Title: State v. Crowdell

State: nebraska

Issuer: Nebraska Supreme Court

Document:

451 N.W.2d 695 (1990) 234 Neb. 469 STATE of Nebraska, Appellant, v. Robie D. CROWDELL, Appellee. STATE of Nebraska, Appellant, v. Michael CROWDELL, Appellee. Nos. 89-434, 89-435. Supreme Court of Nebraska. February 16, 1990. *696 Charles W. Campbell, York County Atty., York, for appellant. Kevin V. Schlender, York, for appellee Robie Crowdell. *697 Max C. Mankin, Aurora, for appellee Michael Crowdell. HASTINGS, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, WHITE, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, GRANT, and FAHRNBRUCH, JJ. SHANAHAN, Justice. In separate informations filed in the district court for York County, the State charged each of the defendants, Robie D. Crowdell and Michael Crowdell, with one count of intentional abuse of a minor child, John Jeffrey Crowdell. Intentional violation of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-707 (Reissue 1989) is a Class IV felony, which is punishable by maximum imprisonment for 5 years, a $10,000 fine, or both such imprisonment and fine. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-105(1) (Reissue 1985). Section 28-707 provides: Each of the Crowdells filed a motion to quash the information on the claim that § 28-707 is vague and, therefore, unconstitutional as a denial or deprivation of due process guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and Nebraska. See, U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Neb.Const. art. I, § 3. Concluding that the provisions of § 28-707(1)(a) and (c) were unconstitutionally vague, the district court sustained Crowdells' motions and quashed the information against each of them insofar as the prosecution was based on § 28-707(1)(a) and (c), which the court had found to be unconstitutional. The State appealed pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2315.01 (Reissue 1989) (county attorney's appeal from a decision in a criminal case). Alleged unconstitutionality of a statute presents a question of law, which must be determined by the Supreme Court independent from the conclusion reached by a trial court on the constitutional question. See, State ex rel. Spire v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 233 Neb. 262, 445 N.W.2d 284 (1989); Williams v. Gould, Inc., 232 Neb. 862, 443 N.W.2d 577 (1989). The State's exceptions are twofold. First, the State contends that Crowdells lack standing to attack the constitutionality of § 28-707(1)(a) and (c). Second, the State asserts that § 28-707(1)(a) and (c) are not void and unconstitutional as a denial or deprivation of a defendant's right to due process relative to a criminal statute which is the basis for prosecution of the defendant. State v. Monastero, 228 Neb. 818, 837-38, 424 N.W.2d 837, 849-50 (1988) (quoting from In re Estate of West, 226 Neb. 813, 415 N.W.2d 769 (1987)). See, also, State v. *698 Michalski, 221 Neb. 380, 377 N.W.2d 510 (1985); State v. Irwin, 208 Neb. 123, 302 N.W.2d 386 (1981). Both Crowdells face potential criminal liability as a consequence of conviction on the charges against them in the present proceedings. Thus, punishment for violation of the statute in question creates a direct threat to the liberty of Crowdells, who, therefore, have standing for a constitutional challenge based on the alleged vagueness of § 28-707(1)(a) and (c). Crowdells contend that the word "endangers" in § 28-707(1)(a) and the word "necessary" in § 28-707(1)(c) fail to define, with requisite constitutional definitude and sufficiency, the conduct sought to be prohibited by the statute, which thereby deprives them of notice necessary for due process in and from a criminal statute utilized for prosecution of a defendant. The State argues that the questioned language in § 28-707(1)(a) and (c) is easily understood by persons of ordinary intelligence and affords sufficient notice concerning the conduct condemned by the statute. "One claiming that a statute is unconstitutional has the burden to show that the questioned statute is unconstitutional." State ex rel. Spire v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 233 Neb. 262, 265, 445 N.W.2d 284, 288 (1989). Unconstitutionality of a statute must be clearly demonstrated before a court can declare the statute unconstitutional. State v. Copple, 224 Neb. 672, 401 N.W.2d 141 (1987). 224 Neb. at 684, 401 N.W.2d at 151 (quoting from State v. Neal, 187 Neb. 413, 191 N.W.2d 458 (1971)). An essential purpose of a penal statute is to provide notice to the ordinary person concerning conduct which is proscribed as criminal. State v. Carlson, 223 Neb. 874, 394 N.W.2d 669 (1986). Regarding a constitutional attack on a statute claimed to be vague, we have noted: The vice of vagueness in a penal statute was denounced in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983), by the U.S. Supreme Court's statement: "As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Citations omitted.] Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine `is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrinethe requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.' [Citation omitted.] Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit `a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.' [Citation omitted.]" 461 U.S. at 357-58, 103 S. Ct. at 1858-59. See, also, Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972). State v. Monastero, 228 Neb. 818, 833, 424 N.W.2d 837, 847 (1988). "[D]ue process requires that a penal statute supply adequate and fair notice of the conduct prohibited and also supply an explicit legislative standard defining the proscribed conduct, to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement at the discretion of law enforcement officials." 228 Neb. at 833, 424 N.W.2d at 847. A penal statute is given a strict construction which is sensible and prevents injustice or an absurd consequence. *699 Wounded Shield v. Gunter, 225 Neb. 327, 405 N.W.2d 9 (1987); State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 388 N.W.2d 801 (1986). When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, no judicial interpretation is needed to ascertain the statute's meaning so that, in the absence of a statutory indication to the contrary, words in a statute will be given their ordinary meaning. State v. Carlson, supra. Crowdells contend that § 28-707(1)(a) is facially vague because, regarding the life or health of a minor child protected by the statute, the meaning of the term "endangers" is not reasonably certain or sufficiently definite. The word "endangers" is not defined by § 28-707 or any other part of the Nebraska Criminal Code pertinent to the charges against Crowdells. However, "endanger" is defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 748 (1981) as "to bring into danger or peril of probable harm or loss: imperil or threaten danger to." " `[E]ndanger' means to expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize." Texas Dept. of Human Services v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.1987). Therefore, in § 28-707(1)(a), "endangers" means to expose a minor child's life or health to danger or the peril of probable harm or loss. As a matter of practicability for general application, child abuse statutes, by virtue of the nature of their subject matter and the nature of the conduct sought to be prohibited, usually contain broad and rather comprehensive language. In response to a challenge to a statute imposing criminal liability on one who " `causes or permits the life or limb of such child to be endangered,' " People v. Beaugez, 232 Cal. App. 2d 650, 655, 43 Cal. Rptr. 28, 32 (1965), the court observed: (Emphasis in original.) 232 Cal. App. 2d at 656-57, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 32-33. In State v. Fisher, 230 Kan. 192, 631 P.2d 239 (1981), the Supreme Court of Kansas, when confronted with a constitutional challenge to the Kansas child abuse statute which prohibited willfully "endangering a child," rejected a "vagueness" attack on the statute, concluding: 230 Kan. at 199-200, 631 P.2d at 246. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v. Mack, 467 Pa. 613, 359 A.2d 770 (1976), rejected a "facial vagueness" challenge to a child abuse statute which imposed criminal liability if one "knowingly endangers the welfare of [a] child" and stated: 359 A.2d at 772. Other courts which have held that the word "endanger," or similar language derived from "to endanger," in a child abuse statute withstands a constitutional attack for facial vagueness include the following: People v. Vandiver, 51 Ill. 2d 525, 283 N.E.2d 681 (1971) (a child abuse statute which contained "wilfully to cause or permit the life of [a] child to be endangered, or the health of [a] child to be injured, or wilfully cause or permit [a] child to be placed in such a situation that its life or health may be endangered," 51 Ill. 2d at 527, 283 N.E.2d at 682, "is not so vague as to constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of due process of law," 51 Ill. 2d at 530, 283 N.E.2d at 684); People v. Bergerson, 17 N.Y.2d 398, 218 N.E.2d 288, 271 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1966) (child abuse statute, "Wilfully causes or permits the life or limb of any child ... to be endangered, or its health to be injured," N.Y. Penal Law § 483 (McKinney 1944), was constitutional against a "vagueness challenge"); State v. Sammons, 58 Ohio St.2d 460, 391 N.E.2d 713 (1979) (child abuse statute which prohibited "endangering children" was not unconstitutionally vague); People v. Kailey, 662 P.2d 168 (Colo.1983) (child abuse statute prohibiting placement of a child "in a situation that endangers the child's life or health" was constitutional, 662 P.2d at 169 n. 1); State v. deBoucher, 135 Ariz. 220, 660 P.2d 471 (1982) (a child abuse statute which prohibited placing a child " `in a situation where its person or health is endangered' " was "sufficiently clear to allow members of society to comprehend their legal duty," 135 Ariz. at 227, 660 P.2d at 478); People v. Rogers, 104 Ill.App.3d 326, 60 Ill.Dec. 76, 432 N.E.2d 975 (1982); and State v. Coe, 92 N.M. 320, 587 P.2d 973 (1978). Michael Crowdell directs us to State v. Meinert, 225 Kan. 816, 594 P.2d 232 (1979), and states that the Supreme Court of Kansas, in Meinert, held that "the language `endangering of life' is too indefinite to pass constitutional muster." Brief for appellee Michael Crowdell at 7. We have examined the Meinert opinion and find no such conclusion by the Kansas Supreme Court. Rather, the court concluded that the phrase "unjustifiable physical pain" was too vague and uncertain to establish a reasonably definite standard for determination of criminal guilt in accordance with due process. Consequently, we conclude that the word "endangers," used in § 28-707(1)(a), has an easily and commonly understood meaning and is not vague. For that reason, § 28-707(1)(a) supplies sufficient notice concerning the criminal conduct prohibited by the statute and is in accordance with due process. Crowdells also contend that the word "necessary," used in § 28-707(1)(c) regarding deprivation of food, clothing, shelter, or care, is too vague and uncertain to comport with the due process requirement of notice pertaining to conduct proscribed by a penal statute. "Necessary" is *701 defined as "1a ... items (as of food, clothing, shelter, medical care, equipment or furnishing) that cannot be done without: things that must be had (as for the preservation and reasonable enjoyment of life)... 2: that cannot be done without: that must be done or had: absolutely required." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 1510-11 (1981). In a challenge to the phrase "necessary sustenance" in a child abuse statute, the Supreme Court of Georgia defined that phrase: " `Sustenance is "that which supports life; food; victuals; provisions;" ... Our statute, in the use of the word "sustenance," means that necessary food and drink which is sufficient to support life and maintain health.' " Caby v. State, 249 Ga. 32, 33, 287 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1982) (quoting from Justice v. The State, 116 Ga. 605, 42 S.E. 1013 (1902)). Consequently, in relation to a child's sustenance, the Georgia court held that the word "necessary" in the Georgia child abuse statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Also, in State v. Joyce, 361 So. 2d 406, 407 (1978), the Supreme Court of Florida found no merit in the contention that "necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment," contained in a Florida child abuse statute, was constitutionally defective from the standpoint of notice required for due process. In a similar manner, the Supreme Court of Washington, in State v. Brown, 52 Wash. 2d 92, 323 P.2d 239 (1958), examined the word "necessary" in a Washington child abuse statute which punished the willful failure to provide " `necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical attendance' " to a child. 52 Wash. 2d at 94, 323 P.2d at 241. The Washington court stated that "the word necessary, as used in such statutes, relates to the minimum standard of the quality and quantity of food, clothing, shelter, and medical attendance" for a child protected by the Washington child abuse statute. Id. Robie Crowdell asserts that "necessary" in § 28-707(1)(c) is not subject to a reasonably uniform application and asserts: Brief for appellee Robie Crowdell at 9. The socioeconomic approach, suggested by Robie Crowdell, was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Sammons, 58 Ohio St.2d 460, 462-63, 391 N.E.2d 713, 714-15 (1979), when the court stated: We, too, reject the contention that potential socioeconomic differences render the statute constitutionally infirm. We find that the word "necessary," relative to the condemned deprivation of food, clothing, shelter, or care in § 28-707(1)(c), *702 is a word with an ordinary meaning which supplies a constitutionally sufficient standard based on common usage and understanding. Therefore, § 28-707(1)(c) is not void for vagueness and is constitutional. For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the State's exceptions, reverse the district court's judgments, and remand these causes for further proceedings. EXCEPTIONS SUSTAINED, AND CAUSES REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.