Title: PEOPLE OF MI V REGINALD JOHN LETT

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 4, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 117041  
REGINALD JOHN LETT,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
YOUNG, J.  
We granted leave to appeal in this case to consider  
whether defendant is entitled to the reversal of his  
convictions on the ground that he was retried, following the  
declaration of a mistrial, in violation of his constitutional  
right to be free from double jeopardy. We conclude that the  
trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a  
mistrial and in dismissing the jury where the jury foreperson  
indicated that the jury members were not going to reach a  
unanimous verdict and defendant did not object to the  
declaration of mistrial. 
We additionally conclude that  
defendant’s retrial, following the proper declaration of a  
mistrial, did not violate the constitutional protection  
against successive prosecutions. Accordingly, we reverse the  
decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to  
that Court for consideration of the additional issue that was  
raised by defendant, but not decided.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
On August 29, 1996, Adesoji Latona, a taxi driver, was  
fatally shot at a Detroit liquor store.  Latona was apparently  
confronted by a group of men, including defendant, as he  
entered the liquor store.  One of the men, Charles Jones,  
accused Latona of throwing him out of Latona’s cab, and an  
argument ensued inside the store. 
Latona’s girlfriend  
testified that she saw defendant draw a gun, after which she  
heard two gunshots.  In a statement given to police following  
the incident, defendant admitted that he was at the party  
store at the time of the shooting and that he and Jones had  
fought with Latona inside the store.  Defendant further stated  
that he had retrieved a gun from another friend in the parking  
lot, and that he went back inside and fired the gun into the  
air before running back outside.  Latona died from two gunshot  
wounds, one to the head and one to the chest.  
Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, MCL  
750.316, and possession of a firearm during the commission of  
2  
 
a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b.  Defendant’s first  
trial, which took place in June 1997 before Detroit Recorder’s  
Court Judge Helen E. Brown, consumed–from jury selection to  
closing statements and jury instructions–a total of eight and  
one-half hours spread out over six days.  After approximately  
four or five hours of deliberation,1 the jury sent Judge Brown  
a note which stated: “What if we can’t agree? [M]istrial?  
[R]etrial? [W]hat?”2  Upon receiving the note, Judge Brown  
called the jury into the courtroom and, with the assistant  
prosecuting attorney and defense counsel present,3 engaged in  
the following exchange with the jury foreperson:  
The Court: I received your note asking me what 
if you can’t agree?  And I have to conclude from  
that that that is your situation at this time.  So, 
I’d like to ask the foreperson to identify 
themselves [sic], please?  
Foreperson: [Identified herself.]  
The Court: Okay, thank you. 
All right. 
I  
need to ask you if the jury is deadlocked; in other 
words, is there a disagreement as to the verdict?  
1The jury deliberated from approximately 3:24 p.m. to 
4:00 p.m. on June 12, 1997, and ended its deliberations at 
12:45 p.m. on June 13, 1997.  
2During its deliberations, the jury sent out seven notes.  
Most of the notes were routine requests for evidence, 
instructions, and breaks. However, one note, sent out early 
on the second day of deliberations, stated that the jurors had 
“a concern about our voice levels disturbing any other 
proceedings that might be going on,” indicating that perhaps 
the deliberations had already become somewhat acrimonious.  
3We are unable to discern from the trial transcript 
whether 
any 
off-the-record 
discussion 
took 
place 
between 
Judge 
Brown and counsel before the jury was called into the 
courtroom 
concerning 
any proposed response to the jury’s note.  
3  
Foreperson: Yes, there is.  
The Court: All right. Do you believe that it 
is hopelessly deadlocked?  
Foreperson: The majority of us don’t believe  
that . . .  
The Court: (Interposing) Don’t say what you’re 
going to say, okay?  
Foreperson: Oh, I’m sorry.  
The Court: I don’t want to know what your 
verdict might be, or how the split is, or any of 
that. Thank you. Okay? Are you going to reach a 
unanimous verdict, or not?  
Foreperson: (No response)  
The Court: Yes or no?  
Foreperson: No, Judge.  
The Court: All right. 
I hereby declare a 
mistrial. The jury is dismissed.  
In November 1997, defendant was retried before a  
different judge on charges of first-degree murder and felony­
firearm.  The second jury returned a verdict of guilty of the  
lesser offense of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and  
guilty as charged of felony-firearm.4  
In his appeal before the Court of Appeals, defendant,  
through appellate counsel, raised for the first time the claim  
that he was retried in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause  
of the federal and state constitutions.  Defendant argued that  
Judge Brown had sua sponte terminated the first trial without  
4The second jury deliberated for approximately three 
hours and fifteen minutes before delivering its verdict.  
4  
 
 
 
manifest necessity to do so and without his consent, and that  
retrial 
therefore 
violated his constitutional right to be free  
from successive prosecutions.  
The Court of Appeals panel agreed and reversed  
defendant’s convictions.  The panel opined that defendant had  
not consented to the declaration of the mistrial, citing  
People v Johnson, 396 Mich 424, 432; 240 NW2d 729 (1976),  
repudiated on other grounds in People v New, 427 Mich 482; 398  
NW2d 358 (1986), for the proposition that a defendant’s mere  
silence or failure to object to the jury’s discharge is not  
“consent.” The panel, turning to defendant’s claim that the  
declaration of a mistrial was not manifestly necessary,  
concluded that the trial court’s decision to discharge the  
jury was not reasonable because it had failed to consider  
alternatives or to make findings on the record:  
Recognizing that the doctrine of double  
jeopardy does not preclude retrial after the  
discharge of a jury because of inability to agree, 
our Supreme Court has stated that the inquiry 
“turns upon [the] determination whether the trial 
judge was entitled to conclude that the jury in 
fact was unable to [agree].” People v Duncan, 373 
Mich 650, 660-661; 130 NW2d 385 (1964).  This has  
led to the accepted rule that a trial court must 
consider reasonable alternatives before sua sponte 
declaring a mistrial and the court should make  
explicit findings, after a hearing on the record, 
that no reasonable alternative exists.  People v  
Hicks, 447 Mich 819, 841 (GRIFFIN, 
J.), 847 (CAVANAGH, 
C.J.); 528 NW2d 136 (1994); People v Benton, 402 
Mich 47, 61; 260 NW2d 77 (1977) (LEVIN, J.); People  
v Rutherford, 208 Mich App 198, 202; 526 NW2d 620  
(1994); People v Little, 180 Mich App 19, 23-24; 
446 NW2d 566 (1989); People v Dry Land Marina, 175 
Mich App 322, 327; 437 NW2d 391 (1989).  
5  
 
 
 
In the present case, we must determine whether 
the trial court reasonably concluded that the jury 
was deadlocked. Based on the record before us, we  
are forced to conclude that the court did not  
reasonably declare a mistrial.  The trial court  
declared a mistrial without a hearing or discussion 
of any alternatives.  No deadlock jury instructions 
were given much less even considered by the trial 
court.  See CJI2d 3.12. The jury had deliberated 
only four or five hours in a capital murder case 
following four days of trial testimony. There was  
clearly a reasonable alternative in this case, that 
is, to give the jury a deadlock jury instruction 
and send it back for further deliberation.  See,  
e.g., Hicks, supra, pp 843-844; Benton, supra, pp 
61-62; Rutherford, supra, p 203; Little, supra, pp 
27-30.  
Because a reasonable alternative existed in  
this case, an alternative never given consideration 
by the trial court, the trial court did not engage 
in a scrupulous exercise of discretion in sua  
sponte declaring a mistrial. Hicks, supra, p 829, 
citing United States v Jorn, 400 US 470, 485; 91 S 
Ct 547; 27 L Ed 2d 543 (1971).  Put another way, it 
was not manifestly necessary for the trial court to 
have declared a mistrial given the shortness of the 
jury’s deliberation and the court’s failure to give 
a deadlock jury instruction.  In fact, the trial 
court never even found on the record that the jury 
was 
genuinely 
deadlocked. 
Given 
these  
circumstances, we are compelled to conclude that 
retrial violated defendant’s rights against double 
jeopardy as guaranteed by the United States and 
Michigan Constitutions. 
Therefore, defendant’s 
convictions are reversed. [Slip op, pp 4-5.]  
We granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal.5  
Because 
we 
conclude 
that manifest necessity existed to support  
the mistrial declaration, we reverse.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
A constitutional double jeopardy challenge presents a  
5463 Mich 939 (2000).  
6  
 
  
  
 
question of law that we review de novo.  People v Herron, 464  
Mich 593, 599; 628 NW2d 528 (2001). Necessarily intertwined  
with the constitutional issue in this case is the threshold  
issue whether the trial court properly declared a mistrial.  
The trial judge’s decision to declare a mistrial when he  
considers the jury deadlocked is accorded great deference by  
a reviewing court. Arizona v Washington, 434 US 497, 510; 98  
S Ct 824; 54 L Ed 2d 717 (1978).6  “At most, . . . the inquiry  
. . . turns upon determination whether the trial judge was  
entitled to conclude that the jury in fact was unable to reach  
a verdict.”  Duncan, supra, 373 Mich 661 (emphasis supplied).  
III. ANALYSIS  
A. DOUBLE JEOPARDY IMPLICATIONS OF RETRIAL  
FOLLOWING MISTRIAL  
Under both the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Michigan  
Constitution7 and its federal counterpart,8 an accused may not  
6See Huss v Graves, 252 F3d 952, 956-957 (CA 8, 2001) (a 
case involving the sua sponte declaration of a mistrial in a 
bench trial, contrary to both the prosecution’s and the 
defendant’s motions for entry of verdict of not guilty by 
reason of insanity, was “not similar to those [cases] in which 
a mistrial is declared when a jury is unable to reach a 
verdict, a situation in which a finding of manifest necessity 
is almost always justified”) (emphasis supplied).  
7Const 1963, art 1, § 15.  Our constitution provides no 
greater protection than does the federal constitution with 
respect to retrial following a mistrial caused by jury 
deadlock. People v Thompson, 424 Mich 118, 125-129; 379 NW2d 
49 (1985).  
8US Const, Am V, made applicable to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v Maryland, 395 US 784; 89  
7  
 
 
 
be “twice put in jeopardy” for the same offense. The Double  
Jeopardy Clause originated from the common-law notion that a  
person who has been convicted, acquitted, or pardoned should  
not be retried for the same offense.  See United States v  
Scott, 437 US 82, 87; 98 S Ct 2187; 57 L Ed 2d 65 (1978);  
Crist v Bretz, 437 US 28, 33; 98 S Ct 2156; 57 L Ed 2d 24  
(1978).
 The constitutional prohibition against multiple  
prosecutions arises from the concern that the prosecution  
should not be permitted repeated opportunities to obtain a  
conviction:  
The underlying idea, one that is deeply 
ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of 
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its  
resources and power should not be allowed to make 
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an 
alleged 
offense, 
thereby 
subjecting 
him 
to  
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling 
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and 
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility 
that even though innocent he may be found guilty. 
[Green v United States, 355 US 184, 187-188; 78 S 
Ct 221; 2 L Ed 2d 199 (1957).]  
From this fundamental idea, the United States Supreme  
Court has over the years developed a body of double jeopardy  
jurisprudence that recognizes, among other related rights,9 an  
C St 2056; 23 L Ed 2d 707 (1969).  
9The Double Jeopardy Clause has often been described, in 
simple terms, as embodying three separate guarantees: 
protection against a second prosecution for the same offense 
following acquittal, protection against a second prosecution 
for the same offense following conviction, and protection 
against multiple punishments for the same offense. See Ohio  
v Johnson, 467 US 493, 497; 104 S Ct 2536; 81 L Ed 2d 425  
(1984); Justices of Boston Municipal Court v Lydon, 466 US 
294, 306-307; 104 S Ct 1805; 80 L Ed 2d 311 (1984); Herron,  
8  
 
 
 
 
accused’s “valued right to have his trial completed by a  
particular tribunal . . . .”  Wade v Hunter, 336 US 684, 689;  
69 S Ct 834; 93 L Ed 974 (1949); see also Washington, supra,  
434 US 503; Illinois v Somerville, 410 US 458, 466; 93 S Ct  
1066; 35 L Ed 2d 425 (1973).  Jeopardy is said to “attach”  
when a jury is selected and sworn, see Somerville, supra, 410  
US 467; Hicks, supra, 447 Mich 827, n 13 (GRIFFIN, 
J.), and the  
Double Jeopardy Clause therefore protects an accused’s  
interest in avoiding multiple prosecutions even where no  
determination of guilt or innocence has been made.  See Scott,  
supra, 437 US 87-92; Crist, supra, 437 US 33-34. It is this  
interest that is implicated when the trial judge declares a  
mistrial, thereby putting an end to the proceedings before a  
verdict is reached.  Scott, supra, 437 US 92; Crist, supra,  
437 US 33-34.  However, the general rule permitting the  
prosecution 
only 
one 
opportunity to obtain a conviction “‘must  
in some instances be subordinated to the public’s interest in  
fair trials designed to end in just judgments.’” Washington,  
supra, 434 US 505, n 11, quoting Wade, supra, 336 US 689.  
“[I]t is axiomatic that retrial is not automatically  
barred whenever circumstances compel the discharge of a  
factfinder before a verdict has been rendered.”  Hicks, supra,  
supra, 464 Mich 599; People v Vincent, 455 Mich 110, 120, n 5; 
565 NW2d 629 (1997).  However, as the Court noted in Crist,  
supra, 437 US 32, the “deceptively plain language” of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause “has given rise to problems both subtle 
and complex . . . .”  
9  
 
 
 
 
 
447 Mich 827 (GRIFFIN, 
J.).  It is well settled, for instance,  
that where a defendant requests or consents to a mistrial,  
retrial is not barred unless the prosecutor has engaged in  
conduct intended to provoke or “goad” the mistrial request.  
See Oregon v Kennedy, 456 US 667, 675-676; 102 S Ct 2083; 72  
L Ed 2d 416 (1982); United States v Dinitz, 424 US 600, 608;  
96 S Ct 1075; 47 L Ed 2d 267 (1976); Hicks, supra, 447 Mich  
828 (GRIFFIN, J.).  Additionally, retrial is always permitted  
when the mistrial is occasioned by “manifest necessity.”  
Kennedy, supra, 456 US 672; Washington, supra, 434 US 505;  
Hicks, supra, 447 Mich 828 (GRIFFIN, J.).            
The concept of “manifest necessity” was introduced in  
United States v Perez, 22 US (9 Wheat) 579; 6 L Ed 165 (1824),  
in which the Court addressed the propriety of the retrial of  
an accused following the discharge of a deadlocked jury  
without the accused’s consent.  Noting that in such a case the  
accused has not been convicted or acquitted, the Court held  
that the declaration of a mistrial under these circumstances  
poses no bar to a future trial.  Id. at 580. However, the  
Court indicated that trial courts are to exercise caution in  
discharging the jury before a verdict is reached:  
We think, that in all cases of this nature, 
the law has invested Courts of justice with the 
authority to discharge a jury from giving any  
verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the  
circumstances into consideration, there is a  
manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of 
public justice would otherwise be defeated.  They  
are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject;  
10  
 
 
                    
and 
it 
is 
impossible 
to 
define 
all 
the  
circumstances, which would render it proper to 
interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used 
with 
the 
greatest 
caution, 
under 
urgent 
circumstances, and for very plain and obvious 
causes; and, in capital cases especially, Courts 
should be extremely careful how they interfere with 
any of the chances of life, in favour of the 
prisoner.  But, after all, they have the right to 
order the discharge; and the security which the 
public 
have 
for 
the 
faithful, 
sound, 
and  
conscientious exercise of this discretion, rests in 
this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of 
the Judges, under their oaths of office.  We are  
aware that there is some diversity of opinion and 
practice on this subject, in the American Courts; 
but, 
after 
weighing 
the 
question 
with 
due  
deliberation, we are of opinion, that such a 
discharge 
constitutes 
no 
bar 
to 
further  
proceedings, and gives no right of exemption to the 
prisoner from being again put upon trial. [Id.  
(emphasis supplied).][10]  
As noted in Richardson v United States, 468 US 317, 323­
324; 104 S Ct 3081; 82 L Ed 2d 242 (1984), “[i]t has been  
established for 160 years, since the opinion of Justice Story  
in [Perez], that a failure of the jury to agree on a verdict  
was an instance of ‘manifest necessity’ which permitted a  
trial judge to terminate the first trial and retry the  
defendant, 
because 
‘the ends of public justice would otherwise  
10Interestingly, in Crist, supra, 437 US 34, n 10, the  
Court 
questioned 
whether the Perez Court was actually deciding 
a constitutional question, or was rather “simply settling a 
problem arising in the administration of federal criminal 
justice.”  See also id. at 44-45 (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(“[a]s both Justices Washington and Story believed that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause embraced only actual acquittal and 
conviction, they must have viewed Perez as involving the 
independent rule barring needless discharges of the jury”). 
However, the majority, declining to upset 150 years of settled 
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, stated that “to cast such a new 
light on Perez at this late date would be of academic interest  
only.” Id. at 34, n 10.  
11  
 
 
 
be defeated.’” See also Washington, supra, 434 US 509 (“the  
mistrial premised upon the trial judge’s belief that the jury  
is unable to reach a verdict [has been] long considered the  
classic basis for a proper mistrial”); Kennedy, supra, 456 US  
672 (“the hung jury remains the prototypical example” of a  
situation meeting the “manifest necessity” standard); People  
v Thompson, 424 Mich 118, 128; 379 NW2d 49 (1985) (“we have  
consistently held that retrial after a mistrial caused by jury  
deadlock does not violate the Michigan Constitution or the  
United States Constitution”); Duncan, supra, 373 Mich 660,  
quoting People v Parker, 145 Mich 488, 499; 108 NW 999 (1906)  
(Michigan case law has without exception recognized that “the  
doctrine of former jeopardy does not preclude retrial after  
discharge of a jury ‘for inability to agree, or for some other  
overruling necessity’”).  
Defendant 
nevertheless 
contends, 
and 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals  
agreed, that his retrial constituted a violation of his  
constitutional right to be free from successive prosecutions  
because the trial court precipitously declared a mistrial  
without manifest necessity to do so.  We disagree and hold  
that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar defendant’s second  
trial or convictions.  
B. MANIFEST NECESSITY  
The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court  
abused its discretion in discharging the jury without first  
12  
 
  
  
examining alternatives, such as providing a “hung jury”  
instruction, and without conducting a hearing or making  
findings on the record.  We hold that, because the record  
provides 
sufficient 
justification 
for 
the 
mistrial  
declaration, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in  
dismissing the jury.  
The 
constitutional 
concept 
of 
manifest 
necessity 
does 
not  
require that a mistrial be "necessary" in the strictest sense  
of the word. Rather, what is required is a “high degree” of  
necessity. 
Washington, 434 US 506-507. 
Furthermore,  
differing levels of appellate scrutiny are applied to the  
trial court’s decision to declare a mistrial, depending on the  
nature of the circumstances leading to the mistrial  
declaration.
 At one end of the spectrum is a mistrial  
declared on the basis of the unavailability of crucial  
prosecution evidence, or when the prosecution is using its  
resources to achieve an impermissible tactical advantage over  
the accused.  The trial judge’s declaration of a mistrial  
under those types of circumstances will be strictly  
scrutinized. Id. at 508. At the other end of the spectrum is  
the mistrial premised on jury deadlock, “long considered the  
classic basis for a proper mistrial.”  Id. at 509.11  The trial  
11See also Duncan, supra, 373 Mich 660:  
Defendant contends on appeal that discharge of 
the jury . . . bars his retrial because he has 
previously been put in jeopardy of conviction of 
such charges. . . . 
In none of the cases  
13  
 
 
 
 
 
judge’s decision to discharge a jury when he concludes that it  
[defendant has] cited is it even suggested that 
discharge of a jury, without the defendant’s  
consent, for its inability to agree upon a verdict 
thereby bars subsequent retrial.  
When a mistrial is declared on the basis of juror 
deadlock, double jeopardy interests will rarely, if ever, be 
implicated, because jeopardy “continues” following the  
mistrial declaration.  See Richardson, supra, 468 US 325-326, 
reaffirming that “a trial court’s declaration of a mistrial 
following a hung jury is not an event that terminates the 
original jeopardy” to which the defendant was subjected.  See  
also People v Mehall, 454 Mich 1, 4-5; 557 NW2d 110 (1997):  
One circumstance that constitutes a manifest  
necessity is the jury’s failure to reach a  
unanimous verdict.  When this occurs, and the trial  
court declares a mistrial, a retrial is not  
precluded because the original jeopardy has not  
been terminated, i.e., there has not been an  
assessment of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s 
proofs. [Emphasis supplied.]  
We were recently guided by this principle in Herron,  
supra, in which we determined that the defendant could be 
tried in a second trial for second-degree murder after the 
first jury arrived at a verdict with respect to one charge, 
but was unable to reach a verdict with respect to the murder 
charge:  
Where criminal proceedings against an accused 
have not run their full course, the Double Jeopardy 
Clause does not bar a second trial. . . . Thus, 
because the prosecutor’s retrial of defendant on 
the charge of second-degree murder was the result 
of a hung jury, we conclude that there was no 
violation of double jeopardy principles aimed at 
multiple prosecutions. [Id. at 602-603 (citations 
omitted).]  
See also, e.g., United States v Streett, ___ F Supp ___; 
2001 WL 420367 (WD VA, 2001) (defendants’ argument that 
retrial after a mistrial declared because of jury deadlock was 
constitutionally impermissible is without merit, both because 
of the “broad discretion” enjoyed by the trial court in making 
this determination and because “the Supreme Court has  
expressly held that the failure of a jury to reach a verdict 
is ‘not an event which terminates jeopardy’”).  
14  
  
is deadlocked is entitled to great deference. Id. at 510.  
As the United States Supreme Court has opined:  
[T]here are especially compelling reasons for 
allowing 
the trial 
judge 
to 
exercise 
broad  
discretion in deciding whether or not “manifest 
necessity” justifies a discharge of the jury.  On  
the one hand, if he discharges the jury when 
further deliberations may produce a fair verdict, 
the defendant is deprived of his “valued right to 
have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.” 
But if he fails to discharge a jury which is unable 
to reach a verdict after protracted and exhausting 
deliberations, there exists a significant risk that 
a verdict may result from pressures inherent in the 
situation rather than the considered judgment of 
all the jurors.  If retrial of the defendant were  
barred whenever an appellate court views the  
“necessity” for a mistrial differently from the 
trial judge, there would be a danger that the 
latter, 
cognizant 
of 
the 
serious 
societal  
consequences of an erroneous ruling, would employ 
coercive means to break the apparent deadlock. 
Such a rule would frustrate the public interest in 
just judgments.  The trial judge’s decision to 
declare a mistrial when he considers the jury 
deadlocked is therefore accorded great deference by 
a reviewing court. [Id. at 509-510.]  
Therefore, the mere fact that the reviewing court would  
not have declared a mistrial under the circumstances of this  
case does not mean that retrial is necessarily barred.  The  
issue is not whether this Court would have found manifest  
necessity, but whether the trial court abused its discretion  
in finding manifest necessity.12  
12As 
noted, 
a 
trial court’s decision to declare a mistrial 
on the basis of juror deadlock is entitled to a high degree of 
deference.
 It is well established that “[a]n abuse of 
discretion involves far more than a difference in judicial 
opinion.” Alken-Ziegler, Inc v Waterbury Headers Corp, 461 
Mich 219, 227; 600 NW2d 638 (1999); Spalding v Spalding, 355 
Mich 382, 384; 94 NW2d 810 (1959).  Rather, “such abuse occurs 
only when the result is ‘so palpably and grossly violative of  
15  
  
 
 
 
  
Consistent with the special respect accorded to the  
court’s declaration of a mistrial on the basis of jury  
deadlock, this Court has never required an examination of  
alternatives before a trial judge declares a mistrial on the  
basis of jury deadlock;13 nor have we ever required that the  
judge conduct a “manifest necessity” hearing or make findings  
on the record.  In fact, we long ago stated that, “[a]t most,  
. . . the inquiry in [such a case] turns upon determination  
whether the trial judge was entitled to conclude that the jury  
in fact was unable to reach a verdict.” Duncan, supra, 373  
fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but 
perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance 
thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or 
bias.’” Alken-Ziegler, supra at 227, quoting Spalding, supra  
at 384-385.  We simply cannot conclude that the trial court 
abused its discretion in such a manner here.  
13We acknowledge that we have required the examination of 
alternatives in other mistrial contexts.  See Hicks, supra, 
447 Mich 843-845 (GRIFFIN, J.) (declaration of a mistrial after 
the trial judge recused herself over the defendant’s  
objection); Benton, supra, 402 Mich 47 (sua sponte declaration 
of a mistrial on the basis of prosecutorial error). We need  
not determine whether the failure to consider alternatives to  
mistrial in circumstances other than jury deadlock is  
constitutionally impermissible.  We note, however, that in 
support of the proposition that consideration of alternative 
measures 
is 
constitutionally 
required 
in 
these 
other 
contexts, 
this Court in Benton cited two federal circuit court opinions 
that 
were 
subsequently overturned by the United States Supreme 
Court: Arizona v Washington, 546 F2d 829, 832 (CA 9, 1976), 
was reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court at 434 US 497 (in 
which the Court rejected the notion that the trial judge was 
required to consider or utilize alternatives before declaring 
a mistrial), and United States v Grasso, 552 F2d 46, 49-50 (CA 
2, 1977), vacated by the Supreme Court at 438 US 901; 98 S Ct 
3117; 57 L Ed 2d 1144 (1978) (directing the Court of Appeals 
to reconsider in light of Washington, supra). 
See Benton,  
supra, 402 Mich 57, n 11, 61, n 19.  
16  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mich 661 (emphasis supplied).  Moreover, the United States  
Supreme Court has expressly indicated that the failure of a  
trial judge to examine alternatives or to make findings on the  
record before declaring a mistrial does not render the  
mistrial declaration improper. Instead, where the basis for  
a mistrial order is adequately disclosed by the record, the  
ruling will be upheld. Washington, supra, 434 US 515-517.14  
Although we acknowledge that the “deadlocked jury”  
instruction, CJI2d 3.12, might have appropriately been given  
to the jury in this case, the fact remains that defendant did  
not request that this instruction be given.15  We are not aware  
14Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented: 
“What the ‘manifest necessity’ doctrine . . . require[s], in 
my view, is that the record make clear either that there were 
no meaningful and practical alternatives to a mistrial, or 
that the trial court scrupulously considered available  
alternatives and found all wanting but a termination of the 
proceedings.” 
Id. at 525 (Marshall, J.). 
The Court of  
Appeals panel’s view in the instant case, although apparently 
consistent with the view of Justices Marshall and Brennan, was 
specifically rejected by the Washington majority.  
15Further, it appears from the record that defendant did 
not object to the trial court’s decision to discharge the 
jury. The 
prosecution contends that under these circumstances 
defendant “implicitly consented” to the declaration of  
mistrial, thus rendering it unnecessary to determine whether 
the declaration was supported by manifest necessity.  See  
Hicks, supra, 447 Mich 858, n 3 (BOYLE, 
J., dissenting) (“[t]he 
Supreme Court appears to use ‘consent’ . . . to refer to 
mistrials not requested by the defendant, but only acquiesced  
to”) 
(emphasis 
supplied); 
see 
also 
United 
States 
v  
Aguilar-Aranceta, 957 F2d 18, 22 (CA 1, 1992); United States  
v Beckerman, 516 F2d 905, 909 (CA 2, 1975); United States v  
Phillips, 431 F2d 949, 950 (CA 3, 1970); United States v Ham, 
58 F3d 78, 83-84 (CA 4, 1995); United States v Palmer, 122 F3d 
215, 218 (CA 5, 1997); United States v Gantley, 172 F3d 422, 
428-429 (CA 6, 1999); Camden v Crawford Co Circuit Court, 892  
F2d 610, 614-618 (CA 7, 1989); United States v Gaytan, 115 F3d  
17  
 
of any requirement that a trial court sua sponte instruct a  
deadlocked jury to resume deliberations.  Moreover, we remain  
cognizant of the significant risk of coercion that would  
necessarily accompany a requirement that a deadlocked jury be  
forced 
to 
engage 
in 
protracted deliberations.  See Washington,  
supra, 434 US 509-510; People v Hardin, 421 Mich 296; 365 NW2d  
101 (1984).16  
We conclude that the judge did not abuse her discretion  
in declaring a mistrial under the circumstances of this case.  
The jury had deliberated for at least four hours following a  
relatively short, and far from complex, trial. The jury had  
sent out several notes over the course of its deliberations,  
including one that appears to indicate that its discussions  
may have been particularly heated.  Most important here is the  
737, 742 (CA 9, 1997); Earnest v Dorsey, 87 F3d 1123, 1129 (CA 
10, 1996); United States v Puleo, 817 F2d 702, 705 (CA 11, 
1987).  In light of our determination that the mistrial 
declaration was manifestly necessary, we save for another day 
the issue of implied consent.  
16See also United States v Klein, 582 F2d 186, 194 (CA 2,  
1978):  
The appellant argues that a retrial is barred 
because of the failure of the trial court to make  
explicit findings that there were no reasonable 
alternatives to a mistrial . . . .  The short  
answer to this claim is the holding of Arizona v  
Washington 
that 
such 
findings 
are 
not  
constitutionally required. [Emphasis supplied.]  
See 
also 
Hicks, 
supra, 
447 
Mich 
867 
(BOYLE, 
J., 
dissenting)(“[t]he assumption that, as a matter of law, 
manifest necessity requires the exploration of less drastic 
alternatives to mistrial . . . ignores that the United States 
Supreme Court has specifically rejected [this] proposition”).  
18  
 
 
 
fact that the jury foreperson expressly stated that the jury  
was not going to reach a verdict.17  We conclude that, in the  
absence of an objection by either party, the declaration of a  
mistrial in this case constituted a proper exercise of  
judicial discretion.  Accordingly, manifest necessity for the  
jury’s discharge existed, and defendant’s retrial did not  
constitute 
a 
constitutionally 
impermissible 
successive  
prosecution. 
 
C. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT  
Our dissenting colleague opines that “the majority  
eviscerates established precedent requiring that trial judges  
exert reasonable efforts to avoid a mistrial.”  Post at 1. We  
disagree.  In holding that double jeopardy considerations did  
not preclude defendant’s retrial, we have merely set forth the  
unremarkable proposition that the failure of the jury to agree  
on a verdict is an instance of manifest necessity, allowing  
the trial court to declare a mistrial, discharge the jury, and  
retry the defendant.  
Although the dissent ostensibly agrees that “no specific  
inquiry into alternatives to declaring a mistrial is  
required,” post at 3, the dissent nevertheless points out that  
17This Court long ago indicated that “the court is  
justified 
in 
accepting [the jury’s] statement that [it] cannot 
agree as proper evidence in determining the question.” People  
v Parker, 145 Mich 488, 502; 108 NW 999 (1906). 
See also  
United States v Cawley, 630 F2d 1345, 1349 (CA 9, 1980) 
("[t]he most critical factor is the jury's own statement that 
it is unable to reach a verdict").  
19  
 
the trial court did not poll the jurors, did not give a  
deadlocked jury instruction, and did not ask defense counsel  
for his thoughts.  Post at 4. These, of course, would have  
been alternatives to declaring a mistrial.  However, this  
Court has never required the trial court to explain why it  
chose to declare a mistrial on the basis of jury deadlock,  
rather than poll the jury, give a deadlocked jury instruction,  
or ask defense counsel for his thoughts.  As we have explained  
above, the United States Supreme Court has specifically  
rejected such a requirement.  See Washington, supra, 434 US  
516-517:  
The 
absence 
of 
an 
explicit 
finding 
of  
“manifest 
necessity” 
appears 
to 
have 
been  
determinative for the District Court and may have 
been so for the Court of Appeals. If those courts  
regarded that omission as critical, they required 
too much.  Since the record provides sufficient 
justification for the state-court ruling, the  
failure to explain that ruling more completely does 
not render it constitutionally defective.  
Further, 
even 
the 
dissent in Washington recognized that, where  
the necessity for a mistrial is “manifest on the face of the  
record,” the trial court does not have to make findings of  
necessity on the record to justify the declaration of a  
mistrial. Id. at 526.  
In 
this 
case, 
the 
record 
provides 
sufficient  
justification 
for 
the trial court’s declaration of a mistrial,  
and thus there was no need for the trial court to articulate  
a rationale on the record. 
The reasons were plain and  
obvious: the jury foreperson indicated that the jury was not  
20  
 
going to be able to reach a unanimous verdict.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in  
declaring a mistrial, in the absence of objection by either  
party, where the jury expressly indicated that it was  
deadlocked.  Accordingly, defendant’s retrial did not violate  
the constitutional bar against successive prosecutions.  We  
therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and  
remand this matter to that Court for consideration of the  
additional issue that was raised by defendant, but not  
decided. We do not retain jurisdiction.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred with YOUNG, J.  
21  
 
 
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 117041  
REGINALD JOHN LETT,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
I 
disagree 
with 
the majority’s conclusion that a manifest  
necessity required a mistrial. In reaching its holding, the  
majority eviscerates established precedent requiring that  
trial judges exert reasonable efforts to avoid a mistrial.  
Because I cannot agree that the prohibition against placing a  
defendant in double jeopardy evaporates simply because a  
defendant fails to object when a jury expresses discord, I  
respectfully dissent.  
It is not apparent from the record that it was manifestly  
necessary to declare a mistrial. “Because of the high value  
placed on defendant’s not being required to undergo the  
 
 
discommodity of a second trial, the declaration of a mistrial  
should not be made lightly, even when it is made ostensibly  
for the protection of defendant.”  People v Johnson, 396 Mich  
424, 438; 240 NW2d 729 (1976).  As a “general rule, . . .  
trial judges must consider reasonable alternatives before  
declaring a mistrial.” People v Hicks, 447 Mich 819, 841; 528  
NW2d 136 (1994) (opinion of Griffin, J.).  
[I]n the absence of a motion by a defendant 
for a mistrial, “‘the Perez doctrine of manifest  
necessity stands as a command to trial judges not 
to foreclose the defendant’s option until a  
scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to 
the conclusion that the ends of public justice 
would not be served by a continuation of the 
proceedings. . . .’”  [People v Benton, 402 Mich  
47, 57; 260 NW2d 77, 81 (1977), quoting United  
States v Dinitz, 424 US 600; 96 S Ct 1075; 47 L Ed 
2d 267 (1976).]  
Contrary to the majority’s assertions, this Court’s  
precedent finds support in the guidance provided by the United  
States Supreme Court, which has affirmed that  
a constitutionally protected interest is inevitably 
affected by any mistrial decision.  The trial  
judge, therefore, “must always temper the decision 
whether or not to abort the trial by considering 
the importance to the defendant of being able, once 
and for all, to conclude his confrontation with 
society through the verdict of a tribunal he might 
believe to be favorably disposed to his fate.” In 
order to ensure that this interest is adequately 
protected, reviewing courts have an obligation to 
satisfy themselves that, in the words of Mr.  
Justice Story, the trial judge exercised “sound 
discretion” in declaring a mistrial.  [Arizona v  
Washington, 434 US 497, 514; 98 S Ct 824; 54 L Ed  
2d 717 (1978) (citations omitted).] [Emphasis  
added.]  
2  
 
Thus, sound discretion requires a thoughtful, prudent  
analysis.  
Even though no specific inquiry into alternatives to  
declaring a mistrial is required, such an inquiry would make  
clear the justification for retrial. Where no consideration  
of alternatives is evident, something else on the record must  
make 
clear 
the 
trial 
judge exercised “sound discretion” before  
declaring a mistrial.  Unfortunately, no sound discretion was  
exercised here.  Although this first-degree murder trial  
spanned a ten-day period, tried intermittently over six days,  
the deliberations lasted just over four hours.1  The jury  
likely spent the first thirty-five minutes, late Thursday  
afternoon, doing little more than electing a foreperson.  A  
few hours into the deliberations on Friday morning, the jurors  
sent a note to the judge that indicated concern over their  
voice levels during deliberation. Some time later, the jury  
sent another note that asked about the consequences if they  
failed to agree. On that basis, the trial judge ordered the  
jury into the courtroom at 12:45 p.m. and asked the foreperson  
whether the jury could reach a verdict.  The foreperson  
responded, “no.”  The trial judge then immediately declared a  
mistrial, and by 12:48 p.m., the jury was excused.  Never did  
1 Although it is not clear from the record when the jury 
reconvened June 13, 1997, I have assumed deliberations got 
under way at 9:00 a.m.  
3  
the trial judge consider alternatives or otherwise provide  
evidence that she exercised sound discretion. For example,  
the judge did not poll the jurors, give an instruction  
ordering further deliberations, query defense counsel about  
his thoughts on continued deliberations, or indicate on the  
record why a mistrial declaration was necessary.  
Though I acknowledge that a trial judge need not perform  
any explicit act to ensure a mistrial is manifestly necessary,  
there must be some indication on the record that such a grave  
act was required.  Washington at 516-517 (the record must  
provide “sufficient justification” of the manifest need for a  
mistrial).
 In this case, where the jurors had been  
deliberating only a short time, where the note from the jurors  
merely questioned what might happen if they did not agree,  
where the judge–albeit in an attempt to properly keep the  
jurors’ positions concealed–suppressed all comments by the  
foreperson that could have shed light on the need for a  
mistrial, and where the record as a whole fails to reveal that  
“the ends of public justice” would be served by the  
declaration of a mistrial, I cannot agree that subjecting  
defendant to a new trial was manifestly necessary. Benton at  
57.  
The majority makes special note of defendant’s silence,  
observing that defense counsel did not object to the mistrial  
4  
 
declaration.
 Ante at 20-21, n 15. 
However, it was not  
necessary that defendant object at the very moment the  
mistrial had been declared, particularly because the jurors  
were simultaneously dismissed.  Though an objection on the  
record would have been helpful in determining defendant’s  
position and in refreshing the judge concerning her duty to  
exercise sound discretion, defense counsel’s failure to voice  
an objection cannot be considered evidence that a mistrial  
declaration was manifestly necessary.  
The majority insinuates that defendant tried to have his  
cake and eat it too by failing to object to the mistrial  
declaration.  However, defendant gained nothing as a result of  
his counsel’s failure to timely object.2  Either the trial  
judge properly declared a mistrial on the basis of manifest  
necessity, or she did not.  If she had, retrial would have  
been proper.  If not, defendant’s right to be free from double  
jeopardy was violated by the second trial. If defendant had  
succeeded in convincing a majority of this Court that the  
mistrial 
declaration was improper, he would gain nothing other  
2 Defense counsel’s failure to raise the double jeopardy 
issue any time before or during the second trial was not 
objectively reasonable.  No trial strategy could justify 
failing to object to the second trial.  Defendant had nothing 
to gain by exposing himself to a second trial and, instead, 
lost the very thing the right was meant to protect: subjection 
to a trial in which the state had a second shot to get it 
right, i.e., to get a conviction.  
5  
 
than the lawful protection of his inherent constitutional  
rights.  That the state was able to try defendant a second  
time 
and 
to 
secure 
a 
conviction 
cannot 
make 
an  
unconstitutional second trial retrospectively valid.  
The new standard articulated by the majority negates any  
substance the manifest necessity inquiry might have. Though  
the majority may feel that trial judges can declare a mistrial  
on the most meager record without even a cursory attempt to  
assure that the public interest in such a declaration  
outweighs the defendant’s clear interest in resolution by the  
first factfinder, this narrow interpretation of “sound  
discretion” must be rejected.  The majority’s conclusion  
ignores precedent from this Court and cursorily dismisses the  
mandate from the Supreme Court affirming the need for trial  
judges to exercise “sound discretion.”3  
In erroneously finding that manifest necessity required  
mistrial, 
the 
majority 
diminishes 
the 
constitutional 
rights 
of  
our citizens, specifically the right to be free from double  
3 The majority attempts to escape its duty to execute the 
Supreme Court’s mandate, i.e., to assure the trial court 
exercised 
“sound 
discretion,” by implying that I simply differ 
with the trial court’s result.  To clarify, I object not to 
the trial court’s concern that the jurors held irreconcilable 
differences–in fact, I share that concern–but to its utter 
failure to make the pronouncement in a manner that evidences 
the exercise of “sound discretion.”  Because the judge did 
nothing more than act on a hunch with the most meager record 
for support, I cannot agree that “sound discretion” was 
exercised.  
6  
jeopardy.  Even though defense counsel failed to timely  
object, causing defendant to suffer unnecessarily through a  
second trial, such an error does not excuse a violation of  
constitutional magnitude.  Therefore, I would affirm the  
decision of the Court of Appeals.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
7