Title: Ruelas v. County of Alameda

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
ARMIDA RUELAS et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S277120 
 
Ninth Circuit 
21-16528 
 
Northern District of California 
4:19-cv-07637-JST  
 
 
April 22, 2024 
 
Justice Evans authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, 
Groban, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
1 
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
S277120 
 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
Inmates at the Santa Rita Jail in Alameda County work 
in the kitchen preparing meals for the county jail population and 
staff under an agreement between the county and a private 
contractor.  They are not paid for their labor.  A group of 
nonconvicted individuals who were performing this labor while 
detained at the jail sued the county and the private contractor 
in federal court for failing to pay minimum wage and overtime.  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
asked us to decide whether nonconvicted incarcerated 
individuals working in a county jail for a private company have 
a claim for minimum wage and overtime under California law.  
We conclude the answer is no. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Because this matter arises from an interlocutory appeal of 
the denial of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 12(b)(6) (28 U.S.C.), we recite the facts as 
alleged in the operative complaint.  We treat the factual 
allegations as true for the purpose of addressing the certified 
question.  (See Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc. (2023) 14 
Cal.5th 993, 1004.)   
Under a contract with defendant Alameda County, 
defendant Aramark Correctional Services, LLC (Aramark) has 
undertaken the responsibility for operating the food service 
program and delivery of meals for inmates and staff at all 
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
2 
Alameda County Sheriff’s Office facilities and satellite facilities.  
Satellite facilities include county jails located elsewhere in the 
state.  Aramark, a private, for-profit company, provides the 
contracted-for food services using the industrial kitchen at the 
Santa Rita Jail.  Jail inmates prepare and package the food in 
the industrial kitchen each day and clean and sanitize the 
kitchen after the conclusion of the day’s food preparation.   
Plaintiffs Armida Ruelas et al. are or were pretrial or 
other nonconvicted detainees confined at Santa Rita Jail who 
either prepared and packaged food or cleaned and sanitized the 
kitchen for Aramark.  No party has suggested the analysis turns 
on the basis for the nonconvicted detainees’ detention, so we 
refer generally in this opinion to pretrial detainees.  Sometimes 
plaintiffs work in excess of eight hours a day or 40 hours a week, 
six or seven days a week.  Nonetheless, plaintiffs are not paid 
any wages for their work on Aramark’s behalf.   
On November 20, 2019, plaintiffs filed a complaint in 
federal district court against the County of Alameda, Alameda 
County Sheriff Gregory J. Ahern (together, the County), and 
Aramark on behalf of themselves and the class of Santa Rita Jail 
inmates who perform services for Aramark under its contract 
with the County.  After the district court granted in part and 
denied in part defendants’ motions to dismiss, plaintiffs filed a 
first amended complaint limited to themselves and other 
nonconvicted detainees.  The amended complaint asserted nine 
causes of action, including causes of action for minimum and 
overtime wages.  The district court granted in part and denied 
in part defendants’ motions to dismiss the causes of action for 
minimum and overtime wages.  The court reasoned that “while 
the Penal Code explicitly addresses employment and wages of 
state prisoners, both in relation to the minimum wage [see Pen. 
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
3 
Code, § 2811] and in the context of incarcerated individuals 
working for a private company through a joint venture program 
[see Pen. Code, § 2717.8], the Penal Code does not address such 
matters for pretrial detainees confined in county jails . . . .  
Similarly, although the Penal Code authorizes ‘the board of 
supervisors or city council’ to require ‘[a]ll persons confined in 
the county jail . . . under a final judgment of imprisonment 
rendered in a criminal action or proceeding to perform labor on 
the public works or ways in the county or city,’ there is no 
similar provision regarding non-convicted incarcerated persons.  
[Citation.]  The Court reads these omissions to imply that the 
California legislature did not intend to exclude non-convicted 
detainees working for a private corporation from the Labor 
Code’s protections.”  The court did, however, agree with the 
County that government entities “are exempt from state 
overtime laws” and therefore granted the County’s motion to 
dismiss the claim for overtime wages.     
In a simultaneously filed order, the district court certified 
for interlocutory appeal the legal question of pretrial detainees’ 
entitlement to minimum and overtime wages.  The Ninth 
Circuit accepted the appeal and then certified the following 
question of state law to this court (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
8.548(b)(2)):  “Do non-convicted incarcerated individuals 
performing services in county jails for a for-profit company to 
supply meals within the county jails and related custody 
facilities have a claim for minimum wages and overtime under 
Section 1194 of the California Labor Code in the absence of any 
local ordinance prescribing or prohibiting the payment of wages 
for these individuals?”  (Ruelas v. County of Alameda (9th Cir. 
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
4 
2022) 51 F.4th 1187, 1188.)  On January 11, 2023, we agreed to 
answer the certified question.1 
 II.  DISCUSSION 
To determine whether pretrial detainees working in 
county jails for private companies are entitled to minimum 
wage,2 we examine the interplay among the Penal Code, the 
Labor Code, and the constitutional provisions governing public-
private contracts for inmate labor.  We conclude that such 
individuals do not have a claim for minimum wage under the 
Labor Code.  
Aramark and the County begin with Penal Code section 
4019.3 (all further statutory references are to this code unless 
otherwise specified), which creates a discretionary scheme for 
the payment of wage credits to county jail inmates, subject to a 
cap:  “The board of supervisors may provide that each prisoner 
confined in or committed to a county jail shall be credited with 
a sum not to exceed two dollars ($2) for each eight hours of work 
done by him in such county jail.”  This wage credit, which has 
 
1  
To the extent plaintiffs allege they were forced to work, we 
note those claims are being litigated in the district court.  The 
Ninth Circuit’s question to this court proceeds from the 
assumption 
that 
nonconvicted 
incarcerated 
individuals 
participating in the public-private program do so voluntarily. 
2  
We do not separately address pretrial detainees’ 
entitlement to overtime wages.  No one in this proceeding has 
articulated a separate argument for payment of overtime wages, 
distinct from payment of minimum wages.  Moreover, the right 
to premium pay for overtime logically and legally depends on a 
right to some wage for regular work.  (See Lab. Code, § 510, 
subd. (a) [basing overtime compensation on a multiple of the 
employee’s “regular rate of pay”].)   
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
5 
remained unchanged since 1975, is far below the state minimum 
wage for other workers.  (See Lab. Code, § 1182.12.)   
Defendants argue, and we agree, that section 4019.3 
applies broadly to all county inmates, including pretrial 
detainees, working in the county jail.  The federal district court 
was therefore mistaken in asserting that the Penal Code “does 
not address” wages for “pretrial detainees confined in county 
jails.”   
By its terms, section 4019.3 encompasses all prisoners 
“confined in or committed to” a county jail.  We also note the 
broad construction accorded similar language — a prisoner 
“confined in or committed to a county jail” — in nearby section 
4019 to describe who is eligible for custody and worktime 
credits.  (§ 4019, subds. (a)(1)–(3), (b), (c); see also id., § 4000, 
subd. 2 [authorizing county jails to be used for detaining persons 
charged with a crime and “committed for trial”].)  We have 
construed this language to include not only those who are 
serving a sentence in county jail, but also those who have merely 
been detained following an arrest as well as those who have been 
convicted but not yet sentenced.  (See People v. Dieck (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 934, 938–939 & fn. 2.)  Because sections 4019 and 4019.3 
deal “ ‘with the same subject matter’ ” — i.e., the class of county 
jail inmates who are eligible for an important benefit — the 
category of inmates confined in or committed to a county jail 
“should be accorded the same interpretation” in both instances.  
(See Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc. (2021) 11 
Cal.5th 158, 175 (Kaanaana).)   
An Attorney General opinion, which is entitled to 
“considerable weight”  (Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 
1050, 1087, fn. 17), reached the same conclusion nearly 50 years 
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
6 
ago.  (57 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 276, 283 (1974).)  As the Attorney 
General then noted, the Legislature enacted section 4019.3 to 
equalize the wage credits for inmates working in jail with those 
already authorized by section 4125 for individuals working at 
industrial farms or road camps.  (See 57 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., 
supra, at p. 283; Assem. Com. on Crim. Procedure, Analysis of 
Sen. Bill No. 1394 (1959 Reg. Sess.) as introduced May 4, 1959, 
p. 1.)  The “underlying purpose” of both provisions, the Attorney 
General observed, “is ‘to make possible the substitution of 
constructive labor for profitless prison confinement in order that 
those who are charged with or convicted of public offenses and 
deprived of their liberty may become better citizens because of 
their disciplinary experience.’ ”  (57 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at 
p. 283, quoting § 4100.)  “Penal Code section 4019.3 therefore 
applies to pre-sentence as well as post-sentence work time, the 
same beneficial purpose being served in both instances.”  (57 
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 283.)  We find the Attorney 
General opinion about the scope of section 4019.3 especially 
persuasive because the Legislature “left intact the language 
construed” by the Attorney General (California Assn. of 
Psychology Providers v. Rank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1, 17) when it 
amended section 4019.3 in 1975 to increase the cap on inmate 
wage credits from 50 cents to two dollars per eight-hour shift 
(Stats. 1975, ch. 350, § 1, p. 797).   
Counties therefore may — but are not required to — credit 
inmates, including pretrial detainees, up to two dollars per 
eight-hour shift, notwithstanding the legal minimum wage, 
which is much higher.  Indeed, plaintiffs concede that section 
4019.3, not the state’s minimum wage law, governs the legal 
wage for “county jail inmates working in public works 
programs.”     
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
7 
To support their claim for minimum wage, plaintiffs focus 
on a different part of section 4019.3.  In their view, section 
4019.3 is inapplicable where, as here, the individual is 
participating in a public-private work program.  While there 
may be sound policy reasons for and against such a distinction, 
we find no indication section 4019.3 is limited in the way 
plaintiffs suggest. 
No such limitation appears in the statutory text.  
Plaintiffs instead attempt to infer one from the phrase “in such 
county jail” in section 4019.3.  They argue that because this 
phrase “appears after the description of the type of prisoners to 
whom the provision applies — i.e., “each prisoner confined in or 
committed to a county jail” — “the phrase ‘in such county jail’ 
. . . cannot also serve to signify the state of being detained.”  
Plaintiffs conclude:  “Thus, ‘in such county jail’ must refer to 
work done for a county jail.”  We agree with plaintiffs that it 
would be surplusage to read “in such county jail” to identify the 
class of inmates who are subject to section 4019.3; the statute 
accomplishes that by its earlier reference to “each prisoner 
confined in or committed to a county jail.”  But it does not follow 
that “work done . . . in such county jail” (§ 4019.3) must be 
construed to mean the inmate’s work must be done exclusively 
for the county jail.  The word “in” ordinarily describes where an 
event takes place:  “inside of, within the bounds or limits of.”  
(General American Indemnity Co. v. Pepper (Tex. 1960) 339 
S.W.2d 660, 662.)   
We find further support for this definition in the 
legislative history.  An analysis of the bill that became section 
4019.3 described the purpose of equalizing wage treatment 
between those inmates “assigned to honor farms,” who were 
already eligible for what the analysis called “a small wage,” and 
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
8 
those “working in the jail kitchens, laundry or various 
maintenance assignments” (Assem. Com. on Crim. Procedure, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1394, supra, as introduced May 4, 1959, 
p. 1 [comparing § 4125]).  The latter assignments are all 
consistent with work that occurs “in” the jail.  We also note that 
where the public-private work takes place has significance in 
determining the applicability of the minimum wage under the 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. § 201 et 
seq.).  (See, e.g., Burrell v. Staff (3d Cir. 2023) 60 F.4th 25, 42–
43, 44–48 [nonconvicted inmates working outside the facility for 
a private employer stated a claim for minimum wage under 
federal and Pennsylvania law]; Watson v. Graves (5th Cir. 1990) 
909 F.2d 1549, 1553–1556 [inmates working for a private 
construction business outside the jail were entitled to the 
federal minimum wage and overtime].)  All this leads us to 
conclude that “work done in such county jail” means work done 
at the jail.   
Plaintiffs argue next that section 4019.3 should be limited 
to public works programs because two neighboring statutes — 
sections 4017 and 4018 — likewise are limited to public works 
programs.  Plaintiffs’ premise is flawed:  section 4017 is not 
limited to public works programs, which it defines narrowly and 
only “[a]s used in this section.”  In reality, section 4017 has a 
broader scope; it applies to inmates working “in the prevention 
and suppression of forest, brush and grass fires” in addition to 
“labor on the public works or ways.”  (See Parsons v. Workers’ 
Comp. 
Appeals 
Bd. 
(1981) 
126 
Cal.App.3d 
629, 
634 
[distinguishing inmates who “ ‘labor on the public works’ ” 
under § 4017 from inmates who “fight and prevent forest fires”].)  
Moreover, plaintiffs do not fall within section 4017, which 
applies exclusively to inmates confined “under a final judgment 
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
9 
of imprisonment” or “as a condition of probation” and “required 
. . . to perform labor,” or section 4018, which authorizes county 
boards of supervisors to make rules for the work required under 
section 4017.  In any event, the reference to “public works” in 
section 4017 and its omission from section 4019.3 (as well as 
from dozens of other provisions in pt. 3, tit. 4, ch. 1 of the Pen. 
Code) indicates the Legislature knows how to restrict the scope 
of a provision to public works if it wishes to do so.  (See People v. 
Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 979 [“Had the Legislature intended” 
one subdivision to share the limitation included in a different 
subdivision, “it no doubt would have included similar 
language”].)  “It is not for us to insert a limitation the 
Legislature excluded.”  (Kaanaana, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 171.)3  
Plaintiffs contend that section 4019.3 cannot apply to 
public-private work programs because such partnerships were 
prohibited under the law at the time the statute was enacted.  
As Aramark points out, though, plaintiffs’ premise is 
questionable.  At the time section 4019.3 was enacted, the state 
Constitution barred contracting out “[t]he labor of convicts . . . 
to any person, copartnership, company or corporation” and 
further provided that “the Legislature shall, by law, provide for 
the working of convicts for the benefit of the State.”  (Cal. Const., 
former art. X, § 6, italics added.)  It’s not immediately apparent 
the bar applied to the labor of convicted persons in county jails, 
let alone nonconvicted persons such as plaintiffs.  (See Pitts v. 
Reagan (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 112, 115 [“It has been the practice 
 
3  
Reading a “public works” limitation into the statutes that 
form Part 3, Title 4, Chapter 1 of the Penal Code would also strip 
many inmates of important statutory rights, including the 
ability to earn worktime credits under section 4019.  
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
10 
in California, at least in some areas, for ‘local county prisoners’ 
to aid in crop harvesting during periods when a farm labor 
shortage was believed to exist”]; Copeland v. County of Kern 
(1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 821, 825–826 [noting the issue but 
declining to resolve it]; but see Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 
1990), analysis of Prop. 139 by Legis. Analyst, p. 65 (Ballot 
Pamphlet) [“the California Constitution prohibits contracting 
with any private agency for the use of state prison or local jail 
inmate labor”].)  Yet even assuming that public-private 
partnerships for the labor of county jail detainees were not 
permitted at the time of section 4019.3’s enactment, it does not 
follow that the statute cannot apply to such partnerships.  
Where, as here, “lawmakers choose broad statutory language ‘it 
is unimportant that the particular application may not have 
been contemplated.’ ”  (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. 
Garcia (2013) 58 Cal.4th 175, 192, quoting Barr v. United States 
(1945) 324 U.S. 83, 90; see People v. Bell (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 
315, 344 [“Courts have applied these interpretive methods in 
countless cases, refusing to read an exception into a statute 
merely 
because 
a 
particular 
application 
was 
likely 
unanticipated by the enacting legislature”].)  Indeed, section 
4019.3, by its terms, does not turn on the identity of the 
employer.  Rather, it depends on who performs the work 
(“prisoner[s] confined in or committed to a county jail”) and 
where the work is performed (“in such county jail”).  And while 
section 4019.3 constrains what “[t]he board of supervisors may 
provide” as a wage credit, plaintiffs do not dispute that it is the 
board of supervisors that is ultimately responsible for the terms 
of work performed by detainees pursuant to a public-private 
partnership.    
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
11 
Plaintiffs argue next that even if section 4019.3 has a 
broad scope and could apply to inmates working at the jail for a 
public-private partnership, it would not preclude “the 
application of the Labor Code . . . here” because section 4019.3 
is “permissive” and sets forth “how the board of supervisors 
‘may’ act, not how it is required to act.”  Consequently, plaintiffs 
assert, section 4019.3 and the minimum wage protections in the 
Labor Code “ ‘can occupy the same domain without any inherent 
antagonism.’ ”  But plaintiffs fail to explain how that could be 
so.  A county may not simultaneously comply with Penal Code 
section 4019.3, which sets the compensation ceiling at no more 
than two dollars per eight-hour shift, and at the same time 
comply with the Labor Code, which sets a minimum wage floor 
that is far above that.  Properly understood, section 4019.3 is 
permissive in that, as the legislative history reveals, it “will 
permit a County Board of Supervisors to pay a county jail 
prisoner up to” the amount specified in the statute.  (Assem. 
Com. on Crim. Procedure, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1394, supra, 
as introduced May 4, 1959, p. 1.)  But it does not ensure county 
jail inmates working in the county jail will be paid anything at 
all.   
Finally, nothing in Proposition 139, the Prison Inmate 
Labor Initiative of 1990, imposes an obligation on local 
governments or private entities to comply with the Labor Code’s 
minimum wage provisions for detainees working in county jails.  
Proposition 139 repealed the constitutional prohibition on 
contracting for “[t]he labor of convicts” and provided instead 
that “[t]he Director of Corrections or any county Sheriff or other 
local government official charged with jail operations[] may 
enter into contracts with public entities, nonprofit or for profit 
organizations, entities, or businesses for the purpose of 
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
12 
conducting programs which use inmate labor.”  (Ballot Pamp., 
supra, text of Prop. 139, §§ 3, 4, p. 136, strikethrough omitted; 
see Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 5.)  Although the ballot measure 
granted this power to both state and local custodial officials, it 
articulated distinct frameworks for each.  State prisoners were 
guaranteed by statute compensation “comparable to wages paid 
by the joint venture employer to non-inmate employees 
performing similar work for that employer,” subject to 
deductions for taxes, room and board, restitution, and family 
support, “as determined by the Director of Corrections, which 
shall not in the aggregate exceed 80 percent of gross wages.”  
(Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 139, p. 137.)  More generally, 
the measure provided that programs for state prisoner labor 
“shall be operated and implemented pursuant to statutes 
enacted by or in accordance with the provisions of the Prison 
Inmate Labor Initiative of 1990 and by rules and regulations 
prescribed by the Director of Corrections.”  (Ballot Pamp., supra, 
text of Prop. 139, § 4, p. 136.)  But none of the wage requirements 
in the initiative were applied to labor involving county jail 
inmates.  For the latter category, Proposition 139 said only that, 
in addition “to statutes enacted by or in accordance with the 
Prison Inmate Labor Initiative of 1990,” the public-private 
programs “shall be operated and implemented pursuant to . . . 
local ordinances.”  (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 139, § 4, p. 
136.)   
The ballot measure was conspicuously silent as to how 
counties should structure and operate their programs.  It did 
not, for example, “specify the content of the local ordinances.”  
(Ballot Pamp., supra, analysis by the Legis. Analyst, p. 65.)  Nor 
was it “possible” for the Legislative Analyst “to estimate the 
[fiscal] impact of the measure on local governments,” since “local 
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
13 
ordinances that would implement contracts for use of jail labor 
are not required to contain specific fiscal provisions.”  (Ibid., 
italics added.)  
The question posed by the Ninth Circuit asks us to assume 
that no local ordinance governs plaintiffs’ work at the jail — 
and, indeed, the parties agree that no such ordinance exists.  
Plaintiffs argue that in the absence of a local ordinance, the 
Labor Code necessarily applies.  But they fail to grapple with 
section 4019.3, which sets a specific wage range, well below the 
state minimum, for convicted and nonconvicted inmates 
working in a county jail.  Notably, plaintiffs do not argue that 
Proposition 139 displaced section 4019.3, and we would not 
lightly adopt such a construction.  The electorate is presumed to 
be aware of existing laws — including the compensation scheme 
in section 4019.3 for nonconvicted county jail inmates — at the 
time Proposition 139 was enacted.  (See Professional Engineers 
in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1016, 
1048.)  And unless a conflict between a statute and a provision 
of the state Constitution is “clear and unquestionable,” we must 
uphold the statute.  (California Housing Finance Agency v. 
Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 594; see California Cannabis 
Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 945 [applying 
the 
“strong 
presumption” 
against 
implied 
repeal].)  
Consequently, we must “try to harmonize constitutional 
language with that of existing statutes if possible.”  (Santos v. 
Brown (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 398, 410.) 
We conclude that article XIV, section 5 of the California 
Constitution and Penal Code section 4019.3 can be harmonized.  
(See Penziner v. West American Finance Co. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 
160, 176 [“nor are the provisions of the two acts so inconsistent 
or repugnant that the later repealed the earlier by 
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
14 
implication”].)  Under the state Constitution, public-private 
programs for county jail inmate labor “shall be operated and 
implemented pursuant to statutes enacted by or in accordance 
with the provisions of the Prison Inmate Labor Initiative of 
1990, and by rules and regulations prescribed by . . . local 
ordinances.”  (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 5, subd. (a).)  Penal Code 
section 
4019.3, 
which 
concerns 
the 
operation 
and 
implementation of public-private partnerships for county 
inmate labor, appears to be “in accordance with” the provisions 
of Proposition 139, in that the two enactments can coexist 
where, as here, no local ordinance provides otherwise.   
Plaintiffs and their amici curiae advance several policy 
arguments for paying a minimum wage to nonconvicted 
detainees who work in jail.  Plaintiffs emphasize, in particular, 
that “[n]on-convicted detainees have not been convicted of 
crimes,” but their right to payment for their work is less than 
that granted to fellow inmates who have been convicted.  They 
note that the wages for convicted state prisoners, who can be 
forced to work without pay (U.S. Const., 13th Amend.;4 Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 6;5 Pen. Code, § 2700), must be “comparable” to 
non-inmate workers when the prisoners are laboring, even 
voluntarily, for a public-private partnership (Pen. Code, 
§ 2717.8).  In contrast, nonconvicted detainees working for a 
 
4  
The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “[n]either slavery 
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist 
within the United States . . . .”  (Italics added.) 
5  
Article I, section 6 of the California Constitution provides 
that “[s]lavery is prohibited.  Involuntary servitude is prohibited 
except to punish crime.” 
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
15 
public-private partnership in the county jail, who cannot be 
forced to work, may be paid nothing. 
Plaintiffs and their amici curiae also point out that the 
mere fact of detention may cause detainees to lose wage income 
and potentially their jobs during their incarceration, and thus 
their ability to support themselves and their families.  They 
assert that detainees (or their families) in many jurisdictions 
must also pay to maintain contact through phone calls, video 
calls, and visits — and to obtain what amici curiae have 
described as necessary items from the commissary.  (See In re 
Humphrey (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1032, fn. 13.)  The 
provision of a minimum wage for detainee labor could 
ameliorate some of these burdens.  Yet the wage rate for county 
jail inmates laboring in the jail remains capped at a level set 
nearly 50 years ago.   
Plaintiffs recognize that they receive certain nonmonetary 
benefits by working at the jail.  According to the First Amended 
Complaint, “working in the kitchen means that plaintiffs can get 
out of their cells for some portion of the day, which is beneficial 
to their physical and mental health, and obtain additional food 
for their own enjoyment and nutrition.”  Detainees also receive 
worktime credits for their labor (see Pen. Code, § 4019, subd. 
(b)), but these credits end up providing no benefit to those 
detainees who are not ultimately convicted of an offense and 
punished with a term of incarceration.   
Defendants and their amici curiae acknowledge these 
concerns, although they also elaborate on other benefits 
nonconvicted incarcerated people may receive.  They explain 
that participation in voluntary work programs offers an 
opportunity to acquire job skills and training; facilitates post-
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
16 
incarceration employment and reduction of recidivism; and, in 
addition to defraying the costs of room and board, creates an 
incentive for good behavior, which affects the level of jail 
security.  Mandating a minimum wage, they argue, would 
increase the costs of these programs, potentially reducing work 
opportunities or diverting resources from other inmate 
programs.   
We acknowledge the policy concerns raised by the parties, 
their amici curiae, and others.6  Whether the result here, based 
on an interpretation of the current statutory scheme, “is a 
desirable policy is a matter beyond our purview, but it is not 
beyond the Legislature’s.  The Legislature can, if it sees fit, 
adjust” its approach to the payment of wages or wage credits for 
those awaiting adjudication of their cases as well as for 
convicted persons.  (Kaanaana, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 182 (conc. 
opn. of Kruger, J.).) 
Under the law as it currently stands, however, we 
conclude that nonconvicted incarcerated individuals performing 
services in county jails for a for-profit company to supply meals 
within the county jails and related custody facilities do not have 
a claim for minimum wages and overtime under Section 1194 of 
the California Labor Code, even in the absence of a local 
 
6  
The California Reparations Task Force (Gov. Code, former 
§ 8301 et seq.) has recommended that “the Legislature provide 
payment of the fair market value of the labor provided by 
incarcerated persons, whether they are in jail or prison.”  (Cal. 
Task Force to Study and Develop Reparation Proposals for 
African Americans, Final Report (2023) p. 645.)   
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
17 
ordinance prescribing or prohibiting the payment of wages for 
these individuals.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVANS, J. 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
7  
This is sufficient to answer the question posed by the 
Ninth Circuit.  We express no views as to whether a different 
rule would apply to nonconvicted incarcerated individuals 
working for a for-profit company outside the county jail. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Ruelas v. County of Alameda 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding  XX on request by 9th Circuit (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 8.548) 
Review Granted (published) 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S277120 
Date Filed:  April 22, 2024 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:   
County:   
Judge:   
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Covington & Burling, Cortlin H. Lannin, Isaac D. Chaput, Adam Z. 
Margulies, Eric C. Bosset and Kevin F. King for Defendant and 
Appellant Aramark Correctional Services, LLC. 
 
Hanson Bridgett, Paul B. Mello, Adam W. Hofmann, Samantha D. 
Wolff, Gilbert J. Tsai, Winston K. Hu and Gary A. Watt for Defendants 
and Appellants County of Alameda and Sheriff Gregory J. Ahern. 
 
Jennifer Bacon Henning for California State Association of Counties 
and California State Sheriffs’ Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Siegel, Yee, Brunner & Mehta, Dan Siegel, Anne Butterfield Weills, 
EmilyRose Johns and Sara Beladi for Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
Kyle Virgien; Summer Lacey; and Shilpi Agarwal for American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation, American Civil Liberties Union 
 
 
Foundation of Southern California, American Civil Liberties Union 
Foundation of Northern California, Fines and Fees Justice Center, 
Prison Law Office, Prison Policy Initiative, Roderick & Solange 
MacArthur Justice Center and Worth Rises as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
Bradan Litzinger, Molly Lao and Sabina Crocette for Legal Aid at 
Work, California Employment Lawyers Association, Communities 
United for Restorative Youth Justice, Impact Fund, National 
Employment Law Project and Root & Rebound as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
Kellie Walters for Legal Services for Prisoners with Children as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Dan Siegel 
Siegel, Yee, Brunner & Mehta 
475 14th Street, Suite 500 
Oakland, CA 94612 
(510) 839-1200 
 
Gary A. Watt 
Hanson Bridgett LLP 
425 Market Street, 26th Floor  
San Francisco, CA 94105 
(415) 777-3200 
 
Kevin F. King 
Covington & Burling LLP 
850 Tenth Street NW 
Washington, DC 20001 
(202) 662-5488