental issues or other childhood 
mitigation from Foster and his family.  Accordingly, the court held that, under the 
circumstances, it was not unreasonable for counsel to rely on an attempt to 
humanize Foster for the jury and present only favorable mitigation.   
As to prejudice, the circuit court concluded that even if all the information 
that Foster claims should have been elicited had been presented in the penalty 
phase, there would be no reasonable probability that the mitigation would have 
outweighed the aggravation presented at trial.  The court found that the expert 
testimony concerning mental impairments and the testimony concerning Foster’s 
childhood and alcohol abuse, dementia, and mental illness in extended family 
members would not have outweighed the aggravating circumstances in this case.  
We agree and conclude that all the court’s findings are supported by competent, 
substantial evidence. 
 
- 23 - 
Defense co-counsel Rinard testified that in 1996 a public defender 
investigator interviewed Foster and asked him about any suicide attempts, 
involuntary commitment, chronic drug or alcohol abuse, seizures, retardation, or 
serious head injuries.  The record shows Foster’s negative responses to these 
inquiries.  The interview notes also indicate that Foster did not appear odd-acting, 
inattentive, hostile, or argumentative.  The circuit court noted that neither Wootton 
nor Rinard saw any indications of depression or mental impairment during their 
interactions with Foster.  Wootton testified that the defense team discussed 
whether any additional experts needed to be retained, but based on the examination 
that was done of Foster early in the case and based on everything else the defense 
team had before it, the decision was made that no further experts needed to be 
retained to look into mental health issues, abuse, neglect, or any other similar 
mitigation because there was nothing to support it.  Although Foster’s half-sister, 
Kelly, testified at the evidentiary hearing that their childhood was tumultuous, with 
a series of stepfathers who on occasion were angry and sometimes rough with their 
mother, nothing in her testimony suggested that Foster had an abusive childhood.  
She also described Foster as clumsy and said she had seen him depressed.  Other 
family members testified at the hearing that Foster and his sister were often left 
with relatives and that their home life was unstructured.  However, none of this 
information was provided to defense counsel at the time of trial.  Rinard testified 
 
- 24 - 
that the only information received from family members—many of whom testified 
at the penalty phase of trial—described Foster and his childhood in favorable 
terms, and that Foster and his family were resistant to discussing any other course 
of mitigation.  
In an effort to establish that neuropsychological testing was indicated, Foster 
presented several experts at the evidentiary hearing.  Dr. Ernest Bordini testified 
that he administered a number of tests to Foster, including the Halstead-Reitan 
Battery of tests, the Wisconsin Card Sort tests, the Stroop Interference Procedure 
test, the Luria Battery of tests, and the Victor Symptom Validity test for 
malingering.  Dr. Bordini concluded that Foster has a high verbal IQ score of 137 
but a lower performance IQ score of 105, which Dr. Bordini opined was indicative 
of right hemisphere brain weakness.  Dr. Bordini also noted that Foster’s birth 
records showed he suffered respiratory distress at birth and was hospitalized for 
about a week.  He opined that this respiratory distress indicated that Foster was at 
high risk of having neurological issues.  He characterized Foster’s current reports 
of past head injuries as concussions, although Dr. Bordini did not see medical 
records confirming concussions suffered by Foster.  Dr. Bordini also diagnosed 
Foster with depression occurring after incarceration based on Foster’s current 
reports of depression to Dr. Bordini.  Finally, Dr. Bordini diagnosed Foster with 
possible nonverbal learning disorder, possible bipolar disorder, and antisocial 
 
- 25 - 
personality disorder.  However, the State’s experts, Dr. Leon Prockup and 
Dr. Michael Gamache, disagreed that the records showing the respiratory distress 
at birth were indicative of possible brain damage.  Dr. Gamache testified that the 
hospital records showed Foster suffered common respiratory distress often seen in 
newborns when they lack a “surfactant” on their lungs that enables ease of 
breathing immediately after birth.  He explained that this condition is not an 
indication of lack of oxygen (hypoxia) or complete lack of oxygen (anoxia).  
Dr. Gamache also disagreed that the variance between Foster’s high verbal IQ 
score and his lower performance IQ score were indicative of brain damage.  He 
testified that both scores were above average and not indicative of impairment.  
The circuit court found the testimony of Drs. Prockup and Gamache on these 
issues to be more credible.      
Dr. Ruben Gur testified that he used the raw data from Dr. Bordini’s 
neurological testing to produce a “brain map” that identified areas of Foster’s brain 
which Dr. Gur said showed frontal lobe impairment that would affect Foster’s 
ability to plan, to consider long-term goals, and to make reasoned decisions 
regarding long-term consequences.  However, Dr. Prockup testified that in his 
opinion the brain mapping methodology is not accurate or valid and that the 
algorithm on which the methodology is based was created with insufficient data.  
Dr. Prockup discovered no publications or articles on this type of brain mapping 
 
- 26 - 
methodology since 1990.  Dr. Gamache testified that, to his knowledge, statistical 
brain maps such as this are not frequently used by neurologists.  He opined that the 
mapping methodology used by Dr. Gur was not generally accepted in the field of 
neuropsychology.12
Foster also presented Dr. Thomas Hyde, who testified that Foster’s facial 
asymmetry and asymmetrical leg length were “subtle” findings referable to brain 
damage even though Foster received a perfect score on the “mini” mental state test 
Dr. Hyde performed on him.  Dr. Hyde’s conclusion of possible brain damage was 
also based on the variance between Foster’s verbal IQ score and his performance 
IQ score.  Dr. Hyde diagnosed Foster with significant mood disorder, depression, 
hypomania, and mania based “primarily on self reports.”  The circuit court 
concluded that Dr. Hyde’s “subtle” findings were speculative at best.   
 
Dr. Sultan, who first evaluated Foster in 2002, diagnosed Foster with 
possible brain injury due to his respiratory distress at birth.  In addition, she opined 
that Foster was significantly depressed, suicidal, and bipolar.  To support her 
conclusion that Foster was suicidal, Dr. Sultan cited a gunshot wound Foster 
suffered at age sixteen.  Dr. Sultan concluded that it was a suicide attempt 
                                         
 
12.  The brain map which is the subject of Dr. Gur’s testimony, based on 
statistical data and data derived from psychological testing, is to be distinguished 
from structural or functional brain imaging from an MRI, fMRI, or PET scan of an 
individual’s brain.  
 
- 27 - 
primarily based on Foster’s insistence that it was accidental while he was cleaning 
a gun.  Similarly, she described Foster’s act of jumping off a bridge shortly after 
release from the hospital as a possible suicide attempt, even though Foster did not 
describe it as a suicide attempt.  The hospital records for treatment of Foster’s 
gunshot wound indicated the wound was accidental and that upon specific inquiry 
of Foster and his mother by hospital staff about suicidal thoughts or depression, the 
response was that there were none.  Nothing provided in the evidentiary hearing 
refuted the fact that the gunshot wound was accidental.  Nor was any evidence 
presented to substantiate speculation that Foster’s jump off a bridge soon after he 
was released from the hospital after his gunshot wound was a suicide attempt.  The 
circuit court found that it “could have been merely a teenage stunt.”  Dr. Sultan 
also concluded Foster was depressed based on his reports to her that currently and 
in his teens he had episodes of depression.  However, these self-reports of 
depression which Foster provided his current experts were not provided to trial 
counsel, who had no indication that Foster had suffered any episodes of 
depression.  Dr. Gamache also testified that the data relied on by Dr. Sultan did not 
support her diagnosis that Foster suffered from bipolar disorder. 
As to whether defense counsel should have suspected Foster had brain 
damage or mental impairment based on earlier head injuries, Rinard testified that 
there were no records of Foster having received concussions.  Foster presented no 
 
- 28 - 
evidence at the hearing to substantiate his experts’ speculation that he had suffered 
concussions as a child.  Even Dr. Bordini, who based much of his diagnosis on the 
assumption that Foster had a history of concussions, conceded on cross-
examination that he saw no medical records supporting a history of concussions.  
Moreover, Dr. Wald evaluated Foster prior to trial and testified that his 
standard practice in such examination would be to look for any signs of mental 
illness or impairments.  Neither Rinard nor Wootton detected any obvious mental 
problems in their interactions with Foster.  Nothing in the medical or school 
records that trial counsel reviewed indicated that further mental evaluation was 
necessary.  Foster and his family members denied there were any mental problems, 
depression, or suicidal ideations.   
In concluding that trial counsel had no basis to suspect that Foster might 
have mental issues that required investigation, the circuit court cited the testimony 
at the evidentiary hearing by Ronald Newberry, who also testified at the penalty 
phase of trial, that Foster was “hyper” but was “just a normal, regular kid.”  The 
circuit court also noted that certain of Foster’s extended family members testified 
at the evidentiary hearing that Foster’s grandfather may have suffered from 
paranoia, his grandmother had dementia, his aunt was paranoid, an uncle had 
trouble with alcohol, and another aunt committed suicide.  However, they did not 
testify that they had seen any indications of these problems in Foster.  The court 
 
- 29 - 
also found no evidence to support the contention that Foster suffered mentally 
from the fact that his maternal grandfather essentially disowned his mother after 
she gave birth to him.   
We explained in Jones v. State, 998 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2008): 
While we do not require a mental health evaluation for 
mitigation purposes in every capital case, Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 
2d 25, 34 (Fla. 2005), and “Strickland does not require counsel to 
investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence . . . [or] 
present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case,” Wiggins [v. 
Smith], 539 U.S. [510,] 533, [(2003)], “an attorney has a strict duty to 
conduct a reasonable investigation of a defendant’s background for 
possible mitigating evidence.”  [State v.] Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 
[342,] 350 [(Fla. 2000)].  Where available information indicates that 
the defendant could have mental health problems, “such an evaluation 
is ‘fundamental in defending against the death penalty.’ ”  Arbelaez, 
898 So. 2d at 34 (quoting Bruno v. State, 807 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 
2001) (Anstead, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 
Jones, 998 So. 2d at 583 (emphasis added); see also Taylor v. State, 87 So. 3d 749, 
761-62 (Fla. 2012) (reiterating that when available information indicates the 
existence of mental health issues, an evaluation is fundamental (citing Jones, 998 
So. 2d at 583)).  In this case, available information did not point to the existence of 
mental health issues.  The Supreme Court in Strickland explained: 
The reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or 
substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions.  
Counsel’s actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed 
strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied 
by the defendant.  In particular, what investigation decisions are 
reasonable depends critically on such information.  For example, 
when the facts that support a certain potential line of defense are 
generally known to counsel because of what the defendant has said, 
 
- 30 - 
the need for further investigation may be considerably diminished or 
eliminated altogether.  And when a defendant has given counsel 
reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be 
fruitless or even harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those 
investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.  
 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (emphasis added); see also Anderson v. State, 18 So. 
3d 501, 509 (Fla. 2009) (rejecting claim that counsel was deficient for failing to 
uncover prior sexual abuse of defendant where defendant had denied such abuse 
prior to trial and described his childhood as normal (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 691)).   
We agree that Foster did not establish that trial counsel was deficient in 
failing to discover the information presented at the evidentiary hearing, failing to 
seek further psychological testing, or failing to present this information during the 
penalty phase of trial.  The experts presented by Foster at the hearing relied in 
large part on Foster’s self-reports of head trauma and depression, although neither 
Foster nor his mother ever reported that information to the defense team at the time 
of trial.  Nothing in the records presented at the evidentiary hearing substantiated 
the claim that red flags were raised indicating Foster might have brain damage or 
other mental impairments.  Trial counsel was never given any indication by Foster, 
his mother, his half-sister, or any of the other relatives or friends who testified at 
the penalty phase or at the postconviction evidentiary hearing that Foster had a 
 
- 31 - 
difficult childhood, was witness to any abuse in the home, had a history of mental 
illness in the family, was suicidal, or had a history of head trauma.   
The circuit court correctly determined that under the facts of this case Foster 
did not establish that counsel was deficient in failing to pursue further 
neuropsychological evaluation of Foster and in failing to present mental mitigation 
at trial.  The circuit court concluded that trial counsel made a reasonable tactical 
decision, based in part on Dr. Wald’s evaluation and on other information counsel 
obtained at the time of trial, not to pursue further neuropsychological evaluation.  
The court correctly found that the decision is not rendered deficient merely 
because Foster has now secured other experts who give a more favorable 
evaluation or diagnosis.  We have noted that simply because the defendant “found 
a new expert who reached conclusions different from those of the expert appointed 
during trial does not mean that relief is warranted.”  Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 42, 
59 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Cherry v. State, 781 So. 2d 1040, 1052 (Fla. 2000)).  
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, Foster’s counsel was not deficient 
in developing a mitigation strategy that sought to utilize the humanizing 
information about Foster as a smart, polite, helpful, normal youth who fell in with 
the wrong crowd and deserved to be spared the death penalty.   
Even if counsel erred in failing to discover and present the same evidence 
presented at the evidentiary hearing, we cannot conclude that “absent the errors, 
 
- 32 - 
the sentencer—including an appellate court, to the extent that it independently 
reweighs the evidence—would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.  “In 
assessing prejudice, ‘it is important to focus on the nature of the mental health 
mitigation’ now presented.”  Dufour, 905 So. 2d at 59 (quoting Rutherford v. State, 
727 So. 2d 216, 223 (Fla. 1998)).  The nature of the mitigation presented at the 
evidentiary hearing was not such that it would alter the balance of the aggravators 
and mitigators in any manner that undermines confidence in the result.  In 
sentencing, the trial court found and gave great weight to the aggravating factors 
that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful 
arrest and that it was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner 
without any pretense of moral or legal justification.  Even if the evidence now 
presented by postconviction counsel had been available to the jury and sentencing 
court, we cannot conclude there is a reasonable probability that the balance of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances would have been different or that 
counsel’s deficiencies, if any, substantially impair confidence in the outcome of the 
proceeding.  See Lukehart v. State, 70 So. 3d 503, 514 (Fla. 2011).   
Because nothing presented by Foster undermines our confidence in the 
outcome of the penalty phase proceedings, we affirm denial of relief on these 
claims. 
 
- 33 - 
D. Claim that Counsel Failed to Effectively 
Challenge the Avoid Arrest Aggravator13
 
 
Foster next contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to effectively 
challenge the avoid arrest aggravator.14
                                         
 
13.  Section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), sets forth the 
“avoid arrest” aggravator as follows: “The capital felony was committed for the 
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from 
custody.” 
  The circuit court’s order found that the 
trial transcript refutes this claim because trial counsel did challenge the 
aggravators.  We agree.  Defense counsel argued in the charging conference that 
“[d]uring this penalty phase the State has not offered any evidence of any 
aggravators, nor did it request of the court to take judicial notice, or to instruct the 
jurors of anything that happened during the guilt phase. . . .  We’re asking the 
Court at this time to instruct the jury that the only recommendation that they can 
come back with at this point in time is a recommendation of life, since the State 
has not presented any type of evidence.”  Defense counsel also argued to the trial 
court that there was no evidence presented during the guilt phase to support the 
 
14.  In his postconviction claim below, Foster contended that trial counsel 
was ineffective in failing to adequately challenge the aggravating factors.  On 
appeal, Foster contends that the trial court improperly applied the aggravating 
factor of “avoid arrest” and that the postconviction court denied Foster a hearing 
on this claim.  The circuit court’s order granting an evidentiary hearing did include 
the claim that trial counsel inadequately challenged the aggravating factors.  The 
court noted in its final order that Foster presented no evidence to demonstrate how 
trial counsel was inadequate. 
 
- 34 - 
avoid arrest aggravator.  He argued that the evidence only showed that Schwebes 
was going to report the incident to the school resource officer, not to law 
enforcement.  Defense counsel further argued to the trial court that there was no 
evidence there was going to be an imminent arrest or anything other than a school 
reprimand.   
Defense counsel argued to the penalty phase jury that the State failed to 
prove the avoid arrest aggravator because there was no evidence that avoiding 
arrest was the dominant factor in the murder, noting that it was Black and Torrone 
who were caught on the scene by Schwebes, not Foster, and that Schwebes only 
said he would contact the school resource officer.  Moreover, Foster argued in his 
direct appeal that the trial court erred both in finding and submitting the avoid 
arrest aggravator to the jury.  See Foster, 778 So. 2d at 918.  We rejected the claim, 
concluding that the evidence supported the avoid arrest aggravator and stating, 
“[T]he State established that Foster was concerned that he would ultimately be 
implicated should either Black or Torrone get arrested.  We therefore conclude that 
the trial court properly submitted and relied upon this aggravator in the sentencing 
phase.”  Id.   
Because Foster’s allegations of ineffective assistance in regard to the avoid 
arrest aggravator are merely conclusory, are conclusively refuted by the record, 
and raise matters already presented on direct appeal, the postconviction court 
 
- 35 - 
correctly denied this claim.  We turn next to the postconviction claims that were 
summarily denied. 
II. SUMMARILY DENIED CLAIMS 
Standard of Review 
The circuit court denied the remainder of Foster’s postconviction claims 
without a hearing.  Because a court’s decision whether to grant an evidentiary 
hearing on a rule 3.850 motion or claim is ultimately based on written materials 
before the court, its ruling is tantamount to a pure question of law subject to de 
novo review.  See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 (Fla. 2003).  Thus, this 
Court’s review is de novo.  A postconviction court may summarily deny a 
defendant’s claim asserted in a rule 3.850 motion if “(1) the motion, files, and 
records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, or 
(2) the motion or particular claim is legally insufficient.”  Franqui v. State, 59 So. 
3d 82, 95 (Fla. 2011).  Legally insufficient claims include those that are 
procedurally barred in collateral proceedings because they should have been raised 
on direct appeal.  See Johnson, 104 So. 3d at 1027.  In establishing a prima facie 
case based on a legally valid claim, “mere conclusory allegations are insufficient.”  
Franqui, 59 So. 3d at 96; see also Doorbal v. State, 983 So. 2d 464, 482 (Fla. 
2008).   
 
- 36 - 
When reviewing a circuit court’s summary denial of a rule 3.850 motion or 
claim, the Court must accept the movant’s factual allegations as true to the extent 
they are not refuted by the record.  See Nordelo v. State, 93 So. 3d 178, 184 (Fla. 
2012) (“[T]his Court must examine each claim to determine if it is legally 
sufficient, and if so, determine whether or not the claim is refuted by the record.” 
(quoting Hamilton v. State, 875 So. 2d 586, 591 (Fla. 2004))).  We turn next to 
Foster’s claims alleging juror misconduct as a basis for postconviction relief. 
A.  Summary Denial of Claim of Juror Misconduct 
1. Juror’s Denial of Prior Conviction 
Foster contends in this claim that the trial court erred in summarily denying 
his claim that the State committed a Brady violation when it failed to disclose the 
fact that Juror Q had been prosecuted by Lee County authorities and convicted of 
DUI twenty-four years earlier.  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  
During voir dire, the trial judge asked prospective Juror Q if he had ever been 
convicted of a crime or charged with a crime, to which he answered, “No, sir.”  
Juror Q did serve on the jury.  Foster contends the prejudice which flowed from 
this nondisclosure was that Juror Q may have decided to sentence Foster to death 
based on the juror’s past experiences with Lee County authorities, which were 
unknown to counsel.  Foster contends that the State had actual or constructive 
knowledge of this fact and failure to disclose it was a violation under Brady.  He 
 
- 37 - 
also contends that the State knowingly presented or failed to correct Juror Q’s false 
testimony in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).     
We explained in Lebron v. State, 799 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2001), that “[a] 
juror’s nondisclosure of information during voir dire warrants a new trial if it is 
established that the information is relevant and material to jury service in the case, 
the juror concealed the information during questioning, and failure to disclose the 
information was not attributable to counsel’s lack of diligence.”  Id. at 1014.  See 
also De La Rosa v. Zequeira, 659 So. 2d 239, 241 (Fla. 1995) (same).  More 
recently, we held that the movant must at least allege facts establishing a prima 
facie basis for prejudice.  See Hampton v. State, 103 So. 3d 98, 112-13 (Fla. 2012), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2027 (2013).  In Hampton, we reiterated that the 
complaining party must establish “not only that the non-disclosed matter was 
‘relevant’ . . .  but also that it is ‘material to jury service in the case.’ ”  Hampton, 
103 So. 3d at 112 (quoting Roberts v. Tejada, 814 So. 2d 334, 339 (Fla. 2002) 
(quoting De La Rosa, 659 So. 2d at 241)). 
In Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d 730 (Fla. 2011), we explained, “There is no 
per se rule that [a juror’s] involvement in any particular prior legal matter is or is 
not material.  Factors that may be considered in evaluating materiality include the 
remoteness in time of a juror’s prior exposure, the character and extensiveness of 
the experience, and the juror’s posture in the litigation.”  Id. at 738 (citations 
 
- 38 - 
omitted) (quoting Roberts, 814 So. 2d at 345).  Again, in this postconviction 
context, the movant must establish that the undisclosed information was relevant 
and material to jury service.  Id.15
The claim filed by Foster failed to allege a prima facie basis for concluding 
that the undisclosed twenty-four-year-old DUI conviction, even if verified, was 
relevant or material to Juror Q’s jury service.  Just as we noted in Johnston, 
“nothing about the character and extensiveness of [the juror’s] own experience” in 
being convicted of a nonviolent offense “suggests [the juror] would be biased 
against a defendant pleading not guilty in a death penalty case.”  Johnston, 63 So. 
3d at 739.   
 
To the extent that Foster was denied a hearing on his Brady claim that the 
State knowingly failed to disclose this juror information resulting in prejudice, the 
claim was correctly summarily denied.  In order to establish a Brady violation, the 
defendant must show that (1) favorable evidence—either exculpatory or 
impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) that 
because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.  See Rimmer v. 
State, 59 So. 3d 763, 785 (Fla. 2010) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 
                                         
 
15.  The postconviction court denied Foster’s separate motion to interview 
Juror Q, finding that “[t]he alleged fact that Mr. [Q] was a defendant in a 
misdemeanor DUI case would not be material to his service as a juror in a murder 
trial. . . .  Mr. [Q’s] prior criminal case is also not material because it is too remote 
in time as, according to Defendant, it was 24 years prior to the juror’s service.”   
 
- 39 - 
281-82 (1999)).  To meet the materiality prong under Brady, the defendant must 
“demonstrate a reasonable probability that had the suppressed evidence been 
disclosed the jury would have reached a different verdict,” a reasonable probability 
being one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  Rimmer, 59 So. 3d 
at 785.  Foster has not met this test.  Even assuming that the State knew or had 
constructive knowledge of this information and should have disclosed it, the 
information was not related to guilt or punishment, nor was it exculpatory or 
impeaching, and nothing set forth in the claim demonstrates it would have been 
material or favorable to Foster.  See Evans v. State, 995 So. 2d 933, 951 (Fla. 
2008) (denying Brady claim where information is neither exculpatory nor 
impeaching); see also Smith v. State, 931 So. 2d 790, 798 (Fla. 2006) (same).   
To the extent Foster makes a claim under Giglio that the State knowingly 
allowed the presentation of false testimony on voir dire, the claim was also 
properly summarily denied.  In order to demonstrate a Giglio violation, “a 
defendant must show that: (1) the prosecutor presented or failed to correct false 
testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the false 
evidence was material.”  Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1091 (Fla. 2008) 
(quoting Rhodes v. State, 986 So. 2d 501, 508-09 (Fla. 2008)).  As discussed 
above, Foster’s claim failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that the juror’s 
 
- 40 - 
false statement was material to his jury service and thus prejudicial.  For these 
reasons, the circuit court’s summary denial of this claim is affirmed. 
2. Consideration of Pretrial Publicity by Juror M 
In this allegation of juror misconduct, Foster contends that Juror M gave an 
untruthful response in voir dire about her knowledge of Foster’s case gleaned from 
local media coverage and about her ability to be fair.  He contends that despite her 
assurances that she could be fair, her response was untruthful because at some 
unknown time she mentally compared photographs she viewed at trial with those 
she had seen in the newspaper before being empanelled.  Foster alleged that he 
obtained this information from the 2006 book Someone Has to Die Tonight.  
Foster claims that the book reveals Juror M told the author that the photographs 
shown in court “detailed more than what was in the paper.”   
Foster’s motion conceded that when Juror M was asked on voir dire whether 
she had acquired any knowledge of the case from local news media, she responded 
that she had learned about the case from the newspaper and television.  When 
asked if that information would affect her impartiality, she responded that she did 
not think so.  When asked if she could set aside the information that she may have 
heard or seen in the paper and base her verdict solely on the evidence or the lack of 
evidence at trial, she said she thought she could.   
 
- 41 - 
To the extent that Foster is claiming the information he learned from the 
book is newly discovered evidence entitling him to a new trial, the postconviction 
court was correct in summarily denying it.  To obtain a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence, the defendant must show that evidence was not known by the 
trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial and the defendant could not 
have known of it by use of due diligence.  Second, the evidence “must be of such 
nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”  See Johnston v. 
State, 27 So. 3d 11, 18 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 
(Fla. 1998)).  Summary denial of a postconviction motion alleging newly 
discovered evidence will be upheld if the motion is legally insufficient or its 
allegations are conclusively refuted by the record.  McLin v. State, 827 So. 2d 948, 
954 (Fla. 2002).  The allegations in Foster’s motion concerning Juror M are legally 
insufficient and summary denial of this claim was proper.   
Even if it is taken as true that Juror M made the alleged comments to the 
author concerning the difference between the photographs in the newspaper and 
those at trial, there are no facts set forth that would suggest she made those same 
mental comparisons during trial or during her jury deliberations rather than at some 
point afterward when she was interviewed.  Even if she mentally noted during trial 
that the trial photographs showed more than the photographs in the newspaper, 
such does not indicate that she relied on evidence outside of court or was not fair 
 
- 42 - 
and impartial—or most importantly, that she lied during voir dire when she said 
she thought she could be fair.  Finally, if she made those mental comparisons 
during deliberations, such would inhere in the verdict and her mental 
considerations are not subject to challenge.  See Reaves v. State, 826 So. 2d 932, 
943 (Fla. 2002).  For these reasons, the trial court was correct in summarily 
denying this claim that Juror M lied during voir dire about her prior knowledge of 
the case and her ability to be fair. 
Foster fails to make clear whether he is raising this claim as one of newly 
discovered evidence or whether he is seeking appellate review of the trial court’s 
denial of his motion to interview jurors.  To the extent that this claim is an appeal 
of the trial court’s denial of a jury interview, we conclude that the circuit court’s 
denial of relief was proper.  Foster filed a motion for juror interview pursuant to 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.575 on September 28, 2010, seeking to 
interview Juror M on the grounds that the Greenhill book reported Juror M’s 
comments about the photographs.  A motion for juror interview must set forth 
allegations that are not merely speculative or conclusory, or concern matters that 
inhere in the verdict.  See State v. Monserrate-Jacobs, 89 So. 3d 294, 296 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2012).  The postconviction court denied the motion, finding that allegations 
that Juror M may have compared the evidence presented at trial with her memory 
of prior news accounts were speculative and conclusory, or were subjective 
 
- 43 - 
impressions after the jury was discharged, and that the allegations concerned 
matters that inhered in the verdict itself.  The court therefore concluded that the 
allegations did not allege juror misconduct and the motion to interview was denied.   
“A trial court’s decision on a motion to interview jurors is reviewed pursuant 
to an abuse of discretion standard.”  Anderson v. State, 18 So. 3d 501, 519 (Fla. 
2009).  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.575 requires that a party must have 
reason to believe the verdict may be subject to legal challenge to warrant a juror 
interview.  Juror interviews are not permitted as to matters which inhere in the 
verdict.  See Reaves, 826 So. 2d at 943.  Moreover, “[i]n order to be entitled to 
juror interviews, [a defendant] must present ‘sworn allegations that, if true, would 
require the court to order a new trial because the alleged error was so fundamental 
and prejudicial as to vitiate the entire proceedings.’ ”  Id. (quoting Johnson v. 
State, 804 So. 2d 1218, 1225 (Fla. 2001)).   
Rule 4-3.5 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar also sets limits on an 
attorney’s ability to interview jurors.  We have repeatedly held that this rule does 
not deny a defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel in pursuing 
postconviction relief.  See Reese v. State, 14 So. 3d 913, 919 (Fla. 2009) (noting 
that the Court has held that neither rule 3.575 nor rule 4-3.5 violates a defendant’s 
constitutional rights); Evans v. State, 995 So. 2d 933, 952 (Fla. 2008) (“Without 
more substantial allegations of how juror Taylor’s single ‘yes or no’ response 
 
- 44 - 
prejudiced the entire proceeding, this appears to be a ‘fishing expedition’ after a 
guilty verdict has been returned.”).  Because the rules are valid, and because the 
postconviction motion and the argument on appeal present only speculative and 
conclusory allegations concerning Juror M which, on their face, fail to provide a 
reasonable basis for the court to conclude that the verdict was illegal and that a 
juror interview should have been granted, the postconviction court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Foster’s motion to interview jurors.  For all the foregoing 
reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of this claim. 
3. Jurors’ Failure to Follow Jury Instructions 
The circuit court also summarily denied Foster’s claim that the jurors 
violated the trial judge’s instruction that they were to draw no inference of guilt 
from Foster’s failure to testify.  Foster contends that the jury foreman was quoted 
in the Greenhill book as saying that Foster did not give the jury much to go on and 
that he “sat emotionless during the whole thing.”  Citing the Greenhill book, Foster 
contends that the jury foreman “thought” Foster should “get up there and set the 
record straight” and Juror Q “thought” Foster was “like a bump on a log” without 
emotion.  Foster also contends that other jurors, including Juror M, were adamant 
that Foster should show remorse and that they used lack of remorse as a 
nonstatutory aggravator.   
 
- 45 - 
In the postconviction court’s order denying the juror interview, the court 
stated: 
There does not appear to be any authority which would support 
Defendant’s argument that a motion to interview jurors relying solely 
upon information culled from news articles or a true crime novel, 
without the support of sworn facts or record evidence, would be 
cognizable.  There has been no demonstration that the alleged quotes 
from jurors in the news articles or book were accurate recollections, 
were the juror’s complete statements, were unedited, or were not 
taken out of context.  
  
For the same reasons set forth above, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying juror interviews relative to this claim.  Moreover, Foster’s claim 
focuses solely on the jury’s deliberations, something that we have specifically held 
to be impermissible.  See, e.g., Vining v. State, 827 So. 2d 201, 216 (Fla. 2002) 
(“[T]his Court has cautioned ‘against permitting jury interviews to support post-
conviction relief’ for allegations which focus upon jury deliberations.” (quoting  
Johnson v. State, 593 So. 2d 206, 210 (Fla. 1992))); Reaves, 826 So. 2d at 943 
(holding that matters which inhere in the verdict and the jury’s deliberations are 
not subject to challenge).  “[A] verdict cannot be subsequently impeached by 
conduct which inheres in the verdict and relates to the jury’s deliberations.”  
Johnson, 593 So. 2d at 210 (quoting Mitchell v. State, 527 So. 2d 179, 181 (Fla. 
1988)).  This rule of law extends even to allegations that jurors improperly 
considered a defendant’s failure to testify, “a matter which essentially inheres in 
 
- 46 - 
the verdict itself.”  Reaves, 826 So. 2d at 943 (quoting Sims v. State, 444 So. 2d 
922, 925 (Fla. 1983)).   
Because the allegations were legally insufficient to require an evidentiary 
hearing and because the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
juror interview, we affirm the circuit court’s summary denial of this claim. 
B.  Summary Denial of Claim of Failure to Impanel an Impartial Jury 
 
 
Foster next contends that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to secure 
a change of venue due to his deficient questioning of prospective jurors concerning 
their knowledge of pretrial publicity in the case.  Foster notes that defense counsel 
filed seventeen amendments to his initial motion for change of venue.  During jury 
selection at trial, the court denied the motions for change of venue, but conducted 
separate voir dire with the prospective jurors prior to the guilt phase concerning 
their familiarity with the news coverage and its effect on their potential jury 
service.  Prior to the penalty phase, after Foster had been found guilty and that fact 
had been reported in the news, the trial court did not allow individual voir dire to 
determine if any jurors had seen or heard the coverage, but asked the panel as a 
whole if anyone had been exposed to the media coverage.  No jurors indicated that 
they had.   
On direct appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s denial of a change of venue, 
holding in pertinent part:  
 
- 47 - 
Foster provided voluminous records of various newspaper 
articles and television news accounts of pretrial publicity. . . .  
In contrast to the above-cited articles, most of the articles relied 
upon were not inflammatory.  Instead, they reported on the stages and 
activities of the prosecution and on plea agreements entered into by 
the other members of the Lords of Chaos.  In fact, in one of the 
articles, Foster’s defense counsel was quoted as saying that he had 
expected the plea agreements and had been preparing for them all 
along.  Some articles focused on Schwebes’ life and his contribution 
to the community.  Still, others focused on students’ reaction to and 
coping with the incident and on the state of various programs dealing 
with teenagers.  Many others simply commented on and updated the 
proceedings in the case.  We conclude that the media coverage as a 
whole did not reach such an inflammatory level to have irreversibly 
infected the community so as to preclude an attempt to secure an 
impartial jury. 
 
Foster, 778 So. 2d at 913.  Foster essentially reargues the merits of the trial court’s 
denial of his motions for change of venue, a matter which was raised and decided 
on direct appeal.  We have made clear that “[a]llegations of ineffective assistance 
cannot be used to circumvent the rule that postconviction proceedings cannot serve 
as a second appeal.”  Medina v. State, 573 So. 2d 293, 295 (Fla. 1990), quoted in 
Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 1995).  
 
Foster also claims that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to 
convince the trial court to allow individual “questionnaires” of the prospective 
jurors.  However, he does not explain how the questionnaires would have differed 
from the individual voir dire of the jurors that did take place.  He also complains 
that counsel was ineffective because he could not convince the trial court to allow 
individual questioning of the jurors about media coverage just before the penalty 
 
- 48 - 
phase began.  However, he alleges no facts to indicate that the jurors, who were 
under the court’s directive not to read, watch, or listen to anything about the case, 
were not being truthful with the court when they indicated upon the court’s inquiry 
prior to the penalty phase that they had not been exposed to any media reports.  
As an element of this postconviction claim, Foster also argues that the rules 
prohibiting counsel from interviewing jurors prevented his postconviction counsel 
from adequately exploring possible juror biases and juror misconduct.  As noted 
earlier, we have repeatedly held that the rules prohibiting juror interviews do not 
impair postconviction counsel’s ability to pursue claims.  See, e.g., Evans, 995 So. 
2d at 952.  Because Foster’s contentions of ineffective assistance of counsel are 
conclusory and because the record refutes the allegation that proper inquiry was 
not made of the jurors concerning the effect of media coverage on their potential 
jury service, the postconviction court properly summarily denied these claims. 
C.  Summary Denial of Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
1.  Failure to Challenge the State’s Ballistics Expert and Evidence 
 
Foster next contends that the postconviction court erred in summarily 
denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an expert 
to challenge the State’s ballistics expert, Bill Hornsby, a firearm and tool mark 
examiner.  Foster contends trial counsel should have challenged Hornsby as to why 
 
- 49 - 
he did not perform standard firing comparisons generally performed in the field of 
ballistics when he tested the shotgun.   
At trial, Hornsby explained that the barrels of shotguns and those of rifles 
and pistols are different because shotgun barrels are “smooth bore” and do not 
have the grooves and imperfections, called “rifling,” which appear in the barrels of 
rifles and pistols and which allow testing to determine if a particular projectile 
traveled through a particular barrel.  Hornsby testified that based on the testing he 
could perform, he could say that the two fired shotgun shells found at the scene 
had previously been chambered in and extracted from the Mossberg shotgun which 
he had been provided for testing.  This conclusion was based on testing he 
performed by firing several shotgun shells from that same shotgun and, using a 
comparison microscope, comparing the ejector marks on both sets of shells.  He 
also compared the striations made on the shells by the extractor, which is the 
device that pulls the shell from the chamber prior to ejection.  Finally, he compared 
the stop marks on both sets of shells, which are marks made on the shell when the 
slide moves the shell up into the chamber to be fired.  Hornsby conceded that he 
could not say the two shotgun shells found at the scene were “fired” from the 
Mossberg shotgun, only that at one time they had been chambered and ejected 
from that shotgun.  He also conceded that he could not say whether the shotgun 
pellets taken from Schwebes’ body came from a 12-gauge or some other gauge 
 
- 50 - 
shotgun shell.  However, Hornsby was certain that the 12-gauge three-inch #1 
buckshot fired shotgun shells found at the scene had been cycled through the 
Mossberg shotgun.   
Foster’s motion did not specify how his hypothetical expert would raise 
doubts about the testing Hornsby did.  Even if defense counsel could have 
presented expert testimony that other tests existed which could have been 
performed, Foster’s allegations do not explain how those other tests would have 
resulted in a conclusion that the shells found at the scene were not at one time 
chambered in and ejected from Foster’s shotgun.  Finally, even if trial counsel 
were somehow deficient in failing to present its own ballistics expert, Foster has 
not explained what prejudice flows from that deficiency.  As noted earlier, in order 
to prove prejudice under the second prong of Strickland, a defendant must show 
that, but for counsel’s deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that there would 
have been a different outcome, a reasonable probability being one sufficient to 
undermine confidence in that outcome.  See Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 
487-88 (Fla. 2012).  In this case, the facts set forth by Foster in his motion and in 
his claim on appeal fail to show that, but for trial counsel’s alleged deficient 
conduct in failing to present a ballistics expert, there is a reasonable probability of 
a different outcome such that our confidence is undermined.  Thus, the circuit court 
correctly denied this claim. 
 
- 51 - 
2.  Failure to Challenge Admissibility of Scientific Evidence 
 
Foster also contends that the postconviction court erred in summarily 
denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Frye 
hearing to test the expert ballistic testimony concerning the source of the spent 
shotgun shell casings found at the scene.  The court in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 
1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), held that before scientific evidence is generally 
admissible, it must be based on methodology that is sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.  See id. at 
1014.  
There is no question that “tool-mark identification in the context of ballistics 
has been used in the criminal context since at least 1929, and in Florida since at 
least 1937.”  King v. State, 89 So. 3d 209, 228 (Fla. 2012).  In King, we held that 
tool mark examination in ballistics has been a well-documented methodology over 
the last century and is not new or novel.  Id.  We also note that in Commonwealth 
v. Whitacre, 878 A.2d 96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania was presented with the issue of tool mark testimony concerning spent 
shotgun shells found at the scene of a crime, which were then compared with test-
fired shotgun shells.  In that case, a Frye hearing was held on the evidence 
presented by the firearm and tool mark examiner, who had determined by use of a 
comparison microscope that the spent shells had been discharged from a particular 
 
- 52 - 
shotgun.  Id. at 100-01.  The appellate court concluded that the comparison 
methodology used on the shotgun shells had been in use since the 1930s, is a 
methodology that is accepted by the Association of Firearm and Tool Mark 
Examiners, and was neither new nor original.  Id. at 101.   
Because tool mark examination in ballistics, which was employed by the 
State’s expert in this case, is not a new or novel methodology, Foster’s trial 
counsel was not deficient in failing to demand a Frye hearing before admission of 
the testimony.  In addition, because Foster’s claim is conclusory and unspecific, 
and fails to allege any facts that support his allegation that the tool mark and 
firearms testimony by Hornsby was unreliable, the postconviction court did not err 
in summarily denying this claim. 
3.  Failure to Object to Non-Expert Testimony 
 
Foster’s next claim concerns defense counsel’s alleged failure to object to 
the testimony of the lead forensic crime scene investigator Richard Joslin when he 
commented on the nature of the wounds suffered by Schwebes and on the origin of 
a piece of paper he found at the scene.  As to Schwebes’ wounds, Joslin testified 
that in his experience he had seen other wounds consistent with the injuries he saw 
on Schwebes and that in his experience those were consistent with shotgun 
injuries.  He also testified that he found small metallic objects in the wall of 
Schwebes’ home that looked consistent with pellets from a shotgun cartridge.  
 
- 53 - 
Joslin was present at the autopsy and observed the chief medical examiner remove 
“some small metallic items consistent with pellets from the victim’s pelvic region, 
and also from his head,” and Joslin took possession of the pellets at that time.  
Joslin also testified that he found a small disk of paper at the crime scene 
consistent with the inner makings of a shotgun cartridge.  On cross-examination, 
defense counsel elicited testimony from Joslin that there was no physical evidence 
that connected Foster with the crime scene, and he agreed there were no 
fingerprints on the shotgun shell casings found at the scene.   
 
Foster contends that if defense counsel had objected to Joslin’s testimony in 
which he said that, in his experience, the wounds looked consistent with other 
wounds he had seen in the past caused by shotgun pellets, and his testimony that 
the paper disk found on the scene looked consistent with wadding that comes out 
of shotgun shells, there is a probability that the outcome of this trial would have 
been different.  As noted above, Foster is not required to show that counsel’s 
deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome of the proceeding, but 
instead must only establish a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in that 
outcome.  See Simmons, 105 So. 3d at 487.  We first note that Foster’s trial 
counsel did object that Joslin was not qualified to testify about whether in his 
experience he had observed other wounds in the past that were consistent with the 
wounds he observed on Schwebes.  However, Joslin was not testifying as a 
 
- 54 - 
ballistics expert but only testifying from his experience as a crime scene 
investigator that certain things appeared consistent with his experience.  Further, 
other testimony and evidence established beyond any doubt that the wounds were 
in fact shotgun pellet wounds and that spent shotgun shells that had been cycled 
through Foster’s shotgun were in fact found at the scene. Thus, counsel’s error, if 
any, does not undermine this Court’s confidence in the outcome.  The 
postconviction court did not err in summarily denying this claim. 
4.  Trial Counsel’s Alleged Failure to Challenge Hearsay 
 
 
The next subject of Foster’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective concerns 
whether trial counsel “effectively” challenged the hearsay testimony of 
codefendants Young, Shields, and Magnotti.  Foster also contends that trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to “properly object” to David Adkins’ testimony that 
Schwebes told him he intended to report Black and Torrone to the school resource 
officer.  We find no merit in these claims. 
Taking Adkins’ testimony first, Foster contends in this appeal that 
“[c]ounsel’s failure to raise a contemporaneous objection to or effectively 
challenge Adkins’ hearsay testimony rendered his assistance ineffective.”  
However, defense counsel not only objected to the testimony during trial, he filed a 
pretrial motion in limine to prevent the hearsay testimony of Adkins from being 
presented.  Thus, the trial court correctly summarily denied the claim as it 
 
- 55 - 
pertained to Adkins’ testimony—it was conclusively refuted by the record.  
Moreover, the predicate for the claim—that Adkins’ hearsay testimony was 
inadmissible—was raised on direct appeal and the testimony was found to be 
inadmissible but harmless.  See Foster, 778 So. 2d at 916.  Thus, the claim is 
procedurally barred. 
As to the hearsay testimony of Foster’s codefendants Young, Shields, and 
Magnotti concerning what Black said about Schwebes’ threat to report Black and 
Torrone to the school resource officer, the postconviction court also correctly 
summarily denied this claim.  The claim is both procedurally barred and 
conclusively refuted by the record.  Trial counsel did object to this hearsay 
testimony and on direct appeal we held: 
Foster argues that the statements of Magnotti, Young, and 
Shields, which repeated what Black had told them regarding 
Schwebes’ statement to Black and Torrone about reporting them to 
campus authorities, constituted hearsay within hearsay and, therefore, 
were not admissible.  We conclude that the trial court properly 
admitted these statements to establish both knowledge and motive, 
rather than to establish the factual truth of the contents of the 
statements.  Specifically, these statements were introduced to show, 
first, that Foster and the rest of the group members present had 
knowledge of the statement made by Schwebes.  
 
Foster, 778 So. 2d at 915.  Even though counsel did object and we ruled on the 
issue on direct appeal, Foster now contends that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to move in limine to exclude that hearsay testimony.  Foster may not use the 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in an attempt to circumvent the 
 
- 56 - 
procedural bar presented by this Court’s ruling on direct appeal.  See Gore v. State, 
846 So. 2d 461, 466 n.4 (Fla. 2003) (“Gore cannot now attempt to resurrect these 
issues as ineffective assistance of counsel claims on appeal to this Court by making 
conclusory allegations of counsel’s ineffectiveness.”).  
Moreover, “a defendant may not simply file a motion for postconviction 
relief containing conclusory allegations . . . and then expect to receive an 
evidentiary hearing.  The defendant must allege specific facts that, when 
considering the totality of the circumstances, are not conclusively rebutted by the 
record. . . .”  Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255, 1258-59 (Fla. 2003) (quoting 
Kennedy v. State, 547 So. 2d 912, 913 (Fla. 1989)).  Because the claim that trial 
counsel failed to object to this testimony is conclusively rebutted by the record and 
procedurally barred, the postconviction court correctly summarily denied this 
claim.  
D.  Brady/Giglio and Newly Discovered Evidence Claims 
that the Forensic Science Evidence at Trial is Invalid 
 
 
Although Foster characterized this issue on appeal as both a newly 
discovered evidence claim and a Brady/Giglio claim, he fails to make any 
argument as to the forensic evidence that the State knowingly presented false 
testimony or evidence, or that it withheld any exculpatory or impeaching evidence.  
In a brief conclusory argument, he also contends that trial counsel was ineffective 
in failing to challenge the forensic evidence, based in large part on the same 
 
- 57 - 
criticisms and concerns expressed in a 2009 report issued by the National 
Academy of Sciences Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic 
Sciences Community titled Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A 
Path Forward.16
In order to make a newly discovered evidence claim, Foster first must allege 
sufficient facts showing that the evidence was unknown by the trial court, the 
party, or his counsel, and that his counsel could not have known of it by use of due 
diligence.  Second, if the evidence is newly discovered, it must be such that on 
retrial the defendant would probably be acquitted.  Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 
21 (Fla. 2010) (citing Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998)).  This Court 
held in Johnston that the same 2009 report cited by Foster does not meet the test 
for newly discovered evidence.  We explained: 
   
First, we note that the report cites to existing publications, some 
of which were published even before Mary Hammond’s [1983] 
murder.  The majority of the remaining publications were published 
during the years when Johnston was pursuing postconviction relief.  
Therefore, we decline to conclude that the report is newly discovered 
evidence.  Moreover, even if the report were newly discovered 
evidence, we conclude that the report lacks the specificity that would 
justify a conclusion that it provides a basis to find the forensic 
evidence admitted at trial to be infirm or faulty. . . .  Nothing in the 
report renders the forensic techniques used in this case unreliable, and 
                                         
 
16.  See Nat’l Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the 
United States: A Path Forward (2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf. 
 
 
- 58 - 
we note that Johnston has not identified how the article would 
demonstrate, in any specific way, that the testing methods or opinions 
in his case were deficient. 
 
Johnston, 27 So. 3d at 21-22 (bracketed material added).  Similarly in this case, the 
report cites to existing publications, some of which were published before 
Schwebes’ murder and many of which were published during the years when 
Foster was pursuing postconviction relief.  Most importantly, new research studies 
are not recognized as newly discovered evidence.  See Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 
318, 325 (Fla. 2007) (holding that “new opinions” or “new research studies” 
contained in journal articles are not newly discovered evidence); see also 
Rutherford v. State, 940 So. 2d 1112, 1117 (Fla. 2006) (holding American Bar 
Association report published in 2006 was not newly discovered evidence because it 
was “a compilation of previously available information related to Florida’s death 
penalty system”).  Finally, just as we noted in Johnston, “[n]othing in the report 
renders the forensic techniques used in this case unreliable” and Foster “has not 
identified how the article would demonstrate, in any specific way, that the testing 
methods or opinions in his case were deficient.”  Johnston, 27 So. 3d at 21-22.   
 
As to Foster’s conclusory claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing 
to challenge all the forensic evidence, the claim was also properly summarily 
denied.  For all these reasons, we affirm the postconviction court’s summary denial 
of this claim.  
 
- 59 - 
E.  Summary Denial of Lethal Injection Claim 
 
Foster next contends that the postconviction court erred in summarily 
denying his claim that Florida’s lethal injection procedure violates the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution, although he concedes that this Court has 
repeatedly rejected challenges to Florida’s lethal injection protocol.  Foster 
contends that the Department of Corrections (DOC) protocol now calling for the 
substitution of pentobarbital for the sodium thiopental that had previously been 
used in the procedure renders the lethal injection procedure unconstitutional.  He 
bases this claim primarily on the allegation that in 2011 the Danish pharmaceutical 
company Lundbeck, Inc., which then held the license to produce pentobarbital in 
this country, sought to stop the United States from using the drug to execute 
prisoners.   
We made clear in Pardo v. State, 108 So. 3d 558 (Fla. 2012), in rejecting 
Pardo’s constitutional challenge to the use of pentobarbital, that to raise a 
successful Eighth Amendment challenge, the defendant must demonstrate that “the 
conditions presenting the risk must be ‘sure or very likely to cause serious illness 
or needless suffering,’ and give rise to ‘sufficiently imminent dangers.’ ”  Id. at 
562 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 49-50 (2008) (quoting Helling v. 
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 34-35 (1993))).  We also rejected this same challenge to 
the use of pentobarbital in Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 540-41 (Fla.), cert. denied, 
 
- 60 - 
132 S. Ct. 1 (2011), where an evidentiary hearing was held and expert testimony 
presented.  We held in Valle that “[t]o the extent Valle asserts that the use of 
pentobarbital creates a risk of serious harm in light of the fact that it may be from a 
foreign source or lacks FDA approval for use in lethal injections, we reject these 
claims, as other courts have similarly done.”  70 So. 3d at 541 n.13 (citing Brewer 
v. Landrigan, 131 S. Ct. 445, 445 (2010)).  We also held in Valle that the facts that 
Lundbeck sent letters to the DOC and the Governor stating that the use of 
pentobarbital in lethal injection was outside the approved label and that Lundbeck 
could not assure the safety and efficacy of its use in executions—and requesting 
that it not be used in executions—do not establish a substantial risk of serious 
harm.  Id. at 542.  Similarly, in Ferguson v. Warden, 493 Fed. App’x 22 (11th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 498 (2012), an unpublished opinion, the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to the use of pentobarbital in the 
lethal injection sequence.  See Ferguson, 493 Fed. App’x at 25 (citing Valle v. 
Singer, 655 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2011)).   
Foster attempts to distinguish his claim from those in prior cases by 
contending that if granted an evidentiary hearing, he would call witnesses from 
Lundbeck, Inc., to testify about the properties of the drug, and that he would call 
witnesses to testify about how the DOC is obtaining the drug and whether that 
process is in compliance with state and federal regulations, given that pentobarbital 
 
- 61 - 
is a schedule II regulated substance under section 893.03(2), Florida Statutes 
(2012).  Foster also contends that Baze left open the question of the 
constitutionality of lethal injection where it is not carried out as written and that 
Florida’s history of deviating from execution procedures is relevant to that inquiry.  
This allegation relies on the conclusory and speculative assertion that Florida will 
not adhere to its execution procedures.  However, we held in Pardo that in making 
such a challenge, the defendant cannot rely on conjecture or speculation.  108 So. 
3d at 565.  Because these asserted reasons for holding an evidentiary hearing in 
this case are either based on conjecture and speculation or pertain only to matters 
that are unrelated to whether use of the drug would constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment, denial of relief on this claim was proper. 
F.  Summary Denial of Newly Discovered Evidence Claim that 
Foster’s Death Sentence Constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
 
Foster’s next claim concerns the American Bar Association Death Penalty 
Moratorium Implementation Project and the Florida Death Penalty Assessment 
Team report titled Evaluating Fairness and Accuracy in the State Death Penalty 
Systems: The Florida Death Penalty Assessment Report, September 17, 2006.  
Foster contends that the conclusions in the report show that the death penalty 
system in Florida is seriously flawed and that the problem areas identified in the 
report demonstrate the State’s inability to produce a reliable result in a capital case.  
For this reason, he urges the Court to find Florida’s death penalty violates the 
 
- 62 - 
constitution.  However, this Court has rejected identical claims based on the 2006 
ABA report in a number of prior cases.  See, e.g., Siebert v. State, 64 So. 3d 67, 
83-84 (Fla. 2010) (rejecting claim based on the ABA report and reiterating that 
nothing in the report would cause the Court to recede from its past decisions 
upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 
1072, 1082-83 (Fla. 2008) (“[T]his Court has repeatedly rejected the claim that the 
ABA Report in question is newly discovered evidence.”); Power v. State, 992 So. 
2d 218, 222 (Fla. 2008) (reiterating that nothing in the report would cause the 
Court to recede from past decisions holding the death penalty constitutional and 
finding that “Power has ‘not allege[d] how any of the conclusions in the report 
would render his individual death sentence unconstitutional.’ ” (quoting Rolling v. 
State, 944 So. 2d 176, 181 (Fla. 2006))); Rutherford v. State, 940 So. 2d 1112, 
1118 (Fla. 2006) (“[N]othing therein would cause this Court to recede from its 
decisions upholding the facial constitutionality of the death penalty.”).  We also 
held in Walton v. State, 3 So. 3d 1000, 1013 (Fla. 2009), that although Walton 
attempted to allege that the ABA report’s conclusions rendered his individual death 
sentence unconstitutional, the allegations related only to generalities that were 
noted in the report and did not relate in any specific way to the defendant’s death 
sentence.   
 
- 63 - 
For these reasons, we find that this claim is without merit and affirm the 
postconviction court’s summary denial.   
G.  Claim that Cumulative Error Requires a New Trial 
 
In Foster’s cumulative error claim he contends that he did not receive the 
fundamentally fair trial to which he was entitled under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and that due process was violated by the “sheer number and types of 
errors involved in his trial, when considered as a whole.”  As grounds for this 
claim, he cites only “flaws in the system that convicted Mr. Foster” which have 
been “pointed out throughout not only this pleading, but also in Mr. Foster’s direct 
appeal and his 3.850 Motion.”  We explained in Troy v. State, 57 So. 3d 828 (Fla. 
2011), that where multiple errors are discovered, even if each standing alone is 
considered harmless, the cumulative effect of such errors may deny the defendant a 
fair trial.  Id. at 844 (citing McDuffie v. State, 970 So. 2d 312, 328 (Fla. 2007)).  
“However, where the allegations of individual error are procedurally barred or 
meritless, a claim of cumulative error also fails.”  Id. (citing Israel v. State, 985 So. 
2d 510, 520 (Fla. 2008)); see also Delhall v. State, 95 So. 3d 134, 166 (Fla. 2012); 
Rogers v. State, 957 So. 2d 538, 554 (Fla. 2007); Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 
380 (Fla. 2005); Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861, 871 (Fla. 2003); Downs v. State, 
740 So. 2d 506, 509 n.5 (Fla. 1999).  On direct appeal, this Court did find several 
errors in improper admission of hearsay, which we held were harmless.  However, 
 
- 64 - 
because we find no error has been demonstrated in this appeal that can be 
considered cumulatively with any other errors, relief is denied on this claim. 
H.  Summary Denial of Claim that Death Sentence Violates the 
Constitutional Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
 
Foster next contends the postconviction court erred in denying his claim that 
his death sentence is unconstitutional because Standard Jury Instruction (Crim.) 
7.11, which instructs jurors on their role in the penalty phase of trial, failed to 
provide the jury with a clear understanding of its role in sentencing.  Foster’s 
substantive challenge to the standard jury instruction in this appeal is procedurally 
barred.  See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 37 So. 3d 243, 262 (Fla. 2010) (“Stewart’s 
substantive challenge to the [penalty phase] jury instructions is procedurally barred 
because it could have been raised on direct appeal.”).   
  
Moreover, even if not barred, Foster’s claims are without merit.  In Patrick 
v. State, 104 So. 3d 1046 (Fla. 2012), cert. denied, --- S. Ct. ----, 2013 WL 
1915248 (2013), we reiterated that the claim that the standard jury instructions 
impermissibly dilute the jury’s sense of responsibility is without merit.  “[T]he 
standard penalty phase jury instructions fully advise the jury of the importance of 
its role, correctly state the law, do not denigrate the role of the jury, and do not 
violate Caldwell v. Mississippi.[17
                                         
 
17.  In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), the Supreme Court 
held that it is “constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a 
]”  Patrick, 104 So. 3d at 1064 (citation omitted) 
 
- 65 - 
(quoting Jones v. State, 998 So. 2d 573, 590 (Fla. 2008)); see also McCray v. State, 
71 So. 3d 848, 879 (Fla. 2011) (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
because there was no error in giving Standard Jury Instruction 7.11 (Penalty 
Proceedings—Capital Cases)); Smithers v. State, 18 So. 3d 460, 472 (Fla. 2009) 
(rejecting claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate the sufficiency of 
the jury instructions that were virtually identical to Jury Instruction 7.11).  We also 
made clear in Chavez v. State, 12 So. 3d 199, 214 (Fla. 2009), that the claims 
Foster raises are without merit.  We stated:  
This Court has repeatedly rejected claims that the standard jury 
instructions impermissibly shift the burden to the defense to prove that 
death is not the appropriate sentence or that these instructions 
unconstitutionally denigrate the role of the jury in violation of 
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).  See, e.g., Taylor v. 
State, 937 So. 2d 590, 599 (Fla. 2006) (citing Elledge v. State, 911 So. 
2d 57, 79 (Fla. 2005); Mansfield v. State, 911 So. 2d 1160, 1180 (Fla. 
2005); Sweet v. Moore, 822 So. 2d 1269, 1274 (Fla. 2002)); Carroll v. 
State, 815 So. 2d 601, 622-23 (Fla. 2002); Rutherford v. Moore, 774 
So. 2d 637, 644 & n.8 (Fla. 2000); Downs v. State, 740 So. 2d 506, 
517 n.5 (Fla. 1999); San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1350 (Fla. 
1997); Shellito v. State, 701 So. 2d 837, 842 (Fla. 1997); Sochor v. 
State, 619 So. 2d 285, 291 (Fla. 1993); Turner v. Dugger, 614 So. 2d 
1075, 1079 (Fla. 1992); Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d 853, 855-58 (Fla. 
1988).  
 
Chavez, 12 So. 3d at 214.   
                                                                                                                                   
determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the 
responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests 
elsewhere.”  Id. at 328-29.   
 
- 66 - 
Foster also argued in the postconviction proceeding below that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request the trial court to advise the jury that its 
recommendation would carry great weight and only be overridden in 
circumstances where no reasonable person could disagree.  However, the record 
reflects that trial counsel did request the court to instruct the jury that it is a co-
sentencer with the court and that the court must give the jury’s recommendation 
great weight.  Foster’s trial counsel also specifically requested and was denied 
various other special jury instructions concerning the jury’s role in recommending 
a sentence and the weight that would be given the jury’s recommendation.18
                                         
 
18.  Foster’s trial counsel requested the following special instructions: that in 
order to recommend death, the juror must find that the aggravating circumstances 
outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond all doubt; that although the jury’s 
recommendation is considered to be advisory, the jury’s recommendation of death 
is entitled to great weight; that if the juror finds that aggravating circumstances 
exist, the juror must determine whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh 
the mitigating circumstances beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable 
doubt in deciding whether the sentence should be life or death; that mitigating 
circumstances need only be proven by the fair weight of the evidence; that any one 
mitigating factor standing alone may support the conclusion that death is not the 
appropriate penalty; and that to impose death, the juror must be convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the totality of the aggravating circumstances outweighs the 
totality of the mitigating circumstances.   
  
Therefore, counsel was not deficient in failing to request additional special 
instructions on the jury’s role in sentencing.  Because Foster’s claims concerning 
the penalty phase jury instructions are procedurally barred, without merit, and 
conclusively refuted by the record, we affirm the court’s summary denial of relief. 
 
- 67 - 
I.  Summary Denial of Claim that the Burden of Proof 
was Shifted to Foster in the Penalty Phase 
 
Finally, in a related claim, Foster contends that the trial court erred in 
summarily denying his claim that the trial court impermissibly shifted the burden 
to Foster to prove that the mitigators outweighed the aggravators by the 
instructions given concerning aggravating and mitigating factors.  The instruction 
about which Foster complains is the trial court’s instruction at the penalty phase 
advising the jury that it must decide whether sufficient aggravating circumstances 
exist that would justify imposition of the death penalty and whether there are 
mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.   
To the extent that Foster is attempting to make a substantive challenge that 
the instructions shifted the burden, separate and apart from any claim of ineffective 
counsel, that claim is barred in postconviction proceedings.  See Stewart, 37 So. 3d 
at 262 (“Stewart’s substantive challenge to the jury instructions is procedurally 
barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal.”).19
                                         
 
19.  Foster’s brief does not allege ineffective assistance of counsel in this 
claim, but had he done so it would lack merit.  Our precedent is clear that counsel 
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.  See, e.g., Troy 
v. State, 57 So. 3d 828, 843 (Fla. 2011).  
  As noted above, we 
held in Chavez that the claim of burden shifting that Foster raises here is without 
merit.  See Chavez, 12 So. 3d at 214; see also Serrano v. State, 64 So. 3d 93, 115 
(Fla. 2011) (“This Court has also rejected the claim that the jury instructions 
 
- 68 - 
unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof.”); Schoenwetter v. State, 931 So. 2d 
857, 876 (Fla. 2006) (“This Court and the United States Supreme Court have 
repeatedly found that the standard jury instructions, when taken as a whole, do not 
shift the burden of proof to the defendant.”).  For these reasons, the postconviction 
court correctly denied this claim. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Foster’s rule 3.850 motion 
for postconviction relief.  
 
It is so ordered. 
 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur.  
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Lee County,  
Edward J. Volz, Jr., Judge - Case No. 96-1362B 
 
Terri L. Backhus, Special Assistant CCRC-South and Scott Gavin, Staff Attorney, 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Stephen D. Ake, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellee