Title: Slabey v. Dunn County

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2023 WI 2 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP877 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Rachel Slabey, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Dunn County, Wisconsin, Dennis P. Smith, Brenda 
LaForte, Marshall L. Multhauf and Paul Gunness, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
Dunn County Sheriff's Office, Ryan Boigenzahn, 
John Doe One, John Doe Two and John Doe Three, 
          Defendants, 
Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Corporation, 
          Intervenor. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 399 Wis. 2d 323, 964 N.W.2d 549 
(year – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 18, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 10, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Dunn   
 
JUDGE: 
Maureen D. Boyle   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, 
JJ., joined.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Cristina M. Wirth, Martha H. Heidt, and Bye, Goff & 
Rohde, Ltd., River Falls. There was an oral argument by Cristina 
M. Wirth.  
 
 
 
2 
For the defendants-respondents, there was a brief filed by 
Samuel C. Hall, Jr., Timothy M. Johnson, Molly K. Woodford, and 
Crivello Carlson, S.C., Eau Claire. There was an oral argument 
by Samuel C. Hall, Jr.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Mark L. Thomsen, Lynn 
R. Laufenberg, Kimberly D. Sweatt, and Gingras, Thomsen & Wachs, 
LLP, Madison, and James D. Rogers and Wisconsin Association for 
Justice, Madison, for the Wisconsin Association for Justice.   
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 2 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP877 
(L.C. No. 
2017CV277) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Rachel Slabey, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Dunn County, Wisconsin, Dennis P. Smith, Brenda 
LaForte, Marshall L. Multhauf and Paul Gunness, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Dunn County Sheriff's Office, Ryan Boigenzahn, 
John Doe One, John Doe Two and John Doe Three, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Corporation, 
 
          Intervenor. 
FILED 
 
JAN 18, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, 
JJ., joined.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   This is a review of 
an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, Slabey v. Dunn 
County, No. 2020AP877, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
2 
 
July 7, 2021), affirming the Dunn County circuit court's1 order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Dunn County on Rachel 
Slabey's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  We affirm. 
¶2 
Slabey argues that her § 1983 claim against Dunn 
County survives summary judgment because she presented evidence 
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Dunn County2 
violated her rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
when 
then-Dunn 
County 
Correctional Officer Ryan Boigenzahn sexually assaulted her.  
According to Slabey, Dunn County is liable because the "County 
was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to 
Slabey by failing to thoroughly investigate, appropriately 
discipline, and adequately supervise Boigenzahn."  Slabey argues 
that the circuit court erroneously granted Dunn County summary 
judgment and that the court of appeals erred in affirming that 
result. 
¶3 
We conclude that Slabey's § 1983 claim against Dunn 
County fails because, under Monell v. Department of Social 
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), no reasonable fact finder could 
conclude that Dunn County was the causal, moving force behind 
the sexual assault.  A § 1983 plaintiff suing a municipality for 
a constitutional deprivation must prove that the municipality 
caused——that is, was the moving force behind——the constitutional 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Maureen D. Boyle presided.  
2 All references to "the County" are to Dunn County unless 
otherwise noted. 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
3 
 
deprivation.  This requires evidence "that the municipal action 
was taken with 'deliberate indifference' as to its known or 
obvious consequences."  Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. 
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (quoting City of Canton v. 
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).  Here, there is insufficient 
evidence 
demonstrating 
Dunn 
County 
acted 
with 
deliberate 
indifference to a known or obvious consequence that Boigenzahn 
would sexually assault Slabey.  The circuit court was correct to 
grant 
Dunn 
County 
summary 
judgment 
on 
Slabey's 
§ 1983 
constitutional deprivation claim.  We affirm the court of 
appeals. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
Ryan Boigenzahn began working as a correctional 
officer ("CO") at the Dunn County Jail in April 2011.  As part 
of his training, Dunn County required Boigenzahn to attend the 
Jail Academy at Nicolet College.  There, Boigenzahn took a 
month-long, 160-hour course where, according to Boigenzahn, he 
learned "what it is to be a corrections officer in the state of 
Wisconsin."  Boigenzahn was also required to participate in the 
course's Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 ("PREA")3 training.  
Boigenzahn admitted during his deposition that he "learn[ed] 
through that training . . . that sexual contact between inmates 
and prisoners was" prohibited by law.  He passed the training 
course, 
and 
he 
received 
his 
certification 
from 
the 
Law 
Enforcement Standards Board in June 2012.  Boigenzahn worked 
                                                 
3 34 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30309 (2018). 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
4 
 
third shift at the jail as a CO, which was from 10:30 p.m. to 
7:00 a.m.  
¶5 
Dunn County also required Boigenzahn to review and 
certify that he reviewed all Dunn County policies, including the 
County's fraternization, sexual misconduct, and PREA policies.  
Boigenzahn signed these policies, stating, "I certify that I 
have 
read, 
understand, 
and 
will 
comply 
with 
the 
policies . . . ."  Dunn County's fraternization policy includes, 
in relevant part: 
Employees of the Dunn County Sheriff's Office shall 
not: 
a. 
Have a relationship with an inmate/prisoner or 
the spouse of an inmate/prisoner under the 
supervision or custody of the Dunn County Jail, 
for one year after their release.  
b. 
Have a relationship with individuals whom the 
employee knows is [sic] incarcerated in a state 
correctional facility or a county jail other than 
the Dunn County Jail, or under the supervision of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Corrections 
(Probation/Parole), or for one year after their 
release. 
c. 
Have personal contacts that are usually one-to-
one 
such 
as 
dating, 
knowingly 
form 
close 
friendships, 
correspond 
without 
an 
exception 
granted or have visits that are not job related, 
for a period of one year after their release. 
d. 
Accept 
or 
give 
gifts, 
provide 
services 
in 
exchange for work performed, for one year after 
their release. 
e. 
Encourage or allow to occur, the exchange of 
personal or departmental information between the 
employee and an inmate. 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
5 
 
The sexual misconduct/PREA policy prohibits all staff, including 
COs like Boigenzahn, from engaging in sexual misconduct, which 
the policy defines as follows: 
Sexual Misconduct is any behavior or act of a sexual 
nature directed toward an inmate, detainee, victim, 
witness, or complainant by any employee, volunteer, 
vendor, contractor, visitor or agency representative. 
1. 
This includes acts or attempts to commit such 
acts including, but not limited to, sexual 
assault, sexual abuse, sexual harassment, sexual 
contact, 
conduct 
of 
a 
sexual 
nature 
or 
implication, 
obscenity 
and 
unreasonable 
or 
unnecessary invasion of privacy. 
2. 
Sexual misconduct also includes, but is not 
limited to, conversations or correspondence that 
suggests 
a 
romantic 
or 
sexual 
relationship 
involving any person mentioned above. 
3. 
Sexual misconduct is not limited to unwanted 
sexual contact.  Sexual misconduct is also a 
range of behaviors or situations that include 
inappropriate remarks, sexualized name-calling, 
correspondence, 
conversations, 
inappropriate 
displays, fondling, inappropriate viewing, and 
sexual contact with individuals vulnerable to the 
authority of the justice system or any other 
person in a work setting.  Such acts are 
inappropriate in a work setting and presumed to 
be unwelcome. 
4. 
Romantic relationships between supervisors and 
those under their supervision are presumed to be 
coercive and may be deemed sexual harassment or 
misconduct. 
Dunn County's sexual misconduct/PREA policy also requires staff 
to report and investigate all alleged violations: 
A.  Reporting Requirements 
1. Any 
employee 
or 
staff 
member 
who 
knows 
or 
reasonably suspects that any employee may be or has 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
6 
 
been involved in sexual misconduct is required to 
inform 
the 
Jail 
Captain. 
 
To 
protect 
the 
reputations and integrity of all persons engaged in 
such a process, including the accuser, the accused, 
and the alleged victim, all such reports shall be 
dealt with as matters of highest discretion both 
before and after they have been submitted to 
appropriate authorities. 
. . . .  
4. Upon 
receiving 
a 
report 
of 
possible 
sexual 
misconduct or harassment, the Jail Captain shall 
notify the Chief Deputy.  The Chief Deputy shall in 
turn notify the Sheriff and other Command Staff as 
appropriate and needed. 
B.  Investigation 
1.  All reported violations of sexual misconduct, 
including sexual assault and harassment, will be 
investigated and, as warranted, will be resolved 
through appropriate disciplinary processes and/or 
criminal proceedings in accordance with applicable 
state and federal laws. 
Dunn County requires all staff, including COs like Boigenzahn, 
to regularly complete policy reviews.  According to Boigenzahn's 
training log, he completed at least eight reviews of the 
County's fraternization, sexual misconduct, or PREA policies.  
After each policy review, Boigenzahn certified that he read and 
understood the policy. 
¶6 
On July 31, 2015, a CO informed Sergeant Michael Owens 
that inmate J.W.B. expressed that staff needed to "keep a close 
eye on [the] 'male COs.'"  Sergeant Owens immediately began 
investigating.  He first interviewed J.W.B.  During the 
interview, J.W.B. said that she observed Boigenzahn passing 
notes between inmates on July 28, 2015.  Sergeant Owens also 
"asked 
her 
if 
one 
of 
[the] 
officers 
was 
developing 
a 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
7 
 
relationship with an inmate."  J.W.B. said "no, nothing like 
that."  Sergeant Owens also reviewed surveillance footage of the 
alleged incident and recorded phone conversations between the 
inmates suspected of note-passing.  He discovered no evidence of 
misconduct and determined "[t]he allegation [was] not supported 
on a factual basis."  Sergeant Owens recorded the results of his 
investigation in a report and, according to County policy, 
forwarded that report to his supervisor.  
¶7 
On August 6, 2015, a different inmate, B.M., said to 
Sergeant Douglas Ormson that "she actually had a lot of respect 
for the staff at the Jail, except for one person who she felt 
was in danger of 'crossing the line.'"  Sergeant Ormson asked 
B.M. who she was referring to and to elaborate.  B.M. identified 
Boigenzahn and said he "was too chummy with some of the 
females."  B.M. said she saw another inmate, A.D., "playfully 
slap[] Officer Boigenzahn on the chest," and that A.D. and 
Boigenzahn "talked quite a bit."  Sergeant Ormson asked B.M. "if 
she felt that anything else had happened."  B.M. said "she 
didn't think so, but she felt that if there was an opportunity 
where there were no cameras around she felt something might 
happen."  B.M. also told Sergeant Ormson how "all the females in 
the Jail talk about that, and about [Boigenzahn's] willingness 
to talk to them," and how Boigenzahn "maybe liked the attention 
from the females."  Sergeant Ormson "asked her again if she had 
witnessed anything sexual or even heard any rumors about that 
type of relationship," and B.M. said she hadn't "but again said 
her feeling was that was a possibility if things progressed."  
No. 
2020AP877   
 
8 
 
B.M. said she "knows that there is a 'bright line' that staff 
aren't supposed to cross" and felt "if Officer Boigenzahn hasn't 
already crossed that line that he is getting dangerously close 
to doing it." 
¶8 
The next day, Sergeant Ormson discussed this matter 
with Sergeant Owens, who stated he heard similar allegations, 
and Sergeant Rachel Vold.  The three decided that Sergeant Vold 
would 
review 
surveillance 
footage 
to 
investigate 
the 
allegations.  Sergeant Vold reviewed two weeks of surveillance 
footage and found two concerning instances.  On July 29, 2015, 
while delivering medications to inmates, Boigenzahn "playfully 
reach[ed] out his foot to step on [A.D.]'s foot."  On August 6, 
2015, again while delivering medications, Boigenzahn "gesture[d] 
with his head as if motioning someone to come in his direction, 
and also with his right arm.  [A.D.] then [came] running over to 
him. . . . [A]s she walk[ed] away she brush[ed] him with her 
hand on his shoulder/chest area."  Pursuant to Dunn County 
policy, Sergeant Vold forwarded this information to the Jail 
Captain on August 10, 2015.  The Jail Captain told Sergeant Vold 
to interview A.D., which she did later that day.  
¶9 
During that interview, Sergeant Vold informed A.D. 
that "at no time should there ever be any sort of contact with 
an officer, male or female, whatsoever."  Sergeant Vold "went on 
to ask [A.D.] if there [were] any instances where she felt 
uncomfortable [because of] any male or female officer."  A.D. 
said that Boigenzahn made her feel uncomfortable.  A.D. reported 
that three months prior, she and Boigenzahn "accidentally bumped 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
9 
 
hands" and that A.D. "pulled her hand back, where [Boigenzahn] 
then responded that it was alright[;] he didn’t mind."  A.D. 
"went on to say that other female inmates . . . told her 
[Boigenzahn] seems to be 'obsessed' with her and that they have 
observed him standing and watching her sleep."  Sergeant Vold 
asked A.D. "if there were any other instances or officers that 
made her feel uncomfortable, to which she responded no."  
¶10 Later that same day, the Jail Captain and the Dunn 
County Chief Deputy interviewed Boigenzahn regarding these 
allegations.  Boigenzahn initially denied passing notes between 
inmates, but he admitted to doing so once the Jail Captain and 
Chief Deputy reminded Boigenzahn that he could be terminated for 
lying.  Boigenzahn said he made a "dumb mistake passing the note 
and it w[ould] not happen again."  They also showed Boigenzahn 
the videos of him and A.D., but he denied that there was any 
inappropriate conduct.  The Jail Captain and Chief Deputy 
further discussed "policy violations, co-worker mistrust, and 
inmates who now think there is a relationship between [A.D.] and 
CO Boigenzahn."  Boigenzahn explained that he "tries to gain 
rapport or cooperation with inmates but now sees that he needs 
to be sterner." 
¶11 Pursuant to Dunn County policy, the matter was then 
brought to the Dunn County Sheriff.  Based on the results of the 
investigation, the Sheriff decided that Boigenzahn violated Dunn 
County's policies which prohibited fraternization and unbecoming 
conduct.  The Sheriff decided to impose discipline.  The 
available options were performance counseling, oral reprimand, 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
10 
 
written reprimand, unpaid suspension, and termination.  The 
Sheriff initially "was planning on terminating [Boigenzahn].  
But [he thought that Boigenzahn] really had been a pretty good 
jailer on a lot of other notes, . . . so the decision was made 
to give him a three-day suspension and try and say wake up."  
Accordingly, 
on 
August 
26, 
2015, 
Dunn 
County 
suspended 
Boigenzahn for three days without pay.  When communicating the 
Sheriff's 
disciplinary 
decision, 
the 
Chief 
Deputy 
warned 
Boigenzahn: 
I expect you will take this opportunity to correct 
your improper conduct in the future, fully meet the 
duties and responsibilities required of you and 
observe all the rules and procedures of your job.  If 
you fail to do so, you will subject yourself to 
further disciplinary action, including discharge and 
termination of your employment with the County. 
Boigenzahn returned to work on August 29, 2015.  The Sheriff 
also considered moving Boigenzahn to the day shift so he could 
be under greater supervision because more staff worked that 
shift, but the Sheriff decided against this because "it would 
affect somebody on day shift that would be bumped off from that 
shift and forced onto the night shift."  
¶12 About nine months later, in May 2016, inmate A.D. 
reported 
to 
Sergeant 
Vold 
that 
Boigenzahn 
again 
acted 
inappropriately. 
 
She 
stated 
that 
Boigenzahn 
frequently 
contacted inmate B.S.  A.D. stated that on one occasion 
Boigenzahn accepted a note that was sexual in nature from B.S.  
Surveillance footage showed that on April 17, 2016, at 2:32 
a.m., Boigenzahn spent 12 minutes out of camera view and near 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
11 
 
B.S.'s bunk.  Boigenzahn later admitted that he did receive the 
note from B.S.  On May 19, 2016, the County placed Boigenzahn on 
administrative leave, and on May 31, 2016, he was terminated. 
¶13 About 
one 
month 
after 
Dunn 
County 
terminated 
Boigenzahn, on June 27, 2016, inmate Slabey was heard saying, 
"[Boigenzahn] must have stuck his hand down somebody else's 
pants, too."  According to Slabey, she said this "jokingly."  
Investigator Dan Westlund, however, who was at the jail to 
interview Slabey regarding an unrelated matter, overheard 
Slabey's remark.  He immediately reported what he heard to the 
Jail Captain.  Pursuant to County policy, the Jail Captain 
called her supervisor, the Chief Deputy, and the matter was 
reported to the Sheriff.  The Sheriff requested that an outside 
agency investigate Slabey's allegations.  The Menomonie Police 
Department then investigated the allegations against Boigenzahn.  
¶14 The 
criminal 
investigation 
regarding 
Slabey's 
statement revealed that on March 25, 2016, about seven months 
after Boigenzahn was first disciplined by the County, he 
sexually assaulted Slabey.  Boigenzahn entered the Huber Dorm4 
and talked with Slabey and her bunkmate.  Slabey was on the top 
                                                 
4 The Huber Dorm is an open area with bunk beds for inmates 
on Huber work release.  See generally Wis. Stat. § 303.08 (2019-
20). 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
12 
 
bunk in a location that was apparently out of camera view.5  
According to Slabey, she "made a comment [to Boigenzahn] about 
do you ever get in trouble . . . . And he's like yeah, I've 
gotten in trouble before, he's like, but I can –- pretty much 
saying he didn't care, you know."  It is undisputed that during 
this time, Boigenzahn began touching Slabey and put his hand 
down her pants.  Slabey told Boigenzahn, "no," and he pulled his 
hand out.  According to Slabey, Boigenzahn said, "you're not 
going to tell on me, are you. . . . And [Slabey] told him no, 
I'm not going to tell on you."  Radio checks were typically 
conducted after ten minutes of not hearing from a CO on rounds 
and, according to Boigenzahn, he did receive a radio check the 
night of the assault.  There was however no radio check during 
the 45 minutes Boigenzahn was with Slabey and her bunkmate.  
Boigenzahn was charged and subsequently convicted and sentenced 
to prison for second-degree sexual assault by correctional staff 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(h) (2016-17).   
¶15 Notably, it was just two days prior to the sexual 
assault that, pursuant to Dunn County policy, Boigenzahn had 
attended a legal update session that included PREA training.  
Boigenzahn admitted that, at the time of the sexual assault, he 
                                                 
5 According to Slabey's deposition, also on or about 
March 25, 2016, Slabey asked Boigenzahn "if [she] could move 
down to the bottom bunk . . . because it was open."  Slabey 
claimed Boigenzahn "told [her], why would you want to move there 
because this one is off camera view up here, and he said that 
[she] couldn't move."  Slabey took this to mean at the time that 
it would be easier for her to have contraband if she remained on 
the top bunk. 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
13 
 
knew it was against state law, against County policy, and 
against PREA. 
¶16 On November 15, 2017, Slabey commenced this action 
against Dunn County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the 
County violated her rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.6  Dunn County moved 
for summary judgment, arguing that it was not liable under 
§ 1983 
because 
"the 
County 
did 
not 
act 
with 
deliberate 
indifference to [Slabey's] safety," "there is no evidence upon 
which a jury could find a Dunn County policy, custom, or 
practice violated her constitutional rights," and "[Slabey's] 
substantive due process rights were not violated by the County."  
Slabey 
opposed 
summary 
judgment, 
arguing 
that 
there 
are 
"sufficient facts to support a jury finding [of] deliberate 
indifference" and that "Dunn County's informal custom/policy of 
ignoring dangers to female inmates caused Slabey's [sexual] 
assault."   
¶17 The circuit court held a hearing on Dunn County's 
motion and subsequently issued a written decision granting Dunn 
County summary judgment.  The court concluded, "There is no 
evidence 
that 
[Dunn 
County's] 
training 
practices 
were 
                                                 
6 In her petition for review, Slabey asserted claims against 
not just Dunn County but also several individual defendants 
employed by the County.  In her briefing, however, Slabey 
asserts claims only against Dunn County and therefore has 
abandoned her claims against the individual defendants.  A.O. 
Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Companies, 222 Wis. 2d 475, 492, 
588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[A]n issue raised on appeal, 
but not briefed or argued, is deemed abandoned.").   
No. 
2020AP877   
 
14 
 
constitutionally deficient and that the County was aware of the 
deficiency and failed to abate the deficiency."  
¶18 Slabey appealed the circuit court's order.  The court 
of appeals affirmed, concluding there is "no evidence upon which 
a reasonable fact finder could rely to conclude [Dunn County 
was] deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that 
Boigenzahn would sexually assault an inmate."  Slabey, No. 
2020AP877, ¶1.  
¶19 Slabey petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶20 "We independently review a grant or denial of summary 
judgment, applying the same method as the circuit court."  
Hoida, Inc. v. M&I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶15, 291 
Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17.  "While our review is independent 
from the circuit court and court of appeals, we benefit from 
their analyses," both of which concluded that summary judgment 
is appropriate.  DSG Evergreen Fam. Ltd. P'ship v. Town of 
Perry, 2020 WI 23, ¶15, 390 Wis. 2d 533, 939 N.W.2d 564.  "We 
will affirm a grant of summary judgment when there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law."  Baumeister v. Automated 
Prods., Inc., 2004 WI 148, ¶11, 277 Wis. 2d 21, 690 N.W.2d 1.  
"A factual issue is 'genuine' if the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-
moving party."  Midwest Neurosciences Assocs., LLC v. Great 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
15 
 
Lakes Neurosurgical Assocs., LLC, 2018 WI 112, ¶80, 384 
Wis. 2d 669, 920 N.W.2d 767. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶21 The parties do not dispute that Slabey suffered a 
constitutional deprivation because she was sexually assaulted by 
Boigenzahn.7  The issue in this case is not whether Boigenzahn 
committed a sexual assault.  He did, and what he did to Slabey 
was terribly wrong.  But a claim against Boigenzahn is not the 
claim we analyze today.  Whether Dunn County is liable to Slabey 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an altogether separate legal inquiry.  
In analyzing that issue, we must consider the exacting standards 
set forth in Monell, 436 U.S. 658.  In short, Slabey asserts 
that "Dunn County was deliberately indifferent to a substantial 
risk of harm to Slabey by failing to thoroughly investigate, 
appropriately discipline, and adequately supervise Boigenzahn."8 
¶22 Because the only issue before us is whether Dunn 
County is liable to Slabey under § 1983, we must analyze the 
standards outlined in Monell.  We begin with an overview of 
                                                 
7 Though the issue is not before us, for purposes of this 
review, we assume without deciding that Boigenzahn violated 
Slabey's constitutional rights.  
8 Slabey raised an additional issue in her opening brief, 
arguing that Dunn County is not entitled to qualified immunity.  
However, Dunn County does not argue here that it is entitled to 
qualified immunity.  Nor could it.  It is well settled that 
municipalities cannot assert qualified immunity.  Owen v. City 
of 
Independence, 
445 
U.S. 
622 
(1980) 
(holding 
that 
municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity); see also 
Davis 
v. 
United 
States, 
564 
U.S. 
229, 
248 
n.9 
(2011) 
(recognizing the same).  
No. 
2020AP877   
 
16 
 
municipal liability under § 1983.  See Monell, 436 U.S. 658.  
Specifically, 
the 
causation 
requirement 
in 
Monell 
is 
dispositive.  We then conclude that Slabey failed to demonstrate 
that Dunn County's action or inaction was the moving force 
behind her constitutional deprivation.  Because Slabey cannot 
demonstrate the requisite causation, we need not analyze the 
other criteria of a municipality's liability in a § 1983 claim 
under Monell.  
A.  Monell Liability Generally 
¶23 Unlike any liability that may exist for an individual 
like Boigenzahn, in order for a municipality to be liable in a 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she 
can satisfy the exacting standards set forth by Monell.  Under 
§ 1983,  
Every 
person 
who, 
under 
color 
of 
any 
statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured . . . . 
In Monell, 436 U.S. 658, the United States Supreme Court 
interpreted "person" within the meaning of § 1983 as including 
local governing bodies.  Monell involved public employees whose 
employers "had as a matter of official policy compelled pregnant 
employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves 
were required for medical reasons."  Id. at 660-61.  The 
employees sued the Department of Social Services and Board of 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
17 
 
Education of the City of New York for damages under § 1983.  Id. 
at 660-62.  The Court held that the employees could sue these 
local governing units:   
Congress did intend municipalities and other local 
government units to be included among those persons to 
whom 
§ 1983 
applies. 
 
Local 
governing 
bodies, 
therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for 
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as 
here, 
the 
action 
that 
is 
alleged 
to 
be 
unconstitutional 
implements 
or 
executes 
a 
policy 
statement, 
ordinance, 
regulation, 
or 
decision 
officially adopted and promulgated by that body's 
officers.   
Id. at 690 (footnotes and emphasis omitted). 
¶24 However, the Court also explained that "Congress did 
not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action 
pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a 
constitutional tort."  Id. at 691.  "[A] municipality cannot be 
held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor——or, in other 
words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a 
respondeat superior theory."  Id. (emphasis omitted).  "Instead, 
it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether 
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may 
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury 
that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983."  
Id. at 694.  Monell and its progeny thus require a plaintiff to 
satisfy each of the following to prove municipal liability under 
§ 1983:  (1) "identify a municipal 'policy' or 'custom' that 
caused the plaintiff's injury"; (2) "the municipal action was 
taken with the requisite degree of culpability"; and (3) there 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
18 
 
is "a direct causal link between the municipal action and the 
deprivation of federal rights."  Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 403-
04.  Because this case is resolved on the third requirement, 
causation, we need not address the first two. 
B.  Section 1983 Causation Under Monell. 
¶25 To prevail in her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
Dunn County, Slabey must demonstrate that the County caused her 
constitutional deprivation.  Slabey argues that causation is 
satisfied 
because 
(1) 
"Dunn 
County 
failed 
to 
thoroughly 
investigate claims that Boigenzahn's conduct would cross a 
line"; (2) "Dunn County failed to appropriately discipline 
Boigenzahn in light of the clear risk of harm that his conduct 
posed to inmates generally and Rachel Slabey specifically"; and 
(3) Dunn County "failed to properly supervise Boigenzahn to 
prevent any further escalation of his misconduct."  Slabey 
argues that these acts of the County caused her constitutional 
deprivation 
because 
they 
"caused 
Boigenzahn's 
conduct 
to 
escalate to Slabey's assault." 
¶26 "Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has 
not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an 
employee to do so, rigorous standards of . . . causation must be 
applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable 
solely for the actions of its employee."  Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. 
at 405.  Monell requires plaintiffs to "demonstrate a direct 
causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of 
federal rights."  Id. at 397.  "[M]ere 'but-for' causation is 
insufficient."  Harte v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 864 F.3d 1154, 1204 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
19 
 
(10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 410).  
Rather, a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim under Monell must 
demonstrate that a municipality was not just a cause, but the 
"moving force" behind the constitutional deprivation.  Monell, 
436 U.S. at 694-95.   
¶27 Monell's causation requirement is a high bar for 
plaintiffs to clear.  "[L]esser standards . . . would require 
the federal [and state] courts endlessly to 'second-guess' the 
wisdom of municipal [programs], a task inappropriate for the 
federal [and state] judiciar[ies]."  Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing City of Canton, 
489 U.S. at 392).  The requirement is "applied with especial 
rigor when the municipal policy or practice is itself not 
unconstitutional, for example, when the municipal liability 
claim is based upon inadequate training, supervision, and 
deficiencies in hiring."  Schneider v. City of Grand Junction 
Police Department, 717 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation Claims & Defenses 
§ 7.12 (2013)).  In such cases, a § 1983 plaintiff "must" prove 
causation by showing "that the municipal action was taken with 
'deliberate 
indifference' 
as 
to 
its 
known 
or 
obvious 
consequences.  A showing of simple or even heightened negligence 
will not suffice."  Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 407 (citation 
omitted).  Evidence of a "pattern of tortious conduct" is 
typically necessary to establish that the municipal action 
"rather than a one-time negligent administration of the program 
or factors peculiar to the officer involved in a particular 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
20 
 
incident, is the 'moving force' behind the plaintiff's injury."  
Id. at 407-08 (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91); see 
also Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) ("[W]here 
the 
policy 
relied 
upon 
is 
not 
itself 
unconstitutional, 
considerably more proof than the single incident will be 
necessary in every case to establish . . . the causal connection 
between the 'policy' and the constitutional deprivation.").  
¶28 Slabey acknowledges that hers is a "single incident" 
case because of the "absence of prior sexual assaults of female 
inmates by male guards."  She argues that, although the single-
incident theory governs her claim, she nonetheless prevails 
under that theory because "Dunn County acted with deliberate 
indifference to a significant, obvious risk of sexual violence 
to all female inmates."  
¶29 Though not impossible, it is exceedingly rare that a 
§ 1983 plaintiff under Monell can prove causation based on a 
single incident.9  The United States Supreme Court first 
                                                 
9 This rigorous standard is what drives our analysis.  
Section 1983 plaintiffs suing municipalities must clear a high 
bar——a bar that is even higher when alleging liability based on 
a "single incident."  For those who would relax this standard by 
conflating it with our standard of review on summary judgment, 
doing so would massively broaden the "single incident" exception 
and "only invite jury nullification of Monell."  City of Canton 
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 399 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
21 
 
recognized the possibility of such a claim in City of Canton v. 
Harris, 489 U.S. 378.  In City of Canton, officers failed to 
seek medical attention for an arrested suspect despite the 
suspect sitting on the floor of the patrol car, responding with 
"an incoherent remark" when asked if she needed medical 
attention, "slump[ing] to the floor on two occasions," and lying 
on the floor.  Id. at 381.  The plaintiff argued that the 
officers "were not provided with any special training (beyond 
first-aid training) to make a determination as to when to summon 
medical care for an injured detainee."  Id. at 382.  The Supreme 
Court noted that a claim based on a single incident might 
survive in some cases:  
[I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned 
to specific officers or employees the need for more or 
different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy 
so likely to result in the violation of constitutional 
rights, 
that 
the 
policymakers 
of 
the 
city 
can 
reasonably 
be 
said 
to 
have 
been 
deliberately 
indifferent to the need. 
                                                                                                                                                             
If this were not the well-established standard, we could 
instead reinvent § 1983 law and analyze how Dunn County might 
have merely allowed, rather than caused, Slabey's constitutional 
deprivation.  However, that would be a sea change in the law.  
Causation under Monell requires much more than "but-for" 
causation.  Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 
U.S. 397, 404, 410 (1997) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).  "In virtually every instance 
where a person has had his or her constitutional rights violated 
by a city employee, a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to 
something the city 'could have done' to prevent the unfortunate 
incident."  City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392.  Whether Dunn 
County could have done more is not the applicable legal 
standard. 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
22 
 
Id. at 390.  In such a situation, "the need to train . . . can 
be said to be 'so obvious,' that failure to do so could properly 
be characterized as 'deliberate indifference' to constitutional 
rights."  Id. at 390 n.10 (citation omitted).  The Supreme Court 
dismissed the § 1983 claim and concluded that "the evidence in 
the record . . . does not meet th[is] standard of § 1983 
liability."  Id. at 392.   
¶30 The Supreme Court again considered, but rejected, an 
argument that this "single-incident" theory applied in Board of 
Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397.  There, 
the § 1983 plaintiff argued that the municipality was liable for 
an officer's use of excessive force because it failed to 
adequately screen the officer's background prior to hiring him, 
and that such screening would have uncovered that the officer 
was previously "charged with assault and battery, resisting 
arrest, and public drunkenness."  Id. at 412-13.  The Court 
reasoned, "[e]ven assuming without deciding that proof of a 
single instance of inadequate screening could ever trigger 
municipal liability, the evidence in this case was insufficient 
to support a finding that, in hiring [the officer], [the 
Sheriff] disregarded a known or obvious risk of injury."  Id. at 
412. 
¶31 The Supreme Court also considered and rejected the 
single-incident theory posed in Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 
(2011).  In Connick a § 1983 plaintiff sued a municipality for a 
constitutional deprivation caused by a prosecutor's failure to 
turn over exculpatory evidence.  Id. at 55-56.  The Court 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
23 
 
reasoned 
that 
because 
prosecutors 
already 
received 
legal 
training on the issue, the § 1983 plaintiff's constitutional 
deprivation was not "so predictable that failing to train the 
prosecutors amounted to conscious disregard for defendants[]."  
Id. at 71 (emphasis omitted).  The Court therefore concluded 
that this case did not fall within the "narrow range of 'single-
incident' liability hypothesized in Canton as a possible 
exception to the pattern of violations necessary to prove 
deliberate indifference in § 1983 actions."10  Id. at 71-72.  
¶32 The Tenth Circuit in Schneider v. City of Grand 
Junction Police Department, 717 F.3d 760, similarly rejected use 
of the single-incident theory in a § 1983 claim.  There, an 
officer sexually assaulted a 911 caller while responding to the 
call.  Id. at 763.  The plaintiff argued that, in light of a 
prior complaint against the officer, the municipality failed to 
adequately investigate, discipline, and supervise the officer.  
Id. at 766.  The court rejected each of these claims against the 
municipality.  The court relied on the facts that the 
municipality "conducted the criminal investigation regarding the 
[prior] complaint," and it "disciplined [the officer] with a pay 
cut and probation" along with a "notice of discipline [informing 
                                                 
10 In 
each 
of 
these 
cases 
where 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
hypothesized that single-incident theory could apply, the 
plaintiffs brought failure-to-train claims, and the Court 
considered the possibility that the theory might apply only in 
such cases.  We note that Slabey's claim is based on alleged 
failures to investigate, discipline, and supervise Boigenzahn, 
but not a failure to train him.   
No. 
2020AP877   
 
24 
 
the officer] that his conduct was unacceptable."  Id. at 775, 
777.  As for the failure-to-supervise claim, the court found "no 
evidence that additional controls or sanctions . . . would have 
had any more deterrent effect than the already-present threats 
of discharge and criminal punishment."  Id. at 780. 
¶33 Similarly, the First Circuit in Santiago v. Fenton, 
891 F.2d 373, 382 (1st Cir. 1989), rejected a § 1983 claim that 
was based on a single incident.  The officer in Santiago used 
excessive 
force 
against 
the 
plaintiff, 
who 
argued 
the 
municipality failed to discipline the officer for an earlier 
incident.  Id.  The court nonetheless concluded that the 
municipality was entitled to summary judgment on the failure-to-
discipline claim and stated: 
The city and the department undisputedly had a policy 
of investigating complaints that expressly included 
the 
disciplining 
of 
officers 
in 
appropriate 
circumstances.  In both of these instances the 
department conducted an investigation and hearing but 
decided that discipline was not appropriate.  As we 
have indicated before, we cannot hold that the failure 
of a police department to discipline in a specific 
instance is an adequate basis for municipal liability 
under Monell. 
Id. 
¶34 Slabey places great reliance on the Seventh Circuit's 
decision in J.K.J. v. Polk County, 960 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2020) 
(en banc), where a § 1983 plaintiff succeeded on the single-
incident theory.11  In J.K.J., the Seventh Circuit concluded that 
                                                 
11 Four judges on the en banc panel dissented:  Circuit 
Judges Easterbrook, Brennan, Bauer, and Sykes.  
No. 
2020AP877   
 
25 
 
Polk County, Wisconsin, acted with deliberate indifference "in 
the face of an obvious and known risk that its male guards would 
sexually assault female inmates."  Id. at 381 (emphasis 
omitted).  That case involved two inmates at the Polk County 
Jail who "endured repeated sexual assaults at the hands of [a] 
correctional officer."  Id. at 370.   
¶35 When Polk County had earlier learned of similar 
allegations against a different guard, it "imposed minor 
discipline on the guard but from there took no institutional 
response——no review of its policy, no training for guards, no 
communication with inmates on how to report such abuse, no 
nothing."  Id. at 370-71.  The jail's Captain "knew of sexual 
comments male guards made about female inmates" and "admitted to 
himself participating in [it]."  Id. at 382.  The Captain also 
knew that an officer's conduct "began with watching [the inmate] 
shower, grew to requests to expose her body for him, and in time 
intensified to forcibly touching her in a sexual manner——all the 
while ordering her to 'keep quiet.'"  Id.  Importantly, "with 
red lights flashing, Polk County chose the one unavailable 
option——doing nothing.  It did not change its sexual abuse 
policy, institute a training, inquire of female inmates, or even 
call a staff meeting."  Id. at 383.  Although Polk County did 
investigate and reprimand a guard for inappropriate sexual 
behavior, jail officials assured him that it was "not a big 
deal."  Id.   
¶36 Unlike Polk County, this record reflects that Dunn 
County in fact required significant, relevant training of its 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
26 
 
officers and took nearly immediate action upon a complaint of 
noncompliant conduct.  Dunn County thoroughly investigated the 
August 2015 complaint and acted in a timely manner to impose 
unpaid leave on the officer.  Boigenzahn was sternly warned for 
the policy violations, which were passing notes between inmates 
and non-sexual physical contact with an inmate.  He was warned 
that his behavior would not be tolerated and that he could be 
terminated.  Leave without pay was one of the most severe 
options of discipline, just short of termination.  When 
Boigenzahn returned to duty, he was required to continue 
training and monthly policy reviews.   
¶37 Nine months had gone by with Boigenzahn working as a 
CO, and there was no indication of his noncompliance.  The very 
next time the County learned that Boigenzahn was noncompliant 
because he had received a note from an inmate, he was 
terminated.  In fact, unlike the facts in Polk County, Dunn 
County first gained knowledge of this off-camera sexual assault 
only after the County had already terminated Boigenzahn.  
¶38 Slabey 
argues Dunn County acted with deliberate 
indifference to a known or obvious consequence that Boigenzahn 
would sexually assault an inmate when it "failed to thoroughly 
investigate claims that Boigenzahn's conduct would cross a 
line," "failed to appropriately discipline Boigenzahn in light 
of the clear risk of harm that his conduct posed to inmates 
generally and Rachel Slabey specifically," and when it "failed 
to 
properly 
supervise 
Boigenzahn 
to 
prevent 
any 
further 
escalation of his misconduct."  However, this allegation in the 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
27 
 
August 2015 complaint was thoroughly investigated.  The County 
officials reviewed two weeks of surveillance video, interviewed 
inmates, and concluded that Boigenzahn committed a serious 
violation of County policy.  The evidence demonstrated that 
Boigenzahn passed notes between inmates and had inmate non-
sexual contact.  The County acted within a month from allegation 
to discipline.  The matter did not languish.  Despite several 
less severe options, Boigenzahn was suspended for three days 
without pay and sternly warned, "If you fail to [correct your 
improper 
conduct], 
you 
will 
subject 
yourself 
to 
further 
disciplinary action, including discharge and termination of your 
employment with the County."  He was also given additional PREA 
training two days before the assault.  For about nine months 
after Boigenzahn returned, Dunn County had no reason to believe 
he was noncompliant.    
¶39 Nonetheless, Slabey argues that the County should have 
done more and, because it did not, it caused her constitutional 
deprivation.  In other words, she argues that the County's 
deliberate indifference "caused Boigenzahn's conduct to escalate 
to Slabey's assault."  However, Slabey offers insufficient 
evidence of how the County was deliberately indifferent given 
its 
policies, 
training, 
investigation, 
discipline, 
and 
additional stern warning of termination for conduct quite unlike 
a sexual assault.  According to Slabey, the only way to 
safeguard against the wrong that was done to her would be that 
the 
County 
should 
have 
terminated 
Boigenzahn, 
constantly 
supervised him, or not allowed him to have any contact with 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
28 
 
female inmates.12  However, the record reflects that three COs 
worked the night shift, with two splitting up to do rounds in 
different parts of the Jail and the third staying in the central 
office.13  Additionally, staffing restrictions prevented the 
County from moving Boigenzahn off the night shift.  In other 
words, constant supervision or moving Boigenzahn were unworkable 
options given Dunn County's Jail; therefore, the only acceptable 
option in hindsight would have been to terminate Boigenzahn for 
passing notes and nonsexual conduct.  Accepting Slabey's 
arguments would make the County liable on a respondeat superior 
theory, a result the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected.  
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 
¶40 In short, Dunn County is entitled to summary judgment 
because there is insufficient evidence for a reasonable fact 
finder to conclude that Dunn County was the moving force behind 
her being sexually assaulted.  Boigenzahn sexually assaulting 
Slabey was the result of his action, which was completely 
forbidden by Dunn County and the criminal law.  It is hindsight 
                                                 
12 Slabey also identifies the County's failure to conduct a 
radio check during the 45 minutes that Boigenzahn was with 
Slabey, and its failure to make sure Slabey's bunk was in view 
of a surveillance camera as acts of deliberate indifference.  
However, these demonstrate the kind of "one-time negligent 
administration of [a] program" that is insufficient to satisfy 
Monell causation.  Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 408.    
13 The Jail Captain testified in her deposition that 
typically three COs worked the night shift, and that one of them 
stayed in the central office at all times.  Boigenzahn testified 
in his deposition that two COs "split up" to do facility-wide 
checks. 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
29 
 
alone that underlies Slabey's causation theory.  Causation in 
the context of a § 1983 claim requires much more.  "[L]esser 
standards . . . would require the federal [and state] courts 
endlessly to 'second-guess' the wisdom of municipal [programs], 
a task inappropriate for the federal [and state] judiciar[ies]."  
Doe, 15 F.3d at 453 (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392).  
Taken together, these facts do not demonstrate that the known or 
obvious consequence of the County's action or inaction was that 
Boigenzahn would sexually assault an inmate.    
¶41 Overall, Slabey's allegations do not rise to the level 
of a cognizable § 1983 claim against Dunn County.  Just because 
the 
County 
could 
have, 
in 
hindsight, 
done 
some 
things 
differently, does not mean that the County was the moving force 
behind the assault.  Section 1983 "does not provide plaintiffs 
or courts carte blanche to micromanage local governments 
throughout the United States."  Connick, 563 U.S. at 68.  The 
standards of a § 1983 claim under Monell are exacting.  Slabey's 
claim does not survive that scrutiny.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶42 Slabey argues that her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against 
Dunn County survives summary judgment because she presented 
evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Dunn 
County violated her rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution when Boigenzahn 
sexually assaulted her.  According to Slabey, Dunn County is 
liable because the "County was deliberately indifferent to a 
substantial risk of harm to Slabey by failing to thoroughly 
No. 
2020AP877   
 
30 
 
investigate, appropriately discipline, and adequately supervise 
Boigenzahn."  Slabey argues that the circuit court erroneously 
granted Dunn County summary judgment, and that the court of 
appeals erred in affirming that result. 
¶43 We conclude that Slabey's § 1983 claim against Dunn 
County fails because, under Monell, no reasonable fact finder 
could conclude that Dunn County was the causal, moving force 
behind the sexual assault.  A § 1983 plaintiff suing a 
municipality for a constitutional deprivation must prove that 
the municipality caused——that is, was the moving force behind——
the constitutional deprivation.  This requires evidence "that 
the municipal action was taken with 'deliberate indifference' as 
to its known or obvious consequences."  Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 
407 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388).  Here, there is 
insufficient evidence that Dunn County acted with deliberate 
indifference to a known or obvious consequence that Boigenzahn 
would sexually assault Slabey.  The circuit court was correct to 
grant 
Dunn 
County 
summary 
judgment 
on 
Slabey's 
§ 1983 
constitutional deprivation claim.  We affirm the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
1 
 
¶44 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   (dissenting).  "The confinement 
setting is a tinderbox for sexual abuse."  J.K.J. v. Polk Cnty., 
960 F.3d 367, 381 (7th Cir. 2020).  
¶45 While women are vulnerable almost everywhere in our 
society, they are especially at risk in correctional settings 
where an estimated 25 to 41 percent of incarcerated women are 
sexually abused.  Hannah Brenner et al., Bars to Justice: The 
Impact of Rape Myths on Women in Prison, 17 Geo. J. Gender & L. 
521, 537-38 (2016).  In such settings female prisoners are 
dependent on guards (who are disproportionately male) for their 
very existence.  This includes "their safety as well as their 
access to food, medical care, recreation and even contact with 
family members."  J.K.J., 960 F.3d at 381.  Due to the 
imbalances of power, the correctional context is ripe for abuse 
as "[p]rison rape represents the intersection of masculine 
elitism and deprivations of civil rights."  Maureen Brocco, 
Facing the Facts: The Guarantee Against Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment in Light of PLRA, Iqbal, and PREA, 16 J. Gender Race 
& Just. 917, 917 (2013).  Sexual abuse is about power and 
control and "this psychosocial dynamic is amplified in the 
prison context."  Id. 
¶46 Victims of sexual abuse 
often confront profound 
physical, social, and psychological effects.  These effects can 
be debilitating and overwhelming, and they are magnified in 
confinement settings.  "Victims often endure great physical pain 
and sustain various injuries.  Moreover, any episode of sexual 
assault could ultimately prove deadly since incarcerated victims 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
2 
 
are at an increased risk of contracting sexually transmitted and 
other communicable diseases such as HIV, AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
hepatitis B and C."  Kevin R. Corlew, Congress Attempts to Shine 
a Light on a Dark Problem: An In-Depth Look at the Prison Rape 
Elimination Act of 2003, 33 Am. J. Crim. L. 157, 160 (2006). 
¶47 To combat the scourge of sexual assaults in the 
confinement setting, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination 
Act (PREA) in 2003.  But the enactment of a law aimed at 
stopping prison rapes does not in and of itself put an end to 
sexual violence.  Prisons and jails must take steps to prevent 
and detect sexual misconduct.  And important to this case, when 
sexual abuse does occur, it is incumbent on the judicial system 
to hold to account those who are responsible in order to protect 
vulnerable inmates.  It is here where the majority falls short.  
In wrongly concluding that the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment for Dunn County should be upheld, the majority allows 
the county to escape all responsibility for (1) ignoring clear 
warning signs that former Dunn County correctional officer Ryan 
Boigenzahn had engaged in inappropriate and escalating behavior 
with female inmates, and (2) creating the circumstances that 
allowed Boigenzahn to sexually assault Rachel Slabey while she 
was incarcerated in the Dunn County Jail. 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
3 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶48 Boigenzahn sexually assaulted Slabey1 while she was in 
her bunk in the Dunn County Jail on March 25, 2016.2  It was the 
middle of the night in the Huber Dorm.3  Boigenzahn was tasked 
with checking the women's dorm despite his recent suspension for 
violating the jail's fraternization policy.  Boigenzahn surveyed 
the women's dorm alone, unmonitored, and entirely unsupervised.  
That night, Boigenzahn spent 45 minutes in Slabey's dorm, an 
extraordinarily long time compared to the few seconds that 
guards usually took to check the dorm during the night.  And 
although the Dunn County Jail practice is for the central office 
of the jail to conduct radio checks when an officer fails to 
report back to the central office after 10 minutes, no 
supervisor checked in on Boigenzahn during the 45 minutes he was 
in the dorm, despite his known history of fraternization.  By 
                                                 
1 Normally, to protect the dignity and privacy of Slabey, a 
victim of sexual assault, I would use initials or pseudonyms to 
identify her.  However, because Slabey filed this lawsuit using 
her real name, I do not follow that practice for her here.  To 
protect the dignity and privacy of other inmates, who were 
witnesses or victims of Boigenzahn, I use initials. 
2 Mindful that this is a summary judgment review, I will set 
out the factual background necessary to understanding this case 
by presenting Slabey's evidence as true while drawing all 
reasonable inferences in her favor, as the court must when 
reviewing a summary judgment decision.  See Burbank Grease 
Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 2006 WI 103, ¶40, 294 Wis. 2d 274, 
717 N.W.2d 781.   
3 A Huber facility is a county correctional facility that 
houses inmates who have been granted leave privileges (typically 
work release) under Wis. Stat. § 303.08(1).  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 303.09. 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
4 
 
all accounts, no one was monitoring Boigenzahn as he abandoned 
his duties to prowl around Slabey's dorm. 
¶49 The jail assigned Slabey to the only bunk in the dorm 
that was entirely unmonitored by security cameras, a fact both 
Boigenzahn and Slabey knew.  Boigenzahn himself previously 
denied Slabey's request to be moved to a different bunk.  
Additionally, 
the 
jail 
recently 
transferred 
Slabey 
from 
administrative segregation, causing her concern that if she did 
anything to "make a scene" or displease Boigenzahn, she would be 
transferred back.  And, unsurprisingly, Slabey did not think 
that anyone would believe her or protect her if she spoke up and 
complained about Boigenzahn.  In a word, Slabey was vulnerable. 
¶50 Armed 
with 
the 
knowledge 
of 
his 
victim's 
vulnerabilities, Boigenzahn entered the Huber Dorm, found Slabey 
and her bunkmate, D.S., and began talking with them.  One of the 
topics of conversation was Boigenzahn's reputation for spending 
an inappropriate amount of time with female inmates.  Slabey 
"made a comment [to Boigenzahn] about do you ever get in trouble 
. . . . And [Boigenzahn was] like yeah, I've gotten in trouble 
before, he's like, but I can——pretty much saying he didn't care, 
you know." As he was talking to the inmates, Boigenzahn began 
touching Slabey, first by rubbing her hand.  Slabey tried to 
protect herself by moving away and lying down, but Boigenzahn 
persisted.  He went after her, grabbing her pants, then her leg, 
then Boigenzahn shoved his hand down Slabey's pants and inside 
her underwear. 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
5 
 
¶51 While Boigenzahn was sexually assaulting her, Slabey, 
now completely defenseless, went silent.  She did not want to 
call attention to his actions "because it was so quiet in there" 
and she "didn't want to have a scene or have him say something 
like, 
oh, 
[she] 
did 
something 
and 
put 
[her] 
back 
in 
[segregation]." 
 
During 
the 
sexual 
assault, 
Slabey 
felt 
"confused," "in shock" and "didn't know what to do."  After 
sexually assaulting her, Boigenzahn asked Slabey if she would 
tell anyone.  Slabey told him no, and soon after, Boigenzahn 
left the Huber Dorm. 
¶52 This sexual assault did not occur without warning.  It 
was not a freak occurrence, a force majeure that could have 
neither been foreseen nor prevented.  Instead, sheriff's 
department officials——importantly here, the Sheriff himself——
first ignored the clear warning signs that Boigenzahn had 
already engaged in inappropriate and escalating behavior with 
female inmates, and then created the circumstances that allowed 
Boigenzahn to sexually assault Slabey. 
¶53 Prior to the sexual assault, the Sheriff had ample 
warning that Boigenzahn was, in the words of one inmate, 
"dangerously close to crossing the line."  Sheriff's department 
officials were first alerted to Boigenzahn's conduct in July 
2015, about eight months before the sexual assault.  Inmate 
J.W.B. informed a correctional officer, and subsequently a jail 
sergeant, that officials needed to "keep a close eye on" the 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
6 
 
male correctional staff.4  When asked for an example, J.W.B. 
explained that on two separate occasions, an officer passed 
notes between female and male inmates.  J.W.B. originally 
refused to identify the officer in question for fear of 
retaliation, but upon further questioning, she identified 
Boigenzahn.  Passing notes was a violation of the Dunn County 
Jail's fraternization policy, one that historically resulted in 
suspension or termination.  Despite the seriousness of the 
allegations, the sergeant only reviewed surveillance video for 
one of the two instances J.W.B. reported, and he failed to 
question Boigenzahn or the inmates directly.  After this cursory 
investigation, the sergeant concluded that there was no factual 
basis for J.W.B's claims. 
¶54 About one week later, another inmate, B.M., told a 
different sergeant that Boigenzahn was dangerously close to 
"crossing the line," and that he had been getting "too chummy" 
with some of the female inmates.  B.M. said that she had not yet 
witnessed anything sexual, but she believed "that was a 
possibility if things progressed."  As an example, she told this 
                                                 
4 When questioned whether her concerns were "in regards to 
fraternization," J.W.B. indicated that she did not understand 
what fraternization meant.  The sergeant then asked whether the 
officer "was developing a relationship with an inmate."  J.W.B. 
answered 
in 
the 
negative, 
but 
there 
was 
no 
additional 
explanation of what the sergeant meant by "relationship" in that 
context nor any additional attempt to understand what J.W.B. 
understood "relationship" to mean.  This exchange illustrates 
how important it is to ensure that female inmates (as well as 
guards) understand "what abuse entails," particularly since 
"they may come from life experiences that have blurred the lines 
of abnormal and normal relationships."  J.K.J. v. Polk Cnty., 
960 F.3d 367, 375 (7th Cir. 2020). 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
7 
 
sergeant that Boigenzahn had been talking with another inmate, 
A.D., when A.D. playfully slapped Boigenzahn on the chest.  B.M. 
said that if there was an opportunity when there were no cameras 
around, "something might happen," and "all the females in the 
Jail talk about that."  If Boigenzahn hadn't already crossed the 
"bright line" that staff are not supposed to cross, B.M. said, 
"he [was] getting dangerously close to doing it." 
¶55 In response to the above reports, sheriff's department 
officials reviewed surveillance footage and found two incidents 
that 
corroborated 
B.M.'s 
concerns. 
 
First, 
on 
July 
29, 
Boigenzahn entered the Huber Dorm, stepped out of camera range 
for a few minutes, then stepped back into view when another 
officer entered the room.  While the other officer was handing 
out breakfast, Boigenzahn reached out and "playfully" stepped on 
A.D.'s foot.  She then stepped back on his foot.  Second, on 
August 6, Boigenzahn entered the dorm and shut the door behind 
him.  He gestured "as if motioning someone to come in his 
direction," at which point A.D. ran over to him and "brush[ed] 
him with her hand on his shoulder/chest area." 
¶56 Sheriff's department officials then questioned A.D., 
asking her whether any officer ever made her feel uncomfortable.  
A.D. "immediately" informed the officials that Boigenzahn made 
her 
feel 
uncomfortable 
and 
provided 
the 
following 
three 
examples.  First, she described an instance where her hand and 
Boigenzahn's hands accidentally touched.  She pulled her hand 
away and apologized, but he responded that "it was alright, he 
didn't mind."  Second, other inmates told her that Boigenzahn 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
8 
 
seemed to be "obsessed" with her, and they observed him standing 
and watching her sleep.  Third, she explained that he just 
"lingered too long" around her.  Like J.W.B., A.D. explained 
that she did not report Boigenzahn sooner because she was afraid 
of retaliation.  In response to A.D.'s statements, the sergeant 
pressed A.D. and asked "if there had ever been anything more 
than statements made or him watching her."  In doing so, the 
sergeant seemingly dismissed A.D.'s claim that Boigenzahn was 
obsessed with her, watched her sleep, and lingered too long 
around her, as if that information alone were unimportant to the 
investigation. 
¶57 Sheriff's 
department 
officials 
then 
met 
with 
Boigenzahn and questioned him about the inmates' allegations.  
Boigenzahn initially lied to the officials and denied passing 
notes between inmates, only confessing after he learned that he 
would be terminated if he were not truthful.  He denied that he 
acted inappropriately toward A.D., which officials also found to 
be false. 
¶58 Despite knowing that Boigenzahn had, at the very 
least, violated the jail's fraternization policy and attempted 
to conceal and lie about his violations, the Sheriff decided 
against terminating Boigenzahn.  The Sheriff made this choice 
despite the fact that violations of the fraternization policy 
"historically" resulted in termination, and despite the fact 
that Boigenzahn's lying, in and of itself, was grounds for 
termination.  The Sheriff opted instead for a far more lenient 
response and suspended Boigenzahn for three days before allowing 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
9 
 
him to return to work——in the same position——where he continued 
to have unfettered access to vulnerable women inmates.  The 
Sheriff did not put Boigenzahn on a different shift, one where 
more staffing would allow for more supervision.  He did not 
assign Boigenzahn to a different section, away from female 
inmates.  He did not bar Boigenzahn from having further 
unsupervised contact with female inmates; in fact, he did not 
assign any staff to further monitor or investigate Boigenzahn at 
all.  Instead, the Sheriff sent an officer who violated jail 
policies, lied to officials, and raised such serious red flags 
that multiple inmates reported him despite fears of retaliation, 
back to guard female inmates on the lightest-staffed shift with 
little to no monitoring.  And that is how former officer 
Boigenzahn accessed, cornered, and sexually assaulted, Slabey on 
March 25, 2016. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶59 When Dunn County took Slabey into custody, it assumed 
an affirmative duty to protect her from harm.  DeShaney v. 
Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 
(1989) ("When the State takes a person into its custody and 
holds [her] there against [her] will, the Constitution imposes 
upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for 
[her] safety and general well-being.").  Sexual assault is one 
of those harms, for while the Eighth Amendment "does not mandate 
comfortable prisons," sexual assault "is simply not part of the 
penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against 
society."  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-834 (1994) 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
10 
 
(internal citations omitted).  Sexual offenses "tend . . . to 
cause significant distress and often lasting psychological 
harm," Washington v. Hively, 695 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2012), 
and there is little doubt that Slabey's Eighth Amendment rights 
were violated when Boigenzahn sexually assaulted her.  The only 
question here is whether Slabey may hold Dunn County accountable 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "plainly imposes liability on a 
government that, under color of some official policy, 'causes' 
an employee to violate another's constitutional rights."  See 
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 
658, 692 (1978). 
¶60 While 
the 
standards 
for 
establishing 
municipal 
liability 
under 
§ 
1983 
are 
rigorous, 
"they 
are 
not 
insurmountable."  J.K.J., 930 F.3d at 378.  In order to 
establish liability and survive summary judgment on her claim 
against Dunn County, Slabey must bring sufficient evidence for a 
jury to reasonably find that Dunn County (1) had an official 
policy, custom, or decision, (2) that demonstrated the requisite 
level of culpability, and (3) caused her injury.  See Bd. of 
Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-
404 (1997).  I will discuss each of these elements in turn 
before explaining why a jury could reasonably find for Slabey on 
each. 
¶61 First, Slabey must identify an official Dunn County 
policy or custom that caused her injury.  Monell, 436 U.S. at 
690.  The Supreme Court has recognized that a decision by an 
official 
with 
final 
policy-making 
authority 
meets 
this 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
11 
 
requirement——that is, municipal liability attaches when "a 
deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from 
among 
various 
alternatives 
by 
the 
official 
or 
officials 
responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the 
subject matter in question."  Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 
U.S. 469, 483 (1986).  Inaction, as well as action, may serve as 
the 
basis 
for 
municipal 
liability, 
depending 
on 
the 
circumstances.  Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61-62 (2011) 
("[a] policy of inaction in light of notice that its program 
will 
cause 
constitutional 
violations 
is 
the 
functional 
equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the 
Constitution." (internal citations omitted)). 
¶62 Second, 
Slabey 
must 
establish 
Dunn 
County's 
culpability, which under Monell means that she must provide 
sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the county's actions 
demonstrated a "deliberate indifference" to the "known or 
obvious" consequence that a constitutional violation would 
occur.  Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 407.  While a pattern of 
constitutional violations is "ordinarily necessary" to establish 
the requisite notice that an official course of conduct is 
inadequate, the risk of a constitutional violation may be so 
obvious that the municipality's actions could demonstrate 
deliberate indifference to that risk.  See Connick, 563 U.S. at 
64.  The Supreme Court in City of Canton v. Harris provided the 
following example of deliberate indifference: if city policy-
makers, having armed their police officers with firearms, fail 
to train those officers on the constitutional limitations on 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
12 
 
deadly force, that failure could be characterized as deliberate 
indifference.  City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 
n. 10 (1989).  The Seventh Circuit in Glisson v. Indiana 
Department of Corrections provided another example: the failure 
to establish coordinated care protocols for inmates with chronic 
illnesses could reflect deliberate indifference if a jury found 
the need for those protocols obvious, even absent prior 
constitutional violations.  Glisson v. Ind. Dep't of Corr., 849 
F.3d 372, 382 (7th Cir. 2017).  And in J.K.J. v. Polk County the 
Seventh Circuit provided another, one relevant to this case: the 
failure to institute more robust policies to prevent the sexual 
assault of female inmates in the face of a guard's escalating 
behavior can demonstrate deliberate indifference to the known or 
obvious risk of sexual assault.  J.K.J., 960 F.3d at 385. 
¶63 Third, Slabey must establish sufficient evidence for a 
jury to find that Dunn County's actions caused her injury.  That 
is, the official actions must be the "moving force" behind the 
constitutional violation.  Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 400 (1997).  
A municipality cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions 
of its employee solely because it employed that employee.  
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.  Instead, the plaintiff must 
"demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action 
and the deprivation of federal rights."  Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. 
at 404. 
¶64 Slabey established sufficient evidence for a jury to 
find for her on each of these three requirements by: (1) 
identifying a course of action by a final policy-maker——namely, 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
13 
 
the Sheriff's choice to return Boigenzahn to his standard shift 
with no additional supervision; (2) alleging sufficient evidence 
for a jury to conclude that the risk of sexual assault was so 
predictable that the Sheriff's course of action constituted 
deliberate indifference; and (3) alleging sufficient evidence to 
show that the Sheriff's course of action caused the sexual 
assault.  Her § 1983 claim against Dunn County should therefore 
survive summary judgment.  I address how Slabey met each 
requirement in more detail below. 
A.  Official Policy, Custom, or Decision 
¶65 Slabey 
met 
the 
first 
requirement 
for 
municipal 
liability under § 1983 because she identified a "deliberate 
choice to follow a course of action" by a final policy-maker.  
See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483.  As Slabey points out, and Dunn 
County does not dispute, the Sheriff was the final policy-maker 
for staffing and disciplinary decisions at the Dunn County Jail.  
And he, as that final policy-maker, deliberately chose to adopt 
a particular course of action——to retain Boigenzahn and send him 
back to guard female inmates alone, on the lightest-staffed 
shift, with no additional supervision, investigation, or follow-
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
14 
 
up.5  The Sheriff had "various alternatives" to his course of 
action.  See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483.  One of those 
alternatives was to terminate Boigenzahn.  Termination was not 
just an option, but (as the Sheriff acknowledged), the typical 
disciplinary response for violations of the fraternization 
policy.  Another alternative was to adjust Boigenzahn's schedule 
to accommodate increased supervision and monitoring of his 
behavior.  The Sheriff considered these alternatives, but 
instead chose the one course of action that would allow 
Boigenzahn to spend significant time alone and unmonitored with 
female inmates. 
¶66 Slabey may not have identified a written policy that 
caused her injury, but she does not need to.  Monell liability 
attaches where "a deliberate choice to follow a course of action 
                                                 
5 Because Slabey focused on this particular course of 
action, this dissent will too.  However, I note that in similar 
cases, plaintiffs have presented expert testimony identifying a 
variety of additional measures that jails must take to protect 
female inmates from sexual assaults.  These measures include 
"informing guards of the inherent vulnerability the confinement 
setting presents to female inmates, educating jailers on the 
symptoms of an inmate suffering from the trauma of abuse, 
requiring officers to report each other's misconduct, or taking 
any time to otherwise instruct guards on matters of prevention 
and detection."  J.K.J., 960 F.3d 367 at 379.  Prevention and 
detection measures also include: a designated PREA coordinator, 
staff training on what to look for and how to report abuse as 
well as how to make inmates feel comfortable coming forward, 
taking additional care with job assignments within facilities, 
ensuring that all inmates understand their right to be free from 
sexual abuse and harassment as well as making sure inmates 
understand what abuse entails, and a confidential way for 
inmates to report abuse.  Id. at 375.  An additional, vital, and 
seemingly obvious prevention measure is not allowing male guards 
to be alone and unmonitored with female prisoners.  Cash v. 
Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 331 (2d Cir. 2011). 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
15 
 
is made among various alternatives by the official or officials 
responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the 
subject matter in question."  Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483.  Slabey 
sufficiently identified that deliberate choice here. 
B.  Culpability 
 
¶67 Slabey also met the culpability requirement because 
she presented enough evidence for a jury to reasonably find that 
the 
Sheriff's 
official 
course 
of 
action 
was 
taken 
with 
deliberate indifference to the known or obvious risk that a 
sexual assault would occur.  Whether the risks were known or 
obvious 
and 
whether 
the 
Sheriff 
acted 
with 
deliberate 
indifference are questions of fact.  See Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 
F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000).  Next I demonstrate how a jury, 
assessing the facts of this case, could reasonably conclude 
that: (1) Boigenzahn’s prior behavior created a known or obvious 
risk that he would sexually assault an inmate and (2) the 
Sheriff's decision to send Boigenzahn back to guard female 
inmates reflected deliberate indifference to that  risk. 
1.  Known or Obvious Risk of Sexual Assault 
 
¶68 When 
evaluating 
Boigenzahn's 
prior 
conduct 
to 
determine whether the risk of sexual assault was known or 
obvious, it is important to note that "consent is not an issue" 
when a correctional officer has "sexual contact or sexual 
intercourse with an individual who is confined in a correctional 
institution if the actor is a correctional staff member."  Wis. 
Stat. §§ 940.225(2)(h), 940.225(4).  In enacting Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.225(2)(h), the legislature barred consent from being a 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
16 
 
defense in this context because it recognized that the power 
imbalance 
between 
correctional 
staff 
and 
inmates 
in 
the 
confinement setting, coupled with restrictions on inmates' 
freedom, make it impossible for inmates to freely consent.  
Because an inmate cannot consent to sexual conduct with a 
correctional staff member, an inmate's "words or overt actions 
that might indicate a freely given agreement to have sexual 
intercourse or sexual contact" in the outside world are 
irrelevant in this instance.  See Wis. Stat. § 940.225(4).  
Accordingly, the deliberate indifference inquiry must be viewed 
through the correct lens of the confinement setting.  And 
through this lens, conduct that merely foreshadows consensual 
sexual contact in other contexts may serve as notice of an 
obvious risk of sexual assault in the confinement setting.   See 
Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 337 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting 
that because (like Wisconsin) New York state law did not 
tolerate any sexual contact between guards and prisoners, jail 
officials "were thus obligated to do the same in carrying out 
their affirmative duty to protect prisoners from harm."). 
 
¶69 A jury aware of the distinctive nature of sexual abuse 
in the correctional setting could, based on Slabey's evidence 
and reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, make three 
factual findings: (1) Boigenzahn engaged in inappropriate 
behavior with female inmates, based on the corroborated reports 
of 
three 
different 
inmates; 
(2) 
Boigenzahn's 
behavior, 
particularly with A.D., was not just inappropriate, but sexually 
charged; and (3) Boigenzahn had a propensity to lie and conceal 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
17 
 
inappropriate behavior unless directly confronted, and sheriff's 
department officials knew about this propensity.  Based on these 
findings, a jury could reasonably conclude that the Sheriff had 
notice that Boigenzahn was engaging in a pattern of escalating 
and inappropriate behavior toward female inmates——including 
physical conduct——that was likely to lead to sexual assault.  I 
will address each of the potential factual findings in turn. 
¶70 First, based on the corroborated reports of three 
different inmates, a jury could find that Boigenzahn engaged in 
inappropriate behavior with female inmates, some of which was 
physical in nature.  Two of those inmates warned sheriff's 
department officials that the behavior was likely to escalate, 
or "cross the line" if it had not already.  One of the inmates, 
A.D., reported that Boigenzahn "made her uncomfortable," told 
her that "he didn't mind" when their hands accidentally touched, 
and, according to other inmates, even watched her while she 
slept.  Additionally, Sheriff's department officials viewed 
video surveillance of Boigenzahn which corroborated some of the 
inmates' reports. 
¶71 Second, 
a 
jury 
could 
reasonably 
infer 
that 
Boigenzahn's behavior, particularly with A.D., was not only 
inappropriate, 
but 
sexually 
charged. 
 
Just 
because 
a 
municipality labels behaviors as "fraternization" instead of 
sexual misconduct does not mean that the majority should defer 
to that characterization, or assume that a jury must.  As Dunn 
County's own sexual misconduct policy acknowledges, sexual 
conduct encompasses a "range of behaviors," including, for 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
18 
 
example, "conduct of a sexual nature or implication" and 
"unreasonable or unnecessary invasion of privacy."  A jury could 
reasonably conclude that Boigenzahn's physical conduct with A.D. 
was "conduct of a sexual implication."  A jury could also 
reasonably conclude that "obsessing" over an inmate and watching 
her sleep is an "unreasonable or unnecessary invasion of 
privacy." 
¶72 The majority errs when it dismisses Boigenzahn's prior 
behaviors and mischaracterizes them as "nonsexual."  See 
majority op. at ¶¶36, 39.  In doing so, the majority incorrectly 
draws inferences in Dunn County's favor, rather than Slabey's 
favor.  See Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 2006 WI 
103, ¶40, 294 Wis. 2d 274, 717 N.W.2d 781 (when reviewing a 
summary judgment decision, "we draw all reasonable inferences 
from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party.").  Sheriff's department officials viewed surveillance 
footage of Boigenzahn quite literally "playing footsie" with 
A.D., which even the Oxford English Dictionary recognizes as 
"surreptitiously touching a person's foot or ankle with one's 
foot . . . as 
a 
playful 
expression 
of 
sexual 
attraction" 
(emphasis added).  Officials also viewed footage of A.D. 
stroking Boigenzahn's chest and shoulder after he beckoned her 
over to him.  And A.D. reported that Boigenzahn told her that he 
"didn't mind" when their hands touched.  A jury, viewing 
Boigenzahn's behavior in the proper context of the confinement 
setting and drawing on their life experiences and common sense, 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
19 
 
could reasonably conclude that his actions were sexually 
charged. 
¶73 Third, a jury could find that Boigenzahn had a 
propensity to lie and conceal inappropriate behavior, and that 
the sheriff's department officials knew about his dishonesty.  
Officials knew that Boigenzahn initially lied about passing 
notes between male and female inmates, and only confessed when 
told 
that 
he 
would 
be 
terminated 
for 
being 
untruthful.  
Additionally, Boigenzahn himself admitted to officials that he 
"tends not to tell the truth."  And finally, officials knew that 
Boigenzahn appeared to intentionally stand out of camera view in 
the Huber Dorm.  A jury could find that the Sheriff knew that he 
could not trust Boigenzahn due to his deceptive tendencies, yet 
chose to put him back in the female dorm, without the 
supervision or monitoring that Boigenzahn clearly needed. 
¶74 Taking all of these facts and inferences together, a 
jury could find that there was a known or obvious risk that 
Boigenzahn's behavior would escalate to sexual assault.  The 
jury could find that the Sheriff received notice from multiple 
female inmates that Boigenzahn's behavior was escalating, had 
become 
physical, 
and 
would 
cross 
the 
line 
from 
merely 
inappropriate to predatory, if it had not already.  The jury 
could find that this escalating behavior was, at the very least, 
"conduct of a sexual implication" that——along with the inmates' 
warnings——created notice of an obvious risk that sexual assault 
would occur.  The jury could find that Boigenzahn had already 
lied to sheriff's department officials and attempted to evade 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
20 
 
detection for his behaviors——thus, he could not be trusted and 
clearly required supervision and monitoring.  Taking all these 
facts together in the context of the confinement setting, with 
its stark power imbalance between guards and female inmates, the 
jury could reasonably conclude that Boigenzahn's behavior 
created a known or obvious risk that he would sexually assault 
an inmate.  
2.  Deliberate Indifference to the Known or Obvious Risk of 
Sexual Assault 
¶75 A jury, having found that Boigenzahn's actions created 
an obvious risk that sexual assault would occur, could further 
find that the Sheriff's decision to put Boigenzahn back on his 
normal shift reflected deliberate indifference to that risk. 
¶76 In determining that the Sheriff was not deliberately 
indifferent, the majority suggests that the Sheriff's chosen 
course of action——suspending Boigenzahn for three days——was a 
"severe" response to Boigenzahn's behavior, and that the Sheriff 
chose it over less severe options.  See majority op. at ¶¶36, 
38. This does not square with the Sheriff's admission that 
"historically fraternization turns into a termination," and that 
a short suspension was the "minimum" appropriate disciplinary 
action for passing notes.  The Sheriff's disciplinary response 
was lenient, based on his own admissions, and does not preclude 
a finding of deliberate indifference as a matter of law.  See 
Cash, 654 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2011) (upholding a jury finding of 
deliberate indifference even though the sheriff's department had 
previously suspended a guard for misconduct). 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
21 
 
¶77 The 
majority 
also 
concludes 
that 
the 
Sheriff's 
decision to send Boigenzahn back to guard the female prisoners 
on the night shift was not deliberate indifference in part 
because moving Boigenzahn to a different shift with more 
supervision "would affect somebody on day shift that would be 
bumped off from that shift and forced onto the night shift."  
See majority op. at ¶11.  But the administrative inconveniences 
inherent to protecting constitutional rights in the confinement 
setting are no excuse for failing to protect those rights.  For 
instance, the difficulty in finding the time and staff to train 
officers about the constitutional limits on excessive force 
before handing those officers firearms would not preclude a 
finding of deliberate indifference.  See Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 
n. 10.  Nor would any difficulties, staffing or otherwise, in 
enacting "centralized treatment protocols for chronically ill 
inmates."  See Glisson, 849 F.3d at 382.  Replacing one staff 
member 
or 
changing 
one 
staff 
member's 
schedule 
is 
not 
"unworkable," as the majority suggests, see majority op. at ¶39, 
but in fact a relatively small undertaking compared to adopting 
a new training program or revamping healthcare protocols; 
therefore, it is difficult to understand why the inconvenience 
of doing either would preclude a jury from finding for Slabey on 
the deliberate indifference element of the Monell test.  The 
Sheriff may have decided to retain Boigenzahn despite his 
behavior toward female inmates in part because replacing him 
would be inconvenient, and "[Boigenzahn] had been a pretty good 
jailer on other notes," but the choice still demonstrated a 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
22 
 
deliberate indifference to the "note" that mattered here——the 
safety of female inmates. 
C.  Causation 
¶78 Slabey also established enough evidence for a jury to 
reasonably find that the Sheriff's course of action caused 
Slabey's injury. 
¶79 Much of the same evidence that supports Slabey's claim 
on the culpability requirement also supports it on the causation 
requirement.  Specifically, evidence of an obvious risk of 
sexual assault can support both a finding of "deliberate 
indifference" 
and 
"an 
inference 
of 
causation——that 
the 
municipality's indifference led directly to the very consequence 
that was so predictable."  Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409-410.  If 
a jury could reasonably conclude that the risk of sexual assault 
was obvious enough that the failure to take action constituted 
deliberate indifference, it may take "but a small inferential 
step" for a jury to find that the failure to take action caused 
the injury.  J.K.J., 960 F.3d at 384.  Causation, like 
culpability, is a fact question for a jury——"finding causation 
is not a mechanical exercise like working a math problem and 
getting an answer, but instead requires jurors to view evidence 
in its totality, draw on their life experiences and common 
sense, and then reach reasonable conclusions about the effects 
of particular action and inaction" (emphasis in original).  Id. 
at 384–385.  Here, Slabey established enough evidence for a jury 
to do so. 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
23 
 
¶80  Slabey's evidence "paved multiple roads for the jury 
to travel" to find that the Sheriff's actions caused her injury.  
See id. at 385.  A jury could find that if the Sheriff had 
pursued the typical course of action and terminated Boigenzahn 
for his violations of the fraternization policy (and arguably, 
the sexual misconduct policy, as discussed above), Boigenzahn 
would not have had access to sexually assault Slabey or any 
other inmate.  A jury could alternatively find that if the 
Sheriff had instead switched Boigenzahn to a shift that allowed 
for more supervision, Boigenzahn would have been prevented from 
spending a significant amount of time alone and unmonitored with 
female inmates, and thus would have either been dissuaded from 
sexually assaulting an inmate for fear of the consequences, or 
denied the opportunity to sexually assault an inmate at all.  A 
jury could also infer that the Sheriff's failure to take any 
additional action to protect female inmates both emboldened 
Boigenzahn 
and 
silenced 
inmates 
who 
now 
understood 
that 
objecting to his behavior was essentially futile.  Since any of 
these inferences would be reasonable, a jury could conclude from 
Slabey's evidence that the Sheriff's course of action caused the 
sexual assault to happen. 
¶81 The Sheriff's actions were the "moving force" behind 
Slabey's injuries.  See Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 400.  This is 
not a case where a plaintiff is attempting to prove causation 
simply by showing that she would not have been sexually 
assaulted "but for" the municipality's original decision to hire 
the perpetrator.  See id.  Instead, Slabey established that her 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
24 
 
sexual assault was caused by the Sheriff's decision to put a 
guard with a known history of inappropriate and arguably sexual 
conduct toward female inmates back in a position where he would 
be alone and unmonitored with those inmates.  The Sheriff's 
decision was thus not only a "but for" cause of Slabey's 
injuries, but "closely related to the ultimate injury."  See 
Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.  A jury could therefore reasonably find 
that Slabey has met the causation requirement. 
¶82 Because Slabey established sufficient evidence that a 
final policy-maker acted with deliberate indifference to a 
serious risk of sexual assault, and in doing so caused her 
sexual assault, she has met all three requirements for Monell 
liability.  Based on the evidence Slabey provided, a jury could 
reasonably find that the Sheriff knew that he was essentially 
sending a fox back to guard the hen house, and in doing so was 
deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of Dunn 
County inmates.  Therefore, Slabey's § 1983 claim against Dunn 
County should survive summary judgment. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶83 Based on the evidence Slabey provided, a jury could 
find that Dunn County Sheriff's Department officials ignored the 
clear warning signs that Boigenzahn had already engaged in 
inappropriate and escalating behavior with female inmates and 
then created the circumstances that allowed Boigenzahn to 
sexually assault Slabey.  The Sheriff's deliberate course of 
action enabled Boigenzahn to escape detection for 45 minutes as 
he was working alone, unsupervised, and unmonitored in the Huber 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
25 
 
dorm on the night he sexually assaulted Slabey.  Slabey provided 
sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find that the 
Sheriff's 
course 
of 
action 
both 
demonstrated 
deliberate 
indifference and was the causal "moving force" behind the sexual 
assault.  Slabey's § 1983 claim against Dunn County should 
therefore survive summary judgment. 
¶84 When municipalities take inmates into custody, they 
assume a responsibility to protect them from sexual assault.  
But this responsibility means little if the justice system is 
unwilling to hold municipalities accountable when they fail to 
protect their inmates.  When municipalities are not held to 
account, measures like PREA, enacted to eliminate sexual assault 
in jails and prisons, are reduced to little more than a 
perfunctory policy for correctional staff to sign, then freely 
disregard.  Dunn County threw a match into the tinderbox when it 
sent Boigenzahn back to guard female inmates.  The majority's 
failure to hold Dunn County accountable is akin to standing idly 
by as the fire burns. 
¶85 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2020AP877.jjk 
 
1