Title: STATE ex. rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASS'N v. HEINEN

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

STATE ex. rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASS'N v. HEINEN  STATE ex. rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASS'N v. HEINEN 2002 OK 81 60 P.3d 1018 Case Number: SCBD-4757 Decided: 10/22/2002 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION, Complainant, v. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE ¶0 This matter was brought by the Bar Association to impose professional discipline on Respondent after his resignation in lieu of disciplinary action was approved by the Texas Supreme Court. Notice of the proceeding was provided to respondent and he responded. We hold that the record of the resignation proceeding is sufficient to show professional misconduct by the respondent. That fact of the misconduct conclusively established by the Texas resignation proceeding need not be relitigated in an Oklahoma evidentiary hearing. The proceeding is remanded to the Professional Responsibility Tribunal for a recommendation on the appropriate discipline. PROCEEDING REMANDED TO THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TRIBUNAL Mike Speegle, Oklahoma Bar Association, Oklahoma City, for Complainant Gary A. Rife and Janice M. Dansby, Rife & Walters, Oklahoma City, for Respondent. SUMMERS, J. ¶1 Respondent was licensed to practice law in the State of Texas. In that State a proceeding to impose professional discipline was commenced, and he later requested that Supreme Court of Texas accept his resignation as attorney and counselor at law. The Texas court accepted the resignation. In the Matter of Timothy William Heinen, Misc. Docket No. 01-9044, (Texas Sup. Ct., March 22, 2001). ¶2 The Oklahoma Bar Association filed an application with this Court to impose professional discipline upon Respondent because of his resignation pending discipline in Texas. We issued an order to Respondent to show cause why discipline should not be imposed. ¶3 Respondent argues that discipline should not be imposed, and argues: 1. That he denies the allegations of misconduct of which he was accused in Texas; 2. No evidentiary hearing was made on the Texas allegations, and they "are not supported by the evidence;" 3.The Texas order does not furnish sufficient grounds for discipline under the Oklahoma rule; 4. The Texas proceeding was the first disciplinary proceeding Respondent had been subject to; 5. He paid his Texas client the amount of the disputed funds; and 6. There has been no "adjudication" of misconduct by the Texas Court. He further argues that disbarment in Oklahoma is not warranted, that the order of the Supreme Court of Texas has no preclusive effect, and that this matter should be referred to a panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal for an adversarial hearing. ¶4 The Bar seeks to impose discipline against Heinen in this Court pursuant to Rule 7.7 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings. That rule provides that a lawyer may be professionally disciplined by this Court because of the lawyer's professional discipline by the highest court of another state or a federal court. ¶5 Application of Oklahoma Disciplinary Rule 7.7 requires the respondent to have been "adjudged guilty of a misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding." Was the respondent adjudged guilty of a misconduct? He argues that the Texas proceeding did not adjudicate a claim of professional misconduct, but that it was a mere judicial acceptance of a resignation, and in the nature of a judgment by consent of the parties. [60 P.3d 1019] I. Sufficiency of the Texas Adjudication to Serve as Basis for Discipline ¶6 We are invited by Heinen to view the order of the Supreme Court of Texas as a consent judgment, and to determine its preclusive effect based upon that status. He argues that the estoppel effect of such judgments is based upon the intent of the parties, and that he did not have the intent for his resignation in Texas to determine issues in an Oklahoma disciplinary proceeding. ¶7 We need not discuss consent judgments and when they may, or may not, be used for claim or issue preclusion. ¶8 The Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure provide that after a respondent has submitted a motion for resignation in lieu of disciplinary action, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel files a response that includes a detailed statement of the lawyer's misconduct, and if that lawyer does not then withdraw his motion, the detailed statement of Professional Misconduct is deemed to have been conclusively established for all purposes. The Chief Disciplinary Counsel shall, within twenty days after service upon him or her of a motion for resignation in lieu of Disciplinary Action, file a response on behalf of the State Bar (acting through the Commission) stating whether the acceptance of the resignation is in the best interest of the public and the profession and setting forth a detailed statement of the Professional Misconduct with which the movant is charged. The movant may, within ten days after service of such response, withdraw the motion. If a motion to withdraw is not timely filed, the detailed statement of Professional Misconduct shall be deemed to have been conclusively established for all purposes. (Emphasis added.) Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, Rule10.02, reprinted in, Tex. Gov't Code, tit. 2, subtit. G app. A-1, (Vernon 1998). ¶9 In our case today the order of the Texas Supreme Court canceled respondent's bar license, and in accepting his resignation stated that "the Court considers the detailed statement of professional misconduct contained within the Response of Chief Disciplinary Counsel to be deemed conclusively established for all purposes." In the Matter of Timothy William Heinen, Misc. Docket No. 01-9044, Slip Op. at p. 1. (Tex. Sup.Ct., March 22, 2001). That response is part of the record in this proceeding, and it contains the following: Complainant [client] hired Respondent [Heinen] in November 1994 to negotiate a settlement for injuries Complainant sustained in an automobile accident. Respondent subsequently negotiated a settlement with the insurance company but failed to notify Complainant [client] or Complainant's medical providers of the settlement. Respondent endorsed the check on behalf of himself and Complainant [client] and cashed the check at Respondent's bank. Respondent failed to place the settlement proceeds in his trust account, failed to provide Complainant [client] with a settlement sheet showing the amount of the settlement and the disbursements to be made from the settlement proceeds, failed to disburse to Complainant [client] the portion of the settlement proceeds belonging to Complainant [client], and failed to [60 P.3d 1020]disburse to Complainant's [client's] medical providers the share of proceeds belonging to the providers. Respondent kept the settlement funds for his personal use. Response of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, at 1-2. ¶10 The Texas Supreme Court treated the statement of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel as a stipulation or admission by Heinen due to his failure to withdraw his motion for resignation after the statement was filed. Texas jurisprudence recognizes a stipulation of fact on the record to be an agreement, admission, or concession made in a judicial proceeding, and if not modified by the trial court, binding upon the party making the stipulation, as well as any appellate court reviewing the record. ¶11 Heinen also argues that the Texas court deemed the facts to be conclusively established, and that this judicial act of deeming is something less than an actual adjudication of those facts so as to weaken the language stating that the misconduct was conclusively established. This argument is without merit. The use of the word "deem" in Heinen's order is consistent with how courts in Texas describe stipulations and admissions in civil proceedings. ¶12 Heinen argues that he did not possess an opportunity and incentive to litigate the disciplinary proceeding in the Texas court because he had decided to longer practice law in Texas. Our use of the fact of Heinen's misconduct as established by a Texas court must be based upon Heinen having possessed a full and fair opportunity to litigate that question in the Texas court. See, Nealis v. Baird, ¶13 At the time of the Texas proceedings, February 2001, Oklahoma had a reciprocal disciplinary rule on its law books. See 5 O.S.Ann. Ch. 12, App. 1-A, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, Rule 7.7 , showing the reciprocal disciplinary rule in the form it has existed since 1992. Further, this Court has published bar disciplinary opinions that involve reciprocal discipline. ¶14 In Texas "sanctions" are imposed for "professional misconduct" of an attorney. ¶15 Finally, in State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Bransgrove, II. The Appropriate Discipline ¶16 Heinen requests that we remand the matter to the Professional Responsibility Tribunal (PRT) for an adversarial proceeding. He requests a hearing for an exploration of his conduct and an opportunity to raise defenses and explanations. He further claims an opportunity "to refute Valencia's [his client's] allegations in an adversary proceeding before the Professional Responsibility Tribunal." ¶17 Rule 7.7 (b) expressly provides that a respondent may submit a certified copy of [60 P.3d 1022] the transcript of evidence of the trial tribunal from the other jurisdiction. A respondent may also submit a brief and any evidence for the purpose of mitigating the degree of discipline. Heinen's request for a remand may be construed, in part, as an opportunity to submit such evidence. ¶18 We remand the matter to the PRT, but not for an inquiry into whether Heinen committed professional misconduct. In State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Patterson, III. Interim Suspension and Conclusion ¶19 The Bar Association requests that the Court impose an interim suspension upon Heinen in the event we remand the matter to the PRT. This Court has imposed interim suspensions. See, e.g., State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Gasaway, ¶20 The Bar Association's request for an interim suspension does not contain any allegations relating to Heinen's current practice of law in Oklahoma, and thus contains no allegations that his conduct imposes an immediate threat of substantial and irreparable public harm. The request of the Bar Association to impose an interim suspension upon Heinen is denied. ¶21 The proceeding is remanded to the Professional Responsibility Tribunal for the purpose of a hearing on the issue of the appropriate discipline to be imposed in this matter. The PRT shall file with this Court a report with its recommendation for discipline. ¶22 HARGRAVE, HODGES, LAVENDER, KAUGER, SUMMERS, BOUDREAU, WINCHESTER, JJ. - Concur ¶23 WATT, V.C.J., OPALA, J. - Concur in result [ 60 P.3d 1024 ] FOOT