Title: Shivaee v. Commnwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
RAHMATOLLAH SHIVAEE 
 
v.  Record No. 041954 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA∗ 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
Everett A. Martin, Jr., Judge 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
JUNE 9, 2005 
 
ORLANDO LAWARREN BUTLER 
 
v.  Record No. 041945  
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA** 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE 
Norman Olitsky, Judge 
 
 
In these two appeals we consider the constitutionality of 
Virginia's Sexually Violent Predators Act ("SVPA"), Code 
§§ 37.1-70.1 through -70.19, and whether the evidence 
introduced by the Commonwealth was sufficient, by a clear and 
convincing standard, to support a finding that Rahmatollah 
Shivaee ("Shivaee") is a sexually violent predator.  For the 
                     
∗ In the trial court this case was styled "Jerry W. 
Kilgore, Attorney General of Virginia, ex rel. Commonwealth of 
Virginia v. Rahmatollah Shivaee." We have amended the style of 
the case to reflect that the Commonwealth is the direct party 
in interest, not a relator. 
** In the trial court this case was styled "Jerry W. 
Kilgore, Attorney General of Virginia, ex rel. Commonwealth of 
Virginia v. Orlando Lawarren Butler." We have amended the 
style of the case to reflect that the Commonwealth is the 
direct party in interest, not a relator. 
 
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reasons discussed below, we will affirm the judgment of the 
trial court in both cases. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
A.  Shivaee v. Commonwealth 
 
In 1996, Shivaee was convicted of four counts of 
aggravated sexual battery, in violation of Code § 18.2-67.3, 
and one count of indecent liberties, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-370.1.  His victims were three girls, each less than 13 
years old.  He was sentenced to serve seven years of 
incarceration on each of the four aggravated sexual battery 
charges, with five years on each charge suspended, and two 
years on the indecent liberties charge, with one year 
suspended.  In 1997, Shivaee was convicted of one count of 
forcible sodomy, in violation of Code § 18.2-67.1, based on an 
incident that occurred prior to his 1996 conviction.  His 
victim was a boy less than 13 years old.  He was sentenced to 
ten years of incarceration, with eight years suspended.  
Pursuant to the SVPA, the Attorney General ("Commonwealth") 
filed a petition seeking Shivaee's civil commitment in lieu of 
his release on September 17, 2003. 
 
Pursuant to Code § 37.1-70.7, the trial court found 
probable cause existed that Shivaee is a sexually violent 
predator as defined in the SVPA and set the matter for trial.  
Prior to trial, Shivaee filed a motion to dismiss the petition 
 
3
for civil commitment on the grounds that the SVPA violates 
both the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and Article I, section 11 of the Constitution of 
Virginia.  The trial court denied his motion.  Pursuant to 
Code § 37.1-70.9(B), Shivaee was tried without a jury. 
 
At trial, Sherry Lawrence testified that Shivaee was the 
father of her sister's child, who was conceived when Shivaee 
was 57 years old and Lawrence's sister was 14 years old.  
Robert H. Steele, III, Shivaee's social worker in the Sex 
Offender Residential Treatment ("SORT") Program while Shivaee 
was incarcerated, testified that Shivaee did not complete the 
SORT Program, only "admitted to some inappropriate touching," 
and remained in denial as to most of his illegal interactions 
with children. 
 
Evan S. Nelson, Ph.D. ("Dr. Nelson"), testified as an 
expert witness on behalf of the Commonwealth.  Dr. Nelson 
stated that Shivaee has a pattern of deviant interest in 
children, based on four female victims – including the teenage 
girl he statutorily raped and impregnated – and one male 
victim, and diagnosed Shivaee with the mental abnormality of 
pedophilia.  Dr. Nelson testified that the mental abnormality 
of pedophilia creates a risk to re-offend, and opined that 
inpatient treatment was more suitable for Shivaee than 
outpatient treatment, especially in light of Shivaee's lack of 
 
4
progress in the SORT program.  Dr. Nelson testified that 
inpatient treatment was "the right venue to help Mr. Shivaee 
as well as to protect the public." 
 
Shivaee called one witness on his behalf, John A. Hunter, 
Jr., Ph.D. ("Dr. Hunter").  Dr. Hunter agreed that Shivaee 
suffered from pedophilia and that there is a risk of 
recidivism with all pedophiles.  However, Dr. Hunter testified 
that Shivaee would be able to control his behavior with 
outpatient treatment. 
 
Upon consideration of the evidence, the trial court found 
by clear and convincing evidence that Shivaee was a sexually 
violent predator and ordered his civil commitment.  Shivaee 
filed a timely petition for appeal, which we granted.  He 
assigns three errors to the judgment of the trial court:  (1) 
that the SVPA violates both the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and Article I, Sections 8, 
9, and 11 of the Constitution of Virginia; (2) that the trial 
court erred in ordering his civil commitment absent proof that 
he "had serious difficulty controlling his behavior"; and (3) 
that the evidence failed to satisfy the "clear and convincing" 
evidentiary standard. 
B.  Butler v. Commonwealth 
 
Orlando Lawarren Butler ("Butler") was convicted of 
aggravated sexual battery on April 12, 2001 and was sentenced 
 
5
by the Circuit Court of the City of Chesapeake to serve ten 
years of incarceration with seven years suspended.  Pursuant 
to the SVPA, the Attorney General filed a petition seeking 
Butler's civil commitment in lieu of his release on August 22, 
2003. 
 
Pursuant to Code § 37.1-70.7, the trial court found 
probable cause existed that Butler is a sexually violent 
predator under the SVPA and set the matter for trial before a 
jury.  Prior to trial, Butler filed a motion to dismiss the 
case on the grounds that the SVPA violates both the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 
I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia.  The trial 
court denied Butler's motion to dismiss and Butler properly 
noted his objection. 
 
On March 11, 2004, a jury unanimously found by clear and 
convincing evidence that Butler was a sexually violent 
predator.  On April 6, the trial court held a hearing to 
determine whether Butler should be civilly committed or 
conditionally released, and, on May 21, entered its final 
order that Butler be civilly committed. 
 
Butler filed a timely petition for appeal, which we 
granted.  Butler's only assignment of error is that the SVPA 
is unconstitutional.  Butler advances four arguments in 
support of this contention:  (1) the SVPA "fails to require an 
 
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independent finding of a serious difficulty in controlling 
behavior and thus violates substantive due process"; (2) the 
SVPA "fails to meet the threshold standard required for the 
minimum degree of difficulty required by substantive due 
process with respect to lack of control as [a] symptom of the 
mental abnormality or personality disorder for which the 
subject individual is diagnosed"; (3) the SVPA "is not 
definite and precise in its meaning and can be interpreted and 
applied in different ways and therefore it is void for 
vagueness"; and (4) the SVPA "fails to comport with the 
notions of due process as it does not meet the requirements of 
[Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002)], it is not a civil 
confinement statute and therefore is void as unconstitutional 
under the doctrines of ex post facto and double jeopardy." 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review 
 
On appeal, the constitutional arguments are questions of 
law that we review de novo.  Wilby v. Gostel, 265 Va. 437, 
440, 578 S.E.2d 796, 798 (2003); Eure v. Norfolk Shipbuilding 
& Drydock Corp., 263 Va. 624, 631, 561 S.E.2d 663, 667 (2002).  
Because the due process protections afforded under the 
Constitution of Virginia are co-extensive with those of the 
federal constitution, the same analysis will apply to both.  
Morrisette v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 386, 394, 569 S.E.2d 47, 
 
7
53 (2002); Willis v. Mullett, 263 Va. 653, 657, 561 S.E.2d 
705, 708 (2002).  We review Shivaee's evidentiary challenge to 
determine if the judgment of the trial court was plainly wrong 
or without evidence to support it.  Code § 8.01-680. 
B.  Constitutionality of the SVPA 
 
In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979), the 
Supreme Court held: "The state has a legitimate interest under 
its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens 
who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for 
themselves; the state also has authority under its police 
power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies 
of some who are mentally ill."  The Supreme Court has reviewed 
civil commitment statutes very similar to the SVPA on three 
occasions.  See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); Seling 
v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
346 (1997).  In each of these three cases, the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the statutes in question. 
 
In Hendricks, the Supreme Court held that the definition 
of "mental abnormality" in the Kansas Sexually Violent 
Predator Act satisfied substantive due process requirements.  
521 U.S. at 356.  The Court recognized that freedom from 
restraint is not absolute, and that a State may "in certain 
narrow circumstances provide[] for the forcible civil 
detainment of people who are unable to control their behavior 
 
8
and who thereby pose a danger to the public health and 
safety," so long as the confinement "takes place pursuant to 
proper procedures and evidentiary safeguards."  Id. at 357.  
The Court considered the level of dangerousness necessary to 
justify indefinite involuntary civil commitment, compared the 
Kansas Act to other civil commitment statutes previously 
reviewed by the Court, and concluded: 
 
The Kansas Act is plainly of a kind with these 
other civil commitment statutes:  It requires a 
finding of future dangerousness, and then links 
that finding to the existence of a "mental 
abnormality" or "personality disorder" that 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the 
person to control his dangerous behavior. 
 
Id. at 358. 
The Supreme Court also reviewed Hendricks's claim that 
the Kansas Act violated the Constitution's double jeopardy 
prohibition and its ban on ex post facto laws.  Because the 
Kansas Act was a civil statute and was "nonpunitive," the 
Court held that the Kansas Act did not violate double jeopardy 
prohibitions and was not an ex post facto enactment.  Id. at 
360-71. 
 
In Seling, Andre Brigham Young ("Young") was civilly 
committed pursuant to the Washington Community Protection Act 
of 1990, Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.010 et seq. (1992).  Seling, 
531 U.S. at 253.  After unsuccessful challenges to his civil 
commitment in state court, Young brought a habeas action under 
 
9
28 U.S.C. § 2254 contending that the Washington Act was 
unconstitutional and that his confinement was illegal.  531 
U.S. at 258.  The district court granted the writ, "concluding 
that the Act violated substantive due process, that the Act 
was criminal rather than civil, and that it violated the 
double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees of the 
Constitution."  Id.  While the case was on appeal, the Supreme 
Court decided Hendricks and the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration in 
light of Hendricks.  531 U.S. at 258. 
 
On remand, the district court denied Young's petition.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded in part.  Id. at 258-59.  In reversing the district 
court, the Court of Appeals held that the Washington Act was 
punitive "as applied" and therefore violated the double 
jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees.  Id. at 258-60.  The 
Supreme Court then reversed the Court of Appeals, and held 
that an act, "found to be civil, cannot be deemed punitive 'as 
applied' to a single individual in violation of the Double 
Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses and provide cause for 
release."  Id. at 267. 
In Crane, Michael Crane was determined to be a sexually 
violent predator and was civilly committed by a Kansas state 
court.  534 U.S. at 411.  The Supreme Court of Kansas reversed 
 
10
and held that Hendricks required a state to demonstrate a 
person has a complete lack of control in order to be civilly 
committed.  Id.  The Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court 
of Kansas and clarified its language from Hendricks regarding 
the proof of lack of control required to determine that a 
person is a sexually violent predator.  The Court began by re-
affirming the constitutionality of civil commitment statutes 
where:  (1) "the confinement takes place pursuant to proper 
procedures and evidentiary standards;" (2) there is a finding 
of "dangerousness either to one's self or to others;" and (3) 
proof of dangerousness is "coupled . . . with the proof of 
some additional factor, such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental 
abnormality.'"  Crane, 534 U.S. at 409-10 (citing Hendricks, 
521 U.S. at 357-58).  Further, the Court emphasized the 
requirement stated in Hendricks that "links" a finding of 
dangerousness "to the existence of a 'mental abnormality' or 
'personality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior."  
Crane, 534 U.S. at 410 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358). 
 
In clarifying the lack of control element required, the 
Court stated: 
[W]e recognize that in cases where lack of 
control is at issue, "inability to control 
behavior" will not be demonstrable with 
mathematical precision. It is enough to say 
that there must be proof of serious difficulty 
 
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in controlling behavior. And this, when viewed 
in light of such features of the case as the 
nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the 
severity of the mental abnormality itself, must 
be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous 
sexual offender whose serious mental illness, 
abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil 
commitment from the dangerous but typical 
recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal 
case. 
Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.  First, Crane restated the 
requirements from Hendricks that civil commitment must be 
attended by procedural safeguards, there must be a finding of 
dangerousness to one's self or others, and there must be a 
link from the finding of dangerousness to a mental abnormality 
or illness that makes it difficult for the person to control 
his dangerous behavior.  Second, Crane clarified the 
evidentiary burden that must be satisfied in order to show the 
requisite nexus between a person's condition and his lack of 
control and consequent dangerousness.  Crane, 534 U.S. at 413. 
We recently reviewed in detail the procedural aspects and 
evidentiary requirements of the SVPA, see Townes v. 
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 234, 609 S.E.2d 1 (2005); McCloud v. 
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 242, 609 S.E.2d 16 (2005); and 
Commonwealth v. Allen, 269 Va. 262, 609 S.E.2d 4 (2005), and 
will not do so again for purposes of this opinion.  A brief 
summary in light of the requirements of Crane will suffice. 
 
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Pursuant to Code § 37.1-70.9, "[t]he [trial] court or 
jury shall determine whether, by clear and convincing 
evidence, the person who is the subject of the petition is a 
sexually violent predator."  A "sexually violent predator" is 
[A]ny person who (i) has been convicted of a 
sexually violent offense or has been charged 
with a sexually violent offense and is 
unrestorably incompetent to stand trial 
pursuant to § 19.2-169.3 and (ii) because of a 
mental abnormality or personality disorder, 
finds it difficult to control his predatory 
behavior which makes him likely to engage in 
sexually violent acts. 
Code § 37.1-70.1.  A "mental abnormality" or "personality 
disorder" is defined as "a congenital or acquired condition 
that affects a person's emotional or volitional capacity and 
renders the person so likely to commit sexually violent 
offenses that he constitutes a menace to the health and safety 
of others."  Id. 
The SVPA survives constitutional scrutiny because it 
satisfies the criteria most recently stated by the Supreme 
Court in Crane.  First, there are proper procedures and 
evidentiary safeguards.  See, e.g., Code §§ 37.1-70.2, -70.5, 
-70.6, -70.7, -70.8, and -70.9; see also McCloud, 269 Va. at 
252-56, 609 S.E.2d at 21-23 (reviewing the procedures which 
must be followed by the Commonwealth in order to have a person 
who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense declared 
to be a sexually violent predator and to have that person 
 
13
involuntarily committed to a secure mental health facility 
upon his release from prison). 
 
Second, the SVPA satisfies the requirement that there be 
a finding of dangerousness either to one's self or to others.  
Under the SVPA, a finding that a person is a sexually violent 
predator includes the finding that the person has a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder, which is further defined 
as "a congenital or acquired condition that affects a person's 
emotional or volitional capacity and renders the person so 
likely to commit sexually violent offenses that he constitutes 
a menace to the health and safety of others."  Code § 37.1-
70.1 (emphasis added). 
 
Finally, proof of dangerousness and lack of control is 
linked to the condition of the person.  For a person to be 
found to be a "sexually violent predator," the Commonwealth 
must show that "because of a mental abnormality or personality 
disorder, [the person] finds it difficult to control his 
predatory behavior which makes him likely to engage in 
sexually violent acts."  Code § 37.1-70.1. 
 
Both Shivaee and Butler contend the SVPA is 
constitutionally infirm because the statute only requires 
proof that a person "finds it difficult" to control his 
behavior and fails to require "serious difficulty," a term 
used in Crane.  They are correct that the Supreme Court used 
 
14
the phrase "serious difficulty in controlling behavior."  See 
Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.  But the Supreme Court also used the 
phrases "special and serious lack of ability to control 
behavior," id., and "particularly difficult to control their 
behavior."  Id. at 414.  The use of various phrases 
underscores the Supreme Court's clear direction that "the 
States retain considerable leeway in defining the mental 
abnormalities and personality disorders that make an 
individual eligible for commitment."  Crane, 534 U.S. at 413 
(citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359).  The Court expressly 
stated, "we recognize that in cases where lack of control is 
at issue, 'inability to control behavior' will not be 
demonstrable with mathematical precision."  Crane, 534 U.S. at 
413.  The object of the definitions and proof requirements is 
"to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious 
mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil 
commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted 
in an ordinary criminal case."  Id.  We are convinced that the 
SVPA in its definitions and proof requirements accomplishes 
this objective. 
In addition to the arguments discussed above, Butler 
advances the argument that the SVPA is "void for vagueness."  
He maintains that the language is indefinite and that people 
of "ordinary intelligence" must guess at its meaning.  His 
 
15
argument is predicated upon a strained attempt to find 
multiple meanings in the portion of the definition of a 
sexually violent predator that recites "because of a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder, finds it difficult to 
control his predatory behavior which makes him likely to 
engage in sexually violent acts."  Apparently Butler finds 
multiple interpretations of this language, primarily because 
he focuses only on the text of that portion of the definition 
and fails to consider the language in context of other 
definitions. 
The definition of sexually violent predator in Code 
§ 37.1-70.1 makes specific reference to "mental abnormality" 
or "personality disorder," a term also defined in that 
section.  When the language is considered in context, its 
meaning is quite clear.  A "mental abnormality" or 
"personality disorder" is defined as "a congenital or acquired 
condition that affects a person’s emotional or volitional 
capacity and renders the person so likely to commit sexually 
violent offenses that he constitutes a menace to the health 
and safety of others."  Such a definition includes a causal 
link between the condition and the potential consequences of 
the condition, namely, lack of control and dangerousness.  
Importantly, the definition is personalized because it focuses 
upon "the person" whose commitment is at issue.  Because a 
 
16
finding that the person is a sexually violent predator 
includes the predicate finding of a "mental abnormality" or 
"personality disorder," a fortiori, the determination 
requires, first, the finding of a condition affecting 
emotional or volitional capacity and, second, the finding that 
the particular person subject to commitment is rendered by 
that condition "so likely to commit sexually violent offenses" 
that he is dangerous.  While the additional language in the 
definition of sexually violent predator ("finds it difficult 
to control his predatory behavior which makes him likely to 
engage in sexually violent acts") may be redundant, its 
meaning in context of other definitions in the SVPA is not 
unclear. 
Significantly, even under the multiple and strained 
interpretations Butler tries to give the statute, he does not 
argue that his conduct fails to be reached.  As such, Butler 
argues hypothetically.  In Commonwealth v. Hicks, 267 Va. 573, 
596 S.E.2d 74 (2004), we observed: 
A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is 
clearly proscribed cannot complain of the 
vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct 
of others.  A court should therefore examine 
the complainant’s conduct before analyzing 
other hypothetical applications of the law. 
 
Id. at 580-81, 596 S.E.2d at 78 (quoting Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982)). 
 
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C.  Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto 
For many of the same reasons enumerated by the Supreme 
Court in Hendricks, we hold that the SVPA does not violate the 
double jeopardy prohibition or the ban on ex post facto laws.  
The SVPA was codified by the General Assembly as a civil 
statute, as indicated by its placement in Title 37.  Nothing 
in the SVPA "suggests that the legislature sought to create 
anything other than a civil commitment scheme designed to 
protect the public from harm."  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. 
The SVPA, like the statutory scheme examined in 
Hendricks, "does not implicate either of the two primary 
objectives of criminal punishment:  retribution or 
deterrence."  521 U.S. at 361-62.  Pursuant to Code § 37.1-
70.10(A), if a person is found to be a sexually violent 
predator, he is civilly committed "for control, care and 
treatment until such time as the person's mental abnormality 
or personality disorder has so changed that the person will 
not present an undue risk to public safety."  The General 
Assembly, through the SVPA, "may take measures to restrict the 
freedom of the dangerously mentally ill."  Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
at 363.  That the General Assembly chose to afford the 
procedural protections provided in the SVPA, see, e.g., Code 
§§ 37.1-70.2, -70.5, -70.6, -70.7, -70.8, -70.9, "does not 
transform a civil commitment proceeding into a criminal 
 
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prosecution."  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 364-65.  Thus, the SVPA 
is a non-punitive, civil commitment statute and as such does 
not violate the guarantees against double jeopardy or ex post 
facto lawmaking. 
D.  Clear and Convincing Evidentiary Standard 
The Supreme Court of the United States clearly stated 
that the "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard is the 
minimum standard that may be used in a civil commitment 
proceeding.  Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33.  An "individual's 
interest in the outcome of a civil commitment proceeding is of 
such weight and gravity that due process requires the state to 
justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere 
preponderance of the evidence."  Id. at 427.  The "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard "is inappropriate in civil 
commitment proceedings because, given the uncertainties of 
psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a burden the state cannot 
meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed 
medical treatment."  Id. at 432.  Thus, the "clear and 
convincing" standard "strikes a fair balance between the 
rights of the individual and the legitimate concerns of the 
state."  Id. at 431. 
Whether to adopt a standard greater than clear and 
convincing "is a matter of state law," id. at 433, for "[t]he 
essence of federalism is that states must be free to develop a 
 
19
variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a 
common, uniform mold."  Id. at 431.  We recognize that some 
other jurisdictions have adopted the "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard for their sexually violent civil commitment 
statutes.  See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-3707(A) (2004); Cal. 
Welf. & Inst. Code § 6604 (2005); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
205/3.01 (2005).  However, for the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
the General Assembly adopted the clear and convincing 
evidentiary standard.  Code § 37.1-70.9(C).  It is settled 
that this standard meets the demands of due process and that 
the decision to adopt this standard has been left to the 
states.  See Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33.  We hold that the 
use of the clear and convincing evidentiary standard for 
purposes of the SVPA satisfies constitutional requirements of 
due process. 
E.  Sufficiency of Evidence in Shivaee Case 
 
Shivaee was found to be a sexually violent predator at 
the conclusion of a bench trial.  In accordance with 
established principles of appellate review, we view the facts 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 
prevailing party below.  We also accord the Commonwealth the 
benefit of all inferences fairly deducible from the evidence.  
Stanley v. Webber, 260 Va. 90, 95, 531 S.E.2d 311, 314 (2000); 
 
20
Evaluation Research Corp. v. Alequin, 247 Va. 143, 147, 439 
S.E.2d 387, 390 (1994). 
 
On appeal, Shivaee concedes that he has been convicted of 
and is incarcerated for a sexually violent offense.  Shivaee 
argues there was not sufficient evidence that he suffered from 
a mental abnormality as defined by the SVPA and that there was 
no evidence he was likely to engage in sexually violent acts.  
A review of the evidence adduced at trial refutes his 
contentions. 
 
Shivaee was convicted of four sexually violent offenses 
against four separate victims, three girls and one boy, in 
less than a five-year period.  Shivaee also statutorily raped 
and impregnated another girl and attempted to hide this 
information from the SORT Program, Dr. Nelson, and Dr. Hunter.  
Shivaee continued to deny or minimize his offenses despite 
treatment in the SORT Program, and he never completed the SORT 
Program.  Shivaee offended against both sexes, was not related 
to any of his victims, and planned the enticement and 
seduction of each of his victims. 
 
In light of this evidence, both experts agreed that 
Shivaee is a pedophile and is a risk to re-offend.  Dr. Nelson 
stated, "The diagnosis of which I can express professional 
certainty is that he meets criteria for pedophilia."  He 
stated that Shivaee's behavior "is indicative of a more 
 
21
predatory pattern of sex offender," and that Shivaee "has a 
likelihood of having another sex offense, specifically a 
sexually violent offense as defined here."  In summarizing his 
testimony regarding Shivaee's diagnosis of pedophilia and 
related predatory behavior, the following exchange occurred 
between the attorney for the Commonwealth and Dr. Nelson: 
Q. 
And, again, to a reasonable degree of 
psychological certainty do you hold 
an opinion as to whether [Shivaee] 
has difficulty controlling that 
[predatory] behavior? 
 
A. 
Yes. 
 
Q. 
And what is your opinion? 
 
A. 
He absolutely has difficulty in my 
opinion. 
 
Dr. Hunter also diagnosed Shivaee as a pedophile, but opined 
that Shivaee "is not likely to commit a new sexual offense." 
The experts disagreed as to the course of treatment.  Dr. 
Nelson said Shivaee "is not going to make, in my opinion, 
adequate progress on an outpatient basis.  Look how little 
progress he has made in two years of being in an inpatient 
program thus far."  Because of his diagnosis as a pedophile, 
and his lack of progress in the SORT Program, Dr. Nelson 
recommended inpatient treatment based on his belief that 
Shivaee is a threat to the public.  Dr. Hunter stated that 
Shivaee "is amenable to community-based [outpatient] 
 
22
treatment."  He based this conclusion on his belief that 
Shivaee could control his behavior. 
 
In light of this evidence, we cannot say that the 
judgment of the trial court was plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.  Shivaee did not dispute that he was 
incarcerated upon a conviction for a sexually violent offense.  
Shivaee was clearly diagnosed with the mental abnormality of 
pedophilia by both experts and there was clear and convincing 
evidence that because of this mental abnormality Shivaee 
"finds it difficult to control his predatory behavior, which 
makes it likely that he will engage in sexually violent acts." 
III.  Conclusion 
 
We hold that the SVPA comports with all constitutional 
requirements of due process and is not unconstitutional.  The 
judgment of the trial court concerning the sufficiency of the 
evidence with respect to Shivaee was not plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support it.  The judgment of the trial 
court will be affirmed in both Shivaee v. Commonwealth and 
Butler v. Commonwealth. 
Record No. 041954 – Affirmed. 
Record No. 041945 – Affirmed.