Title: Coughlin v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Coughlin v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3867.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-3867 
THE STATE EX REL. COUGHLIN v. SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Coughlin v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3867.] 
Mandamus—Writ to compel board of elections to place a name on general-
election ballot for municipal clerk of court—Candidate on nonpartisan 
ballot is not required to disaffiliate from party—Writ granted. 
(No. 2013-1264—Submitted August 30, 2013—Decided September 9, 2013.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an expedited election action by relator, Kevin J. Coughlin, 
for a writ of mandamus to compel respondent, the Summit County Board of 
Elections, to place his name on the November 5, 2013 ballot as a candidate for 
Stow Municipal Court clerk of courts.  Because the board disregarded clearly 
established law by refusing to place Coughlin’s name on the ballot, we grant the 
writ. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Facts 
{¶ 2} On May 6, 2013, one day before the primary, Coughlin filed a 
nominating petition to run for the office of clerk of courts for the Stow Municipal 
Court in the November 5, 2013 general election.  The parties agree that Coughlin 
is a qualified elector and satisfies the statutory requirements to run for the Stow 
Municipal Court clerkship. 
{¶ 3} On July 11, 2013, an elector named Donald Nelsch filed a protest 
against Coughlin’s nominating petition.  The protest letter challenged Coughlin’s 
ability to run as either a nonpartisan or independent candidate by setting out 
Coughlin’s long history of association with the Republican Party.  The letter 
alleged that Coughlin had taken no steps to disaffiliate from the Republican Party 
before submitting his nominating petition. 
{¶ 4} Coughlin responded in writing and at the board’s July 15, 2013 
protest hearing.  Coughlin argued that he was running as a nonpartisan candidate, 
not an independent candidate, and that the requirement of disaffiliation applies 
only to independent candidates. 
{¶ 5} At the close of the hearing, the board voted unanimously to sustain 
the protest and deny Coughlin’s petition. 
{¶ 6} Coughlin commenced this expedited election action for writ of 
mandamus on August 8, 2013, to compel the board to place his name on the 
general election nonpartisan ballot.  The board has filed an answer, and the parties 
have filed briefs under the accelerated schedule in S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08(A). 
{¶ 7} This cause is now before the court for consideration of the merits. 
Analysis 
Preliminary matters 
{¶ 8} At the outset, we reject the board’s claim that this action is barred 
by laches.  Laches may bar relief in an election-related matter if the person 
seeking relief fails to act with “ ‘requisite diligence.’ ”  State ex rel. Voters First 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
v. Ohio Ballot Bd., 133 Ohio St.3d 257, 2012-Ohio-4149, 978 N.E.2d 119, ¶ 16, 
quoting Smith v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections, 123 Ohio St.3d 467, 2009-Ohio-
5866, 918 N.E.2d 131, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 9} “The elements of laches are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time 
in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual 
or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party.”  State 
ex rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 74 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 656 
N.E.2d 1277 (1995). 
{¶ 10} The board of elections denied Coughlin’s petition on July 15, 
2013.  According to the board, an audiotape of the proceedings was available to 
Coughlin by July 23, 2013, and a written transcript was available by August 2, 
2013.  The board alleges that Coughlin did not act diligently because he did not 
file suit until August 8, 2013. 
{¶ 11} The board claims that it has suffered prejudice as a result of 
Coughlin’s delay because August 8, 2013, was less than 90 days from the 
November 5, 2013 election, so the case fell under the expedited election 
provisions of Sup.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08.  This court has held that the element of 
prejudice is satisfied where the delay causes the case to become an expedited 
election case, which restricts the time the board of elections has to prepare and 
defend the case.  State ex rel. Willke v. Taft, 107 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5303, 
836 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 12} However, the board’s own evidence demonstrates that Coughlin 
did act diligently.  He made a public-records request for a transcript of the board 
hearing on July 16, 2013, the day after the hearing.  The board did not notify 
Coughlin that the transcript was ready until August 1, 2013.  He picked up the 
transcript the next day, Friday, August 2, 2013, and filed his complaint four 
business days later. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 13} Although the board characterizes Coughlin’s actions as a three-
week delay, most of that delay is attributable to the board.  Even in the elections 
context, a delay in filing may be reasonable when a relator is diligently trying to 
obtain documents from a board of elections.  State ex rel. Owens v. Brunner, 125 
Ohio St.3d 130, 2010-Ohio-1374, 926 N.E.2d 617, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 14} The chronology of events does not demonstrate a deliberate plan to 
delay filing until less than 90 days before the election.  Rather, the timing of the 
complaint was dictated by the board of elections, which took more than two 
weeks to provide the necessary transcript.  To the extent the board now claims it 
has been prejudiced, it must bear much of the responsibility for that delay. 
{¶ 15} Laches does not bar this claim.  Coughlin acted with diligence by 
promptly demanding a certified transcript and filing suit five business days after 
the transcript become available.  This result is consistent with the “ ‘fundamental 
tenet of judicial review in Ohio,’ ” which is “ ‘that courts should decide cases on 
their merits.’ ”  Voters First, 133 Ohio St.3d 257, 2012-Ohio-4149, 978 N.E.2d 
119, ¶ 21, quoting State ex rel. Becker v. Eastlake, 93 Ohio St.3d 502, 505, 756 
N.E.2d 1228 (2001). 
{¶ 16} We likewise reject the board’s assertion that Coughlin’s claim is 
barred by unclean hands.  The doctrine of unclean hands requires a showing that 
the party seeking relief engaged in reprehensible conduct with respect to the 
subject matter of the action.  Goldberger v. Bexley Properties, 5 Ohio St.3d 82, 
84-85, 448 N.E.2d 1380 (1983).  The board argues that Coughlin should not be 
able to take advantage of legislation he drafted while serving in the General 
Assembly.  We reject the board’s argument that it is reprehensible conduct for 
Coughlin to rely on a duly enacted statute in later litigation. 
Mandamus 
{¶ 17} For a writ of mandamus to issue, Coughlin must establish a clear 
legal right to have his name placed on the November 5, 2013 ballot, a 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the board of elections and its 
members to place his name on the ballot, and the lack of an adequate remedy at 
law.  State ex rel. Allen v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 186, 
2007-Ohio-4752, 874 N.E.2d 507, ¶ 8.  Coughlin must prove these requirements 
by clear and convincing evidence.  State ex rel. Orange Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. 
Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 135 Ohio St.3d 162, 2013-Ohio-36, 985 N.E.2d 
441, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 18} Because of the proximity of the November 5 election, and 
specifically the September 21, 2013 deadline for finalizing UOCAVA ballots,1 
Coughlin has established that he lacks a remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  
State ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-
1845, 928 N.E.2d 410, ¶ 27. 
Clear Legal Right and Clear Legal Duty 
{¶ 19} Coughlin claims the board disregarded applicable law by refusing 
to place his name on the November 5, 2013 nonpartisan ballot for municipal court 
clerk. 
{¶ 20} R.C. 1901.31 sets forth the duties of a municipal court clerk  and 
the manner by which candidates are nominated and elected.  In most jurisdictions, 
including Stow, candidates for the office of clerk of courts must be nominated and 
elected in the same manner as provided in R.C. 1901.07 for the nomination and 
election of municipal court judges.  R.C. 1901.31(A)(1)(a). 
{¶ 21} Candidates for municipal court judge must appear on a nonpartisan 
ballot in the general election.  R.C. 1901.07(A).  Thus, by operation of R.C. 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to R.C. 3511.04(B), the board of elections must begin providing absent voter ballots 
upon request to certain uniformed service members, their families, and other citizens under the 
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voters Act (“UOCAVA”) no later than 45 days before 
the general election. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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1901.31(A)(1)(a), the names of candidates for municipal clerk of courts must also 
appear on a nonpartisan ballot in a general election. 
{¶ 22} Candidates for municipal court or clerk of courts may be 
nominated in one of two ways: either by nominating petition or by primary 
election.  R.C. 1901.07(B).  Each method has a different filing deadline.  
Candidates seeking nomination through primary election must file declarations of 
candidacy and petitions no later than the 90th day before the primary election.  Id.  
Candidates seeking nomination by way of nominating petitions must file their 
nominating petitions no later than the day before the primary.  Id.  Coughlin 
employed the latter deadline. 
{¶ 23} The Nelsch protest letter argued that Coughlin could not in good 
faith hold himself out as an independent or nonpartisan because he had not ceased 
conducting himself as a Republican.  Nelsch alleged that Coughlin was merely 
trying to avoid running in the Republican primary.  The board of elections 
sustained the protest and denied Coughlin’s petitions. 
{¶ 24} We begin by discussing the difference between nonpartisan and 
independent.  These two terms are not synonymous. 
{¶ 25} R.C. 3505.04 provides that the names of nonpartisan candidates for 
election to certain offices, including judicial office, shall be printed on a portion 
of the ballot designated as the “nonpartisan ballot.”  Political-party designations 
are not permitted on the nonpartisan ballot.  R.C. 3505.04, eighth paragraph.  A 
“nonpartisan” candidate is simply any candidate whose name is required by R.C. 
3505.04 to be listed on the nonpartisan ballot.  R.C. 3501.01(J). 
{¶ 26} The Revised Code defines an “independent” candidate as “any 
candidate who claims not to be affiliated with a political party, and whose name 
has been certified on the office-type ballot at a general or special election through 
the filing of a statement of candidacy and nominating petition, as prescribed in 
section 3513.257 of the Revised Code.”  R.C. 3501.01(I).  If an affiliated 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
candidate wishes to run as an independent, the candidate must disaffiliate in good 
faith from his or her political party.  Morrison v. Colley, 467 F.3d 503 (6th 
Cir.2006). 
{¶ 27} Unlike independent candidates, candidates for nonpartisan office 
are not required to disaffiliate from political parties.  State ex rel. Allen v. Warren 
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 186, 2007-Ohio-4752, 874 N.E.2d 507, 
¶ 18. 
{¶ 28} In simple terms, “nonpartisan” describes an office, a ballot, or a 
race, nonaffiliation (i.e., being an independent) is a characteristic of candidates, 
and party affiliation is a characteristic of candidates and voters.2 
{¶ 29} R.C. 3501.01(I) requires independent candidates to meet the 
requirements for nominating petitions in R.C. 3513.257.  R.C. 3513.257 contains 
requirements such as the number of valid signatures necessary on a qualifying 
petition and the location where petitions are to be filed. 
{¶ 30} Petitions submitted by candidates for municipal court judge must 
also meet the requirements of R.C. 3513.257.  R.C. 1901.07(B).  And therefore, 
by operation of R.C. 1901.31(A)(1)(a), candidates for clerk of court must also 
meet these requirements. 
{¶ 31} Thus, the board argues, since R.C. 3513.257 governs the petitions 
of independent candidates, who must disaffiliate in order to run, and since 
candidates for clerk must also satisfy R.C. 3513.257, it follows that clerk 
candidates must be disaffiliated independents. 
                                                 
2 A voter cannot register as an independent, except in the negative sense of not voting in partisan 
primaries or signing partisan nominating petitions.  The Revised Code contains no provision for 
declaring party affiliation when one registers to vote, State ex rel. Young v. Gasser, 21 Ohio St.2d 
253, 255, 257 N.E.2d 389 (1970), and the registration forms do not contain a space for that 
information.  Rather, party affiliation or membership is “that which [the voter] desires it to be 
from time to time.”  Id. at 257.  Essentially, being “registered” as a Republican or Democrat 
means nothing more than voting in that party’s primary, because the local boards of elections keep 
records of that information.   
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 32} However, R.C. 3513.257 does not create the disaffiliation 
requirement.  The obligation of independents to disaffiliate exists as part of the 
statutory definition of an independent in R.C. 3501.01(I).  There is no provision in 
the Revised Code extending that disaffiliation requirement to candidates for 
nonpartisan office. 
 
Although under R.C. 1901.07(B) nonpartisan candidates 
for municipal court judge must have their petitions “conform to the 
requirements provided for those petitions of candidacy contained 
in section 3513.257 of the Revised Code,” which governs petition 
requirements for independent candidates, nothing in R.C. 3513.257 
requires that nonpartisan candidates be unaffiliated or disaffiliated 
from a political party. 
 
Allen, 115 Ohio St.3d 186, 2007-Ohio-4752, 874 N.E.2d 507, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 33} As this court recognized in Allen, the fact that a candidate must 
follow the same petition procedures as an independent candidate does not mean 
the candidate is an independent. 
{¶ 34} Therefore, based on Allen, the board of elections erred when it 
sustained the protest against Coughlin’s declaration of candidacy. 
{¶ 35} The 
board 
disputes 
Coughlin’s 
contention 
that 
R.C. 
1901.31(A)(1)(a) makes the procedures for nominating and electing clerks of 
court the same in all respects as those for nominating and electing municipal 
judges.  However, the board does not explain which procedures in R.C. 1901.07 
are applicable to clerk candidates, which aspects are not applicable, and why.  
And specifically, the board does not explain why the two methods of nomination, 
and their respective deadlines, are not part of the “manner” of nominating 
municipal judges. 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
{¶ 36} The Summit County Board of Elections disregarded clearly 
established law when it concluded that Coughlin had to disaffiliate or else seek 
nomination through a partisan primary and that therefore his nominating petition 
was untimely.  For this reason, Coughlin has a clear legal right to have his name 
on the ballot, the board has a clear legal duty to place his name on the ballot, and, 
given the proximity of the election, Coughlin has no adequate remedy at law. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 37} Based on the foregoing, Coughlin has established his entitlement to 
the requested extraordinary relief.  We grant a writ of mandamus to compel the 
Summit County Board of Elections to place his name on the November 5, 2013 
nonpartisan ballot as a candidate for Stow Municipal Court Clerk of Courts. 
Writ granted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
____________________ 
Donald S. Varian Jr., for relator. 
Sherry Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, John F. 
Galonski, Deputy Chief, Civil Division, and Joseph M. Fantozzi, Chief Assistant 
Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
________________________